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To traditional Chinese thinking, in the political field no less than in the military, the righteous victor is the probable one. Righteousness and the probability become inextricably co-mingled. The victor when he consummates his victory can be seen to have won because he _has won_: His victory itself involves the retroactive legitimization of his war aims; the loser is by his defeat made retroactively corrupt, mistaken, immoral, shortsighted, and stupid. Few Chinese, ancient or modern, have questioned this powerful myth in Chinese culture.

Cleverness is the key tradition of Chinese warfare and is much more admired than the bloodshed or heroism of a charge of a light brigade. (When the Chinese have an Alamo they prefer to forget it. Since it did not succeed they are ashamed of it). It is important to observe that cleverness is a basic characteristic of all Communist operations. In contrast, while surprise and deception are properly at home in American military tradition they are rarely if ever used or considered by our foreign policy makers. In the present conflict situation, the inability or unwillingness of Western political leaders to be clever places the West at a distinct tactical disadvantage in coping with the Communists.

Much of the Chinese traditional doctrine on warfare can be summarized as follows:

a. Bluff the enemy out of fighting;

b. Threaten the enemy so that he will retreat, using skirmishes if necessary;

c. Do not fight when the enemy has the advantage;

d. Whenever possible use the strength of the enemy to destroy him: encourage him to do anything which will lead to his own undoing;

e. Capitalize on the fact that the enemy is always inferior to the Chinese in cleverness, in moral principle, and in resolution to wage a sustained struggle;

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f. Use peace negotiations whenever possible as a means of sapping the enemy morale. In such negotiations concede everything to the enemy except the final political and military victory; (Note the deleterious effect of the Korean and Indochinese armistices on the Western will to resist aggression in Asia).

g. When dealing with a non-Chinese enemy remember that he has no principles or conscience and is almost like an animal. If he is constantly distracted he will sooner or later wander away and give up the fight;

H. When the enemy is resolute let him win; then deny him the fruits of his victory by false armistices, breach of agreement, denial of the peace terms, and other devices, leaving him an ultimate choice of withdrawal or of renewal of the engagement with dispersed and demoralized forces;

i. The enemy should always be dealt with on the principle, "befriend the far, attack the near." (Chinese strategy should always reach beyond China's strategic frontiers to befriend the enemy's enemies and to prepare for a squeeze. In the present time, for example, the South Koreans should be treated with cumulatively, but the Japanese with respect, or the nationalist Vietnamese should be treated brusquely, but the Indians should be regarded with kindness. At a future date, should Japan become the target, the Americans should be treated with high cordiality, or if the Indians are the target, Pakistani should be befriended.)

j. Always remember that the enemies of the next round are watching the fight in this round. The outcome of the war is determined by the domestic and international prestige involved, not by the disposition of the military forces or the occupation of territory. No war is ended until both parties really agree that it is ended. This is a long and difficult process in which the Chinese must persuade the defeated un-Chinese people to accept their new status as a

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consequence of morality as well as of force.

k. Physical facts are of extreme unimportance. That is true when it is stated by persons morally and politically entitled to be regarded as having a truth-speaking capacity. (Contrast this attitude with American reliance on war production figures and other manifestations of industrial capacity to overcome potential enemies). In Chinese thinking, purely physical events do not affect the outcome of a dispute. If the enemy persistently refers to merely physical facts in support of his illegitimate and un-Chinese version of the truth, the calm, innocent reiteration of the truth -- namely, the Chinese version, irrespective of mere fact -- will wear him down so that he will eventually forget what it was that he started talking about.*

While Mao only passingly acknowledges his debt to ancient Chinese military thought, the debt is plain to see for anyone who wishes to check the record. By extensive use of the writings of Mao Tse-tung, one can readily understand the Chinese Communist concept of war. In particular his book entitled *On the Protracted War* is a sort of handbook on the problem of limited warfare.

The Chinese Communists differ from all other Communists in the length and bitterness of the struggle which they had to wage in order to win. Mao dedicated himself and his followers to an unending war, of which even he did not pretend to know the outcome. He preached war for its own sake as a means of furthering the Chinese Communist revolution. Speaking of the anti Japanese war,

*The points enumerated in paragraphs "i" through "k" are a distillation of actual Chinese practices in war, as traced by various writers. Sir Thomas Wade's study of the Chinese armed forces in the middle of the Nineteenth Century remains fundamental: "The Army of the Chinese Empire," *The Chinese Repository*, Canton, 1851, vol. 20, *passim* in three sections. Homer Dubs provided many clues to the beginnings of Chinese strategy under the Han Military Emperor in his translation of Pan Ku, *The History of the Former Han Dynasty*, Baltimore, 1938. A valuable new book is Ralph L. Powell, *The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955.

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he said, "Thus, it is obvious that the war is protracted and, as a corollary,
ruthless too . . . In the course of such a long and ruthless war, the Chinese
people will receive excellent steeling."* He has a contempt for those peoples
and those armies who considered war to be "merely fighting."** To him, twisted
but brilliant philosopher that he is, war is an objective approach to the human
struggle for reality -- a reality attainable only through action, and then only
through that kind of action which is governed and channelled by the guiding
"science" of Marxism-Leninism.

To understand Mao, it is necessary to see him in the light of the Chinese
past from which he himself derives most of his strength. To cope with Mao and
his fellow-Communists among the Chinese requires that we recognize that in *Commun-
ist China, we confront an enemy who has had ten times as much experience fighting
people like us as we have had in fighting people like him. We confront an enemy
who has learned from his experience in fighting Kuomintang China, Imperial
Japan, and various local Chinese powers, and who now turns that experience into
an assessment of the American position.

Mao says, concerning the method of military learning, "What is the method?
It is familiarize ourselves with all aspects of the enemy's situation as well
as our own, to discover the laws of action on both sides, and to take these laws
into account in our own actions."****

Mao has all the advantages of using his national past -- advantages

*Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1954), vol. 2, p. 188, paragraphs 39 and 40. Henceforth cited as "Mao 1954."

**Mao 1954, vol. 1, page 106, paragraph 2.

***Mao 1954, vol. 1, page 183.

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which in the case of Russia were largely thrown away by Trotzky and Lenin and recovered by Stalin -- while denying that past. He can be traditionalist and innovator, can appeal to Asians because his *is* Chinese and appeal to Chinese because he is *not* Chinese and is showing them the way to a new, better, and un-Chinese life.

Mao was able to boil down to essence of his particularized strategy in sixteen words:

* "enemy advances, we retreat;"
* "enemy halts, we harass;"
* "enemy tires, we attack;"
* "enemy retreats, we pursue."*

Mao acknowledged the fact that Chiang K'ai-shek brought into China the first modern army the Chinese had ever known -- an army which actually changed the character of warfare on the Chinese scene. To this extent, he has faced the same enemy with different faces -- the German-trained Nationalists, the Japanese, the Americans and South Koreans, and now the Americans again. Yet he has repeatedly gone on record as opposing an excess "guerrillaism," as he puts it, and on emphasizing the effect of coordinated use of guerrilla and regular forces.** He even reduced the teachings of Chinese guerrilla warfare to six simple aphorisms which could be learned not only by the officers but also by the enlisted men themselves:

Generally speaking, the main directives are as follows: (1) on our

*Mao 1954, vol. 1, page 212.

**Mao 1954, vol. 2, pages 132-134. This section is chapter V of his "Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerilla War," the most nearly classic statement of his teachings on irregular war.

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own initiative, with flexibility and according to plan, carry out of-
fensives in a defensive war, battles of quick decision in a protracted
war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations;
(2) coordinate with regular warfare; (3) establish base areas; (4)
undertake strategic defensive and strategic offensive; (5) develop
into mobile warfare; and (6) establish correct relationship of com-
mands.*

Within an integrated pattern of conflict, limited wars are advocated
by Mao for two primary reasons: First, in order to accumulate strength through
the capture of materiel and territory as well as the training and organizing of
military forces, such invigorating operations to be concurrent with the weaken-
ing and disintegration of the opponent. War is seen not as a destroyer, as we
view it in the West, but as a creator of strength, provided of course that hostile
counter-actions can be warded off or kept under control.

Second, the purpose is to engage the opponent, as Mao says, eccentric-
ally in order to bring to bear an overwhelming numerical superiority in tactical
situations. By his arithmetic, in a strategic situation where one fights against
tenfold odds in overall battle strength, one must operate in such a way that in
any specific battle one has tenfold combat or tactical superiority. These two
objectives of accumulation of strength and eccentric battles, of course, are
interrelated since a large number of tactical successes ultimately may change
the strategic balance of power. This doctrine is easily applicable for infantry
forces with poor mobility. Its applicability to motorized and mechanized
forces and also for air reconnaissance and other aerial weapons needs further
investigation.

Russian-Chinese Communism

It can be seen that elements of the indirect approach, particularly

*Mao 1954, vol. 2, pages 122-123.

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Chinese traditionalism fit neatly into contemporary Communism. (In a sense, many of the Chinese emperors conducted themselves as so many Stalins centuries before Stalin was born). Chinese political and military forces have won against overwhelming odds simply because they maintained a consistent and cumulative process of physical attack, spectacular pretense, effective retreat, renewed attack, and renewed pretense.

The doctrine of war of attrition was naturally adopted by many Communist writers such as Stalin, Tukhachevsky, Frunze, and Mao Tse-tung. The general thought of these writers is that while it is to the interest of capitalist powers, with their allegedly weak social structure, to engage in a rapid war, Communist forces, due to their higher morale and social cohesion, can and should fight long war.

The world revolution is seen essentially as a gigantic war of attrition which will last a hundred years or so, and which is undertaken for the purpose not only of destroying individual forces of the capitalist nations, but also of undermining the very cohesion of capitalist society. Consequently, Communist forces should avoid all-out engagements except when, in Mao's terms, they have a tenfold tactical superiority. They also should fight in such a manner that their major forces are protected and that even their battle forces can be easily disengaged. This concept is connected with the Bolshevik doctrine about "forces" which postulates that even the weakest and smallest forces can make a contribution and that in conflict all available forces should be used in some way without, however, exposing the main strength to extreme risks. Advances should be pushed where they are possible with a minimum of risk but the decision to retreat may have to be taken whenever the risks become too great. The purpose of each individual battle is not to gain a victory as such but to enhance the

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relative power position of the Communists at the expense of the capitalists.

Thus power is accumulated gradually and inevitably.

The Communists are by no means wedded solely to limited war, but only to the idea that the strategy should correspond to the concrete situation. It is of the utmost importance to spell out that in Communist strategy limited wars do not occur in splendid isolation but are a part of an overall strategic pattern. They are installments within a long-range plan of conquest. Limited wars undertaken by the Communists are coordinated with all their other operations.

"Coordination" is probably not the best term: the Communists run their global operations like a military headquarters runs an entire front. Operations of battalions at 100 mile intervals are not "coordinated" -- for local mutual support -- but are undertaken for a purpose defined by GHQ. Communist operations span the entire world and undoubtedly coordination occurs with respect to "unplanned" events. But if the CP in country A starts a guerrilla operation, CP of B launches a strike, and CP of C a huge propaganda campaign, they presumably follow orders which are issued from a center.

A feature of the Communist doctrine which is part of their secret code is concerned with what has been called "controlled war." The purpose is simply to use political warfare as an additional weapons system in order to prevent the opponent from reacting too strongly, that is, a political warfare operation is needed to provide strategic cover for the strategy of accumulating strength through eccentric operations.

It is also essential to recognize that, according to the doctrine of the Sixth World Congress, limited wars in colonial areas have a direct bearing on Communist strategy against European countries. A colonial war will lead to the commitment of a Western military force to a strategically "unimportant" area.

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The white forces fighting under strange and disagreeable conditions will become disorganized and demoralized. Therefore, the germ of revolutionary anti-militarism can be spread throughout the rest of the country's military establishment. If a defeat is inflicted, the chances are that a political crisis will ensue. If the military forces suffer from incipient disintegration, the Communists will improve their position all around. Moreover, while the operations last, it detracts resources from more important utilization, it allows the Communists to agitate over unpopular issues, and it may lead to a disintegration of the alliance between the Western powers, not to mention the "contagion effect" on other colonial areas.

Naturally, the Communist strategic scheme ties in with the Communist theory that the strength of the Western Powers ultimately is derived from their colonial holdings. Conversely, the Communists always camouflage their offensive operations as defensives. For example, the uprising of 1917 was launched in order to defend the revolution of March. Under the present constellation, the colonialism issue gives them the opportunity to run their entire offensive strategy under the guise of an operation designed to defend the rights of the½ oppressed peoples. In the same way as in 1917 the Kerenski government did not act against the Communists for fear that they would destroy the revolutionary achievement, the Communists, through the "anti-colonialist" slogans can hope to influence the Western Powers not only to stop the process of colonial disintegration, but also actively to participate in it. "Let the capitalists accomplish their own destruction."

Limited wars are also launched by the Soviets to support and enhance the value of the "Partisans for Peace" campaigns. Pacifist propaganda in the West is most effective if it is accompanied by actual fighting. Thus, a series of

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limited wars could strengthen Western pacifist inclinations and thus reduce armaments levels, in addition to pinning the label of aggressor on the U. S.

The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party, meeting in early 1956, placed increased emphasis on increased tactical flexibility -- a shift in stress which has been in the making for some time. Probably the origin of this shift can be traced to Stalin's recognition sometime during 1951 that the Korean War was not paying off as originally intended. We cannot be certain, however, that guerrilla wars or wars of national liberation have been completely discarded by Kremlin strategists. We can anticipate that the strategy of peaceful conquest via liberation will at least be given a trial run. The Communist pattern of expansion has always included a full arsenal of weapons as well as the widest possible choice of tactics. Consequently, mere selection of one particular tactical weapons system over another does not presuppose any fundamental change in Communist strategy.

Democracy is a way of life; while Communism is a way of making war.
With the Kremlin, warfare is continuous. Even when the military arm is muted --
which it is most of the time -- Communism's civilian armies, or fronts, are always
on the march. They bore into and envelop the enemy's rear long before the mili-
tary moves in, thus creating a foundation for victory. This type of operation
was forecast in 1926 by Major General J. F. C. Fuller, when he wrote:

> It is conceivable that the method of imposing the will of one nation upon another may in time be replaced by purely psychological warfare, wherein weapons are not even used on the battle fields . . . but instead, the corruption of the human mind, the dimming of the intellect, and the disintegration of the moral and spiritual fiber of one nation by the influence of the will of another is accomplished.

Consistent with this concept, a series of limited wars, undertaken to weaken, demoralize, split, and disarm the West serves furthermore as a dislocator

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of Western social structures. While this series may lead to ultimate success, it is tied in with general war either as a prelude or as a method of reversing the balance of power, or as a method of making us ready for "peaceful" surrender. Furthermore, a series of limited wars may serve the Soviet to win the technological race by forcing the U. S. to expose to them our weapons and procedures.

Another way to look at the Communist conflict system is to visualize it as a strategy of frustration. In such a strategy one does not aim at achieving immediate positive successes but merely at denying consistently successes to the opponent, thus creating a very powerful dislocating factor. Continuous frustration leads to exasperation and therefore makes the frustrated party liable to manipulation and error through provocation.

## A Glance at History

The widespread attention given to superficially attractive total war theories has tended to make many Americans impatient with more limited conflict and to overlook the role of such conflict in the world struggle. Few of them realize that the history of warfare is in the main a history of limited conflict. Basically, the American public does not understand the problem. The people chaff at a strategy of attrition because it takes too long and because it diverts them from politics-and-business-as-usual. The greatest difficulty in this area is not our lack of resolution, but our volatility and lack of endurance. A summary of limited warfare would involve a thumb-nail sketch of military history. No attempt, therefore, is made here to cover the entire field. A short survey of Chinese and Russian experience as a prelude to a closer examination of the important lessons of the Korean war, however, may prove illuminating.

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## The China Story

The Chinese have had only three unlimited wars in the past four centuries. These were: The frightful, pitiless, and unconditional conquest of the Ming Chinese empire by the Manchus of the Ch'ing house, beginning with the establishment of the Ching throne at Mukden in 1625, and concluding with the mopping up of the last nativist rebels in the Southwest about 1686; the repression and extermination of the semi-Christian T'aip'ing agricultural rebels of their uprisings of 1848-1865; the Communist erasure of Nationalist China, 1948-1949.

In November, 1839, the British effectively occupied Chusan and the Canton river forts. The Chinese promptly surrendered and immediately violated the terms of the surrender even though their territory had scarcely been touched. In 1841-42 the British occupied several Chinese coastal ports and cut the Grand Canal at Chunking. The Chinese surrendered even though the bulk of Chinese territory had scarcely been touched. The Chinese proceeded to crowd the Europeans as far as possible by violating the treaty terms.

In the Autumn of 1856 the British and French began fighting again and the two European powers seized the City of Canton while threatening the north. Again the Chinese surrendered promptly and as soon as possible began violating the terms of the surrender.

In 1859 the Chinese provoked the exasperated Europeans into a fourth limited war in which the Europeans had to take the City of Peking. In 1860, with the bulk of Chinese territory utterly untouched by any foreign military forces, the Chinese gave in.

The gunboat operations of the Western powers were often barbarous and almost always highhanded, but they were no more inhumane than what the Chinese

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did to one another at the same time. They were necessary in the opinion of the commanders of the gunboats and in the opinion of the foreign diplomats in China who authorized these operations. The necessity arose from the Chinese application of the concept that violence was humiliating and silly and that an insolent disregard of an agreement with a non-Chinese might very well bluff a non-Chinese into going somewhere else. It is unquestionable that the imperialist powers took the initiative from a military point of view; it is often forgotten, even on the Western side, that the Chinese provocation at any given time and place was enough to bring down the Western reprisal through violence.

The operations of 1899 represent Chinese limited war at its highest level. The Imperial Government turned loose the Boxers, who at their best were far inferior to the Klu Klux Klan at its worst, and experimentally encouraged the murder of diplomats, missionaries, and traders. The Imperial authorities denied any connection with the Boxers and at the same time encouraged an alleged "mutiny" of their own troops in an attack on the foreign legations in the city of Peking. When the Western powers responded with the military operations of 1900 and 1901 the Court attempted to deny all connection with the limited and illegitimate war against the West and did everything possible to evade moral and political responsibility for the injury inflicted on Western persons and governments.

Following the republicanization and the partial modernization of China, Japan began the vigorous and intelligent application of limited war doctrine to the Chinese zone.

The Japanese did not need to be taught Chinese concepts because they were nurtured on them from their own past. In 1915 the Japanese used extensively political warfare and deployment of forces in an attempt to browbeat the Chinese into acquiescence of the twenty-one demands. In 1919 they tried to head

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the Chinese off from the fruits of China's symbolic participation on the Allied side. At various times in the 1920's they used short, sharp military deployments or attacks to reinforce consular or diplomatic demands in Shantung and in Manchuria.

Even the establishment of Manchukuo between September, 1931, and March, 1932, was very strictly a limited war, since the Japanese remained at peace with the rest of China and attempted to continue their normal trading relationships with Chinese ports south of the Wall. The Shanghai war of 1932 was, therefore, a classic instance of a limited war.

It can very seriously be argued that at no time did the Japanese unleash an unlimited modern type war against Chiang Kai-shek. The Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 was both a large war and a limited one. It was large because of the extreme number of people involved and the amount of territory occupied. It was limited because Chiang always struggled with the political problem of survival and attempted (as it turned out, unsuccessfully) to maintain enough of a reserve to have a government-and-army-in-being with which to face the Communists in the post-war period; the Japanese cannot be said to have applied their major effort to China in 1940 and 1941, when they had enough left over from that effort to sweep the Americans, British, and Dutch out of Southeast Asia, to carry the war almost to the Australian continent and to wreck the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese never expected that they would be able to conquer China by means of an unlimited war; the Chinese never expected that their own military effort would lead to victory. Grandiose though it was, the Sino-Japanese War was a limited war, each party watching those outside forces -- especially the military forces deployed in Europe -- in order to ascertain the ultimate victor.

Communist China was born out of the womb of limited war conducted in

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such a fashion that the fibers on which a new social order for a Western-oriented China were destroyed. Many forces had a hand in the Communist triumph in addition to the U.S.S.R.

The Nationalists prepared the way for Chinese Communism by destroying more rapidly than they built, by seeing and attacking the evils of the past without foreseeing the dismal chance that the future might have even worse evils peculiar to itself.

The Japanese prepared the way for Communism by wrecking the only viable up-to-date Chinese government that existed between the 1750's and our own time.

The Americans prepared the way for Communism in China by encouraging the Chinese to partake, with inadequate preparation and means, in a post-war world which, for China at least, no living man knew how to translate from propaganda to face.

## The Russian Experience

In contrast to China, Russia has benefitted more from all-out assaults against her than limited conflicts, regardless of by whom they were initiated. Three of the most bitter wars in modern history -- Napoleon's invasion and World Wars One and Two brought immense defeats and sacrifice to Russia -- but from all three of these challenges Russia ultimately benefitted. Russian experience with limited conflicts has generally been less productive. The Crimean War was particularly noteworthy in this respect.

The Russian Army during the Crimean war was bled white by the battles around Sevastopol. The difficulties the Russians encountered in maintaining communications overland from the Moscow area proved much greater than those encountered by the Western Powers utilizing sea transport. In the end Russia

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gained nothing from her skirmish with the Western Powers on the edge of the Black Sea but internal upheavals.

The Russians have also gained by limited wars. In fact the whole Russian march across Siberia and the great desert stretches of Central Asia was marked by the same kind of colonial wars as were undertaken by the British and French in their far-flung transoceanic conquests. The Russians in Asia applied persistently the principle of continuous aggression against the poorly equipped and irregularly organized tribes that opposed them. The Russian General Skobelev epitomized the military philosophy of conquerors in stating "that in Asia he is the master who seizes the people pitilessly by the throat and imposes on their imagination."

In conflicts against more civilized foes the Russians rarely fared as well. The strain of prolonged wars far from the Russian center generally proved too much for the weak sociological structure of Russia to bear. In addition the limited wars which checked Russian ambitions, were all waged on the periphery of domains which had already become vast by the 19th Century. Poor overland transportation in every instance increased the burden of war for the Russians to a point beyond which continuation of the conflict would become politically unwise.

The Russo-Japanese War is another classic example of the ill effects to Russia of limited conflict. Both sides introduced into the conflict all the military power they could bring to bear but made no direct assault on each other's heartland. Russia was defeated although she was by no means close to the end of her resources. The Russians recognized that further sacrifices demanded by continuing the war would bring no tangible benefit but only damage to their internal structure. The skillful and aggressive pursuit by the Japanese of a limited strategy vis-a-vis Russia put the latter into a mood for a negotiated

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settlement. How unfortunate that the record of the Russo-Japanese War was not
more carefully read by Western policy makers confronted with another limited
conflict on the same peninsula a half a century later!

Just prior to World War II the Japanese and the Russians again engaged
in limited conflict with each other. At Changkufeng and Nomonhan Japanese
and Soviet forces (in the first instance purely Soviet, and in the second
instance a composite of Outer Mongol and U.S.S.R. elements) fought thoroughly
modern battles on the Manchurian frontiers with the Japanese, while avoiding
war in all other parts of China. The outcomes of the battles were inclusive
politically, but served the Soviet purpose of demonstrating to the Japanese
that the Soviet armed forces were ready to repel petty armed raids; the
Japanese drew the intelligent conclusion that they had better fight a bit more
in the South before tackling their Russian antagonists.

## Korean Lessons

The concept of limited war impresses many Americans as repugnant and
strange, although the United States record in the conduct of limited wars is
plain for a century and a half. Most of the American limited wars have in the
past been thoroughly successful in accomplishing their political aims and have
been far less expensive than unlimited wars in the same areas and for the same
purposes would have been.

Except for the United States wars against Germany in World War II and
the Union struggle against the Confederacy in the Civil War almost all United
States wars up to the Korean "police action" have been limited in character
and successful in outcome. It is profitable to review the reasons why Korea
became a disastrous exception.

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The Korean War for the first time brought the world face to face with the new range of political-military problems presented by the nuclear age. Many American military leaders were so impressed by the capabilities of the strategic employment of atomic weapons that they overlooked their limitations. They had come to regard warfare and total strategic air-atomic warfare as synonymous. General Bradley perhaps unconsciously reflected these views when he described the Korean conflict as "war at the wrong place, at the wrong time, against the wrong enemy." This observation seemed to imply that the Communists were a bit underhand in springing a war upon us in Korea for which our plans and preparations were so ill designed. On the other hand, civilian leadership was equally deficient. The civilian leaders had approved the U. S. military structure for reasons which were not necessarily related to the security problems confronting the United States. Nevertheless, they saw the necessity when the challenge was made in Korea to meet it head on. But they were so fearful of an atomic apocalypse that they came to believe a military stalemate was the only solution which would permit a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Throughout the war they continued to ignore a fact which the military leadership gradually came to perceive namely that the contest with Communist ambitions could be lost through a series of limited military stalemates which could be politically and psychologically exploited to Communist advantage.

The Korean War is obviously deserving of attention from the point of view of lessons to be learned since it is the only conflict involving the United States and the Communist orbit. The most striking thing about the Korean conflict is that the United States, to a large degree, imposed limitations on itself, which could not have been forced by the enemy.

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In Korea we denied ourselves many military operations which could have been compatible with a concept of limited war. A conspicuous denial was our refusal to use atomic weapons because of a faulty belief that the size or character of the weapons employed bore some relation to our endeavors to limit the conflict geographically.

Suppose we had employed atomic weapons in strictly tactical roles against the Chinese and North Koreans on the battlefield? We would have extended the range of force employed, not the geographical boundaries of the war. In that way we would have exercised the initiative against the enemy, instead of waiting to counter his move.

Two reasons, perhaps, explain why that was not done. Our atomic stockpile was primarily earmarked for SAC use. Tactical weapons technology and delivery means had not been very far developed when the Korea war occurred. The second reason was the failure by the U. S. and NATO nations to comprehend the wholly logical distinction between employing atomic weapons against aggressor armies in a limited conflict and their strategic use in a total war. The first reason is no longer valid. The second reason, primarily psychological, still operates and may dominate military decisions in the next limited conflict. Unless overcome, this mental block will increasingly favor Communist designs for creeping aggression.

The Korean conflict could still have been limited geographically without at the same time confining it to one particular, specific piece of real estate. For its base without attacking other areas in hostile territory not directly involved in supporting a particular war. Because of misconceptions prevalent during the Korean war regarding the nature of limited conflict, we gradually

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slipped into an almost catastrophic error: Acceptance of the idea that the only
appropriate conclusion for a limited conflict is a draw. Yet history has shown
that limited conflicts can be won or lost in military sense without the war
spreading beyond a particular political-territorial framework.* It would have
been possible in Korea to have obtained military successes, which would have
forced the enemy to negotiate a settlement favorable to our objectives without
forcing his complete capitulation. Thus, in Korea, there were many measures
we might have employed against the Chinese Communists to bring about a more
favorable settlement. To illustrate, general MacArthur made these four sugges-
tions to recoup the situation in Korea after the December, 1950, Chinese
Communist offensive: blockade of China; destruction by air and sea attack
of China's limited industrial centers; deployment of Nationalist troops in Korea;
and removal of restrictions against using Nationalist troops in the mainland.
These proposals were all rejected. In their place MacArthur was told to with-
draw, if necessary, from Korea.

It is not mere hindsight to conclude that, had the Chinese Nationalists
been free to deploy across the Formosa Straits, the Chinese Communists would
not have removed two armies from the Fukien area for use in Korea.

Furthermore, an active U. S. naval blockade against Chinese shipping would have
reduced greatly the support of the Chinese armies in Korea. Finally, our fail-
ure to bomb the bridges across the Yalu made it possible for the Chinese to

*The Italo-Turkish War of 1913 is a good case in point. Although the Italians enjoyed decisive naval superiority they were advised by their fellow members of the TRIPLE ALLIANCE that Italian Naval operations against the Turkish Coasts would be out of bounds. Despite this restriction and some poorly fought battles the Italians finally defeated Turkish forces in North Africa and as a result gained control of territories in North Africa which Italy retained until the end of World War II.

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maintain large forces in Korea. By denying itself operations which could have induced negotiations, the United States left the control and tempo of the war entirely in Communist hands. Perhaps our most pointed failure was the decision to stop military operations after the Communists asked an armistice in June, 1951. Had we followed the 1918 World War I example of continuing the offensive until the armistice was actually signed, there is an excellent chance that the Korean War would have ended by mid-summer of 1951. Will lessons of the Korean War be learned in time to forestall failures in future limited conflict?

## The Problem

Our problem lies in the fact that Communist aggressors will not in the future hesitate to provoke "limited wars" in remote corners if ever they believe such wars advantageous. They will seek to set limits to the conflict by more or less forthright threats of retaliation should we widen the contest beyond what they regard as desirable tactical limits.

In facing this prospect the present U. S. doctrine according to which a capability for fighting global war *ipso facto* makes it possible for us to win limited wars is unsatisfactory in some respects, though not entirely incorrect. It is most valid with respect to what might be called *little* limited wars of the Malayan and Greek type, but inaccurate with respect to a Korean-type war or expansion via infiltration (such as is now occurring in Laos). It would probably break down if in a future limited aggression the aggressor would use fast mechanized forces, air transport and air power, and perhaps even nuclear weapons. The situation might also be difficult if a future aggressor would be in possession of guided missiles with a range of several hundred miles.

Another unsatisfactory feature of our present doctrine is that we tend

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to argue this problem in an either-or fashion without recognizing that limited
wars under some circumstances must precede global wars. Since we do not mesh
the various forms of war into a meaningful pattern, and consider each conflict
in isolation, we are inclined to allow ourselves to be defeated in a limited
conflict, not recognizing that each "minor defeat" brings the global war so much
closer.

An attractive Communist strategy against the West might be to pin down,
through satellites, Western forces in a maximum number of places, allow them
to gain successes, provoke them into launching a major offensive in an area
which is of relatively small strategic importance to the Communists, and --
once Western strength has been dispersed -- suck them, including the air forces,
into *culs-de-sac*, and launch a major attack on the U. S. This particular
possibility poses a serious dilemma. If we try to combat such a strategy with-
out reacting in places of our own choosing, we would have to give up defense
in the local area, and yet if we do this, we would lose limited wars in a
wholesale fashion, thus contributing again to our final defeat.

This difficult dilemma results fundamentally from our attempt to cover
too much with too little, and our determination to remain on the defensive in
all fields and under all circumstances. The United States simply cannot fight
a series of local wars in this pattern and survive. We should think, therefore,
about alternate solutions.

At the present time the United States is challenged by three limited
wars on or near the periphery of Communist China. The three limited wars, all
of them currently dormant, are: The unfinished war in Korea; the suspended war
in Indo-China; and the pending Communist break-through into the insular Pacific

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at Formosa.

The possibilities of limited conflict also exist in the Middle East.
Soviet pressure on Iran to abandon the Bagdad Pact and intermittent Communist
pressure on both Turkey and Greece and the recent Soviet excursion into the
Levant all point up the possibility of heightened diplomatic conflicts and the
eruption of large scale violence. Nor can Europe be barred as a possible
future source of partial conflict. Yugoslavia and Greece might again become
the scene of such a war. Nor can one foretell to what the troubles in North
Africa might ultimately lead.

The fact that these conflicts are now dormant or latent does not mean
that we have found the means of stopping future limited wars. Presently con-
ceived policies and measures fall short in three major respects:

The first deficiency is the attempt to transfer our own distaste for
limited, inconclusive conflicts to the enemy. We make the error that our
Communist opponents, whether Chinese or Russian, adhere to the same kind of
rationality we employ and thus justify the correctness of our own action pattern.
Yet regardless of absolute judgments as to rationality neither the Soviets nor
the Chinese Communists are rational by our lights. This has been well expressed
by G. Niemayer: From the Western point of view, Soviet conduct is not rational
in the strict sense of the word. "... Soviet minds are fixed in a future
exclusively their own, employ a standard of truth peculiar to their Party command,
disregard the logic of consistency, are impervious to the lessons of experience,--
in short lack a common basis of calculation they might share with others, as
most people share it even with their enemies. Soviet leaders may exist on the
same planet with others, but they live in a world of their own. . . . Theirs
is a world resembling that of the constitutional psychopath who knows distinctions

- 36 -

[LC]

between right and wrong but does not care to be guided by them, who can behave
along rational lines but may at any moment strike out in completely irrational
ways, who is prompted by an utterly self-centered mind that is not linked to
others in reaction and response."

If one accepts the validity of this characterization of Soviet behavior
it is difficult to see how we can project our concept of the rational limits
of conflict into the thinking of the Russian leadership. The essence of our
current limited conflict policy is, however, a continuing warning to the Kremlin
not to start a little war since we may meet it by taking a total war against
the heart of Soviet power. Thus far the Soviet leadership has not been im-
pressed with this threat.

The problem of communicating successfully with the Chinese on issues of
limited conflict is even more difficult than it is with the Russians as our ex-
periences in the Korean War testify. The Chinese contempt for material factors
in a given situation and their skill and preference for playing on the time-
psychological sector have been discussed above. Can we successfully impress
the minds of Peking with a policy that relies on strong words and the presumed
use of a weapon they have never seen and which we have thus far declined to use
in the face of the strongest (in terms of our own behavior pattern) provocation?
Part of our failure to communicate with Peking is our reluctance to employ the
persuasion of force.

But even assuming our concepts seemed logical in terms of our opponents
they would still have to be acceptable on the part of our own people. Here the
stumbling block is that we are not prepared doctrinally for this kind of con-
flict. A strategy which does not admit the possibility of limited wars and
hence the necessity of preparing specifically to fight them may prove incapable

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[L.C.]

implementation when put to a test. As of now preparations for meeting a limited conflict generally fall as crumbs from the table of the preparations for all-out war. The "left-over" policy for brush-fire wars is based on the theory that our willingness and ability to meet limited aggression in any area with the threat of taking the war to the enemy's vitals will prevent the occurrence of such aggression. In a democracy, however, statesmen can act confidently only when they are certain that their people will support their actions. With the near advent of nuclear parity there are few spots left on earth which the American people will want to see defended at the risk of initiating a thermo-nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia.

The Western failure to provide adequately for coping with limited conflict has been heightened by the common belief that any employment of atomic weapons in a limited conflict would inevitably lead to a general war in which the entire range of nuclear bombs would be employed.

In American usage the term "limited war" has come to mean a war in which nuclear and other "weapons of mass destruction" are not being used.

Secondly, it means a war which is fought without the concurrent participation of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Thirdly, it means a war which is fought in a peripheral area for the possession of a territory of minor importance.

Fourthly, it means a peripheral war fought under restrictive rules concerning the employment of any weapon.

Fifthly, limited war is a method whereby Western forces deal with Communist guerrillas and uprisings.

Sixth, the term has come to signify a war of any size which is fought with any weapons or tactics, in order to achieve a war objective which falls short of unconditional surrender.

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limited war might also include a war fought by American and Russian forces either
in a limited area and for a limited purpose, or a global and decisive war fought
without nuclear weapons.

Close analysis shows hopeless confusion between these various concepts.
For example, it is entirely faulty to assume that a nuclear war can be of only
one, namely an unlimited type, or that the employment of a few nuclear weapons
automatically transforms a limited into an unlimited conflict. There are many
types of nuclear weapons. These can be employed through many different tactics
against many types of targets with many different results. Nuclear weapons, for
instance, can be employed for the wiping out of entire populations, but they can
also be used against selected industrial or logistical targets, or against troop
concentrations. A comparison of technologies would show that nuclear weapons
need not be more death-dealing than many "conventional" weapons which could be
used instead.

It is entirely conceivable that in a peripheral war, fought for limited
war objectives, nuclear weapons may have to be used and that still the entire
undertaking would qualify as a limited operation. By contrast, a peripheral
war fought with nuclear weapons may be unlimited in the sense that its true ob-
jective is the neutralization and fatal weakening, by indirect approach, of a
major power and that success in such an undertaking is striven for as a pre-
liminary to an unlimited intercontinental war.

At this point another twist may complicate the design: if through con-
flict in a limited area one of the major powers has achieved a position of
cominance in the air, it can force the major opponent into surrender without
even going through the motions of nuclear bombardment. Thus, we would have an
unlimited war of annihilation in the purely military sense, but actually it

[Lc]

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would take place without the employment of major nuclear capabilities and consequently without large-scale casualties.

It is also quite conceivable that a major war fought without nuclear weapons could degenerate into a conflict similar to the Thirty Years War, and that in its impact on all societies it would be entirely unlimited, while a major war, which due to the employment of nuclear weapons can be kept short, will not result in extreme disorganization and devastation.

Some current theorizing on limited war often contains the more or less openly stated assumption that it is possible to maintain military forces which can operate without the employment of atomic weapons. This assumption remains valid to this day, but will become increasingly less so. Unquestionably, small nations, if they were to go to war, might fight with equipment of World War I or World War II vintage, and the old weapons system retains a limited utility even in the military establishments of the major powers.

The more significant question is whether the forces of the major powers can be organized both for a nuclear and a non-nuclear war, so that they retain an option concerning the type of war they want to fight. Such a dual organization might be feasible as an interim solution while the forces of the major power still are equipped with large quantities of older weapons and only with limited supplies of nuclear weapons. As soon, however, as nuclear weapons are plentiful, this solution becomes entirely impractical.

In the first place, if nuclear weapons are available in large numbers, surface forces can no longer be used in the traditional formations lest they run the risk of complete destruction. They cannot be massed, nor can they rely on elaborate logistics installations. Hence they cannot fight, let alone advance -- unless they use nuclear weapons.

Secondly, in the absence of nuclear weapons, aircraft would have to be

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[LC]

used in large numbers. But this would pose the risk of obliteration, if the enemy were to load his planes up with nuclear weapons. Consequently, air defense must be near perfection, and this is not possible except through the employment of nuclear weapons.

It is impossible to fight a war with a technology of thirty years ago. That the clock of war technology can be put back is a childish illusion. The sooner we rid ourselves of it, the better off we shall be.

## Elements of a Solution

Maintaining a United States capability to deter any possible Communist resort to an all-out nuclear war is a pre-requisite to Free World security, but by itself not enough to halt the forward march of Communist. The use or threat of use of force is an essential complement to the Communist grand strategy of subversion and political warfare. If we permit the Communists to work around our thermo-nuclear* barrier to general war we may lost the psychological and political base on which to face any show down. We must be prepared to cope with Communist aggression without resort to our ultimate thermo-nuclear weapons and meet these aggressions in such a way that the Communists cannot use the threat of total war to blackmail our allies into abandoning the alliance.

*Thermo-nuclear is a convenient word but may be loose terminology. The key point is not the type of weapon used but essentially the destructiveness of the weapon. The idea that a fission weapon is acceptable but a fusion weapon is a transitory position. The point at issue is whether there will be "over-destruction" and unnecessary killings both among the military and the civilians, and whether in addition we would release too much and uncontrollable fall-out which would be strategically unsound, in the first place, and destructive to humanity in the second. At the same time, however, we should guard against inweighing against employing radioactivity when actually this could be, under some circumstances, a very humane weapon.

41

This solution requires the development of a strategy that recognizes the possibility of irrational Communist response to our actions, gains the support of our own people for a policy of resistance to Communist intimidation and psychologically paves the way for the use of atomic weapons in limited conflict.

A capability for immediate and effective use of thermonuclear weapons is an indispensable element of U. S. national strategy and is the major deterrent to general war; but this capability cannot be the answer to Communist peripheral expansion in which their threat of force, in its various forms, is a powerful and persuasive support for Communist subversion. The existence of the thermonuclear weapon may discourage, in the future, blatantly overt aggression by the Communist powers, such as occurred in Korea, because of the risk that this might develop into war unlimited by geography. But equally it may, and probably will, encourage the indirect approach through limited actions designed to present to the Free World coalition a seeming risk of general war, should we react in kind.

It is necessary to stress at this juncture that politically divided countries, especially those with strong Communist or independence movements, are among the first targets of Soviet peripheral strategy. Consequently, if political disintegration can be halted and Communist parties be reduced in influence, the chances of such wars occurring have been lessened. Hence, constructive political programs and aggression via good psy-war must be considered to be a deterrent. The Communists have probably learned their lesson from the Korean experience and recognize the advantages of keeping their creeping expansion as veiled and irregular as possible. Such a choice on their part will unfortunately capitalize on the American government's present inadequate organization for coping with the cold war. The U. S. is still trying to fight an enemy who orches trates his actions in a highly compartmentalized fashion. The U. S. still seems

42

[Lc]

to expect a formal kick-off before it is willing to recognize any military res-
ponsibility for counter action in a threatened area. Likewise American agencies
concerned with political, economic, psychological, and ideological aspects of
the problems tend to channel their activities and all of them together ignore
the "force aspect" of the problem before it is too late,

The Communists are old masters at infiltration as a concept of warfare.
Conquering a country from within via infiltration requires either the capturing
of existing political and social organizations within the country or the creation
of new organizations if these can be employed more effectively. Political power
in any country is exercised through organizations. The Communist infiltration
strategy is designed to move into the more strategic of these organizations,
group by group, until the whole structure eventually falls into their hands.

Any operations designed to cope with the entire spectra of Communist
warfare would fail unless they also include a real capability for combating the
Communist campaign of infiltration. The Communist operation is highly organized
and directed by trained cadres. No effective counterplan can be implemented
without equally competent personnel selected and trained for the purpose. With
such trained personnel it would be possible to flush out the Communist cadres
and fight them. In addition to trained people, the government of a threatened
country must espouse objectives which will gain the support of major segments of
the population. There are many ways by which this could be done -- a sensible
land distribution program, a granting of rural credits at lower interest rates,
etc. Many pro-American governments have specifically espoused such objectives
but have lacked the psychological skill to obtain support for what they have
done. In these cases the Communists, instead of being weakened by such moves,
generally claim the lion's share for the "concession."

43

[LC]

An important and often neglected aspect of the serious problem confronting the West, and particularly the United States, is that despite ten years of Cold War experience we are peculiarly ill-equipped to cope with Communist infiltration tactics. If we continue to rely too heavily on orthodox military forces to stop Communist take-overs we may be confronted by situations in which military intervention will have significantly adverse psychological and political repercussions. Admittedly there may be circumstances in which we will have to act regardless of such consequences. It would be much better, however, to develop an effective counter-infiltration capability that will prevent their occurrence. This capability would necessarily involve a combination of talents. The task of welding together the military and non-military services of the government into an effective operational force is a difficult one but such a combination is the one that promises most success.

This discussion raises the question as to whether it is possible to fight a strategy of attrition through limited conflicts both of a political and military nature without having a _cold war operational command_? We are trying to win this conflict by initiating all kinds of "programs," but _we do not conduct operations_, while the Communists do exactly the opposite. This point is of fundamental importance.

The Communists have an unlimited objective, namely world control. Yet they have succeeded in dividing it up with a sort of political differential calculus into many limited operations. The unlimited objective never appears and the limited operations usually are of such a nature that strong reasons militate for our compromising with them. Another term for this is the old notion of the artichoke strategy. By contrast, the United States fundamentally has a limited

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objective, namely the eliminating of all serious military and aggressive threats
and yet it manages to proclaim unlimited objectives whenever it gets involved
in a minor conflict.

The conclusion which emerges from this discussion is that the U. S. must
create deterrent power against every operational capability the Communists
possess. Failure to plug any hole in the dyke will lead to eventual Communist
inundation.

On the assumption that forces capable of preventing Communist infiltra-
tion tactics are being created this paper will henceforth concentrate on the
military aspects of the problem. It is worthwhile reiterating a central prin-
ciple to be followed; namely, that the U. S. and preferably the allied coali-
tion, must be prepared to stop limited aggression without necessarily resorting
to general war. In parallel with our effort to develop the major deterrent
against general war, we equally need to build our defenses against Communist
limited-objective actions by all means at our disposal, including where
necessary the maintenance of specific forces for the purpose.

There is a close connection between the Communists' employment of mili-
tary force from safe base areas and their manipulation of diplomacy, subversion,
and guerrilla warfare.

Elimination of the fear of external aggression, therefore, is a vital
element in coping with the Communists' sabotage campaign against the govern-
ments of the weak countries bordering the Communist frontiers. Obviously the
threat of Korean style aggression can be eliminated only if Free World military
forces exist which are capable of being, and actually are, rapidly and effec-
tively employed in any area threatened by Communist seizure. There is not time
to assemble such forces after an overt act of aggression takes place; they must
exist before such an act. Free World military action must be swift if it is

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to block Communist military-subversive tactics. To meet this criterion, the
Free World should possess ready task forces and must display a manifest inten-
tion to use them in the event of Communist aggression.

A peripheral attack involving guerrilla operations would not, however,
require such swift reaction. This problem requires a different answer. For
example, guerrillas have their own logistics problems but so far we have not
succeeded in developing a method by which their logistics can be interfered
with effectively. This is one area where a particular type of air attack could
be useful.

In order to counter the whole range of possible Communist aggression,
the military posture of the U. S. must be based on strategic forces capable of
delivering thermonuclear weapons, an integrated and effective continental
defense system, together with ready forces of the U. S. and its allies suit-
ably deployed and adequate both to cope with creeping aggression and to dis-
charge the initial tasks required for general hostilities. In specific terms,
the solution of the U. S. military problem requires:

a. Maintenance of technologically and operationally superior strategic air and naval forces. (The U. S. "commanding lead" in technology is a big problem, and there should be no complacency as to where we stand on this point.)

b. Maintenance of an air-sea defense system for continental U. S. and the Western Hemisphere which takes full advantage of the defense in depth and warning facilities provided by the resources of our allies in Europe and Asia.

c. Maintenance of sufficient U. S. forces in Europe to assure the contin-
ued development of a NATO defense force capable of making Europe a firmly held
allied politico-military position which can serve as a base for other anti-
Communist moves.

d. Development of indigenous military forces in Asia and the Middle East,

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assisted by U. S. training missions and equipment, which are capable of main-
taining internal security and, when in conjunction with U. S. and allied forces,
are capable of participating in or supporting limited hostilities.

e. Development and deployment to appropriate locations of flexible allied military forces, possessing both strategic and tactical mobility, which are manifestly designed for immediate "active" employment in any area where Communist limited aggression is tried in any of its militant forms.

U. S. units, combined with all available allied formations into task forces, should constitute the core of the Free World's "cold war mobile reserve," and should be ready for general war, should it arise.

Current U. S. policy recognizes the necessity for adequate indigenous forces and mobile U. S. forces to meet hostile actions lesser than general war. However, the development of these mobile task forces lags considerably behind the effort that has gone into the other elements of the U. S. military program. The creation of such forces is a challenging task involving new ideas and some alteration of military organization, tactics and equipment.

The above outlines the various tasks of the U. S. military services in waging a cold war and in the deterrence of general war. Their performance requires continuous effort and patient vigilance, in order that the Communists do not either achieve a position where general war becomes an acceptable risk or gain their objectives by means other than war.

This analysis suggests that if the U. S. possessed an effective mobile strategic reserve which could be deployed immediately to the scene of a Communist inspired local aggression, the possibility of a Korean-type episode would be sharply reduced.

Although U. S. policy calls for the creation of such a force, it does not

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exist in complete form. One understandable reason why such a force has not been created is budgetary. Yet, by making adjustments in certain existing programs, a U. S. "fire brigade" for use against creeping aggression might be created. A good deal of U. S. defense effort, particularly in the Army, is devoted to the creation of post D-Day forces for use in a general war. In a general nuclear war, the ultimate decision may be made, regardless of the length of time it may take to become fully apparent, during the period of the initial nuclear exchange. If that is true, armed forces in being appear more essential than post D-Day mobilization forces. In fact, in the nuclear age, the concept that U. S. superiority rests upon its industrial potential can be sharply challenged. If we are in a period when ready forces, not mobilization potential, are the decisive factor, than part of the resources required to create a U. S. strategic reserve can be obtained by decreasing the effort we are placing on post D-Day mobilization.

In many of the areas threatened by Communist creeping expansion, the U. S. is assisting in the development of large indigenous forces, large in the sense of being far beyond the capabilities of the countries involved to sustain them. In no case are these forces large enough to withstand, by themselves, any significant overt Communist military aggression. It has been suggested that the military aspect of our foreign assistance program in the Far East could be reduced provided the U. S. itself had an adequate strategic reserve that could be deployed against local aggression. If the U. S. assistance to most threatened countries were concentrated primarily on deploying local security forces (border patrol, anti-guerrilla forces, counter espionage, etc.) money which is now being allocated for orthodox military formations could be decreased. Some of this money could then be diverted to the creation of a U. S. strategic reserve.

Adoption of this concept would have the following results:

(1) The threatened countries would be more secure against subversion and

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[LC]

under less economic and political strain than they would be if they are required
to maintain a large-scale modern army.

(2) The U. S. would have a mobile strategic reserve which it could intro-
duce into a country in the event of overt Communist aggression (subsequently,
local forces could be built up on an existing nucleus in the pattern of Korea).

(3) Communist subversion could be better checked and the Communist
recognition that the U. S. had a means of forestalling overt aggression might
decrease their willingness to attempt it,

If the Communists attempted to tie down our strategic reserve in one
place and then began a new aggression in another, this could be recognized as
a definite willingness on their part to force a general war which should be
reacted to accordingly.

In designing such a U. S.-Allied force many sticky factors should be
considered. One of them is that most of the limited wars we are talking about
occur in countries which have little industry and poor transportation systems.
Some of these wars occur in jungle areas. Under those conditions the rifleman
with a minimum of heavy weapons and logistics becomes the primary force and by
the same token a great deal of our technological superiority is neutralized. In
fact, in those cases where the Communists have large local manpower resources,
they possess distinct logistical advantages over us (human back logistics).
This is particularly true in jungle warfare which under present conditions
allows them to sidestep aerial reconnaissance and aerial supply.

This question must be divided into an argument as to whether we can pre-
pare for such operations by using indigenous forces ourselves and relying on
some kind of an improved infantry (guerrilla against guerrilla) or whether it
would be to our advantage to develop an advanced technology suitable for such
operations, and specifically whether we would be well advised to employ nuclear

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[LC]

weapons of different sizes, not to mention biological and chemical ones.

We should be even more strong in our rejection of the frequent implicit assumption that limited wars are almost exclusively ground wars. Once we stipulate that air weapons will be used under all circumstances and are indispensable above all in the initial phases of a conflict as well as to compensate for numerical inferiority (Korea), then we perhaps discuss the specific problems of air operations in such conflicts. What are the best targets? What is the influence of political considerations on target selections? What are the best weapons that can be used (for example, biological, chemical, radiological, etc.)? In what way do we use our aerial weapons in order not to alienate the local populations?

Furthermore, there is a broad question as to how aircraft would be used to improve the effectiveness of our ground forces. Here we are concerned with envelopment movements by means of helicopters, gliders, and small aircraft, as well as commando type operations and in the case of jungle warfare, of denial (particularly of food), pursuit and encirclement by virtual means. So long as we maintain local air supremacy, we should be able to use light aircraft in large numbers as a modern form of cavalry. Airplanes such as the Piper Cub can be produced for less than four thousand dollars each (even less if you leave out the electronics), and relatively easily air transported to the battle zone. The point is that we have not achieved adequate mobility in Asiatic operations but that such mobility can be obtained through relatively cheap means. Technology of this type would negate a great deal of the enemy's manpower advantages.

In establishing force requirements, the United States should under no circumstances again contribute over 90 per cent of the military force in a limited war. The United States should be the arsenal of equipment, training, cadres, and command, and it also must have a considerably stronger air transport capability, but we cannot fight other nation's battles without self-

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defecting consequences.

On the other hand, the small Asiatic countries should not be invited to
overextend their resources in setting up relatively ineffective military forces.
Part of the answer may be the creation of "Freedom Legions," perhaps on a global
scale, which could be moved around according to need. To acquire such a capa-
bility, it will be necessary first to set up freedom parties and step up our
overall ideological offensive in order to obtain a maximum of volunteers. More-
over, the point must be driven home that a strong anti-Communist posture in the
local areas is one of the most effective and indispensable elements of deter-
rence to limited war. Insofar as strictly colonial wars are concerned, for
example, in the style of the unrest in Morocco and Algiers, we should do more to
see that such troubles are subdued most effectively. In particular how construc-
tive policy actions can be combined with programs of re-education and reform.

## Use of Atomic Weapons in Limited Warfare

With respect to meeting limited aggression, the U. S. is adopting a
combination of conventional-atomic military forces on the premise that it is
possible to use atomic weapons in limited conflicts. It has been contended,
however, that any use of atomic weapons would inevitably widen the area of con-
flict into unrestricted general war. While it is true that both sides may, in
search of local military advantages, desire to extend both the area and scope
of combat operations, the threat of thermonuclear retaliation is likely to
restrain them from such a course. Limited wars have been fought for limited
political objectives throughout history. Both sides found it desirable to
accept limited results in Korea in lieu of enlarging the conflict. Even the
Kremlin might rather accept a stalemate or defeat in peripheral aggression
rather than enlarge the conflict and thus provoke the certain thermo-nuclear
retaliation from the U. S. The thermo-nuclear bomb may emerge not only as a

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deterrent to general war, but also as a potent means of keeping limited wars
limited.

Specific attention must, however, be given to the problem of how nuclear weapons be used for the first time. Since we cannot maintain our overall security without basing it squarely on the nuclear capability, we are confronted by the quandry that our capability for a limited war will be nesimal or will detract from our overall posture of deterrence unless we can use these weapons in limited operations, too. Consequently, the manner by which the first nuclear weapon will be employed in a limited war situation will be of extreme importance. If we do it clumsily, the political consequences may be very disastrous. On the other hand, if we do not use the weapon at all, we may lose the limited war, incur political consequences equally as unpalatable, and even lose our main global war deterrent. The first employment might be preceded by demonstrations and be accompanied by warning to the civilian population, as well as by demands for local surrenders. Routine training with low yield nuclear warheads in Europe and in Asia might accustom people to their role in war. Such training would illustrate that the employment of nuclear weapons need not lead to large civilian casualties, nor does it require massive across-the-board attack. There are many opportunities for the graduated employment of such weapons and they do not have to be more devastating in their effects than other weapons. In a future limited war we cannot count on the enemy remaining impotent to strike back with his own atomic weapons. That prospect does not negate tactical employment of atomic weapons in limited campaigns. Instead, it reduces, in a "limited war," the advantages of mass numbers, to date the Communist trump. We are replacing "mass" numbers with "mass" fire power applied through atomic weapons. The greater flexibility, higher mobility, and speedier communications which atomic weapons demand all rest on higher technology -- the area in which

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the U. S. still holds a commanding lead over its rivals. Military advances made for atomic reasons in organization, mobility and communications can consequently stand us in good stead in a non-atomic conflict.

This is a factor of immense importance in the development of forces for the "cold war mobile reserve," since circumstances might arise which would make it undesirable to use atomic weapons in certain kinds of limited conflict. Consequently, the military task, in developing these units, is to design forces which will meet the requirements of the tactical atomic battle field without at the same time sacrificing their capability to fight effectively if in some situations the use of tactical atomic weapons is not desirable.

In any country threatened by Communist aggression, a nucleus of resistance to external attack or internal insurrection must be on hand. There should be close-by mobile U. S. forces for immediate reinforcements of the threatened area. Together these forces must be adequate to withstand the initial Communist drive. Furthermore, they must be able to force the Communist aggressors both to comport themselves in such a way that their aggressive intent is unmistakable to the whole world and to concentrate sufficiently to become military targets for atomic weapons delivered by naval and air forces.

The Communists have pioneered in the use of guerrilla forces as the anti-dote to technologically superior Western military machines. It is a standing rule of war that a given force can best be countered by like force, i.e., thermo-nuclear bombs by thermonuclear bombs, tanks by tanks, planes by planes, artillery by artillery, etc.

Therefore, the counter to the Communist combination of indigenous armies and guerrillas requires some forces capable of these same operations. However, because of the superiority which the U. S. and its allies can bring to bear in threatened areas in terms of sea and air power, the allied-indigenous ground and

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[LC]

anti-guerrilla forces can be considerably smaller in size than they would other-
wise have to be.

We must do more, however, than create such forces. We must take every
possible measure to inform the Communists of their existence and their capa-
bilities in meeting limited aggression. Moreover, we must demonstrate our de-
termination to use them. By the same token, leaders of certain countries,
particularly in Asia and the Middle East, must also become impressed with the
fact that these new allied task forces, in combination with whatever local forces
a particular country may be able to generate, offer military insurance against
a direct Communist military action. There are numerous ways by which the exist-
ence and manifest effectiveness of the allied task forces can be brought home
to both the Communist and non-Communist leaders. In the first place, they must
be deployed within reinforcing distances of the threatened sectors. Hawaii
and Okinawa suggest themselves as suitable locations for the Asian area, and
the Philippines, under certain circumstances, might be even better. The de-
ployment of mobile forces in or immediately adjacent to the Middle East area
would have significant advantages in the cold war struggle with the Communists,
and the prior political ground work required would not be insurmountable.
Wherever located, the task forces should have the necessary equipment and lift
on hand for immediate effective employment. Amphibious landing craft, troop-
carrier aircraft, floating engineer piers, transportation units capable of
unloading on beach heads, gasoline pipelines, and other necessary equipment
should be conspicuously assembled.

Communist knowledge of the existence of these task forces would have
psychological advantages. Training exercises conducted by these task forces
should make them ready for effective employment in the various threatened areas,
and information regarding this training should be widely disseminated. Jungle

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warfare tactics might be stressed. Troops should be issued manuals telling them
how to live off the unfamiliar plants and animals that might be found in threat-
ened countries such as Thailand. Officers and non-commissioned officers from
the various friendly countries should be given an opportunity to train alongside
the task forces. Such measures are illustrative of the many other steps that
could be taken to give credence to the U. S. intent to forestall Communist
military aggression.

As its net thermo-nuclear advantage becomes neutralized, the alternative
elements of U. S. military strength -- i.e., capability to engage in hostilities
limited in method or area and strengthened military relations with our allies --
must be increased. This U. S. action was stated by President Eisenhower in a
letter published to Secretary Wilson on January 5, 1955: "To provide for meet-
ing lesser hostile action -- such as local aggression not broadened by the
intervention of a major aggressor's forces -- growing reliance can be placed
upon the forces now being built and strengthened in many areas of the Free World.
But because this reliance cannot be complete, and because our own vital interests,
collective security and pledged faith might well be involved, there remain
certain contingencies for which the United States should be ready with mobile
forces to help indigenous troops deter local aggression, direct or indirect."

Locking the back door to Communist aggression offers, in conjunction
with the thermo-nuclear block to general war, the best chance for the U. S. to
master successfully the Communist challenge by diverting it to channels in
which the superiorities of our free society can become manifest. This circum-
stance can arise, however, only if the U. S. is willing to develop, in time, and
to use such ready military strength, including ground forces, as may be required.

The present U. S. military force structure already provides a good part

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of the elements required to demonstrate the U. S. capability and intent to block
Communist creeping expansion. Certain organizational and doctrinal changes
and limited augmentation of defense efforts will, however, be required. Both
in Europe and in the North Pacific (Japan and Korea) areas, an adequate com-
bination of U. S. and local forces exist to deter overt Communist aggression in
these areas. The U. S. has not, as yet, buttressed the defenses of the vast
arc stretching from Iran through South and Southeast Asia. The Middle East
portion of this arc is perhaps less vulnerable than the Eastern segment, for
Communist aggression in the Middle East is more dependent on direct employment
of Soviet military forces. The northern perimeter of Southeast Asia, on the
other hand, offers a promising area for Communist bloc expansion without the
direct use of Soviet military forces. Consequently, an immediate need exists
for developing a concept for assuring the defenses of Southeast Asia against
the dual threat of Communist military forces and their highly organized subver-
sive apparatus. Subsequent to the achievement of a satisfactory solution for
Southeast Asia, attention could be focused on the Middle East.

Deployment of a portion of the Free World's "cold war mobile reserve,"
suitably organized in the kind of task forces described herein, in strategic
locations overseas offers the double advantage of being in position to apply
military pressure on Communist moves at the earliest practicable time, and of
generating the development of favorable influences on the employment of local
politicl-military resources. For example, a task force might be located in the
Southeast Asia area. Such deployment would not mean piecemeal scattering of
U. S. military strength; but rather, a strategic positioning of the task force
in order to take full advantage of its range of flexible military power -- from
a small riot dispersal to major military actions employing atomic weapons. The
strategic dispersal of such task forces will also decrease the vulnerability

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of U. S. armed forces to Soviet surprise nuclear attack.

As long as the United States desires peace the Communists will consider
peace as an invitation to further attack. Peace to the Communists is a charac-
teristic of the moral and political system which they espouse. Peace between un-
related species of animals, peace between barbarously incompatible political
systems -- such peace is no peace at all. Victory, in Communist terms, can
bring peace; only victory can bring peace, because true peace, unlike a tempo-
ary condition of non-fighting, can only be the outcome of a morality which
decisively encompasses both sides.

The response of the United States to this situation should be both de-
fensive and offensive. The United States position is complicated by the fact
that everything which the American policy-makers do must be made intelligible
to themselves, to domestic United States political forces, and to America's
allies elsewhere in the world -- as well as to the Communists, who are, after
all, the other major party concerned.

Defensively the only protection against limited wars undertaken at Com-
munist command is both the physical military capacity and the political will to
strike back with localized, but shattering, violence. This requires selection
of allies ahead of time, designation of areas of American responsibility, and,
above everything else, decision by Americans of how much limited war the Amer-
icans want before the combat starts. It is too late after the fighting has
started to debate, as did MacArthur and Washington, how far the war should
extend, since every mention of a target mentioned but not subsequently hit can
be construed as a victory for Communist forces in being and Communist strength
of will as against American weakness and irresolution.

Offensively the United States could profit by a study of Sun Tzu by some

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of the members of the appropriate planning staffs. One of the chief countermeasures, completely understood by the Communists is reprisal in kind. While both Communist and Chinese thinking coincide in requiring that an aggressor profess his indignation at being attacked, behind such professions there always lies a keen awareness of the actual strategic capacity of the adversaries. _It is by no means necessary to counterattack the Communists at the place and in the manner of their attack on the outside world._ In many cases it is better to select targets convenient to our weapons system and to our own willingness to fight than to meet them on grounds of their own selection.

An optimum local engagement should involve the definition, at the time hostilities open, on the part of the American military command responsible of the following elements:

a. The general territory in question;

b. The military character of the American counterattack;

c. The obnoxious, immoral, militaristic, and aggressive character of the targets (gasoline dumps, air fields, military camps) hit by American air power or sea power;

d. The extreme care of the Americans in avoiding targets which injure the ordinary people living under Communism;

e. The intention of the Americans to conduct operations limited in both space and time;

f. The further intention of the Americans to discontinue operations when it suits them and not when it suits the Communists.

When possible American policy should contemplate the conduct of an open-ended war -- a war which, although limited by American desire for peace and world stability, makes itself subject to reopening with or without further

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negotiation or declaration -- if their adversaries fail to observe the terms of an armistice agreement or any other interim agreement.

With such a plan of action and adequate means to implement it deterrence to local aggression might become almost as absolute as deterrence to all-out nuclear war. The flexible approach outlined above, if successfully tested, could convince the leaders of Moscow and Peking that little profit would be found in little wars. The entire Communist strategy of World revolution can be frustrated if the West prepares to meet any Communist use of force with utmost speed and resolution. By thus neutralizing the Communist capability for successful aggression, diversionary Communist brush fires could become a thing of the past. With further Communist expansion blocked the long-heralded, but never implemented, policy of active containment of the Communist orbit might begin. The East-West conflict could then be fought in the competitive political, psychological and economic arenas, in which we should be more than able to compete successfully with the Communists. If the Free World can achieve sure and clearly recognized ability to cope with the power threat that lies behind Soviet creeping expansion, we could deprive them of an outlet for internal frustrations and thus actively promote within the Communist orbit the growth of the "seeds of its own destruction."

[L.C.]

Summary

There is a good deal of evidence that the Soviets will continue to exploit a peripheral approach, enjoying the years that may be required for them to achieve technological superiority. In pursuit of this strategy the Soviets would endeavor to disarm the US psychologically and to gain acceptance of a concept of global sanctuary. Peripheral action in either latent or overt form will still be pursued

Conflict because of changing technology and communist doctrine has taken on new dimensions and range. In addition to effective political and psychological pressures we face a range of wars fought under the threat of nuclear destruction as the consequence of any major slip by either side.

The current conflict no longer is as much concerned with industrial and material strengths as were previous wars. It is essentially a war fought in the time dimension, specifically a technological and moral-intellectual race. Since this is the nature of the overall conflict it calls for a different and more flexible structure of defense and a different foreign policy as well.

This new structure and policy are different not only from what is required in a period of monopoly but from the preatomic age as well. For a nuclear stalemate will in no sense return old-style conventional war to its old place. The past cannot be restored.

The United States must think through the implications of the new weapons and the many-sided communist challenge and reformulate its doctrines and strategy on an entirely different plane of magnitude. We need to find a way to deter war by some other means than guaranteeing that a war that is

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not deterred will eventually lead to defeat or mutual suicide.

If the United States is to live with the Soviet bloc on terms which are consistent with our national well-being and dignity, United States national policy must provide the political and economic framework for the development of sound military strategies and programs capable of coping both with the threat of thermo-nuclear war and the whole range of subversive, psychological and paramilitary actions open to the Soviets in time.

Such a program calls for meeting the fraudulent "peace" propaganda of the Communists with an authentic peace propaganda of our own. It calls for meeting aggression with a full range of morally acceptable deterrent force. For both domestic and foreign considerations, it means that future administrations must draw their inner morality from the great resources of the American people -- the sense of fairness, the willingness to sacrifice, the enthusiasm about *ending* a fight which can never be produced among Americans by *starting* one. Preventive small wars are as out of place as a preventive big one, but the possession of a capability for limited, planned, harsh, and effectual -- can stop the Communists when peacefulness itself cannot; in this frame can be found the American limits of safety with honor.