DAEDALUS

1

UNEDITED DRAFT

NOT FOR RELEASE

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DRAFT

LIMITED WAR: NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL 4/1

## A. The Nature of the Debate.

Few issues have aroused more controversy than the relative role of conventional and nuclear weapons in Western strategy. Its resolution is of vital significance for our strategy, our alliance policy and the future of arms control negotiations.

Two facts need to be understood at the outset: No war in the nuclear age can ever be completely free of the specter of nuclear weapons — at least until arms control measures are much further advanced and much more reliable. In a war between nuclear powers, even if no nuclear weapons are used, both sides would have to take account of the possibility that they might be. The tactics would necessarily differ from those of World War II; deployment would have to guard against the sudden introduction of nuclear weapons. Diplomats would have to negotiate with the knowledge that any prolonged conventional war may turn into a nuclear conflict, if not a final show-down. Every war henceforth will be nuclear to a greater or lesser extent whether or not nuclear weapons are used.

A second fact is equally important: The choice between using conventional or nuclear weapons is no longer entirely up to us. The Soviet nuclear arsenal is growing. Soviet military journals report tactical exercises with nuclear weapons. We cannot gear our strategy or stake our survival on the assumption that nuclear

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DRAFT

2

weapons will *not* be used against us. Even if we prefer to resist with conventional weapons, we have to be prepared for nuclear war as well. Only being ready for limited nuclear war will give us the option of a conventional strategy.

With this as a background, we can summarize the arguments for both sides. Advocates of a nuclear strategy emphasize the disparity in mobilizable manpower between the Communist bloc and the free world, a disparity made even more acute by the Communist ability to concentrate their whole weight against states much smaller and much less well-equipped. Nuclear weapons, it is claimed, can serve as a substitute for manpower. At the very least they will force an aggressor to disperse his forces. This will prevent breakthroughs of established defensive positions and consolidation of occupied territory.

Proponents of a nuclear strategy admit that if nuclear weapons were simply added to the tactics of World War II the result would probably be the complete devastation of the combat zone. They reply that such a course would be senseless. The cost of a nuclear strategy must be judged in terms of the tactics appropriate to nuclear weapons. Since nuclear weapons are so destructive and at the same time so easy to transport, large military formations cannot be maintained in the field. And they are unnecessary because fire power is no longer dependent on massed armies. To concentrate is to court disaster. Safety resides in mobility. Logistics must be simple. The traditional supply system is too cumbersome and too vulnerable. Accordingly,

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DRAFT

3

a great premium will be placed on small, self-contained units of high mobility. In such circumstances, it is argued, a conventional war of the World War II variety with a flankless frontline rolling over the countryside.

A nuclear strategy according to its proponents would have these advantages: (a) The dispersal of troops would separate the requirements of victory from those of controlling territory. To prevail in a nuclear war, it is necessary to have small, highly mobile units. To control territory, larger concentrations are required particularly in the key centers of administration. For example the Soviet army required some twenty divisions to crush the Hungarian rebellion. This, it is argued, would have been clearly impossible in the face of nuclear weapons. (b) Nuclear war would complicate the aggressor's calculations -- if only because it is an unfamiliar mode of warfare. The Soviet Union and Communist China possess many "experts" in conventional warfare. With respect to nuclear war, the calculations are theoretical. There would always remain the inevitable uncertainty of embarking on a course in which no experience is available. (c) Nuclear war would be an effective device to weaken the Communist control of Soviet dominated areas. The small detachments appropriate for nuclear war will be extremely vulnerable to guerilla activity and can be handicapped severely by a hostile population. Since the population on the Western side of the Iron Curtain is more loyal to its governments than those under Communist rule, a nuclear war

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DRAFT

4

is thought to be the best means of exploiting Soviet political difficulties -- at least in Europe -- and therefore the most effective means of deterring Soviet aggression. (d) Nuclear weapons are our "best weapons", the result of our most advanced technology. To forego using them is to deprive ourselves of the advantages of a superior industrial potential. (e) Any other course would impose impossible force requirements. It is admittedly impossible to fight a conventional war against a nuclear enemy without having a nuclear establishment in the field -- otherwise the temptation for the aggressor to use nuclear weapons and sweep all before him, might become overwhelming. This means that we would need a well-protected retaliatory force, a capable limited war force and increasing conventional strength. Since the expense of maintaining each category even at present levels is multiplying and since the military budget is shrinking, any attempt to build up conventional forces must result in a fundamental, perhaps fatal, weakness in each category.¹

The advocates of a conventional strategy reply that the decision to use nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the very concept of limitation. Pointing to such military exercises with nuclear weapons as *Carte Blanche* in Europe and *Sagebrush* in the United States, they stress that the inevitable consequence of nuclear war will be the desolation of the combat zone and the decimation of the population. No country would wish to be defended at that

¹. For a fuller discussion of limited nuclear war see the author's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Ch. VI - "Problems of Limited Nuclear War," p. 191 ff.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DRAFT

5

price. Even a "successful" nuclear war would provide a conclusive argument for future Soviet blackmail.

Moreover, once nuclear weapons are used, so this school of thought reasons, all restraints disappear. It will be difficult enough to establish the limits of a conventional war. Because of their very unfamiliarity, nuclear weapons would make the task nearly impossible. The very fact that there exists a continuous spectrum of destructiveness in nuclear weapons, so often invoked by advocates of a nuclear strategy in defense of their thesis, is used by their critics against them. If the distinction between the low-yield and high-yield weapons is so difficult, if so much depends on the manner of employing them, any effort to set limits based on explosive equivalent will be meaningless. The temptation to resort to ever more destructive weapons will be overwhelming.

Proponents of a conventional strategy question not only the possibility of limitation but the efficacy of the tactics thought to be appropriate for nuclear war. Small detachments, they contend, whatever their nuclear firepower, would be extremely vulnerable to harassment and defeat by conventional forces. When confronted by an opponent possessing both a nuclear and a conventional capability, they are almost certain to lose, for they would be largely defenseless against small conventional raiding parties. Nuclear weapons, it is contended, are not a substitute for manpower. On the contrary, because of its high rate of attrition, nuclear war would probably require more manpower, not less.