DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM
Vice President/Kissinger

11:25 am

4/21/70

VP: Congratulations. It looks like you pulled it off. It surprised me but every comment I have seen with the exception of Eric Severid -- the reception is pretty good.

K: The President wondered if you would call some of our more heroic Cabinet members and tell them your reaction. They need bucking up. Rogers and Laird.

VP: I should think Rogers would be pleased.

K: He is but he is afraid we will do something in Cambodia. He is right. Laird is afraid we will do much less this year.

VP: In withdrawals?

K: Yes. He would have pulled out about 100 this year.

VP: I will do what I can. I'm amazed. You are a better politician then I am.

K: If I'm a good politician than this country is in trouble.

VP: I need assistance on ? ? ? ? ? and thoughts I have.

K: You saw I walked out on a bunch of students.

VP: I saw that. If you have anything, please send it to me.

Further conversation: 11:35 a.m.

K: I was just talking with the President about our conversation and he wondered if you would talk to some of the hawkish Senators. Could I drop over and talk to you for about 30 seconds?

VP: Yes, sure.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
11:37 am 4/21/70

K: I just wanted to tell you. I talked to the President briefly about our conversation and we will have a meeting tomorrow at 3:00, a small group, on the whole Cambodian situation. He wants to go ahead on the money but he won't do anything else until that meeting.

R: Fine.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Gen. Westmoreland/Kissinger

12:05 pm 421/70

W: I asked Buz yesterday for plans of operations in these sanctuaries. Do you know about that?

W: No, I don't know about it. I was out of town yesterday.

K: The President is aksing for those. Could we get them as soon as possible?

W: ARVN plans into Cambodian sanctuaries? You talked to Buz about it?

K: Yes. Will you let me know as soon as possible? What is your assessment? Could we take a Cambodian defeat -- if Sihanouk came back?

W: That's more political but it seems Sihanouk has taken a considerable loss of face. My impression is that Long Nol is capable of holding the country together. The 15 battalions that have been mobilized shows that this administration has popular support. They need arms and provisions but they should be effective.

K: Do you think the VN can move in and handle the attack without us, except for artillery and air support?

W: Yes. They have some very fine troops. But we have the rainy season coming next month which will complicate things. The dry season would facilitate it, but with our support on the borders and helocopter and tactical air they can be effective but I don't think they can clear them out.

K: Can we?

W: We would be hard pressed in the rainy season but it could be done. If Gen. Abrams wants to we could do it.

K: Would it be worth it?

W: If we could destroy the Comovan headquarters this would indeed. We have an apparent idea where it is. It's about 10,000 troops. Troops would have to move into the area and stay there some time. It would be costly with respect to casualties because there are no doubt mines, booby traps, bunkers, etc. But we could do it. The weather period is an unhappy coincidence and would inhibit our operations flexibility. The VN would be less effective but with the proper support they could be effective and would be desirable.

K: Thank you. Would you find out as quickly as possible and call me back?

W: I sure will.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCORNaird/Kissinger

12:35 pm 4/21/70

K: I'm working up to a nervous breakdown.

L: I think I will have to talk to the President. Herb Klein wants me to go on these news shows and meet the press and I can't do that without --

K: There's a meeting at 3:00 tomorrow with Rogers, Helms, Wheeler and you and I.

L: I want to speak to him privately. He has asked layed down fiscal (physical ) guidelines the toughest of any. He thinks we can shift between personnel and shipbuilding. If he gives the military the idea they can wait until the end, we will have a tremendous supplemental which I don't think we can get approved. We are now 100 percent over the rates that are in the budget. I can't get rid of people in Europe or here but I need that personnel.

K: You don't have to wait until next year. There will be a withdrawal this year. More next year maybe but --

L: According to that Nov. thing you have to have ? ? ? ? ? ?. I would like to show you the transcript today. The press is beating us over the head wanting to know what this means.

K: We will take out significant numbers this year and next year. But we will not say which or they will murder us.

L: I have to go to Abrams for a plan he has based on guidance I have to give him given my me by the President.

K: The President doesn't intend to have 50,000 troops out by Aug. 15.

L: What would he approve?

K: 60,000 out this year.

L: If it's Nov. or Dec., forget it.

K: 60 by Nov. 1 and none the rest of the year -- that's ok.

L: I have to talk to him. He has to give me assurance that he will give me a supplemental.

K: I think he should understand and we meet to sort it out.

L: I don't think he understands it. He made the guidance on the budget.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

12:35 pm 4/21/70

-2-

K: If you stick to the existing schedule you will go against him.

L: I have two guidelines from him. One -- ? ? ? ? ? ? . The only figures I have are for a 24 month program. I have no quarrel with that. But the 24 month program is based on a phased reduction so I can muster out 270 thousand military personnel. Of those, one-half come out the first half of the fiscal year and the second half come out the second half. You come out with an end strength mk and you get a ______ saving.

K: None of this will do us any good if we fall on our face.

L: We will not.

K: The two things are going in Cambodia -- just because we are meeting our fiscal guide doesn't mean we are not falling on our face.

L: I tried to convince people but the don't listen.

K: That was a grave mistake. We have to be sure your people are not aggressive about this thing.

L: We will be in the numbers game every week over here.

K: I don't know why. We have never done that before.

L: If we approach the election period -- if we don't keep up momentum.

K: We will keep up momentum. But we can do 60 thousand this year.

L: We can do it but it takes two months to get the KMB equipment out.

K: With a year's planning cycle you can compress that. You can plan it in such a way to give your orders.

L: I have to give the ______ for the first two quarters.

K: That's what he will tell you.

L: I will go to my committees and tell them there's at least a supplemental.

K: I told him and he is willing to do that. How about tacair in Cambodia'?

L: We are doing it. Yesterday -- didn't you tell him?

K: Yes, but I wanted to confirm. How about getting border operations started again?

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Laord/Kissinger

12:35 pm 4/21/70

-3-

L: We have one going right now.

K: A plan is an ARVN movement into Cambodia. He will tell you tomorrow.

L: ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: He wants that plan in a preliminary form this afternoon.

L: I think these excursions have been worthwhile.

K: You have that plan to us this afternoon?

L: I think I had better talk to him this afternoon so we are all aboard. The state of their backgrounder this morning is that we are moving at a rate of 12,0000. I want to say we can do 60,000 by election time -- I don't always want to be the bad guy in government. We are ending up with a monthly rate with the momentum of the program. I want to say we will maintain momentum but not keep books on the numbers.

K: That's what he wants.

L: Abrams does not feel it would be difficult by 35,000 by the end of Aug. McCain doesn't but Abrams could live with that. He objected to 50. I used 50 because the President directed my people to put that out.

K: He wants that DMZ strike started.

L: There's not much in supplies in that pass and we would like to wait for a build up. We can take out the AA but I would like to take it on a day with a lot of supplies.

K: He is most anxious to show them things might be getting out of control.

L: Today we could do good work with 52's in Laos.

K: Lets.

L: We will hit them tonight. They are good today. This other may be good tomorrow.

K: Do that. And the tack-air in Cambodia.

L: That started yesterday out there.

K: How deep?

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

12:35 pm 4/21/70

-4-

L: 25 miles in some places. They didn't go that far yesterday. They are authorized for 30 days to go in. I will follow that closely.

K: Do you think we can get air traffic control He wants to see Bill and you with Chiang Ching-kuo at 7:30 before the dinner.

L: That's fine. I do have to be in a position because I know I will get pressure --

K: Let me see if you can get in to see him late in the afternoon. I will do that right away.

L: I could even get dressed first.

K: Come and get dressed first.

L: I want you there too,

K: I will be there.

L: As far as -- Let him know we are going on tac-airx and 52's. As far as the pass is concerned -- if there's a good build-up -- we had reconnaissance planes up there yesterday and there was no reaction to them if there's something there we can go for them but we should keep that until we can slop over.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Rabin/Kissinger

12:55 pm

4/22/70

K: How is the softest man in town?

R: The call is that I would like to see you towards the end of this week.

K: All right.

R: There's a new development with regard to the visitors in the country southwest of us. They have taken a new step in being involved more than when it comes to ground to air missiles. We have supplied most of the information to your intelligence community. We are supplying them because today there are two additional cases. I would like to come.

K: You have pictures?

R: There are no pictures. I am talking about pilots -- combat missions.

K: We suspected that once and then decided no. Come in Friday. I will have my secretary call your secretary. If you have any ideas what can be done we would appreciate them.

R: I am coming with certain suggestions.

K: Have they been given to anyone else?

R: Not yet.

K: Then don't until we have met. I will see you no later than Friday.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

3:15 pm

4/21/70

L: I am sending over those responses from Abrams. I don't think you will be satisfied with them. They are not worked up. The problem here -- we will talk to them on the phone -- the problem is working a plan out with the SMN government. The Joint Staff is confused over Bunker calling them off last week and me calling them on. They think their operations are good this week but they are reluctant to recommend a general plan. They are afraid it will for them into Cambodia. They think it's the wrong plan and they will have to be pressed a little bit.

K: We haven't tried yet. Let's do the planning without --

L: We had better tell theVN that this is just planning. They have turned off and on all the short operations.

K: Tell them to do that.

L: I have send a backchannel to Abrams every night. They killed a lot of VN yesterday.

K: We will have a meeting at 3:00 tomorrow on Cambodia. He will see you today at 5:00. You want him to understand the fiscal problem and you are willing to go with him on anything.

L: I have to reconcile the two. I talked to -- my people -- I want you to know how Freidheim handled the press.

K: They are cutting you up.

L: That's right. Bill told them I shouldn't give the speech. We are giving them hell on the ABM. Then I get a memo from Haldeman saying I'm being too soft and should hit them harder.

K: I told the President you just want your instructions.

L: I have to get both things together.

K: Come at 5:30. Then we will go and see him together. He wants you at 7:45 and not 7:30 at the residence.

L: Understand that Abrams is having trouble with the Joint Staff.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The Vice President
4/21/70 3:27 p.m.

VP: I made most of those calls. Scoop Jackson did a TV appearance this morning in full support of the President. He said he's with him 100 percent. Said that he would be as helpful as he can. I also called Tower, Goldwater, Byrd, and a few others whose names escape my mind. Everyone seemed pretty satisfied. And Laird, I talked to him.

K: Good.

VP: He still thinks you are going to pull out 60 thousand by August.

K: Never.

VP: He thinks you are. He says we need it for ______
and we've only cut three months.

K: We need a victory. There's going to be an NSC meeting on Cambodia at 3:00 tomorrow. The President particularly wants you there and says you shouldn't hesitate to speak against his subordinates.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Joesph Alsop

4/21/70 5:05p.m.

A: That was a good speech if it means what it seems to--
that (1) the President is prepared not to go too far too fast as long as the
overall goal is met.

K: Exactly right.

A: And the President also recognizes that even at the end
you will have to leave a fire brigade force till Hanoi decided it's no
good.

K: I was going to say I hoped you noticed it was a tough
speech, but I don't have to say that.

A: Oh, very tough. I'll bet it surprised many god damned
fools in the government.

K: Defense is running amok. It upset their schedule.

A: They would rather lose a war than change a schedule.
When am I going to see you?

K: May I call you first thing tomorrow? I have been literally
picking up the pieces all day.

A: I imagine. I saw Dave Burke, Teddy's man. They wanted
to get something to get their teeth into. This won't change the whole
atmosphere like the November 3 speech did, but then that's not what it's
meant to do. It's meant to further the atmosphere. What about supper
on Thursday?

K: I'm tied up every night for dinner this week except Friday.

A: That's all right.

K: There's a chance I'll bring my children down. In that case
Friday wouldn't be possible.

A: Bring them down Saturday.

K: Well, we'll see each other some time this week.

A: Good. I'm so worried about the Middle East I can't think about it.

By

NARA, Dato

5/26

Telecon
Joseph Alsop

4/21/70 5:05 p.m.

K: It's a good thing you aren't a historian. It would lead you to somber reflections about where this country's going.

A: Well, I am in a way, and am going to publish my somber reflections. If we keep going this way we're going to have another 2-1/2 million dead Jews.

K: I know it. What do you think about the Chinese border?

K: I'm not very optimistic.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Gov. Reagan/Kissinger

5:20 pm

4/21/70

K: The President wanted me to call you re the speech yesterday. We consider
this a fairly hard speech. It gives him the flexibility of moving withint that
speech.

R: You can tell the President I had already had my morning press conference and I said that the speech was made for Americans and enemy ears, and ears in Russia. We would not hold still for taking advantage of us. We will not say ? ? ? ?

K: Those were the very points he wanted to get across. Come see me when
you are next here.

R: This is my option year and I don't get away much. One problem -- I think
he is being publicly trapped with the welfare program. It's subtly changed from
the orignal concept to a land mine. We are studying it extremely carefully and
analyzing what we are doing.

K: We are coming to a xxx crunch in my area in the next 3 months.

R: Where?

K: S.E.Asia

R: They didn't wait for the ______ and now with closing the borders they want the other way and leave a broad rear exposed. ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: We wouldn't suffer any pain if you said that publicly.

R: Thank you. I will.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Marshall Green
4/22/70 10:00 a.m.

K: I told the President about the cable about the Embassy problem having to do with Phnom Penh. He blew his stack. His instructions are no one moves without his permission, no matter what happens. There is to be no further discussion of this subject without his approval and no further planning to which the Cambodians might catch on. This is to be carried out this morning.

G: No preparations that the Cambodians might catch on to.

K: That's right. And Marshall a personal note. Don't appeal this; it would just make the President madder than hell.

G: We won't.

K: He brought this up himself. He read it in a wrap-up.

G: We're at the point in Phnom Penh where there's a danger of a direct attack. . . What about dependents?

K: You can't move embassy personnel.

G: We've got 5 dependents there.

K: I have no instructions from them. He wants to make sure our presence is maintained there. My advise is to take it easy on the dependents. He doesn't think you did wrong, but this is the way he wants to play it.

G: Beyond those two points, which don't conflict . . .

K: Just make sure they don't move personnel.

G: That includes dependents. They would catch on. The Japanese and Australians are moving their people out.

K: Let me check with one of my people who was there. [K turned away from phone] Don't worry about the dependents.

G: I am going to see the Australian charge in about 5 minutes. He is going to tell me the Australian attitude about it. I think we have to be pretty honest with them. Could I have the authority to tell them about the special message sent to Lon Nol?

K: About our willingness to support . . .

K

Telecon
Marshall Green
2/22/70 10:00 a.m.

page 2

By NARA, Date 5/26

G: Yes.

K: Oh, yes, and encourage them to give aid. That's absolutely in the spirit of the President.

G: On the President's directive that the jamming should be instituted. USIS has a lot of difficulty. They are coming up with a plan, but it has pros and cons. And there are some important cons, like lack of efficacy. This looks as though we are demurring on the President's request but . . .

K: Let me have that memo and I will raise it.

G: A formal memo from Elliot to you?

K: Yes, but just give me the facts, as low-key as you can. I will raise it myself so it doesn't look like you are demurring.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
4/22/70 10:28 a.m.

K: I've just come from the President. His part of the psychological war thing is he'd like to move some American forces to the border of Cambodia so they will see them.

L: We do have some there.

K: Move additional ones. Some significant unit and some ARVN forces. But that may not be necessary; there must be some there. Secondly, he's sending out a order, addressed to you but you know who it's meant for, regarding speculation about ABM and MIRV bans. It says that any speculation on a moratorium is contrary to his instructions and undermines our position. It says anybody doing so should be reprimanded and then dismissed. Third, he understand the Secretary of State has to make the case for doing nothing. But the Secretary of Defense has to stand with the President on doing something. He says he'll take the heat.

L: I have been doing that on this question.

K: I just wanted to tell you that he appreciates it.

L: I get turned down usually, but I make the point.

K: He's just sent me a scorching memo. If you come in five minutes before the NSC meeting, I'll show you the memo. It will give you some of the flavor of what he's thinking. And the Laos things went yesterday?

L: Right.

K: Good. The plans for this operation, tx can they be over by noon?

L: Did you see my memo yesterday?

K: Yes.

L: That's where we're tied up.

K: Just send me what you can.

L: Okay.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
General Westmoreland
4/22/70 10:45 a.m.

W: More information pursuant to our conversation of yesterday. There was a conference yesterday in Saigon. MACV should have the benefit of this ARVN planning conference now. We should have it by afternoon.

K: But we need something by noon.

W: I have had a session with Laird. And I have a map with a plan which came in yesterday, based on more sketchy information.

K: Are you the acting chief?

W: yes. Moorer is due back in time for the meeting though.

K: Can you see that whoever comes stands firm?

W: I'll try.

K: The President said to me he can understand the political people thinking of reasons why we shouldn't, but the military usually stands with its Commander-in-Chief and he wants to do something.

W: If I am there I will assure you I will stand that way. And if Moorer represents the Chiefs I will get the message to him.

K: Good.

W: Now, on the impact of the forthcoming monsoon. I may have over-emphasized that. We have about a month before the rains will affect operations in that area. But it's important that we take advantage of the good weather remaining.

K: We will move next week.

W: I sent something to Abe yesterday and said he should be thinking of our providing logistical and fire support on the Vietnam side with GVN crossing.

K: I have three operations in mind: The sort of things we are doing now--what are we doing now? How deep do they go in? With how much?

W: 10 to 20 kilometers with a brigade for 10 km.

K: They are doing that now?

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
General Westmoreland

4/22/70 10:45 a. m. page 2

W: The forces are up to a brigade strong in the Mekong area.

K: Well, then that changes it somewhat. I was thinking of (1) doing the thing we are doing at present, (2) some large thing, but not for investiture of the sanctuaries, (3) all-out investiture of the sanctuaries.

W: I just found a note here; the troops on the 31st were 25 hundred.

K: I am thinking of a larger lever than present, 75 hundred or 10 thousand, but short of a full-scale campaign, but enough to bring great pressure.

W: The first level would be 35 hundred, and second 75 hundred to 10 thousand, the third level an all-out campaign.

K: Yes. He will probably choose the second, if that makes any sense.

W: I think that makes sense.

K: Please tell me if it doesn't. You are in a better position than anyone to know the trouble field marshalls in Washington can make.

W: Let's put it this way. It's essential to do what we want that we deal in division-size force; probably 10 thousand men.

K: Right. If that case could be made this afternoon it would be a great help.

W: If we don't talk in these terms we won't get the results we seek.

K: That's what the President wants. How quickly can they move over there?

W: In four or five days. Would provide . . .

K: You can do two division-size operations. We just don't want to at first to completely occupy the sanctuaries.

W: We could have operations to put two divisions in two different areas, or maybe three.

K: That would be fine.

k

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
General Westmoreland
4/22/70 10:45 a.m. page 3

W: We provide transportation to the border, logistical and artillery, gunship and tactical air support at the border.

K: Exactly right.

W: Along this line I sent a message to Abe yesterday.

K: I hope you need a political analyst in the Army. I'll never be able to go back to Harvard.

W: You're very tough.

K: It's a pleasure to do business with you as always.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Prof. Doty/Kissinger

11:22 am

4/22/70

K: How does Cambridge react to the speech.

D: The older generation good and the younger <u>is</u> generation too slow.

K: Everyone says 40 and we do 150 and it's not enough for the academicians.

D: No, it's the kids.

K: They are beyond hope. How long will you be here?

D: Tomorrow morning.

K: What about your Russians friends.

D: Sun. or Mon. or May 2-5.

K: I may be on the West Coast. Lunch on Monday. Who is it? ______ and ______?

D: Yes.

K: I may have dinner with your friend Shirley McLaine tonight. Will you be here?

D: Yes.

K: Maybe you would like to join us? I will call you back in half an hour.
Someone has just come in. (The President.)

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM
N. Rockefeller/Kissinger
11:50 am 4/22/70

R: I think you merit the best possible on the President's speech *BY under
the circumstances. I saw the surface but what's going on --

K: There are a lot of guys here who would like to loose.

R: You're kidding.

K: But they will have a struggle. We will have to do some rough things in the
next week.

R: The countries waiting for it.

K: If you can say something about the speech Monday night we would appreciate
it. Will you be here Monday night?

R: I will have to check my calendar.

K: Watch what we do and not what we say. Before we are through they will
know they have been in a scrap.

R: Good for you.

K: I just hope you have a job in your universities system for me. Try to
come down next week and I will try to fill you in. The President was very pleased
by your call.

R: You are a great friend and a wonderful guy.

K: I enjoyed Puerto Rico.

R: I did too and so did Happy. Her children just loved you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Prof. Doty/Kissinger

11:55 am

4/22/70

K: The President walked in before. If I do this do you want to join us at 9:30 for a moderate period of time?

D: I don't want to make a night of it either.

K: I don't know about "either." The Rive Gauche?

E: All right.

K: Where can I reach you?

D: at the NSF or here. Leave a message here and otherwise I will see you there. We can talk business there.

K: I think she is reliable. Anything classified?

D: Not if you are following up on new replacements.

K: We have the most comprehensive SALT position you could want.

D: I want to hear about that too.

K: One of these days I will get a word of approval from Harvard. I will see you tonight one way or another. I may have to be stuck with you alone for the evening which is a depressing thought.

D: Dorothy is here. You are seeing her?

K: For lunch today.

D: She will enjoy that.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Laird/Kissinger

12:40 pm

4/22/70

L: Did you get those tentative plans?

K: I haven't seen them yet.

L: I will bring the maps. I can take up to division strength. Some of our tactical stuff doesn't bare out what Reeves is saying. Do you think I can talk about the 52's?

K: No, not in this forum. We deal only with you on that.

L: I want to bring Moorer with me.

K: Sure but not Packard.

L: He is acting Chairman. Bux is in the hospital.

K: We want him there. You know the basic orientation of the President.

L: I will try to get over a few minutes before hand if I can get rid of the Vice Premier. How do we get option D presented in Vienna.

K: Haven't they done it yet?

L: Just one paragraph. It strengthens us to have it before them at the same time.

K: I will see that it's done. I couldn't agree more. They are suicidal.

Further conversation: 12:45

L: Let me put in through Geo. Tucker a suggestion that in tomorrow's session they put in a paragraph that on Monday they will put in a paragraph on reduction.

K: OK.

L: On Monday we will press this. Smith's statement for tomorrow is good but it doesn't direct itself to the proposal. I will go through Gardner instead of escalating between you and Farly.

K: Fine.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger
5:30 pm 5/22/70

L: I think that I may have to go out and see Abrams or send someone to visit with him.

K: ON what?

L: The troop thing. Let me work it both ways on the 60 thousand. I don't see much point in withdrawing any troops in Nov. and Dec.

K: We didn't say when you should do that.

L: We should have 60 thousand out by election. The political pressure is important to have but I wonder if we should have x 60 thousand by the end of Nov. We could work 50 pretty well.

K: We need you here for the next couple of weeks.

L: Abrams felt he could go for 35-40 thousand and then let off for awhile. I don't want to put this in black and white that we are putting it off.

K: Can I talk to the President and let you know tomorrow?

L: I would like a longer time than the first of May.

K: How about the 10th?

Kb: Yeah. I have an understanding with Abrams that I cannot have it broken down and I have an ax to understand with Buz Wheeler that is good and I don't want a misunderstanding.

K: You won't have trouble with us if you pull out weaker (?).

L: It doesn't do any good to pull them out in Nov. and Dec.

K: I can give you until the 10th. I just came from the President. He wants to be sure you are moving units into the Cosvan headquarters because of stories he has leaked to Hanoi that he is moving in there.

L: We have moved troops in and some in by the parrot's beak.

K: A new movement?

L: We did it yesterday.

K: You were only asked this morning but fine.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

5:30 pm

5/22/70

-2-

L: We told SVN we would get in position to give them some support and show them the seriousness of it.

K: Can you be sure that this is what he will do. He will order a move into the parrot's beak area and you will get tac-air.

L: Congress won't a veto.

K: I just told State that we will handle Congress here.

L: I was surprised the President brought up our other operations and the President shouldn't give the veto to the Congress.

K: The President is working over an NSDM tonight and will issue it and we will have a WSAG meeting tomorrow. This had been rough for you.

L: No, I just feel that with these double signals we give the SVN --

K: I told the President we dropped that ball here.

L: I don't believe that and you shouldn't say that and tell him that. My problem here is that the SVN are off and on again. We told them to move around a bit and they think we are on and off and they don't know what to think.

K: Well, we are on.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

6:20 pm 4/22/70

R: What is Mel Laird talking about when he is talking about difficult signals?

K: He is bitching about -- he is fighting both you and me. You and I independent of each other have urged the President to go easy on border infiltration. He is urging the President to keep going. He ways we are driving the VN crazy. I think that was the right policy at the time we did it.

R: That was what Lon Nol said he wanted. He is trying to survive.

K: Even if we thought it was going to wind up this way, it's best to go through a period of excessive restraint. He has been at me for three weeks. I didn't bother you because you and I were pulling in the same direction.

R: When he has the military people with him he talks one way and later he talks another.

K: On that one -- I had that turned off and when I was on vacation he got some authorized again.

R: When he bitches it's because he does it. I have no ______ about taking military action.

K: Any one who thinks you are soft is nuts.

R: I just want to be smart about how we do it.

K: Take everyone's ______ idea and do it one shot at a time. Then we don't know what we are doing.

R: At this meeting today the President gets all our views.

K: On Laos your people stated their views and in the end you have carried out even though they aren't in favor of it.

R: They even liked it after awhile.

K: On Laos -- you called over and said we were going the same way.

R: We went through the thought processes and decided that it was the best decision. The same on Cambodia in the past. The President has thought about it and we agreed and there have been no leaks. But this complaining is ______.

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Rogers/Kissinger

6:20 pm

4/22/70

-2-

K: One of my jobs is to see to it that there's no sneaking around getting decisions. I talked to the President half an hour ago and he is cogitating that decision memo. He is thinking about that period back (?). It will be out in the morning.

R: I hope we will not commit to air support at the first request.

K: We will do it at the highest level.

R: And not at their request. Historically it will be bad if we give it ahead of time to act to their command. What about the time? Is the objective to take over the territory or get in and then out?

K: My recommendation to the President is that we make clear to Lon Nol that they will leave the territory.

R: We can pass on some language that is indefinite but not too long a period of time.

K: Definitely. The diplomatic part will be taken over by State.

R: I think we want to be sure that we don't go far enough so if Penom Penh is taken over we don't get the ______ because we encouraged the government. If it comes out the action was initiated by us we would be in a bind. Lon Nol could say we warned you and you did it anyway and my government fell. The intelligence says they will not now take over Penom Penh.

K: It's awfully hard to keep them from being heroes.

R: If they were to hear guns, they run.

K: As you said -- it would be nice to have an ally who could fight.

R: One other thing -- I see where there's a decision the President made to permit some Soviet trade official to come in for a UAW meeting.

K: We thought you recommended it. If you don't want it, we will cancel it.

R: It will make Geo. Meany madder then hell.

K: We thought you were for it. We have no reason for going for it. We have had protests from G. Meany and we didn't want to overrule State because we thought you wanted it.

R: I think it's much to high a price to take.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Warren Nutter
4/22/70; 6:40 p.m.

N: I hate to trouble you again but we are getting more messages on the Philippine matter and I was wondering if you have had a chance to check on it.

K: I would go ahead with it.

N: I just wanted to check it out with you.

K: It was very thoughtful of you to check and I am sorry that I didn't get back to you sooner.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Presidnt/Kissinger

7:10 pm

4/22/70

P: On the ____ it's very important not to ? ? ? ? I don't want the parrot's beak to be slow. Can you emphasize that point? Tell them to go in and get it donw. There should be momentum.

K: It's South Vietnamese and they have never conducted division operations before.

P: There's a lot to be said for doing it as quickly as possible.

K: I will press it right now.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Adm. Moorer/Kissinger

7:12 pm

4/22/70

K: We are going to send out a directive but the matters we discussed this afternoon are approved. On the subject of air support it will be approved but may be in complex language. You and I will make a deal in the name of the President.

M: We are expecting them -- they are going to work right now.

K: Do you think we can do it by Sunday night?

M: We can try. Their plan will be here tomorrow night.

K: The President requested that they be moved up to the sanctuaries.

M: We are asking their opinion and if they think it's a good idea, we will do it.

K: I don't care what they think. He wants it. Move some troops in there, especially in the Cosvan and some artillery in there.

M: We are discussing it with MACV. The plan will be completed late tomorrow.

WSAG

K: We have a meeting late tomorrow to implement this. Either you or Vogt can come. It's at the Under Secretaries level. You don't mind discussing these plans in front of Alex Johnson, do you?

M: No, not at all.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
General Vogt
4/22/70; 7:20 p.m.

K: I am calling you to make sure that the naval movements we discussed are being made.

V: We sent a message on it as soon as we got back.

K: And the military orders are still being followed?

V: As a matter of fact this went out without reference to anyone else. We told him to come back in with his plan to do this and then we would give order to execute.

K: Make sure it is done in the next 24 hours. We have authorized, for your information, that operation we discussed today. I am calling a meeting for tomorrow on it.

V: We are moving ahead in that area.

K: When will you be ready to go?

V: I talked to the Chief of Staff -- temporary setback -- lack of commitment.

K: Nonsense, you will get it. It may be in an ambiguous way, but you will get it. Can it be implemented over the weekend?

V: I don't want to make any promises.....

K: Let's shoot for that.

By

NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Director Helms
4/23/70 9:30 a.m.

H: I don't quite understand about the 10:30 meeting. You want me only?

K: That's right. We are calling it a WSAG meeting, but we are upgrading it one level. Either you or Chushman, we want the number of people kept to a minimum. Unless you think you need someone else to better implement it. We want to be able to pin responsibility in this one.

H: I'll just bring Karamessines.

K: Well, I've just turned off Nutter. I'm under instructions. There should be just one. If you want Karamessines at it, that's your privilege.

H: Well, I'll come to this one.

K: I would appreciate it if you came. From now on we'll expand it.

H: Who put out the Beecher story?

K: It must be somebody who's seen the Gable.

H: It must be State.

K: It couldn't be Defense; they weren't opposed to it.

H: That's right. We're not in that situation I've been uncomfortable about all along. They'll leak us to death. The Congress will get ahold of it and kill it before we've had any chance.

K: There will be a blood bath if it keeps up.

H: This is just awful.

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
4/23/70 9:50 a.m.

By NARA, Date 5/26

R: Couple of things. One, on the Congressional liaison, I think the President should get some leaders down. I'm going up next Monday. Of course this Beecher story is going to complicate life. I'll talk about that in a minute. My thought is that we might make a virtue out of necessity. If we give the committee a briefing on where the sanctuaries are and where we stand on the may, and then say consider a massive military assistance to support 400,000 Cambodians and we have gotten requests to send American troops across the border, and get their views. Later when we don't do it we could say we didn't do what they didn't want us to do.

K: Yes, in that context 1,500 rifles looks like a sop.

R: Say we don't want a client state and we want our troops out of Vietnam. But first we should ask if they want a military assistance program or to send troops in. The answer will, of course, be no. Then what we want to do seems small.

K: The only thing to avoid is a statement saying "under no circumstances will we get involved."

R: No, No. I think it's important though not to have a complete break with the Congress.

K: What you said on Saturday about Cambodia had the right note.

R: It must have been on the cable. On the Beecher story...

K: He must have been seen the cable. He mustx "Caution against ______ expectations"--those are exactly our words.

R: Yes.

K: And he says "an Administration official," not just a source.

R: I know. Of course, Defense had the cable.

K: You never know where these things come from. There's no doubt he had the cable.

R: I'm having Ted Elliot check with Defense.

K: And I'm checking here in the same way. But these are the things you never find.

By NARA, Dato 5/20

page 2

R: I know. I may call Fulbright and say these were Chinese rifles...

K: And they were captured by the GVN.

R: There's no reason why I shouldn't tell Fulbright about the
Congressional liaison with the White House vis-a-vis the Beecher story
is there?

K: No, I don't think so.

R: What about an immediate step-up of military assistance?

K: That was through a third party.

R: I'd like to be in on that decision.

K: There won't be a big program you aren't in on.

R: We may end up with Cambodia a client state.

K: He wants as many as we can through this other channel.

R: We should try to get other countries to do more. Today
Indonesia has indicated willingness to...

K: That was the second part of the NSCM.

R: Keep in mind on Monday's session I would like to have the
President think about how we can do it.

K: This sounds like a clever way of doing it. It makes whatever
we do do look moderate. May I raise it with the President?

R: Sure.

K: I will call you by early afternoon.

R: Or the President could call the leaders down.

K: No, but the best way is for you to do it since you'll be there.
If he calls them down it makes it look like a crisis atmosphere.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Rogers/Kissinger

12:30 pm 4/23/70

K: I have had a chance to think over that matter about the trade union official and I think you are absolutely right.

R: I will send it over. Ted Eliot *was* sent it over and we called Hal ______ and when I considered it it was a high price for the President to pay.

K: I didn't want to do it but I didn't want to overrule you. I Send if over and we will approve it.

R: I might just call Geo. Meany and get credit. He knew we were thinking the other way and we can tell him the President won't do it. We are just ? ? ? ? ?

K: That's the last thing is to have them mad with us. He was so mad about the Beecher thing. He thought your idea was clever but he wants to think about it. All the alternatives are worse.

R: I told Fulbirgt that he shouldn't consider this story that we are not going to discuss things with Congress. The major things we do. We *will* be embarking on a large assistance program and should we want ? ? ?

K: On the large assistance program, we *will* be facing (?) not building that up.

R: I'm talking about large numbers. We will have to get Congressional support.

K: If they take Penom Penh it's something the President will think of.

R: I'm not saying we shouldn't do it but we should talk to Congress.

K: I think that's right.

R: I don't think we should ever give them the veto power. On military assistance we have to get their support. And it's important to get Congressional support if we are going to invade.

K: What we would like is to keep the threat and not *use* what we are going to do. I thought the way you handled it at Cornell really gave a grave view but wasn't

R: We may *have* to be forced into it in a big way. This is the only alternative to protect our men.

K: It's not imminent. I don't think they plan to take Penom Penh.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Rogers/Kissinger

12:30 pm 4/23/70

-2-

R: They must have one hell of a problem.

K: If you were a policy maker at the tag end of a supply line with a major force at their rear -- it's not a brilliant position.

R: I wish the President wouldn't jump to the conclusion that we leak anytime.

K: Max He called people and someone said it had to come out of there.

R: Who?

K: I don't want to say. But it wasn't one of your subordinates.

R: Why Beecher?

K: They leak it in one department and give another guy the story to protect that department. No one is more apt than the other.

R: Laird thought it came from Saigon.

K: Except they don't have the cable.

R: Yes, they did.

K: All I know is that as I told you last week and I told the President in recent months that it's been an ideal relationship. It's been no leak that can be described to State. They carry out their orders and they should state their views.

R: All President's go through this. I can remember 10 occasions when Eisenhower called me for a full investigation and we never found anything out.

By NARA, Date 5/26

YELCON

Laird/Kissinger

1:35 pm

4/23/70

K: We have an enraged President.

L: Can't you quiet him down?

K: No. It's on the leak.

L: On the other things -- the leak is very bad. I don't know why they closed that airport all night. I think the State Dept. handled it right this morning. They said it was SVN airplanes. I think that from that traffic this morning the Cambodian government put out more than we know.

K: That's psychological warfare.

L: It was important to them to let other countries know. There were only 3 people here and 12 in the Joint Chiefs who knew about that. The Joint Chiefs have never leaked. It must have come out of the back door. They used Beecher.

K: The President wants sworn statements from everybody who had access to the cable that they didn't talk to the Times.

L: I think his decision memo is exactly correct. My problem over here is that they said the President was aware that the tac-air had limited on the Ho Chi Minh trail.

K: I thought it was being used in Cambodia for a distance of 25-30 miles.

L: How was raising hell with me for permitting SVN tac-air in there. They can handle 100 strikes a day. We can let them get in there. We asked him for targets on tac-air. Rather than any targets you should identify targets.

K: I want to make clear that as far as he is concerned if Mel wants to take off some sorties as far as he is concerned Cambodia has priority and up to a depth of 30 miles.

L: If he has targets but he should give first priority to SVN and if they don't, we should. The last time we approved it in less than 35 minutes.

K: I may not understand he is encouraged to come in.

L: He is reluctant because he is afraid it will blow the menu thing.

K: We don't want to use it just to say we have used tac-air.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

1:35 pm

4/23/70

-2-

L: I will approve tac-air as soon as they have need for it. The next thing ? ? ?

K: The President wants me to handle this directly. If it becomes necessary, begins to look
that they need ______ air support, heliocopter them in as soon as possible.

L: Ask the President to give me authority to put Americans in with targets.
I don't think we should tip our hand.

K: We have to succeed with this operation.

L: The casualties will be high but we have to be successful. When they are
needed to identify targets but to put the command advisors in first will be a
mistake. I'm glad he didn't include that in thememo.

K: You will see that they go in as fast as needed.

L: Right. It should be limited that way. That's what he asked me to tell you.
Bill is going up to the Foreign Affairs Committee Monday. He asked me if I
am sure we will not put Americans in. I said not right away. I didn't say
anything about that bill. He says the President didn't approve that. This
idea to put dummy mines in Haiphong --

K: We will not approve that. That's too obvious.

L: We will be a laughing stock.

K: That will not be approved.

L: Make sure. That would get out in the press. That would look like hell.

K: Don't worry about it. We have never even hinted at that.

L: The Joint Staff has. I said the President would let me know.

K: We don't deal directly with the Joint Staff. We want those ships to move
_________ as we are thinking of it.

L: We will move them in to Sihanoukville too. That's ? *@!!.

K: Go in immediately.

K: I want you to understand on the tac-air thing -- I understand I have authority
and tell Abrams and that they should come off steel tiger. That's on the Ho
Chi Minh trail. We can't take them off barrel roll. Sorties in Laos should stay
there. But I want Abrams' approval which is more lucrative.

By NARA, Dated 5/26

TELCOM

Laird/Kissinger

1:35 pm 4/23/70

-3-

K: Excellent.

L: I showed the President where we are using tac-air. We are using it heavily.

K: He misunderstood.

L: I showed him.

K: I will show him. He didn't focus on it.

So I may

L: He is

K: We

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Senator Mansfield
4/23/70 3:00 p.m.

K: The President asked me to call you about these stories in the newspapers in regard to his conversation with you.

M: People have been asking me about that. I said I didn't meet him.

K: About the Cambodian aid request. He wanted you to know his thinking. We have a large request for military assistance to the Cambodian government. What we would have preferred was for Sihanouk to stay in. We feel that if it were taken over by North Vietnam it would affect us in a serious way. We don't want to put in a massive military aid program. But we want to keep what is there until some other diplomatic measures help. The only thing going in now are small arms, Communist weapons captured in Vietnam from their stocks, a thousand or two M-1 rifles that were allocated to South Vietnam. These are to help out with the weapons they have, weapons they got from the aid program in the 50s. We are trying to keep our involvement to a minimum; there is no heavy aid going in and it buys us some time. We are trying to be as circumspect as possible.

M: Well, I am glad to hear that. You are playing with fire either way.

K: We tried to strengthen Sihanouk. He played a very skillful game. With him there was some restraint on Communist forces. If the whole were worked open it would expose our troops in Southeast Asia to serious dangers. We are trying to hold until the rainy season. These things in the newspapers we are doing as a way to buy time as much as anything. These M-1s are from American-made, but come from South Vietnamese stock. What is going in now are a few thousand Communist rifles and no heavy weapons, and, of course, no military advisors.

M: Well, be careful and I'll keep my fingers crossed.

K: We just wanted you to know our thinking.

M: I appreciate it.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Rogers
4/23/70; 7:20 p.m.

K: I am returning your call.

R: This isn't what I wanted to talk to you about, but Mel Laird called and was concerned, as I am, about the possibility of using American advisors and that that was one of the things you were considering in WSAG.

K: No, I thought the understanding was that there should be no advisors and only if tactical air were authorized later then ground advisors would be authorized later.

R: Are you going to provide that if necessity arises that we are going to have Presidential approval? Laird thought instructions were going to be "US advisors when needed" and he didn't think that was a good idea and I don't either.

K: I am meeting with the group now and I will make sure of the understanding.

R: Are you going to the meeting with the Chinese?

K: No.

R: I will explain.

On this business of the leak, I have volunteered to sign the statement as the others have to but they took pictures of the plane landing and we are just not going to be able to do things secretly.

K: It is the NODIS cable that drove him (President) up the wall. I have seen him fly off the handle before, but I have never seen it last. Hell, he wanted to give polygraph tests.

R: I am going to limit our people to four or five on all these Cambodian things. There is no reason why all the assistants would have to see it.

K: I doubt if it came from here. I am sure whoever it was, his superior will assure us that his assistant couldn't have done it.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon

Mr. Kissinger /Secretary Rogers

4/23/70; 7:20 p.m.

-2-

K: I was told upstairs that it came via Halerin (sp. ?)

R: When you say upstairs, do you mean Ziegler?

K: No, Haldeman.

R: I didn't even know Halerin was even around. I thought Schultz was the man. OK, let me check -- I haven't even seen him. If Bob Haldeman knows that, maybe he knows something. I noticed the other day that the President said the press was being briefed on MIRVS and ABMs -- who has been doing that.

K: Congressmen, also. I was told it was done by State and ACDA.

R: If they know, why don't they tell me.

K: You can be sure that when I get a complaint, I tell you -- I don't tell the President. I got something from the Vice President on Holland and am going to send it over to you. We have enough troubles without eating each other up.

R: This business about having a stack of stool pigeons running around to the President ---- if there is something that I should be doing or that I can do, I would like to do it.

K: Well, this one didn't come from here.

R: I am going to talk to the President. We know each other enough that if he knows something, he should tell me.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM

Laird/Kissinger

9:55 am 4/24/70

L: It's no misunderstanding about grojnd advisors going in add on this operation. I understand that correctly and I make (?) those and he said he talked to you about that.

K: The understanding I have is that they are not going in and that ground observers will be lifted in with tac-air.

L: Evacuation?

K: The President is willing to do that.

L: By heliocopter but it's opening up American vehicular traffic in and out of there and we will limit that. Bill wants to on Monday or Tuesday say that there are no Americans involved. We can protect him for a few days.

K: The basic requirement of the President is that the thing succeeds. We will not get any awards from Fulbright if it doesn't.

L: I was concerned this morning because I thought I had misread him. The gunships will be inserted when and if they are required. I will make that clear to Abrams.

K: One other thing -- The President made a number of phone calls last night and he wanted to try xing the information he got a briefing on a number of contingency plans-- B'52 areas on Consvan. He asked Moorer to come this morning at 7:15 to brief him, which he has. He instructed him to have that one brought up to day and kept current.

L: He really should.

K: Let? ? ? ? ?

L: I should talk to him about that. BuzWheeler has a different view point.

K: Well, I have to say in defense of Moorer, he did not advocate it or not. He just presented the plan you sent over.

L: Good.

K: There are two combat things of

L: Abrams and Wheeler recommend against that.

K: I have the plan here and I read along. It wasn't an advocacy of it. It's the

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

9:55 am

4/24/70

K: (cont.) sort of stuff you send over and as the President ordered. Get Abrams to bring it up and make sure that plan is ready and can be expert work with this effected within 72 hours after it's ordered.

L: The House Arms Services Committee wants to be sure we are not putting in Americans in Camb. and Laos. Otherwise, he will right something in the bill. I will talk to him on Wed.

K: It's best to delay that a little bit.

L: He is being assured by his committee that we will not put Americans in Laos or Cambodia. Maybe you would like to come up with me.

K: You can handle Senators -- if you want me I will do it but you are pretty masterful in handling those guys. Tom will come and see you anyway.

L: So there's no misunderstanding I am sure we can handle the language so there's no problem about Americans and advisors.

K: We wouldn't want to get into a Bay of Pigs syndrome.

L: The important thing is the success of this.

K: We have no interest in having advisors go along there but we don't want to put excessive restraints on it. The President will take the political heat.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
4/24/70 10:10 a.m.

R: I'd like a summary of what you told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee vis-a-vis Cambodia.

K: It wasn't the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Fulbright asked me to come by for a drink. I didn't go the first two dates he suggested. 85-90% of the conversation was SALT and roughly the same as what we discussed at the meeting. There were no new questions. The President asked me to do this and so did Harlow. On Cambodia I described some of the consequences if it went Communist. On the other hand, I said we've had requests for assistance, but we are not eager to get involved. I said we asked them to restudy it and they restudied and doubled it. In this context we have to understand what we've sent in there. Fulbright said you said essentially the same thing. That's all I told them. There were only at most two questions or three about Cambodia. There were the usual questions about how do you expect Vietnamization work and another question on... Fulbright said this proves you have got to negotiate. I said that's what we are trying to do. The whole thing was only an hour and 15 minutes and no more than 15 minutes was devoted to the Southeast Asia thing.

R: Alex mentioned A-1s.

K: I said... I told them about the AK-47s. The only other thing was M-1s, from the stocks for the South Vietnamese. They didn't balk at that. I said we are only thinking of small arms.

R: I testified at the House yesterday. They asked about Cambodia. I present the problem that faces us and said we have to consider all the alternatives. They said including use of American troops? I said including everything. Good preparation demands that we think of all the possibilities.

K: I said the last thing we are possibly interested in is getting into another guerilla war.

R: Fulbright will say that's the same thing as Johnson said. I said but facts are different from then.

K: Symington was the only rambunctious one. Brooke was on the hawkish side with regard to Cambodia. He kept saying if Cambodia's so important why don't you do more? Of course, I don't know what he was driving at. It wasn't a hectoring session. It was billed as a social gathering. I didn't know who was going to be there. I cancelled two dates. When he offered the third the President and Harlow thought I should go.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

page 2

R. I sat next to Stennis at the Chinese thing last night. He's in a frame of mind to be totally ______________ about Cambodia. He said I have supported you but I ______________ may have to change. I think it would be a major setback for Stennis and Rivers to come out against us. What Stennis was talking about was use of troops, not an aid program, I think. It's a fine line we're walking here. Incidentally Reeves reporting is pretty good I think.

E: There were a couple of days when someone told the President that Reeves was blowing his cool. But I think I had a talk, by the way with Haldeman this morning about our conversation last night, and I found out you had talked with him about it. I thought you had a good case and I wanted to talk to Bob to see what we could do about it. I want to assure you of one thing: We are not snooping around your department. I don't carry gossip to the President and neither does Bob. I agree with what you said yesterday, and insofar as Bob and I can do anything about it, we'll prevent it. We know if we told you A is a liar he'd be out.

R: Sure.

K: What often happens is somebody comes into the office and says there is a possibility this is happening. And he wants something done. Sometimes Bob and I will sit on it, but if it keeps boiling along...

R: I don't want to bother the President but when he's got a bitch like that he should tell me. My thought on Monday is to give the committee a briefing on the military situation in general terms. We've got a problem of juxtaposition with Sunday night and my appearance on Monday.

K: On Monday it won't be obvious how big that operation is. We would like to keep it as low profile as possible. There won't be any American advisors going in with them until there's tactical air.

R: Good, and then tell them about Lon Nol's request and what we have under consideration.

K: What I told those guys is that they made a large aid request. They will not have had the details on the request. You can give that if you want to.

R: Okay, and say we should consider whether we should let Americans cross the borders? Let them think about that. In the House yesterday

By NARA, Date 5/26

page 3

that worked out well. Now we just have to worry whether the think
will work. The only question is about believing where Lon Nol says
he regretted our invasion.

K: Are we having him say that?

R: It's not final yet.

K: No, I agree. Why should we say that? Incidentally, Alex
and your people have done a superb job on that.

mawi
> import
was driven
gathering.
dates. Why

conclusion
for the good
President

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Governor Dewey

4/24/70 10:55 a.m.

D: Things don't look so good, do they?

K: The President is at his best under pressure. So, it's not
as bad as it looks.

D: Good. I was to call when I know the date I can come?
How about next week?

K: Next Wednesday I'm free for lunch.

D: Well, Tuesday, I'm clear all day. I wouldn't have to race
back. Wednesday is the 29th? I can do that if it's better than Tuesday
for you.

K: My assistant just gave me a list of the people I should have
lunch with on Wednesday. There's nobody I'd rather do it with than you.

D: There are some updated reports to be read?

K: Yes.

D: I wish they'd put dates on them. It's curious--the last several
I've read haven't had dates on them. You couldn't run a law office that
way.

K: It is curious.

D: I had quite a session with the people who came up regarding
the Prisoners of war. Okay, Wednesday lunch, and I don't have to take
an early plane.

K: Good, if your office will let me know when you will arrive,
I'll have you met.

D: Okay. Some time between 12:00 and 12:30.

K: Or it would be better closer to 1:00.

D: If there's some material worth reading I could do that.

K: You haven't seen the culmination of the disarmament thing.

D: I also haven't seen the McCloy krix report.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Governor Dewey
4/24/70 10:55 a.m.

page 2

K: It will just take you five minutes.

D: I'm a slow reader.

K: Well then 10 minutes. That report is more interesting to the drafters than the readers.

D: I hope the things I write aren't like that.

K: At least if you write something you wouldn't leak it.

D: It was a leak, was it?

K: Yes, McCloy wouldn't do it, but that fellow Ruina would.
Academics with a mission are dangerous men.

D: I'll be seeing you Wednesday.

Regarding
I am to take

I'll be active,

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger

11:10 am 4/24/70

Z: I have a letter here which is being circulated to Dayan over HARRY your signature. "I wish to thank you for your congratulations ? ? ? ? ? and I hope that the work I do will ? ? ? ? ? ? ? !" (copy of letter attached to original of telcon)

K: It's a total and absolute forgery. They have also circulated a pledge by me to the Zionist organization. They used a photostat copy of a signature.

Z: May I say that?

K: You can say it's a forgery and you are sending it to the FBI. They also said I sent $25,000.00 to the Zionist Organization. I don't remember whether Dayan wrote congratulating me but I doubt that I wrote to him. It's not absolutely out of the question.

Z: The great thing to do on this -- Henry wrote Dayan and let me quote what he said and then quote you.

K: I don't know if my filing system is up to that. Say that to your knowledge Henry Kissinger never wrote to Dayan.

(In the files we subsequently found a cable of congratulations from Dayan with a formal response -- nothing remotely like the attached letter -- and the further UK notation that HAK had sent Dayan a greeting card for Christmas 1969.)

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/The Vice President

11:20 a.m., April 24, 1970

K: Mr. Vice President, I'm sorry about breakfast. The President called a meeting for 7:15 this morning which lasted until about 10:00. Are you free at any point this morning?

VP: I am trying to polish off this South Carolina speech which I must give tonight.

K: How about noon, for 15 minutes?

VP: Yes, we could do that.

K: I will come over there. You are not going to upset my academic colleagues, are you?

VP: No, but I may upset Fulbright, McGovern and Muskie. I used the remark that the President had suggested I might play golf with them in South Carolina. That would be a foursome, but I preferred not to play with them because I might hit one of them on the head with a golfball. They might have responded with their typical reaction to brutal and aggressive acts, and I hated to be kissed in public.

K: I'll see you at 12:00.

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger
11:30 am ca. 4/24/70

Z: Says that NVN are threatening to leave. I will make the pitch that we have no information and we are willing to negotiate.

K: Right. Also, if you can, hit again the Cambodian question. This is not even the pretense of a civil war. These are foreign invaders.

Z: The President wants to make the point we will do anything to protect Americans.

K: Leave it out.

Z: 40,000 foreign invaders.

K: We are interested in preserving the neutrality of Cambodia.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Joe Alsop

4/24/70 11:37 a.m.

A: Your young are coming?

K: No, but I'm extremely caught in several critical situations
which make my plans uncertain.

A: How about over the weekend?

K: I'll be here.

A: I will too. How about supper on Sunday?

K: All right, let's shoot for that.

A: Let's meet here at 7:30 and then go on to the Metropolitan
Club for supper.

K: All right.

A: Good. Good.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

D. Chapin/Kissinger

12:50 pm

4/24/70

C: There will be a rally for POW war wives at Constitution Hall on May 1 and the VP and President will be out of town/

K: Rogers.

C: Not Laird?

K: Yes, he would appreciate it if you gave him that chance.

C: Have Laird do it. The other question --

K: Where will the President be?

C: Fla.

K: Am I going?

C: I doubt it -- you might. You get such good press on your suntan. Cong.
Rhodes has been to VN and wants to come in and talk to the President. The
question is should he see you first.

K: He won't have anything for either of us but I leave it up to you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telcon

April 24, 1970, 1:40 p. m.

Admiral Moorer

K: That matter we were discussing this morning. Is it your understanding that Abrams is for it?

M: Yes.

K: I was told he did not like it. That would make a difference.

M: You mean the second one?

K: Yes.

M: He has recommended both of them.

K: That is right.

M: I think he wants to do this. McCain also has recommended it.

K: I want to confirm our understanding. He thinks it is feasible and desirable.

M: Did you talk to Wheeler.?

K: No.

M: I think he would tell you the same thing.

K: Will you be there this afternoon?

M: Yes, and Wheeler will be there too. We are working up a proposed paper for you.

K: I will see you this afternoon. We might have a word afterwards.

M: OK, Henry.

ms

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/General Wheeler

2:25.p.m., April 24, 1970

K: It is our understanding that on military grounds, you and Abrams are recommending this COMUS thing.

W: That is correct. Abrams recommended it, and I supported it on military grounds.

K: I wanted to confirm this for the President. I, myself, was clear enough. What is the latest time we can give to execute on this.

W: He needs 72 hours after the 26 days. He couldn't handle it after that. However, I will check that point and if there is any change, I will let you know.

K: He should act on the assumption that it may be ordered. Another item: we may have a meeting on this Sunday afternoon -- I just wanted you to keep that in mind.

W: Thank you for alerting me. I will see you at 4:00 today (WSAG mtg).

lds

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

2:30 p.m., April 24, 1970

L: Good morning, Henry.

K: Mel, it's afternoon.

L: I just got through with Dr. Draper and the President of Johns Hopkins, and I've lost track of time.

K: You politicians give the academicians too much credit. I know Linc Gordon (Pres of Johns Hopkins), and he is a good man.

L: I like Dr. Draper, too; I've known him a long time.

K: The President keeps bugging me on two things: (a) tac air, but I think I have that under control; and (b) can you do the B-52 things for a while. I am ordered to tell you that. May I tell him they will be done?

L: Sure, we can put them in. I think we have one tonight and we have one tomorrow. It takes 36 hours to cycle it.

K: Cycle them through next week. Another subject: he may want to have a meeting on Sunday -- he isn't sure. Will you be in town?

L: I will be in town on Sunday afternoon. If you could make it at 4:30 or 5:00, it would suit me better.

K: Subject to his approval, of course, we can do that.

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

2:55 p.m., April 24, 1970

P: Can you hear me, Henry [he was calling from the helicopter en route to Camp David].

K: Yes, Mr. President.

P: I want you to, if you possibly can, to see Stennis this afternoon, particularly in order to enlist him (not telling him what we plan) on the importance of doing something along the lines of what we talked about.

K: I understand and will take care of it.

P: I will call you in about an hour.

lds

(Mr. Kissinger arranged for Senator Stennis to come to the WH to meet with him at 3:30 -- in view of K's heavy schedule of meetings, he could not attend to the Senator's office.)

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON
Sen. Mansfield/Kissinger
4:00 pm 4/24/70

K: Something I am suffering from -- a soft head. The President asked me to mention one thing before and I nearly forgot. Strictly for your information. We called in the Soviet Charge/ and said we would listen to a reasonable proposal for Cambodian neutrality and that this was an informal means. We do not have a reason to want it. He asked if we had any other ideas. I said ? ? ? ? ? ? ? This is very secretive,

M: It's movement in the right direction.

K: We wouldn't want to cut out the State Dppt. but a formal request would have been cleared in Hanoi.

Telecon
David Frost

4/24/70 5:36 p.m.

F: It was very enjoyable meeting you on Saturday.

K: I enjoyed it too.

F: I'm going to be in Washington next Thursday and Friday and wondered if you are going to be in town and if lunch was free for you.

K: Let me see. As it turns out I'll be in town. Friday I may be in Key Biscayne, so let's aim for Thursday. Let's eat at the Metropolitan Club, unless you prefer my office.

F: Whichever is more convenient for you.

K: Let's say the Metropolitan Club at 1:00. Will I be able to reach you if there are any changes?

F: Why don't I call you Wednesday night or Thursday morning, and if it's suddenly more convenient to eat in your office we'll do that.

K: Okay.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon
Ron Ziegler
4/24/70 6:00 p.m.

Z: I have a memo I'd like to go over with you. It will take 5 minutes of your time. I've put some thoughts on paper and I'd like to have you look at them.

K: Okay, after I see the Ambassador. What did the Secretary want?

Z: Probing around. It is his judgment that the Beecher story didn't leak out of State. He felt it more likely that it leaked from Defense.

K: Did you tell him that Laird believes the opposite view?

Z: No, I said the President is quite concerned that this cable leaked almost in entirely. He said I'm concerned too. I said I didn't suggest otherwise. He asked about my press conference. I told about the foreign invasion. He asked if the President had told me to say that. I said oh yes, I wouldn't say something like that without guidance from the top. It was kind of a probing but very cordial call. I think he felt that I suggested the leak came from State. We shot that other story down.

K: Excellent.

Z: I'll be down in half an hour or check when you finish with the ambassador.

K: Okay.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telcon

Rebozo

4/24/70; 6:05 pm

R: I am doing something without the President's necessary knowledge. We were thinking about possibly having dinner here tomorrow night, possibly going out on the Sequoia, or maybe even going to New York. I know he would love to have you with us unless you had planned to be with your children. I thought I would call you and see if you had planned to do that. It would be no problem.

K: I understand. Because of some things you may know about I won't be able to see my children this weekend, so I would be happy to do that.

R: OK, Henry. Just stay loose and we will be back in touch.

ms

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Director Helms

7:20 p.m., April 24, 1970

K: After our meeting this morning, I never asked you what you thought in your private capacity of the course of action. I didn't want to do it in front of the others. Part of my job is to raise queries if they deserve to be raised.

H: I realize that. I also realize I had the chance to go back to you. When I saw the state of mind, the political aspects...

K: Forget about the state of mind.

H: I'm thinking in a larger context; not whether we feel good or bad. It seemed to me that if he is prepared for the fallout, then it is the thing to do. He obviously was.

K: You think it's worth it?

H: I think it is.

K: What we ought to do is think through what the counter-moves would be.

H: Certainly. There are several contingencies here. The trouble with studying those things is you have to bring in a lot of people to study them. My inclination would be to defer a little bit. It can be done but by the same token, it does spread things around.

K: Could you on your own get somebody to think about it?

H: I can put it up as a contingency, and can get that started in the morning.

K: You think that can be held securely?

H: This has been done for years. I have no problem with that.

K: I want ideas -- I don't care whether there is a consensus; not just possibilities, but what is the probable reaction.

H: By possibilities, I meant you must list them, and then harden up the ones you think are active. This can come rolling along about the first of the week.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Director Helms

7:20 p.m., April 24, 1970

- 2 -

K: Assuming we make the final decision without regard to the consequences, there is no sense taking on flak for the first, and then building up flak for the second again.

H: It's in the right timeframe. If we do one, we should do the other. I think the amount of problems one will have is about the same with regard to one or two. I agree with you on this other problem that what is likely to result has to be longer range.

K: Unless you think what is going to happen is of the nature of making your decision to begin with.

H: I don't think any of these things are like the serious matters which used to worry people. I will put this other in the works.

K: Then the first of the week would be good.

H: I wouldn't wait on that, nor would I back up from the decisions made.

K: It is my judgment and strong recommendation that any decision must be discussed with the two Cabinet Members -- even if the decision has already been made and an order is in the desk drawer. You can't ram it down their throats without their having a chance to give their views. I have talked on a contingency basis with Laird which is really all we are talking about now.

H: You have to bring the other fellow in.

K: And give them both the opportunity to discuss the wisdom of it.

H: I promise you of all the things that are not just right is to start monkeying with something like this at the last minute. I think the state of mind I saw this morning was just right -- keep it and not monkey with it. I have been thoughtful about this -- not casual.

K: I know that. If I didn't value your judgment I wouldn't call you.

H: I realize the groundrules between you and me; I would have come to you.

K: As long as you XXX know you are not entitled to have a judgment.

H: I realize that, and I have already forgotten it.

lds

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Marty Shram/Mr. Kissinger

7:28 p.m., April 24, 1970

K: I was told you only need 60 seconds, and that is all I have.

S: I will only take 50 seconds. I was told yesterday by two
officials, neither of which is as high as yourself [K said, "Who is?"],
that on the Wednesday before the Thursday on which the President
originally planned to give his speech on further withdrawals, he had
planned to announce merely another increment of withdrawal of ~~50,000~~ 40,000
50,000 -- that the change was made after the Thursday speech was
cancelled. Is this correct?

K: No. I don't want to go into what was made, but the President
almost never improvises.

S: Even if he delivered the speech on Thursday, it would have
contained the figure announced on Monday?

K: Yes.

S: That means I don't write a story tonight.

K: I hate to do this to you, but there are not too many who would
contradict it.

lds