TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger

April 25, 1974

12:01 PM

K: Joe, have you seen a cable here from Aikins that he asked the Saudis to extend an invitation to the President for a visit.

S: No, I haven't.

K: Look, we've just got to get more discipline into this.

S: Is there such a cable?

K: Yes, there is such a cable.

S: Well, let me see what it is.

K: Well, there's nothing to see what it is, Joe. You've got to get these guys in line.

S: He would have done this totally on his own responsibility.

K: Yes, but there is too much flapping around. These guys have to learn that they are serving the God-damn United States and not themselves. No one has asked him to discuss this.

S: He certainly hasn't.

K: What are we going to do with an invitation if the President isn't coming?

S: That's a good question.

K: There was never any question that the President would be welcome there.

S: I'm sorry to hear this, Mr. Secretary and I have no answer and no explanation.

K: Well, take a look at it.

S: Alright, I will.

END

By DECLASSIFIED
 authority EC 12958
 NARA Date 6-8-84

TELECON

Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger

April 24, 1974

12:04 PM

S: I could only make two assumptions, either our Ambassador has lost his mind or there is somekind of a back channel message.

K: There is no back channel message.

S: Well then he's lost his mind.

K: You know, there's a back...

S: I would be at least as angry as you are. I think you're being really terribly restrained. What the hell would urge this guy to even raise this in this way. What do you think I ought to do, slap him down or ...

K: Just tell him to stay the hell out of that without authorization and tell Saqqaf we have no question that we're invited, the King told me when I was there.

S: As far as you're concerned the invitation's been rendered.

K: That's right, we don't need a special letter.

S: Alright, I'll do something very quickly.

K: Also, I've drafted a reply -- we couldn't get you this morning. I thought your letter -- that message to Sadat was a little ambiguous. It made it almost sound as if I had to decided to meet Gromyko in Damascus.

S: Oh really. Did you think that. You saw the x incoming.

K: I've asked Larry to come -- to go down and show you what I think we should say.

S: You notice, by the way, that you're even getting resistance from the Egyptia
on the scenario that you outlined, really, at least from Fahmy.

K: Yes.

S: They sure as hell don't want that guy around even while you're in Cairo.
Alright, I'll do something on this.

K: Alright. Bye.

END

DELLADIFILU
Authority E0 12958
By C8 NARA Date 6-8-04

TELECON
John Dunlap/Secretary Kissinger

April 24, 1974

12:17 PM

K: How are you?

D: Fine.

K: I just wanted to check with you what your reflections ....

D: Yes. I gather you're leaving town, anyway.

K: On Sunday, yes.

D: I had wanted to talk with George about it and he's been away, as you know, I must say it is a very challenging situation.

K: As long as you're willing -- if you're moving in that direction I can wait till I get back.

D: When are you going to be back - a week?

K: About 10 days or two weeks.

D: That's too damn long, isn't it. Well, why don't I do this, I wanted to have a good heart to heart talk with George about it and he's coming back Monday, as you know, Sunday, no Monday morning. And I thought I would talk with him and then be back in tough with you.

K: If you can reach me on the trip, then we could start the....

D: I will be back to you by Wednesday -- I need one chat with George. That's really what I need.

K: Do I correctly understand that you're leaning in that direction.

D: Well, I'm willing to say to you I certainly -- it represents a major change in my work as you know. Because it's not the area of my -- I mentioned this to you the other day.

K: Look, I have to learn it and I don't know anything about economics and I really think that in all these top policy jobs, it's really, if you know how to get the experts into evaluation, then.....

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCONE

Mankiewiecz/Sec. Kissinger

April 24, 1974

2:32 p. m.

M: I had no idea when I last spoke to you that you were sort of -way down the aisle. I asked if you were going to Acapulco or Syria and you thought I had gone out of my mind. Very well done. I congratulate you. She always struck me as a marvelous woman. I am a great admirer.

K: We have got to get together soon.

M: I have two matters to tell you. One is the trip that I told you about is now on.

K: Wait a minute now -- what trip was that?

M: To the Caribbean.

K: I must have blanked out *on* that.

M: I told you that I might be doing a television interview with...

K: Yes, yes, I know exactly -- of course. Good. Then I want to see you.

M: Yes. Well it's a .......

K: When?

M: Well, it's six weeks away.

K: Well, let's do it when I get back from the Middle East.

M: When you get back -- early in May?

K: Yes.

M: I'm going to England on the 17th of May so maybe sometime in between there, or even after the 1st of June. It will be late in June.

K: I must see you before you do that.

M: I think there might be something useful in that. I'm delighted to hear about the Chilean. You're leaving at the end of this week and coming back....

K: I'm leaving on Sunday.

M: Do you think before you leave you could get us a tentative date. I'm told..

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Mankiewiecz - page 2

K: Let me look it over.

M: ...that our seminar file is in your action file. We've been talking to Eagleburger and to Gompert. If you could just give them a tentative date before you go that would be good.

K: Good.

M: Now you mentioned one other things once which I think would be very useful in light of a lot of things that have happened, which is, you suggested that Maxx Holly and I should put on a very discrete evening with critics of a kind that you're not likely to meet.

K: I would like that.

M: ...in your normal travels. Nothing public or anything like it. Responsible concerned people who are not members of the foreign relations committee, or even members of the Senate but who have some influence. Are you still interested in that?

K: Yes, I am, very much.

M: Maybe we could try to work that out -- May I think is probably too quick, but maybe after the 1st of June.

K: Why don't you and I talk as soon as I get back.

M: Alright. But we'll have to do that, we'll talk sometime between the 5th and the 7th of May.

K: Right. I don't think I'll be back until the 10th.

M: Alright, whenever it is.

K: We'll talk in that period and then we'll set that evening.

M: And then if you could tell Larry or somebody, if you can pick a date after the 10th, anytime in the rest of May for this seminar thing. That will be fine. And then we'll talk about the other thing when we talk, because it looks very serious and I think it's not without significance.

K: It is of significance because it fits in with other things.

M: Exactly. The time cable strikes me as an interesting one and of course I will say not a word to anyone.

DECLASSIFIED
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DECLASSIFIED
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Mankiewicz - page 3

K: And the NY Times with it's great acumen has missed the whole point of what we did with Cuba at the OAS.

M: Really? I haven't seen the Times.

K: Well, they have an editorial complaining.

M: Complaining that you didn't do anything.

K: That the Latin's know what we're doing.

M: Of course they do. I got that from the AP. If you know how to read and if you know how Latin's talk, it was quite obvious. I wasn't surprised when this other thing came along. I think we can make all kinds of ground.

K: Exactly. What you're doing may fit really very nicely into it.

M: I hope that you will not mention it to anybody.

K: Look, it's against my interest.

M: Where it could get back to them. Above all, we certainly don't want them to think....

K: No, no. What you can do is to give your impressions. I don't want you to be a messenger.

M: But in any event, you don't know that I'm going or at least you're not treating it very seriously because otherwise they get the impression that I seem to be but that I'm indeed some kind of ....

K: No, I'm not going to talk to anybody about it.

M: Good.

K: There's no need for me to talk to anybody.

M: But file the information away that that happened a day or two ago, it should effect your thinking about other things, perhaps.

K: Exactly. No, I don't consider it an accident.

M: I don't either. Just put it into your file and I think it's significant, if you want to know, that this was the only one accepted.

DECLASSIFIED

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Mankiewiecz - page 4

K: What channels did they use? I mean, they didn't use the Soviets, that's all I....

M: No, they used their own UN mission.

K: OK, well that's fine.

M: And simultaneously did not accept major networks, all of which had been asking for the same thing.

K: That's intelligence.

M: In other words, they want exposure, but.....

K: But from somebody with political sophistication.

M: Exactly.

K: Very intelligent.

M: And whom they have reason to believe, you know, if not friendly, at least open.

K: Exactly.

M: So, it all sort of fits together and I'm.....

K: Look, as soon as you hear that I'm back, will you call me.

M: Yes, I will.

K: Good, Frank.

M: I will and if you could give them a date, we'd set something up for late May on the other thing.

K: Right.

M: Alright, Thank you, Henry and congratulations.

K: Thank you, Frank.

K END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By CB NARA Date 6-8-87

TELCOM
Sisco/Sec. Kissinger

April 24, 1974

3:57

K: Will you let Sadat know what the response from Asad was?

S: Yes, we will.

K: Just so that we close the circle.

S: A good response wasn't it.

K: I tell you how to lose friends.

S: Isn't that fantastic. These guys must be so heavy handed.

K: It is not to be believed.

S: I would never have believed it if I were in the outside and someone told me this I'd just blink and say it's beyond this world.

K: Why don't you first tell Asad, send a message to Asad thanking him, telling him that this is exactly how we will proceed and not to pay attention to anything else that will be told to him. That may be told to him.

S: Right.

K: And second, tell Sadat how we will proceed and add this gives us an opportunity for a full discussion before any decisions need to be made.

S: Yes. On the Security Council, I think we've made a bit of progress. The British now, we got to the Foreign Minister through Ramsbotham -- I'm doing it all on this end because John can't really do any good in N. Y. And now they're going to Israel and saying to Eban we're ready to go ahead and co-sponsor this now but with this change and we want to be sure this is OK with you. In other words, they're checking with the Israelis themselves, which is a very good thing.

K: Good.

S: And I'm seeing Dinitz in a few minutes.

K: Then call Dinitz and tell him that this was done at our pressure.

S: He's coming in right now because I need to take up with him those couple of little things, very, very low key that I sent you a wire out over the weekend, but the first thing I'll tell him is precisely what I've just told you

April 24, 1974

5:55 PM

S: The situation in NY is moving very rapidly and I wanted to describe it to you and get some guidance and make a recommendation to you on how to handle it. The meeting is about to convene. We've been able to delay it for a couple of hours but no more than that. I gather the Lebanese Foreign Minister needs to get back to Lebanon. The expected scenario is as follows: One that the original non-aligned text which was very bad from our point of view will be submitted by someone. Secondly, the unamended draft, the draft you looked at over the weekend will somehow get to the table. I'm not quite sure you will the sponsor be. Now, Scali needs guidance and the guidance that should be given in my judgment is as follows. The presumption, by the way, is that of these two resolutions, the one that you looked at over the weekend would have priority in the voting. Scali should be told to arrange for someone to submit the amendment to paragraph two and if he can't get anybody, to submit that amendment, he should do it himself, to that paragraph. Then to get the British and the others to vote for this resolution with the thing in it. Vote for the amendment, if the amendment carries, they vote for the resolution. If the amendment fails to carry, we abstain on the resolution. That would be my recommendation. And to get as many of the others -- it would pass you understand, but I think on that basis we would probably have -- I want to confirm this -- we would probably have the British, perhaps the Austrians and perhaps the Australians at least abstaining with us. Which is not bad.

K: But would it carry then?

S: It would carry. My judgment is that it would carry. This is the resolution, you know, the one I'm talking about.

K: That we negotiated with the Lebanese.

S: That's correct.

K: But how will it makes us look with the Lebanese?

S: Well, they won't be entirely happy, they would obviously prefer an affirmative note, but on the other hand, we will have supported the amendment and that will be the basis for really our abstention.

K: OK.

S: That's my recommendation and I haven't had a chance to check it either with Roy or with ....

K: Now, I had a message from Callaghan.

S: Yes, I just ready it.

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Sisco - page 2

K: Right.

S: And R<sub>a</sub> msbotham x has just called me 5 minutes ago.

K: Right. Which Which makes it very clear where we stand.

S: You know, if however, we find...

K: In fact, he doesn't want to go as far -- he would vote for it.

S: Vote for the resolution?

K: Yes.

S: With the amendment.

K: No. He would vote for it without the amendment.

S: Well, let me see that. Because if that's what they would do, then we've got to be together on this.

K: He wants the French to put forward...

S: Yes, but I'm just k getting the last page here. Well, if they are going to vote affirmatively and if the Australians and the Austrians are going to vote affirmatively, even if that amendment is not adopted, then I think we're in difficulty abstaining.

K: That's w x what I think. So I think Scali's instructions ought to be that -- at any rate we ought to be for the amendment and if necessary put it forward outselv

S: Right.

K: If the amendment -- if Britain and Austria or even Britain alone abstains, then we should abstain with it.

S: Sure.

K: If they do not abstain, then we should vote for it and x make a public statement saying that we interpret paragraph to mean that it is directly relevant to the...

S: As is evident by our support of the amendment.

K: Right.

S: I've got it. I think that's x sounder.

K: Good. Thank you.

END

TELECON
William Simon/Secretary Kissinger

April 24, 1974
6:13 PM

S: Hi, Henry.

K: Hello, Mr. Secretary-designate.

S: How are you, sir.

K: OK.

S: I wanted to talk to you just briefly about lesser developed nations and aid programs and everything that's being suggested. We have no real domestic plan. Iran has one, Saudi Arabia has one, everybody's coming up with a different idea. What I'd like to suggest is that the State Department and the Treasury Department get together and I'll just have Volker and (Denite) get together with whomever you please, to get together a United States Government posture on aid for the lesser developed nations as far as the oil problem is concerned.

K: On these bilateral things.

S: Well, it perhaps could be a topic and this is just one suggesting, for the producer-comsumer meeting. Maybe that is the proper form to handle lesser developed nations.

K: I, ll have Sisco, Donaldson and Denix, Enders on my side.

S: OK, and I'll have Volker and E. Deni Denite.

K: Good. But we should include in this also these various bilateral deals.

S: Sure.

K: I think it's a good idea.

S: Great, well I'll get it going right now because I think it's important before we get in a corner.

K: Right.

S: Wonderful. Thanks, Henry.

K: Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
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TELECON

Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger

April 24, 1974

6:33 PM

K: Do you know what John Hunts wants on Friday.

S: I'm trying to guess. It apparently concerns with the super antelop matter
but exactly what it is I don't know.

K: Well, how the hell can I make a decision if I don't know what's going on.

S: I'm trying to get together for you everything that bears on it.

K: Well, why don't you ask Ramsbotham what's it's all about.

S: I have tried and I'm not sure he knows, but I will ask him now again.
My guess is -- well I'll ask him.

K: Will you also tell Ramsbotham we're very eager to get the Diego Garcia
concluded.

S: Yes, You know what happened yesterday in the Senate.

K: I know. We still want it concluded.

S: Yes. OK, I'll call him.

K: And also I'd like the Hunt appointment in the morning.

S: Well, I better check that with -- have you told you schedule makers -- well
I'll talk with them.

K: Oh, about 11:00 or 11:30.

S: Yes. OK.

K: Thank you.

END

TELECON

Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Sec. Kissinger

April 26, 1974

10:20 am

K: Look, I have a press conference at 11:00, what is the problem.

S: No, no, it is clear that if the Russians give you everything you want on emigration they are going to be hit on the Credits anyway and they know it, so they have no incentive to give you anything on emigration.

K: No, but they have an incentive to give me something on credits.

S: Well, but the credit thing they can't control because Scoop is going to, you know, if they get this amendment through, it means they can veto any credit of any kind of quantity on any ground they want, even if the Russians behave perfectly on emigration, they can veto it on national security grounds. So the Russian incentive to give you something on emigration with this thing hanging over their heads is much less since they have no guarantee that they'll get major credits. And that's Scoop operation on this. He doesn't give a damn about the Trade Bill any more, because he'll get you on the other thing. The only reason I intervened is you know, I have to testify in your behalf before the Stevenson Committee on Thursday.

K: Well, you say we're against it, it depends how the Amendment is written.

S: Well, I think we have to say in public that this is something..

K: Look, I have got to prepare for the press conference.

S: Alright.

END

DECLASSIFIED
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TELECON

Elliot Richardson/Secretary Kissinger

April 25, 1974

11:45 AM

R: Henry.

K: How nice to hear from you.

R: Nice to hear your voice. What an exciting life you've been having lately.

K: Oh, that part of it. My personal life, yes.

R: Well, the whole thing. I follow it like housewives follow a soap opera.

K: Aren't you nice.

R: I was prompted to call you now, rather than any of the other times I might have done it, by the fact that I happened to get a call from Brad Moore who says that Barbara Jackson is in NY and very anxious for a few minutes with you.

K: Well, I'm going to the Middle East on Sunday. If it can wait till after I get back, certainly.

R: When will you be back?

K: By the 10th of May.

R: And you obviously can't do it before that.

K: Not really.

R: OK, well, what it's about is the very critical problem of smaller countries that are being caught in a horrible price squeeze on raw material.

K: No, I'm very interested in that.

R: Well, you know her better than I do. I think she's an impressive woman.

K: Yes.

R: Whatever ideas she had would be worth a little while. Maybe just somebody she could see in the meanwhile there. Anyway, that's what it was about.

K: Yes. Let me think, because Sisco would be the other one, but he's going with me.

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Richardson - page 2

R: Well, I hope thiangs go well on the trip.

K: Well, it's the water shed, if we bring off the Syrian disengagement, we're
over the hump for a year.

R: Yes, that would be terrific. I think I can guess the significance of it for
Sadat and so on.

K: Exactly.

R: Well, good luck, Henry. I'd love to see you sometime.

K: No, as soon as I'm back let's have lunch.

R: Will you call me.?

K: Yes, but if I don't will you call me.

R: Alright, I will. Congratulations. Nancy for me.

K: Thank you. It is always reassuring for me if someone congratulates her.
Everyone congratulates me.

R: I think you deserve an incidental congratulation too, Henry.

K: I do.

R: I think it's marvelous.

K: Hope to see you very soon.

R: I hope so too. Thank you. Bye.

K: Bye.

END

TELECON

Art Hartman/Secretary Kissinger

April 25, 1974

5:00 PM

K: Arthur, I wonder whether I should talk to Sheerer or whatever his name is, in Geneva on Monday.

H: It would be very good if you could.

K: Why don't you do it. I've just checked off your memo, I go for option B with a preference for B2 to be decided in mid-May.

H: Alright, Good.

K: I'd like to talk to him and also it will give the impression to Gromyko that I'm taking it seriously.

H: Yes. Oh, that would be very good.

K: So, will give that some publicity.

H: Good.

K: Have we got any other negotiators in Geneva?

H: Just, well no, Alex isn't back there. No I don't believe we have any.

K: Well, Sheerer I should see anyhow.

H: Yes.

K: Good.

END

TELECON
Senator Kennedy/Secretary Kissinger

April 25, 1974

6:55 PM

HAK: Hello?

K: Henry, how are you?

HAK: I tell you, you keep up this detenting, I'm going to get Jackson after
you.

K: I was over there, you wouldn't have believed how wonderful I was to you over there.

HAK: I thought you were very good. REally, I have no complaint.

K: I'd like you to take a look of the talks, I think there would be very little in there that you wouldn't agree with. I think....

HAK: Well, I've seen....

K: Public statements and the private conversations.

HAK: Really, Ted, I think that you really behaved in a most responsible way and very constructive for the US national interests, as I see.

K: You're Your people were very good.

HAK: I've seen some of the reporting cables.

K: They've been very helpful. I was particularly impressed with the Ambassador down in Romania. A younger fellow down there.

HAK: Yes. He's one of the young fellows we put in there.

K: I thought very impressive. I had verbatim notes on that Brezhnev, which I'd be glad to let you see. We gave a briefing here, the Ambassador's representative over there. If you had a minute on the phone I could fill you in while talking to you or I can come by and see you, whatever is necessary easier. I know you're getting ready for a trip.

HAK: Well, when are you free?

K: I was going out of the city tomorrow, I'll probably be back here on Saturday afternoon.

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Kennedy - page 2

HAK: Well, we could get together briefly on Saturday or I could -- yes I think it might be best ~~xx~~ if Saturday....

K: If I could check in with you on Saturday morning and find out what you're....

HAK: Good. Would you do that.

K: If it gets ~~tomorrow~~ right I could chat with you over the phone if it doesn't work out.

HAK: Good. Wonderful.

K: OK.

HAK: Again, I really think you did a very constructive job.

K: I hope so. I think, as you well know, there's -- from successful negotiations is very good opportunities and I think you've got up your sleeve ~~too~~ very some still very difficult problems but I think there's still an awful lot that can be achieved.

HAK: That's what I think and that's why we're so eager to keep this process going.

K: Yes, and it's just terribly important. I mean, there's nothing more important.

HAK: Well, I agree with you completely. I would like to talk to you, not just about your trip but about the over all international situation.

K: If I could in the middle of the morning, if that's alright, in your office at the Department.

HAK: At the Department.

HAK: I have a meeting at the White House from 9 to 11. From 11 on I'll be in the Department.

HAKxx. Fine, OK. Thanks, very much, Henry.

HAK: Good. Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
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By NARA Date 6-8-84

TELECON

Mr. President/Sec. Kissinger

April 26, 1974

10:40 am

K: Mr. President

N:L Hello, Henry. On the Portugese thing, let's be sure that we have a man over there that is close to that new junta and you know the Portugese are like the Brazilians for obvious reasons, they just like to do things constitutionally and, but don't shove them in the direction for doing something for Africa, the hell with it.

K: No, no, but I think that is one of the reasons for the...

N: you understand if they do it is for them, but I just don't want us pushing them around.

K: Actually, we have been helpful to them. We have been helpful to the old government within the constraints of our Congressional limitations.

N: Second point, Lebanon.

K: Oh that came out well.

N: Good.

K: We passed resolution for which we voted.

N: Did it make little news summary. That I figured that meant it was all right.

K: XXX That's right. The Jewish community is sorta [Jewish community] mumbling that I had them in yesterday and I told them

N: Tell them what the hell was our choice.

K: I told them they should give us credit that it isn't a question of our voting for this resolution it was our taking an impossible resolution, and making it a possible one and having made their formal complaint they are all right.

N: Good. Make any points with them? on MFN or anything like that?

K: Yes. Although our overwhelming problem XXX now isn't MFN its the credits which they are also not the Jews which Jackson is trying to cut off.

N: Oh, credits to the Russians.

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President/Kissinger

K: Yes.

N: Well, look by God we just can't allow that.

K: On MFN I think got the

N: On the credits who are we working on?

K: Well I had Brent, Brent said

N: Well, even Mansfield would help us on that, I think.

K: Well, I think on the credit credits we may be able to work out a formula. Because there the Jewish community hasn't committed itself. and I don't think they are going to commit themselves.

N: They would be out of their minds.

K: And

N: Just tell them we need the credits in order to keep the Russians from playing <u>mischief</u> role in ME. That is what it is really about. You know it and I know it.

K: Of course. Absolutely.

N: Right.

K: So

N: Do they want us to have a stroke at the Russians or not have stroke that's it. Do they want us to be able to get out Jews from Russia or not get them out.

K: Exactly.

N: And by God if they just turn the credits off that <u>ox</u> would be the straw that broke the camel's back.

K: No question that would be worse than MFN.

N: Right.

K: Actually Jackson is <u>irresponsible</u>.

N: We all know that.

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-3-

President/Kissinger

N: You're leaving Sunday?

K: I'm leaving Sunday, Mr. President.

N: God bless you and good luck.

K: Well

N: Hope it works out and in meantime. If I do take a trip, I think the sooner the quicker.

K: I agree.

N: What do you think about 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 or what?

K: I would say any time from the 25th on.

N: It will be the 25th, OK.

K: And I'll set it while I am out there. As soon as

N: Get indications from everybody.

K: That's right. And as soon and then we can announce it within a few days of my return.

N: The quicker the better that we can announce it too, Henry.

K: Right Mr. President.

N: All right. Fine. You feeling all right?

K: I am feeling fine. I am having a press conference in about 20 minutes.

N: Oh, fine, fine.

K: But it is mostly about foreign aid

N: Give'em my love. And incidentally be sure you hit the fact. Let's talk w very candidly, the investment in Egypt and the investment in Viet Nam and the investment in peace that's all.

K: Exactly.

N: Peace that is all we are talking about. It is no give away, it is no donor thing or anything like that. It isn't something to get us involved, it is a way to keep out of war in the ME. To keep

TELECON

Congressman Doc Morgan/Secretary Kissinger

April 26, 1974

12:15 PM

K: Mr. Chairman, how are you?

M: Very good. I'm just trying to get some votes.

K: Are you down below 80% already?

M: Oh, yes - I'm slipping. We've got to work for this thing.

K: I don't have to tell you that I'm -- that we're all pulling for you. I'm calling you about the Cambodian drawdown authority. We were given 250 million dollars last year, but the conference report indicated that the congressional hope was not to draw down more than 200 million for Cambodia. Now we're in a position where we will actually run out of ammunition if we don't use the extra 50 million. Legally we have a right to do it but we didn't want to do it without consultation in view of this conference report and we wonder what your attitude would be.

M: Well, Mr. Secretary, if it's an emergency like that, I'm for using the 250.

K: It is an emergency.

M: No problem with me, Mr. Secretary.

K: Thank you. When I come back from my trip would you think it would be appropriate to meet with your Committee and just brief them on it.

M: I think it would be wonderful.

K: We'll schedule it as soon as I return.

M: OK.

K: Right, Bye.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>EC 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>CO NARA</td><td>Date</td><td>6-8-74</td></tr></table>

TELECON

Mr. Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger

April 26, 1974

12:25 PM

K: Jack, two things. I saw Rabasa yesterday, he told me about his conversation with you. I just want you to know if he's made it at you that's his problem. If I'm made at you, I'll tell you, I don't tell you through Rabasa.

JK: I know that.

K: You know, he isn't running the Department yet.

JK: I know. He said he wanted to clear the air with me because we've been friends.

K: No, he complained bitterly to me about you, but what he complained about was your carrying out my instructions. What he complained about was your short communique which was my instruction to you.

JK: And at hearing so forcibly, forcibly all night long to the long one that we've worked out.

K: Yes, but that's fine. It worked out perfectly. We wouldn't have gotten the end result if we hadn't proceeded this way.

JK: I know. I think he just wanted to apologize or clear the air. He really was very.....

K: I just wanted you to know that when he said he was made at ____, that didn't reflect my view. The second thing is, he mentioned to me, I don't know whether he's mentioned to you, and also the ____, that they would be willing -- they wanted to give any asylum to ____, and Almeida and they would undertake a promise not to engage in political activities. They want us to pass that on to the Chilean Government. Do you see any reason why we shouldn't?

JK: No, as a matter of fact the Chilean Ambassador is coming in this afternoon to discuss this arms question with me.

JK: Well, would you raise that with him?

JK: I will and I can tell him as I told you earlier that there are job opportunities, teaching opportunities available for these two in the US.

K: Well, I wouldn't get into that because in the US they'll be pains in the neck.

JK: In any case, he said that after their trial it looks like they're going to be expelled or deported.

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Kubisch - page 2

K: Well, let them go to Mexico where Rabasa has promised -- why do we want them.

JK: I agree.

K: Tell them that Rabasa has promised it to me and we would see to it that he'd carry out his promise.

JK: OK. After we do that, do you want to send a message to Rabasa...

K: That we've done it.

JK: That we've done it. To __too?

K: Yes.

JK: Anything else?

K: How are we doing on the ____.

JK: We're waiting for an answer from Agriculture. I've got a draft letter just waiting for a clearance from Agriculture.

K: Tell Agriculture I've got to have an answer this afternoon.

JK: We have told them that. If we need your help, I've sent you a note, we may ask you to call somebody, but I think we can get it sorted.

K: Good. Thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority CO 12958
By CD NARA Date 6-9-64

TELECON

Senator Sparkman/Secretary Kissinger

April 26, 1974

12:35 PM

K: Senator, how are you? I'm seeing you this afternoon. I'm calling you, I don't know whether that's the right procedure and you can pass it as acting chairman of the committee because we have this problem. Last year the Congress gave us 250 million dollars of drawndown authority for Cambodia but at the same time the conference report pointed out that they would hope that we don't exercise more than 200 million. As it turns out we are in an emergency in Cambodia where if we don't use the other 50 million we have to suspend delivery of ammunition. I've talked to Chairman Morgan about this and he feels that under those conditions he would go along with it. There's no legal objection to it, but the intent of the conference committee was clearly expressed in a strong hope that we wouldn't go beyond 200 million.

S: Yes, well my feeling would be that is a wish that was expressed but it has no binding effect and if it's needed, I think it's possible to do and do it.

K: OK. Can I mention that to our people?

S: Yes.

K: Right. This is the right...

S: You realize there are some on our committee that probably wouldn't agree.

K: No, I know that. Can I tell you personally that I'm relieved you are acting chairman.

S: Well, thanks. It really keeps me busy trying to run two committees.

K: Yes, I understand.

S: well, I enjoy it.

K: It's a great to us.

S: That is my view point and...

K: So, we'll proceed on that basis.

S: Fine.

K: Thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12458
By NARA Date 6-8-74

TELECO N
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

April 26, 1974

12:40 PM

K: ____ to Sparkman and Morgan and they both approve our drawing down
50 million.

S: Great. That's very good.

K: Probably makes an irreversible enemy out of Fulbright. I just think the
______ danger of calling him in Arkansas and turning me down, is too great.

S: No, I agree.

K: I called his office, he wasn't in town.

S: I think you've done the right thing then. Did Sparkman sayk anything about....

K: Now, let's get a little money into Arkansas for ____, because I can't afford
having a ____ Fulbright again. OK, Brent.

S: Good. Thanks.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-94

April 26, 1974

3:05 PM

K: I think ____ will be the following arrangement. If we could put the re-scheduling study into the ____ text, which is after all ____ by Treasury, we would go along with it as long as actual negotiations are handled by State. Can you agree on that?

S: Sure, as far as I'm concerned, I don't care what we do as long as we get a study, but I will have to talk to George about that on Monday and tell him that's what you said.

K: Good.

S: Thank you. Bye.

END

<table><tr><td>DELLADIFFICILE</td></tr><tr><td>Authority EC 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By CO NARA Date 6-8-84</td></tr></table>

TELECON

William Simon, Secretary Kissinger

April 26, 1974

3:45 PM

S: Hi, Henry.

K: How are you Secretary Designate? Are they ever going to confirm you?

S: Well, Russel Long came back from Louisiana Monday night and he called me, my hearings were Wednesday morning and they have an executive session, I was reported out unanimously this morning and it will be voted on, he tells me, Monday.

K: I see. Some of us had to hang in there for two weeks.

S: That's right.

K: Bill, on that rescheduling exercise that Shultz is so interested in.

S: That rescheduling?

K: Yes. He wants Treasury to head the study and a lot of my guys were bleeding. Let me make this suggestion to you. I would agree to Treasury chairing the study if you do it within the framework of the __, which you're chairing anyway. You see what I mean?

S: Sure.

K: As long as we handle the actual negotiations, once there is a policy, which is the existing procedure anyway.

S: It is, that's the way it's done now.

K: Yes.

S: I see no reason why we shouldn't do it that way.

K: OK, why don't we work it out that way. I don't mind your chairing the study and chairing the policy body, I think it is sort of demoralizing for my people not to handle the negotiations, that they have been handling.

S: I'm just thinking about -- you're talking about that rescheduling.

K: That rescheduling.

S: Has the Treasury traditionally handled that rescheduling with Chile. And all the rest.

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Simon - page 2

K: I'm not sure. To me this is -- no I think State handles the <u>NEGOTIATIONS</u> negotiation, or at least that's what my guys tell me.

S: Alright, unless you hear back from me, that's going to be just fine.

K: At any rate, if State heads the negotiation, there will be a Treasury <u>XXIX</u> representative on it.

S: Sure. Alright, as I say, unless I give you a buzz in a very little while, that will be fine.

K: Good.

S: Thank you. Bye.

END

TELECON

Mr. Rush/Secretary Kissinger

April 26, 1974

3:50 PM

R: I had a call from Roy Ash.

K: Yes.

that

R: While you were away about the end of March/at a Cabinet meeting the President brought up the subject that there should be some initiative and he would be coming to the cabinet officers that for them, some initiative that he might take himself. He also went into the concept of the goals of the Department, you know the Roy Ash talk, that sort of thing. Roy said he was talking to the President this morning and the President wants -- he called me because he said he assumed you were so busy you wouldn't be able to get around to it. The President wants by May 1 from each Department, and keep it out of the way. The bureaucracy, a list of 3 suggestions, 3 concepts, new initiative, new ideas, new thrust of some kind, that the President could do as President. Now he said that he's sending a paper over on this, but he said -- I said will ours should be in the international _ and he said, no, if you have some ideas as Weinburgs department, he would like to have those too. He wants something that -- he just wants to get ideas and he wants 33 ideas from....

K: Oh, Jesus Christ. I've gone through this for about 6 years.

R: I just wanted you to know about it.

K: I don't want anything to go to the Department President from the Department that I don't see.

R: Right. I've got Win Lord working on this thing and we can get something up -- well we'll have to have it by May 1 -- we'll cable over to you just what we have. Now, as I say, it might not be anything in international field at all.

K: If it's out of the international field I'm not much concerned. But if it is, I want to see it. Ken, as long as I've got you on the phone, on two things. You think well of this fellow Goldberg that Holson is bugging me about?

R: Yes, as a matter of fact, I'm the one who suggested him. The reason I did was I knew him very well in Bonn. We thought very highly of him.

K: OK, then I'll go along with it.

R: He's an excellent man.

K: I heard that he wasn't very good, but if you like him, that's good enough for me.

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Rush - page 2

R: He was very good there and I tried to keep him in the Foreign Service, as that's a matter of fact. He's not in the Foreign Service I tried to keep him -- but there was a 20% payroll deduction cut. We had to let him go, he's time was up.

K: Secondly, Ken, this we really shouldn't talk about on the phone. Everyone once in a while, not very often, people come to me and say you're not happy, or there's this and that problem, I'm assuming that if you are not happy, you will let me know.

R: I will let you know.

K: And unless I hear it from you, there's nothing to it.

R: Unless you hear anything about me from me, ignore it.

K: That's my view.

R: Exactly. And I expect the same thing from you.

K: Exactly right. I have no problem and I think you're taking over a lot of things that make my life a hell of a lot easier. Of course, you know, all you have to do is look over my schedule, any meeting you want to join, it's up to you.

R: Good, Henry. I appreciate that very much. I have been trying to keep things away from you as much as I could, that you don't really need to be involved in.

K: Exactly. And I'm aware of that, and I appreciate it.

R: One other thing, I was talking to this morning the Somali Ambassador came in. This was an official invitation from him to visit Somali if and when I make my efforts. I said, well I assume from this that your country wants to improve relations with our country and he said that is the case. He said we would like -- he was talking to his President when he was there just two weeks ago.

K: I don't think that's a bad idea.

R: I don't either. It's an open ended invitation. He said -- I said I assume you want to improve relations with us as we do with you and he said, yes, we do and he said the President told me that he wants us to know, President Nixon and you that they do want to improve relations and that they've -- they would take any steps necessary along that end. I said, well, in that connection, we have been quite disturbed by the uprest in Ethiopia and I assume that your country is

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Rush - page 3

still ________ that you told me about when I saw you before you went to Somalia. He
said ________ that the President had told the Ethiopian Prime Minister and
also had told the former emperor that they would not in any way interfere in
Ethiopia, there would be no hostilities of any kind and that they hoped very much
that everything would be stabilized in Ethiopia and they would come out of this
in good shape and that they hoped emperor would stay in power.

K: Ken, I unfortunately have a 4:00 meeting in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Can I call you tonight, I have one other question I want to ask you about Bill Donaldson.

R: Yes. Good.

K: I'll call you when I get back around 7:00. Will you be at home?

R: I will either be here or at home.

K: Good. If you go anywhere else, would you leave your number with the
White House operator?

R: Yes, I will, Henry.

K: Thank you.

R: Bye. I have to go out this evening, but I'll leave my number.

K: I'll call you before 8:00, I'm sure.

R: Good. I'll be home until then.

K: Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-84

TELCORN
Peter Flanigan/Sec. Kissinger

April 26, 1974

F: I heard of your meeting with the Jewish leaders.

K: With the Jewish leaders, oh...

F: And their feeling that it would take some time -- before you tell
me that, could you tell me how you did with Jackson.

K: Very inconclusively, and above all they all implored me not to go
running around because it would kill everything. I wouldn't have enough
to run around with.

F: What did they mean -- run around to other senators.

K: That's right.

F: The question is.....

K: I mean to run around quoting them about their attitudes.

F: Oh, I see. Well, tell me this, then, what do you think we ought to do?

K: My impression is that after a lot of tough talk at the meeting Javits
didn't give much. I had the impression that Jackson was a little bit more
receptive. He didn't insist on a thousand hundred thousands any more.

F: Would he go towards a formula as you suggested?

K: Well, he said I should take a run at the Soviets about ending harrassment,
which is what I'm going to do with Gromyko.

F: You got the feeling that there's enough give so that it's better to stay on
this track then to try another track.

K: No, I think if you try another track, that's fine with me. Like What?

F: Well, I have a feeling there's -- that they made a real plea not to have
this put on the Ex-im bank. bill. If it were put on the Exim Bank Bill
it came off this bill we could have a bill that wouldn't do us any good but it
wouldn't get us MFM but it would stop credit. I think they're afraid they'll
lose their support on the other -- from the other Senators on Exim because
the other senators constituents want loans. Another approach is to come up
with a position that is significantly different then our original position but

Flanigan - page 2

not what Jackson wants and then see how many senators who are very unhappy at being on his amendment. How many of them will say, well that meets my requirement, I'd not have to stick with you Scoop.

K: Well, I have the impression that we might work out something on the Exim Bill. He wasn't so strong on the Exim Bill.

F: Well, but did that assume that there was nothing in the bill. Or assuming there was a Jackson ___ in this bill.

K: I had the impression he'd keep the Jackson ___ also in the bill.

F: Well then we haven't gotten anywhere.

K: Exactly.

F: I wonder if he isn't afraid -- he must be knowing that his senatorial support is erroding and a lot of these guys didn't mean to kill the Trade Bill and they're beginning to think see that that's what he's doing and they're beginning to suspect he's doing it really at that behest of Labor and a deal to keep Labor support for his candidacy. So, there aren't 78 guys up there who want him to be President. Most of them want to be President themselves.

K: I think what he really wants is to kill the Trade Bill for this year.

F: That's right, for the Labor people. Because we know full well that once you get a veto through Congress, we're never going to get that thing out of the Ways and Means Committee again. It's 77 for you get another swing at a Trade Bill and that means no trade negotiations. The argument that we shouldn't go running around is probably a good one, surely a good one if we can make head way with him on the other hand are we being had for his purposes and he's just giving us a little in order to kill the bill. I presume you are as anxious for foreign policy reasons as I am for international economic reasons to get a bill.

K: Oh, I'm very anxious.

F: I would guess that we have about 15-20 days in which to get some movement here or we're going to lose the bill just because of the Finance Committee's timing because I have to admit there's not what you'd call a great deal of enthusiasm in the Senate or in that Committee for this piece of legislation so that they'd happily go on to other things. Do you think we can bring it to a head in that period of time?

K: I think what we should do is to move very ____. The first thing, I think is impossible. I think we can try to bring it to a head as soon as I return.