MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL RICHT

The strongly expansive trend in Soviet foreign policies has three main sources: first, the will to promote world revolution; second, the reborn Russian nationalistic and imperialistic urge; third, the Soviet faith in the basic Marxian tenet that capitalistic states are bound to experience recurrent economic crises which will drive them on the road to war "as a way out."

The first two underlying motives of the Soviet drive of expansion are so well known and so obvious that it is not necessary to dwell on them. If only these two reasons were behind the Russian greed for domination, there might conceivably be a chance of our coming to terms with the Kremlin on a compromise basis. It might be possible, in fact, to convince the Soviets that their drive for world revolution be better postponed for tactical reasons until a crisis in the capitalistic, particularly in the US economy, has actually occurred. The purely imperialistic-nationalistic expansiveness might also be the object of a compromise agreement of the type concluded between Russian and Great Britain in 1907. More imperialist rivals may, after all, agree on a delimitation of "spheres of influence," the best known example being the papal arbitration line dividing the globe into a Spanish and Portugese sphere of influence.

The real and the decisive reason why any compromise agreement with the Soviet Union is impossible lies in their unshakeable conviction that the United States will undergo in the near, or more distant future, an economic crisis which will drive the US Government and ruling classes

an economic crisis which will drive the U2 Government and ruling classes
that the United States will undergo in the near, or more distant future,
with the Soviet Union is impossible if in their machines die conviction
The real and the decisive reason why any compromise agreement
sphere of influence.

babe arbitration line dividing the globe into a Spanish and Portuguese
delimitation of "spaces of influence," the best known example being the
Britain in 1907. Were imperialist rivals may, after all, agree on a
compromise agreement of the kind concluded between Iran and Great
imperialistic-nationalistic expansion which might also be the object of a
tionally in the U2 economy, has actually occurred. The briefly im-
boated for tactical reasons until a crisis in the capitalistic, bar-
to convince the Soviets that their drive for world revolution be better
with the Kremlin on a compromise basis. It might be possible, in fact,
domination, there might conceivably be a chance of our coming to terms
on them. It only these two reasons were behind the Iranian greed for
ation are so well known and so obvious that it is not necessary to dwell
The first two underlying motives of the Soviet drive of expan-
to war "as a way out."

experience recurrent economic crises which will drive them on the road
forward in the face of a Soviet tenet that capitalistic states are bound to
reform Iranian nationalistic and imperialistic rule; third, the Soviet
main sources: first, the will to promote world revolution; second, the
The strongly expansive trend in Soviet foreign policies has three

[Y]

into a war against the Soviet Union "as the only way out." It does not
matter whether such a belief is stupid or not. Marxists believe that they
have found an impeccably scientific explanation of history, that they are
able to describe historical events in terms of unalterable economic laws.
They have shed in the course of time many parts of Marxist theory in
practice, but this conviction that all international clashes had and
have but one scientifically ascertainable reason, namely, underlying
economic factors, has remained with them unaltered and unchanged. To them
the question of whether or not the US might go to war against the Soviet
Union has nothing to do with personalities. From the Marxist point of view
even the most pro-Russian president of a capitalist US could in no way
escape the operation of the economic law that, when the great slump comes,
the capitalist state will, of needs, try war as the only possible escape
route.

The terrifying implication is this: that according to an
erroneous but religiously genuine conviction on the part of the Kremlin
the Soviet Union is constantly being threatened by the mere existence of
the capitalist system. In other words, they not only feel that capi-
talism is unacceptable from the point of view of communist doctrine,
but they feel, that as a country, they are permanently threatened by the
survival of our capitalist society. This means that even were they to
give up one day, for some reason or another, their missionary zeal for
world revolution they would still consider themselves involved in a
deadly struggle with the capitalist system. In their eyes, in other words,

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deadly attraction with the capitalist system. In their eyes, in other words, a world revolution they would still consider themselves involved in a given one day, for some reason or another, their missionally seal for survival of our capitalist society. This means that even were they to put they feel, that as a country, they are permanently threatened by the taliban is unacceptable from the point of view of communist doctrine, the capitalist system. In other words, they not only feel that capit-

eone put religiously genuine conviction on the part of the Kremlin

route.

even the most pro-Turkish president of a capitalist U2 could in no way

the creation of whether or not the U2 might go to war against the Soviet
economic factors, has remained with them unaltered and unchanged. To them

have put one scientifically ascertainable reason, namely, underlying

practice, put this conviction that all international clauses had and

They have acted in the course of time many parts of Marxist theory in

have found an impossibly scientific explanation of history, that they are

into a war against the Soviet Union as the only way out." It does not

[x]

they are intrinsically, and under the basic historic laws in which they
believe, on the defensive. Any compromise peace between their system
and ours can only be to them an armistice, but never a final ending of
the struggle. It is of the utmost importance to understand that this
is so _not_ merely because _they themselves_ would conclude such compromise
peace with the mental reservation of breaking it later to continue their
world revolution and Pan-Slavic offensive, _but_ that they cannot be convinced
of the _objective_ possibility of peace being preserved by a capitalistic
society. One might theoretically even assume that they would believe in
the _subjective_ sincerity of those of our leaders who would sign such a
peace. They would, however, smile contemptuously at this sincerity
because of what they believe to be their better knowledge of historical
trends; trends, that is, which would simply crush all the naive subjective
sincerity on our side and push us toward war with the irresistible power
of an avalanche.

It is, of course, difficult to imagine that realistic politi-
cians, and in some respects the men in the Kremlin are certainly realists,
should stick to such a theory with such superstitious and uncritical
tenacity. The pride of a true Marxist in his "superior understanding"
of the inner mechanism of history is, however, one of the basic psycho-
logical factors in the life of the true communist. It is impossible in
this paper to enumerate the innumerable ways in which this is daily
manifested. Studying, to mention only a very recent source, the memoirs

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manifested. Studying, to mention only a very recent source, the memoirs
this paper to enumerate the innumerable ways in which this is daily
logical factors in the life of the true communist. It is impossible in
of the inner mechanism of history is, however, one of the basic bayeo-
tensity. The pride of a true Marxist in his "superior understanding"
should atok to such a theory with such aberrations and moralistic
isms, and in some respects the men in the Kremlin are certainly resists.
It is, of course, difficult to imagine that realistic politi-
of an avajoune.

sincerity on our side and push us toward war with the irrefutable power
trends: trends, that is, which would simply mean all the naive subjective
because of what they believe to be their better knowledge of historical
peace. They would, however, smile contemptuously at this sincerity
the subjective sincerity of those of our leaders who would sign an
society. One might theoretically even assume that they would believe in
of the objective bausplicity of peace being preserved by a capitalistic
world revolution and Pan-Slavic otelaias, put that they cannot be convinced
peace with the mental reservation of presiding it later to continue their
is so not merely because they themselves would conclude and they
the angle. It is of the utmost importance to understand that this
and ones can only be to them an ansimilarity, put never a final ending of
believe, on the defensive. Any compromise between their system
they are intrinsically, and under the basic historic laws in which they

[N]

of Bedell Smith one will find a very interesting confirmation. Every-
thing, moreover, that is known to us about *internal* Soviet discussion
of historical trends and events, points without a shadow of a doubt to
the fact that all responsible leaders, trained now for thirty years and
more in Marxist dialectics, are fully convinced of the inevitability
of the development: economic crises of capitalism lead necessarily to
war.

This conviction poisons, from the root, the entire relationship
between the Soviet Union and the outside world. It is ever present in
the minds of those who frame Soviet policies; it dictates their every
move, and explains why, at an enormous cost, they continue to gear their
economy and life toward a coming war. It explains also how they can
conduct their highly aggressive policies with such a show of resounding
conviction that in reality they are on the defensive. It would be better,
from our point of view, if this plea of being on the defensive were nothing
but a propaganda trick, and if in their hearts of hearts they were quite
convinced that *they* are the aggressors and *we* are on the defensive. In that
case they might at least pause for a while to consolidate the gains made
so far and interrupt their preparations for war. Every psychiatrist
knows that no type of aggressiveness is so impossible to stop as the one
that flows from a deep inner conviction of insecurity. It must also be
reemphasized that it would be entirely wrong on our part to try to allay
this Russian feeling of insecurity by any concessions whatsoever. No
concession could possibly change the Kremlin conviction that good will
shown by the capitalist countries cannot alter the underlying basic facts
of capitalist society.

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