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inevitable that the Alliance structure came to be dominated
by its decisions. But since then Europe has recovered
economically and restored some of its military strength.
Britain and France have developed nuclear forces of their
own. In the process, existing arrangements have become
imbalanced. When one country dominates the alliance on
all major issues--when that one country chooses weapons and
decides deployments, conducts the arms-control negotiations,
sets the tone for East-West diplomacy and creates the frame-
work for relations with the Third World--little incentive remains
for a serious joint effort to redefine the requirements of
security or to coordinate foreign policies. Such joint efforts
entail sacrifices and carry political costs. Leaders
are not likely to make the sacrifice or pay the cost unless
they feel responsible for the results.

An imbalance such as the one now existing cannot be
corrected by "consultation," however meticulous. In the

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American policy that for all the temporary irritation it
might cause us, a strong, United Europe was an essential
component of the Atlantic partnership. We have applied that
principle with dedication and imagination, insofar as it
depended on American actions, in all areas except security.
With respect to defense, the U.S. has been indifferent at
best--at least since the failure of the European Defense
Community--to any sort of Europeanization. Many in this
country seemed to fear that a militarily unified Europe might
give less emphasis to transatlantic relations or might botch
its defense effort and thus weaken the common security. The
opposite is almost certainly the case.

In the economic field, integration was bound to lead to
transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination. What
defines a Common Market, after all, is that its external
barriers are higher than its internal ones. In the field of
defense, by contrast, increased European responsibility and

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unity would promote closer cooperation with the U.S.

A Europe analyzing its security needs in a responsible manner
would be bound to find association with the U.S. essential.

Greater unity in defense would also help to overcome the
logistical nightmare caused by the attempt of every

European nation to stretch already inadequate defense efforts
across the whole panoply of weapons. For example, there
are at least five kinds of battle tanks within NATO,
different types of artillery and different standards for
calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. In a major
conflict, it would be nearly impossible to keep this
hodgepodge of forces supplied.

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance
requires Europe to develop greater identity and coherence
in the field of defense. I am not talking about traditional
"burden sharing", paying more for the existing effort.

I have in mind something more structural--a more rational
balance of responsibilities. The present allocation of

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responsibilities fails to bring the allies to reflect
naturally about either security or political objectives.

Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative in changing
the present arrangement, lest doing so unravel the whole
enterprise. But since drift will surely lead to unraveling--
if more imperceptibly--statesmanship impels a new approach.

There is no foreseeable East-West conflict in which
Europe will not be better off without American support.

This is why, if the British and French can agree on
coordinating their nuclear forces, the United States should
encourage it as an important first step toward a greater
European role in nuclear defense.

To symbolize its confidence in the new arrangement, America
could allow the NATO military commander to be a European.

Meanwhile, the secretary-general, the political representative
of NATO might be American--a reversal of traditional roles
that would demonstrate that the alliance is adapting to new
political conditions.

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East-West Relations.

At the moment too many in the West seek to escape their dilemmas by taking refuge in the personality of Gorbachev. But without entering into the debate as to the long range purposes of the Soviet leader, the democracies cannot make themselves dependent on a single personality. But surely also more fundamental questions must be asked. In the entire postwar period, there has been amazingly little analysis of the content of peaceful coexistence--the avowed goal of U.S. national policy in all administrations. What exactly is it that the West wants the Soviet Union to stop doing? What is the American notion of cooperative conduct? In the contemporary situation is glasnost or human rights progress enough, or are other changes necessary? Can four centuries of Russian expansionism be due to personalities, or do they reflect more permanent geopolitical and strategic elements? The absence of criteria causes domestic disputes

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to fester. The reluctance to endow peaceful coexistence with
political content produces a near obsession with arms control,
which confuses symptoms with causes and threatens to open up
a gap between strategy and arms-control policy in which each
checkmates the other.

Gorbachev's personality is no doubt striking. He is
being greeted as the deus ex machina to solve all the West's
dilemmas--a communist leader who will bring peace and
tranquility without any real effort on the part of the free
countries.

But are these attitudes realistic? Do they in fact do
justice to the real choices facing the Soviet leadership? It
is easy to forget that he has emerged at the top of what
must be the toughest competition in the world--one in which
nice guys finish last and losers are rarely heard from again.
He has never wavered from basic communist doctrine. And how
could he, never having held any position other than as a

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member of the communist hierarchy?

Even assuming his intentions are conciliatory, he can
be expected to go only so far by himself. Reality no doubt
imposes at least a respite on Soviet foreign adventurism,
perhaps even an end to it no matter who governs in Moscow.
But Gorbachev, as any prudent leader, is unlikely to court
unnecessary domestic problems. He will not volunteer changes
in political and strategic arrangements that powerful factions
within his bureaucracy would find unpalatable. Obviously, he
will push those programs most advantageous to his own
country.

I do not know how Gorbachev would react if presented with
a comprehensive program that would reduce nuclear and
conventional weapons simultaneously. Or how he would respond
to a serious attempt to discuss the U.S.-Soviet role in the
world a decade or so ahead of us. I am convinced that he has
the intelligence and imagination to make a significant and

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constructive response. And if he refused, we would at least
understand the nature of the challenge better than we do now.

The failure to test Gorbachev seriously may be the great
missed opportunity of this period.

## Conflicts Outside the NATO Area.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a response
to the fear of Soviet aggression against Europe. At that time,
40 years ago, the United States had a huge nuclear superiority
and was dominant economically, while Europe was only
beginning its recovery from the war. Conflicts outside
Europe were produced by the process of decolonization; the
Soviet role in them was relatively minor. The United States,
reluctant to be involved in colonial wars, insisted that the
obligations of the Atlantic Treaty did not extend outside of
Europe. Indeed, it reserved the right to oppose its allies in
dealings with the Third World, and during the Suez crisis of 1956,
it went so far as to threaten Britain and France with economic

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sanctions.

Since then, conditions have changed dramatically.

Europe has recovered its economic dynamism and is moving, although fitfully, toward political unity. The fear of Soviet invasion has diminished. American nuclear superiority has been replaced by rough parity with the Soviet Union, and European allies increasingly question the credibility of the nuclear deterrent.

But one early problem remains almost unchanged, although the two sides of the Atlantic have exchanged their roles.

Now it is Europe that insists that the treaty's obligations do not extend to the developing world. And it is Europe that feels free to dissociate itself from U.S. actions where indigenous upheavals and Soviet efforts to outflank the alliance produce contemporary crises.

That process of dissociation has been accelerating for at least 15 years. During the 1973 Israel-Arab War, Britain

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and West Germany refused to grant the U.S. permission to use
American bases for reconnaissance--or blocked American arms
shipments to the Middle East from their territories. Allied
governments almost unanimously have opposed American policy
toward Iran during the hostage crisis, on Central America
and Grenada. To be sure, cooperation in the Persian Gulf
has been much better. But as Europe develops its own
autonomy explicit arrangements for third area conflicts and
tolerable dissociation become even more important.

This is a vast agenda. But so is the opportunity. For
changes in the Soviet Union must bring about as well
reflections about Soviet international conduct. But that
process will not be automatic. The democracies must help
themselves.

2/19/88

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

---

Statement

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to take this opportunity to sketch briefly
the main tasks facing the Atlantic Alliance.

Any discussion of the state of NATO must begin with
the recognition that it represents one of the great success
stories of the post-war period. For forty years Europe
has known no wars--the longest period of peace since the
creation of the modern state system. While it is never
possible to prove conclusively why something has not happened,
the Western democracies have every reason to take pride
in their collective achievement.

Success however breeds two contradictory dangers: on
the one hand complacency and on the other a restless tinkering
that takes the achievement for granted and seeks to combine
it with other, basically irreconcilable objectives.

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The Atlantic Alliance faces both dangers: complacency in the reluctance to come to grips with the major political and technological changes that have occurred; tinkering in the restless quest for formulae that would undermine the cohesiveness of the Western democracies.

Part of the cause for this state of affairs lies in the failure to resolve contradictions that have beset the alliance since its early days. These contradictions were tolerable so long as the democracies possessed a vast military superiority. But the growth of nuclear stockpiles on both sides and the at best nuclear parity requires that they be dealt with now if the West is not to undermine its security.

## NATO Strategy

The present NATO deployment of five American divisions and supporting air and naval forces evolved in the 1950s, when NATO's doctrine was massive retaliation--to react to

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aggression with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear blow
against Soviet territory. Massive retaliation paradoxically
required that the total forces on the Continent be kept
below the level required for conventional defense. NATO did
not wish to tempt Soviet conventional aggression by doing anything
to suggest that a Western response would be limited to non-
nuclear means. Hence the American conventional deployment in
Europe reflected political, not military criteria: it was
intended to give us no choice about nuclear retaliation and to
leave the Soviets no doubt that this would be the consequence of
even a conventional war. European conventional forces
represented a similar political decision: they too were
conceived as a trip wire for our nuclear riposte. From the
birth of NATO a full conventional defense has been part
neither of its strategy nor of its efforts.

This situation became anomalous when the growth of Soviet
strategic forces deprived general nuclear war of much of its

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credibility. Yet NATO deployment has been essentially
unaffected by the change. NATO has improved its conventional
defenses but has not closed the gap in such forces. As the
current NATO commander made clear recently, even counting
the five American divisions that have remained in Europe, the
alliance is still unprepared to withstand a major Soviet
ground attack for more than a few days. European ambivalence
continues 35 years after NATO's creation. Our allies remain
unwilling to develop forces strong enough to provide an
alternative to nuclear weapons and yet much of their public
opinion shies away from even thinking about the practicalities
of nuclear deterrence.

The Atlantic Alliance is thus for the foreseeable future
dependent on nuclear deterrence of some kind or other. To
be sure NATO should be in a position where it is not forced
to resort to use nuclear weapons at an early stage of a

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conflict. Hopefully it will become strong enough so that it
can repel any level of conventional attack by conventional
means. The need to build up NATO's conventional capability
has been passionately affirmed for a long time; for an equal
period the target has proved elusive. The United States will
not reintroduce the draft; its allies have heretofore given
priority to domestic concerns over a defense build-up.

This is partly because our European allies have less
confidence in conventional defense than some systems
analysts. History teaches them that deterrence with
conventional weapons is a chancy enterprise. Europeans have
seen wars break out for hundreds of years between armies
that were thought to be evenly matched. (Even at the outset
of World War II the French army was considered to be--and in
fact was--superior in numbers and equipment to the German
army.) In conventional war, leadership, concentration of
force, and tactics, play a role which make comparative systems

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analysis calculations a hazardous guide to deterrence. It
can be no accident that _all_ wars in the postwar period have
occurred where there were _no_ American forces and _no_
nuclear weapons; during that period Europe under American
nuclear protection has enjoyed the longest period of peace
in its history.

NATO has never solved its perennial problem: the
proper mix between conventional and nuclear forces and the
appropriate strategy for the use of nuclear weapons albeit
as a last resort. The question of how nuclear weapons should
be used without destroying mankind remains unavoidable.

Concensus on this subject has yet to be achieved. Some
experts--though declining in numbers--still want to treat
nuclear weapons as "conventional". Another, larger group--
ironically composed in its majority by individuals generally
advocating humane and "progressive" domestic policies--have
insisted that nuclear war must necessarily involve the deliberate

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extermination of civilians; they are convinced that governments
can be kept from nuclear adventures only by committing them
to the most gruesome strategy.

However, statesmanship and morality both demand that so
long as nuclear weapons exist and nuclear war is at least
conceivable, governments seek ways to limit their use and to
terminate such a war **before** it turns into a world holocaust.

In a world of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, it is
reckless to teach that any nuclear incident must automatically
escalate into a cataclysm. If the worst happens--for
whatever reason--governments have an obligation to humanity and
to history to limit the consequences. Only nihilists or abstract
ideologues can shirk that duty.

A resolution of the problem is inhibited because in nearly
every country the consensus on defense and foreign policy has
broken down. As a result, national security policy is too often
overwhelmed by domestic politics. This could not happen but

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for two comforting illusions. Europe chooses to believe that in
the end America will either prevent aggression or resist
it with its ultimate weapon employed in the most destructive
manner if it has no other choice. America chooses the
illusion that with intensive consultations Europe will be
induced to increase its defense contribution in the conventional
field. Neither expectation is realistic--the European one
slightly more so than the American.

If present trends continue we run the risk that we are
left with a precarious combination of the formal NATO
doctrine of flexible response which, however, now--unlike
when it was first developed--has to be applied under conditions
of nuclear stalemate, growing nuclear pacifism and continued
inadequacies in conventional forces. Left with no coherent
defense policy we will ourselves have crippled our capacity
for military response while sitting on the most destructive
stockpile of weapons the world has seen and against an

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adversary whose political and economic system seems to have
lost all vitality.

INF

These trends have been magnified by the INF agreement
and the manner in which it came about. This is not the
occasion to analyze the merits of what in terms of NATO
reality will be an accomplished fact. If the Senate were to
refuse ratification, domestic pressures in all European
countries would force the withdrawal of these missiles. The
current choice is between unilateral withdrawal or the quid
pro quo envisaged in the agreement.

To understand the impact of this state of affairs some
discussion of the background of INF is important. The
formal justification for INF as a counterbalance to the
Soviet SS-20's was always superficial. The ultimate justifi-
cation was to prevent the nuclear blackmail of Europe
by linking the strategic defense of Europe with that of the

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United States. With intermediate range American weapons in Europe the Soviets could not threaten Europe selectively; any nuclear attack and any successful conventional attack would trigger an American counterblow from European installations.

The Soviets would have to calculate even in case of conventional attack that we would use our missiles before they were overrun.

Hence the Soviets would have to attack the missiles if they used even conventional weapons in Europe; that in turn would trigger our strategic forces.

In that sense the American offer of intermediate range missiles was a selfless act on behalf of the Alliance. If we needed intermediate range weapons for purely *American* purposes at all we could have deployed them more easily and with much less controversy on ships or on airbased stand-off weapons.

INF in short was a symbolic reassurance for defense minded Europeans that America would use its nuclear capability

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on behalf of Europe's survival.

To be sure, this point of view was never unanimous.

A significant portion of European opinion always believed that Europe should rely less on the United States and instead mediate between East and West. In the end these missiles were introduced only after riots and demonstrations that shook the domestic tranquility of many countries for months. It is impossible to understand the European reaction to the forthcoming INF agreement without considering what the current leaders went through when the missiles were installed. And the fact that the agreement was supported by some American hard-liners with arguments first advanced by the opponents of missile deployment has added to the psychological havoc.

The NATO crisis can thus be summed up as follows:

— The apparent change in a military doctrine pursued by the past five administrations places the predominant burden

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of nuclear defense on weapons based in the United States
or at sea. This is occurring at a time when congressional
budgetary pressures have put in doubt plans to develop new
weapons necessary for a more flexible strategy.

-- In the process, many Europeans are convinced a gap
is being created that in time will enable the Soviet Union
to threaten Europe while sparing the United States. In
technical terms, the defenses of the two sides of the Atlantic
will be "decoupled."

-- This fear is all the greater because the Soviet
conventional superiority has not been reduced. Because of that
imbalance, administration invocations of its horror of
nuclear war send a shudder through the Europeans, who worry
that America may recoil before its nuclear commitments.

-- This has created also a problem with modernization
of NATO's short-range nuclear weapons. The Atlanticists in
The Federal Republic have been traumatized by the removal of
intermediate range weapons, US and German. The critics

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of US policy feel confined in their view. Both now tend to unite against a scheme that can be represented as making Europe a nuclear battlefield. Sentiment is therefore being generated for the removal of these missiles--the third zero option.

On the other hand, the denuclearization of the Federal Republic would create profound splits in the Alliance whose nuclear armed members would be asked to assume risks on behalf of the Federal Republic which that country is not prepared to run for itself. A nuclear free zone logically implies the adoption of a "no first use" concept, because otherwise the zone would still be under nuclear threat from weapons outside.

And once the alliance has proclaimed that it would not use nuclear weapons first, it is committed to accepting defeat with conventional weapons rather than escalating to nuclear war.

The neutralization of Central Europe, the goal of Soviet policy for 40 years, will then be nearly complete.

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# The Future of the Atlantic Alliance

A single statement can do no more than outline directions. A complete policy must in any event emerge out of a detailed debate within the United States as well as within the Alliance. But restoration of the unity of the Atlantic Alliance must be a prime objective; without it a continuation of current East-West negotiations will lead to the unravelling of all that has been achieved by forty years of bipartisan foreign policy.

## A. A Coherent NATO Strategy

The ambiguities that have beset NATO for forty years--some of which have been outlined above--must be overcome. On the part of the United States it requires an end to the rhetoric that America's goal in East-West negotiation is the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. Such a goal is neither possible nor desirable and Western leaders do their publics a disservice if they shrink from facing this truth.

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Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have been produced by
the superpowers; hundreds by medium-sized countries;
dozens by recent and possibly new entrants into the nuclear
club. No scheme of disarmament could account for all
these weapons. Nations would insist on residual forces to
protect themselves against cheating, or against the fact
that the factories that produced the weapons would remain, or,
should by some improbable chance these too be destroyed, against
the knowledge in the minds of men from which these factories
and weapons sprang in the first place. Mankind cannot unlearn
the secret of the atom. In other words, we are doomed to some
kind of deterrence, equilibrium, or balance at some level and
in some form. For the immediate future--even assuming
forseeable reductions--that level will be quite high; the real
issue before us will be the nature of deterrence, and its
components. That problem is neither new nor the exclusive
discovery of newly concerned groups in all our countries.

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Technology would have imposed a reconsideration of existing strategy in any event; the destructiveness of weapons was bound sooner or later to break the cocoon in which we suppressed the consciousness of our Promethean power. But the public outcry has had the healthy result of forcing governments into considerations that they should in fact have initiated; of coming to grips with the awesomeness of the choices into which they have slid because of their reluctance to face, and tell their publics, the implications of their own design.

At the same time our European allies have an obligation to face strategic and technological realities. Too many of them create the impression that deterrence can be separated from defense. But the reality is that deterrence is the product of the threat and credibility. If credibility is zero even the most devastating threat will amount to nothing. Europe has a right to insist that the United States use **all** the means necessary to stop Soviet aggression. It has no

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right--and can have no interest--in a strategy that has the end of all civilized life as its inevitable corollary.

It is therefore urgent to end the unworthy debate over which side of the Atlantic is seeking to escape what responsibilities. The responsibilities ought to be taken for granted. What is needed is a doctrine that defines flexible response in concrete terms.

## B. Arms Control Policy

The very idea of arms control is novel, if not revolutionary. Developed in its present form in the 1950's it strove explicitly for stability by reducing the incentive for surprise attack not through arms but through agreement. The historically extraordinary notion emerged that a country's vulnerability was a strategic asset; with the civil populations of both sides at risk--so the argument ran--neither side would dare to launch its weapons. Arms control theory contributed--in the West--to an aversion to defensive weapons;

18

it also caused every offensive system to be subjected to
extended scrutiny lest it somehow "destabilize" the military
equation. Never before in history had military policy been
judged by such criteria; the Soviets for their part have had
no such inhibitions in their unilateral weapons decisions.

This is not the place for an analysis of arms control
theory which included many valuable insights. However, arms
control, to be effective, requires an unusually delicate
understanding of the elements of strategy. Nations had
often suffered catastrophe in the past even when they fancied
themselves superior; negotiating equality with an adversary
calls for an unprecedentedly sophisticated analysis. The
measurement of equality has been maddeningly complicated by the
novelty of the weapons, by the asymmetry in the design of the
weapons system of the two sides and in their geostrategic
positions. Thus even were the Soviets ready for a serious
study, negotiations would be difficult because the weapons

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cyj

of the two sides are designed by different criteria and
serve different strategic ends.

Since its early days, arms control theory has developed
a life of its own. It used to be argued that arms
negotiations should be an essential complement to broader
strategic and foreign policies. Today the tail comes closer
to wagging the dog. Care must be taken lest esoteric,
abstract arms control becomes its own purpose and defeats
any relationship to defense. In the end, agreements must
justify themselves not by slogans like "verification" or
"reduction" but in what concrete way they contribute to the
defense of the free world. It is not obvious that the agreements
negotiated or in process inevitably meet this test.
Especially the subject of verification needs a new look.

### c. A Larger Role for Europe.

When in the early days of NATO the United States had
first an atomic monopoly and then a huge superiority it was

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long run, consultation works only when those being consulted have a capacity for independent action. Then each side takes the other seriously; then each side knows that the other's consent has to be won. Otherwise consultation becomes "briefing." Agreement reflects not conviction but acquiescence for want of an alternative.

Moreover, military dependence on another nation has a cumulative impact. When dependence no longer results from wartime destruction but from a policy choice, made under conditions of relative prosperity, it can breed guilt, self-hatred and a compulsion to display *independence* of the U.S. wherever doing so is safe, especially with regard to some Third World issues and certain aspects of East-West relations.

For all these reasons the United States has a positive interest in encouraging the evolution of a more autonomous European voice in security matters.

During the entire postwar period it has been an axiom of

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East-West Relations.

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Gorbachev's personality is no doubt striking. He is
being greeted as the *deus ex machina* to solve all the West's
dilemmas--a communist leader who will bring peace and
tranquility without any real effort on the part of the free
countries.

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sanctions.

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TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON STRATEGY AND
CAPABILITIES FOR NATO DEFENSE, INCLUDING
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE OF THE
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY

Wednesday, February 24, 1988

United States Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m., in
Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam G. Nunn
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn [presiding], Stennis, Levin, Glenn, Shelby, Warner, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Also Present: Armed Services Committee Staff Members:
Arnold L. Punaro, Staff Director; Carl M. Smith, Staff
Director for the Minority; Jeffrey H. Smith, General Counsel;
Patrick A. Tucker, Minority Counsel; and Kathryn E.
Bognovitz, Special Assistant.

Research Assistant: Colleen M. Getz.

Professional Staff Members: Gerald K. Bankus, Robert G.
Bell, Robert F. Bott, Brian D. Dalley, Richard D. Finn, Jr.,
Judith A. Freedman, John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr.,

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

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Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Michael J. McCord, T. Kirk McConnell, and Norman G. Mosher.

Staff Assistants: Barbara B. Brown, Barbara Gallo, Lori M. Jackson, Mary J. Kampo, Pamela G. Powell, and Mickle Jan Wise.

Committee Members' Assistants Present: Jeffrey B. Subko, Assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory J. Weaver, Assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, Assistant to Senator Kennedy; Donald A. Mitchell, Assistant to Senator Glenn; Terry Lynch, Assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, Assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, Assistant to Senator Cohen; Mark J. Albrecht, Assistant to Senator Wilson; Lorne Craner, Assistant to Senator McCain; and Anthony H. Cordesman, Assistant to Senator McCain.

The Chairman: This afternoon our Committee conducts our twenty-first hearing on NATO defense and the INF Treaty. After our recent focus on the specifics of the Treaty, the Committee will renew this afternoon our attention on the broader issues of strategy and capabilities for NATO defense, especially in the post-INF environment.

We are extremely fortunate to have Dr. Henry Kissinger as our witness. He needs no introduction to this Committee or to any other Committee of the Congress. Dr. Kissinger has written extensively on the issues that are the focus of this Committee's Inquiry.

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We are delighted he has taken time from his busy schedule
to share his expertise and experience. This Committee also
appreciates the special effort Dr. Kissinger made to submit
his prepared statement early yesterday afternoon. Copies
were immediately made available to the Committee membership.
We have had an opportunity to read and study the statement in
advance, at least some of us have.

Dr. Kissinger, we were in session until about 3:30 or
4:00 o'clock this morning. We had half of our membership on
the Democratic side that were going through procedural
motions and the Republican side were trying to avoid arrest
by the sergeant at arms.

We had a very different kind of evening, and only history
can judge which side was using its time to the greatest
advantage.

Senator Cohen.

Senator Cohen: I was just going to point out that
Secretary Kissinger has experienced gestapo-like tactics in
the past. We experienced them last evening at the hands of
the sergeant at arms.

The Chairman: To the best of my knowledge, no Republican
Senators were apprehended, let alone arrested.

Senator Warner: Senator Packwood was.

The Chairman: So there was some success.

[Laughter.]

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The Chairman: We are delighted to have you here today, and we would welcome any kind of summary you would like to make of your statement or whatever time you would like to take. We are indebted to you for coming and taking your time to address these crucial issues, and we look forward to your statement, plus questions and answers afterward.

Senator Warner.

Senator Warner: Thank you.

I have had an opportunity just a few moments ago to visit with our distinguished visitor, who I have known and worked with for many years. And we welcome you.

The Chairman: Dr. Kissinger.

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STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the Committee:

I appreciate this opportunity to appear here. I have admired the work of this Committee greatly.

I will not read my entire statement or even any parts of it, but with your permission let me summarize its key points. I began with a discussion of the problems that strategic doctrine has faced within the NATO alliance since its beginning.

When NATO was formed, it relied in effect on the doctrine of massive retaliation, that is to say that any Soviet attack on Europe would be met with an overwhelming nuclear response. And in terms of the technology of that period, that made sense because we had first an atomic monopoly and then a huge nuclear superiority.

In a somewhat anomalous way, we nevertheless also sent substantial conventional forces to Europe, even though in terms of the strategic doctrine that would not have been necessary. The reason for the deployment of conventional forces in Europe was political, rather than military, in the fifties.

That is to say our European allies had had enough

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experience in their own history of the precariousness of alliances to want a more tangible guarantee than the assurance of the American leadership that we would in fact come to their assistance, and therefore they wanted a tripwire or enough of a force to guarantee that Americans would be involved in combat and therefore make it more likely that nuclear weapons would in fact be used.

And that was also, at least inarticulately, the reason for their own conventional buildup.

Now, ever since then NATO has been best by this ambivalence, to have a military establishment on the continent large enough to raise the risks for the Soviets, but not so large as to give the United States an ultimate alternative to nuclear retaliation.

That state of affairs became more and more precarious as the Soviet nuclear stockpile developed and as our American weapons decisions with respect to our strategic forces moved more and more away from discriminating targeting and a counterforce strategy.

In these circumstances, NATO has had an inconsistency that it has not ever resolved. There has been a conventional buildup, but it is arguable that it has not been as fast as the Soviet conventional buildup. And the link of the conventional defense of NATO to the nuclear defense of NATO has been a subject of argument, or at any rate has been in

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the back of the minds of the NATO -- has been in the back of
the NATO disputes.

It is for that reason that, regardless of any of the
disputes about INF and other current issues, a re-examination
of NATO doctrine is necessary. And the Committee, with all
due respect, is doing a very useful service in focusing
attention on this problem.

My own view is that wherever one draws the dividing line
between conventional and nuclear defense, the argument that
is made by so many, that a nuclear defense must of necessity
be total and aimed at the most cataclysmic strategy, is one
that cannot be sustained indefinitely.

I think the political leadership of the alliance has an
obligation to limit the consequences of nuclear war should it
break out, and I do not think it is possible to keep relying
on a threat that involves the certainty of suicide. Our
allies have a right to ask of us that we risk what is
necessary for their defense, but they can have no interest in
the consequences of some of the strategies that are being
proposed.

Now, all of these disputes which have been in here and in
NATO and have been going on for a long time, and not only in
this Administration -- they have been going on for 20 years
at least -- have been accentuated by the INF agreement and
the debate that it has generated.

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I want to make clear that, even though I have had the gravest reservations about that agreement, even though I believe that we started at the wrong end of the nuclear spectrum in the negotiations, I do not think that my concerns can be cured by non-ratification. Whatever damage this agreement has done in the political field, it has already done.

And we would pay an exorbitant price if the Senate by a minority larger than a third but less than half, which is what would be the situation, would refuse to ratify the agreement.

Having said this, however, I would like to point out why I think the agreement has raised a whole new set of issues. I believe that the INF deployment, whatever its original justification had been, operationally performed the function of linking the nuclear defense of Europe to the strategic retaliatory capacity of the United States, in the following way.

As the credibility of the American nuclear threat declined on the basis of calculations, the location of weapons that would be in the direct line of a Soviet advance provided a reassurance of a certain automaticity of response.

The Soviets had to calculate that we would not permit these weapons to be overrun without using them, and that

9

therefore some delegations would probably have taken place,
whether or not this was the case. The Soviets would
therefore have had to attack those weapons if they wanted to
launch an attack on Europe.

But even a 90 percent effective attack would have
elicited a counterblow that, standing by itself, would have
produced exhorbitant damage. The Soviets could not cure that
problem except by simultaneously attacking the American
strategic forces in the United States. In other words, they
were put into the position where they could extricate
themselves from their dilemmas only by the initiation of
general nuclear war, which was a risk out of proportion to
any objective to be achieved.

That organic link has been severed to some considerable
extent by the INF agreement, and it cannot be cured by
arguments of counting warheads on both sides.

It has had the second difficulty that those groups in
Europe, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany, who
have in the entire postwar period stood for a close alliance
with the United States have been somewhat demoralized by this
agreement, pushing the political spectrum more in a
neutralist direction and driving some of them in a more
nationalist direction.

This is revealed in the debate that is now going on with
respect to the so-called third zero option, the modernization

10

1 of the alliance weapons. And I mention these issues not
2 because I want to keep carping on a Treaty that I consider to
3 be an accomplished fact, but because I believe we have to
4 understand what the problems are that need to be cured in the
5 alliance.
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6 Now, let me sum up very quickly the arguments, the
directions in which I believe we ought to attempt to go.
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issue of the relationship between conventional and nuclear
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defense and between the various kinds of nuclear defense. In
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14 On the American side of the Atlantic, it is not — I
15 would warn against the constant reiteration by the
16 Administration and other spokesmen that the goal of American
17 arms control policy is the total elimination of nuclear
18 weapons. That is an unachievable objective. It is not even
19 a desirable objective.
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20 So many weapons have been produced that no conceivable
21 verification system could reassure us against weapons that
22 might be hidden in the Soviet Union. Then there is the
23 problem of third country nuclear capabilities, so that very
24 soon any such negotiation would get us right back to where we
25 are in one way or another anyway, namely to a level of

11

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nuclear force that we consider compatible with our security.

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On the European side, I would warn against the tendencies
towards the third zero option, because the larger evolution
of that is toward the denuclearization of the Federal
Republic of Germany.

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The Chairman: Senator Warner suggests we all go vote,
because we all want to hear what you have to say and we have
a vote on. And we will be back in about five or ten
minutes.

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We will recess briefly.

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[Recess.]

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The Chairman: Dr. Kissinger, we apologize for the
necessary break, but we had to go vote. I hope we can get a
few minutes now without a vote, but why do we not start back
where you were.

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Dr. Kissinger: I had reached the point where I wanted to
-- where I warned against the tendencies that are developing
in Europe, especially in the Federal Republic, in the
direction of the so-called third zero option, the removal of
short range nuclear missiles from Europe, which would
gradually move in the direction of the denuclearization at
least of the Federal Republic of Germany.

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I believe this would have the gravest consequences for
the future of the alliance. The denuclearization of the
Federal Republic would almost inevitably produce a proposal

12

for the no first use of nuclear weapons, because there would
be no benefit from denuclearizing if weapons based outside
the territory could be used on the territory. And I have
noticed that the French President already felt obliged to
make a public statement to the effect that French weapons
would not be used on German territory.

On the other hand, the no first use doctrine implies that
NATO would prefer to be defeated with conventional weapons to
using nuclear weapons, and when we have reached the point
where the distinction between whether one accepts defeat or
not depends on the nature of weapons used, one has in effect
abandoned the nuclear guarantee and the link between Europe
and the United States.

So these are two dangerous tendencies that have developed
partly as a result of the INF Treaty. With respect -- and
these link us explicitly to the problems of arms control as
it confronts the Atlantic alliance.

When I first started out in academic life working on arms
control, the advocates of arms control were saying that some
place ought to be left in the considerations of strategy for
arms control because the new weapons were unprecedentedly
destructive.

I feel now we are reaching a point where one has to ask
for some space to be left in arms control theory for security
policy, and where we run the risk that arms control theory,

13

arms control, becomes an end in itself.

I have had the opportunity to read the testimony before this Committee, for example, of Professor Kaiser, an old friend of mine and a fine man. But I have noticed that, in the attempt to vindicate the modernization of these weapons, proposals are being made that get us down the same road as the INF again, that is that in order to modernize INF he proposes withdrawing all the artillery, nuclear artillery, and then links the INF reductions to conventional reductions.

And before we know it, we will be engaged in an arms control exercise that loses any relationship to a coherent NATO strategy. And this is by a man who would agree with every premise that I have stated and whom I consider one of the pillars of defense policy, certainly within the Social Democratic Party.

So this should not be taken as a criticism of him, but rather as an indication that even the most thoughtful observers are now having great difficulty relating arms control and security policy and the need for developing this.

In all of these exercises, I have stressed the importance of Europe developing a more autonomous and more coherent role with respect to its own defense. In the United States we have supported a united Europe in the economic field, but we

14

have been aloof in the military field, though I noticed with great agreement the comments made by President Reagan yesterday indicating our support for a greater European identity in the defense field.

Finally, I devoted some pages to the relation -- to the impact of the new Soviet leadership on East-West relations and U.S.-NATO relations, and I simply want to make one point. I do not want to engage in a debate about Gorbachev's real motives and I do not pretend to know Gorbachev's real motives.

I note simply this fact: No Soviet leader has ever accepted several of the key policies of his predecessor. So no matter what one assumes about Gorbachev's intentions, we cannot make western policy rely on an essentially psychiatric analysis of a single Soviet leader.

Secondly, one has to look at history. For 400 years the Russian empire under czar and commissar has expanded, for any number of reasons. But to establish a political and security relationship, an equilibrium, between that empire, that has eleven time zones, and its much smaller neighbors has been one of the security problems of Europe and Asia and the Middle East for hundreds of years.

It cannot be removed by one individual, even if he were to conceive peace in the manner in which Americans conceive it. And there is no indication in either the Russian or

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communist history that even a conciliatory Soviet leader
would have a necessarily parallel view.

So it is absolutely imperative not only that we develop a
strategic doctrine, but that we get some concept of what kind
of a world equilibrium we are after, and that we do not lose
ourselves in an orgy of personal relationships.

Nor should we assume that the Soviet leadership -- that
the Soviet economic reforms automatically guarantee a more
peaceful foreign policy, since their purpose is to make the
Soviet Union strong, not to make the Soviet Union
conciliatory.

These are my main points, Mr. Chairman, which I concluded
with an appeal, which is not necessary in this Committee, for
bipartisanship in the treatment of these issues, because if
the United States is assumed to be changing its policy or
reviewing its policy every four to eight years, if our
national interest is never perceived to be settled, then we
become a factor of instability.

And I find it painful when I read that a senior member of
Chancellor Kohl's party said that they could not go along
with the modernization proposals of the Administration
because they did not know what the next President was going
to do and they did not want to expose themselves to American
changeability.

I think this is a situation that we need to remedy on

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1 this side of the Atlantic no matter who wins the election
2 this year.

3 Thank you very much.

4 [The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:]

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The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger.

We will rotate around with our six minute rule. I will
lead off.

Dr. Kissinger, you say on page 3 of your statement that
-- I believe it is the second paragraph. You say: "The
situation is made more complex because in nearly every NATO
country the consensus on defense and foreign policy has
broken down."

Could you elaborate on that and tell us what you mean by
that?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I think -- well, let us begin with
our country. I believe that we lack right now a clearcut
national consensus, not so much -- well, we lack a clearcut
national consensus of what our defense policy is supposed to
accomplish.

But we are better off than, say, the Federal Republic or
Great Britain, in which case were the opposition party to
come into office, in each case were the opposition party to
come into office, they are committed to the most drastic
changes in defense policy: In the British case, the
abandonment of the nuclear deterrent; in the German case, the
adoption of the zero option and various other devices that
would run counter to what has heretofore been established
NATO doctrine.

In France this is not the case. There seems to be

18

amazing consensus on defense policy. But France is not fully
integrated into NATO. So perhaps the sentence was
overstated.

But as we saw when the deployment decision had to be made
with respect to INF, there are in many European countries
significant neutralists and even pacifists current.

The Chairman: One of the points you emphasize, which I
strongly agree with, is the United States should be in a
position of encouraging more European cooperation and
European initiative in the overall NATO, both contributions
and policymaking.

How do you view the French-German brigade in that respect
and the new council they have created?

Dr. Kissinger: I think I view it very favorably. I
believe that one of the results of the INF negotiations and
of Reykjavik and other events that have happened in the last
few years has been that the pro-western element in the
Federal Republic has been cut adrift to some extent. And if
one wants to keep them from pursuing substantially
nationalistic goals, they must find some home in a
relationship beyond Germany's borders.

And I think it is an act of statesmanship on the part of
both Chancellor Kohl and the French leadership to have
created these organizations.

Now, I know there is some concern in Britain, for

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19

example, that this might lead to the alienation of the United
States. I think it is up to us to make clear that we view it
favorably, that it is not that we do not consider the defense
-- a greater European role in European defense as consistent
with the Atlantic alliance, because after all in the economic
field competition is almost inherent in the creation of
European unity.

In the defense field, I cannot conceive any attack from
the East on Europe in which Europe would not be better off
with American assistance than without it. And so I would
have enough confidence that the Europeans would see that the
same way.

The Chairman: Do you see the need, in light of your
feeling about the breakdown of consensus and also your
feeling, which is well stated here, about NATO not really
having a broad strategy that encompasses both security and
arms control, and arms control has become sort of the end in
itself rather than the means to a broader end -- we do not
really know where we are going.

And I detect from your statement that you feel that we do
not really have a comprehensive proposal to put on the table
before Gorbachev that involves both conventional and nuclear
and also the broader issues, and so we in the West have not
formulated our own position.

In light of all of that, if I have correctly come close

20

to paraphrasing it, do you believe we need a new Commission
of some kind, like the Harmel Commission in the late
sixties? Do you believe this should be the subject at the
summit conference, with the direct leaders taking the
initiative here?

How do you believe the western alliance --

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, I have not given any
concrete thought to how to resolve the problem, but I would
certainly favor if one could get a non-partisan Commission
like the Harmel Commission to address these issues. Any
device that could state this in a coherent manner that then
the governments could adopt I would consider highly
desirable.

I do not think the existing NATO machinery will generate
it by itself, because they have too many current tactical
problems to address.

The Chairman: It is also awfully hard for even summit
leaders to develop the consensus back in countries like
Britain and Germany, where you noted the opposition party is
in almost diametric opposition to some of the fundamentals.
They are talking some about a Harmel Commission in France. I
have heard several of them mention that that might be an
approach.

Dr. Kissinger: I had not heard it, but I think it is an
excellent idea.

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The Chairman: I think they are reflecting in France about the same view you reflected here, that there has been sort of a breakdown of consensus.

I was amazed. Senator Warner and I were over there a week ago, and I was amazed that, particularly in some of the younger leaders, that they seemingly have, perhaps because of INF but probably because of Reykjavik, INF and the talk about immorality of deterrence and all of those things, eliminating all nuclear weapons -- probably a combination as I read it, not just INF.

Dr. Kissinger: No, no, it is a combination of all these factors.

The Chairman: They are really doing some soul-searching in France now, I think.

Dr. Kissinger: I think Reykjavik was a serious shock to many Europeans.

The Chairman: And also, as you note, they talk about going to zero nuclear weapons. The Europeans have to ask, what is America's policy, where are we going.

Senator Warner, my time has expired and you are next.

Senator Warner: Dr. Kissinger, I will just pick up on my chairman's reference to the trip that Senator Byrd and Pell and Boren and Nunn and myself took. Almost without exception, every leader of the five nations that we visited -- and you are familiar with the trip -- foreign ministers

22

1 and defense ministers were quite supportive of the INF Treaty
2 and the timing.

3 Therefore -- and I certainly listened attentively and
4 talked to a number of persons outside of those that we met
5 with directly. If there is a credible collection of
6 viewpoints contrary to the INF Treaty, I did not perceive it
7 to exist.

8 Do you find that there is?

9 Dr. Kissinger: I think one has to do this country by
country. I think the nuclear-armed countries of NATO were so
shaked by Reykjavik, where they thought we were giving away
their nuclear weapons, that they decided that, since this
Administration was not likely to leave office without giving
away some nuclear weapons, it was better for them if we gave
away ours rather than theirs.

16 And I think this is particularly true of the British, who
17 were worried about the Trident program and whose
18 understanding of the Internal German trends is not as highly
19 developed as that in France.

20 In France there is that feeling, plus perhaps also the
21 sense that a Germany completely dependent in the nuclear
22 field on France might have certain benefits for the French
23 political influence. I think, incidentally, that latter is a
24 short-sighted view and it is not likely to stand the test of
25 time.

23

Within the Federal Republic, the problem is that the people who have been most disillusioned are also the ones with the longest tradition of pro-American feelings, and therefore for them to go public now and indicate reservations which they know to be futile would mortgage their political position even more than they feel that it has been jeopardized.

So I think this is not an issue on which simply asking people gives you a good count. I am quite convinced that at the beginning of this process, if they had been given another choice, say 50 percent reduction at first and another 50 percent in the case of conventional disarmament, or if we had begun at the short range end of the spectrum, I believe it would have been received in a much more positive way.

But this is all water over the dam now and within the present context no European leader will want to risk his political position by attacking a fait accompli.

Senator Warner: Well, we are now negotiating a START agreement. Do you think there is adequate consultation and consideration being given to allied views as we work on the START agreement?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, the START agreement, strangely enough, has less of an impact, because the Europeans did not stake their own political position on the deployment of the weapons that are now being negotiated.

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Now again, one has to ask oneself, what kind of political consultation? I believe there has been adequate political consultation in the sense of keeping the Europeans meticulously informed of the details of the negotiations. I do not believe there has been adequate consultation on the grand strategy that emerges from all of these agreements, not because we have kept it from them but because we have not developed it for ourselves.

We do not know ourselves what it means. It seems to me to be a fact that when, on the one hand, INF shifts the nuclear defense of Europe to weapons based in the United States or at sea, and now at the same time we are cutting these weapons by 50 percent and shifting the ratios with respect to land-based weapons to an even more unfavorable direction to the United States, so that the practical result will be, as soon as people start doing the figures, to raise even more doubts about the American willingness to initiate general nuclear war in the defense of Europe.

So what our nuclear strategy will be after we have made all of these agreements is something that we absolutely have to face, A for ourselves, and then secondly within the alliance.

And in this sense, there has not been adequate consultation because there has not been an adequate thinking through. Take an issue which I am sure those of you who deal

25

with NATO know very well. There are four submarines
technically assigned to NATO. I do not attach any importance
to that because it is sort of a theological point what
"assignment" means.

But it seems to me obvious that when we are down to 17
submarines, which we will be after the START agreement, that
we will not be able to maintain that particular commitment.
Now, has that been explained to the Europeans? Have we
explained alternative ways by which we will meet our
commitment and, above all, what exactly is going to be the
strategy of nuclear war after a START agreement?

This is something we need to think through.

Senator Warner: The application of the doctrine of
flexible response is what you are speaking to?

Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

Senator Warner: Now, in the event It is the Judgment of
the President and others -- and hopefully the allies would be
a part of that formation of the Judgment -- that we cannot
reach a START agreement at this coming summit or within the
foreseeable balance of this President's term, what procedures
would you recommend to hold sort of in place the work, the
valuable work that has been done on START, should it go on to
the next Administration?

Dr. Kissinger: I must tell you, I am not familiar with
the details of the negotiation. I have the greatest

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1 difficulty visualizing how they can possibly work out the
2 verification procedures for a START agreement when I look at
3 the difficulties we have had with the INF verification
4 procedures, which deal with only one category of weapon and
5 at zero level.

6 But they can do a Vladivostok type agreement, in which
7 they state, as they more or less did after the Washington
8 agreement -- or after the Washington summit, in more
9 specificity where they stand in the negotiations, and hand
10 that on to their successors.

11 I am frankly uneasy about a forced draft push toward
12 START without thinking through the strategic implications of
13 some of the questions with respect to which I have raised.

14 Senator Warner: In particular, the verification aspect
15 of the START?

16 Dr. Kissinger: The verification aspect and what exactly
17 is --

18 Senator Warner: You are not suggesting it is
19 unachievable?

20 Dr. Kissinger: No, I think it is achievable, but I think
21 that -- I think that all of arms control theory -- arms
22 control theory was developed in the late fifties and it has
23 now become almost a numbers gave.

24 For example, after the Soviet heavy missiles are cut by
25 50 percent and our land-based missiles are cut by whatever

[LC]

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1 percentage we decide to cut them, on any foreseeable

2 projection the ratio of Soviet warheads to our land-based

3 missiles that is available will be greater after the 50

4 percent cut than before the 50 percent cut.

5 And so I ask the question, what exactly are we trying to

6 achieve? Are we simply trying to cut 50 percent or are we

7 trying to improve the situation?

8 And I would like to see an agreement where we can say the

9 situation has been improved: one, with respect to

10 war-fighting stability; second, with respect to the

11 population; or with respect to anything. That is my

12 concern.

13 It is achievable. The question is what is it we should

14 try to achieve?

15 Senator Warner: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. My time has

16 expired.

17 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Warner.

18 I believe, Senator Shelby, you are next under the early

19 bird rule.

20 Senator Shelby: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21 Dr. Kissinger, Senator Nunn was talking about, as I

22 picked up, a lack of a coherent strategy or a grand

23 strategy. Maybe "grand strategy" was your word. Why have we

24 not linked our various negotiations on arms control --

25 conventional, short-range, strategic, and so forth -- in some

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sense, if we have a grand strategy?

Dr. Kissinger: Partly because it is an intellectually
very difficult problem and partly because -- you take
conventional arms control. I have written some articles with
greater or lesser eloquence on that subject. But the fact of
the matter is I have not actually thought through what I mean
by "conventional arms control."

And I have started going around various research
institutions to see what work they have done, to get my own
thought processes started. And most of the work that has
been done on arms control is in the nuclear field. And then
there is the bureaucratic problem that it is so difficult to
evolutionize a position within our government that in fact it has
never happened.

But we have used up our fat with respect to this, and I
think in the future they ought to be linked together.

Senator Shelby: Dr. Kissinger, is conventional arms
control in any sense a numbers game? You know, you alluded
to the numbers game as far as reducing so many strategic
weapons or so many intermediate range weapons. But is
conventional weapons something else?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, conventional arms control has of
course a number of major problems. One is that no amount of
arms control can eliminate the fact that the Soviets have
interior lines of communication and therefore can reinforce

29

in Europe or almost anywhere along their frontiers faster
than the defenders can.

Secondly, verification with respect to conventional arms
control is even more difficult, far more difficult, than it
is with respect to nuclear arms control. In the 1920's,
Germany was open for full inspection. Its army was limited
to 100,000 men. It was not permitted to have heavy weapons.
And yet, they managed to work around that agreement to a
point where two years after they broke it and started
rearmament they were already one of the most substantial
armies in Europe, and four years afterwards they were the
most substantial army in Europe.

Third, there are a number of really extraordinarily
difficult problems to which I do not pretend to have the
answer. For example, do we want the Soviets to withdraw
whatever is being withdrawn to beyond the Urals, to the
western military district, or do we want them to destroy it?
And if we want them to destroy it, where? How do we know it
is being destroyed.

Fourth, any disarmament -- any arms control that applies
in the conventional field to Europeans, since they have no
place to withdraw, given the short distances, they will have
to demolish them. They will have to destroy the weapons that
are being reduced.

So I have a whole set of intellectual problems, on which

30

I do not pretend I have the answers, but which need to be solved and need to be solved fairly urgently. Then I have seen a Rand Corporation study which some of you gentlemen may have seen, which argues that, unless the reductions in Europe are five to one they actually make the situation worse.

Now, to the public that does not sound like a super-plausible presentation. And then when you say five to one, five to one what?

I think the Rand people come to the conclusion that the only thing that we really can have a chance of verifying is tanks and heavy artillery, and that most of the other weapons would elude verification.

I have not done any independent study on this, so I am quoting it, not endorsing it.

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Senator Shelby: Doctor, if you had had your 'druthers, and I know we have an accomplished fact, or what looks like it is beginning to be on INF, would you have started at another starting point rather than INF negotiations?

Dr. Kissinger: You never know what you would have done if you had been there. I opposed the zero option proposal from the minute it was put forward. I would have preferred to have any other number than zero, say, a 50 percent reduction symmetrically at first, and then have the remainder on the basis of a very significant conventional reduction of the Soviets.

We have absolutely no idea how the Soviets view conventional arms control. They talk about asymmetrical reductions, and that sounds impressive. When they were here I asked two members, senior of their party what they meant by asymmetrical reductions, and they said to trade Soviet tanks for American strike aircraft.

Well, if we trade strike aircraft on top of the INF deployment, that in effect makes it impossible to mount any retaliation from Europe. So I would at least like to see what they have in mind before we get ourselves into a box from which the initiation of a nuclear defense becomes almost illogical.

Senator Shelby: You have to draw some goals there before you start into real negotiations, had you not?

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Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Senator Warner: Mr. Chairman, prior to the first vote, the Chair announced it might be in the interest of all Members if all Members left at one time and then came back, thereby allowing Dr. Kissinger to share his views with everyone present, and I would suggest to the Chair we follow that.

Senator Levin [presiding]: Are you done?

Senator Shelby: If my time is up. If you want to give me six more minutes, I will take it.

Senator Levin: We are all going to vote at one time because none of us want to miss you, so we will be back in ten minutes.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator Levin: The committee will come to back order.

Thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for your understanding. You are an old pro, and you know the problems we have.

Going back to the Republican side, Senator McCain would be next, at least for those who are here, and it would be Senator Glenn after you, Senator.

Senator McCain: May I proceed, Mr. Chairman?

Senator Levin: Yes.

Senator McCain: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for again, your always illuminating and stimulating testimony, as well as response

33

to the inquiries of the Members.

I read your testimony with great interest, Doctor, and I have to say I came away to some degree questioning where we go next. You call for a major shift in European attitudes that would respond to the INF treaty, and I certainly am in total agreement with that, by creating a cohesive strategy and stronger European forces, and I think your eloquent statement sets that out very clearly.

But I wonder if you or I believe that we or Europe will pay for the improved conventional and theater nuclear capabilities that we need. I have analyzed the data on NATO and Warsaw Pact force modernization and U.S. and European military equipment production in great detail, and these data show me, anyway, that NATO fell behind the Warsaw Pact in virtually every measure of conventional force strength during a period when both we and our allies were increasing real defense spending far more quickly than we are today or in the future.

I suspect that you know far better than I do that the constraints on NATO are enforced by money, the size of the Warsaw Pact effort, and the fact that most of the key technologies for any conventional defense initiative will take a decade or so to fully deploy, plus we have acute limits on current military equipment production facilities.

I would like to begin by asking you your opinion as to

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the trends in the conventional balance, as to whether you feel there is any conceivable chance that NATO will fund a robust conventional defense option over the next five years, and if so, what should their priorities be.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe there is some chance, as a result of the impact of recent events, that Europe will make a more coherent if not a larger effort. I think we have to face the fact that if this effort is not made, and if these inconsistencies in NATO strategy that I have pointed out and that almost all experts agree on are not met, that sooner or later we will have to pay a price for it. This may be deferred, but sooner or later, there are no free lunches in foreign policy. Sooner or later one will have to pay a price for that. There will be some crisis in which we will come up short. I may not be able to predict what that crisis is.

Now, the first step has to be that the Alliance lays out what its requirements ought to be so that at least if it falls short, it knows where it has fallen short, and why, and that it develops some kind of coherent military strategy that the key Alliance members agree to.

Senator McCain: And your view of what their priorities should be?

Dr. Kissinger: I believe -- well, from where we are -- of course, the strengthening of conventional forces is generally agreed on as a desirable objective, though it is

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1 never reached.

2 Now, to meet some of the problems caused by the INF agreement, a European capability for stand-off weapons would, in my view, be highly desirable, and if the British and French were to combine to create a stand-off weapon, the United States should be very sympathetic, even though the fact is that it would be in a way -- I mean, you would then ask yourself what is the sense of going through all these exercises in arms control if you find another weapon that replaces the weapon you have taken out.

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Still, I would favor a European stand-off weapon. I would favor some cruise capability for some of the dual-purpose aircraft based in Germany. And I would favor some of the modernization proposals that have been made with respect to the nuclear tactical forces in Germany.

But it becomes very difficult if we do these things piecemeal and one at a time.

Senator McCain: Thank you, Doctor.

I am sure you are also aware that the fastest growing area in Warsaw Pact forces has been nuclear forces, that to a significant degree will not be reduced as a part of the INF agreement. This includes a rise in theater nuclear strike aircraft that JCS estimates have given them a three-to-one advantage in numbers, which has more than doubled their range payload capability and includes a 50 percent increase in

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1 short-range nuclear delivery systems since 1980.

2 Given this background, If you had known we were going to
3 eliminate the Pershing II and GLCM, would you still have
4 supported the reductions in other NATO theater nuclear
5 systems that cut 2800 warheads from the NATO stockpile?

6 Dr. Kissinger: I do not think that those 2800 -- yes,
7 almost certainly. I do not think those 2800 are relevant to
8 the problems caused by the INF agreement. They were all
9 short range, if I remember correctly.

10 Senator McCain: And you do share a lot of our concerns
11 about Genscherization or the triple zero option?

12 Dr. Kissinger: I am very concerned about the trends in
13 the Federal Republic towards the triple zero option which
14 will have as an inevitable corollary a no first use doctrine,
15 and that will then create a distinction between the
16 non-nuclear and the nuclear members of NATO and between the
17 European members of NATO and the American members of NATO
18 because you cannot ask countries that are not themselves
19 attacked to run risks which the attacked country is not
20 prepared to run for itself, and it will create an
21 increasingly complex psychological situation.

22 Senator McCain: It also appears to me, Doctor,
23 conspicuous by its absence from Chancellor Kohl's statements
24 is any commitments towards modernization of existing
25 short-range nuclear forces.

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Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we have to -- I have known Chancellor Kohl for 30 years, and there is absolutely no doubt that he belongs to the most pro-American wing of the Christian Democratic Party, which in turn has been most consistently supportive of the United States, and we have to ask ourselves what brought him to the point where he is today.

By instinct, he would want to be supportive. It reflects domestic pressures that have been accentuated by recent events.

Senator McCain: Thank you very much, Doctor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman [presiding]: Thank you, Senator McCain.

I believe next is Senator Glenn.

Senator Glenn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There are some benefits to a fillbuster also in that last night I had a chance to read its statement in its entirety and reread parts of it. So some good comes out of a fillbuster, and I thought that was one of the more thoughtful statements on this whole process that I had seen.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you.

Senator Glenn: I want to compliment you on that, and I mean that in all sincerity.

Your position on INF is basically problems, you might not have gone that way, but you think it would be a mistake not to go -- we would do more damage by going back than we would

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[L.C.]

1 forward with it now.

2 Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

3 Senator Glenn: On page 7 of your testimony you said that
4 since its early days, arms control theory has developed a
5 life of its own. It used to be argued that arms negotiations
6 should be an essential complement to broader strategic and
7 foreign policies. Today the tail comes close to wagging the
8 dog. Care must be taken lest esoteric arms control schemes
9 become an end in themselves, thereby eliminating any
10 relationship to defense strategy.

11 Well, I could not agree with you more on that, and I am
12 nervous also about us rushing into the new START thing
13 prematurely when we know that in INF they were writing some
14 of the fine print on the airplane coming across the ocean to
15 meet with the President, and I am concerned that we may be
16 considering that INF sets a basis that we now can use in
17 future arms control negotiations, and I doubt that very
18 much. I think that future arms control is going to have to
19 get into more of some of the things you talk about here,
20 verification, conventional balances. At some point along the
21 way we have to start considering bringing other nuclear
22 powers into the equation, somewhere. We may be a ways from
23 that now.

24 And also, somewhere I do not think we are going to feel
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Reykjavik, with them sitting with 12,000 removed warheads on the shelf and us over here with the same thing and not get back to our traditional American emphasis on control of fissile material, which we had for some 40 years.

Now, that leaves us with where do we go from here with regard to START, and my question would be do you have a series of things you have thought out or proposed as guidelines for START that would fit within a strategic framework?

I am looking at INF as sort of a given, it is going to go through, there will be some debates and so on.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Senator Glenn: But the important thing now to me is let's make sure that as we move on to START, that we set a pattern that is going to go for the future.

Could you set us down some guidelines for START?

Dr. Kissinger: Senator, I have -- I agree with you on INF. The only reason I keep reiterating it, it is really two-fold, one, to show the Europeans that some people in the United States understand the problem that has been raised, and secondly, to alert us to the problems that need to be dealt with here, and not to consider INF as the end of a process.

Now, with respect to START, I belong to -- I must tell you that I am extremely uneasy about that negotiation. I

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[LC]

1 know that one can only say a 50 percent reduction is a great thing, and that is true if you accept the premise that any 2 elimination of nuclear weapons is in itself desirable. Then 3 you can say getting rid of two categories of weapons is good, 4 and then you can say a 50 percent reduction is good. 5

6 But if you look at it at the other end and ask yourself 7 where is our security situation, in what way is our security 8 situation improved after the 50 percent reduction, if you put 9 these numbers into ratios of warheads and so forth, then I 10 come to the following concerns. 11

12 One, the ratio of warheads, even if the Soviet heavy 13 missiles are cut by 50 percent, the number of our missiles is 14 cut by more because we have more MIRVed missiles. So I think 15 most calculations show that the ratio of warheads that the 16 Soviets have available to target at our remaining missiles 17 goes from about three-to-one to about 4.5 to 4.8-to-one. So 18 I do not see the benefit that we have achieved in strategic 19 stability. 20

21 Secondly, the number of our submarines is cut to 17 or 18 22 from whatever it is today, but the number of Soviet 23 antisubmarine forces is not affected because they are not 24 part of the agreement. The number of our airplanes are cut, 25 but the Soviet air defenses are not affected by the 26 agreement. So air defenses are not limited, submarine 27 defenses are not limited, but antimissile defenses are 28

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limited, or are attempted to be limited.

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It is a sort of a one-sided equation, and I would really
plead for putting arms control reflection not into the
framework of a numbers game of how many warheads we have
reduced, but where we will be after they are reduced.

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Then for every gain in stability, you pay a price
someplace else. I find it hard to visualize how we can
continue to say that we will be forever ready to treat an
attack on Munich like an attack on Chicago when the numbers
of warheads and the comparative counts raise the question of
what are you going to attack when you do use nuclear weapons,
and what risks do you run to the security of your own forces?

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And that gets to your most important question of what do I think would be the right proposal. Of course, one of the difficulties when you are outside the government and do not have big staffs is that if you as an individual are asked to come up with an alternative proposal, it may not be all that persuasive and all I want to tell you is if you do not like my ideas, that does not mean that 15,000 people in the State Department and 20,000 in the Defense Department could not come up with a better idea than I can come up with by myself.

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Dr. Kissinger: Now, I was tempted, and I think I still

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would be tempted, to a view that if we could go to mobile, if both sides could go to mobile, single-warhead, land-based missiles, that the danger of surprise attack would be substantially reduced. Other problems would arise, namely, how are you going to use your strategic weapons in defense of allies. But that problem exists now because we have no clearcut military mission of a counterforce nature for our strategic forces now.

So I would tend to, I would welcome an attempt to base the land-based forces of both sides on single-warhead missiles that could be permitted to be mobile, and I would not then worry so much about numbers. I mean, the numbers should be equal, but I would then not see any great magic in whether the number is at one level than another. This is one thought I have had. But that is, of course, not a complete answer to your question.

I also, I certainly favor the idea that the Chairman put forward as an interim measure on the Strategic Defense Initiative for the protection, for ballistic missile defense of some missile sites.

Senator Glenn: Thank you very much. My time is up.

Just one comment. You stated that the INF magnifies divisive trends.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Senator Glenn: I would think that you would see START as

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even more of a magnification.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, you see, the trouble is with all of
these proposals, in each country there is such a large
constituency of people who are yearning for agreement and who
see in every agreement a beginning of a change of Soviet
attitude, and who tend to treat foreign policy
psychiatrically so that it eases tensions and therefore it
improves the situation.

I think the first reaction to a 50 percent cut will be
one of great euphoria and great relief. But when you begin
thinking about it and you begin to ask yourself what will be
the security situation afterwards, that is when questions
arise. And we are drifting into a situation where we have
hooked ourselves, the whole West has hooked itself to certain
slogans, reductions. They have become sacramental so that
anything you reduce is desirable.

Secondly, on-site inspection, so if we are given the
right to some on-site inspection, you then do not have to
analyze anymore what machinery you need, how much are you
permitted to inspect. Some of these inspection procedures, I
would be interested to get an intelligence estimate of what
percentage the on-site inspection provisions of the INF
agreement add to what we could have found by national means.

I would be amazed if it is very significant.

I am not against it, and I am not so worried about

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The Chairman: Senator Cohen?

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Senator Cohen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, I commend you for the windburn which has colored your complexion.

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You mentioned in response to Senator McCain that Chancellor Kohl is one of the most pro-American people that we could hope to have in West Germany. That may be the case. But all of us who attended a conference recently, the Veracunda Conference, were struck by the anomaly of having Mr. Draga sit next to Egon Barr and Mr. Vogel and link hands metaphorically.

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And so I would not want to put too much stake in the fact that Chancellor Kohl, while he may be pro-American, nonetheless may be under similar pressure from his own right.

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Dr. Kissinger: This is exactly the point that I have been trying to make. When Chancellor Kohl came back from Washington, he was congratulated by Egon Barr for the delay he achieved in facing the modernization issue.

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Draga, whom I have also known for 30 years, I was getting some award in Germany last May, came to see me and pleaded with me to use whatever influence, he had a totally wrong impression of my influence, to abort the agreement.

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And now he has Joined, we are seeing an alliance now between some of the right-wing people and some of the

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1. neutralist people, which is extremely worrisome. And we
2. cannot count on the traditional, the Adenauer wing is
3. fragmenting.

4. And that is one of the most worrisome things, that if you
5. look at German history you will find that in German history,
6. of the modern state system, there has never been an alliance
7. between Germany and any Western country.

8. There has been occasional friendship with Russia. But
9. never with a Western country, because France was the eternal
10. enemy, hereditary enemy. Adenauer was the first German who
11. tied Germany to the West. And that is what is now in
12. jeopardy, and that is why we should be so worried. You are
13. absolutely right.

14. Senator Cohen: Dr. Kissinger, I used the phrase
15. Genscherism, and that was the equivalent of using the phrase
16. secular humanism in the face of Pat Robertson's delegates, it
17. got quite a reaction at that time.

18. But also said something to the effect that the West
19. Germans were forming a parade and they were about to march
down through a nuclear-free corridor right into the Neville
20. Chamberlain square. And that also produced a rather
21. remarkable reaction among the delegates who were there.

22. But frankly, I think that some of this language has to be
23. used to shake somebody to their senses, because the dynamic
24. has been set in motion now. Not only the double zero but the

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triple zero that you have talked about.

And I do not know what it is going to take to shake that
momentum, because it has taken on a force of its own.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, a reliable American foreign policy
would help. And by reliable I mean what that does not change
all the time.

Senator Cohen: Well, that would help. And by the same
token, I tried to take this into account.

The Germans were very concerned when President was first
elected. He was seen as being too warlike. Then they became
really alarmed in Reykjavik because he was seen as the
apostle of peace at that point, and that worried them too.

We have a problem with their reaction. They seem to coin
a new phrase every five or 10 years. Once it was
decoupling. We have heard that for about 10 years. Now it
is singularization, and now they are focusing upon that.

So they come up with a new phrase about every five years
in order to demonstrate their particular historical alarm.
So it is not just the United States, it is also a question of
Germany as well.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I am not saying it is all our fault.
But I think we have to recognize that in Germany we have a
divided country with unnatural borders, a capital in a town
that has no historical relationship to being the capital.

And therefore rapid changes in American policy, no matter

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how meritorious, are going to create disproportionate responses among a very insecure people that is denying its own past.

Senator Cohen: Let us face it. The zero-zero was not our proposal. That was Helmut Schmidt's proposal.

So it is not exactly something that has emanated from Ronald Reagan. They came from Helmut Schmidt, and they cannot lay the blame upon an American innovation that somehow has laid them naked to their enemies. This is something that they proposed back in 1980 or 1981.

I would also like to get your assessment on the, I think you mentioned this, about the French and the British perhaps combining their efforts to develop a standoff weapon. I am more concerned about the new proposal about Franco-German cooperation.

It sounds right on the surface. Dr. Schlesinger and others, I think Dr. Brown, as a matter of fact, perhaps suggested that we should embrace it at least calmly, if not enthusiastically.

But does that not also carry a consequence that the United States urges the Germans to start moving closer with the French and their defensive needs, that that will be used as a rationale to say, there they go again, they are decoupling.

Dr. Kissinger: We should not, there is no doubt, first

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one has to recognize that the Germans suffer from congenital insecurity that cannot be removed by anything we do.

Partly of their geographic location and partly from the fact that a big part of their history has been blocked out, so that it is a more rootless society than many others. I do not think the United States should urge a Franco-German cooperation. I think it should be tolerant of it and supportive of it.

And the coupling between the two sides of the Atlantic has to emerge from the merits. And we cannot keep thinking up, and there I agree with you completely, a gimmick every five years to meet a new slogan.

The big danger, in my view, in Germany is that feeling abandoned, rightly or wrongly, they will start pursuing nationalist policies in the guise of neutralization, of parallel policies between East and West Germany, and all other kinds of vague ideas.

And again, if you look at German history, if in the year 1900 anyone had predicted that within 10 years France, Britain, and Russia would be on the same side, it would have been considered crazy. It was the German inability to choose here in objectives.

So Germany operating alone in the center of Europe will be a factor of great instability. And that is as much a criticism of them as a blame of ours.

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Senator Cohen: If I could just pose one more question on the INF Treaty. You indicate that it is by the board now for all practical purposes.

But the fact is it also creates another problem for us on a strategic level, because the Soviets can now use SS-25s unlimited in production, and conceivably could use them in an INF mode or intermediate targeting mode.

Would that not call for at least some argument on behalf of having a reduction in strategic systems to minimize that problem? That would be one question.

And you also were part of that group on recommending discriminate deterrence, and part of that discriminate deterrence was having an ability to deploy strategic defenses.

The question I would have, if the Soviets were to deploy large-scale defenses, what would that do to the United States' credibility and its strategic retaliatory credibility, if they should move conventionally in Europe? What would large-scale defensive deployments on their part do to that credibility?

And you may take as long as you like to answer that.

Dr. Kissinger: One would have to assess how effective these defenses are supposed to be against what kind of American strategy.

Obviously, if the Soviets were to deploy large-scale

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defenses, it would complicate the American, any American retaliation to an attack on Europe. But I think in part this is inherent in the current situation, because I find it difficult to visualize the precise purpose.

It is easy to say the United States must be prepared for an all-out blow by people who do not have to make the decisions. But then when you ask yourself, what is the man who walks into the President's office going to say to the President his targets are, and what risks is he running for what benefit?

And this is a question that is becoming increasingly difficult to answer, with or without defenses. Now, to me, to go back to what Senator Glenn mentioned, I would like to see a negotiated level of offense and a negotiated level of defense, and hopefully these two will be brought into a relationship with each other so that they produce the maximum degree of strategic stability.

Having said that, if you ask me what that level is that would, I could not give you a good answer.

Senator Cohen: Well, I think that the Chairman and others on this Committee have tried to argue that very point, trying to strike a balance between the acceleration of our offensive systems and matching that against the defensive.

Dr. Kissinger: I have not favored the version of SDI that states that its purpose is to eliminate nuclear weapons

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altogether.

On the other hand, I do not understand why, I believe
that, I am totally unopposed to offensive systems. They must
in the long term have a demoralizing effect on a democracy,
and one must be able to define a strategic objective for
defense similar to a strategic objective for offense and then
relate the two to each other in the negotiations.

The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Cohen. Senator Levin,
I believe you are next.

Senator Levin: Let me add my welcome, Dr. Kissinger, to
you. I would like to ask you about your position on linkage
between conventional arms control and START.

You have written, and I believe you reiterated it today,
that we should not take a step towards START unless it is
linked with measures that reduce Soviet preponderance in
conventional weapons.

Now, if I thought, frankly, that linking it, linking
those two would produce a better conventional arms control
agreement, I would favor linkage also. Because I think of
the two, a START agreement and a conventional agreement, that
a good conventional agreement is more important.

I happen to favor a good START agreement, but I would put
a conventional agreement, if it is a good one, on a higher
plateau. And so I would favor linkage if I felt the linkage
would lead us to a better START agreement.

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We recently visited Europe also and talked to a lot of people there, and we heard Prime Minister Thatcher on this subject. She and the people that we talked to in Europe, I would say almost unanimously, not quite, feel that if we linked a START agreement to conventional arms, that we would give the Soviets leverage of the conventional arms control agreement.

There would be a popular START agreement being held up, while a conventional agreement was being negotiated. And that would give them great public political leverage over those conventional arms control agreements.

In addition to that, we have been the ones who have struggled to delink. We have been the ones who have tried to delink, for instance, SDI from the other talks. And so we, in a way, would be playing into the Soviet hands when they seek to link if we did some linkage of our own.

And finally, we do not have a conventional arms control position, as you have so eloquently pointed out here today. And so linkage could create problems for a number of reasons.

But in any event, I am wondering if you would put yourself kind of in our framework. Would you favor some kind of a resolution during the INF ratification debate which stated that the President or the Administration should not bring us a START agreement for ratification until it has

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negotiated a conventional arms control agreement?

Dr. Kissinger: In my statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I modified my linkage proposal to the extent that I said that before we go ahead with the START agreement we should know at least the parameters within which the conventional reductions are to be negotiated.

In other words, I would like to know what the Soviets understand by asymmetrical reduction. I admit the 50 percent reduction is highly popular. The INF reduction is highly popular.

At some point the leadership of this country and of the democracies has an obligation to tell its people what the realities are. And if we cannot explain in what way a 50 percent reduction improves the situation, then it is a false popularity for which we will pay further down the road.

Now, as all of you know anyway, all Europeans profess to rely on the American nuclear guarantee. If the Soviets managed to conduct arms control negotiations in such a way that once nuclear weapons become systematically delegitimized, so that in the preamble of every agreement there is a statement that nuclear war can never be fought, and which is the case, I think, in the INF agreement, or must never be fought or something like that.

And if secondly the resulting balance from these agreements makes it less and less plausible that the United

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States can use its nuclear weapons because it has no rational
targets for them, then the conventional balance becomes more
and more worrisome.

And if we have not even a clue to what the Soviets mean
by asymmetrical reductions, I admit that we will not be able
to negotiate it for many years. But we can ask for at least
that much, to have a frame of reference within which the
negotiation will then take place.

Senator Levin: Putting yourself now again in our
framework, are you saying then that you would recommend that
we adopt a resolution as part of the INF ratification debate,
which says something like, hold off bringing us a START
agreement until you can present to us the parameters as
identified by the Soviets of a conventional arms proposal?

Dr. Kissinger: I would favor an expression by the Senate
that says we are very worried about the conventional
imbalance.

We are also worried about the kind of strategy that will
result after all these agreements are made. And we would
like you to come to us when you present START with one, the
parameters of the next negotiation, and secondly, some
explanation of the strategic doctrine underlying this
agreement, so that we can explain to the public or debate
before our committees whether this in fact increases the
security of the Western world.

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Senator Levin: Would the agreement on a mandate for
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Dr. Kissinger: The existing mandate?

Senator Levin: Would the agreement, if we finally agree
upon a mandate for the conventional arms control
negotiations, would that mandate agreement satisfy?

Dr. Kissinger: If it was sufficiently specific, it would
meet that requirement. But I have to tell you I am not wild
about this particular agreement.

Not because I do not think it does a comparable damage as
the INF agreement, but it is another step down a road in
which numbers become a substitute for thought.

Senator Levin: My time is up. Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Levin. Senator
Quayle?

Senator Quayle: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
congratulations for another excellent statement. We all
appreciate you and your thoughts.

Let me just follow along the lines of Senator Levin's
question and ask you this. We have got INF behind us. We
negotiate START 50 percent reduction. We have got a ban for
chemical and biological weapons on the table. As you say, we
have got this fixation with numbers.

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Once we negotiate those things, what leverage do we have with the Soviets to begin these asymmetrical reductions that need to take place on conventional forces? I do not see what leverage, once we get those things out of the way and move in that direction, what we have left.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I suppose you could argue that the Soviets will want to reduce the expenses of maintaining large conventional forces, and cannot reduce the unilaterally.

But I am worried about the fact that the Soviet Union, in a period of obvious difficulty, has managed to focus the negotiations on those weapons on which, for better or worse, we have relied, and have managed to keep out of the negotiation those weapons that have represented the greatest threat to the security of their neighbors. Namely, the conventional weapons. That is not a healthy situation.

The Chairman: Could I interrupt one second on that? I would like to just venture that perhaps they have not managed that, we have managed that.

Dr. Kissinger: We have managed it.

The Chairman: I think you give the Soviets too much credit. We cannot figure out what we want.

Dr. Kissinger: You are quite right.

Senator Quayle: We have managed that, but we have negotiated things that are in the greatest interest to them rather than focusing on this conventional imbalance.

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And once we negotiate the things that are of interest to them, I ask again in the leverage that we have with the Soviet Union beyond the economic considerations. Certainly they have to make resource allocations in the Soviet Union.

But past tradition and precedence do not seem to indicate that they have too much reluctance to invest in defense whatever they want to.

Dr. Kissingert But the point that Senator Levin implied is also important, that we go four-fifths of the way down a road and at that point we raise the considerations we probably should have raise at the beginning of the road.

And that makes it much more difficult with people like Margaret Thatcher and others, who really are basically very well disposed towards us.

Senator Quayle: So therefore it would make sense to put the conventional issue on the front burner?

Dr. Kissinger I would certainly put it on the front burner. We probably cannot now insist upon having it completed, but I would certainly, I would want to see whether the Soviet idea of conventional disarmament is so preposterous that we are in a ball game in which they want to maintain their conventional threat at all costs.

Or at any rate, want to maintain their conventional threat.

Senator Quayle: Senator Cohen outlined in some of the

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concerns he came away with from Veracunda, and I would just like to continue that train of thought.

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Not only did Hagar and Barr and Vogel join in congratulating Chancellor Schmidt, but Strauss had some rather revealing comments about the threat of the Soviet Union that I had not heard before. Some I had read, but had not heard before.

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I do not believe, from a political sense, I do not see Chancellor Kohl really getting any stronger down the road. Two years from now, five years from now, most predict that he would have a re-election capability. I think they are being held in 1990.

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Given that, and that perhaps they are not going to get politically stronger, given the fact that you have got this momentum going with zero-zero, 50 percent reduction, I mean from a political sense, despite the call for a steady American foreign policy, how are we realistically going to deny that third zero, when the Soviets put it on the table?

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You have a situation in Germany now where the politicians are out ahead of the public on this issue. In this particular discussion of modernization. I did not detect it when I was over there in the public that there are a lot of demonstrations, a lot of talk about this.

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I detected it with the politicians. And it will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. And the public will certainly

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begin to focus on this, once that gets on the table. But how
do we realistically think in the next decade that we are
going to stop this triple zero?

And once you have that you basically have the
denuclearization, you have got the concern of whether our
troops will be in harm's way or in safety. I am just sitting
here and walking away, having spent a week over there, not
terribly optimistic.

And if I look at this thing just from a political sense,
how do we stop this? What do we need to do? How do we
recommit ourselves --

Dr. Kissinger: In fairness to some of the people you
have mentioned, Kohl, Strauss, Draga, none of them wanted the
double zero. That they did in response to us. That now has
unleashed the triple zero.

The only hope, if there is a hope, that there are
certainly trends in Germany that may move faster than we can,
than anything we can do. I suspect that there will be more
and more economic lures put out by the East.

I suspect that some sort of romantic nationalism will
develop where they will say, the two Germanies need not be
unified, but can pursue parallel foreign policies. All of
which will have the objective tendency of easing Germany out
of NATO.

The only hope that we have is that we have a bipartisan