TELCONE
Vice President/Mr. Kissinger

11:07 a.m. 2/22/73

VP: Welcome home, Henry.

HK: Thank you.

VP: Would you have any time to bring me to date on the situation over there today.

HK: Sure. Let me just look at my calendar. Goddamn it, it's a bad day.

VP: How about tomorrow?

HK: Well how about around 2:30

VP: Tomorrow, I've got to go--

HK: No, no, 2:30 today.

VP: Yeh, that'd be all right.

HK: I'll come over at 2:30. Mr. Vice President, as long as I have you on the phone. Our plans for having Thieu here is to have him in San Clemente on the 2nd and 3rd and then let him go on from there to Washington, where we were hoping that you would host him, say around the 4th of April.

VP: Let me see what my situation here is--that's Sunday; I was going to be out of town through Sunday and be back Monday, the 5th; would that be all right?

HK: Oh well, we'll just fix it up that way.

VP: Yeh, All right.

HK: You're talking about April now?

VP: You're talking about April, wait, I am not looking at April, I'm talking about March. Yeh, sure, I can do that.

HK: If you could block out the 4th and 5th, and 6th in case he is travelling on the 4th.

VP: All right.

NAMINGHAN LAD
Authority Eo 12458
By: NARA Date 05/04/04

HK: And then we hope that give dinner for him.

VP: All right

HK: Maybe at Blair House or Anderson House, whichever you prefer.

VP: Okay, we'll block that out.

HK1@ Good, Mr. Vice President--and I'll see you at 2:30.

Authority E0 12458

By: A4

NAP Date 6/15/89

TELCON

Mrs. Dunn (Maureen)/Mr. Kissinger

12:20 p.m. 2/22/73

MD: Hi, Dr. Kissinger, how are you?

HK: How are you Mrs. Dunn, I am sorry I couldn't talk to you yesterday.

MD: I assumed you had a busy day.

HK: It was a busy day and I also wanted to get the written communication. I can really add not much to what Gen. Scowcroft said except to express my own sense of the matter. I think the Chinese for their own reasons our extremely eager to have better relations with us now --I see nothing they can gain by either hiding a prisoner or hiding information and of course I could be wrong

MD: Well my feeling is that I am sure they are not hiding Joe Dunn--my feeling is and I'll be very honest with you, is that Joe Dunn is dead.

HK: That seems to be--

MD: I am not suffering from any delusions that he is alive--I have not suffered from that for a long time because I could not see what the advantage to keeping him alive and not using him as a propaganda advantages

HK: Exactly.

MD: And I also felt if they wanted good relations with us, this would be the time to say it. The only thing that I do find a little dubious to believe they say for example that his plummeted and exploded to the ground.

HK: No they didn't say to the ground

MD: Oh, it said in a report that we had received prior this account in the Peking magazine

HK: No, they said it fell into the water 20 miles offshore is what they told me

MD: General Scowcroft said that it was 11 miles

HK: No 11 miles--20 kilometers

MD: From the Wang Ning Sing county

HK: Right from the Wang Ning Sing county.

Page 2

MD: The only thing that I don't understand--

HK: They said they downed American aircraft--an AlH--fell into the sea about 11 miles approximately 20 kilometers from the coastline of Hanang Island Wang Ning Sing Chinese navay security vessels at that time first to set area under surveillance for over 3 to 4 days but found nothing. And they told us orally that there was an American destroyer also in that area at that time.

MD: That's right, the McCord.

HK: They didn't give us the name.

MD: It's the destroyer McCord and they heard my husband speak for 20 minutes 7 hours after the incident occurred. See this is the only thing that I find so hard to believe that no one--after four crewmen saw him in a parachute fully opened and he used the beeper when he first reached the water and then 7 hours later the beeper was used for 20 minutes--and used the parachute. It could possibly have been him, but do you think that the Chinese would not have been able to get to him when 7 hours--

HK: Well, they say it was bad weather in that area at the time.

MD: It was bad weather?

HK: That's what they told me. It's not in their note, but what Chou-En-lai said to me orally. All I can say is our experience with them in this phase of their policy has been that they have been absolutely meticulous, and I think that it makes some sense from their point of view--and I don't see why they would be willing to be caught in a lie. I don't see what they would gain from it. Suppose that they had fished out the body--why not say it?

MD: Well again I say--someone was at fault for not picking up Joseph Dunn, well the Chinese of course probably didn't know who he was.

HK: And they may not have been able--you know the beeper may not have meant anything to them.

MD: If the destroyer picked it up strongly for 20 minutes, then maybe we were at fault for not picking him up, but the thing is of course that it went inside international waters--so it could have been the case they just couldn't have picked the plane up

Page 3

HK: And supposing it was just floating, is it possible that the beeper--

MD: No this is the thing that has been the mainstay as to why this case has been strongly upheld is that his beeper was manual --it was plane of 25 year old vintage --it was going to have-- it didn't even have an ejection seat of sort until November 67 and it took 20-40 # thrust to pull that lever back which would then open the cockpit meaning that he would then have to stand up on the seat and jump out. Now in the Navy's telegram to me it said that the plane went down in a 70 ° angle which is a very mild angle with just a small trail of white smoke coming from it and the 4 men on the other plane saw this and said that the plane just hit a small trail of white smoke from the rear-- thus my husband's condition could not have been bad to have ejected from it because everything he had on him had to be manually operated due to the age and vintage of the plane. Thus when he landed in the water and the beeper on he had to get to rafter and the beeper that was under his pocket--so that his signs of being alive at the time were good. I'm not saying he couldn't have drown, but boy he lasted seven hours.

HK: They claimed they looked for him from 3 to 4 days. Now whether they in fact looked for him hard, that I wouldnt bet my bottom dollar on

MD: No, I wouldn't either--because you know why--there were ____ in the area.

HK: This was at a completely different phase of our relationship and I wouldn't guarantee anything about what they did. What I am reasonably sure of is that they are not lying to us now because my experience for whatever it is worth is --since I have started dealing with them--they've been meticulous--they've been the most honest people we've dealt with for very good reasons--it's their only currency with us now--there isn't a hell of a lot they can do for us in any other respect.

MD: No, there isn't. It would certainly be beneficial to them propagan wise to say that yes Joe Dunn did die on such and such --

HK: It would be hell of a lot better for them to say he died--drowned-- we fished out his jacket--

MD: Is there a possibility that questioning the two pilots who shot him down--I have their names--did they search the area also, were they in on the search party and they knew exactly where he went down.

Page 4

HK: I tell you what I am willing to do--if you would send me these questions--my judgment is if we make a formal inquiry, it will hurt our foreign policy without helping you. But what I would like to do is to pay a personal call on the Chinese ambassador at the UN when he comes back and you write me a letter and I say now these are things that torment this lady--

MD: There is no possibility of me meeting with them with you, is there?

HK: Let me explore it first and say on the grounds of compassion is it possible for you to do something--either see this lady or answer this letter and I'd be willing to help--happy to do that --if I put it on grounds of compassion rather than questioning their report

MD: Right then you would jeopardize our relations with them.

HK: If--since Chou En-lai took a personal interest in it, if I challenge his report, I am in effect calling the Prime Minister a liar and that will not get your husband back.

MD: I know I am not going to get Joe Dunn back I am willing to admit this now--I feel it and I know since I am his wife, I'd know it more than anybody would feel it.

HK: But on the other hand, if you write a letter, I will personally take it to this Ambassador, I will do my damnedest to arrange a meeting for you with him

MD: From here where do we go--do we still leave him in the missing in action status until the men return so as to follow suit with the others or what--

HK: I don't know what the legal procedure is.

MD: Without these questions being answered that I am writing you in a letter, I don't think he could be presumed dead. I don't feel that the case would be closed. I would feel that I would have to make a fuss over it and I don't want to do that--in other words I don't want to hang up from you and then call the Navy and have the Navy say to me, as of February we will declare Joe Dunn dead --I will say to them, you can't, but I will do such and such until I see to get the facts straight on Joe Dunn. And

HK: That is your privilege--I personally do not believe it would be a wise course, because I really believe there is a limit you can ask another government to do. But if we do it on the grounds of

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 6/16/65</td></tr><tr><td>TO CHOU En-lai</td></tr><tr><td>FROM MARIA. Date 6/16/65</td></tr></table>

Page 5

MD: That's what I mean--would we wait until I have the meeting with the Chinese--

HK: You may not have the meeting with the Chinese--I don't want to hold our a promise

MD: I'm sure you have an in somewhere. I not saying I would broad cast it to people at all that you were going to get me in with the Chinese ambassador--I'm just saying --if the thing breaks that the Navy is going to determine Joesph Dunn dead --you can rest assured that Joe Dunn 's name and my name is **I am well known throughout the US as being the MIA in China --** now people are going to say, how did they presume him dead--do you believe --do you accept these facts--I in all honesty cannot answer if they accept the facts--I know if have nothing to lose and nothing to gain by lying to us but I still feel questionable about thus and such

HK: Write me that letter and see what I can elicit. And let me see what I can do with the Navy, in holding off a final legal determination.

MD: Okay, I appreciate your calling me--it would have been nicer to tell me something nice but

HK: It would have meant a lot to me.

MD: I appreciate it. Are you meeting with the League tomorrow?

HK: I don't think tomorrow, maybe Saturday.

MD: Right, I am going to the Board meeting, so you'll probably be seeing me down there.

HK: Be a pleasure. Bye.

MD: Thank you very much.

TelCon
Eugene Ormandy/Mr. Kissinger

1:10 pm, Feb. 22, 1973

K: Hello.

O: Dr. Kissinger, it's Ormandy. I'm so sorry to disturb you.

K: I don't think you have any basis for a press conference, I mean I'm delighted if you want to hold one.

O: I didn't want to hold it, our Board of Director's decided.

K: You know, what can you say.

O: That's exactly what I wanted to know.

K: Well, you can say nothing, that the details are going to be worked out.

O: That's about all. Seriously, I didn't want to hold any, but my president got all excited, he said you'd better hold it--you see Senator Scott--leaked a release.

K: Well, he had no right to do that either.

O: But, that's the trouble, he made the release; my mouth was closed until about 11:30, then people began to call from newspapers, for statements, and--

K: Well, you can express your pleasure but for God sakes don't make any statements about what you're going to do to the Chinese people or anything else.

O: No, the questions they will ask is how did you--I still can't say anything.

K: You can say that the President called you. You can say that.

O: Can I say that?

K: Yeah.

O: Can I say that you called me too?

K: Yeah.

-2-

O: May I.

K: Certainly.

O: All right, that's all I wanted to know.

K: But don't, for God's sake, speculate on what this means or
anything else.

O: What it means to me and to the orchestra and to the country.

K: Yeah, but don't say you're going to penetrate the Chinese people and teach them Western culture, or anything like that.

O: Oh, I never do those things. No, that would be terrible, it would be in very bad taste. Unfortunately you don't know; me well enough to know that I wouldn't make such a statement. That's why I'm calling you because I'm so careful. I'll still try to cancel it, I will call my president right away.

K: Good. Well, if you hold it, if you make some general statements towards the Chinese people, and so forth, that would be helpful.

O: All I was going to say is I am grateful to the President, am grateful to you and I'm grateful to Premier Chou En-lai.

K: That would be excellent, why don't you--

O: For inviting us and for recommending our orchestra and--

K: Why don't you hold the press conference and say that.

O: That's all I intended to say, but they will tell me "who told you", and I can't say the President and You, the two top men.

K: Yes, you can say that.

O: May I say that, that's all. I won't keep you another second. I'm grateful to you. If anything I can do, let me know.

K: And I'm delighted.

O: Thank you sir.

K: Bye.

TELCORN

Amb. Rabin (Israel)/Mr. Kissinger

4:38 p.m., February 22, 1973

K: I wanted to check, are you still having that dinner for Mrs. Meir?

R: Yeah, the 27th.

K: And you're still counting on me?

R: Oh, very much because the Secretary would not come.

K: Okay. Do you mind if I leave somewhat early because Kay Graham is giving a dinner for all my enemies and I want to show up to show that there's no hard feelings -- say around 10:30 if I leave?

R: Well, I hope that it will be 10:30 or 10:45, it will not be a problem.

K: It won't be a problem.

R: I hope so. We try to do everything quicker.

K: I mean, this is going to be a pretty big group, isn't it?

R: About 34-36 people.

K: I mean, she isn't going to expect an intimate talk there?

R: No, not there.

K: Oh, when am I seeing her?

R: We talked about the possibility of meeting her the next day in the morning -- 28th.

K: For breakfast?

R: Yeah.

K: Fine. Where, at the hotel?

R: Now the problem is that in the meantime the President invited her to be the State guest at the Blair House. I thought it might be -- it's not going to be the most advisable thing.

K: Oh, the hell with it, I don't --

FEBRUARY 22, 1973
Authority Eo. 12458
By NAPARA DATED 6/15/73

Amb. Rabin/Mr. Kissinger

4:38 p.m., February 22, 1973

K: Yeah.

R: All right.

K: To take notes.

R: And we'll be three, the Prime Minister, myself and Dinitz.

K: Is Dinitz definitely going to replace you?

R: Yeah.

K: Okay. Well, we regret it -- we maintain our position.

R: Thank you.

R: Okay, good.

R: And I just talked to Peter and I asked him, you'll remember, that this
paper that I have submitted would not be mentioned to the other people
that I told you that we gave to.

K: Oh, no, no, no, but you'll find Schlesinger is less hysterical than Helms.

R: Well, I tell you quite frankly, I was aware of the first bout and I had
some doubts about it but I was overruled and therefore -- the condition
that my guy -- well, not guy, their to this organization said from
the very beginning that nothing of this paper will be conveyed but to the
White House.

K: Okay.

R: And it was as clear-cut and they had to say formally that they promised
not to do it.

K: Yeah.

R: For the time being, our experiences then even under the previous Admin --
elector was that they never leaked to State or other agencies what we
asked them to keep only to themselves and to the White House.

K: No, I think that's true, one can count on that.

R: Yeah.

K: And it's even more true under Schlesinger.

DISTRIBUTED
Authority
BY: NAPAS Date: 6/15/89

TelCon
Senator Mansfield/Mr. Kissinger

5:25 pm, Feb. 22, 1973

K: Hello.

M: Good evening, Henry.

K: How are you. Sorry I had to rush off.

M: That's okay.

K: This morning I had to get ready for that--

M: No, no, because I thought you were too rushed. That's why I ran after you to tell you that we could make it tomorrow.

K: Right.

M: Would it be all right tomorrow.

K: Sure.

M: What time.

K: Well what time is good for you, I have a meeting at 10:00.

M: Well, your convenience.

K: Shall we say 9:30.

M: 9:30 will be fine. I'll come in up that street and come in at the bottom.

K: Good, wonderful.

M: 9:30.

K: I look forward to seeing you.

M: Okay, Henry.

K: Bye Senator.

TelCon
Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

5:27 pm, Feb. 22, 1973

K: Hello.

Z: You got a problem?

K: Yeah. Joe Alsop is going to call you and if he doesn't, you should call him anyway.

Z: I've talked to him.

K: And you tell him, No.

Z: Well I didn't tell him anything.

K: Well, tell him it's not to be done. I've talked to the President about it, I just don't want to get into that position.

Z: Well, what he proposed to me was that he report the part of the report--

K: That is right, and that is unacceptable.

Z: Well, okay, I didn't--

K: That's what he told me he was gonna do and that is just unacceptable.

Z: Uh huh. Based on his conversation--

K: That is unacceptable. Of course that will drive the Liberals up the wall, it makes him a clear outlet, and will you tell him the President absolutely forbids it.

Z: I will do that. Did you talk to him about it.

K: Yes.

Z: Okay, I'm not questioning it.

K: I understand. Herb Klein is going on the TODAY show tomorrow about the trip. Ron, this cannot be turned into one of our God damned circuses.

RZ: Well, what I told the people who were responding to Herb was that before I would approve anything--

-2-

K: But it's already done. He's already agreed to it.

Z: Well, he wanted to use film apparently, of Hanoi.

K: He has no right to use film of Hanoi.

Z: Then I said that before you do that, that he make sure that you--

K: I thought he was coming with me to give him one last trip. I did not realize he was coming along for the usual flackery. I had no idea that he was going to go out on the circuits.

Z: All right. I have not promoted it, I have not agreed to it, and I have told the people who have asked me that before one inch of the film from Hanoi or China is used that you must approve.

K: That's right. I totally disapprove of White House senior people going on the circuit with serious business. It--wasn't a travelogue.

Z: Yeah. All right, then he shouldn't use the film.

K: Frankly, I don't want him on any God damned shows, he's an idiot. What good does he do us. Everyone up to now has thought this was a serious effort.

Z: Well, I'd have one of your men call him and tell him you're totally against it.

K: Has he got the right to put himself on television shows.

Z: I suppose he can book himself on them, but I did not discuss it.

K: Well, somebody should have told me that this was even a conceivable possibility.

Z: Well, I'm telling--you know, I told them to tell you.

K: He would never have been on the trip. I've got to keep these people under control. The minute we start exploiting them in this way they know we need them more than they need us.

Z: Oh, I don't think Herb's going to do anything damaging.

K: What do you know what's damaging. What does he know what's damaging. What do you think showing films from Hanoi, from a town where they don't let you buy pictures postcards.

Z: I'm not arguing, you know it's not my decision.

K: But was Herb along to do this sort of thing.

Z: Absolutely not.

K: That was never explained to me.

Z: He was not along to do that sort of thing.

K: Well, I'm going to get Scowcroft to call him.

Z: And tell him not to do it.

K: That's right, and we must approve everything--television or

Z: You see, if he does it, if I call him, Henry, he's going to think it's some, you know, I vs Klein thing, get Scowcroft to call him.

K: Somebody should have told me before this trip.

Z: Henry, no one knew before the trip. I told you the moment that I was aware of it. The moment that I was aware of it.

K: Yeah, but he--I thought that this is a nice little thing we do for Herb who's leaving--

Z: That's what I thought.

K: And now it's turning into a huge promotion. Everytime I look up the news summary, here is Klein popping off again.

Z: All right, well let Scowcroft call him.

K: Okay.

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

5:55 p.m., February 22, 1973

Z: Yeah. It can't go live because of the embargo but we're going to have it for film and sound.

K: That's fine.

Z: Because she wanted to make sure that --

K: That's fine.

Z: I said that was fine, it was locked.

K: That's fine.

Z: Okay?

K: Actually, I'm sure they wouldn't mind doing it live.

Z: Well, you better not do it live. I've already said no on live.

K: No, good.

Z: They're going to tape it and they'll replay it right afterwards anyway.

K: Yeah, fine. It's not that momentous.

Z: Will be film and sound. You know, regular briefing rules.

K: Well, we'll just make it lower key. You know, I won't make it such a momentous thing. Have you got the Communique?

Z: No, that's the other thing. I need it to reproduce.

K: Yeah, get it from Brent.

Z: Okay, I'll get it tonight. We'll keep it under lock and key.

K: Excellent.

Z: Now, then the final thing, you'll call Barbara so she's covered.

K: Yeah, but I've got about three different Ambassadors coming so I've got -- I'll call her by 7:00.

Z: Okay.

K: Good.

TELCON

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

5:55 p.m., February 22, 1973

Z: Henry, you're going to have to talk to Barbara.

K: Well, now, let me just check it with her again. The President has just asked me to go up to Camp David on Friday and we may just put it off a week.

Z: Well, we can get him not to have you go to Camp David.

K: Well, we can also put it off a week.

Z: She said, "Can I lock this?" I said, "I talked to Henry earlier and he said 4 o'clock Friday sounds okay but he wants to talk to you first."

K: Okay.

Z: Now my view is you'd be far better off getting this damn thing out of the way on Friday.

K: Okay.

Z: He said you had to go out of town over the weekend anyway.

K: Who did?

Z: The President.

K: Yeah, that's true.

Z: So you can get out of the Camp David thing.

K: I don't think so. Well, let me see. Maybe she can do it earlier.

Z: Okay. Well, if you want to do it at 2:00 Friday, fine.

K: Okay.

Z: Now, also, Henry, the President wants to make -- in talking about your thing tomorrow -- you're going to do that for film right?

K: Yeah.

Z: Film and sound?

K: That's what I guess, yes.

wgh

TELCOM

John Scali/Mr. Kissinger

6:15 p. m., February 22, 1973

S: Hi, Henry, welcome back.

K: Thank you.

S: I listened to your backgrounder or rather your news conference and I thought you were in good form.

K: Thank you.

S: And in addition to that I think the results border on the spectacular side.

K: But did you see what that bastard Ted Kennedy said? He said it's too little and too slow.

S: You're kidding.

K: No.

S: Jesus #*@%!

K: Here we are, the only country where the Chinese communists have a mission, which also has a Nationalist Embassy.

S: Yeah, and it's too little and too slow. My Lord. Henry, I wanted to unless it's an emergency Security Council meeting on Libya and the aircraft, I wanted to sit down and chat with you briefly about a couple of issues. I'm going to meet with the Chinese up in New York early next week as a courtesy. I also want to talk to you about two other things -- Vietnam and UN.

K: Right.

S: And possibly your views on Panama in the Security Council meeting.

K: I don't have any very clear views on it.

S: Yeah. I've been dealing with Bill Jorden on that so I'm fairly familiar with his views but there are a couple of thoughts I had which I wanted to discuss with you.

K: Okay. Where are you? Are you in New York now?

S: No, I just came back this morning.

K: Right. Well, when did you think you wanted to do it?

John Scali/Mr. Kissinger

6:15 p.m., February 22, 1973

- 2 -

S: Tomorrow morning if I could.

K: Tomorrow is impossible.

S: Well, if I'm here on Saturday, how would that grab you?

K: Maybe Saturday morning.

S: All right.

K: Early.

S: All right.

K: Where can I reach you, at the State Department?

S: No, I'm still here in the White House.

K: Good. Well, let's talk to each other tomorrow.

S: If we do it on Saturday, could we do it before 10:00?

K: I'll do my damnest.

S: Cause I want to play tennis at 10:00 in order to maintain some tone.

K: Okay. You'll maintain tone --

S: Listen, we're in joint company in one of the magazines here. It lists --
the *Washingtonian* lists the 10 sexist men.

K: Oh, really?

S: And then it lists 10 who think they're sexy.

K: And I understand I'm among them. Are you among them too?

S: Who think they're sexy.

K: Well, who is sexy then?

S: Well, they have all sorts of very interesting people like Tom Braden.
(laughter) Can you believe that?

K: No.

TELCOM

6:20 p. m. --2/22/73

Herb Klein/Mr. Kissinger

HK: Hello, Herb, how are you?

HK: Fine. When do you want to talk for a couple of a minutes?

HAK: Herb, there must be a misunderstanding, because I have a violent view that my trip should not turn into slack operations. I don't care what good they may do in the short term, when I go on a trip, it's a business trip and I just don't want them on television. I'm already resisting that they are putting me on television.

HK: I think you should because it is needed to you in understating, you know like you did today. And the Barbara Walters thing, I think is going to be excellent.

HAK: My philosophy is that we have to have stature. We don't have to sell this like soap, and I have never after any trip had anybody on television. I haven't gone on tv unless I was pressured on it by Haldeman. And I am just very unhappy about this idea that we are going to show home movies now on television of the trip that I take. No country is going to have me on a secret trip again.

HK: Henry, there certainly not going to be any secret photo or any thing of this kind. It isn--

HAK: It isn't a question of a secret photo--the question is that I am going on a trip to negotiate serious business. We bring you along so that you can get a flavor of it--the next thing we know we are on television three times a week or once a week or whatever, pushing that trip. What purpose does it serve? Whom does it help. It helps maybe you, but it doesn't help anybody else.

HK: I think it helps with the Congress in understanding what we are doing maybe it will describe what kind of thing you do.

HAK: Well, I don't think we want to describe what sort of thing I do. I am not in trouble with Congress and we're going to get that aid bill through some other way, so I really feel I'll just have to go to the President if this thing keeps going.

HK: You know me, that I'm not about to make a circus of anything--

HAK: No, look I like you Herb, I have enormous respect for you. But what I--when I go on a trip and the President goes on a trip--he's a politician--he has to be exposed--I don't want exposure. I don't want the goddam

Page 2

HK: thing on television. When I move, the achievements have stand and the countries I visit have to know that when I go there, it's not a public relations exercise. This is even more important.

HK: I don't think in the brief time that I am going to do this tomorrow morning, he's going to find that it's going to sound like a public relations exercise.

HAK: The point is what are you doing--you are describing the atmosphere in Hanoi and Peking, right? What else can you do? That's not what I want. That's not what we go on these trips for. That was not my understanding of why you went along.

HK: As a matter of fact, we were talking about it, to talk a little bit about what was going on x kind of thing took place and I'd like to try to follow up with you just a little bit--if it's all right, and the chance in the sense of your building a continuing relationship.

HAK: Well, I just feel that we have to keep these things in a sense of perspective. Never have we had on any trip that I was on--had a follow-up by a member of the party who would then go out on his own --or any other basis, and start going on that television and give his own version of thing. And when people negotiate with me they have to know everything I say publicly I cleared with Chou En-lai and with P. Van Dong. They were never told that any other member of our party was going to speak. And it is a totally different concept. I was told that you were coming along because you hadn't been on any other trip and that you deserved to absorb some of this atmosphere. I enthusiastically agreed to that, but never occured to me that after that it would lead to a lot of television things.

HK: I haven't agreed with any other television things--

HAK: Or even newspaper interviews--it just didn't occur to me.

HK: I certainly didn't understand that Henry, and I don't mean in any way to go contrary to any understanding we had --

HAK: I don't see what this accomplishes when I go it is usually in preparation for something for the President--I always conduct confidential negotiations. It was never that afterwards that we would then plug the trip. For me personally, you've probably put in a hell of a lot of plugs, so I have no reason to complain.

HK: You can be sure I would.

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HAK: I know you would, but frankly, I don't think that's what is needed right now

HK: I don't think I can get out of doing the thing tomorrow morning, it's going to be like 8 minutes or something like that, that's all.

HAK: You know, I know I'm sure you can't get out of it tomorrow morning, but can you check in with us on anything you are considering doing

HK: Sure will.

HAK: And I don't suppose you can get out of it tomorrow morning.

HK: I'd like to talk to you tomorrow about how you would like to look at it tomorrow.

HAK: What time are you on--7:30-8:00

HK: Right.

HAK: I'll watch you.

HK: Good, do that for me.
Thank you Henry. I am sorry, you know,

HAK: You've been a nice guy about the whole thing, I have no complaints about you.

HK: My method is to try to do some good--

HAK: You are the least self-serving guy around here. That's not saying a hell of a lot.

HK: (laughs) I'll take it as a compliment.

TELCOM

Joe Sisco / Mr. Kissinger

2/22/73 6:30 p.m.

HK: Joe, I have to tell you I think you guys are going crazy again--

JS: What have we done now

HK: I mean calling ambassadors, calling Ismail--I mean goddamn it, it took us two years to get the Egyptians in the frame of mind where they were pleading with us to get into it and now we are acting like puppy dogs.

JS: Oh, I don't think so, Henry.

HK: I will tell you something--I haven't lost one of these yet. And I'm not losing it--I will not tolerate it--and you remember this--I will not tolerate any area being segregated as the exclusive jurisdiction of anybody--

JS: Well of course

HK: And if anybody--you ought to have enough experience, Joe, that it won't work--it didn't work--

JS: Henry, you ought to have experience to know that I am a goddamn lowly assistant secretary with practically no influence and Henry, you can call me and bawl me out--I just don't have this kind of influence--I don't have this kind of power in the State Department--

HK: Okay, I'll talk to--

JS: I'm just not--you know Henry, 9 times out of 10 you call me and bawl the hell out of me--I agree with you and you are putting me in an absolutely impossible position, I don't know what to do--you've gotten me to the point-I'm saying to myself I might as well get the hell out of here--

HK: No, that I don't want you to do--

JS: I'm just not the Secretary of State, Henry and Henry, get off my back--because you're really criticizing me when I'm not--when it's not justified, and Henry I'm with you, I'm your friend, Henry. I keep telling you--

HK: What are guys planning to do tomorrow--

JS: I don't know a goddamn--well what are we going to do--sent--the Secretary sent you a memo and I am certainly going to sit and listen

HK: Are we going to make a proposal--

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JS: We have no proposals to make -- I mean I haven't developed one purposely Henry. When you left the Understanding between you and me was--

HK: Well the papers you gave me I thought was a good Idea.

JS: I do too, but Henry, look seriously, I just can't -- I am with you, if you --you and the secretary--I know what the problem is and I know what your problem is and I know what the Secretary's problem is and I don't blame you for being angry, but Henry, I'm not trying to segregate anything--

HK: unless it won't work that's the main thing--

JS: I'd like to get down to work and to know what I am supposed to be doing, but Henry, really I sympathize with you, but you are really wasting your breath on me--you really are--frankly I am your friend--I keep telling you this--

HK: I don't need friendship, I appreciate it--

JS: But as far as I am concerned you've got my support, you've got my loyalty and you know Henry, I just

HK: How do you people visualize this thing is going to go from here? Tell me what you think the Secretary thinks is going happen next.

JS: Frankly, I think he's quite adjusted to the notion that this is a listening month in terms of the Egyptians, a listening month in terms of Golda and I think what has to happen is that there has to be a meeting of you, the Sec. and the President and hopefully myself and we got to then after the Golda visit sit down and say where do we go if anywhere--if anywhere and then we have to ask as a team--as a team, Henry,

HK: But we don't want to --after four years--

JS: Why not, Henry, it's never too late.

HK: Be breaking an old habit. We have the quarterback running in one direction and the half back in the other direction and the other side wondering who's got the ball.

JS: Sure. The Secretary, as you damn well know, was very anxious about making sure that there is no appearance of division between the WH and the State Dept--who in the heck do you think told him this--to get together with you and be sure that you are together--we are the ones who urged him, rather than a division you see, and so Henry, look you've got to sort it out with him--and your big enough to be able to sort it out.

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HK: I think I'll let it run for a bit.

JS: Well, what happens tomorrow, what is the President going to do tomorrow--

HK: I don't know--there is great opposition from you people to have me sit in with the President--

JS: Oh is that right?
When did this happen?

HK: Today. So I can absolutely guarantee it, but if he follows advice, he's just going to listen--

JS: For sure. What else is there to do--in the first place we are committed to check with the Israelis before we'd ever put anything together anyway and if you do put something together, the first people you have to talk to as that paper indicates that I gave you is the Israelis--so you've not going to get anywhere.

HK: Oh no, there's no danger about getting anywhere--
I think if the British reported correctly, this thing is a sure loser now.

JS: Oh, it's a stiff line if that report that came in today--we're going to get stiffened armed-- They're in a spot now where you are absolutely right--it has taken 18 months to get these people to crawl to us.

HK: Yeh, but that's one reason why we shouldn't blow it all by excessive eagerness.

JS: No, but you've got one other problem, that you have to remember, throughout the entire area the words that are being spoken by the US today are being compared with the words spoken by the US at the time of Munich and this is a real political problem--you know, people who get killed, whether they are on--[end tape]

JS: ....[begin new tape] it doesn't bother me that we're being criticized in the Arab world today because we haven't condemned or used the kind of purple language that we used at the time of Munich but you should be aware that the whole Arab press is saying well here we are--sweet words from the Americans, but we heard much more than sweet words at the time of Munich--

HK: What time is this guy coming in incidentally--

JS: He's in--I went out to Dulles, shook his hand and --they aren't doing anything tonight--

Page 4

HK: Do you have him all afternoon--

JS: No, all there is an 11:00 meeting and then 12:00 and give him a lunch and that's it.

HK: 12:00 luncheon meeting--

JS: No, no, 12:00 meeting with the Secretary beforehand and then that moves right into the lunch.

HK: Oh I see.
I've been asked to come over to that lunch but don't see much point in it.

JS: I think it would be a very good thing myself. Very good thing.

HK: They usually put a white jacket on me when I eat at

JS: (laughs) well, just think you could make some extra tips as a result.

HK: At the Paris Peace Conference--my three guys who did the negotiating were put in the fourth row behind the Secretary--

JS: Oh really?

HK: Yeh.

JS: Oh, I'll be damn--you mean at that signing--

HK: At the signing--

JS: Henry- I would encourage you to do this--really--think about it.

HK: I'll think about it--I don't know what I think about it.

JS: That'll make a little news.

HK: If I come to lunch in a white jacket --

JS: Either way--I think he'd take you either way you come.

HK: I don't know I hate to be outranked by Atherton.

JS: That's about the extent of my influence -- It hink x I can assure you that you won't be outranked by Atherton.

HK: Okay--Joe I know the position you are in--as much as you can control it--keep excessive energy from developing until we know where the hell

Page 5

we are going.

JS: As I say--I just think Henry, you have to take the lead and convene this session after the Golda visit and you have to approach it systematically and all possibilities have to be canvassed and directly with the President and they have to be examined with--

HK: In five years this has never happened and it can't happen given the personalities involved.
I can do it in a WSAG meeting or SRG meeting, but the level you are talking about, it isn't going to happen.

JS: Yeh, Well, it ought to be done at somewhere and you're ingenious enough to know where it ought to be done. But I had the impression in the first two years it had been done in a fairly systematic way

HK: Oh yes, the first two years--at that level I can get it down--

JS: What ever way--otherwise the danger you cited at the outset in terms of divisions and one person going in one direction and another in another--is really very great, Henry. There is no point to it.

HK: Moreover it's a sure loser. Not one in which--can you see how this negotiation can end in less than 2 years.

JS: Oh no--long and drawn out--Henry it's not necessarily a sure loser--

HK: No, not a sure loser in two years--but if you're aiming for a quick success.

JS: I don't think anyone is aiming in that direction.

HK: Give it two years and let enough frustration build up and then there is a chance.

JS: The frustration level is at a very right peak right now--you would never have gotten this guy to take this kind of initiative that they took--let me make a wild guess-you may come into that office tomorrow and suggest that maybe it would be very desirable to take a trip there. What if Ismail suggests that to the President tomorrow--

HK: Well-

JS: Don't be surprised--what will this guy say--nothing new on substance

HK: Well we'll see what he says.

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JS: There is nothing in intelligence that indicates this, but I wouldn't be surprised if this occurs.

HK: I'll ask him to give us a picture of the belly dancers because otherwise I go to Tehran where I know there is a sure thing.

JS: We're both officers in charge of that aspect of the problem.

HK: I won't go in to buy a pig in a poke

JS: I wouldn't permit you to go out to the area--without you taking me along.

HK: So after they submit an album of belly dancers--I might consider it.

JS: That one was Egyptain you better bear in mind.

HK: No, Joe I wouldn't spend any favored nights on the prospects of my going to Chiro.

JS: I wouldn't be so sure.

HK: It's never happened that the Security Advisor was assassinated by the Secretary of State.

JS (laughs) Well you better tighten security over the next couple of weeks.

HK: There is a Harvard professor who once killed a colleague--in the 19th C and at Harvard no professor has ever been dismissed so that gave the corporation a real problem until the guy was executed when they published in the Harvard Gazette that the position of Prof. of Chemistry having been vacant the corporation is looking for a successor to a professor so-and-so. Never said how it was vacated.

JS: I have heard that story--it's a very good.

HK: Okay Joe I don't want to give you any ideas, particularly with you Mafia connections.

JS: That's correct--think look about joining the group tomorrow.

HK: I believe in segregation-- Don't you get discouraged, we need your optimism--

JS: Yeh, okay--

TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger
7:45 pm, February 22, 1973

P: The point that may be raised which we should be prepared to handle is whether this stuff from Cambodia, like the Laotian one, can any way jeopardize the return of POWs.

K: We'll just say absolutely not.

P: Right.

K: And it was just in response to a request by Souvanna Phouma after violation on the other side and if it stops now, then we stop too.

P: Right. That would be my judgment. I can't--

K: I won't affect it Mr. President, certainly not.

P: How the North Vietnamese, you must have talked to them about this sort of thing anyway didn't you.

K: Yes, Mr. President, if we don't show a Khair trigger response then this is going to pay off for us.

P: I know but you told them that, you warned them of this sort of thing.

K: Oh, yes.

P: Good.

K: Mr. President, I'm sending over to you a brief talking paper for the meeting in the morning so that you know what the issues are in detail.

P: Right. Right.

K: There are two or three points you might consider making.

P: I'll do it. I'll read them. I'm going out to this play and then I'll see it when I return.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: See you at 8:30 tomorrow.

K: Right.

P: All right, fine.