Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Under Secretary Meyer/Mr. Kissinger

9:40 a.m., June 18, 1971

M: I am more than aware of the impossibility of your scheduling, but on the SRG on Latin America, Monday I am supposed to be in Guyana.

K: We will not have it without you. We will schedule it the following Monday then.

M: I thought you were leaving -- taking a vacation.

K: No, I will be in England for three days and it isn't a vacation.

M: Then the SRG would be on the 28th. Thanks

K: Okay. Good.

lds

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KML NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCONE
Sen. Stennis/Kissinger
10:25 a.m. 6/18/71

S: I want to think you for the fine work you have been doing. You have done a lot. We have the Stephens/Cooke amendment. Let me give you -- in the dams about to break here. If they amend that around where it's milder they will get stronger and frankly I think if it breaks it will be an avalanche. I just learned this morning I think we will have to vote before cloture because they gang up and defeat cloture. I just learned an hour ago that Scott is in Europe and not planning to come back. don't see how I can say it's important to the President when he is over there.

K: You couldn't be more right.

S: We will loose unless you get him back. He is symbolic of the President's interest to a degree. If you don't tell the President, I will.

K: I will tell him.

S: If they switch this around a couple of key fellows will break.

K: I will move heaven and earth to get Scott back.

S: I told them I will vote Tuesday. So it's no use talking about Wed. or Thurs.

K: I will get after it immediately.

S: We have to close doors and ranks.

K: You have stood with us and in the national interest.

S: Nothing but my duty.

K: I know you are not even remotely our problem, you are our solution, and everyone who stands with us this month will never regret it. It's a time with the most delicate negotiations going.

S: I will agree to hold the vote until Tuesday. We can't put it off.

K: I can't advise you on legislative tactics. I will abide by your judgment.

S: You can get him here Tues. as well as Wed.

K: ?? ??

S: Belieu knows. Way over into the week.

By KHC

NARA, Date

5/12/04

Stennis/Kissinger

10:25 a.m. 6/18/71

-2-

S: I haven't checked but he is symbolic of the minority side.

K: I will talk with McGovern about tactics and the President will be informed
the hour. When you call and request something we know it's essential.

S: I will await your call.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, Sect. 3.6

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Stennis/Kissinger

11:04 p.m.

6/18/71

K: We are ordering the Minority leader back and he will stand up to fight with his usual firmness. We recognize the vote has to be on Tuesday. I can only tell you I will talk with you in the next few weeks to explain why it's so important.

S: The amendment?

K: Why important to hold firm.

S: That's fine. This vote will be Tues and cloture Wed. This is a problem with change in Administration.

K: We will get Scott back.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Ambassador Hilaly/Mr. Kissinger

11:06 a.m., June 18, 1971

K: How are you. I called to make sure -- did I understand we
would get a formal reply.

H: You are going to get the actual ~~KK~~ note, and they missed the connection. So it is coming this evening or tomorrow morning.

K: I will be in Key Biscayne. What time this evening?

H: Late. I doubt if it will be here by this evening. Tomorrow is safer. I am coming back this afternoon [was in New York].

K: If it comes in tomorrow, get in touch with Colonel Kennedy on my staff. I am assuming the note is, in effect, what you told me.

H: That is what I have been given to understand. There has been some anxiety about non-announcement of the trip.

K: Tell them not to worry. I have my own bureaucratic problems. It will be announced in the next week. I have to take another call. Thank you.

lds

By KHC NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCONE
Amb. Hilaly/Kissinger

11:10 a.m.

6/18/71

K: I am sorry I had to take another call. On the announcement one of our hand is that no one in our govt. knows about it. That process will be triggered on Monday and over a period of a week a progression of moves that will be modifi The other party can notify you this(?)

H: They are getting anxious. The way I wrote to them --

K: I needed their OK to trigger the formal request which is more important the announcement. We will go through normal procedures on Monday and ask for his host govt. We will ask two days for you and expand it as necessary and i be 8th and 9th.

H: I will say not to worry and being set in motion.

K: It's firm.

H: OK. There's the extension over there.

K: Tell them nothing to worry about.

H: I will be there this afternoon.

K: And give a copy of what you have to Col. Kennedy.

H: The usual deputy will not be there?

K: He is on vacation.

H: When are you coming back?

K: Sunday night. I will discuss this with President in Key Biscayne so it will be helpful to have it.

H: I don't expect it tonight. I think it's coming on a plane from Paris last night

K: If it comes in today, please call me immediately.

By KHL

NARA, Dato

5/12/94

TELECON

Jerome Wiesner/Mr. Kissinger

11:10 a.m., June 18, 1971

W: Hi, Henry.

K: Jerry, how are you.

W: I have been under some pressure from a fellow who runs the Citizens Exchange Committee which I have supported from time to time. They together with Arbatov are running an International Conference on Education and Information in 1973. I have been reluctant to do it. Arbatov wants me to be the international chairman. I am inclined not to do it. I thought I would get your feeling for whether these things are valuable. I am trying to avoid outside commitments.

K: In principle, I think they are quite useful. Could you send me something about it?

W: I will send it and would like your reactions.

K: If you send it to me, I will give you my opinion. Will you call me when you come to Washington?

W: I have been missing recent PSAC meetings. I hope I'm at the peak of my overload. I have been trying to do my old job and learn a new one, but that's probably too rosy a view of the future.

K: It will keep you going.

W: Can you come up? Would you like to come to the Vineyard for a weekend. I promise not to bother you.

K: It would be a great job. When? Make some suggestions.

W: We will be in Europe from the middle of July until...

K: Maybe sometime in the first two weeks of August.

W: I will pick a weekend.

K: Good. Nice to talk to you.

lds

By KHL

NARA, Date 5/12/04

K
TELCON

Harlow/Kissinger

12:34 p.m.

6/18/71

H: How did you come out on the problem of last night on what the man down south should do?

K: Our policy here is to divulge on a need to know basis.

H: I need to know because I am curious.

K: I just had the same question. We had an impassioned talk and listed the pros and cons and never came to a conclusion. If we want to play it in a conventional way I should talk and we should say something or vice versa: or someone could get on moral ground and say we are defending on principle and say you cannot steal 47 documents and can't take things out of context and calumny people and if they ______ we should do it alone. I don't see what he to us.

He made

H: I made one observation that is the nugget in my mind and I was trying to sell it in my chat with Chuck. I don't think he should do it. After he talked and told me his attack then if you said as last evening from that point forward our end is (support) LBJ.

K: And to say LBJ defends while we defend the principle, there will be 3 people who understand that. Then Johnson and Nixon are fighting shoulder to shoulder. I would rather go alone. We can say we don't know what's in the documents I have. It's one-sided. Chuck Colson thinks you are in favor of LBJ making a statement.

H: I told him I agreed with you.

K: You must have said you agreed with you -- seriously, he said this morning you came around to his view.

H: I gave up after our last conversation. After you talked with Walt.

K: (We gain nothing by an LBJ & statement). It's a personal matter and does help us and irrelevant to our cause. It puts Johnson and Nixon on the same page. He said he would speak on the record. He said he will speak on the record but not a LBJ has spoken.

H: So it waits in limbo in the moment.

K: I will talk with Colson and turn it off. I think he will go.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Harlow/Kissinger

12:34 p. m.

6/18/71

-2-

H: It moves the lightening over.

K: No because we will have to go into it. It will for 2 days but after that we be in it. Those people have already killed Johnson. That's not what they are after. People who are worreid about the next 3 days are missing it. It's after the next 3 weeks to see these guys stood up for something. I think it's a profound moral issue.

H: I don't see how any President can weazel on this.

K: Or play it as a tactical issue. The President owes it for the continuity of govt. to protect his predecessor against this. Naughton was a flaming dove a I despised him for what I thought was unpatriotic and now he appears as a hay and he was killed with his family and it's not right.

H: On the trip the President said he should do what he I want. Is he relaxed about it?

K: Totally. I raised the point where we started. I said in your view and our it didn't enhance your credibility with him when we needed it as a free rider. I made it plain that if he preferred it, you would go without question and he would abide by our judgment.

H: I will then pull off Korea end too.

K: That I wouldn't do.

H: K No?

K: Then he would think you are avoiding identification with him. He had a bright idea and you refused many part of it. I can see why you don't feel need for the primary objective of the inauguration but I wik would go.

H: I will do it. I wanted to run it past you. I thought the object we have in mind is not achievable in this way.

K: I agree but you should play the game partly his way. You will not bring pressure on Texas.

H: The call was cancelled.

By KML

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Kissinger/Under Secretary Johnson

12:45 6/18/71

K: Hello

J: Henry

K: Alex

J: Now that I've got Okinawa out of the way I've got Madagascar.

K: You can have it.

J: I know about your concern last night. . .

K: No, but I said I would clear the cable. I just said my own feeling, and this is not something in which I think the White House authority should enter into, my feeling is that when people kick you around we ought to let them know that it is dangerous.

J: I have no problem with that. We are dealing here with a psychotic.

K: I bow to your judgment.

J: I want to borrow Marshall Wright to send out to get out a message.

K: You want my good men. I think it should be taken care of at the State Department. Why do you need Marshall?

J: Well, for two reasons. First, I think Marshall is good. Second, it does give a little White House flavor to this thing that could be useful at this time.

K: I have some doubts about that. I think about it until 2:30. I think very highly of him, but. . .

J: Yes, I do, too, but what I would like to do is send Marshall, Dave Newsome and the Country Director.

K: Let me think about it.

J: I want to have the agency send out the expert on documents to be available at the neighboring post.

By KHL

NARA, Dato 5/12/04

2

K: Alex, you have found a way by which the State Department is going to conquer the White House --- send them all to Madagascar.

J: We have no problem with you or Marshall Wright.

K: I will call you by 2:30.

J: Make it a little later. I am having a luncheon.

K: All right, I will call you at 3:00.

By KCL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger
100 p.m. 6/18/61

H: What's your thinking at this point?

K: I just talked with Bryce who feels strongly that we shouldn't trigger John
Will not deflect it from us and when we have it back we will be standing shou
to shoulder with Johnson. I did not initiate the call. If that's our judgment
had better get word to Rostow quickly. I don't see what we gain either.

H: All the PR and political types feel it's what will do us good. It provides us with what we don't have now which is a responsible national figure to press it and gets it back in the media and controversy gets back where it ______ on Johnson.

K: The controversy is the moral thing.

H: There are two issues.

K: If the (President fights the issue on the integrity of the govt and to protect the office from the situation) then it's the best case.

H: On the cable?

K: Consider this, Bob. DeGaulle did everything wrong PR wise but people remember him for clear personality.

H: He did half of the things right PR-wise. The problem you have to deal with is that people don't understand the danger on documents.

K: Johnson can't bring that home to them. We might be able to.

H: He won't bring that home.

K: Once you have Johnson on TV, it will be us and him standing together.

H: Not necessarily.

K: I will call Rostow then.

H: One thing with value, it would rally what's left of the Johnson supporters get people talking on our side of the issue. We are carrying the whole deal All the blame.

K: We have gotten an injunction, we have taken a protective action and give no rational and not begun to give our case. Makes it an unequal battle.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

Haldeman/Kissinge

1:00 p.m.

6/18/71

-2-

K: Where?

H: In court.

K: That's the wrong ground. That's irreprable damage which is all it leaves
us by law and that's all right but it's not irreprebable damage to ? ? ? social
and govt. I can say that those are correct arguments that Johnson would sp

H: We are not making our line clear between Johnson and us. It looks like we are the only ones.

K: I think so. If the President says he didn't know what documents are and defend the govt. then I think he could make a moveing case.

H: I think he could be understoodably I don't know.

K: We have to tell them something.

H: Can we wait until John is out of the briefing?

K: I will tell them to hold up and we will get to them later this afternoon.

H: We have got some how to -- I don't know.

K: We won't do it with one home run. We can do it if we are on the attack
and stay there and take a little flack for a few days but gradually shift it. 1

H: You would argue for the President going on TV?

K: On the whole, yes.

H: Then we should build a case before he goes.

K: If Johnson goes on then the President could still go. But I would --

H: Johnson go on defending himself which brings it back --

K: If the President went on to defend Johnson from a certain point of view if
said what's the country coming to when senior officials are tried in the news.
It's one thing this ____ but to describe them to public as liars on documents
which will be unread by many and selective.

H: Then it's on the merits of the case.

By KHL

NARA, Date 5/12/04

Haldeman/Kissinger

1:00 p.m. 6/18/71

-3-

K: (cont) look like a hawk I can't believe. I knew McNaughton as a dove.

H: You are one small segment.

K: All I am saying is we have two choices -- they are liars and not off our backs or we can say these aren't our documents and we don't know about it. Or say it's an attack done on the basis of ______ documents and we cannot condone this. No judgment on individual documents. It's the highest possible but most difficult. (pause)

H: Are you talking?

K: No, I'm thinking.

H: I thought I'd lost you. Then Johnson shouldn't go on.

K: I believe that but I could be persuaded. We need a high moral position. I would play it to the turning point. Can't act on unorthodox way. The President attacking liberals for denying basic human rights.

H: OK. I think what we should do if we can is stall an hour. Ehrlichman will be available then and I will go with him. Then we will be on top of it.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON
Kissinger/Rostow
1:15 p.m. 6/18/71

K: Let me get back to you towards the end of the afternoon.

R: No problem at all.

K: We think there will be nothing to do until the courts have decided.

R: Actually, I will be flying back shortly and be back there after 5:00 pm.

K: Your time?

R: Yes, that will be 6:00 pm yours, but I will now inform the boys of your guidance and they will continue contingency planning there. We will be in touch with you about proceeding further.

K: It's not a question of who will do what or where.

R: I am sure, but if there ever were a time for us to work in harness together now is the time.

K: I am in complete agreement.

By KML

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Bob Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

1:50 p.m., June 18, 1971

H: I talked with John -- he feels we should not be in the position of the President asking him to do anything. It is desirable still to have him say something but only on his own initiative which Bryce feels he would and should do.

K: But Bryce doesn't feel that way. Where did you get that?

H: I got it from Colson and from Bryce earlier.

K: Bryce called me at noon and said he thought we would actually lose from it. Why don't you check his opinion yourself.

H: We should turn the thing off through Rostow?

K: I left it that I would call him at 6:00 our time and I will tell him to consult their own interests. And do whatever is indicated from their own point of view.

H: Ehrlichman can get back with Bryce whom I cannot reach, and figure that one out. John will then be in touch with you as soon as he gets him. John is coming back there this afternoon.

K: I cannot reach Rostow before John gets back. John should talk to Bryce. We cannot tell them yes or not until this evening. How did it go?

H: Fine, I think. I have been on the phone the whole time.

K: I will get down there at 10:00 tonight.

H: Don't wake me up.

K: We are staying together?

H: I am staying in the poor people's quarters.

K: In the hotel?

H: Yes. No, I have a villa

K: That's what I figured.

H: But not one of those jazzy ones.

K: I will see you down there. He knows I am coming down?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL

NARA, Date 5/13/64

TELCONE
Sisco/Kissinger

2:55 p.m. 6/18/71

Kx S: Just to express my appreciation to you. My daughter was accepted at Radcliffe. Now that she's in, I hope she will shift from Berkley.

K: Thank you for calling. What was (the purpose in the Secy. making that statement yesterday?) Wasn't it a blanket endorsement?

S: I doubt anyone took it down. I was already to go to sleep by the time the Foreign Minister was done.

K: They won't hold it to us?

S: I don't think so.

K: The President never does anything for nothing. Especially for Indians. They will pay for it.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Rowland Evans/Kissinger

5:10 p.m.

6/18/71

K: One of the guys I wanted to send a letter to is in Germany but I sent one to the other guy who is better. I have not reached Bogdan because he is out of town but I will Monday. I have sent a message to Helms and Taxca and you have the satisfaction of knowing if you are kidnapped in Greece someone's head will roll.

E: How did you like our column on the documents?

K: Yesterday? Fine -- tell me what the hell -- some PR people tell me we are in a PR disaster.

E: I think so. Even if you win you lose. Only one newspaper in the country supports the WH position on this.

K: What is happening to us? Here we are on basis of 47 work stolen volumes and destroy McNamara, Bundy and [illegible] without warning and without replying and without saying there are other documents which prove them false.

E: I agree and we said that. My position agrees with that. The only answer is that it's the way the information and media game works here and there's no way you can do about it. There are many weaknesses in it but over all it's the way it has to work. McNamara and these guys who are being worked and dealt with in the most harsh way, well, they risked it when they took the job. It's unfair and murder but nothing to do about it. Look at the McCarthy situation.

K: With McCarthy people were outraged.

E: From my close friends on how it effects them, they say McNamara deserve what he gets and Bundy is a snob and deserves it. I don't think any of them thought they wanted to pull them into a major ground war and were fighting it and it was a disaster and hot for scape goats. And try to find CORDS --

K: That's a different question.

E: When a top secret document gets out, the press has to use the [illegible] to get a danger to the country and that's seldom.

K: I am trying to understand the psychology.

E: You know the psychotic reaction to VN and further corroded by the drug picture. People can't look at VN objectively. They can't look at it objectively.

K: You know who will be destroyed by that -- people who are practicing this assassination.

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Rowland Evans/Kissinger

5:10 p.m. 6/18/71

-2-

E: You talk with some of your friends at the Times and Post and you can't find a dent on them. They are determined to hunt down and crucify anybody who had to do with the '60's.

K: Can they complain when McCarthy did the same thing? ? ? ? ?.

E: I can't answer that. A very interesting column is Monday on stuff Smyse and Droge briefed.

K: Good.

E: You look at the vote in the House and it's better then a year ago. Let out in detail the President's plan and sell it on it's merit. It's good.

K: OK and have a good trip.

E: Can I ask a question?

K: If you step out of line I will change the instructions to Greece.

E: How will you feel when I knock you from Greece?

K: It's hard to break up friendships with me.

E: How did Agnew by-pass Greece on his trip? I am told State wanted to keep him out because of his stance. I am not writing it.

K: State wasn't the principle factor.

E: You don't think he should go.

K: That was the principle factor. But I don't want anything written.

E: I will buy you a big meal in two months.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Under Secretary Johnson/Kissinger

5:55 pm 6/18/71

K: Hello

J: Henry?

K: Yes, I didn't get back to you.

J: No, I just got back to the office.

K: You can have him. I am not going to spill any blood over there. Are you going to get Vaky a job, for Christ's sake?

J: Yes, I'll get him a job. You're off to London next week.

K: Yes.

J: Ted raised with me the question as to whether or not any announcement is going to be made on it. Our boys feel it is just better off to make an announcement, otherwise it takes on an air of mystery.

K: I told the British there is some low key thing you could make.

J: I think you should make it over there.

K: Yes, we will make it. We will make it on Monday - just low key.

J: I saw your schedule. You have quite a tough one.

K: It was to be mostly with Burke Trend. Now they have thrown in all the others. I tell you you have got an active Ambassador there.

J: Whose Ambassador? Do you know B____ Galloway?

K: Yes, he is a good fellow.

J: He is a very good fellow.

K: Is B____ Galloway the one I should deal with?

J: Frankly, I think you should deal with him and take him along whenever you can.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KMC NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

2

K: I don't think I can control that. I have no messages from here for them.

J: OK, well, how will we manage without you?

K: Oh, run through all the telegrams in those three days.

J: OK, Henry, thanks for Marshall and have a good trip.

By KHLU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Packard/Kissinger

6:05 p.m. - 6/18/71

P: Hello

K: Hello, Dave.

P: Say, Henry, I just talked to my boys on Bolivia. Do you know anything about it?

K: Yes, about the military system.

P: We are in favor of the $1 million.

K: Yes, I am willing to go along with that. I think it is worth a gamble.

P: Well, I feel exactly the same way. Now, the other thing that ought to be looked at, but not in as much urgency, is that there is somebody who ought to take a look at the other countries.

K: We would favor that.

P: We would, too.

K: Well, could you make a formal proposal?

P: I will do that.

K: If you can get a formal proposal to me early next week, I will take action fast.

P: All right.

By KHL

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELECON

Ziegler/Kissinger

6/21/71 - 9:45 am

Z: So I could say that he did not, well, he did, contribute to our strategy then, didn't he?

K: Well, he contributed to the development of an options paper.

Z: Well, he claims in *Time* that you accepted all his recommendations. Did you?

K: They were options, only options. I had said that every option was put before us and the President. It doesn't look bad.

Z: How many were there?

K: About 8 or 9.

Z: Who were they?

K: Professor S______, General Goodpaster, Rowan, Ellsberg. That's all I remember now.

Z: OK, no problem.

K: OK, will you straighten that out.

Z: We will make your announcement today. You met with the President yesterday, didn't you?

K: Yes.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Ambassador Rabin
6/21/71 10:00 a.m.

R: I enjoyed myself very much on the West Coast.

K: Good.

R: I am instructed about three days ago while on the West Coast to tell you something about a certain visit of a Russian to Israel.

K: Right.

R: I was instructed to tell it only for your information and when you have the time.

K: I will set it up today or tomorrow.

R: All right. It was not an official, but a representative that travels unofficially, but he says he represents the officialdom of the Soviet Union and he came with certain points.

K: Right.

R: And whenever it will be possible to you I'll give you the details of what he said. Otherwise I don't see much development.

K: Good. Did you see the people on the West Coast?

R: Yes, I talked to them. I think that was fine.

By KHU NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Mardian/Kissinger
10:13 a.m. 6/21/71

K: I understand you have a problem only I can help with.

M: I don't know if you can. I am keeping tabs on what's happening in NY and Washington. We have been in court since 8:00. The argument we are making is that Congress has authorized the President to classify documents and there is a procedure of declassification and the Post has violated this order. They have not sought declassification as required in statute and put themselves above Legislative and Executive Branches and claiming immunity in Executive Branch. The court then inquired when it would be done and I authorized my deputy to __________ in view of declassifications the govt was making a review of the documents and they will attempt to declassify any documents that could be.

K: That's not true. We are making a general study which we started before this. We cannot accept proposition that we will declassify by leakage of documents.

M: That could bring the public disclosure act to force us to make a __________ pushed on declassification of documents. He is treating case xxx if they come up for this purpose. I think our chances are 20%.

K: It's not __________ factually true we are making a review.

M: If not then Doolin testified in NY that he made 3 studies of documents in response to Laird's and Fulbright.

K: OK. Then what's the question.

M: He has asked us to prepare a proposed order. He wants to make an order in which he in effect says unless we review the documents going back to '45 in light of Executive Order 10501 and make an offer to the court within a specific time --

K: All documents in this series?

M: In litigation. All the documents relating to VN history.

K: Where do they cut off history?

M: Embodied in this report on source material. I wanted to advise you of the situation we are in and what we can make in the order. __________ That would make it more difficult to undertake an exhaustive review and within 90 days state which could, if any could be declassified.

K: How much time do I have to react?

TELECON
Ambassador Bunker

6/21/71 10:25 a.m.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: Where are you?

B: In Vermont. I'm coming down this afternoon.

K: We are going to get Haldeman to call Rogers today and tell him that the President talked to you about this. He is going to imply that it was over the weekend and that it was your judgment that we can turn off the visit provided I get sent there. I just want to make sure we both have the same story.

B: That's fine.

K: I think it's better if we trigger it here. If you take it up with him and he disagrees then we have a fight. This way we are just ordering it.

B: You are going to say the President talked to me.

K: Right and that you feel this is the minimum we could do.

B: To send you there.

K: Yes.

B: And that we can do it in a low-key way and in the same time frame.

K: Right.

B: Will I see you before I go back?

K: I hope so.

B: I am going back on Wednesday.

K: Then we'll definitely do it tomorrow. Backuse I am going to Londo to do that other exercise on Wednesday.

B: Okay.

K: Good Ellsworth, I'll see you tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC W

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELECON
The President

6/21/71 10:35 a.m.

P: Is your morale a little better today?

K: I don't know why you think it is bad Mr. President.

P: Well you're bound to be depressed to have these bastards raise these questions. But on the other hand as you said last night there is something to be said for having to turn hard on the Russians. Also there's a lot to be said for going the other way, and there's an awful lot to be said for what we are doing with the Chinese. It's got to be done some time, so why not us?

K: I simply stated what I thought the impact would be, but I am not discouraged.

P: You have got to remember this is a battle. When we smoked everybody out on Laos and that time with the demonstration . . . it's the same thing. From the standpoint of enemies now at home, we have really got them smoked out now. Even Ted and the whole bunch.

K: Exactly. The Times is taking a few slaps at us, but primarily it's at the previous Administration. It takes slaps at us on holding back on the right to know.

P: Did they say anything about our problems on keeping security?

K: No, I have just skimmed them, but didn't see much about that.

P: But you know, the impact around the country on this is not as big as it seems. You would think from reading the New York Times and the Washington that it's the biggest story in the world. But it doesn't have the emotional impact of the Calley story.

K: I think we can still turn it to an advantage over a period of weeks.

P: We may well be able to. But whether or not we are able to do that, we know that it is going to go away. You know that because, due to the fact that after you water it all down, what is it, an old story. They have been saying for a long time that Johnson lied and it's an immoral war. They'll try to make a hero out of the guy that did it though -- we can't allow that. It's like they tried to make a hero out of Hiss.

K: It's exactly the same phenomenon.

TELECON
The President

6/21/71 10:35 a.m. p. 2

By KCLW

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

P: I pointed out then, look at the facts after the confrontation I had and after Hiss finally admitted he had done it. I was talking to a reporter, ____. He was emotional about it -- he said he still thought this investigation was wrong because it casted doubt on the Roosevelt foreign policy. From that time on I knew people in Washington have a different morality. I said to him 'you can't mean that.' And he said 'yes sir.' His point was that Hiss had been at the UN and at Yalta, and he was right, and it did cast doubt. When you really smoke them out, they want to prove the war is wrong and they want to destroy us. On the first, you can't fight them but on the second you wan.

K: They've thrown down the gauntlet...

P: And in a way that's a good thing.

K: And when we have told them that we are going through a delicate process. It's unforgiveable, what they are doing to the country,

P: What they are trying to do -- they haven't done it yet. Well Henry we'll have an all-out offensive. We'll get you out saying a few things. We'll start using the background thing, not just in Britain but here. And I'll do it too. If they think Agnew was hard on them wait till the President starts.

K: Exactly. And the press isn't all that popular right now. If we just give it a little time... don't object to giving documents to Congress, but we must do it with great care. There are going to be lots of documents going to newspapers.

P: Once they have been published I'd give them to them.

K: I'd do it but with a bleeding heart and a reluctant attitude.

P: Be sure you get that view to Ehrlichman.

K: I have. Of course McGregor is the other way.

P: Of course he has to fight that battle. You've gotta say this, he has done a job on those votes Henry. Even better than Bryce did. What he does is he says the President has something going, don't know what but something. He brokers that something terrific.

K: No, he's terrific.

P: And Scali's the same on the other side.

By KHLU

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELECON
The President

6/21/71 10:35 a.m.

p. 3

K: Well, next week some of our cards are going to fall and we will know what we are holding. We can play it the other way then.

P: Well, it's too bad you had to come down with all these problems, but you are all right now?

K: Mr. President, I am fine, and we got a lot of very good work done down there.

P: Henry for the next couple of weeks skip the parties, get some rest. I wouldn't try to fight the battle with the press guys; I don't think this is the week to do it. Did Stewart Alsop write his article?

K: I don't know; I haven't seen Newsweek yet.

P: I wouldn't start hitting the press until later.

K: That's right. I think we should wait till the court case subsides a little.

P: Right, and then we've got only one amendment this week.

K: Cooke-Stevens tomorrow.

P: How does McGregor feel? Can we win it?

K: He thinks it is close but we can win.

P: And then we should be through.

K: Well, I think their strategy is to throw something in every other day.

P: What a bunch of bastards.

K: They really are. It's a clear Congressional determination.

P: You get back from Paris when?

K: About 6:00 on Sunday I guess.

P: I think what you want to do then . . . is probably go to bed. That's what you want to do. But on Monday morning . . . . I'm going to be in Camp David then.

K: I could come up there.

By KML NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELECON
Secretary Laird

6/21/71 11:06 a.m.

L: Dave and I are just sitting here and I got this message kind of gabbled. I haven't had a chance to talk to Mitchell.

K: His man Mardian called me and said we have about one chance in five. Doolin seems to have testified that we are reviewing these documents

L: These documents are always under review for declassification.

K: They think there is one chance in five for Cassell to continue the restraining order pending a ninety-day period while the government reviews these documents.

L: Most of them could be declassified.

K: We don't have to say that, just that we are willing to accept that order. I don't see what we lose if the alternative is publication.

L: The thing that will influence the judge the most is the compromise on how we got the information. Most of this doesn't hurt us but some things in there do. One in five isn't very good, but it's the best we can get.

K: That's what Mardian seems to think.

L: If this issue goes to the judge and we lose, we lose a lot as far as classification is concerned throughout the government, for the future. If we lose this case it's bad. But I think that that is not a bad way. We have a regular redclassifying provess over here. If they can get that 90-day thing . . .

K: And it would be out of the news for 90 days.

L: Yes and . . . There are an awful lot of copies of this thing around. These aren't the volumes we have over here; these are the working papers this guy walked away with. The language is sometimes different and the dates are different.

K: He is ____________. He claims I accepted all the recommendations he made to me.

L: He really goes for you. You attract all the nuts. Okay, I think this is fine. I'll talk to Mitchell about it.

K: Marvelous.

TELECON
Secretary Laird

6/21/71 10:35 a.m. p. 2

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

L: We ought to go over the Times papers though. They have got stuff in the Times papers that are not in the MaNamara reports.

K: Let me talk to Mardian.

L: That's fine and I have got a call in to John. I got ________ the judge offered this. That's the best deal you could get.

K: Right.

By K.L. W.

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCON
Mardian/Kissinge
11:11 a.m. 6/21/71

K: I have talked with Laird and State is he consulting it up and down but I think so does Laird that you should go ahead with this.

M: It was Laird's man and Adm. Bluen of the Joint Chiefs that made the representation to __________.

K: NYTimes too?

M: I don't have an immediate problem with the Times case. But you might wa to know that the judges in NY decided to keep in a restraining order against the Times until the ______ court ______ at 3:00 tomorrow. That takes the heat off So we are breathing.

K: What do you think the fellow here will do?

M: NOthing that will permit the Washington Post to print that will mute it for t circuit court. He is anti-Administration and against Defense particularly but I don't think he is that wild.

K: That's what Does that cover this area?

M: No, it's a separate court of appeals.

K: That's a wild bunch.

M: The Second Circuit is the most responsible we have. Responsible and the t lawyers in any circuit.

K: The best group you could get.

M: Not in better hands. At least there we have a square shake. Anything you do to encourage Defense to ______ these documents with the purpose of better showing of clear and present danger would be helpful. Best they could in time frame.

By KCL V

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

11:15 - 6/21/71

HAK: Hello. I just talked to Mardian and told him what we had discussed. Their case has been referred to the Second Circuit Court. Any investigation you have should continue today at the Pentagon.

Laird: The NSA document is the strongest one we have. I just wanted to make sure you understand some of the Johnson papers have been declassified. I sent three men down there to declassify them for President Johnson. He wanted certain ones declassifi so we sent them down. The only ones we declassified were the ones that Johnson wanted. I wanted to remind you of this, that the three people were sent down there on the specific instructio of the President of the United States. This will be a problem if it KNOCK gets out.

HAK: I vaguely remember. That's right he called me in San Clement He was kidding me about...

Laird (laughed)

HAK: What are you guys going to do when you don't have me to laugh a

Laird: Now Henry you know better.

HAK: I know - no problem.

Laird: This declassification was done for Johnson's book he was writing

HAK: OK.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Haldeman/Kissinger'

11:18 a. m.

6/21/71

K: I think you have to get to Rogers today.

H: I can't do it now. I will have to call when I get back from the Union meetir
About an hour and a half.

K: OK but it must be done today.

H: OK.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Flanigan/Kissinger

11:30 a.m.

6/21/71

K: Re the dinner for the chowder and marching society. I am meeting with them at 5:00. Must I come to dinner too?

F: Not mandatory.

K: I am going to England the next day and rather not come to dinner.

F: Never let me interfere with your social life and I hope you have fun there and all your dinners are gay.

K: That's dangerous in England.

F: Well, (jolly) then. Delighted you can come at 5:00.

K: Can I answer questions? Or make a speech?

F: Along the lines of the other business groups. 20 mins of general discussion. These people should get your views on why the Times thing is wrong and bad and a brief (summary) of what's happening in VN and a couple of items on the rest of the world.

By KM W

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Doty/Kissinger

12:20 p.m. 6/21/71

D: Busy burning your papers?

K: It's an amazing period.

D: How are things going? All through the meetings with the panel?

K: We are still meeting but we are coming out okay.

D: One thing we let slip when we talked with you is that option 3 doesn't do the harm we thought it would do.

K: What option 3?

D: Option 3 that we acquiesced and since it involves implacement it doesn't.

K: Yes.

D: The main reason I am calling is that back in March I contacted Millionshe about a meeting and he said okay. Nothing heard further but a cable arrived this morning which said glad to receive Aug. 5-22 for a 3 day meeting in Mos

K: What is the date?

D: Aug. 5-22. How does that sit with you?

K: It has no problems now.

D: We are going to give ourselves to Vienna anyway. Will Helsinki be over?

K: Not by the 5th.

D: Maybe I could make it later part.

K: I would.

D: Amongst 7 people and I took Kaysen or Shulman have you any feelings?

K: Take both.

D: And Drell or Panovsky.

K: Good idea.

By KML

NARA, Date 5/12/04

Doty/Kissinger

12:20 p.m.

6/21/71

-2-

K: No problem with me on that.

D: We will go ahead. I am staying away from Weisner who is going to Eng
in July and Kistakowsky going to Moscow in July for the Dartmouth conferen

K: I think the latter part is best.

D: Good. I gather things are on for the 16th in Calif. We will work up rada briefing and test ban. And catch up on other things. Anything pressing?

K: I am very interested in the test ban.

D: We will do those things and find out where things stand before then.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Gen. Goodpastor/Kissinger
1:55 p.m. 6/21/71

G: I am back until tomorrow mid-afternoon and I wonder if I could see you sometime tomorrow?

K: I will make it such. Whom should we call?

G: Pentagon 78068.

K: We will call you.

G: I will keep the day clear until I hear from you.

K: It will probably be around noon.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KH U NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Ehrlichman/Kissinger

1:56 p.m.

6/21/71

E: The President thinks well of the idea providing we write the statement for U.S. attorney to speak to the second circuit. Thinks the January NSSM should be ______ by ______.

K: OK. What about the British.

E: I didn't ask him. I think you should go ahead. I couldn't reach Mitchell because I don't think it will hurt.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Cromer/Kissinger

2:01 p.m. 2/21/71

K: I talked with my associates about that conversation and they think it would be helpful if you could say something with the full understanding that you explored the desirability and not that you will do it.

C: I better come back with some suggested wording.

K: You should never offer to do a kindness for bureaucrats because they ask more. It would be helpful at the meeting but especially if it could be done tomorrow.

London

C: I will call back right away. I would like to check the working with you.

TELECON
Irwin/Kissinger
2:15 p.m. 6/21/71

By KM U NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: Hello

I: Hello, Henry.

K: Yes, John.

I: You remember some weeks ago we talked briefly on the phone about weather modification. This is coming up now again in the working group with the Under Secretaries Committee and they are coming down to a couple of versions. One, supported by the Department of Defense, State and the National Science Foundation which states the support of the principal of peaceful uses with certain qualifying explanations and, the other one supported by ACTA and the National Atmospheric Association which is a renunciation, a little more definitive. I gather you have had a Colonel Behr attending all of these, but apparently the last one he wasn't there.

K: No, he is no longer with me.

I: I just think that you should check it from your point of view because this is coming up. I think it is important that you all know what the problems may be.

and

K: Well, whichever you have Defense support, we do, too.

I: I asked how far up it was supported in Defense, but they weren't sure. They thought it was a JCS.

K: Yes.

I: I hear you're off to London. It's a good city to visit.

K: Yes, I love it. My schedule is pretty full though.

I: Fine, Henry. Good. It's nice to talk to you.

TELECON

Mr. Ehrlichman

6/21/71 2:30 p.m.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: The British are going to see what they can do about making a statement tomorrow and checking it with me.

E: Good. The President was just on three times in the last ten minutes. What he'd like is to describe the declassification process to a few bipartisan leaders informally next week rather than with a formal statement.

K: That's excellent.

E: Not Fulbright or Stennis, but Mansfield and few of those. He says how about mentioning declassification on World War II and Korean War papers.

K: He can say as part of the declassification procedure this is one thing we are now looking urgently into. But the reason why we have been so sticky is that the NSC papers include all the covert operations.

E: Who gets disillusioned in that? Everybody?

K: World War II doesn't bother me, but we ought to keep in mind the difference between getting out of trouble this week and . . .

E: Yeah, too many babies getting thrown out of the sleigh.

K: In fact I don't think we are in that much trouble. If you look at Time and Newsweek we are doing famously.

E: That's what I am trying to tell him.

TELECON

Ron Ziegler

6/21/71 2:40p.m.

By KHL

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Z: Let me tell you what I told them about you. I announced that you are going to London to visit Sir Burke Trend for an operational discussion . . . is that right?

K: Whatever the guidance was.

Z: I also denied that you had ever discussed with Ellsburg the document.

K: Correct.

Z: Said that you were aware that there was a study in the Pentagon, but were not aware that it was ever completed.

K: Nor did we have one in the White House.

Z: Right. Had Ellsburg contributed to the formulation of foreign policy at the White House was a question asked. I said that he was one of the ones you invited to the Pierre . . .

K: Just to do a paper on options.

Z: Yes, but it was incorrect that he contributed to policy beyond that.

K: That's correct.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

3:15 pm 6/21/71

K: Hello

S: Henry, several weeks ago we spoke of the possibility of having something to pass to the other side before the start of It seems the prospect of that is no longer, right?

K: Right. Oh, Jesus, I slipped on something. Dobrynin mentioned to me last week what we thought of it. If you and S______ could work it out, we were for it. He said to me last week that there wasn't much prospect from their side.

S: You mentioned that to me. I was just wondering if out of courtesy, I should pass a message to S______ saying it is not going to work.

K: I don't think that is necessary. He might think it is a sort of one-upmanship.

S: OK, if you think there will be no misunderstanding, that is fine.

K: Let me raise it with Dobrynin if I see him.

S: If it was a personal call. . .

K: I see nothing wrong if you refer to the conversation you had with me.

S: Well, I like your first reaction better which is to say nothing.

K: Yes.

S: Now, one other point - the question of the form of a possible offensive agreement structure which I see as one of the most troublesome things here. Maybe someone like Scoop Jackson would have some good advice. On the other hand, if the Senate Foreign Relations people thought one was taking counsel with Jackson, they would be miffed.

K: What are our choices?

S: Going to Fulbright and saying there is a problem here about form and we would like to get his thoughts in advance.

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

K: What if he says we insist on a treaty?

S: That's the risk.

K: My general philosophy is never to ask for an answer you know you can't live with.

S: His juridical sense would say that, but his political sense is something else.

K: Yes.

S: I don't think he or anyone else would fight you to get a treaty on the offensive side.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Mr. Ehrlichman
6/21/71 3:45 p.m.

K: I was putting in a call to Henry Hubbard in order to yell at him about publishing the Ellsberg interview knowing what Ellsberg said isn't true.

E: What was that?

K: That he had spoken to me urging me to read it and me saying I wouldn't. At any rate, I couldn't reach him because he is separated from his wife and has gone into hiding. I talked to Elfin. He said that he knew I had called Hubbard and he knew this was only half the story and that next week they will tell the other half. They have found the man who xeroxed the papers for a thousand dollars.

E: Oh! Thank you.

K: No for Christ's sake protect me.

E: Sure, I'll call Mardian and tell him we have a tip.

About two minutes later:

E: The FBI has had that guy for five days, and another beside. It was actually done in two places, so you can sleep well.

By KLW NARA, Dato 5/12/94

TELECON

Amb. Johnson/Kissinger

4:17 p.m. 6/21/71

K: Hello.

J: Henry, in the absence of a meeting this afternoon I have been talking to Jim ________. You haven't talked to Jim Schlesinger and Karamessines about the financing work, have you?

Query: Is there any chance that the President would be willing to make a call to Ellender?

K: Well, that is what I am going to move heaven and earth to do. I will do that tomorrow.

J: I was talking to Haldeman and he didn't think he would want to make a call.

K: That is always his reaction.

J: This is a subject, though, that has a lot of interest. In conclusion of all this, this USIA role is a very bad alternative. If there is any possibility, a call from the President could induce Ellender to go along with the resolution road, this would have by far the most advantage.

K: Well, nothing can be done -- well, I don't know why he couldn't do it tomorrow.

J: The date we are up against is the 24th when the USIA bill goes on the floor.

K: Well, I will move heaven and earth, believe me. I am very interested in this.

J: Well, I know he is too, and if he is not willing to make the call then we have got to proceed very fast on the USIA road ourselves.

K: A call from him which first arranges a continuing resolution.

J: Yes, the argument being that the RFA and RL are all ready over and a continuing resolution just enables it to go on. But, if he can't persuade him on that, try to get a commitment from Ellender saying he would permit going ahead on the USIA bill.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By KCLY NARA, Dato. 5/12/04

TELECON

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

4:40 p.m. 6/21/71

K: Hello.

S: Henry, with the time schedule that I see coming up we are going to be in a jam if we are still planning to table a draft treaty on opening day and I am wondering if we could possibly get to you a draft which had sort of alternative language.

K: Sure, I think that would be very helpful.

S: Then if at some point you could issue that and ask for agency comments.

K: Well, let me see it and I will do my best. That is a constructive approach.

S: We are going to have a ________ do about the North Atlantic Congress if we are to table a draft treaty.

K: As Carl C______ used to say in the Kennedy Administration, "Be tough with your friends, it's too hard to be tough with your enemies."

S: Carl was quite a man. We will try to get you something before the end of this week. Do you have any feel as to when we might have a meeting with the President on this?

K: Next week Tuesday or Wednesday.

S: You think it is a sensible thing for us to table a draft treaty?

K: Don't you?

S: Yes, I think psychologically it would be very helpful.

K: I'll be talking to you.

By KCL-WS

NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Robert McNamara
6/21/71; 6:40 p.m.

M: I thought it was the _New York Times_ calling -- I don't get calls from anyone except the _New York Times_.

K: I am putting my documents together...

M: Ellsberg said he was going to be your...

K: He thought I had accepted his scheme verbatim -- and he attacks me anyway! I am calling you about Reuters dispatch -- it says World Bank which convened a meeting issued a statement no indication of future aid to Pakistan was given -- until settlement of conflict on E/W Pakistan is in sight. That was not my understanding of our talk the other day.

M: I think what was said is they could not do anything until XXIX Yahya Khan makes his announcement of political program for the East.

K: Is my understanding correct that you thought something could be done to keep ______ until October.

M: I think something could be done to keep him in that position until the first of September -- I think something could be done to keep him in power, Henry. I am not sure that something could be done to get money out there. What is happening, I am told, is his reserves have been rising and that it looks as though he could struggle for another 60-90 (?) days. All we have to do is avoid saying "no." I don't know exactly what action can be taken. It will depend on what he says in ten days. I know exactly what your problem is.

K: Anything you could do will be greatly appreciated.
(Our?)

M: Your requirement is that he remain in power.

K: And to show some interest. I understand now what you were saying the other day -- at least avoid the negative.

M: Maintaining him in power.

K: Exactly!

M: Whatever is necessary would be done. I am not fit entirely clear at the moment what it is.

K: Maybe we can talk about it personally soon.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr Kissinger
Robert McNamara
6/21/71; 6:40 p.m.

M: I have to be in New York tomorrow afternoon -- after that I will be in a better position to talk to you. I will call you on Wednesday.

K: I will be in London on Wednesday.

M: Call me when you get back.

K: If you can avoid anything in the way of public statements.

M: Right.

K: I will call you next week.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Ambassador Dobrynin

7:01 p.m., June 21, 1971

K: On that matter we discussed.

L: Yes.

F: Why don't you keep the telegram as it is. In other words don't change the [scope of it].

D: No, no; as I mentioned to you along those lines.

K: We can't offer any other alternative.

D: No, no; if they would consult me, don't send anything more on this subject except you would like to have the answer for 7 days.

K: Our answer is still __________.

D: Will not add anything except what you mentioned today except about the date.

K: Okay, bye.

D: Fine; bye, bye.

By KHL

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

3:25 - 6/21/71

HAK: Hello Bob. I just wanted to check with you in view that I am leaving Wednesday for London. Am I safe enough triffling the trip now. I won't give Rogers anything that I have a special mission with Yahya. He will think I want to get into the refugee problem and that I am taking away from him some big public relations scope from him. He dosen't want me to get any credit for it.

RH: Why are you going out there?

HAK: I have to. Also it will take the heat off the Vietnam issue.

RH: I agree. *

HAK: I think we should just outline it and blame it on me. I am obstinate. I will call the embassies tomorrow and get it formally triggered off. OK.

RH: Yes, fine go ahead.

HAK: OK thanks.

*

RH: But why aren't you going to say Bangkok and Indonesia?

HAK: I was in Bangkok a couple of years ago and am going there now. Why should I go to Indonesia?

RH: Yes, that's right.