Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telcon
Ambassador Rabin
9/2/70; 8:45 a.m.

R: Do you have any answer to me?

K: I should have one no later than tomorrow but I think it is almost certainly yes. I tell you that on an informal basis.

R: It is very important that I know if it is possible today.

K: All right.

R: It is important for some of the considerations there.

K: Tell me, is my judgment correct that w this will dampen down the intensity of controversy, at least until the visit.

R: I hope so. I cannot give you any assurances but it looks as if this is the intention.

K: All right I will get you an answer before the end of the day.

R: I hope you will be in the position to do so. I am coming to the conclusion that it is very important to her.

K: Right.

R: It does not mean that the other issues are not of great importance.

K: I am not successful as sole adviser in Jerusalem but I will get you the answer today. I am joking.

R: Well, I understand.

K: I have trouble enough in Washington without taking on another country. I will get you an answer today. Even now I can tell you it is 95 percent done.

R: I see. All right then. I hope when you will be back I will have an opportunity to talk with you.

K: I will be back next week and I hope to see you then.

R: Thank you very much.

ms

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCORN
Sisco/Kissinger

9:00 a.m. 9/2/70

K: I am being bugged again by Rabin about the Sept. 18 date. I don't see how we can play games. I told him it would dampen the controversy and let them know.

S: Call at the end of the day. It's okay. It would be better to wait a day. I am doing a telegram on the meeting yesterday. I will need an immediate clearance because I must see Rabin today. He asked if I could give a positive judgment which would have a good effect on the Cabinet meeting tomorrow.

K: That's what he said on the visit.

S: I will get you this cable in an hour. How did you think the meeting went?

K: I don't think we are estimating xixx the intensity of the Israelis adequately but I think it was a good meeting.

X:

*

By: KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE

N. Rockefeller/Kissinger
10:07 a.m. 9/2/70

R: I am grateful for a chance to speak to you. I am making a speech tomorrow night at the Zionist Org. and I am now trying to sharpen my recommendations so they are up to date with what's going on. 3 recommendations. One relates to planes, electrical equipment, and ordance.

K: Planes and whatever is necessary to deal with missiles.

R: Soviet missiles?

K: Soviet surface to air missiles.

R: I am saying that these should be shipped now. That all right?

K: Good.

R: Point two is namely that Israeli credibility on intelligence was destroyed by Laird denying the facts. Now he has said they are right and we were wrong. Now that Israel's credibility has been restored --

K: I haven't seen this.

R: I haven't either. But ________ said it was. The point is now the U.S. should ________ see to it that all parties conform to the peace initiative.

K: I wouldn't say that Israel's credibility has been restored. We know that there's general agreement that violations have occured. And now your recommendation. That would be very effective. The other puts it all on Israel. We have our own independent means of verification.

R? I know that there's significant agreement that violations have occured.

K: And we have (means of verifying that.)

R: Since peace talks. Violations have occured since agreements to the cease-fire. We have responsibility to see that the Egyptians and Soviets conform.

K: Absolutely.

R: Does that mean withdrawing the newly installed missiles and equipment to the pre-

K: To beyond the standstill zone.

R: Those are my two principle recommendations.

By: KHW NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

Rockefeller/Kissinger

10:07 am. 9/2/70

-2-

K: They are good.

R: The other one relates to prisoners. They won the international Red Cross to go in.

K: I would confine yourself to what we have a moral right to concern ourselves.

R: How can I check with Defense if they put out a statement this morning. If they did, it's a pretty big thing.

K: I will check it.

R: If I am wrong, will you call me back?

K: Haig or I. I am glad you are in public life. I will give you a run down when you come down. It's rough. There's more apt to be a war than peace this year.

R: They have really double-crossed us on this one.

K: That's the truth. What can you expect when senior people say they are for peace and a soft line.

R: If Defense didn't admit to this --

d

K: I will check this out.

Further conversation: (about 15 minutes later)

R: We are going to be asked by the press if I checked with the President on what I am saying before I said it. I wonder if I should get a copy of the speech to him.

K: I don't think we need to check with Defense. There are enough stories coming out.

R: I am covered now, I said there's general agreement on violations. I would like to say that I sent a copy --

K: There's nothing wrong with that.

R: Should I send it to you?

K: Send it to him. I will get it but it will look less like you and I cooked it up.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Rockefeller/Kissinger

10:07 am 9/2/70

-3-

R: I will get Ann to work it out.

K: And I will tell the President you add I worked it out.

R: I won't mention you.

K: I don't need any mention on the M. E. It's all being done for me.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

*

TELCOM

NRockefeller/Kissinger

9:22 a.m. 9/4/70

R: I want to thank you very much because that thing last night with the Zionist Organization was fantastic. I was made a life member by a standing ovation of 1000. It was most timely and hope it caused no problems.

K: I haven't heard but there will be rejoicing if this thing moves along.

R: Someone asked me how the President was reacting and I said I thought he was reacting the same as I would. Golda Meir is coming over here and I want to have a lunch or dinner for her.

K: She would be eager to do it.

R: I would invite the leaders of the community to come but I don't know how without stepping on people's toes. State wouldn't be enthusiastic.

K: The best would be if they asked you.

R: State or Golda Meir?

K: What do you care what State thinks?

R: I don't care but I don't know the proper channels.

K: Call Rabin. Say you are an old friend.

R: Just tell him what I want to do.

K: If you can't reach him, call Argov, who is minister. By that time or shortly thereafter we will be grateful for anything that's done in that line. The Russians are really getting tough. When they see softness they know what to do.

R: My position was that U.S. is co-sponsor of this program and have to get Egyptians out immediately.

K: I agree.

R: This is the most serious thing we are facing.

K: Of that there's no doubt.

R: Everyday that goes by that he doesn't -- This is the same as the Cuban missile crisis. I am your friend.

K: You are doing a tremendous job. I was glad to see the AFL/CIO endorsed you.

By KHC

NARA, Date 5/12/04

N. Rockefeller/Kissinger
9:22 a.m. 9/4/70

-2-

R: Goldberg fought that.

K: He looks in bad shape.

R: I worry because it's too early.

K: He can't come back.

R: He is attacking the press.

K: I don't see how this can drift in the M. E.

R: I don't see how this can drift in the M. E.

K: That's why I don't want you to throw your hat in the air two weeks ago.

R: Does the President wee it?

K: He will soon.

R: Does Rogers see he is reading him down the garden path on this one?

K: Not yet.

R: They will soon. The Jewish Community sees this crystal clear.

K: They don't count but it's their throat. You are doing the right thing. We need some senior Americans who they trust so when it gets bad they will have someone to listen to. Your speech yesterday may be a caution to the Russians. It may have helped our foreign policy.

R: That's interesting. Do you think I should send Rogers a copy with a little note?

K: It wouldn't hurt.

R: And draw attention to where I really layed it on.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger
September 4, 1970 2:30 p.m.

[extremely garbled - jlj]

L: Henry, can you hear me.

K: Yes, hello Mel.

L: I sent you a memorandum on 27 August regarding the Israelis financial obligations. The Israeli Government wants
F-4, A-4 ???? Total amount of credit is
Credit is $390 million - will not be able to pay this amount. I have the check. The Senate has it and it will be approved by the House.
We will have the authorizing legislation. I want to make sure that BOB, WNK our friend George, will not hesitate to send up a supplemental.
That would amount to another $400 million.

K: Would this include Cambodia?

L: Cambodia, Korea and all the rest. '73 Israel wants another 120 days and . . . . . Only have $40 million. Pay off contract - supplemental.
Problem I have here - Bureau takes the position that . . .

Henry, can you keep this thing covered. I have to send this letter.

K: What are the practical consequences of what you are saying?

L: The practical consequences is that BOB must approve this. I have to sign these papers but I want to be sure that the BOB will approve this.

K: You want BOB to approve this?

L: Yes, Have George here WNK. . . . . [discussions of getting it approved in George's shop.]

K: I will get it approved.

L: Then I will go ahead and sign papers for 120 days.

K: As long as I have you on the phone - what about this Freedom fighter thing. Reagan is giving us a hard time.

L: We have a KNK restudy of the contract.

K: You won't do anything without giving us some warning will you?

L: No,

K: Thanks, see you next week Mel.

*

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCORN

Rogers/Kixisinger Haig

2:55 pm

9/4/70

R: I got a call from Ted Eliot on what the President wanted.

K: No, I said I was just in there. I called about the Sisco message coming out which I said HAK and you should look at right away.

R: I got the impression that you said that we should lodge a strong protest to the Russians.

K: He was just crispy on the subject. I told him what happened with Beam and the Arabs. He was troubled about the Soviet problem.

R: They will deny responsibility. The only point of lodging a protest is to see if they will do anything short of an ultimatum. I don't want what we say to them to launch a major confrontation.

K: I don't mean to imply that course of action.

R: I get that. I have some reservations about going to Gromyko. If we demand something from them, they will deny it. If we had a follow-up move I would be happy to do it.

K: That's what we have to sort out.

R: I don't want them to say U.S. is helpless and ? ? ? ?

K: The message is here and I think you and Henry should talk about it.

R: We will when I have it.

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Secy Sisco

10:30 a.m., 9-70

X-1

S: Henry, we have just received a telegram from Moscow which you probably will have received in San Clemente by now. I am having a check run. Let me read it to you because it is a note - an oral type thing. (Sisco read the message).

S: The Soviet Government expects that the Government of USA will undertake the steps to prevent Israel from taking the steps they are planning. Our man in Moscow believes we should come back urgently with action he recommends.

K: Thing is not true, of course.

S: We have talked about this here and think it affords us an opportunity to do the following. Vorontsov just asked to see me urgently and he is meeting with me at 2:30 pm today. At the meeting I will just say thank you very much and receive the message. I will take two steps. We ought to tell the Israelis that this note has been received and, of course, we wish to repeat to them what we really said the other day that we assume that there is not going to be any unilateral action on their part and how serious this would be. The second phase would be to go back to the Russians and say we have taken action in this regard but we want to say to you that you have a responsibility and we have then put them in a position of getting these things out of here and then to conclude by saying once these missiles have been removed, you, the Russians will no longer have any worry about this. I would like to proceed this way. This raises the question of the letter you have.

K: The Secretary does not wish to send it. And I am not prepared to overrule him.

S: Then we can proceed in this way which will achieve the same thing but it gives us the opportunity to (K interrupted here).

K: Let me tell you my reaction. I would not give color to the fact that we have taken appropriate measures. That gives them a shot at the Arabs. All we need to do is tell Rabin that we have had this communication and I would not make any new views. I would not go back to the Russians today and then today I would go back with essentially what you have done here.

Authority E.0.12958

By AB NARA Date 6/9/01

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Secy Sisco
10:30 a.m., 9-6-70

By: KHC NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

TELCORN
V. P. /Kissinger

2:24 pm

9/8/70

VP: I just finished talking to Rogers a little bit. I thought if you saw the analysis in the Baltimore Sun about the proposed Ky visit to attend that rally. Reading from the article "?? ?? ?? ?" (indicates that the V.P. knew about the Ky visit even before going to V. N. and that he encouraged Ky to come. It also implied that the V.P. wasn't congnizant of what this could mean to the country.) It's totally false. "?? ?? ?? ?" It's the same old "this guy doesn't know what he is doing but we must not be too hard on him." I told Bill that they did it on the President-elect of Guatemala. You have to sit on these non-attributive statements. I am sending him (a very tough note and every time this happens I am going to send him a very tough note, until they stop.) The only people in the meeting were Bunker, Ky and me. I said he should check it out and make sure ?? ?? ?? ??

K: You know Bunker didn't make it.

VP: When Ky made his statement it was probably leaked by someone who wanted to embarrass me. Ky's statement alone without the confirmation by out people wouldn't have done it. American sources confirmed. There was no one to confirm it. Bunker didn't as I didn't.

K: You and I know what the problem is. It can be stopped. One of the papers the President wants to do, he wants the Foreign Service to get into the ceasefire and they have kept it very quiet. So they can do it.

VP: Every time it happens, I am going to raise hell. Bill said he would retract it.

K: Send us a copy and we will get it to the President.

VP: I will send you a copy.

K: Send it to Haldeman.

Telecon
Secretary Laird
9/8/70 2:30 p.m.

L: I wanted to check on a couple of things with you. First, when I talked to you . . . on Friday when the Israelis were over here in the building working on the F4s and A4s, they didn't go along with the F-4s in 120 days.

K: What do you mean in 120 days?

L: We offered them 120-day credit. That's the most liberal we can give.

K: What do they want?

L: They want us to give it to them.

K: How did we give them the others?

L: [something about the Military Sales Bill] . . . and the 1969 finance bill. We never got the finance bill in 1970 or 71. We have kept a close balance back and forth. They are going to take it up with their Finance Minister and he wants to talk to David Kennedy about it.

K: Is there anything we can do about it?

L: No I just wanted youto be aware of it. On the proposals for the use of the American military, we have these timetables.

K: That's just a pipe dream anyway; we can't get it done by tomorrow night can we?

L: We might be able to; it would take 24 to 36 hours.

K: On the evacuation plans, we've got that all worked out.

K: And on that other thing, I thought you didn't want to get into it.

K L: No, you're right. The last time we alerted the State Department said we hadn't and certain people hadn't known and we got shawndown shot down so fast. No, I didn't want to do it.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 1258
By NARA Date 6/9/70

*

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: What do they want?

K: On the evacuation plans, we've got that all worked out KAVVAXXXXX

K L: No, you're right. The last time we alerted the State Department said we hadn't and certain people hadn't known and we got showdown shot down so fast. No, I didn't want to do it.

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

September 9, 1970 4:25 p.m.

jlj

R: Henry

K: Yes Bill.

R: I was calling on another subject, not the Middle East this time, only peripherally. Do we have a date for Mrs. Meir to see the President yet?

K: I think it is the 18th.

R: He talked to me a couple of times on the plane. He said we should see her together. Then there is no difference between us. Do we have a time of day?

K: My guess is in the afternoon. I can get it for you quickly.

R: No, there is no need. I will be over there in a little while. I will get it then.

K: OK

R: See you in a little while.

DECLANDED
Authority E.O.1558
By: NARA Date 6/9/70

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

*

TELCON

Amb. Stoessel/Kissinger

6:05 pm

9.8.70

K: We have disapproved the catalytic cracker.

S: I know. Harold Scott wants to tell the Poles and Romanians about the decision.

K: We have already authorized the Romanians.

S: How do we put it to the Poles? He plans to see the Amb. and Stans. Harold told me that he got it from you that perhaps at some future date there's a chance.

K: I haven't talked to him.

S: How do you see it?

K: If there's a general realization of relations then there's a possibility. You can say we may take another look at it next year.

S: I know there's a petroleum task force looking at this.

K: This won't have any bearing on it.

S: Nothing more specific that we should say.

K: Not that I can think of. When are you going back?

S: the 22nd.

K: I would like to see you. How about calling David Young in my office. He makes the appointments for me.

S: I will talk to him. How about the x chief?

K: Let me see what I can do.

S: He might be interested in the Chinese angle. I think we may get back with them when I return.

K: That would be good. I will set something up.

S: It would be good to say I have talked to him. ? ? ? ? We want to exclude a bitter dialogue.

K: Say we have the whole subject under review.

By KML NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCOM

Amb. Wm. Sullifan/Kissinger

1:00 p.m.

9/9/70

S: The Secy. of Stat has asked me to consult with you.

K: Jesus! Get a medical check!

S: On three points. The first one is his feeling that we should draft an x instruc-
tion on Bunker on this initiative.

K: I agree.

S: His thought -- he doean't know and wonders if you have any idea of the precise date.

K: In that last week.

S: I thought between 25 and Oct. 1

K: 23 and Oct. 1.

S: I thought in that instance we should get it out as soon as possible.
I will start a draft and check with Dick Symser. No. 2, On the visit of Ky.
I am trying to keep the U.S. out. Bunker recommends we get into it. It
has been suggested to him from President Thieu's office. It was agreed that
the two President's would consult. He wants us to forestall Ky.

K: I don't think so.

S: But the Secy. doesn't think Ky should come before the elections.

K: Right. Get him to see the light.

S: I have suggested to Ky that he delay until November on the grounds that our V. P. who is his running mate's counter-part will be tied up with the elections.

K: I wouldn't think we could use that other protest. I don't think the President would. I was present at that meeting and that's very thin.

S: Three, is our information that Shultz and Ehrlichman are going --

K: To Japan. I suggested VN for a feel of it.

S: The other point, since they will be in VN during the time of the economic
______ that that might be of value.

K: Excellent idea.

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger
1:00 p.m. 9/9/70

-2-

S: Did you get my memo on the economic thing and give Bunker your decree?

K: Yes but I forget.

S: It suggested the possibility that something may have to come out from the
President.

K: Still needed.

S: Perhaps Shultz and Ehrlichman could carry that out.

K: Let you know tomorrow.

S: Since then it's clear that the Senate will not act at all. Thieu is reluctant
but I think we have to do it.

K: Unless it brings him down.

S: I have all our people independently doing an assessment of consequences.
They feel it would be unpleasant but he would survive.

K: What about the Cooper plan?

S: That's what I am talking about. It's agreed but Thieu and Bunker ______
concur put it in effect without political sanction. Bunker wants to urge him to take
the risk.

K: I will think about it and let you know tomorrow. It's an historic occasion.

1

S: I should have advised you to be sitting down.

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Laird/Kissinger/Flanigan

3:30 pm 9/9/70

K: I have that program now. I understand that they want to put armed guards, civilians, but then move in military personnel on an interim basis and may create a special force of air marshalls.

L: We can recruit retired people. I think civilian people should be civilian. If they shot anyone while in civilian clothes -- a military man in civilian clothes can be convicted of being a spy.

K: Explain it to Flanigan. I will put him on.

L: I am glad you are shifted to using marshalls. That's the way to do this.

K: Brasard reviewed every available source of personnel and said we cannot train people too fast. By the way, he's a very good man.

L: We can use retired people.

K: Your admiral didn't feel there was any source other than armed forces in the near future.

L: We have to train our men.

F: A fellow who has come through a course knows more than someone who hasn't.

L: You are talking about 5,000 men and we have retired people -- sergeants -- otherwise we have to get volunteers because we cannot assign them to civilian jobs. We will charge the airlines?

K: The President hasn't said. There would be a good argument for not doing that.

L: You have to charge the airlines. You put a security tax or charge on this. You have to give them TDY and clothing allowance. TDY on 5,000 men would be $______ million. a

K: Could we ask Congress for it?

L: The appropriations --

F: We could add it to the Cambodian Map.

L: I can't get any map to Congress. You will have to charge customers. On domestic flights?

F: We have to or else they will take one of those.

By: KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

Laird/Kissinger/Flanigan
3:30 p.m. 9/9/70

-2-

L: Everyone but Panam is working on searching and has been.

F: They are only doing it half-heartedly. We haven't given them marshalls to make the arrests.

L: Military personnel cannot arrest either. They can only protect. Did you get those questions?

F: I have asked your man to provide them and the answers.

L: The answers have to be worked out with military law (?) people at State. We have someone coming over. No problem using them if you mark them or in uniform.

F: That makes them sitting ducks.

L: If they are policemen, they would have to identify themselves.

F: Put them on as secret agents.

L: They couldn't leave the plane. They would be in trouble.

F: They would leave their weapons on board the plane.

L: They couldn't bring weapons into the terminals.

F: We have to work out a program as quick as possible.

L: Bill is working with the President of TWA now.

F: He is anxious to have a program.

L: He wants it paid by the government up to $100 million a year. I think passengers should pay it. Congress will say that people should pay for it for using the airlines. That it can't be assigned to the general public. You have less than 4/10 of a percent travelling on international flights. A passenger would be willing to pay for security even if it's $5-10. We are the only air lines flying shotgun.

F: El Al.

K: Or people will fly American air lines when we do it. Can't we permit them to add $5.00?

L: Sure and credit it to the FAA and get a reimbursement.

By: KLC U NARA, Dato

5/12/04

-3-

F: I am sure we can but when you use the army to go to Santo Domingo to protect American citizens, did you charge them?

L: Living there?

F: Yes.

L: Believe me, you will not get appropriations from Congress unless they are reimbursed by airlines. You will have to charge people using the airlines.

F: OK

L: You have to -- I will send you a plan.

K: The problem now -- When can the President go on this? He wanted to this afternoon but that's impossible.

L: I am trying to get recommendations from the JCS on how much training they need. If a guy gets on and shoots down an aisle and shoots the pilot (there is then a sex discussion on guns going off on planes and the problem of decompression.) They will get trigger happy. You can shoot a bullet in an airplane because it takes a period of time to depressurize an airplane.

K: I think we need to get your recommendation of issues to be resolved. We will go tomorrow afternoon.

F: If we could get questions and alternatives answers we could get them resolved tonight.

L: Stevex Stevenson is coming over.

F: He is very good.

L: Tomm Moorer is seeing how much training should be given to these guys. Who should be picked. Who's request. I suppose it will be announced that there is no it's being done by American flag ships.

F: The President will probably say it's done on request.

K: We should be able to say who will pay.

F: Heyy -- I have a couple of memos on the Armed Forces Journal on how we are cutting back on Defense to fast. It's from Haig. I can give you an answer. I think we have given too deep a cut. It doesn't do any good to go back and defend our position.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHW NARA, Date: 5/13/04

-4-

K: I will do a memo to the President saying we have talked.

L: I don't want to be on record. I will take any cut I am told to take. I will not be in a position to have to explain these cuts. The other is a memo on Margaret Chase Smith. Her concern and I will reply (?) that we haven't gone forward on sea pay over extended periods of time. I am for it. I have gone to BOB several times. I have been turned down. I am afraid I will be running counter to the administration and I have to support the administration which is in flux opposition to her. She thinks that the Secy. of Defense I should be trumpeting the cause. I am for it.

K: I have been called to the President, I will call you. Thank you.

TELCORN

Rabin/Kissinger

5:00 p. m. 9/9/70

R: I understand you are troubled with the planes now.

K: Your airplane knew what to do.

R: We had no illusions from the beginning so we armed ourselves. The point I would like to raise is the question of the visit. I understand the 18th is fine.

K: At 11:00 in the morning. Tentatively.

R: For the time being. I would like to make it clear.

K: Whenever you want to I will be glad to talk about other things.

R: Whenever you are free to do so I would like to do so.

K: I will call you in a day or two.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12158
By: A.B. NARA Date 6/9/70

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/13/04

*

TELCORN

Mr. Flanigan

Mr. Kissinger

September 10, 1970, 3:00 p.m.

F: When I talked with the President on this statement, he stated it was not tough enough. We improved it somewhat. Is there any merit in saying we will hold the country in whose bounds the plane lands responsible for the safety of our people and for our property. I am having some little problem with State.

K: I would tell the State Department what we want.

F: I have told them and Rogers will have to take it up with the President if he objects. Do you think we would gain any mileage in saying we will hold the country in whose bounds the plane lands responsible for the safety of all the American people on the plane?

K: I would say for the property and the citizens.

F: For the U.S. citizens and property.

K: Yes.

F: That means we are holding Egypt responsible for the plane they blew up? We got the people back. What are we going to do about the plane?

K: Demand payment and see what happens.

F: What if they say go to hell?

K: If they kill the people, the same is true. We should get tough now. Don't think I am not in agreement with what is being done. I think this is a weak attitude. I don't think these Arabs are going to kill people.

F: Should we send paratroops in?

K: No, not now, we will either make a strong statement and act on it or not make a statement. This is the 18th month of the Administration and we are running out of publicity.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

-2-

I would still tell the President if you say this you have to do
something. I am in favor of it and doing something.

F: What would you say about the $20 million airplane?

K: I refuse to get drawn into this without staffing being done. This is no way to do business. We have to get the thing out tomorrow. I want the tough statement in. We can figure out sanctuaries(sanctions?).

F: As long as you are satisfied that we will have sanctuaries(sanctions?).

K: We will figure out sanctuaries(sanctions?).

F: Okay

mlh

Reproduced from the original
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHLN NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Ambassador Ortona
9/10/70 5:20 p.m.

O: The tentative answer of my government is yes, but I am still waiting for a cable giving me a few questions to ask you. I would appreciate it if you could see me tomorrow morning for 10 to 15 minutes. There may be some problems. It might be difficult to have the two visits in the capital in the same day and then go down.

K: That's been turned around now. Let me see if I have any time tomorrow. How about 12:30?

O: Okay.

K: Or would another time be better.

O: I have got to leave for Cincinnati at 2:00.

K: Okay then make it 11:30.

O: Okay. One thing from Rome is that they would like to see the announcement a little bit delayed. There are reasons why I will tell you tomorrow morning.

K: What date for the announcement?

O: The 25th.

K: That's impossible. Of course we can do it out of another country too if there are difficulties. We could do it out of Spain and just see the Pope.

O: Oh no, for God's sake don't do that. That just creates a problem between church and state that has been going on for four centuries.

K: It's impossible to announce on the 25th because we would have to send advance teams out if we were leaving on the 27th.

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
9/10/70 5:55 p.m.

K: I just wanted to check with you if they announce the 6th Fiet
visit this weekend is that apxk apt to screw up the negotiations on the
release of prisoners?

R: It might take on a significance. Could you wait till Monday.

K: I am leaning in that direction.

R: I think that's better. I asked Peter Flanigan to take out that
Kcorxx "condemn" language because it too could have an effect. I
think it's best not to do that now. The President has this other announce-
ment tomorrow anyway.

K: Okay.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 1958
By AB NARA Dae 5/9/01

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Rabin
9/10/70; 7:20 p.m.

R: How are you?

K: Okay. You called me?

R: I talked to Haig about the problem of when we can let the public know there would be a meeting.

K: Can I confirm it to you tomorrow morning. I think you can do it almost anytime. I have not been able to get to Haldeman who handles these things. I will have an answer to you by 9:30 tomorrow morning.

R: There are some preparations that have to be made.

K: You can be certain there are no problems. It is a pure courtesy problem at this point -- having President mentioned without his specific approval. I can assure you there is no possibility of a hitch.

R: I thought it would be helpful if I could have an informal talk with you about some of your views prior to the visit. Whenever it is possible -- the sooner, the better.

K: Let me see what my schedule is for the next few days and then we can get together.

R: The sooner I will be able to give them something, the better it will be for them.

K: I have to find some government that takes me seriously. (Laughter) I will get together with you and give you my views.

R: I think I would like to tell you in an informal way what we have in mind.

K: That I take it is for me, or to be passed on? Let's discuss that. You mean to be kept in this building?

R: I would not talk to anybody else.

K: I will try to do it on Saturday or tomorrow late in the afternoon.

R: The sooner, the better.

K: I had planned to go to New York but I don't think I can do that tomorrow. If I don't, we can talk tomorrow.

R: You will let me know on the other.

K: Let's say by 10:00 a.m. feg

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 1258
By AB NARA Date 6/9/70

Telecon
Roger Davies (Sisco's office)

9/11/70 11:30 a.m.

D: I have just talked with Vine in Berne who said they will
make the five-power declaration in a matter of minutes in behalf
of the five countries concerned. The Swiss are extremely grate-
ful to the President and have no problem with the White House
statement supporting their statement.

K: We may change a few words. Does that bother you?

D: No, no problem with that.

K: Okay, thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12158
By NARA Date 6/9/01