THE ISSUES AT GENEVA

2

[LC]

pursuant to the principles and provisions of Security Council Resolution 242, of November 22, 1967.

The peremptory form of this paragraph is a response by the Council to the central fact about the Middle Eastern conflict for twenty-five years -- that the Arab states, and notably Egypt among them, have refused to carry out many less mandatory Resolutions of the Security Council, including Resolution 242 itself, which called on them to make peace with Israel.

We attach an authoritative analysis of Security Council Resolution 242, from Volume 64 of the Proceedings of the American Journal of International Law (1970). The analysis was written by Professor Eugene V. Rostow of Yale University. As Undersecretary of State in 1967 and 1968, he had been charged with the direction of American policy towards the Middle Eastern crisis.

The basic idea of Resolution 242, as shown in Professor Rostow's paper, is that of a "package deal," whose structure and content were determined by the experience of the world community with the Suez settlement of 1957. After Suez, the United States induced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai without a peace treaty, in exchange for Egyptian promises to make peace with Israel, to allow Israel to use the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal, and to prevent guerrilla attacks on Israel from Egyptian territory. It was explicitly understood between the parties and at the United Nations in 1957 that if Egypt should ever use force to close the Strait of Tiran, Israel would be justified in using force to open the waterway, as a legitimate act of self-defense. This of course, was exactly what happened late in May and early in June, 1967.

THE ISSUES AT GENEVA

3

[LC]

The experience of 1957 was in every mind when Security Council Resolution 242 was drafted and negotiated. In effect, the Security Council decided not to repeat the error of 1957. This time, it determined, Israel need not withdraw a single soldier from the cease-fire lines until an agreement establishing peace had been signed by the parties. The peace agreements would deal with the problems specified in the Resolution, and, when agreed, Israel would withdraw from the territories occupied during the 1967 war to definitive boundaries.

On this fundamental issue, -- the nature of the package deal embodied in Resolution 242, -- there has been no disagreement between the United States and its allies. While some Arab spokesmen have occasionally claimed that under the Resolution Israel should withdraw from occupied territories in advance of peace negotiations, the European and Asian allies of the United States have always agreed that the Resolution requires no withdrawals until peace agreements have been signed. Against the background of the history of the 1957 agreements, it would be hard to assert another view.

Some disagreement between the United States and its allies has arisen, however, on a second issue -- the boundaries to which Israel should withdraw after peace agreements have been signed. In recent years, some European nations, and more recently the nine members of the European Community as a group, have nominally supported the view that Resolution 242 requires Israel to withdraw from all the territories it occupied as a result of the 1967 war: i.e., that the definitive international boundaries of Israel to be established by peace treaties under Resolution 242 should be the Armistice Demarcation Lines of 1949.

The case for this view derives from the official French text of Resolution 242, which calls for Israeli withdrawal "des territoires" occupied

THE ISSUES AT GENEVA

4

during the 1967 war. When this text appeared in 1967, the British and American governments immediately protested to the Secretary General. The United Nations Secretariat explained that there was no other way to translate the English text into French; that the Russian text had no articles at all; and that in any event the record of the debates on the subject before the Security Council, and especially the fact that a number of amendments proposing Israeli withdrawal from "all the occupied territories" had been defeated without recourse to the veto, made the meaning of the Resolution entirely clear.

Satisfied with this answer, and unable to formulate a more accurate French translation, Britain and the United States dropped the matter, only to witness its recrudescence six years later.

While the Arab states have engaged in a long campaign to gain support for the so-called French text of Resolution 242, it is significant that after the recent Algiers Arab summit meeting, the issue has been abandoned. No recent attempt has been made to obtain Israeli or American acquiescence in this position as a condition for attending the Geneva Conference.

## II. The Issues

### 1. One Conference or Several?

Both reason and history suggest that the Geneva Conference should be divided into separate bilateral groups, following the procedure successfully used at the Rhodes Conference in 1949. Such negotiating teams would deal with the bilateral issues between Israel and each of its neighbors. The only issue affecting Israel and all the parties to the negotiation is that of a refugee settlement. There is no reason to allow Syria, for example, to participate in the discussions between Jordan and Israel over their

THE ISSUES AT GENEVA

5

[LC]

boundaries, their economic relations, and the novel arrangements they may
decide to make in order to reconcile their interests and positions on a
number of matters, such as the possibility of a customs union.

The experience of Lausanne suggests that when the Arab nations are
united in a conference as a group, all tend to rally to the most intransigent
position.

## 2. No Withdrawals Before a Peace Agreement is Signed.

The first issue to be confirmed at the Conference, perhaps at the opening
session, is the central concept of Resolution 242 as a package deal: that
is, no withdrawals until a peace agreement has been signed. Nothing in
the recent diplomacy of the subject should prevent European nations, Japan,
or other friendly nations from fully and effectively supporting the American
view of the matter, which has never been officially challenged in any event
by the Arab states. They should make their views known publicly or privately
to the Secretary General, and to the representatives of the Soviet Union,
the United States, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria.

A corollary of this principle concerns the nature of the peace to be
established. It should be stressed that the just and durable peace contemplated by the Resolution of October 22, 1973, must be full peace within
the meaning of the Charter. The character of that peace will inevitably
have an effect on the timing and extent of the withdrawals to be undertaken,
and on the negotiating position of Israel and the United States on many
secondary questions.

## 3. Demilitarization of the Key to All Four Sets of Negotiations.

The secret and illegal Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel of October 6
makes obvious a point on which most students of the subject had long since

THE ISSUES AT GENEVA

6

[LC]

agreed: that the complete demilitarization of the Sinai is the only
possible basis for a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, and that
correspondingly clear and extensive demilitarization agreements would be
required to justify any Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank, the Gaza
Strip, and the Golan Heights.

A prompt and clear agreement on the principle of complete demilitarization should be the first substantive issue on the agenda. Such an agreement should clear the air for every other issue of the negotiation. The problem of "secure and recognized" boundaries would obviously look different to Israel if the Sinai were to be demilitarized than if Egypt would have the right to move troops into the area at will.

## 4. Disengagement and Demilitarization.

The thorny problem of disengaging Egyptian and Israeli forces near the Suez Canal should be examined in the context of the problem of demilitarization. The Israeli and Egyptian forces along both sides of the Suez Canal should be separated in ways which advance the principle of demilitarizing the Sinai peninsula.

This is the problem on which the Rogers plan broke down. That experience highlights the centrality of the problem for the negotiations as a whole.

Secondly, disengagement arrangements should not seek to evade the basic principle of the package deal concept of Resolution 242. Disengagement should not be pushed to the point where it becomes Israeli withdrawal before a peace agreement is negotiated and signed. As noted above, Israeli withdrawals are required only after the parties have made peace.

THE ISSUES AT GENEVA

7

5. Security Arrangements and Boundaries.

Resolution 242 contemplates security arrangements to assure Israel maritime rights through all the waterways of the region, as well as protection for its definite borders to be established by the peace treaties.

The first principle to be stressed on this as on all other aspects of the problem is that the parties should be free to negotiate without excessive pressure from those who are not parties to the dispute. The experience of 1957, when the United States government used coercive measures to induce Israel to accept its plan for withdrawal without peace, should be a sufficient lesson to the powers about the risks of such a course. The maximum force of the petroleum boycott should be reduced within a few weeks, as a result of American diplomacy and other factors. Unless the Geneva Conference genuinely achieves a negotiating situation like that at Rhodes, the question of Arab good faith in the negotiations may well poison the atmosphere of the Conference, and prevent it from achieving its goal. The publication in Beirut of the secret annex apparently agreed at the Arab Summit Conference in Algiers makes this a grave issue. That annex presents the Geneva Conference as the first step in a two-phase plan intended to destroy the state of Israel.

On the problem of boundaries, the parties should be free to agree on a wide range of procedures for establishing and securing definitive boundaries, ranging from annexations, leases, and condominiums to extra-territorial arrangements, custodianships, and special corridors.

In this connection, it should be noted that the status of the occupied territories under international law is quite different. While Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai is controversial, Israel has not recently contested

THE ISSUES AT GENEVA

8

the Egyptian territorial claim in that area. Egypt makes no claim of
sovereignty over the Gaza Strip. And the claim of Jordan to sovereignty
in the West Bank has never been recognized internationally, by the United
States and many other countries. They regard Jordan as the occupying
power in that region, under the Armistice Agreements of 1949, holding part
of the mandated territories as a result of the fighting which followed
the Arab armed attack on the partition plan recommended by the General
Assembly in 1947, and never confirmed or approved by the Security Council.

6. The Problem of the Arab Refugees.

Resolution 242 calls upon the parties to reach a just settlement of
the refugee problem as an integral part of their agreements of peace.

Manifestly, all the nations should approach this serious human and
political issue magnanimously, and in a spirit of peace. Like many other
problems of refugees and displaced persons, it is an issue which concerns
the international community as a whole.

In order to facilitate a solution of the problem, the international
community should arrange a series of alternatives for the Arab refugees.
They should be allowed to elect among these alternatives through secret
procedures of individual choice. A reasonable number could well be
allowed to return to Israel, pursuant to proposals of the kind Israel has
made from time to time in the past, especially to facilitate family reunions.

A fair compensation plan should be a basic element of any refugee
settlement.

On the much mooted problem of Palestinian self-determination, Resolution
242 remits the issue to the kingdom of Jordan, which has been recognized
by the international community since 1921 as the state which should include

YALE UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOL
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

December 18, 1973

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
The Secretary of State
The Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Henry:

I enclose an exchange of letters with Kurt Birrenbach for your information, since they deal with the delicate subject of German ratification of N.P.T., and the possibility of a European nuclear force.

Congratulations on the evident success of your trip to Brussels and London. It is good to read the news that came out of both capitals. And good luck in your Middle Eastern and Vietnamese talks.

Yours, as always,

EVR/dhw

Enclosures

Dr.Dr.h.c. Kurt Birrenbach

Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages

53 Bonn

Bundeshaus

Fernruf 16...................

Die Wahl dieser Rufnummer vermittelt den gewünschten Hausanschluß.

Kommt ein Anschluß nicht zustande, bitte
Nr. 161 (Bundeshaus-Vermittlung) anrufen.

4 Düsseldorf, December 10, 1973

Berliner Allee 33

Professor Eugene V. Rostow
Yale University
Law School
New Haven, Connecticut /USA

Dear Eugene:

Thank you very much for your letter of November 13. I am
very glad that we are, as far as the present situation is
concerned, in full agreement. I can only hope that Europe
and the United States will arrive at concrete and construc-
tive solutions as far as the creation of a real partner-
ship is concerned, which for both - for Europe as for the
United States - should have priority vis-à-vis the rela-
tions with the Soviet Union. If we do not stick together,
the interests of the United States as well as of Europe
would be very seriously affected. This applies still more
to Europe, because the last crisis has shown that we have
made progress as far as our economic potential is concerned.
On the other side our vulnerability with respect to oil
and raw materials is much superior to your's and the Soviet
Union. The last point is decisive. I have written some
other articles in German magazines on the same topic. I
made speeches before our Parliamentary Group and Committees
of our Party. I talked with Government officials to make
clear the urgent necessity to come to terms with you. I
also fully share your judgement with respect to the Middle
East crisis. The memorandum of November 9 you sent me is

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the best paper I have seen on this crisis, whoever it
may have written. It is objective, clear and takes into
consideration the whole world situation.

As far as the NPT is concerned, I am now the main rapporteur of my party for the whole treaty. I defend the position I have explained to you in a very cautious way and I try to convince my party that with the reinforcement of the European option by a cautious interpretation of the treaty and a confirmation of your interpretations 1 to 5, as far as the security structure of NATO is concerned, the treaty, as bad as it is, should be accepted. You know that I have been always a European Atlanticist. I think that the reinvigoration of the Alliance is absolutely necessary and that without the United States we cannot defend Europe. But I think we should try to begin to accelerate the political integration of Europe, including foreign policy, defense and security. That is the only chance to become a real partner of the United States. In that case the consultation problem will solve itself, because two big powers, as far as they have common interests, will consult mutually if their interests are directly affected. I repeat again that the press conference of the Secretary of State of October 25 has shown to me, as you say, that some people in your country will stop talking about an American special relationship with the Soviet Union. I can only hope that you will overcome soon your constitutional crisis and avoid a loss of authority in conducting your foreign affairs, as the Secretary of State insinuated in the press conference I just mentioned.

I also admire the brilliance and courage of the Israeli
armed forces. But the world since 1967 has changed. I have
warned Mrs. Meir just in May 1971 when I visited her a
few days after Secretary Rogers' visit. More or less I
have predicted her what has happened now or perhaps may

-3-

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

YALE UNIVERSITY · LAW SCHOOL

December 18, 1973

Dr.Dr.h.c. Kurt Birrenbach
Berliner Allee 33
4 Düsseldorf
Federal Republic of Germany

Dear Kurt:

I was happy to have your interesting letter of December 10, which arrived as I returned from a vigorous week in London, where I delivered the enclosed speech, and had a series of talks with our Atlantic colleagues, and with the Foreign Office.

I think the tide has turned. The response to events, as crystallized around Secretary Kissinger's trip to Brussels and London, encourages me to believe that European and American opinion is taking constructive shape. This is the result we hoped to encourage through our Amsterdam meeting. It was the result Kissinger sought by way of a European answer to his speech of April 24. The statement of the Nine, issued on December 14, is sound, and I am confident the NATO statement will also be sound.

The most urgent tasks of the moment, I think, are (1) to achieve a concerted diplomatic policy for the Atlantic nations as an influence on the Middle East negotiations in Geneva, and (2) to eliminate finally the poisonous offset problem.

On the Middle Eastern question, I think the first principle, on which it should be possible for all of us to agree, is that the famous Resolution 242 embodies a package deal -- withdrawal for a peace agreement settling the problems set out in the Resolution. At a minimum, the package deal concept means no Israeli withdrawals until the peace agreement has been negotiated and signed. The reason for that principle is obvious in the history of the 1957 settlement, which we negotiated for Nasser, and which he then broke.

The key to everything in that context, I think, is that the first item on the agenda at Geneva should be the complete demilitarization of the Sinai, a solution fair to both sides, and one which would transform the problem of boundaries, maritime rights, and so on (including the ticklish problem of disengaging the forces).

As to the boundary question itself, which is the only issue on which we and the Europeans nominally disagree, it will take care of itself if

Dr.Dr.h.c. Kurt Birrenbach

2

December 18, 1973

the principle of demilitarization is agreed. The European position, relying on the French text of the Resolution (withdrawal "des territoires occupés ...") is really frivolous. We and the British protested that version in November, 1967, and were told by the U.N. translating services there was no other way to say it in French! The Russian version, of course, has no articles at all! The real point is that seven or eight amendments proposing Israeli withdrawals from <u>all the</u> occupied territories were defeated, without use of the veto.

As for the offset problem, I still believe the only sound long-term solution is the Lend-Lease principle, which I expound again in the enclosed speech. It would mean that American military supplies for Europe would be on our account, DM expenditures on yours, pound expenditures for the British, and so on. But it would end the poisonous political issue of some allies losing or gaining in their balance of payments as a result of security decisions.

I hope Europe will not rush into a strategic nuclear program. That would be a major step in many, many perspectives, and a difficult one for everybody. Above all, however, as the Chinese posture shows, it could not really alter the basic problem, since the actual use of nuclear weapons is so problematical.

With warm good wishes for Christmas and the New Year, and with most affectionate appreciation for your valiant spirit and work,

Yours sincerely,

EVR/dhw

Enclosure

cc: Honorable Henry Kissinger

["cc: Honorables Henry Kießinger", "Europeans", "EAF\\qpn", "Yonse sincerely,", "most affectionate abscission for your ardent spirit and work,", "With warm good wishes for Christmas and the New Year, and with", "measles in so propitious a condition not really after the past brooms, since the actual ease of nuclear for everybody. Vpows all, however, as the Chinese brooms shows, it would be a major step in many, many perspectives, and a difficult one I hope Europe will not need into a strategic nuclear program. That decisions.", "loving or gaining in their presence of benefits as a result of security and so on. But it would end the heterogeneous political phase of some states on our account, DM expenditures on yours, bound expenditures for the British, speech. It would mean that American written subsidies for Europe would be solution is the long-lease principle, which I expound again in the encyclopaedia. It would mean that American written subsidies for Europe would be solution is

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

February 25, 1974

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
The Secretary of State
State Department
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Henry:

I am a little uncertain about the protocol
problem involved, but in the nature of our rela-
tionship I enclose, for your personal and confi-
dential information, a copy of a letter I have
just sent to the President.

With warm good wishes,

Yours, as always,

EVR/dhw

Enclosure

JUGENE V. ROSTOW

February 25, 1974

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of February 13. I am glad to speak out for
the Constitution.

May I call a matter of deepening concern to your attention?

You have spoken of our relations with the Soviet Union -- most recently
in your address to Congress on the State of the Union -- as if a condition
of detente has been achieved. While an understanding with the Soviet Union
on the reciprocal rules which should govern our relationship has been and
certainly should be a primary goal of American foreign policy, and you have
labored faithfully in the vineyard, I am convinced that what you have in
mind when you talk of detente does not exist. Soviet behavior in the Far
East, the Middle East, and elsewhere is simply incompatible with any plau-
sible interpretation of the promises they made to you in the Declaration of
May 29, 1972, on Basic Principles of Relations between the two countries.

Your recent statements on detente therefore lull American opinion at a
time when it should be alerted.

I can detect no sign of a Soviet effort to carry out the Geneva Agree-
ment of 1962 about Laos and Cambodia, or the Indo-Chinese Peace Agreements
of January and March, 1973. On the contrary, it seems apparent that the
Soviet Union is moving heaven and earth to nullify those agreements.

Similarly, in the Middle East, far from working with us to induce
Syria and Egypt to make peace under Security Council Resolution 242, which
was surely your legitimate expectation when you signed the Moscow Decla-
ration, the Soviet Union prepared, encouraged, and indeed incited the
October war against that Resolution, and only desisted when the Arabs were
defeated by Israel, with our staunch help.

Since the Soviet goal in the October war was NATO, and the American
link to Europe, not Israel alone, the issue is absolutely vital to the
security of the United States and of its allies. I venture to enclose a
recent article on the subject.

[LC]

The President

2

February 25, 1974

I hope you will seriously consider the possibility of making a statement on the subject soon -- a statement which could provide a more realistic foundation for American and Allied public opinion and foreign policy. Moscow might be the most appropriate and most spectacular setting for such a statement. It would suffice, I think, to express disappointment that our quest for detente has not yet been successful, and that Soviet actions have not met the standards established by the Moscow Declaration, as we understand it.

Confronting the massive and indeed accelerating buildup of Soviet nuclear and conventional arms, we should be increasing our military budget not only in nuclear weapons, but in all categories of conventional power, and in research and development as well.

But we cannot expect American or Allied public opinion to understand the need for much larger military budgets while they also hear that our relations with the Soviet Union are on a footing of "detente."

There is another dimension to the problem. Unless Allied conventional and strategic forces fully and visibly match those of the Soviet Union, there will be an increase within China in the influence of the strong Chinese groups which oppose China's rapprochement with the United States, and favor a renewal of its close association with the Soviet Union. Even from the evidence in the press, it is obvious that tendencies in this direction have become manifest.

In my view, we are at a critical moment in the evolution of our affairs -- the most serious, indeed, since 1945. Our basic position is favorable, especially if we can deepen and consolidate our rapprochement with China, and our alliances with Japan and the European nations. But people are troubled, divided, and uncertain. They want desperately to believe in the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. And they are not always clear about what foreign policy is for.

Here and in Europe, the great problem is a paralysis of will. People hesitate to act, although at one level they know that reality does not match their hopes. The atmosphere sometimes recalls the time of the sleep-walkers in the late thirties. The spell must be broken, and broken soon, or the slide towards war will become nearly unmanageable.

The success of the recent Washington conference on energy was an important and heartening beginning, and I congratulate you on it. But it was no more than a beginning. We should now be moving forward with comparable energy and determination on a number of fronts, fully supported by an informed public opinion. I am utterly confident that with the

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

February 12, 1974

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
The Secretary of State
The State Department
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Henry:

Your speech to the assembled Foreign Ministers on energy was superb, and I cheer. A great state paper, and, I hope and believe, the beginning of a process that should be as powerful and effective as the nuclear weapon itself in overcoming the centrifugal tendencies within the indispensable alliance.

The Secretary of State should always be an optimist, and live by Porter's Law: "When in doubt, do the right thing." You did, superbly.

As always,

EVR/dhw

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

March 12, 1974

Dear Henry:

To complete your files on the subject, I
enclose Kurt Birrenbach's report on the final
stages of the NPT debate in (and near) the
Bundestag.

With warm regards,

Yours cordially,

EVR/dhw

Enclosure

Dr.Dr.h.c. Kurt Birrenbach

53 Bonn
Bundeshaus

Fernruf 16....................

Die Wahl dieser Rau Nummer vermittelt den
gewünschten Hauswahlbü.

4 Düsseldorf, February 27, 1974

Berliner Allee 33

Dear Eugene:

I thank you very much for your letter of February 5. I fully
agree with you. I discussed this matter also with Carstens
and we shall see what we can do. I had the intention to
fly to the United States last week for talks in Washington
and New York. In any case I would have telephoned with you.
Unfortunately I had to cancel my trip because I had certain
light heart troubles three days before my departure and
two days before the decisive debate in the Bundestag on
the NPT. My speech destined for the Bundestag has been read
before the floor because I could not participate in this
debate. This is a pity. As you know the Bundestag approved
the NPT and the Verification Agreement with a great majority.
As main rapporteur of my party I have been able only to
induce the majority of my parliamentary group to accept
the treaty. A big minority has been against it. The principal
reasons for the vote of the minority have been our experiences
with the interpretation of the Eastern Treaties by the Soviet
Union. The fact that the articles I and II contain a dissen-
sion has deeply influenced the attitude of many of my
colleagues. They fear that the Soviet Union, as in the past,

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- 2 -

[lc]

would try to interfere in the nuclear structure of NATO
and the process of the unification of Europe. This argument
without any doubt has certain weight. But I countered it
with the American interpretations and the fact that the
Soviet Union has never contradicted these interpretations,
neither before nor in nor after the ratification of the
treaty. As far as a European union is concerned, which is
farer away than ever (the European situation is disastrous),
this process has nothing to do with the treaty unless the
MLF debate would flare up again. In my opinion the creation
of a central decision making structure with respect to the
external security policy is the only realistic political
basis for a European nuclear option. This alternative would
be in accordance with the sixth American interpretation,
in any case with the doctrine of state succession. This
would not be a question of the treaty but of the solidarity
and the moral political and military strength of the Euro-
pean partners. It is unnecessary to tell you that I can see
such a solution only in the closest possible relation with
the United States. But all this is very far away. The
problem of the peaceful use of nuclear energy is either
settled or about to be settled in a more or less satisfactory
way. This counts very much inmidst of the deep energy crisis.
Therefore I finally have accepted the treaty in spite of
some doubts. The Federal Government will introduce a use-
ful European formula in the process of the ratification,
which apparently is acceptable to your country.

So far what happened with the NPT. May I thank you another
time for your good advice in this matter.

With respect to the offset agreement I should like to stress
one point which I did not remember. The taking over of the
local costs would be in contradiction with the troop statute

- 3 -

- 3 -

[LC]

agreed upon when the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO. The German Finance Minister Schmidt had the opportunity to talk about this matter with Secretary Shultz. We shall do what we can without creating dangerous precedents for the future and for other countries which station their troops in Germany. I think that this government will make an important contribution to this problem and avoid in this way a clash with Senator Mansfield and his colleagues. In any case my friends and I do what we can to encourage the Federal Government to settle this problem in a mutually satisfactory way.

With respect to the papers which are prepared in the EC and in NATO in response to Henry Kissinger's speech of April 23, 1973, there is slow progress. In my opinion these papers are without substantial importance. *Important will be a clear redefinition of the partnership between the United States and Europe under the changed conditions and a clear limitation of the self-interests of the Europeans - and your bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union.*

As far as the last point is concerned, I am more optimistic after the speeches and actions by your Administration since the beginning of the Near East conflict.

I invited you to speak before the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. You offered me a series of days in the month of June. Unfortunately this is a very bad month for us for the following reasons. We organize for each month a speech by a prominent foreign speaker outside the vacation time. The month of June is dedicated to our annual meeting of our members. In this meeting a prominent German speaker will give a lecture. If we would invite you ten days or so before this date, then we are afraid that the audience would not be big and good enough. For this reason I should like to ask you whether you will be in

- 4 -

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

March 12, 1974

Dr.Dr.h.c. Kurt Birrenbach, M.D.B.
4 Düsseldorf
Berliner Allee 33
Federal Republic of Germany

Dear Kurt:

I am so sorry you had another round of heart trouble. I trust it
is well over now. And I am sorry too that the June dates will not work
for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. I shall be over
then in any event, and will come to visit you if we do not meet at the
Atlantic Institute or otherwise. And I shall let you know about a lecture
date in the fall as soon as the calendar is clear. I shall surely be
in Europe in January, 1975. Is that too far off for your purposes?

It is good to know that NPT is behind us in Germany, and I am glad
to think I was useful in helping you to make up your mind. It is a big
responsibility. I pray we never regret what we have done, either of us.

The friction between us and Europe is painful, and dangerous, and
I hope it will soon be over. A cure should not be beyond the reach of
sympathy and empathy. Each one thinks his ally does not care enough
about his troubles. Meanwhile, mutual irritation makes everything worse.

Please give Carstens my warmest regards. I think you and he can
change the atmosphere throughout the Alliance, and beyond. I am glad
he agrees with us.

Isn't it sad about Christopher Emmet? Such a fine man.

EVR/dhw

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

March 18, 1974

Dear Henry:

I had a long talk with Henry Fowler after we talked. He is revising
the talk he will give on Tuesday in the light of our conversation. I
have urged Scoop to see you before you go to Moscow; sent the enclosed
letter to Scotty; and started to draft Resolutions for the Atlantic Council
Board meeting on April 10. And I shall finish my piece for the newspapers
in the next day or two.

I must add that I have grave doubts about the consequences of your
policy of public controversy with our European allies, whatever the
provocation. You won on the energy meeting, and I hope you are following
it up with zest. You could win, I think, in Brussels consultations to
develop a concerted policy for supporting and implementing Resolution 242,
without the French of course, but with the rest. Resolution 242 was, at
least nominally, a British Resolution which Wilson and George Brown fought
for hard. You could win, probably with the French, on monetary problems,
and then on trade.

Wouldn't it be better to work for concerted policies on these and
other fronts rather than quarrel about the text of declarations? I am
very much afraid the President's remarks in Chicago strengthened Mansfield's
hand, and restored the mood of August, 1971. After all, what inferences
will people draw from the fact that we are silent about the Soviets, but
complain every day about our allies? And is it true that the President's
trip was cancelled because of a quarrel over protocol, as the *Times* says?

Yours, as always,

EVR/dhw

Enclosure

Dictated but not read.

RESOLUTION ON ATLANTIC RELATIONS
ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES

April 10, 1974

The Board of Directors of the Atlantic Council of the United States, at their regular Quarterly meeting on April 10, 1974, at Washington, D.C., approved the following statement:

1. The recent outbreak of public controversy among the North Atlantic allies manifests long standing differences which have become acute in recent years, and especially in recent months. The difficulties revealed by this episode must be overcome by urgent governmental and private efforts to restore the solidarity of the Alliance on which the basic security and prosperity of each allied nation depends. A failure to resolve these differences now could dangerously strengthen separatist and isolationist impulses in Europe, the United States, and Canada.

2. The recent differences among the allies, important as they are, give a misleading impression of the condition of the Alliance. On security problems, and on some political and economic issues as well, the Atlantic allies have achieved agreement on a number of critical matters. The allies were divided on policy, it is true, during and after the October war in the Middle East. It would have been far better if they had followed a concerted policy on Middle Eastern questions, as was the case, in effect, in 1967. But we hope that a concerted Alliance Middle Eastern policy is now being developed to support the critical peace negotiations which should take place during 1974.

RESOLUTION ON ATLANTIC RELATIONS -- ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE U.S. -- April 10, 1974

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We welcome the success of the recent Washington energy conference, a most important victory for the principle of Allied solidarity. And we welcome the outcome of the German-American offset negotiations. Both governments took far-sighted and constructive positions, which should eliminate the balance of payments costs for maintaining American forces in Germany. We hope and urge that the success of this difficult German-American negotiation will lead in turn to a wider alliance solution for the problem of neutralizing the balance of payments consequences of Alliance security dispositions, through which all the Allies could share equitably in these costs.

Above all, we call attention to the outstanding success of the European Defense Improvement Program, which has resulted in substantial increases in the defense expenditures of the European Allies since 1970. As Deputy Secretary of State Rush pointed out on July 10, 1973, "while the U.S. contribution is highly significant, particularly because of the quality of our forces, our Allies contribute to NATO nearly 90 percent of the ground forces, 80 percent of the seapower, and 75 percent of the air power. In Central Europe the Allies, including France, supply 25 of the 29-1/3 combat-ready divisions." Secretary Rush pointed out that the expenditures of the European Allies for the defense of Europe are nearly twice what they were in 1965. Their expenditures for the defense of NATO Europe are larger in relation to national income than our own.

3. It remains true, however, that on a number of critical political and economic issues, the Atlantic Allies are still dangerously divided. In the nature of the problem of nuclear deterrence, and of Soviet foreign policy, all the Allies are agreed that their security interests are and

will remain indivisible. Nations which share a common destiny, as the Atlantic Allies do, cannot be at loggerheads on major political and economic issues without sacrificing coherence on security and other matters of common interest. Their common interests far outweigh the separate national interest of any one of them. On such matters, they should at least consult regularly in order to minimize their differences. At best, their policies should be harmonized and concerted. This was the recommendation of the Wise Men in 1956, of the Harmel Report adopted by the North Atlantic Council in 1967, and of the Committee of the Nine in 1973.

The machinery for harmonizing and concerting allied policy exists -- through the North Atlantic Council for political and security issues, and through the OECD and other bodies on economic questions. What has been lacking thus far is the political will to use these procedures on a regular and sustained basis.

The time has come for the Allies to intensify the search for common or harmonized policies. The world has changed irrevocably since President Truman's time when NATO was established. Europe, the United States, and Canada are now more interdependent than they were then. This is a fact which no nation can alter. And it is a fact with far-reaching political corollaries.

4. American opinion must accept the fact that, in a nuclear world, the forward deployment of substantial American conventional forces in Europe will have to be continued indefinitely, to make sure that crises can be handled at the conventional level. No one wishes to return to the illusion that "massive retaliation" is a policy which can be used save

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as an ultimate resort. We therefore welcome the assurances President Nixon gave in Houston recently that he would continue to oppose unilateral American troop withdrawals from Europe.

5. On the other hand, European opinion must equally accept the fact that political and economic questions cannot be hermetically separated from security questions. There are elements of high security concern in most important political and economic questions. All must be approached with full consciousness of their relationship.

6. There is no contradiction between adherence to the principle of Atlantic solidarity and support for the full development of the European Community. We should welcome the evolution of the European Community as a constructive and responsible partner of the United States in all the works of peace.

7. Because of the relative size of the United States there is understandable worry in Europe over the possibility of American "domination." The fallacy of this fear is demonstrated by American efforts over the years to develop European strength and unity, and processes of Atlantic political and economic cooperation. The danger is not of American dominance, but of American isolation.

8. Some in Europe claim that Europe must choose between the concept of a "European Europe" and that of an "American Europe." Europe faces no such choice. The only feasible course for Europe is that of an Atlantic Europe, just as the only feasible course for the United States is that of an Atlantic America. American isolationism -- and the concept of a European Third Force -- would be a catastrophe for Europe, for the United States, and for Canada.

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

7418893

September 16, 1974

Dear Henry:

I enclose some material about the Atlantic Treaty Association Assembly in Ottawa last week. I hope you will find the Resolution useful, and supportive. That was our purpose.

You will note that both Greek and Turk agreed on the urgent need for immediate negotiations to achieve a new basis for the civic life of Cyprus. I trust they represent somebody! In parting, the Turks reiterated their concerns about their own army I transmitted by telegram. I think they are sincere in believing that only the prompt beginning of negotiations can restrain their military from doing something irrevocably foolish.

About the Middle East, I saw Rabin at his request on Saturday, September 14, in New York -- since you could not be reached, I told Joe about the invitation from Ottawa. Rabin's comments on the situation fitted what you told me on August 26. He said that all next steps had to be political, not military, in character. If he had anything concrete in mind, I could not detect it. And I tried hard.

We recalled the idea of an agreement to make a series of agreements we had discussed in 1968 and January, 1969. He thought well of adapting the principle to the present situation, and would be receptive, I believe, if you proposed it as a way of providing a political framework for the process of making peace in stages.

As I told you when we met, and wrote ten days ago, I think the heart of the matter is the political and legal position of the twin Security Council Resolutions 388 and 242. They define a posture we should never qualify, or abandon: first, that this time, unlike 1957, there should be no Israeli withdrawals without a prior, written, signed, negotiated agreement of peace; and second, that the agreements of peace should provide for Israeli withdrawals to secure and recognized boundaries which do not have to be the same as the Armistice Lines of 1949. We fought and bled for these two principles. They were reaffirmed in Resolution 388. They are sound, and right, and "even-handed," too -- the provision in the Armistice Agreements that the Armistice Demarcation Lines can be changed when the parties move from "armistice" to "peace" was put in at Arab insistence.

The Honorable Henry Kissinger

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September 16, 1974

The "agreement of peace" required by Resolution 242 need not be a
Treaty of Peace: that could come at the end.

Why couldn't the agreement necessary to get things going under
Resolution 242 provide, for example, that in stage one the parties would
negotiate about security arrangements and guarantees of maritime rights,
including demilitarized zones; the political conditions for carrying out
the first step in that direction would be some Israeli withdrawal, plus
the restoration of all or most of the diplomatic relations with Israel
cut off at Arab urging in 1973 and 1974, an end of the economic boycott,
Israeli adherence to the Constantinople Treaty governing the Suez Canal,
the acceptance by Egypt of the 1951 and 1957 Security Council Resolutions
on non-belligerence, or some combination of them.

Stage two could carry the process another step, perhaps reaching the
question of "secure and recognized" boundaries; and so on.

The deadlock, as I sense it from what you and he said, is the old
one, worse than ever: Israel doubts the Arab intention to make peace,
and the Arabs doubt Israel's willingness to withdraw. Rabin was positive
and hopeful about Sadat and King Hussein, but, of course, acutely conscious
of what happened a year ago. I am sure that only we can break the dead-
lock, by proposing a plan of our own, unless you can get Sadat to sponsor
one -- after all, the Egyptians first floated the word "time table," which,
at that time, the Israelis did not like. I see no objections to our taking
on that responsibility -- certainly not from Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Tunis.
Our interest is in peace, as soon as we can get it. So is Israel's, even
though Israel hesitates to make a proposal of its own.

Don't let the magic of your success in the disengagement negotiations
vanish into the mist.

Secondly, can't we hammer out an agreed NATO position of solid support
for the Security Council Resolutions? Have we tried? Most of my A.T.A.
colleagues thought that there has been no real effort in that direction
since last fall.

With warm regards,

EVR/dhw

Enclosures

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

185, rue de la Pompe, Paris 16e

Chairman: Eugene V. Rostow - Secretary General: Jean de Madre

XXth Annual Assembly in Ottawa from 9 to 13 September 1974

REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

The Committee notes that inflation has already gone through four different phases:

- it became world wide when the United States lost its price stability through increases in demand in 1966;

- it accelerated when all industrialized countries experienced a simultaneous boom in 1971-72 which provoked a first steep rise in the price of oil and raw materials, accompanied by the effects of a drought on cereal and other food prices;

- it was further aggravated by the fantastic increase in oil prices which disequilibrated most of the balance of payment;

- the present situation is more a "price-price" than a "wage-price" spiral with the ensuing deflationary consequences on popular consumption.

To these factors the following may be added:

- the steep rise in money supply and Government expenditure;

- the slow increase of productivity in some countries in the face of rising expectations and the impatience of the people;

- the non-optimal use of natural resources;

- the increasing number of people working in the service industries compared to a stagnation or decrease of the people employed in production;

- the increase of costs for safeguarding environment.

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Because of the shortage and the accelerating increase of prices for energy and raw materials, which were imposed for political reasons, the monetary and tax policies, especially credit restrictions, which remain necessary to correct the previous excesses and which would have been effective in the first stage of inflation, are, by themselves, no longer sufficient to prevent and curb inflation in its present form. Moreover, they delay economic growth and may lead to unemployment and social troubles.

There is an unfortunate interdependence between the monetary mess, resulting from the large overhang of dollars, the increasing circulation of Euro-dollars, and the consequences of the enormous rise in oil-prices.

Therefore, the classic monetary and fiscal instruments must be supplemented by other efforts.

In order to obtain as soon as possible a decline in the oil prices, these efforts should include a better use of the existing resources of energy and raw materials, the lowering of the specific energy consumption, the creation of substitute sources of energy and an improved "recycling" of raw materials largely wasted until now.

The long-term perspective so created should be used in talks with oil producers including proposals for a well-timed development of their economies and for a reasonable financial investment of the profits achieved by these countries. A cooperative alliance of the oil-consuming countries should enable a collective action of these countries comparable to that of the petroleum-producing countries.

As to internal price developments, the governments should individually and jointly appeal to all the parties concerned so as to reach agreement on the allocation of incomes and of the benefits of growth without the waste of spiraling prices; in particular they should launch a mass information programme to educate the public in the necessity of avoiding waste and of developing monetary savings to offset the increase of exports required by the increased price of imports as well as to persuade consumers not to pay higher prices unless they are justified by increased costs.

Further proposals include:

- the joint interests, the mutual interdependence and the results of inflation disastrous to all participants should be discussed and resolved by negotiations between industrialized, raw material-producing and developing countries;

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ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

FINAL RESOLUTION

1. The 20th Annual Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association (A.T.A.) was held in Ottawa from 9 to 13 September, 1974. The theme of this meeting was "Atlantic Partnership: Action for Renewal."

General Alliance Policy

2. The Assembly reviewed the state of the Alliance in the light of the radically new circumstances which have developed since its last meeting. These new challenges attest the deepening interdependence of the Allies in the economic, military, and political spheres. The magnitude and complexity of the emerging problems of the Alliance are so great that they can be dealt with only through concerted policies, prepared in the first instance through existing institutions of cooperation: The North Atlantic Council for political and security problems, and the O.E.C.D. for economic questions.

3. The Assembly welcomes the Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations of June, 1974, and its emphasis on the new conditions affecting the Alliance. The Assembly reaffirms the abiding goals of the North Atlantic Treaty: deterrence and defense; political solidarity; and the persistent search for détente.

4. The Assembly concludes that the North Atlantic Alliance requires a broader strategy than has existed so far. In scope and scale, the problems confronting the Alliance now transcend its present activities as well as the geographical area of the Treaty. Many of these problems have become worldwide, but what the democratic industrialized nations of western Europe and North America do about them is of

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utmost importance to the possibility of their solution.
In particular, the Assembly stresses the fact that the
problems of peace and security can no longer be isolated
from those of political, economic and social stability.

5. In view of the importance and urgency of the new problems which confront existing Atlantic Institutions, the Assembly recommends a study of their adequacy in the light of their responsibilities. Special attention should be given to strengthen the North Atlantic Assembly (formerly the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference).

## Solidarity Among the Allies

6. One of the great aims of the North Atlantic Treaty is to consolidate and sustain the indispensable unity of the Allies, to protect their equal dignity and equal rights, and to facilitate the peaceful resolution of differences among them.

a. The Assembly welcomes the progress towards the restoration of democratic institutions in Portugal and Greece.

b. The Assembly, however, is dismayed and deeply concerned about the tragic current stage of the prolonged conflict over Cyprus and its impact on relations between Greece and Turkey, and on the security of the Alliance as a whole.

c. The Assembly condemns the military coup of July 15, 1974. It regrets the subsequent course of events, condemning especially all violations of the agreed cease-fires. It regrets the suffering which the conflict has brought to the people of Cyprus, and condemns the atrocities and abuses which have occurred in the course of the hostilities and disorder.

d. The Assembly regrets the Greek decision to withdraw from the integrated military command system of the Alliance. This decision can only weaken the common defense. The Assembly appeals to the Greek Government to reconsider its decision. At the same time, it invites the Defense Planning Committee and the military authorities of NATO to take all appropriate measures necessary to restore the security of the Alliance.

e. In the name of humanity as well as allied solidarity, the Assembly calls on the parties to resume negotiations

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urgently, and indeed at once. The Assembly is greatly concerned about the many-sided and cumulative risks of delay, and urges that conditions favourable to the negotiation: process be established immediately. The goal of negotiations should be to establish a new and more stable basis for social and civic peace in Cyprus, and arrangements which will safeguard the political independence and territorial integrity of that country. A just and durable constitutional settlement for Cyprus should open the way to the normalization of relations between Turkey and Greece, and thus reinforce the security of the Alliance as a whole. In this connection, the Assembly calls attention to the Treaties of London and Zurich, made in 1960, pursuant to which Cyprus was established, and its independence guaranteed by Great Britain, Greece and Turkey. The best hope of peace for Cyprus is full respect for the rights and duties declared in these Treaties.

f. The Assembly urges an early and magnanimous settlement of the problem of refugees, hostages, and prisoners.

## The Quest for Detente

7. It is one of the purposes of the Atlantic Alliance to promote security through policies designed to reduce the causes of tension and to achieve a state of true detente. A basic obstacle to the achievement of true detente was and is the continued division of Europe.

8. The Assembly stresses that the partition of Europe is not only a political and military division. It reflects in its essence the cruel denial of the human rights of free expression, movement and self-determination in Eastern and Central Europe. A genuine and lasting detente must begin with the removal of the barriers to contacts among human beings on the continent of Europe.

9. The Assembly emphasizes that the continued build-up of military strength in Europe is beyond the necessities of self-defence and therefore inconsistent with the negotiation in good faith of lasting improvement in East-West relations.

10. The Assembly regards the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as a means to increase security and confidence.

a. It stresses that the substantial and irrevocable improvement of human contacts and the freer flow of information is an essential test of a higher degree of confidence among the two parts of Europe, and particularly of Germany.

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b. The Assembly states that the catalogue of principles which should be one of the results of CSCE must in no way seal the partition of Europe as a matter of international law. Therefore the "modus vivendi" character of the Eastern Treaties of the Federal Republic of Germany, confirmed by earlier documents of the North Atlantic Council, remains essential for the prospect of the future reunification of Germany.

c. The Assembly underlines the importance of military confidence building measures.

11. The Assembly notes that recent measures, as well as Soviet and East German interpretations of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin throw doubts on the readiness of the Soviet and East German leaders for authentic détente.

12. The Assembly supports the vital goal of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. It notes with satisfaction that allied consultations on SALT have been close and productive.

a. Such consultations will remain essential in order to preserve and strengthen the political cohesion of the Alliance in an era of Soviet-American negotiations about the central balance of strategic deterrence.

b. The Assembly emphasizes also the necessity to preserve a stable strategic balance based on the possession of second-strike capability by the United States as well as on essential equivalence between the Soviet and American strategic forces.

c. The Alliance should continue to resist Soviet proposals designed to weaken the chain of deterrence linking the security of Western Europe to that of North America.

13. The Assembly welcomes the opening of the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and associated measures in Central Europe (MBFR).

a. Any unilateral reduction of forces in any member country cannot but prejudice the success of the MBFR negotiations.

b. It is the aim of those talks to preserve a situation of undiminished security at a lower level of forces and costs.

c. It should be a major objective of the Alliance in MBFR to reduce the intimidating shadow of military force in the political life of Europe. Proposals designed to prevent closer political collaboration in western Europe cannot be accepted.

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d. No agreements should be negotiated on MBFR which would deny the Alliance its full freedom to restructure the defense of Europe in consonance with the evolving requirements of politics, technology, and economics.

e. The continued presence of substantial North American forces in Europe remains indispensable.

14. Despite disappointments, the Assembly emphasizes that it must always be the policy of the Alliance to pursue conditions of true détente with patience.

## Economic Interdependence

15. The Assembly draws attention to the important Report of its Economic Committee, which is annexed to this Resolution. It concludes that the well-being and continued economic progress of the nations, of the Alliance require a new and broader strategy, based on the principle of concerted action among the members of OECD. The Allied nations, and the other members of OECD, face unprecedented economic problems of inflation, soaring raw material prices, balance of payments deficits, and the necessity to make huge investments in order to assure new sources of energy. And, like other countries, they face as well the ominous problems of world food shortages in a time of rapid population growth. They face these problems as a group. No nation, however strong economically, can now master these problems alone. The restoration and strengthening of the open economic system which has been achieved since Bretton Woods, based on freedom of trade and investment, monetary convertibility and general monetary stability, is indispensable to the welfare of our own peoples. It is equally important to the possibility of economic progress for most of the developing nations - those which do not happen to possess large reserves of petroleum.

16. It is obvious that the monetary and fiscal arrangements which have served the world economy so well in the Bretton Woods era are no longer adequate to the problems the Alliance faces. The Assembly therefore draws special attention to the following proposals of the Report of its Economic Committee:

a. Collective monetary action among the key industrial nations is the necessary, but not the sufficient condition for the possibility of their success in dealing with the other problems of the present economic crisis.

b. The Alliance cannot, and must not, accept a state of affairs which would require their members to pay for their current needs of petroleum by transfers of capital.

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c. The Assembly welcomes the initiative of the Washington Energy Conference of February, 1974, and urges the Allied governments to negotiate agreements, and establish procedures for collective action, which would permit the major oil consuming countries to deal with the organization of the oil-producing countries on an equal basis.

d. The goal of such negotiations between producing and consuming countries should be a social compact equally fair to the interest of both and based on the fact that both groups are interdependent, and have an equal interest in their continued economic development. The achievement of such a social compact is even more important to the countries of the Fourth World.

e. In the light of these principles, existing or new intergovernmental organizations should be made more effective in their methods of work. The Assembly recommends that careful study should be devoted to improving their methods of making decisions.

## New Military Requirements

17. The events of the last 12 months - including the 1973 war, inflation and the oil crisis - raise large strategic and tactical questions so much the more as the Soviet Union has considerably increased its military potential the major part of which is arrayed against Europe. On these issues, the Assembly came to the following conclusions:

a. Among the lessons of the 1973 Middle East War for NATO are the complexities of the problem of warning time, and the danger posed by a strategy of "fait accompli"; the corresponding need for constant readiness; the huge consumption of material in modern war, and the striking increase in the effectiveness of modern anti-tank and surface-to-air weapons and also of precision bombing.

b. The conduct of an international military analysis of the war's lessons at SHAPEX is welcomed. But given the normal conflict of Service interests, a strong objective element is essential in any long-term examination.

c. The need for cost-effectiveness improvements based on the lessons of the war emphasizes the crucial need to establish common tactical doctrines within the Alliance.

If such tactical doctrines are not established, the West could make serious mistakes in its handling of MBFR.

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18. The huge and continuing increase in Soviet naval power, and a new era of ocean diplomacy, especially with the forthcoming opening of the Suez Canal, raise the question of protecting sea lanes world-wide.

The protection of off-shore oil rigs and pipelines in the North Sea and elsewhere could introduce requirements not susceptible to traditional navies, and provide a useful take-off point for joint NATO action.

The Assembly recommends that these problems be studied on an Alliance basis as well as within the A.T.A.

19. In the context of a broader Alliance strategy, the Assembly strongly recommends the approval of the principle of proposals for NATO to undertake relief operations in the case of natural disasters on a systematic basis.

20. The Assembly reiterates with increased emphasis its recommendation for the standardization of weapons and supplies. This could start at the most elementary level. Current attempts by the Conference of NATO Armaments Directors to establish a selected group of Anti-Tank Guided Weapon systems deserve all support, as does the work of Eurogroup.

21. To meet threats to the security of the Alliance arising outside the North Atlantic Treaty area, interested members of the Alliance should, as a matter of urgency, undertake appropriate consultations as envisaged by the Harmel Resolution adopted by the North Atlantic Council in 1967.

## A.T.A. Information Policy

22. The rapid changes in the present circumstances of the Alliance have made more difficult and more indispensable the task of the Atlantic Treaty Association and of its member bodies to keep the peoples of the Allied nations informed about the policies of the Alliance.

23. The Assembly therefore calls upon its members to intensify their programme of information and to adapt them to the emerging challenges of the Atlantic world. It directs its secretariat to develop its communications system, so that each member body will be promptly informed about the activities and publications of the others.

24. The Assembly reiterates that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, by providing East Europeans and Soviet citizens daily, with a range of news and analysis, play a special part in promoting better understanding in Europe.

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25. The Assembly urges its member bodies, with the assistance of the officers of A.T.A., to place special emphasis on developing their contacts with teachers, scholars and journalists, in order to promote, with their help, the spread of solid knowledge concerning the Alliance, and to initiate, in their respective countries, an open debate on the lasting reason of Atlantic solidarity and its current problems.

The Assembly was opened by Mr. Marvin Gelber, President of the Atlantic Council of Canada. An introductory address was given by the Hon. A.J. MacEachen, Canadian Secretary of State for external affairs, and by Ambassador P. Pansa Cedronio, Deputy Secretary General of NATO. The Chairman of the A.T.A., Professor Eugene V. Rostow, made an introductory speech in which he commented on the following study papers:

- Cooperation as a Form of Conflict - The Soviet Approach by Professor Franklyn Griffiths (Canada);

- Economic Uncertainties by Mr. Pierre Uri (France);

- NATO, A.T.A. and the Press by Mr. Patrick Brogan (U.K.);

- The Lessons for NATO of Recent Military Experiences by Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt (U.S.A.);

- Canada and NATO by Professor Peyton V. Lyon (Canada).

The first three expanded on their reports during the inaugural plenary session.

The Assembly also listened to addresses by the Hon. Leonard Hopkins, Parliamentary Secretary to the Canadian Minister of National Defence, on Canada's Defence Policy; by General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, on New Challenges to NATO, and by Admiral Ralph W. Cousins, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, on the rapid expansion of the Soviet Navy, and the growing challenges it presents to the security of the Alliance at sea.

The Rapporteurs for the Committees were:

- Political: Dr. Henri Brugmans (Netherlands)

- Military: Mr. Hugh Hanning (U.K.)

- Economic: Dr. Wolfgang Waldner (Germany)

- Information: Mr. William W. Shepard (U.S.A.)

The General Rapporteur was Dr. Alois Mertes, M.P. (Germany).

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ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

WHERE ARE WE NOW ?

Opening remarks at the Twentieth Annual Assembly
of the Atlantic Treaty Association,
by Eugene V. ROSTOW,
President of the Atlantic Treaty Association,
Ottawa, Canada, September 9, 1974.

Such an indispensable role in political and diplomatic discourse, to say that "a great deal has happened" since our Assembly met in Brussels a year ago. None of the clichés on which we normally depend is really adequate. In good conscience, can we evoke the volcanic events, of the last year through common place phrases about "water under the bridge", or the dust settling soon? The proverb about the barn door seems more appropriate. The dust we see in the air around us isn't really dust, but radioactive fallout, and it will not settle in our lifetimes. Not even the Cassandras among us can take any pleasure in the transformations which have occurred since September, 1973.

I do not mean to suggest that all the changes which have taken place during this ominous year are for the worse. Some important changes for the better have indeed been achieved. But events have outstripped the genuine political progress the Allies have made.

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not only a response to the German-American offset agreements, but the reluctant acceptance in the United States of the fact that nuclear deterrence requires the permanent forward stationing of American conventional forces in many sensitive areas of the world. Without adequate conventional deterrent capacity firmly in place, the Alliance would confront the risk that in a crisis they might face the impossible choice between abandoning an important interest and using the nuclear weapon. The force of this truism has become more obvious with the steady increase of Soviet naval power, particularly in submarines.

In Europe, as the Ottawa Declaration attests, the notion of a Third Force Europe has receded in attraction. The Declaration fully recognizes that the security interests of the Alliance are indivisible. Europe seems ready to accept the view that its supposed freedom to elect between a "European Europe" and an "American Europe" is not available. Europe's influence can be brought to bear in world affairs only through the policy of an Atlantic Europe, just as the influence of the United States can be brought to bear most effectively through the policy of Atlantic solidarity.

Practical men have replaced visionaries in many governments, and a fresher political atmosphere prevails. The strange notion that relations of true détente with the Soviet Union have already been achieved has nearly vanished. Détente with the Soviet Union is a state of things the Western allies have sought to attain through thick and thin since the days of the Second World War. It will continue to be the lodestar of Allied policy. But there is no way of reconciling Soviet behavior, or the Soviet military budget, with the rules of détente. Similarly, the chimera of a multipolar world, in which peace would be the consequence of the magnetic attraction and repulsion of five equal

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II

All this progress is evident, and real. But the pace of change has been so rapid, and its implications so stupefying, that the sense of progress has been engulfed and overwhelmed. The governments have said all the right things, but their policies and their patterns of action have not really changed, or changed enough to keep abreast of events.

- It may be that modern democracies have become so complex, and the task of governing them so bewildering, that governments are nearly paralyzed, if not stunned and somnambulent.

- Let me mention a few of the problems on the Atlantic agenda where the relationship between events and policies strikes me as bizarre.

At the moment, throughout the industrialized world, we face a situation in which nearly every country individually, and the OECD nations as a group, are paying for petroleum products not out of current income, but out of capital. We are transferring wealth on a scale which is nearly unimaginable in order to buy our current requirements of petroleum for industry and for pleasure. In a few years, unless present trends are reversed, we shall have given over wealth equal to the total value of all the securities on the New York Stock Exchange before its recent collapse - the value, that is, of the total capital accumulated in one hundred and fifty years of industrial growth.

Yet no western country has a tough and adequate programme of conservation, based on reality. In the United States, I have noticed no massive shift of freight and traffic to the railroads; no real restrictions on consumption; no rapid

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substitution of coal, nuclear power, and alcohol for petroleum products. An
international committee is preparing a plan of sharing supplies in the event of
another emergency. But from the external signs, at least, that committee has not
even begun to generate policies addressed to the existing situation, and adequate
to its true dimensions. No tourniquet has been applied to the patient, who is
still bleeding profusely.

Prevailing opinion, even among serious financial experts, is that we can do
business as usual if only the petrodollars generated by our balance of payments
deficits are "recycled"- deposited in New York, London or Frankfurt. A few argue
that we should really persuade the oil producing countries to make long term rather
than short term investments, in the interest of monetary stability.

It is hard to believe that such nonsense can find any takers. But it does
Are the countries of the west really so possessed of a death wish that they are
ready to transfer power completely - and irrevocably - to the petroleum producing
countries, where it can be siezed by any passing buccaneer? Hard as it is to
imagine, this is exactly what we are doing - and calling it policy.

There is a second area - related to the first, but not caused by it -
where the gap between policy and the flow of events seems bizarre: inflation.
The causes of the inflationary fever now raging throughout the western world are no
difficult to identify. The economies of the OECD countries, and those of many
developing countries, are now far more integrated than their monetary systems.
Since 1945, increasing flows of trade, tourism, investment, and security expendi-
tures have involved each deeply with the others. But we have not developed
monetary institutions capable of governing the western economy.

For this reason, it has been inherently vulnerable, and is now very vulnerable indeed. Profound mistakes have revealed that vulnerability/precipitated a genuine crisis - reckless inflation of the money supply; persistent balance of payments deficits, creating a hugh Eurodollar mass; and differential rates of inflation in many countries, resulting in random and nearly useless flows of funds on an increasing scale.

No country, however big, is now master in its own house. Even the Federal Reserve system cannot control the quantity of money in the United States. It locks the doors, but the petrodollars come in the windows.

Yet the governments of the key industrial nations show no signs of a desire to build institutions of cooperation through which they might manage the process internationally. Instead, the devices and habits needed to restore discipline are weakened every day. The impulse for autarchic solutions is getting stronger. As Roy Jenkins said a year ago, to call world monetary arrangements a "system" is like calling a chicken still running around after his head was chopped off, a "chicken".

In the realm of political and military affairs, the story seems to be nearly the same.

Let me mention the Middle Eastern war of October, 1973. That war was a fundamental Soviet thrust at NATO, designed to outflank Allied forces in central Europe from America, and bring its resources under Soviet control; and drive the United States out of the Mediterranean and Europe itself. The attack of October last was the most basic thrust against the Alliance since 1945, far more serious than earlier crises over peripheral points like Cuba, Berlin and Korea. The

October War was a strategic, not a tactical move - a threat to the heart of our positions.

This view of Soviet policy in the Middle East has been commonplace in the memoranda and diplomatic conversations of all our governments for seven years at least. But, as Admiral Zumwalt's paper brings out, even the American government had to learn the lesson anew in October last year.

The Soviet plan in 1973 was exactly the same as that of 1967, but on a larger and far better prepared scale. In 1973, it nearly succeeded. The brilliant success of Israel's army, backed by the diplomacy of the United States, Portugal, and some other Allies, gave us some time.

But are we using that time?

After nearly a year, there does not appear to be an allied position on the politics and security problems of the Middle East, as there was, for all practical purposes, in 1967.

The high hopes for peace negotiations in the Middle East last fall and winter are rapidly fading. There seems to be no real prospect for carrying out the Resolution of the Security Council of October 22, 1973. That Resolution - the most constructive single step in Middle Eastern affairs since the conflict began - requires the parties to make an agreement of peace before Israel withdraws from the cease fire lines. Instead, we read of futile negotiations to coax Israel to enter into a series of further "military disengagement" agreements without peace: the disastrous formula of 1957, which permitted the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the area and approach the point of invasion.

[LC]

and perhaps Japan as well, entirely under its control.

Here again, the prevailing pattern of Allied behaviour seems nearly
inexplicable. Do the Allies as a group intend to stand by while a nation which
came into being in reliance on their promises is destroyed? Are they unwilling
or unable to defend their interests against coercive pressures applied to them
from beyond the area specifically mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty? Are
they sleepwalking, as their predecessors did forty years ago?

III

In every realm, the overriding problem is to help policy keep up with
events. The inertia of habit is nearly overpowering. It is made worse by doubt,
guilt, and uncertainty about what to do next.

Some of our finest scholars believe that the mutations of the last year
were the warning thunder-claps of doom. They see no capacity for effective action
among us, no will to survive. For them, 1973 and 1974 mark the beginning of the
end of the suicidal agonies which began for the west in August, 1914: a great
historical process of decline and fall.

We cannot and must not accept this apocalyptic vision. We are committed
to the values of our civilization, and will redouble our efforts not merely to
survive, but to endure. Confronting the new realities which challenge our
security and well-being, we must together develop concerted policies adequate to
the problems we face together. Success in the effort is by no means assured. But
one thing is clear. There is no chance whatever to master the turbulentflow of
events which now threatens us so profoundly, unless we act together, as friends,

as allies, and as communicants in a tradition of decency, of responsibility, and
of respect for the individual, which transcends all our other concerns.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Dear Gene:

Thank you for your letter of September 16 with which you forwarded the Atlantic Treaty Association resolution and your further thoughts on the Middle East.

You are an experienced practitioner of politics and I believe you share with me the belief that politics is the art of the possible. At this delicate and sensitive time I see no alternative to continuing a process which permits mutual testing and confidence building. If opportunities for bold and comprehensive moves towards peace should present themselves, we would surely grasp them. Until then, however, I think we will have to proceed slowly to permit all parties to the problem the time to digest recent events and their meanings, particularly the impact on their postures of the precipitate rise of the PLO.

It is good of you to share your thoughts with me. I will keep them in mind.

The Honorable
Eugene V. Rostow,
Yale University Law School,
New Haven, Connecticut.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

November 25, 1974

To: The Secretary

From: NEA - Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.

Reply to Letter From Eugene Rostow

Eugene Rostow wrote to you on September 16 (Tab B). In his letter Professor Rostow suggests that UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 388 define a posture which we should totally support: that there should be no Israeli withdrawals before a prior, written, signed negotiated agreement of peace. He also suggests that there is a deadlock in the Middle East negotiations and he proposes that we break it with a plan of our own.

A brief reply to Mr. Rostow's letter is at Tab A. In it you reaffirm that though the political situation still dictates that we follow a step by step approach, we would avail ourselves of an opportunity for more comprehensive moves should such an opportunity present itself.

Recommendation:

That you sign the suggested reply to Professor Rostow at Tab A.

Attachments:

Tab A - Proposed reply to Mr. Rostow

Tab B - Mr. Rostow's September 16 letter

Drafted:NEA/IAI:MDSternberg:vf
11/21/74 X 22647

MICROFILMED
BY S/S-I