[Lc]

Georg Gaupp-Berghausen

Enviado especial de Austria para asuntos culturales

Vicepresidente del ICER
(Instituto Costarricense de Enseñanza Radiofónica)

Miembro de la Junta Directiva del IGER
(Instituto privado Guatemalteco de Educación a través de la Radio) Guatemala

San Pedro, Montes de Oca
Apartado 132
San José, Costa Rica
Teléfonos: 252137 y 243783

Vertretung in Europa:
Institut zur Förderung
der Erwachsenenbildung
in Iberoamerika, Vaduz
Sekretariat:
Armin Kloser
Südtirolerplatz 9
A-6971 Hard
Telefon: 05574/365813

Seite 2

amerika", ausserdem noch eine Kopie eines Interviews im österr.
Profil. Für eine kurze Bestätigung dieses Briefes mit eventuellem
Terminvorschlag für eine Zusammenkunft wäre ich Ihnen im Interesse
der Sache sehr dankbar.

Meine Adresse in Europa: Institut zur Förderung der Erwachsenenbildung in Iberoamerika, Vaduz
Postfach 657
FL-9490 Vaduz
Fürstentum Liechtenstein

(Ueber unsere Tätigkeit ist im übrigen Senator Claiborne Pell
bestens informiert, da er mit der Familie Liechtenstein besonders
freundschaftlichen Kontakt hat.)

In der Hoffnung Sie jetzt vielleicht doch wiederzusehen bin ich

mit den aufrichtigsten und herzlichsten
Grüssen Ihr

## Georg Gaupp-Berghausen

Vicepresidente del ICER
(Instituto Costarricense de Enseñanza Radiofonica)

Vertretung in Europa:
Institut zur Förderung
der Erwachsenenbildung
in Iberoamerika, Vaduz
Sekretariat:
Armin Kloser
Sudtirolerplatz 9
A-6971 Hard
Telefon: 05574/365813

23. Mai 1983

## Betrifft: Entwicklungsprogramm Karibik und Zentralamerika

### Stellungnahme:

Im allgemeinen wäre eine derartige Initiative des Bundestages äußerst zu begrüßen. Man darf eben nicht außer Acht lassen, daß die Entwicklung in Zentralamerika und in der Karibik den interessierten Weltmächten leicht aus den Händen gleiten könnte. Dies könnte in der Folge zu einem Krisenherd führen, ähnlich dem im Nahen Osten. (Siehe Entwicklung in Nicaragua, wo sich die Weltmächte plötzlich direkt konfrontiert sehen könnten und nicht mehr ihre Stellvertreter bzw. Stellvertreter der Stellvertreter).

Außerdem sind vielleicht folgende Punkte noch zu beachten:

1. Die Karibik und Zentralamerika müssen unbedingt getrennt betrachtet und behandelt werden. Die Bevölkerung der Karibik ist mehrheitlich afrikanischer Herkunft (z. B. in Kuba über 60 %, daher auch leichter erklärlich ihr Engagement in Angola und Mozambique gegen die Kolonialherren, die ihre Ahnen als Sklaven in die Karibik verschleppt haben). Zentralamerika dagegen ist mehrheitlich indianischen Ursprungs (in Guatemala bis 80 %). Der afrikanische Einfluß an der Atlantikküste Zentralamerikas hingegen ist gering mit Ausnahme von Belize, das auch durch seine Mitgliedschaft im Commenwealth mehr zur Karibik gerechnet werden muß.

Diese Verschiedenheit zwischen der Karibik und Zentralamerika hat auch ihren starken Einfluß auf die politischen Verhältnisse. Der unterdrückte Afrikaner wie auch der "befreite" Afrikaner (siehe Kuba) ist mentalitätsmäßig (da ja entwurzelt und nicht mehr in Stammesgemeinschaft lebend) marxistisch-leninistischen Indoktrinationen zugänglich. Die Indios dagegen, als die eigentlichen Herren in ihren

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Ländern und Erben einer Jahrtausende alten Kultur, die zu Zeiten der Inkas, Mayas und Azteken wie auch schon Jahrtausende vorher (durch die Überlieferungen der Hopis in Kalifornien in den letzten Jahren erst bekannt geworden) Formen des menschlichen Zusammenlebens hatten, die unseren europäischen demokratischen und volksdemokratischen bei weitem überlegen waren und sind, so-lange sie in ihrer Kultur und Stammesverband leben können. Hier droht nun nach der militärischen und wirtschaftlichen Eroberung Amerikas den letzten indianischen Reservaten und Gebieten auch die Kulturelle (siehe mein Bericht über Informationsdienst für Indioamerika).

2. Dieser Situation in der Karibik wie in Zentralamerika muß man bei allen Hilfen Rechnung tragen, die man diesen Gebieten zukommen lassen will. Bisher hat man meistens nur den sichtbaren politischen Institutionen Gehör geschenkt und sich nie die Mühe genommen mit den Vertretern der eigentlichen Herren dieser Länder Kontakt aufzunehmen. Es wäre daher äußerst wichtig und für die weitere Entwicklung dieser Region von großer Bedeutung, wenn man einmal die Frage der Hilfe an diese Menschen vom Blickpunkt eines "Indioamerikas" betrachtet und hier die Hilfe dort ansetzen würde, wo diesen Menschen in ihrer Kultur, in ihrer wirtschaftlichen Infrastruktur geholfen werden kann. Diese weiterzuentwickeln würde ihnen helfen und sie von ihrem, immer mehr aussichtslos erscheinenden Dasein am Rande der Gesellschaft, befreien. Natürlich müßte Europa und die Industrienationen auf vorübergehende geschäftliche Interessen und Gewinne verzichten, dafür aber vielleicht in Zukunft einen echten Partner haben.

3. Erste konkrete Hilfen:

Herstellung von Verbindungen und Kontakten seitens der unterstützenden europäischen Länder und Institutionen mit den Indio-Verbänden, -Vertretern und -Institutionen dieser Länder.

Dazu könnte die Schaffung eines Studienzentrums für Indioamerika eventuell im Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft oder des Europarates dienen. Federführend sollten hiebei Länder sein, die keine koloniale Vergangenheit haben (zumindest nicht in dieser Region). Vielleicht wäre zu überlegen, so ein Studienzentrum zuerst in den deutschsprachigen Ländern BRD, Österreich und Schweiz mit Liech-

[LJ]

3

tenstein durchzuführen. Die primäre Aufgabe eines Studienzentrums wäre eine
zweiseitige:

a) Information über die derzeitige Situation der Indios und die Vermittlung ihrer Kultur und ihres Wissens nach und in Europa

b) Erarbeitung einer Studie mit einem Konzept für die Durchführung über Art und Umfang der jeweiligen Hilfe aus Europa, die zur Erhaltung der eigenständigen wirtschaftlichen Infrastruktur und kulturellen Entwicklung der Indios in Zentralamerika beitragen könnte.

Mai 1983

INFORMATIONSDIENST FÜR INDIOAMERIKA (IIA)

Einführung:

Als Indioamerika kann man fast alle Länder südlich des Rio Grande bezeichnen bis auf die drei südlichen Länder (Chile, Uruguay und Argentinien), die heute bereits einen mehr europäischen Charakter auch in der Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung angenommen haben.

In allen anderen Ländern leben entweder noch große oder kleine Gruppen von Indios in Stammesgemeinschaften und eigenen Kulturen und Sprachen oder sind so vermischt, daß das indianische Element immer noch stark zum Ausdruck kommt. Immerhin sind es noch weit über 60 Millionen reine Indios, die Indioamerika bevölkern.

Sie sind aber nicht die Herren in diesen Ländern, sondern eine Oberschicht aus Weißen und Mestizen, die ihnen eine fremde Zivilisation bzw. Kultur übergestülpt haben, unter der die eigene Kultur und Tradition nur ein Schattendasein führen kann.

Seit der sogenannten Entdeckung Amerikas durch Columbus wurde die militärische und wirtschaftliche Eroberung dieses Kontinents durch Europa herbeigeführt. Die endgültige kulturelle Eroberung droht nun den letzten in Reservaten bzw. in die Berge oder Urwälder abgedrängten Indiostämmen. Die westliche Zivilisation dringt durch Straßenbau, Öl- und Mineralsuche, wie mittels Radio in die letzten, bisher unberührten Winkel dieser Länder.

In den letzten Jahren begannen sich aber die Indios nach westlichen Modellen zu organisieren. Eingeborenenvereine auf nationaler, regionaler Ebene wie in Costa Rica, Mittelamerika und Südamerika, auch in USA und Kanada. In USA gibt es aber nur mehr ca. 800.000 in Reservaten lebende Indios, während der Verein der Mestizen über 60 Millionen Mitglieder haben könnte.

Die reinen Eingeborenenvereine haben sich auf Weltebene zu einem Weltrat zusammengeschlossen, dem u. a. auch die Lappen Nordeuropas, die Australier und Ureinwohner Indiens angehören. Der Präsident dieses Weltrates ist

2

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ein costarrizensischer Indio aus Boruca (einer Indioreservation, wo wir einen regionalen Kultursender errichtet haben, den die Indios selbst betreiben) mit Namen José Carlos Morales.

Die verschiedenen nationalen wie regionalen Vereine beginnen Informationsdienste herauszugeben, die über alles was die Lage und die Entwicklung der indianischen Bevölkerung betrifft, berichten. Auch die costarrizensche Vereinigung der Indios gibt seit diesem Jahr erstmalig ein Informationsblatt heraus. In all diesen Informationsdiensten werden die den bestehenden Gesetzen meist zuwiderlaufenden Unterdrückungen, Landwegnahmen, Vertreibungen etc. offen dargelegt und geben ein beredtes Zeugnis darüber, daß fast noch in allen Ländern die Indios rechtlos sind.

Im folgenden ein Auszug aus einer Erklärung des Indiovereines "Pablo Presbere" von Costa Rica:

"Wir Indios lieben die Freiheit und die Unabhängigkeit unseres Volkes und unser Verein verpflichtet sich die Einhaltung unserer Rechte zu überwachen, sowie die seitens verschiedener Strömungen ausgesprochene Bedrohung der Landwegnahme zurückzuweisen.

Wir verpflichten uns auch auf internationaler Ebene mit indianischen Bruderbewegungen zu solidarisieren und deren Forde rungen für ihre Volksgruppen zu unterstützen.

Für viele ist die Kolonisierung noch nicht beendet und wir sehen uns ständig bedroht. Unsere eigenständige Kultur soll sich in einem ständigen Austausch mit anderen bereichern und in Frieden leben, aber nicht zerstört werden oder andere Kulturen übergestülpt bekommen.

Unsere Indioorganisationen haben sich dem unbeugsamen Kampf verschrieben. Wir werden von vielen Seiten bestürmt: Von den Kirchen und Missionen, unfähigen Staatsbeamten, großen Landbesetzern oder skrupellosen Wissenschaftlern, die uns nur als Objekt zur Erreichung akademischer Würden sehen.

Wir sind offen und gesprächsbereit. Im Dialog wollen wir für unsere Sache und die Einheit unserer Völker eintreten, wie seinerzeit Pablo Presbere. Von ihm haben wir gelernt, nicht nachzugeben und wenn notwendig für unsere Sache zu sterben."

Diese Informationsdienste sind der Ausdruck einer stattfindenden Bewußtseinsbildung, die nun Rechte für eine Volks- bzw. Rassengruppe fordert, die bis jetzt verweigert oder überhaupt nicht zur Kenntnis genommen wurden. Ein weiteres Ziel ist die Anerkennung als Volksgruppe von der UNO, die über den bisherigen Status - als beratende nicht regierungsoffizielle Vereinigung der Categorie II - hinausgeht.

Diese Bewußtseinsbildung steht an ihrem Anfang, wie auch die Organisationen in den verschiedenen Ländern im Aufbau begriffen sind. Die derzeitige Lage

[L]

3

der Indios, ihre Rechtlosigkeit, ihre Unterdrückung, ihre immer weitere Zurückdrängung schafft immer mehr Gegendruck, der nicht mehr lange Zeit brauchen wird, um in einer sehr gefährlichen Explosion zu enden. Anzeichen sind in einigen Ländern bereits zu erkennen,

Dem vorzubeugen und zu verschleiern glauben viele der Machthaber die berechtigten Forderungen der unterdrückten Indios als Aktivitäten "marxistischer Guerrilleros" vor der Weltöffentlichkeit diskriminieren zu müssen.

Wenn man sich nur etwas mit den gesellschaftlichen Vorstellungen des Zusammenlebens der Indios beschäftigt, erfährt man, daß hier Formen des menschlichen Zusammenlebens existieren, die bereits in der vorkolumbianischen Zeit, unserer Zeit weit voraus waren und daher keine der europäischen Formen von "Demokratie" oder "Volksdemokratie" mehr nötig haben. Im Gegenteil, hier hätten wir Europäer viel von ihrem "kooperativen" Gesellschaftsformen lernen können, wenn wir nicht in unserem Größenwahn alles zerstört hätten; Kultur, Religion und Lebensformen.

Selbst die Sandinisten mit ihrer nach marxistischen bzw. nationalsozialistischen Form bestehenden Massenorganisationen begingen den großen Fehler, diese Form ihren Indios an der Atlantikküste aufzustülpen. Die Miskitos, Sumas und Ramas rebellierten, wurden ausgesiedelt oder flohen. Nun befinden sie sich zwischen zwei Feuern, entweder sie geben ihre Kultur und Tradition endgültig auf oder sie lassen sich von den Gegner des Regimes in Managua, als Soldaten ebenfalls zweckentfremden.

Das ist das Los der Dritten Welt und hiemit auch der Indios: Zwischen schwarz und weiß, Ost und West, Staats- und verantwortungslosem Privatkapital darf es keinen dritten Weg geben.

Folgerungen:

Hier für Aufklärung zu sorgen, vor allem in Mitteleuropa, damit auch hier eine Bewußtseinsbildung einsetzt, die die Verantwortung zur Wiedergutmachung verübten Unrechts sieht, annimmt und mithilft den Indios ihre Rechte zu erlangen, soll dieser Informationsdienst gewidmet sein.

In der Anlage Copie und Übersetzung des Briefes des Präsidenten des Weltrates der Eingeborenenvölker, José Carlos Morales.

WORLD COUNCIL OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
CONSEJO MUNDIAL DE PUEBLOS INDIGENAS
CONSEIL MONDIAL DE PUEPLES INDIGENES

San José Costa Rica, 1 de mayo de 1983

Sr. Georg GAUPP-BERGHAUSEN

Enviado Especial de Austria Para
Asuntos Culturales.
Vicepresidente ICER-COSTA RICA
A-6914 Hohenweiler
AUSTRIA

WCIP-Secretariat
Suite C-812
The University of Lethbridge
Lethbridge, Alberta
Canada T1K 3M4
Telephone: (403) 327-7255
Telex #: 03-849357

Estimado señor Gaupp;

En mi calidad de Presidente del Consejo Mundial de Pueblos Indígenas CMPI, Organización No Gubernamental con estatus Consultivo, Categoría II, dentro del Consejo Económico y Social de las Naciones Unidas y en base a los principios de la Carta Constitutiva que entre otros manifiesta:

a) Buscar la unidad entre los Pueblos Indígenas del Mundo.

b) Establecer un significativo intercambio de información entre los pueblos Indígenas y otros sectores sociales del mundo.

c) Fortalecer la organización de los pueblos Indígenas en los diferentes países.

d) Abolir el Genocidio físico y cultural y el etnicidio.

e) Combatir el Racismo.

f) Asegurar la justicia social, política y económica para los Pueblos Indígenas. Estableciendo y fortaleciendo los conceptos de los Derechos Indígenas y culturales... y demás principios.

Me permito manifestarle lo siguiente:

Agradecer al ICER y su país que representa por el esfuerzo y trabajo en relación a nuestra cultura, que Ud. realiza en Centro América y en especial en Costa Rica, sobre todo por ese gran esfuerzo de ayuda y comprensión hacia mis hermanos indígenas, que por lo general en cualquier país de América, son los pueblos marginados y despojados de sus propios derechos, pero que con personas como Ud. de visión universal, podremos forjar un nuevo horizonte para nuestra cultura y derechos, y por ende de la Humanidad.

El CMPI, tiene en proyecto después de varios años sin logro alguno, establecer un Centro de Información en algún punto de la Europa Central para dar a conocer nuestro verdadero rostro, como pueblos con derechos propios en estas tierras americanas, y que vale la pena decirlo que somos un pueblo de más de 65.000.000 de personas entre Alas ka y Cabo de Hornos, esto sin incluir nuestros hermanos indígenas de las otras partes del Mundo que son millones y millones.

Señor Gaupp, por esa visión humanista universal que Ud. posee y conforme a nuestras discusiones aquí en San José y en base a los objetivos del CMPI, me permito decirle que sería un gran aporte a nuestras luchas...

Georg Gaupp-Berghausen

Vicepresidente del ICER

San José, Costa Rica

Telefonos: 25 21 37 y 24 37 83

Sekretariat:
Armin Kloser
Sudtirolerplatz 9
A-6971 Hard
Telefon: 0 55 74 / 36 58 13

Juni 1983

Betri fft: **STUDIENZENTRUM INDIOAMERIKA**

Die in den Monaten Mai und Juni 83 durchgeführten Aussprachen, Kontakte, Vor-
träge und Diskussionen über Möglichkeiten, Art und Weise der Durchführung
obigen Vorhabens, ergeben folgendes Bild:

Die Idee fand zum großen Teil überall Zustimmung bis begeisterte Zustimmung.
Die Hilfe, die ein Studienzentrum für Indioamerika anbieten sollte, muß zwei-
fach sein: moralisch und finanziell.

<table>
   <tr>
    <td>
     Moralisch heißt
    </td>
    <td>
     Eintreten von Institutionen und Persönlichkeiten des öffentlichen Lebens für die Indios
    </td>
   </tr>
   <tr>
    <td>
     Finanziell heißt
    </td>
    <td>
     den Indios die Möglichkeit geben ihre eigenständige Kultur wie ihre berechtigten Forderungen einer breiten Öffentlichkeit nahezubringen
    </td>
   </tr>
  </table>

Voraussetzung für jedwede Hilfe kann nur auf einem offenen und klaren Prinzip
der Partnerschaft basieren.

Konkret könnte das so aussehen:

1. Finanzierung eines Koordinationsbüros beim Präsidenten des Weltrates der Eingeborenenvölker, José Carlos Morales, in Costa Rica auf zwei Jahre. Die Aufgabe dieses Koordinationsbüros wäre ungefähr folgende:

a) Sammlung, Sortierung, Analyse und Auswertung aller Nachrichten über die Lage der Indios in Amerika

b) Sammlung, Sortierung und Herstellung von kulturellen Gütern (handwerk-
licher, dichterischer und musikalischer Art, wie auch von religiösen
Überlieferungen, Tänzen, Legenden und Erzählungen)

c) Sammlung, Sortierung und Auswertung von Erkenntnissen der Naturwissen-
schaft und Naturheilkunde

d) Sammlung und Zusammenstellung der indianischen Form und Art mensch-
lichen Zusammenlebens gestern und heute (kooperatives Denken etc)

e) Übersetzung des sortierten und ausgewerteten Materials in Fremdsprachen
vorerst in Spanisch und Deutsch

2. Das Studienzentrum in Europa (eventuell Vaduz) würde als Partner des Koordinationsbüros von Costa Rica für die Durchführung der Verbreitung der in Costa Rica erarbeiteten Unterlagen verantwortlich sein. Die Formen der Verbreitung könnten folgende sein:

[c]

Studienzentrum Indioamerika (2)

a) Grundsatzartikel, Nachrichten, Kurzgeschichten, Legenden, Berichte, Broschüren und Bücher

b) Kassetten, Platten, Noten

c) Hörberichte für Rundfunk und Videokassetten

d) Weiterleitung persönlicher Botschaften und Informationen des Präsidenten des Weltrates der Eingeborenenvölker

e) Kontaktherstellung mit Instituten und Organisationen, die sich für die Rechte ethnischer Gruppen einsetzen

f) Vorbereitung und Durchführung von Kontaktgesprächen, gemeinsamen Tagungen und Seminaren

3. Der finanzielle Gesamtbedarf um all dies durchzuführen, hängt von der Größe und dem Umfang der gesamten Tätigkeiten inklusive den Tagungen und Seminaren ab. Der Mindestbedarf für die ersten zwei Jahre, um eine halbwegs erfolgreiche Arbeit zu leisten, würde sich ungefähr auf US $ 100.000. - pro Jahr belaufen.

profil sprach mit Georg
Gaupp-Berghausen,
österreichischer
Erwachsenenbildner in
Zentralamerika

Lenin-Orden
für
US-Politiker

**profil:** Sie gehörten in der Vergangenheit zu denjenigen, die meinten, man möge die Entwicklung in Nicaragua eher positiv betrachten. Sehen Sie das noch immer so?

**Gaupp:** Schon seit 1979 faszinierte mich die große Anteilnahme der Bevölkerung an dem Versuch, einen von Washington und Moskau unabhängigen Weg zu finden, einen Weg abseits von verantwortunglosem Privatkapitalismus und von grauem Staatskapitalismus. Als ich die ersten 100 kubanischen Lehrer aus dem Flugzeug steigen gesehen habe, fragte ich mich, wieso nur ein kommunistisches Land bereit ist, physische Hilfe zu leisten. Mit Hilfe der katholischen Männerbewegung und auch des Nicaragua-Fonds des Bundeskanzleramtes ist es gelungen, fünfzig spanische Lehrer für ein Jahr zu bezahlen, um den Alphabisierungskreuzzug fortzusetzen.

**profil:** Ist die positive Entwicklung inzwischen ins Negative gekippt?

**Gaupp:** Das ist ein längerer Prozeß. Es scheint sich hier das langfristige strategische Interesse der Sowjetunion bemerkbar gemacht zu haben – gegenüber einem kurzfristig tagespolitischen Denker der USA und der Unkenntnis Europas über die wahren Verhältnisse. Sonst hätte man mit allen Mitteln versuchen müssen, jene Leute in der pluralistischen Junta Nicaragua zu halten, die von Anfang an drinnen waren.

**profil:** Was konnte das Ausland machen, außer Kredite zu geben, wie es anfangs auch geschehen ist?

**Gaupp:** In der Endphase des alten Regimes waren einige amerikanische Senatoren in Managua und haben den damaligen Staatschef Somoza, der aufgeben wollte, bestärkt zu bleiben. Man hätte auch in diesem Fall – mit besseren Intentionen – die Gemäßigten auffordern können, in der Junta zu bleiben.

**profil:** Setzen sich in einer solchen Situation nicht immer die Verfechter einer geschlossenen Ideologie durch?

**Gaupp:** Ohne Zweifel.

**profil:** Aber ist der Sandinismus so eine geschlossene Ideologie?

**Gaupp:** Nein. Er ist für mich eine Abart des sozialistischen Nationalismus, dessen Gründer General Sandino alles andere als ein Marxist war. Er hat in den dreißiger Jahren einen kommunistischen Führer seiner Befreiungsarmee erschießen lassen. Der Marxismus ist erst später, durch einige Führer, die in Moskau ausgebildet wurden, hineingetragen worden.

**profil:** Ist es eine totalitäre Bewegung?

**Gaupp:** In den Ausdrucksformen erinnert sie sehr an die spanische Falange, nicht nur dieselben Fahnen, auch dieselben Slogans, die Verherrlichung der Helden, werden eingesetzt. Sie versucht noch immer, einen eigenen politischen Weg zu gehen. Doch inwieweit die Dirigenten der Bewegung jetzt noch diese persönliche Bewegungsfreiheit haben, das ist eine Frage, die selbst in Nicaragua kaum jemand beantworten kann.

**profil:** Wie steht es um die praktischen Bürgerrechte? Es soll auf manche Häuser geschmiert worden sein: „Hier wohnt ein Verräter.“

**Gaupp:** Das gehört zu den Dingen, die mich im Ablauf der letzten zwölf Monate sehr besorgt gemacht haben. Wenn auf ein Haus geschrieben wird: „Hier wohnt ein CIA-Agent“, so erinnert das an die Zeit der Judensterne und bekommt dadurch einen fatalen Beigeschmack.

**profil:** Wie steht es um die Bürgerrechte? Kann man beispielsweise noch einen Laden eröffnen und ihn nach privatwirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten führen?

**Gaupp:** Das ist verfassungsrechtlich verankert und auch möglich. Es ist nur wie bei all diesen Regimen ein immenser Bürokratismus eingekehrt. Die vielen Behördenwege wirken sicher bremsend.

**profil:** Werden die Menschen von einer Geheimpolizei kontrolliert?

**Gaupp:** Soviel mir bekannt ist, würde ich die Existenz eines geheimpolizeilichen Überwachungssystems verneinen. Es gibt allerdings das System der Blockwarte, sandinistischer Vertrauenspersonen, die sich um ihr Wohnviertel kümmern. In letzter Zeit wuchs das Mißtrauen. Man hat Angst, beim örtlichen Komitee als Gegner aufzufallen.

**profil:** Wie haben sich die Freiheiten im Vergleich zur Somoza-Zeit verändert?

**Gaupp:** Damals waren die frei, die zu Somoza gehört und von ihm gelebt haben, während der andere, größere Teil der Bevölkerung nicht frei war. Da hat sich schon Wesentliches geändert.

**profil:** Schneiden andere Länder der Region noch besser ab?

**Gaupp:** Costa Rica ist zweifellos eines der demokratishesten Länder Lateinamerikas.

**profil:** Strahlt das friedenswillige Costa Rica nicht auf die Nachbarn aus?

**Gaupp:** Das liegt absolut in den Intentionen der costaricanischen Regierung, die jegliche Bewaffnung kategorisch ablehnt. Ich erinnere mich an den Besuch der amerikanischen UN-Botschafterin Jeanne Kirkpatrick, die 1981 gleich nach der Landung auf dem Flughafen erklärte, die USA wären zu jedweder Militärhilfe an Costa Rica bereit. In den nächsten Tagen schrieb der Präsident in einem offenen Brief, er bedanke sich für das Angebot der UNO-Botschafterin, nur mache er sie aufmerksam, daß Costa Rica seit 1948 kein Militär mehr habe. Die USA sollten lieber das Thunfisch-Embargo aufheben, das sie gegen Costa Rica verhängt hatten.

**profil:** Wie steht es um die übrigen Länder der Region?

**Gaupp:** Guatemala ist meiner Ansicht nach

Zentralamerika-Kenner Gaupp-Berghausen: Faszination für den 3. Weg

36

profil

[Lc]

Die Revolution...

viel ärger als Nicaragua. Die Presse kann dort noch relativ frei schreiben, und sie berichtet auch von den täglich dreißig bis vierzig Morden an den Indios und an der Landbevölkerung. Aber aus diesen Fakten werden keinesfalls irgendwelche Schlußfolgerungen gezogen.

**profil:** *El Salvador?*

**Gaupp:** Dort ist die

dürfte Honduras mit Nicaragua auf einer Stufe stehen, nicht aber in bezug darauf, was man für die Menschen tut. Deno eines, muß man trotz allem anerkennen: Die sandinistische Regierung hat es geschafft, die Grundnahrungsmittel zu einem Preis zu sichern, den sich jeder leisten kann.

**profil:** *Der frühere Sandinist Eden Pastora will einen Volksaufstand entfachen. Hat er Chancen?*

**Gaupp:** Nein. Ein gesundes Mißtrauen gegen die Regierung ist vorhanden. Ich würde nicht von einem Enthusiasmus der Landbevölkerung für das Regime sprechen, aber ich würde es nie wagen, zu sagen, daß die Volksseele kocht.

**profil:** *Von manchen wird die Unzufriedenheit auch mit der Unwissenheit der Menschen begründet, die sich zum Beispiel gegen Impfaktionen wehrten.*

**Gaupp:** Die Menschen wehrten sich nicht so sehr gegen das Impfen, sondern dagegen, daß sie dabei erfaßt werden. Das ist nicht nur in Nicaragua der Fall. Dasselbe ist bei der Alphabetisierungskampagne geschehen, die auch dazu diente, die Menschen zu erfassen und zu organisieren. Die Sandinisten haben sich aber zugleich die besten Fachleute geholt und den ganzen Bildungssektor hervorragend aufgebaut.

**profil:** *Die Bildungsarbeit nach dem Alphabetisierungskreuzzug wird aber weitergehen?*

**Gaupp:** Ja, in einer Art, die der postrevoltionären Situation entspricht. Unser Institut kann dort nicht arbeiten, weil die Alphabetisierung in Nicaragua auf sogenannte Schlüsselwörter aufgebaut wurde: Revolution, Befreiung usw., während unser Erziehungssystem in Costa Rica von der Einheit der Familie und der Gemeinde

ausgeht. Wir wollen keine Politik in der Erziehung, und sie müssen sie haben – was verständlich ist.

**profil:** *Die sandinistische Führung scheint verhindern zu wollen, wie zuvor Kuba, im Westen tosoliert zu werden.*

**Gaupp:** Fidel Castro soll den sandinistischen Führern selbst gesagt haben, macht nicht denselben Unsinn wie wir, begebt euch nicht unter die völlige Kontrolle von Moskau. Ob das noch geht, weiß ich nicht – bei den ungeschickten Maßnahmen des Westens und der Vereinigten Staaten. Die ersten, die den Lenin-Orden verdient haben, sind die Verantwortlichen der USA, weil sie alles machen, was nur möglich ist, um die Leute in die Hände der anderen Seite zu treiben.

**profil:** *Zunächst ließ man ja die Kredite und den Warenverkehr aufrecht. Erst als der Liberalismus der Anfangszeit abnahm, wurde gekürzt.*

**Gaupp:** Was weiß der normale Nicaraguaner von Europa, von der Sowjetunion? In Lateinamerika stellt sich ihm der Marxismus als die einzige politische Bewegung dar, die spektakulär für die Unterdrückten eintritt – bis auf den Heiligen Vater, der erklärt hat, daß er für die Kehrtwendung der Kirche von der Oberschicht zu den Unterdrückten eintritt. Die USA haben keine Kommunikation mit den eigentlichen Bewohnern dieser Länder. Sie haben nur mit einer gewissen Oberschicht Kontakt.

**profil:** *Aber sie haben dennoch geholfen.*

**Gaupp:** Im Jahre 1981 haben die USA die restlichen vier bis sechs von 72 Millionen Dollar gesperrt und die geplanten Getreidelieferungen nicht durchgeführt. Darauf wurde in ganz Nicaragua, auch von den Kanzeln, verkündet, die bösen Gringos geben uns kein Brot. Das war demagogisch, weil die meisten Menschen dort Mais-Tortillas und kaum Brot essen. Was machte Moskau? Zwei bulgarische Getreideschiffe wurden von Kanada herunterdirigiert und spektakulär im Hafen entladen. Das erzeugt in der Bevölkerung ein immer stärker gegen die USA aufgeheiztes Gefühl.

**profil:** *Würden Sie glauben, daß die Entwicklung in Nicaragua doch noch einen positiven Verlauf nehmen kann?*

**Gaupp:** Ich glaube, ja. Es müßten nur noch mehr glaubwürdige Staatsmänner wie Bruno Kreisky aufzeigen, welcher Gefahr Nicaragua läuft, wenn es demokratische Prinzipien über Bord wirft. Es gibt noch eine Gefahr: Denken Sie an die gewissen Avancen, die Andropow Reagan gemacht hat. Wenn sich Moskau und Washington in Genf über ihre Einflußzonen einigen, dann könnten die Nicaraguaner eines Morgens aufwachen und sind fallengelassen wie ein heißer Apfel.

...und Nicaragua: Abart des sozialistischen Nationalismus

Überwachung durch sehr weit rechtsgerichtete Gruppen so stark, daß die Menschen unter einem gewissen Druck stehen – was sich auch bei den Wahlen gezeigt hat.

**profil:** *Wo würden Sie in Zentralamerika leben wollen?*

**Gaupp:** Zweifellos liegt Costa Rica an erster Stelle. In bezug auf die Rechtsstaatlichkeit

Georg Gaupp-Berghausen, 65, absolvierte die Maria-Theresianische Militärakademie in Wiener Neustadt und bekleidet den Rang eines Obersten der Reserve a. D. Der frühere Herausgeber einer zweisprachigen Zeitschrift für Iberoamerika und Europa ist seit 1972 in der Erwachsenenbildung Zentralamerikas tätig. Er ist Vizepräsident des costarikanischen Instituts für Radiounterricht und Vorstandsmitglied des Erwachsenenbildungsinstituts Guatemalas. Gaupp-Berghausen ist außerdem Ehrenpräsident der Gesellschaft für politisch-strategische Studien in Wien. Das Gespräch führten Peter Michael Lingens und Erhard Stackl.

profil

37

September 8, 1983

TO: President Magana

THROUGH: Alfonso Moises-Beatriz

FROM: Donald Wilhelm

Our mutual friend the Ambassador has often spoken of you, and I am looking forward to our meeting. We indeed have important things to discuss--and these relate to practical means for defeating Communism.

Southeast Asia, where I have worked extensively, has been the scene of two decisive victories over international Communist subversion and one disastrous defeat. The two decisive victories were respectively in Malaya/Malaysia and in Indonesia. The disastrous defeat was of course in Vietnam.

Each of the two decisive victories was achieved through a triple strategy composed of these elements:
(1) a psychological/ideological offensive;
(2) a highly-geared program to bring the troops close to the people and particularly the villagers;
(3) refined low-intensity military tactics needing only a minimum of heavy weapons.

In Vietnam, two (some observers say three) of these elements were essentially missing. I grew up in the U. S. A. (where I know you studied) and remain a loyal citizen there, but we must be objective. Even up to the present day, the U. S. civil/military bureaucracy has failed, both in Washington and in the field, to apply the victorious lessons of Malaya/Malaysia and Indonesia.

Two of my friends are generals in the British Army who took part in the decisive defeat of the Communists in Malaya/Malaysia, and they will gladly provide their advice. In addition I know the Indonesian leadership who scored the great victory in their country, and they will welcome the opportunity to offer their experience. The keys to victory indeed lie within our grasp.

We can organize all this upon my return to San Salvador. Can you invite me soon for that purpose? We can thus save many innocent lives and hasten the return of peace and progress. I look forward immensely to our meeting.

16 BOWERS CROFT, CAMBRIDGE CB1 4RP, ENGLAND

TELEPHONE: CAMBRIDGE/48810

July 29, 1983

Professor Henry Kissinger
Suite 520
1800 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
U. S. A.

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Further to my letter of July 23, a message has just come from President Magana of El Salvador endorsing the proposed project--or "system" as he well calls it--and recommending its implementation. The message was transmitted to me by the Ambassador here, who has known the President for many years.

President Magana is most anxious to get a constructive U. S. response, and clearly he will be pleased if the concept of the project can be included in the Commission's recommendations. In addition he wants to start the project without delay on a pilot basis, and for sure he deserves our encouragement.

President Reagan has of course spoken of wanting to defeat Communist subversion by peaceful means, and that is exactly in harmony with the project's purpose. We can save many lives.

The stakes are very great, and can you telex me on 817915 STAIRS G or phone me on 01-44-223-248810? Thanks from all concerned.

AUG 03 1983

AN INTEGRATED TRAINING/INDOCTRINATION PROGRAM FOR CENTRAL AMERICA

Recently I had a series of splendid meetings in
Washington and especially at the Pentagon including the
JCS level. The purpose was to discuss an integrated
training program which can play a key role in defeating the
Communists in Central America. Then I was for five full
days in San Salvador for the same purpose. The response
in Washington was excellent and that in El Salvador was
if anything even better--and most of all among the American
business community there.

In both places I suggested that it would make sense
to identify and study prior instances of the defeat of
Communism. And where, since World War II, has Communism
been most decisively and comprehensively defeated anywhere
in the world? A prime answer must be Indonesia. Nobody
disputed this (some had not thought of it before), and
people agreed that we should ask ourselves how the
Indonesians did it. I have given careful study to this
matter, as reflected in my book *Emerging Indonesia*.

How did they achieve decisive success? The
answer lies in their integrated triple approach. In
the first place they developed effective counterinsurgency
tactics especially in the category of low-intensity
warfare. Secondly, they have emphasized, perhaps more
than any other non-Communist country, the role of the
ideological. They believe in supplying their troops, and
their population at large, with effective non-Communist
ideological ammunition. Thirdly, and again perhaps more
than any other non-Communist country, they have trained

2

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all members of their armed forces to take part in village development. This has brought the troops close to the people.

On the ideological front the Indonesians have made comprehensive use of my handbook entitled *Creative Alternatives to Communism*. They have published it both in the Indonesian language and in English--and it is likewise available in Spanish. The Indonesians use the handbook throughout their university system, within their armed forces, and even for re-educating released Communist detainees. The Indonesians employ the handbook as a resource base and they realize that presentations derived from it can readily be adjusted to any educational level.

On the village development front the Indonesians have adopted an approach which has proved particularly effective. Under their philosophy and their practice, all members of the armed forces--from generals down to the lowliest privates--must themselves be equipped to take part in village development. In this way the troops can come close to the people, identify with them, win their confidence, and effectively counteract the Communists. The American business community in El Salvador believe that this is essential for success there.

My approach will, as previously, emphasize *training the trainers*. For this purpose the integrated training/indoctrination sessions can readily be mounted in Panama, Honduras, and El Salvador itself. Considering the stakes involved and the urgency of the situation, a crash pilot program can well be launched. Trainers can be trained and the program can then fan out to achieve

[L]

3

a broad and rapid impact. The pilot program can be
activated upon my return to Central America under
suitable auspices.

Incidentally the Indonesians, who were earlier
criticized for their alleged neglect of human rights
in dealing with the Communists, then very wisely invited
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ICRC,
to send a team from Geneva. The team have monitored
Indonesian performance and have issued periodic reports
which have proved reassuring. I know members of the team,
and the projected program can also reflect that experience.

I have found that one of the most important things
which I can teach is _confidence_. I have carefully
observed and studied how Communism has been defeated,
and I have the confidence arising from seeing it happen.
I can impart this knowledge in Central America, and this
can pay major dividends not only there but likewise in
the United States. American legislators and others can
be taught to think in terms of formulas for success, and
this will in turn affect the overall levels of aid. There
is no time to waste.

Telephone, 0223-248810
Telex, 817915 STAIRS G

Donald Wilhelm (Professor)
16 Bowers Croft
Cambridge CB1 4RP, England, U. K.

CHAIRMAN
DR HENRY A. KISSINGER

COMMISSION MEMBERS:
MR NICHOLAS F. BRADY
MAYOR HENRY G. CISNEROS
GOV WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR.
DR CARLOS F. DIAZ-ALEJANDRO
MR WILSON S. JOHNSON
MR LANE KIRKLAND
MR RICHARD M. SCAMMON
DR JOHN SILBER
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
AMB ROBERT S. STRAUSS
DR. WILLIAM B. WALSH

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AMB. HARRY W. SHLAUDEMAN

THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

Chris Vick

SENIOR COUNSELLORS:
REP MICHAEL D. BARNES
SEN LLOYD BENTSEN
REP WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD
SEN PETE V. DOMENICI
SEN DANIEL K. INOUYE
REP JACK F. KEMP
AMB JEANE KIRKPATRICK
MR WINSTON LORD
SEN CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS
MR WILLIAM D. ROGERS
REP JAMES C. WRIGHT

October 28, 1983

The Honorable
Warren Christopher
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Warren:

I'll make sure that Dr. Kissinger gets your most thoughtful letter of October 26 when he returns from his current trip and that it is made available to the members of the Commission when they meet next week.

We very much appreciate your taking the time to let the Commission have the benefit of your thinking on these difficult issues.

With every best wish,

NOV 18 1983

2201 C STREET NW., ROOM 1004, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520, TEL: (202) 632-7804

SUITE 500
1800 M STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

October 26, 1983

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Chairman
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America
2201 C Street, N.W., Room 1004
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Henry:

Because of the enormous importance of the study undertaken by you and your colleagues, I want to accept your invitation to send you a letter outlining some of my views on the problems you will be considering. If appropriate, I would appreciate your providing a copy of this letter to the other members of the Commission.

Our relationship with Central America hungers for a long view -- for an analysis that is detached from daily crises and current controversies, and thus is free to examine the underlying issues and interests.

One of the most serious handicaps to our foreign policy is the tendency for each new Administration, of whatever party, to regard continuity almost as a calamity -- with the result that it vigorously seeks to separate itself from its predecessor in nearly all areas of policy. This tendency toward fits and starts needlessly fosters an unsteady approach. In the process it comforts our adversaries and confuses our friends.

The Commission has an opportunity to break this dreary cycle, and to begin building a broadly-based consensus on the nature of our interests in Central America and how we can best pursue them over the long term.

If the Commission takes a detached and objective long view -- if it pursues the right questions -- you will reach some surprising conclusions and will challenge the current conventional wisdom of all of us.

I.

As a general framework for considering the challenge of Central America, I would recommend several fundamental propositions.

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#2 - Dr. Henry Kissinger - 10/26/83

First, although the issues are controversial -- or more precisely *because* they are controversial -- it is useful to begin by identifying certain elements of what I believe should be the common ground on the relationship between U.S. interests and Soviet ambitions in the area.

The United States has important interests in this region. They are so deep and pervasive that we cannot hope to distance ourselves or remain aloof.

- We have significant security concerns. Sea lines of communication transit the region through the Panama Canal and the Gulf of Mexico. A hostile military buildup in the area, because of proximity, could be a direct threat to us.

- We have extensive economic ties in the region. The countries there are important both as markets and as a source of supply.

- And we have special human concerns. Many of our citizens share a heritage with Latin America. That, and our physical and traditional closeness, mean that we feel with special intensity the suffering felt by the people of Central America when their rights are abused and their needs are left unfilled.

Beyond our interests in Central America is the reality that the Soviet Union is opportunistic in this region, as it is elsewhere. The Soviets support instability, turmoil, and revolution, which inflict human suffering and risk wider conflicts. So their ambitions are at odds with our interests.

Because these basic tenets are widely accepted, it is not useful to consider whether some are more and some are less alert to the danger of Soviet inroads in our hemisphere, or whether some are more and some are less in opposition to those trends. The reality is that, whether or not the Soviet Union is the proximate cause of violence and revolution, it is certainly a major complicating factor. What we must do is devise a policy that will protect and advance our interests in spite of that reality.

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#3 - Dr. Henry Kissinger - 10/26/83

Second, as another fundamental reality, we must recognize that the turmoil in Central America has an enormous economic component -- indeed, economics is probably the most critical factor. That means we must be prepared to invest considerable sums in the region, in ways that are designed to improve the economic prospects of the poor and to broaden the economic base of poor countries -- or else we must lower our sights dramatically, to suit a modest commitment. Rather than bemoaning the expenses of economic assistance, we should remember that military commitments usually are both more expensive and less promising. The need for such military commitments regularly stems from stinginess in economic support.

Third, we must persuade ourselves, and others, that while countries are important, no set of rulers is indispensable. Our interests and those of the rulers we help do not always coincide, and we must keep our interests central to our policy. It is not in our interest to be perpetually engaged in military causes that are not winnable because effective indigenous leadership does not exist and cannot be created.

Fourth, I recommend great caution in elevating local or civil conflicts into global symbols. While recognizing that the Soviets are ambitious and opportunistic, we should not give them more credit than they deserve, nor ascribe to them more effectiveness than they have. When we define what is essentially a civil war as a cosmic confrontation between East and West, one of the consequences is that we eliminate much of our leverage with the government we are trying to support, for it becomes convinced that we cannot afford to let it fall no matter what. That may lead to a situation in which our assistance is no longer buying time for reform, but is accepted by the ruling group as an alternative to reform. Perhaps that is our dilemma in El Salvador.

Fifth, we should have sufficient confidence in our system and our own values to maintain correct, affirmative relations with a diversity of governments, regardless of their internal ideology. It may turn out that our relations with revolutionary countries are often adversarial. We should have no illusions. But neither should we have a rigid posture. It is not in our interest to drive any country either into a dependency upon the Soviet Union or more deeply into the Soviet fold.

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#4 - Dr. Henry Kissinger - 10/26/83

Sixth, we should emphasize an active, creative diplomacy. In a troubled and important region, it is not enough for us simply to make speeches or declare policies and then wait until others come around to our view. That, as we have seen, can be a formula for isolation, irrelevance, and impotence. Rather, we need an aggressive diplomacy -- one that is principled, but that is also untiring in the search for solutions.

Seventh, human rights, broadly defined, must be at the core of our policy. Human rights -- including political, personal, and economic rights -- are much more than nice sentiments; they are powerful instruments. We pay an unacceptable price, morally and pragmatically, when we are seen as condoning death squads. In the long term, human rights are the only means that can hope to defeat the revolutionaries now bent on imposing and propagating Marxism in Central America, quite simply because they represent better, more appealing, and more effective ideas than Marxism offers.

II.

Within this broad framework there are a number of specific subjects or issues areas that I believe a comprehensive study would be well-advised to address in detail, as a means of determining how we can most effectively pursue our interests in this region. Let me list them by topic.

(1) **Security aims.** We need to identify our minimum indispensable security objectives in Central America. We have military bases in the region. Some will believe that our security will be enhanced if we acquire more than those we presently have. Or perhaps it will be sufficient simply if we ensure that outside powers do not develop military bases from which they can threaten us. On the other hand, we probably cannot hope to exclude the Soviet Union's growing contacts in aid, trade, and diplomacy, so we must find ways to respond to any political influence those ties bring along. Perhaps the most difficult dilemma is to decide whether we can tolerate the presence of a Marxist government in Central America, or must we subject any such government to unremitting pressure.

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#5 - Dr. Henry Kissinger - 10/26/83

(2) **Military Prospects.** In our national experience, military solutions sometimes have been chosen not because they showed promise, but simply because the means were at hand. But because the costs are high and the consequences of failure so severe, we need to take a realistic look at the chances that military steps will succeed in Central America. For example, we should be able to identify and measure specific criteria that will make military assistance effective in some circumstances and ineffective, or even counterproductive, in others. Perhaps the Commission can propose preconditions that would make such aid more effective. You might also determine whether there are fundamental differences, in both law and practicality, between supporting the defense of a sitting government, as in El Salvador, and supporting efforts, as in Nicaragua, to overthrow one. Other related questions include the means of avoiding an arms race among the impoverished countries in the region if we do supply arms aid, and the question whether and when a direct U.S. military intervention can be a viable option.

(3) **Clandestine Operations.** We have had newspaper stories almost daily on the debate over whether we should provide "covert" assistance to the anti-Sandinista "contras" operating out of Honduras and Costa Rica. Clandestine aid is no secret, of course, from the recipients, nor, probably, is it altogether unknown to the targets. Where our secret hand is revealed, as it has been in Nicaragua, it often tends to insure that our cause will fail. So it is pertinent to ask whether and under what circumstances we should try, as an open society, to compete with the Soviets by attempting to conduct sustained political or military activities on a clandestine basis in Central America.

(4) **Economic Concerns.** It is necessary to consider the full range of our economic relationships with Central American countries, to evaluate their net effect. For example, it is quite possible that our posture on such matters as sugar prices, the terms of lending by the World Bank and the IMF,

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#6 - Dr. Henry Kissinger - 10/26/83

and trade preferences, may be working in contradic-
tion to our political objectives in the region.
Or the traditional austerity measures we support
for the sake of economic viability may sow the
seeds of revolution, for the heaviest burdens usually
fall on the poor.

(5) **Central America in a Global Context.** By virtue of its proximity and our historical connection, some would argue that the region is so extraordinarily important to us, in comparison to Asia and Africa, that it should receive special attention in our aid and concessional trade programs. Others contend that we should deal with Central and South American countries on the same basis as we relate to other similarly situated countries around the world, in order to help dispel the impression of paternalism that had infected earlier Hemispheric approaches.

(6) **Peaceful Reform.** Given the nature of revolutionary ferment in this region, we are forced to consider whether peaceful change can hope to keep pace with rising expectations, or whether violent revolution is destined to be the order of the future. It is difficult, to be sure, but still not unreasonable, to expect progressive and constructive reform by governments that are already facing armed guerilla attacks, for such reform is the best way to compete effectively for popular loyalty. Our best opportunities lie not in sterile arguments over whether or not revolution is exportable, but in encouraging democratic economic, social and political progress. It may be contended that Nicaragua is infecting El Salvador, or that El Salvador may, in turn, infect, Mexico. But regardless of the ambitions of outsiders, the disease will not take hold unless indigenous conditions make the target countries hospitable to revolution.

(7) **Relations with Revolutionary Governments.** We have seen that revolutionary governments in the region sometimes seek security through alliance with or reliance upon the Soviet Union, both directly and through Cuba. But is it inevitable that new governments will perceive the United States as a threat,

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#7 - Dr. Henry Kissinger - 10/26/83

justifying them in looking to the Soviets for support? The irony associated with this question is the fact that on the record, the Soviet Union is not an appealing ally. The United States, objectively, is more aligned than the Soviet Union with the aspirations of revolutionary movements that proclaim the objectives of serving economic justice, national independence, and basic human needs. An equally pressing question is how to deal with governments that are hostile to the United States not because of outside stimulation but stemming from indigenous sources.

(8) **Negotiating Flexibility.** Perhaps, in the interest of long-term stability and peace, we need to be more open and flexible in the search for diplomatic solutions to Central American conflicts. To take a specific case in point, I am not so sure that negotiated power sharing -- which might also be seen as forcing the opposition to take some of the responsibility for the way things are going -- is always repugnant, especially if it is a step toward truly fair and open general elections.

(9) **The Role of our Allies.** Reality -- including their own growing ties in the region -- suggests that we must work with our allies toward a common position on Central American issues, lest we be isolated and ineffectual. It troubles me that we are so often at odds with them -- that our posture seems to be that events in this Hemisphere are none of their concern. In addition, we must, of course, coordinate and reconcile our policy with the views and roles of other governments in the region, including such friends as Mexico, Brazil, and the other countries that serve with Mexico in the Contadora group.

(10) **The U.S. Presence in the Region.** We have gone through a variety of postures in Central and South America, from a "Good Neighbor" to an "Alliance for Progress," and now there is talk of a new "Marshall Plan" there. So it is important to consider how we want to be perceived now in the region, and how we can adjust our conduct to support

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#8 - Dr. Henry Kissinger - 10/26/83

that perception. In my view we want to be seen as
respecting the people and nations of Central America.
We want to be recognized not as noticing the region
only when the pressure of injustice boils over and
the problem becomes a military one, but as pressing
constantly toward justice, even when conditions
are calm. We must have the discipline to align
ourselves, even when it is painful to do so, with
popular aspirations and democratic ideals. We
want to be respected, not simply feared.

I hope these will be among the subjects the Commis-
sion will cover when it issues its report early next year.
If your report takes a new and critical look at each of these
issues, then I feel it will certainly make a fundamental
contribution to the formulation of American policy at a crucial
time for a critical region.

With personal regards,

DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.

MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTANTS

2924 COLUMBIA PIKE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22204-4399

AWASH

September 14, 1983

Dr. Henry A.
National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America
2201 (C)
Washington, D.C.

This letter received
a form thank you signed
by HAK. Since all the letters
were the same, copies of
each one were not saved.

Dear Jack,

Thank you for your kind
support on your Commission's agenda.

I have three suggestions:

1. That the U.S. rededicate itself to accelerating the economic and institutional integration of Central America. Many of the requisite institutions and patterns are already in place - although rapidly deteriorating from recent U.S. neglect and funding curtailment. All available evidence shows these integrationist moves are stabilizing. I see no other answer to the medium and long-term stability, viability and growth of those mini republics. Ultimate goal: political integration.

2. That we ease away from the highly doctrinaire, insensitive and largely mis-managed agrarian reform kick we are on (Exception: Honduras). We must realize that at best, agrarian reform is the most costly and destabilizing event which can befall a traditional, largely rural society when the process is rushed.

As the late Panamanian General Omar Torrijos once told AID Director Douglas Benett, "The made-in-Vietnam agrarian reform bomb which you have dropped on El Salvador during a civil war, will eventually explode in your (expletive deleted) face."

3. That you produce a simple manifesto instead of an intellectual tome; that you come up with a bi-partisan "This we believe" credo instead of the traditional this-we-massaged task force epic which will be read mainly by those who contributed to it.

I wish you well in your deliberations, and send you kind regards.

SAN FRANCISCO - 693 SUTTER STREET, 3RD FLOOR. SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102 • 415/776.0120
PHILIPPINES - 161 ROXAS BLVD., #304. BACLARAN, METRO MANILA, PHILIPPINES • 011/63-2-828-73-46

DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.

AWASH

tember 14, 1983

Dr. H.
National Bipartisan Commission
on
2201
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear I.

Comment on your Commission's agenda.

I have three suggestions:

E35
27 SEP 1983

SAN FRANCISCO - 693 SUTTER STREET, 3RD FLOOR. SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102 • 415/776.0120
PHILIPPINES - 161 ROXAS BLVD., #304. BACLARAN, METRO MANILA. PHILIPPINES • 011/63-2-828.73-46

DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.

2924 COLUMBIA PIKE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22204-4399
U.S.A.
703/979-0100

CABLE ADDRESS: DAWASH

September 14, 1983

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America
2201 C Street, N.W., Room 1004
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Thank you for the invitation to comment on your Commission's agenda.

I have three suggestions:

635
27 SEP 1983

SAN FRANCISCO - 693 SUTTER STREET. 3RD FLOOR. SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102 • 415/776-0120
PHILIPPINES - 161 ROXAS BLVD.. #304. BACLARAN, METRO MANILA. PHILIPPINES • 011/63-2-826-73.46

BANK OF AMERICA

RUDOLPH A. PETERSON
President (Retired)

October 4, 1983

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Henry A. Kissinger Associates
Suite 1100
55 East 52nd Street
New York, N. Y. 10055

Dear Henry:

As you were leaving "The Grove" this summer, you mentioned that, in due course, you would want to talk about Central America. I would again repeat that I am certainly no authority on Central America. However, with the Bank of America's intensive interest and activities throughout Central America, beginning in the early 1960's, and my own ranch holdings there, dating back to 1967, my interest has been quite a continuous one in that part of the world.

On my way to the World Bank meeting a couple of weeks ago, I found myself in the bank's conference room in Miami with an interesting gathering of some two business and/or professional leaders from each of the five so-called Central American countries: Costa Rica; El Salvador; Guatemala; Honduras; Nicaragua. Roberto Motta and Roberto Eisenmann, Jr., publisher of the only independent newspaper in Panama, had gotten them together. As representatives of the private sector, I think they could all be classified as "moderates" with longer-term objectives and, certainly, the outstanding business leaders of their representative countries. As you would gather from the attached summary, prepared by our bank's young Latin American economist who acted as a kind of secretary of the occasion, several lively hours of discussion followed.

Certainly I would have no comment on their so-called military solution, except to say that prompt U.S. support was so unanimously considered essential as a first step that alternative solutions were apparently judged to be quite inoperative. With the sophisticated and thoughtful advice and counsel you have available on this score, certainly it would be presumptuous for me to comment one way or the other.

However, when it comes to development programs, be it economic, educational or of a social order, I very much concur with their observations in several respects. It should indeed be on a considerably more sophisticated level than development assistance has been either from the U.N. or the U.S. (AID) during the past 10 to 15 years. Secondly, I very much concur that the direction of implementation of such

BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION • SAN FRANCISCO, CA. 94137

[L]

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

October 4, 1983

assistance should be followed through to a much greater extent by
the U.S. organizations concerned and, while collaborating of course
with the local government, control and direction should be retain-
ed to a much greater degree than heretofore. Finally, I heartily
endorse the concept that the private sector can today be enlisted
to a much greater extent than heretofore. With the difficulties
of recent years, it is obvious that many of these business
organizations have only recently acquired a real sense of the
community responsibility. Hence, I think they are prepared to
step into the breach with both financial and manpower participa-
tion at some considerable cost to their own affairs, in order to
ensure a more constructive effort.

In the meantime, I understand our Bill Bolin has already
called to your attention the critical near-term requirements
of short-term, seasonal financing. With the so-called "supplier
credit" almost completely withdrawn along with the restrictive
activities of local banking institutions, you have here a
real void. Interim measures through established institutions
in this country should not be difficult, and could rather
readily be made available.

As your Commission moves forward to reach the point of
more definite plans for a development program, particularly in
the economic sector, I shall be at your disposal, if I can be
helpful in any way.

With kindest personal regards.

RAP/ms

Encl. cc: SUMMARY OF COMMENTS...ON THE
CENTRAL AMERICAN PROBLEM
Miami, Florida
September 22, 1983

SUMMARY OF THE COMMENTS MADE BY A GROUP OF BUSINESMEN
ON THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PROBLEM.

Miami, September 22 of 1983.

OBJECTIVES.

Any approach to solve the Central American problem should have the
following objectives.

- *Bring peace.* It will not be feasible to implement any other actions while the areas is at war.

- *Strengthen democracy.* A lasting solution will only work in the context of a democratic system.

- *Create a social security net.* Basic needs -education, health, food and housing- must be properly satisfied.

- *Further develop the productive structure.* To absorb the high number of entrants to the job market and to extend the means of the countries to pay their debts the area's productive capacity has to be rapidly widened.

MEANS AND ACTION PLANS.

To *bring peace* to the Central American area is the most crucial task presently *existing* since actual confrontation precludes the possibility of implementying any social and economic programs and thus renders useless the discussion of future plans. The accomplishment of that objective overrides any other consideration. There may be other alternatives to peace, however only a military solution conducive to the definite overthrow of the sandinista government in Nicaragua is at this point in time the only alternative at hand, the establishment of a democratic system will not be possible otherwise. For this to be succesfull the following is needed.

- Very fast action since the solution of the problem can any further postponed. Communist penetration is escalating and internationally well known and effective subversive movements are participating in the confrontation. If a rapid solution is not found, the solution will become more difficult and expensive as time goes by.

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-Open, direct and decisive US support since the Central American countries will not be able to succeed by themselves. This has clearly become a case of West-East confrontation and no solution will be possible without the military participation of US military might. Permanent peace in Latin America is vital to US interest. It is widely recognized that the US government has been gradually been increasing its military assistance to the area however more is needed.

-Full commitment from parties involved whatever the military action plan may be since an inconclusive action will have very negative psychological repercussions.

The peace seeking solution absolutely requires most immediate military action. In that regard the first step to be taken is to extend more military and technical support to the counter-revolutionary forces that are operating in Honduras and that have also infiltrated into Nicaraguan territory. However, if that action fails a regional army could be formed with the specific mission of toppling the Sandinista regime, an action that will not demand the participation of ground US combat troops, but that will require a blockade and extensive support of the naval and air forces. Grounds for US participation could be established in the context of the Rio de Janeiro treaty on reciprocal assistance in the case of an external threat to the continent. An alternative will be to encourage the takeover of one of the northern state capitals of Nicaraguan and form a provisional government that will be later recognized by Washington and to which also all military support will be extended to reach the ultimate goal.

At certain point in time, the support of the Interamerican community will be sought to maintain peace and to supervise the electoral process that should be programmed subsequently. It is discarded that the ousted forces will inmediately recur to extensive subversive activities. Once the Nicaraguan problem is solved in the context explained before, the way will be paved for a solution of the problem of subversion in El Salvador.

Once peace is established in the area, only then other objectives could be successfully pursued. To rapidly establish or strengthen democracy becomes then crucially important after the debilitating impact of the events taken place and the massive propaganda campaign and infiltration effort put by the communist world. The means to accomplish this objective are:

-Free elections to bring democratic government to all countries of the region and to let the people decide their own destiny.

-Redimensioning of the state apparatus that most often has become too big and inefficient.

-Modernization of democratic institutions and definition of a accountability system to eliminate corruption. Along these lines, a system of check and balances has to be created.

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-Definition of an operative mechanism to make democracy and sovereignty compatible with the actions of international institutions affecting the area, i.e, the International Monetary Fund.

-Creation of democratic conscience, deepening of democratic principles and wide dissimilation of the system's virtues.

-Emphasis in a free market mechanism as that most compatible with a democratic system.

A political agreement has to be reached by all social groups about how to promote economic and social development in the context of a democratic system and a free market economy.

More direct and indirect exposure to the free world principles and way of living should be provided to counter the action of the Soviet Union that provides thousands of scholarships which are used for ideological infiltration.

The generally low living standards of the region have been even further lowered due to the international recession, the deteriorating terms of trade, the lack of credit, the devastating effects of the war and the stringent measures imposed by IMF adjustment programs. It is imperative then the creation of a social security net as to at least bring living standards to past levels. Also, problems associated with balance of payments require urgent attention. In the short run, the only viable means to achieve that objective are:

-Stepping up direct economic assistance.

-Facilitating official credit or creating mechanisms to reestablish some flows of commercial credit.

-Opening up of new immediate opportunities for the area's products in US market.

A viable long term strategy has to be based in further and extensive development of the productive capacity of the country at the same time that the internal demand grows and external markets are opened. If the economy is able to absorb the growing amount of new job applicants social pressures will diminish.

Regarding the design of action plans oriented towards the achievement of long term objectives, the following points ought to be taken into account.

-Their general focus needs a conceptual change given the fact that past plans have not produced the expected results despite good intentions. That is the case of the AID and Alliance for Progress programs.

-Hand-outs, though need it sometimes, have not produced good results. In most cases they have been given to the public sector that has grown out of proportion and has created an imbalance of the countries' economic structure.

-Education is the area where probably most attention has to be devoted. Technical and vocational programs should be encouraged as well as educational training at all levels, but mainly at the university level. A successful effort in this front should favorably impact the area's productive capacity as a result of better technical and managerial abilities.

-Future plans should be designed along the lines of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Overall, they should emphasize the importance of a free market economy and the role of the private sector in the economic development process.

-Foreign investment in the area should be encouraged. US could provide incentives to make it attractive, such as easy credit and tax reductions.

-The penetration of sophisticated foreign markets requires marketing and managerial expertise. Any plan should make provision for that expertise to be developed. Concomitant with this, the appropriate financial mechanisms have to be established.

COMMISSION MEMBERS
MR NICHOLAS F. BRADY
MAYOR HENRY G. CISNEROS
GOV WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR.
DR CARLOS F. DIAZ-ALEJANDRO
MR WILSON S. JOHNSON
MR LANE KIRKLAND
MR RICHARD M. SCAMMON
DR JOHN SILBER
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
AMB ROBERT S. STRAUSS
DR WILLIAM B. WALSH

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AMB HARRY W. SHLAUDEMAN

October 21, 1983

Mr. Charles W. Robinson
Chairman
Energy Transition Corporation
P.O. Box 2224
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

Dear Chuck:

Many thanks for your kind letter. It was good to hear from
you and to get your ideas on economic growth in Central
America. I especially appreciate your suggestion of dusting
off the IRB proposal. I have taken the liberty of sharing this
thought-provoking letter with my staff.

2201 C STREET NW. ROOM 1004. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520. TEL. (202) 632-7804

ENERGY TRANSITION CORPORATION

October 13, 1983

CHARLES W. ROBINSON, CHAIRMAN
213 CATHEDRAL PLACE
MAILING ADDRESS: P. O. BOX 2224

SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO 87501
(505) 988-5589

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street - Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006

OCT 18 1983

Dear Henry:

I have been intending to write to express admiration for the courage (and sense of devotion) which led to your acceptance of the challenge of Central America. Having been involved in that part of the world for over thirty years, I know the complexities - political, social, and economic - which you must seek to resolve.

I believe that our only hope is in establishing a sound basis for economic growth in an environment which holds promise for more equitable distribution of the benefits. Without this there can be no hope for political continuity. (I avoid use of the expression "political stability" in the conventional sense, as this is not a realistic near term goal in Central America.)

I also believe that the foundation for economic growth cannot be achieved through government to government financial support. Only through development of an environment attractive to private investment - domestic and foreign - can we achieve this objective.

I have always believed that "timing" is the essence of success, whether in the boardroom or the bedroom. It is unnecessary to suggest that the same is true in foreign affairs. This leads me to my point in writing. Now is the time to dust off your "International Resources Bank" (IRB) proposal and tailor it to fit the specific problems of Central America. A political risk guarantee program would encourage private foreign investment to join with domestic capital to revitalize the Central American economies. It would:

- Provide capital

- Encourage transfer of appropriate technology (a subject on which you became one of the world's leading authorities)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

October 13, 1983

--Stimulate development of effective business management, and

--Improve access to world markets for export products.

The involvement of The World Bank in providing "political risk" insurance for investments in Central America (as opposed to the U.S. acting alone) would:

--Assure the financial and political muscle required to essentially eliminate the risk of capital loss from "rule" changing or expropriation,

--Establish norms for capital investment and operations which would assure fair treatment for both investors and host governments, and

--Provide a multilateral approach to the problems of Central America, thereby minimizing the possibility of unilateral action against the U.S. and the political opposition to what would otherwise be viewed as U.S. "interference."

Perhaps this program could be administered through the new World Bank subsidiary now under consideration to help raise and channel additional funds into developing countries. This could be linked to the InterAmerican Development Bank through some joint venture mechanism which would assure greater support from other Latin American nations.

The world was not ready for the IRB at Nairobi in 1976 but I believe that the growing acceptance of the importance of private sector investment in economic development, combined with increasing evidence of a slowdown in such investments due to political risk, makes this an idea whose time has come. Certainly there is an opportunity in Central America today to apply this concept as an important element in providing some hope for the future.

I wish you well on this very important assignment.

Personal regards.

CWR/gc

cc: A. W. Clausen, The World Bank

EMBAJADA DE COLOMBIA
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

FROM : The Ambassador of Colombia, Alvaro Gómez
TO : Doctor Henry Kissinger
RE : To keep the International Coffee Agreement alive

SEP 27 1983

1) Coffee is outstanding as one of the world's commodities that have a major social significance due to their intensive need of labor in regions that are heavily populated. To safeguard the necessary economic conditions surrounding this commodity has always been seen as a positive element of political stability in many African States and most Latin American countries. Inversely, a crisis in the marketing of coffee would wreak havoc in those same economies by producing such large income reductions that internal order would be severely threatened.

2) The coffee world market has been regulated since 1962 and periodically, even before that date, through agreements made between coffee growing countries and consumer nations. These agreements call for certain price levels that are deemed fair for growers and consumers and supply is regulated within an established price range. In times of bumper crops, exporting countries buy and withhold surpluses in excess of their established export quotas. If prices tend to increase, these surpluses are unloaded on the market as part of the regulating mechanism.

This regulating mechanism has permitted coffee prices to stay within a range considered acceptable by exporting and consumer countries and has succeeded as a deterrent of radical and unsettling price changes.

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EMBAJADA DE COLOMBIA

WASHINGTON

Memorandum: To keep the International Coffee Agreement alive

3) Coffee's Economic Impact

Coffee is one of the main sources of foreign currency for Central American countries. Estimated export earnings for the year 1983/84 are:

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Coffee exports<br>in US millions</th><th>Percentage of coffee<br>exports in relation to<br>total exports</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Costa Rica</td><td>197</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Honduras</td><td>128</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>Guatemala</td><td>292</td><td>30</td></tr><tr><td>Nicaragua</td><td>114</td><td>37</td></tr><tr><td>El Salvador</td><td>369</td><td>58</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>1.100</td><td>Average 34</td></tr></tbody></table>

Estimates show that coffee employs around 500.000 workers in Central America who maintain their families, roughly 2.500.000 people. It is the region's principal source of employment.

These two factors -foreign currency earnings and large work force- are critical ones in the social and political behavior of any nation.

4) Present Status of the Coffee Situation

A deteriorating situation can be observed since 1980, when prices began to tumble and marketing policies, both internal and external, were put to test.

This deteriorating situation can be traced to three factors:

1. scarce foreign exchange,

2. insufficient external credit; and,

3. growing fiscal deficits.

Central American authorities have had to:

1. force exports of coffee even to countries that are not members of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA);

2. negotiate sales for future shipments in order to obtain partial prepayments, even at discounted prices;

3. place coffee in free ports for sale on a consignment basis to obtain cash advances, thus supplying grain in quantities that exceed the needs of the market.

Naturally, these marketing procedures have also affected the individual coffee producer whose income is low and slow. Internal credit supply has diminished as IMF guidelines are followed by governments to limit inflationary pressures.

The outcome of these different factors seems to be that the conduct of growers and exporters, as well as local governments, is tending to accelerate the supply of coffee with the corresponding deteriorating effect on prices.

5) A drop of US$0.10 per pound (actual price around $1.25) in the price of coffee has the following yearly adverse effect on Central American economies:

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| US$0.10 per lb. drop in price of coffee | Yearly loss of income |
|---|---|
| Costa Rica | $ 16.700.000 |
| Honduras | $ 10.700.000 |
| Guatemala | $ 24.500.000 |
| El Salvador | $ 35.600.000 |
| Annual loss for Central America | $ 87.500.000 |

If the regulating mechanism of the ICA should fail, it is foreseeable that the drop in coffee prices would be extreme, down to $0.50 or $0.55 per lb. The number cited above as an annual loss for Central America would have to be multiplied by 7, implying an annual loss of revenue for the Central American region alone of $612.500.000, more than three billion dollars in a five year period.

6) The behavior of Central America is adversely affecting the world coffee market

We can clearly state that the world price of coffee is presently at least $0.10 per lb. lower than the level it would have if Central American nations followed a more structured policy of sales and exports. As a consequence, since the price of Central American coffee is reflected in the price of other world coffees, this behavior is also affecting countries like Brazil and Colombia.

The ICA price regulating mechanism has suffered during the 1982/83 year due to the Central American problem and we see the world price of coffee at roughly $1.24 per lb. instead of the desired $1.30.

A very negative consequence of Central America's distress sales to obtain needed foreign currency is the sale of coffee to countries that are not members of the ICA, specially to those of the Communist Eastern block, at prices as low as $0.55 per lb. A great irony, to see nations trying to fend off communism at the same time that they subsidize coffee consumption in communist countries as a way to obtain the foreign currency needed to keep alive their political and economic ties with the West.

7) What to do?

It seems clear that a good marketing strategy, both in each country's management of the coffee crop and in its exports, requires the full compliance of Central America with the terms of the ICA, with its tri-monthly distribution of export quotas and shipments and with the provision to stock internal surpluses to avoid ruinous sales to non-ICA member countries.

In order to be able to finance these necessary purchases of surplus coffee, a medium term credit line would be required in the order of approximately 30% of annual Central American Exports, the rough equivalent of 480 million dollars.

On the institutional side, countries like Colombia and Brazil could offer convenient technical assistance.

Possible financial sources to be considered are:

1. International Development Bank (IBD)

2. Income from U.S. surplus food sales to Central America (wheat, grains, oils, etc.)

3. Credit from U. S. sources

4. A combination of the former.

Such a plan of action ought to be ready, at the latest,
during the last 3 months of this year to be able to regulate the new
coffee harvest that will start to be picked. It would certainly
be in step with the provisions of the ICA whose success hangs not
only on its mechanisms and economic clauses, but also, primarily, on
the discipline mustered by its members to comply with their commit-
ments.

We are thoroughly convinced that the ICA is an
economic instrument with far reaching benefits for consumer and
exporting countries, not the least of which is the Central American
region. Should some countries find themselves unable to implement
their ICA commitments because of the lack of necessary financial
strength, the whole system would be endangered and consequences, as
shown, could be dire.

Therefore, it seems imperative to face the problem
very frankly in order to adopt, while there is still time, a
positive approach to its solution by keeping the International Coffee
Agreement alive.

Washington, D.C., September 9, 1983

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-- It promotes the maintenance of adequate coffee stock levels by making each producing country's export quota partially dependent on its level of stocks. These stocks can be released in a period of high prices to put immediate downward pressure on the market.

In the 1983 Agreement, however, the United States sought and achieved several improvements. These include:

-- An enhanced role for importing countries in the determination of individual country export quotas. Although consumers will still not be directly involved in negotiations on export quotas, consumers must approve the final quota distribution. Our vote on this issue will help assure that sufficient quantities of the types of coffee demanded by U. S. consumers are included in the final quota distribution.

-- More effective provisions regarding the declaration of export shortfalls to assure that export quotas remain realistic. Exporters which do not declare in a timely fashion their inability to fulfill their assigned quotas will be penalized by having their quotas reduced in the following year.

-- Language clarifying the obligation of producers to refrain from multilateral activities outside the scope of the Agreement which would affect the price of coffee.

CHAIRMAN
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

COMMISSION MEMBERS:
MR. NICHOLAS F. BRADY
MAYOR HENRY G. CISNEROS
GOV. WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR.
DR. CARLOS F. DIAZ-ALEJANDRO
MR. WILSON S. JOHNSON
MR. LANE KIRKLAND
MR. RICHARD M. SCAMMON
DR. JOHN SILBER
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
AMB. ROBERT S. STRAUSS
DR. WILLIAM B. WALSH

SENIOR COUNSELLORS:
REP. MICHAEL D. BARNES
SEN. LLOYD BENTSEN
REP. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD
SEN. PETE V. DOMENICI
SEN. DANIEL K. INOUYE
REP. JACK F. KEMP
AMB. JEANE KIRKPATRICK
MR. WINSTON LORD
SEN. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS
MR. WILLIAM D. ROGERS
REP. JAMES C. WRIGHT

November 11, 1983

Mr. Paul A. Wee
General Secretary
Lutheran World Ministries
360 Park Avenue South
New York, NY 10010

Dear Mr. Wee:

Many thanks for your thoughtful letter on Central America, and for your offer of counsel. I have taken the liberty of sharing your letter and its enclosures with the other members of the Commission. We will keep your concerns and suggestions in mind as we draft our report.

Lutheran
World Ministries

USA NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION

LUTHERAN CENTER/360 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, NEW YORK, NY 10010
TELEPHONE: 212/532-6350, CABLE: LUTHCO NEW YORK, TELEX: 620651 LUTWORL
PAUL A. WEE, GENERAL SECRETARY

October 26, 1983

NOV 1 1983

Dr. Henry Kissinger
1800 K Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

It was a pleasure for my wife and me to meet you during the Annual Awards Dinner of the Appeal of Conscience Foundation. We appreciated your words during the dinner and were grateful for the opportunity to share some thoughts concerning the Central America policy of the Administration during our brief conversation at the reception following. Let me state quite frankly that we value your presence in the diplomatic circles at this most precarious juncture of world history.

It is in the context of our high estimation of your personal and professional commitment to peace with justice among the nations that I wish to pursue your invitation to follow-up our conversation regarding two concerns which reflect the convictions of our churches.

(1) It is our shared conviction that the present course of US policy in Central America is both counter-productive to our stated aims and inconsistent with the fundamental values upon which this country was founded. Should we cease the destabilization of the Nicaraguan government and alter the present course of military and economic support of the vested interests in El Salvador and Guatemala, seeking rather the type of political solutions to which you have been committed, we would immediately begin to

a. create precisely those links which would ultimately insure the maintaining of US strategic interest in the hemisphere,

b. obviate the need for Central American countries to look to nations of the Eastern Bloc for their long-term security and well-being,

c. gain the respect of the vast majority of people in these countries, who seek tranquility, a greater measure of democracy and economic stability,

d. achieve consistency with the deeper ethical values and the more noble element of our own American tradition.

Many of us regard as a positive step your readiness to initiate discussion with Mr. Guillermo Ungo, President of the Democratic Revolutionary Front of El Salvador.

continued....

A Common Agency in International Mission and Ministry of The American Lutheran Church.
The Lutheran Church in America, and The Association of Evangelical Lutheran Churches

Joint Reflections by the Presiding Bishop
and a Group of District Bishops
of The American Lutheran Church
Following a Central American Trip

I. General information:

1. We are bishops, pastors, and lay employees of The American Lutheran Church who strive to speak as informed Christians.

2. We spent a total of 10 days traveling in Central American countries. We do not speak as experts.

3. We talked with a broad range of people with many different perceptions and convictions. Mostly we spoke with leaders of churches, government officials, and professionals in the fields of business, education, and social services. We made a studied effort to hear from both proponents and opponents of existing government and church leadership. We had very few interviews with people randomly chosen.

4. Four days were spent in two briefing sessions in Washington, DC, prior to taking the trip. There we spoke with persons representing various points of view regarding Central America.

5. We, like all Americans, are faced with the necessity of developing opinions about U.S. policy in Central America. We also have a responsibility to assess the churches' role in those countries.

6. We offer here those opinions on which we substantially agree. It is our hope that in so doing we will make a useful contribution to the current debate over U.S. policy and also provide some guidance for our church's work.

II. In regard to Central America generally we are agreed that:

1. The root problem is the injustice worked on the many poor people by the few rich people.

2. The unrest in Central American countries cannot be settled by military means.

3. The possibility of rising out of poverty and the claiming of full human and civil rights are necessary pre-conditions for peace in the region.

4. The countries of Central America are rich in natural and human resources. The resources for a prosperous society are present.

5. The turning of Central America into an East-West battleground is a tragedy imposed by nations outside the region, including the U.S.

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6. The people of all Central American countries live in daily fear of warfare. The people of Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras especially also live in daily fear of summary executions, disappearances, and imprisonment without charges.

7. The absence of a history of democratic practices, of peaceful changes of government, of a loyal political opposition able to dissent without fear, make solutions in Central American countries very difficult.

8. Negotiated solutions are necessary if long-term peace with justice and freedom is to become a reality.

9. The U.S. should vigorously support short- and long-range negotiated solutions with special concern for regional self-determination.

10. The churches have the responsibility to press for negotiations as well as to provide and encourage humanitarian aid.

11. The refugee flow is an increasing tragedy. Churches and governments will need ongoing commitments to assist these victims.

12. The Lutheran World Federation and Lutheran World Relief are closely following refugee needs in Central America, are providing some aid, and anticipate further supportive efforts.

13. The following ALC Church Council resolutions adopted in June 1983 continue to express our best judgment regarding U.S. policy in Central America.

Resolved, That the Church Council of The American Lutheran Church urge members of ALC congregations to pray for peace with justice in the Central America region, to inform themselves about the underlying causes of the conflicts, and to be generous in support of efforts by the church's agencies to alleviate suffering there; and be it further

Resolved, That the Church Council encourage the participants in The ALC bishops' study trip to Latin America, planned for the fall of 1983, to seek all appropriate ways to share their observations upon their return; and be it further

Resolved, That the Church Council ask the government of the United States to:

a. Support resolution of conflicts in Central America through nonmilitary means, including negotiations and increased commitment to economic justice and protection of human rights;

b. Increase its economic aid to governments of the region whose human-rights performance record is acceptable;

c. Suspend both covert and overt actions seeking to destabilize the government of Nicaragua and move toward normalization of relations with Nicaragua;

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d. Grant legal asylum (with refugee or extended-voluntary-departure status) to the many Central Americans who have recently emigrated to this country and remain under threat of deportation to life-threatening situations in their countries of origin; and be it further

Resolved, That the Church Council urge congregations of The ALC to seek opportunities for ministry with Central Americans who have come to find refuge in this country; and be it further

Resolved, That the Church Council encourage members of ALC congregations to communicate concerns such as those noted above to the President of the United States and to those who represent them in Congress; and be it further

Resolved, That the Church Council support the establishment of an interunit task force on Central American concerns, with representation from appropriate national units of The ALC, to work with the Division for World Mission and Inter-Church Cooperation and the Office of Church in Society in fulfilling ALC General Convention, Church Council, and official unit actions pertaining to Central America.

### III. With respect to Nicaragua we are agreed that:

1. Life under former dictator Somoza was unbelievably bad for the vast majority. Poor, middle class, and rich all joined in his overthrow.

2. The post-revolution government (Sandinista) has made significant progress in meeting the needs of poor people for land, health care, literacy, and hope.

3. The Sandinist government also says that:

a. It will exercise a preferential option for the poor.

b. It will avoid dependency on any other nation or nations, East or West.

c. Its economic goal is for a mixed economy, roughly 65 percent private and 35 percent state-owned.

d. Banking and international marketing will be entirely in the hands of the state.

e. Producers will be encouraged to stay in Nicaragua, regardless of the size of their business, so long as they operate productively and do not seek to subvert the revolution.

f. Elections will be held in 1985 with a political-parties law providing for opposition parties.

g. The present nine persons forming the national directorate, the ultimate state authority, are the expression of the people's will even though not elected.

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[L]

4. The several opponents of the Sandinist government with whom we spoke believe the Sandinists to be creating a one-party state with no possibility for significant opposition in spite of the above assurances given by the Sandinist party.

5. The Sandinist party controls the government, the military, and the media.

6. Censorship of the media is attributed to the state of war. However, the censorship extends beyond military matters.

7. The general secretary of the national directorate told us that the Sandinists use Marxism-Leninism as their guide, but adapted it to Nicaraguan needs.

8. U.S. policies toward Nicaragua over the last century led to widespread distrust for and antagonism toward the U.S.

9. U.S. policy should call for the removal of all outside military involvement in and around Nicaragua.

10. The U.S.-supported contras do not represent a possible alternative for a democratic Nicaragua.

11. Nicaragua by itself poses no threat to the U.S.

12. We have no way to judge the extent of Cuban and Soviet involvement in Nicaragua. Pro-Sandinists insist it is slight, opponents think it substantial.

13. The churches are badly split in their attitudes toward the current government. Large numbers of Roman Catholics, including priests and nuns, are involved in "base Christian communities" which see support for the revolution and its aims as a Christian calling. In contrast the Roman Catholic bishops have publicly warned of the development of a totalitarian state imposed on Nicaragua by the Sandinist party. The Protestants with whom we spoke were strong supporters of the Sandinista program, but indicated that substantial numbers of their faithful would disagree with them.

David W. Preus

October 10, 1983

DWP/glr6f

-4-

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES FOR FOREIGN SERVICE, INC.

200 PARK AVENUE SOUTH NEW YORK, N. Y. 10003 777 8210

STATEMENT ON SAFE HAVEN FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES

We feel compelled to express our concern over current national policy towards certain Central Americans arriving in the United States.

We are particularly concerned over the expulsions of Salvadorans and Guatemalans from this country and the possible consequences which they may face upon return to their homelands. We believe that the concept of "safe haven" from persecution and warfare established in the traditional principles of this nation must be reaffirmed and immediately extended to Central Americans arriving in the U.S. as a country of first asylum.

Large numbers of Salvadoran and, recently, Guatemalan nationals have arrived in the United States over the last three years. Some estimates indicate that over 250,000 Salvadorans alone have entered the U.S. since early 1980. Many, if not most, of these nationals and others from Central America are arriving as refugees fleeing conditions of generalized civil warfare and widely acknowledged, pervasive human rights abuse in their homelands.

Since early 1980, international observers have frequently characterized the internal situation in El Salvador as one of widespread civil warfare. The acknowledged level of human rights violations has been extremely high, with most sources indicating at least 30,000 civilian deaths since the beginning of 1980. More recently, well-documented reports indicate killings throughout rural Guatemala, primarily of indigenous peasants.

Salvadorans and Guatemalans entering or seeking entry into the U.S. have, according to American government pronouncements and practice, been treated as 'ordinary' undocarded aliens on the explicit presumptions that their motives for entry are economic. Large numbers of Salvadorans and Guatemalans continue to be apprehended and deported or encouraged to return voluntarily to their homelands each month by U.S. authorities, despite reports that some of those returned have been persecuted or even killed.

Extended voluntary departure, an existing remedy for temporary safe haven applied in other similar situations to protect nationals from being returned to countries in which their lives would be threatened, has not been made available, nor is the existing asylum determination process meeting the need for provision of protection.

[L.C.]

Member agencies of the Migration and Refugee Affairs Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies, reflecting both religious and secular perspectives and heritages, strongly reaffirm the right of these Central American refugees to remain in safe haven in the United States.

The agencies recognize the government's concern to avoid blanket consideration of groups seeking safe haven. However, the agencies firmly believe that the United States cannot depart from its long historical tradition of responding to humanitarian emergencies. It must not establish a system which precludes such responses.

In denying individual requests for asylum and in dismissing consideration of extended voluntary departure protection, the government has argued that many Salvadorans fleeing are merely innocent neutrals caught in a crossfire and that most are motivated primarily by economic considerations. As a consequence, Central American refugees are treated as undocumented aliens and simply part of the larger illegal immigration problem.

It is clear, however, that the situations of El Salvador and Guatemala, like so many others in the world, are precisely those which motivate refugee flight. That flight is a natural and predictable response by people to escape crossfire and the danger of pervasive random violence. These are situations from which refugees must be protected.

The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has declared that all Salvadorans who have left their country since early 1980 are in a refugee-like situation and should be provided the protection from *refoulment* afforded refugees recognized under the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. UNHCR explicitly based this determination on the internationally-recognized conditions of civil warfare and the impossibility of making individual refugee determinations on a case-by-case basis given the large numbers fleeing and the presumption of collective danger.

The other nations through which refugees travel to reach the United States, - Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico, - have not signed or ratified the UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Legal protection from *refoulment* is *not* assured even in Mexico, let alone Guatemala or Honduras. Nonetheless Mexico alone currently harbors over two hundred thousand Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees according to UNHCR estimates, despite its economic inability to meet even their most minimal needs. The current minimal levels of international refugee assistance to the region must be substantially increased if even more are not to be forced to seek refuge in the U.S.

2

[Lc]

The argument that Central American refugees should stay in Mexico as their first country of asylum is based on the presumption that the refugee knows in advance where one should or should not go. However, the nature of rapid flight precludes such premeditation. It is overwhelmingly the case that those coming have family relatives here in the United States. We cannot deny the logic of people going to where their relatives are. Therefore, while supporting other first asylum countries in their efforts to cope with refugees, the United States must recognize that it has also become a country of first asylum. It must thus be prepared to offer protection to those fleeing persecution and civil war as our neighbors are doing both to the south and the north.

Through the daily work done by our local affiliates directly with Salvadoran and Guatemalan nationals and in the face of countless testimonies of families and lives destroyed by violence, we have been convinced of the validity of their claim to and need for protection. We have also heard with increasing frequency reports of persecution, disappearances and deaths of individuals expelled from the United States and returned to El Salvador and Guatemala. While it may be true that some of those returned face no more danger than those who stayed, as has been argued by our government in justifying deportations, this is precisely the point. The entire populations are subject to terrorization and random killings.

The understanding our constituencies have reached through their direct responses to the needs of those refugees has led some groups to make increasingly dramatic gestures challenging current U.S. policy towards them, namely offering "Sanctuary" to Central Americans fleeing the violence of their homelands. The voluntary agencies, because of who we are, do not like to see our own constituencies forced to question the legitimacy of government policy.

Current national policy is counterproductive. Continuing this policy will not discourage those compelled to flee their homelands from seeking safe haven in this country.

In conclusion, we ask that extended voluntary departure be granted on a comprehensive basis to Salvadoran and Guatemalan nationals seeking safe haven in the United States. We believe that this will meet the humanitarian and legally compelling need to provide protective safe haven and that for most it will be temporary. They want to go home. This status has been implemented in the past in similar circumstances and persons granted this safe haven here returned home when conditions permitted.

3

American Council for Nationalities Service
American Friends Service Committee
American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees
Buddhist Council for Refugee Rescue and Resettlement
Church World Service of the National Council of
Churches of Christ in the U.S.A
HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society)
International Rescue Committee
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
Migration and Refugee Services, United States Catholic
Conference
Polish American Immigration and Relief Committee
The Presiding Bishop's Fund for World Relief/The
Episcopal Church
Tolstoy Foundation
World Relief of the National Association of
Evangelicals
Young Men's Christian Association
Young Women's Christian Association

June 8, 1983

Vol. 17, No. 9, September 1983

focus
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

A PUBLICATION OF THE OFFICE FOR GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, LUTHERAN COUNCIL IN THE USA

GIVE SALVADORANS
SAFE HAVEN NOW!

By Zdenka Seiner, Associate for Governmental Relations, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service

Since the outbreak of civil war in El Salvador in 1980, an estimated 500,000 Salvadorans have sought refuge in the United States. Fearful of deportation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, most have become part of the nation's sizable undocumented population. As of July, 14,272 had applied for political asylum here, with discouraging results. Less than 100 such petitions have been approved since 1980.

Most Salvadorans currently here seek a status which would remove the immediate threat of deportation while violent conditions prevail in their homeland. This status is known as "Extended Voluntary Departure" (EVD), and it would grant them a temporary safe haven.

EVD is not authorized by statute or regulation, though it is informally based on a section of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act. It is completely discretionary, granted by the attorney general upon recommendation by the secretary of state, usually in six-month or one-year intervals, to persons unable to return home "because of civil strife or catastrophic circumstances there." It can be lifted at any time, usually when conditions at home have improved sufficiently to allow for a reasonably safe return.

EVD has been granted 16 times since 1960 to foreign nationals otherwise deportable from the United States. Beneficiaries include Ethiopians, Nicaraguans, Poles, Afghans and Lebanese. All of these cases have a common denominator: the existence of civil strife or other dangerous, life-threatening conditions in their countries which necessitate that they find a temporary safe haven elsewhere.

The EVD status is fundamentally different from political asylum. The latter presumes that permanent resettlement in the United States is necessary and requires that applicants meet the definition of refugee as specified in the Refugee Act of 1980. That is, they must be persons unable or unwilling to return to their home countries "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."

Appropriately, the political asylum standard is somewhat rigorous. On the other hand, EVD benefits those who may not meet the standard for asylum and who do not wish to remain in this country permanently.

Without question conditions in El Salvador are

dangerous and life-threatening. Since 1980 more than 30,000 Salvadoran civilians have been killed. Altogether more than 15 percent of the population has been either killed or displaced.

The arm of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Salvador which monitors human rights violations, Tutela Legal, has documented 2,527 civilian deaths at the hands of military or paramilitary forces in the first six months of 1983. This toll constitutes a 12 percent increase over the last six months of 1982. The actual number of deaths in all likelihood is much higher since Tutela Legal tabulates first-hand, eyewitness accounts only.

U.S. physicians working in El Salvador's "free-fire" zones—areas where guerrilla activity is suspected and thus the military is given a free hand to deal with the situation—report daily bombings of some villages and the use of a napalm-like substance on the civilian population.

Congress has a significant interest in granting EVD status to Salvadoran refugees here. Last May two House committees—foreign affairs and judiciary—said so in "sense of Congress" resolutions they passed. Members of Congress have repeatedly written to the administration requesting that it take this action, but to date their efforts have been unsuccessful.

On May 31 the State Department issued a statement which said that EVD would "encourage further illegal immigration to the United States from El Salvador." This position has since been reiterated by various administration officials. They have pointed to "distressing levels" of civil strife and violence when asking for increased military aid for El Salvador. But they continue to perceive and treat Salvadoran nationals coming here as displaced peasants or economic migrants in search of a better livelihood and therefore to deport them if apprehended.

Deportations in the 1981 federal fiscal year numbered 2,332 and in the 1982 fiscal year 2,118. These figures do not include much larger numbers of Salvadorans whom the INS forces to leave the United States "voluntarily."

A leading U.S. expert on Central America, Professor Blaise Benpane of California State University, has asserted that without doubt 5-10 percent of those deported are executed. Among cases documented by Amnesty International is that of Santano Chirino Amaya, a 24-year-old Salvadoran refugee sent back in 1981. A month after his return his decapitated body was found along the so-called "Road to Death" near San Salvador's airport.

U.S. Lutherans became particularly conscious of the life-threatening situation in El Salvador with the arrest

Salvadoran refugees who have been hiding or accepted sanctuary in various churches over the last two years in the United States—Ricardo and Noemi Zelada and their daughter Adelila—are welcomed by Pastor Brandoch Lovely of Neighborhood Church, Pasadena, Calif.

[L]

last spring of Pastor Medardo Gomez of Lutheran Church of the Resurrection in San Salvador and Dr. Angel Ibarra, director of medical services for Lutheran Social Services of El Salvador. The men have been key figures in a Lutheran refugee camp named "Faith and Hope." Pastor Gomez was released shortly after his arrest, but Dr. Ibarra remains detained to this day as a political prisoner.

Among local churches which have become involved with Salvadorans being detained and threatened with deportation is Southside Presbyterian in Tucson, Ariz. On March 24, 1982, the church declared itself a public sanctuary for the refugees. The decision came after an extensive study of the congregation's role as a "people of faith," and it was based on a long tradition in the Judeo-Christian community of giving sanctuary.

The Old Testament talks about sanctuaries where people who committed manslaughter were offered protection. Roman law, medieval canon law and English common law all recognized the principle of sanctuary. In our own country, the concept though not the legal basis of church sanctuary was reaffirmed in the 1850s after the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law. This law allowed for suspected runaway slaves to be arrested and turned over to alleged claimants as property without any recourse whatsoever. Resistance developed. Churches defied the law to protect slaves and even established an underground railroad to facilitate their flight to freedom.

Public sanctuary today is an act of hospitality which dozens of churches are practicing. It means welcoming refugees instead of sending them away. "When a stranger sojourns with you in your land, you shall not do him wrong. The stranger who sojourns with you shall be to you as the native among you, and you shall love him as yourself; for you were strangers in the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God," reads Leviticus 19.33-34.

Sanctuary is an act of compassion. U.S. policy is to detain and deport Salvadoran refugees to possible suffering and death. Giving sanctuary cries out, "No! Practices which condemn people to such a fate must cease."

Sanctuary is a statement of resistance to injustice. It is a witness—a bold appeal to the nation's conscience to recognize the injustice of current U.S. policy toward Salvadorans.

Offering sanctuary is a grave decision because it is considered a felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. This matter was addressed by Pastor John Steinbruck of Luther Place Church in Washington, D.C.—a recently declared sanctuary—in a letter to The Lutheran magazine. He wrote:

"Luther Place did not 'break the law.' To the contrary, we believe we are in precise keeping of the Refugee Act of 1980 that affirms the UN Protocol on Refugees. It is the U.S. government that is breaking the law of God and humanity in its waging of unconstitutional wars in Central America and the destruction of an impoverished people yearning to be free.

"Nor did Luther Place have to vote on sanctuary. For many years the homeless of Washington and of the world have honored our congregation by accepting sanctuary in Luther Place. When there is a knock, one doesn't vote. It is for us to open unto others."

Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, the American Friends Service Committee, Church World Service and the Interreligious Task Force on El Salvador and Central America have jointly published a 100-page "congregational guide to helping Central American refugees in the United States." It includes a section of background information on giving sanctuary to refugees and answers questions about it. The guide, "Seeking Safe Haven," costs $4 per copy plus $1 for postage and handling and can be ordered from LIRS at 360 Park Avenue South, New York NY 10010.

Giving sanctuary has received wide media

## 'MOMENT OF REDEDICATION'

The August 27 march and rally which brought an estimated 300,000 persons to Washington's mall to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the civil rights march at which the late Martin Luther King Jr. delivered his now famous "I have a dream" speech was "more than a reminder of the past," states Co-director Susan Ruehle of the Lutheran Human Relations Association of America, shown at left above. "It was an affirmation of the struggle for jobs, peace and freedom today. It was a moment of rededication in continuing work for justice." Over 350 Lutherans marched under the LHRAA banner. Ruehle is talking here with Director Paul Brndjar of the Church in Society Office of the Lutheran Church in America and Assistant Director Carolyn Kilday of the LCA's Special Services Office.

coverage and, therefore, has been one of the most effective methods for bringing the issue to the attention of the public. To date, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service has not entered any of the sanctuaries. Nor have any parishioners or refugees in them been arrested for violating the law. However, the INS has expressed growing concern over the trend and may in the future take a more aggressive role to dissuade congregations from taking the step.

The administration has reasoned that the EVD status is granted only if such a decision is in the best national interest. Allowing Salvadorans to remain here temporarily is not deemed to be the case since the action would bring a flood of "feet people" streaming across our borders, as President Reagan recently described the situation.

However, refugee advocates point out that this potential flood has in fact already begun. The New York Times commented editorially on June 24: "To shout, 'The refugees are coming!' is neither a humane refugee policy nor a persuasive argument for Mr. Reagan's larger policy."

The fundamental question here is, "What is our best national interest?" Americans have prided themselves on their history of protecting and accepting refugees. Our government has frequently been a leader in safeguarding international human rights.

Yet since passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, refugee admissions to the United States have declined each year—in spite of growing refugee populations around the world. The decline reflects in part a genuine desire to explore solutions to mass displacements of people other than permanent resettlement in third countries. It also reflects a trend toward greater insularity along with efforts to "internationalize" the refugee burden.

Though on a reduced scale, the acceptance of refugees by the United States has continued as has the role of the nation as an advocate of refugee rights around the world. That this commitment would cease is unthinkable.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has suggested that by deporting Salvadorans the United States may be in violation of the UN Protocol on Refugees, to which this country is a signatory. The UNHCR manages refugee camps for Salvadorans in several Central American countries, including Mexico. It has identified three common "manifestations of terrorist acts"—murders, abductions and disappearances—in El Salvador, and it has recommended that Salvadorans who have fled their country since 1980 should be considered bona fide refugees under a presumptive group determination.

[L]

In 1979 the UN General Assembly requested that all law-abiding nations "respect scrupulously the role of non-refoulement"—not sending people back to countries where they face the danger of persecution.

The United States has often exerted pressure on countries of first asylum to adhere to the principles of "non-refoulement" and thus has effectively protected thousands of refugees. But now in continuing to deport Salvadorans the United States appears to be in violation of these very principles. All other countries to which Salvadorans have escaped have offered them some form of refuge, and deportations, though they have occurred, have not been frequent.

Usually the United States has been able to screen refugees scrupulously in various countries of first asylum according to specified criteria of eligibility. Only if they meet the criteria are they approved for admittance and transportation here. Now in becoming a country of first asylum for Salvadorans we must continue our commitment to their protection.

Congress has two basic options in dealing with this issue:

* To legislate the extended voluntary departure status for Salvadorans and thus take the decision out of the discretionary hands of the administration.

* To legislate a comprehensive and generic temporary safe-haven law which could apply equitably to any group.

The second option is far more controversial, and it will take some time to be resolved. Also, civil rights advocates and lawmakers do not agree on the most effective format for such legislation.

What is essential immediately is that the deportations of Salvadorans cease. This will not happen unless significant pressure is put on Congress by constituents to support the suspension of Salvadoran deportation and the granting of EVD.

The administration has taken its position and is holding to it firmly. There is no doubt that some Salvadorans suffer violence, persecution and death upon return. This must stop, now!

## CRIME BILLS PASS SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

A comprehensive crime package proposed by the Reagan administration, S829, and a separate bill which would re-establish the death penalty for federal crimes, S1765, have passed the Senate Judiciary Committee and are expected to come before the full body this fall.

Among other provisions, S829 allows for preventive detention—referred to as "bail reform" in the language of the bill—whereby judges can deny bail to an accused person. It also abolishes parole and greatly reduces time off for good behavior.

S1765 covers treason, espionage and the assassination of the president as well as murder occurring on federal property and death resulting from such felonies as kidnapping.

This attempt to re-establish a federal capital punishment law was originally part of the comprehensive crime bill but was separated to enhance the prospects for both causes. Such attempts have been made ever since 1972 when the Supreme Court invalidated all existing death penalty statutes.

## NONPROFIT GROUPS FACE HIKE IN POSTAL RATES

Postal rates for third-class, nonprofit mail could rise if the Senate rather than the House version of the appropriations

bill for the Department of the Treasury and Postal Service for the 1984 fiscal year is approved.

To keep this mail at its current rate of 5.2¢ per piece, an appropriation of $879 million is needed. Only $802 million was approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee in July. The House subcommittee with jurisdiction over the issue OK'd $879 million, and the full House Appropriations Committee is to take up the bill late this month.

In urging adoption of the full amount, advocates for nonprofit organizations have cited increased demands for services and decreasing revenues due to federal budget cuts. A rate hike would be a major burden to already overburdened agencies.

Meanwhile, the Independent Sector, of which the Lutheran Council is a member, reports that Director David Stockman of the Office of Management and Budget is proposing to "freeze" the appropriation for third-class, nonprofit mail at $400 million. At this subsidy level rates would increase by over 70 percent. The Reagan administration has not yet introduced legislation implementing the proposal.

## REAGAN NAMES POLITICAL ALLIES TO FOOD ASSISTANCE TASK FORCE

At least six of the 13 persons named this month by the White House to a task force to produce a "no-holds-barred" study of hunger in the United States and its causes are known critics of federal food programs, and only two have any working knowledge of local community food assistance efforts.

The appointments give credence to the view expressed by skeptics as soon as formation of the Task Force on Food Assistance was announced by the Reagan administration in August (see lead article, "Soup Lines for Real?" in last month's Focus), that it is a political move to pacify those who have attacked Reagan's policies as being unfair to the poor and underprivileged.

Another factor justifying the skepticism is that the administration has largely ignored offers to assist in the study by such well-respected anti-hunger groups as the Interreligious Taskforce on U.S. Food Policy and Bread for the World.

Task force appointees are:

* Economist Kenneth Clarkson, who during a one-year term ending last April as associate director for human resources of the Office of Management and Budget helped make cuts of $1 billion in the food-stamp program and $300 million a year in child-nutrition programs.

* George Graham of Johns Hopkins University, who under contract to OMB in 1981 wrote a paper the administration used to justify cuts in the supplemental feeding program for pregnant and nursing women, infants and children (WIC). In 1968 he testified before the Senate Agriculture Committee that revelations of hunger and malnutrition in the United States "were gross distortions of the facts."

* Former Gov. Edward King of Massachusetts, one of the few Democratic governors to support Reagan's cuts in domestic programs and his economic policies.

* John Perkins, who believes strongly in black self-help projects and has criticized public assistance programs. He is a former civil rights activist in Mississippi who is president of an evangelical church called the Voice of Calvary Ministries.

* J.P. Bolduc, a conservative Republican who as an assistant secretary of agriculture in the Ford administration was a critic of food stamps.

* Dean J. Clayburn LaForce Jr. of the Graduate School of Management of the University of California at Los Angeles, the task force chair. He is a conservative

[L]

# OPINIONS IN focus

By Charles V. Bergstrom

Executive Director, Office for Governmental Affairs

Pastor David Aanonson of rural Mamelund Lutheran Church near Stanton, Iowa, was one of the presenters at a "Global Mission Event" held last July in Fremont, Neb., by the Lutheran Church in America. As an Illinois farm boy turned big-city pastor and also as a participant in the event, I was interested in these changes concerning the family farm described by Aanonson:

> "From 1940 to 1979 we lost over one-half of our farms, from 6.1 million to 2.3 million. From 1940 to 1979 farm population decreased from 25 percent of U.S. population to 5 percent. Yet farm production doubled in that same amount of time. The average farm in 1940 was just 197 acres in size; today it is over 400 acres.

> "There is less diversity in farming and more specialization. Unfortunately evaluation has taught us that specialization is the first step toward extinction. Farmers today have a more sophisticated world view—probably even more so than their urban-suburban neighbors. Gold prices, the strength of the U.S. dollar, political unrest overseas, world weather conditions—all have a direct bearing on the farmer's pocketbook.

> "The farmer today is more interdependent both nationally and internationally. Farmers are no longer self-sufficient. The farm family pays the same for milk and flour as does the city neighbor. They both buy them at the same place. Farmers are at the mercy of events on the other side of the globe that are beyond their control. Most farm families today have income from two or three sources: the farm, the husband's second job, the wife's second job. The cost is family stability, although the income has helped preserve the family farm."

And now we have the PIK (Payment In Kind) program, which seems to be helping massive conglomerate farms rather than family farms. The rich get richer! We need to remember some of the suggestions David Aanonson makes to those who are in the church. He asks us:

1. To see the rural community as a vital area in which to proclaim the gospel and to bring the good news to bear on the problems of rural communities.

2. To call into question the practice of growth for the sake of growth—in other words, greed.

3. To help ensure the stability of rural communities and rural social structures.

economist with longstanding ties to President Reagan.

* Donna Carlson-West, former national chair of the American Legislative Exchange Council. It describes itself as an "advocate of limited government" and is funded primarily by large corporations.

* Sandra Smolley, a Republican member of the Sacramento County board of supervisors in California.

* Betsy Rollins, who directs the soup kitchen of St. Phillip's Episcopal Church, Durham, N.C.

* Former Mayor John Driggs of Phoenix, Ariz., who now heads a savings and loan association. He chairs the board of Second Harvest, a Phoenix-based organization which coordinates the distribution of food donated voluntarily to food banks operated privately.

* Mayor Richard L. Berkley of Kansas City, Mo., a Republican.

* Director Erma David of the George Washington Carver Association in Peoria, Ill.

* Executive Director Midge Decter of the Committee for the Free World, New York City.

## MILEAGE PROPOSAL SEEKS TAX BREAK FOR VOLUNTEERS

Legislation which would give volunteers a better tax break for the mileage they drive when using their automobiles to carry out charitable activities is pending in Congress. The present allowable deduction is 9¢ per mile, although the American Automobile Association estimates operating costs at 25.9¢ per mile for a six-cylinder, standard car driven 15,000 or more miles per year. The proposals call for a 20¢-per-mile deduction.

HR358, introduced by Rep. Robert Roe (R-N.J.), and HR2697, by Rep. Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.), are among bills being considered by the House Ways and Means Committee. S1169, introduced by Sen. David Durenberg (R-Minn.), and S1579, by Sen. William Armstrong (R-Colo.), are among those pending in the Senate Finance Committee. In the House the 20¢ deduction relates to that allowed for business expenses, while the Senate relates the fee to the rate government employees use.

Passage of such a bill appears to be contingent on movement of the larger tax bill mandated by the budget "blueprint" for the 1984 federal fiscal year adopted by Congress in June. Any movement in the remaining months of this session appears uncertain.

## EMERGENCY PROGRAMS PUT IN JEOPARDY

Counting on the $225 million increase for social services for the unemployed and disadvantaged which was included in emergency jobs legislation signed into law last March, some states have already begun to expand such services. But they could face quick termination because of new budget cuts now before Congress.

One month after the emergency jobs bill became law, the administration proposed reducing Title XX funding for the 1984 fiscal year from $2.5 billion to $2.44 billion. Title XX provides for services funded under the jobs bill as well as such other services as family planning, counseling and food preparation and delivery. The administration reasoned that with the $225 million increase states would not need the full $2.5 billion.

Social service advocates argue that because of growing demands for services and fiscal difficulties in many states, such a compensatory cut would undermine the intent of the emergency jobs bill. A level of $2.8 billion for Title XX is needed, they maintain.

The appropriations bill including Title XX is currently pending before the House Appropriations Committee.

**Focus on Governmental Affairs (USPS 003-770)**—Published monthly by Office for Governmental Affairs, Lutheran Council in the USA. Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and additional mailing offices. No advertising included.
**Focus Editor**—Lita Brusick Johnson. **Editorial/Circulation Office**—122 C Street NW, Suite 300, Washington DC 20001; 202/783-7501. **Subscription Rates**—$5 annually for each individual subscription of 12 issues. Bulk mailing rates to one address—5-99 copies, $2.50 each; 100 copies or more, $2 each. Multiple subscriptions individually mailed by OGA—applicable bulk mailing rates given plus $1.50 per copy. **Additional Copies of Single Issues**—$1 per 12 copies postpaid.

COMMISSION MEMBERS:
MR NICHOLAS F. BRADY
MAYOR HENRY G. CISNEROS
GOV. WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR.
DR CARLOS F. DIAZ-ALEJANDRO
MR WILSON S. JOHNSON
MR LANE KIRKLAND
MR RICHARD M. SCAMMON
DR JOHN SILBER
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
AMB ROBERT S. STRAUSS
DR WILLIAM B. WALSH

October 14, 1983

Mr. John C. Duncan
St. Joe Minerals Corporation
250 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10177

Dear Mr. Duncan:

Thank you for your letter following up on
our discussion in California. I have taken the
liberty of sharing it with my staff. We will be
sure to take your recommendations and the ACCION
International/AITEC memorandum into
consideration when it comes time to draft the
report.

2201 C STREET NW, ROOM 1004, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520, TEL: (202) 632-7804

ST. JOE MINERALS CORPORATION

250 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10177

JOHN C. DUNCAN
212-953-5003

October 5, 1983

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I appreciated very much the opportunity of discussing with you
several weeks ago in California the program of the Commission on Central
America. Your Commission has a unique opportunity, not only to make an
important foreign policy recommendation, but also to set in motion a
program which could have a lasting effect on the Central American
countries.

You asked me to follow up on the development of small business
throughout the area in coordination with the Council of the Americas
whose representatives, Sam Segnar and Seymour Milstein, testified before
your committee. Accordingly, I am attaching hereto a memorandum from
ACCION International/AITEC estimating what they could accomplish in
Central America in the next five years.

Your Commission will probably come up with a recommendation of a
more massive input of funds which would have an immediate impact on the
area. However, for the long run, it is our feeling that an organization
such as ours could also be of real assistance in increasing employment
over a larger time frame. Continuity is all important in this type of
effort, so that a commitment of funds over five to ten years, without
interruption for the vagaries of political happenings, is the best
solution, if at all possible.

The attached proposal from Accion estimates that in any one of the
Central American countries, for an investment of $1,220,000 over five
years, 7,000 new jobs could be created and 43,200 people would
indirectly benefit. This is in accordance with our experience in other
areas of Latin America and represents an extremely efficient use of
money.

Other organizations which have long-term experience in Central America and might be prepared to do the same are as follows:

Partners of the Americas
Allan Rubin
Executive Director

Latin American Agri Business Development Corporation
Robert Ross
President

Pan American Development Foundation
Jarvis Jones
President

In addition, as I mentioned, the Inter-American Foundation, whose President is Peter Bell, has wide experience throughout the Continent and Central America. They made grants to all Latin America of $21.2 million in 1982 and the program is supervised by a board with four members from the private sector and three from the government. The Foundation has been effective in supporting local small business enterprises, rural cooperatives, and other nongovernmental development efforts within the region. Many of the projects it assists were begun with the help of Accion and the Pan American Development Fund.

In essence, my suggestion is that the Commission include among its recommendations an allocation of funds to these organizations and any similar reputable ones which may be in existence. For example, within Central America there are many valid local organizations working in the private sector, some of which are being supported by the institutions mentioned above.

Funds would be made available and disbursed only if each one of the organizations provides a realistic blueprint of how the monies would be spent and the resulting impact on employment throughout the area. In this way, with a relatively limited sum of money, a continuing program of developing individual entrepreneurs and private businessmen could be launched under the aegis of the Commission.

If I can be of any further assistance to you and the Commission or if you wish to talk personally with any members of the ACCION operating management, please do not hesitate to call us.

Best regards.

John C. Duncan
Chairman
ACCION International/AITEC

Enc.

SPECIAL PROGRAM FOR CENTRAL AMERICA

ACCION International/AITEC

It is the hope of ACCION International/AITEC that the Presidential Commission on Central America will bring a fresh and innovative perspective to the socio-economic development of the region, and to the role of the United States within that region.

When studying the development problems of the various countries, it is readily apparent that a large segment of the urban and rural population lives virtually outside the social, political and economic mainstream. These individuals, in most cases a majority within their country, have been relatively untouched by traditional development strategies. These strategies have either consisted of top down government programs plagued by bureaucratic slowness and rigidity or have focused on large-scale private business investments, the benefits of which have not necessarily reached the poorest population group.

If the poor majority in Central America are to be effectively reached, a bold new approach to assistance is called for, one which directly stimulates the informal economic sector. While the needs of the poor are diverse and urgent, ACCION strongly believes that by far the **greatest need in the region is the creation of employment and additional family income.**

Any new assistance effort on the part of the U.S. government and private sector must directly address this problem. ACCION'S experience throughout Latin America has demonstrated that new jobs and sorely needed income can be generated among the poorest groups through the promotion of small-scale businesses and small farming activities. For example, in the urban areas, one new permanent job can be created through the provision of $750-1,000 in credit

to a microbusiness. Other important benefits accrue from this approach as well: the local economy is stimulated, needed goods and services are provided to the local population, and unskilled workers gain on-the-job training.

How to best actively promote such productive activities in the informal sector of the countries of Central America? Several channels are already in place, all of which avoid the static bilateral government agreements that have stymied most development efforts in the past. Four specific examples readily come to mind:

1. Provide additional resources to such entities as the Inter-American Foundation and the Small Projects Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank which currently finance such activities throughout the region.

2. Through a system of incentives and guarantees, make additional capital available to local private and development banks earmarked for microbusinesses and small farmers.

3. Finance the activities of local indigenous organizations which are working directly with the sector. Such entities would include savings and loans cooperatives, farmers associations, labor organizations, and various types of private voluntary organizations (PVOs).

4. Finance the work of U.S. based PVOs which have a proven track record in the microenterprise development field, and which are capable of scaling up their operations in Central America.

While each of these entities by itself is small, the collective impact of their efforts in the Central American countries over a five-year period would be most impressive. Given adequate financial resources, ACCION International itself would be capable of scaling up its present operations in Central America. By way of illustration, such a scale-up effort might have the following characteristics and expected results:

Objective

Create family income and employment among the poor of Central America.

Strategy

Promote and provide assistance to urban microbusinesses and rural small farmers.

Inputs

Credit, guarantee funds, management and marketing assistance, management training, and the creation of microbusinesses and small farm organizations.

Role of ACCION International/AITEC

Through professional on-site staff in each country, back-
stopped by a regional office in Guatemala, ACCION would seek local
private sector involvement to work with existing local private
organizations and to create new ones capable of attending micro-
businesses and small farmers. Credit pools would be established
in local banks earmarked for these clients. Guarantee funds chan-
nelled through ACCION would be used to leverage additional direct
bank financing for such clients. ACCION would teach local organi-
zations how to provide management and marketing assistance to micro-
businesses and small farmers in a cost-effective and efficient
manner. Following a three- to five-year start-up phase, a local
self-financing structure would be in place, capable of reaching
significant numbers of the client population over a sustained
period of time.

directly among those individuals of society that are most in need.
Perhaps even more important, a local structure would be in place
with essential managerial skills transferred to local individuals
so as to guarantee a permanent and dynamic strategy for dealing
with local development problems.

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 9, 1993

Mr. Francis X. Gannon
Advisor to the Secretary General
Organization of American States
17th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Gannon:

Ambassador Motley has asked me to reply to your letter of August 11 with your most thought provoking essay on Central America. As you requested, it will be passed on to the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America for their review.

We find ourselves in agreement with most of your essay's conclusions, though we are perhaps more hopeful that the Contadora Process will make a lasting contribution than you are. We especially appreciate your view that economic development in the isthmus will depend not so much on infusions of assistance funds but on improved efficiency in the public sector and increased dynamism in the private sector.

Two of your observations especially caught my eye.

First, on pages 25-26, "Left to their own devices and resources any or all countries bordering on the Caribbean Basin scarcely constitute a credible danger to U.S. security. Without such imperialistic support from the Eastern bloc, in fact, no regional country would prove excessively bothersome to its regional neighbors."

-2-

We think this is a fundamental insight. There is, if I may use the term, a "natural" balance among the Central American nations which operates to limit and contain disputes and which promotes peaceful relations. Even the Salvadoran-Honduran war of 1969, the most recent direct conflict of another epoch, pales in comparison to the tensions and destructive capacity of the present situation. The difference is the presence of a powerful outside force which supports violence as its chosen vehicle to power in Central America. Nicaraguan militarization, based on support from Cuba and the Soviet bloc, began long before that nation's relations with its neighbors or with the U.S. had deteriorated in any meaningful sense. Indeed, we and Nicaragua's neighbors in the isthmus, based on the stated goals of the revolution -- democracy, non-alignment, and a mixed economy, wished the post-Somoza regime well. We can only conclude that this militarization, at a time of good relations between Nicaragua and its neighbors, was largely offensive in nature or, at least, anticipated with remarkable foresight the effect that Sandinista policies would have on the other nations in Central America. The present tensions in the isthmus are largely a result of that militarization and of those policies.

Second, you discuss the balance between U.S. security interests and non-intervention on page 19. I believe that our present policy is an attempt to balance these two considerations through a unique policy mix.

As your essay affirms, the U.S. has a serious security stake in Central America. Yet, no serious analyst can claim that our policy there is interventionist. Our economic assistance is four times our military assistance to the region. The President has repeatedly stated that we have no intention of involving U.S. citizens in combat there. And there is no comparison between the number of U.S. military trainers in all of Central America and the more than 2000 Cuban military and state security advisers active in Nicaragua.

By any measure, we are in a supportive, not a domineering, posture. We are working closely with our friends in the isthmus to strengthen them so they themselves can respond to both internal tensions and external threats. We are determined to foreclose a military solution; we will provide adequate military assistance to prevent a victory by anti-democratic forces. We support negotiations likely to promote peaceful solutions consistent with the democratic aspirations of our friends, whether between the Salvadoran Peace Commission and the Salvadoran guerrillas or among the nations of the isthmus and their nearest neighbors in the Contadora process. And, most importantly, we support political and economic reforms which directly address the popular frustrations so tragically exploited by the promoters of violent Marxist-Leninist revolution.

As you might have inferred from the previous paragraph, We believe that your essay contains one critical omission. You do not give enough weight to democracy.

Critics of our policy who insist on the importance of political, economic and social reforms in Central America frequently scoff at the notion of democracy, the most profound reform of all. Their inconsistency always puzzles me. Costa Rica has proven the benefits of democracy in the isthmus; it is the most stable and egalitarian regime there and, except for the present temporary aberration in the global economy, has had the best record of economic development. Only democracy can accommodate in a balanced, stable, evolutionary way the rapid change which Central America has been undergoing and will continue to experience. Only democracy can accommodate the diversity of political opinion which now percolates there. And only democracy can guarantee the people of the region that they will never again face the arbitrary misrule they have experienced in the past. With some two-thirds of the members of the OAS now practicing democracies, we believe that democracy in Central America should not only be a goal, but an operational tool.

TELEPHONE:
01-600 4555

30, GRESHAM STREET,
LONDON, EC2P 2EB

6 October 1983

You encouraged us the other day to come forward with suggestions for the development of investment in and exports from Central American countries. This is of course not a very fruitful area for innovative thinking because fundamentally things can only improve as and when those countries make themselves more competitive. But there are a number of gimmicks which are worth considering and I offer three of them with great humility :-

1) <u>Barter</u>

Although barter is a dirty word at the IMF, it has become an inescapable necessity for many developing countries. However, the complexities involved in fixing barter transactions often act as a powerful deterrent and, given the homogeneity of Central America as an area, it occurred to me that it might be possible for the US Administration to set up a kind of "Central American Barter Office" which would help the countries concerned to achieve what they want in that field. (This is less complicated than it sounds because the actual work of such an Office could be farmed out to a consortium of US trading companies.)

2) <u>Finance for "Processing" Industries</u>

Where Central American countries have industries (e.g. textile)

OCT 12 1983

... 2

2.

importing raw materials and subsequently turning these into
exportable manufactures, financing could be arranged on a "toll"
basis, i.e. so that the raw material remains in the ownership of
the USA source of finance which then recovers its outlay from
the proceeds of the export of the manufactured products. This
was a system employed to keep important parts of German industry
going during the financial crisis of the 1920s. The trouble is
that there are probably too few cases of industries meeting the
required definition in Central America.

### 3) Managing Agencies

Anachronistic though it may seem, Central America could take a
leaf out of the book of British India. One of the engines of
industrial development in pre-independence India was the system
of Managing Agents. Under this system UK companies undertook
the complete management of businesses in India for a fee, thereby
allowing these businesses to be genuinely Indian and yet giving
investors the feeling that at least one of the risks, that of
grossly inefficient management was averted. Clearly this concept,
which would help to promote investment, could only be sold to
Central America if its British Indian provenance was carefully
concealed!

As I said at the beginning, these are only gimmicky ideas but you might
find a tiny place for them in your scheme of things. I would be happy to
elaborate on them if required.

The Hon. Henry A. Kissinger.

c.c. The Hon. William Rogers.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MEXICO

OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR

September 28, 1983

The Honorable
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 520
1800 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Henry,

We were sorry to miss you in Washington. The Jockey dinner was fun. You and Nancy McGuinis have a rain-check.

Should you go to Panama please see:

1. J.J. Vallarino, Jr. Jake is a Dartmouth graduate who married the daughter of one of his English professors. He is an important industrialist and an astute observer of the politics and problems of the region.

2. Fernando Eleta. Stanford and MIT. Television and radio stations. Former Secretary of Foreign Relations and of Treasury. Son of Spanish emigrants. Connected by marriage to Ignacio Fierro in Spain.

3. Roberto Heurtematte. I believe you know Bobby.

Ted Briggs will put you together with them. They are all friends of very long standing.

If your peregrinations take you to Nicaragua look up Ernesto Salazar, Jr. He was my class-mate and room-mate in prep school. His father was anti-Somoza even then. His first cousin was Jorge Salazar, former head of the coffee growers association. He was killed by the Sandinistas after they came to power. Ernie is president of the cattlemen's association.

OCT 6 1983

Episcopal Conferences of Central America and Panama: Principal Officers

Secretariado Episcopal de America Central (SEDAC)

President: Archbishop Roman Arrieta of San Jose

Secretary General: Bishop Antonio Troyo, Auxiliary of San Jose

Costa Rican Episcopal Conference

Secretary: Bishop Antonio Troyo

El Salvador Episcopal Conference

President: Bishop Marco Rene Revelo of Santa Ana

Vice President: Archbishop Arturo Rivera Damas of San Salvador

Secretary: Father Leopoldo Barreiro

Guatemalan Episcopal Conference

President: Bishop Prospero Penados del Barrio of San Marcos

Secretary: Bishop Jorge Mario Avila of El Peten

Honduran Episcopal Conference

President: Archbishop Hector Santos of Tegucigalpa

Secretary: Bishop Oscar Rodriguez, Auxiliary of Tegucigalpa

Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference

President: Archbishop Miguel Obando Bravo of Managua

Secretary: Bishop Leovigildo Lopez of Granada

Panamanian Episcopal Conference

President: Bishop Jose Carrizo of Chitre

Vice President: Archbishop Marcos Gregorio McGrath of Panama

Secretary: Bishop Carlos Ambrosio Lewis, Auxiliary of Panama

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305

DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY

(415) 497-3421

September 14, 1983

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Room 1004
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

SEP 27 1983

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

If I had any hope that the Commission you head would actually undertake a profound reassessment of the current administration's Central American policy, I would write detailed answers to the twenty questions you posed and more. But the questions themselves show the bias of the Commission. The history of Central America and the US role in the region from the late nineteenth century on are ignored, and there is an overwhelming presumption that the conflict may be analyzed in an East-West framework. If you are indeed looking for justification for the US military involvement with repressive right-wing governments, and for defining all forces for change as puppets of the Soviet Union, my comments are likely to be of little interest to you. I will therefore keep them brief.

First let me speak to the main area of my own expertise. As one of a handful of academic researchers who has done extensive fieldwork in rural El Salvador, I feel confident in arguing that the root of the conflict is the grossly inequitable land tenure system. No amount of military assistance, no amount of bombs or napalm can solve this problem. In no other country of Latin America have the estate owners been so intransigent (from 1932 on). Until they are neutralized by an effective and comprehensive agrarian reform, done with the participation of the landless laborers and the peasants who would benefit, there will not be peace in El Salvador. What the US has supported is a token reform effort imposed from the top down by a corrupt regime which cannot even control the goon squads of the landowners. Currently, the Reagan administration is focusing on the travesty of elections in such a context, pouring hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars into a corrupt and inept military while ignoring the real developmental needs of the country and refusing to negotiate with those who decided after decades of trying to change the system peacefully that armed opposition was the only remaining alternative. This is an absurd policy, undermining legitimate long term US interests in the region.

This analysis may be extended to the general situation in Central America. What is needed is a massive development effort aimed at the needs of the majority. This would eliminate hunger, illiteracy, much of the illegal migration to the US--and the social and political base for the revolutionary movements the US finds so threatening. But what we have instead is a knee-jerk anti-Communism which somehow defines the government of El Salvador, which is implicated in massive human rights violations (a euphemism for political terror and the coldblooded murder of tens of thousands), as "friendly" and "improving its record." At the same time, our government is supporting the ex-torturers of Somoza's National Guard as "freedom fighters" in an illegal "covert" war aimed at overthrowing the purported "totalitarian" government of Nicaragua (a government which is certainly not as tolerant of opposition as we would like, but for whatever its failings, it has made great strides in feeding and educating its people, clearly has popular support despite the economic adversity created by the hostility of the US and is certainly not engaged in human rights violations of the

THE DEVELOPMENT GROUP FOR ALTERNATIVE POLICIES

The Development GAP
1010 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Suite 521 • Washington, D.C. 20005

Telephone: (202) 638-2600

15 September 1983

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America
Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

SEP 27 1983

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Thank you for your letter of 16 August requesting our insights on long-term U.S. policy toward Central America, in general, and our responses to the twenty questions you attached, in particular.

I should begin by explaining that we at The Development GAP were opposed to the establishment of a commission to explore such issues, and we continue to have misgivings about its present undertaking. The Commission's very existence serves to divert attention from the current crisis, as well as related American actions, including covert activities and military exercises. The time for such a commission is either well before hostilities commence or as they reach their end, not while the United States is expanding its military role. At this point, it is far too late to use economic means to engender regional stability and far too early -- without a knowledge of the political and institutional configurations that will emerge from the current situation -- to formulate anything but the most general of long-term economic policies.

We wish, in fact, that we could support the work of the Commission, as we feel that, under different circumstances, we would have a contribution to make. Over the past seven years we have worked in the economic development of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica for the World Bank, AID and other governmental and non-governmental organizations. My personal experience in the region dates back thirteen years, when I lived and worked in Nicaragua. At that time, the region was relatively peaceful, but the poverty and injustice that underlie the present conflict were readily apparent.

I will not single out the Nixon Administration and you personally for the misdirected Central American policies that ultimately precipitated today's crisis, as Administrations before and after were equally to blame. They all supported governments such as the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, channelled economic aid through institutions that did not represent the interests of the poor, and encouraged economic policies that exacerbated already grave

A Non-Profit Development Resource Organization

p. 2/Dr. Kissinger/15 September 1983

economic inequalities. The United States was unwilling to promote the profound structural changes that are necessary to combat poverty and is thus now faced with a much more radical and difficult reality.

It is this history that makes the questions you ask particularly troubling. The questions, in and of themselves, are quite good. It is what is missing that is most striking: there is not a single question that refers to the past. In fact, anyone uninitiated in world affairs would have to conclude from a reading of your letter and attachment that the United States had played no role in Central America before 1979. As chief architect and implementor of American foreign policy from the late 1960s until the mid 1970s, many of your decisions profoundly affected the course of subsequent events in Central America. Where, however, is an attempt to study this history? Where is the effort to learn from the past? How can we hope to successfully establish a new policy without examining our mistakes?

The most significant contribution that the Commission could make to the current policy debate on Central America would be an analysis of the political and economic forces that, over the past several decades, have perpetuated the poverty and social injustices that have culminated in instability and conflict. As the major foreign actor in the region during that period, the United States should be looking inward to determine its own contribution to this process of destabilization, rather than outward to blame those who had nothing to do with the region's growing inequities. I hope that, in the end, your Commission will examine the U.S. role in Central America in its historical context for, if we do not reflect and study the past, we will, as we are now doing, continue to commit the same mistakes.

SH/kb

cc: Hon. Henry Cisneros
Hon. Robert Strauss
Dr. Carlos Diaz-Alejandro
Hon. Charles Mathias
Hon. Michael Barnes

AIDE MEMOIRE

Francis X. Gannon (Ph.D)

August 29, 1983

CENTRAL AMERICAN BIPARTISAN NATIONAL COMMISSION.

A CRITICAL ISSUE: **Should Nelson Rockefeller's Service Unit (Servicio) Approach--(1942-1961)--Be Applied Again to Help Central America Reconstruct and Revitalize its Development Progress?**

A strategic and, indeed, pivotal question for a "Marshall Plan" for Central America is whether such a program should consist of the development approaches that have dominated the U.S. foreign and multilateral aid programs since the Alliance for Progress was initiated: These approaches revolve around long-range planning, loans rather than grants, downplaying of technical assistance etc.; (The conceptual basis for these approaches remains a proposal: **The Key to Foreign Economic Policy** by Rostow/Milliken, 1957. These concepts were embedded in the 1961 Foreign Aid Act and have remained there ever since.

Under this foreign aid framework, whether bilateral or multilateral, total emphasis for two decades has been on financial assistance approaches, though public banks, e.g. the IDB, or, as in recent years, private concessional loans. This approach presumes that financial assistance alone can resolve Central America's development problem.

**An Alternative Proposal** - Restore the Service Unit Approach of Foreign Assistance which existed between 1942 and 1961.

The following proposal is based on the general success of the
<u>Servicios:</u>

o Between 1942 and 1961, the Servicios

o Built the roads, dug the sewers, constructed the health and sanitation systems, and promoted general agricultural development (rather than special interest production, e.g. coffee) in many Latin American countries. Brazil and Venezuela, in particular benefitted.

o Servicios were run jointly by the host country and the U.S. directors.

Each had a veto on the other. Therefore moneys expanded had to go for technically sound projects (to which the U.S. provided heavy technical assistance support and training), rather than to politically pressing ones alone.

o The renewal that, e.g., the Agriculture Minister began to put most of his budget into the Servicio since this developed agriculture (rather than being forced to bow to pressures of, e.g., the coffe growers). Initially the U.S. put in $5 to every $1 put in by the particular ministry in a Servicio (some countries had 4 or 5 Servicios in different fields, e.g. sanitation, highways, etc.) But these figures were quickly reversed as the Ministers saw their value.

o **Negatively**, the Servicios sometimes suffered a "bad press" as countries gained technical capacity to run their own show, e.g. in sanitation or road-building and found them too constructive. At home in U.S.A., this technical assistance approach seemed too much of a U.S. imposition of its own technical modes on other societies.

However, they worked well and despite the generally low volume of U.S. foreign aid in Latin America (e.g. between 1945 and 1950 the U.S. gave more help to Belgium and Luxembourg than to all of Latin American combined) they succeeded in giving regional (larger) governments capacity to serve their people.

**The problem**, is that in Central America and small countries they were abolished too soon. The result: when governments came under attack from guerrillas or revolutionary movements (or when societies, e.g. Managua, were destroyed by earthquakes, etc.), governments proved incapable of responding to basic human needs of their people.

**The proposal** - readopt and re-adapt the Service Unit approaches to foreign aid, whether bilateral or multilateral, re-establish the Service Units on a 15-year basis; then automatically terminate them.

**Barriers to the proposal** - The World Bank, the IDB, etc. (and AID) have little technical ability to provide hands-on technical assistance in the field. These agencies have so concentrated on providing loans that they would find it extremely difficult to re-incorporate technical assistance and training in their programs.

**Conclusions and recommendation** - Study the feasibility of re-establishing the Service Units again but include a review of their relationship to the international banking community, public and private.

NB: These ideas are discussed by the author in *Worldview* (January 1982) and in his recent essay, *On Thinking About Central America: A Framework for Policy Analysis*.

SENIOR COUNSELLORS:
REP. MICHAEL D. BARNES
SEN. LLOYD BENTSEN
REP. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD
SEN. PETE V. DOMENICI
SEN. HENRY M. JACKSON
REP. JACK F. KEMP
AMB. JEANE KIRKPATRICK
MR. WINSTON LORD
SEN. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS
MR. WILLIAM D. ROGERS
REP. JAMES C. WRIGHT

September 20, 1983

Luis Alberto Monge
President of the Republic
Costa Rica

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your extremely thoughtful letter regarding the Central American situation which was hand carried to Washington by Ambassador McNeil. I have taken the liberty of sharing it with the other members of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, who join me in acknowledging it as a valuable contribution to our deliberations.

I was particularly struck with your comments on the possibilities for democracy in Central America. Because of Costa Rica's unique experience, we will be listening very closely to what you say on this question.

I am pleased that we will have a chance to see each other in Florida on October 2, prior to the Commission's trip to Central America. I will be looking forward to discussing these issues further and hearing your wise counsel at that time.

With warmest regards,

2201 C STREET NW., ROOM 1004, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 TEL: (202) 632-7804

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO.

110495
RHC/MM
Spanish

San Jose, July 26, 1983

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Your decision to accept the chairmanship of the Bipartisan
Commission appointed by President Reagan to formulate policy re-
commendations on Central America for the United States Government
leads me to share certain thoughts with you concerning Costa Rica
and Central America. When I had an opportunity on March 14, 1982,
in Indian Wells, California, to talk with you about the situation in
Central America, I was impressed by your clear and firm grasp of
the true social, economic, and political origins of the crisis engulfing
us and of the strategic impact that opposition to national liberation
movements would have on the Central American people fighting for
such movements.

[L]

- 2 -

I particularly recall your interpretation of the War of National Liberation that shook Costa Rican society in 1948 and set our people on the road to modernization within the framework of democracy. The institutionalization of the important objectives that inspired that armed movement has occupied all my energy as a champion of democracy for more than three decades. I am especially grateful to the intellectuals, politicians, and statesmen who, in investigating our historical development, found confirmation that a small, poor country, in the midst of the turbulence of Central America and the Caribbean, has been capable of establishing solid democratic institutions that support constant efforts to guarantee freedom, justice, and solidarity for all.

One of the great successes of the War of National Liberation was the concrete expression of the Costa Ricans' historic desire to opt voluntarily and unilaterally for total disarmament. Months later, in 1949, we institutionalized disarmament by proscribing the army in our Constitution. Our people's commitment to peace entered a new stage in 1983 when we announced to the world our decision to declare ourselves neutrals in any warlike conflict but staunch fighters for democracy, freedom, and social justice in any other arena.

This commitment to peace and disarmament has made funds available for sizeable investments in the health, education, and cultural

- 3 -

advancement of our people. When I became President of the Republic in 1982 I nonetheless faced a tremendous financial problem that has jeopardized our free way of life. In response to an almost unmanagable external debt, sustained increases in the price of oil, unprecedented increases in the cost of capital, and a constant decline in the price of our principle export products, we have pursued a policy of strict austerity and "wartime discipline" to contain the expansion of the government. We have also adopted policies designed to increase production and exports, fully aware that only a dynamic private sector can compete efficiently with its products in foreign markets.

The tremendous effort all Costa Ricans are making to preserve the great Western traditions of peace and civic life, while limiting the growth of the government and encouraging the private sector, will be frustrated if we do not soon encounter generous and active solidarity on the part of the Western democracies of the Americas and Europe. At a time when investments in Central America and the Caribbean by the enemies of democracy are increasing daily, the Western democracies cannot remain indifferent to the tragedy that the desperate economic crisis represents for our peoples. The situation is complicated by a security crisis provoked by hegemonic interests which are transforming Central America into the theater of their global confrontation.

Costa Rica will not fall into the deadly trap of confusing its

- 4 -

genuine national interests, which arise from its desire for justice,
freedom, peace, and the well-being of its people, with the conflicts
armed by the hegemonic power. Costa Rica needs the practical
solidarity of the Western democracies in the form of economic and
technical support to keep our political program from falling victim to
the arms race. We do not and will not have an army. We are a peace-
ful people, and we are determined not to become involved in war. We
are working resolutely for a peaceful revolution. Since the vast majority
of our people are truly democratic, future actions should not be decided
by right and left extremes, which are anti-democratic by nature and
design. We are striving to overcome the ills of our democracy with
more democracy, more political, economic, and social democracy. We
must guide our country in this vital direction, without the slightest
deviation, whatever it costs.

I am convinced that democracy cannot be exported or imposed.
When I speak of the Costa Rican political system, with its strengths
and weaknesses, and when I point out some of the steps my people
have taken to develop their institutions, the idea of recommending that
other peoples emulate our methods is far from my mind. Democracy
does not have universal formulas for confronting a society's social
and economic problems; such formulas can only be designed through

- 5 -

knowledge and interpretation of each nation's individual historical
development. I believe that democracy cannot be imitated, copied, or
transplanted; democracy creates and is original. Neither can democracy
be imposed by force; it progresses only through conviction and the
support of peoples.

A dissection and analysis of the Costa Rican experience and our
political process which began nearly a century ago reveal a case of
institutional development within the turbulence of Central America.

Dr. Kissinger, I propose that Costa Rica's achievements be analyzed
from the perspective of Central America, since it is living proof that
democratic institutions can rise in small, poor, tropical countries.

The task that President Reagan has entrusted to the Bipartisan
Commission which you chair arouses our interest. Clearly it is a
domestic political exercise by the United States, whose leaders wish
to obtain recommendations in order to define a long-term policy toward
the Central American countries. With strictest respect for the great
principles that govern the relations between our peoples--sovereignty,
dignity, noninterference in internal affairs, national independence,
peaceful resolution of disputes, and an unending search for justice--I
am prepared to support the work that you and the other members of
the Bipartisan Commission are preparing to undertake.

Luis Alberto Monge
Presidente de la República

San José, 26 de julio de 1983

Doctor
Henry A. Kissinger
Washington, D. C.

Estimado Dr. Kissinger:

Su decisión de aceptar la Presidencia de la Comisión Bipartidista nombrada por el Presidente Reagan para formular al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América recomendaciones de política sobre la América Central, me lleva a compartir con usted algunas reflexiones sobre Costa Rica y la América Central. Cuando tuve la ocasión de conversar con usted el 14 de marzo de 1982 en Indian Wells, California, sobre la situación del istmo centroamericano, me impresionó la claridad y firmeza de su percepción de los verdaderos orígenes sociales, económicos y políticos de la crisis que nos sobrecoge, así como del significado estratégico que constituye la intercepción de los movimientos de liberación nacional por los que luchan los pueblos centroamericanos.

Particularmente recuerdo su interpretación de la Guerra de Liberación Nacional que sacudió en 1948 a la sociedad costarricense, hasta colocar a nuestro pueblo en el rumbo de la modernización dentro del marco de la democracia occidental. El desarrollo institucional de los grandes objetivos que inspiraron aquel movimiento de armas, ha ocupado todas mis fuerzas de luchador democrático por más de tres décadas. Yo aprecio especialmente a los intelectuales, a los políticos y a los estadistas que escudriñan nuestro devenir histórico para confirmar que un país pequeño y pobre, enclavado en la turbulencia de la América Central y el Caribe, ha sido capaz de establecer instituciones democráticas sólidas que hacen posible el esfuerzo cotidiano por garantizar la libertad para todos, la justicia entre todos y la solidaridad de todos.

Uno de los grandes logros de la Guerra de Liberación Nacional fue la concreción de la voluntad histórica de los costarricenses para optar voluntaria y unilateralmente por el desarme total. Meses más tarde, en 1949, institucionalizamos el desarme al incorporar como norma constitucional la disolución del ejército. El desarrollo de la vocación pacifista de nuestro pueblo ha alcanzado una nueva etapa en 1983 cuando anunciamos al mundo nuestra decisión de declararnos neutrales ante cualquier conflicto bélico, pero tenaces luchadores por la causa de la democracia, la libertad y la justicia social en cualquier otra arena.

.../

2

El cultivo de la vocación pacifista y la práctica contínua del desarme, ha permitido a la sociedad costarricense liberar recursos para realizar importantes inversiones en la salud, la educación y la elevación cultural del pueblo. Al asumir la Presidencia de la República en 1982 fui confrontado, sin embargo, por una tremenda adversidad en el flanco financiero que ha incrementado la vulnerabilidad de nuestro sistema de vida en libertad: una deuda externa casi inmanejable, sostenidos aumentos en el precio del petróleo, incrementos sin precedentes en el costo del capital y baja constante en el precio de nuestros principales productos de exportación. Hasta el momento hemos aplicado una estricta política de austeridad y una "disciplina de guerra" para contener la expansión del Estado. A la vez, hemos adoptado políticas tendientes a incrementar la producción y las exportaciones, plenamente conscientes de que urge un sector privado dinámico para que compita eficientemente con sus productos en los mercados externos.

El esfuerzo titánico que realizamos todos los costarricenses por preservar las grandes tradiciones civilistas, pacifistas y occidentales, al tiempo que limitamos el crecimiento del Estado y estimulamos el sector productivo, se verá frustrado si no encontramos pronto una generosa solidaridad activa de las democracias occidentales de América y Europa. Mientras las inversiones de los adversarios de la democracia aumentan día con día en América Central y el Caribe, las democracias occidentales no pueden permanecer de brazos cruzados ante la tragedia que representa para nuestros pueblos la crisis económica desesperante, complicada por la crisis de seguridad alentada por intereses hegemónicos que trasladan a nuestro istmo centroamericano el teatro de su confrontación global.

Costa Rica no caerá en la trampa mortal de confundir sus genuinos intereses nacionales surgidos de su vocación de justicia, libertad, paz y bienestar para su pueblo, con las disputas armadas por el poder hegemónico. Costa Rica reclama solidaridad práctica de las democracias occidentales que se traduzca ahora en apoyo económico y técnico, para que nuestro proyecto político no naufrague después en la carrera armamentista. No tenemos ejército y no tendremos ejército. Somos un pueblo de paz decidido a evitar que la guerra nos envuelva. Trabajamos denodadamente por la revolución posible. Como la inmensa mayoría de nuestro pueblo es auténticamente democrático, el camino del futuro no deben señalarlo los extremismos de derecha o de izquierda, que por naturaleza y por intención son antidemocráticos. Estamos empeñados en superar los males de nuestra democracia con más democracia: más democracia política, más democracia económica, más democracia social. Hacia ese horizonte vital es preciso dirigir los pasos de nuestro país, sin desviarnos un ápice de ese camino, cueste lo que cueste.

.../

3

Estoy convencido de que la democracia no se exporta ni se impone. Cuando hablo del sistema político costarricense, con sus virtudes y sus defectos, y señalo algunas de las etapas del itinerario cumplido por mi pueblo en el desarrollo de sus instituciones, está lejos de mi mente la idea de recomendar que otros pueblos imiten nuestros métodos. Para enfrentar los problemas económicos y sociales de una sociedad, la democracia no tiene fórmulas universales; sólo es posible elaborar tales fórmulas conociendo e interpretando la evolución histórica particular de cada nación. Creo que la democracia no se calca, no se copia, no se transplanta; en la democracia se crea, con autenticidad, con originalidad. Tampoco se impone la democracia por la fuerza, sólo avanza por el convencimiento y por el apoyo de los pueblos.

La vivisección y el análisis de la experiencia de Costa Rica, de nuestro proceso político que se aproxima a su primer siglo, representa, empero, un caso de desarrollo institucional en el convulsionado istmo centroamericano. Yo ofrezco, doctor Kissinger, que la práctica costarricense sea analizada en la perspectiva de la América Central, pues es una prueba viviente de que el surgimiento de las instituciones democráticas es posible en los pequeños países pobres del trópico.

La tarea que el Presidente Reagan ha encomendado a la Comisión Bipartidista que usted preside concita nuestro interés. Se trata, claro está, de un ejercicio político interno de los Estados Unidos de América, cuyos gobernantes desean obtener recomendaciones para definir una política de largo plazo hacia nuestras naciones centroamericanas. Dentro del respeto más estricto a los grandes principios que rigen las relaciones entre nuestros pueblos --soberanía, dignidad, no injerencia en los asuntos internos, independencia nacional, solución pacífica de las disputas y búsqueda incesante de la justicia-- estoy en disposición de apoyar los trabajos que usted y los demás miembros de la Comisión Bipartidista se aprestan a iniciar.

Reciba un saludo atento y amistoso.

Cordialmente,
Ricardo A. Montoya

COMMISSION MEMBERS
MR NICHOLAS F. BRADY
MAYOR HENRY G. CISNEROS
GOV WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR.
DR CARLOS F. DIAZ-ALEJANDRO
MR WILSON S. JOHNSON
MR LANE KIRKLAND
MR RICHARD M. SCAMMON
DR JOHN SILBER
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
AMB. ROBERT S. STRAUSS
DR WILLIAM B. WALSH

SENIOR COUNSELLORS.
REP MICHAEL D. BARNES
SEN LLOYD BENTSEN
REP WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD
SEN PETE V. DOMENICI
SEN HENRY M. JACKSON
REP JACK F. KEMP
AMB JEANE KIRKPATRICK
MR WINSTON LORD
SEN CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS
MR WILLIAM D. ROGERS
REP JAMES C. WRIGHT

September 21, 1983

Mr. James Symington
Suite 400
1700 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Jim:

Many thanks for your letter. It was good to hear from you. Your idea on increasing studies of Latin America in secondary schools and supporting exchanges is a valuable one. I am taking the liberty of sharing your letter with the Commission staff. We will be sure to keep this in mind when it comes time to draft the report.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

JAMES W. SYMINGTON
SUITE 400
1700 K STREET, N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

September 7, 1983

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Henry,

The reason for my call to your office a couple of
weeks ago was to pass along an idea re the Panel's
important work. The idea stems from some considerable
time spent in Latin countries during the old Food For
Peace days, and later as Chief of Protocol for LBJ.

In the latter capacity I had the discomfort of
observing the 1966 Conference of American Presidents
in Punta del Este - particularly the failure on our
side to pick up on the opening words of Arosemena
(President of Ecuador) in his keynote address. "May
the genius of Uruguay who gave us *Ariel*," he said,
"guide our thoughts."

His reference was to an intriguing essay by Jose
Enrique Rodo of Uruguay. Written at the turn of the
century it urged his young countrymen not to become
"delatinized" by the influences of the north (Caliban).
U.S. achievements in science, material progress and
political freedom tended, nevertheless, in Rodo's view,
to reflect a mediocrity of spirit and purpose...question-
able conclusions, but all the more important to address.
I secured a copy of the essay in the town library, but
could develop no interest in its contents - a small
example of a larger problem which should be addressed
in any "long term" assessment of relations with Latin
America or any part of it.

Remember the politician who was asked which he
considered the greater evil, ignorance or apathy. His
response: "I don't know and I don't care." Not knowing
or caring on the part of our society as a whole has
hampered our relations with other countries and cultures.
I would hope that a recommendation at your personal
level for greatly increased studies at the secondary

SEP 8 1983

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

PHILADELPHIA 19104

DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE C2

Sept 15 1983

Dear Henry:

I was delighted when President Reagan made you
Chairman of the Central American Commission. By now you
know the can of worms that you must sort out. I've followed
that area rather closely. Last January I visited, Bolivia,
Chile and Panama. A large part of our problems issue from
the long-term communist cultivation of the intellectuals.
My trip report (enclosed) brings this out as does Dan James'
report on Mexico.

The enclosed letter from Ed Corr (one of my
best people in Bangkok) contains a useful suggestion which
may be applicable in Central America.

At any rate I wish you luck. If I can be of
any help let me know.

With all Good wishes,

SEP 20 1983

217 Stiteler Hall/C2 * * * (215) 898-7641

19 SEP 1983

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
La Paz, Bolivia

August 19, 1983

The Honorable
William R. Kintner
Department of Political Science C2
University of Pennsylvania
217 Stitelar Hall/C2
Philadelphia, PA 19104

Dear Bill,

I am writing to seek your advice and support for an
important project in terms of our national interests,
as well as for the future welfare of Bolivians.

You know from your study, your visit here, and our
discussions that Bolivia has a state-dominated econ-
omy (perhaps up to 80%, excluding small farmers) and
that there is a strong Marxist influence in all the
major political parties, except for the Democratic
Nationalist Action Party (ADN) of former President
Hugo Banzer. You and I have talked of the need to
try to influence public policy through dialogue,
analysis and dissemination of information regarding
policy alternatives and their likely consequences...
As Ambassador to Thailand you were very effective in
this, and I am trying to put into practice here in
Bolivia what I learned from you as your executive
assistant.

Bolivia, in contrast to more economically developed
Latin American countries, is lacking in foundations,
"think-tanks," and policy institutes that analyze
public questions and provide policy options to public
decision-makers. Since the Government of President
Banzer the bureaucracy has not served this function
either because the frequent turn-overs of government
have been reflected in instability and lack of conti-
nuity in the civil service. The nation is badly in
need of objective analyses and policy options from
a non-Marxian source.

2

[L]

General Banzer, ADN Party leaders, and I have been discussing the need for a policy institute with a private sector orientation and staffed by persons committed to constitutional democracy as understood in the Western World. The ADN has begun to put together such an institute and has very sound plans in terms of organization and objectives. What they lack in this economically crisis-ridden country is adequate financial support.

Because the Policy Institute would have an indirect affiliation with the ADN, it is not feasible for the U.S. Government to provide direct support. We would be accused of intervention and playing partisan politics; therefore, I need help in knowing where to go for private funding.

During General Banzer's recent trip to the United States, I arranged for him to meet with Mrs. Kirkpatrick, Bill Middendorf, and members of the American Enterprise Institute. I also have talked with him about the Heritage Foundation, which you have been so intimately associated, and have given to the lady whom he has working on the creation of the institute publications of the Foundation. Also I have described university organizations, such as the Foreign Policy Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, which you so ably directed.

I believe that for the establishment of a lasting Western-style democracy, with a minimum of communist influence, it is necessary to strengthen political parties, resolve the economic crisis, reduce the statist/leftist tendencies of a large part of the political elite, and build strong free enterprise oriented, democratic political parties. The creation of the type of policy institute that I am discussing with the ADN would greatly contribute to all of these purposes.

Please let me have your counsel and views as early as possible.
I believe this is an opportunity to strike a blow against communism and have democracy.

With highest personal regards,

P.S. I would appreciate your sending to me as early as possible a copy of the charter or statutes of the Foreign Policy Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, the Institute's last annual report, and any descriptive material of the Institute's work and publications. The ADN asked for this as a guide to its own planning and organization on a policy institute.

AIM

REPORT

Published by ACCURACY IN MEDIA, INC.
1341 G Street, N.W., Suite 312
Washington, D.C. 20005 • Telephone: 202-783-4406

Reed Irvine, Editor

$1.00

August-B 1983

XII-16

# MEXICO—THE UNTOLD STORY

by Daniel James

The infrastructure of a communist state in Mexico is in place. Powerful forces, including its leftist-dominated media, are attempting to make it operational without awaiting the "fall" of El Salvador or Guatemala; Mexico, in short, is no "domino." Yet that story, topping any other south of the border, has been totally ignored by our media.

In fairness, the U.S. media have focused considerable attention upon Mexico's financial crisis. The wide-ranging implications of its almost $90-billion debt are indeed scary. But that is only the tip of the iceberg itself: the danger of a Marxist-Leninist state being installed on our very border.

**What is the evidence that a communist infrastructure already exists in Mexico?**

## Economy Virtually Socialized

The No. 1 fact is that the Mexican economy has been virtually socialized. That, too, has gone unrecorded by the U.S. media. Time magazine, for example, published an 8-page cover story on "Mexico's Crisis" on December 20, 1982, that failed to recognize the reality of state domination of the economy.

The U.S. officials in Mexico estimate that 75 percent of the economy is now in state hands, while Mexican business leaders say it is between 80 percent and 85 percent. Even the Mexican government acknowledges that it controls two-thirds of the economy; but that was before the nationalization of the country's 57 private banks on September 1, 1982, and along with them more than 3,000 private companies in which they had held equity.

Whatever the exact percentages, nobody in Mexico doubts that the state exercises effective control over the entire economy. It actually owns outright or is the dominant partner in nearly every basic industry: utilities, aviation, surface transportation, communications, mining, steel, commercial fishing, even tourism and, since 1938, oil, as well as the banks.

This article was written by Daniel James, author of three books on Mexico. Mr. James lived in Mexico over 20 years. He recently spent three weeks there conducting research and interviews for this article.

Mexican capitalism was virtually buried, without Khruschevian fanfare, last September. The 15-20 percent of the economy in which it retains some strength consists mainly of secondary industries and commerce: textiles, light manufactures, food-processing (now experiencing rapid state encroachment), tourism-related businesses (which must compete with state-owned enterprises including the biggest hotel chain), and assorted retail concerns. Private companies remain a major factor in exports, especially of winter fruit and vegetables, but are under strict government regulation.

The Mexican state is the sole arbiter of the national economy. President Miguel de la Madrid himself candidly declared on May 30, when he unveiled his 1983-88 National Development Plan. That ended all debate with business leaders over the direction of the economy. As the respected Mexico City News economics editor, Patricia Nelson, summed it up, "Thus, it is now crystal clear: the State is in full command of the nation's economy—for better or for worse."

The well-known independent Mexican economist, Luis Pazos, pointed out that the National Development Plan's projected "qualitative transformation" and "structural changes" in the Mexican economy by 1988, when de la Madrid leaves office, "are part of Marxist-Leninist philosophy." And "those of us who oppose Mexico's conversion [into] a Marxist-Leninist system," he concluded, "denounce the danger implied" by them.

Notwithstanding wide coverage of them in the Mexican press, the National Development Plan and its Marxist content have not been reported by a single member of the U.S. media, to this writer's knowledge.

## Next: Communist Dictatorship?

If the economic underpinning of a Mexican Marxist state is in place, does that necessarily spell communism? France has a socialized economy yet reportedly is experiencing a wave of anti-communism, particularly among its influential intellectuals. In Mexico's case, still lacking is the political infrastructure of a communist state. It is, however, a one-party state.

[L]

The central issue is whether the fatal step toward its totalitarianization will be taken, or even attempted, short of a violent upheaval.

Mexico has been ruled by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), since 1929. For 54 consecutive years it has "elected" every Mexican president, state governor, federal senator, and-until it recently bestowed 100 of the 400 seats in the Chamber of Deputies upon opposition parties-federal deputy. It controls the lives of 75 million Mexicans through a two-million-strong bureaucracy, which dispenses jobs, favors, social services and money to the faithful and compliant. To dissenters, it metes out harsh penalties including punitive action.

The PRI, like Mexico itself, faces a historical crisis. Torn by rival factions, it faces difficult choices. Should it encourage real democracy and freedom-political pluralism-if only to provide a safety valve for the universal resentment against its ruinous misrule? That might ultimately involve surrendering its monopoly of power. Or should it resort to generalized repression, in the name of defending its "revolutionary" program against the "reactionaries," so paving the way for a totalitarian dictatorship? That might preserve its political monopoly, but at the price of great bloodshed- which the people, remembering the one million lives lost during the 1910-20 Mexican Revolution, fear above all.

A third option could be a military coup. Although the Mexican armed forces have remained strictly loyal to party and state hitherto, rumblings of their dissatisfaction with PRI rule are said to be reaching an acute stage. They are particularly concerned over the rising tide of refugees from Guatemala, in the south, and the guerrilla threat it implies.

The left-which includes not only the four openly Marxist parties outside the PRI but also its dominant, tacitly Marxist left wing-is pressing for a Leninist solution. The outright Marxists demand, for example, that "emergency measures be adopted" to prevent the "bourgeoisie" from toppling the near-socialized economy. And they are a power to be reckoned with. They obtained two million hard-core votes in the 1982 national elections, and have long penetrated government, the media, and the schools.

## Mexico's Pro-Left Media

The Mexican media are perhaps a reflection of how far Mexico has gone down the Marxist road. Of Mexico City's estimated 30 daily newspapers, about two dozen are basically left-oriented and stridently anti-U.S. That so many dailies can exist in a capital whose 16 million inhabitants are largely illiterate or semi-literate, is due to the government subsidies they get.

That includes even identifiably Marxist dailies like *El Día* and *Uno Más Uno*, and the highly influential weekly *Proceso*, which carry almost no advertising and would fold without government support; the two newspapers are even distributed free to the public on state-owned airlines. When President de la Madrid sought, soon after taking office, to withdraw government-supplied newsprint, the Mexican press proved strong enough to fight him off.

Communist propaganda also appears with surprising frequency in "general" newspapers, including Mexico's biggest and probably most influential, *Excelsior*. That paper provides a regular platform for such Marxist theoreticians as Heberto Castillo, leader of an extreme radical group, and it features daily on page one such blatantly pro-Castro, anti-American columnists as Manuel Buendia, who buys his space. (Mexicans wonder how he can do so, since he is not a staffer.) Only rarely can one find in *Excelsior*, or even in more conservative papers like *El Universal*, a fair, not to say friendly presentation of the U.S. position on major issues. On Reagan's Central America policies, for example, unbiased reports are at a premium.

A recent article in *El Día* throws light on how Marxist ideas came to pervade the media and, even more frightening, the Mexican leadership. It boasted that generations of students at the National Autonomous University of Mexico have been receiving Marxist indoctrination from its professors. The university has 300,000 students at the present time. The author pointed out that even biology students must study "the Soviet biologist Oparin," while in economics "we enter even more deeply into Marx's conceptions." Since the University of Mexico and other universities provide Mexico with its leaders, the continuing inculcation of their students with Marxism tells us a lot about our neighbor's political system.

The Mexican government itself openly purges Marxist propaganda. At an outdoor book fair in May sponsored by the Mexico City government, volume after volume of works by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and more recent Marxist theoreticians were displayed side by side with books attacking the United States.

Although the phenomenon of university and government-sponsored Marxist propaganda is treated uninhibitedly by the Mexican media, ours have not reported that important information. Instead, they prefer to spread the fiction that, for example, the Mexican government is "forced" by "leftist pressure" into adopting such policies as aiding Marxist revolutionaries in Central America, when in reality an ideological affinity dictates them. Our media also urge that we follow Mexico's lead in Central America, claiming that it is more knowledgeable than we are, when actually its leaders believe that the way to peace lies in supporting the revolutionaries.

## PRI-Communist Party Ties

Ideology also explains, of course, the long-term trend within Mexico itself toward statism, which was accelerated under its last two Presidents, Luis Echeverría (1970-76) and Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-82). Echeverría initiated an open class struggle against the Mexican "bourgeoisie" and its "Yankee imperialist master," while Lopez Portillo escalated it into outright warfare ending in virtually burying it with the bank nationalization. As a result, Mexico may be close to a catastrophic civil conflict.

The bank nationalization exposed the previously unrecognized fact that the PRI's left wing is in the ascendant. Its author is a practicing Marxist economist,

Carlos Tello. Lopez Portillo, nominally not a Marxist, signed Tello's nationalization decree as President, put it into effect, then named Tello head of the Bank of Mexico to carry it out. His mission: to end Mexican capitalism if he could.

Further, the banking measure also exposed an
unsuspected tie between the PRI and the Mexican
Communist Party, which dominates the new and much
larger Unified Mexican Socialist Party (PSUM). The
leader of the PSUM faction in the Chamber of Deputies,
Rodolfo Cordera, co-authored with Tello the book that
blueprinted both the nationalization and the ultimate
socialization of Mexico.

It is probably superfluous to mention that neither the
Tello-Cordera book, nor the PRI-Communist connection
it symbolized, received commensurate notice in the U. S.
media. Nor have they noted that the legal legerdemain
accompanying the nationalization decree has so
compromised Mexican constitutional law that no
Mexicans or foreigners can never again rely upon it to
protect their rights as investors in Mexico. That
happened when the Mexican Congress, acting under the
President's orders, passed an amendment to the
Constitution declaring the nationalization "constitu-
tional" after the nationalization had been decreed and
gone into effect.

If the Mexican Constitution could so easily be flouted by
both the President and the Congress of Mexico, what
protection can it offer future investors? What about the
courts then? The sad truth is that they have acquiesced
in the travesty by not challenging it, joining the other
two branches of the government in effectively scuttling
the Constitution that created them. In Mexico, power—
presidential power—is the only law.

End of Middle Class?

Much has been made by the U. S. media of the extreme
hardship that last year's bank nationalization, three
steep devaluations of the peso and a 100 percent
inflation rate have imposed upon Mexico's already
impoverished masses. It is all too tragically true.
Ordinary Mexicans can scarcely afford their staple
tortilla-and-beans diet, whose cost has doubled. But the
media have missed a potentially more explosive story:
the progressive ruin of the middle class.

Constituting 25-30 percent of the total population, and
growing steadily, the middle class was Mexico's most
promising social development. It comprised managers,
executives, technicians, scientists, teachers, lawyers,
doctors, contractors, small-to-medium businessmen,
skilled workers . . . the people that made the wheels of
industry and commerce go 'round. Most significantly, it
was beginning to provide the buffer between the
extremes of rich and poor that Mexico has historically
needed to "depolarize" its society—and to bring about.
in the process, real democracy and freedom.

But the shutdown of countless private enterprises and
even of whole industries—construction, for example—
is rapidly putting the middle class out of work and out of
business. And chances of its recovery are dim, with the

Mexican economy, reports the New York Times grimly,
in a state of "continuing decay."

What is more, its savings are being devoured by the still
rising inflation. Its homes and other investments are
threatened, its children's education jeopardized, its very
future aborted. An entire class, in short, may be
disappearing from the Mexican scene.

On the political level, the crushing of this class and of
the private sector is eroding the power base of the PRI's
right wing. That, in turn, presages the end of the labor-
peasant-middle class coalition upon which five decades
of PRI rule and national stability were based. An era of
instability is now dawning, with the middle class, cast
adrift from its old moorings, becoming increasingly
volatile as it seeks a new political home. Although it
could swing to the right or the left, tangible signs point
to the former at present.

Right-Wing Prospects

That is causing the Marxists some loss of sleep. There is
a "virtual mutiny among the middle sectors," cries
Socialist Deputy Arnaldo Cordova in alarm. Already,
that has "become translated . . . into the reinforcement
of the right," electorally, since "the middle sectors,
individualistic and depoliticized, tend, in their
opposition to the government, to move to the right."

Cordova's fears reflected the concern of the left over
record right-wing gains in last year's Presidential
election, when the National Action Party (PAN), the
PRI's rightist rival, and a smaller party farther right
polled 20 percent of the total vote with middle-class
support. That was followed, on July 3, by more
unprecedented victories when the PAN won nine
mayoral races to give it control of four state capitals.
Now the PRI fears even greater conservative triumphs
in the 1985 midterm elections, with five state governor-
ships and the 400-member Chamber of Deputies up for
balloting.

The PRI is particularly worried about losing the key
state of Sonora, whose capital, Hermosillo, was won by
the National Action Party in 1982. When the U. S. consul
there gave a dinner for the local conservative leaders
and the Catholic bishop in May, the PRI overreacted,
charging that the United States was conspiring with
"reactionaries" to "destabilize" the Mexican govern-
ment. It was seconded by the Mexican Socialist Party
and another Marxist party plus the press. Whereupon
U.S. Ambassador John Gavin denounced them all
"scurrilous," pointing out that prior to the controversial
dinner the consul had lunched with local PRI leaders,
and that he was only carrying out American policy to
maintain contact with all Mexican currents. The PRI
has since embarked upon a pre-election drive to
discredit the National Action Party in Sonora.

Such a triumph in 1985 presupposes a rightward
movement of the middle class reaching avalanche
proportions. But by then many middle-class families,
which traditionally shun politics as "dirty," may have
wearedied of the uphill struggle to make a living and opted
to seek a new future across the border. That could prove
to be a two-edged sword: for Mexico, a dangerous "brain
drain" aggravating its current crisis, and for the United
States, unwelcome competition for top jobs.

(L)

To forestall a National Action triumph in 1985 that could lead to Mexico's first real contest for the presidency in 1988, the PRI, as it has in the past to meet lesser challenges, might resort to wholesale fraud and violence. That seemed to be previewed by its persistent harrassment of National Action candidates in July. Besides, to preserve its power monopoly in the long term the PRI must cripple or destroy the right politically as it has economically. Prodded by the four Marxist parties outside, it might conclude that its only hope would lie in imposing a totalitarian dictatorship on Mexico.

Whether the option will be attempted, and can succeed, depends upon President de la Madrid.

## Where Does de la Madrid Stand?

The President appears to be a democrat, at least in principle, and to favor the free play of political forces. But would he buck his party's powerful left wing and its Marxist allies, just to see the hated right get a fair break in 1985?

Does he, for that matter, have the power to do so?

De la Madrid, like all Mexican presidents, will not enjoy the absolute power foreign commentators attribute to him until around midterm. It usually takes them that long to learn how to use the levers of power. That makes the present period one of transition and full of uncertainty and indecision. It could therefore be the propitious time for the Marxists to move their forces into place for the "final conflict."

Meanwhile, de la Madrid is gradually revealing where he stands on some basic issues. Immediately after taking office on December 1, he pronounced the bank nationalization "irreversible." Since then, responding to the outcry for fair indemnification of bank stockholders, he has offered them government bonds; but they cannot be redeemed before 1992.

He has also announced that new stock in the banks—now renamed "national credit corporations"—is available for purchase by private persons. The hitch is that the total amount of stock which all such persons may buy cannot exceed one-third of the total for any corporation, leaving control in state hands.

The acid test of de la Madrid's political strength, will and personal integrity is whether he will fulfill his most important election campaign pledge: to bring about Mexico's "moral renovation." That is, eradicate corruption, which he admits "permeates to the very root of Mexican culture" and is therefore at the heart of the crisis.

"The moral crisis precipitated the economic," is how the perceptive Mexican writer, Margarita Michelena, puts it. That is, the massive corruption pervading the Lopez Portillo administration—which reportedly drained up to $20 billion from the country—stimulated the massive government spending and borrowing that ran up the public debt astronomically. Add the simultaneous flight of about $25 billion of private capital, and the two account for approximately half of the debt.

The vast corruption has so demoralized Mexicans that they have not shown Madrid the confidence they usually do a new President, while agreeing that he seems personally honest and is surrounded by honest and capable advisers. To earn their confidence, de la Madrid must, in Michelena's graphic phrase, "deliver the head of Lopez Portillo"—prosecute him. For he was, after all, accountable for the corruption on his watch and, besides, reportedly profited handsomely from it.

Lopez Portillo, for example, perfected the art of nepotism. He put on the public payroll his wife, his son, his sister, his nephews, and numerous cousins and other relatives. He also lavished on them such perquisites as free use of government facilities, including jet planes for private use, besides permitting them to dip freely into the Treasury. Just before he left office, he constructed at state expense a complex of five mansions for himself and his family.

De la Madrid may be preparing to "deliver the head" of a Lopez Portillo intimate, at least: Senator Jorge Diaz Serrano, who is formally charged with having defrauded the state oil company, PEMEX, of $34 million while he headed it. But unapprehended, so far, are Diaz Serrano's nominal former superior as Minister of Patrimony, Jose Andres de Oteyza, and the Marxist economist, Carlos Tello, who reportedly has not accounted for $100 million said to be missing from the Bank of Mexico since he left it.

As for "delivering the head" of Lopez Portillo himself, that will probably never happen since it would "open the system itself to judgment and could well end in its death," concludes Michelena. It is the system, after all, "that permits a man so much power that it . . . permits him to commit every kind of abuse . . . and [even] to be the author of his people's ruin."

De la Madrid is placed in a critical dilemma. Since he is a creature of the system and owes his position to Lopez Portillo, in whose government he served as Treasury Secretary, he is not likely to bite the hand that feeds him.

## What You Can Do

Some "experts" assure the American people that they need not worry about communists taking over Central America because (a) Mexico is not worried and (b) Mexico stands as a stable barrier between Central America and U.S. Our media are doing very little to alert people to the true situation. Use the material in this report in letters to editors to correct these misperceptions.

AIM REPORT is published twice monthly by Accuracy In Media, Inc., 1341 G Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005, and is free to AIM members. Dues and contributions to AIM are tax deductible. The AIM Report is mailed 3rd class to those whose contribution is at least $15 a year and 1st class to those contributing $30 a year or more. Non-members subscriptions are $35 (1st class mail).

USIA TRIP REPORT (Panama, Bolivia, Chile) *

Jan. 5 to Jan. 19

General

From my discussions with many informed people in Panama, Bolivia and Chile certain conclusions emerged. There is a general concern that the United States is not winning the struggle to prevent a significant Soviet intrusion into Latin America. U.S. policy is viewed as uncertain and inconsistent. U.S. strategy to coodinate its actions in Central America is viewed as non-existent. The Latinos have long been accustomed to U.S. professions that the southern part of the western hemisphere is the central focus of U.S. policy. They are also aware that this priority is rarely matched by sustained commitments. Yet they now fail to see how we continue to pour vast sums into the defense of Europe, the Middle East and Northeast Asia while we are content with a nickel and dime effort to put out a conflagaration raging in our own backyard.

The foregoing views were conveyed to me by leading citizens of the three countries I visited on this trip; Panama, Bolivia and Chile. These people were sympathetic to the U.S. but worried about our leadership and determination. I would like to note the high quality of the U.S. representatives I met. I spent considerable time with Ambassadors Briggs, Corr and Theberge. They are all first rate men, fully informed, bi-lingual, conscientious and worried. The USIA personnel were competent and helpful in every way. My program in each country enabled me to meet a cross section of the leadership group who shared and supported U.S. values.

The activities of USIA in Latin America are extremely important. By demonstrating our concern and support they can compensate, to a degree, for inadequate efforts of a more tangible nature. The visit of important American citizens to out of the way countries such as Bolivia or Chile serves a useful role. It's a special way of saying that we care. I both heard and sensed this in many encounters in both Bolivia and Chile. These two countries, unlike Panama which is located at a major international crossroads,

* William R. Kintner
Professor of Political Science
University of Pennsylvania

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feel isolated in a remote region far from the center of things and tend to welcome
whatever attention they receive.

Before commenting on issues unique to each of the three countries I visited I will
make some overall observations. First, over the past twenty years there has been a
noticeable decline in the number of USIA personnel posted to Latin America along with
an accompanying reduction in the scope of U.S. information and cultural activities. This
decline has taken place concurrently with a steady increase in leftist, Marxist and
communist influence in every sphere of intellectual life, particularly in the Latin
American universities. The leftist bias of many, if not the majority, of Latin American
university professors and students is not being countered by the most effective tool
at our disposal, a large scale, well financed student exchange program, particularly at the
college level. Almost all Latin Americans who study in the States come from the wealthier
classes and pay their own way. In contrast the Soviets provide hundreds of fully paid
(travel, tuition, personal needs) scholarships on a competitive basis to the brightest
students they can find. These generally come from the poorer classes. After four or
five years of study in the Soviet Union during which they are assiduously indoctrinated
in Marxism-Leninism, they are often then returned to their own countries fully committed
to the destruction of the political order from whose limited benefits they would have been
excluded. Generally unable to find employment in the private sector they enter the
government or the universities and contribute to the leftist swing of these two institutions.

A basic problem confronting the United States in dealing with the Soviet-Cuban
intrusion into Central and Latin America is the failure of many Norte Americano and
Latino intellectuals to understand the Marxist-Leninist approach to the seizure of power
through insurgencies. Many western intellectuals believe that insurgencies arise spon-
taneously out of conditions of poverty, hunger and inequality. The Marxist-Leninists
however, reject the spontaneity theory. Instead they believe that the impoverished masses
must be led to revolt by trained agitators, organizers and guerilla fighters. If the
spontaneity theorists were right, apathetic Haiti would be the hot-bed of revolutionary

[L.C]

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insurgency in the Central American-Caribbean region and once prosperous El Salvador would be enjoying calm tranquility. Obviously the Marxist-Leninists exploit the despair of the down-trodden masses to recruit their guerilla forces. But without the catalytic interraction of trained revolutionaries, the frustration generated by the political and social structure in which it exists.

Another problem of most Latin American countries is their ideological bias favoring economies largely under the control of the state. Hence, the U.S. preference for helping the economies of Latin American countries via increased trade and investment is not readily understood or accepted by many of the leaders of Latin American countries.

There are other complications related to the U.S. approach to development in Latin America. One is that most American businesses do not project themselves aggressively and imaginateively into the Latin American markets. Secondly, Latin American governments tend to evaluate U.S. development aid in terms of the level of direct U.S.-recipient government-to-government assistance and to ignore the benefits following from the improved exchanges in the private sector.

An issue raised by many Latin Americans in evaluating U.S. policy toward the question of Soviet-Cuban intervention in the area is where does the United States draw the line? In tolerating Cuba's alignment with the Soviet Union, in accepting and assisting in the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, in tolerating Bishop's takeover in Grenada and the December 1982 coup in Surinam, the U.S. has established a track record of acquiescence in Soviet-Cuban intrusion into Central America. Another example, was the U.S. unwillingness to advise the new Bolivian government of Silles not to bring communists into the government. In Bolivia, the Minister of Labor and the Minister of Mines are both communists. Under this arrangement Bolivia is comparatively peaceful, although the economy is in bad shape and the Bolivian government is moving rapidly toward the left in foreign affairs.

This report now turns to specific observations in Panama, Bolivia, and Chile.

[L]

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Panama

On my visit to Panama, I arrived at the airport at around 8:15 on January 5 and was met by the cultural affairs officer Paul J. Saxton. Saxton has served here for three years and seems to be well qualified. I was picked up the next morning at seven o'clock to go to the Holiday Inn to have breakfast with the American Chamber of Commerce at the Salon de Las Americas where I met with a group of some 65 people. It was a very interesting session; about 60 percent of the people were American, the rest were Panamanians. After presenting the general subject of Soviet-Cuban intrusion into Central America, the questions which followed indicated a considerable sophistication and considerable awareness about the threat facing this part of the world. Following this meeting I went to the embassy to meet with Mr. Garrett Sweany who spoke on the efforts being made to carry out the implementation of the treaties which will eventually turn the Panama canal over to Panama. He mentioned some of the problems and obstacles involved and the general progress that has been made. Despite some hitches all seems to be going along well.

At a luncheon that day I was hosted by the PAO Sigrid Maitre-Jean. At that meeting there were some dozen or so people from Panama who were high up in the business community.

The executive director of the Chamber of Commerce Adolpho Arrcha, and Mr. Jaun Jose Garcia, the head of the committee for Expo Commerce. This is a very large conference hall which next week will host a major international conference at which such luminaries as Henry Kissinger and David Rockefeller will be present. Most of the members of this group had been educated in the United States and were graduates of the Citadel, Notre-Dame, the University of Pennsylvania-Wharton School and Nebraska. They were all sensitive to the turmoil in Central America and were concerned that the United States were not doing enough to combat it. They were also concerned about their own problems as a future target of Soviet subversion. One of the points that they stressed was the fact that the Soviet Union and some of the Eastern European satellite countries are offering numerous