THE REPORTER

136 East 57th Street
New York City 22

Harlan Cleveland

March 30, 1956

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
58 East 68th St.
New York 21, N. Y.

Dear Henry:

Both Phil Horton and I have read your "Notes on the Soviet
Offensive" with much interest, and with admiration for your very
lucid and intelligent summary of What It All Means. I don't think,
though, that it's a possibility for us. We have covered a good
many of your essential views and view points in recent articles
and editorials; indeed the piece is really sort of an editorial.
There is nothing wrong with editorials, of course, but in our shop
that is Max Ascoli's department.

I have read your lead piece in Foreign Affairs, and found
it admirably clear and helpful. Let's get together soon for lunch
or otherwise to talk about the state of the world. I would like
to try out on you a couple of theories why the U.S. isn't pulling
the stroke oar it should be pulling.

at
encl: "Notes on the Soviet Peace Offensive"

THE REPORTER

136 EAST 57th STREET

NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Murray Hill 8-4033

February 11, 1959

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University Center for
International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I am working on the promotion of your article which will appear in the next issue of THE REPORTER.

We all think this is an extremely informative article and would like it to receive as wide a distribution as possible. I would like to send it to people in and out of government, people who have been associated with advisory committees, people in universities and any others you think would be interested.

If you have any suggestions along these lines, I would appreciate it very much if you would send me a list.

I would just like to add that I found the article extremely thoughtful and provocative and I am sure it will create a great deal of discussion.

RMD:sem

February 12, 1959

Mr. Gouverneur Paulding
The Reporter
136 East 57th Street
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Paulding:

Many thanks for the gruelling
task of taking down the revisions on the
galleys of my article. Enclosed are the
galleys, which may be of some help although
my changes are not very legible.

There is one thing I would like
to stress, which is that the title should
be changed to "The Policy Maker and the
Intellectual." If you would like to make
a sub-heading, this would be all right
with me.

I would also like to stress that
the page proofs should be sent to me at
my home address: 104 Fletcher Road,
Belmont, Massachusetts. These should be
sent special delivery or they will not
reach me over the weekend.

Henry V. Krasinger

Sincerely yours,

reach me over the weekend.
sent special delivery or they will not
Belmont, Massachusetts. These should be
my home address: 104 Kleefoper Road,
the page broads should be sent to me at
I would also like to stress that

with me.
a special reading, this would be very right
intelligently." It you would like to make
be changed to "The Policy Maker and the
to stress, which is that the title should
there is one thing I would like

my chunks are not very legible.
Siffels, which usually be of some help although
Siffels of my article. Enclosed are the
task of taking down the references on the
Henry thanks for the briefing.

Dear Mr. Bannding:

New York SS, New York
130 East 25th Street
The Reporter
Mr. Convenor Bannding

February 15, 1938

February 16, 1959

Miss Ruth M. Davis
Assistant Promotion Director
The Reporter
136 East 57th Street
New York 22, New York

Dear Miss Davis:

Many thanks for your letter
of February 11th. We are sending to
Miss Katzander a list of the persons
to whom we will be sending reprints
of the Reporter article so that there
will be no duplication. The only
suggestions I have as to persons to
whom you could send copies are Senators
Kennedy, Symington and Humphrey.

THE REPORTER

April 7, 1959

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

We thought you would like to know that we have had requests for more than 500 reprints of your essay, "The Policymaker and the Intellectual."

Requests have come from various sources -- educators, businessmen, advertising people and other readers.

Interestingly, Mr. Reddington Fiske, editor of Export Trade and Shipper, a trade publication urged his readers to be sure to get a copy of your piece and the results were very nice indeed.

Enclosed is a copy of the item he ran.

SK:sm
enc.

The Brookings Institution

722 JACKSON PLACE, N.W.

Washington & D. C.

ROBERT D. CALKINS
President

ROBERT W. HARTLEY
Vice President

CONFERENCE PROGRAM ON
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

JAMES M. MITCHELL
Director

CARL F. STOVER
Associate Director

July 1, 1959

Mr. Douglass Cater
Washington Editor
The Reporter Magazine
1107 National Press Building
Washington 4, D. C.

Dear Mr. Cater:

The Brookings Institution is conducting a series of Conferences for executives in the Federal Service, designed to contribute to their continuing education. In connection with this Conference Program, pertinent reading materials are distributed to the seminar participants.

We would appreciate receiving your permission to reproduce for limited seminar distribution *The Policymaker and the Intellectual* by Henry A. Kissinger, which appeared in the March 5, 1959 issue of the *Reporter*.

The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization devoted to research, education, and publication in economics, government, and the other social sciences.

I look forward to hearing from you about this request.

THE REPORTER

THE MAGAZINE OF FACTS AND IDEAS

660 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

May 3, 1960

Dear Henry:

I am writing to tell you some unexpected news: I am going to leave The Reporter at the end of this month. For the time being, it is confidential. Reason: incompatibility. I do not know what I shall do next. I'd like to spend my energies on serious writing and teaching but, unfortunately, I do not possess a doctorate and that seems to be a bar in most, if not all, schools. In the course of the next few weeks or months, you may hear of something that needs to be done and that would make me both useful and tranquil. The current issue of The Reporter has an article on Cuba by me; though it is not all that I would like it to be--hence the "incompatibility"-- it nevertheless may interest you because I think it says some things that have not appeared in our press. My book, _American Communism and Soviet Russia_, appears May 16; I am asking the publisher to send you a copy. If you think it helpful for me to come to Cambridge, I could do so next week or so. Please forgive me for this intrusion; in any case, it will be good to see you again.

P.S. My home address is

285 Riverside Drive, N.Y. 25

With best wishes
Theodore Draper

November 10, 1960

Miss Susan Michelson
The Reporter
660 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Miss Michelson:

This is just to let you know that
I have not been able to think of anyone to
whom the Reporter might send advance copies.
We will take care of sending reprints of the
article from my office here.

5504 S. Woodlawn Ave.
Chicago 37, Illinois

November 25, 1960

The Reporter
660 Madison Avenue
New York 21, N.Y.

To the editor:

Henry Kissinger in his article "The New Cult of Neutralism" (Reproter, November 24) finds it convenient to overlook the real sources of our difficulties in wooing the nations of Africa. His insistence that Kruschev won the neutrals with his tough talk in the U.N. is even more ludicrous than the claims of the press that the reverse is true. The simple fact is that the U.S. is working to defeat independence and unity in the Congo and Algeria because of our N.A.T.O. ties to Belgium and France.

Under the guise of preserving order the U.S. position is that the split in the Congo should be maintained so that mineral rich Katanga province can remain in the hands of a puppet government under Belgian control. At the same time, weapons of U.S. manufacture given to France through N.A.T.O. are being used to suppress the Algerians. When Kruschev addresses himself to these matters he will have the support of the African people no matter what his tone of voice.

321 Porter Street
Easton, Pennsylvania

Editor
The Reporter
660 Madison Avenue
New York 21, N. Y.

TO THE EDITORS: I was taken aback upon reading Henry Kiasinger's "The New Cult of Neutralism" in the November 26th Reporting. I don't know when I have read an article on international affairs showing so little appreciation of the issues. How can one discuss American relations with the new nations without mentioning colonialism? How can one discuss American relations with African nations without mentioning racial discrimination? These are the issues on which "neutralists" are fully committed. Instead of saying the "neutralists" support the Communist bloc, let's be honest - the Communist bloc supports their stand against colonialism and racial discrimination. How, finally, could Kiasinger discuss America's role in the Congo situation without once referring to Belgium, to Belgian-American ties, or to other such factors that enter into our policy in Africa, our support of Portugal for a seat on the Security Council, for example?

Alvin V. Wolfe

Easton, Pennsylvania

THE REPORTER

660 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.
Templeton 2-8800

November 28, 1962

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

Here's the carbon copy of Garthoff's review of the
Sokolovsky book. A very sad performance indeed, but one which
I like to think can be salvaged by a pretty complete rewrite
after specific guidance at this end.

Also attached is the Deutscher piece I mentioned to
you. I wonder if you or any of your chaps has read the Red
Star article which Deutscher is quoting from. Anyhow, I would
appreciate your reactions as soon as possible, since I would
like to get back to Garthoff next week. To save time why
don't you phone me your comments.

Incidentally, Garthoff has not yet got clearance on
the piece but doesn't anticipate any difficulty--and why should
he, given the quite innocuous and rather empty character of the
article.

I was delighted to hear that you will be able to
produce the Wohlstetter review in short order after you get a
new copy, and I have already put that request in the works.

PH:EL
Enclosures 2

December 20, 1962

Mr. Philip Horton
THE REPORTER
660 Madison Avenue
New York 21, N. Y.

Dear Phil:

I have read the Garthoff piece which is more coherent now and more
meaty, but still requires work. I think that the first five pages
dealing with theoretical Soviet military thought are very confusing as
they now stand; the lay reader simply will not know what Garthoff is
talking about. It seems to me he could explain a little more of Stalin's
theory. Also, I think he fails to do justice to Stalin. It is true that
he developed a very conservative military theory, but the traditional
means were the only ones available to the Soviets at the time. That he
understood at least something about modern technology is proved by Stalin's
energetic pushing of nuclear development as well as of jet planes.

Then again, the period between 1953 and 1959 does not emerge very
clearly. Since the background is not clear, the contemporary debate is
vague also.

I am returning the manuscript, on which I have made some marginalia.
On page one, for example, the references to the "misinformed and misin-
forming" newspaper articles is to obscure. There are many problems of
transition, and you will find the margins filled with the phrase, "Ex-
plain," which is due to Garthoff's very undisciplined style.

["Henry V. Kleinfelter", "Sincerely yours,", "blain¹, which is due to Gartrott's very undisciplined style.\ntransition¹, and you will find the margins filled with the burles¹, \"Ex-\ntorting\" newspaper articles to the tune of.\nOn page one¹, for example¹, the references to the \"misinformed and mis-\ninforming\" newspaper articles is to one example¹. There are many problems of\nOn page one¹, for example¹, the references to the \"misinformed and mis-\ninforming\" newspaper articles is to one example

-4-

of the 1960 program of reductions, after about one-half of the scheduled cuts had been made. The mid-1961 reversal of course on military reduction, and resumption of nuclear testing, were clearly favored by the military, though they were decided upon by the political leaders primarily as a politico-military demonstration.

It is clear from published Soviet military writings, including this book, that in the period after Khrushchev's 1960 military policy statement there followed a new and more penetrating reconsideration of the nature of modern war than had the revisions of 1953 to 1957. This debate, spurred by the initiative of the political leadership, gave encouragement to military men who may have believed that more drastic changes in doctrine, strategy and force structure were called for in the missile age. Even so, there was apparently no widespread inclination among Soviet military men to favor a strategic concept and military policy relying on "more rubble for the ruble."

The result of the recent intensive review has been a compromise of a more radical "modern" school with the conservative or "traditional" one. The "Khrushchev doctrine" with its stress on deterrence has been modified since 1960 to meet somewhat more fully requirements seen by the military for waging nuclear war should one occur. These requirements

- 9 -

The recent Soviet attempt to redress partially their strategic inferiority by emplacing medium range missiles in Cuba raises an important question concerning future Soviet policy. Having failed in Cuba, which offered a unique apparent opportunity, will the Soviets turn their energies elsewhere—for example to economic development—or will they redouble their efforts to improve their military position. This book, while certainly not answering that question, does suggest that Soviet military thinkers are well aware of the shortcomings of their present posture. Western alleged hostile designs are recounted, with "constant combat readiness" for a retaliatory or preemptive Soviet blow as the response to any Western attempt at attack. Nonetheless, this writer is led to the conclusion that while the Soviets will continue vigorous efforts to improve their military position, their attention will remain focused chiefly on the political conflict manifested in the many now familiar forms of struggle in the "peaceful coexistence" of the cold war.

Raymond L. Garthoff

JUNGE UNION DEUTSCHLANDS
BUNDESSEKRETARIAT

An

" The Reporter "

17 Lexington Avenue

<u>New York - City</u>

U.S.A.

BONN. den
Nassstraße 1
Telefon 520 23
81915

6. Februar 1963

Ha./Sch.

FEB 18 1963

Request permission to reprint Kissinger's
"The Skybolt Affair" from Jan. 17, 1963,
"The Reporter's Notes," in March issue
of <u>Die Entscheidung</u>, monthly review for
young Christian Democrats.

L.C.

Sehr geehrte Herren!

Herr Professor Henry A. Kissinger hat in Ihrer Zeitschrift einen Beitrag zu dem Thema "Die NATO und das Polaris-Abkommen " veröffentlicht. Wir hätten diesen Artikel gerne in der Monatszeit- schrift der Jungen Union Deutschlands, CDU/CSU, DIE ENTSCHEIDUNG, zur Diskussion gestellt. Die Zeitschrift wird in erster Linie von unseren Mitgliedern gelesen und erscheint in einer Auflage von ca. 13.000 Exemplaren.

Wir wären Ihnen sehr dankbar, wenn Sie uns bald mitteilen würden, ob Sie uns die Abdruckgenehmigung erteilen können. Der Artikel soll in der Märzausgabe unserer Zeitschrift, unter dem Titel "Die Platt - form" erscheinen.

Mit bestem Dank für Ihre Mühe
und freundlichen Grüßen

Vorlage
nach Vorschrift

April 9, 1963

Telephone call to Mr. Bingham THE REPORTER

Relayed letters written to HK about article from

Arleigh Burke
Lucius Clay

Perhaps they would like to publish them in letters
to the Editor. Too many negative replies. Must have
more positive ones. Will check with individuals
concerned.

JOSEPH M. KIRCHHEIMER

60 BROAD STREET
NEW YORK 4, N.Y.

May 24, 1963

The Editor
Reporter Magazine
660 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Gentlemen:

According to both Henry Kissinger and Eugene Rostow in recent issues of the "Reporter", the principal basis for our nuclear problems within NATO is the rise of a "strong and self confident Europe", or as Mr. Rostow states: "What President de Gaulle was saying, in effect, last January was that so long as we [The USA] claim such freedom of action for ourselves [as in Cuba in 1962] the strong Europe of the 1960's must insist on the same privilege."

Both authors, I suspect, are confusing prosperity with strength, which is a divisible and even an ephemeral thing. Thus, while it is clear that Western Europe is prosperous and may become more so -- Italian gross product, for example, has been rising at over a 7% annual rate over the past three years -- it is in the military area that Western Europe's strength is a dubious quantity.

Measuring military strength belabours the obvious, for it essentially involves numbers: of divisions - of aircraft - of missiles, etc., or simply firepower. It also includes the monies appropriated for defense expenditures. On each of these counts Western Europe,

[1c]

JOSEPH M. KIRCHHEIMER
80 BROAD STREET
NEW YORK 4, N.Y.

-2-

particularly Great Britain, France and West Germany, do not evidence great strength. Perhaps Europe by itself on the Central Sector could mobilize 15-20 divisions in an emergency (see New York Times, May 9, 1963). This present capability, when coupled with the defense budgets for all three of $12-14 billion, which, incidentally, is less than we spend for nuclear weapons alone (New York Times, June 17, 1962 reporting Mr. McNamara's speech at Ann Arbor), should give us little confidence in Western Europe's ability to handle anything alone but a very low-powered threat. Of course, this assumes a degree of political consensus in Europe which does not seem to exist at this time.

Politically, Europe's strength is ambiguous at best, and verging on the unstable with a changing scene in Germany; the probability of an election and a new government in Britain; the possibility of violence in France; and a further move to the left in Italy. Should Italy really be considered a strong prospective member of a self-confident (and more self-contained) Europe solely due to its economic growth rate? Will the Europeans be prepared to follow General de Gaulle's leadership? If not, what political mechanism will be found around which Europe can coalesce? And what about the people on the flanks? Are they to be left to their own devices?

Nurturing the myth of European strength is neither in the best interests of the Alliance nor of Europe. Some day Europe may be willing to provide military power commensurate with its economic power but that day is not here. A sizeable U.S. commitment on the ground in Europe, coupled with an awesome nuclear force,

THE REPORTER

660 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.
212 TEMpleton 2-8800
Cable Address:
ASCOREP NEWYORK

July 2, 1963

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

I trust you got the package of stuff I sent over to
22 West 55th Street this morning. This follow-up is simply to
ask if I could have your comments and suggestions on the Baldwin
manuscript by Tuesday of next week. Baldwin will be leaving
town after next week, and I want to have a fairly detailed brief-
ing session with him before he leaves about the revision I am
asking for. I told him yesterday on the phone that the piece
was not acceptable in this first version, and I suspect he was
rather relieved to know he would have time to rewrite it. I
don't know how pleased he will be when he learns just how much
revision is expected. To my mind, it needs complete rewriting
with a good deal of new material and certainly new thinking.

To save time and trouble at your end, why don't you
give me your comments on the phone--say Tuesday morning if
that is convenient for you.

Incidentally, don't waste any time on the Sterling
galleys. Not having received the set of galleys I sent him
to his little hideaway in Alto Adige, Max latched on to Claire's
original manuscript and decided to do his own job of editing
from over there. So the version that will appear in print will
include a good many of the passages I had cut and will look
rather different around the fringes, so to speak. That's usu-
ally the kind of thing that happens when Max finds himself in
a spot where there is no lively company.

PH:EL

5 July 1963

Dear Phil:

Thanks for your letter. In the meantime, I have read the Baldwin
manuscript and I share your general feelings. My comments would fall
into two categories, the first having to do with the tightening of
existing material, the second with the need to supply some supplementary
material.

With respect to the existing material, I have made some marginal
notes. I would call them unreadable except that some of your
secretaries seem to be able to read Max's handwriting. If there is any
trouble why don't they call me.

As a general proposition I would say that this is really a piece
for insiders; it will not be very clear to people who do not know too
much about our intelligence community. For example, the relationship
between CIA, DIA, NASA, the Board of Intelligence Estimates and the US
Intelligence Board is never made clear. I think Baldwin should be asked
to give a brief description of the functions assigned to each, their
relationship to each other, if any, and so forth. Also, Baldwin ought
to indicate a little more clearly the precise nature of the changes
that have taken place in the last two years and why they raise certain
questions in his mind about the effectiveness of our intelligence
operation. Also, there seems to me some inconsistency between the
statement that McCone is a strong individual not subject to New Frontier
influences and the account of the Cuban episode last October.

After this description of the organizational aspect of US intelligence,
I think Baldwin should deal more explicitly than he has with the recip-
rocral influence that policy makers and intelligence have on each other.
For example, it is often said that intelligence only presents alternatives
and does not made policy recommendations. On the other hand, most
policy decisions depend precisely on a conception of alternatives. Thus
the intelligence community, in the guise of reporting facts, can really
push its own views, perhaps more effectively than departments responsible
for "opinion". Conversely, the intelligence community cannot help but be
influenced by the known preferences of the people to whom they are
reporting. It is human nature - and certainly empirically true in our
government - to flatter the known views of the Chief Executive. For
example, over two months prior to the Cuban crisis last year it was known

example, over two months prior to the Cuban crisis last year it was known
government - to flatter the known views of the Chief Executive. For
reporting. It is human nature - and certainly empricially true in our
influenced by the known preferences of the people to whom they are
for "opinion". Conversely, the intelligence community cannot help but be
bundled into own views, hence more effectively than departments reasonable
the intelligence community, in the sense of reporting facts, can really
policy declare a demand precisely on a conception of alternatives. Thus
and does not make policy recommendations. On the other hand, most
for example, it is often said that intelligence only presents alternatives
rocal influence that policy makers and intelligence have on each other.
I think Baldwin should deal more explicitly than he has with the recib-
After this description of the organizational aspect of U2 intelligence,

Viao¹ there seems to me some inconsistency between the
operations in his mind about the effectiveness of our intelligence
that have taken place in the last two years and why they raise certain
to indicate a little more clearly the precise nature of the changes
relationship to each other, it says, and so forth. Viao² Baldwin ought
to give a brief description of the functions assigned to each, their
to Intelligence Board is never made clear. I think Baldwin should be asked
between CIV¹, DIV¹, IVS², the Board of Intelligence Estimates and the U2
much about our intelligence community. For example³ the relationship
for insiders; it will not be very clear to people who do not know too
as a general proposition I would say that this is really a piece
trouble why don't they call me.

secretaries seem to be able to read Max's handwriting. If there is any
notes. I would call them unreadable except that some of your
with respect to the existing material, I have made some marginal

material.

existing material, the second with the need to subify some supplementary
into two categories, the first having to do with the tightening of
manuscript and I share your general feelings. My comments would fall
Thanks for your letter. In the meantime, I have read the Baldwin

Dear Bill:

2 July 1963

that there was a heavy deployment of Soviet anti-aircraft missiles at one end of the island. These missiles were deployed in a way that suggested that the whole area was to be protected and not simply possible landing beaches. As far as I know, nobody asked the questions of why the Soviet Union would be sending its most advanced anti-aircraft missiles (which incidentally no European satellite has) and why they would then deploy them at only one end of the island, which had, at that time, no significant military installations. One reason was that the President had made the distinction between offensive and defensive missiles and much of our intelligence effort was directed to determining whether a given weapon was offensive or defensive and not what other purposes they might serve.

A similar analysis could be made of the Yemen episode, where, moreover, we seem to have gone completely counter to the British assessment based on perhaps more experience with that area than we have. Some of this material is in the piece but I think could be made much more explicit.

Innumerable examples of this reciprocal relationship could be cited from service intelligence estimates and since Baldwin has excellent sources in the Pentagon I believe it should be up to him to find the examples. In defense of the administration it might be said that while the DIA presents many of the problems mentioned by Baldwin, the previous system of service intelligence collection had its drawbacks too. For example, the estimates of Soviet missile and bomber strength varied widely from service to service and usually agreed precisely with the service's known strategic preference. It was difficult to avoid the conclusion that the service policies guided the intelligence estimates rather than the other way around.

One comment about the Sterling piece. I do not believe that the dates for the Israeli and Arab rocket programs are conclusive. If the Israelis fired a weather rocket in 1961 they must have started their program well before 1960. I think also you should check the cost for fighter planes purchased abroad.

As for the Smith interviews, I think they are fascinating and, to my knowledge, essentially correct. I would recommend that he have another go at Admiral Burke, who knows a great deal.

With warm regards,

Mr. Philip Horton
Executive Editor
The Reporter
660 Madison Avenue
New York 21, New York

New York 51, New York

cc: Madison Avenue

The Reporter

Executive Editor
Mr. Philip Horsfield

Henry V. Krasinger.

Sincerely yours,

With warm regards,

another go at Admiral Burke, who knows a great deal. My knowledge, essentially correct. I would recommend that he have a

Vs for the Smith interviews. I think they are fascinating and, to

fitter planes purchased abroad. Program well before 1960. I think also you should check the coat for tarsellae fired a weather rocket in 1961 they must have started their dates for the laser and Arap rocket program are conclusive. If the

One comment about the aeroing piece. I do not believe that the

Conciliation that the service policies guided the intelligence estimates service's known strategic preference. It was difficult to avoid the widely from service to service and usually agreed precisely with the example, the estimates of Soviet missile and powder strength varied system of service intelligence collection had its drawbacks too. For the DIV breates many of the problems mentioned by Baldwin, the breviation examples. In defense of the administration it might be said that while sources in the Pentagon I believe it should be up to him to find the cited from service intelligence estimates and since Baldwin has excellent

explicit.

this material is in the piece but I think could be made much more
based on perhaps more experience with that area than we have. Some of
over, we seem to have gone completely counter to the British statement
A similar analysis could be made of the Yemen episode, where, more-

might serve.

Given weapon was offensive or defensive and not what other purchases they
much of our intelligence effort was directed to determining whether a
had made the distinction between offensive and defensive missiles and
significant military installations. One reason was that the President
deploy them at only one end of the island, which had, at that time, no
(which incidentally no European satellite has) and why they would then
the Soviet Union would be sending its most advanced anti-aircraft missiles
landing beaches. As far as I know, nobody asked the questions of why
argued that the whole area was to be protected and not simply bostacle
one end of the island. These missiles were deployed in a way that
that there was a heavy deployment of Soviet anti-aircraft missiles at

- 5 -

THE REPORTER

660 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.
212 TEMPLETON 2-8800
Cable Address:
ASCOREP NEWYORK

July 8, 1963

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

Many thanks for your very prompt and helpful comments on the Baldwin. All of them made a great deal of sense and will provide very useful ammunition for my session with Hanson later this week. I particularly liked your reminder of just why there was such obsessive concern on the part of the intelligence community with the distinction between offensive and defensive missiles last summer and fall.

We continue to find all sorts of dreadful errors in Claire's otherwise excellent piece--including a 50 per cent error in the bomb load of Nasser's Ilyushins. But I think we caught most of them before we locked the piece up on Wednesday night. I too was suspicious of the cost of the fighter planes purchases abroad and asked for checking, but I am not sure we were able to pin that one down.

Glad you liked the Smith interviews. I have already talked to young Smith about having another go at Burke, and he too thinks it might prove worthwhile. I hardly dare speculate whether anything printable will come of this project, but I hope we can talk about it in more detail during your visit to New York next week. Incidentally, since I rather hope to get to Washington for a couple of days next week, I do hope you will let me know in advance what day you are likely to be here in town. Did we make a firm luncheon date for Wednesday or was it only tentative?

PH:EL

THE REPORTER

July 18, 1963

Dear Henry:

Here's something I hope you will be able to give me
a reading on by next week. We are so shorthanded during this
summer period, and I am so swamped with other article projects
for the next issue that I know I shan't get to it. Yet the
subject matter is certainly important and Max seems to have
some kind of special interest in the writer. He apparently
had a talk with him not too long ago and gave him some encour-
agement.

There is a further reason for my wanting you to read
it. I feel this mid-summer issue should certainly carry some-
thing on the Sino-Soviet split whether as an article, a Note,
or for that matter, even an editorial. We can hardly ignore
it. I have been holding back from making any assignment until
the conclusion of the current talks in Moscow. Furthermore,
though I have managed to get useable contributions from both
Brzezinski and Zagoria in the past, I am not too keen on their
writing--and anyhow I believe both of them are now out of the
country. Is it likely that you or any of your colleagues in
the Harvard-MIT complex would have any brief comment to make?
Max would certainly be very happy to think you might have some-
thing in this coming issue, and so would I. Hence you can look
on the Petrov manuscript as a form of artificial respiration
in that direction.

I am also for much the same reason enclosing a mani-
fold of an article by Ted Draper on Khrushchev and Castro, which
we will be running in the coming issue. I told Ted I liked
everything but the last two or three pages where it starts com-
ing apart at the seams, but he has agreed to fix this. Since
I proposed it to Max as a possible candidate for the front-of-
the-book, it could well do with a short companion piece on the

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

-2-

July 18, 1963

Sino-Soviet bloc.

Max and I had a good talk on the phone yesterday (he was in Milan en route to Elba). In raising the possibility of squeezing some copy out of you for this issue, Max asked if he would be able to reach you by phone at home on Sunday afternoon, the twenty-eighth. He will then be in Rome and could probably get a good connection. Do let me know the answer to this so I can send him a cable one way or another.

Unless I hear otherwise, I will look forward to seeing you here in the office next Wednesday. Incidentally, Jean Smith continues to plug away at his research on the Bay of Pigs. He will be going down to Washington again in the near future, and for what good it may do, I am lining him up for a session with Allen Dulles. Do you have any suggestions for other men he should see more or less on the same basis as his interviews with Bissell and Burke? We can talk about this when you come down Wednesday.

PH:EL
Enclosures

THE REPORTER

660 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.
212 TEmpleton 2-8800
Cable Address:
ASCOREP NEWYORK

July 24, 1963

Mr. Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

Here is a manifold of the revision of the Baldwin. On the basis of a quick reading, I found it considerably improved though it is still no great shakes and, of course, too long for what it has to say. Though he took care of most of the points I made to him in my last briefing, he still has not come up with any new materials to illustrate the influence of intelligence estimates on policy formation. Anyhow, I plan to run it in this issue unless, of course, it gets crowded out by more important, late arriving stuff next week. For that reason, I hope you will give it a quick run through before taking off for New México, and let me have your comments by phone, if that is more convenient, say by Friday.

Incidentally, I guess I have solved my most urgent problem--namely, to get some kind of article bearing on the Sino-Soviet break. By dint of a phone call to Lima, Peru, I managed to persuade my old friend John Patten Davies to come up with something. It will be primarily historical in that it deals with Stalin's handling of Communist China against the earlier backdrop of imperial Sino-Russian rivalries. I suspect that in many ways such a treatment will have more freshness--and make a good deal more sense--than some of the stuff I have been reading by the Rand type analysts.

Sorry you weren't able to get to town this week. I will let Max know you won't be available by phone over the weekend.

PH:EL

Enclosure

July 26, 1963

Mr. Philip Horton
THE REPORTER
660 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Phil:

I am returning the Petrov manuscript. Let me summarize
what I have already told you on the telephone.

I believe that the manuscript, to be useful at all,
should deal with the following theme. Even if there is a rift
in the Communist world the hostility towards the non-Communist
world of both Communist countries may produce a policy which
amounts to coordination whatever the ideological differences.
From this, one could deduce that the West could do little to
influence the split. Also, that it cannot really play the
two sides off one against the other.

At the same time, I believe that there are a number of
factual errors that ought to be looked at. For example, the
paragraph next to which I put a question mark on page 16 is
surely wrong.

Also, it seems to me that an article like this should
make some reference to exchange of notes between the Soviet
Union and Communist China, if only to explain that they do not
mean what they seem to imply. As it stands, one would not
really know that there <u>has</u> been a split whatever its significance.

Kind regards.

THE REPORTER

660 Madison Avenue

Templeton 2-8800

New York 21, N. Y.

MEMO

30 Aug 63

Dear Dr Kissinger:

The enclosed will be my last magazine report, as I am leaving
the Reporter this week to attend Northwestern Law School later this
month. However, as Max and the staff have made clear, I'm not to
get off too easily: not out of habit but rather because of what
keeps the group together. I'm planning to keep in touch with what is,
is a big way, home base for me. I hope that you've found the
reports as useful as others have, and that should you get around
to helping enlighten the mid-west I should be able to see you
again.

Yours,

Bruce Cutler

2

[L.C]

how comparatively weak they are. All this leads into the judgement and desire to cut back on military commitments and spending abroad as well as on the foreign aid program in order to solve the balance of payments problem, to step up capital investment at home to goose the economy, concentrate on domestic issues such as the negro problem (investment in education), etc.

If this is not isolationist thinking in itself it plays into the hands of the isolationists. The trick is to cut back without overdoing it, to make withdrawals without starting a run on the bank.

To sum up, the basic attitude seems to be this: now that we have won the cold war or rather, now that Russia has lost it, we should adopt an attitude of compassion toward our Russian enemies and assist them in backing away from their untenable positions. At least lip service is paid to the self-understood necessity for maintaining a firm stand on all matters of principle. Both Clay and the Washingtonians emphasized that the present crucial area for a military and economic build-up abroad is India (see attached notes).

Both Clay and the Washingtonians approved of the proposal of Egon Bahr (the Press Chief and spokesman of Willy Brandt) that the Leopold Office (the trusteeship of West Germany for interzonal trade) be expanded and upgraded to the level of a ministry so as to be able to negotiate—in some form or other—with the East German Ministry of the Interior. Clay has consistently—if only privately—advocated this sort of contact between East and West Germany. In our last talk he said he did not see why there should not be direct negotiations between Brandt and Ebert, the mayor of East Berlin. Clay has been equally consistent in his disapproval of the dominance of the three Western Commandants in West Berlin affairs—he holds that the Commandants should remain in the background as much as possible and be called upon to arbitrate only the most crucial issues. An example of this is the recent decision by the Commandants not to allow Austrian Air Lines to service West Berlin's airports (on the ground that the Four Power Statute limits air access to Berlin to the four signatory nations). The issue arose when Austrian Air Lines entered into negotiations with East German authorities for permission to service East Berlin's Schoenefeld airport, and the East Germans opened up another crossing through the wall to enable access from West Berlin to the East Berlin airport. Clay supports the idea of allowing non-signatory nations to fly into both East and West Berlin, on the assumption that this would increase movement between the two parts of Berlin and decrease the isolation of Berlin as a whole from the outside world. This would of course be at the expense of the Four Power Statute, a fact which does not bother Clay. For Clay believes that if access between East and West Berlin (and East and West Germany, for that matter) can be increased this in itself will decrease the desire of East Germans to escape to the West. This is where the Washingtonians and Clay part company. My Washington sources agree with me that any substantive relaxation of the restraints on movement from East to West Germany would almost inevitably result in mass escape attempts. It seems to me that Clay's belief on this score flies in the face of sixteen years of uninterrupted refugee flow incalculably aggravated by two years of the wall. But after this departure my friends in Washington rejoin company with Clay in the general belief that increased contact—political, economic and cultural—between East and West Germany is the only way out of the dilemma. In short, the de facto recognition of East Germany is very much in the cards.

Clay with the Ministry of Trade.

Clay stated flatly that China cannot mount and maintain any substantial offensive without Soviet support. The Chinese economy itself is incapable of supporting sustained, massive military action involving modern weapon systems. The Chinese action in Korea was made possible only because massive military and economic support was given by the Soviet Union.

The Washington experts agreed wholeheartedly with this and went on from there. Given China's weakness in economic power and modern weapons systems, given the fact that China's rail networks are concentrated in the North, the experts expect China to begin harassing the Soviet Union by sporadic incursions across the five thousand mile long land border into Siberia. A number of reports have been received—a few have been made public—concerning the strengthening of Soviet garrisons along the Soviet-China land border (the withdrawal of the bulk of Soviet troops from Hungary and East Germany would help to reinforce the line facing China but would not make all that much difference). The prognosis is that China and Soviet Union will break off diplomatic relations before the end of the year. By much the same token a renewed Chinese offensive against India is discounted, particularly since transport lines and communications facilities are comparatively lacking in the Chinese build-up area facing India.