IN FORMER Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's White House Years, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization is never called a "terrorist" — not once in the four chapters or 138 pages dealing with the Middle East. Even when Kissinger discusses various Palestinian murders, hijackings and other atrocities, he carefully avoids this pejorative description of the PLO.

Instead, he prefers the more neutral or even complimentary "commando," "guerrilla" or "fedayeen," the last word loosely translated from the Arabic as "martyrs" or "those willing to sacrifice their lives heroically for a just cause." That's the standard description of the PLO in the Arab world.

FOR COGNOSCENTI of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Kissinger's choice of words cannot be seen as accidental. There must have been a deliberate decision made not to offend the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world. Presumably, Kissinger does not want to burn his bridges to the

Arabs, lest he be recalled to the State Department by a future president, Kissinger apparently still yearns to return to the State Department if not in January 1981 then at some point in the future.

Kissinger, only 57 years old, should not be counted out yet. He remains a powerful force in foreign policy, despite all the continuing criticism from the left, right and centre. His influence today is far-reaching, largely because his personality and intelligence still command almost instant media attention.

Since leaving office in January 1977, Kissinger has been walking a delicate Middle East tightrope. His strategy appears to have been two-pronged: avoid overly upsetting the Arabs while currying favour simultaneously with Israel and its American Jewish supporters, who could prove to be valuable allies in winning a return to power. This combined strategy was foreshadowed before the 1976 elections when Kissinger started making major appearances before strictly Jewish audiences.

Clearly, he was stung by the sharp Israeli and Jewish response to his 1975 six-month "reassessment" of U.S. policy in the Middle East, which followed the initial collapse of his Sinai II mediatory effort. While an agreement was eventually signed in September 1975, the "reassessment" remains one of the most acrimonious periods in U.S.-Israeli relations.

The "reassessment" represented a genuine watershed. The strains which developed still continue to have their impact today. It was during that crisis when Kissinger began his highly-publicized sniping at Israel for allegedly standing in

Henry Kissinger's Department should his recent 'pro-Is

Rhetor

the way of an agreement. By legitimizing a policy of pressure against Israel, Kissinger also sought to intimidate American Jews into supporting his policy.

Whenever the secretary of state is publicly criticizing Israel, the Arabists in the State Department bureaucracy become emboldened and their knee-jerk condemnation of Israel's "intransigence" comes centre stage. Public criticism of Israel became almost fashionable during the "reassessment." Much of Israel's erosion in the news media can be traced back to that period when Kissinger put forward during his private briefings the intellectual justification for blaming Israel. The spectacle of a Jewish secretary of state telling non-Jews that one could criticize Israel without worrying about being called an anti-Semite continues to have its effects today. In short, Henry begat McHenry.

But Kissinger did not limit his pressure on Israel to a sophisticated public relations campaign, which later became a central feature of the Carter Administration. President Carter was merely following Kissinger's lead when he candidly told Time magazine in August 1977 that he would try to stir public opinion to persuade Israel to accept the U.S. position at a reconvened Geneva Peace Conference. "I would try and marshal the support of the (Israel) leader first of all; secondly, the opinion of his people back home, the constituencies that might exist in our country that would have influence around the world, opinion that exists in the European community and the Arab nations as well." That approach, which is premised on Israel's sensitivity and vulnerability to American public opinion, was pure Kissinger.

Many friends of Israel, in their nostalgia for Kissinger, have either forgotten or were never aware of the fact that during the "reassessment" the U.S. refused to sign any new arms contracts with Israel; the Administration, moreover, delayed for over six months the introduction of a new foreign aid bill to Congress. By then, Israel had become America's largest individual foreign aid recipient and the delay was squeezing Israel tightly.

Kissinger developed carrot-and-stick diplomacy in dealing with Israel to an advanced form. Whenever there was some friction with Israel, the U.S. could "pacify" the Israelis by providing some military assistance. In his book, he blamed the State Department for trying to keep Israel on a "short leash," when in fact he was often the architect of that policy.

In partial fairness to

PAGE 14

THE JERU

Abiding desire to return to the State
be taken into account when evaluating
'Israel statements,' writes Wolf Blitzer.

ic and record

Kissinger, it should be noted
that Israel, under the
governments of Mrs. Golda
Meir and Yitzhak Rabin,
always encouraged Kissinger to
pursue that policy by itself
often linking concessions to
further arms supplies. This led
many Israelis to twist Rabin's
stated policy of "a piece of
territory for a piece of peace"
into "a piece of territory for a
piece of military equipment."

LARGELY BECAUSE of the fallout from the "reassessment, especially the vitriolic attacks against Kissinger by Israeli and American Jews, the secretary came to exaggerate the power of the so-called Jewish lobby. He personally resented the letter from 76 senators to President Gerald Ford during the "reassessment" calling for continued, strong support of Israel. After that order, he began to give the impression to Israeli visitors and American Jewish intellectuals that he knew what was best for Israel.

In his book, Kissinger
disclaims that President Nixon, in
late 1969, wrote the following in
longhand on a memorandum
which Kissinger had prepared
explaining King Hussein's
pessimism in the face of
Israel's tough stand: "I am
beginning to think we have to
consider taking strong steps uni-
laterally to save Israel from
her own destruction."

Yet Kissinger, like his critic
George Ball, later seemed to
move toward that same ap-
proach. He rationalized it this
way in his book: "An Israeli
Cabinet meeting is well-suited
to nit-picking peace proposals to
death, less adapted to develop-
ing a long-range policy; Israel
sometimes finds it easier to
shift the responsibility for dif-
ficult choice to its great ally
than to make the decision itself;
'American pressure' can be an
excuse for what many Israeli
leaders know in their hearts is
necessary for Israel anyway."

SAUL BELLOW, probably better than anyone else, captured Kissinger's spirit in an article in the New Yorker magazine during the summer of 1976. After interviewing Kissinger, Bellow offered these impressions:

"He represents himself as a
strong defender of Israel whose
efforts are not appreciated...
The impression he wants to con-
vey is that he has stood between
Israel and its enemies in the
American government. When
he steps down, and he must step
down soon, he will be missed by
the very people who now assail
him.

"Mr. Kissinger has the deftness of a master manipulator, but I feel his touch, subtle as it is. For what it may be worth; he wants to convince me of his warmth. In this warm, however, there are icy spots — a scattering of threats which he perhaps has the habit of making when talking to American Jews: they had better understand that in letting themselves be used as lobbyists by Israel's leaders they are helping neither Israel nor themselves; in the disastrous event of Israel's defeat, they too will get it in the neck. So they had better stop making so much noise in Washington and undermining their chief protector, Henry Kissinger."

IN ANALYZING Kissinger's comments on the Arab-Israeli conflict since leaving office, one should not lose sight of the fact that Kissinger has been motivated to a great extent by the desire to erase much of the historic record and to return to the State Department. Only by fully appreciating his intentions can we fully understand his statements and behaviour. And seen from this perspective, his spate of very "pro-Israel" statements (made without overly upsetting the Arabs) takes on a new light.

During his last year in office,
Kissinger embarked on a con-
certed drive to improve his im-
age in Israel and the American
Jewish community. With one
eye on the history books, he
tried to package himself as
Israel's great friend. The first
public demonstration came
May 9, 1976, when he addressed
several hundred Jews at a
Baltimore synagogue.

"All of us who are friends of Israel and who are at the same time dedicated to further progress toward peace understand Israel's uncertainties — and at the same time we share her hope," he said. "There will be no imposed solutions; there should be negotiations between the parties that will eventually have to live in peace."

KISSINGER'S defence reached
a new climax on January 11,
1977, after Carter had won the
election but before the January
20 inauguration. The occasion
was a rather moving if
somewhat fulous tribute
to Kissinger by the Conference
of Presidents of Major
American Jewish
Organizations. After being
warmly praised by the
conference's chairman, Rabbi
Alexander Schindler, its im-
mediate past chairman, Rabbi
Israel Miller, and Israeli Am-

bassador Simcha Dinitz,
Kissinger spoke of his
relationship with Israel and the
organized U.S. Jewish leader-
ship.

"From my point of view," he
said, "probably no criticism
has hurt me more than if it
came from this community.
And probably from your point
of view, it was especially pain-
ful if disagreements occurred
between the Jewish community
and the first Jewish Secretary
of State in American history."

Speaking emotionally,
Kissinger continued: "I have
never forgotten that 13
members of my family died in
concentration camps, nor could
I ever fail to remember what it
was like to live in Nazi Ger-
many as a member of a
persecuted minority." And in
concluding his remarks, he
said: "The problems of security
and of peace in the Middle East
will be with us for as long as we
can see. I will remain dedicated
as a friend of Israel, and as a
friend of this group, for as long
as I live."

After leaving office,
Kissinger deliberately adopted
a low profile on the Middle
East. His public comments
were kept to a minimum. Even
at a March 10, 1977, black-tie
dinner at the Madison Hotel in
Washington, when receiving an
honorary doctorate from the
Weizmann Institute of Science,
Kissinger avoided any substan-
tive or controversial com-
ments on the occasion.

It was not until November 13 of that year, only days before Anwar Sadat stunned the world by announcing his decision to go to Jerusalem, that Kissinger broke his silence. The occasion was an American Jewish Congress dinner in New York honouring Mrs. Golda Meir. "Given my own involvement in the conduct of foreign policy over eight years, I have thought it inappropriate since January to participate in a discussion of today-day tactics," he said. "But I would like to use this occasion to articulate a few general principles."

Kissinger included an im-
passioned statement of support
for Israel. "No people have suf-
fered more from the absence of
peace than the people of Israel,
every square mile of whose
country is drenched with the
blood of its pioneers and whose
existence has never been
recognized by any of its
neighbours." His criticism of
the Carter Administration's
policies, including the ill-fated
October 1, 1977, U.S.-Soviet
joint communique on the Mid-
dle East calling for a reconven-
ed Geneva Conference, was
tempered and veiled.

"MY OWN acquaintance with
President Carter, Secretary of
State Vance and their senior ad-
visors convinces me that this
Administration would not
deliberately put Israel's securi-
ty at risk. But there is always
the danger that actions under-

SALEM POST INTERNATIONAL EDITION

Published weekly • June 15-21, 1980