TELECON

Ben Bradlee

10/14/71 10:15 a.m.

k: I am sorry to bother you, but I have thought about it and I don't want to ask for anything, and I don't want to be called back. You use your news judgment and I will take my chances with all the other Washington Post readers. I have done what I have done and I'll stand by it. And if there's any medicine in it I'll take it. The only thing I would ask is that you take out any comments by me. Just say Kissinger refused to comment. When I talked with her yesterday I thought it was a little item and said some things. I do ask that you leave them out. And I don't want to be called back; I'll know what you have decided when I read it.

B: Okay, fair enough.

K: Thank you.

TELCON

G. Smith/Kissinger

10:31 a. m.

10/14/71

G: I am still blue. This is a new subject. Do you know about the Smathers commission to the ACDA? He was nominated along with Wheeler and McC

K: Not discussed with you?

G: That's not too important. It was decided. But the security clearances comes up for renewal under the Security Act and in the file, although 54 people say he is fine, there's a letter from Rebozo who says he would recommend him for any job except one of high clearances because he talks too much. Also there's an article in the NY papers.

K: On Rebozo.

G: No, Smathers. He will be at a meeting at GAC tomorrow where I am supposed to say everything about SALT. I want to know from the WH what I should do. I have sent the papers to the Secy. and Macomber.

K: Let me talk with the President. (I cannot handle this myself.)

G: If the President wants me to clear him, I will. Macomber says when 54 people say yes and one says no, they are inclined to clear a man.

K: I will have to be checking with the President. Are you still blue about the announcement?

G: I think its rough on me. The President said the summit meeting is right because of SALT, sea beds, accidents, and ? ? ? .

K: All of which you did.

G: Also Berlin, which we didn't do. We learned about it after the French and Chinese. I tried to get a press release after the press had it but I couldn't get it. I was told I would have to wait. Don't prees too hard on this or you will find out how I stand. I won't scream --

K: You have acted with honor and there are certain ways things are done here and we have to --

G: It's highly dangerous the way it's handled. I read the Kromyko thing. One sentence that is 180 degrees off what I have been told to do. "? ? ? "

K: It's in the program.

G. Smith/Kissinger

10:31 a.m.

10/14/71

-2-

S: Cm't it be corrected?

K: I know exactly what you mean. I wouldn't know unless it's a sentence that bothers me. It's the trouble with meetings at high levels. I was flabbergasted. The way he said it was *as if* you race us we will race you. But taken out of context it's very dangerous.

S: Well, if there's any way it can be done, it should be.

TELECON

Peter Lisagor

10/14/71 11:18 a.m.

L: I understand Mayor Daley told you how to deal with Chou En-lai yesterday.

K: That is true, but ...

L: ... you can't say it for the record.

K: That's right.

L: Seriously, you say him?

K: Yes to brief him; it was essentially a courtesy call.

L: How long did you spend?

K: About 45 minutes.

L: Talking about anything specific?

K: No, it was more in general. Of course we couldn't leave out Vietnam.

L: Okay. Chicago just wondered if we could find out more about it. It was just one of your usual briefings?

K: Yes, no profound significance.

L: But your purpose was to speak at a Percy affair?

K: Yes. I had wanted to go out for one of my periodic briefings of the newspaper executives, but I combined the two.

L: Did you brief the newspaper executives?

K: Yes.

L: Which newspapers?

K: All four.

L: Those bastards! They didn't tell me.

K: They'll check up on you now because they have the truth. I know you have made a request to see me.

L: Right. And now you are busy. Hope to see you when you get back. Have a good trip, and I hope everything goes well.

TELCOM
S. Hurok/Kissinger
11:26 a.m. 10/14/71

H: Speaking from Moscow. Congratulations on coming events. They are
all excited. I want to offer my services in any way you want, particularly
in Moscow. I will give all help to the President as well.

K: I am thrilled to hear this and I will talk with you when we get back. We
are looking forward to this and hoping to make it a significant event.

H: Good to hear this. I will call you when I get back.

TELCOM

D. Chapin/Kissinger

11:37 a.m.

10/14/71

K: We can't show Mrs. Nixon on the official party. We have to handle it separately. She hasn't been invited.

C: (Aside) Do we have Mrs. Nixon on the official or unofficial party?

No, I am making a separate book in case it comes up but I agree.

K: OK.

TELECON

Gerald Ford

10/14/71 1:05 p.m.

F: How was your trip to Illinois?

K: Okay.

F: You like the political arena?

K: It's interesting. I wish I had done it for a stauncher supporter.

F: I was going to say, you're starting on a low rung of the ladder. I am calling because Cellar came to me yesterday with a letter he and Albert are sending to all the House members. He asked me to jointly sign it. Do you have a minute for me to read it to you?

K: Sure.

F: 

K: Well, we wouldn't ask you to sign it, to put it mildly. And if you gave us free choice, we would ask you not to. But it you do, we will understand. And we would understand also that we don't want the Democrats to run with this issue.

F: It would look bad... I, as leader here...

K: Would be forced to say the White House discouraged it.

F: That's right.

K: Why don't we say that if you [cross] are forced to do it you will, but with a bleeding heart.

F: That's right Henry.

K: Okay.

F: Thank you.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ron Koven (Wash. Post)
10-14-71; 7:35 p.m.

RK: I am Mr. Oberdorfer's editor. We are told on reliable sources that the Russians in connection with Mr. Kosygin's trip to Canada had expressed an interest in Kosygin meeting with President Nixon in the U. S.

HK: And then what happened?

RK: U. S. said it was not interested in that.

HK: I may suggest that I would drop that reliable informant to a less reliable -- there is nothing to it. Literally nothing to it. I am not trying to be cute. This is simply not correct. Why should they make such an approach since we are going to have a summit?

RK: Something before the China . . .

HK: Absolutely nothing to it -- at least if they did not reach the President.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Henry Brandon
10-14-71; 7:40 p.m.

B: I got back last night and it was a fascinating experience. If you need a really good holiday after Peking, Crete is the ideal place.

K: I appreciated your card.

B: You got the clipping, too.

K: No.

B: ... about Bismarck -- something you had written -- Julie from footcomer (?). I will send you another copy. I have just seen on the news that you are off on Saturday. Any chance of seeing you before you are off? I am still on leave so I am not writing -- just for generalistic purposes.

K: I don't think there is a chance that we can get together before I leave. I don't know how I will get through tomorrow.

B: When do you think you will be back.

K: A week from Monday. We are staying a day and one-half in Hawaii to get used to the time change. And we are spending a night in Guam and then going on.

B: Does this mean relatively sooner than later?

K: You can really draw no conclusions.

B: In London there are two people who sent you their very best -- John...

K: How is he?

B: I think he enjoys what he is doing. The TV company is now beginning to make a profit so he is quite pleased. The other is Burke Trend who really seems quite fond of you.

K: I am fond of him, too. He is a very impressive man. Besides, there aren't many of us in this world that understand each other.

Telecon

Mr. Kissinger

Henry Brandon

10-14-71; 7:40 p.m.

-2-

B: (I missed the first part of this -- something about somebody being unhappy) -- from the economic thing to the China thing to some extent.

K: What bothered them from that?

B: The British said they kept the US informed on their own negotiations for raising embassy from Charge to Ambassador and the Chinese after the visit raised the ante. I think the thing may be finished fairly soon. I think they thought they could have completed it before the visit but they delayed the negotiations. I saw everybody in London so I got thoroughly brainwashed.

K: Are they unhappy with me, too, in London.

B: No, nothing personal. If there is anybody that was personally mentioned, it is Connally.

K: I take their point on the UN thing except what could we have done?

B: I don't know enough about the details -- maybe to have encouraged them to clinch the deal first and not to wait.

K: I was not involved init. Who urged delay -- that's the trouble.

B: I am going on leave of absence during November to make a head start on my book. I wondered whether perhaps in your absence It would be possible to see the President?

K: Why don't you try?

B: Through Ron Ziegler or . . .

K: Yes.

B: Is this good enough or what?

K: I would start there.

-3-

B: There is a certain impatience around but otherwise I left London more optimistic than I had in the last three years. I think all sorts of things may come to a head.

K: I am very impressed how Heath has performed. Henry, I must run.

B: Muffy wanted to say one word to you.

K: Of course.

M: I have to tell you we are having a revolt of the FXX palace guard. He thinks you don't like his cooking and you are going back.

K: Tell him I will come over when you ask me.

M: You are always welcome. Don't get indigestion.

K: I probably will.

M&B: Lots of luck. Tell us all about it.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Prof. Russ Terrill
10-14-71; 7:50 p.m.

K: John Negroponte sent me a memo about his conversation with you about Burchett. I just wanted you to know that I said nothing of the sort nor did I say anything that could be remotely understood about that. If somebody wants to make a proposition, it is nothing that I said. I read your article from China with the greatest interest this summer.

T: Good! I have just finished another one on China. I will get it to you.

K: Good, I would appreciate that.

T: Good luck.

TELCONE

Peterson/Kissinger

10:02 p. m.

10/14/71

K: Congratulations! I couldn't reach you because the President was raving so much about you and I cannot stan competition from my peers.

P: That's the nicest thing you ever said. I never knew you considered me your peer.

K: I told him it was my behind-the-scenes work.

P: Behind the scenes is right. Did he say anything about making an announcement?

K: Personally?

P: I said he was making one.

K: He wants you and me to come to his office at 9:00. Chinese will go off the end so make it bland. It was hard but not in the common interest and also we can work together. A few sentences.

P: Is there someone there to work with us in drafting this or not?

K: Haig and I are here.

P: How long will you be there?

K: Another 20 mins.

P: We will get you a paragraph.

K: You really hung in there. What makes achievements in this Administration so remarkable is whether you have defeated the others or your people.

P: Defining your enemy is hardest. Did he tell you about Koraa?

K: No.

P: Korea has agreed in principle and going down on Sat. to sign. We have Taiwan and meetings going on tonight on Hong Kong.

K: He doesn't know the regular people. If Kennedy hadn't hurt these people's feelings so much --

P: I understand Henry.

K: I told this to the President. The old boy did a good job. What did State say?

TELCORN
Peterson/Kissinger

10:02 p. m.

10/14/71

P: Why the hell should I call them? They will be the last. What will we say
about other countries? Taiwan possibly will confirm and Hong Kong maybe.

K: Difficult but look for clearer benefit for all which will lay the basis for
other max positive things -- like cutting back on cotton textiles and shoes.

K: Hang in for another 30 mins.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Dwight Chapin
10/14/71; 8:30 p.m.

K: I have been looking over your book. I must have an alternative
to the ground station.

D: That's just the suitcase one, Henry.

K: What if they don't want satellite transmission? What if they say
we can use their facilities in Peking?

D: I will ask them what they are.

K: You have to do what they tell us. I agree a ground station would be
best.

D: Okay, we will get a page in and what they will have to do, look at
their facilities, etc., which point is made under the press section.

K: I will guarantee once you are there with me you will agree with
me.

D: I understand what you mean.

K: My point is that they are not going to take being told it must be done.
All of this should be changed "it would be desirable."

D: I told your people they would have to rewrite it to put it in the
language that you want it presented to them.

K: Take the 747. Suppose we don't get that there any explanation.
You have no worry with me again about getting involved with advance
work. I have no doubt once you see what that place is like . . .

D: We watched a great film -- China 1971 -- it ain't going to be like
any place we laid eyes on before in our lives. May be we come out
with only 130 people or 30 and that's it but then we will just have to
sit there and revise it on the spot. I agree to the alternative on the
ground station. Then have suitcase satellite . . .

K: somebody has to explain what that is or they will think it is a bugging
deskphone device for all their telephones.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Dwight Chapin
10-14-71; 8:30 p.m.

K: You cannot have that idiot Redman who has never met foreigners before -- I want them to have a night to read it. If I don't understand it, they won't understand it. I want to understand it well enough so that if they raise hell I can answer something. Do you think we can get it.

D: Yes. It will take a half a page to describe that satellite.

K: Some of this material is extremely good.

D: I think a lot of this needs to be boiled down.

K: When can that be done? I want that all done on the plane.

D: They are working on it tonight getting it perfected and we are trying to get it down to where it is. . .

K: Do you explain how many go with us if we travel?

D: We don't have that yet. We have to know how much they have to prepare for.

K: You will be a chastened man when you get out of there, unless they feel we are such jerks that they give us the TV. Putting TV before the President is like putting alcohol before an alcoholic. We have to resist. The basic book is alright. I thought the backup would be an expansion of explanation of past trips.

D: Bob doesn't want us to leave it with them. There is some question as to how much information we turn over to them -- flow of aircraft. . .

K: You can hardly ask for aircraft without giving them all the information. The only hope you have is total honesty. The only hope we have is to show them what we did before.

D: They trailed us in Pakistan when we did the advance.

-3-

K: If you want to advance separately, fine. Nothing would please me more. If you think you have a better way of doing this, go ahead.

D: I don't know if we have a better idea. I think we have to take your lead. Ground station and TV are paramount in his . . .

K: He has also told me to bomb places that I am glad we did not. The issue on the ground station is whether they will permit the operation of foreign equipment on their soil that they are not capable of running themselves. My instinct is that they will knock themselves out on anything they can do themselves. Maybe I am wrong.

D: We will get a better description of the satellite.

K: You have to find out something of their facilities. The way to get them to do something is for us to do it in a way that they can pick it up as their own idea. If you turn it into a confrontation they will kill you. They are not the yugoslavs.

D: The Yugoslavs got mad when the President went from town to town.

K: They were restive about the photo truck. If you want something from the Chinese, you will have to do it so they can easily pick it up or easily turn it down.

D: Okay, now we will give a better description of the suitcase satellite and then the alternative to that.

K: It is the best way to get your ground station.

D: The 747 thing we have given you . . .

K: I am going to ask Howe to rewrite it in such a way . . .

D: I told Jon that a lot of this you would want to put in better diplomatic language.

K: Make sure we don't only have one option.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
10/14/71; 9:45 p. m.

P: Peterson just called me. Did you talk to him? He deserves a lot of credit -- Dave Kennedy.

K: Against sabotage of the Embassy . . .

P: And State. Let's give Peterson credit. What I wanted to ask and I asked him, too, they are announcing something in Japan in the morning and I believe I should say something in particular appreciation -- something nice about the Japanese.

K: I don't think you should say it on TV.

P: No, no. Have Ziegler make a statement.

K: You know this was a difficult problem.

P: This is a demonstration of how we can make progress. The other thing I think you should tell the Japanese Ambassador in the morning -- I would like Connally to go to Japan. I would not mind if you brought him in the office a minute . . .

K: Okay, I will take him in around 10:00.

P: Just before I see McNamara. He will be pleased. I think they will be pleased, don't you?

K: Yes, I think we are getting back on the track with Japan. All reports said Russian summit has taken off much of the sting on China. Even Joe Kraft had an article.

P: I did not mean I would make a TV statement but I do think it is important to let the Japanese know I am pleased.

K: That's correct. It shows Congress and Industry (?) that you are a man of your word.

P: Incidentally, I just had a thought on NATO. How about Kennedy?

K: State would have a heart attack.

P: So what if State has a heart attack. He is loyal. I want a man -- Brosio said a man that is close to me is what is needed. He said he hoped a would send a man that was my man and not a career man. Kennedy would be good. I think Bill would like to have him out of State anyway.

K: If you don't have any other negotiations you want him to do . . .

10/14/71; 9:45 p. m.

-2-

P: It's a difficult thing to have this type of negotiations done. We can have
Peterson do them. He could meet in Brussels. He knows about offsets,
community, etc. He knows all this like the back of his hand.

K: I think there is a lot to say and he has been extremely loyal.

P: We ought to send him a cable in my name, "Warm congratulations
for a superb job against almost insurmountable odds. The whole nation is
in your debt." It is difficult to send someone who does not know a damn
thing. Kennedy knows the foreign policy, europe and he knows enough
about NATO. He gets along with Laird.

K: I think it is a good idea.

throw

P: When he gets back maybe we will throw that at him.

K: Incidentally, Taft (?) had put out an article about the summit...

P: Have one of your junior man do something for me. Tricia called me
and said Eddie went to seminar at Harvard and took on one of the people
talking about the Chinese and Russian summits. I wonder if one of your
people could get best columns that were written and have it ready by
tomorrow night and also just a statement with regard to summit. Just
for his own information -- with regard to why it is really in the interest
of Japan. Ed is a left wing but he thought it was unfair. Smith is probably
dying. H I bet he was terribly sorry to see the Summit.

K: He saw himself already with a Noble Prize.

P: This is a damn good achievement. Let's give Peterson credit. If you
could have one of your boys do that and send a memorandum over to the
residence so that I could have it when Tricia comes in tomorrow night --
just some of the editorials, etc. Just a collection of some of the good
columns. I bet that Harvard crowd is going out of its mind.

K: According to them you should have fallen on your face years ago.
They wished their darling Kennedy had done it.

P: They are furious that we are doing it. Get that cable out -- say I
have another assignment for you when you return. I really think the NATO
thing would be a ten-strike.

10/14/71; 9:45 p.m.

P: After this State will be madder than ever. I did something they didn't know.

K: Peterson had a file full of intercepts how they were trying to undercut him.

P: Haldeman had Marshall Green on the list for China.

K: Inconceivable -- Oh, oh, you mean on the trip. Yes, he is on the list.

P: He can negotiate with ______. I will not have him with me.

K: We will have a separate role for Rogers (?)

P: It is really going to shock these people. Did you get it to them that Connally is going to Vietnam.

K: Oh, yes. The more I think about it it is a terrific shot in the arm.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Eliot Richardson
10-14-71; 9:45 p.m.

K: I am returning your call of this morning.

R: I had a nice talk with one of your most recent biographers.

K: Myer?

R: Yes. Nice guy. I wondered if there was anything more on the
Vietnam inauguration.

K: We have asked Connally to go and he is going.

R: Okay. That's good choice.

K: I think he will be good. He is not directly involved with it so I
think . . . (operators interrupted and said President was calling.)

TELCOM

S. Alsop/Kissinger

afternoon

10/14/71

K: Do you have a British Secretary? Your snobbism is too much to take.

K: Very beautiful and efficient and the envy of the journalism profession.

K: How did you do yesterday?

A: Terrific.

K: You will get 6 months of the worst shellacking in town.

A: The blood is normal. We have moved up the marrow test until Monday and if normal, we can sigh with relief.

K: All your admireres here are relieved.

A: I feel much better then when I was checked. I feel better then in years.

K: The other day when we met and my diagnosis isn't worth a damn -- I am delighted.

A: It's a tiny bit embarassing.

K: And I will have to work still on getting a decent column out of you.

A: Remember what I told you the other day.

K: The first chance I have to talk, I will talk with you.

TELECON

Jack Valenti

10/15/71 9:05 a.m.

V: Henry, two things, one very frivolous. One of the reasons why I love you is that you and I have the same instincts, and same yearnings . . .

K: You are a great fellow, but you don't have my naivete to talk to Maxine Cheshire.

V: That's one of the things I learned in three years there. Give her one of your Kissinger quips, but don't say a god-damned word.

K: I wrote the story for her!

V: I always tell people, look, this is a single man and an attractive man, and if I were in his shoes I would be doing the same thing only may-be a little worse.

Henry, I know you are going to Peking. During the Venice Film Festival someone from Peking accosted my man there and said there would be some interest in having me come there. I am willing to take some movie stars and all that and go to Peking if they will take American film. I just wanted you to know that they have broached this to us. I would do it if there was any chance of their being interested in American films.

K: Well, I'll tell you. I have a number of individual requests like this. There won't be a formula opportunity to raise it. I don't know about this time -- the last time I was there, there were no strictly social occasions. But if there is one this time I will mention it.

V: You know, film is something above and beyond the normal thing -- it is a common link between people. If there is an interest, I would put something together. I don't want to do it as a PR trip unless they want to talk about American films.

K: If there is any opportunity at all . . . I have a file of a few key things like this. At a minimum I will ask Chou into what channels we should put such requests.

V: Good. Mine is not so much a request as a follow-on.

K: Could you give me the name and the circumstances under which this was raised?

V: Sure. I'll bring a little memorandum over by hand to your office today.

K: Good, look in on your bleeding friend.

V: I'll have it brought over. I tell you what compassion I feel for you.

TELECON
Jack Valenti

10/15/71 9:05 a.m. p. 2

K: I'm just very lucky I don't have LBJ as my President.

V: If I were a bachelor in his Administration and had done this he
would have dropped me off the banks of the Perdernales. You are lucky
to have such an understanding Chief.

K: LBJ would probably have done the same himself, but he wouldn't
have let you.

V: Exactly.

TELCON

Rabin/Kissinger

2:20 p.m.

10/15/71

R: Sorry to bother you.

K: You don't ever.

R: You remember we once had a long talk about the question of interim settlement. I got a telegram today and I am told by her that on the question of terms I have gone too far.

K: I did nothing with it subject to our agreement I have not passed this on to anyone. I mentioned it in passing to the President.

R: On four points I have gone too far. The first is in regard to the U.S. position on the over all statement. I said no pressure and she considered that unsatisfactory. The question of extent --

K: of withdrawal --

R: In maintenance in requested cease fire and on crossing, I went too far. Since I am instructed and since nearly 3 weeks since I have heard from her. This is my instructions to say I did it on my own and went too far.

K: I understand. I will not get involved in this. If you thought it would help matters to get it in a different channel I would consider it but you raised it.

R: I reported it that I raised the question. Second, allow me to xxx say after yesterday it seems that psychologically and politically we are in much poorer shape, I would say, if you understand what I mean.

K: Who is we?

R: Israel.

K: Israel, yes.

R: It's to say psychologically it seems that something given to us by statement but practically nothing.

K: Roger's statement.

R: On the other hand it will create difficulties not to accept certain procedures Sisco suggested.

K: Military ____.

Rabin/Kissinger

2:20 p.m. 10/15/71

-2-

R: No, Sisco had lunch with the Foreign Minister a few days ago.

K: Sending of an emissary.

R: The Foreign Minister said to the Secretary that we cannot agree to that but the statement now puts us in a more difficult position. I don't believe it will be decided in the next week or two.

K: If you can wait until I get back it will make matters easier.

R: Because now because of the statement we are in a much more difficult position.

K: You want to ______ suggesting a **MEE** di-ferent involvement.

R: This is not said in involvement. Cable says I have gone too far in substance and second, not to go on the matter of the option. Not to close it but not go forward.

K: I am the least of your problems here. I will not raise it until you do.

R: Fine.

K: No one else will make the suggestion either. You can reassure PM there's nothing to worry about and nothing will happen and things will stay in present channels.

R: For the time being these are my instructions for today.

K: Tell her not to worry about it. That's what will happen and it's my preference.

R: I said it in the first report.

K: Personally it's much easier for me. As far as we are concerned nothing more on this subject unless you approach me.

R: All right. Hope to see you when you get back.

K: I will be back in 10 days and I hope to see you.

R: All the best. Hope to see you when you get back.

TELCONE
Amb. Rabin/Kissinger

2:55 p.m.

10/15/71

K: I was wondering if you could let me have a copy of your conversation with Sisco since I have trouble locating ours.

R: There were two. Private talk between Sisco and the Foreign Minister on Wed.

K: Do you have a report?

R: In Hebrew. I will ask for a summary. The second was talk yesterday with the Secretary of State.

K: If I could have both it would help me.

R: The second one I have in English. Therefore it's easier.

K: You suit yourself. It's easier when writing for the President to have both versions. One I don't have at all.

R: The private talk I don't know if Sisco has written.

K: I don't think so.

R: At the Foreign Minister's initiative. How to proceed. Either to send American emissaries to capitols and there or to bring secretly or in cover of the UN to bring Israeli and Egyptian to NY and U.S. will negotiate between the two countries.

K: That one I know.

R: I think the other was the same idea. How to put it. The Foreign Minister got instructions before meeting with the Secy. not to agree to any of these situations and a decision will be heard in Israel before answering these.

K: Right.

R: The Secy would not raise the problem. Unfortunately, the Foreign Minister brought it up based on which he held with Sisco but the Secretary practically refrained from answering and was not discussed yesterday. The Secy said we will be in touch with you. The Secy did not commit himself how to proceed. I will prepare something and send it to Haig.

K: I would appreciate it.

TELECON

Mr. Fred Brisson/Mr. Kissinger

5:44 p. m., October 15, 1971

K: Fred, how are you?

B: You have been traveling?

K: I was in Chicago yesterday, and I'm off on my trip tomorrow.

B: Roz decided not to go. I told her you really would be leaving and not to plan on it -- it would be too much of a rush anyway. She said tell Henry we look forward to seeing him the end of October. You will be back between the 25th and 30th?

H: Yes. Excellent.

B: My play ['Twigs'] opens in New York on Sunday, November 21st. Put it on your calendar.

K: I would love to do it.

B: She's doing her big thing on December 15. [performance of "Nicholas and Alexandra" at the Criterion Theater benefiting the Arthritis Foundation of which she is honorary chairman -- in New York; gala supper dance at the Plaza following the movie, she will receive the Floyd S. Odlum award for efforts in fight against arthritis.] Did you get Dyan Cannon?

K: Just as she was leaving for the West Coast. She said you would have to tell me the number out there. She was going to Malibu.

B: We will arrange it.

K: I am going out around Thanksgiving.

B: We have the Eisenhower Hospital opening then.

K: I am going with the President.

B: Don't eat too much. You are leaving tomorrow?

K: Saturday noon.

B: The news has been very interesting -- the Moscow thing.

K: We have a lot of balls in the air.

Fred Brisson/Mr. Kissinger

5:44 p.m., October 15, 1971

- 2 -

B: Keep your health up. Give me a ring when you return.

K: I will call you on the 26th or 27th when I get back.

B: I will be in Boston, but call my New York office. We will try to arrange something in Washington before Rosalind takes off again.

lds

TELECON

Pete Peterson/Mr. Kissinger

6:15 p.m., October 15, 1971

K: Just because you settled the textile problem...

P: I have been talking to Sato trying to patch things up.

K: But that doesn't entitle you to wait until I get on the phone first.

P: The greatest thing you ever said to me was that I was one of your peers. It is an enormous step up.

K: First you have to buy me and then sell me. Dobrynin mentioned the other day someone left a memo with you about their trade decision.

P: You remember he left it several months ago. It was a hysterical thing -- it asked for everything but the kitchen sink.

K: Could you send a copy over here so when he mentions it again I will know what he is talking about.

P: You are terribly tied up?

K: Yes.

P: When are you getting back.

K: The 25th.

P: That long! God! You are hopelessly tied up tonight.

K: Pretty much. I'm leaving at noon tomorrow.

P: How about tomorrow?

K: We might try for 1/2 hour in the morning.

P: I have to talk with you about expropriation and the whole negotiating business -- I need some help on the surtax, trade and defense.

K: Let's try for 30 minutes tomorrow morning.

lds

TELECON

Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger

7:01 p.m., October 15, 1971

H: There certainly must be something you can do about Maxine. You have told Kay about what Maxine did in connection with the groundrules and this item?

K: I called her a little while ago. I didn't ask her to do anything with NEWSWEEK.

H: Mel Elfin is going to call Mister Bernstein to see what can be worked out.

K: Good. I have the President on the other line. Does that impress you?

H: You talk to him. We will talk to Mister Bernstein.

lds