P.O. Box 73
Lexington 73, Mass.

March 15, 1960

Dear Henry:

I am happy to report to you that acceptances have now been received from authors for all of the projected chapters for the special issue of DAEDALUS on arms control. This letter is to bring you up to date on a number of points concerning the volume.

The enclosed detailed outline should provide you with a better view of the intended structure of the volume than was possible with the simple table of contents sent you with the commissioning letter. It should also help reduce unnecessary overlap among the various chapters. We are operating under very stringent space restrictions for the special issue of DAEDALUS, and, with only a limited amount of editorial time available between the receipt of the manuscripts and commitment to the printer, it is essential that unnecessary overlap be reduced to the minimum possible.

Please note that the deadline for the receipt of manuscripts is only seven weeks away. In view of the sizable editorial task, and the large distribution problem involved in circulating copies to members of the Editorial Board, the other contributors to the volume, the additional invitees to the conference of May 20 and 21, and the foreign commentators, we shall be most grateful for any manuscripts received well in advance of the deadline.

You will find enclosed a printed sheet entitled "Notes for Contributors" that sets forth standard practices for DAEDALUS papers. However, in view of the large number of papers for this volume, and the distribution problems mentioned previously, we should like to request an important departure from the second sentence of the first paragraph of that sheet. It would assist us greatly if you could:

1. Send us 70 copies of the completed manuscript. Ditto, mimeograph, multilith, or any other legible reproduction process would be acceptable for this purpose.

2. If course 1) is not practical, send us your manuscript typed on Ditto masters. We can furnish such masters if you do not have them available. These are just as easy to type (even by amateur typists) as on plain paper. Copies reproduced from such masters will be returned to the author forthwith.

3. If neither course 1) nor course 2) is practical, follow the practice set forth on the "Notes for Contributors" sheet.

In any case, send the copies or Ditto masters to the DAEDALUS Editorial Office, 33 Little Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge 38, Mass. Please note that this is a new address, and is not the address of the Editorial Office that appeared on the commissioning letter.

Outline for special DAEDALUS issue on "Arms Control" and book "Arms Control and National Security" (tentative title).

Guest Editorial Board:

R. R. Bowie
D. G. Brennan (Editor)
J. T. Edsall
B. T. Feld
W. T. R. Fox
S. R. Graubard
G. Holton (Academy Editor)
H. A. Kissinger
L. B. Sohn
J. B. Wiesner (Chairman)

Acceptances of commission to write the articles have been received as of March 10, 1960, from all of the authors for the indicated chapters, except Chapter 5.2.

The chapter titles and outlines given below are essentially those suggested to the authors, and are, in some cases, subject to modification by the authors.

FOREWORD TO THE ISSUE - Jerome B. Wiesner

I. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

1.1 Goals of Arms Control - Donald G. Brennan.

Armament policy as one dimension of the general problem of achieving a world to our liking, and the uncertainty of what the latter is. Various kinds of security. Definition of arms control as multilateral or cooperative approach to armament policy. Arms control is not necessarily disarmament. Major foreseeable hazards of present unilateral nuclear armament policy. Some possible hazards of arms-control programs. Major goals of arms control: (a) to reduce present risks by more than the amount of new risk introduced by control program. (b) to introduce constructive international services and court functions that might contribute to the development of a more rational world. The problem implied by (a) of estimating the net security balance of various possible courses. The philosophical problem of tinkering with world political structure, especially when consequences are uncertain.

General conclusion: Multilateral arms control includes unilateral control as a particular case and therefore offers intrinsic grounds for optimism. But the real problem is always the evaluation of specific cases.

1.2 Agreements Between Hostile Powers - Robert R. Bowie

The character of the ideological difference that divides the world today, the importance of that difference in negotiations, its relevance to the sort of agreement that is possible, and its role in policy formation. The threefold ideological conflict (Soviet-East-West). Consideration of the problem also in a historical dimension, and examination of whether or not ideological difference has been a significant factor in the failure to reach agreement before now, and whether there are valid precedents for psychological

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and ideological disarmament. The role of ideological difference in less recent historical conflicts (e.g., Moslem-Christian conflicts) might also be studied.

## 1.3 Characteristics of Recent Arms Control Proposals and Agreements - William R. Frye.

A selected history of arms control negotiations, emphasizing recent history, specifically post-Hiroshima history, with some reference to a few major previous arms control agreements or proposals, such as the international agreement prohibiting the use of chemical gas weapons. The formation of the United Nations and the considerations determining the structure of the Security Council. A brief survey of the Baruch proposals for the control of atomic energy. A summary of negotiations and proposals between the Baruch proposals and the conference of experts on bomb tests. An outline of the major features of control proposals in this period, especially indicating the large amount of common ground in the various major Eastern and Western proposals.

A prime objective should also be to illuminate the underlying policy considerations that dictated the various features of such proposals and the negotiating positions in support of them.

# II. MAJOR ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

## 2.1 The Hazards of the Nuclear Arms Race - Herman Kahn.

Probable consequences of nuclear war at various levels. Technological character of contemporary arms race. Near-term possibilities of technical developments in offense or defense that could result in dangerous shifts in bipolar strategic balance--illustrate with shift from nuclear-aircraft generation to nuclear-missile generation. The hazard of pre-emptive strikes. Other possible conditions under which the deliberate initiation of nuclear war might appear rational. Increasing dependence on automatic or semi-automatic quick-reaction systems. Various possibilities of accidental war. Long-term problem of increasing cheapness of mass destruction (e.g., fusion weapons) and consequent spread of technology to other powers--illustrated with France. Doomsday Machines. Research in pure-fusion weapons. The potential long-term problem of China equipped with a Doomsday Machine. The same problem with a deranged leader of a large Western power. A potential Chinese solution to the problem of over-population in China.

## 2.2 On the Feasibility of Arms Controls - Edward Teller

The essay will be on the general problem of Arms Control, and will include some of the following points, among others. General hazards: possible aggravation of political climate due to irritations induced by inspectorate, perhaps leading to breakdown of control system and subsequent war. Possible withering of United States facilities (e.g., Los Alamos), moral fiber, and general will to maintain adequately alert posture. Possibility of a false sense of security while the Communists prepare to destroy us with the aid of forces

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built up clandestinely. Possibility of adverse economic readjustments.
Hazards of denuclearization: develop adverse balance of power by
eliminating nuclear weapons without corresponding balance of conventional
forces. Elimination of large strategic nuclear capability might
encourage more adventuring. Of a bomb-test ban: possible one-sided
Communist advances due to clandestine testing. Possible need for
further United States development for defensive purposes. Bomb-test
ban probably would not contribute to Nth-country problem in any
event--consider France. Of a missile test ban: would leave U.S.S.R.
in a superior position. Of a tactical-warning network: possibility
of subverting communication system to supply erroneous information
of possibly catastrophic effect. Of international security force:
possibility of subverting group decision procedures for applying force
or sanctions.

2.3 The Role of the Smaller Powers - Paul M. Doty.

Brief review of "Nth-country" report on world-wide capabilities for the
production of nuclear weapons. Prestige and security motivations of
smaller powers to acquire nuclear weapons, especially tactical. Present
security guarantees available to smaller powers. Future possibilities
of guarantees and their relation to probable spread of nuclear
weapons. The role of CBR weapons from each of the four aspects
mentioned previously. Hazards stemming from widespread possession of
nuclear and CBR weapons. Desirability of international security force
to insure security of smaller powers.

2.4 The Inclusion of China in an Arms Control Program - A. Doak Barnett.

An exploration of various conceivable solutions to the indicated
problem, perhaps including some indication of the motivation for
solving the problem. The extent to which China might be interested in
joining an arms control program. The likely effects on China of such
a program. Various possible inducements that might be offered to
secure her participation. The possibility of a Russian-American pact for
solving the problem.

2.5 Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear? - Henry A. Kissinger.

Review of considerations set forth in the book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, including specifically a section on nuclear weapons in limited war. Views on the basis of the present situation. Relevance of this problem to arms control. Arguments for use of nuclear weapons in limited war, including the desirability of use of tactical anti-personnel nuclear weapons for defensive purposes, and weigh this against: (a) hazard of uncontrolled growth of initially limited nuclear exchange between major nuclear powers, (b) consideration of the fact that the considerably superior Western industrial base could not be equalized by the Communist powers in a conventional war fought away from their borders, while nuclear weapons do in fact provide something of a relatively cheap "equalizer," (c) the fact that we cannot possibly prevent the Communist powers (including China) from using such weapons if we do, (d) the hazard of such weapons spreading to

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the smaller powers (e.g., Arab League against Israel) if we continue
to rely on them, (e) the hazard of involving the major nuclear
powers in a war initiated by irresponsible allies or satellites using
nuclear weapons. Conclusion: Should one rely on the use of nuclear
weapons in limited war?

2.6 Domestic Implications of Arms Control - Kenneth Boulding.

The likely economic consequences of a major alteration in defense
spending (including the shift from present arms production to
the production of likely inspection system components), the political
implications of a shift of that magnitude, and the likely social effects.
The other changes that have occurred in American society since 1941,
which would not be reversed by a cut in arms expenditure. What
pressures would exist for continued large government spending? What
sort of spending would recommend itself? How would such a change
influence our readiness to offer greater amounts of aid to under-
developed countries? How would the business cycle be affected by
such a development? What utilization should be made of our research
and development potential?

2.7 Unilateral Disarmament - Erich Fromm.

The ethical and pragmatic reasons for such a policy, and the likely
consequences of it. Exploration of the recent history of such pro-
posals, and the actual experience with them. The views suggested by
the names Gandhi, Bertrand Russell, the SANE group, and the Quakers.
Other arguments to support a decision to disarm unilaterally.

III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMS CONTROL

3.1 The Political Feasibility and Diplomatic Prerequisites of Arms Control - William T. R. Fox.

Political problems that might inhibit acceptability of, or limit
extent of, arms controls--e.g., separation of Germany and Korea.
Arms control cannot reduce armament below the levels the major
powers believe necessary to support political objectives. Compare
with purely political pressures for arms control. The political
feasibility of distasteful features of arms control.

3.2 Techniques of Arms Control - Bernard T. Feld.

Various types of inspection and surveillance for various controlled
or prohibited objects of undertakings. Personnel inspection. Impor-
tance of statistical sampling techniques. Research and development
constraints. Inadequacy of present knowledge of techniques.

3.3 Adjudication and Enforcement in Arms Control - Louis B. Sohn.

Various possible adjudication and enforcement measures and systems
for use in arms control programs that did not presuppose a system of
world law. Various possible enforcement threats against various sizes
of national powers.

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[10]

3.4 **Limited Arms Control Measures** - T. C. Schelling.

The philosophy of approach implicit in the phrase "limited measures".
Differences in underlying premises about the nature of arms control,
the objectives of arms control, and the relation of these to limited
arms control measures. Illustrative applications to specific measures
such as a bomb-test ban, missile-test ban, etc. (Author's outline.)

3.5 Comprehensive Arms Control Programs - Jerome B. Wiesner.

Definition of "comprehensive control" as control of all significant weapons and forces. Deterrence of various things and of various kinds. So-called "stable" deterrence. Weapons and forces to be controlled, including Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBR). Relation of permitted weapons to efficacy of inspection. Research and development constraints. Relation of the components of the system to the total system functioning. Systems with and without an international police force. Outline of a representative system. Planning, organization, and time phasing.

IV. UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL POLICY AND ITS FORMATION

4.1 **Recent Decision-Making in the United States Government** - Saville R. Davis.

Description of the decision-making processes in actual operation in
recent years in arriving at United States policy positions and in
negotiating positions bearing on arms control. The factors to be
explored include the effects of current administrative and congres-
sional organization on governmental decisions, the influence of strong
personalities, the ineffectiveness of public channels of communication
to and from the White House, and the role played by our allies.

4.2 Government Organization for Arms Control - Hubert H. Humphrey

Recommended forms of government organization to provide various
functions in connection with arms control, such as research, policy plan-
ning, field experimentation, etc.

4.3 Attitude Formation - Ithiel de Sola Pool.

What factors contribute to the formation of public and private attitudes on armaments policy. How much does the public reflect on the matter? What sorts of "pressure groups" are particularly effective in this area, and how is one to explain their effectiveness? Does the ardor for arms control rise and fall sharply with changes in the international situation, or is it fairly constant? What role do the communication media play in the formation of opinion on such a subject? Does religion play a significant role in attitude formation? Public and private understanding of security concepts, especially of cooperative security measures. Attitudes and influence of defense contractors and weapon system scientists and engineers.

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V. BEYOND THE COLD WAR

5.1 Arms Control Through World Law - Arthur Larson.

Approach to arms control through a system of enforced world law, with an international security force under judicial or administrative control, including the problem of devising force levels and methods of application that would be both acceptable and useful to the major powers. An international security force under political control.

5.2 How Can the Economic System of the United States Contribute To Stabilization of a World Without Arms? - (Author-uncertain) Clarence Randall

What contributions can United States capitalism make to a peaceful and disarmed world of the future? Various specific dimensions along which our society could contribute to the stability and well-being of the world. Areas to which we could devote much of our contemporary research and development capability.

VI. FOREIGN COMMENT - Edited by Victor F. Weisskopf.

Brief comments on certain of the foregoing collection of papers to be solicited from selected foreign experts, including Raymond Aron, Jules Moch, Powell, Noel-Baker, Nutting, Boyd-Orr, Lester Pearson, Hammarskjold, von Weiszäcker, Topchiev, Federov, and Tsarapkin.

VII. SELECTED CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY - Edited by Christopher Wright.

DÆDALUS

Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

EDITORIAL OFFICE

Jefferson Laboratory, Harvard University

Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

on the Preparation of Manuscripts

AUTHOR: *Please scan these directions and give them to your typist*

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1. John K. Dupree (editor). *High-Energy Neutron Sources*. (Monographs in Nucleonics, No. 5.) Chicago: Frederick Watson Company, 1959.

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provide the best chance to limit hostilities.

It may be argued that this line of reasoning demonstrates the absurdity of a greater reliance one conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons must favor one side or the other. If they favor us, we should use them. If they give an advantage to the Communists, they will use them. But this is not necessarily the case. Unless the superiority of one side grows overwhelmingly, the increased risks of an unfamiliar mode of warfare may outweigh the purely military benefits.

The relation between conventional and nuclear capabilities is

The relation between constitutional and nuclear capabilities is
rates of an installment mode of writing may outweigh the benefit militarily benefits.
the case. Unless the superiority of one side knows overwhelmingly, the increased
advantage to the Communists, third will see them. But this is not necessarily
side on the other. It third favor me, we enough see them. It third give an
a guester reliance one concession of a side. Written a side must favor one
If may be argued that this line of reasoning demonstrates the spasmity of
provide the best chance to limit hostilities.

July 20, 1960

Dr. Donald Brennan
Lincoln Laboratories
Wood Street
Lexington, Massachusetts

Dear Don:

I am enclosing a reprint of my article for *Foreign Affairs*, which is going to become part of a more extensive discussion in my book. I would be very grateful for your frank comments--where you agree, where you disagree, what you would change, early in August so that I can avoid any damage before the book goes to the publishers.

With many thanks and kind regards.

Dictated by Mr. Kissinger before his departure for Europe and signed in his absence.