-15-

## II. The Change in the Nature of Alliances

Since the end of World War II, an important change has taken place in the nature of Alliances. In the past, Alliances have been concluded for three basic reasons: (1) To provide an accretion of power. According to the doctrine of collective security, the larger the alliance, the greater the power available to resist aggression

(2) To leave no doubt about the alignment of forces. It has often been argued that had Germany known at the beginning of both World Wars that the United States would join the Allies, war would have been averted.

(3) To provide an incentive for assistance beyond that already supplied by an analysis of the requirements of the national interest.

To be sure, there was some inconsistency between these various requirements even in the past. The attempt to align the maximum number of states occasionally conflicted with the desire to leave no doubt about the alignment of forces. The wider the system of collective security, the more various the motives composing it. The more embracing the

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

focussed on the adequacy of our warheads. In fact, the other elements of modern weapons systems may be much less reliable. The "hardness" of Minuteman silos depends entirely on theoretical studies. Of the thousands of missiles in our arsenal only a relatively few of each category have been proof-tested. There is little experience with salvo firing. Air-defense systems are designed in the absence of any definite knowledge of the nature of the offense. Thomas Schelling has pointed out that at least fifty per cent of the effects of nuclear weapons discovered in the U.S. test series have been "unexpected".

The situation is further complicated by the fact that the purpose of modern weapons is deterrence -- to prevent a certain course of action by a particular threat. But deterrence is primarily a psychological problem. It depends on the aggressor's assessment of risks not the defender's. A threat meant as a bluff but taken seriously is more useful for purposes of deterrence than a "genuine" threat interpreted as a bluff. Moreover, if deterrence is successful, aggression does *not* take

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

confined to discussions about the technical implementation of an
American conception. What gave the dispute its particular urgency was
that the advent of a new, highly analytical American Administration,
eager to enhance the United States prestige in the world, coincided
with the growing strength and self-confidence of Europe and the
deliberate policy of President de Gaulle to assert a more independent
role.

In the process, many of the issues that had been obscured in
the previous decade by the curious, somewhat one-sided nature of the United
States-European dialogue came for the first time into a sharper focus.
The emphasis which we suddenly gave to conventional weapons raised
the technical question whether a strategy which was to be stable to us might
not prove unbearable to the Europeans. Beyond that, it highlighted a
difference in perspective between the American and the European conception
of NATO which had existed since its beginning.

When the Korean war raised the specter that Soviet aggressiveness
might take military form, both sides of the Atlantic made a serious
effort to turn NATO into a more effective military instrument. However,

vailing strategic concept would have made necessary. Indeed, they were
somewhat inconsistent with it. Despite our commitment to a retaliatory
strategy we constantly pressed for a European contribution of ground
forces. It was considered against all reason to maintain the most
effective United States army in a military vacuum overseas. The
Europeans in turn though they agreed to a succession of NATO force
goals never really believed in the doctrines used to rationalize them
Rather they saw in their military contribution a form of initiation fee
to United States nuclear protection. The Europeans agreed to our requests
But they tried to see to it that their actual contributions would
be large enough to induce us to keep a substantial military
establishment in Europe, yet not so high as to provide a real alternative
to nuclear retaliation.

This ambivalence was brought into the open by the shift in
United States strategic doctrine in 1961. The American attempt to
strengthen the forces for local defense had the paradoxical consequence

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

of bringing to the fore the issue of nuclear control which for many Europeans had always been the crux of the matter. Suspicions were only exacerbated by repeated official United States pronouncements that our policy was not new; that it only asked the Europeans to meet existing commitments. The trouble was, after all, that existing commitments had a different psychological significance for us as for Europe.

For the first time, United States strategic views were publicly challenged, at first hesitantly then ever more explicitly. Europe had now gained sufficient strength and confidence so that the mere enunciation of a United States policy no longer guaranteed its acceptance. The pre-emptory way in which the United States (particularly Secretary McNamara) proceeded only sharpened the controversy. And France added fuel to the flames by giving European misgivings their most extreme formulation.

But, if the United States precipitated the dispute and our tactics sharpened it, European attitudes have been far from constructive. Europe has demanded a voice commensurate with its increased stature but it has been less ready to assume the burdens to go with it. Our requests

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

with the exception of Britain--knew defeat at one time or another during
World War II. Every country--again with the exception of Great Britain--
was the victim at some point of foreign occupation. Societies were
shattered, as never before.

This created two optical illusions: one in inter-European relations, the other in the relationship of Europe to the United States. In the immediate post-war period, the dislocation was so great that the most immediate task was to rescue some order out of chaos. On the Continent, the quest for a modicum of stability overrode all other considerations. Great Britain alone seemed to possess a structure capable of sustaining a long-range, orderly policy. During this period, Britain could have had the leadership of Europe for the asking. It would have seemed inconceivable that Europe might exclude Britain from its community--assuming that it would ever be able to form one.

Yet it was precisely the memory of its recent isolation that
prevented Britain from seizing its opportunity. The Continent contained
the countries which had collapsed during the war and were still wracked

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

conventional strength to the hordes of easily mobilizable Soviet man-power. To try to resist a Soviet attack with conventional weapons was to adopt a strategy that emphasized Communist superiority. The defense of NATO, according to United States doctrine in the late Fifties, depended on nuclear weapons. In so far as local defense was envisaged, tactical nuclear weapons would be an integral part. Conventional forces were the shield; nuclear weapons the sword of NATO.

As a result, large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons were shipped into Europe under the so-called double-veto system which required the consent of both the United States and the host country for a nuclear weapon to be fired. Moreover, the definition of tactical was such that SACEUR (the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) was to be able to destroy all Soviet weapons capable of attacking Europe. The nuclear arsenal in Europe thus included weapons of a range which could be called tactical only in the sense that they were stationed in Europe and not in the United States.

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

According to this strategic concept, conventional weapons played

a minor role. Their function was to deal with minor incursions or to
determine that a full-scale Soviet attack was taking place. Though there
was some talk of a "pause" before nuclear weapons might be used, the
logistic system of NATO made clearer than any public declarations where
the real emphasis of NATO strategy was. None of the conventional forces
had supplies for more than two weeks and several national contingents had
supplies for considerably less than a week. In case of large-scale Soviet
attack, nuclear weapons would have to be used practically from the outset.
"The pause," General Norstad was reported to have observed, "will probably
take place before the outbreak of hostilities."

Almost concurrently with the revelation of the "new" strategy
in 1957, the United States came to believe that it was inferior in long-
range missiles. In order to close this "missile gap", the United States
pressed its NATO allies to permit the installation of intermediate range
ballistic missiles on their territory. It was argued that these were

essential to the over-all strategic posture of the West. The vulnerability of the sites was not considered decisive because the Soviets would not be able to launch a blow against our European bases without an unacceptable risk of an all-out United States counterblow.

All these policies were drastically and suddenly changed with the advent of a new United States Administration in 1961. Great emphasis was placed on strengthening conventional forces in Europe. Reliance on tactical nuclear weapons was sharply reduced -- though, somewhat in-consistently, we continued to ship tactical nuclear weapons into Europe in order to fulfill existing commitments. We insisted on a degree of central command and control over all the nuclear weapons in the Alliance which lent color to arguments that we wanted to reserve for ourselves the sole decision over war and peace. The intermediate range missiles stationed in Italy and Turkey were peremptorily withdrawn. Opposition to the French nuclear program was extended by some influential spokesmen

- 41 -

to the British nuclear effort as well. The significance of "shield"
and "sword" in NATO doctrine was reversed.

The correctness of these policies is not now an issue. For
present purposes, it is sufficient to emphasize that they represented
unilateral American decisions and that these decisions were at sharp
variance with previous doctrine. The sudden emphasis on conventional
weapons had a disturbing psychological impact which made it very difficult
to discuss the issue on its merits. A local defense of Europe based on
conventional weapons implied that the United States might make a dis-
tinction between attacks on its allies and attacks on itself. The
constantly shifting intelligence estimates with which we sought to butress
our arguments compounded the difficulty. Europeans may have had an in-
creased feeling of security when the "missile gap" suddenly disappeared
but their confidence in the steadiness of our judgment was hardly increased.
The repeated reductions in our estimates of Soviet troop strength from 175
divisions to 90 to less than 60; the change in requirements for NATO

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

- 42 -

conventional forces since 1961, from pressing for somewhat above
thirty divisions to declaring that the present number of 22 is
adequate if properly equipped, have created the impression that our
intelligence estimates follow rather than guide our policy. Finally
the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey and
particularly the peremptory manner with which it was carried out
encouraged fears of a planned United States nuclear disengagement.
The tremors of uncertainty created by Operation Big Lift in October
1963 indicate the tenuousness of Europe's confidence in America's
strategic intentions.

Against this background it is difficult to understand the
outrage of so many of our officials against European doubts about our
constancy. Europeans may not question our commitment to their defense--
although this too has occured; but their fate is equally dependent on
the strategy by which this commitment is to be made effective. There
have been a sufficient number of shifts with respect to strategy to
indicate that another change is not unthinkable. And the fact that

these shifts have occured as essentially unilateral American decisions,
that the process of consultation was applied primarily to the implementa-
tion of United States views, created a sense of impotence in some
Europeans and a quest for autonomy in others.

Our dilemma in the field of strategy is real, of course. It
is unprecedented that the major burden of the defense of an area so
rich and potentially so powerful as Europe is carried by a country
thousands of miles away. And it is ironic that our most intense disputes
should be with the country which attempts to assume a greater share
of its defense.

Precisely because this situation is so unnatural, Europeans have
become inordinately sensitive to changes in American policy. They have
tended to cling to the familiar as one guarantee of continuity. A
decade and a half of dependence have created in some parts of Europe
the emotional insecurity of the impotent. A lack of direct responsibility

has turned criticism into querulousness.

We, in turn, are faced with the problem that technology is
changing so rapidly that no strategic doctrine can be maintained over
an indefinite period of time. The changes in our strategy were not
primarily the product of restless minds--though there has been an
excess of righteousness. To a considerable degree they have been
made inevitable by the growing nuclear arsenals on both sides.

Yet making all these allowances, we can correctly be charged
with a lack of psychological insight and historical feeling. There
has been too strong a tendency to treat our allies as factors in a
security arrangement and too little understanding of the tradition that
makes them want to defend themselves in the first place. There has
been too much insistence on theory and too little allowance for the
intangible elements of political will. We have not understood that our
hegemony in military matters--even if it is desirable--is bearable only
if coupled with great tact on political issues. Consultation has to

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

leave room for concepts different from ours if our doctrine is not to
appear as dictation. In short, the defense of NATO is not primarily
a technical problem. Its efficacy will ultimately depend on intangibles
of confidence and will.

A. Bilateral Negotiations

The United States has been torn by a dual ambivalence: it has
asserted the indissoluble community of our interests with those of
Europe; at the same time there has been a tendency to deal bilaterally
with the Soviets to settle East-West disputes. There has been an
emphasis on Atlantic unity; yet in the underdeveloped parts of the
world we have insisted on dealing with issues "on their merits," by
which we generally meant appealing to shifting UN majorities rather
than relying on a consensus within NATO. On many occasions our views
have been more nearly correct than those of our allies. But the fact
remains that too often our initiatives both with respect to East-West
relations and the emerging nations have been unilateral, leaving our
allies no option except to acquiesce in or perhaps seek to modify an

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

essentially United States policy.

In the long run such a course is bound to be dissolving of Allied unity. The United States will not be able indefinitely to combine the advantage of a free hand in East-West dealings with the benefits of Allied unity. Separate talks involve the possibility of separate accommodations. In 1959 Premier Khrushchev was invited to the United States at the height of the Berlin crisis as a unilateral American initiative. This required a subsequent tour of Europe by President Eisenhower to reassure our allies of our fidelity. Our allies, in turn, organized massive public demonstrations in part at least to give the United States government a reputation to uphold in the impending East-West talks.

In 1961, we repeatedly pointed out that as the country which would bear the ultimate burden of the defense of Berlin we had also the responsibility for exploring all possibilities of a settlement--if necessary alone or with those allies willing to join the effort.

Washington's view of the Alliance was described in one dispatch as a

- 47 -

cart whose two front wheels (the United States and Great Britain) were
well-oiled while the rear wheels (Germany and France) were creaking
badly. There were various hints that the bills for World War II were
coming due for Germany. "Exploratory" talks were started with the
Soviet Union about a Berlin settlement which did not end until our
plan was leaked to the press by the Germans as a means of torpedoing
it.

This procedure combined the disadvantages of every course of
action. France refused to agree to the "exploratory talks." The
Federal Republic gave its assent only reluctantly because it did not
want to be burdened with the onus of bellicosity and because it
hoped for a French veto in any event. Thus our two closest continental
allies were on the sidelines in a position to criticize the unfavorable
features of any plan but unwilling to assume any responsibility. Though
President de Gaulle would undoubtedly have pursued his "independent"
policy in any case, he was given unnecessary opportunities by our
diplomacy. Any dominance which he managed to exercise over German

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

policy was due to the fact that he represented Germany's real wishes better than we did.

After the collapse of the "exploratory talks" on Berlin there was a hiatus while the Soviets were preparing the installation of missiles in Cuba. The end of the missile crisis was followed by a lively correspondence between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. The contents of this correspondence have never been revealed--not even to our allies. It is not necessary to imply that these communications involved any "deal" prejudicial to our allies. The mere possibility that our allies might be excluded from a United States-Soviet arrangement is divisive of allied unity. It is not surprising that the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey two months after the missile confrontation in Cuba and while a lively correspondence was taking place between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, was represented by critics of the United States as part of a "secret" United States-Soviet deal to settle the Cuban crisis. Such a diplomatic process creates pressures in many allied countries to anticipate our overtures to Moscow.

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

by diplomatic initiatives of their own. Precedents are created for
Third Force postures even in countries which do not have explicit
doctrines to that effect or which may even formally deplore them.

The ambivalence of American diplomacy was again demonstrated during
the summer of 1963. President Kennedy's American University speech
of June 10, 1963 with its call for the end of the Cold War and the
admission of a certain deficiency in Western reactions towards Communism
suffered from not having previously been discussed with any of our allies.
France and the Federal Republic in particular saw in it another unilateral
overture by the United States--misgivings which were publicly expressed
by Chancellor Adenauer when President Kennedy arrived in Germany for his
triumphal visit a week later. During his visit, President Kennedy
constantly reiterated the indivisibility of American and European interests.
In Berlin he even went so far as to say that the wall demonstrated the im-
possibility of working with Communists. When questions were raised about how
this statement could be reconciled with the American University speech of
two weeks earlier, it was explained that the Berlin statement referred to
domestic politics, especially to the notion of Popular Fronts with the
Communists then being revived in some European countries.

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

explicit. One consequence is that in the decade ahead the roles
taken by the United States and Europe in the emerging countries
may well be reversed. Especially in Latin American and South
East Asia we may increasingly encounter European policies drawn
from the American script of the late Fifties and early Sixties.

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

- 32 -

## IV. Differences Caused by Acts of Policy

It would be idle to pretend that the strains within the Alliance have been the result exclusively of factors out of the control of governments. And it would be defeatist as well. Some of the difficulties have been the result of specific policies. This section will deal primarily with the United States' responsibility for the present state of affairs. This does not mean that other countries have been blameless--President de Gaulle, for example, often gives the impression that opposition to American purposes is for him an end in itself. It is simply that in a treatise addressed to Americans, it seems more sensible to concentrate on issues where the remedies are under our control.

Three issues have divided Europe and the United States in the past decade: the problem of NATO strategy, particularly the control of nuclear weapons; the issue of East-West relations; and, the problem of dealing with the new countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

In both the nuclear field and that of East-West relations, one
of the most disturbing elements has been the sudden shifts in American
policy. A great deal of the formal debate about strategy has concerned
the technical adequacy of our views. We have acted as if the obstacle
to an agreed NATO strategy were European inability to understand United
States strategic doctrine.

However, the problem goes much deeper. Many Europeans are indeed
disquieted by our views on strategy. But an even more serious problem
is the manner in which our concepts are formulated and the unpredictability
(at least for Europeans) with which they appear.

We have not taken sufficient account of the fact that to our allies
the constancy of United States policy is crucial for symbolic reasons...
far transcending the individual merit of specific policies. If we
drastically alter one set of policies without adequate consultation, this
creates a fear that a similar change of heart may come about with respect

to other policies, perhaps even with respect to the United States commitment to the defense of Europe. The concern goes all the deeper because the issue of peace and war rarely arises in terms of either-or. There are many intermediary issues where the outcome depends on nuances of interpretation of the common interest. Other countries value reliability and predictability in us more than brilliance, particularly if that brilliance takes the form of an erratic quest for novelty.

Changes in United States policy affect not only our reputation for reliability but the domestic stability of allied countries as well. Allied leaders who follow the United States lead inevitably stake their prestige on the correctness of our course. If we change direction--particularly in a manner that permits allied statesmen no share of the initiative--we are bound to shake the domestic position of those who have built their policies on close association with the United States. We enable the political opponents of these leaders to charge them with lack of foresight; or else we expose our friends to the ironical criticism that they are threatening the American alliance. This has been the fate

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

of Chancellor Adenauer in Germany and, to some extent, of Prime Minister MacMillan in Great Britain. Even in Italy those who were responsible for the installation of American intermediate range missiles in 1959 paid a political price.

What makes our impact all the more powerful is the singlemindedness with which some of our policies have been pursued, particularly in the past few years. Even measures that became governmental policy only by the narrowest of margins--such as the NATO multilateral force--are then pushed relentlessly. Briefing teams descend on European capitals to further our views regardless of the hesitations of the host government.

The teams line up political support where they can find it, if necessary with the Opposition parties. In fact, in both Britain and Germany the Opposition parties claim to be more pro-American on strategic matters than the government.

Occasionally, internal United States bureaucratic wrangles are fought out by attempts to line up European support for particular points

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

of view. Europeans have for the past four years, at least, heard
different assessments from Americans at SHAPE -- the Supreme Headquarters --
and from the Pentagon. They have been subjected to different emphasis
by the State and Defense Department. Some American officials have
urged the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force as a device to tie
the alliance indissolubly together. They have stressed that American
membership in that force was one of its most attractive features.
Other officials have broadly hinted that the multilateral force
can be a step towards a European force and that we are prepared to
consider giving up our veto.

Our view of consultation magnifies the difficulty. Though we
are strong advocates of it in principle, our tendency has been to try
to negotiate from an American agenda. The change of strategic doctrine
in 1961 was proclaimed from Washington. Our diplomatic efforts con-
centrated on removing objections to it. The Nassau agreement reversed
the traditional NATO usage of sword (for nuclear weapons) and shield

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

-65-

[Y]

service of new conceptions. Something must be left to history
and to organic development. No one would think of digging up a tree
every few years to see how its roots are doing. The same is true
of political constructions. Our whole tradition inclines us to
view tragedy as wishing something badly and, despite our best efforts,
fail to obtain it. But there is a form of tragedy even more poignant:
that of having one's deepest wishes fulfilled and to find them hollow.

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

# Nuclear Control in NATO

## Psychological Background of Problem

Difference in approach between our attitude towards European economic recovery and the defense of NATO.

With respect to the economic recovery program, we, in effect, asked the Europeans to develop among themselves a method for achieving their recovery and also to divide among themselves the total aid available.

Our influence was considerable, even though we were not very insistent and perhaps because of it.

We also encouraged the emergence of a responsible group of leaders experienced in the practice of partnership.

In the military field the relationship was more complicated for two reasons:

(a) The pressures seemed greater--the Korean war seemed to indicate that an attack on Europe was imminent.

(b) The defense of Europe seemed to us indissolubly linked with the defense of the United States. It, therefore, was only natural for us to play a more prominent part.

technology but when we cling to outdated concepts. But if we
were justified in seeking a revision of NATO strategy, we showed
little understanding in the manner with which we advanced our
views and the abstractness, sometimes bordering on dogmatism, of
our conceptions.

In order to understand the impact of the new strategic theories,
it is necessary to sketch briefly the historical background of
NATO doctrine.

In the early years there was an effort to meet Soviet attack
on the ground.

This was changed in the middle '50's to a greater reliance
on nuclear weapons.

Belief grew that NATO was permanently inferior in conventional
weapons.

Conventional weapons for border incursions

Tactical nuclear weapons

Strategic nuclear weapons

Sword and shield

Though there were rationalizations for the disproportionately

insufficient information. Most of the restiveness could be alloyed
by fuller exchange of information. It has been suggested that more
European serve on American staffs in the Pentagon, at SAC
headquarters and elsewhere. Some British Labor leaders have even
indicated a willingness to give up the British nuclear deterrent
in return for a greater voice in American policy. And there have
been several proposals for a reorganization of NATO to give Europeans
a larger say in NATO planning. The ideal solution according to
this school of thought would be a division of functions according
to which Europe would supply the conventional arms and the United
States the nuclear arsenal tied together by an intimate system of
consultation.

In assessing these proposals it is important to distinguish
two kinds of consultation: (a) that leading to an improvement
of technical knowledge (b) that involving a decision about goals.
The decisions where the dispute concerns technical issues are most
amenable to the system of consultation suggested in the various
proposals. A fuller exchange of information between us and our
European allies is desirable--regardless of the distribution of nuclear
power in the alliance. The close cooperation between SAC and the

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

XERO
COPY

Insert A

It is rooted in the nature of sovereignty and compounded by
the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Robert Bowie, one
of the most eloquent spokesmen of the dominant school of U.S.
thought, criticized British nuclear policy before the Assembly
of the West European Union as follows: "Britain has retained
its national command structure and the right to withdraw them
at its option. This means that they certainly could not be
counted on by any of the others to be available in case of
need."¹ [Italics supplied.] If this concern is real for the
British nuclear forces which are, after all, assigned to NATO,
it applies even more strongly to U.S. strategic forces which
remain under exclusive American control.

¹Proceeding of Western European Union Assembly, Ninth Ordinary Session, December 3, 1963.

December 3, 1963.

Proceeding of Western European Union Assembly, With Ordinary Session,

remains under exclusive American control.

It abides even more strongly to U.S. strategic forces which British nuclear forces which are, after all, assigned to NATO, need."¹ [Italia abbiglied]. It this concern is real for the counted on p. 7 and of the others to be available in case of its option. This means that they certainly could not be the national command structure and the right to withdraw them of the West European Union as follows: "Britain has retained thought, criticized British nuclear policy before the Assembly of the most eminent abbeamen of the dominant school of U.S. the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Robert Bome, one It is rooted in the nature of sovereignty and combined p.

Insert V

[A]