2

was not an easy matter in the United States. For the
temptation to treat the subject by analogy to our domestic
experience was overwhelming. There existed in America a
well-developed literature on international law that saw
international relations in terms of legal processes. There
was a pragmatic tradition of solving issues that arose "on
their merits." There was the belief in America's moral
mission that had produced both isolationism and later on
global involvement.

Morgenthau sought to transcend all these disparate tendencies. He
was passionately convinced that peace was a statesman's
noblest objective; but he did not believe that this yearning alone
would avoid war. He was a liberal in his political view but he
thought his convictions required not simply an affirmation
but sufficient stability at least to enable man's humane
aspirations to prevail. He was willing to confront the
political leader's fundamental dilemma that moral aims can be

3

reached only in stages, each of which is imperfect.

Morality provides the compass course, the inner strength to face the ambiguities of choice.

So Hans set out to understand what he considered the "real" world of international politics, not as he would like it to be but as he found it. He wrote his seminal work on *Politics among Nations*, analyzing international relations in terms of power and national interest. He believed that a proper understanding of the national interest would illuminate a country's possibilities as well as dictate the limits to which it could push its aspirations.

Hans was much criticized for his alleged amorality in those days. His critics did not understand him. Being himself passionate, he did not trust passion as the regulator of conduct. Being committed to peace, he was prepared to enter the cold world of power politics to achieve it.

In the Sixties Hans proved that he was beyond the

4

manipulation of military calculations. He opposed the war
in Vietnam when it was still supported by all fashionable
opinion. In 1966 he and I debated the issue in *LOOK*
magazine. He considered America overextended, the war
unwinnable, the stakes not worth the cost. I maintained
that the size of our commitment had determined our stake; that
we had an obligation to seek our way out of the morass
through negotiation rather than unconditional abandonment of
the enterprise. He was right in his analysis, probably in
his policy conclusions as applied to 1966. Three years
later--quite unexpectedly--I was faced with the problem as a
policymaker. We both stuck to our convictions.

I will not debate their ultimate merit in this space.

But I think it is important to understand that we shared
almost identical premises. We both believed America was
overextended; we both sought a way out of the morass. Hans
wanted to cut the Gordian knot in one dramatic move; I chose
a different route. But we were both in a way lonely among

5

our associates. Hans is not correctly understood as a
protester. He was a teacher trying to bring home to his
beloved adopted country the limits of its power, just as
earlier he had insisted on its central role. Through all
these disagreements I never ceased admiring him or to remembering
the profound intellectual debt I owed him.

With the end of the war our paths became increasingly
parallel again, though I do not wish to burden Hans' memory
with the army of my critics. Hans remained always himself:
clear in his perception, uncompromising in his insistence on
getting to the essence of a problem. He meant much to me.

A word must be said about Hans as a human being. Few
eminent men correspond to their image. Hans made his reputation
as an analyst of power, but he was a gentle, loving man.
He was a great teacher, yet quite shy. He had a marvelous,
slightly sardonic sense of humor which never stooped to the
malicious. Yet he was slightly tentative--at least in his

6

dealings with me--in showing this side of himself. He would
make a witty remark with an absolutely straight face, peering
from behind his bushy eyebrows to see what the response would
be. Only when he saw that his sally had been understood
would his whole face crease in the smile of a slightly
mischievous little boy. He was a lovable man.

Hans Morgenthau was deeply conscious of his Jewish
heritage. He knew that no people was more likely to be the
victim of injustice and passion. He thus felt a special
obligation to resist intolerance and hatred. And he under-
stood that in this battle he must never stoop to the methods
he was combatting. He was a noble man.

I saw Hans for the last time at breakfast a few weeks ago.
He had grown quite frail, though mentally he was as alert as
ever. His professorship at the New School had just ended. He
spoke of how much teaching meant to him. Everyone must feel
he makes a difference to the world, he said. And his vocation

7

was teaching, which he hoped to continue. I told him that
he had already made a big difference to the world; he did
not have to prove himself constantly. He did not quite believe
it. His life was his work and as he said on another occasion,
he saw no sense in extending the one by cutting down on the
other.

We promised each other to meet regularly. It was not
to be. He settled our little dialogue by his sudden death.
There would be no gap between Hans Morgenthau's life and his
work; he had made a difference.

And the nature of that difference is best shown in the
sorrow of his friends and in the fact that all who remember
Hans Morgenthau recall his passion for justice, his fertile intellect,
his warmth and his honesty. It will be a lonelier world
without him.

[c]

# From Quantity and Heterogeneity to Quality and Homogeneity: Toward a New Foreign Policy

by George Schwab

President Carter's indecisiveness and incoherence are often cited as the reason why the foreign policy of the United States is in a sorry state. That his ineptitude has contributed to this state of affairs cannot be denied. But in fairness it should be remembered that he inherited a quagmire in foreign policy, one that was long in the making.

When the United States assumed the role of guardian of the noncommunist world, it did so on the heels of a long depression and a war fought in Europe and in the Pacific. At the time the United States assumed this role it was generally believed that its resources were sufficient for "guns and butter." It was not until the student and ghetto riots of the 1960s that this assumption began to be questioned. The riots not only exposed the cumulative impact that the depression and World War II had had on a large segment of society, they also pointed toward the fact that despite still ample resources, the United States could not continue indefinitely waging a global policy. The impact on society of the failure to conserve resources and reconcile rationally the needs of state with those of society led many to conclude that United States priorities were in disarray and needed to be reordered to eliminate poverty, improve race relations, and rebuild urban America.

It was under the impact of ghetto and student riots and an urban America sinking deeper into distress that President Nixon initiated an about-face in American foreign policy. Whereas prior to 1969 the posture of the United States was that of a defender of the noncommunist world, Nixon, in the doctrine that subsequently bore his name, stipulated the gradual withdrawal of American troops from the western Pacific. This pronouncement meant that Asians would have to defend themselves against communism. Aside from questions about morality and national interest implicit in the United States involvement in

Southeast Asia, the fact that the American government was pressured into retreating signified that the state's monopoly on politics, that is, the sovereign's ability to determine the national interest and decide who the state's enemies or foes are and to act accordingly, was successfully challenged.¹

Although the American retreat from Southeast Asia was roundly applauded by Americans and by allies alike, the implications and consequences of the move were not widely anticipated.

## Detente American Style, the Politics of Defeat

Even though the lessening of tensions in global affairs is always wholesome, the American policy of detente was, unfortunately, doomed. Two factors converged to contribute to its failure: (1) the American policy of detente assumed definite contours during the retreat from Southeast Asia that coincided with the emasculation of the American sovereign authority (e.g., the War Powers Resolution of 1973) and the retrenchment of the American military machine in the face of a

George Schwab is professor of history at the City University of New York (Graduate Center and City College). He has written on international relations, legal and political theory, and German history. He has recently completed editing a volume entitled *Eurocommunism: Ideological and Political-Theoretical Foundations*.

Professor Schwab's views do not necessarily reflect those of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Inc.

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rapidly escalating Soviet modernization and expansion program of conventional and nuclear military arsenals and an unprecedented naval buildup; (2) the mirror image of politics conceived by the American foreign policy public was incompatible with the image perceived by Soviet foreign policy decision makers.

That the Soviet Union is arming itself far
beyond defense needs is finally being conceded.

But it is amazing to see that in the face of the
Soviet military buildup and the invasion of
Afghanistan a still influential segment of the
American foreign policy public continues to hold
to the assumption that Soviet foreign policy deci-
sion makers operate on the same political
wavelength as their American counterparts. How
can this be explained?

Militant Ideology, a Political “Surplus Value”

Despite the ideological implications inherent
in the confrontations between the Soviet Union
and the United States in the late 1940s, 1950s, and
1960s, abhorrence of things theoretical continues
to permeate American thinking. Hence the arroga-
tion by the United States of such universal con-
cepts as humanity, justice, and progress, on the
one hand, and its basic commitment to political
and cultural pluralism, on the other hand, has
never resulted in the United States forging an all-
embracing ideology, a Weltanschauung, that is
militant and global or unlimited in scope. By fail-
ing to translate universal concepts into dogmas
of action United States foreign policy has remained
secular or nonideological in nature.²

Wedded to a secular notion of politics, one
that is void of militant ideology and all that this
implies, including that interests of state are
limited in scope, an influential segment of the
American foreign policy public projects such a
notion onto the Soviet foreign policy establish-
ment. It thus dismisses militant Marxism-
Leninism, a doctrine that generations of Soviet
people have been conditioned to believe in, as a
vital component of Soviet foreign policy and the
framework within which Soviet foreign policy
decision makers operate. Dismissing militant
Marxism-Leninism is not tantamount to making it
irrelevant. Although Marxism-Leninism is a dead
issue to this segment of the American foreign
policy public, it is alive in the Soviet Union and
continues to constitute a political "surplus value"
in Soviet foreign policy, as Hitlerism did in Nazi
foreign policy between 1933 and 1945.

Stated briefly, Marxism-Leninism is a belief
in the progress of history toward a stage in which

society will once and for all rid itself of classes
and states. Because progress toward this goal is
often hindered by reactionary developments the
historical process cannot be left to chance.
Hence it is up to the progressive forces in the
world to spur this process by helping push that
which history has condemned to die, namely
capitalism. Thus while the United States was
retreating, was immersed in a frenzy of rampant
and runaway individualism, and was pursuing a
peculiar policy of detente³ the Soviet Union,
evaluating correctly the weakness of the United
States, moved more boldly into the African conti-
nent and the Middle East and pocketed strategic-
ally vital Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union's endeavors to outflank and neutralize the United States are succeeding in tightening its grip on Western Europe. Given the Soviet Union's military capabilities and aim of interdicting American troops and supplies reaching NATO countries during a crisis, the Soviet Union's growing military presence in the oil jugular of the world is adding another dimension to the dilemma of Western Europe. Thus in the face of United States wobbliness, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union's proximity to Western Europe and military superiority in the European theater, on the other hand, Western Europe has become neutralized. Should the United States continue on an incoherent foreign policy path, then the question as far as Western Europe is concerned will no longer focus on its neutralization but on its dependence on the Soviet Union, or its Finlandization.

(continued)

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Events in Iran and Afghanistan have shocked the American people and aroused their fury, thereby leading to the possibility that rampant and runaway individualism can be arrested and instead channeled into integral liberalism that has characterized the American scene in the past, an individualism that can be mobilized in emergencies to defend interests of state. What is now required, in addition to imaginative and responsible leadership, is a new foreign policy conception.

Such a policy will need to be based on a rational reconciliation between the civil needs of the nation and the public needs of the state and on the realization that the civil needs of the nation cannot be permitted to overshadow the interests of state. The thrust of the new foreign policy must be directed toward the true interests of state and therefore must be rational.

Concretely speaking, given the finite resources of the United States and the Soviet Union's global challenge in general and of the West in particular, it would be counterproductive for the United States to continue wasting its resources and national will by pursuing quantitative foreign policies in defense of the most heterogeneous systems in the world. Because of the Soviet Union's thrust against the West and because the United States continues to be the only power capable of challenging the Soviet Union militarily, the focus of the new foreign policy must be on the homogeneous West. Like the United States, in addition to being committed to political and cultural pluralism, the West is also under-pinned by a nonideological or secular notion of politics. As such the countries of the West adhere to the order that is characterized by the *jus publicum Europaeum*, and notions such as *pacta sunt servanda*, equality, and reciprocity in relations among states are no mere ideological tools to defraud and bury a foe but principles that are respected.

Such a qualitative foreign policy that is focused on the West could decisively help European countries check and eventually cut the sling that the Soviet Union is tightening around it. A Western Europe less fearful of the Soviet Union and more confident of itself and of the United States will not easily be intimidated by Arab petro power. This bloc has the potential of seriously challenging the coherence of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and offering the nonfree world an opportunity to gravitate toward it, on the other hand. Should the open-society bloc of free West constitute an exclusive club?

In the present power-political competition an inward-directed club would be counterproductive. The open-society bloc must instead serve as a model for countries that are neither liberal democracies nor committed to the Soviet Union or to other totalitarian one-party states. As long as the political and societal structures of such countries remain alien to those of the open-society bloc, they cannot be admitted to the core. This need not preclude, however, such states from entering security zones,⁴ zones that by the logic of politics will arise at the peripheries of the open-society bloc.

NOTES

1. For a discussion of this topic, see George Schwab, "The Decision: Is the American Sovereign at Bay?" in *Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto, Revue européenne des sciences sociales* (Miroir de Carl Schmitt), XVI, 44 (1978), pp. 67-76.

2. For a delineation of secular or nonideological politics from one dominated by propaganda, on the one hand, and militant ideology, on the other, see George Schwab, "Ideology: Reality or Rhetoric?" in *Ideology and Foreign Policy*, ed. George Schwab (New York, 1978), pp. 143-157.

3. On the American version of detente, see George Schwab, "Appeasement and Detente: Some Reflections" in *Detente in Historical Perspective*, ed. George Schwab and Henry Friedlander (New York, 1975), pp. 138-150, *passim*.

4. See also, George Schwab, "American Foreign Politics at the Crossroads: Idealism versus Realism" in *Innen-und Aussenpolitik: Primat oder Interdependenz?* (Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. Walther Hofer), edited by Urs Altermatt and Judit Garamvögli (Bern/Stuttgart, 1980).

Copyright © by National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Inc., New York. All rights reserved.

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MEMORIAL
SUPPLEMENT

NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON
AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY, INC.

THE WALDORF ASTORIA, SUITE 1883
301 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

Telephone: (212) 755-0925

[LC]

# Eulogy: Hans J. Morgenthau

by Henry A. Kissinger

Hans Morgenthau was my teacher. And he was my friend. I must say that at the outset because so many obituaries have stressed his disagreement with policies with which I have become identified.

We knew each other for a decade and a half before I entered office. We remained in sporadic contact while I served the government. We saw more of each other afterward.

It is not often that one can identify a seminal figure in contemporary political thought or in one's own life. Hans Morgenthau made the study of contemporary international relations a major discipline. All of us who taught the subject after him, however much we differed from one another, had to start with his reflections. Not everybody agreed with Hans Morgenthau, but nobody could ignore him. We remained close through all the intellectual upheavals and disputes of two and a half decades.

Establishing international relations as a discipline was not an easy matter in the United States. For the temptation to treat the subject by analogy to our domestic experience was overwhelming. There existed in America a well-developed literature on international law that saw international relations in terms of legal processes. There was a pragmatic tradition of solving issues that arose "on their merits." There was the belief in America's moral mission that had produced both isolationism and, later on, global involvement.

Morgenthau sought to transcend all these disparate tendencies. He was passionately convinced that peace was a statesman's noblest objective, but he did not believe that this yearning alone would avoid war. He was a liberal in his political view, but he thought his convictions required not simply an affirmation but sufficient stability at least to enable man's humane aspirations to prevail.

He was willing to confront the political leader's fundamental dilemma—that moral aims can be reached only in stages, each of which is imperfect. Morality pro-

## Possibilities and Limits

So Hans set out to understand what he considered the "real" world of international politics, not as he would like it to be, but as he found it. His seminal work, *Politics Among Nations*, analyzed international relations in terms of power and national interest. He believed that a proper understanding of the national interest would illuminate a country's possibilities as well as dictate the limits of its aspirations.

In the 1960s, Hans proved that he was beyond the manipulation of military calculations. He opposed the war in Vietnam when it was still supported by all fash-ionable opinion. In 1966 he and I debated the issue in *Look* magazine. He considered America overextended, the war unwinnable, the stakes not worth the cost. I maintained that the size of our commitment had deter-mined our stake, that we had an obligation to seek our way out of the morass through negotiation rather than unconditional abandonment of the enterprise. He was right in his analysis, probably in his policy conclusion as applied to 1966. Three years later—quite unexpectedly—I was faced with the problem as a policy-maker. We both stuck to our convictions.

## Shared Premises

I will not debate their ultimate merit here. But I think it is important to understand that we shared almost identical premises. We both believed America was overextended, we both sought a way out of the

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dilemma. Hans wanted to cut the Gordian knot in one dramatic move; I chose a different route. But we were both in a way lonely among our associates. Hans is not correctly understood as a protester. He was a teacher trying to bring home to his beloved adopted country the limits of its power, just as earlier he had insisted on its central role. Through all these disagreements I never ceased admiring him or remembering the profound intellectual debt I owed him.

With the end of the war, our paths became increasingly parallel again, though I do not wish to burden Hans' memory with the army of my critics. Hans remained always himself: clear in his perception, uncompromising in his insistence on getting to the essence of a problem. He meant much to me.

A word must be said about Hans as a human being. Few eminent men correspond to their images. Hans made his reputation as an analyst of power, but he was a gentle, loving man. He was a great teacher, yet quite shy. He was a lovable man.

## The Jewish Heritage

a special obligation to resist intolerance and hatred. And he understood that in this battle he must never stoop to the methods he was combatting. He was a no-ble man.

I saw Hans for the last time at breakfast a short while ago. He had grown quite frail, though mentally he was as alert as ever. His professorship at the New School had just ended. He spoke of how much teaching meant to him. Everyone must feel he makes a difference to the world, he said. And his vocation was teaching, which he hoped to continue. I told him that he already had made a big difference to the world, he did not have to prove himself constantly. He did not quite believe it. His life was his work. As he said on another occasion, he saw no sense in extending the one by cutting down on the other.

We promised to meet regularly. It was not to be. He settled our little dialogue by his sudden death. There would be no gap between Hans Morgenthau's life and his work; he had made a difference.

And the nature of that difference is best shown in the sorrow of his friends and in the fact that all who remember Hans Morgenthau recall his passion for justice, his fertile intellect, his warmth, and his honesty. It will be a lonelier world without him.

*(Reprinted also with the permission of The New Republic.)*

## National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Inc.

by Francis L. Kellogg

As president of the National Committee, it may be appropriate for me to speak briefly about this organization and the central and vital role Hans Morgenthau played in it. In 1974 a small gathering of academicians, leaders in the professions, and businessmen joined together under the leadership of Professor Morgenthau to study and discuss American foreign policy. Hans readily agreed to these meetings, which in time grew larger and more formal.

Public symposia soon became recognized forums for analyzing various aspects of public affairs as they affected American interests abroad. Experts in specialized fields were invited to participate—some of whom joined the fold known as the National Committee on American Foreign Policy with Professor Morgenthau as chairman.

Seminars also became a regular part of NCAFP's program. Citizen task forces sponsored by NCAFP undertook field examinations of critical areas such as Panama, the Middle East, China, and recently the Maghreb. High-level briefings with both Americans and foreign ministers and heads of state led to substantive reports distributed to the media and to Washington. Breakfast meetings were also held so that the membership could meet at firsthand with foreign dignitaries, presidential candidates, publishers and journalists specializing in foreign affairs, and others.

As membership grew, so did the organization's influence—always under the watchful eye and the guidance of its mentor. And we, as officers and members, were always responsive to the professor's counsel. To all this activity was added an authoritative

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[lc]

Newsletter, and the voice of NCAFP became increas-
ingly recognized in the Department of State and in the
halls of Congress and beyond.

And so I think it can be concluded that the Na-
tional Committee on American Foreign Policy will long

remain a viable and appropriate memorial to its first
chairman: Professor Hans Morgenthau.

Hans J. Morgenthau

by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

Hans Morgenthau died in New York City on July 19
at the age of 76. His intellectual leadership over the last
forty years helped produce a revolution in the way
Americans think about foreign policy.

Born in Germany in 1904, he migrated to the United
States in 1937. Coming from a continent on the brink of
war, he brought with him the conviction that the strug-
gle for power was the essence of international rela-
tions and that the national interest was the only
authentic basis for a nation's foreign policy. Among
the anti-Nazi refugees who so enriched American intel-
lectual and artistic life, he was one of the few trained in
the Middle European philosophical tradition who suc-
cessfully made the passage from German dialectics to
American empiricism. He found great satisfaction in
anchoring his "realist" analysis in the thought of
Washington, Franklin, Hamilton, and other founding
fathers.

Morgenthau's message gave him for a season an
unfair reputation for amorality. In fact, although he
detested moralism, sentimentalism, and self-
righteousness in foreign policy, his own approach was
deeply moral. "To act successfully," he wrote in *Scien-
tific Man and Power Politics*, "... is political wisdom.
To know with despair that the political act is inevitably
evil, and to act nevertheless, is moral courage. To
choose among several expedient actions the least evil

one is moral judgment. In the combination of political
wisdom, moral courage and moral judgment, man
reconciles his political nature with his moral destiny."

He never flinched from testing scholarly analysis
against hard questions of current policy. His defense
of the national interest cut against illusions of
American omnipotence as well as of Soviet benevo-
lence. In the 1960s, along with other members of the
realist school—Walter Lippmann, George Kennan,
Reinhold Niebuhr—he launched a devastating critique
of American participation in the Indochina War.

Morgenthau's writings, especially *Politics Among Nations*, gave international relations a new framework as an academic discipline. For a time the wave of quantifiers in political science deprecated his analysis as "literary," but no one can doubt that his penetrating inquiries into power politics and *raisons d'etat* will endure long after the computerized investigations of recent days are forgotten. This analyst of power politics was a gentle and kindly man, civilized, sardonically humorous, and unexpectedly affectionate. As we were all enriched by knowing him, we are all impoverished by his death.

Morgenthau as Historian, Philosopher, and Moralist

by Kenneth W. Thompson

Hans J. Morgenthau was a political scientist and, with Harold Nicolson, perhaps the twentieth century's profoundest student of diplomacy. A clue to his unique contribution and to the scope of his thought is the fact that he was also a historian, philosopher, and moralist. In these basic disciplines, as much as in political science, may be found explanations for the consistency and coherence of his political thought.

Put another way, continuity of thought for Morgen-
thau was grounded in fundamental principles of inter-
national relations, not in the advocacy of a particular
foreign policy or posture for the United States. He was
a striking exception to the rule that American intellec-
tuals on the move associate themselves with an intel-
lectual trend or an administration, a political party, or
quasiideological movement such as internationalism

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or isolationism. He was more serious about his principles than his politics.

He derived the principles that made up what he called political realism from certain underlying concepts of human nature; they provided standards for evaluating successive administrations and policies, including his favorite policymakers. In holding to principles, he remained aloof from the center of partisan political debate. In consequence, he only rarely commended himself to defenders or critics of controversial policies within the political arena. Exceptions were of course Vietnam and Israel in which conscience drew him into the malestrom of political controversy. At his death, his files on these two issues were more voluminous than on any other issue with the possible exception of the nuclear question. In *Politics Among Nations* he addressed the latter question by invoking the concept of usable and unusable power: "the magnitude of its destructiveness, as compared with the limited character of the political purposes which are the proper object of foreign policy, renders nuclear force unusable as an instrument of foreign policy." He agreed that it was usable as a deterrent but within limits.

It was characteristic that change for Morgenthau occurred in the application of enduring principles, not in their integrity. Change for him was a product of history, not philosophy. If he was a philosopher of international politics, he found the testing ground for principles in history, not science. History was indeed "philosophy teaching by example." The milieu of the statesman, he maintained, is history. He wrote: "Politics is an art and not a science, and what is required for its mastery is not the rationality of the engineer but the wisdom and moral strength of the statesman" (*Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, 10). In the broadest sense, the practitioner of politics is not the bureaucrat, the expert, or the technician but the politician, the legislator, and the statesman. The principal resource of the statesman is his understanding of politics, of the social forces and possible directions that history can take, and of the nature of man reflected in social forces and history. "The best the so-called 'social laws' can do is . . . to indicate certain trends and to state the possible conditions under which one of those trends is most likely to materialize in the future." (*Politics*, 1954, 18.) Given history's imponderables, prophecy for the best of statesmen is a precarious and uncertain art.

With Montaigne, he argued that the historian, faced with the ambiguity of historical events, can provide only "wrested, forced and biased interpretation." Each episode in history is a unique occurrence happening in this way only once and never before or since. Knowing this, the historian must shun false analogies while

recognizing, in Montaigne's words, that: "As no event and no shape is entirely like another, so also there is none entirely different from another. . . . If there were no similarity in our faces, we could not distinguish man from beast; if there were no dissimilarity, we could not distinguish one man from another. All things hold together by some similarity; every example is halting, and the comparison that is derived from experience is always defective and imperfect. And yet one links up the comparisons at some corner."

The historian's and the policymaker's task is to distinguish similarities and differences in two political situations and to form political judgments about them. Napoleon I, William II, and Hitler undertook to conquer Europe and failed. What were their similarities and differences, and how are we to judge Russian imperialism by their lights? What of Washington's Farewell Address, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Truman Doctrine? Is the Truman Doctrine a modification of the principles underlying Washington's and Monroe's conceptions of foreign affairs, or does it constitute a radical departure from the traditions of American foreign policy? If so, is it justified by changed circumstances? What of its extension to Asia in Korea and Vietnam? What will historians say of the use of the Munich analogy as a guide to American foreign policy around the world?

In addressing such questions, Morgenthau, although he never wrote narrative history, demonstrated his devotion to history and its unfolding empirical record. As historian, he was more an empiricist than most social scientists. He held a joint appointment as professor of history at the University of Chicago. History was an essential if not the exclusive foundation for the study of international relations. It has been said: "The task of creating, testing, perfecting and supplying principles is hazardous; it requires a profound knowledge of the past as well as an honest, forthright evaluation of the situation in which the principle is to be applied." (Norman Graebner, "Morgenthau as Historian" in *Truth and Tragedy*, 66.) Morgenthau wrote in 1967: "Modern theorists of international relations are repelled by history; for history is the realm of the accidental, the contingent and the unpredictable. . . The rational model is a utopia that reflects the desires of theoreticians but not the real physical world, dominated as that world is by the principle of indeterminacy, and predictable as it is, at least as microcosmos, only by the way of statistical probability." (*Truth and Power*, 245.) To the extent that theory ignores history, it tells us little about the real world. In evaluating Morgenthau as historian, the Harmsworth professor of American history at Oxford wrote: "If insight is still the measure that distinguishes historians from antiquarians, Morgenthau met the high standards that historians impose on one another." (Graebner, op.

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cit., 76.) Or in Louis J. Halle's words: "The heritage of our culture has entered into Hans Morgenthau's understanding of international politics, which is why, comprehending them as a whole ... he understands them so much better than those who know nothing else." (Truth and Tragedy, 65.)

For the majority of students of international politics, however, Morgenthau is remembered more as a philosopher than a historian. One of his most famous courses at the University of Chicago was entitled "Philosophy of International Relations." For former students, his Aristotle seminar was a classic. His 1952 Walgreen Lectures were an inquiry into Marxism and *Scientific Man* vs. *Power Politics* set forth all the assumptions he carried forward in criticizing the prevailing philosophy of the social sciences regarding politics. As Reinhold Niebuhr began his Gifford Lectures with the words: "Man is his own most vexing problem. What shall he think of himself?" Morgenthau began with man "suspended between his spiritual destiny which he cannot fulfill and his animal nature in which he cannot remain ... forever condemned to experience the contrast between the longings of his mind and his actual condition as his personal, eminently human tragedy." (*Scientific Man*, 221) He found the link between statesmanship and the common lot of all mankind "in this unsolvable contrast between what he needs and wants and what he is able to obtain." In this, the statesman is the prototype of man in society.

In the pursuit of the common good, man has no choice between the use of power and some other form of politics. Early on, Morgenthau summarized man's threefold political and moral dilemma and proposed a resolution in three classic axioms or precepts to which we shall return. "To act successfully, that is, according to the rules of the political art, is political wisdom. To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless, is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least evil one is moral judgment. In the combination of political wisdom, moral courage, and moral judgment, man reconciles his political nature with his moral destiny." (*Scientific*, 203.) All the regnant philosophies—rationalism, scientism, liberalism and perfectionism—gloss over and distort the tragic contradiction in human existence and the worst offenders are those who cover reality with the "soothing logic of a specious concord." (Ibid.) Morgenthau went back to a religious thinker who declared, "Man is neither angel nor beast and his misery is that he who would act the angel acts the brute." (Pascal.)

For his pains, Morgenthau was rebuffed on both practical and philosophical grounds. Practically, his strong language regarding power gave offense,

especially in the 1940s. Across the broadest possible spectrum, he met opposition. Idealists and world government spokesmen deplored his failure to recognize that "world government was necessary, and therefore possible." American political theorists condemned his "Germanic way of looking at things." International lawyers proclaimed that nations were prepared to relinquish sovereignty and power, pointing to the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Practical politicians, whose influence depended on their appearing to stand for less ignoble ends than power, were quick to dissociate themselves, publicly at least, from so explicit an analysis of power.

Viewing his philosophy three decades later, those of us who observed his challenge and the response cannot but ask why all the commotion? Not only his principles but their application have stood the test of time. His hope has been realized that men might say of him what Winston S. Churchill proclaimed as the statesman's declaration of faith: "I have not always been wrong." On Nuremberg and the United Nations, East-West relations, and messianic foreign policy, global containment and liberation, and the nuclear question, it would be difficult to prove him wrong. And for those who in his last days detected a greater sense of urgency about world order, it is instructive to reread words written in the 1940s: "As there can be no permanent peace without a world state, there can be no world state without the peace-preserving and community-building process of diplomacy." (Politics, 560.)

Finally, the sphere in which controversy has persisted through the years has been over Morgenthau as moralist. If the moralist is seen as the chronic moralizer filling the air with passionate moral pronouncements, he was no moralist. But if the moralist is a philosopher who makes, in William James' words, "an unusually stubborn attempt to think clearly" on moral issues, Morgenthau was preeminently a moralist. "Man is a political animal by nature; he is a scientist by chance or choice; he is a moralist because he is man," he wrote (*Scientific*, 168). "Morgenthau's moralism focused on the moral evaluation of the power man has over man. One of his great disappointments was the modest response to a book he considered among his most basic works, *The Purpose of American Politics*. In another of his writings he declared: "To say a political action has no moral purpose is absurd; for political action can be defined as an attempt to realize moral values through the medium of politics, that is, power." (Dilemmas of Politics, 85.) In his moralism he sought to understand the relation between politics and morality without obscuring the tension. In international politics, broad moral principles such as freedom and justice had to be filtered through the national interest subject to its constraints. To blame the contradictions on

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cultural lag or man's ignorance was never Morgenthau's version of moralism.

If Morgenthau is judged by his own precepts of "moral courage" and "moral judgment," his quality as moralist is demonstrated. The three elements of his moralism were action, choice, and moral reasoning. As a citizen, he knew the despair of political action with all its ambiguities, but he had the moral courage to act. In his lectures he had warned of the conflicting roles of the philosopher and the statesman. He never went as far as Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, who declared that he who tried to be both an actor and an observer would fail at both, but he sought to keep his distance from those who exercised power. Yet with all his reservations about the philosopher in politics, he defied what he taught. He traveled the globe expounding his views; he made every public assembly and legislative committee his classroom. It was as though he were driven to prove that everything he had written about the gulf between philosophy and action was false. Yet he returned to Goethe: "He who acts is always unjust; nobody is just but the one who reflects." (Scientific, 189.)

At the same time Morgenthau was a moralist who learned moral judgment in choosing among lesser evils. "Only the awareness of the tragic presence of evil in all political action enables man to choose the lesser evil and be as good as he can be in an evil world." (Scientific, 202-3.) When he proposed a political settlement in the cold war based on spheres of influence or an Asian settlement in which a divided

Korea remained, he chose among lesser evils, including the evil of nuclear war.

Throughout his political writings Morgenthau struggled with the hard demands of moral reasoning. Against most contemporaries, he argued that moral reasoning involved painful and insoluble choices. For him: "The demands which life in society makes on our good intentions surpass our faculty to satisfy them all. While satisfying one, we must neglect others, and the satisfaction of one may even imply . . . violation of another." (Scientific, 189.) Loyalty to the nation may conflict with responsibility to mankind. Rendering to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's leads at best to precarious compromises without putting the conscience at ease. There is no end to examples. "The daughter perceives, like Desdemona, 'a divided duty' between parents and husband. The father must choose between two children, the friend between two friends; . . . a man must choose between himself and others." (Scientific, 190-1.) Life offers no escape from the weighing of such alternatives.

Moral reasoning "is the battlefield where man takes up the challenge . . . with the forces of nature, his fellow man's lust for power; and the corruption of his own soul." (Scientific, 223.) If the search for man's nature and destiny on such a battlefield is true moralism, Morgenthau was to his last hours the consummate moralist.

Copyright © by National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Inc., New York. All right reserved.

## Professor Hans J. Morgenthau

by Mordecai Hacohen

Professor Hans Morgenthau, our teacher and mentor, was the founder and chairman of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. We, Hans, George Schwab, and I, among others, established the committee shortly after the Yom Kippur War to debate major foreign-policy issues that we considered vital to the national interests of the United States. For nearly six years, Hans guided, inspired, impelled, and adorned the many activities of our committee. He was a great chairman.

I had known of Professor Morgenthau long before I had the privilege of meeting him at a convention of political scientists in Washington three decades ago. There I met this brilliant scholar whose texts were required reading for students of political science and international affairs. Little did I know then that common

purpose would bring us together 24 years later in a bond of friendship that I enjoyed in a ripening measure till the end. And it is from this proximity of friendship that I gained further insight into his abundant gifts of intellect and character, his sagacity, his broad outlook, and his civic courage that earned him admiration and the position of eminence that he maintained in the academic community and among practitioners of statescraft around the world.

There were few topics in which Hans was not interested, and whatever attracted him he could expound and embellish; politics, philosophy, religion, jurisprudence, sociology, science in all its branches, art, history, archeology, and anthropology were themes on which he readily discoursed. He appeared interested in any subject that was raised or in any person with whom

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he was talking. He was a scholar of high attainments
and a man of vision to whom, without exaggeration,
one could apply the title statesman.

His thoughts were both national and international,
and his interests were universal. He saw a great deal of
life from afar. Coming to this country as a refugee from
Hitler's Germany, he was an asset to America. Hans
looked on America as the champion of right, justice,
and peace. He yearned to see the blending of
America's ambitions and aspirations into the interests
of a growing world community.

It is said that courage is rightly esteemed the first
of human qualities because it guarantees all others.
Hans was a man of courage. He often pleaded un-
popular causes with a courage that commanded the
respect of his opponents.

We live in the presence of events without
precedence in the experience of mankind. Hans
Morgenthau had a marvellous gift of comprehension
and receptivity that enabled him to adjust all new
phenomena and the ever-changing currents of events
to his solidly wrought convictions.

Hans combined the knowledge of the historian
with the practical understanding of a statesman. He
knew the history of all nations, how they had lived their
lives for hundreds of years, what they had fought
about, and which nations had been subjugated and
which were seething with ancient wrongs.

The grandson of a rabbi, he knew particularly well
the history of the Jewish people both in ancient and
in modern times. His profound concern for Israel
stemmed from his deep Jewish consciousness and his
conviction of the righteousness of Israel's claim to
sovereignty in its historic homeland with Jerusalem as
its eternal capital. It is an interesting coincidence that
the funeral of Hans Morgenthau took place on the sad-
dest day in the Jewish calendar, when Jews all over the
world lament the destruction of the holy temple in
Jerusalem some two thousand years ago and pray for
its rebuilding in our time. His concern for Israel also
stemmed from the conviction that a politically,
economically, and militarily strong Israel is a most vital
strategic asset to the national interests of the United
States—a bulwark against Soviet expansionism in the
region. He believed therefore that a betrayal of Israel is
tantamount to a betrayal of the United States.

To defend his convictions, principles, and prej-
udices, Hans summoned every resource; literary,
oratory, and dialectic. I remember him at the first sym-
posium of our committee in Washington in 1974
debating the "Political, Economic, and Strategic Con-

sequences of Detente." He challenged the policy of
detente after its crude violations by the Soviet Union
and predicted its failure as long as the policy was not
applied to the Middle East as well. At the same time, he
questioned whether there was an alternative to that
policy.

Hans was a man of vision. He recognized the most
important fact that faces the world in the 1980s, name-
ly, the reality of Soviet military power and the implica-
tions that flow from it. He was deeply concerned with
the second most important fact: namely, the reluc-
tance of many in the West to recognize that reality and
to respond to it. It is worrisome that the Soviet Union is
the only major power that has occupied substantial
new territory during the last fifty years, surrendering its
claim to nothing while accusing others of occupying
territories that belong to them long before there was a
Soviet Union. He became increasingly frustrated with
an ever-more perverted and defunct United Nations.

Hans was one of the best-mannered men I ever
met: easy, courteous, patient, and considerate. His ur-
bane, graceful air was entirely natural and effortless.

He knew how to say whatever had to be said. At
the right time and in the right place he could and did
say with dignity and politeness any hard thing that was
necessary. But such occasions were rare. He was
always most agreeable and amusing. He never en-
couraged or engaged in desultory conversation. To his
guests and companions he was a pleasure, and his
conversation was a treat.

He appreciated anything that was said in good
will, taking up every point and lifting the discussion
step by step but often speaking very little. All who met
him came away feeling that they had been at their best
and that they had found someone who, whether he
agreed or differed, understood their points of view.
Very often they remembered the things they had said to
him better than what he had said to them. No one
escaped his attention. Everyone produced his most
valued mental treasure and became proud and
delighted to have it generously admired by a man of
such distinction.

The essence of his art involved understanding op-
posite points of view and listening with so much sym-
pathy and good humor, while affirming his own views
that his captivated audience was often led to believe
that they agreed with him or, at any rate, that the re-
maining differences were small and not final.

Hans rarely allowed political antagonism to be a
barrier in private life. Nor did he let personal friendship,
however sealed and cemented, hamper his strong

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political and moral convictions. He challenged some of the policies of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger but always referred to him as one of the greatest secretaries of state in American history. With all due academic objectivity and fairness, who can judge right from wrong policies other than in the perspective of time, when all facts and data become public knowledge. He consistently held to his basic beliefs, steering the same course, diverging only under the pressure of inevitable adverse trends.

He moved with the times. He loved youth and both accepted and encouraged its demands. Although he was always young in mind, he inspired the feeling that he possessed the wisdom of the ages. His taste was refined. His judgment was balanced, his insight penetrating, his passion unyielding.

It is difficult to convey the pleasure I derived from conversations with him at his home, during strolls, or over dinner. We met and talked on innumerable occasions, and our conversations ranged spontaneously over all kinds of topics. Never did I part from him without having learned something. He was always great fun, but, more than that, he had innate common sense and sagacious comprehension, which made his counsel invaluable.

In our last symposium together on "Salt II and the Future of Nuclear Arms Control," he reached somber conclusions concerning a large number of questions about which many people are content to remain in suspense.

This was Hans Morgenthau as I knew him — a man of the world in the true sense of the word. This was Hans Morgenthau as I saw him in class, at conventions and symposia, during strolls, on trips, at meetings and parties, and in the voluminous library isolated in academic detachment.

I had the privilege of visiting Hans several times during the last months of his life. He always received me with great courtesy and cordiality. He looked frail but still boyish. Despite his illness, his mind retained its clear, tranquil outlook on the human scene and its inexhaustible pleasure in the process of thought. I saw with grief his approaching departure and—for all human purposes—the extinction of a being who stood above the common man. He had premonitions of his death. When I went to see him a fortnight before his passing, he led me into his study, and, standing behind his desk, before he asked me to be seated, he thanked me for attending to some family-related matter and said: "It is a good feeling to have a friend like you. I shall not be around much longer." I responded in the traditional Jewish way by saying: "Oh, no; you will be around till a hundred and twenty." Hans smiled and began what was to be our last discussion. For the first time, I found it hard to concentrate. My mind wandered, and I perceived the impending tragedy that would rob me and the world of all the wisdom and treasure gathered in this great man.

Now that he has passed away, the imprint of his personality lives in the minds of his students and friends. The sense of his loss is in no way dimmed for us who sat at his feet and fed on his wisdom. We all feel poorer that he has gone from us especially in these days when dangers and difficulties threaten the free world and we are conscious of a lack of outstanding figures who can confront them. We mourn the man who possessed not only an immense capacity for inspiration and guidance but that touch of genius that everyone recognizes but cannot define. May his memory be blessed, and may his soul rest in peace.

This special double-issue Newsletter (including the supplement on the Middle East) was made
possible through the generosity of the following:

M. H. Blinken
Anthony D. Duke
Roseline Gussman
Herbert M. Singer
Kenneth Abrahami

Lou L. Berkman
Prof. Bruno Bettelheim
Albert Bildner
Prof. Albert P. Blaustein
Andrew M. Blum
S. James Coppersmith
Jacob Feldman
Steven R. Fenster
J. S. Feynman, M.D.

Michael J. Franzblau, M.D.
Samuel H. Givelber
Prof. H. L. Greenberger
Harriette Levine
John L. Loeb, Jr.
Dr. John M. Lowe
Winston B. McGuire
Samuel M. Melton
Prof. Oscar Ornati

Sam Paznik
Bayard Rustin
Prof. David Sidorsky
Oliver J. Sterling
Jay Wells
Helen Wollens
Gordon Zachs

— 12 —

Sony Corporation of America
9 West 57th Street
New York, N.Y. 10019
Telephone (212) 371-5800

Akio Morita
Chairman of the Finance Committee

Chairman of the Board &
Chief Executive Officer

Sony Corporation
Tokyo, Japan

July 11, 1980

Ms. Chris Vick
Secretary to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Ms. Vick:

Thank you very much for reserving in Dr. Kissinger's schedule Monday, October 6.

As Mr. Morita explained to him at CSIS Meeting, Mr. Morita is going to have a Reception-buffet lunch on that day to celebrate Sony of America 20th Anniversay in New York.

We will send a formal invitation to Dr. and Mrs. Kissinger later, sometime in early September.

Please have a wonderful summer and accept my personal regards.

HO/ml

Science

# Test-Tube Life: Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

*The Supreme Court protects the genetic engineers.*

When Thomas Jefferson, an amateur scientist himself, wrote the nation's first patent law in 1793, he was determined to ensure that "ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement." Under his law, "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter" was patentable and thus legally shielded from theft. Last week, in a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court applied the Jeffersonian measure to one of the latest examples of human ingenuity. It ruled that new forms of life created in the laboratory could be patented.

The decision, climaxing an eight-year legal battle, should give a boost to an emerging industry, genetic engineering, which seeks to create new life forms. This promising field offers the prospect of advances in everything from medicine and food production to alternate energy forms. The court's ruling also revived fears —vastly exaggerated in the opinion of most responsible scientists —about the dangers of tampering with life.

The center of dispute was a new human-made variation of the common bacterium *Pseudomonas*. While working at General Electric's Schenectady, N.Y., labs in the early 1970s, Indian-born Microbiologist Ananda M. Chakrabarty made a significant discovery. Chakrabarty knew that certain bacteria are able to break up hydrocarbons. What he found was that the genes responsible for this capacity are not contained in the bacterium's single chromosome, or principal repository of DNA, the genetic molecule. Instead, they reside in small, auxiliary parcels of genes, called plasmids, elsewhere in the cell. Taking plasmids from three oil-eating bacteria, Chakrabarty transplanted them into a fourth, thereby creating a crossbred version with a voracious appetite for oil.

Freeze-dried until needed, then sprinkled on straw and tossed into the ocean, the superbugs could presumably make quick work of oil spills by breaking down the crude into harmless protein and carbon dioxide. Says Chakrabarty, 42, now a researcher at the University of Illinois Medical Center: "You can make tons of these microorganisms in a matter of days." Nor, he says, would the bacteria pose any danger. After the feast, they would die for want of oil.

When GE tried to patent the bacterium in 1972 under Chakrabarty's name,

U.S. patent officials balked. They argued, in effect, that if either Jefferson or Congress had intended life to be patentable, special laws would not have been needed to protect certain new plant hybrids like the Red American Beauty Rose. But when GE pressed its case, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rejected the Government's argument, and the Supreme Court last week went along with that position. As Chief Justice Burger explained, the issue is "not between living

and inanimate things, but between products of nature—whether living or not—and human-made inventions.”

Though GE was pleased by the decision, it seems in no rush to exploit the bug commercially. Ronald Brooks, head of the GE environmental unit where Chakrabarty did his work, says that the company would entertain licensing agreements with those who want to develop the oil eater. But he adds that GE does not see a market big enough for it to become directly involved.

Others are less hesitant. Awaiting the outcome of the GE appeal are patent applications for at least 100 different kinds of organisms or processes to make organisms. All are products of genetic engineering activities in more than a dozen com-

panies and countless university laboratories in the U.S. and abroad. Most of this work does not involve the relatively simple process of plasmid reshuffling used by Chakrabarty, but the more complex and promising technique of recombinant DNA, or gene splicing. With it, scientists actually break apart DNA, using so-called restriction enzymes, and isolate certain desirable genes. These genes are then inserted into plasmids, again using enzymes, and transferred into another bacterium. The recipient bug, in effect, becomes a new life form with all the characteristics and capabilities carried by the spliced-in genes.

Even in its infancy, the technology has led to the making of new bacteria that are in fact microscopic chemical factories. Already the common intestinal bacterium *E. coli*, the favorite tool of such researchers, has been genetically "re-engineered" to produce human insulin and interferon, the antiviral protein that could be effective against several types of cancer, as well as the hormone that stimulates growth in humans. In the future, scientists should be able to use such reprogrammed bugs to meet other medical needs: manufacturing malaria vaccine, for example, or creating chemicals to heal burns, kill pain or stanch the flow of blood from wounds.

Yet the new technology should extend far beyond medicine. Scientists are talking about creating bugs that will enable plants to "fix" nitrogen directly from the air, thereby reducing the dependence on fertilizers. Others could be created to make amino acids, a building block of proteins and thus a basic food source. Some organisms, like Chakrabarty's oil eater, might be developed to degrade metals and other materials; these could help mining companies leech ores from hard-to-reach

veins or assist in the cleanup of such toxic waste sites as Love Canal. Even the energy crisis might be alleviated by the genetic engineers, who are devising new ways of using yeast to make alcohol, and other superbugs for making fuels, anti-freeze compounds and plastics. Says Molecular Biologist Herman Lewis, the National Science Foundation's adviser on recombinant DNA: "Theoretically, any process occurring in nature can be harnessed for man's use. We could even learn how to duplicate photosynthesis, the basic energy-converting process in green plants." Basically, says Eli Lilly Vice President for Research Irving Johnson, "You're talking about a process that could affect all living species. I can't think of a single event that is as broad as that, except

Variety of oil-eating bacteria, magnified 28,000 times

*A Jeffersonian view on an example of human ingenuity.*

GENERAL ELECTRIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER

52

TIME, JUNE 30, 1980

maybe the discovery of atomic particles.”

With so much research already going on, the Supreme Court's decision mainly gives formal sanction to what had been happening for some time, a classic example of the law's lagging behind technology. Millions of dollars have been invested without patent protection. Says Bernard Talbot, special assistant to the director of the National Institutes of Health: "Recombinant DNA work is going on in numerous labs. This would have gone on whatever the court decided." Chief Justice Burger himself acknowledged that a patent law "will not deter the scientific mind from probing into the unknown any more than Canute could command the tides."

The most important patent application now pending is for the key gene-splicing processes developed by Microbiologists Stanley Cohen of Stanford and Herbert Boyer of the University of California: both have signed over royalty rights to their respective universities, but Boyer is a major stockholder in Genentech Corp., a Bay Area genetic engineering firm, and obviously stands to make money from the process. No one quarrels with that. But there is a mixed view of just how much good will accrue from the introduction of patents to the infant industry.

Biochemist Ronald Cape, chairman of Berkeley's Cetus Corp., a rival firm, sees patents as increasing the "free flow of ideas." More companies and investors are sure to plunge into the expensive business with less fear of having ideas stolen, or at least with an assurance of legal recourse if they are. But others fear that just the opposite will happen: that scientists will be cautious about sharing information, long an essential part of the scientific process. Warns M.I.T.'s Jonathan A. King, a molecular biologist: "Now you have the prospect of keeping a strain [of bacteria] out of circulation until you have the patents." Wolfgang Joklik, chairman of Duke University's department of microbiology and immunology, wants to see scientists rewarded for what they do. But he adds with concern, "I just don't want to see organisms patented for commercial exploitation. I would like to be sure that everything is available for basic research."

There will almost certainly be efforts to get around the patents of others through slight variations. Says James Watson, Nobel laureate and co-discoverer in the 1950s of the double-helix structure of DNA: "It will be awfully hard to show uniqueness, to prove that one man's microbe is really different from another's." That, says J. Leslie Glick, president of Genex Corp. in Bethesda, Md., could lead to modifying bacterial strains mainly for "defensive reasons, a waste of research." Lawyers especially stand to gain if patenting life becomes their way of making a handsome living. Quipped Stephen Turner, president of Bethesda Research Laboratories: "I call this the Patent Lawyer's Employment Act of 1980."

For others, the decision stirred re-

newed anxieties. They argue that altering life, to say nothing of patenting it, is not the wisest of human activities. Better, they say, to leave the doomsday bugs to fiction. Said the Peoples Business Commission, a Washington-based consumer group, in a hyperbolic press release greeting the court's decision: "The Brave New World that Aldous Huxley warned us of is now here." Nobel Laureate George Wald, a guru of various antiestablishment causes, echoed those concerns. If the GE bug ever gets loose in the world, he said, "it could digest petroleum that has not been spilled. You can't put bacteria on a leash once you introduce them into the environment."

Chakrabarty, who stands to make no money from his discovery because GE will own the patent, crisply dismisses such dissent. "I can't respond to imaginary scenarios," he told TIME Correspondent

Chakrabarty with slide of his bacteria

ARTHUR HUGHES

PHOTOGRAPH-BLOCK STAY

Fermenter vat (above); yeast (below)

MARY KATZ

Drop contains trillions of *E. coli* plasmids; Boyer with vial of interferon (below)

JACK

ROBERT GODHENHAY

David Jackson. He insists that his *Pseudomonas* is safe, although it was developed before the Government imposed strict containment rules for lab experiments with such organisms. Indeed, in the past few years, researchers in dozens of labs have been performing similar experiments, and as Burger put it, there has been no "gruesome parade of horribles" forecast by the naysayers to the new research. Yet with Shakespeare, Burger acknowledged, "It is sometimes better to 'bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of.'" If Hamlet's wisdom had prevailed, there probably would be no such thing as genetic engineering with all its potential for good. For that matter, there probably would be no science. —By John S. DeMott. Reported by Evan Thomas/Washington

TIME, JUNE 30, 1980

OFFICE OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER

August 11, 1980

Dear Mr. Morita:

Further to your inquiry about the reference
made by Dr. Kissinger to the "coal-eating
bug", I have received the enclosed material
from the friend of Dr. Kissinger's in Great
Britain who had initially mentioned it to
him.

I am afraid it isn't much and will not be
very helpful to you. It seems it is still
all in the theoretical stage, but that a
number of people, both here and in the U.K.,
are working on it.

Mr. Akio Morita
Chairman
Sony Corporation
7-35 Kitashinagawa-6
Shinagawa-ku
Tokyo 141
Japan

ZCZC WB6420 UYS929 LGE239 TX267141
URWN CO GBLG 056
LONDON LG 56754 31 1750

MISS MACFARLANE 1800K STREET NORTH WEST
WASHINGTON C (20006)

YOUR ENQUIRY WAS PASSED TO ME FROM LORD SIEFFS OFFICE STOP NO WORK
DONE IN UK ON BACTERIAL BREAKDOWN OF MINED COAL STOP USE OF BACTERIA
IN MINING COAL SUGGESTED BUT NOT PURSUED STOP BOTH THEORETICALLY
POSSIBLE STOP AM SENDING RECENT NEWSPAPER ARTICLE STOP P SYMES

MAR SPENZA

Reply via RCA: call 212-248-7000

Reply via RCA

AKIO MORITA
CHAIRMAN
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

SONY
SONY CORPORATION

T-85 KITASHINAGAWA-6
SHINAGAWA-KU, TOKYO 141, JAPAN
TELEPHONE: (03) 446-2600

CABLE ADDRESS:
SONYCORP TOKYO
TELEX: J 22262

October 30, 1980

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 520
1800 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
U. S. A.

Dear Henry:

Thank you very much for your letter of October 24th.

As far as spring of 1981 is concerned, my availability for a meeting at that time in Tokyo is rather slim. In April, the two weeks following the 6th are already fully committed on business matters outside the country, and in May, I expect to be abroad between the 8th and the 15th. Furthermore, I do not recommend the first week of May for the meeting in Tokyo, since the 3rd and the 5th are national holidays, and most companies close their operations for the entire week.

I feel that it is a bit too late for your Council office to begin arrangements for a conference to be held abroad, considering the fact that all members are prominent businessmen assembling from various parts of the world, and that good hotel accommodations require reservations way ahead of time, especially in Tokyo, where a surging number of tourists visit Japan during this season. Even if the meeting were to be held abroad in fall, 1981, it is not too early to start preparing now. Frankly speaking, I would greatly appreciate it, if the Council office would contact the members at a much earlier date for future meetings. For the last meeting, it was at the final moment that I received the reference materials, and I would have appreciated some more time for preparation.

NOV 10 1980

THE AWAKENING OF AMERICA : a chance for France

by Jacques Kosciusko Morizet

Le Ruchisliende PARIS
NOVEMBER 6

The French press, radio and television, was not wrong when it gave the American Presidential election an exceptional frontpage. We deeply feel that we are directly concerned. The French particularly.

This is a singular paradox: we expose, sometimes rightly, the imperialism of the United States, the manichean messianism of many of their leaders, their technological and commercial colonisation, a certain religious hypocrisy, a linguistic and cultural invadment which dangerously alters our way of life. However, as soon as the American power shows signs of weakness, we are anxious. Because we know that the military, economical, moral power of the United States, their ability to understand the challenge of the contemporary world, more or less directly affects our security, our prosperity, our own future.

The Atlantic Ocean unites more than it splits both our continents. In many ways America is as next to us as any other European country.

French, Americans: "two peoples whose destiny is since always and for ever linked" said General de Gaulle, whom we cannot suspect of Atlantism.

If the spot of the medias has been focused so much on the November 4 election it is because the real stake was the American credibility, which had been very much affected for many years by the Soviet expansionism, the impotency to break the Iranian blackmail in the hostages affair and by all a series of analyses, exploited by the neutralist propaganda, on the "American decline".

The Western world, France included, felt wounded by this lost of credibility, since Europe had unfortunately not resisted either to this erosion of power and confidence.

In fact, it was hasty and imprudent to conclude from an incontestable weakening of the influence of America to a retreat or even a definitive decadence!

It is true that the States have so far been unable to master or even check an economical and monetary crisis

DEC 11 1980

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which spread all over the world and for which they are much
responsible.

Rightly underlined has been the regression of their
national raw product, the decline of their industrial product-
ivity, compared to their Japanese and European competitors,
the inadaptation of their car industry, etc...

Was it however to be forgotten that by the abundance
and the diversity of its mining and energetic ressources, its
scientific and technological creativity, the enthusiasm of its
searchers, its enterprise spirit, its genius for organisation,
this continent-country, this laboratory-country has the geogra-
phical dimensions, the intellectual wealth, the moral energy,
the social mobility which enable it to take up any challenge.
After Veitnam, Watergate, Angola, Iran, Afghanistan, America
fell to the lowest ebb. But the ability to spring to life again
of the American people (which is united, religious and nation-
alist through its various ethnies) has remained unaltered.

Like after Pearl Harbour, America makes a move.

Indeed opinion was ahead of the Government. All those
who know the American people well have never doubted the awa-
kening of America. But this movement had no political sanction.
Now it has.

Ronald Reagan's victory is first a national pride
reaction.

The Americans were fed up with hesitations, failures,
humiliations after the traumatism of Vietnam and Watergate.
The angel-like good will of their former President had brought
desilusion in almost every field. They have choosen mere will:
will to redress, will to revive.

The American people straightened up. It has demonstra-
ted its vitality. It is an event we, French, must be happy about,
since we are its most ancient friends and ally.

We can wonder who Ronald Reagan really is and what we
can expect from him. As a man, he is very different from the
caricatures which are the proof of ignorance, not to say the
despite of the American democracy. Can we forget that one of
the best presidents of the United States, Harry Truman, had
been a ties salesman.

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Ronald Reagan is open-minded, cordial, direct. He is certainly not a "conceptual". He is much better: he has good sense and courage.

An excellent governor of California, he was reelected for a second mandate. He knows how to choose his men: George Bush, the vice-president, my ex-colleague and friend at the United Nations; general Alexander Haig, George Schulz, William Simon, Greenspan, etc... are outstanding personalities, and important parts will certainly be attributed to Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger.

I can witness that Ronald Reagan wants to give a new breath to the Franco-American relations; he also wants to dissipate our misunderstandings, identify and reduce our divergences, and come for the essential to large fields of agreement for solidar nations.

He will not always be an easy interlocutor. He will not worry about subtilities nor exegesis. But provided our dialogue be frantic and confident, he will perfectly accept that we deal on an independant basis in real partners. It is easy to see what could be the themes of these indispensable conversations:

* First, to define a liberty and peace strategy for the defense of the Droits de l'Homme and the independency of Nations. These are indeed the subjects we could the more easily agree upon.

* Then the reestablishment of a stable monetary order which could sustain the recovery of world economy.

* At last, the problems of development of the relations between the industrial countries and the petrol productors and the underdeveloped countries.
  On this point, France, thanks to its experience, its opening on Africa, can play a counsellor and incitator part with an American interlocutor badly prepared to make a sufficient effort in this field.

Such would be the basis of a renewal in the Franco-American relations. The States and France would benefit from it, Europe and the world also.

In the first months of his mandate, a president chooses his orientations and marks his style. Indeed, for France, the election of Ronald Reagan is an occasion not to be missed.

FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES

by
Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet*

Le Monde, February 28, 1980

In my opinion Franco-American relations cannot
deviate from two principles:

1) Alliance and friendship with the United States are absolutely essential to France, its security and its prosperity. It is therefore important to maintain a climate of trust between our two nations through a constant exchange of information and--as far as possible--close consultations.

2) Our dealings with the United States must always be based on independence and reciprocity. Although it may at times be difficult to preserve this attitude, France would lose all credibility, all possibility of providing guidance or wielding influence in the world, if we were to align ourselves with Washington, voluntarily or under duress, following the all-too-frequent example of our friends in Europe.

What are the political implications of these two principles for France's foreign policy when viewed in the light of current events in Iran and Afghanistan?

Iran: Hostages have been taken and responsibility for this lies with the Imam Khomeini, who holds power in Teheran and to whom we provided security and asylum.

*Ambassador of France

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[L.C.]

Our reaction should have been instantaneous in the face of this overt violation of diplomatic conventions and the most sacred human rights. Furthermore, even though it is not strictly in accordance with diplomatic practice, it would not have been amiss to express warmly our sympathy for the American people: In matters of foreign policy, the relations between peoples sometimes count every bit as much as those between governments or embassies.

Afghanistan: An independent nation was invaded and an alien government regime forcibly imposed upon it. Here again, we regret our reaction was tardy and our condemnation of this act of aggression somewhat hesitant. We are on the side of liberty, so are the Americans; we have both been on the side of liberty for the past two hundred years. Perhaps we should quote General de Gaulle-- since people seem to have the effrontery to use his name to bolster some sort of neutralist policy that is nothing other than a path to abdication and servitude. This is what De Gaulle said to President Eisenhower: "Although, materially speaking, the balance between the two camps dividing the universe may seem equal, morally speaking it is not. France, for its part, has made its choice: It has chosen to side with the free peoples, it has decided to join them with you...." Do we need to be reminded that during the Berlin crisis and the Cuba crisis, the French President was the first to side with the United States without waiting for anyone else?

Among allies, it is quite normal to converse and consult, especially when the vital interests one shares are threatened. Some people question whether the Atlantic Alliance is a fitting place for a dialogue of this kind. It is true that Afghanistan does not, strictly speaking,

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form part of the geographical area covered by the terms
of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is nonetheless evident
that according to the spirit of the Treaty--which is now
30 years old and needs to be updated--the members of the
Alliance must consult each other should the security of
Europe be imperiled. Nobody can claim that the Soviet
thrust toward the warm-water seas and oil-production areas
is a matter of indifference to Europeans.

Even if one takes exception to a meeting of the
Atlantic Council, there are many other ways of holding
joint consultations. Our government would have done well
to initiate talks between Americans and Europeans. As
Jacques Chirac has said, form is indeed important at a
time of crisis. If we had been less passive, we might
not have been placed in the uncomfortable position of
being summoned to Bonn and having to reply in the negative
without any substantial justification.

We are given to talking about the "two superpowers"
as if they were on the same level and represented the
same danger to us. In fact, one of them, the United States,
is our ally, because we share the same ideal of liberty
and progress, and the same concept of human rights. With
the other, we try, in a climate of detente that recent events
have shown to be fragile, to maintain and develop a certain level
of economic and cultural cooperation. We are well aware of the limits
of such cooperation, however, because our Soviet partners, by their
own admission, believe that peaceful coexistence does not
by any stretch of the imagination mean abandoning the
ideological struggle. We have been warned, therefore,
and must remain on the alert. In the case of the Soviets,
the ever-present threat is military and political. With
the Americans, there is danger of economic and monetary
pressure, and even linguistic and cultural invasion. This
too is important, but in a different way.

[L]

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Nor can we remain neutral: Our geographical position prevents this, not to mention our history and world responsibilities. How could anyone think in a nuclear war between America and the Soviet Union we would somehow remain unscathed?

Does anyone seriously think that we could remain independent for long if, under the pretext of reunifying Germany--a plan in which Moscow holds the key element--the Federal Republic were turned into another Finland or a satellite state? We are united with our allies, and foremost among them the Americans, by a de facto solidarity. That is why it is important at a time of crisis to show a common determination, for this is the only way of preserving peace.

So what does our independence actually mean? It does not mean that we are in any way trying to shirk our duties as allies, nor does it mean that we are trying to gain admission to the group of nations that are nonaligned, or claim to be so.

## Preserving Our Freedom

Independence means, first and foremost, that we intend to keep our freedom to make judgments and decisions. General de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated military organization of the Atlantic Alliance for two reasons: He did not want France's security--i.e. the decision to use nuclear deterrence--to be the responsibility of the United States alone, nor did he want to be automatically drawn by the United States into outside ventures in cases where Washington's interests were not necessarily those of France.

[c]

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We cannot accept today--any more than we could
in the past--a White House *fait accompli*, nor can we follow
all the hasty and improvised zigzags of its policies.
As examples one can point to the Olympic boycott, the economic
sanctions against the U.S.S.R., or the summons to a meeting
in Bonn. I am not making any pronouncement on whether
or not the measures taken were the right ones. They were
widely publicized and we were subsequently invited to back
them. This has nothing to do with a strategy for freedom
which is very necessary but can only be effective if it
is coordinated and decided upon by common consent.

The United States has crushingly heavy
responsibilities, given the present state of the world:
monetary anarchy, lax oil policies, economic and commercial
self-centeredness, inconsistency on Iran, inaction in the
face of Cuban infiltration in Africa, the Cambodian
tragedy, failure to understand the problems of the Third
World, and so on.

But these shortcomings on the part of the Americans,
however serious they may be, should not be used to cover
up our own mistakes. Europeans have always been guilty
of "toeing the line" vis-à-vis Washington. Although we
may at times have had our "reservations," we never voiced
them loudly enough, e.g. to resist the American monetary "Biktat"
in Jamaica. None of these bones of contention gives us
reason, however, to renege on solidarity, when our independence
and liberties are at stake. We have no right to be divided
when our security, the existence of Europe, and peace all
depend on our clearly expressed common determination.

It was pleasant enough for [Mr. Giscard d'Estaing]
to go to India to be presented with the bouquet of
nonalignment by the "Iron Lady" of New Delhi. It was
less appropriate, however, for him to go to the country
of Sibelius to perform a sad little waltz with a neutralist

[L]

policy pursued in the shadow of Moscow. What is much
more urgently needed is to provide the initiative for
a broad consultation between Americans and Europeans.
The following items should feature on the agenda: the
reestablishment of a stable international monetary order,
one that stands a chance of helping the world economy get
back on its feet, and the working out of a strategy for
freedom, development and peace. Both world wars could
have been avoided if, while peace still lasted, the allies
had shown the same solidarity that was later to unite
them in wartime in order to save--but with what devastation
and sacrifice!--their independence and freedom.

I'm not talking about an anti-Soviet crusade,
nor of reverting to the cold war. I'm talking about
acting in time to prevent the Kremlin leaders from
making errors in calculation.

If all ambiguity is eliminated, "detente" may
once again have some meaning, some concrete content, i.e.
something other than a cover-up for Soviet expansionism.

First, however, we have to talk things over with
Washington.

Early in your political career, as president of the Screen Actors Guild in Hollywood, you became acquainted with the underhanded, destructive tactics of communist union infiltra-tors, you fought them and you defeated them. From then on, you have always exhibited an informed and principled opposition to com- munism and have never been swayed by leftist apologists of Soviet imperialism.

But you know as well as we do that just being anti-communist is not enough. America needs a long-range strategy and consistent policies to stand up against the relentless com- munist assault on the Free World. As you know, the Soviet Union has never abandoned its long-range goal of world colonization and never ceases to mobilize every resource, try every trick, and seize every opportunity to weaken the West and strengthen its own posi- tion. The greatest task of your administration, Mr. President, will be to equip America with a goal, a strategy and effective policies capable of defeating communism.

In that regard we are greatly encouraged by the policies elaborated in your campaign and by the quality of the advisers that you have gathered in the fields of foreign policy and defense. Your pledges to stand firm in our commitments to our allies, to strengthen Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, to reconstruct our debilitated intelligence agencies and to strengthen our dangerously unprepared defenses are indispensable.

HOWEVER, THESE STEPS ARE only the minimum necessary to keep up a credible defense against physical aggression. If all we faced was an arrogant nation bent on imperial- ism, these steps would be sufficient. But the challenge of communism is much more.

As you know, communism is a world-wide evangelistic ideology—in effect an theistic religion—which preaches the universality of “class” warfare and dictatorship “of the pro- tariat” just as Christianity upholds the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule. The United States, unfortunately, has never grasped this essential ideological nature of the enemy. That is why America won the military battles against the communists in Vietnam but lost the war because many Americans, deluded by Marxist ideas, became in effect a “fifth col- umn” on the side of Hanoi.

History has proven you right, Mr. Presi- dent, in saying that the cause for which America fought in Vietnam was a “noble” one after all. But then why didn't the American people realize it at the time? And why do so many people seem to believe that the communists' bloody aggression against free people is nobler? Why is the impotent American CIA suspected and accused throughout the world, while the much more extensive, active and brutal Soviet KGB is ignored?

The reason is that the communists, constantly emphasizing the necessity of waging what they call the “ideological struggle” against capitalism, use the weapon of ideas far more massively and effectively than the West. The Soviet budget for propaganda is estimated to be larger than those of all of the countries of the Free World combined. The Soviet KGB has become expert in the art of “dis- information”—the covert propagation of lies and distortions in the Western media to con- fuse and undermine the West's response to communist aggression. Liberal democratic countries such as the United States which allow the open dissemination of all ideas—no matter how destructive—and eschew propagation of any countervailing ideology are sitting ducks for such an attack.

THIS IS A TRAGIC IRONY considering that the West has at its fingertips the most potent and infallible weapon against Marxism-Leninism which, if we dare to use it, would send the communists reeling in defeat. That weapon is very simply the truth.

Communism, from the basic tenets of Marx and Lenin to the daily dull diet of pap in the Soviet newspaper Pravda, is a tissue of lies. That is why communists distort statistics, the news, even the facts of history to conform to the Party Line, use lies to advance their for- eign policy goals, put up an Iron Curtain to keep out the contagion of other ideas and try to stamp out religion and other competing thought systems wherever they come to power.

The problem is that Americans seem to complacently assume that the Truth will win out by the strength of its own virtue. But that is no more realistic than believing that the Good Guys always win as in Hollywood westerns. And you know better than most, Mr. Presi-

dent, that the Good Guys have been losing this fight against communism ever since World War II.

FOR THE UNITED STATES to use the weapon of truth effectively, it must first be completely understood, then coherently artic- ulated, then aggressively and strategically spread on every front. This has nothing to do with so-called “anti-communist propaganda.” We need only expose the most obvious com- munist fallacies and present the truth as a counter-proposal.

This is made easier by the fact that the biggest hwellers of all are contained in the “sacred” dogmas underlying communism itself—the sophistries of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Such keystone ideas as dialectical mate- rialism, Marx's labor theory of value, histor- ical materialism, Lenin's doctrine of capitalist imperialism, and many other such hallowed superstitions can be proven wrong to any reasonably well-educated person. Furthermore, religion, modern science, philosophy and eco- nomics abound with basic truths which are sounder, more logical and better able to meet humanity's needs, if they can only be presented in a way that people can use. And, of course, the horrendous record of communist failure in the economic and social fields provides grim facts to back up the indictment of communism as fundamentally false.

President Reagan, the “think tanks” and talented experts that have helped you formu- late your solutions to America's problems con- stitute one of the finest assemblages of minds ever gathered by an American president. Why not mobilize this brain trust towards the devel- opment of a long-range strategy and ideolog- ical arsenal for victory over communism?

As you well know, the Soviet Union has for decades operated “universities” for training eager young killed from around the world in the techniques of terrorism, subversion and social destabilization. These campuses of mayhem have developed the art of social destruction to a fine-tuned science, and their graduates are directly responsible for the recent upsurge of terrorism throughout the world.

To counter this communist technology of social demolition, the United States must develop a superior science of social construc- tion. Not only would this new field of human

thought shatter communist myths, it would provide mankind with techniques for building a freer, more prosperous and more peaceful world.

The new discipline, once it is established, could first be made an integral part of the service academies and ROTC training. If the government made a diploma in this new field a prerequisite for employment in the diplomatic corps, the State Department, and intelligence agencies, it would rapidly spread throughout the academic world.

BEFORE LONG, Marxist professors would become as rare on American campuses as medieval alchemists. American officers and soldiers would no longer be confused and demoralized when confronting communist insurgencies as they were during the Vietnam war. Diplomats from Marxist countries would find themselves on the ideological defensive in every confrontation with their American coun- terparts. And bright young people from coun- tries troubled by communist insurgencies would flock to America to learn the new dis- cipline—and come home to convince their authoritarian governments to try something more effective against communism than elim- inating civil liberties.

Mr. President, we believe you have nothing to lose and everything to gain by implementing this modest suggestion. It would cost only a tiny fraction of the federal budget and yet do more to defeat communism than any other government program now existing.

Of course, if you did, the cry would go up from leftist circles that you are attempting to “indoctrinate” the American people in your own ideas. But you can tell them that it is the communists who have been indoctrinating humanity in their seriously flawed, unscien- tific, negatively-biased and obsolete ideology. They have been hustling their poisonous ideo- logical snake-oil for too long and it's time to put a stop to it.

the courage of their convictions and denounced the slave trade, as Jefferson had penned in the Declaration's first draft! The painful course of American history proved human bigotry and inhumanity towards man to be often more powerful and persistent than its highest ideals.

But that only means that we, who must pick up the standard dropped by our historical predecessors, must fight harder to achieve those ideals. It remains for America in the beginning of its third century to finally erace racism and heal the historical wounds it has caused.

### THIS CHALLENGE
President Reagan, is now yours to accept. The responsibility to lead America towards fulfilling its greatest promise—the unified family of man living in equality and harmony—rests on your shoulders. And we believe that you have what it takes to handle the challenge because your record as governor of California in minority hiring and concern for the preservation of Indian sacred lands shows you to be sensitive to the needs of minority Americans.

Your task is all the more urgent at the present time because an upsurge in racially-motivated attacks and killings, side by side with renewed activity by racist groups like the Nazi Party and the Ku Klux Klan, has caused widespread fear and consternation among the black community. The acquittal of several Nazis in a murderous North Carolina shootout with members of a communist group has further aggravated racial tensions and may lead to further violence between extremists on the left and the right.

### MINORITY AMERICANS
would be greatly relieved if you mobilized the FBI and the power of the federal government to investigate the recent attacks on blacks as well as the upsurge in Klan and Nazi activity. The racist extremist groups have apparently benefited from the liberal-sponsored cutback in FBI surveillance that occurred under the Carter administration. They are now widely reported to be engaged in para-military training for young people. We urge you, Mr. President, to reestablish the FBI's surveillance of these racist groups at the same time as you build up the capability of the FBI in general.

At all costs, racial violence and animosity must be prevented. This is why it is so important to isolate and discredit those groups which preach racial hatred as well as those that preach class war. Leftist and communist groups are as bad as any racist bigots in this regard, because while screaming "death to the Klan" and "smash racism," they are actually manipulating minorities toward their own ends, exploiting racial tensions in their twisted desire for violent revolution against the capitalist system.

### BLACKS ARE ALSO WORRIED
that, based on certain suggestions that have been made by your advisers, affirmative action programs, aid to minority businesses, school busing and other government efforts on their behalf may be gutted. We realize that affirmative action, school busing to achieve racial balance and schools and other racially-weighted programs have caused widespread resentment among whites and are beset with many problems. It often appears as if, instead of eradicating racism, these programs cause "reverse discrimination" and are self-defeating because they put even more emphasis on skin color as a factor in job placement or opportunities for advancement.

The question is: Does eradicating racism mean bringing about a "color blind" society where race plays as little a part as possible in determining a person's position in society? Or does it mean making up for a century of slavery and discrimination with specific programs targeted towards the injured racial groups to bring them up to the same level as whites?

President Reagan, you have an unenviable task trying to balance between these two concepts. However, we are confident that if you fulfill your pledge to "put America back to work" and unleash America's productive potential, blacks will benefit from the general prosperity along with everyone else. Your advocacy of "free enterprise zones" to reverse economic decline in urban poverty areas should be more effective than many racially-targeted welfare programs in bringing blacks, who make up the majority of these poverty pockets, into the economic mainstream.

A particularly severe problem, however, that deserves special attention is the inordinately high level of unemployment among black youth. This problem not only contributes to racial tensions but to high crime. The current CETA jobs program has been widely criticized as not providing minority youth with the job training they need to escape the grip of poverty. Your Urban Task Force urged that CETA be replaced by a program that mobilizes the resources of private industry to give minority youth genuine job training. We would be favorable to such a development, but in any case the easing of black unemployment calls for strong measures from your administration.

Another proposal to reduce unemployment associated with your campaign is an easing of minimum wage laws for young people to make it easier for employees to hire them. But some

must be made in implementing that proposal to ensure that employers will not lay off older workers with more seniority to take advantage of the lower rates for young people. It makes no sense to reduce unemployment among young people by lowering the minimum wage if it causes a corresponding rise in unemployment in older, higher-paid workers.

### AS FAR AS SCHOOL BUSING
is concerned, even many black commentators such as News World columnist Tony Brown oppose that solution because it seems to be based on the fundamentally racist assumption that educational quality for blacks can only be improved by putting them together with whites. The real problem, as we see it, is that schools in many poor, black, urban areas receive less funding, equipment and competent teachers than schools in upper class, white suburban areas.

We believe you should concentrate on upgrading education for black children as a more important task than mere busing to achieve racial balance. This will be difficult to achieve, because the root of the problem lies in the fact that school financing in most cases is based on property taxes, thus guaranteeing that schools in wealthy neighborhoods will get more funding than those in poor neighborhoods. Rectifying that disparity would do more towards racial equality than busing and be much more gratefully received by black parents.

We want to emphasize that affirmative action has an important part to play in the overcoming of historical resentments and disparities caused by racism and slavery, but we don't think it should be based only on quotas which determine percentages of one race or another in employment or education. The goal, as we see it, is to purge the poison of historical resentment and to defuse the possibility of racial violence by bringing alienated groups into the mainstream, helping them to identify their own prosperity with that of the nation as a whole.

### IN THIS GREAT COUNTRY
, which contains representatives of nearly every racial group, nation and religion on earth, giving special privileges to any one group at the expense of another is asking for trouble. The problem is similar to that of a parent with many children, all with different needs and capacities. How can each person's needs be met without causing resentment from the others? Some amount of jealousy and rivalry is inevitable. But the wise parent makes each child feel as if they are special, unique and loved for what they are.

As a parent yourself, Mr. President, we're sure you can appreciate the difficulty of this task. Unit ing the disparate racial and interest groups in this country, getting them to unite around a common concept of nationhood, is a gigantic task. However, we are convinced that you have the personal qualities that can bring it about.

Our only worry is that some of the conservatives who have risen to prominence on your coattails lack the same commitment to serve all Americans as you have demonstrated. Please, Mr. Reagan, watch out for the reactionaries who may seek to use your victory as a mandate for total neglect of the legitimate needs of minority Americans. Your administration—and the unity of this nation—cannot afford reinforcing minority fears of new setbacks in the steady progress America has made toward racial equality.

Still, the issue of morality or goodness is one of the most serious concerns of Americans who see the recent upsurge in crime, drug abuse, pornography and the sexual exploitation of children as being the result of a serious decline in moral standards in this country. This concern is reflected in a recent Gallup poll in which 76 percent of the Americans responding said they support voluntary prayer in the schools. Your campaign statements on such domestic moral issues, as well as on the worldwide moral imperatives of supporting America's allies and opposing communism, show that you share this concern very deeply.

### THE GREAT CHALLENGE

Facing you, Mr. President, is to unite Americans around a common view of goodness. This is a tough job indeed, considering that differing moral tenets are among the most divisive elements in politics and could work against establishing a national consensus as solid as your electoral landslide victory. We believe a consensus can be forged, however, if you base it on those key principles of Judeo-Christian ethics and American ideals which are truly universal—not only for Americans, but for all humanity.

To start with, the inalienable right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" as guaranteed in the Declaration of Independence is not only held sacred by Americans, but can be considered a universal human creed. We're sure that all Americans would agree that an undeniable moral imperative of your administration is to enhance all Americans' right to the "pursuit of happiness" by lifting the burden of taxes and inflation, unshackling the bureaucratic restraints on American productivity and allowing Americans the freedom to strive for a better way of life in a climate of abundant opportunity. We think that your proposals for economic recovery and decreasing the size and expense of government fulfill that moral goal admirably and constitute your surest basis for a national consensus transcending partisan interests.

On that foundation, we think that you can afford to rise above the more divisive controversies without diminishing your moral stature. This is strongly enhanced by the spirit of fairness, magnanimity and good feeling towards adherents of differing ideas which you have demonstrated throughout your campaign, while remaining firm in your own convictions.

### A STERLING

Example of this is your Vice President George Bush. You chose him as your running mate although he has acknowledged differences with you on abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment and school prayer. Yet he publicly defended the right of those religious groups with which he differs to advance their views and even pointed out the hypocrisy behind much of the criticism of such groups, noting that "nobody got all excited" about political activities of clerics "on the more liberal side." Such firmness and fairness will serve you and your team well in the next four years in navigating the minefield of differing factions and interest groups.

Another area of morality in which all Americans can agree is that of political corruption. Americans voted for Jimmy Carter because he seemed at the time to be as far removed as possible from the corruption of the Nixon administration, which shows how seriously Americans want to eliminate the problem from our political life. Unfortunately, the mere fact that Carter was not associated with the Nixon administration did not make him a more competent leader or make him devoid of new forms of corruption he brought with him to the presidency.

In fact, the American people began to see Carter's rule as even more corrupt and immoral in many ways than Nixon's, as evidenced by the fact that Carter's popularity rating sank even below what Nixon's had been at the height of Watergate. Scandals followed thick and fast during Carter's administration, from Bert Lance's financial misdoings through Billy Carter's carousings with Libyan agents. The air of moral ineptitude which surrounded Carter by the end of his four years we're sure had a lot to do with his overwhelming rejection by the voters.

### ALL THE MORE REASON

for you, Mr. President, to fulfill the voters' hopes in you by demonstrating an absolute, uncompromising abhorrence of political corruption in all its forms. This does not mean a political or media witch hunt along partisan lines against imagined as well as genuine miscreants, which characterized Watergate and its aftermath. We mean a firm and constant upholding of the principle that America's elected officials and government workers are servants of the people and holders of the public trust and they must devote their careers to fulfilling that trust, or else leave that

hallowed service. We want you, Mr. President, to end the stigma that many people attach to politics and politicians, and make government service the noble profession that it can and should be.

Hand in hand with political corruption is the infection of crime in general. The federal government's greatest contribution in that area would be to crack down on organized crime and the narcotics trade. Much of the upsurge in street crime that has made our cities places of fear is connected with an epidemic of heroin caused by the collapse of international drug controls brought on by political instability in the Mideast's "Golden Crescent" area. Organized crime, bloated by drug profits, has been buying into legitimate industry, corrupting the very fabric of our national life.

### IT IS IMPERATIVE

Mr. President, that you strengthen and mobilize the law enforcement bodies of this nation to overcome this threat, otherwise every effort to end corruption of our national life will be in vain. Money is power, and the ill-gotten billions of dollars of organized crime is an evil power threatening this nation as dangerous to our liberties as any foreign foe.

In searching for a moral consensus to unite Americans, we must not neglect our responsibilities to the world at large. The United States is admired throughout the world for its generosity and magnanimity to people of all countries. Even in war, the United States has proved forgiving of its former enemies to a fault.

The Japanese and the Germans today are solid allies of the United States only decades after having been forced into unconditional surrender during World War II. The Japanese people are eternally grateful to Gen. Douglas MacArthur for his benevolent handling of the post-war occupation which he based on his belief in Christian forgiveness, as are the German people for the Marshall Plan which rebuilt their war-torn economy.

What a stark contrast to the Soviet Union's treatment of its vanquished foes, both internally and among its satellite nations. Even the faintest opposition to communist power is ruthlessly and unmercifully crushed. Consequently Moscow's so-called "allies" are sullen and mutinous subjects rather than free and equal partners. This demonstrates the natural superiority of Judeo-Christian love over Marxist class hatred—a superiority which you, Mr. President, should exploit to the fullest.

Based on that ethic of love, America also gained a reputation as a fount of aid and disaster relief for countries in need, as well as a defender of countries beset by aggression. Unfortunately, this reputation has been greatly tarnished in the last decades through abandonment of the people of Indochina to the hellish rule of the Vietnamese and Cambodian communists. America's moral standing fell further due to President Carter's cutoff of relations with Taiwan at the behest of the Red Chinese and his contradictory human rights policy, which punished many countries fighting communist subversion for "human rights" violations, while turning a blind eye to the efforts of Marxist revolutionaries to establish a much worse totalitarianism.

We believe there is a universal good which can unite, not only Americans, but all human beings. That goodness is realized in the practice of absolute love which the Judeo-Christian scruples identify as the love of God. If that love succeeded as it did in defeating death itself, it can certainly triumph over communism, crime, corruption and immorality. And that love, President Reagan, is your secret weapon.

# What Is Hustle ?

**HUSTLE IS DOING SOMETHING THAT EVERYONE IS ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN CAN'T BE DONE.**

**HUSTLE IS GETTING COMMITMENT BECAUSE YOU GOT THERE FIRST, OR STAYED WITH IT AFTER EVERYONE ELSE GAVE UP.**

**HUSTLE IS SHOE LEATHER AND ELBOW GREASE AND SWEAT AND MISSING LUNCH.**

**HUSTLE IS GETTING THE PROSPECTS TO SAY "YES" AFTER THEY HAVE SAID "NO" TWENTY TIMES.**

**HUSTLE IS BELIEVING IN YOURSELF AND THE BUSINESS YOU'RE IN.**

**HUSTLE IS THE SHEER JOY OF WINNING.**

**HUSTLE IS BEING THE SOREST LOSER IN TOWN.**

**HUSTLE IS LIVING EACH MOMENT BY BEING IN THE CENTER OF A "HAPPENING".**

**HUSTLE IS HEAVEN IF YOU'RE A HUSTLER.**

**HUSTLE IS HELL IF YOU'RE NOT.**

THIS ORGANIZATION HAS HUSTLE !!!!!

flower
aviation of kansas, inc.

2524 Hein, Salina, KS 67401 • (913) 825-6739 • Unicom 122 95

© Success Motivation Institute, Inc. 1975. All rights reserved.

Ontario

Office of
the Crown
Attorney

Ministry of the
Attorney
General

Judicial
District
of York

416/965-7331

Court House
361 University Avenue
Toronto Ontario
M5G 1Y1

August 29, 1980

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
1800 K Street N.W.,
Suite 520,
Washington, D.C.,
U.S.A.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

RE: Regina v. Charles BARKER

Please accept this belated "thank you"
for taking time out of your hectic speaking schedule
in order to discuss "the Nelson Club" brochure with
investigator Smith and I at the Four Seasons Hotel
in Toronto. It was truly an honour for me to meet
you in person.

Are you going to attend the dinner in
November at the Waldorf in honour of Vladimir Jabotinsky?
He was my great grandfather's first cousin, and there-
fore my first cousin if one ignores the generation gap.
You and he have allot in common, and in fact your work
in the Middle East in giving Israel a secure political
and military foundation would be along the same lines
as he would have followed, had he been alive during

.../2

SEP 2 1980

THIRTEEN

WNET/THIRTEEN / 356 WEST 58th STREET/NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10019/(212) 560-2000.

October 28, 1980

Mr. Henry Kissinger
River House
435 East 52 Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

Dear Henry:

On Friday, December 12th, we are planning to produce a special 90-minute edition of *Bill Moyers' Journal* which will be a colloquy -- possibly a debate -- between three Russians and three Americans on the subject of "Alternatives to Disaster". With ominous events taking place in the world today, particularly the deterioration of relations between the two major powers, my colleagues and I perceive the need for a direct exchange of views between high level Soviet citizens and representatives of the United States.

The program will explore possibilities for alternatives to nuclear war and the arms race. The Russian participants will be Dr. Georgi Arbatov, whom you know as a member of the Central Committee of the Presidium; General Mikhail Milstein, retired, who is chief of the U.S. Military Policy Department of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian studies of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences; and Vitaly Ivanovich Kobysh, journalist, foreign correspondent, and former head of Soviet Radio and Television office in New York. Kobysh is now working in the American section of the Ministry of Propaganda.

You are my first choice for one of the three American participants, for all the obvious reasons. The other two would be individuals of stature and wisdom, with first-hand experience in dealing with Russia, but you are the first person I've asked and I strongly hope your answer will be yes.

NOV 12 1980

BILL MOYERS
Executive Editor
(212) 560-3177

NOV 10 1980

Recycled Paper

Henry Kissinger

October 28, 1980

Page 2

As you have pointed out so frequently, all the world is sitting atop a nuclear arsenal that could be triggered by a misunderstanding between the superpowers. We think this broadcast will allow the U.S. citizens to hear an exchange of views on that issue in an unprecedented setting. Not only will it be an important television program but an important event which could help Americans understand the issues facing the U.S. and Russia.

The program will be broadcast to the nation live at 9PM from a location in New York or Washington.

Will you counsel and join us?

Continuation of House Proceedings of July 31, 1980,
Appears in This Issue After Today's House Proceedings

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 96th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 126

WASHINGTON, FRIDAY, AUGUST 1, 1980

No. 122

Senate

HANS MORGENTHAU

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, in this week's issue of New Republic, Dr. Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, has written a moving and enlightening memoir of the life of Hans Morgenthau, who was his friend and teacher and who was indeed a teacher to a whole generation of Americans who have studied international affairs and international relations.

Few men have so marked an age by their work. He was, indeed, a seminal figure, as Dr. Kissinger states.

I ask unanimous consent that Dr. Kissinger's eulogy, if I may use that term—and it is an appropriate one—be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HANS MORGENTHAU

(By Henry Kissinger)

convinced that peace was a statesman's noblest objective, but he did not believe that this yearning alone would avoid war. He was a liberal in his political view but he thought his convictions required not simply an affirmation but sufficient stability at least to enable man's humane aspirations to prevail. He was willing to confront the political leader's fundamental dilemma—that moral aims can be reached only in stages, each of which is imperfect. Morality provides the compass course, the inner strength to face the ambiguities of choice.

In the 1960s, Hans proved that he was beyond the manipulation of military calculations. He opposed the war in Vietnam when it was still supported by all fashionable opinion. In 1966 he and I debated the issue in *Look* magazine. He considered America overextended, the war unwinnable, the stakes not worth the cost. I maintained that the size of our commitment had determined our stake, that we had an obligation to seek our way out of the morass through negotiation rather than unconditional abandonment of the enterprise. He was right in his analysis, probably in his policy conclusions as applied to 1966. Three years later—quite unexpectedly—I was faced with the problem as a policy maker. We both stuck to our convictions.

I will not debate their ultimate merit here. But I think it is important to understand that we shared almost identical premises. We both believed America was overextended; we both sought a way out of the dilemma. Hans wanted to cut the Gordian knot in one dramatic move: I chose a different route. But we were both in a way lonely among our associates. Hans is not correctly understood as a protester. He was a teacher trying to bring home to his beloved adopted country the limits of its power, just as earlier he had insisted on its central role. Through all these disagreements I never ceased admiring him

With the end of the war, our paths became increasingly parallel again, though I do not wish to burden Han's memory with the army of my critics. Hans remained always himself: clear in his perception, uncompromising in his insistence on getting to the essence of a problem. He meant much to me.

A word must be said about Hans as a human being. Few eminent men correspond to their images. Hans made his reputation as an analyst of power, but he was a gentle, loving man. He was a great teacher, yet quite shy. He had a marvelous, slightly sardonic sense of humor which never stooped to the malicious. Yet he was slightly tentative—at least in his dealings with me—in showing this side of himself. He would make a witty remark with an absolutely straight face, peering from behind his bushy eyebrows to see what the response would be. Only when he saw that his sally had been understood would his whole face crease in the smile of a mischievous little boy. He was a lovable man.

Hans Morgenthau was deeply conscious of his Jewish heritage. He knew that no people was more likely to be the victim of injustice and passion. He thus felt a special obligation to resist intolerance and hatred. And he understood that in this battle he must never stoop to the methods he was combatting. He was a noble man.

I saw Hans for the last time at breakfast a few weeks ago. He had grown quite frail, through mentally he was as alert as ever. His professorship at the New School had just ended. He spoke of how much teaching meant to him. Everyone must feel he makes a difference to the world, he said. And his vocation was teaching, which he hoped to continue. I told him that he already had made a big difference to the world; he did not have to prove himself constantly. He did not quite believe it. His life was his work. As he said on another occasion, he saw no sense in extending the one by cutting down on the other.

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PART I

On August 25 the Eleventh Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations will convene in New York to commence "Global Negotiations" concerning the condition of the developing countries, and the future of "international economic co-operation."

For the first time in the history of such conferences (there have been four since the founding of the U.N.) the delegates will confront a true as against rhetorical world economic crisis.

This is the crisis brought on by the OPEC cartel which has shaken the economies of the developed nations, and devestated those of the less developed. The crisis is now compounded by the upheaval in Iran, and Soviet advances. President Sadat has put it that the "entire Gulf region is shaking, not only Saudi Arabia, but all the emirates and sheikdoms there..."

Just as the crisis is unprecedented so is the opportunity. For the first time in this history of "North-South" relations there is an intense and perceived interest in the parties reaching agreement; and perhaps for the last time the United States has the power to bring it about. It is possible to commence arrangements in which the oil producers would be secure in their nations; the developed nations be

- 3 -

secure in their supplies; and the developing economies com-
paratively secure in both. Success would be momentous. So
would failure: much as the failure of the London Economic
Conference of 1930, the sign of an international system that
cannot save itself.

Failure is almost certain.

There have been two preliminary meetings. The
U.N. Conference on Tariffs and Trade (UNCTAD) met in Manila
in May 1979; the U.N. Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO) met in New Delhi last January. Both conferences failed.
Both failed according to plan; in a by-now ritualized pattern.
The United States did not desire failure, anymore than it
will desire failure at the coming special session. But it
acted so as to make failure almost certain, and is doing
so once more. The only success has been that of the Soviets,
for whom the Leninist doctrine persists: "The Worse the Better."

The pattern is simple enough. At the outset of
the Conference the LDCs, with a heavy majority of the votes,
present a set of propositions that are not going to be agreed
to. The Europeans and the Japanese keep their heads down.
The United States asks that the majority be reasonable. It
is not. Tensions mount, ending in a marathon closing session
at which the original demands of the LDCs are adopted by
them and rejected by the others in an atmosphere ranging

[10]

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from disappointment to bitter imprecation.

At Manila the group of 77 (now 120 countries) arrived with a huge agenda. The United States, the press reported, responded by being "almost invisible." (This was to contrast with a supposed confrontational past.) Ambassador Young's speech, "outlined very reserved positions and was peppered with such words as 'pragmatic', 'practical' and realistic.'" But there was nothing the least new in this. With the rarest exceptions it has been our position since the first UNCTAD conference in 1964 when George Ball, as Under Secretary of State lectured the Assembly on investment realities and the inevitability of gradualness. This was received with predictable enthusiasm, while the Soviet delegate won roaring applause by announcing that _his_ country would abolish _all_ tariffs on LDC exports. (As a state trading economy, the U.S.S.R. has no tariffs.)

A Philippine newspaper reported "Third World Disheartened by Young's Speech". It evidently availed little that the U.S. declined the use of the Mercedes Benz and chauffeur provided each delegation by the host country. In the end there was no agreement on any issue of substance. The spokesman for the O.E.C.D. countries declared the meeting a "failure." The official press release nonetheless reported that, "The Conference decided without dissent to launch a

[1c]

- 5 -

comprehensive new Programme of Action for the least developed countries...."

The New Delhi Conference of UNIDO followed the precise pattern. The Group of 77 arrived with a proposal for a vast transfer of wealth. The Americans responded with discussions of strategies for "endogenous industrialization." Nothing was achieved. An Indian newspaper headline "Poor Nations Let Down by the Rich."

This did not, of course, prevent the adoption of the "New Delhi Declaration and Plan of Action" calling for a $300 billion "North-South global fund to promote industrialization of developing countries." The official press release explained, "The fund would provide financing on soft terms and would be controlled by the developing countries, while developed countries would provide the bulk of the resources."

The developed countries voted against the Declaration; the "Socialist" countries voted for, it being understood they would not contribute.

The Conference also expressed "satisfaction that the Group of 77, by strengthening its solidarity and unity, is enhancing its collective negotiating power and expressing its right to share in international decision making." It called for efforts to end "colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, interference in internal affairs, racial discrimination, including apartheid and zionism, and all forms

[LJ]

- 6 -

of foreign agression, occupation, domination, hegemony, ex-
pansionism and exploitation".

## Two Sources of Failure

Now this is atrocious. The United States, with Britain, founded the U.N., set its directions, and has paid far the greater share of its costs. That we have allowed it to decline to such ritual incantation of hostility to or denial of the things we have tried to stand for is at very least a massive failure in statecraft. Worse, it comes at a time when we need the institution, absent any better setting in which to deal with the realities of a global economy and the global politics to which it has given rise. Success is not probable, not even likely. But it is *possible*, given the common interests that press the North-South countries at this moment. It seems almost an imposition to go through the data yet again.

The trade of the developing countries is overwhelmingly *with* the West; the transfer of capital to them is overwhelmingly *from* the West. Their economies can improve only as ours do-- and vice versa. The LDCs now account for more U.S. exports than the European Common Market and Japan combined. The U.S. imports half the developing-country manufactured exports to industrial countries.

*Things were not going that badly.* By the outset of the 1970's the developing countries were coming along well

- 7 -

by any historic or contemporary standards. During the 70's the real economic growth rates of the LDC's outpaced those of developed countries by better than half. Real per capita income rose by nearly 3½ percent annually; manufacturing output increased at an average rate of 7 3/4 percent. Developing countries trade grew at almost twice the pace of that of the developed economies.

Aid increased. In an address in New York given at the time of the New Delhi Conference C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, reported that for the Least Developed Nations aid receipts increased from 2.6 percent of combined GNP at the outset of the 1970's to over 10 percent by 1978. For all countries with per capita income below $400 the growth was from 3.3 to 4.7 percent of GNP-an increase of a third within the space of a decade. Bergsten went through an impressive recitation and concluded: "The record clearly belies any view that the United States has been ungenerous in its help, or protectionist in its trade, or unresponsive to the needs of others."

This to be sure was a period when the rhetoric of crisis was much in vogue. Scarcely a quarter passed without a new pronouncement of impending world famine, population explosion, or environmental collapse, such that this reality was easily obscured. The same pronouncements lessened the impression made by a true disaster when it did strike.

Bergsten puts it: "Developing countries have in fact been

[1c]

- 8 -

ravaged by OPEC's actions. In 1974 it took 4 percent of LDC exports to pay for their oil imports. In 1980...it will take 25 percent."

Oil price increases now routinely wipe out aid transfers. External debt of the non-OPEC developing countries grew from $142 billion in 1974 to $315 billion in 1978. Most of this came from private banks. Salomon Brothers estimates that American banks alone are now owed--from these LDCs--some 130 percent of their total equity capital and loan-loss reserves. In every relevent statistic our common interests would seem evident.

Yet they are not addressed. OPEC is the dirty little secret of every conference on North-South relations, or as an American at the UNCTAD meeting put it, the "hidden item on the agenda". At most there is an allusion in UNESE (if an acronym may be offered for a vocabulary generally designed to heighten anxiety!) to "developing countries with excess financial liquidity." But nothing has been done; nothing has been attempted.

It is difficult to ask the LDC's to confront the implications of OPEC. It is shattering alike to their hopes and to their ideology. (An ideology with which they maintain their organizational solidarity: an asset in which they understandably place much store.) And they do still have hopes

[Lc]

- 9 -

that they might get some share of the swag if they keep quiet.
But why do we keep quiet? (Or start blaming one another: the
administration blaming Congress; <u>Foreign Affairs</u> blaming the
administration?)

Is it beyond our explanatory powers to put it to
these nations, oil producers and consumers alike, that no
one's interest is being served by the present predatory, wildly
destabilizing arrangements? Evidently. And why? Because
we still do not see the issues as engaging our interests. We
look upon failure in North-South negotiations as something that
happens to someone else; whilst occasionally reproaching our-
selves for not perhaps having been sufficiently forthcoming.
At the conclusion of the UNIDO conference Ambassador John W.
McDonald, the leader of the U.S. delegation spoke up a bit.
"The declaration" he told the press, "attacked the West repeatedly,
unfairly blaming us for all the evils of the world. It ignored
the role of OPEC completely, and the East Europeans were
ignored completely. We are the bad boys and the Group of 77
are the good guys, doing everything right. We just think
this is the wrong way of having an international conference...."
This is the voice of a self respecting man who tried hard and
was disappointed. But if we are to follow Bacon, "Conference"
is supposed "to maketh the ready man." We are ready?

Had we considered who might think the collapse of
the New Delhi negotiations might be just the right way to run
an international conference? Complete with the closing

- 10 -

remarks of the Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao that
the onus for failure lay "squarely in one quarter."

The Soviets do, of course. And they see that with
each successive collapse some nation or other grows more
dependent, more compliant. Within months of the New Delhi
fiasco, India, with half the world's chronically undernourished
people, announced that it would export rice to the U.S.S.R.
in return for crude oil. In July India became the first
major nonaligned nation to recognize the Soviet-backed regime
in Cambodia.

So long as American policy regards the collapse
of such negotiations as a failure of good intentions, we
can be certain not to succeed.

- 11 -

PART II

How is this pattern of failure to be reversed?
We can thank Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie that we are
freer to ask this question today than in the recent past.
In an address in New York on July 8 Muskie, calling for
increased American efforts in this field, put it: "Declining
American aid, and declining American influence, would also
help the Soviets exploit internal instability. In Nicaragua,
in El Salvador, and in many other places where Soviets are
prepared to exploit tensions to expand their power and to limit
Western influence."
One need not agree with the analysis
that American aid increases American influence, nor yet with
the notion, if implied, that countries go Communist because
the people do not have good roads, in order to feel liberated
by the thought that it may at last be possible once more to
speculate that the _Soviets_ might have thought that failure
would be a good outcome for the recent New Delhi conference
of the United Nations Industrial Development organization.

It happens that the New Delhi conference provides
almost too good an example of the process. As a 'model' start
with the idea that the blocs of nations engaged in these
negotiations enter alliances with one another, much as
political parties do in a fractionated parliament. (I would
restate the thought that something like a party system is
emerging in world politics.) For some time there has been a

[LC]

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working arrangement between the Soviet bloc and the "Nonaligned,"
or the Group of 77 as they appear in this context. The
origins of this arrangement is complex, but it starts, with
a symmetry of rhetoric and analysis as between the two groups.
But the startling fact is that there is no corresponding
symmetry of *interest*. This is a huge reality: central to
this entire subject. In objective terms most developing
nations and the Soviet bloc could as well exist on different
planets for all the economic relationships they enjoy at this
point in their histories. The Soviet bloc buys almost
nothing from the LDCs, and gives almost nothing, save advice
on how to ensure that things get worse or appear worse.

Since Cuba became head of the nonaligned group in
1979, the Soviet task has been much facilitated. In prepara-
tion for the UNIDO meeting, the Group of 77 met in Havana in
December of 1979 and drew up the Havana Declaration, complete
with the $300 billion development fund. The Declaration was
dated January 3, but not made available to other delegations
until they arrived in New Delhi January 21. It was then trans-
formed verbatim into a conference document. As reported by
the U.S. delegation: "The 66 pages were in effect dumped
on all participants half way through the global conference
making it physically impossible for delegations to read, ab-
sorb and react in a meaningful fashion to this mess of difficult
material." Which is to say the proposal was presented in
such a manner that it would not be accepted. Which it was

[LC]

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not, and so the Conference failed.

How has this pattern come about? Reject out of
hand the notion that the representatives of the developing
countries do not know what goes on. They know perfectly well.
Why then do they acquiesce?

Put a slightly different way, what is the source
of the persistant unwillingness on the part of the developing
nations to reach agreements with the West in these meetings?
This is an absolutely central question. Almost everything
follows it.

The familiar answer is that these nations have
grievances; and are overwhelmed by them. To cite the New
Delhi declaration: "colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism..."
and so down the list to "occupation, domination, hegemony,
expansionism and exploitation."

And indeed they do. There are few that do not
have in their past a wound that hurts still and will go on
hurting. In superb testimony before a Congressional panel in
June Edward Heath, former British Prime Minister allowed
that this issue was continually put to the European members
of the Brandt Commission (The Independednt Commission on Inter-
national Development Issues) on which he served. "To which
our reply to my friends from the South, as far as my genera-
tion is concerned, I am now over 60. All we have done is not
colonize people, but to liberate them whether they like it
or not."

- 14 -

Both things are true and about the most an American
can do is to acknowledge both--with the particular perspective
of a nation that nursed its own grievances for a solid cen-
tury, and contributed its share to the grievances of others.
The rhetoric won't change, and it is too much to ask that
it should. It has little explanatory power for us, but a
great deal for them. It is in a sense necessary to them, and
in that sense rational.

But why then act in ways that appear to inhibit
or foreclose any effective response to such grievances? Why
act so that conferences fail and agreements are not reached?

Something as follows seems to be the case.

First. We are dealing by definition with elites,
which as much as any know their interests. These elites have
a pronounced political interest in perpetuating the (largely
Soviet) model of modernization through mobilization and
strong central control. As with Chinese Foreign Ministers,
they want to send their sons to Harvard, but they also want
that Five Year Plan. Increasingly, however, the experience
of modernization and now even the doctrine on the subject is
turning away from the mobilization model. At New Delhi the
American spokesman stressed "the endogenous nature of industrial
development" and called "for greater recognition of the fact
that internal development imbalances and inequalities call for
more urgent attention and higher priority in the use of scarce
development and resources than the problems of international

[c] -

- 15 -

development and inequalities which have received disproportionate attention..." There is a sense, then in which the more serious and willing the West is about development, the more our spokesmen are likely to be espousing a doctrine that threatens the rulers of these nations, however much it might advance the well being of the peoples they represent.

This ambivalence is sustained by a pervasive view that failure isn't really failure, indeed that sometimes it brings forth yet greater offerings. This is an understandable view. Most of these nations have been asked for the whole of them to view world affairs as a conflict in moral and political systems in which one side will do anything to win adherents. An atmosphere of crisis brings forth the best efforts. At New Delhi a member of the Mexican delegation allowed that the collapse of the conference there would only intensify American efforts for a successful outcome at the Special Session of General Assembly.

And the evidence? It is unclear, of course, but American aid did double in the years 1970-1978, a period in which the rhetoric of antagonism reached its present level.

Finally there is the Soviet opposition to success. For some time now Algeria and Cuba have been among the leaders of the nonaligned in these conferences. They more or less openly take orders from the Soviets, and on occasion, in turn, *order* that a conference fail. (This happened at the Sixth

[L]

- 16 -

Special Session of the General Assembly in 1974. As the meeting was about to break up the United States made an offer which many wanted to accept. Algeria said none was to be accepted and none was.) The Soviets have a complex of interests here. As they give virtually no aid themselves--some four hundredths of one percent of GNP--they have no interest in the West appearing to do so. And, simultaneously, by making clear that nothing can be expected of them, they direct pressure to the West.

Of late, however, this pressure has taken on a new element. Fear. Bernard Lewis, writing of the United Nations generally, has described the process in a compelling analogy:

> There is in the Euphrates area where Syria and Iraq meet, near the Turkish frontier, a little known Kurdish sect called the Yazidis. An aberrant offshoot separated from Islam at an early date. They are described by their neighbors as devil worshippers. This is a slander. The Yazidis are in fact dualists, surviving holders of a religious belief, once widespread in the Middle East, that there is not one but two eternal spirits, one of good, the other of evil, contending for the domination of the universe. Since the good spirit is by definition good and will remain so, the Yazidis devote most of their worship to propitiating the spirit of evil. Given their assumptions, this makes good sense. It is, thus unfair to call their beliefs worship; they might more appropriately be described as theological nonalignment.

Consider the New Delhi meeting, where some 2,000 delegates from 133 countries assembled three weeks after the Red

[L]

- 17 -

Army, as it were, first made its way to the Khyber Pass. Through 56 plenary speeches, the U.S. delegation reported, the word 'Afghanistan' was "not mentioned once." (Or consider the June meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Sierra Leone. Not a word was said about Cuban and the East German troops marauding about the continent. But a stern resolution declared the American base at Diego Garcia, 12,000 miles out in the Indian Ocean, to be a "threat to Africa.")

A football coach might follow such a tactical analysis, but it is not to be expected that a Secretary of State will, or more importantly, that a State Department will. And so, in the main, the ever rising rhetorical hostility and ever increasing negotiation breakdown was simply avoided. The present administration took this to be a sign of indifference, and came to office genuinely determined to change things. Nothing changed; in some respects the worsening trend continued. And so the incidents have gone from merely avoiding the facts to actually denying them.

Thus the highpoint to date of Soviet influence on Non-aligned pronouncements came at the Havana meeting of Heads of State in August 1979. The Final Declaration was the most poisonous and extensive anti-American tract ever to emerge from such a gathering. Just last May, however, in an address to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, President Carter stated: "...We can be proud of our accomplishments in building strong

- 18 -

new bridges to the developing world....Last year's meeting in Havana was a notable example of Soviet failure, through their puppet Castro regime, to convince the other nonaligned countries to be subsurvient to the Soviets..."

If the United States has borne with all this, and the Europeans ever so slightly conspired in it--better that we be denounced than they--it is because our institutions have never taken the trouble to understand the forces at work and because the outcomes haven't seemed to matter that much anyway.

Surely these circumstances are past. Its forces are understandable, and the outcomes do matter. The world is a far more dangerous place than it has ever been for us. We enter a decade in which the Soviets are going to surpass us in military power, or think they have done, with the knowledge that if they are foolish enough to allow us the time, we appear disposed to restore our traditional advantage. Whether or not the Soviets move, the Persian Gulf region could collapse at any moment. Even if it does not, the economies dependent on it are becoming unstable. In his superb Congressional testimony, Heath put it: "We have high inflation, high unemployment, high interest rates, no growth, and a constant rise in the price of the basic raw material for all industry, which is oil. We've never had this situation before in economic history." The oil importing LDCs, he continued, are if anything worse off. "The cost of oil and the cost of servicing the debt last year for

[LC]

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Brazil was more than all its exports put together. In the meantime, the Saudis sit there wondering who it was seized their holy places in Mecca. The United States has a strategic oil supply reserve that would keep us for ten days.

_Does anyone grasp the situation?_ The world is on the edge of convulsion. One successful meeting at the United Nations is not going to change that, but another failure could bring us het closer.

Congressman Bingham of New York asked Heath what he would do about the coming Special Session. The answer was direct and useful. We have to "recreate" the world economy. We have to have a guarantee of oil supplies for the next twenty years in order to get out of the overdependence of the present period: a dependence the oil exporters don't want anymore than the importers. We have to protect the exporters, and finance the importers. Everyone shares this interest—including the Soviets if they but knew. There _is_ a world economy: if it collapses everyone collapses. Massive defaults. Closings down. Panic. War?

How is this to be done? Let me first declare an interest. The last Special Session of the General Assembly on North-South relations was held in 1975. It was expected to fail as its predecessors had done. It did not. After two intense weeks it ended with unanimous agreement to a long list of undertakings, including measures to deal with the OPEC induced

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payments problems of the LDCs. (Without these a score of develop-
ing nations would have defaulted by now.) I represented the
President and the Secretary of State, Gerald Ford and Henry
Kissinger--and can report how it was done.

First, the Secretary decided that it should be. He
would not accept failure. Second, we would risk failure. But
this would be known and we would assign the responsibility.
(Even the least open of the new nations has some public opinion.
A cost can be imposed on governments that contrive not to
obtain what they noisily demand. The Marxists call this "de-
mystification.") Third we took the initiative in a four hour
opening day speech--and held it. So we stayed up longer,
talked more, flooded the place with paper. We rejected nothing,
but rewrote everything to conform in others' languages to our
proposals. We never got mad, but made clear that we would not
shrug off failure, that we would try to make it costly for
those we judged responsible. We ended up, after every pos-
sible crisis, with unanimous agreement.

It wasn't that hard. The LDCs needed an agree-
ment, and we wanted one. The Europeans weren't against it,
and the Soviets couldn't prevent it once our initiative took
hold.

The situation is in that sense even more promising
today. The LDCs desperately need someone to raise the OPEC