-4-

fund for strengthening our cultural and
scholarly interchange.

Those with experience in foreign
affairs recognize that diplomacy is much
like gardening -- the unseen roots must be
healthy in order for the plant to prosper;
growth is an organic process requiring time
and careful nurture. The roots of our
relationship with Japan are healthy; we are
devoting our attention not only to the
requirements of our intergovernmental ties,
but to the intangibles of a valued association
with the Japanese people. We expect the result --
with continuing attention and prudent care --
will last like these bonsai trees for generations
to come.

PR #345

1

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In response to popular request, we will start with you.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, good morning.

Immediately after the Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport, President Ford sent a message to Prime Minister Rabin expressing U.S. gratification over the rescue of the hostages.

Since then, the State Department seems to have had second thoughts about the legality of such operations. Can you explain this apparent contradiction in the U.S. policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is no contradiction in U.S. policy. The President expressed gratification about the rescue of the hostages. The United States is going to state in detail its position with respect to the legality and the international implications of this operation when Ambassador Scranton speaks at the United Nations -- I believe it is in all likelihood going to be on Monday.

I stated our view on Tuesday, in Chicago, in which I pointed out that it is, of course, an unprecedented act for a nation to rescue hostages at the airport of another. It is also totally unprecedented to deal with the issue of terrorism that we now find in the world.

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We have been telling nations for years that terrorism must be ended, and when innocent people are being held under conditions in which the government that controls them either is unable or unwilling to cooperate against the terrorists, you have a situation for which there is no precedent in international law and in which various considerations must be balanced. That has been our position consistently, and there are no second thoughts.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have linked the -- that is, the resolution of the Lebanese conflict with the general Middle East settlement. There are reports now that U.S. officials are depressed, or despair of ever finding a Lebanese settlement.

Does that mean a Middle East settlement is out of the picture?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the depressed U.S. officials aren't talking to me, probably because they would feel more depressed if they did.

I have pointed out that one of the elements in a Middle East settlement is a degree of unity among the Arab nations.

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3

The conflict in Lebanon, in which there is disagreement among several of the key Arab countries, has deflected attention and concern away from the overall Middle East settlement.

We strongly support a conference in which all the parties in Lebanon get together and attempt to settle their affairs.

We are not depressed about the prospects. We believe that there are prospects for a solution -- given some goodwill and given, above all, the increasing realization that none of the parties can impose a solution by force.

So we believe that there are possibilities of a Lebanese settlement and we are convinced that there are prospects for a Middle East settlement, and we will be encouraging both of these.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have been talking about the need for a new consensus in American foreign policy. In line with that, do you think it would be a good idea if, after the conventions, President Ford, whether he is nominated or not, conferred with Jimmy Carter, presuming he will be nominated -- and Mr. Reagan if he is

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nominated or just himself and Mr. Carter, to discuss how
American foreign policy could proceed in the interim months?

In other words, it has been said that because of
the elections, it is difficult to get progress on any
substantive fields in foreign policy. But if it was possible
to work out some -- at least implicit -- agreements, would
that be possible?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I have been calling
attention to the importance of a national foreign policy
ever since my confirmation hearings. This is not a new
theme for me.

I have always believed that the foreign policy of
the United States must reflect permanent interests and
permanent values -- those values and interests cannot
change at regular intervals.

Of course there can be tactical disagreements, but
at some point the lines of American foreign policy ought
to be set for a considerable period of time.

This has been my conviction, which I have expressed
in every speech for over three years.

With respect to the particular solution that you

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put forward, I think this is a decision that has to be made
after the nominations of both parties have been made,
and it involves many considerations.

I do not believe that the foreign policy is
being slowed down.

I also believe that the main lines of some of the
themes that I have heard from the candidates are compatible
enough to permit progress to be made.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you --

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, with respect to the style of
the conduct of foreign policy, do you think it would be a good
idea, then, after the election, to end your "Lone Ranger" style
of diplomacy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, of course, I am
very flattered to be constantly put on horses by various
people. It gives me great prestige with my children who
have never seen me on one. [Laughter.]

So I think we will continue foreign policy the
way it has been conducted.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what are the prospects
for preserving the life of Daniel Gearhart, in your

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6

estimation, and how far is the Untied States willing to go
to accomplish this?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States has made
enormous efforts. We have appealed to over ten countries.
There has been a direct appeal to President Neto. There
has been an appeal through international organizations like the
International Red Cross.

If one considers that Mr. Gearhart is being tried
under a law, under a regulation that was promulgated in
1966, when the MPLA was one of many resistance movements to
the Portuguese, one can only feel that the legal basis
for this action is problematical.

We hope that the decision that was announced
yesterday is not final, and we are appealing it on humanitarian
grounds.

We cannot permit our basic foreign policy to be dictated
by our concern for the lives of Americans -- of individual
Americans -- that may be held prisoner, because this would
encourage people to take Americans prisoners all over the world.
But we believe, on humanitarian grounds, there is a strong case for
clemency, and we hope that President Neto, on reconsideration,
will consider it in this light, and will also consider the

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impact on American opinion if he goes through with his
intention.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have been quoted
as saying that you could live with the foreign policy
outlined by Governor Carter.

Do you, in fact, support the basic outline of
the foreign policy as he has laid it down, or do you find
objection to certain points? And if so, which?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think this issue is
stated a little bit upside down.

We have been talking about foreign policy a lot
longer than Governor Carter, and if there is agreement by
him with several of the things that have been put forward
by this Administration, we of course welcome support where-
ever we can find it..

There have been some indications, some hints in
the speeches that have not been fully elaborated, with
which we would disagree, but I would prefer to wait until
they are elaborated more before commenting on them.

But the main outlines that I have found in the
speech have been fairly consistent with the outlines of

PR #345

8

the foreign policy that we have put forward previously.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there was apparently some thought in the State Department last week that the United States should seize the initiative in the U.N. Security Council debate that is going on and perhaps introduce a resolution condemning terrorism and asking for cooperation from other countries.

In view of the legal debate over the Israeli actions, has that initiative now been dropped?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You know, I am not aware of a legal debate over the Israeli action that has been going on here.

Our position, with respect to the Israeli action has been consistent from the first day. We have maintained it since then, and there have been no second thoughts about this.

We are at this moment discussing with other countries a resolution which we hope to introduce, together with other countries, dealing with the subject of terrorism, and we have not yet achieved a final consensus with all of the other countries. But when we do, we will put it forward.

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If we cannot achieve a consensus, we will put it
forward on our own.

We believe that the issue of terrorism is one
that the international community must address. It is in-
tolerable that innocent people are being used as hostages
for the political aims of particular groups. It is a
violation of the Geneva Convention* and of all basic
principles of humanity, and the United States will strongly
oppose it and will participate in nothing that encourages it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary -- are you -- is your concern about the participation of Communists in the Italian Government in any way relieved by the recent elections and/or by the recent events at the Communist Party meeting in East Berlin, which turned to a ratification of national communism, and would you appraise that East Berlin meeting?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The outcome of the Italian election has tended to polarize Italian political life between the Christian Democrats and the Communists. The Christian Democrats did better than had been expected by some. The Communists did quite well.

* The Secretary meant to refer to the Hague Convention of 1970 which deals with the unlawful seizure of aircraft.

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It is important to remember that the non-Communist vote was more than two-thirds of the total vote. So one cannot, in any sense, speak of a mandate for the Communists. The Communists had 34 percent of the vote; 66 percent was non-Communist.

Even if you exclude the right-wing non-democratic parties, you would still have to say that the democratic parties had over 56 percent of the vote in the Italian Parliament.

So the technical possibility for constituting a government without the participation of the Communists, exists.

Our concern about Communist participation has been stated, and we have not changed our view with respect to that in any sense..

With respect to the conference in East Berlin, there are a number of things to keep in mind:

First, the issue concerned the internal organization of the Communist movement. It did not concern the policies of the individual Communist parties.

Our concern is not only whether the parties are

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11

controlled from Moscow, but also that they are Communist
and that their philosophy and that their basic approach
is likely to have long-term consequences for the Western
alliance, that we consider unhealthy for the Western
alliance.

Thirdly, this is not the first time in history that
there have been statements about "different roads towards
Communism." And I would urge all of you to read statements
that were made between 1945 and 1948 by the leaders of the
Communist parties of Eastern Europe -- by Mr. Gottwald,
by Mr. Gomulka, by Mr. Dimitrov -- we have a compilation
of those which we can make available next week -- in which
in effect at that time to set their different roads towards
communism, we have chosen in Eastern Europe, the democratic
road -- the revolutionary means -- or the dictatorship of
the proletariat -- is not the inevitable result.

Now I am not saying, necessarily, that the views that
are expressed now are insincere. All I am saying is that
it is dangerous to judge the long-term orientation of these parties
by what is said when their interests, their electoral interests
are so identical with what they are now saying. And I do point
out that this is not the first time that this has happened.

PR# 345

12

[lc]

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow that up with a question. In 1968 your predecessor, Mr. Dean Rusk, described a doctrine that has been put forth in the Soviet Union as the "Brezhnev doctrine" of limited sovereignty. Do you think that doctrine still exists, following the East Berlin conference?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not think one can judge from the East Berlin conference whether or not the doctrine still exists. And if one judges by the historical record, one has to say that historically any attempt by Communist parties in Eastern Europe to establish independent positions has been dealt with, if necessary, by military force.

I would not make a final judgment on the basis of the East Berlin conference, whether the Brezhnev doctrine still exists. We, of course, hope it does not. And if it does not, that would mark a significant change. But I think it is totally premature to draw the conclusions that I have seen in some of the speculations.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, when the President was asked yesterday about the comment of one of the American hostages in Uganda that, quote, "America didn't give a damn about us, but Israel freed us", Mr. Ford replied

PR #345

13

by asking us to remember his Administration's swift and
decisive action with regard to the Mayaguez, and within
hours, on another issue, the President expressed shock
about what he termed the unjustified death sentence of
Daniel Gearhart.

My question is, since Ambassador Scranton has
apparently sanctioned black nationalist intrusion into
Rhodesia, why can't this Administration consider some sort
of Mayaguez or Israeli action to save Gearhart from being
what the President terms "unjustifiably executed?"

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Each of these circumstances
has to be looked at in the conditions that prevail and in
relation to what is physically possible.

We are not elaborating a doctrine by which a
nation, whenever it has any grievance against another
nation, can enforce it by the use of military power.

With respect to Ambassador Scranton, our position
is that we are attempting to settle the conflict in
southern Africa by peaceful means. All of our efforts
have been designed to bring an end to the violence that
had already started before we enunciated our policy. We
have urged all of the parties in southern Africa to resort

PR #345

14

to negotiations.

The efforts we are now undertaking in our con-
versations with the South African Prime Minister, in the
mission that Ambassador Schaufele is now undertaking in
black Africa, are designed not to encourage violence.
Quite the opposite. It is designed to bring an end to
violence and to permit the communities in southern Africa
to coexist under conditions of justice and equality.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, now that the Department
has broken its silence with respect to the radiation
problem at the United States Embassy in Moscow, could
you please clarify some of the aspects of this which have
caused a lot of concern among Foreign Service personnel
and the public?

First, why did the United States wait for fifteen
years before making a concerted effort to stop the radia-
tion at the United States Embassy in Moscow?

Second, is the U.S. timidity and long silence
related to American electronic eavesdropping from the
roof of that Embassy, and, if so, why doesn't it stop,
since the Russians already obviously know about it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would not accept your

PR #345

15

characterization of American timidity with respect to
this signal. There were many complicated issues involved,
and the intensity of the signal did not reach proportions
that required concentrated action until the second half
of last year.

At that point the United States -- at all times,
the intensity of the signal was well below American safety
standards.

It is now an infinitesimal proportion of
American-safety standards and well below levels that
exist in many American buildings from existing American
electronic equipment.

Therefore, there is no present danger. The
level has been significantly reduced. It has been reduced
to one ten-thousandth of the American safety standard,
and it was never more than a fraction of the American
safety standard.

But, be that as it may, there are many factors
involved in the American response. And even if some
things are known, there is not always the possibility
to do something about them, even when they are known.

PR #345

16

QUESTION: May I follow that up by asking if there is no grounds for concern, or very little, as the Department said in its statement, and as you suggest, why are we criticizing the Russians for continuing this, "without regard for the working life of Americans in Moscow"?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because we do not believe that a signal of whatever intensity aimed at an American installation is an appropriate procedure. But we have reduced the intensity of the signal, partly through unilateral action and partly through negotiation, to an infinitesimal part of the American safety standard, and a very small fraction of the Soviet safety standard.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, why have the Soviets declined, or what have they (inaudible) given you as a reason for not stopping the signal?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I have pointed out, there are many complicated issues involved with respect to the signal, and also with respect to our own counter-actions which have been very carefully considered.

Timidity or concern about our over-all relations with the Soviet Union has not been a factor in these, but

PR #345

17

we have had to balance various advantages and disadvantages
for the United States, and we have, of course, had to
pay primary attention to the health of our employees.

There has been a response in a very substantial
reduction in the intensity of the signal.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what do you know about the
fate of Dora Bloch, the woman in the Kenya, in the Uganda hospital?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have really no information beyond what has been printed in the newspapers. The last we know is that she was taken from the hospital in which she was held by two Ugandan plain clothesmen, and we have had no account of her whereabouts since then.

The statement that was made on the Ugandan radio
is obviously untrue.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the House Select Committee on Intelligence has charged that you and Deputy Under Secretary for Management Eagleburger violated Federal law by interfering with the civil right of a State Department officer by the name of Thomas Boyatt to transmit information to that Committee. What was your response to those charges?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am not familiar with
these charges. Are you talking about the report that was
not published?

PR #345

18

QUESTION: That is correct. It was published; it just wasn't published by the Congress. It was published before [sic] the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am not familiar with the charge that we interfered with the right of -- what is the name of this -- ?

QUESTION: Boyatt.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, Thomas Boyatt. Well, we went through this at great length. The Department took the position that recommendations by junior officials to their seniors should not be submitted to Congressional committees, because it would lead to a situation in which every official would be afraid to make his recommendations for fear that either then or later he would be haled before a Congressional committee to account for his recommendations.

We offered to make available any policy-making official, any official whose appointment had been confirmed by the Congress, and let him testify with respect to this particular -- to any policy matter, and with respect to any recommendation that had been made to him.

PR #345

19

In addition, we offered to the Committee, and indeed the Committee accepted, that we would make a compilation of all the recommendations that had been made on the subject, including Mr. Boyatt's recommendation, without identifying them by name, so that the Committee would have before it all the recommendations that we had before us, without, however, the names of the people who had made the recommendations.

We made such a compilation. We submitted it with the approval of the Committee that voted, I think, nine to five in favor of this. Therefore, the Committee had before it all the recommendations that had been made to us. But, for the protection of the integrity of the Foreign Service, we do not believe that middle-level officials should be compelled to be accountable for their recommendations. The responsibility for the recommendations, and for the actions that are taken, are, in the first instance, those of the Secretary of State and, secondly, those other senior officials who have a Congressional appointment.

QUESTION: The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have been a cornerstone of yours and the President's policy. A number of months have passed now with no

PR #345

20

apparent sign of progress. Could you give us some
indication of where we are on this matter?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have settled a large percentage of the outstanding problems. There are two major issues that remain -- whether Backfires should be counted in the total, and how cruise missiles should be either counted or limited.

On these two issues there has not been a final
resolution. We have put forward an approach. The Soviet
Union has put forward a different approach, and it has,
up to now, not been possible to settle, to reconcile
those two approaches.

On the other hand, in Geneva, the teams have
continued to negotiate on the very considerable area on
which agreement has already been reached, working out the
technical implementation of the agreements in principle
that have been achieved, so that whenever those two
issues of the cruise missile and the Backfire are finally
resolved, it ought to be possible to make -- when they
are conceptually resolved--it ought to be possible to make
fairly rapid progress toward a solution.

PR #345

21

QUESTION: Is there active negotiation on those
two outstanding issues at this point?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On those two issues, we
are studying the Soviet position. They are studying our
position. And these two issues are still open, and
there is no immediate negotiation going on until we have
restudied our position on those two limited -- on those
two issues.

PR #345

22

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, despite your pronouncement in Lusaka, thus far, since you came back from Africa, the Administration has really made no major push toward getting the Byrd Amendment repealed. It has paid lip service to it but really no major Administration effort. Is such a major push in the offing this session?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We will put before the Congress the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, but even without the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, we are making major efforts to bring about a diplomatic solution to the issues of Rhodesia and Namibia and to make progress on the whole range of issues in southern Africa. And if these diplomatic efforts succeed, of course, then it may be that over time the issue of the Byrd Amendment could become moot. But we are proceeding to make major diplomatic efforts, and we will also approach the Congress on the Byrd Amendment.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The gentleman in the rear.

QUESTION: Sir, returning to the question of the microwave signals in Moscow, are you saying that there is some effort being made to achieve a mutual level of eavesdropping back and forth?

PR #345

23

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am not saying there is an effort being made to achieve a mutual level of eavesdropping. I am saying that in making our decisions as to what diplomatic approaches to use and what retaliation might be appropriate we have to consider many factors, but the paramount factor is the health of our employees, which I believe has been adequately safeguarded.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, may I ask again, what reason do the Soviets give for not stopping the signals entirely?

Do they say that there is no safety factor involved, so it is not the Embassy's business, or is it because of certain American activity -- electronic activity -- at the site of the Embassy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think it would be appropriate for me to give the content of the diplomatic exchanges. But in activities of this kind, it is not always easy to obtain an admission that it has taken place to begin with, and sometimes one can observe *de facto* actions without having a theoretical discussion as to whether they are in fact taking place.

QUESTION: Does the fact that the State Department went public recently mean that they have really given up or there does not seem to be any great

PR #345

24

chance of getting a stoppage?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They have pointed out there is no -- the best medical judgment that we have been able to obtain--and measured also against any safety standards that any nation has ever devised for this problem -- what is now going on is an infinitesimal amount and a smaller amount than takes place in many industrial areas simply by walking in the streets. So we are not dealing now with a health problem of any kind.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you might not now be dealing with a health problem, but I think it is a fact that the American standard that you quote is a thousand times less stringent than the Soviet standard, and the Soviets do take into account a great many medical issues that the United States does not, and there was a time last year when the level of activity on the Russian part was higher than their own standard would have permitted.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is correct and at that point we took very strong action.

[c]

PR #345

25

QUESTION: Is it not possible then, or are you acknowledging here that it simply isn't possible to demand that the Russians stop this?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have demanded that the Russians stop it --

QUESTION: And they haven't --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: -- it has not been completely stopped.

PR #345

26

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in view of the tension in east Africa, is the United States sending any naval units to the area of Kenya -- Uganda? And, (b), what is your opinion of Kenya's proposed purchase of 20 F-5Es from the United States?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, it would be quite a trick to send naval units to Uganda. (Laughter) So I can safely say that none of that is being contemplated.

There have been periodic port calls at Mombassa, and there will be a port call by an American frigate in the near future.

But this is not a new development. This is something that has taken place in the past.

With respect to the sale of airplanes to Kenya, one has to keep in mind that Kenya is surrounded by neighbors that are heavily armed by Communist nations, that have made territorial claims on Kenya, that Kenya has been a country that has pursued a very moderate policy -- has pursued a policy in which

PR #345

27

the various races and communities have been able to live
side by side, and it is the direction in which we
would hope African countries in other parts of
Africa will also evolve.

So we are sympathetic to some of its military
requirements.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, before the California
primary you cancelled a couple of speeches, because I think
the Department said they might be viewed as too
politicál. Why do you think it is now proper to go
around the country making speeches that will also certainly
be interpreted as political?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, at that time it was
on the Friday before the primary in a campaign which was
very intense, and it seemed to me that to speak, even
though it was before a non-partisan forum two days
before the election -- or three days before the election
-- might be viewed as a partisan effort. What I'm doing
now is a continuation of what I've been doing for nearly
two years -- that is, to speak about once a month in
some part of the country about the main outlines of
American foreign policy before non-partisan forums.

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28

In the leadership meetings that take place off the record, we always invite individuals of all political parties and of different views. And my effort is to bring before the American public the nature of our foreign policy.

And it is not a new effort. It is not especially related to the election.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary --

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, may I clarify an earlier answer on the Gearhart matter? You said that it would not be proper for us to permit our foreign policy to become hostage to the fate of any one particular individual or prisoner, because this would encourage other countries to do so. Does this mean that you are not -- you have not and you will not, in any way, link the question of future economic aid to Angola to the fate of Mr. Gearhart or any other prisoner?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We will not promise economic aid to Angola in order to obtain the release of Mr. Gearhart. Obviously, the execution of Mr. Gearhart will worsen the relationship between Angola

PR #345

29

and the United States and slow down any possibilities of normalization that may have existed. But we are putting our appeal to President Neto on humanitarian grounds, and we are not negotiating a ransom.

QUESTION: Well, we haven't told Mr. Neto what you're saying here today -- that his execution would obviously slow down this process of admission to the UN, for example?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am not talking about any particular political conditions that we have put before Mr. Neto. Mr. Neto must understand -- and he certainly has been given to understand -- that the general attitude of Americans towards Angola will be seriously affected by his actions in the case of Mr. Gearhart.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, has the United States noticed yet any net reduction in the presence of Cuban troops in Angola?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What makes a judgment very difficult to come by is that there is obviously an outflow of some Cuban troops, but there's also an inflow of

R #345

30

other Cubans. And to make a net judgment as to how
many have returned and how many remain has not been
easy.

We've also had unconfirmed reports that some
of the Cuban troops that are leaving Angola are going to
other African countries. We have not been able to
confirm it yet. But it is clear that whatever reduction
has taken place is not significant enough to affect
the basic situation that the government is being
significantly supported by a foreign expeditionary force
of, by African standards, very substantial dimensions
-- which is, in turn, supported by the Soviet
Union -- and it is a precedent which we find extremely
difficult to live with.

(Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the press
conference was concluded.)

---

HUMMEL SWEARING-IN

July 12, 1976; 3:30

It is a source of comfort to me to welcome Art Hummel back to the confines of EA, where he properly belongs. He is one of our most experienced and tested Foreign Service officers on East Asian matters, and his presence here affords me reassuring expertise on that important area.

Having properly "washed" Art via our assignment policy commonly known in the Department's corridors as GLOP, my well-known instincts of human kindness and compassion for colleagues impel me to return him to the calm waters of the Pacific.

- 2 -

Unlike his predecessor in EA, Art Hummel
is reknowned for his serene and even temperament,
so compatible with the style of the East. Phil and
I, of course, intend to test that temperament
as often as possible.

Art, as you all know, has had probably
more experience in things Chinese than any other
Foreign Service Officer. His counsel in this
area has been of immense value to me in the past.
We are indeed fortunate that it is again available
to us.

Through two Ambassadorial assignments,
two extended periods of service as Acting EA

-3-

Assistant Secretary, and a total of more than 25 years
in the Foreign Service, Art Hummel has consistently
performed at the level of excellence demanded of our
top career officers.

I count on Art to not only serve as my key
advisor on a slice of the globe critical to this
country's interests, but also to soothe the frayed
nerves of the Bureau left behind by Phil Habib.

RADIO-TV MONITORING SERVICE, INC.

[L.C.]

3408 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N. W. → WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016 → 244-8682

HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN BRIEFING
EAST ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE

JULY 14, 1976

Mr. Baroody has said that I should make my remarks brief, which for a professor means 50 minutes. (LAUGHTER) I knew I was--

We have an interesting political campaign this year in which, in the two statements that the opposing candidate has made on foreign policy, he has taken the main lines of our policy and has called them new. So I think I can help you all by outlining them on the part of the people who've actually done it. (LAUGHTER AND APPLAUSE) And then you'll have the scorecard for both sides.

There have been enough indications of differences on specifics, but I don't want to get into them. Let me emphasize the basic foreign policy problem that the United States now has faced in recent years. It is a change from a period in which our physical power was so predominant that we could dip in and

- 2 -

[LC]

out of foreign policy at our choice, in which we could overwhelm
our problems with resources, to a period when, as the charts
that Don has shown indicate, our power is roughly equivalent to
that of the Soviet Union, and in which we have to make a major
effort to maintain that rough equivalent. For the greatest part
of our history--and I would say until the late sixties--we were
overwhelmingly predominant in most categories, and we also had--
and even our involvement in the immediate post-war period was
really justified on two basic grounds: one, that if we contained
the Soviet Union long enough, there would be a change in the
Soviet system that would make the Soviet system more peaceful,
and after that the need for exertion would presumably disappear.

And secondly, in our economic assistance programs
around the world, first in Europe and then elsewhere, that we
would restore political stability, whether it's a particular kind
of one-shot or effort which had a terminal date, after which,
again, the need for effort would disappear.

The big change that we now face is that we're engaged
in a foreign policy which has to be continuous, that there is no
terminal date, that nobody can in good conscience predict that
there will be a magic date at which the Soviet Union will become
more peaceful and therefore the need for effort will end. Nor
can we say that a certain level of effort in the economic field
is going to produce an end to our exertions in foreign policy.

We are now in foreign policy the way other nations in
history have always had to conduct foreign policy. That is to

- 3 -

[lc]

say, we have to balance security and our positive objectives. We are in an endless process in which we have to use political, economic, military and other elements of power to create, first, an equilibrium of power with those countries that are our principal adversaries, or that have declared themselves our principal adversaries; secondly, to try to create an international environment that is compatible with our values. Both of these objectives are essential. If you do not have an equilibrium of power, you do not have a foreign policy. The weak can only ask for terms; they cannot negotiate seriously. And therefore all of foreign policy has to begin with security, and therefore any thoughtful person that is concerned with diplomacy must be in favor of an adequate defense budget that would enable us to conduct foreign policy.

Secondly, we need an international environment in which-- which is compatible with our principle, with our basic values, because unless there is a community of nations which more or less share our perception of the national interest, and our perception of what is essential for human dignity, every problem will turn into a test of strength with every nation in the world. And every issue becomes a confrontation. So those are the two main strands of our policy that have to be conducted.

Now, with respect to those, I believe that our foreign policy right now is in reasonably good shape. It is true that the Soviet Union has gained in military strength, as is inevitable with its gain in--improvement in its technology, the increase of

- 4 -

[L.C.]

its industrial base. But I think if a man from Mars came down here, and were given an accurate description of the situation of both countries, taking into account all the factors, not only the military factor, he would have to conclude that the assets on the side of the United States and its allies far exceed those of the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet Union has made gains only in circumstances where it could use military power or military equipment given through proxy. It has made no significant gains in any other situation, and that means that it is well within our capacities, since we have the greater resources, to balance that one element of power where the Soviet Union has made gains.

Now, if we face the situation that I described, of a continuous foreign policy where power is more nearly equivalent, we inevitably confront a new domestic situation, and the new situation derived from the fact that when the decisions are made, when the scope for action is greatest, the knowledge on which to base such action is at a relative minimum. When the knowledge is greatest, the scope for creative action has very often disappeared. In 1936, for example, one French division could have stopped the problem that led to World War II. On the other hand, if the French had then moved, people would still be debating whether Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist or a maniac bent on world domination. Five years later, everybody knew he was a maniac bent on world domination, but it was knowledge acquired at the cost of 20 million lives.

To come closer to home, last October and November nobody

- 5 -

could prove what the implications of Angola would be for the
acceleration of policy in Africa, for the position of the United
States in the world, and for the general perception that other
countries had of the United States. One had to make an assess-
ment that one could not prove true at the time. We were prevented
by the Congress from doing, at really relatively minor expense,
what would have been the right thing to do. Today it is increas-
ingly clear what the consequences are, and that the effort that
has to be made is infinitely more complicated.

The policy we have to conduct in Africa today, and the
acceleration of our own action, is the direct result of decisions
that were made--that were made last year. And yet, looking at
all of these factors, if you look around the world, we had to go
through a period of transition in relation to western Europe and
Japan in which the period that followed World War II, in which the
United States was the predominant partner, and foreign policy for
these countries consisted really, in effect, in lobbying in
Washington for getting out decisions to be compatible with their
desires, had to be adjusted to the growing strength and self
confidence of these countries. And we had to transform a relation-
ship of tutelage to a relationship of equality. That process is
substantially completed, and there is more consultation today on
all levels between Europe and Japan and the United States than
has ever been the case.

I had recently--this is not in itself conclusive--but I
had recently had a survey made of how many times the President

- 6 -

and I have met with the leaders of western Europe and Japan over
the last three years, since he came into office. It turns out
that he has met with those leaders 50 times; I have met with
them 200 times. If we added Don, we would add another big chunk,
and this is only cabinet level consultation.

Of course, frequency of consultation does not guarantee
good results, but it is a pretty good indication of the amount
of time senior people are now spending on coordinating their
policies. In 1973, I proposed that economic subjects should be
added to the agenda of the industrial--of consultation with the
industrial democracies. It was considered--there was an outcry
that this could not be done, that this falsified the existing
relationship. Last year President Ford has met twice with the
leaders of the industrial democracies, and the principal topic of
conversation was to coordinate their economic policies, both for
domestic recovery and on the international scene. So one of
the tremendously important facts of this time is that the
industrial democracies of western Europe, the United States and
Japan, that comprise 70 per cent of the world's trade and 65 per
cent of the world's GNP, are coordinating their policies. This
has profound implications because in the north-south dialogue,
for example, the relationship between the developed and the
developing countries on which a great deal depends for world
stability, the fact of the matter is if there is to be development
in the world, it can only come from the industrial democracies.
The communist countries are totally irrelevant to that process,

- 7 -

and there's therefore no reason for the industrial democracies--
western Europe, the United States and Japan--to be defensive and
to go to these conferences wondering what concessions they must
make.

Yes, we must help construct a stable and just inter-
national system, but the fact is that only we have the resources
to do it, and this has been one of the major factors in the
dramatic improvement of relations with Latin America and the
improvement that is now going on with Africa and in other parts
of the world. The programs that express these improvements do
not lend themselves to very theatrical performances, because they
are highly technical, and they involve long-term projects in many
cases. But the basic fact is that on the political side our
relations with western Europe and Japan have never been better.
With respect to the developing nations, we are at the beginning
of a new set of relationships in which almost the entire agenda
that is being discussed is dominated by American proposals.

In relation to the communist countries, we have the
problem that Don has described. If we do not maintain a military
equivalence, none of these other policies make any sense, but if
we do maintain a military equivalence, then the Soviet Union will
appear as a rather sluggish, rather unimaginative state whose
capacity for diplomatic action, as is proved in the Middle East
and elsewhere, is really relatively limited.

In addition to these structural changes, we have, of
course, the problem of managing the crises that in a world of

- 8 -

[lc]

150 nations inevitably arise. It's again important to keep in mind the change that has occurred in the Middle East since 1973. In 1973 we faced an oil embargo. We had no diplomatic relations with any of the Arab countries. Israel had been severely weakened in the war, and in the situation we face today, Israel's security has been assured. We have diplomatic relations and growing friendship with most of the Arab countries, and the diplomatic process is being importantly shaped by the initiatives of the United States, with very good prospects that when the peace process resumes, it can go on at an accelerated rate.

Now, I'm not suggesting that we do not have problems. In a world of 150 nations, where you have global decisions, where for the first time in history the impact of all decisions is global, it is, of course, inevitable that there are crises, and sometimes perhaps even set-backs. But with domestic unity, if we can prevent the debilitating decisions that the Congress has taken on Angola and on military assistance to Turkey, we can be in a period in which we--of great creativity and in which we can complete the process of constructing a new international system in a way that we will have a stabler peace than any we have known in the post-war period. Now, I've talked a little longer--

(APPLAUSE)

LUNCHEON TOAST - July 16, 1976
in honor of
FRG CHANCELLOR AND MRS. SCHMIDT

Chancellor and Frau Schmidt, Friends,

Ladies and Gentlemen:

For those of you who are not familiar with
the cast of characters who will be speaking to you
today, the Chancellor is the one who speaks English
with only a slight accent.

In view of the Chancellor's recent comments,
it is a good thing that the kitchen staff here at
the State Department did not decide to serve
hotdogs today. It is clear that in his view at
least that would have been the wurst possible

- 2 -

thing to do.

One of the greatest minds that Germany
has ever produced, Goethe, once wrote:
"Amerika, du hast es besser -- als unser
Kontinent, das alte."

That very flattering thought may have been
true at one time, but I am not sure it is today.
Today, we might, with not entirely unjustifiable
pride, address the first part of Goethe's comment
to the great industrialized democracies of
North America, Europe and the Far East.

Thanks to men like the Chancellor, today

- 3 -

we do "have it better." Together we have given
the world a vibrant and living example of the
benefits which free peoples can derive from
societies governed by the ideals we share. We
have shown by example that it is possible for
nations to be economically prosperous,
intellectually prolific, and at peace -- meeting
both the basic material needs of our peoples,
and nourishing the needs of the soul and the mind.

But we, and you -- and the leaders of the
other nations with whom we form a moral
partnership -- have not done so by endlessly

- 4 -

congratulating ourselves on our goodnesses. We
have done so with that combination of criticism
and self-regeneration in which free peoples
uniquely indulge. It is a truism to speak of the
ideas, achievements and material benefits which
flow from our European heritage. But another
German writer, Carl Schurz, in one brief remark,
not only epitomized my point, but also symbolized
what we owe to Europe. Building on the remark
of an American patriot, Schurz said: "Our
country, right or wrong. When right, to be
kept right; when wrong, to be put right." We

- 5 -

can be proud of the fact that in our societies the
"putting right" proceeds from the people, and is
not imposed according to the will of one, or a few.

Mr. Chancellor, I think we all feel more
deeply than we can put into words how strong and
intimate the ties between the people of our two
countries have become in the past twenty-five
years. Your visit to Washington this week is
especially appreciated not only as a part of the
formal celebration of our bicentennial, but also
as a demonstration of the real friendship which
has developed between our two governments and,

- 6 -

more importantly, between our two countries.

It is appropriate, in a way, that the United States celebrate its bicentennial at this point in the history of the world. The emphasis of our commemoration has been on the future rather than the past. We have attempted to use the anniversary as an opportunity to reexamine the ideals which have guided us for these two hundred years and assess their applicability to the problems of the future.

It is in foreign affairs where a look at the future is especially important. We are truthfully

- 7 -

entering a new era in the relations between
states. It is an era where the old calculations of
power and influence are rapidly giving way to a
new calculus based on the increasing interdependence
among all the peoples of the earth. It is a time
when solving the problems put before us will test
our ideals as they have never been tested before.

Mr. Chancellor, it is in this context that I
am especially grateful for the close ties which
have developed between our two countries. We
are like-minded peoples sharing both a dedication
to the democratic ideal and a determination to

- 8 -

ensure that the earth's problems do not overtake
the progress which is possible for all mankind.

It is in this spirit that I propose a toast to
the close and continuing German-American
friendship which we all value so highly.

-3-

FOREIGN TRAVEL OF SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER

<table><thead><tr><th>DATE</th><th>DESTINATION</th><th>PURPOSE</th><th>MILEAGE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>5/18-24/75</td><td>Vienna; Bonn; Berlin; Ankara</td><td>Mtg with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko; Consultations; CENTO Ministerial Mtg</td><td>13,600</td></tr><tr><td>5/26-6/4/75</td><td>Paris; Brussels; Madrid; Salzburg; Rome</td><td>IEA and OECD Ministerial Mtgs; Accompany President to Mtgs with Egyptian President Sadat and other Government Officials</td><td>11,700</td></tr><tr><td>7/9-12/75</td><td>Paris; Geneva; Bonn; London</td><td>Mtg with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Geneva; Prime Minister Rabin, Bonn; Foreign Ministers, Paris and London</td><td>8,800</td></tr><tr><td>7/26-8/4/75</td><td>Bonn; Warsaw; Helsinki; Bucharest; Belgrade</td><td>Accompany President for Consultations and CSCE</td><td>12,400</td></tr><tr><td>8/11/75</td><td>Montreal</td><td>Address American Bar Association Convention</td><td>1,150</td></tr><tr><td>8/20-9/3/75</td><td>Jerusalem; Alexandria; Damascus; Taif; Amman</td><td>Consultations</td><td>20,240</td></tr><tr><td>10/14-15/75</td><td>Ottawa</td><td>Consultations</td><td>980</td></tr><tr><td>10/17-24/75</td><td>Peking, Tokyo</td><td>Consultations with Government Officials</td><td>16,200</td></tr><tr><td>11/15-17/75</td><td>Paris, France</td><td>Accompany President to Economic Summit</td><td>7,660</td></tr><tr><td>11/29-12/8/75</td><td>Anchorage, Fairbanks, Tokyo, Peking, Jakarta, Manila</td><td>Accompany President on official visit; Consultation with Japanese officials</td><td>23,180</td></tr><tr><td>12/10-17/75</td><td>Brussels, London, Fuerth, Paris</td><td>NATO Ministerial Mtg; Chiefs of Mission Mtg; Accept Fuerth's Gold Medal; CIEC</td><td>9,005</td></tr></tbody></table>

-4-

Date:

No.

<table><thead><tr><td>DATE</td><td>DESTINATION</td><td>PURPOSE</td><td>MILEAGE</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1/9-25/76</td><td>Copenhagen; Moscow; Brussels; Madrid</td><td>Consultations with Government Officials</td><td>11,700</td></tr><tr><td>2/6-24/76</td><td>Caracas; Lima; Brasilia; Rio de Janeiro; Bogota; San Jose; Guatemala</td><td>Consultations</td><td>13,450</td></tr><tr><td>4/23-5/7/76</td><td>London; Waddington; Nairobi; Dar es Salaam; Lusaka; Kinshasa; Monrovia; Dakar; Paris</td><td>UNCTAD (Nairobi); Consultations with Government Officials</td><td>26,650</td></tr><tr><td>5/19-27/76</td><td>Oslo, Bonn, Stockholm</td><td>NATO Ministerial Mtg.; consultations; CENTO Ministerial Mtg.</td><td>11,400</td></tr><tr><td>6/6-13/76</td><td>Santo Domingo, Santa Cruz, Santiago, Mexico City, Cancun</td><td>OAS General Assembly; consultations</td><td>11,100</td></tr><tr><td>6/20-27/76</td><td>Paris, Grafenau, London, San Juan</td><td>OECD; meet with Prime Minister Vorster; Buchan Memorial Lecture and consultations; Economic Summit</td><td>11,035</td></tr></tbody></table>

-5-

Date:

No.

DOMESTIC TRAVEL OF SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER

<table><thead><tr><th>DATE</th><th>DESTINATION</th><th>PURPOSE</th><th>MILEAGE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>9/23-26/73</td><td>New York</td><td>UNGA & Mtgs with<br>Foreign Ministers</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>10/3-6/73</td><td>New York</td><td>UNGA & Mtgs with<br>Foreign Ministers</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>12/30/73-<br>1/3/74</td><td>San Clemente</td><td>Consultation with<br>President</td><td>5,130</td></tr><tr><td>1/26-27/74</td><td>New York</td><td>Meeting with UN<br>Secretary General<br>Waldheim</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>2/15-16/74</td><td>Little Rock, Arkansas;<br>Key Biscayne</td><td>Consult with Sen. Fulbright<br>Consultation with<br>President</td><td>2,645</td></tr><tr><td>4/14-16/74</td><td>New York</td><td>UNGA</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>4/19-21/74</td><td>Atlanta, Georgia</td><td>OAS General Assembly</td><td>1,150</td></tr><tr><td>7/18-20/74</td><td>San Clemente</td><td>Consultation with<br>President</td><td>5,130</td></tr><tr><td>7/25-29/74</td><td>Grand Forks, N.D.;<br>San Clemente; Hot<br>Springs, Va.</td><td>Tour of AF Base;<br>President's Mtg with<br>German FM Genscher</td><td>5,650</td></tr><tr><td>8/20-21/74</td><td>Miami Beach, Florida</td><td>Address American Legion<br>Convention</td><td>1,890</td></tr><tr><td>9/18/74</td><td>New York</td><td>UNGA</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>9/22-25/74</td><td>New York</td><td>UNGA</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>9/29-10/3/74</td><td>New York</td><td>UNGA</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>10/16-17/74</td><td>New York</td><td>Address - Alfred E.<br>Smith Memorial Dinner</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>11/14-15/74</td><td>Chicago</td><td>Address - University of<br>Chicago</td><td>1,250</td></tr><tr><td>12/20-22/74</td><td>New York</td><td>Consultation at UN</td><td>460</td></tr></tbody></table>

For further information contact:

-7-

<table><thead><tr><th>DATE</th><th>DESTINATION</th><th>PURPOSE</th><th>MILEAGE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>9/5-6/75</td><td>New York</td><td>UNGA</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>9/15-17/75</td><td>Orlando, Fla;<br>Cincinnati</td><td>Address Southern<br>Governor's Conf.;<br>Cincinnati Chamber<br>of Commerce</td><td>1,950</td></tr><tr><td>9/21-25/75</td><td>New York</td><td>UNGA</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>9/27-10/1/75</td><td>New York</td><td>UNGA</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>10/26/75</td><td>Williamsburg, Va.</td><td>Sadat Arrival</td><td>440</td></tr><tr><td>10/30/75</td><td>Pocantico and New<br>York, N.Y.</td><td>Vice President's Mtg<br>with Egyptian President<br>Sadat; Sadat dinner</td><td>510</td></tr><tr><td>11/2/75</td><td>Jacksonville, Fla.</td><td>President's Mtg with<br>President Sadat</td><td>1,300</td></tr><tr><td>11/11-12/75</td><td>Pittsburgh, Pa.</td><td>Address World Affairs<br>Council</td><td>438</td></tr><tr><td>11/18/75</td><td>New York, N.Y.</td><td>Mtg with Businessmen in<br>Louis Harris Perspec-<br>tive; N.Y. Times<br>luncheon</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>11/24-25/75</td><td>Detroit, Mich.</td><td>Dinner and Mtgs with<br>Detroit civic organiza-<br>tions</td><td>880</td></tr><tr><td>2/1-4/76</td><td>Los Angeles; San<br>Francisco; Laramie</td><td>Blue Ribbon 400 Mtg and<br>Reception;<br>Address Commonwealth<br>Club and World Affairs<br>Council of Northern<br>California;<br>Address Un. of Wyoming</td><td>5,400</td></tr><tr><td>2/26/76</td><td>New York, N.Y.</td><td>Dinner with Pakistani<br>Prime Minister Bhutto</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>3/6/76</td><td>Atlanta</td><td>Address Southern Council<br>on Public &amp; Interna-<br>tional Affairs and Sigma<br>Delta Chi</td><td>1,150</td></tr><tr><td>3/10-11/76</td><td>Boston</td><td>Address Boston World<br>Affairs Council</td><td>806</td></tr></tbody></table>

-8-

Date:

<table><thead><tr><th>No.<br>DATE</th><th>DESTINATION</th><th>PURPOSE</th><th>MILEAGE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>3/22-23/76</td><td>Dallas</td><td>Address Dallas Council on World Affairs and Southern Methodist University</td><td>2,590</td></tr><tr><td>4/8/76</td><td>New York</td><td>Address Foreign Policy Association, U.S. Council of International Chamber of Commerce, and United Nations Association</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>4/16-20/76</td><td>Phoenix, Arizona</td><td>Address Downtown Rotary Club</td><td>4,000</td></tr><tr><td>5/7-8/76</td><td>Hot Springs, Va.</td><td>Address Business Council</td><td>390</td></tr><tr><td>5/9/76</td><td>Baltimore, Md.</td><td>Accept Award and Address Chizuk Amuno Synagogue</td><td>60</td></tr><tr><td>5/13/76</td><td>New York</td><td>Attend March of Dimes Dinner and Meet with Wall Street Journal Editorial Board</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>5/31/76</td><td>New York; New Haven, Connecticut</td><td>Meeting with Golda Meir; attend Bicentennial Soccer Cup match</td><td>540</td></tr><tr><td>6/4-5/76</td><td>New York</td><td>Meeting with UN Secretary General Waldheim</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>7/3-5/76</td><td>New York</td><td>Participate with President in Bicentennial "Operation Sail"</td><td>460</td></tr><tr><td>7/6/76</td><td>Chicago</td><td>Luncheon and meetings with Council on Foreign Relations and Mid-America Committee; dinner with newspaper editors and publishers</td><td>1,250</td></tr><tr><td>7/10-11/76</td><td>Newport, R.I.</td><td>Dinner with Queen Elizabeth aboard HMY Britannia</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

730

The Secretary
of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[LC]

## Speech

July 22, 1976

Seattle, Wash.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

## AMERICA AND ASIA

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Downtown Rotary Club and the Chamber of Commerce.*

A little more than two weeks ago this Nation celebrated its 200th birthday. In the process of that celebration, Americans learned that despite the agony, the turmoil, and the constitutional crisis of the last decade, we are still proud to be Americans and still proud of what America means to the world. We felt once again that our country is free, and vibrant with life and change. We saw that tolerance and hope and dedication are far more a part of the American national character today than hatred, division, and despair.

To the generation that came to maturity in the late 1960's or early 1970's, these truths may have been apparent for the first time. For my generation it was, rather, a reminder of basic verities about America which had been in danger of being obscured by the turmoil of a decade. But for all of us, of whatever generation, it was an uplifting experience.

Certainly the events of one celebration, however inspiring, cannot by themselves solve the long-term problems that our Nation will face in its third century. But they illuminate the road before us as we enter our electoral campaign. They tell us that it is time to move away from the counsels of timidity, fear, and resentment which have done so much to corrupt our public dialogue.

Ours is not a Nation bent on domination, as we were told four years ago. Ours is not a Nation in retreat, as we have been told too often this year. Ours is a Nation which understands that America

cannot be at peace if the world is at war; that America cannot be prosperous if the world is mired in poverty; that America cannot be true to its heritage unless it stands with those who strive for freedom and human dignity. In short we know that our lives, liberty, and pursuit of happiness depend on the world in which we live and that America's leadership is crucial to shaping what kind of world that will be.

We face today, as we have for several years, international conditions quite unlike those known by earlier generations of Americans. We have designed a foreign policy capable of mastering those new challenges; a foreign policy for the last quarter of the 20th century based on four propositions.

* First, American strength is essential to the peace of the world and to the success of our diplomacy. We should not bemuse ourselves with false choices between defense or domestic needs, between security or social justice. Unless we pursue all these objectives we are likely to achieve none of them. Security cannot be the sole goal of our policy, but no other achievements can endure without it.

* Second, our alliances with the great democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Asia are the bedrock and the top priority of our foreign policy.

* Third, in an age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic balance, we have a moral, as well as a political, obligation to strive mightily toward the overriding goal of peace. We are ready to use our strength to resist blackmail or pressure; we must

PR 351

2

also be prepared to negotiate longstanding disputes, foster habits of moderation, and develop more constructive ties with potential adversaries. The American people and the people of the world ask for a peace more secure than a balance of terror constantly being contested.

* Fourth, security and peace are the foundation for addressing the positive aspirations of peoples. Prosperity, human rights, protecting the environment, economic development, scientific and technical advance, and cultural exchange have become major concerns of international diplomacy. In these spheres the destinies of nations are interdependent and a world of order and progress requires new forms of cooperation among all nations—rich and poor, industrialized and developing.

We want our children to live in a world of greater peace and justice. We want them to have the opportunity to apply their own genius, in their own time, to the betterment of mankind. To do so we, in our time, must help shape an international order that welcomes the participation of all nations and responds to the deepest concerns of all peoples.

We have come a long way already. We are at peace for the first time in more than 15 years. Our collaboration with the great industrial democracies is steadily expanding into new fields, while its fundamental basis is stronger than it has been in years. We have made progress toward peace in the Middle East and, partly because of our unique role there, the elements for major new advances exist. In Asia, we have—as I will discuss in greater detail—solidified our ties with both our friends and our potential adversaries. Here in the Western Hemisphere we are building a new relationship based on equality and mutual respect. We have inaugurated a hopeful new policy in Africa. And with respect to the Soviet Union we have combined a determination to resist expansion with a readiness to build relations on a more stable and lasting basis; we are, and will be, conciliatory but vigilant.

The people of the Pacific Northwest hardly need to be told of the strength or role of America. Yours is a region but recently carved from a wilderness by men and women of courage and vision. Here the pioneer spirit that is so much a part of our history lives on, and from here America looks out across the Pacific toward the nations—new and old—of Asia. And it is America's relations with

Asia that I would like to discuss with you today.

## The Asian Dimension

No region in the world is more dynamic, more diverse, or more complex than Asia.

* In the past generation Americans have fought three major wars in Asia. We have learned the hard way that our own safety and well-being depend upon peace in the Pacific and that peace cannot be maintained unless we play an active part.

* Our prosperity is inextricably linked to the economy of the Pacific basin. Last year our trade with Asian nations exceeded our trade with Europe. Asian raw materials fuel our factories; Asian manufacturers serve our consumers; Asian markets offer outlets for our exports and investment opportunities for our business community.

* And our ties with Asia have a unique human dimension. For generations Americans have supplied an impulse for change in Asian societies; Asian culture and ideas in turn have touched our own intellectual, artistic, and social life deeply.

American foreign policy has known both great accomplishment and bitter disappointment in Asia. After World War II we sought above all to contain Communist expansion. We essentially succeeded. We forged a close alliance with democratic Japan. We and our allies assisted South Korea in defeating aggression. We provided for the orderly transition of the Philippines to full independence. We strengthened the ties with Australia and New Zealand that had been forged as allies in two wars. We spurred the development of the Pacific basin into a zone of remarkable economic vitality and growth.

By the late 1960's, however, old policies confronted new realities—American disenchantment with a war we would not win and could not end; acute rivalry between the major Communist powers; and, above all, Japan's burgeoning power and prosperity. It was becoming apparent that our commitments in Asia too often dictated our interests; that we sometimes acted as though our stake in our allies' security was greater than their own; that estrangement with China no longer served either nation's interests nor the cause of global stability; that our economic dealings not infrequently resembled patron-client relationships.

Throughout the first half of this decade,

3

therefore, we have been fashioning a new policy for Asia. We have been bringing our commitments into balance with our interests. We have helped our allies and friends augment their own strength, while we have gradually reduced our own military presence in Asia by 130,000 men, in addition to the 550,000 troops we withdrew from Viet-Nam. We have strengthened our relations with Japan, be- gun a new relationship with the People's Republic of China, and searched for political solutions to Asian regional conflicts. We have encouraged Asian nations in their self-reliance and in their efforts at regional cooperation. We have welcomed Asian na- tions in new multilateral efforts to improve the global economic system.

While a great deal has been accomplished, Asia remains a region of potential turbulence. The collapse of Viet-Nam last year produced concern about a more general American retreat from Asia. Happily such fears have subsided, largely because American policy has buttressed the inherent strength and resilience of the nations of Asia. But there are no grounds for complacency. Soviet activ- ity in Asia is growing. North and South Korea re- main locked in bitter confrontation. Hanoi repre- sents a new center of power, and its attitude toward its neighbors remains ambiguous and poten- tially threatening. Most developing nations remain afflicted by social and political tensions. And the scramble for oil and ocean resources raises the specter of possible future territorial disputes.

Much will depend on our actions and on the confidence of Asian nations in our steadiness. In- deed all the strands of our global policy meet in Asia.

* Peace in Asia is crucial for global peace.

* The need to resolve conflicts and to ease ten- sions is nowhere more acute than in Asia.

* And the effort to shape new patterns of in- ternational cooperation holds great promise in Asia where the developing nations are among the world's most dynamic and self-reliant.

Let me now discuss each of these challenges in turn.

## Asian Security

First, the problem of security in Asia.

All the world's major powers—the United States, Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Western

Europe—have significant interests in Asia. All would be directly affected by conflict there. Yet the security of none of these powers is determined exclusively—and in some cases not even primar- ily—by events in Asia. Therefore, no nation should believe that it can enhance its security by deflect- ing conflicts from one continent to another. If the European balance is upset, our security and the security of Asian countries will be affected. If the Asian balance is jeopardized, serious repercussions will be felt in Europe. Neither in Europe nor in Asia can we permit others to dictate our destiny or the destiny of those whose independence is of con- cern to us.

Security policy for Asia must, therefore, be formed in global terms. Yet its requirements are uniquely complex. In Europe two alliance systems face each other directly across a clear line drawn down the center of the continent. The principal danger is external attack by organized military forces. The strengths and weaknesses of both sides are relatively calculable.

In Asia the balance is more multiple and fluid. The focal point is not solely between East and West; it includes the contention between the two major Communist powers, and the threats are high- ly diverse.

In some areas, such as Korea, the principal danger lies in armed attack across an established frontier. In others, such as Southeast Asia, the more immediate threats involve insurgency. Gov- ernments confront the difficult challenge of na- tion-building. Most are burdened by complex social problems arising from religious, racial, and cultural differences. Virtually all must contend with armed dissidents who are frequently ready to accept out- side assistance.

As President Ford stated in Honolulu last December, the linchpin of our Asian security effort must be a strong and balanced U.S. military pos- ture in the Pacific. Only if we are perceived to be clearly capable of supporting friends can we dis- courage aggression against them. Only by showing that we understand the necessities of the regional balance of power can we encourage free countries to see to their self-defense. To the extent that the nations of Asia achieve a margin of security, the political forces that stand for democracy and human liberty are encouraged. By the same token unilateral withdrawals from Asia diminish our se- curity as well as our influence even over the domes- tic evolution of friendly countries.

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It goes without saying that an American com-
mitment is vital only if it is perceived to be as
much in the interest of our allies as of ourselves.
No nation should conduct its policy under the illu-
sion that it is doing the United States a favor by
permitting us to contribute to its defense. Those
who seek to adjust their defense relationships with
us will find us prepared to accommodate their
desires in a spirit of reciprocity.

At the same time let there be no doubt about
this Administration's firmness with regard to our
treaty commitments. Allies needing our support
will find us constant; adversaries testing our resolu-
tion will find us steadfast.

It is not possible to enumerate all our security
interests in Asia in one speech. Let me therefore
discuss three areas of special importance or com-
plexity: Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia.

No relationship is more important to the
United States than our alliance with Japan. Mutual
security remains fundamental to our collaboration,
but in a new era we have extended our partner-
ship to a broad range of common interests—easing
tensions in Asia, solving regional and global prob-
lems, and combining our vast economic strengths to
spur stable and noninflationary world economic
growth.

In the early 1970's Japan and the United
States passed through an inevitable period of ad-
justment from dependence and American predomi-
nance to equality and mutual responsibility. There
were frictions over textiles and monetary policies
and over the timing of our essentially parallel
China policies. But these difficulties have been
overcome; they proved to be the growing pains of a
more mature and equal relationship. Today our re-
lations with Japan are better than they have ever
been. There are no significant bilateral disputes. We
have developed a clearer common perception of
our security requirements, which will be further
enhanced by the recently formed Joint Committee
on Defense Cooperation. We have injected greater
balance and reciprocity into our economic rela-
tions. We have learned to identify and deal with
potential difficulties before they become political-
ly explosive. We have consulted with greater fre-
quency and frankness and in greater depth than in
any previous period. Both nations are displaying
sensitivity to the intangibles of our relationship
and have built a wide base of public support for
closer cooperation.

Our relationship with Japan plays a central
role in furthering stability and progress in Asia and
the world. Our security relationship is crucial for
the global balance of power. Japan is our largest
overseas trading partner. Each of us seeks to im-
prove relations with Moscow and Peking, to ease
tensions in Korea, to encourage a stable political
evolution in Southeast Asia. Each of us cooperates
in the development of effective international ef-
forts to promote stable economic growth, strength-
en bonds among the industrial democracies, and
shape more positive ties between the industrial and
developing countries.

Japan and the United States share a common
dedication to the principles of democracy. And so,
close consultation on key regional and global issues
is at the heart of our respective policies. The
United States will make every effort to strengthen
these bonds.

Americans fought and died to preserve South
Korea's independence. Our experience and our
sacrifice define our stake in the preservation of this
hard-won stability; treaty obligations of mutual
defense define our legal obligations. Our support
and assistance will be available where they have
been promised. In fulfilling our commitments we
will look to South Korea to assume the primary
responsibility for its own defense, especially in
manpower. And we will continue to remind the
South Korean Government that responsiveness to
the popular will and social justice are essential if
subversion and external challenge are to be resist-
ed. But we shall not forget that our alliance with
South Korea is designed to meet an external threat
which affects our own security, and that of Japan
as well.

Difficult as the situation still remains in
Korea, it is the friendly nations of Southeast Asia
that, in the wake of Indochina, are facing the great-
est adjustment to new conditions.

Nations which once looked to us for their
security almost exclusively have been forced by
events into greater self-reliance and broader co-
operation among each other. The members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
[ASEAN]—the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand,
Malaysia, and Singapore—are determined to pre-
serve their independence by hastening the pace of
regional consolidation. All face serious problems
that are endemic to the process of development; all
seek to sustain and expand their relations with us;

5

all hope that we will retain an active interest in their destiny.

President Ford, in his speech in Honolulu last December and in his visits to the Philippines and Indonesia, affirmed our continuing interest in the well-being and safety of Southeast Asia. We shall encourage the efforts of the ASEAN countries to bolster their independence; we welcome Southeast Asian regional cooperation. Clearly our effort cannot substitute for, but only supplement, regional efforts. But we are prepared to continue to provide military assistance, though with greater emphasis on cash and credit sales. We will, as well, maintain our military presence in the Western Pacific, especially our mobile naval and air power. We are in the process of negotiating a new base agreement with the Philippines. We will promote new patterns of economic cooperation. And we will cooperate with ASEAN countries, consistent with their own initiatives and concepts.

## Easing Tensions to Strengthen Peace

Second, let me turn to the problem of easing tensions.

In the thermonuclear age, we have no more important obligation than to push back the shadow of nuclear confrontation. If crises occur they must not result from any lapse of vision on our part. Accommodation without strength or principle leads to appeasement; but in the thermonuclear age, reliance on power—not coupled with a spirit of conciliation—can spell catastrophe for all of mankind.

Thus the United States, in concert with its allies, seeks to reach beyond security toward better relations—based on strict reciprocity and principle—with former or potential adversaries.

No nation is more important to this process than the People's Republic of China. Together we have turned a dramatic new page, following a generation of mutual suspicion and hostility. There have long been deep sentimental attachments between the American and the Chinese peoples which have provided an important bond between our two nations even in the most difficult times. But it was mutual necessity that impelled us both to launch a fresh beginning in 1969. Our shared concern that the world remain free from domination by military force or blackmail—"hegemony" as we have described it in our various communiques—provided the strategic foundation for a new relationship.

This mutual interest continues and is the basis for durable and growing ties.

Both sides derive benefits from constructive relations—improved prospects for maintaining a global equilibrium, reduced dangers of conflict in Asia, mutually beneficial trade and cultural exchanges, and expanded possibilities for cooperative or parallel action on specific global issues. We have made significant progress in improving relations with China over the past several years. We have established liaison offices in each other's capitals. We have increased trade and promoted exchanges. Frequent and wide-ranging talks with Chinese leaders—including visits by two American Presidents and many congressional delegations—have deepened our mutual understanding. On some international issues there is substantial compatibility in our perspective and, where our interests diverge, we are diminishing the risks of miscalculation.

It is important to recognize that China's perception of the United States as a strong and resolute force in international events is an important factor in shaping our relations. We will keep Chinese views in mind in framing our approach to important international questions. But, equally, if so subtle and complex a relationship is to prosper, the People's Republic of China must take our concerns and problems into account as well. We must deal with each other on the basis of equality and mutual benefit—and a continuing recognition that our evolving relationship is important for global stability and progress.

The new relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China is now an enduring and important feature of the international scene. We are determined to work to improve it further. While difficult issues remain, we intend to continue to move toward the normalization of our relationship in keeping with the principles of the Shanghai Communique.

On the Korean Peninsula, too, we are prepared to make serious efforts to ease tensions.

In recent years North Korea and its friends have mounted a major diplomatic campaign—especially in the so-called nonaligned forums and the United Nations—to alter the institutional arrangements of the armistice agreement which ended hostilities in Korea 23 years ago and helps to keep the peace today. They insist upon unconditional dissolution of the U.N. Command, which,

6

together with North Korea and China, is a signa-
tory to the armistice agreement. They have gone so
far as to claim that if the Command is dissolved,
the armistice agreement itself would cease to exist.
At the same time North Korea demands the uni-
lateral withdrawal of American forces from Korea.
They propose that the issues of peace and security
on the peninsula be discussed in bilateral talks with
the United States alone, excluding the Republic of
Korea which represents two-thirds of the Korean
population.

North Korea's proposals are designed
not to promote peace but to isolate our ally, to
precipitate unilateral American withdrawal, and to
dissolve the existing legal arrangements into
amorphous general negotiations.

The United States will never accept such
proposals. No nation that truly believes in peace
should support them; no country interested in
genuine nonalignment should lend itself to so one-
sided an approach.

We do not maintain that present arrangements
in the Korean Peninsula must remain forever
frozen. On the contrary the United States favors
new negotiations to promote security and to ease
tensions there. We are prepared to discuss a new
legal basis for the existing armistice. We are also
ready to replace the armistice with more perma-
nent arrangements.

But this Administration cannot, and will not,
negotiate behind the back of our South Korean
ally over issues which affect its very existence. Nor
will the United States agree to terminate the U.N.
Command without new arrangements which pre-
serve the integrity of the armistice agreement—the
only existing legal arrangement which commits the
parties concerned to keep the peace—or which
establish a new permanent legal basis. And the
United States will not undermine stability and
hopes for negotiation by withdrawing its forces
unilaterally.

The United States position with respect to
Korea is clear.

* First, we urge a resumption of serious dis-
cussions between North and South Korea.

* Second, if North Korea's allies are prepared to improve their relations with South Korea, then and only then, will we be prepared to take similar steps toward North Korea.

* Third, we continue to support proposals that

the United Nations open its doors to full member-
ship for South and North Korea without prejudice
to their eventual reunification.

* Finally, we are prepared to negotiate a new basis for the armistice or to replace it with more permanent arrangements in any form acceptable to all the parties.

In this spirit we proposed last September [22, 1975, at the U.N. General Assembly] a conference including North and South Korea, the United States, and the People's Republic of China—the parties most immediately concerned—to discuss ways of preserving the armistice agreement and of reducing tensions in Korea. We noted that in such a meeting we would be ready to explore possibilities for a larger conference to negotiate more fundamental and durable arrangements.

Today President Ford has asked me to call
again for such a conference.

Specifically the U.S. Government is prepared
to meet with South Korea, North Korea, and the
People's Republic of China during the coming
session of the U.N. General Assembly. We propose
New York, but we are ready to consider some
other mutually agreeable place. We are willing to
begin immediate discussions on issues of procedure
and site. Such a conference could provide a new
legal structure for the armistice if the parties agree.
It could replace the armistice with more permanent
arrangements. It could ease tensions throughout
Asia.

We urge other parties to respond affirma-
tively. Any nation genuinely interested in peace on
the peninsula should be prepared to sit down and
talk with the other parties on ways to improve the
existing situation.

Southeast Asia, as much as Northeast Asia,
requires our careful attention. Indochina, an arena
of war for generations, has yet to find a positive
and peaceful role. Viet-Nam has been unified by
force, producing a new and strong power in the
region, and Communist regimes have taken over in
Laos and Cambodia. The relations of the Indo-
Chinese states with one another are unsettled and
unclear, as are Hanoi's longer term ambitions. Our
policy is designed to bolster the independence of
our friends, encourage the restraint of former foes,
and help chart a more constructive pattern of rela-
tions within the region.

We have said on many occasions that for us

7

the Indochina war is over. We are prepared to look to the future; we are willing to discuss outstanding issues; we stand ready to reciprocate gestures of good will. We have conveyed our willingness to open discussions with the Vietnamese authorities, with both sides free to raise any issues they wish.

For us the Americans missing-in-action remain the principal concern. Let there be no mistake: There can be no progress toward improved relations with Hanoi without a wholly satisfactory accounting for these men. Nor will we yield to cynical efforts to use the anguish of American families to extort economic aid. If the Vietnamese meet our concerns for the missing-in-action and exhibit restraint toward their neighbors, they will find us ready to reciprocate and to join in the search for ways to turn a new page in our relations.

## New Patterns of Cooperation

Beyond security, beyond the imperative of easing tensions, lies a new dimension of international relations—to help shape a global structure that responds to the aspirations of peoples and assures our children a world of prosperity, justice, and hope. We must meet this challenge because:

* There cannot be enduring tranquillity in a world scarred by injustice, resentment, and deprivation;

* There cannot be assured prosperity in a world of economic warfare and failed development; and

* There cannot be an enduring international order in a world in which millions are estranged from decisions and practices which determine their national well-being.

As the world's strongest economy, the United States has accepted responsibility for leadership in this agenda of interdependence. In many international forums over several years, we have put forth comprehensive initiatives to produce concrete progress on the most compelling issues of our interdependent world—food, energy, commodities, trade, technology, the environment, and the uses of mankind's last frontiers, the oceans and outer space.

Nowhere are the possibilities and benefits of economic cooperation greater than in Asia. The record of developing countries in Asia is extraordinary. Most grew at annual rates of six to seven

percent a year for the entire decade prior to the 1973 oil embargo; Asian economies have flourished, even in the face of global recession.

The secret of their economic performance is no mystery. Rich in natural resources, fertile land, and industrious people, East Asia—with few exceptions—is not burdened with massive overpopulation. Most countries in the area possess talented entrepreneurs and skilled administrators; most governments have rejected the confining straitjacket of statist economic practices; virtually all provide a hospitable climate for foreign investment.

If growth and vitality are a common feature, the developing nations of Asia otherwise reflect a considerable diversity. Some, despite abundant resources, remain among the world's poorest in terms of per capita income. Others are rapidly approaching the ranks of the advanced nations. Some export principally raw materials and foodstuffs, while others have joined Japan as industrial workshops for the world.

Although the impulse for regional integration is apparent, the Asian-Pacific market economy is open and accessible to the world. The United States, Japan, and others supply capital, market, management skills, and technology. We in turn obtain from the developing countries of Asia reliable supplies of important raw materials, fair treatment of our investments, and expanding markets for our trade.

Economic development does not automatically insure tranquillity between states or within them. But it can enhance the ability of governments to obtain public support, strengthen the legitimacy of institutions, and consolidate national independence. These factors are of particular importance for Asian nations beset—as they often are—by the problems of national building and domestic dissidence.

Cooperative relations between the industrialized nations and the developing nations of Asia are both inescapable and vital.

The United States and the developing nations of Asia share important interests.

* We should both value an international economic system which insures steady, noninflationary growth and expands the opportunities of our citizens.

* We must both recognize that if economic

8

development is to strengthen stability, it must enhance national self-reliance. The developing nations of Asia need concessional foreign assistance far less than support for their efforts to participate in the international economy on a more equal footing.

* We must deal with each other on the basis of parity and dignity, seeking responsible progress on issues, to liberalize trade, to expand investment opportunities, and to transfer technology.

* We must cooperate to improve the effectiveness of established institutions such as the Asian Development Bank. We must be ready to create new instruments—for example, the proposed International Resources Bank—to address the new range of issues in the field of commodities.

The nations bordering the Pacific have an opportunity to usher in an era of cooperation which will enhance the prosperity of their peoples and give an impetus to the well-being of mankind.

## America's Strength and Spirit

Three times in the past 35 years many thousands of American lives have been lost in wars on the Asian Continent. For us World War II began and ended there. A blatant Communist attempt to conquer Korea was defeated there. And the tragedy of Viet-Nam, with its 50,000 [U.S.] dead and the wave of bitterness it created here at home, was played out there.

It must not happen again. It will not happen again if America's policy, profiting from the past, takes charge of its future, making aggression too costly to attempt and peace too tempting to reject.

Our greatest challenge abroad is to continue to act on the knowledge that neither peace nor prosperity—for ourselves or anyone else on our

small planet—is possible without the wisdom and the continuing active involvement of the United States. Our size, our economy, our strength, and our principles leave us no alternative but to be concerned with events in the world around us.

Our greatest foreign policy need at home is steadiness, cohesion, and a realization that in shaping foreign policy we are engaged in an enterprise beyond party and not bounded by our electoral cycles. Today Americans—of whatever party or political conviction—can have confidence that their country, as always, has the substance and the strength to do its duty.

* We have the military and economic power, together with our allies, to maintain the balance of stability upon which global peace must rest.

* We have the wisdom to see that an enduring peace requires dedicated and realistic measures to reduce tension.

* And we have the vision to fashion new relationships among all nations in an interdependent world, to work toward a true and lasting world community.

The bond between America's spirit and America's achievement, between its courage and its responsibility was expressed by a great poet here in Seattle. As Theodore Roethke said:

> I feel my fate in what I cannot fear.
> I learn by going where I have to go.

That is the American way. We are a people accustomed to, and capable of, forging our own destiny. We are ready, as Americans always have been ready, to face the future without fear. We shall go where we have to go. We shall do what we have to do.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STA-501

JULY 22, 1976

[L]

PRESS
STATE
DEPARTMENT OF
BY THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE

BEFORE THE DOWNTOWN ROTARY CLUB OF SEATTLE
AND THE SEATTLE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, JULY 22, 1976

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, my question is: in the light of the recent nuclear weapons-making capability, please explain your position on the export of nuclear materials.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The danger of nuclear proliferation arises from the fact that, with the energy crisis, nuclear energy has become economical-- in fact, essential -- therefore, a market for many countries that can produce nuclear reactors all over the globe. Most of these nuclear reactors, as a byproduct, produce materials that, either directly or through reprocessing, can be turned into fissionable materials.

Therefore, the problem is how, short of prohibiting the export of nuclear reactors--which none of the nuclear suppliers seems to be ready to accept -- one can establish safeguards that inhibit nuclear proliferation.

Now, this is a very difficult process. Our policy has been that we will not sell processing plants which will enable countries to reprocess the material that emerges from nuclear reactors into fissionable material suitable for explosives.

Other countries have not followed this approach, and we have brought a considerable amount of pressure to prevent the spreading of reprocessing plants.

We have also created or invited countries to join a suppliers conference, in which countries that are supplying nuclear materials or nuclear reactors would agree on common safeguards so that the nations of the world do not compete with each other in easing safeguards in order to do nuclear business.

This conference has made considerable progress, but the rate of the spread of these nuclear reactors is such that it becomes extremely difficult to prevent the capabilities of the countries receiving them in the nuclear field from growing.

It is a problem to which we have given the highest priority attention, in which we are making a major effort, in which we will continue to make a major effort, and which we hope we can get under increasing control.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, a decision of the State Department has resulted in an increase of $31 million in the annual natural gas bill for Washington State.

The Canadian Government was ready to recognize different United States areas' dependence on their exports. Is there any possibility that your Department can reconsider its decision?

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PR #351-A

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I have had occasion to say this morning that it is moving for me to find that people outside of Washington talk of the State Department as a cohesive organization (Laughter) — as a department that has unified opinions. I can tell you when you sit where I do that I don't share that impression.

Second, I must tell you — which will be extremely discouraging for most of the audience here — I was not aware that this issue was particularly contentious until I arrived in Seattle. (Laughter) Since then it is apparent to me that there is not complete unanimity on it. (Laughter)

Our position was not aimed against the Northwest. Our position derived from the fact that we did not want to accept the principle that a foreign government could establish differential rates in the United States by its own unilateral action and to exercise in effect monopoly powers seemed to us to set an unfortunate precedent.

Now, I have heard so much about this problem since I've come here (laughter) that I will take another look at it when I get back (laughter). But what I am aiming at primarily is to get out of town in one piece. (Laughter)

I'll tell you another thing. The State Department may not have an extremely unified opinion, but it is extremely good in delaying replies (Laughter)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow up on another question regarding our relationship with Canada. That relationship has undergone some drastic changes in the past several years — changes that has been inflicted on the people in this region by strains in the area of natural gas, Alaska oil shipments, construction of the Trident Base, the pipeline, the flooding in the upper Skagit Valley, Columbia River compact, Point Roberts, and large-scale property purchases across the border. Leaders on both sides have expressed some deep concerns about this and one — Senator Jackson —, recently suggested it would appear that these relations ought to be one priority in our foreign policy.

Now, why is it in such bad disrepair? And what plans, if any, are there to correct this?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I, first of all, do not believe that our relations with Canada are in such an acute stage of disrepair.

Secondly, one should not believe that problems which exist can always be resolved by hyperactivity.

It is inevitable that a country like Canada, which has such a powerful neighbor and such a great percentage of whose economy is tied to the United States, will try to develop an identity that is separate from the United States or that it becomes very conscious of its own

PR #351-A

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identity. And I think we have to accept the fact that in Canadian politics a certain amount of ability to show that one is independent of the United States is not unprofitable. And this has not been lost on the various Canadian political leaders.

On the other hand, our ties economically are really so close that the practical possibilities of divergence between our countries are fairly limited.

There are a number of irritating problems, most of them growing out of the economic impact of the populations living along the border on each other. We are in the process of negotiating many of them. And it is one of the few cases where the public dialogue is more bitter than the private dialogue (laughter) because usually after the public controversy has been gone through, privately we manage to make some progress on these issues.

So I think we have to be mature about our relationship with Canada. We have to recognize that there will occasionally be voices that are not particularly pleasant to us. But we also have to recognize that on most fundamental issues Canada and the United States work together very well. And considering the interdependence of our two nations, and considering the extent to which our economies interact, I think we can keep these disputes to manageable proportions.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, my question to you is: beyond the limitations created by SALT on strategic-weapons delivery systems, what new initiatives can the United States take to reduce the global arms race?

And second, how long can bilateral deterrence provide global security in an increasingly multipolar world?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course, the most important negotiation is the one of strategic arms limitations that is now going on in Geneva, which attempts to put a ceiling on the strategic arms race and which, in its next phase, will attempt to turn it down and reduce the strategic armaments.

In addition, we are engaged in negotiations for the reduction of forces in Central Europe, which also attempts to ease the burden of arms in those areas.

The third area in which arms competition creates problems is in such areas as the Middle East where there are large resources and many arms suppliers, and on top of it many contentious parties and parties whose own differences among each other seem to them to outweigh the requirements of global peace very often. Now, in that area, how to control the shipment of arms into an area like the Middle East is a matter to which we must give increasing attention.

I would point out, however, a number of serious problems here. The shipment of arms among Arab countries is relatively easy, while Israel has only one country from which it can acquire arms. So until about five years ago, it used to be thought that if the shipment of arms could be

PR #351-A

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limited into the Arab states bordering Israel, one could get some
through. But the fact of the matter is that arms now move
with increasing ease among these various countries, as we have seen
recently in Lebanon, and therefore the problem of controlling the
international arms trade must reach all of the suppliers and all of
the possible recipients and also those countries that could transfer
arms among each other and therefore strengthen one of the sides in
the region. That is an important issue to which we have to turn.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the American war effort in Viet-Nam is justified by our Government largely in terms of the various consequences accrued in South Viet-Nam held by the Communists.

Now that more than a year has passed since the fall of Viet-Nam,
can you list the negative consequences of that event?

And also, in your opinion are those consequences of sufficient magni-
tude to justify the human and material cost of the American war effort?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, of course, I think it is important to keep in mind, which is sometimes forgotten, that when we came to Washington there were 550,000 American troops in Viet-Nam and that some of those who most actively opposed the war were those who put the troops there.

And it is a difficult problem, how to remove troops once a country's
prestige is already engaged.

Secondly, you cannot measure the impact of an international event
after one year. History moves more slowly than this, and the effect
of any event can only be measured in a five- or ten-year period.

The immediate effect on the collapse of Indochina has been the collapse of Laos, and, Cambodia of course, following it -- and the human cost in Cambodia has been dreadful. The number of deaths number in the hundred of thousands in one year, in addition to the incredible suffering that has been imposed on the population.

Thailand has moved toward a position of neutralism.

The Philippines have begun to change their policy.

The impact on the perception of other countries of the American failure in Indochina will take many years to work itself out, and therefore, I have to say no one should recommend to a country that losing a war is painless.

Whether the entry into the war was well considered -- whether one
should have made this move in the middle 1960's -- is a different
matter. But the consequences of the war in Indochina, the impact of
our defeat there, will take many years to work themselves out; and
they will not be favorable to us.

PR #351-A

-5-

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, is our foreign policy sufficiently broad-based and bipartisan to allow for continuity of present long-range policies should there be a regrettable change of the Secretary of State? (Laughter)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think that the foreign policy of the United States has to be based on the permanent interests and permanent values of the United States, and those are independent of personalities.

And, therefore, I tend to believe the main lines of our foreign policy will be continued, regardless of administration and regardless of the incumbent Secretary of State, hard as the latter is to imagine for me. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, I am Lawrence Peterson, a drylands wheat farmer from Eastern Washington for about forty years; and in lieu of the fact that we are now seeing the start of a surplus of grain products -- wheat, corn and that -- I would like to ask this question:

Do you believe in withholding food products as a diplomatic bargaining tool?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I will tell you the experience that I have had.

When I travel around the United States, in most non-farm states people come up to me and shake their fist and say: "Why don't you withhold food products as a bargaining weapon against the Soviet Union, or against other countries?"

In the wheat-growing states, I get a slightly opposite reaction. (Laughte

I think we have to make a national decision. If we want to gain diplomatic benefits from our farm products, then we must have some mechanism by which the sale of these products is geared to certain foreign policy decisions.

On the other hand, I understand the feeling of the farmers that they should not have to pay, themselves, for foreign policy initiatives.

The Administration has taken the position that we would not interrupt the sale of wheat and we would not interrupt the markets. But the practical consequence of this is that any foreign country can enter our market on the basis of equality and can use our free markets the way they operate, and then we cannot use it for that reason for foreign policy reasons.

I am not criticizing the decision of the Administration. I am simply pointing out what the consequences are. I support the decision of the Administration.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, essentially what is US policy on Taiwan?

Do you think U. S. will eventually recognize the People's Republic of China as the true representative government? If "yes," won't

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[w]

that be a sharp departure from our past policy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the United States indicated in the Shanghai Communique our view that the relationship between the Mainland and Taiwan should be settled by peaceful negotiations between the parties concerned. This has been the stumbling block to progress on normalization. And we have not changed our view that these relations should be settled on a peaceful basis.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, as the current Secretary of State, based on your past background at the UN, do you think the UN has any real purpose now that the Council has again failed to only condemn terrorism -- mostly the pro-Palestinians -- the hijackings and the killings? Don't you think that this in effect gives the green light to further terrorism?

And what does this mean to the future of the UN as you see it?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, to us, as far as the UN is concerned, we have come to an interesting transformation in this country.

Until about two years ago, when one met with an audience like this, the general question was: "How can you strengthen the United Nations?"

Now there has been a growing skepticism about the United Nations, which is justified in a considerable part by its performance. There are many aspects of the United Nations to which we strongly object:

- We object to the automatic majorities.

- We object to the one-way morality.

- We object to the fact that more stringent criteria are applied to some countries than to others.

- We will not submit vital interests to such procedures.

On the other hand, there is needed in the world some meeting place where it is easy for parties to get together and where you can have an exchange of views which does not have to be especially organized. And therefore we believe that the United Nations, as an institution, still has important functions.

And we also believe that if the trend in the United Nations of recent years continues -- the trend toward confrontation; the trend toward one-way-voting; the trend toward automatic majority, the tendency to get the so-called "Group of 77", which is really more than a hundred nations always voting together so that they constitute a bloc of their own -- that then the political functions of the United Nations will become less and less relevant to the issues concerned.

Now actually, we think that the Security Council debate, while it did not condemn terrorism, marked a step forward because they also did not condemn Israel. In fact, they withdrew their resolution condemning Israel.

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[Lc]

And we had a majority for the condemnation of terrorism, but it was not the majority that is needed to pass something in the Security Council. So I believe that there are functions that are still necessary to be performed by the United Nations; but the United States will fight and not accept the sort of procedures that have become, unfortunately, too characteristic of the United Nations procedures.

And we hope very much that in the General Assembly this year, there will be some improvement. And, if there isn't, we will certainly make our position very plain.

**QUESTION:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, yesterday the West German press broke the scandal of the shipment of arms from U. S. bases in West Germany to the Phalange faction in Lebanon.

The Soviets have been increasingly threatening nuclear -- or rather, military - activi
ty to defend the existence of the Palestinians. And many of our sources
in the Ford faction in the White House point to the immediate danger
of a global nuclear war from your global policies.

Well, "Dr. Strangelove," (laughter), I'd like to ask if you don't think that a policy of debt moratorium is preferable to a global thermonuclear war?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I will make the daring assertion that I am against thermonuclear war. (Laughter)

I am not familiar with that story in the German press that material has been shipped from Germany to the Christian groups in Lebanon. And if it has, I don't believe it was American equipment. It was certainly not done with our permission.

**QUESTION:** This is in the Munich press in West Germany.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, it could be. I am not familiar with it.

But I also believe that we cannot set up a false antithesis between
the development -- a debt moratorium is really just one way of
encouraging development -- between development and security.

Now there has to be security for development to be meaningful, and
we have got the choice between security and development. If we cannot
do both, we cannot do either. So I am in favor of pursuing both
courses simultaneously, as I have attempted to indicate.

There was somebody over there who still wanted to ask me a question, but he seems to have disappeared.

**QUESTION:** How about a question from the gallery?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Do you want to have one question from the gallery? (Applause)

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[lc]

I will tell you after I hear the question, whether -- (Laughter and applause.)

**QUESTION:** Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger. It is a great pleasure (inaudible) in world affairs.

I would like to ask one question, if I may, but it calls for a statement first:

It appears to me that the record will show that you have done everything to promote disarmament, and the destruction of our defenses in America.

You, in fact, have made the statement that the way of the future is the communist-Moscow way of government.

I would like to know if a man in your important position in America truthfully holds that view, why do you not resign and let a true American take your place?

**Voices:** No!

**SECRETARY:** This is beginning to sound like a Washington press conference (laughter).

I don't want to disturb the equilibrium of the questioner (Laughter). But I hate to tell him that I have never said, nor do I believe, that communism is the wave of the future.

I have said, and I have tried to conduct foreign policy on exactly the opposite proposition.

Secondly, I have always believed, and I have said so in every public speech, that a strong defense is essential for an effective foreign policy. You cannot have an effective foreign policy without a strong defense.

At the same time I believe that the American people have to understand this, that in the thermonuclear age, a nuclear war would mean the end of civilized life as we know it.

And therefore a responsible Government official cannot engage in much tough rhetoric. He has an obligation to see what can be done to reduce the danger of nuclear catastrophe on the basis of reciprocal agreements, on the basis of unilateral American action.

And maybe this gentleman, and the previous questioner can get together and check their perception, because I think they have slightly divergent views, of what I stand for.

(Applause.)

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[c]

NO. 353

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

JULY 22, 1976

PC 105

**QUESTION:** In reference to Africa, in the past two weeks we have been having some military forces moving in that direction. I wonder, number one, if they are still there; and, number two, does this mean that we might look at some kind of military involvement in the crisis?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not want to comment on the location of military forces. What we want to do is discourage outside powers from intervening in this area. We believe that the African problems should be settled by Africa.

In fact, our basic principle has been to see that the African nations settle their disputes among each other. But this was an unusual case with international connotations, given the international implications of terrorism.

**QUESTION:** Why did you chose Seattle to send up a little trial balloon to North Korea?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course, no matter where I did it, I would have been asked that question.

I would not consider this a trial balloon to Korea. It is a trial balloon to all of the countries concerned, and it was, of course, discussed fully with South Korea before we did this. It was put forward with their concurrence.

I think Seattle is a natural place to speak about Asian affairs and Pacific affairs. But you can't speak about Asian affairs without speaking about the problem of Korea.

**QUESTION:** Back on the purely parochial issue which you learned about when you arrived here, you made a passing remark at the end that you would reconsider, and then sort of laughed it off, indicating that maybe or maybe not we would get a reply. Could you tell me whether or not you are going to reconsider the State Department's position on the Canadian natural gas question?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I will have to look at it. I frankly do not see

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PR #353

[lc]

how the United States Government can take the position that a foreign
government can exercise in effect monopolistic control by setting
differential prices within the United States. I think we have to take
the position that a foreign government can only treat the United States
as a unit and not differentially with separate parts of the United States.
And so, as a question of principle, it is very hard to reconsider.

Now, whether there is some relief possible, given the special conditions
of the Northwest, we will have to -- that is what I have to look into.

**QUESTION:** Were you aware that the states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho petitioned the US negotiator with the Canadian Federal Agency Board long before Canada came up with this disparate rate, and received at that time assurances from the Administration that "you do not need to send personal representatives here, we will watch out for your interests"?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I was not aware of this, quite candidly. I am going to look into these circumstances to see whether there are any special conditions. But, of course, we were opposed to the increase in rates altogether, so we made two appeals to Canada.

**QUESTION:** May I follow up on a little of that? Were you aware that Mr. Enders arranged the meeting for the Washington State utilities in Ottawa? I mean, before he became Ambassador, while he was Assistant Secretary.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Anybody who knows Mr. Enders knows he considers the Secretary of State an unavoidable intrusion in his authority (laughter). And you must not assume that I would know every appointment he has arranged.

I have to be quite candid. I did not follow all the details of that negotiation, nor is there any reason why the Secretary of State would follow a negotiation on rates of natural gas unless some principle of national policy got involved. That principle turned out to be whether a foreign government should have the right to set preferential rates within the United States. And whether we must not take the position that foreign governments must treat the United States as a unit.

Now, what I want to look into is whether -- what the implications are of the special conditions to which my attention has been drawn.

**QUESTION:** Do you find that you are --

You didn't have any problem with this today -- but do you find that you are having a problem in keeping from being drawn into the political campaign, now that the Convention is so close?

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PR # 335

[lc]

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the speech I gave today I could have given it at any time. I don't think that is a partisan issue, and that is our policy. I will do my best not to be drawn into the campaign, and I will certainly take no offensive action. I will not look for disagreements. So, I would prefer to keep foreign policy non-partisan, and to have it discussed in terms of specific issues, rather than in terms of personalities or in terms of the good faith of the various people concerned.

**QUESTION:** Do you share Jimmy Carter's worries about Mr. Reagan possibly having a dangerous nature?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Shall I say I reciprocate Mr. Reagan's feelings?
(Laughter)

I do not want to get into that. I think this is something which I prefer not to comment on.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you made it quite clear, I believe on at least one or two occasions, that you do intend to leave the State Department within the next few months. Are there any circumstances that you can foresee that can make you change that opinion?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I stated my view on that subject, I think it was in May, and I have said since that I don't want to get drawn into further explanations of it. I think we now have to wait until after the election and can see what conditions are then.

**QUESTION:** Do you have any plans beyond your present role in the State Department?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have not discussed my future plans with anybody. The people approach me, I turn them over to my lawyer who is, however, under instructions not to share with me what they ask. So, I don't know what they have discussed. I don't think it would be appropriate for me as Secretary of State to discuss my future plans with outsiders until I have resigned.

And you know, it is hard to know what one exactly can do -- unless there is some government that needs somebody to run its foreign policy.
(Laughter)

Okay, thank you gentlemen.

**THE PRESS:** Thank you, sir.

* * * * *

MR. HOLLAND: Good evening. May I have your attention? Moderating our program this evening is Mr. J. Richard Nokes, Editor of the Portland Oregonian and past President of the World Affairs Council. I ask that Dick please introduce this panel.

MR. NOKES: Thank you, Mr. Holland. I would like to first introduce Tom McCall, former Governor and television commentator to KG Television Channel. (Applause)

MR. MCCALL: Thank you.

MR. NOKES: Next is Wanda McAlister, who is Editor of the editorial page of the Corvallis Gazette Times, who last week won the Editorial of the Year Award from the Oregon Newspapers Publishers Association. (Applause)

Donald Sterling, Jr., Editor of the Oregon Journal. (Applause)

Kenneth Rystrom, Editor of the Vancouver, Washington Columbian. (Applause)

MR. RYSTROM: Thank you, Dick.

MR. NOKES: Thank you.

MR. HOLLAND: Thank you, Dick. The World Affairs Council of Oregon, like its counterparts over the country, has long been dedicated to the promise that one of the strongest elements in the arsenal of democracy is an informed citizenry. So, it is most appropriate tonight that soon after the very successful appearance here of President Ford at the conclusion of the Northwest Forum on Foreign Policy, that we have as our honored guest a man who has tirelessly travelled the globe in pursuit of an elusive peace.

He is also one who has made significant contributions to the domestic understanding of foreign policy issues, which in one form or another, directly impinge on our lives and fortunes here in the trading and shipping center that we know as the City of Roses.

Our speaker tonight requires no formal dissertation on my part. His distinguished career as a Harvard faculty member has been enriched by authorship of half a dozen books in international affairs and diplomatic history.

His honors and awards are legend. His contribution to strategic studies, both in and out of the military, are impressive and varied.

He was sworn in as America's 56th Secretary of State on September 26, 1973.

Our speaker has been described as a latter day Metternich. But in these days of instant communications and flash-point diplomacy, a word familiar to all of us here in the heavily timbered and fire-conscious Northwest, he is probably best known as the central force of what has become the

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era of shuttle diplomacy, an age of almost ceaseless efforts to bring
peace among the warring nations of the Middle East.

Our guest tonight has his human side. He once confided to an Italian journalist that he felt at times like a lone cowboy leading caravans into dangerous territory.

I believe we can assure him that here in the West on the Oregon trail, the analogy is very apt. But we can also reassure him that both the country and the natives are friendly in large part. (Applause)

So we invite him to fire away at the problems he sees on the ramparts of the world of both peril and promise.

Will you join me and welcome Dr. Henry Alfred Kissinger, Secretary of State, from America and the idea of America as a most special place in heart and mind.

(Standing ovation)

MR. NOKES: Mr. Secretary, do you have any opening remarks before we begin our questions by the panel?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to say, first of all, that it is very dangerous for you to ask a former Harvard professor to make opening remarks because the normal period of remarks for me is 50 minutes. (Laughter) And I don't usually get to the verb until the 25th. (Laughter)

I appreciated the very friendly things that have been said about me. Before you get too impressed by my authorship of books, I would like to tell you what a British reviewer wrote about one of my books. He said, "I don't know whether Mr. Kissinger is a great writer, but anyone finishing his book is a great reader." (Laughter)

When I was a professor, nothing used to irritate me more than senior officials who descended on us and explained to us that all options had been considered. The best possible one had been chosen. And if we only knew as much as they did, there wouldn't be a question period. (Laughter) I am here to tell you that all options have been considered. (Laughter and applause) And the best possible ones have been chosen. And if that doesn't intimidate the panel, nothing will. (Laughter)

But I thought, rather than make a formal presentation, it is more interesting for me to be able to respond to some questions. It is also easier on my staff if they don't have to prepare a formal speech.

The basic point that I would like to leave with you, ladies and gentlemen, is that we have been living through a revolutionary period of foreign policy -- not because we want to, but because conditions in the world have changed.

Through all of American history until the late Sixties the United States was physically predominant. We could choose to enter foreign affairs

PR #554

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or withdraw as we saw fit. We had such a margin of physical superiority over other countries that we could wait until dangers became overwhelming.

Now we live in a world in which there are other countries of roughly equal strength. And therefore we have to conduct foreign policy, no matter who is in office, with a sense of nuance, on the basis of permanence, the way other nations have had to conduct foreign policy throughout their history. That means that the relationship between the public and those who make decisions becomes extremely important -- more important than in any previous period. Because when the scope for action is greatest, the knowledge on which to base such action is at a minimum, and when the knowledge is greatest, the scope for action has often disappeared.

In 1936, Hitler's Germany could have been stopped with very little effort. And if that had been done, people would still be arguing today whether Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist or a maniac bent on world domination. But by 1941, everyone knew that he was a maniac bent on world domination. We had to pay for this knowledge -- or the world had to pay for this knowledge with 20 million lives.

So, when one acts in time, one has to do so on the basis of an assessment that one cannot prove true when it happens. And therefore there is a need for confidence and a need for restraint if one is to avoid harder decisions further down the road.

We have, in the thermonuclear age, complicated problems, on the one hand of maintaining our military security, because no nation can make itself dependent on the good will of another nation. But we also have to realize the fact that in the thermonuclear age the question of war and peace takes on an unprecedented character. A nuclear war would mean tens of millions of casualties and the end of society as we have known it. Therefore, no task is more urgent than the maintenance and preservation of peace, as long as it can be done honorably.

In addition to this, we live in a world in which there are a hundred or so new nations that have to be integrated into the community of nations.

So these tasks of security, of peace, of the construction of an international order are the tasks that have preoccupied me while I have been in office, and preoccupied President Ford, and they will preoccupy anybody else who is in this position.

And it is for this reason that I welcome opportunities such as these to go out into the country, meet with concerned citizens, hear their questions and try to respond to the best of my ability.

So, why don't we, with your permission, turn this over to the panel.

PR #354

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**MR. NOKES:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I decided that I had the right to ask the first question, and I am sure some one will ask it tonight, so I will ask it now and get it out of the way.

Mr. Secretary, three or four years ago, you were riding the crest of a popularity wave. You were on the cover of the news magazines which called you "Super K." More lately you have been bruised by Democratic criticism in Congress, Republican criticism from Ronald Reagan's supporters and a picket line in front of our building tonight.

Do you feel, in retrospect, that you should have quit while you were ahead (laughter) and is there any feeling on your part, or on the President's part, that you should leave your present position prior to the election in November?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, of course, my father is of the view that -- and he is an objective observer (laughter) -- that this criticism is extremely unfair. (Applause and laughter)

It is true that there has been some criticism. But I think this is inevitable in an election year. I have the impression that for the main lines of our foreign policy, there is considerable support. I don't think it would be proper to leave to husband one's popularity. I think one has, if one is fortunate enough to have public support, that is something one should use to do constructive things and not something that one should attempt to bank and preserve. And in attempting to bank it, one will certainly lose it. Because the ultimate judgment is what people think of one's actions five or ten years from now and not the fluctuations of day-to-day opinion.

But, on the whole, I think we have had the sort of support that makes policy possible.

I have no intention of leaving before the election. (Applause) After the election, there are many applicants for my job. (Laughter)

**MR. MCCALL:** Two months ago, Mr. Secretary, I interviewed your boss, the President, and you had made the statement the day before that you planned to leave the Administration. And I said to Mr. Ford, aren't you going to wheedle him into staying and try to keep him there? And he said, "I believe when you have a good man, you want to try to keep him." I am wondering if any amount of wheedling, either by President Ford or Jimmy Carter, might induce you to stay on as Secretary of State?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I have seen the beginnings of three Administrations, and that is a rough period while people adjust to each other. So, I would say that I would not think that I should begin

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with a new Administration again. But I would also hasten to add that I don't have the impression that I will have to spend sleepless nights on that problem. (Laughter)

I couldn't break so many hearts of people who are already measuring the drapes in my office. (Laughter)

In case President Ford -- or when President Ford is re-elected, I don't think it would be proper for me to say now that I will not talk to him, and we will just have to wait until that situation occurs.

**MRS. MCALISTER:** The Olympic teams are very much on people's minds on television these days. At one point, the United States threatened to boycott the games because of the Taiwan-China question. And now, 29 or 30 -- I don't know how many teams have walked out over the New Zealand team's tour of South Africa. And the whole future of the games seems very much up in the air.

I am wondering, as a foreign relations asset, do the games really serve a constructive purpose, or has politicalization become too intense to warrant continuation of the games?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Our basic position has been that the Olympic Games should be treated as a sports event in which the competitors are there because of athletic ability and not to make a political point.

We were in no position as a government to either enter a team or to withdraw a team. Our position was not geared to the merits of the issue of which of the governments that claimed to represent China should be represented at the Olympics.

Our position was that if the host government insisted on its political judgment over that of the International Olympics Committee, then in 1980, when these games are in Moscow, or in 1984 when they could be anywhere else, there would be a political test applied to each of the participants, and the games would become totally politicized.

Our position was that whomever the International Olympics Committee certified should be free to appear and that the host government should act as a landlord rather than as a screening agency.

Similarly, we think that the participation of other governments or of other countries should not depend on their agreement with actions of one of the member countries, whose individual team may have competed in a way that they didn't like.

So we hope very much that the Olympic Games can be returned to the athletes and do not become an arena in which political tests are applied.
(Applause)

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MR. NOKES: Don Sterling.

MR. STERLING: Sir, one of the issues that is of some concern here in the Pacific Northwest is the problem of illegal immigration, especially from Mexico. Is there anything the United States can do that it hasn't done to reduce that flow or to otherwise alleviate it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The illegal immigration is produced by two pressures -- obviously by pressures within Mexico which make it attractive for people to leave and work in the United States; and by pressures in the United States to get cheap labor.

In addition, there is a long frontier which is almost impossible to police.

We have attempted to -- we have had negotiations with the Mexican Government on this subject. And the latest idea which we are attempting to explore is to see whether we can put the economic assistance, or the technical aid that we give to Mexico in those farm areas from which the greatest exodus takes place, to create additional incentives for people to stay there. And many people think, and the Mexican Government believes, that this may be a promising approach, which we will be trying in the next year.

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**QUESTION:** Do you have the impression, sir, that the Mexican Government is doing all it can to discourage this illegal immigration?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is a tough political problem for the Mexican Government. It is not using maximum force, which one can understand.

**MR. NOKES:** Ken Rystrom.

**MR. RYSTROM:** Mr. Secretary, recently you said that Governor Carter's foreign policy basically was parallel to yours, his proposed foreign policy. And I was curious what was behind your statement. Were you trying to take the foreign policy out of the Fall campaign? Were you looking for a job next January? (Laughter).

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have already said that I --

**MR. RYSTROM:** I know, you kind of stole my thunder on that one. (Laughter) But I still had to ask that question. But, further, in what areas do you see your policy and his proposals as being parallel?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course, I suffer from the fact that Governor Carter has pronounced himself on foreign policy only twice in general speeches. So there has not been excessive precision in his pronouncements. I was referring to the general philosophical outlines.

I do believe that the foreign policy of the United States should be approached on a non-partisan basis. I do not believe it is healthy for our country and for other countries to have the impression that every four or eight years there can be a fundamental revision of foreign policy.

That doesn't mean that there cannot be tactical disagreements. Of course there can be. But the main lines of our foreign policy have to reflect the basic interests and basic values of the American people. And they don't change that frequently.

This is why I believe that if at all possible, debates on foreign policy should be conducted with great restraint. And my general hope is to keep the foreign policy issues on as high a level as possible.

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I don't doubt that as Governor Carter spells out his program in greater detail that my professorial instinct may run away with me. And undoubtedly disagreements will develop. And, as I said at a press conference in Washington some weeks ago, there have been enough hints and indications in what Governor Carter has said on individual items in which we would not see eye to eye. But I will wait until they are spelled out more before we make any comment.

But I don't think, in any event, that it is the function of the Secretary of State to be a principal participant in a political campaign. (Applause)

MR. NOKES: Tom McCall has another question.

MR. McCALL: Do you think, Mr. Secretary, that the dialogue in the Presidential race has in any way influenced or impaired the conduct of American foreign policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Inevitably in an election year, foreign governments are beginning to look at what may be ahead. Inevitably they will have to ask the question whether the government with which they are dealing -- or the Administration with which they are dealing -- is going to be able to carry out whatever commitments it is making in the negotiations. Which is one reason why it is important for foreign governments to have the sense that there will be substantial continuity for the main lines of our foreign policy no matter who is in office.

I cannot say that our foreign policy has as yet been impaired by the political campaign. I have the impression that foreign governments are getting more sophisticated in understanding what is being said in the pageant of the moment.

So, on the whole, and in fact rather surprisingly for me, I think we have been able to conduct foreign policy without any substantial impact by the election.

MR. NOKES: Wanda McAlister.

MRS. MCALISTER: Terrorism, with all its trappings of political murders and skijacking and all the rest, continues unabated and seems to be on the increase. Yet the United Nations can't even pass a resolution condemning terrorist acts.

Is there any hope that that organization can take effective action whatsoever to reduce terrorism? Or how do you propose that international terrorism can be controlled?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: The difficulty with getting international action on terrorism is that there are always some governments that sympathize with the objectives of some of the terrorists, even though they don't agree with their methods. There are other governments that are afraid of what the terrorists might do to them if they take drastic action. And therefore in the past it has not been possible to get international action.

Now, it is becoming, however, increasingly apparent. I think more and more nations are coming to realize that terrorism is a blight on the human conscience and it is an offense to all civilized relationships among nations.

It is true we could not get the required majority for the anti-terrorism vote in the United Nations Security Council. But we did have six nations in favor and four nations opposed, and we were just lacking the three additional votes which it would have taken to make it a legal resolution.

But the other resolution, the one that was condemning Israel for its raid, was never brought to a vote at all, which is a considerable change over the mood in the United Nations a year or two ago.

We will reintroduce -- or we will support the reintroduction of -- anti-terrorism resolution, and particularly focused on the kidnapping of people, on the issue of the kidnapping of people and hijacking of airplanes, in which we hope that the international community of the United Nations will put some teeth into its provisions, and we will not understand if nations will not go along with trying to stamp out this blight.

MRS. MCALISTER: What sort of teeth are you talking about?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: For example, we are now working with several countries on this. But if, for example, there were international agreements to prevent hijackers from landing in an airport, and if countries that permitted hijackers to land were then excluded from the International Civil Aviation Organization, I think some progress could be made.

We had a spate of hijackings with Cuba for a long time, and then an agreement was made, and since then there haven't been any. So we know it can be stamped out if there is decisive international action, if there is no haven to which the terrorists could go.

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PR #354

MR. NOKES: Don Sterling.

MR. STERLING: Shifting to the Middle East, sir, what effect does the war in Lebanon have on your step-by-step diplomacy in the Middle East.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First, let me explain with respect to our diplomacy. We were faced in 1973 with a situation in which there was an oil embargo. We had no diplomatic relations with any of the key Arab countries. The whole industrialized world was in increasing difficulties because of the impact of the Middle East war.

The Soviet Union was backing the Arab countries and was the principal influence in several of the Arab countries.

Under those conditions, our immediate objective had to be to prevent the impact of this crisis from escalating further. We also thought that for nations who had made no progress towards peace for a generation, it was important above all to get to learn to deal with each other.

Under those conditions, the step-by-step approach was the most effective method to make progress, because it enabled us to reduce problems to manageable proportions -- insofar as anything is manageable in the Middle East -- and enabled the countries to take those steps on which they could agree.

We were also convinced that somewhere along the line, the step-by-step approach would merge into an over-all approach and that an attempt would be made to bring about a permanent peace on the basis of negotiations between the Arab countries and Israel. And we are approaching that point in any event.

Now, the impact of Lebanon on this process has been that for the time being the energies of almost all of the participants in a potential negotiation in the Middle East, and particularly of the Arab participants, is focused on their disagreements with respect to the evolution of Lebanon. And the Lebanese civil war has taken on these tragic dimensions because each of the factions--each of the Arab factions -- is backed to a greater or lesser extent by some of the Arab countries.

So I would have to say that until the problem of Lebanon is resolved, it will be very difficult to get enough attention to (make) serious progress on the Middle East. And the degree of unity among the Arab countries as to their political objectives is essential to make significant progress towards peace.

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**MR. STERLING:** As a follow-up, then, by your lights, what would be the happiest possible resolution of the Lebanese situation?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think, however, that as the Lebanese situation develops and as it evolves, the experience of the various Arab countries with the crisis may bring about consolidations that would be quite favorable to peace.

Now, what the United States has always believed is that the outcome in Lebanon should be one in which the territorial integrity of Lebanon is preserved, in which the two communities, the Christian and the Moslem community, can exist side by side without either of them attempting to impose its will on the other. And this will require some new constitutional arrangements from those that prevailed previously. And if the Lebanese parties are left to settle their disputes -- and I believe that some formula can be found and will be found, in which these objectives can be achieved.

**MR. NOKES:** Mr. Rystrom.

**MR. RYSTROM:** Are you prepared, Mr. Secretary, or are you willing to state whether the United States played any role at all in the rescue of the Israeli plane in Uganda, the gathering of intelligence, the role of the CIA or any other type of activity?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As you know, we would be glad to grab any little bit of credit that is available. And we have been known to do that. (Laughter) But even with the best will in the world, we can't claim any credit for the Israeli actions. We did not know ahead of time what they were planning or that they were planning anything. And we gave them no intelligence. They did this by themselves and we were as surprised as anybody else when we were informed about it.

**MR. RYSTROM:** What does that then say about your intelligence? (Laughter)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** According to the accounts that have been published, this whole operation was conceived, planned and carried out within a 48-hour period. And within a 48-hour period, it is extremely difficult to put together these various indicators that you can tend to get in retrospect that would give you these indications.

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You have to remember that intelligence is composed of many bits and pieces, many of which are quite confusing when you get them. Afterwards, when the whole event has occurred, you can usually then understand what each little item meant. But this was something that in the nature of things we could have very little information about. And that would not be a failure of intelligence, because our intelligence is not specifically targeted on Israeli actions in Africa. (Laughter)

MR. NOKES: I wonder if the moderator might interject a question concerning the local area? Mr. Secretary, South Korea is extremely important in this area as a trading partner. Today in Seattle, you renewed a call for a four-party conference for the People's Republic of China, North Korea and South Korea, to meet in New York to negotiate a reduction of tensions and create a permanent armistice in Korea.

I believe you stated that old agreements are not the Ten Commandments.

Might this not be interpreted as a willingness on our part to write off our old friend South Korea as a part of the Communist world? What would the United States seek from such a conference? What would be our goals?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That was a rather eloquent phrase there that I wished I had used. (Laughter) I must compliment the Associated Press writer who is a lot more eloquent than I am. (Laughter)

What I attempted to do -- in Seattle -- is to explain the proposals that the North Koreans and their allies and supporters have made in the United Nations. I pointed out that those proposals are absolutely unacceptable to the United States. Those proposals are the unilateral withdrawal of American forces; the abolishing of the United Nations Command; and in effect the end of the armistice on a unilateral basis, and then bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea.

I pointed out that the United States would not negotiate with North Korea except in the presence of South Korea; that we would not negotiate over the fate of an ally without the participation of that ally.

Secondly, we expressed our general readiness to replace the existing armistice agreement by a more permanent arrangement if a more permanent arrangement could be negotiated.

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MR. NOKES: A two-Korea arrangement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: A two-Korea arrangement, unless the two Koreas agreed to unify, which is up to the two Koreas, but not something that we will impose on them.

I think if you read my speech, you will find it a strong defense of our South Korean allies, a strong statement that we will not accept the Communist negotiating program, but that we are prepared to meet in a forum in which there would be a representative of the United States, South Korea, North Korea and the People's Republic of China, to discuss other ideas.

The proposal that I made today had the strong and willing support of the South Korean Government, which has urged us to make some concrete proposal to indicate that we are prepared to have arrangements on the Peninsula that do not depend simply on an armistice agreement. But under no circumstances will the United States negotiate behind the back of its ally.

And under no circumstances will we unilaterally withdraw our forces from Korea in the absence of a political arrangement.

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MR. NOKES: Tom McCall.

MR. MCCALL: I am looking at a copy or a clipping from the
*Los Angeles Times* concerning your press conference of a recent
Saturday, Mr. Secretary, and the reporter said you seemed to be
more concerned with justifying past policies than urging new
ones. Is that because you are looking forward to a new career
in November, or is the situation so turbulent that you have
to in diplomacy simply react rather than initiate? Are initiatives --
what direction would some new initiatives take? Or are we
just trying to combat yesterday's left-overs as far as problems
are concerned?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I didn't read this particular story. It is
in the nature of the format of a press conference that you are
always justifying old policies. I don't remember that in a
press conference anyone ever got up and said, "Have you thought of
any new initiatives lately?" (Laughter and applause)

The press conference is not the place where you float new
initiatives, and this, therefore, is a criticism that can be
made of any press conference that any President or Secretary of
State has ever had that dealt with foreign policy.

I think, over the past year, we have made a number of major
initiatives in the field of our relations between the
developed and developing countries, as in
the Special Session of the United Nations General

Assembly and at the Conference on International Economic
Cooperation. We have made major initiatives in the field of our
relations with our allies. We are continuing initiatives with
relation to the limitation of armaments. But when we make
proposals, we make them in formal speeches and not in answers
to questions because it might just happen that the right
question isn't asked, and then we would be left sitting there and
having the press conference. (Laughter)

MR. NOKES: Mrs. McAlister.

MRS. MCALISTER: Secretary Kissinger, after what has been called
the decade of benign neglect, the United States has suddenly and
very conspicuously injected itself on the African scene. The
war in Angola, with participation by the Cuban troops as the
Soviet arm, seemed to precipitate this involvement.

First off, are there any indications in fact that Cuba will take
its troops home from Angola? And, secondly, is the United States
making some dent in convincing South Africa and Rhodesia to
take more rapid steps toward eventual majority black rule?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to the Cuban troops, we were given an indication, when I visited Sweden, by the Prime Minister of Sweden, who was speaking on behalf of the Cuban Government, that they would start withdrawing troops at a specified rate.

We have not been able to confirm this in any manner. It is true that Cuban troops are leaving Angola. It is also true that other Cubans, either troops or civilian personnel, are entering Angola. And what the net flow is has not been -- we have not been able to determine conclusively.

In any event, the net flow is so relatively insignificant that it does not affect the basic situation of a massive Cuban expeditionary force in Angola that has imposed a government on Angola that could not have been achieved any other way. That is the basic factor to which we object.

Now, with respect to the United States in South Africa.

The United States has an interest in preventing a race war from developing in southern Africa, which will have a high potential of bringing in new outside intervention, which would then turn the African countries more and more towards violence and radicalism, and given the historical relationship between Europe and Africa, and between many parts of our population and Africa, such a consequence would have a major impact on the stability of the international system.

So, our attempt in Africa has been to see whether it was possible to settle these conflicts through a negotiation in which both communities in Rhodesia and Namibia especially, white and black communities, can continue to live side by side. And to do this before they get into a war that took on new dimensions in which the outcome can only be a radical solution.

We are not injecting ourself into a situation that would not exist without us. If we do not act, then violence will become more and more widespread and coexistence will become impossible. And it is the judgment of everybody who has studied the problem, of all the experts, that sooner or later these minority governments, such as Rhodesia, will not be able to support themselves.

This is why we have strongly urged negotiated solutions. We are now in the process of exploring with black African countries and with South Africa a formula by which perhaps a negotiated solution can be achieved.

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We do this in order to put an end to the violence, in order to put an end to the war, and in order to permit the white and the black communities to live side by side, to avoid a race war, and to avoid the radicalization of all of Africa.

We could do nothing which is the tempting thing to do. Then, a year or two from now, we will face impossible problems. And just as Angola made the next case more difficult, so inactivity in Rhodesia and Namibia will make further evolution even more painful and even more difficult.

This is why we take this initiative. This is why we are making an effort. And we believe that there are possibilities of a solution in which the black moderate leaders and the white communities can coexist and with which a race war is averted, which is both a moral and political necessity.

MRS. McALISTER: And you are saying progress is being made toward this?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think there is a possibility of progress. Passions are very high and the differences between these people are very great. But we think that the possibility of progress exists.

MR. NOKES: Before we come on to you, Don, may I ask those who have been selected from the floor to ask questions, approach the mikes and get ready, and now we have time for one more short question from Don.

MR. STERLING: In the light of your expressed hope for a peaceful resolution in Africa, why do we continue to allow the recruiting of mercenaries in the United States?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am not aware that mercenaries are being recruited in the United States right now. And it is certainly not done with the connivance or agreement of the Government. I am not exactly sure what the legal position is and what legal authority we have. But I want to make it absolutely clear that the United States does not encourage, or support, the recruiting of mercenaries for the wars in Africa.

MR. NOKES: We are now ready to take questions from the mikes.

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PR #354

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, my question is as follows: What are the chances of a second Arab oil embargo? And what should the United States response be to a possible second Arab oil embargo, if one should occur?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the possibilities -- our relations with the Arab world have improved to a point where an oil embargo is not likely to be undertaken lightly. If there should be another Arab-Israeli conflict, I suppose that there will be several Arab states that will be tempted to do this.

Since 1973 we and the other industrialized nations have formed an agency -- the so-called International Energy Agency -- whose purpose it is to make it easier for the industrialized nations to withstand the impact of an oil embargo. We have built up our oil stocks so that most countries now have between six to nine months of reserves. We've agreed to share available supplies, and we've brought about a situation where a selective embargo is no longer possible because of the mutual support that the industrialized nations will give to each other. So an embargo would be a much more complicated matter.

And without going into details, it's not a matter which the oil exporting countries should take lightly because in the future the United States and its industrial allies would also -- would look to their own economic means of resistance.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I would like to know: Will the United States take any action to try to reconcile the differences between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, both parties have maintained that we have no standing in reconciling these differences and both parties have insisted that this is an essentially internal Chinese affair. We have stated publicly that we favor a peaceful negotiation of these differences and we would welcome any efforts to do this. But this is a matter that may take a while to work itself out and it is a matter that we will leave primarily to the Chinese to negotiate -- although, of course, you're aware of the fact that we have a defense treaty with Taiwan.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you feel now that the State Department made a mistake in not intervening and to stop the Turkish nation to halt their invasion of Cyprus -- as was done previously by President Johnson -- and since the results of not intervening are not what they are today, what are your plans and suggestions for a settlement of the Cyprus tragedy?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, first of all, the State Department
ment is -- I'm always moved when I travel around and I'm asked
about the State Department as if it were a monolithic organiza-
tion. (Laughter) It's not the impression of it where I sit.
(Laughter)

Secondly, those of you who know Washington know that the
Pentagon doesn't necessarily do what the State Department asks
it to do (laughter) -- so these decisions are national decisions
taken by the President.

Thirdly, if you look at the situation that existed at the time
of the Cyprus crisis, the United States, if it had intervened
militarily, would have been intervening against an ally on
behalf of a Greek Government of which we strongly disapproved and
in defense of an action which had been started by that Greek
Government. It is forgotten today that during the first week
of that crisis -- the week during which the Turkish invasion took
place -- the State Department was accused of siding with the
Greeks and of not condemning the Greeks sufficiently. And this
may have been true because we wanted to discourage a Turkish
invasion.

Now -- and if you will remember also the situation that existed
in the United States in July 1974, in the last weeks of the
Watergate crisis -- to engage in a military action against an
ally, under those circumstances, on behalf of a government
with which we were in strong disagreement, would not have been a
simple matter. And, therefore, I supported -- and still support,
in retrospect -- the decision that was then made not to use the
Sixth Fleet in a military operation.

I must say also that one of the primary reasons why further
progress has not been made is the intervention by the Congress,
which has constantly legislated acts which have interrupted
the negotiating process through the various embargoes which they
have legislated -- which have deprived both sides of the in-
centives to make concessions and which have brought about a
situation where the status quo has lasted a lot longer than it
should have.

I believe that progress can be made. The United States would
strongly support and be willing to assist in the negotiating
process. We have stated publicly that we do not believe that
the territory -- that the settlement can be along the lines
that now exist in Cyprus. We have stated publicly -- and we

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are willing to back this up -- that a settlement must take into account a sense of justice and self-respect of all of the communities -- especially of the Greek community, which has been deprived of a great deal of its territory. But it is not possible to conduct a serious negotiation when there are constant specific legislative proposals, because a negotiation has to be conducted over a sufficient period of time. It can only be conducted by a few people.

That is the basic reason why there have been difficulties in the negotiations in Cyprus, which we regret and in which we would be prepared to make a major effort to bring about a just settlement.

**QUESTION:** The question, Mr. Secretary, is: What is the basis for selling goods, technology and making bank credits available to the Soviet Union, when these are helping the Soviet Union extend its worldwide policies against the interests and security of the United States?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, first of all, as far as credits are concerned, the United States Government has made available only infinitesimal credits compared to what other nations have done.

The governmental indebtedness of the Soviet Union to the United States is a few hundred million dollars. The credits given by Western Europe and Japan to the Soviet Union are close to $11 billion.

So what the United States has done is a rather small part of the total and it is a pity that we have been deprived, again, through legislative action, of the authority to do more -- because we would be in a better position to negotiate specific political arrangements in return for credits than the weaker countries and the weaker economies of Western Europe and Japan.

With respect to both the credits and the food, we face this problem. This morning in Seattle I was asked the same question from exactly the opposite point of view. The question was put in terms of our interrupting the sale of grain to the Soviet Union for political objectives. And the national decision we have to make is whether foreign countries can enter the American market simply on commercial terms, regardless of the political circumstances, without the United States negotiating some political foreign policy benefit for itself, or whether the United States will try to get some foreign policy benefits.

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If we try to get foreign policy benefits there will have to be
some authority to interrupt the entering of our market.

Now, this is a question that in the case of the grain has been
resolved in favor of permitting foreign countries to enter our market,
esentially without restrictions. It has been a policy that I have noticed
every Presidential candidate has affirmed and that also reflects our nation
decision. But in that case one cannot afterwards complain that we are selling
grain to the Soviets because that has been the decision which has been produced by our democratic process.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, my Jewish brothers and sisters are being tortured, enslaved and murdered in the Soviet Union. In view of the Helsinki Accord, is not the right of Jewish emigration of prime concern to this Administration?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When this Administration came into office
in 1969, 500 Jewish people emigrated from the Soviet Union a
year. We have taken the position -- we took the position
then -- that we would not make any dramatic issues but that we
would appeal to the Soviet Union quietly and using the general
atmosphere of our relationship in order to make progress on
emigration.

Between 1969 and 1973 the rate of emigration from the Soviet
Union went from 500 a year to 35,000 a year. It was then made
a public political issue and -- again -- the subject of attention.
And the emigration went down from 35,000 to 12,000.

The question, therefore, is: What policy is most likely to
bring results?

This Administration has never ceased urging an increase in
emigration. We have repeatedly and successfully submitted
lists of people in prison to the Soviet Union and we have
achieved the release of a large percentage of those lists that
we have submitted. When we have been successful, we have not
made any public claim for it because we have thought that the
saving of lives was more important than getting the credit.

It is our conviction that results are more likely if we do not
turn it into a public confrontation on an issue that will be
argued as being within the Soviet domestic jurisdiction. But
it is a matter of profound concern -- a matter which this
Administration has strongly supported -- and in which great progress
has been made and in which we are prepared to continue to
exercise a great deal of influence.

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**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, can you tell us the difference between your latest concept of foreign policy as differing from that of Professor Brzezinki, who likes to think of himself as your possible successor? (Laughter)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I've told my friend Brzezinki that there is no constitutional requirement that the Secretary of State must be foreign-born. (Laughter and applause) And one of the difficulties of being both a professor and a Secretary of State is that half of the professors in the country then get to think that they should be also Secretaries of State. (Laughter) They can bear having a lawyer or a businessman in this office, but one of their own is more than their nervous constitution can tolerate. (Laughter)

Now, as far as Brzezinki is concerned, I don't consider myself in competition with him. And he has been known to change his opinion at various times. Sometimes I've agreed with him; sometimes I haven't agreed with him. But he's a man of considerable ability and has written some outstanding books. And I wish him well in his academic career. (Laughter and applause)

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what in principle is the official United States proposal regarding the Panama Canal?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** One of the amazing things of this Presidential campaign is that suddenly an issue was raised that gave the impression that new negotiations had been started on the Panama Canal.

The first thing to keep in mind is that the negotiations about the Panama Canal have been going on since 1964 in three Administrations and not necessarily commented upon by some of the most vocal critics of the Panama negotiations this year.

The issue of the Panama Canal is not whether the United States should accept the position of a tin-horn dictator -- as the phrase went -- in Panama. The issue is the relationship of the United States to all the countries of the Western Hemisphere. And what the United States has to decide is whether -- if we can achieve guaranteed free and uninterrupted access through the Canal -- whether it is possible to change some of the other arrangements with respect to the Canal.

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We cannot make any concessions on the right of free, guaranteed and neutral access through the Canal. If that condition can be met, then there are serious issues having to do with the operation of the Canal -- issues having to do with the defense installations in the Canal Zone and having to do with the nature of the defense arrangements for the Canal.

Those are in the process of being negotiated and not one line of an agreement has yet been put on paper. All our negotiations have been fully briefed to the Congressional committees.

The procedure that we would undoubtedly follow if the negotiations were to make progress would be first to agree on a basic concept -- to submit this to the Congress for discussion -- and then when the basic concept has achieved general agreement, then we would negotiate a treaty.

That treaty would again go to the Senate, where it could be blocked by a third-plus-one vote.

So there is no possibility of doing anything that does not have the overwhelming support of the American public. We are, of course, prepared to defend our rights for free and unimpeded access through the Panama Canal. (Applause) But, if we have to do this, we want to be able to look the American people in the eye and say, "We have made very effort to avoid such a contingency." And we do not want to risk all our relations with all of the countries in the Western Hemisphere without at least exploring whether it is possible to make an arrangement which guarantees our rights by other means.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, as Admiral Zumwalt suggested, do you believe that the U.S. in the future will lose its position of pre-eminent leadership in world affairs?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I've nominated Admiral Zumwalt for the Pulitzer Prize for fiction. (Laughter and applause) I don't think the good Admiral has yet fully grapsed the fact that in running for the Senate in Virginia his opponent is called "Byrd" and not "Kissinger." (Laughter)

I have never expressed the view that he ascribes to me, and I do not believe -- I've never believed, nor do I believe today -- that the United States is bound to become in a secondary position to any other country. (Applause)

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I do believe that there are changing circumstances in the world which we have to take into account, but under no circumstances will the United States accept second place, and under all circumstances must the United States maintain sufficient military power to make sure that no other country can impose its will on the United States. (Applause)

**QUESTION:** Secretary Kissinger, during the Kennedy Alliance for Progress era, a strong U.S.-Latin America bond was beginning to form. What since has happened, and how can this Pan-American bond again be re-cemented?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** During the Kennedy period, the Alliance for Progress was a very imaginative approach to Latin America, but it is also true that it was no longer appropriate to the conditions that developed later. The basic premise of the Alliance for Progress -- namely, that the United States could define for Latin America what its institutions might be and that the United States could develop a program made in the United States for Latin America-- do not correspond to the realities of the late Sixties and of the contemporary period.

We have tried to substitute for it something that we have called "The New Dialogue," in which we deal with each other on a more equal basis and in which we try to take into account the emergence in Latin America of many countries that are going to be within a generation among the most powerful nations in the world and whose rate of economic progress is very considerable.

This policy has made considerable progress. It is not as dramatic because a long-range policy doesn't lend itself to great drama. But I think the foundations have been laid for close cooperation in the field of economic cooperation, in the field of transfer of technology and in the field of restructuring the institutions of the Western Hemisphere that in the next year or two are going to show considerable result.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how can a rise in the price of oil by the oil-producing countries be prevented by other means than trading in armaments?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I don't think that the trade in armaments is a device to prevent the rise in oil prices. I think it results from the rise in oil prices that has already occurred because it gives the oil-producing countries enormously large resources with which to purchase either industrial goods or armaments -- if that's what they choose -- so the basic problem is not that we are trying to prevent a rise in oil prices by selling armaments. The fact is that having already achieved

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such tremendous surpluses as a result of the oil prices that have
occurred since 1973, the oil-producing countries can enter the
international market and buy armaments. And if they don't
get them from us, they get them from other countries. And it
isn't in our interest. Our purpose in selling arms, when we do, is
not to prevent the rise in prices but in order to prevent
other countries from gaining the position of influence that often
comes with the sale of arms.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask if you believe that the Russians control the Eastern European nations. And do you think their dealings with the West continue or are those countries becoming more independent in their dealings with us now.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of the East European nations?

**QUESTION:** Yes. The bloc of the East European nations.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I believe that many countries in Eastern Europe are making an attempt to achieve a greater degree of autonomy in their dealings with the West.

At the same time, the scope of their independence is severely
limited by the kind of economic ties that the Soviet Union has
insisted upon and by the presence of Soviet troops in almost
all of these countries and, finally, by the memory of what
has happened in those countries that tried to make a decisive
break.

So I would say that there is a greater scope for greater autonomy
in Eastern Europe -- a scope that we encourage.

We do not accept the proposition that the Soviet Union has a
right to dominance in Eastern Europe. But we also do not make
promises we cannot fulfill.

But there is a greater autonomy -- but there is not the degree
of freedom that we would prefer.

**MR. NOKES:** The last question.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you recently went to Africa, and at the time the U.S. does not seem to want the physical involvement in Africa. Don't you think that this trip upsets the delicate balance of power currently existing in Africa and that the words in favor of the most radical black liberation movements will cause considerable trouble to the more moderate governments, black or white?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the purpose of going to Africa was to encourage and to strengthen the moderate governments in Africa. And the trip was especially welcomed by the moderate governments in Africa and was constantly attacked by the radical governments in Africa.

The purpose of the trip was to prevent the further radicalization of a situation that was already getting increasingly violent and increasingly threatened to get out of control. And, therefore, I would say far from upsetting a balance, we're trying to bring about a balance. Far from encouraging the radical governments, we're trying to create situations in which the moderate governments would be able to have a program to which they can relate themselves. And far from trying to encourage one community against the other, we're trying to bring about conditions in which all communities can live under conditions of justice and progress.

MR. NOKES: Thank you.

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Thank all of you who asked questions (laughter), and I'm sorry we could not accommodate everyone. (Applause)

Mr. Secretary, we wish to present now Oregon II -- a photo essay that shows some of the beauties of the State or Oregon -- as a moment of your visit to Oregon. This is but a small token of our thanks. And we shall understand, if you don't have time to devour it immediately -- as you should do -- (laughter)-- that it will look nice on Mrs. Kissinger's coffee table, where you can pick it up from time to time.

We are adjourned. Thank you. (Applause)

* * * * *

REMARKS OF SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER
AT RECEPTION IN HONOR OF JOSEPH J. SISCO

JULY 26, 1976

As many of you know, Joe Sisco has often been thought to have been interested in being Secretary of State. I have no way of knowing whether this rumor is true or not, but it has led to some jokes in the corridors of the State Department about Joe measuring the dimensions of my office and scrutinizing the furniture and the drapes in an appraising way. I won't repeat any of those jokes here tonight, however, because it's just possible that I may sometime soon be visiting Joe at American University in order to judge the dimensions of his office and look over the furnishings.

I will miss Joe in at least one concrete way. I often thought that if we ultimately succeeded in what we were trying to do in the Middle East, we would call it the "Kissinger Plan" -- and if we failed, the "Sisco Plan." Now that we won't have Joe around any more, we'll have to find another candidate -- and given the part of