Many outstanding authorities on China are here tonight. Perhaps I can sum up my central theme in terms that you may find appropriate. According to Chinese tradition, the model Confucian gentleman was taught that, whenever involved in a dispute, he should first examine his own behavior, ask himself whether he bears some responsibility for the dispute, and take the initiative to try to arrive at a harmonious settlement.

It may prove futile for us to follow this advice when dealing with Chinese who claim to reject many of China's great traditions. But we will never know unless we try. If nothing changes, we Americans will have to live with the consequences of arms and fear and war. We owe ourselves, we owe the future, a heavy obligation to try.

-30-

Official

(Date of request)

8/23/71

(Date received)

DCM

(By)

Name:

Sen. Ted Kennedy

Request:

Wants to see HAK privately to talk about trips. TK would not tell anyone about it. Drain understands that not back until after Labor Day.

Richard Drain x/45-43

DRY's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: Yes - 8/25

Date and Time:

Party Contacted: 8/26 - Contacted

Additional Information: Drain indicated Kennedy had wanted to see HAK prior to 8/25 (and his speech before the National Press Club). He saw Secy. Rogers and had hoped to see HAK -- had come down from Boston especially. When checking with Muriel, who took the call, Muriel indicated that nothing was said about a speech or Secy. Rogers, that she made it clear that HAK would not be back until after Labor Day -- which Drain said would be okay -- and offered to have the Senator speak with a staff man present in Washington. Drain would have none of that and did not indicate that the Senator was coming back especially to see HAK and Rogers. When I apologized to Drain -- saying apparently the message hadn't been clear in D. C. -- he said that he had made it quite clear. I asked there was no way I could rectify the situation at that point but would call him back next week for an appointment. Drain indicated the Senator would be out of town part of that week but perhaps something could be arranged. DCM

Done 9/8

HAK-Personal

Kennedy

(Last name and pending date)

D

[Y]

To:

From:

KISSINGER, HENRY A. /K#

8/25 CST spots with Drain present. Drain indicates when Kennedy will be in town. He will check and touch if meeting is called.

RECEIVED
SEP 1 0 1971

CENTRAL FILS

FORTUNE

Time & Life Building, Rockefeller Center, New York, N.Y. 10020

February 26, 1969

Miss Sally Dahler
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Miss Dahler:

Knowing how busy your staff is these days, I am trying several approaches in an effort to set up a date between Mr. Kissinger and Max Ways, with whom I am working on an article on foreign policy. The article will deal with the U.S. role in world affairs and the need for improvement in such increasingly inadequate definitions of the U.S. goal as "containing" Communism and protecting the "national interest."

On February 20th I wrote a note addressed to Mr. Kissinger, and while I am certainly not surprised by the lack of an answer, it occurs to me that in view of the trip and your own absence from the office, my letter might have been shuffled into the mill of press requests without coming under your eyes. Nancy Maginnes suggested at lunch yesterday that I write to you.

My present chief concern is to be sure Mr. Kissinger knows that Mr. Ways would very much like to talk to him.

In addition, we would like to have background interviews with several members of Mr. Kissinger's staff. The ones whose names occur to us are Mr. Halperin, Colonel Haig, Mr. Vaki and Mr. Saunders, but Mr. Kissinger's guidance in this matter would be very much appreciated.

We could come to Washington for interviews any time between March 12th and March 20th. We will be in Europe all of next week, but I will call on Monday, March 10th, to see what can be arranged. We will be grateful for anything you can do to facilitate matters.

Judson 6-1212

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 28, 1972

Mr. Kissinger:

Do you want to reply to this letter?

Yes ____ No, file ____

If yes:

just acknowledge saying sorry can't help ✓ ____

make suggestions: ____

jlp

310 EAST 75TH STREET, APT. 5F. NEW YORK 10021 YU 8.8944

March 16, 1972

Mr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

I have been following the development of foreign policy
with great interest and am filled with admiration and
delight.

I am between jobs at the moment, having left Fortune for
a public relations job that of course wasn't right for me.
I am eager to find a suitable position this time and would
like it to be in an area that could serve the public interest.
I believe you know my work well enough to have some
feeling for where that might be.

Several people have suggested the foundations (Mellon,
Rockefeller, Carnegie, etc.) but my contacts there are
limited. If you have any suggestions, I would very much
appreciate hearing from you.

310 EAST 75TH STREET, APT. 5F, NEW YORK 10021 YU 8.8944

KISSINGER, HENRY

A.

May 31, 1972

Mr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry,

Congratulations on still another stunning success,
and maybe two. It is a joy to see the world being
reshaped according to your own prophetic vision.

The job is turning out well. I think of myself
as an anthropologist among a strange but surprising-
ly likable species known as capitalists. Still and
yet, I do not believe my journey to Wall Street
will last very long.

I will be in Washington for a family reunion
Saturday and Sunday, June 17th and 18th, and would
like very much to see you if you are there and by
any chance free. I'll call Friday evening or
Saturday morning.

JUN 1 5 1972

CENTRAL FILES

212/444-1212

EXT. 2662

GENERAL

FEB 11/7 KISSINGER, HENRY A.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

November 13, 1972

Dear Henry:

I was sorry to miss seeing you on my last trip to Washington. Your extraordinary successes since that time merely confirm the faith in you held by your old friends.

I am writing now in a professional capacity on behalf of the Saturday Review. I would like to do an article on you for the "Up Front" section of the magazine. I think it should deal mainly with 1) the effect you think peace may have on the mood of the country, and 2) the events of the last four years in relation to your overall career. Topics to be discussed might include journalistic references to the correlation between contemporary foreign affairs and your historical viewpoint as well as lighter subjects such as what you have enjoyed most -- and least -- about the last four years and what affect you think these years will have on your future academic career. The questions could, if necessary, be agreed upon in advance to avoid any embarrassment to you.

Ronald Kriss, the executive editor, is an old friend of mine who was formerly World News Editor of *Time*. He asked me to say in connection with this request that he is concerned about the anti-administration tilt the magazine has been developing and that he would like to begin to right it by publishing this article. He pointed out that it would reach a wide audience, consisting mostly of young people and intellectuals. And he agreed that, *if you wish*, it could provide the opportunity for you to elaborate on the difficulties inherent in the relationship between the government and the press in a modern democratic society.

The time and place for the interview would of course be worked out to suit your convenience. (I am still at Merrill Lynch, but I don't anticipate that this would create any difficulties).

I would like very much to do the article, and I do hope you will agree to the interview. I look forward to hearing from you.

Warm regards,

310 East 75th Street
New York, New York 10021

January 4, 1972

Dear Henry:

In light of all that has happened since, an explanation concerning my
request for an interview for the *Saturday Review* may seem trivial.
However, I do want you to know that I was appalled by the article by
Barnard Collier, and I hope you will accept my deepest apologies for
even having tendered the request.

I have no way of knowing, of course, if your refusal was directed at
the *Saturday Review*, or was due to the timing and nature of the ques-
tions, or to the fact that you may have had enough of lady journalists
(or journalists in general). But I do wish to disassociate myself
from the present editorial policies of the *Saturday Review*.

For the record, I had been given the very clear impression that the
editorial policy of the *Saturday Review* would be changing. I suggested
the interview with the understanding that the article would be sub-
mitted to you for approval prior to publication. And I proposed
questions (subject to your approval) that I thought would serve the
purpose of 1) capturing the interest of the readership, and 2) afford-
ing the opportunity to explore some ideas after the conclusion of the
peace negotiations that are of interest to you and that I thought would
help the public better understand some of the administration's present
policies. I had no idea, of course, of the events that would ensue.

I hope, after all of that, that we are still friends. I will be in
Washington more often this spring and will call after things have
settled down again for you. Meanwhile, my very best wishes to you
for the successful conclusion of the peace negotiations and a happy
and prosperous new year.

Home address after January 15th:

170 East 78th Street, Apt. 5A
New York, New York 10021

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 19, 1973

Dear Henry:

Thank you very much for the beautiful silver bowl commemorating the efforts to bring peace to Southeast Asia. Each of us who was associated with you in that effort in even the smallest way was gratified and honored at the opportunity to participate.

As you again meet with the North Vietnamese, I know that the hopes of all of your friends and colleagues, and indeed of all Americans, are with you in your continued search for that lasting peace which has been the goal.

Your thoughtfulness is deeply appreciated.

With warmest personal regards,

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

RECEIVED
JAN 21 1974

CENTRAL FILES

RECEIVED
KISSINGER'S OFFICE

1973 JAN 25 AM 8 37

The White House
Washington

1973 JAN 24 PM 7 21

ITT-21VIA ITT WORLD COMM INC JAN 24 1973

LONDONDLB TF 33/31 24 1834

LT

KISSINGER WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON DC UNITED STATES

HALLELUJAH STOP MINE YOU STICK AROUND FOR MBFR/CSCE

STOP THE LACKET AS ALWAYS IS YOURS IF YOU WANT A HOLIDAY

WAYLAND LIZ LOUISE AND ALL YOUNGS

FORM 0805 PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U. S. A.

100405

WAYLAND LIZ LOUISE AND ALL YOUNG
STOP THE LACKET AS ALWAYS 12 YOURS IF YOU WANT A HOLIDAY
HALLELUIAN STOP MINE YOU STICK AROUND FOR MARRYAGE

WASHINGTON LONDONUNITED STATES
KISSINGER WHITE HOUSE

LT

LONDONTB IF 33\31 84 1934

ITT-SVIA III WORLDCOMM INC JAN 24 1933

With Mrs. Young's compliments.

JAN 6 1969

## ARMS CONTROL FOR THE LATE SIXTIES

EDITED BY JAMES E. DOUGHERTY AND J. F. LEHMAN, JR. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967. Pp. 265. $8.50.

Reviewed by
ELIZABETH YOUNG

The late sixties are moving on apace, and it is interesting now—two years after the symposium whose papers this volume consists of—to see how events are dealing with the views then expressed. The topics chosen by the organizers (and editors) as “likely to remain crucial throughout the remainder of this decade” were: “strengthening peacekeeping institutions or finding other ways to control conflict; the Sino-Soviet split and changes within the Soviet system; the problem of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation or of adjustment to its consequences; the impact of East-West negotiations on Nato; and the question of whether or not to deploy ballistic missile defense.” The symposium itself was sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania, St. Joseph’s College, and the Bendix Corporation; a decent proportion of the official and unofficial elite of the American arms control community participated; and a handful from foreign parts.

In one of the introductory papers J. F. Lehman approvingly describes a “metastable strategy,” consisting of a “clear set of goals that statesmen can realistically try to attain.” These are more or less encompassed by the topics “likely to remain crucial” listed above, are implicitly grouped round “the central bipolar balance,” and are specifically contrasted to the “millenarian visions of the horribles simplificateurs.” Mr. Lehman also refers to the argument advanced elsewhere by one of the contributors, Hedley Bull, to the effect that “the real choice with which governments are confronted is not between opting for the present structure of the world or for some other structure, but between attempting to maintain a balance of power and failing to do so.” (Control of the Arms Race, London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1961.) In these words, the dilemma is patently absurd: no govern-

ment ever set out positively to fail to maintain a balance of power: “maintaining a balance of power” would be the only policy open to governments.

But putting together two other sentences of Mr. Bull's, a more respectable argument can be formulated: “The chief objective of arms control is international security” and “security rests on a balance of power among sovereign states.” It is then easy to decide that the meat lies in some such phrase as “the chief objective of arms control is the maintenance of the balance of power” (it is necessary to substitute “the” for “a”—only that which already exists can be “maintained”) and then to identify this with the “central bipolar balance.” This hypothesis has been absorbed as a valid assumption into the philosophy of many of the more official practitioners and commentators, and because of this the implications and effects of the assumption are worth looking at. Indeed if this assumption is left undisturbed, and were to prevail, we might well find ourselves overtaken by the momentum we are currently allowing it to develop. In this review I will mainly be discussing this assumption.

In the first place, of course, the suggested non-alternatives are not such: it may only be by opting for a more appropriate structure that a balance of power can actually be maintained at all. There are grounds—financial, economic, political, and other—for thinking this to be the case now.

Another, also to be rejected, implication is that an existing balance of power, regardless of what it is that is in balance, or how, or with what eventual prospects, is in itself valuable: Mr. Lehman refers specifically, and approvingly, to the “relative stability” of the last twenty years. In retrospect the great technological arms race (of the existence of which one contributor enragingly claims to have seen no evidence) shows some sort of “balance of power” to have more or less effectively obtained. But the motive force of this arms race has been the differing opinions held by the two parties about what an acceptable balance might be. A crisis occured in October 1962, for instance, because the Soviet Union, to rectify what it discerned as an excessively dangerous imbalance, took steps that the United States, in its

turn, judged to be intolerably destabilizing. The relative “stability,” has been maintained by the fortuitous skill of the operators, rather than by anything inherent in the system.

Again, though this is not the intention of either side, a local balance of politico-military power has effectively been achieved in Vietnam. The situation is not therefore worth maintaining: the “relative stability” is maintained at an unbearable level of violence and expenditure. The stability of the “balance of terror” that is being retrospectively fêted is of the same kind: we should notice that the balance only operates at the level of “terror,” and cannot be converted into effective military, let alone political “power”—or balance—at lower levels. More obviously conclusive evidence came in June 1967, when the superpowers could do no more in the Middle East than neutralize each others’ influence. Klaus Knorr, in his elegant and wise little book, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton University Press, 1966),

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December 1968 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 29

has demonstrated once and for all the
change that has overcome military
power in the recent past.

It is moreover not seemly to ignore
that the "relative stability" of the last
twenty years has been maintained at a
level of military expenditure so eno-
mous as perhaps permanently to dis-
tort human society. This has been hap-
pening in two ways: one is the inter-
national brain-drain into the defense-
oriented industries of the United
States—a kind of intellectual soil-ero-
sion in the "Free World." The other
is the confusion of standards in the
academic community, consequent
upon military largesse.

Burke talked about the "mischief of
not having large and liberal ideas in
the management of great affairs," and
blamed the government of his day for
taking "things by bits and scraps, some
at one time and one preference, and
some at another, just as they pleased,
without any sort of regard to their
relations and dependencies." This is
effectively now the received view of
arms control: "the mid-sixties wit-
nessed a remarkable maturing process
in the attitudes of governments toward
the arms problem" is only one way of
putting it. Another—until the John-
son and Gromyko statements in June,
which may turn out to have been im-
portant—would have been that the
leaders of the major powers had come
to the conclusion that although the
present system, with its expense and
its unjustifiable pre-emption of certain
resources, prevented attention being
paid to the world's real problems of
population and pollution, a little judi-
cious dickering might preserve the
existing balance of power and preclude
any immediate explosion. There may
of course be times when a government
can appropriately commit itself to "the
maintenance of an extant balance of
power," and probably many of the
middle of the road participants in this
particular symposium, when they ar-
gue the general merits of such a pol-
icy, are only generalizing from what
they believe might be the right policy
now for the United States. (Their col-
leagues in the Soviet Union may well
feel the same.) Were they nationals of
a country whose neck serves as fulcrum
to that balance of "power," their opin-
ion might well be different.

There is an almost total exclusion
of "large ideas" in this book; of any

proper examination of the context in
which arms control might or might not
be necessary, or of the possible range
of consequences if events are merely
left to succeed each other. To accept
the view that maintaining the balance
of power is the principal and most
proper aim of foreign policy is in fact
to mistake the nature of politics,
which is not the mere living through
of history in the present tense, the
acting-out of predetermined events
with a little optional manipulation at
the edges. In retrospect, history in-
deed appears necessary; in prospect it
is no such thing: politics is an ethical
activity concerned with the defining of
ends and standards, and with con-
trolling or devising means to those
ends, which are in accordance with
those standards. Questions pose them-
selves in the purely ethical form, "what
ought I—or we—or the government—
to do" in these unique circumstances;
responsibility is inescapable and total,
and because a politician cannot even
count on identifying the expedient or
the necessary, all he can do is what he
thinks is right.

How it has come about that the
words "moral" and "ethical," instead
of being used to refer to a category
of action, or to right behavior within
that category, should now be misused
to mean "virtuous" or "idealistie," or
even "financially respectable," is not
immediately relevant. The fact remains
that they generally are misused, and
that politics is widely assumed specifi-
cally to exclude everything that these
words are now normally held to apply
to. Nature abhors improper exclusion;
and those politicians, both practical
and academic, who have accepted and
behaved in accordance with this stunt-
ed conception of political activity, now
find that what they had thought to
exclude as irrelevant is becoming the
mainspring of a political movement
which is forcibly demanding re-inte-
gration.

This has been a rather wide-ranging
complaint and contributors to the vol-
ume may well feel it is unfair: they
were asked to consider specific issues
and they did so. Equally the editors
and organizers will feel that their deci-
sion to concentrate on specific issues
is explained and justified by the self-
evident uselessness of the "large and
liberal ideas" about general and com-
plete disarmament and such that pro-

liferated in the early sixties. This re-
action would be understandable, but in
its turn it too is neither here nor there:
the failure of our policies and think-
ing in the early sixties was a failure of
content and appositeness, not of scale.
In reducing the scale and the range of
their proposals and thinking, the edi-
tors of this volume are not escaping
from irrelevance, they are merely ap-
proaching it from a different angle.
What I am asking for, as background
and context to discussion of these mat-
ters, is evidence that it is the large,
real, multicolored world that is being
talked about, not some mere conceiv-
able shadow or toy. Writers in this
field—perhaps more than in any other
—need a true sense of where history
has got to, of the nature of its momen-
tum, of where, each moment, the ful-
crum may rest.

In the real world, political events
and situations, solutions to the prob-
lems they raise and mitigations of
them, continue Proteus-like for years:
how, for example, do we now interpret
the partial test ban? Obviously not as
the "first step" it was immediately
hailed as. A fairly effective anti-pollu-
tion measure? Part of a joint super-
power nonproliferation policy? In the
next half decade, if the superpowers
do indeed embark on ballistic missile
defenses, the partial test ban's greatest
effect will be in preventing the effec-
tiveness of their systems from being
demonstrated to each other, or to the
world at large; the uncertainty of the
strategic balance will be increased, the
value of small nuclear forces will re-
main incalculable: all results far from
the minds of those who drafted the
treaty only five years ago. But this kind
of constant metamorphosis cannot but
happen with small, uncoordinated
measures of arms control. This kind
of problem is not mentioned.

A mere five years ago, a politically
united West Europe as part of an
enduring Atlantic Military Alliance
still appeared not only possible but ra-
tionally desirable; now it is quite evi-
dently neither, because no solution to
the German problem is compatible
with it, and so we must start thinking
in terms of a wider European settle-
ment. Are these developments fol-
lowed and understood by the American
arms control community? On the evi-
dence of this book, hardly. But the
interface of the two alliance systems

30

continues raw and dangerous in Central Europe. Yalta is due for revision.

Five years ago, the possibility that American defense expenditure might bump up against some arbitrary limit seemed highly unlikely, but it has happened, and the security of the United States appears today to depend more strictly from civil, than from military, expenditures. A consequence of this, and of the widespread evidence that military superpower is anyway not convertible into local military efficacy, has sapped the whole idea of guarantees on which the bipolar system used to rest. Yet this matter, the credibility of guarantees, which is fundamental to several of the topics dealt with in *Arms Control for the Late Sixties*, and particularly to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, is never explicitly examined. The dashing suggestions in the book tend to be hawkish, to be that nuclear proliferation would not be all that bad if it happened, because the central bipolar balance can cope. This is also an unexamined assumption.

It is not that this is a bad book. Given the limits the editors set themselves and their writers, it is honest, businesslike, fair, and only ratherotonous. If Willi Brandt and, particularly, V. C. Trivedi, the Indian delegate to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee for many years, stand out as exotics, it is because the quality of their commonsense is rooted in the political soil of their two countries, which they know to be critically involved. Mr. Lehman is probably tempted to think of them as part "horribles simplificateurs," part interesting sports in that usually reliable breed, the arms control specialist.

The last contribution is a commentary on the symposium by Klaus Knorr, and, not for the first time, I find myself agreeing with him: "We require a drastic system change. This makes me, I believe, a realist," he writes. And as I write it looks as if Mr. Johnson and Mr. Kosygin may be with us: they are certainly proposing action. In order to act at all, it is necessary to simplify, which is not necessarily to distort: it is to make judgements about the relative importance of things, and that is what politics is about.

Elizabeth Young is a British writer who frequently contributes to the Bulletin.

> **"One of the most important documents on Communist affairs in recent years"***

PRIVATELY circulated commentary on Soviet-American relations and a wide range of other problems by the "father of the Russian H-bomb," with extensive commentary by Harrison E. Salisbury of *The New York Times*.

"Hats off to Sakharov and Salisbury! The Sakharov paper illuminated by Salisbury's notes should be the basis of a seminar in every college and university in the country." — JERROLD R. ZACHARIAS, Institute Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

"The Sakharov document is a deeply moving testimony to the freedom of the human spirit. It is therefore one of the most important documents on Communist affairs in recent years."
— HENRY A. KISSINGER, Center of International Affairs, Harvard University

## Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom

by Andrei D. Sakharov

With Introduction, Afterword and Notes
by HARRISON E. SALISBURY

*A New York Times* BOOK • At all bookstores, $3.95
(A paperback edition for classroom use is available at $1.50)

W. W. NORTON & COMPANY, INC.
55 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003

December 1968 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 31

100 Bayswater Road,
London W.2. 3HJ.

October 8, 1970.

Dear Henry,

It was so very pleasant that you
escaped for a while last weekend. Of course,
there were 104 things we never got round to
talking about, particularly the proposed
institute - the former "Bundy Institute"-and
the China and United Nations entry question.

So I am going to be in Washington
from the evening of November 5 to the morning
of November 8 and would very much like to see
you any time then. Or I shall be at the
Belmont Conference Center of the Smithsonian
Institution at Elkridge, Maryland on November
9 and 10 and could, I suppose, get out and
dine in town. Do let me know.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.