Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KNU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Yoshida
9:00 a.m. 12/1/69

Yoshida said that his friend specifically asked him to convey the following message with respect to the Item 2. His friend will do his very best to honor the understanding reached between them, their two friends on both points. A bilateral understanding and agreement would be reached by the end of December. Secondly, it should be comprehensive in effect and in essence, to this particular term should not be used. K said we could probably handle that. Yoshida repeated that this particular word cannot be used but in effect and in essence it should be comprehensive. These two points, Yoshida's friend is going to do his very best and is very optimistic. However, as K may now know, Y's friend faces the bureaucratic problem to overcome so that this can be solved in the most natural way from Yoshida's side. If there should be any difficulty in that sense, he asked that K or even K's friend call him to their Ambassador (Shimoda) here in Washington. K asked how much the Ambassador knew and did he know every- thing. Yoshida said he (the Ambassador) was given specific instructions directly from Y's friend on Item 2. However, Y was not certain to what extent the Ambassador knows the understanding. However, Y's friend emphasized that Amb. Shimoda will be kept in his present position specifically for this purpose until the "end" will be completed. Y was not certain how K would approach the Ambassador. The Amb. has been given specific instructions directly from Y's friend so the Amb. can handle this question. It has to be handled in a very delicate way since now they are going to have general elections on December 27. Y said, K asked if this was generally known. Y said it would be published tomorrow, their time. Y asked if K and his friend would appreciate Y's friends domestic position at this moment. Nevertheless, Y's friend will honor the understanding on both points. Y said his friend sends his warmest personalk regards and very best wishes. Y's friend expressed his appreciation to K for all he had done for them. K said he appreciated this very much, indeed, and added that we were all very pleased with the meetings. We all hope that this will inaugurate a new period of relationships which will be even more fruitful and beneficial than the one we have just ended. Y was wondering if K was satisfied with the achievements and was K's friend satisfied. K said they were. We were all very satisfied and very please with the meetings. Y said he was very happy to hear that. K said he knew he spoke for his friend that Y should call his friend to tahe warmest personal feeling and at every level we felt the meetings were successful.

K said let me understand the other point. Y's friend will continue to work out the understanding during this month in a delicate manner understanding each other's particular needs and thus their Ambassador here is the proper person to deal with. Y agreed and added that this has to be handled through understanding their bureaucratic pressures. K said what we are

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

going to do, for Y's information, is to make a very strong proposal in
Geneva which is what is needed. The release of the important agreements
should be handled here because here we can guarantee secrecy. K asked
if that was in accord with what Y thought. Y said he should think so. K
said we will continue to talk in the other place but the other proposal
Y outlined can be guaranteed better here. Y agreed and said he fully
understood what K had said and it was his feeling that since this
particular man (meaning the Amb.) was given specific instructions and
Y thought he would be the proper man to deal with on these matters.

K said if there was any difficulty, he would call xxx and let Y know. K
said he felt that they had a good working relationship and that it was
done in an honorable way and on the basis of good faith on everybody's
side and on every important item. Y said the only concern he had is how
to handle this through bureaucratic procedures. This has to be done in the
most natural way and he emphasized this very important to his friend and
his friend was also concerned. That is why Y's friend asked him to call
K. K assured Y that we would handle it in the best bureaucratic way.

Y said in addition, we are going to have this particular even this
month (referring to elections) so his friend would like K and his friend
to take that into consideration. K said he was aware and certainly had no
intentions of adding to their complications. Y said that was his own
interpretation. K asked if Y's friend intended to go ahead with the
understanding. Y said yes, that's why he asked Y to get in touch with K.
This has to be done in a very quiet way for the major event. K said it
will be done in a very quiet way and he would guarantee it.

Y said that if there should be any need to talk, K should call him.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/64

Telecon IO
Pete Flanigan

12/1/69 9:15

K said he had a nice little chore for F. The P wants to get rid of Sullivan as head of the Vietnam working group, with my full support. K said he has been nothing but trouble. F said at State? K said yes, the P wants him to be made Ambassador to Morocco. K asked, are you with me? F said yes. K said and he wants you to call Eliot Richardson and tell him. K said take care of the Sullivan matter, and get him sent to Morocco. F said Soonest. K said right; you call tell Richardson the President has no confidence in him. F said I'll do so.

By: KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Sec. Laird

9:25 a.m.

12/1/69

Laird said he wanted to visit with K about those messages that came through State. K said Bunker came right back and he didn't understand it at all. Laird explained that Bunker had been out of town. Laird didn't know why Bunker came back with the message but Bunker was trying to correct what he thought was a mistake. It spotlighted the whole thing in the State Dept. Laird told Bunker not to come in on that channel again. This is something that has never gone to the State Dept. and Bunker was trying to correct it. This area has been hit by tactical air before in the so-called "disputed" area. Laird said he would do a paper on it and would be in touch with K later -- he had staff in his office.

K said he talked to the President yesterday and the President thought Laird handled it well. The President is completely aboard with Laird's thinking.

K explained that he wouldn't be free until after 11:00.

By: KHW NARA, Date: 5/13/64

Telecon
The President
9:30 a.m. 12/1/69

The President indicated that he would be tied up for most of the day but has set up a 5:00 meeting with Rogers and Laird. There were a few things he wanted to go over.

K asked if the President had seen the letter he sent up. The President said he had not but it should be there very soon. He indicated he wouldn't have a chance to look at it for about 3 hours though.

The President said he looked at the news summary and noticed there was a Catholic party raising hell on this thing(?). The President supposed this is a left wing group. K agreed.

The President was also looking at the picture of the helicopter where the man was being pushed out and didn't believe it. He thought it was made up. K said that it has been done though, but they usually don't have a cameraman aboard. K said he hadn't looked at the pictures yet.

The President asked if K had talked to Ziegler this morning and K indicated that he had. The President said the line is extremely clear and hard here. We cannot be backed off our position of no comment. K said there was nothing more to be gained. K said you don't magnify your since of shock by repeating it three times a week. The President said we have stated our position. K thought we ought to get the Departments to follow. The President indicated that Harlow's group has to do their best to get Republicans in line.

K indicated that he had talked to Ziegler about the Bailey telegram. K suggested that the President say we have received it sent it over to Defense and nothing more. The President agreed. K said if we say no comment, there will still be the question of receipt of the telegram. We should acknowledge receipt and say we sent it over to Defense which is the responsible agency. The President said you never know what Bailey is going to do. He could be an asset. What K saw on TV of the line Bailey is taking isn't going to hurt us. Bailey wants to attack people who are interviewing soldiers -- it prejudices the line of defense. The President said K might get people to work on that. -- Give Laird a call to see that this is properly fed, and he suggests that they are fed K indicated that he would be talking to Laird later.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon
The President

12/1/69 9:40 a.m.

K said he was just getting ready to call Richardson on Sullivan, and he wanted to check again. K said somebody has got to go over or they won't pay any attention. K said his candidate is Green--Green's sneaky, but he's weak. K said he didn't want to bother the P with all the details, but they have been disobeying instructions. K said he has a big record; that paper gives the flavor. The P said where should Green go--Paris? K said no, give him the ambassadorship. K said thinks Green is the real villain. The P said rather than Sullivan? K said Sullivan has energy, and causes more trouble--he's a Harriman man. But Green is sneaky and puts him up to it. K said this is the sort of choice you have; it would be easier to move Sullivan. The P said he would move Sullivan, than bring Green in and raise hell. Say look we have to have this and get him in directly. The P said that's the problem; there's not enough contact. The P said Sullivan should go; you can't send an Assistant Secretary to Morrocco. K said no, I'd like to send Sullivan. The P said Morocco is a damn good place for Sullivan--it's an important place.

The P said he is thinking about Paris. The P said we need a dependable man; you said Porter. K said he said he'd rather send Porter to Paris than to Saigon. The P said why not take a cract at Dewey? K said superb, if you are sure you can control him. The P said hell yes. The P said that's the kind of thinking I think we should do. The P said he's a big name, and we've got to have some movement; we can't sit for 10 months. K said what about that dual thing, Ambassador to Paris, the thing we had in mind for Nelson? The P said he doesn't know if he'd care for that, the parties and all. His wife has been ill. K said he doesn't know him well enough. The P said he knows him well enough. K said it's a good idea, but shouldn't be announced before January. The P said no, and for Ziegler, he should say Habib is a good man--completely qualified. The P said that's the thing to put out. The P said on the Dewey think, I don't know. K said he's coming down tomorrow; I might feel him out. The P said he wishes Acheson were younger. K said he'd be a bad symbol. The P said okay, let's have the meeting first.

By KLC NARA, Date 5/12/64

Telecon

Secretary Laird

12/1/69 11:40 a.m.

L wanted to talk to K about . . . He's going to be gone starting . . . going with Rogers. Rogers will be gone for almost two weeks; L til
next Monday night at NATO and NATO Council meeting. L said you'
know about that? K said right. L said Dave will be here, and he's
sure everything will be all right without me in town.

L said he wanted to talk about hitting targets. K said right. L said Bunder came in with this cable without talking to Abrams. L said what happens is, he gets back to the Embassy, finds a cable from Berger and disagrees with it. L said he would like to call the damn thing off; I would like to talk to Rogers and tell him we are going to turn this off. L thinks State should be authorized by the P to inform that we are going to do it the other way. L said this just confuses the situation all over again.

K said he talked with him; he agreed with what L did yesterday. K
said he would like it if L would help to keep it quiet. L said he thinks
he will go back to Bunker through the frong channel and tell him that
it has been disapproved. K said right, and not go through State. L
said he thinks we should tell Bill we are going to do it; it would be
better for L's personal relationship with him. K said right, that's
good; go ahead and tell him. L said you tell the P I don't want to open
it again; I'll take care of it.

L said our appropriations bill is going to be out; L said he will be before
the Senate on Tuesday. L said they wanted more money than we can use.
L held them down. L doesn't want Bureau of the Budget or the White
House to think that they are making these cuts. L said he had taken part
in the mark-up of this bill which is something the Secretary of Defense
has never done before. L said we can't bring the budget down below
72.5. K said he completely supports L on that. K said you were going
to send over that paper--on the request to cut it down to 70. L said
didn't you ever get that? K said no. L said he would check into that; K
should have gotten that. K said he had talked to the P; it's out of the
question to go below 72.5. K said he completely agrees with L on this.
L said as far as NATO is concerned, we will probably have
to make a few cuts even at 72.5. K said we'll probably have to reduce
forces here. L said here, but not in Europe. L said we'll tell them
we have a few budget problems, but fears of cutting back in
NATO because of Vietnam are ill-founded.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
U. Alexis Johnson
12/1/69 1:15 p. m.

K said on the Japanese business, I have had an indirect communication
today in which Sato reaffirms the understanding and says that Shimoda
is instructed along these lines. K said it's still not clear whether
Shimoda knows what is in the memo. K said the only thing is they all
agree to 'comprehensive'in fact, but don't want to use the word. J said
he understands. K said Stans says that can be done. K said you know
they're calling an election for December 27. They are still pleading
for great discretion. K said I am wondering whether we should extend to
January 15.

J said he had Shimoda in on Saturday morning. J said he had the same
impression K did that he is not aware of the memo. J said he didn't
mention it specifically. J said he is getting in touch with Sato in this.
As soon as he has a reply, he will get in touch with J. J was hoping
today. J said your message did not come through the embassy? K said
no, but Shimoda is the man. K said they repeat the need for delicacy.
K said he said J is the man. J said he told Shimoda he wanted to do it
in a way Sato would find most helpful. J said they agreed on what the
end result should be. J said very helpful. J will see Stans tomorrow
morning.

K said Maury is upset. Some people in State are saying everything has
been taken away from him. J said oh no. K said he says he has a Presi-
dential mandate, which he does. K said he says he has other countries.
J said they should all be done together. K said he would like it done
through J; K said he would like it if you [J and Stans?] could work together.
J said Stanley Nemur wants to negotiate with the Koreans and Taiwanese.
J said I want my people to do it; Stan raises too many hackles. K said all
I want is peace. J said he [Stans] called me and said what about this morn-
ing. J said he said tomorrow morning and he said okay, so J said he was
able to hold him off until then. J said he will try to keep peace.

By KHC NARA, Dato. 5/12/04

Telecon
Bill Safire
12/1/69 2:15 (?)

K said just before he calls Blocker, have you had a chance to talk to H? S said yes; he said the story will be in two weeks; not next week. S said he said Blocker is back in New York. S said either he or the man covering the NSC's affairs for Newsweek will be after you to come in and see you this afternoon or tomorrow. K said about this? S said yes, they've read it; it's part of their file on you. S said some things shouldn't get perpetuated into legend. S said maybe K could make himself available. S said don't do anything until he calls you, and then sit down and talk with him. K said good, excellent.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird
12/1/69 3:15 p.m.

K said he just talked to the President about the 5:00 meeting. He is concerned about the permanent cease-fire they are pushing. K said he read L's memo. K said the P is hoping L will take a strong line that we shouldn't couple the two if we can avoid it. L asked if K had seen his memo. K said yes. L asked if it was okay. K said it was fine, but he doesn't want to couple them; he doesn't even want to make a specific offer. K said he wants L's help.

L said Bill had called him, and he thinks K should know about it. L said he is concerned about Bunker's wire. L said he said he'd handle it. L said he wants to raise it with the President. K said what wire? K said about the strike? L said yes. K said and he wants to raise it with the P? L said yes. K said okay, let him raise it. L said he is worried that this will look like we're escalating. K said if we get out of this all right, it proves God is benevolent. K said okay, I'll warn the P. L said the Bunker wire--God damn that makes me mad. L said Abrams comes back to me telling me every time he hits that area. But it never gets to the Washington lever. He just got back to town and that's when he found out it got to the P. K said he will warn the P. K said if you could keep in mind the P's feeling about the permanent cease-fire. K said he basically agrees with your memo, but he doesn't want to go the large route.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Mitchell

12/1/69 3:22 p.m.

K said we are having a meeting with the P about 5:00. K said we are faced with a power play from State to ram their permanent cease-fire through. K said if you come over half an hour earlier I can show you a paper. M said he would try, but he has several appointments. K said the P asked him to make sure M would come out against it. M asked if this was in connection with the Christmas holiday. K said yes, and they wanted to come with a permanent cease-fire. K said Sir Robert Thompson is here, and K's trying to set up a meeting between M and him. K said he says this would be disastrous. K said he is optimistic, more so than K would have been. M said both Laird and Rogers are leaving for NATO. K said there's something much too complicated to explain. K said it's really a fast shuffle. K said he thinks the problem is totally out of control. K said he doesn't want to explain it over the telephone; if M can come about a half-hour early, he can.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

Hugh Sidey

12/1/69 4:30 p.m.

S was seeking guidance on what this whole Mylai business has done. What it does to the war; what it does to your thinking. S said he wanted to see where we should head. Does it harm anything? K said yes, it has harmed.

S said he heard a theory today that might indeed . . . the extreme right wing element advocated heavier pressure and that sort of thing. K said it might do that.

S asked if there was any impact on Hanoi that is discernable. K said not discernable, but whenever Hanoi begins to make twitches, something happens to make them wait.

S asked if the worst is over, like the Pueblo, is it just going to end in trial? K said you can't judge; the basic analysis we made is right--the thinks I talked to you about have not changed.

S asked if the military picture has changed. K said every report we have is extraordinarily favorable. S said despite infiltration? K said there isn't much yet. What they have couldn't give them a major offensive capability.

S asked, you still can't calculate this business in terms of Paris? K said we must distinguish what was done clearly against orders from fundamental business.

S said before he felt the heat was draining out. K said yes, before we were getting into a framework in which we could talk rationally.

S said he was fascinated by a Sunday Times thing about the kids. S said we've talked about the kids, how despite the moratorium, environment was a bigger issue and should be taken up, a tacit acknowledgement that you have changed directions. K said and that shouldn't be affected.

S said is it pretty much out? K said everything he knows is out.

S said does it affect your December 15 review of the next step? K said no, we have the basic goals clearly in mind. S said is the Nixon thing next week related? K said not to the best of his knowledge.

By KHLW NARA, Dale S/12/64

Telecon

Hugh Sidey

12/1/69 4:30 p. m.

Sidey said what about troop withdrawal? K said unaffected. S said the troops are below the actual level. K said I said when we talked that we are always 1 or 2 percent below the figure we announce, for technical reasons, so we handle fluctuations, so we don't go over.

S said that helps him. S said we have to hold tight he guesses, and see if this blows over. S said he was trying to get some measure of the impact.

S asked if anything was coming up on Paris. K said nothing new there.

S said K has got the toughest job in the world. K said every time he starts to get complacent something happens to--he doesn't want to say teach him humility--he doesn't want to exaggerate.

S said he guessed K found out like everybody else. K said he found out late in August. K said it's thedarndest thing. S said we did okay this week; went to the atrocities of the communists. K said you've done a reasonable job. S said as reasonable as the press is these days. K said you've been very kind. S said we have our aberrations. K said it's not your job to be a comfort to me, but it has been comforting to know there is somebody with whom you can speak on the same dimension.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELECON
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Rogers
12/1/69; 10:45 p.m.

R said he heard on the radio about the Clay-Acheson-Dewey appointment. K said it has been cancelled. K said the President has been wanting to see Dewey, Clay and Acheson for a general bull session -- certainly not on any decision. K further said that Ziegler saw it on his schedule and just announced it. R said together?? Jesus Christ it really will be a bull session. K said at the first stage the President wanted to discuss intelligence programs with them -- that was about 6 months ago. Then he wanted to discuss SALT. K said frankly I don't know what he has in his mind now, but it is not concerning any decision. K said at any rate it has been put off until next week sometime. K said it was to be a 45 minute appointment and there was nothing particular --- one reason it came up was because Dewey came in and said Clay's feelings were hurt because he had not been asked to do anything. Clay thought the President might be mad at him for his supporting Rockefeller. R said that's an amusing combination. R said I can remember Clay and Dewey telling him to get off the ticket. K said this meeting has no significance -- just cosmetic.

K asked if he could read that thing to Bunker or should he just send R a copy. R said send me a copy -- we take of at 9:00 a.m. K said I will have it on the plane for you and just wire back any comments to me.

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/69

Telecon

David Rockefeller

8:15 a.m.

12/2/69

K said he talked to the President after his conversation with Rockefeller last week and K thought he might have left Rockefeller with a misleading impression. The President was terribly busy that week. Now the President would like to get together with Rockefeller and several people who are interested in the Middle East and the two men that Rockefeller had mentioned. Rockefeller thought he had damaged their cause by being involved and mentioned that the men have since sent a letter two the President. K said the President would like to have Rockefeller meet with them as well as with John McCloy and Robert Anderson and the five of them have a session on the Middle East. Rockefeller said he would be delighted.

R mentioned that he was seeing a man from the FIAB (Frank Lincoln) shortly. R understood that Lincoln was apparently going out there(?) and called to talk to Rockefeller. K said they were also sending Robert Murphy too. K added that Admiral Anderson would be going to other parts of the Mediterranean and that there would soon be an NSC meeting. R thought that would be a good idea since the situation seemed to be getting worse. R indicated that he was sending a copy of his luncheon with Gorbow(sp) the Egyptian representative. R said that Gorbow was down cast about the whole thing. K asked if Gorbow indicated anything about their willingness to do something. R said that Gorbow feels they have repeatedly made concessions and we have made none. The main thing is that it should be done with the three powers and feels Cyprus will modify position and ought not be completely neglected at this time. R thought it might be good for Murphy to see them. K said we are sending somebody to all of these countries.

K said he hoped to set up the meeting within two weeks. K also mentioned that he received the letter from Rockefeller's friends. Rockefeller said he would be delighted to attend the meetings but didn't feel he had to. K told R that any introduction by Rockefeller is always a guarantee that the people will be seen. it was just that last week was just a bad period for the President.

R asked if K had heard anything back on Vatican report. K said no but that it had to be handled with great delicacy. K indicated that he had set up a meeting this week on it and that he had read the report which he thought was fascinating. For R's information, K was sending a copy to the President for his weekend reading.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/64

Telecon
Elliot Richardson

9:25 a.m. 12/2/69

K said that Flanigan had told him about his conversation with Richardson and wanted to explain the situation. K said he really now has an order from the President to get the thing done -- on the other hand, K was willing to put a hold on it until he could get back to the President again on Sullivan. K indicated that the President just doesn't have any confidence in Sullivan. Richardson thought, that apart from the situation that he and K had discussed, R didn't think there was any reason to think that Sullivan has been promoting his own views outside of channels anyway -- R didn't think Sullivan talks outside. K aksed if R meant outside the Government -- but said that Sullivan plays a very rough game inside the Government and the President is really getting extremely restive. The President gives an order and 10 days later he gets an appeal. There has been an unending set of power plays. They just haven't stopped on ceasefire which no one is trying to keep from being proposed, we just want to know the facts. Richardson asked what Mansfield thought. K said that was another play where they tried to use the Mansfield resolution and wanted ______ out of that including ceasefire. Richardson said he understood the position and asked if K wanted him to follow it up with Rogers. K asked if it was R's judgment that we shouldn't do it. R said he wouldn't go that far -- he didn't have the same feel for it as K did. K wanted to tell R the succession of events. The President said twice over the weekend that he wanted it done. K said he talked again to the President yesterday and he asked again that it be done. The President then called in Peter Flanigan and asked him also to get it done. K said he would go to the President again tomorrow. R said for K not to do anything yet. R said he could not go ahead on this without getting in touch with Rogers. K asked him to hold up for 24 hours -- K didn't think it should be done while Rogers was traveling. R said he could quiet things down for the time being. K asked if R agreed that this was something we should not do with Rogers in Europe and R agreed. R said he knew Rogers would ask to have it held up until he could get back. R thought it would be difficult to refuse. K asked if there was some way R could have a talk with Sullivan. R said he would do that and keep the lid on. K asked R also to convey that the President is getting extremely restive. Sullivan can ask console himself that K is putting this up to the President and continue testing it. R said he would do it today. K asked him to keep it at that until Rogers gets back -- that would be the practical outcome anyway. Unless he heard otherwise, R would do that. K added -- understanding that Sullivan will try to work within the spirit and not try these power plays all the time. R said he would make it clear.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/69

Telecon
Secretary Richardson
9:35 a.m. 12/2/69

K had been thinking about the NSC meeting on Thursday on the Middle East. Considering that it isn't impossible that we may get into a war next year and that we are involved in a very tricky business, K was wondering if we should postpone it until Rogers and Laird return. On intellectual grounds, K would prefer it in the present form but was wondering -- if a decision should come out -- that Yost or Sisco wouldn't like and the Secretary isn't there. That would be tough for R. R said he was relieved at this thought. R said he talked with Rogers yesterday about the meeting and Rogers didn't like the idea Kx that R and K had reached the conclusion they had reached. Rogers reacts against formulating such a conclusion. K asked if R would be able to talk with equal freedom if the Secretary is present. R assured K that he could, in fact he thought with greater freedom since Rogers would be there to say what he wants to say. K said, then, if that is the case, he thought we should postpone it until next Wednesday. R indicated that he was planning on being out of town on the 10th. K said that was the day they had picked and the meeting just couldn't go on without R there. R said he would be departing about 13:30 on a convair and said if K could get him a faster plane. K said he would work on it and was serious about that.

would
K said that Yost, at the meeting, resisted R and K's conclusion also. K said he would not state any conclusions at the meeting, just present issues. Richardson thought K's feeling was right as to Rogers and Laird. K said he would let R know tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/13/04

Telecon

Packard

12/2/69 9:55 a.m.

K said he was going to set up a meeting Wednesday or Thursday between P and the President. K said he thinks he should hear from you. K said he was impressed with the remarks P made yesterday and K told the President I wanted you to see each other soon. P said whatever is convenient for him.

K said on the budget meetings, . . . their DPRC, those four issues which we isolated. K said he wanted to know with whom on P's staff should Larry Lynn work on this. K said what P did last time was very helpful. P said these issues can be presented in a simple manner. P said by next week we can get an overall picture of what the problems are on the budget.

P said while you're on the phone, we've got work to do on the SALT business. P said whether we should propose reductions or something on MIRV. P said he is putting together a memo on this; he said it will get it to K today. Then we can decide how to proceed. K said good, if P can give him a memo, then we can use this to get things moving.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon
Amb. Rabin

12/2/69 10:07 a.m.

R said just about two weeks ago when I was in your office, we discussed . . . I asked if . . . K said on the Air Force. K said he looked into that. K said it's not possible technically to speed up the delivery of the planes with your specifications until the end of February. R said only technical? K said only technical on our side. K said the production line is so set up . . . your planes have some special equipment. R said if you find it technically possible to produce in greater speeds, you don't see any problem? K said it is something we would certainly want to consider. K said if you can make a proposal to me, I can get it considered.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/64

Telecon
Secretary Packard
9:20 a.m. 12/3/69

K asked if Packard could see the President and himself at 11:30 on December 4. Packard agreed. K said the President will want him to talk about the Vietnam trip. Packard said he would also touch upon his contacts in Taiwan. He asked if K had a chance to look at the proposal to push back some B-52s. K said yes but he hadn't had a chance to discuss it further with the President. When the subject first came up, the President was opposed to it. Packard explained that we have 15 in Guam. We don't need those to maintain the 1,400 sorties and we can generate up to 1,890. We have never run more than 1,850 sorties. K asked what we would do if there was an offensive. Packard explained our sortie capability and added that the other safeguard is to take them back and that could be done in a couple of weeks. K asked how much would be saved. Packard thought between $10 and $15 million per year. K said he would get an answer by early next week. Packard mentioned that he had a note from L Card asking for a decision this week. K explained that it was in with the President and it depends on how much he can push him. Packard wanted to get it settled as soon as possible.

Packard said he was sending over memo on SALT issues. He asked that K look at the memo to see if any of these issues should be addressed. K said he had been looking for some way of triggering it.

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/69

Telecon
Robert Manning
Atlantic Monthly - Boston
9:30 a.m. 12/3/69

K mentioned the article by Nora Beloff about a week ago and said that it is so full of things, that to call them factual inaccuracies is to dignifying it. It is maliciously wrong and there are a number of statements that involve others that K felt he must point out to Manning. Manning said he was upset to hear this. K said he was not saying that Nora Beloff was milicious but whoever she talked to at Harvard must have been. Manning said he preferred to hear everything so he could make the record clear.

(1) She said that Larry Eagleburger suffered a nervous breakdown. That is totally inaccurate. K said he did a superb job for him. E had an attack of the flu, he began working for K 15 hours a day and had a relapse, he came back to work 15 hours and had another relapse. A weeks vacation restored him. Manning said he was making notes.

(2) She said that K "did not like the richboy values of the Kennedy White House and felt that the sense of nobility and honor was lacking.". K explained that he always has always been proud of his association with the Kennedys and warm about Robert. The last quality that this family is lacking is nobility and honor. K said he had some policy disagreements but remained close friends with the family. K suggested that Manning talk with Ethel or Teddy. The article says K does not like the New Frontiersmen. He said that a lot of his friends are Frontiersmen but that he would not flaunt his friendship with the Kennedys because of his present position. He said he disagreed on European policy but never attacked them on the policy. He had reason to believe that Robert agreed with him after he left. K suggested Manning call Yarmolinsky or Newstadt about his relationship with the Kennedys.

(3) The article says that Nixon bid up to three times the money that had been offered for his services. That wasn't true. Manning said that he had heard this discussed and rasied the question with Nora. She said she had checked this out. K said while he was working with Rockefeller, he had no contacts with the Nixon people. There were many other things that were totally wrong in Miss Beloff of the article but these were the major points.

K She goes on to say that K doesn't believe in missile agreement(?). She quotes K saying something about absolute security. K indicated that what he had said that was that an arms race couldn't work. The only way we can be secure is by making everyone else insecure. Another point was that K doubted anyone has ever seen him do impressions.--KKK K said he was not emotionally shattered when a Germany tried to go over the wall. He wasn't even aware of it.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Manning said he saw the things that bothered K. K said he would not write a letter. Manning was trying to think of something to do. K said the three things that really bothered him were Eagleburger, Kennedy and Nixon/ Rockefeller and finally his views on missiles because it effects his performance here.

Manning said he wanted to make clear that he was appalled. Nora Beloff came to Manning with the manuscript and he raised some questions. He mentioned that he does not have a full research staff and asked her if she had checked the stories out. She said she had.

K mentioned another point where Miss Beloff says K considered Bismarck the greatest man of his time. He asked if Manning had read his article on Bismarck. Manning had but some time ago. K suggested that he read the last 5 pages in which his conclusion is exactly the opposite. K suggested that Bismarck was successful and his very success made World War I. Manning recognized why K didn't want to write. K said it would just lead to another letter and another. Manning said he could control that. K, Manning said he had worked with Beloff before and encouraged her to spend a few more days in the states since he didn't think the manuscript had enough research. Manning said he couldn't write a letter himself. K suggested that Manning call Newstadt or Yarmolinsky at Harvard. K assumed that some of the information Beloff got was from Bowie. Manning said he didn't get along with Bowie either. K asked also suggested that Manning talk to Schlesinger or Weisner. Manning said he knew Yarmolinsky very well and he would talk to him.

K said the Eagleburger thing was damaging to Eagleburger, the Kennedy thing was a point of honor as was the Nixon/Rockefeller. Manning said he would ponder this to see what could be done. K said he realized Manning did this in good faith -- since he has known Manning for so long, and he doesn't know what possessed Beloff. She must have gotten something very hostile which colored her judgment. Manning appreciated the call and certainly considered it a responsibility of his to see something wasy done that wouldn't embarrass K and keep within the dignity of his own position. K suggested Manning call Paul Doty on his(K's) relation role on arms control issues.

Manning thought that the right thing could be done to put things in their proper perspective. K said he would drop a note to Eagleburger.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/94

Telecon

12/3/69 10:18 a.m.

Professor Doty

D said he would be down here tonight and tomorrow; wonders if there's any chance of getting together. K said it's going to be rough; they're going to see each other in any event on the 18th? D said yes. K said they might be able to do something tomorrow; D should call the office when he gets in. D said is that 6:00 on the 18th? K said yes, he'll make that.

K said one thing he had called D about and then decided not to mention, but while he's got him, he'll mention it. K said did you see Nora Bel-off's Atlantic Monthly thing? D said he's read about half of it. K said she must have talked to Bowie and gotten most of the Harvard stuff from him. K said much of it is really . . . I've never done imitations of Dr. Strangelove. D said in London she's just cast aside. K said a lot of the stuff . . . I was emotionally shattered when a German tried to climb over the wall and didn't make it. I don't know what she's talking about. K said she says I've been saying that the Kennedy's lacked nobility and honor and I've been uneasy with New Frontiersmen. K said hell, most of my friends are New Frontiersmen. She said K is opposed to arms control; K said she took my statement out of context--I'm not in a position to make definite statements on this--I'm in a tough position to say what I do believe. K said he hopes those who worked with him on arms control can set the record straight. K said he talked to Bob Manning about Kennedy; K said you know how I felt about Bobby. K said she says Eagleberber had a nervous breakdown. K said that is untrue and may harm him. K said he took the liberty of saying talk to Jerry Wiesner and D about arms control. K said anything you could say about the Kennedy relationship I'd greatly appreciate. K said it would also help my usefulness. D said of course, that's not a favor; it's an obligation--he'll be glad to do it. D said what did she do that for?

D said he needed K's advice on one thing. There's a lot of talk there about war crimes in Vietnam. D said they are hoping something would come out to assure a reasonable investigation on how extensive this sort of thing has been. D said as far as the court martial aspect, is there any information? K said, for your information--don't use it--we had a meeting on that this morning. K said it's just a question of timing, but there's a strong leaning toward that now. K said we had a senior staff meeting on that this morning. This seems to be the trend in which things are going. K said it's miserable; I can't even bring myself to look at the pictures. I've tried twice; I stop where the children are involved.

D said he would talk with K tomorrow and see him on the 18th.

By KLC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
Ambassador Dobrynin
10:40 a/m 12/3/69

K was calling D on a minor matter. Cyrus Eaton called K and said he was a close personal friend of the Prime Minister and Eaton knew he could settle things directly and that the P. M. would do things for Eaton that he wouldn't do for anyone else. K said he had too much respect to ask D to comment on this. K indicated that Eaton has since told others that he is going to Moscow and Hanoi with authority from K. K wanted D to know that if he had anything to say -- he has complete confidence in D. K said he did not know Eaton but when Eaton returns he asked if he could come in to see K and bring Dobrynin. K indicated to D that he had no objections if he wanted to come, but K said he doesn't feel he needs Eaton to have discussions with Dobrynin.

D said that Eaton had mentioned that he was going. Eaton asked D whom he should see here and D told him he didn't advise on those matters. K said that D and his Government had always acted properly. D said to his knowledge, for Ks information, Eaton wasn't received by any of D's leaders. Eaton saw them at a reception and there were pictures in the paper. Eaton did not have a private audience. K said he told Eaton that if D's leaders had anything to say K would be glad to hear it from D. K mentioned that he didn't think this was important enough for D to come in but there was the 2% chance there might be a slight misunderstanding. D said he was glad that K had called and called and didn't think that K or anyone from the Administration would have given Eaton any special messages. D didn't think Eaton was even aware of all that is going on. D mentioned that he knew when Eaton was in Paris and Moscow before, he expressed a desire to see NVN Amb. D said there was no discussion with him on this. K said he was relaxed about it and did not suggest to Eaton who he should see. D said his impression was that he was going on his own.

D invited K to dinner some time before Christmas. They settled on Dec. 16 at 8:00.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/13/64

Telecon
Secretary Packard

10:55 a.m

12/3/69

Packard said that Chairman Mahon called him. Mahon wants to get a
position on the F4s for China. Packard wondered if K had any thoughts
on this question. They want to know if the Administration will support
the F4x, and they are anxious for an answer. K asked what Packard's
view was.

Packard said they don't need them from a military standpoint -- they are
in good shape there. On the other hand, if we are going to follow the
President's policy of supporting our Allies, (they are one of our strongest
freinds) and it would be a move in the President's long-range proposals.
It is therefore a political move, not military. Pac kard advised that we
recommend that we go ahead with it. K said he was sure the President
will go ahead but he wouldn't be able to get to the President for the rese
of the day. K said this was the sort of thing which he would be willing to
back Packard up on if he wanted to go ahead. Packard said when he
talked to the President, he made a very strong point that he of China,
he made very strong point that he supported President Nixon's position in
that Southeast Asia must defend itself. K asked if it could wait until
tomorrow, but if Packard felt he must move on it, it would be o, k..
K said he would make sure it gets raised tomorrow with the President and
K said he would support it. He was sure it is in the spirit of what the
President wants.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon

Robert Anderson

12/3/69 11:00 a.m.

K said the President is trying to get a number of people together, including David Rockefeller, Jamieson and Warner and you and me next Tuesday to talk about the Middle East. K wonders whether 11:30 on Tuesday would be possible. K said he would love to see A. A said he would be here and he's looking forward to it.

A said how are you and how are you taking care of yourself? A said he worries about his friends; he knows how over-worked K is. K said it's a lot of work, but it's also fascinating. A said take care; see you next Tuesday. K said he would like to get together some time privately. A said maybe we can set something up on Tuesday. K said okay, let's definitely do that.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Senator Teddy Kennedy
11d00 a.m. 12/3/69

K was calling Kennedy with respect to the article that appeared in the Atlantic Monthly about Kissinger. There was a paragraph which says that Kissinger didn't like the rich man's values of the Kennedy Administration and that he had criticized the lack of honor and nobility of the Kennedy family. K said this was an outrageous lie and if there are two characteristics the Kennedy family does have, it is that. K said the article was written by Nora Beloff. K mentioned that he had talked to Bob Manning and he is going to do something about it. K said he was going to have some of his friends at Harvard talk to Manning about K's relationship with the Kennedys. Kennedy said this is not something that he even remotely believes. Kennedy said he would contact Bob Manning himself. K appreciated it and said this article was totally against all his convictions.

K said he would like to see Kennedy send and Kennedy said he would be glad to.

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

Roland Evans

12/3/69 11:10 a.m.

E said are you the famous White House swinger? K said Jesus Christ! I don't have to do anything more. E said K will never get rid of that reputation; it will be more important on your gravestone than having been President Nixon's top advisor. K said I just hope everyone will remember when I am teaching at Arizona State.

E said he had been bothering K's secretaries about seeing K. K said no, I agreed this morning to have breakfast with you next Tuesday. E said wonderful; what time? K said 7:45 or 8:00; 7:30 is really too early. E said we'll go to the Metropolitan Club.

K said he read what E wrote about Vietnamization. K said he had never said it before because he's not sure of it and he's afraid of suffering from the Rostow disease, but something seems to have happened in the countryside. K said they would talk about it next week. K said he is doing a detailed study; doesn't have the results of that yet.

E said there's a good man in State, maybe K knows him--Bill Steerman-- he's done a lot of thinking on this. He's in Ray Klein's shop - INR. K said no, he doesn't know him; he's got to meet him. E said he was in Vietnam.

E said the big thing to him is the Middle East. E thinks we've really got our asses in this thing. E said he would talk with K about that next week.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/64

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Adam Yarmolinsky
10:40 p.m., 12/3/69

K said I hope I did not get you out of bed. What I called you about this morning were two things. I would like to get the group of you with whom I met or those who signed the letter down for a discussion before Christmas -- for lunch -- I would appreciate it. K asked if he could get his office to work it out with Y and Doty. Y said if you have your secretary call mine, she will call all the others and set it up.

K said the second thing is I had discussed with Jack talked to Bob Manning about the Nora Beloff article. Y said he called me but I have not had a chance to read the article. K said the whole thing is full of atrocities. K said I don't do imitations of Dr. Strangelove. The part about Kennedy's lacking nobility and honor -- you know how I feel about the Kennedy's K said I took the liberty of telling Bob that you know about me more than anybody. K said the reason he told him that was because Manning would not have to take K's word for it.

Y said that Manning told him that K's phone call was the gentlest phone call he had ever received from anybody that was calling about an article. Y said Manning asked if Y would be willing to write a letter which he would print. Y said if that is satisfactory to all concerned I am perfectly willing to do it.

K said the statement on Eagleburger that he had a nervous breakdown, the fact that the Kennedy's lacked honor and nobility -- which I think is cruel to such a courageous family -- and the fact that I was opposed to arms control -- there are but 50 other inaccuracies. Y said possibly we could work something out where I would cover the latter points.
K said I am happy to clear the first one about Eagleburger. Y said I think it would be good if your letter concerned Eagleburger and my letter concerned you. K said I am delighted if you would do that.

K said the reason I was calling you is to tell you that I told Manning that he should call you to get the facts

K said you have been a good friend -- it is really appreciated.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon

Ethel Kennedy

12/4/69 10:18 a.m.

K said he called EK because there was an article about him in the Atlantic Monthly in which one paragraph said K had been unhappy with the Kennedy team and the Kennedys because of their rich boy values and because they lack nobility. K said this is exactly the opposite of his convictions. K said he is going to state so publicly and make sure they correct this. EK said that's terrific of you. EK said she knows it's an effort. K said no, he thinks it's a matter of course and he didn't want EK to have a minute's doubt. EK said she wouldn't have so K didn't have to worry about it, but thanked him for calling. K said he always enjoys talking with EK and hopes to see her soon. EK said that would be nice; nice speaking with K.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Joe Sisco

12/4/69 11:48 a.m.

K said how is the just and lasting peace progressing. S said I'm a war monger; I'm for war.

S said the Secretary wonders whether he can get a general go-ahead on that speech. K said it's in the President's office now; K said what is the advantage of giving it? S said it's geared to upcoming summit meeting. S said it's within the framework of our present policy. K said assuming what the P doesn't yet accept . . . that we have to keep pushing negotiations. S said the speech goes down in whatever foreseeable purpose we could have in the future. S said we haven't said anything substantive since March; we haven't taken a balanced stand in the discussions; we think it will bolster the Jordanians, Moroccans and Libyans; it makes our position reasonably clear in circumstances where we are not likely to get a political settlement.

K said he is not at all sure from talking with the P that he believes we are on the right track. K said the P wants to reserve judgment until the NSC meeting. S said it's a statement of policy on what we've done. K said he has passed it on. S said he thought this was based on the assumption that the NSC meeting would be today. K said the more he thought about it he thought to make a major policy decision without the Secretary of State present . . . If it were arms supply for Pakistan or something . . .

S said he has come to two conclusions: 1) we've got to operate on the assumption that we are not going to get a consensus; 2) as long as we're not going to get a consensus, it's better in the area having the disagreement part of the overall disagreement in a four power context rather than we being pushed into a corner where it's 3 against 1 and we can't produce the Israelis. K said I don't understand. S said he is going to try to get this down on paper. S said on the Jordan aspect, we ought to decide what the outer perimeter of what our views are on the Jordan settlement: hope to maintain a toehold on Hussein; consistent with Jordanian security. S said secondly, if Charlie is armed with that-- can say that's out position--it's unlikely to get a Russian agreement. If that's the case we can stand firm on the October 28 document. We can say we think it's a reasonable and fair proposal. We say these proposals stand; there's no purpose in talking further until a closer meeting

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/64

Telecon
Sisco
12/4/69
p. 2

of the minds can be achieved. K said are you doing this as a formal proposal or personal. S said he can't do it as formal. S said he talked with Elliot. K said Elliot agrees with you. K said do you mind if I show it to the President? S said he's only going to make it personal first; only going to give to Elliot and K. S said what he would do for example: X the assistant to the King wants to talk with S--just a friendly chat on December 12; the Secretary is going to talk to Eban on the 16th. S said it's an opportunity to consult generally along these lines. Say this is fair; as far as we are going to go. It's not the Russians playing lawyer for the Egyptians and we for the Israelis. S said we've got to get something if we're not going to let Hussein go down the drain. K said he's just concerned about letting the Russians in on ________.
S said the opening meeting of the four powers indicates that they've pegged out their most extreme position; paper asked for total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territory. K said including Syria? S said yes, on Syria the President spoke to Golda Meir in a way that would make it tough. K said yes he remembered.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/69

Telecon
Bill Sullivan

1:15 a.m.

12/4/69

Sullivan saw the initial report that came in from Miller on the meeting today(?). S wanted to check the wording used in the report. There are two things he said, both of which S would like to question. K asked if these were things Xuan Thuy used. S said yes. He was talking about releasing prisoners in that all would be released in South Vietnam, some would remain there and some would return to North Vietnam. Sullivan doubted he said "return" to North Vietnam. Another point was that he said something about using the occasion to reaffirm that Hanoi was willing to resume negotiations on basis of 10 points. S asked if K had seen the report and said they come in as telephone conversations. K asked they are usually put before him by Haig. K asked if S would make sure he has them.

Another point Sullivan brought up was the consultations with the Thais. He had before him NSDM 36. He said the Thais are asking for consultations in advance. Sullivan thought there wouldn't be much chance for that. K said this would be the inclination of the President but K suggested that he and S work something out. S said that K knew what the Secretary said to Bui Diem. K suggested that we may want to do it back channel, and K would send over a copy if S would hold it close. S said there wouldn't be any need to see copies but would like to know what action will be taken. K asked how far ahead of time do they want the consultations. S mentioned that they would probably want several days. S said he would leave this with K and when K felt there is a definite date to call him. K agreed and asked if S would let K know how this would be handled and to whom we should inform. S asked if K meant other than the Vietnamese and K said yes -- we have to do something. S said the Thais are getting itchy but the Australians and New Zealand Zealand are leaving us alone. K said the agreement was to call Gorton on the phone but supposed that wasn't a very secure method. S said it depends on how much time is involved. K said my Monday he expected to have a date so there should be at least a few days notice.

K told Sullivan that Habib was in to see the President and Habib is asking for K's notes. K thought that one way of getting communications clearer, if K sent the notes over, would Sullivan hold them tightly. S said certainly. He mentioned that the copies of the letter K sent over to him and Marshall were very helpful. K said that the letters would explain why the big flap over here. K mentioned that Elliot had talked to him about the situation.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

- 2 -

Sullivan said he didn't see where either of the two recipients of the letter
were acting entirely within the framework. He was not aware of the letter
when it first came out. S asked if K was aware that he had sent out the
cable. K said yes but he didn't think it would culminate into an action
paper only that it would be a paper for NSC consideration. K said for
S's information, the President was thinking of moving this into a mid-January
NSC and depending on that, K should make some decisions. The President
doesn't want a confrontation before.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/64

Telecon IO

Ehrlichman

12/4/69 7:18 p.m.

[Didn't hear the very beginning of conversation, but E must have said that the P may call a special session of Congress for after Christmas, and so for the moment is] cancelling the plans for going to California after Christmas. E apparently related the special session to appropriations bill at beginning of Conversation; E said if it was taken care of early then the P would go to the West Coast (no special session). But for the moment plans are being suspended. E said if the P does go to the WC he may not take a full staff but E is sure the P would want K to go. E said we should know in the next few days. K said please keep him informed.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

Amb. Reischauer

12/4/69 7:30 p.m.

R wanted to pass along something to K. Yesterday R gave a speech in Detroit to a meeting of the National Council of Churches. R talked to a Mr. Howard Schomer (?); doesn't know if K knows him. K said I don't think so. R said he and his colleagues have close relations with Paris; then have information from big Minh. R said they say something bit may be moving there. K said what, like overthrowing the government? R said some new form of government coming out which may be more approachable for negotiating a settlement. R said he (Schomer) was much exercised that some action might be taken by the U.S. that might discourage some hopeful possibilities. K said like what possibilities? R said like replacement of Lodge that might be taken as a symbol of a hard line or lact of sympathy. R said he doesn't know if something like this is going to happen. R said he was wondering if K had any interest in talking to him, or does K have adequate sources? K said he would like him to talk to one of his staff people who handles Vietnam, Holdridge--that K would like very much. K said he is just too over-worked. K said even if I agree to it now I will still never see him. R said he would tell him to get in touch with Holdridge. R said you will tell Holdridge? K said absolutely. R said these people have been working very hard with lots of Vietnam contacts. K said he is sympathetic with their general concerns; but I think it is unrealistic for me to suggest I do have time to see them. R said he could understand that very well.

R said he hoped K got a letter from him. K said he got it and he appreciates it. R said hewas delighted about Okinawa. K said the trouble was some of R's ex-colleagues oscillate between excessive toughness and excessive softness, and usually at the wrong moments. R said he thinks we are going in the right direction at the right time. R said he was enthusiastic about the Guam declaration. R said if we can only move in that direction. K said we have every intention of that. K said of course the really constructive things have to wait until the war is over. K said he appreciated thaarticles R send too. K said he called Adam Yarmolinsky to see if he could get a group together for lunch. K said he has nothing particular in mind, but he suggested having R come. R said he hasn't heard from Adam. K said he hadn't given him the dates yet, but R will. R said good.

*

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Telecon
Paul Keyes
12/4/69 8:06 p.m.

Keyes asked if K had a few minutes. K said yes. Keyes said K could say there is no truth to the rumor that the President has asked Haynesworth to become a Catholic so he can be confirmed. [K laughed.] Keyes said he was going to read K some rough stuff and get K reactions and K should be frank about what he thinks. Keyes said K wanted to open with "Gentlemen forgive me if I seem a little thrown; I was compromised by Luch Winchester that if I came here tonight I would be seated next to Gloria Steinem. In my present position as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs I am concerned chiefly with Vietnam, the Middle East and Zsa Zsa Gabor. I am happy to be here tonight and since it is raining in Key Biscayne there was no other alternative to my coming. As you know the President is making changes in the White House: he is making a new press room in the swimming pool area, but he and the Vice President have had a disagreement--the President feels he should drain the pool first.

Keyes asked if John Hightower was still president of the Gridiron Club. K said yes, he invites me. Keyes said oh good that would work right in. K could say "I am happy to be here tonight as the guest of John Hightower, of whom Jack Valenti said 'I sleep better tonight knowing John Hightower is my president.'" Keyes said this may be too punny, but you might say "Let's hope the Soviets are not on a salt-free diet." Keyes said is that too punny? K said it may be, but write it. Keyes agreed said K might say something about "watch what what you do instead of what you say" being the watchword of the administration. K could repeat that then say as Mrs. John Mitchell so well demonstrated. Keyes reminded K that the night after Mrs. M said that on TV, M had to explain what she had said. Keyes said he wondered if that would have currency. K said it probably would.

Keyes said K could say what an interesting place the White House is to work--so many things going on at all times. Just the other day while General Hershey was drawing the first capsule, the President was in his oval room signing a bill saying that Birch Bayh is now officially 19 years old and his birthday was September 9, 1950. Keyes asked if that would make sense. K said yes, the people here know who Bayh is.

Keyes said in his experience with the Gridiron--this year it didn't work with the Vice President--. . . K said yes, but he liked what Keyes did for the VP: it changed his whole image; it was tremendous. Keyes said yes, but he couldn't get out of it at the end.

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon

Keyes

12/4/69 8:06 p.m.

page 2

Keyes wanted to tell K something he had thought of for the ending; something like K saying: It's a rough job with many demands and long hours, but there are a few rare moments that you can put away in your memory book and dwell upon for ever after. Such a moment heppened to me only a few hours ago, flying with the President on Air Force One. The P had briefly forgot- ten the cares of the world and was thinking of his family. He was discussing the future of his son-in-law, David Eisenhower, how David is torn between a future as a lawyer like his father-in-law or a military man like his grand- father. The President closed his eyes, leaned his head back, and there, 7 miles above the earth, I shared the silence with him. Gone were the lines of worry; the P was thinking of good thoughts, family thoughts. Finally he broke the silence and said Henry, do you think the Senate would approve yough David to fill the Fortas seat?

K said that was good; it would be out of character for K to go on with a bunch of 1-liners. K said before all this publicity I was thought of as a stuffy professor. Keyes said yes, then said yes only because that was the image of K, not because Keyes thought that of him. Keyes said he thought this would work, and would bring them to their feet. Keyes said he would call tomorrow. K said this is basically what he wants. K said they will have *KX* in mind the supposed rivalry with State, but K said he shouldn't make Rogers look bad. K said he could make fun of himself, but not of Rogers. Keyes said he would find a good way to do that, maybe a lower- your-voice line. Keyes said the problem is you wind up writing a lot of jokes you can't use.

Keyes said he was thinking of combining Zsa Zsa with *KX* of Mitchell's new 'no-knock' law. Keyes said he doesn't mean that in a vulgar way, just that you can go into her house without knocking. K said he liked the Agnew and the press joke. K said if Keyes could think of one or two for- eign affairs sort of things. K said Keyes has hit the right tone, the sort of thing K is hoping for. Keyes said he is trying to sound like K; he wants K to say the sort of thing that only K can say. Keyes said, incidentally, the information about his doing this for the VP did not come from Keyes. He wants to do this strictly anonymously--it came from his secretary. K said he just couldn't imagine the VP writing that kind of stuff for him- self. Keyes said he would call tomorrow.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/13/64

Telecon

Paul Keyes

12/4/69 11:36 p.m.

K said he was calling with a presumptuous question. Keyes said no, you couldn't. K said yes I could. Keyes said you want Zsa Zsa's telephone number? K said no, that I've already got; maybe you can get me some others. K said he's got a problem; he's supposed to talk to the Gridiron Club on Saturday night and supposed to be humorous, and that's not his forte. Keyes said he would volunteer to help so K wouldn't have to ask. Keyes said it would be his pleasure; he would thoroughly enjoy doing it.

Keyes asked for details about the occasion. K said there are two big affairs, the white tie one for which you did the Agnew thing which I liked so much. K said this is slightly less formal, but essentially the same thing. K said Ehrlichmen and Harlow are speaking. Keyes asked in what order; said K should be last. K said he may be last because he's going with the President to Arkansas.

K said you know the image that have of me. K said the only thing he would go easy on is not needling the State Department. K said he doesn't mind making fun of himself. Keyes said he would call K today or tomorrow to tell K some; see if they're on the same beam. K said he appreciates this enormously. Keyes said my pleasure sir.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Paul Keyes
12/4/69; 11:55 p.m.

PK said he wanted to check a few things with K. Wanted to know if K's office was really in the basement. K said yes and PK asked how about this:

As you know I have an office in the basement of the White House. It is just next to the White House Mess. As a matter of fact, there are those of the Foggy Bottom who think my office is the White House Mess.

But now that this is brought up I would like to put an end to the rumors about the Secretary of State and myself -- the fact that we are competitive. Let me tell you that Secretary Rogers shares with me equally knowledge and intelligence -- only this morning I telephoned Bill to say that Vice President Ky had agreed to discuss a coalition government in Saigon. Within 15 minutes Bill was back on the phone calling me to tell me that Rudolph Hess had parachuted to Scotland with a peace proposal and Bill agreed to let me tell that to the President.

(They discussed the above further and decided that the coalition government wasn't a good thing because it would have to be a true statement and that certainly was not. K said he would think up a suitable statement -- but he liked the idea.)

My friendship with Bill Rogers is deeper than that. Bill has gone on record that he will let me represent not only his own office but the entire State Department should Senator Fulbright decide to reopen the foreign relations hearings.

PK said he would call in the morning.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
Joe Sisco

10:10 a.m.

12/5/69

Sisco said he had finished the paper and would send it over during the course of the day. K asked if he could show it to the President. Sisco said K could do whatever he wished with it. K said he might mention to the President that it came from Sisco.

K said he had a letter from John Walsh in which he stated that there has been
alot of propaganda in his part of the world about the alledged $2,000 K pledged
to the Zionist organization. First of all, K explained that he didn't have $2,000
to give, secondly, the signature was a forgery, thirdly, he has never had anything
to do with any Zionist organization and was opposed to the creation of it. Sisco
said he was aware of this type of thing going on and has asked John to send along
whatever he has. K wondered if this waskicking around the Arab world in
general. Sisco said that he was being call Jewish
K said, jokingly, that he heard it was kicking about the Jewish world that Sisco
was Arab. K asked if there was any point in denying this. Sisco didn't think
so. He said this will continue. He has been talking to K about the
anti-American material that has been in their newspapers and on radio. He made
strong points to the Ambassadors here. John Walsh is under instructions to
keep plugging away at this. Sisco told K not to lose any sleep over it.
K said he wouldn't.

Sisco told K about his childhood. When he lived in Chicago, his father owned
a butcher store below their "flat." The couple who lived behind them were
Jewish. Sisco said he ate more chicken soup as a child than the average Jewish
child, therefore that may be his claim to being Jewish. Sisco said he never told
anyone that story. K said if Sisco read in the papers that he was a Jewish chicken
soup eater, he would know where the leak came from.

On another subject, Sisco asked if K had a chance to get an answer on the speech.
K said he hadn't. Sisco said Elliot Richardson would bring it up at lunch today
and Sisco said he would call Brussels at the end of the day and that whatever is
decided would be o.k. with him.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Adam Yarmolinsky
11:30 a.m. 12/5/69

Yarmolinsky said he had everybody aboard for the lunch on December 22
EXAMPLE which will be at 1:00. K said he would have Y's car met. Y said
he would be coming in on Flight #875 Eastern Airlines.

On the letters, Y said he would propose to write on the two points -- Kennedy
relationships and arms control to Bob Manning. Y asked if he understood that
K was going to write to Eagleburger? K said he would. Y said, if not, Bator
would be glad to but thought it would be better coming from K rather than a
third party. Y said he understood Mannings deadline is this weekend.
K said he would do it today.

Y asked if K was aware of the suggestion that the President appoint a
commission to investigate Mi Lai and other related matters. Y said he signed
a statement and went to the press conference with Goldberg. Y thought the
statement, which he did not draft, came out very well. K said he read the
news stories but didn't read the names connected with it. He said we don't
find the idea offensive. K said the only issue is if there is another atrosity,
we will certainly do it. Y said he would be a dollar to a donut they will show
up. He had heard of one of his first stories K said he was not immediately
involved in it. He sits in on some of the meetings to hear the discussions.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Hubert Humphrey
Mr. Kissinger
1:45 p.m., 12-5-69

H said, Henry, I am sorry to bother one of the busiest men in America. K said you never bother me, my friend. K said, how are you. H said fine. H said I am out here teaching school and things are quiet. H said I have a little problem here. I had a student group come in here to see me that I have been working with and told them I would like for them to get a broader view of the matter if they were going to have any more Vietnam meetings. H said I have a fine young student that is willing to get a broader view. H said I have a man coming out here Wednesday who is a reporter. The young people wanted to bring in one of the people who had been indicted in Chicago. H said I told them I could not be associated with that.

H said I wanted to get someone from the Administration that could discuss with a rather substantial body of students, someone that could rationally discuss the Vietnam policy, a more in-depth perception of what this is all about in that part of the world. I am not asking for you. K said I do not make any public appearances. If I can appear at a seminar where there is no press, you need only ask. H said I know you can't do it. K said let me talk to Elliot Richardson. K said I have heard good things about this young fellow, Marshall Wright, who has made trips to other campuses. K said I will get back to you this afternoon and make every effort to get someone for you. H said spokesman could even give an historical analysis. H said I want the young people to know there are different points of view.

H said the time we need him for is next Wednesday night. The night of the 10th. We would pay his fare out and back. H said he would have a very good audience - at McAllister College. H said we could arrange for radio and TV coverage. If the spokesman is articulate, that would be good.

K said I hope if you come to town you will let me know. It means a lot to me. H said will you be in Washington around Christmas. K said I don't know. The President may go to San Clemente and I might go with him. H said if you don't mind, I will keep in touch with you. H said I like what I hear from Helsinki. K said the tone of it is very good. H said I had a feeling it would after my visit over there this summer. K said we are looking at this problem with them as two sides would that really want to go anywhere. H said I think this is one of the most

By K.L. NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Ernst Van der Beugel
12/5/69 4:20 p.m.

V said now he knows why K is so busy. K said now that he has got this
reputation he is in business. V said and how. K said he doesn't have to
do anything any more. V said he was very much amused.

V asked if K was coming up to NY this weekend. K said he doesn't know.
When is V leaving? V said he is leaving Tuesday, but he can't come to
Washington, too many meetings in NY. K said there is a slight chance he
is coming on Sunday, but it's not clear yet--the President has a press con-
ference on Monday. V said he knows he does. V said if K gets away let
him know.

K said he was saw Milton Katz and he said V was with the President when
with you when the President gave his speech. It brought paroxysms of
rage. V said he was the only defender; he was in a minority. K said it
had a great effect on everyone but the intellectuals.

V said he is telling K for his own good, Harvard isn't an interesting
place anymore. It is a pedestrian place. K said that's his feeling; it is
dull. V said it is unbelievable. K said his ex-colleagues have nothing
to say that is interesting. V said Harvard used to be a window on the world;
now it is only a window on Harvard. V said people just spend their time
wondering where the trouble starts tomorrow. V said he finds New York
thousands of times more interesting. K said oh, far. K said when he
leaves here he intends to get a job there. K just hopes some of V's founda-
tion friends will employ him. V said if something happens to our universities
we are in trouble. V said it's nice to see them, nice to meet with them, but
be in contact with them, but if you ask me if they are interesting, I say no.
K said when he goes to see his children he gets a few of his friends together
but they have nothing interesting to say. K said how do they feel about me?
V said there's great resentment about the policy, but nothing like the Rostow
situation. V said there's a complete break with the policy. K said but they
have no policy of their own. V said they would welcome you with open arms
after 1 or 2 or 3 years. K said I have no intention of going back. V said his
advice would be against it; it is an uninteresting, rather violent parochial
place.

V asked how's Nancy. K said she's fine. V said he would give her a call.

By KLCW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

V said he's been following the American press on the summit conference in the Hague. V said it's not a disaster, but that's all you can say about it. V said they avoided a complete breakdown, but simply delayed the difficulties. [I think V said the French simply made all the difficulties more complex.] K said he's always thought that. V said he thinks in a very subtle way we should let it be known now that we hope it will be a success. V said there are strong forces in this country that are rather hesitant about this new animal, afraid of economic discrimination. V said in the long run the political thing is more important than economic discrimination. V said the hesitant forces are stronger now than they used to be. That is probably true K said.

V said Brandt behaved very well. V said whether he behaved as well on other fronts I don't know. K said it's good to hear that; he's a decent fellow. V said it was in his opinion the best speech made in the last 5 or 6 years; really first class. K said he must get that.

V said we have not spoken to one of our friends in which there is not something basically wrong with the one or two of the children. K said it's a real problem. V said one of the ones has dropped out; Johnson's son has disappeared. V said he is less interested in American foreign policy and more interested in what is happening domestically. K said, yes but they are related; somebody has to do something in Vietnam before he will be listened to again. V said this society has been held together by optimism and the Constitution. The Constitution remains, but the optimism has gone out the window. K said that is true. V said what is relevant is what is happening domestically in this country.

K said when are you coming back. V said he would be here 4 or 5 times in 1970, K said the next time you come we must see each other. V said he hoped K would contact him if he comes to New York. [V talked about some meeting taking place in Switzerland, 16 - 19 April and asked K to come.] K said okay he would do his best to get there. V said yes, but he hopes to see K before that. V said how are you? K said fine. V said K looked 10 years younger. V said he had a marvelous time these 10 days, but he is terribly worried. V said in 1930 or the 40s or the 50s we could survive in Europe feeling there is strength on the other side of the ocean; V said that feeling is gone. K said he agrees that is our big problem--much bigger than the war. V said nothing fundamental will change--the liberals will remain as irresponsible as they always used to be.

V said he saw Galbraith and his next target will be the council on Foreign Relations. V said to him what the hell are you doing

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KCLY NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon
Van der Beugel

12/5/69 4:30 p. m.

Galbraith said it's a scandal that bankers and lawyers get inside information and use it for business purposes. V said he said this is absurd; if you succeed you will destroy the most unique institution in the world. K said he must run. V said he understood; bless you and good-bye.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
Elliot Richardson
5:05 p.m. 12/5/69

K said the P would like it if Senators and Congressmen not be given trips with State support and the best way to handle it would be for Richardson to send the names over before they go. It doesn't mean we shouldn't let Embassys know they are coming but if there are any junkets encouraged by us, the President would like those people excluded. Richardson said he had made it a practice to send names over but he is now sure where to draw the line. K said he would get Richardson a reading on it. Especially Percy. Percy made a statement that Robbs company was involved in an atrocity and the President considers that really dirty pool. Richardson said he would ask Elliot and Haig to work out where the line is and where we support or ask the Embassy to show courtesy.

K asked if Richardson had the name of the person for Hubert Humphrey. Richardson said that Marshall Wright would be glad to do it. K said he would call Humphrey and asked if H's office should get in touch with Wright at State. R said that would be o.k. K asked who Wright was again. Richardson said he was former country officer for the Philippines and his present assignment is at the National War College. He used to be on the Rostow staff.

Richardson had thought of a couple more names for the Paris spots. One was Tom Gates and Jack Irwin. K asked if Gates was for Embassy or negotiations. R thought both but he would probably be better for Embassy. K asked R thought Irwin might be good for negotiator. K thought it was interesting and said we would consider both names.