55

1 believe that ~~that~~ should be turned over to some kind of ~~all~~ new

2 international group ~~that~~ can be formed in which we would have

3 a very major role. ~~Therefore,~~ it is very difficult to talk

4 ~~all~~ about this in the abstract.

5 Senator Feingold: Well, I appreciate that answer. And
6 if I could just comment, Mr. Chairman, and then turn it over.
7 We are talking about a scenario here where we have militarily
8 succeeded and whoever is taking over there, we still have the
9 problem of the weapons of mass destruction and securing those
10 weapons of mass destruction. I do not think that is the time
11 to start figuring out how we are going to secure those weapons
12 of mass destruction.

13 I agree with Senator Lugar, although I certainly do not
14 want to try to put words in his mouth, that there is a sense
15 here that we are not getting even the outlines or the general
16 concept of what would that entail. What would be the American
17 commitment? What kind of agreements do we have to get up
18 front from our allies about how to achieve the kinds of things
19 in that area that Senator Lugar has devoted so much of his
20 career to doing in other places?

21 So I think this is central, and I am worried that we are
22 talking about knocking out Saddam Hussein and then trying to
23 figure it out after the fact.

24 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 The Chairman: Senator Hagel.

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.
1111 14th Street, N.W. Suite 400 1-800-FOR-DEPO Washington, DC 20005

56

1 Senator Hagel: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

2 I add my welcome and thanks to both of you. We are

3 grateful for your appearance this morning and the benefit of

4 your expertise and insight and great experience. Thank you.

5 I would just add a comment to what the Senator from

6 Wisconsin and prior to the Senator from Wisconsin's comments,

7 the Senator from Indiana said, but more to the point, their

8 line of questioning. I think as you have sat through this for

9 about an hour-and-a-half, you both are getting a sense, at

10 least from some on this committee, where the thrust of this

11 is, this great question, this debate, this issue of whether we

12 should go to war and the questions that you both began with,

13 how, when. I think it is clear to state that no one has all

14 the answers, and I think it is also clear to state, going back

15 to referencing the Senator from Wisconsin's point, I do not

16 know if there is a Member of the Congress certainly that I am

17 aware of that does not take seriously the threat of Saddam

18 Hussein.

19 Now, that said, we differ a bit on how we deal with that.

20 But there are those who minimalize even such a debate and how

21 outrageous to even question things like the destabilization of

22 the Middle East. I mean, how foolish of you to ask such a

23 question. If we could just get rid of Saddam Hussein, then

24 all of our problems would go away. Everybody knows that. And

25 you heard some of that.

60

1 aspect if it cannot be handled in some other way.

2 May I just make one other point? The inspection issue is

3 a dreadful one because what happened in the course of the

4 years, the original inspection regime became weaker and it did

5 work at the beginning. As I said, the inspectors managed to

6 get rid of more weapons of mass destruction than the war

7 itself. But ultimately there were changes in the modalities,

8 and I do think that the deal that Kofi Annan made in '98 was a

9 problem in terms of inspectors had to be accompanied by

10 diplomats and all that. But even that has not been enforced.

11 So we need to get back to an intrusive and overall inspection

12 regime, not the modalities that we have had in the past.

13 Senator Hagel: Mr. Chairman, may I ask if Secretary

14 Kissinger had any response to that, we would welcome his

15 response?

16 Secretary Kissinger: I think the conditions after

17 September 11th produced the current situation. I understand

18 why before September 11th it was deemed not to be desirable

19 but sooner or later, we would have faced this problem. Sooner

20 or later the problem of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq

21 would have had to be faced, but I generally sympathize with

22 the answer that Madeleine has given.

23 Senator Hagel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24 The Chairman: Senator Wellstone.

25 Senator Wellstone: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I

59

1 suffering.

2 We also did consider a number of military options, and I
3 think we managed to do what was the right thing, which was to
4 keep constantly vigilance on the no-fly zones to make sure
5 that he stayed within that box, and were more and more robust
6 in that bombing not just when our pilots were illuminated, but
7 when we felt that there was danger from ground-to-air attacks.
8 So I think we really did bomb and do that job well, and they
9 are continuing to do it now.

10 I must say that while there were sometimes discussions
11 about a ground option, you point out very accurately the mood
12 is very different after 9/11, and I think that there was no
13 way to do that psychologically, much less do I think
14 physically given what we knew about the numbers that were
15 necessary to do that.

16 I stand down to no one in terms of my characterization of
17 Saddam Hussein in terms of being a danger and an evil. And I
18 think the question is what is the best way to handle it. I do
19 think that the continued bombing is the way to do it. And as
20 I suggested in my testimony, if we know or have suspicions
21 that some facility is actually in the process of doing
22 something with weapons of mass destruction, I think we have
23 the authority to just go and do the bombing. So I think that
24 we need to continue this robust keeping him in a box until we
25 are ready with all the plans that we need to have some other

63

1 very well. I admire what was done, and there is great

2 continuity where we picked it up in '93 from there. So I do

3 think that it is very important to do it internationally. It

4 would make a huge difference.

5 If it is impossible and if we are given better

6 information than at least I believe we have on how rapidly

7 this has to be done, I think that we then owe it to our people

8 to take action. But all that is missing. Those are the

9 missing pieces.

10 And I must say that I think this is a remarkable

11 discussion. I think the fact that we are able to have these

12 kinds of discussions is what the American people need to hear

13 because this is going to be long-term and expensive. There

14 are a lot of priorities that we will have to set aside because

15 of this. I am very concerned not just about a unilateral

16 foreign policy but a unidimensional foreign policy. We will

17 suffer for that in the long run.

18 Senator Wellstone: Dr. Kissinger.

19 Secretary Kissinger: When we look back at the first Gulf

20 War, it is important to understand its structure. It is indeed

21 correct that the first President Bush achieved an

22 international consensus. It is also true that he moved some

23 400,000 American troops into the region before there was an

24 international consensus, and it was clear that we could not

25 march in and march out and that the implication of his conduct

(Y)

64

1 was that if we did not achieve ~~international consensus, we~~

2 would operate with those nations that would support us. I

3 believe that one reason ~~that~~ he received as much support as he

4 did was that ~~this~~ was ~~a~~ way by which other nations could

5 influence our actions and participate in ~~it~~. So ~~that~~ in

6 principle, the difference is not so great in the methods of

7 the Bush family ~~in~~ the Gulf with ~~which, I must say, I agree.~~

8 Secondly, in conducting these discussions, we have to

9 keep in mind that we seem to agree that ~~we are talking about~~

10 ~~timing here is~~ We are not talking about the principle. One has

11 ~~to take care that these discussions~~ of what might happen ~~and~~

12 ~~of the inspection system~~ is not used for endless

13 procrastination. On the other hand, we have to be serious in

14 conducting them.

15 Senator Wellstone: Well, if I could say to me the two

16 issues that I feel like are staring me in the face -- and I

17 appreciate the answer of both of you -- are, one, as a matter

18 of public policy, are we not going to make it the first

19 priority to try to put into effect an arms inspection regime

20 that will work, unfettered access, and will insist that these

21 weapons of mass destruction are out? Is that the first

22 priority or not? I think some, frankly, do not think it is.

23 They have other priorities. And some think it is.

24 The second point I would make is it seems to me that we

25 are in an odd position right now because, on the one hand, we

63

9 missing pieces.

(Y)

65

1 are saying to the United Nations we want your support. On the
2 other hand, we are asked to vote on a resolution that gives
3 the United Nations the back of the hand and says regardless of
4 what you do, we are going in. And if we go in unilaterally, I
5 would just say to the Chairman again, I think that the
6 consequences throughout the Near East and South Asia, the
7 consequences in the world that we live in, and the
8 consequences for our men and women that are there in Iraq
9 could be very serious.

10 I think we need to pay very special attention to that,
11 the difference between unilateral, going alone, and having the
12 support of the international community. If it requires more
13 diplomatic heavy lifting, we ought to at least make every
14 effort to do that first. That would be my plea here today.

15 Secretary Kissinger: I think we one looks at the
taking place discussion in the Security Council, it is interesting that
16 none of the permanent members has threatened a veto, or they
17 know that, by abstaining, if that is what they are going to do,
18 they will make possible a resolution that will support our
19 action, Assuming we can achieve nine votes. Britain will
20 clearly be for us. And I am not sure that France will
21 abstain. But it is not necessary now to speculate about what
22 the or may not
23 individual countries may do in a final vote.

24 Secondly, as I pointed out before, I am convinced that if
25 military action is taken, we will not act alone, that there

66

1. will be significant countries supporting the United States.

2. None of this is ~~absolute~~ true, and one always has to keep

3. focus on what is the alternative? Therefore, we all seem to

4. agree that we cannot acquiesce in the growth of weapons of

5. mass destruction in Iraq. So we are talking about means for

6. dealing with that problem.

7. The Chairman: Senator Allen.

8. Senator Allen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you

9. both, our esteemed witnesses, today for your insights and comments.

11. I think I speak for everyone on this committee that no

12. one cares to risk lives unnecessarily of the men and women in

13. uniform. We do not want war. It is not in our interest.

14. However, when you think of the priorities and you say, gosh,

15. there are a lot of different concerns and priorities, the top

16. responsibility of the Federal Government is national security.

17. Unfortunately, we only have a theoretical unimpeded path to disarming Saddam Hussein.

19. I would say to Secretary Albright that we have had briefings and some of these briefings that we have had were of

20. a highly classified nature and we cannot necessarily publicly

21. state every bit of intelligence, very credible intelligence,

22. about the capabilities that Saddam has as far as chemical,

23. biological weapons and also the means of delivering those.

25. One can be in a box and still deliver outside that box. Or

66

2. None of this is true, and one always has to keep in mind that the alternative is not absolute.

3. focus on what is the alternative, and we all seem to agree that we cannot acquiesce in the growth of weapons of

4. what really is the alternative, and we are talking about means for mass destruction in Iraq. So we are dealing with that problem.

5.

6.
7. The Chairman: Senator Allen.

8. Senator Allen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both, our esteemed witnesses, today for your insights and comments.

11. I think I speak for everyone on this committee that no one cares to risk lives unnecessarily of the men and women in uniform. We do not want war. It is not in our interest. However, when you think of the priorities and you say, gosh, there are a lot of different concerns and priorities, the top responsibility of the Federal Government is national security. Unfortunately, we only have a theoretical unimpeded path to disarming Saddam Hussein.

19. I would say to Secretary Albright that we have had briefings and some of these briefings that we have had were of a highly classified nature and we cannot necessarily publicly state every bit of intelligence, very credible intelligence, about the capabilities that Saddam has as far as chemical, biological weapons and also the means of delivering those. One can be in a box and still deliver outside that box.

65

15 Secretary Kissinger: I think we one looks at the
16 taking place in the Security Council, it is interesting that
17 none of the permanent members has threatened a veto, and they
18 know that by abstaining, if that is what they are going to do,
19 they will make possible a resolution that will support our
20 action, assuming we can achieve nine votes. Britain will
21 clearly be for us. And I am not sure that France will
22 abstain. But it is not necessary now to speculate about what
23 individual countries may do in a final vote.
24 the
25 being and not alone

24 Secondly, as I pointed out before, I am convinced that if
25 military action is taken, we will not act alone that there

81

1 think about.

2 Senator Boxer: Actually, that was my next question. My

3 time has run out, but I will put it in the record and hope

4 that you can respond to it. I would greatly appreciate it.

5 The Chairman: Madam Secretary, I proposed that 5 months

6 ago. He should be declared a war criminal.

7 Senator Boxer: Can we hear from Dr. Kissinger?

8 Dr. Kissinger: I do not agree with the statements that

9 have been heard around here about the irrational exuberance of

10 the administration towards war. The administration is facing a

11 the problem on which we all agree: the existence of weapons of

12 mass destruction. They are facing the problem that if we

13 acquiesce in that now, they will continue to grow. We will

14 face the same problem a year or 2 or 3 from now.

15 The President went to the United Nations and put the case

16 to the United Nations, and therefore started the process

17 which I am confident he will let run to a reasonable

18 conclusion. We have all agreed here we are talking about

19 months and not years, so the difference in regard to all of

20 this is relatively small.

21 Now, with respect to that inspection system, I have

22 talked to General Boyd, who was one of the drafters, and I

23 have read the report and I put a sentence in my statement

24 about a stand-by force and a stand-by authority when I

25 discussed the general requirement for inspection, so I think

82

1 it is a useful idea, and if an inspection system were to be

2 worked out, that would be a possible element in it.

3 The only warning I would issue is not to use inspection

4 as a means of avoiding the problem and facing the same issue

5 ~~2, 3, 4 years from now. We should (in good faith) see what can~~
down the road of course

6 ~~be worked out. I cannot make a big contribution because I do~~
but

7 not know enough about it, and I think the administration will

8 ~~do this because, in fact, they will have to answer the~~
but

9 question of the inspection system as it goes through the

10 process, ~~but then we will have to face the issue within a~~
limited period of time

11 ~~of time or action if that does not prove~~
feasible.

12 Senator Boxer: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 The Chairman: I apologize to the Senator from Rhode

14 Island for this additional intervention, and it will just take

15 a second, but I want to make sure the record is straight. My

16 understanding was, the comment was made earlier on that some

18 within the administration were engaged in irrational

19 exuberance about war. I do not think that was said of the

20 President.

21 The second point is --

22 Senator Boxer: I said that, Mr. Chairman.

23 The Chairman: I know. I just want to make sure what we

24 are talking about here, because we are trying to all -- and

25 the witnesses are incredibly helpful to this degree. We are

82

1 it is a useful idea and if an inspection system were to be

5 2, 3, 4 years from now. We should (in good faith) see what can

6 be worked out. I cannot make a big contribution because I do

8 do this because in fact, they will have to answer the

10 process, but then we will have to face the issue within a

11 limited period of time of action if that does not prove

12 feasible.

13 Senator Boxer: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 The Chairman: I apologize to the Senator from Rhode

15 Island for this additional intervention, and it will just take

16 a second, but I want to make sure the record is straight. My

17 understanding was, the comment was made earlier on that some

20 President.

21 The second point is --

81

1 think about.

9 have been heard around here about the irrational exuberance of
10 the administration towards war. The administration is facing a
11 the problem on which we all agree: the existence of weapons of
12 mass destruction. They are facing the problem that, if we
13 SE WEAPONS WILL ONLY BE ACQUISITED IN THAT TIME, THEY WILL
14 ACQUISCE IN THAT NOW, THEY WILL CONTINUE TO GROW. WE WILL
15 FACE THE SAME PROBLEM A YEAR OR 2 OR 3 FROM NOW. AND

16 THE PRESIDENT WENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND PUT THE CASE
17 TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THEREFOR STARTED THE PROCESS THAT
18 WHICH I AM CONFIDENT HE WILL LET RUN TO A REASONABLE
19 CONCLUSION. WE HAVE ALL AGREED HERE THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT
20 MONTHS AND NOT YEARS, SO THE DIFFERENCE IN REGARD TO ALL OF
21 THIS IS RELATIVELY SMALL.

21 Now, with respect to that inspection system, I have
talked to General Boyd, who was one of the drafters, and I
have read the report, and I put a sentence in my statement
about a stand-by force and a stand-by authority when I
discussed the general requirement for inspection, so I think

87

1 date intelligence as to what the effect of all of this will be

2 in those countries, because there is little doubt in my mind

3 that there will be outpourings of sentiment against what we

4 have done.

5 Dr. Kissinger: I am assuming we will not act unless we

6 believe it is in the overwhelming interest of national and

7 international security. If that is our judgment, is that it ~~the~~ *Indeed* the judgment of the administration, then it cannot be deterred

8 ~~the~~ by ~~threats~~ of outbursts in the streets, because that will

9 ~~and it~~ ~~surely~~ ~~become~~ ~~that~~ will become a permanent source of blackmail.

10 ~~and it~~ ~~become~~ ~~that~~ will become a permanent source of blackmail.
11 I also believe that ~~the~~ countries you mentioned have ~~Still~~ shown a pretty good capacity to control their streets. ~~but we~~ our cannot be driven in the fundamental judgment of what is ~~the fear of~~ necessary for international order by threat of demonstrations.
12 ~~Iraqi~~

13 The growth of these stockpiles is a serious problem and ~~it~~

14 ~~addressed~~ must be dealt with. It hopefully can be dealt with through

15 ~~even if it is not,~~ the processes which are now being conducted, but I do not

16 ~~think that~~ the demonstrations are going to ~~be~~ a disastrous element.

17 Moreover

18 I also think that ~~the~~ German election was not caused by

19 ~~American~~ our policy. There were many elements within German politics

20 that produced this reaction, and ~~it~~ will almost certainly be

21 ~~dealt with, will be~~ resolved in the weeks to come in a

22 cooperative spirit.

88

1 Senator Sarbanes: Would the Senator yield on that very

2 point for just a minute?

3 Senator Chafee: Certainly.

4 Senator Sarbanes: I am interested to hear Dr. Kissinger
5 say that, because on January 13 you wrote -- and I would only
6 make this point because earlier in this discussion you said we
7 should not engage in speculation about individual countries,
8 and I wanted to just quote what you said then. Talking about
9 building up this movement against Hussein you said, Britain
10 will not easily abandon the pivotal role, based upon its
11 special relationship with the United States, that it has
12 earned for itself in the evolution of the crisis, nor will
13 Germany move into active opposition to the United States,
14 especially in an election year, end of sentence.

15 Dr. Kissinger: I think All of us who have been concerned
16 with German-American relations were surprised by the fact that
17 an anti-American appeal could evoke such feelings.

18 Senator Sarbanes: But it does underscore, I think, the
19 warning you gave today about the danger of speculating about
20 individual countries.

21 Dr. Kissinger: That is right. I had not understood the
degree to which *such feeling* had evolved, but *I think that* it
23 *Surely* has deeper causes than * reactions* to the immediate
tactics of this situation.

25 Senator Sarbanes: I thank the Senator.

88

2 point for just a minute?

3 Senator Chafee: Certainly.

15 Dr. Kissinger: I think all of us who have been concerned
16 with German-American relations were surprised by the fact that
17 an anti-American appeal could evoke such feelings.

21 Dr. Kissinger: That is right. I had not understood the
22 degree to which this feeling had evolved, but I think that it
23 has deeper causes than reactions to the immediate
24 regarding this situation.

87

4 have done.

7 international security. If that is our judgment, it is indeed

8 the judgment of the administration, then it cannot be deterred

9 by threats of outbursts in the streets, because that will

10 happen ~~and it surely become~~ that will then be a permanent source of blackmail.

12 shown a pretty good capacity to control their streets, ~~but we~~

13 cannot be driven in the fundamental judgment of what is

14 necessary for international order by ~~threats of~~ the fear of

15 demonstrations.

16 The growth of these stockpiles is a serious problem and ~~it~~

17 ~~addressed~~ must be dealt with. It hopefully can be dealt with through

18 the processes which are now being conducted, ~~but I do not~~

19 think that the demonstrations are going to ~~be a~~ disastrous

20 element.

21 ~~I also think that~~ Moreover the German election was not caused by

22 ~~American~~ our policy. There were many elements within German politics

23 that produced this reaction, and ~~it~~ will almost certainly be

24 ~~dealt with, will be~~ resolved in the weeks to come in a

25 cooperative spirit.

90

1 saying, we do not know that.

2 We do know that there are people who are looking for

3 reasons to be opposed to us that are part of societies that

4 are dysfunctional, or where there is a great gap between the

5 rich and the poor, or people have no way of knowing what their

6 future will be, that they are out there as potential recruits

7 for terrorism and therefore, if the streets explode, it is not

8 just a matter of controlling them by the monarch or the ruler.

9 It may be impossible, and it may, in fact, create an

10 environment that hurts us in the overall fight against

11 terrorism, and that is my concern.

12 Senator Chafee: I would agree with that.

13 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 Dr. Kissinger: One has to go back to the fundamental

15 issue there are stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction

16 in Iraq, in violation of the U.N. resolution we are engaged

17 in a diplomatic process to attempt to deal with him. Can we

18 be first of all, does Mubarak really mean this, and

19 secondly, even if he means it, can we then in the end be

20 deterred from doing what we should do and leave these weapons

21 undisturbed, and will that not create a worse problem with the

22 streets as time goes on? That is the question that needs to

23 be addressed.

24 Senator Chafee: I know my time is up, but I guess I did

25 not get an answer to the question, what does happen, just for

89

1 Senator Chafee: Thank you. I will just follow up a
2 little bit.

3 At a hearing we had earlier this month, I asked one of
4 the witnesses about spontaneous combustion that has happened,
5 and specifically I mentioned Iran, and how we were caught so
6 flat-footed. It just seemed to happen overnight. We did not
7 even get our embassy evacuated, obviously.

8 He responded, the witness responded by saying yes, as a
9 matter of fact, one of the leading scholars in the area wrote
10 a book, Iran Under the Pahlavis, by Professor Lenkowski, if I
11 have pronounced it right, and saying it is the most stable
12 regime in the region -- his book was not a best-seller -- so
13 we have to be aware of that, and when President Mubarak is
14 making these type of statements, no Arab leader will be able
15 to control the outbursts -- let me get it right, the angry
16 outbursts of the masses, I think we have to listen, and if we
17 are going down this road, go down it.

18 And I guess I will ask one more time, if Jordan is, the
19 Arab leader cannot control the outburst of the masses, or
20 Egypt, for the sake of argument, then what do we do?

21 Ms. Albright: Could I, Senator -- I think that -- I hate
22 to, I really do hate to disagree with Henry on this. I think
23 that as we look at what the causes of terrorism are -- I
24 remember, Chairman Biden asked me when I testified sometime
25 ago whether poverty was the cause of terrorism, and I remember

91

1 the sake of argument? Do we preemptively go into Jordan if

2 there is someone there, but I do not want to take any time.

3 Dr. Kissinger: The word preemptively is being thrown

4 around too loosely in the debate. It has always been

5 understood that, if there is a fundamental threat to the

6 national security, ~~one~~ reserves the option for military

7 action. There have been occasions in the past ~~as~~ when the

8 Jordanian Government was threatened, ~~that~~ the United States

9 was willing to give it very substantial support.

10 I do not know ~~Nobody~~ would recommend moving American

11 troops into Egypt or Jordan on the basis of riots in the

12 streets. This will have to be dealt with when the issue 5

13 ~~arises~~, in a way that is not determined by an abstract theory

14 of preemption, but by an assessment of the national security

15 and international security as it is perceived at that moment.

16 Senator Chafee: Thank you very much.

17 The Chairman: Senator Nelson.

18 Senator Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am intrigued

19 by the declaration of this preemption doctrine. As I read the

20 Constitution, the President in his role as Commander in Chief

21 can act preemptively for the protection of the interest of the

22 United States, so what is different in this declaration of

23 preemption, and if it is an emphasis on it, is there a

24 weakening of the actual constitutional rights of the Commander

25 in Chief?

92

Dr. Kissinger: This is a question you should address to administration witnesses. I was traveling. I have only read it on the Internet. I have not had the document in my hand yet, I read it on the Internet but I have read it, I have expressed my general view in my statement and elsewhere I do not believe it is in the American interest to proclaim a universal theory of preemption that any nation can use to protect itself against its definition of a threat.

I believe also that, it would be wise -- I also believe given that the kind of terrorism that now exists, that to deal with it would be that is incompatible with some of the notions of sovereignty, I have as they had evolved in the 17th, 18th, and 19th century, that they have for govern the rules among nations, so that there is an element of preemption inherent in the nature of the terrorist threat and in the nature of the modern reference.

Therefore think it would be useful to initiate a general international discussion, or Security Council discussion of what principles of preemption could be universally applied so that not every major nation could attack every nation around its periphery, but I have no resolution to this problem, but I think this is as I recall when I read it, preemption is listed as an absolutely last resort in that document, and primarily aimed at terror, but one really ought to ask the people who drafted it. My view on preemption is the one that I have

92

I believe also that, it would be wise -- I also believe given that the kind of terrorism that now exists, that to deal with it would be that it is incompatible with some of the notions of sovereignty, I have as they had evolved in the 17th, 18th, and 19th century, that it have for that have govern the rules among nations, so that there is an element of preemption inherent in the nature of the terrorist threat and in the nature of the modern reference.

Therefore think it would be useful to initiate a general international discussion, or Security Council discussion of what principles of preemption could be universally applied so that not every major nation could attack every nation around its periphery, but I have not resolution to this problem, but I think this is as I recall when I read it, preemption is listed as an absolutely last resort in that document, and primarily aimed at terror, but one really ought to ask the people who drafted it. My view on preemption is the one that I have

91

5 understood that if there is a fundamental threat to the

7 action. There have been occasions in the past when the

8 Jordanian Government was threatened that the United States

10 I do not know. Nobody would recommend moving American

25 in Chief?

93

1 stated.

2 Senator Nelson: Madam Secretary.

3 Ms. Albright: Well, I think that it becomes a very kind
4 of shadowy area in terms of what the right of self-defense is
5 versus the preemption, and I think you raise a very important
6 point, that perhaps it does undermine the whole concept of
7 self-defense if, in fact, you begin now to see it as a new
8 doctrine, and that is what has concerned me, is that all of a
9 sudden -- you know, everybody has been looking for a term for
10 the post cold war era and whether deterrence still works, and
11 these are very important discussions, but I do not think they
12 should be superimposed on what we are trying to deal with now,
13 because it is so unclear, and I agree with Secretary Kissinger
14 that it would be worth having a national as well as an
15 international discussion of this, not in any kind of an overly
16 rapid or hysterical way.

17 Dr. Kissinger: I think In retrospect, though, I did not
18 argue that at the time. It would have been appropriate to
19 take preemptive action against bin Laden in Afghanistan, and
20 as these terrorist cells exist, it cannot be precluded, but
21 what it means in an international system as both a concept and as
22 something that can be more or less universally accepted so
23 that it does not become arbitrary, that is something that we
24 are at the beginning of the problem, not at the solution of
25 it.

94

1 Senator Nelson: Mr. Chairman, I have come away from this
2 discussion and others we have had both in this committee and
3 our other committee, the Armed Services Committee, thinking
4 that the draft resolution that was sent to us clearly needs to
5 be changed, that Ambassador Holbrooke had four suggestions of
6 change yesterday that I think were excellent, and I am just
7 curious as to our two witnesses here.

8 One was to delete the clause that would seemingly give
9 carte blanche to go into the whole area, and nail it down just
10 as a resolution as to Iraq, another one was to make reference
11 to a U.N. Security Council resolution, a third would be the
12 executive branch reporting clause to the Congress, and a
13 fourth was a statement, a clause as to the post conflict Iraq,
14 and what would be our responsibilities there.

15 Are we moving in the right direction with such changes to
16 the resolution?

17 Ms. Albright: Well, I do not think that as a private
18 citizen it is absolutely right to give you suggestions on
19 this, but my problem with the resolution that came here is its
20 broadness, and you all have in previous ways worked out a
21 resolution that makes clearer what the co-responsibility of
22 the executive and legislative branch is in this, and as
23 somebody that was in an administration that we always have had
24 discussions about the war powers, I do think that it is up to
25 you all to figure out how to refine this, and it is essential,

95

1 frankly, but I am not sure it is appropriate for me to make

2 suggestions.

3 Senator Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 Dr. Kissinger: I have not studied the resolution enough

5 to make suggestions. As a general proposition, I think the

6 President should be given authority of a nature that makes

7 clear that the Congress understands the relationship of the

8 Iraq issue to other issues in the area, and does not just deal

9 with it or look at it in Iraq terms and that the President is

10 given adequate flexibility to deal with this as to reporting

11 requirements.

12 Senator Sarbanes: I am not clear on that answer. Is it

13 your view the President should be authorized to take military

14 action with respect to issues in the region, and not just with

15 respect to Iraq?

16 Dr. Kissinger: I am now most concerned about the issue

17 of Iraq. I think the resolution should clearly indicate the

18 relationship of the Iraqi issue to others, though I really have

19 not studied it enough to make drafting suggestions.

20 The Chairman: Senator Brownback.

21 Senator Brownback: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you

22 both very much for being here, and for lasting through this.

23 A couple of quick things. I want to apologize for not

24 being here during a portion of it. There were other hearings

25 I had to be at.

96

1 A point that I would like to make is, at least for this

2 Member, if we need to narrow the resolution or add

3 restrictions or reporting requirements to that, I would be

4 open to any of that being done as long as at the end of the

5 day it allows the President the use of force, including

6 military force against Iraq if the administration decides it

7 is necessary to move on forward.

8 So working the wording on this to make it clear that it

9 is not expansive, it cannot be used in other places, I think

10 that is good, and if we can do that and get a large, positive

11 vote for it, because I think that is an important statement to

12 make, that it be a large vote in the Senate for moving forward

13 on this, I think it would be a very positive statement to do.

14 Secretary Kissinger, I wanted to ask you, in looking

15 through your statement about a post Saddam Iraq and the impact

16 on terrorism if we do move forward against Iraq -- and I

17 apologize if this question has been asked in another forum or

18 not while I was not here, but I see a problem if we do not

19 move forward -- and you articulate that some people will ask

20 why now, and you would ask, why not now in your original

21 statement. I can see a lot of difficulty if we move forward,

22 but I see a lot of difficulty if we do not move forward, and I

23 think there is a substantial positive scenario if we do move

24 forward on Iraq, not on the basis of a preemption doctrine,

25 but on the basis of what he has failed to do with U.N.

97

1 resolutions, that we could have a substantial positive impact

2 on the Iraqi people and the war on terrorism if this is done

3 right, and with the right reasoning in place.

4 Dr. Kissinger: That is my view.

5 Senator Brownback: I would like you to articulate, how

6 do you see this impacting the whole region and its war on

7 terrorism if we do move forward with this war on Iraq?

8 Dr. Kissinger: There are many causes for which groups join

9 terrorism, and Madeleine has indicated some of them. I would

10 focus on the toleration by governments of terrorist groups

11 because they are afraid of the consequences of not tolerating

12 them and, secondly, by the perception that in the end the

13 United States and its friends are too weak to defend their

14 fundamental interests.

15 So for all these reasons, I believe that a

16 demonstration that the United States will insist on carrying

17 out the obligations that a country has undertaken in

18 particularly this region and especially with respect to
19 weapons of mass destruction, will have a positive impact on

20 the war against terrorism.

21 I do not accept the proposition as I have said, that

22 there is a distinction between the war on terrorism and this

23 the problem. I believe the two are closely related. The war

24 against terrorism must be pursued energetically and think

25 our credibility with respect to it will be enhanced if we act

(Y)

98

1 as I have indicated and, more importantly, as the

2 administration has indicated on the Iraq issue.

3 Senator Brownback: Previously I have worked a lot with
4 the Iraqi National Congress, the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998
5 that Secretary Albright, you worked on its implementation, and
6 with Senator Kerrey of Nebraska, Bob Kerrey, the former
7 Senator. Both of us concluded -- and this is somewhat wishful
8 thinking, but I do not think so, that Iraq will move to
democracy and will be, we would hope and think, clearly very
10 possible in the near future, a strong democracy. It has
11 resources underneath it. It has an educated population. It
12 is not without its difficulties and divisions within the
country, north and south and in the middle, but that this
14 could be a very strong force for democracy once Saddam is
15 removed in that region.

16 Secretary Albright, you would have dealt with that a lot
17 as Secretary, and probably had a lot of chance to think about
18 that recently as well.

19 Ms. Albright: Well, I think it would be much wished, and
20 clearly the population of Iraq is a little bit different in
terms of its modernity and education from some of the other
21 places, but the question that I think we have, and we raised,
22 was, what is the plan to get from here to there, that it will
24 not be simple, that there is not only the potential of
democracy, but also the potential of internecine fighting
25

98

9 democracy and will be, we would hope and think, clearly very

13 country, north and south and in the middle, but that this

15 removed in that region.

18 that recently as well.

21 terms of its modernity and education from some of the other

22 places, but the question that I think we have, and we raised,

23 was, what is the plan to get from here to there, that it will

25 democracy, but also the potential of internecine fighting

97

11 because they are more afraid of the consequences of not tolerating

14 fundamental interests.

18 particularly this region, and especially with respect to
19 weapons of mass destruction, will have a positive impact on

20 the war against terrorism.

21 I do not accept the proposition, as I have said, that

24 against terrorism must be pursued energetically, and I think

99

1 before we get there, and what I have wanted to hear a little

2 bit more from the administration, what is the plan from

3 getting here to there?

4 I am chairman of the board of the National Democratic

5 Institute, that has been working very hard at looking at

6 different ways that democracy might be possible in the Middle

7 East. We have programs in Yemen and Bahrain, and I am not one

8 of those people who believes that it is impossible to have

9 democracy in the Middle East, but I think that we have to get

10 there in a systematic way, and understand how we get there,

11 and I must say that while I have a great deal of respect for

12 those people who try to work with the Iraqi National Congress,

13 it is not a group that I think is quite -- has shown so far

14 that it has the continuity and the cooperation within it to be

15 ready to have democracy.

16 I have talked to the Kurdish leaders. They would so much

17 like to hear us talking about not regime change but a freeing

18 of Iraq, and I think we should be thinking about that, but I

19 think it is a long way between here and there, and that is why

20 we need to see a little bit more how we get there, and what

21 the role of the United States in that will be.

22 Dr. Kissinger: I would say that the choices with respect

23 to the weapons of mass destruction are relatively limited.

24 Our choices after a military operation require us to bring

25 about a substantial improvement in conditions in Iraq.

1 would consider it unlikely that one could move ~~to democracy~~ there to ~~100~~

2 full democracy in a very brief time ~~However~~ but I think it is

3 essential to move to ~~its~~ accountability of the Government

4 institutions towards some type of constitutional system, and

5 ~~to~~ substantial improvement in the lives of the population

6 ~~We cannot do that alone,~~ and it will ~~this requires~~ an international

7 effort.

8 Senator Brownback: I would certainly agree with that. I

9 just -- I think there is a potential to do something

10 extraordinarily positive for a lot of people and

11 extraordinarily positive for our security here, not without

12 huge risks, substantial risks, but the risks of waiting I have

13 concluded are greater than those of acting now.

14 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15 The Chairman: You have been very patient. With your

16 permission, I would like to let Senator Sarbanes -- he says he

17 has another question, and I know you missed your shuttles, two

18 of them here.

19 Senator Sarbanes: Mr. Chairman, I am looking at a

20 dispatch from a Virginia paper reporting on a meeting at the

21 University of Virginia on Tuesday at the Miller Center, at

22 which General Scowcroft and Secretary Eagleburger spoke. They

23 had a crowd of, it says here of over 900 people, and the

24 director of the center says, I do not know of a larger

25 gathering, or an event of this kind in the city in a long

2 full democracy in a very brief time ~~but~~ I think it is

5 ~~to a~~ substantial improvement in the lives of the population

6 ~~We cannot do that alone, but it will require an international~~

7 effort.

14 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 of them here.

99

3 getting here to there?

15 ready to have democracy.

25 about a substantial improvement in conditions in Iraq. I

103

1 associate of mine, and friend, for whom I have very high

2 regard. We just have a serious difference of opinion on that

3 subject. I do not believe that the war against these bases is

4 competitive with the need to destroy the weapons of mass

5 destruction in Iraq and, Indeed, I believe that success,

6 either diplomatic or military, in destroying these weapons of

7 mass destruction will enhance our ability to conduct another

8 war. Scowcroft has a different opinion.

9 Senator Sarbanes: What do you think we should do about
10 these four countries here?

11 Dr. Kissinger: Well, one would have to deal with them,
12 and I do not think there is a general rule. Somalia has no

13 Government, really, no effective Government, and therefore the
14 question is, what are these places actually doing? Yemen has

15 a Government, but not in every region of the country. With
16 respect to bases from which terrorist attacks are being

17 planned against the United States, or might be planned
18 we cannot exclude, ultimately, the use of military action.

19 ~~NOMEN~~, Obviously, a country like Indonesia is of a
20 magnitude where this is not something that should be done

21 except in the most extreme provocation, which does not exist
22 right now. It is not even clear whether there are bases, as

23 some people claim, on these islands, so one would have to go
24 this country by country, and depending on the nature of the

25 each threat.

(N)

104

1 The Chairman: Not that you ever need me to defend you,

2 Dr. Kissinger, but as I listened to Senator Sarbanes and your

3 response, am I missing something, or is there -- it seems to
4 me that your underlying premise is that if and when the

5 President takes action, he is not going to be antagonizing the

6 rest of the world, that he is going to have a sufficient

7 portion of the rest of the world with him. Is that -- I mean,
8 because I think everybody agrees --

9 Dr. Kissinger: That is my underlying premise.

10 The Chairman: Again, though there is a disagreement, one
11 of the things that I find the most difficult as I try to go
12 through this --

13 Dr. Kissinger: It depends upon how you define the rest
14 of the world, but as a general principle, if you take all the
15 major countries and all the other countries, I do not
16 believe --

17 Senator Sarbanes: What is your analysis if it is done
18 unilaterally?

19 The Chairman: In other words --

20 Senator Sarbanes: What is your analysis if it is done
21 unilaterally, American military action unilaterally?

22 Dr. Kissinger: I do not believe it will happen.

23 Senator Sarbanes: But we have to reason this through, do
24 we not?

25 Dr. Kissinger: But I am convinced that --

104

(Y)

103

5 destruction in Iraq and Indeed, I believe that success,

12 and I do not think there is no general rule. Somalia has no

17 planned against the United States, or might be planned against the United States,

19 Obviously, a country like Indonesia is of a

23 some people claim, on these islands, so one would have to go about

25 each threat.

105

1 Senator Sarbanes: Would you condition the President's
2 ability to act on the premise that it not be unilateral?

3 Dr. Kissinger: I think we pay a higher price if we act
4 unilaterally, but I would have enough confidence in the
5 President, if he does act, that I think that I would assume
6 that it will have been necessary.

7 Senator Sarbanes: Well, the rhetoric that has been used
8 it seems is moving us increasingly to the position where we do
9 not have options. If they do not act, then we say, aha, he
10 did not act. He said he was going to act, unilaterally or
11 not, and he did not do it.

12 The Chairman: Well, if I can, you have been here 3 hours
13 You have been incredible. I just want to conclude by,
14 a) thanking you, but b), also pointing out what I think is a
15 fair statement, I hope is a fair statement, and that is that,
16 as it relates to Saddam Hussein in Iraq, as policymakers writ
17 large, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
18 Defense, they are never going to have more than 75 percent of
19 the facts they need to know to be certain.

20 There is no place we reach the point where there is
21 certainty, so where we peel off among us is the degree to
22 which it seems to me -- it is not observation, but the degree
23 to which we think certain things are going to fall into place.
24 I happen to agree with Dr. Kissinger on this point. I cannot
25 fathom the President going alone. I just cannot fathom the

(Y)

106

1 President going alone.

2 If I am wrong about that -- and I am going to end up

3 having to take a chance here when I vote. If I am wrong about

4 that, I have made a tragic mistake, because he would be making

5 a tragic mistake if he went alone, but that comes down to a

6 little bit of faith here. I mean, it comes down to the point

7 where, at least for me, what I do not know I have to look at,

8 and based on my personal conversations, public conversations,

9 I have to take a chance. We all do at some point. We are not

10 going to get all the facts here.

11 One point I would make, though, and I publicly urge the

12 President, he made a very compelling case to the United

13 Nations as to why Iraq has violated the United Nations

14 standards. That is a different case than the case to the

15 American people of what he is asking the American people to be

16 prepared to do.

17 I will end where I began this hearing. I am absolutely

18 convinced that no matter how well-formulated a foreign policy,

19 it cannot be sustained without the informed consent of the

20 American people, and at this moment we do not have that

21 informed consent.

22 You go home -- and I will just read from today's paper,

23 the Washington Times. It says, an increasing number of

24 Republican lawmakers are saying that President Bush has not

25 made a convincing case of using force against Iraq, although

1

CONTENTS

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2

STATEMENT OF PAGE

3

HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 3

4

HON. JESSE HELMS, U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA 5

5

HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE,
CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 8

6

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HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, CEO,
KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, INC., NEW YORK, NEW YORK 17

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2

IRAQ

2

3 Thursday, September 26, 2002

4

5 United States Senate

6 Committee on Foreign Relations

7 Washington, D.C.

8

9 The committee met at 10:35 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
10 Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., chairman of
11 the committee, presiding.

12 Present: Senators Biden, Sarbanes, Feingold, Wellstone,
13 Boxer, Nelson, Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Frist, Chafee, Allen, and
14 Brownback.

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25

3

1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S.

2 SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

3 The Chairman: The hearing will please come to order.

4 Starting in July, the committee has held a series of
5 hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq, and we have heard from a
6 broad range of experts and witnesses, former senior officials
7 on the basic questions before the country, which is, what
8 threat does Iraq pose to the United States? What are our
9 possible responses? How do our allies around the world and
10 our friends in the region see the problem? What would be our
11 responsibilities the day after? What is the goal that we have
12 here?

13 I think the President is dead right about the danger of
14 Saddam Hussein. The witnesses and my colleagues are tired of
15 hearing me say this. I think no matter how well formulated a
16 foreign policy, it will not be sustained very long without the
17 informed consent of the American people.

18 So one of the questions I have been asking is, at what
19 point, if it gets to this that we "take down Saddam," do the
20 Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State turn to the
21 President and say, we are done here, Mr. President? We have
22 met our goals and we can go home. I think we should be
23 talking about that.

24 This morning we continue our inquiry with two Americans
25 who have had an extraordinary impact on our country's foreign

4

1 policy and security problems: former Secretary of State

2 Madeleine Albright, and former Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger. This committee has heard from them on many occasions in the past and I am pleased to welcome them both here again to help us work through a difficult challenge posed by Iraq.

3 Kissinger. This committee has heard from them on many occasions in the past and I am pleased to welcome them both here again to help us work through a difficult challenge posed by Iraq.

4 occasions in the past and I am pleased to welcome them both here again to help us work through a difficult challenge posed by Iraq.

5 here again to help us work through a difficult challenge posed by Iraq.

6 by Iraq.

7 This afternoon we are going to hear from the current Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and I will have a lengthier statement at that time.

8 Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and I will have a lengthier statement at that time.

9 statement at that time.

10 For now, let me simply welcome our two witnesses and tell them how pleased we are they are here for this important process and yield to my very good friend from North Carolina, Senator Helms.

11 them how pleased we are they are here for this important

12 process and yield to my very good friend from North Carolina,

13 Senator Helms.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

5

1 STATEMENT OF HON. JESSE HELMS, U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH

2 CAROLINA

3 Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

4 You have rung the bell this morning by bringing these two
5 leaders here this morning. I join in welcoming them here. If
6 I had been a little closer, I would have hugged you, but it is
7 hard to do it with a barricade like that.

8 We could not have, I think, two finer examples of
9 naturalized citizens. I have thought about that a lot. They
10 are a tribute to the opportunities offered by our country to
11 all citizens. And certainly I join you and the rest of the
12 committee in welcoming both of them.

13 An international consensus to rid the world once and for
14 all of Saddam Hussein is developing, I think, and the
15 President's speech to the General Assembly of the United
16 Nations 2 weeks ago presented the clearest possible case for
17 action against the Iraqi regime of Hussein.

18 Tony Blair. My affection for that guy rose all the time
19 because he has really stuck with us in thick and thin. His
20 speech and his report to the British Parliament also laid the
21 case out clearly and succinctly.

22 Yesterday Ambassador Holbrooke sat where you are sitting
23 this morning, ma'am. He called Turkey our indispensable NATO
24 ally. I could not agree more, and that country's assistance
25 is noteworthy.

6

1 The Washington Post reported last week that Qatar and
2 Jordan and Saudi Arabia are coming around, even at the expense
3 of criticism and possible -- possible -- unrest within their
4 jurisdictions.

5 In any case, it is certainly good to see you here this
6 morning, and all of us will be interested in your assessment
7 of the further steps we can take to solidify the key support
8 of our key allies. And I thank you for being here, both of
9 you.

10 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 The Chairman: Thank you very much.

12 Let me suggest to our witnesses something that we do not
13 often suggest. I am not asking you to be limited by time.
14 This is such an important issue. I mean this sincerely. We
15 have two incredibly knowledgeable people and we will benefit
16 from whatever time you think is necessary for you to make the
17 points that you make. So I am going to ask the staff not to
18 turn on this light and apologize to my colleagues. I do not
19 expect that the witnesses will take an inordinate amount of
time, but your statements are so important I do not want you
21 to feel rushed to say I am summarizing my statement in 3
22 minutes or 5 minutes and move from there, unless that is what
23 you prefer to do. I just want you to know we are anxious,
24 truly anxious, to hear from you both.

25 Only in order of recent occupants of the chair, I would

8

1 STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER

2 SECRETARY OF STATE, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE,

3 WASHINGTON, D.C.

4 Secretary Albright: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much,
5 and Senator Helms, thank you for your kind comments. It is
6 very nice to see you.

7 I am delighted to be here as you exercise your patriotic
8 duty to ask questions about the substance and direction of
9 American policy towards Iraq. To me this committee is kind of
10 like a second home, and it is a special honor to be
11 accompanied by my very distinguished and charismatic
12 predecessor and especially very good friend.

13 I think I speak on behalf of both of us, Senator Helms,
14 that there is no greater honor than to serve this country,
15 especially for those of us who were not able to be born here
16 but have benefitted from the great generosity of the American
17 people.

18 Mr. Chairman, the President's speech to the UN 2 weeks
19 ago paralleled many of the statements that I made when I
20 served as UN Ambassador and as Secretary of State. The
21 details of Saddam's noncompliance with Security Council
22 resolutions were not new, nor was the President's challenge
23 for the council to respond firmly or face a forceful American
24 response.

25 The difference now is that weapons inspectors have been

9

1 absent from Iraq for almost 4 years, and the risk that Saddam

2 Hussein will succeed in reconstituting deliverable weapons of

3 mass destruction has increased. It is in the interest not

4 only of the United States but also of the entire international

5 community to act.

6 So I strongly support the administration's decision to

7 back the return of UN inspectors to Iraq without any

8 conditions. The path of inspections is all too familiar, but

9 it is worth traveling one last time. If the Iraqis break

10 their promise, the case for military action will be stronger.

11 If they keep it, the UN inspection and monitoring regime will

12 resume, and that is good. Before the inspectors were kicked

13 out, they had destroyed more weapons of mass destruction

14 capacity than the Gulf War itself had. Unfettered inspections

15 and monitoring will make it far harder for Iraq to continue

16 developing advanced arms.

17 So we must be willing to take a "yes" for an answer. But

18 we must also be prepared for a negative response.

19 The President has asked Congress for the authority to use

20 all means necessary to enforce Iraq's compliance with UN

21 Security Council resolutions. He should have this authority

22 and members of the Security Council should join us in the

23 enforcement effort. And I refer particularly to permanent

24 council members France, Russia, and China. You know, we speak

25 about the UN, but ultimately it is the individual members who

[10]

10

1 make the decision. These are the countries that most

2 vigorously promote the council's prerogatives, and they should

3 be the countries most determined to see that its resolutions

4 are enforced.

5 If Saddam continues to behave like Saddam, we have

6 legitimate grounds for acting on behalf of the Security

7 Council to bring Iraq into compliance. This answers the

8 question of why a confrontation might be necessary.

9 It does not, however, answer two other questions. The

10 first is how and the second is when.

11 The question of how has two parts. One is military,

12 which I will leave to my friends in uniform. The other is the

13 problem of planning for a post-Saddam era. This is

14 complicated because we could be confronted with a no-win

15 choice. One option might be a prolonged U.S. military

16 occupation of the country that served as the cultural capital

17 of Islam during that civilization's Golden Age. This would

18 hand a new organizing tool to anti-American terrorists

19 worldwide.

20 The other option is to withdraw promptly and risk

21 plunging the country into factionalism and civil war. It is

22 naive to think that a peaceful and democratic Iraq will

23 automatically emerge from the ashes of our invasion. It is

24 crazy to believe we can run postwar Iraq alone. And it is

25 essential that the administration think through the

11

1 consequences of all this in advance, which it is not evident

2 to me that they have done. One thing is certain. We may be

3 able to win a war against Iraq without a broad coalition. But

4 there is no way we can win the peace without help from many

5 others.

6 As for when to confront Iraq, the answer should be at a

7 time of our own choosing. In making that choice, several

8 factors should be borne in mind.

9 As evil as Saddam Hussein is, he is not the reason

10 anti-aircraft guns ring this city and a Department of Homeland

11 Defense is being created. Saddam Hussein remains the enemy we

12 know. His military is far weaker than it was a decade ago,

13 and he knows that he will be obliterated if he ever tries to

14 attack another country again. As a rule, people who build

15 statues to themselves are not suicidal.

16 [Laughter.]

17 Secretary Albright: The more urgent threat remains al

18 Qaeda and related groups because deterrence is ineffective

19 against those who embrace death. More than a year after

20 September 11, only a handful of al Qaeda's top leaders have

21 been eliminated and its funding sources have not dried up.

22 Terrorist attacks continue to take place and al Qaeda members

23 are reportedly filtering back into Afghanistan.

24 Defeating al Qaeda is not a part-time job, and we will

25 need the sustained help of governments everywhere and

12

1 especially in the Islamic world. And we must make an

2 undivided commitment of our own military power, diplomatic

3 capital, intelligence, and law enforcement resources.

4 This is not the time or place for short attention spans.

5 The fight against al Qaeda must remain our top priority.

6 I did note that yesterday, Dr. Rice in an interview

7 talked about the fact that they can now link some al Qaeda

8 people and Iraq. This kind of information is just dribbling

9 out and I am not sure that we fully understand what it means

10 or that we have enough information about it. And I hope very

11 much that that is something that we can all explore.

12 In his memoirs, one of our most illustrious predecessors,

13 Secretary of State Acheson, wrote that it is sometimes

14 necessary to over-dramatize a threat in order to arouse public

15 support for a policy. This administration is now doing just

16 that by trying to claim September 11 as a primary reason to go

17 to war against Iraq. Officials say that September 11 created

18 a new reality, which is that terrorists might be able to

19 obtain weapons of mass destruction. That is, of course, a

20 reality but hardly a new one. There are perhaps half a dozen

21 other countries that are thought to have weapons of mass

22 destruction programs and links to terrorism that are at least

23 as extensive as Iraq's.

24 Certainly the danger is real, but eliminating Saddam will

25 not eliminate the threat. It might even make it worse if

13

1 anti-American extremists elsewhere are energized by an assault
2 on Baghdad.

3 There is a valid case for using force against Iraq, but
4 timing matters. At a minimum, the administration still needs
5 to develop a coalition, strengthen Iraqi opposition groups and
6 develop a coherent blueprint for the post-Saddam era. It must
7 also conduct diplomacy aimed at cooling tensions in the Middle
8 East and make certain that a war with Iraq does not result in
9 attacks against Israel and a broader regional conflict.

10 To buy this time, we should give notice that if UN
11 inspectors are again rebuffed by Iraq, we will destroy,
12 without warning, any facilities in that country we believe are
13 being used to develop prohibited arms. Even if those
14 suspicions prove wrong, the blame should fall on Iraq for
15 denying access, not on America for enforcing the Security
16 Council's will.

17 Mr. Chairman, in closing, let me say that I expect
18 Congress to authorize the President to use force against Iraq.
19 I hope, however, that it will not be necessary to use the
20 authority in question. America must respond firmly to Saddam
21 Hussein, but I do not share the irrational exuberance for
22 conflict that is present among some pundits and perhaps even a
23 few administration officials. It is not an American trait to
24 want war, and it is not a sign of sound leadership to
25 understate the risks of war or to offer constantly shifting

14

rationales, as this administration has, for undertaking such a venture.

I also question the administration's wisdom in publicly adding new and hegemonic language to our national security strategy. This document brags unnecessarily about American strength and gives ammunition to those who accuse us of pursuing our interests without regard to international norms.

More than 200 years ago when the British Empire was at its height, Edmund Burke wrote, "I dread our own power and our own ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded. We may say that we shall not abuse this astonishing and hitherto unheard of power. But every other nation will think we shall abuse it. Sooner or later, this must produce a combination against us which may end in our ruin."

Mr. Chairman, there is a gathering danger that America will be perceived as a nation uninterested in the concerns of others at the precise moment we most need global cooperation to fight terrorism, proliferation, and menacing dictators such as Saddam Hussein.

We must, therefore, be strong but also smart in articulating the why, planing the how, and choosing the when of actions directed against Iraq and other challenges we face. And we must be clear not only about what America is against, but what America is for. We are against terrorism and Saddam Hussein; that is a given. But we are for democracy and

15

1 development, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

2 These priorities must not be lost amidst the sound and fury of

3 some parts of this present debate.

4 I salute you and the committee for these hearings because

5 I think that they are providing a very important place to

6 debate, as calmly as we can, what is the most difficult

7 decision any President and Congress has to make, to go to war.

8 I will not take more advantage of your time and hope very

9 much that a lot of the issues that we have will come up in

10 questions. I am very, very pleased now to turn to the floor

11 over to my good friend, Secretary Kissinger. I am sure that

12 he agrees heartily with everything I have said.

13 [Laughter.]

14 [The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:]

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1 The Chairman: Dr. Kissinger, you are probably the single
2 most listened-to voice in the last 30 years in American
3 foreign policy. It is an honor to have you here and it is a
4 pleasure. It is almost 30 years to the day since the first
5 time I met you at a similar hearing. At least we have now got
6 each other's names straight. It is a long story. But at any
7 rate, welcome, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Secretary. Happy to have
8 you here.
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1 STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY

2 OF STATE, CEO, KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, INC., NEW YORK, NEW YORK

3 Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Chairman and members of the
4 committee, like Madeleine, I would like to express my pleasure
5 at being here, the recollections I have of many meetings in
6 this room and the different chairmen and on issues that deeply
7 affect our country.

8 Madeleine and I have been friends for decades and we have
9 discussed these problems between us when we were in office,
10 when one of us was in office and when both of us were out of
11 office. And we share, as she pointed out, the experience of
12 having had the great good luck of being safe from
13 totalitarianism by finding refuge in this country. That then
14 creates a very special sense of obligation and concern for the
15 role that America plays in the world.

16 Now, the Senate and the Congress have been asked to
17 express themselves on what action the United States should
18 take to deal with the threat posed by illegal stockpiles of
19 weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and their potential
20 growth.

21 President Bush has reaffirmed America's commitment to a
22 cooperative world order by asking the United Nations to
23 rectify Iraq's defiance of a large number of United Nations
24 resolutions mandating the destruction of these stockpiles, as
25 well as Iraq's flagrant breach of its pledge to do so as a

18

1 condition for the suspension of the Gulf War in 1991. But if
2 the world community, by fudging its response, opts for the
3 risk of a greater threat in the future, the issue will be
4 whether America and a coalition of the like-minded can
5 acquiesce in stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in
6 Iraq.

7 I do not believe that the issue of America acting alone
8 will arise. Whatever happens, the United States will have a
9 significant number of countries that will support and maybe a
10 larger number that will welcome an American action. I think
11 that Secretary Albright and I agree that the authority for
12 such action exists, whether or not the UN passes a resolution,
13 in the previous resolutions.

14 But there is a question as to the when and the how. I
15 would like to stress first the integral connection between the
16 Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and the
17 terrorist threat. I do not believe it is possible to separate
18 these two issues and deal with them in sequence. How we deal
19 with Iraq will affect the ability to deal with the terrorist
20 threat.

21 On September 11th, 2001, the world entered a new period
22 in which private, non-state organizations undertook to
23 threaten national and international security by stealth
24 attacks. Highly disciplined operatives were scattered around
25 the globe, some on the soil of America's closest allies and

19

1 some even within America itself. Having no territory to

2 defend, these terrorists are not subject to the deterrent

3 threats of the Cold War. Having as their aim the destruction

4 of social cohesion, they are not interested in the

5 conciliating procedures and compromises of traditional

6 diplomacy.

7 Modern technology in the service of terror gives no

8 warning and its perpetrators are capable of inflicting

9 catastrophic damage and vanishing with the act of commission.

10 So the relationship of international politics to the

11 traditional notions of sovereignty is inherent in the nature

12 of the challenge and, therefore, to the accumulation of

13 weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. And violation of UN

14 resolutions cannot be separated from the war against

15 terrorism.

16 The Cold War world reflected a certain uniformity in the

17 assessment of risk between the nuclear sides. But when many

18 states threaten each other for incongruent purposes and when

19 they acquire weapons of mass destruction, who is to do the

20 deterring and in the face of what provocation? And this is

21 especially true when what has to be deterred is not simply the

22 use of weapons of mass destruction, but the threat of them.

23 In the discussion that is going on today, one hears a

24 great deal about the possible danger of American and allied

25 action in provoking the use of the existing stockpiles of

20

1 weapons of mass destruction against Saudi Arabia, Israel, or

2 other targets. But if that is a danger today, how much more

3 will it be some years from now? This illustrates the

4 complexity of the challenge rather than the obstacle to

5 dealing with it now.

6 Therefore, when the question is asked, why now, I would

7 like to ask the question, why not now? What is the reason for

8 not dealing with it?

9 Global terrorism cannot flourish except with the support

10 of states that either sympathize with it or acquiesce in its

11 actions. To the extent that these countries observe the

12 flouting of United Nations resolutions, the weakening of

13 international norms, and the defiance of America, they feel

14 less restrained in acquiescing or ignoring terrorist

15 activities. For the nations of the world to accept the

16 existence of growing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction

17 in the region where the new form of terrorism has originated

18 is to undermine restraint with respect not only to the weapons

19 proliferation, but to the psychological impulse towards

20 terrorism altogether.

21 In short, the continuation of illegal proliferation, the

22 global dangers which it involves, the rejection or

23 infeasibility of establishing a viable inspection system, and

24 the growth of terrorism require action, preferably by the

25 international community, but as an ultimate resort of America

21

1 together with those countries that will be prepared to support
2 it.

3 It is argued and it has been argued by my friend that
4 dealing with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq weakens the
5 war against terrorism. It is not clear to me what measures
6 that are required in the war against terrorism would be
7 interrupted or weakened by the actions that may be imposed on
8 us if it is not possible to do away with the stockpiles of
9 weapons of mass destruction in Iraq by other means.

10 One can make the opposite argument that by showing our
11 determination to prevent such threats, we will strengthen the
12 war against terrorism.

13 At any rate, my basic point is that the two issues are so
14 closely related that they cannot be separated, and that the
15 attempt to separate them will make it difficult to achieve
16 both. The war against terrorism will take many years.
17 Dealing with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq cannot wait
18 for many years. So one can argue about how many months one
19 can defer action.

20 At the same time, while reserving the option to act in
21 concert with only the nations it can convince, I strongly
22 support the United States' appeal to cooperative action of the
23 world community. As the most powerful nation in the world,
24 the United States has a special unilateral capacity and,
25 indeed, obligation to lead in implementing its convictions.

22

1. But it also has a special obligation to justify its actions by

2. principles that transcend the assertion of preponderant power.

3. It cannot be either in the American national interest or the

4. world's interest to develop principles that grant every nation

5. an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition

6. of threats to its security.

7. The case for enforcement of established resolutions is

8. based on the special danger represented by Iraq in the

9. violations of the United Nations resolutions. It does not

10. require a universal principle. Indeed, I would favor a

11. discussion led by the United States of what principles of

12. preemption are compatible with the operation of an

13. international system, separate from the case of Iraq which

14. does not require such a debate.

15. Secondly, if military action against Iraq is unavoidable,

16. it is important to address the question of reconstruction and

17. the future of the region.

18. Iraq is a country of strategic importance to the

19. equilibrium in the region, and it is composed of a combination

20. of at least three and maybe several more ethnic groups. A

21. federal system to enable these groups to live together without

22. domination and oppression is surely desirable, but how this

23. can be achieved, with what degree of American involvement, is

24. a matter that requires serious thought.

25. And I believe also that when military action proves

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1 necessary, that however many nations may hesitate to support

2 it explicitly, we will find a larger degree of support in

3 inviting them into a program of postwar reconstruction which I

4 believe is in the interest of the region and in the interest

5 of the world.

6 So, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Congress

7 has an opportunity to vindicate a system of international

8 order. I urge you to give the President the authority to

9 enforce the appropriate UN resolutions, together with the

10 world community, if at all possible, in concert with like-

11 minded nations if necessary. Thank you.

12 [The prepared statement of Secretary Kissinger follows:]

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2 With the permission of Senator Helms, we will go 7-

3 minutes rounds. Does that make sense?

4 Senator Helms: Yes, sir. That would be fine.

5 The Chairman: Let me again thank you both.

6 There are a number of questions, as you can tell by the
7 attendance here. I would like to focus on just one aspect,
8 and I apologize for being parochial in the sense of
9 articulating my view.

10 I arrive at the same spot that you both do, which is that
11 it is not a question of if, it is a question of when and how
12 we deal with this problem of Saddam Hussein. I for one think
13 that the distinction made by Dr. Kissinger is a very important
14 one and implied by the comments of Secretary Albright, that we
15 need not yield to a newly and not fully articulated doctrine
16 of preemption to justify action against Saddam Hussein.

17 I am operating on the premise that I am likely to be
18 faced with voting for a resolution that I think is not a good
19 resolution, because I believe that the President will not go
20 alone. I believe there are other nations in the world,
21 whether it is a Kosovo model or a UN model, that we will not
22 be alone. And I am quite confident of that. But I do worry
23 about a resolution that sets a precedent for future
24 Presidents, Democrat and Republican, that they will be able to
25 turn, assuming I am here after November, and say, well, Biden,

25

1 you voted for a resolution that said the following.

2 We all have a resolution in front of us that I think is
3 so broad, and unnecessarily broad, without articulating the
4 rationale for action and a conclusion that I have reached, as
5 a matter of policy, that the President should be in a position
6 to be able to enforce the UN resolutions, preferably with the
7 UN stepping up to the ball, clearly with some outside help,
8 but if need be, reserving the right to enforce them alone.

9 But we have kind of put the cart before the horse here in
10 a sense. The President keeps saying that he has not made a
11 decision about war. I believe him. He said that privately
12 and he said that publicly. Yet, he is asking us for an
13 equivalent of a declaration of war. I cannot think of any
14 time in American history where there has been a resolution
15 sought authorizing the use of force at the discretion of the
16 President against an individual country before the President
17 has come to the American people and us and said, this is what
18 I intend to do. That disturbs me.

19 It further disturbs me that there is no clear
20 articulation as it relates to precedent, based on the
21 administration witnesses, as to what the legal rationale for
22 action is. In the Armed Services Committee, some of the
23 testimony was, as I understand it -- I did not attend at all,
24 but just on the reading of the news excerpts -- that it fits
25 within this doctrine of preemption.

26

I for one would like to see a resolution make it clear that that is not the basis upon which we are giving the President authority, adopting an non-articulated or, I think, poorly articulated doctrine of preemption that warrants the debate Dr. Kissinger refers to, led by the United States, as to whether or not the world should change its attitude.

If I am not mistaken, you have pointed out, Dr. Kissinger, it was back as far as the first half of the 1600s that after the religious wars, we agreed on a modus operandi of how we proceed, as to what constitutes a legitimate action on the part of one nation state moving against another nation state. And to change that blithely is, I think, a very dangerous precedent.

So it leads me, believe it or not, to a question coming from a Senator who is likely to vote for what is probably going to be an imperfect resolution, but because I think the President should be in a position to be able to enforce the UN resolutions.

Now, here is my question. Given the sequence of events that got us to this moment, this hearing, and the primary rationale being offered by the administration at the moment for wanting us to act, the United States Congress, is that it strengthens his hand at the United Nations to get the United Nations to do the thing that they should do, and that is jointly enforce a violation of what effectively are the

27

1 conditions of surrender of a country that invaded another
2 country, lost the war, and agreed to a set of conditions in
3 the wake of that loss, the UN resolutions, and that this would
4 strengthen the President's hand.

5 If that is the case -- and I think it is a legitimate
6 case -- then it seems to me we should be saying to the
7 President in a resolution, Mr. President, we authorize you to
8 act in conjunction with a UN resolution, a Security Council
9 resolution, authorizing force in the absence of Saddam
10 agreeing to unfettered inspection. And if the Security
11 Council does not give you that or if that is granted through
12 the Security Council and Saddam resists, then we authorize
13 you, with some further conditions, to use force independently
14 if need be.

15 Can either of you tell me why that is not a more rational
16 way for us to do this in terms of making two cases? One,
17 giving the President sufficient authority; and two, not
18 leaving the impression around the world and allowing us to be
19 subject to the criticism that comes from many quarters of the
20 world that we are ignoring international law, that we are
21 ignoring the United Nations, that we are acting independently
22 and we are acting without any serious consideration of what
23 the rest of the world thinks.

24 Because nobody that I know suggests we can win the second
25 war -- and I agree they are inseparable, although there is no

28

evidence that al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein were united in their
effort in 9/11, none that I have heard, no matter what is
implied, none that I have heard. We need the cooperation of
the intelligence services from Beijing to Moscow, to Berlin,
to Singapore in order to win that second fight.

So in the waning seconds of my time here, would it not be
a better way to sequence, not condition -- not condition, but
to sequence -- any resolution we have, rather than give a
broad declaration to the President, when you have in the New
York Times today, whether it is true or not, an article saying
that there is a disagreement still within the administration
as to whether or not we want the UN involved and one unnamed
spokesperson saying, all we need is the congressional
declaration and we can go? It does not matter what the UN
does.

Can you speak to that? I realize that is a long
question, but it is fairly basic. Does it make more sense to
sequence, not condition? Or should we just go the other way?

Secretary Albright: If I might, Mr. Chairman. I think
you have asked a key question here because it goes to the
relationship between the role of Congress and our
participation in an international organization.

I have I think the dubious honor on having spent more
time dealing on Iraqi resolutions, both as UN Ambassador and
as Secretary of State, than anybody else. When I went to New

29

1 York first in 1993, we had these resolutions on the table, and
2 we worked very hard to try to get compliance with them through
3 a variety of means, which I will not go through, that you all
4 know. I am the first one to testify to the fact that it gets
5 harder and harder to get coordination and compliance by
6 everybody on the Security Council. It was there initially.
7 It is harder and harder to get. But when you get it, it is a
8 really big deal because it does allow you to have more
9 legitimacy behind the way you operate abroad.

10 Obviously, when you cannot get it, as we did not on
11 Kosovo, we took another route, but at least we could see
12 whether we were trying that particular approach.

13 If I might just say this, when I sat at the UN, I used to
14 sit there and think, in my political science professor mode,
15 that this is the most fascinating thing in the world, that you
16 actually are talking about what is going on inside another
17 country and that you have the right to do that. That is a
18 very different concept that came into existence. And as
19 Secretary Kissinger said, we are in a very different phase
20 where there are non-state actors and you have to look at
21 things in a different way. Nobody is denying the complication
22 of this.

23 But it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that your suggestion
24 makes a great deal of sense. I also know that when I was at
25 the UN and as Secretary, it helps a lot when you have the

30

1 power of Congress behind you. It is a big plus in your

2 pocket. So I think a resolution -- I am not going to get into

3 the wording of it -- makes sense.

4 The Chairman: No, I am not either. Just conceptually.

5 Secretary Albright: But the other thing I must say that

6 bothers me, if I might say this, I think we are loading too

7 much onto this issue. There are many people within or outside

8 the administration that had a different agenda from the very

9 beginning, and I think they are finding this, in some ways, a

10 useful horse.

11 And I think the issue of preemption is a huge issue, and

12 I would definitely agree with Secretary Kissinger that it is

13 worth discussing. It is a huge deal. It is a totally

14 different way of operating. It is one thing for self-

15 defense, and I think that becomes a complicated issue of how

16 quickly do you move when you believe you are being attacked.

17 But I think to load this issue now with a major discussion of

18 change in our whole strategic policy is a mistake, and I think

19 we need to deal with this issue as you have presented it, and

20 as I have heard the discussion. But we do not need to load it

21 with ideological issues that had nothing to do with this in

22 the first place.

23 The Chairman: Dr. Kissinger.

24 Secretary Kissinger: When the President spoke at the

25 General Assembly, he did not base the case on a general

31

1 doctrine of preemption. He based the case on the violations

2 by Iraq of a whole series of UN resolutions and agreements to

3 the Gulf War.

4 The Chairman: I agree.

5 Secretary Kissinger: So, therefore, the issue of

6 preemption is inherent in the terrorist challenge because you

7 have non-state actors operating from the territory of states

8 in pursuit of objectives that go beyond national borders.

9 It is not an issue, however, that needs to be settled
10 theoretically now. In order to justify action against Iraq,
11 it is sufficient to examine the behavior of Iraq and the
12 violation of its undertakings and of UN resolutions.

13 Secondly, in order to establish a relationship between
14 terrorism and violations of UN resolutions in Iraq, it is not
15 necessary to prove a specific connection between al Qaeda and
16 Iraq. It is sufficient to point out that one of the motives
17 of the terrorist groups is they believe that the will of the
18 West and of the United States is flagging, that they can
19 assert their claims by a ruthless demonstration of power. And
20 to the extent that a country that is surrounded by nations
21 that are acquiescing in or helping terrorism explicitly, it is
22 getting away with a violation of the international system. To
23 that extent, the psychological support for terrorism will
24 grow.

25 So the reason why I believe that the two issues cannot be

32

separated is that psychological and geopolitical connection

and why I believe that action on the violation of the UN

resolutions is a part of the war against terrorism,

independent of whether al Qaeda had connections in Baghdad, of

which I have no personal knowledge.

I would also think that the newspapers tend to emphasize

whatever disagreements may exist at middle and at lower

levels. My impression is -- and the Secretary of State will,

undoubtedly, express himself more convincingly on this than I

can -- that on the basic principles we are discussing here,

the administration is united and that the basic principles

that we are discussing here are in the fundamental national

interest.

Senator Helms.

Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, I would like to have a give

and take between these two distinguished Americans. Do you

agree with Secretary Kissinger, Ma'am?

Secretary Albright: Well, I agree with part of what he

has said. I think that there certainly is the question, the

way he has redefined it, on preemption that makes sense to me,

that it is important to have a discussion about it, but not

apply it to this, and that there are, in fact, legitimate

resolutions that are already in place.

I have a disagreement, somewhat, not in the fact that

33

1 what is going on in Iraq is terrorism and that it links to
2 terrorism generally, but that I am concerned about the timing
3 on this because, as Chairman Biden said, there are certain
4 aspects of the war against terrorism that require cooperation,
5 even among countries that we do not particularly agree with,
6 on intelligence, on tracking the money of al Qaeda and Osama
7 bin Laden, and on law enforcement when the people come into
8 their various territories. And I think this is not the time
9 to disrupt that.

10 I think one of the things -- actually Henry and I have
talked about this a lot -- we do talk to each other. And by
12 the way, may I say the only time that there was not
13 disagreement between the State Department and the White House
14 was when Henry Kissinger was both National Security Advisor
15 and Secretary of State.

16 [Laughter.]

17 Secretary Albright: Otherwise, it is hard wired.

18 But I think that there is this question about what is the
19 right timing on this. What you pointed out, Henry, is that
20 having unsheathed the sword here, if we in fact do not use it
21 immediately, do we lose credibility? I do not think so
22 because I hope very much that we would continue to be robust
23 in our fighting of terrorism in Afghanistan, where I pointed
24 out we have not finished, and also make clear what we believe
25 in. So I hope we are not in this position, having threatened,

34

1 that we cannot take a measured approach to what we are doing.

2 Secretary Kissinger: Could I make two points?

3 Senator Helms: Yes, sir.

4 Secretary Kissinger: The first is when one talks about
timing, when is a better time to deal with Iraq than at this
5 moment when the major nations of the Security Council are not
6 in open opposition to us and can be brought along? But above
7 all, the war against terrorism will take many years, and the
8 decision one has to make is whether one waits and permits the
9 growth of stockpiles for many more years and then addresses
10 the issue of Iraq under quite different international
11 circumstances.
12

13 The second point is when nations help us or help in the
14 fight against terrorism, they are not helping us; they are
15 helping themselves. Russia has a major interest in not
16 permitting fundamentalism to become a dominant force in the
17 Muslim world. And the war against terrorism must be conducted
18 on the basis that the participants in it have a common
19 interest and must not be looked at as if it is a special
20 challenge to the United States. Therefore, to the extent that
21 other nations believe in the importance of a strong America,
22 they will not stop cooperating with us on something that is so
23 much in their own interest because we are enforcing UN
24 resolutions.

25 But I do believe that we must go through a process that

35

1 is now underway which will make clear what support we can
2 generate and what coalitions we can create. And I am sure the
3 Secretary of State will talk about this this afternoon.

4 Secretary Albright: I think that I do not believe, nor
5 did I say, that the war on terrorism would have to be
6 finished. First of all, I think it will not be finished for a
7 long time. It is unfortunately what we have to live with for
8 most of our lives and our children's lives. So there can be
9 no termination to our effort on it.

10 But I think that we are in a crucial phase as far as
11 finishing the job in Afghanistan. Just to use an image here,
12 I think that we do have Saddam in a box, a strategic box. We
13 do not know a lot about it, but I have a feeling that if we
14 blow up the box, that as the sparks fly out, they will have an
15 effect already on a region that is inflamed and we cannot
16 forget what is happening or not happening in the Middle East.

17 So I actually think we are probably not as far apart as
18 might seem. It is a matter of timing and our favorite
19 diplomatic word, "nuance," in terms of when we do things. I
20 agree with Henry that we cannot persuade other countries to
21 think that fighting the war on terrorism is only in our
22 benefit. It has to be in their benefit also, obviously.

23 But I think it is just unnecessary to do this this
24 moment, and what I am advocating is that we play out the UN
25 string with the support of Congress in the pocket of the

36

1 President and the Ambassador, and we will have a better chance
2 of getting support by the other countries if it is evident to
3 everybody that the Iraqis stiffed us. And that is where my
timing comes in.

5 Senator Helms: Do you have any further comment?

6 Secretary Kissinger: It really is a question of whether
7 we are talking about a few months or a few years. The
8 process, as it now seems to evolve, seems to me to require
9 some months of clarification and that seems to me also
10 perfectly consistent with what the administration is doing and
11 saying. So I do not think there is a fundamental difference,
12 if that is what we are talking about.

13 The Chairman: You are both talking about a few months,
14 are you not, as opposed to a few years?

15 Secretary Kissinger: Then there is no difference.

16 Senator Helms: What was your answer to his question?

17 The Chairman: I said you are both talking about a few
18 months, and your response was, yes, if that's the case, there
19 is no difference. Right? Is that correct?

20 Secretary Kissinger: I am talking of a few months.

21 The Chairman: And I understand, Madam Secretary, you are
talking months, not years.

23 Secretary Albright: Correct, but I think that we have to
24 run out the string.

25 The Chairman: No, I understand.

37

1 Secretary Albright: And may I just say this. The

2 inspectors have to get in. They have to have a chance to work

3 it, et cetera.

4 Secretary Kissinger: May I say something about that?

5 The Chairman: Sure.

6 Secretary Kissinger: I think before inspectors go in or

7 as inspectors go in, we require for ourselves some definition

8 of what is considered an adequate inspection system.

9 The Chairman: Absolutely.

10 Secretary Kissinger: The previous inspection system was

11 clearly unworkable. My understanding is that an inspection

12 system needs to have some assurance that inspectors can talk

13 to potential informants without interference from local

14 authorities. I do not know how you bring this about, but

15 those concerns need to be answered because one knows that the

16 previous inspection system has not worked. One must not

17 permit the word "inspection" to be used as a subterfuge for

18 endless procrastination. One must tie inspection to a system

19 that gives a major assurance that we will not see a repetition

20 of what we went through for the last 10 years.

21 Secretary Albright: You have given us unusual leeway,

22 and I do not want to take advantage of it. But I think the

23 timing also depends on whether we hear from the administration

24 what a day-after plan looks like. It is the getting the

25 inspectors in and going through that string, but I think it is

38

1 irresponsible to go in without knowing a little bit more than
2 at least I know about what their plans are afterwards. So for
3 me the timing depends a lot on the information that comes out
4 on the UN string, and on what very detailed plans are -- not
5 on the military side, because that is not my job and never
6 was, but more on the process of not leaving a vacuum there.

7 The Chairman: Senator Sarbanes.

8 Senator Sarbanes: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

9 Secretary Kissinger, is it your position the war against
10 Iraq is necessary and inevitable?

11 Secretary Kissinger: My position is that military action
12 to enforce the UN resolutions is necessary if they cannot be
13 implemented any other way. And I think it is likely.

14 Senator Sarbanes: Therefore, should we move to military
15 action?

16 Secretary Kissinger: We should not move to military
17 action until we have run out the string on the diplomatic
18 process that is now underway.

19 Senator Sarbanes: Is there a peaceful path by which this
20 matter can be solved?

21 Secretary Kissinger: I have difficulty visualizing how
22 an inspection system can operate while Saddam Hussein is in
23 unimpaired power. So it would require I believe some
24 political changes in Iraq. But I would be open-minded if
25 somebody could produce an inspection system that can operate.

39

1 I do not think the issue should be defined in terms of
2 who is for war and who is against war.

3 Senator Sarbanes: Well, that is a pretty fundamental
4 question, is it not, whether we are going to go to war or not
5 or whether there is a peaceful path? I take it your position
6 is you do not think there is a peaceful path. You just sort
7 of dismissed the inspection path. So if we do that, what is
8 left? War.

9 Secretary Kissinger: No, no. I think there is a
10 peaceful path.

11 Senator Sarbanes: Well, what is that peaceful path?

12 Secretary Kissinger: Theoretically if the UN passes a
13 strong resolution and if an inspection system is devised that
14 meets the objectives of the UN resolution, it is theoretically
15 possible that they will agree to this, and under those
16 conditions I think that would be a peaceful solution. I think
17 it is unlikely that this will happen, but that is a judgment,
18 not a course of action. I think we should run out the
19 diplomatic string.

20 Senator Sarbanes: Well, because you think it might work
21 or just as a matter of appearance?

22 Secretary Kissinger: Not as a matter of appearance. I
23 would like it to work. I think it is unlikely to work, but I
24 would be delighted if it worked.

25 Senator Sarbanes: You say in your statement that we have

40

1 to entertain a program of reconstruction for Iraq.

2 Secretary Kissinger: Are you talking to me?

3 Senator Sarbanes: Yes, and that is on page 5 of your

4 statement.

5 Secretary Kissinger: Right.

6 Senator Sarbanes: What do you think about the program of

7 reconstruction in Afghanistan?

8 Secretary Kissinger: Afghanistan is a notoriously

9 difficult country for foreigners to reconstruct or to deal
10 with. I strongly favor economic aid to Afghanistan.

11 Senator Sarbanes: Do you think we are paying adequate
12 attention to the question of reconstruction in Afghanistan?

13 You argue here in Iraq, we are going to go in, and then we are
going to do a major reconstruction program in order, in
effect, to deal with the aftermath. What about the
reconstruction program in Afghanistan? If we are going to
look at say, well, what kind of reconstruction program would
we do, how committed have we remained in Afghanistan in order
to reconstruction?

20 Secretary Kissinger: It depends on how you define
21 reconstruction.

22 First about Iraq. I believe reconstruction in Iraq
23 should be undertaken not just by the United States, but by an
international consortium, international community, and a group
of major interested countries.

41

1 I believe something like that should be done in
2 Afghanistan, too, but Afghanistan has the additional
3 difficulty that the country is run by a group of warlords
4 whose subjugation is a major military effort and in the past
5 has produced a situation in which the warlords, who normally
6 fight each other, unite against the foreigner who is trying to
7 curb their power. So I would be uneasy about a major military
8 effort to pacify the whole country, but anything that we can
9 do with a reasonable military effort and a significant
10 economic effort, together with other nations, I would favor.
11 But I do have a question in Afghanistan which would not arise
12 to the same extent in Iraq.

13 Senator Sarbanes: Is the effort underway in Afghanistan
14 for reconstruction up to the standard that you think it should
15 be? Are we falling short, perhaps woefully short, in
16 Afghanistan? There are some who think we are risking turning
17 a success into a failure by not following up on the
18 reconstruction.

19 Secretary Kissinger: The first thing one has to
20 consider, Senator, is if on September 10th, 2001, somebody had
21 said we are going to have an expeditionary force in
22 Afghanistan, we are going to overthrow the Taliban, we are
23 going to operate all over the Middle East, and we will do all
24 of this within 6 weeks, that would have been considered
25 incredible. So considering that the magnitude of the

42

1 challenge that we have faced and the unusual cast of thinking

2 that is required in terms of American tradition, I think we

3 have done well in Afghanistan. As things continue --

4 Senator Sarbanes: You think at this point that our
5 reconstruction effort is adequate and meets the standard? You
6 do not think we should be doing more?

7 Secretary Kissinger: I think we have done the best that
8 could be done under present circumstances. As time goes on,
9 we will probably want to strengthen the reconstruction effort.

10 Senator Sarbanes: Could I hear from Secretary Albright
11 on these points?

12 Secretary Albright: I disagree. I think that we have
13 done a halfway job in Afghanistan and we need to keep our
14 attention on it. I know that I certainly have met with some
15 Afghan officials, and they are grateful to us, but they
16 understand that there is a lot more to do and that there is
17 reconstitution there potentially of some al Qaeda groupings,
18 and Pakistan continues to be a haven for some of these issues.
19 So I think it is very hard. We have not finished the job and
20 this concerns me.

21 And I might say that I think we have to deal with
22 something very serious here. The issue of Afghanistan is as a
23 result of unintended consequences of previous foreign policy
24 decisions, and I think we have to be very careful about the
25 unintended consequences of whatever decision we make on Iraq.

43

1 And Iraq at the moment, as I have said, I think is in a

2 strategic box. We need to be careful about blowing it up and

3 seeing what the problems are.

4 And to answer your previous question, I do think there is

5 a possibility here that there could be some working of the

6 issue if in fact the international community is mobilized. We

7 did it once, and the problem was that it dissipated over the

8 years. We do continue to bomb. We have authority to do that.

9 And I think we have got to be careful about making this a war
10 versus the fact that 40 percent of Iraq is already under a no-

11 fly zone. So it is a matter of enforcing issues and giving

12 strength to the United Nations resolution, that maybe the

13 threat of this will, in fact, make it possible to have a

14 different solution.

15 Senator Sarbanes: Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, and
16 I appreciate it. I hope we will have a second round because I

17 want to address this issue.

18 The Chairman: We will. I realize I am frustrating my
19 colleagues at the end here on both ends, but I am going to let
20 the witnesses go on, otherwise I will go to a 15-minute rule
21 for each Senator.

22 Senator Sarbanes: I just want to say I do want to come

23 back to the preemption issue. I see Secretary Kissinger has

24 put Yemen, Somalia, Indonesia, and Iran on the agenda here,

25 and I want to explore that with him.

44

1 The Chairman: Senator Lugar.

2 Senator Lugar: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 Dr. Kissinger in his testimony says the United Nations
4 is, therefore, challenged to come up with a control system
5 that eliminates the existing weapons of mass destruction in
6 Iraq, together with procedures to prevent their being rebuilt.

7 This follows his discussion of the violation by Iraq of United
8 Nations resolutions dealing with weapons of mass destruction.

9 And certainly he is right. This is at the heart of our
10 problem, but it is obviously very difficult to think through
11 how the United Nations is going to have this ability under
12 current conditions or even with Hans Blix and inspectors going
13 back in. This does not negate the discussion we have had of
14 timing, but it is at the heart of the matter. How in the
15 world do you ever find weapons of mass destruction and then,
16 as Dr. Kissinger said, have a control system not only that
17 destroys them but that makes sure that no one ever rebuilds
18 them? That is a degree of invasion of sovereignty that is
19 very substantial.

20 Secretary Albright mentions it is naive to think that a
21 peaceful and democratic Iraq will automatically emerge in the
22 ashes of our invasion. It is crazy to believe, she says, we
23 can run postwar Iraq alone. It is essential that the
24 administration think of the consequence of all this through in
25 advance. But she says, which it has not yet done.

45

1. Now that is at the heart of our dilemma. There is a big
2. dilemma as to whether we ought to have war and peace. But I
3. think as the Chairman has said, we are heading toward a
4. resolution, a very imperfect one, in which many Senators may
5. vote in favor of authorizing our President to have this
6. authority so that he has some bargaining ability with the rest
7. of the world.

8. But the consequences of this are if, Secretary Albright,
9. this is true and she is saying that, in essence, they have not
10. done this yet -- and I have certainly not heard any discussion
11. whatever of Secretary Kissinger's thought about how the United
12. Nations or anyone else comes up with a control system. We
13. need to hear about this rapidly.

14. And the Chairman and I, about 5 o'clock last night, were
15. having a dialogue between the two of us, and Mr. McFarlane who
16. was left as a survivor at the witness table at that point,
17. essentially saying we are trying to send messages. We are
18. asking somebody. Now, this afternoon we will have our
19. Secretary of State, and we will ask him. Is there a plan? Do
20. we have any idea what we plan to do in Iraq after we win the
21. war? How do we stop the fragmentation of this box that
22. Secretary Albright has talked about?

23. All the testimony we have had from the Iraqis who came
24. before us before was simply to confirm it is a very complex
25. country with many nationalities and divisive groups, Iran

46

1 coming in from one area, Turkey from another. This is very

2 tough business right now.

3 The Chairman: If the Senator will yield. And every one
4 of those witnesses said the United States has to be the one to
5 manage this.

6 Senator Lugar: Yes, so we come back to that. Now, maybe
7 the United Nations.

8 And you are probably both right. We ought to try to make
9 sure there are a lot of other helpers to help pay for this as
10 well as sustain it for a period of time.

11 But let us take the worst case scenario. It is us. Do
12 we have any idea, any plan for how to bring about peace in
13 Iraq, the territorial integrity, peace with the neighbors, to
14 get the weapons of mass destruction?

15 Now, maybe somebody in the administration does. Maybe
16 even as we speak there are people who will come and say, we
17 have thought of those things. We have not told you about them
18 and they are highly classified. That would be reassuring.

19 But I simply use this opportunity to ask either of you.
20 You do not know what the administration is doing, but
21 Secretary Albright, what would you do? How would we begin to
22 think through the situation at the end of the war in the worst
23 case scenario that we are there? Now, you said we enlist
24 other people. We try to do that. But what are the elements
25 of a plan for a post-war Iraq?

47

Secretary Albright: Well, first of all, I think that we
do have to recognize, while I agree with Henry that
Afghanistan is full of warlords and a real problem, Iraq is
not exactly a unified place. And everything that we have ever
heard is that it is a country that was created by outside
powers that put together at least three groups, the Kurds, the
Shiites, and the Sunnis. And that is the least of it. So the
integrity of the country is an issue.

I met previously many, many times with the Iraqi
opposition, and as somebody whose father was part of an exile
movement, I applaud those people, but I also know how
difficult it is. Everybody has a different view, and believe
me, the Czechoslovak exile movement had nothing in common with
the Iraqi one.

So I think that there are very many different kinds of
groupings. When I met with them, they all had a different
idea about what to do. And I think the first thing that has
to happen is to try to bring them together in some particular
way.

The reason that I also believe that it is essential to
get more international support is while it has not been
perfect, Bosnia and Kosovo have, in fact, provided a model of
what happens with you work with an international organization
in terms of getting a high representative and various
countries participating in not only the reconstruction, but

48

1 the modeling of local elections, et cetera. We cannot do that

2 alone. So that is one of the reasons I think it is important

3 to have UN support because it does provide some kind of model.

4 That is a beginning.

5 But I was plagued always whenever I suggested using

6 force -- and I did -- with what is the exit strategy. As far

7 as I have heard, none. And I do think that the

8 administration, while there is no way they can give us all the

9 details on this -- I think that is impossible -- they do need

10 to give us a better blueprint for what is out there after the

11 day after.

12 Senator Lugar: Secretary Kissinger, do you have any idea

13 as to how the control situation might work with regard to the

14 nuclear weapons, how we would get to something that is

15 satisfying?

16 Secretary Kissinger: I think this is a question that

17 should be addressed to the Secretary of State.

18 At some point in this process, we have to make clear what

19 we would consider an adequate inspection system or, at least,

20 what we do not consider an adequate inspection system.

21 Otherwise, there will be no criteria on which to base our

22 actions. I have put down here some general ideas, but I have

23 not studied in detail what you would require.

24 At the same time, I want to warn against the danger of

25 using the imperfection of any solution that you can offer as

49

1 an argument for doing nothing. And where we are now, we are
2 faced with the choice of will there be an enforcement of the
3 UN resolutions or will these stockpiles continue to grow. I
4 think the danger of acquiescing is greater than some of the
5 concerns that have been raised, but I do think we have to
6 answer this.

7 Now, about a post-war Iraq and its political
8 organization, that requires really a lot of thinking because
9 it is easy to say you have a democratic government. The
10 question is how quickly can you create this and what are the
11 interim arrangements that have to be made. And one has to
12 keep in mind that there will be great temptations on the part
13 of Iran to wreck any political structure in order to shift the
14 balance of power in the region, and there will be other
15 neighboring claimants. So this is not a vacuum in which one
16 can operate politically with an unlimited time span. This is
17 an issue that has to be dealt with.

18 Senator Lugar: Mr. Chairman, I would just add yesterday
19 one of our witnesses suggested, as Dr. Kissinger has, we may
20 not have the perfect solutions and that should not defeat
21 action. But the administration ought to report to the
22 Congress at least every 30 days on how it was going. In other
23 words, if you are still trying to perfect the solutions, that
24 one resolution to go to war ought not to suffice for the next
25 8 years, given all the ramifications that we are discussing

50

1 that would follow.

2 Secretary Kissinger: Also the power of improving what

3 exists now is not too high. We do not have to achieve

4 perfection to have the people of Iraq live under better

5 conditions than they live now.

6 The Chairman: The interim solution will be a MacArthur

7 in Baghdad.

8 Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent

9 that a letter relevant to what we are discussing right now

10 from the State Department be printed in the record.

11 The Chairman: Without objection, it will be placed in

12 the record.

13 [The information referred to follows:]

14 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

51

1 The Chairman: Senator Feingold.

2 Senator Feingold: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly

3 appreciate Senator Lugar's line of questioning.

4 To get some initial answers about some of these basic
5 questions about the day after is not to suggest that any of us
6 are in a do-nothing posture. The administration is passionate
7 about regime change in Iraq, and I subscribe to a policy that
8 supports regime change by reasonable means. It does not mean
9 I will sign off on any proposal aimed at that end. I cannot
10 imagine any American would not support the overall goal.

11 Saddam Hussein's rule has been brutally violent.

12 So I guess I would like to just assume, in terms of my
13 questions, that a military operation has been successful in
14 toppling Saddam Hussein, and I would like to see if we could
15 get you to at least speculate on a couple of specific points,
16 following on Senator Lugar's question.

17 The Iraqi people have suffered terribly from years of
18 deprivation. Of course, they have been consistently told that
19 it is American support for sanctions that is responsible for
20 their plight.

21 If widespread civil conflict breaks out in the wake of
22 military action, a significant military presence, obviously,
23 might be required for some time, particularly given the
24 reality of weapons of mass destruction in the country. What
25 kind of reaction can we expect from the Iraqi people if the

52

1 U.S. moves to invade and then for some period of time has to
2 occupy the country? Secretary Albright?

3 Secretary Albright: I have to tell you frankly we do not
4 know because we have been told that there are many people who
5 would welcome us with open arms on the assumption that they
6 have lived under the terrible boot of a dictator and that they
7 know that he is responsible for this and that the United
8 States is not. But in our lives I think we have all dealt
9 with people who have been heavily propagandized for a number
10 of years, and they have, as you have said, Senator, been
11 basically told that the sanctions are the fault of the United
12 States. Some of them will definitely not be pleased to see us
13 there.

14 Plus, I think as I said in my testimony, Baghdad is a
15 very special place to the Islamic religion, and the question
16 is how others would react to a United States occupation of
17 that country.

18 Then there is the whole issue of the divisions within
19 Iraq itself.

20 I think we all need to ask these kinds of questions so
21 that the people at the State Department who are working on
22 this know. What would we do if a civil war developed in Iraq
23 between the Sunnis and the Shi'as, or what if the Kurds take a
24 different position vis-a-vis each other? They are not also
25 totally united. So I think these are the kinds of questions

53

1 that have to go down.

2 But we cannot assume that this is like liberating central

3 Europe after Hitler. This is a different situation, and so we

4 have to look at that very carefully.

5 Senator Feingold: Let me follow that. Then I want to

6 hear Dr. Kissinger's remarks. Can you say anything more

7 specifically about what kind of threat conditions our U.S.

8 soldiers might be facing for months on end and what we could

9 do to reduce the threat? I wonder if you would follow with

10 that, Secretary Albright.

11 Secretary Albright: I think, again, this is something we

12 do not know because it depends if it is the Republican Guard

13 or the people that have been very close to Saddam Hussein --

14 if we are in Baghdad with hand-to-hand fighting from block to

15 block, I think there would be a threat. And I think that the

16 number of forces that will have to stay there and should to

17 protect our own forces as a result of our own experiences in

18 this, we would have to assume that there would be a threat to

19 our military. Whether it exists or not, we cannot take the

20 chance of sending them in without assuming that there would

21 be.

22 Senator Feingold: Dr. Kissinger.

23 Secretary Kissinger: First, as to the political outcome

24 in Iraq, I do not pretend to be an expert on the Iraqi

25 conditions. I think a lot of it depends on what kind of

[tc]

54

1 outcome there is. It is conceivable to me that if the United
2 Nations takes a firm stand and if this country is united in
3 its general direction, as I believe it will be and is, that
4 then Saddam may do what Milosevic did after Kosovo, to accept
5 some kind of an agreement that in fact undermines his rule
6 and, after some interval, he will be removed. It is not very
7 likely, but it is not totally inconceivable.

8 It is more conceivable but still not very probable that
9 some of the military people in Iraq will decide that they have
gone about as far as they can and to fight a suicidal war is
10 senseless and that we will find that Saddam is removed. In
11 that case we have the problem of negotiating with a de facto
12 government, and then the question of coming up with an
13 inspection system that has real teeth would be very relevant,
14 but the need of governing itself in Iraq would be less.

16 From the point of view of post-war reconstruction, the
17 most complex situation is one in which there is military
18 action leading to the disintegration of all authority in Iraq
19 and the need to reestablish authority as was the case in the
20 occupation of Germany and, to some extent, of Japan. That
21 would be an extraordinarily complicated case.

22 I am opposed to a prolonged occupation of a Muslim
23 country in the heart of the Muslim world by western nations
24 who proclaim the right to reeducate that country. That seems
25 to me a very difficult undertaking, and therefore I would

55

1 believe that that should be turned over to some kind of an

2 international group that can be formed in which we would have

3 a very major role. Therefore, it is very difficult to talk

4 about this in the abstract.

12 of mass destruction.

24 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

56

18 Hussein.

25 you heard some of that.

57

1 I want to go back to the destabilization issue in a
2 moment and would like very much to hear from each of you on a
3 particular question I will ask on that.

4 But before I do, Secretary Albright, you are the most
5 recent Secretary of State who has had to deal with this issue.
6 You were Secretary of State in the first 2 years after Saddam
7 Hussein kicked the UN inspectors out. What did your
8 administration learn that you could share with this committee
9 on how we should be dealing with Saddam Hussein and this issue
10 today, the debate that is going on today?

11 For example, did your administration ever closely examine
12 or pursue tightening those resolutions or forcing those
13 resolutions at the UN and looking seriously at a military
14 option, to go through maybe what President Bush is going
15 through now, realizing that you did not have the force of
16 September 11th? You did not have the mobilization of the
17 country, the world, the Congress behind you on that. But is
18 there anything that you can share with this committee with the
19 experience you had most recently that might give us some
20 assistance here as we grapple with this great debate of our
21 time?

22 Because I am one who believes that we are not talking
23 about just going to war with Iraq. You both have talked about
24 preemption, about doctrines, about the future, of what this
25 will do to balance of power and geopolitical strategic

58

1 interests, economic interests. We are talking about an awful
2 lot here. Your point, Madam Secretary, about overloading the
3 structure and the system, I generally happen to agree with
4 that.

5 But not to get off into that tangent, I would like to
6 stay on focus on asking you to answer the question and then I
7 would come back to a more particular question I have for each
8 of you. Thank you.

9 Secretary Albright: I, unfortunately, do have more
10 experience with this than most, and I think we have to keep in
11 mind the following, that we did try very hard to keep a
12 consensus in the United Nations. There began to be what we
13 called sanctions fatigue. As we know, certain of our friends
14 and allies had a different idea. But we, for a long time,
15 kept a completely unanimous Security Council to enforce the
16 resolutions, but ultimately it was very hard I think to keep
17 everybody in line.

18 We began to think about very much the kind of thing that
19 Secretary Powell came forward with at the beginning of the
20 administration, which were the smart sanctions which was
21 trying to limit and tighten the box on the regime and not to
22 punish the people because one of the things that was happening
23 was we were losing support because there was increasing -- I
24 would actually not have agreed with this -- propaganda,
25 basically that it was our fault that the people were