DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By.

NARA

Dato

5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Lucet

11:20 a.m., December 7, 1971

K: Charles, I understand that your President is giving a ride to our Ambassador in a Concorde. The best we can offer you is a ride on the President's plane to the Azores.

L: I thank you and the President very much. I will have to speak with Paris.

K: Tell them you have been invited to ride on Air Force One.

L: When are you leaving.

K: Sunday afternoon. We apologize for the slowness of the transportation.

L: What do you mean?

K: It's slower than yours.

L: (Laughed) That is very good. Thank you. I will get in touch with Paris and call you back.

K: Call me or General Haig. We will keep a place for you on the plane.

L: I am very thankful to you.

lds

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCORN
Lucet/Haig

12:50 p. m. 12/7/71

L: H: Spoke with Henry Kissinger an hour ago that President would take me on AF#1 to go to the Azores. I called Paris. It's okay. I accept. That is very kind of the President, Mr. Kissinger and yourself. You will let me know what time?

H: We will call your office.

L? I will be in NY but my secretary will know how to reach me.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/20

TelCon:2:50-12/7/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Senator Goldwater

K: Hello.

G: Henry.

K: How are you.

G: Fine. I wanted to tell you I had some information passed on to me this morning by an Admiral Burke. A man who I have a lot of faith in. The Admiral told me that he had many Japanese friends here and some fella by the name of Hura(?) in the Japanese San Francisco office is concerned over a remark that you apparently had said about the hope for the two China to get together.

K: I did not make such a statement.

G: I didn't think you did. I never saw the statement.

K: I said we will accept anything they may negotiate between themsevles together.

G: Well I know the Japanese are concerned about this in view of the President's trip to Peking. They feel that the nationalist Chinese can only go to them and they don't want to be pushed to the other side. They want them.

K: No, I never said that. I will talk to the Japanese (Ambassador?) However it is settled it should be peaceful otherwise we will invoke the . . .

G: That is exactly what Burke said you said. I will call him and have him check it.

K: Good. May I send you some material for our friends on the Hill on the Indians.

G: Yes, I work usually through Lyn Nofziger.

K: Good, I will get it to him this afternoon.

or

G: You may either send it to him directly to my office.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Haldeman/Kissinger

3:40 p.m. 12/7/71

H: Is he still roaring like gang busters?

K: Yes.

H: Bad?

K: No. Rogers gave an assinine briefing but no one else would know.

H: President is so cracked up he will go through the ceiling.

K: It would be better to show him normally.

H: That would be fine but this is the way he wanted to do it. He said he will see Stans tomorrow on the Moscow report and sees it as a possibility to squeeze the Russians and you should think about that.

K: Right. Anything else?

H: No.

K: Were you in Key Biscayne this weekend?

H: No. Stayed home. Did Christmas shopping and saw the kids. You have this damn merry-go-round this week so I stayed home.

K: You will be along on these trips. Have we settled housing in the Azores?

H: No problem. Have the general's house and good visiting staff. Like Alaska. We will stay at the base. No place else.

K: Where are the ones staying?

H: At a hotel with 5 rooms and 45 minutes away.

K: We will chopper?

H: I assume. We will give him a ride too. I think that's the way.

K: Bermuda will be better.

H: Not much because he will stay at Government House there.

K: That's not adequate?

H: It's nice but Heath stays there too.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Haldeman/Kissinger

3:40 p.m.

12/7/71

K: Why both?

H: Because it's where Heath stays and he invited the President. President can't turn it down. He will only be there one night. We have an estate 10 minutes away which we can use if he stays through the weekend second afternoon. He can go there for lunch as a way to get away from British.

K: Is he going from the Azores to Key Biscayne?

H: Don't know. Depends on Congress.

K: Am I expected to go there?

H: No. He will not go from Key Biscayne to Bermuda. On Sat. he will come back to go to NY on Sunday and leave that night for Bermuda.

K: He will leave from here.

H: Question of whether you go to Florida is up to you.

K: At any rate -- yes. I have too much to do.

H: He says after Bermuda he will go to Florida but I don't think so.

K: Definitely day after Christmas and stays until New Years.

H: Until the 31st. Pat leaves for Africa on the 1st.

K: I hope that doesn't conflict with the ball games or she might never get off.

H: That's set. Then on Sunday we leave for California.

K: There are two championship games on Sunday.

H: Good, maybe we will not go until Monday.

K: Can I go between Christmas and New Years and take my children?

H: Sure.

K: I could take my children and then come back. I do want to go to Calif. If the world report not done there, it will be not be. I will go and stay maybe.

H: Congress not returning until the 18th.

K: I will stay until the 15th if I can. Unless there's a crisis here.

Haldeman/Kissinger

3:40 p.m.

12/7/71

NARA, Date

H: Have they asked you about housing in Bermuda?

K: No.

H: President is staying at Government House. Then question is whether you want to stay at Anderson Estate or at the Hotel, Princess, where Rogers and Connally are staying and rest of official party. If you want to be away, stay at the Estate.

K: Which is closest to the President?

H: Equal distant -- 10 minutes each, in a triangle.

K: Then I will stay at the hotel.

H: You are better off there. If for some reason you want to be away from them -

K: I see no advantage in that.

H: OK.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Dr. Arthur Burns/Mr. Kissinger

10:35 p.m., December 7, 1971

B: I got a phone call today from Wormser, head of the Bank of France.

K: Yeah, I know him.

B: Pompidou invited him to go to the meeting in the Azores to accompany the French Delegation and he wanted to know whether I would be coming. I said that I would inquire and let him know. The President mentioned this Azores meeting the first time -- remember that luncheon we had on a certain Wednesday a few weeks ago?

K: Yeah.

B: And then in a meeting I had with the President and Connally, the President turned to me and said, "I don't know whether the French are going to bring their central banker or not."

K: I can't make this kind of decision but I will raise it with the President in the morning.

B: All right.

K: You can be sure that I will raise it.

B: Can you call me tomorrow? I have got to go off to Chicago tomorrow afternoon.

K: I will do my best.

B: All right. What do you think?

K: I can't judge what Connally is up to but he talks all right.

B: Okay. Thank you.

[Wormser is "Oliver Wormser", Governor of the Bank of France.]

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger

9:20 a.m. 12/8/71

NARA, Dato 5/26

S: I think it's an outstanding job. Very constant.

K: What the Washington Post printed is crap. I back you up.

S: Disassociating yourself from the word aggressor which you and I know must ______. It's what Geo. said. It's a good case. The President wants me to go on TV Sunday. Your backgrounder helped me more.

K: Can you get it to your posts?

S: It's already out. I will send mine out and point out we both did not condone the Pakistanis. The reasons for it, of course.

K: Make sure it's what your people don't emphasize.

S: Of course not.

K: Their whole instincts are the other way.

S: We will not send mine then.

K: That's fine. Just don't flag that.

S: We were racing against time and this is way India resorted to force.

K: They were afraid we would succeed and not fail.

S: They knew we would.

K: Exactly.

S: You did a tremendous job. It will be very helpful.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Sen. Javits/Kissinger

10:31 a.m.

12/8/71

J: Did you see the two powers bill we turned out here?

K: No.

J: I will send it to you. It will probably be under debate.

K: You have the ability to get me to agree with things against the Administration.

J: I need to talk with you about something that's important. I may do that during the recess.

K: Set breakfast?

J: Friday morning for breakfast?

K: If not this Friday, can we do it next week?

J: If not Friday, let's make it Tues. It's urgent.

K: We will get together. How's Marion?

J: We will be here Tues. night. Going to Bruce's Tues. night?

K: I am coming from the Azores and if the time change not bad I will go.

J: I will see you before then.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Sisco/Kissinger
Sisco/McCloskey/Kissinger
10:40 a.m. 12/8/71

S: I am on with Bob McCloskey and he would like guidance from you. "Has the U.S. Govt. or not in fact branded India as the aagressor?" We want to be sure to handle it as you want.

Mc: As a commentary. No time to use this as characterizing (?) Indian actions in E. Pakistan. That hurts George but hell --

K: That sounds soft. We have not asked the UN for a formal resolution to that effect. The UN resolution was justified.

S: That's the kind of finding the UN makes.

K: Action unjustified and we would like to hit her that overwhelming number of nations are supporting us.

S: 100 plus votes who agree with Richard Nixon. One other -- more and more word getting out that Pakistan Government asking for military assistance.

K: It is.

S: We know. In handling that we think Bob could say I have nothing to add on our policy to economic assistance to both sides. What do you think, Bob?

Mc: It's tolerable.

K: All right.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Connally/Kissinger

11:08 a.m.

12/8/71

K: Mr. Secretary. I had a call from one of your unruly children, like Arthur Burns, and he said he had a call from Wormser and Wormser is going to the Azores and do we want him to go? I have no doubt that Pompidou is hearing the same story in reverse.

C: That's right. Volker says that they will take no one if we take no substantive people.

K: I will get a direct line to Pompidou saying we will not take anyone substantive and then I will tell Burns we have heard Wormser is not going after all.

C: I am taking x taking Volker.

K: That's all right. You are entitled to bring an assistant. Rogers is bringing an assistant.

C: I don't think we should bring these central bank guys.

K: I agree.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
R. Zeigler/Kissinger
~~XXX~~ 1:20 p.m. 12/8/71

Z: Henry Brandon was in my office and said that out of London there's a story of a Pakistan doctor that was here to set up ? ? ? ? and Bengla Desh. Mrs. Nixon went sent a ticket to this fellow in Calcutta to make another visit here.

K: It's prepostruos. We shouldn't comment because if we get into the preposterous ones we will have to answer the others. XXX Tell him that it's preposterous and don't ask us these because (we will not answer).

Z: It's spelled __________.

K: Don't pump me. I wouldn't let Mrs. Nixon near someone like that. Did you have anymore ax questions?

Z: No.

K: It's playing well. Except in the Washington Post because it's a deliberate lie.

Z: Don't let people knee jerk within 15 hours of your briefing.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Senator Case/Kissinger
2:25 p.m. - 12/8/71

K: Hello, how are you?

C: Fine, Henry.

K: I am calling you about these two radios that I understand there is some issue as to whether they should go to conference or not and if I understand it, the Chairman is holding up going to conference. Now I simply wanted to indicate that we are very strongly in favor of - and I know you were in favor of them to...

C: That's right. I prefer the simple bill, but I did discuss this with the Department at some length and did agree to go conference. I don't know if we can get anything out of Bill. They want just a straight appropriation.

K: Well, if I understand it and I am not really quite up on the legislative history of this thing, but the issue is whether it should go to conference or tied up with the AID legislation and we would like to have it go to conference.

C: Yes, well I am all for it and anything I can do to start it up is fine. Actually they put one up and AID is in it and to the point of order they had to make that appropriation subject to the authorizing of legislation so it is the authorizing that has to be provided in some fashion.

K: Well, I am very fond of the Chairman, but whether I can get him to do something I don't know.

C: If the Department would accept a simple appropriation it would be the best all around. And if it will, Bill would take that in a minute.

K: But in the meantime, if you would do what you can.

C: I will, Henry.

K: It's been a long time since I have seen you. Let's have breakfast sometime.

C: I'd like that, Henry.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Raza/Kissinger
2:47 p.m. 12/8/71

R: I thought you were angry with me.

K: Due to the incompetence of my staff you were not notified. I was expecting
you at 2:45.

R: No one tole me.

K: It was because it was someone I wanted to see.

R: I am going to the State Dept. I rang Gen. Haig 3 times.

K: They didn't notify me.

R: The President has sent another message direct by Farland. About the whole
situation. One or two suggestions -- my trouble is that they keep saying see you.

K: Two things. One, tell your people to stop all cable traffic with respect
to help on ammunition and so forth. We are doing what we can and we will send
a coded message. It's getting too dangerous for you to send it. I will keep you
informed.

R: I am going to State now to keep the record straight.

K: Tell them you would like to invoke mutual security treaty. A formal request --

R: An aide memoire. Unsigned.

K: The secret clauses also?

R: "The bilateral U. S. /Pakistan agreement ? ? ? ? and independence of Pakistan
? ? ? ? ? ? gravest to Pakistan ? ? ? extend material help to us."

K: Say they should use clarifications used in subsequent year's

R: Are you very busy today?

K: I will see you first thing tomorrow. We will be here to support you.

R: You don't have to say that. Things are getting late.

K: I can give you news that we are getting something out of the Shah for ammunition. You can send a cypher through me.

R: I have not sent a cable. Only ______ through you. Are your cables different
from the State Dept. ?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012587
By: L.B. NARA Date: 12/8/71

TELECON

General Haig/Minister Vorontsov

3:50 p.m., December 8, 1971

V: How are you, General?

H: Fine, Mr. Minister. I am calling to convey a message.
Dr. Kissinger is in a meeting right now, but he wanted you to have
this message as soon as possible. It is to the effect that with
respect to your note yesterday, the President does not feel a
response at this time is necessary until he receives a response
to his written communication, and he wanted it understood that the
'watershed' term which he used was very, very pertinent, and he
considers it a carefully thought-out and valid assessment on his
part.

V: Okay. I will have this in mind and transmit it to Moscow.
Thank you, General.

H: Good-bye, Mr. Minister

lds

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Amb. Bush/Kissinger

3:50 p.m.

12/8/71

B: Calling on the question of mission security. I am told -- have you been briefed on the thing that got us stalled up on the JDL thing?

K: Yes.

B: The fellow who is handling that for the Atty. Gen. was just in my office. One recommendation that we were going to make was to put EPS people in the Chinese mission here. Glenn spoke up and said someone had better speak with them because we wanted city police put there when they first came and they didn't want it. I said this was a <u>KK</u> WH thing and --

K: Could I call you at 5:00?

B: I will be across the street. Call me later. I wanted to be sure you got in the act on the thing.

By. NARA, Dato 5/20

TELCOM

Sisco/Kissinger
6:20 p.m. - 12/8/71

S: Henry, you are going to get about 4 telegrams from us tonight which I would like you to look at, but there is one in particular which I want to call to your attention.

K: The one instruction is I want to have Keating clean this rat from his...

S: Let me tell you about the one. It is a telegram where this Defense Minister says to us we want you to go to the Indians Paks and tell them to give up.

K: I understand and it is rejected.

S: Well, here is what I have done with that cable and if you don't like it, throw it out. Well, we are obviously not going to go to the Paks and tell them to give up. Alternatively, if they don't do anything, put the onus and responsibility on the Americans back so that if there is a bloodbath, the Americans will be to blame.

What I suggest in the cable, and it is only a ploy, Henry, is to tell Farland, of course, we are not going to tell this to the Paks, suggest that he mention this what the Indians are saying.

K: No, I won't agree to that.

S: You know what I am trying to do.

K: No, we are not going to convey even an Indian request, not even as information. What I want is a ______ to the Defense Minister that the Indians will be responsible to world opinion for anything that occurs.

S: Well, that is what the other cable says and that one is coming to you. By the way there is also a cable which indicates where they will assume responsibility.

K: Well, send it over. I don't think we will approve it.

S: Henry, just look at it and if I don't see it tomorrow morning I'll know; you didn't like it.

K: The President doesn't think we can take the course (?) of neither. We are doing it half way.

By. NARA, Date 5/20

Telcon
The President
12/8/71; 6:25 p.m.

P: Ken Ryland is waiting for you.

K: Aren't you nice.

P: Can you go?

K: Yes, I'll go right over.

P: (Speaking of President Medici) How do you like the man?

K: I think he is really impressive.

P: Does he feel good about his visit?

K: Nelson told me, and he confirmed it, he was really very impressed by his meeting with you. As far as I understand, he is really most anxious to establish that special arrangement.

P: It will be done. That is the big thing I will hit tomorrow.
All right - he is waiting for you.

K: I will be right over.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Raza
12/8/71; 7:10 p.m.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

K: I just wanted to tell you for your own information and slight peace of mind that we are working very actively on getting military equipment to you -- but for God's sake don't day anything to anybody!

R: Thank you so much and tomorrow I hope you will give me a few minutes.

K: 3:00. I will explain to you about ammunition and airplanes.

R: Thank you ever so much.

K: Don't communicate that.

R: No, no. I will follow you to your last word.

K: How were you treated by my colleagues?

R: Very nicely. He said he was nobody but decision rests with other people.

K: In the White House?

R: No, he meant Rogers.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Lloyd Shearer
12/8/71; 7:15 p.m.

S: I have a question which you may or may not be able to answer. Could you tell me who will be the interpreter for President Nixon when he goes to China and the name of your interpreter?

K: I cannot tell you who will interpret for the President in China because we have not decided. I can tell you I used their interpreter. One was the fellow who was at Harvard, Chi Ch'ao-chu. The other was that girl -- Ming Toy Epstein (laughter). It was the one that is now at the UN in New York, T'ang Wen-sheng. They interpreted for the Chinese side and we used them. I did not bring an interpreter but two members of my party spoke Chinese so we knew if the interpretations were correct.

S: Who on your staff has the Chinese wife? Does he speak Chinese?

K: No. We are not keeping it a secret -- we just have not decided.

S: Do you have a large number of pretty good interpreters?

K: No, only three or four possible ones.

S: Can you give the names?

K: No, I better not tell you the names. Then everyone would know the ones that did not get selected.

S: When will you be out here?

K: I will come out around the 3rd for ten days. Give my best to your wife.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Sander Vanocur/Kissinger
9:15 a.m. 12/9/71

V: Sorry about your dinner tonight.

K: With the situation what it is here I could not leave.

V: I know you don't like to do these things --

K: John Kenneth Galbraith is a good friend and we will do it in Jan.

V: Ken is coming down with Schulmann tomorrow and a whole program on the situation.

K: I can't go on the air.

V: I called Sisco and he can't do it. Someone should do it now from the Admin.
They are not sharpshooters.

K: I will try to find someone.

V: Someone from the Administration should be there.

V: Ken and Marshall.

K: They are both good friends of mine. Are you here permanently now?

V: Yes. I am trying to come up with something here. Perhaps during Christmas?

K: We will get together.

V: You will have someone call me.

K: Yes.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger

11:22 a.m.

12/10/71

S: Two things. Did Jack fill you in on NY and where matters stand?

K: The only thing I know is what the Indian Ambassador said.

S: It's interesting because it points in the direction we want to go but who knows? It's a personal reaction. Happily Bhutto and the Indian Foreign Minister are there in NY.

K: Sing is there too?

S: That gives the opportunity for locus for this thing which is helpful and gives opportunity to see what's possible -- with Bhutto there he is our line. He will link it the way we want it linked and way to do it is for informal consultations to take place. If you can find common ground with clear cut ceasefire in the West and then go into the Security Council and present it.

K: Unless the Indians play the same game in the West as in the East.

S: We can only wait for Islamabad right now. I am just trying to think ahead. I looked at the message. It's written by commander in the field. It has to be ______ exclusively. Bhutto will see it as an honorable withdrawal from East. It's a way of saying if they destroy my forces in the East they want the whole territory because they want unacceptable irreparable damage. Happily that calbe they referred to this morning is along this line in achieving our objective and I hope Yahya will confirm that it's a mutual objective.

K: Nothing will happen I don't know about?

S: No.

K: The only trouble you are in is when you are assailed from both sides.

S: I took a beating here last week and not from the bottom.

K: He hasn't won one yet but he keeps trying.

S: We can do one other thing with India. Write a letter to Mrs. Gandhi that incorporates basically the line we expressed to ambassador.

K: Let me look at the cable again. Do it tentatively but make it brutal. I won't do anything else.

S: We will achieve this.

K: We will succeed.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCONE
Sander Vanocur/Kissinger
2:50 p.m. 12/9/71

V: I was calling about whether you talked with Sisco.

K: I haven't yet but I will.

V: Tomorrow night with Galbraith and Schulmann. Joe cona't do it because of
Face the Nation. Who's Bray?

K: SANITIZED

V: I accused Sisco of meeting Meir at ______ in NY. He is mad at me. I will
have to go for a Sanator. One who can make a case are weak and ______ beaten.

K: And they are not for us. How proposed Bray?

V: No one. But if I can't get you or Sisco, who?

K: Rogers?

V: He isn't in the States.

K: Irwin?

V: Does he know this?

K: Alex Johnson?

V: He has made enough mistakes.

K: I will do my best to get someone but someone to take on Galbraith is not
running out of our ears.

V: I am not on a hunting expedition. I want the govt.'s side. We should have a
spokesman. We could go to Frelinghuysen.

K: That's not bad.

V: We may go to it but we really want someone from the Administration.

By.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
Secy. Butz/Kissinger
4:40 p.m. 12/9/71

K: We are seeing Soviet Agricultural Minister and want to be sure lunch was cool.

B: It was good.

K: I don't want it good. Cool.

B: We were not warm. We were cordial.

K: Did we say it was political context on deals.

B: We didn't talk about deals and didn't talk politics.

K: So how could we let him know we are cool?

B: We were formal. We didn't know we were to be cool.

K: You had no chance to get guidance in that we sent you.

B: I talked with the General over there.

K: You didn't actually use some of the language.

B: I got it after the morning conversation this morning but before lunch. We gave a toast.

K: Warm?

B: About agriculture.

K: I wanted to get across no trade if they don't go in foreign policy. If they think they can pressure us on trade. I am trying to find out where his mind is.

B: Our conversations were cordial. He brought up trade and I didn't tie it to diplomatic relations. I had it at luncheon but nothing came up.

K: I yelled about something we wanted done as I was going out the door.

B: I had a memo with your signature "(quotes)".

K: I know my answer.

B: I never came up so I thought it better for me not to raise it.

K: It's my fault. What I wanted to get done and it's not your fault. I thought if our agricultural minister whom could not know about this raised this then they would get the word.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Butz/Kissinger

4:40 p.m. 12/9/71

-2-

B: I avoided discussion of it.

K: It infuriates me. Howould have said what is this guy trying to do.
No one asked you to.

B: I will do better next time.

K: On the basis of the information you had you did just right.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

P. Peterson/Kissinger

12/9/71 - 12X 4:50 p.m.

K: Pete, I just want to check quickly. I think we are missing signals all over the place. My impression from your memo about that Russian Minister is that we are slobbering all over him trying to get agriculture deals.

P: We are slobbering all over?

K: The thing we want to get across is no political behavior - no deals.

P: All I heard was listening to him. I didn't talk to him.

K: What was the posture of the Department?

P: Well, they are interested in deals. They have surplus you know.

K: Can we have a conference tomorrow?

P: He is leaving at 5.

K: Today?

P: Yes.

K: God damn it. We blew it. Is he coming back here?

P: No. Well, he is seeing the President at 4.

K: Well the President he will think is bluffing. If we could have gotten the Agricultural Department to play ball with us this week, we could have had the war settled in the subcontinent.

P: Could you talk to him?

K: I am discounted. Everyone knows what I say.

P: Well maybe I could say it, Henry.

K: What good would that do now? I mean, do you have a regular appointment with him?

P: No, but he is going to see the President, I could see him after that.

K: How could you do it? I mean I would be delighted but...

By. NARA, Dato 5/20

P: What would you think about you and me joining him afterward?

K: I don't want to talk to him afterward.

P: I could say...

K: No, it won't do any good coming out of the White House.

P: Now, as you know, Henry, the President has a lot of ambivalence on this.

K: He has ambivalence on every subject until you deliver the bacon to him.

P: Now you should know that in the meeting the other day with Maury this possibility was suggested by the President - this commodity credit. He wanted to know how we could go through the ExIm Committee.

K: I know it. I am aware of it.

P: OK. Well, if you think there is anything I could say to him...

K: I don't think so.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

5:23 p.m.

12/10/71

K: The President had the WSAG principles in and he was sorry you weren't included. He raised hell.

J: About what?

K: He said he didn't want the State Dept. to be loyal to the President but to the US.

J: What's the problem?

K: Constant new stories. I know it's not your fault.

J: What news?

K: The Daily News --

J: In the last day or so?

K: Daily News story that said State Dept. diplomats were horrified by the anti-Indian attitude of the govt. He said it to Mrs. Gandhi. He said he cannot and he cannot for reasons that are his to lean in a direction opposite of the way you people are pushing them.

J: I don't know of any difference any where but saving Pakistan.

K: Even if you look at the record of this meeting where he gave orders where I went back to soften. A number of things he ordered done I need softened considerably. I have to get across to you his exact policy.

J: I am not challenging the policy. We do think we have an obligation to give him our views.

K: After he has ruled then it has to be done. You have given your views -- yesterday he wanted a cable to Keating. That thing takes forever. Yelling at Yahya takes two hours.

J: I am sorry sorry he feels this way. Did you see in this connection -- I have the Pakistan ambassador here. Did you see about Bhutto's mission here? Says he is going to work for a ceasefire and negotiations with East and West. Wants to see the President. Arriving tomorrow.

K: Good. Let me bring you up to date. We have a WSAG tomorrow. The President saw the Russian Agricultural minister as a pretext and said we will have to stop. If Bhutto has the same idea can we keep people from leaking about the new scheme so we can get it down without being in the papers first.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Henry Brandon/Kissinger

5:35 p.m. - 12/9/71

B: Henry, how are you?

K: I'm fine. Shouldn't I be?

B: Well, with so many things happening. Henry, I am doing a long piece on the President's monetary tactics and in view of our conversation sometime ago, I was just wondering whether we were talking about the magic wand . . .

K: Well, I think he has softened the position, but not his tactics.

B: No, but I mean how did this process come about?

K: I don't want to go into that.

B: You haven't got a few minutes?
not

K: Well, / now.

B: Tomorrow?

K: Well, let me see if I can find some tomorrow, but I am not able to give you reliable information on this subject. That is a sensitive one.

B: I thought you could only give reliable information?

K: That's why I don't want to give any.

B: Well if you can I have a good idea, but since it doesn't come from you I would like to check on it.

K: Well, I would rather have you get it from other sources, to tell you the truth.

B: Well if you prefer that I will try just that, but in case I get complaints afterwards . . .

K: Just say I was for a tough line all along. Anything else will not make me complain.

B: Well, I didn't mean to say that.

K: What? Tough line?

By.

NARA, Dato 5/20

2

B: No. But any way...

K: I would rather take the position that I didn't talk to you.

B: All right. Tell me, does the name Octarosky (?) mean...

K: I know what you are going to say. You already tried it on Ziegler. Let me tell you something. If I do something secretly it may suffer from an excess of complexity, but it will not suffer from using Mrs. Nixon as an intermediator.

B: Well, that part is not so important, but I was wondering if he played some sort of important part.

K: Let me put it this way. I do not want to answer any questions. I would not use that sotry if I were you. I do not want to be in a position to be in a position to comment on every name you come up with.

B: It comes from London and after talking to Ziegler I said whether the story is correct or not it will nevertheless be used.

K: All right. Nice to talk to you.

By.

NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
12/9/71; 6:45 p.m.

P: I was thinking of going up to Camp David tomorrow afternoon.
I wondered if you wanted to go along.

K: I would like to if I could come on Saturday. I was going to see
Golda Meir tomorrow.

P: Okay, fine. We will check it out in the morning. Is that meeting
at 9:15?

K: Yes.

P: Be sure to emphasize 82 because that basically means what it will
be in the future.

K: Right, Mr. President.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Dick Allen/Kissinger

6:52 p.m.

12/10/74 9/71

K: I had lunch with Henry Hubbard. A good friend of mine. A very positive story. He is very high on you. Despite what people recognize as your mortal failings, he was surprised how strong and praiseworthy Henry is. They are going to have to put in some needles. I gave him a quotation. They may not use it, I said everyone agrees that Henry is doing a great job. If he is (shaping) the story, it will be great. If not and goes to the bad fellows --

K: Then they do me in to do in the President.

A: Was very enthusiastic.

K: I am delighted.

A: He can't commit Newsweek on your behalf.

K: I hope they gave the President a break too.

A: Wants to know who learns the most, the President or you. I said I didn't know. Mutual. I will not give you a memcon because 20-25 mins. devoted to it.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Under Secy Irwin/Mr. Kissinger/Jo Sisco

7:10 p.m., December 9, 1971

I: Two things, Henry.

K: You always seem to get the heat, Jack.

I: Well, I am glad I was there. Eliot told me he had a telephone conversation ... two cables we had done. I mentioned to Al before the meeting that we had the cables but after the President's comments, I didn't think they were applicable so I didn't leave them. One was actually doing what the President asked me to do with Jha.

K: Could I see the cables?

I: The other is a potential cable to Islamabad. I think they are overtaken. We are coming over with them.

K: Of course. Let's wait until tomorrow.

I: I don't want them to go out before tomorrow. I called Jha as soon as I got back. In fact, he just left here about 5 minutes ago. Joe and I both met with him.

K: Were you tough?

I: Yes, we were and I think he left with a real feeling of the seriousness of the whole situation. In fact, I have seen a great deal of Jha and from the conversation we had today he showed he had a real concern of the situation and said he would try to query his Government on taking territory.

K: Right. If you send a reporting cable over here, I will show it to the President the first thing in the morning.

I: Obviously, we are going to do that.

K: Not for clearance though.

S: Henry, this is Joe. He tried to probe us on what kind of report and obviously, we didn't give him any inkling of that.

I: What Joe means is, why in effect we are making this.

K: Okay.

By. NARA, Dato 5/20

TELCORN

Under Secy Irwin/Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco

7:10 p.m., December 9, 1971 -- page 2

I: I said the matter in which they had started East Pakistan and what they had done in the West. We just wanted to know what their intentions were. Just Joe and I sat in with him and Jha had just one fellow -- he has been here before. So we will be over in the morning.

K: Okay.

S: Henry, there is something --

I: When I got back, I mention this to Joe and I'm glad he's reminding me. It would be good if we could have a kind of meeting around the table tomorrow like today after the President left.

K: You mean we should restrict the group?

I: If anything, you or we had no staff.

K: Who would you suggest?

I: Packard, Moorer, Helms, myself, you and maybe Joe.

K: There is a lot to be said for that. I need a notetaker just for our records.

I: That's up to you. This way we can be sure that nobody around is talking. The only people we have told about the meeting today is Joe and Eliot.

K: No one else needs to know.

I: These are the only two. I will go over it with the Secretary once he gets back.

K: When does he get back?

I: Talked on the phone but it was not a secure phone ... we had had a meeting. Talked to the Ambassador and stated our current situation and possible movement of a carrier and didn't want to talk about it any further because we were not on a secure phone and would send a copy of the cable.

S: Henry, I need from you any kind of general or precise guidance for Face the Nation. It is not going to be an easy exercise. I want to make sure the President is as satisfied with that as he was with Saturday's exercise.

TELCOM

Under Secy Irwin/Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Sisco

7:10 p.m., December 9, 1971 -- page 3

NARA, Dato

I: I would like to talk to you about -- obviously, there is deeply held feeling by the President and probably by you about how State is really almost trying to act against the President and what he wants done.

K: No, no; I will tell you one thing that drives him up the wall. He gets an accumulation of stories -- he has a news summary made up every day -- not here, somewhere else -- of what goes on in the news and on television. When senior officials say they are appalled at the President's attitude; nobody can be surprised -- he has been saying it for three years. Joe, you have heard him say it.

S: Yes, I have.

I: I don't want to carry it on on the phone but Henry, it obviously breeds and makes the President very unhappy with the Department and I can understand the way he feels. On the other hand, if you talk about individuals or senior individuals but assume the President isn't referring to me, Joe or Mr. X but that he is talking about the Department.

K: No, no; he isn't talking about you or Joe.

I: I deplore as much as anyone could the idea of whether we try to make comments --

K: He likes as many arguments before a decision as he can get but it drives him crazy after a decision has been made for individuals to say what he must have meant, which is quite the opposite of what he said.

I: Leaks are one thing, and I wish I had the answer to that, but are there things that we have done that have delayed bureaucratically? They are really just putting out to the maximum. We are trying to respond as rapidly as possible.

K: We have gone through these crises before and I am a great admirer --

I: We are just trying to move quickly and we have moved quickly tonight and we are willing to.

K: Let's talk about it tomorrow. Believe me I am not here to make your life harder.

I: We just want to get the thing done.

K: Okay.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Joe Sisco
12/9/71; 7:25 p.m.

K: I forgot to mention one thing. Sander Vanocur has to get an
Administration guy to defend our position tomorrow. I know you
can't do it.

S: I asked McCloskey to try to find someone else. I can't do it with
going on Face the Nation. I don't know who to suggest -- that is the
problem.

K: I told him if it was not Sisco I didn't know who it would be.

S: I didn't know how Alex would feel about it.

K: Can I leave it in your hands? That's not a command performance.
I will tell Sander to check with you -- neither of us has an idea.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Secretary Connally/Mr. Kissinger

11:10 p.m., December 9, 1971

C: An item that raised my curiosity. In my reading material tonight is a note from David Kennedy which says the attached cable raises some important points which have been approved by the President on my NATO assessment along with a copy of a cable sent to you, looks like a December 2 date.

K: Ambassador to NATO.

C: Ambassador to NATO -- outlining conditions that are significant and sending a copy to me. I would obviously expect to coordinate my comments with Secretary Connally. It was a sweeping portfolio.

K: What he wants -- he retains some sort of ________. To attend NSC meetings doesn't mean a goddamn thing. NSC meeting on European issues. Any meeting we want to exclude him from, we just call a meeting for principals only. It pleased him to have some voice in the cables. International economic matters are handled by you with whatever assistance in the White House we can give you.

C: Ambassador to NATO?

K: He will be named in a few days. Don't you think that it is better than having him run around loose?

C: He's cutting himself out a pretty big swat.

K: You have got to have easy access to the President and secondly, you have got to know what the President wants. Nothing of these are fulfilled.

C: He sent me this cable and this note saying I thought you should have a copy.

K: There is no conceivable way it can affect him. He will not know anything.

C: Who is Greenwald?

K: I frankly asked the same question myself. Greenwald is the fellow we have got in Geneva.

C: Ambassador Greenwald?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

11:10 p.m., December 9, 1971 -- page 2

K: Ambassador to the ______ Community. He is one of these George Ball types. We don't mind having Kennedy keep a close eye on him. I think Kennedy is more our man than anyone.

C: I think he is completely loyal.

K: You can program him anyway you want to.

C: I think he's a good man and I think he would be a hell of a good "eyes and ears" for you.

K: 90% of his work will be in NATO. There will be no economic instructions that isn't written by you unless State sends him some. They will come from State but not from here. He will do less damage on State instructions than what State will do.

C: That's correct. Once you let him in, he will be loyal to the President. State has cut him every step of the way and he knows it.

K: If there is anything I feel passionate about in this job, it is the President has to have control of it.

C: If you don't like who you have negotiating, just change him.

K: To my knowledge, there is no question that you are running the show on economics. You are doing yours in the open; I am doing mine in secret. I always like to have one ring in which people can watch me.

C: That's right. I had a good visit with the President which I wanted to tell you about. Brought up and briefly outlined _______ and also brought up the question of Ind______.

K: That he has approved and wants done and giving instructions tomorrow.

C: That's good, I think.

K: State will get the instructions tomorrow and you will get the authority. I understand you to have said that you would favor my having a preliminary meeting with Pompidou. I didn't want to leave here with this India thing but I am planning to have a preliminary meeting with Pompidou for 1/2 hour on Sunday night. I will put it to him in the political context. Write me the brief of the terms you have in mind. Aside from what you give me, there is only ignorance on my part.

TELCORN
Secretary Connally/Mr. Kissinger

11:10 p.m., December 9, 1971 -- page 3

NARA, Dato

C: He brought this up and I told him I knew the access to Pompidou was Andre Meyer (sp?) but there might be somebody different that he would want. I said, how about Henry? Obviously, the President wanted to have what was possible before we got there.

K: The problem is I can't get there and back ...... Pompidou can decide on his own, he doesn't need 10 people to tell him. If it is the President, can go a little further.

C: ......

K: We have plenty of things to talk about. It's not a bad scheme.

C: It may work.

K: My instinct tells me he will try to make it work. I don't know whether your terms on Agriculture are too tough for him.

C: Not too tough. We don't have to agree on those in particular, just in general terms.

K: I will put it to him. If he will do it, he will do it.

C: For two reasons, it is well to dictate the parameter the President wants to speak in. Some idea so he can tell D'Estaing. I don't think he will tell D'Estaing a goddamn thing..... until he talks to President Nixon.

K: Until after he talks with the President. I am working on setting up an appointment in the Azores with him. If you could have something for me by the weekend.

C: You will have it.

K: Good.

TELECON

Sec. Irwin

12/10/71 9:00am

By. NARA, Date 5/26

I: Have you seen the flash message just in from East Pakistan about the Pakistani army request for cease-fire?

K: No.

I: There is one in. The Pakistani army with General ______ in command has asked for cease-fire, repatriation of ______, ______ ask UN to arrange this and a UN fellow named Paul Henri called together the British, Frnech, Soviets . . .

K: Why don't you come right over?

8 I: Why don't we be over at 9:30?

K: Right. I have a meeting in the President's office at 10:00 but we can deal with this in half an hour.

I: Okay; we'll get the scenario for the UN.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Bush/Kissinger
10:30 a.m. 12/10/71

K: While Jack is here want you to know the President's view. Doesn't want anyone to say we pushed Pakistan over the edge. We are helping them. Want to prevent India onslaught in W. Pakistan.

B: The other point -- the Indians have just discussed with Under Secretary General of UN. His reaction is Yahya should get in touch with Mujib. Is it an army question. Third, if it's repatriation of the army, will it fight in West or fighting for both governments. It's unofficial because I don't know if the fellow has the whole memo yet. I think we know what to do and we will act accordingly.

Hrwin: We will keep in touch, George.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Sisco/Kissinger

11:30 a.m. 12/10/71

S: Henry, we just got word from New York that the Paks want to make a change in that document. They have pulled it back. It has not been submitted to the Security Council and they are now in the process of changing it. Let me get your judgment on one thing. Do you think that George ought to call the UN representatives and say to them I understand you pulled the document back and try to ascertain the reasons. I don't want to authorize George until you have thought about this. I think it would be a good idea for George to call the Paks and try to find out the reason for this. I said to George to do absolutely nothing until you hear from you.

K: Let me think about it and I will get back to you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Raza/Kissinger

1:03 p. m. 12/1/71

R: Would it be possible for me to get in touch with you in NY?

K: The WH will know.

R: Shall I get in touch with you?

K: It's good to call the WH. The WH switch board is always in touch with me.

R: Col. Knox?

K: Kennedy. The WH can always reach me.

R: Don't forget that special source.

K: I am seeing them and your other friends too.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Vorotnxov/Kissinger
1:27 p. m. 12/10/71

K: I just spoke with the President before going off. I think this is basically clear but I wanted to be sure there was no ambiguity left. It seems to us that basically your proposal is being accepted and therefore even harder to understand adelay in the joint action.

V: I understand and I proceeded from that assumption.

K: So some formulation should begin between East and West Pakistan. It's not exact text but NASAR substance.

V: When I was reading the paper, in what form this joint action should be.

K: ? ? ? ? Security Council?

V: That's clear.

K: Consider other proposals as well.

V: I will make that clarification.

K: The language you have is more precise then one I gave you.

V: I understand.

K: We will draft something in Security Council type-language and get it to you this afternoon.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E10268
By: C.P. NARA Date: 9/1/71

TELCOM

Vorontsov/Kissinger

1:35 p. m.

12/10/71

K: I have to tell State a little about these exchanges so they don't run wild at the UN. I don't want them to present a resolution that embarrass you this afternoon. I am giving a brief oral summary of where we stand. No matter who approaches you, deal only with me.

V: I understand that.

K: I have to tell them because otherwise it will be unmanageable at the UN.

V: Later on.

K: No, now. We are under great pressure to introduce resolution to **max** condemn India. Until we here your answers we don't want a clash with you. No sense in Malik voting until he has instructions.

V: It's night in Moscow so he will not get them until tomorrow.

K: So, no rush.

V: Any approaches for us will not go.

K: Your proposal at the UN isn't new. This is reaffirmed by Mr. Brezhnev (?).

V: ? ? ? ? ? specially mentioning Brezhnev this morning. In Moscow done very **xx** narrow basis.

K: I will make sure nothing goes into diplomatic channel. That Beam doesn't speak with someone there about it.

V: It's embarrassing to all diplomatic channels because they know nothing about contacts between Brezhnev and President.

K: It's only on this narrow issue. I am going to NY and Gen. Haig also. So Col. Kennedy is the one to contact. He will find me immediately.

XX

TELCONE
Vorotnxov/Kissinger

1:27 p. m.

12/10/71

K: So some formulation should begin between East and West Pakistan. It's not exact text but *substance*.

K: ? ? ? ? Security Council?

V: That's clear.

K: The language you have is more precise than one I gave you.

V: I understand.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOLAST
By CHNARA Date 12/10/71

U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

5:23 p.m.

12/10/71

NARA, Dato 5/26

J: What Jack brought over was not accepted?

K: Could he present them. After he stated what he wanted he walked out of the room.
I went after to soften things.

J: Things we discussed this morning and things about discussion with Yahya.

K: Can you send them back over?

J: Let me call Jack.

K: They are neither approved or disapproved. They were not considered. Could you make sure no leaks on the scheme of this morning. It's not in favor of it but more chance of working if Russians assimilate conversation and then do it.

J: No one here but Jack and Chris and I.

K: Sometimes Joe goes over.

J: These telegrams are what we discussed this morning. I don't know why he didn't present them.

K: Because the President was so sharp he didn't give him a chance.

J: I see. I will call Jack and see where it stands.

TELCON

Johnson/Col. Kennedy

6:00 p.m. 12/10/71

NARA, Date 5/26

K: Just got a call from Henry. He talked with the President sometime this afternoon. He didn't know if anyone had a thought of the Secretary stopping off to see Bhutto.

J: Coming directly here. Due at 8:00. We can talk tomorrow about what we do on Bhutto. I understand George is seeing him. We will be here for a hearing from him. You saw the Pakistanis are changing signals?

K: Yes. I called attention to the incoming. Everyone is thinking. Slightly different ball game.

J: In obvious confusion. It will depend on what Bhutto knows and what his instructions are.

K: How long has he been travelling?

J: A couple of days.

K: So he can't know about this.

J: And a notorious free-wheeler.

K: If we heard two months ago that ? ? ? ? and Bhutto did form a new government we would think that's a crisis. Also Henry asked that if we could ask the Secy. not to see Vorontsov. You understand.

J: Yeah. OK.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Col. Kennedy/Ambassador Raza
6:25 p.m. 12-10-71

Amb. Raza: I just had a talk with Henry. He asked me to confirm to him through you that he will be breakfasting tomorrow at 8:00 a.m. with PM Bhutto at our permanent representative house. He said to confirm it with you--Mr. Shahi, address: 47 E. 92nd Street, along with Amb. Bush. Henry wanted to bring Bush. We will have the car waiting for him.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Col. Kennedy/Admiral Moorer

6:30 p.m. 12-10-71

Adm. Moorer: I know that most of your people are out of town, but I wanted to keep you aware of the situation we have. Got those ships moving to that point. Some time Sunday--we have to make a move to what they will do next. Several alternatives.

Col. Kennedy: Yes, we are aware of that.

Adm. Moorer: I just didn't want you to forget them. Someone has to tell them what to do next.

CK: I will be talking with Al tonight.