Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

It is an honor to appear before this committee on a
matter of such importance to America's future. If this
century has taught any lesson, it is that our security is
inextricably linked with Europe's. NATO, the institution
expressing this conviction, has successfully deterred war in
Europe for 50 years. Now that Soviet power has receded from
the center of the continent, NATO needs to adapt itself to the
consequences of its success.

The stakes involved are large, for the nations of the
Atlantic area need each other, and NATO is the fundamental
link between the two. Without America, Europe would turn into
a peninsula at the tip of Eurasia, unable to find equilibrium,
much less unity, and at risk of gradually subsiding into a
role similar to that of ancient Greece in relation to
Rome--the only outstanding question being whether America or
Russia will play the role of Rome. Without Europe, America
would become an island off the shores of Eurasia, condemned to
a kind of pure balance-of-power politics that does not reflect
its national genius. Without Europe, America's path would be
lonely; without America, Europe's role would approach
irrelevance. This is why America concluded twice in this
century that the domination of Eurasia by a hegemonic power
threatens its vital interests and has gone to war to prevent
it.

A major American role in Europe is a prerequisite for
European coherence. Without it, the European Union would
founder on the fear of German domination; France would see
reinsurance in a Russian option; historic European coalitions
would form, compounding their traditional tenuousness with
irrelevance; Germany would be tempted into a nationalist role,
Russia into revanchism. That role requires a definition of
Europe that is historically valid--that is, which includes the
nations of Central Europe.

An American presence in Europe provides a measure of
equilibrium. It gives France a safety net against German

2

hegemony and Germany an emotional harbor as European unification slows down, as well as protection against outside dangers and excessive European nationalism. Even Russia has much to gain from an American presence, which is the best guarantee against the reemergence of historical European rivalries. Europe by itself cannot handle the two most dangerous Russian contingencies: resurgence of nationalism or implosion. A Russia facing a divided Europe would find the temptation to fill the vacuum irresistible. An America cut off from Europe would lose an anchor of its foreign policy.

Critics of NATO enlargement argue that the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary threatens prospects for the democratic evolution of Russia and therefore magnifies perils rather than allays them.

I hold the opposite view. The former Russian Defense Minister Igor N. Rodionov explained Russian opposition to NATO enlargement on the ground that it deprives Russia of a buffer zone in Central Europe. Were NATO to fall in with this argument, it would perpetuate the injustice of the Soviet satellite orbit by condemning the only newly liberated nations of Central Europe to institutionalized impotence. And it would store up endless future troubles.

Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land between Germany and Russia runs counter to historical experience, especially that of the interwar period. It would bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe: those that are potentially threatened but not guaranteed, and those that are guaranteed but not threatened. If America decides to defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east, the credibility of the existing NATO guarantee would be gravely weakened. Nor would this exclusion of traditional Central European nations from the common defense achieve its purpose. Once Russia had succeeded in establishing a military buffer zone, it would logically follow with demands for a political corollary that would imply a veto over foreign policy.

If the eastern border of Germany is defined as the limit of the common defense, Germany will be driven to doubt America's leadership role and to try to influence the security position of the buffer zone. Failure to enlarge NATO thus would risk either collision or collusion between Germany and

3

Russia. Either way, American abdication would produce a
political earthquake threatening vital American interests.

Considerations such as these have transformed the great
Czech president, Vaclav Havel, into a strong advocate of early
NATO enlargement. An ardent human rights activist, he surely
appreciates the argument for encouraging a democratic
evolution in Russia. But he obviously believes that even the
most optimistic outcome will take longer than is safely
compatible with the establishment of a vacuum of power in
Central Europe. I know no leader of Central Europe who does
not share this view.

NATO expansion therefore represents a balancing of two
conflicting considerations: the fear of alienating Russia
against the danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe
between Germany and Russia. Failure to expand NATO is likely
to prove irrevocable. Russian opposition is bound to grow as
its economy gains strength; the nations of Central Europe may
drift out of their association with Europe. The end result
would be the vacuum between Germany and Russia that has
tempted so many previous conflicts. When NATO recoils from
defining the only limits that make strategic sense, it is
opting for progressive irrelevance.

While I strongly favor NATO expansion, I am deeply
worried about the Founding Act which seeks to reconcile Russia
to NATO expansion by offering Russia a role in NATO councils.
Alliances define a common threat; collective security deals
with a legal contingency. Alliances delineate an area to be
defended; collective security is open-ended and is redefined
from case-to-case.

The language of the Founding Act is that of collective
security, not of alliance. The Act speaks of the parties'
"shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided
Europe, whole and free" and refers to the parties' "allegiance
to shared values, commitments and norms of behavior." But
Russia sells nuclear power plants, submarines and other arms
to Iran, ignoring specific American requests to desist.
Russia supports, in opposition to American policy, the lifting
of the embargo on Iraq. It refuses to delineate its border
with Ukraine. Of what, then, do the shared commitments cited
in the Founding Act consist?

4

The words "common defense" apparently proved so offensive to their commitment to collective security that the drafters of the Founding Act could not bring themselves to invoke them and used instead (and only once) the euphemism "commitments undertaken in the Washington Treaty" (which created NATO in 1949). But they did not specify the nature of these commitments.

The view assuredly is not shared by the new members, who are seeking to participate in NATO for reasons quite the opposite of what the Founding Act describes--not to erase dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed territory by shifting the existing NATO boundaries some 200 miles to the east.

The most worrisome aspect of the Founding Act is the consultative machinery for which it provides. The Act calls into being, side-by-side with existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council composed of the same ambassadors who form the existing NATO Council, plus a Russian full member. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at least once a month. Twice a year, the Council is to meet at the foreign ministers' level. The first such ministerial meeting was held in the shadow of the United Nations last month. Regular meetings of the defense ministers are also envisaged, as well as summits.

The Act designates the Permanent Joint Council as the principle venue for crisis consultation between Russia and NATO. Each side agrees that "it will promptly consult" within the Permanent Joint Council "in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence and security." Thus if Poland feels threatened by Russia, it may have to appeal first to the Permanent Joint Council. Similarly, according to the letter of the Act, Russia could have insisted that the Gulf War be brought to the Permanent Joint Council where--as the Founding Act repeatedly states--decisions are made by consensus.

It will be argued that if the Permanent Council deadlocks, the regular NATO Council remains free to perform its historic functions. That is true in theory but will not work in practice in all but the most extreme cases. Since, except for the Russian representatives, the membership is identical, each country will assess the grave step of meeting without a Russian presence in terms of its overall

5

relationship with Moscow. Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent Council sessions will tend to merge. The free and easy "family atmosphere" of existing institutions will vanish.

As for the new members of NATO, they are clearly joining in a second-class status subject to unprecedented restrictions with respect to the deployment of other NATO forces and nuclear weapons. The ultimate irony is that Russia will be participating in the Permanent Joint Council and achieving a voice in NATO two years before the new members who have to wait for ratification of the enlargement by all the parliaments of NATO.

The dilemma the supporters of NATO enlargement now face is that the Founding Act has gone into effect upon signature. As an executive agreement, it will not have to be ratified by the US Senate, while NATO enlargement, involving a treaty, does. Thus if the admission of new members is not ratified, we will have inherited the worst possible outcome: the demoralization of Central Europe and a NATO rendered dysfunctional by the Founding Act.

Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of this committee share my concerns about the possibility that the Founding Act has given Russia too much of a role in NATO matters. And I am aware that you pressed the Secretary of State for clarification on a number of these issues when she appeared before the committee two weeks ago.

I was pleased to note that, in her response to your questions, the Secretary reassured you and the American people that nothing which has been agreed to with the Russians will detract from NATO's primacy. And if I may make a suggestion, I believe this offers the Senate an opportunity, in the course of the ratification procedure, to address the philosophical ambiguities of the Founding Act.

Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that, in its instrument of advice and consent, the Senate should explicitly reassert the central role of the Atlantic Alliance for American foreign policy and insist that nothing in any other document shall detract from the North Atlantic Council as the supreme body of alliance. Such a resolution could draw directly on the forthright response which Secretary Albright gave to your questions. Additionally, the Senate resolution

6

should declare that the United States expects Russia--after
the qualitative changes that we have made--to desist from all
pressures and threats in Europe on this issue. In the
meantime, while ratification proceeds, a joint resolution of
Congress should urge that the new NATO members be permitted to
join the Permanent Joint Council while waiting for
ratification. This would remove the anomaly that the
institution created to reconcile Russia to NATO's expansion
comes into being years before expansion occurs.

If the administration does not want to be remembered as
having in effect atrophied the most effective alliance of this
century, it should welcome efforts to clarify the many
ambiguities in the Founding Act. In this way, a truly
bipartisan approach to American-European security relations
can be restored.

I testified on NATO enlargement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 30, 1997, a copy of which is attached. Because of overseas travel, I have not had an opportunity to develop a full-fledged statement nor to address the more specific issues raised by Senators Thurmond and Levin in their letter of January 19. However, I will attempt to respond to these questions extemporaneously.

The following is a summary of my presentation.

## Speaking Notes

Thank you for the opportunity to testify with respect to the extension of the American troop presence in Bosnia. Like several Senators, I was ambivalent about the deployment of American troops when it was first proposed, since it was at the margin of the American national interest as I understood it. Peace in Bosnia was important, but not every important international goal rises to the stature of having to be vindicated by risking American lives. Nevertheless, like many Senators here, I went along with it, (1) because of the danger of setting a precedent for other conflicts in or close to Europe, (2) because two NATO allies--Britain and France--were already involved and threatened to withdraw--and the Administration had promised to support this extrication with American troops and (3) because of the intrinsic merit of the enterprise.

However, from the beginning, I have made clear that I supported the presence of American forces for one purpose only: the preservation of peace.

The key document with respect to Bosnia is the Dayton Agreement. The Administration and its negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, deserve much credit for bringing about a cease-fire. But the Dayton Agreement has two aspects: the military provisions that establish a cease-fire and place international forces between the contending parties; and political provisions which seek to bring about a unitary multi-ethnic state composed of Croats, Serbs and Moslems.

I support the first objective. I am deeply worried about the use of American forces to bring about the second.

The Administration's tendency is to treat Bosnian tensions as an institutional problem to be overcome by constitutional provisions that reconcile the parties and establish procedures for settling conflicts. But, for the Bosnians, the overwhelming reality is their historical memory, which for centuries has sustained their ineradicable hatreds and unquenchable aspirations.

Throughout their histories, Serbs and Croats have considered themselves defenders of their religions, first against a Muslim tide, then against each other. The Serbs' identity derives from a series of bloody battles in defense of the Serbian faith and population against Islam. Once Islam was

2

stopped, the Serbs fought to vindicate their independence
from Catholic Austria, identified for them by the Croats.

The Croats' perception is precisely the reverse--they
view themselves as upholders of Catholicism against Serbian
Orthodoxy and Islam. And the Muslims know that they are
regarded by the two other ethnic groups as a historical
instrument of the hated Turks and therefore--since
ethnically they are at one with the Serbs and Croats--as
turncoats.

The deep-seated hatred of each party for all the others
exists because their conflict is more akin to the Thirty
Years War over religion than it is to political conflict.
And this should serve to caution the United States not to
get in between these parties by trying to impose political
solutions drawn from our own, largely secular, experience.

Once passions were unleashed by the civil war, each
group committed unspeakable cruelties in the process of
expelling the other groups from the regions that they
controlled--the ethnic cleansing. The Serbs started the
process but, as the war continued, the other parties also
engaged in murderous acts--the Croats in Krajina, the
Muslims around Sarajevo.

The NATO allies would have done well to stop the
killing six years ago, in its incipient phase. They could
have taken the position that they would not tolerate such

3

outrages within reach of NATO forces and on the continent
where the political concept of human dignity originated and
is now institutionalized. As a result of their failure to
do so, each of the ethnic regions of Bosnia has become
largely homogenous; the results of ethnic cleansing are now
the dominant fact of life in Bosnia.

The political provisions of the Dayton Agreement seek
to reverse this state of affairs. They provide for free
movement among the ethnic enclaves, for free repatriation of
refugees and for elections leading to national
reconciliation. This vision has turned out to be a mirage.

No free movement among the various ethnic enclaves
takes place, and no mail or telephone services exist. Each
ethnic group issues its own currency, license plates and
passports. Serbs with Cyrillic license plates are at
particular risk in other areas, but so are the Muslims and
Croats if they leave their enclaves. Not surprisingly,
refugees tend to return home only with armed escorts and are
frequently obliged to flee as soon as the escorts leave.

Attempting to create a unitary multi-ethnic state will
therefore involve us in one of two outcomes: either a
resumption of the civil war, which sooner or later will
claim American casualties, or a victory of the Muslim part
followed by ethnic cleansing, this time of the Serbs. (30%
of the Croats have already left.) The reason for this

4

prediction is that the military balance between Muslims and Serbs has been reversed in favor of the former as a result of America's only slightly indirect efforts. Either course will risk American casualties; the second raises the question of why it is in the American interest to create a fairly large Muslim state with ties to Iran in the center of the Balkans.

For all these reasons, I recommend that the Senate approve the continuation of an American troop presence in Bosnia. But the political purposes of the mission should be redefined by a suitable Congressional expression. I support the recommendation of former US Deputy Commander Charles Boyd in a recent issue of *Foreign Affairs*. (a) Bosnia should be constituted as a loose Confederation with no attempt by us or the international force to increase the power of the central authority. (b) The United States should be more even-handed in the distribution of aid and cease intervention in the political details of especially the Serbian part of Bosnia. I am extremely uneasy about the degree of detail of the intervention of the international force, especially in the Serbian part of Bosnia.

Reconstruction aid should be more equitably divided.

(c) The US should avoid arming one of the constituent ethnic groups.

Henry A. Kissinger

5

1

HEARING ON

NATO/RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP - PART I

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Thursday, October 30, 1997

U.S. Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Smith, Grams, Frist, Biden, Robb, and Wellstone.

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JESSE HELMS, U.S. SENATOR FROM

NORTH CAROLINA

The Chairman: Good morning, Dr. Kissinger. It is great
of you to come after having had such a late evening last
night. It is a pleasure to welcome you on behalf of the
committee. The subject this morning, of course as everybody
knows, is the NATO/Russia Relationship.

Now, Henry Kissinger needs no introduction by me, or for
that matter by anybody else in the world. He is that well
known. The Secretary and I have sometimes had slightly
different views during the decades that we have known each
other, but I have always respected Dr. Kissinger and
particularly his appraisals of important foreign policy
matters. So I say to you, Sir, in addition to good morning,
your views on NATO enlargement and specifically the
NATO/Russia relationship will be enormously helpful to this
committee.

I see the ranking member will be here shortly, but I
suggest that you proceed.

DEC-05-1991 21:20

1:04

CJ

3

1 STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, PRESIDENT,

2 KISSINGER AND ASSOCIATES, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

3 Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman and members of the
4 committee, I have submitted a formal statement and I stand by
5 all of it, but in order to permit more time for questions I
6 will just read some extracts from it and then respond to your
7 questions.

8 It is an honor to appear before this committee on a
9 matter of such importance to America's future. If this
10 century has taught any lesson, it is that our security is
11 inextricably linked with Europe's. NATO, the institution
12 expressing this conviction, has successfully deterred war in
13 Europe for 50 years. Now that Soviet power has receded from
14 the center of the continent, NATO needs to adapt itself to the
15 consequences of its success.

16 Let me add here a comment which is not explicitly in the
17 text [as it is]. Whatever we believe about the evolution of
18 other parts of the world, I believe that the rock bottom
19 organization and grouping which we must foster is the nations
20 which share our democratic tradition and much of our history.
21 So I believe that the relationship of the democracies in the
22 North Atlantic and in the Western Hemisphere should be the key
23 building block of the future American foreign policy.

24 Therefore it is of course a key question, what is this Europe?

25 What is this North Atlantic area with which we want to relate

4

1. ourselves, to which we must relate ourselves. I think it is
2. essential that the nations of Eastern and Central Europe,
3. which were excluded from their historical traditions by the
4. arrangements that were made at the end of World War II, find
5. their place in the relationship of the democracies.

6. Now, critics of NATO enlargement argue that the admission
7. of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary threatens prospects
8. for the democratic evolution of Russia, and therefore
9. magnifies perils rather than allays them. I hold the opposite
10. view. The Russian Defense Minister, Rodionov, explained
11. Russian opposition to NATO enlargement on the ground that it
12. deprives Russia of a buffer zone in Central Europe. Were NATO
13. to fall in with this argument, it would perpetuate the
14. injustice of the Soviet satellite orbit by condemning the
15. recently liberated nations of Central Europe to
16. institutionalized impotence, and it would store up endless
17. future troubles.

18. Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land
19. between Germany and Russia runs counter to all historical
20. experience, especially that of the interwar period. It would
21. bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe, those that
22. are potentially threatened but not guaranteed, and those that
23. are guaranteed but not threatened. If America were to act to
24. defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east,
25. the credibility of all the existing NATO guarantees would be

DEC-03-1973 21:20

F.03

5

1 gravely weakened, nor would this exclusion of traditional

2 Central European nations from the common defense achieve its

3 purpose. Once Russia had succeeded in establishing a military

4 buffer zone, it would logically follow with demands for a

5 political corollary that would imply a veto over foreign

6 policy.

7 If the eastern border of Germany is defined as the limit

8 of Western Europe, then the western defense, Germany will be driven

9 to doubt America's leadership and to try to influence the

10 security position of the buffer zone on a national basis.

11 Failure to enlarge NATO would thus risk either collision or

12 collusion between Germany and Russia. Either way, American

13 abdication would produce a political earthquake threatening

14 vital American interests.

15 Considerations such as these have transformed the great

16 Czech president, Havel, into a strong advocate of early NATO,

17 enlargement. An ardent human rights activist, he surely

18 appreciates the argument for encouraging a democratic

19 evolution in Russia, but he obviously believes that even the

20 most optimistic outcome will take longer than is safely

21 compatible with the establishment of a vacuum in Central

22 Europe. I know no leader of Central Europe who does not share

23 this view.

24 NATO expansion therefore represents a balancing of two

25 conflicting considerations: the fear of alienating Russia

1 against the danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe

2 between Germany and Russia. Failure to expand NATO is likely

3 to prove irrevocable. Russian opposition would only grow as

4 its economy gains strength. The nations of Central Europe

5 would drift out of their association with Europe. So I would

6 strongly urge the Senate to ratify NATO expansion.

7 Now, let me turn to another matter. While I strongly

8 favor NATO expansion and recommend its approval, I am deeply

9 worried about the Founding Act which seeks to reconcile Russia
to NATO expansion by offering Russia a role in NATO councils.

10 Part of my objection is philosophical. Alliances define a
11 common threat; collective security deals with a legal
12 contingency. Alliances delineate an area to be defended;

13 collective security is open-ended and is redefined from case-
14 to-case.
15

16 The language of the Founding Act is that of collective

17 security, not of alliance. I have gone through a lot of

18 analysis of the language, which we do not have to do here.

19 The words "common defense" apparently proved so offensive
20 to their commitment to collective security that the drafters

21 of the Founding Act could not bring themselves to invoke them,

22 and used instead the euphemism, quote, commitments undertaken
23 in the Washington Treaty, unquote, which created NATO in 1949.

24 This view is assuredly not shared by the new members who

25 are seeking to participate in NATO for reasons quite the

8

1. have to appeal first to the Permanent Joint Council on which

2. Russia is represented.

3. It will be argued that if the Permanent Council

4. deadlocks, the regular NATO Council remains free to perform

5. its historic functions. That is true in theory, but it will

6. never work in practice. Since, except for the Russian

7. representatives, the membership is identical, each country

8. will assess the grave step of meeting without a Russian

9. presence in terms of its overall relationship with Moscow.

10. Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent Council

11. sessions will tend to merge. The free and easy "family

12. atmosphere" of existing institutions will vanish.

13. As for the new members of NATO, they are joining in these

14. restrictions with respect to the deployment of other NATO

15. forces and nuclear weapons. The ultimate irony is that Russia

16. will be participating in the Permanent Joint Council and

17. achieving a voice in NATO 2 years before the new members, who

18. have to wait for ratification of the enlargement by all the

19. parliaments of NATO.

20. The dilemma the supporters of NATO enlargement now face

21. is that the Founding Act has already gone into effect upon

22. signature. As an executive agreement, it will not have to be

23. ratified by the Senate, while NATO enlargement, involving a

24. treaty, does. Thus if the admission of new members were not

25. ~~to be~~ ratified, we will have inherited the worst possible

DEC-03-1997 21:21

1 outcome: the demoralization of Central Europe and a NATO
2 rendered dysfunctional by the Founding Act.

3 Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of this
4 committee share my concerns about the possibility that the
5 Founding Act has given Russia too much of a role in NATO
6 matters; and I am aware that you pressed the Secretary of
7 State for clarification on a number of these issues when she
8 appeared before the committee 2 weeks ago.

9 I was pleased to note that, in her response to your
10 questions, the Secretary reassured you and the American people
11 that nothing which has been agreed to with the Russians will
12 detract from the primacy of NATO. And if I may make a
13 suggestion, I believe this offers the Senate an opportunity
14 in the course of the ratification procedure to address the
15 philosophical ambiguities of the Founding Act.

16 Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I recommend that, in its
17 instrument of advice and consent, the Senate should explicitly
18 reassert the central role of the Atlantic Alliance for
19 American foreign policy, and insist that nothing in any other
20 document shall detract from the North Atlantic Council as the
21 supreme body of the alliance. Such a resolution could draw
22 directly on the forthright response which Secretary Albright
23 gave to your questions. Additionally, the Senate resolution
24 should declare that the United States expects Russia to desist
25 from all pressures and threats in Europe on this issue. In

10

1 the meantime, while ratification proceeds, a joint resolution
2 of Congress should urge that the new NATO members be permitted

3 to join the Permanent Joint Council while waiting for
4 ratification. This would remove the anomaly that the

5 institution created to reconcile Russia to NATO's expansion
6 come into being years before the expansion actually occurs.

7 In this way I believe a truly bipartisan approach to the
8 European security relationship can be achieved.

9 Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

10 [The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:]

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DEC-03-1997 21:21

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1 The Chairman: Dr. Kissinger, I thank you very much. I
2 am so glad that you got into the matter that I exchanged
3 correspondence with the Secretary about recently.

4 I think we will go on 5 minutes for each Senator for the
5 time being, because as soon as this breakfast is over we are
6 going to be joined by many other Senators. Let us see how we
7 can do on that.

8 I am hesitant to do this, Dr. Kissinger, but you know
9 about as much about China as anybody I know. I guess all of
10 us have been thinking about the advice to give visitors, that
11 includes me.

12 Dr. Kissinger: That I give the advice --

13 The Chairman: To the Chinese leaders who are visiting
14 us. That has nothing to do with NATO, but I want you to spend
15 a minute or so saying, telling, revealing what you think would
16 be the best course for the United States to follow in trying
17 to work out an amicable relationship with China.

18 For my part, I have made several contacts over a period
19 of time now trying to point out to the Chinese that the
20 American people like the Chinese people and they want to do
21 business with them and want to recognize them as the power
22 they are, but the human rights thing is standing in the way.
23 It certainly stands in the way as far as I am concerned. As I
24 put it to one leader yesterday, you have no idea, Sir, how
25 much cooperation and goodwill you would build if there could

12

1 be not an expression of retreat but an expression that we are

2 going to work on it sincerely and honorably. I do not know

3 whether that did any good or not, but I thought the President

4 of the United States did quite well yesterday in standing up

5 for that.

6 If you would give your opinion, what would you say to the

7 President, or maybe you have said it since he has been here,

8 the President of China, what would you say to him?

9 Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, I am doing this really off

10 the top of my head.

11 The Chairman: I know that.

12 Dr. Kissinger: I have not done any formal preparation

13 for this, however it is obviously a topic about which I have

14 thought. I did not have an opportunity on this trip, because

15 I just came back from Europe yesterday late afternoon, to talk

16 to the President of China, but I have had other occasions and

17 I am sure I will have opportunity.

18 Of course we are all influenced by our experiences. I

19 was the first American official to visit China. I was sent

20 there by President Nixon. In those days there was a huge

21 philosophical gap between China and the United States.

22 President Nixon, with my enthusiastic concurrence, agreed or

23 felt that peace, flexibility for American foreign policy, the

24 ability to play a significant role in Asia, required that we

25 have diplomatic exchanges with China, even though

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1. disagreements between us and China on human rights, there is

2. the question of how we influence them better. I believe we can

3. influence them as a nation better by quiet diplomacy than by

4. visible pressure.

5. Let me add, incidentally, that I have no problem, in fact

6. I respect the demonstrators who express their views as private

7. citizens. This is how our system operates. I, however,

8. believe that, as a government we should, if at all possible,

9. avoid sanctions and attempt to find areas where we have

10. genuinely common interests. So this is what I would say. If

11. China's leaders asked me, I would tell them that they should

12. take very seriously expressions such as the one you mentioned.

13. If the President asked me to what extent he should do that
14. publicly and with pressure, I would urge him to try to find

15. another way to do it if at all possible.

16. The Chairman: Thank you. Senator Wellstone.

17. Senator Wellstone: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you

18. for being here, Dr. Kissinger. I have just one comment about

19. the last day or two, and I much appreciate your comments about

20. people in the parks.

21. Dr. Kissinger: I was not here, though.

22. Senator Wellstone: On the question of the situation in

23. China, that it is relative, you of course have a perspective

24. that I do not have, but I know that one of the things that I

25. find personally, and this, Mr. Chairman, goes to some meetings

DEC-03-1991 21:23

15

1 we had yesterday, really quite devastating is this passage of
2 the State Department's report on human rights in China. It is
3 really dismal. In fact Secretary Shaddock, I believe is his
4 name, Wei Jei-shun met with him and because of that meeting
5 now finds himself back in prison. He just wrote a book called
6 The Courage to Stand Alone, Wei Jei-shun did.

7 It is troubling that we don't see a lot of evidence of
8 the quiet diplomacy working, at least by our own State
9 Department reports on the state of human rights. I quite
10 agree with you, there is of course a very legitimate question
11 as to what we should do, what is most effective. But, boy,
12 the most recent empirical evidence we have on what is going on
13 in China is not, it certainly does not give one much reason
14 for optimism, and I think that is why many of us are speaking
15 up and are proud to identify ourselves with the human rights
16 community.

17 You can respond to that if you want to, but I want to ask
18 you a question about NATO expansion. Do you want to respond
19 first?

20 Dr. Kissinger: Could I make a response to the Senator?

21 Senator Wellstone: Of course.

22 Dr. Kissinger: If I may make a response, Senator, I have
23 never criticized the people who express their views on human
24 rights, and I have on several occasions which I have chosen
25 not to publicize, intervened on behalf of some of the cases,

DEC-03-1997 21:54

16

1 and at least two cases have succeeded. But my approach
~ requires that I do not talk about it afterwards.

2
= What
The question that bothers me is that I see this debate
is that
we are dealing here with a huge country

3
> The question that bothers me is that I see this debate
> is that
> we are dealing here with a huge country

4
> evolving here as this
> still
> in the process of evolving
> we are dealing here with a huge country

5
> in the process of evolving
> and I believe it is really not in
> the American national interest to conduct it
> from a posture of

6
> the American national interest to conduct it
> from a posture of
> confrontation. First, because I do not believe that any other

7
> confrontation. First, because I do not believe that any other
> Asian nation will support us. Secondly, I believe
> other Asian nations will then adopt a posture of semi-

8
> Asian nation will support us. Secondly, I believe
> other Asian nations will then adopt a posture of semi-
> neutrality between us, which means a more nationalist policy.
> So our capacity to shape events will diminish.

9
> neutrality between us, which means a more nationalist policy.
> So our capacity to shape events will diminish.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
1. When I became a first Security Advisor and then Secretary

10
> neutrality between us, which means a more nationalist policy.
> So our capacity to shape events will diminish.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

11
So our capacity to shape events will diminish.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

12
> When I became a first Security Advisor and then Secretary
13
> of State, we had 500,000 Americans in Vietnam, where we
14
> thought we would bring democracy and then found ourselves in a
15
> struggle we did not know how to end. So I am very influenced
16
> the
17
> by an experience of not getting ourselves into a confrontation
18
> if it is avoidable, and secondly, to make absolutely sure that
19
> when we do, the American public understands why we have done
20
> it.
21
> becomes a military threat, I will be before this committee
22
> supporting opposition to it. But I am trying to avoid the
23
> situation, and I think the future of China is now still
24
> somewhat open. I cannot believe that it is possible to change
25
> the economy as they have without political consequences. What

16
> by an experience of not getting ourselves into a confrontation
17
> if it is avoidable, and secondly, to make absolutely sure that
18
> when we do, the American public understands why we have done
19
> it.
20
> becomes a military threat, I will be before this committee
21
> supporting opposition to it. But I am trying to avoid the
22
> situation, and I think the future of China is now still
23
> somewhat open. I cannot believe that it is possible to change
24
> the economy as they have without political consequences. What

20
> If China threatens the equilibrium in Asia, and if it
21
> becomes a military threat, I will be before this committee
22
> supporting opposition to it. But I am trying to avoid the
23
> situation, and I think the future of China is now still
24
> somewhat open. I cannot believe that it is possible to change
25
> the economy as they have without political consequences. What

TOTAL P.09

DEC-03-1997 21:23

102

EJ

17

1 these consequences are exactly, I do not pretend to know.

2 So this is my profound worry. Incidentally, I must add,

3 it has nothing to do with economics. I would like to see

4 trade, but that is minuscule in my consideration.

5 Senator Wellstone: I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary.

6 Dr. Kissinger: So this is what is on my mind as we go

7 through this, these dramatic few days.

8 Senator Wellstone: Let me ask one question. I very much

9 appreciated --

10 The Chairman: He will have to answer it on the next
11 round.

12 Senator Wellstone: Okay. I will put the question out
13 there. You have written that the new nations that are hoping
14 to join NATO, and I quote, are seeking to participate in NATO
15 not to erase dividing lines but to position themselves inside
16 a guaranteed territory by shifting existing NATO boundaries
17 300 miles to the east, quote, end of quote. I really
18 appreciate your candor. This position, though, at least seems
19 to me to be in contradiction with the administration's
20 pronouncements that NATO expansion will erase dividing lines
21 in Europe. In the words of the President, it is intended to,
22 quote, build and secure a new Europe undivided at last, end of
23 quote.

24 Maybe you can get to it later. I do not think it is, Mr.
25 Chairman, an inconsequential question, because if there is

18

1 anything we want to know about NATO expansion, it is whether

2 it is going to unify or whether it will redivide Europe. I

3 wonder whether you could comment at some point in time on what

4 I identify at least as a contradiction here.

5 Dr. Kissinger: Should I do that later?

6 The Chairman: Yes, Sir. Senator Hagel.

7 Senator Hagel: Dr. Kissinger, thank you for coming this
8 morning. I have just a quick comment on China, and then I
9 would like to get your thoughts on a couple of the elements
10 that you talked about in your opening statement. I have
11 always thought on the China debate we have somehow misplaced
12 some of the focus of the debate. It should not be about do we
13 support human rights or do we not support human rights. Of
14 course we all support human rights in China. The debate
15 should be focused on how we best influence the behavior of the
16 Chinese leaders to bring more human rights, and I only say
17 that because as I have listened and witnessed much of this
18 debate, it is like environmental issues and other issues, you
19 are either for a clean environment or you are against it, and
20 we need to get back to the real issue.

21 Your points about the Founding Act, what do you believe
22 the Russians think about the Founding Act, but more
23 importantly, what do you believe their view is of the Founding
24 Act?

25 Dr. Kissinger: Let me just make a very quick comment

DEC-03-1991 21:25

LYJ

19

1 about your China point. I am somewhat disturbed by the

2 impression that is being created in the debate that the only

3 issue we have vis-a-vis China is human rights, and that the

4 only debate we have in this country is how we can improve

5 human rights in China. I would urge that ~~there be~~ ~~of~~ examination be given

6 whether we have any ~~interests~~, any common interests in terms ~~would~~

7 of our national security that ~~will~~ drive us to some degree of

8 cooperation with China. This aspect of the relationship must

9 be included, otherwise we will always look as if we are

10 somehow inadequate.

11 Now about Russia. I do not agree with the

12 administration's analysis of the Russian problem, and

13 therefore I do not agree with the statement ~~of~~ about erasing

14 dividing lines in that sense. My analysis of Russia is as

15 follows. A dominant view of some of the administration

16 spokesmen seems to be that the obstacle to relations with

17 Russia is the absence of pluralistic democracy, and that once

18 democracy is established in Russia, all other problems ~~will~~

19 disappear. And then Russia will merge into ~~some~~ kind of

20 Eurasian **big** structure.

21 I think the problem of Russia is more complicated. First

22 of all, ~~the~~ country is partly in Europe but ~~it is~~ also partly in the

23 Middle East and ~~it is~~ partly in Asia, so that the pulls on

24 Russia are much more complex than those faced by any other

25 nation in Europe. Secondly, the history of Russia is quite

DEC-03-1991 21:24

21

1. borders and recognizes that Austria, Singapore, Japan, and Israel all developed huge economies with no resources and in small territories, they have vast territory and vast resources. They could do enormous things for their people. Then there is no security problem.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6. So for all of these reasons I do not believe that in any foreseeable future it is possible for Russia to join NATO, and I think it would be a lot better if we said explicitly that this cannot happen. If I am very much in favor of negotiating with Russia, and the Chairman will remember, as I surely do, that in earlier incarnations he expressed some doubts about what he considered my excessive propensity for negotiating with the Soviet Union.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14. (Laughter.)

15. Dr. Kissinger: But I believe that this is a question for political and diplomatic efforts. If we had created a body within the European Security Conference to conduct dialogue with Russia, I would favor that. What I do not favor is this impression that everything sort of mergers and everything is sort of evolving towards some kind of mini-U.N. from the Chinese border to the Canadian border up in Alaska. I have been very opposed to this approach and have said so repeatedly publicly.

16.

17.

18. I would favor that. What I do not favor is this impression that everything sort of mergers and everything is sort of evolving towards some kind of mini-U.N. from the Chinese border to the Canadian border up in Alaska. I have been very opposed to this approach and have said so repeatedly publicly.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24. Senator Hagel: Thank you.

25. The Chairman: Senator Biden.

22

1 Senator Biden: It is good to see you, Dr. Kissinger, Mr.

2 Secretary. I apologize for being late. I was where the

3 Chairman was wise enough not to be. I was at the breakfast,

4 and I apologize.

5 My understanding, and please correct me if I am wrong, is

6 that on the central issue before this committee, which is

7 whether or not we should expand NATO, whether we should vote

8 to amend the Washington Treaty, you think that we should.

9 Dr. Kissinger: I strongly support it, and I urge you to

10 do that.

11 Senator Biden: The primary criticism is the way in which

12 the relationship, as it relates to what was the Partnership

13 for Peace and is now becoming the expansion of NATO, the

14 relationship with Russia on those two fronts has occurred.

15 Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

16 Senator Biden: I, quite frankly, got myself in a little

17 bit of a bind because I quoted you in a debate, I referenced

18 you in a debate I was having as a source of authority for a

19 position I was taking, and was later informed that it was not

20 your position. This was about 8 months ago. I recalled, and

21 I had my staff go back and get it, a piece you had done in

22 December of 1994 where you called for, and it confused me, you

23 called for a treaty with Russia, a U.S. treaty with Russia.

24 You said such a treaty would provide that no foreign troops be

25 stationed on the territory of new NATO members on the model of

DEC-03-1993 21:24

25

1 Dulles, I am here to ask you whatever I can.

2 (Laughter.)

3 Senator Biden: That is how our relationship started.

4 Dr. Kissinger: Now you understand why my relations with
the Senators were not always what they should have been.

6 (Laughter.)

7 Senator Biden: Anyway, my time is up. I truly
8 appreciate your clarification, but I am not being facetious
9 when I say my view of the arrangement that has been worked out
10 is what I thought you were envisioning by a treaty providing
11 consultation between NATO and Russia on matters of common
12 interest. My reading of the agreement we made is not, and I
13 could be dead wrong, but as I read the text, and talking to
14 the principals, there is no including the NATO members of
15 other countries. It was literally consultation, not
16 intertwining the, as you put it, a larger matrix of
17 relationships. But you have answered my question.

18 Dr. Kissinger: I have high regard for the people who
19 negotiated this. What Secretary Albright said here, I can
20 live with very happily I simply think that it is difficult
21 to make it work that way as time goes on. You have these
22 ambassadors sitting in the building, they meet every day.
23 Then the NATO members go off and say we are going to have our
24 own meeting. It is legally, of course, they can do it, but
25 the human nature of these multi-lateral parties is against it.

DEC-03-1973 21:00

26

1 You asked me what is the Russian strategy. Russian

2 strategy cannot be to build NATO. It is against their whole

3 tradition. So they have every interest to water down NATO

4 into some vague multi-lateral U.N. type talk shop. Therefore

5 they will bring issues before the NATO Council that will

6 achieve this purpose. This is my concern. I have no doubt at

7 all that Secretary Albright means exactly what she is saying.

8 Senator Biden: I thank you, Mr. Secretary.

9 The Chairman: Senator Smith.

10 Senator Smith: Mr. Secretary, first, thank you for

11 coming to this hearing. For those of us who are new and

12 trying to catch up with what you know and to learn the history

13 that you both have and have made, I for one am grateful to

14 you.

15 When I listen to the President of the United States and

16 others, well-intentioned, use words like we are not redrawing

17 lines in Europe, Europe is undivided and free, and I see us

18 expanding NATO, I frankly must confess I think we are playing

19 word games. I think in fact what we are doing, and rightfully

20 doing, is redrawing lines that say American values, western

21 interests, principles that we value such as private property,

22 the rule of law, human rights, that we do draw lines, and that

23 as a community of western nations we reflect this not just

24 economically and politically but even militarily in order to

25 provide security arrangements. So frankly I find somewhat

DEC-03-1991 21:25

[Y]

27

1 puzzling some of the language that we use to talk around this
2 issue.

3 I think what we are doing is moving lines, but I do think
4 we have got to allow others, other people on the other side of
5 those lines, we have to give them an eraser. They have to be
6 able to join the western community by taking on our values,
7 our culture, if they will, if they want to, and we need to be
8 prepared to receive them. In my mind that certainly includes
9 Hungary and Poland and the Czech Republic. I would have even
10 allowed Slovenia and Romania into this first round.

11 I guess the real push is going to come when it comes to
12 the Baltics. And even we must be honest and say should it not
13 also ultimately include Russia, if they would take on the
14 kinds of institutions and abide by the rule of law that we
15 share commonly with Western Europe. I wonder how you feel
16 about further expansion, and ultimately Russia's inclusion if
17 they would join Western Europe more than just rhetorically.

18 Dr. Kissinger: Let me tell you what historic models I
19 have in mind. I know there are a lot of people who think
20 if I burn votive candles to Metternich every night in my
21 devotion to the 19th century --

22 Senator Biden: We thought you were.

23 (Laughter.)

24 Dr. Kissinger: I knew it. May I give, however, an
25 historic example. At the end of the Napoleonic wars France

DEC-03-1995 21:25

LYD

29

1 areas, and I certainly believe it even more today.

2 Senator Smith: There is no more reason then to keep the

3 Baltics out than to keep Poland out.

4 Dr. Kissinger: The problem with the Baltics, or say ~~the~~ Ukraine, is that when you move former republics of the Soviet

5 and Union into NATO, into an integrated military structure, then you have, especially with ~~the~~ Ukraine, a major challenge to

7 Russian self-consciousness. On the other hand, we have to

9 find a way of conveying that a threat to the independence of the Baltics and the Ukraine would be inimical to any friendly relationship with the United States, and that this is something we would look at with the greatest gravity.

13 The Chairman: Senator Robb.

14 Senator Robb: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, thank you for being with us this morning. You have indicated skepticism about the consultative process and the degree of influence that Russia might have on the NATO operations. Are there any steps that the United States ought to pursue, in your judgment, during this formative period that could be included in whatever charter arrangements are ultimately agreed to or changes that might be made that would restrict that role in ways that you believe are appropriate?

23 Dr. Kissinger: Senator, I made clear before you came in the room that I strongly favor ratification in any event.

25 Senator Robb: Unless there be any doubt, I do too.

DEC-03-1995 21:08

30

1 Dr. Kissinger: Nothing I have said should be interpreted
2 as negative.

3 Senator Robb: Nor was my question intended to imply
4 that.

5 Dr. Kissinger: I did not interpret it that way. What I
6 have recommended to the Chairman and to the committee is that
7 in the instrument of ratification, the Senate find a way of
8 expressing its view that the NATO Council is the dominant
9 instrument for the operation of the alliance, and that the
10 Permanent Council is a more political instrument, and
11 fundamental decisions are taken in the first instance in the
12 NATO Council. In order to keep the bipartisan character, I
13 have also recommended that some of the language, or for all I
14 know, all of the language that Secretary Albright used before
15 this committee in explaining how she interprets the Founding
16 Act be incorporated in this so that we have a basis for a
17 bipartisan consensus.

18 I am convinced that future Secretaries of State would be
19 grateful to be able to point to a Senate instruction to them,
20 so that it does not look as if they are the spoil sports if
21 they want to move more issues into the regular NATO Council.
22 I would do my utmost to establish a procedure where
23 significant issue moves into the Permanent Council until there
24 is a NATO Council decision with respect to it, and
25 that this not be used as an alternative method. First there is a NATO

DEC-03-1997 21:25

31

1 Council decision, and then one meets with the Russians.

2 Senator Robb: Well, with respect to current or future
3 progress in terms of coming to decisions, I think it is fair
4 to say that the rather lengthy and protracted process where we
5 move from UNPROFOR into IFOR was not a model of efficiency.

6 Are there suggestions you might have to address that
7 particular question?

8 Dr. Kissinger: One of the problems with respect to
9 Bosnia was that the United States did not really have a
10 policy and history shows that a strong American lead is
11 usually needed to crystallize a position. But I do not have
12 any great structural suggestion.

13 Senator Robb: There were a number of us, including
14 members of this committee, who made certain recommendations
15 earlier in that process that might have facilitated that.

16 Dr. Kissinger: As to policy or as to procedure?

17 Senator Robb: Really as to procedure. I take it back,
18 as to policy in terms of what we ought to do, when we ought to
19 do it.

20 Dr. Kissinger: I agree. If that had been done, Senator,
21 the likelihood is that there would have been a more unified
22 NATO position.

23 Senator Robb: It certainly proved to be beneficial once
24 that was achieved. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is about up,
25 and I am expected to be the acting ranking member over in the

32

1 Armed Services Committee at this point. I thank you for the
2 time, and I thank Dr. Kissinger for his appearance before this
3 committee.

4 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Robb. Dr. Frist.

5 Senator Frist: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
6 Dr. Kissinger, for being with us. I am interested in the
differing expectations that current members and prospective
gmembers of the expanded NATO might have and what that might
mean in terms of obligation and role in a post-Cold War
Europe. These potential differences in expectations I would
think would have real implications as we project ahead what
the participants and potential participants would see as the
future mission of NATO and how effective that future NATO can
be.

15 First of all, there is our own expectation, and it seems
16 to me that the United States is struggling with what we should
really think and expect of a future NATO. It is something
18 that these discussions help all of us with, I think, to a
great degree. If we look at the current participants, their
visions and expectations with our European partners seem to be
different in many ways, but judging from their view of NATO's
role in Bosnia and of numerous comments, there seems to be an
indication that their expectations are different than our own.

24 Then if we look at the prospective members, and you might
25 help us with this in terms of what their expectations might

DEC-03-1997 21:20

10

33

1 be, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, clearly their
2 expectations are very high, and understandably so, viewing
3 NATO membership as a long overdue reentry back into the West.

4 With the common bond or the glue that has held NATO
5 together in terms of an external threat clearly changing, and
6 with members and future members having these different
7 visions, I guess I have two questions, do we have today an
8 internal culture in NATO that is consistent with the
9 expectations of the three potential new members to support an
10 alliance strong enough to hold the expanded NATO together,
11 again, the expectations today being very different than they
12 might have been 10 years ago?

13 Dr. Kissinger: Well, I think that is a very important
14 question. I had the privilege of being in Poland at just
15 about the time that its membership in NATO was ~~agreed, was~~
16 approved. I thought it was one of those exhilarating moments
17 ~~which was~~ somewhat comparable to being in Europe at the end of
18 World War II, the liberation from German occupation, ~~in that~~
19 Polish people that I met felt they were at last, after several
20 hundred years, rejoining Europe as an integral member and as a
21 charter member.

22 A personal friend was Havel, the President of the Czech
23 Republic. I did not see him at that time, but I saw him
24 shortly afterwards, and he has a similar view. I might add, ~~that~~
25 when I first met Havel he had some of the classic left wing

TOTAL P. 10

35

1 the protesters on China, but I would go much further on

2 pushing the cohesion of the democracies in the West. This is

3 a question of emphasis here, and I am very worried that our

4 relations in the North Atlantic are sort of withering.

5 Nothing bad is happening, but a whole new generation is

6 growing up that does not have the experience that my

7 generation had of working together for noble objectives. We

8 have become sort of mechanics in operating a system, and

9 Bosnia is a symptom of this. So in this respect I much prefer

10 the attitude of the East and Central Europeans, ~~for whom this enlargement represents~~ it

11 ~~expansion is~~ a moral act, and why not ratifying ~~would be a~~

12 terrible blow to their whole image of what recent history has

13 meant.

14 Senator Frist: Thank you.

15 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator. Mr. Secretary, I

16 think you can imagine the correspondence we receive, maybe you

17 get some of it too, that at best is an over simplification of

18 what the problems are. Even some of the witnesses, and I

19 respect them all, who have appeared here, some of them have

20 appeared to suggest that this is an either/or proposition,

21 that either we expand NATO and get drawn into future conflicts

22 in Europe, as they put it, or we do not expand NATO and

23 perhaps stay free of any involvement in Europe's recurring

24 calamities.

25 Now, my question to you almost answers itself, but I want

DEC-03-1997 21:55

36

1 to get it as a matter of record. Can you foresee a major

2 European war occurring in which the United States would not be

3 involved?

4 Dr. Kissinger: No. There has not been one in which we

5 have not been involved in this century.

6 The Chairman: Our involvement in a European conflict is

7 all but inevitable, if it happens, and, as you just indicated,

8 it happened twice in this century. May I say what advantages

9 does NATO expansion provide us in the best case to prevent

10 wars and in the worst case to win them? I know that is sort

11 of a convoluted question, but I would like to have your answer

12 to that so that, to be honest about it, we can quote you.

13 Dr. Kissinger: First, Mr. Chairman, with respect to some

14 of the testimony you have received, I am frankly astonished

15 that professionals of diplomacy could argue that a treaty that

16 we have signed that is then not ratified -- let me put it this

17 way: If 3 years ago when this debate started, somebody said

18 let us not do this, I understand that position. I disagree

19 with it, but I understand it. I do not understand how it can

20 ... be recommended to the Senate not to ratify an agreement which

21 if it is not ratified would have such a devastating impact on

22 Eastern Europe, and in my view would also have in the longer

23 term a devastating impact even on the existing NATO countries.

24 How can one say to the Germans that we are absolutely

25 determined to defend the Oder, but the Vistula, which is a few

DEC-03-1995 21:40

38

1 Russia an honorable opportunity to participate in dialogue,

2 and these would be my major reasons.

3 The Chairman: Very good. Thank you. Senator Biden.

4 Senator Biden: Mr. Secretary, I really appreciate the
5 way only you can express very, very fundamental basic ideas.

6 It amazed me, some of the people who have testified here,
7 people I have great respect for, who seem not to understand
8 the history, the very recent history. When in history, in the
9 last 300 years, has there been a vacuum in Central or Eastern
10 Europe that has not been filled? And when has there been a
11 circumstance where countries that were part of this grey zone
12 or supposedly neutral have not sought their own separate
13 arrangements for their own security because they are wise
14 enough to understand that someone is going to attempt to fill
15 the vacuum? That seems to me to beg the issue whether we
16 should expand.

17 My question is, in light of the way the Soviet Union has
18 collapsed, it is not whether we expand NATO or keep it the
19 - same, it is whether we have NATO or we expand it. The way you
20 describe the attempt, the necessary foreign policy judgment
21 would have to be made in Berlin and in Bonn and in Moscow,
22 that they would have to compete to try to fill that vacuum.
23 That seems to me the absolute last thing in the world we want.
24 The Germans doing it as well as the Russians. I am not
25 anxious for either of those outcomes.

DEC-03-1991 21:20

39

I am not by this question suggesting that you do not feel
and believe we have a commitment to the Baltics, but one of
the things that I think there is a factual historical
difference between the Ukraine and the Baltics, for example, I
think the immediate effect in the Russian psyche of admitting
either the Baltics or Ukraine would be very similar. But in
fact we never recognized as a nation that the Baltics, which
were annexed by the Soviet Union, were legitimately part of
the Soviet Union. We have never recognized that, and it seems
to me that it may take some time and may need some massaging.
I am not smart enough to know exactly how to do it, but it
seems to me as a matter of principle it is very important to
make a distinction between the Baltics, for example, and
Ukraine.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree with this. I would say this. On
the current schedule of NATO expansion, there is no way the
issue of the Baltics can arise until well into the next term,
if not later. Simply, if we look at the priorities that have
doubt that
been established, I do not believe there will be another similar
hearing like this about new members in this administration.
But that is my judgment. It is simply the way these things
work. So we are talking about well into the next
administration, or maybe even the one after that.

I think however, immediately some steps should be taken to
make clear that the Baltics are members of the Western

DEC-03-1991 21:20

41

1 its economic integration, a historic role here that could
2 ameliorate a circumstance that could fester in a way that
3 causes political problems. I quite frankly am -- it is one of
4 the great disappointments, the disconnect between their view
5 of their naked economic interests and their long-term
6 political interests. I think it is a very little chance they
7 would be taking, although they have made some steps now with
8 regard to Latvia, or maybe it is Estonia, I am not sure.

9 The second point --

10 Dr. Kissinger: But they do it as a pure economic issue.

11 It is not an economic issue.

12 Senator Biden: No, it is not. It is well beyond an
13 economic issue. But the second point that I would make, if I
14 may conclude, Mr. Chairman, is that by 5 years from now one of
15 two things is going to happen. This progression within Russia
16 toward democracy and a market economy will be considerably
17 more evident or it will be in difficulty, in my view. It will
18 not be settled, but we will have a clearer picture. And that,
19 I think, is going to impact significantly on what the next
20 president of the United States feels he or she is able to do
21 relative to the Baltics without upsetting the apple cart in
22 meeting what I think is a recent historic obligation.

23 Again, I thank you for the way in which you phrased the
24 dilemma relative to expansion of NATO and this neutral zone
25 and the vacuum.

DEC-03-1995 21:40

42

Dr. Kissinger: One slightly heretical point on the

Russian situation. We have a tendency to present the issue

entirely in terms of Russian domestic politics. I could see

that Russia makes progress towards democracy and becomes

extremely nationalistic, because that could become a way of

rallying, and we have also to keep an eye on this propensity

towards a kind of imperialist nationalism, which, if you look

at the debates in the Russian parliament, is certainly present.

Senator Biden: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Senator Hagel.

Senator Hagel: Mr. Secretary, following up a little bit
on what Senator Biden was talking about, your response to
Senator Frist, you mentioned in your opening comments about
reasserting the central role of NATO. You mentioned a theme,
you talked about new political initiatives, the interconnects
that Senator Biden was talking about that have been discussed
here the last hour and a half. Should we take some initiative
to redefine NATO after 50 years? It is being somewhat
redefined. Should we take the initiative to really start
focussing on its mission?

The thing that you mentioned earlier in response to a
comment I made on China it seems to me is very clear here, and
that is the interconnects here. You mentioned Bosnia. All
these are going to have major consequences and impacts on what
we do with NATO expansion. I was wondering if you could

TOTAL P.13

DEC-03-1997 21:43

11:01

44

1 Europe and the Western Hemisphere we do have a choice. One

2 reason, to get back to the German traditional question of is that

3 Asia we have to balance the various nations, but in

4 Europe and in the Western Hemisphere we can create a

5 community. In Europe and in the Western Hemisphere war is

6 highly unlikely. There we can build structures based on

7 common values, and we should give this more emphasis. In fact

8 we have not given it any significant emphasis. We have put

9 much more emphasis on relations with Russia and trade and other

10 similar things.

11 That would be my basic theme, even if I do not have the

12 precise notion. If you put the best minds we have to work on

13 it, as we did in the early 50s, we will come up with

14 something. I have no doubt.

15 Senator Hagel: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.

16 Chairman.

17 The Chairman: Senator Grams.

18 Senator Grams: Dr. Kissinger, welcome. I am sorry I am

19 late. I do not know if I will maybe retrace some steps that

20 have been taken or questions asked, but if I have you could be

21 brief in answering those for me. A couple of questions. In

22 June of 1997, of this year, in an op ed article in the

23 Washington Post you said that you were gravely concerned that

24 the Founding Act will dilute NATO into being a U.N.-styled

25 system of collective security by grafting an elaborate and

DEC-03-1995 21:44

50

1 been here, have a way to put issues we are discussing in
2 perspective in the broad sweep of historical change, and I for
3 one appreciate it.

4 It is presumptuous of me to predict anything, but I
5 predict that you are going to be dead right, and that is I am
6 absolutely convinced an expansion of NATO in the near-term and
7 long-term will enhance our relationships with Russia, not
8 diminish them. I am absolutely convinced of that. I am also
9 convinced that as you look back over the last 50 years the
10 very people who knew the most about Russia and the Soviet
11 Union are a little bit clientized as they look at these
12 things. I think their focus is so narrow in terms of what
13 negative impact may come as a consequence of moves we make
14 that I think sometimes, it is presumptuous of me to say this,
15 they are somewhat blinded by the extent of their knowledge, if
16 that makes any sense.

17 The last point I will make is, and this is the only thing
18 I disagree with what you said, and time will tell, I predict
19 that we will have another hearing in this committee before
20 this President's term is up on admission of Romania and
21 Slovenia.

22 Dr. Kissinger: I will be here testifying for it.

23 Senator Biden: I know you will. But I was just
24 referencing the point about how long this process is going to
25 take. I agree with you that it probably will not be the

DEC-03-1995 21:44

51

1 Baltics within the time of this President, but I suspect we
2 will, I hope at least we will be considering those other two
countries sooner rather than later.
3

4 At any rate, I want to thank you very much, and thank
5 you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to make a concluding
comment.
6

7 The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, we are all
indebted to you for being available. We may not always agree,
but the young folks on the Foreign Relations Committee staff,
both Democrat and Republican, they know that they can ask you
for your opinion and you always take the time to answer. We
have two or three people like that, but we have a whole lot of
people who say they do not have the time. I thank you for
coming here this morning, and we are getting you out at
approximately the time we had agreed to do. I bid you
farewell, and good luck.
16

17 Dr. Kissinger: Thank you for this opportunity.

18 The Chairman: There being no further business to come
before the committee, we stand in recess.
19

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the hearing was recessed.]

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TOTAL P.05

(PLEASE DO NOT DETACH THIS SLIP
FROM THE TRANSCRIPT.)

UNITED STATES SENATE
Committee on Foreign Relations

NOV 24 1997

November 7, 1997

TO: Hon. Henry A. Kissinger

Attached is the stenographic transcript of the Oct. 30, 1997, "NATO/Russia Relationship - Part I," hearing. Please review your remarks and edit as necessary.

Changes in diction, expression, accuracy, or to correct any errors in transcribing are permitted. Rewriting will not be accepted. If further changes are desired, application must be made to the Chair. Return this slip, signed, with corrections by November 22, 1997.

(Signature of person making changes)

If your changes are not received within 2 weeks, it will be assumed that the transcript is correct, and will be printed as is.

Additional material to be included in the hearing record, including copies of questions and their responses must accompany these corrections.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Please return to:

Ted Kimmerly
Office of the Printer
Committee on Foreign Relations
Room SD-423, Dirksen Building
Washington, DC 20510
Phone No. 1-202-224-3947

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HEARING ON

Thursday, October 30, 1997

U.S. Senate

Washington, D.C.

2

1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JESSE HELMS, U.S. SENATOR FROM
2 NORTH CAROLINA

3 The Chairman: Good morning, Dr. Kissinger. It is great
4 of you to come after having had such a late evening last
5 night. It is a pleasure to welcome you on behalf of the
6 committee. The subject this morning, of course as everybody
7 knows, is the NATO/Russia Relationship.

8 Now, Henry Kissinger needs no introduction by me, or for
9 that matter by anybody else in the world. He is that well
10 known. The Secretary and I have sometimes had slightly
11 different views during the decades that we have known each
12 other, but I have always respected Dr. Kissinger and
13 particularly his appraisals of important foreign policy
14 matters. So I say to you, Sir, in addition to good morning,
15 your views on NATO enlargement and specifically the
16 NATO/Russia relationship will be enormously helpful to this
17 committee.

18 I see the ranking member will be here shortly, but I
19 suggest that you proceed.

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3

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, PRESIDENT,
KISSINGER AND ASSOCIATES, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, I have submitted a formal statement and I stand by
all of it, but in order to permit more time for questions I
will just read some extracts from it and then respond to your
questions.

Let me add here a comment which is not explicitly in the
text as it is. Whatever we believe about the evolution of
other parts of the world, I believe that the rock bottom
organization and grouping which we must foster is the nations
which share our democratic tradition and much of our history.
So I believe that the relationship of the democracies in the
North Atlantic and in the Western Hemisphere should be the key
building block of the future American foreign policy.

Therefore it is of course a key question what is this Europe,
what is this North Atlantic area with which we want to relate

4

1 ourselves, to which we must relate ourselves. I think it is
2 essential that the nations of Eastern and Central Europe,
3 which were excluded from their historical traditions by the
4 arrangements that were made at the end of World War II, find
5 their place in the relationship of the democracies.

6 Now, critics of NATO enlargement argue that the admission
7 of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary threatens prospects
8 for the democratic evolution of Russia, and therefore
9 magnifies perils rather than allays them. I hold the opposite
10 view. The Russian Defense Minister, Rodionov, explained
11 Russian opposition to NATO enlargement on the ground that it
12 deprives Russia of a buffer zone in Central Europe. Were NATO
13 to fall in with this argument, it would perpetuate the
14 injustice of the Soviet satellite orbit by condemning the
15 recently liberated nations of Central Europe to
16 institutionalized impotence, and it would store up endless
17 future troubles.

18 Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land
19 between Germany and Russia runs counter to all historical
20 experience, especially that of the interwar period. It would
21 bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe, those that
22 are potentially threatened but not guaranteed, and those that
23 are guaranteed but not threatened. If America were to act to
24 defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east,
25 the credibility of all the existing NATO guarantees would be

5

6 policy.

8 of Western Europe, the western defense, Germany will be driven

14 vital American interests.

23 this view.

[cc]

6

10 to NATO expansion by offering Russia a role in NATO councils.

11 Part of my objection is philosophical. Alliances define a

12 common threat; collective security deals with a legal

13 contingency. Alliances delineate an area to be defended;

14 collective security is open-ended and is redefined from case-

15 to-case.

17 security, not of alliance. I then go through a lot of

7

1 opposite of what the Founding Act describes, not to erase

2 dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed

3 territory by shifting the existing NATO boundaries some 200

4 miles to the east.

5 My major concern is not philosophical. The most

6 worrisome aspect of the Founding Act is the consultative

7 machinery for which it provides. The Act calls into being,

8 side-by-side with existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent

9 Joint Council composed of the same ambassadors who form the
10 existing NATO Council, plus a Russian full member. The

11 Russian ambassador is located inside the building where the
12 other Council members are, and so are the military

13 representatives. The Permanent Joint Council is supposed to
14 meet at least once a month. Twice a year the Council is to

15 meet at the foreign ministers' level. The first such
16 ministerial meeting was held in the shadow of the United

17 Nations last month. Regular meetings of the defense ministers
18 are also envisaged, as well as regular summits.

19 The Act designates the Permanent Joint Council as the
20 principal venue for crisis consultation between Russia and

21 NATO. Each side agrees that, quote, it will promptly consult,
22 unquote, within the Permanent Joint Council, quote, in case
23 one of the Council members perceives a threat to its

24 territorial integrity, political independence and security,

25 unquote. Thus, if Poland feels threatened by Russia, it may

8

1 have to appeal first to the Permanent Joint Council on which

2 Russia is represented.

3 It will be argued that if the Permanent Council

4 deadlocks, the regular NATO Council remains free to perform

5 its historic functions. That is true in theory, but it will

6 never work in practice. Since, except for the Russian

7 representatives, the membership is identical, each country

8 will assess the grave step of meeting without a Russian

9 presence in terms of its overall relationship with Moscow.

10 Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent Council

11 sessions will tend to merge. The free and easy "family

12 atmosphere" of existing institutions will vanish.

13 As for the new members of NATO, they are joining in these

14 restrictions with respect to the deployment of other NATO

15 forces and nuclear weapons. The ultimate irony is that Russia

16 will be participating in the Permanent Joint Council and

17 achieving a voice in NATO 2 years before the new members, who

18 have to wait for ratification of the enlargement by all the

19 parliaments of NATO.

20 The dilemma the supporters of NATO enlargement now face

21 is that the Founding Act has already gone into effect upon

22 signature. As an executive agreement, it will not have to be

23 ratified by the Senate, while NATO enlargement, involving a

24 treaty, does. Thus if the admission of new members were not

25 to be ratified, we will have inherited the worst possible

9

3 Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of this
4 committee share my concerns about the possibility that the
5 Founding Act has given Russia too much of a role in NATO
6 matters, and I am aware that you pressed the Secretary of
7 State for clarification on a number of these issues when she
8 appeared before the committee 2 weeks ago.

9 I was pleased to note that, in her response to your
10 questions, the Secretary reassured you and the American people
11 that nothing which has been agreed to with the Russians will
12 detract from the primacy of NATO. And if I may make a
13 suggestion, I believe this offers the Senate an opportunity,
14 in the course of the ratification procedure, to address the
15 philosophical ambiguities of the Founding Act.

16 Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I recommend that, in its
17 instrument of advice and consent, the Senate should explicitly
18 reassert the central role of the Atlantic Alliance for
19 American foreign policy and insist that nothing in any other
20 document shall detract from the North Atlantic Council as the
21 supreme body of the alliance. Such a resolution could draw
22 directly on the forthright response which Secretary Albright
23 gave to your questions. Additionally, the Senate resolution
24 should declare that the United States expects Russia to desist
25 from all pressures and threats in Europe on this issue. In

10

1 the meantime, while ratification proceeds, a joint resolution
2 of Congress should urge that the new NATO members be permitted
to join the Permanent Joint Council while waiting for
4 ratification. This would remove the anomaly that the
5 institution created to reconcile Russia to NATO's expansion
6 comes into being years before the expansion actually occurs.

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[cc]

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11 The Chairman: I know that.

13

1 philosophically we could not disagree more than with the China
2 of the Cultural Revolution.

3 So we have on the face of it two somewhat contradictory
4 problems. We have a national security problem, a national
5 interest problem which is that China has a population of
6 1,250,000,000. There are 60 million overseas Chinese with a
7 major influence on the economies of Southeast Asia. China
8 plays a significant role in Korea, Cambodia, and elsewhere.
9 So it is in our interest, if we can, to find a basis for
10 cooperation to serve our own purposes and to see whether there
11 are joint interests that can be developed.

12 Any confrontation with China is not the same as with the
13 Soviet Union. It is a different history, a different society.
14 Their method of conducting confrontations is to be extremely
15 prolonged and exhausting. On the other hand, it is also true
16 that, being a democracy, our government will not find support
17 if fundamental American values are consistently being
18 violated. These are the dilemmas that one faces.

19 For somebody who has been in China in the seventies, the
20 present China looks more respectful of individuals than the
21 China we saw then. Now, I recognize this is a relative
22 statement, and I believe that in terms of day-to-day life the
23 lot of the Chinese has greatly improved. In terms of their
24 right of political opposition, it has not.

25 Then, assuming as we must that there will be strong

14

1 disagreements between us and China on human rights, there is

2 the question of how we influence them better. I believe we

3 influence them as a nation better by quiet diplomacy than by

4 visible pressure.

5 Let me add, incidentally, that I have no problem, in fact

6 I respect the demonstrators who express their views as private

7 citizens. This is how our system operates. I, however,

8 believe that as a government we should, if at all possible,

9 avoid sanctions and attempt to find areas where we have

10 genuinely common interests. So this is what I would say. If

11 China's leaders asked me, I would tell them that they should

12 take very seriously expressions such as the one you mentioned.

13 If the President asked me to what extent he should do that

14 publicly and with pressure, I would urge him to try to find

15 another way to do it if at all possible.

16 The Chairman: Thank you. Senator Wellstone.

17 Senator Wellstone: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you

18 for being here, Dr. Kissinger. I have just one comment about

19 the last day or two, and I much appreciate your comments about

20 people in the parks.

21 Dr. Kissinger: I was not here, though.

22 Senator Wellstone: On the question of the situation in

23 China, that it is relative, you of course have a perspective

24 that I do not have, but I know that one of the things that I

25 find personally, and this, Mr. Chairman, goes to some meetings

[LC]

15

22 Dr. Kissinger: If I may make a response, Senator, I have
23 never criticized the people who express their views on human
24 rights, and I have on several occasions, which I have chosen
25 not to publicize, intervened on behalf of some of the cases,

16

1 and at least two cases have succeeded. But my approach
2 requires that I do not talk about it afterwards.

3 The question that bothers me is I see this debate
4 evolving here as this, we are dealing here with a huge country
5 in the process of evolution, and I believe it is really not in
6 the American national interest to conduct it from a posture of
7 confrontation. First, because I do not believe that any other
8 Asian nation will support us. Secondly, I believe all the
9 other Asian nations will then adopt a posture of semi-
10 neutrality between us, which means a more nationalist policy.
11 So our capacity to shape events will diminish.

12 When I became first Security Advisor and then Secretary
13 of State, we had 500,000 Americans in Vietnam, where we
14 thought we would bring democracy and then found ourselves in a
15 struggle we did not know how to end. So I am very influenced
16 by an experience of not getting ourselves into a confrontation
17 if it is avoidable, and secondly, to make absolutely sure that
18 when we do, the American public understands why we have done
19 it.

20 If China threatens the equilibrium in Asia, and if it
21 becomes a military threat, I will be before this committee
22 supporting opposition to it. But I am trying to avoid the
23 situation, and I think the future of China is now still
24 somewhat open. I cannot believe that it is possible to change
25 the economy as they have without political consequences. What

17

9 appreciated --

18

24 Act?

[LC]

21

borders and recognizes that Austria, Singapore, Japan, Israel
all developed huge economies with no resources and in small
territories, they with a vast territory and vast resources
could do enormous things for their people. Then there is no
security problem.

So for all of these reasons I do not believe that in any
foreseeable future it is possible for Russia to join NATO, and
I think it would be a lot better if we said explicitly that
this cannot happen. If I am very much in favor of negotiating
with Russia, and the Chairman will remember, as I surely do,
that in earlier incarnations he expressed some doubts about
what he considered my excessive propensity of negotiating with
the Soviet Union.

(Laughter.)

Senator Hagel: Thank you.

The Chairman: Senator Biden.

22

4 and I apologize.

10 do that.

15 Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

23

1 the arrangements for East Germany (or better, no closer than
2 fixed distances from the eastern border of Poland). In the
3 next paragraph you say, at the same time such a treaty would
4 provide for consultation between NATO and Russia on matters of
5 common interest.

6 I kind of thought that is what the President did, and
7 that is what confused me. Now, I am not being a smart guy
8 here or a wise guy. What is different between what you are
9 recommending and what actually is the thing that took place?

10 Dr. Kissinger: First of all, that was the first article
11 I wrote on this subject, and I do not believe that the
12 President goes to bed at night worrying necessarily what I
13 think of the subject.

14 Senator Biden: I do. He does not, but I do.

15 Dr. Kissinger: But he can be in no doubt that I modified
16 my thinking on this. This statement is, I had not worked out
17 -- what I had in mind then was to accept some restrictions on
18 the deployment of troops, and that I still favor, on the model
19 of the East German. I did not think that it could be
20 interpreted into this elaborate machinery which makes Russia,
21 to my mind, a de facto member of NATO, no matter what we say
22 about a voice and not a veto.

23 Senator Biden: Again, as you know, as you were kidding
24 me earlier today when I saw you in the hallway, you were
25 saying you were hoping I would not be here because you and I

25

2 (Laughter.)

6 (Laughter.)

18 Dr. Kissinger: I have high regard for the people who
19 negotiated this. What Secretary Albright said here, I can
20 live with very happily. I simply think that it is difficult
21 to make it work that way as time goes on. You have these
22 ambassadors sitting in the building, they meet every day.
23 Then the NATO members go off and say we are going to have our
24 own meeting. It is legally, of course they can do it, but
25 human nature of these multi-lateral parties is against it.

26

[lc]

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18 Dr. Kissinger: Let me tell you what historic models I
19 have in mind. I know there are a lot of people who write as
20 if I burn votive candles to Metternich every night in my
21 devotion to the 19th century --

23 (Laughter.)

28

1 was in the position Russia is today, that is it was considered
2 the aggressor in Europe. Everybody was deeply concerned about
3 the fact that they might start on expansion again. So they
4 created two separate institutions. One was the Quadruple
5 Alliance. This was aimed at military attack from France.
6 Secondly they created something called the Concert of Europe
7 in which France could participate. The Concert of Europe
8 discussed all the political issues, and in fact that became in
9 time the dominant element. The Quadruple Alliance was never
10 abolished, but never needed to be activated.

11 This is sort of the model that I have in mind for Russia.
12 I think Russia should be consulted and participate in
13 political discussions that affect its vital interests and the
14 peace, and as Russia evolves those institutions would become
15 more and more dominant. But I would keep NATO as a safety
16 net, and keep it as unspoiled as possible as a community of
17 democratic nations. If values were to be shared, then the
18 political organs would become more dominant.

19 But what worries me is that now we have created something
20 that day-by-day competes with the NATO Council and which sort
21 of, if I take that historical analogy, merges the Quadruple
22 Alliance and the Concert of Europe, and that worries me
23 deeply. I do not think that Russia should be permanently
24 excluded. I think the Chairman knows very well I was in favor
25 of exploring with Russia then whether there were any common

30

5 Dr. Kissinger: I did not interpret it that way. What I
6 have recommended to the Chairman and to the committee is that
7 in the instrument of ratification the Senate find a way of
8 expressing its view that the NATO Council is the dominant
9 instrument for the operation of the alliance, and that the
10 Permanent Council is a more political instrument, that the
11 fundamental decisions are taken in the first instance in the
12 NATO Council. In order to keep the bipartisan character, I
13 have also recommended that some of the language, or for all I
14 know, all of the language that Secretary Albright used before
15 this committee in explaining how she interprets the Founding
16 Act be incorporated in this so that we have a basis for a
17 bipartisan consensus.

18 I am convinced that future Secretaries of State would be
19 grateful to be able to point to a Senate instruction to them,
20 so that it does not look as if they are the spoil sports if
21 they want to move more issues into the regular NATO Council.
22 I would do my utmost to establish a procedure where no
23 significant issue moves into the Permanent Council until there
24 is a NATO Council decision with respect to it, that this not
25 be used as an alternative method. First there is a NATO

[lc]

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8 Dr. Kissinger: One of the problems with respect to
9 Bosnia was that the United States did not really have a
10 policy, and history shows that a strong American lead is
11 usually needed to crystallize a position. But I do not have
12 any great structural suggestion.

32

15 First of all, there is our own expectation, and it seems
16 to me that the United States is struggling with what we should
really think and expect of a future NATO. It is something
17 that these discussions help all of us with, I think, to a
great degree. If we look at the current participants, their
19 visions and expectations with our European partners seem to be
different in many ways, but judging from their view of NATO's
21 role in Bosnia and of numerous comments, there seems to be an
23 indication that their expectations are different than our own.

33

15 about the time that its membership in NATO was agreed, was

17 which was somewhat comparable to being in Europe at the end of

18 World War II, the liberation from German occupation, where the

21 charter member.

34

1 notions of European socialism. He thought that NATO was sort
2 of what the bellicose people do, and the elevated people did
3 something better. He has changed that view completely because
4 he thinks it is now essential for the morale and cohesion of
5 Europe.

6 In this respect the Central Europeans have a different
7 view from the West Europeans. They are more like the West
8 Europeans were in the fifties, and they also do not have the
9 view that dividing lines are being erased. They still feel
10 threatened. Now, in Western Europe the problem is, and in
11 America, that NATO has not been given a new morale impetus, or
12 psychological impetus, or political impetus, whatever you want
13 to call it, for a long time, and that we are running on just
14 operating the institutions.

15 The Europeans are now absorbed in creating a common
16 currency and in elaborating some kind of European identity,
17 but what is that identity, what is it they are trying to do.
18 There are too many voices in Europe that want to create this
19 identity in some sort of opposition to the United States. If
20 that becomes the dominant theme, then NATO will wither, no
21 matter what institution we create. So I think it is very
22 important that some new political initiative be taken to tie
23 the western democracies together.

24 I find myself in this position, that on the issue of
25 democracy I do not go along with all the exuberant notions of

36

3 involved?

17 way. If 3 years ago when this debate started somebody said

20 be recommended to the Senate not to ratify an agreement which

21 if it is not ratified would have such a devastating impact in

23 term a devastating impact even in the existing NATO countries.

38

16 should expand.

19 same, it is whether we have NATO or we expand it. The way you

[LC]

39

Dr. Kissinger: I agree with this. I would say this. On
the current schedule of NATO expansion there is no way the
issue of the Baltics can arise until well into the next term,
if not later. Simply if we look at the priorities that have
been established, I do not believe there will be another
hearing like this about new members in this administration.
But that is my judgment, it is simply the way these things
work. So we are talking about well into the next
administration, or maybe even the one after that.

I think however immediately some steps should be taken to
make clear that the Baltics are members of the western

40

1 community, and I think the European community, the European

2 Union has almost an obligation to speed up the membership of

3 these countries in the European Union. It is absurd to say

4 that 10 million Baltics, because their economic evolution is

5 not quite at the right level, is going to create an

6 insuperable problem for a union that has some 300 million

7 population.

8 Senator Biden: I absolutely agree with this.

9 Dr. Kissinger: But this is the first thing that should

10 be done. The second thing we should do is to study how

11 military arrangements can be made that do not necessarily

12 involve the advance of the integrated command, because the

13 method of defending the Baltics does not have to be the same

14 as the method of defending the Vistula because it is sort of

15 geographically different. This I would recommend as a study.

16 I have not come to any view, but I would not just sit until

17 2005 or whenever that issue is ripe on the present schedule.

18 These are interim steps we should be able to take almost

19 immediately.

20 Senator Biden: Again, my time is up, Mr. Secretary. Let

21 me just make two very brief comments. One, nothing has

22 disappointed me more than or reinforced my view of the lack of

23 political maturation that still exists in Europe, in Western

24 Europe, nothing has disappointed me more than the failure of

25 the EU to understand how it could play, without any damage to

41

The second point --

It is not an economic issue.

I think, is going to impact significantly on what the next
president of the United States feels he or she is able to do

and the vacuum.

42

Dr. Kissinger: One slightly heretical point on the
Russian situation. We have a tendency to present the issue
entirely in terms of Russian domestic politics. I could see
that Russia makes progress towards democracy and becomes
extremely nationalistic, because that could become a way of
rallying, and we have also to keep an eye on this propensity
towards a kind of emperalist nationalism, which if you look
at the debates in the Russian parliament is certainly present.

The Chairman: Senator Hagel.

43

1 develop that a little further.

2 Dr. Kissinger: I believe that the next major

3 constructive phase of American foreign policy should be an

4 emphasis on uniting the democracies that exist as the base

5 from which we operate, and I would apply that to the Western

6 Hemisphere and to the North Atlantic. These are separate

7 building blocks, but I would try over time to merge them.

8 Right now there is no significant initiative in the North

9 Atlantic area. We are operating by momentum. The Europeans

10 are creating their own currency and are trying to evolve a new

11 identity without any significant input from the United States

12 of what might emerge in the long run. A few years ago I

13 recommended a North Atlantic free trade area, but there may be

14 other, better ideas. But unless there is something by which

15 we define that relationship, I think the evolution in the rest

16 of the world is going to make what I consider the central

17 relationship less and less relevant. And if that continues,

18 then we are in the strange position, we will be confined sort

19 of to an island off the coast of Europe and Asia.

20 This will drive us into the sort of policy that, for

21 example, my critics always say is unsustainable, namely a

22 balance of power policy all over the world. If we do not have

23 a community within which we operate, then we have to try to

24 balance interests, rewards, and punishments.

25 Now, in Asia we have no choice on this matter, but in

44

1 Europe and the Western Hemisphere we do have a choice. One
2 reason, to get back to the German traditional question, in
3 Asia I believe we have to balance the various nations, but in
4 Europe and in the Western Hemisphere we can create a
5 community. In Europe and in the Western Hemisphere war is
6 highly unlikely. There we can build structures based on
7 common values, and we should give this more emphasis. In fact
8 we have not given it any significant emphasis. We have put
9 much more emphasis on relations with Russia and trade and
10 similar things.

11 That would be my basic theme, even if I do not have the
12 precise notion. If you put the best minds we have to work on
13 it, as we did in the early fifties, we will come up with
14 something. I have no doubt.

45

1 convoluted machinery for consultations with Russia at every
2 level of the alliance. Now, what steps do you suggest that
3 the Senate take in the resolution of ratification to ensure
4 that this would not occur?

5 Dr. Kissinger: I have made this recommendation. As I
6 said, I strongly favor ratification, and nothing I have said
7 should detract from that. I would, however, find it helpful,
8 and I believe succeeding Secretaries of State and Presidents
9 will find it helpful if the Senate expressed its view that the
10 NATO Council remains the priority, that the central
11 relationship we have in the North Atlantic area is within the
12 Atlantic Alliance, and that relations with Russia should be
13 friendly, cooperative, but are not part of the essence of
14 NATO. I complemented Secretary Albright with respect to her
15 forthright statement in response to a question by the
16 Chairman, and some language she used might be incorporated so
17 that it does not look like a partisan attack.

18 Senator Grams: Is that in response to an argument, then,
19 that while the Founding Act may give Russia no formal veto
20 over NATO decisions, that Russia will acquire basically a de
21 facto veto through the Permanent Joint Council since some NATO
22 countries could hesitate to decide a sensitive issue in NATO's
23 policy making North Atlantic Council? Russia does not sit on
24 that Council. Are we giving Russia too much voice, whether de
25 facto or actual?

46

Dr. Kissinger: I look at NATO, Senator, as our core group, and therefore I would not begin a new initiative by diluting it. There are many fora that can be created to deal with Russia, and I would favor those. But to use a military alliance as the principal forum I think confuses things. You know, I may be too old fashioned. I was not wild about the idea of a NATO Council meeting, of a Permanent Council meeting within the context of the U.N. in which the NATO Council meets with Russia in New York. If we had tried to have a NATO Council meeting in New York in the context of the U.N., everyone would have screamed that this was extremely provocative, merging with a military organization. But here now you have a Permanent Council meeting in New York. That is not what NATO was originally designed to do. Many of these foreign ministers can meet.

Secondly, you have this machinery in Brussels. You have the Secretary General who sits in all these meetings. His staff serves both the NATO Council and the Permanent Council. The United States rotates -- Russia and the Secretary General are there all the time in the Permanent Council, and the United States rotates through it every 16th or 18th time. So these are two different institutions that are being merged by the same bureaucracy and in the same building.

I do not doubt the good intentions of the people who are testifying here about a voice and not a veto. I am saying

47

1 operationally I am very uneasy about this, and therefore the
2 committee and the Senate could make a contribution by defining
3 the role in a way to which future Presidents and Secretaries
4 of State can point as in instruction from the Congress, from
5 the Senate. Even then I do not like it, but it would improve
6 it. But I would not have gone this way.

7 Senator Grams: There are some critics of enlargement
8 that have stated concerns that enlargement will push Russia
9 away from being cooperative with the West and toward more
10 cooperation with China and with rogue states such as Iran,
11 Iraq, and Libya. Do you think that this is a valid concern?

12 Dr. Kissinger: Russia's relations with China will be
13 determined by its own perception of its national interest, and
14 not by irritation such as may be with the West. I would think
15 that there are certain geopolitical realities. They have a
16 4,000 mile frontier on one side of which is a billion people
17 and on the other side are 30 million people, and normally this
18 is not an ideal place for close political cooperation. After
19 all, what brought the Chinese into relationship with the
20 United States when Nixon and Mao started it was not that both
21 of them had suddenly become sentimental, but that it was the
22 common national interest between the United States and China.
23 So I think whether Russia and China cooperate will be
24 determined by their fundamental interests. It is not a
25 natural partnership, and I do not think it can possibly be

48

1 affected by whether Poland is in NATO.

2 One ought to remember another thing. Here is Russia with

3 20,000 nuclear weapons. Who in Western Europe can even

4 conceive of an attack on Russia? This is a myth. This is an

5 experience they made previously, but I think if one looks at

6 history one also has to say Russian armies entered Europe more

7 frequently even than European armies entered Russia. So if

8 war comes to be excluded in that region, then a whole new

9 consideration will arise. But I do not accept the

10 proposition.

11 I might point out one other thing from my own experience.

12 When we made our first tentative overtures to China, all

13 former ambassadors to the Soviet Union, and they were a very

14 distinguished group including George Kennan, Chip Bolen, a

15 very distinguished group, requested an appointment with

16 President Nixon, called on him saying he was creating --

17 Russia would never forgive us, our relations with Russia would

18 never recover from these little moves we were making at first.

19 It was long before President Nixon sent me there. The exact

20 opposite happened. Our relations with the Soviet Union

21 improved after our opening to China.

22 If we conduct ourselves sensibly, which is continue in

23 serious dialogue with Russia but not within the context where

24 everyday they will be tempted to see what they can do to

25 weaken NATO, but on those issues that are of principal concern

[cc]

49

1 between us, I think our relations are more likely to improve

2 than not. But anyway, I do not believe that their relations

3 with China will be driven by whether Prague is in NATO.

4 Senator Grams: So we are not going to push Russia into a

5 closer alliance with China just because of this? It would

6 have to be in their best interest?

7 Dr. Kissinger: If you look at what Russia is actually

8 doing rather than the rhetoric, Russia is trying to needle us

9 in many places, in Iran, in many institutions, in order to

10 establish some claim to great power status. That is

11 understandable. Some of this we can deal with by consulting

12 with them, but we cannot change the structure of what we

13 consider to be the essence of future relationships. I really

14 feel when you look at the world, at the upheavals that are

15 likely to arise in the Islamic world, at the evolution in Asia

16 and elsewhere, that the Western democracies ought to have a

17 basis for cooperation that should be preserved that is in

18 essence theirs. I do not know what will happen 20 years from

19 now with Russia, and we could then see this thing evolve, but

20 that is a more political and not a military issue.

21 Senator Grams: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

22 The Chairman: Senator Biden.

23 Senator Biden: Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have no

24 further questions. I want to thank you again, Mr. Secretary,

25 for being here. You, unlike anyone in the 25 years I have

50

3 one appreciate it.

16 that makes any sense.

21 Slovenia.

51

1 Baltics within the time of this President, but I suspect we
2 will, I hope at least we will be considering those other two
3 countries sooner rather than later.

4 At any rate, I want to thank you very much, and thank
5 you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to make a concluding
6 comment.

7 The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, we are all
8 indebted to you for being available. We may not always agree,
9 but the young folks on the Foreign Relations Committee staff,
10 both Democrat and Republican, they know that they can ask you
11 for your opinion and you always take the time to answer. We
12 have two or three people like that, but we have a whole lot of
13 people who say they do not have the time. I thank you for
14 coming here this morning, and we are getting you out at
15 approximately the time we had agreed to do. I bid you
16 farewell, and good luck.

18 The Chairman: There being no further business to come
19 before the committee, we stand in recess.

20 [Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the hearing was recessed.]

21

22

23

24

25

[Y]

3

4

An American presence in Europe provides a measure
of equilibrium. It gives France a safety net against
German hegemony and Germany an emotional harbor as
European unification slows down, as well as
protection against outside dangers and excessive
European nationalism. Even Russia has much to gain

5

6

204

Dr. KISSINGER. I look at NATO, Senator, as our core group, and therefore I would not begin a new initiative by diluting it. There are many fora that can be created to deal with Russia, and I would favor those. But to use a military alliance as the principal forum confuses things. You know, I may be too old fashioned. I was not wild about the idea of a NATO Council meeting-of a Permanent Council meeting within the context of the U.N. in which the NATO Council meets with Russia in New York. If we had tried to have a NATO Council meeting in New York in the context of the United Nations, everyone would have screamed that this was extremely provocative and merging with a military organization. But here now you have a Permanent Council meeting in New York. That is not what NATO was originally designed to do.

Second, you have this machinery in Brussels. You have the Secretary General who sits in on all these meetings. His staff serves both the NATO Council and the Permanent Council. Russia and the Secretary General are there all the time in the Permanent Council, and the United States rotates through it every 16th or 18th time. So these are two different institutions that are being merged by the same bureaucracy and in the same building.

I do not doubt the good intentions of the people who are testifying here about a voice and not a veto. I am saying however that, operationally, I am very uneasy about this, and therefore the committee and the Senate could make a contribution by defining the role in a way so that future Presidents and Secretaries of State can point to it as instruction from the Congress, from the Senate. Even then I do not like it, for I would not have gone this way, but it would improve it.

Senator GRAMS. There are some critics of enlargement that have stated concerns that enlargement will push Russia away from being cooperative with the West and toward more cooperation with China and with rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya. Do you think that this is a valid concern?

Dr. KISSINGER. Russia's relations with China will be determined by its own perception of its national interest and not by irritation, as may be the case with the West. I would think that there are certain geopolitical realities. They have a 4,000 mile frontier on one side of which is a billion people and on the other side of which are 30 million people. Normally, this is not an ideal situation for close political cooperation. After all, what brought the Chinese into a relationship with the United States when Nixon and Mao started it was not that both of them had suddenly become sentimental, but that there was a common national interest between the United States and China. So I think that whether Russia and China cooperate will be determined by their own fundamental interests. It is not a natural partnership, and I do not think it can possibly be affected by whether Poland joins NATO.

One ought to remember another thing. Here is Russia with 20,000 nuclear weapons. Who in Western Europe can even conceive of an attack on Russia? It is a myth. If one looks at history one has to say that Russian armies entered Europe more frequently than even European armies entered Russia. So if war becomes excluded in that region, a whole new consideration will arise. But I do not accept the proposition.

205

I might point out one other thing from my own experience. When we made our first tentative overtures to China, all the former Am-bassadors to the Soviet Union—and they were a very distinguished group including George Kennan and Chip Bolen—requested an ap-pointment with President Nixon and called on him to say that Rus-sia would never forgive us, that our relations with Russia would never recover from these little moves we were making. It was a long time before President Nixon sent me there and the exact oppo-site happened. Our relations with the Soviet Union improved after our opening to China.

If we conduct ourselves sensibly, which is to continue a serious dialog with Russia, but not within the context of them being tempt-ed every day to see what they can do to weaken NATO, but on those issues that are of principal concern between us, I think our relations are more likely to improve than not. In any case, I do not believe that their relations with China will be driven by whether Prague is in NATO.

Senator GRAMS. So we are not going to push Russia into a closer alliance with China just because of this? Such an alliance would have to be in their best interest?

Dr. KISSINGER. If you look at what Russia is actually doing rath-er than at the rhetoric, you realize that Russia is trying to needle us in many places, such as Iran and in many institutions in order to establish some claim to great power status. That is understand-able. Some of this we can deal with by consulting with them, but we cannot change the structure of what we consider to be the es-sence of future relationships. I really feel that when you look at the world—at the upheavals that are likely to arise in the Islamic world, at the evolution in Asia and elsewhere—that the Western democracies have a basis for cooperation that should be preserved. I do not know what will happen 20 years from now with Russia. We could see this thing evolve, but that is more of a political than a military issue.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have no further questions. I want to thank you again, Mr. Secretary, for being here. You, unlike anyone in the 25 years I have been here, have a way of putting the issues we are discussing in perspective in the broad sweep of historical change, and I for one appreciate it.

It is presumptuous of me to predict anything, but I predict that you are going to be dead right. That is, I am absolutely convinced an expansion of NATO in the near-term and long-term will en-hance our relationships with Russia, not diminish them. I am abso-lutely convinced of that. I am also convinced that as you look back over the last 50 years the very people who knew the most about Russia and the Soviet Union are a little bit clientized as they look at these things. I think their focus is so narrow in terms of what negative impact may come as a consequence of moves we make that I think sometimes, it is presumptuous of me to say this, they are somewhat blinded by the extent of their knowledge, if that makes any sense.

The last point I will make is, and this is the only thing I disagree with what you said, and time will tell, I predict that we will have

206

another hearing in this committee before this President's term is
up on admission of Romania and Slovenia.

Dr. KISSINGER. I will be here testifying for it.

Senator BIDEN. I know you will. But I was just referencing the
point about how long this process is going to take. I agree with you
that it probably will not be the Baltics within the time of this
President, but I suspect, I hope at least we will be considering
those other two countries sooner rather than later.

At any rate, I want to thank you very much, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for allowing me to make a concluding comment.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, we are all indebted to
you for being available. We may not always agree, but the young
folks on the Foreign Relations Committee staff, both Democrat and
Republican, they know that they can ask you for your opinion and
you always take the time to answer. We have two or three people
like that, but we have a whole lot of people who say they do not
have the time. I thank you for coming here this morning, and we
are getting you out at approximately the time we had agreed to do.
I bid you farewell, and good luck.

Dr. KISSINGER. Thank you for this opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. There being no further business to come before
the committee, we stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the hearing was adjourned, to recon-
vene at 2:08 p.m., October 30, 1997.]