AFL-CIO FREE TRADE UNION NEWS, May 1966.

ELCJ

# Walter Lippmann—Wrong Then, Wrong Now

One of the sharpest critics of President Johnson's Vietnam policy is the noted American columnist Walter Lippmann. He holds that Washington exaggerates the threat of Communist expansion and especially Peking's aspirations to dominate Southeast Asia. Lippmann's article are widely read in the United States and abroad. His views on international affairs are considered authoritative by many people.

In this connection, it may be interesting to recall Lippmann's evaluation of Hitler's foreign policy as set down in his article of May 19, 1933. History has proved Lippmann utterly wrong on. Nazi Germany. Unfortunately, this lesson has not taught him greater insight into or greater caution regarding the nature, aims and methods of totalitarianism. Thirty years later he repeats his error in underestimating the destructive dynamism and aggressive designs of world Communism.

We republish Lippmann's article of May 19, 1933, as a warning to his followers not to accept blindly his judgment on Vietnam. Otherwise, they will suffer the same shock and dismay his admirers of the Thirties experienced when Nazism revealed its ruthlessness and bellicosity.

By WALTER LIPPMANN

IT was evident from the first impression of Herr Hitler's speech that he had chosen the path opened to him by President Roosevelt, and that the immediate crisis had therefore been surmounted. A close reading of the full English text of the address is even more reassuring. In so far as words can bind the actions of a people the Chancellor went further than any one had dared to hope in offering specific guarantees that he does not wish to disturb the peace. Not only was he definitely reassuring on those very points which are at the root of the European political disorder, but in the manner which he employed to present the German case no fair-minded person can fail to recognize that the bitter truculence of the Nazi propaganda was singularly lacking, and that Herr Hitler remained strictly within the limits of honest indignation at the injustices and humiliation to which Germany had been subjected.

The specific assurances are to be found in his discussion of the problem of the frontiers. Thus, after saying that Versailles had failed to find a solution of the eastern boundaries which "met Poland's understandable claims just the same as Germany's natural rights," the Chancellor stated that "nevertheless no German government will of its own volition break an agreement that cannot be abrogated except by substituting a better one. However, this ac knowledgment of the legal character of such a treaty can only be a general one. Not only the victor has claims to the rights granted therein, but also the vanquished. The right to demand revision of this treaty, however, is founded on the treaty itself. As the motif and measure of its demand, Germany desires nothing but the experiences thus far attained, and the undeniable findings of logical, critical reason." Unless I am greatly mistaken, this is the most definite pledge that has yet been given by any German government that it would pursue its claim for revision within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations. For it is in the Covenant, most particularly in Article XIX, that the right of the "vanquished" to appeal to the "findings of logical, critical reason" is stipulated.

This pledge as to the territorial ambitions of Germany was supplemented by a specific offer which is certainly of the utmost importance. This was in the Chancellor's emphasis on that part of the MacDonald plan, which is also a fundamental requirement of the French plans, that armaments should be subjected to international supervision. What is important here is that he offered, provided other nations took a similar position, to submit not only the German army to international supervision, but all the semi-military and semi-official organizations, such as the Nazi storm troops and the Steel Helmets. That such supervision of all kinds of actual and potential military force is fundamental to any kind of disarmament by treaty has long been evident to those who have worked on the problem. The Chancellor's willingness to submit the whole German military

power to international inspection is, therefore, as definite an evidence of good faith as it was in his power to offer the world.

For the address itself, both as to its substance and its manner, there must be a very high degree of general approval. The difficulty, which will cause the world to be reserved in its judgment, will come from trying to reconcile it with the Nazi propaganda, with Herr Hitler's own speeches in the past, with the recent speeches of some of his own ministers, with the ruthless injustice of the treatment meted out to the German Jews, with the violence of the attack, as symbolized by the burning of the books, upon the spirit of peace and international comity. How does one reconcile this genuinely statesman-like address with official words and official actions that have caused consternation throughout the civilized world?

There will be some who will say that the address is merely a shrewd maneuver and that it must be rejected as insincere. I do not take this view. The truer explanation, I believe, is that we have heard once more, through the fog and the din, the hysteria and the animal passions of a great revolution, the authentic voice of a genuinely civilized people. I am not only willing to believe that, but it seems to me that all historical experience compels one to believe it. The idea that any people is intrinsically outcast has no foundation except in ignorance and cupidity. It was an intolerable idea when it was applied to the German nation and written like the Treaty of Versailles, and it is an intolerable idea when it is applied now by the Germans themselves to an integral part of their own nation. To deny today that Germany can speak as a civilized power, because uncivilized things are being said and done in Germany, is in itself a deep form of intolerance. Like all intolerance it betrays a lack of moral wisdom, in this case the moral wisdom of religious insight into the dual nature of man.

Those who have that wisdom will pass judgment upon the actions of men but never upon their whole natures. Who that has studied history and cares for the truth would judge the French people by what went on during the Terror? Or the British people by what happened in Ireland? Or the American people by the hideous record of lynchings? Or the Catholic Church by the Spanish Inquisition? Or Protestantism by the Ku-Klux-Klan? Or the Jews by their parvenus? Who then shall judge finally the Germans by the frightfulness of war times and of the present revolution? If a people is to be judged solely by its crimes and its sins, all the peoples of this planet are utterly damned. Such judgments can produce only the deepest kind of anarchy. The civilized judgment, on which depends all the possibilities of a decent human life, requires that men, while condemning and resisting evil deeds, should be unfaltering in their faith in and their response to the healing impulses of their fellow men.

So the outer world will do well to accept the evidence of German goodwill and seek by all possible means to meet it and to justify it. Herr Hitler has said that "the generation of this young Germany, which in its life hitherto came to know only the distress, misery and woe of its own people, has suffered too tremendously under the madness of our time to intend to inflict the same upon others." It is the intention of the young Germany which Adolph Hitler leads that has troubled mankind, as the German Chancellor must know from the reports of every honest German diplomat and emissary in the outer world. He will find that the further he can go to prove that it is not the intention of young Germany to inflict upon others the misery and humiliation it has suffered, the greater will be Germany's dignity and power in the council of nations. For the world, and most certainly the American part of it, desires neither that Germany should be morally isolated or politically encircled or economically destroyed, and every interest of the American nation is to prevent that from happening. This is not 1914. As world power is now distributed, Germany can become isolated or encircled only in so far as she rejects the common standards of civilized men and by deliberate injustice or calculated violence cuts herself off from the confidence of mankind.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 1966

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3110, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Jackson, Harris, Kennedy of New York, and Javits.

Also present: Senators Stennis, Symington, Saltonstall, and Kuchel.

Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Cedric W. Tarr, Jr., professional staff member; and Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN

Senator JACKSON. The committee will come to order.

We continue today our public hearings on the Atlantic Alliance in which we are seeking the advice and guidance of experienced statesmen, noted military commanders and outstanding scholars.

Authorized in 1965 and 1966 by Senate resolution, the subcommittee has been reviewing the conduct of national security policy, with special emphasis on the Atlantic Alliance. In February this year we published a study entitled *The Atlantic Alliance: Basic Issues*, which presents the fundamental questions on which the subcommittee is now taking testimony. Our inquiry is nonpartisan and professional. Our hearings have this principal purpose: to help find better ways to use the Atlantic Alliance in the tasks of mutual defense and deterrence, and in creating a situation in which one day a genuine European settlement may be possible.

In recent weeks we have been privileged to receive the expert counsel of Dean Acheson, Christian A. Herter, Gen. Lauris Norstad, Prof. Thomas C. Schelling, and Dr. Malcolm W. Hoag.

Today, we are very fortunate to have as our witness, the Honorable John J. McCloy. Servant of the Nation in the tasks of war and peace, godfather to the Federal Republic of Germany, international banker, lawyer, he has combined distinction in private life with the effective performance of countless public duties placed on him by grateful Presidents.

Mr. McCloy, I have read recently that you are a part of a small but terribly influential conspiratorial group known as the New York Foreign Policy Establishment. It is said that you and your as-

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sociates have exercised undue influence on Presidents Roosevelt, Tru-
man, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, and now President Johnson.

All I can say, Mr. McCloy, is thank God for you, the Elihu Roots,
the Henry Stimsons, the Robert Pattersons, the James Forrestals, the
Robert Lovetts, the Dulleses, not to mention many others from other
cities of this country. The truth is that this Nation can be profoundly
grateful that throughout its history, such distinguished, wise, and dedi-
cated private citizens have answered the call to national duty in war
and in peace.

On behalf of the committee, I want to express to you a warm con-
spiratorial welcome.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, as Mr. McCloy is from New York and is a personal friend of many years standing, may I, as one of the Senators from New York—and I am so pleased my colleague is here today—join the chairman in welcoming our witness and expressing the pride of our State in having such a distinguished son and having such a great servant in the interest of the Nation and of peace in the world.

Senator JACKSON. We are glad you join the conspiracy. Are there
others?

Senator KENNEDY. I also want to join in welcoming you, Mr. McCloy. I also read the fact that you had this influence on various Presidents of the United States and I am here to attest to the fact that you did have that kind of influence on President Kennedy—and he was very pleased that it existed.

In fact you and I conspired together, I think, on various occasions.
I remember what an important part and role you played during the
time of the Cuban missile crisis and you were responsible as much as
anybody else in the final decision of the Russians to withdraw their
IL-28's from Cuba. And you had the major responsibility for the
negotiations that took place at the end of October and through No-
vember 20, 1962.

So I am very pleased to welcome you. I think the country has
been most fortunate in having your services and I as an individual
felt most fortunate in having an opportunity to talk with you.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, Jack McCloy may be a New
York citizen—and a very distinguished citizen in many ways I know
because I have worked with him—but I want the committee and the
people to know that he is a graduate of one of our finest Massachusetts
colleges, Amherst. Amherst honored me at the same time Mr. McCloy
was, I think, celebrating his 25th reunion at the college. It rained cats
and dogs and thundered and yet McCloy could be heard above the
thunder as he always has been since.

Senator JACKSON. I am a little concerned here, Senator Saltonstall.
You have raised some doubt about the qualifications of our witness
for the New York establishment. There was an unrebuttable pre-
sumption that he graduated from Harvard and not Amherst. We had
a good story going here until you raised the issue of another
institution.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Amherst is a fine institution.

Senator JACKSON. We look forward to your testimony, Mr. McCloy.

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STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. McCLOY

Mr. McCLOY. I am quite taken aback by these introductions and these very flattering statements that have been made. I think my influence on all of these Presidents has been grossly exaggerated, but after hearing all of these comments, I think of another man who after hearing himself introduced in somewhat the same way said, "I just can't wait to hear what I have to say."

Mr. Chairman, I am aware that several others, including some whose experience overlapped or exceeded mine in the post-World War II planning, have appeared before you in connection with the serious situation which has developed in connection with NATO and the overall Euro-Atlantic security system of which we are a part. I would wish to avoid occupying the time of this committee with a repetition of matters already dealt with or presented to this committee by other witnesses. Certainly my statement can be briefer than perhaps I could have made it had not the work of this committee in this field advanced as far as it has.

I think the subject we are examining now is extremely important. An examination such as this is almost overdue and it should be taking place.

As one who was engaged in two world wars commenced in Europe and successfully concluded only after massive intervention by the United States in each case, I do have views in regard to the present situation, though those views may be somewhat prejudiced by experience.

I was concerned with the problems of the postwar adjustments even during the course of World War II when my activities in the War Department were related, in part, to the political-military aspects of the war. Later, both in and out of Government, I participated in some of the thinking and planning in the postwar period for the reconstitution of the political, military, and economic strength of Europe. From this perspective I view the recent attack on NATO as a serious threat to the security of this country and the other NATO countries. This is because the attack has taken the form of a determined effort to reverse policies of collective security which to date were so eminently successful in maintaining the peace, as well as in bringing Europe to a position of renewed and sustained economic strength. In some quarters it is claimed that those policies are a product of a condition no longer relevant and that clinging to them is an example of out-of-date thinking. In contrast, the reemergence of an emphasis on national flexibility and national sovereignty is now being put forward as a more advanced form of thinking in the field of international security.

Far from being representative of obsolete or outworn concepts, the policies instituted and implemented after World War II, I believe, constituted a forward-looking departure from old patterns of national alliances and axes which had proven in the past to be so tragically unproductive of peace—indeed to be provocative of war. How it can be reasonably contended that this attempted return to 19th- and 19th-century practices with a renewed struggle for primacy in Europe constitutes an expression of modern or advanced thinking in international affairs completely escapes me. The old system was in-

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adequate in the days of conventional weapons—it is archaic in the context of a nuclear world.

France has sought to find a point of departure between the original treaty of NATO and the subsequent agreements and resolutions which are characterized as "the organization." France seems prepared to accord validity to the original treaty but to give short shrift to the subsequent agreements which gave significance and reality to the commitments of the original treaty. Apart from the questionable legality of according lesser validity to a more recently concluded agreement than to a preceding one, it is important to point out that NATO is only one expression of an entire composite of policy which emerged after World War II in what I believe, was an example of foreign policy in an enlightened, if not a heroic, mold. It was a period of farsighted thought and action. It was the era of the Marshall Plan, the defense of Berlin, the defense of Greece, the reorientation of Germany and Japan, the creation of the Coal and Steel Community, the beginning of the Common Market, of NATO, of Euratom.

It all amounted to a convincing political, economic, and military front behind which the Western European peninsula and the British Isles could recover their strength and preserve the political and individual values for which all the allies had struggled so hard and sacrificed so much to maintain.

And it was made possible by the active participation and help of the United States. It was not designed solely as a military defensive system—it was consciously erected and designed to serve as a base upon which constructive steps toward disarmament and arms control and the preservation of peace in a nuclear world could be achieved with the Communist world.

It discouraged further adventures to extend Communist influence westward and it created a sense of security under which Europe prospered. The United States played a great and influential part in creating this base—without U.S. aid and cooperation it would have been impossible.

Now the effort is being made to destroy a very important element of this complex because France contends, while adhering to a "come hostilities" form of alliance, that her sovereignty is impaired and her flexibility limited by continued membership in NATO and in the forms of collective security which grew out of it.

It is interesting to examine the stated reasons which France gives for this position. First and foremost is the alleged disappearance of the Soviet menace such as first gave rise to NATO. Another reason given is that the United States and the Soviet Union now have reached a nuclear balance; another, that France and the majority of members of NATO are Europeans with no interests outside Europe, whereas the United States, and presumably Great Britain, do have such interests and these interests may prove embarrassing to the majority of NATO nations if they were called upon to respond to an attack on one of the non-European members.

If we take these arguments at face value, they go equally well to the validity of the alliance as to the "organization." One may suspect that the desire is to rid France of the alliance itself if it were feasible to do so, for the distinction between the alliance and the

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closely allied implementation of it, to all of which France once form-
ally subscribed, and indeed insisted upon, is not very persuasive.

It becomes even less convincing with France's introduction of the
term "unprovoked aggression" in connection with the treaty commit-
ment—a significantly different commitment than is contained in either
the NATO Treaty or the Western European Union obligations. This
is bound to introduce an equivocal note in the alliance itself, and I
do not believe it can be ascribed to a mere slip of the pen.

Certainly, conditions are not precisely the same as they were when
NATO was erected, fortunately for all of us, and one may suggest
largely because of the existence of NATO. No one can reasonably
contend that NATO's procedures were perfect. They are capable of
considerable improvement, I am sure, and the substance of NATO
decisions could, in my judgment, be profitably enlarged. One can
perhaps readily agree that for the time being, and perhaps for the
measurable future, the pressures and strains on Western Europe will
be less than they were when Stalin's postwar intentions first became
manifest. The Soviet Union's differences with Red China, the added
assertiveness of some of the satellites, the confrontation over Cuba,
the existence of the Berlin wall, the general well-being of the continent
and some moderation of the flow of polemics, all seem to suggest a
less aggressive and less adventurous attitude on the part of the Soviet
Union in regard to Europe.

But we can well be reminded without being alarmed that Berlin is
still invested, that scores of Russian divisions are still mobilized to the
West, and that Soviet objectives in respect of Western Europe still
persist in the absence of any tangible evidence of their abandonment.
The existence of the Sino-Soviet schism moreover in my judgment
does not point exclusively in the direction of a pacific policy on the part
of the Soviet Union. The latter is in a position, well known in history,
where the leader of a radical movement finds his flank threatened on
the left. A certain dynamism inevitably attaches to the extreme left
and a threat of its defection is very disturbing to the leader. We have
only to recall the example of the French Revolution which bears on
this. Robespierre followed Danton. The Soviet Union is charged by
Red China throughout the world with being soft on imperialism and
weak on classic Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Though there seems to
be no present disposition on the part of Moscow to institute new
adventures in the West and though the Soviet Union is vexed by this
challenge to its leadership, Moscow, it must be recalled, has not yet
made its choice. Until that time comes the Soviet Union may be
inclined to attempt diversions, if only to respond to the criticisms from
Peking and their impact on the rest of the Communist world. The
boldness of the Soviet attempt to implant intermediate range missiles
on the island of Cuba indicated, too recently for comfort, a willingness
on the part of the Soviet Union to take great risks to advance its
dominance in Europe, for it is clear to all who were aware of the facts
that the Cuban episode had a direct and ominous bearing on the Soviet
nuclear threat to Western Europe, a factor, which I believe, was
overlooked in the recent debates in the French Chamber.

Berlin has not lost its essentially vulnerable position—the wall is
still up. One could readily imagine new pressures being applied there.

62-318 O—66—pt. 4—2

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All this would seem to point to the advisability of maintaining a deterrent which has thus far been successful rather than to urge steps which would encourage new threats.

The fact of the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States does not appear to have much relevancy in respect of the validity of NATO. The reasoning is obscure or not clearly stated. Could it not be justly argued that during the period of the American nuclear monopoly there was little need for NATO and that now when a delicate balance of nuclear strength as between the Soviet Union and the United States exists, an effective NATO is all the more necessary? With the Soviet Union armed with nuclear weapons and announcing new developments in nuclear capacity and defense from month to month, it is difficult to see how it can be cogently maintained that there is now less need for collective security.

The final reason given is summed up in the following sentence:

> International crises no longer center in Europe, but in Asia, and the majority of NATO countries is not involved in Asia.

The thought was repeated again the other day in the French Chamber when Mr. Pompidou referred to the Cuban crisis and the fact that during it the American Air Forces were on the alert in France.

Without accepting at face value the rather ambitious Chinese concept of a "rural" (i.e., Asian, African, and South American) attack on the "city" areas (i.e., Europe and the North Atlantic powers) through the activities of national liberation fronts, it would appear that whatever form and from whatever source attacks on Europe may be delivered, a united European or Atlantic policy to meet them would be appropriate. NATO was not formed to protect Berlin alone; it was not alone formed to protect Europe from the Soviet Union. It was designed to build a structure upon which, with the defense of the West secure, a solid, cohesive basis could be laid for long-range discussion and, if possible, settlement of all the major problems affecting the Atlantic world and the preservation of peace.

It has become the essence of the Red Chinese doctrine that Soviet communism failed in Berlin and failed in Greece and it was unable to dominate the Western European peninsula. The Chinese contention is that now the Soviet Union should stand aside and allow new forces and new techniques to bring Europe and the "imperialistic countries" of the West under Communist influence. The target is still the North Atlantic, even though the attacks may not come over the parapets of Berlin. If an explosion comes in Asia, is it not just as important that policies successfully evolved in the North Atlantic Treaty be preserved to cope with such threats as well?

Certainly, it seems shortsighted to argue that the areas in which the explosions are occurring in this foreshortened world are of no interest to Europe and only concern the non-European members of NATO. It is not suggested that NATO and its commitments be extended to include Southeast Asia, but the relation of NATO to Southeast Asia should not be overlooked. The fact that explosions have ceased or have moderated in the NATO area and have erupted elsewhere has certainly been due, in large part, to the convincing aspect of NATO in regard to Europe. The logic which would strike it down because dangers averted in Europe by reason of NATO have arisen in other sections is difficult to follow.

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It is well to go back a little and consider the philosophy on which the NATO structure was created. It embodied two new and very significant elements. Responding to continued criticisms that the United States intervened belatedly in two world wars, we committed our troops in substantial numbers to Europe so that if an attack did occur, we would be immediately involved. This is about as eloquent an earnest of the validity of our commitment as any nation could be expected to give.

Mr. Acheson, I see, referred to Prime Minister Queuille's expression of this criticism of our late arrival, and it is one which has been frequently repeated in Paris, although it is usually expressed in the form of our entry only following an attack on the United States—the *Lusitania* and submarine sinkings in the case of World War I, and Pearl Harbor in the case of World War II.

If the criticism was justified, the fact is that our troops are there and their presence should be an answer to the skepticism regarding our commitments, but the skepticism is repeated at the same time that the demand for the removal of American troops persists.

The other important new element was the concept that this time all the European nations joining NATO would be accepted on an equal partnership basis. We would not insist, as the great powers, or some of them at least, did, after World War I that Germany go through a purgatorial period during which that country could not be treated on an equal basis by the other European powers. This gave rise long before the Hitler period to strain, disquiet, and the refomenting of ill will that led to the disastrous results of which we are all aware.

These two fundamental elements, together with our economic aid and the latent strategic nuclear reserve of the United States, were the buttresses on which a convincing credible overall deterrent was based.

The second element may have even deeper significance than the first. All sensible people applaud the prospects of rapprochement between France and Germany. The world has been disturbed too many times by the lack of it and, despite any intimations to the contrary, it was a cardinal principle of U.S. policy that such a rapprochement be effected.

I remember I was in Germany when Chancellor Adenauer was first elected and he was elected, you may remember, by one vote. He came to me and asked me—since we had been so to speak running the country prior to that time—What do you think should be the major objective of my administration? I remember I told him the most important thing you can do is work out a rapprochement between France and Germany. It can never be said that we have ever tried to interfere with a good relationship between France and Germany.

It was only when the original Franco-German draft of treaty appeared showing provisions which cut across the priority of NATO commitments that objections were voiced by the United States and in the German Bundestag. In the Bundestag a preamble to the French treaty was introduced reaffirming the priority of the NATO commitments. In looking back we should probably have taken warning then of a new and more determined attack on NATO.

We shall again be on very dangerous ground if we isolate Germany or treat her other than as a competent full-fledged partner of the al-

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liance. It would be ominously reminiscent of the past, and, more importantly, it would be morally and politically wrong if we did so.

There are other fallacies and contradictions in the French position which remain puzzling. In the first place, there is the inherent contradiction in seeking to hold to the advantages of the alliance and refusing to conform to what all the members once agreed upon—and 14 still do—as practical and sensible obligations designed to give reality to the commitments and to the security objectives of the alliance.

I have referred to another contradiction, namely, the criticism of earlier failures of the United States to intervene promptly on Europe's behalf, and the generally advertised skepticism regarding American commitments while at the same time the demand is made that American troops leave France. There are other arguments and statements of fact, a number of which were adduced in the recent debates on the censure motion in the Chamber of Deputies, which are distorted and easily refuted, but it is, after all, fruitless certainly at this place and time to dwell upon them. The General has made up his mind and he speaks for France. The word has been passed and further argumentation or discussion, as the General has said, is no longer welcome or appropriate. The manner in which the peremptory démarche was made, so untypical of the usual pattern of French diplomatic exchange and strict regard for written commitments, also emphasizes the radical alteration in the position of France in the European security system with which we are faced. There is nothing to be gained in this by indulging in personalities or in speculation as to whether things would be different if Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, let us say, had acted more considerably toward General de Gaulle during the war period. This is not a matter of personal pique—it is a deliberately thought-out policy now approved by the French Legislature, and I am not one who believes it will be soon reversed.

What we have to do is to face the situation and, in the light of it, examine the risks and choose a line of conduct that best protects our security and that of our allies. Two things, I believe, have become clear. France believes, or at least the present French Government believes, that the concepts of collective security which Robert Schuman and earlier Frenchmen espoused no longer fit the aspirations and independence of action now desired by France. They suggest an undesired dilution of French influence on the Continent, particularly if the United States continues to play an important and integrated role in European defense.

It has also become clear that insofar as France's own commitments are concerned, a new note of uncertainty has been introduced. France can be depended upon now only in the case of "unprovoked aggression"—the provocation or lack of it, presumably, to be determined unilaterally. It certainly would be awkward to have allied troops integrated under NATO principles flanked by French troops uncommitted and on an equivocal basis and status.

With one foot in NATO, and one foot out, France goes to the Soviet Union, whose primary objective over the years, as everyone knows, has been the destruction of NATO and the removal of U.S. troops from European soil with something in common. A further objective coinciding with Soviet purposes is a continued discriminatory attitude toward Germany. Kept from any form of sharing nuclear potentials

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and denied an equal place at the table because of the claim that Germany is still not a sovereignty in the same sense as France, we have the seeds of ill will, reminiscent of the discriminatory provisions of Versailles. This attitude to me is like a firebell in the night—an attitude which we can only hope will be offset by a high order of statesmanship on the part of all other NATO members.

These attitudes, however, are all within the prerogative of France to adopt. One can understand and sympathize with the aspirations of a great country with great traditions, such as France, to wish to be free of any dependence on outsiders, and perhaps particularly upon the United States, whose power and role in the formation of European policy since the war has been so substantial. France has great contributions to render the cause of peace, some which no other nation can match—her geographic position, her history, her culture, her presently strong economic position—but the fact is that no nation in this day and age is in a position to be entirely “flexible” or independent of others. Even the United States cannot be and the reintroduction of nationalistic approaches into Europe is a real threat to the preservation of peace today. Nationalism breeds nationalism, and if we do not watch our step we shall find Europe again engaged in a struggle for national dominance with cross alliances reminiscent of 1913. Perhaps the chief concern which the French action has induced is the reinfection of Europe with nationalism.

The problems facing Europe and the world, such as the settlement of the East-West problem, the reduction of armaments and the relationships with the non-European world, require more than nationalistic approaches. They can be solved, and I think we were on the right track toward their settlement in setting up this collective system after the war which has thus far proven so successful. France could, I believe, make a much greater contribution toward settling them within this collective system than she can out of it but she does not see it that way. Yet we cannot afford to permit the system to collapse because of the departure of one member, as important as that one member is. Too much depends on the preservation of peace in the nuclear age.

It is for these reasons that I believe we have no other course than to continue with the other 14 NATO members to maintain the principles of NATO, hopefully that in good time France will be impelled to return to the principles of Robert Schuman and the other Frenchmen who were so instrumental in forging the new order of postwar adjustments. It will not be an easy task. There are difficult adjustments which will have to be made to insure that the organization continues a credible, viable, and convincing front on the basis of which the great problems and responsibilities confronting Europe and the Atlantic World can be better met and dealt with.

I feel strongly that we should continue to keep our troops in Europe to maintain the confidence and continuing sense of security which has meant so much to Europe, and indeed to other parts of the world. I would not reduce or withdraw those troops until some important political decisions are taken on the basis of which we can with confidence reduce our strength. I do not believe that we should now be talking about maintaining only a token force there. This would only confirm the skeptics in their claims of our unreliability and confound

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our loyal partners. The situation requires that our guarantees should be maintained in full force. I do feel that serious thought and attention must be applied to the problem of our Atlantic Alliance, both on the part of the Europeans and the United States. We have not given it the thought and attention it deserved, and, by "we," I mean the Europeans quite as much as ourselves.

I believe I have answered the four questions posed in the study submitted by the subcommittee, to the best of my ability, either directly or by implication. I have dealt with the Soviet threat. I am convinced that France views the Atlantic Alliance, as presently constituted, as an encumbrance to her aspirations for primacy on the continent and wants to be free of it, better able, from her point of view, to act independently and better able to deal with Moscow. There are improvements which can, I am certain, be made in the decisionmaking processes of the alliance. I believe this is merely a matter of getting at the problem. With France no longer able to obstruct or drag her feet, I believe the 14 members could give good example of how NATO can efficiently be run, and this is also my reply to question No. 4 of the study.

I have purposely avoided a more detailed discussion on the effect of the French action on the German situation. It is obviously a delicate one for the Germans and for the rest of us, but this statement is already longer than I intended it to be.

Let me conclude by repeating that in my judgment the situation is a serious one and there should be no blinking it. The withdrawal of France poses more than a few military problems. It challenges a new expenditure of energy and thought, such as was applied to the creation of NATO and the other steps which have thus far maintained the peace and the security of Europe.

Thank you very much. I apologize for the length of my statement.

Senator JACKSON. You need not apologize. That was an excellent statement. I know I express the sentiments of the committee in their appreciation to you for giving us your time to come down here.

I have a number of questions, but Senator Saltonstall has to leave for another committee, so I will first yield to him.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. McCloy, although I am not a member of this committee I appreciate very much what you say about the need for maintaining the military alliance of NATO. We have heard many statements about extending the influence of NATO into economic and cultural activities, as well as the military field, and perhaps putting less emphasis on the military, and also extending the alliance to the whole of the European area. I am sure you read Mr. Walter Lippmann on that subject. Do you feel it is essential to maintain the alliance as a military one? How do you feel about extending it into other activities and perhaps to other parts of Europe?

Mr. McCLOY. I think I have been a little more prone to extend the operations of NATO into these other fields than some others have. I have read Mr. Acheson's testimony where he indicated that he had felt the other agencies and institutions could cope with economic and perhaps cultural exchanges better than NATO and that you should not encumber NATO too much in that respect. I am not too convinced that is right. I would like to have a more thorough consideration given to that than I believe has been given thus far. There have been

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invitations to many other European countries, particularly France, to come forward with suggestions as to how the situation could be enlarged. So far as I know there has been no response to those inquiries.

I feel that perhaps it is not so important whether you put it within the particular scope of the NATO organization, if you have other adequate agencies. I am thinking as I said in my statement of the entire composite policy that would enable us to deal with these wider exchanges whether they are strictly within the NATO military treaty or not.

I hope that answers your question.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you for your courtesy Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. McCloy.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. McCloy, I would like to turn first to your statement that we should not now reduce or withdraw our troops from Europe. You say you do not believe we should now be talking about maintaining only a token American force in Europe—that this would only confirm the skeptics in their claims of our unreliability and confound our loyal partners.

As you know, all Members of the Senate do not agree on this issue. One of the problems here, I think, is that we need to distinguish what is wise policy in the present situation when NATO is trying to meet the shock of the French withdrawal, and what is wise longer-term policy with respect to burden sharing in the alliance.

Would you perhaps comment on the *shorter* and the *longer-term* aspects of American forces in Europe?

Mr. McCLOY. I think that on the shorter term it is perfectly clear that this would be a most inappropriate time to reduce those forces. If we at this stage, coincidental with the French attack on NATO, pull out a substantial number of our troops, I think that the cat would be among the pigeons and it would probably be the death knell of NATO and I cannot see that it would be a wise policy to take any such step as that.

Senator JACKSON. Do you feel that this development could trigger the end of NATO?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes, there is no question in my mind at all about that.

Senator JACKSON. Coming on top of all of the events up to now?

Mr. McCLOY. I think that would be an accumulation of forces that would make it impossible for NATO to retain its vigor. I feel very strongly about that.

I heard that the other day, when one of our commentators suggested that General de Gaulle had done us a favor by bringing this out into the open, General Lemnitzer said that one more favor like that and there would not be much left of NATO.

I think that would be another one of those types of favors.

I think we should have the same quantity of troops in Europe that we have now. I think the point we are making was that our troops were committed there and this would involve a substantial number of troops. I think that a substantial number of conventional forces there also has a tendency toward avoiding the necessity of immediate nuclear response.

For those considerations I would certainly say we ought to maintain in the long view as well a substantial quantity of American troops in

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Europe. I don't know that they would ever get to the point where a mere token would be a satisfactory solution.

I do feel that at some stage, when some of these political decisions that I referred to have been taken, we can take a good look at the situation and see then if it would not then be in good reason a wise step for us to reduce our forces and perhaps in conjunction with a general reducing of forces around the world.

That is the way I see it.

Senator JACKSON. I know the committee would be interested to have your views on the delicate matter of French troops in West Germany. In your judgment, what are the main military and political problems involved in De Gaulle's position on this issue?

Mr. McCLOY. I have to speculate a little I think about General de Gaulle's position. He has said, or the French Government has said, they would be willing to have their troops remain on German soil. He has said that France would not be willing to have any foreign troops on French soil even though they were integrated. He says this is an indignity to French sovereignty and impairment of French flexible options.

Naturally in saying that he arouses speculation among the Germans. They don't want to be insensitive of their own sovereignty. They hesitate to be less sensitive of their sovereignty than the French and the point is even integrated forces on French soil, some of whom are "integrated" under French generals, are considered an affront to French sovereignty.

The presence of French troops on German soil, uncommitted and equivocal in the sense that they are not integrated as the other allied troops are integrated, causes a real problem and poses a real problem for the Germans. I do not think that the Germans, from what I know of their position, are anxious to throw out the French troops; quite the contrary. But I can see what an awkward position it is politically and militarily if you have 70 or 80 thousand armed men there with no commitment as the others are committed, unintegrated where the others are integrated.

What do you do with that flank? I think the German attitude is we have to understand on what basis these troops are to be there. I think that is a reasonable attitude for them to take. It is up to the Germans to determine what they are willing to do, but I believe this becomes quite a symbolic issue. I gather that they are having some difficulty with it.

You have to have something like the NATO organization, or the NATO principles applying to those troops, whether you call it NATO or you don't, unless you are willing to have them there as occupation forces which I don't think the Germans want.

Senator JACKSON. This is the central issue with the Germans, is it not?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes, if they are not there as allies, ready and committed to defense, what are they there for? The suggestion is that they are simply there as an attenuation of the occupation force—which is a poisonous concept.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. McCloy, we are sometimes told that a face to face meeting between President Johnson and General de Gaulle is now wanted by "most Europeans." Do you think this is true? It has been

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my impression that most Europeans—apart from the Gaullists themselves—prefer to keep discussions now within the regular channels of the Atlantic Alliance and of the European Economic Community—that such a face-to-face meeting now would only play into De Gaulle's strategy to downgrade the Atlantic Alliance.

What is your judgment on that?

Mr. McCLOY. My feeling is that this step having been taken; that is, the French having thrown down the gauntlet on the NATO affair, to move into the purely individual approaches at this time I do not believe would be wise.

I do not know that some good might not come of it. But here you take the case of General de Gaulle going to Moscow in June of this year. Immediately others are beginning to suggest, well, why shouldn't we go to Moscow? There is even some suggestion that the United States should go to Moscow. You find that cropping up in some circles at this stage.

The Germans must have the thought that maybe they should go to Moscow. There is some precedent for them dealing individually with the Soviet Union. There have been some precedents in the past.

The Germans perhaps could speak as pungently and we could speak as pungently as the French, but if we had that same jockeying around for individual alliances, I think we would be back where we were in 1913, let alone 1939.

I deplore this move away from the collective approach. I question whether at this time all solutions would fall in place by simply another communication between General de Gaulle and the President of the United States.

I thought that at one time that was about to take place but it did not evolve and it may be under a different atmosphere than we have now something good too could come of such an exchange.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you first for the invitation to be here again with you and to say, too, I think you are conducting a highly important study of the Atlantic Alliance.

Mr. McCloy, I have looked on this NATO as the hope of the Western World. I came here to the Senate at just about the time it was born. With you, I am certainly concerned, but I believe you have made the best analysis and the finest statement about it that I have had the privilege to see or hear. With your background, it certainly does add strength to what you say.

You have put great emphasis here on the question of withdrawing our troops. I see where it is a great psychological factor and I do not favor withdrawing them unless necessary, but you understand, I am sure, that it is a strain on our military resources now to keep them there because of engagements on the other side of the world. You are aware of those facts and we have had to withdraw at least 15,000 troops recently in order to send some others to Vietnam.

Mr. McCLOY. That caused a little repercussion.

Senator STENNIS. In spite of those conditions and facts you still strongly recommend that certainly under present conditions we keep this strength up to what we have now, or approximately what we have?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes, I do.

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Senator STENNIS. You are also familiar with the fact that even though some of us would favor such a course, we have not been happy with the failure on the part of the other nations to come up nearer to their minimum requirements. I do not bring that up to try to dis-credit them but anything you want to say on that—any suggestions you might have—would be helpful.

How do you think France's withdrawal is going to affect the other nations with respect to their military strength and contributions—I would like for you to comment on that.

Mr. McCLOY. We are making sacrifices as you pointed out to keep our troops there, sacrifices not only with respect to Vietnam but the balance of payments and other things and I think it behooves the other countries to come up to the nubbing post on their full commitments.

I think the French action, if anything, has emphasized the need for such a response. I think we have to pay more attention to our alliance. We have to give more strength to it, and this applies just as much to the European countries as it does to us.

Senator STENNIS. I think Mr. McNamara has really made a very strong effort to bring the other countries around to a willingness to up their ante some. But, at the same time, this balance-of-payments problem is of acute concern here and it is eating into this matter, I believe, more than anything else right now. And if the need for more troops in Vietnam occurs, and I think it will occur, the demands will be even greater, and that will add to the problem of keeping those troops of ours over there in Europe.

I think your warning and emphasis on it is very timely. Is there anything else you have to say along that line?

Mr. McCLOY. I think I have said everything that needs to be said on it. The balance-of-payments problem would be somewhat improved if the purchases to be made in this country for the maintenance and the supply of the NATO forces were carried out, and they should be. That would tend to alleviate to some degree the balance-of-payments problem.

Senator STENNIS. That understanding is not being carried out.

Mr. McCLOY. There has been some dragging of feet. They don't like to put the taxes up any more than we do but I think we are at a point now where those considerations are not as important as others we have referred to here.

Senator STENNIS. In this day of reappraisal they certainly loom large on the horizon and I believe it is going to be necessary that our allies carry out those agreements affecting the balance of payments and also raise the ante with respect to the military contribution.

Otherwise this matter could go the wrong way and there would develop here tremendous sentiment to withdraw a substantial part of those American troops.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Kuchel.

Senator KUCHEL. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to say these hearings under your chairmanship on these far-reaching and most crucial problems are the clearest, the most stimulating, that we have had in the Congress this year.

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Secondly I want to say, Mr. McCloy, I share all the great commendations of respect that my colleague indicated on the record here earlier for your contributions to your country. I must say that I thoroughly enjoyed listening to you and it has been stimulating and most helpful to this Senator and to all others who listen and will read your words.

I gather there is no question in your mind that a defensive alliance composed of 14 members of the present NATO organization is completely feasible?

Mr. McCLOY. I think it is feasible. I think it is going to take some doing. I cannot say that it would be the same as if we had the whole 15. There are some complicated military problems. I have talked to some of the soldiers about this, and some of the logisticians about it, and they tell me it is feasible. I think the alternative would be so unfortunate that we have to expend a great deal of energy; we have to apply a great deal of energy and thought to the solution of the problem—and I think it can be found.

Senator KUCHEL. And the interdependence of the free nations of the Atlantic Community to the maximum extent necessary to deter potential aggression continues to be an important basic ingredient for the foreign policy of our country?

Mr. McCLOY. I believe so.

Senator KUCHEL. We listened a week ago in this committee, Mr. Chairman, to some outstanding citizens discussing this same problem and speaking about the empty chair to remain available for France when, as, and if, under certain conditions, she determined to embrace again the theory of the alliance.

Yet, I gather from your testimony that where we have a defensive alliance, as in the Atlantic Community, with a further interest in attempting to find common policy in other fields—trade, culture, foreign policy generally—that it is not helpful to think in terms of one member of NATO which would be half in the alliance and half out. I gather some people feel this way as far as France is concerned.

Mr. McCLOY. I think you have France at the present time half in and half out. This is a very embarrassing thing, and awkward, and it presents all kinds of problems to us and the Germans and to all of the other Europeans. But I do not think you should permit one member of that alliance to bring the whole house down by withdrawing from it, considering the benefits that I believe can continue to be drawn from the balance of the alliance and considering the tremendous success that the whole concept has had so far. I think we just have to grin and bear the equivocal position of France.

I indicated in my talk that I was not one of those who felt there was going to be a sudden reversal there. People say, "Well, General de Gaulle may pass from the scene and everything will be fine." I believe in keeping the empty chair there, but a lot has happened and positions have been crystallized and the vote of confidence in General de Gaulle's attitude has been taken. So I don't think we ought to look upon this as an ephemeral and as a purely temporary episode.

Senator KUCHEL. Whatever France's unilateral decisions may be now and in the immediate future—eliminating the headquarters of the military establishment of NATO from French soil, all the infrastructure, the logistical support even below the ground, and the pipelines

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which apparently would now have to be removed—it would be your statement to the committee that during the period ahead France, nevertheless, as a matter of fact, will be a de facto half-in, half-out member?

Mr. McCLOY. I don't know how long she will continue in this position. I think the illogic of it will appeal to a great many Frenchmen. I cannot estimate how long it will last but I think there is no real alternative but for us to maintain the vigor of NATO even though it is only 14.

Senator KUCHEL. Mr. McCloy, I was most interested in the comment you made in which you said that the jurisdiction of NATO continues to be the Atlantic area but that the members of NATO cannot be impervious to any conflict that takes place out of the area. That must be true. The American people are troubled because, on the one hand, we have our problems in NATO and, on the other hand, we have our problems in Southeast Asia. We adhered to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, I think, with the hope that the same kind of collective security would be brought to bear on a conflict in Southeast Asia as would be brought to bear in Europe, which has not proved to be the case.

Would it be at all feasible for NATO in the future to eliminate the geographical jurisdiction and become committed to a collective course of action wherever, in its opinion, conflict endangered the community?

Mr. McCLOY. I think that is quite a long way off, considering the attitude of the Europeans at this point. But I share your view that you cannot compartmentalize this world. I think one of the most obscurantist points of view, if I can use that term to describe the attitude of the French at this point, is that the majority of NATO members are only interested in Europe and they do not have interests outside it. I think it is one of the most backward-looking statements I have heard for a long time.

As I was saying to the chairman this morning, it is very interesting that in 1793 President Washington said the United States must have nothing to do with Europe with its entangling alliances apt to get us into all kinds of European feuds and if we don't keep away we will be involved, too.

Now we have come full circle and now we find a European country which has twice, in less than one lifetime, had to be liberated from oppressive forces by forces coming from outside Europe using this argument in reverse. That was one of the arguments put forward against membership in NATO and it is shockingly anachronistic to me.

We are getting back to provincialism again. If we could form an organization somewhere between NATO and the present U.N. to cope with these global problems well and good, but I don't think we are making great progress in that area at the moment. I would not think it would be wise to strike down this proven regional organization at this stage if for no other reason than that it might lead to a wider concept of our problems and perhaps a wider cooperation in the solution of them.

Senator KUCHEL. Yet, meanwhile, would it not be your belief that NATO should take a maximum amount of interest in potential conflicts occurring outside the community?

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Mr. McCLOY. I believe so. I don't mean to extend the NATO Treaty around the world but I do think we should have exchanges of views with respect to those problems within NATO. I think it is rather obvious that we should.

Senator KUCHEL. Mr. Chairman, let me defer to our colleague from Oklahoma, but I want to say this is as stimulating a morning as I have had, listening to you, Mr. McCloy, and talking with you, and I thank you very much.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Harris.

Senator HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I certainly want to concur in the commendation of Mr. McCloy. Mr. McCloy, I do commend you on your statement here and your answers to the questions. You have stated views which, as you know, I share because we have discussed some of these matters recently in another forum. I agree with you about a greater economic policy role for NATO.

I think if we were to sum up what you said it would perhaps be that we should not move on any of these problems unilaterally, abruptly, without consultation. For example, we should not talk seriously of withdrawal of troops, or talk seriously of reducing our troop level, without prior consultation.

Since that is the burden of your testimony and since we all understand that there is this credibility problem in dealing with our allies I want to refer to General Norstad's recommendation before this committee for some advances in nuclear decision sharing in NATO.

I do not know if you would particularly want to comment on the military aspect of his suggestion, but I wonder if you might comment on the need for improvements in decisionmaking with respect to the use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. McCLOY. This is a very difficult question. I do feel that we have to make up our minds what we really want to do in the way of improving the procedures in the decisionmaking field by which nuclear power is to be delivered.

I think this Government has not made up its own mind as to what its position should be.

There was, as you know, the question of nuclear sharing in the form of the MLF. We also had the ANF and we had a change in administrations in the course of arriving at a Government position. MLF was put forth in a rather halfhearted fashion and it was withdrawn in the same fashion. The whole thing was maladroit. I do not believe we have really cracked down on the solution of that problem yet.

I rather disagree with Dr. Schelling that this is a problem impossible of solution. I think if we really coped with it we could find the answer to it. It does not mean we would not have criticism or opposition from the Soviet Union or France.

In fact I think France places emphasis on the fact that she is the exclusive nuclear power in Europe, but I would believe that real thought should be given and real analysis should be applied to the suggestion that Secretary McNamara has made—as well as to the other suggestions that have been made—in regard to some more satisfactory way of dealing with this subject of the employment of nuclear energy.

I do not know that I would go to the extent that I see President Eisenhower did the other day with an immediate amendment to the McMahon Act. I have not talked to General Eisenhower about this.

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I was very much interested in reading his letter, however. And his views are entitled to great respect. I think that until you have specific suggestions as to just what the project for sharing is that it would be, in my judgment, unwise to amend the McMahon Act across the board.

Let the particular project be put forward and then let the Congress face it and decide what they should do at that point.

I think the thing that motivated General Eisenhower—I am only speculating, he has to speak for himself—is that he was troubled by the fact that we had the monopoly and our allies did not have atomic power; he was troubled, perhaps, because we were not forthcoming with the French in giving them atomic secrets. We couldn't without amending the act.

He realized this was a problem as we all do. He suggested a possible solution. I simply would think his suggestion would be at this point a too drastic one.

Senator HARRIS. The reason I asked the nuclear question in the context of credibility or unilateral action without prior consultation is because I think that is really what is involved here.

As I have said in other of these hearings, my own conversations with some of my friends in the Federal Republic would lead me to believe that something less than hardware or a finger on the button would be satisfactory if what we said was really credible to them, if they could really believe we would do exactly what we say. That is why I think the way we withdrew the 15,000 troops is really related to this question of nuclear sharing. And the idea that we might come in now and suddenly talk about bringing our troops out of Europe is also involved in this question of nuclear sharing because that is primarily a question of credibility.

Mr. McCLOY. I think we should have a determination in our Government as to what our policy is. It has been sort of a musical chairs. I think it takes joint application of energy and thought to solve the problem.

Senator HARRIS. I certainly agree that we ought not to deal with De Gaulle on a unilateral basis, or do what he is doing with the Soviet Union on a unilateral basis, because any such action unilaterally strikes at the very heart of NATO. As I said earlier, I agree with what you said and I commend you for your presence and your statement.

Thank you very much.

Senator JACKSON. The Atlantic Alliance has not yet achieved its initial and still its fundamental purpose—which is a reliable European settlement. What do you think are the prospects that the alliance—at least the 14 members—can develop a common approach to the East-West problems—a genuine working policy toward central Europe?

How important do you think it is that we and our allies move together—move as one—in dealing with these issues? You have been in Europe very recently and we would be pleased to hear your thoughts on this.

Mr. McCLOY. I believe there is need for a collective approach to this problem. I believe it can only be solved on a collective approach. I do not believe any nation has the genius or the strength to carry it out unilaterally as the exclusive agent of any country or countries.

I feel that some progress perhaps will be made through these discussions which are now going on between the East Germans and the

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West Germans. But I believe, in the last analysis, we are also deeply concerned with the East-West problem and this is a problem that has to be looked at on more than a bilateral basis.

I will not go into what I thought was perhaps the basic principle of such a solution. There was a time when I was more hopeful of it than at the moment. It is bound to come up with varying emphasis as the years go on, and within the alliance I think we ought to have the machinery to deal with the various considerations which affect such a vital problem and such a vital element in the future security of Europe and the Atlantic world.

I do not believe that France can work out the solution alone. I do not believe that West Germany can work it out. I think we have to all work it out, and we have to have an understanding with the Soviet Union.

Senator JACKSON. To follow up in this same area I wanted to ask this question: What in your view is the role of East-West trade in helping create a situation where the present gap between the peoples in East Europe and West Europe and the division of Germany might move toward solution?

Mr. McCLOY. Well, there is a great deal of trade now going on between East Germany and West Germany. I did not get from your question whether you were referring to that or whether you were referring to trade with all countries beyond the curtain.

Senator JACKSON. The President recently sent up a message on this, and my question goes to the whole area of East-West trade and the relaxation of restrictions that are now in effect.

Mr. McCLOY. I cannot object in any way to the stimulation of East-West trade. As I say, until the Soviet Union makes up its mind, I would still not be giving them strategic goods. I would certainly be clear on that. There is some difficulty in determining what is strategic and what is not strategic.

In addition I think we have to look at what they can give us in return. If the trade is going to amount to anything it has to be on a mutually beneficial basis. What are the things we want from them? We know pretty well what they want from us. They want pretty highly developed, highly sophisticated plants and equipment.

What do we get in the return? The mere thought that just because there is trade moving across the border at no matter what expense you have better relations is questionable. I am not so sure this is the case. You have to have a mutuality of trade.

So many people say: "Yes, I am for East-West trade. It is a good thing." Well it would be if there were a good interchange but if they can only give us what we have a surplusage of, then I think you might have an East-West trade, or a form of trade, that would not be particularly significant in terms of the establishment of good relations.

Senator JACKSON. It has been proposed that the President's discretion to grant most-favored-nation status be restored. You would favor this, I take it, on nonstrategic items, assuming that there is a real quid pro quo?

Mr. McCLOY. A real reciprocity. That is an important element. Otherwise you have something without substance.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is a privilege to see you here before this superb subcommittee. I am very grateful to the chairman for sug-

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gesting that I come. I would have liked to have heard all of your testimony because you are one of the great public servants of our time. I have been at the Foreign Relations Committee, however, and I have just listened to two statements by two eminent psychologists.

Mr. McCLOY. Perhaps we can get the benefit of psychology in this hearing.

Senator SYMINGTON. Perhaps we could, but you notice we do not have any couch in the room.

I have had the privilege of reading your statement. There are several questions that I would like to ask you. I know of your magnificent service not only during the war but after the war in Germany. You understand the German position as few other people do. I have just come back from Germany, where they have increased by nearly 500 percent in the last 10 years their gold holdings and also their total reserves, whereas, alone among the highly industrialized countries, our gold holdings and reserves have been heavily reduced.

Why is it that they do not fulfill their NATO commitments, if it is as important as you say it is and as some of us think it is and as I would presume they think it is? Why don't they have 12 real divisions and why don't they try to correct the sad condition of their air force? Is it because they feel they are allowed to pursue their prosperity along with the other European countries under the protection of the nuclear umbrella of the United States?

Mr. McCLOY. We talked about this a little before you came in. You also touched on some phases we did not talk about.

I had the strong feeling the Germans should come up to their commitments. It is sort of a sine qua non particularly after the French attack on NATO.

I suppose they have explained to Secretary McNamara and others why they have been slow in fulfilling their full obligations. I have not gone into it with them for sometime. They do have substantial forces there, as you know, and they have made some very heavy expenditures. They have not by any means failed or substantially failed in my judgment in meeting the commitments.

They have done more than other countries have done, but that does not mean that they ought not to come up to their full complement.

As to what their motivations are, I suppose in the press of the politics and the distasteful aspect of having to raise and increase taxes, the tendency perhaps is to question the necessity of the earlier commitments, to think always in terms of the American nuclear umbrella. It must be a temptation.

You have heard, not from Germany, I think, but from other places that no matter what, the Americans must come to the aid of Europe. Why should we be making these expenditures? These are human reactions in which I believe we just cannot afford to continue to indulge. I believe that the representations that are now being made by Secretary McNamara are well taken.

I cannot give you the answers that the Germans are giving in the form of a request for further time to meet their commitments. I do not believe that they disown the obligation to fulfill their commitment. So far as I understand the situation, it is simply a matter of more time. They have budget problems.

Senator SYMINGTON. My second question—and let me assure you I ask it only to get the benefit of your great experience. I know we

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are both worried about some of the things that are going on in the world. I was impressed, as were two of my colleagues, seeing the new Russian delegate in the disarmament talks in Geneva, who is a different type than Tsarapkin. This is also a field which I have had the privilege of discussing with you before and in which you have had vast experience.

Mr. Roshchin's position is that any MLF or ANF is in effect an allowance for proliferation in our bloc. He made it very clear that if we pursued that course he saw little hope of any meaningful arms control-disarmament agreement, inasmuch as we now have various forms of proliferation. For example, I visited a French base on German soil that also had on it American nuclear weapons. Do you believe that there is any justification for Mr. Roshchin's thinking about the MLF or the ANF?

Mr. McCloy. I think you have to sit back and take this in perspective. In the first place, the Soviet Union has just as much to gain by nonproliferation as we do. I have not been sympathetic with those who have said we must make sacrifices or we must give the Soviets inducements to sign this agreement.

It is just as much to the interest of the Soviet Union, indeed I think it is more to their interest than ours if anything, that there should not be proliferation. I do not believe we ought to be begging them to do something that they are already most anxious to have accomplished.

I would not feel that we ought to take any steps which would dilute the alliance or dilute our own security in order to induce the Soviet Union to agree to nonproliferation.

Everyone who has a bomb does not want proliferation. They all want to keep it for themselves.

I met Mr. Roshchin. He was part of the group I negotiated with in Moscow a number of years ago, I understand he is taking the position that he will not agree to even the status quo. He would not agree to language which would permit the status quo with regard to the use of American nuclear weapons on Allied territory. Whether that would be his ultimate position, I don't know. I think the Soviet Union would like to bring into this agreement anything that would tend to restrict even our present use of nuclear potentials and certainly any future use of nuclear potentials within our alliance. I believe that would be too high a price to pay for the advantage of nonproliferation. I believe the Soviets from the point of view of their own interests are shortsighted in this.

I would like to have nonproliferation if we can bring it about, but I don't believe we ought to beg the Soviet Union to do it at the risk of what I would consider our security or the dilution of our alliances.

You could give the Soviet Union the credit of saying they are trying to gain the most they can from our desire to have an agreement, but I believe it would be in their own interest to have a solid alliance in the West, one in which the Germans would be contained, one in which there would be no longer a fear that there would be another venture, a new breaking out, a new revanchism.

A number of individuals from satellite countries say "For goodness sake don't give up NATO because NATO has been an element of confidence in our being able to express ourselves." I think this has

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the germ for a good base for a solid understanding between the East and West.

Senator JACKSON. As a matter of fact a strong, stable NATO makes it possible for the satellite countries to obtain some concessions from the Soviet Union. Is this not essentially correct?

Mr. McCLOY. I think it is a comfort to them.

Senator JACKSON. I understand that some of the representatives from the satellite countries hope and pray that NATO will remain strong so that they can continue to negotiate with Moscow to improve their own independent stature.

Senator SYMINGTON. What worries me is the fact that the Soviets, to the best of my knowledge, have no troops on foreign soil in any quantity and they have not let any of their nuclear weapons out of their own country, even to their satellites. We have them spread around, and although this question of joint control is much more sophisticated than when we had such things as the Thor set up in England, from their standpoint—looking at it in terms of the other fellow's attitude on it—it gives me increasing apprehension if we consider it important, as I know you do, that we arrive at some arms control agreement.

On the question of the United States taking troops out of Germany, I don't think anybody I know wants to take the flag out of Germany and take all of the troops out of Germany.

The chairman of this committee is a member of another committee I am on and we both signed a report recently pointing up the serious situation that now faces the United States from the standpoint of the shortage of trained military people.

It is becoming a military condition, not a political-diplomatic theory. You would not object to a reduction of the number of troops in Germany if they were needed in Southeast Asia or in Vietnam?

Mr. McCLOY. We took out about 15,000 troops and the only thing I object to is the German Government learned it first from Der Spiegel and not from us. I took the position that I do not believe that we should have any substantial reduction beyond this 15,000 now. I believe NATO has gotten a blow, so another withdrawal should not be made at this point, any withdrawal of substance. I think the justification for taking the 15,000 out was a solid one which the Germans and Europeans would have fully understood if the reason for it had been explained to them before they got it from the newspapers.

Because of the present psychological situation, I think our security and whole general position would be badly impaired if we pulled a substantial number of troops out of Germany even if we let a substantial number remain. I do not believe in the token idea; I do feel that sometime in the future— and I don't know just when that would be—perhaps after this situation in regard to the future of NATO is composed, after perhaps some political decisions have been made, we could then talk in terms of reducing the troops.

Maybe other troops could be reduced, too, but I believe at this stage to talk in terms of either token or substantial reduction of troops would be contrary to the interests of the United States.

Senator SYMINGTON. Even if it affected our operations in South Vietnam?

Mr. McCLOY. I am not an expert on this. If you told me it affected the safety and the security of the troops in Vietnam or the soldiers

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

147

on the line, I might want to take another look at it. I am not a military expert although I have had some experience in military affairs, but I would think the present situation is not at so acute a state.

I do feel the withdrawal of those 15,000 men was justified and necessary by reason of the Vietnam situation.

Senator SYMINGTON. You mentioned that, and the actual withdrawal was over 30,000. The net reduction was 15,000, for the others were replaced by untrained troops. The fact is these troops were needed very badly.

Mr. McCLOY. Certainly that was a necessary step to take, and it would be understood by our allies if it had been properly explained to them.

Senator SYMINGTON. I find in Germany the German people know as much about these things as the American people and the French people. So this is all known to them.

I certainly would agree with you without any reservation on the subject about which you know a great deal more than I do. I do not want in any way to denigrate your military experience. You went through World War II with Secretary Stimson and Secretary Patterson. But things have changed. That is a fair statement. We have, for example, certain strategic units that we did not have before. Perhaps the greatest of all is the Polaris submarine. We have always had the problem with France and the consequent maneuvering over the last 15 or 20 years in SHAPE. Do you think, with the elimination of France from a logistics and operations standpoint, that we can have a meaningful ground resistance to modern Soviet attack in Europe on the ground with just the space left between the Rhine and East Germany?

Mr. McCLOY. I think you can redraw your lines in such a way that you can have a meaningful balance left. It remains to be seen what the French will permit you to do in the way of overflights.

You know more about this than I do. In order to get altitude you frequently have to go over France and you have to have room to make your formations. There may be some things that we could exchange with the French that would permit us to have more elbowroom in that respect.

I don't blink at the fact that it would be much more restricted but I still think the military posture we could maintain would be convincing. The very fact that we were prepared to show our resolution to stand fast and that Britain, and ourselves, and the Low Countries, Italy, and the Germans, were there as well would be highly convincing.

That would still represent a pretty darn formidable force militarily and politically. It would not be just a paper defense by any means. Maybe that expression of our determination would mean a great deal in terms of a deterrent, and it would not be, in my judgment or from a military point of view, an empty gesture by any means.

There would be a solid force still there and the means for providing them support. They would discourage attack.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JACKSON. Again, Mr. McCloy, on behalf of the committee we want to express to you our deep appreciation for your outstanding presentation made to this committee this morning.

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The Chair wishes to announce that these hearings will resume on Thursday, June 16, when Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, will testify before the committee.

The committee is now recessed.

(Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene on Thursday, June 16, at 10 a.m.)

BIOGRAPHY OF WITNESS

John J. McCloy's record of service goes back to World War I, when he served as a captain in the artillery. He was named Assistant Secretary of War, April 1941-November 1945. His postwar responsibilities have included President of the World Bank, 1947-49; U.S. Military Governor and the High Commissioner for Germany, 1949-52; Co-ordinator of U.S. disarmament activities, 1961-63; continuing duties in an advisory capacity under President Johnson. In 1963, President Kennedy awarded him the Presidential Medal of Freedom with distinction. Mr. McCloy, Chairman of the Board, Chase Manhattan Bank, 1955-61, has been a member of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley, and McCloy since 1963. He is Chairman of the Atlantic Institute.

# Structural Changes in the Atlantic Alliance

## I. European Recovery

The most obvious and striking factor is, of course, the recovery of Europe. Present policies were devised when the end of America's isolation coincided with the temporary loss of Europe's ability to play an effective international role or to protect itself against foreign danger. Every European country--with the exception of Great Britain--had been defeated at one time or another during World War II. Every country--again with the exception of Great Britain--had been the victim of foreign occupation. Societies were shattered. Europe was dependent on the United States for its material well-being, domestic cohesion and safety from invasion.

In such a situation it was natural that the United States should have a dominant position. European policy consisted of trying to influence choices essentially made in Washington. NATO discussions usually involved the technical implementation of unilateral American strategic decisions. It was no accident that our European allies--with the exception of Great Britain which possessed many unofficial contacts--oscillated between formal pliancy and excessive suspiciousness.

This pattern of benevolent paternalism on one side and more or less adaptable lobbying on the other could not survive European economic recovery. Its new-found strength has enabled Europe to express again its own view of the world. The trend has been given impetus by the existence of an intact young generation--the first since the carnage of World War I. Difficult as this adjustment is, a Europe assuming ever greater responsibility is profoundly in our long-term interest. It represents, in fact, the realization of the most consistent United States policy since World War II.

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## II. The Changed Nature of the Soviet Threat

Relations with the Soviet Union have changed dramatically since the Cuban missile crisis. Most of our European Allies have reached the conclusion that the two main nuclear powers will avoid a direct military confrontation for an indefinite period. This conviction has been strengthened by the hope of some, and the suspicion of others, that bilateral United States-Soviet dealings are prevented only by the war in Vietnam. An atmosphere of imminent detente removes the previous urgency for Allied cohesion. As the Soviet threat appears to recede, the scope for largely national action widens proportionately. As the impression grows that bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations are sooner or later inevitable, Third Force tendencies in Europe are stimulated. In an alliance of sovereign states each country will think that it is a better judge of its own requirements than any partner, however close. While it would be a mistake to treat President de Gaulle's policies as reactions to American moves, his interpretation of the long-term trends in East-West relations and of United States policy necessarily play a role in shaping his actions.

As the detente develops, the need to transform the Alliance from its present defensive concept into a political arrangement defining itself by some positive goals will grow ever more urgent. The effectiveness of defense against a military threat will diminish. Negotiations with the East will prove corrosive unless they go hand in hand with the creation of common political purposes and the institutions to embody them.

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### III. The Process of Decolonization

The process of decolonization has also contributed to current difficulties. Freed from overseas commitments, many European countries for the first time in a generation are able to develop a specifically European role for themselves. Ironically, the end of Europe's colonial empires has led to a reversal of the traditional postwar attitudes of the United States and Europe toward many underdeveloped countries. Some European leaders are now repeating the American argument of the fifties: that the larger interests of the free world are sometimes served by allowing for differing, occasionally even competing, Western approaches to the emerging nations.

This attitude, too, was inevitable. As a result of decolonization, our European Allies have ceased to think of themselves as world powers. They possess neither the resources nor the domestic framework for distant enterprises. No European government, with the possible exception of the United Kingdom, is likely to be convinced that its security is jeopardized by events in another part of the globe.

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## IV. The Strategic Problem

Underlying the malaise in the Alliance is the change in the nature of strategic relationships. When NATO was formed the United States possessed an atomic monopoly. Soviet land forces seemed poised for an attack on Europe --American territory was invulnerable. In these circumstances our European Allies had a high incentive to devise a structure which committed the United States organically--and preferably automatically--to the defense of Europe. The preferred strategy was one that guaranteed the maximum American nuclear involvement from the outset.

The result was a difference in perspective between the United States and Europe about the military purpose of NATO. From the beginning the symbolic commitment of the United States has been crucial to the Europeans; or to put it more accurately, our Allies saw the significance of the American deployment in Europe and the command structure which went with it primarily in terms of the *commitment* it created. The United States, on the other hand, judged these measures largely in terms of actual military operations. The Europeans were primarily interested in the *fact* of an American response to aggression, which to them meant primarily a nuclear response. The United States was as much concerned with the *mode* as with the *fact* of its reactions, with its options as well as with the initial decision to go to war. The United States since 1961--when mutual vulnerability became apparent--has sought a "pause" if war broke out to give both sides an opportunity to "appreciate the wider risks involved". The Europeans have preferred to make our response as automatic as possible.

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As long as American nuclear power was dominant this difference in perspective could be evaded. In recent years, however, the nuclear equation has basically altered. The absolute superiority of the United States in nuclear weapons may be unimpaired, but the *useful* margin has changed fundamentally. In the past, the major problem for strategists was to assemble superior strength; in the contemporary period the problem more frequently is how to make the available power relevant to objectives likely to be in dispute. Though the major nuclear powers have an unprecedented capacity to devaste their opponent, their threats to do so have only a limited credibility. This is because the ability to destroy is not related to the ability to disarm--so that using one's nuclear arsenal indiscriminately against a major opponent guarantees only self-destruction.

This is illustrated by figures given by Secretary McNamara in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee of February 18, 1965. He gave the following estimates of possible United States fatalities given various levels of expenditure for active and passive defense:

Estimated Effect of Fallout Protection on U.S. Fatality
Levels for Several Damage Limiting Programs
(Based on 1970 total population of 210 million)

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Additional<br>Investment</th><th colspan="4">Millions of U.S. Fatalities</th></tr><tr><th colspan="2">Early Urban Attack</th><th colspan="2">Delayed Urban Attack</th></tr><tr><th>Partial<br>Protection</th><th>Full<br>Protection</th><th>Partial<br>Protection</th><th>Full<br>Protection</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>$ 0 billion</td><td>149</td><td>149</td><td>122</td><td>122</td></tr><tr><td>5 billion</td><td>145</td><td>120</td><td>107</td><td>90</td></tr><tr><td>15 billion</td><td>121</td><td>96</td><td>79</td><td>59</td></tr><tr><td>25 billion</td><td>107</td><td>78</td><td>59</td><td>41</td></tr></tbody></table>

According to these estimates, at *any* level of expenditure--and so far no additional expenditures for these purposes have been budgeted--the President

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must count with fatalities amounting to a minimum of twenty per cent and perhaps ranging as high as seventy per cent of the population. No leader in history has had to conduct policy against the background of a potential catastrophe of such magnitude. In the face of such expectations, it is unrealistic to insist that the credibility of a nuclear guarantee has remained unimpaired. It must make a difference to the President of the United States whether no civilian casualties need be expected which was the situation in 1949 or whether the decision to go to war hazards a major part of the population. Even if his determination should remain unaffected, it may grow increasingly difficult to convince an opponent of this fact.

At the same time, while the new strategic balance affects the credibility of a nuclear response to some challenges, those issues with respect to which a nuclear guarantee does remain credible are so fundamental that Allies may feel that their actions cannot affect our decision to support them. In the fifties our Allies believed that American support had to be purchased by acquiescence to our preferences. In the sixties and seventies this condition no longer holds. De Gaulle probably believes--almost certainly correctly--that in case of full-scale Soviet attack on Europe we have little choice but to support him. Conviction of American reliability in the face of an ultimate challenge is thus coupled with uncertainty about lesser issues to produce the present debate in the Alliance.

Two contradictory tendencies result: Those Allies with nuclear weapons have an incentive to provide themselves with an opportunity to assess the full implications of the decision to go to nuclear war. This is the psychological origin of the "pause" theory, which was developed first by the United States

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in 1961 and which is also at the heart of the French disengagement from the
integrated NATO commands. Yet the attempt to make the reaction dependent
on the circumstances of the moment creates disquiet among those Allies who do
not have the technical means to implement their judgments. They cannot know
what the circumstances will be at the time of attack or how discretion will be
exercised. NATO's nuclear "problem" is due to the fact that in the new
strategic situation Allies have an incentive either to develop forces of their own
or to try to participate effectively in the decisions of its senior partner--to an
extent inconsistent with traditional notions of sovereignty.

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V. The Internal Change in Europe

The political structure in every European country--with the exception of Great Britain--is in a state of transition. Personalities which dominated the formative periods of NATO are being replaced. In Germany, the Christian Democratic Union, which shaped the Federal Republic's pro-Western orientation in the fifties, is rent between an "Atlantic" and a "European" wing. The Socialists are explaining new initiatives towards East Germany while all parties are reassessing their stand on unification.

In Italy the Center-Left experiment is not yet consolidated; its ultimate direction is far from clear.

Even in France the seeming stability of the De Gaulle era is likely to be deceptive. While it is premature to predict the precise policy of De Gaulle's successor, it is safe to say that a post De Gaulle France will face internal pressures now obscured by the towering personality of one man.

On the Iberian peninsula such stability as exists may not survive two aged dictators.

American policy toward Europe must therefore take account of two contradictory trends: Europe's economic and psychological recovery and the tenuousness of this assertiveness. Many United States policies are geared only to the first of these tendencies. The assumption seems to be that European vitality will be permanent and that the only obstacle to Atlantic cohesion is an excessive estimate by the Europeans of their power.

However, De Gaulle's policy may have produced an illusion of European strength and self-confidence which is more a reflection of his personality

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than of underlying factors. If one moves from Europe in the abstract to an
examination of the individual European countries, it becomes apparent how
precarious Europe's stability really is. The vigor so noticeable in Europe
today is very close in time to nihilism; European self-confidence is still
shaky. Little would be gained by replacing a nationalism of insufficient strength
by a neutralism which exalts impotence. To avoid both dangers and to create
a new and more vital structure is the challenge before the Atlantic Alliance.

June 27, 1966

Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen:

The current NATO crisis was triggered by a unilateral, pre-emptory French demand. But it would be wrong to conclude that the pattern of relationships which developed after the war could have continued. The withdrawal of France from integrated commands forced a reconsideration of the structure and the purpose of the Alliance which would have been inevitable in any case--though the atmosphere was surely worsened by France's tactics.

It is well to keep three things in mind at the outset. First, the present crisis is a family affair. It concerns internal arrangements between closely related peoples. France is not our basic opponent in the world; unless statesmen everywhere submerge their judgment in their passions, there are objective limits which reality imposes on inter-allied discord.

Second, the present crisis marks the end of the phase of U.S.-European relationships which was ushered in by the Greek-Turkish aid program and led through the Marshall Plan to the construction of the Atlantic Alliance. Nothing can restore the former state of affairs. In many ways this should be an occasion for self-confrontation rather than bitterness. Goals which seemed visionary in the late forties have been essentially achieved. Europe has recovered its economic strength and much political vitality. The threat of imminent invasion no longer dominates people's minds.

Third--and somewhat contradictorily--Europe's recovery is still tenuous. It is often assumed that European vitality will be permanent and that the primary problem is to moderate Europe's assertiveness. However, the vigor so noticeable in Europe today is very close in time to nihilism; European confidence is still

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shaky. To avoid both the danger of excessive nationalism and a new version of
neutralism is the challenge before the Alliance.

[Foreign policy knows no plateaus. What does not become a point for new departures soon marks the beginning of an inexorable decline.] It would be unprecedented if a policy developed in the late forties remained valid for the seventies. The original conception of NATO was correct for the situation which then existed. I have always supported it strongly. But it no longer exhausts current challenges. What we need today is another leap of the imagination similar to that which took place two decades ago.

In order to reduce my views to relatively manageable proportions, I am
submitting two documents to this Committee.

(a) This formal statement dealing with policy issues.

(b) A background paper dealing with the structural causes of the current crisis.

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# I. Some Policy Issues before the Atlantic Alliance

## A. American Policy - The Grand Design

Any attempt to sum up American policy in a few sentences is bound to be highly misleading. What follows must be taken as a summary of a dominant trend which has been followed with various degrees of consistency.

1. Commitment to an Atlantic Community based on Equal Partnership.

The United States has supported the notion of an equal partnership between the United States and Europe. This Grand Design--variously symbolized by such concepts as "dumbbell" or "twin pillars"--was based on the proposition that an Atlantic partnership would enable our European allies to share our global responsibilities more equitably.

2. Support for a United Europe on a Federal Basis: European unity has been considered by American policymakers as a prerequisite to the formation of an Atlantic Community. A politically and economically integrated Europe would become an equal partner with the United States and share with us the burdens and obligations of world leadership. To its supporters, in Europe as well as in the United States, such a partnership has seemed realizable by only one method: a politically unified Europe in close association with the United States. Similarly, a single solution has been offered for the achievement of European unity: supranational federal institutions controlled by a European Parliament. American pronouncements have often played down anything less as no unity at all.

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3. **Integrated Defense:** While the United States has advocated a twin-pillar concept in the political and economic realm, it has urged an integrated military defense. Partly this has reflected the conviction that with modern weapons, defense is indivisible; partly it was due to our special responsibility in the nuclear field: ninety-five percent of the nuclear arsenal of the Alliance belongs to the United States. Only those allies on whose territory nuclear weapons are located share in their control and then only negatively: they can prevent these weapons from being fired but they cannot make us fire them nor can they prevent us from resorting to nuclear weapons located elsewhere.

Finally, the United States has insisted on central command and control of nuclear weapons in the Alliance. It has sought to meet the concerns of its allies --real or imagined-- by a number of devices ranging from the creation of a new nuclear force (either in the form of an MLF or ANF) to the NATO Special Committee (the so-called McNamara committee). (The nuclear problem will be discussed in greater detail below.)

4. **Summary and Critique:** United States policy has had the great advantage of offering a clear-cut concept. In the early stages of the Atlantic Alliance it provided the basic impetus for European recovery. Its major drawback has been not that it was wrong but that one conceivable pattern of relationships has sometimes been presented as the only possible one. A too theoretical and schematic approach runs the risk of losing touch with contemporary European realities.

For all its idealism, the American view has always contained some inconsistencies. In the emerging areas the nation-state has been treated as

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natural, and in Eastern Europe great hope has been placed in nationalism as a
counterweight to Communism. But in Western Europe, where the concept of
nationalism had originated, American policy has decried the nation-state as
outdated and backward.

Moreover, American claims regarding the general applicability of our
federal institutions have ignored those factors which have made the American
experience unique. The American federal union was formed on a new continent
by states sharing a common historical experience. The American colonies had
fought together to achieve their freedom. They were roughly of the same size.
They had no tradition of sovereignty in the conduct of foreign relations. Their
peoples were of similar cultural background and spoke the same language.

The situation in Europe differs fundamentally. Every European state is
the product of many centuries of a history in which a sense of national identity
was often linked to what distinguished a nation from its neighbors. Independence
for many countries required a long process of struggle against the domination of
other European states. In other words, the nations of Europe were formed in a
manner which emphasized their uniqueness. It is no accident that support for
federal institutions has come on the whole from smaller countries accustomed to
the protection of some major power or from countries like the Federal Republic
or Italy, eager to escape their past. France and Great Britain with the longest
history as national states have consistently aimed for a confederal rather than a
federal solution. Another inconsistency in the American position has been
ardent advocacy of Britain's entry into Europe and a federal structure which is
as unacceptable in London as in Paris.

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These problems might have remained dormant for many years but for
the emergence of President de Gaulle--though it is my view that they would have
had to be faced sooner or later. Deliberately, brutally, often cynically ex-
ploiting American inconsistencies, President de Gaulle has proclaimed a com-
pletely different view of Atlantic relationships and European unity. Since this
conception has more support in Europe than is generally recognized, I will
sktech it briefly now.

B. <u>The Gaullist Conception</u>

1. <u>Historical Perspective.</u> However irritating De Gaulle's methods and however brutal his tactics, there are few figures whom it is more crucial to see in historical perspective. For his policy reflects at its core a deep awareness of the suffering of his people over the span of a generation. Few countries have known the travail which France has suffered since it lost much of its young generation in World War I. Victorious in 1918, France knew better than any of its allies how close to defeat it had been. Inchoately, the survivors of that catastrophe realized that France could not stand another trial like the one just surmounted. Deprived of its youth, fearful of its defeated antagonist, feeling misunderstood by its allies, France experienced in the interwar period an almost uninterrupted succession of frustrations. The French collapse of 1940 was as much moral as military. Even though France emerged among the victors of World War II, its leaders were aware, despite all the rhetoric and perhaps because of it, that France had been saved largely through the efforts of others.

Once more, peace brought no respite. Instead, the Fourth Republic
experienced the same governmental instability as the Third, and in addition it

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had to go through the searing process of decolonization. Humiliated in 1940,
the French army had barely been reconstituted when it was obliged to engage
in nearly two decades of frustrating colonial wars each of which ended in defeat.

President de Gaulle's brutal tactics sometimes give the impression that a powerful, self-confident France has been a permanent feature of the postwar landscape. It is all but forgotten that between 1958 and 1962 France was on the verge of civil war three times. So well has De Gaulle succeeded in his *tour de force* that his critics act as if the only problem for Europe were to moderate excesses of French assertiveness--a notion which would have been inconceivable five years ago. Thus in a certain sense De Gaulle's objective may well be pedagogical: to teach his country and his continent attitudes of independence and self-reliance. This is an act of historical importance wholly consistent with American long-range interests--however abrupt and annoying the methods by which it comes about.

2. **Substantive Views.** The attempt to achieve more self-reliance makes De Gaulle wary of integration in any sphere but particularly in the military field. De Gaulle believes that countries without direct responsibility for their defense will not make the necessary effort over a period of time. This will lead, in his view, to a growing sense of impotence and dependence on the United States. Where the United States believes in the obsolescence of the nation-state, De Gaulle passionately affirms its continued role. Where the United States and many Europeans want to construct a united Europe by way of federal institutions, De Gaulle bases his notion of Europe on agreement among governments. Where the United States tends to equate unity with formal,

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legal commitments, De Gaulle emphasizes the notion of interest and equilibrium. He insists on autonomy in nuclear matters; recently he has come close to affirming freedom of action across the whole spectrum of defense. Once an advocate of an autonomous, if confederated, Europe he seems to have become disillusioned by the possibilities of Franco-German cooperation which would be essential to such a scheme and for the failure of which many French officials blame American pressures. He has, therefore, resurrected the first hints of the classic Russo-French understanding. Whatever his motive, De Gaulle has moved from advocating the unity of Western Europe to holding out a vision of the unity of all of Europe. He has made himself the spokesman for a relaxation of East-West tensions.

3. Summary and Critique: De Gaulle's abrupt and unilateral tactics often tempt his opponents to absorb their energies in dealing with the symptoms to the neglect of the deeper challenge. Whatever we may think of his answers, he has posed questions which the West will not be able to avoid answering. There is merit in his contention that before a political unit can mean something to others it must first mean something to itself. It would be wrong, moreover, to picture De Gaulle as totally isolated. Many Europeans support his views --especially on NATO questions and East-West relations--though they are too used to the old pattern to say so openly. Some of his critics oppose him for reasons of domestic not of foreign policy; the recent actions of his challenger in the Presidential election--Mitterand--illustrate this point. Others affirm a version of Atlanticism that comes close to shifting all responsibility to us. It is possible to argue that but for De Gaulle the previous pattern might have

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continued; now it cannot be restored even after De Gaulle's departure.

At the same time De Gaulle's imperious style explains why he has often thwarted his own aims. Man is not governed by reason alone. History may appear inevitable in retrospect: but it is made by men who cannot always distinguish their emotion from their analysis. De Gaulle's wounding insistence on intellectual submission to his maxims and his rigid defense of an extreme conception of sovereignty has antagonized even those who share his aspiration for greater European autonomy. His tactics create the impression that he desires autonomy not to enhance the unity of the West but to enable him to pursue policies contradictory, if not hostile, to those of the United States. Great men build truly only if they remember that their achievement must be maintained by the less gifted individuals who are likely to follow them. A structure which can be preserved only if there is a great man in each generation is inherently fragile. This may be the nemesis of De Gaulle's success.

### C. The Problem of Germany

The real victims of the current split in the Atlantic Alliance has been the Federal Republic of Germany. Urged by France to pursue a "European" course and by the United States towards "Atlantic" conceptions, advised to seek unity now by firmness, now by conciliation, pressed to meet balance of payment costs, the pillar of everybody's construction and the worry of many, the Federal Republic stands in danger of losing the precarious stability which it has so painfully and so responsibly developed since the war.

For the seeming balance and solidity of post-war Germany--which causes it to be the object of constant wooing--is highly deceptive. Every German over

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fifty-five--and this includes almost all leaders--has lived through three revolutions. He has known four different regimes each claiming to be morally antithetical to its predecessor. He has seen Germany lose two world wars and experience two catastrophic inflations. Every German over forty has lived through the Nazi period, World War II and the post-war collapse. Germany has suffered too many breaks in historical continuity and too many shocks to sustain prolonged pressure. Great national prosperity has developed at the same time that national, political and territorial integrity has been lost. The incongruity of this situation contributes to the insecurity of German leadership groups, the legalism of whose policy prescriptions often hides a lack of inner assurance.

This sense of insecurity is absolutely central. The dominant German desire is to escape the burden of difficult choices. The German nightmare is a reappearance of the historical isolation which for almost its entire national history has forced Germany to confront hostility on all its borders, East and West. [If this situation reappears German worries could take dramatic form.] If the Federal Republic becomes the focal point of all European tensions, German frustrations are likely to turn on the seeming cause of its isolation. It is essential that we do not find ourselves in that position. This--not the nuclear issue--is the real German "problem".

The German "problem" is complicated not only by history but by difficulties of policy. Alone among the Western powers, the Federal Republic cannot be satisfied with the territorial status quo. Any foreseeable German government--regardless of party--will have as one of its paramount objectives

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the reunification of the German people. Until 1961, it was assumed that this
goal could be achieved by ever closer integration within the Atlantic Alliance.
The Berlin Wall shattered these hopes. It is clear that however German unity
comes about--if ever--it will be under conditions other than a movement of the
frontiers of NATO towards the East. It has become apparent that the slogans of
the fifties no longer fully apply causing all German political parties to grope
for "new approaches" to a problem which in the present world constellation
may be insoluble and whose intractability may further mortgage German political
life. (I will say more about this later.)

The unsettling effect of these developments causes efforts to relax East-West tensions to take on a special significance in Germany. German leaders welcome relief from pressures on them; but they are uneasy lest all other aspects of the German situation become frozen too. They make a distinction between "peripheral" settlements which they welcome and "central" agreements which they oppose unless they bring some visible progress on the German question. This explains the extremely unsettling effect the negotiations on non-proliferation have had on many German political leaders.

In short, the Federal Republic finds itself in an extremely difficult
situation. France threatens to withdraw its troops over the principle of
integration; Britain and the United States indicate that they might reduce theirs
unless the Federal Republic eases their balance of payments problem. The
Soviet Union has cast the Federal Republic in the position of the international
villain. Even within the Western Alliance a potential "threat" from the Federal
Republic is often invoked to justify schemes--from MLF to enhanced integration.

- 12 -

All this threatens to upset the delicate balance of German political life. It exposes the Federal Republic to dangerous pressures and temptations. Germany has emerged as the balance wheel of the Western Alliance. The most exposed Western ally, 17 million of whose people are Communist hostages, has become the focal point of all disputes. Its internal structure may not be equal to this strain. There are signs already that the conflict may tear apart the governing party, the Christian Democratic Union, which largely forged the pro-Western orientation of the Federal Republic. This will liberate tendencies in the other parties that are now restrained by their desire to present themselves as responsible trustees of a well-established consensus. Thus the current situation contains a series of time bombs. Schizophrenia is built into the Federal Republic's political life.

[Many of these difficulties are insoluble at least in the short run. Many are outside American control. But the volatility of the situation does impose on American policy requirements for very great circumspection. The insecurity of German leaders and their desire to be good allies cause them to go along with American proposals not necessarily because they want them but because they believe it is expected of them. But this does not mean that the Federal Republic can sustain the consequences of all such actions. A break with France which can be ascribed to American pressure could easily backfire on us. And I am bound to say that American actions in recent years have already placed us into a precarious position in this respect. Overtures towards East Germany encouraged in the belief that they offer a possibility of reunification could easily generate a frustrated nationalism if it turns out that they cement

- 13 -

the partition of Germany rather than allieveate it. What the Federal Republic needs above all is solid, reliable, steady allies. What it cannot stand is to be the focal point of all pressures. It would be tragic if Germany whose national disasters in this century were caused in part by the attempt to conduct an isolated policy in the center of the European Continent, now came to grief because it tried to be too responsive to allies whose conflicts strain German political life. To be sure, President de Gaulle bears a heavy responsibility for this state of affairs. But if we compound his abruptness with our outrage history will not excuse the inadequacy of the response by the magnitude of the challenge.

### D. The Nuclear "Problem"

In recent years, the so-called nuclear "problem" has been at the center of the NATO debate. Until President Johnson called off intense pressures on its behalf--in my view wisely--the MLF was pushed as America's principal answer to the Gaullist challenge. The MLF is no longer actively pursued; but the belief that NATO's problems could be eased by a new nuclear force under Alliance ownership and control dies hard. It therefore may require a few words here.

I have always been extremely skeptical of the so-called "hardware
solution" for the following reasons:

1. If the analysis in my background paper is even partly correct, the basic problem before the Alliance is political not military. It derives from the need to adjust European-American and East-West relations to new conditions. Even the nuclear issue is not technical but political; its "solution"

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--insofar as it has one--depends on the ability of an alliance composed of sovereign states to develop the confidence which will enable it to act in common in the face of a technology of unprecedented destructiveness.

2. It was a mistake to attempt to gear NATO policy to the projection of unstated German wishes. No significant demand for possession of nuclear weapons existed in Germany when the MLF was first proposed. Outside very restricted official circles, no significant backing exists for other "hardware" solutions. Even after three years of discussion and pressure only a small number of German officials--and no other public figures--are committed to the "hardware solution."

3. The nuclear control issue is not "solved" by any of the "hardware" solutions now being discussed nor can it be by any adaptation of them. [If any of the common ownership schemes so far proposed were accepted the situation would be as follows: (a) No country presently *unable* to go to nuclear war will be enabled to do so as a result of the "hardware solution"--the existing vetos would remain. (b) No country presently *able* to go to nuclear war can be prevented from doing so by participating in a "hardware" solution. (c) No country presently *unable* to go to nuclear war can force its nuclear ally to go to nuclear war as the result of a "hardware" solution.] All that participation in a commonly owned force buys is the ability to veto the use of the very small percentage of the total nuclear arsenal which it represents (about 3%) but *not* the remainder. If a "hardware" solution were accepted, this could not remain a permanent state of affairs especially if heavy financial sacrifices are involved. The probability is, therefore, that a commonly owned force will

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repeat within its framework all the arguments it was supposed to allay.
Pressures for altering the control mechanism are inevitable. A jointly owned
force will buy not a solution but a permanent crisis.

4. The nuclear issue diverts attention from the cardinal problem of political cooperation to an inherently divisive issue with respect to which formal pronouncements are likely to be highly misleading. Nuclear war--if it should occur--will come only at the end of a long diplomatic process and will involve the national survival of all participants. It seems contradictory to try to integrate nuclear strategy while leaving the process of diplomacy which precedes it bilateral. If a coordinated diplomacy can be achieved the problem of who presses the button will seem less crucial. If political confidence and cooperation cannot be developed, theoretical voting formulae for entering nuclear war will prove empty. [No country will let itself be voted into nuclear war against its better judgment. No one can seriously believe that a United States President would risk hundreds of millions of lives after being outvoted in a committee--after, in short, having decided that nuclear war was not in the American interest. And the same is true of other countries.] The primary guarantee for our allies is a harmonization of political objectives so that the conception of vital interests of various allies is virtually indistinguishable.
If we and our allies see our vital interests the same way, the nuclear control issue will be well on its way to a "solution." [If we cannot achieve such a consensus, physical possession of a small jointly owned force will be irrelevant.
As will be discussed below, the major thrust of American policy should be to strengthen political consultation and for this the Special Committee (the McNamara committee) seems at present the best forum available.]

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## II. Where Do We Go From Here?

The French challenge has raised a whole host of logistic, legal and technical problems which inevitably absorb much of the immediate attention. I will here try to sketch some of the long-term goals which I believe should guide United States policy. Not all of them are inconsistent with existing U.S. policy; many of them in fact reflect American objectives. I will state my views partly in the form of answers to questions, partly under various policy headings.

### A. What Kind of a Europe is in Our Interest?

Though I deplore the methods of President de Gaulle, I have always been prepared to grant his historic importance. A greater degree of political and military autonomy for Europe is essential for the cohesion of the West and in our own long-term interest. Though this proposition will be granted in the abstract, there is a tendency to resist independence when it takes the form of challenging our judgments. Nevertheless, it is essential that we adjust the pattern of relationships which grew up after the war. Though historically we are the children of Europe, with respect to the postwar evolution we are somewhat in the position of a father toward a grown-up son. He can always take the attitude that, since their interests are identical, he will continue to control all the resources. He can challenge the son to name circumstances in which their interests might differ. He can tell him that no legitimate request will ever go unheeded. Such an attitude will either drive the son to open rebellion or, if accepted, will break his spirit.

Since the war Europe has been first nurtured and then protected by us. Now we require wisdom and delicacy in handling the transition from tutelage to equality--a process to which no nation has ever adjusted easily.

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The assertions of European self-will which we find so irritating today can be
the growing pains of a new and healthier relationship which ultimately is impor-
tant for us as well.

Some critics of American policy argue that the attempt to play a role
simultaneously in every part of the globe is beyond our *physical* resources. It
seems to me clearly beyond our *psychological* resources. If we insist on
assuming the principal responsibility for every square mile of territory at
every moment of time, we will tear ourselves to pieces inwardly. The continent
closest to us culturally, with similar political traditions and substantial economic
resources should--for our sake as well as its own--assume a greater respon-
sibility for its policy and defense. It is neither in our interest nor that of
Europe that Europe become the Greece to our Rome--a political backwater,
interesting culturally but unable to play an active role. This would not be
healthy for us because hegemony is demoralizing in the long run.

Painful as it may be to admit, we
could benefit from a counterweight to discipline our occasional impetuosity
and to supply historical perspective to our penchant for abstract and "final"
solutions. The day will come when we will consider a measure of autonomy in
Europe a blessing rather than an irritant. In this century no one could have
foreseen at the beginning of any decade what the world would look like at its
end. Things have not grown less complicated or more predictable. Those
centers of initiative which still exist should not be discouraged. It is not always
the least responsible allies that wish to reserve some measure of control over
their destiny. Some of those most eager to have us assume all responsibility
may do so for reasons which are not too comforting in the long run; they may

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be only too eager to shift all risks and burden to our shoulders. Little would be gained by replacing a nationalism of insufficient strength by a neutralism masquerading as Atlanticism.

## B. Do We Need to Fear a Third Force?

Many would grant the need for a greater European role in the abstract. However, they tend to argue that this will have to await the unification of Europe on a federal basis. There exists also a certain ambivalence: the desirability of a united Europe is affirmed, but there is also a fear lest it pursue "Third Force" tendencies. The seeming dilemma is often solved by a call for American leadership. Some invoke the "heroic" days of the creation of the Marshall Plan as a model for current American attitudes.

I believe our present challenge to be more complex and subtle. In the late forties, conception, execution and salesmanship alike depended on American initiatives. Today, the central task is to encourage a European sense of responsibility. To the extent that the United States uses the methods of the forties it encourages two unfortunate tendencies. On the one hand, some Europeans will be only too happy to abdicate "leadership" to us. The question is whether those most ready to shift the burden of difficult choices to our shoulders will prove very steady partners in times of crisis. On the other hand, we will see a mounting tendency to base European policy on anti-Americanism. There will be a growing belief that a European identity can only come about if seized from the United States and not with our cooperation.

I am not advocating a reduction of our commitment to the defense of Europe. I am urging a change in the means by which the commitment is carried out. I am not saying that our influence in Europe should disappear. I am arguing

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that the only way we can maintain our influence is by reducing our formal pre-
dominance.

As for Third Force tendencies, it is important to distinguish the fact
of a Third Force from its objectives. Europe as a Third Force--in the sense
of being powerful and active in world affairs--is in our interest even if its inter-
nal structure does not follow our preferred prescription. Whether there is a
danger that Europe pursues policies detrimental to the United States depends
on Europe's ability to perceive its proper interests. [The memory of its im-
potence and of our tutelage contribute to the illusion that we understand Europe's
problems better than it does itself. In the long run, this is not a reliable basis
for Atlantic policy.] If Europe cannot be trusted to perceive the realities of its
position, American tutelage can be at best a stopgap remedy. [I would even
argue that the greatest incentives for irresponsibility exist when we seem
anxious to assume all risks while our allies are on the sidelines free to criticize
but unwilling to shoulder burdens. ]

A long-range Atlantic policy will try to base itself on the following
facts:

1. A Europe assuming greater responsibility for its own foreign policy and defense will be bound to recognize (a) that there exists only one potential threat to its security and (b) that in every conceivable case this threat can be met more effectively with United States assistance than without it.

2. It follows that Europe must be at least as interested in an American commitment to its defense as we.

3. We do not have to "fight" for our position in Europe; there is always likely to be a substantial majority on behalf of a continued major U.S. role--even in France.

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4. There are objective limits to an "anti-American" European policy. It is hard to visualize a "deal" between the Soviet Union and Europe which might jeopardize our interests or security and which would not jeopardize European interests and security first. What is true of Europe as a whole is even more applicable to individual European countries.

5. An erratic United States policy can perhaps make thoughtful Europeans doubt the integral connection between their future and ours. By itself, French policy cannot.

This suggests a policy of great restraint by the United States. Care should be taken not to resurrect old national rivalries--which De Gaulle has already done so much to foster--in the name of Atlanticism. To the extent that Europeans are made to face their problems in a European context they are more likely to be driven to Atlantic cooperation than the opposite. To the extent that we take the principal role in attempting to shape internal European developments we may create the impression that there is an inconsistency between Atlantic cooperation and a European evolution.

### C. Is It in Our Interest to Isolate De Gaulle?

According to one school of thought President de Gaulle is the chief obstacle to European unity and Atlantic integration. Its advocates urge "isolating" De Gaulle both within NATO and in Europe. I consider this approach to be mistaken and doomed to failure. In fact, I believe that De Gaulle's policies are sometimes given impetus by our aggrieved, personal reactions to them. Like a judo artist he uses our moves to gain a leverage that his own strength does not afford. To test Allied cohesion by a formal counting of votes is misleading. Within NATO the 14:1 line-up against France may prevail on technical issues;

- 21 -

it will not hold together in a prolonged political contest--even over strategic
doctrine. Within the Europe of the Six, De Gaulle has never been as alone as
some like to believe. And he would have even more support were he to pay lip
service to some wider conception of European unity. On the issue of East-West
relations, his views without question represent the dominant trend in Europe.

The real victim of a deliberate policy to isolate De Gaulle will, in any
event, not be France but the Federal Republic of Germany. France cannot be
isolated without the assistance of the Federal Republic. This is why some have
urged that NATO essentially rest on a "special" United States-German relation-
ship. Such a course would mortgage the Alliance as well as the Federal Republic.

A confrontation with France--unless provoked unambiguously by France
and perhaps even then--must undermine German political life. It will split the
CDU. This will in turn radicalize the other parties.

At the same time, the practical consequence of such a policy will be
to exalt the relative weight of the Federal Republic both in Europe and in the
Alliance. This will not be healthy for the Federal Republic, for European
cohesion, or for the Atlantic Alliance. If the Federal Republic becomes the
senior European NATO partner, the existing--already largely superficial--unity
in opposition to De Gaulle will disintegrate. Most European countries will be
extremely uneasy about a structure in which German influence will seem to
predominate. This will have profound effects when the issue of renewal of NATO
comes up, especially in the Scandinavian countries and Italy.

Finally, such a course has a high probability of alienating us in the
end from the Federal Republic. If the cementing of a Franco-German rift should
be followed by measures of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union

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which causes anxiety in the Federal Republic a serious crisis in U.S. -German relations is likely. In short, I believe that the United States has a positive interest to prevent a Franco-German rupture and to encourage the Federal Republic to retain its ties to France.

The future of the two French divisions in Germany should be considered largely from this aspect. Their removal--unless it results from clearly demonstrable French intransigence--will symbolize a Franco-German rupture. A reappearance of a situation in which Germany once again has only hostile neighbors will lead to serious psychological effects later on. We could easily become the target of these frustrations.

Four policy conclusions follow:

1. If France must be fought on the onus for such a conflict should be clearly on its side. We should lean over backward to avoid it.

2. The United States has a positive interest in encouraging the closest relationship between London, Paris and Bonn. No other road to European unity is as promising. A grouping of Britain and the Federal Republic--which many urge--is fragile even should we join it. There are too many differences in perspective on global problems, East-West relations and deployment for such a grouping to be anything but a temporary expedient. A Bonn-Paris axis arouses too much hostility in Washington and too much distrust in the rest of Europe. A London-Paris understanding would isolate Germany and might lead to separate German overtures toward the East. A Washington-Bonn grouping is likely to focus all anti-German, anti-American and anti-nuclear sentiments against the Atlantic Alliance.

- 23 -

3. If Franco-British-German understanding is essential, we must take care not to submerge the long-term in the immediate and to encourage the building of bridges to France instead of the opposite. The United States should do nothing to weaken further the Franco-German rapprochement. If a rift should come, it should be evident beyond doubt that it was not due to American pressures--direct or indirect, official or unofficial. Though many American statements are formally consistent with these maxims, it would be difficult to convince most Europeans that they represent American "action" policy. In this connection I want to express my strong support for the reported decision of President Johnson not to permit a public debate with France.

4. Whatever happens, a serious dialogue at the highest level between France and the United States is essential. I recognize that some may construe such an effort as a reward for bad French behavior. But too much time has already been lost and too much is at stake. In a period of hoped-for detente with the Communist world, it should not be impossible to conduct unconditional conversations with a traditional ally. If the attempt succeeds, most Europeans would be relieved. If it fails we could face the ensuing contest with the knowledge that no effort was spared to prevent a rift which must hurt the West.

D. How Much Integration Do We Really Want?

1. Political. Many hold the view that the reason Europe is reluctant to play a global role is due to the inadequacy of the resources of national states. They hold that unified Europe would assume greater global responsibilities. One answer to the current crisis, therefore, is to urge more integration and to press for European unity. In the meantime, consultation and formal legal structures should promote Allied cohesion.

- 24 -

I think this view is vastly oversimplified. The American national experience would seem to contradict the assumption of an automatic relationship between power and the willingness to play an international role. Until 1941, the United States possessed the resources but not the inclination to assume global responsibilities. Conversely many European states maintained vast overseas commitments when their resources were much smaller than they are today.

With respect to overseas involvements, the combination of decolonization and two world wars have been traumatic for the Europeans--Great Britain partially excepted. Having been forced to relinquish their overseas possessions, they no longer consider that their security is *directly* affected by what happens in, for example, Southeast Asia. Rather than run the risk of nuclear destruction on behalf of a distant area from which they have been recently ejected, they prefer to shift the risks and the burdens to us. They are reasonably sure that long before upheavals in other continents threaten the safety of Europe, the United States will have entered the fray. In other words, they treat America's extra-European concerns in much the same way that the United States looked at Europe's quarrels until 1941. And they are no more likely to be swayed by exhortations than we would have been in our period of isolation.

Even within Europe, burden-sharing provides an incentive for responsible policy only when two conditions are met: (1) our Allies must have the same view of the political environment as we, at least as it affects Europe and (2) they must believe that unless they play a greater role the United States will reduce its contribution (not its commitment). Neither condition is met today. Indeed our over-eager, importuning attitude with respect to the second point defeats our objectives with respect to the first.

- 25 -

Thus it seems high time to consider how much integration we really want. The logic of our position will create pressures for integrating ever more of our forces, including our strategic forces. And it will generate increasing demands for European participation in global decisions. This leads to the curious position where our Allies at one and the same time reduce their defense contributions while pressing for increased political influence. (The British White Paper on Defense is not free of these tendencies.)

The consequences for over-all policy are highly undesirable. In such a system, policy may grow stagnant. The Alliance will be able to agree only on doing nothing. Domestic pressures in most Allied countries will mount. Any crisis, occurring anywhere will turn immediately, automatically and organically world-wide. It is often said that World War I was caused by the absence of a functioning system of collective security. This may be true. But World War I surely illustrates the perils of alliance structures so rigid that any conflict --however trivial--becomes immediately and organically world-wide.

Of course, we should cooperate with Europeans wherever possible. But cooperation cannot be an end in itself. It functions best through balancing incentives for responsible policy. A multiplication of legal devices--unsupported by a real conception of common interest--defeats its own purpose. In the long term excessive concentration of decision-making may deprive our Allies of the incentive to act responsibly and it may open up profound fissures when a conflict of interests becomes apparent--especially in crises outside of Europe.

2. **Military Integration.** As I have pointed out in my background paper the military arrangements of NATO have had both a symbolic and a substantive aspect. Our European critics are right when the accuse us of

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dominating NATO planning, but they are wrong when they ascribe it to dark American designs. SACEUR's role was deliberately brought about by Europeans afraid of a return to American isolationism and eager to create as many tangible American ties to the Continent as possible. During the period of the American nuclear predominance our Allies had an interest to commit us organically--preferably automatically--to their defense.

In the fifties, a dominant position for the United States seemed to our Allies the best guarantee of our commitment to the defense of Europe. But many Allies have used this state of affairs as an excuse to avoid difficult domestic choices. They have encouraged us to assume the burden of defense expenditures and the stress of difficult strategic decisions. Their incentive has been to provide forces large enough to induce us to maintain a maximum deployment in Europe but not so large as to create real alternatives to nuclear deterrence. Their interest has been in the symbolic, not the substantive, aspect of NATO. Some Allies have been more concerned with status within the Alliance than with elaborating a strategic posture on its merits.

Such a state of affairs cannot be healthy in the long run. It is unprecedented that the defense of an area so rich and potentially so powerful as Europe should in all essentials be left to a country 3000 miles away. As a result, our Allies have either abdicated from the strategic field or adopted a military posture which duplicates the categories in which we are strongest.

The malaise of NATO is, therefore, organic. The present system encourages too many of our Allies to shift the costs and the responsibilities of the common defense to us. Exhortation will not alter this. Countries do not assume burdens because it is fair; only because it is necessary. Europe will

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not assume a larger burden for its defense until it also shares a larger
responsibility.

[This suggests that it would be a great mistake to identify the future of NATO with the indefinite continuation of every detail of the existing structure. Whether a country comes to the assistance of an Ally depends less on formal chains of command than on its conception of vital interests. It is primarily a political, not a military, problem.]

Three principles should govern our attitudes towards the present military command structure:

(1) Integrated commands are made necessary by modern technology. This realization will govern the decisions of all those taking defense seriously.

(2) As NATO has evolved, the symbolic functions of SACEUR are no longer so crucial as in the fifties. SACEUR should therefore concentrate on the military problem while the political and doctrinal issues should be shifted partly to the Special Committee, partly to the Military Committee. Present policy seems to be moving in this direction.

(3) The relative weight of Europe in the command structure and in the NATO organization should be increased. This is all the more important because in no other area has the dependence of Europe on the United States been so great or so prolonged. In every other field American policy has deliberately sought to reduce Europe's dependence on the United States; in the military sphere the thrust of United States policy has been to make our tutelage more bearable.

...to page 27a

- 27a -

When the United States gave economic assistance to Europe after World War II, it tried to induce its European Allies to assume responsibility for developing a joint program and a system for dividing up the total available aid. Though United States representatives played an active and important advisory role, the basic scheme was European. The Atlantic Alliance owes a great deal to the habits of cooperation and mutual respect developed during the Marshall Plan. In the military field, by contrast, the United States never encouraged the emergence of a specifically European point of view. It made no

..... to page 28

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effort to stimulate European institutions comparable to those it fostered in the
economic sphere. The Western European Union (WEU), which originally had
been expected to play that role, has remained dormant. It would seem wise for
the WEU to be given new vitality by charging it with carrying out the European
portion of common plans as well as to define common strategic guidelines.

E. Policy toward Germany

The necessity of retaining the Federal Republic as a willing member
of the Alliance, of keeping Germany organically tied to NATO, of meeting real
or assumed Germany wishes is being invoked to support almost every policy in
almost every country. Apart from the fact that the objective is used to justify
widely contradictory policies, the formulation is highly dangerous. It creates
the impression that whether the Federal Republic behaves responsibly depends
entirely on the self-restraint of its government. It overlooks that integration
has corresponded to basic interests of the Federal Republic and did not simply
reflect individual preferences. What has kept Germany tied to the West is not
a legal obligation but a wise assessment of its long-term interests.

Integration was the route to equality. It was made necessary by the
trauma of defeat and the consequent horror of standing alone. It is extremely
dangerous to create the impression that we must pay a yearly price to the
Federal Republic lest it do something very reckless. If the U.S. becomes the
advocate of unstated German desires and gears its policies to anticipate them,
it may create illusions of choice for the Federal Republic. It is essential to
take legitimate German concerns seriously. It is dangerous to act with such
extraordinary nervousness for this may encourage tendencies not founded on
reality. Similarly, it cannot be good for the cohesion of the Alliance to keep

- 29 -

insisting that one of its primary functions is to restrain the potential menace
of one of its key members. Fifteen years of responsible policy should have
earned the Federal Republic the right to have its positions accepted on their
merit.

What is most urgently needed in our German policy is steadiness and
reliability. Constant pressures--however valid the requests--must shake Ger-
man self-assurance. Unending exhortations to accept the latest version of "new"
doctrines may strain the fabric of German political life. Frequent changes of
policy will use up our credit--whatever the merit of individual measures.
Trying to make Germany take the lead in an anti-French crusade will--as
already pointed out--mortgage the future. Germany's psychological margin is
far narrower than its economic one and in the long run more decisive.

But if the United States requires compassion and respect for the
political and moral dilemmas of a divided country, and if it should strain to
avoid complicating its choices, this will presuppose sufficient confidence to
deal with individual issues rather than their symbols.

Among these, German reunification looms ever larger. I cannot do
justice to this complicated problem in a statement which is already too long.
Let me confine myself to a few observations.

(1) An alliance which does not treat this paramount German interest
with respect and understanding will soon lose its meaning in German eyes. It
is incumbent on Germany's Allies to take the concern for unification seriously
and to help develop responsible programs.

(2) Any such program must include provisions about Germany's
eastern frontiers, its military status and its renunciation of nuclear weapons.

- 30 -

These may not be enough, but without them no serious program is possible.

(3) Whatever the program, unification will result not from one spectacular negotiation but from an extended historical process. Under present world conditions **no** program, however reasonable, can induce the Soviet leaders to sacrifice the East German regime. The collapse of a Communist regime would shake the Soviet hold in Eastern Europe and jeopardize its prospects in the ideological conflict with Communist China.

(4) German unity will become possible only if there is (a) a collapse of Soviet power or (b) a change in the ideological climate of the world which might make the East German regime less important for a more national Russia.

(5) A "program" for unification will be relevant primarily in these contingencies. It will be promising to the extent that there exists a European structure in which the significance of national frontiers is sharply reduced.

(6) It is dangerous to encourage the Federal Republic into solitary efforts on the subject of unification--especially toward East Germany. The superiority of West Germany's bargaining position toward East Germany --which is postulated by some--is likely to be an illusion. On the contrary, German political leaders may find themselves facing a growing dilemma. In return for easing the fate of their population, the East Germans can demand concrete political gains. Confronted by popular pressures and moved by humanitarian impulses, no German government will find it easy to be dispassionate in deciding at which point an accumulation of seemingly marginal concessions has produced an irreversible trend. The result is more likely to be the indefinite continuation of two hostile, competing German states than progress toward unification. Such an outcome would build pressures toward

- 31 -

a Popular Front into the German scene--a Popular Front of a particularly virulent kind because the partner would be not a party but a sovereign state.

(7) While progress toward German unity presupposes a change in current East-West patterns, this change must be sought in a framework larger than the German national one. This is another reason why a European structure is so important and why the United States must do nothing to undermine the building blocks of European unity, including Franco-German friendship.

## F. The Nuclear Issue

As I have already pointed out, the so-called "hardware solution" does not seem to me fruitful. Since the problem is essentially political, the Special (McNamara) Committee should be given every opportunity to work and should be expanded to include political functions. Its task should be to formulate common strategic doctrine and common disarmament policy. [Within its framework, the European countries could, if they wished, form a closer association. For example, the Western European Union might well be given responsibility for the European contribution to joint NATO plans. As Europe gains structure, the Special Committee could draw nearer to the "twin pillars" concept. But Atlantic partnership, in this approach, could become operative even if European unity were delayed. Atlantic partnership and increased European cohesion thus could be pursued simultaneously, with no advance commitment to giving priority to either course.]

(If this solution fails to satisfy our Allies in the long run, a European nuclear force is preferable to the "hardware" solutions now being proposed. Indeed, it is likely that nuclear autonomy is the least divisive form of European unity. In the economic field, competition between Europe and the United States

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involves, at best, indirect risks. In the political area, the temptations for
independent action are great and the penalties small. In military matters--and
particularly in the nuclear field--the closest association between Europe and the
United States is in the self-interest of both sides. Whatever their formal
autonomy, it is highly improbable that our Allies would _prefer_ to go to war with
the relatively small nuclear forces available or in prospect for them and _without_
the support of our necessarily preponderant arsenal. Close coordination between
Europe and the United States in the nuclear field is dictated by self-interest; and
Europe has more to gain from it than the United States.

This is not to say that the United States should actively promote a
European nuclear force. On the contrary, the United States should show more
restraint in seeking to influence internal European arrangements and exert its
influence in shaping Atlantic relationships. It does mean, however, that we
should not seek to destroy those elements from which a European force could
emerge by pressing for alternatives--through the so-called "hardware solution"--
which will in time cause much greater difficulties. A European nuclear force
presupposes, however, European political unity.

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### III. Conclusion

Gentlemen of the Committee, I have tried to present some possible directions, not a detailed policy. Those who have final responsibility are, of course, aware of nuances unavailable to me; all of policy moreover depends on assessments which cannot be proved correct when they are made. Needless to say, this applies to my judgments as well.

In these days we are aware of disagreements above all. It is well to remember that the problems in the Alliance are essentially a luxury made possible by an increasing margin of safety; they reflect strength and returned vigor; we can therefore hope that they can serve as the basis of a new relationship.

Some months ago at a private conference of Europeans and Americans we were discussing the nuclear question when a Frenchman said something with which I strongly agree. He pointed out that it is futile to have the future of the Alliance turn on plans for such an apocalyptic contingency. The only way the Atlantic nations could come together is to find a way of dreaming together about the kind of world they want to bring about, rather than about the circumstances in which they might wish to blow it up. We live in a world which, because it is revolutionary, constantly confronts us with problems. Yet it is impossible to create another structure, or another form of community, without a clear conception, which we sometimes deny ourselves by our intense preoccupation with daily crises. It is important to remember that there are two kinds of realists: those who adapt to reality and those who seek to shape it. The world we in the West will build may depend less on technical discussions than on common dreams.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman

JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama

MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana

WAYNE MORSE, Oregon

ALBERT GORE, Tennessee

FRANK J. LAUSCHE, Ohio

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho

STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri

THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut

JOSEPH S. CLARK, Pennsylvania

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island

EUGENE J. McCARTHY, Minnesota

GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming

BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa

GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont

FRANK CARLSON, Kansas

JOHN J. WILLIAMS, Delaware

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota

CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey

CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff

ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk

II

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In your letter of March 31, you recom-
mended that I undertake a trip to Europe for the purpose of ascer-
taining current opinion there on issues of concern to the United
States. You suggested that I interview government leaders, members
of opposition parties, scholars, journalists, and other political ob-
servers. You indicated your belief that these conversations would
furnish the committee with up-to-date information, and that this was
a particularly important time to reexamine European problems.

As you anticipated, my trip proved to be most useful and informative. I began, on May 1, in Geneva, where the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference was meeting and, in the course of the following 2 weeks, visited Brussels, Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin. I returned to Washington on May 14. Throughout the trip, I had the able assistance of Mr. James G. Lowenstein of our committee staff.

Each day, from early morning until late in the evening, I questioned
as many persons—ranging across the whole spectrum of opinion—as
time would permit. Included among the government leaders were
President de Gaulle, Premier Pompidou, and Foreign Minister Couve
de Murville in Paris; Prime Minister Wilson and Defense Minister
Healey in London; Prime Minister Vanden Boeynants, Foreign
Minister Harmel, and former Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak in
Brussels; Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder in Bonn;
and Mayor Brandt in Berlin. Memorandums of these, and of all my
other conversations, are included in a separate confidential 91 page
committee print which you have already received. As you know, I
assured all those with whom I talked that there would be no public
disclosure of these conversations and, accordingly, the confidential
print is being given the most carefully limited circulation.

The report that is submitted herewith contains my general con-
clusions and recommendations. They reflect my conviction that
the problems we face elsewhere in the world must not distract us from
the imperative need to bring our policy toward Europe into line with
the changing realities of the European scene.

I would like to thank publicly the Secretary of State, our Ambassa-
dors to the countries I visited, and the many officers in our missions
abroad who were so helpful and cooperative. Their assistance,
individually and collectively, was much appreciated.

I should note, in closing, that I was received most cordially wherever
I went. I am indebted to the officials of the foreign governments,
opposition leaders, and many private citizens in the countries I
visited for giving me so generously of their time.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK CHURCH.

III

EUROPE TODAY

I. CONCLUSIONS

1. *Europe and the United States*

In the eyes of most Western Europeans, the postwar period has ended. Western Europe has fully regained its vitality. Living standards far exceed prewar levels. The threat of a Soviet armed attack appears to be subsiding, and the prospect of a new war in Europe is regarded as increasingly unlikely. Western Europeans long for a thaw in the "cold war." They sense that the time may now be opportune for a gradual relaxation of tensions between the two halves of Europe, as a necessary precondition for an eventual settlement which could bring an end to the present unnatural partition of the Continent.

Although reasonably satisfied with the present and sanguine about the future, there is still a feeling of uneasiness when our allies in Europe look either to the East or to the West. In the East, Western Europeans see a less militant Soviet Union and her neighbor Communist countries evolving, some more rapidly than others, in the direction of a more independent relationship with Russia. At the same time, Western Europeans see no evidence of any present disposition on the part of the Soviets to release their hold on East Germany to permit a reunification that would end the uneasy, potentially explosive, military confrontation in the heart of the continent. Thus, while a Soviet military thrust into Western Europe is regarded as highly improbable, it is not dismissed as impossible. And there appears to be virtually unanimous recognition among Western Europeans that, should war threaten again, their protection still rests on American nuclear power.

Looking westward, many Europeans suspect that the United States is unattuned to the changing sentiment in Europe—that we are not moving with the times but remain wedded to concepts which reflect the old status quo. In particular, Europeans would welcome our placing less emphasis upon NATO's role as a fort and more upon its use as a forum for reaching agreement on Western initiatives directed toward the normalization of relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

As for closer ties with the United States, Europeans are apprehensive about being smothered in our embrace. They are uneasy about the magnetic attraction of a voracious American economy. As cause for alarm, they point to the "brain drain," the disparity between research and development funds in the United States and Europe, and the widening American technological superiority in such growth industries as electronics, aircraft and space. Against these American advantages, even the Common Market is a meager and insufficient answer. "We shall be reduced," a renowned economist lamented to me, "to the same subordination to the United States as ancient Greece bore toward imperial Rome. Unless the trend can somehow be

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reversed, we are destined to become a continent of hotel keepers, store clerks, salesmen, and tourist guides."

Thus, on the one hand, there is much evidence in Western Europe today of a satisfaction derived from recovery, of a pride associated with the present prosperity, of a desire for the reassertion of European prerogatives, of a wish for reconciliation with the East and, above all, of a general belief that the danger of war in Europe is diminishing. But, on the other hand, a feeling of vulnerability remains. Europeans have yet devised no substitute for the American nuclear shield— and they do not see any in the offering. As a consequence, they regard the continued deployment of U.S. troops in Europe as vital to the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent. Opinions vary, however, as to the number of troops we need to keep in the Federal Republic of Germany.

In attempting to cope with these somewhat ambivalent sentiments, the interests of American policy would seem to call for less dogmatism, less insistence on American solutions which meet with strong European resistance, and a certain relaxation of pressure—an approach which could be best described by that idiom of the American West, “riding a little looser in the saddle.”

## 2. Our relations with France

If we are regarded as the sentinel of the status quo in Europe, then President de Gaulle of France is looked upon as its challenger. To the degree that he has plumbed the European desire to reach eastward—and to the extent that he has appealed to the dignity, pride, and independent spirit of Europeans—he is not isolated either in France or in Europe. His defiance of what is sometimes described as the American hegemony over Western Europe has engendered admiration, as well as apprehension. In this sense, it seems likely that much of what is called Gaullism will outlive De Gaulle. Moreover, his goal of rapprochement with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, together with his hopes for overcoming the present partition of Europe, represent objectives to which all of Western Europe and the United States can and do subscribe.

But while there is widespread support for these stated objectives, there is anguish over the separatist course De Gaulle has chosen for pursuing them. Outside France, and to some extent even within it, De Gaulle's preemptory treatment of the alliance in general, and of the United States in particular, is deeply resented. There is misgiving that, even though he has declared his intention to remain in the Western alliance, De Gaulle's withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated command will stiffen, rather than lessen, Soviet intransigence. There is also considerable skepticism that France, lacking the needed size and strength in the great power equation, can possibly act as a catalyst in engaging the Soviet Union in meaningful negotiations on European security questions. Nevertheless, there seems to be a certain grudging awe of De Gaulle among many, although certainly not all, Europeans—an inkling that he may be in tune with the trend of the times and that we are not. As one perceptive political observer remarked to me: “France has the objective but not the means, while the United States has the means but not the objective.”

One final observation about our relations with France. I left Paris with the impression that a diplomatic glacier now separates France

EUROPE TODAY

3

and the United States. Communication between the two governments appears to have dangerously broken down. If a useful dialog is to commence again, humility must somehow prevail over pride. Overtures will have to come, so it would seem, from the highest levels.

### 3. *The United States and the alliance*

I found abundant sentiment in Western Europe that reform of NATO is overdue. In the first place, there is pronounced support for "Europeanizing" the alliance—for giving a larger role to the European countries. Secondly, I encountered a strong desire to see the North Atlantic Council utilized for the forging of agreed-upon Western initiatives directed toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Central to both of these considerations is the question of how the members of the alliance should share in NATO's nuclear defense system. There appears to be little enthusiasm for a "hardware solution" to this problem, outside of a certain circle of officials in Bonn, and, I gather, in Washington. Indeed, I was told repeatedly that the United States had been ill advised in pushing the MLF proposal so aggressively. Far from demanding nuclear weapons for themselves, the German people were said to be either disinterested or opposed. Moreover, the conflict is apparent between striving for greater German access to nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and seeking the reunification of Germany on the other. Finally, candor requires the admission that an antipathy toward Germany still pervades Europe. More than once, from among the most highly placed, I was told: "If West Germany ever acquires nuclear weapons, there will never be a solution to the German problem."

At the same time, I found little resistance expressed against giving West Germany a direct voice in nuclear defense planning and strategy. For these reasons, among all the countries concerned, a consultative solution to the nuclear sharing problem, along the lines of the McNamara committee, appears to have by far the widest measure of popular and official support.

### 4. *The German problem*

Germany lies in the middle of Europe—not only geographically but economically and politically as well. Germany is also the frontier in Europe today, for the line which divides it at the same time separates Communist from non-Communist Europe. Thus, so long as Europe lies broken between two hostile camps, Germany, it would seem, will also stay divided.

Western Europeans seem to have reached a consensus that the solution to the German problem will come only after an "improvement in the general climate of confidence" is realized; that a process of reconciliation between Western and Eastern Europe is a necessary precondition to any possible reunification of Germany; in sum, that reunification will follow detente and not vice versa. Even the West Germans themselves appear not to dispute this sequence.

Additionally, it seems to be accepted that a final resolution of the German problem will have to result from negotiations in which the United States and the Soviet Union will be the principal parties. A new all-European security arrangement, guaranteed by the two great nuclear powers, will be required. Given present rigidities on both sides, any speculation as to the specific form of such an arrange-

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EUROPE TODAY

ment, or what Germany's status within it might be, is obviously premature.

In light of these considerations, many West Germans now seem to be thinking more about what practical action can be taken to improve the lot of their East German brothers. There seems to be growing sentiment for doing everything possible to broaden contact and communication across the wall so that East and West Germans will continue to think of themselves as one people. Support for such small steps, however, appears to be stronger within the opposition in West Germany than within the governing coalition. Bonn is skeptical as to what these small steps can accomplish and remains adamantly opposed to recognizing the Oder-Neisse line or modifying the Hallstein doctrine, preferring to retain such concessions for future bargaining in connection with a final settlement.

### 5. Britain and Europe

The British appear to have decided tentatively to enter the Common Market when the time is right, but this decision betrays definite elements of equivocation. Certainly, there is no evident disposition to move until it is certain that there will not be another French veto. The debate continues on collateral questions: the need first to strengthen sterling by overcoming Britain's adverse balance of payments, the resistance to the supranational character of the Common Market, the uneasiness about the Common Market's agricultural policies, the concern that Britain's close ties with the United States might be attenuated, and the feeling that Common Market membership will inhibit Britain's role in the world at large. Still, there is an underlying realization, both in Britain and on the Continent, that admission of the United Kingdom (which would also entail the entry, either as members or associates, of most of the other EFTA countries) would have highly desirable consequences: it would furnish a healthy counterbalance to West Germany's economic weight, the Common Market itself would be strengthened and enlarged and the cause of European unity would be advanced.

Looking into the future, it is likely, then, that Britain and some, if not all, of her Free Trade Area partners, will enter the Common Market within the next 5 years. However, the chances for immediate entry, specifically within the next year or so, appear slim.

### 6. The Geneva Conference

At Geneva, there are grave misgivings that if the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference produces no tangible results by this fall, after 3 years' running, further negotiations there may be broken off, with the United Nations assigning disarmament problems to a much less satisfactory forum. Most of the countries represented at Geneva seem to feel that such a setback would imperil whatever chance there may be for agreement on two treaties of far-reaching importance: a nonproliferation agreement and a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The impasse blocking agreement on a nonproliferation treaty results from Soviet unwillingness to accept the so-called European clause in the American draft which would allow for the creation, sometime in the future, of a European nuclear force, to which West Germany could belong. I found little evidence that Europeans either want such a force or think it now feasible to create one. This has given rise to some suspicion in Geneva that we are not really serious about

EUROPE TODAY

5

consummating a nonproliferation agreement at this time; otherwise, some contend, we would not be mortgaging present prospects for the sake of a highly problematical development which, at best, lies way off in an uncertain future.

The practical effect of a nonproliferation treaty is open to legitimate question. It is possible that the key nonnuclear states, wishing to retain the option of developing nuclear weapons, will refuse to sign. As of now, France and China are not likely to adhere. Moreover, it can be argued that none of the nuclear states intends to help non-nuclear states develop these lethal weapons anyhow. But Europeans see the importance of a nonproliferation agreement as less military than political. They believe that such a treaty could contribute significantly toward improving the climate of confidence in which detente can grow. For all who perceived the positive psychological effect in the United States of the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the question of political consequences is a very important one; no other single event has done more to ease Soviet-American tensions than this first-step agreement.

As for a comprehensive test ban treaty, it seemed obvious to me that Europeans are not sufficiently aware of the political problems that would arise in the United States if the Senate were asked to ratify a comprehensive test ban treaty which did not include the right to on-site inspection. Consequently, our reluctance to drop our insistence on inspection—that is, our refusal, as they see it, to accept a small risk for large political gains—is considered, in some quarters, to be an indication of the dominance of military influence over U.S. policy. This is all the more regrettable because, to many at Geneva, a comprehensive test ban agreement is considered to be the most effective nonproliferation measure, for nations are apparently unable, at present, to develop nuclear weapons without testing them.

## II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In the conduct of our relations with France, our manner should be firm but correct. We must avoid over-reacting to French initiatives, even though we may regard them as undesirable. In no case should we disparage the greatness of France, our oldest ally, or engage in any sort of political guerrilla war against the French Government; such tactics should be reserved for our enemies. Above all, we should resist the temptation of interjecting our voice into the internal politics of France. Any American appeal, directed over, under, or around the French President, would surely backfire.

2. It is crucial that effective communication be restored between the French and American Governments. If a summit meeting between the two Presidents is not now feasible, then consideration should be given to the appointment of a special American emissary, who would endeavor to act between President Johnson and General de Gaulle as Harry Hopkins acted between President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. His purpose would be to reopen and develop a dialog to the point where a summit meeting between the two Presidents would seem likely to bear fruit.

3. If the NATO structure is to be salvaged without France, the old architects must come up with new plans or new architects must be engaged. Clearly, SHAPE should be moved to a new site in the

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Benelux countries and streamlined, its bulk trimmed back in adjust-
ment to the diminished danger. The European role in SHAPE
should be sharply upgraded. Since the headquarters exists for the
defense of Europe, I would recommend, among the specific steps
that should be taken to Europeanize NATO, the following:

(a) Appointing a European general to serve as SACEUR, under a command arrangement which would leave control of our nuclear weapons in the hands of the President of the United States.

(b) Moving the Military Committee of NATO out of the Pentagon and relocating it in Europe in close proximity to SHAPE and the North Atlantic Council.

(c) Establishing a hot line communications system, linking
together the heads of the NATO governments, to enable im-
mediate consultation in case of emergency.

4. Another objective in the revision of NATO should be to make the alliance outward looking, an instrument concerned not only with the negative aspects of military defense but also with the positive aspects of the quest for peace. Here, it is De Gaulle who has seized the initiative. Yet, it remains the United States, not France, which possesses the size and power to engage in meaningful negotiations in the field of East-West relations. President Johnson has spoken of the need for "building bridges" to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. De Gaulle's initiative makes it more urgent that we assume our natural position of leadership in this vital endeavor.

5. With regard to European integration, the Common Market appears to be weathering its way to success. This is, by all odds, the most significant achievement in the direction of European unity since the war. The economic cement binding the six members of the Common Market together is the best guarantee against any reversion in Western Europe to the rampant nationalism of the prewar period. Accordingly, in lining up 14 to 1 against France in the current dispute over the command structure of NATO, we should strive to avoid any rupture between France and her European neighbors so bitter as to propel the French toward neutralism or vengeance. As between vindicating our position in favor of an uncompromised NATO command, and jeopardizing either the underlying Western alliance or the prospects for strengthening and enlarging the Common Market, the course of prudence should be clear.

6. As for Geneva, I recommend that immediate attention be given to pumping life back into these moribund negotiations. A decision should be delayed no longer on the issue of nuclear sharing within NATO. We must make up our minds whether to give priority to binding West Germany more tightly into the remnants of the NATO organizational structure, or whether to seek further agreements with the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear arms control. If a consultative arrangement, along the lines contemplated by the McNamara committee, is settled upon with West Germany, then the way may yet be open to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on a nonproliferation treaty. I strongly recommend this course as best suited to our highest national interests. But time is fast running out at Geneva.

APPENDIX

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Geneva:

Jacques Freymond, Director, Institute of High International Studies.

General Burns, Canadian Representative, Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference.

Count Wachtmeister, Acting Swedish Representative, Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference.

Mr. Blusztajn, Polish Representative, Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference.

Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom Representative, Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference.

Ambassador Roshchin, Soviet Representative, Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference.

Brussels:

Prime Minister Vanden Boeynants.

Acting President Robert Marjolin, and Commissioners Jean Rey and Guido Colonna di Paliano, European Economic Commission.

Foreign Minister Harmel and Paul-Henri Spaak.

Paris:

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville.

French political leaders:

Jean Lecanuet, leader of the Democratic Center.

Maurice Faure, president of the Radical Party.

Guy Mollet, secretary of the Socialist Party.

Valery Giscard d'Estaing, leader of the French Independent Republican Party.

President de Gaulle.

Alain Peyrefitte, Minister Delegate for Scientific Research, Space and Atomic Questions.

Defense Minister Messmer.

General Beaufre, Director, Institute of Strategic Studies.

Prof. Raymond Aron.

Prime Minister Pompidou.

London:

Hedley Bull, Consultant to the Foreign Office and J. E. D. Street, Head of Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department, Foreign Office.

Uwe Kitzinger.

Prof. Max Beloff.

Mr. Michael Palliser, private secretary to the Prime Minister.

Prof. Patrick Blackett.

Mr. George Thomson.

Defense Minister Healey.

Kenneth Younger, Director, the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home.

John Barnes, Head of Western Development, Foreign Office.

Lord Carrington.

Prime Minister Wilson.

Berlin:

Prof. Richard Loewenthal.

Egon Bahr, press chief of the West Berlin Senate.

Mayor Brandt.

Bonn:

Foreign Minister Schroeder.

Chancellor Erhard.

Franz-Josef Strauss.

Dr. Karl Mommer.

Erich Mende, Minister for All German Affairs.

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