PR #283

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eliminating it, but by introducing some stability into the rate and nature
of their deployment.

If an agreement is reached within that time frame, more or less --
that doesn't mean down to the last month -- then it can make a major
contribution to turning down the arms race, to including the problem
of reduction to which we attach importance and to bring stability into the
strategic equation.

With every six-month period that it is delayed, the problem becomes
more complicated, but the point is precisely to avoid what you called the
hell of an arms race, and the difficulty, as you analyze the problem with
cutoff dates of 1977, 1979, is that both sides will be preparing for the
break of the agreement while they are negotiating the agreement, and it
became clear that one of the obstacles was that both sides, while
negotiating limitations, were also putting themselves into the position
of the agreement lapsing and, therefore, having to develop programs that
would be pressing against limits of the agreement at the edge of its time
period and for that very reason have another vested interest not to have
an agreement.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, General Secretary Brezhnev said last
night that these accords could have been still broader than they were.
First, I would like your comments on that and also whether it is not
correct then from your interpretation that one could not say there are
agreed guidelines on the MIRV warhead negotiations.

Secondly, one the question of the underground nuclear test ban, could
you clarify with some figures what I believe is a fact that the limit
of 150 kilotons would permit all continuing underground testing of MIRV's
currently conducted by the United States which are considerably below
that range and would that not allow the continuance even beyond the target
date here of all the projectable of multiple warheads likely to be
produced by both sides.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First, the degree of cooperation between the
Soviet Union and the United States has not yet reached the point where the
General Secretary shows me the text of his speeches before he makes them.
(Laughter) And therefore, I am not the best witness of what he may have had
in mind.

My impression from what I have observed is that both sides have to
convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint and
that is not a thought that comes naturally to military people on either
side.

Now, by definition, the limitations could have been broader. On the one
hand as you know, the Soviet Union has been proposing a complete test ban,
but under provisions that are unverifiable and with escape clauses which
would make it directly clearly against other countries. And therefore,
we have deferred a further discussion of the test ban, which we are not
rejecting in principle, which indeed we are accepting in principle for a
later occasion. So I am assuming this is one thing the General Secretary
had in mind.

The second is, from my description of the SALT discussions, obviously
a broader agreement is conceivable. With respect to your question, are
there agreed guidelines for Geneva, the idea of extending the time frame
arose really only on Monday, and it wasn't possible to work out detailed
agreed guidelines in the interval.

PR #283

- 9 -

On the other hand, certain basic principles do exist and I believe we
have made a major step forward in the approach to the problem.

With respect to the testing, it is not true that all the projected
MIRV developments are in the category below 150. Indeed, the enthusiasm
seems to run more in the categories above 150, coupled with improved
accuracies, but whenever I link these two I get a rebuttal. So I must
be cautious. So if we are concerned that one of the threats to stability
is the combination of accuracy and higher yields, then in the next
phase of the MIRV warhead race, this ban will make a major contribution.

Clearly for the existing multiple warheads the testing has been
substantially completed on both sides. We are concerned with the next
generation of warheads, not this generation of warheads, and with respect
to those, it will play a very significant role.

QUESTION: May I follow that, Dr. Kissinger?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

QUESTION: On this question of the 150 threshold, just if you can get
a little more specific, what will it prevent us from doing that we had
planned to do, planned to test and what will it prevent the Soviets from
doing that we know they had planned to test?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: To tell you what we know about what the Soviets
are planning to do would present major problems of hospitality. (Laughter)

QUESTION: We have had some already. (Laughter)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You are supposed to laugh at my jokes, not top
them. (Laughter)

I cannot obviously go into what we were planning to do and what the
Soviet Union was planning to do. It is obvious that if one of the concerns
is the elaboration of strategies that rely on first strikes, and if, to
put it another way, the concern of each side is that the proliferation of
warheads might make it subject to a first strike, then it stands to
reason that with the hardening of silos, it is the increase in the
explosive power of warheads together with improved accuracy that becomes
of greatest concern and therefore to the extend that those strategies
become possible, conceivable or dominant on each side, whatever it previous
approach, each side will be driven towards the elaboration of larger war-
heads on its MIRV's.

So, I repeat, this is addressed to the next generation of warheads, not
to the present generation of warheads.

QUESTION: What I was getting at there, as I understood it -- and
I could be wrong -- we test in miniature, or do to some extent,
wouldn't that put us well below 150, below 100 in fact, and do the
Soviets do the same kind of testing in miniature or not?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think this is the place, nor can I
think of many more convenient places (Laughter) to go in detail into our
methods of testing or what we know about the Soviet methods of testing.

It is my understanding that miniature testing is very rarely done,
never done with operational weapons, and the concern that has been
expressed to us, as we were discussing this within our government, was
precisely the necessity of full scale tests of those categories of weapons
of principal significance.

PR # 283

- 10 -

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, will they be able to test MIRV's on the SS-9 under that 150 kiloton limitation?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Whenever I describe the characteristics of Soviet weapons to Soviet colleagues, their self-control evaporates. I don't know how they feel when I describe them to American journalists.

It is our understanding that no MIRV's are being put on SS-9's, that they are developing a missile of comparable size which will have a MIRV capability. I am not making a hair-splitting point. The warhead of that missile which we call the SS-18 and in which our judgment is that the testing of the MIRV's is in its very early stage, those warheads, in our judgment, would be considerably larger than 150 kilotons and indeed, if those warheads could be driven below 150 kilotons, we would consider it a considerable success.

**QUESTION:** Do you interpret this limitation as in effect to preventing them from MIRVing on SS-9's or SS-18's?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As I said, they are not MIRVing the SS-9's. In order to get MIRV's on a large missile, they would have to replace the SS-9 with a SS-18, but that is just a refinement.

Quite honestly I believe they have probably tested the warheads they would want to put on the SS-18 already. However, these have always to be calculated in terms of weight-to-yield ratio; that is to say, at the present state of their technology there may be a limit to the number of warheads of large yield they can put on the SS-18, while with continued testing, the number of warheads could be multiplied very considerably and still maintain the same explosive power, but I don't want to go beyond that. But you have to look at it both in terms of numbers of warheads that can be carried on an individual missile as well as in terms of the explosive power of each warhead and both of them are a function of testing, because testing determines the packaging, which is to say the size of the warhead, as well as the yield of the warhead.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, will you be presenting to Members of the Congress any indications of a lessening of tensions and the problems with respect to emigration and harassment and have you found any further understanding and receptivity on the part of the Soviet leaders in this field?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There was a discussion of the subject -- and I will have to maintain the position that we have previously, which is to say that we believe that the objective which we think we share with those who have other approaches can, in our judgment, be realized more effectively without making it a public government-to-government confrontation.

**QUESTION:** Can't you tell us if anything new has arisen, not what it is, but if anything new has arisen?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I will discuss the subject with those who are interested in the Congress after I return, but I will not discuss it publicly, as I have stated consistently.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, you sound as though you have, at least for the time being, given up hope for getting a comprehensive SALT agreement with the Soviet Union. Is that correct?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Not a comprehensive, but a permanent, and this is not a question of giving up hope, it is a question of looking at the

PR #283

- 11 -

realities of how to move matters forward. We have been operating up to now within the constraint of either a very short term or a sort of permanent agreement.

Now, permanent would have to have reveiw clauses every five to ten years anyway. So, when you talk of 1985, that is about as permanent as you can realistically become under present circumstances.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, what is the view of the Government of the United States of the effect on the good will and spirit that this agreement and the others seek to create of Soviet efforts to interfere with American television transmissions last night?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't know the details of the interference with the television transmission, but we certainly don't approve of it.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I thought I heard you say at the outset that the underground testing ban -- I may have misheard you -- but I thought I heard you say the underground ban included some provision for observers. I can't find it. Can you elaborate on that?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, the negotiations with respect to the verification of peaceful nuclear explosions included an understanding which is not part of the agreement, that the verification of the underground explosions would involve, among other things, the specification of time and place, and the presence of observers.

That, in itself, is not enough, however. It is not written in the document, and you are quite correct in not finding it because this is, I believe, Article III, and Article III simply says it will be negotiated in the earliest time, and I am simply indicating that we did discuss some of the substance of this Article III, even now.

The difficulty with peaceful nuclear explosions, or the inspection difficulty or verification difficulty, is on two levels. Below the threshold level of 150 kilotons, it does not present a problem of magnitude, but it presents a problem of location.

As you know from the agreement, the location of military test sites is specified and geological information is exchanged and also, there is provision, as you can see in the protocol for calibration shots.

Therefore, we have a substantial degree of confidence within a factor that is very tolerable for military purposes that we will know violations of the threshold test ban as long as the testing takes place at known sites.

A peaceful nuclear explosion obviously will almost never take place at military test sites; therefore, we will have less geological information; therefore, special verification procedures will have to be used.

This is below 150 kilotons. If the peaceful nuclear explosion should be above 150 kilotons, even more stringent requirements exist to make sure that peaceful nuclear explosions do not hide military testing and those provisions frankly have not been worked out, but there is an understanding that they will include the presence of observers.

**QUESTION:** For those of us without a deep background in the arms negotiations, is this then the first time the Soviet Union has -- leaving aside what kind of tests these are -- agreed to on-site inspection?

PR #283

- 12 -

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That is correct. But agreed in the form of an
unwritten understanding. This does not exist yet.

**QUESTION:** Sir, does this understanding specify as to whether these
observers will be principals of both countries or whether they will be
third nation observers or perhaps observers from an international body?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** This has not been worked out. In the context
of the discussions, it was from the two countries, which incidentally is
much more reassuring to the two countries than to bring in outsiders, but
that is a question that has not been refined.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, are we or the Russians currently testing
any warheads larger than 150 kilotons?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I can't go into great detail about it, but as
I said, the trend is clearly in that direction.

**QUESTION:** I didn't quite understand that. What I wanted to get out
was, does this merely freeze the tests at the current level, or is it
actually cutting the size of it?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As I pointed out, because there is no sense in
misleading anybody, obviously the warheads for the current generation
have been substantially tested almost certainly by both sides. What will
be affected is the improved packaging of new generations or the improved
yield of new generations, not of missiles necessarily, but of warheads.

In that sense, without going into the testing programs, I think it is
correct to say that the trend of the arms race is in the direction of the
higher yields, for reasons which I gave you.

**QUESTION:** What about the problem of decoupling?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The problem of decoupling, I think has been
insofar as it can be, taken care of by the exchange of geological infor-
mation and by the calibration shots.

**QUESTION:** I am kind of puzzled how you can take what happened here
on SALT as anything less than a setback. If you have changed from searching
for a permanent agreement to searching for one in a finite time period,
and you postponed the time you have given yourself, or you have put back
the time you have given yourself to find that agreement, it seems
to me there are two setbacks there, and I don't see how you can say
this hasn't been a failure at the summit.

**QUESTION:** We couldn't hear the question.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is just as well. (Laughter) The question is
how we can construe SALT as anything other than a setback because we
extended the time period for negotiation and we shortened the time period
of the agreement to be reached.

Is that correct?

**QUESTION:** Yes.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** If you approach it in a formalistic way, then
these are valid arguments. If you approach it from the point of view

PR #283

- 13 -

of what will in fact contribute to slowing down the arms race, then I believe that we have found an approach in which the facts that have inhibited progress can be hopefully overcome.

The difficulty with the previous negotiations has been that it has proved extremely difficult to reconcile the various asymmetries that exist in the design of the forces, in the locations of the forces, and in the relative deployment rates of the forces. And the time limits we have been talking about until this visit, created a situation in which both sides would be pressing against the limits of the agreement at the precise moment of its expiration date, the Soviet Union from the point of view of quality, the United States from the point of view of quantity; and therefore, there was a great danger that the mere expiration date might fuel, especially in its final phases, a race.

And as a result of the discussions that took place Sunday, where for the first time, I believe, at least where the concerns and the perceptions of both sides were put before each other in what I considered an unusually frank way, and in which it turned out that the perception by each side of the other really was remarkably close -- the only difference being that each side of course has to take the worst case of what the other one might do; I think this was the major gap that existed -- it became apparent that the time pressure was a great factor than had been commonly understood by either side.

So, I don't want to do this in terms of setback. We are not running a race with ourselves. This is a problem which I have been stressing will be with use for a long time and it shouldn't be seen in terms of hitting a home run on any one occasion.

**QUESTION:** You, at the Brussels briefing, said there was only 18 months before their decisions were irrevocable and each six months made it worse in terms of the rate of deployments.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That is right and I have reaffirmed that here.

**QUESTION:** But what I mean is you introduced the time pressure as you call it.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There are two time factors, the time factor available for negotiation and the time factor invovled in the length of the agreement. I have reaffirmed here that in my judgment the time frame in which the problems that I have identified can be constructively settled is in the 18 month range -- 24 months, 18 months -- in that range, and one of the reasons for 1985 is that if this agreement were to be concluded in '75, it would then take care of the next decade. This was one of the reasons behind it.

So that time factor still exists and that time factor will press on us and must press on us if we are serious.

**QUESTION:** Can I follow up that, sir? What would you envision will happen then if the interim agreement expires or is allowed to expire in 1977 but you have not yet reached areplacement agreement --what will happen between 1977 and 1985 in terms of the arms race psychology?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** If we have not reached an agreement well before 1977, then I believe you will see an explosion of technology and an explosion of numbers at the end of which we will be lucky

PR #283

- 14 -

if we have the present stability; in which it will impossible to describe
what strategic superiority means. And one of the questions which we
have to ask ourselves as a country is what in the name of God is
strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically,
militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do
with it?

But my prediction would be that if we do not solve this problem well
before, in my judgment, the end of the expiration of the agreement, we will
be living in a world which will be extraordinarily complex, in which
opportunities for nuclear warfare exists that were unimaginable 15 years ago
at the beginning of the nuclear age, and that is what is driving our concern,
not the disputes that one reads in the day-to-day --

**QUESTION:** One last point, on the weather modification, sir, could you clarify? You only referred to it very briefly. Weather modification techniques, as I understand, proved a failure in the Vietnam war. Could you explain why the issue is regarded as significant in arms control?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well. The issue is significant because the problem exists and it is not a problem, frankly, that we have completely understood. We have just started our studies on the subject. How significant it is, frankly, will become apparent only as time goes on. It is significant for the determination of the two sides to try to limit new areas of arms competition.

**THE PRESS:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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1147

[lc]

E.O. 11552: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
SUBJ: SECRETARY KISSINGER'S JULY 4 PRESS CONFERENCE AT
NATO HEADQUARTERS

DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND ZIEGLER
USIA FOR IPS/PE AND IBS

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF JOINT KISSINGER-LUNS PRESS CONFERENCE
AT NATO HEADQUARTERS:

SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS: (OPENING PHRASE INAUDIBLE)...I DON'T WANT
TO INTRODUCE HIM, BUT I JUST WANT TO GO IMMEDIATELY.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THIS IS SUCH A STUNNING PERFORMANCE BY
THE SECRETARY GENERAL. I WAS PREPARED FOR ONE OF HIS BRIEFER
COMMENTS OF ABOUT TWENTY MINUTES. I HAD TOLD HIM TO SAY SOMETHING
FRIENDLY BUT I SUPPOSE THAT HE COULD'T BRING HIMSELF TO DO THIS
(LAUGHTER). SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS: OH, I CAN. IT WAS AN EXCELLEN
MEETING. SECRETARY KISSINGER: I LIKE THE CONVICTION (LAUGHTER).
I REALLY CAN SAY NO MORE THAN THAT I DESCRIBED TO THE COUNCIL
THE SUMMIT THAT HAS JUST BEEN CONCLUDED IN MOSCOW, OUR EVALUATION
OF IT, A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE CONTENT OF IT. WE THEN HAD A
VERY USEFUL, VERY CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION IN THIS PERIOD OF CON-
SULTATION THAT IS FORESEEN IN THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION, AND AS
PART OF IT WE ALSO DISCUSSED ONE OR TWO OTHER SUBJECTS IN ADDITIO
TO THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. I WILL BE GLAD TO ANSWER QUESTIONS.

QUESTION: IF WE CAN GO BACK TO THE SUMMIT JUST FOR A MINUTE BEFORE
WE TALK ABOUT EUROPE. THERE IS A REPORT IN THE WASHINGTON POST
THAT PRESIDENT NIXON MADE A NEW PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIET UNION JUST
BEFORE THE SUMMIT. CAN YOU EXPAND ON THAT? ON NUCLEAR ARMS, OF
COURSE. CAN YOU EXPAND ON THAT, PLEASE? IT'S IN THE PARIS TRIBUNE
TODAY.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I HAVEN'T SEEN THAT REPORT. THERE WERE NO
PROPOSALS MADE TO THE SOVIET UNION JUST BEFORE THE SUMMIT. THERE
WAS A FULL DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES OF SOLVING THE SAL
PROBLEM AT THE SUMMIT INCLUDING SOME NEW APPROACHES THAT HAD NOT
PREVIOUSLY PUT BEFORE THEM AND I DISCUSSED THAT IN THE PAST SO THE
IT IS SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT EXCEPT FOR THE TIME.

COPIES

RECIPIENT NO.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1147(9)

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, WHAT WERE THE OBSTACLES IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS, AND WHAT'S THE NEXT STEP?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: (INAUDIBLE PHRASE)...DISCUSSING NATO PROBLEMS WITH AN OBSESSIVE CONCERN. THE OBSTACLES WERE THAT IT DID NOT PROVE POSSIBLE TO FILL A BALANCE BETWEEN OVERALL NUMBERS AND THE NUMBERS OF MISSILES WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS; THAT THE NUMBERS THAT THE PRESIDENT AND I PRESENTED IN MOSCOW SEEMED TO US THE UPPER LIMITS OF WHAT WAS ACCEPTABLE AND THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT SEE IT QUITE CLEAR TO ACCEPTING THEM. THEREFORE, THE NEXT STEP WILL BE TO SEE WHETHER THE PROGRAM IS EXENDED OVER A LONGER TIME PERIOD WHEN THERE ARE LESS PRESSURES OF THE BUILDING PROGRAMS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN PLANNED IN A SHORT TIME FRAME, WHETHER A SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND AND THAT WE ARE FAIRLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

QUESTION: WHAT ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MOSCOW SUMMIT MEETING, AND WHAT WAS THE SOVIET REACTION REGARDING THE AMERICAN PEACE EFFORTS IN THAT AREA?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THE SOVIET-AMERICAN POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN FULLY SATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH IS TO SAY THAT WE BEG FAVOR A RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND THAT THIS CONFERENCE WILL NATURALLY THEN DISCUSS THE WHOLE RANGE OF PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE DID NOT DISCUSS IN DETAIL SOVIET REACTIONS TO EVERY INDIVIDUAL AMERICAN MOVE THAT MAY HAVE BECOME MADE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BUT IT HAS BEEN CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WOULD GENERALLY KEEP EACH OTHER INFORMED AND THAT THE UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS NOW CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD.

QUESTION: (INAUDIBLE)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THE DISCUSSIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, I HAVE ONE QUESTION FOR YOU AND ONE QUESTION FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL. COMING BACK TO YOURS, TURKEY HAS LIFTED THE TOTAL BAN ON OPIUM. WILL YOU BE ASKING TURKEY TO RESURRECT THE BAN? DO YOU THINK THAT U.S. AID TO TURKEY CAN BE REVISED WITH PRESSURE FROM CONGRESS, AND DID TUREKY NOTIFY WASHINGTON BEFORE TAKING THIS DECISION? IF SO, WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION? AND THE QUESTION TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, IF YOU MAY...DO YOU THINK THAT GROWING TENSIONS IN THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF THE ORGANIZATION IS DANGEROUS ENOUGH FOR YOU TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES LIKE YOU DID BETWEEN ENGLAND AND ICELAND?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: AS YOU KNOW, THE PRIME MINISTER OF TURKEY IS A FORMER STUDENT OF MINE. IT IS ALWAYS DOUBLY PAINFUL WHEN EVEN IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE IS NO COMPLETE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ACTIONS OF THE STUDENT AND CONVICTIONS OF THE TEACHER KLAUGHTER). THE UNITED STATES, NEEDLESS TO SAY, DOES NOT WELCOME THIS ACTION. WE THINK IT IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM. WE EXPRESSED OUR VIEWS TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND WE STILL HOPE TO WORK OUT SOME SOLUTION THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM AS WELL AS TURKISH NECESSITIES.

(lc)

SECRETARY LUNS: WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION DIRECTED TO ME, I MAY REMIND YOU OF MY WATCHING BRIEF. UNDER THE WATCHING BRIEF, I HAVE BEEN IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND I MAY ADD THAT SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL. I AM SLIGHTLY WORRIED ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS BUT I AM HOPEFUL THAT A FORMULA MAY BE FOUND TO DE-FUSE POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN TWO VERY IMPORTANT ALLIES OF THE ALLIANCE.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, AFTER THIS MEETING WITH YOU THIS MORNING, PRIME MINISTER TINDEMANS WAS QUOTED AS SAYING HE TOLD THE PRESS IN ABSENTEAT TALKS ALL RESULTS ARE NOT ALWAYS ANNOUNCED IMMEDIATELY.

ME SEEMS TO HAVE GOTTE THE IMPRESSION FROM YOU THAT THERE WERE THINGS DECIDED IN MOSCOW THAT HAVE NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC. COULD YOU DOCUMENT ON THAT, SIR?

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRETARY KISSINGER: NO, ALL THE DISCUSSIONS THAT TOOK PLACE IN MOSCOW HAVE BEEN PUT BEFORE THE NATO COUNCIL. I EXPLAINED TO THE PRIME MISISTER, AS I EXPLAINED TO THE NATO COUNCIL, THE STRUCTURE OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS. THERE ARE NO SECRET AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, CONCERNING CSCE--FIRST OF ALL, DO YOU HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT MOSCOW WILL MAKE A MOVE IN GENEVA? AND, SECOND, AFTER THE DISCUSSION IN THE COUNCIL TODAY, DO YOU HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE THIRD STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE CAN BE INITIATED RATHER SOON, AND AT WHAT TIME PROBABLY?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION AT THE COUNCIL ABOUT THE TIMING OF THE THIRD STAGE. THE UNITED STATES HAS NO FIXED IDEA ABOUT THE TIMING OF THE THIRD STAGE. AS I SAID IN MY PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW, WE BELIEVE TWO QUESTIONS REQUIRE SOLUTION:

(1) WHETHER ANY RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE NOW FORESEEABLE WOULD WARRANT A SUMMIT FOR PHASE THREE, AND (2) WHAT THAT RESULT WOULD BE? THESE ARE QUESTIONS WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WITHOUT PRECONCEPTIONS AND WITHOUT PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS.

QUESTION: GIVEN THE OBSTACLES ON SALT THAT YOU ONLY BRIEFLY MENTIONED THIS MORNING, IT IS A LITTLE HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHAT IT IS PRECISELY THAT YOU ARE FAIRLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT. COULD YOU SPELL THAT OUT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I HAVE TO EXPLAIN TO YOU, MR. SECRETARY GENERAL, THE PRESS THAT'S TRAVELING WITH ME IS TRYING TO GET ME TO SAY ON THE RECORD WHAT I MAY HAVE SAID ON BACGROUND PREVIOUSLY (LAUGHTER). AS I TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR IN MOSCOW, THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN HOW TO RECONCILE THE OVERALL QUANTITIES WITH THE QUANTITIES OF MISSILES WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS. ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES IS THAT IN A SHORT TIME FRAME, SUCH AS FOR EXAMPLE FIVE YEARS, THE BUILDING PROGRAMS OF BOTH SIDES MAY BEGIN TO OPERATE AT THE VERY END OF THAT TIME PERIOD SO THAT THE WHOLE PERIOD WOULD BE OVERLaid BY EXISTING BUILDING PROGRAMS. IF ONE CAN LOOK AHEAD OVER A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE PLANS WITHIN A TIME FRAME THAT PERMITS A MORE DELIBERATE DEPLOYMENT PATTERN IF THERE EXISTS THE WILL ON BOTH SIDES TO BRING THIS ABOUT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE DISCUSSIONS THAT ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE ON THE NATURE OF THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM WERE, AS THE COMMUNIQUE SAID, DEEP AND, I BELIEVE, SEARCHING. I BELIEVE THAT AS A RESULT THE PERCEPTION OF BOTH SIDES OF THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM HAS GREATLY IMPROVED AND THEREFORE WE BELIEVE THAT IF THERE IS A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE A NEW LOOK AT THIS IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE, THAT A NEW APPROACH CAN BE DEVELOPED THAT WOULD LEAD TO CONSTRUCTIVE RESULTS.

SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS: IN ORDER TO REASSURE YOU, I CAN TELL YOU THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOKO THE MINISTERS, THE HIGH OFFICIALS AND THE AMBASSADORS EXACTLY THE SAME THING.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, COMING BACK TO THE SECRUTIY CONFERENCE, THERE SEEMS TO BE A DIFFERENCE IN LANGUAGE BETWEEN THE OTTAWA COMMUNIQUE AND THE MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE ON THE EVALUATION OF THE PROGRESS SO FAR ACHIEVED, AND I WONDERED IF YOU COULD EXPLAIN THAT, AND ALSO DID THE RUSSIANS GIVE ANY IDEA THAT THEY MIGHT MAKE A CONCESSION IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO EXPLAIN THAT DIFFERENCE OF LANGUAGE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO A DEBATE ABOUT THE PRECISE SIGNIFICANCE OF ADJECTIVES. AS FAR AS THE FUTURE IS CONCERNED, I HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE ISSUES THAT REQUIRE SOLUTION ARE TO GIVE A PRECISE CONTENT TO WHAT OUTCOME WOULD BE CONSIDERED USEFUL AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, AS FAR AS OUR ALLIES ARE CONCERNED. WE ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR ALLIES. I BELIEVE THEY, TO, ARE PREPARED FOR THAT SORT OF DIALOGUE. IT WAS, IN FACT, ALREADY STARTED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COUNCIL AND THAT WILL THEN GIVE US A PRECISE YARDSTICK SO THAT WE DO NOT HAVE TO USE GENERAL TERMS TO DESCRIBE WHERE WE ARE GOING.

ACTION REQUESTED BY EMBASSY PARIS: PLEASE DELIVER 30 COPIES TO A/AMBASSADOR ROBERT ANDERSON WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER'S PARTY.
RUNSFELD

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PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 5, 1974

No. 284

No. 28

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT NATO HEADQUARTERS
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
JULY 4, 1974

**SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS:** (Opening phrase inaudible) ... I don't want to introduce him, but I just want to go immediately.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** This is such a stunning performance by the Secretary General. I was prepared for one of his briefer comments of about twenty minutes. I had told him to say something friendly but I suppose he couldn't bring himself to do this. (Laughter)

**SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS:** Oh, I can. It was an excellent meeting.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I like the conviction. (Laughter) I really can say no more than that I described to the Council the summit that has just been concluded in Moscow, our evaluation of it, a detailed explanation of the content of it. We then had a very useful, very constructive discussion in this period of consultation that is foreseen in the Atlantic Declaration. And as part of it we also discussed one or two other subjects in addition to the Moscow summit. I will be glad to answer questions.

**QUESTION:** If we can go back to the summit for just a minute before we talk about Europe. There is a report in the *Washington Post* that President Nixon made a new proposal to the Soviet Union just before the summit. Can you expand on that? On nuclear arms, of course. Could you expand on that, please? It's in the *Paris Tribune* today.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I haven't seen that report. There were no proposals made to the Soviet Union just before the summit. There was a full discussion of various possibilities of solving the SALT problem at the summit including some new approaches that had not been previously put before them and I discussed that in the past so that it is substantially correct except for the time.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, what were the obstacles in the strategic arms negotiations with the Russians, and what's the next step?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** (Inaudible phrase) ... Discussing NATO problems with an obsessive concern. The obstacles were that it did not prove possible to find a balance between overall numbers and the numbers of missiles with multiple warheads; that the numbers that the President and I presented in Moscow seemed to us the upper limits of what was acceptable and the Soviet Union could not see it quite clear to accepting them. Therefore, the next step will be to see whether the

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program is extended over a longer time period when there are less
pressures of the building programs that have already been planned in a
short time frame, whether a solution can be found and that we are fairly
optimistic that this might be possible.

**QUESTION:** What about the Middle East in the Moscow summit meeting, and what was the Soviet reaction regarding the American peace efforts in that area?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The Soviet-American position on the Middle East has been fully stated in the communique which is to say that we both favor a resumption of the Geneva Conference and that this Conference will naturally then discuss the whole range of problems connected with peace in the Middle East. We did not discuss in detail Soviet reactions to every individual American move that may have been made in the Middle East but it has been clearly understood that we would generally keep each other informed and that the United States' policy in the Middle East is now clearly understood.

**QUESTION:** (Inaudible)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The discussions were conducted in a constructive spirit.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I have one question for you and one question for the Secretary General. Coming back to yours, Turkey has lifted the total ban on opium. Will you be asking Turkey to restore the ban? Do you think that U.S. aid to Turkey can be revised with pressure from Congress and did Turkey notify Washington before taking this decision? If so, what was your reaction? And the question to the Secretary General. If you may . . . do you think the growing tension in the southern flank of the organization is dangerous enough for you to mediate between the two countries like you did between England and Iceland?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As you know, the Prime Minister of Turkey is a former student of mine. It is always doubly painful when even in those circumstances there is no complete agreement between the actions of the student and the convictions of the teacher. (Laughter) The United States, needless to say, does not welcome this action. We think it is a serious problem. We expressed our views to the Turkish Government and we still hope to work out some solution that takes into account our concern about the narcotics problem as well as Turkish necessities.

**SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS:** With regard to the question directed to me. I may remind you of my watching brief. Under the watching brief, I have been in constant touch with the two governments and I may add that several governments of the Alliance have been in touch with the Secretary General. I am slightly worried about the present state of affairs but I am hopeful that a formula may be found to defuse possible difficulties between two very important allies of the Alliance.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, after this meeting with you this morning, Prime Minister Tindemans was quoted as saying he told the press in armament talks all results are not always announced immediately. He seems to have gotten the impression from you that there were things decided in Moscow that have not been made public. Could you comment on that, sir?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, all the discussions that took place in Moscow have been put before the NATO Council. I explained to the Prime Minister, as I explained to the NATO Council, the structure of the

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strategic arms limitation talks. There are no secret agreements or
understandings.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, concerning CSCE -- first of all, do you have the impression that Moscow will make a move in Geneva? And, second, after the discussion in the Council today, do you have the impression that the third stage of the Conference can be initiated rather soon, and at what time probably?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There was no discussion at the Council about the timing of the third stage. The United States has no fixed idea about the timing of the third stage. As I said in my press conference in Moscow, we believe two questions require solution:

One, whether any results of the Conference now foreseeable would warrant a summit for phase three. And two, what that result would be? These are questions which we are prepared to discuss in detail with our European allies without preconceptions and without previous commitments.

**QUESTION:** Given the obstacles on SALT that you only briefly mentioned this morning, it is a little hard to understand what it is precisely that you are fairly optimistic about. Could you spell that out?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have to explain to you, Mr. Secretary General, the press that's traveling with me is trying to get me to say on the recond what I may have said on background previously. (Laughter) As I tried to make clear in Moscow, the problem has been how to reconcile the overall quantities with the quantities of missiles with multiple warheads. One of the difficulties is that in a short time frame, such as for example five years, the building programs of both sides may begin to operate at the very end of that time period so that the whole period would be overlaid by existing building programs. If one can look ahead over a longer period of time, it should be possible to make plans within a time frame that permits a more deliberate deployment pattern if there exists the will on both sides to bring this about.

We believe that the discussions that actually took place on the nature of the strategic problems were, as the communique said, deep and, I believe, searching. I believe that as a result the perception of both sides of the nature of the problem has greatly improved and therefore we believe that if there is a willingness to take a new look at this in the light of the discussions that have taken place, that a new approach can be developed that would lead to constructive results.

**SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS:** In order to reassure you, I can tell you that the Secretary of State told the Ministers, the high officials and the Ambassadors exactly the same thing.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, coming back to the Security Conference, there seems to be a difference in language between the Ottawa Communique and the Moscow Communique on the evaluation of the progress so far achieved, and I wondered if you could explain that, and also did the Russians give any idea that they might make a concession in the near future to explain that difference of language?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't want to get into a debate about the precise significance of adjectives. As far as the future is concerned, I have pointed out that the issues that require solution are to give a precise content to what outcome would be considered useful as far as we are concerned, as far as our allies are concerned. We are prepared to engage in serious detailed discussions with our allies. I believe

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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<table><tr><td>FROM</td><td>CLASSIFICATION</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>MUNICH</td><td>UNCLASSIFIED</td><td></td></tr></table><table><tr><td>E.O. 11652:</td><td>GB NA</td><td rowspan="4" style="vertical-align: top;">7</td></tr><tr><td>TAGS:</td><td>CVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)</td></tr><tr><td>SUBJECT:</td><td>SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL REMARKS TO MUNICH</td></tr><tr><td>SECSTATEMENT</td><td>SECVISIT MUNICH:ARRIVAL STATEMENT</td></tr><tr><td>ACTION:</td><td>SECSTATE WASHDC</td><td>IMMEDIATE</td></tr><tr><td>INFO:</td><td>AMEMBASSY BONN</td><td>IMMEDIATE</td></tr><tr><td>SECTO</td><td>197</td><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">UNCLAS MUNICH 1031</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR SCOWCROFT AND ZIEGLER</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">1. Following is transcript of Secretary's arrival remarks to press at Fuerstenfeldbruck Airfield, Munich. Remarks were in German and English as indicated.</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">2. (Begin German) Ladies and Gentlemen, You will have noticed in the last few days with what intensity the consultations within NATO are being carried out, especially between the Federal Republic and the United States. I am here - as everyone knows - to consult with the German Foreign Minister. I am a polite guest and I will follow him everywhere, wherever he suggests. I will also continue to consult wherever he thinks it is advisable. But we will have the opportunity to continue our consultations.</td></tr></table><table><tr><td>DRAFTED BY:</td><td>P.M. CR</td><td>DRAFTING DATE:</td><td>6 July 74</td><td>TEL. EXT.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>USIS P. Modic/C. Peter</td><td></td><td>CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:</td><td>MS/PRS Amb. Anderson</td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>

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I am glad to be here and am looking forward to the
discussions which I will have with the Foreign Minister.
(end German remarks)

3. (Begin English) If I may say a word for the
Americans present, I would like to say that everyone
must have noticed the intensity with which consultations
are being pursued between the United States and the
Federal Republic the last few days. As is obvious,
it is the result of long-term planning and I had
accepted the invitation of the Foreign Minister to
meet him wherever he proposed - and being a polite
guest, I will of course accompany him wherever he
thinks it would be suitable for me (laughter) to be
and I will not ask any questions about that. I do
look forward to my talks with the Foreign Minister
and I also look forward to some of the activities
which we have planned, about which a program will
be handed to me at the end of this meeting (laughter).
Thank you. (end English remarks)

4. In his remarks, Foreign Minister Genscher said
that he regarded the Secretary's presence as
confirmation of the U.S. commitment to consultation
and cooperation.

5. Press questions dealt only with the Secretary's
view of soccer and his own playing experience.

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PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR ZIEGLER AND GGEN. SCOWCROFT
" MUNICH FOR AMBASSADOR ANDERSON

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S ROME DEPARTURE INTERVIEW

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY'S RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM RAI (ITALIAN TELEVISION) VIDEOTAPED AT AIRPORT ON DEPARTURE ROME JULY 6 (OTHER MEDIA ALSO PRESENT):

2. Q. MR. SECRETARY OF STATE, I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU FIRST OF ALL YOUR IMPRESSIONS ON THE TALKS YOU'VE HAD HERE IN ROME YESTERDAY AND TODAY.

3. A. THE TALKS WERE CONDUCTED IN AN EXTREMELY FRIENDLY AND WARM ATMOSPHERE AND I THINK THERE WAS A COMPLETE UNANIMITY OF VIEWS ON ALL SUBJECTS.

4. Q. COULD YOU GIVE US A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SUMMIT IN MOSCOW?

5. A. THE SUMMIT IN MOSCOW SERVED A NUMBER OF PURPOSES WHICH I HAVE DESCRIBED PREVIOUSLY. FIRST, IT ENABLED THE TWO COUNTRIES THAT BETWEEN THEM HAVE THE CAPACITY TO DESTROY MANKIND AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. AND THAT WAS DONE IN A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. SECONDLY THERE WERE A NUMBER OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WHICH WILL STRENGTHEN COOPERATION AND THIRDLY GOOD PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE FIELD OF LIMITATION OF ARMS, BOTH IN AGREEMENTS THAT WERE SIGNED AND IN LAYING THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENTS TO COME.

6. Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOUR ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN CRUCIAL AND DECISIVE AND I WONDER IF YOU CAN GIVE US ANY COMMENT ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.

7. A. WELL THE NEXT STAGE WILL BE A RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER EXCHANGE BETWEEN ALL THOSE PARTIES, BETWEEN US AND THE PARTIES AND BETWEEN US AND THE OTHER CHAIRMANN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE - TO DO OUR BEST TO MOVE THINGS TOWARDS PEACE ON A STEP-BY-STEP BASIS.

8. Q. JUST ONE MORE QUESTION, WHAT DEVELOPMENTS MAY TAKE PLACE IN U.S. - EUROPE RELATIONS?

9. A. WELL, I THINK EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS ARE NOW IN - GOING ALONG IN A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE DIRECTION AND IN THE DIRECTION WE HOPED TO STIMULATE WHEN WE STARTED THE DIALOGUE LAST YEAR. WE SIGNED THIS DECLARATION AMONG THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES WHICH IN ITSELF IS USEFUL BUT WHICH IF IT ISS Carried OUT IN THE SPIRIT

["CONTROL: 1030\nJULY 6, 1974 11:14 Local", "DEPARTMENT OF STATE\nTELEGRAM", "INDICATE\n☐ COLLECT\n☐ CHARGE TO", "<table><tr><td>FROM</td><td>~~BAGET~~ MUNICH</td><td>CLASSIFICATION</td><td>UNCLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>I.O. 11652:</td><td>N/A</td><td>CLASSIFICATION</td><td>UNCLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>TAGS:</td><td>CVIP (KISSINGER, Henry A.)</td><td>CLASSIFICATION</td><td>UNCLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>SUBJECT:</td><td>Kissinger's Toast at President Leone's Luncheon</td><td>CLASSIFICATION</td><td>UNCLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>ACTION:</td><td>SECSTATE WASHDC - IMMEDIATE</td><td>CLASSIFICATION</td><td>UNCLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>S/S</td><td>UNCLASSIFIED MUNICH</td><td>CLASSIFICATION</td><td>UNCLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>SECTO 196</td><td>CLASSIFICATION</td><td>UNCLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>CLASSIFICATION</td><td>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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<table><tr><td>FROM</td><td>CLASSIFICATION</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>UNCLASSIFIED</td></tr></table><table><tr><td>E.O. 11652:</td><td>Pge. 2</td></tr><tr><td>TAGS:</td><td>very proud of our Ambassador, Mr. President, but in the unlikely</td></tr><tr><td>SUBJECT:</td><td>event that you have to consider in the distant future the composition</td></tr><tr><td>ACTION:</td><td>of a new Government, it is not true that you have to take him</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>into consideration for Prime Minister.</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>3. And the only request I have of you, Mr. President and</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, with respect</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>to your own Ambassador is to cut down on the frequency of his</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>reporting. I consider him a personal friend, but much as I know</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>love Italy I cannot give him a daily report on my activities.</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>If we can compromise on once a week, I think we can....</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>4. But, Mr. President, really the only reason I have</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>about Italy is that you don't cause more foreign policy troubles</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>to give me an excuse to come here more frequently. Our</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>friendship for Italy requires no reiteration. We follow events</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>here with sympathy and affection. And you can count on the</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>fact that whenever Italy faces difficulties the United States</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>will do its utmost to help guarantee stability and insure</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>progress. In the discussions I will have with your Ministers</td></tr></table><table><tr><td>DRAFTED BY:</td><td>DRAFTING DATE</td><td>TEL. EXT.</td><td>CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:</td></tr><tr><td>CLEARANCES</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>

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7

E.O. 11652:

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this afternoon, and in the discussions that will no doubt follow, this will be our guiding attitude.

5. And beyond Italy, we will never forget that whatever we may achieve in foreign policy has been based on the unity of the West, to which an Italian statesman, De Gasperi, and Italian leaders in the whole post-war period, made such a major contribution. We are now in a more complicated period of foreign policy than in the early post-war era. The people of none of our countries will be prepared to sustain crises unless the leaders of the countries can show that they made every effort to preserve the peace.

6. So, therefore, for the sake of the defense of the West, it is imperative for the United States to prove to itself and to prove to others that it is prepared to make every reasonable effort to bring about a relaxation of tensions. But we will never bring about relaxation of tensions by sacrificing the interests of the security of our friends. And therefore I look forward to my talks at your Foreign Ministry this afternoon where we can chart again common action -- after I have listened for

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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<table><tr><td>FROM</td><td>CLASSIFICATION</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>UNCLASSIFIED</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>E.O. 11552:</td><td>Pge. 4</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>TAGS:</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>SUBJECT:</td><td>15 minutes to other mistakes we have recently made. But beyond relations with the Communist countries, we have common interests in preserving the peace in the Mediterranean and in other parts of the world.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ACTION:</td><td>7. We have appreciated the interest you have taken in the Middle East and we have followed the efforts you have made with interest and sympathy. So whatever issues we consider, we approach them from the point of view of the identity of interests between Italy and the United States. We are happy about the important role that Italy has played in the European Community, and we continue to support European unity as one of the essential elements of the Atlantic relationship. We believe that recent events have strengthened ties across the Atlantic and we look forward to the new efforts to foster European unity.<br>8. So, I am delighted to be here to discuss these and other problems, including especially what we can do together with others to help Italy with some immediate difficulty. Our two countries have been closely tied for the entire post-war period.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>DRAFTED BY:</td><td>DRAFTING DATE</td><td>TEL. EXT.</td><td>CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY</td></tr></table>

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<table><tr><td>FROM:</td><td>CLASSIFICATION:</td><td>UNCLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>E.O. 11652:</td><td>Pge. 5</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>TAGS:</td><td colspan="2"></td></tr><tr><td>SUBJECT:</td><td colspan="2">The sentiments of our peoples are very friendly to each other and it is in this spirit of friendship that I would like to raise my glass. I would like to propose a toast to the President and to the warm friendship of Italy and the United States. UNQUOTE 9. Foregoing text is sent for the record, but not repeat not for release.</td></tr><tr><td>ACTION:</td><td colspan="2">KISSINGER</td></tr><tr><td>DRAFTED BY:</td><td>DRAFTING DATE:</td><td>TEL. EXT.</td><td>CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:</td></tr><tr><td>CLEARANCE:</td><td colspan="3"></td></tr></table>

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<table><tr><td>FROM</td><td>MUNICH</td><td>CLASSIFICATION</td><td>UNCLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>E.O. 11652:</td><td>N/A</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>TAGS:</td><td>OVIP(Kissinger, Henry A.)</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>SUBJECT:</td><td>SECVISIT MUNICH:</td><td>EXCHANGE OF REMARKS WITH GOPPEL</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ACTION:</td><td>SECSTATE WASHDC</td><td>IMMEDIATE 5150</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>INFO: AMEMBASSY BONN</td><td>IMMEDIATE 3667</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>SECTO 211</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>UNCLAS W MUNICH</td><td>1045</td><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">1. Following is a transcript of remarks by the Secretary and Dr. Alfons Goppel, Minister President of Bavaria (Governor), at the Bavarian State Chancellery in Munich on Sunday, July 7 at 1010: The Secretary and Goppel spoke in German:</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">2. Goppel: WRITE QUOTE</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">Honoured Mr. Foreign Minister, Excellencies, my honored ladies and gentlemen:<br/>I am permitted to welcome you heartily in Bavaria, here in the Bavarian State Chancellery, on behalf of</td></tr><tr><td>DRAFTED BY</td><td>MODIC/CPeters</td><td>DRAFTING DATE</td><td>July 7</td><td>TEL. EXT.</td><td>CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:</td><td>RAnderson</td></tr></table>

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the population and the State Government.

I know you are not here to make Bavarian-American Foreign Policy but to attend the World Soccer Championship. And therefore this afternoon we also wish you -- in remembrance of soccer years in Fuerth and in remembrance of the competition between Nuremberg and Fuerth, the two great teams of your youth -- a great, pleasant -- especially a fair -- sport event.

In the meantime you have had so many other important discussions that we only would like also to wish that you be protected by a gracious fate so that a settlement can be reached in any controversy. From here we will state that we wish you, and this also means us, a hearty victory.

We know that we need most of all our American friends here -- where we have the border to the East. And we also feel happy that we have such a good relationship with the American troops stationed here to secure our borders, kin and that we settle everything that bothers us in peace and friendship. Therefore we also expect from your visit a strengthening of this friendship

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which of course first of all serves our security but -- and we believe we may say so -- serves also the Americans. And therefore, we are, in my opinion, ideal allies.

Mr. Foreign Minister, may I ask you to sign our guest book. I have selected a map from Bavaria (for presentation) on which Fuerth is engraved as a small village. But it is already shown there.

Again a hearty welcome and thank you for your visit.

UNQUOTE

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Mr. Minister President, I thank you for this reception, which is significant especially for me in the capital of this state with which my youth was connected. I realized that the priorities of this country are still the same -- because one of the officers here told me that he appreciated that I attended a very hearty dinner yesterday -- given to me by the Foreign Minister -- since my presence would guarantee that at least two Bavarians would be present. (Laughter)

Mr. Minister President, I regret that you have said in

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front of the TV cameras that I am here because of
the Soccer World Championship. Because all my
colleagues in America are of the firm conviction that
we are having very sincere, deep talks here, which
out of courtesy I will carry out anywhere where the
German Foreign Minister is. But I'm looking forward
to the game this afternoon and although I, as the
Secretary of State
American President, have to be neutral, I
should be permitted in this room to wish you all the
best. I have had already very constructive conversa-
tions with the Foreign Minister and I will see the
Federal Chancellor soon. We meet as allies and we
talk as personal friends.

The relationship between the Federal Republic and the
United States is a close partnership, which we always
will deepen and in which there will take place the
closest consultation and a continuing dialogue. We
defend the same values and we stand for the same
interests -- and therefore we never feel we are here
as foreigners -- for many reasons. But also because
the interests of the United States and those of the
Federal Republic are closely bound.

Mr. Minister President, I thank you very much for this
reception and the pleasant days which I am able to
spend here. UNQUOTE

KISSINGER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

<table><tr><td>FROM</td><td>AMCONGEN MUNICH</td><td>CLASSIFICATION</td><td>UNCLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>E.O.</td><td>11652:</td><td>CONTROL:</td><td>1043</td></tr><tr><td>TAGS:</td><td>OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)</td><td>July 7, 1974</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>SUBJECT:</td><td>SECVISIT MUNICH: ARRIVAL STATEMENT</td><td>2030</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ACTION:</td><td>SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5148</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>INFO:</td><td>AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3666</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>SECTO 209</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>UNCLASSIFIED MUNICH 1043</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>S/3 - 10</td><td colspan="3">ZIEGLER</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">DEPT. PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR SCOWCROFT AND</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">Following is the transcript of an interview</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">the Secretary made with Hans Gressmann of the First</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">German Television Channel (ARD) to be telecast at</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">2015 (Central European Time) on Monday, July 8.</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">Mister</td></tr><tr><td>G:</td><td colspan="3">Secretary, jet diplomacy, helicopter dip</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">lomacy, is that your personal style or is it a necessity</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">of modern diplomacy?</td></tr><tr><td>K:</td><td colspan="3">Some of it is obviously my personal style, but</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">I think it's a key element now in modern diplomacy that</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">it's easy to get in touch with your counterpart and that</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">so many intangibles are involved that you're better off</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">with personal contact.</td></tr><tr><td>DRAFTED BY:</td><td>BPAO:Paul A. Modic:es</td><td>DRAFTING DATE</td><td>7/7/74</td><td>TEL. EXT.</td><td>CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:</td><td>AMBRAnderson</td></tr><tr><td>CLEARANCES:</td><td colspan="6">S/Worrell</td></tr><tr><td colspan="6">S:DPBremer</td></tr></table>

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G: Well, your profession is political theory and now your job is battle line diplomacy. How does it combine?

K: There's no inevitable connection in the sense that you cannot use political theory as a cookbook, and because what you call battleline diplomacy depends also on psychological understanding, human relationships and the ability to find a correct formula. But I would say that at least in my case, I couldn't have done what I'm trying to do without my long studies in history and political theory, and I believe that for most statesmen this is likely to be true because the day-to-day events run in on you, and if you have no concept by which to sort them out, you are in great difficulty.

G: Well, with your tight schedule, with trips all over the world, you all the time seem to be relaxed. How do you manage?

K: I don't think my staff would tell you that I'm relaxed. I think there is enough excitement in the public mind as it is without those who conduct policy contributing to it.

G: Somebody someday described you as a mixture of German systematic (sic), French flexibility, and American energy. Do you think it's a correct interpretation of your character?

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K: I think one is generally a bad judge of one's own character.

G. But fundamentally you think it's ...

K: Well, fundamentally it's true that I try to be flexible. I try to be theoretical, conceptual, and I'm lucky to have a lot of physical energy.

G: One last question. Again somebody someday said there might even be a sort of an erotic sense of relationship between power and Henry Kissinger.

K: I think, I haven't heard that. That is one statement I haven't heard. But, I think there is in any event a sort of erotic relationship between power, and that has to be exercised on the basis of a commitment in a short time span. Whether it's more so in my case than in others, I don't know. That I have thought of myself.

G: Thank you very much, Mister Secretary.

KISSINGER

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NOTES OF THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION TO THE
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE

Thursday, July 18, 1974

Opening Remarks:

When I was out of Government nothing use to infuriate
me more than to have a senior government official assuring
a group of us that the Government was following the best
course possible, that all options were being pursued and that
anyone who did not recognize this was guilty of short-sightedness.
Well, I am here today to tell you that the best course is being
pursued; all options are being considered and anyone who does
not agree certainly must be short-sighted.

I understand that this morning Tom Hughes spoke at length
on the institutionalization of foreign policy and I thought I might
take a few minutes to say a few words about this problem. I
don't know exactly what he said, but it is clear to me that the
basic problem of foreign policy is to achieve continuity and to
separate foreign policy from any individual achievements
especially in the last two years of a second term Presidency.
It is important because other governments will necessarily in
these circumstances judge the degree of their commitment to
our policy on the reliability of that policy being consistent after
a change in Administration. In addition, the kinds of problems
we are now facing, for example, energy, balance of payments, simply
cannot be done on an individual basis.

Now the real question then is not: "Should foreign policy be
institutionalized?" but how do you achieve the institutionalization.
This is elusive. First, I have found that the policymaker always
acts on insufficient knowledge and you always know too late the
information you needed to make a decision. Secondly, this means
that you are always acting on guesses about the evolution of certain
trends. Therefore, the tendency to think that foreign policy making
is an expert skill can actually stultify decision-making since it also
means that policy making would rely on certainty. But as we have
seen that certainty is not always, indeed is probably never,
available. So you are faced with the problem of how to get
decisions from a system where certainty is required or at least
desirable. The important, and most difficult part of policy-
making is to spot the trends.

-2-

To illustrate the kind of thing I am talking about we need
only look at Cyprus. Now we are getting plenty of advice from
a lot of people all over the world on proclaiming objectives in
the present Cyprus situation. How to reach those objectives
however and what trends will be set in motion by whatever we
do is something we have to consider. We cannot simply
proclaim objectives without considering the consequences
of such a proclamation. Therefore the policymaker must spot
the interrelationship of events and the long-term consequences
of what he is doing and of course he must try to know and
control the effect on the course of events that he sets in motion.
Can this kind of thing be taught? I just do not know. The policy-
maker must at some point make a leap into the unknown future.
In this there is always an element of artistry.

Nonetheless its absolutely clear that policy cannot be geared
to personality because if it is there will be no continuity. As an
historian I have studied enough statesmen to see the danger of
basing a policy on one personality and then having the personality
leave the scene. The problem is very acute especially
in the problem areas which I have mentioned before and also
in the general area of our relations with the Soviet Union. Here
we are faced with a very complex series of problems on balancing
nuclear threats, on hostile ideology and detente now suddenly
becoming somewhat taken for granted due to its very success.
If we were to make a massive change of policy towards the
Soviet Union, it would take a long time to undo. If we changed
our detente policy it would have an enormous impact on the
Soviet leadership or on the successors to the present Soviet
leadership. These are some of the reasons why I am interested
in trying to get a public debate started on our military and foreign
objectives.

Well, I have said a few words here and I would now like to
take your questions:

Q: You had breakfast today with Senator Jackson. Can you give us any kind of assessment on the prospects for the Trade Bill?

A: Our policy is not to confront either Jackson or the Soviet Union. We are not interested in public posturing or positions but in results. There are limits to what we can demand of a sovereign government on things which are clearly within its domestic policy. This morning we did have a good constructive talk, as we will announce publicly, and I think we are making some progress towards a solution. Therefore, I am inclined to be more optimistic about the Trade Bill just now.

Q: Mr. Warneke has said that he thinks the continuing round of talks with the Soviet Union on arms control may itself incite more expenditures on arms and he thinks what we ought to have is a policy of mutual restraint without formal negotiations. Can you comment on this proposal?

A: Well, I don't think the decisions of either country are substantially effected by the desire for bargaining tips in the negotiations, but more by theories of overall strategy. Now it is true that programs do tend to have a life of their own. There is generally speaking a five year cycle from the start to the procurement of a weapons system and the longer you wait in a program's life cycle the more difficult it is to stop it. During the last negotiations we did see this kind of a problem when we had a five year agreement with ongoing programs. Our hope is that now by stretching our talks over two procurement cycles there is a better chance to put a ceiling on the arms race and then perhaps mutual restraint can play a role. However, before then, I think, mutual restraint is a bit difficult to make work since you have the problem of who goes first on a unilateral reduction of arms and how is that justified to his public if the other side does not restrain itself.

Q. This year there is the UN World Food Conference. Can you tell us if a viable program will be possible and will we be able to finance whatever program comes out of it?

A: Well I have study groups that now are examining these questions and in fact had hoped to make some decisions on our programs in the next few weeks until the Cyprus situation came upon us. We will increase our food aid this year though not as much as we had hoped since the crop level in the U.S. is somewhat lower than we had hoped. I think we can take care of the financing. But the problems are very complex involving worldwide stockpiling and the assurance of proper usage of these stockpiles. These are some very difficult problems.

Q: You spoke before of the interrelationship between domestic and foreign policy. Can you tell us if we have a national energy policy and if not when we can hope to see one?

-4-

A: Well the energy problem is not strictly speaking within my jurisdiction except insofar as it involves the international aspects of it. However, some of my colleagues do suffer from the illusion that we do have a national energy policy.

Back in February we called the Washington Energy Conference to emphasize how the energy crisis showed the inter-dependence of all nations in todays world. Som of the other countries saw our attempt as a unilateral effort to have our way. Now however, there is complete consensus on our course including even France. Obviously to the degress we are able to have a unified national energy policy, our influence in these councils will be enhanced and our ability to solve our own problems at home will increase. I think we may have a very severe energy crisis within a few years as the surplus funds continue to build in the oil producing countries and their incentive to cut production becomes overwhelming.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you say a few words about the OPEC policies and about what appears to be a lack of intra-muslim brotherhood. They don't seem to be treating fellow muslim countries very well and can you speak about the comments that one of your cabinet colleagues has made about the Shah of Iran?

A: Well the OPEC countries are having a decisive influence on the world economy and they have this often without having the personnel to understand their impact or even how to use their new resources in their own countries. Of all of the OPEC leaders certainly the most consistent strategy is that being followed by the Shah. And I do not share my colleague's views about the Shah, in fact I spend plenty of time soothing ruffled feathers. The problem is that the Shah is pursuing, from an Iranian point of view, a perfectly rational strategy for a country with the cowering oil balances. The challenge to the industrialized countries is to give him and other OPEC leaders incentives to help with our problems and to understand the impact they are having on the world economy.

Q: With the coup in Portugal are we rethinking our Southern African policy and are we taking the opportunity of the Azores talks to press for full independence of the Portugese colonies? Secondly, won't the opening of the Suez Canal decrease the importance of the southern African route and thirdly, you have visited many parts of the world can you tell us anything about your plans to visit Africa?

A: The Azores negotiations are now suspended due to the recent change in Portugal and there really is no enormous urgency in the negotiations since the use of the base can continue after the present agreement expires in August unless either side want to rescind it. But we will return to the negotiations in the not-to-distant future. It is not necessary we think to use pressure on the Portuguese since the general direction of the new policy is towards independence especially in Gambia-Bissau. Now it may be more complicated in Mozambique and Angola but my impression is that once a country grants the principle of independence the process itself becomes irreversible. Therefore, it is my feeling that the issue is not likely to be with us for very much longer unless there is a coup in Portugal or another change in the Portuguese policy.

The opening of the Suez does decrease to some extent the importance of the southern cape route. However, I would like to say that our policy towards southern Africa has not been all that much dominated by this kind of strategic thinking.

As far as visiting Africa, I have the impression that I really should spend some time in Washington just now.

Q: Senator Jackson says that the exports that we will be making in industry and technology to the Soviet Union will be much more valuable to them than whatever we can get in return. Can you comment on that?

A: Strictly speaking it is probably true since we are so much more industrialized than the Soviet Union, but trade is not necessarily the central issue. The question really is can we create a combination of incentives and penalties to encourage the USSR to pursue a moderate foreign policy. There will still be crises even with detente. But if you look at the Middle East, for example, there are several tendencies apparent in the Soviet involvement there. On the one hand the USSR gave arms to the various Arab combatants in the Middle East but in the perception of the Arabs in the area they did not give enough precisely because of detente.

We have to ask ourselves what would this country be like if after Vietnam and given our current domestic problems, we added on top of all those things a series of crises and confrontations with the Soviet Union. This would simply not be acceptable.

-6-

Q: Can you comment on whether the present surplus of crude oil and apparent softening of oil prices are a threat to OPEC solidarity?

A: Well, I think we should talk less about it, since it will produce an incentive to reduce production if we don't. If the consumers can cooperate, the divergent tendencies in OPEC will become apparent.

Q: First, can you give us a prognosis on the evolution of the European common market and secondly, do you foresee some similar arrangement here in the Western Hemisphere especially between the U.S. and Canada?

A: Early this year it appeared that the Common Market was in deep trouble, but in recent months, the Common Market seems to be gaining new impetus with new leadership in Great Britain, Germany, France. In five years the EC will be more solid even if it does that without Britain though I think it is unlikely that Britain will withdraw. I don't foresee the same kind of block here since we found usually if there are two neighbors one of which is preponderantly powerful, the other one will try to set itself off from the powerful neighbor. There, fore, I would think that Canada may try to balance the U.S. against the EC.

Also in this hemisphere the Latin American countries are talking about some common market arrangement, but I have the impression that this is some distance away.

Q: There has been considerable press attention to the possibility of a reapproachment between the U.S. and Cuba. Can you comment on that?

A: Our policy towards Cuba has both domestic and international aspects. Within the Western Hemisphere there has been recently some improvement in Cuba's rhetoric and a softening on their part by some Western Hemisphere countries maintaining sanctions towards Cuba. We discussed Cuba at the Foreign Ministers Meeting in Atlanta in April and will discuss it again next year in Buenos Aires. The Argentines have been asked to poll the others for their attitudes before that next meeting and I think we will be able to make a better judgment on where we stand after we have the results of that poll.

Q: While we are still on Latin America can you comment about the possibility of a new treaty with Panama on the Panama Canal?

A: If we cannot grant sovereignty to the Canal Zone, then there will be very little basis for a treaty. At the same time the Panamanians are well aware of our congressional views and interests in the Canal Zone. We will proceed on the basis of the principles which I signed when I was in Panama City not long ago earlier this year. If formal sovereignty becomes the primary issue in Latin America and in the U. N. and in other international forums, then I think we will pay a much heavier price in the long run for not granting sovereignty.

Q: Can you tell us something about the present Cyprus situation and about its effect on the Middle East?

A: Well, it depends on how things evolve now. Sisco is in London for talks today and if I ever succeed in institutionalizing foreign policy, I will eventually see a report from him on his talks. Makarios will apparently appear before the Security Council next, and and then we will see where we stand. At the present stage our major objective is to prevent a Greek/Turkish conflict and to restore the constitutional process while preventing an enhanced Soviet role in the area. I would say by the middle of next week we may have broken the back of the Cyprus problem.

Q: Returning to the Trade Bill, can you give us any kind of estimate whether on the part of our trading partners there will be a willingness to engage in GATT in serious negotiations.

A: Well the political will is certainly much better than it was 6 months ago and the economic necessities are now even more driving.

Q: There are before Congress a number of amendments on limiting the extension of credits and the extension of exports to the Soviet Union, but I have the impression that the Administration is not trying to influence the outcome of these issues at all.

A: No, that is not correct since the denial of credit would have been much more severe impact than the denial of MFN which is after all essentially symbolic. Now we are trying to achieve an overall package solution with Jackson and the others.

S-LPBremerIII

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE AND
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS

AT 10:21 A.M. PDT

JULY 20, 1974

SATURDAY

(San Clemente, California)

MR. ZIEGLER: For those who may have come in late, Secretary Kissinger will give a briefing on the developments in Cyprus and our activities over last evening.

You can refer to Secretary Kissinger as providing this information but no direction quotations.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If you identify me as a senior official, Ron will deny that I am a senior official. (Laughter)

I thought it might be helpful if I gave you an informal description of the evolution of the situation in Cyprus and between Greece and Turkey, what we have been trying to accomplish and where things stand now.

I will be brief about the events during the week. As you know, Archbishop Makarios was overthrown by a coup of the Cypriot National Guard on Monday. We first learned about it at dawn on Monday and until Tuesday morning, we did not know whether Makarios was dead or alive. In fact, for the better part of Monday, we operated on the impression, which was widely held, that Archbishop Makarios had been killed or captured during the coup.

Our policy was stated that day -- to maintain the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus and to maintain the constitutional arrangements on Cyprus.

The difficulty that arose was how to implement those principles and through what vehicle. During the course of Tuesday, we learned that Archbishop Makarios was alive and that he would be taken off the island at his request by the British. He went to London on Wednesday.

I might say that throughout this crisis I talked by telephone never less than two or three times a day with the British Foreign Secretary Callaghan. There has been a complete unanimity as to objectives and substantial agreement as to policies and some of the impressions that there was disagreement between Britain and us is totally wrong.

MORE

We acted in the closest coordination and the moves of each side were carefully synchronized with those of the other. In attempting to bring about a constitutional solution, the problem was to discover a means which would be acceptable, at least to some of the parties, and the problem was to avoid getting into a position where none of the parties would support the possible outcome.

And since it turned out to be difficult to do this by cable and even by telephone, we sent Under Secretary Sisco to London. In London, he spoke to Prime Minister Ecevit and, of course, had extensive conversations with the British Foreign Secretary and his colleagues.

I think it is safe to say that the Turkish demands were less concerned with the constitutional arrangements on the island than they were with bringing about a different balance of forces on the island, specifically having to do with an increase of Turkish forces and a rearrangement of the location of the Turkish population with access to the sea and other proposals which would have had the practical consequence of strengthening the balance of power on the island in the direction of Turkey rather than Greece. Who governed on the island, as long as it was not Sampson, was of secondary concern to the Turks and was not a major subject of discussion between us and the Turks. Therefore, you have to keep in mind that there were two parallel discussions going on.

One, what would be an acceptable constitutional arrangement, acceptable meaning one that could be brought about without the use of force since nobody seemed to be ready to impose by force a particular solution; and secondly, what physical arrangements could be made on the island to meet the objectives of all of the parties.

Under Secretary Sisco then went to Athens with, in effect, a joint U.S.-British strategy and was going to go on to Ankara from Athens. The British Government, while Under Secretary Sisco was in London, invited both Greece and Turkey to send representatives to London for negotiations within the framework of the Zurich agreements which formed the basic structure of legitimacy on the island.

Under Secretary Sisco went to Athens and achieved with some difficulty a Greek agreement to send a representative to London on Monday without pre-conditions. He then went to Ankara to put to Turkey several ideas which were American ideas, but for which we had, I believe, substantial backing from Britain on how the constitutional crisis on the island might be resolved.

MORE

During the course of the day yesterday, as Ron has already told you, I talked not only to the British Foreign Secretary several times, I also talked to the French Foreign Minister both in his capacity as Foreign Minister of France and in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers of the European Community.

He agreed with the general strategy we were pursuing and he agreed also to make representations in the same direction that we were trying to promote, that is to say that neither side should take military measures until a diplomatic track had an opportunity to work out. In the event all these attempts failed, because of the judgment of the Turkish Government in the absence of a change of the balance of forces on the island, it would not be prepared to negotiate or it would not have enough confidence in the negotiations to achieve its objectives. And therefore, last evening, we were aware during the day that the Turks were concentrating forces and last evening, to be specific, at the end of the party, at least the end of the party for me (laughter) I was informed that a Turkish landing was imminent.

## What time?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would think it was about 7:45. A few of you may have seen Mr. Eagleburger come in with a slip of paper and hand me that paper and whatever time that was, that was the first time we had word that Turkish forces were actually moving out of the pattern of being at sea and headed for the beaches.

I may point out that both in 1964 and 1967 there had been similar deployments of Turkish forces without resulting in an invasion and therefore, many members, especially many foreign governments with which we checked during the day, and also members of the intelligence community, thought this might be a similar device to bring pressure on the negotiations but not the precursor to an actual attack.

Two or three of you may remember at the party that I told you that a landing might happen. This I pointed out only because it reflected the state of our knowledge at that time. The state of our knowledge at that time was that a Turkish fleet was at sea. Its deployment was no different from the Turkish deployments in 1964 and 1967 and it was not until whatever time that was last night, 7:30, 7:45, as I remember it, that Mr. Eagleburger handed me a slip of paper that emphasized that the Turkish fleet was heading towards the shore.

MORE

This is not of earthshaking significance, but
what I think is important for journalists to understand
is that in these crises, the overwhelming impact is always
total confusion and it isn't that you get clear information
of what is happening.

When I got this message I went to my office
and called the operations center at the State Department
which collates all the intelligence information that comes
in from all over the world. They told me, which was
correct, that the Turkish ships, after heading for shore, had
turned around and were again outside the 12 mile limit and
simultaneously, I received a message from Sisco that he
had made an appeal to the Turkish Prime Minister to give
us 48 hours to work out a solution acceptable to both
sides, so we were already drafting contingency plans of
what to do in these 48 hours and what messages would have
to be sent in order to make the maximum use of these 48
hours. And while we were talking about that, about 25
minutes later, we got word that the Turkish ships were
now strung out in a line and had turned around again,
and at that point, Sisco was informed that the Turkish
Government had decided to land.

Throughout the week, of course, as Ron announced,
I think daily, I was in daily, touch several times a day,
with the President. I informed the President of what
we knew about 7:45 last night and we were in frequent
touch for the rest of the night, the last time being
about 12:30.

Now, after the Turks had landed our major problem
was, and it remains, to contain the fighting and to
continue to work for the objectives which we set early
in the week, which is to maintain the rights of the Cypriot
people, the constitutional arrangements on the island and
the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

The President ordered the preparation of two
messages to the Greek and Turkish Governments, urging
restraint. We communicated with the Turkish Government
our extreme disappointment at the fact that they had used
military means before the diplomatic process had, in our
judgment, been exhausted even though we granted that some
of the actions of the Greek Government had been rash and
had been a contributing factor in precipitating the
sequence of events that led to Turkish intervention.

We were in immediate telephone contact with Foreign
Minister Callaghan, whom I got out of bed at 4:00 in the
morning, London time, and who retaliated by getting me
out of bed at 3:30 in the morning, San Clemente time, and
he assures me that he is a better man for it. Not for
being gotten out of bed at 4:30 but for having been able
to retaliate within 12 hours (laughter). We were in
frequent contact all night.

MORE

I must say I believe that there is practicably
unanimity of views between us and Britian on how to
proceed. Britian invited Greece and Turkey to come to
London. Sisco met with the Greek Government last night
and after emotions had cooled a little bit, it is our
impression that they are now prepared to undertake negotiations
with Turkey if Turkey accepts a ceasefire.

We have made it clear, I want to repeat here, that
a war between Greece and Turkey will not be fought with
American weapons. It may be fought with those weapons they
have, but it will not be fought with an open supply line
and there can be no question in the minds of either of
our allies of our view on this matter.

Sisco has now returned to Ankara to discuss this
Greek situation with the Turkish Government. It is our
hope that Turkey believes now that whatever it needs
in the balance of forces has been achieved and that it will now
speedily send a representative to London.

This morning, also, I talked by telephone
to the French Foreign Minister in his capacity as President
of the Foreign Ministers Committee of the Common Market,
and at this conference, the German Foreign Minister Genscher
was present, he was apparently in Paris. A call was
placed to me by the French Foreign Minister, whom we had
briefed this morning through our Ambassador about our
detailed exposition of our analysis. I think I can say that
our views and those of the European Community are
very parallel.

It is our understanding that the European
Community has made representation in both Athens
and Ankara very much along the lines of the principles
that I have outlined here.

We are therefore hopeful that negotiations
may start in the very near future. If they start,
they will, of course, take place in London within the
framework of the Zurich agreements. In that case, Under
Secretary Sisco, at the request of Great Britain, will
go from Ankara to London. And he has already told me
he will not again volunteer for such a mission. (Laughter)

This is the situation, as we see it. We regret,
of course, that there has been unilateral military action,
just as we regret that there was an attempt to change the
constitutional arrangements on the island. The problem
now is how we can return to constitutional rule with
the agreement of all of the parties concerned without
a war between Greece and Turkey which would have catastrophic
consequences for the security of the Eastern Mediterranean
for the future of NATO, and for the whole web of relationships
in that area.

MORE

- 6 -

This is what we are trying to bring about and
we will hear later in the day about the Turkish answer. It
is our understanding that the Turkish Council of Ministers
is now meeting and we should have an answer by the end
of the day, local time.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is the Soviet interest and what is the Soviet action? What has the Soviet action been in the last few days?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Soviet position has been that they supported the Makarios government. The problem wasn't, however, whether one supports the Makarios government, because as you know, we never extended recognition to any alternative government, nor did we have any dealings with any alternative government.

The problem was to bring about a solution which
was, one, constitutional; secondly, accepted by the
parties; and third, could be achieved without war. So,
the general Soviet position was in support of Makarios.
They did not have any specific position of how to answer
those other three issues which I raised.

Of course, as you know, I am seeing Archbishop Makarios on Monday. Now, the Soviets apparently have alerted some of their units, or at least have heightened their state of readiness. This is a procedure they also followed during the Middle East War and maintained for several weeks during the Middle East War.

I would like to point out when we went on alert
during the Middle East War, it was because that state of
readiness which then existed, had been heightened beyond
the point which has now been reached.

I have been given a report that a ceasefire has gone into effect in Nicosia between the Greeks and the Turks. I wouldn't go all that hard with it, because our information is -- not on that ticker -- that it went into effect in Nicosia but not necessarily in the area of the airfield. So, it may not be all of Nicosia, it may be the town of Nicosia and not the airfield. And I would not draw final conclusions from it. This would not be a political decision, this would be a local decision.

Now, let me finish with the Soviet Union. We
have kept the Soviet Union informed. We communicated
with them several times during the night to tell them what
our attitude was, what we were doing with Britain and how
we were dealing with the Europeans. Britian, as I under-
stand it, also informed them. We have been in touch with
the Soviet Union about three times.

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- 7 -

Q By the hot line?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

Hot line? No.

Q How?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: By delivering a message in Washington to the Soviet charged d'affaires. This sort of communications is more effective than the hot line because you can explain what you mean and you don't have to send it on the hot line and then get a query back and also, it doesn't create the same sense of urgency.

It may also be faster but I don't want to get into that. (Laughter) That was a joke.

I want to say one other thing that has happened this morning. The Security Council is meeting and the United States, the United Kingdom and France are going to submit a joint resolution asking for a ceasefire and calling on the parties to go to London for negotiations under the aegis of the Zurich agreement and the chairmanship of Great Britain.

I stress all of this because I must say we have talked a great deal about improved consultation in the Alliance over the past year, and I think during this week, the consultation within the Alliance under a situation that is enormously complicated and has been as close to ideal as it can be, we have all been minutely informed of not only everybody's moves, but of everybody's thinking and while there may here and there be a nuance of tactics, there is a substantial agreement as to the direction in which we are to go, both as to constitutional arrangements as well as the international position.

The Soviet Union has not taken, incidentally, a position today on the fighting, at least that has not been brought to my attention.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what about the U.S. military units in the Mediterranean. What about their movements?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The U.S. military units in the Mediterranean have been put into a position where they can more effectively contribute to the evacuation of our forces and they have been moved a little bit closer to the scene of action, but we are not in a confrontation posture.

Q Why are we moving them closer to the scene of action, then?

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- 8 -

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are moving them closer to the scene of action for a number of reasons, because if evacuation becomes necessary from Greece and Turkey, in order to be ready in case there are unforeseen developments, but they are still well out of the range of military operations, well away from military operations and there has been an alerting of one airborne unit in Europe.

Q American airborne unit?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

Q You spoke of evacuations of our forces?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not forces, of our civilians.

Q Is there a possibility we could go into this war, and also --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't foresee any such possibility under present circumstances.

Q Then, the alerting of an airborne unit would be for evacuation purposes?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, and just general readiness. We do not, I repeat, anticipate American military action in this crisis.

Q Do you anticipate Greece fighting with the Turks?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our understanding is -- again I must emphasize, that in these situations people are under great stress and therefore the reporting, you do not always get the ideal picture.

Our understanding is that Greece is prepared to accept a negotiation if there is a ceasefire on the island and if Turkish forces are confined to the enclaves in which the Turkish forces are permitted to be under the Zurich agreement. This is what Sisco is now exploring in Ankara. This may, itself, lead to a negotiation subject to some adjustment, but it is our impression that the road to a negotiation in London is open.

It is strongly supported by the European Community and it is again individually supported by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in a joint resolution which we will submit to the Security Council. It may have been submitted already for all I know.

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- 9 -

Q Isn't there a danger that this alert of the airborne unit might be misunderstood?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is not a very high state of alert, and misunderstood by whom?

Q Well, the Soviet Union.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Soviet Union has increased the readiness of some of its forces.

Q Why?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I couldn't get Grechko on the line last night. (Laughter) But let me make this clear: We are not in a posture of confrontation with the Soviet Union nor do we believe the Soviet Union is in a posture of confrontation with us. These are normal precautions that are taken in a crisis when a war may be imminent between two countries in a strategic area. We have no reason to believe that the Soviet Union is planning any military moves, nor are we planning any military moves.

But obviously, one has to take certain limited precautionary measures as a crisis develops.

Q There were reports last night of movements of Greek forces toward the Turkish border. Have you anything to say on that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: These reports are undoubtedly correct and the problem that the Greeks face is that Cyprus is too far away from Greece for effective military operations by Greece on Cyprus or for effective reinforcement of Cyprus by Greece.

So therefore, if there is a war between Greece and Turkey, it will, in all probability, take place in the area of Thrace. There is military movement. I can only repeat that we have made clear that there will be no open United States supply lines to American equipment in a war between Greece and Turkey and we have made clear our strong view that the parties should begin immediate negotiations and end the hostilities and we are supported in this by the European Community. We will submit this also to the Security Council.

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- 10 -

Q Has the Soviet Union given us similar indication or any indication one way or the other as to whether it would supply either party in case of war?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We sent a message to the Soviet Union about 1:30 last night local time and we also have had several oral contacts with the Soviet charge d'affaires and we have no present reason to believe that the Soviet Union wishes to encourage a crisis in this area.

Now our judgment could change, because we have not yet had an official Soviet reaction, but it would certainly be a major step for the Soviet Union to set up a supply line to two NATO countries fighting each other and therefore assume full responsibility for the conduct of their military operations.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did you say you have had no response from the Russians on this latest message to the Russians?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, but it is very early. We have the impression, and I may say it is my impression also from the talks that the British Foreign Secretary has had with the Soviet Ambassador, that as of this moment, which is as far as I can go, there is no inclination by the Soviet Union to turn this into a major crisis.

Now the reason I express myself so cautiously is because it is too early to tell, but I would say if one puts together the behavior in the Security Council yesterday with the general low keyed diplomatic approach, if there were a crisis, it would be a new decision. It is not now in evidence.

Q Are there any developments you could see which may cause you to leave Washington and go abroad to negotiate?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Some of my colleagues in the State Department, I understand, would like to send me off some where. (Laughter) But I do not foresee that it will be necessary for me to go abroad in this negotiation.

I hope very much that our effort to get the parties to London will succeed. If it succeeds, then of course Britain is the principal mediator and we will have Sisco there to give our advice and I have complete confident in Sisco. He knows my views very well, and unfortunately telephone connections are very good to London, but the time zone runs against us. (Laughter)

Q Is there enough American material there so they can maintain a war for any period of time?

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- 11 -

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not for any period of time and we have already taken measures to secure our more sensitive equipment.

Q Have Americans on Cyprus been alerted to possible evacuation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Americans on Cyprus have been alerted and the evacuation plans area ready. We have given them the option of moving them to the British base on the island. Thirty-one Americans have decided to leave Cyprus by commercial airliners. The remainder have decided to stay and to stay in their homes and it appears that the city of Nicosia itself is now quiet.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in answer to Mr. Irwin's question, you said that they could not maintain a war for any period of time. Could you put some amount of days, weeks or months on that? How long could they fight with the arms they now have?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I will tell you, I have tried in quite a different context for the last three years to figure out what the supply stocks of NATO really mean and what it means when somebody says they have X days of supply, whether this is an average figure for all of the supplies or what the lowest critical item is that they have. There has been a tremendous reluctance to produce that figure because, I suspect, and it may be a blessing in this situation, that the number of days in which the lowest critical item is available is not very large, but that is my suspicion and I cannot prove it.

One also has to say that history proves that the Greeks and Turks have managed to go at each other even when obstacles were very great. Nevertheless, let me stress, our policy is to bring about a ceasefire as rapidly as possible.

We believe as of the information we now have available that the chances are fairly good and we are doing our utmost to promote a negotiation into which we will also make a contribution in terms of ideas on specific outcomes.

Q Speaking of ideas and specific suggestions, Dr. Kissinger, is the United States pushing for the removal of Sampson as some sort of compromise in easing the hostilities between the Greeks and Turkish Cypriots?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As you know, we have not recognized Sampson and we believe that the outcome should be a constitutional arrangement acceptable to all of the parties, but our impression is that he will have great difficulty finding agreement, to put it mildly.

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- 12 -

Q What will you be discussing with Archbishop Makarios on Monday?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When the appointment was set up, of course we were doing it in the context of the evolving situation and we wanted to have a full and detailed consultation. I saw Archbishop Makarios, as it happens, when I was in Cyprus in May during the Syrian-Israeli negotiations to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko, and had two good talks with him on that occasion.

We will review the whole situation with him as it will stand in the afternoon when I see him on Monday.

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- 13 -

Q You seem certain that the Greeks will be
willing to cooperate in this now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, it is a situation
fraught with great emotion and the longer this goes on--
the Turks struck because they thought the situation was
evolving in a certain way. The Greeks, when Sisco left,
had accepted the proposition of a ceasefire, talks in
London, and had attached to it some provisions for the
deployment of Turkish forces on the island.

The Turkish Government is now considering
this proposition and I have had a message saying that the
Greek Government, just before I came here, was still waiting
for a reply. So, I believe it is generally correct to
say that the Greek Government will be prepared to go along
with what I have outlined here.

Q Dr. Kissinger, can you give us any more
information on this alert? Can you tell us what was
the situation when you put that unit on the alert
and can you identify the unit, or at least tell us where
it is?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is in Europe. It was put
on alert actually, by General Goodpasture on a normal,
routine basis. This is not part of an overall scheme of
confrontation. He thought, within the discretion that
is available to him, that he should have that unit ready
in case any requests were made upon him.

Q It didn't come from Washington?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. We had earlier in
the week tried to identify what units were available
but, I repeat, there is not a confrontation between
us and the Soviet Union at this moment. The Soviet alerts
are within the normal range of precautions in crisis.
That could change. But as of now, there has been no provoca-
tive Soviet action. We will take no provocative action. It
is not a confrontation between the United States and the
Soviet Union.

We hope for Soviet cooperation in bringing
this to a rapid conclusion. We have kept the Soviet Union
informed of all the moves we are taking and
we and our allies are in complete agreement of
the direction in which we should go and none of us has
the view, as of this moment, that we are being challenged
in this course by the Soviet Union.

Our actions are low-key, they are the minimum,
and they are not directed against anyone. They are to give
us flexibility totally in a situation that could evolve
rapidly.

THE PRESS: Thank you very much.

END

(AT 11:02 A.M. PDT)

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 22, 1974

No. 309

#29

JULY 22, 1974

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I thought I would review for you the events of the last 36 hours to tell you where we are and what is likely to happen now; and take a few questions confined to the Cyprus situation, Greece and Turkey on a somewhat informal basis.

On Saturday in San Clemente I gave a review of the diplomacy of last week; so let me pick it up from Saturday:

After the Turkish landing, our efforts were, first, to prevent a Greek-Turkish war from erupting;

Secondly, to keep open the possibility of a settlement of the Cyprus issues along constitutional lines; and

Thirdly, to prevent a further internationalization of the conflict.

Obviously, the prime necessity for this was to bring about a cease-fire. We operated with great intensity, both in Ankara and Athens.

Joe Sisco was in Athens when the invasion occurred.

PR #309

2

And when the Turkis landings in Cyprus occurred
he spent Saturday morning in Athens, and then went back to
Ankara.

He received a Turkish agreement in principle
to a cease-fire, which he then took back to Athens --
at which point, all the parties discovered that it was
easy to telephone Washington; and we were in very intensive
contact with Prime Minister Ecevit, the Greek Prime Minister,
Foreign Minister Callaghan, the French Foreign Minister
and towards the end the German Foreign Minister.

Our effort throughout was that this was an
issue affecting NATO, affecting Western Europe, in which
we should work in the closest cooperation with our allies
and particularly with Great Britain, which had a relation-
ship as one of the guarantors of the Zurich Agreement.
Throughout the period, as I pointed out Saturday,
there has been a complete unanimity as to objective and
very substantial agreement between the United Kingdom and
the United States in every facet of the diplomatic process,
and a complete coordination of our efforts.

There has also been a very close cooperation with
the French Foreign Minister in his capacity of President

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3

of the Communities Council of Ministers. And it was in
this matter that we proceeded.

Now I won't go through all the complications of
the negotiations during the day, which were pursued on two
tracks.

The United States concentrated on getting the cease-
fire; the United Kingdom concentrated on getting the
negotiating process started after the cease-fire.

The attempt has been made to get a cease-fire established
and then have the United Kingdom invite Greece and Turkey
to a meeting.

The difficulties during the day arose because,
as always in these cease-fire negotiations, there were
infinite technical disputes -- for at one point the Turks
thought that a Greek fleet was approaching Cyprus -- and
were reluctant to make a cease-fire while the Greek fleet
was approaching Cyprus. The Greeks denied that there was
a Greek fleet.

To do all of this on trans-Atlantic telephone
had many complexities. There was, in fact, some dispute on
whether it might be a Turkish fleet.

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I won't pursue the complexity of military
operations in a confused situation. All I want to say
is that this has delayed matters somewhat.

Then in the afternoon, the Turkish
Prime Minister called over here with a proposal that he
would accept a cease-fire in principle provided the
Greeks would send a representative to any place in Europe,
and then at that place they would negotiate the
modalities of the cease-fire, after which, the cease-
fire would go into effect.

Each one of these phone calls -- and a complex
series of phone calls -- then, involved Sisco in Athens.
And it was apparent that we weren't going to get anywhere
on this basis, because the Greeks, predictably, rejected
this.

And so about six o'clock yesterday afternoon,
we thought it might be time to come up with an American
proposal -- and therefore, we proposed to the Turkish

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5

Prime Minister, that after consultation with Foreign Minister Callaghan and the French Foreign Minister, we proposed to the Turkish Foreign Minister that a ceasefire go into effect.

We gave the time at 1400 today Greenwich Mean Time, and that this should be followed almost immediately by negotiations between Greece and Turkey, under United Kingdom auspices.

This was supported by the United Kingdom and by France -- and France, in turn, was backed by the Nine.

Turkey accepted this around nine o'clock last night -- or eight o'clock last night -- and then we had to get Greek acceptance.

Having obtained Greek acceptance, the problem was to find a means between two parties that have no great confidence in each other to achieve a simultaneous announcement so that each party would have enough confidence that an announcement would, in fact, be made.

And this led to the solution that we would make the announcement here, and after that, each party would confirm our announcement.

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6

But these are the mechanics of how the cease-fire
was achieved. The problem now is, "Where do we go from
here?" Our expectation is that within the next few days,
hopefully by Wednesday, probably the Foreign Ministers of
Greece and Turkey will meet under British auspices in
Geneva and these talks can settle the constitutional
arrangements of Cyprus and all other issues that stem from
recent events. And we believe, therefore, that a rather
complicated crisis which had dangers of internationalization
has been overcome.

We have been in touch with the Soviet Union
throughout, and we believe that there will be no complications
from that side. And these exchanges have been constructive.

So we hope that during the course of the week we
can move the situation towards a solution that will be
acceptable. There have been reports, with which you're
familiar, that there may be a coup in Greece at this moment.
But we have very sketchy reports, and we can't form any clear
judgment as to the complexion of the forces that might take
over the Government. And I'm not confirming that either
officially. We've had no official word. We have had the
fragmentary reports that you always get at the beginning of
a crisis.

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So this is where we are. I'll be glad to
answer a few questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you threaten to cut off
military aid to both Greece and Turkey in order to get
them to accept the cease-fire?

A I made clear on Saturday in San Clemente that
no war would be fought between NATO allies with an open
American supply line. So this put a limit to the escalation
that could be conducted.

As to the other steps that were taken, there were
no specific threats made. It was very clear that we would
consider a continuation of a military confrontation between
NATO allies as a very grave matter.

Q Mr. Secretary, I get the impression that
"constitutional arrangements," a phrase which has been
used frequently, is a codeword for something else. Does
it mean a reversal of the coup which took place a week ago
and the removal of Mr. Sampson?

A At the risk of again being criticized of
tilting, leaning, or other adjectives, we believe
constitutional arrangements involve a solution within the
obviously constitutional framework which existed in Cyprus
before the coup. And it is one of the subjects for negotiation
among the parties in Geneva.

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Q Mr. Secretary, could that involve a return to power of Archbishop Makarios?

A That is certainly not excluded.

Q Will he be in Geneva?

A I do not believe he will be in Geneva in the first instance. But I believe that in the first instance the framework of those negotiations will be the same as the one that established the original arrangements. But I expect, as you know, to see Archbishop Makarios this afternoon and will get the benefit of his views.

Q How well is the cease-fire going?

A Well, the cease-fire between military forces is going, apparently, very well. However, there is also communal fighting going on. And there, it is, apparently, not holding quite as well.

We have been in urgent contact with the Secretary-General. I talked to him at some lengths this morning. And Secretary Buffum has also been in contact with him. And I've also talked to the Turkish Prime Minister on the telephone this morning with a view towards strengthening the UN forces there to assure communal peace. And we have

PR #309

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been assured of the cooperation of all of the parties.

Q What do you mean by "communal fighting,"
Mr. Secretary?

A Communal fighting between the Greek and
Turkish communities on the island as opposed to the
Cypriot and Turkish military forces on the island.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you address yourself in
more detail -- I know it's difficult -- to the Geneva
Talks -- what the mandate for the Talks will include? Will
they include, as well as a settlement of the current crisis,
the longer-term issues which have been under discussion
for many years between the Turks and the Greeks?

A Well, obviously, if there is a domestic
upheaval in Greece at this moment, it is difficult to
predict what each party is prepared to discuss. Moreover,
these talks are being conducted under British auspices and,
therefore, they will have to take a leading role in it.
The United States view would be that in view of
recent events, one should go to the root of the issues
and attempt to settle all the outstanding issues affecting
Greece and Turkey, particularly as they bear on the Cyprus
problem.

(LL)

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Q Mr. Secretary, you said earlier you didn't
-- you were not confirming any coup in Athens or any change
in government in Athens?

A No.

Q But I assume from your subsequent and
previous remarks that you still expect that whatever
emerges politically or doesn't emerge, the arrangements for
the meeting in Geneva will continue. In other words, some
Greeks of some sort will attend. (Laughter.)

A Joe Sisco is on the way back, and it is my
impression that he will not soon again volunteer for a
mission. (Laughter.) But, before he left, he had
some talks with Greek governmental leaders; and we believe
that the arrangements that were made last night will stick,
though there may be a delay of 24 hours in the beginning of
the talks.

This is why I said "probably on Wednesday,"
but I think that the substance of the arrangements
will be maintained.

Q Whether he volunteers or not, will you
send him to Geneva?

A No. I need him here now. I'm sending

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Bill Buffum, the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, to Geneva.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you talk about restoring things to their prior state, what would you recommend be done with the force of 650 Greek military officers -- which seems to have been such a critical issue?

A Well, I think this is an issue that will have to be settled in Geneva because it had one connotation last week and it may have a different connotation in a different context under present circumstances when there are large Turkish forces on the island.

Let me say, incidentally, that last week the obstacle was not what position the United States might or might not have taken on the 650 Greek officers, because we were willing to support any solution last week that could gain the consensus of, say, Turkey and Britain. The difficulty was that a series of demands were made in which this was only a small part that grew unacceptable as between Turkey and Britain. And, therefore, we never got to the issue of the 650 officers. So what concrete

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position we will take will depend somewhat on the
position the parties take.

Q Well, would it be possible for troops on
both sides to remain behind?

A It is possible for troops of both sides
to remain behind; it is possible for troops of both sides
to leave; it is possible for troops of both sides to
be substantially reduced. So it is, at this point,
difficult to predict what the precise outcome will be
because, obviously, when you have some six-thousand
Turkish Troops on the island, you're in a different
situation than you were last week.

Q Are you going to use --

Q Mr. Secretary, does the United States have
a position on partition?

A Our position is that we support the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus and,
therefore, this would not be an American solution; and
we don't think that this is a likely outcome. But at
this stage it is difficult for us to write the scenario of
a negotiation that hasn't started.

Mr. Binder?

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13

Q Mr. Kissinger, there was a report of a joint British-U.S. note to the Greek and Turkish Governments calling for a cease-fire, a toughly worded note.

A The exact sequence is that I first made the proposal on the telephone to Prime Minister Ecevit around 6 o'clock, U.S. time, last night. And it was the first time that the United States made a concrete proposal in which it said something other than we propose a cease-fire. We said we propose a cease-fire at this hour to be implemented in this manner.

This was followed up by a Presidential letter to the Presidents of Greece and Turkey, and this in turn was backed by a British note and a Common Market note.

I believe that several of these notes arrived after the parties had already accepted the cease-fire. But given the staggered timing for first an American announcement and then a confirmation of this announcement by Greece and Turkey, we permitted these notes that did express the urgency everyone felt to be delivered by all the parties

-- by all our friends and ourselves -- so that the parties knew that this was a matter that was not taken lightly in the United States and in Europe, and that there

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14

was total unanimity of view between Europe and the United
states on this issue.

Q Mr. Secretary, your expectations that the
Geneva talks may in fact take place with only a 24-hour
slippage would seem to indicate that whatever may or may
not be happening in Greece did not take you by complete
surprise.

A If I answer this question, I get into major
difficulties, because if I say it took us by complete sur-
prise, you will say "intelligence failure." And if I say
it didn't take us by complete surprise, you will say othEr
things. [Laughter.]

May I make one general point. I have read many
learned articles during the week of why we were taken by
surprise by the coup in Cyprus, and I simply would like
to point out to you ladies and gentlemen that obviously
the man most concerned in Cyprus, namely Archbishop Makarios
also was taken by surprise, so that the information was
not exactly lying on the street.

Late in the day yesterday, it became apparent
in Athens that there was a certain restiveness, so that
in this sense, we were aware of the fact that the events

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RR #309

14

PR #309

15

of the last week were not considered unanimously in Athens
as a complete success. And this gave a particular urgency
to the need to bring about a cease-fire during the night
and it was one of the reasons why we took a rather active
and even more active role towards the end of the day. So
we had some general information.

Marilyn. I'll take two more questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, before the Turkish invasion,
did the United States warn the Turkish Government that it
wuld lose aid if it moved, military aid?

A No, but we made very clear that we were
very strongly opposed to military action.

Q Mr. Secretary, what are we doing about the
3,000 Americans on the Island? Are they going to be taken
out?

A The Americans are being evacuated. I think --

Q By US Forces?

A By American helicopters. We have offered
the British that we would be willing to send in a Marine
Company to the British base if that would help them, if
their facilities were overloaded. I don't believe they
have accepted it yet, and it may not be necessary, but

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16

American helicopters will take them off the British base, and then there is an enclave near Kyrenia about which we have now begun negotiations for their removal.

I might also say that we have been asked by the Soviet Government to help them in the evacuation of some of their 150 civilians in Nicosia. A Soviet ship is going into the port -- I never can remember the name -- in the south of Cyprus, and we are cooperating with the Soviet Union to bring this about.

Last question.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is our policy now on recognition of governments? Are we prepared to recognize whatever government will come to power in Greece, in Cyprus?

A Well, our basic policy is to recognize _de facto_ governments. In Cyprus, it is a more complicated problem, because the governments in Cyprus also have resulted from constitutional arrangements that have international sanction, and therefore we would expect this to be the subject of negotiation and not simply be decided on a _de facto_ basis.

Thank you, very much.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 24, 1974

No. 312

AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS

---

FY 1975 Foreign Assistance Program

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Committee:

I deeply regret that the pace of recent events prevented me from appearing before you earlier, for the foreign assistance program is of such urgent and fundamental importance to the entire range of our foreign policy concerns.

Developments during the past month alone — in the Middle East, at the Moscow Summit, and with our Atlantic Allies — demonstrate both the challenges and opportunities before American diplomacy today, and the central role that the assistance program plays. It is my profound conviction that programs of foreign assistance are not handouts. They are done on behalf of an international order and on behalf of an approach to the solution of problems that is in all nations' interest, and very much in the American interest.

The test we must apply is whether what we are proposing is adequate to meet the need, and whether anything less would fulfill our purposes as a nation.

We believe that the program before you will substantially contribute to achieving these six goals:

- creating a lasting peace in the Middle East, not just another cease-fire;

- building the capacity of the peoples of Indochina to determine their own destiny;

- establishing the basis for relationships of mutual restraint and respect with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China;

- avoiding the division of the world into competing blocs of developed and developing nations;

- bringing into balance food production and population growth;

- lowering the burden on the United States by building other nations' capacity for self-development and self-defense.

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We in the United States cannot alone underwrite the success of the quest to resolve old issues or alone persevere in the face of continuing obstacles to peace. Nor can we assure that the imperative of cooperation will overcome nations' temptation to pursue short-term advantage.

But it is equally clear that hopes for a peaceful, cooperative and just international order can only be realized with the strong participation of this nation.

Our assistance programs are crucial vehicles for that participation. Our economic assistance is designed to reinforce developing nations' efforts to bring a better life to their citizens, increasing their stake in a cooperative global economy at a time when events threaten to divide the world anew — between North and South, developed and developing, consumer and producer. Our security assistance is designed primarily to help others strengthen the peace in areas where it is threatened, and to provide a framework of cooperation that will prevent new threats from emerging.

Let me comment briefly on each of the principal elements of the program we have proposed:

## Middle East

In the Middle East, a new era is opening in our relations with both Arabs and Israelis and in their relations with one another. The program before you is vital to give substance to these new relationships and to preserve the momentum toward peace that has developed over the last six months. We are witnessing one of the most arduous but also one of the most hopeful developments of the past generation. Thanks to the far-sighted views of key leaders in the region, and with the active role of the United States, we have seen important steps toward peace and the partial erosion of decades of hostility and mistrust among the parties.

Our proposals have three basic purposes:

- First, to provide Israel with the assistance needed to maintain its security, giving it resolve to persevere in the negotiations assured of its own strength and of our support;

- Second, to give tangible expression to our new and fruitful relations with various Arab countries and encourage those which are seriously prepared to work for peace; and

- Third, to encourage the peaceful development of the area, reducing the incentives to violence and conflict and deepening the interest of all the peoples in cooperation.

More specifically, with this program we would:

- make available to Israel $350 million in grants and credits to enable it to continue purchasing vitally needed military equipment from the US and to relieve it of some of the burden of its onerous defense costs.

- extend to Jordan roughly $207 million in grants and credits both to enhance its security and to assist its economic development. This would strengthen Jordan's ability to hold to the course of moderation it has consistently followed.

- provide $250 million in economic assistance to Egypt. Egypt has made the bold decision to move from confrontation to negotiation as a means of resolving the Arab-Israel dispute. Its leaders

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have shown a desire to substitute friendship and trust in the US
for the hostility and distrust which has so long divided us.

- make $100 million available in the form of a special requirements fund to be used to reinforce the peace process as we get further into negotiations. We would consult closely with Congress on the use of this money.

## Indochina

Now let me turn to Indochina.

Sustaining the achievements of recent years — an honorable termination of direct American military involvement, peace in Laos and a substantial reduction of hostilities in Viet-Nam, a prevailing military balance of forces, and a substantial lessening of the risk of confrontation among outside powers — now hinges on sums that are small in proportion to the total effort that has been made. Including the separate legislation for military aid, our total Vietnamese assistance request is about what we spent in a single month in 1968 at the height of US involvement.

But the basic question is not what we have achieved or failed to achieve in the past. It is the kind of world we want to create for the future.

To help shape a world of negotiation, stability and peace rather than confrontation, intervention and force, our policy in Indochina is guided by these two objectives:

- First, to enable the states of Indochina to move freely toward a future of self-determined political and economic stability;

- Second, by thus strengthening their independence, to avoid both the dangers of rivalry for domination by outside powers and to preclude domination itself.

We have submitted to Congress a six-year projection which reflects our expectation of a gradually declining role in Indochina.

But our present request for $750 million in economic and humanitarian assistance for South Viet-Nam is essential to make this transition. A stable military situation and eventual accommodation cannot be achieved if South Viet-Nam's economic problems are allowed to get out of hand. In the past year, that nation has experienced problems over which it had very little control — a sharp decline in dollar revenue following the withdrawal of our troops, and world inflation:

- At the peak of our involvement in the war, Viet-Nam's dollar earnings from US Government activities ranged between $350 and $400 million a year. Last year, following the withdrawal of US troops this figure dropped to just over $100 million.

- At the same time, the costs of Viet-Nam's imports soared as global inflation boosted the prices of raw materials and semi-finished products.

South Viet-Nam has been attempting to adjust to these challenges with its own resources. But its foreign exchange reserves have fallen severely.

Substantial assistance is still necessary. Our programs, however, are designed to do more than shore up the Vietnamese economy. They are shaped to nurture Viet-Nam's capacity for self-support by:

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- stimulating reconstruction and development;

- returning refugees to productive lives; and

- helping the Vietnamese to defend themselves.

In the past, Viet-Nam has made good use of our assistance. We are confident it will do so in the future.

We are also seeking $362.5 million in military assistance and $110 million in reconstruction funds for the Khmer Republic. The Cambodians are fighting for their survival against forces aided and advised by the North Vietnamese. The country's economy has been shattered and the level of combat is intense. The people have paid a heavy price. The Government of the Khmer Republic has consistently affirmed its desire for a peaceful settlement through direct negotiations with its adversaries. Clearly, a negotiated settlement of this war is the only responsible outcome.

In Laos, a cease-fire has been achieved and the process of political accommodation begun. The country is shifting from war to rehabilitation and reconstruction. The $142 million assistance package we are seeking will help it to carry out that transition.

## Development Assistance

Over two decades ago, the United States played the principal role in establishing the concept of economic assistance from the richer to the poorer nations. We can take pride in the record we have established. It both reflects humanitarian concerns and serves our national interests.

Today our values and our interests continue to mandate an active assistance program by this nation. But the old formulas and old justifications will not suffice.

In recent months the energy crisis has driven home the fact that interdependence is a condition, not a theory. That reality transcends any particular crisis and its lesson is clear: we live in a world economy under severe stress that makes cooperation an imperative if the open global economy is to be preserved and expanded.

While the United States is in a better position than most nations to compete in a world where autarchy prevails, it is not in our interest for events to carry the world in that direction. Down that road lies an inevitable increase in political tensions which would unravel the fabric of global stability.

The programs we are proposing will place us in a better position:

- to enlist the developing nations' cooperation in sustaining an open global economy;

- to promote a long-term balance between demands for goods and their supply; and

- to be responsive to the concerns of countries and areas of importance to us.

The United States must pursue a comprehensive approach to our relations with the developing nations. To do so we:

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- are requesting $1.2 billion for development assistance, which with loan receipts, interest payments and deobligations will make possible programs of $1.5 billion;

- are seeking $1.006 billion for international financial institutions; and

- have PL-480 programs totalling $996 million.

As you know, the focus of our assistance program is largely a product of Congressional initiative. The development of this program exemplified the constructive bipartisan cooperation between the Legislature and the Executive that we seek in the foreign affairs field. The program is designed to provide a more effective approach to assisting the poorest of the poor — the 800 million people who subsist on 30 cents a day and have no means to pay the sharply higher prices for fuel, food and fertilizer on which their survival depends. The most critical challenge is to achieve a balance between food production and population growth — a balance the program's focus on agriculture, family planning and education will help realize.

Thus:

- $676 million, almost half of our development assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act, is destined to support rural development and to increase food production;

- $226 million will go to family planning and health;

- $109 million will go to education.

Developing nations meet more of their foreign exchange needs through trade than aid. Thus Congressional passage of the Administration's Trade Bill would be a crucial contribution to the development process. The Bill contains our request for authority to grant generalized tariff preferences which are of major economic and political significance to the developing nations.

## Security Assistance

I have outlined the essential role our security assistance will play in nurturing the prospects for a stable and lasting peace in the Middle East and building the capacity for self-determination in Indochina.

For similar reasons there is a continuing need for this country to assist nations elsewhere in meeting their legitimate defense needs. As you are aware, our approach has been to encourage other nations to assume an increasing share of the burden for their own defense.

Refinement of our program does not mean that its objectives everywhere have been reached. Not all nations have developed a self-sustaining capacity for their own defense. And a climate of security is required if political and economic development are to take place. Thus our proposed program reflects a continuing need to do the following:

First, we should continue our assistance program to selected countries around the world as they develop their indigenous defense capabilities. The largest proportion of this assistance is directed to a selected group of countries where our direct security interests are involved. But the program also will provide modest amounts of materiel and training to a number of nations in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and East

FOR IMMEIDATE RELEASE

JULY 26, 1974

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(San Clemente, California)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE
AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
AND
HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER, FOREIGN MINISTER
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

11:55 A.M. PDT

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, the President concluded an hour's conversation with the German Foreign Minister who did us the courtesy of paying a call here.

As you know, the consultations between the Federal Republic and the United States have always been close but in recent months, they have grown in informality and in depth.

During the recent crisis on Cyprus, which is, of course, in some ways still continuing, there was frequent telephonic contact between the Foreign Minister and myself, and this provided one of the bases for the action of the European Community and the close identify of views that developed between Europe and the United States on that issue.

The President took the occasion to thank the Foreign Minister for the manner in which the Federal Republic worked in cooperation with the United States on the important problem of bringing peace to the Eastern Mediterranean. The President and the Foreign Minister also reviewed the state of the Alliance, recognizing the close connection between political, economic and military elements. There was further a discussion of the situation in and around Berlin in which I am happy to say there is a complete unanimity of views between the United States and the Federal Republic.

So, this was one of the many meetings we are having with our friends from the Federal Republic and if I may say a personal word about the Foreign Minister, with whom I have worked closely in recent months -- in recent months only because he became Foreign Minister a few months ago -- I would say that the spirit of cooperation is based on a strong, personal feeling of affection and confidence and friendship which reflects the constantly improving attitude in the Alliance as a whole, and the always firm relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic.

It is a pleasure to welcome you here, Mr. Foreign Minister.

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I had offered to interpret, but my memory doesn't reach the fact that the Foreign Minister only spoke four sentences in German. (Laughter)

FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER: As the State Secretary pointed out, we discussed the political and the economic aspects of the Alliance. I referred to the speech the President made last night and I was able to point out that the economic policy pursued by the Federal Government was completely in line with what the President had discussed in his speech last night.

We see three dimensions of the Alliance, an economic dimension, a military dimension and a political dimension. In connection with the Mediterranean crisis, we were happy and delighted to see how close the ties between Europe and the United States of America have come to be and the State Secretary already referred to the good cooperation between the Europeans and the United States and particularly between Germany and the United States.

This is a reflection of the very close and trustful relations that do exist between us. Speaking personally, I was very glad to be able to come to the United States so soon after having taken over this present office and to see the President and to have a conversation with the President, and to emphasize once again the very close, personal and friendly relationship with the Secretary of State.

You will certainly understand that the unanimity of views which was expressed in this conversation concerning the interrelationship between a policy of detente and the problem of Berlin, free access to Berlin, is of special importance to the Federal Republic of Germany and I was able to express our gratitude for this unanimity of views, both to the President and to the Secretary.

Thank you very much.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Foreign Minister and I will be glad to take a few questions.

Q Mr. Foreign Minister, do you anticipate any invitation from the Federal Republic to President Nixon for a visit in the foreseeable future?

FOREIGN MINISTER GINSCHER: I consider that to be possible, though we have not discussed this question today.

Q Secretary Kissinger, is the ceasefire holding on Cyprus today? What do you hear about that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The reports I have are that in a rather complex situation, there are always some uncertainties, but that it is substantially holding.

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Q Mr. Secretary, do you think that the President will, or should, travel abroad if he is impeached or if an article of impeachment is recommended by the Judiciary Committee?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, I don't think this is an appropriate subject to discuss until the unlikely event to which you refer occurs. And at that time, the President will make the decision in the light of the national interest.

Q Would you tell us the question you answered?

Q We heard the answer. We didn't hear the question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, just write the answer. I have three all-purpose answers. (Laughter)

The question was whether the President should travel in case of impeachment.

Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you, gentlemen.

END (AT 12:04 P.M. PDT)