# For a New Atlantic Alliance

HENRY A. KISSINGER

THE CURRENT NATO CRISIS was triggered by a unilateral, pre-emptory French demand. But it would be wrong to conclude that the pattern of relationships which had developed after the war could have continued. The withdrawal of France from integrated commands forced a reconsideration of the structure and the purpose of the Alliance that would have been inevitable in any case—though the atmosphere was surely worsened by France's tactics.

It is well to keep three things in mind at the outset. First, the present crisis is a family affair. It concerns internal arrangements between closely related peoples. France is not our basic opponent in the world; unless statesmen everywhere submerge their judgment in their passions, there are objective limits that reality imposes on inter-allied discord.

Second, the present crisis marks the end of the phase of U.S.-European relationships that was ushered in by the Greek-Turkish aid program and led through the Marshall Plan to the construction of the Atlantic Alliance. Nothing can restore the former state of affairs. In many ways this should be an occasion for self-congratulation rather than bit-

terness. Goals that seemed visionary in the late 1940's have been essentially achieved. Europe has recovered its economic strength and much political vitality. The threat of imminent invasion no longer dominates people's minds.

Third—and somewhat contradictorily—Europe's recovery is still tenuous. It is often assumed that European vitality will be permanent and that the primary problem is to moderate Europe's assertiveness. However, the vigor so noticeable in Europe today is very close in time to nihilism; European confidence is still shaky. To avoid both the danger of excessive nationalism and a new version of neutralism is the challenge before the Alliance.

Foreign policy knows no plateaus. What does not become a point for new departures soon marks the beginning of an inexorable decline. It would be unprecedented if a policy developed in the late 1940's remained valid for the 1970's. The original conception of NATO was correct for the situation that then existed. But it no longer exhausts current challenges. What we need today is another leap of the imagination similar to that which took place two decades ago.

## The American View

Any attempt to sum up American policy in a few sentences is bound to be highly misleading. What follows must be taken as a summary of a dominant trend that has been followed with various degrees of consistency.

1. *Commitment to an Atlantic Community Based on Equal Partnership.* The United States has supported the notion of an equal partnership between the United States and Europe. This Grand Design—variously symbolized by such concepts as "dumbbell" or "twin pillars"—was based on the proposition that an Atlantic partnership would enable our European allies to share our global responsibilities more equitably.

2. *Support for a United Europe on a Federal Basis.* European unity has been considered by American policymakers as a prerequisite to the formation of an Atlantic Community. A politically and economically integrated Europe would become an equal partner with the United States and share with us the burdens and obligations of world leadership. To its supporters, in Europe as well as in the United States, such a partner-

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ship has seemed realizable by only one method: a politically unified Europe in close association with the United States. Similarly, a single solution has been offered for the achievement of European unity: supranational federal institutions controlled by a European Parliament. American pronouncements have often played down anything less as no unity at all.

3. *Integrated Defense.* While the United States has advocated a twin-pillar concept in the political and economic realm, it has urged an integrated military defense. Partly this has reflected the conviction that with modern weapons, defense is indivisible; partly it was due to our special responsibility in the nuclear field: ninety-five per cent of the nuclear arsenal of the Alliance belongs to the United States. Only those allies on whose territory nuclear weapons are located share in their control and then only negatively: they can prevent these weapons from being fired but they cannot make us fire them nor can they prevent us from resorting to nuclear weapons located elsewhere.

Finally, the United States has insisted on central command and control of nuclear weapons in the Alliance. It has sought to meet the concerns of its allies—real or imagined—by a number of devices running from the creation of a new nuclear force (either in the form of a multilateral force or of an Atlantic nuclear force) to the NATO Special Committee, the so-called McNamara Committee. (The nuclear problem will be discussed in greater detail below.)

United States policy has had the great advantage of offering a clear-cut concept. In the early stages of the Atlantic Alliance it provided the basic impetus for European recovery. Its major drawback has been not that it was wrong but that one conceivable pattern of relationships has sometimes been presented as the only possible one. A too theoretical and schematic approach runs the risk of losing touch with contemporary European realities.

For all its idealism, the American view has always contained some inconsistencies. In the emerging areas the nation-state has been treated as natural, and in Eastern

Europe great hope has been placed in nationalism as a counterweight to Communism. But in Western Europe, where the concept of nationalism had originated, American policy has decried the nation-state as outdated and backward.

Moreover, American claims regarding the general applicability of our Federal institutions have ignored those factors which have made the American experience unique. The American Federal Union was formed on a new continent by states sharing a common historical experience. The American colonies had fought together to achieve their freedom. They were roughly of the same size. They had no tradition of sovereignty in the conduct of foreign relations. Their peoples were of similar cultural background and spoke the same language.

The situation in Europe differs fundamentally. Every European state

is the product of many centuries of a history in which a sense of national identity was often linked to what distinguished a nation from its neighbors. Independence for many countries required a long process of struggle against the domination of other European states. In other words, the nations of Europe were formed in a manner that emphasized their uniqueness. It is no accident that support for federal institutions has come on the whole from smaller countries accustomed to the protection of some major power or from countries like West Germany or Italy, eager to escape their past. France and Great Britain, with the longest history as national states, have consistently aimed for a confederal rather than a federal solution. Another inconsistency in the American position has been ourarent advocacy of Britain's entry into Europe and also of a federal structure that is as unacceptable in London as in Paris.

These problems might have re-

mained dormant for many years but for the emergence of President de Gaulle—though it is my view that they would have had to be faced sooner or later. Deliberately, brusquely, often cynically exploiting American inconsistencies. President de Gaulle has proclaimed a completely different view of Atlantic relationships and European unity.

## The Gaullist Conception

However irritating de Gaulle's methods and however brutal his tactics, there are few figures whom it is more crucial to see in historical perspective. For his policy reflects at its core a deep awareness of the suffering of his people over the span of a generation. Few countries have known the travail that France has suffered since it lost much of its young generation in the First World War. Victorious in 1918, France knew better than any of its allies how close to defeat it had been. Inchoately, the survivors of that catastrophe realized that France could not stand another trial like the one just surmounted. Deprived of its youth, fearful of its defeated antagonist, feeling misunderstood by its allies, France experienced in the interwar period an almost uninterrupted succession of frustrations. The French collapse of 1940 was as much moral as military. Even though France emerged among the victors of the Second World War, its leaders were aware, despite all the rhetoric and perhaps because of it, that France had been saved largely through the efforts of others.

Once more, peace brought no respite. Instead, the Fourth Republic experienced the same governmental instability as the Third, and in addition it had to go through the searing process of decolonization. Humiliated in 1940, the French Army had barely been reconstituted when it was obliged to engage in nearly two decades of frustrating colonial wars each of which ended in defeat.

President de Gaulle's brutal tactics sometimes give the impression that a powerful, self-confident France has been a permanent feature of the postwar landscape. It is all but forgotten that between 1958 and 1962 France was on the verge of civil war three times. So well has de Gaulle succeeded in his tour de force that

July 14, 1966

his critics act as if the only problem for Europe were to moderate excesses of French assertiveness—a notion that would have been inconceivable five years ago. Thus in a certain sense de Gaulle's objective may well be pedagogical: to teach his country and his continent attitudes of independence and self-reliance. This is an act of historical importance wholly consistent with American long-range interests, however abrupt and annoying the methods by which it comes about.

THE ATTEMPT to achieve more self-reliance makes de Gaulle wary of integration in any sphere, but particularly in the military field. De Gaulle believes that countries without direct responsibility for their defense will not make the necessary effort over a period of time. This situation will lead, in his view, to a growing sense of impotence and dependence on the United States. Where the United States believes in the obsolescence of the nation-state, de Gaulle passionately affirms its continued role. Where the United States and many Europeans want to construct a united Europe by way of federal institutions, de Gaulle bases his notion of Europe on agreement among governments. Where the United States tends to equate unity with formal, legal commitments, de Gaulle emphasizes the notion of interest and equilibrium. He insists on autonomy in nuclear matters; recently he has come close to affirming freedom of action across the whole spectrum of defense. Once an advocate of an autonomous if confederated Europe, he seems to have become disillusioned by the possibilities of Franco-German cooperation which would be essential to such a scheme and for the failure of which many French officials blame American pressures. He has, therefore, resurrected the first hints of the classic Russo-French understanding. Whatever his motive, de Gaulle has moved from advocating the unity of Western Europe to holding out a vision of the unity of all of Europe. He has made himself the spokesman for a relaxation of East-West tensions.

De Gaulle's abrupt and unilateral tactics often tempt his opponents to absorb their energies in dealing with the symptoms to the neglect of the

deeper challenge. Whatever we may think of his answers, he has posed questions the West will not be able to avoid answering. There is merit in his contention that before a political unit can mean something to others it must first mean something to itself. It would be wrong, moreover, to picture de Gaulle as totally isolated. Many Europeans support his views—especially on NATO questions and East-West relations—though they are too used to the old pattern to say so openly. Some of his critics oppose him for reasons of domestic, not of foreign, policy; the recent actions of his challenger in the presidential election, François Mitterrand, illustrate this point. Others affirm a version of Atlanticism that comes close to shifting

all responsibility to us. It is possible to argue that but for de Gaulle the previous pattern might have continued; now it cannot be restored even after de Gaulle's departure.

At the same time de Gaulle's imperious style explains why he has often thwarted his own aims. Man is not governed by reason alone. History may appear inevitable in retrospect, but it is made by men who cannot always distinguish their emotion from their analysis. De Gaulle's wounding insistence on intellectual submission to his maxims and his rigid defense of an extreme conception of sovereignty has antagonized even those who share his aspiration for greater European autonomy. His tactics create the impression that he desires autonomy not to enhance the unity of the West but to enable him to pursue policies contradictory, if not hostile,

to those of the United States. De Gaulle may be right in demanding a greater role for Europe; but his refusal to go beyond the framework of the nation-state prevents him from implementing this insight. This may be the nemesis of de Gaulle's policies.

## The Problem of Germany

The real victim of the current split in the Atlantic Alliance has been the Federal Republic of Germany. Urged by France to pursue a "European" course and by the United States toward "Atlantic" concepts, advised to seek unity now by firmness, now by conciliation, pressed to meet balance-of-payments costs, the pillar of everybody's construction and the worry of many, the Federal Republic stands in danger of losing the precarious stability that it has so painfully and so responsibly developed since the war.

For the seeming balance and stability of postwar Germany, which causes it to be the object of constant wooing, is highly deceptive. Every German over fifty-five—and this includes almost all leaders—has lived through three revolutions. He has known four different régimes each claiming to be morally antithetical to its predecessor. He has seen Germany lose two world wars and experience two catastrophic inflations. Every German over forty has lived through the Nazi period, the Second World War, and the postwar collapse. Germany has suffered too many breaks in historical continuity and too many shocks to sustain prolonged pressure. Great national prosperity has developed at the same time that national, political, and territorial integrity has been lost. The incongruity of this situation contributes to the insecurity of German leadership groups, the legalism of whose policy prescriptions often hides a lack of inner assurance.

This sense of insecurity is absolutely central. The dominant German desire is to escape the burden of difficult choices. The German nightmare is a reappearance of the historical isolation that for almost its entire national history has forced Germany to confront hostility on all its borders, east and west. If this situation reappears, German worries could take dramatic form. If the

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Federal Republic becomes the focal point of all European tensions, German frustrations are likely to turn on the seeming cause of its isolation. It is essential that we do not find ourselves in that position. This, not the nuclear issue, is the real German "problem."

The German "problem" is complicated not only by history but by difficulties of policy. Alone among the western powers, the Federal Republic cannot be satisfied with the territorial status quo. Any foreseeable German government, regardless of party, will have as one of its paramount objectives the reunification of the German people. Until 1961, it was assumed that this goal could be achieved by ever closer integration within the Atlantic Alliance. The Berlin Wall shattered these hopes. It is clear that however German unity comes about—if ever—it will be under conditions other than a movement of the frontiers of NATO toward the East. All German political parties grope for "new approaches" to a problem which in the present world constellation may be insoluble and whose intractability may further mortgage German political life.

The unsettling effect of these developments causes efforts to relax East-West tensions to take on a special significance in Germany. German leaders welcome relief from pressures on them; but they are uneasy lest all other aspects of the German situation become frozen too. They make a distinction between "peripheral" settlements, which they welcome, and "central" agreements, which they oppose unless they bring some visible progress on the German question. This explains the extremely unsettling effect the negotiations on non-proliferation have had on many German political leaders.

IN SHORT, the Federal Republic finds itself in an extremely difficult situation. France threatens to withdraw its troops over the principle of integration; Britain and the United States indicate that they might reduce theirs unless the Federal Republic eases their balance-of-payments problem. The Soviet Union has cast the Federal Republic in the position of the interna-

tional villain. Even within the Western Alliance a potential "threat" from the Federal Republic is often invoked to justify schemes—from the multilateral force to enhanced integration.

All this threatens to upset the delicate balance of German political life. It exposes the Federal Republic to dangerous pressures and tempitations. Germany has emerged as the balance wheel of the Western Alliance. The most exposed western ally, seventeen million of whose

people are Communist hostages, has become the focal point of all disputes. Its internal structure may not be equal to this strain. There are signs already that the conflict may tear apart the governing party, the Christian Democratic Union, which largely forged the pro-western orientation of the Federal Republic. This will liberate tendencies in the other parties that are now restrained by their desire to present themselves as responsible trustees of a well-established consensus. Thus the current situation contains a series of time bombs. Schizophrenia is built into the Federal Republic's political life.

Many of these difficulties are insoluble, at least in the short run. Many are outside American control. But the volatility of the situation does impose on American policy requirements for very great circumvention. The insecurity of the German leaders and their desire to be good allies cause them to go along with American proposals, not necessarily because they want them but because they believe it is expected of them. But this does not mean that the Federal Republic can sustain the consequences of all such actions. A break with France that can be ascribed to American pres-

sure could easily backfire on us. And I am bound to say that American actions in recent years have already placed us in a precarious position in this respect. Overtures toward East Germany, encouraged in the belief that they offer a possibility of reunification, could easily generate a frustrated nationalism if it turns out that they cement the partition of Germany rather than alleviate it. What the Federal Republic needs above all is solid, reliable, steady allies. What it cannot

stand is to be the focal point of all pressures. It would be tragic if Germany, whose national disasters in this century were caused in part by the attempt to conduct an isolated policy in the center of the European continent, now came to grief because it tried to be too responsive to allies whose conflicts strain German political life. To be sure, President de Gaulle bears a heavy responsibility for this state of affairs. But if we compound his abruptness with our outrage, history will not excuse the inadequacy of the response by the magnitude of the challenge.

## The Nuclear 'Problem'

In recent years, the so-called nuclear "problem" has been at the center of the NATO debate. Until President Johnson called off intense pressures on its behalf—in my view wisely—the multilateral force was pushed as America's principal answer to the Gaullist challenge. The MLF is no longer actively pursued; but the belief that NATO's problems could be eased by a new nuclear force under Alliance ownership and control dies hard. Current schemes—technically called the "hardware solution”—envisage the sale of some existing nuclear forces (especially

July 14, 1966

(c)

American and British submarines) to NATO with joint NATO control and eventual mixed manning by the participating nations. The so-called "hardware solution" seems to me wrong for the following reasons:

1. The basic problem before the Alliance is political, not military. It derives from the need to adjust European-American and East-West relations to new conditions. Even the nuclear issue is not technical but political; its "solution"—insofar as it has one—depends on the ability of an alliance composed of sovereign states to develop the confidence that will enable it to act in common in the face of a technology of unprecedented destructiveness.

2. It was a mistake to attempt to gear NATO policy to the projection of unstated German wishes. No significant demand for possession of nuclear weapons existed in Germany when the MLF was first proposed. Outside very restricted official circles, no significant backing exists for other "hardware" solutions. Even after three years of discussion and pressure, only a small number of German officials—and no other public figures—are committed to the "hardware solution."

3. The nuclear-control issue is not "solved" by any of the "hardware" solutions now being discussed, nor can it be by any adaptation of them. If any of the common-ownership schemes so far proposed were accepted, the situation would be as follows:

* No country presently *unable* to go to nuclear war will be enabled to do so as a result of the "hardware solution"—the existing vetoes would remain.

* No country presently *able* to go to nuclear war can be prevented from doing so by participating in a "hardware" solution.

* No country presently *unable* to go to nuclear war can force its nuclear ally to go to nuclear war as a result of a "hardware" solution.

All that participation in a commonly owned force buys is the ability to veto the use of the very small percentage of the total nuclear arsenal that it represents (about five per cent) but *not* the remainder. If a "hardware" solution were accepted, this could not remain a permanent state of affairs, especially if

heavy financial sacrifices are involved. The probability is, therefore, that a commonly owned force will repeat within its framework all the arguments it was supposed to allay. Pressures for altering the control mechanism are inevitable. A jointly owned force will buy not a solution but a permanent crisis.

4. The nuclear issue diverts attention from the cardinal problem of political co-operation to an inherently divisive issue with respect to which formal pronouncements are likely to be highly misleading. Nuclear war—if it should occur—will come only at the end of a long diplomatic process and will involve the national survival of all participants. It seems contradictory to try to integrate nuclear strategy while leaving the process of diplomacy that precedes it bilateral. If a co-ordinated diplomacy can be achieved, the problem of who presses the button will seem less crucial. If political confidence and co-operation cannot be developed, theoretical voting formulas for entering nuclear war will prove empty. No country will let itself be voted into nuclear war against its better judgment. No one can seriously believe that a United States President would risk hundreds of millions of lives after being outvoted in a committee—after, in short, having decided that nuclear war was not in the Ameri-

can interest. And the same is true of other countries. The primary guarantee for our allies is a harmonization of political objectives so that the conception of vital interests of various allies is virtually indistinguishable. If we and our allies see our vital interests the same way, the nuclear-control issue will be well on its way to a "solution." If we cannot achieve such a consensus, physical possession of a small jointly

owned force will be irrelevant. As will be discussed below, the major thrust of American policy should be to strengthen political consultation, and for this the Special Committee (the McNamara Committee) seems at present the best forum available.

## Where Do We Go from Here?

The French challenge has raised a whole host of logistic, legal, and technical problems that inevitably absorb much of the immediate attention. I will here try to sketch some of the long-term goals that I believe should guide United States policy. Not all of them are inconsistent with existing U.S. policy; many of them in fact reflect American objectives. I will state my views partly in the form of answers to questions, partly under various policy headings.

**What kind of Europe is in our interest?** Though I deplore the methods of President de Gaulle, I have always been prepared to grant his historic importance. A greater degree of political and military autonomy for Europe is essential for the cohesion of the West and in our own long-term interest. Though this proposition will be granted in the abstract, there is a tendency to resist independence *when it takes the form of challenging our judgments.* Nevertheless, it is essential that we adjust the pattern of relationships that grew up after the war. Though historically we are the children of Europe, with respect to the postwar evolution we are somewhat in the position of a father toward a grown-up son. He can always take the attitude that, since their interests are identical, he will continue to control all the resources. He can challenge the son to name circumstances in which their interests might differ. He can tell him that no legitimate request will ever go unheeded. Such an attitude will either drive the son to open rebellion or, if accepted, will break his spirit.

Since the war Europe has been first nurtured and then protected by us. Now we require wisdom and delicacy in handling the transition from tutelage to equality—a process to which no nation has ever adjusted easily. The assertions of European self-will that we find so irritating today can be the growing pains of

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a new and healthier relationship that ultimately is important for us as well.

Some critics of American policy argue that the attempt to play a role simultaneously in every part of the globe is beyond our *physical* resources. It seems to me clearly beyond our *psychological* resources. If we insist on assuming the principal responsibility for every square mile of territory at every moment of time, we will tear ourselves to pieces inwardly. The continent closest to us culturally, with similar political traditions and substantial economic resources, should—for our sake as well as its own—assume a greater responsibility for its policy and defense. It is in neither our interest nor that of Europe that Europe become the Greece to our Rome—a political backwater, interesting culturally but unable to play an active role. This would not be healthy for us because hegemony is demoralizing in the long run.

Painful as it may be to admit, we could benefit from a counterweight to discipline our occasional impetuosity and to supply historical perspective to our penchant for abstract and “final” solutions. The day will come when we will consider a measure of autonomy in Europe a blessing rather than an irritant. In this century no one could have foreseen at the beginning of any decade what the world would look like at its end. Things have not grown less complicated or more predictable. Those centers of initiative which still exist should not be discouraged. It is not always the least responsible allies that wish to reserve some measure of control over their destiny. Some of those most eager to have us assume all responsibility may do so for reasons that are not very comforting in the long run; they may be only too eager to shift all risks and burdens to our shoulders. Little would be gained by replacing a nationalism of insufficient strength by a neutralism masquerading as Atlanticism.

## A Third Force?

Many would grant the need for a greater European role in the abstract. However, they tend to argue that this will have to await the unification of Europe on a federal basis.

There exists also a certain ambivalence: the desirability of a united Europe is affirmed, but there is also a fear lest it pursue "Third Force" tendencies. The seeming dilemma is often solved by a call for American leadership. Some invoke the "herroic" days of the creation of the

Marshall Plan as a model for current American attitudes.

I am not advocating a reduction of our commitment to the defense of Europe. I am urging a change in the means by which the commitment is carried out. I am not saying that our influence in Europe should disappear. I am urging that the only way we can maintain our influence is by reducing our formal predominance.

I believe our present challenge to be more complex and subtle. In the late 1940's, conception, execution, and salesmanship alike depended on American initiatives. Today, the central task is to encourage a European sense of responsibility. To the extent that the United States uses the methods of the 1940's, it encourages two unfortunate tendencies. On the one hand, some Europeans will be only too happy to abdicate "leadership" to us. The question is whether those most ready to shift the burden of difficult choices to our shoulders will prove very steady partners in times of crisis. On the other hand, we will see a mounting tendency to base European policy on anti-Americanism. There will be a growing belief that a European identity can only come about if seized from the United States and not with our cooperation.

As for Third Force tendencies, it is important to distinguish the fact of a Third Force from its objectives. Europe as a Third Force—in the sense of being powerful and active in world affairs—is in our interest

even if its internal structure does not follow our preferred prescription. Whether there is a danger that Europe pursue policies detrimental to the United States depends on Europe's ability to perceive its proper interests. The memory of its impotence and of our tutelage contributes to the illusion that we understand Europe's problems better than it does itself. In the long run, this is not a reliable basis for Atlantic policy. If Europe cannot be trusted to perceive the realities of its position, American tutelage can be at best a stopgap remedy. I would even argue that the greatest incentives for irresponsibility exist when we seem anxious to assume all risks while our allies are on the sidelines, free to criticize but unwilling to shoulder burdens.

A LONG-RANGE Atlantic policy will try to base itself on the following facts:

* A Europe assuming greater responsibility for its own foreign policy and defense will be bound to recognize that there exists only one potential threat to its security and that in every conceivable case this threat can be met more effectively with United States assistance than without it. It follows that Europe must be at least as interested in an American commitment to its defense as we.

* We do not have to "fight" for our position in Europe; there is always likely to be a substantial majority on behalf of a continued major U.S. role—even in France.

* There are objective limits to an "anti-American" European policy. It is hard to visualize a "deal" between the Soviet Union and Europe which might jeopardize our interests or security and which would not jeopardize European interests and security first. What is true of Europe as a whole is even more applicable to individual European countries.

* An erratic United States policy can perhaps make thoughtful Europeans doubt the integral connection between their future and ours. By itself, French policy cannot.

This suggests a policy of great restraint by the United States. Care should be taken not to resurrect old national rivalries—which de Gaulle

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has already done so much to foster
—in the name of Atlanticism. To
the extent that Europeans are made
to face their problems in a Euro-
pean context, they are more likely
to be driven to Atlantic co-operation
than the opposite. To the extent
that we take the principal role in
attempting to shape internal Euro-
pean developments, we may create
the impression that there is an in-
consistency between Atlantic co-op-
eration and a European evolution.

Should We Isolate de Gaulle?

According to one school of thought, President de Gaulle is the chief obstacle to European unity and Atlantic integration. Its advocates urge "isolating" de Gaulle both within NATO and in Europe. I consider this approach to be mistaken and doomed to failure. In fact, I believe that de Gaulle's policies are sometimes given impetus by our aggrieved, personal reactions to them. Like a judo artist, he uses our moves to gain a leverage that his own strength does not afford. To test allied cohesion by a formal counting of votes is misleading. Within NATO the 14-1 lineup against France may prevail on technical issues; it will not hold together in a prolonged political contest—even over strategic doctrine. Within the Europe of the Six, de Gaulle has never been as alone as some like to believe. And he would have even more support were he to pay lip service to some wider conception of European unity. On the issue of East-West relations, his views without question represent the dominant trend in Europe.

The real victim of a deliberate policy to isolate de Gaulle will, in any event, not be France but the Federal Republic of Germany. France cannot be isolated without the assistance of the Federal Republic. This is why some have urged that NATO essentially rest on a "special" United States-German relationship. Such a course would mortgage the Alliance as well as the Federal Republic.

A confrontation with France—
unless provoked unambiguously
by France and perhaps even then—
must undermine German political
life. It will split the CDU. This will
in turn radicalize the other parties.

At the same time, the practical consequence of such a policy will be to exalt the relative weight of the Federal Republic both in Europe and in the Alliance. This will not be healthy for the Federal Republic, for European cohesion, or for the Atlantic Alliance. If the Federal Republic becomes the senior European NATO partner, the existing unity in opposition to de Gaulle, already largely superficial, will disintegrate. Most European countries will be extremely uneasy about a structure in which German influence will seem to predominate. This will have profound effects when the issue of renewal of NATO comes up, especially in the Scandinavian countries and Italy.

Finally, such a course has a high probability of alienating us in the end from the Federal Republic. If the cementing of a Franco-German rift should be followed by measures of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union that cause anxiety in the Federal Republic, a serious crisis in U.S.-German relations is likely. In short, I believe that the United States has a positive interest to prevent a Franco-German rupture and to encourage the Federal Republic to retain its ties to France.

The future of the two French divisions in Germany should be considered largely from this aspect. Their removal—unless it results from clearly demonstrable French intranigence—will symbolize a Franco-German rupture. A reappearance of a situation in which Germany once again has only hostile neighbors will lead to serious psychological effects later on. We could easily become the target of these frustrations.

Five policy conclusions follow:

1. If France must be fought, the onus for such a conflict should be clearly on its side. We should lean over backward to avoid it.

2. A contest with France—if ab-

solutely unavoidable—should be
over the future and role of Europe
and not over technical military issues.

3. The United States has a positive interest in encouraging the closest relationship between London, Paris, and Bonn. No other road to European unity is as promising. A grouping of Britain and the Federal Republic—which many urge—is fragile even if we should join it. There are too many differences in perspective on global problems, East-West relations, and deployment for such a grouping to be anything but a temporary expedient. A Bonn-Paris axis arouses too much hostility in Washington and too much distrust in the rest of Europe. A London-Paris understanding would isolate Germany and might lead to separate German overtures toward the East. A Washington-Bonn grouping is likely to focus all anti-German, anti-American, and anti-nuclear sentiments against the Atlantic Alliance.

4. If Franco-British-German understanding is essential, we must take care not to submerge the long-term in the immediate and to encourage the building of bridges to France instead of the opposite. The United States should do nothing to weaken further the Franco-German raprochement. If a rift should come, it should be evident beyond doubt that it was not due to American pressures—direct or indirect, official or unofficial. Though many American statements are formally consistent with these maxims, it would be difficult to convince most Europeans that they represent American “action” policy. In this connection I want to express my strong support for the reported decision of President Johnson not to permit a public debate with France.

5. Whatever happens, a serious dialogue at the highest level between France and the United States is essential. I recognize that some may construe such an effort as a reward for bad French behavior. But too much time has already been lost and too much is at stake. In a period of hoped-for détente with the Communist world, it should not be impossible to conduct unconditional conversations with a traditional ally. If the attempt succeeds, most Europeans would be relieved. If it fails, we could face the ensuing contest

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with the knowledge that no effort
was spared to prevent a rift that
must hurt the West.

How Much Integration?

Many hold the view that Europe's
reluctance to play a global role is
due to the inadequacy of the re-
sources of national states. They hold
that unified Europe would assume
greater global responsibilities. One
answer to the current crisis, there-
fore, is to urge more integration and
to press for European unity. In the
meantime, consultation and formal
legal structures should promote al-
lied cohesion.

I think this view is vastly over-
simplified. The American national
experience would seem to contradict
the assumption of an automatic re-
lationship between power and the
willingness to play an international
role. Until 1941, the United States
possessed the resources but not the
inclination to assume global respon-
sibilities. Conversely, many Euro-
pean states maintained vast overseas
commitments when their resources
were much smaller than they are
today.

With respect to overseas involve-
ments, the combination of decoloni-
zation and two world wars has been
traumatic for the Europeans—Great
Britain partially excepted. Having
been forced to relinquish their over-
seas possessions, they no longer con-
sider that their security is directly
affected by what happens in, for
example, Southeast Asia. Rather
than run the risk of nuclear destruc-
tion on behalf of a distant area from
which they have been recently
ejected, they prefer to shift the risks
and the burdens to us. They are
reasonably sure that long before
upheavals in other continents threat-
en the safety of Europe, the United
States will have entered the fray. In
other words, they treat America's
extra-European concerns in much
the same way that the United States
looked at Europe's quarrels until
1941. And they are no more likely
to be swayed by exhortations than
we would have been in our period
of isolation.

Even within Europe, burden-shar-
ing provides an incentive for respon-
sible policy only when two condi-
tions are met: our allies must have
the same view of the political en-

vironment as we, at least as it affects
Europe; and they must believe that
unless they play a greater role, the
United States will reduce its con-
tribution (not its commitment).
Neither condition is met today. In-
deed, our overeager, importuning
attitude with respect to the second
point defeats our objectives with re-
spect to the first.

Thus it seems high time to con-
sider how much integration we
really want. The logic of our posi-
tion will create pressures for ever
more integrating of our forces, in-
cluding our strategic forces. And
it will generate increasing demands
for European participation in global
decisions. This leads to the curious

position where our allies at one and
the same time reduce their defense
contributions while pressing for in-
creased political influence.

The consequences for over-all pol-
icy are highly undesirable. In such
a system policy may grow stagnant.
The Alliance will be able to agree
only on doing nothing. Domestic
pressures in most allied countries
will mount. Any crisis occurring any-
where will become immediately,
automatically, and organically world-
wide. It is often said that the First
World War was caused by the ab-
sence of a functioning system of col-
lective security. This may be true.
But the First World War surely
illustrates the perils of alliance
structures so rigid that any conflict,
however trivial, becomes immedi-
ately and organically world-wide.

Of course, we should co-operate
with Europeans wherever possible.
But co-operation cannot be an end
in itself. It functions best through
balancing incentives for responsible
policy. A multiplication of legal de-
vices, unsupported by a real concep-
tion of common interest, defeats its

own purpose. In the long term, ex-
cessive concentration of decision
making may deprive our allies of the
incentive to act responsibly, and it
may open up profound fissures when
a conflict of interests becomes appar-
ent—especially in crises outside of
Europe.

THE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS of
NATO have had both a symbolic
and a substantive aspect. Our Euro-
pean critics are right when they
accuse us of dominating NATO plan-
ning, but they are wrong when they
ascribe it to dark American de-
signs. The role of the Supreme Al-
lied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
was deliberately brought about by
Europeans afraid of a return to
American isolationism and eager
to create as many tangible Amer-
ican ties to the Continent as pos-
sible. During the period of American
nuclear predominance, our allies
had an interest to commit us
organically—preferably automatical-
ly—to their defense.

In the 1950's, a dominant position
for the United States seemed to our
allies the best guarantee of our com-
mitment to the defense of Europe.
But many allies have used this state
of affairs as an excuse to avoid diffi-
cult domestic choices. They have
encouraged us to assume the burden
of defense expenditures and the
stress of difficult strategic decisions.
Their incentive has been to provide
forces large enough to induce us to
maintain a maximum deployment in
Europe but not so large as to create
real alternatives to nuclear deter-
rence. Their interest has been in the
symbolic, not the substantive, aspect
of NATO.

Such a state of affairs cannot be
healthy in the long run. It is unprece-
dented that the defense of an area
so rich and potentially so powerful
as Europe should in all essentials be
left to a country three thousand
miles away. As a result, our allies
have either abdicated from the stra-
tegic field or adopted a military pos-
ture that duplicates the categories
in which we are strongest.

The malaise of NATO is, therefore,
organic. The present system encour-
ages too many of our allies to shift
the costs and the responsibilities of
the common defense to us. Exhorta-
tion will not alter this. Countries do

July 14, 1966

not assume burdens because it is fair, only because it is necessary. Europe will not assume a larger burden for its defense until it also shares a larger responsibility.

THIS SUGGESTS that it would be a great mistake to identify the future of NATO with the indefinite continuation of every detail of the existing structure. Whether a country comes to the assistance of an ally depends less on formal chains of command than on its conception of vital interests. It is primarily a political, not a military, problem.

Three principles should govern our attitudes toward the present military command structure:

¶ Integrated commands are made necessary by modern technology. This realization will govern the decisions of all those who take defense seriously.

¶ As NATO has evolved, the symbolic functions of SACEUR are no longer so crucial as in the 1950's. SACEUR should, therefore, concentrate on the military problem while the political and doctrinal issues should be shifted partly to the Special Committee, partly to the Military Committee. Present policy seems to be moving in this direction.

¶ The relative weight of Europe in the command structure and in the NATO organization should be increased. This is all the more important because in no other area has the dependence of Europe on the United States been so great or so prolonged. In every other field, American policy has deliberately sought to reduce Europe's dependence on the United States; in the military sphere, the thrust of United States policy has been to make our tutelage more bearable.

When the United States gave economic assistance to Europe after the Second World War, it tried to induce its European allies to assume responsibility for developing a joint program and a system for dividing up the total available aid. Though United States representatives played an active and important advisory role, the basic scheme was European. The Atlantic Alliance owes a great deal to the habits of co-operation and mutual respect developed during the Marshall Plan. In the military field, by contrast, the United States

never encouraged the emergence of a specifically European point of view. It made no effort to stimulate European institutions comparable to those it fostered in the economic sphere. The Western European Union (WEU), which originally had been expected to play that role, has remained dormant. It would seem wise for the WEU to be given new vitality by charging it with carrying out the European portion of common plans as well as to define common strategic guidelines.

## Policy Toward Germany

The necessity of retaining the Federal Republic as a willing member of the Alliance, of keeping Germany organically tied to NATO, of meeting real or assumed German wishes, is being invoked to support almost every policy in almost every country. Apart from the fact that the objective is used to justify widely contradictory policies, the formulation is highly dangerous. It creates the impression that whether the Federal Republic behaves responsibly depends entirely on the self-restraint of its government. It overlooks that integration has corresponded to basic interests of the Federal Republic and did not simply reflect individual preferences. What has kept Germany tied to the West is not a legal obligation but a wise assessment of its long-term interests.

Integration was the route to equality. It was made necessary by the trauma of defeat and the consequent horror of standing alone. It is extremely dangerous to create the impression that we must pay a yearly price to the Federal Republic lest it do something very reckless. If the United States becomes the advocate of unstated German desires and gears its policies to anticipate them, it may create illusions of choice for the Federal Republic. It is essential to take legitimate German concerns seriously. It is dangerous to act with such extraordinary nervousness, for this may encourage tendencies not founded on reality. Similarly, it cannot be good for the cohesion of the Alliance to keep insisting that one of its primary functions is to restrain the potential menace of one of its key members. Fifteen years of responsible policy should have earned the Federal Republic the right to

have its positions accepted on their merit.

What is most urgently needed in our German policy is steadiness and reliability. Constant pressures—however valid the requests—must shake German self-assurance. Unending expectations to accept the latest version of "new" doctrines may strain the fabric of German political life. Frequent changes of policy will use up our credit, whatever the merit of individual measures. Trying to make Germany take the lead in an anti-French crusade will, as already pointed out, mortgage the future. Germany's psychological margin is far narrower than its economic one and in the long run more decisive.

But if the United States requires compassion and respect for the political and moral dilemmas of a divided country, and if it should strain to avoid complicating its choices, this will presuppose sufficient confidence to deal with individual issues rather than their symbols.

AMONG these, German reunification looms ever larger. I cannot do justice to this complicated problem here. Let me confine myself to a few observations.

¶ An alliance that does not treat this paramount German interest with respect and understanding will soon lose its meaning in German eyes. It is incumbent on Germany's allies to take the concern for unification seriously and to help develop responsible programs.

¶ Any such program must include provisions about Germany's eastern frontiers, its military status, and its renunciation of nuclear weapons. These may not be enough, but without them no serious program is possible.

¶ Whatever the program, unification will result not from one spectacular negotiation but from an extended historical process. Under present world conditions no program, however reasonable, can induce the Soviet leaders to sacrifice the East German régime. The collapse of a Communist régime would shake the Soviet hold in Eastern Europe and jeopardize its prospects in the ideological conflict with Communist China.

¶ German unity will become possible only if there is (a) a collapse

THE REPORTER

of Soviet power or (b) a change in the ideological climate of the world that might make the East German regime less important for a more national Russia.

¶ A "program" for unification will be revelant primarily in these contingencies. It will be promising to the extent that there exists a European structure in which the significance of national frontiers is sharply reduced.

¶ It is dangerous to encourage the Federal Republic into solitary efforts on the subject of unification —especially toward East Germany. The superiority of West Germany's bargaining position toward East Germany—which is postulated by some—is likely to be an illusion. On the contrary, German political leaders may find themselves facing a growing dilemma. In return for easing the fate of their population, the East Germans can demand concrete political gains. Confronted by popular pressures and moved by humanitarian impulses, no German government will find it easy to be dispassionate in deciding at which point an accumulation of seemingly marginal concessions has produced an irreversible trend. The result is more likely to be the indefinite continuation of two hostile, competing German states than progress toward unification. Such an outcome would build pressures toward a Popular Front into the German scene—a Popular Front of a particularly virulent kind because the partner would be not a party but a sovereign state.

¶ While progress toward German unity presupposes a change in current East-West patterns, this change must be sought in a framework larger than the German national one. This is another reason why a European structure is so important and why the United States must do nothing to undermine the building blocks of European unity, including Franco-German friendship.

## The Nuclear Issue

As I have already pointed out, the so-called "hardware solution" does not seem to me fruitful. Since the problem is essentially political, the Special (McNamara) Committee should be given every opportunity to work and should be expanded to include political functions. Its task

should be to formulate common strategic doctrine and common disarmament policy. Within its framework the European countries could, if they wished, form a closer association. For example, the Western European Union might well be given responsibility for the European contribution to joint NATO plans. As Europe gains structure, the Special Committee could draw nearer to the "twin pillars" concept. But Atlantic partnership, in this approach, could become operative even if European unity were delayed. Atlantic partnership and increased European cohesion thus could be pursued simultaneously, with no advance commitment to giving priority to either course.

If this solution fails to satisfy our allies in the long run, a European

nuclear force is preferable to the "hardware" solutions now being proposed. Indeed, it is likely that nuclear autonomy is the least divisive form of European unity. In the economic field, competition between Europe and the United States involves, at best, indirect risks. In the political area, the temptations for independent action are great and the penalties small. In military matters—and particularly in the nuclear field—the closest association between Europe and the United States is in the self-interest of both sides. Whatever their formal autonomy, it is highly improbable that our allies would *prefer* to go to war with the relatively small nuclear forces available or in prospect for them and *without* the support of our necessarily preponderant arsenal. Close co-ordination between Europe and the United States in the nuclear field is dictated by self-interest; and Europe has more to gain from it than the United States.

This is not to say that the United States should actively promote a European nuclear force. On the contrary, the United States should

show more restraint in seeking to influence internal European arrangements and exert its influence in shaping Atlantic relationships. It does mean, however, that we should not seek to destroy those elements from which a European force could emerge by pressing for alternatives —through the so-called "hardware solution"—that will in time cause much greater difficulties. A European nuclear force presupposes, however, European policy unity.

I HAVE TRIED to present some possible directions, not a detailed policy. Those who have final responsibility are, of course, aware of nuances unavailable to me; all of policy, moreover, depends on assessments that cannot be proved correct when they are made. Needless to say, this applies to my judgments as well.

In these days we are aware of disagreements above all. It is well to remember that the problems in the Alliance are essentially a luxury made possible by an increasing margin of safety; they reflect strength and returned vigor; we can therefore hope that they can serve as the basis of a new relationship.

Some months ago, at a private conference of Europeans and Americans, we were discussing the nuclear question when a Frenchman said something with which I strongly agree. He pointed out that it is futile to have the future of the Alliance turn on plans for such an apocalyptic contingency. The only way the Atlantic nations could come together is to find a way of dreaming together about the kind of world they want to bring about, rather than about the circumstances in which they might wish to blow it up. We live in a world which, because it is revolutionary, constantly confronts us with problems. Yet it is impossible to create another structure, or another form of community, without a clear conception, which we sometimes deny ourselves by our intense preoccupation with daily crises. It is important to remember that there are two kinds of realists: those who adapt to reality and those who seek to shape it. The world we in the West build may depend less on technical discussions than on common dreams.

July 14, 1966

Henry V. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

Beat regards,

may have after I have seen it.
but I will write you with any comments I
Unfortunately, the book has not come yet,
was hoping your book would arrive.
continuously this fall, but also because I
because I have been out of town almost
I have delayed writing to you partly

thought about them a great deal.
appreciate your extensive remarks and have
on my article in THE REPORTER. I
Thank you for your letter commenting

Dear Mr. Leaniewaki:

Poland
Warsaw
Mickiewicza 18p
Mr. Andrzej Leaniewaki

December 19, 1966

Warsaw, 9th September 1966

Dear Professor Kissinger,

I have read with the greatest interest your article "For a New Atlantic Alliance", published in "The Reporter" of July 14. I think it is a comprehensive review treating the political situation in Europe, and in Germany in particular, with all the necessary seriousness. Your views are based on a thorough knowledge of the subject and distinguished by a realism not too often encountered in writings on European problems, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

Discussing Europe's present-day role against the background of the new political trend which is spreading wider and wider on the old continent, you very pertinently observe that "a too theoretical and schematic approach runs the risk of losing touch with contemporary European realities", and that "what we need today is another leap of the imagination similar to that which took place two decades ago".

In assessing the situation in Europe consequent upon the policies of General de Gaulle you emphasize rightly that "his views on the issue of East-West relations without question represent the dominant trend in Europe". It is precisely this trend - linked as it is with the external and domestic policies of the West German Government, policies which are a cause of increasing alarm to all the nations of Europe, in both East and West - which is largely responsible for the fact that "General de Gaulle has moved from advocating the unity of Western Europe to

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[L.C]

holding out a vision of the unity of <u>all Europe</u>".

This made me search even more keenly in your
article for evidence of the "leap of imagination"
which you recommend to meet "contemporary European
realities".

I am well aware that the nations of Western
Europe, including France, still see in their alliance
with the United States a guarantee of their security.
Even so, as a consequence primarily of the policies
of the United States and the German Federal Republic,
there has grown in Europe - all Europe - something
of a new solidarity of the countries of the old con-
tinent, a solidarity which, whatever the ideological
differences, revolves around the increasingly ap-
preciated need to create conditions for European
security.

However, I looked in vain in your article for
any conclusions from this kind of assessment of
"contemporary European realities". Your proposals
concerning "a new Atlantic alliance" do not seem to
me to be indicative of that "leap of imagination"
which is now so indispensable.

In your proposals to cure the Western alliance
of its ailments you do see the need for European
unity. It might have been expected that, aware as
you are of the existence of the new trend in European
countries, you would have appreciated the need for
the unity of all Europe. I have looked in vain for
even a trace of such a suggestion. For you, Europe
ends on the Oder and Neisse, if not on the Elbe. You
employ the very term "Europe" only when you speak
about the unity of its Western part. Far be it from

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[LC]

me to assert that conditions are ripe for the political unification of all Europe. But a correct assessment of "contemporary European realities" permits one to concur with what an author in "The Christian Science Monitor" wrote on April 1, namely that "the Atlantic community may still be the ideal context for America's future, but it belongs as much to the past as does Britain's Victorian empire". And also with Walter Lippmann's view, expressed in the "New York Herald Tribune" of March 30, that "the key to an understanding of what is going on about the problem of NATO is to realize that... the issue is between the little Europe of the cold war era of the 1950s and the greater Europe... whether in this nuclear age the Europeans can end the cold war among them and construct for themselves a greater European community".

As late as August 22, the Secretary of State, Mr Dean Rusk, declared that "the United States must continue to work for a united Europe in which neither the Atlantic Powers nor the Warsaw Pact nations see any threat for themselves". The point is that, so far, the United States has failed to act in this direction. And your own proposals seem to be designed to draw Europe back to the 'fifties, a time when polarized political blocs prevented any settlement of European problems while the very existence of such blocs perpetuated the cold war. It is too early yet for military blocs in Europe to be wound up, although the sooner this happens, the better.

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[Lc]

Fortunately, the realization by the countries of Europe of the common interest they have in European security and of the need to promote lively economic, cultural and even political co-operation (the Franco-Soviet consultations) puts the concepts that were at the roots of the Western Powers' policies in the early post-war years and that consisted in a perpetuation of the division of Europe at a heavy disadvantage. The Polish proposal for a conference on European security and co-operation surely amounts to a "leap of imagination" better in keeping with "contemporary realities".

Another part of your article which, to my mind, arouses serious misgivings, is your suggestions on Germany. While justly pointing out that German reunification can only come in the wake of a lengthy historical process, and that an effective plan for reunification must contain provisions relating to Germany's eastern frontiers (I do know, incidentally, that you are in favour of the West German Government recognizing the Oder-Neisse frontier), her military status and her remuneration of nuclear weapons, you seem to be of the opinion that hardly anything can be done on Germany at the present juncture. You are concerned above all with the consequences of the isolation into which the West German Government has been driving itself by its own policies. And you say that allied pressures on the Federal Republic place explosive time bombs in that country. You also use the argument that "overtures toward East Germany", encouraged in the

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[L]

belief that they offer a possibility of reunification, could easily generate a frustrated nationalism if it turns out that they cement the partition of Germany rather than alleviate it".

Quite irrespective of the fact that these "overtures" have given rise throughout Europe, and even in your own country, to considerable hopes for a relaxation of the tense situation in Central Europe and for progress on the German problem, I believe that it is certainly not such overtures that can generate any "frustrated nationalism" of a kind which in fact has been growing for quite some time now as a result not of any dashed hopes but of the policies conducted by West Germany's present government. Suffice it to recall here - a fact also known to the West - the advances made by West Germany's new right-wing party, the NPD, or the latest rebellion of the Bundeswehr generals who are less and less ready to accept civilian control over the education of the Bundeswehr troops in a militarist spirit. There is still time to build a barrier against such dangerous internal developments in the German Federal Republic. However, it will not be possible to build it if, following your suggestions, West Germany's allies continue loyally to support the Federal Republic's revisionist policies which, by the way, have long been negatively appraised even by the West European countries. Which is precisely what General de Gaulle has refused to do, and in this he has enjoyed the support of most of the European countries.

Thus, this is not the way to reform the Western

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alliance. Such reform would only strengthen the nations of Europe in their conviction that the United States does not care about their interests and that the United States' only desire is to find in the German Federal Republic a willing agent of American policies. It is hard to understand otherwise your statement that "fifteen years of responsible policy should have earned the Federal Republic the right to have its positions accepted on their merit". This kind of assessment of West Germany's policies has not been made even by her loyal friend, John Foster Dulles, who in January 1959, towards the end of his tenure of the post of Secretary of State, called into question the Bonn recipe for German reunification. Responsible European policies require that the voice of the nations of Europe be heeded rather than that of a government which fomented anxieties in Europe and waits impatiently for another round of the cold war.

P.S. Have you had time enough to have a glance at "Western Frontier of Poland", the book which I edited?

[Y]

November 25, 1966

Professor Carol Edler Baumann
Department of Political Science
University of Wisconsin
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201

Dear Professor Baumann:

In response to your letter of
November 17, I would be very willing to have
you use the portions of my article "For a
New Atlantic Alliance" in your book of
readings.

Would you be kind enough to send
me a copy of your book when it is finished?

Best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Henry A. Kissinger

TO: Permissions Dept.
The Reporter Magazine Co.
660 Madison Ave.
New York, N.Y. 10021

Date: October 31, 1966

This is to request permission to use the selection(s) listed below for inclusion in the following college textbook to be published by D. C. Heath and Company:

Title and description Western Europe: What Road to Integration? (Problems in Political Science series) A readings collection designed as supplementary reading for undergraduate classes.

Author-editor Carol Edler Baumann (hard) (paper) bound

Approximate length 144 pages Tentative price $1.50

Probable publication date Spring, 1967 Probable size of first printing 8000

It is understood that unless otherwise specified, permission covers world rights. The editor will make proper acknowledgment and meet such conditions as you specify. A duplicate of this request is enclosed for your files.

Name Carol Edler Baumann
Dept. of Political Science

Address The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201

Permission is granted on the terms indicated.

Please see enclosed letter.

## SELECTIONS DESIRED

Author Henry A. Kissinger
periodical

Title of book The Reporter

Title of selection For a New Atlantic Alliance

Beginning on page 20 with "The Problem of Germany ---"

Ending on page 21 with strain German political life,"

GENERAL STAFF

NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE

21 King George Avenue, Jerusalem.

SEP 6 1966

30th August 1966.

Prof. Henry Kissinger,
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
U. S. A.

Dear Prof. Kissinger,

Thank you for your thoughtfulness in sending me the
article from "the Reporter", which I find of great interest
to us.

August 19, 1966

Mr. Pötzsch
Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung
Berliner Freiheit 7
Bonn 53, Germany

Dear Mr. Pötzsch:

Thank you for your letter of
August 12th.

I am agreeable to the honorarium you
are suggesting. Please send it to The
Cambridge Trust Company, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.

Bundeszentrale
für politische Bildung

Gesch.-Z.

II/3 - 1550/66

(Bei allen Antwortschreiben wird Angabe
obigen Geschäftszelchens erbeten)

Bonn, den 12.8.1966

Berlinei .. reiheit 7

Telefon: 5 29 41 - Hausruf:

Fernschreiber: 8/86 392

Postanschrift: 53 Bonn 1, Postfach

Luftpost

AUG 17 1966

Herrn

Professor Henry A. Kissinger

6 Divinity Ave.

Cambridge, Mass./ USA

Betr.: Beilage AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE

Sehr geehrter Herr Professor Kissinger!

Ich bedanke mich verbindlichst für Ihre Antwort auf meine telegrafische
Anfrage und für die Genehmigung zum Nachdruck Ihres Aufsatzes aus REPORTER
"For a New Atlantic Alliance".

Es macht uns nichts aus, daß die WEHRKUNDE, die eine sehr kleine Auflage
hat, den Beitrag ebenfalls übernimmt. Selbstverständlich werden wir auch
erwähnen, daß es sich ursprünglich um eine Erklärung vor dem Ausschuß für
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten gehandelt hat.

Inzwischen habe ich den Text bereits zur Übersetzung gegeben. Der Artikel
wird voraussichtlich Mitte September bei uns erscheinen.

Ich vermute, daß die Rechte, zumindest was fremdsprachliche Veröffentli-
chungen angeht, bei Ihnen liegen.

Darf ich Ihnen daher anliegend das übliche Honorarangebot unterbreiten.

Mit verbindlichen Empfehlungen

Im Auftrag:

Ihr sehr ergebener

(Pötzsch)

Anlage

Gesch.-Z.

II/3 - 1550/66

(Bei allen Antwortschreiben wird Angabe
obigen Geschäftszeichens erbeten)

Bonn, den 12.8.1966

Berliner Freiheit 7

Telefon: 5 29 41 - Hausruf:

Fernschreiber: 8/66 392

Cambridge, Mass. / USA

Betr.: Beilage AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE zur Wochenzeitung DAS PARLAMENT

Bezug: Ihr Telegramm vom 9.8.1966

Die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung bedankt sich vielmals für die Überlassung Ihres Manuskriptes

"For a New Atlantic Alliance"

Es wird in der oben genannten Ausgabe der Beilage AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGE-SCHICHTE veröffentlicht werden.

Ich erlaube mir, Ihnen ein Honorarangebot zu unterbreiten. Die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung bietet Ihnen für den einmaligen Abdruck in der Beilage den Betrag von

DM 700.--

(i.W.: Siebenhundert Deutsche Mark)

an. Würden Sie sich bitte gelegentlich mit der Regelung schriftlich einverstanden erklären und ein Konto angeben, auf das der Betrag überwiesen werden kann.

Die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung übermittelt Ihnen die Auszahlung Ihres Betrages.

Mit vorzüglicher Hochachtung

Im Auftrag:

Ihr sehr ergebener

(Pötzsch)

September 7, 1966

Mr. D. U. Stikker
Villa Belfaggio
Menaggio-Loveno
Lago di Como
Italy

Dear Mr. Stikker:

Thank you for your very nice letter
of September 2nd.

I appreciated your comments very
much and I am in almost complete agree-
ment with them.

Milton Katz has already been in
contact with me about your visit here and
there is a definite plan for us to meet. I
look forward to it.

With kind regards.

Henry A. Klaarner

With kind regards.

look forward to it.
there is a definite plan for us to meet. I
contact with me about your visit here and
Milton Katz has already been in

ment with them.
much and I am in almost complete agree-
I appreciated your comments very

of September 19th.
Thank you for your very nice letter.

Dear Mr. Stikker:

It's very
Lado di Como
Menadgio-Loveno
Villa Belvedere
Mr. D. U. Stikker

September 7, 1966

D. U. STIKKER

TEL. 2361 MENAGGIO

VILLA BELFAGGIO
MENAGGIO - LOVENO
LAGO DI COMO

SEP 6 1966

2 September, 1966

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

It is already some days ago that I received your
letter of 10 August and your enclosed article in The Reporter.

Personally, I am rather pessimistic about Nato's future
and Atlantic cooperation. Mistakes have been made on all sides,
most by de Gaulle, many by MacNamara (whose general influence
on American Policy vis-à-vis Western Europe has in the last
years been too great), while the U.K. in its special position
has not been able to promote more unity.

I would agree with a great deal of your analysis,
especially when you remark that now we are faced with the
dangers of excessive nationalism and a new version of neutralism.
De Gaulle's nationalism has affected German internal politics
seriously. The revival of the old desire of the generals to
influence politics (which is the reason for the generals'
opposition against von Hassel) and the grouping of so many
politicians in the CDU around Adenauer (who has completely
forgotten that his mission after the war was to give that new
image of reasonable wisdom and democracy to Germany) are clear
indications that changes are already taking place. The attitude
of Canada, Denmark and Italy in the discussions of the fourteen,
but also the inability or the unwillingness of Belgium and the
Netherlands to take any fresh initiatives spring from a reluc-
tance to change the trend towards neutralism which can be seen
within but also outside the socialist or other leftist political
parties in these countries. The U.K. is out of the picture,
not only for economic reasons but also, I fear, because
Wilson's Government is not really ready to play its much needed
role in Europe and via Europe in the Atlantic.

We could talk a lot about the need of integration. Some
months ago I wrote a long letter to Dean Acheson in which I
asked him "does the U.S. really want integration". I pointed
to the declining role for European integration of OEEC since
it became OECD and feared that the same may happen to Nato.

September 7, 1966

Mr. John E. Lockwood
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

Dear John:

Thank you for your nice letter of
August 30th about my article. I ap-
preciated it very much indeed.

Your letter reminded me that it
has been much too long since we have
met. Perhaps we can remedy this
soon.

With kind regards.

Henry A. Klaasder

With kind regards.

soon.
met. Perhaps we can remedy this
has been much too fond since we have
Your letter reminded me that it
preciated it very much indeed.

August 30th spent my article. I as-
Thank you for your nice letter of

Dear John:

New York 30, New York
30 Rockefeller Plaza
Milwaukee, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
Mr. John E. Lockwood

September 7, 1968

MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY

30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK 20

MAIN OFFICE
1 CHASE MANHATTAN PLAZA
NEW YORK 5

August 30, 1966

SEP 2 1966

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

I have just returned from a brief holiday in Europe and, in preparing for the new and oncoming year, have given myself the pleasure of reading your piece "For a New Atlantic Alliance" from THE REPORTER of last July 14.

As always, I enjoy your articles which contribute to our sophistication and hopefully to our maturity. I like your pluralism and what seems to me to be your efforts to lead us away from the rigidities of Wilsonian Presbyterianism. Strange how Wilson still hangs over us and particularly the Democratic Party, although heaven knows Dulles had a bit of it in him, too.

While in Belgium, I encountered a man who is to become one of your students, I believe shortly, a Mr. Jean Paul Van Bellinghen. I commended you to him and I commend him to you. He is a member of the Belgian Diplomatic Corps who will, I believe, be on assignment to your school.

I hope that after Labor Day our paths may cross and we may have a chance to discuss a little some of the things that are going on in the world.

[4]

September 7, 1966

Mr. Andrea Cagiati
40 Via Monti Parioli
Rome, Italy

My dear Mr. Cagiati:

How nice of you to write to me
and how thoughtful.

I can imagine that your new
post will be a pleasant change. Your
experience in Mexico should certainly
stand you in good stead.

I have never been to Madrid but
should I come through their I will make
it a point to look you up.

Kind regards.

Henry A. Klaarner

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards.

if a point to look you up.
should I come through their I will make
I have never been to Madrid but

stand you in good stead.
experience in Mexico should certainly
boat will be a pleasant change. Your
I can imagine that your new

and how thoughtful.
How nice of you to write to me

My dear Mr. Cadizil:

Rome, Italy
40 Via Monti Paroli
Mr. Andrea Cadizil

September 7, 1966

MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI
Direzione Generale Affari Politici
SERVIZIO NATO

TELESPRESSO N. 121/453

RISERVATO

MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA - Gabinetto -

Roma

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA DIFESA

Roma

AMBASCIATA D'ITALIA: Algeri-Ankara-Atene-Belgrado
Bonn-Bruxelles-Buenos Aires-Cairo
Cambera-Caracas-Città del Messico
Copenaghen-Djacarta-Karachi-L'Aja-Lisbona-Londra-Lussemburgo-Madrid
Mogadiscio-Mosca-New Delhi-Oslo-Ottawa
Parigi-Rio de Janeiro-Saigon-Santiago
del Cile-Stoccolma-Teheran-Tel Aviv-Tokio-Tripoli-Tunisi-Varsavia-Vienna

RAPP. IT. PRESSO IL CONSIGLIO ATLANTICO

Parigi

RAPP. IT. PRESSO LE NAZIONI UNITE

New York

DELEGAZIONE IT. ALLA CONFERENZA PER IL

DISARMO

Ginevra

CONSOLATO GENERALE D'ITALIA: Berlino - New York

DIREZIONE GENERALE AFFARI POLITICI

- Segreteria 10/A - Gruppo Lav. Disarmo-

- Servizio ONU - Ufficio C. EUR -

Sede

- Ufficio I-II-III-IV-V-VI-VII-

DIREZIONE GENERALE AFFARI ECONOMICI

- Segreteria -

Sede

DIREZIONE GEN. RELAZIONI CULTURALI

- Segreteria -

Sede

e. per conoscenza:

AMBASCIATA D'ITALIA

Washington

Roma, li 28 luglio 1966.

OGGETTO: Reazioni in Congresso alla iniziativa di de Gaulle nei con-
fronti della NATO: hearings del Comitato per gli Affari Este
ri del Senato.

La nostra Ambasciata in Washington ha trasmesso, in data 30
giugno u.s., i testi delle deposizioni rese da varì esperti di poli-
tica internazionale dinanzi al "Comitato degli Affari Esteri del Se-
nato" nel corso degli "hearings" sui problemi della NATO.

Si allega, per opportuna conoscenza, la traduzione dell'inter-
vento, particolarmente interessante, effettuato dal Prof. Kissinger
in data 27 giugno u.s..

D'ORDINE DEL MINISTRO

September 7, 1966

The Right Honorable George Alfred Brown, M.P.
Foreign Office
London S.W. 1
England

Dear George:

Thank you for your note of August 23rd.

I will make every effort to come to
Washington or New York during your visit
if you have somebody get in touch with me.

With kind regards.

Foreign Office,
S. W. 1.

23 August, 1966.

SEP 2 1966

Your letter gave me tremendous pleasure. As I have been reading the background and briefing material my mind keeps going back to that week at Harvard and all we discussed there.

I would like to see you pretty soon. I will of course be in the States in October and I am trying to lengthen my stay to get several days in New York and several days in Washington. I am asking Henry Brandon to lay on at least one dinner party for the old hands. I hope you will arrange that either we meet alone or that we get together at one or other of the parties. I really would like to talk to you.

(GEORGE BROWN)

Professor Henry A. Kissinger.

WHITEHALL 5422

SEP 6 1966

CABINET OFFICE
LONDON, S.W.I

30th August, 1966

SEP 6 1966

Dear Henry,

I was fascinated by the statement you prepared for the Foreign Relations Committee entitled "For a New Atlantic Alliance". What was the reaction? I myself would have been almost completely on your side, except in the section which you head "A Third Force?" Not that I disagree with your conclusion. I found your arguments here somewhat less convincing than those in the rest of the paper. But, saying that in no way diminishes the very considerable impact which the reading of your paper had on me.

SOLLY ZUCKERMAN

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

J. M. & J. R. Gaus

Prospect, new york
13435

NEW YORK STATE ROUTE 287
AREA CODE 315
Telephone: Barneveld, N. Y. 896-2738

29 August 1966

AUG 31 1966

Dear Henry:

I am grateful again to you for remembering that I would be glad to have your statement entitled "For a New Atlantic Alliance". I had read it in "The Reporter" with interest and although I know you are an enormously busy person send you this note of appreciation and comment which requires no reply.

I like and respect the even temper and clarity of diagnosis which marks your discussion. This impresses me particularly in your treatment of the phrase "we are the children of Europe" which is often employed perhaps particularly abroad with an air of finality as though we were an island off the coast of Portugal or Galway who should look up hungrily to the east for guidance and an occasional pat on the head and who may now and then provide food and manpower. You do not fall into this naivete which leaves me to think of some writers in these matters as what I call West Portugese. I am not sure however that we are really in what you speak of as "the position of a father toward a grown-up son". Most of the people I know are perhaps over impressed by imported styles and ideas or perhaps better, genuinely humble confronted by the varied cultures and societies not only of Europe but of Asia and Africa -- as witness so many young people who have gone into the Peace Corps with a view of whom even at my age I have some friendship and correspondence.

I incline to the view that we are not only the children but also the grandchildren down to the great great great grandchildren not only of Europe but also of Africa and Asia, and somehow this bewildering complexity in our relationships must be considered in any efforts to reconstruct an Atlantic Alliance -- if such there should be. For good and ill we are in large numbers and over a long period of time from Africa and in some respects we need to think of the unfinished task of improving our national society at the points at which it is weakened by the inadequacies of our white-negro relations.

But this is not all: our earliest human beings apparently came from Asia and indeed (particularly through historical accident) we still think of them as Indians. Even here in New York State there are still unsettled problems of the relations between Indian and white men who even recently violate treaties that have

[10]

been made. And if you go as my wife and I have gone to spend
any time in our Southwest there are still the unsettled
questions -- in the southeast and the Great Plains and in the
pacific northwest and Alaska -- of relations between the cultures
of the white men and of the red men. Contrary to an earlier
view, the Indians are on the increase and the still unsettled
questions of land ownership and use and of local and other insti-
tutions are of major importance for example in may regions. And
the urgencies of sub-nationalisms that have developed all through
our history but particularly in the last 120 years (Irish, Italian
and the like and more recently Latin-American) also create a
relationship not to "Europe" but to a host of groups who come
bearing the special and peculiar attitudes -- too often of hatred --
between nationalities in Europe and now also the new Africa and
the new Asia.

Forgive these platitudes: I admire and respect your careful
diagnosis. I struggle with my attachment to an earlier acceptance
of ideas of Atlantic organizations and programs as against my
increasing skepticism as to national commitments which have al-
ready been so costly but which must be built on insecure founda-
tions if account is not taken of the fact that we are so many
different kinds of children and that some of the family connections
have been here a long time -- so long as to be transformed by the
efforts to work out a new way of life under continental and varied
regional conditions of a kind quite outside the knowledge and ima-
gination of people in other continents and perhaps particularly
in Europe.

Thank you again for plowing up my thinking, which is only a
minute part of the work which you are doing. I send my good wishes
to you and yours.

August 31, 1966

Mr. Albert C. E. Parker
12 Kevin Lane
East Greenbush, New York 12061

Dear Mr. Parker:

Thank you for your letter of
August 21st.

I am enclosing a copy of the
testimony from which Senator Morse
quoted. I hope you find it helpful.

Kind regards.

Henry V. Klaasenber

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards.

testimony from which Senator Morae

I am enclosing a copy of the

August 31st.

Thank you for your letter of

Dear Mr. Parker:

East Greenpoint, New York 13061
13 Kevin Lane
Mr. Albert C. E. Parker

August 31, 1966

DEAN ACHESON

AUG 1 5 1966

August 11, 1966

Dear Henry:

The *Reporter* and your note of July 27 awaited me on my return from two weeks in Aspen. I read the article with great interest and thank you for sending it along.

With warm regards.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.

July 22, 1966

Mr. Achille Albonetti
Via Belisario 15
Rome, Italy

Dear Mr. Albonetti:

In Mr. Kissinger's absence on a
trip to Vietnam, I am writing to ac-
knowldge your letter of July 18th.

He is expected to return to the
office the first week in August and
I will bring it to his attention then.

Mr. Klaander
Secretary to

Sincerely yours,

Office the first week in August and

knowledge your letter of July 18th.
trip to Vietnam. I am writing to so-

In Mr. Klaander's absence on a

Dear Mr. Albonetti:

Rome, Italy
Via Bellassario 16
Mr. Achille Albonetti

July 23, 1968