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November 6, 1968

[LC]

MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON
ON UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CHINA

DEC 1 6 1988

As scholars in the field of East Asian studies who have completed a year of private discussions of America's relations with East Asia under the auspices of the Institute of Politics of Harvard's J.F. Kennedy School of Government, we write to give you our thoughts on the pivotal issue of United States relations with China.

United States Objectives

The past two decades of American-East Asian relations have been dominated by the central reality of Sino-American hostility and deadlock. It seems evident that, whatever the nature or timing of a Vietnam settlement, the China problem will continue to dominate our East Asian relations in the years of the new Administration and, indeed, through the decade of the 1970's.

Communist China's size, ideology, relative isolation, potential power and current internal upheaval increase the dangers of instability in a chronically unstable part of the world. The central objective of America's China policy has been and should continue to be to avoid war with China and to minimize its disruption of surrounding areas.

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Since the end of the Korean War, previous Administrations have generally followed a two-fold policy to achieve these objectives: on the one hand, military containment in order to deter possible Chinese aggression; on the other hand, a limited and tentative effort at communication with the China mainland through ambassadorial talks and, from time to time, proposals for unofficial contacts. Through much of this period, of course, the first of these approaches has been given such priority as to dwarf the significance of the second.

It seems to us that the time has come for a more equal balance between these two approaches, so that, while continuing to avoid war with China and to discourage Chinese military intervention abroad, we move more positively toward the relaxation of tensions between China and the United States, and the eventual achievement of reconciliation.

The specific steps we propose below in pursuit of these objectives require some important words of caution. Although the outcome of the domestic turmoil that has disrupted mainland China for the past three years remains unclear, we do not now anticipate any Chinese desire to improve relations with the United States. It is therefore highly likely that any and all of the initiatives that we propose will be rejected out of hand by Beijing's leaders in the foreseeable future.

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We propose these initiatives, nonetheless, because of our conviction that our national interests in Asia will best be served by an American policy that offers the Chinese the clear option of a less hostile relationship with the outside world. At a minimum, we will complicate a Peking decision-making process that has all too easily been based on a theory of implacable American hostility; at the same time, we will be speaking--through our deeds as well as our words--to present or future Chinese leaders who harbor doubts about Mao Tse-tung's vision of the world. Unless we achieve this better balanced policy, we may at the least miss significant opportunities to moderate Peking's behavior and, at the worst, may help lay the groundwork for a war with China that neither side can hope to "win."

## Proposals

### A. Relations with Mainland China

#### 1. Exploratory Meeting

You should seriously explore the possibility of arranging confidential--perhaps even deniable--conversations between Chinese Communist leaders and someone in whom you have confidence. Your emissary would convey the new Administration's interest in hearing Chinese views on a wide spectrum of subjects including Vietnam and disarmament and in probing,

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unofficially and in a more informal setting than at Warsaw,
the prospects for a normal relationship. It may well be
that the Chinese will refuse to receive such an emissary;
the effort should nonetheless be made to signal a revised
American attitude.

## 2. <u>Vietnam Negotiations</u>

The arduous process of a Vietnam settlement may well
offer an opportunity for the improvement of relations with
China and engagement of China in the international order.
Despite China's present hostility to a negotiated solution,
the new Administration should be alert to opportunities to
involve Peking in some stage of the Vietnam negotiating
process--perhaps through the re-convening of the Geneva
Conference, perhaps through a restructured forum, perhaps
through a packaged end-product that would bring China, both
Vietnams, and other divided nations into the United Nations.
The chief consideration: Vietnam negotiations should be
looked upon as a possible step toward a wider Asian settlement,
and, thereby, an instrument for the potential inclusion of
China in the international community.

## 3. <u>Lowering of Polemics</u>

It is essential that all Administration spokesmen
refrain from provocative statements in their comments about

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China, regardless of Peking's hostile rhetoric. In the past, pious hopes for "reconciliation" have often been undermined by press releases such as those that compared the Chinese Communists to the Nazis. Especially galling to the Chinese Communists is the apparent American stand that Taiwan is the only China. The new Administration should find an early opportunity to erase this lag between rhetoric and reality. Since 1955, under two parties and three Presidents, the U.S. Government has dealt, in Geneva and Warsaw and in Taipei, with two regimes that call themselves "China." It would be most useful for you or your Secretary of State to find an occasion to take note of the fact--without fanfare--that we have in effect accorded Peking _de facto_ recognition for a decade and a half, but that _de jure_ recognition is obviously a far more complicated matter that remains to be discussed.

4. Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)

The new Administration will have to decide whether to continue with the recently authorized "thin" ABM system. In our view, insufficient consideration has been given by the present Administration to the consequences for Sino-American relations that this system may entail. Aside from questions of the Soviet-American military balance, present plans for an ABM are not only militarily unnecessary as a

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deterrent to Peking but may well be viewed by the Chinese
Communists as evidence of American intent to attack China.
We urge that the ABM decision be reconsidered.

5. <u>Trade</u>

The new Administration should seek an early opportunity
to modify America's trade embargo against China, a residue
of the Korean War which denies China nothing she needs, is
supported by none of our major allies, acts as periodic
irritant in our relations with third parties, denies America
even the possibility of marginal economic leverage in a
changing China, and prevents our businessmen from sharing
in the China market. In this regard, the new Administration
should build on the tentative rhetoric of its predecessors
and place our trade with China on the same basis (non-strategic
goods) as our trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe.

6. <u>Travel and Other Contacts</u>

The new Administration should likewise remove the
last vestiges of controls on the travel of Americans to China
and, at the same time, should make known its willingness to
admit as visitors to the U.S. any Chinese the Peking government
is willing to send to our shores. These steps will not only
reflect the confidence and strength of a free society; they
will open the door to the possibility of de-isolation when

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some future Chinese leadership is ready to choose that option.
In addition to official contacts, the new Administration should
encourage private and unofficial meetings between Chinese and
American journalists, educators, scientists, artists, and
others.

B. <u>Relations with Taiwan</u>

The foregoing steps involve preliminary attempts to
restructure the Washington-Peking relationship. Simultaneous
with such steps should come, inevitably, a restructuring of
the Washington-Taipei relationship. Here again the aim
should be to bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality.
The United States recognizes the Chinese Nationalists as
the Government of the Republic of China, purporting to rule
the mainland as well as Taiwan and the Pescadores; but
Washington has long since begun to treat them as a government
restricted to Taiwan and the Pescadores, tacitly accepting
the fact that the Nationalists will not reconquer the mainland.
Ever since 1951 every Administration has made it clear that
Taiwan is not legally part of China, leaving the question of
its status open to future developments. The new Administration
should now build upon this reality. It should reaffirm America's
commitment to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, so
long as people in Taiwan wish to retain a separate identity
from mainland China. But by taking four particular steps
it should anticipate and defuse Chinese Nationalist potential.

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for causing Washington embarrassment:

1. Your Administration should send as Ambassador to Taiwan a man who understands the Administration's broad China strategy and can communicate it. In order to demonstrate the importance that you attach to political rather than military considerations, he should not be a military man.

2. As long as relative peace prevails in the Formosa Strait, the Administration should use this opportunity to press anew for orderly Nationalist evacuation of the offshore islands, Matsu and Quemoy. (While occupied by the Nationalists, these islands provide a lever by which either "China" can draw American forces into an unwanted Asian conflict.) It should also press for an end to provocative Nationalist acts against the mainland.

3. The Administration should prepare the ground, in frank discussions with the Chinese Nationalists, for a gradual shift in America's relationship with Peking and, specifically, for the complex problems which will undoubtedly arise in the United Nations (see below).

4. Finally, the Administration should be alert to political forces that are at work beneath the surface in Taiwan and, when opportunity offers, should press Chiang Kai-shek and/or his successors to offer the eleven million Taiwanese and the two million mainlanders on the island an opportunity for fuller participation in political life.

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C. **Broader Problems**

1. The United Nations

The problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations will probably not confront the new Administration until the autumn of 1969. By that time the search for a Vietnam settlement as well as earlier China-related initiatives may have tested the prospects for normalization of relations. In the unlikely event that these previous steps have borne fruit in our relations with China, the UN situation would present a smaller problem. If not, however, it is nonetheless our conviction that the Administration should not seek to block the PRC's representation in the United Nations. For several obvious reasons, UN representation for Peking will undoubtedly come before--and is probably a prerequisite to--improved relations between China and America. In our view, the de-isolation of China requires Chinese participation, whenever possible, in international forums and the long-term "socialization" that such contacts may produce. U.S. policy-makers should therefore accept Peking's membership in the General Assembly and the Security Council while seeking simultaneously to preserve a General Assembly seat for Taiwan, whether as the Republic of China, an independent nation, or an autonomous region of China. Such objectives may best be achieved through acquiescence rather than active leadership

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by Washington; but they will require careful advance
planning.

2. <u>China's Neighbors</u>

A gradual shift in our China policy, while welcome
to our major allies, will cause anxiety among some of China's
neighbors who have tailored their actions to the containment
aspect of our policy. It is imperative that we ease the
transition for these states by keeping them informed of our
progress and plans and by assuring them of our continuing
interest in their welfare.

3. <u>Japan</u>

It is especially important that we take Japan into
our confidence in every step of our strategy. Although Japan
will favor the substance of our strategy, if we abruptly
shift gears without prior notice, we will create acute embarrass-
ment for the Japanese Government.

4. <u>Third Country Contacts</u>

We should welcome the efforts of countries such as
Japan to develop increasing contacts with mainland China,
in the hope of involving the Chinese Communist regime more
substantially in the world community.

5. <u>Washington-Moscow-Peking</u>

Implicit in the foregoing suggestions is the hope
that the new Administration will attempt to view Sino-American

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relations as a separate problem from Soviet-American relations,
though inevitably a related problem. The Sino-Soviet split
provides us with an opportunity to treat each party separately
and to scrutinize our national interests in each relationship
with care. We urge that the new Administration, in its proper
concern with the bilateral super-power balance, avoid judgments
about China and its development that derive from Moscow's
views of Peking. A Soviet-American alliance against Peking
may serve Russia's interests; but it may not automatically
serve U.S. national interests.

* * * * *

We believe that the recommendations outlined above
will establish an American posture of firmness in our declared
purposes and yet of reasonableness, prudence and willingness
to resolve political problems by going half-way to meet the
other side. This is a posture that will command the support
of the broad center of the American electorate and of most
of the nations of the world.

A. Doak Barnett
Professor of Government, Columbia University

Jerome Alan Cohen (Chairman)
Professor of Law, Harvard University

John K. Fairbank
Director, East Asian Research Center,
Harvard University

(over)

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Roy Hofheinz
Assistant Professor of Government,
Harvard University

Dwight Perkins
Professor of Economics, Harvard University

Lucian Pye
Professor of Government,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Edwin O. Reischauer
University Professor, Harvard University

Benjamin I. Schwartz
Professor of History and Government,
Harvard University

James Thomson
Assistant Professor of History,
Harvard University

Ezra Vogel
Professor of Social Relations,
Harvard University