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- 15 -

Q Dr. Kissinger, we haven't discussed this specifically, I don't believe: Do you intend the Romanian trip to be a signal to the Communist Chinese of some sort?

DR. KISSINGER: I have made, I think, very clear what the purpose of the Romanian visit is, and I think what I have said about this previously really exhausts its purposes.

Q Doctor, you have not mentioned any specific AID project that the President might be discussing. Will he be making any commitments?

DR. KISSINGER: As I said in the beginning, the President is not going there to settle any particular AID programs. He, of course, according to our procedures, approves the total AID program for each country when it comes in to his office. This is usually a very complicated program, which receives careful consideration.

What the President is prepared to discuss on this trip, and is looking forward to discussing, is the views of these countries about their longer term economic evolution, and what purposes they have set for themselves in this respect, and what the longer term attitude of the United States to this process can be, together with other developed countries, together with other countries in that region.

So what we look for in these discussions are some general principles and approach. The concurrent adviser meetings can go into more details, but the individual AID programs will have to be worked out in bilateral discussions and not on a Presidential visit.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have the pools for the USS HORNET and on through Manila completed. They are being run off now. They will be in the bins when you leave here.

Also, we drew, from those who were going on the trip, three members of the travelling press corps to attend the dinners that will be held. Those names will be in the bins also, together with the required clothing that you will have to bring to attend those dinners.

The schedule at this point is not locked firmly. We hope to have those details complete by at least Monday.

In reference to the schedule you already have, you can refer to events that are listed in the schedule that we released the other day as tentatives or probables, except for, of course, the meetings with the heads of state that Dr. Kissinger referred to.

Also, the times listed there are only tentative times.

Q They are on the record as tentative times?

MR. ZIEGLER: They are on the record, yes.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 3:25 PM EDT)

This Copy For RCHOUDEK

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH THE PRESIDENT

6:30 P.M. Guam Time

JULY 25, 1969

FRIDAY

(Top O' The Mar, Guam)

MR. ZIEGLER: May I have your attention, please?

The President will be here shortly. As I mentioned in Washington before we left, the President wanted to meet with you on an informal basis. What he will cover will be his objectives for the upcoming Asian trip and also the trip to Romania.

The President will give a rundown on the trip and then be available to questions. He will take questions on the trip only, on the trip and those matters related to the visits to the individual countries.

What the President says will not be for direct quotation, but you can attribute it to the President without quotation.

Q Do you mean without quotation marks?

MR. ZIEGLER: Without quotation marks, to be more precise. "The President said," "The President feels," "The President's objectives of the trip are. . ."

Q For immediate release?

MR. ZIEGLER: For immediate release.

THE PRESIDENT: As Ron Ziegler has already told you, the remarks today will be for attribution but not direct quotation, and for BACKGROUND.

For your further information in that respect, Marshall Green will brief members of the press who desire to have BACKGROUND on the Philippines and Indonesia. He will be with us through those two stops. For the balance of the stops, Henry Kissinger will be available to brief you if you desire him to do so.

Insofar as the plans are concerned, there are no changes in the schedule to announce. I have seen some speculation about changes in the schedule. I have no present plans to go to Vietnam. I should say, however, that Ambassador Bunker will be coming to Bangkok along with the Ambassadors from the other Asian countries that we will not be visiting, and I intend to have a conversation with him there which will be apart from the conversation I will have with the other Ambassadors on the general situation in the area.

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There is also a possibility that General Abrams
will be able to come over with Ambassador Bunker to Bangkok
for that meeting.

Now, insofar as this phase of the trip is con-
cerned, and I will speak first to the Asian phase and then
later and briefly to the Romanian phase, I think that the
backgrounder that you have already had from Henry Kissinger
and the general statements that have been made from the State
Department have covered it pretty well. I think what would be
of greatest interest to you before we go to your questions is
to give you the perspective that I have with regard to
Asia and America's role in Asia.

As you know, my background here goes back a few
years. It was in 1953 that I first visited this area. That
trip was very, very extensive, with the usual four days in each
country, a so-called state visit in each country. It provided
an opportunity to meet the leaders, but more than that to know
the countries in a very effective way.

In the 16 years that have passed, however, since that
time, the changes have been very dramatic. I have returned
to Asia, as you know, on a number of occasions since then, and
particularly to the countries that we will be visiting on this
trip. Consequently, I have kept up with later developments
and also with the exception of President Yahya in Pakistan,
I know each of the Asia leaders that I will be meeting and will
be able to speak to them from that background.

Insofar as the general purpose of a trip like this,
I can understand some of the speculation to the effect that
"Why does a President of the United States think he learns
anything by spending one day each in an Asian country?" or,
for that matter, as we did earlier, in a European country.

The answer is, and I might indicate what will be my
general policy for the balance of my service in the White House,
that I think a one-day trip is just as valuable as four days.
In other words, if you take a one-day trip, and concentrate,
as I do, on very little protocol, and a great deal of face-
to-face conversation, an individual, in meeting the leader of
the other country, will gain as much as if he stretches it
out over a period of four days. I have been through both
experiences and, therefore, am somewhat knowledgeable in that
respect.

I feel, too, that when one considers the time that
is available to a President in these periods, that it is
essential in order to cover all the ground that needs to be
covered to limit, first, the amount of travel and the amount
of time that is taken for each one of the stops. I mention
that only as some of the reasoning that has gone into my deci-
sion with regard to covering a great deal of ground in a very
short period of time. In this case, going around the world
and, in the space of about eight days, after the moon shot,
covering a number of countries.

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Now, insofar as the individuals are concerned, having met all of these leaders previously, I suppose the question could be raised, and with good reason, that once you know a leader, then contact with Ambassadors would be sufficient. However, I have found it, in my previous travels in Asia and in Europe as well, that as the situations change, it is vitally important to have a renewed contact with the leader on each of the countries involved, a renewed contact because his attitudes may change and in that way when I read, as I do read day after day, the cables that come in from all over the world, I can have a much better understanding of what those cables mean, the nuances, if I have more recently had a direct contact, face-to-face, with the individual involved, the individual leader involved.

That is one of the reasons why I am a great believer in visits of this sort, where they are consistent with and can be taken at a time that will fit in with other very demanding parts of our schedule.

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But as far as those other areas are concerned, the possibility of finding some kind of solution, I think, is potentially greater than it is in the Asian area.

Pursuing that line of reasoning a bit further, then, I would like to put it in a more positive sense: When we look at the problems in Asia, the threat to peace that is presented by the growing power of Communist China, the belligerence of North Korea and North Vietnam, we should not let that obscure the great promise that is here.

As I have often said, the fastest rate of growth in the world is occurring in non-Communist Asia. Japan, in the last ten years, has tripled its GNP; South Korea has doubled its GNP; Taiwan has doubled its GNP; Thailand has doubled its GNP. The same is true of Singapore and of Malaysia.

The record in some of the other countries is not as impressive. But consider the Philippines, where there are very grave problems, as you will learn when you are there, political problems and others. One of the brighter spots is that when I was in the Philippines in 1953, it was a major importer of rice. Today, as a result of miracle rice, it no longer has to import it. Some progress is being made in areas like that.

When we look at India and Pakistan and the terribly difficult and traumatic experience they have had because of their conflict with each other, more than with the problems they have had from the outside, that picture tends to be rather black.

But India's rate of growth as a result of two good crop years, and a reasonably good one this year, has been at six percent. If we can get the population problem, if they can, under better control, the promise for the future, of course, is rather bright.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, they are emphasizing growth in manufacturing. They are growing at the rate of ten percent per year in manufacturing and from 1965 to 1970, their agricultural productions will go up 21 percent.

When you visit these two countries, even in the brief visits we have, when you see the poverty which strikes you in the face, if you have not seen it before, with a tremendous impact, you will wonder whether there is a great deal to hope for. But all I can say is that having seen what it was in 1953 and seeing what it was again in 1957, the amount of progress that has taken place, even in those countries where the rate has not been as high as others, is a very, very formidable thing to see.

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So, what I am trying to suggest is this: As we look at Asia, it poses, in my view, over the long haul, looking down to the end of the century, the greatest threat to peace of the world, and, for that reason the United States should continue to play a significant role.

It also poses, it seems to me, the greatest hope for progress in the world -- progress in the world because of the ability, the resources, the ability of the people, the resources physically that are available in this part of the world, and for these reasons, I think we need policies that will see that we play a part and a part that is appropriate to the conditions that we will find.

One other point I would make very briefly is that in terms of this situation as far as the role we should play, we must recognize that there are two great, new factors which you will see, incidentally, particularly, when you arrive in the Philippines -- something you will see there that we didn't see in 1953, to show you how quickly things change -- a very great growth of nationalism, nationalism even in the Philippines, vis-a-vis the United States, as well as other countries in the world. And, also, at the same time that national pride is becoming a major factor, regional pride is becoming a major factor.

The second factor is one that is going to, I believe, have a major impact on the future of Asia, and it is something that we must take into account. Asians will say in every country that we visit that they do not want to be dictated to from the outside. Asia for the Asians. And that is what we want and that is the role we should play. We should assist it, but we should not dictate.

At this time, the political and economic plans that they are gradually developing are very hopeful. We will give assistance to those plans. We, of course, will keep the treaty commitments that we have.

But as far as our role is concerned, we must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam.

This is going to be a difficult line to follow. It is one, however, that I think, with proper planning, we can develop.

One word about Romania. Let me just answer some of the speculation about Romania by pointing out that this trip to Romania is not directed toward the Chinese or toward the Russians, but toward the Romanians.

I do not believe that the President of the United States should be able to accept an invitation to visit a Western European country, but should automatically have to decline an invitation to visit an Eastern European country.

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I have said that this is an era, I hope, of negotiation rather than confrontation. It will be more difficult, of course, to develop the communication with Eastern European Communist countries than with the Western European countries, but I think it is time that a beginning be made.

We will have discussions of bilateral issues with President Ceausescu, the problems of Europe, East-West relations.

But this trip under no circumstances should be interpreted as an affront to the Soviet Union or as a move toward China.

It will, if it works out, I trust, set the stage for more openings of this type with countries in Eastern Europe where it would be mutually beneficial to the United States and the other countries involved.

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Q Mr. President, when you speak of internal threats, do you include threats internally assisted by a country from the outside, such as we have in Vietnam?

THE PRESIDENT: Generally speaking, that is the kind of internal threat that we do have in the Asian countries. For example, in Thailand the threat is one that is indigenous to a certain extent to the northeast and the north, but that would not be too serious if it were not getting the assistance that it was from the outside. The same is true in several of the other Asian countries.

Q Mr. President, you mentioned that you hoped that your meetings in Romania would open the way to the other meeting involving Eastern Europe. Is it your hope that you would eventually be invited to Moscow to talk with the Russians perhaps within the next six months or so?

THE PRESIDENT: As far as any meeting with the Soviet Union is concerned, summit meeting, I have stated my position previously. I think it would be well to restate it again.

I do not believe that any summit meeting with the Soviet Union is useful unless a subject of major interest to both powers is to be discussed with some promise of finding a solution or at least making progress on that particular problem.

I believe, for example, as I look over the history of summitry with the Soviet Union, that while, in all administrations, we have had the best of intentions, that summitry has not been particularly helpful. I would say this with regard to the spirit of Geneva, the spirit of Camp David, the spirit of Vienna and the spirit of Glassboro.

I feel that were the Soviet Union is concerned, for example today, there are three major areas where a summit meeting could be useful. If, for example, the time had come when we could make a breakthrough in the Mideast, and a summit meeting with the Soviet Union would play a significant part, I think that could be considered. I do not anticipate that, incidentally. We are too far apart at this time to suggest that that is on the way.

The second area, of course, is in the field of arms-control. I had, as you know, a long discussion with Mr. Smith just a few days ago, just before leaving, the day before leaving. As far as arms controls are concerned, at this time, the place and the forum in which the discussion should take place is at the Ambassadorial-level: There may come a time when a summit meeting may be the device which will make the breakthrough that we need to make in arms control. In that case, I, of course, would favor arms control.

Then at the top of the list, of course, I would put the problem of Vietnam where, if a summit meeting would serve a useful purpose insofar as Vietnam is concerned, naturally we would welcome that opportunity. That poses, as we all know, however, a very significant problem because, whether the Soviet Union can be of assistance in Vietnam is somewhat dependent on its evaluation of whether such assistance should be so publicly provided as a summit of course, would indicate.

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Q. Mr. President, it has been suggested that we have relaxed trade and travel restrictions to China as a backdrop to your Asian trip, and that this may cause some disquiet in those countries which fear Communist China. Can you say whether there was any connection between your trip and those relaxations, and what accounted for the timing of them?

THE PRESIDENT: No. As a matter of fact, suggestions for relaxing restrictions vis-a-vis Communist China -- incidentally, suggestions going considerably beyond those that I adopted -- have been before the National Security Council for the past three months. As far as these two matters that you refer to, one, of course, as you know, dealt simply with the purchase by tourists of commodities of $100 or less -- the more significant one dealt with the travel restrictions -- I have always felt that with Communist China or with any country in the world, that an exchange of persons is very valuable for us, and I would trust also for them.

This is a policy I have announced previously and it is one that I was simply implementing at this time. It had no relationship with the timing of this trip. I see no reason why any of the countries should be concerned.

Q. Mr. President, as a background to your thinking on Vietnam, even though we recognize it is not to be a major subject of discussion, could you tell us, what sort of reports you had from General Wheeler about the prospects for additional replacement of American troops, and on the question of whether the fighting has eased to the point where we can make some de-escalation move ourselves?

THE PRESIDENT: I would rather not comment on that at this time. If, after my conversations with Ambassador Bunker and possibly with General Abrams, I feel that some comment would be appropriate, I will make it then. But I should, Mr. Scali, correct one impression which I should not have left, and that is that Vietnam will not be a major topic for discussion. In each of the Asian countries I am going to raise with the Asian leaders the question of the extent to which they would be willing to participate in the international supervisory bodies for elections in South Vietnam and for the policing of cease fires provided we are able to get any kind of acceptance on the part of the North Vietnamese and the VC on our May 14th proposal.

I believe, for example, that the international supervisory bodies which, as you know, Mr. Thieu has also agreed to, that they should primarily be made up of and come from Asian nations and the Asian nations that I visit I know will all be interested in this subject. I want to get their views on that.

Q. Mr. President, do you anticipate in that connection that during your talks with the Asian leaders you are going to have to spend any significant amount of time perhaps convincing them that your plan for withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam will pose no threat to their security?

THE PRESIDENT: One of the reasons for this trip is to leave no doubt in the minds of the leaders of non-Communist Asia that the United States is committed to a policy

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in the Pacific -- a policy not of intervention but one
which certainly rules out withdrawal, and regardless of what
happens in Vietnam that we intend to continue to play a role
in Asia to the extent that Asian nations, bilaterally and
collectively, desire us to play a role.

I think that some reassurance is needed because
Vietnam is on the minds of all the Asian leaders. I believe,
incidentally, that I will not have difficulty in providing
that reassurance because, from the report that I did get from
General Wheeler, he tells me that the troop withdrawals have
been accepted by the Thieu Government and by the military in
South Vietnam with not only very good grace, but that they have
responded very effectively in meeting their own requirements,
in handling their own defense. I think that I can give some
reassuring comments to those Asian leaders who might raise
the question.

Q Mr. President, you mentioned that you felt that
perhaps five years or ten years from now the Asian nations
could collectively take care of their regional security prob-
lems. What is our policy to be in the meantime if a Vietnam-
type situation does occur?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would rather not speculate
about one occurring. Each of these countries, as you, of
course, know from your studying the background materials and as
you will note when you visit them, poses an entirely different
question. I would simply say we are going to handle each
country on a case-by-case basis.

But attempting to avoid that creeping involvement
which eventually simply submerges you -- incidentally, I don't
say that critically of how we got into Vietnam, but I do know,
that we can learn from past experience and we must avoid that
kind of involvement in the future.

Let me put it this way: I recall in 1964 some advice
that I got from Ayub Khan, who was then the President of
Pakistan. This was before the United States had any signifi-
cant troop commitment in Vietnam. I asked him what his view was
as to what our role should be. He said, "Well, the role of
the United States in Vietnam or the Philippines, or Thailand
or any of these countries which have internal subversion,
is to help them fight the war but not fight the war for them."
That, of course, is a good general principle, one which we would
hope would be our policy generally throughout the world.

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[L]

Q Mr. President, the last time we met with you you mentioned that it was your hope that we might be able to withdraw all our combat troops, ground combat troops, in South Vietnam by the end of next year. In the light of that, I wonder if you have any plans for withdrawing the troops that we now have, or some percentage of them, from Thailand, and could you tell us what you are going to tell the Thais about that?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would tell the Thais first. But it is, of course, a proper question.

We are reviewing, as you know, not only our civilian personnel abroad, where I announced a cut a few weeks ago, but our military personnel abroad, including Thailand?

This is a matter, however, which will be discussed with the Thais, but it would not be appropriate to make any announcement as to what we were going to do until we have discussed it.

Q Mr. President, in looking at the situation post-Vietnam, and in countries other than Vietnam, would it seem to you that in terms of our military strength, the military men that we put into these other countries to help them, or military assistance or economic assistance, that in Asia, generally, we would have more or less of this type of assistance and aid in the years down the road than we have now.

THE PRESIDENT: Less. Yes. If I get your question correctly, you mean more or less a military type of assistance?

Q Both in military and non-military. There are really two parts to this assistance problem, the economic part and the military part. I was wondering from your discussion whether you would see us having a greater expenditure and a greater involvement in those respects or a lessened involvement as we look down the road.

THE PRESIDENT: What I would see would be that the military involvement, the military assistance, the military aid programs and the rest, and particularly the commitments of military personnel, that that type of program would recede.

However, as far as economic programs are concerned, and particularly those of a multilateral character -- and here we have some new ideas that we will be expanding on in the months ahead -- I would say that the level of U.S. activity would be adequate to meet the challenge as it develops; because it is very much in our interest in terms of economic assistance, economic assistance through loans and other programs, to help build the economies of free Asia.

Let us consider, for example, what has happened to South Korea, what has happened to Taiwan, what has happened to Thailand, what has happened to Japan, all of whom we have assisted enormously economically. All of them now, or virtually all, are on their own feet, at least from an economic standpoint, and are very good customers of ours.

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Q Mr. President, could you give us your impres-
sion or evaluation --

THE PRESIDENT: We will take another five minutes.
I don't mean the question will be five minutes. (Laughter)

Q I will make it very short.

THE PRESIDENT: That is all right.

Q Could you give us your evaluation of Red China's
economic-political capability of inspiring further wars of
liberation in the Asian nations? Are they able to continue
that?

THE PRESIDENT: Red China's capacity in this respect
is much less than it was five years ago, even ten years ago.
Because of its internal problems, Red China is not nearly as
effective in exporting revolution as it was then. I think
a pretty good indication of that is the minimal role that
Red China is playing in Vietnam as compared with the Soviet
Union.

Three years ago, Red China was furnishing over 50
percent of the military equipment, the hardware, for the
North Vietnamese. Now it is approximately 80-20 the other way
around.

There may be other reasons for that coming about,
and part of it is that Red China has enough problems within.

Another point I would make in that respect that bears
on this, how things have changed since 1953, in country after
country that I visited -- and I was in every one that we are
visiting here and all the others as well, the ones that Secre-
tary Rogers is going to visit on that trip -- among most of
the intellectual leaders and among many government leaders,
there was a real question as to what was the best path for
progress, a question as to whether communism, as it was
developing in Red China, a Communist system was a better way
to progress, or whether a non-Communist system was the better
way.

Now, one of the significant developments that has
occurred over these past 16 years, with all the bad things that
have occurred, including the war in Vietnam, has been that that
situation has reversed itself. The appeal of the Communist
philosophy, for example, in Pakistan, in India, in Indonesia,
in Japan, in any one of these countries, is less today than
it was 16 years ago, 10 years ago, 5 years ago.

On the other hand, I would have to say that the
effectiveness of subversive activities in many of these coun-
tries has not abated to the same extent. It can be on the up-
grade. But as we look at the whole of Asia today, it is sig-
nificant to note that what we have going for us more than
anything else is this enormous rate of growth in non-Communist
Asia as compared to Communist Asia. You compare Hong Kong with
Communist China, you compare Taiwan with Communist China,
you look at Japan with 100 million people, with a greater GNP
than China with 700 million people, looking clear around the
perimeter, from Japan through India, we find that free Asia's
record of growth is a very significant factor in affecting the
thinking of those who have to make the determination as to which
path they are going to take.

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Q Mr. President, sir, when you say the United States is going to continue to play a major role in Asia and that this is one message that you intend to take with you on this trip, my impression, from the thrust of your remarks today, is that another message is no more Vietnams. Is that impression correct, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly the objective of any American administration would be to avoid another war like Vietnam any place in the world. You may recall -- and, of course, it was called campaign oratory, I said it and so did my opponent, Mr. Humphrey, during the campaign -- that we should develop a policy that would avoid other Vietnams.

I realize it is very easy to say that. I will be quite candid when I admit that to develop the policies to avoid that is taking an enormous amount of my time and those of my associates.

But what we can do is to learn from the mistakes of the past. I believe that we have, if we examine what happened in Vietnam, how we became so deeply involved -- that we have a good chance of avoiding that kind of involvement in the future.

Q Mr. President, do you intend to make it clear to the Asian leaders that if the lull in Vietnam continues, you will announce a substantial withdrawal of U. S. forces in August?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I will not make any announcement, and no decision on, troop withdrawals on this trip, and, of course, I would not make any disclosures of plans in that respect to Asian leaders prior to the time that we had discussed it with the Government of South Vietnam and then made the announcement jointly.

As you do know, we are re-examining, as I indicated we would, our whole troop commitment in Vietnam during the month of August, and we hope to be able to make an announcement sometime during the month of August with regard to troop withdrawal.

But that is one of the matters that I have still under study, under consideration, that I will be discussing with Ambassador Bunker, that I did discuss with General Wheeler and that I may discuss with General Abrams.

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This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY
TO THE PRESIDENT; AND HON. HENRY
KISSINGER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO
THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS

6:45 P.M. Local Time

JULY 29, 1969

TUESDAY

(Bangkok, Thailand)

MR. ZIEGLER: I have a couple of announcements to make before Dr. Kissinger covers the information he has with you on a BACKGROUND basis.

First of all, in relation to Dr. Kissinger, the President has asked Dr. Kissinger, who is by title the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, to visit Paris on August 4th. The President appreciates the courtesy of the French President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in agreeing to receive Dr. Kissinger, who will be prepared to convey the President's impressions on his current trip.

Q I take it it was at our initiative that he is going?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is correct. Dr. Kissinger will leave the President's party for Paris following the stop in Mildenhall, England.

The information I am going to give you now will be on an OFF THE RECORD basis.

Q Could we just finish with that one section, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes.

Q Is he not going to any other European country?

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger will also go to Brussels from Paris to talk to the NATO representatives.

Q Did the president volunteer this to the French Government and they accepted?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is correct; it is at the President's initiative.

Q Didn't the French ask the President to come?

MR. ZIEGLER: The President felt that it would be appropriate and meaningful for Dr. Kissinger to meet with the French leaders and convey his impressions of the trip.

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Q How long will he be in Paris and how long in Brussels?

MR. ZIELGER: Why don't I let Dr. Kissinger give you the details of the trip when he refers to it.

Q Does he plan to meet with the American negotiators in Paris?

MR. ZIEGLER: Why don't we allow Dr. Kissinger to provide you with the information regarding his trip now that I have made the formal announcement for you? I think you would rather get it direct from him. He is sitting right here. We can eliminate the relay system.

What I am going to give you now is on an OFF THE RECORD basis.

The President will probably, and very likely, make a movement tomorrow, a scheduled movement tomorrow, and in relation to that, I would like to announce some names who should, in relation to that very likely possibility, be available at 8:00 a.m. in the lobby of the hotel:

AP and UPI reporter and photographer; a network correspondent to be assigned by the Pool Coordinator; the Washington Star; Life Magazine; AFP; Reuters; a network crew; Newsweek photographer; Mutual Broadcasting; Baltimore Sun; Hearst Newspapers; Minneapolis Tribune; U.S. News; and the Philadelphia Bulletin.

All other reporters and correspondents who have been traveling with us and who have been manifested on our traveling roster since Manila should be prepared to depart the hotel at 7:00 a.m. in the morning.

Those are all the details that I have for you on this upcoming addition to the schedule.

Q Does this involve bringing baggage to the lobby?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, there will be no baggage required. The schedule would call for returning to this very hotel tomorrow evening.

Q Any particular time likely?

MR. ZIEGLER: The only time I have to give you would be your 7:00 a.m. for the bus.

Q Does this affect the Prime Minister's dinner tomorrow night?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, it does not.

Q This is OFF THE RECORD; right?

MR. ZIEGLER: The part that is off the record is the fact that I am telling you specifically that there is an addition to the President's schedule tomorrow and, of course, the times which I am giving to you in terms of departure.

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Q The fact that you are asking reporters to be at a certain place, is that on or off the record?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is OFF THE RECORD.

Q The entire thing is on or off the record that you have discussed?

MR. ZIEGLER: What I have discussed with you in terms of the possible addition to the President's schedule and the times that I have given to you, we would request that that go OFF THE RECORD.

Q You are saying the pool will go off at 8:00 and everybody else at 7:00?

MR. ZIEGLER: The 20 names that I read should be available in the lobby at 8:00 a.m.; yes.

Q Just to make this perfectly clear, is there anything about the item which you have just told us which is on the record?

MR. ZIEGLER: The material which I am giving to you and which I have stated as OFF THE RECORD are the words that came out of my mouth.

Q But there is nothing to preclude one from doing what we have been doing before; that he would probably make a trip somewhere?

MR. ZIEGLER: There has been a great deal of speculation on that already.

Q Ron, quite seriously, if there are reasons why you don't want this on the wires, in more than a speculative way --

MR. ZIEGLER: I know what you are probing for. I don't think I can be more direct than saying that the information which I am giving you which is OFF THE RECORD is the possibility of the President adding to his schedule tomorrow, and the fact that we have asked those members of the press who are traveling with us to be at certain places at certain times. We would request that that be kept OFF THE RECORD. That is what I am giving to you OFF THE RECORD.

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Q May I ask a question at that point? There
is already on the wires, one wire particularly, a story
saying that White House sources say that the President
is going to a specified place tomorrow. Have you any
comment on that story?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think I know what speculation you
are referring to. I am quite sure that that wasn't a White
House source. If it was, it could probably be in the future
as a former White House source.

Q Is there any indication about what time one
would expect to return to the hotel here tomorrow?

MR. ZIEGLER: The information I have given to you
regarding the President's schedule is all that I am prepared
to give to you at this time.

Q Do you expect wherever it is the President
may go that there will be filing facilities there, or will
all filing have to be from here?

MR. ZIEGLER: Any arrangements that would be made
we would make every effort, if the President does make an
addition to his schedule, to provide at least some filing
facilities.

Q While we are at the point of his possibly
visiting --

MR. ZIEGLER: We will make every opportunity to
provide at least some communications at any point where the
President may go.

Q Ron, along those lines, anywhere he may go,
what times would you expect our filing opportunities to be?

MR. ZIEGLER: I just would not be in a position
to give you any additional times than those which I have
given you.

I think we can now go to Dr. Kissinger.

Q Is there a time limit on this off-the-record?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. We will inform you when that
time limit would be. We would request that this remain --
in other words, the information I have given you, in terms
of time and the possible addition to the schedule, we would
request that that remain off the record until we inform you
that it is on the record.

Dr. Kissinger.

Q Doctor, have you a statement?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I haven't.

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Q While in Paris, are you going to see the American representatives who are participating in the talks?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. I expect to see Cabot Lodge and whatever members of his team he wants me to talk to.

Q Can you tell us the basis on which you are now speaking, please?

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me cover that.

Dr. Kissinger, as has been the practice in the past, his comments will be on a BACKGROUND basis attributed to White House sources.

Q Except for what has to do with Paris?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is right.

Q What has to do with Paris is on the record?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is fine, yes.

DR. KISSINGER: You don't have to quote me for that.

Q Doctor, could you give us whatever fill-in you can on the President's talks, his various talks today?

DR. KISSINGER: Wouldn't it be easiest if I said whom I expected to see on this trip and we will get it all done?

Q Yes.

DR. KISSINGER: In Paris, I expect to see the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the President, in addition to the members of our negotiating team, although the reason I am seeing the members of the negotiating team is simply because I am going through Paris and this is a good opportunity to get their immediate reactions. There is no special reason to see them.

Then I am going from Paris late Monday and I will meet Tuesday morning with the Secretary General of NATO and a few of the permanent representatives of NATO, to give them a fill-in on the trip on an informal basis. A formal briefing will be provided to the NATO Council through normal diplomatic channels.

The President felt since I was stopping in Europe anyway it was in keeping with his spirit of consulting with our NATO allies fully if I stopped by Brussels, which I will do Tuesday morning, to give them a briefing on the trip.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you tell us why the President felt the French Government, of the various European Governments that we are associated with, was the one he was specially interested in having you see?

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DR. KISSINGER: The reason is that the President himself is going to have an opportunity to talk to Prime Minister Wilson when he stops in England on the way back. The President also expects, as you know, to see Chancellor Kiesinger on the Thursday and Friday after we return, so the German Government will be getting a personal report from the President.

It was the President's belief that since he was personally briefing the heads of Government of Britain and the Federal Republic, that it would be appropriate to brief also the head of Government and the President of France as well as the NATO Secretary General and the permanent representatives in Brussels. So no country is being singled out.

Q Mr. Kissinger, how have the Asian nations taken to the President's Guam conference?

DR. KISSINGER: I would prefer to answer how the Asian nations have taken to the President's general position, because the text of the Guam conference isn't available and we haven't presented the Guam conference as such, although, of course, we stand fully behind it.

We have had full and detailed conversations with the Asian nations about the general philosophy that the President expressed at Guam and repeated at Manila.

The Asian nations that we have talked to have agreed with us that the future of Asia must be, in the first instance, shaped by Asians and cannot be developed on the basis of prescriptions devised in Washington. They have also agreed with our general philosophy that the United States will, of course, fully live up to all of its commitments in this area, and that it will, of course, remain a Pacific power.

However, it is clear that in the new period, in the period ahead, it becomes important to understand the various dangers that the Asian nations may face. As against military aggression from the outside, the President has repeated at every stop our intention to live up to those commitments that we have made, as well as to those commitments that are implied in the general United Nations Charter and the inherent importance of various countries.

As regards internal subversion, we have stated that the primary responsibility for combating internal subversion has to be borne by the countries concerned with respect to manpower, with American material and technical help where that is indicated and thought appropriate.

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I am happy to report to you that this view has
been shared by the heads of Government of every country
in which we have spoken, and I have been particularly
authorized by the heads of Government of Thailand to
express to you their complete agreement with our philosophy,
that the manpower to fight internal subversion has to be
supplied by the countries concerned, with American material
and technical help where indicated.

Q Does that mean that the United States now
has decided not to supply any combat troops where a country
is faced with internal subversion?

DR. KISSINGER: The general policy is that internal subversion has to be the primary responsibility of the threatened country. In an overwhelming majority of the cases, to which it is hard to think of an exception, the numbers involved are not tremendous. We are talking now of internal subversion.

Q The numbers of what?

DR. KISSINGER: The numbers of guerrillas involved
are not tremendous. Therefore, local manpower should have
the predominant responsibility for meeting this.

The United States stands ready to supply material
assistance, advice and technical assistance where that is
requested and where our interests so dictate. But the
general policy is as I have indicated.

You understand, of course, that it is never possible
to be absolutely categorical about every last case, but this
is the general policy as it now stands.

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O Doctor, does this technical assistance include
perhaps providing pilots for planes, or ground crews, or any
kind of manpower of that sort?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me answer this in two ways.
First, when you speak about policy, it becomes terribly
complicated to define every case in advance and to talk
about every hypothetical situation that might arise, first,
because it is difficult to predict every hypothetical
situation and, secondly, because if you define it in absolute
detail then you give the impression that everything outside
that range is permissible or can never happen.

But as a general rule, to which it is now very
difficult to think of exceptions, the United States will
have the general policy to supply material and technical
assistance and training, but not to use American combat forces
for counter-insurgency operations when these do not take
the form of externally introduced forces.

O Doctor, how is this any different from what
our policy has been in the past?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think what American policy
has been in the past tends to speak for itself, and, there-
fore, I would think -- well, let me put it this way.

In the early 1960's there was the belief that the
new form of aggression would take the form of insurgency,
and that it was the task of the United States to stop the
insurgency, thereby closing off the last loophole to aggres-
sion.

I would think that it is our belief that insurgency
is, indeed, a serious problem and, indeed, should be resisted,
but that it can be resisted effectively only by the predominant
engagement of the country under attack, and by its willing-
ness to take the measures that are required in terms of
domestic reform, in terms of utilizing its resources, plus
whatever American material and technical help can be given.

I am not talking, however, of the case where
military forces are introduced from across recognized
demarcation lines.

O What about so-called advisors, Doctor, to
give technical help and help in training? Would that be a
possibility? Who would do the training of helicopter pilots?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think the best thing I can
do here is to define the general philosophy. Any of you
who have covered national policy know that at the edges of
every general policy, there are special cases. I think it
would be pedantic for me to say that under no circumstances
would we ever use advisors or trainers.

Of course, we will be available for training.
But what we will attempt not to do is to use American com-
bat forces for the direct resistance to guerrilla type operations.

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To go into every last detail of where the role of
advisor ends and that of combat forces begins would get
extremely complicated. Obviously, we mean what we say
or we wouldn't be talking about it.

O Dr. Kissinger, in distinction to what you
have already told us, what is the general policy when
external forces are introduced across a recognized border?

DR. KISSINGER: The general policy is governed by
two considerations: One, by the existing treaty commitments
of the United States. I want to repeat again that the
President has made clear at every stop that we would honor
the existing treaty obligations.

Secondly, it will be governed as are the actions
of any country, by the importance we attach to the threat and
by the significance we attach to the threatened country.

The fact that there is no treaty commitment in a
given area does not necessarily mean that we would not resist
aggression.

These, I would have to say, would be the two basic
criteria that would govern our actions. In determining what
our interest is, we would, of course, as a major power, have
to take into consideration, the general interest we have in
a peaceful world, and, therefore, the general interest in
discouraging recourse to force.

We would particularly have to take into account
the nature of the threat so that a threat with nuclear weapons
would have to be treated with special gravity, whether or not
a formal commitment exists.

O Dr. Kissinger, here in Thailand, as you know,
there is a special concern about the events that are
taking place now in Southeast Asia. The Thais are worried
about our withdrawal from Vietnam and they appear to be
worried about the situation in Laos.

I gather that the Thais would like to know what we
will do for them if the situation in Laos or Vietnam, or both,
should become much more unfavorable than it is today.

In the conversations with the Thai government, did
they ask the President what precisely he means by his statement
that we will stand with Thailand against the foreign and domestic
enemies? Did they ask for specific amounts of military aid
or weapons, or for American troops?

What is the President's posture toward the situation
in Thailand?

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DR. KISSINGER: Let me say first of all that obviously you will recognize that I cannot go into the details of the conversations this morning. I can give you the general thrust of our conversations. I will say that in these meetings, not just here but on every trip which the President takes, it is not his policy to go into the sort of details that should be settled on the technical level. Therefore, his general approach in all these conversations is to talk about basic purposes, general directions, and the concerns that are primarily the business of heads of government, and not those that can be dealt with on either an administrative or on a technical level.

Therefore, we, as a general rule, do not discuss details of a program, economic or military.

Now to answer your question. Of course, in any general review of the international situation, the Thai Government would express its concern about Vietnam and even more its concern about Laos. Those of you who have covered this area know about the close connection between events in Laos and developments in the northeast part of Thailand.

We, too, are concerned about developments in Laos, for several reasons: First, because Laos has been the corridor through which supplies have moved into Vietnam; secondly, because in 1962 an agreement was made with Hanoi which intended to bring about the neutralization of Laos, an agreement which has been constantly violated, and it does not inspire extraordinary confidence in the possibility of settlements in South Vietnam, particularly settlements that involve similar terms, such as neutralization, if an existing agreement is constantly being violated.

Thirdly, our interest in Laos is that the Soviet Union, as co-chairman has, in our view, a certain responsibility in the Laos conference to see to it that the agreements that were made in good faith would be maintained.

Finally, of course, as an ally of Thailand, we have a concern with Laos because of its effect on the security of Thailand.

As for the specific question, while I do not generally like to answer or will answer questions about the details of the conversations, I did feel obliged to tell the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Thailand that I would have a backgrounder this evening, and they did authorize me to say to you that they have not asked for a commitment of American troops, and that that issue, therefore, has not arisen.

I also would like to say that my impression was that the meeting was conducted with great amity and understanding. The Thai leaders, as the other leaders of Asian countries that we visited, know the President is familiar with their area, and that the policies that he has announced should also be seen in the context of his profound conviction that peace in the world depends on peace in Asia and, therefore, that we would not engage in actions that we believe would threaten the peace in Asia and, therefore, the peace of the world.

Q Did they ask for military aid or not?

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[LC]

DR. KISSINGER: As I have said, we have indicated our readiness in principle to extend military aid in some of the specific situations enumerated, and there was no opportunity to go into details, since we had already indicated our willingness in principle.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in view of the shift in policy, can you give us any idea how much of an increase in military aid is going to take place over the next few years in this part of the world?

DR. KISSINGER: To say that the United States stands ready to extend assistance to countries that request it, and where our assessment of the situation coincides with theirs, and our interests coincide with theirs, does not mean that necessarily there is going to be an increase, or a substantial increase, in military assistance.

For example, in those countries that feel threatened by insurgency, but where insurgency has not yet occurred, it may be a better utilization of resources to concentrate on economic reform, or administrative reform, than on military programs.

The basic challenge in counter-insurgency operations is to prevent the insurgency from developing, or keeping it to very small proportions. This can generally be done most effectively by meeting the reasonable demands of the population, and perhaps by a certain increase in police and constabulary forces that do not require complicated equipment or large outlays.

By the time an insurgency has become a major military problem, requiring a major military effort, things have usually developed to a point that it will be our policy to attempt to avoid.

So you should not read these statements as indicating necessarily any particular commitments in one category rather than another.

Q Yes, Doctor, but there is no nation in Southeast Asia except South Vietnam armed with any even small arms comparable to the Soviet weapons like the AK-47. Have you thought through these questions of how you would make the Southeast Asian nations more self-sufficient in their constabulary, border patrol and counter-insurgency forces, including the possible use of helicopters? I would like to refer particularly to M-16's.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, we have thought about the problem, but I must add another of our basic tenets here. I know it is not the policy of this Administration to take the position that the defense of another country is more in our interest than in its own and, therefore, it will not be our policy to go around with defense schemes to the countries of Asia.

We think that the primary conceptual work on the sort of question which you have raised should come in the first instance from the threatened country. We will then respond and give our judgment, if our judgment is requested.

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But counter-insurgency operations, and indeed the
whole problem of defense, must engage the intellectual and
other energies of the country concerned if the United States'
contribution is to be meaningful.

Q Dr. Kissinger, to follow up a question, can
you tell us at least, as the President implied at Guam, whether
the problem of reduction in U.S. military forces in Thailand
was brought up in these meetings, either between the President
and the Prime Minister or the meeting of aides, or whether it
has been broached at all between the two countries?

DR. KISSINGER: There was some discussion of the
general policy of the President which he enunciated some weeks
ago of reducing the American presence by eliminating unneces-
sary personnel. There will be no reduction in personnel support-
ing Thai efforts. There will be no reduction in personnel that
is required for efforts in other parts of Southeast Asia.

But there will be a general review of whether the
forces here are at their most efficient composition. The Thai
Government has indicated that this is a matter that depends
entirely on an American judgment within this framework.

Q Doctor, you seem to be accepting the premise
in the air that this is basically a new orientation of
American policy. If so, I am not sure I fully understand how.
If you leave out the argument whether Vietnam was an external
aggression or not, where else in the area that we are discussing
are the things that you are enunciating here really a change
of approach?

DR. KISSINGER: I would say two things: First of all, that is a rather big exception. Secondly, I didn't say it was a new policy. This is a question that was put to me. I am saying what our policy is. I think it is our general tendency not to use too many adjectives and to claim too much for it.

I think I have explained that if you read the
rhetoric of some years ago it would be, on the whole, that it
was a principal American responsibility to prevent wars of
national liberation from succeeding. We are saying that it is
principally a local responsibility with whatever American
technical help and advice that we can generate.

I think, therefore, insofar as general approaches
to policy, determined actions and expectations and relation-
ships, it is a new statement of the American responsibility
with respect to this particular category of issues.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is there any retroactive appli-
cation of this policy to Vietnam? If not, aren't we asking
our men there to fight for a policy that the government no
longer subscribes to?

DR. KISSINGER: The answer to that is no. What we
are fighting against in Vietnam, and what we have repeatedly
stated, what this Administration has repeatedly stated, is
the introduction of outside forces into Vietnam.

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We have repeatedly stated, and I reaffirm it here, that we are willing to withdraw American forces from South Vietnam if the other side withdraws its forces into North Vietnam under procedures that give some guarantees against their reintroduction.

If that condition is met, then, indeed, we are in a situation where the problem of local insurrection, or whatever one wishes to characterize it as, would have to be handled locally, and where the people of South Vietnam can decide their own fate.

Therefore, our Vietnam policy seems to me to be perfectly consistent with the general policy. In addition to that fact, I would like to call your attention to the first part of the President's speech on May 14th in which he pointed out the serious consequences of an American unilateral withdrawal after the commitments that have been made over the past six or seven years.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is there anything in this new statement of American objectives that, if it had been in effect in the fall of 1961, would have precluded the actions that were taken by the United States after the Taylor mission?

DR. KISSINGER: I really think that the general principles I have stated speak for themselves, and I don't want to criticize actions that were taken by other administrations.

Q I am not asking you to criticize actions. I am just asking this as a way of helping to explain this new policy.

DR. KISSINGER: The general policy that I have described would mean that we would put a major emphasis on strengthening the local resources, and the local willingness to resist, but I really don't want to get into a detailed critique of a very anguishing period.

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I would like to get back to Max Frankle's question. I misunderstand you on where your new policy represents a difference. You say Vietnam is no exception, but Vietnam under your definition would come under externally introduced forces so it must be discounted.

Can you give me an example of how your policy would make a difference in the last ten years anywhere?

DR. KISSINGER: Vietnam now falls under the exception which I have indicated. This does not mean that our approach to Vietnam would have fallen under the exception that I have indicated.

I think if you look at the rhetoric and at the actions of some previous periods you may find that there would have been a considerable difference in nuance and in expression. But we are perfectly content with resting on the announcement of what we are going to do, and we are not making any excessive claims. We are not stating what the American policy in the next phase will be, and it will be consistent with our general approach.

Let me say it in two respects. With respect to the general problem of defense, the United States, for very understandable reasons, for much of the post-war period sometimes acted as if the defense of other parts of the world were more in its interest than in the interest of those areas. Therefore, in many parts of the world it was the United States which took a very energetic role in devising the legal arrangements, the strategy, and the formula for defense.

I don't say this critically because in the immediate post-war period the United States was predominantly strong and many parts of the world were impotent. But now in the period of foreign policy that we are now entering, with respect both to external aggression and with respect to internal subversion, a major shift of responsibility to threatened countries has to occur.

With respect to internal subversion, I have indicated what our general approach is, which is to rely predominantly on local resources with American help.

Doctor, could I ask you a question that is disturbing some of us? We are talking about a post-Vietnam period at a time when we are not in a post-Vietnam period, at a time when the morale of our troops, a sizable number of them, seem to be involved still in Vietnam.

How do you answer the question: Is it not prematurely enunciating a policy while a war is going on?

DR. KISSINGER: To say that we face a complicated situation is a platitude. We obviously and regrettably are not in a post-Vietnam situation.

On the other hand, everything we do with respect to the settlement of the war in Vietnam has to be seen in relationship to the post-Vietnam period as well. We have always known that we can settle the war in Vietnam, if necessary, by pulling out.

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Our concern has been to make sure that whatever
settlement was made in Vietnam it would help the peace of
Asia and the peace of the world.

One of the themes which I believe the President
stressed in Guam, but which he has certainly stressed in
his meetings in Asia is his recognition that the nature of
the settlement in Vietnam will importantly affect not only
the immediate situation in Asia, but also the American
willingness to play any role in international affairs and
in Asia.

Therefore, we are in the situation where we have
to talk about post-Vietnam while the war in Vietnam is still
going on.

Let me say one other thing: For many of the Asian
nations that we are visiting, the issue of Vietnam has a
substantive as well as symbolic role. The symbolic role is
their fear that our actions there may be a prelude to a
general withdrawal of the United States from international
responsibilities and from a role in Asia.

We are not travelling through Asia to gain support
for our immediate tactics in Vietnam, but we are in Asia
to work out with the countries we are visiting and to
explain to them our general approach for a period ahead so
that in the interval, while a settlement in Vietnam is being
worked out, they can make the necessary adjustments.

Doctor, is it safe to presume that the policy
you have enunciated here applies equally to Latin America,
to the Middle East, to Africa, to other places? We are not
talking only about an Asian phase of American policy?

DR. KISSINGER: I think you gentlemen will recognize
the enormous difficulty of stating a general proposition that
is universally applicable. The basic thrust of what I have
said here, that the defense of other countries in terms of
the general approach, should not be a predominantly American
concern, but must involve the participation of the countries
themselves, the fact that we are determined to honor our
commitments, and the fact that as a general proposition
internal subversion should be resisted internally with whatever
outside help is appropriate, I think I would generalize, but
if you pressed me from cases to case around the world you would
have to recognize that policy-making is not simply writing
a set of maxims and then looking them up.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

MR. ZIEGLER: Just one moment, please, before
we break up.

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Just so that everyone is totally aware of the
ground rules on this, some of you who have not been covering
us regularly at the White House, this is for BACKGROUND
and attributable to White House sources without direct
quotations. You can attribute the content of what Dr.
Kissinger has given you without direct quotations to White
House sources.

Also, immediately after this briefing is concluded,
I would like to see representatives from the American
broadcasting companies -- not ABC, but all American
broadcasting companies -- the senior representative from
the New York Times and the senior representative from the
Los Angeles Times. Also, I would like to see the foreign
correspondents who are travelling with us.

Q Ron, in our previous days we have gotten
a rundown of what topics were discussed by the President
or the other aides with the country involved. We did not
get that for Thailand. Can we get it?

MR. ZIEGLER: This briefing is not concluded.
Keep the doors closed, please.

Q We have no idea what was discussed today,
for how long, or with whom.

MR. ZIEGLER: We will be happy to give you a rundown
on generally the topics which were discussed. I think
Dr. Kissinger can give that to you very quickly, and also
give you a brief indication as to time.

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Q Did General Abrams get here?

Q The President left a loose thread dangling. Is General Abrams here?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, he has arrived in Bangkok. There is no planned meeting between General Abrams and the President this evening.

Q There is not?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is correct.

Q Will they meet tomorrow?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, the President will meet with General Abrams tomorrow.

In terms of the schedule, I think all of you have the schedules which indicated what today's activities were. The day went pretty much as scheduled. You have the pool reports which have been filed, I suppose, by the poolers who have accompanied the President on the various movements. The meetings this morning lasted from about 10:15 until 12:15 between the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Thailand, and, on the U. S. side, the President, President Nixon, and Dr. Kissinger.

There was also a larger meeting which consisted of Ambassador Unger, Assistant Secretary Green, John Holdridge, and myself.

Dr. Kissinger, I think, can give you a rundown to the extent he feels it appropriate on the topics covered.

DR. KISSINGER: The topics covered in the meetings of the principals, which, as I understand it, pretty well parallel the meeting of the advisors, included a general appreciation of the situation in Southeast Asia, the war in Vietnam, the situation in Laos, some considerable time on possible cooperative efforts in Southeast Asia in a post-Vietnam environment, a review of the role of China in this area, some explanation by the President of our views with respect to the Communist world, and, in the last part of the meeting, a general discussion of various foreign policy issues, such as the Middle East.

Following the ending of the meeting of the principals which ended, as Ron said, around 12:15, there was a brief joint meeting in which the principals joined the advisors. Then there was a luncheon for both delegations.

Q Doctor, I apologize for doing so, but I wonder if I can just ask one more question which I think is important.

In this new policy, you mentioned the importance or desirability of social, administrative and military reform.

To what extent in a new policy would you insist on social and political reform before you gave any kind of combat support aid such as you have outlined?

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DR. KISSINGER: I really don't want to go into the details of the implementation. I would expect that in any situation in which a country discusses counter-insurgency problems with us, we would express our views as to the best methods to resist those, and those views would be consistent with what I have told you.

MR. ZIEGLER: Following the luncheon which Dr. Kissinger referred to, there were no toasts delivered at that luncheon, the President met with the United States ambassadors from other Asian countries. That list is in the press room for those of you who have not had that information.

That meeting, of course, was a private meeting between the ambassadors and the President. Generally, the ambassadors reported to the President on the situation in the various countries which they represented.

The President, following that, attended the reception which is indicated on the schedule. There were toasts offered at that reception. I believe they will be in the press room, if not there already, very shortly.

The President has no other planned activity for this evening.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 7:50 p.m. Local Time)

[L.C.]

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

(Vietnam)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY
TO THE PRESIDENT; AND HON. HENRY
~~KISSINGER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO~~
THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

7:58 P.M. Local Time

JULY 30, 1969

WEDNESDAY

(Bangkok, Thailand)

MR. ZIEGLER: I know many of you just got back.

The purpose of this BACKGROUNDER is we thought it
would be valuable to you for Dr. Kissinger to give you
a brief rundown on the subjects that were discussed in the
small meeting. He is here for that purpose.

The same groundrules as last night.

After Dr. Kissinger is completed, I will give you
a very quick rundown on the timing. I think we should be
complete here very shortly.

Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: Let me just cover the subjects that we discussed. I don't have any notes, so if in the question period you find that there was one that I skipped, be gentle with me.

First, we reviewed what had happened since the
Midway meeting in terms of the offers that have been made and
some of the political steps taken by the GVN. We used
this as a point of departure for a discussion of the strategy
to be pursued in the negotiations at Paris, as well as the
long-term strategy and some of the immediate tactics.

We discussed the problems connected with Vietnamizing
the war and the replacement of American forces by South
Vietnamese forces. We discussed it both in terms of
procedures to be followed in planning for it, in terms of
the rate at which it can be reasonably accomplished.

We discussed the political evolution in South
Vietnam, including the attempt by President Thieu to
reconstitute his Cabinet and to broaden his political base.
We discussed the meaning of what is sometimes described as
the present lull. But, in any event, the nature of military
strategy in Vietnam and enemy intentions.

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President Thieu then spoke to us about some of the reforms he is intending to undertake and is in the process of undertaking in Vietnam. And we discussed President Nixon's general conception of the evolution of South Asia, especially Southeast Asia, and of the general philosophy that President Nixon is pursuing with respect to that area.

I think those were the major topics covered in the private meeting, which was conducted in an atmosphere of cordiality (laughter) and why don't I answer your questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, are you prepared to tell us anything more on the troop question? Can you tell us anything more than the general statement you gave us? You spoke of the rate at which it might be accomplished. Can you go beyond that at all?

DR. KISSINGER: I can say that the troop question was discussed both in the private meeting and in the advisors meeting. The problem is to establish a rate which is consistent with the objective of turning over the major responsibility to the Vietnamese Army as quickly as possible. But, on the other hand, not so rapid as to break the will to resist or the confidence of the South Vietnamese.

There will be another decision in the second half of August. And it was agreed that the numbers and the time period at which they were to be replaced would be determined in the second half of August.

There was some general discussions about magnitudes, but no decisions.

Q Doctor, can you tell us what President Thieu had in mind, what the meaning was when he said that his understanding was, in connection with President Nixon's criteria for the withdrawal of troops, that after the initial withdrawal increasing attention, or something like that, would be given to the third criteria, that is, progress in the Paris peace talks?

DR. KISSINGER: I think he said after the initial replacements.

Q Reductions.

DR. KISSINGER: Initial reductions.

Q Yes.

DR. KISSINGER: Let me, first of all, explain the statements.

Because of the nature of the planning of this trip -- the usual joint statements are prepared well ahead of time and only the final finishing touches are put on them at meetings such as Midway. In this particular case, because of the way the trip was planned, there was no preparatory staff work in preparing a joint statement.

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Therefore, the two Presidents prepared separate statements which each of them saw, and, this is not intended to disavow anything that was said. But we assume full responsibility for our statement.

We saw President Thieu's statement and it is acceptable to us. But we did not write it.

What President Thieu said, however, as we understand it, was that after the first reductions, which does not necessarily mean after the first increment a point will obviously be reached in which we have to pay increasing attention to the response of the other side.

It has always been clear that there are several factors governing American withdrawals. If the other side reciprocates, the rate of American withdrawal can obviously be faster. Because then this would be a factor which we would take into account.

If the other side does not reciprocate, one of the principal governing factors will be the degree to which the speed with which South Vietnamese forces can be trained to replace ours.

In that case, the replacements will take place somewhat more slowly.

So, as we understand President Thieu's statement, it calls attention to the fact that there is some relationship with the speed with which American forces can be replaced and reciprocity on the other side.

At any rate, this is our policy.

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Q Was any consideration given to interpreting what you call the present lull with a decision by the other side to withdraw some of the troops by way of a reciprocal move?

DR. KISSINGER: I will repeat the question. The question is whether any attention was given to the present lull and whether there was any intention to reciprocate the lull on the other side and any withdrawals by the other side.

From the point of view of reciprocity, significant withdrawals from Vietnam have to be into North Vietnam and not simply into Cambodia and Laos.

A withdrawal into Cambodia, into base camps right up near the border of South Vietnam, may be significant in terms of the intensity of the war, and it may effect our decisions with respect to the particular tactics of the war.

It cannot effect our decisions with respect to any reciprocity that may be involved in withdrawing forces.

On the other hand, if Hanoi withdraws some forces into North Vietnam, or if Hanoi stops replacing its forces in South Vietnam, and, therefore, the total number of forces in South Vietnam is gradually reduced, this would be a factor that we would take into account in determining whether there should be reciprocity.

We have always made clear that Hanoi does not have to avow having forces in South Vietnam. For our purpose it is sufficient that either North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam withdraw into North Vietnam or that North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam or contiguous territories are significantly reduced through attrition.

Q Dr. Kissinger, we understand in this current colloquy of yours that you have gotten no evidence that Hanoi has withdrawn troops or has stopped its replacement rate or slowed its replacement rate.

DR. KISSINGER: No, let me be specific. We have no evidence that Hanoi has withdrawn troops from South Vietnam into North Vietnam. We have some evidence that some units have been withdrawn from South Vietnam into base camps contiguous to the border.

We have some evidence that the replacement into South Vietnam is at a level lower than it has been for a considerable period of time.

We are now studying the meaning of this. If the infiltration of North Vietnamese units into South Vietnam remains at a level below the casualties so that there is an attrition of the total number of North Vietnamese forces, this is a factor we will take seriously into account.

But there is no evidence of the withdrawal of North Vietnamese units from South Vietnam into North Vietnam.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, President Thieu made a good deal of the fact that North Vietnam's military activity in Laos and Cambodia is extensive. He said it violates all of the agreements, but more than that, it threatens South Vietnam. Do we share that view with him?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, we are concerned about it.
Did everyone understand the question?

We are concerned about North Vietnamese activities
in Laos for a variety of reasons. As I indicated yesterday,
first, because it starts with the possibility of any agreement
in good faith; secondly, because it raises some question
about the ability of the Soviet Union, which is, as you know,
co-chairman of the Laos agreements, to exercise a restraining
influence; and, thirdly, because of the impact of events
in Laos to Thailand and South Vietnam.

We are also concerned about the continued tendency
of the opposing forces in South Vietnam to be supplied through
base camps in Cambodia. We recognize that this is being done
under duress. It is done under duress by Prince Sihanouk.
But it is a complicating factor in the situation.

Therefore, it is our view that in case of a settle-
ment, North Vietnamese forces will have to be withdrawn not
only from South Vietnam, but from Cambodia and Laos.

Q Dr. Kissinger, will you ask President Pompidou of France to intercede with the Soviet Union both in Laos and Vietnamese situations?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether on my
trip to Paris I am going to ask President Pompidou to
intercede with the Soviet Union either on Laos on Vietnam.

The purpose of visiting Paris is to inform President
Pompidou of our trip, to give him the President's impression
of the trip, not to ask for any particular initiative.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is it fair to assume that
from President Thieu's statement today and from what you
have said tonight that there has been at least a subtle
change in the President's three requirements for troop reduc-
tions and in fact there is a new one which is progress towards
peace and negotiations and progress in the Laos-Cambodia
situation?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether there is
a new requirement in American troop withdrawal, namely, progress
in the Laos and Cambodia situation.

The answer to the last part of the question is, no.
We have always said that a permanent settlement in Vietnam
would require a withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from
Cambodia and Laos. This was the President's May 14 speech;
whereas, it was expressed as a withdrawal of North Vietnamese
forces from South Vietnam into North Vietnam and from Cambodia
and Laos.

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This is not new in our position at all.

Secondly, with respect to the troop replacement
program in South Vietnam, we have not made that dependent
on North Vietnamese withdrawal from Laos and Cambodia.

Let me sum up the troop withdrawal issue in order to
make a distinction.

There are two basic ways American troops can be
withdrawn from South Vietnam.

One, through the ability of the South Vietnamese
forces to take over some of the combat functions. This
strand of American withdrawals is unaffected by what
happens in Laos and Cambodia.

The second and more accelerated troop withdrawal
can be brought about by the withdrawal of North Vietnamese
forces from South Vietnam into North Vietnam.

To the extent that this strand is considered,
in other words, to the extent that American troop withdrawals are
based not on unilateral decisions but on reciprocity, the
actions of North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia are considered
equivalent to the actions of North Vietnamese forces in
South Vietnam; in other words, they would have to withdraw
from South Vietnam into North Vietnam and not simply into
Cambodia before we would withdraw on the basis of reciprocity.
But the unilateral troop withdrawal is going to go ahead
independently, but more slowly.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, you say there are two reasons that U. S. troops could be withdrawn. One, if North Vietnamese troops are withdrawn and then we should have our withdrawal faster. There has been no inclination, it seems, to that. The second, you say the question is how fast can South Vietnamese forces be trained to replace them.

Based on past history, it would seem that it is going to be a good while before South Vietnamese forces are going to be adequately trained. What is your thinking and what is the Administration's thinking, really, about how fast the South Vietnamese forces can be trained?

DR. KISSINGER: The Administration's thinking has been expressed in a number of public statements. We have withdrawn a contingent starting in June. We announced it in June and we started withdrawal in July.

I told you today that we will make another decision ab out another possible withdrawal in the second half of August. I think this will make clear what our intention is and we will move as rapidly as is consistent with the three criteria which we have established for the unilateral phase of the withdrawal. I think we should let our actions speak for themselves.

Q Dr. Kissinger, I gather from what you have said, then, that we are interpreting the current lull in Vietnam as not a de-escalation by the other side?

DR. KISSINGER: We are looking at the current lull very seriously. Of course, we consider that even a level of between 150 to 200 casualties a week is a fairly substantial level. And the best one can say is that it is a lull relative to the preceding period.

What we are studying now very carefully is whether the lull is a result of an enemy decision to de-escalate or whether it is the result of an incapacity to mount a larger effort; in other words, whether they are engaged in the maximum effort of which they are now capable.

We are looking at it carefully and I may say prayerfully. And if we conclude that it is a deliberate de-escalation, this would certainly be taken seriously into account in planning our own moves.

Max?

Q Both you and the President have now spoken vaguely of our adjusting tactics in response to either diplomatic situations in Paris or the lull. Could you tell us where this subject stands in light of your talks with Thieu and also General Abrams today?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. We had talks with General Abrams both going to Saigon and, as most of you know, coming back from Saigon.

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Q. Is he here now?

DR. KISSINGER: He flew back with us. I do not know whether he remained here. We don't intend to have any further discussions with General Abrams. I am not certain whether he flew right back or whether he is staying overnight.

Ambassador Bunker also came back with us.

Q. What was the question?

DR. KISSINGER: The question was that there had been some references to adjusting tactics, both by the President in Guam and by me here.

I think the President stated the issue as well as is possible in Guam when he pointed out that in a normal war military considerations are known, but this is not a military war. This is a war in which political, psychological and military factors are inextricably connected.

The attempt to conduct this war on the basis of purely military considerations misses the essence of this type of war. Therefore, we are constantly reassessing and we are in the process of now assessing our military operations in terms of the impact on our political objectives and in terms of their suitability for reaching these political objectives.

This matter was discussed in Washington. We had an opportunity to again discuss it with General Abrams. It is not the sort of thing that lends itself to dramatic announcements.

But I am safe in saying that this Administration is fully cognizant of the fact that there is a war which is broader than a military war; that what we do anywhere must have a pay-off in the negotiations; and that we are going to adjust our actions to fit our objectives.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in all of this, it seems to me that the Administration has more or less discounted the talks in Paris as leading nowhere and not likely to. Is this correct?

DR. KISSINGER: This is absolutely incorrect.

The Administration's view is that the war should be settled by negotiation. It is our belief that we have offered a broad-gauged, reasonable basis for a settlement.

There can be, I know, on an issue as complicated as this, many tactical new answers. We have not presented our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

But we believe that, in essence, if the other side wants to negotiate, and wants to have a reasonable settlement, the proposals put forward by President Thieu and this Administration offer the basis for reasonable discussions.

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The President has offered, and so has President Thieu, that we are willing to discuss the programs of the other side, together with the points put forward by us.

What has been lacking so far is a readiness on the part of Hanoi to negotiate with us in the same spirit. There may be still an expectation that if the war is prolonged the United States will be driven to more and more concessions. I believe that this hope is bound to be disappointed. The President has reiterated in every statement he has made since May 14 that there is nothing to be gained by waiting.

Therefore, we do not intend to make any new proposals. We also do not intend to give up on the negotiations in Paris. We expect that when the other side realizes that there will not be a unilateral withdrawal that they will meet us hopefully in the spirit in which we have put forward.

Q What did the President mean today when he said we have gone about as far as we can or should? That sounds like he is slamming the door.

DR. KISSINGER: What the President meant was exactly what I have just said. He was not slamming any doors. He was trying to convince the other side that there was nothing to be gained by waiting.

The temptation for the other side must be very great to expect that any deadlock will be rewarded with yet another round of concessions.

What we are trying to say is that we have offered the withdrawal of all our forces if the other side withdraws its forces, and the other side can essentially regulate the speed of this withdrawal by the speed with which it withdraws its forces.

So we are not talking of an extensive stay. We have offered the basis of settlement of the political issues through internationally supervised free elections which are arranged by mixed commissions in which the other side will be represented.

We believe that this represents the most forthcoming proposal that could possibly be made. We recognize that the implementation of it will require a great deal of negotiation and adjustments. But what the President was going to say is that beyond these two principles, it is not possible for us to go and that it is now time for the other side to start talking with us, but not to slam the door.

MR. ZIEGLER: We will be able to take two more questions.

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Q You say on the one hand that there is a temptation for the enemy to wait for more concessions and that there are not going to be any. I assume you say there are not going to be any. There is no reason for them to wait. On the other hand, you suggest there may be a change of our tactics.

In the light of past experience, any change obviously is going to be, or seems obvious that there will be a diminishment of our operations. We certainly have not been escalating since this Administration came into power. So the only assumption one can make is that we are going to diminish them. That doesn't seem consistent with your statement that they can't expect any more.

DR. KISSINGER: I said that we are going to reassess our tactics in order to support the objectives which we are seeking. We believe that by constantly reviewing our military operations, we may strengthen our negotiators and not weaken them, particularly if we tie together the psychological and the political factors.

I can assure you that our review is not intended to diminish our bargaining power, but to increase it. Therefore, I won't even accept your characterization of what we intended to do.

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O Doctor, do you find it either significant or possibly encouraging that the President of the United States could go into South Vietnam today without any kind of incident, follow-up or anything which might embarrass him?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is, do I believe it is significant that the President of the United States can go into Saigon today without any incident.

I believe it is profoundly significant that the President of the United States went into Saigon today. I think it should limit the range of what the other side can expect to be conceded, and, therefore, can contribute to the speeding up of negotiations over a period of time.

It was an important symbolic gesture, and, I believe, also, that the substantive results of the talks today will be apparent in the weeks ahead.

O Why was it symbolic? What does the symbolism show?

DR. KISSINGER: I have explained, I believe, what it is. I think it makes it clear that Saigon will not be turned into a Ho Chi Minh city.

Does this gentleman want to ask me the tough question he has?

O It was such a good question that someone else thought of it, sir.

MR. ZIEGLER: The only additional thing you may not have gotten in the pool report is you know who attended the meeting between the two presidents. I should say that Vice President Ky, I believe, joined the group at 20 minutes toward the end of the meeting. I think you have the times. The meeting began at about 12:35 and ended at approximately 2:45 and following the statements that the two presidents made, after that meeting, they briefly joined the larger group that had met in the cabinet room. The pool reports follow up from that point.

O When did it begin, again?

MR. ZIEGLER: At approximately 12:35.

The meeting took place in President Thieu's office.

O Was there any doubt in the President's mind that he would make this trip in the beginning of the planning of this journey?

MR. ZIEGLER: I can't pinpoint a final decision on the trip. There was some discussion, of course, about it.

O I am curious about what the policy considerations were, pro and con?

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MR. ZIEGLER: As to making the trip?

Q What was the argument, for or against? We
heard the argument for. What was the reason for keeping it
in doubt, other than security?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think security was one of the
key items.

Q What were the others?

DR. KISSINGER: I think it is safe to say that
we always plan to make the trip over the strenuous objections
of the Secret Service. There were no political considerations
against it.

Q Can you give us the rules?

MR. ZIEGLER: To restate the rules of the backgrounder, it is the same as previously, attributed to White House sources without direct quotations.

The Foreign Ministry of Thailand had invited you
to a luncheon today and have rearranged for a cocktail
reception and dinner this evening around the pool.

So, if you would like to attend that, I am sure
you would be welcome.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 8:35 P.M. local time)