PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1965

Conversation with Eugen Gerstenmaier, President of the German Bundestag, June 23, 1965.

The conversation took place at Mr. Gerstenmaier's request. A mutual friend (Von Schlabrendorf, one of the survivors of the plot on Hitler's life of July 20, 1944) told me on the occasion of his visit to the United States in May, 1965, that Gerstenmaier would appreciate if I would devote two days on the occasion of my visit to Bonn to briefing him on the world situation. I replied that I would not be able to spare more than an afternoon. The conversation lasted about six hours starting at noon with an interruption of about half an hour.

Gerstenmaier began the conversation by saying that it was next to impossible to conduct a differentiated conversation with American diplomatic personnel. They were always using simple-minded categories like Gaullist and anti-Gaullist, which completely falsified the situation. He had the impression that American diplomats had no sense for history or of the tragedy of Germany. The only American Ambassador who had understood anything--and that in a passive way--was Conant.

Despite his initial suggestion that I explain the world situation to him, Gerstenmaier then launched into a long disquisition about the relationship of Germany-France-U.S. He said that he was sick of common-place

ship of Germany-France-U.S. He said that he was sick of common-place
film. Gerstenmaier then launched into a long diatribe on spout the relation-
ship of the initial objection that I explain the world situation to
anyone--and that in a passive way--was correct.

tragedy of Germany. The only American Ambassador who had understood
impression that American diplomats had no sense for history or of the
and anti-Germans, which completely falsified the situation. He had the
berenой. They were always mind simple-minded categories like Germans
impossible to conduct a differentiated conversation with American diplomatic
Gerstenmaier began the conversation by asking that it was next to,
spontaneous.

conversation lasted about six hours starting at noon with an interruption of
I replied that I would not be able to spare more than an afternoon. The
days on the occasion of my visit to Bonn to brief him on the world situation
in May, 1965, that Gerstenmaier would appreciate it if I would devote two
life of July 30, 1944) told me on the occasion of his visit to the United States
mutual friend (von Schloфendorf, one of the survivors of the blot on Hitler's
The conversation took place at Mr. Gerstenmaier's request. A

June 23, 1965.
Conversation with Erben Gerstenmaier, President of the German Bundesrepublik,

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

26 June 1965

[N]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Gerstenmaier - 2

platitudes. When Americans asked him to choose between France and the United States, he felt like asking: "And after we have made the choice will France then disappear from Europe?". France and Germany were fated to live together. They could choose against the other only by destroying themselves. Germany could therefore not participate in a policy which was directed against France or which produced Franco-German antagonism.

I replied that I had heard it said that the Federal Republic, while wanting to live in close amity with France, could not accept the latter's hegemony. Gerstenmaier said it was absurd to speak of one nation's hegemony in contemporary Europe. The nations were too equal in strength and moral quality. No country could found a claim to hegemony on legal formulae. The only possible leadership was of a moral nature. It depended in short on achievement. And here it was highly improbable that one country could permanently excel the others. He admitted that De Gaulle probably believed that he could continue to dominate Europe through his personality. De Gaulle in this sense thought in out-dated categories. But he had the impression that the younger generation of French leaders were willing to use the positive side of De Gaulle without clinging to out-dated formulae. For example, during De Gaulle's last visit in Bonn, Pompidou had spoken privately to him of a fusion of the Federal Republic and France --a word which De Gaulle would never had uttered.

--a word which De Galle would never had uttered.

had aboken privately to him of a fusion of the Federal Republic and France
formmise. For example, during De Galle's visit in Bonn, Pompidou
willing to me the positive aide of De Galle without clinging to out-dated
persoaslity. De Galle in this sense thought in out-dated categories. But
propably believed that he could continue to dominate Europe through his
country could permanently excel the others. He admitted that De Galle
in a sort on achievement. And here it was highly improbable that one
formmise. The only possible leadership was of a moral nature. It debended
and most duality. No country could found a claim to pedagogy on its
pedagogy in contemporary Europe. The nations were too equal in strength
hedenough. Gerstenmaier said it was spent to abase of one nation's
wanting to live in close proximity with France, could not accept the latter's
I replied that I had heard it said that the Federal Republic, while
directed against France or which produced Franco-German autodivision,
selves. Germany could therefore not participate in a policy which was
live together. They could choose against the other only by destroying them-
France then disband from Europe?". France and Germany were tied to
United States, he felt like saying: "And after we have made the choice will
plattitudes. When Americans asked him to choose between France and the

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Gerstenmaier - 5

[4]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Gerstenmaier - 3

The great task was to separate the lasting contribution of De Gaulle from the idiosyncrasies produced by his upbringing. It was senseless to combat a hegemony that could not be established anyhow and to be lectured by others about dangers which were non-existent. The big challenge/was to make some progress in European unity. He deliberately avoided the word integration because this was another of those abstractions which obscurred reality. He was quite prepared to go ahead with something like the Fouchet plan. Once a European unit was formed there was plenty of time to discuss the constitutional arrangements.

I said that I had been told that the Gromyko visit to Paris had cooled German sympathies for De Gaulle. Gerstenmaier replied that this was absolute nonsense. If anything, the Gromyko visit had demonstrated the unwillingness of France to sacrifice German interests and had set an example of European initiative which Germany might well emulate. For this reason, Gerstenmaier considered Adenauer's warning letter to De Gaulle unnecessary and even presumptuous. The only thing which disturbed Germans about De Gaulle was his style which reminded them too much of authoritarian tendencies. Particularly the German left was reserved toward De Gaulle.

Nevertheless to gauge Franco-German feelings one must never forget the state visit of De Gaulle. Kennedy's trip was the journey of a young demi-god; the Queen of England was a fairy-tale. But De Gaulle was the end of three centuries of tragedy; it plumbed depths which only those

the end of three centuries of trading; it bumped debts which only those
bundled demi-cod; the Queen of England was a fairly-tale. But De Gamle was
torquet the state visit of De Gamle. Kennedy's trip was the journey of a
newspaper to hand Franco-German teelings one must never

Nevertheless to hand Franco-German teelings one must never
tendencies. Particularly the German left was reserved toward De Gamle.
De Gamle was his style which reminded them too much of authoritarian
and even brazenness. The only third which disturbed Germans about
Geratenmayer considered Adenauer's warning letter to De Gamle unnecessarily
of European initiative which Germany might well emulate. For this reason,
millingness of France to sacrifice German interests and had set an example
asolate nonessence. If underlying the Gromyko visit had demonstrated the
German sympathies for De Gamle. Geratenmayer replied that this was
I said that I had been told that the Gromyko visit to Paris had cooled
the constitutional arrangements.

Once a European mit was formed there was plenty of time to discuss
plan. He was quite prepared to do so with something like the Fonsdet
integration because this was another of those spactions which opacified
make some progress in European unity. He deliberately avoided the word
by others spout sensers which were non-existant. The pid challenge\msa to
compat a pedagony that could not be satisfied anyhow and to be lectured
trom the idiosyncrasies produced by his abpringd. It was senseless to
The great task was to separate the lasting contribution of De Gamle

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Geratenmayer - 3

[A]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Gerstenmaier - 4

who had suffered together could reach. Any German leader who falsified
those emotions would destroy the moral equilibrium of Germany.

To be sure, Schroeder was hostile to France. But he was an
intellectual purist, convinced that his only duty was to Germany's own
national interest--a fact which he never tired of reiterating at party
caucuses. The United States would find him a no more reliable ally than
had Adenauer, who used to think that Schroeder was a close supporter. Be
that as it may, Schroeder would have to go after the next election. He was
clever, but not intelligent. The only thing that could save Schroeder would
be a victory by the CDU as large or larger than in 1961--a most improbable
contingency.

Despite Schroeder's bad relations with Couve, De Gaulle's visit
earlier in the month had gone well. De Gaulle obviously had made great
efforts to demonstrate the importance which he attached to friendship with
the Federal Republic. In a private conversation De Gaulle had assured
Gerstenmaier that he had carefully insisted on maintaining German interests
in his conversations with Gromyko. When Gerstenmaier mentioned the
Oder-Neisse line recognition, De Gaulle replied that France had not been
at the Conference where this boundary was established. Pompidou had spoken
of the fusion of France and Germany. Couve had said to Gerstenmaier that
after the German and French elections this year he wanted to have a private
talk with him about NATO reform on the basis of an "ellipse theory"
Gerstenmaier had developed in a speech last November.

Geratenmayer had developed in a speech at November.

talk with him about NATO reform on the basis of an "ellobae theory".

of the Union of France and Germany. Conve had said to Geratenmayer that

at the Conference where thisньard was established, Pombigon had spoken

Oder-Melae line recognition. De Gamle replied that France had not been

in his conversations with Gromako. When Geratenmayer mentioned the

Geratenmayer that he had carefully inated on maintaining Germany's interests

the Federal Republic. In a private conversation De Gamle had saamed

earlier in the month had done well. De Gamle optionally had made great

Deabite Schroeder, a pd relations with Conve, De Gamle, said his

contingency.

be a victory by the CDU as far as further than in 1981--a most improbable
clever, but not intelligent. The only thing that could save Schroeder would

that as it may, Schroeder would have to do after the next election. He was

had Adensner, who said to think that Schroeder was a close supporter. Be

campeana. The United States would find him a no more reliable ally than

intellectual bent, convinced that he only truly was to Germany's own

to be ame, Schroeder was hostile to France. But he was an

toose emotions would destroy the most equilibrium of Germany.

who had suffered together could reach. And German leader who failed

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Geratenmayer - 4

[4]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Gerstenmaier - 5

I asked Gerstenmaier to explain this theory. Gerstenmaier said that he had thought of it on a visit to Tokyo last year. He had realized then that the world looked different from the Pacific than from the center of Europe. The United States was engaged on two continents and was part of two security systems. One could not ask the United States to make itself responsible for every decision, everywhere. Two other centers had to be created, one in Asia and one in Europe, with the United States being part of each but sharing specific functions with the other partner. I asked how he envisaged the construction of a European center. Gerstenmaier replied that the important point was to start building and the Fouchet plan was as good as any. I asked about the MLF. It was clear that he did not know too much about its details. He said he would go along with it if it led to a European structure; he would oppose it if it threatened to produce a rift with France. In reply to my question he said he felt no sense of discrimination because France possessed nuclear weapons and the Federal Republic not; he saw in the French force the nucleus of a European center of nuclear decision. He was vague about what he meant by a center of nuclear decision. He insisted that it would have to be closely linked with the United States.

In fact, he argued, Europe would have to assume greater responsibilities outside of Europe. It simply would not do for Europe to take the attitude that God had imposed on the United States the obligation

take the attitude that God had imposed on the United States the obligation
reasonabilities outside of Europe. It simply would not do for Europe to
In fact, he argued, Europe would have to seemme greater

the United States.
unclear decision. He insinuated that it would have to be closely linked with
of nuclear decision. He was very spont what he meant by a center of
Republi: not; he saw in the French force the nucleus of a European center
discrimination because France possessed nuclear weapons and the Federal
right with France. In reply to my question he said he felt no sense of

to a European structure; he would oppose it if it threatened to produce a
know too much about its details. He said he would do so along with it if it led
was so good as any. I asked about the MIL. It was clear that he did not
replied that the important point was to start building and the Bomber plan
how he envisaged the construction of a European center. Gerstenmaier
part of each but sharing specific functions with the other partner. I asked
to be created, one in Asia and one in Europe, with the United States being
itself reasonable for every decision everywhere. Two other centers had
of two security systems. One could not ask the United States to make
of Europe. The United States was engaged on two continents and was part
then that the world looked different from the Pacific than from the center
said that he had thought of it on a visit to Tokyo last year. He had realized

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Gerstenmaier - 8

[4]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Gerstenmaier - 6

to defend the whole world while Europe pursued its own business. He strongly supported American actions in Vietnam. His only concern was that if we protested too much about our restraint the other side would lose its fear of escalation and become more stubborn. He said this not critically, but simply to define a tough problem. Every morning when he saw his eighteen year old son he understood the anguish of American mothers and he was angry at the Phariseeism of some European critics of the United States. He asked me to explain the behavior of American professors to which he objected strongly. I did my best in terms of a history of strong moral convictions, unhappiness with ambiguous situations, and reluctance to deal with policy in terms of power.

Gerstenmaier then asked me about President Johnson. How did he make policy? Did he have a brain trust? Was he a man of strong convictions? Could he conduct an effective foreign policy? Did he grasp nuances?

I told him that I did not know the President. My judgment was of an elemental force, tough in making decisions, a man who would not willingly lose and who knew how to exercise his power. Gerstenmaier said that Erhard told him after a visit to Johnson that Johnson had indicated how heavy the burden of the Presidency was and that he might not stand for re-election. Did this prove that Johnson was indecisive? I said that Bismarck resigned every two years and served nearly thirty years as

Biamarck realized every two years and served nearly thirty years as
re-election. Did this prove that Johnson was indecisive? I said that
he was the burden of the Presidency was and that he might not stand for
Ernst told him after a visit to Johnson that Johnson had indicated how
JOSE and who knew how to exercise his power. Gerstenmaier said that
an elemental force, tough in making decisions, a man who would not willfully
I told him that I did not know the President. My judgment was of
mances?

convictions? Could he conduct an effective foreign policy? Did he draft
he make policy? Did he have a brain trust? Was he a man of strong
Gerstenmaier then asked me about President Johnson. How did
and reluctance to deal with policy in terms of power.

history of strong most convictions, insubordination with loudmouth situations,
protestors to which he objected strongly. I did my best in terms of a
of the United States. He asked me to explain the behavior of American
mothers and he was angry at the Pariaracism of some European critics
he saw his eighteen year old son he understood the意味 of American
critically, put simply to define a tough problem. Every morning when
rose its fear of escalation and become more stubborn. He said this not
that if we protested too much about our restraint the other side would
strongly anti-bşporbed American actions in Vietnam. His only concern was
to defend the whole world while Europe burned its own fires.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Gerstenmaier - 6

[4]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Gerstenmaier - 7

Chancellor. I would not worry unduly about Johnson getting tired of the Presidency. Gerstenmaier said Erhard was a simpleton.

I then asked Gerstenmaier to explain his views about German unification. He replied that unification could come in only one of two ways: through pressure leading to an internal collapse of the Communist world or through a policy of relaxation of tensions. Pressure was much too dangerous and relaxation of tensions would never go far enough to make unification an object of negotiations. Anyone who pretended otherwise either deceived himself or the Germans. This being so, the Federal Republic had to get used to an indefinite continuation of the division of Germany. The task of the German leadership was to keep alive the will to unity without raising unfulfillable hopes. He strongly opposed the recognition of Eastern Germany or the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line.

Gerstenmaier stressed that the real issue was the moral fiber of Germany. The danger was not that Germany would try too much but that it would do too little. A passive attitude might become dominant which turns over all burdens to America. The new German nationalism will take the form of neutralism.

The meeting ended with a long analysis of the domestic situation. The gist of it was that the probable outcome was a small CDU plurality which would make necessary a coalition with the SPD. I had the impression that Gerstenmaier sees himself as a possible Chancellor or Foreign Minister of such a coalition.

* * * * *

* * * * *

Minister of state and a coalition.

that Gerstenmaier sees himself as a possible Chancellor or Foreign
which would make necessarily a coalition with the SPD. I had the impression
that that was the probable outcome was a small CDU splurshly
The meeting ended with a loud analysis of the domestic situation.

form of neutralism.

over all burdens to America. The new German nationalism will take the
would do too little. A passive attitude might become dominant which turns
Germany. The danger was not that Germany would try too much but that it
Gerstenmaier stressed that the real issue was the moral fiber of
or the acceptance of the Oder-Nesee line.

unmultifacile hober. He strongly opposed the recognition of Eastern Germany
of the German leadership was to keep alive the will to fight without retaliation
to get need to an indefinite continuation of the division of Germany. The task
decided himself or the Germans. This being so, the Federal Republic had
unification an object of negotiations. Anyone who pretended otherwise either
too dangerous and relaxation of tensions would never do so enough to make
world or through a policy of relaxation of tensions. Pressure was much
moral: through pressure leading to an internal collaboration of the Communist
unification. He replied that unification could come in only one of two
I then asked Gerstenmaier to explain his views about German
Presidently. Gerstenmaier and Erhard was a simpleton.

Chancellor. I would not worry much about spontaneity of Johnson detting tired of the

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Gerstenmaier - 1

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL