# Kissinger on Clinton: No Clear Idea Where We're Going

## ■ Foreign policy: Look at the likely challenges ahead; where's the vision of America's role?

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was interviewed by Anthony Day, senior correspondent, and Doyle McManus, national-security correspondent, for The Times.

**Question:** Everyone has drawn a parallel between this period and the immediate post-World War II period. What are the defining facts of our era, and what should be the defining principles of an American foreign policy?

**Answer:** Today, there is no clear-cut ideological threat and no clear-cut concept of geopolitics or geostrategy in American thinking. This, I think, is the problem that American foreign policy is facing. It is compounded by the fact that, when an old system disintegrates and a new world order emerges, all kinds of tensions accompany it. But these are symptoms, not causes, nor can Americans solve them from their traditional perspective of seeking final answers.

**Q:** If you were to try to imagine a final outcome, what would it look like? And how would American power be used?

**A:** To apply the concept of the balance of power, you have to know what your vital interests are. What is it you will defend no matter how it is challenged? America has never faced that issue before. America has never had a concrete definition of the vital interest in the way Britain did when it maintained that the Low Countries must never be occupied by a major Continental power or in the way France did when it was still dominant and adhered to the rule

that Central Europe must not be controlled by a single power.

It is probably a vital American interest to see to it that Eurasia not be controlled by a single power center. In essence, we have fought two wars over this issue. With respect to Europe, I think we have learned to live with a United Europe, though probably because we don't think it can be more powerful than we are.

In Asia—in the interplay of Japan, Russia, China, Korea and Southeast Asia—we have to play a role very similar to that

'Clinton is... less willing to stick to something over time.

... Our current political process closes its books almost every evening with "Nightline."'

—Henry Kissinger

of Britain in the 19th Century vis-a-vis Europe. It will require us to be closer to each of the participants than they are to each other. This is one reason we should be reluctant to break with China.

**Q:** Even though China has the potential to exercise hegemony in Asia?

**A:** Right now, it does not. But 25 years from now, it could well be that we will have to move to limit the influence of China.

**Q:** Anthony Lake, President Clinton's national-security adviser, last year gave a speech that was intended to set forth a set

LOS ANGELES TIMES

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1994

of principles. He came up with a word enlargement, which tried to give American foreign policy an ideological basis.

A: American foreign policy has historically been based on the notion that America has a unique role in the world. That is one side of the equation, which Lake correctly emphasized. On the other hand, it is necessary to analyze what reality is imposing on us independent of our values. Can the two approaches be combined? Lake's speech contained very elevated attitudes, yet he gave it no operational definition. When George Ken-nan put forward containment as a policy toward the Soviet Union, his had been a clear definition: to resist communism wherever it might press. Now what was an operational definition, being something that one could actually do.

Enlargement of democracy operates from a number of assumptions that are not self-evident. One is that democracies don't make wars. But there have never been enough democracies to test this. In the former Yugoslavia, most of the govern-ments are more or less popularly elected; the ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union and the wars in the Middle East are in fact extremely popular there. And one of the reasons the various leaders are in-volved in these conflicts is that they think it gets them public support.

Secondly, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that market economics auto-matically translates into democracy. Do we really know enough about conditions in every country to prescribe how to go through the stages that took hundreds of years in the few operational democracies that do exist? And when we become that intrusive, might we not be contributing to nationalist reactions?

The Clinton Administration was right in trying to help reformist Russia. It went overboard by identifying support for Yelt-sin with ignoring normal foreign-policy considerations, including symptoms of re-emerging Soviet imperialism.

Q: Strobe Talbott, Clinton's nominee for deputy secretary of state, said that not only should our policies aim for the best case, but if we visibly prepare for the worst case, we are in danger of bringing the worst case about.

A: I disagree. I would argue that it helps Russian reformers if they are warned against the dangers of a return to historic Russian expansionism by pointing to clear-cut Western policies. A country like Po-land, partitioned four times in 200 years by Russia and for just five years free of Russian occupation, has every historical reason to be terrified of its neighbor. Nor would I accept the proposition that Russia has a just cause to feel threatened if Poland, the victim, takes security precau-tions that cannot possibly threaten Russia.

America should pursue a two-track policy. It should provide additional security for Eastern Europe while at the same time enabling Russia to participate in other

structures in the political, economic, social and cultural fields.

Q: Then you believe that America is going to be the dominant power in the world as far as we can foresee?

A: By the weight of its powers and its ideals, America will be the most influential country in the next decade. After that, China could become very powerful.

Q: Do you think that the American people are ready to continue this role for another 10 years? And do you think that Clinton has an understanding of our in-fluence? Is he ready to lead the people?

A: The American people have always responded to strong national leadership. As yet, Clinton does not appear to have a clear view of international affairs. He is shaped by the experiences of his youth, feeling instinctively that an assertion of American influence around the world is not healthy for either America or for the world.

Clinton is an example of the contem-porary style of leadership, shaped far more by television and the visual image than by the written word. Thus he is more emo-tional in his response and less willing to stick to something over time. That affects foreign policy above all. Our current political process closes its books almost every evening with "Nightline."

Q: If you were the national-security adviser now, what would you suggest to the President that our national interests actually be?

A: We need to educate the American people that we still have major interna-tional interests. America has historically oscillated between global approaches and isolationism: to keep Eurasia from being dominated by a single power, to build new ties across the North Atlantic, to create a Western Hemisphere community, to learn to conduct a balance of power policy.

Q: In the next 10 years, what are the potential threats that worry you the most?

A: Islamic fundamentalism and mass migrations, for which we have no concept at all. Given the stark distributions of wealth and resources in the world, we could experience migrations similar to those at the end of the Roman Empire.

Q: How do you think the Administration is doing on an operational level?

A: It doesn't have the right mix of people, or, rather, it has not integrated their individual qualities. I think highly of Secretary of State Warren Christopher, but the mix between the key people is not right. When you have a President who really does not seem attuned to foreign policy, there should be a process that leads to a philosophical resolution and by which he can force himself to think about where he is trying to go rather than to reduce it all to tactical issues. In this Administration, there is more emphasis on selling whatever is being done at a particu-lar moment than on analyzing its intrinsic worth.

1

Kissinger LA TIMES Interview - Edited - 1/31/93 - Take One

Q. Everyone has drawn a parallel between this period and the
immediate post-World War II period; we are present at the
creation of something but we don't know what it is yet. Can
you bring any coherence to what is to most of us still a very
incoherent picture? What are the defining facts of this new
era, and what should be the defining principles of an American
foreign policy?

A. The defining characteristic of the post-World War II
period has been that, in essence, American presidents since
Woodrow Wilson have all been Wilsonian, with the possible
exception of Richard Nixon. Thus, American foreign policy has
been justified in ideological rather than in strategic terms.
After World War II, once the ideological conflict was
recognized, it was invested with the geostrategic concept of

X

[LJ]

2

containment. But the impetus behind containment, and behind
the whole American effort in the postwar period, was not
general principles of foreign policy but the existence of a
specific threat which had to be countered and which was
perceived, above all, in moral terms.

Today, we are in a world in which there is no clear-cut
ideological threat. And there is no clear-cut concept of
geopolitics or geostrategy in American thinking. Even if there
were, we would have a difficult time applying it to
contemporary circumstances. This, I think, is the problem
which American foreign policy is facing at the moment.

It is compounded by the fact that, when an old system
disintegrates and a new world order emerges, all kinds of
tensions accompany it. But these are symptoms, not causes, nor
can Americans solve them from their traditional perspective of
seeking final answers. We are therefore at present in

X

[Lc]

3

transition from a period of ideological conflict to one of
open-ended process with no clear-cut terminal point and about
which we haven't really come to any conclusion.

Q. If you were to try to imagine a final outcome, what would it look like? And how would American power be used?

A. There are two main types of problems in the world today. First, the traditional problems of equilibrium among nations, and, secondly, genuinely global problems - nuclear proliferation, the population explosion, technological development - which have nothing to do with the equilibrium.

How, then, is America to apply the concept of equilibrium in
the post-modern world? In order to apply the concept of the
balance of power, you have to know what your vital interests
are. What is it you will defend no matter how it is
challenged? America has never faced that issue before. It did
not have the Monroe Doctrine, which was gradually expanded

X

4

until it had attained a hegemonic character. But that was
mostly in relation to conjectural, not actual, threats.
America has never had a concrete definition of the vital
interest in the way Britain did when it maintained that the
Low Countries must never be occupied by a major Continental
power, or in the way France did when it was still dominant and
adhered to the rule that Central Europe must not be controlled
by a single power.

It is probably a vital American interest to see to it that
Eurasia not be controlled by a single power center. In
essence, we have fought two wars over this issue. And we have
a certain interest in the equilibrium, especially in Asia.
With respect to Europe, I think we have learned to live with a
United Europe, though probably because we don't think it can
be more powerful than we are.

[Lc]

5

We would, for instance, have to resist if the whole area
from Europe through Russia and China were being dominated by a
single country. Even if all of the countries of Asia formed a
single group, it would pose a serious long-term problem for
America. Therefore, in Asia - in the interplay of Japan,
Russia, China, Korea, and Southeast Asia - we are in the
position of having to play a role very similar to that of
Britain in the 19th century vis-a-vis Europe. The trouble is
that we have no theory or experience for such a role. The
diplomacy sketched here will require us to be closer to each
of the participants than they are to each other. This is one
reason we should be reluctant to break with China. I think the
Administration is recognizing this, or at least is moving in
that direction.

Q. Even though China has the potential to exercise hegemony
in Asia?

X

[c]

6

A. Right now it does not. But 25 years from now, it could well be that we will have to move to limit the influence of China. But that is not the case today, though it could be even in 15-20 years, and we should then act accordingly.

Q. Let's go back for a minute to the fundamental principle you are trying to lay out here. You know better than anyone else that Americans tend to be uncomfortable with geostrategic equations.

A. Absolutely. It is one of our problems.

Q. Anthony Lake, President Clinton's National Security Adviser, last year gave a speech he had worked on for a long time that was intended to set forth some kind of set of principles, and I'd like to know your reaction to it. He came up with a word, "enlargement," which tried to give American foreign policy an ideological basis.

X

7

A. American foreign policy has historically been based on the notion that America has a unique role in the world. And every president has adhered to this theme. In the context of that symbiotic relationship which presidents have with their publics, they all realized that their publics needed some such affirmation. That is one side of the equation, which Lake correctly emphasized.

On the other hand, it is necessary to analyze what reality is imposing on us independent of our values. The query is, can the two approaches be combined? That has not yet been done.

Lake's speech contained very elevated attitudes based on the Wilsonian tradition. And he was trying to oppose his concept of the enlargement of democracy to the concept of containment.

Yet he gave it no operational definition. When George Kennan had put forward containment as a policy toward the Soviet Union, his had been a clear definition: to resist communism

X

8

wherever it might press. Now that was an operational
definition, being something that one could actually do.

Enlargement of democracy operates from a number of
assumptions which are not self-evident. One is that
democracies don't make wars. But there have never been enough
democracies to test this. In the former Yugoslavia, most of
the governments are more or less popularly elected; the ethnic
conflicts in the former Soviet Union and the wars in the
Middle East are in fact extremely popular there. And one of
the reasons the various leaders are involved in these
conflicts is that they think it gets them public support.

Secondly, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that
market economics automatically translates into democracy.
I consider democracy the best form of government, but I don't
see evolution toward it as being automatic. Do we really
know enough about conditions in every country to prescribe how

X

[L.C.]

9

to go through the stages which took hundreds of years in the
few operational democracies that do exist? And, when we become
that intrusive, might we not be contributing to nationalist
reactions? To what extent is American pressure helping reform
in Russia or impeding reform in Russia?

Clinton said in Europe that we ought to conduct policy on
the basis of the best possible outcome. We should certainly
try for that. But a statesman must make allowances for the
worst contingency as well. The Clinton Administration was
right in trying to help reformist Russia. It went overboard by
identifying support for Yeltsin with ignoring normal foreign
policy considerations, including symptoms of reemerging Soviet
imperialism. The art of policy is to strike a balance between
influencing Russian attitudes and Russian calculations,
between incentives for restraint and penalties for
intransigence.

X

[LC]

10

Similarly, in the economic field, it is possible that there will be one global economic system. But it is also possible that the world will break up into regional groupings. It is all very well to say that we want non-discriminatory treatment from the European community, but it is the essence of an economic community that it be discriminatory. We can try to make it less discriminatory, as we should. We have to be prepared for either contingency.

I am a strong supporter of a Western Hemisphere economic unit for these reasons. If the international system becomes genuinely global, a Western Hemisphere arrangement facilitates the growth of the Western Hemisphere. On the other hand, if the system becomes regional, it gives each nation of the Western Hemisphere a way to compete without encapsulating itself in 19th century nationalism. Indeed, it gives the Americas an opportunity to use the Western Hemisphere

X

[LC]

11
community to attach non-Western Hemisphere nations to the
principles which operate within the Western Hemisphere.

Q. Strobe Talbott (Clinton's nominee for Deputy Secretary of State) said that, not only should our policies aim for the best case, but that, if we declare that we are preparing for the worst case and visibly prepare for the worst case, we are in danger of bringing the worst case about.

A. I disagree. I would argue that it helps Russian reformers if they are warned against the dangers of a return to historic Russian expansionism by pointing to clear-cut Western policies. A country like Poland - partitioned four times in 200 years by Russia and for just five years free of Russian occupation - has every historical reason to be terrified of its neighbor. Nor would I accept the proposition that Russia has a just cause to feel threatened if Poland, the victim, takes security precautions that cannot possibly threaten

[L]

12

Russia. America should pursue a two-track policy. It should provide additional security for Eastern Europe while at the same time enabling Russia to participate in other structures in the political, economic, social, and cultural fields. If Talbott's hope is realized and the best were to happen, after 20 years NATO would become vestigial. What I object to is merging the two and trying to use NATO as an instrument for bringing about the so-called best outcome, which leaves us with no safety net.

## Take Two of Same Tape

Q. I take it that you believe that America is going to be the dominant power in the world as far as we can foresee?

A. By the weight of its powers and its ideals, America will be the most influential country in the next decade. After that, China could become a very powerful country.

X

[Lc]

13

Q. Do you think that the American people are ready to continue this role for another 10 years? And do you think that Clinton has an understanding of our influence? Do you think he's ready to lead the people?

A. The American people have always responded to strong national leadership. In 1937, three Neutrality Acts were passed by the Congress with overwhelming majorities. Yet, three years later, Roosevelt had managed to convince the American people that Germany must not be permitted to win the war.

As yet, Clinton does not appear to have a clear view of international affairs. He is shaped by his youth and by the experiences of his youth, feeling instinctively that an assertion of American influence around the world is not healthy for either America or for the world.

X

[Lc]

14

Clinton is an example of the contemporary style of leadership, which is quite distinct from historical precedents. The modern leader is shaped far more by television and the visual image than he is by the written word, that is by images rather than by concepts. Thus he is more emotional in his response to stimuli and less willing to stick to something over an extended period of time. That affects foreign policy above all, where some notion of what kind of a new world order is essential, one that might take five years to emerge and which must be sustained in the face of being sniped at every day. Our current political process closes its books almost every evening with "Nightline." And if you are in a high office, you are necessarily concerned about your public image. From this point of view, I don't think that Clinton has yet shown strong long-term leadership. On the other hand, he is a man of extraordinary intelligence. And on an issue

X

[L]

15

like NAFTA, he came a long way and fought for it with great
courage and skill.

Q. Roosevelt in 1940 and Truman in 1949 were both aided by
large threats which made it easier to express what the
national interest was. We're circling around the question that
we can't escape: if you were the national security adviser and
you were to devise for the president a statement of the
national interest at its core, how would you, where would you,
start?

A. The President made a mistake by including Russia and
Europe in the same trip. They represent two entirely separate
problems. You have a thousand newsmen with you the minute you
hit Brussels, and then you have to worry about what they will
write from Moscow. Then too, Clinton had to deal with the fact
that, in Europe, the generations are changing. The political
structure of Italy has collapsed. In Spain, there is a great

X

[Lc]

16

deal of difficulty. In Germany, there will be a generational
change in leadership within the next five years and perhaps
sooner. Thus, all the European leaders were preoccupied with
their own domestic affairs. They could not afford an argument
with the United States. And they didn't have any clear ideas
about what they wanted. Clinton arrived with a set of answers
with which many of the leaders he encountered did not agree
but which they were also not prepared to resist.

I believe that Clinton would have been better advised if he
had said: "Look, fellows, we're in a new world. We have the
following problems which we haven't solved and toward which we
should develop a common approach: out-of-area conflicts, the
Balkan problem, Russia, Eastern Europe, Islamic
fundamentalism. I'm coming back here on June 6 for the D-Day
celebration. Why don't we use that occasion not to celebrate
our ancient hatreds but our new, common, purposes? In the

X

17

meantime, let's create a group of our best people to make recommendations to us." Then, Clinton could have repeated the same message in Prague. And he could have gone to Moscow separately after a Russian Cabinet was formed.

If he had done that, the thoughtful individuals would have had something to rally around. His Partnership for Peace idea is basically a sugarcoated gimmick to sidestep granting the countries of Eastern Europe their request to join NATO. Either Russia or the East European countries will, sooner or later, see it as a subterfuge.

Q. If you were the National Security Advisor now, what would you suggest to the President that our national interests actually are? And how would you try to get a president to focus?

A. First of all, we need to educate the American people that we still have major international interests. America has

[c]

18

historically oscillated between global approaches and
isolationism: to keep Eurasia from being dominated by a single
power; to build new ties across the North Atlantic; to create
a Western Hemisphere community; to learn to conduct a balance
of power policy.

Q. What, as you look out ten years, are the potential
threats that worry you the most?

A. Islamic fundamentalism and mass migrations - for which we
have no concept at all. Given the stark distributions of
wealth and resources in the world, we could experience
migrations similar to those which had occurred at the end of
the Roman Empire. And military conflicts of the Bosnian type
could spread over a much broader area and with much larger
units, leading to a sort of regional anarchy.

X

[ic]

19

Q. I can't help but wonder whether we are incapable of defining our national interest until someone else presents a sufficiently large threat?

A. That has been historically true but will no longer be adequate in the contemporary world. The art will be to act early enough before a threat has become overwhelming and without having it turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Q. How do you think the Clinton Administration is doing on an operational level?

A. It doesn't have the right mix people of people, or, rather, it has not integrated their individual qualities. I think highly of (Secretary of State Warren) Christopher, but the mix between the key people is not right. When you have a president who really does not seem attuned to foreign policy, there should be a process that leads to a philosophical resolution and by which he can force himself to think about

X

[c]

20

where he is trying to go rather than to reduce it all to
tactical issues. From that point of view, I cannot say the
process is working very well. In the current Administration,
there is more emphasis on selling whatever it is that is being
done at a particular moment than on analyzing its intrinsic
worth.

Q. Christopher made a couple of runs at filling the vacuum
at the top by trying to get some time on Clinton's schedule
for precisely the kind of discussion you are talking about -
non-tactical, non-crisis discussion of where we are heading,
what we are here for, but Clinton keeps knocking it off the
schedule.

A. I think that Christopher's recommendation was wise.

I used to spend hours with (President) Nixon. Not on tactics, which really didn't interest Nixon, but on where we were trying to go. Ford was less conceptual but we still spent a

X

[Lc]

21

minimum of half an hour every day whenever we were both in
town, on the theory that it could not be that the President
and the Secretary of State had nothing to talk about. Usually
it was longer than a half hour. And when we didn't have
current problems, we picked an issue, the Near East or
whatever, and talked about it. I think that it's definitely a
big mistake not to have that kind of dialogue.

If you look at football teams, what is the difference
between a great and an ordinary team? It's in the nuance of
execution. It's not that one has a super-duper play which the
other does not. Everyone knows more or less the same things.
The way you get outstanding policy is to think about your
basic concept so that when something important comes along you
don't have to discuss the goal and can focus on tactics. But
if everything has to be analyzed from scratch as a deadline

X

JAN-30-1994 16:35 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.01

A. Some of the difficulties we will be facing are due to the fact that we are not asking the right questions. It took us some four to five years after World War II to come up with a design.

JAN-30-1994 16:36 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.03

[Y]

3

tensions accompany it. But these are symptoms, not causes, nor
can Americans solve them from their traditional perspective of
always seeking conclusive answers. We are therefore at present
in transition from a period of ideological conflict to one of
with us clear - and terminal point
open-ended process about which we haven't really come to any
conclusion.

How, then, is America to apply the concept of power in the
post-modern world? In order to apply the concept of power, you
have to know what your vital interests are. What is it you

JAN-30-1994 16:37 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.04

[Y]

4

will defend no matter how it is challenged? America has never faced that issue before. It did have a Monroe Doctrine, which did not say and which was gradually expanded until it had attained an offensive character. But that was not in relation to a conjectural not actual case, ideological as it was geopolitical. However, we have never had a concrete definition of the vital interest in the way Britain did when it maintained that the Low Countries must never be occupied by a major Continental power, or in the way France did when it was still dominant and adhered to the rule that Central Europe must not be controlled by a single power.

JAN-30-1994 16:37 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.06

6

A. Right now it does not. But 25 years from now, it could well be that we will have to move to limit the influence of China. I-would be totally open to that strategy, But that is not the case today, though it could be even in 15-20 years, and we should then act accordingly.

JAN-30-1994 16:38 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.08

[Y]

Enlargement of democracy operates from a number of not self-evident assumptions which are extremely dubious. One is that democracies don't make wars. But there have never been enough democracies to test this. In the former Yugoslavia, most of the governments are more or less popularly elected; the ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union and the wars in the Middle East are in fact extremely popular there. And one of the reasons the various leaders are involved in these conflicts is that they think it gets them public support.

Secondly, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that market economics automatically translates into democracy. I want to make it clear that I consider democracy the best form of government, but I don't see it as an automatic evolution of an automatic

However, even assuming that these propositions are true, do we

JAN-30-1994 16:39 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.09

[Y]

9

really have ~~any~~ idea how they are to be implemented, or know enough about conditions in every country to prescribe how to go through the stages which took hundreds of years in the few operational democracies that do exist? And, when we become that intrusive, might we not be contributing to nationalist reactions? To what extent is American pressure helping reform in Russia or impeding reform in Russia?

Clinton said in Europe that we ought to conduct policy on the basis of the best possible outcome. We should certainly try for that. But a statesman must make allowances for the ~~undisguised~~ worst as well. The Clinton Administration was right in trying to help reformist Russia. It went overboard by identifying ~~growing normal foreign policy~~ support for Yeltsin with ~~growing symptoms of reemerging Soviet~~ imperialism. The art of policy is to strike a balance between influencing Russian attitudes and Russian calculations,

JAN-30-1994 16:53 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.02

[Y]

11

Hemisphere a way to compete without encapsulating itself in
19th century nationalism. Indeed, it gives America an
opportunity to use the Western Hemisphere community to attach
non-Western Hemisphere nations to the principles which operate
within the Western Hemisphere.

TOTAL P.02

JAN-30-1994 16:39 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.10

[Y]

12

its neighbor. Nor would I accept the proposition that Russia
has a just cause to feel threatened if Poland takes security
precautions. America should pursue a two-track policy. It
should provide additional security for Eastern Europe while at
the same time enabling Russia to participate in other
structures in the political, economic, social, and cultural
fields. If Talbott's hope is realized and the best were to
happen, after 20 years NATO would become vestigial. What I
object to is merging the two and trying to use NATO as an
instrument for bringing about the so-called best outcome,
which leaves us with no safety net.

## Take Two of Same Tape

JAN-30-1994 16:39 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.11

13

Does Clinton have that fire in his belly? As yet, Clinton does not appear to have a clear view of international affairs. He is shaped by his youth and by the experiences of his youth,

JAN-30-1994 16:40 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.12

[Y]

14

feeling instinctively that an assertion of American influence
around the world is not healthy for either America or for the
world. With that, I disagree.

Clinton is an example of the contemporary style of
leadership, which is quite distinct from historical
precedents. The modern leader is shaped far more by television
and the visual image than he is by the written word, that is
by images rather than by concepts. Thus he is more emotional
in his response to stimuli and less willing to stick to
something over an extended period of time. That affects
foreign policy above all, where you have to have some notion
of what kind of world you are moving toward over, say, a five-
year period in the face of being sniped at every day. Our
current political process closes its books almost every
evening with "Nightline." And if you are in a high office, you
are necessarily concerned about your public image. From this

JAN-30-1994 16:40 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.13

[Y]

15

point of view, I don't think that Clinton has yet shown strong
leadership. On the other hand, I think that he is a man of
extraordinary intelligence. And on an issue like NAFTA, he
came a long way and fought for it with great courage and
skill.

JAN-30-1994 16:40 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.14

16

write from Moscow. Then too, Clinton had to deal with the fact that, in Europe, the generations are changing. The political structure of Italy has collapsed. In Spain, there is a great deal of difficulty. In Germany, there will be a generational change in leadership within the next five years and perhaps sooner. Thus, all the European leaders were preoccupied with their own domestic affairs. They could not afford an argument with the United States. And they didn't have any clear ideas about what they wanted. Clinton arrived with a set of answers with which many of the leaders he encountered did not agree but which they were also not prepared to resist.

I believe that Clinton would have been better advised if he had said: "Look, fellows, we're in a new world. We have the following problems which we haven't solved and which we may develop a common approach not even know how to solve: out-of-area conflicts, the Balkan problem, Russia, Eastern Europe, Islamic fundamentalism. I'm

JAN-30-1994 16:41

FROM

TO

12124213934 P. 16

[Y]

18

A. Islamic fundamentalism and mass migrations - for which we have no concept at all. Given the stark distributions of wealth and resources in the world, if we could experience migrations similar to those which had occurred at the end of the Roman Empire. And military conflicts of the Bosnian type could spread over a much broader area and with much larger units, leading to a sort of regional anarchy.

JAN-30-1994 16:42 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.17

19

A. It doesn't have the right mix of people, or, rather, it has *not* been integrated *them*-independently-of-their-individual qualities. I think highly of (Secretary of State Warren) Christopher, but the mix between the key people is not right. When you have a president who really does not seem attuned to foreign policy, there should be a process that leads to a philosophical resolution and by which he can force

JAN-30-1994 16:43 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.20

[Y]

22

If you look at football teams, what is the difference
between a great and an ordinary team? It's in the nuance of
execution. It's not that one has a super-duper play which the
other does not. Everyone knows more or less the same things.
The way you get outstanding policy is to think about your
basic concept so that when something important comes along you
don't have to discuss the goal and can focus on tactics. But
if everything has to be analyzed as a deadloss and then you have
appraoches to get ready for a presidential trip, it is human nature that
we prepare for the photo opportunity.

TOTAL P.22

TOTAL P.20

1

[Y]

2

Richard Nixon. Thus, American foreign policy has been justified in ideological rather than in strategic terms. After World War II, once the ideological conflict was defined, it was invested with the geostrategic concept of containment. But the impetus behind containment, and behind the whole American effort in the postwar period, was not general principles of foreign policy but the existence of a specific threat which had to be countered.

Today, we are in a world in which there is no clear-cut ideological threat. And there is no concept of geopolitics or geostrategy in American thinking. Even if there were, we would have a hell of a time applying it to contemporary circumstances. This, I think, is the problem which American foreign policy is facing at the moment.

[Y]

3

tensions accompany it. But these are symptoms, not causes, nor
can Americans solve them from their traditional perspective of
always seeking conclusive answers. We are therefore at present
in transition from a period of ideological conflict to one of
open-ended process about which we haven't really come to any
conclusion.

X

[X]

4

will defend no matter how it is challenged? America has never
faced that issue before. It did have a Monroe Doctrine, which
did that in a way and which was gradually expanded until it
had attained an offensive character. But that was as
ideological as it was geopolitical. However, we have never had
a concrete definition of the vital interest in the way Britain
did when it maintained that the Low Countries must never be
occupied by a major Continental power, or in the way France
did when it was still dominant and adhered to the rule that
Central Europe must not be controlled by a single power.

X

[X]

5

We would, for instance, have to resist the whole area from
Europe through Russia and China being dominated by a single
country. Even if all of the countries of Asia formed a single
group, it would pose a serious long-term problem for America.
Therefore, in Asia - in the interplay of Japan, Russia, China,
and Korea - we are in the position of having to play a role
very similar to that of Britain in the 19th century vis-a-vis
Europe, only we have no theory for such a role. And we will
have to be closer to each of the participants than they are to
each other. This is one reason we should be reluctant to break
with China. I think the Administration is recognizing this, or
at least is moving in that direction.

X

6

[Y]

A. Right now it does not. But 25 years from now, it could well be that we will have to move to limit the influence of China. I would be totally open to that strategy. But that is not the case today, though it could be even in 15-20 years, and we should then act accordingly.

X

7

A. If you look at the way Americans have conducted foreign policy, you cannot separate it from the notion that America has a unique role in the world. And every president has adhered to this theme. In the context of that symbiotic relationship which all presidents have with their publics, they all realized that their publics needed it. That is one side of the equation.

On the other side, it is necessary to analyze what reality is imposing on us. The query is, can you marry the two approaches? That has not yet been done. Lake's speech contained very elevated attitudes toward the Wilsonian tradition. And he was trying to oppose his concept of the enlargement of democracy to the concept of containment. Yet he gave it no operational definition. When George Kennan had put forward containment as a policy toward the Soviet Union, his had been a clear definition: to resist communism wherever it

[Y]

X

8

Enlargement of democracy operates from a number of
assumptions which are extremely dubious. One is that
democracies don't make wars. But there have never been enough
democracies to test this. In the former Yugoslavia, most of
the governments are more or less popularly elected; the ethnic
conflicts in the former Soviet Union and the wars in the
Middle East are in fact extremely popular there. And one of
the reasons the various leaders are involved in these
conflicts is that they think it gets them public support.

Secondly, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that
market economics automatically translates into democracy. I
want to make it clear that I consider democracy the best form
of government, but I don't see it as an automatic evolution.
However, even assuming that these propositions are true, do we

[Y]

X

[Y]

9

really have any idea how they are to be implemented, or know
enough about conditions in every country to prescribe how to
go through the stages which took hundreds of years in the few
operational democracies that do exist? And, when we become
that intrusive, might we not be contributing to nationalist
reactions? To what extent is American pressure helping reform
in Russia or impeding reform in Russia?

Clinton said in Europe that we ought to conduct policy on
the basis of the best possible outcome. We should certainly
try for that. But a statesman must make allowances for the
worst as well. The Clinton Administration was right in trying
to help reformist Russia. It went overboard by identifying
support for Yeltsin with gnawing symptoms of reemerging Soviet
imperialism. The art of policy is to strike a balance between
influencing Russian attitudes and Russian calculations,

X

[Y]

10

Similarly, in the economic field, is it really likely that there will be one totally coherent economic system? Or is it at least possible that the world will break up into regional groupings? The second is more likely than the first. It is all very well to say that we want non-discriminatory treatment from the European community, but it is the essence of an economic community that it be discriminatory. We can try to make it less discriminatory, as we should.

I am a strong supporter of a Western Hemisphere economic unit for two contradictory reasons. Reason one is that, if the international system becomes genuinely global, the fact that there is a Western Hemisphere arrangement facilitates the growth of the Western Hemisphere. On the other hand, if the system is not global, it gives each nation of the Western

[Y]

11

X

[Y]

12

## Take Two of Same Tape

X

[Y]

13

X

[Y]

14

X

[Y]

15

X

16

I believe that Clinton would have been better advised if he
had said: "Look, fellows, we're in a new world. We have the
following problems which we haven't solved and which we may
not even know how to solve: out-of-area conflicts, the Balkan
problem, Russia, Eastern Europe, Islamic fundamentalism. I'm

X

[Y]

17

coming back here on June 6 for the D-Day celebration. Why don't we use that occasion not to celebrate our ancient hatreds but our new, common, purposes? In the meantime, let's create a group of our best people to make recommendations to us." Then, Clinton could have sent out the same message in Eastern Europe.

If he had done that, the thoughtful individuals would have had something to rally around. His Partnership for Peace idea is basically a sugarcoated gimmick [to sidestep granting the countries of Eastern Europe their request to join NATO].

18

A. Islamic fundamentalism and mass migrations - for which we have no concept at all. [Given the stark distributions of wealth and resources in the world,] we could experience migrations similar to those which had occurred at the end of the Roman Empire. And military conflicts of the Bosnian type could spread over a much broader area and with much larger units, leading to a sort of regional anarchy.