DR. KISSINGER: Let me first explain what this concept is. The President, in his speech in Kansas City in July of 1971, pointed out that in contrast to the immediate post-war period, when there were really only two major powers, there were now five centers of power in the world. This has been interpreted to mean that we were going to conduct a classical balance of power policy in which alliances were going to lose some of their significance.

What this last chapter attempts to do is to explain how we interpret this five-power world, because there are many aspects to the contemporary international environment that are quite novel.

First, of course, is the familiar one of the enormous destructiveness of modern weapons. In the past, it would have been inconceivable to any statesman that he could ever have too much power, and any increment of power was politically useful. In the contemporary period, we are in a situation in which the overwhelming fact for the nuclear superpowers is the knowledge of their capacity to destroy each other and where additional increments do not necessarily have either military or political significance.

A second fact in the contemporary situation which is quite different from any previous period is that there is no necessary relationship between economic strength and military strength.

Again, in the past, if you look at history, nations that were economically powerful were generally militarily powerful as well, and there was a direct relationship between the size of a nation, its economic potential and its military potential.

Today we live in a world in which in the military sense there are only two superpowers; that is to say, the United States and the Soviet Union alone possess the full panoply of modern armament.

On the other hand, in the economic field, you would certainly have to include Japan and Europe as superpowers, and in the political field, in the sense of having a major political impact in the world, even though they are not yet an economic or military superpower, you would have to count the People's Republic of China.

It really makes a great deal of difference of what area you are talking about or what area of activity you are talking about.

Secondly, this notion of the five centers of power was interpreted in many parts of the world as an American assertion that it make no difference any more between its friends and its opponents, that it was conducting foreign policy entirely on the basis of a temporary juggling of relationships. Indeed, this was equated with classical balance of power.

Of course, it wasn't even true in the old balance of power that alliances did not exist. Alliances existed throughout history, even in periods when the balance of power policy was pursued.

The difference between classical power politics and the contemporary period is enormous. They are the differences I have already mentioned in the destructiveness of weapons, in the disparity between economic and political and military factors and in the enormously increased role of ideology.

Therefore, we felt it important that in our last chapter of this report we emphasize just what we understand by the international environment today: that we continue to value our friends, that we do believe there must be a recognition of the emergence of other centers of power, but that power cannot be an end in itself in the contemporary period, and that power politics in its purest sense is the most difficult and the most treacherous form of international politics.

Q Doctor, how do you assess the prospects for a real peace in Southeast Asia?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the record should show that it took until the third question to reach Southeast Asia.

Q It is Topic "A".

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, one has to ask oneself what is meant by "real peace." If one means a consciousness of tranquility, if one means that the parties to the conflict

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in Southeast Asia will live henceforth with a consciousness
of reconciliation, then I would say that that day is very far
off.

The essence of the settlement was that the military
issues were settled in some detail, at least in the document,
and the political issues were left to further evolution.
The political issues were not solved; they were left to hopefully
a political rather than a military contest.

The parties that had fought for 25 years did not
suddenly give up their differences. Therefore, the issue in
Southeast Asia is not whether a consciousness of harmony can
be brought about or the absence of tension but whether the
political evolution that will inevitably occur take place
essentially in peaceful forms or at least without large-scale
conflict.

We have stated repeatedly that we are disappointed
at the way the agreement has been implemented, but is is also
true that for all of the parties there is a difficult process
of adjustment.

We are not pessimistic about the long-term prospects
in the negotiations that we are conducting with the North
Vietnamese. We are approaching them with the attitude that
the difficulties can be ameliorated, if not solved, and that
one should look at this as an evolutionary process rather than
a final settlement.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how much progress is actually
being made in both Cambodia and Laos toward a political settle-
ment within those countries?

DR. KISSINGER: Just to give myself some possibility of
avoiding some questions later on, I must point out that this is
not exactly related to the subject of this press conference, which
is to explain the report.

The situation in Laos and Cambodia differs in the
sense that in Laos -- they are similar in one respect.
Article 20 of the agreement provides for the withdrawal of all
foreign forces and for an end to the use of Laos and Cambodia
as bases against any neighboring country.

5

In this sense, the obligation is clear and unambiguous, and obviously is not being fulfilled. There is a difference, however, in the sense that in Laos there exists a cease-fire agreement between the Laotian parties.

We are not formally a part of that agreement, and this is why the agreement provides that within a fixed time period after a political settlement, which in turn was supposed to come 30 days after the cease-fire agreement, all foreign forces should be withdrawn.

This is not, strictly speaking, in accordance with Article 20, which makes no prior conditions to the withdrawal of foreign forces.

If this agreement is implemented among the parties, then a definite deadline will exist for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. Up to now, the political agreement has not been achieved, so the negotiating problem in Laos would be for the outside countries to encourage a conclusion of the political negotiations, which would automatically produce a deadline for the withdrawal of foreign forces. This, in turn, would achieve one of our principal objectives as far as Laos is concerned.

Q How much progress has been made in that respect?

DR. KISSINGER: Our judgment is that enough progress has been made so that a settlement could be achieved rapidly if it were wanted by both sides. The obstacle to a settlement right now is the reluctance, I would think, to withdraw troops rather than the conditions of the settlement. If a decision were made to have a settlement, it could come fairly rapidly.

Q Dr. Kissinger ---

DR. KISSINGER: I am not finished yet with Cambodia. In Cambodia, for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the forces opposing the Government were divided among various factions, some of which were receiving their support from different capitals, it did not prove as feasible to arrange a global negotiation as it turned out to be in Laos.

However, we believe that some of the same process that operated in Laos can be applied also in Cambodia, particularly now as all the opposing forces claim to be rallied under one central direction and that the government in Phnom Penh has broadened its base.

We are not too pessimistic that over a period of weeks, maybe some months, some cease-fire negotiations could start. Cambodia is somewhat behind Laos in this process. What form these negotiations would take, we would leave to the parties.

Q Dr. Kissinger, since three-quarters of the Senate and almost two-thirds of the House are opposing MFN for the Soviet Union, why is there no mention made of this matter in your report to the Congress dealing with the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: We have made very clear -- and I will repeat here -- that the Administration has strongly supported the provision in the trade bill that would enable the President to grant MFN to the Soviet Union.

If this provision is approved, it is the President's intention to grant MFN to the Soviet Union. It is furthermore the belief of this Administration that the issue of MFN for the Soviet Union is part of the whole fabric of our negotiation with the Soviet Union over a period of two years and should not be separated as an issue to be addressed in isolation.

Finally, we believe that the exchanges that took place between the Soviet leadership and the President on the issue of the exit visas substantially meets the concerns that were expressed by many of the signers of these resolutions.

We hope that as the Congress studies the problem in its entire range, and as we continue our discussions with Soviet leaders on some of the problems that gave rise to these concerns, that by the time the Congress votes on MFN it will see matters in the same light.

Q Dr. Kissinger, are you proposing some sort of consortium consumer union with Europe in terms of the energy crisis in the Middle East, to put the pressure on the Arab nations to provide more oil? There seems to be some sort of an ambiguity in the report.

DR. KISSINGER: May I point out, incidentally, that MFN is mentioned at the bottom of page 34 and at the top of page 35 of the report.

Q I am thinking in terms of the issue of immigration, in terms of MFN.

DR. KISSINGER: That issue we did not deal with separately, it is true.

With respect to Miss Thomas, her question was whether we were implying a consortium of consumer nations to bring pressure on the producer nations to produce more oil. Frankly, we have not thought of this problem in terms of pressure.

Indeed, we have not completed our own deliberations on the international implications of the energy problem. The Energy Message dealt primarily with the domestic implications, and we are now engaged in the NSC process in an investigation of the international implications.

It is clear that we face here a number of problems with which we have had no previous experience in the international field. For example, the dollar reserves of the oil producing nations are going to increase enormously as the dependence on mid-East oil and foreign oil increases.

This fact alone creates a new reality for the international monetary system, and frankly, we have not thought through all of the implications, but we know we have to study the implications.

It is a fact that many of the producing nations... are operating in the form of a consortium. What that means for the consuming nations is really not clear, and there are totally different points of view on the subject. How you define the national security interests in this respect is, in itself, a question that I must tell you honestly we have not yet fully resolved.

There is one school of thought that argues that it is to produce as much of our energy requirements, at least in the Western Hemisphere, as possible. There is another school of thought that points out that this would deplete the resources in the Western Hemisphere at a very excessive rate, and that, therefore, under peacetime conditions it is best to increase one's imports from the more distant areas and to preserve the Western Hemisphere reserves for crisis situations.

I just want to put before you the sort of issue that we are looking at. If the national security definition were in the sense of relying on Western Hemisphere sources primarily, then the pressure on the producing nations in the Middle East, for example, as far as this country is concerned, would be much less.

8

So until we have completed this study, we will not be in a position to make any very definitive statements. We have had preliminary talks with some of the Arab nations, when the Saudi minister of oil production was here, and we are in constant contact with the Iranians, and with others.

We are having some preliminary conversations with some European countries, but this is really one of these areas of new exploration where we have to get our own intellectual house in order first, before we can make any definitive statements. But we are definitely not approaching it with the attitude of wanting to bring pressure, because at this point we first have to define what our objectives are.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the European chapter puts great stress on the need for developing a new security concept, especially in the field of nuclear strategy. On one point, would you amplify on that a bit; and secondly, could you explain the concept of the timetable that you have in mind in relation to what is mentioned on page 207; namely, the need for the alliance to set its security goals before it enters into effective negotiations on MBFR, in view of the fact that those negotiations are currently anticipated in the fall?

DR. KISSINGER: The two questions are really two sides of the same point.

With respect to the first question, we have felt that obviously NATO today is in a strategic environment entirely different from the time when it was conceived. When it was conceived in the late '40s, and when it received impetus after the beginning of the Korean War in the 1950s, the security of Europe depended almost entirely on the American strategic nuclear guarantee, and the American forces in Europe were conceived primarily as a means to trigger the American nuclear guarantee and to deprive the United States of any great freedom of action with respect to it.

But as the years have gone on, as the nuclear stockpiles on both sides have increased and the delivery systems have multiplied, the reliance on strategic nuclear war is bound to have a different significance.

We find ourselves today in Europe with a deployment that was designed in the late '50s, that was adapted at various stages, but which requires an explicit adaptation to new circumstances in a number of areas, and we believe that this is one of the pre-eminent tasks of the alliance.

This task becomes particularly acute as we begin the negotiations on the mutual balanced force reduction.

Murray is quite right: We anticipate these negotiations starting in the fall. We believe that they can be conducted effectively only if the allies first understand what the elements of their security are, so that specific proposals can be related to their understanding of how they affect the security situation, rather than to be caught in a negotiating process in which abstract figures are thrown around, and in which, then, domestic pressures and pressures within the conference room become predominant.

Now, in terms of the timetable, we have submitted to NATO, I believe this week, a document which outlines, on the one hand, our perception of these elements of security in Europe, and secondly, two principal approaches by which one can look at these mutual balanced force reductions from the point of view of security with some additional models by which they could be approached.

We want to elicit from our European allies, first, a response to the security section, and equally a response to the approaches we put before them to the issue of mutual balanced force reduction. That doesn't mean that every figure we put before them is necessarily the final one. It is really a more conceptual approach at this stage of the game in order to define where are we trying to go, how should we look at this problem, how can we have security, how can we have equal security at lower force levels and how do we reach these lower force levels, how can we make the cuts in such a way that they enhance the sense of security of all of the participants, hopefully to reduce both sides' capacities for offensive action, and thereby give each side a sense that the danger has been lessened.

This is the reason why we are linking conceptually the security issue and the MFBR issue, and we are really following a procedure we adopted in the early stages of SALT and which then has enabled us, once the basic principles and building blocks were understood, to move fairly rapidly in the actual negotiations.

10

Q Can I follow that up?

DR. KISSINGER: First this gentleman who has been
very patient, and then I will come to you.

Q Doctor, a rather parochial question, if you
please.

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know what parish you represent. (Laughter)

Q Do you want me to tell you?

When is the President going to visit, this year, Latin America, and what countries is he going to visit? Does he still believe, as he said, that "As Brazil goes, so goes the rest of Latin America," and finally, don't you think that we are being left out on a limb in relation to the whole question of recognition of Cuba, inasmuch as half a dozen countries have already recognized Cuba and others are making noises, and the obvious way to undercut the prestige and effectiveness of an international body, the argument doesn't hold any more, since that prestige has already been undercut?

DR. KISSINGER: The gentleman asked about six questions.

Q In direct proportion to the time I had to wait.

DR. KISSINGER: All dealing with Latin America, specifically, when is the President planning his trip to Latin America, which countries does he intend to visit, what relative importance does he attach to Brazil specifically in the light of a comment he made during the toast for the President of Brazil, and various questions connected with our Cuban policy, particularly as the questioner believes it is being eroded anyway.

Q That is right.

DR. KISSINGER: Now, with respect to the President's trip, he announced some weeks ago that he was planning a trip to Latin America this year. There has been no further, detailed planning on this, and, therefore, I haven't much that I can add to what the President said. He has not yet decided which countries to visit, although it would probably be that countries whose leaders visited here would have a special claim on a return visit.

Now, we attach great importance to Brazil as geographically the largest country in Latin America, the greatest population, and making great progress. Therefore, we attach great importance to our relationship with Brazil, but this does not mean that we do not think other countries in Latin America also play a very major role or that we will hinge our whole Latin American policy on one country alone.

With respect to the Cuban policy, I think the basic considerations have been stated in the report, which are related to the policy that Cuba is pursuing and which can be affected by changes in Cuban policies.

Q Well, this went to Murray's question on MBFR. It seemed to me in reading last year's report you were much firmer against symmetrical reductions on both sides than you are now. You said it was inherently unstable, I think. In this report, it seems to me that you are backing off that position and leaving open various options. Is this correct?

DR. KISSINGER: In the interval we have, of course, made many more studies, and the complexity of our argumentation always increases with the number of studies that we conduct, not necessarily our lucidity. It depends how you define symmetrical.

Basically, our view remains that if you have an unequal number of forces, and if the forces on one side are composed heterogeneously, and the forces on the other side have a predominant element, then having cuts of exactly the same size is not necessarily the most sensible way of approaching the problem. Therefore, if there is an implication in this report that we have backed away from our attempt to wind up with equal security rather than to look at it in terms of the cuts that have to be made, then that is wrong. That is not our intention.

We have this year really made extensive studies. We have looked at eight different ways of approaching it. We finally have gotten it down to two or three.

In general, our approach is that the answers will have to be somewhat complex, and that the straight percentage approach is probably not the most realistic, but since we are in the process of discussing this with our allies, we don't want to pre-judge that question.

Q If you would indulge a question that is not directly related to this report, but which is connected with stories in this morning's paper concerning a former staff member of the NSC who, according to these stories, was implicated in wiretapping efforts, I wondered, first, if you knew about this, or what your response to these stories is.

DR. KISSINGER: First, I have no knowledge whatever of the activities to which this report refers.

David Young, who was a trusted member of my staff, was detailed on July 1, 1971, to join the Domestic Council which, under the direction of Mr. Ehrlichman, was conducting a study of declassification procedures and the security procedures within the Government. These studies led to a new classification system which was promulgated by the President, and this study was publicly announced.

Upon the completion of these studies, or of this report, which occurred in the early fall of 1971, David Young, whose interest was more in the domestic than the international area -- he was a lawyer when he joined me -- remained with the Domestic Council, and he continued to be paid from National Security Council funds because the Domestic Council had no budget of its own, and as most of you will note, most members of the White House staff are paid by some agency that has a budget for them.

He continued to be on the Domestic Council until he left in March of this year, before these stories became known. What his duties were, I do not know, and, therefore, I cannot make any comment about what he did except for the study on declassification. But I knew him as a trusted junior member of my staff.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in the Cambodian section, the report says there has been little progress in Cambodia and the military picture at times has remained spotty and precarious. You said that you were not pessimistic that a cease-fire might evolve in the weeks or perhaps months ahead.

This seems a bit inconsistent with the estimation of the Cambodian situation in the report, and would you please square the two?

DR. KISSINGER: I wanted to point out that in the report, which of course was written several weeks ago, we described the situation as well as we could in the light of the conditions that then existed.

13

The military situation in Cambodia is uneven, and in some sense precarious. We do not judge that the opposing forces have the military capacity to occupy the whole country and, therefore, the problem is whether the political structure in Phnom Penh will become so demoralized that it collapses.

If the political structure can be maintained, then we believe a basis for a negotiation exists. Recently, the political base of the government in Phnom Penh has been broadened. The rainy season is approaching, there has been no major change in the military situation in recent weeks, and in fact, there has been probably a slight slackening of pressure.

Therefore, we say that the conditions exist for a negotiation. Anyone who would say flatly that he is certain it will come about would, of course, be excessively optimistic.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you possibly provide an answer to the "fundamental question" on page 79 as to the possibility of reconciliation of the old Atlantic concept of unity in defense as opposed to what you call European regionalism, and what would happen if European regionalism persists.

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, let me explain there has been some comment in Europe that we wanted to confine Europe to a regional European role while we reserved for ourselves the right to conduct a global foreign policy.

The references to regionalism, both in this report and in the speech that I made some weeks ago, were intended to be descriptive and not prescriptive. It has been the whole thrust of American postwar foreign policy to encourage the Europeans to assume a responsibility in the world commensurate with their economic power and their political vitality.

It is the Europeans who have preferred to concentrate primarily on their region. To the extent that the Europeans want to play a global role, we welcome it, and we will be happy and eager to consult with them and to cooperate with them.

In the economic field there are strong tendencies towards regionalism in Europe, and it is the nature of the economic field, in any event, in both the United States and in Europe that as negotiations are prepared, pressure groups and special interests will advance their particular claims, which on their merits are usually quite reasonable and which in the

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absence of an overriding framework are extremely difficult to
resist by political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic.

Therefore, what we are attempting to do, what the
President is urging, is that the political leaders on both
sides of the Atlantic and in Japan first set themselves some
general political goal in the name of which they can then
adopt a more generous, a more flexible and a more farsighted
approach to their economic relationships.

If regionalism is continued or if regionalism is
enhanced, then the consequences will, of course, be a conscious-
ness on both sides of the Atlantic of constant conflict, of
every negotiation turning into a test of strength. Sooner or
later this is bound to affect other relationships.

When I say this, I am not saying this as a threat.
We expect that there is enough statesmanship on both sides of
the Atlantic and on both sides of the Pacific to recognize the
overriding political imperatives and that, therefore, we believe
we can avoid the development of regional blocs and these
autarchic groupings confronting each other.

Q. To what extent do you think oil would be a
dangerous destabilizing influence within the Western Alliance?
Specifically, as one example, I refer to the differences in
posture vis-a-vis the United States and France in the Middle
East.

DR. KISSINGER: It is obvious that as energy becomes
a growing concern for all of the industrialized nations that
it is conceivable that the competition for energy, for sources
of energy, will take forms that could threaten other political
relationships.

If Western nations engage in a process where if one
is expropriated and expelled, the other one moves in to pick
up the pieces, as sometimes has been done by every Western
nation with regard to every other Western nation, then, of
course, you are creating a high premium on all sides to continue
this process.

On the other hand, we expect again, as in the other
areas, that as we look ahead 10 or 15 years it should be
possible to develop policies that assure the energy supplies
of all nations and in a manner that is consistent with the
dignity of the producing nations.

It has to be consciously pursued from a long-range
prospective and in a generous framework. If it isn't done,
and if it is permitted to run wild, then the divisive tendencies
may easily predominate.

Q Doctor, on page 11 of your report you refer
to the political relationship with Japan as not yet having been
fully defined. Could you explain that a little further, please?

DR. KISSINGER: As we explained in the chapter on
Japan, Japan went through a phase in which its predominant
effort was on economic recovery and then on this tremendous
industrial expansion.

The degree of political activism was not commensurate
to the economic power that had been developed. The political
change from the occupation era and the post-war era to one in
which Japan pursues a diplomacy that is more in keeping with
its economic strength and its new vitality began in the last
years of the Sato prime ministership, but took symbolic form
when Prime Minister Tanaka acceded to office.

For example, he has now announced the trip he is
intending to take later this year is in pursuit of his multi-
polar diplomacy, which is a different word than Japanese prime
ministers and foreign ministers used in the past.

The adjustment of Japan is from pursuing a rather
single-track foreign policy to a more complex foreign policy.
After all, last year was the year when Japan restored or
normalized its relations with the People's Republic of China.
They are now engaged in peace negotiations, or of seeing whether
they can get them started with the Soviet Union so that the
political role of Japan is now in the process of transition.

How we relate ourselves to this change and how we can
maintain, as we intend to, our traditional friendship while at
the same time taking account of the greater complexity of the
Japanese role is the task that the President attempted to
describe in this report.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you amplify what you said on page 87, where you talk about the need to review the strategic options involved in conducting a nuclear defense, if necessary, and how that would relate to what you said about MBFR and to an alliance role in defense?

DR. KISSINGER: I am just trying to see what you are referring to. I understand.

The question is what we meant on page 87 of the report, in the chapter on Europe, by a review of the strategic options involved in conducting a nuclear defense if it should become necessary, and how we can prepare within the alliance a framework that integrates defense planning and diplomacy. Isn't that what you asked, to explain No. 2 and 3?

Q I was talking about the alliance role in that, and the alliance planning.

DR. KISSINGER: Okay, fine. I will just confine it, then, to the first question.

I keep looking over here. Where is Ron Ziegler when I need him the most to cut off the questioning? (Laughter)

Q Where is he? (Laughter)

DR. KISSINGER: He is measuring the walls of my office. (Laughter)

Q There is a lot of other empty space around here. (Laughter)

DR. KISSINGER: It is clear that the use of nuclear weapons under current conditions has a different significance and must pursue a different strategy than was the case in the 1950s. Now, the problem of how nuclear weapons are to be used, if that should become unavoidable, the relationship between what used to be called tactical and strategic uses, what rational purposes can be achieved, has to be addressed by the alliance.

There exist several bodies which can do this; for example, the nuclear planning group that was established in the Kennedy Administration to perform this role. What we are attempting to bring about is to shift the discussion from the more formalistic agreement on general propositions to a more concrete perception of what would actually occur in specific circumstances. So the forums exist, but what needs to be done is a more systematic and comprehensive approach to what is a very serious problem.

MR. WARREN: One more question is all we have time for.

Q Mr. Kissinger, I have an additional question.

DR. KISSINGER: You pick it. Why should I make an enemy? (Laughter)

MR. WARREN: This gentleman down here.

Q You have on page 142 a four-point program for the Middle East. Could you kindly elaborate a little on that? In the first sentence you speak of the process of negotiations. Do you mean by that that the Jarring mission has been abandoned in your future attempts to bring peace?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is, on page 142 where we list four areas or four points with respect to the Middle East, to what extent that represents an American program for the area; and secondly, whether the first point which refers to a process of negotiation with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict means that we have abandoned the Jarring mission.

Actually, our attitude toward the negotiations in the Middle East is more fully covered on pages 138 and 139, and we make very clear that we are in favor of both the comprehensive approach as well as to the so-called interim approach; that we support both the Jarring mission as well as the various schemes that have been proposed that would have a practical consequence of clearing the Suez Canal and bringing about a withdrawal from some areas. We have explained on page 139 that we recognize that there has to be a relationship between the so-called interim approach and the so-called overall approach, and that we recognize the fact that one of the concerns is that if this relationship is not established, a new arrangement may take on the character of permanence.

WASHINGTON POST - 4 FEB. 1974

# U.S.-British
## Differences
### Seen Wider

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Staff Writer

Reconciliation of the Middle East war by the United States' SR-71 high-altitude spy plane was delayed for at least three days last October because Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger vetoed a British-approved plan to use a base on English soil for the flights, according to military sources.

The sources said they later ascertained that Kissinger canceled the plan because he was angered by a British request that the London government's knowledge of the operation never be revealed.

At the time, the British government, its economy rocked by labor trouble and other difficulties, was urgently trying to ensure a continued supply of petroleum.

U.S. government sources, however, leaked information to the press here suggesting Britain had been "uncooperative" throughout the crisis.

In fact, the sources said, Prime Minister Edward Heath had personally approved the SR-71's use of the U.S. base at Mildenhall in Suffolk, provided the United States protected the British from Arab suggestions that it was aiding Israel.

Pentagon officials were shocked by Kissinger's action. As a result of the secretary's decision, a more intricate, and costly route originating in the United States and involving mid-air fueling operations, had to be hastily devised. The overall result was to sharply reduce the effectiveness of American intelligence as to the scope of Soviet deliveries of supplies and equipment to the Arabs in the first week of the war.

The SR-71, a successor to the U-2, is a camera-equipped plane which flies at three times the speed of sound, at 80,000 feet.

On Oct. 14, with the war already 12 days old, Egypt protested the alleged flights of American planes over its territory.

In outlining the incident, sources in the Nixon administration related it to the widening rift between the

United States and its European allies, particularly Britain. The basic concern of these dissident voices is that Washington, under Kissinger's guidance, is becoming increasingly more isolated from traditional allies.

U.S. officials say that these relations are now charged with emotion, and steadily worsening. Most of the bitterness toward the Europeans on the part of top U.S. policy makers, such as Kissinger, has been directed at Britain.

Last September, Britain joined the other eight European Common Market countries in drafting a paper that described the nine as a "distinct entity." Kissinger told friends that the paper was unacceptable, and expressed irritation that the Europeans were "ganging up" on the United States.

According to the sources, Kissinger was particularly annoyed at Britain's alleged refusal to fight for the American version of a joint European-American statement of long-range principles — a key element of the Nixon administration's "year of Europe."

At one point, Kissinger ordered that the 23-year-old British-American system of exchanging of intelligence information be "reviewed." In his talks with British officials, Kissinger left the impression that the flow of intelligence to London might be choked off unless Heath took a more pro-American position in the Common Market discussions.

Since this warning, the international free-for-all for scarce oil supplies has added to Anglo-American tensions.

U.S. policy makers say they are angry at Britain's efforts to conclude deals with Iran and Saudi Arabia exchanging guarantees of oil for industrial technology.

At a press conference Jan. 10, at which he pleaded for support for his proposed Feb. 11 Washington conference of oil consuming countries, Kissinger said: "Unrestricted bilateral competition will be ruinous for all..."

Subsequently, the Heath government negotiated a bi-

lateral deal with the Shah of Iran providing for 100,000 barrels of oil a day at $7 a barrel in exchange for products and plants.

Britain is supporting Kissinger's call for a conference of consuming nations here. However, British officials want a quick follow-up conference with the Arabs, to avoid any impression of a consumers monopoly, rather than the three-month interim period when Kissinger favors.

American officials here charge that the Franco-British policy of making deals with the Arabs is shortsighted, because only the United States has the ability to guarantee the long-term stability of the Middle East and Persian Gulf oil producing countries.

But British officials argue that their government is only following a policy of national self-interest and survival.

British diplomats in Washington are mystified by the hostility they find among top American policy makers. They believe that the tone for it is set by Kissinger, whom some of them regard as a "Francophile."

On Jan. 26, the Times of London objected to "Dr. Kissinger's practice of securing (Foreign Minister) Sir Alex Douglas-Home in a room at London Airport" as "tiresome and somewhat discourteous."

It suggested that "perhaps there is something wrong with his standard of values."

British diplomats also feel that they were victims of a smear campaign during the Middle East crisis. Reports that London had "refused" to propose a cease-fire resolution at the United Nations Security Council on the Sunday after the war began is strongly denied. British sources say the British ambassador in Cairo, Sir Philip Adams, twice raised the proposal with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, at Kissinger's urging. They assert that Sadat told the British emissary that he would get the Chinese to veto any such resolution.

In describing Kissinger's relationship with the recently departed British ambassador, the Earl of Cromer, an American official said: "He treated Cromer like an errand boy . . . as for Lord Cromer, he never felt that Kissinger cared about Anglo-American relations."

British diplomats say however, that Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger has also been critical of British policies on a wide number of issues.

A Senate committee study released last year noted that Britain is the NATO country

most opposed to the current East-West talks on a reduction of forces in Europe.

The talks are a key element in the American definitive policy, and the Nixon administration views the negotiations as vital for countering congressional pressure for unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe.

Britain has also taken an independent line at the European Security Conference talks at Geneva. It puts more emphasis than either Washington or Moscow on "confidence building measures" such as exchanging observers at military maneuvers and giving prior notification of such exercises.

Although the United States applauded Britain's entry into the European Common Market on Jan. 1, 1973, American officials now indicate extreme displeasure at Britain's close relationship with France.

"There is this general problem of them always being with the French," said a sub-cabinet official. "There is a feeling in this government that Heath is some kind of a decadent Gaullist. The French poison everybody's well, and that's not good company to be in."

"All of a sudden, the British are opposite us at a lot of tables," he continued.

The frequently voiced expectations of France's late President Charles de Gaulle that Britain would be a "Trojan horse" in the European community have not been fulfilled, officials here concede.

"The British are meticulous about their agreements and treaties," said one U.S. official. "This means that when they entered the Common Market, they followed the rules, and rather suddenly."

Last week, for instance, an American diplomat in London who sought information from a British colleague was told he would have to wait for an answer until after a Common Market meeting in February.

"That just wouldn't have happened in the old days of the special relationship," said an official in Washington.

Nongovernmental analysts, as well as middle level foreign policy technicians inside the government, are concerned about the present hard line toward London.

"We have always expected Britain to follow our lead automatically," said Andrew J. Pierre, a specialist on European-American affairs at the Council on Foreign Relations in New Yrok City. "Whenever we wanted something done around the world, we went to them and said come along with us."

See U.S.-BRITISH, Pg.8F

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 12 FEBRUARY 1974

## Dr. Kissinger and the oil weapon

We wish Henry Kissinger had used a more discreet word than "blackmail" when he spoke of the Arabs' oil embargo last week. It was bound to exacerbate Arab sensitivities and complicate the crucial meeting of Arab oil producers this Thursday where the decision whether or not to extend the embargo will be taken. It now seems likely that the producers will maintain the embargo.

To the Arabs the "oil weapon" is a legitimate form of sanctions to bring pressure to bear on Israel, which is illegally occupying Arab lands. They point out that the United States itself resorts to economic sanctions in certain circumstances.

Dr. Kissinger said that the U.S. had been led to expect that the oil embargo would be lifted soon and that failure of the Arab nations to lift it would be regarded as "a form of blackmail." He went on to warn that such action would be "considered highly inappropriate by the U.S. and cannot but affect the attitude with which we will have to pursue our diplomacy."

Rightly or wrongly, this has been interpreted as a warning that if the embargo continues the U.S. may ease up on its efforts to bring about a Mideast settlement.

The oil embargo is directed mainly against the U.S. Nationally the Netherlands also is still under the embargo, but Western Europe as a whole is now receiving adequate supplies of oil although a cutback in output is still being enforced by the Arab producers. The reason for maintaining the embargo on the U.S. is

obvious: only Washington is in a position to keep up pressure on Israel.

Apparently at the time of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement to disengage their forces on the Suez Canal front, Dr. Kissinger received assurances from Egyptian President Sadat that he would press for an early end of the embargo. This was the basis for President Nixon's optimistic statement in his State of the Union message that the embargo would be lifted shortly.

But Egypt is not one of the producers involved in the embargo. The decision to end it depends primarily on Saudi Arabia, but also on the other big producers like Kuwait, Libya, Iraq, and Algeria.

King Faisal of Saudi Arabia is said to be deeply concerned about the effects of the oil crisis and the price increases on Western economies. At the same time he feels that the Israeli pullback from Suez was not sufficient to justify lifting the embargo. Moreover, Syria is urging that the embargo be maintained until a disengagement agreement is reached on the Golan Heights front.

Latest indications are that Dr. Kissinger's "blackmail" statement has weakened the position of the moderates among the oil producers, and that the so-called radicals will dominate Thursday's meeting.

In the delicate realm of Mideast politics, Washington should lean over backwards to choose its words carefully — especially what it says in public.

WASHINGTON POST 12 FEBRUARY 1974

## Options on Targeting U.S. Missiles

Tom Braden's article, "Who is Making Foreign Policy," in The Post of January 26 appears mischievous to the experienced observer. Secretary Kissinger did not announce the retargeting of U.S. missiles on Russian missile sites rather than on cities, as Mr. Braden claims. At the Overseas Writers Association luncheon on January 10, he said that a change in targeting strategy had been made so that hitting Soviet cities would not be the only option open to the President. Many of the assembled writers leaped to the conclusion that this meant targeting missile silos instead of cities. The Secretary went out of his way, it seems to me, to deny that interpretation. For example, there was the following exchange:

> Q... are you saying ... we would be shifting our targets to Soviet weapons rather than Soviet cities, and we will be perhaps improving the accuracy of our missiles so that we can knock out the Soviet missile sites if we have to, rather than going for the Soviet cities?

A: No... what I was referring to is a set of selective options against different sets of targets. We would not nec-

essarily specify any particular set of targets. Military targets, whether silos or other military targets, are, of course, one of the possible target sets. But it is necessary to maintain a set of options which goes beyond the inherent attack — all-but-attack —against enemy cities in the event of nuclear exchanges.

What seemed clear was the administration's recognition that one doesn't threaten all-out war on cities if one wishes to deter the Soviets from intervening militarily in the Middle East, or in Europe, or in China. That threat is no longer credible. I find the option to shoot up part of the Soviet missile forces not too appropriate nor credible, either. But the current energy "crisis" does suggest that the option to destroy the 50 or so Soviet oil refiners, along with his natural-gas pipelines and hydroelectric facilities, might be a convincing deterrent under some circumstances. Energy sources are not the only set of targets that might be considered as a presidential option; transportation, agriculture, and Army encampments come to mind.

There is nothing new about this idea. Fifteen years ago, Herman Kahn

WALL STREET JOURNAL

12 FEBRUARY 1974

## Panama Canal Treaty

The announcement that the U.S. has agreed in principle to relinquish sovereignty over the Panama Canal means that America no longer considers it feasible to maintain a sovereign enclave in another nation. Given modern international realities, we don't see how any other position would have been possible or consistent with our ideals.

The history of the canal is one of vision, political intrigue, engineering boldness and gunboat diplomacy. Even today its controversial origins remain a legal jungle for which there is evidence to support any of the many bizarre theories about its creation. But Secretary Kissinger's recent announcement means that, whatever the legal merits of America's claim "in perpetuity" to that vital shipping link between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the current treaty has become a political anachronism.

The U.S. will continue to participate in both the administration and defense of the canal, but as a partner rather than supreme authority. Mr. Kissinger described this new relationship as "an act of reconciliation," and so it is. But it is bound to have repercussions far beyond Central America, since not only Panamanian nationalists viewed American insistence on sovereignty as a preeminent example of Yankee imperialism.

Some of the criticism of America's role in the Canal Zone was untrue, much of it exaggerated, and a good deal of it simply obsolete. Panamanian nationals were often treated like inferiors years ago, but the worst expressions of that colonial mentality had long since been amended. Still, the very existence of a largely one-sided treaty, one that supposedly had been settled for all time, was enough to fuel the sort of anti-Americanism that exploded in bloody riots in 1965. What most Panamanians objected to was not so much the U.S. presence, but the nature of that presence.

The new status won't mean an end to problems for the U.S., that being the nature of international relationships. And it's likely that anyone expecting gratitude in return for the new agreement will be sorely disappointed. But an irritant has been removed by agreement rather than by confrontation, and in any event the U.S. can derive the comfort of knowing it has done the right thing.

called them "avoidance attacks"—attacks against either counterforce or countervalue target systems with a conscious effort not to kill millions of civilians in the process. Although Secretary Schlesinger avoided being specific, my guess is that this was what he meant.

I doubt that Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger are at cross purposes on this matter. It is Mr. Braden's interpretation that is awry.

WALTER K. STROPE.

Falls Church.

2-E

CURRENT NEWS
AFTERNOON EDITION-1400

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1974

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS 11 FEBRUARY 1974 Pg 1

CONFERENCE

By Oswald Johnston

Star-News Staff Writer

The U.S. delegation to the international energy conference today begins the difficult task of convincing Europe and Japan that world cooperation is the only way to beat the oil crisis — even at the risk of alienating the Arabs.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's opening statement today is expected to present an overview of the political and economic consequences of a continued race among consumer nations to get a piece of the oil market for themselves at any price.

To buttress Kissinger's argument, State Department, Treasury Department and Federal Energy Office officials have compiled an analytical dossier on the economic how-to present the oil price situation could cause if it is not checked.

THE ANALYSIS is understood to predict that the rich nations will run out of currency reserves in less than two years, the underdeveloped nations will face bankruptcy and in some cases famine, and the producer nations will be glutted with increasingly devalued currency as world markets approach collapse.

U.S. officials concede that the reason for making the analysis is to present a grim statistical picture which the conference participants — the European Common Market nine, plus Norway, Canada and Japan — understand perfectly well.

Meanwhile, in Libya, a major oil exporter, Tripoli Radio attacked the conference as "an American trap." Statements denouncing the meeting were also made in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

But U.S. officials say the initial problem facing them at the conference is a deep-seated political resistance on the part of Europeans, particularly the French, to accepting U.S. leadership at a time when the United States seems to be in a commanding economic position.

Unlike any other conference participant except Canada, the United States is largely self-sufficient in energy, and the dollar has begun a recovery while the franc, the mark and the yen have devalued. Five of

the seven major international oil companies that have dominated prices and supplies for 25 years are American. And U.S. policies in the Middle East in the years before the October war are seen in Europe as a catalyst of the current crisis.

Not surprisingly, it was the French who led opposition to U.S. plans at yesterday's preliminary meeting to set an agenda for the conference.

IN RECENT DAYS high administration officials had expressed hopes that the Europeans would agree to a list of five or six precise discussion topics proposed by Kissinger and his conference staff.

But at French urging the delegates agreed instead on a general-

ized agenda of four headings that could include all—or none—of the U.S. proposals.

Looking on the bright side of things, administration officials pointed out yesterday that the conferences did leave the way open for appointment of working groups to discuss specifics. They also noted that the agenda, which includes such items as a general discussion of "the economic situation and its implications," does provide for a formal communique to be drafted during the two-day conference.

In addition, U.S. officials described as encouraging a series of meetings Kissinger held privately during the day with West German, Canadian, Japanese and Common Market

(See CONFERENCE, Page 2-A)

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS 11 FEBRUARY 74 Pg 4

Soviet Reported
Prodding Syria

United Press International

The Soviet Union, in a move to break the stalemate on the Syrian front, has agreed to pressure Syria for concessions to gett troop withdrawal talks started with Israel, according to Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban.

On the tense Golan Heights front, Israeli and Syrian artillery duced yesterday for the first time in nearly a week.

In Jerusalem, an Israeli government statement said Eban told the cabinet at its weekly meeting yesterday that the United States informed him "The Soviet Union would be employing its influence on Damascus to obtain the (Israeli prisoners of war) list and Red Cross visits for the prisoners."

Israel has refused to discuss a disengagement with Damascus until a prisoner list is turned over and the Red Cross is allowed to inspect the POWs in Syria.

In the northern front artillery exchanges, Israel said four of its soldiers were wounded. Near the Lebanese border a civilian

woman was killed in an apparent guerrilla bazooka attack on an automobile, Israel said.

Syria said its guns "silenced the sources of enemy fire at several points."

Meanwhile, Cairo political sources said disengagement on the Syrian-Israeli front will be taken up in a "limited" summit conference in Cairo within the next few days, along with the embargo against Arab oil shipments to the United States.

The Cairo newspaper Al Ahram said the "limited" summit will be held before the full blown 30-nation Islamic summit scheduled for Feb. 22 in Lahore, Pakistan.

In another Arab world development, Libyan leader Muammar Kadafi launched a blistering attack yesterday on Arab leaders who he claimed obstruct the unity of the Arab world, Associated Press reported.

The Libyan strongman said he was ready to arm and train revolutionary fighters needed to overthrow the leaderships in Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria. He spoke at a land distribution ceremony in Tripoli.

PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE (SAFA) AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL MATTERS WITHIN THEIR OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES,

JAMES KILLINGBECK, CHIEF, CURRENT NEWS BRANCH, OX 78765

FOR RESEARCH, CLIPPING SERVICE AND DISTRIBUTION CALL

HELEN YOUNG, ASSISTANT CHIEF
EXECUTIVE AGENCY SERVICE, OX 52884

MILTON VIORST

## Ventilating the Issues

Excessive as the influence of the military on policy-making often is, I think it's probably a mistake to make a federal case of the Pentagon's filing of Henry Kissinger's documents on negotiations with Peking and Moscow. I don't think the issue in the incident is military spying, or an effort by the Pentagon to scuttle a civilian-oriented policy in favor of a military one, though elements of both of these were involved.

The issue, I believe, is an open bureaucracy versus a closed one, an administration in which decisions are made with or without public debate, government which tries, or doesn't, to avoid error by ventilating questions before deciding them.

In the cases with which the documents deal, I happen to agree with the Kissinger position, and disagree with the Pentagon's. But neither the Peking trip nor the SALT treaty were executed without blunders—and these might have been averted had a little less secrecy been imposed.

The official explanation for Kissinger's efforts to keep these documents out of the Pentagon hands was that, if critics of the policy got hold of them, the information would probably be leaked to the press—and stir up debate.

It's important that no claim was made that the documents could have been damaging if leaked to the enemy. Obviously, Peking knew that Kissinger was negotiating Nixon's China trip. It is probable, too, that the SALT positions outlined in the documents had already been presented to Moscow.

Only segments of the American government—and the American public—were kept in the dark, so that Nixon and Kissinger could make the decisions without interference either from inside or outside the administration.

What the Pentagon was trying to do was to make its weight felt in the deliberations, to influence a policy decision with which it had direct concern. It was fighting back against a structure Kissinger had created to exclude it.

In effect, the Pentagon was seeking to fulfill its mandate to represent military thinking inside the councils of government. Throughout most of our post-war history, it has

been amply represented, even excessively.

If anything, since 1960 diplomatic thinking has been under-represented, largely because of the coincidence of two successive weak secretaries of State. Dean Rusk bowed to McNamara, William Rogers to Kissinger.

But the Pentagon—as the incident of thefilched documents shows—has not lost its vigor. It is determined to have itself heard, even though in Kissinger it has found an adversary of unaccustomed strength.

What distinguishes the Nixon administration from its predecessors is not that bureaucratic differences exist. They will always exist, and they ought to. More often than not, past bureaucratic differences have been introduced into the public domain—and the people have had a chance to take sides.

Indeed, during the New Deal, for example, Roosevelt made public argument between Cabinet members, as well as between White House advisers, an essential part of decision-making. The histories of the period are rich with accounts of the monumental battles involving Harold Ickes, Henry Wallace, Harry Hop-

kins—in which the American people were participants.

If the news of Nixon's impending trip to China had been “leaked,” it would not have been the end of the project, which was immensely popular. More likely, it would have averted hard feelings with Japan, which have continued to loom unfavorably in our Pacific relations.

Similarly, an advance “leak” of SALT's terms would surely not have killed the treaty—but might have developed a consensus on some of the provisions widely considered objectionable.

It's hard to defend theft, even if the documents were being kept secret for political convenience rather than national security. But I do not hesitate to submit that the Pentagon was justified—if, indeed, that was its goal—in getting some basic policy questions out on the table.

Bureaucratic in-fighting is not necessarily a bad thing. This administration has tried to suppress it to keep decisions in a very few hands. That may be a tidy way to run a government, but isn't not a healthy way.

CONFERENCE -- CONTINUED

representatives.

Officials had previously insisted that virtually all the conference participants other than the French have shown a “constructive” attitude, despite their desire to avoid offending their Arab suppliers.

IT IS EXPECTED that Kissinger's aim is to persuade conferees that the United States understands their short-term need to nail down secure supplies, but that America wants to avoid a situation where currently inflated oil prices are made permanent by a series of long-term contracts, such as the French have sought in Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

"The French policy is unworkable," one high official explained. "At the price of $11 a barrel, they are going to run out of their currency reserves in 15 months, if they import oil at last year's rate of consumption. Our concern is that these bilateral deals keep the prices up and will sooner or later create a world economic collapse."

Kissinger's opening statement is to be followed by a reply from West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, a spokesman for the Common Market.

Treasury Secretary George P. Schultz and Energy Administrator William E. Simon are to address the conference later in the day, when the delegates are scheduled to discuss the economic consequences of the crisis.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS 11 FEB 74 Pg 3

## Indian Ocean Base

In a move that drew little attention in this country, the United States and Britain last week concluded an agreement under which a permanent American naval and air base will be built on the British-owned island of Diego Garcia, where we already operate a communications station. The location is in the middle of the Indian Ocean, 1,000 miles from any place one ever heard of. The purpose of the base is to provide refueling and other support for U.S. Naval units patrolling the area.

The plan for the first permanent American facility in the Indian Ocean has drawn immediate fire from India, Australia and New Zealand, all exploring the idea of big-power rivalry in an area they want to keep neutral. India long has espoused neutralism, when not enjoying Soviet support in its battles on the subcontinent. Australia and New Zealand are longtime military allies of the United States, but have veered away from identification with American security interests since coming under Labor governments last year. The Australian statement stressed the wish of Asian nations for the Indian Ocean to be a neutral zone.

The regional desire for insulation from world-ranging military concerns deserves sympathy, but it is outdated.

## The Lobster Mission

The Navy has denied a report that it sent a jet fighter from Oceana Naval Air Station near Norfolk, Va., to Brunswick Naval Station in Maine to pick up a load of fresh lobsters. While admitting that the Dec. 7 flight did return with lobsters, a spokesman at Atlantic Fleet Naval Air Force Headquarters said the mission involved both training and information. It was training, he said, in that it was aimed at maintaining cross-country airways proficiency in controlled departures and approaches. But he said the primary reason was to acquire material on desert survival at the Navy's survival, evasion, resistance and escape school.

The Indian Ocean is no longer a remote backwater, the littoral countries cannot make it one and neither, by itself, can the United States. The area for years has figured importantly in the deployment of American submarines with their nuclear deterrent trained on the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet naval presence there has been growing, and will grow more with the reopening of the Suez Canal. At the same time, the Indian Ocean sealanes are crucially important to the Western world—and increasingly to the United States—as the super-tanker routes to the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. Russia should not be given unchallenged domination of such vital links.

2-A

WASHINGTON POST - 15 FEBRUARY 1974 P-25

# Guerrillas of Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia and Argentina Link Up

BUENOS AIRES — Leaders of the outlawed People's Revolutionary Army held an underground news conference yesterday to announce that their guerrilla organization, based in Argentina, had teamed with three other South American groups for a united campaign against "imperialism and repression."

"Before, we exchanged ideas and some material," said Domingo Mena. "Now we have reached a second stage and are prepared to do combat under a joint command."

The other groups are the Tupamaros of Uruguay, the Leftist Revolutionary Movement of Chile and the National Liberation Army of Bolivia. All four proclaim Marxist socialist ideology.

Mena, from the group that kidnaped Esso Argentina refinery manager Victor Samuelson, two months ago, said the company was failing to follow through on distribution of $10 million in aid to the poor and the American's life hung in the balance.

The guerrilla groups have cooperated for years. Tupamaros who escaped to Chile after a crackdown in 'Uruguay are thought to have made it to Argentina following the coup last September.

WASHINGTON POST - 15 FEBRUARY 1974 P-14

# Clash of Strategies Makes Kissinger Diplomatic Victor

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

An unusual interplay of competing diplomatic strategies gave Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger an easier victory than the United States expected in the 13-nation Washington Energy Conference.

It was not primarily American shrewdness or guile, or even planning, that alone produced the 12-to-1 outcome on Wednesday over French opposition. Instead, foreign and American sources acknowledged in the aftermath of the conference, the United States was the beneficiary of opposing diplomatic strategies that checkmated each other.

The fundamental question in the long run will be what the conference will be worth in providing relief for the world energy crisis, without causing costly damage to Western cohesion. From the narrow standpoint of an exercise in power diplomacy, however, the course of the conference intrigues the specialists who watched it unfold behind the scenes.

Kissinger himself is getting good—but by no means perfect — marks from the diplomatic professionals. Despite the fact that he is the world's most publicized virtuoso diplomat, Kissinger was chairing his first major international conference, no easy task for even veterans in the business when the pros are trying to carve each other up.

At one point, a Kissinger ruling left Italian Finance Minister Ugo La Malfa claiming in dismay that Kissinger had "beheaded the finance ministers"

Not literally, of course. La Malfa was expressing chagrin that Kissinger had acquiesced in a refusal by French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert to permit finance ministers to meet as an official working party. on grounds that France had no finance minister present.

d'Estaing, admired by American colleagues as a professional bargainer.

Kissinger, in that instance, undoubtedly had his mind set on a larger objective: to allow the French to polarize the conference.

At his news conference on Wednesday, after the United States' initiative prevailed, Kissinger said "the French views were reasonably well-known" at least "two weeks or so" before the conference began.

As late as the opening session on Monay, however, American sources now concede, the United States was not sure precisely what specific opposition tactics the French would use. "We knew the trend was in our favor," said one U.S. source, "and that France had been playing 'odd man out' for years. But we couldn't be certain exactly what France's Common Market partners would do."

Jobert's moves decided that: On Monday, Jobert laid out what diplomats call an "absolutist" position: end the American-called conference inconclusively, and take up the energy discussion in the 24-nation Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), at top level.

This, in effect, would give France veto power. When OECD meets at foreign ministers' level, it operates by consensus; there can be no action if any nation objects.

Jobert's uncompromising stand polarized the issue. It forced the Western Europeans, as has been shown, to choose between a French lead and an American lead with the United States prepared to make some compromises but not France. Jobert's refusal to compromise on anything, however, also had another major but less-obvious effect; it destroyed the strategy of other nations to water down the U.S. energy plan. Japan, for one, found its own intended

BRIEFING ... CONT'D

plies.

Several delegates suggested the new figure was "too pessimistic," arguing that the crisis was likely to ease and the prices might be rolled back. Officials of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development stressed, in any case, that the figure was extremely tentative, useful only as a basis for the main discussions that centered on finding an international solution to the massive balance-of-payments deficits many countries face.

The French coincidentally reported their latest trade figures yesterday, showing that their deficit for January was a modest $100 million despite a 78 per cent increase in the price of oil since October.

French imports were $3.5 billion (up 48 per cent from January, 1973) and exports were $3.4 billion (up 36 per cent since January, 1973). Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the French finance minister, told television viewers last night that this was "a relatively favorable result," but stressed the need to concentrate on exporting more.

The French television viewers were also given a chance to see Michel Jobert, their foreign minister, defend his performance in Washington, where, he said, other European nations exceeded the restrictive mandate agreed for the Common Market representatives.

Georges Pompidou, the French president, weighed in with some harsh comments of his own, according to report of a Cabinet meeting here.

Mr. Pompidou told French ministers that the Washington conference was an American ploy to establish leadership of the Western world, and said President Nixon was trying to imitate Soviet control of its satellites by "a pax Americana in the West." These words reflected the chill relations these days between Washington and Paris.

tail its ability to engage in bilateral oil deals. Japan was extremely anxious, as well, to avoid any action that would antagonize the United States—or the Arab oil producers.

The planned strategy of Japan, and several other nations, was to play the "helpful compromiser." Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira offered an initiative to do just that, with oil producer representatives being brought into a "liaison group" to plan a subsequent conference.

But Jobert, to Japan's dis-

But Jobert to Japan's dismay, left no opportunity to bridge anything. "We were

## OIL ... CONTINUED

ing, Oller read it and said: "Well, then I stand behind my written statement." He did say that the shrunken reserves would not affect military readiness in a crisis.

Oller also said that some oil suppliers have bypassed the Pentagon because of the "red tape" involved in defense contracts. "They're going to sell it [fuel] to the man it's easier to do business with." He said after the hearing that the Pentagon has not tried to shorten or simplify contract forms.

## NEW YORK TIMES (15)
13 FEB. 1974 P-10
Cosmos 632 Launched

MOSCOW, Feb. 12 (AP)—The Soviet Union launched today Cosmos 632, the latest earth satellite in the unmanned Cosmos series, Tass, the official press agency, reported. Tass said that the satellite was functioning normally. The secret

AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY JULY 1, 1974(3)

# Ten MIRV Proposals Prepared

Pentagon excluded from final drafting of positions for summit on accord attempts on both ICBMs, underground nuclear tests

By Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.

Washington-Ten U. S. proposals have been prepared for the current Moscow summit meeting in an attempt to achieve an accord with the Soviets limiting deployment of multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Of the 10 positions available to President Nixon, only one would meet the essential equivalence criteria established earlier by the White House as an acceptable negotiating position.

All 10 proposals would involve a reduction of MIRVs by the U. S. and would limit the Soviets to MIRV deployment by numbers of missile launchers which would affect both MIRVs and total missile throw weight. The Soviets rejected, in meetings with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in March, limiting MIRVs by throw weight only. Under that concept both sides would be limited to 5 million lb. throw weight that could be MIRVs. U. S. now has about 2.5 million lb. (AW&ST May 27, p. 14).

The single position that falls within the essential equivalence criteria-adopted by the Administration to comply with the amendment by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D.-Wash.) to the ratification of the present offensive interim strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) agreement-would require limiting missiles with MIRVs to the low hundreds.

The U. S. is expected to have 550 land-based Minuteman ICBMs with MIRV warheads operational by next year and 31 Poseidon submarines, each with 16 MIRVed ballistic missiles, a total of 1,046 MIRVed missiles.

The acceptable position would cause a major cutback in U. S. MIRVs but would also result in an equivalent reduction of the Soviet force level by throw weight as their MIRVs are built up to the reduced U. S. level.

In recent weeks, the Pentagon has been excluded from preparation of positions by the Administration for the summit meeting.

A National Security Decision Memorandum has been published on the U. S. position for obtaining an agreement on underground nuclear testing with the Soviets. According to Defense Dept. officials, that position was achieved without input or approval by the Pentagon.

Curbs on underground testing of nuclear warheads are expected to be agreed to, at least in principle, during the Nixon visit, to be based on thresholding-limiting nuclear detonations by warhead force.

The Soviets advanced the thresholding request in the March meeting with Kissinger. But because of the secrecy involved and communications between the White House and Moscow without explanations to U. S. SALT negotiators in Geneva, some senior U. S. officials initially be-

respect to the limitation of the strategic offensive arms signed on May 26, [1972] the United States understands that: one, the aggregate level of ballistic missile launchers by the protocol for the United-States and the USSR, 950 for the USSR and 710 for the United States, includes ballistic missile launchers on all nuclear-powered submarines and launchers for modern ballistic missiles which may be deployed on diesel-powered submarines."

Kissinger added, "There is, therefore, no basis whatever for saying that we authorized the modernization of missiles on diesel-powered submarines.

"Secondly, launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel-powered submarines are not included in the above-mentioned levels and, therefore, cannot be used for purposes of replacement as defined in the protocol." In other words, Kissinger added, they had to get rid of ICBMs if they wanted to add submarine launchers.

"Three, a modern ballistic missile on a submarine is a missile of the type which is deployed on nuclear-powered submarines in the USSR since 1965. The Soviet side has indicated its agreement with this interpretation," Kissinger said.

"In other words," he added, "the so-called secret agreement is nothing other than a statement by the United States of what we had already stated publicly on May 26."

Kissinger said the U. S. believes the Soviets have 20 operational G-class submarines. Eleven have missiles in the 700-mi. range, and nine are equipped with 300-mi.-range missiles.

He added that no G-class submarines have been off the U. S. Atlantic coast since 1967, and none has been off the Pacific coast since 1969.

"The G-class submarine is a diesel-powered submarine that can stay under water for only two to three days, that is extremely noisy and, therefore, extremely vulnerable," Kissinger explained. "And moreover, the 300-mi.-range missile which is, as I pointed out, on nine of the submarines, can be fired only if the submarine surfaces-it cannot be fired from under water," he added.

It also has been charged by Sen. Jackson that the Administration secretly agreed not to build up to the permitted level of 710 submarine-launched missiles.

Kissinger explained that before going to Moscow to negotiate the interim agreement, he conferred with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on submarine building programs. "Both told me that they did not wish to build additional submarines, missile-carrying submarines, of the type that it was then possible to build-substantially the existing Poseidon boats. And that they preferred to wait with the building of new submarines until what was then called ULMS [undersea long-range missile system], and is now

"State [Dept.] believed that Defense [Dept.] would not concur with the timing and threshold limits involved because they might impact on the near-term retargeting doctrine Schlesinger is pushing," an official said.

The retargeting of Minuteman to provide a deterrent by having sufficient accuracy to destroy hardened military targets, including ICBM sites in the Soviet Union, would require a new reentry vehicle to accommodate the guidance package for improved accuracy and would necessitate designing a new nuclear warhead requiring underground testing.

The Pentagon already has asked Congress for money in Fiscal 1975 to develop a Mk. 20 nuclear warhead in the 400-kiloton range to replace the Minuteman's Mk.12/12A current warhead in the 200-kiloton range.

It is expected that a threshold agreement will limit underground nuclear testing to the 150-200-kiloton range. Under such an agreement, verification would be accomplished by seismic detection devices to police an accord. Experts believe that a Richter Scale reading of about 4.5 will emerge as a limiting factor for underground tests.

Controversy surrounded the SALT negotiations up to the time President Nixon arrived in the USSR. Sen. Jackson declared that Kissinger had made a secret agreement with the Soviets that would permit the Russians to deploy an additional 70 modern ballistic missiles on their older G-class diesel submarines above the 950 limit in the interim agreement.

Kissinger immediately denied the charge, calling it false in every detail. He also expressed pessimism from Europe last week on the eve of the summit over reaching any significant SALT agreement during Nixon's visit.

Sen. Jackson claims to have a document classified secret by Kissinger that proves the terms of the interim agreement on SALT were altered by Kissinger without the knowledge or approval of Congress.

Kissinger said that all he did was to gain clarification of the portion of the agreement dealing with submarine-launched ballistic missile totals and did not change the interim agreement. He added that the Soviets, after first rejecting an U.S. interpretation of the agreement as

AVIATION WEEK 1 JULY 1974(3)

# Nixon Pledges Consultations
With NATO on Soviet Parleys

Brussels—Heads of North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations last week were assured by President Richard M. Nixon that they would be fully consulted on any matters concerning the alliance that stems from his talks with the Russians in Moscow.

Nixon's emphasis on consultation was considered here as a major effort to mend a subdued, but continuing rift between the alliance and the U. S. over the latter's sudden international alert during the October Middle East War.

In a briefing after the 2-hr. heads-of- state session, Dr. Joseph Luns, NATO secretary general, joined in the effort to downgrade any special significance to the lack of consultation with NATO at that time.

He pointed out that the time between the decision to put U. S. world forces on a Condition 3 alert status and the time that the NATO Council was informed was only 5 hr. Luns said four of those hours were used in discussions between Washington and Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe, and the fifth hour between Good-

paster and the NATO Council.

Luns also contended that the U. S. at that time did what any other alliance member would have done if faced with a Soviet probe of the magnitude shown during the Middle East War.

Nixon, who arrived here with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, signed the NATO declaration on Atlantic relations reached recently in Ottawa, along with other heads of state or their representatives. Political leaders of Canada and Iceland were not present, due to elections in, their countries, and France was represented by Premier Jacques Chirac who signed for President Giscard d'Estaing.

Before signing, Nixon told the alliance that the issue of forward bases would not be part of the Moscow talks and that Kissinger would return to Brussels to brief the NATO Council on the talks and their outcome, as they related to the alliance and its strategy in facing the Warsaw Pact countries.

He also assured the alliance that U. S. troops would remain in Europe as long as the threat to the West continued. But he added what was considered a veiled

warning—that the troops would remain as long as the Europeans took a fair share of the defense burden.

His comment was generally considered an aside to the heads of the British and Netherlands governments—Prime Minister Harold Wilson and J. M. den Uyl—both of whom are presiding over defense reviews aimed at drastic cuts in spending and commitments (AW&ST June 24, p. 16).

Nixon also stressed that detente with the Soviet Union and its allies is not inevitable and should not be taken for granted.

The President and Luns both told the group that, in their opinion, detente is complementary to defense and not a substitute for it.

Along with the necessity for consultation, money problems continue to trouble the alliance, and not only through a tendency to cut defense budgets. Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt informed the alliance chiefs that if continued inflation and poor balance of payments situations were not dealt with by the alliance as part of its strategy, the result could be a serious threat to NATO's solidarity.

MIRV...................................CONTINUED.)

agreement, Kissinger added. "Nevertheless, we put into the interim agreement a provision according to which we could convert 54 of our older ICBMs [USAF's Titan 2 missile] to submarine-launched missiles. We put it into the interim agreement, quite frankly, for the third and fourth reasons which I gave with respect to our general strategic policy—the perception of other countries of the American position."

He added that "we did not think it was desirable to put into an agreement a Soviet right to convert old missiles into submarine-launched missiles without maintaining an American right to convert old missiles into submarine-launched missiles. And therefore, to maintain the formal symmetry of the agreement, we put into the agreement a right which we had no intention to exercise."

Kissinger said that because of published information about Trident President Nixon decided at the 1972 summit to tell the Soviets what would soon become obvious within weeks, "namely, that we had no intention of exercising the conversion right from Titan missiles to submarines during the period of the interim agreement."

"This did not change the total figures," Kissinger said.

"We testified that the United States was entitled to have 1,710 missiles. It did not—I repeat—change the total figure. It

neva, and testimony by him to the Senate Armed Services Committee's arms control subcommittee, which Sen. Jackson heads.

The controversial "secret clarification" resulted from Nitze's testimony. Nitze resigned unilaterally after the Administration refused to accept his request to resign. He left so that he would be free to publicly criticize the way SALT negotiations have been handled in an atmosphere of secrecy privately by Kissinger without members of the negotiating team being aware of progress or positions in the talks.

The move by the White House to negotiate an extension to the interim agreement until 1979 was another reason for Nitze's action.

"Such an extension, of course, would be in defiance of the explicit congressional mandate to negotiate a permanent agreement based on the principle of parity," said Sen. James L. Buckley (Cons.-R.-N. Y.). He added: "The United States would have expressed by its action a willingness to live with very unequal terms for an extended period of time—seven years. Moreover, as the Soviets begin exploiting their quantitative advantages through qualitative improvements in their warhead technology, they could achieve an overall strategic superiority that could blunt their interest in a permanent agreement based on true parity."

agree, the Soviets are moving to deploy their new land-based missile—SSX-16, SSX-17, SSX-18 and SSX-19—with MIRVs and improve accuracy with onboard computers.

Soviets have apparently abandoned the rail-type launching system for their MIRVs and are developing a post-boost control system similar to that used by the U. S. Minuteman and Poseidon missiles, an expert said.

The Soviets also have tested the 4,500-naut-mi. SS-N-8 submarine-launched ballistic missile with a stellar-inertial guidance system comparable to the Trident I's proposed system.

Soviet SLBM deployments have increased from 120 in 1964 to more than 820 in 1974. The Soviets have tended to keep obsolete submarines in their forces even after replacements are available. There has been no attempt by the Soviets to phase out their G- and H-class submarines when Y-class boats were introduced. Y-class boats have been retained even though more capable D-class boats are available.

The Soviets have a preference for 12 or 16 missiles per boat so the actual missile ceiling, including 66 SS-N-5s on G boats is likely to be 1,010, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told the Senate. "An unexplained anomaly is the role of the nine H-class submarines. These are nuclear powered and capable of launching ballistic missiles."

BALTIMORE SUN 5 July 1974

# More and Better Warheads

The Nixon-Brezhnev meetings conspicuously failed to halt the offensive arms development race, which terrifies the world and grossly distorts the national budgets of both powers. This is not to denigrate the agreement by each side not to go ahead with a second antiballistic missile system. But the agreement on underground testing, which merely prohibits testing of nuclear weapons larger than 150 kilotons after March 1976, underscores that the race for phantom "supremacy" in offensive weapons is on. Secretary of State Kissinger's explanation that "both sides have to convince their military establishments of the need for restraint," conjures up an intriguing image of President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev jointly negotiating against Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and Marshal Grechko-and losing.

The situation left over from the 1972 agreement

is that the Soviet Union has more and bigger missiles while the United States has more and better warheads. The Soviets are working furiously to deploy multiple warheads to give it an overall lead. Mr. Schlesinger therefore wants to plunge ahead with better delivery systems and more accuracy in the American multiple warheads. This was the situation when the summit might have headed off but did not. If Mr. Schlesinger is stopped, it will be by the budgetary power of Congress, which cannot impose equal sanity on the Soviets. The underground testing allowed under the treaty accommodates both rival development plans.

The chief ray of light on this problem was the agreement to try again next year. However personal the terms in which it was couched, this has an institutional feel about it, as likely to be committing the President and the chairman, whoever may hold those positions at that time.

WASHINGTON STAR &
NEWS
4 July 1974

## 'Little Details'

In Saigon, a visiting U.S. congressman says the Viet Cong have dismissed as "little details" the search for men missing in Indochina.

Rep. G.V. Montgomery, D-Miss., spoke for an hour yesterday with a Viet Cong delegate to the four-party military talks in Saigon in hopes pressing him with the importance of which the search is viewed in America. Montgomery said he got no information that there are any missing Americans left alive and even less encouragement that the search would continue.

LOS ANGELES TIMES 3 July 1974

# Nixon's Talk: a Lost Opportunity

President Nixon's address to the Soviet people Tuesday was a strong affirmation of the importance of peace combined with a candid recognition of the "many difficulties" remaining in the path of better Soviet-American relations. He did the right thing in saying those things.

But it was also a lost opportunity.

For Mr. Nixon chose to speak in such broad generalities, such generous platitudes, that Leonid I. Brezhnev could safely have made the same speech to the American people.

It was understandable that Mr. Nixon should quote Leo Nikolaevich Tolstoy rather than Alexander Isayevich Solzhenitsyn. It would be an abuse of the privilege of addressing the Soviet people to use the occasion to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union.

Yet we could not help thinking of the Soviet citizens who are oppressed and abused, whose hopes lie in the Western light of freedom, and how they must have felt when the President spoke only in

passing of the differences in values that divide the two nations.

We cannot believe that the climate of negotiation and cooperation, which the President has so successfully cultivated, would have been harmed had he identified those differences and reaffirmed the determination of the United States to seek justice with peace, freedom with detente. He could have acknowledged the imperfections of the American way, but said something of that brave experiment, communicating some of its excitement and value in this rare opportunity to reach every radio and television set in the Soviet Union.

One of the last unresolved issues of the European security negotiations now under way is how to open frontiers between East and West to the free movement of people and ideas. The President could have shared with the Soviet people the hopes of the West on that issue. It is a crucial issue, for it recognizes that freedom is an essential element of security.

OMAHA WORLD WOOD 30 June 1974 (5 July)

## Coverage of Calley

A familiar and bothersome issue has been raised in the case of Army Lt. William Calley, who is incarcerated at Fort Leavenworth pending appeal of his conviction in the My Lai massacre.

Calley's defense attorneys, seeking reversal of the murder conviction, contend that the officer was the victim of "damaging and inflammatory" pre-trial publicity.

News coverage of My Lai and the publication of "gruesome pictures" were cited. It is the defense's contention that members of the military court were exposed to "every salient fact" in the case before they ever were named to sit in judgment on Calley.

The question of pre-trial news coverage has bothered lawyers, judges

and journalists for years. In many areas, issues relating to coverage of crime news have been resolved or compromised by cooperation between press and bar.

But exceptional cases probably will continue to present exceptional problems. The Calley story is one of these.

It was one of the biggest stories to come out of the Vietnam war. It involved not just a criminal case against an Army officer, but larger questions of military conduct, the relationship of soldiers to civilians, "war crimes" precedents set at the Nuremberg trials, and, indeed, the basic controversy over U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Some of the news coverage of My Lai and the uncovering of Calley's

4-E

part in it probably was inflammatory and prejudicial. Under the circumstances, given the intense public interest in the case, it probably could not have been otherwise. It is hard to imagine how the public interest in full disclosure of the facts about My Lai could have been reconciled with Calley's rights as a defendant.

In fact, there is some question whether the free press—fair trial issues, which had been discussed almost solely in connection with civil cases, are applicable to trials before military tribunals.

In recent rulings the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the principle that military and civilian justice systems are separate and do not necessarily have to follow identical guidelines.

This is another consideration that would tend to confuse the issues in the Calley case.

RADIO - TV
DEFENSE DIALOG

RADIO TV REPORTS INC. WASH., D.C. SUMMARIES NOT TO BE QUOTED.

FRIDAY, JULY 5, 1974 (BROADCASTS OF JULY 3, 4, 1974)

SUMMARY OF NETWORK NEWS IN THIS ISSUE

Tom BROKAW, NBC News, Dan RATHER, CBS News, Marvin KALB, CBS News, and Tom JARRIEL, ABC News, all report July 3 on the end product of the Moscow summit talks between President NIXON and Mr. BREZHNEV. The agreements, they report are as follows: limiting ABM sites to only one, a partial limit on megatonnage of underground nuclear tests not to go into effect for two years, and pledges to work for limitation of offensive weapons perhaps in the form of a ten year pact. They all noted the difficulty of achieving an agreement on the limitation of offensive nuclear weapons, especially MIRVs.

Richard VALERIANI, NBC, reports on Secretary KISSINGER's end of summit conference in Moscow, July 3, and John CHANCELLOR reports that KISSINGER stated that some military persons in both the U.S. and Russia are against a nuclear treaty now. In rebuttal, John COCHRAN, NBC, Roger MUDD, CBS, and Howard K. SMITH, ABC, report that Defense Secretary SCHLESINGER said that the DOD is under firm civilian control and there is no problem with the DOD or its military personnel with respect to impeding SALT negotiations.

Bob SCHIEFFER, CBS Morning News July 3, reports on the Pentagon send off for recently retired Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Thomas MOORER.

Richard VALERIANI, NBC News July 4, and Herbert KAPLOW, ABC News, both report on Secretary of State KISSINGER's meeting with the NATO Council in Brussels to impart to member countries the outcome of the summit talks in Moscow. KISSINGER said that there were obstacles in the limiting of offensive nuclear weapons which he will try to surmount during further talks with the Russians in October. The meeting with the NATO members, they report, was in keeping with the new NATO declaration and its consultation provisions.

Charles QUINN, NBC News, and Frank TOMLINSON, ABC Evening News, both report on Vietnam veterans protests in Washington. They report the vets demand change in the VA, feel that educational benefits are too low, that VA hospitals are understaffed and give poor service, feel that the Paris Peace Agreement is not being carried out and should be, demand amnesty for deserters and resisters, and the impeachment of President NIXON. Tom PETTIT reports that the main problem is that the VA does not know or understand the problems of the vets.

Barbara WALTERS and John COCHRAN, the "Today" show NBC, interview Admiral Thomas MOORER, the former Chairman of the JCS. WALTERS asks Admiral MOORER whether Admiral ZUMWALT was correct in saying that the U.S. Navy is uncompetitive with other navies and that our forces would be unable to win a conventional war with an understrength navy. Admiral MOORER describes the missions of both the Soviet and U.S. Navy and then says the U.S. would win a conventional war but with heavy losses. He points out that access to the sea is vital to an overseas military operation. COCHRAN asks Admiral MOORER whether the JCS vetoed any agreement at the Moscow summit and MOORER says the JCS does not vote but advises and abides by the President's decisions.

## NBC NIGHTLY NEWS NBC TV

6:30 PM JULY 3

### Moscow Summit Ended

JOHN CHANCELLOR: President NIXON and Soviet Party Chief BREZHNEV ended their summit conference in Moscow today. They signed two modest agreements on weapons, one limits ABM systems, the other will limit the size of nuclear weapons which can be tested underground, but it won't go into effect for about two years and in the meantime both sides can go on testing their new warheads.

And BREZHNEV and NIXON pledged to work for some kind of limitation on offensive nuclear weapons. The hope is for a ten year treaty to go into effect next year, but it's only a hope and the hard questions of the nuclear balance were not answered at this summit -- no breakthrough.***

TOM BROKAW: In ceremonies at the Kremlin President NIXON and General Secretary BREZHNEV signed the protocols for their limiting the ABM systems of the two countries and setting limits on the size of underground nuclear tests.***

What they did not have on the table was a treaty on controlling the deployment of missiles of multiple warheads or MIRVs. The problem proved so difficult that Secretary KISSINGER said, the U.S. has given up hope of ever getting a permanent agreement. Instead the two countries will send delegations of experts to Geneva in August to begin work on controlling MIRVs under an agreement that would last until 1985.***

Both Secretary of State KISSINGER and Foreign Minister GROMYKO told reporters that even without the MIRV agreement these talks were important because now the U.S. and the Soviet Union understand each other's objectives much better.***

There will be much less ceremony and a good deal more urgency when teams of American and Soviet experts meet in Geneva beginning in

multiple warheads.

Secretary of State KISSINGER said the U.S. and the Soviet Union have about 18 months in which to find controls for the missiles with multiple warheads. If it does not follow within that time period, he said, there will be opportunities for nuclear warfare that were unimaginable at the beginning of the nuclear period.

### Kissinger Speaks On SALT

CHANCELLOR: Secretary of State Henry KISSINGER told reporters in Moscow today that he thinks the two sides at the summit have found an approach to slowing down the arms race.

But KISSINGER also said, in speaking of the weapons both sides now have in their nuclear arsenals, he said, what in the name of God is strategic superiority when you are at this level of warhead.

And he said that if some agreement is not reached before the present nuclear freeze expires in 1977 we'll be living in a world in which opportunities for nuclear warfare will be unimaginable.***

RICHARD VALERIANI: Before coming to Moscow Secretary of State KISSINGER outlined rather modest goals for the third NIXON-BREZHNEV summit. And, as advertised, the results here were rather modest.

The improvement in American-Soviet relations continues, but progress on the central issue of slowing down the nuclear arms race was only minimal.***

KISSINGER also told the news conference that, what he called, the realities of the situation had convinced the negotiators that their 1974 target date for reaching an agreement on limiting offensive nuclear weapons had been too optimistic.

The principal reality appears to be that the Russians believe they are still too far behind in the nuclear arms race to make a deal now and so there will be no definitive agreement until they feel they have sufficiently caught up.***

CHANCELLOR: KISSINGER also seemed to acknowledge today that

are against a nuclear accomodation
now. He said, "my impression from
what I have observed is that both
sides have to convince their mili-
tary establishments of the benefits
of restraint. And that, he said, is
not a thought that comes naturally
to military people on either side.

## Schlesinger News Conference

CHANCELLOR: Later in the day the Secretary of Defense and the head of the arms control agency -- who were not taken to Moscow -- held a press conference at the Pentagon.***

JOHN COCHRAN: Defense Secretary SCHLESINGER and arms control chief Fred IKLE represent bureaucracies with often opposing views on curbing the arms race, but today both said the President did not pass up any opportunities for a fair agreement at Moscow.

And SCHLESINGER indicated that Secretary KISSINGER is wrong in putting any blame on the Pentagon.

DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER: There is no problem with the Department of Defense. I think that we have firm civilian control in this country as Admiral MOORER underscored yesterday that there is no problem with regard to our military personnel.

REPORTER: Does he feel that the Soviet military is perhaps exerting too much pressure on Mr. BREZHNEV?

SECRETARY SCHLESINGER: Well, I couldn't elaborate on his remarks, but there is no problem here.

REPORTER: Was there a tentative agreement, something acceptable to the Secretary of State, that you -- and or -- the JCS found unacceptable on offensive nuclear weapons.

SECRETARY SCHLESINGER: There was no such agreement.

COCHRAN: Pentagon officials are relieved that the President did not rush into what they had feared might be an unfavorable arms agreement in Moscow. But at the same time those Pentagon officials did not feel they should be cast as the heavies, the ones responsible for Mr. NIXON's failure to get a new limitation on offensive nuclear weapons.***

agreements. Which means that the next generation of nuclear weapons, both Russian and American, may be brought into deadly production before there will be another chance to place some limitations on them. As of now the two sides are too far apart to bring an end to the nuclear arms race.

CBS EVENING NEWS CBS TV

7:00 PM JULY 3

## Results of Summit Talks

DAN RATHER: The Soviets got tough at the very end of this summit, but both sides worked hard today to put the best possible face on this final signing routine.

This is what the two leaders agreed to; limiting anti-missile defense sites to one, a reduction from the two which had been their previous agreement; no new agreement on actual numbers of missiles, only on numbers of sites, the Soviets have one ABM defense ring around Moscow, the U.S. will keep its one ABM defense ring for the time being at least in the far west and will not build one around Washington.

Also agreed to, a partial limit on underground nuclear testing, eliminating by 1976 the larger megatonnage underground tests.

A new approach on trying to limit strategic arms, an effort at a ten year arms pact now which if it can be worked out would begin next year.

General agreement to push again for a 35 nation European summit soon. A move that would help the Soviets legitimize the borders they have set in Eastern Europe. There is no sign in the agreements today of any progress on the question of reducing troops and arms in Central Europe.***

No agreement, not even in principle, about limiting the numbers of nuclear missiles and multi-warhead or MIRV missiles.***

The American negotiating team

reason because it may have helped
President NIXON's standing at home
and because it may have helped keep
the momentum of detente going.

Dan Rather, CBS News, Moscow.

ROGER MUDD: Marvin Kalb reports
now on the significance of the
Soviet-American arms agreements and
the problems they create for the
future.

MARVIN KALB: The summit repre-
sented a sizeable setback for
administration hopes for controlling
the arms race. Secretary KISSINGER
acknowledged that there will be no
permanent strategic arms agreement
by the end of this year, and, in
fact, there may never be.

Both sides have now given them-
selves more time to extend the int-
erim agreement until 1985 they hope.
But the problems are enormous.
Pentagon type objections in both
countries plus the keen awareness
both by Russians and Americans that
Watergate has so badly damaged
President NIXON's stature that no
far reaching arms agreements are
possible.

So in the absence of a compre-
hensive agreement the hawks in both
countries will probably press for
more arms, more warheads, larger
budgets. The numbers, to quote
Secretary KISSINGER, could become
astronomical.

He still believes that both sides
have about 18 months left to control
the spread of multiple warheaded
missiles or MIRVS. The Geneva
dismarmament conference will be re-
convened on or about August 5th,
with MIRV control first on the
agenda. But the deep down official
mood despite all of the high flying
rhetoric is quite gloomy.

Marvin Kalb, CBS News, Moscow.

Pentagon Approves Agreements

MUDD: The arms agreement got
the approval of the Pentagon today.
Defense Secretary SCHLESINGER gave
assurances the American military
will not interfere with progress
toward further agreements limiting
nuclear weapons. Added SCHLESINGER
I think we have firm civilian
control.

ABC EVENING NEWS ABC TV

7:00 PM JULY 3

Summit Agreements Signed

TOM JARRIEL: ***One was a joint
communique which urges further
negotiations toward another interim
strategic arms control agreement to
last until 1985. Secretary KISSIN-
GER ruled out a more permanent
agreement as being impractical.

A joint statement and protocol
were signed limiting each side to
its existing one defensive anti-
ballistic missile site.

A treaty and protocol were
signed covering underground nuclear
testing for military purposes.***

In an extraordinary turn, two of
the proposals publicly signed will
be kept secret at the request of the
Soviet government. They involve
the dismantling of some weapons and
modernizing of others.

KISSINGER says Congress will be
informed about details of the
secret protocol, but the Russian
request for secrecy from the Amer-
ican public will be observed.***

HARRY REASONER: At the opening
of the Moscow summit several admin-
istration officials cautioned
against great expectations. They
said they anticipated no substantial
breakthrough. How did it all work
out? A report from Herbert Kaplow.

HERBERT KAPLOW: The concrete
results, as expected, are modest
and perhaps on the central issue of
the further limitation of strategic
arms perhaps somewhat disappointing.
On this the President and General
Secretary BREZHNEV agreed to work
on a ten year ban, it would run
until 1985, the current agreement
 expires in 1977.

But American officials had hoped
to be much farther along by now on
a permanent ban on offensive
weapons. And though Secretary
KISSINGER denied this morning that
today's ten year proposal was a
setback, a permanent agreement is
nowhere in sight.

The agreement to limit under-

a similar peaceful nuclear deal is negotiated. The limit on the power in today's arrangement is 150 kilotons. As far as we know current tests, certainly American tests, are below that, but the power has been growing.***

## Schlesinger Rebuts Kissinger

HOWARD K. SMITH: With no permanent ban on offensive nuclear weapons development, Secretary KISSINGER said it is now up to both sides to persuade their military establishments of the benefits of restraint. Well here in Washington Defense Secretary SCHLESINGER said, the U.S. military establishment is under firm civilian control and there's no problem with the U.S. military getting in the way of progress on disarmament.

### CBS MORNING NEWS CBS TV
7:00 AM JULY 3

#### Moorer Retired

BARRY SERAFIN: Admiral Thomas MOORER, who stepped down Monday as Chairman of the JCS, retired from the Navy all together yesterday.

The Pentagon sent him off the way the Pentagon likes to send men off and Bob Schieffer was at the ceremony.

BOB SCHIEFFER: Honors for Admiral MOORER, whose last days of duty were plagued by a seamy episode in which his underlings were accused of spying on White House civilians. MOORER maintained innocence and finally last week a Senate committee cleared him of wrongdoing.

So there were medals, awards, and warm praise from the administration as MOORER closed out 41 years of service with these words:

ADMIRAL THOMAS MOORER: As I now retire from active duty I would say that I certainly leave without regret but with gratitude in my

moment of history I have had the opportunity to play a small part at the highest levels of our government.

SCHIEFFER: An elaborate aerial show followed the speeches. There were bombers, modern fighters, and one of the old planes that MOORER himself first flew as a young Navy pilot.

MOORER noted that one of today's modern fighters weighs more and costs more than an entire squadron of the old planes.

### THE TODAY SHOW NBC TV
7:00 PM JULY 3

No News Of Relevance to DOD.

### NBC NIGHTLY NEWS NBC TV
6:30 PM JULY 4

#### Kissinger Briefs NATO Members

RICHARD VALERIANI: Less than 24 hours after leaving Moscow, KISSINGER was in NATO headquarters in Brussels to report to America's European allies on the summit. This was in keeping with the provisions about closer consultations in the new NATO declaration which President NIXON signed just before going to the Soviet Union.

Speaking to the NATO Council and to a news conference afterwards, KISSINGER said that because of the thoroughness of the NIXON-BREZHNEV talks in Moscow he was fairly optimistic about the next round of arms control negotiations with the Russians.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We believe that the discussions that actually took place on the nature of the strategic balance were, as the communique said, deep and I believe certain. I believe that as a result the perception by both sides of the nature of the problem has greatly improved. And therefore we believe that if there is

a new approach can be developed
that might -- that would lead to
constructive results.

VALERIANI: KISSINGER then flew
to Paris for talks with French
officials. American officials
aboard his plane insisted that
KISSINGER was not taking an opti-
mistic line about the strategic
arms talks merely to claim some-
thing more positive about the just
concluded summit. But the test will
come when he goes back to Moscow to
resume the negotiations this fall,
probably in October.

## Vets Protesting in Washington

CHANCELLOR: In Washington yesterday some Vietnam veterans fought with police who wouldn't let them go where the veterans wanted to go. There were some injuries on both sides and some arrests.

The veterans came to the capital
to demand improved benefits from
the government. They say also that
the Paris Peace Agreement ending
the fighting in Indochina has not
been carried out and they want that
done. Today they made their pro-
test peacefully and Charles Quinn
has that story.

CHARLES QUINN: For most Ameri-
cans the war in Vietnam is over,
for some it is not. The Vietnam
Veterans Against the War and their
supporters, many of them leftists,
climaxed four days of protests with
a march demanding amnesty for all
of those who resisted the war and
better benefits for veterans.

They also want other things,
end to aid to South Vietnam and
Cambodia, a single type of dis-
charge, the impeachment of Presi-
dent NIXON.

The Veterans Administration was
a special target, President NIXON
has not yet replaced Donald JOHNSON,
the head of the VA who resigned
under fire. One demonstrator said
he thought they had the VA on the
run.***

The question often arises
whether these demonstrations
accomplish anything. One protest
leader said today that in the short
range probably not, but in the long
range, yes, because he said each

eventually, he said, they expect
to win.

CHANCELLOR: The veterans of
Vietnam are a special breed, unlike
those who fought in any other war
for this country. And tonight, from
Tom Pettit, we have a special
report on those veterans and how
little their government really knows
about them.

TOM PETTIT: In typically obscure
language government statisticians
use the polite phrase Vietnam era,
not war. During the Vietnam era
38,450 Americans died in combat.
Seven million Americans who served
during the Vietnam era did not die.
There is no unknown soldier of this
war, only unknown survivors. There
are no Vietnam battalions marching
in today's Independence Day parades.

Unlike men who served in past
wars Vietnam veterans seem to seek
obscurity. Where are they then?
Well, about ten per cent of all
patients in VA hospitals are sur-
vivors of the Vietnam era. Many
of them are paraplegics who have
the use of just half their bodies.
Listen to the voice of Ron KOVIC
(?) a leader of the Washington
protest.

RON KOVIC: What can the country
do? Well, they can give me my legs
back, you know, and they can give
me the ability to make children
back. But I guess they're not
going to do that. All I ask is for
them to treat me and my brothers
like human beings.

PETTIT: An estimated 2,500 vet-
erans are in federal prisons. No-
body in California knows how many
are in state prisons or local jails.
Nearly two million men are enrolled
in vocational and correspondence
schools. About two and a half
million are in college, men like
Jack BAKER a Navy veteran of Vietnam
in the early '60's. Students get
subsistence but they do not get
tuition as WWII veterans did under
the original GI Bill of Rights.
Perhaps 200,000 men like Jay
MORALES are unemployed, but the VA
says it does not know the exact
number.

In general, recently discharged
vets and blacks have higher unem-
ployment rates than the general

feel shortchanged, not just in
benefits but by bureaucratic delays
of the VA which was built on a
tradition of war heroes, not sur-
vivors of an era. One in five of
Vietnam era survivors has needed
help re-adjusting. Psychologist
Matthew BEUTELARI (?).

MATTHER BEUTELARI: Many of the
Vietnam veterans feel that they have
been used or exploited in a war that
was one of the longest and least
understood and most unpopular in our
history. And whether or not they
personally engaged in anything for
which they might feel guilty or
ashamed the reaction of the public
has been such as to make them feel
that what they were involved in was
wrong. It creates a feeling of
helplessness and hopelessness and
of bitterness and resentment.
Frequently depression is a major
symptom.

PETTIT: Right now in government
psychiatric wards about 3,000 Viet-
nam vets are undergoing re-adjust-
ment therapy. The VA does not know
the relationship between combat and
maladjustment because it does know
how many of these men were in
combat. It says it does not know
how many are black, how many white,
how many chicano, it does not even
know how many psychiatric out-
patients it has.

***One of its leaders (AVM) who
helped to organize the march on
Washington is Max INGLET (?). Max
INGLET lost both legs in Vietnam.
INGLET and a small army left Los
Angeles June 15th to join the other
rag-tag veterans groups in Washing-
ton trying to get attention. These
men are not typical and yet it is
hard to believe the government's
ignorance of young veterans re-
adjustment problems, its lack of
hard facts, that other than count-
ing the dead no government agency
has done a systematic study of the
survivors.

CBS EVENING NEWS CBS TV

7:00 PM JULY 4

No News of Relevance to DOD.

ABC EVENING NEWS ABC TV

7:00 PM JULY 4

Kissinger Meets With NATO Members

HERBERT KAPLOW: ***Later to
headquarters of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization just outside of
Brussels.***

Now KISSINGER returned to tell
them what happened. At a news
conference with NATO Secretary Gen-
eral Joseph LUNS KISSINGER was
asked about the strategic arms talks
in Moscow, the obstacles that led
both sides there to just about give
up on a permanent arrangement now
for further limiting offensive
weapons.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Presi-
dent and I presented in Moscow --
seemed to ask the upper limit of
what was acceptable and the Soviet
Union could not find -- see its way
clear to accepting them. And there-
for, the next step will be to see
whether if the program is extended
over a longer time period.

KAPLOW: ***Altogether on this
post-Moscow tour he is to visit six
European countries before returning
to the United States on Tuesday
night. But already he's talking
about more travels, including
another visit to the Soviet Union,
perhaps in October, to try again
to move forward on that issue that
proved so stubborn in the Soviet
Union this past week, further
limitations on strategic arms.

Vets Protest In Washington

FRANK TOMLINSON: The 2,000
demonstrators came with a list of
demands aimed mainly at the VA. The
Vietnam veterans claim the VA is
oriented to the older veteran and is
not in tune with the times, that
educational benefits are too low,
that VA hospitals are understaffed
and give poor medical service and
that jobs for veterans are far too
few.

The veterans marched from the
Lincoln Memorial to the Ellipse near
the White House. There the ex-
servicement demanded unconditional
amnesty for deserters and draft

7 Friday, July 4, 1974

resisters and the removal of President NIXON from office.***

The demonstrators know their chances of getting what they want are slim right now, but they say they'll be back again and again until the Vietnam veteran gets what he wants and needs.

THE TODAY SHOW NBC TV

7:00 AM JULY 4

Interview With Admiral Moorer

BARBARA WALTERS: Admiral ZUMWALT, the Chief of Naval Operations, who also retired this week has expressed the view that the U.S. Navy is uncompetitive with many of the other country's navies and that indeed our navy and the military in general would be unable to win a conventional war as things stand now with the lessening of our navy and other military. Do you share this view.

ADMIRAL THOMAS MOORER: I think Admiral ZUMWALT was speaking in terms of probabilities and he made the point that the Navy's been reduced from over 900 ships down to about 508, and that in the meantime the Soviets have been greatly expanding her navy. He also made the point, I believe, that the two navies have different missions and consequently bearing in mind that the mission of the U.S. Navy is to protect the sea lines and the mission of the Soviet navy is to interdict these sea lines, one has to look at the projected scenario of a possible conflict in order to answer your question.

WALTERS: But what I'm asking is could we, with our military strength now, win a conventional war?

ADMIRAL MOORER: I think we could win a conventional war, I think the losses would be quite high. But I think that we would have to compensate for quantity with quality. And I agree with Admiral ZUMWALT that the size of the Navy is dangerously low, because I would point out to you that there could be no military operations overseas by any service, Army, Navy, Air Force or Marines,

if we do not have access to the sea. And that's the point he is making and he's absolutely right.

COCHRAN: ***Can you just give me a quick yes or no as to whether or not during the Moscow negotiations that the President just completed the JCS in any way put a veto on any agreement that the President was trying to make with Soviet leader BREZHNEV on arms?

ADMIRAL MOORER: No, the JCS are by statute advisers to the President of the United States. We do not veto anything that the President does.

COCHRAN: Did the JCS advise against any agreements?

ADMIRAL MOORER: ***And we stated our position and if the President chooses to do otherwise, the JCS will support him once the decision is made. We have a position which we feel will bring about balance.***

CBS MORNING NEWS CBS TV

7:00 AM JULY 4

Commentary: John Hart

JOHN HART: ***The military establishments of each side wants the advantage (nuclear), fears the other side has it, while the governments of each side profess willingness to stop at parity. But there's no agreement on what parity really is, even within governments.

Dr. KISSINGER says each side has problems with its own military establishment, implying that the heads of government need to negotiate with their own generals before negotiating with each other.

Because of secrecy and complexity most of us will remain ignorant of the arguments that decide our existence. And until those arguments are settled summits are likely to increase common interests without affecting the common danger.

PLEASE NOTE: Letters from Listeners
VOA June 30, 1974. Complete
transcript of the interview with
H. Minton FRANCIS, Deputy Asst.
Secretary of Defense is available.

8. Friday, July 5, 1974

BALTIMORE SUN

8 JULY 1974 Pg. 1

# Kissinger meets Schmidt

By ANTHONY MURRAY

Bonn Bureau of The Sun

Munich—The American secretary of state and West Germany's chancellor have agreed that the 35-nation European security conference could be "successfully concluded" with a summit conference "by the end of this year," a Bonn government spokesman announced yesterday.

Henry A. Kissinger and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt also believe that still-unsettled points that have been delaying progress at the Geneva-based talks can be solved, Klaus Boelling, the spokesman, said.

The announcement came after Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Schmidt met for an hour and 35 minutes yesterday in the chancellor's Munich hotel. before attending the final match between the Netherlands and West Germany for soccer's World Cup. West Germany won, 2 to 1.

The optimistic assessment dampened suggestions of differing views between Bonn and Washington on how far the West should go in making concessions to Moscow and its satellites at the Geneva security talks, which the Kremlin hopes will produce a framework cementing post-World War II borders in Europe.

## Grand summit meeting

Some American allies in Europe, including West Germany, were reported concerned that at President Nixon's Moscow See KISSINGER, Pg. 2

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER - 7 JULY 1974 Pg. 60

Makarios Demands
(8)
Greek Troop Cut

Associated Press

NICOSIA, Cyprus — The president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, repeated his claim Saturday that the Greek military junta is plotting to overthrow his government and kill him. He demanded that Greek military cadres be pulled out of Cyprus.

Makarios made the accusations in a letter sent to Greek President Phaedon Gizikis on July 2 and released Saturday. In the letter Makarios demanded the recall of the 600 Greek army officers who

formed the command element of the Greek Cypriot National Guard.

There has been no official response from the Greek Government to the letter, according to sources close to Makarios. The charges increased local fears of an anti-Makarios coup by sections of the guard.

Makarios accused the Greek officers of being the chief supplier of men and material to the Greek Cypriot underground movement, EOKA-B. Makarios says the movement has tried to overthrow him and unite the island with Greece.

KISSINGER

... CONTINUED

talks with the Soviet Communist party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, last week the United States might have committed itself to the Soviet idea of a grand summit meeting crowning the European security layer.

Dr. Kissinger himself was said to be chafing under a tougher stance taken by the Europeans, who feared Moscow could get everything it wants without giving anything substantial in return, such as freer exchange of information, people and ideas.

Though Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Schmidt now appeared more closely in accord than generally assumed, the German chancellor made clear to American reporters at an earlier briefing that he still sees two "essential points," which must be satisfied in any Ge- neva results.

One is that the door must be left open to "peaceful changes" of European borders, a concession to the formal Bonn view that reunification of East and West Germany must not be ruled out.

The other point is that the Western Europeans, chiefly West Germany, should not be "discriminated against" in the area of military confidence-building measures, such as mutual observation of maneuvers and the depth of zones in which such maneuvers might be restricted.

The two leaders, in addition, held a general discussion of international problems and also took up the situations in several alliance countries, in-

cluding the United States.

Asked if this meant that Watergate had come up in the talks, Mr. Boelling said he did not know but would not exclude it. "It would be natural," he added.

Economic and monetary problems, the energy crisis, and economic and political "co-operation" between the United States and Europe were also discussed.

Last night, Dr. Kissinger dined with West Germany's new president and former foreign minister, Walter Scheel, and was scheduled to leave for London this morning to continue his tour of European capitals after having visited Brussels, Paris and Rome.

Wherever he has gone, Dr. Kissinger has been greeted warmly by crowds who have applauded when he arrived or left his posh quarters at the Hotel Vier Jahreszeiten.

But despite the friendly atmosphere in this soccer-crazy metropolis, security measures have been extremely tight, with more than 2,000 police-men especially detailed to guard Dr. Kissinger and the cup games from possible attack.

There have been at least two anonymous threats against the secretary. One was against his U.S. Air Force jet before its Saturday arrival, necessitating a change in landing sites from Munich's civilian Riem Airport to the more secure North Atlantic Treaty Organization air-base at Fuerstenfeldbruck.

The other threat was against Dr. Kissinger personally and was communicated to a local tabloid newspaper.

2

LOS ANGELES TIMES 4 July 1974 (8)

Summitry at Work

Although President Nixon may be more disappointed in the modest results of the Moscow summit conference than he indicated, there is a lot of truth in his comment that "the most remarkable thing about this summit meeting is that it is taking place so routinely, so familiarly ..."

The practice of holding annual summit conferences is in itself an important breakthrough in Soviet-American relations; it is a habit worth preserving even when the results of any one meeting seem meager.

Because of the impeachment threat, Mr. Nixon is under heavy temptation to claim greater accomplishment in negotiations with the Russians than is really warranted. That temptation was apparent in his address to the American people after his return from Moscow Wednesday night.

Nevertheless, Mr. Nixon's trip did produce worthwhile results. The agreement to open negotiations to prevent the military use of weather modification techniques, for example, is of great potential consequence.

The new treaty limiting each side to one antibal listic missile site instead of the two allowed under the 1972 agreement is redundant, in a sense, since neither the United States nor Russia has begun building a second site. But at least it reaffirms each side's willingness to leave its cities and military installations fundamentally vulnerable to nuclear attack—an essential foundation stone for eventually controlling the competition in offensive missiles.

The agreement limiting underground nuclear tests does not take effect until March 31, 1976, and even then explosions below 150 kilotons will be allowed. But the agreement could head off deployment of the huge multiple warheads that the Soviet SS-18 missile is capable of carrying.

Still, there is no escaping a deep sense of disappointment, even of foreboding, in the failure of Leonid I. Brezhnev and Mr. Nixon to progress toward a permanent offensive missile limitation treaty to replace the five-year pact expiring in 1977.

The temporary agreement, reached at the 1972 Moscow summit, allowed the Soviet Union a substantial edge in the number of offensive strategic missiles, an edge offset by the American lead in MIRVs—multiple independently targeted warheads.

Since 1972, however, the Russians have made rapid progress toward MIRVs of their own, raising the possibility that the marriage of quantity and

quality will ultimately give them a dangerous edge over the United States in nuclear striking power.

The Pentagon has reacted by proposing new weapon systems of its own.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is concerned that, unless an agreement limiting deployment of MIRVs can be reached well before 1977, "the number of warheads on both sides will quickly reach a level that seems astronomical."

The best that Brezhnev and Mr. Nixon could come up with, however, was a joint statement of intention to negotiate a new, comprehensive offensive missile limitation agreement "at the earliest possible date."

It is extremely important that these negotiations succeed. Kissinger said what everybody knows when he observed that one barrier to success is the difficulty of selling the military establishments in both countries on the "benefits of restraint."

Kissinger's remark obviously was directed in part to Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger, who favors a tougher, less trusting negotiating stance than does the secretary of state. Even before going to Moscow, however, Kissinger is known to have doubted that Brezhnev could sign a comprehensive arms control accord because Soviet Defense Minister Andrei A. Grechko is opposed.

The debate over the appropriate mixture of risk and caution in arms control negotiations is a disturbing illustration of the ways in which the Soviet Union's repressive political system is a barrier to genuine detente.

In this country, such differences of opinion are aired more or less openly; the Russians can monitor the debates and gauge with some assurance the sincerity of an American negotiating position.

In Russia, there are collisions of opinion between the military-industrial complex and those who favor a reduction in defense spending. But these debates are carefully hidden from public view; they don't show up in newspaper ads, open letters or interviews on Moscow's version of the Today Show. Military budgets are themselves secret.

Thus, it becomes extremely hard for outsiders to judge, in all good faith, just what Soviet intentions are—whether their interest is in arms control or in using arms control negotiations to legitimatize a tipping of the balance of terror in their favor. And this uncertainty, unfortunately, forces U.S. policymakers to be more cautious than they might like to be.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS 7 July 1974 (8)

Return of the Vets

The militant Vietnam veterans have come and gone again, having flung their angry rebukes at the mute halls of government and taken some lumps in collisions with the police. There was a good deal of pathos in their return here for the Fourth of July, somewhat older but using the same shrill and sweeping invective as in years past. Disheveled and fagged out because no sleeping was allowed by police at their "encampment" on the Mall, they marched and shouted—many demanding President Nixon's removal and a put-down of the "ruling monopoli stic classes" in America.

Surely there was little satisfaction for them in this visit, which has be-

come a standard recurring episode for the Nation's Capital. There was hardly any official recognition of it, though the violent aspects and hotter declarations against the existing social order did, of course, get on television. And the public impression fostered by all this amounts to another minus, we suspect, for the demonstrator's causes. Those speeches that sound like wholesale damning of the government aren't apt to gain much public support, nor should they.

But there's more to it than that. These protesting vets were not all cut from the same cloth. Of the two major groups sounding off, one was quite radical, the other much less so. Some of those young men on the Mall were superheated ideological activists;

others simply wanted more benefits for veterans, and better treatment by a Veterans Administration that is notable for its inefficiency. In those Fourth of July ranks were men with a variety of frightful disfigurement from the war. There were stories of deplorable conditions in some veterans' hospitals, and the inadequacy of pensions and educational benefits in a period of soaring inflation.

The legitimate grievances were almost drowned out, though, by the radical rhetoric of some out-front demonstrators. And this is a pity, for the government needs to hear what is wrong, specifically, in its treatment of Vietnam vets, and be spurred to remedial action. It should be told again and again.

4-E

RADIO - TV
DEFENSE DIALOG

RADIO TV REPORTS INC. WASH., D.C., SUMMARIES NOT TO BE QUOTED.

MONDAY, JULY 1, 1974 (BROADCASTS OF JUNE 28, 29, 30, 1974)

The Moscow summit and progress, or lack of it, toward a comprehensive agreement on the limitation of nuclear arms systems is the subject of reports by John CHANCELLOR, NBC Nightly News for Friday, Marvin KALB, the CBS Morning News, and Tom BROKAW, the NBC Sunday Night News. In his report, CHANCELLOR notes speculation that the summit will produce an accord limiting the two nations to one anti-ballistic missile system. KALB reports that although the Soviet leaders have concluded Mr. Nixon will not be impeached, uncertainty generated by the impeachment question will impede any substantive progress on the more complex issues under discussion. And in his report, BROKAW confirms speculation that the summit will not yield agreement on the limitation of offensive nuclear weapons.

In a byline on the Moscow summit, John COCHRAN, the "Today" show, comments on some of the political factors at play. Citing the pressures on the President to achieve a significant breakthrough on the control of nuclear weapons, COCHRAN notes, nonetheless, that it is essential for the President to have the Pentagon's endorsement of whatever agreement may be reached. And that endorsement, according to Bob SCHIEFFER, CBS Morning News, may be difficult to achieve. SCHIEFFER reports that senior military advisers have been "increasingly uneasy on the question of arms control" since Soviet rejection of U. S. initiatives in March.

President NIXON has referred repeatedly to the close personal ties that exist between him and Soviet General Secretary BREZHNEV. In a commentary on the ABC Evening News, Harry REASONER analyzes that relationship, noting its dangers and advantages. For example, REASONER asserts that although informal dealings between the two men "can certainly expedite things," future relations between the two countries could suffer were either one of them to be deposed.

In Southeast Asian news, Edwin NEWMAN, NBC, and Frank BLAIR, the "Today" program, report that North Vietnamese troops routed a government unit trying to re-take territory north of Saigon.

Jim BRONOTTE, a Vietnam veteran, is the subject of a profile on the NBC Nightly News. As Edwin NEWMAN notes, BRONOTTE's life has been a continuous struggle. As a child, he was stricken with polio and his doctor said he would never recover the use of his legs. He did recover, and in 1967 he was drafted into the Army. One year later, a Viet Cong booby trap exploded beneath his jeep, severing both legs, an arm and blinding him in one eye. BRONOTTE admits that initially he was depressed, deeply troubled that he would never overcome his disabilities. The turning point, he relates, occurred during his flight back to the United States when his stretcher was placed above that of an eighteen year old soldier who had suffered a bullet wound at the base of his brain, reducing the soldier, in BRONOTTE's words, to "a fish out of water," "just a vegetable." It was then, BRONOTTE notes, that "I started being thankful for what I had left." Today, in partnership with his sixty-eight year old father, BRONOTTE operates a three hundred and sixty acre ranch near San Luis Obispo, California. In a concluding remark, BRONOTTE states: "I don't believe in the word 'can't.""

In other news, Howard K. SMITH, ABC, reports that the Army has suspended plans to use beagle dogs in nerve gas tests; Don OLIVER, "Today," reports on official reaction to disciplinary problems aboard the Midway; and George Lewis, the NBC Saturday Night News, reports on the progress of the all-volunteer Army.

PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE (SA) AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL MATTERS WITHIN THEIR OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES.
FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THIS PUBLICATION CALL MR. HARRY JUBKOFF, OX 578.

JUNE 28

Focus Turns to Arms Limitation

JOHN CHANCELLOR: ...And on this second day of the summit, the two sides began discussing the difficult questions of arms control. Specifically, this afternoon's session, with the American side led by President NIXON and the Soviet side led by Party Chief Leonid BREZHNEV, talked for about two hours. Among the things they talked about were additional measures to limit both countries' anti-ballistic missile systems and the question of limiting nuclear weapons tests.

On ABMs, we have one ABM system and the Russians have another, and there has been speculation that these systems might be modified or scrapped at this summit conference. But we don't know the details, only that the two sides have begun discussing nuclear matters and a presidential visit tomorrow to a Soviet space station has been cancelled so they can have extra time to talk.

CHANCELLOR: The announcement that President NIXON and the Russians have started talking about new standards for nuclear testing and about ABM systems means that the nuclear dialogue here in Russia has begun. But the two sides have not yet got to the far more difficult question of a limitation on offensive nuclear weapons.

Richard VALERIANI has been looking into that, and here is his report.

RICHARD VALERIANI: The head-to-head NIXON-BREZHNEV talks are what the summit is really all about. The signing ceremonies represent negotiations which have already taken place at lower levels and they're essentially cosmetic. But agreement in such major areas as arms control requires the kind of decisions that only the two top men can make.

For example, experts on both

sides have already laid the ground-work for an agreement on limiting underground nuclear testing. But Mr. NIXON and Mr. BREZHNEV must now decide what the limit will be, and they'll probably do that over the next few days.

Their most difficult negotiating problem is placing limits on offensive nuclear weapons. And while both sides have made it clear that a complete agreement is not possible now, it seems unlikely that the leaders of the two superpowers will go away from the summit without at least an agreement in principle on some important phase of SALT II, such as a formula for checking the development and deployment of multiple warheads.

Richard VALERIANI, News, at the Kremlin.

## Beagle Replacements Being Sought

EDWIN NEWMAN: The Army caused considerable public outry when it was discovered that it had used beagles to test nerve gas and planned to use more.

Now the Pentagon says the Army will use no more beagles in its nerve gas tests. It's looking for some other animal to which people are not so attached.

## Government Unit Routed in Vietnam

NEWMAN: In Vietnam, north Vietnamese forces knocked out a government column trying to retake territory north of Saigon.

## Education Benefits' Extension

NEWMAN: In Washington, the House has completed action on a bill to extend for two years education benefits for veterans who served between 1955 and '66. Those benefits would have expired on Sunday.

## A Profile in Courage

NEWMAN: There's a young Vietnam veteran in California named Jim BRONOTTE whose life has been a continuous struggle.

2 Monday, July 1, 1974

He had polio as a child, and his
doctor said he would never walk
again. But he did recover, so
well that he was drafted into the
Army and sent to Vietnam. That
was the beginning of another re-
markable chapter in his story.

REPORTER: You are located just
north and east of San Luis Obispo
on Highway 58, entering Rancho
Kumbya. And you are in the company
of a most extraordinary young
man.

Jim BRONOTTE does not operate
his truck in the conventional
manner. Special linkage permits
him to operate gas and brakes by
hand. Jim BRONOTTE has no legs.
He has only one arm and one eye.
His twenty-seven years have been
filled with incredible tragedy and
incredible accomplishments.

And now he and his sixty-eight
year old father have purchased
this three hundred sixty acre
ranch to help Jim accomplish a
dream. As a youngster he had
polio and was told he would never
walk again. Then he fought back
to full recovery.

In 1967, he was drafted into
the Army. One year later in Viet-
nam, his jeep drove over thirty-
five pounds of dynamite, a Viet
Cong booby trap.

JIM BRONOTTE: It blew the
jeep up, and it cut the jeep right
even with the front seat. And all
limbs were traumatic amputations,
blown right off instantly. They
couldn't find anything from the
front seat forward.

REPORTER: Jim told of the
depression that came with the loss
of his limbs. He wondered if he
could ever recover from it. But
on the plane coming back to the
States, his stretcher was placed
above an eighteen year old soldier
who had also been wounded in Viet-
nam, and that proved to be the
turning point.

BRONOTTE: He had been shot up
through the back and at the base
of the brain, and he was like a
vegetable out of water -- more
like a fish out of water. He was,
just a vegetable laying there.
And all he'd do is just flop around
on the gurney (?) and everything.
I saw him, and right then and there

REPORTER: Jim says his handi-
cap only slows him down a bit; it
never stops him. There is nothing
on the ranch he can't do. And
he doesn't use artificial limbs.
They probably would only get in
his way.

Four years ago, Jim BRONOTTE
was a patient at a veterans'
hospital in Denver. It was the
Colorado scene that helped in-
still in him his dream -- to be
a rancher, to ride horses and to
help other handicapped persons
do the same, seemingly an almost
impossible dream.

Yet with the help of his
father, Jim has purchased a three
hundred sixty acre California
ranch near Paso Robles, and the
dream is coming true.

BRONOTTE: Everybody keeps
pounding the word "can't" into
a handicapped person's mind. And
after a while, the person thinks
he can't do it. They have drummed
into their heads that you can't
do this, you can't horseback ride,
you can't swim, you can't do
anything. You're confined to a
wheelchair. And a person is not
confined in that wheelchair. He
can get up on a horse and he can
climb that ridge that's over
there.

And I have found no limita-
tions really of what I can't
do. I don't believe in the word
"can't."

[Film clip ends with BRONOTTE
riding his horse.]

CBS EVENING NEWS CBS TV 7:00 PM
JUNE 28

No News of Relevance to DOD

ABC EVENING NEWS ABC TV 7:00 PM
JUNE 28

Use of Beagles Suspended

HOWARD K. SMITH: The Pentagon
says the Army has suspended plans
to use beagles in nerve gas and
poison gas tests. The Army earlier

3 Monday, July 1, 1974

said that beagles were needed because their reactions were similar to humans.

But now they're looking for a non-domesticated animal with similar reactions whose use won't arouse public passions.

### Commentary by Harry Reasoner

HARRY REASONER: Mr. NIXON said it again last night: the progress in United States-Soviet relations would not have been possible without the close personal ties between him and Leonid BREZHNEV. There's no doubt that the relationship exists, and it is fascinating. In a way, this kind of thing is always dangerous in traffic between sovereign states, because while friendly, informal dealings between two men can certainly expedite things, if they have a falling-out or if one of them is superseded, the same things can fall apart in a hurry.

But aside from that, in this case what grabs you is why the two men get along so well. Mr. NIXON has had a good record over the years in foreign affairs expertise, but he has never particularly liked or been liked by foreign leaders as individuals. Mr. BREZHNEV is a strong and respected man, but he has never unbent in public with any non-Russian to the extent that he does with Richard NIXON.

There is some kind of chemistry here of the kind you see at lower levels at the lodge hall or the country club or the corner tavern. If Leonid and Richard were not Chairman and President, you can imagine them stopping off for one together on the way home from the shop or hitting the nineteenth hole together after a Saturday morning round.

Assumptively, there must be substantial personal agreement and mutual admiration in the area of political philosophy. Mr. NIXON, the pragmatic capitalist who says that Americans are like children, must have struck a cord of recognition in the leader of the proletariat whose citizens

are indeed treated like children.

And in turn, and understandably after what he has been through in the past year, Mr. NIXON may look wistfully at the Russian press and the docile Russian politicians and say to himself, "Now, there's a man who knows how to run a country."

### THE TODAY SHOW NBC TV 7:00 AM

JUNE 28

### Government Column Mauled in VN

FRANK BLAIR: A South Vietnamese armored column was badly mauled by enemy forces only twenty-five miles north of Saigon yesterday, and the government says nine soldiers were killed and ninety-nine wounded.

The column had been trying to re-take ground lost earlier when it came under heavy rocket and mortar attack.

### Navy Dismisses Midway Complaints

BLAIR: When the Aircraft Carrier Midway sailed from Japan two weeks ago, a number of its crewmen were absent without leave. They had various complaints -- alleged racial discrimination, harsh treatment and bad conditions on the ship.

Now the Midway is back in the port in Japan, and the Navy says there is no truth to the complaints.

Don OLIVER reports.

DON OLIVER: Fifty-five men were AWOL when this aircraft carrier, the Midway, left Yokosuka Navy Base on the fourteenth. The Navy at Yokosuka now says only twenty-five or so of the AWOL men were protesting, and the Navy believes they were exploited by people at this activist anti-military headquarters just outside the base. Staff members of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War said, however, that the AWOL men had legitimate grievances.

WOMAN: They're complaining about racism, about working and living conditions, about brutality,

4 Monday, July 1, 1974

about complete lack of constitu-
tional rights, like passing out a
paper like ours, which is covered
by freedom of speech. They're talk-
ing about home-porting in Yokosuka
and being used as tools of the
United States.

OLIVER: There are probably
more complaints on the Midway by
sailors than there are on any
other aircraft carrier in the United
States fleet. One of the main
reasons is that the Midway is not
based in the United States as the
other carriers are: it is based
here in Japan, and the single
young sailors don't like that.
They say it costs them too much
money to get back home and that they
can't have their families here with
them.

Captain Richard SCHULTE (?),
Commander of the Midway, who was
the target of much of the wrath
of the deserters, held a news con-
ference to deny all the charges.

CAPTAIN RICHARD SCHULTE: I
have read the reports of what the
men said at the press conferences,
and I am confident that they are
neither accurate nor do they re-
present the conditions or opinions
of the overwhelming majority of
the men on this ship.

OLIVER: Don OLIVER, NBC News,
at the U. S. Navy Base, Yokosuka,
Japan.

Byline on Summit

JOHN COCHRAN: ...Washington
knows what arms agreement will
come out of Moscow, but that has
not stopped speculation, some of
it politically inspired and much
of it suggesting the President
will play impeachment politics
at the summit.

One theory has Mr. NIXON acting
tough with the Russians in order
to shore up his conservative sup-
port in Congress. Another com-
pletely different scenario has
the President rushing into an
unfavorable arms agreement with the
Russians so he and Soviet leader
BREZHNEV will have something to
sign in front of the cameras.

Defense Secretary James
SCHLESINGER thinks that's a lot
of rot, that the President's
patriotism is above question. And

besides, says SCHLESINGER, a bad
deal will not help the President
fight impeachment.

SCHLESINGER credits Congress
and the public with sophistication
in understanding nuclear hardware.
Actually, most of us will have
to rely on the experts, but there
are some things we can look for,
which the President and BREZHNEV
may agree on.

One is a further limitation on
defensive or anti-ballistic mis-
siles. But that will hardly
stir the world's imagination,
since the SALT I agreement put
both countries virtually out of
the ABM business two years ago.

Another possibility, even a
probability, is a limited ban on
underground nuclear tests. Already
critics are lined up ready to
label anything less than a total
ban as hypocritical and as detente
window dressing.

The President may confound these
critics if he can get BREZHNEV to
agree that the limited ban would
eventually be expanded into an
agreement outlawing all nuclear
tests.

Finally there's the chance --
and that's all it is -- that
the Russians will agree to limit
arming their big missiles with
new multiple warheads called
MIRVs, the kind the United States
already has. But the Russians
would expect something substantial
in return, and the American Con-
gress, Senator Henry JACKSON in
particular, will be watching for
any concessions.

JACKSON is all primed to lead
a fight against any agreement
that he believes might favor the
Russians.

The President is aware of this,
and he realizes that it's a politi-
cal must for him to have the
Pentagon's endorsement of any
new arms agreement.

To add to the President's
difficulties, his two key advisers,
the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense, are not in
complete agreement on what a new
arms pact should look like.

So it will require all of the
President's considerable abilities
in foreign affairs to come home
with an agreement which would ad-

5 Monday, July 1, 1974

Byline on Summit

5 Monday, July 1, 1974

ban; maybe even trying to limit
the deployment of multiple warheaded
missiles, the so-called MIRVs,
sometime before the end of this
year.

Because BREZHNEV is committed
to a policy of better relations
with the United States, he must
show progress to keep himself in
office, but not too much progress
because he's not sure the President
will remain in office. Therefore,
both sides are obviously walking
a tightrope here between the needs
of diplomacy and the often con-
trary poles of domestic politics.

Marvin KALB, CBS News, Red
Square, Moscow.

## Jackson Terms Summit "Cosmetic"

BOB SCHIEFFER: Washington Senator Henry JACKSON, who has emerged as the chief critic of detente and the President's trip to Moscow, left on a trip of his own today. He's going to Peking to confer with Chinese leaders. He said his trip should not be considered a mini-summit in competition with Mr. NIXON's journey. But in a speech last night in Richmond, Washington, JACKSON described the Moscow summit as "cosmetic" and said it would not lead to disarmament, but what he called "American subsidy of the Soviet military-industrial complex."

### NBC SATURDAY NIGHT NEWS NBC TV
6:30 PM JUNE 29

## Report on All-Volunteer Army

EDWIN NEWMAN: Tomorrow is the first anniversary of the end of this nation's military draft. A year ago the Army, like the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, became an all-volunteer service. Recruiting had some very rough going in the early months, but now it seems to be working better.

George LEWIS has a report.

GEORGE LEWIS: The Army says the recruiting business has been good this year. By the end of the month, the recruiters hope to completely fill their manpower quota. Things weren't always as good for

the all-volunteer Army. Last year the recruiters were meeting only seventy-six percent of the quota, and a number of critics, including those in the Army, were saying the all-volunteer idea would not work.

That resulted in some shake-ups in the Army's recruiting command, including the addition of fifteen hundred people. The Army also boosted its advertising budget to thirty-five million dollars.

## [Series of advertisements.]

The Army added another recruiting tool, the computer. All the job openings have been electronically catalogued. In an instant, a recruiter can find a variety of job offers for someone who's thinking of joining.

RECRUITER: The missile field [is] open for you. The supply field [is] open for you. The radio communications field's open for you.

LEWIS: It's all part of the Army's big sales pitch, free schooling and a guaranteed job.

RECRUITER: The schools that come up on this list are the best schools that you're qualified for. These are jobs that the Army needs at the present time and would offer you what you're looking for. I mean it's a chance to succeed in life.

LEWIS: At a time when unskilled teenagers are having a tough time finding work, joining the Army has become more appealing.

Why did you decide to go into the Army?

UNIDENTIFIED ENLISTEE: Because of the opportunities it had to offer, the education.

LEWIS: What specific opportunities are you looking for?

ENLISTEE: Really for the medical. But I'm going into electronics.

SECOND ENLISTEE: I decided to go in for the benefits like medical. Medical care you get free. And then you can go to schooling, plus you get paid while you get to study.

THIRD ENLISTEE: I play the trumpet, and the Army's got a good band.

LEWIS: Now the leaders of the recruiting command believe they've won over some of the skeptics who said the all-volunteer Army was a bust.

7 Monday, July 1, 1974

RADIO - TV
DEFENSE DIALOG

TUESDAY, JULY 2, 1974 (BROADCASTS OF JULY 1)

Richard VALERIANI, NBC News, Barry SERAFIN, CBS News, and Frank BLAIR, the "Today" show, all report on the progress of the NIXON-BREZHNEV Moscow talks. On the "Today" show VALERIANI reports that there has been little progress but later reports on the nightly news that some progress is being made on limiting underground nuclear testing. He also reports on the nightly news that according to Russian sources an agreement is expected to be reached by the end of this year. He reports that while Mr. NIXON was sightseeing in Minsk Dr. KISSINGER and Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO as well as Soviet Leader BREZHNEV were discussing SALT. BLAIR reports that sources have indicated that the two have reached an understanding of what they want accomplished.

Howard K. SMITH, on comment for ABC, says he feels that we have been had in past talks with the Russians because they continue to expand their military complex, continued their anti-American propaganda at home and have not been keeping pledges that have been made.

SERAFIN, CBS Morning News, reports that Admiral Elmo ZUMWALT, who is soon retiring, has turned down a position as head of the VA.

Roger MUDD, CBS News, reports that on the first anniversary since the draft ended the all-volunteer Army is doing alright as far as enlistments go according to Army Secretary Howard CALLAWAY.

Bob SCHIEFFER, CBS Morning News, reports that all three branches of the armed forces are fulfilling or almost fulfilling enlistment quotas and presents some arguments for continuance of the all-volunteer system and for the re-institution of the draft.

Hughes RUDD, CBS Morning News, talks about U.S.-Soviet relations during WWII slightly. The major part of his report being devoted to the Red Army Museum which he notes contains the U-11 of Gary POWERS.

PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE (SAFAA) AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL MATTERS WITHIN THEIR OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES.
FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THIS PUBLICATION CALL MR. HARRY ZUBKOFF, OX 52884

NBC NIGHTLY NEWS NBC TV

6:30 PM JULY 1

Kissinger and Gromyko Talks

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Secretary of State KISSINGER and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei GROMYKO talked for five hours today in Moscow. And tonight a White House spokesman indicated that there was good progress in their talks aimed at limiting the testing of underground nuclear weapons.

There was also a report from Russian sources that President NIXON and Soviet Party Leader BREZHNEV have agreed on the objectives they hope to reach in limiting nuclear arms by the end of this year. That was the report, no details.

KISSINGER and GROMYKO also worked on the draft of the communique to be issued at the end of President NIXON's visit.

Richard Valeriani has a satellite report.

RICHARD VALERIANI: Secretary of State KISSINGER and Foreign Minister GROMYKO returned to Moscow with Mr. BREZHNEV. They split off from President NIXON's visit to Minsk in order to continue negotiations on the central issue of this summit, limiting offensive nuclear weapons.

GROMYKO was already inside when KISSINGER arrived and they bantered a bit with newsmen. The Secretary was asked about a report that the NIXON-BREZHNEV talks in Yalta yesterday had produced a sense of understanding on goals the two sides hope to achieve by the end of this year.

REPORTER: Soviet sources are reported as saying that Mr. NIXON and Mr. BREZHNEV have reached a sense of understanding on the goals the two sides hope to achieve by the end of this year.

SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER: I don't know what the statement means to tell you the truth.

REPORTER: Are we going to have a MIRV agreement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know.

VALERIANI: Both men were accompanied by their top aides and weapons experts as they sat down beneath gilded crystal chandeliers to bargain across a table covered with green felt.

Their job was to try to convert into specific numbers whatever general principles and concepts may have already been agreed on. And the results of this meeting will provide the main agenda item when the NIXON-BREZHNEV talks resume tomorrow.

Richard Valeriani, NBC News, with the President in Moscow.

CBS EVENING NEWS CBS TV

7:00 PM JULY 1

Anniversary of Volunteer Army

ROGER MUDD: On the first anniversary of the end of the American draft, the all volunteer Army is doing well according to Army Secretary CALLAWAY.

He said today the Army wound up its first volunteer year with 783,000 men and women in uniform which is about 1,500 more than its goal.

ABC EVENING NEWS ABC TV

7:00 PM JULY 1

Comment

HOWARD K. SMITH: As one who applauded the arms deal with the Russians and was present in Moscow when it was signed two years ago, I want now to express some (unintelligible).

The deal which was made by our concessions was to be the basis for reducing arms in the future and permanently improving relations between the two countries.

But the deal hasn't had that effect. In two years of smiles and embraces Russia has built up momentum in missilry it will cost us a fortune to catch. BREZHNEV

2 Tuesday, July 2, 1974

has increased his navy with modern
ships firing long range missiles
we can't match, which caused
Admiral ZUMWALT to say yesterday if
we had a naval confrontation in the
Mediterranean now we would lose.

Though not adding any new
divisions in Europe, BREZHNEV has in
those two years tripled the number
of tanks and doubled the amount of
artillery available to them.

He has released a few spectacular
dissidents but clamped down harder
on thousands of others. While he
smiles with the President, his press
continues to feed the Russian
people with anti-American propa-
ganda.

At his last meeting with NIXON
in this country one solemn pledge
was made, each nation would inform
the other of any threat to peace
it knew about. Shortly thereafter
he knew about the Arabs planning
war, he gave them the means to do
it, but did not inform us, a
flagrant violation, a deception that
augurs ill for his keeping any other
agreement.

I favor talks, including those
of the present visit, but there's
too much evidence we're being had
and we ought to stop it.

CBS MORNING NEWS CBS TV
7:00 AM JULY 1

Nixon-BREZHNEV Talks

BARRY SERAFIN: President NIXON
today will do some sightseeing in
Minsk, then return to Moscow
tonight.

A weekend of talks between Mr.
NIXON and Soviet leader Leonid
BREZHNEV covered arms control and
other matters, but there is still
no indication that any broad agree-
ment will be reached on limiting
offensive weapons.

President and Mrs. NIXON
departure from Yalta today was
delayed nearly half an hour when
the first lady's car broke down and
she had to be transferred to another
vehicle.

While the President was busy
with summit talks, Mrs. NIXON was
busy taking in the sights around
Yalta.***

Zumwalt To Retire

SERAFIN: Admiral Elmo ZUMWALT,
who's retiring today as Chief of
Naval Operations, says he has
turned down an offer to take over
as head of the Veterans Adminis-
tration.

ZUMWALT says he thinks the
current political situation makes
it impossible for the VA to carry
out any innovations to help
Vietnam era veterans.

Volunteer Army Anniversary

SERAFIN: Today is an anniversary
which a lot of young men might like
to celebrate if they'd stop to
think about it, because it's
exactly one year since the military
draft became a bit of history
instead of a fact of life.

Bob Schieffer looks at how things
have gone in that year and how they
may go in months ahead.

BOB SCHIEFFER: The all volunteer
Army costs a lot more than the old
Army and it still triggers a lot
of controversy. But one thing is
now obvious, the Army has managed
to survive for one full year with-
out the draft.

Congressional skeptics still
think we'll go back to the draft
eventually. Chairman F. Edward
HEBERT of the House Armed Services
Committee says we'll be drafting
again by 1977.

But even so, no one is predicting
that the draft will start up
immediately. When a freshman
Congressman proposed resumption of
the draft recently, the reaction
was a large Congressional yawn
punctuated by occasional giggles.
Can you imagine starting up the
draft during an election year, said
one Congressman, especially during
this election year when incumbents
aren't faring all that well anyway?
It would be about as smart as
coming out against Sunday school.

In the meantime the Army has been
getting some good news for a change
about recruiting. Recruiters had

3 Tuesday, July 2, 1974

very good months in May and June where enlistments are going up, and those trends coupled with the fact that Congress recently ordered an overall reduction in the size of the military forces means that the Army will not have a big manpower shortage at the end of the year. Instead it will be at about the strength that Congress has authorized.

Congressional critics suggest that new problems will crop up in the future. Among other things, they say a declining birth rate will reduce the manpower pool from which tomorrow's recruits must be drawn.

But that's on the horizon. For now, anyway, this will be a fairly happy and somewhat surprising birthday for the all volunteer Army.

Rudd Looks At Detente

SERAFIN: President NIXON's visit to the Soviet Union has brought on a lot more talk there and in this country about East-West detente.

And Hughes RUDD has a look at the time when there was probably more detente than ever before or since.

HUGHES RUDD: Most of a generation of Americans are probably not aware that the United States and the Soviet Union were once allies. But the thousands and thousands of Soviet citizens who visit the Red Army museum in Moscow find reminders of that in almost every hall in the building.

Between five and ten thousand people come to the museum every day, more than that on a holiday. And the first thing everybody does is pose for a snapshot in front of a T-34 tank, the model which so startled the Germans when the T-34s appeared by the thousands and proved to be the best medium tank in the world at that time.

Old soldiers abound at the museum, dripping medals and ready to tell war stories to anybody who will listen.***

Inside there are 500,000 separate items ranging from molotov cocktails to artillery pieces dating back to their civil war which followed the 1917 revolution.

They also have the wreckage of

Gary POWERS U-11 airplane in here and hanging above it a rocket like the one which shot him down. The Russians seem vaguely embarrassed when American tourists stop and look at it, and the Americans feel genuinely embarrassed when they look at it.***

Pictures are up showing that happy day when the American and Russian troops met along the Elba River in Germany and there's an American map given to the Soviets to show them where we were.

THE TODAY SHOW NBC TV
7:00 AM JULY 1

Nixon-Brezhnev Talks

VALERIANI: If there was any progress made toward a formula for limiting offensive nuclear weapons during the NIXON-BREZHNEV talks here in Orianda nobody would say so.

The official spokesman for both sides carefull avoided characterizing the talks in any way, except to quote Mr. NIXON as having said, that the talks had very extensive and very intensive and that various positions had been reviewed and discussed in detail.

A White House spokesman even resisted using the word constructive to describe the talks, although he did concede the atmosphere was friendly and businesslike.

There was one positive sign. Secretary of State KISSINGER and Foreign Minister GROMYKO flew back to Moscow with Mr. BREZHNEV to continue the arms control negotiations while President NIXON toured in Minsk.

Before the summit a well placed administration source had said that if KISSINGER split off from the official party and conferred with Soviet leaders in private that would be an indication of progress, and that's just what he's doing.

Richard Valeriani, NBC News, in Orianda.

GARRICK UTLEY: Tomorrow there'll

4 Tuesday, July 2, 1974

be more negotiations in the Kremlin,
and the President will speak to the
Soviet people on television. On
Wednesday he leaves for Washington.

By that time it is hoped there'll
be some sort of an agreement on
limiting nuclear weapons or nuclear
tests to demonstrate that detente
is really working.

## Some Progress On Talks

FRANK BLAIR: Soviet sources in Moscow are putting out the word this morning that President NIXON and Soviet leader Leonid BREZHNEV made at least some progress in their weekend talks on controlling nuclear weapons.

The informants say the two
achieved a sense of understanding
on just what they hope to accomplish
in arms control by the end of the
year.

WALTER CRONKITE CBS RADIO

7:18 PM JUNE 28

## Armed Forces Without The Draft

ROGER MUDD: ***A year ago this coming Sunday, our Armed Forces lost their legal authority to induct men through the draft. The switch over to an all-volunteer force had formally begun. As a matter of fact, the military had started the switchover before the gun, so to speak, ending actual call-up six months before.

Without the prospect of forced
induction as a spur, there were
immediate troubles meeting enlist-
ment quotas. Critics said, "I told
you so" and predicted the draft
would soon be reinstated.

But unexpectedly the U.S.
military manpower problem seems to
have eased in recent months. The
Air Force has more volunteers than
it can handle, and is happily
selecting the most qualified among
them.

The Navy, currently, is meeting
its recruitment goals. The Marines
are still failing a little short,
but the big surprise is the Army

which, until recently, was consis-
tently falling well short of its
recruitment goals. Not in the last
couple of months, though.

Now officials predict that this
summer the Army will reach its full
authorized strength of 780,000 men.
Even enlistments in the Army's
combat arms, Infantry, Armor, and
Artillery, are up sharply thanks to
substantial cash bonuses, although
not yet up to the level the Army
wishes.

Furthermore, re-enlistments are
also notably up, indicating a lot
of volunteers may have decided on
the military as a fulltime career.

What's bringing our Armed Forces
back to full strength?

For one thing, full strength
means less than it used to. In
1968, we had more than 3.5 million
people in uniform, high for the
Viet Nam war. Authorized full
strength today is less than 2.2
million.

Pentagon officials also cite
the decreased risk of death or in-
jury and a resurgence of public
respect for the military now that
the U.S. combat role in Viet Nam is
over. Also, higher pay and benefits
and an augmented recruitment effort
by the Army. And, some other
observers add, a youth unemployment
rate on the outside of 15 per cent.

Whatever the reasons, military
officials now seem more optimistic
than they used to over doing with-
out the draft.

But, of course, almost all the
major questions about an ali-
volunteer force are still unanswer-
ed.

Will the inducements of higher
pay and more benefits drive the
cost of an all-volunteer force out
of sight? Maybe, and maybe it will
prove to be cheaper than constantly
training new draftees who return
to civilian life as soon as they
can.

Then, will an all-volunteer
force be representative or dispro-
portionately poor, rural, southern,
and above all, black? Army Secre-
tary, Howard CALLAWAY, predicts
the volunteer Army will end up
about 20 per cent black compared to
13 per cent among the general
population. He calls this "a good

5 Tuesday, July 2, 1974

workable balance."

Also, the enlistees are younger
and less educated on average than
were the draftees. Will they be
able to handle the increasingly
complicated weapons they'll be
called on to use?

Which leads to the bottom line

How well would an all-volunteer
force perform in combat?

The critics fear it may turn out
to have too many men in it motivated
by no more than the almighty dollar.

Proponents ask whether the draft
provided a higher level of motiva-
tion in the last war, sending in so
many men who opposed being there.

Both sides agree that the only
way we can know how our all-volun-
teer force would respond in a
general war is to put it in one and
see. Without being editorial, here's
hoping we never have to find out.

SPECIAL NEWS VOA
8:00 PM/EST JUNE 30

Zumwalt Says Navy Has Lost

(The following report originated
in both Greenville, North Carolina,
and Washington, D.D., and was
recorded in Washington, D.D., via
shortwave radio.)

GENE PETERSON: The retiring
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Elmo ZUMWALT, says the United States
has lost control of the seas to the
Soviet Union.

But Senator Stuart SYMINGTON has
disagreed with him. The two men
spoke on separate television
programs.

Admiral ZUMWALT said he thinks
the United States can no longer
protect ocean shipping routes.
This, he said, is our Navy's chief
job. He said the reason for this
is not enough public support for
defense spending.

PLEASE NOTE: Complete transcripts
of the following are available:

Interview with James DAVIDSON,
Executive Director, National Tax-
payers Union. Johnny Carson Show
June 26, 1974

An Interview With Charles COLSON
The 10:00 News WTTG TV June 28,
1974

6 Tuesday, July 2, 1974

DAY LD 042A KHATYN 7-2

BY KIM WILLENSON

KHATYN, U.S.S.R. (UPI) -- PRESIDENT NIXON PAID A SOMBER VISIT MONDAY TO THIS TINY HAMLET WHICH HAS BECOME A MEMORIAL TO WORLD WAR II NAZI TERROR.

ON MARCH 22, 1943, 149 VILLAGERS OF KHATYN WERE MASSACRED BY THE NAZIS. THEIR MEMORIAL ALSO HONORS ALL THE OTHER 2.2. MILLION VICTIMS OF THE NAZIS IN WESTERN RUSSIA.

(THE VILLAGE IS NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH THE KATYN FOREST, NEAR SMOLENSK, SCENE OF A DISPUTED MASSACRE OF ABOUT 14,000 POLISH OFFICERS 'DURING WORLD WAR II.)

WITH HIS WIFE AND A GROUP OF 50, INCLUDING HIS AIDES AND SOVIET HOSTS, NIXON WALKED WHAT WAS ONCE THE VILLAGE'S MAIN STREET, WHILE HIS INTERPRETER EXPLAINED THE SYMBOLISM OF THE MONUMENTS' PARTS. THESE INCLUDED:

-- A V-SHAPED SLAB OF GRANITE REPRESENTING THE ROOF OF THE BARN WHERE THE NAZIS LOCKED THEIR VICTIMS -- 7S OF THEM CHILDREN -- HEAPED STRAW ALL AROUND AND LIT A FIRE.

-- TWENTY-TWO TOWERS, EACH WITH A SINGLE BELL CHIMING EERILY IN THE WIND, REPRESENTING THE CHIMNEYS -- ALL THAT WAS LEFT OF THE VILLAGE AFTER THE FIRE WENT OUT.

-- A BRONZE STATUE OF A MAN, JOSEF KOMIN KAMINISKI, GROTESQUELY BURNED BUT THE ONLY SURVIVOR, CARRYING IN HIS ARMS THE CORPSE OF HIS SON.

-- ROW UPON ROW OF GRAVES.

THE PRESIDENT HAD VERY LITTLE TO SAY DURING THE VISIT.

BUT AS HE WAS LEAVING, THE SOVIETS INTRODUCED HIM TO AN OLD WOMAN CLAD IN A BROWN KNIT SUIT, HER BREAST SPANGLED WITH MEDALS -- AMONG THEM HERO OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE HIGHEST ORDER THIS NATION CAN BESTOW.

HE LEARNED SHE WAS MARIA OSSI OSIPOVA OF MINSK. SHE WON GLORY BY ARRANGING THE ASSASSINATION OF THE NAZI GAULEITER FOR ALL OF BYELORUSSIA.

SHE HAD TWO DAUGHTERS, SHE SAID, ONE OF THEM ONLY 11 AT THE TIME. BOTH FUGHT IN THE RESISTANCE. BOTH SURVIVED AND MADE HER A GRANDMOTHER OF 10.

"WE HOPE THEY ALL GROW UP IN PEACE," SAID THE PRESIDENT, OBVIOUSLY MOVED.

THEN HE STEPPED OVER TO A NEARBY DESK AND SPENT NEARLY 10 MINUTES SLOWLY AND PAINSTAKINGLY COMPOSING A FINAL TRIBUTE TO WHAT HE HAD SEEN WITH A BLACK, FELT-TIP PEN:

"MAY THIS MOVING MEMORIAL TO THE VICTIMS OF WAR REINFORCE THE DETERMINATION OF ALL THOSE WHO CAME HERE TO BUILD A LIVING MONUMENT TO THOSE WHO DIED -- A WORLD OF PEACE FOR THEIR CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN."

UPI 07-02 04:04 AED

REYKJAVIK (UPI) -- THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY EMERGED AS THE DOMINANT POLITICAL FORCE IN ICELAND TODAY, DEFEATING A LEFTIST GOVERNMENT PLEDGED TO OUST AN AMERICAN MILITARY BASE.

GEIR HALLGRIMSSON'S CONSERVATIVES, WHO PROMISED TO KEEP THE U.S. RADAR OUTPOST, RECEIVED NEARLY TWICE AS MANY VOTES IN A PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION AS PRIME MINISTER OLAFUR JOHANNESSON'S PROGRESSIVE PARTY.

JOHANNESSON CONCEDED DEFEAT MONDAY NIGHT WHEN COMPUTER RETURNS INDICATED THE CONSERVATIVES WOULD WIN 42.7 PER CENT OF THE VOTE IN SUNDAY'S ELECTION TO 24.9 PER CENT FOR THE PROGRESSIVES.

"WHEN I HAVE THE FORMAL RESULTS, I WILL ASK PRESIDENT KRISTJAN ELDJARN TO ACCEPT MY GOVERNMENT'S RESIGNATION," JOHANNESSON SAID.

ABOUT 89 PERCENT OF THE 130,000 ELIGIBLE VOTERS CAST BALLOTS, ELECTORAL OFFICIALS SAID. THE FINAL RESULTS WERE EXPECTED TO BE ANNOUNCED LATER TODAY.

THE UNOFFICIAL RETURNS GAVE THE CONSERVATIVES 25 SEATS IN THE 60-MEMBER ALTHING, ICELAND'S 900-YEAR-OLD PARLIAMENT, TO 17 FOR THE PROGRESSIVES.

JOHANNESSON, WHO HEADED A LEFT-OF-CENTER COALITION INCLUDING THE COMMUNISTS, HAD FUGHT FOR OUSTING THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) BASE AND ITS 3,300 AMERICAN SERVICEMEN.

HALLGRIMSSON, WHO EASED HIS CAMPAIGN ON RETAINING THE FACILITY, SAID, "THE PEOPLE LIKED OUR CAMPAIGN. NOW LET'S CONCENTRATE ON THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS."

ICELAND CURRENTLY HAS AN ANNUAL INFLATION RATE OF ABOUT 40 PERCENT.

JOHANNESSON'S COALITION GOVERNMENT BROKE UP MAY 9 AFTER A DISPUTE OVER THE NATO BASE AT KEFLAVIK AND INCREASING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

HIS FORMER COALITION PARTNERS, THE LIBERAL LEFT AND THE PEOPLES (COMMUNIST) ALLIANCE, POLLED A TOTAL OF 22.9 PER CENT OF THE VOTE, GIVING THEM 13 SEATS IN THE PARLIAMENT.

A PRESIDENTIAL AIDE SAID A NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE FORMED UNTIL NEXT WEEK AT THE EARLIEST.

POLITICIANS SAID IT WAS TOO SOON TO GUESS THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT, BUT IT WAS LIKELY TO BE A COALITION OF CONSERVATIVES, SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND PROGRESSIVES.

UPI 07-02 04:12 AED

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