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UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 3 TOKYO 6119

USIAC: JOINT USIS/EMBASSY MESSAGE

USIA PASS WHITE HOUSE AND NSC FOR JANKA

SUBJ: TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE BY DR KISSINGER
OKURA HOTEL, JUNE 12, 1972, 2:30-3:30 PM.

OPENING STATEMENT; MR CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.

I APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU. I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A BRIEF COMMENT. THERE ARE MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN PRESS HERE WHO WILL TELL YOU THAT I AM INCAPABLE OF MAKING A BRIEF COMMENT, BUT A SHALL ATTEMPT TO DO SO ANYWAY.

I WANTED TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK MY JAPANESE HOSTS FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY COURTESY THAT HAS BEEN SHOWN TO ME AND TO THANK ALL OF THE JAPANESE, WHO HAVE UP PART OF THEIR WEEKEND IN TALKING TO ME, FOR THEIR FRANKNESS, FOR THEIR OPENESS, WHICH AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED HAS CONTRIBUTED ENORMOUSLY TO MY UNDERSTANDING.

BEFORE I CAME HERE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US WAS PRIMARILY AN INTELLECTUAL ONE. I CAN SAY THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE HOSPITALITY THAT HAS BEEN SHOWN TO ME THAT IT HAS BECOME AN EMOTIONAL ONE AS WELL. BEFORE I LEFT SOME ACQUAINTANCE ASKED ME WHAT I WAS PLANNING TO DO IN TOKYO, AND I SAID THAT I WANTED TO CONTRIBUTE TO SOLVING SOME OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN DIDDICULTIES. MY FRIEND SAID, "DON'T YOU REALIZE, YOU ARE NOT THE SOLUTION. YOU ARE THE PROBLEM."

[lc]

I HAVE INTENDED TO PRESENT HERE AS FRANKLY AS I COULD WHAT WE THINK AND TO LEARN AS MUCH AS I COULD OF WHAT YOU THINK. I WANTED TO SAY A WORD ABOUT THE BASIC ATTITUDE OF THIS ADMINISTRATION TOWARDS JAPAN AND TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. I HAVE READ THAT THERE IS THE IDEA THAT WE ARE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN THE FRIENDSHIP OF JAPAN, THAT WE WANT TO CREATE ON A COLD-BLOODED BASIS A BALANCE OF POWER POLICY, AND THAT WE WANT TO FORCE JAPAN TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE MILITARY FIELD, WHICH IT IS RELUCTANT TO UNDERTAKE.

IT IS TRUE THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION CAME INTO OFFICE AT A TIME OF VERY RAPID CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. MANY COUNTRIES THAT WERE COMPLETELY DEPENDENT ON US IN THE 1950'S, INCLUDING JAPAN, HAD GAINED AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF VIGOR AND STRENGTH, ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD. MANY OF OUR OPPONENTS WERE ENGAGED IN RIVALRIES AMONG EACH OTHER AND ALSO HAD ADOPTED A MORE COMPLEX FOREIGN POLICY. SO WE ATTEMPTED TO FORGE NEW TIES WITH OUR FRIENDS AND TO LIMIT AND REDUCE THE HOSTILITIES OF OLD ADVERSARIES. WE KNOW THAT IN THE MILITARY FIELD THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE THE TWO COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE THE GREATEST ACCUMULATION OF MILITARY POWER. BUT IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD THERE ARE MANY OTHER CENTERS OF POWER AND WE HAVE TO WORK OUT AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM WHICH RELATES THESE VARIOUS KINDS OF POWER TO EACH OTHER. WE ARE NOT ASKING JAPAN TO PLAY A MILITARY ROLE BEYOND ITS HOME ISLANDS. NOR ARE WE ATTEMPTING TO PUSH JAPAN AWAY FROM US IN THE OLD FRIENDSHIP THAT HAS DEVELOPED. BUT WE DO BELIEVE THAT IN THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FIELDS MANY COUNTRIES HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY NOW AND THAT ONE CAN HAVE STABILITY AND PROGRESS ONLY IF THOSE COUNTRIES THAT POSSESS ECONOMIC POWER CONDUCT FORWARD-LOOKING AND CONSTRUCTIVE MULTILATERAL POLICIES. SO THE BASIC CONCERN OF THIS ADMINISTRATION IS HOW WE CAN GIVE EVEN GREATER VITALITY TO OUR EXISTING RELATIONSHIP. AND HOW WE CAN ADAPT IT TO THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT PERIOD.

AND NOW BEFORE I TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS, I WANTED TO MAKE ONE ADDITIONAL ANNOUNCEMENT. BEFORE COMING HERE THE PRESIDENT ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AN INVITATION FOR HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME. I CONVEYED HIS INVITATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER, AND HE EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR IT. THE PRIME MINISTER INDICATED THAT WE WOULD CONVEY THIS INVITATION TO HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR, AND THAT AN APPROPRIATE TIME WOULD BE ESTABLISHED THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. AND NOW I'LL BE DELIGHTED TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS.

[c]

HASEGAWA (YOMIURI): DR KISSINGER, MY NAME IS HASEGAWA OF THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN. AND I KNOW YOU HAVE MET A GREAT NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN A VERY ENERgetic FASHION IN A VERY SHORT TIME DURING YOUR VISIT IN JAPAN. WHAT IN YOUR VIEW, SIR, IS THE GREATEST FRUIT OR RESULTS IN YOUR CURRENT VISIT TO JAPAN?

KISSINGER: AS THE AMERICAN PRESS WILL TELL YOU, EXCESSIVE HUMILITY IS NOT ONE OF MY PROBLEMS. BUT, NEVERTHELESS, I DO NOT FEEL IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO SPEAK FOR THE JAPANESE SIDE, SO I WILL ONLY SPEAK FOR MYSELF. AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED IT HAS BEEN INVALUABLE TO GET AN APPRECIATION OF THE JAPANESE APPROACH TO ASIAN POLICIES AND HOW THE JAPANESE HAVE VIEWED AMERICAN ACTIONS ESPECIALLY OVER THE LAST YEAR; AND WHAT ROLE JAPAN THINKS IT CAN USEFULLY PLAY, AND WHAT MEASURES AND THINGS ARE BEYOND ITS CAPABILITIES. ALL OF THIS HAS BEEN EXTREMELY INVALUABLE TO ME, TOGETHER WITH A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC IDEAS WHICH WE WILL STUDY WITH GREAT CARE AND ATTENTION WHEN WE RETURN TO THE USA.

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UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 3 TOKYO 6119

SNOW (BOSTON GLOBE):

MY NAME IS CROCKER SNOW OF THE BOSTON GLOBE. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW, DR KISSINGER, YOU SAID THAT YOU WOULD CONVEY TO THE JAPANESE THE IDEA THAT JAPAN SHOULD NOT PLAY A DEFENSE ROLE BEYOND ITS HOME ISLANDS. AND YET SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE MELVIN LAIRD HAS SAID AS RECENTLY AS FEBRUARY THAT JAPAN COULD PLAY MORE OF A DEFENSE ROLE IN THE AREA -- AND HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF A NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. I WONDER IF YOU WOULD COMMENT ON THAT.

KISSINGER: THE JAPANESE JOURNALISTS HERE MAY NOT KNOW ONE OF THE FAVORITE EXERCISES OF THEIR WASHINGTON COLLEAGUES IS TO GET ME EMBROILED WITH MY ASSOCIATES IN WASHINGTON. AND THEY HAVE SUCCEEDED VERY EFFECTIVELY IN A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS. THE BASIC DEFENSE ROLE OF JAPAN IS, OF COURSE, FOR JAPAN TO DETERMINE, AND DOES NOT DEPEND ON PRESCRIPTIONS HANDED DOWN FROM WASHINGTON. OUR BASIC VIEW IS THAT JAPAN SHOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE CARE OF ITS CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE, OF THE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE OF ITS HOME ISLANDS. THERE WILL BE NO AMERICAN PRESSURE TO EXPAND ITS DEFENSE ROLE TO OTHER PARTS OF ASIA.

SAM JAMESON (THE LOS ANGELES TIMES) DR KISSINGER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER QUOTED YOU AS SAYING IN HIS MEETING WITH HIM THAT YOU FAVORED RETAINING THE US-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY REGARDLESS WHAT CHANGES OCCURRED IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. IS THAT A CORRECT QUOTATION OF YOUR THINKING, AND IF SO, DO YOU REGARD THE US-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY AS A PERMANENT FIXTURE?

[lc]

KISSINGER: IT IS OUR VIEW THAT THE SECURITY TREATY IS NECESSARY AT THIS TIME. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ASKING FOR ITS ABROGATION OR ITS REVISION. AND WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE MAINTAINED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. OF COURSE, JAPAN IS A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY WHICH HAS THE RIGHT TO RAISE ANY ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO THE SECURITY TREATY. NOTHING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS CAN BE SAID TO BE ENDLESS, BUT FOR THE FUTURE THAT WE CAN FORESEE, WE SEE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE TREATY SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. AS FAR AS THE USA IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF EITHER TO ABROGATE IT OR ASK FOR ITS REVISION.

PEPPER (BALTIMORE SUN): WHAT IMPRESSION DID YOU GET OF THE SENSE OF DIRECTION OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE NEXT THREE TO FIVE YEARS, PARTICULARLY, AS YOU MENTIONED EARLIER, THE ROLE THAT THEY DO OR DO NOT WANT TO PLAY.

KISSINGER: I DON'T REALLY WANT TO MAKE ANY COMMENTS ON WHAT THE VARIOUS JAPANESE LEADERS SAID TO ME. MY GENERAL IMPRESSION, THOUGH, IS THAT MOST JAPANESE LEADERS BELIEVE THAT JAPAN CAN PLAY A MORE USEFUL ECONOMIC ROLE INTERNATIONALLY THAN IT CAN PLAY A SECURITY ROLE.

OMORI (ASAHI SHIMBUN): I WOULD LIKE TO ASK DR KISSINGER A QUESTION ON YOUR VIEWNAM POLICY. YOU ARE CONTINUING TO BOMB NORTH VIETNAM AND YOUR TARGETS ARE NOT LIMITED ONLY TO MILITARY TARGETS BUT YOU ARE BOMBING NON-MILITARY TARGETS AND NON-COMBATANTS AS WELL. AND THE INTENSITY OF SUCH BOMBING IS RISING, AND SOME DAMS HAVE BEEN BOMBED RECENTLY, TOO. ONE, CAN YOU JUSTIFY SUCH MILITARY ACTIONS? QUESTION TWO, HOW LONG WILL SUCH NORTH VIETNAM BOMBING LAST?

KISSINGER: FIRST OF ALL, I CANNOT ACCEPT THE PREMISE ON WHICH THE QUESTION IS BASED. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE U.S. IS DELIBERATELY BOMBING NON-COMBATANTS, AND IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE U.S. IS DELIBERATELY BOMBING DIKES. IF ANY OF THIS HAS OCCURRED, IT HAS BEEN BY ACCIDENT, AND NOT AS A QUESTION OF POLICY. BUT I AM NOT AWARE THAT DIKES HAVE BEEN BOMBED AT ALL.

SECONDLY, THE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN NORTH VIETNAM HAS TO BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF EVERYTHING THAT IS GOING ON IN INDOCHINA. THROUGHOUT MARCH WE SAW A BUILD-UP OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES ALL AROUND THE BORDERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. ALL OF MARCH WE RECEIVED DISPATCHES FROM OUR MILITARY LEADERS TO AUTHORIZE THE BOMBING OF THESE CONCENTRATIONS. WE REFUSED BECAUSE WE WERE STILL PURSUING A POLICY OF NEGOTIATIONS AND BECAUSE OF OUR RELATIONSHIPS THAT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH PEKING AND WITH MOSCOW.

[L]

IT WAS ONLY AFTER NORTH VIETNAM PUT ITS ENTIRE ARMY INTO SOUTH VIETNAM, ONLY AFTER WHILE WE WERE ARRANGING NEGOTIATIONS IT LAUNCHED THREE NEW OFFENSIVES THAT THE PRESIDENT WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE AUTHORIZED THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM. WE WOULD LIKE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ISSUE OF VIETNAM.

THERE IS ONLY ONE CONDITION THAT WE HAVE REFUSED TO MEET, WHICH IS IN EFFECT THE IMPOSITION OF A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON BY OUR ACTIONS UNDER THE GUISE OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL COALITION. WE HAVE MET EVERY OTHER CONDITION AND WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY SCHEME THAT GIVES THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AN OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FATE. THAT AND ONLY THAT IS THE ISSUE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THERE IS NO OTHER.

NICKEL (TIME MAGAZINE): BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER HERE HAVE STATED THAT THE TAIWAN PASSAGE OF THE 1969 SATO-NIXON COMMUNIQUE HAS IN EFFECT LAPSED BECAUSE OF THE CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. AT THE TIME IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THIS CLAUSE REFERRED TO FUTURE WILLINGNESS OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW THE USE OF AMERICAN BASES IN JAPAN FOR THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN. MY QUESTION TO YOU IS WHETHER ANY NEW JAPANESE ATTITUDE IN YOUR VIEW IMPAIRS THE ABILITY OF THE U.S. TO KEEP ITS TREATY COMMITMENTS TO TAIWAN, WHETHER THIS QUESTION WAS DISCUSSED DURING YOUR STAY HERE, AND WHAT VIESS YOU EXPRESSED.

KISSINGER: I WILL NOT DISCUSS, I WILL NOT COMMENT ON ANYTHING THAT WAS DISCUSSED BY JAPANESE LEADERS WITH ME. THE U.S. POSITION WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN HAS BEEN EXPLAINED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR. THIS REMAINS OUR POSITION, AND WE PROPOSE TO PURSUE IT.

AXEL WHITE (MONTREAL STAR AND NATION MAGAZINE): THERE HAS BEEN SOME CONCERN EXPRESSED BY COMMENTATORS LIKE BRZEZINSKY AND HERMAN KAHN THAT JAPAN MAY ADOPT A NUCLEAR ROLE IN THE FUTURE. DR KISSINGER, COULD YOU PLEASE SAY WHETHER THERE IS ANY CONCERN ABOUT THIS POSSIBLE FUTURE NUCLEAR ROLE IN THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION.

KISSINGER: I WAS TOLD, MR CHAIRMAN, THAT THE JAPANESE PRESS WAS VERY FIERCE, BUT THEY'RE BEING OVERPOWERED HERE BY THEIR WESTERN COLLEAGUES. AT MY NEXT WHITE HOUSE PRESS CONFERENCE I PROMISE TO RECOGNIZE SEVERAL JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS. WITH RESPECT, I HAVEN'T ANSWERED THIS GENTLEMAN'S QUESTION. WITH RESPECT TO JAPAN'S NUCLEAR ASPIRATIONS, THEY WERE NOT OBVIOUS TO ME ON THIS TRIP, AND IT IS NOT THE POLICY OF THE U.S. THAT JAPAN SHOULD GO NUCLEAR.

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UNCLAS SECTION 3 OF 3 TOKYO 6119

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USIAC: JOINT/USIS/EMBASSY MESSAGE
TAKADA (NHK): I UNDERSTAND ONE OF THE PURPOSES OF DR KISSINGER'S PRESENT VISIT IN JAPAN IS TO REDUCE ANY SENTIMENT OF ANXIETY OR LACK OF CONFICENCE CREATED AMONG JAPANESE PEOPLE SINCE YOUR GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT NIXON TO PEKING LAST JULY. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THIS PURPOSE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED?

KISSINGER: OF COURSE, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO JUDGE WHAT IMPACT MY VISIT MIGHT HAVE HAD ON JAPANESE LEADERS TO WHOM I SPOKE. I INTENDED TO EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TO THEM AND WHY WE HAVE TAKEN CERTAIN ACTIONS AND, ABOVE ALL, WHAT MEASURES SEEM TO US NEEDED FOR THE FUTURE. I THINK THAT WHATEVER MAY HAVE HAPPEDED IN THE PAST IS LESS A POINT THAN WHETHER THE U.S. AND JAPAN CAN WORK TOGETHER ON THE COMMON PROBLEMS THAT WE HAVE. AND THAT WAS REALLY THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF MY DISCUSSIONS.

MEALEY (MCGRAW HILL): DR KISSINGER, SINCE YOU ARE HERE AT THE INVITATION OF THE U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC COUNCIL, CAN YOU TELL US WHAT ECONOMIC AREAS YOU TOUCHED ON, WHAT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, AND IF YOU MADE ANY ASSURANCES TO THE JAPANESE TOWARD PROGRAMS THAT MIGHT BE CARRIED OUT BY THE U.S. TOWARDS JAPAN WITH REGARD TO TRADE? AND IF YOU RECEIVED ANY ASSURANCES FROM THE JAPANESE AS FAR AS CLEARING UP SOME OF OUR PROBLEMS IN THIS AREA?

[lc]

KISSINGER: AS I HAVE TOLD THE MEMBERS OF THE JAPAN-U.S. ECONOMIC COUNCIL, I WAS NOT GIVEN MY PRESENT POSITION ON THE BASIS OF MY COMPETENCE IN ECONOMIC MATTERS. I GET INVOLVED IN ECONOMIC MATTERS WHEN THEY AFFECT GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY, AND IN THIS RESPECT, MY PRINCIPAL CONCERN HAS BEEN TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF A SUCCESSION OF CRISES PRODUCED BECAUSE SOME PARTICULAR INDUSTRY IS AFFECTED BY A PARTICULAR ACTION OF ONE COUNTRY OR THE OTHER AND TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE IMPORTANCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK THAT ENABLES BOTH COUNTRIES TO TAKE ANTICIPATORY ACTION RATHER THAN TO DEAL WITH PARTICULAR MANIFESTATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFICULTIES. AND I BELIEVE THAT THE JAPANESE SIDE IN GENERAL AGREE TO THIS APPROACH.

NAKAO (MAINICHI SHIMBUN): YOU EXPLAINED THE BASIS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TO THE JAPANESE CABINET MEMBERS AS WELL AS BUSINESS LEADERS. IN YOU EXPLANATION TO THEM WHAT KIND OF PLACE DID YOU DESCRIBE JAPAN'S ROLE TO BE IN AND WHAT DID YOU TELL THEM WAS YOUR EXPECTATION OF JAPAN IN THIS RESPECT? PARTICULARLY I THINK THAT YOU COINED THE WORD OR YOU STARTED THE EXPRESSION "THE MULTIPOLAR AGE," ARE YOU CONSIDERING JAPAN AS ONE OF THESE MULTI POLES IN DEPLOYMENT OF YOUR FOREIGN POLICY?

KISSINGER: LET ME MAKE CLEAR, FIRST OF ALL, THAT I DID NOT COME OVER HERE TO LECTURE JAPANESE LEADERS ABOUT THE FOREIGN POLICY JAPAN SHOULD PURUSE. I HAVE TROUBLE ENOUGH ADVISING THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT TAKING ON THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AS WELL. SO LET ME ANSWER THE QUESTION ABOUT JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE MULTI-POLAR WORLD, BECAUSE I KNOW THAT IT HAS BEEN A SUBJECT OF A GREAT DEAL OF DISCUSSION. IT'S ONE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRESENT WORLD THAT THERE ARE, THAT IT IS, THAT IT HAS MANY CENTERS OF POWER DEPENDING ON WHAT CATEGORY OF POWER YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE MILITARY FIELD, THE WORLD IS PROBABLY ESSENTIALLY BIPOLAR. IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, AS I POINTED OUT BEFORE, IT IS ESSENTIALLY MULTI-POLAR. IN THE POLITICAL FIELD IT IS SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN. THEREFORE WHEN ONE SPEAKS OF A MULTI-POLAR WORLD ECONOMICALLY ONE ISN'T STATING A PREFERENCE, ONE IS STATING A FACT. JAPAN IS A POWERFUL ECONOMIC COUNTRY. AND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE AN ORDERLY WORLD ECONOMY WITHOUT A MAJOR PARTICIPATION BY JAPAN. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE A SYSTEMATIC AND FOCAL-POINTING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN THE NEW COUNTRIES WITHOUT A CONTRIBUTION BY JAPAN. IT IS POSSIBLE TO HAVE THE DEFENSE OF CERTAIN AREAS WITHOUT A CONTRIBUTION FROM JAPAN. SO ONE HAS TO KNOW WHAT CATEGORY ONE IS TALKING ABOUT WHEN ONE SPEAKS ABOUT THE ROLE OF JAPAN OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY. IT IS OUR CONCERN TO COOPERATE IN THE FULLEST EXTENT IN WORKING OUT AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND POLITICAL SYSTEM IN WHICH JAPAN PLAYS A ROLE TO WHICH ITS DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE WAR ENTITLES IT. BUT WE ARE NOT DRAWING FROM THAT A CONCLUSION THAT IT HAS TO BE UNIFORM IN EVERY FIELD, ESPECIALLY THE MILITARY FLIED, NOR DO WE DRAW FROM IT THE CONCLUSION THAT THIS MEANS THAT THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES HAS BECOME LESS IMPORTANT.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 15, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING BY
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE STATE DINING ROOM

9:30 A.M. EDT

DR. KISSINGER: Gentlemen, the President has asked me to present to you the White House perspective on these agreements, and the general background, with the technical information and some more of the details to be supplied by the formal witnesses before your various committees.

I will read a statement to you which we will distribute. It is still in the process of being typed.

In considering the two agreements before the Congress, the treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems and the interim agreement on the limitation of offensive arms, the overriding questions are these: Do these agreements permit the United States to maintain a defense posture that guarantees our security and protects our vital interests? Second, will they lead to a more enduring structure of peace?

In the course of the formal hearings over the coming days and weeks, the Administration will demonstrate conclusively that they serve both of these ends. I will begin that process this morning by offering some general remarks on the agreement, after which I will be happy to take your questions.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE 1970'S

The first part of my remarks will deal with U.S.-Soviet relations as they affect these agreements. The agreement which was signed 46 minutes before midnight in Moscow on the evening of May 26th by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev is without precedent in the nuclear age; indeed, in all relevant modern history.

Never before have the world's two most powerful nations, divided by ideology, history and conflicting interests, placed their central armaments under formally agreed limitation and restraint. It is fair to ask: What new conditions now prevail to have made this step commend itself to the calculated self-interests of both of the so-called superpowers, as it so clearly must have done for both willingly to undertake it?

Let me start, therefore, with a sketch of the broad design of what the President has been trying to achieve in this country's relations with the Soviet Union, since at each important turning point in the SALT negotiations we were guided not so much by the tactical solution that seemed most equitable or prudent, important as it was, but by an underlying philosophy and a specific perception of international reality.

The international situation has been undergoing a profound structural change since at least the mid-1960s. The post-World War II pattern of relations among the great powers had been altered to the point that when this Administration took office, a major reassessment was clearly in order.

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The nations that had been prostrate in 1945 had regained their economic strength and their political vitality. The Communist bloc was divided into contending factions, and nationalistic forces and social and economic pressures were reasserting themselves within the individual Communist states.

Perhaps most important for the United States, our undisputed strategic predominance was declining just at a time when there was rising domestic resistance to military programs, and impatience for redistribution of resources from national defense to social demands.

Amidst all of this profound change, however, there was one important constant -- the continuing dependence of most of the world's hopes for stability and peace upon the ability to reduce the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The factors which perpetuated that rivalry remain real and deep.

-- We are ideological adversaries, and we will in all likelihood remain so for the foreseeable future.

-- We are political and military competitors, and neither can be indifferent to advances by the other in either of these fields.

-- We each have allies whose association we value and whose interests and activities of each impinge on those of the other at numerous points.

-- We each possess an awesome nuclear force created and designed to meet the threat implicit in the other's strength and aims.

Each of us has thus come into possession of power singlehandedly capable of exterminating the human race. Paradoxically, this very fact, and the global interests of both sides, create a certain commonality of outlook, a sort of interdependence for survival between the two of us.

Although we compete, the conflict will not admit of resolution by victory in the classical sense. We are compelled to coexist. We have an inescapable obligation to build jointly a structure for peace. Recognition of this reality is the beginning of wisdom for a sane and effective foreign policy today.

President Nixon has made it the starting point of the United States policy since 1969. This Administration's policy is occasionally characterized as being based on the principles of the classical balance of power. To the extent that that term implies a belief that security requires a measure of equilibrium, it has a certain validity. No national leader has the right to mortgage the survival of his people to the good will of another state. We must seek firmer restraints on the actions of potentially hostile states than a sanguine appeal to their good nature.

But to the extent that balance of power means constant jockeying for marginal advantages over an opponent, it no longer applies. The reason is that the determination of national

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power has changed fundamentally in the nuclear age. Throughout history, the primary concern of most national leaders has been to accumulate geopolitical and military power. It would have seemed inconceivable even a generation ago that such power once gained could not be translated directly into advantage over one's opponent. But now both we and the Soviet Union have begun to find that each increment of power does not necessarily represent an increment of usable political strength.

With modern weapons, a potentially decisive advantage requires a change of such magnitude that the mere effort to obtain it can produce disaster. The simple tit-for-tat reaction to each other's programs of a decade ago is in danger of being overtaken by a more or less simultaneous and continuous process of technological advance, which opens more and more temptations for seeking decisive advantage.

A premium is put on striking first and on creating a defense to blunt the other side's retaliatory capability. In other words, marginal additions of power cannot be decisive. Potentially decisive additions are extremely dangerous, and the quest for them are destabilizing. The argument that arms races produce war has often been exaggerated. The nuclear age is over shadowed by its peril.

All of this was in the President's mind as he mapped the new directions of American policy at the outset of this Administration. There was reason to believe that the Soviet leadership might also be thinking along similar lines as the repeated failure of their attempts to gain marginal advantage in local crises or in military competition underlined the limitation of old policy approaches.

The President, therefore, decided that the United States should work to create a set of circumstances which would offer the Soviet leaders an opportunity to move away from confrontation through carefully prepared negotiations. From the first, we rejected the notion that what was lacking was a cordial climate for conducting negotiations.

Past experience has amply shown that much heralded changes in atmospherics, but not buttressed by concrete progress, will revert to previous patterns. at the first subsequent clash of interests.

We have, instead, sought to move forward across a broad range of issues so that progress in one area would add momentum to the progress of other areas.

We hoped that the Soviet Union would acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of negotiations and that it would become convinced that its interests would be best served if the entire process unfolded. We have sought, in short, to create a vested interest in mutual restraint.

At the same time, we were acutely conscious of the contradictory tendencies at work in Soviet policy. Some factors-- such as the fear of nuclear war; the emerging consumer economy, and the increased pressures of a technological, administrative society -- have encouraged the Soviet leaders to seek a more stable relationship with the United States. Other factors -- such as ideology, bureaucratic inertia, and the catalytic effect of turmoil in peripheral areas -- have prompted pressures for tactical gains.

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The President has met each of these manifestations on its own terms, demonstrating receptivity to constructive Soviet initiatives and firmness in the face of provocations or adventurism. He has kept open a private channel through which the two sides could communicate candidly and settle matters rapidly. The President was convinced that agreements dealing with questions of armaments in isolation do not, in fact, produce lasting inhibitions on military competition because they contribute little to the kind of stability that makes crises less likely. In recent months, major progress was achieved in moving toward a broadly-based accommodation of interests with the USSR, in which an arms limitation agreement could be a central element.

This approach was called linkage, not by the Administration, and became the object of considerable debate in 1969. Now, three years later, the SALT agreement does not stand alone, isolated and incongruous in the relationship of hostility, vulnerable at any moment to the shock of some sudden crisis. It stands, rather, linked organically, to a chain of agreements and to a broad understanding about international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age.

The agreements on the limitation of strategic arms is, thus, not merely a technical accomplishment, although it is that in part, but it must be seen as a political event of some magnitude. This is relevant to the question of whether the agreements will be easily breached or circumvented. Given the past, no one can answer that question with certainty, but it can be said with some assurance that any country which contemplates a rupture of the agreement or a circumvention of its letter and spirit must now face the fact that it will be placing in jeopardy not only a limited arms control agreement, but a broad political relationship.

## PREPARATIONS FOR THE ARMS TALKS

Let me turn now to the more specific decisions we had to make about what the agreement should do and how it could be achieved.

We knew that any negotiations on arms control, especially ones involving those central weapons systems which guarantee each side's security, were found to be sensitive and complicated, requiring frequent high-level decisions.

The possibility of a deadlock would be ever present, and the repercussions of a deadlock could not help but affect U.S.-Soviet relations across the board. We had to begin, therefore, by assessing what the situation was in terms of armaments in place and under construction; what realistic alternatives we had at the negotiating table; and how a tentative or partial agreement would compare with no agreement at all.

For various reasons during the 1960s, the United States had, as you know, made the strategic decision to terminate its building programs in major offensive systems and to rely instead on qualitative improvements. By 1969, therefore, we had no active or planned programs for deploying additional ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles or bombers. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had dynamic and accelerated deployment programs in both land-based and sea-based missiles. You know, too, that the interval between conception and deployment of strategic weapons systems is generally five to ten years.

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A further complication was that the composition of forces on the two sides was not symmetrical. The Soviet Union had given priority to systems controlled within its own territory while the United States had turned increasingly to sea-based systems.

The result was that they had a panoply of different ICBM's while we essentially had one general class of ICBM's, the Minuteman, together with a more effective and modern submarine force operating from bases overseas and equipped with longer-range missiles.

All of this meant that even arriving at a basic definition of strategic equivalency would be technically demanding and politically intricate.

Looking beyond to the desired limitations, it appeared that neither side was going to make major unilateral concessions. When the national survival is at stake, such a step could not contribute to stability. The final outcome would have to be equitable and to offer a more reliable prospect for maintaining security than could be achieved without the agreements.

With these facts in view, the President, in the spring of 1969, established a group of senior officials responsible for preparing and conducting the SALT negotiations.

I acted as Chairman and the other members included the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

This group, called the Verification Panel, has the task of analyzing the issues and factors and submitting for the President's decisions those options which commanded support in the various departments and agencies.

The Verification Panel analyzed each of the weapons systems which could conceivably be involved in an agreement. It compared the effect of different limitations on our program and on the Soviet programs, and weighed the resulting balance. It analyzed the possibilities of verification, and the precise risk of evasion, seeking to determine at what point evasion could be detected and what measures would be available for a response. This was done in various combinations so that if one piece of the equation changed, say the ABM level, the Government would be able to determine the effect of that change upon the other components of a particular negotiating package.

Our aim was to be in a position to give the negotiations a momentum. We wanted to be sure that when stalemates developed, the point at issue would not be largely tactical, and that the alternative solutions would be analysed ahead of time and ready for immediate decision by the President.

## SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

In the first round of the talks, which began in November of 1969, the two sides established a work program and

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reached some tentative understanding of strategic principles.

For example, both sides more or less agreed at the outset that a very heavy ABM system could be a destabilizing factor, but that the precise level of ABM limitations would have to be set according to our success in agreeing on offensive limitations.

In the spring and summer of 1970, each country put forward more concrete proposals, translating some of the agreed principles into negotiating packages. During this period, we, on the American side, had hopes of reaching a comprehensive limitation. However, the initial search for a comprehensive solution gradually broke down over the question of defining the scope of the forces to be included.

The Soviets believed that strategic meant any weapons system capable of reaching the Soviet Union or the United States. This would have included our forward-based aircraft and carrier forces, but excluded Soviet intermediate range rockets aimed at Europe and other areas.

We opposed this approach, since it would have prejudiced our alliance commitments and raised a distinction between our own security and that of our European allies.

We offered a verifiable ban on the deployment and testing of Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles. The Soviets countered by offering a totally unverifiable production ban, while insisting on the freedom to test, thus placing the control of MIRV's effectively out of reach.

At this juncture, early in 1971, with the stalemate threatening, the President took a major new initiative by opening direct contact with the Soviet leaders to stimulate the SALT discussions and for that matter, the Berlin negotiations, and providing progress could be achieved on these two issues, to explore the feasibility of a summit meeting.

The Soviet leaders' first response was to insist that only the ABM's should be limited, and that offensive systems should be left aside. But as far as we were concerned, the still incipient ABM systems on both sides were far from the most dynamic or dangerous factors in the strategic equation. It was the Soviet offensive programs, moving ahead at the average rate of over 200 land-based and 100 sea-based missiles a year, which we felt constituted the most urgent issue. To limit our option of developing the ABM system without at the same time checking the growth of the Soviet offensive threat was unacceptable.

Exchanges between the President and the Soviet leaders embodying these views produced the understanding of May 20, 1971. As any workable compromise in the field must do, that understanding met each side's essential concerns. Since the offensive systems were complex and since agreement with respect to all of them had proved impossible, it was agreed that the initial offensive settlement would be an interim agreement and not a permanent treaty, and that it would freeze only selected categories at agreed levels.

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On the defensive side, the understanding called for negotiations towards a permanent ABM solution with talks on both issues to proceed simultaneously to a common conclusion.

This left two major issues for the negotiators, the precise level of the allowed ABM's, and the scope of the interim agreement, specifically what weapons would be included in the freeze.

Devising an equitable agreement on ABM's proved extremely difficult. The United States had virtually completed its ABM site at Grand Forks, and we were working on the second site at Malmstrom. Hence, we proposed freezing deployments at levels operational or under construction, that is to say, two ICBM sites on our side, and the Moscow defense on the other.

The Soviets objected this would deny them the right to have any protection for their ICBM's, a new formula was then devised allowing each side to choose two sites, one each for national capital and ICBM defense or both for ICBM defense. The resolution of the ABM issue was completed after our Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Secretary of Defense, decided that a site in Washington to defend the National Command Authority was to be preferred over the second ICBM-protective site at Malmstrom. They reasoned that while a limited defense would not assure the ultimate survival of the National Command Authority, it would buy time against a major attack while the radars in both the NCA defense and the defense of ICBM's would provide valuable warning. Moreover, an NCA defense would protect the National Command Authority in the event of a small attack by some third country or even an accidental or unauthorized launch of a weapon toward the United States.

The President accepted their recommendation.

What about the offensive weapons freeze? Early in the discussions about the implementation of this portion of the May 20 understanding between the President and the Soviet leaders, it was decided to exclude from the freeze bombers and so-called forward-based systems. To exclude, that is, the weapons in which this country holds an advantage.

We urged the Congress to keep this fact in mind, when assessing the numerical ratios of weapons which are subject to the offensive freeze.

There was also relatively rapid agreement following the May 20 breakthrough that intercontinental ballistic missiles would be covered. This left the issue of the inclusion of submarines.

With respect to ICBM's in submarines, the situation was as follows: The Soviet Union had been deploying at the average annual rate of 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 100 sea-based ballistic missiles a year. The U.S. had completed deployments of Minuteman and the 41 Polaris submarines in 1967. Of course, as you know, we are engaged in increasing the number of warheads on both our ICBM's and submarine-launched missiles. We were, and are, developing a new submarine system, although it cannot be deployed until 1978 or until after the end of the freeze. In other words, as a result of decisions made in the 1960's, and not reversible with the time-frame of the protected agreement, there would be a numerical gap against us in the two categories of land- and sea-based missile systems whether or not there was an agreement. Without an agreement, the gap would steadily widen.

The agreement would not create the gap. It would prevent its enlargement to our disadvantage. In short, a freeze of ICIMs and sea-based systems would be overwhelmingly in the United States' interest.

These basic considerations undoubtedly impelled the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that any freeze which was to command their support must include the submarine-based system. The only possible alternative was a crash program for building additional missile-launching submarines. The President explored this idea with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. Their firm judgment was that such a program was undesirable. It could not produce results before 1976 -- that is, toward the very end of a projected freeze -- and only by building a type of submarine similar to our current fleet, and without many of the features most needed for the 1980s and beyond.

The President once again used his direct channel to the Soviet leaders, this time to urge the inclusion of missile-launching submarines in the offensive agreement.

After a long period of hesitation, the Soviet leaders agreed in principle at the end of April. Final details were worked out in Moscow between the President and the Soviet leaders.

My purpose in dwelling at such length upon the details of our internal deliberations and negotiations has been to make one crucial point: Neither the freeze of ICBMs nor the freeze of submarine-launched missiles was a Soviet idea, and hence, it is not an American concession. On the contrary, in both cases it was the Soviet Union which reluctantly acceded to American proposals afterlong and painful deliberation.

## PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT

I will not spend this group's time in further review of the frequently arduous negotiations in Vienna, Helsinki, and during the summit in Moscow leading to the final agreement. I do want to pay tribute on behalf of the President to Ambassador Smith and his delegation, whose dedication, negotiating skill and patience contributed decisively to the outcome.

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Let me summarize the principal provisions of the documents as signed. The ABM treaty allows each side to have one ABM site for the defense of its national command authority and another site for defense of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The two must be at least 1,300 kilometers, or 800 miles apart in order to prevent the development of a territorial defense. Each ABM site can have 100 ABM interceptors.

The treaty contains additional provisions which effectively prohibit either the establishment of a radar base for the defense of populated areas or the attainment of capabilities to intercept ballistic missiles by conversion of air defense missiles to anti-ballistic missiles.

It provides for withdrawal by either party on six months' notice, if supreme national interests are judged to have been jeopardized by extraordinary events. By setting a limit to ABM defenses the treaty not only eliminates one area of potentially dangerous defensive competition, but it reduces the incentive for continuing deployment of offensive systems.

As long as it lasts, offensive missile forces have, in effect, a free ride to their targets. Beyond a certain level of sufficiency, differences in numbers are therefore not conclusive.

The interim agreement on offensive arms is to run for five years, unless replaced by a more comprehensive permanent agreement which will be the subject of further negotiations, or unless terminated by notification similar to that for the treaty.

In essence this agreement will freeze the numbers of strategic offensive missiles on both sides at approximately the levels currently operational and under construction. For ICBM's, this is 1054 for the United States and 1618 for the Soviet Union. Within this overall limitation, the Soviet Union has accepted a freeze of its heavy ICBM launchers, the weapons most threatening to our strategic forces.

There is also a prohibition on conversion of light ICBM's into heavy missiles. These provisions are buttressed by verifiable provisions and criteria, specifically the prohibition against any significant enlargement of missile silos.

The submarine limitations are more complicated. In brief, the Soviets are frozen to their claimed current level, operational and under construction, of about 740 missiles, some of them on an older type nuclear submarine. They are permitted to build to a ceiling of 62 boats and 950 missiles, but only if they dismantle older ICBM's or submarine-based missiles to offset the new construction.

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This would mean dismantling 210 ICBM's and some
30 missiles on some nine older nuclear submarines. Bombers
and other aircraft are not included in this agreement.

In sum, the interim offensive agreement will keep
the overall number of strategic ballistic missile launchers
both on land and at sea within an agreed ceiling which
is essentially the current level, operational or under
construction. It will not prohibit the United States
from continuing current and planned strategic offensive
programs, since neither the multiple-warhead conversion,
nor the B-1 is within the purview of the freeze and since
the ULMS submarine system is not, or never was planned
for deployment until after 1977. The agreement will stop
the Soviet Union from increasing the existing numerical
gap in missile launchers.

Finally, there are a number of interpretative
statements which were provided to the Congress along
with the agreements. These interpretations are in several
forms: Agreed statements initialed by the delegations,
agreed interpretations or common understandings which
were not set down formally and initialed, unilateral
interpretations to make our position clear in instances
where we could not get total agreement.

In any negotiation of this complexity, there will
inevitably be details upon which the parties cannot agree.
We made certain unilateral statements in order to insure
that our positions on these details was included in the
negotiating record and understood by the other side.

The agreed interpretations and common understandings
for the most part deal with detailed technical aspects of
limitations on ABM systems and offensive weapons. For
example, it was agreed that the size of missile silos
could not be significantly increased and that "significantly"
meant not more than 10 to 15 percent.

In the more important unilateral declarations we
made clear to the Soviets that the introduction of land
mobile ICBM's would be inconsistent with the agreement.
Since the publication of the various unilateral interpretative
statements, suggestions have been heard that the language
of the treaty and agreement in fact hide deep-seated
disagreements. But it must be recognized that in any
limited agreements, which are between old time adversaries,
there are bound to be certain gaps.

In this case the gaps relate not so much to the
terms themselves, but rather to what it was impossible
to include. The interpretations do not vitiate these
agreements, but they expand and add to the agreements.

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WHAT DO THE AGREEMENTS MEAN?

Taking the longer perspective, what can we say has
been accomplished?

First, it is clear that the agreement will enhance
the security of both sides. No agreement which fails to do so
could have been signed in the first place or stood any chance
of lasting after it was signed. An attempt to gain a unilateral
advantage in the strategic field must be self-defeating.

The President has given the most careful consideration
to the final terms. He has asked me to reiterate most
emphatically this morning his conviction that the agreements
fully protect our national security and our vital interests.

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Secondly, the President is determined that our security and vital interests shall remain fully protected. If the Senate consents to ratification of the treaty and if the Congress approves the interim agreement, the Administration will, therefore, pursue two parallel courses.

On the one hand, we shall push the next phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the same energy and conviction that have produced these initial agreements.

On the other hand, until further Arms limits are negotiated, we shall push research and development and the production capacity to remain in a fully protected strategic posture should follow-on agreements prove unattainable and so as to avoid giving the other side a temptation to break out of the agreement.

Third, the President believes that these agreements, embedded as they are in the fabric of an emerging new relationship, can hold tremendous political and historical significance in the coming decades. For the first time, two great powers, deeply divided by their divergent values, philosophies, and social systems, have agreed to restrain the very armaments which their national survival depends. No decision of this magnitude could have been taken unless it had been part of a larger decision to place relations on a new foundation of restraint, cooperation and steadily evolving confidence. A spectrum of agreements on joint efforts with regard to the environment, space, health, and promising negotiations on economic relations provides a prospect for avoiding the failure of the Washington Naval Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand pact outlawing war which collapsed in part for lack of an adequate political foundation.

The final verdict must wait on events, but there is at least reason to hope that these accords represent a major break in the pattern of suspicion, hostility, and confrontation which has dominated U.S.-Soviet relations for a generation. The two great nuclear powers must not let this opportunity slip away by jockeying for marginal advantages.

Inevitably an agreement of such consequence raises serious questions on the part of concerned individuals of quite different persuasions. I cannot do justice to all of them here. Let me deal with some of the most frequently asked since the agreements were signed three weeks ago.

Who won?

The President has already answered this question. He has stressed that it is inappropriate to pose the question in terms of victory or defeat. In an agreement of this kind, either both sides win, or both sides lose. This will either be a serious attempt to turn the world away from time-worn practices of jockeying for power, or there will be endless, wasteful and purposeless competition in the acquisition of armaments.

Does the agreement perpetuate a U.S. strategic disadvantage?

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We reject the premise of that question on two grounds. First, the present situation is on balance advantageous to the United States. Second, the Interim Agreement perpetuates nothing which did not already exist in fact and which could only have gotten worse without an agreement.

Our present strategic military situation is sound. Much of the criticism has focused on the imbalance in number of missiles between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But, this only examines one aspect of the problem. To assess the overall balance it is necessary to consider those forces not in the agreement; our bomber force which is substantially larger and more effective than the Soviet bomber force, and our forward bases systems,

The quality of the weapons must also be weighed. We are confident we have a major advantage in nuclear weapons technology and in warhead accuracy. Also, with our MIRV's we have a two-to-one lead today in numbers of warheads and this lead will be maintained during the period of the agreement, even if the Soviets develop and deploy MIRV's of their own.

Then there are such factors as deployment characteristics. For example, because of the difference in geography and basing, it has been estimated that the Soviet Union requires three submarines for two of ours to be able to keep an equal number on station.

When the total picture is viewed, our strategic forces are seen to be completely sufficient.

The Soviets have more missile launchers, but when other relevant systems such as bombers are counted there are roughly the same number of launchers on each side. We have a big advantage on warheads. The Soviets have an advantage on megatonnage.

What is disadvantageous to us, though, is the trend of new weapons deployment by the Soviet Union and the projected imbalance five years hence based on that trend. The relevant question to ask, therefore, is what the freeze prevents; where would we be by 1977 without a freeze? Considering the current momentum by the Soviet Union, in both ICBM's and submarine launched ballistic missiles, the ceiling set in the Interim Agreement can only be interpreted as a sound arrangement that makes a major contribution to our national security.

Does the agreement jeopardize our security in the future?

The current arms race compounds numbers by technology. The Soviet Union has proved that it can best compete in sheer numbers. This is the area which is limited by the agreement.

Thus the agreement confines the competition with the Soviets to the area of technology? And, heretofore, we have had a significant advantage.

The follow-on negotiations will attempt to bring

the technological race under control. Until these
negotiations succeed, we must take care not to anticipate
their outcome by unilateral decisions.

Can we trust the Soviets?

The possibility always exists that the Soviets will treat
the Moscow agreements as they have sometimes treated earlier
ones, as just another tactical opportunity in the protracted
conflict. If this happens, the United States will have to
respond. This we shall plan to prepare to do psychologically
and strategically and provided the Congress accepts the
strategic programs on which the acceptance of the agreements
was predicated.

I have said enough to indicate we advocate these
agreements not on the basis of trust, but on the basis of
the enlightened self-interests of both sides. This self-
interest is reinforced by the carefully drafted verification
provisions in the agreement. Beyond the legal obligations,
both sides have a stake in all of the agreements that have
been signed, and a large stake in the broad process of
improvement in relations that has begun. The Soviet leaders
are serious men, and we are confident that they will not lightly
abandon the course that has led to the summit meeting and to
these initial agreements. For our own part, we will not abandon
this course without major provocation, because it is in the
interest of this country and in the interest of mankind to
pursue it.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

At the conclusion of the Moscow summit, the President
and General Secretary Brezhnev signed a Declaration of
Principles to govern the future relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union. These principles state
that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence in the
nuclear age. They commit both sides to avoid direct
armed confrontation, to use restraint in local conflicts,
to assert no special claims in derogation of the sovereign
equality of all nations, to stress cooperation and negotiation
at all points of our relationship.

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At this point, these principles reflect an aspiration and an attitude. This Administration will spare no effort to translate the aspiration into reality. We shall strive with determination to overcome further the miasma of suspicion and self-confirming preemptive actions which have characterized the Cold War.

Of course the temptation is to continue along well worn paths. The status quo has the advantage of reality, but history is strewn with the wreckage of nations which sought their future in their past. Catastrophe has resulted far less often from conscious decisions than from the fear of breaking loose from established patterns through the inexorable march towards cataclysm because nobody knew what else to do. The paralysis of policy which destroyed Europe in 1914 would surely destroy the world if we let it happen again in the nuclear age.

Thus the deepest question we ask is not whether we can trust the Soviets, but whether we can trust ourselves. Some have expressed concern about the agreements not because they object to their terms, but be cause they are afraid of the euphoria that these agreements might produce.

But surely we cannot be asked to maintain unavoidable tension just to carry out programs which our national survival should dictate in any event. We must not develop a national psychology by which we can act only on the basis of what we are against and not on what we are for.

Our challenges then are: Can we chart a new course with hope but without illusion, with large purposes but without sentimentality? Can we be both generous and strong? It is not often that a country has the opportunity to answer such questions meaningfully. We are now at such a juncture where peace and progress depend on our faith and our fortitude.

It is in this spirit that the President has negotiated the agreements. It is in this spirit that he asks the approval of the treaty and the Interim Agreement and that I now stand ready to answer your questions.

END

(AT 10:45 a.m. EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 15, 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
AFTER A BRIEFING BY
DR. HENRY KISSINGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

STATE DINING ROOM

MR. MacGREGOR: Gentlemen, as the President indicated in his report to the Joint Session of Congress two weeks ago tonight, he places the highest importance on executive-legislative partnership in the further carrying forward of the constitutional process with respect to the treaty and the agreement.

This session this morning is designed to further that commitment on the President's part and to give to you and through you the American people, an opportunity for the fullest possible debate and the fullest range of questions.

The President has asked me, and I would like to do so, to recognize the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Fulbright.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Thank you, Mr. MacGregor.

Dr. Kissinger, first, may I say I think that was an extraordinarily thorough and enlightening statement. The only regret I have is that he didn't make it public so all the country could have heard it, because I think it is a very great description, I think, of what these agreements mean.

I am thoroughly in accord with the spirit with which you have given them and the way the President has presented this agreement for our country. I have only one serious question about it.

There does appear to me to be an inherent inconsistency in the attitude as expressed by the Secretary of Defense the other day. For background, I will read one sentence. This is a quote from his testimony before the Armed Services Committee: "I could not support the agreements if the Congress fails to act on movement forward of the Trident system, the B-1 bombers or other programs that we have outlined to improve our strategic offensive systems during this five-year period."

Now, the explanation that Mr. Kissinger has made about maintaining our security during the five-year period I accept as a general statement, but in view of the fact that we know the Soviets have no aircraft carriers whatever, they have a very small and not very modern bomber force, they have no forward bases similar to ours, unless you consider Cuba perhaps a forward base.

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But so far, we have no evidence that it is being
so prepared. They are not planning a Trident system
that I know of. Their system of submarines is traditional
and similar to the ones they already have.

In view of all this, it seems to me to couple
the approval of the ABM and the interim agreement with
Congressional approval of these vastly expensive programs
raises a serious question about our determination to accept
this agreement in the spirit in which I think it was
negotiated and the spirit which you have stated. That is
a gradual relaxation of the tensions, and not to use these
agreements as an excuse for a greatly enlarged arms system
of our own.

This is the only thing that has bothered me about
them. I, of course, am personally extremely pleased with
the overall agreements with the sole exception, do we mean
it, as I have said, and you yourself so offer, put yourself
in the place of the Russians, if we proceed immediately
to a very large expansion of our weapons systems, would
this not leave in the mind of General Grechko and his
colleagues a question about our sincerity in really
moving toward a reduction in the arms race.

This is the only question I have and it is the
one which bothers me and I wish you would enlarge
upon the necessity of proceeding at once and tying these
agreements with the approval of programs about which there
were serious questions even before this agreement was made,
there were very serious questions about the A-14 and B-1
before these negotiations were agreed on.

Now, we seem to be put in the position of being
pressured into that in order to get an agreement with which
I am thoroughly in accord.

DR. KISSINGER: As the President pointed out, and
as I also said in my statement, Mr. Chairman, we intend
to move on two tracks: One, we hope to start the second
round of SALT negotiations as soon as the Senate ratifies
the treaty and the Congress approves the interim agreement.

If the schedule that was tentatively suggested to
you by the President were met, that is to say, approval by
the end of August, we would hope to have the first session
of the second round of SALT sometime during October and then
to begin the process again. We will pursue those nego-
tiations with the attitude towards bringing about a change
in the international climate that I have described.

At the same time, the question arises of what
we should do in our national defense posture while we engage
in these negotiations. It has been the judgment of this
Administration that we must continue those programs which
preserve our strategic position. I do not, in this setting,
want to go into each individual weapon system because I
believe that the appropriate committees will examine the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff with respect to them.

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MR. MacGREGOR: I am sure if the President were
here, he would like to have recognized the Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Chairman Morgan.

CONGRESSMAN MORGAN: Thank you, Clark, and I want to
thank Dr. Kissinger in inviting us to brief us on it.

When the President appeared here in the short
appearance he made before this group, he spelled out the reason
why this had to be done in Moscow at such a high level, because
it crossed over so many agencies and because of the form of
government of the Soviet Union.

He also ended up by saying that you would not be
available for testimony on Capitol Hill, in which I agree. But
I just wondered, with the five committees who are represented
here today, who are going to consider over in the Senate side
the Treaty of the ABM's and over on the House side this, the
limitation that has been set by you and the President, of
September 1, whether you would be available by these committees
for consultation as we go along.

DR. KISSINGER: I would be delighted to meet with
members of these committees in groups, on an individual basis,
or in the kind of setting that we have worked out before, in
which I will meet with the committees at the invitation of the
Chairman in some setting that maintains the position of Executive
privilege.

But I will be fully available to answer any questions
and we are prepared to go as far as is humanly possible with
respect to Executive privilege.

Certainly, to make available to the Congress any
answers that we can.

CONGRESSMAN MORGAN: I want to assure you that the
Committee on Foreign Affairs will go to work on this as soon
as we get back from the Democratic Convention.

MR. MacGREGOR: I am sure we would like to hear from
the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the
Honorable John Stennis.

SENATOR STENNIS: Well, Mr. Chairman, and colleagues
of the Congress, I certainly didn't come here to make a statement.
I came to listen and to learn. I did respond when I walked in, to
a request that I would say just a word.

Gentlemen and ladies here in the Congress, I have
been on the Armed Services Committee since before we had ICBM's
and I have thought many times the growing realization I had of
what these could mean and now what they do mean in our hands and
then this same weapon in the hands of our adversaries.

So, I have been driven into a corner of wanting
very much to have some kind of an agreement that would be the
germ, perhaps, of something that would relieve the tensions
and assure our safety.

I do have one major reservation about this situation
I am going to mention, but I do believe if we can approve it,
it is a start, maybe not much of a start, but it is a start.

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That is the biggest thing I see about it.

May I just respond one moment to the very major
point that the Senator from Arkansas made, about if we get these
agreements, why go on with the ULM's. I remember so well the
ABM debate that we had in the Senate. The most outstanding
point in my mind, I was convinced that the great probability
was that by putting in the ABM for whatever it was worth,
it might increase the chances of getting some kind of a start on
agreements.

Not that I have any perception, but as I have under-
stood, from the President at other briefings, they thought that
was a major point in getting this.

This same reasoning applies, I think. I am going to
support the B-1 and the ULM's and frankly, I am going all of the
way on ULM's now, even though I had in mind supporting it only
for a limited amount this year, and not on an all-out program.

I have in mind now, the statement you made, Dr.
Kissinger, but I am not under its impact exactly, and I have said
these things because they were old thoughts. But it is quite
helpful.

By the way, is this an open meeting, is the
press here? Anyway, the reservation I have is on this
surveillance, our power to detect any cheating. That hadn't
been gone into here and it hasn't been gone into in other
briefings that I have been to, and I don't insist on any
question being answered on it, but I raise that point.

If you want to comment on it, you may. I want to
make this observation. I think that we are more than doers
out there in the Congress. We are not going to say just Yes
or No. We have to actively make up our mind on this, and take
a position for future generations.

I believe that will help us approach it. Do you
want to comment on that detection and surveillance?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I am sure that when Mr.
Holma testifies in executive sessions, that he can go into more
detail than I can. In fact, all I can do is to make the
statement that we are confident that national means of verifi-
cation are sufficient to monitor the numerical limitations of this
agreement.

We studied this problem in great detail before we
entered negotiations, and determined for each category of
weapon the margin of error that we thought our collection
systems had and what we could do to react once we found out
that there had been a violation.

In each of these cases, we found that the
margin was well within tolerable limits. In this case, however,
where we are dealing with numbers, we are confident that the
national means of verification are sufficient to give us the
highest degree of confidence that this agreement will be lived
up to, or that we will know it almost immediately if it is
not lived up to.

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MR. MacGREGOR: The President is aware that the members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have developed a tremendous expertise which applies directly to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and to the interim agreement and we are delighted to see the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Honorable John Pastore, from Rhode Island.

Senator Pastore, do you have a question?

SENATOR PASTORE: Not exactly a question for the moment because I have asked it before and I think it has been answered. I think the one dominant question here is whether or not in these agreements we have reserved to ourselves the military potential that will constitute a deterrent against an attack upon us, and also whether or not in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff they are all unanimous that this is a good agreement.

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. Chairman, we would not have entered into this agreement if we thought it impaired our capacity for deterrence. As was pointed out in my statement, we believe that it maintains the capacity of deterrence and at the same time, enables the world to start toward turning away from the arms race as well as improving the whole international climate.

Secondly, at every stage of this agreement we consulted in the greatest detail with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This has been pointed out, both in my statement, but it was done throughout the work of the Verification Panel in which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is represented and at every decision that the President made, the International Security Council.

I do not know of any significant decision -- I don't know of any decision with respect to this agreement that was made which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not unanimously supported.

During the final stages of the negotiation in Moscow, we were in direct touch with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the various proposals unfolded, and, of course, you will be calling Admiral Moorer yourself, but I am certain that he will confirm the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for this agreement.

MR. MacGREGOR: Yes, Congressman.

CONGRESSMAN NEDZI: Dr. Kissinger, on March 14, the President gave as a rationale for the broad safeguard system, part of his rationale, was the defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which the People's Republic of China is likely to be able to mount within the decade.

Has anything happened to that threat, and in that connection, are you able to tell us anything about your forthcoming visit to China?

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DR. KISSINGER: Our estimate of the Chinese
nuclear capability is still approximately what it was at the
time that Safeguard was developed. Our estimate of the like-
lihood of our being involved in any nuclear conflict with
the People's Republic of China is considerably less than it was
at the time that the Safeguard program was submitted to the
Congress, because of the political developments that have
happened since then, specifically the opening toward China.

Therefore, we accept now that in the overall con-
text of the contribution that this agreement could make toward
world peace and toward improving general relationships, and in
the light, also, of improvement of relations with the People's
Republic of China, that we could pay this price of foregoing
the additional protection that the President requested in his
original statement.

We could do this all the more so because if our
estimates turn out to be incorrect, we have such an over-
whelming retaliatory capability vis-a-vis any other country
other than the Soviet Union, that the idea of a third nuclear
country attacking the United States is a rather remote possi-
bility.

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CONGRESSMAN NEDZI: Didn't we have it three months ago?

DR. KISSINGER: I was talking about the justification which the President gave when he started the Safeguard Program. I don't know what March 14th statement you are talking about. It must have been March 14, 1969.

CONGRESSMAN NEDZI: My apologies.

DR. KISSINGER: It was not March 14th of this year.

CONGRESSMAN NEDZI: I stand corrected.

DR. KISSINGER: That was 1969. Then with respect to my visit to the Peoples Republic of China, it was foreseen in the Shanghai Communique. It was tentatively agreed to at the time of the President's visit to Peking that sometime during the course of the summer we would send a senior representative to the Peoples Republic. We intend to review the whole range of international problems as they affect American-Chinese relationships.

MR. MacGREGOR: When I recognized Congressman Nedzi, I was looking unsuccessfully for the Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, Congressman Hebert of Louisiana. I don't see Eddie, but I do see the ranking majority Member of the Committee, and the Vice Chairman of the Committee on Atomic Energy. I would like to recognize Congressman Mel Price.

CONGRESSMAN PRICE: Mr. MacGregor, Mr. Hebert has important business in Louisiana today and could not be here. But I would like to advise the group that the committee will mark up the Procurement Bill and all the items in there are going to be approved this afternoon.

SENATOR BENNETT: My question is partly a request for additional clarification. Do I understand that Mr. Kissinger's statement will be available to us as well as that of the President?

DR. KISSINGER: That is correct.

CONGRESSMAN HANSON: Dr. Kissinger, as I understand the ABM Treaty, it anticipates the construction of an ABM site at the capital of each of the two countries, plus one other site.

CONGRESSMAN HANSON: With respect to an ABM system to protect our Nation's Capital, is it the intention of the Administration to push forward for authorization and construction of this system around Washington and how important is it to the credible defense to which reference was made that we do proceed to authorize and construct this protection for the Nation's Capital? Will our position be significantly weakened in terms of future negotiations if we fail to take this step?

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DR. KISSINGER: First of all, we will request this authorization. Secondly, it was the judgment of our senior military leaders that a second site in the Capital area would be more useful than a second site in Malstrom. It would give additional warning time in case of a major attack and it would give protection against an attack by a third country. It is for this reason that we are recommending to the Congress and requesting the Congress to authorize its construction.

SENATOR JACKSON: Dr. Kissinger, first I want to compliment you on a very fine statement. I think we all want to see an end to the arms race, but I think we all should agree that if you are going to have an agreement it should be one that will stabilize and not destabilize. When you have a number of ambiguities such as we have in the present arrangement, I think it is fraught with some trouble.

For example, I just want to illustrate a couple: There are a lot of them. But we do have, for example, a bilateral understanding on the number of advanced strategic type submarines, the Y Class, Polaris. That is defined specifically. But there is no specific limitation other than our unilateral statement as to the number of land-based missiles, intercontinental, that are permitted.

Would you comment? The same is true of "What is a heavy missile?"

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the numbers of missiles actually being deployed, the Soviet Union has been extremely reluctant to specify precise numbers, that is true. We have operated with a number of 1618. There is absolutely no question that if our intelligence should reveal that the Soviet numbers significantly exceed that figure that the whole premise of the agreement will be in question.

Now, what will maintain this agreement is not the fact that we can wave these provisions and take it to court at any particular moment, but what will maintain this agreement is the consequences the other side will face if it turns out that it has turned into a scrap of paper and that it is being circumvented.

If this agreement were being circumvented, obviously we would have to take compensatory steps in the strategic field. But beyond that, as is pointed out in my statement, the two countries have a unique opportunity right now to move into an entirely different relationship of building additional trust.

If it turns out that through legalistic interpretations of provisions of the agreement of through failing to specify numbers about which we have left absolutely no doubt as to our interpretation and where are hereby reaffirmed, if it should turn out that those numbers are being challenged in any significant way at all, then this would cast a doubt. It would not only threaten disagreement, but it would threaten the whole basis of this new relationship which I have described.

We are very confident that our national means of detection give us the highest degree of confidence that these numbers cannot be exceeded without our knowing and that if they are exceeded that the consequences I described will follow.

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Now, with respect to the definition of heavy missiles, this was the subject of extensive discussions at Vienna and Helsinki, and finally, Moscow. No doubt, one of the reasons for the Soviet reluctance to specify a precise characteristic is because undoubtedly they are planning to modernize within the existing framework some of the weapons they now possess.

The agreement specifically permits the modernization of weapons. There are, however, a number of safeguards. First there is the safeguard that no missile larger than the heaviest light missile that now exists can be substituted.

Secondly, there is the provision that the silo configuration cannot be changed in a significant way and then the agreed interpretive statement or the interpretive statement which we made, which the other side stated reflected its views also, that this meant that it could not be increased by more than 10 to 15 percent.

We believe that these two statements, taken in conjunction, give us an adequate safeguard against a substantial substitution of heavy missiles for light missiles. So, we think we have adequate safeguards with respect to that issue.

It is, however, true, Senator Jackson, that within these limitations, improvements, qualitative improvements, are possible which will increase the capabilities of each of these missiles and this is one of the reasons why we have advocated qualitative improvements in our strategic forces. But as far as the break between the light and the heavy missiles is concerned, we believe that we have assurances through the two safeguards that I have mentioned to you.

CONGRESSMAN STRATTON: Dr. Kissinger, I have one question with regard to one of the unilateral statements that was published the other day. Under the agreement, as I understand it, we have 41 Polaris submarines and we could go to 44 if we turned in our old Titans. But the Soviets say that they are considering the British and the French Polaris submarines to be part of our force and that if the total goes over 50 they will consider the agreement breached. The British have four. The French have one and three others in construction, which means that if the French ones are completed, then we could only have 42 without putting it over the total of 50.

Could you comment on how we can hold down the British and French as part of this agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, the Soviet Union has not said that they would consider the agreement breached. The Soviet Union has said that they would then reserve the right to ask for additional compensation.

Secondly, we have emphatically rejected that interpretative recitation and have written our rejection of that into the record. So, we do not consider that we have agreed to this Soviet interpretation. You have to remember the interpretative statements are in a number of categories. There are those that are agreed and initialled. There are those orally agreed. There are those that are unilateral and not challenged and then there are those that are unilateral and challenged.

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I would think that a unilateral statement that was
challenged at the time it was made would not be the most
determining feature in our own policy with respect to this.

But, finally, the provisions that permit the trading
in of one type of missile for another do not have to be
implemented. We have the right, but we don't have the
obligation, to trade in the Titans for additional submarines
and given our construction program at this moment, with no
additional submarines of the Polaris type being built, we
may well decide not to exercise this option and keep the
Titans, in which case your question would be moot.

But in any event, we have not accepted this Soviet
interpretation.

CONGRESSMAN PIKE: Dr. Kissinger, if I understand the
philosophy whereby one of these agreements requires a treaty
and the other is an executive agreement, it has to do with
the fact that the executive agreement is limited to a term
of years. As we look ahead to SALT II, I would like to ask
this question: For how long a period of years could an execu-
tive agreement be made which was not required to be a treaty?
Could it be for 25 years, for example?

I would also like to ask a question in this regard:
The tentative agreement was fairly well leaked or publicized
in some manner before the President went to Moscow. I would
simply like to ask whether there were any substantive changes
made at Moscow.

DR. KISSINGER: The first question is an important
Constitutional question: At what point does an executive
agreement achieve character of such permanence that it should
really more properly be in the form of a treaty?

There were two reasons why the executive agreement
was put into that form. One was because of its limited
duration and secondly because of its limited scope. That is
to say, here we had an agreement, the major categories of
which were going to be included again in a more comprehensive
negotiation leading to a more permanent arrangement.

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For example, the disparity which is involved
for a limited period of time might not prove acceptable
for a more permanent arrangement.

For this reason, that is to say, the limited
duration and the limited scope, it was decided that an
Executive Agreement which, however, is submitted to the
entire Congress, was more appropriate.

If you got to the point where you made a 25-year
agreement, I don't want to prejudge that issue, but, as a
political scientist and not as a presidential assistant,
it would look more like a treaty to me. But I don't want
to get into that.

Now, with respect to the second question, the
general outlines of the agreement were shaped, really,
in three ways. One was by negotiations in Helsinki
and Vienna, which did most of the detail. But the policy
decisions that were brought about through direct contact
between the President and the Soviet leaders which led
to the May 20, 1971 breakthrough and then, again, to the
formula which led to the inclusion of the submarines --
when we were in Moscow there were four major issues that
had not been resolved in Helsinki, which were known as issues,
but the solution of which could not have been leaked
because it hadn't been achieved. Those were the subjects
that were most intensively discussed between the President
and the General Secretary, primarily the issue of how
you calculate the submarine limits, and at what point
the replacement of submarines has to start, and which
submarines had to becounted for replacement purposes, and
questions of this type.

There were subsidiary issues having to do with the
silos, I mentioned interpretative statements, and matters
of this kind, none of which had been settled in Helsinki,
and had to be settled in very extensive conversations
between the President and the General Secretary and between
members of our delegation in Moscow and their Soviet colleagues.

MR. McGREGOR: Senator Javits?

SENATOR JAVITS: I would like to revert to the
question asked by Senator Fulbright and Senator Stennis,
because they raise some, to my mind, very serious points.

On the assumption that the treaty can be denounced
in six months, but the agreement cannot be denounced
at all, if it is breached, either party can treat it as an
end. What do you advise us to do about the September 1
date the President names, if by then we have not determined
that we wish to authorize any additional weapons systems
in view of the fact that the President has made it clear
that he made this agreement on the assumption that we, too,
would press forward with our weapons plans as the Russians are?

And the second part of that question is: Is this
the total bill or are there more weapons systems to come

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within the next five years that we are going to have to
authorize because we have made this deal?

DR. KISSINGER: First, I think it is not correct
to say that you have been asked to authorize weapons
because we have made this deal. All of the weapons that
you are being asked to authorize had been requested prior
to the deal and were judged to be necessary before the
deal. The question is not whether the deal impels them,
but whether the deal makes them dispensable.

This is the shape of the debate.

Secondly, I am frankly not sure about the withdrawal
provisions of the defensive agreement. I thought it had
the same withdrawal provisions.

It is my impression that the offensive agreement
has exactly the same withdrawal provisions of the defensive
treaty, so that we are protected.

Thirdly, as I have said, we are requesting both of
these programs on their own merit, and, therefore, it is
up to the Congress to decide how to deal with them.

SENATOR PERCY: Dr. Kissinger, I would like to
first express that in dealing with our two major adversaries,
you will always be as skillful and successful as you have
in skirting around the Executive privilege question.

I think in the case of the treaty and the agreements,
you have been, and the President has been, and Secretary
Rogers.

My question pertains to the second allowable site
that each party can have. Neither one of us has even begun
the preparation of those two sites. Neither one of us have
either site in our original defense strategy plans. Is it
possible that we could reach an agreement that neither one
of us go ahead with those two sites and would we take the
initiative in suggesting that might be a possibility?

DR. KISSINGER: The question of the deferral of
the second site had been considered and had been rejected
by both sides. The Soviet Union had taken the position that
it could not agree to an ABM limitation that did not give
it the right as long as we were in a position to defend
ICBM's in which they could not also defend some ICBM's of
their own.

So, therefore, our failure to go ahead with our
second site would, in effect, give them two sites to our one.
The only possibility for us would have been to scrap the site
we had and build an entirely new one in Washington, and it
seemed to us not a good policy to begin a disarmament
agreement by which we had to scrap everything that we had done
in order to build something entirely different from what we
started out to do.

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MR. MacGREGOR: If you have any complaint about this process, I am the one to complain to, but I have not identified to date the following hands, and I would like to recognize you in this order, if I may. Senator Ervin, Congressman Gubser, Congressman Fascell, Congressman Leggett, and Congressman Frelinghuysen, and then we will go on from there.

SENATOR ERVIN: I would like to ask this question. I think we had the wisest of all Americans in Benjamin Franklin, and he said, "Beware of being lulled into dangerous security." My question is this: Wouldn't a ratification of the treaty and the approval of the Limited Arms Agreement make it all the more imperative for us to go forward with the Trident and with the B-1 bomber, and other programs, to keep from being lulled into a dangerous sense of security?

DR. KISSINGER: That is the position of the Administration.

CONGRESSMAN GUBSER: I seem to get from your remarks that we do, under the treaty, have the option of going ahead with Malmstrom instead of the protection of the National Capital. Is that correct or was that possible at one time?

DR. KISSINGER: This was considered at one time, and then when we reached a point where we were talking about two sites, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that if there were to be two sites, they would rather have the second site around the National Command Authority than in Malmstrom. Whether we could have obtained Soviet acquiescence in two ICBM sites rather than having the second site in Washington, we cannot judge today, because we accepted the recommendations of our military leaders that if there were to be a second site, that second site should be in Washington.

CONGRESSMAN FASCELL: Dr. Kissinger, what does the protocol address itself to, and what were the circumstances which brought it about; and, secondly, we know what is excluded from the Interim Agreement and we know what we can proceed with in terms of qualitative improvements because they won't be deployed until 1975. What is it that the Russians have excluded from the Interim Agreement and what is it that the Russians can proceed with in terms of qualitative improvement that might not be deployed until after 1975?

DR. KISSINGER: The protocol came about because the submarine question could have been an extraordinarily complicated one, and the complications arose from this fact. We do not have a program for building missile-carrying submarines until 1978 at the earliest. The Soviet Union had been producing over the last few years at the rate of eight missile-carrying submarines a year. It has built additional facilities which would enable it nearly to double this production rate, although up to now they have used it mostly for the conversion of older submarines into more modern types. But they do have a very substantial production capability.

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This was the situation we faced. So we developed a formula which enabled the Soviet Union, if it wished, to go beyond their present level up to 62, which is well short of their capacity, but only at the price of trading in some of the older ICBMs and some of the older missiles on earlier nuclear submarines, so that the Soviet Union has to trade in 240 missiles in order to be able to build up to this agreed level.

So the submarine agreement has the dual advantage of stopping the Soviet program on construction well short of its capacity; and secondly, retiring for the first time by international agreement a substantial number of other missiles that we, in our annual statements, had been carrying as part of the Soviet missile force.

So we needed a protocol to determine those things.

Then there was the second question of at what level does the process of trading-in start? That is to say, at what point do you determine that the Soviet Union must trade in these ICBMs and older submarine missiles for newer ones. The ambiguity here arose from the fact that while our intelligence is adequate to tell us when they are putting submarines at sea, and how many submarines are under construction in the sheds at any given moment, there is some difficulty in defining the term "under construction."

If you start the process of "under construction" when the hull sections are being built, before they are moved into the sheds, you get a different figure than if you get the figure in the sheds. Therefore, this was a subject of some complicated negotiation to determine the level at which the trade-in would start, which is, as expressed in the communique, at the level of 740 ballistic missiles on submarines, which includes 30 older ones, which is to say, therefore, at the level of 704 to 710 of the newer submarines.

This is the explanation for this rather complex calculation of the protocol.

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Now as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, their bombers are outside of this system and theoretically they could start building up their bomber force without being limited by this agreement.

Historically, the Soviet Union has not put the emphasis on its bomber force that we have. Its operating procedures and experience is far below the level of our Air Force. We do not consider it probable that they will make a major effort in that field, but this is one field in which they could make progress.

The field in which it is most likely that they will make progress is in the modernization of the missiles that are permitted under the agreement. That is, they will not violate the numbers of the agreement, but they will improve the quality, accuracy, number of warheads and this is what will represent a threat to our strategic forces.

CONGRESSMAN LEGGETT: Doctor, I want to commend you and the Administration on the negotiation of what I think is an extremely remarkable agreement. I have my reservations that perhaps the Department of Defense is stampeding in the opposite direction, though, of the spirit of the negotiations.

I am concerned that in the bill that we marked up yesterday in the Armed Service Committee we increased the hard site Sprint nuclear program clearly outlawed as far as deployment 100 percent.

We accepted the budget figures which had a 900 percent increase in the ULMS or Trident program. Of course, the answer you originally gave was that we needed this as a bargaining chip perhaps for Phase 2 or 3, however, it seems to me we have successfully negotiated the limitation on the number of land-based missiles without an accelerated program, limited the submarine tubes without an accelerated program.

We perhaps have wasted several million dollars in the ABM program in making that a bargaining chip and aren't we perhaps doing the same thing in developing the big bargaining things which obviously will never be deployed if you are successful in your negotiating program?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me say two things: One, it is not easy to prove the motivations of the other side in making an agreement. I would think it probable however that we could not have negotiated the limitations on offensive weapons if it had not been linked to the limitations on defensive weapons and to their desire of stopping the deployment of the ABM system.

So, what drove these negotiations for the first year was their desire to limit our ABM deployment. And it was not until we insisted that we could not agree to an ABM treaty without offensive limitations that they reluctantly included the offensive limitations.

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Secondly, I think we will deploy, even if we are
successful in the negotiations that it is very likely we
will deploy ULMS and Trident and then retire a similar
number of the older submarines, use them for replacement
purposes rather than additions to the current submarine
fleet.

So, I cannot fully accept the assumption that
they will not be deployed. What would almost certainly
happen though if an agreement were successful is a sub-
stantial replacement of the older Polaris boats.

CONGRESSMAN LEGGETT: Of course, those older Polaris
are a quarter billion dollars a piece, zero defects and
a third of a mile CPI. It is hard to conceive that they
are obsolete or will be.

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go into the
technical weapons characteristics. I think you will get
more competent witnesses than me on that subject.

CONGRESSMAN FREYLINGHUSEN: I am sure we all appreciate
both your presentation and the question and answer period
which you have given us. I would like to congratulate you
on a masterful presentation. I think Clark is to be
congratulated on the music that he has provided to supplement
the high points.

My question gets back to this level of defense
spending. The President and you both said you hoped
for an earlier resumption of the SALT talks. Assuming
ratification of the treaty, you didn't really answer Senator
Fulbright's question as to whether the Soviets might not
consider defense spending an indication of our sincerity
or insincerity. Do you think that there is any chance that
there is not an expectation on the part of the Soviets
with respect to defense spending that might jeopardize
successful talks following the ratification of the treaty?

In other words, does the other side hook our
spending and our attitude towards defense to further talks?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, this last round of
talks took nearly 2-1/2 years. So, even if the talks start
again this fall, they are likely to be prolonged. We
would expect that the first session will deal with general
principles rather than with detailed negotiating packages.

All the more so in the next round, we are getting
into the more complicated issues of how to control
technological change where national means of inspection are
not as reliable as they are with respect to sheer numbers.

Now, there is no question that the Soviet Union
will judge our intentions in part by the level of our
defense spending, for good or evil, and that we cannot
take the position that our defense spending is irrelevant
to our general political relationship.

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The question is: If we spend too little on defense, if we create such a unilateral weakness then we destroy their incentive to negotiate seriously. If we spend too much and give them the idea that we are gearing up simply for getting a tremendous spurt to get ahead of them, then we create the other problem.

So our problem is to get our defense expenditures at a level that does not create a unilateral weakness and give them pressure for agreement but does not get us into an area where it had the counter-productive tendency of generating a new round on their side.

We believe that we are navigating that course. But it is a serious question and it is a serious problem and we have to be alert to both of these dangers.

MR. MacGREGOR: John Hunt wishes to make a statement in explanation for the departure of a number of members of Congress.

CONGRESSMAN HUNT: Let me thank you for the clear and concise explanation of your mission this morning. On behalf of the Armed Services Committee, you will notice some of us are leaving. It is not because of any discourtesy to you, sir, or because we are not interested.

The fact is we have a conflicting schedule of sub-committees that are getting ready for an important mark-up of the legislation this afternoon in the absence of Mr. Hebert.

So, if you permit me for a moment to explain, that is the reason they are leaving.

DR. KISSINGER: Thank you. I thought they were like my Harvard students. (Laughter).

CONGRESSMAN HARRINGTON: At the risk of being repetitive, to follow on Congressman Freylinghusen's question and Senator Fulbright's question, I am puzzled that this year and last year we saw a $6 billion increase in defense spending requested and if the estimates given us the Assistant Secretary of Defense Moot are correct, we can expect a $5 billion increase in Southeast Asia.

I have seen before the tide was even out, before our committee, hundreds of millions of dollars sought for additional spending in the procurement bill for the better-ment of systems that were not part of your agreement in Russia.

On three levels I am puzzled, one, sound economic policy which appeared to be both centered in the White House as a concern prior to the present occupancy in the White House looking toward the era of 1964 and 1968, public confidence that has been led to believe that somehow out of this whole business will come a reduction, not an increase, in the overall spending in the defense area and in general, whether or not in going to these talks you didn't have enough of an outline of questions in coming before Congressional committee and members of the Executive Branch did to be able

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to live this year with the procurement and appropriations bill
as they were without adding to them in the way and with the
timing I think has been chosen to do it.

I would like to have you address yourself to some
of those considerations, particularly as a constituent
might say to me, "What do you mean it is going to cost more
for defense? I thought you fellows were negotiating for
reductions in tensions and costs." I think that is the
problem most of us have.

DR. KISSINGER: It is our intention and conviction
that as these talks proceed into other areas that we will
be able to bring about a substantial reduction in defense
expenditures as a result of these talks.

There are, of course, certain savings in the ABM
program. What we are finding out is that the combination
of certain trends has produced requirements which are
not themselves the cause of the agreement, but which have
come to a head at about the same time by accident as the
agreement.

One of these problems is that for a number of years
we had significantly slowed down the modernization of
our strategic programs so that our strategic weapons now
were essentially designed in the early 60s, while those of
the Soviet Union were designed in the late 60s and this has
created a certain technological requirement.

This is the reason for this additional expenditure.
This other figure for Southeast Asia that you mentioned is
a projection forward of current rates and may or may not
be necessary, depending on how long current rates are being
sustained.

CONGRESSMAN HARRINGTON: I am quoting Assistant Secretary Moot.

DR. KISSINGER: I know and he projected them forward
over a period of months which may or may not be necessary
because he was being proper with the Congress by giving his
best estimate, but he was projecting current expenditure
rates.

If there were negotiations, for example, if the
offensive slows down, there are many factors that could
affect this. I am just trying to give you an idea.

Thirdly, the increase in the defense spending
has been caused to a considerable extent also by military
pay increases which now consume about 54 percent of our
defense budget. I have seen a chart — I think the Secretary
of Defense can do it much better than I — that shows what
the present defense establishment would cost if the pay scales
were still those of eight or 10 years ago.

So, it is a combination of these factors that have
produced the increase of defense costs while forces have
actually been shrinking.

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SENATOR COOPER: I would like to join with others in thanking you and showing appreciation for your very fine statement.

The first question I will ask is not one that I suggest myself, but it was asked the day the agreement was announced. I am sorry Senator Jackson is not here, but he wouldn't mind my saying he asked the question.

Are there any other understandings, secret understandings, which have not been made public or will not be made public? I think we will be asked, and it is just as well to ask it now.

DR. KISSINGER: There are no secret understandings. We have submitted to the Congress the list of all the significant agreements and interpretive statements, and so forth. What we have not done is to go through the record to see whether Ambassador Smith might have said something that they interpreted in a certain way, and this is why we put on the qualification "significant", because otherwise we would have to submit the entire record.

According to the best of our judgment, there are no secret understandings, and all the significant interpretive statements have been submitted to the Congress.

SENATOR COOPER: May I ask one more question? I notice in your explanation, it is said that the United States asked for a prohibition on mobile land-based missiles. You later withdrew that. But you did say that if the Soviet Union went ahead with deployment, you would consider it serious enough to break the agreement. Is the Soviet Union going ahead with mobile land-based missiles?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me make one other comment with respect to the first thing about secret understandings.

There are, of course, in the discussions, general statements of intentions. For example, we have conveyed to the Soviets what I have also said here publicly on the record: that the option of converting the Titans into submarines, given our present construction program, was not something we would necessarily carry out. But we do not consider that as a secret agreement, that sort of thing. This was simply a statement of general unilateral intentions.

Now, with respect to the land-based mobile missiles, we have made an interpretive statement according to which the deployment of land-based mobile missiles would be inconsistent with the purposes of the agreement. Then this raises the question of whether our national means of verification are adequate to monitor this.

The national means of verification are adequate to monitor over a period of time whether a land-based mobile missile is being deployed. The margin of error with respect to total numbers would be great, if you have a margin of error of five percent, and I am giving you a fictitious figure; it might be 15 percent with respect to mobile missiles.

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But the fact of the matter is, what we have to
monitor is not total numbers of land mobile missiles; what
we have to monitor is the fact that they are deploying any
of them. We are quite confident that within a reasonable
period of time after the initial deployment, and maybe not in
the first month, but over a three- to four-month period, and
well before they can develop a substantial capability, we
will be able to tell whether they have deployed a land mobile
missile and we can draw the appropriate conclusions.

So as to the fact of deploying a land mobile mis-
sile, we are confident that we will discover it well before
they could deploy enough to have any effect.

CONGRESSMAN MOYNIGHAN: Dr. Kissinger, you have said
that these agreements, our confidence in them, is not based on
trust, but enlightened self-interest, and yet I think you would
agree with any bilateral arrangements, with the credibility of
the other party to the contract, where that is very important,
you have also said that there is reason to believe that the
area of distrust and suspicion may be at an end.

I just wonder, in view of that question of credi-
bility, is there any specific reason that you have for coming
to this conclusion?

DR. KISSINGER: We are not basing this agreement on
trust, and we believe that this agreement can be verified; and
secondly, that it has adequate safeguards to prevent its being
violated. We also believe that we have started a process by
which we can move international relations into a new era, and
we base this on the fact that we agreed with the Soviet Union
over the past two years on the issue of Berlin, which has
removed one of the primary causes of tension in the world for
the foreseeable future, and a whole spectrum of agreements on
health, space, environment, rules of navigation, that we are
on the verge of making progress with them in other fields such
as commercial agreements, and finally, we have signed a Declara-
tion of Common Principles which it would have been no point to
sign unless we meant to move in a major effort in that direction.

So, for all of these reasons, we believe that there
is a basis, that we have an opportunity both in the Soviet
Union and in the United States, to move into a new era. Whether
both sides have the wisdom to do it, and even if they have the
wisdom they are not caught by events in areas in which they
cannot control their decision, this remains to be seen. But
I think we have the opportunity to turn a significant page in
history, and as far as this Administration is concerned, we are
going to make a major effort in that direction.

SENATOR PELL: It is an excellent presentation. I
have three short questions.

First, if the Soviet expenditures for arms remains
static, or should decline, or 'ours go up, wouldn't that have
a reverse effect on their willingness to move into SALT II?

Secondly, are any of the provisions of the seabed
disarmament treaty in conflict with our own treaty which you
have negotiated, in view of the fact that we apparently still
consider the possibility of weapons of mass destruction stored
on the seabed floor, and they are prohibited by the seabed
disarmament treaty?

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Third, why, in this set of negotiations, was the constitutionally normal course of Congressional consultation, advise as well as consent, not engaged in?

MR. MacGREGOR: When did you stop beating your wife?

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the seabed, I am not aware that we have any intention of deploying weapons on the seabed, and we have no intention of violating the seabed agreement, so unless you know of some weapon that I am not aware of, I would have to say that this is not planned.

We believe that the defense expenditures will stay roughly in balance and that the Soviet incentive to come to an agreement will not be reduced by our being stronger. On the contrary. So the judgment has been that our strength, if anything, gives them an additional incentive to make a negotiation, if we do not carry it to a point where they are convinced that this is just a subterfuge for a massive effort to get ahead of them. If that should become their conviction, then, in fact, we have a problem.

I have to repeat: We have to navigate between that, on the one hand, weakening ourselves unilaterally, and on the other hand between having them see these negotiations simply as a stage by which we try to achieve superiority. Either of these things would be self-defeating.

As for the process of consultation with the Senate, as Senator Fulbright knows, this is not my specialty, but it has been my understanding that Mr. Smith and the appropriate Secretaries have been in close consultation, and we have tried from here to be on a personal basis in contact with key Senators.

MR. MacGREGOR: Might I add in that respect, Senator Pell, that at least since I have been here, that is, January 4, 1971 to date, it has been Ambassador Gerard Smith's intention, following the directions of the President, to make himself readily available to the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, here in Washington as well as in Helsinki and Vienna. I would be delighted to talk to you further about that, but I had thought that was worked out to the reasonable satisfaction of the Members of the Congress.

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CONGRESSMAN FRASER: Dr. Kissinger, let me say
first that I have thought that the consultations with Ambassador
Smith have been good, both here in Washington and in Vienna.

I listened with some care to the answer you gave to
Senator Percy's question on the ABM sites. I can appreciate
the Soviets would want to have a symmetrical arrangement with
ours, but I was not quite clear from your answer whether in
fact you have evidence that the Soviets intend to go ahead
with their option to protect an offensive missile site.

The reasons I ask that is that since building the
National Capital Defense is not a bargaining chip clearly because
we have now put a cap on ABM and since we have a two to three
times lead over the Soviet Union building a site over the
Capital is not going to give us any significant benefit from the
possibility of attack. It will not even give us more time.

Unless we already know the Soviets are going to build
a second ABM, why couldn't we wait on ours and save the
taxpayers several billions of dollars?

DR. KISSINGER: It depends on how you define
"how do we know". We have no evidence that they have started
construction. We have the impression that they have the firm
intention of proceeding. I have no evidence whatever to the
contrary that they do not intend to proceed.

All the conversations the Presidential party had with
them left the impression that they have the firm intention of
proceeding with their second site. As for the argument of how
much time you gain, the effort to overwhelm, in itself, is
apt to give some additional time but I would not insist
that this will add a huge span of time to the warning.

CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI: Dr. Kissinger, the President
and you have made it quite clear that it would be desirable
to have the treaty ratified and the Executive Agreements
approved by Congress in order that Phase II could begin in
October.

We fully understand the system of the Soviets and
there is no ratification on their part as we have it here, and
I am sure the Soviets understand that this is an election year and
we have political conventions and there may be an opportunity
not to meet, that is a ratification and approval of the Executive
Agreements.

Is it absolutely necessary that the treaty be ratified and Executive Agreements approved by Congress before Phase II can begin, sometime in October? Indeed, cannot Ambassador Smith meet with his counterparts, even though the Senate and the Congress have not finished their work as far as the treaty and Executive Agreement are concerned?

If I may ask just a second question, I think it is
in the report, but what problems were there, or why didn't
we pursue with greater determination the inclusion of MIRV's
in the Executive Agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the first question,
actually, the Soviets do go through a ratification procedure.

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They have their Supreme Soviet approve it but with all
respect, it is a little more tractable than our Congress.

The reason why, really, we can have some
exploratory informal talks and we probably will at various
levels, but the reason it would be difficult to start formal
sessions is because we have to know from what base we are
operating. It is rather an embarrassing position to have a
senior negotiator operate on the basis of the assumption of
a ratification.

Also, it would be somewhat presumptuous towards
the Congress to assume a ratification that has not in fact
taken place. Yet, on the other hand, unless you make some
assumptions, you really have not got a fixed base from which
you can operate.

Therefore, the beginning of the second phase of
SALT really has to follow congressional ratification. We
understand the pressures of this year and this is simply a
fact.

Now, with respect to MIRV, MIRV is a complex issue
for this reason: You can count numbers with national means of
verification, but it is much more difficult to determine how
many warheads are confined in the master warhead.

Now, you have some indications but it is not very
easy. Therefore, with respect to the deployment of MIRV,
the inspection requirements have to be a little bit more
rigid than would be otherwise the case.

Now, we have made two proposals, two linked
proposals, one is a ban on the testing of MIRV, this we are
prepared to monitor by national means of inspection, and
second, a ban on the deployment of MIRV for which we asked
for spot-checks on on-site inspection. Now we considered the
test ban absolutely crucial because we could have been some-
what more lenient on the frequency of on-site inspection if
there had been a test ban on MIRV's because without testing,
by definition, it is not easy to deploy them. It is, in fact,
impossible to deploy them.

The Soviet Union, for not ununderstandable reasons,
because they are behind in MIRV technology, refused a test
ban. They also refused a deployment ban as such. What they
proposed was a production ban but without inspection. A
ban on production is totally unverifiable in the Soviet
Union while they could verify ours through our budget and other
methods through which our industrial production generally becomes
known.

So, the Soviet counter-proposal for a production ban
without a test ban was generally unacceptable to us and when we
reached that stalemate, we could not proceed any further.
This was the obstacle to proceeding on the MIRV's.

CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI: What encouragement do you
see, or optimism that this may be an area that in Phase II we
may find some common ground on?

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DR. KISSINGER: Phase II, Mr. Congressman, will
be very much more difficult than Phase I, because there, we
will deal with technological problems and there we will
require even more ingenuity with respect to Phase II than was
shown in Phase I.

If one can have optimism with respect to it, it is
because now the Soviet technology has gone somewhat further
probably so that they may be more willing to accept a test
ban which will at least put a limit on further deployments,
and secondly, you will remember when we started these
negotiations in 1969, we were going through a crisis in the
Middle East and the Berlin Crisis. We were emerging out of this
whole miasma of suspicion and it was the first time we engaged with
the Soviets in any major negotiation, so the climate was
different.

Now, we have established a pattern in which the
Chief of State on our side, the President and their political
leaders, can be in constant contact with each other and I
believe we can perhaps move a little more creatively in the
early stages of SALT II than we could in the early stages of
SALT I.

I must also say that the subject is more difficult.
Certainly, we had conversations of the breadth and precision in
Moscow that would have been unimaginable three or four years
ago with respect to strategic questions, but this gives us some
hope that at least we can talk about the gut issues.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Can I ask you to comment on one
aspect, on the significance of ABM, so much more has been said
about the agreement.

How do you evaluate what appears to me to be a
renunciation of the effort to create a defense? What you have
left in the ABM is surely nothing more than a token. Hasn't
each country, in effect, said, "We recognize, we have no
defense to almost total devastation in view of the capacities
for destruction, or within the existing weapons", and if that
is true, isn't this the experience, and I don't know why you
would say it would be much more difficult.

If they live up to that and we give them no
reason to believe we haven't accepted in good faith that our
population is hostile to their weapons, and vice versa, and it
seems to me it ought not to be more difficult if you believe
in that.

DR. KISSINGER: I believe, Mr. Chairman, this is
a very good point. The limit on ABM's or effective ABM's
of both sides, really creates a situation, as I said in my
statement, in one sentence, in which the offensive weapons
of both sides really have a free ride into the country of the
other.

So that therefore, the difference in numbers is
somewhat less significant than you would assess otherwise
There is still a danger that one side will get such an enormous
numerical advantage in warheads that it can completely obliterate
the force of the other.

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But in the absence of significant defenses, even relatively small forces can do an enormous amount of damage.

Therefore, too, if we can move into the second phase of SALT, into an explicit recognition that both sides will try to stay away from counter-force strategies, from the one danger that now exists, or the overwhelming danger, that they will try to destroy each other, then perhaps the premium on MIRV's will be reduced, because, as you remember very well, Mr. Chairman, MIRV's were developed at first as a hedge against ABM.

So I think we will find, in perhaps unexpected ways, that the new strategic relationship that is created by this treaty will create realizations on both sides as to the significance of usable strategic power that over a period of the next negotiations could have quite dramatic impacts.

I am very glad that you asked that.

MR. MacGREGOR: It is very close to 12 noon. We appreciate your participation and your presence and your patience, and we thank you for launching what the President has called an effective Legislative-Executive partnership.

END

(AT 11:55 A.M. EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 24, 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE

OF

FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE BRIEFING ROOM

10:50 A.M. EDT

MR. ZIEGLER: As I mentioned to you yesterday, I hoped that Henry would have a moment to come out this morning to talk to you a little bit about his recent trip to the People's Republic of China and take your questions.

Before we do that, I would like to tell those of you who are not aware of it that Dr. Kissinger returned from the People's Republic of China yesterday at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. When he arrived here at the White House, he conferred with the President and Secretary Rogers for an hour and 15 minutes.

They talked about Secretary Rogers' upcoming trip to Australia for the SEATO meeting, and also the Secretary's trip around the world, which he is leaving on today. Of course, Dr. Kissinger briefed the President and the Secretary on details of his meetings in the People's Republic of China.

Last night Dr. Kissinger flew up to Camp David with President Nixon and spent an additional two hours with the President talking about the visit to the People's Republic of China and other foreign policy matters.

Before Dr. Kissinger talks to you, I would like to read a Joint Statement which is going to be issued today at 11:00 o'clock in Peking and simultaneously in Washington. We will have copies of these to hand to you, so I will read it rather quickly and we will pass out the text to you.

"Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China and other Chinese officials held discussions with Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the U.S. President for National Security Affairs, and his party from June 19 to 23, 1972. The talks were extensive, earnest and frank. They consisted of concrete consultations to promote the normalization of relations between the two countries and an exchange of views on issues of common interest.

"Both sides agreed on the usefulness of these consultations which were foreseen in the Sino-U.S. Joint Communique of February 1972 and on the desirability of continuing them."

That is an agreed to joint statement relating to Dr. Kissinger's recent visit to the People's Republic of China.

With that, Dr. Kissinger can discuss his trip with you. It is on the record and available for sound and film.

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DR. KISSINGER: Actually, the first person I talked to was Ron, who urgently requested me to meet with this distinguished group this morning, so if I am a little incoherent, it is due to jet lag as well as the syntax.

I thought I would give you a brief rundown on the atmosphere of the meetings and how they were conducted, and then answer your questions. You will understand that these discussions were, of necessity, confidential, and, therefore, I cannot go into great substantive detail about what was discussed. However, I will give you as much as I can.

We spent 3-1/2 days in Peking. The discussions were conducted in two parts. There were the discussions that I held with Prime Minister Chou En-lai which, on the Chinese side, included the senior Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua; the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chang Wen-chin; the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Wang Hai-jung; and other Chinese leaders that we met from time to time at banquets, for example, the Ambassador to France, who is handling the bilateral exchanges, Huang Chen, and also the Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, who participated in the meetings in February, Yeh Chien-ying. But the formal meetings were conducted by the group that I have described.

Altogether, we spent about 18 hours in the formal meetings, and then another five to six hours at banquets with the Prime Minister, and riding in cars, in semi-formal discussions. So altogether we had about 24 hours with the Prime Minister.

Then there were other meetings that were conducted by Mr. Jenkins of the State Department, and Mr. Holdridge and Mr. Solomon of my staff, which dealt with the implementation of the bilateral exchanges in trade that were provided for in the Shanghai Communique. They were chaired on the Chinese side by Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by Ch'ien Ta-yung, the Deputy Director of the American Division of the Foreign Ministry.

We were treated with extraordinary courtesy, as those of you who have been there will remember from previous visits. It was announced that the Prime Minister gave a banquet for us, and also another dinner the night before our departure. In addition to this, there was a performance of the Shanghai Opera Company in the same room in which the President saw the cultural performance. Our host for that occasion was the Foreign Minister.

There was a trip to the Forbidden City, and another trip to a sports academy where they were teaching acrobatics, ping pong, and where some of my colleagues disgraced themselves by trying to play ping pong with the Chinese, and by superhuman efforts on the part of the Chinese, our people made one or two points, but it required Chairman Mao's dictum of "Friendship before Competition" to bring that event about. (Laughter)

That was the occasion, incidentally, which the press reported that I was visiting the Chinese rocketry expert at the Polytechnic Institute, which I may say, is a lucky thing for the Chinese missile program, because if anyone can learn from me about rockets, he is in bad shape, indeed. (Laughter)

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In any event, that Polytechnic Institute is
located in the same general area as the Sports Academy, but
I assume the traffic police intervened with the following
correspondents before they could see our ultimate destination.

These were the highlights of the trip. As the joint
announcement says, both parties considered it useful and
expect to continue these discussions.

Now let me take any questions you may have. I would
like to do one thing, though. When I was in Japan there was
a press conference which I agreed to because I was told that
the Japanese press did not have sufficient access to me, and
then with the restraint for which our press is so well known,
they asked nine out of ten questions at that meeting, and no
Japanese got a chance to ask a question, or very few, so I
promised myself that at the next briefing at the White House
the first question would be given to a Japanese correspondent,
if there is one here. Is there a Japanese correspondent here?

Mr. Lisagor-san. (Laughter)

Q To what extent did you discuss Vietnam with the
Prime Minister?

DR. KISSINGER: Vietnam was discussed at some length.
Obviously it is a subject in which we have different interpre-
tations of the situation. No useful purpose would be served
by going into the details of the discussion, because events
will be more important than what we may say.

But the differences in perspective only underline
the basic problem, which is whether it proves possible to find
a solution which is just and reasonable for both sides. Our
discussions were conducted in that spirit.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is the Vietnam War any closer
to a settlement because of your trip to China?

DR. KISSINGER: I do not want to speculate about
what may happen in Vietnam, except to say that it has been
the determination of this Administration to bring about a
negotiated settlement of the war in Vietnam, and that this
remains our set policy.

Q Dr. Kissinger, there has been an impression
current for several weeks that both the Soviets Union and
the Chinese would like, in some way, to help end the war, but
that North Vietnam is recalcitrant; that they want to con-
tinue prosecuting the military part of the war. Is there any
truth to that impression?

DR. KISSINGER: We have no information about the
relationship of North Vietnam to its two principal allies.
We recognize that both the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China are dedicated to their principles. These
principles are not identical with ours, and, of course, they
have a close relationship to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
What fluctuations these relationships may undergo at any
particular time we are in no position to judge.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you expect that the peace
negotiations, formal peace negotiations, will be resumed at
any time soon?

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DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the peace negotiations, our basic attitude has been that we are in favor of resuming peace negotiations as soon as there is any prospect -- not certainty; but any prospect -- of substantive talks in which the points of view of both sides will be seriously discussed.

It is not the fact of the negotiations that matters; it is the substance. Our efforts over the last weeks have not been to stonewall negotiations, and they certainly have not been to bring about a purely military solution. Our efforts have been to create a condition in which serious, substantive talks could take place.

We have been making efforts in this direction, and as soon as these efforts reach a point where we have some hope that substantive progress is possible, we will be prepared to resume negotiations.

Q Dr. Kissinger --

DR. KISSINGER: Well, if I can't have Japanese, I can have ladies. (Laughter)

Q In your talks in Peking and Moscow, did you have any feeling that they were as eager to get this Vietnam War behind them as this country is to get it behind us?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, this country is directly involved in the war in Vietnam. The war in Vietnam has been a serious, searing, in many respects tragic experience for us, so no one is as immediately concerned, but I believe that all countries in the world now have an interest in bringing about a peaceful solution. There may be differences as to what the best solution would be.

We do not believe there is any major country in the world today, or any country in the world, that wants the war to continue in order for it to continue.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you have information indicating that the mining of the North Vietnamese harbors and the recent bombing attacks are having an effect in slowing down the movement of supplies to the battlefield? Do you think this will eventually cause the aggression in the South to stop?

DR. KISSINGER: Military activity in the South in recent weeks has declined for a variety of reasons, including some of the measures to which you refer. We hope that the combination of a further study of the President's May 8th proposal, plus the failure of the offensive to succeed in achieving a military solution for North Vietnam, will convince the leaders of the Democratic Republic to enter serious negotiations. As soon as that point is reached, we will, of course, announce it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, Secretary Rogers said today that there was no clear sign yet that North Vietnam was interested in serious negotiations. Do you have anything to say about that?

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DR. KISSINGER: We have not had a good intramural
brawl for at least three days. (Laughter)

Q What was the question?

DR. KISSINGER: The question was whether I agreed
with Secretary Rogers' statement that there were not yet any
clear signs that the North Vietnamese were interested in serious
negotiations.

This, in the language of the capitals we have
recently visited, would be classed as a provocative question.

Q It wasn't intended to be.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, I know. I would agree we have
not yet had any clear indication, but we are pursuing the
subject. When we do have any indication, we will resume
negotiations and it will then be announced.

Q Did you discuss the results of the Soviet
summit with Premier Chou?

DR. KISSINGER: We reviewed the entire international
situation, including that.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did you by any chance get any
impression of the Chinese attitude or Chinese views regarding
North Vietnam's invasion of South Vietnam and its attitude
toward negotiations in general?

DR. KISSINGER: I do not want to go beyond what I
have said previously. I do want to reiterate again that the
Chinese leaders, as the Soviet leaders, are men of principle.
We have not asked either of them to betray these principles
or to sit in judgment on their allies.

The world now faces a concrete problem that is,
whether it is possible to find a just solution to a war that
has gone on for a long time. We are prepared to do our share.
We are prepared to listen seriously to the views of others
who also have an interest in bringing the war to a conclusion.

I do not want to suggest that we are traveling
around the world asking people to sit in judgment on specific
tactical moves that their allies may have taken.

Q Dr. Kissinger, were you able to satisfy their
reported curiosity or anxiety about the proximity of our
bombing to their borders, which seems to have been of interest
to them?

DR. KISSINGER: I think they would have to answer
as to the degree to which whatever comments I made to them on
any topic were satisfactory. Any bombing that has gone on has
been intended to deal only with the North Vietnamese situation.
We have no interest whatever to pose a military challenge to
the People's Republic of China, to infringe in any sense what-
ever on its sovereignty, or to suggest in the slightest degree
that we are using military pressure against the People's Republic
of China. Our military actions in North Vietnam will be con-
ducted with those principles in mind.

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Q Did you see Prince Sihanouk?

DR. KISSINGER: Prince Sihanouk was out of town.
(Laughter) It was widely reported in the newspapers.

Q He was not out of town when you were out of town.

DR. KISSINGER: No, No, I was not out of town. (Laughter)
I was in town. (Laughter)

Q Can you give us any indication of when Le Duc Tho or Xuan Thuy are going back to Paris?

DR. KISSINGER: We have no indication of when they are returning, but we would think upon completion of the policy review that may be going on in Hanoi now that they will return to Paris. Again, let me stress, the crucial issue in Paris is not when the talks resume. It is not a procedural issue. It is a substantive issue. When the North Vietnamese are prepared to talk to us in a serious way on substantive issues and prepared to examine our views, together with theirs, we will meet them in the same spirit.

So what is going on now is an attempt to create the substantive framework and not the procedural one. We, however, expect that Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy will return to Paris in the not too distant future. But we have no concrete information to that effect. It just seems to be inherent in the situation.

Q Do your comments cover both plenary meetings and private meetings?

DR. KISSINGER: We never comment on private meetings. But we are prepared to talk in all available channels. Once negotiations start, we are not going to raise procedural obstacles.

Q There are reports in China that the Party Chairman, Mao Tse-tung, has been ill and may be dying. Did you get any indication of this?

DR. KISSINGER: I received no such indication. On the contrary, insofar as I received indications, they were to the effect that important matters were being checked with him.

Q Did you make any progress in arranging for any cultural exchanges or scientific ones?

DR. KISSINGER: We discussed in some detail those parts of the Shanghai Communique that dealt with cultural exchanges as well as with other exchanges. We believe, based on these conversations, that there will be steady progress, perhaps not of a spectacular nature, but steady progress over the months ahead in setting up these exchanges. It is a difficult process to find the right mechanism and to find programs that are mutually beneficial, but I believe that progress is being made.

While I was in Peking I had an opportunity to talk to Professor Fairbanks of Harvard, who was there to talk about this matter with the Chinese officials in the educational field. I believe that progress is being made.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, you spoke of the policy review now underway in Hanoi. Can you describe that in any way or what information we have about it; what the meaning of it is?

DR. KISSINGER: Ron tells me that I don't sit in on that, but that is because I don't tell him everything. (Laughter)

Q You seem to be sure that there is such a policy review going on.

DR. KISSINGER: We surmise that based on the fact that Minister Xuan Thuy was called back explicitly for that purpose and in fact stated in a newspaper interview that he was expecting to receive new instructions and that when he received new instructions he would return to Paris. He said this on the public record.

It is logical that Le Duc Tho, who is the Politburo Member, who is in general responsible, from the Politburo's point of view, for the negotiations, would participate in these discussions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the stories we have been reading are to the effect that the Chinese were not permitting the Soviets to land their ships in Chinese ports to transfer war supplies to North Vietnam. Did that come up in your discussions and did you make any efforts to prevail upon the Chinese to stop at that point of view?

DR. KISSINGER: This is a matter entirely between the Soviets and the Peoples Republic of China and has nothing to do with our relations with either of these countries. It was a matter that was not discussed.

Q Could you tell us whether the subject of the resumption of a Geneva-type conference came up and if so, what the Chinese attitude is toward it?

DR. KISSINGER: My impression from the public statements that Prime Minister Chou En-lai made to a group of American advisers, including two newsmen, was that the Chinese leaders did not remember their participation in the 1965 Geneva Conference with sufficient gratification so that they looked forward to another one. (Laughter) I am basing this on reported statements.

Q Did it come up in your talks?

DR. KISSINGER: I will not go into the details of my talks.

Q Was Vietnam the primary purpose of your trip to Peking? To what extent did it figure in the 24 hours of discussions you mentioned?

DR. KISSINGER: To what extent did it figure in them?

Q Did it take up most of the time of your discussions, or only a secondary part?

DR. KISSINGER: No. It played, as one would expect, an important part, but it was not the primary reason for my visit. The visit was basically foreseen on the occasion of the

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President's meeting with the Chinese leaders, and was set
for approximately this general time frame, within a two-month
period around this time. The precise timing, then, was
settled, as Ron explained to you, when the announcement was
made, more recently than that.

But the primary purpose was not Vietnam, but to
discuss, first, Sino-U.S. relations and concrete measures
toward further improving them, plus a general review of the
international situation. Of course, it would be absurd to
pretend that Vietnam did not play an important role in this.
It was not the purpose of the visit. It did not take the pre-
dominant part in the discussions, although it played an impor-
tant role.

Q Now that we have had your visit to Peking and
President Podgorny's visit to Hanoi, is it your judgment
that progress is being made to go into substantive talks
with Hanoi?

DR. KISSINGER: I just do not want to speculate on
that. It has been, as you ladies and gentlemen remember,
always the view of this Administration that the best, most
reliable and most effective way of ending the war in Vietnam
is through negotiations. We maintained this position through
all the years that we have been in office. It remains our policy.
It is what we are giving major attention to. How well we
succeed, I do not want to anticipate.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have time for just a few more ques-
tions. Gene: Risher first, and then you.

Q Did you talk about Chinese officials coming
to the United States, and what are the prospects?

DR. KISSINGER: No. I did not say "officials". We
were talking about cultural exchanges. I was not talking
about Chinese officials.

Q Yes, but my question is: What are the prospects
for Chinese officials to come to the United States, and was
this discussed?

DR. KISSINGER: The problem of Chinese officials is,
of course, complicated by the fact that there are no formal
diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China
and the United States, and the fact that the People's Republic
of China has no formal representation in the United States.
Our general approach to these exchanges is not to have exchanges
for their own sake, but to have those exchanges that are use-
ful, that can be done without strain, and that genuinely con-
tribute to better understanding between our two peoples, and
to create a contact between our two peoples, and in this con-
text I would have thought that officials would not be the first
group that would arrive here.

Q Does that extend to trade exchanges back and forth?

DR. KISSINGER: No. As you know, there were American
businessmen invited to the Canton Fair. I believe that there
will be a slow but steady progress in discussions on trade.

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Q I wanted to ask one thing more regarding the
May 8th speech of the President in which he offered the inter-
nationally supervised cease-fire. Do you feel more confident
now that we will get uch a cease-fire or less confident or what?

DR. KISSINGER: I just don't want to make any
predictions along that line.

Q Did you detect any change at all in the Chinese
attitudes between your visit last February and the current visit
now on the Chinese readiness to go along with any proposal that
would produce the just solution, the end of the war, any changes
in that period of five months?

DR. KISSINGER: The meetings were primarily an
exchange of views. They were not a request on our part to the
Peoples Republic to do anything. Our basic policy is that the
war in Vietnam will be settled in Paris or some other place where
we and the North Vietnamese will negotiate directly. We recog-
nize that a people that has fought with so much dedication for so
long will, of course, not surrender its destiny and its future to
decisions by other countries.

Therefore, we expect that when the war is finally
settled it will be through direct negotiations between the
North Vietnamese and American negotiators.

Q Did the Chinese show any interest in the American
Presidential elections insofar as it might relate to Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: I am supposed to be an expert on
foreign policy and anyone who took my views on domestic politics
seriously would be in only slightly more trouble than anyone who
asked my views on rockets. (Laughter)

Q Did they ask you about them at all?

DR. KISSINGER: No. We did not discuss American
domestic politics.

Q As a final question, looking ahead, will any
decisions on agreements be made at the regular contacts between
the United States and the Peoples Republic in Paris *now* will it
take another trip by somebody to go back to Peking?

DR. KISSINGER: As you know, in the Shanghai Communique
it was foreseen that there will be visits at appropriate times
by senior officials to Peking. There is no plan for the immediate
future. In the nature of things, these visits have to take place
at their regular intervals and spaced some distance in time apart.
The detailed discussion will take place in Paris.

As I pointed out, we expect slow, but steady progress.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END

(AT 11:23 A.M. EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JULY 8, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(San Clemente, California)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE

AT 9:20 A.M. PDT.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have an announcement to make
this morning.

Also, Dr. Kissinger has agreed to come by this
morning to respond to some of your questions on the announcement,
and also to take some of your questions on other subjects.
He has agreed to do that.

The announcement we have this morning relates to a
long-term commercial trade purchase agreement which has been
made between the United States and the Soviet Union.

President Nixon is pleased to announce this morning
that the United States and the Soviet Union have signed the
largest long-term commercial trade purchase agreement ever
made between two countries.

The Soviet Union has agreed to buy a total of $750
million of U.S. grown grain, a mix of wheat, corn, sourgham,
rye, barley, and oats at their option over the next three
years.

Within the year beginning August 1, they have
agreed to purchase at least $200 million in U.S. grain.

The grain purchases to be financed under the export
credit program of the United States Department of Agriculture
will make the Soviet Union the second largest foreign consumer
of United States grain.

The President notes that this agreement has three
important benefits for the American people, and the United
States economy. It will provide grain farmers with a boost
in income. It will also provide jobs for Americans involved
in shipping the grain, including longshoremen, seamen, exporters,
railroad and barge line workers. It will reduce the cost to
taxpayers of storage, handling and other charges associated
with maintaining commodity stocks.

The President also feels that the agreement is a
tribute to the immense productivity of America's farmers,
which makes possible export sales of this magnitude.

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Finally, in terms of foreign policy, the President considers this agreement a very important, concrete forward step in the commercial relations between the United States and the Soviet Union which benefits both countries. As such, it builds on the accomplishments of the Summit meetings in Moscow last May.

Just to conclude, the agreement was signed this morning in Washington by Secretary of Commerce Peterson, and the United States Chairman of U.S.-Soviet Commercial Commission; Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR, M. R. Kuzmin.

I should add that Secretary Peterson and Secretary Butz will be holding a briefing today at 10:30 our time, 1:30 in Washington.

Dr. Kissinger is here to discuss this with you and take other questions. He is on the record.

DR. KISSINGER: Actually, this is the sort of thing which if Carroll were not here I would prefer to do on background because I just wanted to give you a little bit of the history of how this negotiation was conducted. Then I will take some questions on this and any other area of foreign policy, if you want to ask them.

As in all other negotiations that took place prior to the Summit, the discussions about the agricultural field occurred in two channels; one, the regular negotiation, which I will describe in a minute, and secondly, the direct Presidential channel to Brezhnev which is invoked when there is some deadlock or some issue that requires political decision, and in which then both sides attempt to make the decisions which will enable the negotiations to go forward.

These discussions first started when Soviet Minister of Agriculture Matskevich was here in December. He had extended general conversations at that time with his counterpart, and he also, as you remember, saw the President for about an hour in December.

The conversations were then continued when Secretary Stans visited the Soviet Union in February. At that time we were still within the framework of a one-year arrangement, but after the Stans visit, there were some exchanges in which the idea of a long-term grain deal began to mature.

These conversations were continued when the Soviet Minister of Trade, Patolichev, visited Washington early in May, just prior to the Summit. This was the first time that the details of possible credit arrangements were discussed in some detail.

Patolichev, if you remember, had a rather extended conversation with the President in which this was one of the major features.

At the time of the Summit, there were extended conversations on this subject by the President with Podgorny, and Kosygin at one of the sessions at which Mr. Brezhnev was not present. I think it was on the Wednesday of the week of the Summit.

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The difficulties at the time concerned the details of the credit arrangements, the length of time for the credit arrangement and the length of time for which the Soviet Union would commit itself and also the possible linkage, if I may use this word, of this field to the Maritime Agreement which was then under negotiation.

At the final session between General Secretary Brezhnev and the President this range of issues was discussed again and both parties decided that they would review the situation as quickly as possible after the end of the Summit in order to see whether a significant advance could be made and to use this advance then for broader relationships throughout the entire commercial field.

This has now been accomplished. About two weeks ago the Soviet Union informed us that they were ready to send their Deputy Minister of Trade Kuzmin to Washington to conclude the agreement, essentially along the lines that had been discussed between the President and General Secretary Brezhnev at their last meeting. Mr. Kuzmin has been in Washington for nearly the past two weeks now.

The agreement was finally concluded yesterday and has been signed this morning.

Secretary Peterson and Secretary Butz will hold a briefing at 1:30 Washington time, 10:30 our time, to discuss the technical ramifications of the deal.

I will be glad to answer any questions, and also to take questions on other subjects.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what was the size of the original deal last year, $130 million?

DR. KISSINGER: $150 million was the deal last year. So this is the largest deal per year and it is a long-term deal.

I repeat, you should not look at this as equal yearly installments. They are not committed to buying it in any one time period. The figure we gave you of what will be bought this year is the minimum. It is not the total.

Q Henry, the percentage of interest in this explanation sheet kind of puzzles me. Are they going to pay six and an eighth or seven and an eighth or both, depending on where their letters of credit come from?

DR. KISSINGER: My understanding is that it will be six and an eighth. They are paying exactly the same rate as anyone else who is getting it. There are no concessionary rates.

Q Could you discuss how this agreement relates to the prospect for an overall trade agreement with the Soviet Union, and also the World War II debt?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. As you know, Secretary Peterson, who is the Chairman on the American side of the U.S.-Soviet Economic Commission is going to be visiting the Soviet Union in the latter part of July to continue these discussions.

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Our view all along had been that we wanted a comprehensive new approach to the issue of U.S.-Soviet economic relations, of which the components would be the trade deal, the possible maritime agreements, the settlement of lend lease and possible extension of credit.

Obviously it is impossible to settle all of these issues on the same date, and therefore, our approach has been to attempt to settle them within the same general time frame, but to announce them as they are completed.

We believe that this agreement that we are announcing today is a major step forward in the conclusion of more comprehensive arrangements in the other fields as well, and we are entering the negotiations, as we believe the Soviet leaders are as well, with the attitude of finding a solution that is constructive to both sides, and we believe that major progress will be made when Secretary Peterson visits Moscow.

I might say when I characterized our attitude, I think I correctly described the Soviet attitude as well.

Why did the United States decide to extend credits this time?

DR. KISSINGER: This deal is the largest grain deal that has been concluded between two countries. It is also the largest grain deal, obviously, we have ever concluded. It is also the longest term one. Therefore, it was felt that some more novel approaches were needed which were in conformity with the importance of the general approach.

Secondly, leaving aside this particular deal, we have made clear consistently that as our general relationship with the Soviet Union would improve, we would be prepared to adopt new and forward-looking approaches to the question of financing trade between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Now the nature of the credit that was extended was the subject of rather extended conversations. On the Soviet side, I think it is correct to say that they believe in somewhat more extended credit arrangements and their approach to paying interest is somewhat different from ours, which we have already experienced in the lend-lease arrangement. But it was concluded satisfactorily.

Incidentally, I want to make an historic announcement here which is the first public admission of a mistake by a Harvard professor, and I hope you will all report it properly. Secretary Stans visited the Soviet Union in November and December, and therefore, his visit preceded Matskevich.

I have never seen Ziegler so happy. We just wanted to make this a normal press briefing. (Laughter)

Henry, can you say what the unions have agreed to?

DR. KISSINGER: I was afraid you would ask that question. (Laughter). Ziegler is looking it up in his instructions and he is going to hand it to me. (Laughter)

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One of the problems, as you will recognize, has been the question of loading ships by our unions, and this was one of the delays. We have had extended conversations with the unions, and we have reason to believe that this problem is either solved or very near to a solution.

Q Was credit given on last year's deal?

DR. KISSINGER: No, last year was cash.

Q Has there been no congressional feeling that settlement of lend lease should precede more detailed trade with the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: There has been a congressional feeling that settlement of lend lease should precede the more extensive credit arrangements that have been undertaken by the Export-Import Bank. This is a credit arrangement of a more short-term nature under a law which is designed to promote the sale of agricultural commodities, and we would not have undertaken it were we not optimistic that we could bring about a settlement of the lend-lease issue.

The problem we face is whether we want to hold up an agreement that is concluded, and use it as a sort of blackmail for another agreement which we have every reason to believe we are at least moving in a constructive direction on.

We think that when Secretary Peterson visits the Soviet Union that some progress will be made.

Q How much does the Soviet Union owe us in lend lease?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, that is an item that is under very active debate and is in the process of being established. Opinions are somewhat divided on that subject, so I would rather not get into it.

Q You mentioned that this was the largest grain deal. Is it also the largest trade arrangement of any kind between the U.S. and the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: I would rather have them answer that in Washington. My impression is yes, but I think this is somewhat that Secretary Peterson and Secretary Butz are better able to answer than I.

Q The sales themselves will be handled by private companies; is that right, through financing by the Government?

DR. KISSINGER: That is right and the credit is extended to the exporters, really.

Q Henry, I don't think you answered Carroll's question in any detail. I am still interested in knowing what the unions agreed to. Will this grain be shipped on Soviet bottoms entirely or 50-50 of what?

DR. KISSINGER: The details of this will be announced when they are fully worked out. I know that they will not be shipped entirely in Soviet bottoms and we believe that the unions will agree to load under those conditions.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, does that mean that you no longer expect Congress to insist that lend lease be a prequisite?

DR. KISSINGER: We expect that within a reasonable time all of these issues will become part of a more comprehensive arrangement. We believe that for more permanent credit arrangements of a more general nature, not tied to one specific set of purchases, Congress will probably still insist, and that is our approach in any event.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have ten minutes. We will take questions on other subjects if you would like.

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Q Could we talk about Vietnam? Could you tell us whether the Administration now has any evidence that the Hanoi Government is willing to seriously negotiate?

DR. KISSINGER: Bob, obviously the period between the break-up of the last set of meetings, the plenary sessions, has been one of very intensive, diplomatic activity. The primary purpose of this Administration has been, in direct contact and in indirect contact, to make clear that we believe that the time for serious negotiations has long been overdue.

By "serious negotiation" we mean not an acceptance necessarily of every proposal we have made, but a systematic discussion by both sides of each other's positions with a view toward finding a solution that is satisfactory to everybody.

We have made it very clear that this will be our approach. We believe that this attitude has been fully conveyed to Hanoi and we have some reason to believe that perhaps they will approach these negotiations in something like the same spirit. Of course, we cannot be sure until these negotiations actually start.

Hanoi has taken the view -- and I must say it is an understandable view in light of its sacrifices -- that they have earned the right to do their own negotiating. Therefore, one never knows exactly what they will do until they have actually presented it. But we have seen no sense in resuming negotiations unless there was a really constructive attitude. We hope that this will be the North Vietnamese attitude and at least we have some reason to believe that maybe there will be a new approach. But we cannot guarantee it because it will not be certain until we have heard it from them.

Q Dr. Kissinger, if your expectations prove to be wrong, are we prepared to break them off?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go into a hypothetical discussion of what we might do because one would have to see in what way they are wrong, what approach they are going to take. But our attitude has been made clear. We do not want these negotiations to be simply a propaganda forum for either side. And we do not want to raise expectations that we cannot fulfill. So how we would react would really depend very much on the circumstances.

Q You said several times that our attitude has been made clear. Are you by chance implying that our attitude has been made clear by representatives of the Soviet Union or China, as has been reported or indicated in dispatches from London earlier in the week?

DR. KISSINGER: You will remember, these dispatches quoted Communist sources and authoritative Communist diplomats. They did not quote us. It is conceivable to us that, just as we brief our allies about the contents of summit meetings or high level discussions, that the Soviet Union, and perhaps the Peoples Republic of China, inform Hanoi of discussions that they are having with us.

However, this is between Peking and Moscow and Hanoi and I want to emphasize what Ron has said already, on a number of occasions this week, that we recognize that the final settlement will be made with Hanoi and not in any other capital.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, the President said some time ago that a political solution is the heart of the matter. At his news conference last week he said the United States would not even discuss with the other side the creation of a coalition government in any kind. How can you get a political solution without talking about that kind of thing?

DR. KISSINGER: There are two basic approaches to this settlement. One is a comprehensive one that includes political and military issues. The other one is to emphasize military issues between us and the North Vietnamese and to leave the solution of the political issues to the Vietnamese themselves.

Now, in our proposal of January 27th, which was presented by the President on television on the evening of January 25th, we presented our idea of a comprehensive settlement; that is to say, one which attempts to tackle the political and military issues simultaneously. We made our proposal of what was our best judgment of how one could relate the withdrawal of American forces, the end of military operations, to a process which, in our judgment, would give the South Vietnamese people an opportunity to determine their own future.

I don't believe the President said "We won't discuss." The President said, "We will not impose", if I remember the phrase. But what I am saying is that we are prepared to discuss their points, together with our points. We are opposed to a coalition government. I don't want to create the wrong headlines here. We are not going to accept the proposal that they have made of a government of national concord, because as I have explained to you on a number of occasions, this is simply a thinly veiled device to bring about a Communist-controlled government.

We are prepared to discuss with them means to give the people of Vietnam an opportunity to determine their own future. However, our experience has been that the political issue is an extremely time-consuming one, extremely complex, and we believe on the whole that would be better, in light of our experience, to have it discussed by the Vietnamese themselves.

This is why the President proposed, in his May 8th speech, a solution to the military issues which would end the American participation in the war, which would bring about an end to military operations throughout Indochina and thereby -- by separating the military from the political issues -- create a calmer atmosphere in which the political issues can be discussed by the Vietnamese themselves, among themselves.

As of now it is our judgment that that is the better approach.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you summarize for us the report of General Haig from his visit?

DR. KISSINGER: Ron has already pointed out to you that General Haig was generally encouraged by the military situation. You will remember that in an earlier briefing we said that it was our judgment that the peak of the military offensive would have passed by July 1 and that judgment was confirmed. This does not mean that there cannot be some high point some time over the next month.

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The other side always has the capability, by collect-
ing enough forces and husbanding its resources, to do one thing
of that nature, but we do not believe that the sort of massive
attack which we witnessed in April and May on a country-wide
basis is likely in the immediate future.

So, he came to the conclusions, as I understand it,
that the military situation is greatly improved, that the
offensive has been essentially arrested, and that reinforces
our conclusions that the time for serious negotiations has
arrived.

I can again speak for the President and for the
Administration to say that we will enter these negotiations
with a serious attitude and with the intention of bringing about
a rapid and just conclusion of the war.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you happen to know whether
Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy have returned to Paris yet?

DR. KISSINGER: They have not sent me any postcards
from along the road. (Laughter) But we expect both Le Duc Tho
and Xuan Thuy to return to Paris in the near future. We would
expect at least one of them to be present at the first plenary
session and we expect both of them to return to Paris.

Q Are you optimistic, Doctor?

DR. KISSINGER: I am open-minded.

Q Will you be going to Paris?

DR. KISSINGER: Will I be going to Paris? Ron Ziegler
makes no announcements about my movements any more.

Q But we are not asking Ron Ziegler.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I am passing it to Ron Ziegler.
We will eventually announce my movements, if there are any.
(Laughter)

Q The President said at the news conference that
you are going back to the peace talks on the assumption that the
other side is ready to talk seriously and you say we have some
reason to believe it. Can you tell us some of the factors on
which the assumption is based?

DR. KISSINGER: As I pointed out, there has been very
intensive diplomatic activity. It has led us to believe that
one other effort was required. I don't want to raise any
expectations beyond that until we are in actual negotiations.

Q Is the Connally trip at all a part of that?

DR. KISSINGER: No.

THE PRESS: Thank you, gentlemen.

END

(AT 10:00 A.M. PDT)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE

July 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

FROM: MAJOR GENERAL ALEXANDER M. HAIG

Attached at Tab A is the record of the briefing on the strategic arms limitation agreements given by the President and Dr. Kissinger to Congressional leaders on Friday, June 2, 1972, 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, in the State Dining Room.

SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE

June 2, 1972.

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT AT LEADERSHIP

BREAKFAST

10:10 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: I think under the circumstances we can probably all be heard a little better if I can stand up for the remarks I am going to make. We are having a meeting in this room this morning because somebody put it up to me after the meeting just before we left that there were several Senators and Congressmen who sat in the back row. Having once sat in a back row, I don't want to do that to any of my friends. So I can say both Carl and Mike, and you and Jerry thought this would be a better meeting.

The way we would like to conduct this meeting, and this is not for the purpose of cutting off your own questions or comments, is I think I will start with a statement. Then I think Henry Kissinger should make a statement covering some of the matters that I will not be able to go into, where he participated in meetings, all of which I was participating in as well, but he can give you sidelights that might be of interest to you. Then we will go to any questions you have, or any suggestions you have, with regard to what the Senate, the House and the Congress needs to do, or any questions you have with regard to policy in general in this part of the world.

Now what I would like to do with the leaders this morning is something that I did not cover on television last night, which basically was a somewhat formalized report, and something that will be covered when the treaty is presented, for example, to the Senate, when the concurrent action is called for from the whole Congress, the House and the Senate, on offensive weapons, when, for example, we will ask for funds for the joint space venture, when we may have to ask for some authority on MFN. All of these are technical matters which the Administration

Page 2

people, for example, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, the arms control people, the space
people, the science people and so forth, all of those will
present those issues, and cover the whole groundwork very
exhaustively in the hearings that the appropriate
committees will have.

I think what you as leaders ought to hear, or what
best you could hear from me is somewhat of an observation
as to how I see the U.S. interest in the general moves we
are making toward the Soviet Union, and with the Soviet
Union, and parenthetically I am going to relate this also
to the general move we had made earlier with regard to the
PRC. I think it is necessary to do both, because only then
if we can see the reasons for the action will you be able
to determine whether that action deserves your support.

John Stennis and Margaret Smith, for example,
will have a hearing, and they will go into this ABM thing,
and they will count and see whether we should have two
sites or one site or what the deal is. Is it a good deal
for us, or a bad deal for us, and so forth. Those are all
questions you should ask and those are questions which we
would expect you to comment on. You are not going to
learn anything from me that Moore, Laird, Jerry Smith can't
tell you better, or that this morning Henry could not
comment on. So I won't go into that. It is the same on
some of the others.

But there is an area where I feel you would like
to hear, and that is in terms of the United States at
this particular time in our history and its foreign policy,
is making a very significant change. It is a change that
must be understood, understood as to why we are changing,
and also understood with regard to the motives, what we
think to be the motives of the leaders of the PRC and the
leaders of the Soviet Union. Because the greatest mistake
we could make is to change our policy because of wrong
assumptions with regard to our role in the world, and
with regard to what our potential adversaries in the world
may have in mind.

Now, I don't mean to suggest by this that we
do not take the various understandings, the statement of
principles, the agreements that were signed, and accept

Page 3

them for what they read. They have been very carefully
worked out. They have been executed and signed by the
leaders of the two countries, as you have noted, and
you should examine them as I said last night. I asked
for the very closest scrutiny because what we want is not
only for the members of the Congress to be satisfied in
your own minds that this is in the interest of the United
States, but by your questions we want you to satisfy the
American people that it is in their interest. That is why
we are not trying to hide anything. We are not trying to
say, "Well, this matter or that matter should just be
rushed through." We would like prompt action because
naturally the Soviet Union does not have the problem we
have with regard to getting prompt action, although they
have some, as I will indicate in a moment. It is prompt
action, but on the other hand we want thorough consideration
so you in your own minds are satisfied that the arrangements
we have made and the agreements that we have made are in
the best interests of the United States. I believe they are.
I have examined every one of them personally. I spent
hours and hours, as you can imagine, and I believe they are.
But I don't ask you to take my word for it. I am simply
saying make up your own minds, but as you make up your
minds, and now I come to my own analysis, put yourself in
the position of the other fellow. Put yourself in the
position that the United States would be in if we proceeded
simply on the course on which we had been running, whether
it is on arms control or trade or in any of the other
areas that we cover.

In other words, what I am simply trying to say is
this: Dean Acehson wrote a book, you remember, and the
title of it was "Present at the Creation". And the book
of course is about the fact that he was present at the
creation of the Marshall Plan, and all of the other great
initiatives. Then he used the example there of saying
that when a couple of diplomats were nitpicking an
agreement that had been signed, and so forth and so on, that
one of them responded with some irritation that if he had been
present at the creation, that he would not have had these
problems.

But we are faced now with certain facts. We
were not present at the creation, and therefore we have to
deal with the facts as they are.

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As I said to the leaders before, it may be that looking at this imperfect world of ours, the Creator, if he had it to do over again, might have made it a little different. I don't know. But in any event, we were not present at the creation of these problems. I am not speaking of "we" as this Administration, but we as leaders. The problems have arisen over a period of 25 years since World War II. The world has changed. Some of those changes occurred without our having anything to do with them. For example, the change with regard to the monolithic character of the Communist world, 25 years ago or 20 years ago, during perhaps all of the fifties, up to 1956 or 1957, you could quite honestly say that the Soviet Union was the center of the Communist world, and that basically the decisions made in Moscow would be reflected in all of the Communist parties and in the Communist nations around the world. It was true then. It is not true today.

Now, therefore, the world has changed and our policies must be changed to deal with that world as it is.

I come to a couple of specific examples. I suppose we wonder why is it that clearly apart from the reasons that we moved on our China initiative, why did the Chinese make the move? Let us look at it that way, because I think many of us could find good reasons for us to do what we did. After all, here are 800 million potentially very productive people, and here are people that potentially can be a great power militarily as well as economically. They are not yet, but they can be, and they have the capacity to be. Here are a people that we already have had one war with by proxy in Korea. Here are people that we want peace with in the Pacific. We either deal with them or live with them or we are going to die with them. So as a result, the United States clearly apart from economic and other factors, it seems to me, had good reason to try to develop a different relationship with the People's Republic of China.

Why would they want to change? It is not because their attitude toward our philosophy is any different from what it used to be. They are the implacable enemies of our philosophy, even more so than the leaders of the Soviet Union. They are more purist, as Henry Kissinger pointed out, in their communist ideology. They are thinking in terms as the Soviets thought 50 years ago, and it is not that much, but a shade of difference can make a very great

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difference sometimes in policies.

But put yourself in the position of those very intelligent men, and I would use this as an example of the very intelligent man who is primarily responsible for making decisions at the present time in the People's Republic of China. Mao Tse-tung, of course, is the leader. There is no question about that. There is no question about his strength. There is no question about his power. But in terms of the Government of the PRC, Chou En-lai is the man who makes the decisions. He has incidentally more power, he can make a decision on the spot, much more so than can any Soviet leader. Brezhnev, for example, cannot move as Chou En-lai can move. More on that in just a moment, because that is a very significant thing.

But put yourself in the position of these highly intelligent, sophisticated, dedicated Communists who fought the United States in Korea, whose attitude toward the world is different than ours -- why would they want to have a meeting with us? So here is China, and here is a poor nation. Andre Malraux, a very brilliant man, said the reason they wanted to have the meeting with us -- the first question that would be asked when we went to the People's Republic of China would be will the richest nation in the world help the most populous nation in the world with economic aid. That is not the question they asked. It never came up. It was not discussed at any point. It is not going to be asked of Jerry when he goes over there, and the House leaders.

The reason of course is a very pragmatic one, and it goes to this: As China looks at its place in the world, they see on one border more Soviet divisions lined up against them, or at least opposite them, than there are lined up in Europe. That huge monolithic Soviet Union is there. They know in terms of military power they are infinitely stronger than they -- not in numbers, but in terms of power. They are a mini-nuclear power. The Soviet Union is a super-power, nuclear-wise. They look to the south. After the way they mopped up the Indians in that brief border conflict a few years ago, they have contempt for the Indians in terms of their military capabilities. They do not fear them. But on the other hand, they certainly have to take into consideration the fact that India is a big country with a huge population, that India with the support of Soviet arms can be a very formidable opponent to the south. Of course, what happened recently in India and Pakistan tended to bear that out.

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Then they looked at the other side. They look up
to the north and the east, and they see Japan. Japan
militarily is no threat to them at all. They disarmed as
a result of World War II. But they know from experience
that the Japanese are an enormously capable people, that
they are very, very powerful economically, they know that
economic power is all that is needed in order to develop
military power, and from their past historical experience
with Japan, they have reason, they believe -- I don't
say this, but they may believe it, and they have reason to
believe that Japan might be a threat to them in the future.
They take the long view. They have a long head and a long
view.

So they look again, and what else is left? The
United States of America. The United States of America is
the only nation on the rim land of Asia, the only nation,
powerful as we are and they know we are powerful, and rich
as we are, completely different from them philosophically,
but we are the only nation that they can really say --
they will not say this publicly, I believe, because it goes
against their doctrine, but they know this deep down --
we are the only nation that has no designs on them. We are
the only nation that they do not fear in terms of aggression.

Therefore, put yourself in the position of the
Chinese leaders. What would you do? Would you continue to
have a whole wall of enemies around you, Russians on the
one side, and the Indians on the other side, and the
potential of Japan on the other side, and the United States
in the center, or would you try to have a different
relationship even with the one that you consider to be your
greatest philosophical enemy?

That is my analysis of the major reasons -- there
were others -- that the Chinese and American initiative was
begun.

Now we look at the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union
is in, of course, a position now of parity with the United
States militarily. The Soviet Union economically, while
its population is greater than that of the United States,
produces approximately half as much as we do. But the
Soviet Union, if you were a Soviet leader, has to look
around itself as well. They look at China, the People's
Republic. They also take the long view, and they realize

Page 7

that at the present time that presents no problem to them. Incidentally, let me make one point. The Soviet leaders did not say this to us. It would be very unfortunate if anything were to come out of this meeting indicating that the Soviet Union did this and that, and told the President that they were concerned about China. Neither is going to say that to the other. Put yourself in that position. If you have a country, 800 million people with all of the potential, and all of the dedication and all of the drive of China, on your border, and look ahead 25 years, knowing they can be if they want to be a super-nuclear power, you have to be concerned about your future. You have to be concerned about having other friends, or at least not adversaries in the world. Also, let me say this on the Soviet Union. As they have become more mature, the demands of their people for consumer goods have risen. They see on the border of Eastern Europe everywhere, in Poland and Czechoslovakia and Hungary and Roumania, they see the rumblings of discontent of these countries which are basically European, and which are pulled toward the West for economic reasons as well as for cultural reasons.

Looking at those and other reasons, the Soviet leaders naturally will conclude that their interests would be served by a better relationship with the United States.

But let me come to the more fundamental point. The Soviet leaders, like the Chinese leaders, are dedicated Communists. They consider us to be their philosophical enemies. They left no doubt about that and we left no doubt about our disagreement with their principles in our discussions in both capitals. On the other hand, the one thing you have to remember about the Soviet leaders as well as the Chinese leaders, they are very pragmatic men. They would never have gotten to the top doing foolish things. The fact that they have survived, that they have gotten to the top, means that they make decisions that are not rash. It does not mean that they don't press from time to time, that there is not sometimes some elements of adventurism. Khruschev was an example of that with the Cuban missile crisis, you all remember. But generally you will find as you talk to these leaders that each of them in his way is intelligent. He has a total belief in his own philosophy, and he is very pragmatic with regard to his position and the position of his country.

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Now, when the Soviet leaders look at themselves, they have to determine what does the future hold for them. Do they want to have the United States, the most powerful nation in the world, or at least equal to them in power, more powerful, depending on how you balance it out -- we have enough for what we need, and they have enough for what they need. That is the way I would express it. But because of our economic potential, if we continue, and this is the fundamental point that we have to bear in mind in this country, and they bear in mind in their country -- if we continue the arms race, it is a race in which neither can win. The Soviet Union is not going to ever allow the United States to get in the position it was in at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, when the advantage was 10 to 1 in our favor, and we were looking down their throats. They also know that the United States, even though we have not built any new systems during the sixties, even though we allowed that 10 to 1 advantage in terms of land based missiles to be wiped out and for them to gain an advantage, they know that the United States with its enormous economic power is not going to allow the Soviet Union to get into a position where it is looking down our throats. So from a pragmatic standpoint, they have to make a command decision. Do they want to continue a race which will mean more and more of their production will continue to go into military production when they so desperately need more consumer goods? Do they want to continue a race that they are not going to be able to win, regardless of what happens? Do they want to continue a race which does run the risk of war in the future? Because as the race continues, obviously who knows who will be the leader of any one country, and who knows whether we will always have rational men in positions of power in the major countries of the world, and also they realize as they look around in areas like the Middle East, where the two countries run together in their policies, they look around and they can see the possibilities of conflict.

So the Soviet leaders, it seems to me, from a very pragmatic standpoint, conclude that while they are still opposed to us ideologically, while they still, and I will use the term "want to win", they want Communism to win in the world, they, however, are pragmatic enough to realize that a nuclear arms race is not to their advantage. They made these agreements for their reasons, and we made them for ours. We also have to examine ourselves in that way.

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Now, a word about the men and I would say also
before turning this over to Henry, just to put ourselves in
the position of the United States at this point, in terms
of the arms control agreements, so that we can have the
other picture -- I describe Chou en Lai and Mao tse Tung
in my Chinese part. We had most of the meetings with
Chou en Lai. He is not as well known, but a brilliant man,
totally dedicated, enormous stamina, and great subtlety,
as I said, a long head and a long view, and a very, very
formidable opponent, if we are going to be opponents.

It is a great mistake, and this is a mistake over
and over again we make in our world, our system is best for
us, ours is the most productive system in the world. Every
time we come back to the United States, you say, "Thank
God we are from the United States and not from there." But
don't under-estimate what a system that is totalitarian in
character can do with the kind of fanatical leadership you
have in the PRC and the Soviet Union. They can be a very
formidable opponent.

Leaving out the systems, just erase Communism from
the top, and call it a fascist dictatorship, call it any
kind of a system, the Communist people are a formidable
people. The Russian people are a formidable people. You
see them in the streets, and they are strong and vigorous
people. Under those circumstances, never under-estimate them.
Never assume because our system is best for us, because in
any kind of a race we will win economically, because we
unleash the great powers of freedom, that it is inevitable
that in any contest we will eventually come out ahead. You
have to have that in mind.

Now, the Soviet leadership has been under-estimated
by some of the experts. I know Robert Conquest's testimony be-
fore the Senate committee was extremely interesting. He
is a great expert, British, as you know, but he said that
basically the Soviet leadership is third rate. Don't you
believe it.

What we have here is a situation, and let me take
some of it, Kosygin is basically a governmental expert
and economic expert. He is as good as any man in the
world in these fields, and he makes a very, very hard deal.
That is one of the reasons we did not reach an agreement
on Lend-Lease. We clarified the difference. We got down

Page 10

to the lump sum, but he would not give a bit in the
interest rate and I could not give it. That is something
that will have to be worked out later, and that is the way
you have to deal with these people. Otherwise we can't
make the kind of deal that is in our interest and they are
not going to respect us if we just roll over and accept
the deal they lay before us.

Podgorny you think of as some sort of president
running around the world, but he also was a formidable man.
He came up the hard way, as did Brezhnev. All of them did.
He is a man who has great tenacity, considerable charm, and
in conversations with each of these -- I had separate
conversations as well as seeing them all together on
occasion -- I was able to evaluate them.

Brezhnev is the man that perhaps has been under-
estimated the most by the western world. They compare him
unfavorably with Kosygin because Kosygin is known more for
his expertise in various areas, but you can see after meeting
the three, the reason that Brezhnev is the man in charge.
He is basically a very strong man. I use that term, and he
is strong physically, and he has a mystique of leadership.
He is able to make decisions on the spot very effectively.
He is tenacious and a very formidable opponent.

Now, an interesting sidelight: One difference,
from the days with Khrushchev, we knew that in
meeting with him, he could make decisions on the spot for
the whole Communist world, let alone the Soviet government.
That is not the case today. Brezhnev is the man in charge,
but he meets and he usually consults with the other two I
have mentioned, Podgorny and Kosygin, and on major decisions,
and we found this the case several times during the week
we there there, with the whole Politburo, 12 to 15,
depending upon how many are present at any time, would make
the decision on a critical point.

There is a kind of collective leadership in the
Soviet Union at the present time, which is on one side
a strength and on the other side is a weakness in dealing
with us in the United States.

We look at the world and we see it from their
standpoint, and how China has to look at the world, and

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let us look at the United States. What do we do about all
of this?

I suppose as one who is known, and I gained this
reputation I think with much justification, and I still
am this, I am one who as everybody in this room does has
a very deep commitment to our system. I have a very deep
antipathy for the Communist system and what it stands for,
and they know that I feel that way, and I know how they feel
toward our system. There was no molarkey about this as we
got to know each other. Henry can give you a little feeling
of how personal contact is so essential in dealing with
governments that are totalitarian in character. When you
are dealing with the British or the French, and so forth,
you can do it at the ambassadorial level or foreign minister
level, but when you talk to these people, they don't talk
to foreign ministers. They will talk with them, but they
don't make decisions with them. They have to talk to the men
at the top. That is why summit meetings properly prepared
serve a useful purpose.

But having said that, let me say finally that with
the background that I have, the reason that I reached the
conclusion that the United States should make the move that
it has, has nothing to do with the change of philosophy,
a change in ideology. What it has to do with is with the
survival of the United States and with the chance of the
survival of civilization, if I can put it in a melodramatic
way. The United States has the strength economically that
no other nation will ever get ahead of us and we can
always be ahead of them, but it is a race nobody is going
to win, and if we allow this confrontation with the
Soviets and if we had allowed the confrontation with the
Soviets and the lack of communications with the Chinese
to continue, inevitably at some time in the future, either
because of erratic leadership at the top in any one of
the three countries, or because of a showdown in an area
where like the Mid-East, where neither could give, the
chance of a nuclear war would develop.

Whoever sits in this place cannot allow that to
happen. Putting it the other way, as I said last night,
I don't mean the fact that we have met with the Chinese
means that we are not going to have confrontations with
them in the future. We may. I don't mean the fact that we
have met with the Soviet Union does not mean that every

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deal that we make, that the limitations must not be
bargained very hard, because they are out to get the best
deal from us and we have to get the best deal from them.
But what I am suggesting is that our interest, like theirs,
demand a limitation on the arms race, and eventually we
would trust a reduction, because neither can win it, and
both will lose it. That is the reason we have moved as we
have.

So what I am saying, in conclusion, the world has
not changed a great deal in terms of the philosophies,
Putting it in a religious context, the true believers in the
Communist world are still true believers, and the people in
our world are still true believers. But pragmatically the
world has changed a great deal, and we take seriously as
Democrats and Republicans our responsibility for the future.
We have to move in the arms control area, move or accept
the other possibility, which is this: You can nitpick these
agreements, and certainly be, if you were present at the
creation and did not have someone on the other side of the
table who was dealing from strength and not from weakness,
and this is the way it was, and it was hard going, hard
bargaining all of the way, I can tell you. This was no
pattycake operation. Then it might have been different.
But let me say either you could make the deal and start
down this long road of arms control, or we have to make the
decision to go ahead and build, because make no mistake
about it, they are going, they are not stopping. It is
they that have caught up with us, and passed us in land
based missiles. It is they that have a submarine program
and we don't have one. None will come on stream until
1979. So as one of the circumstances, it is therefore in our
interest to accept this fact and to deal with it in that way.

I only have tried to give an over-view on it, so
that you can see the motivations that I had in making some
of these very close, tough decisions. What should we do
about submarines, and what should we do about the size of
missiles, and what should we do about all of these other
things. What should we do about cooperation in the space
race? Should we go with these? I know some people are
concerned about the initiatives on trade. They said don't
build up these totalitarian systems, and don't trade with
them, because it only helps them, and there is nothing in
it for us. Let me only say this: With regard to trade,
with regard to the environment, and with regard to health,

Page 13

and with regard to cooperation in space, I am not a bit,
shall I say, taken in by the usual argument that if we
just cooperate in these particular areas we are going to
get to know each other and like each other and understand
each other -- knowing and liking and understanding from a
personal standpoint, all of this is possible and all helps
a bit. I realize we are going to continue to be competitors
in the world. Our systems are going to go their separate
ways, but we trust not to a collision.

But I also know this, that from a pragmatic
standpoint, and that is what the whole arrangement has to
do with, from a pragmatic standpoint. If the leader of a
nation has an interest in good relations with another nation,
he then has a reason to deal with you in other fields.
Therefore, if, for example, the Soviet leaders have an
interest in trade with the United States, it is something
where we are strong, where they want to get something from
us, then if in this area we can make progress, if we can
build more trade, it means that in the future the possibility
of our making progress in other areas involving national
security becomes much greater.

But if on the other hand we do not have these
contacts and they don't have an interest in trade and health
and environment and all of the rest, which do not seem
important, but adding up, become very important, you can
see that inevitably the conflict will arise in the critical
area of national security.

I have talked far more than I expected to in my
opening remarks, but I have given you some of my own
feelings with regard to this situation. We want you to
examine all of our agreements as closely as you can. We do
ask for your approval. I can tell you I have examined them.
I have examined them in a hardheaded way. I have examined
them from the standpoint that I know you would want,
as the President of the United States, not as a partisan
or a person, but recognizing that with an election coming
up, who knows who is going to be in this chair. The main
thing is I am convinced, and I can simply say this to the
leaders, that every agreement we have made with the Soviet
Union, every agreement that we will ask you to approve,
either approve by your votes or by your funding, is one
that is in the interest of the United States, not just

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this year of 1972, but for the years ahead, and not just
for the Republican Administration but for a Democratic
Administration. If it is not, you should not approve it.
But I believe it is. That is why we are sending it down.

Henry, would you give a little of the more
concrete things that I think some of you might be interested
in? Then we will go to questions.

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. President, Senator Smith and
gentlemen: I think the President has outlined the general
framework which has shaped our policy, which has brought us
to this point.

As the President has pointed out, in several -- in all
of his annual reports since he came into office, we are facing a
new international situation compared to the one that
obtained through most of the postwar period, and therefore
it would be wrong for the United States, not in keeping with
the opportunities before it, if we had simply continued the
traditional pattern.

No one would have ended this course with fewer
illusions. In one of the first meetings, the President said
"You gentlemen all know me as an anti-Communist, and I
want you to know I have not changed." And Kosygin looked
at him with his blue eyes and impassive face, and he said
"It is a well deserved reputation."

So this was not a meeting that was entered into
with illusions, but what we are facing is a period of tre-
mendous historical change in which necessities have brought
all of the chief actors into a position where they have to
deal with each other, and where by a fortunate coincidence
there is enough far-sightedness in the leadership of all of
these countries to permit one to adjust international
affairs to what is ahead of us.

As one looks backward over the 3-1/2 years that
we have been in office, we can see the enormous hesitation
and pain with which the Soviets brought themselves to
dealing with us as they have in this situation. Their
normal conviction, as Communists, is that foreign policy
is shaped entirely by what they call objective doctrines,
which means entirely by predominance of force. We told them
from the beginning, against some opposition, that we would
deal not on the basis of sentimentality but on the basis of

Page 15

concrete negotiations, which we said should be related, each topic should be related to the other. So progress in one would produce progress in the other. The President constantly offered the Soviet leaders from the very beginning a direct channel to him in which he would talk candidly, and he said, "I always deliver what I say." That was very difficult for the Soviet leaders to accept, and they tried various ways.

The first year they tried to get into generalities as they always like to. The second year they tried what we call a differential detente, which is to say they tried to get good relations with Europe and a posture of hostility toward the United States. That was the summer in which we had the nuclear submarine base in Cuba, we had the missile crisis in the Middle East, and we had harrassment on the Autobahn toward Berlin, all of them happening in the same three months period, and all of them really based on the proposition that the United States could be divided from its European allies, and could be isolated by a policy of relaxation towards Europe, and a policy of tension with the United States.

These policies failed because the President stood firm in each of these areas, and because through this process and if we are frank through the Polish uprisings in December of that year, the Soviet leaders knew that the dynamics of the world in which they lived could not be encompassed by additional Marxist slogans, if they tried to have a relaxation with us, all of the forces in their system would begin to operate.

They found themselves in the Middle East at the very edge of a precipice, in which they had to look down the threat of nuclear war on the basis of actions of governments they had absolutely no possibility of controlling. They had no way of knowing what the Syrian tanks were going to do, and the luckiest thing that ever happened to the Soviet Union was the incompetence of its Syrian ally. What would have happened if their Syrian allies had been a little more competent, and the Israelis then had struck, and the general eastern war had resulted out of a sequence of events that could not be controlled from Moscow, and could not be controlled from Washington is very difficult to say. It is our judgment, it is this realization that brought

Page 16

the Soviet leaders, against their instincts, against their philosophy, and maybe even against their preferences, to working on a detente with the United States, and to work on it within the framework that essentially the President had sketched in his first press conference, and in his series of conference from the beginning.

The increasingly intimate exchange between us and the Soviet leaders at the highest level really gave impetus in early January 1971, and the President had always said in effect and not exactly in those words, but in effect, "If you want to talk seriously to us, here is a channel in which you can tell us what you really think, and we will tell you what we really think, so that if we fail, we won't at least fail because we have never talked with each other."

One of the first results of this was the Berlin agreement which had been absolutely deadlocked for over two years, and in which as a result of the direct exchanges between the Soviet leaders and the President, we wound up with a better deal than our own offer had been, which is not a bad negotiation, if you can get it from the Soviets. We tried to convince the Soviets, and I think we have on the whole succeeded, that in a number of these areas the worst thing that can happen to you is to get more than to try to take a marginal advantage of a situation, because no great country in the nuclear age is going to permit its national survival to be threatened. The risk of conducting a policy, as had been traditional, where each side amasses little advantages in the hope of getting such an edge over the other that it can destroy it -- that policy is totally wrong. We are sometimes accused of going back to traditional balance of power situations. Well, to some extent it is true, because power is an essential element of international affairs, but in a significant respect it is wrong. In the nuclear age, no country has the possibility individually to get such a tremendous advantage that it can destroy, and to attempt to get the advantage is going to create such a crisis that a holocaust could easily result.

The second result was the breaking of the deadlock in the SALT negotiations on May 20, 1971. Up to that time they had been hung up on the Soviet insistence that the treaty be limited to defensive weapons and our insistence that it be comprehensive. Without going into the details, through the confidential exchanges between the Soviet

Page 17

leaders and the President, a compromise was achieved which then set the framework for the subsequent SALT negotiations. I think it is important to keep in mind the pattern of diplomacy that has been followed all along. On the one hand, we have had highly complex negotiations. On the other hand, when they reached a deadlock, the President would intervene directly and have semi-philosophical discussions with the Soviet leaders, and I mean where they asked him, "Where do we really want to come out, and in what time frame? What is it that both of us genuinely want?" Once that was established, general conclusions were reached which then permitted the technical negotiators to go forward.

Here we are in the curious situation with relation to the large Communist countries, and perhaps especially the Soviet Union, on the one hand our philosophies are totally implacably opposed, on the other hand we are bound to go by a knowledge which no one else shares. We cannot really talk to anybody else about nuclear arms about the question of war and peace on a global basis, as we can to the Soviet leaders, because there is no one else in the world who shares this experience of conducting such a foreign policy.

As I will explain in a minute, one of the interesting and maybe useful byproducts of the meetings in Moscow last week was the way the President and the Soviet leaders when it came down to the final stages of SALT could talk about their perception of what they were doing in this world.

This has been the pattern that has been followed, but I would have to say that it got its real impetus since January of 1971. When the President arrived in Moscow, he did not come as a stranger nor were they strangers to us. We had been exchanging communications at great length and sometimes with amazing detail about a whole panoply of issues.

Now, then, when the decision was made; we had agreed already in October of 1970, on the occasion of Gromyko's visit here that there should be a summit meeting. But we had also agreed that the summit meeting could take place only when it was well prepared, when there was a real substantive basis. The last thing we wanted, the President always said, was to go to a meeting and create an atmosphere in which just joviality would be encountered and then evaporate afterwards because it had no concrete basis. So even though there was an agreement

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in principle in October 1970, it was not until after the SALT breakthrough of May 20, 1971, and after the Berlin agreement of September of 1971, that both sides felt confident enough, and we felt confident enough to go ahead and schedule a summit, with the expectation that it had a high chance of succeeding.

Once the summit was set, we decided together with the Soviet leaders that it was not going to be just an atmospheric summit, but we would try to bring forward simultaneously as many issues as we could for resolution at the summit. This is why starting last summer we worked in all of the fields that finally culminated in an agreement in Moscow on two levels -- first on the technical level where the various departments were negotiating with the Soviet counterparts, but equally important, on the Presidential level where when deadlocks developed or difficulties arose, the President took a personal hand. So that the imminence of the summit gave an impetus to all of these negotiations.

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Let me give you an example: There was a case of the problem with incidents at sea. There was one particular issue having to do with this problem, and I give it to you only to give you a feel about how this operated. It had to do with the problem of whether you should state the safety rules in terms of fixed distances between ships, or whether you should indicate a general formula which left something to the judgment of both sides.

For a variety of reasons, our Navy felt very strongly that it should not be expressed in fixed distances. The Soviets felt equally strongly that anything that didn't express fixed distances was a meaningless agreement. That deadlock had been going on for four months. If there hadn't been a summit, it could go on for another four years, because there is no solution to this problem in technical terms; each side wanted something different.

They wanted something that we couldn't very well allow, and we wanted to prevent an operationally unacceptable agreement. So this finally led to a Presidential intervention in which the President said, "Why do we want this agreement?" We want this agreement not because of the technical side. None of our ships ever really collided. We want an agreement to indicate we are capable of specifying some rules. Therefore, a lot depends on the spirit in which it is carried out, and we offered a formula which more or less 90 percent expressed our point of view, but permitted the Soviets to have their point for a fixed distance discussed later.

This was submitted in the direct Presidential channel and the answer came back in 24 hours and it was solved more or less in our favor. I am not saying that that agreement changed the course of history. It is a marginal agreement. It is a symbolic agreement and we are mentioning it only to indicate how we operated.

The President didn't say that many of these agreements on health or environment, and so forth, important as they are in themselves, bring about a qualitative result alone; but there is this significant aspect about making all of this simultaneously and having the Soviet people see all of them on television, and having the whole Politburo at every meeting, which Brezhnev was very careful to do; having the whole Politburo at every signing ceremony, no matter how relatively insignificant the agreement seemed to be.

[L]

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What has been the problem now? Part of it has been ideology. Part of it has been the fact that we are two great powers who just infringe on each other all over the world, but part of it is the persistence of the bureaucratic momentum; that each side had so many people who have done the same thing for so long that the easiest thing to do is just continue what you have always been doing. That presents less strain on each ministry, and less strain on them.

What we have attempted to do is to create enough interest across the board in the Soviet governmental structure so that when a crisis comes up there will be people all over the government who have a vested interest in the continuation of normal relations with us, and who will ask themselves whether it is really worthwhile to have 100 tanks running around in Jordan, as compared to the risk they run in undermining this whole complex of relationships.

If I can mention one basic theme that the President has had with the Soviet leaders, it is to try to present them with this real choice. In this connection, I might say our sharp reaction to the India-Pakistan crisis last year has to be seen in that context. I don't want to go into the tactics that we pursued and reopen old issues. I want to say that the way it looked to us is that in the middle of preparing for a summit meeting in which we were trying to do these things, there came this vestige of the old policy of trying to gain an advantage in one particular part of the world, and we wanted to show the Soviets that this was too risky a course to pursue.

Now, this is what the background had been when the President arrived in Moscow. He didn't arrive as a stranger. He didn't arrive just to create an atmosphere. He arrived with eight or nine negotiations already going on, on which there had been a lot of exchanges. He arrived with the Soviet leaders knowing what the agenda was and in what areas agreements had to be sought.

We didn't insult them by pretending that these dedicated Communists who for 40 years had bitten their way up, were going to be challenged by us into changing their views. Every conversation that the President conducted was on the basis of, "Here we are. We have different views, but we are here to discuss the necessitites that have brought us together on the basis of concrete, precise negotiations."

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[LC]

It was on this basis that we achieved the results
with which we are all familiar. I have been reading, as all
of us have, the American debate on the SALT agreement. We
obviously haven't heard the Soviet debate on the SALT agree-
ment, but I can assure you, for example, that the second
meeting that the President had with Brezhnev -- and the first
was a general review of the situation -- the second meeting
dealt exclusively with SALT. It lasted six hours. It went
into enormous detail on such issues that I don't think, with
all respect to the Members here, more than four or five people
in this room have had an opportunity to address.

What is the relationship between silo dimensions
it -- what is the relationship between silo dimensions
and the possibility of modernizing missiles? Can you put new
missiles into old silos? How should you express restrictions
on silo modification? and questions of that type. Three hours
were spent on this problem, with Brezhnev going into volcanic
outbursts of accusing the President of not operating on the
basis of trust and confidence, and why should we modify silos,
and the President said, "If you don't want to modify them,
why don't you write it into the agreement?"

Then we were explaining to them how they could put
new missiles into their silos, and he accused us of intel-
ligence operations, and he didn't even know these things, and
how did we know these things? I don't want to go into detail.

The President didn't go in there and say, "I love
dismarmament and you love disarmament, so why shouldn't we
sign this agreement?" There were extensive discussions on
that issue. Even more extensive discussions were had on
the relationship of how you freeze offensive weapons.

I don't know who the people are in the Politburo
who raised the sort of questions that we have been reading
about, but just as an example, I can tell you that there
was one point where Brezhnev raised the question, which I
think is actually more perceptive than some questions I
have seen raised in our newspapers, the question being this:
He said, "You are going to build new submarines. How am I
going to answer my people who say that all this agreement does
is to hold us still while you are putting new weapons into
production?"

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The President said, "We are going to add one submarine by this year."

And he said, "Look, you and I know it is the first submarine that counts, because after that you can build as many as your productive capacity permits."

I must say, it was a very perceptive question, because that is one of the possible meanings of the offensive freeze. We look at the disparity of numbers that exist today, but you gentlemen have seen this disparity of numbers every year. That disparity isn't new. It wasn't created by the agreement. It was something that we inherited, and all of you who have dealt with weapons know that from the time you think of a new weapon until it goes into production, it takes 10 years. So this gap existed.

The problem the President faced in Moscow wasn't whether he liked the gap or not; the problem that he faced was that he knew that this gap was going to be growing every year; that we had no program to close it during the period of the freeze, and no matter what disposition he made, he couldn't close it during the period of the freeze.

So there is the easy statement, "Why don't we go into a crash program and close the gap?" None of the Joint Chiefs would have supported it, and there was no possibility of doing that, so you have to look at it from the perspective of both sides, and from the perspective of a dynamic situation, and above all, from the perspective which the President outlined also.

There is no question that the only hole card the President had was the numbers were totally against us. In fact, if you analyze it carefully, you have to say the offensive part of the agreement is to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union so much that you wonder why they signed it, because there was nothing we could do about it. If they wanted to, they could produce, as all of you who are on the Armed Services Committees know, eight or nine submarines a year, and we could produce none. So, therefore, you have to compare not the number of weapons, the gap in the submarines that will exist, but the gap that would have existed. The same is true for ICBMs.