November 12, 1965

Mr. William Bundy
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

It was good to talk to you yesterday and I look forward
to seeing you next week.

We did not have an opportunity to discuss some of the
repercussions of the Foisie story. To be quite candid, I
believe that perhaps unnecessarily harsh White House
statement made me appear at least indiscreet and perhaps
disloyal. The damage has been rectified to some extent with
respect to those who have access to cable traffic between
Saigon and Washington. But there are many others who get their
information primarily from the press and who must have substantial
doubts left.

I can understand the reluctance to stir up the whole
controversy once more and I, therefore, have not asked for a
public retraction. I wonder, however, whether you might be
willing to set the record straight with a few people whose good
opinion matters to me. I am thinking specifically of John Gardner,
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and Ham Armstrong
(or George Franklin). Would you consider telling them what really
transpired on an informal and personal basis? If John Gardner were
to be authorized to share this information with Caryl Haskins and
Ham Armstrong (or George Franklin) with Chuck Spofford and
John McCloy, I think we would have reduced the damage to me.
I ask your help because I am in a very bad position to offer
explanations.

...

....

explanations.
I ask your help because I am in a very bad position to offer
John McCloy, I think we would have reduced the damage to me.
Ham Armstrong (or George Franklin) with Chuck Sbottord and
to be authorized to share this information with Carl Haskins and
transferred on an informal and personal basis? It John Gardner were
(or George Franklin). Would you consider telling them what really
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and Ham Armstrong
opinion matters to me. I am thinking specifically of John Gardner,
wanting to set the record straight with a few people whose good
public relation. I wonder, however, whether you might be
controversy once more and I, therefore, have not asked for a
I can understand the reluctance to attrb the whole
donuts felt.

information primarily from the press and who must have substantial
Beison and Washington. But there are many others who get their
respect to those who have access to cable traffic between
dialoual. The damage has been rectified to some extent with
statement made we appear at least indiscriminate and berate
believe that the berate unnecessarily harsh White House
reconscensions of the Foteate story. To be quite candid, I
We did not have an opportunity to discuss some of the
to seeing you next week.

It was good to talk to you Wednesday and I look forward

Dear Bill:

Washington, D. C.
Department of State
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
Assistant Secretary
Mr. William Bundy

November 12, 1962

November 23, 1965

Dear Bill:

Upon my return to the office I found your letters
to Ham Armstrong and John Gardner. They seemed to me
warm and thoughtful.

One of the rewards of my Vietnam mission has been
to get to know you better.

As you know the Council dinner has been changed
to December 15th in order to enable McCloy to attend.
I look forward to seeing you then.

I am putting together a few random thoughts about
negotiations and I will send them to you in the form
of a personal letter by the beginning of next week.

Warm regards.

November 24, 1965

FOR MR. BUNDY'S EYES ONLY

Dear Bill:

As I told you I would, I had breakfast with Senator Ted Kennedy today at his request. I suggested that participation be broadened to include other faculty members specifically Lucian Pye and Sam Huntington.

The discussion concerned Vietnam and general Asian problems. Because of my relations with the government on Vietnam I will sum up the salient points on that subject:

(1) **Negotiations:** Kennedy feels that the Sevareid story put him into a very tough position politically. It made it harder to defend the Administration's record. I took the liberty of saying that the story was incomplete and that the government was in a tough position to state its side of the case. My impression was that the U Thant feeler had not been as unambiguous as Sevareid implied and that efforts to obtain clarification through neutral sources had been rebuffed.

(2) **Pacification:** Kennedy felt that our pacification program was inadequate. The army was not suitable for that task and AID suffered from inadequate personnel. He seemed to think of a Peace Corps type program for Vietnam to take over all of pacification. I made essentially three points: (a) The problem was intellectually understood in Washington and Saigon. The problem was to get some implementation in a society wracked by civil war and divided on other grounds as well. (b) Big, splashy programs should be avoided. A moderate success was more important than a big project that would peter out. (c) We should be leery of adding another layer to the

....

FOR MR. BUNDY'S EYES ONLY