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After the death of Stalin, the previous allied unanimity about the nature of the Communist threat evaporated. 1 Under the impact of periodic Soviet peace offensives and the schisms within the Communist world, differences in the allies' approach to the Communist challenge became apparent. Great Britain, Italy and the Scandinavian countries tended to treat every peace offensive as the beginning of a new era of international cooperation. Each sign of Communist moderation was hailed as a basic transformation of the Soviet system. In these countries the predominant view was that Soviet ideology had become transformed into a Marxist form of moderate nationalism.

In the Federal Republic and in France after the advent of De Gaulle, the *attitude* has been quite different. The Federal Republic, divided by Communist intransigence and repeatedly subjected to Communist pressures, has viewed Soviet peace offensives as variations in Communist tactics, not as major shifts in objectives. Supported by France, the Federal Republic has been uneasy about East-West negotiations and fearful that any settlement would legitimize, at least indirectly, the division of Germany. In 1962, Paris and Bonn disagreed with the United States about the utility of the exploratory talks regarding Berlin; they have been uneasy about most of the schemes advanced at the Geneva disarmament conference; France rejected --as the Federal Republic would have liked to do but did not dare--the limited nuclear test ban treaty.

1

Throughout, there had been significant opposition groups in each country which maintained that the threat was exaggerated or even that NATO was provocative.

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United States policy has oscillated between these conflicting views. American pronouncements often include many of the phrases of the early days of NATO. Our actual policy on many issues has tended toward bilateral dealings with the Soviets. Seeking to straddle the conflicting views of its allies, but not reconciling them, the United States has retained the liturgy of the early days of NATO and a good deal of the practice of those urging a policy of accommodation. RRELAXATION OR TENSIONS

not the issues
A problem
A situation
but
Within the Alliance much of the debate about East-West relations has nature of the Soviet system. concerned the desirability of relaxing tensions. Those who see a change of policy in every Soviet change of tone tend to transform foreign policy into a form of psychotherapy. To them everything depends on establishing good personal relations with Soviet leaders or a general atmosphere of goodwill. Those who insist on the unchangeable nature of Soviet hostility postulate a Soviet society immune to the erosion of time--an achievement unprecedented in human history. But the desirability of easing tensions should never be at issue. The only sensible debate can concern the question of how peace can be reliably achieved. The issue is not whether tensions should be maintained, but what their cause is and how they can best be ended. Has the Cold War been caused by personal malice or does it have deeper reasons? Is a detente to be achieved by improving the atmosphere first and moving from there to specific settlements? Or is a relaxation of tensions reliable only if it is tied from the very beginning to a settlement of outstanding issues? Questions as these form the core of the problem of East-West relations.

Many base their hopes for peace on an optimistic estimate of the convictions of individual Soviet leaders. Prior to Khruschev's dismissal, detente was often urged to buttress him against obscure Stalinist forces in

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the Kremlin. Khrushchev's overthrow makes it unnecessary to discuss whether
this assessment of his motives was valid. It emphasizes, however, how dangerous
it is to gear policy to the presumed personal preferences of an individual
Communist leader. Careers in Communist hierarchies are too precarious to base
policy on individuals. Peace will be most secure if the West conducts itself
so that any Soviet leaders, regardless of his personal preferences, becomes
convinced that peace is the preferable course at any given moment.

Peace offensives, of course, are not new in Soviet history. Peaceful
co-existence has been avowed since the advent of Communism in Russia. It was
stressed particularly between 1924-39; between 1941-46; at the time of the
Geneva Summit Conference of 1955; again on the occasion of Khrushchev's visit
to the United States in 1959; since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. On each
occasion the reason for the detente was some internal or external strain on
the Soviet system. In 1924, it was the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky
followed by the forced collectivization of agriculture and the purges; in
1941-46 it was the Germany invasion; in 1955 it was the succession struggle
after the death of STALIN; in 1959 it was part of a Soviet attempt to push the
Western allies out of Berlin; since 1962 it has been caused by the shock of
the defeat in Cuba and the internal strains on the Soviet system.

On each occasion the period of relaxation ended when an opportunity for
expanding Communism presented itself. The period of tranquility after 1924
was followed by the annexation of Bessarabia, of the Baltic States, a third of
Poland, and an attack on Finland. World War II led to the creation of the
satellite orbit in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva gave way to an
attempted penetration of the Middle East and a crisis over Berlin. And, the
spirit of Camp David was ended with another Berlin crisis which did not end

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[Y]

until the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

During each previous Soviet peace offensive, many in the West --including some who thought of themselves as staunchly, sometimes almost religiously anti-Communist--hailed a fundamental change in Soviet attitude. This demonstrates the extent of the American consensus that conflict is usually the result of individual malice rather than of structural causes. The corollary is that East-West tensions can be ended by a simple change of heart on the part of Communist leaders. In the 1920's a noted historian wrote:

> The former crusaders of world revolution at any cost have exchanged their swords for machine tools and now rely more on the results of their labor than on direct action to achieve the ultimate triumph of the proletariat.²

When Stalin abolished the Comintern in 1943, the then Senator Connally from Texas commented: "Russians for years have been changing their economy and approaching the abandonment of Communism and the whole Western world will be gratified at the happy climax of their efforts."³ In 1956 Secretary Dulles was impelled by the spirit of Geneva to say: "The Soviet leaders are scrapping thirty years of policy based on violence and intolerance."⁴ This is matched by Secretary Rusk's statement early in 1964: "They [the Communists] appear to have begun to realize that there is an irresolvable contradiction between the demands to promote world Communism by force and the needs of the Soviet state and people."⁵

² Michael T. Florinsky, *World Revolution and the USSR*, p. 216.

³ *New York Times*, May 23, 1943.

⁴ U.S. Department of State Press Release, No. 92, Feb. 25, 1956.

⁵ *Bet footnote must be some special or*

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Each of these assessments turned out to be mistaken--except Secretary Rusk's about which returns are not yet in. This suggests that a real relaxation of tensions depends on the ability to deal with the causes which produced them. Sentimentality is not useful in charting East-West relations. What is required for an assessment of those factors in the Soviet system which produce belligerence and those which make for accommodation. These are precariously balanced, in the Communist system. It should be the goal of Western policy to give a maximum spur to the peaceful trends.

Two factors encourage intransigence in the Communist world: the kind of man who rises to leadership positions and the ideology on which the Communist system is built.

Any comparison of the composition of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of any decade with its membership at the end of that decade illustrates the precariousness of high office in the Soviet system.⁶ Turnover is rapid; the penalties for failure in the inevitable

6

The fate of the first groups of post-Stalin leaders has been described as follows:

> "Two (Beria and Bagirov) were shot. Six (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Saburov and Pervukhin) were denounced and expelled from leadership and have disappeared from public life. One (Voroshilov) was publicly denounced, expelled from the leadership but admitted to Khrushchev's banquet circuit. Two (Ignatiev and Melnikov) gradually disappeared from public life following censure.

Three are no longer in positions of leadership but are still members of the Central Committee and occupy positions of secondary importance. These are Aristov, the Ambassador to Poland; Mikhailov, the Ambassador to Indonesia, and Pospelov, the director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. One (Ponomarenko) was removed from the Central Committee without censure and occupies a fourth-rate post. Only two (Mikoyan and Suslov) outlasted Khrushchev and are now in the front ranks of the post-Krushchev leadership."

Bialer, Severyn, "Twenty-four Men Who Rule Russia," *New York Times Magazine*, November 1, 1964, p. 27

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leadership struggle are drastic. Loss of position involves public disgrace, usually for the former leader's family as well, and complete separation from all erstwhile colleagues or from any public activity. In almost half a century of Soviet rule, the reputation of only the first leader (Lenin) has outlived his tenure in office.

Even more poignant than the fate of the top leadership is that of the middle and lower echelons. The top leaders at least have the consolation that the enormous risks they run are on behalf of their own ambitions; those on the lower levels may find themselves engulfed as a result of events totally out of their control. Loyalty may turn into a source of personal danger; followers will often share the fate of their leader even though they may have had no real alternative.

All of this creates an atmosphere of suspicion--even of conspiracy--in the Communist leadership groups. There is no legitimate succession. Power goes to those skillful and ruthless enough to seize and hold it. Power becomes it own justification because it brings with it control of the only source of legitimacy: the Communist Party apparatus. In the past, no attempt at collective leadership has lasted. One leader has eliminated all rivals and has not felt restrained by ties of loyalty or by past obligations. Stalin had all the individuals who helped him into power executed. Khrushchev disgraced Kaganovich whose protégé he had been and he turned on Marshal Zhukov six months after being saved by him from a conspiracy of his own colleagues. Brezhnev and Kosygin owed their careers to Khrushchev; they, nevertheless, overthrew him and started a campaign of calumny against him

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within twenty-four hours of his dismissal.

Only an enormous desire for power can impel a man to enter such a career. Anyone succeeding in Communist leadership struggles must be single-minded, unemotional, unsentimental and dedicated. Nothing in the experience of Soviet leaders would lead them to prize peace as an end or to accept protestations of personal goodwill at face value. Their own career --indeed their survival--has been advanced by the ability to dissemble.

Khrushchev's success, as Brezhnev's after him, depended on his ability to hide his ambition until it was too late for opponents. The suspicions of Soviet leaders, are toward each other, therefore, inherent in their situation. It is unlikely that their attitude toward the outside world is more benign. There is no reason for them to treat foreign leaders more gently than their own colleagues or to expect more consideration from them.

The Soviet system tends to produce leaders who identify their survival with the elimination of all possible rivals. Domestically this means that the power of potential competitors must be broken. Internationally it implies that opponents must be neutralized if at all possible. The motives of Soviet leaders may well be defensive. The problem is that basically only the impotence of an opponent can reassure them. The type of person who rises to a position of leadership in the Soviet Union will identify security less with goodwill than with a balance of forces. suspicious even of his closest colleagues, he will be tempted to engage in constant probes designed to reduce the power and influence of countries whose size or structure make them possible rivals of the U.S.S.R. This does not make crises inevitable or

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settlements impossible; Soviet leaders, whatever their experience, are
cautious and patient. But if peace were to depend on their pronouncements
alone, it would not be very secure. Soviet tendencies to exert maximum pressure
and to emphasize the importance of a balance of forces are reinforced by
Communist ideology. To be sure, Communist leaders do not follow the
teachings of Marx or Lenin literally; they could not, even if they wished,
because these writings are so contradictory and so dependent on tactical
considerations. However, if ideology does not guide the day-to-day actions,
its basic categories shape the Communist sense of reality. It is considered
to be the guarantee of the ultimate victory which would make all sacrifices
worthwhile. It is the means for establishing discipline within the world
Communist movement. It provides the legitimacy for the settlement of disputes.
While the growing gap between ideology and reality is one of the latent
weaknesses of any Communist system, in the immediate future ideology
continues as one of the prime obstacles to a basic accommodation.

Communists believe that Marxism-Leninism supplies an invaluable tool
in understanding historical trends and the relation of forces existing at any
particular moment. According to it, "subjective" factors, such as the
personal convictions of statesmen, matter less than the "objective" factors
which they reflect. These objective factors include the social and economic
conditions of society, the nature of the economic process and, above all, the
class struggle. Communists believe that Marxism-Leninism enables them to
distinguish between appearance and reality, to avoid the "subjectivism"
inherent in an excessive reliance on personality and the "adventurism" which
risks a historical movement on one throw of the dice.

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Belief in the predominance of "objective" factors explains why Soviet leaders, whenever they have had to make a choice between Western goodwill and a territorial or political gain, have unhesitatingly chosen the latter. The friendship of the West built up during the heroic efforts of World War II was ruthlessly sacrificed to the possibility of establishing Communist-controlled governments in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva did not survive the temptations offered by the possibility of penetrating the Middle East; the spirit of Camp David ended with another ultimatum on Berlin; the many overtures of the Kennedy Administration were rebuffed until the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that the balance of forces was not in fact favorable.

The Soviet reliance on "objective" factors is one of the reasons that negotiations with the Soviets have often been so frustrating. Communist negotiators cannot admit that they could be swayed by the arguments of opponents whose understanding of the basic laws of historical development is, by definition, inferior to their own. They cannot reciprocate "concessions" because they believe that concessions are made to reality, not to individuals. They may change their position but they will go to great lengths to demonstrate that they did so of their own volition and at their own pace. For them a great deal depends on avoiding what seems basic to most Western negotiators: the give-and-take of a bargaining process. Their attitude toward Western negotiators is very similar to that of Western psychiatrists toward their patients: no matter what is said, they think they understand their Western counterpart better than he understands himself. This is one of the reasons why it is so difficult for Western negotiators to see things as they are.

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The ritualistic belief in the importance of the class struggle causes
Soviet leaders to adopt a posture of irreconcilable philosophical hostility
toward the non-Communist world: Even while educating political caeustone,
the Communist party of the U.S.S.R. deposed!

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union comes out resolutely
against peaceful coexistence in the ideological sphere. This
is a simple truth that all who regard themselves as
Marxists-Leninists should have mastered long ago.⁷

Thus, peaceful co-existence is never advocated for its own sake. It is
justified primarily as a tactical device to overthrow the West at minimum risk.
In replying to Chinese charges that it was abandoning world revolution, the
Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. proposed the following test for the policy
of "peaceful co-existence":

> Does the policy of peaceful co-existence favor the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries? Does it favor the upsurge of national liberation movements?⁸

In yet another reply to their Chinese tormentors, the Soviet Communist Party
affirmed:

> We stand fully for the destruction of Imperialism and Capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable destruction of Capitalism, but are doing everything for this to be accomplished by class struggle and as soon as possible.⁹

Moreover, "peaceful co-existence" is advanced by Soviet leaders not as a new

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insight, but as the continuation of Leninist tradition. This proposition has
elicited the following exasperated comment from George F. Kennan:

... people in Moscow are not likely to strengthen belief outside of Russia in their attachment to liberal and tolerant principles of international life... by pleading that such attachment flows naturally from the nature of the social and political system prevailing in the Soviet Union. It is possible to conceive that the Soviet attitude in such questions may have changed; it is not possible to accept the proposition that it did not need to change in order to meet the requirements of peaceful co-existence.¹⁰

These factors, which almost overnight could produce again an expansionist Communist foreign policy, must be balanced against restraints which, over a period of time, may come to predominate. First, there is the power of modern weapons. Ideological hostility comes up against the stark risks of nuclear warfare. Soviet leaders must be acutely aware that if they press intransigence beyond a certain point, they run the risk of hazarding what they have built up at so much sacrifice over four decades. Whatever strategic theory predominates in the West--even if it is not an ideal one--Soviet planners will not be easily convinced that the danger of escalation in any direct confrontation is not enormous. The West would have to behave extraordinarily foolishly before the Soviets risk an overt military challenge. To be sure, in some circumstances aggression does not need the support of overt military action and this accounts for the persistence of the so-called "wars of national liberation." However, if the West conducts itself with reasonable

10 George F. Kennan, "Peaceful Co-existence: A Western View", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2 (January 1960), p.

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prudence, the traditional forms of military pressure can be made increasingly unattractive. Then agreements may be possible to implement one interest the two great nuclear powers must have in common: to prevent a nuclear holocaust. It is significant that one of the principal arguments advanced by Soviet leaders on behalf of peaceful co-existence is that nuclear war is too dangerous. It is in the West's interest to see to it that it remains so.

Another factor making for restraint in Soviet foreign policy is the instability of the leadership group. A great deal of the energy of Soviet leaders is absorbed in internal maneuvering. It is a symptom of weakness that over forty years after seizing power, the Soviet Union has not solved the problem of legitimate succession. Each ruler has felt secure only by villifying his predecessor. In the short term, the patience and capacity for endurance of the Russian people may support such a style of government.

After some point, however, cynicism and demoralization seem inevitable. Sooner or later, the Communist leaders will be asked by the younger generation how a system that prides itself on the universality of its maxims can produce leaders who, by the account of their successors, are so fallible and so corrupt; how an ideology which prides itself on its mastery of "objective" forces could have as its pervasive aberration--again by its own account--the "cult of personality."

The difficulty of settling domestic disputes is closely related to the inability to deal with other Communist states. Communist ideology makes no provision for conflict among Communist states. Since national rivalries are thought to be the result of class conflict, they are expected to disappear.

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whenever Socialism has triumphed. Since conflict among Communist states is believed to be impossible, no provision for the settlement of disputes exists. Consequently, Or, put another way, Communist leaders try to conduct disputes among Communist states as they do their own internal struggles by ostracizing and destroying their opponents. But since Communist states remain sovereign, such tactics cause disputes to harden into irremediable schisms. Each schism, in turn, demonstrates the possibility of various interpretations of a supposedly universal orthodoxy. This must, in time, erode confidence in the universality of Communist ideology as well as the discipline of the world Communist movement.

Thus, events of the past decade have had a shattering impact on the world Communist movement. The enormous tactical flexibility of Communist parties in the past has been due to two factors: belief in the scientific truth of Communist ideology and the existence of Moscow as the center of Marxist infallibility. Belief in scientific truth supplied the assurance; the pre-eminence of Moscow provided the discipline without which tactical flexibility easily degenerates into opportunism.

This has been undermined by three factors: de-Stalinization, the manner in which Khrushchev has been overthrown and the Sino-Soviet split. De-Stalinization raised the question of the relationship between the scientific truth of the dominant ideology and the murderous cult of personality of Stalin. How could a system which was supposed to end forever man's oppression produce an even more pervasive tyranny than the one it replaced? How was it possible that a system which prides itself on its scientific truth could bring about the

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slave labor camps and cruelty of the Stalin period? Even if the Russian people did not ask such questions, the self-confidence of Communist caddies must have been shaken by nagging doubts which must have been reinforced when Khruschev was overthrown in his turn and denounced for "hare-brained schemes".

Khruschev's fall undermined the cohesiveness of the Communist world in yet another way. Communist leaders, whatever their views about Khruschev's merit, must have realized that they were jeopardizing their own position by tying themselves too closely to whoever might be in power in Moscow. Since foreign Communist leaders share many of the characteristics of their Soviet colleagues--including a highly developed sense for personal power--the instability of the Kremlin hierarchy impels them to seek reassurance in a measure of autonomy. They must try to prevent their position from being shaken by every upheaval in Moscow. The initial hesitation of the Communist parties around the world in endorsing Khruschev's ouster can be partly explained in this manner.

A stance more independent of Moscow corresponds in any event to the dominant trends in East European countries. A decade and a half of Communist rule have if anything intensified traditional nationalism. In fact, Communism has been able to gain a measure of support among those who believe it can gain popular acceptance only to the extent that they emphasize national and not Communist concerns. The autarkic organization of each Communist economy compounds these tendencies. It encapsulates each state in a system of total planning, which discourages relations even with its Communist neighbors. A particularly virulent form of nationalism results.

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The Sino-Soviet split completed the fragmentation of the Communist world. While the actual manifestations of the rift may be patched up, its underlying cause seems to be beyond repair. A movement, which claims to represent a universal truth, cannot tolerate two centers of orthodoxy. As long as Peiping rejects the doctrinal pre-eminence of Moscow, the most important reason for discord will persist. The mere assertion of Peiping's independence on doctrinal matters is bound to alter the nature of Communism.

Once the Soviet Union's doctrinal infallibility was challenged, the pattern of relationships within the Communist world changed irretrievably. The East European governments, beset by economic difficulties, saw an opportunity to solidify their sometimes tenuous hold by appealing to the national feelings of their populations. The Soviet Union was no longer in a position to command their loyalty but had to compete for it. In the face of Albanian and then Rumanian defiance, the previously monolithic unity of the Communist world has been eroded. Convinced Communists must be demoralized by the disarray; technicians see in the Sino-Soviet split an opportunity for striking the maximum bargain for their country.

All of this suggests that the current period of relaxation of tension has been initiated not because one individual has overcome the opposition of some unnamed Stalinists, but because conditions require it. To the West the challenge presented by this detente can be defined as follows: When the Communist world faces internal difficulties, should we bask in the relative calm of the Communist tone, or should we use the opportunity to press for the settlement of the issues that produced the tension in the first place?

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The temptation is strong to consider a more conciliatory Communist tone an end in itself. Convinced that a peaceful policy is the "normal" pattern, many in the West treat every change in Soviet tone as a conversion to a permanently pacific course. This is reinforced by domestic considerations which impel most Western leaders to present themselves to their electorate as the architects of a lasting peace.

Such attitudes will cause the West to squander its opportunities, as has happened so often in the past. The cause of peace if not served by leaving the Soviet leadership with the impression that any action, no matter how belligerent, can always be reversed by a change of tone. If a detente is not to be part of another cycle leading to renewed tensions, it is essential that negotiations be concrete and programs specific.

Above all, the West must conduct its policy without illusions. The same pressures which have produced a relaxation of tensions can also tempt Soviet leaders to enter upon another period of hostility. There is always the danger that the Kremlin will try to restore the unity of Eastern Europe by fostering a crisis centered on Germany. Events in other continents can have a backlash in Europe.

The split between the largest Communist countries represents danger as well as opportunity. It means that henceforth the West will confront not alternating periods of hostility and conciliation but both at the same time.

Moreover, to the degree that the Soviet Union is certified as the more conciliatory Communist country, a "respectable" form of Communism begins to intrude in the domestic situation of several of our allies. One of the major

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achievements of the post-war period in Europe has been the isolation of the
Communist parties. Under the impact of many factors, to which United States
policy has occasionally contributed, this isolation is beginning to break
down. In Italy, for example, the "opening to the Left" has resulted in new
found strength for the Communist Party. In France, the demoralization of the
traditional parties by De Gaulle and the change in tactics by the Communist
Party has opened up prospects of a Popular Front for the first time in thirty
years.

*In becoming this isolation is prevented by the presence of
France, Britain, and the US.*

Similar factors influence the approach of Communism in the new
countries. Until de-Stalinization, ambitious leaders were restrained from
joining the Communist camp because this action reduced them to the status of
satellites. With the growing disarray in the Communist world it will seem
increasingly possible to combine nationalism and Communism. Many in the West
draw comfort from this. But it is important to distinguish between a national
Communist government in Eastern Europe and a similar regime in, for example,
Latin America. A national Communist regime in Eastern Europe is an improvement
over the previous condition of absolute Soviet control. A similar regime in
Latin America would inevitably reduce our influence; it could not help but become
a center of anti-American agitation. The logic of its position will drive it
in that direction much as the Algerian regime has been fundamentally anti-Western.

If the West is to act purposefully in this situation, it requires a
common policy. The temptation for bilateral approaches is great. Each national
leader, depending on his temperament, has visions of appearing as the apostle
of a final settlement or of adding Communist pressures to his own as a

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bargaining device within the Alliance. Such a course is suicidal for the West. It will stimulate a race for Moscow's favor. Distrust within the Alliance will grow. The traditional Western balance of power diplomacy will reappear manipulated by the Kremlin. In such circumstances whatever incentives the Soviets will have to be responsible will vanish. They will be able to escape their difficulties with the assistance of the West and without settling any of the outstanding issues. Since in the Kremlin--as in the West--there must be many who consider maintaining the status quo preferable to diplomatic declaration change, the result is likely to be paralysis obscured by abstractions about peace and friendship.

A great deal depends, therefore, on two related policies: (a) the willingness by the members of the Alliance to subordinate short-term advantages to a long-term conception of the future. (b) The willingness to face concrete problems and continue to develop a commitment to a common peace and security program, including the West's version of the police issues. A united West would have unusual opportunities for negotiation. The disarray in Eastern Europe should permit it to adjust its policies to the degree of autonomy shown by the various East European countries. Measures to discipline the arms race could be considered in a new atmosphere. The problem of East-West trade policy urgently requires a comprehensive solution. All these approaches presuppose some consensus in the West about the shape of international affairs over the next decade or so.

Central to any long-term policy is some conception of the future of Germany. No other issue illustrates as dramatically the need for unity and for purpose, for an agreed Allied policy as well as for concrete proposals.

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B. <u>The Future of Germany</u>

The position of the Federal Republic after De Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, and the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation has become increasingly complicated. After the initial period of shock, the United States undertook an assiduous wooing of the Federal Republic. One motive behind the MLF was pressed at least in part to prevent West Germany from accepting a possible French offer of nuclear cooperation--an offer which has not yet been made and, given De Gaulle's awareness of the inter-European equilibrium, might never have been extended. In order to tie Germany to us, successful efforts were made to have German arms purchases funneled to the United States. The culmination of this process was the agreement between Secretary McNamara and Defense Minister von Hassel of November 1964 which in effect tied the equipment of the German armed forces to the United States for this military equipment. The military equipment is the mainstay of the German military.

In the political field the United States, while welcoming Franco-German rapprochement, has made clear that it does so only as long as this does not lead to a new power grouping--a condition inherently impossible of fulfillment. Thus, George McGhee, U.S. Ambassador to Bonn, has said:

> "It is true that the signature of the Franco-German Treaty came as a surprise to many Americans, particularly in the light of what had already been achieved without formal commitments. . . . Fears which have been expressed that the Franco-German Treaty might be used as a vehicle for a new power alignment in Western Europe have so far proved groundless. It is in the interest not only of Germany and France but of Europe and the whole Atlantic community that they remain so."

George McGhee, "Some Thoughts on Current Issues," July 16, 1964, _DOSB_, Vol. LI, No. 1310 (August 3, 1964), pp. 140-1.

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American pressure and high-handed French actions have caused the Treaty of Cooperation to become largely a dead letter. With progress toward European integration blocked, and with the Franco-German Treaty ineffective, the Federal Republic, courted on all sides, finds herself in an extremely uncomfortable position. Among responsible Germans the impression has grown that the Federal Republic is being asked to choose between France and the United States. The most unfortunate aspect of the MLF project is that it has become the symbol around which the competing policies have crystallized. This will lead to a bitter debate which must split the pro-Western elements in Germany into an Atlantic and a European faction. The gainers must be the nationalists or the quasi-neutralists (who sometimes appear in the same guise). Thrown on its own resources by the rivalry of France and the United States, the Federal Republic has been forced to become increasingly conscious of its own national aspirations.

Thus, Germany is growing more vulnerable to Soviet siren songs and Communist blackmail--a tendency which is further magnified by American hints that Germany should be more flexible toward the East. As long as Germany could avoid a direct confrontation by pleading the pre-eminent role of some other relationship--the Western Alliance or the Franco-German Treaty--these dangers were minimized. The combination of De Gaulle's high-handedness and America's short-sighted reaction to it threatens to bring about what each of the rivals should fear most: a Germany increasingly conscious of its own unfulfilled national aims and of the bargaining position conferred on it by its central position.

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All this threatens to upset the delicate balance on which Germany's integration into the Atlantic Alliance was built. It exposes the Federal Republic to dangerous pressures and unfulfillable temptations. Germany has emerged as the balance wheel of the Western Alliance. The most exposed Western ally, seventeen million of whose people are Communist hostages, ~~is postulated on~~ becomes the focal point of all disputes. ~~may come to overestimate the range of flexibility open to it.~~ Or else ~~its internal structure may not be equal to the strain.~~ There are signs already that the debate about the MLF will tear apart the GDR which is ~~suggested is largely responsible for~~ the architect of the pro-Western orientation of the Federal Republic.

This will liberate tendencies in the other parties which are now restrained by their desire to present themselves as responsible trustees of a well-established consensus. France, in turn, seeing that the Franco-German Treaty by which it has sought to ~~relate the Federal Republic~~ to a larger conception has had the practical consequence of enhancing Germany's national role, may be tempted to seek reinsurance by improving its relations in Eastern Europe. Thus the current situation contains a series of time-bombs.

The most serious potential conflict between the Federal Republic and its allies--and the lever which the Communist countries may hope to use to pry Germany loose from its Atlantic ties--is brought about by the division of Germany. The problem is complicated by three factors:

(a) NATO is an alliance of status quo countries; yet one of its principal members seeks a basic change in the status quo.

(b) None of Germany's allies shares her national aspirations with equal intensity.

(c) Germany's past has left a legacy of distrust which creates special obstacles to its

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international role. These divergences would be difficult enough for a
cohesive Alliance; Franco-United States rivalry threatens to make them
insoluble.

These problems become particularly severe whenever there appears
tensions to be some relaxation in East-West relations. To most of the members of
NATO, detente comes as a welcome respite. To the Federal Republic, it
implies the danger of a tacit acceptance of the status quo. Most allies
do not find the status quo intolerable whereas the Federal Republic
consolidation of power in the post war Europe considers recognition of the status quo as a sacrifice of basic national
aspirations. This is why German leaders are always extraordinarily
ambivalent during periods of detente. They welcome relief from pressures
against Berlin; but they are uneasy lest all other aspects of the German
situation become frozen too. They make a distinction between "peripheral"
settlements which they welcome and "central" agreements which they oppose
unless they bring some visible progress on the German question. If this
progress is delayed too long, there will be increasing pressures for
purely German initiatives. The West may be confronted increasingly with
the choice whether the goal of German unification is to be pursued by
the Alliance as a whole or by Germany as a separate national policy.

Many in the West find either prospect disquieting. Remembering
two world wars and the atrocities of the Nazi period, they are uneasy
that international tensions should focus on Germany for the third time
in fifty years. But the West must rise above its memories, keeping
in mind that the disasters of this century arose in part because Germany
strove to assert its own narrowly conceived interests against both East

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and West. Ten years after the decision to rearm Germany, it is too late to invoke Germany's past transgressions in discussions of policy alternatives. It is possible to argue that other choices should have been made a decade ago. Today, the sole hope for having Germany be a responsible member of the Atlantic Community is to treat her like one.

The fate of the seventeen million people in East Germany is one of those intangible issues that can remain quiescent for many years, only to erupt suddenly and dramatically. Although few West Germans expect to achieve unity rapidly, fewer still are prepared to accept their country's division as permanent. Growing prosperity in the Federal Republic tends to magnify ~~their~~ uneasy feeling of guilt and responsibility. Any determined, perhaps demagogic, group could suddenly bring the issue to the fore. Coupled with setbacks in other fields, this could severely shake the political stability of the Federal Republic. A so-called Rapallo policy--a change ~~of fronts toward the East--is~~ extremely unlikely; but ~~the transformation~~ of the Federal Republic into a sullen, reluctant ally, or even into one ~~(if in German eyes the Alliance seems to lack with herie national气) maneuvering for its own national advantage,~~ would be serious enough. The Soviet Union would then be able simultaneously to use a national appeal to Germany and an appeal based on the fear of Germany to the other Western countries.

Any policy on Germany must have three components: (a) relations with the East-German satellite regime; (b) relations with the East European governments; and (c) relations with the Soviet Union. In all three respects the interests of the Western allies and of the Federal Republic are potentially divergent; at the very least they must be carefully synchronized.

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For many in the West, the East German regime is an injustice; but it appears to them not fundamentally different from other satellite governments in Eastern Europe. They, therefore, believe that the best way to provide German unification is to enhance the status of the East German regime and to rely on the erosion of time to ameliorate its oppressiveness.

According to this school of thought easing conditions in the so-called German Democratic Republic will make the division of Germany more bearable for the Federal Republic. A general detente, extending even to Eastern Germany is, therefore, considered by many the best road to unification.

But for the Federal Republic the issue is more complicated.

Enhancing the status of Eastern Germany has a different significance in the Federal Republic than improving relations with Eastern Europe or with the Soviet Union. It means that two German states will be competing all over the world; it seems to defer indefinitely any hope for unification.

To the Federal Republic the East German regime can never be simply another East European government. Though there are factions within Germany which advocate the same posture toward the German Democratic Republic (the group around Willy Brandt in the SPD, for example), such a cause would guarantee a violent, divisive debate within Germany.

Even with respect to relations with Eastern Europe, the German situation is more complicated than that of its allies. The Federal Republic seeks to isolate the East German regime by refusing to maintain diplomatic relations with any government that recognizes the German Democratic Republic.

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However, it is important to keep in mind that the Federal Republic is exposed to exceptional pressures if it is to assume primary responsibility for negotiating about the future of Germany. In any negotiation over Germany in which the Federal Republic is the principal negotiator, its bargaining position will be precarious. Humanitarian concerns will outweigh political considerations; purely German interests will be stressed which cannot be of equal significance to Germany's partners. Even if such negotiations do not succeed in luring Germany out of its formal Western ties, they may demoralize Germany, political life in the Federal Republic.

This is a particular problem with respect to relations between the Federal Republic and the East German regime. We should not contribute to the already considerable confusion between three partly incompatible objectives: improving conditions in Eastern Germany, consolidation of the East German regime and progress toward German unification. Ameliorating conditions in Eastern Germany is likely to contribute to the consolidation of the East German regime and thus make unification more remote except on East German terms. As the respectability of the East German regime grows, the moral cost to the Soviets of maintaining the division of Germany is diminished. As the East German regime gains stature, its pressure on the Federal Republic will almost surely mount.

This process is likely to be gradual. As long as the East German regime is striving to consolidate its international status, its demands may be moderate. But once the East German regime is recognized--or even if its international status is substantially enhanced--it will have major incentives to press on the Federal Republic. It will, in fact, be driven

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It is against all probability that a large and dynamic country can be kept divided indefinitely in the center of the Continent which gave the concept of nationalism to the world. As long as two hostile German states exist, they are bound to interact with each other. If they consider that their social and political systems are incompatible, each will be driven to try to subvert the other. Since they contain the same basic population and a similar tradition, each has unusual scope for doing so. The Soviet formula that the two German states should settle their own future is a short-sighted, if clever, move to consolidate the status quo. It guarantees that sooner or later events will be beyond the control of either East and West--and perhaps of the Germans themselves. The permanent division of Germany into hostile, competing states is inherently dangerous. If Germany's neighbors to the East understand their own interests, they will realize that the present course may have the most dire long-term consequences.

If German unification is to be a central concern of the Alliance, a clarification of objectives is necessary. While the Federal Republic should not be urged into bilateral dealings with the East, it should be given every encouragement to make a major contribution to the formulation of an Allied position on Germany. When Foreign Minister Schroeder proposed to the NATO Minister's Conference of May 1964 that the three Western powers make new diplomatic overtures on behalf of German unification and when he pressed for another initiative later that year, he deserved a more positive reaction than he received. To be sure, the Western allies were probably correct in their view that any proposal acceptable to the Federal Republic would not prove negotiable with the Soviet Union. But negotiability is only

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by Berlin's Senator Hoppe at a convention of the Free Democratic Party.

Criticizing the Western powers for insisting on their special prerogatives

in West Berlin, Senator Hoppe said:

> Our elementary national interest is paramount. We cannot be satisfied with safeguarding the status quo. Faith in the strength of the West, in its political superiority in the inventiveness of the free world all can be maintained and strengthened only if we exercise initiative in that which we are free to act on in accordance with our national interests. 13

Erich Mende, Vice Chancellor and FDP minister for all-German affairs, later supported Hoppe. Unless relations are handled with great delicacy on both sides of the Atlantic, such an attitude carries within it the seeds of serious misunderstandings.

Moreover, as German activity toward the East increases, the fear of another Rapallo may create a vicious circle. Germany's Western neighbors will draw closer together; they may also seek to anticipate the Federal Republic by speeding up their own contacts with Moscow. This cannot be in the interest of either Atlantic or European cohesion; in the long run it will prove disastrous for the Federal Republic as well, because it contains the seeds of its eventual isolation.

Only a united Atlantic Community facing jointly the issue of Germany's future can minimize the danger of a sharp conflict between Germany's national goals and its Atlantic ties. The effort to devise a common German policy is essential not only in order to retain Germany as a willing member of the Alliance, but for the peace of Europe as well.

13 Spandauer Volkszeitung, September 13, 1964. I am indebted to Hans Speier, author of a forthcoming book on Germany, for calling my attention to this quotation.

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one criterion for diplomacy and not always the decisive one. If we can
discuss only those items which the Soviets have declared negotiable, the
agenda of any conference will be determined by them. On the issue of
Germany, in particular, one purpose of Allied negotiations should be to
demonstrate that if no progress toward unification is made, the onus for
it rests on the Soviets.

Two areas of policy require particular attention: relations
with the countries of Eastern Europe and the definition of Germany's
Eastern frontier.

Today, the East German regime is being widely supported in Eastern
Europe at least in part because of the historical fear of Germany and the
memory of the Nazi occupation. The East European countries are much less
committed to the existence of a Communist regime in Eastern Germany than to
a divided Germany which may seem to them the best guarantee of their
security. Though they cannot admit it, a unified Communist Germany might
worry the East European states hardly less than any other powerful unified
German state. There is reason to believe that the East German regime is
despised in Eastern Europe; but this attitude cannot prevail against the
image of a belligerent and hostile West Germany which the Soviets have built
up.

It would be foolish to expect that even the most moderate Western
policy could eradicate these fears. Nevertheless, wherever possible,
an attempt should be made to distinguish East European countries conducting
an autonomous foreign policy from the East German regime. A maximum of

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flexibility should be shown toward the East German regime. Such a policy will not in itself lead to the unification of Germany. Nor will it make the East European countries abandon their preference for a divided Germany.

I would, however, contribute to a demoralization of the East German regime and to its isolation. And it is likely to reduce the already small East European incentive to support Soviet or East German pressures against exposed Western positions such as Berlin.

Perhaps the most sensitive issue in relations with the East European governments is the tragic question of Germany's eastern frontier, particularly the Polish-German border. In 1945, the Potsdam agreement placed the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, which had been German for centuries, under Polish Administration pending a final settlement in a peace treaty. Poland then proceeded to expel the thirteen million Germans living there and to replace them with Polish settlers mostly from Polish territories taken over by the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic has refused to accept the Oder-Neisse line as final. This is partly to retain a bargaining lever for an eventual peace conference, partly because of the pressure of the refugees from the disputed territories most of whom now live in the Federal Republic.

The problem posed by the Oder-Neisse line is one of the human tragedies of our time. Expelling thirteen million people from their ancestral homes cannot be justified by citing even worse German outrages during the War. The reluctance of the Federal Republic to renounce territories which had been German for centuries is understandable. Moreover, there is something cynical about the insistent East European demand that the

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Federal Republic accept the eastern frontier of the East German satellite regime which, in turn, is recognized by all East European countries. The Eastern European countries obviously want to have it both ways: they prefer to keep Germany divided; but they also insist that the Federal Republic recognize the frontiers of the Soviet puppet regime. These policies complicate a meaningful discussion.

Nevertheless, even granting all these considerations, the perpetuation of German claims to the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line prevents any progress on the issue of unification. It provides the Soviets with a convenient excuse for maintaining their hold on Eastern Germany; it cements Soviet relations with Eastern Europe. Reluctance to cede a claim to territories which no longer contain any German settlers perpetuates foreign rule over seventeen million Germans between the Elbe and the Oder-Neisse line. The refusal to face the issue of the Oder-Neisse line guarantees that the frontier of free Germany will remain on the Elbe.

To be sure acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line will not automatically advance unification. But it is an essential step towards isolating Eastern Germany. It would permit a maximum differentiation in the treatment of the Eastern European states and the East German regime. Coupled with a new approach to the problem of unification, such a gesture by the Federal Republic could demonstrate that the maintenance of a Communist regime in Eastern Germany is not required to safeguard their security and that progress towards German unification is not an inevitable prelude to a new set of pressures.

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What could be the elements of a new approach to the German problem?
Three factors must be reconciled: (1) the German desire for self-determination,
(2) the East European concern for security, and (3) the Soviet concern lest
a unified Germany impair its own security and shake its international position.
These objectives are, of course, incompatible to some extent. A great deal
depends on whether it proves possible to convince those most concerned that
to strive for absolutes will lead first to stagnation and ultimately to
crisis.

For present purposes it is not necessary to offer a detailed program.
The primary need is to agree on a new concept the details of which could
be filled in later. One possible course would be to separate the issue of
self-determination from that of unification for an interim period, say
fifteen years. Pressure for immediate unification consolidates all opponents
of Germany in Eastern Europe and *sub rosa* in Western Europe as well.
Self-determination, on the other hand, is a moral imperative commanding a
wide consensus. If rejected by the Communists, it would place them at
least morally on the defensive.

Such a proposal could take the following form: The Western
countries, including the Federal Republic, could declare that, while
the unification of Germany remains the ultimate goal, their immediate
aim is to enable the East German people to choose the form of government
which they prefer. The Western allies could, therefore, declare their
willingness to acquiesce in the existence of an East German state provided
its government emerges from a process of free elections. For a period of
fifteen years the territory now comprising the German Democratic Republic

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would have a status similar to that of present-day Austria. A loose confederation could be established between the two German states, but East Germany would be independent, neutral and demilitarized. For a period of ten years, the existing economic obligations of the present German Democratic Republic to the East European countries, including the Soviet Union, could be maintained. After that period, these links would depend on normal negotiations with the government then in office in East Germany.

A commission composed of the European neutrals, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and perhaps, Finland, would supervise the free elections and the demilitarization provisions of the treaty. After a period of fifteen years, there would be a plebisite in East Germany supervised by the Commission of neutrals to determine whether it wanted to continue as a separate state in a loose confederation with the Federal Republic or whether it preferred unification. In either case, East Germany would remain demilitarized. Both German states would recognize the existing frontiers of Germany, including the Oder-Neisse line. After the neutral Commission certified that a freely elected government had taken over in East Germany, Berlin could become the capital of that state as well as the seat of the organs of the German confederation. No further reason to maintain Berlin as a separate political entity would exist. Foreign troops would be withdrawn a distance of some hundred miles from the Western borders of the new East German state and the number of West German troops in that belt would be limited. The Federal Republic would renounce any form of access to strategic nuclear weapons.

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Even if there were agreement in principle, many details would remain to be worked out: The precise definition of demilitarization, for example, or what international undertakings would be consistent with the neutral status of the new state. But once the direction of an "Austrian" solution for East Germany is taken, the advantages would be plain: while Germany would have to defer full unification for fifteen years, the German states which emerged would no longer be antagonistic. There would be opportunity for conditions within Germany to be equalized gradually. A foreign regime detested by the population would be removed. The East European states would gain the security of a divided Germany for fifteen years and a demilitarized belt along their borders for the indefinite future. The East European economies could adjust to the loss of the East German partner over a ten-year period. The Berlin problem would be solved. Germany's frontiers would be settled both judicially and psychologically because the generation which was expelled from Eastern Europe would have largely disappeared by the time Germany was unified. Arms control schemes for Europe could be considered in a new atmosphere. Under present conditions, the Federal Republic is driven to oppose them whatever their merit. By using the dividing line in Germany as the line of demarcation, they reinforce a status quo which is intolerable for Germany in the long run. With the dividing line along the Oder-Neisse and a demilitarized zone established in what is now the German Democratic Republic, such measures as inspection posts and zones of limited armament could be considered in a new light.

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The price, of course, would be high. The Federal Republic would have to defer its hopes for immediate unification in return for agreement on a terminal date of the division. The Soviet Union would have to be prepared to give up the hope of a Communist Germany. The East European governments would have to change their policy of acquiescing in what seems most expedient to their senior partner. The Western allies would have to overcome inertia and place the problem of Germany high on their agenda.

But the rewards would be great. Such a program would end a situation which is bound to become more dangerous the longer it lasts. It would allow a more objective analysis of arms control in Europe. With the Federal Republic no longer torn between its knowledge of the requirements of stability and its national aspirations, the construction of Europe could be placed on a sounder basis. Even were such a program rejected initially by the Soviets, it could in time become the basis for an over-all settlement. And it would provide a platform on which the West, as well as the Federal Republic, could stand for the indefinite future.

No major progress is possible, however, as long as the rift in the West continues. The practical result of the Franco-American rivalry is that each ally is tempted to add the Federal Republic to its side by holding out vague hopes for the achievement of Germany's maximum objectives. German leaders will be torn by the conflicting demands of their allies and their own national aspirations. The West, which has so often been and is now in internal struggles, stands in danger of repeating its historic folly. Paris may have thought that by committing the Federal Republic to a treaty of special friendship, it was braking temptations of nationalism and providing

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for the construction of Europe. Washington's attitude towards the Treaty of Cooperation was motivated by a desire to combat Third Force tendencies.

These competing efforts stand in danger of producing what they seek to prevent: the attempt to use Germany as a balance-wheel must complete the fragmentation of the Atlantic Alliance.

In its own interest, the West should make sure that Germany faces its future within the framework of the Western Alliance and not apart from it. The best hope to prevent a latent nihilism in Germany from again menacing the West is to give the Federal Republic a stake in something larger than itself. The future of the Federal Republic depends on two related policies by the West: (1) recognition of the psychological and political dilemmas of a divided country, and (2) the ability to make the Federal Republic part of a larger community. These policies are interdependent; to pursue one without the other is to defeat both. It is to the construction of this larger community that we must now turn.