Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

*

TELCON
Professor Yoshida
Mr. Kissinger
7:05 p.m., 3-24-70

K: How are you? I have checked with my colleagues and what I told you is correct. Kendall proposals are unacceptable. You should not proceed any further. It would lead us to break off negotiations.

Y: A separate aggregate ceiling on two categories. Second, we do not seek any __?__ on injuries.

K: Or on a formal one we are sure will be accepted. The 10 items that you mentioned.

Y: If we exercise this, then you would be prepared to accept.

K: That is right. I must tell you what is getting difficult here is that nothing happens. We would rather know one way or the other and then we will take whatever measures are indicated than to have this exchange that does not produce anything.

Y: I hate to give you __________ impressions.

K: I have great respect for you and I respect you but my colleagues do not know you exist.

Y: I understand. I have absolute confidence in you.

K: You know how I feel about our relationship and last thing I want is showdown.

Y: Neither do I. I am very grateful to know that Kendall business has no standing. We were totally confused. He gave us such strong impressions. You have my strong support.

K: You can rest assured he has no White House standing. I have checked it. Just to make sure I double checked.

Y: I will tell my friend and will urge my friend to make a counter-proposal along the lines you suggest. (missed whole paragraph here because could not hear). Now I think in my own judgment we are making good progress.

K: Only way we can judge that is if something happens. I

*

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

managed to delay our original decisions on basis of my
conversations with you.

Y: I have told my friend that and he is very grateful. I will talk to my friend and I will be in touch with you as soon as I can.

K: Fine.

mlh

By KML NARA, Dale S/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Stans

3/24/70 9:00 a.m.

S: They called me about this McNeil thing yesterday. I hit the ceiling.

K: We turned them off.

S: Good. That was the right thing to do. That would have been the worst thing to do, and McNeil's personal thinking is about as far from the Japanese as you can get.

K: It's ridiculous for a friend of the President to go over there and negotiate and bring it to us. And Don had no business getting into that either.

S: I don't think he intended to. So now where do we stand?

K: They haven't moved yet, and we're following your suggestion. We're not going to move.

S: The Industry leaders have been calling me. I said we are still negotiating.

K: I was going to call Japan today and see where we stand. I'll call you and let you know.

S: Good. Now, while I have you on the phone, did you get any word from the President on my trip to Latin America?

K: No, he's been so busy with the postal strike thing.

S: You were going to run it by him.

K: Yes. I think you can just assume that that's okay. But I'll check.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger
10:10 am 3/24/70

S: We talked about giving Phil some latitude on the POW issue. Smyser called and said it could not be until after this meeting. I told Phil this morning and he has some anguish about it. He has to talk first on Thurs. The effort to releast 500 has stalled because Thieu has backed off. Also he feels the other side will jump on Laos and Cambodia.

K: Oh, yes, he can talk about that.

S: He feels in his opening statement --

K: Is that what you recommends?

S: That's what he recommends. He sent a cable.

K: I will look at the cable. That looks ok.

S: It looks like we will be sparse on the prisoner business with the back-off of the Vietnames.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
President/Kissinger
11:45 pm 3/24/70

P: I wonder if we could try the Volunteer Army thing. Could you have that ready by 3:00? Get that out of the way. Tomorrow morning I have that postal thing.

K: If 3:00 is too early, would 4:00 be possible?

P: 4:00 -- 4:00 5:00 would be all right.

K: I will aim for 4:00.

P: I have to meet with the postal people.

K: This is just pro forma thing. It's best if you have a time limit on it.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

*

TELECON

Kissinger/Flanigan
3:30 p.m.

March 24, 1970

By KM V

NARA, Dato.

K: I intend to amuse myself at this afternoon's NSC meeting, and you can do the work.

F: I think the President should know that his Special Assistant for Manpower Matters [General Hershey] disagrees with everything.

K: You had better see him 10 minutes before the meeting and tell him that!. Also tell him not to make a decision at the meeting -- he should think about it. From the foreign policy view, I think the longer term he gives before going to zero draft, the better. He can always make it shorter, but never longer.

F: Then you are against it, too.

K: I am basically against it, but I don't think we should debate it now. But I think he should go for the longer term. Budgetarily, it will be easier too.

F: I will tell him.

lds

*

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Professor Yoshida
3/25/70; 6:40 p.m.

By: KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Y: I have just spoken to my friend (it is morning here). According to him our people in Washington have been under the order to keep your negotiators informed about what is happening here and what efforts are being made. Now again fresh instructions will be given to our people to get in touch with your people officially.

K: What I don't understand... will they make a proposal or just tell us what is going on?

Y: We are unfortunately not at this moment making a definite proposal to you because our situation is somewhat confused. Kendall has made a concrete proposal.

K: But Kendall does not represent us.

Y: That's quite clear. When you told me I immediately told my friend.

K: I don't even know what Kendall's proposal is. I don't want to know. I told you what our proposal is.

Y: The three main conditions you mentioned.

K: Yes.

Y: My friend's aides feel that the major points of your three conditions will be met in Kendall's ideas.

K: What does your friend think Kendall represents? Why do we have to negotiate with Kendall when we can talk directly?

Y: That's right. Our people were confused by Kendall.

K: Why don't you make it to us officially?

Y: We will make it very shortly.

K: I am told Kendall's proposal is unacceptable to us.

Y: If that is unacceptable to you, we have to stop that progress.

K: I will make some calls to check and call you back -- I don't have to check.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Alexis Johnson
3/24/70; 6:50 p.m.

K: Do you want to play a little kabuki?

J: Oh, my God!! That just brought me in a three-pager from Armin.

K: My understanding is that these characters are moving but they are trying to get industry to accept it... they are supposed to keep us fully informed. They have the impression that the formula Kendall gave them would be acceptable. I told them my impression is that it would not be acceptable. What is that formula?

J: That formula was for a moratorium for unspecified nature plus task force idea -- but we cannot accept that.

K: Tell me why not.

J: Industry will not accept moratorium.

K: Incidentally, Kendall told them the industry and Commerce would take it. At least that's what my character told me.

J: Stans sounded out the industry on the moratorium and Peter Flanigan said the industry was opposed. Vehemently opposed.

K: Violently opposed. Are you people going to back me up if I tell him there is no possible basis for accepting it.

J: Yes.

K: I will be out of your hair on Laos. I am sending you that letter. The president kept the operative section and took out most of the explanation. He feels if you do something unpleasant, just tell them and not explain.

J: I was worried about Don talking to them on this. I just got a three-pager from Armin and will send it over to you.

K: If it changes in the next 15 minutes or so, call me as I told him I would call him back.

*

By KNV NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Stans
3/26/70; 6:55 p. m.

K: I just talked to my friend again and he told me that Kendall told them it's formula may be acceptable to Commerce.

S: No, not at all. I got a copy of a telegram this afternoon that upset me very much...I have it here somewhere. It would not be acceptable. It would not be acceptable to the industry. They say all that we have is a one-year stall with resumption at the end of the year.

K: My friend said they were ready to move towards our proposal until Kendall told them that.

S: I don't know. It has been called back.

K: I am getting more and more unpleasant.

S: I think you are doing great. Now you know why we are so frustrated.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCON
Gerard Smith
Mr. Kissinger

7:13 pm, 3-24-70

S: Do you see any objection to my having (interrupted here by HAK)?

K: Do you object to the President taking Option 1?

S: The letter I wrote to the President?

K: I am distributing it.

S: I am sending Secretary Rogers a copy.

K: That is OK. Gerry, I got another letter from you a while ago. I am prepared to recommend it to the President. Actually you might be best off to have two or three options and then you can feel your way in Vienna, depending on what they will buy, as long as one of your options is the preferred one.

S: I agree with that. If we can have a little flexibility, it would be helpful.

K: I will brief the work of the panel tomorrow. If I do it unfairly, you will all jump on me. After that, the President will ask you what you really want or anything else you want to say. If you want to say you are not ready to say what you want that is OK. The President will undoubtedly ask first, Gerry, what is best position you think we should take.

S: I will be glad to state my views calmly. I am glad to know the scenario and we will be glad to follow it out.

K: Fine, Gerry, I know you always present your views calmly.

mlh

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Professor Yoshida
Mr. Kissinger
7:29 pm, 3-24-70

Y: I conveyed to my friend what you have just told me about Kendall. He appreciated the information and understood and accepted this. However, he wanted to make it quite clear about one thing, i.e., our understanding with you that whatever we agree to bilaterally will be included in multilateral agreement. Then it will be put into effect.

K: That is my understanding. But when will you accept it?

Y: As soon as possible. First, we have to agree on a bilateral basis.

K: Yes, but when will you agree?

Y: As soon as possible. I told him that time is now very short, that it is long overdue and he is pretty aware of this. We were somewhat confused about the Kendall draft but are now very clear on it. My friend did not say when we would make a formal proposal.

K: Let me check the multilateral thing to make sure but I am sure you are right. That is what the paper says and I am sure you are right. Let me check it and I will call you right back.

Y: Alright.

mlh

By: KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
Professor Yoshida
Mr. Kissinger
7:40 pm, 3-24-70

K: I have checked and your understanding is correct. It will be embodied in the multilateral agreement. It is as you understood.

Y: Alright, I will again urge my friend to make a formal proposal to you as soon as we possibly can and at the same time I will let you know through this channel about this. I am personally sorry for the delay.

K: I understand.

Y: I will be getting in touch with you again. Could you give me General Haig. I would like to arrange for your calls to my office to come in on a certain number.

(at that point General Haig got on the line and Professor Yoshida gave him number he wants used when calling him at office).

mlh

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

9:25 am

3/25/70

L: I am going to hand-carry the menu report to you for the President. There are things I think should be careful.

K: The assessment?

L: yes. I will bring it for our meeting today.

K: How does it look?

L: It's an up-dated report.

K: You have seen the Beecher story? Where did that come from?

L: I'm not sure. That 225 figure is the one with a big to-do. It was someone on the WH staff who was using that figure. That's not our figure. I told Dan to deny it today.

K: That's what we will do.

L: They will ask if it's lower or higher and I will say no the budget is classi and the Secretary doesn't speculate on the figures. We had 225 and 260 and we decided to go on 260. I have a paper that says it was a mistake to use the 225. We didn't.

K: There was a dispute about it.

L: The people who are planning on this over here -- they know it isn't 225. I don't know how we can trace a leak like that.

K: The President will probably blow his stakc.

L: He probably doesn't know the figure. He may know it's 260.

K: He probably knows.

L: ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: He was very low. You did a good job at the meeting.

L: I thought you wanted to get the meeting over.

K: He wants me and your staff to work on a position and work it out with Flanigan afterwards. He is close and wants to work in the direction you are.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHLW NARA, Dalo.

TELCON

U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

10:25 am

3/25/70

K: My friend called me at 1:00 last night. Here is the message: SAto and Ai have decided to go on that package we gave them and they are working with their industry and they will take a little longer and they have informed their Embassy to tell you of their efforts but not exactly what they are doing. You are not to be put off by the Embassy. This cannot go on for more than another week. That guy didn't know that Armin was given a run-down and said that Kendall created total confusion. For a week they thought Kendall was the emmissary.

J: It's good that we stopped McNeil.

K: And I think that's probably true.

J: There's a long telegram from Armin. There's not much to it but you should read it.

By KL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Amb. Shimoda/Kissinger

4:35 pm 3/25/70

S: In the evening, very late, I received a message from PM Sato and he asked me to transmit his message Xhe is accepting utmost efforts to speed up the negotiations. If you will kindly transmit these remarks.

K: You can be sure. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

4:38 pm

3/25/70

R: I was just -- any final plans yet?

K: No meeting on Friday. Another meeting the week of April 6. What he is going to ask is for some specific position in each category. Then we will look at those. He isn't going to forclose anything. One limited option and one comprehensive one with or without a ______.

R: The general concept is fairly clear. Option 3? start out with what we see ? ? ? . It's such a complex subject with ramifications that to get an answer ban without negotiating would be counterproductive. The approach we might start out with for the comprehensive ban is we would like to start out with ______ ban. Then if it's possible we can work up.

K: Basically I lean this way too. That's how I think we should go.

R: Then we can say in the PR world that we are working on a comprehensive ban but we are working on (the limited ban?)

K: The President seems to be going with it.

R: ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: I'm not persuaded by Nitze. I said supposing we get the freedom to ______ so we can put our missiles in at sea. ? ? ? ? He said they can take out our military installations. I said name 3.

R: I don't think it's very strong.

K: I think on your approach we can bring the Joint Chiefs around.

R: It's the one the President will be most comfortable with.

K: We need to work out one comprehensive and one limited. I think it's more our interest to get a limited one quickly instead of waiting 3 years for a comp

R: On this Africa letter, I would like to make a memo to the President and then talk about releasing it. Maybe release it over there.

K: We will be glad to. Can you send a draft.

R: When does he leave?

K: Tonight but I may stay until tomorrow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHL V NARA, Dato' 5/12/04

TELCOM
Lucet/Kissinger

4:50 pm

3/25/70

L: I am calling you concerning the visit of Gauffier (sp?). He will be here Sat. through Tues.

K: I am hoping on being on vacation.

L: The President too? Because of course Gauffier

K: The President will be

L: I finally got word that he is coming but he is coming at the worst possible time. He will be here from Sat. through Tues.

K: I will not be back.

L: I received some telegrams from him and he very much wants to see you.

K: I would love to see him but I will be out of town. Give him my warm regard

L: Have a good time in Fla. I hope you will not work too much.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KL V NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

G. Smith/Kissinger

5:35 pm

3/25/70

S? I wondered if sometime I could have some time to see what useful we can do after this meeting this morning.

K: How about tomorrow morning? 11:30. I'm always subject to the President, of course.

S: I understand. I will be there at 11:30.

Mr. Kissinger/Yoshida
3/25/70; 6:40 p. m.

By KHL U

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Y: Kendall implied that he represents the thinking of your people.

K: Nonsense! Do you know what his proposal is?

Y: Only according to the Japanese press reports.

K: My idea is the one we want. You should ignore everything else.
You just get into trouble. I will check and call you back within 45 minutes
to an hour.

Y: Please. I will be waiting and my friend is waiting. We are confused
by Mr. Kendall.

K: I will get you an answer quickly.

Y: I told my friend he does not represent the authority.

K: We have cancelled his(?) trip -- that should give you some idea of
how much he represents us -- if he shows up, we cannot control that. Let
me understand, are you prepared to accept our proposals?

Y: Yes.

K: When are you going to tell us that?

Y: My friend feels that once we get our industry people to accept this
basic proposal -- we will be making good progress. We are prepared to
accept the aggregate ceiling.

K: Two separate aggregate ceilings.

Y: We are prepared to accept this aggregate ceiling and also we are
prepared to make concession on the injury business as we mentioned.

K: Let me check on this and I will call you back.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TelCon
Under Secy Johnson

3/26/70; 11:45 a.m.

J: Did you get Unger's telegram?

K: Yes, but I haven't had time to read it yet.

J: Let me say it is a very excellent message and it covers the points we were discussing. I think it is well worth reading.
Point 2, I sent you a little note I had Bill Sullivan do. Having thought this thing through between the two alternatives. I have discussed it with the Secretary.

K: He called me and told me the same thing. In my own evaluations I don't usually provide a check list with our bureaucracy of what I think. Last night I started leaning toward your second alternative. But the more I think of it the more I lean towards the first, but it really doesn't matter because he is going to do the first.

J: I don't say I lean toward the first, but the final judgment being...

K: I am calling another meeting for 2:30 and will give you the final judgment there. Will you and Marshall Green be there?

J: Yes.

ms

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Laird/Kissinger

11:50 am

3/26/70

L: I think I ought to come talk to the President for a few minutes.

K: Sure. What about?

L: I thought I should talk to you first. On the -- before we have an execute message we should talk about the casualty

K: He didn't order you to do it.

L: As far as American are concerned we should have

he

K: We are talking about two separate things. After the Action Group he asked Packard and Wheeler to come into his office. On those plans you sent over, he wants them worked out including the casualty estimates. He just wants the plan and not to execute them now.

L: I have talked to Abrams about the capability. When is he leaving?

K: I don't know.

L: I'm afraid he will get away -- I talked personally with Abrams.

K: He wants a detailed plan for the two bases including the casualty estimate.

L: I thought he might be ______ those

K: He won't execute the plan until he sees them but he wants it in case they do something. He will not order it until he sees the plans and the casualty estimate.

L: I have gone over this with the Joint Chiefs. On the next thing I should talk on the secure phone.

Secure Voice Conversation (Secy Laird only could be heard by the notetaker.)

L: The other item is that on these execute items he approved, they want to it changed to take out the supply dumps.

K:

L: Because you see what you have there -- are you familiar with those targets? The problem is that Dave and Buzz are not up to speed on it. That's a different operation. We can do that but you

K:

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KM V

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger

11:50 am 3/26/70

-2-

L: You can do it as part of the same operation but you cannot give the impression if you want to give the impression that it's to a SAM site -- they're different targets.

K:

L: Well, that's what we will have to do. We will have to be in a position to that everyone understands. This is several miles away.

K:

L: You don't miss, several miles away. You don't miss that much. I think we should understand that. We can do it. You have to go after the other targets. You follow me, don't you?

K:

L: I'm afraid that they might have given the President that they were next to one another.

K:

L: The distances are such that we can hit them but that's a difficult decision because they are not that close. You follow me?

K:

L: We can hit them. We shouldn't try to make out -- we shouldn't be that naïve the will condemn (?) -- the NVN. We will not be able to keep our cover here the far apart. I think we have to understand that if the President understands it, it ok. Another thing I want to talk about before he leaves -- ACDA has put out a new publication all over the country called "Military Expenditures for 1969." It prais the Soviet Union for only spending ______ of their national product. The figures are incorrect. It goes into this thing to weaken the people of the U.S. when the President wants to ? ? ? ?.

K:

L: Just about 100% are tougher.

K:

L: We have to have some policy on this cover that we cannot just put out something that's not checked out. They take the educational expenditures of the government and compare them with the Soviet Union.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

Laird/Kissinger

11:50 am

3/26/70

By KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

K:

L: We have ________ contributions including contributions from parents. When you put out this information when we not in Congress and Congress looks like it's going to limit South East Asia expentures? ? ? this the worst time for our government to go in this direction.

K:

L: Maybe I ought to call him on the phone first if he is getting ready to leave.

K:

L: If you make it, the information like a spill over, it's different then other orders.

K:

L: I understand that.

K:

L: Would you give him a run-down on the menu? Dave didn't think he knew we were hitting up there. Did he? -- alright.

K:

L: No, we won't put out any order to hit the supply dumps. It will only be a spill over.

K:

L: Well, the thing is that I should visit with him about this. You tell him

K:

L: I figured I would tell you first.

K:

L: Tell him too that I am up-set about the expenditures being put out by ACDA.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

12:10 pm 3/26/70 (secure voice phone)

K: ? ? ? ? ? supply dumps and tel Mel to slop it over. He won't tell you how to write your orders.

L: That can be done but I want him to understand when it comes back the other way so that he understands it.

K: He understands it.

L: I don't have the problem in doing it but I have the problem in that I want him to know that you cannot keep it under that cover for ever. He understands that? --

K:

L: When is he coming back?

K:

L: OK. We go. We will let it go that way. Just so he had it impressed upon him that the cover might break.

K:

L: That will be done. Sure, I understand that.

By KLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE
D. Ruckefeller/Kissinger

12:45 pm

3/26/70

R: I am just back from my trip around the world and I hope to tell you about it sometime. I am having lunch with Amb. Malak today. I read in the paper about Rogers meeting with Dobrynin and I am sure he will bring up the M. E.

K: Two thoughts. Whether it's another ______ in the arms race is up to them. If they keep pouring in arms we will have to lift the restraint we have had. And we take a dim view of the SA-3 with Soviet personnel.

R: Is it a major thing?

K: I will have to turn into a major thing. Tell him you know me and this is your impression.

R: How was the meeting with Dobrynin?

K: non-committal.

R: I suppose the same thing was told him?

K: But it's good from other sources too. And if you can say you agree with that position

R: I do completely. I am also glad you didn't give the planes right away.

K: It wasn't easy.

R: I'm sure but I'm sure it's the right decision.

K: We leaked it out slowly to cushion the shock.

R: I will be down shortly and hope to see you.

K: I hope to see you.

R: I hope you are planning to go to Blidenburg.

K: I'm planning on going although I may not get there until the end of the first day. But that leaves two full days.

R: Get there as soon as you can.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KCL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

2:25 pm 3/26/70

L: We have developed and have requests for two targets.

K: I think you should go ahead. Send them over.

L: I think we should go ahead. I talked to Bill and he thinks we should too. He agreeable so long as they are military. I hope you don't mind.

K: I want you to tell Bill because it saves me the trouble. I didn't want to keep it from Bill.

L: His only question was whether it was militarily significant.

K: The President will be pleased. Where are they?

L: In the area that you would like. They will go in 24 hours.

By: KHC NARA, Dato. 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

2:27 pm

3/26/70

R: What's the President's schedule now?

K: Either just left or is just leaving. I am leaving a little later. I talked to Mel and he tells me he has talked to you.

R: We still have this African thing I want to get done. I can bring it down and we can release it from there or from here.

K: I think from here with a strong letter.

R: We will do it tomorrow. I talked before the House Foreign Relations Committee. It showed me that it's tough. They want me in public but I hate to go through it.

K: My position is if you could take it ______ if you take a hard line they will scream and a soft line will give them a false concept.

R: Maybe I can get a doctor to say I have a health problem. I have a bad throat.

K: Two weeks would help.

R: Developments may come that will influence ______. How is Carswell?

K: Yesterday it was 46 against and he I don't know how many for.

R: That's rough. It has sort of a deteriorating effect on everyone.

K: These things always turn up after the nomination is in.

R: I used to do all that. I never lost anyone.

K: It's a nasty victory for the opponents.

R: I thought Hruska

K: That really hurt. The President thinks John Sherman Cooper will come out next week. I will believe it when I see it.

R: When is he coming back?

K: Tues or Wed. It will probably depend on the weather.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Amb. Shimoda/Kissinger

3:15 pm

3/26/70

K: Alex Johnson is in my office and we were talking about your conversation with him. I wanted to make it clear to you and I have discussed this with the President yesterday, the Kendall proposal is totally unacceptable to us and has no standing. So it would be best if you didn't make a recommendation from the PM to the President on this because we could not accept it and we would not like to turn the PM down. The President will not accept it and does not accept it as a basis of negotiation.

S: That's very discouraging.

K: He doesn't consider it in the area with what he discussed with the PM.

S: Then even if the PM made it to the President he would reject

K: I think it unwise because we would hate to refuse the PM.

S: Establishment of a Presidential commission cannot be accepted and the fact that the aggregate control but not individual items control.

K: Mr. Johnson and I work very closely on this and you can be sure he represents the President's view. I am always here for clarification and I will do what I can

S: I told Mr. Johnson that there are no thinkable other plans that my government including the PM himself, can accept at the moment.

K: Then we have reached an impasse and I see no reason for further negotiation.

S: I will transmit this to Tokyo.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KM V NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Mollenhoff/Kissinger
3:25 pm 3/26/70

K: You are investigating me.

M: I wish I were but I can't say that I am. That would be the ultimate. I have some stuff from the Hill -- Sen. Curtis. Briefly, the situation is that some Nebraskan constituent is interested in giving his services to Biafran relief. He is a pilot and they were going to get some helicopter pilots together to help Biafrans. They couldn't get any answer from Ferguson's office in State. The answers were that no one was going to engage in helicoptering. But Ferguson's office contracted with a group from Arizona to do this job at $250.00 an hour, up. I have taken a look at this thing and I was going to send a memo to keep you advised of this matter.

K: I stayed out of this other thing, no matter what the newspapers said.

M: My only inquiries were very low key. There were questions that should have been answered. I would appreciate if there's anything that comes along you question, I would appreciate your giving me a ring. I try to low key it and wait until it's worth sending it to some one's attention.

K. Good. Many thanks.

By KML NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCON

Bill Leonard (CBS)/Kissinger

3:45 pm

3/26/70

K: I have Hunebell chasing me and I want to know what you are negotiating.

L: We are not negotiating anything. We were about and later she called attention to your film.

K: She did?

L: And one of our people in Europe saw it. She asked if we were interested. The only way it was available to us -- she feels obligated to you before releasing it.

K: She made a sucker out of me. I would never have agreed to this if I had known what she was doing.

L: She will not release it unless you felt it was okay.

K: What would you do with it?

L: I feel it's important that people know more about H. Kissinger.

K: I differ on that. I don't care.

L: It's not a question of TV but a question of the importance of what the second most important man in the U. S., people like to know about. We would like to do an interview but lacking that it's the only film made of you. Not that I don't think it could not have been a good deal better.

K: How would you use the French material.

L: We wouldn't. And the trakk is in English -- nothing in French we would use. The interview we would like to usecompletely. The material of you walking around and in action and in your natural habitat is material that we would like to use on 60 Minutes -- a weekly magazine of the air. These are the only glimpses of Henry Kissinger that are available. We would much prefer -- this is black and white and we would rather do it with one of ours. We are grasping at straws.

K: If I had known I would have not agreed to this. That was my inexperience. For instance, I wouldn't want it said that I'm the second most important man in the country. That's suicide.

L: There's enourmous public interest. It's not necessary to say just that.

K: If I knew what segments you would use rather than have you carve it up as

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

Leonard/Kissinger

3:45 pm

3/26/70

-2-

L: The segments would be the thing with your family, the section with the scenes in the office and you in the Situation Room and the interview. That's the only material that's of value to us.

K: McNamara is in English. I don't care about him.

L: We can always go to individuals and ask about HKissinger.

K: I can't keep you from that.

L: I think a thoughtful interview.

K: I don't want to set my views on substance on national TV.

L: In reference to this material.

K: Let me think about it.

L: Call you in a day or two?

K: You would put in a commentary of your own.

L: Reisner or Wallace. Portrait of Henry Kissinger.

K: I respect you. You are too good.

L: That's better than not being good enough.

K: It may interrupt obscurity too much. It's whether I want that much exposure.

L: I won't pretend it isn't exposure.

K: When you have bought it, am I rid of Hunebelle? Then she can't sell it again.

L: Not in the U.S.

K: Is she driving a hard bargain? That's between you and her.

L: I haven't talked that with her. All I can say is that those conversations can start because she feels responsible to you and would not dream of opening negotiations unless you say okay. I would be glad to talk to you.

K: I would like to talk with you for a week. There's no time limit?

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/13/04

Leonard/Kissinger

3:45 pm

3/26/70

-3-

L: It will be out-dated if it's not in the next 5-6 weeks -- events showing you that would get away from us.

K: My incompetence in opening safes will not improve. My problem is exposu: and on this you cannot help me.

L: The kind of exposure is -- you cannot avoid exposure other than you will be on the recieving end of speculative exposure.

K: How long? 5 - 10 mins?

L: Probably 12-13 or maybe 15 mins. We would get the best we could from the interview material. There may be material she shot -- the things you said about the U.S. I would like that in the clear.

K: What was that?

L: The role of the U.S. not being the only nation to influence.

K: Now I know exactly what you want and let me think about it. If I don't call you, you call me.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE

G. Smith/Kissinger

4:10 pm

3/26/70

K: I'm sorry we were held up by the President.

S: I wanted to get into the timing jam we will be in if we are not to have a
chance to get some policy decisions -- Noth Atlantic Council.

K: I think you have enough for a preliminary briefing.

S: They will be that will confuse the NAC. They don't know whether to go for
massive reductions or not.

K: We don't know what categories we will find and that's our basic ______. I
would stay off reductions for the time being. Brief on the comprehensive and
limited options. There are some proposals on reductions but it's apt to be
on the first ______.

S: We have that proposal from Helsinki and that commitment to brief Congress.
You remember the trouble before. Nothing we can do next week for the future
clarifications.

K: I sent out a directive that today which the President wants some detail and
he will review it April 6.

S: All of us know the options backwards and forward and we could have it
for him Monday morning and use next week for tactical ______. I wouldn't
say we need a great deal more time.

K: The President is out and he was hoping to go away. I don't know how we can
do it physically.

S: That will telescope on the last week. We hope to leave the 13th. They want
a paper they can study in advance. Maybe we could take a sanitized version of
______ report.

K: That's what I thought. How about giving them some briefings on 3A and 5?
Subject to some modifications and that won't be too far off. That's true. The
area on MIRV and ABM know levels ______ are unsteady but -- I will ask the
President if he wants a meeting down there.

S: If we could speed up the process it would release a lot of energy getting
people working on the papers.

K: My impression is not that it's not in your interest to go for it today. You
get an increase

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE

G. Smith/Kissinger

4:10 pm 3/26/70

-2-

S: I wouldn't be surprised at that anyway.

K: What you want is a Presidential decision on which option.

S: Yes and on what does he want us to fetch up? Roger's ?

K: What is Rogers' Mirv or ABM ban?

S: We spend three months with Defense and yesterday a completely new proposal. On-site reductions before a MIRV ban.

K: I wouldn't worry about that.

S: If we ever said that to Congress.

K: I think the best procedure will be to plan on NATO ______ next week. Get the President down early the next week.

S: That gives us 7 days including Sat. & Sun.

K: I will see what I can do.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Danielle Hunebelle

3/26/70; 6:35 p.m.

H: Are you under much pressure -- are you leaving?

K: I hope to in another hour or so.

H: So it is not possible to come and discuss the world with you for one hour or so?

K: I am afraid not. I talked to Mr. Leonard of CBS and you kept your promise, which doesn't surprise me.

H: I am also so surprised myself when you don't trust me.

K: I don't even trust myself. I think your film is good and very touching

H: What impressed me with the CBS people -- this film is nothing compared to what they are used to...technical...but everybody was impressed by the emotional quality of the film. That is for me a great achievement. You didn't realize when you kept saying that I was putting you under pressure, that I knew better than you what I had to get to make you great on TV. I know exactly how I could put somebody in the best conditions -- with some I don't want to do that -- but with you I wanted to do that.

K: You did a very beautiful job.

H: You were smiling when you were looking at it. Have you accepted it.

K: I have to think about it.

H: They asked me for your material -- of course I refused.

K: What other material could you give them?

H: Out-takes -- breakfast with Doty, boy scouts, arrival of Pompidou, that's all. We did not use everything because we had to balance the pictures and interviews. Since I am the editor I was obliged only to use one-third of the interviews. These people, they can use all of it.

K: I am not sure I will agree to it.

H: I hope. I would like to see the people in America like you in this film as the French people.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHL

NARA, Dalo

5/12/04

Mr. Kissinger/Danielle Hunebelle
3/26/70; 6:35 p.m.

H: Did you have some problems because of my intrusion in your sanctua

K: No. Don't worry about it. We will be in touch with each other.

H: I hope. I may write to you? You don't prefer to read official articles?

K: No, I prefer to read personal articles.

H: I will let you know when I am coming back. I hope you will have more time.

K: This is a bad week because of Laos and... when you come back, you let me know.

H: I hope you don't have a bad remembrance of me.

K: It was a real labor of love.

H: I hope you can call me from time to time.

K: I will.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
afternoon 3/26/70

L: Let me get some advice from you. We got word from State that Rabin was coming over today. On that 119 million.

K: In the Presidential Memo -- no, the Rogers one.

L: We haven't got 119 million. That bill hasn't gone through Congress. You realize that.

K: No.

L: The credit sales bill is not signed by the President or passed by the Congre
We will have to tell Rabin. The military sales bill -- we testified last
week -- but it hasn't come from Fulbright's committee. Last year Mansfield
objected to tying it on the ______ Act. He must know it hasn't passed.

K: I don't know what he understands.

L: We will have to level with Rabin, won't we?

K: He wants to keep him happy.

L: He knows the bill isn't passed.

K: Will it pass soon?

L: I think it will but Fulbright wants to bargain with State on some things. He wants Rogers and me in open testimony. That means I want me on the cost of the Laos and VN thing.

K: Bill is going to finesse it.

L: I have a letter here demanding that I appear.

K: He would prefer that you put it off for a couple of weeks. Bill is going to
plead ill health.

L: When he comes over here we will say we are sure the Bill will pass.

K: That's all he can expect, for every effort made he wants to see it pass. We have 250 million.

L: There will be every effort made here to see that it passes. We have 250
million in that bill. We will have to take it from some other countries. We can

Laird/Kissinger

afternoon 3/26/70

By KL NARA, Date 5/12/04

-2-

L (cont): other commitments and tasks live within the 250. And tell him it's going to pass.

K: That's best.

L: We will see it will pass and we will re-assign the priority. We had 75 mill for Israel and we can get the other money by cutting back on other countries.

By: KL V NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE

Amb. Winthrop Brown/Kssinger

afternoon

3/26/70

XXX

B: My problem is the reply to the note and letter.

K: We are getting that done within the hour.

B: Wonderful. You have heard about Chow being called home?

K: Yes. Are you handling the Warawaw talks?

B: You can talk to me. I'm handling ______, ? ? ? ? and Marshall Gre
is on top of it all.

K: I think the President senses -- I have a couple of nit picks --? ? ? ? "

B: That's better from our point of view. I was quoting the directive.

K: Why give them initiatives now and see what they come back with.

B: I would prefer that too.

K: We only wanted to upon a discussion of modalities.

B: Something has to be put on the table.

K: That's a minor point. The President wants something other than Taiwan which is playing the game. Couldn't we raise other problems?

B: We do. We mentioned it first and raised 6 other areas.

K: I couldn't find that.

B: Leave Taiwan to one side.

K: Where?

B: Let me get it -- in paragraph 2 of the first page. It starts off and says we see a number of points -- and then we see say our government particu
noticed intentions to / / / /

K: One thought we had here -- While listing the 6 principles if we couldn't say it would be in the interest of the Chinese and the U.S. to discuss a program where tensions would be reduced. It's not world shattering

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

Amb. Brown/Kissinger

3/26/70

By KMLNARA, Dato

B: We thought we had covered it.

K: The President said where we pretty much commit ourselves whether we couldn't make it an explanation of principles -- looking forward to doing it. Drop it as a principle and say we would look forward to the day. If they surface the ? ? ? ? ? That would be our major objections.

B: Then for paragraph 7

K: Drop para 8 and make it explanatory items after these 6 principles and after that say it's in the interest to reduce tensions between the U.S. and China. You can put that in diplomatic language. On page 2, para 4, say "I have been instructed to begin today towards the necessary preparations of such a meeting. As far as we are concerned -- on page 7 these include -- I would drop the timing and let them come up with something. Just say the size of our delegation.

B: Good. I like this.

K: On the bottom of page 7

B: You wanted to leave out the minute.

K: That's up to you.

B: You won't mind?

K: No, I think we only wanted to indicate we are willing to talk about it.

B: And let them make some proposals.

K: Then say that we want to meet and let them make the modalities.

B: "We are prepared to discuss these matters with you."

K: Right. Then drop para 17. What do you think? I would leave out "for your reference the English language text" but I don't care.

B: Very good. We will. Let me see that I have it correct. "? ? ? ? ? ?"

K: As long as they understand we mean something larger than the Taiwan statement.

B: Bat? Page 7 /? ? ? ? ? ?

K: If you agree on the min. The President said let it -- put it to State but let them decide it.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KL V NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Amb. Brown/Kissinger

3/26/70

B: We will revise these on the basis of this. Would you like to see it again?

K: If you can do it without holding it up.

B: Will you be in Key Biscayne tomorrow?

K: Almost certainly. I'm always available through the WH line.

B: We can expect your word on the other two?

K: Right.

B: That's fine. I hope you get a few moments of relaxation.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
W. Rostow/Kissinger
afternoon 3/26/70

K: We have heard that LBJ may visit Jpaan with some other Texans. We will want to help. We want him to go as a former President.

R: I know of nothing. I will let you know and I am sure your generous
will be appreciated by the President.

By KHC NAHA, Dato 5/12/04

Telcon
Max Frankel, NY Times
Gen Haig
3/27/70; 4:30 pm

F: Story by Jerry Smith, South Vietnamese troops of battalion strength penetrated two miles into Cambodia and engaged enemy troops. First time operated in any strength inside Cambodia. Two teams American helicopter gunships participated in the operation, firing rockets and guns - appeared to be inside Cambodia. Air Bombers flown by Vietnamese AF planes. Back-up American bombers had been put into alert but were not called in. Five or more miles inside Cambodia. How does this fit into the rules of engagement as Laird has described the

H: It wouldn't be any good for me to give you any more other than we have air confirmation there are some armed forces in there. They are out now and there were no US advisers with them. I think you know what the rules of engagement are -- if they draw fire they can take whatever actions the commander feels necessary to protect his forces. It has happened in the past, usually by fire. I don't think this is a big deal. I can't intelligently go any further. The Pentagon is the best place right now. We are waiting for some information from them.

F: You think this might be one of those cases where they did in fact draw fire?

H: I think this might be the case, but you know how dangerous it is to pop off too fast.

F: We have other cases out there where guys are stretching the rules a little bit.

H: I can't comment before we have all the facts. We have had these things from time to time over the years of this war where a commander determines he has to protect his own forces.

ms