including the NATO forces deployed on the continent, give the West a
survivability that have become manageable, we believe, that this force,
the U2R. Now that the problems of command and control diabolical and
by far the greater nuclear force, including delivery capability, than
fear it might. There has never been any doubt that the West possesses
Soviet deployment of ICBMs has proceeded less rapidly than it was once
intelligence community, both in the United States and in Russia, that the
survivability. Furthermore, it appears to be the consensus of the
to the foregoing programs show, much has been and is being done to increase that
is likely to survive a massive enemy attack designed to destroy it. As
strength of the deterrent depends in large measure upon that fire power which
numbers but one of the potential survivability of our strategic deterrent.
the so-called missile gap. The question was not so much one of relative
there was always a certain degree of misunderstanding concerning
there will be more to come.

honestly claim that very solid and real progress has already been made.
survivability and durability of the nuclear deterrent. I think we can
in assessing today the progress of this effort to improve the
miscalculation.

to minimize any possibility of triggering nuclear war by accident or
decision to use nuclear weapons -- if that decision must be made -- and
the President will have the time and capability personally to make the
strategic deterrent. The object of this program is to assure that
organization and technical aspects of command and control of the

-2-

definite nuclear advantage. We further believe this advantage can be
maintained into the future, as improved weapon systems are developed
and deployed by both sides. Furthermore, we believe this advantage,
particularly when viewed from the Soviet side, to be strategically
important in the equations of deterrence and strategy.

The other half of the new Administration's initial defense program
was directed at strengthening our ability to deter or confine non-nuclear
aggression. Here again, and particularly under the impetus of the
serious tension over Berlin, we have made solid progress. The President
selected three specific areas for improvements: a higher priority for
research, development and production of non-nuclear weapons; an increased
flexibility of non-nuclear forces including air lift and sea lift
capacity; and increased personnel and training for covert aggression.
We have already added substantially to the 11 permanent Army divisions
available last July and, after our fiscal 1963 program, will have a total
of 16 combat ready divisions, roughly a 45% improvement. We have also
made improvements in our tactical air, our naval capabilities and in
support and logistics forces.

These concrete improvements in U.S. non-nuclear capabilities have
been complemented by a concurrent series of actions by our NATO allies,
which, on the whole, has been creditable. The Federal Republic of
Germany has been a notable leader in this build-up, having provided
nine NATO divisions by ________, 1961 and taken the measures

-6-

nine NATO divisions by __________, 1961 and taken the measure
Germany has been a notable leader in this build-up, having provided
which, on the whole, has been creditable. The Federal Republic of
been complemented by a concurrent series of actions by our NATO allies,
These concrete improvements in U.S. non-nuclear capabilities have
supported and logistics forces.

made improvements in our tactical air, our naval capabilities and in
of 16 combat ready divisions, roughly a 1/2 improvement. We have also
available last July and, after our fiscal 1963 program, will have a total
We have already added substantially to the 11 permanent Army divisions
capacity; and increased personnel and training for covert aggression.
flexibility of non-nuclear forces including air lift and sea lift

research, development and production of non-nuclear weapons; an increased
selected three specific areas for improvements: a higher priority for
serious tension over Berlin, we have made solid progress. The President
aggression. Here again, and particularly under the impetus of the
was directed at strengthening our ability to deter or confine non-nuclear
The other half of the new Administration's initial defense program
important in the equations of deterrence and strategy.
particularly when viewed from the Soviet side, to be strategically
and deployed by both sides. Furthermore, we believe this advantage,
maintained into the future, as improved weapon systems are developed
definite nuclear advantage. We further believe this advantage can be

-2-

which promise an additional three divisions by ________, 1962.

The Dutch, the French, and the Canadians have also made responses worthy
of particular note.

I recognize that some people regard the non-nuclear build-up
as irrelevant in a world where nuclear weapons are at the disposal of
each of the two major groups of powers facing each other across the iron
curtain. It is argued, for example, that *any* clash of arms will inevitably
and immediately escalate to general nuclear war and that the build-up
of NATO's non-nuclear forces is defeatist, divisive, and undermines the
credibility to the Soviets of our nuclear deterrent. I disagree with
these judgments. I believe that the non-nuclear build-up substantially
increases the credibility of our deterrent.

and
It prevents in its own right many undesirable consequences.

We can ask ourselves the question, what capabilities and courses
of action on our part are likely to affect Mr. Khrushchev's judgment on
whether aggressive courses of action on his part will be likely to bring
him unacceptably close to the danger of nuclear war. I should think the

- 7 -

him unacceptably close to the danger of nuclear war. I should think the
whether aggressive courses of action on his part will be likely to bring
of action on our part are likely to affect Mr. Khrushchev's judgment on

We can ask ourselves the question, what capabilities and courses
of action in the near future may make nuclear war possible.
increases the credibility of our deterrent.

these judgments. I believe that the non-nuclear build-up substantially
credibility to the Soviets of our nuclear deterrent. I disagree with
of NATO's non-nuclear forces is defeatist, divisive, and undermines the
and immediately escalate to general nuclear war and that the build-up
curtain. It is argued, for example, that any clash of arms will inevitably
each of the two major groups of powers facing each other across the Iron
as irrelevant in a world where nuclear weapons are at the disposal of

I recognize that some people regard the non-nuclear build-up
of particular note.

The Dutch, the French, and the Canadians have also made responses worthy
which promise an additional three divisions by ________, 1965.

- 7 -

most persuasive capability would be the Western nuclear arsenal, its survivability against anything Soviet forces can do, its penetration capabilities against Soviet defenses, its responsiveness to responsible control, and its accuracy, numbers and power. On this score, as I have said earlier, the facts support a very credible deterrent indeed. I personally know of nothing significant which the Alliance could do within the probable time frame of the present Berlin crisis to improve the capabilities part of its nuclear deterrent which it is not doing.

A second part of the deterrent is the indications Mr. Khrushchev and his advisors receive from Western words and actions as to what the West regards as its vital interests and as to the Western determination to protect them. Western leaders have already expressed to Mr. Khrushchev in clear and unambiguous terms our determination to defend vital Western interests in Berlin. I doubt whether much would be gained if we were to adopt the Soviet tactic of dwelling often and at length upon what would happen to Moscow or other Soviet areas if given numbers of thermo-nuclear weapons were to strike them. Mr. Khrushchev already knows the facts.

- 8 -

the facts.

Thermoneuclear weapons were to strike them. Mr. Khrushchev already knows what would happen to Moscow or other Soviet areas if given numbers of Western interests in Berlin. I doubt whether much would be gained if in clear and unambiguous terms our determination to defend vital interests as its vital interests and as to the Western determination to

protect them. Western leaders have already expressed to Mr. Khrushchev regards as its vital interests and as to the Western determination to his advisors receive from Western words and actions as to what the West A second part of the deterrent is the indications Mr. Khrushchev and capabilities part of its nuclear deterrent which it is not doing.

probable time frame of the present Berlin crisis to improve the know of nothing significant which the Alliance could do within the earlier, the facts support a very credible deterrent indeed. I personally and its accuracy, numbers and power. On this score, as I have said against Soviet defenses, its responsiveness to reasonable control, pability against anything Soviet forces can do, its penetration capabilities most persuasive capability would be the Western nuclear arsenal, its survival-

- 8 -

We are left, then, with those actions which can convince the
Soviet mind that if they persist in their aggression, they will thereby
cause a situation in which the danger to them of nuclear war is very
great indeed. Let us assume two different hypothetical situations.

In the first situation, the central NATO front is very lightly covered
by our forces. It is subject to the risk of deep penetration by the
Soviet non-nuclear forces stationed opposite to those of NATO. To demon-
strate its determination to have its vital interests respected, the
only option open to the West in the event of a Soviet/initiation of
the responsive action with the use of nuclear weapons. In the second
situation, the NATO front is firmly held on a continuous line. There
are enough reserve forces to mount a really serious non-nuclear probe
in the air corridors or along the autobahn. That probe can be thrown
back only by a full application of Soviet non-nuclear power in a major
fight against NATO forces.

If you were sitting in the Kremlin, which situation would you con-
sider more laden with a risk of nuclear war? In which would you be

- 9 -

alder more laden with a risk of nuclear war? In which would you be

If you were sitting in the Kremlin, which situation would you con-
fight against NATO forces.

back only by a full application of Soviet non-unclear power in a major
in the air corridors or along the autopahn. That probe can be thrown
are enough reserve forces to mount a really serious non-unclear probe
situation, the NATO front is firmly held on a continuous line. There
the responsive-action with the use of nuclear weapons. In the second
only option open to the West in the event of a Soviet initiation of
challenge is the

strate its determination to have its vital interests respected, the
Soviet non-unclear forces stationed opposite to those of NATO. To demon-
py our forces. It is subject to the risk of deep penetration by the
in the first situation, the central NATO front is very lightly covered
great indeed. Let us assume two different hypothetical situations.

cause a situation in which the danger to them of nuclear war is very
Soviet mind that if they belated in their aggression, they will thereby
We are left, then, with those actions which can convince the

- 3 -

more inclined to withdraw from a course of action challenging what
the West considers to be its vital interests? To me, the answer is
clear. If I were in the Kremlin I would be much more concerned in the
second situation; I would consider it much more likely that the West
would find it politically possible to initiate action in defense of
the Berlin access routes from the second posture than from the first.
During the last few months we have moved a long way from a military
capability requiring the first toward one permitting the second situation.

It is worth noting that the forces which would put us in the second
situation have for years been a firm and agreed NATO requirement. On
the crucial central front that requirement has been approximately 30
M-day divisions. Last year we had the equivalent of about 18 divisions,
many not being up to standard. Soon NATO will have the equivalent of
26 M-day divisions, including five fully manned and ready U.S. divisions
and their supporting forces. The U.S. contribution can be augmented,
if the situation makes it advisable by six additional combat ready
divisions. Beyond that are 1st and 2nd echelon divisions.

- 10 -

- 10 -

divisions. Beyond that are fast and slow echelon divisions.

If the situation makes it advisable by six additional combat ready and their supporting forces. The U.2 contribution can be augmented, 56 M-day divisions, including five fully manned and ready U.2. divisions many not being up to standard. Soon NATO will have the equivalent of 16 M-day divisions, and the crucial central front that requirement has been approximately 30 situation have for years been a firm and agreed NATO requirement. On

Last year we had the equivalent of about 18 divisions, M-day divisions. the crucial central front that requirement has been approximately 30 situation have for years been a firm and agreed NATO requirement. On

it is worth noting that the forces which would but us in the second capability requiring the first toward one permitting the second situation.

During the last few months we have moved a long way from a military the Berlin access routes from the second posture than from the first. would find it politically possible to initiate action in defense of second situation; I would consider it much more likely that the West

clear. If I were in the Kremlin I would be much more concerned in the the West considers to be its vital interests? To me, the answer is more inclined to withdraw from a course of action challenging what

It is not our view that, even in the longer run, would it be
necessary and advisable to have more than 30 M-day divisions. We
do believe, however, that those we have should be excellently equipped
and trained and that their logistic support should be in proper shape.
We further believe that reserve forces should be augmented.

We should keep reminding ourselves that Berlin is much more important
to the West than it is to Moscow. Khrushchev now virtually admits as
much. Today he emphasizes that his prestige is at stake. That he has
taken positions which make it difficult to back down. He may in fact
have a prestige problem and it is important that we leave him a way
out. He set the deadlines and he has now postponed them. But the
root of the matter is that the continued freedom of Berlin has more
importance to the West than the suppression of that freedom has to
Khrushchev. We must have the means of bringing home to him the full
danger of pushing his campaign against the integrity of Berlin -- the
danger that he will bring us to an irreversible situation.

- 11 -

danger of pushing his campaign against the integrity of Berlin -- the
Khrushchev. We must have the means of bringing home to him the full
importance to the West than the suppression of that freedom has to
root of the matter is that the continued freedom of Berlin has more
out. He set the deadlines and he has now postponed them. But the
have a prestige problem and it is important that we leave him a way
taken positions which make it difficult to back down. He may in fact
much. Today he emphasizes that his prestige is at stake. That he has
to the West than it is to Moscow. Khrushchev now virtually admits as

We should keep reminding ourselves that Berlin is much more important
We further believe that reserve forces should be augmented.

and trained and that their logistic support should be in proper shape.
do believe, however, that those we have should be excellently equipped
necessary and advisable to have more than 30 M-day divisions. We
it is not our view that, even in the longer run, would it be

- 11 -

Sometimes I wonder whether the opposition to the non-nuclear build-up does not arise from considerations just the opposite of those publicly advanced. If we build up strength on the NATO front, may we not then be tempted to use that strength in defense of our interests? And then may the situation not get out of hand and degenerate into a nuclear war? Without question there are risks in using military force to bring home to the Russians the fact that we propose to defend our interests. But it seems to me to be the sheerest nonsense that this should be called defeatism, ~~which undermines the credibility of the nuclear deterrent.~~

In addition to the acceleration of NATO's non-nuclear build-up, the recent period of intense concentration on Berlin has made clear some important NATO organizational problems which require prompt but thought-ful examination. We will need some structural changes if we are to recognize legitimate European desires for a bigger voice in the Alliance and, at the same time, have swift, clear decisions in moments of extreme crisis, including the failure of deterrence. The causes of the new

- 12 -

- 15 -

crisis, including the failure of deterrence. The causes of the new
and, at the same time, have swift, clear decisions in moments of extreme
recognize legitimate European desire for a bigger voice in the Alliance
tful examination. We will need some structural changes if we are to
important NATO organizational problems which require prompt but thought-
recent period of intense concentration on Berlin has made clear some
In addition to the acceleration of NATO's non-unclear build-up, the
unclear deterrent.

should be called détente, which undermines the credibility of the
interests. But it seems to me to be the shortest non sense that this
to bring home to the Russians the fact that we propose to defend our
unclear war? Without question there are risks in using military force
And then may the situation not get out of hand and degenerate into a
we not then be tempted to use that strength in defense of our interests?

publicly advanced. If we build up strength on the NATO front, may
build-up does not arise from considerations just the opposite of those
Sometimes I wonder whether the opposition to the non-unclear

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