DRAFT

WHEN GOVERNMENT WORKS

Robert Wood

August, 1969

We are short of talent, short of people, thin on patience. . . . We are overworked, overburdened, overwrought and, on many things, overly anxious. . . . Increasingly, ours is a society slipping out of phase. In sector after sector -- from the delivery of medical services to the delivery of the daily mail -- we are barely able to do what we are doing, with no assurance how long we can continue.¹

By popular consensus and professional diagnosis, the Achilles heel of American government today is government itself. Parties, interest groups, philosophies, popular attitudes, available resources -- all these don't prevent us from feeding the hungry, reforming the welfare system, discouraging the overthrow of democratic governments abroad. Bureaucracies do. Organized public efforts to execute authorized public tasks do.

Bureaucracies sink their own ships, design and build unsafe and needless highways, and "destroy more homes than they build" in urban renewal. They also perpetuate themselves, multiply, demand increasing taxes -- together they keep the country in a mess.

1. Horace Busby, Detroit Address, November 14, 1968.

2.

Presenting the facts of organizational behavior apparently does not change the nation's judgment. General statistical series showing that since 1953, federal purchases of goods and services dropped from 15 per cent to 11.4 per cent of the GNP in 1967, or that the number of federal civilian employees remained the same, does not blunt the belief that government grows and grows. Specific examples of understaffed, underfunded public organizations are ignored -- HUD tripled in program outlays between 1965 and 1969, but its work force rose less than 9 per cent. At the end, its manpower position was where it was at the start -- 500 fewer employees than the FBI and 500 more than the Bureau of Indian Affairs -- but it was still described by a leading journalist as "burgeoning." Attacks on government bureaucracy have always been good politics in America, and they are with special vengence these days in the season of our discontent.

In point of fact, the typical characterization of government as inherently sprawling, irredeemably inefficient, masks deeper, more serious complaints. It is not so much the inefficiency of bureaucracy we complain about as its efficiency for purposes other than those we feel appropriate. Viewed strictly in terms of transportation engineering, the American interstate highway program is a monumental achievement. Since 1950, urban renewal has helped preserve or restore the central business district and the municipal tax base in a thousand cities.

3.

Even the maligned welfare administration has accommodated a
balooning caseload -- and an increasingly articulate clientele
-- in the last five years, without delay in processing or dis-
closure of serious scandal. Large-scale, professional, skillfully
managed government action becomes an elemental condition of
organized life.

The root difficulty is that public agencies often achieve
goals and carry out objectives that political observers or the
public have come to feel are out-of-date, inadequate in scope,
or plain wrong. Alternatively, we feel that the objectives are
in fact set internally by the public organizations themselves;
hence they are self-serving, not serving us. In either case,
the very efficiency with which ends are achieved compounds our
frustration: our public objectives are not being achieved, and
others which we do not accept are.

Put in these terms, the issue is not so much how to make
government work but how to make it work for more general pur-
poses, or for explicitly stated purposes. Effective, legitimate
control over a potent bureaucracy -- not the elimination of an
impotent bureaucracy -- is the problem to be solved.

For this problem, two simultaneous solutions are required.
First, the pattern of general oversight needs to be deepened
and extended beyond its present narrow confines and beyond the
surveillance of the careerists and the in and outers of the
Presidential staff. Second, the behavior of the permanent
career employee needs to be professionalized, made more responsive

4.

to the changes in the general political system. In short, what
American needs now is more bureaucracy, not less; and disciplined
bureaucracy, not amateurs run riot. Given these two conditions,
government works.

II

Orthodox analysis of the mismatch between the goals and performance of American government identifies as the chief problem the absence of effective Executive oversight. The belief is that the President cannot direct the Executive Branch for the broader purposes that his Administration represents. Instead, the management of key programs is determined by an informal "triple alliance," as David Truman has called it, of spokesmen for concerned interest groups, Congressmen who are members of the relevant subcommittees, and the civil servant chief of the bureau, or division or office, in which responsibility for program administration is lodged. The alliances, according to prevailing views, are manned by professionals who are conditioned to "last out" any administration. They are not prone to risk-taking or problem-solving. They go by the books; protect their organization; save their programs; suppress humane instincts. The net result is parochial behavior: a single-purpose administration oblivious to the side effects that prove so unpalatable to the outside observer and are an affront to the Constitutional responsibilities of the system.

According to many observers, a President grapples with these program alliances for control over affairs of state from the day he enters office until the day he leaves. Throughout the last three decades, every chief executive has struggled to retrieve the authority that seems to have slipped down to the whirlpools

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6.

of interests below him. The strategy the Presidents and their advisors have evolved, from Louis Brownlow, through Richard Neustadt to Charles Schultz, is now well-known and well accepted. It has four parts:

- strengthen the institutional Presidency, that is, the Executive Office of the President in general and the Bureau of the Budget in particular;

- strengthen the oversight capability of the incumbent President, increasing the size and visibility of the White House staff;

- reorganize departments and agencies frequently, reducing their number, tightening the lines of their authority to the President, and introducing new techniques for evaluating their performance;

- when important new activities are authorized, ignore established agencies, establish new ones.

So, in accordance with this strategy, since the report of Brownlow's President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937, the Executive Office has expanded. The Council of Economic Advisors, the Office of Science and Technology, the Office of Emergency Planning have come, and others like the National Resources Planning Board have both come and gone. The Budget Bureau in particular has expanded in authority, its case resting on an unswerving nonpartisan loyalty to the Presidency as an institution and on an assertion of superior perspective and competence that comes from the "big view."

7.

Similarly, the White House staff has multiplied from FDR's
dozen men with a passion for anonymity to President Nixon's 120
plus, whose faces regularly grace pages and covers of the
national weeklies, provides additional resources for Presidential
oversight -- but to the President as a person. The shuffling
and reshuffling of agencies and departments has been a permanent
feature of the Washington scene since the Reorganization Act
of 1946, although the Executive initiative originally provided
has been whittled away over the years. Planning-programming-
budgeting systems in the 1960's building on accounting and
budgeting reforms of the 1950's, add new zest and style to the
Executive evaluation and Presidential disposition to create
new agencies in the alphabet tradition of the New Deal continues.
The Office of Economic Opportunity of Lyndon Johnson, the Peace
Corps and the Disarmament Agency of John Kennedy attest to the
principle that whenever an urgent new program hoves into view,
a President wants the vitality of a new organization to
accompany it.

Yet with all the steady evolution in the doctrine of
Presidential control, plainly, by the clamor of complaint,
bureaucracy is not yet bridled. The thirty years war of
Presidential staffs against the triple alliances has maintained
a semblance of order over the increasing complexity of modern
government. But if one is to judge by the call for new
structural reforms in the Budget Bureau, more power in the
White House, more surveillance in general, then no early end to

hostilities seems in sight, much less a victory for the
Presidential forces. A full generation's experience with
bigger and better Presidencies, applied with special enthusiasm
in the 1960's but still leaving the situation substantially
unchanged, suggests that there are some immediate operational
limitations to the doctrine of Presidential oversight. More
fundamentally, there may be some flaws in the analysis of the
triple alliance and the flows of bureaucratic power.

9.

III

The immediate operational limits of the prevailing concept of Presidential oversight are established by the confusion the increasing number of decisions to be handled generate. The tendency to review or make more and more decisions (otherwise who knows what decisions are being made elsewhere) blur the distinction between staff and line, program and policy. Responsibilities between White House, EO, and agency are fudged and demarcations as to who does what become uncertain. Decisions tend to be massaged and remassaged and operational delays increase accordingly.

While operational matters flow to the top as central staffs try to subdue outlying bureaucracies, policy matters emerge at the bottom. This curious inversion occurs as small decisions squeeze out large ones on top, and almost by default, those with time for reflection and mischiefmaking in lower echelons come to concentrate on issues of fairly fundamental philosophical and political significance.

The dilemmas and ordeal of the permanent Presidential staff is perhaps best traced in the evolution of the Budget Bureau. Originally committed to exercise control primarily by mechanisms of the budget, legislative reports and reviews, with occasional forays into management matters, the Bureau has gradually abandoned these generalized forms of oversight. The pressure of big deficit-ridden budgets, the expansion of complicated programs,

10.

often with sophisticated theoretical and technical components,
all increased the propensity of Bureau staff to assume direction
of operational matters. Internal Bureau reorganization in 1967,
reflected not so much increased policy-making activity but a
disposition to "run" activities especially those that were not
clearly under the mandate of a single agency. The distinction
between staff and line became blurred to the point where in 1968
the Bureau could undertake to direct the suballocation of funds
below .005 per cent of a departmental budget.

The problems for the White House staff are almost as grave.
Recruited from outside, likely to be amateurs to government
(though not to politics), suspicious of the professional
Washington establishment, they deal both with program oversight
and politics. To the extent they subscribe to the doctrine of
the triple alliance, their compulsion is to unravel the techniques
of the interest groups that surround a program or hover around
a department. Their overload occurs because interest groups
tend to take their troubles directly to the White House, filling
calendars with vexing, political problems -- replete with booby
traps in highly technical language -- but which are usually small-
bore in terms of the major political considerations of the White
House.

Simply in terms of available time, the program-operation
proclivities of the Budget Bureau and the interest-group
politicking of the White House aides loqjam the overview and
directional function. Too many items handled too quickly under

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too much pressure multiply the range and detail of the decisions
reaching the President. There is control in the mechanical sense
that somewhere an Executive Office staff member has drappled with
an operational problem. But control is absent for the matters
that genuinely require policy attention but for which no time
remains.

Thus, throughout the years 1966-1969, Budget Bureau staff
tried their hand at dividing $53 million of open space funds among
inner city and suburban localities and White House staff requested
weekly reports on a housing program with a two-year lead time.
But in the same period, the Bureau never managed to allocate funds
for a pilot neighborhood center program that the President had
publicly announced and the White House never resolved the dif-
ferent definitions of citizen participation that were bringing
the property programs to a standstill.

To the excessive involvements encouraged by the compulsion
to control matters must be added obscurity in motivation and
authority. Budget personnel take the stance that they are loyal
to the President whoever he may be -- and hence objective and
professional in judgment. Yet, the core of the Bureau's respon-
sibility is the budget; the central issue for the Budget Director
each year is whether or not the budget is balanced, and the
values that the organization ultimately assumes are bankers'
values. When the chips are down, and a deficit or surplus hangs
on the level of an agency program, or the resources available
to its effective management, the preferences of a budget-maker
are predictably financial.

12.

The biases of the White House staff are less predictable. Here the critical factor is whether the views and values expressed are those of the President or of the staff member. A staff member may transmit the wishes of the President in literal and automatic fashion; he may anticipate from experience a Presidential reaction, so that he may relieve the President's burden and still represent him faithfully. It is also conceivable that in a notably hazardous occupation, he may seek to establish rapport in other permanent political sectors of the nation's capital. Thus miscalculations may then occasionally distort outgoing messages and twist incoming ones.

Behavior close to a principal source of great power and dependent on personal standing, and perpetually under review, is always difficult to understand with precision. One thing is certain: the wider the range of White House involvement, the less credible becomes the notion that the Chief Executive is always personally concerned. A non-White Houser tends to take at face value the first half-dozen calls from the White House that begin, "The President has asked me to ask you. . . ." When the calls multiply, and the phrase repeats, skepticism intrudes on the relationship.

The longer one examines the awesome burdens and limited resources of those who help the President in his immediate circles, the more skeptical one becomes of a strategy that seeks to oversee government from Pennsylvania Avenue by "running" it. The semi-heroic, semi-hopeless picture has been captured many times

13.

in several administrations: dedicated men, of great intelligence and energy, working selflessly through weekends and holidays to master an endlessly increasing array of detail on complex subjects -- on which they are not knowledgable but on which decisions must be made "here," since a resolution elsewhere is not to be trusted. They persevere, taking their stand against "the bureaucrats," pushing programs through against sullen, hidden resistance from the departments. Committees are abolished, agancies rejuggled, staff reviews simplified, new reporting forms introduced, all in the effort to assure that more and more decisions are, or can be, Presidential. Yet, in the end, after thirty years, the effort to help the President in making government work has not succeeded. As one veteran White House staffer, McGeorge Bundy, has observed, "The ablest of Presidents, with the most brilliant and dedicated of Executive Office staffs simply cannot do it alone."

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IV

Who else and what else is needed so that government can
work for general, accepted, announced, prescribed, public
purposes? How can effective control be maintained without
continual operational build-up in the Presidency?

Bundy nominated an obvious resource in his 1967 Godkin
Lectures -- the Cabinet -- and its potential is probably greater
than even he acknowledged. As a collective body the Cabinet
has almost always been unwieldy and uncertain, and it is likely
to remain so. The principal collective concern of the Cabinet
is the political survival of the administration, and even this
is not always shared. But Bundy's thesis is not a parliamentary
one; he would recast the role of Cabinet members as Presidential
outposts within their departmental domain, politically subduing
their interest groups and managerially directing their bureau-
cracies. His image is that of a Secretary "highly autonomous
and deeply responsive in relation to the White House," who is
continuously the agent of the President but is endowed with
great discretion and flexibility.

This Secretarial assignment as President's men contrasts
sharply with the conventional wisdom of Washington watchers.
Until Bundy's formulation, most observers believed that Cabinet
members were, by reason of their interest group captivity, the
natural enemies of the Presidency. Yet in fact, recent Secretarial
behavior has come closer and closer to the Bundy norm. Nomina-

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tions made strictly because of ties with interest groups or for
reasons of geography grow rarer, as these considerations become
less important in Presidential politics. The demand increases
for effective program performance, and managerial skills rather
than partisan symbolism rise in value.

In departmental affairs, broker relationships with interest
groups and Congressional committees do not disappear -- and they
should not be expected to. Agencies will continue to represent
the particular views fashioned by their work. What does change
is the belief that Secretaries will forever be "captured,"
that only physical proximity to the President ensures loyalty.
Instead, a Secretary, trusted as a President's man, can
exercise reciprocal impact on both interests and Congress --
persuading, changing, influencing in the name and for the benefit
of the Chief Executive. The triple alliances are, in fact,
not intractable, but subject to redirection and indeed to
neglect, as more massive forms of public appeal become available.

In order to assume this job of operational oversight, a
Cabinet member needs help now just as the Presidency did in the
thirties. Executive Office support rather than competitive
degradation is one obvious need, and this is in the power of
any President to command. More program evaluation and analytical
capability at the Secretary's level is a second, and here the
initial impact of PPBS in the Defense Department is indicative
of what can be achieved. (Unfortunately, the Budget Bureau
preempted that technique in 1966, and its heavy-handed and

clumsy application of PPBS in matters that it deemed urgent
for budgetary purposes, discouraged most Cabinet departments
from developing effective program-policy staffs.)

A third requirement is the establishment of much stronger
links between Presidential outposts in the departments and
permanent program units. One HUD innovation in this last re-
spect was to assign program responsibilities to Assistant
Secretaries, who are themselves Presidential appointees. This
reform placed a heavy premium on finding Assistant Secretaries
who could absorb new information and direct new enterprises
quickly, but it effectively eliminated the problem of the all-
powerful bureau chief.

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17.

V

If genuinely effective governmental performance is to be achieved, extending Presidential authority via the Cabinet and transforming Presidential outposts into command posts are not sufficient reforms. At least three other changes in the present method of public operations are necessary, if the rule of triple alliances is to be broken, Presidential oversight restored to effective boundaries, and bureaucracies set to work efficiently to achieve the public purposes for which they were established:

- The outlook of the middle-echelon bureaucracy, especially those who entered the ranks in the 1960's, needs to be recast.

- More and more programs have to be introduced on a multi-agency basis, not under a single jurisdictional authority.

- Congress and President need to synchronize their schedules -- that is, the legislative and executive aspects of financial and manpower planning have to work together.

An administration, President and Secretaries, can risk sharing operating responsibilities among agencies (rather than continually reshuffling organizations) and decentralizing authority only if commensurate changes take place in the professional administrative establishment. The chief adjustment here is one of attitude, the development among the career

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18.

managerial professionals of a responsiveness to program inno-
vation and collaboration so as to ensure that directions
initiated by the administration will in fact be executed as
conceived. Today, the danger is not so much that administration
policy will be grudgingly carried out as it is that it will be
excessively carried out. Just as a disposition to handle
operational detail grows at the top of the Executive Branch, a
disposition to dabble in policy-making infects the lower ranks.

Over the years, the chief criticism leveled at the American
civil service has been its parochial professional bias, its
orientation toward occupation rather than program. Lacking the
British tradition of the generalist administrative class, and
building its first positive programs around scientific and
engineering activities, the U.S. government recruits by trade:
lawyers, accountants, architects, engineers, appraisers. And
interagency mobility has often been by trade. Specialized
education and specialized occupation encourage bureau and pro-
gram parochialism, making many careerists both insensitive and
resistant to broad policy activity. Often policy is created
almost accidentally at the operational level as a by-product
of occupational creativity.

To this long-standing deficiency, a second liability now
is added: conscious lower-echelon policy innovation, a growing
disposition of career executives to continue policy-making
rather than proceed to policy execution. In the age of great
domestic program innovation, the urge has apparently grown among

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19.

line administrators to interject doses of home-grown philosophy in every operation. Asserting that "Congress couldn't really have meant to proceed this way," or "the Secretary must have been poorly advised," intoxicated by visions of policy formation as advanced in academic seminars, bequiled into believing that participatory administration gives the lowest regional officer the right to rewrite the rulebook unilaterally, a distrubingly large number of career professionals are simply undisciplined. The havoc that the injection of their individualistic interpretations has wreaked in the poverty program, in urban and welfare assistance, and in job training is only now beginning to be calculated.

Before a Secretary can truly vest program responsibility in a career officer, that officer's outlook and style have to be genuinely professional. That critical distinction between bending rules in a specific case to meet the spirit of a program and changing rules covertly has to be appreciated. Young career men need also to recognize that their legitimate power is never individually acquired, it is delegated. The new spirit of policy amateurism coupled with the old tradition of occupational provincialism are a disastrous combination for the practice of effective government.

There are no instant solutions to this problem of outlook, conditioned as it is by the general temper of society. Mid-career training programs, strong disciplinary action, effective information and reporting systems are all good medicines. For

20.

the present it is simply important to record that some of the
major maladies of American government arise out of its non-
bureaucratic posture rather than excessive bureaucratic behavior.

A further necessity is the rapid strengthening of the
managerial devices required for improved interagency collabora-
tion. Robert Weaver is fond of observing that nobody likes
coordination except the coordinator, and a graveyard of in-
effective interagency committees, task forces, and working
groups testifies to the wisdom of that remark. It is equally
true, however, that the old administrative doctrine of "going
it alone," each agency operating its only program in splendid
isolation and autonomy, are now prescriptions for program
disaster.

Like the space program, our domestic programs require a
complex assembly of different organizations, different skills,
and different programs which are held together principally by
a common plan. In the urban field, for example, a housing
program unrelated to an education program unrelated to a job
program unrelated to a health program will not get off the
ground. Successful community programs contradict every tenet of
traditional administration: they are non-national (i.e., they
cannot be applied uniformly across the country, in Seattle as
in Atlanta); non-public (private as well as public organizations
are desirable as well as inevitable); and non-agency (HUD cannot
help build a neighborhood center without a clear concept of the
health or poverty program to be housed there). Collaboration

21.

is the essence of modern administration; slippage in collaboration guarantees bureaucratic malfunctioning, which then sets off public indignation.

Trying to improve interagency collaboration by taking the problems to the Presidency is a prime cause for White House overload today. Operational detail and program niceties baffle the well-meaning intervenor. Cabinet-level coordination among the principal agencies is vital in setting policy guidelines and initial agreements. But the principal answers are to be found in the "lead agency" concept, represented in the so-called Convenor Executive Order issued by President Johnson, and in the decentralization of authority to regional offices with uniform boundaries and responsibilities, on which a start was made early in 1969. By placing primary operating responsibility in a single department (there are enough tasks so that each agency can have its day in command) and by placing much greater decision-making power in the field the complex programs that now deal with complex problems can be made to move.

There is a third series of professional reforms that is required -- and that falls in the area of Congressional-Executive relations. More energy in Washington is consumed, more frustrations generated, more constraints placed on effective management by apparent conflicts in legislative and executive calendars than by any other single condition. These calendars have been somewhat out of phase throughout the time of the Republic; usually out of phase in this century; and with serious consequences since World War II.

22.

A Presidential budget is submitted in January, and most major messages are in shape by spring. Congressional action is rarely forthcoming until late summer or fall, and in the interim, matters proceed under continuing resolutions, so far as appropriations are concerned, and manpower freezes. Routine established programs can anticipate these time lags and live with them. But new programs are condemned to inauspicious starts, and those sensitive to sudden shifts in workloads or demands for speedy action are always caught in the vice of fixed resources, so that their managers look like fools.

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was the first genuine program with teeth in it to provide open housing in the American suburbs. It was enacted five days after Dr. King was murdered. Five months after his death a Congressional committee considered -- and denied -- any appropriation for that program. Only the unprecedented resubmission of a supplemental budget by the President and the Secretary of HUD, and the stimulation of major political resources in the process, produced a start-up figure of $2 million of administrative money in October. By statutory mandate, the program had to become operative by December thirty-first.

VI

Building effective government in the United States is not a challenge for which there are simple answers. Giving tasks back to states, localities, and neighborhoods, in the hopes of reducing them to manageable proportions, is not a self-evident solution, until the capabilities and resources and motives of these institutions are appraised. Building up Presidential staffs, in the expectation that they can think and act, provide resources for leadership as well as for managerial direction, can be set down as a necessary but far from sufficient condition. With operations flowing increasingly to the top and policy covertly bootlegged in at the bottom, the dilemma can be resolved only by a series of systematic steps that extend proper Presidential oversight throughout the Executive Branch, free operational discretion at the program level, and reward professional behavior.

The plain fact is that this country has never been serious about establishing a responsible and responsive bureaucracy. Still captivated by the revolutionary effort to tame a king's power, still misquoting Lord Acton, still regarding the delivery or nondelivery of a particular public service as a scene in a morality play, the American government has existed mostly on the energies and devotion of the organizational amateur. The political lawyer who has suddenly been asked to handle administrative matters in the White House; the economist called on

to weld together the energies and loyalties of a large number
of men; the neighborhood leader introduced into participatory
programming; the government engineer or accountant asked to
grow into leadership -- these have been the executors of our
public policy. This country possesses policies and programs
that are clearly capable of resolving many of our paralyzing
ills if only they are well executed; it cannot afford amateurs
in administration any longer. We cannot will government away;
we cannot endure a second-rate government; we cannot solve
problems by rhetorical denunciations. We must at long last
take the problem of public management seriously.

jch

27 October 1973

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I wish to express my sincere thanks for your
personal message which you kindly sent me on the
occasion of Eid El-Fitr. I would also take this
opportunity to reciprocate a fervent hope that durable
peace will soon be established in the Middle East on
the solid basis of justice.

With best wishes for your happiness and continued
success.

The Honorable Dr. Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 29, 1973

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20501

Dear Henry:

Could you in your spare moments from your present
concerns cast an eye over Enno Kraehe's application to
me for support, mostly of the writing, of the second
volume of his work on Metternich?

Even if you haven't time to go through our routine
you might be interested in having a look at it. If you
can do more than that, so much the better!

I arrived here to take up this job about simultaneously
with you to take up yours but have managed to maintain a lower
profile and so far to avoid all press briefings. Of course I
enjoy yours and my new wife has become positively addicted to
them, much preferring them to "As The World Turns".

Enclosure - 8779

RATING SHEET

Applicant's Surname Log No. H-

A. Please evaluate each of the following aspects of this proposal:

1. The relative value of the project as a contribution to the given field of study.

2. The research design or plan of work.

3. The competence of the applicant for the project proposed; his standing in his field or, if a newcomer, his potential for accomplishment.

4. Soundness of the budget.

5. Where relevant, comment on the value of the project as a contribution to the understanding of problems of national concern.

B. Please indicate your overall evaluation of this proposal by checking one of the following merit ratings. In addition, where you find it possible, please indicate a funding recommendation.

| MERIT RATING | FUNDING RECOMMENDATION |
|---|---|
| ____ (5). Superior | ____ Fund. 1st Priority |
| ____ (4). Good | ____ Fund. 2nd Priority |
| ____ (3). Average | ____ Fund. 3rd Priority |
| ____ (2). Poor | ____ Not to Fund |
| ____ (1). Incomplete | ____ Defer |

Signature

Institution(include Dept.)

If you prefer, feel free to give your evaluation
in a letter rather than on this form.

NED+2 (8/71)

Form Approved: BOB 128-R0003

<table><tbody><tr><td>NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES<br>DIVISION OF RESEARCH GRANTS<br>WASHINGTON, D. C. 20506<br>Telephone: (202) 382-5857<br>RESEARCH GRANT APPLICATION FACE SHEET</td><td>DATE RECEIVED<br>LOG NUMBER<br>→ 8779</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">1. PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR (name & address)<br>Enno E. Kraehe, Professor of History<br>University of Virginia<br>Charlottesville, Va. 22903<br>TELEPHONE:<br>Office (703) 924-7146<br>Home (703) 295-3097</td></tr><tr><td>2. INSTITUTION (name & address)<br>University of Virginia<br>Charlottesville, Virginia<br>22901</td><td>3. AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (name & title)<br>Ray C. Hunt, Jr.<br>University Comptroller<br>TELEPHONE: 703-924-3349<br>(person named here must sign in Item 12)</td></tr><tr><td>4. BUDGET REQUEST<br>Total amount requested from NEH $ 24,919<br>Outright $ __________<br>Gifts Plus Matching $ __________<br>TOTAL $ __________</td><td>5. PAYEE (name & title of person)<br>Vincent Shea<br>Vice President for Business and<br>Financial Affairs<br>Univ. of Va. TELEPHONE: 703-924-3252</td></tr><tr><td>6. DATES OF REQUESTED GRANT PERIOD<br>February 1, 1973 to Feb. 1, 1974</td><td>7. LIST ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES CONSIDERING THIS<br>PROPOSAL<br>None</td></tr><tr><td>8. PROJECT TITLE<br>Metternich's German Policy. Volume II: The Contest with<br>Tsar Alexander, 1814-1820.</td><td>9. ABSTRACT The title above is that of a book which will be the sequel<br>to one I published in 1963 with the subtitle, The Contest with<br>Napoleon 1799-1814. Its significance lies in providing the first<br>detailed study of Metternich's German policy, in shedding fresh<br>light on the formation of modern Germany, and in disclosing new<br>insights into the statecraft of one of history's major foreign<br>ministers. The central theme is that the rivalry between Austria<br>and Russia was the key to Metternich's German policy--more impor-<br>tant than legitimacy, conservatism, antagonism to Prussia, fear of<br>revolution, or any other motive commonly adduced in the existing<br>literature. Throughout I shall deal explicitly with the problem of<br>the relationships among ideology, class interest, and interests of<br>state. I have already completed the basic research, mainly in Eur-<br>opean archives. What I need now is one year of free time to concen-<br>trate on writing and, if necessary, to tie up loose ends in a<br>brief trip to Europe. Since the University of Virginia is paying<br>my salary for five months, I hope that the NEH can take up another<br>five. This constitutes about 85% of my request.</td></tr><tr><td>10. LIST PERSONS OTHER THAN P.I. WHO HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH<br>WITH NEH ABOUT THIS PROJECT<br>None</td><td>11. IF THIS IS A RENEWAL REQUEST TO NEH, HAVE YOU<br>INCLUDED A DESCRIPTION OF WORK ACHIEVED UNDER<br>THE PREVIOUS GRANT?<br>__________________________________________________</td></tr><tr><td>12. SIGNATURE OF PERSON NAMED IN ITEM 3. (if applicant is unaffiliated, his signature)<br>DATE 10 November 1972</td><td>U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971 O - 450-035</td></tr></tbody></table>

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