[LC]

INTERVIEW WITH HENRY A. KISSINGER
FOR LEADERS MAGAZINE

1Q) What effect do you foresee the Iran/Contra arms affair having on:

- relations with the United States' European allies?

- with Israel?

- with our Mideast friends?

- with Iran?

- the successor to the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini?

1A) The impact of the Iran affair on relations with our allies has not been as severe as many expected and some hoped. True, our anti-terrorism policy resembles the emperor who had no clothes, but that can probably be rectified -- or at least salvaged -- if we are prepared to act strenuously against terrorists in the future. We should not, however, expect our allies to be particularly enthusiastic when we want their cooperation against terrorism. They were never wildly supportive; they will be less so now.

The Iran controversy has had one striking impact on our allies. The European leaders with whom I have spoken since the Iran revelations have, without exception, worried most about the scandal's effect on the President's ability to continue to govern effectively. What comes home to the observer every time we find ourselves in the midst of a domestic crisis is the degree to which our allies depend upon us -- and particularly the President -- for leadership, and how nervous they become when we appear uncertain. As we debate with ourselves over our misdeeds and what to do about them, we need to keep in mind -- far more than we usually do -- how much we, our stability, and our leadership mean to most of the rest of the free world.

The effect on Israel and U.S.-Israeli relations remains to be seen, since there is so much yet to be revealed about the entire affair. Having said that, my judgment is that neither Israel nor Israeli-U.S. relations will suffer any long term damage. It may well develop that the Israelis were instrumental in persuading us that it was in our strategic interests to seek a better relationship with Iran (which is a judgment I share), and that arms sales were a productive way to achieve that end (a judgment I do not share), but the Administration made up its own mind about what was in our best interests; the responsibility for the decision is, therefore, our own, and should not be thrust onto someone else's shoulders.

There is no silver lining in the cloud that hangs over our relationship with Middle Eastern friends. We have left them thoroughly confused about what our policy is with regard

-2-

to both terrorism and Iran. Most of the Middle Eastern states are deeply fearful of an Iranian victory in its war with Iraq, which they believe would unleash a wave of Moslem fundamentalism and Iranian muscle-flexing throughout the area. The Gulf States would be massively vulnerable to an Iran no longer tied down by its war with Iraq; Saudi Arabia would be forced to adjust its oil policies in ways damaging to the West if faced with a victorious Iran within striking distance of Saudi oilfields and cities. And other states in the area -- Jordan and Egypt foremost among them -- would have to deal with the new reality of a regional super power freed of the costs of its war with Iraq and intent on spreading the infection of its anti-Western, anti-Israeli fundamentalism throughout the region. All, therefore, can be expected to trim their sails to accommodate Khomeini; all can, equally, be expected to put less faith in our leadership for some time to come.

Since I don't know who will replace Khomeini, or when, I cannot even begin to guess what an Iranian government will look like after the Ayatollah's demise. We can hope that whoever follows will be less fanatic, but we will not know until the event. Any level-headed strategic analysis should tell Iran's leaders -- now and in the future -- that the U.S. offers no threat to the existence or well-being of Iran. It is not we, but the Soviet Union, that has tried in the past to seize Iranian territory; what is today Soviet territory is the historic invasion route into Iran. Thus, we can hope that at some point in time Iran's leaders will recognize both the futility and danger of Khomeini's hatred of the West in general and the U.S. in particular. We should do what we can to keep channels of communication open to Teheran in anticipation of that day; and we should be willing to reciprocate friendship if it is extended to us. But we should not beg, plead, or bribe in an effort to urge Teheran toward a more sensible policy.

2Q) After a series of U.S. foreign policy problems -- the vague but undeniable link between the Administration and covert Contra aid, the disinformation campaign waged against Libya, the questionable dealing with the Soviets at Reykjavik, and before that such political missteps as the mining of Nicaragua's Puerto Sandino harbor -- it's been charged, in this instance by Simon Serfaty at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, that the U.S. not only doesn't have "coherent policies," it doesn't "even have a coherent process for formulating those policies." How would you rewire the present system for deciding and executing American foreign policy?

2A) "Rewiring," as you call it, is not the crucial question. In the last analysis, every President will decide on how the "system" should be structured based on his own

-3-

instincts, prejudices, and predelictions, and no amount of legislation or proposals for reorganization will change that fact.

The more productive question is, are there any general rules that a new administration ought to keep in mind as it puts its national security mechanism in place. Some of the most salient of those rules are, from my perspective:

a) No President should be totally dependent on the bureaucracy for his advice. The great departments of government -- State, Defense, Treasury, etc. -- are staffed with intelligent men and women devoted to their country. But, as in any large organization, there is an understandable commitment to present policies, and a reluctance to challenge assumptions or move in new directions. Nor are the heads of those departments, no matter how close they are to the President or how knowledgeable on foreign and security policy, immune from becoming, over time, advocates of the views of the departments they head. Therefore, the President must also have available to him an institutional devil's advocate who challenges the conventional wisdom of the day. The best place to put the man or woman who performs that function is probably as National Security Advisor, where he or she can be supported by a small staff whose principal task is to assure that the President is provided with all relevant information and a range of sensible options from which to choose his course of action.

b) Implementation of policy should almost always be left to the appropriate department or the CIA; the NSC staff should, as a matter of principle, avoid an active role as the instrument to carry out the policies it helps develop.

But every rule must have its exception and I believe that is true in this case. When a matter of extreme sensitivity directly involves the President personally, and probably cannot be accomplished by the normal instruments of government, then it may be that the NSC Advisor should be used. Each case must, of course, be judged on its own merits, and with a prejudice against using someone so close to the President too frequently. But there may be rare occasions when no other mechanism offers the same assurance of success. I very much believe, for example, that President Nixon's opening to China could not have been accomplished without the personal

-4-

involvement of the NSC Advisor. The Chinese had to
know that what we were attempting was the _personal_
wish of the President, and that there would be no
publicity about the initiative until our agreement
was concluded.

c) The Secretary of State must be the President's principal (but not sole) foreign policy advisor. He heads the department which bears responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations, and has at his disposal a vast pool of talented foreign service officers who have spent their professional lives dealing with foreign affairs. The Secretary of State's advice on foreign policy issues must be given due deference and, in most circumstances, followed. Indeed, if the Secretary and the President do not, on most issues, see eye-to-eye, then the President needs to find a new Secretary of State. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence have their own responsibilities, but when their advice impinges upon foreign or security policy, the Secretary of State must be informed, and permitted his day in court with the President before any decisions are made. The President need not always rule in favor of the Secretary of State, but he should never act without getting the Secretary's advice.

In short, coherent foreign policy, and coherent
processes for determining that policy, cannot be
guaranteed by wiring diagrams, no matter what the experts
on public administration may contend. Coherent structures
can make it easier to manage sensible policy deliberation, but
in the last analysis, it is _people_, not organization charts,
that assure coherence (or a lack of it). If the President
fails to surround himself with people who know something about
foreign policy then he is in for trouble no matter how popular
or articulate he may be.

3Q) Presidents seem to have their dirty errands run by the NSC, which doesn't have to report its activities to Congress as the CIA does. Is this a loophole that should be closed?

3A) Your use of the words "dirty errands" is based on a misconception. There have been, are and will be, times when the President -- who above all other officials must protect our national security -- must act in ways that can be painful and complicated. But when a President fails in his responsibility to protect our national security, Americans -- not least among them _Leaders_ -- would, rightly, hold him responsible for the failure.

-5-

As I have already indicated, and as the Iran affair has
so clearly demonstrated, the NSC is not the instrument to use
to conduct covert or clandestine operations -- important as
those operations can sometimes be to our security -- though
it should review them. The proper instrument is the CIA,
which means, of course, that Congressional consultation
requirements must be met. It also means, however, that the
ability to maintain secrecy is diminished because of the
increased risk of leaks. But that is a price we must pay,
since the law clearly requires Congressional oversight of
Agency activities. That law, or at least some of its more
stringent requirements, may be unwise. But it must be
obeyed.

4Q) Are presidents or their agents ever justified in breaking the law?

4A) No, of course not. Neither the President nor his agents are justified in breaking the law -- not even when they are acting with the best of intentions.

But the matter does not end there. The Congress has
over the past decade and more tended to believe that the
answer to presidential abuse of power is to legislate
additional restrictions on his authority. These laws, while
they may have made it less possible for a president to act
arbitrarily, have also often tied his hands in the
legitimate use of power to protect national interests. And
then, when an issue arises which the President believes poses
a serious danger to the country, he finds himself in
an extremely frustrating situation. The essence of wisdom
in foreign policy often is to deal with small problems before
they become big ones. Yet, small problems are seldom
generally recognized for what they may become, so it is
difficult to generate widespread support for effective early
solutions. Under such circumstances, a president is tempted
to try to deal with the problem by whatever tools remain
available to him.

So while presidents must obey the law, it is also true
that not all laws are wise. Nor do the members of
Congress who pass the laws always have a better under-
standing than the President and his advisors of what is best
for the national security interests of the United States.
Thus, the Congress has a responsibility to review its own
decisions periodically. And the President has the obli-
gation to oppose unwise laws when under consideration, and to
seek their repeal when enacted.

5Q) What conditions justify secret, illegal wars, such as those the Nixon Administration engaged in in Laos and Cambodia and the one the Reagan Administration is conducting now in Nicaragua?

-6-

5A) This depends on your definition of legality. But facts should not be ignored. U.S. forces were in Viet Nam legally. When attacked by the North Vietnamese from Cambodia, what were we do do? Permit them to use a privileged sanctuary to kill Americans? President Nixon chose the only course I believe was available to him.

As for Laos it was being invaded by the North Vietnamese. U.S. actions were subject to periodic Congressional hearings.

I make no judgment on whether laws were violated in aiding the Contras in Nicaragua during the period when the Boland Amendment was law. I leave that to the lawyers, the judges, and the courts to determine. But surely you cannot argue that our support for the Contras today, authorized as it is by law, is illegal. If the Congress decides at a later date to cut off aid to the Contras, I will believe it to be a wrong decision, but I am sure the President will do what the law demands.

6Q) There is a persistent public myth, one might even say hope, that the actions of all the president's men are guided by an overriding interest in the country's well-being. History has shown, however, that often these men have personal ambitions that they consider first. Is this an evitable condition that the American public ought to wake up to and simply accept? Or do you see a way to safeguard against it?

6A) History has, indeed, shown that *some* of the President's men, *sometimes*, are driven by personal ambition rather than the best interests of the country. But what I find remarkable is that this has happened so seldom in our history, not that it has happened at all.

There is a regrettable tendency in this country, particularly at times when some public officials have been shown to have feet of clay, to ignore the fact that we are governed by human beings prone to mistakes, and to jump to the conclusion that our system is somehow flawed. For the overwhelming majority the only reward that makes all the exertions worthwhile is the consciousness of having served one's country and the causes of peace and freedom. I have said before that until Vietnam we often thought of ourselves as too good for the world, while after that tragedy we thought of ourselves as not good enough.

Indeed, one of President Reagan's accomplishments has been that he led us out of this self-flagellation to a renewed pride in our country and ourselves.

In short, I see no reason for us to be apologetic for the character of most of our leaders most of the time. We

-7-

are freer, wealthier, and more secure than any other nation on earth -- even when badly led. So we should take pride in our system and our accomplishments, and recognize that most of the time "the president's men are guided by an overriding interest in the country's well-being."

7Q) What qualities do you look for in the people you surround yourself with? What qualities exist in overachievers that you try to avoid, and how do you recognize them?

7A) Reliability, intelligence, and loyalty are, I suppose, the qualities I most value. I am not the easiest person in the world to work with or for. But those who have been with me for any period of time have all become personal friends. All of them know that I admire those who tell me what they think and are prepared to argue with me when they believe I am wrong.

I am not sure what an "overachiever" is. If you mean someone who falls victim to the Peter Principle, rising above his level of competence to the point where he can no longer cope, then the only way to recognize them is through exposure, testing, and challenge. I have always tried, whether in government or the private sector, to challenge my associates to perform above their own conception of what they can do. That usually provides a reasonably accurate picture of how competent they really are.

If by "overachiever" you mean someone who is constantly seeking new challenges and adventures, then the wise course is to make use of them, for they are a rare commodity.

8Q) If you could invite anyone, living or dead, to dinner, who would it be?

8A) I cannot limit myself to one individual. Certainly Metternich, because he was so much a part of my early university studies and writing; a man of extraordinary breadth and strategic grasp. Certainly, as well, Churchill and de Gaulle, because both understood the strengths and weaknesses of their countries as few leaders have, and by the strength of their own personalities carried both nations to greatness. Truman, too, for presiding over the assumption by America of historic responsibilities.

9Q) Henry Kissinger's strengths are well known. What is his greatest shortcoming?

9A) If you don't know, I am certainly not going to tell you.

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# Kissinger:
An Exclusive Interview

Henry A. Kissinger,
Chairman, Kissinger Associates

What effects do you foresee the Iran/Contra
arms affair having on relations with:

• the United States' European allies?

• Israel?

• its Mideast friends?

• Iran?

• the successor to the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini?

The impact of the Iran affair on relations with our allies has not been as severe as many expected and some hoped. True, our anti-terrorism policy resembles the emperor who had no clothes, but that can probably be rectified—or at least salvaged—if we are prepared to act strenuously against terrorists in the future. We should not, however, expect our allies to be particularly enthusiastic when we want their cooperation against terrorism. They were never wildly supportive; they will be less so now.

The Iran controversy has had one striking impact on our allies. The European leaders with whom I have spoken since the Iran revelations have, without exception, worried most about the scandal's effect on the President's ability to continue to govern effectively. What comes home to the observer every time we find ourselves in the midst of a domestic crisis is the degree to which our allies depend upon us—and particularly the President—for leadership, and how nervous they become when we appear uncertain. As we debate with ourselves over our misdeeds and what to do about them, we need to keep in mind—far more than we usually do—how much we, our stability and our leadership mean to most of the rest of the free world.

The effect on Israel and U.S.-Israeli relations remains to be seen, since there is so much yet to be revealed about the entire affair. Having said that, my judgment is that neither Israel nor Israeli-U.S. relations will suffer any long-term damage. It may well develop that the Israelis were instrumental in persuading us that it was in our strategic interests to seek a better relationship with Iran (which is a judgment I share), and that arms sales were a productive way to achieve that end (a judgment I do not share), but the Administration made up its own mind about what was in our best interests; the responsibility for the decision is, therefore, our own,

There is no silver lining in the cloud that hangs over our relationship with Middle Eastern friends. We have left them thoroughly confused about what our policy is with regard to both terrorism and Iran. Most of the Middle Eastern states are deeply fearful of an Iranian victory in its war with Iraq, which they believe would unleash a wave of Moslem fundamentalism and Iranian muscle-flexing throughout the area. The Gulf States would be massively vulnerable to an Iran no longer tied down by its war with Iraq; Saudi Arabia would be forced to adjust its oil policies in ways damaging to the West if faced with a victorious Iran within striking distance of Saudi oilfields and cities. And other states in the area—Jordan and Egypt foremost among them—would have to deal with the new reality of a regional superpower freed of the costs of its war with Iraq and intent on spreading the infection of its anti-Western, anti-Israeli fundamentalism throughout the region. All, therefore, can be expected to trim their sails to accommodate Khomeini; all can, equally, be expected to put less faith in our leadership for some time to come.

Since I don't know who will replace Khomeini, or when, I cannot even begin to guess what an Iranian government will look like after the Ayatollah's demise. We can hope that whoever follows will be less fanatic, but we will not know until the event. Any level-headed strategic analysis should tell Iran's leaders—now and in the future—that the U.S. offers no threat to the existence or well-being of Iran. It is not we, but the Soviet Union, that has tried in the past to seize Iranian territory; what is today Soviet territory is the historic invasion route into Iran. Thus, we can hope that at some point in time Iran's leaders will recognize both the futility and danger of Khomeini's hatred of the West in general and the U.S. in particular. We should do what we can to keep channels of communication open to Teheran in anticipation of that day; and we should be willing to reciprocate friendship if it is extended to us. But we should not beg, plead or bribe in an effort to urge Teheran toward a more sensible policy.

After a series of U.S. foreign policy problems—the vague but undeniable link between the Administration and covert Contra aid, the disinformation campaign waged against Libya, the questionable dealing with the Soviets at Reykjavik, and before that such political missteps as the mining of Nicaragua's Puerto Sandino harbor—it's been charged, in this instance by Simon Serfaty at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, that the U.S. not only doesn't have “coherent policies,” it doesn't “even have a coherent process for formulating those policies.” How would you rewire the present system for deciding and executing American foreign policy?

“Rewiring,” as you call it, is not the crucial question. In the last analysis, every President

16

LEADERS

February 25, 1986—
President Reagan signs a request to Congress asking for the transfer of funds in the Defense Department to be used for military aid to the Contras in Nicaragua. From left watching are: White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan; Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger; Vice President George Bush; Secretary of State George Shultz and Admiral John Poindexter, National Security Adviser.

will decide on how the "system" should be structured based on his own instincts, prejudices, and predilections, and no amount of legislation or proposals for reorganization will change that fact.

The more productive question is, are there any general rules that a new administration ought to keep in mind as it puts its national security mechanism in place? Some of the most salient of those rules are, from my perspective:

■ No President should be totally dependent on the bureaucracy for his advice. The great departments of government-State, Defense, Treasury, etc.-are staffed with intelligent men and women devoted to their country. But, as in any large organization, there is an understandable commitment to present policies, and a reluctance to challenge assumptions or move in new directions. Nor are the heads of those departments, no matter how close they are to the President or how knowledgeable on foreign and security policy, immune from becoming, over time, advocates of the views of the departments they head. Therefore, the President must also have available to him an institutional devil's advocate who challenges the conventional wisdom of the day. The best place to put the man or woman who performs that function is probably as National Security Adviser, supported by a small staff whose principal task is to assure that

■ Implementation of policy should almost always be left to the appropriate department or the CIA; the NSC staff should, as a matter of principle, avoid an active role as the instrument to carry out the policies it helps develop.

But every rule must have its exception, and I believe that is true in this case. When a matter of extreme sensitivity directly involves the President personally, and probably cannot be accomplished by the normal instruments of government, then it may be that the NSC Adviser should be used. Each case must, of course, be judged on its own merits, and with a prejudice against using someone so close to the President too frequently. But there may be rare occasions when no other mechanism offers the same assurance of success. I very much believe, for example, that President Nixon's opening to China could not have been accomplished without the personal involvement of the NSC Adviser. The Chinese had to know that what we were attempting was the *personal* wish of the President, and that there would be no publicity about the initiative until our agreement was concluded.

■ The Secretary of State must be the President's principal (but not sole) foreign policy adviser. He heads the department which bears re-

LEADERS

17

## Kissinger: An Exclusive Interview

sponsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations and has at his disposal a vast pool of talented foreign service officers who have spent their professional lives dealing with foreign affairs. The Secretary of State's advice on foreign policy issues must be given due deference and, in most circumstances, followed. Indeed, if the Secretary and the President do not, on most issues, see eye-to-eye, then the President needs to find a new Secretary of State. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence have their own responsibilities, but when their advice impinges upon foreign or security policy, the Secretary of State must be informed, and permitted his day in court with the President before any decisions are made. The President need not always rule in favor of the Secretary of State, but he should never act without getting the Secretary's advice.

In short, coherent foreign policy, and coherent processes for determining that policy, cannot be guaranteed by wiring diagrams, no matter what the experts on public administration may contend. Coherent structures can make it easier to manage sensible policy deliberation, but in the last analysis, it is *people*, not organization charts, that assure coherence (or a lack of it). If the President fails to surround himself with people who know something about foreign policy then he is in for trouble no matter how popular or articulate he may be.

*Recent Presidents seem to have liked their dirty errands run by the NSC, which doesn't have to report its activities to Congress as the CIA does. Is this a loophole that should be closed?*

Your use of the words "dirty errands" is based on a misconception. There have been, are and will be times when the President—who above all other officials must protect our national security—must act in ways that can be painful and complicated. But should a President fail in his responsibility to protect our national security, Americans—not least among them leaders—would, rightly, hold him responsible for the failure.

As I have already indicated, and as the Iran affair has so clearly demonstrated, the NSC is not the instrument to use to conduct covert or clandestine operations—important as those operations can sometimes be to our security—though it should review them. The proper instrument is the CIA, which means, of course, that Congressional consultation requirements

*Are Presidents or their agents ever justified in breaking the law?*

No, of course not. Neither the President nor his agents are justified in breaking the law—nor even when they are acting with the best of intentions.

But the matter does not end there. The Congress has over the past decade and more tended to believe that the answer to Presidential abuse of power is to legislate additional restrictions on his authority. These laws, while they may have made it less possible for a President to act arbitrarily, have also often tied his hands in the legitimate use of power to protect national interests. And then, when an issue arises which the President believes poses a serious danger to the country, he finds himself in an extremely frustrating situation. The essence of wisdom in foreign policy often is to deal with small problems before they become big ones. Yet, small problems are seldom generally recognized for what they may become, so it is difficult to generate widespread support for effective early solutions. Under such circumstances, a President is tempted to try to deal with the problem by whatever tools remain available to him.

Training camp for Nicaraguan Contras on the Honduran border, March 1985.

18

LEADERS

So while Presidents must obey the law, it is also true that not all laws are wise. Nor do the members of Congress who pass the laws always have a better understanding than the President and his advisers of what is best for the national security interests of the United States. Thus, the Congress has a responsibility to review its own decisions periodically. And the President has the obligation to oppose unwise laws when under consideration and to seek their repeal when enacted.

*What conditions justify secret, illegal wars, such as those the Nixon Administration engaged in, in Laos and Cambodia and the one the Reagan Administration is conducting now in Nicaragua?*

This depends on your definition of legality. But facts should not be ignored. U.S. forces were in Vietnam legally. When attacked by the North Vietnamese from Cambodia, what were we to do? Permit them to use a privileged sanctuary to kill Americans? President Nixon chose the only course I believe was available to him.

As for Laos, it was being invaded by the North Vietnamese. U.S. actions were subject to periodic Congressional hearings.

I make no judgment on whether laws were violated in aiding the Contras in Nicaragua during the period when the Boland Amendment was law. I leave that to the lawyers, the judges and the courts to determine. But surely you cannot argue that our support for the Contras today, authorized as it is by law, is illegal. If the Congress decides at a later date to cut off aid to the Contras, I will believe it to be a wrong decision, but I am sure the President will do what the law demands.

*There is a persistent public myth, one might even say hope, that the actions of all the President's men are guided by an overriding interest in the country's well-being. History has shown, however, that often these men have personal ambitions that they consider first. Is this an inevitable condition that the American public ought to wake up to and simply accept? Or do you see a way to safeguard against it?*

History has, indeed, shown that some of the President's men, sometimes, are driven by personal ambition rather than the best interests of the country. But what I find remarkable is that this has happened so seldom in our history, not that it has happened at all.

There is a regrettable tendency in this country, particularly at times when some public officials have been shown to have feet of clay, to ignore the fact that we are governed by human beings prone to mistakes and to jump to the conclusion that our system is somehow flawed. For the overwhelming majority the only reward that makes all the exertions worthwhile is the consciousness of having served one's country and the causes of peace and freedom. I have said before that until Vietnam we often thought of ourselves as too good for the world, while after that tragedy we thought of ourselves as not good enough.

In short, I see no reason for us to be apologetic for the character of most of our leaders most of the time. We are freer, wealthier and more secure than any other nation on earth—even when badly led. So we should take pride in our system and our accomplishments, and recognize that most of the time “the President’s men are guided by an overriding interest in the country’s well-being.”

*What qualities do you look for in the people you surround yourself with? What qualities exist in overachievers that you try to avoid, and how do you recognize them?*

Reliability, intelligence and loyalty are, I suppose, the qualities I most value. I am not the easiest person in the world to work with or for. But those who have been with me for any period of time have all become personal friends. All of them know that I admire those who tell me what they think and are prepared to argue with me when they believe I am wrong.

I am not sure what “overachievers” are. If you mean someone who falls victim to the Peter Principle, rising above his level of competence to the point where he can no longer cope, then the only way to recognize him is through exposure, testing and challenge. I have always tried, whether in government or the private sector, to challenge my associates to perform above their own conception of what they can do. That usually provides a reasonably accurate picture of how competent they really are.

If by “overachiever” you refer to those who are constantly seeking new challenges and adventures, then the wise course is to make use of those individuals, for they are a rare commodity.

*If you could invite anyone, living or dead, to dinner, who would it be?*

I cannot limit myself to one individual. Certainly Metternich, because he was so much a part of my early university studies and writing— a man of extraordinary breadth and strategic grasp. Certainly, as well, Churchill and de Gaulle, because both understood the strengths and weaknesses of their countries as few leaders have, and by the strength of their own personalities carried both nations to greatness. Truman, too, for presiding over the assumption by Amer-

ica of historic responsibilities.

Henry A. Kissinger

LEADERS

19