and that group effort is valuable in itself. The interation of several
minds is thought to make available a greater range of "experience" and
"expreience" is believed to be the ultimate source of knowledge.
And group effort is believed part of the highly esteemed xix social
jx adjustment. Pragmatism, at least in its generally x accepted
form, produces a tendency to identify a policy issue with the search for
"empirical" data; it strives for the application of the criteriaxx of
the physical sciences to decision-making. (Though there is a social lag
in the "social sciences which often operates with notions of "certainty"
and "accuracy" increasingly outmoded in the natural sciences). It x sees in consensus a test of validity; it distrusts individual effort or at
least individual certitude and it x tends to suppress personal judgment as
"subjective." Pragmatism is in fact more concerned with methodology than
with judgment, or rather it seeks to x reduce judgment to methodology
and value to knowledge.

The low valuation of "personal" views leads to a multiplication of
advisory staffs and a great reliance on study groups of all types whose
chief test is unanimity. For disagreement is proof of the lack of
"objectivity" of whatever course may be adopted. Each difficulty calls
into being new panals which frequently act as if nothing had ever
been done before. This is partly because their attraction is thought to
reside in their "novelty", partly because the very existence of a
problem is taken as a reflection of the tenuousness of the previous advise.

13.

[Y]

the bureaucracy. Nevertheless they suffer from serious drawbacks. Whatever the previous experience of the members they require extensive "briefing."

This places an additional strain on the bureaucracy while the members of the committee are frequently ready to make their best contribution at the point when the group is disbanded. Then again, the committee is of necessity drawn from the same segment of society as the top officials, simply because it contains the largest pool of talent. They have therefore also been victims of the prevailing administrative pace. And the committee process with its trend towards the fragmentation of policy and its bias towards simplified approaches is almost as pervasive in private or official ad hoc groups as in governmental committees.

In some respects "outside" ad hoc groups can even be said to represent an important diversion of talent. The number of outstanding individuals with experience in a given field is severely limited. As a result the same group is called in again and again on related tasks. Its discussions soon become predictable and sometimes even stereotyped. The ideal situation would be a "leapfrogging" process in which the current high officials expend their intellectual "capital" while another group builds up new concepts and developments.

["their intellectual deficits, while some students build new concepts and\nworld views through critical thinking.\n\nIn some respects \"outside\" as do groups can even be said to\nrepresent an important dimension of talent. The number of outstanding initiatives with experience in a given field is severely limited. As a result, some become predictable and sometimes even stereotyped. The ideal situation the same group is called in again and again on related tasks. Its discussions should be a \"fleshing place\" in which the current high officials exchange some predictions and sometimes even stereotypes. The ideal situation soon becomes predictable and sometimes even stereotyped. The ideal situation", "Governmental committees.\n\nSubcommittees are almost as benarative in private or official as do groups as in trend towards the fragmentation of policy and its rise towards assimilation of the prevailing administrative pace. And the committee process with its constant the furthest front of progress. They have therefore also been effective drawn from the same segment of society as the job officials attempt to process it. Point when the group is disbanded. Then again, the committee is of necessity the committee are frequently ready to make their best contribution at the time places an additional strain on the pmemorach while the memper of the briefons experience of the memper can require extensive briefing.\n\nWhatever the pmemorach. Nevertheless they suffer from a serious flawpacks. Whatever", "the briefons experience of the memper can require extensive briefing.\nthe briefons experience of the memper can require extensive briefing

-22-

[Y]

means to filter ideas to the top outside of organizational channels. He
can serve as a legitimizer for the point of view of contending factions
within and among departments. This is why many organizations build up
batteries of outside experts or create semi-independent research groups,
and why articles or books become tools in the bureaucratic struggle. In
short, what our executives want all too often from the intellectual is not
ideas but authority. ENDOURSEMENT,

This attitude affects not only the use to which the intellectual is
put but also the conception of excellence which underlies the recognition of
the individual as an expert. For the fact that the need for excellence is
constantly invoked is no guarantee that its nature will be understood.

A person

An expert can be considered an individual who best represents the prevailing
views or one engaged in charting new paths. Excellence can be identified with
doing the familiar as well as possible or it can be equated with pushing back
the frontiers of knowledge and insight. The search for talent can limit
itself to finding personnel for familiar tasks; or it can include an effort
to bring about an environment that constantly produces new and not yet imagined
products of performance,

Next page tip 23

-needs.

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[N]

often simply adds another burden to already overworked officials. It tends to divert attention from the act of judgment on which policy ultimately depends to the assembly of facts - which is relatively speaking the easiest step in policy formation. Few if any of the recent crises of US policy have been caused by the unavailability of data. Our policy makers do not lack advice; they are in many respects overwhelmed by it. They do lack criteria on which to base judgments. In the absence of commonly understood and meaningful standards, all advice tends to become equivalent, and every problem turns into a special case. In helping the bureaucracy to find its way out of this maze, the intellectual too frequently becomes an extension of the administrative machine, accepting its criteria and elaborating its problems. While this too is a necessary task and sometimes even an important one, it does not touch the heart of the problem, which is that purpose must dominate the mechanism if we are to avoid disaster.

The dilemma of our policy is not so much that it cannot act on what it has defined as useful - though this too happens occasionally - but that the standards of utility are in need of redefinition. Neither the intellectual does nor the statesman make the policy.

Draft

11/17/58

THE INTELLECTUAL AND THE POLICY MAKER

by Henry A. Kissinger

Any observer of the American scene must be struck by the tentativeness of our policy both domestic and foreign. In a period of revolutionary upheaval in every part of the world our diplomacy for all its technical skill has lacked vision. There has been no bold initiative since the Marshall plan projected America's concern for the growth and cohesiveness of Europe. Millions are groping for a new orientation, but America acts almost as if it were a spectator at a play which did not concern it. Major parts of the world are undergoing revolutionary upheaval; but America seems hardly aware that many peoples find increasingly little in America with which to identify themselves. Beyond any disagreement over specific policies exists an ever-growing distrust or at least incomprehension of America's purposes. And at home we have elaborated a cult of dispassion and lassitude which has deprived much of our domestic performance, outside the economic field, of dynamism and a sense of direction.

It would be comforting to believe that this state of affairs is due to particular mistakes of policy which can be reversed more or less easily. Unfortunately the problem is more deep-seated. The lack of vitality of our policy makers is matched by the stagnation of many of their critics. It has been a long time since there has been a real debate on policy issues beyond a bland competition for slogans such as "peace" or "prosperity." As David Riesman has pointed out in a brilliant paper, we have every reason to be worried not only about the things which are done but about the alternatives which are presented to us both by our political and our intellectual leaders.

2.

It is often argued that our best people are no longer attracted into government service. It may be equally pertinent to inquire how qualified our "best people" are for the task of policy making in a revolutionary period. Others trace the cause of our difficulties to the lack of respect shown the intellectual by our society. However, a case could be made for the proposition that in some respects the intellectual has never been more in demand; that he makes such a relatively small contribution not because he is rejected but because he is embraced too enthusiastically. ✓

And even more, because his whole methodology must be deeply different.

II

Any society faces the problem whether the qualities which are encouraged in the rise to eminence are also the qualities required once eminence is reached. The more specialized it becomes, the more the qualities displayed at the early stages of a career may be irrelevant to the requirements of leadership. At the lower levels of an organization, the requirement is increasingly encouraged for a kind of technical skill which may have nothing to do with the inspiration and creativity needed for leadership. Eminence thus is often reached for reasons which are irrelevant to the tasks which must be performed in the highest positions. Despite all personnel procedures and perhaps because of them, superior performance at the apex of an organization is frequently in the deepest sense accidental.

The dilemma, real enough in the "private" sector is even more complicated when it comes to selecting personnel for the higher levels of our government. In a society which has prided itself on its "private" character it is inevitable that the qualities which are most esteemed in civilian pursuits should also be generally rewarded by high governmental

3.

office. This means that an extraordinary and increasing premium is placed
on administrative skill. But though administrative ability is very useful
in high office, it does not touch the central problem of policy making.
The essence of good administration is coordination among the specialized
functions of a bureaucracy. The task of statesmanship is to impose purpose
on routine. Administration is concerned with execution; policy making must
also address itself to developing a sense of direction.

Very little in the experience which forms American leadership
groups prepares them for the tasks to be performed in high office. The
American executive (or the lawyer coming from a business background) who
is placed in a policy-making position is rarely familiar with the substance
of the problems into which he finds himself projected, partly because the
effort to achieve eminence in his previous profession has absorbed most of
his energies. Even after they have reached eminence our executives are
shaped by a style of life which inhibits reflectiveness. For one of the
characteristics of an increasingly bureaucratized society is the enormous
work-load of its top personnel. The greater the specialization of functions
the greater the need for "coordination." Everything is geared to the act
of decision and not to the development of the criteria on which a decision
is to be based. Issues are reduced to their simplest terms. A premium is
placed on "presentations," which take the least effort to grasp and which
in practice usually means oral "briefing." (This accounts for the emergence
of the specialist in "briefings" who prepares charts, one page summaries, etc.)
The executive even in the private sector is dependent to an increasing
extent on his subordinates' conception of the essential elements of a problem.

6.

[Y]

with judgment. Its internal processes are so complicated that agreement
however vague tends to become an end in itself. Indeed often the only
achievement is the fact of agreement and not its content.

The elaborateness of the process is compounded by the tendency
of advisors to advise. Silence may mean not that the idea under discussion,
is good but that the advisor is inadequate. Much of committee procedure is
therefore designed to permit each participant or agency to register objections.
Therefore, too, the committee system stresses avoidance of risk rather than
great conception. A policy dilemma is produced because the advantages and
disadvantages of alternative measures appear fairly evenly balanced; other-
wise there would be no need for discussion. But in assessing these alternatives
the risks always seem more certain than the opportunities. No one can ever
prove that an opportunity in fact existed, but failure to foresee a danger
involves swift retribution.

In this manner policy is transformed into a series of ad hoc
decisions which distort its essence. Profound policy derives not so much
from the skill of individual moves as from their relationship to each other.
It requires a sense of proportion; it thrives on a feeling for style. All
these intangibles are negated where problems become isolated cases each of
which is disposed of on its "merits" by experts in the particular difficul-
ties it involves. It is as if in commissioning a painting, a patron would
ask one artist to draw the face, another the body, another the hands and
still another the feet simply because each artist is particularly good

This is very powerful!

7.

in one particular category. Such a procedure in stressing the components
would lose the meaning of the whole.

The committee system not only has a tendency to ask the wrong questions, it also puts a premium on the wrong qualities. The committee process is geared to the pace of conversation. Even where the agenda is composed of memoranda these are prepared primarily as a background for discussion and they stand and fall on the skill with which they are presented. Everything therefore depends on the ability to absorb ideas by ear and to present arguments fluently. Quickness of comprehension is more important than profundity; plausibility more useful than reflectiveness. For all their cumbersome procedure and their striving for "objectivity" there is something approaching frivolity about many committees. Ideas are accepted because no one can think sufficiently quickly of an objection; or they are rejected because they cannot be grasped very readily. Individuals skilful in marshalling arguments tend to dominate; others, perhaps more thoughtful, have no impact because they may not be attuned to adversary proceedings or because they require more time to make judgments. The ideal "committee man" does not make his associates uncomfortable; he does not operate with ideas too far *outside* of what is generally accepted. Thus the thrust of committees is towards a standard of average performance. Since a complicated idea cannot be easily absorbed by ear - particularly when it is new - committees lean towards what fits in with the most familiar experience of their members. They therefore produce great pressure in favor of the status quo. Committees are consumers and not creators of ideas.

- *Excellent!*

8.

Unfortunately, not everything that sounds plausible is profound and many profound ideas do not seem plausible - at least at first glance, the only glance permitted by most committees. Rapidity of comprehension is not always equivalent to responsible assessment - it may even be contrary to it. The time spent on safeguarding against error is often taken away from the definition of goals. And in the absence of a well-understood set of purposes each problem becomes a special case. The typical pattern of our governmental process is therefore endless debate about whether a given set of circumstances is in fact a problem until a crisis removes all doubts but also the possibility of effective action. The price to be paid for the absence of a sense of direction is that more time is spent in identifying problems than in solving them.

The result is a paradox: the more intense the search for certainty, the greater will be the inward insecurity of the participants. The more they seek "objectivity," the more diffuse the efforts become. Because of the lack of criteria on which to base judgments, work sometimes becomes an end in itself. Their insecurity leads officials - and other executives as well - to work to the point of exhaustion as one goal that they have done all that could be asked. This insecurity is also shown by the fact that almost in direct proportion as advisory staffs multiply they are distrusted by those at the top. Officials increasingly feel the need for "outside" - and therefore unbiased - advice. Memoranda which are produced within the bureaucracy are taken less seriously than similar papers which are available to the general public. Crucial policy advice is increasingly requested from ad hoc committees of outside experts.

9.

These committees are often extraordinarily useful. They provide a fresh point of view. They can focus public discussion. They may even galvanize the bureaucracy. Nevertheless they suffer from serious drawbacks. Whatever the previous experience of the members they too require extensive "briefing." This places an additional strain on the bureaucracy while the members of the committee are frequently ready to make their best contribution at the point when the group is disbanded. Then again, the committee is of necessity drawn from the same background as the top officials simply because it contains the largest pool of talent in our society. They have therefore also been victims of the prevailing debilitating administrative pace. And the committee process with its trend towards the fragmentation of policy and its bias towards simplified approaches is almost as pervasive in private as in governmental groups.

In some respects "outside" ad hoc groups can even be said to represent an important diversion of talent. The number of outstanding individuals with experience in a given field is severely limited. As a result, the same people are called in again and again on related tasks. (It would be interesting to study the percentage of overlap of groups studying say disarmament or military policy over a five-year period.) Their discussions soon become predictable and sometimes even stereotyped. In this manner ad hoc committees deprive our society of the full benefit of the individuals with previous governmental experience. The ideal situation would be a "leapfrogging" process in which the current group of high officials expands its intellectual capital while another group

10.

often with previous service concentrates on the problem of looking ahead. But constant membership on committees prevents many of their members from deriving full intellectual benefit from former governmental service. They do not have sufficient leisure to analyze their experience or to draw lessons from it; they are forced to stay intellectually at the level of their most recent official position. ~~ideally & conceptually~~

Moreover, outside groups are handicapped by the fact that unless they constitute themselves into a pressure group seeking to mould public opinion - a function beyond their scope and contrary to their purpose - they can be effective only if they convince the bureaucracy. If they are too far *in advance* of existing thinking, they are ignored. If they only confirm what has already been considered within the government they are unnecessary. The relationship of ad hoc committees to the bureaucracy is therefore somewhat analogous to that of a member to his committee: generally both can be effective only in a narrowly circumscribed area which may be somewhat ahead of existing views but is rarely real creativity. Indeed because their report can often be presented as a "new" idea, ad hoc committees sometimes tend to foreclose the really fundamental examination of policy which may be required.

All these factors combine to produce in American policy a combination of formalism and rigidity alternating with spasms of innovation almost for its own sake. The cumbersomeness of the method of arriving at decisions causes most of our initiatives to occur during crisis periods. In calm times we have a tendency to act as if stability were a natural condition, at least in part because the process of arriving at new departures is so painful that it is generally not embarked upon except under pressure.

11.

The formalism is the result of the tendency of a bureaucracy to protect itself against all contingencies. Thus on any given issue some paper will be produced for almost any eventuality. This does not mean, however, that the policy is broadly conceived. Where everything is open for discussion, nothing is ever finally settled or even sharply focussed. Although a memorandum may exist for almost every case, it is usually so vague that it has to be renegotiated when the situation to which it applies arises. Even more important, it is frequently so abstract that it cannot guide day-to-day action. In the deepest sense many of our policies are not "real" to our policy makers: they produce a document but not sustained measures capable of being applied over a period of time.

The rigidity of American policy is therefore a symptom of the psychological burden placed on the policy makers. Policies developed with great inward doubt and accepted by rather close division become almost sacrosanct as soon as they are finally officially adopted. The reason is psychological rather than substantive. The status quo has at least the advantage of familiarity. Short of catastrophe, its very existence is a demonstration that the worst has been averted. There is no point in borrowing trouble by changing course, all the more so as an attempt to do so involves the prospect that the whole searing process of arriving at decisions will have to be repeated.

Thus the cumbersome method of arriving at decisions causes most of our initiatives to occur during crisis periods. When frustration becomes too great or a crisis brooks no further evasion there arises the demand for innovation almost for its own sake. Yet the problem of innovation is not solved simply by calling

12.

for it. Creativity cannot be achieved by fiat. The lack of a sense of
direction which has produced the policy impasse in the first place will also
inhibit a successful response. Creativity will be conceived mechanically
and identified with novelty. Policy is now suddenly adopted not because it
is profound but because it is new. Therefore too many ideas are first rejected
in tranquil times because they are too far in advance of the thinking of
the bureaucracy and then when a crisis produces the demand for a new approach
they may be accepted though it is now too late; or even more ironically *they may be
rebuffed again because in the interim they have become "old hat."*

The combination of unreflectiveness produced by the (style of
life) of our most eminent people in and out of government, faith in adminis-
trative processes, and the conversational approach to policy accounts for
much of the uncertainty of our policy and its lack of a sense of proportion.
It is the deepest cause of our failure to contribute a sense of direction
to a world in turmoil.

III

13.

What then is the role of the intellectual in this situation? Can he overcome the impasse? Why does he not inject creativity and a sense of proportion into our policy-making process? Is the difficulty caused by a rejection of the intellectual?

The attack on "egg-heads" and the anti-intellectualism of much of American society has undoubtedly discouraged many thoughtful people from making their full contribution. However, a case could be made for the proposition that, far from being rejected, the intellectual has never been more in demand. Every organization of any size or claim to importance, governmental or private, has its panel of experts. Many political leaders have intellectuals as advisors. Throughout our society policy planning bodies proliferate. Research organizations multiply. There is a general recognition that our performance will be (not) better than the talent we manage to attract into key positions. What then is the difficulty?

One problem is the demand for expertise itself. Every problem which our society recognizes - leaving aside the question whether these are always the most significant - calls into being panels, committees or study groups supported either by private or governmental funds. Intellectuals with a reputation soon find themselves so burdened that their pace of life hardly differs from that of the executive whom they advise. They cannot supply perspective because they are as harassed as all other prominent men. All pressures on them tend to keep them at the level of the performance that gained them their reputation. They become in a sense administrators of a static body of thought which assumes ritualistic overtones. In his desire to be helpful, the intellectual is too frequently compelled to sacrifice his greatest contribution to society:

14.

his creativity.

This is compounded by the conception of the intellectual held by
the officials or organizations that call on him. A bureaucratized society -
the adjective is not intended invidiously - is based on an elaborate special-
ization of functions. This both delimits tasks and establishes categories
of expectations. A person is considered suitable for assignments within cer-
tain "classifications." But the classification of the intellectual is deter-
mined by the premium society places on administrative skill. The intellectual
is therefore rarely found at the level where decisions are made; his place com-
monly is on the advisory staffs where alternatives are prepared. And in pre-
paring these alternatives he is not a free agent. It is the executive who de-
termines in the first place whether he is in need of advice. He and the bu-
reaucracy frame the question to be answered. They and not the intellectual
determine the standard of relevance. They decide who is consulted and there-
fore the definition of "expertness."

The contribution of the intellectual to policy planning is therefore
in terms of criteria which he has played a minor role in establishing. He is
rarely given the opportunity to point out that any query delimits a range of
possible solutions or that an issue is posed in terms which are irrelevant.
The nature of "utility" is beyond the competence assigned to him. He is ask-
ed to solve problems not to establish over-all goals. As a result the intel-
lectual is often used to legitimize a point of view which already exists with-
in the policy-making apparatus. When decisions are arrived at by what are in
effect adversary proceedings, a specialist - particularly if he is not himself
part of the bureaucracy - is a useful weight in the scale. This is why contend-

15.

ing factions within the bureaucracy try to build up batteries of outside experts or of semi-independent research groups, and why articles or books become tools in the bureaucratic struggle. In short, what our executives want all too often from the intellectual is not ideas but authority.

This attitude affects not only the use to which the intellectual is put but also the conception of excellence which underlies the recognition of the individual as an expert. For the fact that the need for excellence is constantly invoked is not a guarantee that its nature will be understood.

An expert can be considered an individual who best represents the prevailing views or a person charting new paths. Excellence can be identified with doing the familiar as well as possible or it can be equated with pushing back the frontiers of knowledge and of insight. The search for talent can limit itself to finding personnel for familiar tasks; or it can include an effort to bring about conditions in which creative men produce not yet imagined needs.

It has almost invariably been true that the intellectuals whom society finds most acceptable and who are therefore most in demand are also those whose approach or style is the most comforting. Excellence is more often thought to consist of the ability to perform at a high level but within an already understood framework, rather than of true creativity. The individual who strikes out on unfamiliar paths is regarded askance.

The proverbial difficulty prophets face in being recognized at home is almost inevitable; they are prophets after all precisely because they transcend the traditional frame-work. In some respects this reaction is healthy or at least understandable. A society can function only by reducing most actions

16.

to a standard of average performance - a high standard if it is fortunate, but still a pattern not beyond the capability of its people, at least potentially. To attempt to conduct each act of policy by acts of prophetic insight is to dissolve all restraints and to undermine social cohesiveness.¹ But because the vast majority of social actions depend on routine, the nature of creativity is very rarely understood. The most that can be hoped for is that there be a belief in its existence; that society not destroy or divert what it cannot fully understand.

Paradoxically, the great valuation our society places on expertise may be even more dangerous to creativity than indifference. It is inevitable that in a society which prides itself on being *practical*, many intellectuals gauge their usefulness by the extent to which they are drawn into administrative and policy-making activities. By its rewards our society thereby creates a structure of incentives which put an accent on essentially stabilizing qualities: the quickness of comprehension essential for committee work,

1.

Any society must therefore strike a balance between the requirements of organization and of inspiration. Organization and the routine on which it is based require continuity, and cannot be geared to an expectation that a great man will appear to guide each generation. Inspiration is required to adapt to new conditions or to create new purposes. The danger in an overemphasis on organization is that routine becomes an end in itself. The peril of an excessive concern with inspiration is that it brings about a mood of exaltation and fanaticism which tolerates no deviation.

*Also units of consideration here*

17.

the gregariousness required for any cooperative effort. It turns the intellectual into a "specialist" in ideas, one component among many others considered necessary for effective policy formulation. Even further, the intellectual is often selected as a representation of a specialized approach: a committee on military policy will have a spokesman for the "all-out war" concept as well as one for "limited war." A committee on foreign policy will have proponents for the "uncommitted areas," as well as "specialists" on Europe.

The individuals who achieve prominence as advisors to large organizations in turn set the tone for the intellectual effort in major fields, even outside the bureaucratic frame-work. The intellectuals who advise large organizations are often able to dominate intellectual effort in their field by their prestige and occasionally because they have easier access to funds for research projects. They become a professional group of liason men between the bureaucracy and the "academic" intellectuals. They develop an "in-group" with its own jargon and its own ethos. This sometimes inhibits the intellectual outside the circle from working on problems with policy implications because it convinces him that fruitful research in these fields is impossible without access to classified information. As for the intellectuals drawn into too extensive relationships with large organizations it is not a far step from being willing to be consulted to needing consulting relationships for one's self-esteem. And since individuals who challenge the presuppositions of the bureaucracy, governmental or private, can rarely maintain their relationship as advisors, great pressures are created to elaborate on familiar themes rather than to risk everything on new departures which may