OBJECTIVES

The United States has, at all times, multiple security objectives. Each provides a distinct criterion by which to judge the adequacy of an overall military posture and the strategy for its use. The most urgent objectives are:

1. To deter any deliberate major nuclear assault upon the United States or its Allies.

2. To deter any attempt by the Sino-Soviet Bloc to extend its political, military and ideological influence by the threat or use of force in local aggression, or by the threat of major nuclear assault upon the United States or its Allies.

3. To reduce the likelihood of uncalculated, unpremeditated or mutually undesired nuclear exchanges. To reduce the likelihood of accidents, misinterpretation of incidents or intentions, false alarms, or unauthorized actions within any nation (including the United States and its Allies); and to reduce the tendency of such events to trigger major nuclear war.

4. To inhibit and, if possible, to reverse the diffusion of nuclear weapons; to deter nuclear attacks by minor nuclear powers, against the interests of the U. S.; and to reduce the tendency of such attacks to trigger major nuclear war.

5. To protect U. S. security interests in any armed conflict involving U. S. forces which might occur. In particular:

2. To protect U. S. security interests in any armed conflict involving major nuclear war.

Villies); and to reduce the tendency of such events to trigger major nuclear war.

unauthorized actions within any nation (including the United States and its
accidents, misinterpretation of incidents or intentions, false alarms, or
mutilated undereased nuclear exchanges. To reduce the likelihood of
States or its Villies.

3. To reduce the likelihood of unaccounted, unremediated or

aggression, or by the threat of major nuclear assault upon the United
military and ideological influence by the threat or use of force in local
States or its Villies.

5. To deter any attempt by the Soviet Union to extend its political,

1. To deter any deliberate major nuclear assault upon the United
    objectives are:

Each provides a distinct criterion by which to judge the adequacy of an
The United States has, at all times, multiple security objectives.

OBJECTIVES

a. **In local war:**¹ To bring the conflict to a conclusion satisfactory to the U. S., in a manner which protects U. S. Allies and preserve U. S. alliances, which tends to deter further attempts by hostile nations to enhance their influence and strength by armed force, and which minimizes the risk of escalation to major nuclear war.

b. **In central war:**¹

1. To preclude, under all circumstances, significant U. S. military inferiority to an opponent or any potential enemies during or after the war; to reduce the military capabilities of the opponent and to retain major strategic capabilities, ready, effective and controlled.

2. To limit damage to the U. S. and its Allies, to a level consistent with national survival and independence.

3. Subject to above objectives, to achieve significant military superiority to the opponent.

4. To force a conclusion to the war on terms acceptable to the United States.

1. Central war is defined as war involving major nuclear attacks upon the homelands of one or both of the two major powers, the U. S. and the USSR. Local war is defined as any other armed conflict.

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local war is defined as any other armed conflict.

homeland of one or both of the two major powers, the U. S. and the USSR.
I. Central war is defined as war involving major nuclear attacks upon the

the United States.

4. To force a conclusion to the war on terms acceptable to
superiority to the opponent.

3. Subject to above objectives, to achieve significant military
consistent with national survival and independence.

5. To limit damage to the U. S. and its allies, to a level
retain major strategic capabilities, ready, effective and controlled,
after the war; to reduce the military capabilities of the opponent and to
military inferiority to an opponent or any potential enemies during or

p. In central war:¹

the risk of escalation to major nuclear war.
enhance their influence and strength by armed force, and which minimizes
alliance, which tends to deter further attempts by hostile nations to

to the U. S., in a manner which protects U. S. interests and preserves U. S.

a. In local war:¹ To bring the conflict to a conclusion satisfactory

CENTRAL WAR POSTURE AND STRATEGY

The primary purpose of U. S. military strength is peace, not war.
Above all, the primary objectives of U. S. policy with respect to central
war must be to deter deliberate attack and prevent unintended outbreak.
The U. S. rejects aggression as a means of enhancing its security, under
any circumstances; nor can major thermonuclear war be its preferred
instrument even in meeting armed aggression, if there are adequate
alternatives. Yet if central war is forced upon the United States, U. S.
military strength must still serve multiple national objectives.

Central war can result from a variety of causes other than the
calculated and objective view of enemy leaders that they can achieve
decisive superiority over the U. S. by deliberate surprise attack.
National planning cannot safely be based on the assumption that deterrence
will certainly succeed, that unpremeditated exchanges cannot occur, or
that major aggression, undeterred, will never challenge the U. S. to
fulfill its commitments to Allies and to protect its security by risking or
waging central war. Neither can it regard all possible outcomes of a
central war as indistinguishable. In some circumstances, even the
best outcome attainable in central war may represent unprecedented
catastrophe; yet outcomes very significantly worse than the best, both
in civil and military aspects, may also be possible, and it will remain

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in civil and military aspects, may also be possible, and it will remain
catastrophic; but outcomes very significantly more than the best, both
best outcome attainable in central war may represent unprecedented
central war as indistinguishable. In some circumstances, even the
waging central war. Neither can it regard all possible outcomes of a
fulfill its commitments to Villes and to protect its security by risking or
that major aggression, undeterred, will never challenge the U. S. to
will certainly succeed, that unmediated exchanges cannot occur, or
National planning cannot safely be based on the assumption that deterrence
decisive authority over the U. S. by deliberate surprise attack.
calculated and objective view of enemy leaders that they can achieve
Central war can result from a variety of causes other than the
military strength must still serve multiple national objectives.
Yet if central war is forced upon the United States, U. S.
instrument even in meeting armed aggression, if there are adequate
any circumstances; nor can major thermoneutral war be its preferred
The U. S. rejects aggression as a means of enhancing its security, under
war must be to deter deliberate attack and prevent unintended outbreak.
Above all, the primary objectives of U. S. policy with respect to central
The primary purpose of U. S. military strength is peace, not war.
CENTRAL WAR POSTURE AND STRATEGY

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the urgent goal of U. S. security policy to forestall them.

Thus, central war posture and strategy must be tested not only for ability to prevent deliberate or undeliberated attack but for ability to secure basic wartime objectives. Solutions to these separate problems can and should be chosen to reinforce each other.

The most urgent military goal in central war is to preclude the prospect of an unarmed U. S. confronting armed opponents. It is essential that no enemy be able to disarm the U. S. by surprise attack on forces or controls; it is equally important that the U. S. not disarm itself, by expending all ready forces in initial attacks that cannot guarantee to disarm the opponent. Although the Soviet Union can and must be assured that its military strength would be drastically reduced in any central war, there may be future circumstances in which U. S. countermilitary action alone could not disarm it totally in initial exchanges; the Soviets might be able to retain sizeable forces that were untargetable or that could be destroyed only at a highly unfavorable rate of exchange in terms of residual capability.

To the extent that conservative planning must allow for the survival of such forces, U. S. posture and strategy must permit the retention of ready forces in reserve, at least comparable to presumed Soviet reserves in ability to inflict further damage or to influence further the military balance. These forces must remain, under all circumstances of enemy attack, under effective control by political leadership.

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These forces must remain, under all circumstances of enemy attack, ability to inflict further damage or to influence further the military balance. Forces in reserve, at least comparable to breakfasted Soviet reserves in war forces, U. S. force and strategy must permit the retention of ready reserve forces that were untargetable or that could be destroyed not disarm it totally in initial exchange; the Soviets might be able to future circumstances in which U. S. countermilitary action alone could strength would be drastically reduced in any central war, there may be although the Soviet Union can and must be assured that its military ready forces in initial attacks that cannot guarantee to disarm the opponent, it is equally important that the U. S. not disarm itself, by expanding all enemy forces able to disarm the U. S. by surprise attack on forces or controls; or at an unswamed U. S. confronting armed opponents. If it is essential that no

The most urgent military goal in central war is to preclude the breach can and should be chosen to reinforce each other. To secure precise wartime objectives. Solutions to these separate problems for ability to prevent deliberate or unrelieved attack put for ability thus, central war posture and strategy must be tested not only the urgent goal of U. S. security policy to forestall them.

[Y]

A visible and indisputable capability to achieve this basic military requirement will deter deliberate attack on the U. S. It denies such attack any incentive. It guarantees that even a well-designed surprise attack would be futile and costly; it could neither win significant military superiority nor reduce to acceptable proportions the nuclear retaliation that could be launched by U. S. forces.

At the same time, the capabilities required for this fundamental task serve the other wartime goals of limiting damage to the U. S. and its Allies and forcing a conclusion to the war on acceptable terms. U. S. countermilitary action reduces enemy capability to inflict further damage or to continue the war; the survival of sizeable U. S. reserve forces, threatening, by their very existence, targets deliberately left unhit in initial attacks, can destroy the will of surviving enemy leaders to pursue unrestricted attacks or to continue the war.

The latter ability to influence enemy will might be particularly vital in circumstances when attacks upon enemy capabilities alone could not deprive enemy forces of a residual ability to inflict intolerable damage. Under the same circumstances, it might appear probable that attacks against high governmental and military command centers, or indiscriminate initial attacks on all major urban-industrial centers, would eliminate all possibility of coordinated enemy restraint or halting of further attacks in response to threats, while failing to inhibit punitive retaliation by surviving units.

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surviving units.

In response to threats, while failing to incur direct retaliation by
possibility of coordinated enemy restraint or striking of further attacks
initial attacks on all major urban-industrial centers, would eliminate all
against high governmental and military command centers, or indiscriminate
Under the same circumstances, it might abate probable that attacks
degrave enemy forces of a residual ability to inflict intolerable damage.
in circumstances when attacks upon enemy capabilities alone could not
The latter ability to influence enemy will might be particularly vital
unrestricted attacks or to continue the war.

Initial attacks can destroy the will of surviving enemy leaders to pursue
threatening, by their very existence, targets deliberately left undisturbed
or to continue the war; the survival of simple U. S. reserve forces,
counter military action reduces enemy capability to inflict further damage
its Villes and forcing a conclusion to the war on acceptable terms. U. S.
task serve the other Maritime goals of limiting damage to the U. S. and
At the same time, the capabilities required for this fundamental

Superiority nor reduce to acceptable proportions the nuclear retaliation
attack would be futile and costly; it could neither win significant military
attack any incentive. It guarantees that even a well-designed surprise
requirement will deter deliberate attack on the U. S. It denotes such
A viable and indispensible capability to achieve this basic military

The ability of U. S. reserve forces to extend deterrence, in some degree, into the wartime period, can have important effect not only upon the later stages of hostilities but upon the damage deliberately inflicted by the enemy in his initial assault. Whether the enemy attack were premeditated, irrational, or based on false alarm, initial enemy tactics will reflect his preattack planning, which in turn reflects his image of U. S. capabilities. The prospect of confronting sizeable, protected and controlled U. S. reserve forces after any attack should deter him from planning unrestricted attacks on U. S. society under any circumstances; it should further induce him to imitate U. S. preparations for post-attack flexibility, control, and information. It thus lays the groundwork, if war should occur, for deterring unrestricted enemy attacks and for deterring continuance of hostilities.

Not all objectives can be achieved with equal confidence. But a capability to preclude, with high confidence, enemy residual military superiority offers best hope not only of deterring deliberate attack but, if war occurs, of limiting damage to the U. S. and of stopping the war on acceptable terms.

Posture and strategy for central war must be designed to achieve these various U. S. security objectives under a spectrum of contingencies. It must be intended to deter not only a conservative decision-maker in the absence of national or international tension, but a wishful or frightened opponent in a time of crisis, when his alternatives to attack upon the U. S.

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opponent in a time of crisis, when pie alternatives to attack upon the U. S.
appearance of national or international tension, put a wistful or frightened
It must be intended to deter not only a conservative decision-maker in the
these various U. S. security objectives under a spectrum of contingencies.
Posture and strategy for central war must be designed to achieve
of limiting damage to the U. S. and of stopping the war on acceptable terms.
others postnde not only of deterring deliberate attack put, it was occurs,
to preclude, with high confidence, enemy residual military superiority
Not all objectives can be achieved with equal confidence. But a capability
hostilities.

for deterring unrestricted enemy attacks and for deterring continuance of
control, and information. If true lays the groundwork, it must occur,
further induce him to initiate U. S. preparations for post-attack flexibility,
unrestricted attacks on U. S. society under any circumstances; it should
U. S. reserve forces after any attack should deter him from planning
capabilities. The prospect of confronting someone, protected and controlled
reflect his brevetack planning, which in turn reflects his image of U. S.
mediated, irrational, or based on false alarm, initial enemy tactics will
by the enemy in his initial assault. Whether the enemy attack were pre-
the later stages of hostilities put upon the damage deliberately inflicted
degree, into the wartime period, can have important effect not only upon
The ability of U. S. reserve forces to extend deterrence, in some

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might also seem dangerous. Its ability to deter must be able to withstand sizeable enemy miscalculation of U. S. intentions or capabilities, and should offer hope of withstanding unforeseen technological shifts. Its ability to prevent or to contain the consequences of accidents, unauthorized actions, false alarms or "third party" actions must be considered for varied situations of international tension and local war, when such incidents are both more likely and more dangerous than in periods of calm.

If central war should occur, despite U. S. efforts to reduce its likelihood, there could be wide variance in the circumstances of initiation, enemy posture and readiness, enemy tactics, the results of initial exchanges, the attitudes of Allies on both sides, and enemy wartime objectives. Ability to achieve U. S. wartime objectives would depend upon ability to adapt U. S. strategic response to these various circumstances, which might be unforeseen, ambiguous, or both. A single detonation or several might preclude a major assault, or come by accident, unauthorized action or attack by a minor power. A surprise attack might be calculated and well-designed or a hasty response to false tactical warning or miscalculation of U. S. intentions. It might be well or poorly executed, providing much warning or none; retaining sizeable, protected enemy reserves or few; destroying all but the most protected U. S. forces or failing to do so. It might direct heavy initial assault against U. S. and Allied civil society and major command centers or it might carefully avoid such targets. Central war might culminate

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an escalating local war, preceded by mobilization, deployment and heightened
alert on both sides; or an attack might follow a period of normal alert.

Enemy posture and readiness might be designed well to lack major vulner-
abilities, assuring the survival under counterforce attack of major mobile,
concealed or hardened enemy forces; or the enemy may have failed to
protect his system effectively.

Among all these contingencies, it is not merely the "worst" cases or
even the most likely ones that deserve attention; the design of posture and
strategy should provide "insurance" against a broad range of uncertain
possibilities, with ability to exploit improbably favorable circumstances.

A capability for flexible response under high-level, authorized and
experienced leadership may be most critical, and most rewarding, in the
ambiguous and urgent circumstances presented by accident, unauthorized
action, "third party" attack, enemy false alarm or escalation of local war;
and such cases may be relatively more likely than deliberate, premeditated
enemy attack, if U. S. deterrent policy is effective.

Finally, the posture and strategy for deterring or waging central war
must be consistent with efforts to minimize the likelihood of unintended
nuclear exchanges, to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons, to deter or
defeat local aggression, and to enhance U. S. security by safeguarded
arms control agreements and by non-military means.

These are complex and stringent requirements; yet none can safely
be ignored.

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be ignored.

These are complex and stringent requirements; but none can easily
arise from agreements and by non-military means.

detest local aggression, and to enhance U. S. security by safeguarding
nuclear exchanges, to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons, to deter or
must be consistent with efforts to minimize the likelihood of unintended
harm, the posture and strategy for deterring or waging central war
enemy attack, if U. S. deterrent policy is effective.

and such cases may be relatively more likely than deliberate, promulgated
action, "third party" attack, enemy false alarm or escalation of local war;
ambiguous and urgent circumstances presented by accident, unauthorized
experienced leadership may be most critical, and most rewarding, in the
A capability for flexible response under high-level, authorized and
hostilities, with ability to exploit unpropably favorable circumstances,
attract should provide "insurance" against a broad range of uncertainties
even the most likely once that deserve attention: the design of posture and
among all these contingencies, it is not merely the "worst" case or
protect pie system effectively.

conceded or hardened enemy forces; or the enemy may have failed to
spoil,uring the survival under counterforce atack of major mobile,
ennemy force and readiness might be designed well to lack major miner-
 alert on both sides; or an attack might follow a period of normal alert.
an escalating local war, preceded by mobilization, deployment and heightened

To satisfy these demands, military posture for central war should
acquire, as soon as possible and to the utmost extent practicable, the
following general characteristics:

1. **Survival and endurance.** Strategic offensive forces, in major strength, must be capable of surviving an enemy surprise attack without essential reliance upon quick reaction to warning or upon alerting procedures likely to appear to an opponent as initiating an assault. A sizeable fraction of such forces must be capable of enduring in a wartime environment under prolonged reattack, as a reserve force responsive to flexible, centralized control.

2. **Strict positive control.** Control over the initiation and conduct of nuclear war must be exercised at all times by highest national authority. The President must determine and review procedures for such control, including any delegation of basic decisions under any circumstances of Presidential death or inability to control. There must be reliable physical safeguards against accident or unauthorized action involving nuclear weapons, including weapons under dual control with an Ally. Authorized procedures and protected control capabilities must assure an opponent of an effective, properly authorized response under all circumstances of attack, without any reliance upon the possibility of unauthorized initiative.

3. **Information.** Reliable, unequivocal bomb alarm detectors and bomb alarm signals at key warning, communication and command points

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**Pomp alarm signals at key warning, communication and command centers.**

2. **Information.** Reliable, unambiguous pomp steam detectors and
    **attack, without any reliance upon the possibility of unauthorized
    **initiative.  
    **an effective, properly authorized response under all circumstances of
    **procedures and protected control capabilities must ensure an opponent of
    **weapons, including weapons under dual control with an ally. Authorized
    **enlistees against accident or unauthorized action involving nuclear
    **Presidential death or inability to control. There must be reliable physical
    **including any delegation of basic decisions under any circumstances of
    **The President must determine and review procedures for such control,
    **nuclear war must be exercised at all times by highest national authority.

3. **Strict positive control.** Control over the initiation and conduct of
    **control.**  
    **broengaged restack,** as a reserve force responsive to flexible, centralized
    **of such forces must be capable of enduring in a wartime environment under
    **likely to appear to an opponent as initiating an assault. A flexible traction
    **essential reliance upon quick reaction to warning or upon alerting procedures
    **strength,** must be capable of surviving an enemy surprise attack without
    **following General characteristics:**  
    **acquire,** as soon as possible and to the utmost extent practicable, the
    **To satisfy those demands, military posture for central war should**

1. **Survival and endurance.** Strategic offensive force, in major
    **following General characteristics:**

EXD

and all major offensive force bases, and detectors at all major cities, must assure any opponent that dependable notification of any surprise attack cannot be eliminated. Such a system should be protected under attack to a degree which will enable it to provide at least gross indications of the size and nature of enemy attack, the status of U. S. bases and the level of damage to U. S. society. So far as practicable, reliable information, status-reporting and reconnaissance systems, including protected post-attack capabilities, should furnish more discriminating knowledge of the source and nature of attack, U. S. and enemy residual capability, and damage to U. S., Allied, and enemy societies. Means must be provided for prompt, reliable and unequivocal indication of the status of higher command centers to all units, permitting orderly devolution of command in accordance with authorized procedures.

4. **Force flexibility.** Offensive forces, both missiles and bombers, must be capable of selective commitment against alternative targets, with capability for rapid retargeting after attack. Forces held in reserve should have capability for continued countermilitary action, as well as retaliatory attacks against non-military targets.

5. **Countermilitary capability.** Offensive counterforce capabilities, active defenses and passive defenses, supported by warning and reconnaissance systems, must be able to reduce enemy residual military capability relative to that of U. S. residual forces; they should be equipped to explain possible

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to that of U. S. residential forces; they should be equipped to explain possible
systems, must be able to reduce enemy residential military capability relative
to active defenses and defensive defenses, supported by warning and reconnaissance
3. <u>Counterforce capability.</u> Offensive counterforce capabilities, retaliatory attacks against non-military targets.

should have capability for continued counter military action, as well as
capability for rapid retargeting after attack. Forces held in reserve
must be capable of selective commitment against alternative targets, with
4. <u>Force flexibility.</u> Offensive forces, both missiles and bombers, command in accordance with authorized procedures.

higher command centers to all units, permitting orderly revolution of
provided for by prompt, reliable and unequivocal indication of the status of
and damage to U. S., Aflied, and enemy societies. Means must be
the source and nature of attack, U. S. and enemy residual capability,
attack capabilities, should turned more discriminating knowledge of
status-reporting and reconnaissance systems, including protected host-
of damage to U. S. society. So far as practicable, reliable information,
size and nature of enemy attack, the status of U. S. forces and the level
a degree which will enable it to provide at least gross indications of the
cannot be eliminated. Such a system should be protected under attack to
must secure any opponent that dependable notification of any袭 force
and all major offensive force, base, and detector at all major cities,

vulnerabilities in Soviet posture or gross inefficiencies in Soviet planning or execution of attacks. These measures should be complemented by (a) geographic separation of U. S. strategic forces from population centers to the fullest extent consistent with other military objectives; (b) such active anti-bomber and anti-missile defenses of cities as promise to be effective; (c) civil defense which, at a minimum, provides adequate fallout protection and recovery capability from nuclear attack directed at important U. S. military bases.

6. **Contingency planning.** To permit rapid selective responses on the basis of information available at the outset of hostilities and after, contingency plans must be provided corresponding to gross differences in the circumstances and course of central war. In particular, alternative options should include counterforce operations carefully avoiding major enemy cities while retaining U. S. reserve forces to threaten these targets; the option to exclude enemy control centers from counterforce attacks should also be available under all circumstances. Alternative plans covering central war with the USSR will provide both for the inclusion and exclusion of Communist China and other individual members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc as enemy nations, the choice to be designated by the President or highest surviving national authority at the time of hostilities. So far as consistent with military objectives: (a) all plans for military action against Bloc members other than the USSR

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(a) All planes for military action against Bloc members other than the U2E2 the time of hostilities. So far as consistent with military objectives: designated by the President or at least surviving national authority at members of the Soviet Bloc as enemy nations, the choice to be for the inclusion and excision of Communist China and other individual Alternative planes covering central war with the U2E2 will provide good counterforce attacks should it so be available under all circumstances. These targets: the option to excise enemy control centers from major enemy cities while retaining U. S. reserve forces to threaten options should include counterforce operations carefully avoiding the circumstances and context of central war. In particular, alternative contingency planes must be provided corresponding to those differences in base of information available at the outset of hostilities and after, consistent with the Contingency Planning. To permit rapid selective responses on the U. S. military planes.

protection and recovery capability from nuclear attack directed at important effective: (c) civil defense which, at a minimum, provide adequate fallout active anti-particle and anti-missile defences of cities so promised to be to the fullest extent consistent with other military objectives; (d) such (a) geographic separation of U. S. strategic forces from population centers or execution of attacks. These measures should be complemented by minerals capabilities in Soviet posture or gross inefficiencies in Soviet planning

and Communist China should minimize fallout and non-military damage and casualties; (b) all planned attacks against designated enemy nations should be designed to minimize resulting damage and casualties in all other nations, in particular neutrals and Allies of the U. S. While avoiding premature decisions or commitments, plans should be formulated and kept under review specifying acceptable terms for ending hostilities, suitable to the several circumstances under which central war might commence and proceed; these terms should provide for the satisfaction of U. S. security objectives in such circumstances, without a predetermined requirement for unconditional enemy surrender. The President and the Secretary of Defense will review all strategic plans.

7. Wartime control. To the utmost extent feasible, the protected command, communications and information systems must permit coordinated, informed and selective direction of U. S. forces by the highest surviving, authorized civilian and military leaders. In particular, these systems should be designed and protected to minimize the loss of command capability and political leadership that could result from a small number of detonations, stemming from accident, unauthorized action, attack by a minor power, badly executed attack or attack intended to avoid U. S. command capabilities. By means of mobility, hardening, active defense, dispersal, internetting, or concealment, the protection of primary command

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diabetes, interning, or confinement, the protection of primary command
command capabilities. By means of mobility, hardening, active defense,
a minor power, partly executed attack or attack intended to avoid U. S.
of defenseless, stemming from accident, unauthorized action, attack by
capability and political leadership that could result from a small number
systems should be designed and protected to minimize the loss of command
surviving, authorized civilian and military leaders. In particular, these
nated, informed and selective direction of U. S. forces by the highest
command, communications and information systems must permit coordi-
1. **Warime control.** To the extent extent feasible, the protected
Defense will review all strategic plans.

for unconditional enemy surrender. The President and the Secretary of
objectives in such circumstances, without a predetermined requirement
proceed; these terms should provide for the satisfaction at U. S. security
the several circumstances under which central war might commence and
under review specifying acceptable terms for ending hostilities, suitable to
broadside decisions or commitments, plans should be formulated and kept
other nations, in particular neutrals and allies of the U. S. While avoiding
should be designed to minimize resulting damage and casualties in all
and casualties; (b) all planned attacks against designated enemy nations
and Communist China should minimize talent and non-military damage

facilities serving highest national leadership should aim to raise the cost
to the enemy of destroying primary centers to a level which would deter
him from planning to attack them, given his inability - which must be
assured with the highest confidence - to paralyze U. S. response by doing
so. Plans for protection of primary command capabilities and leadership
should not rely upon warning, but should be prepared to utilize available
warning, either strategic or tactical. The command system should enable
highest surviving national leaders to exploit, in pursuit of national
objectives, the full capability for selective, deliberate, response provided
by force flexibility and endurance, information, and countermilitary
capability. It should enable them to use surviving forces efficiently, to
make significant choices as to target systems, scope and timing of attacks,
and to modify these choices during hostilities on the basis of new information.
It should allow commanders not only to select preplanned responses but to
modify them or, within limits, to improvise new ones. It must provide
highly reliable means for transmitting orders to offensive forces in
support of threats or to terminate hostilities, as well as "Go" orders.
National leaders must have reliable means of communication with enemy
leaders during hostilities. Plans and preparations should be made to enable
U. S. national leaders effectively to threaten use of U. S. reserve forces
against civil or military targets as yet unhit; to carry out demonstrations;
to propose terms acceptable to the U. S. for ending hostilities, safeguarding

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to probe these terms acceptable to the U. S. for enabling hostilities, undertaking
against civil or military targets as hot spots; to carry out demonstrated
U. S. national leaders effectively to threaten use of U. S. reserve forces
leaders during hostilities. Plans and preparations should be made to enable
National leaders must have reliable means of communication with enemy
support of threats or to terminate hostilities, as well as "Go" orders.
Highly reliable means for transmitting orders to offensive forces in
modify them or, within limits, to improvise new ones. It must provide
It should allow commanders not only to adopt preapproved responses but to
and to modify these choices during hostilities on the basis of new information.
Make significant choices as to target systems, scope and timing of attacks,
capability. It should enable them to use surviving forces efficiently, to
py force flexibility and endurance, information, and countermandery
objectives, the full capability for selective, deliberate, response provided
highest surviving national leaders to exploit, in pursuit of national
warning, either strategic or tactical. The command system should enable
should not rely upon warning, but should be prepared to utilize available
so. Plans for protection of primary command capabilities and leadership
arised with the highest confidence - to barrelize U. S. response by doing
plan from planning to attack them, given its insubility - which must be
to the enemy of destroying primary centers to a level which would deter
facilities serving highest national leadership should aim to raise the cost

M

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U. S. security interests in the light of circumstances of war initiation, the conduct of the war and the results of initial exchanges; and to monitor and enforce conformity to agreed terms.

A U. S. military posture with these broad capabilities permits a wide variety of strategic response under varying conditions of central war. Its major post-attack capabilities should effectively deter deliberate attack; yet if central war occurs, they give highest national authority maximum opportunity to preserve U. S. military strength, to limit damage to the U. S. and to stop war on acceptable terms. They will allow U. S. commanders to exploit any opportunity in wartime to disarm the opponent or to achieve decisive military superiority in support of U. S. postwar aims, if circumstances offer hope of doing so without grave jeoparately to other wartime goals. These capabilities will assure an aggressor of unprecedented damage to his society (even with a purely countermilitary U. S. response) and to his military strength if he should initiate central war; they will assure him of still greater damage and further worsening of his military position if he should continue the conflict. They would warn him that direct attack upon U. S. civil society would be for him, under any circumstances, the worst of all possible actions.

Moreover, this posture will reduce the likelihood of unpremediated nuclear exchanges. The protected command system, safeguarded positive control, and ability to achieve essential goals by deliberate response,

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control, and skill to achieve essential goals and deliberate responses. Moreover, this posture will reduce the likelihood of unmitigated circumstances, the worst of all possible actions.

that direct attack upon U. S. civil society would be for him, under any military position if he should continue the conflict. They would warn him they will secure him of still greater damage and further worsening of pie U. S. response) and to pie military strength if he should initiate central war; unprecedented damage to pie society (even with a barely counter military other maritime goals). These capabilities will secure an aggressor of time, if circumstances allow him of doing so without grave jeopardy to or to achieve decisive military superiority in support of U. S. postwar commanders to exploit any opportunity in wartime to disrupt the opponent to the U. S. and to step war on acceptable terms. They will allow U. S. maximum opportunity to breach U. S. military strength, to limit damage attack! but if central war occurs, they give highest national authority its major post-attack capabilities should effectively deter deliberate variety of strategic response under varying conditions of central war.

A U. S. military posture with these broad capabilities permits a wide and enforce conformity to agreed terms.

the conduct of the war and the results of initial exchanges; and to monitor U. S. security interests in the light of circumstances of war initiation.

without reliance upon hasty reaction under ambiguous circumstances,
should reduce both the chance and enemy fear of U. S. accident, unauthorized
action or false alarm. At the same time, the U. S. posture reduces the
tendency of any opponent to attack hastily under similarly ambiguous
circumstances, since the propsect of U. S. post-attack capabilities
deprives him of incentive to do so.

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circumstances, since the prospect of U. S. post-attack capabilities
tendency of any opponent to attack hastily under similarly ambiguous
action or false alarm. At the same time, the U. S. posture reduces the
should reduce both the chance and enemy fear of U. S. accident, unauthorised
without reliance upon pasty reaction under ambiguous circumstances.

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