3

urbanized and industrialized West and the more rural and semi-feudal East,
dynastic rivalries including that between Austria and Prussia.

The German national feeling, so powerfully aroused and stimulated
by Napoleonic domination, had no territorial message to convey. At the
turn of the Eighteenth Century, and even later, nation and state had become
divergent if not antagonistic concepts for the Germans, unlike those held by
such nations as the French or English. Because of her weakness, portions
of her ethnic body had broken off in the course of centuries, some of them
forming separate nations. She lost the Dutch and the Flemings in the
northwest, the Alsatians in the west, the Swiss in the south and, lastly, the
Austrians. She compensated herself, however, by pushing far into the east,
mixing with and absorbing Slav populations but without reaching anywhere
natural or clear ethnic frontiers.

Generally speaking, the basic non-statist concept of German
nationalism meant that all persons of German tongue and culture were
considered members of the German folk-nation, a concept later successfully
exploited by the adherents of Pan-Germanism and abused by Hitler.

The Bismarckian Reich, when created, possessed no
nationalist-ideological basis; it was intended by its founders to be a greater
Prussia, that is, the Prussian military and bureaucratic machine enlarged
by permanent confederates. Thus, Prussian power hunger and nationalistic
aspirations to German unity could be satisfied at a stroke and for the
benefit of all.

Until the Bismarckian unification the Germans had been an "inchoate
nation"; after 1871, however, Germany has definitely become a nation-state

4

though a belated nation-state.² The symbiosis of Germans within the confines of the Second Reich shaped them into a self-conscious national community.

While, on the one hand, those who had so far lived outside Prussia experienced the regimentation into Prussian discipline and orderliness, Prussia, on the other hand, became more exposed to German idealism and romanticism, for better or worse.

The coherence and resilience of the new German nation-state, badly tested after the defeat suffered in World War I, withstood the trial. It is reasonable to believe that even after the much greater catastrophe of 1945 the German state would not have fallen apart if zonal occupation would not have forced on it a political division.

Germany is located in the very center of Europe; she is surrounded by small but also by two big nations, the French in the West and the Russians in the East (Poland lies between the Germans and Russians and had four times been partitioned by them). A centrally situated country without conspicuous natural boundaries, such as Germany, is more likely to suffer amputation and dismemberment than nations of peripheral location. The Hapsburg Empire was, in its time, supranational and powerful, and held the periphery of Germany only. Prussia, also peripheral, was able to expand because of her Spartan-like military and political organization. Without these two powers, or whenever they faltered, divided Germany was nothing more than an agglomeration of buffer states.

When lacking power, as in Napoleon's time, Germany became a route of march and battleground for foreign armies and easy prey for the victors. When powerful, after her unification, despite her fright from a two-front war,

5

she became a threat to all her neighbors. In two World Wars she tried to establish a continental hegemony but failed. Hitlerite hubris not only dislocated the entire world and caused unspeakable human miseries but wrought havoc on the German nation itself. The gruesome chaos of Nazi Germanism fell into the hands of the Allies, called to dispose of the lifeless body of the defeated giant, Hitler's Third Reich.

## The German Problem of the Mid-Twentieth Century

Her dismembered status had been, for centuries, Germany's specific characteristic and problem. Unity, an accustomed and natural status for France since the end of the Middle Ages, had been for a long time a desideratum for the Germans. Prior to 1871, political independence of German states, the Kleinstaaterei, may have appeared natural to many, or even a desired status for a few, the unity for 75 years of Bismarckian and Weimar Germany led Germans to resent the division of their country as thoroughly unnatural and harmful.

Germany, prior to 1871, had no single political or cultural center. With the creation of Bismarckian Germany the center of German national life shifted to the East. For centuries, the weight of Germanism had been essentially situated between the Rhine and Elbe; now, with Berlin as the capital of the Reich, German political, cultural and economic activities became for 75 years concentrated in a city hundred miles east of the Elbe River.

One-fourth of the Bismarckian Reich was beyond the Oder-Neisse Rivers; the remaining three-fourths had been divided in an approximate ratio of five

6

(the Federal Republic) to two (German Democratic Republic), while Berlin, with a special status, had become an isolated enclave in the center of East Germany. With the establishment of the Federal Republic free German political and cultural life had shifted back into the West. Former decentralization, (as the French historian Pierre Gaxotte has pointed out, provided secondary political, economic and cultural centers (like Hamburg, Frankfurt, Munich, Cologne, etc.) for Western Germany; thus, the loss of Berlin as a capital proved to be more expendable than would have been the loss of Paris for a truncated France, or that of London for a partitioned Britain.³

The Federal Republic is, under the terms of its own constitution, a provisional state, encompassing a truncated nation. The fact that, mostly, it feels and behaves as an amputated part of a larger entity confers on West Germany a character which clearly differentiates her from any other West European nation-state. Is West Germany a nation-state; are West Germans a nation? Evidently not; they would reply that they are only a part of a nation or nation-state. The French, intent on clear definitions, concluded that West Germany is neither a nation nor a state, "just a unit of economic administration."⁴ In a way, West Germany acts like Hungary after Trianon which lost more than half of her area, or Lithuania which had been deprived of her ancient capital (Vilna); however, beside the Federal Republic, there is "another" Germany. And Hungary was a small, Lithuania an even smaller country; and there had been no "other" Hungary or Lithuania.

Amputation of a nation raises both international and internal problems. The desire to re-unify what used to be united is, in its essence,

7

an international issue; but the people of a truncated nation resent it very much as an internal one. In West Germany, refugees from Eastern Territories and from East Germany significantly contributed to the forming of public opinion and, with their votes, to electoral results. Thus, the question of German unity affected the internal political process, elicited disputes on priorities, determined the scale of political values and positions of political parties. The juridical-political aspects of Germany's status gave rise to doctrinal disputes and influenced political decision-making.

There is consensus among the major political parties of West Germany and mouthpieces of public opinion that national unity or, at least, national self-determination is to be sought; but there is less unanimity, in fact, there is vagueness and ambiguity, as to what unity or self-determination really means. Vagueness has always been a secret tool of mystic nationalism; does the *Wiedervereinigung* (re-unification) end along the Oder-Neisse or should it include the territories beyond? And how far beyond?

Beyond the Oder-Neisse there are hardly any Germans, only territories of the former *Reich*. But East Germany, whether it is or not recognized as a state, includes seventeen million Germans, almost one-third of the population of the Federal Republic. Is the West German policy objective to achieve political unification with East Germany, at all cost, or is the goal to alleviate the fate of separated co-nationals? Here doctrinal questions are also involved: could the D.D.R. be recognized as a state should it receive popular "legitimation," or would all-Germany, considered existing in idea, have to remain indivisible? In other words, would unifying

8

nationalism have priority over humanitarian and tolerant patriotism which would
primarily seek freedom for the "other" Germans. Can East Germany ever develop
a national consciousness of her own that would counterbalance forces of political
unification?

An analysis of these and related questions could possibly shed light
on the problem of Germany as it presents itself in the mid-Twentieth Century.
Answers, if found, to these queries might perhaps provide a key to Germany's
future.

I

Unity and Security

The First Dilemma

The present division of Germany was neither willed nor could have been
prevented by the Germans. They were the result of the Cold War, the global
cleavage between Western Powers and the Soviet Union, and their wrangle over
the inanimate body of Germany. Only when the Western Occupation Powers,
early in 1948, decided to go beyond the establishment of German
administrative agencies and bring about the "maximum possible unification"^5
of the Länder into a federated state were the politically conscious German
elements, political parties, pressure groups and other elites called to
collaborate and express their views on an issue which vitally affected the
future of Germany and the unity of the German nation.

At the time of the negotiations concerning the establishment of the
Federal Republic the German leaders felt serious misgivings whether
the creation of a West German government would not jeopardize chances of

9

re-unification, whether it would not rather strengthen and perpetuate Germany's partition. On the other hand, a compliance with the main items of the London Recommendations, a program offered by the Western Powers for the political integration of West Germany, opened a road to emerge from political lethargy and to make a start for the political and economic reconstruction of Germany, by the Germans themselves and to their own benefit.

The leaders of West Germany, especially the Ministers-President of the Länder, had it within their power to collaborate in the projects worked by the London Conference or not. West German leaders and political parties were no tools in the hand of Western Powers as the SED had been a pliable tool of the Soviets. The Western leaders also acted under certain pressures exerted by their Occupation Powers but these were of a hortatory and not disciplinary character.⁶

The first dilemma or problem of priorities for the West German leaders was: should a government be established over a fragmented portion of Germany, a Germany still under the nominal control of the Allied Control Council set up by the victors; or should the establishment of a German government wait until an all-German solution could be achieved?

The advantages of creating--for the time being, as it was believed-- a German government in the area of the three Western Zones were felt to outweigh the dangers. The relatively few opponents of the plan, found among all parties, relied on their national sentiment which forbade the severance of still existing ties (ties which really existed only in theory) with the Eastern part of Germany. Realistic patriotism, however, militated for the

10

acceptance of the London Recommendations. It was this reasoning that prevailed in the minds of Ministers-President, party leaders, and the majority of West Germans.

Nonetheless, it was considered indispensable that no definitive or permanent form should be given to the political unit to be set up and that its provisional and territorially incomplete status should duly be emphasized. This was the compromise solution which relieved the patriotic conscience of most West German leaders as they weighed the impact of their impending action on Germany's territorial and national unity.

The German leaders objected to naming the assembly, which was to draft the constitution of West Germany, a "Constituent Assembly" and the document to be drawn a "Constitution." Instead, they suggested calling the meeting a "Parliamentary Council" and the constitutional law of the West German state-unit: Grundgesetz (Basic Law). These semantic changes would, in their view, conclusively point out that no Constitution was planned and would underline the temporary nature of the state-organization to be created.

It would be incorrect to interpret this attitude of German leadership as indicating a lack of devotion to the cause of German unity. Some of the political actors may have seriously believed that the success of a German state in the West would attract the East and, in fact, serve unification. A better insight into the conditions prevailing in the Soviet Zone would, however, have convinced them of their error; the people there were miles away from being their own agent and it was more likely that the Soviet authorities

11

would be induced by the Western example to set up a counterpart government
within their area of control.

It appears that the majority of the West German decision-makers were
led by a healthy egoism, a kind of *sauve qui peut* attitude. The East Zone
could not now be helped by them; why should their inability of rescuing
one-third of their co-nationals prevent them from emerging from a state
of political impotency and economic debility into a status of self-government
with good prospects of obtaining complete independence. They undertook to
save for the future that part of the German nation that could be saved.
And they also had hoped that a reconstructed Germany of the West might one
day come to the rescue of the East.

It was also thought that the compromise formula of creating only
a "provisional" state would not foreclose the chances of re-unification.
A comparison with Weimar Germany is not without irony: the Weimar Constitution
of 1919, intended to be a definitive one, was considered by many Germans a
*pis aller*, a temporary substitute. The constitutional document of the
Federal Republic, planned by its authors to be provisional, had outlasted
the lifetime of the Constitution of Weimar. The Basic Law proved to be the
*provisoire qui dure*.

## Basic Law and Basic Consensus

The Basic Law was passed by the overwhelming majority of the
Parliamentary Council and ratified by the parliaments of the Länder. It is
thus reasonable to believe that its principles represent the quasi-unanimous
consensus of the three major political parties and of the West German

12

electorate. By its own terms, the Basic Law wished to serve West Germany for a "transitional period" only; by declaring itself temporary in character it had constitutionally enacted the fundamental goal and raison d'être of the Federal Republic: to preserve the "national and political unity" of the German people. With no negligible political effects on the German mind, the West German state considers itself a truncated unit of the nation but its government the only true representative of the German nation-state, no matter what future name this state will take.

State names can have particular significance. It should be remembered that the West German state does not call itself *German Federal Republic* but rather *Federal Republic of Germany* (the East German state's name is: German Democratic Republic). In German the difference is even more expressive: West Germany is *Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, instead of *Deutsche Bundesrepublik*.<sup>7</sup> The Federal Republic's official name denotes its claim to represent all-Germany.

According to its Preamble, the Basic Law was enacted by the German people in the Länder of the Western Zones and "also . . . on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied." The Preamble also called upon the entire German people "to achieve, by free self-determination, the unity and freedom of Germany." German politicians and publicists, therefore, do not fail to point out that the furtherance of Germany's re-unification is, under the terms of the Basic Law, not only a political objective but also a duty prescribed by the provisions of this Law.

13

The area of application of the Basic Law is not identical with the areas of the Länder which, according to the Premable, participated in its enactment. Article 23 mentions "Greater Berlin" (sic!) as one of the territories where the Law applies. In other parts of Germany, "it shall be put in force on their accession." The Basic Law may thus be extended to those parts of Germany where, because of the existing international situation, it cannot be made applicable, and thus may become the constitution of reunited Germany. But the Basic Law also provided for its own replacement by a permanent Constitution when it pronounced in Article 146 that it shall cease to be in force "on the day on which a Constitution adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into force."

Under the Basic Law there is only one kind of citizenship: German citizenship. There is no special citizenship for the inhabitants of the Federal Republic; they are simply Germans and not "Federal Republicans." "Germany," in the meaning of the Basic Law, is the area which was the German Reich on December 31, 1937, before Hitler embarked on his road of conquest. Citizens of the Reich, as it was at that date, their descendants, and also refugees or expellees of German stock, are "Germans" within the meaning of the Basic Law.

German political and legal scholars have pointed out that the Basic Law as well as the official political philosophy held by the Federal Government rest on three fundamental theses: (1) the continued legal existence of the German nation-state; (2) the territorial integrity of this Germany, as long as a Treaty of Peace, to be concluded with an all-German

14

government, has not changed the territorial status quo; and (3) within the confines of this German state there exists only one legitimate state-structure and government: the Federal Republic and its government.

8

The Federal Republic's basic policy goals are said to be inspired by these theses. There is no reason to believe that there is no general consensus among all major parties and policy decision-makers concerning these principles. These principles have been interpreted and amplified by constitutional-legal theories which, on their part, influence political thinking in West Germany.

Constitutional-legal theories spur the momentum of politics by supporting political expedience with juridical arguments. In a country like Germany, where the majority of the civil service, the staff of their Foreign Office, and a great many politicians and publicists receive legal training, constitutional theories supporting the idea of German unity--even if they are not always understandable to the ordinary layman--are of considerable political and practical importance. Statements made by the Federal Government, diplomatic notes of the German Foreign Office, arguments advanced by German scholars, writers and journalists are today under the influence of the prevailing doctrines relative to Germany's international and constitutional legal status.

The complete surrender of Germany, Allied assumption of integral control and the subsequent revival of a native governmental machinery in the West and East of the country gave rise to various doctrinal interpretations. Outside Germany (but also by a few German scholars) it

15

was held that the German state, as a consequence of unconditional political surrender had ceased to exist (discontinuity doctrine). ⁹ Others, mostly West German scholars, developed the doctrine of German state survival: the German state as a legal entity had never ceased to exist, it had only lost its self-governing capacity to the inter-Allied Government. This view is said to have received confirmation by the wording of the Four Power Declaration of Berlin, June 5, 1945, by the Potsdam Protocol, and by the Basic Law itself (continuity doctrine).¹⁰

Followers of the now prevailing "continuity doctrine" are divided between those who identify the Federal Republic with "Germany" (identity theory), either by explaining its status (a) as a Germany, reduced in size (contraction theory) or (b) as conterminous with the German state of 1937 but _de facto_ prevented from exercising authority beyond its factual border (kernel- or core-state theory). The area of all-Germany beyond the constitutional authority of the Federal Republic is either considered as under foreign occupation or as an international no-man's-land.

Others operate with the so-called "roof" theory by distinguishing between the "dormant" but legally existing pre-1945 German state and the Federal Republic. The latter exercises its authority legitimately while the East German government is simply a protectorate of a foreign power. This appears to be the official view held by the SPD; the CDU-CSU theoreticians seem to lean toward the "core-state" doctrine. ¹¹ But the conclusions drawn from both concepts are similar: non-recognition of the D.D.R., Allied responsibility for Berlin and the unity of Germany, the claim for exclusive representation of the German nation are all practical-political applications

16

and adaptations of one or more of these constitutional-political doctrines.

A political-legal doctrine that purports to explain the inner aspirations of a nation is both a source of strength and weakness. It is a guideline for decision-making, a lodestar for public opinion, a standard by which actions or attitudes can be measured. Doctrines simplify decision-making but they do not solve what perhaps could be solved with greater flexibility. They make policy-shapers prone to inflexibility where suppleness would be expedient. The doctrinaire-deductive approach to the problem of German unity adopted by the leaders of West Germany may occasionally clash sharply with the empirical-pragmatic thinking which prevails in Washington as exemplified by the misapprehensions surrounding Ambassador Grewe's mission in the American capital.

## The Second Dilemma

The relative harmony and agreement which had eventually prevailed over the question whether and how to establish the "provisional" Federal Republic of Germany came to a quick end as soon as the new state-structure began its operations. It was the question of German re-armament and the concomitant participation in a West European integration process which, when opposed to the postulate of re-unification, created a violent dispute between government and opposition, a dispute which divided elite groups from others and amounted almost to an internecine rift within West Germany. The political issue also involved the emancipation of the Federal Republic from the restrictions imposed by the Occupation Statute.

17

Under the terms of West Germany's political existence as defined by the Basic Law, and also by virtue of their own declared policy goals, all the three major parties, the CDU-CSU, the SPD, and the FPD, were committed to promote unification of Germany. The conflict which had arisen in 1950 centered around questions of priority or emphasis in regard to how and when the re-unification issue should be taken up, and whether it should have absolute priority over all other policy goals. The problem which now faced the contending parties and factions was: how would the choice for re-arming West Germany in alliance with the West and her integration into the Western power system affect the chances and prospects of re-unification? Would such a policy, if pursued, hamper the achievement of German unity or even render final the division of Germany? Or would an integration into the alliance system of the West be conducive toward the unification "in peace and freedom" of the severed portions of the German people? The agelong German "East-West dilemma" had again emerged but now in a new form, offering new alternatives though none of them being clear-cut solutions; what both sides could submit in respect to re-unification were just tentative, inchoate policy-lines and mere possibilities. Nonetheless, they demanded a resolute yes or no response.

The most powerful opposition against Germany's re-militarization arose within the SPD, whose leader, Kurt Schumacher, had become the foremost critic of the "Adenauer line." He was not fundamentally opposed to re-militarization and alliance with the West. But he wanted to use the threat of German re-militarization for the promotion of German unity and he believed that by giving top priority to re-unification it would prove

18

feasible to obtain it despite present Soviet opposition.

The Social Democrats of Germany had traditionally suffered in
popularity and prestige because they were considered in the Weimar years,
and earlier, "internationalists," not devoted to German interests and
under the influence of the Socialist International. This time, they wished
to take a different course: partly to refute accusations of
cosmopolitanism, partly to distinguish themselves from the Communists, the
post-1945 SPD leadership tried to please their electorate by championing
the national German cause in a manner which set them apart from the more
moderate and "European" attitude of the Christian Democrats.

Schumacher and his followers never made it clear what price they
would be ready to pay for re-unification; they possibly might have offered
the neutrality of united Germany, had such an opportunity arisen. From this
point of view the SPD view has to be differentiated from that of outright
"neutralists" or pacifists or adherents of the East-oriented *Schaukelpolitik*,
policies advocated with little success by former Chancellors Wirth and
Brüning, former Ambassador Nadolny and the "Nauheim Circle" led by
Professor Noack.

The essential difference between Adenauer's view and that so
tenaciously held by Schumacher was a matter of diplomatic timing: the
Socialists and other nationalist groups wished to give first priority to
the unification question, and reproached Adenauer for sacrificing German
unity to a policy of pleasing the Western Powers. Schumacher went so far
as to pretend with regard to the European Defense Treaty that "whoever
approved this treaty ceases to be a German." His personal animosity against

19

Adenauer carried him away when calling him the "Chancellor of the Allies."
His Party reluctantly followed Schumacher on his violent warpath until his
death in 1952. ¹²

The Free Democratic Party did not follow the SPD in their all-out
battle against Western alignment. They included so many different shades
of opinion that it was impossible for them to find a common platform and
they continued to support the government in which they participated with
several ministers. The so-called Pfleiderer Plan, submitted by an outstanding
FDP deputy, former diplomat Karl-Georg Pfleiderer, wished to make a united
Germany more acceptable to the Soviets by reducing Germany's obligations
to the Western Alliance.

The governmental view, shared by the majority of the CDU/CSU,
militated for securing West Germany economic and military strength, the
protection by the Western Allies and their support for Germany's national
goals. Adenauer refused to side openly on the priority issue; for him
alliance with the West was tantamount to promote re-unification. West
Germany's strength, backed up by the strength of her Allies, would act as
a "magnet" by drawing the Soviet Zone to the Federal Republic. Thus, so
Adenauer promised, German unity would be achieved "automatically," without
political or military risks.

The dilemma which the West German electorate faced at the 1953
general elections was, in a sense, unique: it had to express opinion on
a highly speculative subject. The SPD told them that joining the West
meant "forgetting" the other Germany; the CDU/CSU replied that joining the

20

West would be an important step toward re-unification. In other words: if you go West you really go East. Evidently, the voters, having witnessed Hitlerite adventurism, had no taste for risks, for uncertainties; furthermore, they distrusted Soviet readiness to negotiate, and wished to place their stake on the West. The impact of United States influence on West Germany's politics was also clearly reflected in this vote. German nationalism had turned conservative, defensive and self-centered, instead of being expansive and romantic.

To speculate in retrospect what would have happened if West Germany's inclusion into the Western Alliance had failed appears now just as futile as to consider whether the SPD in power (had Adenauer refrained from voting for himself at the nomination of a Chancellor) would have acted differently than did the Christian Democrats. By 1959, the SPD had arrived at the same conclusion with regard to re-unification as the governmental party. Nevertheless, Social Democrats, even so, continued to maintain that the Chancellor (and under his influence the Western Powers) had "missed opportunities" to come to terms with the Soviet Union. There is a danger that these alleged "missed opportunities" might, one day, develop into a myth like that of the "stab in the back" of post-World War I days.

Whenever the signature or ratification of the treaties concerning the accession of the Federal Republic to the Western Alliance were making progress, a series of notes from the Soviet Union broached the subject of German unity with the design to prevent signature or ratification of the agreements in question. None of these notes had clearly indicated that the unification of Germany would be accomplished by free elections; they

21

all insisted on the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line and on united Germany's neutralization. After the famous Soviet Note of March 10, 1952, Adenauer established four conditions for negotiations with the Soviets: re-unification in freedom, free elections under international supervision, no neutralization, and no outright acceptance of the Oder-Neisse frontier.¹³

The question whether the Soviet Union had, in 1952, and again in 1954, meant business is moot. More moderate critics admit that the Chancellor may have been right in assuming that the Soviets used delaying and obstructing tactics without serious intention to agree on re-unification, but--as it is said--Adenauer has "no alibi" to prove that he was right. For such evidence he should have promoted negotiations.¹⁴ It is also pointed out that in those years (between 1952 and 1955) the international balance of forces was different from what it developed subsequently; although the Soviet Union was far superior to the Western Powers in conventional forces, the nuclear monopoly of the United States was able to keep Soviet aggressiveness at bay. This favorable strategical position--it is said--has not been exploited for achieving an acceptable solution in the German question and, after 1955, the nuclear stalemate excluded the possibility of forcing Moscow's hand.¹⁵

The SPD could not induce Adenauer, neither before or after the 1953 elections, to change his policy of priorities. The dilemma whether the certainty of security and strength was to be put before the uncertainties of a quest for German unity, without Western guarantees, was resolved by the electorate and the German people in favor of the first alternative. The demands and criticism of the opposition proved, however, helpful in Adenauer's bargaining exercises with the Western Powers. Although

22

re-unification failed to come nearer, its auspices having probably been
reduced, Adenauer succeeded in obtaining from the Allies commitments in
favor of the official German thesis on German unity: on the sole right
of the Federal Republic to represent the German people in international
affairs, Allied protection for Berlin, and the determination of the
Oder-Neisse frontier by the peace settlement.

These treaty commitments undertaken by the United States, Britain
and France--often ignored by spokesmen in the West--are highly valued in
West Germany. There it is considered that the Western Powers had endorsed
the German concepts, if not in all their details, nonetheless in their
essence. In return, the Federal Republic undertook "never to have recourse
to force to achieve re-unification of Germany or the modification of the
present boundaries of the Federal Republic, and to resolve by peaceful means
any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other States."

This is an international commitment; the German state-doctrines
on national unity, non-recognition of East Germany and survival of the German
state (which is the theoretical basis for the non-recognition of the
Oder-Neisse frontier) should, however, be interpreted in the light of the
pledge not to use force for the implementation of German national goals.

Governmental Fiasco - Socialist Volte-Face

For years the paramount issue which separated the Federal Government
and its supporters from the SPD opposition was their different approach to
the re-unification question. Although there existed other noteworthy
differences between them, their divergent roads toward the common goal of

23

German unity appeared to be the momentous divisive factor, a unique feature of West German politics.

After Stalin's death, hopes that the Soviet Union would modify its Germany-policy faded away after the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers held in January, 1954. Similar expectations, inspired by the coming into force of the London-Paris Agreements, the Geneva Summit and Foreign Ministers conferences of 1955, and by Adenauer's visit to Moscow, proved to be illusory. Since 1955, Moscow relied stronger than ever before on the "two German states" concept (to be soon supplemented by the "three Germanys" thesis, including the "independent unit" of West Berlin). These theses were thoroughly incompatible with the prevailing dogmatic position of the Federal Republic and the policy-line of the Western Allies.

Large segments of German public opinion had become conditioned to believe that alignment with the West and West German contribution to Western military preparedness would force the hand of the Soviets and bring about the long-expected concessions and, as their result, the unity of Germany. The failure of the policy of strength or of "automatic" re-unification was not, at once realized throughout Germany.

Despite the evident failure of Adenauer's Germany-policy, the general elections of September 15, 1957, even increased CDU/CSU majority in the Bundestag. How far this vote of confidence reflected approval of governmental policy on re-unification, or whether it rather reflected satisfaction with other, more successful, items of the Adenauer-platform, is, with certainty, impossible to ascertain. ¹⁶ Still, the most convincing proof that the majority of the West German electorate continued to support the Chancellor's

24

stand had come from the SPD itself. The sensational reversal of this
Party's *Deutschlandpolitik*, by giving up its almost traditional maximalist
view on the top priority of the unification issue sheds light on the
importance and singularity which this problem purports for the Germans,
a problem unparalleled by any other European country.

In the years immediately following the Geneva conferences of 1955
the SPD never ceased to draw attention to the failures and omissions of
the Adenauer cabinet which, in its view, had prevented a meaningful
exchange of ideas on the re-unification problem. But the position of the
SPD was ambivalent; it was characterized by such contradictory theses as the
dropping of the "one German state" claim but, simultaneously, refusing
recognition to the East German state; that the question of German unity
should be solved through Four-Power negotiations, and not by talks between
"Bonn and Pankow," nevertheless contacts between West and East German
governments were not to be excluded "should they become later indispensable
and if they can be carried out in internationally unobjectionable /?/
forms. "17

Replacing the policy of recrimination (missed opportunities), the
SPD leadership had thought to initiate, with its *Deutschlandplan*, ¹⁸ an
active and constructive policy which could attract a greater number of
voters. It could serve as a basis in the hoped for discussion with
Moscow. But the abortive conversations between the German SPD delegation
in Moscow in March 1959 convinced the Party leaders that there was, at that
time, no price to be offered to the Kremlin which would induce it to abandon
its East German satrapy. ¹⁹ In this they were confirmed by the inconclusive

25

ending of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva during the summer
of 1959.

The SPD master plan, instead of being, as they hoped, a tool of victory,
had become a liability. They were no longer hopeful that the Plan could
ever become operative, because of Soviet opposition. A commitment to this
project would thus expose the Party to well-founded attacks by its
opponents and even by its own membership. Even if victorious at the next
federal elections, the Party would be compelled to fall back on the
unification policy (or lack of such policy) of the Adenauer-line; why then
take the risk to tie themselves to a futile policy instrument? Instead, the
SPD leadership decided to carry out a frontal change, align itself to the
essential governmental policy-line and try it out on the electorate.

The Bad Godesberg Program of November 1959 and the formal revocation
of the *Deutschlandplan* before the *Bundestag* in March 1960 marked the
movements of policy-reversal. The SPD officially endorsed the Federal
Republic's participation in the Western European and North Atlantic
Alliance as a contribution toward the policy of re-unification. The SPD
affirmed the necessities of national defense and refused to favor any
form of disengagement. The demand for self-determination and free elections
in East Germany was to be the basic pillar of their Germany-policy. The
*Deutschlandplan*, they declared, was to be considered "past history."20

The SPD had earlier displayed a somewhat similar attitude of negation
and depreciation toward the Federal Republic as did the conservative
opposition in its denial of the legitimacy and durability of the Weimar
Republic. The Social Democrats, until their conversion, had often expressed

26

doubts about the nature of the Bonn Republic as a sovereign state and were
inclined to regard it as an even more provisional state structure than
warranted under the terms of the Basic Law. They overstressed its
transitional character and its purpose merely to serve as stopgap between
the Occupation Regime and the achievement of full sovereign unity of the
German nation. The West German state was frequently compared with the
Confederation of the Rhine suggesting a similar puppet construction under
the Western Allies as that under the domination of the French Emperor.
By embracing the majority thesis on re-unification, it had implicitly
recognized a more permanent status to the West German political entity,
one that is not destined to be the carrier of a single-line policy
objective.

Henceforth, the SPD thesis on unification and German unity no
longer differed from that professed by the CDU/CSU. Both wished to rely on
the possibilities inherent in the Western Alliance and the diplomatic
support of the West, in particular, that of the United States. The about-face
proved to be no mere tactical move of the Social Democrats, no mere gambit
to attract voters but a policy sincerely believed and abided by.

The SPD not only reversed itself on its attitude toward the ways and
means of re-unification but also suggested active collaboration on this
national issue. It asked to be recognized as an opposition which will
undertake to promote German unity along the lines of a mutually accepted
foreign policy. In their words: "to endure the irreconcilable enmity
of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats is too heavy a burden for a
partitioned Germany." It was an invitation of pursuing, thereafter, a

27

common, bipartisan re-unification policy, based on the mutually recognized principles of German statehood. This bipartisanship might have become the source of a genuine national policy. But new divisions of opinion developed; less along party lines but rather across the major parties producing a bipartisan policy of a strangely multifarious and shifting character.

## Bipartisanship and Factionalism

The political life of the Federal Republic, during the first ten years of its existence, was characterized by the cleavage created by divergent attitudes toward the question of German unity. After 1959, the gap having been bridged by the SPD, the preliminaries for a national policy had been laid down. Bipartisanship in the *Deutschlandpolitik* was not reached by any formal agreement. The endorsement of the basic course followed by the Government and CDU/CSU could never be really complete because the official doctrine and policy on re-unification allowed manifold interpretations and applications. Even while official SPD policy now adjusted itself to governmental views no absolute unanimity existed within the Social Democratic Party on many questions of detail. Differing nuances of opinion which, according to the significance attached to them in a given situation, could occasionally grow into formidable political conflicts which beset the SPD no less than the CDU/CSU.

The eclipse of Adenauer's prestige, the deadlock on Berlin and, generally, the standstill of the re-unification issue, promoted faction-forming within the CDU/CSU. The sudden reversal of fronts carried

28

out by the SPD fostered the rise of independent attitudes: tendencies
favoring neutralism and direct contacts with the East German regime
have survived. The Free Democratic Party has always been a divided
Party, on practically all issues, and also on the issue of
re-unification.

The basic though tacit understanding which now appeared to
develop between the SPD and the Government (the FDP, since its renewed
participation in the cabinet has also become part to such implied
agreement) included the following theses:

(1) The primary task of German politics is the restoration of German unity in "freedom and peace." This policy objective is thus inseparable from another postulate: the preservation of peace (which is also meant to include the security of the Federal Republic).

(2) Any form of the Two German-States Doctrine is to be rejected; the Federal Republic is the only true representative of the German nation.

(3) Re-unification of Germany is to be achieved by peaceful means only; preferably by an application of the right of self-determination (free elections).

(4) The improvement of the fate of Germans in East Germany is, for humanitarian reasons, to be considered an immediate and urgent objective.

(5) The Federal Republic remains committed to the defense and international representation of Berlin (the SPD is more inclined to stress the view according to which Berlin is part of the Federal Republic).

29

(6) According to international law, the boundaries of Germany are those of December 31, 1937; the Oder-Neisse line can, therefore, not be recognized as a frontier until the border question has been settled by a Peace Treaty with united Germany.

(7) The bipartisan policy also relies on Four-Power responsibility for the restoration of German unity and on Three-Power responsibility for the maintenance of the Berlin-status quo; it is also in agreement with the view that the solution of the German question be sought in association with the question of European security. A secession of united Germany from the Western Alliance is, however, not foreseen by the adherents of bipartisanship.²¹

It is interesting to note that the SPD conversion had caused the Government, especially since Erhard succeeded Adenauer, to approach the original Socialist thesis by recognizing first priority to the "great national task: freedom for the Germans in the Soviet Zone and unity for our nation." European unification has thus been relegated to the role of "the second, international task facing us."²²

The informal bipartisan handling of problems arising from Germany's partition, including the Berlin question, has undergone serious trials during the last years. But the difficulties which arose in the wake of the Berlin crisis and the attempts by the D.D.R. to improve its international status were, mostly, not inter-Party disputes but rather divergences within the CDU/CSU and, to a lesser degree, within the SPD. It occurred that factional views within one party were in harmony with views held by groups within the other party. This is the manner in which bipartisanship

30

prevailed; for divergent opinions, too, acquired a bipartisan character when they were shared by members of both participating parties. It is to be remembered, for instance, that Foreign Minister Schröder, in the pursuance of his policy of "movement" received stronger backing from the ranks of the SPD than from groups within his own party.

The division within the CDU/CSU along such unofficial factions as the "hard" and "flexible" ones, the "Gaullists" and "Atlanticists," the "patient" and "impatient" ones was never watertight but kaleidoscopic and shifting according to the exigencies of the situation. These trends and their representative groups intersected one another resulting in an even greater variety of views whenever concrete problems emerged or a decision had to be made. The problem of Germany's partition is the main issue which contributed to a disintegration of party-unity. Most prominent but not exclusive in its views was the Bavarian faction, opposing Erhard's and Schröder's pragmatism which, in their opinion, was likely to erode the basic concepts of the correct German state doctrine. The "hard-line" view supported by a group surrounding former Chancellor Adenauer was another persistent factor on decision-making.

Within the SPD the most important divergencies arose between the Berlin party organization and the national center of Bonn. Prior to, and immediately after, the erection of the Berlin Wall, the Berlin SPD advocated a more intransigent policy against the East German regime than the central party executive. Subsequently, however, the policy of cautious rapprochement, to alleviate the hardships caused by the Wall and, generally, a more "realistic" approach to the question of re-unification

31

was adopted by the Berlin Senate and SPD group than was found acceptable by
the Party leadership in Bonn.

The results of the 1961 federal elections are little enlightening
on what the electorate really thought on the problem of German unity. The
polls were held shortly after the disaster of the Berlin Wall divided
East and West Berlin and closed the Berlin door to the stream of
refugees. Most likely, the frustrating effect of this event had turned
part of the voters against Adenauer; it is also possible that some of the
voters had just become frustrated of the old Chancellor and were seeking a
change. On the other hand, the security-first attitude may still have
persuaded many voters not to relinquish the safe road and they might
have been grateful to Adenauer for having used his restraining influence
against more bellicose members of his Party and the SPD of Berlin.
Nevertheless, the CDU/CSU's absolute majority in the Bundestag came to
and end.

The analysis of the impact of the re-unification issue on these
polls cannot be entirely conclusive. The SPD did not suffer because of
its about-face; it may even have gained votes on this basis. The FDP
certainly did increase the number of its voters on account of its strong
condemnation of governmental policies with regard to the Wall and Berlin.
But the CDU/CSU was not the only loser; the Gesamtsdeutsche Partei
(All-German Party), representative of refugee voters, failed to receive the
statutory 5% of votes whereas in 1957 it still obtained 17. The inference
cannot be discarded that the question of German unity had, despite or
because of the Wall, played only a secondary role in these elections. The

32

electorate might have felt that it was not then called to vote on this
issue. Had re-unification been a practical question, as it was at the
Saarland elections of 1956, it is unlikely that voters should have shown
indifference toward it.

The CDU/CSU was now compelled to look out for coalition partners.
A participation of the SPD in the government, due to the practical
bipartisanship on the essential *Deutschlandpolitik*, had become within the
reach of possible. Nevertheless, Adenauer preferred the partnership of the
FDP. Among the conditions which the FDP stipulated as a price for its
collaboration, were: a more active re-unification policy, eventually even
direct talks with Moscow.

The question of German unity continued and is likely to continue
to be the *primum mobile* not only of West German foreign but also domestic
politics. This problem harbors unforeseeable potentialities with regard
to the formation of public opinion, the collaboration or opposition of
parliamentary groups, and even with regard to the internal cohesion of
any or all political parties in the Federal Republic. It is a typically
German issue, without parallel in contemporary West European countries.
Although the national aspirations behind the policy of re-unification and
German unity are rooted in the not exclusively German desire for the
creation of a nation-state, the experience is new for the Germans. The
German problem of the Twentieth Century is, in many respects, dissimilar
to the German problem of earlier centuries although its theme is, again,
national unity.

33

German unity in the past meant the political merger of German states. East Germany is, neither a state maintained or run by a German dynasty nor supported by a German **Stamm**, like Prussia, Bavaria and the others were, but a political unit, run by leaders committed to an international movement or to Soviet interests, using in a way the German **Volk** element as the experimental material for their socio-economic experiments and as a military outpost of foreign interests.

The other **terra irredenta** of the Germans, the territories East of the Oder-Neisse line, are territories which used to be but are no longer inhabited by Germans. In the past, Pangermanism, wished to unite branches of the German Volk in East-European countries; now the post-World War situation created a situation where territories without German inhabitants are demanded, again a new experience and a different problem. It raises the question of the **limits** of the policy for German unity.

## II

### Ethnic or Territorial Unity

#### The Oder-Neisse Line and Re-Unification

The interrelation between the re-unification issue and the international problem of the Oder-Neisse border can only be properly assessed in the light of over-all Polish-German relations. The antagonism of the Poles at the root of this relationship, is more than political; it is motivated both by history and by personal experiences. In the German psyche, a guilt-complex intermingled with recrimination, and led many intellectuals

34

to desire an end of Polish-German conflicts, once for all, similarly to
the ending of Franco-German territorial disputes.

As a result of World War II, Poland lost 46 percent of her prewar
area to the Soviet Union; her remaining territory was increased by the
annexation of East German territories, including the area of the Free
City of Danzig, which under the Potsdam Protocol were placed under "the
administration of the Polish State."

Poland had been the most victimized country of the last war; 22 percent of her population had been killed and an even larger percentage of her intellectuals. Although Russians were also to share in the guilt of Poland's crucifixion, German savagery is ingrained deeper in the mind of Poles: the Soviets had wished to liquidate what they considered the Polish ruling class, but the Nazis had wished to exterminate the Polish nation. In return, about seven-and-one-half million Germans were expelled from the areas taken over by the Poles and about one-and-one half million perished during or as a consequence of expulsion. Only an insignificant number of ethnic Germans had remained East of the Oder-Neisse Line. 23

The acquisition of German Eastern Territories is officially considered as "recovery" of former Polish lands. The threadbare historic argument (Churchill had remarked in Yalta that Britain would have a better claim for the recovery of the United States) being hardly convincing, more sophisticated Poles prefer to indicate German aggression and German brutalities as the reasons why Germany had forfeited possession of these territories.

The formal legal basis of Polish acquisition of title is said to be the Potsdam Protocol, which, however, only conferred "administration" of

35

these areas to Poland. Poles and Russians, nevertheless, maintain that the
intention of the Three Big Powers in Potsdam was to give these territories
in all finality to Poland and only the final "delimitation" (demarcation on
the spot) of Poland's western frontiers was to await the conclusion of the
Peace Treaty with Germany.

As the historic argument so the Polish legal argument is weak. There
was no intention to cede all the area to Poland but the settlement of
this question was to be reserved to the Peace Conference. On the other
hand, the wording of Potsdam Protocol did not encourage the Germans to
believe that they would be given back part or all of the territories east
of the line of demarcation.

The strongest Polish argument is the possession of and exercise of
authority over these territories during the last twenty years. The debility
of Poland's legal title, however, explains that country's interest and
insistence for obtaining recognition of her sovereignty over the "recovered
Western Territories" by the Western Powers and the Federal Republic of
Germany. The East German Government, almost as soon as it was formed,
hurried to recognize the "inviolable frontier of peace and friendship" on
June 6, 1950. A month later a formal agreement was concluded between the
German Democratic Republic and Poland recognizing, once again, the "existing
frontier" between Germany and Poland. 24

Poles do not like East Germans better than West Germans.
Friendship with East Germany is just a <u>marriage de convenance</u>. Germany's
partition secures stability to the Communist regime in Poland and, under
certain conditions, security to Poland's national existence. As Gomulka

36

expressed it:

> The security of the Polish border along the Oder and the Neisse rests today on the security of the frontier along the Elbe which divides the two German states.²⁵

The Western Territories of Poland include one-third of the present Polish national area; they had been, after the expulsion of the Germans, settled by Poles, and now one-third of the population of Poland lives there. The area is superior in industrial production over other parts of Poland; since 1945 the Poles have made enormous efforts, spending much money and energy in developing these former German lands. It is certainly correct to say that the possession of these territories is vitally essential for Poland; without them Poland would be reduced to the approximate area of the Napoleonic Grand Duchy of Warsaw, would become an unviable rump-state, an état tampon between Germany and Russia.

For Poland, therefore, her "recovered Western Territories" are simply non-negotiable. Poles cling to these areas with the desperation and determination of a man clinging to his life. And they do so irrespective of their political views or affiliations. If there ever was a national issue, this is certainly one. From the point of view of the territorial question, anti-Communists are collaborators of the regime, and Communists fervent nationalists. The determination to hold on, at any price, to these territories is strongly shared by the Catholic Church of Poland.

The territorial question makes Poland, at present, dependent on Soviet support--even in the view of Polish nationalists. The Soviet Union

37

is the only European big power which had formally recognized the Oder-Neisse frontier and did, up to now, stand up for its defense vis-à-vis the Western Powers and Federal Germany. The compelling national dependence on Poland's Number Two antagonist, Russia, is the prime stabilizing factor which maintains the Polish Communist regime. Greater independence of Poland within or without the Communist camp appears to many Poles undesirable because it would impinge on Soviet support and guarantee, and only strengthen the danger of German *irredenta*. 26

Although the German Democratic Republic is the "German state" which borders Poland, the Warsaw Government, ever since the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany, endeavored to obtain a recognition of the Polish Western frontier from Bonn. The commitment made by West Germany not to resort to force for the purpose of re-uniting Germany is far from setting Warsaw at ease. For the Poles, even a formal renunciation by West Germany of the territories east of the Oder-Neisse would not be considered a perfect expedient; extreme distrust toward Germany and the Germans rules supreme in the Polish capital.

The continued existence of the German Democratic Republic and thus Germany's division serve Polish national interest, at least as long as no recognition of their Western borders is forthcoming from West Germany. As long as the Federal Republic--the *real* Germany in Polish eyes--refuses to accept the present border, the existence of an East German Communist state appears indispensable to Poland's safety. Under the present conditions, all Poles, whether Communist or non-Communist, identify their own security with the preservation of the D.D.R., and would be ready, if

38

called to do so, to protect it, although Gomulka-admirers detest the Stalinist methods employed by Ulbricht, and nationalist Poles detest the regime for being Communist and for separating Poland from the Western world to which they yearn to belong. This is the present nexus between the problem of re-unification and the question of the Oder-Neisse line, from the Polish point of view.

The German position on the Oder-Neisse border question is embedded in the doctrinal views on Germany, as a whole, and on the East German regime, in particular. Because of the conceptual-legal character of this view West German foreign policy finds little room for action and accommodation as may be needed by the requirements of a flexible policy. The German position and argumentation, as officially held in Bonn and supported by the three major parties, may thus be summarized:

(1) The East German Territories had not been legally acquired by Poland; the Potsdam Protocol only conferred administration of these territories to Warsaw, pending the final decision of a peace settlement with Germany.²⁷ Legally, the German state is still co-extensive with the area it held in 1937.

(2) Only a government of a united Germany would have legitimacy to negotiate freely and agree to a final settlement of her border with Poland. The recognition given by the East German regime, both because the latter is not a "state" and because it does not represent the German nation, is legally and politically meaningless.

(3) According to the German official view, it would even be an "absurdity" for the Federal Republic to grant recognition of the Oder-Neisse

39

frontier because West Germany has no common border with Poland, and certainly not according to the standpoint of the Polish Government. The frontier question would become negotiable only when re-unification with East Germany could be achieved.²⁸

The German official view, as described above, is, by and large, approved and supported by the majority of West Germans. Very few, if any, politically conscious West Germans entertain genuine hopes, however, that the Eastern Territories or most of them could be recovered. No official government spokesman had gone as far as to claim the return of all these territories. Political leaders and the German Foreign Office foresee, however, that when the time comes for meaningful talks, the Oder-Neisse Line, instead of being simply approved, would become the object of bargaining and modifications in Germany's favor. The non-recognition of the Polish western border is held as a kind of "nuisance value" by official West Germany.

There are, nevertheless, differences between the officially pronounced views and pronouncements made by leaders of expellee organizations and their resolutions. Sometimes even Federal Ministers addressing a rally of Landsmannschaften, by a slip of the tongue or intentionally, express opinions which go beyond the well-known governmental positions. Such pronouncements often emphasize the Heimatsrecht, which could be interpreted either as the individual's right to return to his or her native homeland, or the claim for the return of the Eastern Territories to German rule. The Potsdam Agreement holds no promise for a return of these areas to Germany; it only reserved the final decision to

40

the peace settlement. The Federal Government, accordingly, never claimed an unqualified retrocession of the territories of the "German East" but steadfastly refused to accept the present territorial status quo as final. The lack of clear distinction between the merger of the two Germanys (where the claim is territorially unequivocal) and the expected return of the now Polish "administered" areas (where the claim is territorially vague) adds to the ambivalence of the situation and increases Polish susceptibilities and anxieties.

In Poland, and also in West Germany, the question of the Oder-Neisse frontier is both an external and internal political issue: in Poland, the Communist government is able to strengthen its position by constantly invoking the German danger and Poland's dependence on Soviet support; in the Federal Republic, the government and the political parties cannot ignore the personal interest of millions of voters toward the lost territories of the German East, their former homeland.

The refusal of the Federal Republic of committing itself before re-unification is achieved and an All-German Government is formed suggests to the Poles that Germany is planning an insidious *pas de deux*: as a first step, to achieve unification with the "Soviet Zone" and, as a second step, to explode the Oder-Neisse issue. The German reluctance to discuss the Polish frontier question rests, however, rather on the doctrinal concepts of German unity than on any preconceived scheme of deception. For West Germany, the chronological priority reserved for the re-unification question to precede a decision on the Oder-Neisse problem, is the nexus which logically connects the two issues. The Polish order of priorities is the

41

reverse: Poland could not tolerate a united Germany without the prior recognition of her western frontier. Thus, one *non-possumus* appears to oppose the other.

## German-Polish Relations and Re-Unification

The mutual lack of confidence and the deep-seated distrust of Poles toward Germans, was greatly enhanced by the absence of official contacts between West German and Polish governments and by a lack of communications between the elites of both countries.

Attempts to "normalize" relations were hampered by blocks erected on both ends of the road: by the application of the Hallstein Doctrine on the one hand, and by the demand for a recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier on the other. In 1955, Warsaw was ready to take up diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic (following the similar Soviet move) without insisting on acceptance of her western frontiers. By 1957, after West Germany's severance of diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia, it became, however, evident that two German ambassadors would not be posted in Warsaw.

When Khrushchev launched his Berlin campaign in 1958, the Polish Government, setting its stake on a Russian breakthrough in the affairs of Germany, was no longer willing to enter into even limited contacts (e.g., consular relations) with Bonn without a "clarification" of the frontier issue. The Warsaw regime was deeply offended because of what it considered an offhand rejection of the Rapacki Plan by West Germany; it now believed that all initiatives should be abandoned and hoped for a solution of the German problem under the Soviet terms as propounded by Khrushchev. Only after the fizzling out of Soviet attempts to force upon the West their Berlin project or to pressure the West into recognizing East Germany, the

42

Government of Poland again changed its attitude and was ready, for the time being at least, to accept the exchange of permanent trade missions, as a substitute for normal diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic, with no preliminary conditions attached. In Bonn, as presumably in Warsaw, it was expected that these permanent missions would facilitate discussions also on questions other than economic.

For the first time since the end of World War II, an independent German Government had thus established permanent state-to-state contacts with Poland. What operational advantages could emerge from such a relationship for the furtherance of primary foreign policy objectives of the two countries in view of the vicious circle in which they have fallen? The prime attention and vital interest of West Germany is directed toward the emancipation of the Germans in the D.D.R., one-third of the population of the Federal Republic. The primary and vital Polish national interest strives to obtain the optimum of security and guarantee for their Western border which enshrines one-third of Poland and of the population of Poland. The policy of the Federal Republic toward Poland is governed by that principal concern: how could this relationship be utilized for the promotion of a settlement of the East German problem? Poland's primary preoccupation in her rapport with West Germany is governed by the thought: will it lead to a recognition by Germany of the Oder-Neisse boundary and a genuine renunciation of the territories east of that line?

The concept of German national unity (union between the two Germanys) is so strongly ingrained in the political and constitutional build-up of West Germany that no Federal Government could consider itself

43

authorized to negotiate, no Federal Parliament would be prepared to
ratify any final agreement concerning Germany's eastern border. Any final
commitment with regard to the frontier issue will have to await the
solution of the German problem, whether it will take the form of political
re-unification or some acceptance of an East German state by Bonn.
On the other hand, there appears to be no controlling reason against a
simultaneous agreement on both the all-German issue and the Oder-Neisse
question.

The argument against recognition of the Polish western border,
relying on the fact that the Federal Republic is not contiguous to the
Oder-Neisse line, appears to be less convincing than the argument based on
German internal constitutional-national points. Non-contiguous borders
can be, and have been in the past, recognized and guaranteed by third
states. The Federal Republic, according to its own doctrine, is either
identical with the former all-German state or the successor-state; its
(the Federal Republic's) consent to a frontier-line resulting from an
alteration of the original border of the Reich, may be given even if this
border is separated from it by another political entity.

National-sentimental reasons militate, no less than doctrinal ones,
against recognition of the Polish border, a renunciation of ancestral
territories. Even if these territories had been depopulated of Germans
and lost since twenty years, their renunciation would still be regarded by
most Germans as an act of self-immolation; it seems practically impossible
that such a consent can be given without some tangible counter-performance
in return. From the German point of view, recognition of the new border

44

would be no mere verbal acknowledgment of existing facts; it would be an
extremely painful sacrifice. Furthermore, it is known to the Germans how
valuable such a recognition would be for the Poles even if the latter may
not always place all their confidence in such a recognition and would
prefer to have more tangible guarantees, such as neutralization,
demilitarization or continued partition of Germany.

Despite all these tremendous nationalist-political, sentimental-personal
and constitutional-doctrinal obstacles and inhibitions it is being argued by
some Germans that recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier should be granted--
and granted without an immediate *quid pro quo*--because such diplomatic move
is likely to promote re-unification of the two parts of Germany. It is also
stated that in some respects national foreign policy objectives of Poland
and Germany are now much more in harmony than ever before in history; both
share the interest of opposing the predominant position of the Soviet Union
in Central Europe. The advance position held by Russia in East Germany is
both an obstacle of German national unification and of genuine Polish
independence, provided, of course, that the frontier issue is settled.
In discussing the reciprocal interests and policy goals of these two
countries, it is believed that one must differentiate between the national
Polish view and the Moscow-oriented Communist viewpoint. The latter would
hardly ever admit that a weakening of Soviet influence would be in the
interest of Poland.

The stationing of Soviet armed forces in East Germany constitutes,
strategically and politically, an encirclement of Poland. Poland is thus
separated from the West not only by the belt of Communist East Germany but

45

also the presence there of 20-22 Soviet divisions, a circumstance which weighs heavily on the freedom of Polish decision-making, as demonstrated by the events of October 1956. Because Soviet lines of communication run across Poland, the presence of, at least, some Soviet armed personnel on Polish territory seems inevitable. This presence is also a means to impress and influence Poland, making any move for getting rid of Soviet tutelage so difficult.

Another argument concerns the nature of the East German regime. This regime, as it is well realized in Poland, is only maintained by the presence of Soviet Army and by an unmitigated terror, reminiscent to Stalinist times, a mode of government detested even by most convinced Polish Communists. The subservience of East Germany, and her dependence on the Soviet Union, exercises a retrograding influence on the whole Soviet bloc; it is an impediment to complete de-Stalinization, decompression or liberalization. Advocates of recognition--having re-unification in mind--point out that recognition of the Oder-Neisse border would strengthen "polycentrism," that is, it would promote the emancipation and independence of East European countries, primarily Poland. In the proportion Poland may reduce her fears from German "revanchism" or "revisionism" the more independent she could become from Russia. Disintegration and centrifugal tendencies of members of the Soviet bloc would, according to this view, significantly weaken the Soviet position in East Germany and, eventually, pave the way for re-unification. Such a policy would also bring into line with the policy of Western Powers the Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic which, in this respect, is said to be out of tune with the diplomacy of the

46

Allies. 29

It is no doubt correct to assume that Poland's present still subordinate status is, partly at least, due to her--not unreasonable--alarm over German claims against what she considers her national territory. The sudden uprise of West German wealth and power, including rearmament, rekindled Polish fears and added to their sense of inferiority if left alone against Teutonic might. The present situation allows for Poland--whether Communist or not--only one answer to her security-dilemma, namely, alignment to Russia. The road to another of the two possible combinations, an alignment to the West (as it existed in the interwar period but, as events have shown, provided no security for this country) is excluded because of the geographical position of Poland. 30

As stated earlier, Gomulka's regime is based on the support inspired by the fear of Germany and the consequent necessity of Soviet alignment. One would wonder whether it would be profitable for Gomulka and the Polish Communist rule to discard this fear by any kind of rapprochement toward non-Communist Germany. At present, nationalist and Catholic Poles are conditioned to believe that his (Gomulka's) is the best-possible regime they can have. Would they still continue to cherish such a belief when their awe before Germany would dissipate? It seems rather likely that Gomulka's regime or any other Polish Communist regime would try to belittle significance of a German renunciation, should it really take place, by exploiting distrust in German promises. Warsaw and Moscow could in case of an unconditional German recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier simply announce that the Germans had at last recognized already existing

47

facts and their declaration has no value whatsoever. The Germans would then realize that they had given "something" for "nothing," an apprehension by no means unfounded. No West German Government would lightly engage in such a risky operation involving one-fourth of the 1937 **Reich** territory, even if this territory had been **de facto** lost and earlier evacuated by Germans; such an operation would especially be discredited by a lack of progress toward re-unification.

Since re-unification is foremost in the mind of the Germans, and since recognition of the Oder-Neisse border in that of the Poles, evidently the most plausible solution would be, as had been suggested, a combined and simultaneous settlement of both issues.³¹ This was the solution originally envisaged by the Western signatories of the Potsdam Agreement when they wished to reserve the final territorial arrangement for the Peace Conference on Germany. But as long as Moscow is unwilling to modify its stand on "two Germanys" which should discuss their problems between themselves, and as long as Poland is unwilling "to negotiate" the Oder-Neisse issue (it would immediately be accused of being ready to consent to a "fourth partition" of Poland), the idea of a radical solution of the German problem seems unrealizable.

Only a continuous and consistent diplomatic contact, necessarily a long-drawn out operation, between the Federal Republic and Poland could establish that minimum of understanding which could lead to a meaningful exchange of ideas on both the re-unification and the recognition of the border issues. A permanent representative of the Federal Republic in Warsaw could possibly convey views of his government concerning the eventual recognition of the Oder-Neisse border, and suggest methods

48

whereby the Polish Government, if willing, could be helpful in promoting German unity. No precise formula could reasonably be suggested; proposals, such as a declaration by the Federal Government announcing its intention to respect vital interests" of Poland (as substitute for a formal recognition),³² are just as unfeasible now as to expect the present Polish Government to make a declaration favoring re-unification.

The greatest danger to Poland is not just German unity; it is a united Germany, emerging along the Oder-Neisse without having renounced the formerly German inhabited areas west of the rivers. Such a contingency appears now to be remote. But it may happen, when Russia might feel obliged to abandon her East German forward position because of international or internal pressures or--and that would be the greatest danger of all to Poland--under an agreement with Germany directed, once again, against Poland. It is in Poland's elementary national interest to forestall such a possibility by securing German recognition, if not before, at least simultaneously with the solution of the re-unification problem.

Diplomatic support by Poland in favor of a small-German unity is no high price paid for a formal abandonment by Germany of her maximalist claims to a Great-German unity. Poland could even be helpful to promote a German solution which would not necessarily be the political union between West and East Germany, but an intermediary solution. If the Germans once agree to limit their concepts of German unity by the line of the Oder-Neisse, that is, to the area still inhabited by Germans, it might be easier for them to define their ideas of re-unification. As the concept of "unity of Germany" urgently needs clarification, so the political goal of re-unification.

49

III

# The Meaning of Re-Unification

## Political Unity or Restitution of Freedom

Before the establishment of the Federal Republic, German politicians, including the later Chancellor Adenauer, expressed hopes for a restoration of the "unity of the Reich." After the formation of the West German state and of the political entity in the Soviet Zone, re-unification signified the political merger of these two units. In the constitutional-political frame, as envisioned in Bonn, the Federal Republic, and only the Federal Republic, represented the continuity of the German state and was legitimized to act on behalf of the German nation. Accordingly, re-unification was envisaged as an **Anschluss** of East to West Germany. The Basic Law, dedicated to "preserve the national and political unity" of the German people foresaw an extension of its application to "other parts of Germany" . . . "on their accession" (Art. 23).

The intra-German and international developments of the last fifteen years greatly reduced if not ended prospects of an "accession" of any of the Länder of the Soviet Zone (in the meantime, even these Länder had disappeared in giving way to a centralized regime in the D.D.R.). The maximalist demand for re-unification is, therefore, no longer upheld by all segments of West German leadership. Although negotiations between the "two German states" for the purpose of creating a "confederation" on a parity basis are, under the present circumstances, still unacceptable, and self-determination for the East Germans in the form of "free elections" are advocated, the

50

possibility of other solutions is no longer excluded. Did not Konrad Adenauer himself admit that the German problem "is in the last analysis a human one." And he added:

> This is why a starting point for a solution could be found in that sphere. If our countrymen in the Soviet-occupied zone are granted decent living conditions and at least a certain amount of freedom and self-determination, we shall be open to discussion on a good many points.33

It appears that the postulate demanding "freedom" for the East Germans had obtained priority, in the minds of many influential West German leaders, over the demand for political integration of East Germany with the West. Restitution of democratic freedom might be a substitute for restoration of political unity. But such a humanitarian approach is strongly opposed by followers of the "hard" line policy; the violent polemics in the summer of 1963 between Willy Brandt and his Press Chief, Egon Bahr, on the one hand, and the Chairman of the Berlin CDU organization, Franz Amrehn centered around this issue.

The question is one of both doctrine and practical politics. It turns around the essence of the objection which may be raised against an independent statehood of East Germany. Is the refusal to recognize the *soi-disant* East German state based on the facts of Soviet-foreign domination which operates under the guise of a one-party dictatorship; or is independent statehood to be *per se* denied to the East Germans? Is the direct or indirect foreign domination opposed, or the secession of another

[Lc]

51

group of Germans from the main body of German ethnicum to be precluded?

The doctrinal argument against the recognition of the East German state rests on the "lack of legitimation." The East German regime is said to be German only in form and not in substance; its source of power fails to be autochthonous. It derives its ability to exist and govern from an alien Power. It is really the Soviet Union which exercises control over the East German people and territory through an army of occupation and through "agents and their aids" (the Communist Party), and no power emanates from popular will and consensus.

It is reasonable to ask whether the East German state could ever purge itself from its lack of legitimation by a reduction or elimination of foreign control and influence (a trend perceptible in the entire East-Central European "satellite" area) and obtain popular approval from its own people in the form of "free elections" or otherwise. Or would the objection against the independent political existence of an East German state be upheld even in such a case and political re-unification demanded *à tout prix*, even against the will of the international community or perhaps the people of East Germany? In other words: could the solution of the German problem be conceived by political union only or also by the democratization of the East German state?

A few German scholars had expressed dissident opinions against the official thesis of political re-unification. Their opposition has attracted much interest though few converts, and provoked violent criticism. The time was neither ripe nor opportune for the propagation of such ideas though the persons involved were of highest renown in their field of

52

scholarship. Also their views were rather theoretical than practical;
nevertheless, these views helped to shape West German public opinion.

Ludwig Dehio, a patriarch of German historians, opposed in 1953
the demand for re-unification on the grounds that such a demand, if
endorsed by Western Powers, would "weaken rather than strengthen the unity
of the West," and would in any case be considered as stemming from
"egocentric nationalism." In the eyes of Dehio, "liberty of the individual,
not of the state" must now be the most precious aim. "... unity must
be subordinated to the superior and wider aim of freedom, for today a
demand for unity surely has an anachronistic flavor about it."³⁴

Dehio appears to consider that the freedom of Western Europe,
including that of the Federal Republic, would be endangered if Germany,
supported by the Western Powers, should eventually achieve unification. It
is not easy to follow an argument which predicated that a united Germany
must become disloyal to her association with the West. The priority
accorded to the principle of freedom, as against that of unity, does not
secure freedom for the inhabitants of East Germany and it appears that this
lack of freedom has largely created the demand for unification.

The existentialist German philosopher, Karl Jaspers came to express
his views on the German re-unification question in 1960 and expressed a
conviction that "the demand for re-unification is not only unrealistic
but also politically and philosophically unreal when examining our own
conscience" ("in der Selbstbesinnung"). He refused to accept the
Bismarckian state "as a measure" for the restoration of German unity. The
claim for re-unification is "not wanting to recognize something that has

53

happened." The Bismarckian state has become a matter of the past--due to
German guilt. 35

In Jaspers' view, Germany had forfeited her right to national
unity because of Hitler. What she retained was a right to freedom only,
as well as the right of demanding freedom for the population of East
Germany. He recognized that the German people of the East must be freed
"from slavery" but expressed doubt that the demand for re-unification
would not render liberation more difficult.

Jaspers seems to have believed that an open renunciation of the
demand for re-unification would persuade the Russians to allow East Germany
a status somewhat similar to that of Austria. His ideas were followed by
a similar thesis of Alexander Rüstow, a sociologist and political
scientist. The key idea of Rüstow was that "the primary requirement is
no Germany's re-unification but the liberation of the population of the
Soviet Zone from totalitarian Bolshevik dictatorship." "... Austria
received her freedom while she gave up re-unification with Germany." The
demand for freedom for East Germany corresponds with the universal idea of
freedom in the West, while the demand for political re-unification is only
a "special and specific German affair," and should therefore be abandoned. 36

Jaspers' abandonment thesis was a consequence of his theological-
moralistic conception of German guilt, liability and responsibility. The
"metaphysical" guilt of all Germans as well as their liability, which
Jaspers differentiated from individual guilt (he does not recognize
collective guilt, only collective liability--a very subtle distinction),
have, according to this view, led the Germans to forfeit their unity.
Whether such an abstract philosophical-moralistic principle has validity in

54

the process of international politics is highly questionable. Defeated
nations have been compelled to pay a price for their defeat whether they were
guilty of aggression or not. Whether Nazi Germany's aggression and
unquestionable misdeeds, rightly condemned from the moral and legal point
of view, could permanently justify partition is no longer a question of
morality or right but of political facts of life.

Jaspers' thesis had earlier been suggested, but in a language devoid
of philosophical-moralistic phraseology, by no less a person than Khrushchev
when confronted with the arguments of Carlo Schmid and Fritz Erler at their
meeting in Moscow. The Soviet leader told the Germans that they had to
accept partition as an inevitable consequence of a lost war.

As to the historical argument concerning the discontinuance of
the Bismarckian German state because of Germany's collapse and prostration
at the end of World War II, it does not conclusively prove the end of a
united Germany. There are many historic precedents which demonstrate that
defeated, subjugated or divided nations strove successfully to
re-establish their former territorial identity. Poland did so after more
than 120 years of complete suppression. It is true that Bismarckian Germany
had only existed for 75 years; but it was the smaller Reich in contrast
to a former larger Reich which had existed through 900 years.

It is certainly correct to say that territorial claims based
exclusively on history may be considered unjustified. This may apply to
German claims to the Eastern Territories (as it had applied to Poland
before she had taken over and settled these areas). But it should be
remembered that the demand for re-unification is not only and not primarily
territorial; it is a demand for a union with German co-nationals and,

55

simultaneously, for their liberation from a foreign-dominated regime. In this light, the Austrian analogy--as applied by Jaspers and Rüstow--is hardly convincing. Austria was never part of Bismarckian Germany and her will to be an independent state is nowadays hardly questionable. Austria has not lost her "freedom" in the sense East Germany had; the Russian-controlled Zone was only a fraction of Austria and it was not the Soviet Union, by withdrawing its forces, that allowed Austria to live in freedom. The deal suggested (freedom for East Germany against prohibition of union with West Germany) would, no doubt, be acceptable to many Germans and probably to the Federal Government. But it is highly unlikely that it would be acceptable to the Soviet Union, at least not under now prevailing circumstances. To abandon the claim to political re-unification when there is, at present, no chance for persuading the Soviets to agree to any such transaction, would not be considered in Bonn or in Washington a realistic diplomatic move.

The thesis placing emphasis on libertarian and humanitarian aspects of re-unification as opposed to political unification had certainly influenced West German statesmen and even the public during the last few years. The opposition of freedom against the demand for re-unification had led different people to diametrically opposing conclusions, as we have seen earlier. For some, security within an integrated Western Alliance system was to precede even the demand for German unity. The German policy-makers might one day be faced by another set of priorities when they have to decide whether freedom for East Germany was to be placed above political unification of Germany as a whole.

56

## East Germany - The National Issue

The analogy of Austria appears to be pertinent but in a form different from that invoked by Jaspers and Rüstow. While in the post-World War I years Austria, truncated by the disintegration of the Hapsburg Empire into a small German-speaking country, sought voluntary **Anschluss** to the **Reich** but had been prevented from such step by the prohibitory provisions of the Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain. Subsequently, even an Austro-German customs union plan (1931) was thwarted by France, Britain and Italy, suspected to be the forerunner of political union. After the enforced **Anschluss** by Hitler, the tragic experiences of Nazi-German rule, the war and defeat, Austrians appear to have genuinely lost all appetite for a union with Germany (besides being again forbidden by the State Treaty).

Pre-World War I Austria was held together by a dynasty-oriented patriotism; amputated interwar Austria sought return to the main body of German ethnicum; post-World War II Austria had apparently gained the attributes of a nation-state. There is now an Austrian nation.

The question which Jaspers and others, who envision the existence in freedom of an independent East Germany, should consider is whether the people of the D.D.R. has or is likely to form in the future a national consciousness of its own which would secure its independence much stronger than any treaty prohibitions which are generally effective in a certain balance of power situation only. A division of a nation, to have permanency, must rely on some significant cause; otherwise the principle of "identity of indiscernibles" will prevail: two units cannot exist together

57

as separate entities unless they have different attributes. A desire for independent statehood and some distinguishing characteristic of that part of a nation which wishes to establish itself as an independent political unit seem indispensable. In the past, historical developments, not linguistic differences, had determined the separation of the German-Swiss and the Austrians from the originally common German body politic. In other words, is it possible or likely that, in the course of time, political separation would evolve a separate East German nation, similarly to other fragmentations of ethnic Germanism.

National consciousness of secessionist peoples had generally developed: as a consequence of their struggle against an arch-enemy (often the state from which they had seceded); due to their allegiance to an outstanding leader or dynasty; or as a result of religious (ideological) or linguistic differences. All these factors, and perhaps others, have contributed in many instances to separatism, secession and new nation-building.

The East German regime, in order to strengthen its own internal status and prestige, endeavored to develop the political and ideological identity of the people under its control; in this endeavor it has, however, found itself confronted with almost insurmountable difficulties. Until about 1952 the main emphasis for the strengthening of loyalty and cohesion rested on Marxist-Leninist indoctrination of the elite. The ideological Weltanschauung, together with the "socio-economic achievements" of the Soviet Zone, were believed to be the appropriate basis of differentiation from Western Germany. With the Federal Republic's

58

phenomenal economic and political uprise. East Germany's development was soon out-of-step. The attraction which the West exercised had to be matched with some additional incentive; Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism was no longer sufficient spiritual fodder to explain and underpin the German Democratic Republic's individuality before its citizens. Cultural, linguistic ethnic affinity, and blood-relationship of millions could not be satisfactorily opposed by an involved ideology refuted daily by economic and political realities. The regime, of course, continued to pay lip-service to German unity; but a mere ritualistic exercise of this formula was also inappropriate for the boosting of individual and social morale.

The innate national sentiment was in East Germany, as in other Soviet dominated countries, primarily directed against the oppressor. But other satellite nations had not been partitioned as a result of their conversion to Communism. In Poland and Czechoslovakia anti-Soviet sentiment was to a considerable extent counterbalanced by the animosity in East Germany, in conformity with the political aims of the regime, into another direction, was no small feat of propaganda acrobatics by the leaders of the D.D.R. While the wellspring of Marxism-Leninism had to remain the fundament on which to build, this ideology was to be supplemented by stimuli of a nationalistic character, drawn from the German past and adroitly manipulated for the purposes of the cause:

(1) East German history teaching has drawn from the tradition of Prussianism, both in its military and disciplinarian aspects. Prussian traditions are most conveniently invoked because they are supported by the

59

genius loci and by precedents of past Russo-Prussian military cooperation, especially during the Napoleonic wars. Freiherr von Stein (who had formed an anti-French German Committee in St. Petersburg in 1812), the Prussian generals who had fought side-by-side with Tsarist armies (Blücher, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst), the "day of Tauroggen," and even Bismarck ("who did not believe any controversies between Russia and Germany would be possible") are presented as national heroes or national events to the adults and youth of East Germany. 37

(2) In addition to the emphasis placed on Prussian and pro-Russian traditions anti-Western precedents of German history are stressed. Such precedents range from the *Varusschlacht* (the battle fought in 9 A.D. when the lengendary Germanic leader Arminius or Hermann defeated the Roman General Publius Quintilius Varus) to Luther, who had fought Rome, and to the German statesmen who, in defiance to the West, signed the Treaty of Rapallo.

(3) While Prussia is praised as the state which had achieved German unity, "popular forces" and their leaders, who are told to have striven for German unity, are also glorified. The Anabaptist peasant-leader, Thomas Münzer, the peasant revolts of the 16th century, anti-French revolutionaries of the Napoleonic era and extremists of the 1848-49 epoch are presented as forerunners of the people and leaders of the German Democratic Republic in its struggle for the liberation of the German nation and of German soil.

Thus, East German *Agitprop*, historiography and schoolbooks try to bring into harmony Teutonic, anti-Christian and anti-Western undercurrents

60

of German nationalism with anti-capitalistic trends of proletarian internationalism and Soviet-Russian messianism. The strongly-felt need of building some modicum of spiritual-social cohesion, to create a state concept (Staatsgedanke) for the citizenry of the East German state has led its leaders to instill these, mostly, artificial and self-contradictory theses in the mind of Party members, officials, the military and youth. It is suggested that the imprint of crude, nationalistic traditions may, possibly, have a boomerang effect by turning the recipients of these teachings even more vehemently against the natural target of animosity: Soviet-Communism.

The differences of exposure to which the East and West Germans are regularly subjected cannot, however, fail from introducing some different traits into their character, even to the extent of alienating one from the other. East German refugees often reprove their fellow-countrymen in the Federal Republic of being indifferent, complacent, hedonistic and cosmopolitan. It has also been remarked that linguistic differences have appeared in their respective ways of expression though not to the extent of endangering the basic unity of the German tongue. 38

The question which demands answer is whether, despite the contradictions inherent in the East German regime, the people of the D.D.R. is likely to develop into a separate nation-conscious branch of German ethnicum as did earlier the Swiss and later the Austrians. At the time of this writing, the answer must remain hypothetical. If East Germany would now be allowed an expression of self-determination she would,

61

in all likelihood, side for re-unification. Proof for this was the East
Germans' "voting with their feet." The exodus of millions before
the erection of the Wall, the necessity of setting up that Wall for
preventing the escape of most valuable elements of the population seem
to have been irrefutable evidence that the overwhelming majority of
the people was discontent with the regime. History has produced
precedents when emigrant elements of a population (like the Boers
in South Africa) had created new political entities; but an area where
large masses of the population are eager to escape is unlikely to have
the prerequisites of forming a new nation-state.

Jaspers may insofar be right when assuming that an East Germany,
under a free government but internationally barred from joining West
Germany, may, in the long run, develop a national consciousness of her
own. But, at this time, East Germany has neither a free government
nor does an international consensus exist which would guarantee the
independent existence of such a state.

Popular Will and Re-Unification

Expression of popular will generally influences foreign policy
decisions only in an indirect manner. The electorate can only be called
to decide when there is a clear positive or negative position to take.
Usually, however, the process of foreign policy, depending on a great
many things lying outside the power and competence of the national
society and government, is too involved to admit "yes" or "no"
responses in elections and referendums. Timing is essence of the
diplomatic process, and it can only be directed in a very general

62

manner by the popular will.

The question of re-unification has never been directly put before the West German electorate. This was, rightly, taken for granted--just as the questions of public education and the public use of the German language are not elections issues, re-unification was a value which every reasonable person was assumed to accept. The issues which in the past years have come up in connection with re-unification were: whether the adherence to the alliances of the West and rearmament were or were not conducive to re-unification; whether the security, freedom and welfare of West Germany would eventually promote German unity; and which question was to be given over-all priority.

When the majority of the voters, at several federal elections, pronounced itself in favor of security, freedom and welfare for West Germany, either in the belief of promoting thereby re-unification or that *Wiedervereinigung* was, at the time of voting, unrealizable, one should not conclude from these attitudes that "the Germans do not want re-unification." The gratuitousness of such a conclusion is evident since no unqualified answer could be made to this question. What a German could say was that he wanted re-unification at a certain price, at a certain risk, in a certain manner or that he did not want it under same conditions. It is doubtful that he would want it "at any price."

The importance of timely response had clearly been shown in the Saar referendum. The Saarlanders had also proved that, when national integration was really at stake, the electorate would respond in a different manner than in elections on marginal changes.

63

At the height of Franco-German tension over the Saar question before the November 30, 1952 elections, the CDU, the SPD and the FDP enjoined the Saarlanders to vote blank or refrain from voting in protest. The response was meagre, indicating indifference.³⁹ On October 23, 1955, the population of the Saar was called to approve by referendum the Statute providing for a "European status" of the Saar which would have indefinitely barred it from uniting with Germany. Adenauer, personally, and his Government, bound by the Paris treaty of October 23, 1954, felt strongly obliged to recommend an affirmative vote. But, unexpectedly, the people of the Saar, by 67.2 percent of the votes, refused to endorse European status and clearly expressed its will to rejoin Germany.⁴⁰ Once again, as in 1935, the national issue was at stake and the majority of the Saarlanders voted according to their deepest convictions when it appeared indispensable to do so. In 1935, they had voted overwhelmingly for re-unification with the then Nazi Germany although the majority of the voters consisted of Catholics and Social Democrats for whom Nazism must have been detestable. But they voted on a "national" issue and had no opportunity to choose for a "certain type" of Germany.

The conclusions drawn from the Saar polls might have validity for West Germans and East Germans alike. Up to the present, West German voters were called to vote not on the re-unification issue itself but on questions indirectly related. In such case they might have felt that the re-unification issue is not, as yet, realistic or would in no way depend on their ballot. The East Germans had been given no opportunity to express a free opinion, either directly or indirectly, on the question of their union with West Germany. Should the question of Wiedervereinigung

64

come up as a clear, concrete and realistic issue, it can be expected
that both the people of West and East Germany would overwhelmingly answer
it in the affirmative.

Some ideas about West German sentiment on re-unification may be
gained by studying the results of public opinion polls. The analyst
must, however, admit certain reservations with regard to these polls
taken at various times and shifting according to circumstances. It
should, furthermore, not be forgotten that the impact of popular opinion
on foreign policy, especially in case of knotty international problems
like that of Germany, is bound to be limited and exceptional.

The poll results seem to indicate that, after the improvement
of the West German economy from its postwar low, the re-unification
issue had by 1955 emerged as the most important goal of German politics,
a priority maintained ever since (34% in 1955, 46% in 1960 but only 30%
in 1962). The Berlin Wall is probably the cause for the 1962 decrease.
Hopes for the achievement of German unity and the sense of urgency
attached to it are reflected in the oscillating percentage figures. It
is characteristic that in early 1964, 43 percent of respondents believed
that the SPD was more likely to solve the re-unification problem than
any other Party, while an equal number believed that the CDU/CSU was
more reliable from this point of view. 41

Even after the catastrophic post-bellum years the painful
experience of national division was kept alive by the influx of refugees
from East Germany ranging from ten to fifty thousand per month on the
average. About 3.5 million arrived between 1950 and August 13, 1961,

65

when the erection of the Berlin Wall drastically reduced the exodus. These refugees are, naturally, more intensively prone to grant first priority to re-unification than the average inhabitants of the Federal Republic. Their presence and the memories which they are eager to share with any and all stimulate the demand for re-unification even among those who might otherwise be indifferent.

The determination to achieve re-unification is also constantly fomented by the ties of kinship and friendship between residents of both parts of Germany. These ties were kept alive by reciprocal visits until the Iron Curtain finally closed down; thereafter, the impossibility of seeing relatives and friends made re-unification seem more imperative. It has been stated that in the Federal Republic 16 million persons over the age of 16 (40 percent of all adults) have relatives or friends in East Germany, and that one-third of the inhabitants of West Germany regularly exchange personal correspondence with residents of the German Democratic Republic.⁴²

The attitude of the younger generation of Germans toward the problem of re-unification is of considerable importance for the future fate of German unity. Popular polls have shown a comparative indifference of young people on this question. In August 1963, for instance, various age groups gave the following affirmative views on the question whether Germany's present division is "unbearable" or whether it would be possible to get accustomed to it:

66

<table><thead><tr><th>Age groups</th><th>Unbearable</th><th>Possible to accustom</th><th>Undecided</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>16-29</td><td>44%</td><td>40%</td><td>16%</td></tr><tr><td>30-44</td><td>52"</td><td>34"</td><td>14"</td></tr><tr><td>45-59</td><td>56"</td><td>28"</td><td>16"</td></tr><tr><td>60 and above</td><td>66"</td><td>22"</td><td>12"</td></tr></tbody></table>

It has been observed, however, at least in the case of university students, that in recent years their interest for German unity has constantly increased, in striking contrast to earlier apathy. 43

The issue of re-unification is significantly promoted by unofficial organizations which rally refugees from the East and serve as pressure groups to influence branches of the government. While expellee federations (Landsmannschaften) are interested in areas behind the Oder-Neisse line (and therefore only indirectly serve the purpose of re-unification), the Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland (Committee Indivisible Germany) is the most important nation-wide organization for the promotion of re-unification.

Economic and demographic arguments for re-unification are, on the whole, secondary to emotional and psychological factors. While the popularity of European integration among intellectuals occasionally seems to overbalance pressures for German unity, public opinion polls clearly suggest that the overwhelming majority of average West Germans do not share this sense of priorities.

After the economic recovery of West Germany had been achieved, the popular concern with restoration of national unity constantly

67

increased. The rising popular trend was not to be deterred by the weakening chances that practical politics could bring about the desired result. 44 However, the negative energy directed toward the defense of West Berlin superseded the positive clamor for re-unification. The government's passive acceptance of the Berlin Wall was only partly met by popular furor. But Soviet failure to achieve control over West Berlin, together with the dismal ending of Khrushchev's Cuban adventure, again raised popular interest in the re-unification issue.

In all likelihood public interest in German unity will fluctuate according to international and internal developments. Its importance, as mentioned earlier, should not be overestimated: the solution of the German problem of the mid-Twentieth century depends considerably less on the ups and downs of popular interest than on the will and skill of governmental leadership, not to mention international developments, especially the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The people and government of the Federal Republic are closely following trends in the Soviet Union, searching for favorable signs that might herald a start on the road to re-unification.

Dismemberment had been a historic condition of the Germanys until Bismarck's work of unification. The unexpected economic and political success of German integration had conditioned Germans to think of themselves in terms of a nation-state. It appears unlikely that such a national philosophy could revert within one or two generations to the concept of two or three Germanys. As long as East Germany is governed by authoritarian methods and a regime which

68

ultimately depends on a foreign power for its survival, the desire for
German unity is bound to remain alive. It is a problem which in its
international ramifications and in view of the relative importance and
magnitude of the nation concerned is unique. The division of the German
nation will inevitably impinge on the future developments of German
internal and external politics, on the entire political, economic and
social ethos of the Germans. The "split personality" of Germany
distinguishes her from other European nations none of them faced with
a problem as monumental, intricate and insoluble as the quest for
German unity.

69

NOTES

1. K. D. Bracher, "The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany," in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.), *Foreign Policies of a World of Change* (New York, 1963), p. 116.

2. Helmuth Plessner, *Die verspätete Nation* (Stuttgart, 1959), *passim*.

3. Pierre Gaxotte, *Histoire de l'Allemagne*, Vol. II (Paris, 1963), p. 535.

4. Flora Lewis, "Six Big 'If's' in Germany's Future, *New York Times Magazine*, November 18, 1962.

5. From the Stuttgart Address by Secretary of State Byrnes, September 6, 1946; Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1961* (Washington, D.C., 1961), p. 58.

6. Peter H. Merkl, *The Origin of the West German Republic* (New York, 1963), pp. 50-54.

7. The commentator is reminded of the objections which were raised by the German princes in January 1871 against King William of Prussia assuming the title of: Emperor of Germany (which appeared to them inconsistent with their "sovereign" rights). King William, on the other hand, refused to be called: "Emperor of the Germans" which smacked of democracy. His title, eventually, was to be "German

70

Emperor" with more of a connotation of national appurtenance and less of territorial authority.

8. Wilhelm G. Grewe, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit* (Stuttgart, 1960), p. 95; Rudolf Schuster, *Deutschlands staatliche Existenz im Widerstreit politischer und rechtlicher Gesichtspunkte, 1945-1963* (Munich, 1963), pp. 261-262.

9. Hans Kelsen, "The Legal Status of Germany According to the Declaration of Berlin," *American Journal of International Law*, 1945, p. 519; Kelsen, *Principles of International Law* (New York, 1952), p. 263; Michel Virally, *Die internationale Verwaltung Deutschlands*, (Baden-Baden, 1948), p. 29.

10. Erich Kaufmann, *Deutschlands Rechtslage unter der Besatzung* (Stuttgart, 1948), *passim*; Alfred Verdross, "Die völkerrechtliche Stellung Deutschlands von 1945 bis zur Bildung der westdeutschen Regierung," *Archiv des Völkerrechts*, 1951/1952, p. 129; Theodor Eschenburg, *Die deutsche Frage - Verfassungs-probleme der Wiedervereinigung* (Munich, 1959), pp. 25-26.

11. For a systematic presentation of these doctrines see Klaus Vocke, "Politische Gefahren der Theorien über Deutschlands Rechtslage," *Europa-Archiv*, 1957, pp. 10199-10215; Rudolf Schuster, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

12. Richard Hiscocks, *Democracy in Western Germany* (London, 1957), pp. 81-86; Hubertus Prinz zu Lowenstein and Volkmar von Zuhlsdorff, *Deutschlands Schicksal* (Bonn, 1957), pp. 221-224.

71

13. *Documents on International Affairs, 1952* (London, 1955), p. 94.

14. Claus Jacobi, "German Paradoxes," *Foreign Affairs* (April, 1957), p. 437; Rudolf Augstein, "Konrad Adenauer und seine Epoche," *Der Spiegel*, No. 41 (1963), pp. 75-110.

15. Fritz Erler, *Ein Volk sucht seine Sicherheit* (Frankfurt/M., 1961), pp. 31-32.

16. See Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers: A Study of Mass Opinion, Interest Groups and Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy* (Stanford, California, 1959), p. 178.

17. Party Chairman Erich Ollenhauer's Report addressed to the SPD Congress at Munich, July 10-14, 1956; published by the SPD Secretariat (*An der Wende der deutschen Politik*), pp. 9-12.

18. The *Deutschlandplan* was published by the SPD in April 1959 in Bonn.

19. For the Moscow talks of the SPD delegation see *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 19, 1959; *Frankfurter Rundschau*, March 21, 1959; *Düsseldorfer Zeitung*, March 21-22, 1959; Radio Broadcast by Fritz Erler over the South-West-German Station on March 21, 1959.

20. See Herbert Wehner's declaration in the *Bundestag*, March 18, 1961; H. Siegler (ed.), *Wiedervereinigung und Sicherheit Deutschlands* (Bonn, 1960), pp. 180-183.

72

21. See the *Political Program of the SPD* as adopted at the Party Congress at Bonn, April 28, 1961 (Willy Brandt, *Das Regierungsprogramm der SPD* [Bonn, 1961], p. 8); Resolutions of the SPD Party Congress at Cologne, May 26-30, 1962.

22. Foreign Minister Schröder's address to the *Evangelischer Arbeitskreis* of the CDU/CSU on April 3, 1964.

23. Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Germany's Eastern Neighbours* (London, 1956), pp. 120-122; G. C. Paikert, *The German Exodus* (The Hague, 1962), pp. 1-4; Georg Bluhm, *Die Oder-Neisse Linie in der deutschen Aussenpolitik* (Freiburg/Br., 1963), pp. 19-21.

24. Beate Ruhm von Oppen (ed.), *Documents on Germany under the Occupation, 1945-1954* (London, 1955), pp. 497-500.

25. See Gomulka's speech of December 4, 1958, as quoted by Hansjakob Stehle, *Nachbar Polen* (Frankfurt/M., 1963), p. 348.

26. Adam Bromke, "Nationalism and Communism in Poland," *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1962), pp. 635-643.

27. The German view is, *inter alia*, presented by Zoltan M. Szaz, *Germany's Eastern Frontiers* (Chicago, 1960), *passim*; Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Otto Stenzl (ed.), *Deutschland und die Welt* (Munich, 1964), pp. 333-337.

28. See Helmut Allardt, "Deutschland und Polen," *Aussenpolitik*, No. 5 (May, 1963), pp. 295-300. Ambassador Allardt's views are of particular interest; he headed the West German delegation which

73

negotiated the trade agreement with Poland of March 7, 1963.

29. See Bluhm, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-144; see also Klaus-Peter Schulz, "Eine Chance zur Verständigung," in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Otto Stenzl (ed.), *Deutschland und die Welt* (Munich, 1964), pp. 366-368.

30. Adam Bromke, "Political Realism in Poland," *Survey* (April, 1964), pp. 111-117.

31. Grewe, *op. cit.*, pp. 420-421.

32. Bluhm, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-153.

33. Konrad Adenauer, "The German Problem - A World Problem," *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1962), pp. 63-64.

34. Ludwig Dehio, *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1960), pp. 136-138. The original article which is included in this volume was published in *Aussenpolitik*, June, 1953.

35. Karl Jaspers, *Freiheit und Wiedervereinigung* (Munich, 1960), pp. 110-111.

36. Alexander Rüstow's views were published in *Die Velt*, April 14, and May 6, 1961.

37. See Hans Kohn (ed.), *German History - Some New German Views* (Boston, 1954), p. 25; Fritz Kopp, *Die Wendung zur "nationalen" Geschichtsbetrachtung in der Sowjetzone* (Munich, 1962), *passim*; the Bismarck quotation is taken from a speech by Johannes Dieckmann,

74

President of the Volkskammer, May 7, 1962.

38. Hugo Moser, *Sprachliche Folgen der politischen Teilung Deutschlands* (Düsseldorf, 1962); O. B. Roegele, "Spaltung der Sprache - Das kommunistische Deutsch als Führungsmittel," *Die politische Meinung*, May, 1959.

39. See Robert H. Schmidt, *Saarpolitik*, 1945-1957, Vol. II (Berlin, 1960), pp. 461-480.

40. Op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 164-371.

41. See Erich Peter Neumann, "Wiedervereinigung in der offentlichen Meinung," *Die politische Meinung*, January, 1964.

42. According to a report by the Institute of Applied Social Sciences; *Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 20, 1964.

43. See the volume *Die Jugend und die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands* (Frankfurt/M., 1962). This publication has been made available by the *Stiftung die Welt* and contains contributions by university graduates endeavoring to refute contentions that youth is disinterested in the cause of re-unification. See also Walter Jaide, "Not Interested in Politics?" in Walter Stahl, *The Politics of Postwar Germany* (New York, 1963), pp. 361-376.

44. Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., pp. 177-178.