39

One way to avoid this dilemma would be for each side to designate a special representative enjoying the full confidence of its head of government and foreign minister. He should be authorized to conduct private, exploratory conversations on their behalf, preferably without publicity. Each of these special representatives should have access to the head of state of the other side. Both parties would commit themselves to a global review of their entire relationship. As soon as the conversation between the special representatives demonstrates hope for progress, preparations would begin for a summit meeting which would then approve a full-scale work program for coexistence. But the method is less important -- there are several approaches possible -- than a decision on the direction.

6. So far, attempts to discuss political problems systematically have been dismissed as "linkage" and linkage is supposed to be bad because it is alleged to be an obstacle

40

to arms control. By now we should have learned that the
opposite is true. Arms control separated from any political
context, is likely to run into a dead end. The danger of
war, after all, resides less in the existence of the
weapons of mass destruction than in the minds of the men
who are in a position to order their use. And such men
will be driven by political conflicts, not systems analyses.

A serious dialogue must come to grips with how coexistence
is to be defined. Abstract though this may sound, it is
at the heart of the problem. No detente can be sustained
if all it does is to give rise to a political offensive
designed to unhinge the global balance of power. One can
cite several Western failures of omission and commission.
But no spurious objectivity, no effort to find both sides
equally guilty can overlook the provocations that accelerated
the hardening of American attitudes. The dispatch of proxy
troops to Angola and Ethiopia; the revolutions in Aden and
Afghanistan followed by the occupation of Afghanistan;
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia; the encouragement

41

of terrorist groups; the massive delivery of arms to Cuba and thence to Central America mark a foreign policy that at least since 1976 has missed no opportunity to undermine Western positions.

8. Finally, we in the West must be prepared to face the fact that even with our best efforts a thaw in East-West relations may simply not be in the cards.

In that case, we have no choice except to stand on our best proposals, thoughtfully devised. The West need not panic at a period of deadlock. Its economy for all its shortcomings is more vital; its governmental structure stabler; and its overall power greater. The Alliance can thus face a period of holding firm with confidence -- provided it preserves its unity.

## Conclusion

It has become ritualistic to speak of the need for Allied unity. It is indeed periodically reaffirmed. But

42

it exhausts itself in tactical agreement. Too rarely --
if ever -- is there a real attempt to project a strategy
for the rest of this century.

And yet that is the single most important problem
before the Alliance. I do not believe the present structure
of NATO lends itself easily to such an effort. And I do
not have much confidence in "wise men" exercises. Still
a way must be found to deal with the unsolved issues before
us. Nothing is possible unless we reexamine strategic
doctrine without blinking. An approach to arms control
must logically parallel this effort. It will be time also
to look at the question whether every NATO deployment decided
a generation ago must be sacrosanct for all eternity.

East-West relations in all their manifold aspects need a
sense of direction. The Reagan Administration has in practice
abandoned its confrontational style. Our allies need now
to avoid using the past as an alibi to avoid difficult
choices.

CJD

43

The process is overdue and since it depends on the members
of a democratic Alliance it provides no excuse for failure.

The greatest encouragement to Soviet foreign policy in
the West is the lack of clarity of the Alliance about its
purposes. But that problem, being self-made, can be
undone by our own efforts. Since the democracies have
this possibility, it is also their duty.

EAGLE-A
Trojan Bond
25% COTTON FIBER

March 1, 1985

Chris:

I finally reached Mr. Steinbruckner, and told him HAK "would try his best to provide a written contribution, but definitely could not do it before June". Mr. Steinbruckner phoned Mr. Stoiber in Munich, and called me back with this message.

"They would be honored to have HAK do the written contribution, and would hold up deadline for the manuscript going to print until the first week of June, provided HAK is sure he can do it."

Mr. Steinbruckner also asked me if HAK still agrees to be co-editor of the commemorative volume for Strauss. Apparently, HAK had verbally agreed to do this (See first paragraph of letter.)

I told Mr. Steinbruckner I would try to call him back with some answers next week.

Phone: 544-2626

DT

HK:

Attached is the proposed outline for the
Festschrift for Franz Josef Strauss.

Dr. Stoiber indicates that
Richard von Weizsacker, Carstens,
and Kohl will be participating.

He notes that they would be deligted
if you send a contribution.
They would prefer something along
10-15 pages (manuscript) and a deadline
of April 30th.

I assume this is something you will
want to do.

Tell them "will do my best"
to provide written contribution ✓

Definitely confirm; I will
write something ____

Other ____

TRANSLATION - jw - 1/31/85

23 January 1985

FEB 1 1985

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

As the Bavarian state government representative coordinating the project, I want to thank you very much for your kind willingness to co-edit the Festschrift (commemorative volume) for Bavarian Ministerial President Franz Josef Strauss' 70th birthday.

We have gotten a number of well-known personalities from Germany and abroad as editors and authors, including Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker, former Federal President Karl Carstens and Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

The Festschrift will be published by the Bruckmann Verlag in Munich.

I am taking this opportunity to send you a draft outline from which you can see that under B, III throughout, there would be an opportunity for a contribution from you. If you would decide to do this, I know from conversations with Franz Josef Strauss that this would please and honor him greatly. Obviously, it is clear to me that with such a sought after and well-known author as yourself, this cannot be finalized with just verbal thanks alone as with the other contributors. (1. C, $??)

Should you be willing to make a contribution, following is some pertinent information:

We are planning for a length of 10-15 manuscript pages. The deadline for going to print has been earmarked for April 30, 1985. I am, of course, at your disposal for any questions.

Looking forward to your esteemed reply,

Enc

DR. EDMUND STOIBER

STAATSSEKRETÄR, MDL

LEITER DER BAYERISCHEN STAATSKANZLEI

NR. A III 6 - 01500-7-7

(IM ANTWORTSCHREIBEN BITTE ANGEBEN)

PRINZREGENTENSTR. 7

8000 MÜNCHEN 22

TEL. (089) 2165-0

23. JAN. 1985

Mit Luftpost

Herrn
Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K Street, N.W.
20006 Washington, D.C.

FFB 1 1985

Sehr geehrter Herr Kissinger!

Für Ihre freundliche Bereitschaft, die Festschrift zum
70. Geburtstag des Bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten Franz
Josef Strauß mitherauszugeben, bedanke ich mich als
der von der Bayerischen Staatsregierung mit der Feder-
führung Beauftragte sehr herzlich.

Eine Reihe namhafter Persönlichkeiten aus dem In- und Ausland konnte inzwischen als Herausgeber und Autoren gewonnen werden, unter anderem Bundespräsident Richard von Weizsäcker, Altbundespräsident Karl Carstens und Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl.

Die Festschrift soll im Bruckmann-Verlag München erscheinen.

Ich erlaube mir, Ihnen anliegend einen Gliederungsentwurf zuzusenden, aus dem Sie ersehen mögen, daß etwa unter B, III durchaus die Möglichkeit zu einem Beitrag aus Ihrer Feder bestünde. Wenn Sie sich hierzu entschließen würden,

./.

- 2 -

wäre dies für Franz Josef Strauß, wie ich aus Gesprächen mit ihm weiß, eine große Freude und Ehre. Selbstverständlich ist es mir klar, daß es bei einem so gesuchten und berühmten Autor wie Ihnen wohl kaum mit verbalem Dank allein sein Bewenden haben kann, wie bei den übrigen Referenten.

Sollten Sie sich zu einem Beitrag bereit erklären, so darf
ich Ihnen noch folgende Informationen geben:

Es ist an einen Umfang von 10 bis 15 Manuskriptseiten gedacht. Als Termin für den Redaktionsschluß ist der 30.04.1985 vorgemerkt. Für etwaige Rückfragen stehe ich Ihnen selbstverständlich zu Verfügung.

Ihrer geschätzten Anwort gerne entgegensehend, bin ich

mit freundlichen Grüßen

- 3 -

6. Der Wiederaufbau

a) Staats- und Verfassungsordnung

b) Wirtschaftlicher und finanzieller Aufbau

c) Parteien in der Verantwortung und Parteigrenzen

d) Soziale Ordnung

7. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland heute, ihre politische und wirtschaftliche Bedeutung, Möglichkeiten zukünftiger Entwicklung

### III. Europäisch-atlantische Friedensarchitektur
(als Autoren sind namhafte Politiker des In- und Auslandes vorgesehen)

1. Die nordatlantische Gemeinschaft

2. Perspektiven einer modernen Industriegesellschaft
- Beispiel Großbritannien

3. Europa, Hort der Freiheit

4. Zukunft und Chancen der europäischen politischen Zusammenarbeit

5. Die iberische Halbinsel und ihre Bedeutung für Europa

6. Europa in der Bewährung

7. Die NATO als Wert- und Verteidigungsgemeinschaft

8. Die Teilung der Welt, und wie sie zu überwinden ist

9. CSU und EDU, EVP

./.