4123 Duval Drive
Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida 32082

August 27th, 1968

Mr. Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.
Nixon Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Mitchell
20 Broad Street
New York, New York 10005

Dear Frank:

You may recall that in my telephone conversation with you I indicated
that after this week my schedule was pretty full until well into September. From
some of the things I have been reading in the papers, I rather doubt if Messrs.
Nixon and Agnew will be available for discussions in New York this week.
Consequently, I am enclosing herewith a few comments on the contents of your
memorandum of August 20th.

I am sure that you realize that the items which you listed need to be
"discussed" because it is very difficult to make point blank statements regarding
any of them. However, I am sending these few remarks for whatever they might
be worth.

1. I prefer not to predict what course of action any administration should take with respect to the stalemate in Paris because too many variables may enter the picture between now and then. However, if the situation is "exactly" the same, except that the election is out of the way, I would let word get to the U. S. S. R. that we are,

(a) Going to mine all waters in and around Haiphong and are going to do it in a way which will insure safe exit from the harbor for 72 hours; but after that period of time expires one would enter or exit at one's own risk.

(b) Let them know that we are also going to announce that unless there is a cease fire agreement within ( a reasonable period of time), present restrictions on bombing will be removed.

Franklin D. Lincoln, Jr.

Page 1

I don't believe that it is realistic to talk about turning over the complete defense of the country to the South Vietnamese. I think that it will be years before they can do this alone. Look at Korea - we are still there and it has only been in recent years that the country has become viable.

2. I think the greatest mistake the Johnson - Humphrey - McNamara team made was the fallacious reasoning that we could win this war without John Q. Citizen having to be inconvenienced. No additional emergency was declared, no Reserves were called up and no additional appropriations were requested. Further, it was even stated publicly that we could have guns and butter too, but what actually was happening was those who were already in the service were doing extra duty, equipment which had been stockpiled was drawn down to an excessive degree and even while denials were being made, the readiness of almost all units, except those actually in South Vietnam suffered, Later - John Q. Public woke up and said, "Wait a minute! What is this you have been telling me? Now I see draft calls increasing, I read comments galore about our over-all military readiness and I see that this war has been costing $2 billion a month without anyone letting me know."

Basically, the administration did not lead the people at the time I think they were willing to be lead and this - in my opinion - is the almost sole reason for the present day doves, the draft card burners, the South Vietnamese protesters, etc. Looking a step further - I believe that there is a point beyond which the President should not go without first getting complete backing of Congress. We know today - even if we didn't know then - that the August, 1964 resolution wasn't made sufficiently clear, Further, even a division is much better than shooting one side to one another and the other side to the other.

3. Even after four years as a member of the JCS I hardly know the exact composition of the National Security Council. I believe the Council should be quite formal and that those who attend the meetings who are not actual members should be designated and act as either expert witnesses, advisors, or consultants and not try to perform as members.

Mr. Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.

Page 3.

4. I think the JCS concept is still O.K., but I believe it has been misused by the administration. There is no doubt whatsoever but what the administration has disregarded the advice of the JCS, but I suppose that whether or not it was wise in doing so is a matter of opinion. About the last year and a half he was there - as far as I know - the Secretary of Defense restricted his consultations to the Chairman rather than having discussions with the other Chiefs, either individually or as a group. Sometimes I wondered how much he consulted with the Chairman. After Curt LeMay left, I was the Senior Chief and thus became Acting Chairman when Wheeler was out of town. During these times the Secretary of Defense certainly made practically no demands on me. I also believe that the President should arrange periodic meetings with the JCS as a group - otherwise he might not get their opinions. Let's be practical, individuals serving as Chiefs are not going to request a meeting with the President on their own accord unless there is a disagreement with the Secretary of Defense which they consider to be very vital.

5. I have no constructive comment to make concerning the ABM Defense System at this time.

6. I agree with the desirability of enlisting the active support of veterans associations. Today, the individual services, as well as the Department of Defense conducts what are known as joint civilian orientation trips. The people invited are generally business and/or civic leaders. Often, of course, these men are also veterans. Perhaps some thought should be given to scheduling orientation trips for groups composed solely of the leaders of various veterans' associations.

7. What's wrong with NATO? NATO has really never been capable of implementing the approved strategy and the members of NATO knew it. I don't believe that Regional Defense Groups have necessarily outlived their usefulness, but I do believe that they must be viewed in a more practical way, whereas in the past we have often been kidding ourselves and knew it.

8. DOD, has in my opinion, become unmanageable. While it has grown and proliferated, it hasn't really absorbed any of the service functions; i.e. absorbed them to an extent which made it possible for the service to get out of that particular business. In effect, what we are really seeing in the DOD is a pyramiding effect.

9. No comment on the missile gap.

10. I hardly know how to remedy the damage done by the TFX.
I do think we need a follow-on to the B52.

11. I think our greatest weakness in Naval strength is in major escorts. Aside from comparatively small ASW type ships, we have had no appreciable building program for the larger destroyer types for years. But at this point I would like to say that I think one of the greatest Naval weaknesses in our country is our almost complete lack of an adequate Merchant Marine.

12. We have always had a voluntary Army in peace time and I don't believe that we ever can or should have one so large that we could avoid some type of draft in time of war. To even infer that no Mother's son would be drafted regardless of world conditions would not be being fair to the people of our country.

13. No comment.

14. I believe that it is Russia and not China which is the prime support of the North Vietnamese. I also believe that our military and political policy should be reviewed in depth, with the possibility of revising it.

15. I don't believe China is a present day military threat, but this is something that requires a lot of discussion.

16. During my time I felt that one of the greatest defects in the military budgeting process was Mr. McNamara's insistence that nothing that we actually needed was ever cut out of the budget. Rather than contradict his statement I would rather say that as costs began to climb it became harder and harder to prove that a particular thing was "needed." As a matter of fact, as the budget would reach some magic figure, either he or his non-military advisors would decide that everything beyond that figure "wasn't needed." I would far rather be cut back dollarwise and let the military adjust the hardware.

17. What is strategic power? This question should be "talked out." We should determine what type of forces we want to

TELEPHONE HUDSON 3-6126

Manufacturing Chemists' Association, Inc.

(FOUNDED 1872)

1825 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20009

GEORGE H. DECKER
General, U.S.A. (Ret.)
PRESIDENT

September 11, 1968

Mr. Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.
Nixon Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Mitchell
20 Broad Street
New York, N. Y. 10005

Dear Frank:

The enclosed paper is not directly related to the problems of
national security but does express the views of the chemical industry
relative to foreign economic policy.

It occurred to me that Mr. Nixon would be interested since
the chemical industry in the U. S. last year had sales of approximately
$47 billion and employs more than one million people.

It would be appreciated if you would bring the paper to his
attention for whatever use he may care to make of it.

With best regards.

Enclosure

FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY PROPOSALS
FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

A SOUND TRADE POLICY FOR THE FUTURE

America's competitive position in world trade is in deep trouble. In
approaching 1969 the nation contemplates a trade surplus that has all but
vanished and a balance of payments deficit which saps the strength of the
dollar and drains our gold reserves.

In 1967 our historically favorable balance of trade fell to $3.5 billion, and the commercial trade surplus was only $200 million after A. I. D. and PL 480 shipments were eliminated. In three of the first six months of this year we have actually had a trade deficit.

Our annualized trade surplus for the first half of the year is less than $600 million. On commercial trade we are currently running an unprecedented deficit at the annual rate of approximately $2 billion.

The competitive position of the chemical industry in world trade has suffered a steady decline. Our share of world exports of chemical manufactures has shrunk from 27.9 percent in 1962 to 23.7 percent in 1967. For all exports the U. S. share has declined from 25.2 percent to 23.1 percent. Our imports during that period increased at nearly twice the rate of exports.

In the first six months of this year chemical imports are up 20 percent as compared to a rise of only 5 percent in exports.

Our workers and our industries are becoming increasingly concerned
at our deteriorating position in the export market and at the rapidly rising
levels of import penetration in vital sectors of the national economy.

The adverse effects are being felt by a number of America's backbone
industries like steel and textiles and there is legitimate cause for concern
for the existence of certain other industries. Benzenoid chemical producers
and dye-makers, for example, are threatened by one-sided concessions
bargained in the Kennedy Round. The reactive metals segment of the chemi-
cal industry is being inundated by imports that are now averaging about 30
percent and running as high as 42 percent for some important items.

FREEDOM TO INVEST AND EARN ABROAD

While the U. S. trade position is weakened by competitive disadvantages
and non-tariff barriers, the economic interests of our country are further
jeopardized by the continuation of rigid controls on American direct invest-
ments abroad.

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U. S. subsidiaries and affiliates abroad account for 25 percent of our exports. The restraints not only impede export growth but curtail investments which would increase the flow of earnings to this country from overseas.

U. S. international companies have been the prime means of supplying our foreign markets and the major source of dollar inflows in our balance of payments. Between 1950 and 1966 U. S. private foreign investment totaled $39 billion. These investments returned $58 billion to the U. S. during the same period. The controls are choking "the goose that lays the golden egg."

There is a clear and urgent need for prompt action to improve our competitive position in world trade and to free the creative energies and productive resources of American enterprise abroad which have been shackled by the unwise and harmful investment controls now protracted for the fifth year.

In place of the policy of expediency on overseas investment and a trade policy that ignores the realities of reciprocity and equal access, we must shape a sound foreign economic policy for the future. In this task we urge the architects of new policy to consider the following recommendations --

## I. Improving Competitive Position in World Trade

In the Kennedy Round negotiations we agreed to the deepest tariff cuts in our history with a view of obtaining a reciprocal expansion of trade for the benefit of our workers and our industries and the U. S. economy in general.

The reciprocity we anticipated has proved illusory, however, due to the tax systems, restrictive trade practices, and other non-tariff barriers of some of our trading partners. Their border tax and export rebate systems work to our disadvantage in international trade.

If liberalization of trade is to proceed as a force for growth and prosperity in the world, it must be on the firm ground of equal advantage and equal access.

President Johnson emphasized this point in his January 1 Balance of Payments Message in which he pointed out the need to look beyond the Kennedy Round "to the problems of non-tariff barriers that pose a continued threat to our competitive position."

The principal threat cited by the President was the adverse effect of foreign tax systems upon our trade. The President has stated:

"American commerce is at a disadvantage because of the tax systems of some of our trading partners . . . [which]

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give across the board tax rebates on exports which
leave their ports and impose special border tax
charges on our goods entering their country."

Despite a call for prompt cooperative action by our trading partners to remove these disadvantages, no such action has been forthcoming. Indeed, many of these countries have increased these border taxes and export rebates to the further detriment of our trade. In many instances these increases have more than offset the entire amount of tariff reductions our partners agreed to make in the Kennedy Round.

These unilateral increases in border taxes have further reduced the
competitive position of U. S. exports to these countries. At the same time
the competitive advantage of these trading partners has been enhanced in
their exports to the United States and to third countries because of increased
export rebates.

These disadvantages to our trade must be offset if there is to be
material improvement in our deteriorated trade balance. American industry
and American workers are no longer able to compete in international trade
with one hand tied behind their backs.

Consistent with our international obligations, we can offset most of
these disadvantages to our trade. Consistent with our obligation to maintain
the strength and stability of the dollar and our dedication to trade liberaliza-
tion, governmental action is needed to offset these disadvantages.

If our trading partners are permitted under GATT to rebate upon ex-
portation the entire indirect tax burden normally borne by the product within
the country, so can we. If they are permitted to impose upon imports the same
indirect tax burden applicable to products produced within the country, so can
we.

As a step toward achieving this end and of improving our balance of
payments, we urge:

(1) Exports from the U. S. carry no greater domestic tax burden into international trade than do the exports of our principal trading partners.

(2) Imports into the U. S. bear no less of a share of the indirect domestic tax burden than products manufactured in this country.

(3) U. S. exporters have the benefit of every appropriate form of incentive and assistance, tax or otherwise, for improving their competitive position in world markets.

-4-

The failure to adopt such measures will further weaken our competitive position in world trade, further undermine our balance of trade and balance of payments position, and seriously threaten the future of trade liberalization.

## II. Fair and Orderly Competition from Expanding Imports

Our workers and industries should be assured against unfair competition from imports that are dumped, subsidized, or obtain any other unfair advantage as a result of illegal trade practices. We therefore must vigorously enforce our laws designed to prevent such unfair practices.

In a time of expanding markets here and abroad, there is no reason why imports cannot be expanded on an orderly basis. Where sectors of labor, agriculture, or industry are threatened by disruptive and injurious import competition, we should seek prompt cooperative action from our trading partners to assure an orderly growth of imports. Failing such cooperation we must be prepared to take such further steps as may be necessary to prevent serious injury to sectors of labor or industry resulting from excessive imports.

Finally, where imports are affecting only a limited number of workers or businesses, and adjustment is feasible, liberalized adjustment assistance should be provided. A parallel liberalization of the "escape clause" should be made.

In order to ensure fair and orderly competition in trade the government should:

(1) Vigorously enforce our antidumping, countervailing duty, and antitrust laws to prevent unfair competition from imports that are dumped, subsidized, or otherwise obtain an advantage as a result of unfair trade practices.

(2) Seek prompt cooperative action from our trading partners to assure a fair and orderly expansion of import competition in sectors of agriculture and industry threatened by disruptive and injurious import competition.

(3) Provide for liberalization of adjustment assistance to workers and industries to facilitate adjustment to increased imports, and liberalization of the "escape clause" to prevent serious injury resulting from trade agreements.

If the nations of the world are to thrive and prosper in trade with one another, it is important that fair competition and equal access prevail in the

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world marketplace. It is no less essential that safeguards be maintained to prevent disruptive and injurious effects on the economy of this nation or any nation.

The peoples of the world will continue to reap the benefits of liberalized trade so long as each step in the process of reciprocal concessions ensures opportunity to all and advantage to none. We must be honest and we must be wise in avoiding inequity and injury, neither of which any nation will long endure in any substantial measure.

International investment, along with the rise of trade, has been the dominant force for growth and prosperity in the world during the past several decades. American business has been the leader in international investment.

We must not permit a policy of monetary expediency to impede the enterprise and resources which have so vital a role to play in the pursuit of peace and human fulfillment in the world. We must also preserve a clear view that the business activities of Americans abroad are indispensable to the economic well-being of all Americans.

MEMORANDUM

To: Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.
From: John K. Gerhart

September 3, 1968

1. Vietnam

(a) How do we break the stalemate in Paris?

The frustration of our United States delegates in Paris must be very severe because it is apparent that they have no real cards to play under our present political directive. It seems to me incomprehensible that we are willing to sustain organized rocket attacks on Saigon (as opposed to sporadic guerilla attacks) without doing anything in return.

I believe that one way to break the stalemate would be to change our national policy so as to permit Harriman to tell the North Vietnamese that following the next such attack they pull off against Saigon or other major South Vietnamese city we will counter by comparable attacks, less than we are capable of mounting, on the major cities of the North; that if these organized attacks by the North Vietnamese are repeated particularly against the capital city, Saigon, we will escalate further the intensity of our reciprocal attacks against Hanoi and Haiphong.

(c) Is the Administration realistic when it talks about turning over the defense of the country to the South Vietnamese?

I believe that the defense of the country by completely modernized South Vietnamese forces is feasible once the North Vietnamese have either been pushed out of South Vietnam or have withdrawn North of the demilitarized zone provided it is clear to the North Vietnamese that any further aggression in the South will be met by U.S. assistance to the South Vietnamese in terms of massive U.S. naval and air power support. I believe that naval and air power, properly used, would obviate the necessity for reintroduction of large U.S. ground forces. In my view, turning over the defense to the South Vietnamese is certainly not realistic today as long as large elements of the North Vietnamese forces are present in South Vietnam.

2. Johnson-Humphrey-McNamara Team

I believe the greatest military blunder of this Administration has to do with the deferment or suppression of programs in which technological advance was a key issue. We have the capability of closing the technological gap and surpassing the Russians in this respect if we were to expand our research and development efforts vigorously across the board. Allied to the above is another blunder which is allowing many important decisions to be made by systems analysis people at a low level often in complete disregard for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. <u>National Security Council.</u>

I have written to you about this problem before and I firmly
believe that a more formalized machinery capable of reacting on short
notice must be available to the Chief Executive in his decision making
process.

4. <u>Joint Chiefs of Staff</u>

I do not believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept is outdated,
but I do believe that the Administration has disregarded its advice on
many important issues and has prevented the advice of the Joint Chiefs
from being heard at high levels in the Executive Department and in the
Congress. There is really no forum today for the military, either as
Joint Chiefs of Staff or separate Service chiefs, to air their views
honestly before the Congress.

5. <u>ABM Defense System</u>

I do not believe that the NIKE Zeus-Sentinel system of terminal
defense against ballistic missiles is worth the price of a full defense
system aimed at both China and the U.S.S.R. In addition to the huge cost
to bring it into operation, we now have the new problem of the use of such
a system armed with nuclear warheads completely negating the effective
launching of our own strategic missiles. The Air Force has always contended
that better systems are available and one that is belatedly receiving some
attention from DDR&E is the LWIR (long-wave infrared) which is a non-nuclear
homing missile that is designed to kill an incoming missile at mid-course
in its trajectory rather than in the terminal phase. Predicted accuracies
for such a missile, which I understand can discriminate against decoys,
is from 10 to 50 feet. Mid-course interception is one of the projects that
has been suppressed for many years through the simple medium of non-allocation
of R&D funds by DOD.

6. <u>Veterans</u>

I think the best way we can enlist the active support of the
veterans is by coming out loud and clear for a strong America. This not
only means a strong and integrated military strength, but the political
strength along with it that will permit the proper use of military force
in the achievement of National goals.

7. <u>NATO</u>

I would like to defer discussion of this question until I return
from Europe because I think I may have some more important things to say
than I have now.

Page Two

## 8. D.O.D.

I believe that the DOD under McNamara and now Clark Clifford is manageable provided the huge budget is maintained to keep all these people in business. The unmanageable part of the bureaucracy that I referred to earlier is the delegation of decision to echelons where military advice and even advice from other agencies in the DOD goes unheeded. As an example, I was told today that the chief decision maker determining the composition of our U.S. air defenses is an Army first lieutenant of a few years back, who has now reached the venerable age of 30 and who has two assistants about the same age. These three gentlemen are decision makers on the type and amount of defenses we should have in this country. In the last Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM), as an example, 20 out of the 26 highest priority items for strategic-defensive forces recommended to the Secretary of Defense by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force were either deferred or turned down. This is truly unheeded advice.

## 9. Missile Gap

The answer to this question depends on the definition of a missile gap. It is true that the USSR has at the moment some 300 more ICBMs than predicted for this time period by the NIE. Regardless of a megatonage gap, which used to be the rule of thumb for most people and still is by a few, is not so important as a possible technological gap. Our aim should be to establish and maintain the most sophisticated nuclear deterrent possible through the use of advancing technology rather than by numbers of missiles or megatonage. There should be no such thing as parity if we are constantly pursuing and achieving the ultimate in technological refinement.

## 10. TFX

I think this question is poorly stated in that I do not believe damage per se has been done by the F-111. It is and will be a tactical fighter advanced beyond the current inventory but probably will not show as much advancement when fully operational as we might desire. The FB-111 is certainly not the answer as a follow-on to the B-52. I would say that we very definitely need a follow-on bomber to the B-52. Offensive and defensive air forces must be considered together as our deterrent force. We also have a very serious need for an advanced interceptor such as the F-12 instead of a patched up F-106X to perform the vital role of policing our air space.

## 11. Naval Power

No comment at this time.

## 12. Draft

I do not believe that a voluntary Army would ever work.

Page Three

13. <u>Conventional Forces</u>

The answer to this question seems dependent on whether we are talking about our Reserve and National Guard programs in terms of a general war situation or a contingency situation such as Vietnam. With one contingency in being now, we cannot meet our NATO commitments. With a concurrent contingency in some other part of the world, our over-all commitments might demand the call-up of Reserve and National Guard pro- grams. To answer specifically, they are adequate for a general war posture but insufficient for less than general war contingencies together with our treaty obligations throughout the world.

14. <u>Russia</u>

Most certainly Russia is the prime support of the North Vietnamese. The problem of how to stop the flow of Soviet supplies is a political question. If political decision to stop this flow of supplies is made, it can be stopped militarily without any question. There might, however, be political deals acceptable to both sides that would be far better than the application of military force.

15. <u>China</u>

In determining whether China is a present day military threat, one must define what kind of a threat. There is always a "threat" of Chinese intervention in the Vietnam situation which is not insurmountable provided we use military power as it should be used, including the use of selected nuclear weapons, if necessary. If we are speaking of China as a direct threat to the United States, as of today the answer is "No." Here again, some kind of an agreement with Russia, particularly with regard to spheres of influence, might serve to end run China as a threat to both East and West.

16. <u>Budget</u>

The most glaring deficiency in our present military budget is due to long standing restrictions imposed upon the proper use of our power in Vietnam, such as sanctuaries, restrictions on bombing in other ways, fruitless negotiations in Paris, mounting loss of American lives, and requirement for a huge ground force in Vietnam. If our forces had been used properly instead of the use brought about by political restraints, which are causing us to fight a defensive land operation in Vietnam, this war might have been brought to a close several years ago. We are expending, about two billion dollars a month in maintaining our operational forces in the area which could be used to buy all of the modernized forces we need as a Nation.

17. <u>Strategic Power</u>

I think this question has been covered in other answers.

Page Four

18. <u>Allies</u>

I think we could do no more to pursuade our allies to support
our world efforts for world peace and stability, than to bring the Vietnam
war to a close in a way favorable to the cause of the free world.

19. Military Assistance

The worst thing about our military assistance program today
centers around the efforts of McNamara to enforce his own military strategy
on our allies, NATO, SEATO, etc. by providing equipment such as the F-5
airplane, as an example, to nations based on their financial capability
to support. In other words, a directive which says, "Let us see your books
and we'll tell you what kind of equipment you can have and what kind of
military strategy you should pursue."

20. Mid-East

No comment at the moment.

21. The Pueblo

I do not have enough facts at hand to make any judgment in the
case of the Pueblo. I would surmise, however, that the first screwup was
with the Navy itself. If more forceful action had been taken by the Captain
of the Pueblo, the United States might have had a better basis for action
after the fact. In other words, "Damn the torpedos, full speed ahead!"

Page Five

CONFIDENTIAL

September 2, 1968

1. <u>Vietnam</u>

We break the stalemate by persuading the
Reds that:

(1) We are not going to acquiesce further in diminishing the bombing in North Vietnam unless we see clear and substantial evidence of de-escalation on their part.

and
(2) Our patience has finite limits;

(3) Our military capabilities with
respect to Hai-phong and Hanoi will be exploited without
restraint unless we see some definitive action on their
part.

(NOTE: Our persuasiveness in this regard will be enhanced greatly if we convey our message privately to the North Vietnamese and by one of the usual intermediaries. It will be enhanced further if we make the essential military preparations for reinstituting a powerful air attack on North Vietnam and to establish a blockade of Hai-phong. The enemy will get the word.)

(b) What military steps should we take if the
stalemate continues?

This is answered above. It is essential,
however, that the matter of time be underscored, since
each day of indecision is accompanied by more U. S.
casualties.

(c) Is the Administration realistic when it
talks about turning the defense of the country over to
the South Vietnamese?

As of today - definitely not. The enemy,
by virtue of our bombing reduction, by virtue of the great

CONFIDENTIAL

September 2, 1968

and growing support provided by the USSR and by virtue
of the increased infiltration, is far too strong to be
contained by the South Vietnamese. If, however, all of
the North Vietnamese forces were withdrawn from South
Vietnam and if the material support which the North
Vietnamese now provide were greatly diminished, the
South Vietnamese military could cope with the residual
insurgent forces.

This is a long way off. However, were we to behave
resolutely, leaving no doubt in the Communists' minds
that we will not abandon our role, I do see them dimin-
ishing their physical presence - withdrawing organized
units on a quid pro quo basis, much as was done follow-
ing the main Panmunjom deliberations. It is not likely
that we should even be able to induce the Reds completely
to cease their material support for the insurgency. We
can, however, by sheer military pressure now, and the
threat of it later, cause a major diminution of the flow,
and thus hasten the day when the South Vietnamese can
carry the bulk of the load.

Concurrently, we shall have to turn our efforts to build-
ing up those elements of the South Vietnamese military and
para-military strength which will be needed to manage the
residual problem. I speak of the National Police, the
Police Field Forces, the Regional (Provincial) Forces,
and the Popular (District) Forces.

This we have done most inadequately up to now, giving
these less exotic forces mostly lip service, while em-
phasizing excessively the creation of regular military
forces in our own image.

Military blunders:

The real defect of this team, where our
military security is concerned, is a derivative of the
LBJ personality itself. He is a consensus man. Before
making decisions, he seeks to acquire a consensus of all
the views which may have even remote political impact.
The result of all this has been an incredible wastage of
time and an appalling sacrifice of military opportunity.

CONFIDENTIAL

September 2, 1968

Here are some examples; none secret; all in the public
domain.

By the time he authorized attacks on the North Vietnamese
oil storage, it was largely dispersed underground, and a
major military opportunity was thus lost.

By the time the consensus validated a decision to attack
the North Vietnamese power supplies, they, too, were
largely dispersed.

By the time the consensus approved our firing artillery
across the DMZ and naval gunfire into the coastal routes
of North Vietnam, alternate routes had been developed,
and the enemy DMZ positions were heavily fortified.

By the time the President got around to authorizing the
use of tear gas, the enemy had gas masks.

By the time he authorized reactivation of the battleship
New Jersey, we had lost over a year.

By the time he authorized the limited bombing of the
Hanoi waterfront and the Red River bridges, the enemy
antiaircraft system was as sophisticated as any in the
Communist world.

It is a melancholy certainty that had we been permitted
at the outset to do those things the military ultimately
got authority to do, the war would be over.

All told, the military story of Vietnam is a picture of
frustration at the shooting end caused by a wholly politi-
cal approach at the Washington end; one which fails to per-
ceive the realities of dealing with the Communists.

These are the realities of the Johnson team with respect
to Vietnam. He has tried to run the war the way he ran
the Senate. There, when he had an antagonist, he handled
him by putting a small obstacle in his path. If the ob-
stacle proved ineffective, he increased its magnitude.
Finally, the antagonist got the word, realized that LBJ
intended slowly to escalate until he had his way.

This system does not work with Communists. It is like two
poker players, each with a big bank roll, trying to face one

CONFIDENTIAL

September 2, 1968

another down. Each time LBJ put another little chip on the table, he found the Reds willing and able to call him or raise him; and this they have done.

Finally, the Johnson team has insisted on trying to fight the war with the same conventional tools and formulae as we fought World War II and Korea. They have given little more than lip service to the reality that both the battlefield and the ultimate objective in this war are the Vietnamese population itself. Read the Chicago-Tribune magazine section article attached. It levies a legitimate indictment against the administration's reactionary performance where Communist insurgent war is concerned.

### 3. The National Security Council

The National Security Council is not performing the function envisioned for it by the architects of the National Security Act of 1947. Every major crisis, from Cuba to Vietnam, has called into being ad hoc type task forces which have cut across organizational lines and have failed to exploit the inherent strength of the National Security Council. This is a derivative, again, of personality, and has nothing whatever to do with the basic soundness of the National Security Council system. It embodies the right people. It is sound in concept. It does not need reorganization. It simply needs activation.

### 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concept is not outdated, but it is in disarray for a multitude of converging reasons, - all bad. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are, by law, the principal military advisors to the President. They have not been so employed. Under the Johnson-McNamara regime, in particular, their function has been usurped by three entities:

a. By the Secretary of Defense, who, as a matter of habit, has conveyed military advice to the President in terms often contrary to the previous counsel which he has received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nor has the JCS been consulted, in their military fields, by the President, except on the rarest of occasions.

4.

CONFIDENTIAL

September 2, 1968

To complicate matters further, the JCS themselves have failed to exploit the strength of the National Security Act by requesting sessions with the President, as they may rightfully and lawfully do.

b. By the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. - There is nothing in law which establishes the Chairman of the JCS as the sole and vested representative of the Chiefs as a corporate group. He is charged by the National Security Act to set the agenda for the JCS discussions and to manage their deliberations. He has, in fact, gone beyond this, arrogating to himself the position of the outward voice of the JCS, representing them in the office of the Secretary of Defense, and on most occasions, at the White House. The JCS themselves are to blame for this. Showing unified strength, they could quickly put the Chairman in his rightful place. However, with powerful, able personalities such as Maxwell Taylor and Earle Wheeler in the job, the power has consistently flowed away from the Chiefs.

c. By special advisors such as Walt Rostow, McGeorge Bundy, and Maxwell Taylor. - These are powerful people, possessed of much experience, strong convictions, and considerable impatience. Often, while the JCS has deliberated, men such as these have moved quickly to their own conclusions, proferred their advice, and exerted great influence on military affairs.

What needs to be done? First and foremost, the President needs to rely on the JCS as his principal military advisors, as contemplated in the law. If he leans on them for counsel, he will get it.

Second, there needs to be a complete review of what the JCS should do as a corporate group, and what the individual military services should be permitted to do. Right now, the JCS is swamped with meaningless minutiae, matters which are largely the responsibility of the Army, the Navy or the Air Force.

The statutory task of the JCS is the "strategic direction of the Armed Forces" - not the design of military night sticks or the creation of directives respecting the collection of garbage on military reservations.

5

CONFIDENTIAL

September 2, 1968

What is needed here, just as with the National Security Council, is a reversion to the law, and a decent application of its provisions.

7. NATO

NATO and SEATO have not outlived their usefulness. Involving, as they do, sovereign nations, whose aspirations and resources vary widely, we cannot expect neat, symmetrical solutions, always fulfilling our own specific desires.

These pacts are more than the mechanisms of subsidy. They provide a precious opportunity for the exchange of views and the airing of regional realities.

NATO was never intended to guarantee the security and freedom of Western Europe. It was conceived as one of several convergent mechanisms which, together, might provide that security. A sincere, non-cynical, and open-handed approach to these regional pacts will repay us handsomely.

8. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Yes, the Department of Defense is an unmanageable bureaucracy. When Jim Forrestal testified in 1946 that the Office of the Secretary of Defense would probably not exceed 100 people, I am sure he was sincere. Certainly he could not have contemplated the almost incredible patchwork involving at least 35,000 people, and possessing, in the aggregate, an economic power which exceeds any other similar influence in our country.

Flying squarely in the face of Parkinson, I believe what is needed, where DOD is concerned, is a Hoover Commission form of examination, taking its first departure from the almost unthinkable question, "What is the DOD doing today that does not need to be done at all?"

11. NAVAL POWER

This question concerning the adequacy of our anti-submarine program, nuclear ships, etc., must be answered

6

CONFIDENTIAL

September 2, 1968

in the overall context of how we go about guaranteeing
a viable military posture.

Let me begin by saying that there is little profit and
less wisdom to be found in attempting to match our enemies
in mass armies. We can never make it. The legions of
marching bayonets, World War I style, are not the secret
to military strength for us. The Communists have too great
an advantage in this area. Rather, our virtue lies in
technology, in exploiting our areas of natural strength,
which resides largely in the sea.

No, we are not putting enough emphasis on comprehensive
sea power. This is the area where the enemy cannot match
us, the area where we still have a considerable advantage.

Even at the expense of something like space research, we
need to be more emphatic in our development of sea power.

12. The Draft

It is not a question of whether we should have
the draft or a voluntary Army. Our form of government
cannot survive in its natural image if we eschew com-
pletely the voluntary service idea.

At the same time, we cannot satisfy our military manpower
needs by voluntary means alone. Accordingly, what we want
is universal military service, of a form which accords
some benefit to those who elect to volunteer for a longer
period. I envision universal military service for an
eighteen-month or two-year period, with a follow-on obliga-
tory Reserve or National Guard period. In addition to giv-
ing our young manhood some discipline, such a scheme pro-
vides the fabric for our reserve forces. If, in addition,
a man is freed from his reserve obligation if he elects to
volunteer for a four-year regular hitch, we add stability
to our regular establishment, while rewarding the volunteer.

14. Russia

Yes, it is a fact that Russia is providing the
prime support for the North Vietnamese. She is doing so,
of course, because of the opportunity it offers to bleed

CONFIDENTIAL

September 2, 1968

us. She knows that a nation can be beggared and hurt
vitally by a procession of strength-sapping little wars,
quite as readily as by a single dramatic large one, and
is bent on giving us just that treatment in Vietnam.

Yes, our policy does need revision to give it the semblance
of genuine resolution on our part, to persuade the Russians
that there is a finite limit to the blood and treasure drain
we will tolerate.

15. <u>China</u>

China is a military threat. It will not be many
years before there will be a billion people in China. There
are no prospects in the field of agronomy which would sug-
gest that she can be self-sufficient in food.

So she has to expand. And she is prepared to do so by
violence, if necessary.

There is no need to rationalize the spectre of China in
possession of a nuclear weapon. The temptation for black-
mail, where Japan and India are concerned, are all too
obvious. Nor can China's internal weaknesses be regarded
as sufficient to dissuade her from such blackmail. It
could be that they even make it more likely.

How do we meet the threat? We meet it by exhibitions
of strength, not weakness; by visible evidence that we
are determined not to temporize.

Had we been strong, - overwhelmingly strong - at the outset
of the Vietnam affair, China would have understood and
would have been sobered. Had we taken powerful action
against North Korea incident to the Pueblo seizure, China
would have understood. But we did neither of these things,
and China's interpretation is that we do not have the de-
termination to stand up for the things we believe.

16. Budget

The military budget is a product of a wrong
attitude. The military services are permitted to pursue
almost every program they desire, but they are limited by
dollars in the depth to which they may pursue them.

8

CONFIDENTIAL

September 2, 1968

Put another way, their programs, great or small, critical or unimportant, are restricted by fiscal limitations, with the aggregate held within a stipulated figure.

The result is that projects which are central to the survival of our country often suffer restraints comparable to those imposed on projects of marginal need.

What is required is a mandatory program which distills out those programs which can be sacrificed entirely, because of new systems or new technology.

Here is an example of what I mean. — The advent of the helicopter, with its considerable aggregate load carrying capacity, should have made it possible to do without a large number of trucks, but that is not the way it works. We end up today with both helicopters and more — not fewer — trucks.

## 17. Strategic Power

I would make only one comment with respect to strategic power. It is this. — Strategic power is represented by more than hardware. It is, in no small measure, a state of mind. In the past few years we have — or so it seems to me — actually worked to create a state of mind on the part of our enemies which assures them that however strong we are, we do not have the courage to use our strength. There is no other explanation for Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, the Pueblo, etc.

Let there be no doubt, we have a respectable arsenal today, but we just do not have the credibility to go with it.

## 19. Military Assistance

There is just one thing fundamentally wrong with our Military Assistance Program. We turn the hardware over to our allies too soon. We do not monitor or ration it out in a manner which gives us influence over what they do. The power to feed is the power to starve, and we do not exploit that reality.

CONFIDENTIAL

September 2, 1968

21. The Pueblo

I will not go into the melancholy story of
why we let the Pueblo be hazarded and captured in the
first place. I am sure it is well known to you.

The reason we did not take more forceful action is part
and parcel of the whole decision-making system in our
government today.

By the time the bitter Pueblo pill was swallowed by the
Administration, and passed laboriously through the peri-
stalsis of the colon of consensus, it was too late.

What could we have done? I will tell you and I hope it
does not shock you. We could have made plain to the
North Koreans, via a score of dependable channels, that
they had just 12 hours in which to release crew and ship,
and that their failure to do so would bring them unmiti-
gated disaster. If they failed to react, we should have
destroyed a city - such as Hungnam or Hamhung; - and
given them 12 hours more, with the implicit assurance
that Pyongyang was next.

They would have released the ship.

Mao Tse-tung would have taken notice.

So would aggressors everywhere.

These are tough words, but they are still the answer,
given the situation in which we found ourselves.

Gen. John K. Gerhart, USAF (Ret.) - Encl. 9/23/68

An Overview of NATO, September 1968

Until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in late August, the NATO organization had been the victim of a confluence of various political tides and policy undercurrents that left it weakened, confused, without direction and without the strong, positive leadership of the US that is essential to its success. The predominant influencing factors of decay were: 1) A growing confusion and uncertainty among our Allies as to the real US intentions and interest regarding NATO; 2) A series of national flirtations with "detente", spearheaded by the French, but subscribed to in some hopeful degree by all NATO nations; and 3) Actions by nations of an intensely fiscal or nationalistic orientation that weakened the integrated political image and the integrated military posture of NATO; actions which could, in time, destroy it. This latter malady is normally illustrated by pointing to the French example, but it applies in some measure to all of the Allies - including the U.S.

Whether the provocation of recent Soviet actions will be sufficiently strong and lasting to reverse this erosion of NATO's integrity remains to be seen. It is already evident that proponents of "detente" and of diminished military programs in NATO are rationalizing the Soviet moves into Czechoslovakia as merely internal Communist police actions, of no real interest or threat to NATO. They are pressing for no change in NATO's posture or future plans that might jeopardize the long term prospects for detente, balanced force reductions, the nuclear proliferation treaty, US force withdrawals from Europe, or other such schemes that ignore the harsh realities of Soviet military power, or the vastly increased threat to NATO posed by the presence of first line Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia and in the Mediterranean area.

What should we do to protect US (and NATO) interests in Europe:

1. Admit the threat is real. Face up to the truth about our own (and NATO's) posture and the Soviet/Communist threat in Europe, and elsewhere. Quit "developing" our own combat capabilities and degrading those of the Communist nations by revising "analyses" to coincide with political trends.

2. Re-establish our integrity and credibility - say what we mean and mean what we say. Stop making "fuzzy" statements concerning our plans and intentions regarding US participation in NATO; make our statements concerning our force contributions to the Alliance, our deployments to Allied Command Europe and our dedication to NATO positive and unequivocal. In other words - really "join" NATO and exercise the role of a strong leader.

3. Do not permit fiscal considerations to defeat an essential forward defense posture. Recognize that defenses in Europe are required and do not come cheaply.

4. Correct military weaknesses. Bring the forces we have deployed in Europe up to a truly combat ready status; quit actions designed to reduce forces in Europe unless there is real justification.

5. Re-establish superiority; eliminate gaps in our military capability. Increase the capability of our total force to regain strategic offensive and defensive superiority over the Soviet Union; improve and modernize our force capabilities in Europe to fill gaps in our deterrent posture - insist on a credible capability at each level of potential conflict.

6. Quit dictating Allied force structure. Help our Allies by sharing our military technology, training and development potential; but do so without insisting that they conform to our desires regarding their internal force structure, posture, and domestic policies.

7. Restore military responsibility. Restore practical control of implementing military measures to our military authorities.

8. Share the load with our Allies. When we have set a course to put our own house in order - insist that our Allies do their share of all of the above.

## Some Specific Deficiencies in US Air Forces in Europe versus Soviet Air Forces in the Eastern Bloc Countries

The USSR has achieved a state of maximum readiness in the forward areas. The Soviet Air Army in East Germany must now be considered as absolute tops in any language.

It would appear that they have applied all the lessons learned in the Israeli-Arab conflict to their own airfields in East Germany. These airfields, which only a year ago revealed aircraft parked wing tip to wing tip, now have extensive dispersal facilities as well as hardening of dispersed sites by concrete revetments. It is reliably reported that almost 90% of airfields in East Germany are so equipped.

In addition to passive defense measures, the level of anti-aircraft defenses, particularly against low flying aircraft, is very great. They are introducing some of their most modern weapons including new surface-to-air missiles.

In accomplishing the above they seem to be taking a page out of the US air war against North Vietnam wherein the North Vietnamese are using massive anti-aircraft defenses to good advantage.

They are training their pilots in dual missions, both air defense and attack. The Soviet aircraft in the forward area are among the best and they have very good dual mission capabilities.

Why are they doing all this? The steps being taken by the Soviets are obviously aimed at establishing a high degree of readiness to conduct a sustained conventional war. Is West Berlin a possible objective? Many think so. The NATO alternate strategies in MC/3 plus the pullout of France may well have convinced them that NATO would never escalate to the nuclear level, particularly when looking down the nuclear gun barrel possessed by the Soviets in their IRBM/MRBM fleet against which NATO has no counterpart.

How do US Air Forces in Europe look against this sobering backdrop?

We have roughly 400 aircraft to put up against almost 1100 Soviet aircraft in the forward areas only. We are not dispersed. We have shut down bases that could be used for this purpose. We cannot fill all cockpits available because of a shortage of pilots. We are just now beginning a small hardening and dispersal program after four years of trying to get a program started (17 million in FY 1968 & 69). War readiness materiel and POL are at low levels.

If we were forced by political restraints to fight a conventional air war against the Soviets with today's readiness, my estimate is that we would be out of business in three to four days. Without dispersed and hardened forward bases all equipped with adequate personnel, aircraft, munitions, POL, etc., the chances of putting up a fight even with US based forces deployed are exceedingly slim.

GEORGE W. ANDERSON

1629 K Street, N. W.
Suite 500
Washington, D. C.
20006

September 12, 1968

Hon. Franklin Lincoln, Jr.
20 Broad Street
New York, New York 10005

Dear Frank:

I just received your note of the 11th. Unfortunately, I will be leaving New York for Europe and Africa on 16 September, and by present plans, will not return until 1 November. Hence, time is running out on my ability to be of immediate assistance.

I believe that in my "chicken scratches" to you I have contri-
buted my most important thoughts which in summary form are:

(a) The necessity to use effectively the National Security Council to bring foreign, military, and fiscal policy in harmony.

(b) The necessity to restore the posture and effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(c) The need for thorough re-examination, re-appraisal, and re-evaluation of a basic national security policy.

(d) The necessity to have our allies "pull their weight in the boat" on a concept of collectively balanced forces.

(e) The necessity to make rapid progress for the restoration of qualitative superiority in aircraft, weapons, ships, and equipment vis a vis the U. S. S. R.

(f) With a firm concept of civilian control streamline the Department of Defense to provide positive policy direction and decentralized management of the military departments and agencies.

I must say that the problems are tremendous and complex because
of the terrific escalation of costs of everything, the backlog of unfilled
requirements, and the bow wave of commitments to the point that there is a
serious question as to whether or not the United States has in fact priced
itself out of its prevailing policies. President Eisenhower took a "New
Look." Dick will have to take a "HARD Look."

GWA:lgw

THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY • 810 18th STREET, N.W. • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

Telephone (202) 783-7950

31 July 1968

Dear Frank:

I appreciate your letter of 30 July, and I shall give you a very quick answer off the top of my head, for I expect to leave for Sweden in a couple of hours. I will be back in the latter part of August which may be too late for the meeting that Dick expects to hold with the Military Advisory Committee.

I would like to give you the subjects which I discussed with the Platform Committee in Washington last week. They may be of some help to you.

I am concerned about:

1) Our dependence on allies to take the lead in matters which are of great interest to the United States. Allies are wonderful, but they are also properly primarily interested in matters which affect themselves. We are the most powerful nation in the world, and unless we are willing to step out and proclaim our objectives, we cannot certainly expect one of our weaker allies to carry the flag. We have a tendency to want to hide in the crowd. Allies will frequently help us, but if they do, it will be gravy. Many times they will not, as they are not helping much in Vietnam. Whether they help or not will be dependent upon, first, their own interests, and second, upon the terms of each particular treaty. In any case it is much too much to expect them to take the lead in matters of great interest to the United States. We must do it and act like a great nation.

2) We have an apparent lack of objectives, priorities, and allocation of resources. When I was in the Far East recently the second question of each important official was: what will the United States do. Of course I didn't know, because I didn't know the

## EXECUTIVE BOARD

* Arleigh Burke, Director of the Center

* David M. Abshire, Executive Secretary
Karl R. Bendetsen
Chairman, Advisory Board

James B. Horigan, S.J.

Arthur Krock

Morris I. Leibman

Philip E. Mosely

C. E. Straight

Matt S. Szymczak

Arthur G. Trudeau

## COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH
1968

Henry W. Briefs

*Sevinc Carlson

Karl H. Cerny

*Alvin J. Cottrell

Jules Davids

Siegfried Garbuny

*Gordon D. Gayle

*James H. McBride

Hisham B. Sharabi

*Cornelius D. Sullivan

*Richard J. Whalen
Writer-in-Residence

*M. Jon Vondracek
Communications

## ASSOCIATES

Richard V. Allen

James D. Atkinson

Norman A. Bailey

Frank R. Brandenburg

Samuel F. Clabaugh

Robert D. Crane

Eleanor L. Dulles

George Fielding Eliot

Kenneth O. Gilmore

Anthony Harrigan

Robert A. Kilmarx

Jeremiah O'Leary

Stefan T. Possony

Frank N. Trager

Peter C. White

## ADVISORY BOARD

KARL R. BENDETSEN,
Chairman

ROBERT B. ANDERSON

FRANK R. BARNETT

KENNETH E. BELJEU

DONALD C. BURNHAM

PETER H. DOMINICK

JOSEPH S. FARLAND

GERALD R. FORD

FRANK N. IKARD

KURT L. LONDON

NEIL H. MCEILROY

CLAIBORNE PELL

ARTHUR W. RADFORD

ROBERT B. SEMPLE

NATHAN F. TWINING

RICHARD L. WALKER

JOHN C. WARNER

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI

*In Residence

- 2 -

objectives. We have involved the United States in many
matters which should not be of high priority and which take
resources which should be allocated to things of high priority.
This has not been done maliciously, but has been done because
there is no understanding of what comes first and how is it
going to be paid for, and what means are we going to use to
do it.

3) Our research and development, especially in the Department of Defense, has not produced new weapons or countered the weapons systems which are being developed by the communists. This isn't a question of money. We have spent a tremendous amount of money. Unfortunately we have spent a great deal of money on quick research to obtain a quick answer on things which would have cost a lot less if the research had been done before when it should have. We have paid high premiums for emergency research which became necessary because we failed to conduct the research when we should have. This is bad, but the worst thing is the lack of innovation within the Department of Defense and from industry. There is tight control in the Department of Defense on research which, because it is improperly applied, has stifled the ideas coming up. Unless the idea originates at the top it has a very poor chance of being accepted by the top. Industry submits many fewer unsolicited proposals than they used to for a variety of reasons, one of which is submitting one company's idea to all of the companies for competitive bidding.

4) Our nuclear superiority which had kept the peace is in jeopardy. Many of our people are strong for disarmament without safeguards to our security. We have a tendency to give away our present physical advantages such as the superiority in nuclear weapons, to gain the nebulous goodwill of an enemy which has demonstrated very little goodwill. Some people are trying to get numerical nuclear parity in the hopes that when this parity has been achieved, the communists will stop their efforts to achieve superiority. I think the risk in this is extremely high, especially since we have not insisted upon inspection but instead depend on the word of the commu-nists. They have not proved reliable. We have a great tendency in this country to bargain our real things away for abstract promises. We did this in Korea; we are now doing it in Vietnam by stopping the bombing on half-baked promises of negotiations, which has not been to the advantage of the United States nor has it been so far successful.

- 3 -

5) The Soviets are going to sea with a good plan, with a good program, with good objectives for their purposes. They have developed over the last twenty years a superior fishing fleet, a superior merchant marine, and superior oceanographic research. These are a good solid base upon which to develop seapower. At the beginning they depended upon submarines to deny us control of the sea without any expectation that they themselves could gain control of the sea. That strategy is obviously in the process of being changed. They are now developing not only excellent new submarines but also efficient surface fleets which they are using skillfully. They have challenged our presence in the Mediterranean, and I think that the presence of their ships in the Med and their willingness to use their ships may deter us from taking action in the Med. I think they will do the same thing around the Middle East, and I dread the decision of the United States if the Soviets ever put one lone ship in a troublesome area and challenge us to take any action at all which might result in a direct confrontation between the Soviet Navy and ours.

I think the Soviets will not try to force a direct military confrontation, but I think what they are doing now is to gain great political and economic advantages by the skillful use of their Navy to support their fishing and merchant fleets and economic strategy in various parts of the world, especially in the Indian Ocean and in the Middle East. While our maritime power is dying, theirs is growing rapidly. We seem to have very little appreciation of the tremendously different effects of our geographic position and that of the Soviet Union.

6) Our military departments are controlled primarily by lay people without experience. This control by glib, articulate laymen with preconceived theoretical conclusions and without any practical experience whatever in either combat or strategy, not only delays decisions but frequently causes improper decisions. Civilian control of the military is necessary and good, but that doesn't mean that every little civilian in the Department of Defense should exercise control over every military decision. What is needed is control over policy by civilians, and nothing more.

7) It is quite obvious from many actions which have occurred in the last few years that we have had no plans on what to do if "the chosen alternative fails." I do believe

- 4 -

that various alternatives are discussed before a decision
is made. I don't know whether or not they are discussed
enough, but I also believe that once an alternative is
chosen it is rigidly followed without any plan on what
to do if it goes wrong--and they have frequently gone wrong.

8) We are the most wishful-thinking people in the world. We place great reliance on hope and Soviet goodwill. We always oversell our achievements, and sometimes we misrepresent what has happened as an achievement when that is not actually so. We ignore the disadvantages. We do not analyze our problems objectively even in the closed councils. It also seems that we operate on the myth that the United States is always smart and powerful and that our enemies are weak and stupid. We on the one hand dread to take action ourselves and thereby do not stand up like a man, and on the other hand we depreciate the gains made by the enemy and thereby lose some respect in the eyes of the bystander.

9) The United States is filled full of guilt complexes, and one of them is on the use of power. We do everything we possibly can to avoid the use of power, whether it is military power, economic power, political power, or whatever, apparently in the belief that the use of power is always bad. Our power can be used for good, and since I think the United States has done more for humanity than any other country in history and that the United States system is the best that has been developed, we should use our power for our own interests, which will be good for humanity if we do in the future what we have done in the past.

The first question that was asked by every important official in Asia that I saw was: what about the PUEBLO. We failed to exercise our power at all, and we not only lost a great deal of respect of other nations, but we also have caused those other nations to question whether we know where we are going or how we intend to get there.

10) Our strategy in the last few years, particularly our military strategy, has been very bad. We wait until a situation gets desperate, and then our only cure it to send in massive numbers of troops to make a great big show, but at the same time with built-in restraints to keep those troops from accomplishing what they were probably sent in for. We hope that by the threat we will achieve our purposes, and

- 5 -

since by our demonstrated actions we have caused other nations to believe that we will not carry out the threat, we waste our effort and lots and lots of lives and money. When it comes time for the United States to take military action we should hit hard, fast, and effectively in enemy territory and then pull out, with the understanding that our local allies will handle local situations.

11) Akin to this is the psychologically barren concept of gradualism which we have been following. This has failed in history before and it has failed now. It is built on a theory that takes no account of anything but material matters. As I have said before, a strategy is dependent upon a military capability (that is hardware), skill in the use of the hardware, and above all, the timeliness of taking action. A book can be written about this.

My final concern is the organization of the Department of Defense--overcentralized, overstaffed, overly concerned about minutia, overly paid, and overly confident. There is one channel, and strategy and administration are in that channel together. As a result the day-to-day administration activities take over and strategy is neglected. The saving of a dollar this fiscal year necessitates the spending of many more dollars in a later fiscal year. But primarily the evil is that big important decisions are made by men without experience but with great confidence in their infallibility.

With all good wishes,

24 August, 1968

Dear Frank:

Your 20 August Memo was received after my letter of
23 August went to the typist. I expressed a view that the
first step is to determine what role the United States is
to play in world affairs of the next decade - what is to
be our future policy and strategy.

Annotations on your memo are enclosed.

Here is a try at a skeleton outline of a military pos-
ture exploration (having been given the required policy and
strategy guidance):

A. Strategic Warfare Deterrent Strengths

B. Conventional Warfare "

C. Unorthodox Warfare "

D. Research & Development

E. Command and Control

Such an outline suggests a fusion of men, material, advanced weapons, bases, logistics, technology, human endeavor, and morale.

I will be at the Carlton Hotel in WashDC evening of 27th thru the 30th and then back home via Mobile.

Warm regards.

MEMORANDUM

[LC]

To: Admiral George Anderson
Admiral Arleigh Burke
General Burce Clarke
General George Decker
Admiral Harry Felt ✓
General John Gerhart
General Victor Krulak
Admiral David McDonald
General Thomas Power
Admiral Arthur Radford
General Matthew Ridgway
General Bernard A. Schrierer
General Arthur Trudeau
General Nathan F. Twining

August 20, 1968

From: Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.

The following is a partial list of areas of interest for our meeting with Dick Nixon and Spiro Agnew:

1. <u>Vietnam</u>

(b) What military steps should we take if the stalemate continues? Continue to break up VC control apparatus. NVA/VC grouping. Return to Clean & Hold concept. Deceit NVA/VC lives of communication.

2. <u>Johnson-Humphrey-McNamara Team</u> List the military blunders of the "team" and what we should do to remedy these errors.

3. <u>National Security Council</u> Is the National Security Council performing its function and if not, how should it be reorganized so as to be an effective agency? in National Security: Takeover on Policy?" by Rapport to National Security

4. <u>Joint Chiefs of Staff</u> Is this concept outdated or has the Administration misused and disregarded its advice?

5. <u>ABM Defense System</u> What should our position be with reference to the ABM defense system--should it be enlarged or abolished?