THE NATURE OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY

Memorandum to the Subcommittee on the Arms Equation

Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy

by Henry A. Kissinger

In thinking about military superiority, it seems important to distinguish two phenomena: physical superiority either in resources or in technology or in weapons systems, and conceptual superiority either tactical or strategic. I have the impression that the latter is not always fully recognized and yet superiority in doctrine has at least as often been the cause of victory as superiority in resources.

## Tactical Doctrine

Superior tactical doctrine enabled the Germans in 1940 to defeat an Allied army superior in numbers, at least equal in equipment (except perhaps for air-power), but wedded to an outmoded concept of warfare. Superior mobility and use of artillery, a superior relationship between fire and movement which is the essence of tactics, furnished the basis of Napoleon's victories. Similar examples would be the victories of the Roman legions over the Macedonian phalanx, of the English archers against the medieval knights (in part, of course, also a technological breakthrough), of the Prussian army against the Austrian and French in 1866 and 1870. All these were victories, not of superior resources, but of superior doctrine: the ability to break the frame-work which had come to be taken for granted and of making the victory all the more complete for facing the antagonist with contingencies which he had never even considered.

Thus the key to a proper tactical doctrine is the correct understanding of the elements of one's superiority and then to develop the capacity to apply them more rapidly than the opponent either through the choice of an advantageous battlefield or through the superior utilization of existing weapons systems. In the case of the U.S., it is relatively easy to determine the nature of our superiority -- technology, logistics, etc. -- it is much more difficult to devise means to make it effective. One of the most useful tasks of the sub-committee might be to examine the geographical areas where U.S. technological superiority would be at a premium and the weapons system and the methods of employing it which would put the other side at a maximum disadvantage.

## Strategic Doctrine

The dividing line between strategic and tactical doctrine is not easy to draw, of course, but if tactical doctrine is the application of power on the battlefield, strategic doctrine comes to expression in the choice of battlefield and even more importantly in one's conception of alternatives. If one maintains, for example, that any employment of tactical nuclear weapons will automatically lead to all-out thermonuclear war, then in any crisis

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situation we would weigh our risks in terms of the destruction of New York. In such a case, if the Soviet bloc interprets the utilization of nuclear weapons more flexibly, it may gain a crucial advantage. It has, of course, always been true that the side which could best interpret the meaning of new technological developments would obtain a strategic advantage. Thus the ability to use railroads to concentrate superior forces was the reason of Prussia's military successes in the 19th century. But the problem gains a particular urgency in the thermo-nuclear age: since there does not exist any body of precedent to go on, the only guide for action in crisis situations will be the theories we have developed in advance. It, therefore, becomes of crucial importance for the U.S. to understand properly the significance of new scientific developments and not to paralyze itself by developing a calculus of risks according to which all the dangers would seem to be on our side. Thus one of the key problems in the thermo-nuclear age is to shift the risk of initiating a thermo-nuclear war to the other side by means of alternative weapons systems which have the additional advantage of enabling us to conduct a more flexible diplomacy.

The need for alternative weapons systems can be summed up in two postulates which will have to characterize American strategic thinking over the next generation: 1) that any war will be a nuclear war, and 2) that a nuclear war should be attempted to be fought as something less than an all-out war. Wars will be nuclear for a variety of reasons: the whole procurement, planning and training of the defense establishment is based on the use of nuclear weapons to an extent that will be almost impossible to reverse in another year or so; even if it should prove possible to eliminate nuclear weapons from certain military actions, the war would still be a nuclear war because the military maneuvers will have to be carried out as if nuclear weapons might be used. This is true because the side which concentrates its forces might thereby give its opponent the precise incentive he needs to use nuclear weapons and to sweep all before him. But if forces are dispersed, they will not be able to hold a line with conventional weapons.

On the other hand, it is extremely dangerous to assume that the use of any nuclear device anywhere, necessarily leads to all-out war. The most certain way for such a war to come about is for us never to consider alternatives. If we think in terms of the dichotomy -- thermo-nuclear war or no war at all -- we shall paralyze our diplomacy, for Soviet strategy will surely seek to confront us with situations in which the pressures for solutions short of thermo-nuclear war, will be maximized. To be sure, we shall always maintain that we shall not shrink from fighting if our "vital" interests are threatened. But what is considered vital cannot be treated in the abstract; it always reflects a calculus of risks and as the Soviet nuclear capability grows, fewer and fewer objectives will come to seem vital, in the sense that we will be reluctant to risk the destruction of our major population centers for them. And even if this should not prove to be the case, the frightful consequences of a thermo-nuclear war should still cause us to think of it as a last resort rather than as the sole instrument of strategy.

I do not think, however, that the situation with respect to the employment of nuclear weapons is quite as bleak as some of our commentators make it out to be. The calculus of risks by which a limited nuclear war would be expanded into an all-out thermo-nuclear exchange is almost the same as the one by which a limited conventional war is expanded into an all-out war. Not even an all-out war, in terms of geography, need necessarily mean the thermo-nuclear bombardment of cities--at least our strategic doctrine should take into account this possibility.

Walter Lippmann's thesis that nuclear weapons have made recourse to force impossible and that therefore diplomacy remains the sole instrument of policy, can only lead to an over-concern with finesse. Force is an inseparable component of diplomacy, and indeed its ultimate form of pressure. This has nothing to do with "rattling the Atom bomb." The capabilities of a sovereign power are a factor in the calculations of other states: the growth of the Soviet atomic stockpile is a form of blackmail even if no explicit threat to use it is ever made. Conversely, the diversification of our capabilities would circumscribe the Soviet field of action. The problems of present day strategy can, therefore, be summed up in two postulates:

1) Diplomacy which is not related to a military policy and to a plausible possibility of employing force will be sterile;

2) the only plausible employment of nuclear power is in a war of limited objectives for no power possessing a thermo-nuclear capability will accept unconditional surrender without employing it and no nation is likely to risk thermo-nuclear destruction except to the degree that it believes its survival is at stake.

Of course, we must have a thermo-nuclear capability superior to that of any likely opponent. But it should be conceived as the *condition*, not as the *end*, of policy. By itself, the thermo-nuclear capability in its undifferentiated form may make merely for paralysis of diplomacy. But if coupled with a proper strategic doctrine, the thermo-nuclear weapons may restore a measure of flexibility to international relations in

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the following way: As long as the United States possessed a
monopoly of nuclear weapons, the USSR could find safety only
by extending its orbit as far as possible. But now, where either
side should be able to keep itself from unconditional surrender
by the threat of employing thermo-nuclear weapons, adjustments
may be possible, provided three conditions are met:

1) that it is possible to generate pressures other than the threat of thermo-nuclear war;

2) that it is possible to create a climate of opinion in which the major powers do not believe that survival is at stake;

3) that the governing groups in the major powers can keep control of their public opinion, should a disagreement arise over whether national survival is at stake.

Thus a diversification of our military capabilities would add to
our diplomatic opportunities and may supply the beginning of an
answer to the most vexing problem in current international relations:
whether the thermo-nuclear age permits a strategy of limited objec-
tives, whether the common fear of mutual annihilation can supply
the frame-work of self-limitation brought about in the 19th century by
an agreement about the "legitimacy" of the international order.

## Physical Military Superiority

The nature of military superiority is particularly complex
under modern conditions. This is due to two factors: 1) in
the thermo-nuclear period we may no longer be able to count on
a period in which we can mobilize our industry in relative safety
as in World War I or II, and 2) the rate of technological change
is so rapid that weapons in many areas tend to become obsolescent
even before they become operational. Up to World War I, and for a
considerable period thereafter, a weapons system would be good
for a generation at least, but now, it may be out-dated when it
has barely passed the blue-print stage. Yet the failure to plan
on the basis of these "prematurely aged" weapons might create a
vital weakness in our defense structure at any given point of
time. Thus a great premium is placed on "ready forces", on
shortening as much as possible the procurement and design cycle,
and on correct intelligence, for if an enemy should ever catch us
in the wrong procurement or technological cycle, he might have us
at a complete disadvantage.

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The situation is further complicated by the fact that military strength depends not on the effectiveness of any one weapon, but on the relation of various capabilities to each other. The importance of the offense-defense mix can be shown by the following example: If one nation places all its bets on strategic air-power, while the other side develops a very large defensive capability, and only moderate offensive air-power, it may happen that the defensive capability of the offensively weaker power will absorb the total offense of the other side, thus freeing the initially smaller SAC for a mortal blow. It can be argued that at low levels of military expenditure, the Soviets have a great advantage in adjusting their offense-defense mix to surpass ours because, at low levels, a great deal depends on correct intelligence and we can assume that their intelligence is superior to ours. One problem for our sub-committee might then be to discuss the proper relationship between offensive and defensive capabilities in the U.S. military establishment.

Many of our difficulties stem from the planning of our defense establishment and from our security practices. We are gearing our defense planning to a twelve months budgetary cycle and often on the basis of considerations that have little to do with military effectiveness. This tends to throw our procurement and long-range planning out of line, all the more so, as commitments once made are very difficult to reverse. Ways will have to be found by which defense planning and procurement can be carried out over a longer period, perhaps by making a minimum commitment over, say, a five-year period (in Imperial Germany, the minimum military budget was established over a seven-year period). This problem of planning is compounded by our security practices which seem to me to be based on an out-moded concept. In the 19th and early 20th century, when weapons technology was relatively stable, it was very important to guard a military secret jealously because it might supply a decisive advantage, but in the thermo-nuclear period with its rapid rate of technological change, it is more important to go fast than to play safe. Present security practices tend to lead to compartmentalization, to making it difficult for one agency to find out the work of others and to tap the imagination of private industry.

Another serious problem lies in the field of research and development. In his book "The Decline of the West", Spengler said that the West will begin to disintegrate when its best people consider it more important to become monks than to become scientists. Even if our best people are not becoming monks, it is not certain that they are becoming scientists. Indeed, all statistics seem to indicate that the Soviets are outstripping us in training technological personnel. It might be useful to consider in the sub-committee what could be done to remedy this situation which in the long run might prove to be as dangerous as military inferiority. As a matter of fact, it may force us into a condition of permanent military inferiority.

The solution of many of these difficulties depends on the willingness of the U.S. people to support adequate defense programs. History abounds with examples of nations unwilling to make a relatively small effort and having to pay for it by failing to survive. The furrow the Roman commander Scipio plowed over the site of Carthage was the penalty for the unwillingness

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of the Carthaginian merchant class to support a larger defense establishment. Conversely, many nations have played an international role out of proportion to their real power because of their willingness to devote a larger share of their resources to military expenditures than their opponents. This is how Revolutionary France defeated all the other nations of Europe; this is in many respects the source of the power of the USSR. One of the most difficult tasks, then, is how to make clear to the American people the nature of the security problem facing them, to explain adequately that it is a long-range problem and that the penalty of failure may be national catastrophe. It is difficult to convey such a mood to a people which has never experienced disaster and maybe our group could give some thought to the problem of gaining public support for a long-range security effort.

## Miscellaneous Problems

In addition to the above problems some of the following questions may be worth discussing:

1. What type of national defense organization will permit an objective consideration of the levels of military strength and of the weapons system to insure a maximum degree of safety?

2. What level of military superiority is of strategic significance? Of what importance, for example, is a more elegant delivery system as long as both get to the target? Of what advantage is an increment to SAC after both sides have the capability of destroying the major cities of the other?

3. What is a significant technological breakthrough? Specifically, what is the significance of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles to the arms equation? What is the significance of intermediate range missiles? Will the side that achieves them first have a decisive edge or will other forms of retaliation still have to be eliminated?

4. What is the possibility of the use of other non-conventional weapons such as biological, gas, radiological? Are these inherently more or less reprehensible than nuclear weapons which produce lethal effect through explosive forces? They are less destructive of property and perhaps even less destructive of life.

5. Since tactical superiority rests ultimately on trained man-power and organized resources, is it possible to fall behind in this sector to the extent that a crash program cannot regain superiority? In other words, what is an adequate over-all research and development program? Are there weapons developments which might give us a significant advantage such as SEA DARTS to replace the necessity for long runways for heavy air transports, cross-country vehicles not dependent on tracks, etc.?

6. What should be the ratio between ready forces and reserve forces in a period of nuclear parity?

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7. What is the significance of the growing complexity of modern weapons to the assessment of national power? Because of this complexity few nations can maintain a modern weapons system (in 1914 many second-string powers could maintain a complete weapons system and therefore had to be counted in great power reckoning).

8. What is the purpose of alliances when most countries will, for all practical purposes, be "priced out" of the power struggle?

9. What is the significance of different intelligence capabilities in the military equation? -- Not only intelligence concerning weapons, but concerning strategies and tactics?

10. What is the significance of U.S. constitutional arrangements and congressional enactments regarding U.S. freedom to fight and to employ certain weapons?

11. What is the significance of the mobilization base in the military equation:

(a) Is there a need for greater readiness?

(b) Greater flexibility?

(c) A need for military support to our allies who are logistically incapable of supporting their armed forces?

12. What are the possibilities of barrier warfare to prevent land excursions into vital territory in the event atomic weapons are neutralized -- consider mines, rockets, shape-charge projectors, etc.?

13. How can we meet the need for technical experts in the armed forces who require long periods of training and who, in the American system, are hard to retain in the Armed Services after they have been trained?