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War because everybody would then be tempted to try to play the German states against each other. And being Germans, if you forgive me, they would find a philosophical reason for existing, and it would have really changed the map of Europe. So I think that Chancellor Kohl will go down in world history if for nothing else and for what he did in '89 '90.

Q. In your columns you sometimes seem to refer to sort of (?)---------- types of behavior, nations or national character. Perhaps you (?)---------- from (?)---------- to national security. So what about Germany, which in terms of GNP, population, conventional armed forces has become the most powerful nation in Central Europe. Which behavior do you envisage from Germany as nonaligned member.

A. When somebody tells me that a man of 50 has changed his personality completely I'm apt not to believe it. (I know there are movies in which a man has an experience and then suddenly turns 180-degree turn from what he was). Likewise, I think there is such a thing as national character, a character which results from history. Experiences, geography. It is not a racist view, it's simply what seems "reasonable" to people. In the case of Russia--I'll get to Germany in one second--it is true they have tried to expand their security but it developed a dynamism where their attempt to achieve security produced ever more insecurity and they were therefore on an endless imperialistic expansion which in my view led to their downfall. (They did it) first as a Czarist empire and now as a Communist empire, and I think that is the key issue, one which

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people don't pay attention to.

With respect to Germany. First, it was the last country to be unified, the last major country to emerge. It spent all of its most of its intellectual energy becoming unified rather than reflecting on what to do once it was unified. And especially since it was unified in a way that nobody expected, which was, as an expression of pressure rather than as an expression of national.

Secondly, its foreign policy was conducted for 19 years by a very great man who was a genius, but was not capable of institutionalizing policy. Though that policy was brilliant, it meant throwing a lot of balls into the air and being in a better position to pull them down than anybody else. None of his successors even understood it, nor were they able to do it.

Then between 1890 and 1914, I believe that Germany conducted what is arguably the first foreign policy that has been conducted in Europe in the modern period.

Q. Right.

A. In which Germany produced all the dangers it feared most. And managed to bring together Britain, France and Russia.

Q. Sure.

A. Which nobody would have thought possible 10 years earlier. Building a navy, putting a military mission into Constantinople

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Chester picked two examples for which it is not possible to find a rational (?).

From this I conclude that there is in Germany no tradition of national interest the way there is in England and even in France. So that there is the danger, some people say, of a return of Naziism. I think that's absolutely out of the question. And, when people say Germany's going to march around Europe again, that's also not possible. What is possible, however, is that Germany may not be able to establish the right priorities, and that in its restless attempt to be intelligent, clever it will disquiet a lot of people because when you're in the center of the continent, and you have more neighbors than anybody else, and you are so powerful you have to conduct a more prudent policy than people who are thirdly removed. The German statesman who understood this best was Aldenauer

Q. Yes.

A. And I think Kohl understands it and it is his reason for being so committed to Europe.

But the German danger that I see has nothing to do with imperialism, has nothing to do with evil intentions but may have something to do with a certain romantic restlessness.

Q. Though, but (?......) then a (?......) who's said to have said about Germany and Germans, you either have them at your throat or at your feet.

A. No. I don't agree with that. I am not worried about a

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deliberately aggressive German foreign policy. The problem, I mean the Hitler problem, was--the more one reads about him--is that of a Bohemian psychopath, I don't mean Bohemia but a sort of a "Bohemian" artistic psychopath.

Q. Right. Yes.

A. Got hold of a government. In a country that didn't under couldn't comprehend it.

Q. Yes.

A. The problem of the Germans between 1890 and 1914, which was the other difficult period but never could translate it into anything very concrete. So I think the idea that the Germans would be at peoples' throats is not the danger. The danger is that the Germans without a clear idea of what they want will play every situation purely tactically, and thereby create great disquiet without intending anything particularly unpleasant.

Q. But, as you probably know, what they call the French "political class" is a little bit disturbed.

A. Because, partly, of a real inequality of strength. Germany has a population nearly twice that of France. And it has a more dynamic industry. And, therefore, it has a large influence.

Q. Yes.

A. Now, France, you can reasonably argue, has not come to grips for 100 years with the loss of the preeminent position that the two Napoleons threw away. The French position as the preeminent power in Europe depended on a divided Central

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Europe, of divided Germany and Italy, and especially a divided Germany. That was the French policy since the Thirty Years' War. Once Germany was united, France was bound to be an important but no longer a preeminent country. They have found that very difficult to accept intellectually. So some of the things they're afraid of are unavoidable, and some those things may look to them like excessive assertiveness.

Q. Yes. Now, what about this assertiveness which is called (?......) United States also. What is the reason behind it.

A. I think there are two parts to it. One is that the Adenauer policy, which was followed by most the other chancellors, was to prove themselves reliable allies. And therefore the Germans leaders in most of the post-war years were easier to deal with than is normal with a powerful national state. As long as Germany was divided, West Germany required legitimization from the West, a legitimacy superior to that of East Germany. Now, of course, that Germany's united it has no reason to subordinate itself for that reason, though there may be other reasons.

Q. Yes

A. So it was inevitable that Germany would become more assertive and that we have to get used to it.

The other element is a German tendency, which might be expressed as " anything worth doing is worth overdoing." I think the Germans are a more romantic people than the French, and less rationalistic than the French. Therefore emotion plays a larger role in German foreign policy and in German

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domestic debate. I mean it would be hard in France to generate
so much excitement about tanks to Turkey, or over Kurdistan or
over the Kurds. These things are not even--in a strictly
rational point of view--in the German interest.

Q. No.

A. So that tendency is inherent in German politics. And
that makes people uneasy.

Q. Yes, I see now.

A. But it's less over Kohl than with any other chancellor
except Adenauer.

Q. Could you say something about emerging tendencies,
worldwide, toward nationalism and
internationalism. In the world integration there's this
(?????) Do you see economic community? The European
Community decided last week to enhance the cohesion of the
community, establish even a common currency. And this seems to
indicate a decrease of nationalism in Western Europe at the
same time as nationalism increases in the former Eastern Bloc.
Which tendencies do you think will prevail at the beginning of
the next (?????).

A. Both at the same time.

Q. And wouldn't one tendency affect the other. Could it
happen that the integrating of the West would be as
(????) touched by America on (????).

A. You see (?????) even in the West if you
look at Scotland.

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Q. Yes. Ireland?

A. Ireland, Belfast, Lombardy. It may be that national states may weaken but not necessarily in favor of internationalism.

But of regionalism. I do not think it is at all self-evident that Europe will form itself into one nation. In fact, based on my perhaps in adequate experience, the people I know in the European countries seem to me to be less European today than they were five years ago, or when they are European they do it rationally. I do not find any great emotion. My German friends are not all that enthusiastic about the common currency. So I suspend judgment even about Europe going far beyond some economic integration.

In Eastern Europe, the big problem that, in my view, nobody addresses is that the area between the Polish frontier and Vladivostok is for the first time in 400 years capable of being organized as a region. We all talk about democracy in Russia, market economics. There's no real democracy, and there's real market economics. And it's not even self-evident to me that democracies never make wars against each other. World War I occurred in countries that were more-or-less democratic to the wild enthusiasm of the population. If you held a plebiscite in Serbia today, I'd bet you 80% of the people would approve what is being done in Bosnia and Croatia, and the same in Croatia.

A. So it's not done by dictatorships alone. But I'll put that aside. The major point, it seems to me, is we have this

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area--I mean we don't have it. This area exists for the first time in 400 years, and it is trying to break up into various states. One could make the case for the proposition that this is even better for Russia because it will still be a huge country of 150 million with a bigger territory than any other state but

(......?)

It will not have the incubus? of all these foreign nationalities. I do not see any outside country discussing the relationship of Ukraine to Russia, (?) to Russia. All the actions of the outside countries seem to me designed so as to exalt the role of Russia.

That it becomes inevitable that they will recentralize the whole area again and thereby recreate the old Russian problem. The old Russian problem is that once you have half your population foreign there's no stopping for it. There was a Russian nationalist writer who in the 19th Century said we are now at the (...) but if we don't reach the Adriatic we have to go back to the (...).

Q. Yeah. Yeah. That one to involve (?).

A. But it's built into the structure so we all talk as if this were a social welfare program in Russia. And and that seems to me when you say regionalism what is easily possible is that the West now begins to move towards integration. And will stop short. The East will break up into small units but will reintegrate under the tutelage of one imperial power.

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Q. Taking things.

A. This in fact is what I think will happen.

Q. Which will happen you think.

A. More likely than not.

Q. More likely than not.

A. And we're encouraging it.

Q. What should we do?

A. First, I think the Russians find it offensive to be treated as if they were just another European state. The Russians have a long history of being European and not quite European. They're both. They have their own particular culture. I think we can tell the Russians that we can cooperate with them, provided they don't repeat Russian history. And provided that at least the larger units and the historic units are dealt with as if they were nations. If they then want to create something like the European Community on the basis of sovereignty, that's a different matter. So I do not see why we do not make it clearer that we'll consider Ukraine (?) Baltic states and Khazikstan as nations. It is now a very amorphous area. Now it's very similar to what it was between 1917 and 1922. We had a number of defacto separate units appeared but in the back of the Russians there was the belief, as I believe it is in the present leaders that in a measurable time they'll get them back.

Q. Should the former U.S.S.R become more affiliated to the European Community?

A. Absolutely. I believe it is important that we do not

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create a no-man's land between the German border and the Russian border in which the historic contest between Germans and Russians gets reinvited and in which the countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary a minimum are encouraged rapidly to become associated with the West. And I find it troublesome that so much passion is given to economic aid programs for Russia and so little to Eastern Europe. I do not object to aid program for Russia. But we need to get a sense of priority. And we need to get a sense of balance. I think it is in our interest that the transition to market economics and Western values succeed in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. That will in the long run even help inside the former Soviet Union.

Q. But when these states get affiliated to the EC, it would be difficult to envisage that the cohesion of this community would be enhanced.

A. No but I think Greece and Northern Europe are a bigger obstacle to that. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary inwardly consider themselves belonging to the West.

Q. Now coming to NATO. Do the defense ministers of the states of the former U.S.S.R. take part in NATO meetings.

A. Ridiculous.

Why?

It guarantees the end of NATO. NATO was a defensive alliance. If it isn't a defensive alliance what is it? It will lead to the moral disintegration of NATO. What common purpose do we have with those defense ministers? And what is the

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danger that we're trying to deal with in NATO. You cannot have
a defensive alliance that does not have some probable danger
and common political objective.

Q. So where would you locate the danger?

A. I could say first of all I don't have to know where to locate the (?........?). One of the problems that always happens is you ask an individual what he would do. I I would assume that if these great men who lead world affairs today get together and put all their bureaucracies to work, they might be able to do better than I. Therefore you shouldn't judge the problem. I would say the problem of how the IF? will organize itself over the next five or 10 years. It's a problem that concerns us.

Q. Yes.

A. This may be now more a political than a military problem. And therefore the military forces should be somewhat reduced. Considerably reduced. Secondly, there are certain trouble spots that are certain to arise again-- the Persian Gulf, North Africa--even such conceivable cases as Yugoslavia. We need American forces in Europe for the balance between the West European countries and for the balance between Europe and a reawakening of Russia. Because Russia will become again a major country. And, because she is. And therefore we don't need a plan for military operations but then we have to organize it so that in some areas the United States can take the predominant role and in other areas Europe can take a predominant role. And therefore I have always favored a