MINISTÈRE
DE L'ÉDUCATION NATIONALE

ÉCOLE PRATIQUE
DES HAUTES ÉTUDES

Sciences Économiques et Sociales

Centre de Sociologie Européenne

10, rue Monsieur-le-Prince, 6e (Méd. 17-52)
( et 63-71)

PARIS, le 4 janvier 19 67

JAN 10 1966

Monsieur Henry A. Kissinger

Harvard University

Center for International Affairs

Cher ami,

Merci de votre lettre du 22 décembre.

Que votre compte rendu soit ou non favorable, je me félicite que le New York Times vous ait chargé de ce travail. Au moins les lecteurs auront par votre intermédiaire le sentiment que le livre, bon ou mauvais, traîte de problèmes essentiels.

Avec tous mes voeux pour l'année nouvelle pour vous et
les vôtres, croyez, je vous prie, à l'assurance de mes sentiments
fidèlement amicaux.

PARIS, le 14 novembre 19 66

NOV 1-8 1966

Monsieur Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Harvard University
Cambridge, 38, Mass.

Mon cher ami,

Veuillez trouver, ci-inclus, un témoignage relatif
à M. Guy Berger, auditeur au Conseil d'Etat et qui a posé sa candidature
aux cours d'été dont vous avez la direction.

Je profite de l'occasion pour vous signaler que mon
livre "Paix et Guerre entre les Nations" doit enfin paraître aux Etats-
Unis dans le courant du mois de janvier. Au cas où vous souhaiteriez
en faire le compte rendu dans l'un ou l'autre des grands journaux -ce qui
me serait particulièrement agréable- il vous serait facile de demander,
de ma part, un exemplaire du livre à Mme Freedgood aux éditions Doubleday.

Croyez, je vous prie, mon cher ami, à l'assurance
de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

Raymond Aron, PEACE AND WAR: THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

Henry A. Kissinger

It is curious that a century dominated by international conflict should be so lacking in theories of international affairs. Now this deficiency has been remedied by Raymond Aron in his profound, civilized, brilliant and <u>unfortunate</u> difficult work: *Peace and War: The Theory of International Relations*.

The paucity of theory has many causes. The American national style is pragmatic; the tradition until World War II was largely isolationist; the approach to peace and war tended to be absolute and legalistic. American writing on foreign policy has generally tended to fall into three categories: analyses of specific cases or historical episodes, exhortations justifying or resisting greater participation in international affairs, and investigations of the legal bases of world order.

In Europe continuous involvement in international affairs has been a fact of life. War and peace, power and diplomacy have not presented themselves as rigid alternatives. Nevertheless, no comprehensive theory of international relations has emerged in recent decades. The nearest thing to <u>comprehensive</u> theory has been philosophies of history which tend to subordinate the behavior of states to the evolution of civilizations and very often involve a determinism difficult to reconcile with political analysis.

This inadequacy of theory in international affairs can be partly explained by the difficulty of defining its purpose and relevant subject matter. Should a theory explain past events or should it define desirable goals? Should it account for the world as it is or as it should be?

In the fifteenth century, Machiavelli described the maxims which he considered essential for successful action in his time as he observed it. For

-2-

this his name has become identified with lack of moral scruple. In the
eighteenth century, Kant laid down principles for peace based on moral conduct,
but he left open the possibility that mankind might have to be brought to this
goal through a series of cataclysmic wars rather than by way of moral insight.
Whose theory is more relevant to an understanding of international affairs?
Whom should a theory of international affairs instruct, the statesman or the
prophet?

Both have placed their stamp on historical periods. The statesman is
concerned with continuity; his test is the permanence of his structure under
stress. He will seek to avoid the worst if he cannot achieve the best.
Inevitably his concern is with risks and equilibrium. The prophet's concern
is with his goals; his test is inherent in his vision. The statesman seeks
compromise; the prophet strives for universality. The statesman sacrifices
exaltation to safety; the prophet often gives up the present to his notion of
the future.

This problem can also be viewed in terms of the goals of political
units. Any state must have survival as its minimum goal. No settlement
however "reasonable" or "well-balanced" will be acceptable if it runs counter
to a society's conception of its vital interests. These may be determined by
history, geography, domestic structure or a combination of all these factors.
But they represent the limiting conditions of diplomatic flexibility. To be
stable an international system must come how reconcile various conceptions of
interest. Only a shallow optimist could assert that this is always possible
and then only by ignoring all historical experience.

M. Aron has undertaken the task of explaining these dilemmas with lucidity,
intelligence and impressive learning. He has set a new standard. No book on
such a vast subject can be final; but henceforth, international theory will
require reference to Aron.

Peace and War is divided into four sections: Theory, Sociology, History and -- somewhat obscurely -- Praxeology. The section on theory deals with the nature of past international systems and seeks to define the elements which produce stability or instability. M. Aron is not concerned with what ought to be but with what has been. He does not recommend any particular structure. International systems have been motivated by a quest for power, for wealth, for glory or ideas. Each of these factors -- or a combination of them -- shapes a society's conception of its vital interests. The degree to which notions of vital interests clash depends to some extent on objective factors and to some extent on the values of a society as expressed in its domestic structure. The degree of compatibility determines, in one of M. Aron's most useful concepts, the "homogeneity" or "heterogeneity" of international systems.

The section on Sociology reviews the basic factors that account for the rise and fall of societies: space, resources, numbers, nations and regimes. Once again the approach is detailed and free of dogmatism. M. Aron is concerned with demonstrating the variety of consequences that can flow from seemingly similar causes or, conversely, how the same consequence can be produced by apparently different causes. In the process -- perhaps unintentionally -- he underlines the problem of choice in international affairs. In retrospect everything seems determined. The more remote an event, the more difficult it is to imagine the consequences of an alternative decision. It is impossible to describe the world that would have come about had France moved against Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland. But every political unit acts with at least the illusion of choice -- history is a tale of statesmen obsessed not with the inevitability of their decisions, but with the obscurity and multiplicity of their choices. History teaches only the consequences of certain actions; it does not reveal in advance what situations are in fact comparable. Moreover each generation is permitted only one guess and a single experiment, for it is

-4-

its own subject. The dilemma is that when the scope for action is greatest, knowledge of the consequences is minimal. When knowledge is greatest, the statesman has often become the prisoner of events.

Part III, which is somewhat misleadingly entitled History, applies the theoretical categories of the first section to the structure of the contemporary period, heavily emphasizing the historic novelty of the strategic equation. Peace has been based on Empire and on equilibrium. Ours is the first period striving to construct a peace by fear. Never before have the costs of war been so out of proportion to any possible gain. Paradoxically diplomacy has become rigid as strategy has grown sterile. In an age of revolutionary turmoil, international relations stands as if paralyzed before the problem of peaceful change.

Part IV -- with the impossible title Praxeology -- draws policy conclusions and outlines the major historical options before our period. Where in his analytical portions Aron deals with the variety of possible international systems, in this section he makes an unambiguous moral choice in favor of what is loosely called the West. He knows that it is possible to live in many kinds of structures, but he leaves no doubt about his preference. He does not clothe it in the smug scientific certainty of some of those who pretend to know the "solution" to all contemporary problems. On the contrary, M. Aron insists that commitment does not have to derive from simplicity. Nor does he guarantee success or even survival for his preference. He makes no concessions to the fashionable pretense of being able to encompass history of the contemporary turmoil in a neat formula. He will no doubt be criticized both for being amoral and for being committed, for not giving answers and for the answers he has given.

M. Aron attempts to account for the whole range of international affairs both in space and time. He seeks to include the analytical clarity of Machievelli and the moral commitment of Kant. Even a book of this scope cannot do justice

-5-

to all aspects of international affairs. Some may wish that M. Aron had dealt
in more detail with the relationship between domestic structure and international
stability or that his analysis of contemporary events in Part III had been
projected further ahead, allowing for a greater pluralism within the various
systems he describes. Finally, the style is sometimes excessively complex,
perhaps because the book grew out of a set of lectures.

But these quibbles should not obscure M. Aron's great contribution.
An age addicted to the pat formula needs to be recalled to the need to face
complexity. M. Aron's book is indispensable for the specialist. The general
reader will pick and choose but should gain a new perspective.

It is not a book for those striving for ready-made solutions. But M. Aron
does better than give us answers -- he teaches us which questions are significant.