MAY - 4 1987

(LC]

April 29, 1987

INTEGRATED LONG-TERM STRATEGY PROJECT
CALENDAR OF EVENTS

| **Date** | **Meeting** | **Place** |
|---|---|---|
| April 29, 1987<br>(3:30pm-5:00pm) | Future Security<br>Environment Working<br>Group - Speaker,<br>Richard Speier<br>Subject: Third World<br>Missile Proliferation<br>(By Invitation Only) | Room 3A930, The<br>Pentagon, Washington<br>DC |
| April 30, 1987<br>(9:30am-3:30pm) | Integrated Long-Term<br>Strategy Commission<br>(By Invitation Only) | Old Executive Office<br>Building, Washington,<br>DC |
| May 1 (8:30am-<br>5:30pm) | Meeting of Working<br>Group Chairmen<br>(By Invitation Only) | IDA Board Room,<br>Alexandria, VA |
| May 7, 1987<br>(2:00pm-4:00pm) | Regional Conflict<br>Working Group | IDA, Board Room |
| May 11-12<br>(9:00am-5:00pm<br>each day) | DNA New Alternatives<br>Workshop (By Invitation<br>Only) | Arlington Hall<br>Arlington, VA |
| May 13, (9:00am-<br>5:00pm), May 14,<br>(9:00am-3:30pm) | Offense/Defense<br>Working Group | IDA, Room 120<br>South |
| May 14, 1987<br>(3:30pm-5:00pm) | Future Security<br>Environment Working<br>Group - Speaker<br>S. Fred Singer<br>Subject: Future World<br>Energy Issues | Room 3A930, The<br>Pentagon, Washington<br>DC |
| May 14, (9:00am-<br>5:00pm), May 15,<br>(9:00am-5:00pm) | Technology Working<br>Group | IDA, Room 203 North |
| June 11, 1987 | Integrated Long-Term<br>Strategy Commission<br>(By Invitation Only) | The Pentagon,<br>Washington, DC |
| August 20-28,<br>1987 | Nine-day extended<br>meeting of project<br>principals to work<br>on project report<br>(By Invitation Only) | Naval Ocean Systems<br>Command (NOSC), San<br>Diego, California |

September 25, 1986

Albert Wohlstetter

EXERNOTE, #150

Notes on Exercises and Their Relation to
Decisions on the Conduct of War

1. For the Soviet Union (some of these observations apply also to the U.S. and other countries) exercises can serve many and varied purposes:

(a) Training, especially of large forces.

(b) Testing of communications, data processing and other equipment currently in the force, and their interoperability.

(c) Sending signals to an adversary to make him aware that the country conducting the exercise can actually respond to his attack in a non-suicidal way that serves the national interest.

(d) Sending an adversary signals that lead him to believe the country is better able to respond to attack than is actually the case.

(e) Sending signals that falsely reassure an adversary that the country is unlikely ever to attack, or to attack in a certain way -- in order to make some future attack more effective.

(f) As a cover and immediate preface to an attack. (What the Israelis interpreted as an Egyptian exercise in 1973 turned out to be the real thing. And in 1968, we learned from a radio news broadcast that a Soviet-Czech exercise had become the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.)

(g) To build up a background of intermittent increases in readiness over a long period which could serve to lower the signal-to-noise ratio if an attack should be decided on in the future. (So North Korean exercises in the past decade. And the mobilization exercises which the Egyptians repeated several times before their 1973 attack.)

(h) Sending effective signals of the genuine possibility that the country might attack as an explicit threat and means of coercion. (As the Soviets used

troop movements to coerce the Poles in 1979 and beginning in 1968 have
used fleet exercises in the Norwegian Sea and paratroop landings on fjiords
on their Kola Peninsula to intimidate the Norwegians.)

(i) Exploring the effects on accomplishing some political military objective either in attack or response to attack of new equipment likely to be available in a medium or long term future. (This is much rarer than tests of current forces with old or recently acquired equipment.)

(j) Testing hypotheses about the effectiveness of some strategy against the probable course of action of an adversary. (This function is of very limited value especially in the case of large exercises, because a sequence of free choices follows only one of many potential branching paths yielding only one observation. And repetition may be extremely expensive not only where large scale forces are involved, but where the time of key commanders would be consumed. This is even more obviously the case where the time consumed is that of high political leaders.)

2. Since adversary exercises can serve so many functions related only loosely and in varied ways to possible later decisions on the conduct of a war, they cannot be taken as any sure sign of what an adversary would actually do in a war.

3. In any case, what an adversary will do will depend on what he is capable of and this will change over time as he gets new technologies.

4. What he does will also depend on our changing capability and what we do and what he expects us to do in response to his moves.

5. Exercises, for varying reasons, tend to be done on the explicit assumption that national forces are reacting to enemy attack. The Soviets invariably talk about their forces defending the Motherland and one would expect that most of their exercises would respond formally to some unprovoked attack on Mother Russia.

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Even when the Soviets have *actually* invaded, as in Finland and Afghanistan, they have nominally responded either to an attack on themselves (as in the case of the aggressive Finns) or to an attack on an ally (as in the case of the obscurely motivated and apparently adept supposed CIA aggression in Afghanistan to which the Soviets said they were responding).

6. If a Soviet exercise responds to a NATO attack, nominally, the Soviet counterattack may be affected by what sort of attack NATO is supposed to have made on them. In any case, the nature of the Soviet attack exercised is likely to be affected by what they assume about NATO plans for response and likely actual response.

When NATO plans were based on MC 14/2, NATO was supposed to respond even to a local conventional incursion by the Soviets (as long as it appeared that the incursion was intended to persist) with an "all-out" nuclear response using American strategic forces as well as theater nuclear forces. If the Soviets believed that we would respond all-out with nuclear forces at the time, they were unlikely then to contemplate or exercise making an attack using only conventional forces. And, in fact, NATO plans in the late 1950s and the early 1960s assumed that the Soviets would start with the massive use of nuclear forces if they started at all.

The United States changed its policy in the Spring of 1961 with the Acheson/National Security Council report. We then contemplated an attempt to defeat a conventional attack conventionally, and to use nuclear weapons only if our conventional forces appeared about to be overwhelmed. And we improved our ability to fight without nuclear weapons. It took more than six years for the US to persuade its allies to replace MC 14/2 with MC 14/3 which went part of the way towards the American position. Soviet plans and exercises changed also. And it is plausible to relate these Soviet changes to the changes in American and NATO doctrine and the associated changes in NATO's ability to fight with non-

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nuclear weapons. (The Soviets could increase the priority of conventional forces in their contingency plans also because they had greatly reduced any Western advantage in using *nuclear* weapons as Soviet nuclear forces grew relative to our own.) They began to contemplate an attack using conventional forces only. However, the Soviet change in policy lagged behind the American change and possibly also the NATO change. And the evidence of Soviet exercises undoubtedly lagged behind the Soviet change in doctrine and policy. Moreover, the American intelligence community recognized the Soviet change in policy only with a lag of their own. (In fact, some members of the community still deny the possibility of a Soviet attack using conventional forces only.)

We should document this sequence of changes including the changes in the Soviet military literature, the changes in exercises, and the changes in the American estimates. Much of this is in the public domain.

### 7. Reflections in a mirror of a mirror of a mirror of a mirror

Any American planner who favors the prompt all-out use of nuclear forces can find comfort and confirmation of the adequacy of the policy they advocate in the notion that the Soviets, if they strike at all, would make an all-out strike against an encyclopedic list of targets which left us no incentive to use restraint and no point in *not* responding suicidally since our death would already be certain. Similarly, the MAD faction of arms controllers who oppose any limitation or any extensive effort to prepare to keep destruction under control, fall back on the view that, whatever we do, the Soviets will attack without restraint and so nothing will do except arms control, and implicitly (and sometimes explicitly in the case of men like Carl Sagan) disarmament down to unverifiably and unenforceably low levels in the number of warheads.

We have, then, Americans who advocate using nuclear weapons without restraint -- if at all -- because they think that the Soviets would use nuclear

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weapons without restraint -- if at all. And if the Soviets believe the professions of those Americans who say we should respond in the full expectation that we will end up using everything that we have -- or not respond at all -- the Soviets might base their plans on such professions. If they weigh heavily the idea that we might actually use nuclear weapons suicidally such plans as they make and such exercises as they perform will also involve the comprehensive use of Soviet nuclear forces with little or no discrimination. Thus, just as our plans reflected a belief about their lack of restraint, theirs would reflect a belief about ours. James Angleton has referred to intelligence as a "wilderness of mirrors". This may be a splendid example, rather different from the double agent problems he had in mind.

On the other hand, if the Soviets don't believe that we would respond in a consciously suicidal way to a Soviet nuclear attack which confined damage, say, to an allied country (and largely to military forces) and therefore believe we would not respond at all, they might contemplate making selective attacks -- if the occasion for the use of force should arise. Nonetheless, they might continue to stress in various declaratory statements, and perhaps even in exercises, the likelihood that the United States would be totally devastated if it responded at all to a Soviet invasion. And they might conduct highly visible global exercises suggesting their own indifference to even global damage encompassing the Politburo, the *nomenklatura*, and the whole of the Soviet Union. They might see this as a useful element in coercing the West, in persuading us to be unprepared to respond at all when they *actually* used force in a way that was carefully directed to attain some concrete political military goal and in a way that left us with the alternative of surviving if we did not respond at all.

8. Potential Soviet selective surprise attacks directed at soft spots in the Alliance, using unexpected routes or other methods, are likely to be practiced in ways that

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are deliberately concealed or obscure. One does not normally advertise surprise. The Japanese practiced to extend the range of their Zero aircraft by reducing cruise speeds, setting the fuel mixtures as lean as possible, and training crews in fuel economy from land bases as well as carriers in ways that we didn't anticipate, before their attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. Their air crews practiced short and shallow torpedo runs and their research men developed retrofits for torpedoes that made them effective in shallow waters in ways that we did not think were possible. Our judgment as to what they were likely to do and specifically as to whether they would attack us was faulty as a result.

The Germans in 1940 had trained to invade France by way of the Low Countries (as they had before World War I according to the Schlieffen Plan), and the French focussed their attention on that possibility to the exclusion of a possible invasion through the Ardennes. When Hitler thought the Low Country invasion plan had been compromised, he ordered the invasion through the Ardennes.

Similarly, the Israelis in 1973 didn't think the Egyptians would attempt an attack crossing Suez and breaching the high sand ramparts which the Israelis had constructed all along the bank so long as Israeli air power greatly exceeded Egyptian air power. However, the Egyptians not only practiced river crossings and novel ways of breaching the ramparts quickly but counted correctly on new surface-to-air missiles obtained from the Russians to counter Israeli air enough to make the crossings feasible. And surprised the Israelis.

9. In general, it is not a good idea to count on past and current practice of an adversary which we can monitor in exercises as assuring us against the surprise use of forces and perhaps new equipment in ways that could accomplish an adversary's political military objective. There are two points: (1) changes in technology make possible an effective method of attack, and (2) we shouldn't

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count on an adversary forgetting the importance of using cover and deception in exercises they know we monitor when he is preparing to be able to surprise us. (The Egyptians developed very high pressure water jets that breached the Israeli sand ramparts and practiced their use behind still higher sand ramparts of their own. In Afghanistan, the Soviets invaded without some of the logistic preparations Westerners had come to think of as required by their doctrine and former practice. There is no use complaining that they don't always follow their doctrine.)

10. Selective attacks on a flank against a limited set of crucial targets would be much smaller in size than a massive global attack. This is likely to be even more the case for surprise attacks in areas critical for NATO like the Persian Gulf, but outside the NATO Treaty area. Exercises of such flanking attacks away from the center are much more likely to be missed in collection or, at least, in analysis both because they are small in size and because we focus our limited resources of attention on the center. (Our resources for collection and especially analysis were particularly limited in the late 1970s when the intelligence agencies were under attack. This could easily affect how representative our historical records and analyses are.)

Plans for a small attack might be practiced as a component or module of a large exercise, yet be quite separable in the actual event of a war. Components of a plan might be practiced extensively but not in sequence and such practice might use parts of other plans. The components could be mixed and matched later -- with or without a preceding "break-out" in a full-up "end-to-end" proof test. (In some of our own exercises we have used components of several plans.)

11. In general, Western analysts have shifted from a belief that the Soviets would never start a war with the United States or its major allies unless it began with an all-out attack, including an intercontinental attack on the US, to the recognition

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that wars are most likely to start with a conventional invasion **lasting days at least**, and leading to a use of nuclear weapons by ourselves or by the Soviets overseas lasting more days before there was any intercontinental attack by one side or the other. However, there is still a tendency in the West to regard these initial theater uses of conventional or nuclear forces as preliminaries which hardly change the nature of the initial comprehensive intercontinental attack on many targets and the comprehensive response, and without altering the prompt destruction that would be done in such intercontinental exchanges of blows. This may be an artefact of the standard assumption that continuing control is impossible and of the standard way large exercises are planned in which the way the exercise gets started is thought of only as a perfunctory overture to the main acts, lending a little verisimilitude but without any substantial influence.

12. Even a command post exercise involving smaller numbers of high level figures tends to simulate the coordination of large scale forces and to consider a sequence of events which grow into a very large scale and comprehensively devastating use of weapons. Even if the exercise reaches a natural stopping point, participants are likely to want to know "but what if" the conflict did not stop there. There will be a natural tendency then to end up in the most extreme apocalyptic outcomes to both sides. In an actual conflict (with real casualties), all would have strong incentives to avoid such outcomes.

13. Many in the academic community hold that continuing control is infeasible, that no limited nuclear exchange will stay limited in geography or number or yield of weapons used or in targets attacked, and that, therefore, survival is extremely unlikely. But they have not faced the policy issues as to whether the US should, in that case, respond to any use of nuclear weapons by the Soviets against an ally (or any use that was confined enough to leave us a stake in survival). A good many military planners who hold that the Soviets will attack

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without restraint have some analogous problems. By now it is standard to assume,
as the preceding point suggests, that a war will break out overseas. And it is
usual to assume that nuclear weapons will be used there before they are used
intercontinentally. If our military planners really believe that the use of
intercontinental forces by the Soviets would inevitably mean 100 million or so
Americans dead, shouldn't they recommend that the United States opt out quickly
to forestall that event? Responsible military leaders who plainly think the choice
is between 100 million Americans dead and the loss of even a major ally are
unlikely to recommend suicide -- and responsible political leaders would be
unlikely to accept such a recommendation if they think about the consequences.
Military planners expecting mutual destruction, moreover, have some further
problems that an academic MAD bomber doesn't, if their plans require expensive
US forces directed at destroying a very comprehensive list of military targets. If
the collateral damage from such an attack would, as many believe, end the Soviet
Union as a functioning society without saving our own, there are much less
expensive ways of accomplishing that -- as the academic Minimum Deterrers have
not failed to point out.

14. I have focussed on the evidence supposedly supplied by exercises. There is a tendency in some quarters to say "there is no evidence whatsoever ... that the Soviets would do such and such" where the ostensible meaning is that the Soviets haven't done that in exercises. But there may be considerable evidence in terms of their long run interests, the fundamental views of the Politburo on the importance of political control in war, and the statements of military planners in writing for each other which may not yet have been illustrated by exercises. And we know that such thinking generally precedes exercises. (This -- perhaps the most important point -- can and should be extensively documented.)

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15. Even statements about the content of the exercises themselves are often rather careless. Limited exchanges **have** been exercised. On this subject, passions may run so high that the Principle of Non-Contradiction may join the Law of Excluded Middle on the rubbish heap of history. Statements by some members of the community that there is "no evidence whatsoever" are sometimes refutable by evidence of exercises cited in the same document and are, in any case, disconfirmed by an abundance of evidence in the literature of military planners and in the writings of the political leadership. The situation parallels in some ways the repeated assertion by McGeorge Bundy, McNamara and other former civilian officials that there is "no evidence whatsoever" of Soviet interest in limiting nuclear war -- in spite of the fact that these former officials have had personally presented to them quite a bit of the evidence and more has been published.

An extended example of shuttling quickly back and forth between statements that there is "no evidence whatsoever" and statements providing some of the evidence can be found in Desmond Ball's 1981 Adelphi Paper, "Can Nuclear War be Controlled?" which is perhaps the most frequently cited classic public source of the notion that it can't be.

16. The burden of proof is on those who would focus on the apocalypse to the neglect of any other contingency.

Even if there were "no evidence whatsoever" in the statements of military planners, and no evidence whatsoever in exercises that the Soviets might use force, including nuclear force, selectively to accomplish some concrete Soviet political military objective without committing suicide, leaving us an option of surrender -- we could not ignore such a non-apocalyptic contingency. Nor should we forget that such contingencies might show up in exercises in the future, not to say in reality. Those who talk about their being "no evidence whatsoever" in this case

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misplace the burden of proof. Those of us who think we should consider selective attacks as well as suicidally indiscriminate ones on the part of the Soviets don't have to *prove* that the Soviets might use a selective strategy; and we don't deny that they *might* attack without restraint. On the other hand those who believe the Soviets would only attack in a suicidally indiscriminate way have a little problem in gathering evidence for that. They have the burden of proof. They assume they need only consider enemy strategies which are the familiar ones they deal with even though some strategies that are within our adversaries' competence could realize their political ends and frustrate ours. But we may find to our sorrow that they have long since considered such strategies. Or they may discover them in the future, to our chagrin.

17. Inconsistencies in the defense and intelligence communities way of dealing with threats -- responsive and somnolent.

The R & D community and the MAD arms controllers have developed a habit of evaluating a proposed new US weapon system by pitting it against some future Soviet countermeasures devised specifically to frustrate the new weapon system. In principle, that seems only sensible since we are locked in a contest with an adversary who is no fool and who has lasting and deep -- even if partial -- conflicting interests and objectives. In practice, this has been done so mechanically that the method often results in conjuring up countermeasures which may frustrate not only our proposed weapons system, but defeat Soviet purposes as well. (Fast burn boosters to replace their entire ballistic missile force, replacement of their entire system of ICBM bases in the European and Asiatic Soviet Union with silos concentrated at a point, 30,000 RV attacks directed solely at killing innocent bystanders, etc. etc.) Sometimes the countermeasures are only dubiously feasible but indubitably bad for the Soviet Union as well as the US. The juiciest example of such an extreme "responsive" threat was the suggestion by the Union

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of Concerned Scientists that the Soviets might bring on a nuclear winter, destroying themselves as well as us, as a way of frustrating SDI. Nonetheless, there is no question that any proposed new US weapons system has to be looked at in terms of what feasible measures the Soviets might take to counter it which further their interests and hinder ours. And we should consider such counters even though we have no evidence that they are contemplating them.

When it comes to US indiscriminate strategies of response, however, it seems that the community seldom considers the selective Soviet attack strategies which might make such U.S. indiscriminate responses self-defeating. In fact, there is a very strong focus on what the Soviets have done in the past in exercises, etc. rather than what is clearly within their competence to do. They don't really consider what the Soviets could do in their own interest with least risk which would frustrate our desire to implement a simple, massive, prompt and indiscriminate response by making it quite inappropriate, much more dangerous to us than not responding.

In a more fundamental sense, however, the extreme self-destructive Soviet responsive threat which is frequently contemplated in the US R&D community (and especially in the arms control anti-R&D community) differs little in effect from the non-responsive self-destructive Soviet strategy contemplated by military planners in justifying preparation only or mainly for a massive, uncontrollable US response. Both sorts of Soviet threat are used as a form of justifying a failure to make any changes in our posture and policy.

18. One further point: some members of the community who like to say there is no evidence whatsoever that the Soviets are interested in escalation control agree that the Soviets are very interested in control -- in controlling their forces and, indeed, in controlling the course of a war. They are aware in great detail of the extremely expensive, elaborate and persistent measures the Soviets have taken to

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assure control. It is the jargon phrase "escalation control" that is a red flag to them. Or perhaps a red herring. In opposing the idea that the Soviets are interested in "escalation control", they are fighting the battle of Vietnam once more. The advocates of Mutual Assured Destruction who were involved in the political conduct of the war in Vietnam wanted to send messages about the terrible things we would do -- beyond the bounds that we were so far observing -- if the North Vietnamese didn't behave. But such messages about future escalation were unconvincing precisely because the senders of the message plainly regarded the consequences of escalation as just as devastating, or at least extremely dangerous, for us. In short, the escalation controllers had nightmare visions of escalation getting out of control. And the actions actually taken tended to be purely symbolic in character and to have no decisive military value. The same attitude is illustrated by Mac Bundy's proposals for "less than proportionate response". Such responses are not related to achieving any military objective. Far from indicating "resolve", as the academics like to suggest, about actions in a process of escalation, they would, as the kind of limitations we observed in Vietnam did, show a lack of resolve. They are associated with the notion of inflicting pain or punishment rather than with achieving some military ends. And they would involve punishing us as well as the enemy -- in this case punishing us more.

Such a process of escalation control purely for "sending messages" contrasts with a policy of military responses directed at removing military obstacles to achieving some military end while doing as little damage as possible to ourselves and our allies.

Nonetheless, much of the argument by conservative members of the community against "escalation control" really is aimed at this familiar academic argument. On the other hand, by ignoring the enormous damage that might be done to ourselves and our allies in a nuclear war fought without restraint, they

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unwittingly surrender all possibilities of using nuclear weapons without such catastrophic consequences. And so, paradoxically, join the academics they oppose.

19. It is important to remember that exercises are, for the most part, run by soldiers. They are not only planned by them, but they are the main participants. Political leaders take part in a very peripheral way. That's true for the other chap as well as for us. In the event of an actual conflict between the US and the Soviet Union, political leaders would take a dominant role, and suddenly the dangers of letting things get out of control would tend to dominate, too. And all the exercises in the world that had ignored this fact before would not matter.

20. The upshot of the foregoing so far as the work for the Task Force on Soviet Strategies and Threats is many-fold. Any analysis or forecast of future Soviet strategic choices in the conduct of a war which are based exclusively on exercises will be of limited value at best and may be highly misleading. Some, however, are obvious:

(a) Gross raw empirical statistics showing such things as the minimum or maximum or average length, say, of the conventional phase or some other phase of exercises conducted over a long period have very little significance. We should avoid statistics about "nuclear war" in general and exercise phases of "nuclear war" and pay more attention to who does what to whom in what circumstances.

(b) One needs to observe how these change over time and in various theaters.

(c) How they are related to which side initiates what move and level of violence during the exercise.

(d) What objectives, doctrines and strategies are assumed for the US side in the exercise.

(e) What capabilities are assumed for each side in the exercise.

(f) What degree of cohesion is assumed for the alliances on each side.

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(g) How these factors are likely to change or may change in the future.

The above is only a preliminary list of issues about the use of this very valuable resource. The most important implication of these notes, however, is the one indicated in Point #14: to draw useful inferences about the alternative likely ways in which a war might start and evolve we have to go far beyond the bare deliverances of exercises. We have to consider long-run Soviet interests, and the basic way the Politburo views the world, its deep hostility to the West, its long-term fundamental emphasis on keeping tight political control; and within this framework, the slowly altering Soviet military doctrine that has been responding to the ongoing revolution in military technology and to changes in the geostrategic situation in the West; and the branching alternatives and risks presented to each side at every major decision point.

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

APR 10 1987

8 APR 1987

POLICY

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, N. W.
Suite 1021
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Henry:

We've selected 11 June as the date of the Fourth Plenary
session of the Commission. Please note that date on your
calendar. The meeting will be held at the Pentagon from 9:00
a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Unhappily we were not able to accommodate
everyone's busy summer calendar when selecting the June date.

With regard to the April 30th Commission meeting at the
OEOB, the proposed agenda is attached for your consideration.
Please note the change in time to 4:00 p.m.

Attachment
a/s

COMMISSION ON INTEGRATED LONG-TERM STRATEGY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2000

(202) 697-8360

THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Thursday, April 30, 1987

09:30 am to 4:00 pm

Cordell Hull Room (Room 208)

Old Executive Office Building

PROPOSED AGENDA

09:30 Introduction

09:40 Implication of Soviet exercises for
Soviet strategy

DIA

10:10
Soviet capability and changing
Soviet strategy in light of our
defense resources

Andrew Marshall and
Charles Wolf

10:40
Long-range offense and defense in
plausible US-USSR wartime contingencies
(To be continued at 1400)

Harry Rowen,
Fred Hoffman, and
Commissioners
Huntington and
Wohlstetter

11:45
Luncheon (Host: William Graham)
(Consolidation of preceding Commission
meeting discussion on wartime
capabilities in space)

13:00 Discussion with Frank Carlucci

14:00 Continuation of morning session on
long-range offense and defense

15:00 to Executive Session

16:00 (Plans for future work)

Telephone messages during the meeting can be left at 395-4282/4970.

26 FEB 1987

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 1021
Washington, D.C. 20006

MAR - 3 1987

Dear Henry:

As we discussed at our Plenary meeting on February 20th, we will seek to schedule two more plenary meetings before summer, one in April and one in the first part of June. The April (or early May) meeting will be held in the Old Executive Office Building.

We would like to find the most convenient meeting dates for Commission members by coordinating dates as we did the last time. Please indicate on the enclosures which dates are not convenient, and have the enclosures returned to my office.

From 20 to 28 August 1987 the working group chairmen and other principals will gather in San Diego to synthesize the project research and develop material to support the Commission. As I mentioned at last Friday's meeting, we hope that Commission members will have an opportunity to join the San Diego meetings for a day or so. We will make whatever arrangements are necessary to accommodate your visit.

We also discussed on the 20th the remaining Commission meetings after the summer. As we envisaged, we might hold a one-day meeting in September and perhaps a two-day meeting late in November, with our final report still scheduled for December.

Thank you for your cooperation in having the enclosed forms returned as soon as possible.

Enclosures
Meeting Dates Forms
Self-Addressed Envelope

DATE 3/14/87

LOG NUMBER 394

FILE Integrated Long-Term Strategy [Y]

ACTION:

CV CBN DMT TFG RN CMM
JW LUM ALD CSB SY

CROSS REFERENCE

NY. OFFICE

INFORMATION COPY TO:

<table><tr><td>Draft Reply for HAK Signature</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Direct Reply</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Appropriate Action</td><td>X</td></tr></table>

ACTION COMPLETED: TO BE FILED ✓

COMMENTS:

HK:

Attached letter follows up on a discussion at the last Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy meeting Feb. 20th re members having access to classified documents.

Which of following options is preferable to you:

* Reviewing documents at PENTAGON where a file is maintained for you

* Having documents available for you at PFIAB ✓

* Having documents available in an office at INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS, Alexandria

* Having reading facility set up at NAVAL STATION, FORT HAMILTON, NY

* Asking Commission to pursue setting up classified repository in your home (lengthy process)

Documents can be made available whenever you wish to see them.

Jody

MAR - 4 1987

2 MAR 1987

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, NW
Suite 1021
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

At the February 20th meeting of the Commission on Integrated
Long-Term Strategy several members expressed interest in having
convenient access to classified papers. We can offer you several
options to provide an arrangement that is most convenient for
you:

(1) At the Pentagon, we maintain a complete file for you, under the supervision of Colonel Sullivan, the Commission Executive Secretary. I will be pleased to make the arrangements so that you will have access to this file at any time convenient to you.

(2) Commissioners who are PFIAB members may have documents made available at their PFIAB offices on request.

(3) We can also provide documents in an office at the Institute for Defense Analysis in Alexandria, Virginia. IDA's offices may be preferable to the Pentagon for longer working periods. Pan Heuristics (4640 Admiralty Way, Marina del Rey, California) also maintains a set of these documents to use.

(4) We can set up a reading facility at the Naval Station, Fort Hamilton, New York, if you would like, or we can explore the possibility of establishing a classified repository in your home, if you wish. The last could be a rather lengthy process.

Please let me know any time you want to have access to
the collection of documents or to specific papers, and we will
attempt to accommodate your desires.