Negotiating Items in Turn

I. Pause in Air Attack

What do we want DRV to stop?

What do we really want?

What is a good starting position?

Direct physical shipment of supplies

Sanctuary for combatants

Sanctuary for planning

Direction

Can we monitor by means better than unilateral intelligence?

Inspectors - do they find intervention or certify non-intervention?

Is latter ignorance or conviction?

2 costs of inspection

(a) prolongs ngotiation

(b) intermediary brought in

(c) Intermediary has incentive to find nothing be-
because to do so would involve commitment to
a risky action.

What is sanction for violation?

Should have leverage other than renewal war. If our only sanction is to
renew bombing and if we are reluctant to do it we will have incentive to over-
look violations.

Consequences of Pause in Air Attacks: If DRV stops infiltration (or says it does) in return for pause in air attacks, this must lead to recognition of NLF because non-intereference of DRV is then certified.

What contingency are we addressing: (1) Are VC autonomous; (2) Are
DRV in control?

May be better to deal with VC only bilaterally to avoid legitimizing them.
One could conceive agreement that two outside powers (US-DRV) stop inter-
vention: US forcesstop at present point of build-up.
DRV withdraw units.

-2

Are we better off when it is officially US-VC war? How do we look when we need 500th men to contain indigenous force? Whatever control of DRV over VC, might VC have incentive to stop to save DRV?

## Other Pause Problems

Does that mean no overflights for reconnaissance?

More likely tacit than formal outcomes (because DRV cannot admit (a) that it is largely in control; (b) that it stops supporting compatriots in South).

Whether tacit or formal such an agreement is likely to be non-inspectable. Formally accept US presence in SVN simply for end of air attacks. Once stopped hard to resume.

**Tacit agreements** - Are there any conditions in which we would stop bombing without formal agreement? What other tacit outcomes are possible?

**Tacit means** - DRV must do something specific and we may be forced to explain under what conditions we would resume.

Three ways of stopping:

(1) Give DRV chance to reciprocate.

(2) Assert military situation in S. has improved so that bombing is not needed.

(3) Say infiltration has stopped

(Not needed because war is going well or because no supplies are arriving.)

Stick to secret negotiations. Open negotiations force public support by USSR of DRV.

-3

## II. <u>Cease-Fire in SVN</u>

Should be tied to pause in bombing if DRV control is assumed.

Schelling: We should get negotiations growing out of technical battlefield issues rather than formal forum. Negotiate what? <u>Battlefield arrangements.</u>
Develop this mode of negotiations.

How can cease-fire become anything other than partition?

What is permitted and what is prohibited in a cease-fire?

Schelling: frontiers are always accidental.

Cease-fire is more functional than geographic.

Advantage of a cease-fire

Cease-fire: Mixed territory or discrete territories

Functional cease-fire. Issues: Can government tax collectors come in?

Is resistance <u>prima facie</u> evidence of VC activity?

What happens if any dissident group refuses to play the game?

If you clean up checkerboard--by giving up part of area to VC--you may be left with recognized 5th column.

Local voting control by VC

Taxes

Respite of a year or two is this what SVN needs or fears?

If cease-fire confirms what you can hold anyway, what do you gain?

(1) withdrawal of troops

(2) no casualties

Dynamics show you have never recovered anything you lost, then whole situation looks bad. Enclaves - dangerous.

-4

Is it feasible to control our territory?

Under what circumstances do you know you have control of strip?

If you have unopposed control over a period of time, can you then control
it against opposition?

Is there anything we can do about their surrender to know that you are
getting anything that they couldn't start again?

Disadvantage of Enclave: (1) Still stuck with SVN

Advantage: (1) Would still be there with impressive US forces.

Negotiating Forums

Best forum: Schelling: As much VC on other side as we can manage
because (1) they may be in charge and (2) reduces their dignity to treat them
as dissident terrorists than as expeditionary force of Communist bloc.

May negotiate with variety of regional leaders for amnesty, etc.

May prefer to talk to VC if victory is imminent because (1) formal
international conference engages Sino-Soviet bloc in SVN affairs, (2) forces
DRV to acknowledge defeat.

FBIS No. 75

VNA Statement on Nonaligned Countries Appeal

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 1964 GMT 19 April 1965

To settle the Vietnam problem at present, the only correct way is to carry out the points laid down by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong on 8 April 1965.

It is the unswerving policy of the DRV Government to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:

1--Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, cancel its military alliance with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.

2--Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones, the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected (while?) the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries; there must be no foreign military bases, troops, and military personnel in their respective territory.

3--The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the NFLSV program, without any foreign interference.

4--The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

This stand unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace- and justice-loving governments and peoples in the world.

The DRV Government is of the view that the above-expounded stand is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference in the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam.

The DRV Government declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure a U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

Conversation with A -- September 28, 1965

A -- Unsolved question: After military have swept through area, what
does it take to bring in and maintain security and civil control?

Criteria for control: prevent large VC unit movement in daytime--
VC until recently had superior control of area.

HK -- Supposing they go down to smaller units, how do we deal with them?

A -- If SVN patrols aggressively, we can root VC out. Also use intelligence.
Everything depends on intelligence. (Question: Just what do we know about
the VC?) Our role is to keep large units from operating. Until now VC have
been withdrawing into safe areas. We propose to make these untenable by
B-52 raids and ground force sweeps. Question mark remains the ability to
maintain control over countryside. This is not an American, but a Vietnamese
problem.

Four phases

(1) Main operations

(2) Bringing security: regional & popular forces

(3) Maintaining security: national police

(4) Civil administration

note: (2) and (3) are the unsolved questions

Rivalry in VN among various American agencies. For example, Political Action
Teams (PATs) are useful. But suffer from two limiting conditions:

(1) Availability of personnel

(2) Ability to turn over province to police? And move out to new provinces.

(R.N. Make case study of Chui-Lai and war zones. Who is doing what to make sure the area remains safe?)

CJ

- 2 -

B-52 attacking morale of VC

Strategy:

(1) We employ our forces almost constantly

(2) Clean up base areas

(3) VC can't stand being in combat constantly because of supply situation

(4) Rates of resupply must be increased. VC now fight only three days out of thirty. Requires more intensity of our effort.

Population leans to GVN.

U.S. troops not committed in IV Corps area. This is large population
and we prefer not to be source of constant friction.

Believes it is possible to win.

Probability that we can drive VC underground.

Probability is high that we can maintain civil administration.

Bombing of DRV - Purpose

(1) Hamstrings with Laos operations

(2) Raises question for VC whether game is worth candle

(3) Limited supplies may explain limited use of 325th Div.

(4) Have already imposed ceiling on forces they could bring in.

This applies to Chinese Communists as well. They can bring on large units
only via Laos and Burma. This could well explain the risk of general war to
intolerable levels.

Reaction to cease-fire in place

Our forces would be in great danger. Our forces would be very exposed.

Agreeable to cease-fire in which (a) we have freedom of movement and (b) we accept surrender of VC units.

- 3 -

VC-DRV connection

Staff work is done in Hanoi.

Control of operations is from Hanoi.

Rate of fighting requires 10-15 tons of outside supplies a day.

Must force them to increase expenditure of supplies by 10 by constant
fighting. This we can stop. (Note: Others think rate of supplies is only
4.5 tons a day. Difference is that those who accept larger figure believe
that food for VC is brought in from outside.

Two conditions for pause of Rusk: (1) Withdrawal of 325th

(2) End of infiltration

Chiefs reject it.

Package

(1) Amnesty

(2) End of terrorism

(Chiefs consider it very risky)

Questions to be asked of military

Military concepts: Phase I & II of Vietnam

Pacification

Bombing of North

Conversation with B -- September 28, 1965

Questions to Vietnamese

Whom are you fighting?

Why?

What is successful outcome?

What is acceptable settlement?

What is to be done with indigenous VC personnel?

What contact exists between NLF and government?

B -- Believes that large percent of rice captured on way to cities indicates high degree of collusion. VC seize it at this late stage so that villagers can get PL 480 rice as a substitute.

Why are we not controlling more roads? How can one be convincing at a distance of 10,000 miles that one is prepared to stay as compared to indigenous people who have no place to go.

Conversation with C -- September 28, 1965

Nature of Government

All Presidential statements about negotiations have been cleared with
GVN. Depth of their agreement is questionable. Maybe even fail to understand
what we are doing.

-- As far as GVN foreign minister is concerned, he accepts what we are doing.

-- As far as generals are concerned, they will go along without understanding it. What they fear most is peace. They are right.

-- They recognize how divided the Communist side is.

-- Feel no confidence in handling Communists in political contest when
a split SVN must handle united SVN.

-- Leadership mediocre. Same is true of NLF

-- Turmoil in Saigon concerns not whether to carry on war but how?

-- Utter lack of political experience of Vietnamese leaders. Experience
such as it is is conspirational.

-- Three C's of any government: consultation, conciliation, consensus.

In VN we are just at early stages of consultation. Vietnamese have Samson
complex: pulling temple down around themselves. For example, Quat--Chief
of State--conflict was pursued even though it meant end of civilian government.
Overwhelming fact of situation is regionalism. Works for us vis-a-vis. No,
against us because of refugees.

- 2 -

Why do they fight?

(1) Northern refugees--especially Catholics--hate Communists

(2) To avenge casualties

(3) In part--anti-Chinese

More clear what they are against than what they are for. Local loyalties are strong. If division is moved out of its region of recruitment desertion rate goes way up immediately.

Degree of control of central government is tenuous. Corps commanders and province chiefs carry out orders if they feel like it. Khan was a schemer and maneuverer who finally discredited himself. Khan used to say there were three problems in Vietnam: DRV, VC and himself. He was right. Military remain united for time being. Danger will come when Thi hears "call of people." Generals having stood together during student demonstration there will be brief respite. Ky will have life of two-three months. Directorate about a year and longer if military situation continues to improve. Ky likely to be in that position because most easily discarded.

Challenges: Buddhist
Catholics not decisive as long as military stick together

Primary impetus for what we are fighting comes from North. Can stop VC if they want to. Should save our position on pause of bombing.

## Is Victory Possible?

Does not exclude it. Not because we can kill every VC but because of discouragement of mass of VC. Smells signs of that.

- 3 -

It will take at least six months before impact of present troops can be felt. To make our troops effective two things need to be done. (1) invigorate defector program and (2) improve treatment of prisoners.

What should keep VC from going back to old tactics of simply melting away?

(1) Americans should not do pacification (i.e. clearing and holding a guerrilla infested area by rooting guerrillas out of population. It is a hopeless role for foreigner.

(2) Role of US forces is to defeat main force units. Pacification has hitherto been thwarted by raids of main force units. If these can be stopped local security can be handled by police and militia.

(3) In the highland area it is hard to mainforce units to melt into population because sparsely settled. (HK: Why won't they melt into population?)

(4) What if they avoid combat? Intelligence problem. In Delta it requires support of population. In highlands there is need for better technical intelligence. At some point VC must defend their supplies.

We are in race for time!

-- 6 months before forces are effective

-- 6 more months before mainforce units are defeated

-- 1 year before visible improvement--if not we will have trouble with presence of our forces.

- 4 -

N. Vietnamese feel tricked by 1954 accord.

HK -- If we win VC have three choices

(1) Accept *fait accompli*

(2) Negotiate to salvage what they can

(3) Lie low

Lie low incentive:

(1) Do not want to acknowledge defeat

(2) Don't trust negotiations

Problem exists even in case of negotiations. Assuming VC lie low when do we stop bombing? We have to reach judgment when incidents have stopped. Some withdrawal of troops. The more we talk about negotiations the harder it is for Hanoi to accept.

*What kind of a forum?*

Full dress Geneva is worst outcome: (1) we are not going to improve our military position through a conference (2) VC never give up territories (3) There will be a maximum number of intermediaries--not likely to stick on essential fine points.

(1) Nominal military meeting GVN-DRV is best. Technical military meeting. The purpose would be to withdraw VC mainforce units.

Drawbacks:

-- Technical competence of GVN to negotiate something like this is dubious

-- Verification

US ability to control positions taken by incompetent GVN

- 5 -

To do this DRV would have to admit:

-- that it controls VC

-- that it has been defeated

-- defeated by GVN

Everyone in Vietnam is agreed that VC cannot participate as political unit.

We don't know who can negotiate for VC

(2) Next best forum is to add US to previous scenario

(3) Geneva type forum - big multinational. Do you seek a new
international regime for SVN and SE Asia? Are not going to improve in
'54 accords.

Stop of Bombings

Rusk hint in press conference of end of infiltration and withdrawal
of organized DRV units is not enough--Cannot get intelligence about units.

Might settle for withdrawal of some mainforce units.

Pause prior to negotiations: If they go to conference *during* pause, it
will be impossible to start again. Stoppage of infiltration is not enough
because (a) it cannot be controlled and (b) VC can conduct operations with what
they have. Therefore must have test of withdrawal which is physical withdrawal
of mainforce units.

- 6 -

Cease-fire

(1) A cease-fire as a preliminary to negotiations in present stage is throwing in the sponge.

(2) Stopping shooting is throwing in the sponge.

(3) No way of observing much less controlling what VC are doing during that period. VC could regroup, redeploy during cease-fire while government forces wouldn't have same freedom.

HK -- Problems of cease-fire: (1) Contested areas and (2) recognized VC control in some areas. Either SVN falls apart or, what is the same thing, VC get recognized areas and legitimization. Conditions under which you stop shooting should be end of process not beginning. Government must have chance to exercise sovereignty over entire territory. Recognition of NLF. Fundamental that it can't be recognized.

Individual participation of VC in S. Vietnamese political affairs is amnesty. But how do you keep them from coalescing under some other name.

C -- If there is amnesty VC are likely to coalesce under some other name. Saigon is not equipped for handling well-organized dissident group.

Can't negotiate internal political status of SVN

(1) Why don't we say price is going up the longer they delay?

(2) Make demands on status of N. Vietnam.

Military status of SVN - not get into it because too difficult

Withdrawal of US forces - regrouping & withdrawal

Conversation with D -- September 28, 1965

VC lull in summer produced by Hanoi not by US actions. Deliberate
tactic to deny platform to Johnson for step-up of US military effort and to
think through negotiations.

Deal with NLF has the following disadvantages: (1) proxy of Hanoi
--don't even pretend they are conducting autonomous operations, (2) it is
better to deal with experienced partner, i.e. Hanoi. No Chinese direction
of VC. Advice goes to Hanoi--not to VC.

NLF is hard on negotiations because its position depends on the belief
of its men that maximum terms will be insisted upon. Peking supports NLF
because of ideological position. Tactically Peking has no leverage--leverage
will come when they begin to die or when their aid becomes critical. Critical
point where negotiations were possible has already passed.

July 28-August 31 -- Hanoi seemed interested in negotiations. Indication of difference between Peking and Hanoi. Hanoi never engaged in public denunciation of US July 28 terms simply calling them insincere.

DRV dropped out of Chinese press after August 9th. August 31 tough line
appeared again. Depending on how our terms are spelled out and how we conduct
military operations another critical point may come. Mistake was to step-up
air operations while DRV was deliberating--gave them the feeling we were trying
to bomb them into negotiations. Rusk note during May pause taken as insult because
it simply threatened and offered nothing but end of bombing.

Interesting aspects of July 28th EBJ speech.

(1) Guarantee of ultimate withdrawal

(2) Amnesty for NLF

(3) Reunification on the basis of free choice

- 2 -

Doesn't think N. Vietnam is hurt too badly:

(1) food supplies adequate

(2) bridges probably repaired with Chinese & Soviet help

(3) industry is largely long-term problem of long-term aid

(4) bombing hurts in Laos; delays in S. but that in time becomes normal

(5) long since expected bombing, therefore, not surprised

Will become interested in negotiations again only if (a) they do well in the air-war and (b) if they have some success in the South

Disagrees with notion that when VC can't win they will negotiate.
Partly because if they yield to airpower now it makes their negotiating task harder later.

Three US misconceptions:

(1) Monsoon offensive was never designed to win this year

(2) Communists never doubted our resolve in the short run. Do doubt our ability to last five years.

(3) Will negotiate when they realize they cannot win.

Will negotiate if they think political track is cheaper than military track.

Conversation with E -- September 29, 1965

Outcomes: Cease-fire; Forums, Pause

Three problems about negotiations:

(a) In Saigon: GVN feels we should not negotiate. If military situation is good GVN may feel no sense to quit now. Negotiations lead to collapse of government.

(b) Problem with Lodge opposed to negotiations for the same reasons.

On this side the conservative sector of opinion that supports Administration takes same view as GVN and Lodge.

Need public support for proposition that this kind of war has no victory and, if we come out where we came in we do well.

Must recognize that even a settlement implies

(1) Continued existence of DRV

(2) Continued existence of VC

Must realize that only possible outcome is limited one. Granted that you come to some kind of settlement in which VC have some kind of role. Doesn't know whether this will be (1) control over provinces, (2) membership in government or (3) participation in electoral process.

At that point, in the process both sides bet that their preferred solution will prevail under conditions of peace. Thus must have program of political development.

- 2 -

-- Have some kind of long-range planning in economics

-- How do you create a society in such a divided country.
Not just VC-GVN but many other divisions: Buddhists,
Catholics, etc.

One of the problems is that we know nothing about nation-building.
Vietnamese have to do it. We can help. Perhaps create institutes, etc.
Society building is even harder than nation-building.

GVN should have own group studying this problem.

GVN problem is (1) shortage of people. Perhaps we can deal with
top people now out of government because of Diem affiliation. Dip into
Diem reservoir. Have concentrated on short-term requirements of winning
war rather than society building.

Might settle for a Cambodia about 10% better.

Should have concept of goal & work back from that to negotiatons
What people must be trained for peace?

Conversation with F -- September 29, 1965

What kind of intelligence do we need on monitoring these various
schemes? Can we identify key cadres? How much personality names do
we have? How do they stand down?

Conversation with G - September 29, 1965

Continuing facts of S. E. Asia if war ends.

Assume that war has halted. How it has halted will affect future.

As for negotiations must remember that Communists do not negotiate
with same motive as ours.

Least likely is formal end of war.

More likely is endless conference to dismantle our effort and maintain
their political and military infrastructure. Or else slow decline of military
operations to achieve same objective.

VN has great sense of peoplehood but little sense of nationhood.

Throughout history have had sense of belonging to group of which they are
proud, but not compulsion to work together. Three groups: N; Annamites;
S. have great suspicion of each other.

Religious differences.

Division between urban and rural population. Roughly division between
literates and illiterates.

Peasant very shrewd. Tends to equate all of political life with what he can affect.

Notion of elite with sense of responsibility foreign to educational system
which--such as it is--was designed to train French civil administrators.

Unlikely to have democratic process--more likely to have continuation
of military government for better or worse.

-2

Economic: Credit more important than land reform.
More land can be brought under cultivation.
Can increase productivity.

Urban social revolution going on because leaders have lost touch with
people.

Chinese problems in extending political writ:

(1) Extremely doctrinaire and have no applicable theory.

(2) Chinese disliked

(3) US strength respected if we use it. Inaction is also form of decision.

H--Three questions:

(1) Military structure--does it unify country?

(2) Can rural development grow out of conduct of war?

(3) Is there civilian equivalent to military leaders?

G--As to (1) - Military are to some extent breaking down regional loyalties--
though must remember gap between officers and men.

(2) - Rural reconstruction goes on. But cleaning out main-force VC
is only beginning.

(3) There are young civilians in Vietnam analogous to military.

I --Generals are in this war as divided as civilians if on different lines.

J --Is motivation of youth in army used to achieve political indoctrination,
i. e. give sense of nationhood?

G--Some is done but not enough.

J --What is done? An hour, a week, a year, what?

-3

I -- More in paramilitary forces than in regular forces.

E -- Must remember that at end of effort VC will still exist. Must be realistic about goals in VN after cessation of hostilities. Must realize that outcome will be limited.

F -- estimate to Thomson that VC control 800th including dependents.

J -- Congress not ready for G presentation. Oriental long-term view doesn't apply to Congressmen who are elected every two years. Overestimate what we can expect in S. Vietnam even if we are successful militarily. If they got more information wouldn't leak so much of it.

K -- Would they continue to support our policy if they got all the facts?

J -- Doubtful -- particularly if they got it at once. Any negotiated settlement is going to be considered a sell-out, not a compromise.

L -- Have mastered economic development techniques. Do not know techniques of political development even of economic programs.

Three programs: (1) Counterinsurgency - 400 individuals out of 1000 are working on it. Ranges from Chui Hoi program thru refugee program, medical program, hamlet schools, repairing war damage.

(2) Commercial import program - Through counterpart funds pay for military program. Reduces inflationary pressures even if it lines pockets of fat cat Chinese merchants.

(3) Long-range economic and social development - largely de-emphasized since 1962.

CYJ

-4

## Political Development

1. Push self-help. Make local people select program they most want in counterinsurgency program. Have local self-help team in provinces thus get 44 country teams.

2. Limitations: Can't win war alone. But with others such as PATS have established 160 new hamlets. But half were obliterated last year. Learned that economic deve. can't substitute for physical security.

3. Administrative inefficiency of GVN--occasional bad behavior of ARVN. In short, we can't take over country. Working with student groups; Buddhists; labor groups.

I -- Highly integrated nature of problem. Can't say military is stressed too much. Unless every member of team is winning everybody is losing. Sometimes felt smothered by weight of Washington support. Fragile governments can't handle complex pressure of US bureaucracy.

J -- What is effect of air attacks in SVN on infrastructure?

I -- Area of judgment. Have never heard GVN gov't complain about excessive use of airpower. Have always had problem of civilians in war. Must be careful but not stop. Indications are that it has had suppressive effect on VC morale. N. Vietnamese inS. welcome bombing of N. Has never heard complaints.

A -- B-52 raids without exception have been in areas which had no habitation.

Conversation with N -- October 1, 1965

If we were willing to stop Korean war with a linear stabilization
already achieved then Chinese will calculate we stop anything. Unless
they fear nuclear war won't negotiate.

NLF must become negotiating partner -- Can play on S & N differences.
Thinks in the Front there are many people who don't believe objective is
to unify S.VN. Isolate elements in opposition.

What about side-door negotiations with Front? Easiest group to deal
with may be NLF under cover of Cambodian or Laotion border conference.

Rusk position:

Plebiscite in unification

Free elections in S.

Military accords of '54 carried out

How can we convince N. that we mean to stay?

Conversation with P -- October 4, 1965

Phang Nyu - Grey emminence of Ky group.

This group pops up in lots of unexpected ways.

Chui Hoi program head under Quat had worked beautifully with USOM man Perry.

Ky put it in with Ministry of Psychological Warfare. Americans outraged that their man was being thrown out.

McNamara and Taylor then pressed for Chui Hoi as separate ministry because they wanted to push it. Chui Hoi on American side was staffed by only one man John Perry -- too old.

P thinks Chui Hoi was member of cabal. Cabal may have reason for picking personnel and we should be sensitive to that.

Issues: (1) Judgment about Upper Level Saigon Politics

(2) To what extent do you strengthen ministries as against province chiefs.

(3) Pacification program. USOM programs are competing against each other. CIA competitive--Relationship to province chief. Shortage of personnel. VN government programs--Ministries--provinces.

Infrastructure must be changed.

Once we put in resources may be garden hose hooked up to fire hydrant.

Could fail by having too many resources.

Lodge should work out coordination on pacification. Must have coordinated approach.

Pacification program must be geared to military operations and between them can break back of VC. Would take VC a year to go back to old-style methods of political action.

Thinks increase in combat in Delta is greater aggressiveness of ARVN. If ARVN div. gets badly mauled NCO's hard to replace.

We have shifted our position: bomb in order to stop infiltartion.

Now we say bomb in order to get them to negotiate.

Must avoid de facto recognition of VC control. Should avoid control
of territory and go after main forces.

Hanoi may de-escalate rather than negotiate.

VC moved from regional units to main forces--Undermined cohesiveness
of local groups. Therefore, hard to de-escalate.

Free elections will come out on the basis of who controls
machinery.

Must be careful not to call into question legitimacy of Saigon
government.

Conversation with Q -- October 6, 1965

If Hanoi thinks it can take over government without American pressure then incentive for following (1) US withdrawal, no more infiltration; end of bombing.

What happens to NLF? Can Hanoi get them to agree? NLF pressure for recognition - perhaps by stepping up incidents.

As for bombing, Hanoi might feel worst has happened and it is not unbearable.

Withdrawal of American troops is abandonment of our position.

Hanoi incentives: (1) GVN can't survive without massive American troop support.

(2) Therefore, let's get them out and then take over country.

Can Ho Chi Min deliver a slow take-over?

What assumptions can we make about US withdrawal.

(1) Phased withdrawal with NLF legal. In that case, NLF would press for our withdrawal.

(2) Phased withdrawal with NLF illegal.

Phase our withdrawal on basis of ICC report.

What do we do if we don't want to accept report. Hanoi can play up any settlement as political victory.

Having in this long period not succeeded in forming stable government.

What opportunities would GVN have vis-a-vis VC if there is stand-down in incidents plus political activities.

- 2 -

Two choices: (1) Trade-up. More bombing. Risk of escalation.
Have done worst--now they will take it.

(2) Make clear we plan no permanent occupation.

If we are planning a permanent occupation DRV has no incentive
to settle for anything.

Ho Chi Min can't have global interest in humiliating us.

Assurances of end to infiltration and incident stand-down. Establish
criteria.

NLF's power does not depend on its recognition. Thus some form of
it will exist whatever the formal settlement.

Regrouping technically impossible.

Questions to ask:

(1) What would village and country be like if infiltration stopped and there is no fighting?

(2) How long would it take a Saigon government to do the right thing? What procedures can one devise to handle legal democratic parties?

Laos solution not possible because central government matters too much. Laos solution makes us look worse than when we say outcome is up to political process. Indefinite occupation is bad for us. Casualties hard to take domestically.

What staging can one envisage for withdrawal? Can one say 2-3 years?
Does this give a fighting chance to get government established?

QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED

-- How can we convince N. that we mean to stay?
long-term programs

-- Result: What if they first stand down?
Might lead to cease-fire?

-- Just what do we know about VC?

-- In the highland area it is hard for mainforce units to
melt into population because sparsely settled. Why won't
they melt into population?

-- Three questions:

(1) Military structure - does it unify country?

-- Are we better off when it is officially US-VC war? How do
we look when we need 500th men to contain indigenous force.
Whatever control of DRV over VC, might VC have incentive to stop
to save DRV?

-- Tacit agreements -- Are there any conditions in which we would
stop bombing without formal agreement? What other tacit outcomes are
possible?

Tacit means - DRV must do something specific and we may be forced
to explain under what conditions we would resume.

QUESTIONS

-- What would village and country be like if infiltration stopped
and there is no fighting?

-- How long would it take a Saigon government to do the right thing?
What procedures can one devise to handle legal democratic parties?

QUESTIONS

-- Do the VC prisoners have political line? What is political
motivation?

-- Are VC slowing down? Or are we not contesting areas?

-- Do we want N. Vietnamese to acknowledge influence or do we settle
for tacit outcome?

-- Can they let it atrophy quietly or must they make formal agreements?

-- Is it in our interest to let DRV maintain posture that S. Vietnam
war is indigenous?

-- Talk to them about stopping outside interference.

-- We then defeat and/or negotiate with VC to arrange their surrender.

-- Do we know who culprit is, VC or DRV

(1) Do we know they carry out agreement?

(2) Do we know they do _not_ carry out agreement? If we don't know, we are really in trouble. Cheating may be lesser of problems.

(3) What does it take to destroy authority of VC in hard-core areas?

-- What does it take to defeat VC and maintain it?

-- What do they have to risk to continue?

Questions for Military

1. What is Chinese capability to intervene in S. Vietnam? Land?
   Air?

2. Unsolved question: After military have swept through area, what
does it take to bring in and maintain security and civil control?

Criteria for control: Prevent large VC unit movement in daytime
--VC until recently had superior control of area.

3. Military concepts:

Phase I & Phase II of Vietnam

Pacification

Bombing of North

4. Why are we not controlling more roads?

Questions to Political People

1. How can one be convincing at a distance of 10,000 miles that one is prepared to study as compared to indigenous people who have no place to go?

THINGS TO DO

1. Take provincial report with me on trip. Spend an evening with them, when in IV Corps.

2. Coastal towns in II Corps area -- refugee problem

Qui Nhon-NhaTrang-Pleiku--overwhelming number of Americans in
little towns.

3. Camean Bay

4. Mac V people in field - sector advisors -- problems of province

5. 3rd Group refugee settlement in new territories

PEOPLE TO SEE

Tran Van Do

Quat

Diem - Secretary in PM's office

Thieu

Tri Quan - Mel Levin

Father Quinh

Co - Minister of Defence

General Chieu - Secretary General - National Directory Committee

General Ky

Burr (Labor Union)

Chin - Secretary of Psychological Warfare

General Nguyen Khanh

Ton Tat Tin - Economist & Journalist GVN '54 delegation

Diplomats:

Blair Seaborn - Canadian ICC

David Anderson - Australian Ambassador

Ed Rice - Consulate General

John Holdridge - Chief, China Section

William Wells - Station Chief CIA (small briefing)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TEMPORARY DUTY (TDY) OFFICIAL TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

Department of State

(Agency)

2. APPLICABLE REGULATIONS

FSTR

SGTR

OTHER

(Specify)

You are hereby authorized to perform official travel at Government expense as indicated herein. Unless otherwise noted, all expenses and the maximum per diem under the regulations are authorized.

3. NAME, TITLE, AND ADDRESS

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Consultant
Care of Department of State
Washington, D.C.

122

4. AUTHORIZING OFFICE

FE/EX

6. EMPLOYEE NUMBER
(State Only)

5. AUTHORIZATION NUMBER

FE-600070

7. AUTHORIZATION DATE

September 29, 1965

8. ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION - The coding (A through D) must be shown on all documents issued under this authority and must appear on all vouchers, invoices, TR's, GB/L's, etc.

A. Fund
1960113

B. Allotment
6A-1013

C. Obligation No.
600070

D. State: Organization Code/Function
USIA: Activity/Sub-Activity Codes
130000

E. Object
2152

F. Amount
$2095.00

9. ITINERARY, PURPOSE, REMARKS AND SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AND AUTHORIZATIONS

Itinerary: From Boston, Mass. on or about October 7, 1965 to Honolulu, Hong Kong, Saigon and return to Boston, Mass. on or about November 9, 1965.

Purpose : Consultation with Embassy officials for approximately thirty-five (35) days.

10. TRAVEL REQUESTED BY

Name: Orson W. Trueworthy

Title: Dep. Exec. Director

11. FUNDS AVAILABLE

Name: Walker W. Smith

Title: Budget Officer, FE

12. AUTHORIZING OFFICER

Name: Orson W. Trueworthy

Title: Dep. Exec. Director

13. LIQUIDATION RECORD

<table><thead><tr><td>Date (A)</td><td>Description (B)</td><td>Posted By (C)</td><td>Obligation Authorized (D)</td><td>Obligation Liquidated (E)</td><td>Unliquidated Balance (F)</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

FORM DS-1619
3-65

(Replaces DS-17, DS-17A, and FS-381 when supplies are exhausted.)

1. Traveler

ITINERARY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

September 20, 1965

Thursday, November 4th

Lv. Saigon 12:35 p.m.
Ar. Honolulu 10:30 a.m.

PA #2 (economy)
(on November 5th)

Sunday, November 7th

Lv. Honolulu 9:00 a.m.
Ar. Los Angeles 4:55 p.m.

PA #822 (economy)

Monday, November 8th

Lv. Santa Anna 8:10 a.m.
Ar. Phoenix 9:35

Bonanza #222 (economy)

Tuesday, November 9th

Lv. Phoenix 1:00 p.m.
Ar. Boston 9:29 p.m.

TWA $120 (first class - HK will pay the difference)

HEADQUARTERS COMBINED ARMS GROUP
U. S. ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

August 20, 1965

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center For International Studies
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Kissinger:

It was good to talk with you on Monday. I am certain that your trip will be very useful for us all and, I hope, fruitful from your personal viewpoint.

The interpreter-companions, all of the Embassy. Sam Thompson: Good French, knows Hue and the I Corps Area well. Shrewd, not very deep, anxious to please, pragmatic in the extreme. Dave Engel: Knew him fairly well at Princeton. Sensitive, highly intelligent and has best grasp of Vietnamese language of any American I know. Good for use with the Buddhists, and in the Center generally. John Negroponte: Has excellent French and good Vietnamese. Very much the Yale man - but also very Greek. Opportunistic, wants badly to get on. Good for the area around and including Saigon and the Delta. All are as discreet as any American is apt to be. I suggest that you use more than one and preferably, all - as the geography and the occasion indicates.

The Diplomatic Community. D'Orlandi: Italian Ambassador, a good friend who is committed, does not have a detached viewpoint. He has many useful contacts among the Vietnamese. Msgr DePalmas: Not as good as his predecessors by all accounts, but possessing obvious sources and an interesting viewpoint. Etherington-Smith: British Ambassador - A better man than generally rated, not always listened to - the more apt to have something to say to you. Seaton: The Canadian ICC man. Very clever, with good contacts in the North. Ted Serong: The Australian most knowledgeable in counterinsurgency, with an impressive background in Burma and Malaya. Thinks big, highly opinionated, but always worth an hour. If RKG Thompson has returned from the UK, he is top flight. For a number of reasons, some of them bureaucratic, some personal, he never has enjoyed the hearing from the U.S. he deserves.

The Vietnamese. Many people, including the Ambassador, will have suggestions - you must, of course, see the important figures of the

regime. A few interesting lesser lights: Vo Van Hai - prominent before
the "revolution" as a confidant of Diem, now rehabilitated apparently. I
found him to be one of three or four Vietnamese with the long view - and
a concept of personal honor. Nguyen (Charles) Tuoi - formerly publisher
of the Saigon Post, courageous, outspoken, well informed and well versed
in who's in - who's out. Bui Diem: Pretty much the same sort of fellow
as Tuoi. Trickier, less forthright, but even better informed. Major
Le Minh Dao: A friend and confidant of Le Van Kim and of Duong Van "Big"
Minh, he is, perhaps, the brightest of the young officers. Knows more
about the remnants of the first "Revolutionary" Government than anyone
else who would talk to you. You _must_ talk to Tri Quang and Tam Chau - the
leading Buddhist politicians (in fact, the _only_ politicians other than
cafe). We haven't heard the last of them.

**Americans:** Those you can trust? I simply don't know. They have bled out many of the best. The attrition imposed by the "system" has taken care of most of the rest. (Can you imagine our opponents posting people for one year or eighteen months or even two years?) In USIS - Ev Bumgardner is very much worth while. In USOM - Len Maynard and George Melvin have much experience, many interesting contacts. Lowe, Jack Ryan's replacement, is supposed to be a good man. Worth talking to anyway, because of his contacts with the police. In MacV - Generals Rosson and DePugh are the most talented; hopefully, they will give you a straight story.

Generally, the military are the most professional in their viewpoint -
also most likely to feel constrained. The CIA people are apt to be the
best informed, but unfortunately, are not always objective. The Embassy
people are, alas, seldom either professional in their attitudes or
particularly well informed. The USOM field people used to be pure gold,
but the best and most experienced have gone the way of all flesh. The
newer ones may have the potential but no longer enjoy much freedom of
movement.

I appreciate very much your taking on this chore and am only sorry
that I can't offer more help to you. Good luck. I hope to see you
again, either before you go or after you return.

9

about what we are after. We are interested in starting a political
process, even if the outcome of that process is not to our advantage.
COHEN asked what is the basis of Pye's optimism.

PYE: I am not optimistic, but I am not pessimistic. The
Viet Cong may have made a mistake in deciding last November to go
to stage three and to make itself utterly dependent on supplies
from the North. They are now operating at the batallion level.
They have depleted their guerrilla force, their rate of defection
is up, their pressure on the countryside (taxes, manpower demands,
etc.) is increasing. Psychologically they cannot go back to the
querrilla level. We are heading for a "real hard crunch." The
Saigon governmental picture is not pretty but on the other hand
it is not too bad.

Regarding what Shulman said about the desirability of
negotiations, we should consider the possibility that negotiations
will make the parties adopt a hard line. If we force the Chinese
to the conference table, they might become more rigid and
intransigent. It may have been a mistake for us to move from the
linkage between bombing and infiltration and supplies to the linkage
of bombing with negotiations.

CAVERS: There has been one glaring omission in our discussion.
The problem involves the rest of the world, not only the parties
immediately concerned. Our involvement in Vietnam is creating
tension and misunderstanding for us all around the world--and the

C7

10

establishment of enclaves might increase this tension. We need
the intervention of others to help settle the problem. Possibly
the UN.

KATZ (mostly to Shulman): We need to state--or at least
to know--our aims in order either to negotiate or to fight
intelligently. Anything this group can contribute to the clarification
of aims could be useful. If we enter negotiations without knowing
what our objectives are, we will cut a sorry figure and we will
fall flat on our face.

PADELFORD: Vietnam is the wrong war at the wrong time in
the wrong place.

Regarding a future meeting, it was agreed at Brown's
suggestion that a small steering group composed of Cavers,
Kissinger and Brown and possibly a few others would consult
widely with the group in September and decide whether, in the
light of the situation at that time, another meeting would be
useful and what documentation would be required. There was
general agreement that we had gone as far as it would be useful
to go in general discussion and that any future meeting should
be based on prepared papers or at least a careful delineation
of the issues.

September 10, 1965

Let me turn now to a more fundamental issue to which I propose --with your agreement--to devote more of my time: our goals in Vietnam in the middle and long-term. This can be expressed perhaps in the answers to questions as these: How do we conceive of "success" in Vietnam? What military and, even more important, political goals would we have to achieve? What kind of political structure should we encourage and/or build? In case of negotiations, what terms would we consider desirable? What terms are we willing to settle for? Assuming that there is a settlement--and for many reasons I have my doubts whether one should think of the outcome in these terms--where do we go from there?

The difficulties raised by the much-used word "negotiations" illustrate my point. Many of our public pronouncements give the impressions that the purpose of our military operations is to bring about unconditional negotiations. As a public relations posture, this has considerable merit. If this is its only purpose--if, in other words, we lack a concrete program--it also involves considerable dangers:

(a) It puts a floor under the risks the Communists run. If they know that they can always get to the conference table and that the terms will remain essentially the same they will have every incentive to continue military operations.

(b) Unless carefully handled, it may demoralize the Vietnamese government and people. A civil war turns finally on the hopes and expectations of the people affected. If the Vietnamese leaders should come to believe that they have become expendable--or even that a Laos type settlement is being prepared--they will begin to maneuver in the new context. They will try to obtain reinsurance at every level--including by direct dealings with the Vietcong. A long-term political program in Vietnam seems to me to require confidence on the part of our friends that they will not become pawns. Our reliability is thus much more at issue than our technical competence. This calls for careful coordination of our political thinking and that of the Vietnamese _well before negotiations start_. Otherwise all efforts to build a viable structure may be jeopardized.

(c) This is all the more urgent because the Communists will surely not enter the negotiations with any intention of "settling" but with the aim of winning at the conference table the prize which eluded them on the battlefield. They will strive not for stability but for victory. And by then the contest will be largely psychological.

"Unconditional negotiations," "cease fire," "tacit mutual concessions" are useful phrases if some concrete meaning attaches to them. Otherwise they can be turned against us, and confuse and demoralize our friends. It is true that we cannot know all the elements of a negotiating position in advance.

....

- 2 -

But we do know that we will have to adopt an attitude towards the NLF; we must know whether we will strive for an all-Vietnamese or simply a South Vietnamese solution; we must have ideas on how to police an agreement. If we cannot be precise on these issues, there is a grave danger that negotiations will primarily concern the extent of our concessions. Our Vietnamese allies may lose confidence. The Communists, in short, could repeat the pattern of previous successful civil wars.

This could happen in Vietnam. Let me give two examples: (a) Several official statements have indicated that we are fighting "foreign intervention" in Vietnam. We have said that we would be prepared to stop certain actions provided the North Vietnamese did likewise. I do not object to these statements. But I hope we are backing them up with detailed studies. Several questions seem to me to require specific answers:

-- Do we know exactly what we mean by foreign interference?

-- Could we define precisely what we want to have stopped and by whom? I noticed in one report, for example, that we are not at all clear about how bulk supplies are shipped into Vietnam.

-- If there were agreement to stop specific activities, how do we know that the agreement has been observed? I notice in our reports that the ratio of confirmed to probable infiltrators is 1:10. I assume that we cannot confirm the latter.

-- How will we know whether these activities have started up again?

-- Are the mutual undertakings symmetrical not only as to the extent of the operation involved but also to its effectiveness over time?

-- Supposing the effects of what the North Vietnamese cease takes six months to be felt while what we stop has immediate consequences will we not be at a serious disadvantage?

-- Are we really fighting "foreign" intervention or a Communist take-over by military means? Would not our loss of honor, prestige and standing be even more severe if we are defeated by an indigenous Communist force?

(b) The second issue involves Senator Mansfield's proposal of a cease-fire which he claimed had the sanction of the White House. I do not know to what extent this is true, but if this term should come up again it would be useful to know what it means. Is the cease-fire to be between the

....

- 3 -

Vietcong and the South Vietnamese government or between us and the North Vietnamese? Is the NLF to be recognized as a party to such an arrangement? (Can it, in other words, get official recognition by means of an armistice?) And if so, what protects us against the tactic so successfully used by Mao in China of using a cease-fire to restore his forces and to gain political recognition and then to break it when conditions are once more favorable? What happens to the areas under its control? A cease-fire which effectively divided South Vietnam leaving major territories under recognized Communist control would, in my view, be the beginning of the end.

Whatever the validity of this judgment, I believe that it is time to spell out our ultimate goals more concretely. And we will have to start a dialogue on war aims with the Vietnamese. Otherwise questions such as these raised here will have to be answered under pressure. Negotiating tactics will predominate over long-term strategy. The psychological and political framework will be dominated by the other side.

This suggests two other requirements--one substantive, the other tactical:

-- The substantive item is the need to develop some American proposals which are more positive, even offensive and which convey a clearer sense of purpose. There seems to me too much of a tendency to present a shopping list to the other side. This runs the risk that we will eventually negotiate in a Communist agenda. Why, for example, can we not insist on free elections in both parts of Vietnam?

-- Tactically, I think it is unwise to use the term NLF. By accepting the term "Liberation Front" we give credence to the claim that the Vietcong are fighting an oppressive regime and that their struggle has a substantial moral quality. The tenacity with which our opponents fight for such labels shows their awareness of the psychological element of policy.

A final word about negotiations: Civil wars seem to me the most difficult to end by negotiations and "settlements" which preserve a rough equilibrium are likely to be fragile. This is no accident. Civil wars usually evoke the most intense passions. Involving people of the same backgrounds and culture, inhabiting the same area, the terms are extremely difficult to enforce. This is why these civil wars which have ended since World War II have usually been included with the predominance of one side or the other--as in Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, or China--without formal acknowledgment by the defeated side. Formal settlements as in Laos or Cyprus have almost invariably been the starting point of new conflict. (This may prove true even of the Dominican Republic). It seems to me that an outcome in which we achieve a major pacification without a formal settlement might not be the worst result of the Vietnamese war, *provided we can couple military success with long-term political construction*.

....

- 2 -

Local autonomy

strong central government

effective local control accepted as practical matter

formal geographic lines giving NLF certain areas to administer
"under" central government

Freedom for GVN police

- vast areas they stay out of

- freedom to control most of the country; stay out of some

- go throughout country; do not act against VC offenses in VC areas

Propaganda situation

- continued coerced propaganda

- widespread communist propaganda by NLF

- free "peaceful style" propaganda by all sides

- radio stations attack GVN

DRV involvement

- continues attack on GVN, urges overthrow

- continues illicit supply of VC

- abandons attack on GVN; abandons "war of liberation"

- opens negotiation toward "reunification through peace"

Chicom position

- supplies VC rebels who demand all-out victory

- continues and steps up activities against Thailand

Laos

- continues as is?

- formal abandonment of Northeast corner

Soviet Position

- ?

Limitations on international position of SVN

- none; remains US military ally

- no formal limitations; US out; adopts "middle way"

- treaty commitment as neutral (c.f. Austria?)