FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
EDITOR

PHILIP W. QUIGG
ASSISTANT EDITOR

58 EAST SIXTY-EIGHTH STREET
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.
CABLE ADDRESS: FOR AFFAIRS, NEW YORK

October 22, 1958

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

My comments on your piece for *The Reporter* are either an-
notated on the manuscript or on the attached sheets, which are
keyed to the manuscript.

As usual, my comments may sometimes seem unnecessarily
caustic, and for this I apologize. However, even allowing for
the fact that this is an early draft, I think you must bear in
mind that you do have a rather relentless and unbending style.
To justify itself to the reader, it requires the greatest pre-
cision in the use of words. At its best it is very good, but
because you never let up on the reader - never toss him a re-
laxed sentence with a touch of the vernacular - every sentence
demands the utmost of you, too. At a guess, I would say that
three out of five sentences in this manuscript need to be re-
vised in some way - sometimes from the ground up, sometimes
by changing only a word.

No more for now; I am under some pressure at the moment.
But I'll take time to remind you (àpropos of your manuscript)
of Alfred Sloan's comment during a committee meeting, when
someone marveled at the feat of flying the Atlantic all alone,
as Lindbergh had just done. "It would have been much more re-
markable," Mr. Sloan said, "if the plane had been flown by a
committee."

Yours,

KISSINGER

A. This might be taken as an ambiguous reference to the period of Republican Administration. Moreover, many people think of the Eisenhower Administration as being dominated by businessmen and lawyers and look back upon the Roosevelt era as the heyday of the intellectual in positions of responsibility in government.

After writing the above I now see that, despite the title, you have devoted the first part of your article to lawyers and businessmen. I think this is a mistake because:

(1) Ascoli may cut it anyway as the article is impossibly long for him.

(2) You have not achieved balance because primarily you are talking about businessmen and lawyers in government and intellectuals out of government, but acting as consultants. But there are intellectuals in government, etc.

(3) Almost all of what you have written here about lawyers and businessmen has appeared in *Foreign Affairs* as well as in "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy." I do not think it is wise to repeat, though you could make clear you have analyzed their special problems and shortcomings in another place.

B. This paragraph does not follow logically from your opening sentence. I would move the first sentence to the end of the paragraph - or possibly near the bottom of page 5.

KISSINGER - 2.

C. Where there are in fact "frontiers of knowledge" - that is, where the known and the unknown can be delineated, as in the natural sciences (generally) - I do not think your statement is true. Your comment here seems most applicable when the "frontiers" cannot be discerned and "knowledge" is not the goal - but rather wisdom, perception, judgment, conception.

D. This does not seem to follow nor live up to the expectations and direction charted at the start of the paragraph, preceding page. It is repetitive and toward the end it is a little bit "sour grapes." Good ideas - new ideas - excellence have been fought and misunderstood and overlooked as long as there have been societies. But _some_ people have always recognized them - and I'm confident they will.

E. On this page you get to some of your ideas about intellectuals that I have found most interesting _viz._ "purpose," "commitment." Then you treat them so gingerly that I'm afraid they will be lost, whereas they should form the core of the last section, giving it greater substance and less the quality of a reprise.

Policy-making and the Intellectual

For several years now American foreign policy has suffered
from a deep malaise. Confronted by a tremendous revolution in all
parts of the world and in almost every field of human endeavor our
reactions have been tentative and our diplomacy for all its technical
skill has lacked vision. It would be comforting to believe that
this state of affairs has been produced by specific errors of policy
which can be reversed more or less easily. Unfortunately,
are more
cause of the lack of vitality of our policy may be deep-seated
attitudes of the individuals who given the structure of our society
are likely to emerge in key positions whatever party is in office.

It has often been argued that one of our problems is that our
best people are no longer attracted into government service. It
may be equally pertinent to inquire how well-qualified our "best
people" are for the task of policy-making in a revolutionary period.
Another proposition often advanced is that intellectuals are not
adequately respected by our society. (A case could be made however
for the proposition that in some respects the intellectual has never

2.

been more sought after. His difficulty is not that he is not in
demand but that the criterion within which he is required to operate
are often tangential to his true calling. His relatively small
contribution may be due to the fact not that he is rejected but that
he is embraced too enthusiastically.

II

Any society faces the problem whether the qualities
which are encouraged in the rise to eminence are also the qualities
required once eminence is achieved. As a society becomes elaborated
and its internal workings more complicated, the mechanism may absorb
an increasing amount of energy. Maintaining its equilibrium may
require so much skill that less and less time is left for the task
of adaptation to new conditions and even less for generating new
purposes. A concern for stability replaces creativity not because
creativity is consciously discouraged but because
it comes to be identified with a set of administrative arrangements.
The symptom of any status quo society essentially satisfied with
things as they are and striving less to conquer new worlds than to
preserve the existing arrangements is that the incentives are

5.

Very little in the previous experience of our leadership
~~groups prepares them~~ for the cardinal feature of the situation that
confronts us internationally: a world in which existing norms
are disintegrating, which is revolutionary precisely because
traditional forms are rejected, and millions all over the world
insistently demand a new way of life. That this way of life is only-
dimly perceived only complicates our problem: The primary require-
ment of American foreign policy is to project abroad a sense of
purpose with which the world-wide revolution can identify itself.
A diplomacy, however skilful technically, which fails in this task,
can only postpone the inevitable moment when Eurasia and Africa, with
the possible exception of Western Europe, will be engulfed by
Communist movements or by a nationalism which looks to Moscow and
Peiping for inspiration.

But the qualities by which our leadership groups have
achieved eminence rarely produce the inspiration and the dynamism
to play this role. To begin with, for most of them the problems of
government are novel, to a greater or lesser extent. Even when they

10.

The more they seek "objectivity", the more diffuse their efforts become.

The larger the advisory staffs, the more time is spent on administering them and the less time is left for reflection on the definition of goals.

And, the absence of a clear set of purposes; the identification of problems becomes the primary task because each problem will seem a special case.

Thus the typical pattern is endless debate about whether a given set of circumstances in fact constitutes a problem until a crisis removes all doubts or imposes the imperative of some action, however fitful.

The inward uncertainty of the participants in this process is shown by the fact that the more the bureaucracy multiplies safeguards against error, the more it is distrusted by those at the top; at least to the extent that they feel the need for outside - and therefore "unbiased" advice. Memoranda which are produced within the bureaucratic apparatus are taken less seriously than similiar papers which are available to the general public. The increase of outside advisors or ad hoc committees is in almost direct proportion to the growth of policy planning mechanisms within the bureaucracy. Crucial policy decisions are increasingly turned

15.

III

What then is the role of the intellectual in this situation?
Can he overcome the impasse? Why does he not inject creativity and
a sense of proportion into our policy-making apparatus? Is the diffi-
culty caused by a rejection of the intellectual?

The attack on "egg-heads" and the anti-intellectualism of much
of American society has undoubtedly discouraged many thoughtful people
from making their full contribution. On the other hand, looked at
from another perspective, the intellectual has also never been more in
demand. Every self-respecting organization, governmental or private,
has its panel of experts. Many political leaders have their intellectual
advisors. Throughout our society policy planning bodies proliferate.
Research organizations multiply. There is a general recognition that
our social performance will be no better than the talent we manage to
attract into key positions. What then is the difficulty?

One difficulty is that the demand for expertise or for excellence
is less important than the conception of it. An expert can be considered
an individual who best represents the prevailing views or a person

au individual who best represents the breaking up of a hereon
is less important than the conception of it. An expert can be considered
One difficulty is that the demand for expertise or for excellence
arises into each position. What then is the difficulty?

our society performance will be no better than the talent we want to
raise our organizations uniforly. There is a general recognition that
agitation. Throughout our society, both left and right, polarize broilierate.
but its benefit or expertise. Many leftists tend to have their intellectual
demands. Every left-respectful organization, Government or private,
from another perspective, the intellectual has always been more in
france making their full contribution. On the other hand, looked at
of American society, use undoubtedly discomfited many thoughtful people
The attack on "left-popes" and the anti-intellectualism of much
crafty caused by a rejection of the intellectual?

a sense of proportion into our both-making abstruse? Is the difficult-
Can he overcome the obstacle? Why does he not inject creativity and

III

12.

16.

Charting new paths. Excellence can be identified with doing the familiar as well as possible or it can be equated with pushing back the frontiers of knowledge and of insight.

It has almost invariably been true that the intellectuals whom society finds most acceptable and who are therefore most in demand are also those who are most comforting. At least they are the ones who are comprehensible to whichever group establishes standards or selects key personnel. This in itself creates a bias in favor of defining an expert as the person who does the familiar extremely well. The individual who strikes out on unfamiliar paths is regarded askance and often finds himself under attack. The proverbial difficulty prophets face in being recognized at home is almost inevitable. For their prophetic quality resides precisely in the breaking of the traditional framework, in going beyond the scale of experience of their compatriots.

Similarly, excellence is more often equated with the highest level of what is commonly understood than with real creativity. Those at the frontiers of knowledge almost inevitably must draw their inspiration from their own sense of accomplishment rather than from the approbation

17.

of society or even that of their peers. All commonly accepted
knowledge has a tendency to become a form of routine and to develop
its administrators, a "priesthood" which has the same bias in favor of
its status quo as any other bureaucracy. The Experts become such not because
they challenge prevailing views but because they tend to confirm or at
least fail to disturb them. Most crucially, the standards of expertness
are established by the organization in need of advice. It frames the
question to be answered. It determines the standard of relevancy. It
decides who is consulted.

The contribution of the intellectual to the policy planning
mechanism is therefore in terms of criteria in the establishment of
which he has played a minor role, if any. He is rarely given the
opportunity to point out that any query delimits the range of possible
solutions or to insist that the question may be in the profoundest sense
irrelevant. The nature of "utility" is beyond the competence assigned
to the consultant. He is asked to solve problems not to
establish trends. As a result, the role of the intellectual vis-a-vis
bureaucracies, in and out of government is frequently that of a legitimator

or of fact-finder. Where decisions are arrived at by what are in effect adversary proceedings, "objectivity" can be approached only by individuals or groups who are not themselves part of the process of policy formulation. This is why each contending faction within the bureaucracy has available its own battery of "outside" experts. Therefore, too, articles or books suddenly become tools in the bureaucratic struggle, even though they may be elaborations of reasonably familiar points of view. In short what bureaucracies want all too often from the intellectuals is not ideas but authority.

Another task for which intellectuals are in demand is the collection of facts. The corollary of a bureaucracy's quest for objectivity is that failure of policy is often ascribed to inadequate information. Since the mechanism itself is considered neutral or helpful and since it is supposed to reduce the personal factor, any breakdown must be due to the inadequacy of what certain social scientists choose to call "input." This leads to a constant demand for "research." However the research thus encouraged is not necessarily intellectually

19.

the most vital nor is it substantively always what is most required even by the decision makers. For the research usually suffers from the same handicaps as the "consultations" described earlier. The standard of utility is established by the customer -- indeed one of the requirements of contract research is almost inevitably that it be "useful." The problem is defined administratively. The pace of research is geared to that of the bureaucracy. The last requirement alone discourages venturesomeness. All pressures make for safety and the showing of some results particularly if the research organization becomes financially dependent on continued contracts.

It must be stressed that the motivation of the bureaucracy toward the intellectual is not cynical. It sincerely wants help. The difficulty is that it usually does not become aware of its need until a problem is already severe and that it may then be more concerned with symptoms than with deeper causes. Moreover, the administrative approach to intellectual effort, by stressing the discrete case, tends to neglect the factor of timing. By analogy to its own mode of operation, it makes the intellectual a specialist of ideas, whose performance is repeatable

makes the intellectual a specialist of these, whose performance is remarkable
neglect the factor of timing. If analysis to its own mode of operation, if
abroad to intellectual effort, by stressing the discrete case tends to
withCOME than with deeper causes. Moreover, the administrative
a problem is slightly severe, and that it may then be more concerned
in difficulty is that it usually does not become aware of its need until
the problem is not solved

If it must be stressed that the motivation of the purchaser
on continued contracts.

burdensly if the research organization becomes financially dependent
somehow. VII. because make for safety and the showing of some results
that of the purchaser. The first redressment alone discloses venture-
problem is defined administratively. The base of research is based to
of contract reason is almost inevitably that it be "mature." The
of utility is established in the customer — indeed one of the requirements
same handpipe as the "consultations" described earlier. The standard
even if the decision maker, for the reason usually empires from the
the most vital nor is it necessarily always what is most required

13.

20

at deadlines set by the administrative process. The administrative approach therefore unwittingly often destroys the environment from which great thought could flow. Its insistence on "results" rather than encouraging a process that works counter to the emergence of an intellectual climate which might produce profound ideas whether or not the bureaucracy feels in need of them.

When we consider the reverse side of the coin -- the impact of the administrative machine on the intellectual -- there is also grave reason for concern. The increasing demands for experts and for research involve an important allocation of talent and sometimes a diversion of it. The demands for advice in many categories, both by the government and by private organizations are so insistent, that many intellectuals are kept at the level of the performance which gained them their reputation.

Each of the requests for their services is usually meritorious -- this is indeed what produces the diversion of talent. But conferences, committees and a profusion of tactical problems inhibit real creativity.

The pace of their life, as much as the kind of problems with which they are now obliged to occupy themselves, run counter to spontaneous reflectiveness.

are now applied to each of themselves, run counter to spontaneous reflectiveness.

The face of their life, so much as the kind of problems with which they committee and a proclamation of tactical problems implicit real creativity.

is indeed what produces the divination of talent. But conference, each of the requests for their services is necessarily meritorious -- this are kept at the level of the performance which gained them their reputation.

and by private organizations are so insatiate, that many intellectuums of it.

The demands for advice in many categories, both by the Government involve an inherent allocation of talent and sometimes be a diversion reason for concern. The increasing demands for expertise and for research the administrative machine on the intellectual -- there is also grave

When we consider the reverse side of the coin -- the input of

feels in need of it.

Climate which might produce brooding ideas whether or not the preseniment encountering a process [work] counter to the emergence of an intellectual

which treat thought could flow. Its insatiate on "results" rather than approach therefore unwittingly often deflates the environment from

50

it does not touch the heart of the problem which is that purpose must
dominate the mechanism if we are to avoid stagnation. The dilemma of
our policy is not that it cannot implement what it has defined as useful
-- though this too happens occasionally -- but that their standards of
utility are in need of redefinition. The intellectual does not perform
his full responsibility if he shies away from this essential task.

30.

even more than his ideas is his attitude. He will perform a more important function by being true to himself than by letting our large organizations define his criteria. This is not to say that the intellectual should withdraw into his ivory tower, -- a strong temptation in the face of the situation described earlier. The situation will not be improved by withdrawing from the scene. The intellectual -- at least in the fields which impinge on the large organization -- must also realize that his impact can be as paralysing by a perfectionism which poses alternatives too absolutely as through becoming an extension of the tactical concerns of the bureaucracy. The intellectual should not refuse cooperation with the large organization, governmental or private. What he must avoid is to permit it to define all the standards of relevance or utility.

For the continuing concern of the intellectual, indeed his ultimate raison d'être, is the re-examination of standards, their refinement and elevation. Where so much in our society is done by routine and even the new is so often conceived as a projection into the future of familiar trends, the intellectual by his bearing and his concerns must demonstrate the existence of the overriding importance of

purpose over technique. He should not be concerned that he has
"customers" and that they will judge him by his usefulness in the
attainment of short-term goals. He does-fails only when he makes their
criteria his own. He is untrue to himself not when he is consulted,
only when his ego becomes involved in the act of consultation. In a
society too prone to inquire into the possibility of success as the
condition of an enterprise, his primary duty is to make clear that some
things are worth doing for their own sake ~~and~~ that the criteria of success
~~must~~ transcend the status quo and be often quite meaningless in the early
stages of an enterprise.

~~is meaningless when sought to be applied too early to any process.~~ He
should know better than almost any other group in our society that ideas
become tractable only through the act of commitment, that~~in~~
intellectual
effort past accomplishment is no guarantee of present achievement,
that each new field must be conquered above all by dedication. If he
places process over substance and turns himself into a specialist and
barterer of technical remedies, he must not be surprised at the
increasing bureaucratization of our society.

Perhaps the most difficult lesson to learn for contemporary
America is that there exists no mechanism for the solution of our
problems. It is equally crucial to understand that hard work is no

substitute for profound thought. In fact the more cumbersome the mechanism
the more demanding it will be. The more uncertain the participants, the
more they will tend to satisfy their qualms by working to the point of
exhaustion as one does that they have done their best. Our dilemmas
will not resolve themselves into a technique -- at least not until we
are clearer about our purpose in the contemporary revolution and have
developed some notion of the kind of world which we consider conforms
to our aspirations. To state the problem is of course far from solving
it. Yet we cannot even begin to give an answer until we ask ourselves
the right questions.

the right directions.

if. Yet we cannot even begin to give an answer until we ask ourselves
to our aspirations. To state the problem is to come to us from solving
devoted some notion of the kind of world which we consider conional
are clearer about our purpose in the concomitantly revolution and have
will not resolve themselves into a technique — at least not until we
explanation as one does that they have done their best. Our dilemma
more they will tend to satisfy their diverse working to the point of
the more demanding it will be. The more uncertain the participants, the
suppose for prototyped thought. In fact the more comprehensive the mechanism

N

35.

THE INTELLECTUAL AND THE POLICY MAKER

Any observer of the American scene must be struck by the tenta-
tiveness of our policy both domestic and foreign. In a period of revolu-
tionary upheaval in every part of the world our diplomacy for all its technical
skill has lacked vision. There has been no bold initiative since the
Marshall plan projected America's concern for the growth and cohesiveness
of Europe. In a world where millions grope for a new orientation, America
has acted almost as if it were a spectator at a play which did not concern
it. Major parts of the world are becoming "foreign" in the deepest sense:
they find increasingly little in America with which to identify themselves;
beyond any disagreement over specific policies exists an ever-growing
distrust or at least incomprehension of America's purposes. And at home
we have elaborated a cult of easiness which has deprived much of our
domestic performance, outside the economic field, of dynamism and a sense
of direction.

It would be comforting to believe that this state of affairs
is due to particular mistakes of policy which can be reversed more or
less easily. Unfortunately the problem is more deep-seated. The lack

2.

of vitality of our policy-makers is matched by the stagnation of many of
many of their critics. It has been a long time since there has been a
real debate on policy issues beyond a bland competition for such slogans
as "peace" or "prosperity." As David Riesman has pointed out in a brilliant
paper, we have every reason to be worried not only about the things which are
done but about the alternatives with which we are presented both by our
political as well as our intellectual leaders.

It is often argued that our best people are no longer attracted
into government service. It may be equally pertinent to inquire how
qualified our "best people" are for the task of policy making in a revolu-
tionary period. Others trace the cause of our difficulties to the lack of
respect shown the intellectual by our society. However, a case could be
made for the proposition that in some respects the intellectual has never
been more in demand. Perhaps he makes such a relatively small contribution
not because he is rejected but because he is embraced too enthusiastically.
His difficulty is not that he is not sought after but that he is asked to
work in problems which often distort his true calling.

II

One of the basic problems of a society is whether the qualities which are encouraged in the rise to eminence are also the qualities required once eminence is reached. Paradoxically, this difficulty may be compounded where performance is the chief criteria for advancement. For performance at a lower level may be no guage of ability at the top. In fact, the more specialized our society becomes, the more the qualities at the early stages of a career may be irrelevant to the vision required of leadership.

At the lower levels of an organization, the need is for adaptability and skill in operating within a frame-work which must be treated as given.

But the top executives must possess the inspiration and creativity to establish the frame-work itself. This does not mean that performance at the lower levels of an organization is inconsistent with eventual leadership.

It does emphasize that the criteria for advancement may miss the skills most required in high office, so that superior performance when eminence is reached is, despite all personnel procedures, accidental.

The dilemma, real enough in the private sector of our society, is even more complicated at the higher levels of government. For here the

4.

criteria on which selection to high office is based give very little
indication of policy-making ability. In a society which has prided itself
on its "private" character it is inevitable that the qualities which are
most highly esteemed in civilian pursuits should also be generally by
high governmental office. Within the private sector of our society an
extraordinary and increasing premium is placed on administrative skill.
Though administrative ability is very useful in high office, it does not
touch the central problem of policy making in a revolutionary period. The
essence of good administration is coordination among the specialized functions
of a bureaucracy. The task of statesmanship is to impose purpose on
routine. A good administrator possesses judgment; a great statesman is
distinguished by vision. Administration is concerned with execution;
policy making must also address itself to developing a sense of direction.

Very little in the experience which forms American leadership
groups prepares them for the tasks to be performed in high office. In a
policy-making position the American executive (or the lawyer coming from
a business background) is rarely familiar with the problems into which he
finds himself projected, partly because the effort to achieve eminence
and to advance have absorbed most energies. One of the characteristics of

administrative approach to policy subjects innovation to "objective" tests which deprive it of spontaneity and which turn it into projections of the familiar. It confuses momentum with purpose.

The approach works reasonably well in the private sector of our society because the goals of the economic effort are more or less fixed and because most executives can substitute a great deal of experience in their line of endeavor for reflectiveness. But when the same method is applied to policy making on a national scale its limitations become dramatically apparent. The executive soon discovers that he must pay a price for the lack of a conceptual framework for dealing with his new environment. Even when he belongs to the very small groups that have the opportunity to participate in study groups on say foreign policy in one of our large cities, he has engaged in this activity as a strictly extra-curricular effort, usually in a passive manner and at any rate without the intensity which leads to independent thought. Nor is previous government service a guarantee of overcoming this problem. For the interval between governmental positions is usually filled with duties so demanding that intellectual development is often kept at the level of the most recent experience.

As a result most of our top policy makers begin their governmental
careers with only superficial acquaintance with the problems into which they
find themselves projected. In fact, high office is desired by many precisely
because it is thought to differ from their usual activities and because it
offers a *new* challenge. It is not surprising that many of our high
officials have to begin their governmental careers with extensive briefing
on almost every subject-matter for which they are responsible. They
therefore cannot take advantage of the strong will which is often their
outstanding trait. Great decisiveness in a familiar environment may
become arbitrariness or at least random behavior when the criteria on which
decisions are based prove elusive. Consciously or not, our top policy
makers often lack the assurance or the conceptual framework to impose their
pattern on events.

The usual reaction to this situation is to take refuge in the
method which has served the policy maker so well in private life. If the
decision proves difficult, so the thought runs, it must be because the
alternatives have been incorrectly presented. The obvious solution is to
multiply the advisory staffs both official and non-official. This led

["uniquely the advisory staff official and non-official. The fed\nalternative have been incorrectly presented. The opiate solution is to\ndecide proves difficult, so the thought runs, it must be because the\nmethod which has served the bottom maker so well in private life. It is the\nThe must reaction to this situation is to take refuge in the\npattern on events.", "makers often lack the assurance or the conceptual framework to impose their\ndecisions are passed above elusives. Concretely or not, our job below\nbecome arbitrary or at least random behavior when the criteria on which\noutstanding fruit. Great deci-laveness in a familiar environment may\ntherefore cannot take advantage of the strong will which is often their\non almost every subject-matter for which they are reasonable. They\nrespect of the\nofficials have to begin their governmental careers with extensive pretrial\noffers a new challenge. If it is not surprising that many of our rig\nbecause it is brought to diller from their usual activities and because it\nfinding themselves projected. In fact, high office is desired by many precisely\nour careers with only exceptional competence with the problems into which they", "As a result most of our job below makes begin their governmental\nyears in a new environment. It is not surprising that many of our rig\nbecause it is brought to diller from their usual activities and because it\nfind themselves projected. In fact, high office is desired by many precisely\nour careers with only exceptional competence with the problems into which they\nwill find themselves projected. In fact

8.

to the phenomenon of policy making by committee. Every decision is cleared
by an ever-increasing circle of officials to make certain that no policy
fails because a point of view has gone unrepresented. Every policy
failure leads to the formation of more committees in order to discover
the elusive facts which are thought to have caused the breakdown. The
committee system is therefore less an organizational device than a spiritual
necessity.

Yet whatever the motive the impact of the committee system on
policy is pernicious. Since a committee is a forum of negotiation, the
requirements of success in it have their own logic which at the least
divert energies from other tasks. In many respects the internal problems
of policy making grow as complicated as the problems with which the policy
making apparatus is supposed to deal. Individual policy papers, since they
are never accepted in their entirety, are written with an eye to compromise.
Whether they are overstated to permit concessions, or phrased vaguely to
allow freedom of interpretation they are rarely oriented to the problem
of action. The committee system is more concerned with coordination than

9.

with judgment. Its internal processes are so complicated that agreement however vague tends to become an end in itself. Indeed often the only achievement is the fact of agreement and not its content.

Another characteristic of the committee system is that it is geared to the avoidance of risk and not to great conception. A policy dilemma is produced because the advantages and disadvantages of alternative measures appear fairly evenly balanced. Else there would be no need for discussion. But in assessing these alternatives the risks always seem more certain than the opportunities. No one can ever prove that an opportunity in fact existed but failure to foresee a danger involves swift retribution.

The elaborateness of the process is compounded by the tendency of advisors to advise. Silence may mean not that the idea under discussion is good but that the advisor is inadequate. Much of committee procedure is designed to permit each participant or agency to register objections. Agreement reflects not necessarily a sense of direction but that all objections have been exhausted.

In this manner policy is transformed into a series of ad hoc decisions which distort its real essence. For profound policy derives not so much from the skill of individual moves as from their relationship

10.

to each other. It requires a sense of proportion; it thrives on a
feeling for style. All these intangibles are negated where problems become
isolated cases each of which is disposed on its "merits" by experts in the
particular difficulties it involves. It is as if in commissioning a
painting, a patron would ask one artist to draw the face, another the
body, another the hands and still another the feet simply because each
artist is particularly good in this particular category. Such a procedure
would be thought ludicrous. In stressing the components it would lose
the meaning of the whole. It is no different with policy. To attempt
to conduct policy as a science leads to rigidity. It wastes intelligence
on non-essentials.

The committee system not only has a tendency to ask the wrong
questions, it also puts a premium on the wrong qualities. The committee
process is geared to the pace of conversation. Even where the agenda is
composed of memoranda these are prepared primarily as a background for
discussion and they stand and fall on the skill with which they are
presented. Everything therefore depends on the ability to absorb ideas
by ear and to present arguments fluently. Quickness of comprehension

12.

great pressure in favor of the status quo. Committees are consumers and not creators of ideas.

Not everything that sounds plausible is profound and many profound ideas do not seem plausible - at least at first glance, the only glance permitted by most committees. Rapidity of comprehension is not always equivalent to responsible assessment - it may even be contrary to it. The result of these psychological distortions is a paradox: the more intense the search for certainty, the greater will be the inward insecurity of the participants. The more they seek "objectivity," the more diffuse the efforts become. The time spent on safeguarding against error is taken away from the definition of goals. And in the absence of a well-understood set of purposes each problem becomes a special case. The typical pattern of our governmental process is endless debate about whether a given set of circumstances is in fact a problem until a crisis removes all doubts but also the possibility of effective action. The price to be paid for the absence of a sense of direction is that more time is spent in identifying problems than in solving them.

13.

Another result of the lack of criteria on which to base judgments is that work sometimes becomes an end in itself. Their uncertainty leads officials/to work to the point of exhaustion as one guage that they have done all that could be asked. This insecurity is also shown by the fact that almost in direct proportion as advisory staffs multiply they are distrusted by those at the top. The officials increasingly feel the need for "outside" - and therefore unbiased - advice. Memoranda which are produced within the bureaucracy are taken less seriously than similar papers which are available to the general public. Crucial policy advice is increasingly requested from ad hoc committees of outside experts such as the Gaither committee on civil defense.

These committees are often extraordinarily useful. They bring a fresh point of view. They can focus public discussion. They may even galvanize the bureaucracy. Nevertheless they suffer from serious drawbacks. Whatever the previous experience of the members they too require extensive "briefing." This places an additional strain on the bureaucracy while the members of the committee are frequently ready to make their best contribution at the point when the group is disbanded. Then again,

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the committee is of necessity drawn from the same group as the top officials.

They have therefore been the same victims of the administrative pace in and out of government. And the committee process with its trend towards the fragmentation of policy and its bias towards simplified approaches applies almost as much to outside as to governmental groups.

In some respects "outside" ad hoc groups can even be said to represent an important diversion of talent. The number of outstanding individuals with experience in a given field is severely limited. As a result, the same people are called in again and again on similar tasks.

It would be interesting to study the percentage of overlap of group studying say disarmament or military policy over a five-year period. Their discussions soon become predictable and sometimes even stereotyped. At the same time constant membership on committees prevents many of the members to derive full intellectual benefit from their return to private life. They do not have sufficient leisure; they soon become so overcommitted that they are forced to stay intellectually at the level of their most recent experience.

Moreover, outside groups are handicapped by the fact that

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almost for its own sake. The formalism is the result of the cumbersome
of the method of arriving at decisions, which sometimes places the process
of achieving agreement over the substance. The tendency of a bureaucracy
to protect itself against all contingencies leads to a situation where
on any given issue some paper will exist covering some eventuality. This
does not mean, however, that the policy is broadly conceived. Where
everything is open for discussion, nothing is ever finally settled or even
sharply focussed, particularly when the discussion has the character of a
negotiation rather than of a debate. A policy paper may exist for almost
every case but it is usually so vague that it has to be renegotiated when
the situation to which it applies arises. Even more important, it is
frequently so abstract that it cannot guide day-to-day action. In the deepest
sense many of our policies are not "real" to our policy makers: they
produce a document but not sustained measures applied over a period of
time.

This formalism accounts for the slow reaction time of our
diplomacy. It is not that our policy makers do not know what to do, it
is that they cannot act sufficiently quickly. Many of our negotiations

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with the Soviet Union are responses to slow Soviet overtures and they give the impression of a stubborn rear-guard action at the end of which we often concede what we had rejected as inconceivable when the issue was first raised. Most of our initiatives occur during crisis periods. In calm times we have a tendency to act as if stability were a natural condition at least in part because the process of arriving at new departures is so painful that it is generally not embarked upon except under pressure.

The rigidity of American policy is therefore a symptom of the psychological burden placed on the policy makers. Policies developed with great inward doubt and accepted with a rather close division within the policy-making apparatus become almost sacrosanct as soon as they are finally officially adopted. The reason is psychological rather than substantive. The status quo has at least the advantage of familiarity. Short of catastrophe, its very existence is a demonstration that the worst has been averted. There is no point in borrowing trouble, so the argument goes at least subconsciously, by changing course. Above all such an attempt raises the prospect that the whole searing process of arriving at decisions will have to be repeated.

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On the other hand when frustration becomes too great or a crisis brooks no further evasion there arises the demand for innovation almost for its own sake. Yet the problem of innovation is not solved simply by calling for it. Creativity cannot be achieved by fiat. The lack of a sense of direction which has produced the policy impasse in the first place will also inhibit a successful response. Where there has been no sustained debate about policy, in or out of government, the criteria for innovation will also prove elusive. Another equally mechanical criterion replaces the previous stagnation. Policy is now suddenly adopted not because it is profound but because it is new. Thus during the debate about disengagement in 1957, some commentators argued that while they doubted the substantive merit of a neutral belt in Europe, the proposal at least had the advantage of being a new idea. Therefore too many ideas are first rejected in tranquil times because they are too far in advance of the thinking of the bureaucracy and then rebuffed again when a crisis produces the demand for a new approach because they are now "old hat."

The combination of unreflectiveness produced by the style of life of our most eminent people in and out of government, faith in administrative

to a world in turmoil.

If the greatest cause of our failure to contribute a sense of direction
the uncertainty of our belief and its lack of a sense of proportion.

processes and the convulsive abreaction to belief seems for some of

13.

21.

One problem is the demand for expertise itself. Every problem which our society recognizes - leaving aside the question whether these are always the most significant - calls into being panel, committees or study groups supported either by private or governmental funds. Intellectuals with a reputation soon find themselves so overloaded with commitments that their pace of life hardly differs from that of the executive whom they advise. They cannot supply perspective because they are as harassed as all other prominent men. All pressures on them tend to keep them at the level of the performance that gained them their reputation. They become in a sense administrators of a static body of thought which soon assumes ritualistic overtones. In his desire to be helpful, the intellectual is too frequently compelled to sacrifice his greatest contribution to society: his creativity.

This is compounded by the conception of the intellectual held by the officials or organizations that call on him. A bureaucratized society - the word is not intended invidiously - is based on an elaborate specialization of functions. This both delimits tasks and establishes categories of expectations. A person is considered suitable for assignments within certain

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"classifications." But the classification of the intellectual is determined by the premium society places on administrative skill. The intellectual is therefore rarely found at the level where decisions are made. His place commonly is on the advisory staffs where alternatives are prepared. But in preparing these alternatives he is not a free agent. It is the executive who determines in the first place whether he is in need of advice. He and the bureaucracy frame the question to be answered. They and not the intellectual determine the standard of relevance. They decide who is consulted and therefore the definition of "expertness."

The contribution of the intellectual to policy planning is therefore in terms of criteria which he played a minor role in establishing.

He is rarely given the opportunity to point out that any query delimits a range of possible solutions or that an issue is posed in terms which are in the deepest sense irrelevant. The nature of "utility" is beyond the competence assigned to him. He is asked to solve problems not to establish over-all goals. As a result the intellectual is often used to legitimize a point of view which already exists within the policy-making apparatus.

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When decisions are arrived at by what are in effect advisory proceedings, a specialist - particularly if he is not himself part of the bureaucracy - is a useful weight in the scale. This is why contending factions within the bureaucracy try to build up batteries of outside experts or of semi-independent research groups. Therefore articles or books become tools in the bureaucratic struggle. In short what our executives want all too often from the intellectual is not ideas but authority.

This attitude affects not only the use to which the intellectual is put but also the conception of excellence which underlies the recognition of some individual as an expert. For the mere fact that the need for excellence is constantly invoked is not/guarantee that its real nature will be understood. An expert can be considered an individual who best represents the prevailing views or a person charting new pathes. Excellence can be identified with doing the familiar as well as possible or it can be equated with pushing back the frontiers of knowledge and of insight. The search for talent can take the form of filling identified positions or it can concentrate on creating an environment in which creativity and spontaneity

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will bring about needs not even yet imagined.

It has almost invariably been true that the intellectuals whom society finds most acceptable and who are therefore most in demand are also the most comforting. Similarly excellence is more often equated with the highest level of what is commonly understood than with true creativity. The individual who strikes out on unfamiliar paths is regarded askance. Experts become such not because they challenge prevailing views but because they confirm or at least fail to disturb them.

The proverbial difficulty prophets face in being reorganized at home is almost inevitable because their prophetic quality resides precisely in their ability to transcend the traditional frame-work. In some respects this reaction is healthy or at least understandable. A society can function only by reducing most actions to a standard of average performance - a high standard if it is fortunate but still a pattern not potential beyond at least the/capability of its people. To attempt to conduct policy by acts of prophetic insight is to dissolve all restraints and to undermine social cohesiveness. Any society must therefore strike a balance between the requirements of organization and of inspiration. Organization and the

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routine on which it is based reflects the need for continuity and for not
gearing social action to the accident of great men in each generation. Inspir-
ation is required to adapt to new conditions or to create new purposes.

The danger in an overemphasis on organization is that routine becomes an
end in itself. The peril of an excessive concern with inspiration is that
it brings about a mood of exaltation and fanaticism which tolerates no
deviation. Because the vast majority of social actions depend on routine,
the substance of creativity is very rarely understood. The most that can
be hoped for is that there be a belief in its existence; that society not
destroy or divert what it cannot fully understand.

Paradoxically, the great valuation our society places on expertise
may be even more dangerous to creativity than indifference. For by its
rewards our society creates a structure of incentives among intellectuals
which may put an accent on essentially stabilizing qualities: the quickness
of comprehension essential for committee work, the gregariousness required
for any cooperative effort. It turns the intellectual into a "specialist"
of ideas, one component among many others considered necessary for effective
policy formulation. This fragmentation goes on even within the group of

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intellectuals who act as advisors: they are rarely placed on advisory committees because of their grasp of the overall situation. More usually they are selected as representatives of specific approaches: a committee on military policy will have a spokesman for the "all-out war" concept as well as one for "limited war."

The individuals who achieve prominence as advisors to large organizations in turn set the tone for the intellectual effort in major fields, even outside the bureaucratic frame-work. It is inevitable that in a society which prides itself on being *practical*, many intellectuals gauge their usefulness by the extent to which they are drawn into administrative and policy-making activities. Thus, the intellectuals who advise large organizations are often able to dominate intellectual effort in their field by their prestige and occasionally because they have easier access to funds for research projects. They become a professional group of liason men between the bureaucracy and the "peace" intellectuals who sometimes inhibit creativity in two ways: those intellectuals drawn too extensively into the advisory process develop an "in-group" with its own jargon and its own ethos which restrains the intellectual outside the

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circle from working on problems with policy implications. The intellectual outside the policy circle becomes convinced that fruitful research in these fields is impossible without access to classified information. At the same time those with relationships to policy-making groups develop a style of life which destroys the capacity for growth. Moreover, it is not a far step from being willing to be consulted to needing consulting relationships for one's self-esteem. And since individuals who challenge the presuppositions of the bureaucracy, governmental or private, can rarely maintain their relationship as advisors, great pressures are created to elaborate on familiar themes rather than risking everything on new departures which may fail or prove unacceptable.

This is not to say that the motivation of the administration towards the intellectual is cynical. He wants help sincerely. His problem is that he does not know the nature of the help he requires. And he generally does not become aware of its need until a problem is already critical. In short, the bureaucracy is more concerned with symptoms than with causes. It wants "solutions" to specific problems not a definition of purposes.

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the product. There is no reason why an "outside" group should react very
differently to a particular set of problems than the bureaucracy, if its
activities are concentrated on some range of issues. After all, the one-
sidedness which the "independent" research group is designed to overcome
is itself the result of an excessive and very sincere concentration on a
very narrow range of problems. It is not removed, if the research agency
has no greater possibility for applying a wider perspective than its sponsoring
agency.

Thus though the intellectual participates in policy-making
as rarely before, the result has not necessarily been salutary for him or
for the government. Nor has the present manner of employing outside experts
or the average work of research groups done more than to reduce somewhat
the dilemmas of the policy planners. The production of so much research
often adds simply another burden to already overworked officials. It tends
to divert attention from the act of judgment on which policy ultimately
depends to the assembly of facts which is relatively the easiest step in
policy formation. Few if any of the recent crises of US policy have been

["belligerent formation. Few if any of the recent cases of U2 belligerent have been\ndebuted to theuredp of facts which is relatively the easiest task in\nthe field of attention from the set of judgment on which belliger ultimately\neven adds a single pugion to already overworked outlieirs. It tends\nto divert the attention from the set of judgment on which belliger ultimately