EGYPTIAN KING TUTANKHAMUN EXHIBIT

THE NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART

EAST GARDEN COURT DINNER

November 15, 1976

PAUL MELLON: "Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Minister, Mr. Secretary, distinguished guests, Bunny and I want to welcome all of you to a preview of The National Gallery's final event of its Bicentennial season. When our director was in Cairo a couple of years ago and jokingly said that one argument that he could not make was that Tutankhamun had anything to do with the American Bicentennial. And it was pointed out to him that The National Gallery on our National Mall was surrounded by architectural witnesses of our heritage: the Jefferson Memorial, which is Roman; the Lincoln Memorial, which is Greek, and the Washington Monument, which is Egyptian. Today the good relations between our country and the Arab Republic of Egypt are symbolized by another monument, a human monument. I might say a mobile international monument, who is with us tonight. I would like to turn the dais over to my fellow trustee of The National Gallery, the Secretary of State."

(Applause)

HENRY KISSINGER: "Mr. Mellon, the Minister, ladies and gentlemen, The last time I spoke in this hall, it was in honor of a dinner for the French Foreign Minister, and I became aware of the acoustics

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HENRY KISSINGER (Cont'd): (Laughter) and it was clear that nobody at the next table could understand one word of my prose nor could I understand one word of the French Foreign Minister's reply.
(Laughter) And afterwards Art Buchwald, who was present said he had just seen the quintessence of diplomacy. As far as he knew, I had insulted the French Foreign Minister (Laughter); the French Foreign Minister had declared war on the United States (Laughter), and everyone else was sitting there and applauding the performance (Laughter). And so it gives me great pleasure to be able to express the thanks of the United States to this Bicentennial gift from our friends in Egypt. Before our Egyptian friends have a heart attack, let me point out that it is clearly understood that the gift consists of a loan that will be (Laughter), that will be returned in due course. It gives me great pleasure because in my public life few things have meant more to me than the opening of a period of friendship and understanding between the United States and the Arab countries and the progress towards peace that has been made in the Middle East and the preeminent role in this evolution has been played by the President of Egypt, President Sadat."

"Like many barbarians before me in the thousands of years of Egyptian history, I arrived in Egypt four years ago for the first time. And a little more than three years ago for the first time, and I have been impressed and moved by the humanity and wisdom of its people. As I went through the Museum in Cairo, I was struck by the degree to which Egypt has humanized the many waves of

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HENRY KISSINGER (Cont'd): foreigners that have traversed it. When one looks at the faces of the Egyptian statues, the stern expressions of the early arrivals and then watches the gradual mellowing of the faces as the statues are elaborated over the generations, one can perhaps see something of the eternity that Egypt has represented. And I've always been profoundly moved by Egyptian architecture. Few people in history have so nearly achieved what they set out to do. Here was a people dedicated to immortality in its architecture setting down monuments meant for eternity and that now still stand in the sands and in the vast expanses representing the infinite aspirations of mankind to leave behind them something more than they found and who have built something hopefully better than that with which they began. I believe that we are all very fortunate that the government of Egypt has made it possible for us to see the treasures of Tutankhamun here in Washington, and I would like to express our gratitude to the government of Egypt for this very generous gesture. The Middle East torn by conflict for so many generations is, I hope, on the way to peace and justice in which all people can live in security and in which they can all realize the ______ of the great cultures that have developed it. So it is in this spirit that I would like to propose that all of us drink a toast to friendship between the United States and the people and the government of Egypt and to the distinguished President of Egypt, President Sadat."

(Applause)

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Dr. Ibrahim Badran:

MOHAMED OX GHBEBAXX "Mr. Secretary of State, Mrs. Kissinger, Mr. and Mrs. Mellon, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I would like first of all to thank Mr. and Mrs. Mellon for their wonderful dinner and gracious hospitality. I think that this is an historic day for at this very moment two great nations, one from the holy world and the other the pulsating heart of modern civilization both meeting in friendship. This exhibition of King Tut symbolizes the efforts of both the United States and Egypt. Dr. Kissinger of the United States was able through his shuttle diplomacy to arrange with foreign ministers, families of Egypt to bring this exhibition to the United States. It's done and done as we hope beautifully. This illustrates the determined efforts to work closer together towards establishing of a permanent and just peace in the Middle East. The arrangement for the United States' tour of King Tut's exhibition includes actually the largest collection that ever left Egypt and it will remain here for the longest period ever. This decision was announced in October of '75 after the United States had taken the first positive step towards a peace settlement in the Middle East after 27 years of trouble. At this time, Egypt accepted to send a part of its eternally living history to celebrate with joint friends, Americans, their Bicentennial in 1976. This inauguration symbolizes the glory of Egypt that was, and we hope to be, and the living glory of America that it existed for this civilization which began in Egypt seven thousand years ago and is flourishing now on this green land in the form of a great technology of the United States and

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Dr. Ibrahim Badran

MOHAMED GHOREBALE (Cont'd): which is providing the whole world. I think that every Egyptian here including King Tut, all feel with me this great thrill of sharing with you some of the most precious objects of our own history."

"King Tut's treasures discovered early in this century are, indeed among the most beautiful treasures in the world, but they only represent a glimpse of the vast wealth of ancient monuments, sculptures, art and inborn immortal stamina that speak for Egypt's greatness. When Tut died in 1352 B.C. there had already been eighteen dynasies of previous kings. More than two thousand years before him the nemesis of the god ______ and ______ of god Amun were united by King Menes in the year 3,400 B.C. into one united state. A feature copied in the year 1776 here to start the most powerful component in modern civilization. The sand and dry weather preserved ancient Egyptian monuments and culture over a thousand years, so that Egyptologists can now speak about ancient Egyptian religion, beliefs, arts, social and political achievement, administration, agriculture, hydraulics of the River Nile, mathematics and astronomy."

"Ladies and gentlemen, if the presence in the United States of one-tenth of Egyptian heritage may help to better understanding and friendship between Egyptians and Americans, then the young King Tut would have fulfilled a great job as great as yours."

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Dr. Ibrahim Badran

MOHAMED XGHORBAIX (Cont'd):

"Especially so, as it is a token of respect for your great achievements during your celebrating the Bicentennial Anniversary. I would like to pay tribute to all men and women in both countries, who made this event possible. Special mention should be made to Dr. Kissinger, who realized how vital it is to invite the moral forces of both the American and Egyptian people towards the achievement of peace and tranquility that allow for development and prosperity. Finally, I would like to thank Mr. Carter Brown, Director of The National Gallery, Mr. Thomas Hoving and Miss Christine Lilliquist of the Metropolitan Museum and all Egyptologists, Mr. Ravenel ROY, Mr. George Sexton, the National Gallery Designer and the numerous other friends who gave their time and help to arrange this most tasteful display of Egyptian collection. Finally, if you allow me, can we call on you to drink a toast to the President of the United States of America."

(Applause)

PAUL MELLON: "Thank you very much Mr. Minister, Mr. Secretary. They were very moving remarks and toasts. The gallery is indeed grateful to everyone on the Egyptian side who has made this loan possible; particularly, Dr. Mokhtar, President of the Egyptian Organization of Antiquities, who watches over the museum and archaeology in Egypt with energy and finesse, and Ambassador Ghorbal whose charm has won the hearts of all of us. On the American side,

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PAUL MELLON (Cont'd): I would like particularly to thank Mr. John Richardson, the sixth Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs and his able advisor on the arts, Peter Solmssen.

The United States government has aided this exhibition in many ways.

And Ambassador Eilts in Cairo suggested that the objects be transported here by the United States Navy, and we are very grateful to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Halloway for making that possible. The Federal Council of the Arts and Humanities has awarded federal indemnification, which has saved all of the participants the crushing insurance costs that such an exhibition would have otherwise entailed. The National Endowment for the Humanities, represented here tonight by its Chairman, Dr. Berman, awarded the exhibition a generous grant. Matching funds were donated by Exxon Corporation, represented here tonight by its Senior Vice President, Mr. Bennett and the President of Esso, Middle East, Mr. Headland. We were also greatly aided by another matching grant from the Robert Woods Johnson Memorial Trust, whose Trustee, Mr. Kline is also with us tonight. And, if one is counting federal employees, I would like to thank all of those on the staff of The National Gallery, who labored so hard on the exhibition; particularly, Giloway, Ravenel, the Designer as well as Rusty Powell and Bill Williams, who did the educational panels in cooperation with Dr. Silverman of the Field Museum in Chicago. The show is truly a cooperative effort involving six American cities: Chicago, New Orleans, Los Angeles, Seattle and New York. Their sharing equally in the costs of the show and have all agreed to allow the

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PAUL MELLON (Cont'd): proceeds of all sales of catalogs and other materials related to the show to go as a contribution towards the Cairo Museum and the Egyptian Department of Antiquities. I would like particularly to thank the Metropolitan Museum of New York, which has functioned as the managing partner in this consortium, to Thomas Hoving the Director and all the other members of the Metropolitan staff, who have worked so assiduously on this show, our heartfelt thanks. The able and dedicated President of that Institution, himself a former Trustee of The National Gallery when he was Secretary of the Treasury, is with us tonight, and I would now as our last event before inviting you all downstairs to see the show; I would like now to call on Mr. Dillon to say a few words."

(Applause)

Douglas Dillon:

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX "Minister, Mr. Ambassador, distinguished guests, far be it from me to keep you for any length of time from seeing this glorious exhibition. But, I must say a few words because this is a very special occasion to those of us at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Our relationship with Egypt goes back beyond the turn of the century, and we have had many years of expeditions in Egypt excavating there and some of the results of that are presently in the Metropolitan. For the actual opening of the tomb of Tutankhamun when that was found, the Metropolitan closed its own exhibition in Egypt and turned over all its experts to Lord Carnarvon and to Mr. Carter to help in the great task of unraveling and

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Douglas Dillon:

RIPLEY DILLON (Cont'd): properly cataloging all this great find.
And more recently, we have been working for some seven or eight
years to achieve this expedition, exhibition this time, and I am
delighted that it has finally come to pass. It means a great deal
to our two countries, as you have heard, that it also I think heralds
in a new era of exhibitions by museums at least here in the United
States. As I am a firm believer, as are all of us at the Metro-
politan, that we will have to join together with our sister insti-
tutions and work very closely to have these marvelous exhibitions
from abroad. They cannot any longer come to one or two institutions
and then disappear, and this is a perfect example coming to six
separate institutions and we are honored and delighted to have been
chosen to manage and handle this exhibition here in the United States.
And, we are particularly grateful to Dr. Christine Lilliquist, our
Curator of Egyptian Art, who is also serving as Curator of this
exhibition while it is here in the United States."

"Finally, I cannot think of a more beautiful and finer place
for this exhibition to open than in this great National Gallery of
Art here in Washington, and I want to thank Mr. Mellon and Mr. Brown
for making this possible and also Mr. and Mrs. Mellon for giving
us this wonderful evening here prior to the opening. It's a great
pleasure to be here, and I thank them for us all."

(Applause)

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PAUL MELLON: "Ladies and gentlemen, I think that concludes our dinner unless Mr. Brown would like to tell us how to get to the exhibition."

(Laughter)

J. CARTER BROWN: (His instructions are inaudible to the microphone.)

(Applause)

END OF TAPE

"The Treasures of Tutankhamun" Preview

National Gallery

November 15, 1976

Like many Americans, I have been
overwhelmed at the outpouring of goodwill
which has come to the United States in this
Bicentennial year from our foreign friends.
And I can think of no Bicentennial gift to this
country more spectacular than this one.

But I want to reassure my Egyptian
friends that I use the word "gift" in a very
precise sense. I want to reassure them that
I know that the gift is the exhibit, and that we
are not planning on keeping any of these

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magnificent artifacts.

As many of you know, King Tutankhamun's
tomb was discovered intact, unlike most of
the other ancient Egyptian archeological sites.
This was because it was obscured for many
years by another tomb on top of it.

I didn't realize that myself until today,
and I was struck by it. Some of the recent press
commentary on my years in Washington suggest
that there is a similarity -- that my real policy
aims and objectives are obscured by my public

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statements on the subject.

But as with King Tut's tomb, it may
take researchers six years of devoted work to
discover the reality.

We are touched and we are grateful to
the Egyptian government and to my good friend
President Sadat for this gesture.

There is a particular value to this
nation, in its 200th year, in looking back with
appreciation to the cultural and artistic
achievements of earlier civilizations. This

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dazzling display of the genius of man 35
centuries ago is a sobering but constructive
note as we celebrate our comparatively
brief history.

Above all, it is a reminder that our
relationship with Egypt and the Egyptian
people is a two-way dialogue. We have learned
in recent years that the trappings and
achievements of modernity and progress in
our society may satisfy the material needs
of our people, but in so doing they only

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emphasize the need for society to meet its
cultural and artistic and spiritual needs
as well.

So let us each in our own private
way draw genius and inspiration from
this collection. Let us join together in
expressing our heartfelt gratitude to the
government and the people of Egypt for
sharing their heritage with us. And
above all, let us enjoy the beauty we have
here tonight.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 16, 1976

No. 560

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT A MEETING OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY
TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL SESSION
WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA

NOVEMBER 16, 1976

**CONGRESSMAN JACK BROOKS:** Good afternoon, and our guest today was born in Germany. At the age of twelve, his family emigrated to the United States. He earned a doctorate from Harvard University, where he first gained attention for his summer seminars on international relations. He really is the American dream with a German accent (laughter).

Subsequently, he played an ever-increasing active role in foreign policy, both as an academic writer and as an adviser to public figures, including Nelson Rockefeller. His primary area of concern originally was in nuclear arms and their effect on international relations.

In 1969 he became National Security Adviser to then President Nixon. And in 1973 he became our Secretary of State. In that same year he became a Nobel laureate for his work for peace in Southeast Asia.

Among his many accomplishments, some of the more outstanding were his opening of relationships with Peking, the normalization of our dealings with the Soviet Union, and his extremely difficult problems both abroad and here in our own country. Few American public servants attained the public stature of our present Secretary of State.

Throughout the world he is recognized for his untiring efforts for peace. He has impeccable academic credentials, a keen intellect, and seemingly boundless energy. His most valuable asset, however, is his sound sense of reality leavened with a great sense of humor.

And it is with great pride and pleasure that I present you the Secretary of State of the United States, the Honorable Doctor Henry Kissinger. (Applause)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Mr. President, Mr. Brooks (Congressman Jack Brooks, Texas):

For further information contact:

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As you ladies and gentlemen can appreciate, I have some
difficulty understanding accented English, and therefore there
was one uneasy moment when I thought that my friend Jack
Brooks had said that I was born in Germany at the age of
twelve (laughter).

In fact, having suffered from my accent for so many years, I,
a few years ago, went on German television and eagerly watched
myself in the evening in order to hear me speak my native
language, only to discover that there is no language in the
world I speak without an accent (laughter).

Now, distinguished delegates, when I accepted this invitation
it was at the advice of our Policy Planning Staff which felt
that it was safe to use this occasion to articulate the policies
of the new Ford Administration (laughter).

But you have to remember that not even our Policy Planning Staff
can be right one hundred percent of the time.

So I think there are one or two Congressmen here who, even if
I attempted to bluff, would be eager to tell you that I cannot
fully speak for the policies of the forthcoming Carter Administration.

Nevertheless, the policy of the United States towards NATO, the
basic foreign policy objectives of the United States, have always
been treated as nonpartisan issues in the United States. When a
Republican Administration was in office, the main lines of our
foreign policy have been supported by leading Democrats. And
now that a Democratic Administration is about to assume office,
the main lines of our policy, you can be certain, will be
supported by leading Republicans. We will not treat foreign
policy as an issue between the parties in any event. The
relationship between the United States and its allies in the
Western Alliance goes back over the whole postwar period. It
has been pushed forward by every President of both of our parties,
and it reflects enduring realities.

The United States will always stand for peace. It will always
uphold the security of its friends and of free people, and it
will always strive for bringing about a world that is better
than the one in which we may find ourselves at any moment.

It is fashionable in discussions of the NATO Alliance to emphasize
the difficulties and sometimes the shortcomings of the Alliance.
But we should keep in mind that one can think of few alliances
in history that have lasted such a long time while gaining in
strength and cohesiveness. What started out as an attempt to
deal with a military danger has expanded in significance to
encompass economic and political cooperation, which is turning
our Alliance more and more into a cooperative, creative
partnership.

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I thought the most useful thing I could do today is to make a few observations about the basic problems that any American administration faces in the conduct of foreign policy, and then to answer your questions.

Inevitably, the NATO Alliance faces the need to adjust itself to new realities. Weapons technology has changed enormously since the early days of NATO. At that time the United States had a nuclear monopoly. Today, as a result of unavoidable industrial and technological changes, there exists an effective pattern.

We can discuss forever which side has a marginal advantage in what category of strategic weapons. The basic fact remains that the predominance of strategic weapons which characterized the 1950s and the greater part of the 1960s is no longer the case, and cannot be recaptured at any level of American effort. Therefore, NATO inevitably faces the necessity of adjusting its defense to these new conditions.

That challenge is being met now. Major efforts have been made in recent years to improve the defensive capability of NATO, and this challenge must continue to be met, and I am confident will continue to be met, in the years ahead.

The second problem we face is the political and economic cooperation between the nations of the North Atlantic. Whether this is done within the framework of the NATO organization or through ad hoc arrangements adopted to specific circumstances is less important than for us to remember that military defense without a political and economic consensus will, over a period of time, prove empty. The nations of the North Atlantic have to have some common vision of the future, and a parallel approach to some of the crucial issues of our period.

I believe that in recent years the degree of consultation among the Allies has expanded enormously in all fields, and that very great progress has been made in developing this consensus in the field of economic cooperation.

I remember when in 1973 I pointed out the need for the nations of the North Atlantic to cooperate in the field of economics, there were some who pointed out that this was not necessarily part of the NATO Charter. And that was true. But the events of subsequent years have left no doubt that our nations are interdependent, that we are the engines of the world economy, that none of us can achieve economic prosperity in isolation, and that none of us can master the problems either of East-West economic relations or North-South economic relations by separate policies.

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And finally, there is the problem of relations with the
Communist world, the problem that brought us together in
the first place. We face adversaries that are gaining in
military strength, and we therefore have the necessity of
building up our own military strength. But we also must
remember that we have an obligation to the future and an
obligation to our peoples to demonstrate that military power
is a means and not an end, that we must spare no effort to
bring about a more peaceful world and one less fraught with
risks.

We must avoid, on the one hand, the danger of illusionism and
of wishful thinking that substitutes the desire for peace for
the reality. But we also have to avoid the danger of excessive
truculence and of thinking that tough rhetoric is the same
as substantive policy.

But we face these problems, I believe, in an atmosphere of
increasing confidence between the Allies. In the two political
campaigns in NATO countries that took place this year, the
debate between the parties was as to who would do a better job
in strengthening the Alliance. And while the incumbents, of
course, always believed that the criticism that was made
of them was unjust, unfair, and a few other words I would not wish
to use here, nevertheless, the fact of the criticism is healthy
for the Alliance, because it shows that in this country there is
no dispute about the importance of NATO. There is no dispute
about the central role the Atlantic relationship plays in our
foreign policy. There is only a dispute as to who can most
effectively realize the objectives all Americans share. And
now, in any event, that the campaign is over, all Americans
will without doubt support the strengthening of NATO, the
fostering of the partnership between Western Europe and the
United States, and the common achievement of peace, of progress,
and of security.

Now I will be glad to answer your questions.

(Applause)

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Secretary of State, I would like to thank you very, very much for these words listened to very attentively by all of us.

Let me now call my first colleagues who have questions to ask.
Admiral Morgan-Giles.

ADMIRAL MORGAN-GILES: Mr. Secretary of State, in your very interesting remarks, you spoke about the broadening of the

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original NATO Alliance into political and economic fields.
But I am, as an old military man, concerned with the processes
within the Alliance for taking military decisions for
military crisis management below the threshold of any shooting
war. And could you say whether during your time as Secretary
of State you have been satisfied with the arrangements and
the procedures and, in particular, the communications for
taking military decisions within our Alliance in conditions
below a shooting war?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, during my term of office, we did
not have a major European crisis and therefore the military
arrangements of NATO were never tested as far as I was concerned
in a crisis situation.

I have the feeling, based on no very hard evidence, that an
improvement in the communications would be helpful. I have had
more experience with political consultation, but again not under
crisis conditions. There the relationship between the NATO
Council and consultations in capitals does not always work as
smoothly as one would expect. And in very acute crises, the
tendency has been to consult more immediately in the capitals
than in the NATO Council.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Kissinger. Mr. Koniotakis of
Greece, you have the floor.

MR. KONIOTAKIS: I am a retired Air Force General who has served
with SHAPE for three years under General Norstad as Military
Representative of Greece.

I am, sir, very much concerned, as I am sure all of us here are,
about the weakness in the effectiveness of the southern flank
of the Alliance which, as all of us know, is due to the
existing state of tension in our relations with Turkey.

But Greece is asking nothing that belongs to any of her allies.
The Turks, after twenty years of smooth cooperation in the
Alliance, are claiming today rights that belong to us according
to existing international treaties.

So I ask on which side lies the bulk of responsibility for creating
such problems which produce generally this tension.

I know, sir, that is a very delicate question to answer, but I
am certain that as long as NATO's attitude toward such problems
in the Alliance is to be, or seems to be, influenced not so
much by objectiveness but by other considerations, I am afraid
that the cohesion of the Alliance will continue to suffer.

Thank you.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I am reckless, but I am not
suicidal (laughter).

In my limited but intense exposure to the Greek-Turkish problem, it has become apparent to me that in the history in which Greece and Turkey have impacted on each other over the centuries, there has developed a legacy of distrust in which an outsider would better not attempt to apportion the responsibility.

The major problem we face today is that the disputes between Greece and Turkey, and the attempt to settle these disputes by military means, is a disaster for both countries and a disaster for the Alliance. These issues have, moreover, become enmeshed in our own domestic affairs, and I think that the most useful role that the United States can play is to seek to bring about a resolution of these conflicts by acting as an honest broker between the parties, using its influence, because there can be no victory for either side between Greece and Turkey. Everybody will lose.

I think the major role in this will have to be played by the new Administration. But again, all concerned Americans will support any serious effort to bring an end to these disputes.

THE CHAIRMAN: I thank you, Mr. Secretary of State. If you wish to speak, please place your name on the list. Mr. Amaro da Costa of Portugal has the floor.

MR. AMARO DA COSTA: Mr. Secretary of State, I would like to put to you two questions concerning Angolan affairs and one question concerning Portuguese affairs.

As you know, and all of us know, two former liberation movements in Angola are now conducting or leading or initiating a new guerrilla war aiming, according to their own declarations and statements, to put an end to the presence and domination of Cuban and Soviet military forces in Angola.

I would like to have your reaction on that issue, on those new events, and on the possible consequences of this new state of affairs in the interests of the Alliance.

A second question, sir, it will be concerning the recent reports indicating that the Cuban military forces in Angola are responsible for genocide in the south of the country, and I would like to have your comment on such reports.

The third question, sir, concerns Portugal. The United States and other countries have been giving a positive response to the financial and monetary needs of their own country, and I would like to know if you think that the present level of cooperation is enough to overcome the present economic difficulties of my country? Thank you.

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** With respect to the first question, we are aware that a guerrilla war is going on in some parts of Angola. We are not supporting it. And to the extent that it occurs, it seems to reflect the inability of the authorities in Luanda to establish their control, even with the presence of twelve to thirteen thousand Cuban troops.

We have strongly opposed the presence of these Cuban troops. We think that their introduction was incompatible with the spirit of detente or with the practice of detente. And we believe that any future efforts like this would raise very serious questions about Soviet long-range intentions.

But we are not ourselves participating directly or indirectly in any of these actions.

With respect to genocide in the southern part of Angola, we have seen no confirmed reports, and our information is probably no different from yours. It comes from stories from various surrounding countries. But we have had no independent confirmation.

With respect to the economic problems of Portugal, the United States has strongly supported the democratic government that is now in office in Portugal and the democratic system that has been established. We have under consideration now a program for substantially increased economic aid, and I think that within the next week a decision on this will be communicated to the Portuguese Government and, I think, in a constructive sense.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary of State. The Right Honorable de Freitas, United Kingdom.

**MR. DE FREITAS:** Like the last question, mine goes far beyond NATO, but it concerns Africa.

May I ask the Secretary of State to say something about the Administration's policy on Rhodesia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has supported the principle of majority rule in Rhodesia with respect for minority rights, and was instrumental in bringing about the acceptance by Mr. Smith of the principle of majority rule within two years, and of the establishment immediately of a transitional government before full majority rule comes into being.

There is now in Geneva a negotiation under British chairmanship that is enormously complex because it brings together four nationalist groups of different persuasions -- the Rhodesian authorities, various African observers -- and therefore the

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negotiations have a very complex character.

Nevertheless, I think both the British Government and we are cautiously optimistic that the negotiations are going forward. Each of the parties, of course, has the necessity of making public statements for its own constituents, but we hope that progress -- well, we believe that some progress has already been made, and we believe that the negotiations to establish a transitional government can be pushed forward.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Christiansen of Denmark.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned among other things the economic interdependence. One of your former Ambassadors to the European Community recently published a book called the "Unhinged Alliance". I think it was Ambassador Schaetzel.

In this book he indicates some reluctance from the Americans in recognizing the efforts and endeavors of the Europe of the Nine.

As a European, I would like to hear your comment on that point of view.

And in the same connection, also your opinion with a view to the standardization and rationalization within NATO, your view on the European program group. Thank you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, of course, you have to remember I am leaving public office as an illiterate. I don't read any nonclassified document (laughter). And I don't know whether I am still capable of reading a sentence that doesn't have five dependent clauses (laughter).

So I have not read the book of Mr. Schaetzel but I assume, from a general acquaintance with his views, that he is not in complete agreement with the policies of this Administration.

Now, I don't know what is meant by recognizing the efforts of the Nine. Our view has been that in the fifties -- and maybe in the early sixties -- it may have been appropriate for the United States to be the chief engine of European unification. But at some point in that process, the process of European unification had to develop its own momentum. We have believed that Europe could not be unified by the United States and that frantic efforts by the United States to bring about what has to be an organic evolution would not advance the prospects.

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We welcome European unification. We believe it is in the interests of the West, in the interests of the Atlantic Alliance. We will cooperate with European unification. But I think that the chief impetus for European unification must come from the Europeans, and the United States cannot adopt a patronizing attitude in which we tell the Nine how they should organize their own internal affairs.

Now, in that sense, we may not have been as active as our predecessors. But that is also an imperative, if Europe is ever to be an independent force, that at some point it take over responsibility for its own evolution. We welcome that evolution. We will support it. We are willing and eager to deal with it.

On the issue of standardization, in principle we support it. It is, in fact, highly desirable. In practice, when the issue arises there are very often conflicting pressures in which theory and practice do not always mesh. But certainly the standardization of weapons in NATO is a highly important and desirable objective.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Mr. Macfarquhar, United Kingdom.

**MR. MACFARQUHAR:** Mr. Secretary, after an initial breakthrough, the Administration of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Ford did not succeed in normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China. I wonder if you could explain why that was and whether you would recommend, if asked, that the new Administration should and could proceed rapidly in that direction.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have done my utmost to curb my propensity of telling others how to conduct their affairs, and I don't think it would be appropriate for me to give advice to an Administration that hasn't even taken office yet, and especially somebody who was not short of advice while I was in office. I will try to be somewhat more sparing than was the case when I was here.

But, basically, I would point out that our relationship with China has at least two components -- the component of normalization and the component where two great nations have parallel objectives even in the absence of normalization of relations.

The parallel interest has been expressed repeatedly in public statements by both sides in our concern with preventing world hegemony by any country. And we believe that we can cooperate and have in fact on occasion developed parallel views, whether or not normalization has in fact been completed.

The United States has committed itself to work towards normalization. I would assume that the new Administration will

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continue this process, but I don't want to make cooperation on one of these categories dependent on full completion of the other, nor do I want to tell the new Administration with what speed it should proceed.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Thank you. Mr. Claude Roux of France is recognized.

**MR. ROUX:** Mr. Secretary, our colleague, Chairman Boscher, very clearly expressed the views of the French delegation regarding your action at the service of peace.

We especially appreciate your successful efforts for the safe-
guarding of peace in the Near East and for the strengthening of
alliances. Perhaps this has not been brought out
sufficiently, but I would like to tell you that public opinion
and the opinion of our colleagues as well is that, as regards
Africa, we have the feeling that there is a certain passiveness
on the part of the American Government.

Our Portuguese colleague raised a question a moment ago regarding
the development of guerrilla warfare in Angola. There are Cuban
troops who cross the Atlantic and we would like to have some
clarifications on the attitude of the U. S. Government at this
point and regarding the future developments of the situation in
the whole of southern Africa.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course now we will have to see whether
my French is adequate to my self-confidence.

But since my answers are usually sufficiently opaque, you may
not know (laughter). You may never know whether I understood
your question.

With respect to southern Africa, first of all, we believe that
the decision that was taken by our Congress last year with
respect to Angola had extremely unfortunate consequences, and
set in motion a series of events which we are now attempting
to master. But I think this has to be understood as a back-
ground to the current situation.

Our attempt in Africa is to demonstrate that there is a peaceful
alternative, to strengthen the moderate elements, to prevent
further incursions of military forces from outside of Africa
and, at the same time, to encourage an evolution in the direction
that is compatible with the aspirations of the African peoples.

Now, under the circumstances which we have faced, this is a
very difficult and complicated operation. And the fact is that
the Soviet Union had a first actively opposed it, and it is now
certainly not cooperating with it.

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Still, I believe it is an attainable objective.

The alternative is the radicalization of all of Africa, with impact on Europe that this group knows better than I do, and perhaps even on the Middle East. And therefore the stakes in a peaceful evolution and a strengthening of moderate forces in Africa cannot be underestimated.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Mr. Goodhart (United Kingdom) has the floor.

**MR. GOODHART:** Mr. Secretary of State, I wonder if you could say a few words about the significance of America's last vote at the United Nations on the Middle East, particularly in view of the widespread, if cynical, belief that that vote might have been different if it had come before rather than after the last elections.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, that belief is totally incorrect. We have confronted in the United Nations a series of resolutions of which we have vetoed seven in this year alone. We have before us this month the renewal of UNDOF. We have before us a general debate on the Palestinian question in the General Assembly. And we also have the necessity that if we are going to contribute to peace in the Middle East, we must be prepared to take into account the views of all of the parties.

In this case, we faced a resolution drawn from statements the United States had made over a period of four years.

Secondly, in May we had abstained from a similar resolution because it contained two offending clauses. Both of these clauses were eliminated from the resolution that was put before the Security Council. Therefore, the resolution that went through the Security Council was specifically adapted to meet American concerns and would have been infinitely stronger but for this.

Secondly, it was passed as a consensus statement by the Chairman, which, as you know, has in itself no legal force; it simply reflects a view.

And, thirdly, it was based on statements which the United States itself had made over the period of a decade.

Given our overall responsibilities, given the fact that peace in the Middle East is of profound concern to all of the parties, we felt that we had an obligation to go along with the consensus, and especially if we have to keep in mind the positions we may have to take in the months ahead. It did not reflect a change of American policy. It reflected our convictions that had been expressed over many months, over many years, and I would like to think that had that same resolution come up earlier, we would have voted for it, though one can never know that now.

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But the fact is that in May we had indicated we would vote for this resolution if it eliminated two offending sentences. At that time, the Arabs refused to delete the sentences. This time, they did delete them, and therefore we felt, particularly at this period of great uncertainty in the Middle East, that it was in the national interest, it was in the interest of peace in the Middle East, that we voted as we did.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Thank you. Mr. Blumenfeld (Federal Republic of Germany) has the floor.

**MR. BLUMENFELD:** Mr. Chairman, allow me to put a question to the Secretary of State in his capacity as the main architect of peace in the Middle East so far.

I should like to know whether his experience goes in the direction we could say that future development will best be served if in the near future the Geneva Conference could be reconvened as the Egyptian President seems to have suggested. Or whether, prior to that, between Israel, Egypt, the Syrian Government, the Jordan Government, pre-negotiations should take place under the guidance of the United States?

Second question. Does the Secretary of State see a more important role for the European partners in our Alliance, with a view to a future peace solution in the Middle East? If so, in which direction does he see that?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** With respect to the first question, we have indicated our willingness to reassemble the Geneva conference. We also on other occasions pointed out that a preparatory conference might be a good way to insure the success of the Geneva conference.

Our approach to this issue has been pragmatic; that is, to encourage those negotiations that have the greatest hope for success.

We believe that the objective conditions for progress towards peace in the Middle East are better now than they have been perhaps at any time since the creation of the State of Israel. We believe that the countries of the Middle East, through the experiences of the last few years, have learned that nobody can impose its program on the other, and that the easing of the tensions between Syria and Egypt may create conditions in which progress can again be started towards peace negotiations.

Since these are tactical questions of great complexity, I don't want to prescribe how to do this except to say that we should be flexible about whichever approach seems to offer the greatest prospects.

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Now, with respect to European participation in this process, it depends on the degree to which European actions can be coordinated with those of the United States.

I think if Europe and the United States began to diverge in significant respects as to a peace settlement in the Middle East, then I think it would have a very unfortunate and unsettling effect.

If our policies can be coordinated, then there are several European countries, or the European Community, that could play a useful role. So, my answer to your question would depend on whether we can achieve a coordinated position.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Thank you. Madame Spaak-Danis of Belgium.

**MADAME SPAAK-DANIS:** Mr. Secretary, I asked the same question this morning of Mr. Sonnenfeldt. I think it must be feminine curiosity on my part, but I would like to hear you answer this question now in the same direction as the question raised by my Danish colleague a moment ago. The integration of Europe is the subject.

I would like to ask you, and you said very forcefully, that you thought that the Europeans should draw up this policy themselves, without the intervention of the United States, and I certainly agree with you on that. We are very zealous and jealous of our own independence, and you are quite right. But I think, under certain circumstances, the United States could show their encouragement perhaps to the more European of the Europeans, showing by verbal encouragement their appreciation of this policy, or these policies, and I am thinking especially of the Puerto Rico conference, where you didn't invite the European Commission as such to participate.

I think that this would have been very important for us as Europeans, and I would like to say, as the more European of us, it would have been important for us to have support which was other than just oral or verbal. It would have been a great step forward for us.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I hope that my friend and colleague, Sonnenfeldt, did not announce any doctrines while he was here this week (laughter).

On the question of the participation at the Puerto Rico conference, the question of membership was developed by consensus, and it was one of those cases where the United States did not believe that it could be more European than the Europeans. But it is a rather delicate issue.

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**THE CHAIRMAN:** Senator Giraud of France has the floor.

**SENATOR GIRAUD:** Mr. Secretary of State, a French automobile builder said that he wanted to make them in any color provided they were black.

We have the impression that when the United States talks about cooperation in the area of arms and military materiel manufacture, you want any kind of equipment provided it is American equipment. And I think that this is your view of affairs, is it not?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, you will have a representative of the Defense Department here who can give you the technical explanations for our undoubtedly correct views (laughter).

As I understand it, though, we have made efforts to find means of standardizing on tanks and other equipment, but I would prefer to let experts answer this question.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** I call on Mr. Patrick Wall from the United Kingdom.

**MR. WALL:** The Arab oil boycott struck a considerable blow against many of the nations represented in this room. The threat is dormant, but it is still there.

Could the Secretary of State say something about the future of energy supplies to the West?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have always believed that the West should use this period -- or the industrial democracies should use this period -- to put themselves into the strongest possible position to resist the sort of pressures that we faced in 1973.

In some categories, considerable progress has been made. The formation of the International Energy Agency led to a stockpiling program in which I think all of the participating countries now have reserves of between three to six months. There is a program for emergency sharing in case of another embargo. And those are useful and important steps.

However, the fundamental step, that is, the conservation of energy and the development of alternative sources of energy, has not been pursued with equal intensity, and I have to say that our country is as much to blame in this as anybody.

I think the measures to deal with a possible embargo should be looked at from the point of view of emergency measures. The fundamental program has to be in the field of conservation

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and of the development of alternative sources of energy.
And I hope that in the near future that this will be a program
that all the industrial democracies will jointly pursue.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Psilos of Greece.

MR. PSILOS: Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you a question, very short, very straightforward, concerning your past, recent past.

Since the United Nations General Assembly consists of representatives
of governments, why did your delegation vote in favor of reconsidering
the existing ruling according to which the representative of the
Turkish-Cypriot community should address a committee only?
Thank you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This vote concerned a procedural position
that the United States has consistently taken in which various
liberation movements of several countries have addressed either
the committees or the Security Council. It implied no recognition.
In fact, we have always taken the position that interested parties,
even if they were not governments, could address committees and
the Security Council. And we have simply applied in that case
votes we took in connection with many so-called liberation
movements that have addressed various committees of the General
Assembly. It was in no sense a new decision by the United States.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Williams has the floor. (UK)

MR. WILLIAMS: Mr. Secretary of State, I understand that this
weekend you are going to Plains, Georgia. I am not quite sure
where that is, but I am just wondering whether you could say
something about the discussions that you might be having
with Mr. Carter (laughter).

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Would you repeat the last part of the
question? I was so overwhelmed by the first part of it (laughter).

Well, I have spent so much of my time finding Plains on the map
(laughter) that I have not yet had time to address what I
might discuss, but the discussion depends primarily on the
President-elect, and I am going there to answer fully his questions
and to cooperate to the fullest extent in bringing about a smooth
transition and to enable the President-elect to take over under
the best possible circumstances (applause).

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Gunnella. (Italy)

MR. GUNNELLA: Mr. Kissinger, as Secretary of State, as an
historian, in your view what would be the implications of the
participation of the Communist Party in a government of a great

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NATO country in Europe, the effect of this on Europe and on NATO? Here I am talking about Italy or even France.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I hope that the record shows that I was provoked (laughter), that I did not, in the closing days of my incumbency, volunteer comments on so controversial a topic.

I have stated our view repeatedly that the participation of communist parties in the government of a NATO ally would raise serious questions about the kind of military cooperation that would be possible, the kind of policies that such a government could pursue, the degree of consultation within the Alliance that might be feasible, and indeed the ultimate impact even on the European Community.

So, we have held the view, and we continue to hold the view, that participation would have serious consequences for the Alliance, and this independent of whether this party takes its orders from Moscow or is a relatively autonomous party, which you cannot judge in any event from their declarations.

I would be more convinced about the autonomy if the votes by which it is established in the Central Committees were not so totally unanimous.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Mr. Mattick of Germany.

MR. MATTICK: Mr. Secretary of State, since 1968, when we had in Europe student demonstrations and popular movements against the war in Viet-Nam, and demonstrations have also taken place against armaments, since then there has not been any serious objections against this development in the public opinion of Europe, even I would say a dream-like acceptance of everything.

I would ask you now, how do you estimate the possibilities of disarmament? How do you see the role of the Soviet Union? And, if I may ask, does the United States Administration have certain reservations as far as SALT Two is concerned?

The third question, if there are opportunities for success in disarmament, would there not be time for all European governments to talk with the population of the countries concerned, why there has not been any progress, and should we not also underline that this is perhaps the fault of the Soviet Union and Eastern European governments? Otherwise, we might expect demonstrations against future armament.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have believed that the control of arms is an imperative of our period. With respect to strategic nuclear weapons, we do not believe that either side can gain a decisive advantage unless the other totally fails to meet its obligations over an extended period of time. And since one

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can expect that both sides will make the necessary efforts, it only insures a continuously rising level of expenditures and of arms that in the final analysis will not be relevant to most of the crises that occur.

Secondly, I believe that our governments have an obligation to their peoples not to accept a constant accumulation of nuclear weapons without having made a serious effort to limit them.

We will, of course, accept no unequal agreement. Of course an agreement must be balanced and reciprocal. We believe that such an agreement is achievable at levels somewhat lower than those that now exist, and could lead from there to more substantial reductions. That is in the field of strategic weapons.

In the field of non-strategic weapons, the issue is more complicated because there the West is not in a position of parity as we are in the field of strategic weapons; in certain areas, our opponents have a numerical superiority.

So therefore negotiations such as those in Vienna are more complex because in order to establish parity, the Eastern bloc would have to make disproportionately larger cuts than NATO.

But I believe that if parity is the proper course in strategic weapons, it must also be the proper course in non-strategic weapons.

I agree with your comment that our governments must demonstrate to their public that they are making every effort to control arms. But the art of leadership now is to demonstrate this in such a way as not to undermine the readiness to maintain adequate defenses in the absence of an agreement.

So, we have to do both things -- to maintain adequate defenses and to maintain our readiness to negotiate seriously about limitation of arms.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Mr. Secretary, how much time do you still have at your disposal?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, let's say ten minutes. I may never again get a Congressional group that can't talk back to me.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Because I still have seven speakers, I will close the list now, and I am very sorry, my dear colleagues, if everyone will not have an opportunity to speak.

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We will continue giving the floor as long as the Secretary
is able to stay.

Senator Morgan of the United States.

SENATOR MORGAN: Mr. Secretary, would you comment on what you think the effect might be on NATO in the event of a possible Sino-Soviet rapprochement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not believe that it is in the interest of the West to give the impression that we are panicked about a possible rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China quarrel for their own reasons, and they are going to make their rapprochement for their own reasons. They will certainly not be prevented from any rapprochement by any concern that might be expressed by either Europeans or Americans.

Whatever concerns the People's Republic of China have, however justified they might be about its neighbor, those concerns will continue to exist. And therefore I would judge that there is a limit beyond which rapprochement is unlikely to go.

But I think our best course in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China is to let those two Communist powers handle their own relationship and not give the impression that we can manipulate it for our own end (applause).

THE CHAIRMAN: I will give the floor to Mr. Krall.

MR. KRALL: Mr. Secretary of State, in your speech to us, you pointed out the need for economic cooperation in the Alliance, and rightly so, and the energy policy, I think, is part of it. You have already commented on this.

During these days, the representatives of the OPEC countries meet in Vienna in order to discuss the increase in oil prices.

Now, do you know whether the industrialized states or partners in our Alliance intend consulting with each other in order to develop a joint attitude in that case where such an increase were agreed?

And a second question, what will be the implications for the North-South dialogue of such increases?

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(L)

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the United States has made its view very clear. We believe that an increase in prices will slow down economic recovery in the industrial states, will compound inflationary pressures, and will in fact not solve the problems of the OPEC nations that led to the demand for a price increase to begin with.

We have called our views to the attention of the OPEC nations. We are discussing this problem also with industrial democracies. We are also approaching some of the less-developed countries whose deficits will rise if the prices increase, and whose deficits ultimately will then come back to us. So, we are paying for the increase not only out of our gross national product but eventually in some form in the less-developed countries.

So, what the impact of all these consultations will be it is too early to foretell, but it is certainly a matter we take very seriously and in which the actions of the countries concerned cannot be ignored or taken lightly by the United States.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Goodhew of the United Kingdom.

MR. GOODHEW: Mr. Secretary of State, since the United States Government and other Western governments recognize the right to self-determination of the peoples of the continent of Africa, why did they all go to Helsinki to decide upon the permanent denial of that same right of self-determination to the peoples of Eastern Europe?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, there are a number of myths that have developed about Helsinki. It is clear that the United States was not exactly pushing its European allies on the issue of the European Security Conference. In fact, as I look back over the last eight years, the opposite might be said.

But leaving aside the question of who took the major role, what is it in the document on European security that denies people in Eastern Europe the right to self-determination? The document says that frontiers should not be changed by force, but that they could be changed by peaceful means, according to international law.

I do not know any NATO country that has had the principle that frontiers in Europe should be changed by force. There is nothing in the document that legitimizes Soviet domination of any outside country. And it is precisely those countries that are most concerned in Eastern Europe about getting greater freedom of maneuver that were the most active proponents of the European Security Conference.

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So, I have failed to understand why it is that it is in the West that the most extreme and the most pro-Soviet interpretation of the Helsinki document should be taking hold, and why we in the West should be making arguments on behalf of the Soviet Union that they don't make for themselves. (Applause).

THE CHAIRMAN: Madame Griesinger of Germany.

MADAME GRIESINGER: Mr. Secretary of State, in Western Europe -- not only in Western Europe, in fact, but also in South America and Africa -- we find again and again that the strategy of Communists is directed towards ideological struggle.

This takes two sides. First of all, the feeling of dissatisfaction of the population vis-a-vis environmental pollution, et cetera, is encouraged. We have some examples in the south of Germany recently. A number of nuclear power stations were to be built, and we had to make use of the full power of the police to make sure that these nuclear power stations could be built. And we know fully well that agitators here are not only German Communists but that there are other strategies at play.

Secondly, we see that Communists are active where people are dissatisfied with military governments and with racial governments in southern Africa and in South America.

I have had a very interesting discussion with the Secretary General of the Economic Assembly (sic), and there we saw very clearly that everyone only bases his own judgment on his own experience.

And I am very worried about this in the United Nations. We can see that those who have lived under military governments are not able to judge that Communist governments in fact offer less freedom and liberty.

This is an important problem. This is why I would like to go into the details of this. I would like to have an answer from the Secretary of State what America can do here, what more America can do. Because what is tragic is that even the Christian churches at the moment are very much of the opinion that suppression comes from the West only and exclusively and not from the East.

The Secretary of State gave us such a marvelous speech, but recently -- where was this, New York it was -- during the 50th anniversary of the Council of Synagogues of America, and there he speaks about these problems and these values, et cetera. And this is why I would ask for a very short answer to this very long question.

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I am fully convinced that the Secretary of State will be able to do this, brilliantly he will be able to do this. But I did not want to miss the occasion in order to ask this question.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Among my many abilities, giving a short answer isn't one of them. In fact, my country of origin puts me into the position that it usually takes me ten minutes before I can place a verb. But I think you have called attention to an important problem (Laughter and applause).

**THE CHAIRMAN:** I can only call upon one more speaker, although I have three more. The delegates of the Federal Republic have already participated quite a bit. I would like to ask Mr. Arentoft of Denmark to conclude.

**MR. ARENTOFT:** Mr. Secretary, I fully agree if you do not answer my question (laughter). But I am sure that if you do, your answer will interest very many.

What are your plans to serve your country and the world after the 20th of January 1977?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not have any plans. But I wish the new Administration well. And, as I pointed out, I consider foreign policy a non-partisan effort, and I will continue to support the principles for which I have stood outside the government on a non-partisan basis. And if that helps us to have a more effective foreign policy, I would be delighted. (Applause).

*****************

PR 561

First of all, I would like to express my appreciation and
that of my colleagues to all of you for coming here and
giving us your time on a subject that has proved rather
obdurate for us to deal with.

Of course, when we called this conference we were expecting
to do some more long-range planning (laughter) than now
turns out to be the case.

The issue that we are here to consider is not one that is
bounded by any Administration, and deals with problems that
will have to concern us for the indefinite future.

I thought I would make just a few informal remarks to put
before you some of the thinking that led to this conference,
some of the questions to which we would appreciate your answers
or your views, and then to turn it over to the regular
proceedings.

Any Administration, any President or Secretary of State, must
have as one of his principal concerns the problem of international
order. We are always overwhelmed on a day-to-day basis with
the cables and problems that present themselves. And I have
the impression sometimes that the qualities of our high
officials -- that our high officials need -- are becoming more
and more those of an athlete responding rapidly to stimuli
with no opportunity to reflect about the long-term trends.
The problems that present themselves, however, are not always
the most significant. And in any event, they are those that
are frequently the most unmanageable.

The fundamental problem is how to create an international
system, or to participate in creating an international
system, in which the principal participants have a sense of
belonging.

That doesn't mean that everybody has to be satisfied, but it
does mean that everybody, or at least all those countries or
groups that can upset it, feel either that their basic concerns
have been met or that a mechanism exists by which their concerns
can be met.

If this does not exist, then those who feel themselves dis-
advantaged, unjustly treated, dispossessed, will band together,
and they will join any other group that is willing to undermine
the existing order. And then international problems will be
settled by endless confrontations, by contests of strength,
and we will be living in an environment of political, economic
and, occasionally, military conflict.

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Now, the United States is the strongest nation in the world. The United States could survive better than most, in fact, probably better than any other country, in such an environment. But it is an environment that would tax even our resources. It would be in the long term incompatible with the sort of economy with which we are familiar and under which we have flourished. And above all it would be inconsistent with the fundamental American values.

We have to live in a world, not where everybody agrees with us, but where our values have some relevance. We do not wish to live in a siege mentality or in a world in which only might makes right. And, therefore, while I know that many of you here are hard-headed businessmen, and while I have been told by all of my advisers never to stray from the emphasis on self-interest, I would like to point out that our self-interest is not incompatible with the world interest, and that only to the extent that we can make our self-interest relevant to the world interest can we really prosper as a country and survive with our basic institutions intact.

This is the general problem, as I see it, of the relationship of the tasks that all Administrations since the war have faced in one way or another. It has become particularly acute in recent years because of the beginning cartelization of some of the world's economy, because of the organization of some of the developing countries into political units operating more and more as a bloc, because the United States while still the most powerful country in the world is no longer the predominant country it was in the fifties and early sixties -- nor can it be.

Therefore, our foreign policy problem has become, as it has been for most other nations throughout their history, how to contribute to a world that can be both secure and make progress; how to do this with resources that are finite in relation to all of the objectives we could be pursuing at any one time; and how to build a consensus of like-minded states.

Now, the trends that I have described have resulted in some tendencies which we find very unfortunate. Too many of the developing countries are following a radical rhetoric that is incompatible with their own progress and indeed with the achievement of the goals they profess. Too many of them seek to achieve by confrontation and extortion what can only result, and what can only be significant, through the voluntary

PR 561

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cooperation of all nations.

While it is crucial for the United States to take an
enlightened and farsighted view about the process of
development, while it is foolish and shortsighted for us to
be niggardly and petty in our approach, it is also true
that what we offer cannot appear to be, and indeed cannot
be, the result of conditions imposed on us by those who
will be the primary beneficiaries of the process of
development.

So we have to steer a course in which we show that we are
concerned about the problems of the greater part of humanity,
but where we also have a right to ask of those countries
that they remember that 90 percent of the transfer of all
capital from private and public sources comes from the
industrial democracies; that there are no realistic
alternative sources; and that the process must be a
reciprocal one.

The United States, in my view, has an obligation to respond
to some of the fundamental concerns of our times. The
developing countries must have an enhanced capability of
access to world-wide capital markets, especially private
capital markets. The markets for the primary commodities
sold by developing countries should be stable and efficient.
Special measures will be needed to help developing countries
find new markets for the goods and services which they will be
increasingly able to produce. And the international community
should help the developing countries to develop, transfer,
adapt and manage technology appropriate to their needs.

On the other hand, we have a right -- indeed an obligation --
that the process of development is not something that is
handed by one group of nations to another group of nations.
In all societies it was a process that extended over decades.
And indeed in all other societies it was a process that extended
over generations. It needs domestic disciplines. It requires
a process of education. In many societies it requires an
adaptation of our basic values. There is no substitute for
hard effort by the developing countries in their own process
of development, and no one should create the illusion that
there can be.

Developing countries must find a way to encourage savings,
reward initiatives and ability, spread education and training,
and expand opportunities for all their people.

It is also clear that a constructive world order must have
provisions in which foreign investors can operate in a stable
and peaceful environment as long as they may give serious

PR 651

- 4 -

contributions to the social and economic progress of the
host country. But they must be free of harrassment and
unreasonable restraints. And it is indeed one of the
curious phenomena of this period that, for some reason,
transfer of governmental capital is considered in many
countries more acceptable than private capital, even though
the capacity of governments to attach restrictive conditions
is infinitely greater than the capacity of private
capital to attach restrictive conditions.

So, in the process of development, we need a sense of
obligation on the part of the developed countries and a
sense of participation and reciprocity on the part of the
developing countries.

Now, let me turn to the subject matter of this conference.
When you see me shuffle papers here, I have been deluged
with words of warning, advice and some formulations
that extend over many pages of dependent clauses (laughter).
As far as I can see, every bureau in this building has been
given a chance, not just to add its views, but to make an
input to each sentence (laughter). I just want you to know
that let it never be said that we have not institutionalized
foreign policy.

Let me turn to the issues of this conference. However we
view the process of development, in one way or another it
must involve a transfer of technology. Whether we do it
directly as an act of policy, or whether we do it indirectly
by raising the general level of economic activity of the
developing countries, progress in development depends on
whether the developing countries learn to harness technology
to the purposes of their societies.

Now, among the many warnings I have received is that there
is a group -- I can't see them with these lights -- but I
am told there is a group of cold-eyed managers sitting here that
is determined not to be impressed by do-gooders who want to
spread our technology around the world and to create new
competitors. And I am told by my hard-headed business
friend over here (Deputy Secretary of State Robinson) that I
have got to explain to them that they will make more money
by spreading technology -- (laughter) -- by spreading
technology than by holding onto it. But if you are hard-
headed businessmen and if you believe a Harvard professor
who tells you how to make money (laughter), then you
are in worse shape than I think you are (laughter).

So my friend, Chuck Robinson, who specializes in building
ports in landlocked countries (laughter), no doubt by telling
them that it is highly profitable (laughter), will be able

- 5 -

to explain to his colleagues from the business community
exactly how this works.

I will talk about the subject that I know something about,
which is that if we are going to have an international
environment in which our economy can prosper at all --
not any one business, but our economy in its present form --
then we must be dealing with societies that consider us
relevant to their concerns. We cannot abolish the concern
for development, nor do we want to abolish it. It is an
expression of our entire history. For the United States
not to take a leading role in this would be to abdicate
from one of the principal currents of our time. It would
be to make us irrelevant to the concerns of the major part
of humanity. I know that it would undermine the effective
conduct of our foreign policy. I must believe that over a
period of time it would undermine the effective operation of
our economic institutions around the world.

So in the broad self-interest of the United States which,
in this sense, is identical with the world interest,
development must be one of the increasing concerns of our
country.

Now, I have believed for a considerable time that this country,
representing the most advanced technology in the world, must
be able to make a contribution to what is, after all,
the principal way in which development will take place, namely,
the development of technology around the world.

We have found ourselves restricted by traditional concepts
in which the government would focus primarily on certain types
of exchange programs and in which private industry was
supposed to do its thing entirely on commercial considerations.
And we have lacked a coherent strategy by which the benefits
of technology that we possess can be made available in a
disciplined and farsighted and cooperative manner.

During the last year we have made a number of proposals in
international forums. Our initiatives have generally fallen
into two categories.

One, national. We have proposed national and international
institutes and programs to provide information, research
and training assistance to developing countries in science
and technology.

And secondly, we have attempted to take steps to create an
international environment in which the private sector,
which is the repository of most of our technology, can make
its maximum contribution.

PR 651

- 6 -

The first category includes information supporting the
creation of an international center for the exchange
of technological information; proposing the establishment
of a technology exchange service for Latin America;
proposing an inventory of United States national information
sources and improved access to U. S. facilities; to
support the concept of regional advisory services under
UNCTAD auspices; and to support an offer to host the U.N.
Conference on Science and Technology for Development in
1979.

The second category is in the area of research and training.
We have increased our support for international agricultural
research centers; proposed the establishment of an
international energy institute; urged the establishment of
an international industrialization institute; supported
the creation of an inter-American technology center; and
extended existing support for applied research in nutrition,
health and education.

We have encouraged training by the encouragement of formation
of a technology corps and by proposing incentives and measures
to curb emigration of highly-trained manpower from developing
countries.

With respect to encouraging the private sector, we have
supported a voluntary code of conduct for the transfer of
technology in UNCTAD.

We have supported a voluntary code of conduct for trans-
national enterprises of the United Nations.

We have proposed the establishment of an international
resources bank. And if I had not mentioned this I would
have been shot in the back by the Deputy Secretary (laughter).

We have supported the examination of restrictive business
practices and recommended that other OECD nations urgently
study the possibility of the greater contribution of all
industrial nations to the problems of technology transfer.

Now all of these were useful steps, extorted from a
recalcitrant bureaucracy with great pain (laughter).

What we need, however, at this moment, is some integrated
concept -- something in which all sectors of American life
address such questions as: What technology is it in our
interest and in the global interest to transfer? How is
that transfer accomplished in a way that the developing
countries can benefit from it and the world economy as a
whole advance? What should be the relationship between our
educational institutions, our industrial enterprises and
the host countries so that they can build the most creative

PR 651

- 7 -

partnership, not simply in relationship to any one firm,
but in relationship to the total environment? Is
the establishment, for example, of regional research
centers in developing countries, which has led to major
breakthroughs in agricultural research, a useful tool
in such fields as industrial technology? How can multi-
national corporations relate themselves to universities
and the host countries in a deliberate strategy which
improves the environment in which they operate and at the
same time is of benefit to the host countries?

These and many other questions are the purposes behind
our calling this conference. Indeed, we have, as you know,
distributed a whole list of questions to this group.
You should not feel confined by those questions. You
should feel free to tell us that some of these questions
are nonsense. My colleagues are experts at being lacerated
and ignoring in a graceful way whatever they do not really
agree with (laughter).

But we genuinely would like to know what this distinguished
group thinks about the problem I have put before you. Have
we defined the problem correctly? What approach should be
taken? Obviously, we cannot have a strategy emerge out
of one conference, but I hope that a work program can emerge
out of this conference that can be carried forward in the
years ahead.

I do note, to return to my starting point, that the problem
of world order is the dominant problem of our time. We have
talked a great deal about its military component, and we
have an understanding of its political component. But
in the decades ahead it is very probable that the social and
economic aspects of international order will dominate our
concerns, and our ability to solve it will determine whether
we live in a world that has a consciousness of cooperation
and of progress or in a world of constant strife.

I have no doubt what the United States commitment must be.
And I can think of no area in which our host of private
institutions, private enterprises, and private initiatives
can make a greater contribution to the freedom, prosperity
and peace of man than in the subject matter of this conference.

Thank you very much.

* * * * *

LUNCHEON REMARKS

November 15, 1976

Averell:

I was going to say that I felt I was
standing next to the Rock of Ages but thought
that I would probably get hit by one instead.
Actually, we are honoring today one of the
youngest men in the country -- in mind,
at least. Averell is able to take more than
three quarters of a century of knowledge and
experience, digest it and come up with yet
another fresh idea on dealing with the Soviets,
the West Europeans or on whomever an
incumbent President seeks advice.

Averell Harriman is a figure of the
century. He has known or advised Churchill,
Stalin, Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy,
Johnson. He has played significant roles

-2-

in the domestic recovery of this country in
the thirties, in the winning of the most
terrible war of this century, in the lifting
of Europe from its devastation.

Nearly a President, he was Governor
of our second largest state -- his civil
rights efforts in that period stand as
precursor of the movements of the sixties.
He achieved a compromise in Laos that
lasted that tragic country almost fifteen
years. He was among the first in government
to see the importance of Africa. He paved
the initial steps towards peace in Vietnam.
But perhaps his greatest monument is the
Limited Test Ban Treaty, the first
acknowledgment that the nuclear race must
be brought to a halt.

* New York was the largest state
then ... although it has since slipped

-3-

I have known Averell more than ______
years. He is a valued friend and adviser.
A believer in the bipartisanism of our
foreign policy, he has not hesitated to
support me when he thought I was right --
nor, for that matter, was he totally silent
when I was wrong.

Averell, I have heard -- on TV and
elsewhere -- that your advice is already
being sought by the next administration.
I therefore hope you will forgive me if I
repeat a recent telephone conversation between
us. You called me to let me know that you
would be visiting Moscow and Belgrade
and wished to assure me that you would
do nothing inimical to our foreign policy

-4-

interests. I answered you -- and I
believe this -- that wherever you go in the
world would be in the best interests of the
United States. I hope the new Administration
follows your advice. They could not go
wrong.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATI

November 29, 1976

No. 574

ARRIVAL STATEMENT
BY THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

Mr. Foreign Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is as always a great pleasure for me to visit my
friends in Mexico. I am here at a time of transition
in both of our countries from one presidency to another.

I shall go from here to call on your distinguished
President Echeverria with whom we maintain cordial
relations and with whom I have enjoyed working as well as
with his distinguished Foreign Minister, and we have
confidence that the good relations between the United
States and Mexico will continue to be strengthened
under your President-elect Lopez Portillo.

Similarly, in the United States, friendship between the
United States and our partners in the Western Hemisphere,
and especially with our close and good neighbor Mexico,
is not in dispute between our political parties. Therefore,
we can say with every confidence that the new administration
will make every effort to build on the already existing
friendship between our two countries.

Mexico and the United States, two proud nations,
working together on the basis of independence and mutual
respect can contribute much in demonstrating to the
world that interdependence is a fact that must be based
on equality and mutual respect. And so I am very happy
to be here on what is probably my last official visit
to Mexico, on this occasion, that will symbolize the
transfer of power in both of our countries under peaceful
conditions in a continuity of friendship and a determination
to strengthen our bonds. Thank you very much.

* * * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CyJ

December 1, 1976

No. 576

REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT A RECEPTION FOR THE AMERICAN DELEGATION TO THE INAUGURATION
OF MEXICAN PRESIDENT JOSE LOPEZ PORTILLO
AT THE RESIDENCE OF AMBASSADOR JOSEPH JOHN JOVA
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
NOVEMBER 30, 1976

Mr. Ambassador, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I would like to welcome you all and to express our appreciation for your coming here to see us. My wife and I are always happy to visit Mexico where we had our honeymoon and where we have spent so many happy occasions, and our country has such profound ties to the people and the Government of Mexico which are symbolized by the presence here of the son of our current President, Mr. Jack Ford, and the wife of the President-Elect, Mrs. Carter. Nothing could express more profoundly the importance that the United States attaches to its relationships in the Western Hemisphere, and to its very special relationship to its growing, complicated, difficult, occasionally cantankerous but always close friends in Mexico.

We live in a period in which we have to find peace in the midst of ideological conflicts and we have to strive for progress when the disparities between people and within countries are enormous. And we must give expression to the interdependence of nations at a time when the pride of nations has never been more pronounced.

In this respect, our relations with our neighbors in Mexico are of central importance. We have to deal with each other on the basis of mutual respect. We have to recognize that we will not always see things identically -- and how is that possible, anyway, in a nation of some 70 million anarchistic individualists? But we must also recognize that our destinies are linked and that we can set an example to the rest of the world how proud nations can cooperate.

For the first time in nearly three decades, periods of transition in Mexico and in the United States coincide; and just as the transfer of authority is taking place in Mexico with dignity and with continuity and with the assurance that the basic principles of the relationship between our two countries will be maintained, so I am confident that the basic principles of peace, of progress, of interdependence and mutual

- 2 -

PR 576

respect reflect the views of all Americans. They do not reflect
the view of a single party -- and, after all, the first time
that I met our President-Elect, when only he knew he was going
to run for President, I heard him give an address in Spanish
to a group of diplomats from the Western Hemisphere signifying
his own commitment to the closer relationship within the
Western Hemisphere.

So, in thanking once again Mr. Ford and Mrs. Carter for
joining us, I would like to propose a toast to the friendship
between the Mexican and American people, to the health and
long life of President Echeverria and to the health and success
of President-Elect Lopez Portillo.

* * * * * * * * *

C42

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 2, 1976

No. 577

SECRETARY OF STATE
TO MEMBERS OF THE PRESS
NATIONAL PALACE
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

NOVEMBER 30, 1976

**QUESTION:** What do you think of him? (Refers to President Lopez Portillo)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** To say somebody is a strong man doesn't say much in Mexico because you specialize in strong men, but I was very impressed with him and we had a very good talk.

**QUESTION:** What do you think of Mexico's future?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think Mexico is a great country and even if it has some temporary difficulties, it is bound to come out of them. It is one of the leaders of the world. It is already at the point of being a developed country. So I'm very optimistic about the future of Mexico. It will have a great role to play.

**QUESTION:** Do you have something to say at the end of Mr. Echeverria's presidency?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we always worked closely with President Echeverria and we solved all our problems on the basis of friendship, equality and mutual respect. And so we have warm feelings about President Echeverria and we have a good basis on which to work with his successor, Lopez Portillo.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you see any problems in the transition between the two administrations?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There seem to be no problems in Mexico and I'm positive there will be no problems in the United States. The friendship between our two countries is a permanent feature. We are both making a transition at the same time and we will maintain and strengthen our friendship.

**QUESTION:** What is your conclusion after the meeting with (Foreign Minister) Romulo of the Philippines?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We had a very good talk. We talked about our base negotiations and we had a very good talk, and we made progress.

* * * * *