TELECON
Taft Schreiber

10/2/72 9:31 a.m.

S: You looked good last night. I came in and saw you. I was a couple of
boxes away but you were too occupied.

K: I was looking for you; I thought You'd be there. Were you at the reception?

S: Yeah. I came in for dinner and then we went to the box and I was with Len
Garment and you were oh two, three boxes away, and when we walked around
to come into the reception there was so much security and the hall was full of
people that I didn't want to bother. And then when we came out I noticed that
they had got you to go back stage and I waited about 15 minutes and we were
pretty tired so we left. Did you go back to the reception later?

K: Yeah, I want back to the reception from back stage.

S: Oh my goodness. I never saw so many people. If you're going to be in
today or if you've got some free time I got a couple of things I want to just
fill you in on and I didn't know how locked you are. Would you like to have
lunch at Sans Souci?

K: No, lunch I can't have, I'm having lunch with Gromyko.

S: Gromyko? ! Out of my league already.

K: But you want to come in say at noon?

S: Yes, supposing I get in there around 12:00 or a little bit; I just want 5 minutes.

K: No, I'd love to see you Taft; I was thinking about you yesterday.

S: Yeah, in fact I was going to call you at the house and then I thought, well . . .

K: I wish you had. We might have had a drink or something.

S: Well, you know, I've been really running around, trying to get some work done. But I'll come in around 12:00.

K: I'd love to see you Taft.

S: All right, Henry.

K: Good.

S: Bye bye.

TELECON

Steve Bull

10/2/72 9:54 a.m.

K: Steve, will you come in after an hour and get the Russian out of there?

B: Okay. Now, are you going to be there the entire time?

K: Yeah.

B: Okay.

K: Why?

B: I heard rumblings, I think from Alex, that there were going to be a private meeting.

K: Yeah, that's up in Camp David.

B: Good. All right, fine.

K: And make no reference to that at the meeting.

B: Okay, so it will be you and Sonnenfeldt, Gromyko and Dobrynin, right?

K: And the interpreter.

B: And the interpreter. Okay, good. Thank you.

950-5545

Aubrey

TELECON

Joseph Alsop

10/2/72 11:44 a.m.

K: Joe, I am concluding that the Alsops are my death.

A: Why, what do you mean?

K: Your brother Stewart has done an article which will force me . . . I just can't seem him socially anymore.

A: What do you mean Henry?

K: I'll just have to decide that if these things are going to be written I must say I don't see these . . . You know, every piece of crap that's been around: why I should be Secretary of State, why Rogers should stay because, as the alternative, because then at least there'll be an ineffectual guy there so that I can run it, why I will resign if Connally leaves [sic], why it's in the national interest that I stay as Secretary of State because (1) I can brutalize the Jews and (2) a Nixon without Kissinger is a scary prospect. Now if he wants to get me out of here this month, he could have not written a better article.

A: You mustn't blame me for Stew, Henry.

K: No, but I'll tell you I'm really beside myself about it.

A: I thought of writing a similar article and thought it would make trouble and didn't as you K can find out from General Haig.

K: I know, but it's doing . . . you know, it's . . .

A: And I certainly did n't suggest Stew's article; I didn't know he was doing of the sort.

K: It's the most damaging article to me that's been written in four years in the guise of being friendly.

A: Well it was not intended to be anything but friendly, I can assure you, and I think he doesn't know enoug . . . I thought of doing something similar, not quite so . . .

K: Well you know how . . . you know my affection for Stew.

A: I know and I did take the trouble to call up the General as you were away on your travels and he said it would make a great deal of trouble and so I didn't do it.

K: Well the reason I tell you is because, so you can tell Stew.

A: And I will tell Stew.

Joe Alsop, 10/2/72, 11:44 a.m.

p. 2

K: Because I don't want to have anything to do anymore.

A: Henry, I long to see you.

K: All right.

A: What are you doing this evening?

K: I'm going to Camp David.

A: Oh, you are. We have nice Margaret Jay coming in from London...

K: Oh, isn't she charming. I like her.

A: She's a very charming lady; I thought you might like to have some supper with us.

K: I would love to do it if I could get away from Camp David, which I will not be able to do.

A: Oh well, you will not be able to do that, obviously. But when can I see you then? What about lunch on Wednesday?

K: All right, let's do that. Where shall we eat? Let's eat... I cannot bear the White House mess any longer.

A: Why don't you eat at my house?

K: OK, well, Or, can we eat at the Sans Souci?

A: I'd love to.

K: Let's eat at the Sans Souci, or the Hay Adams, or anyplace near here.

A: Let's say 1:00.

K: Okay, where shall it be?

A: The Sans Souci or the Metropolitan Club are the only two places I know that are near there.

K: Which do you prefer? Why don't we go to the Metropolitan Club?

A: I'd rather do the Metropolitan Club because I hate the Sans Souci.

K: Let's eat at the Metropolitan Club.

A: Okay, 1:00.

K: Good.

A: Good, good.

K: See you then.

DECLASSIFIED
Authentic
E017295
BANA DAE 5/1/72

TELECON

John Connally

10/2/72 11:54 a.m.

Mrs. C: This is Nellie, how are you? You're the busiest man -- I'm getting him off the moving truck. Just a minute. I thought you were on another line.

C: Hello.

K: Hello John, how are you?

C: Hi Henry, how are you?

K: Okay. I keep reading in the papers how you and I are feuding and how I'm giving ultimatums if they give you a Cabinet position. So I thought I better see whether you and I could have lunch some time soon.

C: I hadn't heard that. Where has that been appearing.

K: Stewart Alsop has a column this week as in Newsweek.

C: Does he?

K: Yeah, well, it's the god-damnedest column. You know you're not the only victim; everybody is being torn apart. I mean you're not actually . . . he's not so much after you as after me.

C: Well is it . . .

K: Well it's an analysis of what's going to happen after the election and he says everyone expects Rogers to leave and me to leave. Then he says well the best solution is to let Rogers stay because then I can stay because it's helpful to have an ineffectual Secretary of State.

C: Jesus!

K: Then he says if you came in Secretary of State I'd leave, and then he goes on from there. And, oh God, it's the god-damnedest column.

C: These bastards just have to speculate about something, don't they?

K: Well, I just want you to know I have no such views. A, I know that there isn't any job that you're after, but secondly, if there is . . .

C: Secondly, I don't know of any job I'd take.

K: All I can say is any job you can get would be a god-damned good thing for the country.

C: Well, you're mighty kind. How are you feeling?

Connally, 10/2/72 11:54 a.m.

K: I'm feeling fine. Where are you?

C: I'm in Houston.

K: Oh you're in Houston!

C: Yeah.

K: Are you up here tomorrow?

C: No, I'm not coming tomorrow. We're moving and I've got to go to St. Louis on Wednesday to make a speech and I've had a very bad sinus infection for 10 days, Henry.

K: Well, do you want to have lunch when you're up here next?

C: I'll call you and let you know in advance when I'm coming and we'll have lunch, I'd love to.

K: Cause I'd love to do that and I'd like to catch you up with where we stand on a number of things.

C: All right, sir.

K: And so do I, but I just want you to know, you know, there may be a lot of crap being written, but if you have no worse enemies than me, you're in great shape.

C: (Laughs) Well that's mutual Henry, that's mutual. And I think you for calling.

K: Right.

C: Okay, bye.

K: Bye.

TELECON
The Vice President
10/2/72 11:59 a.m.

A: Henry, it's urgent that I spend a few minutes on the phone with you; I hope you have time.

K: Certainly, right now.

A: I'm going to do the UPI editors today and I want to be fairly sure about a few things concerning Vietnam and the process of negotiations, not to discuss them of course, but to make sure that I don't get into any boxes from our previous positions against the idea that we would ever stand still for another tri-partite situation like we had in Laos, and for example, Thieu being removed or anything of that nature.

K: I think you should stay away from specifics because . . . well, there's no intention of removing Thieu. But when you talk about tri-partite . . . the problem is we're in a very complex negotiation in which we are trying to put in some face-saving formula without substance. But even that we can't have said.

A: No, I understand we can't say anything but in the past . . . they always want to talk about a structured government with the Viet Cong included and I've always used the '62 accords on Laos and saying to knock down that idea . . . I suppose, you mean we could stay away from that?

K: Well, the point is something like the Laotian Accord we are not going to do.

A: That's what I mean, yeah.

K: But the trouble is anything you say on this subject now can be misread by the other side in terms of something. . .

A: Well I'll just stay completely away from it. OK, but let me just ask you this, we intend to stand solidly behind Thieu.

K: Well frankly the other thing I don't want to have happen is, if you don't answer any questions . . . If they say how about the tri-partite government and you say nothing then it almost looks as if you're endorsing it.

A: Well I can fuzz that. I can always say well our principal concern is the right of self-determination and an internationally-supervised fair election. The mechanics of it, of course, are subject to various interpretations . . . I'll fuzz it that way.

K: Exactly. We won't impose a government . . .

A: We won't impose a government; we're there because we're fighting to assist the South Vietnamese in having the right of self-determination and that's what we're for; we're not going to get into mechanics.

Vice President, 10/2/72, 11:59 a.m.

p. 2

K: And on Thieu, I would say, I would put it, I would handle it differently. I would say look, what is it that these people want? It isn't the question of a person. What they want is to so weaken the structure of the South Vietnamese government that they can take over. This is what we are opposing. Put it on this basis.

A: Well, we can say...

K: And you can say, look, Thieu has offered to resign one month before a Presidential election and that's been public. So I'd keep it fuzzed up within that context.

A: I don't know, I didn't get you, all right. Now the other thing I wanted to ask you about is on this POW thing. Of course my idea on that would be not to say anything inflammatory at all except to say these men have shown a tremendous amount of restraint, they have very grave concerns about their fellow prisoners of war, we appreciate their patriotism in getting off the plane with their uniforms, they made it very clear that they're commissioned officers of the United States, nobody forces anyone to become a commissioned officer, it's a voluntary act and so forth.

K: And why don't you say they've suffered enough and let's leave them alone.

A: There have been so many attempts to exploit them -- let's leave them alone.

K: I think that would be the best thing to say.

A: Now, for my private information, are any of these guys going to pop off or anything of that sort?

K: The worst of them had a press conference yesterday and it came out pretty good.

A: Was that Charles?

K: That was Gartley.

A: Now the other thing, how about that if you get a question.

K: I would say, you know, I'd say it was unauthorized, that if the President wanted to do it he would authorize it. I mean why does the President have to have unauthorized rules? I mean there are a lot of people who are trying to say, oh well, all of this was engineered at the White House. No one has ex-p planned plained why the White House should have to engineer unauthorized raids. If we want to bomb something we just give the order. And I'd say that it was unauthorized and that we moved on it as soon as we knew.

A: We have no concern about that, the proper degree of civilian control over the military.

DECEMBER 5, 1972

BRAUN DADE 5/10/72

Vice President, 10, 2/72, 11:59 a.m.

p. 3

K: Not at all.

A: Okay. Now how about the Middle East, anything new on that.

K: No.

A: Okay, anything else that might be . . .

K: I must say, on the prisoners, I would be very charitable to the prisoners but I would be quite tough on the . . .

A: On the anti-war activists.

K: Yes.

A: I know how to handle that I think.

K: And also quite tough on Hanoi who got a cynical propaganda maneuver out of it.

A: Right. All right, anything else you can think of that might be important for me to know at the moment?

K: No, are you here most of this week?

A: No, I'm leaving tomorrow again. I'm only here for probably one day a week now

K: Let me, if you agree, catch you the next time you are here for a day and let me brief you on where we stand in the negotiations.

A: All right, I'll tell John Damgaard to do it.

K: I would love to do it and I think it might help you to give you a sense of what to stay away from and what to do.

A: Okay Henry.

K: What we are trying to do, I can tell you this now, and will do, and we will settle for nothing less, is to keep a non-communist government in being in Saigon.

A: All right.

K: And we will not drop Thi'eu down the shaft.

A: That's good. Everywhere I go people seem to fully understand the position and agree with it.

TELCON

Adm. Zumwalt/Mr. Kissinger

12:56 pm, October 2, 1972

K: Hello!

Z: Hello, Henry, Buda Zumwalt, How are you?

K: Okay.

Z: I'm calling you about the Oceanographic slips that are of the subject of the Maritime Agreement. I don't know whether you know---

K: Yes, I'm aware of the issue.

ZxxK: Well, Now, the Soviets say if we can get them out of Navy jurisdiction in some formal way, they'd agree to let them come it, and I was wondering if that's beyond the wit of man to devise a formu lae by which you continue to operate them, but technically they're under somebody's else's jurisdiction.

Z: It's not beyond the wit of man, the officious part of it is how we work it out with the Congress. What it requires is the technical finding in order for them to be restricted from one agency to another, that they are no longer required, and this would then make it very, very difficult to convince another branch of Congress that they should subsequently be funded. And that's where we think the thing founders.

and if it can't be done

K: Will you take another look at it/practically, you know, we don't want to lose ships. It doesn't do us any good to let them use ports when the ships disappear.

Z: That's right. I will take another look at it, Henry, now how do I come back to you informally.

K: Come back to me informally, and then we can decide how to put it back in formal channels.

Z: Fine.

K: I'd appreciate it.

Z: End of today, or tomorrow?

K: End of today would be helpful, or the first thing in the morning would be good. In fact, I'll be up at Camp David, so the first thing in the morning.

Z: Fine.

95CLASSIFIED

30122255

Attn: J. M. HARRIS

Date: 10/01/72

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F-012857
By CNARA Date 09/01

*

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Minister Gromyko/Mr. Kissinger

11:34 am, October 3, 1972

K: Hello, Anatol.

D: Yes, and now for the first time Minister have a chance to hear how we cooperate.

K: Good. On that text we discussed yesterday, that will be agreeable to us.

D: You mean -- what text?

K: On Berlin.

D: Oh, on Berlin. Could you send me the text?

K: Right. I'll send you the text.

D: Okay.

K: On, let me see, the Embassy height.

D: Yes.

K: We will give you 3 and -- As I understand it, you've just cut us back six meters again.

D: Yes, yes. This is the point. And then we are to describe not to ask any of the 3 1/2 more.

K: Well, if you give us the six meters back, we will give you the three and a half meters.

D: So it will be six we will give back and you will give us three and a half.

K: Right.

D: Okay. I think it settles the whole issue.

K: Okay.

D: Okay. And so you will send me this letter -- I mean, this draft of the UN business, yes? The German business.

K: UN/German business.

D: Yes.

K: ... do it in Bonn.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012387
By: CNAR A Date: Stetoy

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Min. Gromyko/Mr. Kissinger

11:34 am, October 3, 1972

- 2 -

D: Okay. Well, I'll be back the day after tomorrow. I owe you this
about security.

K: Right. The only thing, Anatol, is we have to play the game again
like we did with Berlin.

D: Yes.

will

K: Because we'll give you the unacceptable version, you give us your
unacceptable version, and we compromise on this.

D: Oh, and so it will be precisely like this -- you will send it, Gromyko
will look if it's all right so you put the thing in the Bonn in our channel,
yes?

K: Right.

D: Did you already present your text on this or not yet?

K: No, no; we want to wait until we hear from you.

D: No, I mean the previous one.

K: We haven't presented that.

D: And so then you will present your old one or you will present the new
one?

K: No, we will present the old one, and you present your old one.

D: I see and then it come to compromise.

K: Exactly.

D: Okay, I think it is fine. Just fine.

K: Okay. After this is over, I'll become a theater director.

D: (laughter) What are you afraid of (laughter)?

K: My warm regards to your Minister.

D: Well, he just wonder because he missed you there -- he was just
looking around and said, "Where is Kissinger?" I say, "He is in
the White House because automobile was around." So he would like --

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E12587
By CNRA Date 05/01/87

TELCON

- 3 -

11:34 am, October 3, 1972

D: (cont'd) So he asked me already to give you regards for our visit . . . . he just thinks I am knocking on the _Izvor'_ head. He would like to . . . .

K: Well, it was a great joy to see him.

D: Yeah. He would like to say hello to you alright -- Just a minute please.

K: Certainly.

Gromyko: Hallo.

K: Hello, Mr. Minister.

G: How do you do, how do you do, I am very glad to hear your voice (speaking Russian? . . . .) I also am thinking on how to say goodbye to you since we departed so quickly from the President since I could not say goodbye to you.

K: Well, I want to tell you how much I enjoyed see ing you and I think we have a general understanding of where we are going.

G: Well, I think that step by step we are going ahead on the basis which was discussed, maybe not so fast as we would like to see, maybe in some respect not so fast as you would like to see, but still slowly going ahead. That is my general not only impression but conviction.

K: That is also my conviction, and I hope you notice the President's reference to ultimate restriction and limitation on the use of nuclear weapons.

G: Certainly, certainly.

K: Good.

G: I am notice this and I appreciate it very, very much and I think we can move on this matter. I think it is worthwhile to apply utmost careful.

K: Right. Well, that is what we discussed yesterday when we were alone with the President.

G: Yes, with the President.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Folio
By CNRA Date 01/01/72

TELCON

11:34 am, October 3, 1972

- 4 -

K: I mean, when you were there. And we will proceed in that spirit.

G: Very good.

K: And it was a personal pleasure to see you. I hope to see you again soon.

G: You always would be welcome. It is pleasure to see you always.

K: Thank you, bye.

G: Thank you very much for everything, including the hospitality.

K: And have a good trip back.

G: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

wgh.

["DECLASSIFIED", "Authority E01252\nBy CHNARA Date 05/03/72", "TELCONE", "Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger", "12:17 pm, October 3, 1972", "- 1 -", "K: Hello, Anatol.", "D: Oh, yes, Henry. Yesterday the President discussed in jokingly way with Gromyko about some workers in the vineyard but he said it's better to send them directly to your office.", "K: Right.", "D: To you.", "K: Right.", "D: So, now they are preparing -- they have a case. But they have vodka, liqueur and the same for you. But as for the wines, I will give from my own when I will be back because President would like two cases of wine. I will do the same way when I will be back tomorrow. I will send a case to you and you will give him a [judge in ?] wines.", "K: Good.", "D: So maybe in two hours, but Antonov will be in touch with you and he will bring this one and I hope you will like some nice girl which looks very nice on .........", "K: Oh, yes, yes. It's one of the sorrows of my existence, no one has tried to corrupt me that way.", "D: Well, I think --", "K: Except Antonov.", "D: Yeah (laughter), I understand. No, it's probably the same on this case. And as to the wines, I will send in a little bit because the President likes to have it soon.", "K: Good. That's very nice.", "D: And so he will receive it and please give him best regards from Gromyko.", "K: It will be greatly appreciated by everybody.", "D: And second, he forgot to mention when he was there. He hadn't a chance really to discuss with the President or you about some items being introduced in the General Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01267

By CHINARA Date StatoL

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:17 pm, October 3, 1972

- 2 -

D: (cont'd) and then on this conditional ______ weapons. It's a response to the Treaty, as you know. Just to ask you to look into . . . . . . Japanese.

K: I will raise it with the President.

D: Obligations, yes?

K: Right.

D: Okay.

K: Right. Well, he arranged it this morning. We couldn't miss it.

D: Did he? I didn't hear him.

K: In his speech.

D: Oh, in his speech, yes. No, I mean, exactly but it was in a speech but he didn't meant -- he doesn't want it to look as if he [raise it in ?] public but without telling him.

K: No, we understand that. Well, he raised it with me and I mentioned it to the President.

D: Okay. So just look into this matter.

K: Right.

D: Okay.

K: Right, Anatol.

D: Okay. Thank you very much for everything. I think everything went really beautifully.

K: Well, we are very pleased too and we will keep accelerating the process.

D: Yes, and really today it was quite an event in the sense it really will make a first time really important agreement.

K: Well, it was very moving.

D: Yes. Well, very good, Henry.

K: Thank you, Anatol.

wgh

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:17 pm, October 3, 1972

-1-

K: Hello, Anatol.

K: Right.

D: To you.

K: Right.

K: Good.

D: Well, I think --

K: Except Antonov.

D: Yeah (laughter), I understand. Not it's probably the same on this case. And as to the wines, I will send in a little bit because the President likes to have it soon.

K: Good. That's very nice.

D: And second, he forgot to mention when he was there. He hadn't a chance really to discuss with the President or you about some items being introduced in the General Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DECLASSIFIED
Author: E017.958
Date: Oct 3, 1972

TELCORN

12:25 pm, October 3, 1972

Jerry Schecter / Mr. Kissinger

K: Hello

S: How are you, Henry?

K: Isn't it too late to put me on the carpet this way.

S: No, it's never too late for you, you know that. How's your
week going? You're busy again, huh!

K: Well, I'm pretty busy, yes. One of these days I'll take the
Veitnamese proposal while talking to Gromyko.

S: (Laughter) Well, Henry, you've got a little story going about
the Kissinger market. Whenever you go to Paris it runs the
stock market up, then when you come back, it goes down again.

K: Well, that's why I buy long and short on alternate days.

S: (Laughter) Well, do you think Kissinger is going to replace
Dow Jones, do you think?

K: Particularly as I know nothing about the market.

S: I just wondered if you could explain the phenomenon for me.

K: Well, it's an interesting phenomenon that the capitalists always
get courage when ______ is coming in. This is totall;y
contrary to Marxist theory.

S: Yeah (laughter).

K: Well, you know everyone always expects that there's going to be
one single event that as I've explained to you Friday, it's just
something--this is the process which we are engaged.

S: Yeah.

KX S: But as far as you, personally, is concerned you have no idea
at all about that, the market.

K: No, excuse me, the President is calling.

90-CLASSIFIED

301/22758

BRA Date 5/1/72

TELCORN

James Lynn (Under Sec. of Commerce)/Mr. Kissinger

1:07 pm, October 3, 1972

K: Hello.

L: Yes, sir.

K: The Russians have finally caught on to that postponement thing.

L: What postponement thing.

K: I mean that thing you are trying to talk them into.

L: Yes.

K: Gromyko raised it with me as to the--

L: Yes

K: So, my first fall back was to say all right we will make a con-
cession to you, we will go back from 3-1/2 to 3%.

L: Yes.

K:q But he sez, are you sure that his boss understood that the total sum would be what we agreed on. And no interest.

L: Yes, well it's playing just the way we thought it would play.

K: Oh, yeah. Now, what I want to know is h;ow much money we are talking about here?

L: Let me get back to you right away.

K: Can you get me that figure.

L: Of course. You want both the difference between the 3-1/2 and 3%--

K: No, no, you've got to go to three. I mean we can't very well make ah charge them a higher interest than that than for the total.

L: I'll get you the three and zero.

K: And, on the figures that you and I know will be the postponement.

L: All right. Sure. Thank you

K: Sure. Thank you.

950-555-1111

BANKRUPTCY
5/1/70

TELCONE

Ken BeLieu/Mr. Kissinger

1:09 pm, October 3, 1972

B: Doctor

K: Yes, Mr. Under Secretary.

B: You needn't be so damned formal. You gave me some
instructions one time which we followed through on. There may
be an assist. But, Haig is coming back and they are going to
bring him up before the Committee.

K: Right.

B: All you need is to have somebody fly out and meet him like
Fred Bizard or anybody like that who's got the transcript.

K: Okay.

K: Okay, well he can read them on the way back. But small people are fearful of getting airplanes and ordering people around. Could you take care of it.

K: Certainly. I'll have him met in Alaska.

B: Thank you, sir.

K: Good, thank you.

95CLASSIFIED

3012255

Auburn

B: 5/1/73
C: 5/1/73

TELCOM

James Lynn/Mr. Kissinger

2:38 pm, October 3, 1972

K: Hello.

L: Henry, listen the years we talked about. Three percent vs. zero.

K: Yeah.

L: $35 Million

K: $35 Million!!!

L: Yes, sir, in interest.

K: How does that figure?

L: Well, if you have a minute--if you assume the payments, the regular payments each year are about $24 Million. Then what you do is, you take the average outstanding over whatever period you're talking about, you half that. Because it declines in equal amounts.

K: Yeah.

L: That's $12 Million. $12 Million at 3% ---

K: But, that's not true not for the whole period because we don't put it at the end of the period.

L: No, no, but hear me out. The first year's interest, for example Henry, is $720,000 on one payment. $24 Million, 1% of $24 Million is $240,000. 3% is $720,000. So your first year's interest until you start making your first payment on the deferment is $720,000. Your average interest payment---

K: But after that, they would claim ---

L: It declines then.

K: Prorated after that they just increase--we can't yield, huh.

L: That's right.

K: Well, let's stone wall it.

L: That's my feeling.

CLASSIFIED

Published by B&N Media Inc.

TELOON

James Lynn/Mr. Kissinger

3:38 pm, October 3, 1972

K: If it was never raised, there's no reason to question it.

L: And when Alkyma (sp) told me this will come as a surprise I said, Oh, come on now, Mr. Alkyma, the minute I told you that I was certain that Dr. Kissinger had an opposite, or something, when we were in Moscow, I am certain that you would advise your people of that. And he just smiled.

K: They're just trying to get another---

L: You know what I mean.

K: Yes. Let's just stone wall it.

L: That's my feeling.

K: And tell the truth, we do it because of the exit visas.

L: Of course.

K: Okay, Jim.

L: All right.

K: Thank you.

L: You are welcome. At some point, of course, I think we should sit down on about four of these just to let you know where we are.

K: Well, I don't like to deal with Cabinet members.

L: You are very kind (laughter)

K: It makes me lose prestige.

L: I realize that. But when you deal with me, you understand, there is no question--

K: Yes, but you are so popular, there's no status involved.

L: That's right (laughter)

K: We'll get together tomorrow.

L: Very good. Good talking to you. Bye.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: E0172958

Date: 5/1/9/1
By: JARA Drec

TELCON

Gov. Scranton/Mr. Kissinger

2:42 pm, October 3, 1972

K: Hello

S: Hello, Henry the Great, how are you?

K: Fine, Bill, how are you?

S: You know you are certainly are doing the most stupendous job. But I won't bother you with this, but they're coming from everywhere, and they ought to.

K: Well, I hope you still feel that.

S: I sure do, very, very strongly, I think you are just terrific.

K: Well, you're very nice and I really appreciate it. Ah, Bill, I called you about the proposal which I understand David Rockefeller and some others have made to you to head the Bilataeral Commission, or whatever they call it.

S: Yes.

K: I just wanted you to know I've talked to David and to George Franklin and to others about it, and I think it's a first class contract. In fact, it's a terribly needed one. This is what has to be one of the top priorities as our policy after the election. And yet within the Government it's extremely hard to get the middle range view and long range view that you need. You've got a lot of tactical advice. And secondly, I wanted you to know that as Chairman you were my first choice. Whatever you did and what that group did would have some very open hearted reception here. I know you've had some experience with Presidential commissions but this is the sort of thing where I think. You know, I would consider myself a paragon you wouldn't be working for me, obviously. You wouldn't be operating in a void.

S: I really appreciate this. You're awfully kind to call. I did have a talk with David and

Gov. Scranton (cont'd.) 10/3/72, 2:42 p.m.

S: ... essential as you may or may not know with the proposition with the European community when I went over there as a visitor about a year and a half ago and they started up that Peterson group here to meet with them and I just think this thing is absolutely vital if the world is going to reach the potential that I think it can and the free world getting togger and working out ...

K: And it's got to be done on a framework which is larger than a pure economic issues, because it's insoluble on an economic ... on an economic level we're competitive.

S: Well I told David, I called him yesterday and wrote him today, and told him very frankly that I think I would put my heart, soul and mind into this but in view of the other things I've got to do I wouldn't be free to do this until late next spring and I felt very strongly this thing should start in right away and get going and therefore I would say no to him, which I do very frankly rather reluctantly because I felt strongly for this idea. And I sent him a list today of the possibilities, all of whom I'm sure they thought about. But I just think anybody who's going to do this ought to put at least at the beginning everything he's got into it to get it established and pushed and organized right and I told him very frankly with the other things, I am getting out of them gradually. As you know I've written the President and will not be on the Prime Commission after the election's over and he asked me to continue of your advisory group on SALT business and I'll be more than happy to do that. But a number of these items are coming to an end, but they won't come to an end until late next spring all of them and I just think they've got to get somebody that's going to pour his soul into this thing, I think it's so important.

K: Well, you know, first you have to find somebody with a soul.

S: Well, I don't deny I've got a soul about it, but I just think it's ...

K: Well, you would be ideal but I also agree with you that it ought to be started before late spring.

S: I agree; I think it ought to be started right away and the quicker the better and full blown ahead and things ... I'm all for it. And you're wonderful to call me; I appreciate it a great deal. That means an awful lot. You tell me that he had talked to you and of course you had been enthusiastic about this idea and gosh knows, I don't see how any intelligent person could not be because it's so important.

K: It is really vital.

S: Well more power to you and I certainly hope it works out; I'm all for it.

K: Well we're going to give it a big try.

S: Keep going the way you're going; couldn't be better. K: Thank you Bill, bye.

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

10/3/72 3:24 p.m.

R: I think that went pretty well out there, don't you?

K: Yes and I thought the ceremony was very nice this morning.

R: I did too; I thought the President was in excellent form.

K: Excellent!

R: Yeah. He really should use that method of speaking when he makes political speeches. He's so damned effective that way.

K: It's amazing why he doesn't do it. The low-key thing is a lot better than this arm-waving.

R: I know it and he's so effective. You know he moves his audience. I just wanted to talk to you a bit. I know you're going to have a meeting with Alex at 4:00, and I've gone over those statements. We've got a couple of, following your suggestion we made a couple of drafts, so he'll talk to you about it. I just wanted to say, I have made some suggestions on a draft based first of all on what they proposed and with a minimum of change. And it doesn't on the surface appear to be very tidy but let me tell you what I had in mind.

It seems to me that if we're going to get an agreement before elections it's got to be untidy; we don't have much time.

K: Exactly.

R: If we could eliminate the part on their proposal that refers to the Government of National Concord . . .

K: I couldn't agree more.

R: . . . leave that out, add a few things, not very many . . .

K: We can't accept the Government of National Concord.

R: No, but if you eliminate that and you make the ceasefire apply to all of Indochina and you have the order, those things in the wrong order, because it looks like the ceasefire comes last. But that can be corrected by putting in language that the Commission will do the following things after the incursion of the ceasefire so that it's clear that the ceasefire comes first. You don't have to really change the order.

K: Right.

TELECON

Secretary Rogers, 10/3/72, 3:24 p.m.

p. 2

R: In essence what it amounts to is this. As I say, a very untidy damn thing but in essence it amounts to this, that the President's proposal would be accepted pretty much, we'd have an Indochina ceasefire; you'd have a commitment to pre-elections. You'd have to leave out the word "general" I think because they think of that as Constituent Assembly. But you'd have the elections. . . well, first you'd have the ceasefire and exchange of prisoners and the withdrawal of troops. And then you'd have an election to be supervised, controlled and supervised by this Commission, and if you had this Commission responsible to the Paris Conference, you'd really be begging the question about the political future which is what we want to do.

K: Well of course this isn't their entire proposal; they haven't surfaced the whole thing yet.

R: I see.

K: I mean the whole thing includes that stuff on the government which I haven't shown Alex which I showed you. But it's a good way perhaps of working back into it.

R: Yeah, well what I was going to suggest is . . . We've got two suggestions now, two drafts. One is really a more sensible, practical one that Bill Sullivan and Alex and I have talked over. The other is a minimal changes in theirs, taking out any references to a central government, what do they call it, a government of National Concord, and if they accepted it we could worry about the damned political future later. It would be what would happen in the ceasefire, well, it's difficult, but if both sides would order cessation of hostilities and we could do it in the next two, three weeks I think it would have a tremendous impact and furthermore I think it's a little different than most of these ceasefire situations because I think both sides are sick of fighting. And it might be the North Vietnamese would be willing to stop fighting for a little while and once they stop fighting then . . .

K: I agree completely. The major thing for the next few weeks is not to make any optimistic sounding statements though.

R: Oh hell no, we don't need it now.

K: No, I mean not to say we've got this thing coming or there's progress or . . .

R: No, well I don't think there's any need for it at all. I think that you ought to continue your meetings. I don't know as we need to send anybody around the world again. If we do that it's going to create the impression that . . .

K: What, you mean like Haig?

R: Yeah, I think that ought to be the last one.

DECLASSIFIED
Date: 10/1/95
Author: B. M. Dye

TELECON

Hugh Sidey

10/3/72 3:36 p.m.

S: Every time I see you in Sans Souci with a beautiful woman we have another
international crisis. What's happening back there?

K: God, I gave it away again.

S: Listen I am quite serious and I am doing a piece for next week on Gromyko and just kind of using him to point out the incredible exasperation acceleration acceleration of international events and how they've changed and how 10 years ago, I guess it's October 18, you know, we were in the White House and there we were and Kennedy's anger. I guess it hasn't been proven or unproven yet whether he knew about the Cuban missiles. I don't know; he must have known something.

K: Yeah, he must have known something.

S: I just thought, without giving any secrets away, whether you had any unattributable observations and little personal mannerisms, what's on his mind or what kind of a guy he is or whether he's changed, or any of that.

K: Of course I don't know how he was in '62. And I have no illusions that he will scrupulously carry out the instructions of his government. I have no question that if they were putting missiles into Cuba he would do again what they were doing then. On the other hand, I consider him really a great professional. I like to negotiation with him because he knows his subject, he knows the nuances, he's very much matter of fact, and actually, you may not believe it, he has a delightful sense of humor.

S: Well I gather that of all those fellows he's the one, huh?

K: Yeah, he has a really great sense of humor.

S: Well that's wonderful. Is there anything just from the dinner or did he do anything, bowl or horseback ride, or... What kind of guy is he in his social moments.

K: Well, I would say social small talk is not necessary the forte of either the President or of Gromyko although, you know, it went well enough, but...

S: Mostly business.

K: Mostly business. He was talking about a bit about his hunting, bore
hunting and hunting for bustards, which is a kind of bird.

S: Bustards?!

K: BUSTARD. I told him that if he was hunting for the BIX BASTA
D type that there would be plenty of opportunity here.

CLASSIFIED

SJS
301/2
BY: JAMAICA DATE: 5/1/72

14

TELECON, Hugh Sidey, 10/3/72, 3:36 p.m.

p. 2

S: Just change the spelling a little bit, huh? I see. But as far as you can tell, at least for the moment anyway...

K: Well no, we have really a very different relation with the Soviets... I can't compare it with '62 so much because I wasn't present at those meetings but say with the early years which was very wary, very formal, set speeches on both sides. Now we talk about common problems and say look, here's this problem, what do you think, what do we think, what can we do? And we can even say, look, here is what we think; this isn't yet a formal position but how would that go, you see what I mean.

S: So you can get into real negotiating, or whatever you call it.

K: And, you know, some intellectual rapport.

S: I see, very good. So this session yesterday, last night, this morning, all is quite rewarding then.

K: That's right, I mean not in the sense of any spectacular, immediate agreements growing out of it although we usually have a... You know, as I told you, we had a lot of things settled in principle when I was in Moscow and we're slowly bringing them to fruition. Well, not all that slowly.

S: Yeah, but you feel it gets back... I mean he is a responsible, and knows, and what is said to him has effect back there.

K: Absolutely.

S: In other words, he still has a good deal of clout there. I mean, God, he's been around so long...

K: Well, you know, let's say by clout, he's not in the top policy-making body, but he just has unmatched competence. Now, when I spent these 22, 25 hours with Brezhnev here was Gromyko at his right side, many of the subjects were highly technical like xxxxxxxxxx. I can't believe that Brezhnev knew every last nuance of them and many of the other things he just handled with great aplomb, great skill and within their framework with great fairness.

S: Did he say anything about staying at Camp David all night or any of this special treatment?

K: Well, I think they appreciated it very much.

S: Any other little human...

K: Well, the President drove him from his place to Laurel which is where the cocktails were in his electric golf cart.

S: Oh yeah. That's another of the cabins, isn't it?

Sidey, 10/3/72, 3:36 p.m.

p. 3

K: Yeah, that's another of the cabins.

S: I see. Very good. How did it look up there, good weather?

K: Terrific.

S: That's right. How's the view down in the valley. You flew down, didn't you?

K: Yeah, superb, it was clear, it was really one of the ideal days. And I brought them up a little early so that they could get a view, I brought him up around 4:30 so that he could relax there and he talked about half hour with the President, just socially.

S: Oh I see. Any references at all back 10 years ago?

K: No, none.

S: Is he gone now Henry?

K: I think he's left now, back to New York and he's leaving from New York tomorrow.

S: Well fine, that's all. I was just going to comment on the ironies and ______
How else did it go, all right.

K: I think it's coming, you know, within the framework that I described to you, on the Vietnamese thing nothing much is going to happen now until the Haig report and so forth.

(end of tape)

RECLASSIFIED
Date 5/1/72
Author E. O. B. S. A.

TELCON

John Kenneth Galbraith/Mr. Kissinger

3:55 pm, October 3, 1972

K: They treat you well?

G: Oh, wonderfully, yeah.

K: I mentioned you to them, I don't know whether they--

G: Yes, they did and a morning with, oh what is the name of
that Vice Minister who is here with the ---

K: Oh, yes, isn't he good?

G: Yes, he certainly, he sent you his warm regards and as a
matter; of fact it was a matter of considerable prestige that they said
not once but 40 times that I had the car that Kissinger had had. I could
see no mention of your name anywhere around--you obviously don't put
your initials---at any case, you want---he urged on me that--as a matter
of point I have urged on me myself the Galbraith disagreement, the need
for patience on the Bangladesh business; in the hopes that it wouldn't be
mis-interpreted.

K: Good.

G: I made the point that oddly I had; made to the Indians that
Sutto being defeated, you know, running a defeated country is no easy
business. The point that was made was a highly reasonable one. And,
at the end he said that you can pass that on to your Indian friends--Henry
Kissinger or anybody else, I would appreciate that.

Kailbraith: I'll send you a note

K: I'll appreciate that. I like him very much, he and I worked
a lot together during the summit, and on my last trip, and he is a very
intelligent man.

touched

G: I was touched by your comment how much more relaxed and civil
these people are than theRussions.

K: Aren't they!! Did you find that true.

G: Oh, God, yes, there was a relaxed congeniality about the
whole business which was enormously impressive.

K: When did you get back.

G: Just a week ago. the Middle of last week.

TELCORN
Galbraith/Kissinger

3:55 pm, Oct. 3, 1972

K: Where did you go?

G: Through Canton, and up to Peking for ten days, three of which was taken up with what I thought was an extraordinary good briefing on the Chinese economy without was held and John Layton Stewart told Howson University and they brought in--they ran a succession of experts who I thought talked with great candor about the economy and--

K: Well, my experience with them is when they do anything they do it either superbly or they won't touch it.

G: This was to me at least enormously informative and then then Marxist showed the storage markets, mills, schools, hospitals, anything! we asked todo. And quite a few things we didn't==we did some spectacular sight seeing. I went to Canton for a day, then Han?? for a day and it was lovely place. Then back to Shanghai for three more days with the University people and back to their establishments and it was there that we covered hospitals and schools and that sort of thing.

K: They no how to civilize barbarians.

G: I took about 30,000 words of notes on the whole on which I will also at some time send you a copy.

K: I would love to see it.

G: However, I will extract these comments that I had with the Foreign Ministry and send out, as I say, I don't think there's anything in them that you don't know, but as I promised to send them, I will.

K: Has the economics ______ you negotiated has so far been observed because--

G: Oh, it has! Oh great.

K: Yes, I haven't said anything and they haven't said anything

G: George told me that you was quite clear about it. He said that he saw no reason and he would pass the word down to his staff.

K: Right. I will pass the word on to my side as well.

G: Because the main threat with all the vast amount of money that Kissinger could raise--

K: No, no, that's been stopped altogether. Frank Mankovits called me the other day and said that they had had an offer of $28 Million which they would publicize the fact that I had the prospective donor prisoner for 60 days

CLASSIFIED

30122958

BY MARY DUE 5/14/74

TELCONE
Galbraith/Kissinger

3:45 pm, Oct. 3, 1972

in my basement.

G: That you had what?

K: They had publicized the fact that I had held the perspective donor prisoner in my basement for 60 days.

(Laughter)

K: And he said very tender because it would give them $29 Million in their kitty.

G: Oh, I see. I regard it as very touchy thing on the situation.

K: Well, maybe we ought to keep it that way.

G: How are you, yourself?

K: I'm fine.

G: Your future still holding up.

K: Well, yes, we are making one--

G: You got peace coming.

K: Well, I really don't know, you know I'm not being cute. We'll know in a measurable time. That is the theory, it is not baloney.

G: Well, all the best. Can I drop in on you sometime when I'm in town.

K: I would like it, I would really hope you would. Will you let me know?

G: Oh, I'm going to be there just for an hour or two this weekend so, I'm going to try to do it then. I'm just sold the time to the movies again. I'm in for an hour on that, but I'll be day later in the autumn for a couple of days and I'll give you a call.

K: Really do it, and maybe we have lunch or dinner or whatever.

G: That's wonderful.

K: I'd love to see you.

G: Well all the best and many thanks for the trip. I say in my notes

95 CLASSROOM

Anthony E3 01/22/75 B/MARIA DUE 5/1/75

TELECON

11:34 am, October 3, 1972

- 2 -

K: Right. The only thing, Anatoli, is we have to play the game again like we did with Berlin.

D: Yes.

will

K: Because we/give you the unacceptable version, you give us your unacceptable version, and we compromise on this.

D: Oh, and so it will be precisely like this -- you will send it, Gromyko will look if it's all right so you put the thing in the Box in our channel, yes?

K: Right.

K: We haven't presented that.

D: I see and then it comes to compromise.

K: Exactly.

95CLASSIFIED

RICHMOND 30127

BOSTON MAJORS 5/10/72

TELCON

Arrb. Dobrynin/Min. Gromyko/Mr. Kissinger

11:34 am, October 3, 1972

D: (cont'd) So he asked me already to give you regards for our visit. He just thinks I am knocking on the door. He would like to ...

D: Yeah. He would like to say hello to you right -- Just a minute please.

K: Certainly.

Gromyko: Hello,

K: Hello, Mr. Minister.

G: How do you do, how do you do, I am very glad to hear your voice (speaking Russian? ...) I also am thinking on how to say goodbye to you since we departed so quickly from the President since I could not say goodbye to you.

K: Well, I want to tell you how much I enjoyed seeing you and I think we have a general understanding of where we are going.

G: Certainly, certainly.

K: Good.

G: Yes, with the President.

DEC 22 1972

85021003

B polymers disc 5/10/74

TELECON
Senator Mansfield
10/4/72 9:20 a.m.

M: Listen, I wanted to ask your advice and seek your counsel about some-
thing I've been thinking about since I read on the ticker yesterday that Chiao
Kuan-hua is up at the UN. And that is to give a private luncheon for him down
here and ask the Scotts and the Fords and the Boggs to come.

K: I don't think he'll come down here, in fact I'm sure he won't come down
here, but if you were to do it in New York I think he might come.

M: Well that's kind of hard because with the schedule we've got and I don't know how long he's going to be here . . .

K: Well try it. There's absolutely no reason why you shouldn't try it, but I've tried this idea and they say they won't set foot in Washington as long as there's a Nationalist Ambassador here.

M: I see, I see. Well it won't do any harm to make the effort anyway.

K: Absolutely not and I think it would be a great courtesy and they might
just have changed their mind.

M: Well I doubt it, I doubt it, because they're pretty set on that particular
id issue.

K: I doubt that they'll do it too.

M: But maybe a gesture will be of some value.

K: Right.

M: Okay Henry.

K: I have given them, essentially along the lines of that letter you gave me, I have given that to them about four days ago.

M: Oh, I see.

K: And now we'll wait for an answer.

M: Good enough. Okay Henry.

K: Right.

M: Fine, take care.

K: Bye.

9501-5555

8501-5555

BANK OF CANADA DEPARTS

5/10/72

TELECON
Barbara Walters

10/4/72 10:00 a.m.

W: I am leaving this week on vacation and I wanted to talk with you before I went to see what had happened with Mr. Haldeman.

K: I haven't heard yet. I'll try to get you an answer before the end of this week.

W: All right. I saw him just briefly at the $1000-a-plate dinner for the President, but we just chatted. I didn't say anything at all about it; I thought I shouldn't.

K: No, I'll try to get an answer by the end of this week.

W: All right, shall I call you on Friday?

K: Will you?

W: Yes. Are you all right?

K: I'm fine.

W: Good. I'll speak with you Friday then.

K: Good, fine, marvelous.

W: Bye.

K: Bye.

62105-0000

05/21/93

BAMA DATE 10/1/93

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Folsom
By: L.B. NARA Date: 10-04-72

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin (in New York)

11:20 a.m. 10/4/72

AD: Henry, how are you?

HK: Okay.

AD: You are calling from Washington or New York?

HK: No, I'm calling from Washington--you called me before you left yesterday and I never got back--

AD: Yes, I did indeed. . . . . about United Nations membership.

HK: Right.

AD: You have before you a text right now?

HK: No, but I have it very well in mind.

AD: Okay, let's keep it this way--if it may assist or change--it may affect the question.

HK: Yes, the question of--

AD: Way affect the question of, but without "or change"

HK: Does not affect or change?

AD: In your text, it goes like this--in no way affect or change the question.

HK: You can take out "or change".

AD: Yes, I don't get that. Then it goes like this--the question of the four power right and responsibilities--let me put it this way. and appropriate agreements, decisions and practices--

HK: He just wants to put appropriate before agreements--

AD: Yes and not say or but "and"

HK: And? Okay.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01252

By CHINARA Date Stated

Page 2

AD Appropriate agreements, decisions...

HK: In other words, you want to take out the words "or change" and put appropriate before--

AD: We want to take out "or change"--this is the first one--second, instead of "or" put "and appropriate".

HK: Okay.

AD: And the last line in which you say "which relate to them", just "agreed among them".

HK: And appropriate what?

AD: And appropriate agreements, decisions and practices--this is your text--which relate to them--put in "agreed among them"

HK: Well that I have to check.

AD: Okay please check it--

HK: Good. I'll let you know--

AD: Tomorrow even. Take out "or change" and instead of "or" put "and" appropriate and "agreed among them"

HK: Okay, I'll let you know tomorrow or this afternoon.

AD: Tomorrow I may see you in Washington, yes?

HK: Yes.

AD: Thank you very much for calling Henry.

HK: Bye.

TELCOM

11:20 a.m. 10/4/72

AD: Henry, how are you?

HK: Okay.

HK: Right.

AD: Okay, let's keep it this way--if it may assist or change . . . . . .
It may affect the question.

HK: Yes, the question of--

AD: Yes, I don't get that. Then it goes like this--the question of the four power right and responsibilities--let me put it this way, and appropriate agreements, decisions and practices--

HK: And? Okay.

950 ASHES

Auburn 3012958

B. AMARA DAE 5/1/72

*

*

Page 2

HK: Okay.

HK: And appropriate what?

AD: And appropriate agreements, decisions and practices--this is your text--which relate to them--put in "agreed among them".

AD: Okay please check it--

HK: Good. I'll let you know--

AD: Tomorrow even. Take out "or change" and put ahead of "or" put "and" appropriate and "agreed among them".

HK: Yes.

HK: Bye.

CLASSIFIED

E012658

AND
BY
MAY 6, 1974

MAY 6/1974

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Senator Mansfield

11:25 a/m/ 10/4/72

HK: Yes, Senator, how are you?

SM: I hate to bother you, but I Chiao about the idea--he thought
it would be fine--I'm

HK: You talked to whom?

SM: Stoppe--And I'm trying to get hold of Boggs and Ford and I am
sure they'll think it is a good idea. We don't expect anything to
come of it, but I'd like to send the Secretary of the Senate up
tomorrow--with a personal invitation from the four of us and
but I'd like to have it arranged so that could see him
at sometime certain tomorrow--do you think you could help in
that respect?

HK: Sure-well, I don know whether, yes--I'll give them a call.

SM: Just to extend the invitation -- we expect a turn down, but we
think it might pay off in the future--

HK: Well, I won't tell them what it is about--I'll just say that you want
to send a message on behalf of the Senate with a personal message
for him.

SM: With a personal message?

HK: Yes.

SM: Okay, and then will you have somebody give me a call back here?

HK: Certainly. Thank you.

SM: Thank you very much. Bye.

BROOKLYN
DECEMBER 5, 1972

Anthony 3012958
BOMA DUE 5/14/72

I*

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Walter Stoessel

11:28 a.m. 10/4/72

HK: Walt, we've got another--I got a call from Dobrynin on that Four Powers statement. They are willing to buy our language --you know what we worked on.

WS: Hm hum.

HK: If you take out the word "or change" I don't know how that ever got in there--will in no way affect the question.

WS: Yes, take out the "or change"

HK: The argument is that"affect"includes "change" and if you say "change" it looks as if they went through the whole exercise again.

WS: Sure. In no way affect the question of--

HK: And they want the word "and" instead of "or"--you don't have to give me an answer this minute--I just want you to--but what they want is'in no way affecting the question of the Four Power rights and responsibilities and the appropriate agreement and and decisions and practicies.

WS: And the appropriate agreements, decision, and practices which relate to--

HK: Well, they want to say which are agreed among them, but I am sure we can just refuse to accept that.

WS: Yeh,yeh, I think'which relate to them'we would like much better.

HK: So could you call me in say a couple of hours and tell me whether that is acceptable?

WS: Yeh, okay. Henry. I talked with the Secretary yesterday and told him that there have been discussions by you with the Russians on this and that they in general seem to be disposed to talk about it and we thought agreement was possible and they suggested that discussions be between Ambassadors in Bonn and also that we had shown them our text--he didn't say anything about agreeing.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: E017958
Date: 5/1/72
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Page 2

HK: What did he say?

WS: And he said that sounds reasonable and apparently he also had mentioned this subject to Gromyko yesterday morning and apparently gotten the answer that yes this could be worked out so he seemed fairly relaxed about it--

HK: Well, let's get the text agreed and then how you handle it in your shop is your business.

WS: Anyway he is supposed to tell Shale (sp) this today in New York --that this was discussed in general terms Soviets seems to be agreeable to discussing in Bonn.

HK: Good.

WS: With that we can start the move toward the actual negotiations.

HK: Right.

WS: Now we were planning to send to Martie very privately--by letter-- the actual text.

HK: Well, let's see first what the text is. And make sure he plays the game properly.

WS: Oh yeh, this would be with all caveats and--

HK: He can't table this one.

WS: No, no.

HK: Will you let -- confirm this in a few hours?

WS: Sure. Okay. Good enough.

CLASSIFIED

Aubrey 30177558
B. MARRI DUE 5/10/8

TELCON
Amb. Walter Stoessel/Mr. Kissinger

12:10 p.m., October 4, 1972

S: Henry.

K: Yes, Walt.

S: No problem on dropping or change.

K: Right.

S: We have problems on the appropriate agreement. We feel that indicates that they may be wanting to choose between agreements and there has been a problem in the past. Apparently they feel some agreements are not valid, which we do. So you have difficulties on that.

K: How about which have been agreed among them?

S: No. Because there's some we really haven't agreed fully on. So we'd like to leave it, "in no way affects the question of four-power rights and responsibilities and the agreements, decisions, and practices which relate to them."

K: Okay. I'll call him this afternoon.

S: Okay.

K: Good.

S: Good.

K: Thank you.

S: Alright. Thanks, Henry.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: E0172958
Date: 10/1/98
B.

T

TELCORN

Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger

12:50 p.m., October 4, 1972

S: Hi, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay.

S: Good. Henry, I got this --

K: I've got a terrible problem.

S: What's that?

K: Phan Van Dong wants to come over this weekend and I've got other plans.

S: (laughter)

K: But that's off-the-record.

S: I think we could arrange that, don't you?

K: Well, and then there's the air service out of Hanoi.

S: Well, maybe you should go and meet him.

K: I said he'll have to send his family if he wants to return.

S: I see.

K: I'll pick them up.

S: I think you could meet him in Paris.

K: What do you have on your mind?

S: Can we quote you at all about the stock market, you want to get into the Kissinger market?

K: What did I say about the stock market?

S: Well, Walter Heller apparently is the man responsible for this in his National City Bank of Minneapolis letter. He talks about the Kissinger syndrome and you know, mentioning that whenever you make a trip the market goes up but he also talks about it in a more serious way in the sense that the --

TELCOM
Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger

12:50 pm, October 4, 1972

K: Well, you can say if I can affect anything drastically that I don't understand, I shudder to think what I could do to things that I do understand.

S: (laughter) Okay.

K: Or is that too frivolous?

S: No, I don't think so.

K: No, I don't want to comment on it basically.

S: Yeah, okay.

K: It's a profound subject.

S: Anyway, I've got one other thing here -- I've got a report from our people in Israel saying that there has been a request from the White House to them to call off raids into Lebanon until after the election is over and that one of the raids in fact was called off because of requests from us. How can I handle that?

K: Well, we're not in favor of raids, since it has nothing to do with the election.

S: Right.

K: Especially unprovoked -- you know, if there is no particular provocation.

S: Yeah, I see. How did the session with Gromyko go?

K: Very friendly.

S: There's a report going around town apparently that he said that the head tax thing was going to die in the Soviet Union; that it would probably be minimized here.

K: You know, if people would just shut up on that subject, there's a chance that something might be done. Just remember that there weren't all that many people that talked to him.

S: You mean Gromyko?

K: Yeah. I mean, so I wouldn't take every rumor at face value.

S: Okay. When is General Haig coming back?

TELCOM

Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger

12:50 pm, October 4, 1972

K: Tonight I think or tomorrow morning.

S: Yeah, okay. You looking forward to that with pleasure.

K: Oh, yeah, Haig has never failed yet.

S: (laughter) ... gave him a pretty tough job this time.

K: We're always confident.

S: Okay. Great. Thanks, Henry. Listen, if you get a free evening one of these days, we'd like to have you over for dinner.

K: What do you want me to do, call you and say -- why don't you make a proposal some day?

S: Anytime you're free we'd love to see you in the next week or two.

K: Call Candle and suggest a date. I think that's better than for me to call you.

S: Okay, fine.

K: Or give several dates.

S: Okay. Very good. Thanks, Henry.

wgh

TELCOM
Bill Buckley/Mr. Kissinger

3:10 pm, October 4, 1972

B: Hi, Doc.

K: Bill, how are you?

B: I'm fine, my friend, where have you been?

(laughter)

B: I saw your airplane at the airport in Moscow.

K: Were you there?

B: Yeah. I had dinner with the Beams before I went on to the Ukraine and they were just bringing the airplane to take you back home.

K: Gosh, I wish I had known you were in town, I would have seen you.

B: It was an odd place to run into you. Or it used to be.

K: And, you know, it would have given the wire-tapping equipment something worth recording.

B (laughter) How are you?

K: Okay.

B: I sent you a piece a while ago, I think. Have you had a chance to look at it?

K: In *Playboy*?

B: Yeah.

K: Yes.

B: As I said I challenge you to find anything they disagreed with.

K: No, I didn't disagree. It didn't cause me any great pain.

B: I didn't think it would, I didn't think it would. Well, my great friend, you've been busy.

K: I've been extremely busy. Bill, first of all, I've missed seeing you as I told your brother.

CLASSROOM

Authorship: E0172958

TELCONE

Bill Buckley/Mr. Kissinger

3:10 pm, October 4, 1972

- 2 -

B: Well, I miss seeing you very much.

K: So in general, I would like to see you. But it may be that in the next
48 hours I may want your advice, not on a personal matter but on a
national one.

B: Right. In Washington. Over the phone or what?

K: No, it's got to be face to face. Could you come to Washington? I
won't ask it unless it's really important.

B: Of course. It works out very well because I will be here and my Friday
is uncluttered for complicated reasons so I could come down.

K: Well, Friday is the day I would be thinking of.

B: Okay. Now when will you call, Henry?

K: Tomorrow by noon.

B: Okay, fine. I'll keep Friday clear.

K: Good. I want to talk to Haig after he comes back and then see what
needs to be done or what I think needs to be done but I'd like to get your
view also. Less about the tactics than about the moral issues.

B: Sure. I'll stand by.

K: But of course if you have any tactical views, we'll be glad to have them.

B: Okay. I'll brush up on my tactics.

K: How does it feel to be the specialist on morality?

B: (laughter) Well, as a matter of fact, I think I'm rather used to it.
(laugh)

B: I've been practicing all my life.

K: Well, I mean it as a compliment.

B: Well, thanks a lot, I appreciate it.

TELCON

U. Alexis Johnson/Mr. Kissinger

3:22 pm, October 4, 1972

K: Alex.

J: Yes, Henry.

K: I want to tell you, your papers confirm a theory I've always had -- that if you guys are brutalized enough, you can do the best work in town.

J: Yeah. (laughter)

K: I've produced tears of outrage among my associates by telling them that the best staff work I've had came from the State Department.

J: Now what do you expect to get from me now?

K: No, no -- this is the first thing I wanted to tell you, it is really outstanding.

J: Thanks, Henry.

K: It's opened up really new dimensions for me, not just scenario aspects.

J: Yeah, yeah.

K: And you've deliberately drafted these papers in a way that they really touch on all of the other questions.

J: Yeah, it's true. That's right, yeah.

K: What I would like -- I'll probably go with version B just for the sake of speed because the other one we're just not -- they're going to consider that a turndown.

J: Yes, yes, yeah. I agree, it depends on what you want to do.

K: But then hang very tough on that. But what I would like is some idea of Bill Sullivan's -- not so much for presentation but for my own guidance -- on how such a force would operation. You know, how many people?

J: Yes, we have some of that.

K: Where you would put them.

J: Yeah, we have some of that.

TELCON

3:22 pm, October 4, 1972

- 2 -

K: Now secondly, he made some reference in there how a ceasefire would operate. You know, how the various -- Now, I have some of these ceasefire papers but he had this idea that the local commanders will do certain things.

J: That's correct.

K: And then go to the next phase. If he could flesh that out, I'd use those, you know, for my own thinking . . . any questions.

J: Yes, yes. Alright, we can do that readily enough. We'll do it in brief form. He's working on now -- we've been talking today and he's in the back room now working on this question on how the various ways you can handle Laos and Cambodia.

K: Oh, yes; that's the next thing I must have. When do you think you'll have that ready?

J: I don't know where he stands on his typing -- I just haven't talked to him in the last couple of hours but I would hope by the end of the afternoon if not sooner.

K: I could meet with you if you had it until about -- I have to leave for the Hill at 4:45. But if you don't have it by then, we could meet in the morning?

J: I'll tell you, why not make it the morning and see if we could have some of this ceasefire stuff and cover both of them at the same time.

K: Let's meet at Noon.

J: Yeah, I can meet at Noon.

K: Alright.

J: Let's plan on Noon, yes. Bill and I will come over then. Henry, while I've got you on the phone -- the statement on launch assurances for the Europeans -- have you had a chance to look at that yet?

K: Yes, I have it. I looked at it yesterday. I wanted to look at it again. I'll let you have it by the end of the afternoon.

J: Alright, it's not enormously urgent but the sooner we can get it out --

TELECON
Under Secretary Irwin

10/4/72 3:30pm

I: I'm calling on SALT and I see there's a Verification Panel tomorrow afternoon.

K: Right. I may have to slip that till Friday.

I: That would be helpful. The EEC commission people that we meet with twice a year are going to be here tomorrow through Friday morning at least, that's Dahrendorf. . .

K: Good, I'll slip it till Friday.

I: And then I gather too we got two weighty tomes that have just been distributed on quantitative and qualitative and from an overall view I think if you could slip it till next week it would give us more chance with those. It would help my calendar better if you could get it to Friday but I think it would help us overall if we could slip it to next week.

K: Let me talk to my colleagues. If it's at all possible I'll do it and I see no reason why it shouldn't be possible. In fact I might even prefer it myself.

I: Well, thank you very much.

K: Bye.

I: Bye.

95CLASSIFIED

Aubrey 30172258

TELECON
Secretary Peterson

10/4/72, 3:56 p.m.

K: Hello.

P: Yes sir Henry.

K: As long as you call me Pete and get on the phone first, as long as you
call me Sir and get on the phone first we can get along fine.

P: All right.

K: I understand you've stolen one of my staff members.

P: I did what?

K: You've got Sonnenfeldt hidden away there.

P: I sure do. We're reviewing this whole maritime thing right now Henry.

K: How are you doing?

P: Well we just started the meeting. We've done the survey I promised
you we would do and we have confirmed that what the bastards did, either
stupid or otherwise, ...

K: Which bastards?

P: The Russians. . . . is they offered through the market these $9 rates
for shipment until next June, and remember those $9 rates are above the $8
rates that we had in our agreement.

K: Well if that's what they offered we've got to put up the agreement.

P: So what we're going to do, and this is what we're now discussing on the
options so we can keep the unions, I think Henry, though I want to hear what
these others say, that it is unthinkable, given our grain scandal problem,
that we would be in a position where the Soviets are paying less to us than
the world rate at the beginning. I just would find that an unthinkable position.
We have contacted , you know the Soviet guy; we have told him
about the problem. He now acknowledges that they did this and that they
won't do it anymore, and it's too late now. It's all out and there've been
several, you know, and besides we cannot as a government be negotiating
prices. You know, it would be an incredible error to make. So what we're
now figuring out is what the options are; my current favorite is as follows.
That we change the whole agreement to a market rate mechanism with an
option to go to a moving average if we wish by some day in the future. My

DECLASSIFIED
Author: E0172958
Date: 5/1/72
By: ARA Dure

Peterson

10/4/72, 3:46pm

page 2

reasoning being that by next year sometime we'll be out of this hot
political atmosphere; by then the constituencies who want jobs in business,
the firms and the maritime people will be working for us <u>as</u> instead of
against us and we'll solve the problem then rather than now. But we are
trying to work out that option. But it's a real bastardly thing to do.

K: But why . . . What would have possessed them to do this?

P: All sorts of Machiavellian reasons are ascribed to them like the fact they wanted to get off the rolling average anyway and this is a way of forcing us. What I think happened was that the stupid bureaucracy, anxious to solve its problems but not looking at the larger picture, just went ahead and made a deal not appreciating the incredible problem that it would put us in.

K: That's what happened. Does Dobrynin understand this?

P: I have not talked to Dobrynin but certainly ______ and Tretyakov and Alkimov understand it and Alkimov was over here saying we were a bunch of peasants on the Soviet Jewry issue, you know, which he thinks was an incredible error. He says once again we have behaved like peasants, so they understand what a mess it is. But we'll be <u>waiting</u> ready in two or three hours I think to decide <u>what to do</u> about this problem, or recommend.

K: Okay, how is the trade agreement?

P: Now on the trade stuff they're up at Williamsburg negotiating and they're putting terrific pressure on us to get Patolichev over here; they're even leaking now to the newspaper apparently that he is coming over. I told Alkimov and the others that my instructions were that we should first be sure we have an understanding. We went through all the issues with them; Lynn is going to meet with them tomorrow with Men ______ and Alkimov.

K: Because once Patolichev is over here <u>we</u> will have to settle.

P: Well that's what I thought on the Maritime deal Henry but we sure aren't getting on the navy ships issue. And incidentally, on the navy ships issue, for whatever my opinion is worth, I think this other problem we've got now is far more serious than that. And I would continue, which is what I'm doing, to say the ship problem is impossible, the navy will not go along with the proposal, it is still a very difficult issue, and then at the strategic moment we be prepared to trade off, that's all.

K: Okay, I agree with that.

CLASSIFIED

30/7/72

BRA DA 5/10/72

Peterson

10/4/72, 3:46pm

P: All right. Now I'm not sure. . . What we told Patolichev was the following, I mean to tell Patolichev. We had about five issues remaining they're being sticky on. We gave them a date of next Tuesday or Wednesday; we then said if the problems are solved sooner than that we'll let you know, but remember that when you come over we expect the problems to be solved. So they're going to meet tomorrow, and we'll meet with Menshulo and Alkimov tomorrow. Hopefully by tomorrow night I can let you know/ whether there's anything outstanding.

On lend-lease the main issue there, the other stuff is absolute trivia, is the . . .

K: On postponement.

P: On postponements. I had the calculations made over here, I think Jim told you. It's not an insignificant amount of money we're talking about here.

K: Well Gromyko asked for my intervention. I said I'd study it and I'll just never answer him.

P: All right. But I think you better give us a day until we know what all our problems are and then we wrap them up in a package.

K: Okay, not can I talk to Sonnenfeldt or have you got him hired full time.

P: I can't help it Henry if he's attracted to me. I mean that's your problem, not mine.

K: Pete, may I tell you something?

P: Yes.

K: You better pray he's not attracted to you. He's tough/ enough to deal with when he isn't.

P: I'd better pray what?

K: That he does not get too attracted to you; he has possessive instincts.

P: I see, all right.

K: He can read documents upside down on your desk.

P: I see. I don't think we're at that point Henry. All right, fine, he'll be here.

BECOME better by 30/7/58 Authority B: NARA Date 5/14/58

TELECON

Amb. Rabin

10/4/72 4:34 p.m.

R: Well, I'm bombed by questions as a result of the information that has come up in the Evening Star on the front page by George Sherman. It is written here that Gromyko is understood to have indicated to Nixon Soviet readiness to make a gesture on the education tax it has imposed virtually cutting off Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.

K: You know, I tell you. I'm seriously thinking of converting so that I could become anti-Semitic. What would you say to that?

R: I would not recommend. Therefore I don't want to say anything. I said I don't know. But I will tell you privately . . .

K: There is a little bit to it and I want to talk to you about it, in fact, unfortunately a remark was dropped in the hearing of a State Department official. He was high enough so that one would have thought he'd keep his god-damned mouth shut. Excuse me for speaking so vehemently. But let me talk to you personally because there are a number of things that came up that concern Israel.

R: I understand that . . . the Foreign Minister informed me that we'll have a meeting.

K: Well I couldn't very well reject it.

R: Oh no, no. I think you did it in a right way.

K: Are you coming with him?

R: Yeah.

K: Take him to the Map Room at 9:30 on Friday, oh well, hell bring him to my office, what the hell. Bring him to my office.

R: No I think it's better to . . .

K: No, let's not make it too secretive; bring him to my office.

R: Yeah, I think it's better.

K: He insisted on it; it wasn't my idea.

R: No, no, doesn't matter. Please, I don't want to be involved in it. That's all that I need. It's good that you're seeing him.

BECLASSIFIED
Author: E0172958
Date: 10/4/72
Title: TELECON

B: ANA Dae S/1/01

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page 2

K: Now I will call you in the morning and actually it is fairly important that I see you.

R: Well if you can see me any time before it it will be better.

K: Well I can tell you the relevant part now. I had a talk with Gromyko and with Dobrynin. Now but this is only for the Prime Minister. I talked to them about it. They both said it was a stupid mistake by a Ministry that they didn't know anything about and if they had known about it it wouldn't have happened. Then Gromyko asked me, but unfortunately, it was in the hearing of someone else, what I would recommend as a personal advice how they could get out of this situation. And I said well, one advice would be to see what they can do about the implementation. And he said well, maybe we'll publish some administrative rules.

R: I understand. Because you know that has got 72 sponsors.

K: Well, this is the situation.

R: In the long run I don't, since it's formulated in a way that doesn't call for any vote at the present session. I think it's not counter-productive.

K: No, that doesn't bother me. But for God's sakes make sure that this conversation doesn't go anywhere.

R: No, this is what I want

K: This is exactly what happened and I was going to see you tomorrow about some other things that happened that I don't want to say on the telephone.

R: I understand, all right, all right.

K: Good. But the other part can wait because it requires no immediate action though it raises some long-term issues.

R: All right. It's up to you. Whether you want it Friday or tomorrow.

K: Well we'll do it either tomorrow or Friday. Okay?

R: All right.

K: Good.

R: Thank you. Bye.

95-04-26 10:00:00

00:22:53

BANK OF CANADA 5/10/72

TELECON
The Vice President
10/4/72 4:42 p.m.

K: Mr. Vice President, I'm sorry to bother you.

A: That's all right.

K: I have a ticker here according to which you alledgedly said that there are some things you can't relate concerning the peace negotiations.

A: No, it's not quite that way. That's the way it was reported. I simply indicated that there are some things that I can't relate concerning a lot of foreign policy.

K: Yeah, well, if you could on the negotiations -- I'll see you next week and I'll review them with you -- if you could just avoid any comment if it's possible, just to say . . . what the President is going to say if he has a press conference. He will say that at this stage he just doesn't think any useful purpose is served by making a comment.

A: All right, well, I really did that. They picked up on that on one thing that I had said to indicate that naturally there were things that happened in the course of that couldn't be related.

K: Of course, no, I'm not saying this critically.

A: No I understand, but I'll send you a transcript of what I said yesterday.

K: There are one or two things you can say that would play into what we are doing. One is that by mutual agreement with the North Vietnamese we are saying nothing. Or to say no useful purpose would be served at this point.

A: Okay, I'll take it from there.

K: One or the other.

Okay

A: Thank you, Mr. Henry.

K: Thank you Mr. Vice President.

CLASSIFIED

3012958

B
MARIA DIA

5/1/72

TELECON

Joe Kraft

10/4/72 4:45 p.m.

JK: I'm fine, little bit exhausted and hoping I can see you. I know that
you're and I don't have much time and neither do you...

HK: How long are you going to be in town.

JK: I'm going... You see I have the Century dinner tomorrow and I
promised someone I'd go to that.

HK: You'll be back Friday?

JK: Well I'm hoping to be back but going to the country Friday.

HK: What time are you leaving tomorrow?

JK: I'll be leaving tomorrow around five.

HK: Well I'll do my damnedest to see you tomorrow afternoon at some point

JK: Okay. All right. Today is not possible?

HK: No, today is unfortunately not possible. I'm going up to the Senate
now; I'm meeting with the Fulbright committee in one of these informal
sessions.

JK: I see. And tomorrow morning?

HK: Tomorrow morning Haig will be back and it's just not realistic for me.
If it turns out to be possible I'll call you.

JK: Okay, would you, because I must say sending Haig has peaked my
curiosity. He's the toughest guy Thieu has ever had to deal with.

HK: That's no compliment to me.

JK: Well I included you and Bunker in this competition. I'm not sure it's
not a compliment. In any event it struck me as meaning something interesting.

HK: Well I'll talk to you tomorrow.

JK: All right, fine.

HK: Good Joe, bye.

CLASSIFIED

3012958

Authentic
BANA Date 5/14/72

TELCON

Governor Nelson Rockefeller/Mr. Kissinger

8:33 a.m., October 5, 1972

K: Nelson, how are you?

R: I'm great, how are you?

K: Okay. Nelson, I was going to see you today but we have a rather
important decision to make here on which I'd like if you were willing
to get your opinion and I wondered what would be a good time? How
would lunch be?

R: Marvelous. I'll meet you at lunch.

K: How about coming to lunch at -- in my office?

R: Great, you've got yourself a date.

K: Good.

R: What time do you want to make it?

K: About 1:00 and maybe I'll have Haig join us. He just came back from
Vietnam.

R: Couldn't be better.

K: You know, I can't guarantee that the President won't nab me but then
as soon as I get back -- I mean, he never eats lunch with anyone but he's
usually free at 1:00. At any rate, unless he nabs me, I'm very anxious
to get your judgment on the decision we --

R: I will be there at 1:00 at your office.

K: Marvelous.

R: And I'm thrilled to talk to you and I'm looking forward to seeing you.

K: Terrific.

R: Okay, I'll see you, Bye.

K: Bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED

Authentic
3012955

BROKER DECE 5/1/72

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Foi:2557
By CNARA Date StatoL

TELCOM

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10:05 am, October 5, 1972

wgh

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol.

D: Oh, you are just on the line -- definite progress. Usually it's a girl who answers but you are on the phone. Well, it's an improvement, definitely. (laughter)

K: I thought it was the President to tell you the truth.

D: Ut-ohhhh. But it is a different tone. I'm sure you have a red one which really rings so that everybody have to jump up.

K: That's right.

D: Otherwise, this is the way we have it with Secretary-General. We have a phone which is a separate one.

K: No, no; the President's phone -- it has a red button and it has a slightly different sound.

D: Sound, yeah. Well, I'm sure you have a different kind of tone or ring. Henry, when I could talk to you for 10 or 15 minutes -- I mean, after the *intricate* part of the day.

K: Do you have a message for me?

D: No, this was not specific message. [Gromyko?] asked me to give you explanation about --

K: Oh, yeah, let me call you this afternoon. Maybe around 5:00 - 5:30. Can I call you?

D: After 3:00.

K: I'll call you around 3:00.

D: Around 3:00, I will be back in office.

K: Good.

D: Okay, thank you very much, Henry.

K: Good.

D: Bye, bye.

TELCONE
Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10:05 am, October 5, 1972

wgh

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol.

D: Ut-ohhh. But it is a different tone. I'm sure you have a red one which really rings so that everybody have to jump up.

K: That's right.

D: Sound, yeah. Well, I'm sure you have a different kind of tone or ring. Henry, when I could talk to you for 10 or 15 minutes -- I mean, after the <u>intricate</u> part of the day.

D: No, this was not specific message. [Gromyko ?] asked me to give you explanation about --

D: After 3:00.

K: I'll call you around 3:00.

K: Good.

K: Good.

D: Bye, bye.

SCHOUWS

8502103

Amministrativo

B.M.A. Date 05/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Eugene McCarthy
10/5/72; 11:45 a.m.

K: I'm terribly sorry we have had so many . . .

M: That's all right.

K: On Tuesday the President kept me in Camp David and today I had to talk to Haign who has just come back from Vietnam.

M: Well, those are reasonable interruptions, Henry.

K: Well, I really would have loved to see you.

M: Well, listen, I've got kind of a mixed up schedule for the next week, Henry. I think I will be gone until Saturday night and then I go to New York on Monday. So, you know there is nothing pressing.

K: When will you be back?

M: I'll be back Tuesday and Wednesday, I think for sure.

K: How about meeting a week from today?

M: What's that, Wednesday?

K: Thursday.

M: Let's see -- I think . . .

K: Or Wednesday is possible.

M: I'll have my office call you. I'm not sure about that. I'll tell her to see if she can work something out for Wednesday or Thursday next week.

K: Good, terrific.

M: All right. Bye-bye.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Peterson
10/5/72; 12:58 p.m.

P: Hello, Henry.

K: I've already talked to Sonnenfeldt who tells me you are a good assistant. He's getting better work out of you everyday.

P: Oh, that's fine, Henry. You don't know what that means to me over here. Well, listen, we XXXX'X XXX'X XXX'X XXX'X XXX'X are trying now to get some more money out of the Russians as Henry may have -- did he explain that to you?

K: Yep.

P: And I haven't any idea of whether we can do that. We are prepared if we have to fall back to the 805 or market rate which ever is higher.

K: Well, that's fine. That sounded right to me.

P: Yeah, but we are going to try to get a couple more bucks out of them if we can because frankly these subsidy costs are shocking. They are now up to $60 million which is just fantastic.

K: Yeah.

P: And it's really they that did it. Listen, where are you now on lend-lease?

K: Well, as I understand it they have offered last night to accept 2 and 3/4.

P: Right.

K: I think we should hold out for three and settle.

P: Well what I was wondering, Henry is whether we should or should not in some ways try to combine these two very difficult problems. We have been debating this here. But if we get another XXX buck or two a ton from them it will cost them $5 or $10 million more. Isn't that right, Jim?

Jim Lynn: Right.

P: Five or ten million more -- yeah. This first year. Does it make any sense to try to try to ______ and settle at XXX three? And include this in there? Have you already offered three or where do we stand?

10/5/72; 12:58 p.m.

-2-

K: No, I have offered nothing -- I have stayed out of it. All I've told them was I have to stick to our paper.

P: Yeah.

Which

K: KKKK they had had before them and which I had never withdrawn.

P: Yeah. Well what do you think of the strategy of getting ____ and trying to get the lend-lease matter settled with this? This is going to be a real cruncher.

K: You mean the maritime . . .

P: Oh-h-h-h!

K: I think it is a bad idea myself because they already have, as Jim will tell you they are probably going to bleed over having to pay any interest at all on the postponement.

P: They have already offered 2 and 2/4.

K: I know, I know but that was probably a <u>reducing</u> decision. So on top of it KKKK to try to link it getting some more dough out of something else. What I would do is throw in the 16 fifths.

P: Oh, we are ready to do that. Very much because it is not money.

K: Why don't you say you can go down from 3 - 1/2 to 3 if they settle it. What do you KEX lose?

P: You don't care if I try it.

K: No.

P: And we have ______ here.

K: No, not at all.

P: All right, fine, we will try that package.

K: Good, Pete.

P: Thank you, Henry.

TELCONE

Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

3:25 pm, October 5, 1972

JK: Hello, Henry.

HK: Joe, Sorry we --

JK: No, it's my fault.

HK: I thought you told me you were free till 5:00.

JK: Well, I thought I was too and then my secretary made an appointment for 4:30 and so I'll miss it and hope I can see you next week. It's my fault and I'm very sorry.

HK: Yes, definitely. But I had to spend the morning with Haig.

JK: Yeah. How is the outlook for him?

HK: How is the outlook for what? Oh, as he sees it?

JK: Yeah, for the road show.

HK: For the -- (laughter) I appreciate the faith you all show. The one thing people haven't explained yet is if this is a roadshow, why is Le Duc Tho cooperating?

JK: Well, you and I both canvass various possibilities. I mean, one the Chinese-Russian possibility; another possibility is he doesn't know what he's doing. I mean, if you look at what they did on the prisoners, you are more and more tempted that they are just as bad as all other governments.

HK: Well, they're idiotic about our domestic opinion.

JK: That's right. You know, they are not even consistent in their idiocy. I mean, the way they handled our prisoners really is just shockingly miserable as an operation.

HK: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

JK: Yeah, but look, my assumption is -- I know you don't waste his time and I assume you are getting somewhere.

HK: Well, that I'm not even claiming. I'm saying it's -- you know, we're talking about serious subjects very seriously.

TELCON

Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

3:25 pm, October 5, 1972

- 2 -

JK: Yeah. We're over there -- I mean, the noises they've been making
I think are very, very interesting noises. The Nhan Dan editorial and
various things that they've been telling people are serious things about
serious subjects where I see some movement on their part.

HK: I think that's true.

JK: You know, I don't know whether they -- Really you can see a prime
thing and you can see maybe a minority position thing.

HK: That I can't judge yet. But they must have one hell of a time making
a decision. At least from our looking at it, there isn't any one
preeminent figure.

JK: Yeah. No, I think that's probably right.

HK: And then how you make, you know, the decisions that have to involve
giving up at least some basic previous positions. It's not easy.

JK: No. Alright. Well, look, let me come in early next week. I'd like
to talk Europe as well as this. I assume Europe must be getting kind
of interesting now.

HK: Right. It will certainly get even more interesting after the election if
it comes out the way the polls indicate.

JK: Yeah. Okay.

HK: Call me early --

JK: Monday afternoon any good for you?

HK: Why don't you call me Monday morning, we'll fix a time.

JK: I'll try it.

HK: Good.

JK: Bye, bye.

wgh

95CLASSIFIED

30122758

Anhui
B.

HUN Anhui 30122758 5/1/74

T

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Joe Alsop
10/5/72; 4:37 p.m.

A: Hello, Henry.

K: Joe, how are you?

A: How are you? I enjoyed lunch the other day.

K: It was good to see you.

A: How bad is this Jackson amendment?

K: Well, it isn't going to be called up in this session so I guess we can survive it.
ir

A: He's very responsible and I told Jackson myself who argues, of course, it will help because it will give you -- but if it won't be called up -- it won't be voted on . . .

K: But if you assume it should be part of the national policy of the United States.

A: I don't assume anything of the kind.

K: Non-citizens who . . .

A: That's what I said -- told him . . . I said you are mixing things up. This is not the sort of thing that can be made conditional upon an agreement that is otherwise beneficial to the United States.

K: Exactly. And where you cannot really plausibly argue that troops were subject to concentration camps. It is then a serious question whether the United States foreign policy should be conducted on this basis.

A: Unless you were to contradict that situation . . .

K: But I don't see, for example, that anyone is putting in amendments for the Baharis and Bangladesh who we know have been slaughtered.

A: Or for the unfortunate prisoners -- Pakistani prisoners either.

K: That's right.

-2-

A: Well, I don't know. I thought about writing a piece about it and then the whole things sort of broke over my head in the middle so I wrote about Bridgeport instead and I will get around to it again.

K: Okay. Right.

A: But that was why I called you. It was wonderful to have lunch yesterday.

K: Well I enjoyed it and I...

A: I reflected on that other piece that we discussed, Henry. I think a little later in the month it will be more effective.

K: Oh, yes. Oh for God sakes yes. Much closer to the election.

A: And ah, And ah, And ah, And ah.

K: I don't think I could survive two Alsop pieces on this.

A: No, I think -- in fact I am going to -- the kind of IX piece that I mentioned to you...

K: No, no, that would be much more...

A: Will do possible good. XXXXX Huh?

K: Absolutely.

A: So there you are.

K: Good, Joe, it was very nice to see you and I will see you next week.

A: I'll see you next week. Good-good.

TELECON

Joe Califano

10/5/72, 5:01 p.m.

C: I talked to Harold Hughes about Al Haig and he assured me for whatever it's worth, that he would have no problem with them. I told him a little bit about him and everything. He said he had about a half a dozen questions he wanted to ask him about Lavelle. He did not mention that he had any questions about Thieu or anything like that. And he said he wanted to . . . It was much along the lines of the stuff that we talked about on the street. He said he wanted to know the extent to which Haig was familiar with the rules of engagement; he wanted to know the extent to which he was familiar, or could match those rules of engagement against reports of what was bombed over there, whether he had any knowledge either officially or from friends that he had in the Pentagon that Lavelle was violating this stuff, when he first learned about Lavelle, that kind of thing.

K: Right, right. Well, you know, all of this he should be able to handle. Of course he knew the rules of engagement. The problem was in putting together bombing reports with the rules of engagement was that if this didn't go by target but by provocation. And since they claimed provocation there would be no way you would pick it out of a report.

C: Well I told him I was confident that he had absolutely nothing . . .

K: Absolutely no.

C: . . . to do with that and then I told him about what he'd done for us for years and everything.

K: Oh aren't you nice. Well Joe, this is a big thing for you to do. After all this madness is over you and I should have lunch some time.

C: Okay, love to do it.

K: Good.

C: Okay Henry.

K: Bye.

TELECON

Gerard Smith

10/5/72, 5:10 p.m.

S: Henry, I had a request a few days ago from the Foreign Relations Sub-committee that Muskie and Case . . .

K: Yeah, they complained about you to me yesterday.

S: (Laugs) We've checked with Hal and he agreed with us . . .

K: No, I think you were right.

S: . . . that it wasn't timely. Well now, and it also was the same time that the Verification Panel was scheduled so I said I thought that wasn't too sensible. Now I have a real blast from Muskie about my refusal to meet with the Committee and Congress is going to be adjourning and they have a responsibility and they're going to follow these negotiations closely and they expect to be in regular touch with the delegation in Geneva and with those involved in the negotiation and if I will only take an open and forthcoming attitude it will facilitate everything and I better reconsider my refusal.

K: Well what do you feel like doing?

S: Well I think that to keep these fellows sweet I'd be inclined to call Case and say look, we didn't refuse, we just said that we . . .

K: I agree with you.

S: And if they press I'll be glad to go up and just talk to them in general.

K: I think that's the right thing to do.

S: All right, now, we're going to, if there's no objection, to get ready in Geneva we're going to tell people like the communications people in Geneva that we want to be set up and ready to go although we won't know when we're going to start but we have to have an arbitrary target date . . .

K: Well why don't you wait till it's announced. It shouldn't be too far from, I mean it would still be at least four weeks before it's done.

S: It's going to be pretty close. I'm told we need about 32 whole days from the time they start, and so if it's . . .

K: Well we'll get you 32 days. Okay?

S: (Laugs) All right, now one last thought. I think that pretty soon some of us should go over and talk generally to Mack about . . .

TELECON

Bill Buckley

10/5/72 5:17 p. m.

B: How does it look for tomorrow?

K: Well, it would be nice to see you; it is not a hundred percent imperative but it would be consoling and not unimportant.

B: In other words it's not quite as urgent as you thought it might be yesterday.

K: Well, it's a decision. . . I still have to make the decision. It may be that I have fewer choices with respect to it than I thought yesterday, but your opinion would still matter to me a great deal.

B: Okay, now what sort of a schedule do you have tomorrow Henry?

K: Uh.

B: Is it very tight, or what would be ideal as far as you're concerned.

K: Well, we can do it. . . Can you do it for breakfast? That's probably too early.

B: I don't think I can get there for breakfast, no, I've got this damned Century Club function tonight. How is during . . .

K: How about late afternoon, or how about around noon?

B: Well which of the two do you prefer?

K: I think I'd prefer around noon because then, . . . oh no, wait a minute, that's when I've got to see the President. I'd have to say any time in the afternoon, from 2:30 on.

B: All right. Well let me work right away on the schedule and call your office first thing in the morning. And I'll try to be there in the afternoon.

K: Good, that would be marvelous.

B: Okay Henry, take care.

K: Bye.

TELCONE
Bill Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

7:23 pm, October 5, 1972

K: Hello, Bill.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Bill, I was thinking -- I know you have very little time -- As I am studying your papers and as these guys are so goddamned incompetent on anything practical, I was wondering whether you could edit them as sort of unsigned papers to hand over to them of how some of these things might operate.

S: Now, let me see, which ones are you particularly talking about -- the latter two that we gave you today?

K: That's right. I mean, how the ceasefire implementation might operate and how that Control Commission might in fact physically operate.

S: In other words, in the form that you could actually table and give to them.

K: Well, you know, just as a thinking out loud paper.

S: Yeah. We can certainly have a crack at it. How much time have we got?

K: Till tomorrow night.

S: Tomorrow night. Yeah, sure. I've got to -- my current schedule, I'm supposed to be in -- got to leave for Florida but I can start it and then Alex and Walt Cutler, who's been working with me on this, can finish it up.

K: I think it would be very helpful. Just two or three pages, it doesn't have to be very long.

S: Yeah. You wouldn't want it in too great detail.

K: Oh, no, no, no. Just so that they know what we are talking about.

S: Let me understand -- both on the -- the one on the Control Commission and the one on the ceasefire.

K: Right.

S: And only that.

K: Well, what else is there?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOL557
By CNARA Date StatoL

TELCON

8:00 pm, October 5, 1972

K: Hello.

D: Henry, Popyalov (sp?) is here. I would like to check with you one
point because now I have the maritime delegation here.

K: Yes.

D: The bosses have just have a nice dinner -- I mean, Peterson and
Guzhenko but his Deputy is with me.

K: Right.

D: So what I would like to check because I am just discussing with him
and I'm not very strong in this maritime area.

K: Right.

D: Am I understood you correctly that your position now is you would like
to have near the end of your financial fiscal year and it means the 30th
of June next year the situation under which you are not going to make
any difference -- I mean, to pay differences between world rate and
[what is fixed] now as $8,00, yes?

K: Well, whatever the world rate is --

D: No, no; whatever the world rate really is because now it wasn't but
about $8.00. But your position now is it should be that rate which is
used in the world, yes?

K: That's right. Now I'm sure our negotiators have asked for more.

D: This is the point.

K: What have they asked for?

D: They asked to fix $11.00 from this port and this really is ______
for them. I am asking now for my own because for me it is between
us. This looks like a reasonable fee for me to ask the government.
Say, "Look, here, if the Americans have a war and so on."

K: Let me tell you this between you and me on the basis on which we are
dealing. If you come back with an offer of the world rate and let me
know it before they make it, I will see to it that it gets accepted.

TELCORN

8:00 pm, October 5, 1972

D: Because his Deputy is telling me that in a sense his Minister was prepared to do it but I don't know what he really meant in a sense. I will check with him right now because Guzhenko is now dining with Peterson. So he said in a sense he already was proposing so could I check with the Minister and then tell you in the morning?

K: Yes.

D: If he can't tell me that it is alright that we can negotiate with the understanding that it should be exactly -- I mean, as the world rate is, yes?

K: Right.

D: Okay, then I will call you tomorrow.

K: Good.

D: Alright.

K: Exactly.

D: Okay because otherwise it's really so complicated. Okay, thank you very much, Henry.

K: Right.

D: Bye, bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012357
By CNARA Date 01-01-72