Henry V. Kieinger

Best regards,

regards.

then meet for the Seminar during April.
of your article by April let. We would
in about two weeks and a rough draft
The schedule we discussed was an outline
to do a chapter on our book on Germany.
how delighted I am that you are going
This is just a note to tell you

My dear Benet:

Amherst, Massachusetts
University of Massachusetts
Department of Political Science
Professor Robert A. Vail

December 11, 1963

DEPARTMENT OF
GOVERNMENT

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
University of Massachusetts
Amherst

January 3, 1964

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Henry:

Enclosed you find the Outline for the Center Seminar on Germany. I hope you will find it satisfactory.

I shall have a rough draft ready by April 1, as agreed. But I think we shall see each before that date.

Enclosure

FAV/vg

February 19, 1964

Professor Ferenc A. Vali
Department of Political Science
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts

My dear Ferenc:

If I have not acknowledged your outline before this
it is because I am in general agreement with it.

I am circulating it to the other authors. At the
same time, I am sending you the outlines of Bracher and
Epstein so that you can see what else is being done.

Also, would you save the two weeks beginning April
20th for some discussions at the Center about the papers.

Best regards.

April 6, 1964

My dear Ferenc:

This is just a note to tell you
that we have definitely scheduled the
discussions on the German book for
Thursday, April 23rd from 3:00-5:00 p.m.
and Friday, April 24th from 9:00-11:00 a.m.

It would be very nice if you could
attend. Could you let me know about this?

The Center will pay for your expenses
connected with this visit. I look forward
to seeing you.

With kind regards.

April 8, 1964

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Dear Henry:

Thank you for informing me about the
dates of the forthcoming discussion on
Germany.

I shall be glad to attend.

If I do not hear from you again, I shall
be in the Center on Thursday, April 23,
at 3 p.m.

With kind regards.

June 18, 1964

My dear Ferenc:

I am enclosing a summary of the meetings about the German book which took place at Harvard in April to help you in writing your paper. In a little while Karl Kaiser, who is assisting me in the preparation of this book, will send you that part of the transcript of our meeting which is relevant to your topic. In addition to some of the points covered in the memorandum, I would like to add two other considerations which may not apply fully to your particular topic.

1. It should be kept in mind that this study will not appear before late summer 1965. It would, therefore, seem best to attempt to take into account the dynamics of the topics and try to emphasize those problems which can be expected to be relevant through the middle and long-term future.

2. As German foreign policy will not be dealt with in one general chapter but in different essays, you might try to keep in mind a number of questions you would like to see discussed in a chapter on German foreign policy. In this connection the problem of continuity and change would be especially interesting. To what extent have traditional patterns of thinking in the relations of Germany to the rest of the world been preserved? How relevant are they or could they become in the future? What might be regarded as distinctly new? These are some of the questions that might be asked in the chapters on aspects of German foreign policy.

It would be very helpful to have your paper by September 15th since we are planning another discussion session at the end of October.

I look forward to hearing from you.

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT

June 29, 1964

Dear Henry:

Thank you for your letter of June 18 and its enclosure. In the meantime, Karl Kaiser was kind enough to send me the transcripts (or rather fragments of them) together with the relevant tapes of our meeting. I think, with the help of the latter, I shall be able to reconstruct the entire proceedings.

I shall bear in mind your suggestion to concentrate in my study on the non-perishable aspects of my topic so that it will not be outdated even if published in late 1965.

My paper will touch upon those points of foreign policy which are closely related to the re-unification question. These are:

(1) The Two (or Three) Germanys Question, as foreign policy problem in the relationships between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, and also between the Federal Republic and Western Powers.

(2) The Berlin Question

(3) The Oder-Neisse Border issue (Germany-Poland)

(4) Operation of the Hallstein Doctrine (relations between the Federal Republic and East European states)

I feel I have greatly profited from our meetings in April last. Your summation of our agreements and points of concentration are extremely useful. I shall endeavor to implement all the recommendations given by your memorandum and by some of the participants of our meeting. Thus, the focus of my paper will be on an analytical examination of the topic rather than narration or description of relevant facts and events which will be taken as known by the readers.

I shall try to complete my text before our meeting in the fall.

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT

September 25, 1964

Dear Henry:

Enclosed you find copy of a first draft of my contribution to the volume *In Search of Germany*. I shall be glad to have your reactions.

I shall try to contact you when again in Cambridge, some time in early October. When do you plan our next seminar session?² I have told your Secretary that during the current semester I have *no classes* on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays.

With best wishes,

Enclosure: manuscript

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT

November 27, 1964

Dear Henry:

I have been trying to contact you during my last two trips to Cambridge but had to miss you, to my regret, on both occasions. I trust, however, that by now you may have had an opportunity of looking into my essay for the volume "In Search of Germany."

It would be much appreciated if you could let me have the honorarium ($1000) for my contribution to this volume before the end of this calendar year. I should like to be enabled to report this income in my tax return for 1964 for following reason:

In this state University we are not under the Federal Social Security system. I, individually, continued to buy Social Security credits on a "self-employed" basis for all my earnings from sources other than my university salary, in order to increase my eventual retirement benefits. In the current year, when I spent much time on the German research, my additional revenue so far is rather small and I would require the sum in question for the purchase of the necessary "quarters."

I hope that payment of this sum will not meet with any difficulty.

In the first half of December, I am planning to go to Cambridge again and hope to find you there. I am much interested in the plans for another of our seminars on Germany.

With best wishes and many thanks,

FAV/vg

January 6, 1965

Professor Ferenc A. Vali
Department of Government
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts

My dear Vali:

I have now read your paper for the German book after much delay because I was completing a book of my own. I read it with great interest and I think you have done a fine job.

There are a number of problems which I wonder whether you could take care of for me. The first problem is that the study is too long. It should be reduced from about 16,000 words to about 8,000 to 10,000 words. In order to deal with this, I would suggest that you reduce the first thirty-six pages by eliminating the definition of terminology. It would also be useful if the discussion of history on pages 9-36 would be reduced to about five or six pages by simply stressing some essential points. The material on the Oder-Neisse line strikes me as very good. The material on pages 52-70 on the meaning of reunification might include a critical assessment on some of the established notions.

We are planning a get together of the authors during the week of March 14th. Would this be a convenient time for you?

Do let me know what you think of these suggestions?

With every good wish.

# The German Re-Unification Problem

(working title)

Ferenc A. Vali

To the Reader:

This is a first rough draft of an article contributed to the volume *In Search of Germany*. Its writer is aware that his draft will be subject to amendments, abbreviations, polishing and re-organization of the text, as well as to a thorough editorial job.

Any comment or criticism of any part of it will be greatly appreciated.

This draft wished to comply with suggestions made during the seminar sessions devoted to the preparation of the volume in question. Three main issues have been given particular attention: (1) the impact of the re-unification question on internal West German politics; (2) the relation of the German unity problem to the Oder-Neisse frontier question; and (3) the meaning of the quest for re-unification. Such a selection naturally involved the omission of some other related questions such as, for instance, the problem of Berlin, which could possibly be added as another chapter but would, of course, increase length. At present, the essay covers about 16,000 words.

Please do not quote or cite without permission.

Amherst, Mass., September 25, 1964

F.A.V.

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT

January 13, 1965

Dear Henry:

Thank you for your letter of January 6. I am glad that, by and
large, you like my essay.

I had proceeded in writing this article under the presumption
that its length was to be 15,000 words or so. A reduction of the text
to approximately 10,000 words can, of course, be implemented. I am
grateful for your suggestions in this regard and shall work on the
draft in accordance with these propositions. Naturally, if the material
on the meaning of reunification is to receive a further critical
assessment those parts of the text will inflate rather than decrease
in length. Nevertheless, I shall undertake to tighten up all parts
of the material, and omit and drastically reduce the introductory
sections, and thus achieve the suggested results.

Do you want me to prepare and have typed a new transcript of
the abbreviated and revised draft before our next conference ?

With regard to the date of this planned meeting of authors,
the week of March 14th suits me well. I shall be entirely free on
March 16 (Tuesday), March 18 (Thursday) and March 20 (Saturday), that
is from early morning to the evening. On the other days of this week,
I have classes in the afternoon but, if necessary, could miss one
of those, especially the one on Friday (March 19) when I have only
one undergraduate class.

Please let me know about the exact timing of this conference.

Thank you for letting me have the check as requested.

With all the good wishes,

FAV/vg

March 2, 1965

Prof. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Henry:

Thank you for your letter of February 26 and for informing me of the date the conference about the book on Germany is to be held.

I shall be in Cambridge at the time and date set and am looking forward to this discussion.

Rec'd?

I have sent a few days ago the revised version of my paper to Dr. Karl Kaiser. I hope there will be time for its retyping since I had been far ahead the deadline of March 12 mentioned in your letter.

With many thanks,

FAV/bk

[d]

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT

May 25, 1965

Dear Henry:

Enclosed you find the new draft of my essay. I made the changes suggested during our conference in March; thus I listed the various policy alternatives and also adumbrated the possible options of parties for these alternatives should they present themselves. Thus I complied with your suggestions and also with those of Bob Bowie (with regard to the "hypocritical" attitudes of Germans); I also enlarged the analysis of popular trends with the reactions of regions, confessions, etc. as advocated by Klaus Epstein. I hope you will find all this satisfactory.

Only after our conference did I find time to read carefully Karl Kaiser's paper. I am still at a loss to know whether this paper (or a more elaborate version of it) is or is not to be included in the volume. I haven't however, various questions and reservations with regard to an essay of this character.

You may remember that at our first meeting I was encouraged to restrict myself to a few basic issues in respect to re-unification. I completely abstained from discussing the larger foreign policy implications of this question, also because I have been under the impression that you in your contribution will deal with this topic when assessing German foreign policy issues. The first point is, accordingly, one of organization. Some overlap is quite useful but too much of it becomes repetitive.

My second point is one of principle. Should we in this book, which is one "in search of Germany" as she happens to be, include considerations of a programmatic character, that is, provide for elaborate blueprints of what the Germans should do. If we are ready to embark on such "suggested programs" then the same method should also be used by the other authors: Bracher should discuss how to ensure democracy; Scheuch, how to change or improve Germany's social status; and Stolper, how to maintain economic prosperity, etc.

I also harbor doubts about the "plea for realism." Realism should not be confounded with what is "realizable." The German desire for unity is a political reality and also the form how this desire is politically presented is a "reality" although its goal is hardly "realizable" at present. While I agree with many of Karl's points his suggestions of what the Germans ought to do appear to me far from being "realizable." No government in Germany is likely to declare openly that re-unification is only a "long term" objective, and a

- 2 -

declaration concerning the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border
"to become effective after re-unification" would neither satisfy
Poles nor would it be acceptable to the Germans.

You will find it understandable that I would wish to participate
in a discussion on Karl's paper if it is to be included in the book.
This is yet an additional reason why I suggested that the next
conference should not be held in July but, possibly, in September.

From mid-June to the last days of August I shall be away, mostly
in Turkey. I have been given a grant to do some research there.

Before my departure I shall be once more for a day in Cambridge,
probably during the second week of June. I shall try to contact you
on this occasion.

With best wishes,

ENCLOSURE

FAV/bk

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
ALEX INKELES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
RAYMOND VERNON

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS 02138

June 7, 1965

Memorandum to: Henry A. Kissinger

From: Karl Kaiser

Concerning: Vali paper on reunification.

The only pages revised are pages 32-6, and page 65. There, he crams into a few pages a number of points that were made at the conference. I find it rather unsatisfactory, and one can feel that he did it under pressure. I think the old version is better (i.e., shorter by 4 pages). He addresses himself to policy questions, that is to say, the area Mel Croan and I are covering. If you share my view on the revised part, one could suggest to Vali that *you* realize it is impossible to deal with these policy questions in a satisfactory way in a few pages; since the area he treats will be dealt with by Mel Croan and myself in a more extensive way, perhaps one could propose that he drop these pages.

I still think the essay is of some use, since it presents many of the relevant facts, and I could frequently refer to his treatment. On the whole, however, it is not a very original paper.

In your letter to him you might suggest that he take notice of the fact that the Hallstein Doctrine *is* being revised. There are now statements on this topic, including some by Schröder (Eastern European satellites to be excluded from Doctrine since they had no choice when recognizing DDR, etc.).

I think the final title of the essay should be determined when we have all three pieces dealing with Ostpolitik, the DDR, reunification.

*One very important point.* I think it would be very useful if you could call Mel Croan. He needs some pushing.

Have a nice trip to Europe!

Ferenc A. Váli

## OUTLINE

# The Problem of German Re-unification and its Impact on Internal and External Politics in the Federal Republic of Germany
(provisional title)

I. **Introductory.** - A short historic survey of post-World War II evolution of two ( or three) Germanys.

II. **Earlier attitudes to the re-unification question (1949-1959)**
and their influence on the creation and development of the
Federal Republic:

(1) The official (CDU-CSU) view: priority of Western ties (and of "freedom") over re-unification; concept of "automatic re-unification"; Federal Republic as sole representative of all-Germany (Basic Law, etc.); influence of these concepts on conventions establishing West German sovereignty and on the integration of the Federal Republic into Western political and defense systems.

(2) The opposition (SPD) view: priority of re-unification problem over all other issues (Schumacher; Heinemann, etc.); the policy of "free hand"; readiness to discuss issue with Soviet Union (and even with East German authorities); opposition against Western commitments; influence of these attitudes on internal and external politics.

(3) Other political views: acceptance of status quo (Dehio); pro-Soviet orientation (Nadolny); neutralist (Noack, Nauheim Circle, etc.); extreme right (Armin Mohler); extreme left (Communist).

III. **Contemporary** (since the SPD **volte-face** in 1960) **views**
concerning the re-unification question, cutting across
party lines:

(1) Advocates of hard (inflexible), strictly legalistic attitudes; opponents of "provisional" solutions;

(a) German "Gaullists" ("patient ones"); long term view, tenacity, watchfullness; rigid application of Hallstein Doctrine; no "upgrading" of DDR; no negotiations or even contacts on Berlin, etc.

(b) Impatient' Ones; advocates of pressures to be brought on Western Allies; no further intensification of Western ties unless energetic support for re-unification (some FDP views, Thomas Dehler, etc.).

- 2 -

[LJ]

(2) Advocates of more flexible attitudes (often identical with so-called "Atlanticists"); alignment with US foreign policy ("strategy for peace"); search for areas of understanding (on Berlin - Brandt); more liberal application of Hallstein Doctrine (rapprochement to Poland and other East European satellites); opportunistic policy (readiness to conclude provisional arrangements); emphasis on liberalization in the DDR (humanitarian interpretation of re-unification).

(3) Advocates of acceptance of the *status quo* (under the condition of democratic freedom); doctrinaire views (Jaspers, Rüstow)

(4) Other individual or extreme views (often anti-American):

(a) Return to the status of 1952 (Sebastian Haffner); disengagement of Western and Eastern Germany from alliances and new start

(b) Direct talks with Soviets (Kroll); solution even at the expense of Western ties.

(c) Anti-Western extremist views (neutralist, national-Bolshevist; Deutsche Reichspartei, etc.)

## IV. Discussion of some special questions affecting or interrelated with re-unification problem:

(1) Berlin; how the Berlin issue affects re-unification; its status; the "three Germanys" proposition

(2) The meaning of re-unification: (a) territorial-political; (b) socio-economic; (c) humanitarian; shifting of attitudes and interpretations in the Federal Republic

(3) The so-called Hallstein Doctrine and its operation and impact.

(4) The Oder-Neisse frontier and the re-unification problem

(5) West German planning (political, economic, legal) on re-unification (transitional periods, elections, their supervision, etc.)

V. Conclusions: future of the re-unification question. The re-unification problem and international issue.

Ference A. Vali

# OUTLINE

## The Problems of German Re-Unification and its Impact on Internal and External Politics in the Federal Republic of Germany
(provisional title)

I. **Introductory** - A short historic survey of post-World War II evolution of two (or three) Germanys.

II. **Earlier Attitudes to the Re-Unification Question (1949-1959) and Their Influence on the Creation and Development of the Federal Republic:**

(1) The official (CDU-CSU) view: priority of Western ties (and of "freedom") over re-unification; concept of "automatic re-unification"; Federal Republic as sole representative of all Germany (Basic Law, etc.); influence of these concepts on conventions establishing West German sovereignty and on the integration of the Federal Republic into Western political and defense systems.

(2) The opposition (SPD) view: priority of re-unification over all other issues (Schumacher; Heinemann, etc.); the policy of "free hand"; readiness to discuss issue with Soviet Union (and even with East German authorities); opposition against Western commitments; influence of these attitudes on internal and external politics.

(3) Other political views: acceptance of *status quo* (Dehio); pro-Soviet orientation (Nadolny); *neutralist* (*Noack, Nauheim Circle, etc.*); extreme right (Armin Mohler); extreme left (Communist).

III. **Contemporary (since the SPD volte-face in 1946) Views Concerning the Re-Unification Question, Cutting Across Party Lines:**

(a) German "Gaullists" ("patient ones"); long-term view, tenacity, watchfullness; rigid application of Hallstein Doctrine; no "upgrading" of DDR; no negotiations or even contacts on Berlin, etc.

(b) "Impatient" ones; advocates of pressures to be brought on Western Allies; no further intensification of Western ties unless energetic support for re-unification (some FDP views, Thomas Dehler, etc.).

- 2 -

(2) Advocates of more flexible attitudes (often identical with so-called "Atlanticists"); alignment with U.S. foreign policy ("strategy for peace"); search for areas of understanding (on Berlin - Brandt); more liberal application of Hallstein Doctrine (rapprochement to Poland and other East European satellites); opportunistic policy (readiness to conclude provisional arrangements); emphasis on liberalization in the DDR (humanitarian interpretation of re-unification).

(3) Advocates of acceptance of the *status quo* (under the condition of democratic freedom); doctrinaire views (Jaspers, Rüstow).

(a) Return to the statu of 1952 (Sebastian Haffner); disengagement of Western and Eastern Germany from alliances and new start;

(b) Direct talks with Soviets (Kroll); solution even at the expense of Western ties;

(c) Anti-Western extremist views (neutralist, national-Belshevist; Deutsche Reichspartei, etc.).

#### IV. Discussion of Some Special Questions Affecting or Interrelated with Re-Unification Problem:

(1) Berlin; how the Berlin issue affects re-unification; its status; the "three Germanys" proposition.

(2) The meaning of re-unification: (a) territorial-political; (b) socio-economic; (c) humanitarian; shifting of attitudes and interpretations in the Federal Republic.

(4) The Oder-Neisse frontier and the re-unification problem.

(5) West German planning (political, economic, legal) on re-unification (transitional periods, elections, their supervision, etc.).

V. Conclusions: Future of the re-unification question. The re-unification problem as an international issue.

March 12, 1965

My dear Vali:

I am sending you a copy of the
papers which we have mimeographed for
the Conference.

I thought it would speed things
up if you might have a chance to go
over them before the meeting.

I look forward to seeing you
on Friday.

Kind regards.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table><tbody><tr><td>Unity and Disunity in German History</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>German Nationalism</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>The German Problem of the Mid-Twentieth Century</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>I. Unity and Security</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>The First Dilemma</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Basic Law and Basic Consensus</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>The Second Dilemma</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>Governmental Fiasco - Socialist Volte-Face</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><td>Bipartisanship and Factionalism</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>II. Ethnic or Territorial Unity</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>The Oder-Neisse Line and Re-Unification</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>German-Polish Relations and Re-Unification</td><td>41</td></tr><tr><td>III. The Meaning of Re-Unification</td><td>49</td></tr><tr><td>Political Unity or Restitution of Freedom</td><td>49</td></tr><tr><td>East Germany - The National Issue</td><td>56</td></tr><tr><td>Popular Will and Re-Unification</td><td>61</td></tr><tr><td>Notes</td><td>69</td></tr></tbody></table>

(working title)

Ferenc A. Váli

## Unity and Disunity in German History

Since the end of the Middle Ages, history of each century produced problems peculiar to Germany, engendered by the *Zerrissenheit* (dismembered status) of the German people. The "German problem" of the Sixteenth Century, also a European problem, had been the religious split which separated the German people deeper and more evenly than any other big European nation.

In the Seventeenth Century, the religious cleavage produced the devastating Thirty Years War, both a European and an internal German struggle. Thereafter, the Holy Empire, already cut asunder by the antagonism between Protestants and Catholics, was further weakened by the centrifugal tendencies of German princes and non-German rulers who had a stake in the Empire. The "German problem" of the Eighteenth Century was characterized by the rivalries between the two German super-states, Austria and Prussia.

The end of the Eighteenth and the beginning of the Nineteenth Centuries witnessed a French invasion of Germany which led to her amputation by France, the dissolution of the *Reich*, defeats of Austria and Prussia, and the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine--which was an aggregation of Napoleonic satellite states. After the downfall of the First French Empire, the Congress of Vienna, while maintaining the reduction of German states from 365 to 39, had set up, in lieu of the defunct Holy

2

Empire, an equally frail scaffolding of Germany, the *Bund* (German Confederation). Dismemberment of Germany thus continued; economic factors and the increasing quest for unity led, however, to the creation of the *Zollverein* which, to some extent, paved the way for a political union.

The attempt to establish unity through popular parliamentary methods (today we would say: self-determination) by the Frankfort Diet in 1848 had failed; from 1866 to 1871 Prussia, under the chancellorship of Bismarck, contrived to achieve the *kleindeutsch*, instead of the *grossdeutsch*, solution by creating the Second Reich with the exclusion of Austria.

The decades, following the creation of the Hohenzollern Empire, saw the grand-scale development of German military and economic power. By its mere existence and nature it had upset the traditional European balance of power. While Bismarck anxiously endeavored to present the *Reich* as a territorially satisfied power, under the ambitious William II the young German state embarked on an aggressive nationalistic course.

## German Nationalism

The belatedness of German unity, which even so was not an integral unity, may be attributed to a number of factors characterized as being of such varied nature as "historical-geographical, political-ideological and economic-social."¹ All these factors can really not be strictly differentiated from one another. Among them, the most important appear to be: the phantasmagoria of a universal state as personified by the *sacrum imperium* (the so-called *Reichsidee*), the reformation dividing Protestants from Catholics, the geographical location of Germany, the socio-economic differences between the