DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

TelCon-9:17-9/1/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Secretary Rogers

R: Hello Henry.

K: How are you Bill.

R: I guess you saw the telegram from Saigon that Thieu's draft is not ready and is going to wait a while.

K: ... the referendum.

R: Particularly the referendum in which he says if he loses he will resign. That will be fine.

K: That is what I think.

R: As long as he is prepared to take a chance, it is up to him to make the judgement.

K: I agree. But if they count negatives as all extensions, I don't see how he can win.

R: ... now that Ky is off the ballot, I think it is important for the people to have the specific views of the government. As Thieu says if you vote for me you support the government, if you do not support the government vote for someone else. I think this is a good solution. We shouldn't push him into anything.

K: Yes, you and I agree that whatever our views, he should make the decision and that we are not going to recommend one.

R: It is important that the people of Saigon have the opportunity to express their views and how he manages that it is up to him. Also probably what we know on this end the referendum is the best solution.

K: That is right. We are not going to do anything from here. In fact I am taking my children to the movie studios today.

R: Good.

K: How did the speech go yesterday.

R: Very good I think. I got a lot of applause.

pamphlet

K: Good. Are you going to put it into a pamphlet form and send it to the embassies.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By [illegible] NARA, Date 5/27

- 2 -

R: On the Chinese issue some of them seemed to be opposed. But after the meeting was over I think they understood our position.

K: Good.

R: I am not going to have a press conference until after what I see Thieu does so I think it will be 11 o'clock on Friday.

K: Good.

R: I will talk a little about Chinese representation and how it is going.

K: How is it going.

R: It is going to be close and can't really tell yet. The Japanese are holding back.

K: ... I told Alex. They called back that the President doesn't want to go there and that they wanted [illegible] ? here. Now they are saying they want the President to go to Japan after they told us he wasn't going.

R: ... with regard to this man Thai(?). Says he knows you.

K: I don't know whether I know him or not.

R: Maybe you better have someone else handle it.

K: I think you are right. I will get John Holdridge and Bill Sullivan to see him together. I have no intention of seeing him.

R: Have a good time in Hollywood.

K: I have a big delegation with me. I have got to behave.

By NARA, Date 3/27

TELCOM
Geo. Putnam/Kissinger
9:30 a.m. 9/2/71

P: I have seen you with very beautiful females but I yesterday you topped everything.

K: What do you mean?

P: Your daughter.

K: I wonder if you are down here whether you want to chat at some point. I haven't got anything particular. You were here last year or we could do it next time.

P: If we could because I am up to my ears today. You are leaving tomorrow?

K: Monday.

P: I will call you tomorrow.

K: If we can't work something out I will be back at the end of September.

P: I am disturbed about a number of things. Did you see the Beecher article out of Cairo on the increase in the number of Russian pilots in Egypt?

K: No. We have no illusions about the Soviets.

P: I know you have a tough Senate. But leadership in the past has gone beyond the Senate to the people and the people have responded. You prefere ? ? ? ? instead of confrontation but ? ? ? ? ? might bring about a landslide.

K: We should talk about that. We have had one hell of a problem and we think we are playing the toughest game the situation will support but it's always a matter of judgment.

P: I read in the last year ? ? ? ? ? we get change of leadership. "68 but they are surpassing us in nuclear tonnage now.

K: If not for us there would have been no ABM or MIRV. Nine-tenths of the bureaucracy have kept the budget ? ? ? ? ?. We were being bled to death. The conservatives are more prone to yell at us and when the liberals go off the conservatives aren't there and when we needed maneuvering room they jumped us. I share the concern.

P: I will be delighted to meet at your convenience.

K: Call this afternoon.

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger

9:53 a.m.

9/2/71

Z: Just talked with Haig. Have guidance that says haven't seen text so can't comment. If we follow this line we will end up with hostility here and reports will be negative. And going that we tried to influence Kyand Minh. He feels that you feel that subtleties are such that we should delay comment.

K: I haven't seen speech. What do you think we should say?

Z: I don't know but it seems we should say that one thing is that we are following it with interest and it's internal and Thieu needs to take the steps he has taken. ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? provides a context and that's not ______ to seek to influence the other way. It maybe the wrong way to say it but on that idea. It's that kind of questioning.

K: I just feel -- don't know what the son of a bitch proposed and if it's ______ we are worse off.

Z: We consider elections internal matter and had hoped for contested election. We expressed regret when other's withdrew. Now there's a set of circumstances there and we have not seen the text but it's an internal matter. Then if they say did we know and try to influence we can say we knew but haven't seen the text so can't answer. I don't want to no comments.

K: Then they will say you mean to say that with a speech of that magnitude -- Don't want to get tied to specifics.

Z: Because he made it and we don't know. We could say ? ? ? ? .

K: Say we had general idea but haven't studied the specifics yet. Can you turn off the speculation on Japanese visit? We don't want to go to Japan.

Z: This is based on guidance from your people and that was that President wants to go to Japan in the future.

K: The headline --

Z: It didn't come from me. It came out of Japan.

K: They know they will have no Prime Minister next year and they are making us patsies. They are worse than the NVN. Don't give the impression there's a big hassle. We are generally aware and views known.

ZL: Were we disappointed?

By NARA, Date 5/27

Zeigler/Kissinger

9:53 a.m.

9/2/71

K: Study full text. My judgment is that Thieu was a dope. He made it possible for the vultures to slam him but he didn't do anything that was wrong. Minh and Ky wanted the elections to go to them. They couldn't have won anyway.

TELCOM
Scali/Kissinger

10:20 a.m. 9/2/71

S: Ky resigning once peace restored.

K: I haven't seen the text and I don't know what we are using.

S: "I will bring about all my power when peace restored and if you give me permission I will resign."

K: I don't want to go out on a limb.

S: Then this is far from a pledge (that automatically goes into effect) when a peace agreement is signed?

K: Conceivably pressed into it.

S: I thought it might have impact on the other side.

K: If we don't talk too much.

S: Other people can look at it too who are knowledgable reporters.

K: But no guidance from here.

S: If Minh and Ky ______ in opposition, here is opportunity to combine forces to get Thieu out.

K: It's not true that Thieu is the principle villain. That document isn't that damaging. He wants reports on activities of Minh and KY forces. American governors do that.

S: In referendum process ? ? ? ? ? ? .

K: We want to stay out of telling them. Questions open. Don't want to say WH enforces.

S: But it's been given to them. Just wanted to double check this point. I was particularly intrigued by the idea of resigning.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By CEC NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
Braden/Kissinger

10:30 a.m. 9/2/71

K: Did Joan tell you the President was touched by your letter? He raised it himself. I didn't ask him. He said I said I was at dinner with you the night before. And he said "he wrote me a touching letter and I was surprised." I would have asked him but I didn't. So it should mean more because it was spontaneous.

B: That was human and touching to me. We are leaving in an hour.

K: If I don't go to your party, why should you go to mine?

B: I am seeing Stuart on Monday and might say something about Berlin thing. Is it important?

K: Yes. We have had 4 crises since WW II that got us to the brink of war. Now we have the first agreement that gives rights and access. Whenever Russians want to challenge us, no agreement will stop them but now it's specific and against legality.

B: Why did they do this?

K: We have been talking for 17 months. For your information we have been a particularly active on it behind the scenes in trying to break deadlock and this made it possible for them to do it. They want to have detente on one front.

B: It might be regarded as a safe guard.

K: If Berlin fails then German Ost-Politik fails and it's a government that's anti-Soviet Union. It's a most significant settlement. It looks complicated and that's why not much publicity. When the translation is worked out we will have it signed and published. Don't mention this. When they do something big instead of ______ they act as rug merchants. Now they are haggling about the translation. It's not going to fail on translation and that's why it's ridiculous.

B: They are always that way.

K: Now we have an agreement and being generous and everyone feels they are tough and hard but honorable (and they do something like this which isn't honorable at all). Instead you get someone like Rush who is working his heart out and they try to get in other things in the translation. By Monday it will be worked out. You don't negotiate this long and have heads of govt. involved and not work out the translation.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Braden/Kissinger

10:30 a.m.

9/2/71

-2-

B: Will they announce Monday?

K: Probably. It's the sort of thing that will kepp experts hopping for 48 hours and next week I will not be able to explain it to you. They agreed to ties between W. Berlin and the Sovereign Republic. Now they want relations. That sounds like two soveriegn states. That's what we worked on two months ago. They are sneaking back in words. Third level experts working on it. By Monday it will be history.

B: The main point is 17 months working on this and successful and not much about it.

K: It's important to write about.

B: It's a column I can write that's favorable and I want to do that.

K: That would be appreciated. Would you ask Joan to call?

B: I will.

K: How's Stuart?

B: Going back for treatment after Labor Day.

K: He was going back for results when I talked with him. I guess it wasn't successful. I called him the day he was going to get some results. He was in good shape and blood count level and that was unexpected.

B: I am not sure news of hospital is bad. It means they have found a treatment. At least for awhile. It doesn't sound good but I will inow more when I see him.

K: He will break our hearts.

B: Is Rush a State Dept. hand?

K: Our appointment. Was head of IBM --- no, Union Carbide.

B: Damn good?

K: Fantastic job and very responsive to the President. Ouststanding.

B: Appointed by Nixon to conduct negotiations?

K: No to be Ambassador in Bonn bjt in that capaccity he conducted the negotiations.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E11257
By: CNARA Date: 9/2/71

TELCOM
Dobrynin/Kissinger
12:35 p. m. 9/2/71

D: I received a telegram from Moscow asking me to come for consultations for two weeks because my vacation is out because it's two weeks before the General Assembly. I am leaving tomorrow. I would like to just tell you. Second, I have nothing to say in general, and third? ? ? ? and President prefers to ? ? ? ? just tell me how.

K: You want to discuss in general where we stand?

D: No, need to discuss only if you or President have something for me to tell in Moscow. I know where we stand. Also the point we discussed last time.

K: On the point we discussed last time I have to see the President again and I will have word for you before you leave. What time?

D: From NY in the evening but I go by car at 3:00 p.m.

K: Right.

D: After lunch. Up to 3:00 I will be here.

K: I will be in touch on matter we discussed last time and may also have a general thing to say.

D: You are not here yet?

K: I will not be but we will -- I will not get back until Monday. Vorontsov will pass messages?

D: He doesn't know about the last one but I can tell him.

K: When I give you our reaction we should get it settled.

D: You will give tomorrow?

K: Or in the afternoon.

D: Afternoon 7:00 that I will be back.

K: I will have lunch with the President.

D: I'll later today. 7:00 Washington time I will be back.

By NARA, Dato 5/27

TELCN

Rogers/Kissinger

1:32 p.m. 9/2/71

R: Couple of things -- one, Marquis Childs column.

K: I think he went off his rocker.

R: Mavin Kalb had a story on it.

K: Story is ridiculous. Childs was out here and asked before or after debate.
I thought that was after Dec. They will not vote on China before end of Oct.

R: Could come in middle of Oct. I think in press conference --

K: Shoot it down.

R: Don't want it to be a schedule that's postponed. Story about that said it
was going to be 5 days and now the Great Wall and sightseeing.

K: No one knows about it and not settled. All of this stuff that Childs had on
communique and where we are going was never discussed with anybody.

R: On communique if it comes up I will say thought has been given to
and trade and culture is a good question. Nothing magic about that.

K: On the Great Wall I haven't the foggiest idea. Never came up in my talks.
There hasn't been any discussion even remotely related to that.

R: I told McCloskey here not to say anything on China.

K: That's right.

R: Not prepared to discuss it now. As time goes on we can ?? ? ? and so
forth. How about 175 newsmen?

K: Nothing said. He said thoughsands will want to come and I said it would
depend on hotel rooms.

R: We don't know how many they will let in us bring.

K: That we should shoot down. And we haven't either.

R: ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: And I told you about that.

By C.C. NARA, Date 5/27

Rogers/Kissinger

1:32 p.m.

9/2/71

2-

R: And we should verify it.

K: Not in contact every week.

R: In communication and intend to be and no discussions about it and working out visit. On Tuesday I will be questioned about it and I don't think it's a problem now. I said I/deployed no contest and we prefer that there was a contest but it doesn't work out and Thieu taken best next step.

K: That will position us.

R: I think it's losing force. On the Rush thing, they are having translation problems.

K: I think we should hold tough.

R: We are better off not to rush it. I keep telling Ken. Two days.

K: That was not our preference.

R: It would have been better to take another week. Not a major problem.

K: They are incurable bastards.

R: They ____ interpreted in E. German text and not in the ____ test.

K: And in the Russian text.

R: Cleaver bastards. Did you see the memo to the President on ministers meeting coming up?

K: No. When did you send it?

R: Day before yesterday. Peterson has things in the air and must decide some of these things.

K: How sent?

R: Memo to him and copies to you. State in agreement with ____ on this thing.

K: Not sent through Rose Wood?

R: No.

By NARA, Date 3/27

Rogers/Kissinger
1:32 p.m. 9/2/71

-3-

K: Then I will get it. I recommenced to Alex that you do it. It's too dangerous to have everyone free wheeling.

R: I don't want it to be a tentative thing and everyone filling in views. Treasury on board and just had meeting with advisors on Japan conference.

K: If Treasury aborad, no problems from us.

UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, Sect. 3.6

By [REDACTED] NARA, Dale 5/27

TELECON
Dave Kraslow
9/2/71 2:40 p.m.

K: Well, I'm sorry I haven't been back to you but frankly I have wanted to rest out here.

DK: I know that and I hate to impose.

K: I prefer to talk next week and I think that's a better time to do it.

DK: When will it? Then you don't want to go beyond what Ziegler said today.

K: No, I would like to study that text more.

DK: You think we can get into the conversation Thieu had with Bunker?

K: I doubt it.

DK: Had you been led to believe there might be a more encouraging result than there was?

K: I believed Minh would stay in, but I couldn't remember how on what basis I formed that opinion.

DK: I mean later on when Bunker began his conversations with Thieu -- had you at any point been led to believe there would be a more hopeful result?

K: No.

DK: I will talk with you when you get back?

K: Right. I will see you in the first two days.

DK: Am I to take it that the Marquis Childs column should be ignored?

K: Totally. I must have been more eliptical than usual because it is so totally wrong. Where he got the idea of the number of nuewmen I don't know.

DK: Any chance China will insist on the accreditation prerogatives?

K: No. That's nonsense. They call tell us we can have only so many hotel rooms. But we can tell them . . . we assume the press group comes in and leaves with us. And I might say they have never suggested this.

DK: I hope we will get together when you get back.

K: Definitely Dave. And I am sorry I didn't call you before.

TELECON
(Tape from Home -- San Clemente)

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

September 2, 1971 -- 6:30 p.m.

K: Hello. I had some children to get rid of who I don't think need to hear all these details. So, you know, we understand why you don't want it in the same way as the other one.

D: Yes. You see I think it's a little because to make it in some other form

K: Well, we just want to make clear, we don't want you to say that you proposed the summit. That we agree should be phrased neutrally. But when one visits a country, one has to be invited.

D: Well, I think it's agreed, it is clear that they agree on that one. On why, of course, he couldn't come without an invitation it's very clear. The President could say to himself, "well, I'm coming to you" and to say, "No" and he's still coming .........

K: Well, do you want to say in the light of recent advances President Nixon has agreed to visit Moscow? But that makes it look bad.

D: What do you suggest second?

K: I don't think that's so good for you. In the light of recent advances and so forth, President Nixon has agreed to visit Moscow.

D: Well, I think the President has agreed for a visit, I think it is practically the same.

K: If you want to say that President Nixon has agreed to visit Moscow --

D: Well, I think it is rather neutral instead it has been agreed .........

K: No, no, what we prefer is it has been agreed that President Nixon will visit Moscow in the latter part upon the invitation of the Soviet Government.

D: Yeah. Well, I really don't know what to tell you. Of course, I could tell them what you say because there is no problem for me to understand with the President's visit. Do you have any other ......

K: No, that's the only suggestion. The only other point we have is October 10th is a very bad day for us.

D: Why?

K: Because it's a Sunday and we would prefer it either the 6th or the 7th.

D: 6th or 7th?

K: Yes.

DECLASSIFIED

M2 E0 12958
Authority

NARA Date 6/07/81
By: --

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

D: October?

K: Yes.

D: I don't think that is a very big thing ....

K: Or we could do it the 12th, but for us the 6th or 7th is the best.

D: The best.

K: Yes.

D: Okay, I will check it. But couldn't you say -- I am sure you have the text, how was it solved with the Chinese?

K: The Chinese -- I haven't got the text here.

D: I haven't either.

K: But as I remember it, it went like this. It said "Knowing of President Nixon's interest to visit China (or something like this), Prime Minister Chou En-Lai on behalf of the Government of the PRC has extended an invitation to ..

D: As a suggestion could we say something along those lines, "Knowing his interest and so on?"

K: Well, that would make it identical with the Chinese one and that's what we --

D: That's right. Then they think along those lines because otherwise it looks like you have additional changes but just something along those lines "knowing his interest", not exactly the same phrase but something like this one which is a rather neutral proposal just to keep both sides on the same balance. I tried to put it in some form to make it the same balance both ways.

K: Yeah.

D: Maybe you know some other.

K: Well, if we make two sentences out of it. You know, if we say "it has been agreed upon that such a meeting should now take place", you see. And then one could say "the Soviet Government extended an invitation for the President to visit Moscow for this purpose and the President has accepted."

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 12958
Author:
By: NARA Date 6/10/71

TELECON

D: I don't know really, I doubt it very much but we could sound like the Chinese do and do it for you as a ...

K: Well, we would rather not have it exactly like the Chinese and I'm sure you would rather not have it --

D: I am sure about it too but maybe on the basis of this ... I am not prepared to give you because of outstanding reasons but I am thinking along the main idea not really the circumstance; I'm sure you know the ... for them but the right to propose it to ... or whatever it was about the President... about ... as an idea not exactly worded.

K: Yeah.

D: As you express it.

K: Well, the only one that of course I have discussed with the President -- you know, I don't consider what we are suggesting such a tough problem because all we are --

D: Nor myself really.

K: Because all I am saying -- we're not saying that you have proposed a meeting; all you have proposed is the location.

D: Yes, I know.

K: I mean it is agreed that both sides want the meeting.

D: ... point. Maybe it works this way, have agreed on the point then maybe they can make it two phrases.

K: That's what I think. That such a meeting will take place before the end of May.

D: That such a meeting --

K: Should take place in the second half of May.

D: Should take place in the latter part.

K: Yes.

D: In the latter part of May. Yes and then say it was decided to go to Moscow and ... invited there. Something like this one.

DECLASSIFIED

Moj FE 2958
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/4/71

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

Page 4

K: Something like this. Or the Soviet Government invited the President to visit Moscow for this purpose and he accepted.

D: ....

K: Right, The only problem is, how are we going to get it settled?

D: Good question.

K: With you gone.

D: Well, I think in any case I will be back by 20th.

K: Yeah.

D: The one about 6th or 7th, I will be back on 20th. If not then, the 21st.

K: Right.

D: So we will settle this; by this time I am sure I will get settled on the suggestion.

K: Right. And can you... But could you let us know the date before then because we really have to make our schedule.

D: I will try to get the date first and then the formulation......

K: Good.

D: All right?

K: Good. That is fine.

D: Okay. So long. Let's put it this way. I will try to get the date all ready. I will try to do my best.

K: Okay. And on other business, the President has just asked me to reiterate again that his conviction which we've often told you that we think that the peace depends on the relation between our two countries and that we will not go on byways if your side adopts the same attitude.

D: All right.

DECLASSIFIED

MFO 12958
Authority

NARA Date 6/1/01
By -

K: And that we should both seek not to complicate each other's positions in other areas of the world.

D: Uh huh. All right. All that you have mentioned to me.

K: That I've mentioned to you before.

D: Yeah; I understand. You have not yet scheduled the date for the other meeting?

K: No. If that should get settled while you are gone, I would like to let you know. How do I do that?

D: You mean you think it will be settled before the 20th?

K: That we settle it?

D: Yeah.

K: I think that's unlikely. But I just want always to be prepared. It's extremely unlikely. But what do I do?

D: Well, you might tell Vorontsov or just give me notice through..... Could you do it through your embassy without telling what about -- just telling dates, nothing WK else.

K: Well, I'll figure out a way of doing it. I'd rather tell it to Vorontsov.

D: Okay. Just let him know in this case. But as of now, it is not yet.

K: As of now, it is not yet and...

D: The problem is next year.

K: That is almost certain.

D: Next year -- yeah.

K: I mean, in fact, that is certain.

D: Yes, next year.

K: But that is strictly between you and me.

DECLASSIFIED

MO 12958
Authentic

By NARA Date 6/29/71

D: Oh, I understand........

K: Exactly. But if for some reason it should get settled before you return, I will let you know. I will just say to Vorontsov that the date that we discussed is in this.

D: Yes, without saying what it is about.

K: And he will know what it is about.

D: Yes, he will send me the telegram ............ the date and ............

K: Right. Now can I also assume that our discussions on the subject we are talking now will not be fed back to anybody else in our Government until you and I --

D: No, no, no, on this positive.

K: Right. Even after Gromyko gets here.

D: No, no, no -- what do you mean after? No, when he will be here. He will not say to anybody except President and you.

K: Exactly.

D: On this I am positive.

K: All right.

D: And I will give another one for him.

K: Right. You just make sure that this happens.

D: No, no, only all of this is going through you only. This I am give you
100% on this.

K: Right, right, because it would be very embarrassing for --

D: No, no, this happens. And this was very simply even without this thing it appears simply a document you will tell me there is a discussion ............

K: Well, I don't think it will happen. We are just talking now about a very remote possibility.

D: I understand. All right.

DECLASSIFIED

CWO EO 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

K: And you will be back on the 20th or 21st.

D: Yes, not later.

K: Okay.

D: Not later. And then I will meet with you about what we discussed in the ______ room.

K: Yes, and I think we should prepare again an agenda like last time.

D: We will meet and we will discuss how it was done last year. I think it was very good.

K: Well, it will be done exactly again the same way.

D: Okay.

K: And if he wants to talk to me while he is here, perhaps we can work that out but I leave that up to you.

D: Yeah, I understand. I think it is a good idea but we will discuss later on.

K: That's entirely up to you.

D: Yeah. Okay.

K: Good, have a good trip back.

D: Thank you very much, Henry, and best wishes.

K: And I hope we have a successful year together.

D: Yeah, I hope too. Quite frankly .......

K: I think we have in fact achieved a few things.

D: I think so and when the pieces finally .................... then it will be much more on the right track I think.

K: I can't imagine that we can't come to an agreement on this.

D: No, no, I am sure it will come and then everything will be in a very clear perspective. This is important.

DECLASSIFIED

MJD E0 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/1/01

TELECON

(Tape from Home) -- San Clemente)

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

K: Well, that's our attitude and you can assure your government that that is the attitude with which we will approach matters.

D: Yeah and I think this is important.

K: I am going to send over to you a brief note on the SALT question, on our understanding of it but its main point is that it isn't going to be settled with legal you know, by legal interpretations but by the goodwill of our both sides and we are going to approach it in that spirit.

D: We are trying to approach it the same.

K: I know, it's not a critical note. It's just a reply to yours.

D: Well, I rather prefer to have it when I am here, not when I am out.

K: No, you will get it yourself.

D: When, when?

K: Tomorrow morning.

D: Oh, that's fine.

K: No, no, I will not send anything sensitive unless there is a major crises which I don't expect.

D: No, no, I understand, no.

K: No, no, I will hand it to -- I will have it sent to you by General Haig tomorrow morning.

D: Okay.

K: For you personally.

D: Okay.

K: And we will give it to nobody else.

D: Have you given idea to this idea which I left because ............ one of several representatives there. He still presents idea or two ............ to his area.

K: Yeah.

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 12958
Author

NARA Date 6/10/71
By

TELECON (San Clemente)
(Tape from Home)
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
September 2, 1971 -- 6:30 p.m.

D: But he didn't introduce there what I told you --

K: Yes, I know he didn't.

D: This is really ............ from our side --

K: But it isn't -- at this point, we want to review the whole situation. It doesn't help our basic problem decisively.

D: But ................

K: Because our basic problem is Congressional and other difficulty.

D: Yeah.

K: And if we can get authorization for the capital, we don't need an ABM site.

D: In one case, one idea, one capital.
Oh,

K: And then the other two capitals -- two ABMs.

D: No, no, the proposal now is --

K: Is one capital, one ABM.

D: Yes, yes, this is right. That's our proposal there, but I told you before.

K: I understand. Well, is he going to make it formally soon?

D: It will be ............ but it is really a response to your last appeal.

K: Yeah. No, I recognize that it is an effort to be helpful.

D: Yes, that's exactly along those lines.

K: And we would like to study it a little bit.

D: Okay, okay.

K: But I consider it a sign of -- that you are trying to response.

D: This is it exactly.

DECLASSIFIED

MFO 12958
Authority

NARA Date 6/10/71
By ---

TELECON

K: Exactly. And we didn't consider it in a bad spirit at all.

D: All right. If you get something soon, maybe some question .................... If by that time you hear ....................

K: Okay, fine.

D: In any case, I would like to wish you the very best and I wish to see you soon.

K: That same to you and with all our problems, it's always a pleasure to deal with a real professional.

D: It is mutual.

K: Good, Anatoliy.

D: Thank you very much.

K: Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED

MWO EO 2958

NARA Date 6/1/07

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Folsom
By: CHARA
Date: 6/1/71

*

TELECON

D

9/3/71 9:32 a.m.

D: Are you preparing to depart?

K: No, I'm staying over the weekend.

D: You are a more lucky fellow than I.

K: Yes. I talked to the President again and we have a suggestion for the text which is a compromise between our two versions. Our objection to your draft is that it was stated as if you had _______________ the President to Moscow.

D: Oh come on, oome on.

K: If you can get away with something you will not avoid it. We propose: "In the light of recent advances . . . it has been agreed that such a meeting will take place in Moscow in the latter part of May 1972. President Nixon and the Soviet leaders will review all of the major issues."

D: I don't understand.

K: We are taking the statement I gave you, striking out the words "the United States and Soviet leaders"

D: And that's all?

K: Yes.

D: What difference . . .

K: You can have "at this meeting" if you want it.

D: But you think it is better this way?

K: Don't object to this way.

D: . . .

K: Not "it has been agreed upon . . ." -- that's bad English. "It has been agreed that . . ." The only reason we are mentioning names at this point is so it is clear who is going, because we haven't mentioned the persons yet.

D: Okay. I will send this back over to receive reply. And I have received answer saying they prefer the 12th. You mentioned the 12th. They understand . . . . . . . .

TELECON
D

9/3/71 9:32 a.m. p. 2

K: Right, but how about the 7th?

D: They didn't give me any explanation. I said the President mentioned the 6th and 7th and as a last choice the 12th. They are prepared to take the third choice of the President.

K: I will call you back before you leave.

D: I will be here three more hours.

K: I will call you before you go.

D: So I will await your call.

K: Right -- I'll check it with the President and call you back.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOLASCE
By: CNARA Date 5/23/71

TELCON (San Clemente)
Ambassador Ushiba (Japan)
Mr. Kissinger
6:00 p.m. (Pacific time), September 3, 1971

K: Mr. Ambassador

U: Yes, how are you?

K: Okay.

U: Well, I have just arrived back from Tokyo.

K: I see.

U: Yes, and the friend is very, very happy that the President is going to meet with the Japanese Emperor.

K: Right.

U: Yes, he is very, very deeply touched and he asked me to convey to the President his very deep gratitude for that.

K: You can be sure I will convey that to the President.

U: In about two weeks the _______ situation in Japan is now very difficult particularly with respect to the China problem and of course _______ is coming to Washington and he will meet with the President but I am opposed so I would like to see you as soon as possible.

K: Yes. Now I will be in Washington on the 7th.

U: The 7th, I see.

K: Yes.

U: I have to go to San Francisco to meet the Minister.

K: Yes.

U: If you will give me the exact time, I would like to come back to Washington.

K: You will come back to Washington?

U: Yes, I can if you will give me the exact time.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authentic
By. NARA Date 6/1/67

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Amb. Ushiba/Mr. Kissinger

6:00 p.m. (Pacific time), Sep 3, 1971

K: I will see you on the 7th if you would like me to.

U: On the 7th, huh?

K: Or the 8th, which is more convenient to you?

U: All right, the 8th may be more convenient.

K: Well, then we will do it the 8th.

U: All right, fine. Then I will be back in Washington on the 8th, yeah.

K: And we will let your office know the exact time.

U: Fine, thank you. I understand you are going to see Momoi.

K: I'm going to see Momoi, yes.

U: That's right.

K: I tell you the truth, Mr. Ambassador, I can never make out who speaks for whom in Japan.

U: Oh, I see.

K: Now whom does Momoi represent?

U: I don't know but he is a very good friend, of course.

K: Yes.

U: Another friend of the bosses of the Party so I think he'll -- I don't know exactly what he is but certainly he speaks for the ............

K: Yes.

U: All of a sudden confusion now in the brain, huh.

K: Well, I will see Mr. Momoi and I will see you on Wednesday and I suppose everything can wait until then.

U: Yes, all right.

K: If we could avoid public statements about who visits whom, I think it would help.

DECLASSIFIED

MFD EO 12958

Authority

By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELCON (Home - San Clemente)

Mr. Kissinger / Colonel Kennedy

September 3, 1971

HAK: ..... I've just talked to the President and he's relaxed about this defector. The problem he feels though now is that we better get something out of Thieu and his press conference.

RTK: Right.

HAK: And could you do a backchannel to Bunker?

RTK: Right.

HAK: Saying that the President feels very strongly that it would be most helpful for Thieu to make clear how he intends to conduct the referendum.

RTK: Right.

HAK: It would be hard -- it would be folly to underestimate the depths of public reaction here. And it is essential that Thieu indicate some implementing measures which make clear that it is a real referendum and not just an abstract publicide.

RTK: Right.

HAK: Don't you think?

RTK: I think so. This is the matter we raised with him the other day, remember?

HAK: Yeah. I mean, lay off what he is going to do after he --

RTK: Right.

HAK: And that some of the ideas we outlined to him should be incorporated. Can you do that?

RTK: Yes, sir.

HAK: Thank you.

RTK: Before you go, we are all set now on this memo. We took out that question of the satellites.

HAK: Fine.

DECLASSIFIED

MJO F0 | 2958

By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELCOM (Home - San Clemente)

Mr. Kissinger/Colonel Kennedy

September 3, 1971

- 2 -

RTK: Do you want me to initial this memo off for you then?

HAK: Yeah, but it's still got to go to the President.

RTK: Right, that's right.

HAK: Yeah.

RTK: I'll initial it off to go to the President. Now, I don't think we ought to send it up to Camp David.

HAK: No, no; Tuesday morning.

RTK: Deliver it Tuesday morning.

HAK: Right.

RTK: And hopefully have it signed then so that you would have it for the Tuesday afternoon meeting.

HAK: Right.

RTK: One other thing, I just got a call from State. The Secretary has just signed off a memo to the President transmitting over here a draft cable on the China-UN Rep problem. And he is very anxious to get clearance on it. Said it might be he thought it might be something that you could take up verbally with the President or just go ahead and clear it with the President's permission.

HAK: What's the hurry, why can't it wait until Tuesday morning?

RTK: Well, they are very anxious --

HAK: The hell with anxious!

RTK: Yeah, I know; time is running short. Well, I will get --

HAK: Time isn't running so short that they can't miss half a working day on Tuesday.

RTK: That's right. What I'll do is --

HAK: Just tell him you are sending it out to me.

DECLASSIFIED

M/J EO 12958
Author's

By NARA Date 6/1/71

TELCOM (Home - San Clemente)

Mr. Kissinger/Colonel Kennedy

September 3, 1971

- 3 -

RTK: Right, I'll do that. And I'll call John Holdridge and Marshall and have them take a look at it and we can give you our thoughts on it tomorrow.

HAK: Okay, I don't want them today.

RTK: No, right; I understand.

HAK: I've been on the phone half the morning.

RTK: Well, I didn't want to call back until I had everything wrapped up. I did talk to Al who shares our thoughts that it would be well for you to be here for those Japan meetings. I've been unable yet to reach Walters but I am trying to do so. As soon as I do, I'll let you know his view.

HAK: Well, why don't you see whether he can shift it without making waves.

RTK: Right, that's what I'll ask him.

HAK: If it presents any difficulty, he should stick with the 11th.

RTK: Right.

HAK: But he should put it to both of his clients on the ground that it would be an enormous convenience to me.

RTK: All right, fine. And if he thinks he can do that, shall I tell him just go ahead and do it then?

HAK: Yeah.

RTK: All right, fine.

HAK: And let us know.

RTK: Will do.

HAK: Thank you.

RTK: All right, sir.

HAK: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

MFG FO 2958

By NARA Date 6/1/71

TELCON (San Clemente)

Mr. Kissinger/Secy. Rogers

September 3, 1971 -- p.m.

R: Hi, Henry.

K: Hi, Bill, how are you?

W
R: here are you?

K: I'm still in San Clemente.

R: Oh, are you?

K: Yeah, I'm not coming back until Monday.

R: Oh, I see, I didn't realize that. Well, I just wanted to talk to you essentially about Vietnam. I think it is awfully important that we are fully coordinated from now on because we could be facing a stormy period.

K: Absolutely.

R: And I would hope that the President doesn't decide to do something without telling anybody. You know, it's a tough situation.

K: What could he be doing?

R: Well, you know -- you know, sending a backchannel message or something like that. Not that I -- what I'm saying is that I think we should know about it; we should be coordinated.

K: Right.

R: I'm sure you feel the same way too.

K: I will keep you fully informed. He wouldn't send a backchannel message that I wouldn't know about.

R: Good.

K: And I would talk to you about it.

R: Good. I think so far we are doing about all we --

K: I thought, incidentally, in your press conference was very well done.

DECLASSIFIED

MJO E0 12958
Authority
By: NARA Date 6/9/94

TELCON (San Clemente)
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers

September 3, 1971 -- p.m.

R: Well, it's not easy but I think it came out all right. He was pleased; I got a message from him about it. The other thing I was going to suggest -- I was going to talk to Al but I think I better talk to you about it -- is when from now on I would appreciate it if he decides, for example, that nothing should on a subject or somebody want s to investigate, if Al or you could just call me and let me put out the instructions.

K: My understanding is that Al tells Eliot and no one else.

R: Well, in some cases he has called directly to our investigators and then in other --

K: To your investigators?

R: Yeah.

K: Al?

R: Yeah. It's all right; I'm not complaining about the past. All I'm saying is two things: One, talk to Ted Eliot or me, and secondly, if there is an order from the President, let me send it out as mine rather than having him do it.

K: That's in our interest.

R: That's right. But what happens now, it's a minor detail but it becomes important.

K: No, but it's in our mutual interest that we don't give orders in your Department with which you are not associated.

R: More than that, what I am saying is this -- what happens now is that the President tells Al, for example, or you, usually Al, that if he sees a story in the paper that makes him mad and then he says, Goddammit tell everybody in the Government to shutup on this issue. Then Al usually sends out a little note --

K: But that should go to Ted Eliot to the best of my knowledge.

R: It does but it's really better if you don't put it by way of a note just call me.

K: I understand that. You want it to be discussed with you directly.

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 29 78
Authority

By NARA Date 6/1/71

September 3, 1971 -- p.m.

R: Yes or let us put out -- what happens now, the order comes through signed by you or Al; then people in the building see it.

K: Yeah.

R: Then it says the White House is --

K: I understand and those stories are very unfortunate.

R: That's right. As a result of my press conference yesterday, it came out quite well, I am going to continue to have meetings with my own people and tell them it's their problem, it's not my problem. Goddammit, if the State Department is to survive as an institution it has to learn to be quiet. And what I am going to say to them is that -- I will give guidance on what's to be said and then I expect everybody to follow that guidance.

K: I think -- you know, this has nothing to do now with the President but I think it's essential for the Department.

Yes,

R: I do too.

K: Because every President I have known has lost confidence in the Department no matter who the Secretary was because of this goddamn leaking.

R: That's right.

K: And it's in their own interest. Now, first of all, when such an order exists, Al will call Eliot or I will call you.

R: Good.

K: Generally, I don't like to bother you with orders like this so that's why I think it's better if Al calls Eliot unless it's an overwhelmingly important thing.

R: That's right.

K: And we will not put it out as a White House order, we will let you put it out as a State Department order.

R: Right.

DECLASSIFIED

MJD E0 12958
 Authority
By: NARA Date 6/9/71

- 3 -

September 3, 1971 -- p.m.

K: And I think it's essential for the Department.

R: Well, I do too. As a matter of fact, Henry, we're doing really a lot better.

K: You are doing much better and the press screams a little but that's good.

R: That's right.

K: They have been spoiled.

R: I know it. And I think what's happened has been very good for the Department and I think that we can now with minor exceptions I think you will find that we will conduct ourselves damn well. The Foreign Service is very upset about it because they realize it's their problem.

K: Yeah.

R: In fact there's an article which I stimulated in the Foreign Service Journal right on that point this month saying that this is our problem; this isn't the President's problem, and the Secretary of State's problem.

K: It isn't exactly right that the President -- I mean I say this as a compliment to you, you yourself put some of the more recent stringent orders.

R: Oh, sure I have but I want to take the responsibility.

K: Yeah.

R: I don't want people in the Department to say well, the President is doing what Johnson did and you know this is a reign of terror and all that kind of stuff. Now, if I do it, they won't say that about me because as long as --

K: It's a funny group because in a way they have more institutional loyalty to the Secretary than to the President.

R: That's right.

K: (laughter) You know.

R: That's a fact.

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 3 1971 12:58

By NARA Date 6/01/71

September 3, 1971 -- p.m.

K: It is a fact.

R: Well, it's a natural thing because they get to know him better and there's always a little friction between the President and the State Department in that neither quite thinks the other gets sufficient credit for what happens and what I would like to teach everybody is that there's plenty of credit if things go well, Christ.

K: Hell, if our policy goes well, a year from now no one will know the difference.

R: That's right.

K: Who got the newspaper credit; it will be the credit for everybody.

R: I read a statement on the Four Power Talks which I thought was damn good which I really think we should learn as a model and that is, I praised the President for what he had done and then I praised Rush and his Assistant and then I praised Marty Hillenbrand and his Assistant

K: Well, you notice I took out of Rush's statement where he said everything is due to the President --

R: Yeah.

K: I took that out at midnight when I saw it because for the same reason.

R: Well, in the first place it makes everybody looks silly.

K: Well, it's unnecessary; the President gets the credit.

R: Sure.

K: He doesn't have to have called every last -- he doesn't have to be the water boy to get the credit.

R: That's right. And it looks small; it's looks as if -- the same thing the Russians do, claim they invented everything.

K: Exactly. The one thing in this connection that I was going to mention to you; there sometimes are people in the Department who keep nitpicki around at me. Tom Braden told me he was told by a very high source that I personally had impounded the Klein study on Reaction to the Chinese thing and then he printed it and I didn't even know the goddamn study existed.

MJD E0 12958
 Authority
By ____ NARA Date 6/1/104

TELCOM (San Clemente)
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers

September 3, 1971 - p.m.

R: You didn't even know about it; I did it and I was madder than a son-of-bitch because it was about the day after I told everybody including Cline that I didn't want any studies made until I asked for them.

K: And yesterday there was an article in the Wall Street Journal that said that I personally called German Ministers and summoned them to Washington and the Germans were madder than hell.

R: Yeah.

K: Well, we checked because I have never called a German Minister, summoned him to Washington or done anything else of the kind.

R: Yeah.

K: And that too came from somebody at State they told us. Well, it doesn't matter; I would have raised it sometime in a conversation because basically it's gotten way down that sort of nitpicking.

R: Yeah, it has. But I think even on that the fewer things the Department knows about in terms of what the President has asked us to do, the better. Let me put it out. In other words, I think because the people in the Department tend to see things from Al and you, quite often -- which in effect, gets circulated through the Department either by word of mouth or in fact. -- the word gets out that you're calling signals and you get blamed for things, for example, the Cline thing. You didn't know a goddamn thing about.

K: I didn't even know the thing existed.

R: I was sore about it because I had just the day before said look, we are going to ask for studies and separations for the China trip when the time comes. We'll ask for it, let me ask you; please don't volunteer things.

K: No, you told me about -- you didn't tell me about the Cline study but you told me about your general attitude.

R: Well, it was right after that that I got word and I called Cline and said, Goddammit, you follow orders. Anyway, that's the way it happened. Incidentally, on the China trip I've got a very small group working on it; nobody knows they exist. They are people you will trust and we'll have things done which will not be addressed to anybody and then sometime, the President, you and I can talk about it. I think there again we ought

DECLASSIFIED

MFO 12958
Authority:
By: NARA Date 6/1/71

TELCON (San Clemente)

PM, September 3, 1971

- 7 -

R: (cont'd) to sort of coordinate our efforts.

K: Oh, absolutely.

R: I don't ...... give you anything at the moment and I don't want that to go through the Secretariat or anything else. Anything that I get will come to me and then I will talk to you and the President about it.

K: Well, if you and I could meet about that from time to time.

R: Good.

K: Just so that we know what the basic position is as we begin preparing papers for it.

R: Great. I think we should as a matter of fact. And this one I don't think we should put on paper and I have told them not to circulate anything through the Secretariat, not to send anything that way; anything that is sent to the President, I will hand directly. We'll work it out so we do it together.

K: Right. Well, when we are all together back in town, I will see if your schedule permits that we get together once a week even if we don't have anything.

R: Okay.

K: Just so that we can catch up. But both of these points are very well taken.

R: Did you notice the attention that the American Legion speech ...... got in Russia and Japan.

K: Yes, yes; terrific.

R: Dean (?) said that it showed --

K: I didn't notice it in Japan but I noticed it in Russia that they specially featured what you said they shouldn't be concerned with was a very helpful thing.

R: Dean's (?) telegram to us -- you might take a look at it -- said that it had gotten more attention in the Soviet press, both in ............ , than any other statement by an American for several

DECLASSIFIED

Moj F0 2958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/4/71

PM, September 3, 1971

R: (cont'd) years and he interrupted that as don't worry because he thought that it did allay their concerns about our Peking trip.

K: Right.

R: And it showed that they had finally decided that they were not going to cause too much trouble about it.

K: Right.

R: Interesting enough their present position, if you noticed today's papers, you haven't seen it probably, but what they are doing about the President trip to Peking they are attacking PRC; they are not attacking us at all. In fact, in the statements that came out yesterday they said they understood that we wanted to improve relations with the PRC but they resented very much the PRC's attitude towards this visit because it was being billed as an anti-Soviet mission.

K: Yeah, Oh, I have no doubt that they are going to try to isolate the PRC but that helps us.

R: Sure it does. That means that both of them are saying the United States is okay.

K: And it also forces both of them, especially Peking to behave themselves on the trip.

R: Right. No, in Japan we have really got really massive attention.

K: That I haven't picked up yet.

R: Because they are so concerned and also . . . . . . . . reassuring.

K: Well, I think it's a damn good speech and I thought the press conference I haven't seen the full text but I saw a lot of excerpts.

R: It wasn't particularly good because he spent so much goddamn time talking about the entire investigation but it --

K: That part I actually didn't see.

R: But the total impact was good. Okay, Henry.

K: All right, Bill, thank you.

R: Bye.

MJD EO 12958
DECLASSIFIED

Autumn
By NARA Date 6/1/67

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EQUISSE
By CNAR Date 9/1/71

U.S. COMPROMISE DRAFT

3 Sept. 1971

The leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union
in their exchanges during the past year have agreed that a
meeting between them would be desirable once sufficient pro-
gress had been made in negotiations at lower levels. In light of
the recent advances in bilateral and multilateral negotiations
involving the two countries, it has been agreed that such a
meeting will take place in Moscow in the latter part of May 1972.

President Nixon and the Soviet leaders will review
all major issues with a view towards further improving their
bilateral relations and enhancing the prospects for world peace.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Director Helms/Mr. Kissinger

10:22 a.m., September 7, 1971

H: Good morning. I had a talk with a mutual friend with whom you had breakfast this morning. He said you would get in touch with me. He wanted access to our communications in case he had a message to send back.

K: That is correct. But I don't want that used three times a day.

H: I wanted to give instructions to these fellows if this had your approval and was in accordance with your wishes.

K: Can you give a low-level guy.

H: He intimated he might have a message and talked in terms of one message.

K: Given the leaking from State, I don't want any messages for me leaked.

H: I wanted to be sure I wasn't being diddled.

K: I think you can do that. This has been done before, hasn't it, or is this an innovation?

H: It's an innovation.

K: Shall we do it then? I wanted to be helpful, but I'm not all that interested.

H: I think we can handle it without any rhubarb at all. We will put it low-key -- if he has something important to pass to you, send it to us. I think it's all right.

K: I have no personal interest. It's the first time I have talked with him in four weeks -- since he wrote about China.

H: One other thing -- I sent you a couple of memos last week about what has shown up.

K: I made a note on one of them to Haig that I wanted to discuss that with you. What are my choices? It's no good as information to me alone.

H: I think probably we should go ahead and distribute them.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
Ambassador Bush
9/7/71 10:25 a.m.

B: I'm sorry to re-interrupt you. I'm not sure that I made it clear -- the Republic of China has demonstrated some real flexibility in this question of the Security Council seat and I think that is important.

K: You made that clear.

B: The other thing is Japan. . . I think we've got to get them to co-sponsor.

K: Why?

B: Because they carry a lot of influence.

K: But is it worth it to us to be tied up with Japan that much?

B: Only to the extent that they'll be supportive.

K: But do we want to win it that badly?

B: You have got to tell me that.

K: Given the Chinese sensitivity, I am not that ______ to do it.

B: To get the thing done here, that would be helpful. On this other aspect I am not clued in on that. When you say "can we win this?" -- to win this would be very helpful.

K: I am delighted to have them be helpful. But I'm not eager to have them co-sponsor. Anything short of co-sponsoring I'm delighted with.

B: This is something I didn't know.

K: Is it true that you are recommending recognition for Manchuria too? Have we been told that the Japs would like that? Have we told the Japs we would like that?

B: No.

K: The Secretary has that in his opening statement.

B: Oh really? What the hell are you talking about?

K: It's a good joke. We would like the maximum Japanese support, but not co-sponsoring. If they had offered it we would have taken it, but since they haven't, why don't we let them talk for it but not co-sponsor it.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
Ambassador Bush

9/7/71 10:25 a.m. p. 2

B: That's what they want.

K: Then why not?

B: Because the more help we have in terms of co-sponsoring the better our chance of winning. But I don't know if it's necessary. There is this flexibility in Taipei which the President should know about -- he probably already does.

K: I'm not sure about that but I'll mention it to him.

B: Okay, thank you.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCOM
Johnson/Kissinger

11:47 a. m. 9/7/71

K: I have an list whold of things for you.

J: Over the phone or come over to see you? (pause) Go ahead.

K: Well, --

J: I didn't know what you had in mind.

K: I called an SRG meeting this afternoon to get everyone aboard.

J: It's very useful.

K: I am asking each agency for a 5 min. summary of what they will tell the Japanese.

J: Secy. talked with Peterson and I gave ideas on "? ? ? Z? ? ? " and he said they will have to take that up. It's only point Peterson has raised. I know of no disagreement from anybody.

K: No major disagreements. We will publish a Presidential order this afternoon which incorporates 98% of those points. We can make if a brief meeting.

J: Volker going to be there?

K: We are asking him.

J: I hope so. It's important how Mazjika is handled by a Commer3.

K: I am lunching with Connally today and I will slow him down. He said at the CIEP this morning that the Japanese are always our enemies.

J: I heard that the European are our enemies.

K: He thinks we should break up the Common Market.

J: That's what I heard.

K: I don't know which I disagree with more!

J: He is talking about blocks. Europeans in one and ourselves with Japanese, Australians and New Zealand, in another.

K: Then we should have kept England out of the Common Market. I noticed in

By NARA, Date 5/27

Johnson/Kissinger

11:47 a. m. 9/7/71

-2-

the Communique stepped up purchase (?) of arms by U. S. I see no good for
everyone on this.

J: I haven't seen the text. The Japanese are coming in this afternoon with their ideas. Whatever is said --

K: It will hurt badly with Japan.

J: No quarrel with that.

K: It's sort of thing I don't believe we need. If you can get it out. We will take
it out.

J: No problem with that.

K: Could I have Bob Hormatz of my staff as observer so I know what goes on?

J: Of course.

K: Plenary meetings. Not the private meetings with the Secy. and Fukoda.

J: Plenary is Thursday morning with everybody -- Japanese are bringing 86
advisors. Round tables are on Friday.

K: Let someone at those.

J: I tried either with Japan having *max* principles at one but that's falling down. Trying to make it productive as we can. They will be in the other room with head phone and that's nonsense. Ushiba will *max* talk with Fukoda on way here and find out what minimum is and we will put that out so that they can deal with their own bureaucracy. I don't know what we will end up with. I will introduce Hormatz.

K: It means I have independent information other than -- as issues arise.

J: *max* I will get him a delegation card.

K: On issues you mentioned on senior delegation to Japan later this year and
who should share it I don't think we should settle it now.

J: All of us have had experience now with special negotiators and we can skip (?) by that. I have talked with Peterson and he said we *will* not communicating with them. I said I don't know what we are doing this week. I said every time you come up with economics you take in the political and vice versa. You cannot break it up.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Johnson/Kissinger

11:47 a.m.

9/7/71

-3-

K: If you give these fellows 2-3 fatal points they run with it.

J: I told Peterson put it aside. We don't need to decide now.

K: What's my position and x wanted to check with you.

J: I agree.

K: On principles, anything except for Secy's meeting with Fukoda I think we should discourage.

J: There will be counterpart lunches. I think Connally talking with Mazoka is helpful and others are harmless.

K: I understand the Secy. will talk about textiles with Fukoda.

J: It depends on what they raise. Fukoda trying to get something on textiles to talk when he is here but it looks like he has nothing now. Whatever decision on this there is kx I agree the Secy. and Fukoda should do it. Avoid having Peterson calling people over to talk about it.

K: I will try to fix it here. On the UN, while we will try for Japanese sponsorship [typist not sure of this] I don't want to ask for it. Morex we can avoid ganging up on Chinese the better off we are.

J: I understand. It takes direct handling here. The Secy. will handle it with Fukoda. He has a sense on that.

K: Should I talk with him on a personal basis? Not as a Presidential directive.

J: No. Talk with him on a personal basis. We have had this on mind.

K: We want their vote but not necessarily sponsorship.

J: Without their sponsorship to a considerable degree we --

K: I have heard on the news what demands they will make for co-sponsorship.

J: It's quite clear that the big decisive issuex in politics is China issue and not economy. Tearing LDP apart. ______ and Nakasoni in between. It's the major issue in their country. As far as we are concerned it's economics issue and see Chirep as a subsidiary but it's the opposite in Japan.

K: What does it mean and what can we do?

By NARA, Dato' S/27

Johnson/Kissinger

11:47 a.m.

9/7/71

-4-

J: I don't know that there's anything we can or should do about it. But in economic talks and types of pressures on Japan we should keep in mind if this cabinet fails and they have a less friendly approach cabinet, it will be on Chinese issue and limits what this cabinet can do on economic issue.

K: I don't believe in squeezing that hard on economic issues.

J: We have a memo for the Secy. here and it's published in the ___ (Japanese newspaper) today. Ushiba and foreign office in Tokyo are in (tears) about it. The various ministries asked for copies and one leaked it. Mori (sp?) said ___ it's the 3rd shock but it's a shock of our own making.

K: Because it's too tough? I thought it was too soft. I can see why they think it's too tough.

J: One think in a closed meeting and another in the open press.

K: I notices in the talking points coming here you are considering promising a mission after Peking headed by the Secy. I think nothing wrong but a disaster if announced ahead of time and you know how they leak. It's only useful to Fukoda so he can leak it. The Chinese will not let us broker that visit. We can't -- they might let us in practice but if they think it's what we will do, it will create additional tension in China.

J: I see the point and it's a good one.

K: I would say we will keep them generally informed.

J: Fukoda will want to say as a result of meeting with the President, which I will come back to, and Secy. -- we have reassured them as far as China is concerned. We have to expect that no matter what we say. ___

K: I don't care if we x reassure them but it's different if we say high level (delegation) will visit him.

J: We don't have to do it.

K: Keep them informed as visit is planned.

J: If we are going to do that and tell them that they will leak it.

K: That's why I am much more willing to do things then announce it ahead of time.

J: You have a point there.

By NARA, Dale

Johnson/Kissinger

11:47 a.m.

9/7/71

-5-

K: I will give the Secy. a call on some of these things. ~~x~~ Not a White House --

J: I am meeting on this at 2:30. Your meeting is at 3:30?

K: Want it slipped?

J: 15 minutes.

K: I will move it to 4:00. I have re-opened the John Getz issue. I think there's some prospects.

J: Good.

K: How eager are you? You have submitted another name for ~~x~~ the other issue. NATO one.

~~x~~

J: We want to go through with that.

K: You have submitted Stoessel.

J: We want to go through with that. We have accepted turn down on Doug.

K: No sense in using prestige. We will work on Stoessel. We will also work on Farcas (?) one. I have noted that these people are working up their semi-annual campaign against me. Tom Braden had a column on press reaction. Story in the Wall Street Journal saying the Germans are outraged that I am dealing with ministers directly through phone calls. On Friday and ~~Saturday~~ making a minister come over to report to me withouth going through the Embassy.

J: Washington story?

K: We called the Wall Street Journal and the German embassy had protested. They said it was from unimpeachable State Dept. sources. Now there's a story that "Japanese feel Henry Kissinger is to blame on the cavalier manner in which they have been handled. ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ". We have checked and they got that from State. It's a crazy way of proceeding and some from my people will start up. They never have but --

J: I will run it down.

K: It's gratuitous.

J: It's not true, period.

K: I don't know about the Japanese part. On that you and I have worked closely together.

Johnson/Kissinger

11:47 a.m. 9/7/71

J: Anyone informed knows it's not true. Problem of finding someone in hall and say, isn't it so --

K: When it happens once you can ignore it but three times in two weeks it's the semi-annual syndrome. They haven't won and should give it up.

J: Fukoda wants to see the President. I will talk with the Secy. about this today. I have talked to Ushiba about this for before or after dinner. It's agreeable either time to them. I think good if one thes.

K: We will do it before dinner. I don't trust the President's willingness to go through after dinner in any way acceptable to the Japanese. It might only be 10 minutes. I think in the Oval Office 45 minutes before dinner and fits in with established practice. Then you and I and the Secy. and any Japanese you think.

J: Will there be outsiders at the dinner?

K: I will check into it.

J: I will check over here. Let's plan on that. See you this afternoon at 4:00.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
Vorontxov/Kissinger

12:15 p. m.

9/7/71

V: Good afternoon -- no, it's morning in your side of the world.

K: Where are you?

V: In Washington.

K: No, I am here.

V: I thought you were in Calif. Dobrynin is in Moscow and Gromyko asked that I tell you that in Moscow they agreed on the text agreed on by you and Anatoly here. All the details are considered settled. Actual clarity of the text we are talking about. The latest version of 9/3.

K: The one Anatoly read back to me. The one I proposed to him.

D: They have accepted the latest text.

K: I will send over a copy of the fax text we have. I am sure it's correct that way we avoid misunderstanding. I will do it this afternoon.

By CCO

NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
9/7/71 2:40 p.m.

R: In the meeting this morning Dave Kennedy said he was going to talk to Fukuda (sp?) in Williamsburg / /

K: He's turning into quite a tiger, isn't he?

R: He said Fukuda is asking to see ~~ax~~ everybody and his brother. He said he wants to go there and tell him the textile matter is still very important. It's particularly annoying to me. I don't want an open battle but . . .

K: But doesn't he clear that with anyone?

R: No.

K: It never came through this office. I talked with Alex Johnson this morning. He probably gave you my feelings. I think the only major meeting should be you and Fukuda.

R: Or the President.

K: That's set up. We're planning 7:15. It will be Alex, myself and President on our side and anyone the Japanese want on their side.

R: I don't know how to turn Kennedy off.

K: Let me talk to Peterson and see what his guidance has been.

R: Okay. Also, on the Chinese representation situation. We are not going to bargain to get them to co-sponsor it -- we have no reason to want to trade anything away. But I think we will have to get them to back it; otherwise we'll lose. If we lose without trying very hard we'll be embarrassed. I thought I would just tell Fukuda that we want them to do it.

K: We don't want to give the Chinese too much of an impression of collusion. But the thing I mentioned to Alex is that we should promise them a visit of a high official after the Peking trip.

R: I think we shouldn't promise them anything. I think we should say what they will and we'll consider it. You know, we have problems with leaks, but nothing like theirs. I agree completely with you.

K: If they come back saying they have been assured of full consultation both before and after . . . : You'll tell the Japanese about this meeting with the President?

R: Yes, when is it, 7:00?

K: 7:15, in the Residence.

By NARA, Dalo 3/27

TELCONE
President/Kissinger
5:35 p.m. 9/7/71

P: How did you get along with Connally?

K: Very well. I gave him a preview of what's coming.

P: About the event?

K: Yes and China and so forth and very pleased.

P: Just as well to tell him. No problem on that.

K: Absolute confidence.

P: How did the Soviet thing impress him?

K: Tremendous. He thinks you are home free. He said ______ will be a pin-prick now. He thought at one time get rid of it as soon as possible but he thinks we are home free now.

## Later Conversation :

P: I just spoke with Connally and he said he talked with you about the general ideas.

K: I couldn't talk about it with Peterson in my office.

Q: He doesn't feel we have in the government the tools to deal with the problem.

K: He is right.

Q: I said in my speech I will keep things open. We shouldn't walk in and be nicey nice.

K: I think we should use this opportunity for a fundamental change.

Q: He agrees?

K: Yes.

Q: Is his thinking sound?

K: I was very impressed. We have to think how to set it up.

E: It really can't be handled by Peterson group. It's bigger.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By Cc NARA, Date 5/27

President/Kissinger
5:35 p. m. 9/7/71

-2-

K: I am coming to that view.

P: It involves not only economics but politics. Call Brandt and --

K: I said that. I said every decision more political than economic and he agreed.

P: That's why we cannot do this in the usual way.

K: We discussed a method of getting at it and I thought you and he and I might
get together after your speech and organize it.

P: He thinks very practically.

K: And strongly.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
Senator Kennedy/Mr. Kissinger
6:51 p.m., September 7, 1971

HK: Hello, Ted.

K: Hello, Henry. I didn't know whether you had any time -- a chance to chat for a few minutes. You are probably --

HK: I would like to see you.

K: I am leaving on Thursday evening to go out of the country for ten days with the Subcommittee. Is there any time in the next couple of days?

HK: I never have my calendar here -- what's a good time for you?

K: Tomorrow mid-morning -- 11:00 or 11:30, or I can do it at --

HK: 11:30 is fine. Where should we meet?

K: Any place suitable for you, I can come by there.

HK: Well, I see no reason -- we are not going to announce anything, are you?

K: No. I saw Secretary Rogers ......... (couldn't hear -- office noises)

HK: I am delighted in any event to see you. ......

K: No, I am not. I do have some thoughts on it.

HK: I would like to see you in any event. Let's say 11:30.

K: That will be perfect.

HK: You could come in West Executive Avenue or you can use the front entrance.

K: Come in on that side, that would be fine.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 3/27

TELECON

Jerry Schecter
9/7/71 p.m.

S: I met a Yugoslavian journalist named _______________ he was in Peking for 10 years. I don't know if you have met him, but he was talking to me about receptions in Peking and the fact that he has got a whole set of slides about his stay there and he thought he'd like to meet you and talk with you about the President as someone who thought he might have something to offer in terms of preparation. I recommend it.

K: Okay. How long is he here?

S: Permanently. He left Peking in 167. He is a very bright guy. He's a good Communist, but he is a Yugoslavian communist, and I found him fascinating. He knows the Chinese and understands the subtleties and the places where people should be taken. And he knows what the Chinese are looking for. He suggested certain things I thought you would want to know.

K: Let me see if I can set something up for the next few weeks.