CAESAR D. SERESERES

A staff member of the Rand Corporation, Caesar Sereseres is also
Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California
at Irvine. Dr. Sereseres specializes in U.S.-Mexico relations, civil-
military relations in the Basin, Guatemalan military and paramilitary
politics, and U.S. security assistance policies/programs to Latin
America. He is also assessing the role of ethnic politics on U.S.
foreign policy toward Latin America.

Dr. Sereseres is the author of: *The Management of U.S.-Mexico Relations*, "U.S. Arms Transfers, Diplomacy, and Security in Latin America," "Guatemalan Paramilitary Forces, Internal Security and Politics," and "U.S. Military Assistance to Non-industrial Nations." He has been published in such journals as *Armed Forces and Society*, *Foro Internacional*, and *Military Review*. His most recent works are *Military Politics, Internal Warfare, and U.S. Policy in Guatemala*; and *The Central American Policy Conundrum*.

CITY OF SAN JUAN

HERNAN PADILLA, M. D.
MAYOR

July 29, 1983

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I would like to congratulate you on your appointment by President Reagan to serve as Chairman of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. To be sure, your extensive experience and reputation in U.S. foreign policy will help to assure that the findings of this Commission will be sound, widely acceptable and fully consistent with America's interests in Central America.

Some time ago, during your visit to San Juan, we spoke of the positive role Puerto Rico can play in U.S. initiatives in the Americas, and of the willingness of Puerto Ricans to assist in the development and implementation of U.S. policies in the Hemisphere. I would like to express to you my personal support for the work of the Commission, and inform you of my availability to assist its task in any appropriate manner.

Indeed, as the work of the Commission proceeds in the months ahead, it might be valuable to seek the opinions of U.S. citizens living in the Caribbean Basin, in working towards a consensus of policies and actions our Nation should adopt in Central America. We in Puerto Rico have a great stake in the political, economic and strategic future of this region of the Hemisphere we share both geographically and historically with the peoples of Central America. I would certainly be willing to express some of my opinions on this issue to the group at some time in the future.

In any event, congratulations on your appointment to head this distinguished group of citizens, and please accept my best wishes for success as you begin this important responsibility.

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
c/o Kissinger and Associates
1800 K St., N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

AUG 04 1983

Testimony of Elliot L. Richardson
before the
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives

June 7, 1983

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to say a few supplementary words on the score particularly of the security recommendations of the report of the Inter-American Dialogue. I had the privilege of chairing the working group responsible for that part of the report.

The report is written, of course, from the perspective of the Americas as a whole, and properly so. Today, however, I would like to try to translate its recommendations into their most basic implications for U.S. national security interests. Although I completely share the unanimous view of all Dialogue participants that the roots of insecurity in this Hemisphere are primarily economic, social, and political, not military, these brief remarks will emphasize the military implications.

We start then, Mr. Chairman, I believe, with several relatively clear-cut premises.

First, that any enlargement of the Soviet-Cuban military presence in the Hemisphere would be inimical to the security of the region. This is a concern that is clearly and, it is fair to say, almost unanimously shared throughout the Hemisphere.

Second, that the security concerns created by Marxist-oriented movements or governments stem not from their Marxism but from the risk that they may become subservient to Soviet-Cuban influence and thus open the way to enlargement of the Soviet-Cuban military presence.

Third, that the use of military force in sufficient strength to foreclose the possibility that such a Marxist-oriented movement might prevail or, indeed, sufficient to oust a Marxist-oriented government already in power, is not a politically realistic option. I discount for this reason what is currently being said about the prospect of large-scale U.S. intervention in Central America. There is no serious possibility that U.S. intervention will take place on a scale sufficient by itself to determine the military outcome.

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Fourth, that early intervention on a scale not adequate to assure the victory of the side we favor is counterproductive. Its inevitable consequences, as we are daily being obliged to observe, are to prolong the bloodshed, to drive the other side ever more deeply into the arms of the Soviet bloc, and to erode U.S. prestige and leadership.

Fifth, that the countries of the Hemisphere are united in opposition to intervention from any external source and, as the report indicated, prepared to join in a hemispheric declaration to that effect.

From these five premises, Mr. Chairman, I believe it follows that there is a need for a better option. To put it bluntly, there is the need for a policy.

The President's speech the other night was a powerful plea for the resources necessary to maintain the status quo -- pending what? He never told us explicitly, but one must assume that his principal objective was to buy time in order to give the present government of El Salvador a chance somehow to prevail. That time could, of course, also be used to pursue a negotiated solution. And yet, the Administration's own pronouncements constantly downgrade the chances of a military victory while at the same time resisting alternative negotiation. In any case, even if the chances of a satisfactory outcome were as good as 50-50, there would still be a need to have a fallback in the event that this optimistic possibility did not materialize. If the government's chances are not that good, there is all the more need for a policy rather than a hope.

A realistic option would focus on the real danger, i.e., the danger presented by the risk of the enlargement or establishment of a Soviet-Cuban beachhead in Central America or the continent of South America. That is to say, it must address itself to what we most fear rather than let our resources of leadership be dissipated by reactions to the mere manifestation of a Marxist orientation which may not, in fact, carry with it any serious threat of a Soviet or Cuban presence.

In place of unilateral U.S. intervention at a stage when the danger of a Soviet-Cuban presence is still remote, we, in association with the other countries of the Hemisphere, should substitute a Hemisphere-wide multilateral commitment to oppose any such presence. The advantages of such a multilateral Monroe Doctrine, as I see them -- and I

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think that what I am saying here is essentially a translation of what we said in the report -- are the following:

First, it would perform the function of serving notice on the Soviet Union and Cuba that the Hemisphere is in fact united in opposition to the enlargement of their military presence.

It is in this context that the references in the report to a possible dialogue with the Soviet Union and Cuba are most relevant. What we said in that connection is that it would be desirable if the Soviet Union and Cuba would agree to renounce intervention; that it would be worthwhile to seek such a commitment; but that, in any event, the process of communication with them would give them formal notice that the Hemisphere does not want them on its soil.

Second, such a multilateral Monroe Doctrine would create a basis for organizing a united response in the face of a seriously threatened violation of the united position.

Third, it would lay a foundation that would justify individual member states within the region, including the United States, in the event of a failure to achieve broad-based agreement on a united response, to take such action as the danger then seemed to call for.

This, in essence, is the kind of trade-off, Mr. Chairman, that the report suggests: that the U.S. accept the futility of attempting unilaterally to intervene at an early stage by inadequate means at the cost of erosion of U.S. leadership and prestige in the Hemisphere and substitute instead a broad-based concerted policy adequate to deal with the real dangers when and if they arise.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.