2

momentum remains at its peak. Its prerequisite is that within the Executive the President remains the source from which power flows, the embodiment of the national will and the ultimate arbiter of what constitutes the national interest.

To attempt a divestiture of power and responsibility at a time when the majesty of the Presidency is tarnished, its authority diluted and its poise seemingly shattered, would be an act that creates a vacuum in leadership. It would ensure not continuity but discontinuity, not a sense of participation in a common enterprise but of release from discipline; rather than giving incentives to abide by an integral view of the national interest, it would invite a multiplicity of compartmented and often incompatible definitions.

For now, therefore, Presidential government must continue to be executed by the Presidency, fairly narrowly defined, and with even greater discipline, assurance and initiative than before. Power and authority must be reaccumulated -- not to the point where it again corrupts, but to the point where it can be safely, consciously and systematically shared. (This is not to say, incidentally, that its sole locus must be in the White House staff; it never quite was or should be, anyway. There are in the cabinet and sub-cabinet people who can function well as arms of the Presidency and they should be part of the process of reconstruction. They must also continue to deal authoritatively with the Congress.)

At this delicate moment, it seems particularly important that no member of the White House staff or the Presidentially-appointed corps of Executive officials overshadow the President. And the President will do well to identify himself, and to be seen to be identified, with policies conducted and actions taken in his name.

## How do We Deal With Other Countries and They With Us?

It is not yet clear, at least to me, how others read the effects and implications of Watergate. Those who have "constructive" business with us and those who depend on our commitments and support will obviously be concerned if we have the power to conduct affairs -- and, if so, just where it is located. Those who are out to damage our interests or feather their own nests at our expense may want to test our tolerance and our capacity to act. The controlled use of seemingly irrational power, startling innovation and tactical coups de theatres may be less available to a President whose main concern at home must be to demonstrate

3

rationality, constancy and the purposeful and constitutional use of his powers. (This difficulty is of course particularly applicable to the situation in Southeast Asia.)

Foreigners have always had a tendency to maneuver between the White House and the agencies, sometimes trying to use the latter to vitiate decisions by the former, sometimes appealing to the former to overturn unwelcome decisions or force positive ones by the latter. This game no doubt will be played with special zeal by some.

With respect to the Soviets, the signs so far are difficult to read, partly perhaps because there seems to be some disarray in Moscow also. (Sonnenfeldt's Law of Simultaneous Troubles.) All the authoritative noises from Moscow -- Brezhnev himself with US Senators, Ustinov's Lenin anniversary speech, May Day Slogans -- sound more eager than ever for detente. The Soviets may calculate that the President will look for foreign successes to divert attention from domestic troubles and regain momentum. Their assumption, based on how they saw the election results, will probably be that the President will continue to define success as meaning more detente rather than a successful confrontation somewhere. Brezhnev may think that because of the President's need, the Soviets have greater bargaining leverage in detente diplomacy.

But if we look at the issues where progress with the Soviets might be most eye-cathcing -- trade and SALT/nuclear relations -- we must consider whether Watergate has not in fact narrowed rather than broadened the President's options. We are not yet out of the woods on Soviet MFN. The Congressional tide may be flowing in the President's direction on this issue because of last week's disclosures on Soviet emigration policy. But this is reversible. (The Security Council resolution, Libyan MIGs, and Soviet actions may disaffect some of the Jewish opinion that had begun to swing over.) More than that, however, some aspects of our Soviet trade policy are vulnerable to charges that major benefits are flowing to individuals and firms closely identified with the President personally or politically. We have far from heard the last of the wheat deal. The de-control of natural gas prices can also be portrayed as giving a bonus at the consumer's expense to companies who have deliberately withheld domestic gas and are doing handsomely at the old prices; and the companies who may find it profitable to do business with the Soviets at decontrolled prices have well-established lines into the Administration. Scoop Jackson sits at the switch on MFN as well as energy, not to mention defense policy and SALT. And on the latter, those within the Executive who have their problems with MIRV limitations may well be less willing to accept Presidential decisions that go against them and more willing to appeal

4

to Congressional allies. Furthermore, the formality of the nuclear use
agreement may raise issues with the Senate which may be more difficult
to handle in the present circumstances than before, especially if NATO
allies should also raise a fuss about it. (Incidentally, we have a problem
in any case because the Soviets are bound in their public discourse to
stress the solemnity and committing character of the document whereas
for Chinese, Allied and Congressional reasons we will want to stress its
hortatory quality.) Congressional reasons may also make it undesirable
to begin work on a long-term economic cooperation agreement, which
the Soviets may suggest over and above the existing trade agreement on the
pattern of the one Brezhnev expects to sign with Brandt next week.

In sum, I think with Brezhnev our problem is less likely to be one of
his attempting to take excessive liberties with our interests than one
of his trying to give us too warm an embrace.

Without attempting to survey all the issues that may be more difficult
to handle, or to wargame Chinese, Arab or Israeli calculations and actions
or the fate of the defense budget, I should mention just one further complex.
This relates to our troop commitment in Europe. It is one thing to restate
it, as you did in your AP speech; but if this were to be an integral part of the
offset negotiations as the Germans have long sought and the Allies would
probably do if we try to go the multilateral route), the Senate may well
attempt to raise not only the prudential and economic issues, but the
constitutional one. We may, incidentally, find that the philosophy of the trade
bill, involving substantial grants of discretionary power to the President,
may run into Senatorial objections, even if Mills supports them.

The prognosis therefore is for reduced Presidential flexibility both
with respect to a vigorous and possibly forceful defense of our interests
and to the exercise of discretion in negotiations with adversaries as well
as friends. Possible answers to these problems unfortunately lie largely
in practices and devices -- greater involvement of the Executive departments
and of the Congress -- which if used extensively now would detract from what
I have implied in the first part of this paper the President needs to
do to rebuild his authority. The President does have the asset that the
individuals most likely to be responsibly involved in the conduct of
foreign policy are also untarnished by Watergate: yourself, Shultz, Burns,
Rogers and Richardson. While this is not a perfect combination, it can
hardly be changed now and may provide the nucleus for a Presidential security
policy machinery with which to carry on.

HOOVER INSTITUTION
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

Stanford, California 94305

December 14, 1976

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 "C" Street
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am taking the liberty of writing you today, in order to draw your attention to the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University. Many persons who were and are active in American government, the foreign service, the military, and other areas of public affairs have placed their papers here, and I wonder whether you would consider the Hoover Institution as a repository for any documents or other materials of historical interest that you may have accumulated over the years.

I believe in every way that the Hoover Institution would be a most suitable repository for your papers. A special collection would be established under your name and the material boxed, labelled, and shelved together in closed archives stack areas, where effective security is maintained. In addition, any restrictions on access requested by you would be scrupulously observed.

The Hoover Institution has a long-standing reputation as a leading university-connected center for archival and library materials on both domestic and international affairs in the 20th century. Our library houses over 3,800 archival and manuscript units and over a million volumes of books. Together with the Stanford University Library, this constitutes one of the most important accumulations of research materials anywhere in the United States.

Our own research and publications programs actively promote the use of our archival resources. A staff of permanent scholars, which will soon include Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman, is constantly researching public policy issues. The results of these studies are published by the Hoover Institution or in professional journals. Recently, Alexander Solzhenitsyn was named an Honorary Fellow of the Hoover Institution, and arrangements were made for his use of our Russian collections. Other scholars have been commissioned to undertake specific projects involving in-depth studies based on archives. As a result of one such project, the Hoover Institution will soon publish the original diaries of Admiral C. Turner Joy, the chief United Nations negotiator at the Korean military armistice negotiations at Panmunjom.

Page 2

December 14, 1976

In addition, programs in both domestic and international studies bring together nationally and internationally recognized economists, political scientists, sociologists, and historians for a year or more of research at the Hoover Institution. Chairman of the advisory board of our domestic studies program is George J. Stigler, Charles R. Walgreen Distinguished Service Professor of American Institutions, University of Chicago. Robert A. Scalapino, Professor of Political Science, University of California (Berkeley), is chairman of the international studies program advisory committee. For gifted young scholars a program of National, Peace, and Public Affairs Fellowships also offers an opportunity for one or more years of creative work based on the Institution's holdings.

In closing let me add that construction of a third building for the Institution, which will be named the Herbert Hoover Federal Memorial Building, is now underway. In honor of the centennial of Herbert Hoover's birth and in recognition of his fifty years of public service, the Congress passed and President Ford signed a bill to assist in this endeavor. The new structure will provide space for archival stack areas with built-in controls for humidity and temperature levels as well as space for research areas, exhibits, and a preservation laboratory with the latest equipment for the repair of archival materials.

I would be pleased to hear from you and to answer any questions you may have concerning the Hoover Institution in general or my request in particular.

With best wishes, I am

Stanford, California.
Hoover Institution,
Vas associate Director,
Mr. Richard F. Staar.

Personal Vaaatant
Suzanne 2. McFarlane

Sincerely,

information', he will be in touch with you.
affirmative', or it he would like additional
Hoover Institution in mind. If the decision is
I know that Secretary Klaasinger will keep the
of the papers has not yet been approached', but
The question of the final disposition

as a repository for his papers.
inviting him to consider the Hoover Institution
reply to your letter of December 14th
Secretary Klaasinger has asked me to

Dear Mr. Staar:

January 5, 1977

N.I.A.S.

NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY IN THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
NEDERLANDS INSTITUUT VOOR VOORTGEZET WETENSCHAPPELIJK ONDERZOEK OP HET GEBIED VAN DE MENS- EN MAATSCHAPPIJWETENSCHAPPEN

MEYBOOMLAAN 1, WASSENAAR
TEL. 01751 - 12 41

December 21, 1972

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
WASHINGTON D.C.
U.S.A.

Dear Henry:

I am writing to you, as always, as a fellow-historian.

I realize what a time of anguish and perplexity this must be for you.

I assume that the policy of moving instantaneously from the negotiating table to bombing is not your policy--for that it is too crude, too petulant, too stupid. Even if it works with our "enemies," it will virtually destroy our chances for real rapprochement with our friends.

If I am right that this is not your policy (would de Gaulle ever have executed a similar turn about in the middle of his negotiations?), then the question of your own future responsibility undoubtedly concerns you. The argument on the one hand would be to remain as a moderating influence, not to run out when things are bad; on the other hand would be the question whether you would not serve the country better by resigning and working without restraint outside the government. I know the answers are impossibly difficult even to guess at. But the role of "restraining hand" has worked badly in this century; Bethmann Hollweg tried it--with disastrous consequences. You are much too good to cast yourself in such a role.

I realize, as I said, the complexity. If you had won last week in Paris, the world would have been at your feet and I am writing on the assumption that at this junction there is not a superabundance of disinterested thought.

Warm regards,

U. S. News & World Report

WASHINGTON

2300 N STREET, N. W. • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20037

June 16, 1975

MARVIN L. STONE
EXECUTIVE EDITOR

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am pleased to send along this portfolio.

It includes some photos taken by our staff photographer during our interview, and a copy of the issue in which the interview appeared.

Thank you again for your time and for the attention
you gave to details of the manuscript. I hope you will
consider this a memento of a pleasant experience -- certainly
it was very pleasant for us.

MLS:g
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JOHN DEERE on the move

U.S.News
&WORLD REPORT

The Only News Magazine
Devoted Entirely to National
and International Affairs

Copyright © 1975, by U.S. News & World
Report, Inc., 2300 N Street, N.W., Wash-
ington, D.C. 20037, for entire contents of
this publication. All rights reserved.

VOL. LXXVIII NO. 25 JUNE 23, 1975

The Associated Press is exclusively enti-
tled to the use for publication of the local,
telegraphic and cable news published
herein, originated by U.S. News & World
Report or obtained from the Associated
Press.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT is pub-
lished weekly, at $14 per year, by U.S.
News & World Report, Inc., at 2300 N
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.
Second Class postage paid at Washington,
D.C., and at additional mailing offices.

POSTMASTERS: Send Form 3579 to U.S.
News & World Report, P.O. Box 2860,
Greenwich, Ct. 06830.

CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE

Index to Newsletters.................. 4

Tomorrow.................................. 7

Washington Whispers.................... 13

Can Ford Win in '76?.................... 15

Big Changes Ahead for CIA
After a Damaging Review............ 17

"We Are Moving Into
a New World"—Interview
*With the Secretary of State*...... 20

Again It's No War,
No Peace in Mideast ................ 28

"I Don't Believe Peace Can
Be Imported From Outside"
*Interview With Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin*............ 29

"Secret" Soviet Base ................ 31

The Ku Klux Klan
Tries for a Comeback.............. 32

Breaking 55 mph: Riskier ........ 35

Mood of Americans Now:
Cross-Country Survey ............ 36

Who's "Veto Proof"—
Ford or Congress? ................ 38

Business Around the World...... 39

"NIH" in Turmoil—Harder
Times for Researchers............ 45

Tips for Summer Vacations...... 47

Worldgram............................ 51

Whatever Happened to
Skyjacking: Still a Threat...... 54

Rise in Student-Loan Defaults.... 55

America's Jails:
What's Being Done................ 56

Trend of American Business...... 61

World Perils Ahead—
but "Humanity Will Survive"..... 64

States Go After Tax Dodgers..... 66

News-Lines: What You Can and
Cannot Do in Business............ 68

Tax Rulings.......................... 69

How Recession Is Affecting
Union Finances..................... 71

News You Can Use..................... 77

Russian Immigrants—
No Streets of Gold, but............ 80

Editor's Page......................... 84

Cover Photo: Daniel Simon—Gamma

©AMERICAN TOURISTER, WARREN, R.I.

"Dear
**American Tourister:**
I can look like a V.P.
on a junior exec's
salary."
Martin Sherry, Atlanta, Ga.

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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 23, 1975

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"I'm glad I listened to Don when he suggested I take the Dale Carnegie Course," says Joan. "I guess I was a bit shy, but now I take more interest in talking to people — even those whom I have just met. Yes, our family relationships are better, too, because we can put problems in their proper perspective."

John O'Donnell manages the family farm. "From the time I was a small boy I wanted to run the farm," John says. "But as I grew older I wasn't sure I could take on the responsibility. In the Dale Carnegie Course, I developed the self-confidence to rely on my own ability and

to make the many decisions that are necessary. The Course has helped me over a lot of difficulties."

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Exclusive Interview

SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER

With events at a critical juncture—in the Mideast, dealing with Russia, China, NATO, the energy crisis—Mr. Kissinger takes a sweeping, analytical look ahead in this interview with editors of the magazine.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a year ago everyone was hailing American foreign policy as a great success story. Now everything seems to be coming apart at the seams. What's gone wrong?

A. First of all, I don't think everything is "coming apart at the seams." Our foreign policy is, I believe, effective and strong.

Our relations with Western Europe and Japan have never been better. Our relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are essentially on course. With respect to the "third world," we have developed new initiatives at the recent meetings of the OECD [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development] and the IEA [International Energy Agency] in Paris.

We have had a temporary setback in the Middle East, but I expect that momentum will soon be restored. Further interim discussions or some form of over-all discussions are inevitable. What has been done previously has laid the basis for what is being done now.

The collapse of Indo-China was, of course, both a setback and a tragedy—and, we believe, an unnecessary one. But it has nothing to do with the architecture of our foreign policy.

Q. How then do you explain the widespread criticism of U.S. foreign policy?

A. I believe that many of these criticisms reflect a turmoil in our domestic situation and not the reality of our foreign policy.

I have consistently said that you cannot have foreign policy without authority, and that to the extent that the central authority is undermined for whatever reason—even if it's the

fault of the central authority—it will ultimately affect the conduct of foreign policy.

Curiously enough, the price we paid during Watergate, while harmful, was not extreme. While Watergate was going on, debate on foreign policy was muted. But then, after Watergate was over, there suddenly was an orgy of criticism. Pent-up concerns about Chile, Turkey and Vietnam all crystallized into extremely controversial issues. All of them coming together produced a serious multiplier effect.

I have the sense that this phase was terminated with the collapse of Vietnam. While Congress is now not in an uncritically accepting mood, it is also not in an uncritically contentious mood. The position of the Presidency—which is, after all, the central element in foreign policy—has been considerably strengthened in recent weeks. The dialogue between the Executive and the Congress is now on a healthier basis. Therefore, the effectiveness of our foreign policy is on a healthier basis.

Q. Why did the collapse in Vietnam bring that change in Congress?

A. First of all, because no one can debate any more that there was a "domino effect"; this is self-evident. Secondly, no one can deny that it has had a shocking impact even where there was no domino effect. Thirdly, I believe that the American public is not in a mood to see the country's world position decline. Whatever the public's reaction was to the merits of our involvement in Vietnam, the public reaction to its aftermath is that the United States should not be seen to be retreating in the world.

The support for the handling of the *Mayaguez* incident and the general public attitude which are reflected in the votes on the defense bill seem to indicate that the American public now feels that the period of turmoil—of the Vietnam debate, of the Watergate debate—should be ended.

Q. As you see it, are the American people still prepared to accept the defense burden and other sacrifices necessary to support a world role for this country?

A. Yes, that is my impression. I think our biggest asset is

20

Copyright © 1975, U.S. News & World Report, Inc.

BY THE CIA—FROM THE OFFICIAL RECORD

stitutional questions of unreasonable search and the rights of free press and speech.

**Plugging news leaks.** Under White House pressure, the CIA on five occasions between 1959 and 1972 set up electronic or physical surveillance of newsmen in an attempt to learn the sources of their news reports. The FBI had refused to undertake such investigations unless ordered to do so by the Attorney General.

**Conclusion:** "The CIA has no authority to investigate newsmen simply because they have published leaked classified information."

**CIA and Watergate.** At the request of "various members" of the White House staff, the CIA in 1971 provided Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt with alias documents, disguise material, a tape recorder, camera and film.

After the Watergate burglars were arrested, the CIA was asked for information and aid in the special investigation. "In a number of instances, its responses were either incomplete or delayed, and some materials that may or may not have contained relevant information were destroyed."

**Conclusion:** Giving help to Mr. Hunt was "improper," and the CIA's failure to co-operate fully with the Watergate investigation was "inconsistent with its obligations." However, there is "no evidence" that the CIA participated in the Watergate break-in or cover-up.

**Nixon and politics.** During 1971, the CIA yielded to President Nixon's insistence that it turn over to the White House classified files relating to the Lebanon landing, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War.

"The White House demand for sensitive CIA files—cloaked in what appear to be at least in part false representa-

tions that they were needed for valid Government purposes when, in fact, they were wanted to discredit critics of the Administration—was thoroughly reprehensible. It represents another serious instance of misuse of the Agency by the White House."

**Conclusion:** The CIA Director cannot be expected to disobey a direct request or order from the President without being prepared to resign. But men should be appointed to that post who have sufficient "integrity" to resist outside pressure.

**"Indexing" Americans.** As part of the CIA's "normal process" of compiling names and information of foreign-intelligence interest, the "Directorate of Operations" indexed the names of about 7 million persons of many nationalities, including an estimated 115,000 Americans. Most of the Americans are considered actual or potential sources of information or assistance to the CIA.

**Conclusion:** While such records are proper, "at some points during its history" the Agency collected material not needed for legitimate intelligence or security purposes.

**Death from LSD.** The CIA began in the late 1940s the study of behavior-influencing drugs, including LSD, and how they might be put to use by intelligence agents.

This was part of a larger program investigating the control of human behavior through such methods as radiation, electric shock, psychology and "harassment substances."

As part of the study, LSD was administered to a Department of the Army employe in 1953 without his knowledge. He developed serious side effects and was taken to New York under CIA escort for psychiatric treatment.

Several days later, he jumped from a tenth-floor window and was killed. The CIA General Counsel ruled that death

resulted from the LSD experiment. Two CIA employes were reprimanded.

**Conclusion:** "It was clearly illegal to test potentially dangerous drugs on unsuspecting U.S. citizens."

**Abuse of defectors.** The CIA is charged with providing proper security for persons who defect to the U.S. from other countries. Yet one defector—of unidentified nationality—was confined to a CIA installation for about three years because there was concern over his "bona fides." Much of the time he lived in solitary confinement and under "extremely Spartan living conditions."

Another defector was "physically abused" while in custody. The CIA employe involved in this case was fired.

**Conclusion:** Such treatment of defectors is illegal.

**Wiretaps and break-ins.** CIA agents made 32 wiretaps in the U.S., the last in 1965; set up 32 buggings, the last in 1968; and conducted 12 break-ins, the last in 1971. None was done under a judicial warrant.

Additionally, the CIA examined the federal income-tax returns of 16 persons without authorization.

**Conclusion:** The unauthorized entries and the examination of tax returns were illegal. Some of the bugs and wiretaps also were illegal. Others were lawful when conducted but would be "impermissible" today.

**Cambodia letters.** Under pressure from the White House, the CIA in 1970 "contributed" $33,655.68 for stationery and other costs involved in replying to persons who had written the President after the Cambodia incursion. The White House asked the CIA to fund the project "apparently because its inclusion in the CIA's secret budget provided an opportunity to hide the expenditures."

**Conclusion:** It was "improper" to use CIA funds for such purposes.

Lyman Lemnitzer
Retired General,
Former JCS Chief

Ronald Reagan
Former Governor
of California

C. Douglas Dillon
Former Secretary
of Treasury

John T. Connor
Former Secretary
of Commerce

Erwin N. Griswold
Former Solicitor
General of U.S.

Lane Kirkland
Secretary-Treasurer
of AFL-CIO

Edgar F. Shannon
Former President
University of Virginia

Members of President's Commission Who Investigated CIA

19

Editors of U.S. News & World Report with the Secretary.

USN & WR

widespread public support—which was never as weak as the noise level in Washington would have indicated.

**Q.** What effect has the Vietnam collapse had in the rest of the world?

**A.** I think the sudden collapse of Vietnam brought home to a lot of countries the central role of America and its foreign policy. It led to a profound concern in many countries about the conclusions we might draw from that event.

Basically, what happened in the NATO meeting [summit conference in Brussels, May 29-30] was what we were hoping to achieve in the "Year of Europe" in 1973. Our basic argument then—in 1973—was that security, political and economic factors are all related and that the Atlantic nations, together with Japan, had to deal with them simultaneously and with a concept of what kind of future we wanted for ourselves and our children.

Frankly, our allies were not ready for this approach in 1973. But in 1975—at Brussels—Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada put forward as his own idea, and without any previous discussion with us, exactly this proposal. And all heads of government present accepted it—with France, which was not represented by the head of government, being the only exception.

So I think that in this sense the events in Indo-China have brought things into perspective.

**Q.** Do you expect that our allies, as a result of this, will now do more to keep America involved around the world?

**A.** First, the Allies have understood they cannot necessarily take America for granted and that there is a point beyond which disappointment could push us into a more isolationist position.

Secondly, the central importance of the American role for both peace and progress has been brought home to them in no uncertain terms.

And, thirdly, I think that the President's calm and strong leadership has had a very positive effect.

**Q.** As you look to the future, what lies ahead for the United States?

## KEY POINTS MADE BY MR. KISSINGER

**Israel:** "We have a historic commitment to the survival and the well-being of Israel. . . . But we are in no way committed to the status quo."

**Foreign-policy setbacks:** "I don't think everything is coming apart at the seams." Relations with allies "have never been better," and with Russia and China they "are essentially on course."

**Oil-price increase:** In view of increases over the past two years, "another rise is clearly not justified." The U.S. would "certainly strongly oppose" the $4-a-barrel increase that some OPEC countries have mentioned.

**Arab oil embargo:** "I think it would be a very rash action, and—outside the context of a Middle East war—I would not anticipate it." In any case, "it would be extremely dangerous for the United States to let its foreign policy be determined by oil-price manipulation."

**Detente:** "Détente has not been a one-way street. The agreements we have made with the Soviet Union have been based on reciprocity."

**Brezhnev visit:** The Washington visit by Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev this fall will depend on a new SALT agreement. Chances of an agreement "are better than even."

**SALT violations:** "The Soviets have worried us in several areas" with respect to alleged violations of the strategic-arms-limitation agreement. Most questions have been resolved, but "one or two issues are still unsettled."

**U.S. and China:** "What Chinese leaders have told Asian leaders and some of our leaders" indicated they want the U.S. to stay in Asia. As a result, they are "not interested in an exacerbation of tensions in Asia."

**War danger in Korea:** U.S. was "profoundly concerned that the leaders in North Korea should not misread the American position." But recent events make it clear "it would be a wildly rash adventure to use military force in Korea."

**Communism in Portugal:** At some point "we will have to make a decision whether this is still an Allied government or a neutralist government."

**European neutralism:** "In many of the European countries, neutralist forces are growing—not in the governments but in political life."

**Effect of Vietnam:** As a result of the collapse in Indo-China, "the Allies have understood they cannot necessarily take America for granted and that there is a point beyond which disappointment could push us into a more isolationist position."

**President vs. Congress:** "The position of the Presidency has been considerably strengthened in recent weeks. The dialogue between the Executive and Congress is now on a healthier basis."

**U.S. world role:** "I believe that the American public is not in a mood to see the country's world position decline," and they are prepared to accept the burdens and sacrifices necessary to sustain it.

21

## INTERVIEW WITH HENRY KISSINGER

[continued from preceding page]

A We are moving into a new world. The kind of world that emerged in the immediate post-World War II period had substantially eroded by the late '60s and early '70s. We are in a period of adjusting the American role in the world to a new environment.

Today's world is marked by multipolarity among countries, divisions in the Communist world, growth of Europe and Japan, and greater assertiveness of the underdeveloped countries. All this fragmentation has occurred at the same time that economic interrelationships are demonstrating the interdependence of the world.

So you have confrontation on a political level, and on an economic level the need for co-operation. You have on the political level continued ideological hostility, but you have on the nuclear level the realization that there is no alternative to peace.

Q What does that mean as far as American foreign policy is concerned?

A We had to design a much more complex strategy than the one that characterized the immediate postwar period. We are trying to design a policy that is not a response to crisis but to the realities of the present and the hopes of the future; a policy that looks at the evolution of history and the American contribution to it. While any policy has imperfections, I think we are clearly moving in the right direction.

On the other hand, the architecture is not completed; many issues remain unresolved. There is still an unfinished agenda.

But I would like to point out that if you interview a Secretary of State three years from now he, too, should have an unfinished agenda. It is an American illusion to believe that foreign policy ought to lead to a solution to all problems. Foreign policy cannot do that; it is always a dynamic process.

Q Turning to Soviet-American détente: How do you answer the criticism that is so often heard that this is a one-way street that benefits only Russia?

A I am certain that in Moscow whatever opponents of détente there may be are making exactly the same argument. What you get, as the result of three years of détente, is that people like all the benefits of détente, plus all the psychic satisfaction of a tough posture.

There is no question that the American public prefers peace to war and anti-Communism to Communism. So the question is—and it's not an easy one: How do you bring these two into balance with each other?

Détente has not been a one-way street. The agreements we have made with the Soviet Union have been based on reciprocity; both sides have benefited. Some of the events that have happened in the world that have been against our interests have been caused by the Soviets; others have not. Some have been caused by our failure to take adequate unilateral actions. For those we have no one but ourselves to blame.

Détente is not a substitute for American action. Détente is a means of controlling the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Détente is not a substitute for American strength. But it can enable us to reduce the risks that we will ever have to make use of that strength.

Q Do you mean that under the rules of détente, one side is free to exploit a local situation to gain an advantage?

A Of course not. I am saying that the minimum objective of détente must be to reduce the dangers of general nuclear war. That we have certainly done with some success.

The second objective is to reduce direct conflict in areas of vital importance to both countries, such as Central Europe. That we have done remarkably well.

22

USN&WR

> "We are the only non-Communist country strong enough and cohesive enough to play a world role."

The third objective is to create links that will provide incentives for moderation. Progress here has been uneven, and we have been weakened by the Trade Act.

The fourth objective is to reduce conflict in peripheral areas. And here, to be frank, we have not made as much progress as we should.

Q You mentioned the Trade Act, which made economic concessions to Russia contingent on more-liberal Soviet emigration policies. How has that weakened the policy of détente?

A Relations with the Soviet Union must have incentives for moderation and penalties for intransigence. The penalties for intransigence are supplied mostly by our defense budget and by our foreign policy. I think that is going reasonably well.

As for incentives for moderation, the Trade Act was one of the elements we had hoped to have available. We have always held the view that to inject the emigration issue into it hurt our relations with the Soviet Union, hurt us economically and—most tragically of all—hurt the people it was supposed to help.

Q How can you reconcile what the Russians have done in Vietnam, the Mideast and Portugal with détente?

A Let's discuss each of these.

First, Vietnam was not caused by the Russians. Vietnam had its own dynamics. Secondly, the Soviet aid level in Vietnam remained relatively constant. But our aid level dropped—by 50 per cent in each of two successive years—to the point where no equipment and very few spare parts were delivered in Vietnam after May, 1974. The GVN [Government of South Vietnam] even reached the point where ammunition had to be rationed for the Vietnamese forces. Therefore, what happened had many causes of which Soviet actions were only a part.

The situation in Portugal was not caused by the Soviets. It was caused by the internal dynamics of Portugal itself. If we have not assisted the democratic forces adequately, the reasons lie far more in our own domestic debates than with the Soviets.

Q And the Middle East?

A In the Middle East, I would not be surprised if in

Moscow they made the same argument and said that we
have been using détente to improve our position.

At any rate it is not evident to me—in contrast to our own
position—that the Soviet Union has improved its position in
the Middle East in the last two years. The opposite seems to
me to be the case.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied that the Russians are not cheating on the strategic-arms-limitation agreement that was signed in 1972?

A When you have strategic forces on both sides in the present state of technical complexity and in the process of modernization, it is inevitable that questionable actions will emerge.

The Soviets have worried us in several areas. We have taken those up in the Soviet-American standing commission which is designed to deal with such complaints. With respect to a number of these issues, we have received answers which—while not fully satisfactory—are moving in the right direction. One or two issues are still unsettled, but they do not go to the heart of the SALT agreement. But we will pursue them nevertheless. One or two issues that have been reported in the newspapers seem to me mischievous and special pleading.

Q. What about SALT II? Is there going to be an agreement this fall?

A The issues of principle with respect to SALT have been more or less settled. What now remains to be worked out is the technical implementation of issues that are very complicated. I should think that the chances are better than even that we will have a SALT II in the fall. But we could fail, either because we just can't solve the technical issues or because political tensions rise.

Q. Is a visit to Washington by Soviet leader Brezhnev in the fall firmly set, or will that depend on a SALT agreement?

A That will depend on SALT.

Q. In other words: no SALT agreement, no Brezhnev visit?

A I would think that Brezhnev, too, would prefer to mark his visit with some significant result.

## REFUSING TO LET MIDEAST "FESTER"—

Q. President Ford recently spoke of the Middle East as the most dangerous problem in the world today. What are the prospects now of making progress toward a settlement of the conflict there?

A. Logically, the conditions should be there—either on an interim or an over-all basis. As the President has said, we are determined to make progress. If we cannot get it on an interim basis, we will promote an over-all settlement. We will not permit the situation simply to fester.

Q. How do you prevent it from festering?

A. By engaging in active diplomacy and using our influence—which, after all, is not inconsiderable in that area—to encourage progress.

Q. What has resulted from President Ford's meetings with President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel that will open the way to new negotiations for a Middle East settlement?

A. The meetings with President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin have been extremely important in helping to crystallize our thinking on how best to proceed. They have helped us understand the views of both on how they think the negotiating process might be renewed.

They were both constructive, though neither meeting was an occasion for coming to detailed decisions. We, as well as the two governments concerned, are now reflecting on the best course to follow. We will be following up with both Israel and Egypt through diplomatic channels, as well as talking with Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam here in the

coming days. We will also stay in close touch with other interested governments.

From all of these consultations we hope a decision can be taken on how to move toward the negotiated settlement we all seek.

Q. Is it feasible to go for an over-all settlement if you can't get Egypt and Israel to agree even on a limited settlement in the Sinai?

A. That remains to be seen. It probably won't be an extremely rapid process.

Q. Can you count on any help from the Russians in promoting a settlement—or are they mainly interested in perpetuating a conflict that they can exploit?

A. On the one hand, you can argue that they like the tension in the area because it creates a chance for enhanced influence. On the other hand, it can be argued that tensions which force a country to take positions which it then cannot implement do not, in the long run, enhance its influence.

So I would think that, as a result of the events of recent years, the Soviet Union could come to the view that it is running risks disproportionate to what it is getting out of. And if that is true, perhaps conditions for a more constructive relationship will develop. Certainly in recent months the Soviet Union has not been as aggressive about the Middle East as they might have been.

Q. How is your negotiating position in the Middle East affected by the fact that 76 Senators have signed a letter in support of Israel?

A. I did not recommend the letter be sent. But we will take it into account. We will study it.

## "TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP FOR ISRAEL"—

Q. Six Presidents have declared a commitment to the survival and security of Israel. In practical terms, what does that really mean?

A. We have a historic commitment to the survival and the well-being of Israel. This is a basic national policy reaffirmed by every Administration. But we are in no way committed to the status quo. Israel itself has said that it does not insist on the existing territorial arrangement for a final peace.

The art of our foreign policy is to reconcile as many of America's interests as we can, and not to emphasize one to the exclusion of all of the others. We have many interests that need to be accommodated:

We have an interest in good relations with the Arab countries. We have an interest in the economic well-being and security of Western Europe and Japan. And we have an interest in not having unnecessary confrontations with the Soviet Union. We believe all these interests can be reconciled with our traditional friendship for Israel.

Q. What do you think of suggestions that an Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967 borders would tend to lower oil prices?

A. I think it would be extremely dangerous for the United States to let its foreign policy be determined by oil-price manipulation. We have refused to discuss our political objectives in relation to the price of oil, and will continue to do so.

Q. More generally on the oil problem: Can we live with another $4-a-barrel increase that's being talked about for the fall?

A. I do not know that there will be a $4 increase in the price of oil. That would be an increase of over 30 per cent. We are strongly opposed to an increase. We believe that the increases of '73 and '74 have been so inflationary and so disruptive of the world economy that another rise is clearly not justified. To impose a $4 increase on top of the present precarious world situation is not even in the interest of the OPEC countries. We would certainly strongly oppose it.

Q. But what can we do to oppose any increase that the

23

**Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries chooses to make?**

**A** Basically, we cannot fight unilateral increases effectively until we create the objective conditions which will transform the market forces. It is another area where it is easy to strike a tough verbal stance. But a tough verbal stance unrelated to objective factors is not going to do us any good.

We are attempting in the International Energy Agency to create the objective conditions which will transform power in the marketplace by reducing consumption and developing alternative energy sources. At the same time, the capacity of OPEC to cut production in order to sustain prices will diminish as development programs in other countries grow and the producers' need for real resources mounts.

Therefore, some point inevitably will be reached where the market must shift. How quickly it is reached depends on the decisiveness with which the industrialized consumer countries co-operate. This is the effort in which we are now deeply—and reasonably successfully—engaged.

**Q** A year ago the Administration was talking about getting the price of oil down. Now you're talking about keeping the price from going up. Why has the objective changed?

**A** The policy has not changed. But policy and rhetoric need to be kept separate. We would like prices to come down. But we cannot get them down until after we have succeeded in keeping them from going up.

At a time when OPEC is threatening to increase prices, it's senseless to talk about getting them down. We are opposed to the current prices. We are even more opposed to higher prices. We will work with determination to bring about conditions in which this cannot continue.

If OPEC insists on raising its prices, I have no doubt that it will lead to increased consumer solidarity and a speeded-up program to shift market conditions. This is our policy—to change market conditions—and I think it will succeed.

We are pursuing the only sensible policy available to bring about a price cut. You can talk about embargoes and counter-embargoes, but when you analyze them you will find they usually hit the countries that politically give us the strongest support and whose role may not be decisive. Furthermore, these measures generally would not be backed by the other consuming countries.

So if we pursued them we would be putting ourselves at a political and probably economic disadvantage. But we are determined to bring about an improvement in the market conditions of oil.

**Q** Why is it so difficult to get the industrial consuming countries to co-operate on the kind of joint policy that you advocate?

**A** Because none of the consumer countries want to risk a confrontation. Therefore, to some extent the producer countries can blackmail at least some of the consumer nations.

Another reason is that independence requires difficult domestic efforts. Consumption cuts are unpleasant and occasionally painful.

So, many countries—including ours—are using the fact that there is a recession which imposes oil conservation as an excuse to avoid policy-induced conservation.

**Q** How much will the success or failure of this whole program depend on action by Congress?

**A** The role of the Congress is absolutely pivotal.

The United States consumes 50 per cent of the world's energy; many of the resources for alternative programs must come from American technology. Without a major American program there can be no effective policy among consumer nations.

USN&WRI

> "Relations with the Soviet Union must have incentives for moderation, penalties for intransigence."

**Q** Is the energy program that Congress appears likely to approve sufficient to do the job?

**A** It is sufficient to make a start on the policy. It is not, however, adequate to do the whole job.

**Q** Have you been surprised at the ability of the OPEC countries to cut production as deeply as they have in order to maintain their price?

**A** No. I think they are beginning to approach a point where production cuts will become more and more painful.

**Q** But isn't pressure on OPEC countries to cut production going to ease as we get economic recovery here as well as in Europe and Japan?

**A** It is going to be a very serious problem. The recovery will increase our need for oil, but it will not affect the ability of the OPEC countries to make further production cuts.

**Q** Do you anticipate another oil embargo by the Arabs?

**A** I think it would be a very rash action, and—outside the context of a Middle East war—I would not anticipate it.

**Q** Getting back for a moment to the aftermath of Vietnam: We keep hearing that China wants the United States to stay in Asia. Is that based on any direct assurance you've had?

**A** It is based not on assurances but on fairly hard evidence—that is, on what Chinese leaders have told Asian leaders and some of our leaders.

**Q** Why do they now want us to stay after agitating for so many years to get us out of Asia?

**A** The Chinese are extremely realistic. They realize that their security depends on a world equilibrium. They understand that the United States must inevitably be a major part of such an equilibrium. For this reason, they do not want to open up Asia to the aspirations of other countries whose intentions toward them might be less benevolent.

**Q** In that connection, is there any truth to reports that China has tried to dissuade North Korea from going to war against the South?

**A** I cannot confirm those reports. But our general impression is that the People's Republic of China is not interested in an exacerbation of tensions in Asia.

**Q** What, in your judgment, are the chances of war in Korea?

**A** In the immediate aftermath of Vietnam, we were

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[continued from page 24]

profoundly concerned that the leaders in North Korea should not misread the American position. We were also concerned that a collapse of South Korea would have a disastrous impact on Japan.

The events of recent weeks are beginning to make clear that the United States is prepared to defend its interests in the world and that it would be a wildly rash adventure to use military force in Korea. Many of the problems that existed with respect to Vietnam do not exist with respect to Korea.

**Q** Because the United States has a mutual-security treaty with South Korea—

**A** That's right.

**Q** In view of the Vietnam debacle, is President Ford still planning to go to China this fall?

**A** That is still the plan.

**Q** Is it possible for him to go without discussing the Taiwan situation?

**A** No, but it is possible for him to go without bringing that situation to a conclusion.

**Q** Will the United States be obliged to change its relations with Taiwan?

**A** Not in order for the President to go to China.

**Q** Looking a bit further ahead: Do you expect the triangular Soviet-American-Chinese relationship to survive after Mao Tse-tung and Leonid Brezhnev are gone?

**A** The problem in foreign policy is to be able to discern the realities of the situation and not to tie it to personalities. The realities could shift to some extent—and all foreign policy is subject to change.

The reality of Asia is the geopolitical impact on each other of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, plus the memory of what has happened. We are not exploiting this. We are not encouraging it, and we didn't create it.

To some extent the reality will continue. There may be shifting accents that will affect us, and we must be aware of these. It is also important not to be so obsessed with immediate threats that one forgets long-term threats.

But the essential architecture of our foreign policy is sound and will be seen to be sound. The fact that it has survived some of the shocks of this past year proves that it is sound.

**Q** A final point concerning Europe: Why is it left to this country to deal with major problems in Europe while Europeans turn their backs—problems such as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey?

**A** It is left to the United States because fate has put us in the position where we are the only non-Communist country that is strong enough and domestically cohesive enough to play a world role. Therefore, if certain things are not done by us, they will not be done by anyone. And while it might be fairer if somebody else took some of the responsibility, the fact is that a catastrophe is no less real for having been brought about by attempts to shift responsibility to others.

Portugal, of course, is primarily a Portuguese problem. Many of the European countries are extremely active with respect to Portugal. However, as the strongest country in the Alliance, we have to state a position with respect to Portugal, and particularly its relationship to NATO. This is all we have done, in addition to some economic aid which we have given.

With respect to Spain, we are the only Western country that has a defense relationship with Spain. For some European countries there is a domestic problem with respect to dealings with Spain. But it is also clear that if Spain is left totally isolated, the evolution there could take very traumatic forms, and this is what we are attempting to deal with.

**Greece, Turkey:** Again, we have a problem of the eastern

end of the Mediterranean, of the domestic evolution in both of these countries, and of the world equilibrium. We were perhaps projected into it somewhat more dramatically than we might have desired by certain domestic events in the United States, and we have been forced to stake more on this than might have been thought desirable from an abstract consideration of foreign policy.

But we do have an interest in retaining both of these friendly countries in NATO, in maintaining our traditional friendships with both countries and not have the eastern end of the Mediterranean turn into uncontrolled chaos—or, for that matter, controlled chaos.

**Q** Why does the U.S. seem so much more concerned than the Europeans about the Communist influence in Portugal?

**A** All we are saying is that at some point the evolution in Portugal will have reached a stage where we will have to make a decision whether this is still an Allied government or a neutralist government. At that point, we will have to consider the implications of our actions for Italy, Spain and the other European countries.

We have told our European allies that this is not something to be determined in the abstract. We are continuing our economic-aid program to Portugal for the time being. But we do not believe that we have to delude ourselves about what is going on there.

**Q** Outside Portugal, do you get the feeling that neutralism is spreading in Western Europe?

**A** No, I have the sense that, with the present governments, the awareness of the importance of the Atlantic Alliance is increasing. However, in many of the European countries, neutralist forces are growing—not in the governments but in political life. And that is a worrisome phenomenon for the middle and longer term. It is one of the factors we are keeping in mind with relation to Portugal.

**Q** All in all, Mr. Secretary, are you optimistic about the future?

**A** I'd like to repeat: We're moving into a new world, and I think that we are moving in the right direction.

There will always be unfinished business, and the more effective you are, the more unfinished business you will have.

[END]

USN&WR

> "It is an American illusion to believe foreign policy ought to lead to a solution to all problems."

27

AGAIN IT'S NO WAR,
NO PEACE IN MIDEAST

THE DANGER of a new Mideast war and another Arab oil embargo—seemingly inescapable only a few weeks ago—is fading.

But peace between Arabs and Israel—even a limited agreement—is not yet in sight.

That is the situation in the wake of President Ford's meetings in recent days with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

In his face-to-face talks with the two Mideast leaders, Mr. Ford explored the prospects for reviving the stalled negotiations between Israel and Egypt. He met Prime Minister Rabin in Washington June 11-12 following his first-ever conference with President Sadat in Salzburg, Austria, June 1-2.

Mr. Ford found a wide gap between the positions staked out by the two leaders. On the surface, at least, there appeared to be no significant change from terms so firmly defended by each side in late March that Henry Kissinger's diplomacy collapsed.

**The positions.** Prime Minister Rabin in Washington continued to insist that Israel would be willing to withdraw from the strategic Gidi and Mitla passes in the Sinai only in exchange for an Egyptian declaration ending the 27-year-old state of war.

President Sadat in Salzburg reiterated

his insistence on Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai passes while still rejecting any commitment to end the state of war.

Both leaders now indicate a readiness for compromise, but the concessions mentioned fall short of what is needed to bridge the gap between them.

Nevertheless, at the end of the two days of Ford-Rabin talks, Mr. Kissinger declared that "there are chances" of resuming the negotiations. He stressed, however, that both sides would have to modify their stands to reach an agreement—a message delivered personally to the two leaders by Mr. Ford.

**U.S. proposal expected.** The next move is up to the American President. After one further round of talks with a Mideast leader—Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam—on June 20, he is expected to unveil a U.S. plan to break the Arab-Israeli deadlock.

Odds are that the American plan will call for renewed step-by-step negotiations aimed ultimately at a final over-all settlement.

The first objective: a limited agreement between Israel and Egypt on the Sinai to defuse the crisis on that front for at least three years. The hope is that as tensions relax it would be possible to tackle vastly more difficult problems such as the status of Syria's Golan Heights, now occupied by Israel, the demand by Palestinian Arabs for a state

of their own and conflicting claims over the holy city of Jerusalem. For both Israel and Egypt, there are strong incentives to co-operate with Mr. Ford.

Israel, totally dependent on the U.S. for military aid and economic and political support, is seeking an unprecedented 2.5 billion dollars in American aid—including the most advanced F-15 aircraft and Lance ground-to-air missiles.

The Ford Administration is withholding action on this request until it completes a reassessment of its own Mideast policy—a clear hint that decisions on aid will be influenced by Israel's attitude.

Egypt, for its part, has a significant stake in avoiding another war now that the reopened Suez Canal is starting to produce desperately needed revenues.

Also in view: substantially more U.S. aid—and prospective American private investments—dangled before President Sadat by Mr. Ford at Salzburg.

Mr. Sadat, commenting recently on the importance of America's mediator role, said: "The Arab-Israel conflict will never be solved by war. All the cards in the game are in the hands of the United States because they are the only one who can exert pressure on Israel."

**Hard road ahead.** Thus, the President's personal diplomatic initiative in the Middle East has succeeded in preventing Israel and Egypt from drifting headlong on a collision course. Many diplomatic observers had considered war unavoidable after Secretary Kissinger's last peace mission failed.

Still, Mr. Ford's talks with the Egyptian and Israeli leaders left little doubt that any new U.S.-sponsored negotiations will be long and arduous—and hold out no certainty of success.

Prime Minister Rabin and President Ford in Washington. Their meetings marked latest step to reopen Mideast peace talks.

Mr. Ford and President Sadat in Salzburg. The Egyptian leader looks to the U.S. to pressure Israel into making concessions.

28

Douglas Stuart
737 West 30th St. Apt. J
Los Angeles, Cal. 90007

April 2, 1972

Dear Sir;

I am at present a third semester Graduate student at the University of Southern California School of International Relations. Recently my research has been in the area of Content Analysis and Attitudinal Change. I have chosen you as a vehicle for my study. My aim is to empirically trace the consistency of your philosophical and strategic world images throughout your very active career.

The purpose of my letter is to ask a favor of you which would be of great aid to me in data collection. A good many of your most seminal statements are at present kept from me by the "not to attribution" rule which is imposed on journalists during "backgrounders". Many of these statements have long since lost whatever vital importance they once had, yet the "not for attribution" law is still in effect. I am asking, then, for a brief letter from you, granting permission to use your name on certain of these outdated statements. I can, consequently, gain access to the actual texts that you might specify as attributable through newspaper sources.

I would greatly appreciate whatever help you can give me in this regard, and would be happy to send you a copy of the finished product if you would desire one.