20 January 1982

Hon. Henry Kissinger
Suite 520
1800 K St., NW
Washington, DC 20006

Toshio Nishi, Ph. D.
3119 37th Place, S.
Seattle, WA 98144

Dear Hon. Kissinger:

Given the increasingly serious interest among the American people about Japan and your extraordinary service in foreign policy, you might like to know about my book, *Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan 1945 - 1952*, which Hoover Institution Press (Stanford, CA 94305) has just published this month.

I was born in Osaka one week after the brilliant Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and grew up during the US Occupation of my country.

The book is the result of my extensive archival research of the recently declassified documents at the US National Archives (DC), Harry S. Truman Library (Independence, Missouri), MacArthur Memorial Library (Norfolk, Virginia), Hoover Archives (Stanford), and a couple of Japanese national libraries in Tokyo.

The US Occupation, as you know well, caused genuinely revolutionary changes in Japanese society. Numerous American reforms drastically transfigured militaristic Imperial Japan into a democratic and materialistic nation in seven years. This rapid metamorphosis did not please all the Japanese people. Some of them are still furious.

My book is among very few in English (if any) written by a postwar Japanese, who experienced the Occupation as a child and was schooled in an absolutely pacified nation, the nation severed, so fast, from a proud martial heritage.

The Japanese-language edition will be published by The Sankei Shimbun (one of Japan's five largest national daily newspapers) in Tokyo, late this month.

I hope my brief description would interest you. Would you please let me know if you would like to receive a complimentary copy.

JAN 25 1982

Hard-Headed Détente

By Richard Nixon

SEP 03 1982

Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson of France said recently that the United States and its Western European allies were moving ominously toward a "progressive divorce," explaining that, "We no longer speak the same language." Mr. Cheysson was specifically addressing the dispute over the Soviet pipeline, but his fundamental point was both profound and troubling.

There are sharp differences over how the West should deal with the Soviet Union. Ironically, those real differences are clouded by widely differing perceptions of one French word borrowed by Americans: détente.

The debate over détente has become so charged with emotion that substance gives way to semantics.

To many Americans, détente has become a dirty word, virtually synonymous with appeasement. To most Europeans, it is a good word. To them it describes a period in the early and middle 1970s when tensions between East and West were lessened and when there was more trade, more contact, some liberalization in Eastern Europe, and, above all, a reduced danger of nuclear war.

American critics of détente, by contrast, look with horror at all the Soviet advances of the last decade. They see Soviet attainment of superiority in land-based nuclear weapons, an extension of Soviet domination over Southeast Asia, Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, inroads into Latin America, the brutal oppression of Afghanistan and the cruel snuffing out of Poland's flickers of freedom. This, they say, proves détente a costly failure. They argue, correctly, that the Soviet leaders lie, cheat, steal and are out to impose their oppressive system on the whole world, and from this they conclude that the only safe course is to restore United States nuclear superiority, cut back contacts and attempt to strangle the Soviet Union economically.

This argument misses the point of détente, it misreads history and it would deprive the West of some of our most potent weapons in the East-West struggle.

The failure was not of détente but rather of the management of détente by United States policy makers.

First, let us be clear about what détente is and is not. There are two concepts of détente, which I call hard-headed and soft-headed.

Soft-headed détente — the hand-wringing, willowy, flower-power kind — is not a policy at all, in the sense that a policy is a formula for the use of power. When I speak of détente I mean the hard-headed kind: détente with deterrence. This is based on a strength of arms and strength of will sufficient to blunt the threat of Soviet blackmail, combined with a mixture of prospective rewards for good behavior and penalties for bad behavior that gives the Soviet Union a real incentive for moderation. Soft-headed détente — appeasement in disguise — invites Soviet expansionism by reducing its cost. Hard-headed détente raises the cost of adventurism and thus encourages the Russians to negotiate.

As we practiced it in the early 1970s, this hard-headed détente worked. During that period, not one nation was lost to the Soviet bloc. Under pressure from us, the Soviet Union retreated from its attempt to establish a nuclear submarine base at Cienfuegos in Cuba, it backed away from its support of India's attempt to gobble up West Pakistan, it abandoned its threat to send Soviet forces into the Middle East during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. On May 8, 1972, on the eve of my first summit meeting with then-General Secretary Brezhnev, I ordered the bombing and mining of Haiphong, in North Vietnam. Those who did not understand hard-headed détente thought it would torpedo the summit. They were wrong. It strengthened my hand and helped pave the way for a broad range of agreements.

This hard-headed détente is not a love affair. It does not mean that we and the Soviet Union agree. Rather, it means that we profoundly disagree. What it provides is a means of peacefully resolving those disagreements that can be resolved, and of living with those that cannot.

I have had more extensive personal dealings with the top Soviet leadership than any other American President. Mr. Brezhnev and I held three summit meetings — in 1972, 1973 and 1974. He and I regularly clinked champagne glasses to celebrate agreements. We

These two articles by former President Richard Nixon appeared on the Op-Ed Page of The New York Times on August 18 and 19, 1982.

[1.]

smiled at one another in public. We became,
at times, quite cordial in private. But we also
bargained hard, and neither of us expected
the other to give up anything of substance out
of sheer good will. We recognized that our two
countries were locked in competition, and
each of us was determined to protect his own
country's interests. But we also recognized
that our countries shared certain common
interests, which made it mutually advanta-
geous for us to compromise or otherwise
resolve an increasing range of our competing
interests.

Our central common interest was to ensure
that our differences did not lead us into a
shooting war. With tragic frequency, wars
result from miscalculation. We were able to
reduce that danger.

Many critics of détente tend to regard
United States-Soviet relations as a zero-sum
exercise: to suppose that a gain for one can be
achieved only at the expense of the other. But
this is not so. Properly conceived and balanced
arms limitations can benefit both sides. Expan-
sion of trade, on a strictly nonsubsidized,
businesslike basis, can benefit both sides.
Preventing war through miscalculation can
benefit both sides.

From the United States' standpoint,
détente has an added advantage: It is a means
not only of avoiding armed conflict but also of
engaging the Soviet Union in those fields in
which we have an overwhelming advantage.

Whether or not we agree with Clausewitz
that war is the carrying on of political rela-
tions by other means, in a nuclear age the two
principal competing powers must channel
their competition into other means than war.
That competition will continue. It is in our
interest to direct it into those arenas in which
we are strongest. We no longer outgun the
Russians, but we do outproduce them, and we
clearly outdo them in providing what people
all over the world want: freedom, abundance,
the chance to live in peace and let the human
spirit thrive.

The more we retreat into an angry, cold
war confrontation, the more we reduce the
competition to those levels on which the
Soviet Union is strongest. The one thing the
Kremlin is good at is wielding raw power,
through military might and terror tactics.
Where the contest is waged on that ground,
Moscow has the advantage. Where we shift it
to other grounds, we have the advantage.

Détente is a means of broadening the com-
petition: expanding contacts, opening the way
to Western ideas and Western influence,
weaving a web of economic interdependencies
that raise the cost to the Soviet Union of

stepping beyond the bounds of acceptable
behavior. Those critics who would have us
scuttle détente and return to narrow con-
frontation are urging a form of unilateral
disarmament: They would deprive us of many
of our most effective diplomatic weapons.

The Soviet Union has desperate economic
problems. Looking at these, some analysts
argue that if we just squeeze the Russians
economically the regime will collapse and
will be replaced by a less oppressive one. This
misreads history, and it misreads the nature
of the Soviet dictatorship. Squeezing Russia
economically did not work when the Com-
munists first came to power, when their
problems were far worse, and it would not
work now. Rather than decreasing repression,
it would increase it. An oppressive dictator-
ship is strengthened, not weakened, by ex-
ternal confrontation.

This does not mean that we should do
nothing when the Russians resort to actions
that threaten our interests. It does mean that
if we do have significant economic relations
with them, we may be able to act effectively.
A cardinal rule of diplomacy is that you can't
get something from your adversary unless
you have something to give or something to
take back.

In the broader context of détente, with an
intricate mixture of both positive and negative
incentives, the Soviet Union will respond. As
it did in the early 1970s, it will moderate its
behavior.

The West must restore the nuclear military
balance so that it will not be subject to Soviet
nuclear blackmail.

We must re-establish a credible link be-
tween trade in those items the Soviet Union
wants and the general patterns of Soviet
behavior.

The practice of annual United States-Soviet
summit meetings should also be resumed.
These increase the chance that agreements
can be reached, by increasing the pressure on
lower-level officials to narrow differences
before the annual deadlines. But even where
nothing of importance is agreed to, regular
summits serve two valuable purposes. First,
when the leaders of the two major powers
know each other, the possibility of war by
miscalculation is reduced. And second, the
very fact that a summit is approaching tends
to inhibit the Soviet Union from engaging in
adventurous practices beforehand.

We can call this peaceful competition. We
can call it waging a struggle by nonmilitary
means. We can call it, détente. Whatever we
call it, it is better than the alternatives of
either sterile confrontation or nuclear conflict.

[LC]

# The West's Sleeping Giant

The acute disruption within NATO over the Soviet natural-gas pipeline to Europe exposes profound differences between the United States and its allies over trade with the Soviet bloc, and points up the urgent need to find a common ground on which a set of unified policies can rest.

I once heard President Eisenhower vehe-
mently insist, at a National Security Council
meeting during the height of the cold war in
the 1950s: "We should sell the Russians any-
thing that they can't shoot back." Implicit in
that remark was the idea that we should ban
sales to the Soviet Union not only of weapons
but also of high-technology and other items
that would advance its military build-up.

On this there is general agreement in
principle within the alliance, however much
the principle may be violated in practice.
There is sharp disagreement, however, on
President Eisenhower's more basic point
about the inherent value of non-military trade
with the Soviet Union.

Views on such trade range across a broad
spectrum.

At one end are those who believe trade is
always good because nations that trade with
one another will not fight one another. History
disproves this, but the myth persists.

At the other end are those who insist that we should have virtually no economic relations with the Soviet bloc, arguing that communist economies are in such desperate straits than an economic quarantine would bring about a collapse of a brutal, repressive political system. History suggests that this, too, is an illusion — that rather than cede power the rulers would simply squeeze their people harder.

Where, then, can the West find common
ground?

We can start by agreeing on certain basic
limits. The first is the one that President
Eisenhower alluded to: that of military hard-
ware and related technology. A second in-
volves terms of trade. Many European firms
engaged in such a competitive scramble for
pipeline business that they ended up giving
the Russians credit and other terms that not
only were economically questionable in light
of the pipeline's uncertain prospects, but that
also amounted to a subsidy for the Russian
economy. The rule should be "trade, not aid."

Within those limits, trade that serves the
economic interests of both East and West can
be made to serve the political interests of the
West.

It can do this in three ways.

The first way is by providing leverage
which we need if we are to restrain Soviet
adventurism abroad.

The Soviet Union's achievement of superi-
ority in land-based nuclear missiles has made
our nuclear strength no longer a credible
deterrent against Moscow's creeping expan-
sionism in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and
the Middle East. We will not again be able to
use the threat of that power as President
Kennedy did in the Cuban missile crisis in
1962, when we had a 15-1 advantage, or even
as I was able to do during the Arab-Israeli
war of 1973, when our advantage was far less
but still formidable. Even if we restore the
balance of those nuclear forces, we will not
fully restore their deterrent effect for such
purposes. A threat of mutual suicide is simply
not credible.

However, our economic advantage is over-
whelming: The NATO countries and Japan
outproduce the Soviet Union and its Warsaw
Pact allies by a ratio of more than three to one.
Economically, our system works and theirs
does not. They need us. We know this, and
they know it, and we should make use of it. We
are an economic giant. Unfortunately, we are
a sleeping giant.

The more we engage the Soviet Union in an
intricate network of commercial relations,
the more we increase its stake in peace — and
also increase its incentive to maintain good
relations with us. When the Russians marched
into Afghanistan, the U.S. was reduced to
boycotting the Olympics in Moscow and slap-
ping on a grain embargo that was meaningless
because other suppliers were ready to rush in
and fill the gap. We would have had more
leverage if we had been trading in more
things the Russians wanted. For economic
leverage to be effective, it must be substantial.
We must have something significant to give,
and also to take back. We need both the carrot
and the stick. "Linkage" is only as strong as
the Soviet leaders' desire for whatever it is
that we are linking to their behavior. It is also
only as strong as our own toughness and skill
in bargaining. Unless we are tough, as

[L]

Britain's former Prime Minister Lord Home commented to me recently, the Russians "will simply pocket what we give them and give us nothing in return."

Some people think of economic leverage simply as the punitive use of economic sanctions, with highly publicized conditions set for their removal. This is usually ineffective, and sometimes counter-productive.

The real leverage we gain from East-West trade is both more subtle and more complex. The Soviet leaders want what the West produces, and they are willing to give up something to get it. They will give up more in private than they will in public. The key is to make very clear to them that there is an iron link between their behavior and the West's willingness to make the trade deals they hope for, while not doing so in such a way that they lose face. For example, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union was increased from less than 1,000 in 1968 to nearly 35,000 in 1973 as a result of our private pressure. But then Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which put the Russians on the spot publicly by tying trade to emigration policies, and the number of Jews allowed to emigrate was cut in half.

The second goal that trade can advance is peaceful change within the Soviet bloc. Trade increases contacts and helps open Soviet-bloc countries to the force of Western example. The more contact we have, the more we add to those internal forces that are generating change. During the long, chilly years of cold war confrontation there was little change in 36 of the countries of Eastern Europe. There has been substantial change since then. As I saw on a recent visit to four Eastern European counties, the stirrings of greater freedom are there — economic freedom in some, political or social freedoms in others. And conditions are ripe for further change.

The third way that trade can serve our interests is by opening the way for agreements in other fields. Used this way, trade can be a powerful instrument for peace.

There is great emotional appeal to the notion that limiting arms will ensure peace. But this is naive. Arms control is desirable, but it does not get at the central question. Even if we and the Soviet Union both reduced our nuclear weapons by half, we still would have enough to destroy one another and much of the rest of the world many times over. The threat of war arises not from arms, but from those political differences that can lead to the use of arms.

Peace requires progress on those political issues. Even more important than resolving the individual issues themselves is establishing a continuing *process* of negotiation, which becomes part of a structure of peace. Trade can be the cornerstone of this process, as well as the lubricant that makes progress possible on the divisive political issues.

The capstone of my own first summit meeting with then-General Secretary Brezhnev in 1972 was SALT I — the first strategic arms limitation treaty. We might not have achieved that agreement if we had not been simultaneously negotiating on a host of other issues. The Soviet leaders' eagerness for trade was one of our most powerful levers in winning concessions on political issues.

No matter how great the economic power of the West is, as a weapon it will be useless or worse unless we act together.

If we allow the Soviets to divide and conquer, they will.

Agreement by the NATO allies and Japan on tactical measures is not enough. There has to be a more basic agreement on principles and objectives. Agree on principles, and a concerted approach to applying those principles will follow. But if some nations are coerced into a mere sullen acquiescence on particular restrictions, the alliance will be weakened and the restrictions will not hold. Winning such agreement will test the diplomatic skills of America's new Secretary of State, George Shultz, and it is fortunate for the West that his economic credentials uniquely equip him for such a challenge.

For its part, the United States itself has not achieved a concerted, unified use of its economic power since the days of the Board of Economic Warfare in World War II. One of my greatest frustrations as President was the constant infighting among Cabinet departments and independent agencies involved with foreign economic policies. The time has come to knock heads together. When speaking to the Russians — or to our allies — the United States must speak with one voice, and that voice must be authoritative.

The pipeline dispute can be the alarm that wakes the sleeping giant — that rouses the West at last to the urgency of the need to use its economic power, and to do so in a coordinated way. If it does so, the result will be a major contribution to the twin causes of Western security and world peace.

EXCERPTS FROM REVIEWS OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S BOOK
LEADERS

Karl O'Lessker, Detroit News

[RN] sure knows something about the agony and
ehscasy of leadership on the world stage. This
knowledge, combined with his having had intimate
dealings with almost all the major political
figures of our age and with the fact that he has a
reflective cast of mind and a gift for effective
writing, supplies the ingredients for an
outstanding book on the nature of leadership.

It contains not only incisive portraits of
many of the men and women who have shaped the
modern world; it provides us also with the former
president's most mature and careful analysis of
what it means to be a national leader....It is a
sort of handbook for statesmen, crammed full of
rules, guidelines, and precepts for successful
leadership....

For most readers...what will be of greatest
interest are his insightful portraits of the
political leaders of our era....It is an
extraordinary cast of characters and Mr. Nixon knew
them all.

...He doesn't pretend to have done exhaustive
research toward full-scale biographies. But a lot
is new: candid snapshots of leaders at work and
play, with Mr. Nixon himself present. And his
judgments on their characters and motives are
invaluable.

It is a measure of Mr. Nixon's success as a
portraitist that he manages in every case [with
leaders such as Khrushchev, Sukarno, and Nkrumah]
to give the devils their due; he is as analytical,
as candid about their strengths as about their
weaknesses.

Alden Whitman, Philadelphia Inquirer

The profiles of world leaders that he has
given us are fairly routine stuff, but his accounts

DEC 13 1982

[LC]

LEADERS, Page 2

of his own impressions are engrossing.

Interesting and restrained, it is a definite
footnote to the history of our times.

Ernest Cady, _Columbus Sunday Dispatch_

This is an important book, well worth the
attention of any serious student of contemporary
politics and history....

Peter Carroll, _San Francisco Examiner-Chronicle_

Where Nixon comes alive, typically, is in the
treatment of his ideological enemies, especially
Khrushchev and Zhou Enlai. Here the writing
acquires a genuine passion, and personality merges
with clarity, sensitivity and nuance....

...The former president's extensive range of interest is itself impressive and his characterizations [in "A New World"] often add flesh and blood to the dry bones of history.

Alan L. Miller, _Christian Science Monitor_

The author's profile of Charles de Gaulle is
especially vivid, for he clearly reveres the French
leader's strength of character.... The author's most
memorable portrait concerns Konrad Adenauer, who
was both a personal friend and mentor.... Nixon's
profiles of 15 other postwar politicos are quite
good, and his concluding reflections on the nature
of power are particularly revealing....

Gary D. Barber, _Library Journal_

While Nixon recounts many entertaining
anecdotes, it is his keen analysis of each person's
leadership qualities that proves the most
interesting feature of the book....

West Coast Review of Books

As he did in his memoirs, Nixon again shows

[LC]

LEADERS, Page 3

his ability with the written word. He has always
had the ability to keep the reader interested and
he does so again here.

Nixon's profiles of great leaders are to-the-
point; there is no embroidery here and he seems
able to see the leader within the context of the
man's own political sphere. His admiration of
Japan's Prime Minister Yoshida is a case in
point....

Throughout the book, one gets to know the
people as Nixon grew to know them, and that is
face-to-face.

Arthur Spiegelman, Reuters

Former President Richard Nixon...has written a
candid memoir called Leaders in which he assesses
almost all the major foreign leaders he met during
his political career, dropping both gossip and
analysis along the way...Nixon's editors at Warner
Books...call the book the best he has written. It
is certainly the most relaxed and most
scholarly....

Booklist

As in his examination of U.S.-Soviet
relations, *The Real War*, Nixon's writing in this
book is earnest, articulate, and forthright.

Better suited to political science and history
enthusiasts than to student researchers, Nixon's
profiles of some of the twentieth century's
political giants are accessible and written with
verve and assurance.

Aram Bakshian, *Wall Street Journal*

Whatever one thinks of Richard Nixon, he is
one of the few living links spanning the diplomatic
and political history of the entire postwar era.
For anyone interested in the impact of personality
on contemporary history, he has written a book of
reminiscences about world figures that makes for
most engrossing reading.

[lc]

LEADERS, Page 4

...[I]t is Chou En-lai, the mandarin turned nationalist revolutionary, who emerges from the pages of Leaders as the embodiment of both the virtues and vices of leadership Mr. Nixon most admires. Chou was charming, smoothly aristocratic, dedicated to a goal -- and a ruthless survivor. Mr. Nixon is fascinated by him and manages to make Chou fascinating to the reader as well.

### Bruce Cook, USA Today

...[T]he last chapter, which he calls "In the Arena," is a remarkable essay on political leadership. To anyone interested in the subject, this chapter might be worth the stiff price of the book. While some of what he says he smacks of self-justification, nearly all of it has the sharp ring of truth....[H]e has some strong and original things to say about the ways that television "has transformed the ways in which national leadership is exercised."

...[R]ead this as a qualified recommendation of Richard Nixon's Leaders. If it matters -- and perhaps it does -- it comes to you from a lifelong Democrat.

### Vermont Royster, Wall Street Journal

This is...the sort of book...I could not put aside. It stirs the little grey cells in a provocative way and I commend it to all interested in the ways of political leadership whether as aspirants or simply as citizen observers.

### Telford Taylor, New York Times Book Review

By far the most interesting passages are those in which Mr. Nixon describes his personal encounters with his subjects....[T]hose dealing with de Gaulle, Adenauer and especially Khrushchev, Zhou Enlai and Leonid Brezhnev...are fascinating....Furthermore, the style of these parts is fluent and poised -- not unduly self-laudatory and with few wasted words....

[LC]

LEADERS, Page 5

Brooz Sledge, various Southern newspapers

*Leaders...* is an important book -- truly a landmark effort, superbly done.

*Leaders* is a priceless and thoroughly unique book, with the most powerful world leaders of our time under a candid spotlight by a man with high international expertise...

Charles W. Bell, *New York Daily News*

The anecdotes are sprightly for the most part and revealing, and Nixon recounts them simply, using both his own recollections and an assortment of previously published material. De Gaulle, especially, is well done. So is Churchill...

...[a] fascinating book...

James N. Crutchfield, *Detroit Free Press*

It is well researched and readable.... The book is best when Nixon describes his encounters while president.... Among the better touches: A tottering old Churchill... in 1958...[;] Leonid Brezhnev, with Nixon in the passenger seat, barreling down a narrow road at Camp David...[;] the differences between China's leaders, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai....

*Forbes*

...His perceptive evaluations often offer a different, intimate view of these other former Mighties, their thoughts and places in the history of our times.

John Chamberlain, *Washington Times* (and elsewhere)

Nixon's book on the leaders he came to know as vice president and president is packed with fascinating biographical detail. But it is a mastery of the big picture that really makes *Leaders* an important contribution to our understanding of a mixed-up world.

[LC]

LEADERS, Page 6

Todd Culbertson, <u>Richmond News Leader</u>

The highlights, and there are many, come when Nixon discusses the Communist leaders with whom he talked, and sometimes tangled....Nixon never let wishful thinking about his Communist adversaries blind him to the reality of their malign intent. *Leaders* recounts with drama and humor his confrontations with Khrushchev and Brezhnev. It also gives a detailed discussion of his negotiations with Communist China. The chapter on Chou En-lai makes excellent reading.

...Read *Leaders* for its insights into men who helped chart the world's course, for insights into the character and intellect of the successful leader.

John Barkham Reviews (widely distributed)

...Nixon as a student of contemporary history in general and leadership in particular is very much worth the reader's close attention. As a president who visited 80 countries and came to know all the world's leaders except Stalin, he is uniquely qualified to assess the distinctive qualities that make up leadership.

Nixon's comments on the leaders he has chosen are always perceptive, often penetrating, based on personal knowledge, perspective and experience.

This is Nixon's best, most thought-provoking book. It sums up the lessons he learned at the highest levels of world affairs as measured by a length of experience no other living political leader can match.

Jack Lessenberry, <u>The (Toledo, Ohio) Blade</u>

...An interesting and readable book about some of the significant men of our time...by one who knew them well.

The book is full of interesting anecdotes. Nixon's chapter on Yoshida of Japan is especially good, because far too little has been written in English about this important postwar figure.

LEADERS, Page 7

James Collins, The (Louisville) Courier-Journal

...The author has written what probably is the most startling polemic on the nature and secularity of power ever offered by a modern American statesman. The final pages of Leaders deliver the coup de grace, an essay entitled "In the Arena." It illuminates and infuriates....

Ron Carter, Richmond Times-Dispatch

...It is an entertaining and enlightening work.

More interesting than any single figure...is Nixon's overall vision of leadership....