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By A.R. NARA Date 9/7/8

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELCORN

7/20/74 - 9:30 a.m.

Ingersoll/HAK

K: Hello.

I: Yes. Henry.

K: Bob, that was a false alarm you got.
of military aid.

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There is no cut off

I: Good. They told us unequivocally in the meeting that Schlesinger told them to cut off shipment.

K: You'd better go back there.

I: I surely will.

K: And make sure that they get in touch with their Secretary and that shipments are not to be cut off but on the other hand they're not to be delivered either. If you follow me. There should be in the next few days technical delays. There should be no formal announcement of a cutoff. We'll never get it started again.

I: Well this was -- they told us that they had already held up......

K: It doesn't make a G. D. difference Bob. You're in charge of this operation until I get back. You just tell them what I agreed with Schlesinger.

I: Ok. You talked to Jim recently.

K: I just talked to him 5 minutes ago and he said its a misunderstanding but if its a misunderstanding you'd better make clear it doesn't happen.

I: I'll do that right away.

K: Has Hartman talked to theTurks.

I: And right after that he was going over to see Schlesinger.

K: I know. And he did and Schlesinger was not quite as tough as I would have wanted him but he was at least consistent with us. Did we tell him we'd have to cut off aid if there were no ceasefire.

I: I just heard the message described to me and he didn't put that in there. I don't know why.

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K: Who Schlesinger?

to

I: No Hartman. But we gave that Joe and put it in a cable to him as well.

K: What do you mean Hartman didn't put it in there.

I: I just had read to me a memo on his conversations with the Turkish Ambassador and he didn't say it. At least it's not reported.

K: Well, it's going to be a lonely department when I get back. You called the Turkish Ambassador. You get Hartman to call the Turkish Ambassador and you tell Hartman that the next time he doesn't carry out instructions I want his resignation. I do not accept the principle that Assistant Secretaries have a judgment when they're given an order.

I: Well, there may be....

K: There could be no misunderstanding. He was on the G.D. phone with me.

I: That's what I thought. I don't know that he didn't say. I just heard the message read to me and it didn't have it in it and I question it just before you came on the line.

K: There is no sense you doing it. Tell Hartman to call back the Turkish Ambassador. Tell him he did not make himself clear. He wants it clearly understood that the proposal for a cease fire that Sisco is bringing has our total support and that it is his view that it will lead -- that if we threaten it to Greece it will lead to a cut off with Turkey also and we want him to know that as a friend so that there will not be surprised if things don't go properly.

I: I'll do that right away.

K: Now, it took me an hour and a half to get Sisco to deliver this in Athens now do you suppose we could deliver it in Washington. We've spent 2 hours longer already than I ordered it so tell Hartman its safe. And I want a call in 5 minutes that its been done.

I: Fine.

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TELCONE
SAN CLEMENTE

Ingersoll/HAK

7/20/74 - 9:55 a.m.

K: Hello.

I: Yes Henry.

K: I wanted to check has Sisco or has he not delivered the message.

I: We haven't had any word from him.

K: Alright you call the Ambassador and you give him the message.

I: Hartman is calling him right now.

K: That isn't the message I want. You mean Hartman is going over there.

I: No, he's just calling him.

K: Hartman did not do it right.

I: He did not.

K: For what reason.

I: Because he has some concern about this man's connections and he thought that Joe should get to the top people and we have given those instructions and I talked to Joe and also sent a message.

K: I would like to raise this question with you Bob. When you or I give an order who the hell are these guys not to carry it out whatever their concern is.

I: I think they ought to raise it if they have it anyway at the time and not later.

K: I want to know whether Sisco has got an appointment. He is to demand an appointment. If he cannot get it within the next hour you are to call in the Turkish Ambassador. You are to tell him exactly what Sisco has been instructed to say and you are to do it in very firm K.K. language. I have just talked to the President. He is fully behind this and it is to be done by 2:00 your time and there can be no possible slip on it. I want a call put to Sisco I want to find out where it stands.

I: Are you going to call him or do you want me to.

K: You call him. No Bob I do not accept the proposition that subordinate State Department officials cannot carry out instructions. It is not acceptable to me.

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I: No. We'll carry it out immediately.

K: I'm not talking about you. But if Hartman has a concern let him raise it.

I: That's what I told him he should have done.

K: Did you tell him that?

I: Yes I did.

K: What does he say.

I: Well he just used this excuse that he thought the Turkish Ambassador was not the proper official to get it to the right people. I don't the backplay. I haven't had a chance to get into it.

K: I just cannot believe that if you tell the Ambassador of a country to do something that aid will be cut off that it won't get to the right people.

I: That's what I would think.

K: Besides Hartman is Assistant Secretary. If he doesn't want to carry out my orders he has at least got to tell me.

I: Right.

K: Alright, you've got one hour to get the message delivered either in Ankara or in Washington.

By NARA Date 9/7/69

ELCON
SAN CLEMENTE

Ingersoll/HAK

7/20/74 - 10:15 a.m.

K: Hello.

I: Yes. Henry. I just talked to Sisco.

K: Yes.

I: He has delivered the message.

K: Yes?

I: Yes sir and he said that the military leaders are meeting in a short time and he will see __ after that meeting the Prime Minister.

K: OK. Now the only question we have in our mind now is what message did he deliver since nobody yet has delivered the message he was ordered to I don't want him to break the record.

I: Well, Hartman has delivered your message.

K: By this point he probably went the other way. My instructions this morning which Scowcroft wrote down was to say. Hartman should express his personal opinion that having threatened aid cutoffs to Greece it would certainly come to Turkey if they did not accept a Sisco proposal. It was not to be an official U.S. government threat at that point. It was supposed to be Hartman's personal opinion. I will bet my bottom dollar he didn't do it that way.

I: I can't tell you.

K: Were you under any misapprehension of what I wanted.

I: No. I recall that. Henry. I tried to find out from Joe what he said and he said I hesitate to talk to you on the phone but there is a message coming to you on the wire in five minutes so we'll have it shortly.

K: Bob, you'd better think of whom we put in what places because I am going to make some massive changes after this crisis. Find out from Hartman whether he carried out his instructions or whether he had a better idea of how to present their threat to the Turks.

I: I'll find out.

K: OK. And get that message out to me fast and call it in.

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By NARA Date 9/24
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TELCONE

Ingersoll/Buffum - HAK

7/20/74 - 11:20 a.m.

K: Hello.

I: Henry. I'd like to have Bill Buffum outline to you what we have on the U. N.
right now.

K: OK.

B: It has been proceeding at a very leisurely pace indeed Mr. Secretary. The Council has still not met at this 2:30 p. m.

K: It has not met.

B: It has not met. They have been negotiating in the corridors all morning long on our resolution. The Russians have been dragging their feet throughout the day trying to get everything they can from yesterday's text added to our text. And of course we've been stonewalling them.

K: Yes. Are the British and French with us?

B: They are generally although the French have been willing to accept the paragraph which would call for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces in excess of those envisaged in international agreement on the grounds that this now includes all excess Turks as well as Greeks. In other words those who landed yesterday.

K: Well that might not be a bad -- except the Turks won't like that.

B: No. Neither the Turks nor Greeks will like that. I said provisionally I did not think that accorded with your understanding with the French Foreign Minister and they are seeking further guidance from you.

K: Well I don't think the French Foreign Minister ever expressed himself to me on that.

B: That is not covered of course in the agreement of the points to be put to the 9.

K: That is correct.

B: So I thought that went beyond what you had agreed. And what we are trying to do at the moment is get the Council President to announce as a simple consensus of opinion a common desire that there should be a cease fire and negotiations among the parties. It is possible but not certain that the Peruvian President will do this. If he does not then our best choice I believe is to accept this modified draft as the French have worked it out.

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K: I agree. That is such a shocking sentence for me to say to my friends.

B: Well, we've held the hard line until we heard from you.

K: No, I agree. If we have to do it that way but make sure we've got the British and French with us when it happens.

B: Oh, they will definitely be with us. They are dragging us at this point.

K: OK. Well, that's not a bad position to be in.

B: Alright. Henry, Larry just said you want a WSAG at 9:00 in the morning. We have our group here when you get in at 9:00 tonight.

K: Is that when I'm getting in?

B: That's what he said.

K: Well, I'm leaving here at 2:00. Let's just meet at the Department a half an hour after I arrive whenever that is.

B: You probably won't be here before 10 or 10:30.

K: That's what I would guess but can we work that out -- I haven't worked it out.

B: I'll work it out with Larry.

K: OK now. Have we any idea what Sisco said to these guys.

I've not seen a wire in yet and he wouldn't tell me over the phone.

K: Well, I've never been wrong about Sisco yet and if he didn't tell you he didn't carry out his instructions.

B: He said he was sending a report very shortly thereafter but we haven't received yet.

K: But the point is it would have been easy enough for him to say that he carried out the instructions.

in
I gathered that impression but he didn't say so/any exact words.

K: What, that he carried out the instructions? We'll give him a decoration.

We haven't received his cable. How was the press briefing?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By MR
NARA Date 9-16-76

K: I kept it very, very low key and my major concern was XXXXX to give the impression that we knew what we were doing. The questions were very friendly. You know they are letheic out here.

B: The questions are friendly in California than they are in California.

K: Yes and the group out here hasn't been on top of all this excitement. You get the text. / Tell them that that airborne battallion in Europe has been I did alerted because I didn't want them to find it out afterwards. But I made it very clear we are in no posture of confrontation with the Soviet Union. / We are working cooperatively with them and so forth.

I: What one is this.

K: Well, that G.D. General Goodpath that just went ahead and alerted for 509th Air Force without telling anybody. And I didn't want it to come out of Europe because if I did not say it and it hit suddenly it would sound as if something new had happened. So I listed it. I said it is a normal precaution, there is no alert, there is no confrontation and so forth.

I: Alright. We'll make it all available back here.

K: They can use my name but not quotation.

B: Henry. I was not able to reach Fulbright but I talked to Mrs. Fulbright and she gave her pretty much the story and she's going to get to him sometime this afternoon.

K: OK. Did you call Mansfield.

I: I spoke to Mansfield. He was very pleased that we gave him a briefing. He didn't disagree with anything we're seeking to do. In fact he said it seemed to be the right thing to do.

B: I got the same reaction from John Roades. I got him over.

K: Somebody should call Alpert.

I: I've tried and we can't get him. I am trying to reach Morgan in Pennsylvania.

K: Good. Many thanks. I'll see you all tonight. I'll give you a call just before I leave.

TELCOM

Sat. July 20, 1974

Joseph Sisco- Secretary Kissinger

12:45 p.m.

/.......

S: And I am now awaiting word...... I'm awaiting word for another meeting. Could be this evening, hopefully tomorrow morning.

K: Now, Joe, you put that to him in tough terms.

S: I sent you two full reports.

K: Just so that I know the framework. The President is very strong on this.

S: We are doing everything we can. We have a military...... How long will you --- how long will you be flying--you will be flying now for the next four or five hours.

K: I will leave here in about 1/2 hour and then will be airborne for about five hours and then back in Washington. Assuming you can get all the people to London, Callaghan would like you to be there.

S: Well, if that is it, OK.

K: Yes, that's fine.

S: You know, another man who could stay with this thing is Buffum.

K: Yes, he is a good man. I like him.

S: And he is not so busy right now. OK, I will do everything I can on this end.

K: Make it clear that we are very serious.
be any on

S: There can't/mistake/that.

K: Joe, I want you to know we can't have a better man there. If I growl at you it is from affection.

S: Well, I appreciated your notes more than I can say.

K: I think that they had made their minds up before you got there.

.......

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2

S: OK, I am going to try to get some sleep. I haven't really had
any sleep for the last four nights.

K: I know, Joe. Get some sleep now.

S: That is what I am going to try to do.

K: Thanks again, Joe. My appreciation and-- my confidence.
And, incidently, my respect, Joe.

S: Well, I appreciate it.

K: OK, we'll probably be in touch after I'm in Washington.

S: Yes,

K: OK, bye.

S: bye.

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By A.R. NARA Date 5/16

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NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

*

Page 2

K: What is your idea about this talks--in London or Cyprus. I think London. But tell me your view.

S: London I think is the only possibility--

K: Callahan thought he could go to the Cyprus base.

S: I don't know how well that would go down --

K: Okay, I agree with you.

M: The history of holding talks on Cyprus about Cyprus is not a very--

K: I agree with you Bob. Okay--get them done and call me.

M: Right.

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NARA Date 6/76

TELCONE

7/20/74 - 1:30 p.m.

Ingersoll/HAK

K: Hello Bob. I want to make sure the Greeks know what we're doing in Turkey
so they don't get antsy.

I: Joe sent a wire from Ankara telling what he was doing the same time he sent
the message to us and those both should be in your hands by now.

K: Well, is Tasca going going and telling it to the Greeks.

I: That's the suggestion, yes.

K: Is it an order -- you know in this free-wheeling rable I've got -- I'd like
somebody -- tell Tasca to go in and tell the Greeks and urge them -- tell
them we're doing our utmost to bring about a cease fire.

I: Alright. Fine.

K: Including the same consideration we've advanced to the Greeks.

I: Have you seen the Sisco wire. It's a good one.

K: No. It hasn't got out here yet. When did you send it.

I: Larry says its on the way. I just talked to him. We sent it about a half hour ago.

K: OK. I haven't got it yet.

I: Joe gets a medal.

K: Good. Thank you.

NARA Date 5/7/74

By

TELCONE

McCone/HAK

7/20/74 - 1:31 p.m.

K: Hello.

M: Henry.

K: John, we've had a hell of time getting together.

M: I don't like to impose on you.

K: You can't impose on me but I've had a war going on here.

M: Yes. Two things I wanted to tell you. In 1964 we had the same situation in Cyprus as you know and I was the one that got the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey to sit down and in Geneva with Dean Achieson that brought the situation that has prevailed for 10 years and I did it by meeting Aristotle Onnasis in Paris. He at that time had a great deal of influence with Papandreou and he was selected because he had more influence than anybody else and I was selected because I knew him better than anybody else. So, after a couple of days of meetings in which he went to Athens and presented the matter to the entire Cabinet. We were able to bring about an agreement by the Greek Cabinet that they would send their foreign minister to Geneva and that resulted in papering over the thing which lasted for 10 years. I don't know whether any such approach is feasible at this time but that's the way it worked in a similar situation. I thought that might interest you.

K: Right. John, I appreciate this output. I've got the British Foreign Secretary on the line.

M: The other line if you just take one second. When we have a think it is very important for this Committee, this advisory committee on Disarmament not to meet unless they meet with you at the first movement.

K: I've agreed to come to breakfast with them.

M: You can do that. Because otherwise, G. D. they go in every direction you know and what they need is an outline by you to the perimeters of the problem and your ideas of which might be done and what might not be done and give them a sense of direction you see. OK. Well, you and I are thinking a lot alike on that. If you can't be there then the meeting ought to be cancelled until you can be there.

K: I'm planning to be there.

M: Good. Good bye then.

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Authority
By NARA Date 5/26

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A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER __3__ ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DECLASSIFIED
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EO12958

NARA Date 6/7/84

By J.R.

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

23-B

TELCON
Jim Callaghan/HAK
1:32 p.m. - 7/20/74

UNCLASSIFIED

...K: Well, I told the press today on a background basis that I got you out of bed at 4:00 in the morning but your moral was restored when you got me out of bed at 3:000.

C: I'll do the same for you.

K: I told them that you had -- left that distinct impression. So I/don't consider that an unfriendly remark.

C: It's not very good is it?

K: Well, I've got Sisco in Ankara now and I will get you the reporting cables. They say they will let him know first thing in the morning there time which -- what time is that?

C: That's about -- they're about two hours ahead of us.

K: That's about 10 hours from here.

25x(6)

C: That's right. You know that the ceasefire is broken down in Nicosia do you.

K: No, I do not.

C: Well I think the communities are getting at each now Henry and that's the kind of worse thing that can happen. You get intercommunal violence of this sort and its far more difficult to stop than regular forces.

K: Well, what do you suggest.

C: I've got nothing to suggest at the moment. I'm just feeling a little depressed about it. I don't think that we're going to pull it off you know. What do you think Greece will do?

K: I think they may hold their fire for another 12 or 24 hours but not longer than that.

C: You think if you get a favorable response from the Turks that the Greeks would then consent to come.

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PARTIALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 9/10/03
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23-C

K: Yes.

C: Right.

K: Well, they'll have to be some adjustment I think of the military positions. We now have to do some token withdrawal or go into enclaves or something

C:

K:

C:

K: On the other hand.....

C: He's going to work pretty hard if he's going to get anything from them of any significance. Is there anything I can do?

K: Well you've made strong representations haven't you?

C: My God we have yes.

K: What do they say to you.

C: What they say is its time we went and talked to the Greeks. That is the Greeks who are responsible. That they don't see why they should be put up against the wall by people who are supposed to be their friends. And much is the same strain. This was the Foreign Minister who then said that he would in any case put it to Ecevit and see what the response was. But our Ambassador got a feeling that things were going pretty badly.

K: Yes. Well....

C: Now, what do we do if it breaks down. If they won't come.

K: Well if they don't come I think we all have to cut off whatever military relations we have with them. With both of them.

C: I think that will be the only thing that will be instrumental in the short run if they really felt that would happen.

K: I have said publicly today that nobody is fighting a war there with an open American military supply line.

C: That is certainly a help isn't it. That's right.

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25x(6)

23-D

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K: I have said that.

C:

25x(6)

K:

C: Of course. That's right. Well, let's wait for the 12 hours -- let's wait until first thing in the morning and I think we'd better then have an immediate word -- what time will that be with you then? That'll be about midnight again for you won't it first thing in the morning.

K: What do you consider first thing -- first thing in the morning in Turkey is midnight for me. Yes. Roughly isn't it.

C:

C: I'll call you I think if I get some word.

K: Jim, you call me whenever you get some decisive word and the same for me.

C: Right then. Alright we'll do that. There is a bit of a diplomatic lull at the moment and we're not getting fast I must say.

K: It looks that way. Well, I think the Turks will accept this but probably too late.

C: Yes. (laughter)

K: You know, one respect in which all the humanitarians and liberals and socialists were wrong in the last century was when they thought that mankind didn't like war.

C: Yes.

K: Its regrettable but....

C: I came to that conclusion a few years ago when I saw the position in Northern Ireland Henry.

K: They love it.

C: There is only mind you a handful of people who do for a long period. Most of us like it for a day or two but there is a handful who like it forever.

K: That's right. It doesn't mean that the humanitarians were wrong it just means their life is harder than we thought.

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C: Yes. And I think life is getting worse Henry.

K: I think you are right.

C: I don't know what sort of age were passing through or going to pass through but historian like yourself ought really to give us a rundown on it sometime and tell us how you think how this next half century is going to look.

K: I'll tell you it is -- I'm glad I'm not going to be running part of it. It's going to be brutal.

C: When I think your -- nuclear anxieties you know they're something.

K:

25x(6)

C: Yes, of course.

K: But that's not what...

C: I Suppose the American taxpayers ought to pay for long hours of philosophizing ought they.

K: Jim, I'll talk to you first thing in the morning.

C: Very good Henry. Bye then.

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NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

TELCON

McCloskey/HAK - Buffum joined

7/20/74 - 1:45 p.m.

M: Mr. Kissinger. We got the press conference and its a great help back here. We're seeing that everyone gets it because I think the main story will be written out of here.

K: OK.

M: It looks good on the wires.

K: It does?

M: Yes. We've seen two takes so far. Now Bill Buffum -- one last check with you in New York the situation has changed. Mr. Secretary we read you that paragraph this morning.

K: Yes.

M: Demanding the withdrawal of personnel otherwise than those under the authority of the international agreement. The Cypriots have told the British that they would live with and not object to others supporting this text provided it adds the following phrase: Including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios in his letter of July 2.

K: Well, I think we should fight that but let Scali get off it if we absolutely must.

M: The date of the Makarois letter is July 2 so that predates the coup de tat.

K: Yes, I know.

M: They've been negotiating this all day Mr. Secretary. This seems to be the final sticking point. The Russians of course have been giving Makarios support at every turn.

K: They have. I don't see how Makarios can now come back can you?

M: No, I think each hour becomes more and more remote.

K: My judgment is he has had it whoever else emerges.

B: But I was glad to hear you say out there that you're going to see him still on Monday.

K: Bob, as long as I've got you on the phone two other things. Can you make/the sure

By A. M. NARA Date 6/26/74

- 2 -

British get the reporting cable from Sisco quickly. I promised it to Callaghan. And secondly, what do you think about putting my statement on the record where I say we want to make it absolutely clear no one is going to fight with an open American supply line.

McC: I would leave it just as it is.

K: You would?

McC: I would. I think its there -- its attributed to you. The only difference is it is not literally in quotes.

K: OK.

McC: We understand then that Scali can live with this only if its -- or if its the subject of a bitter debate.

K: No. You should try to fight it in the corridors.

McC: He has been doing this all afternoon Mr. Secretary and the British have now produced this -- given this to us as their estimate of the final acceptable version.

B: After their talks with the Cyprriots.

K: What's your view?

B: I think we have to live with it Mr. Secretary. The rest of the resolution is 99.9 % what we want. A ceasefire, support for the London conference.

K: Listen Buffum. When I get through with the Department we settle for nothing less than 100% of what we want.

B: I'm sorry I don't have it here Mr. Secretary. the .1% we would have preferre to avoid.

K: I agree. OK. No I don't want a public debate on it.

M: Anything else?

K: No.

M: I'll see that the British gets the Sisco report right away.

K: OK. I may call the Turkish Ambassador and give him hell before I leave here.

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M: Did Hartman clear up that other point?

K: Well in a sort of a half-assed way, yes. But I think they are stalling Sisco.

B: What you could do would be to call him and say....

K: And say we're getting very restless and I'm calling on behalf of the President.

B: And furthermore you just said this publicly and he ought to know it.

K: Right.

B: That'll rub it in abit.

K: Thank you.

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By

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Joe Sisco
7/21/74; 9:56 a.m.

S: The thermometer is getting awfully hot here. In particular, we now have in that other capital not one meeting that has to take place but two.

K: One of them seems already to have taken place.

S: It is in train and that was as of your time an hour ago and another one that is supposed to begin an hour from now. The problem is this that -- you know it as well as I do -- they have taken your chat and what I have to say on this end as something very considerably quicker than that and they see in the various settings of these double meetings, two hours apart, as a deliberate stall. What we have here just so you will kknow from the PM and the Foreign Minister is that they don't believe that they can hold any longer.

K: What will they do if they don't hold?

S: Only one of two things as I read it -- either a political decision on NATO or the one of _______ intervening.

K: But . . .

S: I just want to give you that . . .

K: Let me call Echivet again.

S: Yeah, the reason I think that is desirable -- Henry, I don't think this is entirely consistent with what he told you and what you really conveyed to the Prime Minister here.

K: That's right!

S: Two hours apart is really not consistent with doing this thing right away.

K: Well, let me call -- I will put in a call to Echivet and I will call you back.

S: All right, Henry.

K: Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

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NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

Conversation between Secretary Kissinger and Prime Minister Ecevit

July 21 - 10:40 a.m.

Kissinger: Good morning, Mr. Prime Minister.

Ecevit: Good morning, Dr. Kissinger. We are in the middle of a Security Council meeting to discuss this matter. We have a problem. We doubt the reliability of Greece. Ioannides word of honor is a joke. We have now figured out what the joke is behind his words. He said we could fire on any ships bearing Greek flags. His ships are drawing Turkish flags!

Kissinger: Well, no one can blame you if you sink your own ships.

Ecevit: No, Dr. Kissinger, they are not our own ships. They are Greek ships. They are Greek ships drawing Turkish flags.

Kissinger: Yes, Mr. Prime Minister, but you can sink them if they are not your ships but are flying Turkish flags.

Ecevit:

25x(6)

Kissinger: What exactly is it that you want? I know you are an intelligent man -- I know that from the days of Harvard. With all due respect, I cannot take this. This can go on for six weeks on this basis.

Ecevit: They say that they want an armistice. It has become obvious that they want to exploit the cease-fire for massing troops on the islands. The Greeks must cease these methods.

Kissinger: What methods should they cease?

Ecevit: They say that they are ready for a cease-fire. They have already shown us the tricks that they will use to violate the cease-fire.

Kissinger: Are you telling me you will not accept a cease-fire?

Ecevit: We will accept a cease-fire.

Kissinger: Today?

Ecevit: We are in the middle of discussing the problem now.

Kissinger: That means many more hours of delay again.

Ecevit: We have been occupied with the matter of these flags in our Security Council meeting. They had given us their word that no Greek ships would be around Cyprus.

By NARA Date 6/7/67

PARTIALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 9/10/63
by NARA on the recommendation of the
NSC under provisions of E.O. 12958

24-B

2

We cannot rely on them. I will let you know. I will call you when the
meeting is over.

Kissinger: Whatever the outcome is, it will be to the long-term dis-
advantage of Turkey.

Ecevit: I will telephone you.

Kissinger: It is not possible for the U.S. to stay its passage any longer.

Ecevit: I will call you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
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By J.R. NARA Date 6/7/8

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

27-B

Conversation between Secretary Kissinger and James Callahan, British Foreign

Secretary

July 21, 1974 - 11:15 a.m.

Callahan: Hello, Henry. I have read the telegrams and also had an interesting report myself from Athens from one source. Any changes made will be for the worse. Therefore, I believe we ought to remove any excuse for widening the problem. You should take a bit of a risk in telling them what the Turks are willing to do and as far as I am concerned, I would approach them and say we hold ourselves ready for talks which are available -- suggest perhaps in Vienna. The Turks are available, and as far as I am concerned, we are ready.

Kissinger: The Turks are not ready for a cease-fire. Ecevit is using the excuse of Greek fleets in Cyprus. He says there are Greek ships carrying Greek flags. There will never be an end to this. He says that they are speaking Turkish they learned in NATO. I said that no one could blame him if he sank ships carrying Turkish flags; they are his own ships.

Callahan: What did he say to that?

Kissinger:

25x(6)

Callahan: The situation will be worse tomorrow.

Kissinger: I will tell Ecevit we need a cease-fire tonight.

25x(6)

Callahan: How will that move affect the Greeks' move toward the USSR? There is some suggestion of a move that way.

Kissinger: In Greece.

Callahan: Would your bluff be called?

Kissinger: My bluff would be called if we went to war anyway.

Callahan: What will you say to the Greeks?

Kissinger: I must talk to the Turks first.

Callahan: We can expect the next positive action from the Greeks.

DECLASSIFIED
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PARTIALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 9-16-03
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NSC under provisions of E.O. 12958

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By AAR NARA Date 6/7/58

Kissinger: I will call Ecevit.

Callahan: Then on to the Greeks after that. We must get the record
clear with them.

Kissinger: In what way?

Callahan: I have told the Greeks talks are available, so they have no
excuse.

Kissinger: Tell them I am in urgent contact with Ecevit on the cease-fire.
Go ahead with your overture.

Callahan: Yes.

Kissinger: So that they can get a little courage.

Callahan: You and I can exchange views when we have both talked to
Ecevit on the cease-fire.

Kissinger: Bring maximum pressure on him for a cease-fire.

Callahan: I will twist his arm, but I don't have much influence.

Kissinger: Try charm.

Callahan: It doesn't work at 2,500 miles.

Kissinger: It works at over 3,000 miles.

Callahan: The other thing is that we have had a long convoy of more than
1,000 cars and lorries out of Nicosia. It has reached our base area now.
The tourists and dependents are now out of Nicosia. Here is a "tender
report" -- it suggests that Turkish planes have gone home. Three planes
have been hit.

Kissinger: Talk to you soon.

Callahan: Alright.

*

Conversation between Secretary Kissinger and General Haig

July 21 -- 11:20 a.m.

Kissinger: The call was Callahan, not Ecevit. They are pleading -- the British! -- to save the Greek regime and to get Turkey to a cease-fire quickly.

Haig: The leftist channels -- that could unravel the whole thing.

Kissinger: We have a massive insurrection in Defense. Call Brown and talk to him privately. He is sitting down there dying.

Haig: You should go back there.

Kissinger: I want to go back and tell them I have just talked to San Clemente. This is what we are going to do. He will kill us in the press.

Haig: No, I don't think so, Henry.

Kissinger: Al, we can never go through another crisis like this. It has been too bad. I will talk to the President.

[Remainder was private.]

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By

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By NARA Date 9/7/94

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E012958

NARA Date 6/7/68

By A.M.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Prime Minister Ecevit. of Turkey
7/21/74; 11:26 a.m.

E: Hello. We have reached this decision. Of course, we all accept the terms for a ceasefire once the Council has decided it and we want it to materialize. We are ready at the earliest possible time tomorrow to discuss the minimum conditions of ceasefire after all that has happened anywhere in all the countries concerned. It can be in or anywhere in Switzerland so that we don't lose time travelling. And we will authorize our representative to declare for us the time of ceasefire for anytime tomorrow once the minimum conditions for ceasefire, for the supervision of ceasefire is complete. Would that be all right?

25x(6)

E: Even if that happens. If it is going to happen tomorrow, we will encounter the same difficulties tomorrow wouldn't we?

K: Secondly...

W E: I mean this strengthens my arguments. You see, we will be the ceasefire today -- sometime this evening. Tomorrow as you say there will be a change of regime -- a coup in Greece so obviously the new rulers will say we are not committed to this arrangement.

K: Well, in that case -- of course then you can start again if you want to.

E: This is a very new development and I'll...

PARTIALLY DECLASSIFIED ON

9/10/03

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By NARA Date 9/7/98

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

I*

TELCON

F.M. Callaghan/Secy Kissinger

11:44 a.m., July 21, 1974

C: Hello.

K: Him.

C: Henry.

K: I've just talked to Ecevit.

C: Well, well done.

K: Well, here is his proposal and see how that, as they say here, "grabs you." His proposal is that he is willing to meet any place tomorrow.

C: Yeah.

K: To discuss -- not he, but a representative -- to discuss a ceasefire.

C: Yes.

K: But they are not prepared to accept a ceasefire tonight.

C: Humm.

K: Now, of course the Greeks will never send anyone to discuss a ceasefire.

C: Nope.

K: So I have told them this was not acceptable.

SANITIZED

C: Yes. Yes.

K: SANITIZED

C: Yes.

K: And that shook him up and he now promised me an answer in half an hour.

C: Well, I think I will ring him back because I've been speaking to Kipraiof [sp?] -- he's in a very excitable mood. He wouldn't even let me finish a sentence. What he says is they have been waiting for 3 days.

- MORE -

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28-D

Callaghan/Kissinger

2

If they don't have a ceasefire today, then I drew the deduction they would extend the action straightaway. But he has just gone off to see the Prime Minister, whose telephone number he gave me as 603018. They are to have a meeting there and I gather the decision is to be taken at 7 o'clock local time.

K: 60318?

C: No, 603018.

K: 603018.

And I think

C: That's right. If they get on to them there, you'll get the Prime Minister.

K: Okay.

C: If you like to try that.

K: And you talk to Ecevit.

C: And I'll talk to Ecevit. And then, incidentally, Caprell (sp?) said that they would be willing to go to somewhere like Geneva or Vienna after three or four days because they were very tired.

K: [Laughter]

C: That the public -- don't laugh, Henry -- That the public is very angry and because the public is very angry, they cannot wait beyond the day.

K: Yeah, I understand. . . . Will you [play] with Ecevit and you can tell Ecevit that he doesn't have to worry about Sampson.

C: That he doesn't have to worry about what?

K: Sampson staying in office.

C: Why?

K: Because we will support his removal.

C: All right. Okay, okay. I'll tell him that. And then we'll exchange views again later.

K: Right.

C: Goodbye, old man.

DECLASSIFIED

2012958

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TELCONE

Joseph Sisco/ Secy Kissinger

11:49 a.m., July 21, 1974

S: Yes, sir.

K: Joe.

S: Yes, sir.

K: I want the record to show that you were on the phone your knees pleading for this mission.

S: [Laughter]

K: And you may never come back.

S: Yeah, looks that way, doesn't it?

K: Now, listen, here is the situation in Turkey. They put forward a proposal that the ceasefire talks should take place tomorrow. I told them that was unacceptable.

S: Right.

K: And they told me they would let me know in half an hour.

S: Right.

K: Now I understand that the Greek Cabinet is now meeting.

S: ... have not had word of this. I know they went into a meeting. The fact is they've been more or less in continuous session.

K: Now, should I call the Prime Minister or should you go in and see him?

S: Well, I think it would be very well if you called him because I have had some time to make three and four telephone calls in the last two hours saying we are expecting a response shortly and I think your direct call would help to draw this out.

K: All right. Will you call him and say that you have just talked to me and I'm placing a call to him.

S: I will do that.

K: But that we and the British are urgently -- whatever you want to say -- pressing the Turks for a rapid ceasefire.

- MORE -

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NARA Date 5-21-74

By J.L.

Sisco/Kissinger

2

S: Yes.

K: Okay.

tell

S: Well, I will put in a call and them that you are going to put in a call right away.

K: As soon as you tell me his name.

S: [Laughter] Andrewsopulous.

K: Andrewsopulous.

S: Yeah.

K: Okay. Well, we have a happy united group backing you up, Joe.

S: All right. I will call him right away. And then you should put in a call.

K: Okay. Don't go up to Dapasanaut [sp?]. You may be too visible there.

S: I know.

K: [Laughter] Okay, Joe. We'll be talking to you soon.

S: Oh, yes. Thank you.

END.

DECLASSIFIED

2012958

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TELCONE

Tom Braden/Secy Kissinger

11:50 a.m., July 21, 1974

K: Hello.

B: Are we going to have a war?

K: I think we are going to try to quiet it down. We'll know within the
next hour. I'll tell you, I'm beginning to get to the view that I
cannot live any longer in this town.

B: Why? What happened now?

K: Because it's getting to be ridiculous. Every time you move some
@#*! is putting out some story. We never supported the Sampson
regime; we never had any intention of supporting the Sampson regime.

B: I know you never did. But Joe Kraft thinks so.

K: Does he have an article on that?

B: He has this morning. But he doesn't really say that. I haven't seen
anybody -- well, I guess they have been illusions to that.

K: Oh, the New York Times . . .

B: The New York Times said so, yeah. Yeah, that's right. I mean, what
are we going to do, put Makarios back in?

K: We haven't decided yet how to do it but we'll certainly not accept
Sampson.

B: Yeah. Well, I just wanted to -- you know, I'm just the guy that called
you in the middle of a crisis and bother you -- I just wanted to tell you
not to worry about this crap. I mean, I don't think it's very serious.
You know, people like to criticize about foreign policy but they're not
really making any passes at you.

K: No, but -- what's so ridiculous is -- what you told me the other day,
I mean, it shows what's going on in this town.

B: Oh, sure. Oh, I think your . . .

DECLASSIFIED

2012958

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TELCORN [Continued]

Braden/Kissinger

2

K: It's not just -- I mean, all the animals are out of the cages. And here we've got a war cooking and the goddamnest leaking is going on -- inaccurate. You go to meetings -- I tell you this as a friend -- and you don't worry any more about the country, you worry how what you say will read when you see it in the Times or Post.

B: Um-humm. Yeah, there is . . .

K: What did you call about?

B: That's all I called about. Are we dining tonight?

K: We're dining tonight. There's a 50-50 chance that we'll get a ceasefire today.

B: That's great, that's great. And I wonder . . .

K: In fact, I'll know within the next hour.

B: Yeah. You think you'll be at dinner anyway, huh?

K: Oh, yeah. Because the bastards who are fighting are all sleeping.

B: Yeah, yeah. One of the two. Okay, I'll see you tonight.

K: Right.

B: Thanks for calling.

K: Bye.

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NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

By MR NARA Date 9/10

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Greek PM Androutsopoulos

July 21, 1974; 12:01 p.m.

K: In light of the very difficult situation we all face, we are making a major effort with Turkey to get a ceasefire tonight and I just wanted you to know that I have talked to the Turkish Prime Minister again and I hope to hear from him within the hour. But in the meantime it would help me if I could know whether the Greek forces,-- the Cypriot forces would also stop fighting. on the island

A: They will, Mr. Secretary, when we spoke I made it clear that on the part of all the involved parties will take the necessary steps -- in other words as ________. Of course it will not be one-sided ceasefire. Of course everyone would stop.

K: Good.

A: But the problem is this when we talked I got the impression because I think you made it clear to me that the ceasefire will be immediate.

K: Well, that was my impression. My impression was that I would get a very /w/ quick answer but it has proved to be more difficult than I thought.

A: And later when Mr. Sisco came here he brought me -- he set the time for two o'clock and ________ have the ceasefire at the appointed time.

K: Yes, but now I think we will have an answer within another hour.

A: Will I have the answer from you, Mr. Secretary or from Mr. Sisco?

K: One or the other or maybe both.

A: I beg your pardon.

K: I don't know yet -- whichever works faster. I will do my best to call you myself.

convey

A: Mr. Sisco can tell me the message. It is perfectly all right. It is up to you.

K: Good. We will hope very much that your Government will show the Greatest possible restraint. Because we value our friendship and alliance.

Thank you.

A: I don't know what else can be done on our part.

K: No you can't do anything. I will be in touch. Good-bye Mr. P. M.

By A.R. NARA Date 9-1-68

July 21, 1974; 12:01 p.m.

K: Good.

K: Well, that was my impression. My impression was that I would get a very /k/ quick answer but it has proved to be more difficult than I thought.

A: I beg your pardon.

convey

Thank you.

K: No you can't do anything. I will be in touch. Good-bye Mr. P.M.

TELCONE
F.M. Callaghan/Kissinger

July 21, 1974: 12:15 p.m.

K: Hello

C: Mr. Kissinger, have you talked to the PM in Greece?

K: Yes, and he said he would sit tight.

C: He said he'd sit tight? Well, now, what Ecevit says to me is
this: He says that they would be willing to announce the principle of a cease-
fire tonight. I then pushed him and he said he would be willing to meet
in Vienna at 8:00 tomorrow morning, local time, in order to submit what
he calls very reasonable conditions because they can't agree to a cease-
fire without preliminary conditions, and it will be __________ will be
able to agree to a cease-fire. I said I would want him to go and I would go
myself. He said he would be willing to go, but of course if it were Foreign
Ministers obviously it would have to be his Foreign Minister who would agree,
but he would be willing to have a preliminary meeting with me. Now our
people are very sceptical about all this. They think that once we got
there we would find ourselves involved in an awful marathon.

K: Well, it would be the same as that Greek _________ that never
existed.

C: That's right. And so, I just wanted to see what you thought. I'm
not sure what I think. On the whole, as I like action, I'm ready to go, but
on the other hand I don't want to get myself snarled down into a thing that
goes on and on and on, in any case, would the Greeks be willing to accept a
meeting at 8:00 tomorrow morning if the Turks have announced acceptance
of the principle of a cease-fire?

K: Well, why don't I call the Greek Prime Minister and ask him?

C: Well, you could do that or I could do that. It depends who would
do it better. I think that you probably would, don't you? I promised to
ring him at that number - 603018, but I see no reason why you shouldn't
do it.

K: Well, I just talked to, I haven't really talked to Ecevit
Why don't you try it?

C: I hope you're not bowing out of this, Henry Kissinger.

K: You want me to do it then?

July 21, 1974; 12:25 p.m.

K: Hello.

A: Hello, Mr. Kissinger.

K: Mr. Prime Minister.

A: Yes.

K: Can you hear me?

A: Yes, I can hear you.

K: I have not heard, myself, from the Turks, but the British Foreign Minister has, and they made the following proposal to him.

A: Yes.

K: They would accept tonight the principle of a cease-fire; they would be prepared to meet tomorrow morning at 8:00 local time, in Vienna, or any other European city, at any level. If you go, then Ecevit will go. If the Foreign Minister goes, he will send the Foreign Minister. He will send somebody with plenary potential powers, and they will then agree on a cease-fire tomorrow morning. Now can you accept that?

A: Well,
You say the cease-fire will take place tonight?

K: They will agree to the principle of the cease-fire tonight and announce it. They will announce it tonight, the principle. Then tomorrow morning at 8:00, they are willing to meet you in Vienna. And Foreign Minister Callaghan would be there and I would send Sisco there. And this is when the details would be finished.

(line is cut-off)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By A. K. NARA Date 6/24/74

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Greek PM Androutsopoulos
July 21, 1974; 12:35 p.m.

(continued)

K: Hello.

A: Hello. We were cut short.

K: Yes, Mr. Prime Minister, I'm sorry about it. Mr. Prime Minister, the proposal is that the Turkish Government would announce tonight.

A: Yes.

K: It's an agreement in principle to a cease-fire.

A: I cannot hear you.

K: The Turkish Government would announce an agreement in principle to a cease-fire and it would agree to meet tomorrow morning at 8:00.

A: Yes.

K: It's an agreement in principle. Preferably in Vienna. Foreign Minister Callaghan would be there.

A: Is it possible for the day after tomorrow?

K: They will not agree to the actual implementation of the cease-fire.

A: I don't understand. The cease-fire will take place tonight?

K: No. The principle will be announced tonight.

A: Tonight. And the cease-fire will continue until ...

K: They will work out the conditions of the cease-fire.

A: They will work out the conditions of the cease-fire?

K: Yes.

A: What's going to happen in the meantime? Are they going to fight?

DECLASSIFIED

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-3-

K: That's my impression, yes.

A: When are they going to announce it, Mr. Secretary?

K: Well, as soon as I know what your answer is.

A: _________

K: Well, why don't you consider it? I will talk again and I will call you again in an hour.

A: We don't want to put ourselves in a position _________

K: Well, why don't you talk to Sisco.

A: Sisco? Do you think it would be advisable?

K: Yes, or you can contact me, whatever you prefer.

A: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

K: Good bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E012958

By ARL

NARA Date 6/10/88

*(*)

Telcon: 7/21/74:12:36 p.m.

Secretary Kissinger/
Joe Sisco

K: Hello.

S: Hello Henry.

K: Joe, how are you?

S: How is my favorite Secretary of State.

K: I'll tell you it is getting about as much sleep as his favorite Under Secretary.

S: Well I need it by God.

K: Listen, Joe

S: ________ right at the times when I felt low.

K: Well, you are a good friend. Now Joe

S: Do you know what I miss?

K: What?

S: Those discussions we had in your room in the King David.

K: Yes, we cleared both our minds.

S: ________ one of these, you know it as well as I do.

K: Joe

S: ________ that comradeship that you and I had through that whole 33 days.

K: Exactly.

S: It means a great deal psychologically, and I miss it very much.

K: Well I wish I could be there. Now Joe, let me tell you the state of play and you better take it up from here.

S: Right.

DECLASSIFIED
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K: The Turks, you know they have now given up on that fleet. That they don't think any more is a good argument.

S: Yes.

K: So now they just flatly refuse to make a ceasefire tonight.

S: Yes.

K: They have proposed that they would announce the principle of a ceasefire tonight.

S: Right.

K: And they are prepared to meet at 8 o'clock tomorrow morning any place in Europe -- in Vienna if necessary at any level to work out the details.

S: Meet with whom?

K: With anybody from the Greek side.

S: They will never with them.

K: Well, I don't know. I called the Greek Prime Minister and he said they would meet with them on Tuesday but that was when he thought there was a ceasefire.

S: Yea, but they even changed their minds about that in the aftermath of a ceasefire as a result of what I reported to you in that other - you know that other

K: No, but when I talked to the Prime Minister about an hour ago - forty-five minutes ago, he said they would be willing to meet on Tuesday morning if there were a ceasefire.

S: Well that is a change from what he told me four hours ago.

K: And when I made him this proposition, he didn't reject it. He said it is totally new -- they would have to consider it.

S: Yes. All right ah

K: Now will you xxx follow it up? I don't think he fully understood it.

S: Yes. All right ah now let me be sure I understand it. Repeat to me

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By A.L.

K: The proposition is that the Turks XXX announce tonight their readiness to accept the ceasefire.

S: In principle.

K: Yes. And that tomorrow morning at a place to be decided at any level that we decide. You know, Prime Minister-to-Prime Minister, Foreign Minister-to-Foreign Minister, we will send a man with plenty of potential(?) powers.

S: Right.

K: To conclude the ceasefire.

S: Right.

K: And Callaghan would be prepared to go there.

S: Callaghan would be prepared to go there.

K: And you would be prepared to go there.

S: Henry, I will try it. Let me tell you what my quick initial reaction is. It is a stall. (?)

K: Oh, (laughs) no. Are you sure?

S: Wasn't that a profound comment.

K: No, but I figure once we get -- what you should explain to the Greekx to the Greek. Once we get the Turks to Vienna we are going to make him agree to a ceasefire.

S: That is right.

K: As the first item of business any stock(?) any way.

S: Of course. There isn't much that could go on after dark anyway.

K: Exactly.

S: People get into other kinds of trouble after dark.

K: OK Joe, call me back as soon as you have an answer.

S: Well I will go over and see the Prime Minister right away.

K: Good. S: Thank you.

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NARA Date 6/7/69

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TelCon:7/21/74:12:55 p.m.

Secretary Kissinger/
Foreign Minister Callaghan

K: Hello.

C: Hello Henry.

K: M Jim.

C: Yes sir.

K: I just talked to the Greek.

C: Yes.

K: And I don't think he quite understood the proposition. We thought that there would be a ceasefire tonight and under those conditions he would have been willing to meet Tuesday morning.

C: Yes.

K: Which was a change of his previous position.

C: Yes.

K: Now he is - when I explained to him there would be no ceasefire tonight, only the principle of it - he said he would have to consult his colleagues and I just sent Sisco in there to talk to him.

C: Yes, yes.

K: I have no definitive answer. Now do you think if I brought some more pressure on Ecevit to accept it.

C: We were wondering we had so many interruptions in our phone call whether he was being pulled back by other people in the room.

K: Whether he was being what?

C: Pulled back by other people in the room. Because our phone call was interrupted three times. I think he is under pretty considerable pressure. But ah I think - I have come to the conclusion before you rang me that if the Greeks wouldn't accept this we have got to put more heat on to Ecevit. It depends upon how you assess the Greek position. Do you think the Greeks will come on? Let me read to you something that I have just written - scribbled out here as something that could be said under certain circumstances. Following quote "Following

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28-0

- 2 -

discussions with the Greek and Turkish Governments the British
Government understands that both sides agree in principle to a
ceasefire and will send representatives to meet in Vienna at 8:00
a.m. tomorrow to discuss the modalities of its implementation.
The purpose of this meeting is to put into effect paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution # 353 and the British Government urges
all concerned in the meantime to cease all firing and to defray
information which might further aggravate the situation. The
British Government will be represented at the talks.

The wording of that picks up paragraph two of the Security Council
Resolution which they both say they accept. Now do you think on
reflection after having talked to them that the Greeks would accept
that?

K: I doubt it. But I am not sure.

C: It is your target(??) Henry that I think if you think -- well all right then if that is the answer to the first question

K: Well let me find out - no let me first find out what Sisco is going to bring back from them.

C: All right. But then if you doubt it and if he brings back an adverse report, then the second question is, if they don't accept it what do they do?

K: That is a good question.

C: 25x(6)

K: Well, I don't know.

C: All right. Well, let's assume the worse. Let's assume that it does mean that and that you get worst raging(?) then you have got now and I think we have got to turn the heat on Ecevit tonight and get him to accept the ceasefire not in principle but ah in actuality.

K: And it ought to be

C: And also I don't know what are these modalities that he will want to discuss. They could be very complicated and very tiresome things. Are you provising (??) it preventing the access of ships monitoring their entry and all the rest of it. Couldn't

K: They are bound to be.

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C: Do you recken it will be cleared up in two or three hours.

K: I doubt it.

C: You are skeptical.

K: I am extremely skeptical.

C: Well, then, you see we keep coming on in circles at the moment, don't we.

K: Well, if the Greeks accept this proposition, then I think something like your statement would be excellent. If the Greeks don't accept that proposition, then we have trouble.

C: That is right.

K: And we would be prepared to join your statement or make a separate appeal.

C: Yes, yes. Well I think you ought to have a separate, a separate one because you have done so much work on it and we will be associated with the talks, you see. Don't think that would be better.

K: That is fine.

C: I don't really mind.

K: No, no let's do it - we can do it separately.

C: I think we had better probably because we work in tandem so well today that I don't mind a joint statement but I think on balance that we have got to be part of the talks probably you had better put a separate one out.

K: That is fine.

C: Now, Henry, we haven't yet gotten it, have we.

K: No.

C: You will wait for Sisco?

K: Let me wait for Sisco.

C: Shall I ah - I shall not talk to EMK Ecevit again yet then.

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TELCONE

Joe Sisco/Secy Kissinger

1:00 p.m., July 21, 1974

K: Hello.

S: Henry, I have one other thought that I want to mention if you think it's a good idea. I'll try out that idea that you indicated. What would you think alternatively -- the Turks and the Greek commanders ______ with the UN in Cyprus?

K: I think it's too complicated.

S: Uh-huh.

K: And there are too many possibilities for getting it screwed up.

S: All right.

K: But wait a minute, Joe, I've just talked to Callaghan. He says if the Greeks accept it in principle, he's willing to make a public appeal to the Turks to stop fighting until the meeting takes place and also he will join with us in bringing maximum pressure that it should be signed right away.

S: All right. That idea of an appeal will help a little bit.

K: And you can tell them we will join the appeal too.

S: Okay.

K: Now will you get him to call me immediately?

S: I'll go right over.

K: And you call me immediately when you are finished.

S: Right.

K: Good.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 5/26/74

TELCON
Prime Minister Ecevit of Turkey
Secretary Kissinger

1:25 p.m., July 21, 1974

K: Hello.

E: Hello, Dr. Kissinger. I talked with Mr. Callaghan. He was going to telephone but I didn't receive a call yet. Did you talk with him?

K: Yes, I've talked with him.

E: Yes.

K: And I've talked with the Greeks. I think it will be impossible to get your proposal accepted.

E: Why?

K: Well, as I understand your proposal, it is quite frankly another delaying tactic.

E: No, no, it's not a delaying tactic. You see . . .

K: You're a good student of mine.

E: We have reason to be [guarded] of their intentions. We made . . . .
ceasefire. But they have pilots in there speaking Turkish, using
our codes; maybe they're right, I don't complain. We cannot be
sure whether they will not violate the ceasefire in our name so we
must take certain minimum conditions of security assurances. We
can finish that discussion within a couple of hours.

K: Um-humm. Well, I talked to the Greek Prime Minister and his first reaction was negative. I have now sent Sisco in to see him.

E: The Greek Prime Minister?

K: Yes.

E: All right. Then shall I call you again or shall I expect a call?
I'm at the Prime Ministry.

K: I shall call you.

E: All right.

K: But again, you know what high regard I have for you. I would like you to . . . .

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