TELCONE

- 5 -

The President/Mr. Kissinger

P: Um-humm. I don't know; in everything we've done, everything we've said to the Russians and Indians had no effect, is that really what we're saying?

K: Our trouble was that we have been caught -- maybe if we had been much tougher but for that we had no domestic position but certainly everything we have said has been without effect and they have geared it towards a humiliation -- towards a dismemberment of Pakistan.

P: Yeah.

K: And the effect of that will be on all other countries watching it is that the friends of China and the United States have been clobbered by India and the Soviet Union. And I don't see how we escape that by tacking towards India now.

P: Nope. Well, are they now with the Mujib thing out of the way, what is State suggesting that we do?

K: They're not; they are refusing to make a suggestion.

P: What?

K: They are not making a suggestion.

P: They are just saying we ought to review our situation, huh?

K: Right. And that we shouldn't act impetuously.

P: What the Christ are we impetuous about, I don't know of anything impetuous.

K: I asked the same question.

P: Like what, cutting off the arms? A little prinking thing like that, why what about the cutting off of arms to Pakistan, that was impetuous too, huh? You know, it's ridiculous; there's nothing impetuous about any of this stuff.

K: I think it's a carefully considered policy, Mr. President.

P: What we are doing?

K: If we collapse now, I admit it's not a brilliant position but if we collapse now, the Soviets won't respect us for it; the Chinese will despise us and the other countries will draw their conclusions.

DECLASSIFIED

M.O.F.O. 12958

Authority
By: NARA Date 6/4/04

DECLASSIFIED

MO 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/1/67

TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger

- 6 -

P: Well, what about the British position and how they're playing it?

K: Well, they abstained.

P: They abstained on this?

K: Yeah.

P: That sort of figures doesn't it?

K: Yeah.

P: French?

K: They abstained.

P: Humph. The French abstained too, huh?

K: Yeah.

P: What do you think the real game there on the British and the French -- afraid to make Russia mad, isn't that it?

K: That's right; they are trying to position themselves between us and the Russians.

P: Um-humm.
No,

K: I am beginning to think one of the worst mistakes we made was to push Britain onto the Common Market.

P: Yeah, yeah.

K: I mean that wasn't our Administration, we --

P: I know that. That decision was made long before we got here but we continued to push it, that's for sure.

K: Well, we couldn't have stopped it by then.

P: No.

K: We acquiesced in it.

Heath -- And, of course, and

P: Yeah, sure. That was Heath's position long before ... became ...

TELCORN
The President/Mr. Kissinger

-7-

K: No, no; the mistakes of that were made in the Kennedy Administration.

P: It's done now.

K: That's where it could have been stopped easily.

P: You got a little cold?

K: No, maybe I've been talking a lot on the telephone.

P: You have, huh? (laughter)

K: Yeah.

P: Well, on this thing my view is to play this -- I'll get them in and have a little meeting. That's a pretty good idea. But this idea of it's the same old story, Henry, that we have such things as troop withdrawals, Cambodia, Laos or virtually everything we have done, everybody comes in and raises questions.

K: And it's this --

P: Well, goddammit; if they've got a better answer, fine but I don't see -- They raise the questions and that makes a good historical record, doesn't it?

K: That's right and it's this phony wisdom; we ought to consider things carefully. Of course, we ought to consider things carefully.

P: That's right, that's right.

K: What good does our action do? On that basis, we just have to roll over every time a superior country moves. What is the long-term effect? Of course, we have to consider the long-term effect.

P: Yeah.

K: The proper ....................

[End of Tape]

DECLASSIFIED

MDEO 2958
Authority
By: NARA Date 6/1/67

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Mike Wallace/Kissinger

10:45 a.m. - 12/6/71

W: Listen, Henry, seriously. Next Sunday, on "60 Minutes" explain
explain things to us, will you?

K: What do you mean?

W: I mean - how could you better serve the cause of better under-
standing than next Sunday at 6:00 p.m. you explain India/Pakistan,
Middle East, the summit meetings and a little tour of the horizon.

K: Now that's between you and Haldeman.

W: Between me and Haldeman?

K: Right, I have put myself into the hands of these people for this year.

W: All right, I will see if I can.

K: All right, talk to Haldeman. If he agrees, I will do it.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:50 p.m., December 6, 1971

K: I have talked to John Connally.

P: U-huh.

K: I didn't tell him anything, I just asked what he thought of Rogers'
speech. He said he doesn't understand all the ramifications but
thought it was a speech delivered without any conviction; that in
effect we have turned it over to the UN and we have washed our
hands. He is concerned about the NATO thing and impressing
this on --

P: I knew he wouldn't like that. Rogers said we didn't have problems
but we do have problems.

K: On India/Pakistan, he favors a more active policy.

P: Okay. Apparently that is the way it is. We have just -- we can
straighten it out but I am not sure that you can wait for a day on
the backgrounder. Why wait?

K: I want to make sure how he has briefed the Senators. I don't think
we want to have a White House-State confrontation.

P: Where we take the hard line and they take the softer line.

K: I have been trying to -- we have been doing the right thing but
more slowly than we want to. That backgrounder you got Sisco
to give put them on the line.

P: I see, fine. Check with somebody and get the facts.

K: This fellow, Richey --

P: I know, an ambassador.

K: After the dinner, he came up to me and he said, "What a man your
President is." I think that your remarks at the end were really
very powerful.

we've

P: Remarks are not enough; really got to do something on this one. We
have got to straighten it out.

K: Right, Mr. President.

TELCONE

Rogers/Kissinger

x 1:23 p. m. 12/6/71

NARA, Dato 5/26

K: This meeting this afternoon will be run differently from usual NSC. President
will ask you to describe VN situation which will be on film.

R: That's not what he told me.

K: It's not the way it was going to be. He was going to ask Helms to start off.

R: How long?

K: 10 minutes. Maybe 5. So perhaps 5 so other can get in a word.

R: OK. I will be there shortly.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Raza/Kissinger

1:24 p.m. 12/6/71

R: I am sorry when telephone came.

K: I understand you talked with the President.

R: A few words. I said difficulty about arms. He ssid he will see
what he can do.

K: We have announced it. Noon today the cut off of another 90 million dollars
to India. You will informed NY of these steps?

R: I will.

K: 90 million. So only 100 million left now which we will get after next.

R: Economic?

K: Yes. That's all the uncommitted funds and also holding up a loan of 90 million.
We will get in touch with the Shah of Iran in an ambiguous way because of
domestic situation.

R: Thank you, sir. You are holding 100 million of what?

K: Loan due for India now but holding it up.

R: And off 90 million which leaves 100 million left.

K: 124 million.

R: I will not come and bother you at today.

K: Anything you here from Islamabad I would like to know.

R: And tomorrow some time.

K: Absolutely. We wish you well.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Vorontsov/Kissinger

3:32 p. m. 12/6/71

K: I have a letter to your Mr. Brezhnev now. I can send someone in 10 minutes.

V: I will be waiting.

K: Not going in usual channels. Any answer should go back through you.

V: Fine.

K: Good.

TELCON

Joseph Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

10:35 p.m., December 6, 1971

NARA, Dato

K: Well, I just found out -- are you free for lunch tomorrow? I just found out that for tomorrow you haven't been asked. Nothing very urgent.

JK: Nothing urgent.

K: In fact, there is nothing urgent. We can do it tomorrow or one day next week.

JK: If we can schedule it for next week, tomorrow I have something which I could break.

K: It isn't worth it. I called you just to pick up your suggestion from last week.

JK: Right. Let me see, shall we say a week from today?

K: A week from today, I will be in the Azores so it would have to be the 15th or 16th.

JK: The 15th or 16th.

K: I don't have my calendar for then, we will call you in a day or two.

JK: Thank you for thinking of me.

TELCOM

Mr. Vorontsov/Mr. Kissinger

10:50 p.m., December 6, 1971

V: If it is going to be helpful, I can bring it tonight or tomorrow morning as we agreed.

K: Bring it over first thing tomorrow morning. The votes are going to take place tonight. The President is still talking to the Canadian Prime Minister. I had a brief word with him and we can't accept without withdrawal. At any rate, the votes will take place before I can have a serious discussion with the President.

V: Okay, then tomorrow morning.

K: Bring it tomorrow morning.

V: Yes, it is ready anyway so it is no rush. I will bring it tomorrow morning.

K: Well, if it is ready, you can bring it right by.

V: I will bring it on my way home right now.

K: Through the Northwest Entrance to the West Lobby.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Folsom
By: C. NARA Date: 12/01

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Vorontsov/Mr. Kissinger

10:50 p.m., December 6, 1971

K: Bring it tomorrow morning.

By.

D

NARA, Date

5/26

TELCONE

The President/Mr. Kissinger

10:55 p.m., December 6, 1971

K: I am sorry they put you on the line first.

P: That's all right, I don't worry about things like that.

K: I called you to tell you about the Russian thing. They have twitched a little bit. They have now come out with a lengthy note in response to what I gave them yesterday.

P: Hold on just a second -- let me get to another phone. Okay, go ahead!

K: They have now put forward a Resolution which is unacceptable but which is at least a move. Calls for an immediate ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities and calls on West Pakistan to recognize ......

P: Yeah.

K: Now, of course, it has no withdrawal and it does not recognize Bangla Desh, it recognizes East Pakistan. Vorontsov keeps calling asking for your decision. I told him you are still talking to Trudeau and they are calling for a vote. They are going to defeat the Resolution.

P: They are going to defeat it. Just tell them, sorry, no withdrawal; no deal.

K: I told him it was my personal opinion that you would never agree to it without withdrawal.

P: That's right.

K: What we ought to do is play on this with the Indians and the Bangla Desh thing.

P: I think it is awfully small.

K: It is small; it's not enough, not even close to being enough.

P: That's right.

K: But at least it shows that if we braven it up ...... It will never work if we don't get Rogers to talk ..... Ron Ziegler was in my office after the dinner. Ron, who doesn't know anything about it, sat in on the NSC meeting but he came in here after the dinner and said he didn't think that was our policy. When he goes before the Senators

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

10:55 p.m., December 6, 1971 -- page 2

K: (cont'd) and says --

P: I don't know what he talked to the Senators about.

K: The same thing, I'll bet my bottom dollar on it. He has said we are
washing our hands of it; whatever the UN decides; we have done all
we can do; the ceasefire and political accommodations ......

P: No responsibility on the Indians.

K: And not making clear to them their own future is involved.

P: Get your backgrounder first.

K: Wait and see what happens on the Senators.

P: On the Rogers thing. U-Hummp.

K: We can decide tomorrow.

P: Okay.

K: But we can let this note be overtaken by events.

P: Just say, this is totally unacceptable.

K: It will be overtaken by events tomorrow morning.

P: Put the line out, it must be very clearly understood we have done
everything that we can and that the cutting off -- Rogers did have
the cutting off of economic assistance --

K: He has said, "War doesn't help anybody." What he should have said
is ...... where the Indians knew ......

P: That's the line I used. I used it with Trudeau.

K: You used it with Trudeau and it was perfect. But that's not what Richey &
company are going to put on diplomatic wires tonight.

P: Correct it. Why wait?

K: Let's see what he said to the Senators.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Secretary Connally/Mr. Kissinger

11:10 p.m., December 6, 1971

K: Mr. Secretary.

C: Yes, sir.

K: I was just talking to the President and I said, "Where's Connally, he gets out early?"

C: Are you going to try to tell me you are at your office?

K: Don't think that the President doesn't know. I said, "Guess where Connally is now."

C: I don't mind you letting him know you are at the office but ...

K: The President wanted me to ask you what you thought of Bill's speech. I have my reaction on India/Pakistan but rather than giving you my reaction, what was yours?

C: I thought the speech tonight was delivered -- the delivery was without conviction. First, it was like reciting wrote and secondly, he was trying to convey the thought that the only hope we had was the UN.

K: And we aren't going to do anything. There are limitations under our power which isn't the ________ which we had agreed to. One problem we have -- just for your information, we have sent a private note to the Russians ________.

Europeans in October. At first, they are only in favor of political settlement in the Middle East. Agreed to a ceasefire if coupled with withdrawal. They don't recognize Bangla Desh, don't recognize independent state ________ might open crack by the Indians.

I am as terrified now -- I am speaking to you as a friend -- as when Bill was running around Europe saying there is no problem with the economy.

C: That's correct. That was certainly the impression I got, Henry, from what he said tonight. I think Bill might be afraid that somebody's going to get us militarily involved.

K: We can't get militarily involved if we don't want to get militarily involved and there isn't a chance. Can you imagine the President even listening to that for three seconds.

C: No, I can't imagine it so I can't imagine on what he bases his fears.

TELCON

11:10 p.m., December 6, 1971 -- page 2

NARA, Dato 5/20

K: They are so scared of the Indians. On top of it, he is afraid of Church and the New York Times. Our strategy is to play a rough game with the Russians. We have nothing to lose with the Indians. The Russians came into my office three times tonight. Every time we confront them, we are better off for it. If we lose the Chinese ___ dress rehearsal for the Middle East. That's childish, we are too big. We will never get away with it. Stiffle it as quickly as we can.

C: I agree.

K: Johnson made a deliberate decision to do it with Vietnam ___.

C: That's right. You don't slide into these things without knowing what you are doing. No question of what Bill is trying to say and what he said tonight. We ought to pass this to the Security Council and General Assembly and say this is your ___ and your responsibility and to mean it. That's fine but it won't work.

K: Which means we can't cut aid or anything else.

C: I was trying to convey that this afternoon. Seems to me for the first time now, as the President pointed out, we have something that gives us the majority of the UN. Whether it is the Red Cross or some other group, we ought to have some group feeding some story on atrocities. You can't be completely phony but maybe we can get an Arab group to feed out some story and nail India and Russia at the same time.

K: If nothing but to get some points with the Chinese. The tougher we have been with the Indians, they haven't really ___.

C: If we make the Indians unhappy, we make the Chinese happy. Since we forced Great Britain out of there which we never should have done, we are losing a very great chance to make some real points worldwide. It makes them a little bit easier to deal with.

K: And the Sub-Continent --

C: What do we want in the subcontinent?

K: If we show the Chinese, you are hooked up with us --

C: We are not going to roll over and play dead. Washing our hands of it and playing dead are two different things. I thought things went very well tonight.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

11:10 p.m., December 6, 1971 -- page 3

K: Except the Canadian Minister was very boring. I thought the speeches went very well -- you and the President. He talked a little softer in the afternoon on the same line.

C: I didn't know what he had said.

K: The speech you gave is the same as what he said. Trudeau said to be a little more specific and I gave him eht 7% figure but I said there had to be trade things attached to it. We are going to get it, but they are going to scream.

C: We are going to get it. I am no different than anybody else. Everybody likes to be loved --

K: John, they pay off on results not on tactics. Bill has tried to be a good guy for two years and hex I don't think he is better liked than others in the Administration.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Mrs. Nelson Rockefeller
morning 12/6/71

HAK invited her to lunch while she is in town this week. They agreed on Dec. 8 at 1:00 at the Sans Souci.

They will both be at the WH dinner for the Brazilian President and will discuss any further details then.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Passman/Kissinger
afternoon 12/6/xxx 71

K: How much we appreciate your getting that foreign aid bill through.

P: Pulled all stops. Through foreign <u>xxx</u> aid and ____ COMMITtee. I think if it gets through the House we can get it through the Senate. Ellender got it today. Their agreement is tied up. Arkansas people starting on Fulbright. Another fellow is marking up the bill at 4:30. We don't know where we stand. My hope is you could contact Ford. They are having a caucus in the morning. If anyone needs ____ expenses. I will see its a minimum amount. Protect our interests in Vietnam. 47,000 deaths and ____ casualties in Vietnam and Korea. I am putting it on the line. You had better screw down the nut. I am <u>xxx</u> only being a good American. I am not in love with foreign aid. Good and bad together. It's the best. I will fight.

K: Terrific.

P: Contact any members that could influence the Bill.

K: I will do that. You can count on it me.