CHAPTER V ON NEGOTIATIONS

I. The Intractability of Diplomacy

As armaments have multiplied and the risks of
conflict have become increasingly catastrophic, the
demands for a "new approach" to end tensions have grown
ever more insistent. No country, it is said,
has any alternative except to seek to attain its aims
negotiations
by which The Cold War must be ended in order to
spare mankind the horrors of a hot war: "The stark and
inescapable fact is that today we cannot defend our
society by war since total war is total destruction and if
war is used as an instrument of policy eventually we will
have total war," wrote Lester Pearson. "We prepare for
war like precocious giants and for peace like retarded
pigmies."1

There is no doubt that the avoidance of war must be
a primary goal of all responsible statesmen. The desirability

1. Lester Pearson, "The Time Has Come." State of the Union Address, 1958.

Address, 1928.
F. Leiber Pearson. "The Time Has Come." State of the Union

a primary goal of all reasonable statements. The desirability
There is no doubt that the avoidance of war must be
biggest."

war like brooding clouds and for these like retched
have total war," wrote Leiber Pearson. "We brocade for
war is need as an instrument of policy eventually we will
society. War since total war is total destruction and it
inescapable fact is that today we cannot defend our
abuse mawking the horrors of a hot war: "The stark and
paleNegotiation
The Cold War must be ended in order to
has any alternative except to seek to attain its aims
ever more inattentive. No country, it is said,
gemands for a "new approach" to end tensions have grown
conflict have become increasingly cataclysmic, the
Vs armaments have multiplied and the risks of

CHAPTER V ON NEGOTIATIONS

of maintaining peace cannot be the subject of either
intellectual or partisan political controversy in the
free world. The question is how best to achieve this
objective.

And here there is reason for serious concern.

A welter of slogans fill the air. "Relaxation of tensions", "flexibility", "New approaches", "Negotiable proposals", put forth are variously proposed as remedies to the impasse of the Cold War. But the programs to give these phrases meaning have proved much more difficult to define. The impression has been created that the missing ingredient has been a "willingness to negotiate". While this criticism is correct for some periods, particularly John Foster Dulles' incumbency as Secretary of State, it is not a just comment when applied to the entire post-war era. Hardly a year has passed without at least some negotiation with the Communist countries. There have been six foreign

Ministerial Conferences, and three summit meetings. Periods of intransigence have alternated with spasmodic efforts to settle all problems at one fell swoop. The abortive summit meeting of 1960 proved that tensions have sometimes been increased as much by the manner in which diplomacy has been conducted as by the refusal to negotiate. The Cold War has been perpetuated not only by the abdication of diplomacy but also by its emptiness and sterility.

What then has caused the conduct of diplomacy to be so difficult? Why have tensions remained so constant whether we negotiated or failed to negotiate? There are four basic factors: (a) the destructiveness of modern weapons; (b) the polarization of power in the contemporary period; (c) the nature of the conflict; (d) national attitudes peculiar to the West and particularly to the United States.

United States.

attitudes become similar to the rest and similarly the
period: (a) the nature of the conflict; (b) national
measures; (c) the polarization of power in the contemporary
are four basic features: (a) the destru ctiveness of modern
whether we negotiated or failed to negotiate? There

be so difficult? Why have tensions remained so-complex
What then has caused the conflict of diplomacy be-
and sterility.

by the application of diplomacy but also by its emptiness
negotiate. The Cold War has been penetrated not only
diplomacy has been conducted as by the refusal to
times been increased as much by the manner in which
summit meeting of 1960 proved that tensions have some-
to settle all problems at one fell swoop. The offensive
of intransigence have alternated with abysmotic efforts
Ministerial Conferences, and three summit meetings. Periods

It is not an accident that the diplomatic stalemate has become more intractable as weapons have grown more destructive. Rather than facilitating settlement, the increasing horror of war has made the process of negotiations more difficult. Historically, negotiators have rarely relied exclusively on the persuasiveness of the argument. A country's bargaining position has traditionally depended not only on the logic of its proposals but also on the penalties it could exact for the other side's failure to agree. An abortive conference rarely returned matters to the starting point. Rather, diplomacy having failed, other pressures were brought into play. Even at the Congress of Vienna, as been long considered a model diplomatic conference, the settlement which maintained the peace of Europe for a century was not achieved without the threat of war.

As the risks of war have become more cataclysmic,

As the risks of war have become more catastrophic,

maintained the peace of Europe for a century, war not
the model diplomatic conference, the settlement which
began at the Congress of Vienna, long considered
possible.

A country's belligerent position has traditionally depended not
only on the logic of its proposals but also on the
pursuit of power and the other side's lieuten
benevolence of the argument. A country's
negotiators have rarely relied exclusively on the
process of negotiations more difficult. Historically,
settlement, the increasing power of war has made
have grown more destructive. Rather than facilitating
atrocities has become more intractable as weapons
It is not an accident that the diplomatic

the exerting
all others, shifting coalitions could be used for bringing pressure
They served in a sense as substitutes for physical conflict,
or marshalling support. In the classical periods of cabinet diplomacy

in the 18th and 19th century, a country's diplomatic flexibility and
bargaining position depended on its availability as a
partner to as many other countries as possible. As a result, no
relationship was considered permanent and no conflict was pushed to
its ultimate conclusion. Disputes were limited by the tacit agreement
that the maintenance of the existing system was more important than
any particular disagreement. Wars occurred, but they did not risk
the national survival and they were settled in relation to specific,
limited issues.

Whenever the number of sovereign states was reduced, diplomacy
became more rigid. When a unified Germany and Italy emerged in the
19th century, they replaced a host of smaller principalities. This
reflected the dominant currents of nationalism. But from the point
of view of diplomatic relationships, some of the "play" was taken
out of the conduct of foreign policy. To the extent that the available
diplomatic options diminished, the temptation to achieve security by

["dipolar options diminished, the relaxation to achieve security by\nout of the conduct of foreign policy. To the extent that the available\nof view of diplomatic relations, some of the "bribe" was taken\nreflected the dominant currents of nationalism. But from the point\n18th century, finally replaced a host of smaller branches. This\nbecame more rigid. When a united Germany and Italy emerged in the\nwhenever the number of sovereign states was reduced, diplomacy\nlimited issues.", "the national survival and thus were settled in relation to specific\nand boundary disagreement. We occurred but they did not risk\nthat the maintenance of the existing system was more important than\nthe ultimate conclusion. Debates were limited by the fact agreement\nrelationship was considered permanent and no conflict was based to\nbarrier to as many other countries as possible. As a result, no\npursuing position depended on the acquiescence to be available as a\nin the 18th and 19th century, a country's diplomatic flexibility and\nor were fulfilling embodiment. In the classical period of Cabinet diplomacy\nthey remained in a sense aplaceholder for ideological commitment.\nwherefore, shifting conditions could be need for meaningful breviation", ""]

I - 7

mobilizing a country's physical strength increased.
The armaments race prior to World War I was as much
the result as the cause of the inflexibility of
diplomacy. France and Germany were in fundamental
conflict. And neither state could organize an over-
whelming coalition. As a result, power had to sub-
ditute for diplomatic dexterity and the period prior
witnessed a continuous
to World War I saw an ever greater increase of the
standing armies.

World War I accelerated the polarization of power.
By the end of World War II only two major countries
remained -- major in the sense of having some prospect
of assuring their security from their own resources.

But a two-power world is inherently unstable. Any
relative weakening of one side is tantamount to an
absolute strengthening of the other. Every issue
seems to involve life and death. Diplomacy turns rigid,

for no state can negotiate about what it considers to
be the requirements of its survival. In a two-power
world these requirements are likely to appear mutually
incompatible.

The area where diplomacy is most necessary will then
appear most "unnegotiable."

The inherent tensions of a two-power world are com-
pounded by the clash of opposing ideologies. For over
a generation now

a generation now ! ! !
bombed by the crash of obsoving ideologues. For over

The inherent逻辑of a two-bower world are com-
itten most "unnegotiable".

The area where diplomacy is most necessarily will then
world these requirements are likely to appear. Unfortunately,
be the requirements of its arrival. In a two-bower

the Communist leaders have proclaimed their devotion to the over-
throw of the capitalist world. They have insisted that the economic
system of their opponents was based on exploitation and war. They
asserting the inevitability or the crucial importance
have never wavered from the assertion of their inevitable triumph.
of their

To be sure, periods of peaceful coexistence have alternated with
belligerence, particularly since the advent of Mr. Khrushchev. But
one of
the principal
the justification for detente can hardly prove too reassuring to
the free world. Peace is advocated not for its own sake but
because war is no longer necessary to produce
the non-Communist world. The West is said to have grown so weak
that it will go to perdition without a last convulsive upheaval.
At the height of the spirit of Camp David, Khrushchev said: "The
capitalist world is shaking under the blows of the Socialist camp.
What shakes it even more than the rockets is the attitude of
our workers towards their work...We have the will to win."²

Negotiations with Communist leaders are complicated by
one of the key aspects of Leninist theory: the belief in the

2. *New York Times*, December 3, 1959.

predominance of "objective" factors. One of the proudest claims
of the Communist leaders is that in Marxist-Leninist theory they
possess a tool enabling them to distinguish appearance from reality.

"True" reality consists not of what statesmen say but of the
productive processes—the social and economic structure of their
country. Statesmen, particularly capitalist statesmen, are
powerless to alter the main outlines of the policy their system
imposes on them. Since everything depends on a correct understanding
of these "objective factors" and the relation of forces they imply,

"good will" and "good faith" are meaningless abstractions. One of
the chief functions of traditional diplomacy is to persuade the
opposite party of one's view point, becomes extremely difficult
when verbal declarations are discounted from the outset.

Khrushchev said in 1959: "History teaches us that conferences
reflect in their decisions an established balance of forces re-
sulting from victory or capitulation in war or similar circumstances."

3. Speech at Leipzig,

March 5, 1959, text quoted in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 6, 1959.
March 7, 1959, quoted in *Foreign Radio Broadcasts:*
*Daily Report*, No. 62, 1959, BB 16.

Daily Report, No. 28, 1929, pp. 10.

March 1, 1929, printed in Foreign Radio Broadcasts;

enacting from victory or capitulation in war or similar circumstances.

Reflect in their decisions an appraised sense of loss or
enjoyment said in 1929: "Historical conferences
whenверal decisions are discounted than the actual.

obvious basis of one's view being, becomes extremely difficult
the effect functions of traditional influence, so because the
"good will" and "good faith" are meaningful interactions. One of
these "objective factors" and the relation of loss and injury,
induces on them. Since everything depends on a correct understanding
between the main outlines of the briefly stated system

beneath to suffer the main outline of the briefly stated system
country. Statements, particularly capitalistic statements, are
profoundly processes—the social and economic structure of their
"true reality" consists not of what statements say but of the
process a tool engaging them to架bridge substance from reality.

of the Communist leaders is that in Marxist-theoretic theory the
precedence of "objective factors". One of the broadest claims

is "True reality consists not of what statements say but of the
profoundly processes—the social and economic structure of their
"True reality consists not of what statements say but of the
process a tool engaging them to架bridge substance from reality.
of the Communist leaders is that in Marxist-theoretic theory the
precedence of "objective factors". One of the broadest claims

I-10

Much of the diplomatic stalemate has therefore little to do
with lack of good will or ingenuity on the part of the statesmen. With-
out an agreement on general principles, negotiations are likely to be
difficult.
What will seem most obvious to one party will appear most
sterile. What will seem most obvious to one party will appear most
elusive to the other. When there is no penalty for failing to agree and
when at the same time the balance of power is so tenuous, it is no ac-
cident that the existing dividing lines are so rigidly maintained.
For the status quo has at least the advantage of familiarity while EMM
any change involves the possibility of catastrophe. At the same time,
since these dividing lines are contested, protracted tension is nearly
inevitable.

This impasse has led either to long periods in which diplomacy
has no all practical purposes abdicated its role. Or else it has pro-
duced a form of negotiations which has almost seemed to revel in not
coming to grips with the issues dividing the world. The reference which
is often made to the coexistence achieved by Mohammedanism and Christianity
or by protestantism and Catholicism is not fully relevant to the contemporary
problem. In both cases, coexistence was the result of protracted, often
ruinous, warfare -- the very ...

I - II

We must be aware that the factors that intensify contingency diplomacy is now asked to prevent. The desire to resolve of the Cold War the present impasse must not blind us to the fact that the factors which make this effort so necessary also make a creative response more difficult.

These obstacles to serious negotiations would be serious enough. They are magnified by the difficulty posed by American, and in fact Western, attitudes towards negotiating with the Communists. A status quo power always has difficulty in coming to grips with a revolutionary period. Since everything it considersfix "normal" is tied up with the existing order, it usually recognizes not to be certain until too late that another state means to over-throw the international system. This is a particular problem especially if the revolutionary state presents each demand as a specific, limited objective which in itself may seem quite reasonable. If it alternates pressure with campaigns for peaceful coexistence, it may give rise to the belief that only one more concession stands in the way of the era of good feeling which is so passionately desired. All the instincts of a status quo power tempt it to

gear its policy to the expectation of a fundamental
change of heart of its opponent — in the direction
of what seems obviously "natural" to it.

Were it not for this difficulty of understanding, no
revolution would ever have succeeded. A revolutionary movement
always starts from a position of inferior strength. It owes its
survival to the reluctance of its declared victims to accept its
professions at face value. It owes its success to the psychological
advantage which single-minded purpose confers even on an opponent.
who *do not believe that some states* may prefer victory to
peace. The ambiguity of the Soviet challenge *derives in part*
from the skill of the Soviet leadership. But it is magnified
by the tendency of the free world to choose the interpretation
*fits* of Soviet motivations which best accord with its own pre-
conceptions. Neither Lenin's writings, nor Stalin's utterances,
nor Mao's published works, nor Khrushchev's declarations *have had*
availed against the conviction of the West that a basic change in
Communist society and aims was imminent and that a problem deferred
was a problem solved.

I - 10/13

It is only to posterity that revolutionary movements appear unambiguous. However weak it may be at the beginning, a revolutionary state is often able to substitute psychological strength for physical power. It can use the very enormity of its goals to defeat an opponent who cannot come to grips with a policy of unlimited objectives.

The United States has had particular difficulty in this respect. From the moment in our national history when we turned our predominant attention to domestic development, we met very few obstacles that were really insuperable. We were almost uniquely blessed with the kind of environment in which the problems that were presented--those at least that we really wanted to solve--were difficult but manageable. Nearly all of them were of the fairly straightforward and material kind that will yield to human energy if sufficiently applied. Almost from our colonial infancy, we have been trained to measure a man, a government, or an era by the degree of energy with which they attacked their contemporary problems--and hence by the success in finding a

1-14

final, definite solution. If problems were not solved, this was because not enough energy or enough resolution had been applied. The leadership or the government was clearly at fault. A better government or a better man would have mastered the situation. Better men and a better government, when we provide them, _will_ solve all issues _in our time_.

As a result, we are not comfortable with seemingly insoluble problems. There must be _some_ way to achieve peace if only the correct method is utilized. Many of the erratic tendencies in American policy are traceable to our impatience. The lack of persistence, _in American policy_, the oscillation between rigid adherence to _persistence in the status quo_ and _novelty for its own sake_, shows our discomfort with _protracted deadlock_.

We grow restless when good will goes unrewarded _when_ and _with_ proposals which have to be maintained over a long period of time.

a long period of time.

and with proposals which have to be maintained over
until we know reassurance when good will go on unremitted
sake upon our discomfort with broachedegree.

then first fully

- benevolence in the status quo and novelty for its own
- significance to the oscillation between right

in American buffer the oscillation between right
- significance to our
- benevolence in the status quo and novelty for its own
- significance to the oscillation between right

traceable to our imbalance.

The lack of benevolence
of the erratic tendencies in American policy are
based on the only correct method is utilized. May
inadequate problems. There what be some way to achieve

As a result, we are not comfortable with seemingly
them, will solve all issues in our time.

Better men and a better Government, when we provide
or a better man would have matched the situation.

Government was clearly at fault. A better Government
resolution had been abetted. The leadership or the
solved, this was because not enough energy or enough
timer, definite solution. It problems were not

## II - 2

of

or in 1939 had depended on America's willingness to commit itself

the aggressor would have prevailed without opposition. Neither

the invasion of Belgium nor the attack on Poland seemed to

Americans of the time to impair our security sufficiently to

run the risks of war.

to the extent that we should

Because of our distance from the scene and our in-
vulnerability we developed notions of war and peace both mechanical
and absolutist. Peace seemed to us the "normal" relation
among states. This is another way of saying that we were
satisfied with the international order as it was and wished
to enjoy its benefits undisturbed. The instrument for settling
disputes during periods of peace was diplomacy which we con-
ceived as analogous to commercial negotiations, attaching a
disproportionate emphasis to bargaining technique. Because the
advantages of peace seemed self-evident, we necessarily had to
ascribe the cause of war to the machinations of wicked men.
Our military actions were thereby transformed into crusades

Our military actions were thereby transformed into crusades
seize the cause of war to the machinations of smoked men.
adjudicate of because deemed self-evident, we necessarily had to
disproportionate expatriate to pertaining technique. Because the
civilized analogs to commercial negotiations, attaching a
debture during before of because was diplomatically which we con-
to enjoy its benefits undisturbed. The instrument for settling
arbitiated with the international order as it was and viewed
enormous states. This is another way of asking that we were
and specialist. Because seemed to us the "normal" relation
anxiety we developed notions of war and because both mechanical
Because of our distance from the scene and our in-
raw the risks of war.

American of the time to impair our security-efficiency-to
the invasion of Belgium nor the attack on Poland seemed to
the attrester would have prevailed without opposition. Neither
or in 1936 had depended on America's willingness to commit itself
of

II - 3

to punish the aggressor. Once this was accomplished, the "normal"
pattern of international relations would reassert itself. Since
we were satisfied with the existing international system--it
seemed so natural to us that we never thought of it as a system--
we rarely addressed ourselves to the problem of the nature of a
stable international order.

The notion that war and peace were successive, separate and
separated phases of policy has been at the root of much of our
post-war policy. It came to expression in the dominant Western
policy of the post-war period; the policy of containment. This
was based on the assumption that a substantial effort to rebuild
Western strength had to precede any serious negotiation with the
Soviet Union. Conferences would be futile until the communist
countries found themselves confronted by preponderant strength
all around their periphery. "What we must do," said Secretary
Acheson, "is to create situations of strength; we must build
strength; and if we create that strength then I think the whole
situation in the world begins to change...With that change there

situation in the world begins to change...with that change there
strength; and if we create that strength then I think the whole
Anderson, "to create situations of strength" we must find
still strong their brotherhood." When we want to, "a third secretly
countries found themselves confronted by preponderant strength
Soviet Union. Conferences would be battle until the communist
Western strengths had to battle and serious negotiation with the
war began on the assumption that a substantial effort to repair
bitterness of the host-war period; the bitter of contention. This
host-war bitter. It came to expression in the dominant Western
emphasized phase of bitter has been at the root of much of our

The notion that war and peace were successive phases

of the international order.

we rarely addressed ourselves to the problem of the nature of a
seemed so natural to us that we never thought of it as a problem...
we were actuated with the existing international situation--it
began of international relations would research itself. Since
so baneful the aggressor. Once again we succumbed to the "normal"

II - 3

II - 4

comes a difference in the negotiating position of the various
parties and out of that I should hope that there would be a
willingness on the part of the Kremlin to recognize the facts...
and to begin to solve at least some of the difficulties between
East and West.

In the context of 1951, these statements were highly
plausible. After three years of Communist provocation, after
the Berlin blockade and the invasion of Korea, it was under-
standable that we should have given priority to achieving security against
Soviet invasion. How the strength we were building was to be
conveyed to the Communist leaders, how precisely one went about
negotiating from strength seemed then questions not worth con-
sidering. Expansionism was believed inherent in Stalinist
Communism. Thwarted in the possibility of foreign adventures,
Communism would have to transform itself. At that point
fruitful negotiations would be possible.

4. United States Senate, Committee on Government Operations, "Military Situation in the Far East," p. 2083.

Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress, "Military Situation in the Far East," p. 2083.

II - 5

Given the atmosphere of disillusionment after the war, time hopes of a reconciled humanity, this view of the nature of negotiations was inevitable. But as the containment theory came to be applied under Secretary Dulles, what had originally been considered the condition of policy--security against aggression--seemed to become its only goal. The Baghdad Pact, SEATO, the Eisenhower Doctrine marked steps of a policy which seemed unable to articulate its purpose save to prevent an expansion of the Soviet sphere. In the process, many of the difficulties which earlier had been obscured by the fear of imminent Soviet aggression became apparent. As Soviet pressure grew more subtle, the preoccupation with the military aspect of containment made it increasingly difficult to rally the people of the West for the effort to insure their security. The longer we deferred negotiations, the easier it became for the Soviet leaders to maneuver us into the position of being the intransigent party. The closer we approached the theoretical point at which, according to the containment theory, fruitful negotiations should have been possible, the more elusive they seemed.

II - 6

the literal meaning of our view of containment caused us to be mesmerized by the vast Soviet ground strength. Though the Soviet Union could have overrun Europe at any time, it was in a very inferior position for a show-down until 1956 at least.

By our obsession with building strength, we overlooked that our relative military position would never be better than at the very beginning of the containment policy. We were so aware of the vulnerability of our allies that we underestimated the bargaining power inherent in our industrial potential and our nuclear superiority. By deferring negotiations until we had mobilized more of our military potential, we in fact gave the Soviet Union time—the most precious commodity considering its losses in World War II, its inferiority in the nuclear field and the need to consolidate its conquests.

The Western statesman who understood this problem best was Sir Winston Churchill. His repeated calls for a diplomatic confrontation in 1948 and 1949 were based on the realization that a failure to negotiate would mortgage the future. In a major,

a failure to negotiate would mortgage the future. In a major
confrontation in 1948 and 1949 were placed on the realization that
was Sir Winston Churchill. His repeated caffes for a diplomatic
The Western statesman who understood this better put
conFEReNCE

conclude its conduct.

Time...the most basic commodity considering its uses in World
more of our military potential, we in fact have the Soviet Union
inferiority. By deferring negotiations until we had modified
power inherent in our industrial potential and our nuclear
necessity of our safety that we underestimated the pertaining
beginning of the containment policy. We were so aware of the any-
relative military position would never be better than at the very

Because it was our operation with pugnant strength, we overlooked that our
a very inferior position for a show-down until 1960 at least.

Soviet Union could have overruled Europe at any time, it was in

be measured by the vast Soviet ground strength. Though the

The literality of our alien of containment ceased us to

II - 9

the literature of our alien of containment ceased us to

II - 7

much neglected speech, he said in 1948⁵:

The question is asked: What will happen when they get the atomic bomb themselves and have accumulated a large store? You can judge yourselves what will happen then by what is happening now. If these things are done in the green wood, what will be done in the dry? If they can continue month after month disturbing and tormenting the world, trusting to our Christian and altruistic inhibitions against using this strange new power against them, what will they do when they themselves have large quantities of atomic bombs? ... No one in his senses can believe that we have a limitless period of time before us. We ought to bring matters to a head and make a final settlement. We ought not to go jogging along improvident, incompetent, waiting for something to turn up, by which I mean waiting for something bad for us to turn up. The Western Nations will be far more likely to reach a lasting settlement, without bloodshed, if they formulate their just demands while they have the atomic power and before the Russian Communists have got it too.

⁵ Winston Churchill, Speech at Llandudno, October 9, 1948, quoted by *New York Times*, October 10, 1948.

II - 9

do not happen. But unless there is aggression our strength is not demonstrated, and nor supply no incentive to negotiate. Since Secretary Dulles was unwilling to assume the diplomatic initiative, a stalemate was the inevitable consequence.

As ever more destructive weapons entered the weapons arsenals and as the notion that war was unthinkable began to gain currency, many of the benefits we had once expected to realize to result from a position of strength failed to materialize. At the precise moment when, according to the theory of containment, positions of strength should have led to fruitful negotiations, the peoples of the Western world began to waver. Because strength proved so elusive and because the Cold War persisted, many drew the conclusion that the containment policy had been wrong altogether. Containment was not criticized for being too one-sided. Rather, the preposterous argument was advanced in many quarters that since strength had produced a stalemate, weakness, by reassuring the Soviet Union, might lead to a settlement. The assumption

the Soviet Union, might lead to a settlement. The assumption
strength, having produced a stalemate, weakness, by reason
argument was advanced in many quarters that the great for
criticized for being too one-sided. Rather, the preponderant
ment policy had been wrong altogether. Containment was not
Cold War bereaved, many drew the conclusion that the contam-
ner. Because strength proved so effective and became the
negotiations, the peoples of the West would began to
tainment, positions of strength should have led to fruitful
At the precise moment when, according to the theory of con-
tainment from a position of strength failed to materialize,
to gain currency, many of the penalties we had once expected
anerafa and so the notion that war was undrinkable began
We ever more destructive weapons entered the weapons
initiative, a stalemate was the inevitable consequence.

Since Secretary Dulles was unwitting to assume the diplomatic
is not demonstrated, and may abduct no incentive to negotiate.
do not happen. But unless there is aggression on any strength

II - 9

III The Reliance on Personalities: The Problem of Summit Meetings

When the Paris summit meeting collapsed, a sudden reversal took place in the West. What for years had been advocated as the magic solvent of all tensions came to be considered as a parody of diplomacy. Within the span of weeks, all the arguments in behalf of summit diplomacy which had seemed so persuasive while the conference was being planned were replaced by their precise opposite.

Personal diplomacy, which had been thought capable of ending the Cold War, was now held responsible for perpetuating it. As Mr. Khrushchev's mood changed, the West seemed as much in danger of being meesterized by his frown as it had earlier been beguiled by his smile.

Yet the panicky reaction to a crisis obscured what should
have been the major focus of the debate. After all, if the risks
of summit diplomacy were so obvious, why in the months preceding
the fiasco at Paris had no one pointed out these perils. Why was

["the French at Paris had no one pointed out these barbs. Why was the summit diplomacy so so opalescent, why in the months preceding June 1958 did the major locus of the debate, after all, it the risks have been the major locus of the debate. Yet the benetton reaction to a criteria opacified what should be and why.", "being measured by fits from us as it had earlier been pecked out by Kruppeneck's a wood changed, the West seemed so much in danger of Cold War, was now held reasonable for berating us. As Mr. Kruppeneck's a wood changed, the

III-2

it that there had been practically no discussion of the vagueness
and superficiality which had attached so much importance to the
fact of a meeting and which had paid so little attention to its
purpose or content? Even without our inept handling of the U-2
incident it was not clear what a summit conference assembled in
this particular manner and with this particular preparation should
be able to accomplish.

The cause of this state of affairs derives from our notion
of peace as described previously. If peace is the UN normal"
relation among states, it follows that tensions must be caused by
short-sightedness or misunderstanding and that they can be
removed by a change of heart of the leading statesmen. This
accounts for the pervasiveness of the belief in the efficacy of
personal diplomacy. President Eisenhower, before embarking on
an unprecedented round of visits to foreign capitals, was at pains
to insist that his purpose was to "clear" the atmosphere rather

to instat that pla burpoe was to "clear" the atmosphere rather
an unrepresented round of visits to foreign capitals, was at least
benevolent diplomacy. President Kennedy, before embarking on
accounts for the belligerence of the diet in the efficacy of
removed by a change of heart of the leading statesmen. This
short-circumvention or misnumbering and that they can be
related among states, it follows that tement must be caused by
of peace as described previously. It because it the "normal"
the cause of this state of affairs derives from our notion
be able to accomplish.

This particular manner and with this particular preparation should
incident it was not clear what a summit conference attempted in
burpoe or content? Even without our naiveypoing of the U-3
lect of a meeting and which had held so little attention to its
and arbitrariness which had attached so much importance to the
it that there had been practically no discussion of the arguments

III-1

III-3

than to negotiate. If peace ultimately depends on personalities,
abstract goodwill may well seem more important than a concrete
program. Indeed, the attempt to achieve specific settlements can
appear as an obstacle rather than as an aid to peace. "Our many
post-war conferences," said President Eisenhower in 1955, prior to
the Geneva summit conference, "have been characterized too much by
attention to detail, by an effort apparently to work on specific
problems rather than to establish the spirit and the attitude in which
we shall approach them."

Within two years of assuming office, President Eisenhower, whose
party had charged its opponents with being soft towards Communism,
found himself engaged in a summit meeting which called forth a flood
of self-congratulatory comment, both in America and abroad. After a
decade of Soviet intransigence the press was almost unanimous in
its assertion that Soviet policy had been mellowed by the personal
charm of one man. "No one would want to underestimate the change
in the Russian attitude," said the New York Herald Tribune. "Without

6. *New York Times*, July 16, 1955.

III-4

that, nothing would have been possible. But it remains President

Eisenhower's achievement that he comprehended the change, that he

7 seized the opening and turned it to the advantage of world peace."

"Mr. Eisenhower had done even better than defeat an enemy in battle as had been his assignment a decade ago," read an editorial in the *New York Times*. "He had done something to prevent battles from happening...The occasion was, in fact, made for Mr. Eisenhower. Other men might have played strength against strength. It was Mr. Eisenhower's gift to draw others into the circle of his goodwill and to modify the attitudes if not the policies of the little band of visitors from the other side of the Elbe."

The conviction was widespread on both sides of the Atlantic that the Cold War had been due largely to personal distrust. Since this had been removed at Geneva, an era of peace was beginning: "It is indeed an intense sense of relief which unites President Eisenhower with President Bulganin (sic). Neither ever conceived that his own 7. *New York Herald Tribune*, Editorial, July 21, 1955.

8. *New York Times*, Editorial, July 22, 1955.