NOTES ON NIGERIA

Nigeria's achievement of independence on October 1, 1960, marks the end of more than a decade of preparation. Although it was one of the earliest arenas of nationalist agitation in the postwar period (Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe is certainly a leading contender for the fatherhood of African Nationalism), Nigeria is among the last of the colonial territories of Middle Africa to become an independent sovereign state. There are many explanations for this example of orderly transfer of power in Africa--including no little British and Nigerian statesmanship--but the crucial fact is that Nigeria has experienced a protracted period of terminal colonialism during which power and administrative responsibility have steadily passed into Nigerian hands, political forces and public demands have been increasingly channelled through a competitive party system, and important segments of the Nigerian people have become habituated to participation in an array of national and regional institutions they have come to regard as their own. What is more, the formal termination of British authority in Nigeria is taking place in an atmosphere of euphoria, mutual respect and friendliness hardly equalled elsewhere on the continent.

These comparatively happy circumstances underlying and surrounding Nigeria's independence enhance the probability not only that Nigeria will remain Africa's largest and most democratic state, but also that it will become a major stabilizing force in Middle Africa. Whether this proves to be the case depends upon how Nigeria's leaders solve several critical problems, of which three stand out--foreign relations, internal unity and economic development.

## Issues in Nigerian foreign relations:

The formal entry of Nigeria into the expanding world of sovereign African states opens a new phase in the international relations of postcolonial Africa. An important factor contributing to the air of unreality surrounding those relations during the past dramatic years has been the absence of Nigerian participation in the new concert of African powers as well as the absence of Nigeria's voice on African and world issues in international forums. As Nigeria crosses the threshold of independence her leaders must at once not only establish and be prepared to defend their position on an array of complicated international issues, but they must also define the character of their relationships with their immediate neighbors, with other African states, and with the non-African world. Foreign policy issues may hold the key to Nigeria's future as a united state.

### A. Nigeria's Immediate Neighbors

The preoccupation of Nigerians with their own internal problems of unification and development has resulted in only limited attention being given thus far to future relations between Nigeria and her immediate neighbors--the Cameroons under United Kingdom Trusteeship to the east, the Nigeria Republic to the north, and the Republic of Dahomey to the west.

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Until 1959 it was generally assumed that both the northern and southern sections of the British Cameroons would probably remain within the Federation of Nigeria. This assumption was challenged by the victory of the secession-from-Nigeria party in the Southern Cameroons in the election of March, 1959, and by the vote against immediate integration into the Northern Region in the plebiscite held in the northern Cameroons in November, 1959. The leaders in the Northern Region--and particularly Sir Ahmadu Bello (Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier)--were very bitter over this unexpected negative vote. The Premier publicly blamed it upon them machinations of "British Administrative Officers"--an allegation considered particularly shocking in the light of the Premier's rather pro-British stand on other matters. The Premier has stated privately that when the plebiscite is held between September 1960 and March 1961 in the Northern Cameroons he is confident that the Northern Cameroonians will choose to remain a part of Nigeria.

Although the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), the governing party in the Eastern Region, has consistently agitated for the Southern Cameroons remaining a part of Nigeria after independence, the official Nigerian view has been one of restrained neutralism on this issue. Indeed, most Nigerian spokesmen have been quite philosophical about future relations with the Cameroons. The Nigerian Prime Minister has publicly declared that "we would welcome them back," but "only if there is a substantial majority" in favor of remaining part of Nigeria. In the meantime, Nigerian troops that have manned the frontier with the strike-torn (former French) Republic of the Cameroon, and all Nigerian civil servants, have been withdrawn to Nigeria. On 1 October the Southern Cameroons, as well as the Northern Cameroons, cease to be administered as part of Nigeria. Britain retains complete administrative control pending the outcome of the plebiscite in March 1961. Thus, Nigeria's eastern boundary remains indeterminate.

There is also an element of uncertainty regarding Nigeria's future relations with the neighboring Republics of (former French) Niger and Dahomey. Each of the latter are proposed for admission as members of the United Nations this month (September, 1960). It is not impossible, however, that some form of closer association will develop between the Republic of Niger and Northern Nigeria. There are important cultural, historic and ethnic affinities among the peoples of the two areas, and, as well, significant mutual economic advantages could be gained by closer unity. The Premier of the Northern Region of Nigeria has publicly stated that "We would welcome Niger into Nigeria," and recently announced his intention to invite the Prime Minister of Niger to Kaduna for talks. Once Niger becomes a full fledged member of the United Nations, however, it will be most unlikely her leaders would want to give up this status and become a part of Nigeria.

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The ethnic basis for unification between Western Nigeria and the southern portions of the Republic of (former French) Dahomey is equally as strong as that between Niger and Northern Nigeria. In the case of Dahomey, however, there has been no move made for closer ties or boundary revision. In short, at this stage about all that can be said is that Nigeria's relations with her immediate neighbors are friendly, that irredentist agitation is minimal, and that unlike many other countries of West Africa such relations are not acute political issues among Nigerians. Moreover, there is the possibility of the future extension of the boundaries of the present Nigerian federation by consent,

## B. Nigeria's Role in the new African Community.

In defining the position of the Federation of Nigeria regarding the new community of African states, Nigerian spokesmen have tended to stress what they feel to be Nigeria's special claim to leadership on the African continent, as well as the prematurity of large-scale political unions, such as a United States of Africa. These points have been repeatedly expressed in numerous ways and on a variety of occasions, both within and outside Nigeria. For example:

1. On 12 September 1959 Chief Obafemi Awolowo (leader of the opposition in the Federal parliament and leader of the Action Group) stated that it was "unrealistic" to labor for the emergence of a United States of Africa or even economic cooperation among all African countries, though he was all for peace between them and the whole world. He particularly scoffed at the idea of union with Egypt "which had one foot in Africa and another in Asia Minor." "Nassir's undisguised totalitarianism and territorial ambitions in Africa and the Muslim world made effective cooperation with Egypt in any field unfeasible," said Awolowo.

2. The West African Pilot (Azikiwe's journal), in referring to the All-African People's Conference held in Tunis in January, 1960, noted that "some member nations have already begun to jokey for leadership...Africa needs dynamic leadership... (But)... we shall be happy if any of them--even little riot-torn Cameroon--can wear the toga of leadership but we shall be most unhappy if the toga is purchased at the expense of Nigeria with her thirty five million people...Nigeria has her destiny. No amount of intrigue [undoubtedly referring to Ghana] by "power seeking newly independent nations can deprive Nigeria of her rightful position."

3. At the final sitting of the Nigerian House of Representatives the Prime Minister (Alhaji Balewa) appealed to all Nigerians to assist in making Nigeria a strong and united country so that she might "fulfil her destiny as the leader of the African continent."

4. Aminu Kano, leader of the NEPU (Northern Elements Progressive Union) in October 1959 envisaged independent Nigeria as being in a "ruling position in Africa."

EaksEnak Esakkek

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5. The Federal Parliamentarians of the NPC (Northern People's Congress) issued a formal statement on their attitude toward pan-Africanism and the idea of a United States of Africa in February, 1960: "Nigeria's internal problems cannot be solved by a West African Union nor by Pan-Africanism since it would be suicidal for Nigeria to sacrifice her leadership which she is bound to play on the continent and in the world as a whole." The NPC holds a majority in the National Assembly and in the Northern Region and in the Federal Parliament.

The significance of these two themes--the prematurity of a union of African states and Nigeria's special claim to leadership--reflect not only the notion that many Americans would recognize, namely, that mere bigness confers special rights to leadership in international affairs, but also the fact that to date pan-Africanism and the concept of a "United States of Africa" have been the goals most enthusiastically espoused by pan-Africanist Presidents Nkrumah (Ghana) and Toure (Guinea), each of whom claims a role of leadership in the movement. Nigeria's special claim to leadership is based on itsPan-Africanist view that all black peoples need to work together to achieve their independence. It seems rather ignobling to many Nigerians that they should have to follow the leadership of such tiny countries simply because they have not taken a little longer to achieve their independence. Even the NCNC (National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons), the party of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who could rightfully claim to be one of the fathers of pan-Africanism, has taken a gradualist position on the issue of a political union of African states. It remains to be seen whether independent Nigeria can command acceptance of its leadership in the African community, or whether, even if innocent of actual expansionist ambitions, its efforts to assert leadership will, because of its bigness, provoke resentment and distrust.

Nigeria's position on other important issues is as follows:

a. **Neutralism.** Like the other new African states, the keystone of Nigeria's foreign policy has been declared to be "nonalignment" in the cold war. In a major foreign policy statement in late August 1960 Prime Minister Balewa announced that independent Nigeria will follow a foreign policy of neutrality, endeavoring "to remain on friendly terms with every nation which recognizes and respects our sovereignty, and we shall not blindly follow the lead of anyone." He added that "We consider it wrong for the Federal Government to associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs. Our policies will be rounded on Nigeria's interests and will be consistent with moral and democratic principles on which our constitution is based." He emphasized that "existing boundaries must remain recognized until such time as the peoples concerned decide of their free will to merge into one unit."

The Prime Minister also expressed concern over "signs of ideological war creeping into Africa" and called for united efforts by all African states to prevent Africa from becoming an area of crisis and world tension. As a member of the United Nations he claimed that Nigeria would direct her energies and influence to helping

[Y]

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### Kikikik

to reach solutions which would contribute to world peace. Although no specific comment was made on the Congo crisis it was subsequently announced that Nigeria would supply a contingent of troops to their UN command in the Congo after 1 October.

### b. Relations with the United Kingdom.
During the election campaign of 1959 all three major parties declared in favor of remaining within the (British) Commonwealth. The principal leaders have adhered to this position. The Northern and Western regional leaders, however, are known to be somewhat more pro-British than those from the Eastern Region. The election manifesto of the NPC (Northern Region) in September 1959 declared in favor of closer ties with the United Kingdom and increased friendship with their USA.

Despite this general acceptance of remaining within the Commonwealth, it is not improbable that republicanism will become increasingly popular. Already the leader of the Action Group opposition in the Eastern Regional House of Assembly (Mr. S. G. Ikoku) has declared in favor of a Republican constitution for Nigeria, on the argument that Nigerians should see and know their Head of State (who now is the Queen of England), as well as the fact that it would be easier for Nigeria to federate with other African states if it is a republic. As with India and Ghana, however, it would be unlikely that the establishment of a republic would mean departure from the Commonwealth. The British promise of independence "without conditions or strings" has helped to weaken anti-British sentiment.

### c. Relations with other Countries.

The leaders of each of the three parties have expressed strong friendship for America and the desire to expand relations and to maximize American investment in Nigeria. The Action Group leaders of the Western Region of Nigeria have been particularly articulate in their pro-Western sentiment. Indeed, during the election campaign they argued for a permanent alignment with the Western democracies. For this position they were severely criticized by the opposition on NCNC. More recently (April, 1960), Mr. Ikoku (Action Group leader in the Eastern Region) hinted that the Action Group would publicly change their foreign policy from one of alignment with the West to one of strict neutralism. This shift may account for the freedom with which Prime Minister Balewa was able to announce a policy of neutralism for independent Nigeria. One can anticipate that there will be continuing pressures for Nigeria to shift progressively toward a less pro-West position and a more pronounced neutralist position. Thus, recently the Minister for Information and Welfare in the Eastern Region government said that Nigeria's alignment with Western democracies was "unrealistic" and a "betrayal of millions of Africans still under the old colonial imperialism." He added that friendship and cooperation with East Africa and West should be the keynote of Nigeria's foreign policy. These pressures for a more rigoursly neutral policy could be the cause of considerable inter-regional and party attention.

There are differences in attitude among Nigeria's principal leaders and groups not only regarding relations with the West, but also with other countries and regions.

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Leaders of the Western Region, for example, have been strongly critical of the alleged authoritarian and expansionist tendencies of Ghana and the United Arab Republic; yet leaders in the Eastern Region have tended to defend Ghana's actions and Northerners have cultivated close contacts with leaders in the Middle East. Again, in June, 1960, the NPC (Northern People's Congress) strongly protested the development finance arrangements included between the Nigerian Federal government and Israel. The protest was rejected not only by the federal finance minister ("Nigeria welcomes genuine assistance from any country in the world," but also by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who stressed the federal government would not permit itself to become involved in the Israel-Arab dispute. Differences of this order have not yet become acute; but as the federal leaders of independent Nigeria will be increasingly compelled to take positions upon delicate and tense international issues, such differences could place a severe strain upon an already fragile federal government.

Nigeria was admitted as a full member in the Conference of Independent African States in Addis in mid-June, as it was anticipating independence in 1960. The Nigerian delegate (Maitama Sule from the North) opposed a union of African states as "premature," and urged that the Conference set up a committee to mediate between competing Congo politicians.

The Nigerian federal government leaders, as well as the regional leaders have taken an extremely strong stand on two foreign policy issues: the racial situation in South Africa and the atomic tests of the French government being conducted in the Sahara. In April 1960 the Prime Minister stated "My government deplores the recent tragic bloodshed in South Africa, and when Nigeria achieves independence my ministers will employ every method which may be open to them to bring such tragic events to an end. My ministers feel confident that with the influence which an independent Nigeria can exercise in Africa they will be able to achieve important results."

Nigeria's reaction to the second French atomic explosion on April 1 was unanimous approval by Nigeria's Federal Parliament of an Opposition motion that if France explodes another atomic bomb in the Sahara French assets would be frozen and trade suspended with France.

## The Problem of Nigerian Unity

Most of Nigeria's leaders are acutely aware that the preservation of national unity is at once the greatest imperative and the gravest challenge they confront in the postindependence period. Of the many factors and situations that affect Nigerian unity, at least three stand out: the problem of minorities, the fragility of federal institutions, and regional disparities in development. The minorities problem is at once aggravated and alleviated by the fact that each of Nigeria's three regions consists of a core area (Hausaland in the North, Yorubaland in the West and Iboland in the East) of relatively high ethnic homogeneity and economic development that is the political base of one of the three major national parties (NPC in the North, Action Group in the

["(Y)", "- 7 -", "West and NCNC in the East, and of a peripheral area of tribal heterogeneity, lesser economic development and regional minorities to which the dominant parties of each of the other regions make a special appeal in their quest for national support. Over against this recurrent activation of tribal minority sentiment are the countervailing efforts of the dominant party in each regional core area to irradiate the stigma of their dominance by a variety of measures aimed at winning the support of the tribal minorities of their own region. These two factors--the cultural dualism of each of the three regions and the competition of regionally-based parties for national supremacy--have been important considerations in the evolution of both Nigerian democracy and unity, and in the protection of its minorities. It is a moot question whether the creation of new states, for which the Action Group continues to agitate, would produce these same consequences.", "The question of creating additional states within Nigeria is one that has produced considerable controversy over the past several years. The Northern Region contains on its southern boundary a sizeable minority of Yoruba peoples, just as the Western Region has a substantial Ibo minority on its eastern boundary. The leaders of the Action Group of the Western Region have repeatedly argued for the creation of more states, and particularly one in the so-called \"Middle Belt\" of Nigeria, one in the South-KiKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkKkK

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[Y]

Although there is a general trend towards the progressive strengthening and consolidation of the supremacy of the authority of the federal government, it would be unrealistic to minimize the persistence of powerful centrifugal forces. The key leaders of the Northern People's Congress--and most notably Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of the Northern Region--remain in the regional government, and send lesser figures to the federal government. As a consequence of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's resignation of the presidency of the NCNC (National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons), in order to accept the Governor-Generalship on 15 November, effective power over the NCNC passes back to the Eastern Regional premier, Dr. Michael Okpara. Dr. Okpara's actions in the Eastern Region suggest there may be a trend towards more emphatic nationalism and an undermining of the present NCNC-NPC coalition in the federal government. In early January 1960 the official ngokun newspaper of the Eastern Regional (NCNC) Government remarked that "There is little to commend the new federal government to the nationalists of Nigeria." In April 1960 Eastern Regional Members of the House of Assembly formed a "Nigerian Socialist Group" under the patronage of Dr. Okpara, the Regional premier, and new leader of the NCNC. The organization was designed to "project socialist ideas and policies within the various political parties." How these trends in the Eastern Regional section of the NCNC will affect the NCNC-NPC coalition is still uncertain.

Another centrifugal force regional differentials in economic and social development. Wide gaps between the regions persist; the West continues to lead and the North trails far behind. The Northern Region confronts in extreme form all of the problems of an underdeveloped area. Less than 15% of its capital budget is drawn from local resources; more than 70% of its revenue is derived from the federal government. An acute shortage of staff exists, and the output of the educational system does not begin to keep pace with development in other sectors. The Eastern Region continues to lag considerably behind the Western Region (the former's capital budget for 1960-1961 is £6 million, compared to the West's £16 million), and despite the development of an oil industry the growth and the cost of social services might well outstrip the growth in regional revenue. As long as these gross regional disparities persist Nigerian unity will remain on trial.

Nigeria's stability, its friendly attitude towards the West, and the survival of Nigerian democracy and the preservation of Nigerian unity, depends rather heavily upon the ability of its present leaders to bring about the rapid social and economic development to which they and their peoples aspire. Although Nigeria is comparatively well off in terms of the quantity and diversity of its resources, its present economy is weak and vulnerable. The Western Region's affluence is heavily dependent upon cocoa, but there has been a steady decline in world cocoa prices, which it is anticipated will continue. Nigerian tin and columbite has been a

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significant source of revenue for the Northern Region, but cessation of American stockpiling of the latter, coupled with the severe restrictions imposed by the International Tin scheme, led to mass dismissals in the mines and a sharp curtailment in Revenue.

### Ksheshekshak

The coal industry of the Eastern Region has suffered a similar cutback due to in part to the disgelization of the Nigerian railways. On top of these disquieting developments is the fact that nearly one-third of Nigeria's exports go to countries in the European Common Market, whose preferential tariffs could have ominous implications for Nigeria's export position.

### Economic Education

There are several encouraging elements in Nigeria's economic situation. A variety of new industries have been established or are being planned. These include a new textile mill, to be established in 1961 at a cost of £1½ million, near Lagos and using Nigerian cotton; a glass factory; four Pepsi-Cola factories; an oil refinery, an aluminum factory and a cottonseed crushing industry. The prospects for additional oil discoveries are good. Planning machinery has been strengthened by the establishment of a new Ministry of Economic Development. Serious consideration is currently being given to the construction of a major multipurpose dam on the Niger River, which, upon completion in 1970, would meet Nigeria's power requirements for the following generation. The prospects of this dam being built are highly valued by Nigerian leaders. Further evidence of the "expanding to economy" atmosphere pervading Nigeria is the decision to build a 400-mile railway extension in the Northern Region. Perhaps most important of all is the positive attitude of Nigeria's leaders towards foreign capital investment. They are most anxious to obtain it and perhaps nowhere on the continent is there a greater assurance of security and political stability.

### supporting

Further evidence to the hopeful side of Nigeria's economic future is the British loan of £12 million (on Independence Day), the establishment of a Lagos branch of the Bank of America and of the Beirut Riyad Bank (the largest Arab bank outside of Egypt). The latter is significant in view of the fact that 6000 Lebanese settlers are located in Nigeria where they control a substantial element of Nigerian commerce. Oil production is expected to reach ten million tons by 1960, thus making Nigeria one of the leading oil producers of the Commonwealth. Shell-BP plans to build an oil refinery in Nigeria. These and other prospects provide an encouraging picture of the state of Nigeria's economy as it becomes independent.

Perhaps the most disturbing element in the whole Nigerian picture is the problem of higher staff in the administrative services. With the approach of independence the gravity of the situation has become strikingly clear. The reason is that by 1 October all British Civil Servants must have indicated their intentions, either by announcing their retirement or departure with compensation, or by undertaking to remain on under the arrangements that have been worked out between the Nigerian and British governments.