TELCOM

Sec. Schlesinger/Sec. Kissinger

12:49 a.m. 10/13/73

K: Jim,

JS: What is this telegram that you have, what--

K: Look, I don't want it spread all over the bloody Defense Department, that is the problem. They claim they have now stopped offensive on the Syrian front because they are out of ammunition. They claim further that I had told them that they could keep going because they were getting--that their AMMO replenished and in relying on that they've kept going and they didn't get them. Now what does to the diplomacy I described to you yesterday is near disaster because they were supposed to be triggered yesterday, diplomacy was supposed to be triggered tonight--tomorrow night, Saturday night, but that diplomacy requires Israeli pressure--

JS: I understand that.

K: Which will now not be forthcoming. On the other hand, the Israelis will now hoard the stuff we rush in and then they'll strike when the diplomacy was supposed to have been concluded. That's water over the damn now, we'll have to discuss that some other time. But I just think there was massive sabotage.

JS: It's just not true, Henry.

K Well, let's not get into that. One thing we cannot have now given our relations with the Soviets is American planes flying in there. Any thing else is acceptable.

JS: Okay, now they claim Henry it's only five hours ago we talked to these people, we've been asking them what their daily supply is, they have exhibited no uneasiness about it at all.

K: Because they don't trust the people in the room

JS: You mean to say that when General Gure is alone General Sumner that he doesn't trust him?

K: No, with Gure with Sumner, he should trust him.

J:S Sumner has been trying to get it out of Gure for five days and Gure has been perfectly relaxed about the day supply.

K: Because Gure claims that -- I mean Dinitz--I don't know Gure--Dinitz claims that was because every day we told them which is true that they were going to get 20 planes moving. And every day it didn't happen.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized EO 1295C

BY XARA DATE 6/13/73

Page 2

K: If it had been moved, they would have been all right. So they say.

JS: Every day goes back one night--

K: Now I told them Tuesday night based on an assurance of Sisco, about which you have nothing to do--said they were going to get 20 charters the next day. And we told them Wednesday night if everything else failed, we were going to requisition it through Mac(?). Then we told them Thursday night it would now be requisitioned through Mac and then we told them Friday morning that this wasn't working.

JS: That's right. It's two days --

K: It's about 48 hours, but you're responsible for 24 hours, I'm responsible for --be that as it may, let's not worry about what happens. It seems to me we have these options. We've got the 10 C-130's which we could load.

JS: Right. We've got ammo in the ______ now.

K: Yeh, but we don't know when that's going to be released.

JS: How about your negotiations with the Portugese?

K: We just send a telegram two hours ago.

JS: Okay. Well they simply cannot be that short of ammo, Henry. It is impossible that they didn't know what their supply was--and suddenly they' run out of it.

K Look they have obviously screwed up every offensive they've conducted. Ar they are not about to take the responsibility themselves. I have no doubt whatever that they are playing us for their own failures.

JS: Right.

K: But you try to make that case here and above all, I really think we have this thing 90% licked. And you tell the madman you have of a deputy who is spreading the word that I'm driving the Saudis crazy that I have a promise from the foreign minister Saudi Arabia--

JS: I told them at about 6:00 this evening--he seems to be somewhat relieved. You mentioned this to me earlier to tell him. He said he hoped it worked out that way.

K: It may not work out that way, but the only way it is going to work out if we are going to get a quick end of the war. Of which we nearly have all pieces in place, but we need an Israeli offensive.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: EO 12951
By: MARA DOD: 6/13/94

JS: Okay, now Henry if they have enough ammo to carry him tomorrow we can get the ammo in by tomorrow evening. But first of all we have to find out what their supply situation is.

K: I would give a hell of a lot if I could keep them going through tomorrow so that they are not sitting there when this goes into the Security Council.

JS: The only way to do that is to move ammunition in tonight. And it's almost ---it must be damn near dawn there.

K: It is dawn in Israel. It's 8:00 in the morning.

JS: Are they ought of ammo or aren't they?

K: How the hell would I know.
They said they were stopping their offensive.
I was meeting with them tonight to synchronize the diplomacy for tomorrow
And I said where are you going to be tomorrow night, I was getting leary
when they called me after having pleading with me to give them another day
they called me at 4:00 this afternoon and said you can trigger everything
tonight. And I oouldn't do it because I didn't have--I had geared my timing
in such a way that I couldn't recover all the pieces. I could have done it
yesterday--I need 24 hours to get it going.

JS: It's amazing to me--I sat with them from 5:30-6:30 and they simply did not mention ammunition problems -- they didn't indicate any issue in that area. All they talked about was the re-equipment and to get it in within two days.

K: They are so terrified now--or claim to be terrified of Israeli thrust into the Sinai--I mean Egyptian thrust.

JS: That's incredible planning on their part.

K: Look, they _fucked_ it up.

JS: Hm huh. Okay, let me try to find out what the hell their status of supplies situation is. We had the impression that they had 15 days of supply.

K: I bet you they counted their supply on the experience of the six-day war.

J: Could well he.

K: I bet you they didn't expend as much in the whole six-day war as they do in one day of this offensive.

JS: That might very well be, Henry.
I think that is very likely. Sooner or later they could have come back
and told us what their problem was.

DECLASSIFIED
Authorized

EO 12951

By: ARA Dae: 6/12/01

Page 4

K: Well because they would have had to face themselves and I must say in their defense--not on the airplanes on which they and we never agreed--but on the other one, we told them time and again that they were getting all the consumables and they should fight as if they were coming.

JS: Right. But they never told us they were running short.

K: Because you know what happened--as well as I do. These guys got the whole thing screwed up--every time. They are living in 1967. All day long yesterday they were telling me they were heading for Damascus and they were going to stop on the outskirts. This morning they told me they would stop public transportations if they can. Now they obviously can't make it.

JS: Okay.

K: No question in mind that 80% of the blame is theirs. But that doesn't help me tomorrow night. And you know I just have to have them going as a fierce force while this is going on.

JS: If they are out of ammo now, there is nothing we can do to get it there for today's offensive. The nearest step is in the Azores and you know that's kind of screwed up unless we take the US aircraft off and fly it in. It won't be in for 5 hours--

K: How about at least C-130's.
I think what we have to do is to get them the 10 C-130's. We have to twist the arm of the charters by telling them they will never get another defense contract--that's going to produce.

JS: That's right, but we can get that stuff out all right, but we are not going to get it out there for Saturday.

K: No, but that at least will get it moving.
So let's do it --a combination of the Azores ____, the 10C-130's and forced charters. And that I think will be it if we put Sumner working on it tonight

JS: He's there now. We've got John Wickam there--Look we have a group that is working this 24 hours a day.

K: Jim you and I have no problem because we are in complete agreement on the strategy, as far as I can see. You have to delegate it and I have and you have a few people down the line who were put there to sabotage that stuff not by you.

JS: I think it's

K: I think on the other hand you have the goddamn Israelis screwing up everyt
they are doing.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01295C
By: NARA Date 6/17/67

TELCORN
Amb. Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger

10/13/73 1:03 a.m.

D: My military attache is just standing next to me. He just came into my office and said that General Sumner called him and General Sumner told him that because we cannot The Golan Heights tonight or tomorrow he has an order to send some ammunition immediately that we need badly just now.

K: That's what you wanted isn't it?

D: Yeh, we wanted ammunition but we want Sumner to . So what is exactly--you have any idea how many pleans or anything?

K: We are going to do three separate things. We are going to give you the ten- C-130's immediately.

D: Ten C-130. Directly.

K: Immediately. Now you have to work out with Defense--we would prefer it if you knock Israeli pilots in the Azores.

D: We understand.

K: If at all possible.

D: I would like to find out.

K: Well you find that out. Second we are going to force some charters out of the airlines. And thirdly, we are going to use the Azores with your El Al so you have three different operational---

D: Just to be sure I understand. The ten C-130 which will approach either directly to Israel or throughthe Azores depends on the availability of the Israeli pilots to continue to take--

K: Yeh, but make a big effort to put Israeli pilots

D: Of course we will, we will need Israeli pilots for--the charter will go all the way to Israel?

K: Yes.

D: You have any idea how many?

will

K: No, but we are going to force them out--we try to force 20 of them.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12950
D: 12 MARA Dae 01/13/01

Page 2

D: I see.
And now we'll have to fly from the Azores. So what we have to see is--

K: You will have all three of them going simultaneously.

D: We'll have to try and see whether we have enough pilots for El Al and for the ten C-130--we'll check on it and will tell the Defense. We have to deal with Defense, right?

K: Right, because--but if there's any problem call General Scowcroft.

D: Okay, at this point I'll call Scowcroft. All right, thank you Doctor.

K: Now, wait a minute, since I'm interested in the diplomacy of this, I can't tell you how to conduct military operations but I think it would be a disaster for you just to stop tomorrow;

D: Right. I will pass this information immediately to the Prime Minister including these items you just told me.

K: Because if you are seened to be weak, there's no telling what will happen.

D: Hm huh. I know. I know. That is why I was a bit concerned that Sumner of this weakness.

K: I'm dealing with a bunch of idiots.

D: Yeh. Yeh. From Sumner, God knows where it will go.

K: Okay, let me get Schlesinger again.

D: To tell his aides to set up--

K: Right.

D: All right. And I will pass the information on as soon as my military attache will get timetable. Because that is crucial.

K: That's right.

D: I don't want to mislead the government again. So I'll get the timetable first before I cable the Prime Minister.

K: This time if you don't get action I'll quit.

D: Well it will be a double ring ceremony.

TELCONE
Secretary Schlesinger
Secretary Kissinger

10/13/73 1:06 a.m.

K: Hello, Jim. Now I've got a distraught Dinitz calling me saying
Sumner was yelling at his military attache that were stopped because
they're out of ammunition and he said their whole security depends
on that fact not getting out. And that if Sumner says it to him,
to whom else has he said it.

S: Sumner hasn't said it to anybody else, I presume, I'm going to the Pentagon now.

K: You--well could you make sure that they don't blab around the Pentagon
with this because that really would kill everything.

S: Right. Well the point that we've got to get Henry is to find out what the hell their situation is--can't they tell us. Somebody to get Gore (sp) to come to the Pentagon to tell us what his problems were.

K: That's all right, but make sure Sumner doesn't talk to anyone else.

S: Okay, very good.

K: Good. Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012951
By: NARA DEc: 6/17/67

TELCONE
Gen. Haig - Secretary Kissinger

October 13, 1973

9:35 a. m.

H: How are you feeling this morning on this thing? Talked to Jim... he thinks no move with US left...

K: We've got no choice... strongly infected by the s. o. b.'s.

H: Jim admitted to me he investigated this thing and his people did drag their feet. He's goddamned upset about it, which was the surprising thing.

K: If they had come directly... we would have a civilian airlift going.

H: Yah, but the Jordanians have apparently entered it...

K: No, no. They have moved a brigade into Syria, that has been arranged. Their way of staying out of it. ... civilian airlift blow sky high, our interest in this... Israelis are trying to get us locked in...

H: Have you told the President about this.

K: Yes, I talked to him, he called me I didn't call him.

H: Do you want me to say anything to him?

K: You have to tell him this thing will sort of rep things. a bit. ... vicious, stupid bastards. I had their investments protected, I had assurances from the Saudis.

H: Secondly, Jim said he things it is a plan to get us drawn in. I told him these are judgements for Henry and the President to make and you have to do what the President wants done.

K: You know my scheme. If we had been able to get a stop... could be dropping it down.

H: Have to take that chance...

K: Now there are three airborne units of Egyptians that may land in the Sinai overnight.

H: Yup.

K: They have moved artillery across the Canal. This is getting rough, and they still have got a whole air force. It's not amateur

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 1295C
BY XARA Date 0/12/01

2.

night anymore. If we could have gotten the stuff in, breaking the
Syrian front.

H: Jim called a few minutes ago....

K: And its got the whole diplomacy thing screwed up.

H: Really?

K: Well, I mean we've got them coming in at the wrong time.
Instead of coming in to give the Arabs, ... slackening off when we
need their pressure and when we want them to slacken off the
stuff will be in there, and they will want to fight again.

H: Well, Henry, I don't think that's entirely true. It will
take a week to get the stuff in there to the battlefield.

K: OK

DECLASSIFIED
Authoriz
E01295C
BY: XARA Data: 6/13/07

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin-Kissinger

October 13, 1973

9:37 a.m.

K. I still haven't heard from the British. I am having a call placed to Hume to see what's going on.

D. You have talked on the telephone with him... placing a call...

K. We agreed it should happen today. If they don't do it maybe we should try the Australians.

D. All right.

K. The second thing, we just received information that the Egyptians are planning airborne landings in the Sinai.

D. I don't know the significance of this...

K. We all have to realize that if anything looks like trickery we will have to... it will affect things.

D. Better to practice something on which we both agree. I didn't know anything about Sinai really...

K. Of course, you don't know the details...

D. I don't know if... otherwise as I understand the situation in the Sinai... military thinks in the... along the canal along the line covered with something how much they could... there from Sinai. It doesn't look like it is very convincing.

K. We have not heard anything from the Israelis.

D. Nothing from the Israelis, I can pass this information to Moscow do you think?

K. If we don't hear from the British by noon, we will go to the Australians.

D. Is this decided?

K. I will check with you after I have talked with Hume.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012958
By: W. M. S. Parry

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin-Kissinger

October 13, 1973

9:37 a. m.

D. All right.

D. I don't know the significance of this....

K. We all have to realize that if anything looks like trickery we will have to.... it will affect things.

D. Better to practice something on which we both agree. I didn't know anything about Sinai really....

K. Of course, you don't know the details....

D. I don't know if... otherwise as I understand the situation in the Sinai.... military thinks in the... along the canal along the line covered with something how much they could... there from Sinai. It doesn't look like it is very convincing.

D. Is this decided?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
D: 12 MAR 1973
By: XA

TELECON
Hume/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

9:38 a. m.

K. Hello.

H. Henry.

K. I am so sorry we will not be able to meet tomorrow. I was just talking with the President about the matter discussed with Rowley yesterday. We were hoping that you might see your way clear to doing that matter which we discussed.

H. Yes. Have you seen or have the Israelis told you what Sadat said last night? Sadat said that a ceasefire in situ might be possible but they would have to have the agreement that Israel go back to the '67 line. They have repeated their one condition. I have sent our Ambassador in Cairo back to see him. I said suppose we were to propose a ceasefire in situ immediately followed by the introduction of an international force, immediately followed by a conference or some international initiative by the Secretary General. Would this appeal to him.

K. We just can't cooperate in that. We are not ready for that. We think he will accept, unless we have totally been misled. We believe the other thing will work as long as they claim they are yielding to somebody.

H. Suppose Sadat turns us down?

K. Then we are in a stalemate.

H. Then we will be in a worse position than before. We will have lost any ability to make a move. It looks like they will turn this down.

K. That is what you think. I have been told by the others that they will accept.

H. You have been told by the Russians?....

K. I don't see any reason for them to say this and not mean it. What are they to get from it? It was repeated no more than an hour ago.

DECLASSIFIED

Authentic

By: A. MRA Dated: 01/13/73

-2-

H. Sadat says no, according to our sources.

K. When you speak of an international force you mean total withdrawal?

H. What I think is this. Suppose Sadat agrees to a ceasefire in situ.
The international force is introduced while an international conference
or Secretary General or some international machine goes in....
Won't that be possible without a full withdrawal?

K. It won't be what... I think we have agreement on this from the
Russians and might from the Israelis.

H. All you have is Dobrynin's word that the Russians believe that
Sadat would agree and our information is that they could not agree
to this. It would be an almost direct conflict of report unless the
Russians were willing to pressure Sadat. Would they agree to this?

K. My impression is that if they have tricked us on this they will pay
the price of our entire relationship. They have all to lose.

H. I will have another talk with Ted and give you a ring back but I
think our credibility will be completely lost if we were to make the
public initiative and he would not have it. He himself has given us the
conditions to which he would agree to a ceasefire and it includes all the
old things.

K. And the Israelis have given us the other position. The Israelis
said it has to go back to the Canal. We can probably get them to go
along and the Soviets can get the Egyptians to go along. Maybe we should
try.

H. The decision doesn't have to be made by Sunday night.

K. I thought by tonight. We can also ask the Australians to do it.

H. My impression is I can't see how the Russians can do this unless
they are willing to say they will cut off their arms.

K. Maybe that is what they are willing to do. They didn't ask for
you to do it and since we can't propose the resolution it can't be a
maneuver directly against you. They would have preferred France
to introduce the resolution.

H. I see. What time is it in the US? About 10:00 in the morning?
I am traveling to London tonight with Ted in his plane and I will have

another talk with him. We can't really risk being turned down by Sadat
and on our present information from him, we will be.

K. Unless they are committing a treachery the Russians assure me
they will go along with it. Where would they be to put it forward and
we abstain and Sadat refuses and they back him up. I don't understand
what they have to gain. Especially when they wanted us to ask France.

H. What do you think the Israelis response will be? Yes?

K. Yes, but it will not be accepted unconditionally. Let them put
forth their conditions and then we might be able to go.... It is just
having these maniacs in some sort of balance....

H. We have to try something.

K. Therefore, the Russians said any complicated ceasefire will be
refused. The only thing they are willing to abstain from is a simple
ceasefire.

H. Let me think about it again and say in another three hours I will
have another report in from our Ambassador who is meeting with
Sadat again.

K. You will not get a prior agreement from Sadat.

H. No, but then I can't say. Suppose Russia...him into saying yes.
That is not going to be a happy situation. Let me think about it and
if it is to be worthwhile.

K. If this goes on we will have to send a massive airlift in there.
I just know....

H. What is the state of the battle?

K. The Israelis claim that they have beaten the Iraqis and I would
expect them to turn on Sinai. Today we start flying into Israel
which is very dangerous.

H. Let me ring you back in three hours. Thank's for ringing.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized EO 1295C

By: ACHA Dated: 6/13/95

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

October 13, 1973

9:50 a. m.

K: Just talked to Cromer. They have been talking to Sadat
who say's they will never accept a straight cease-fire now. So
they are reluctant to put in the resolution.

D: They talked directly with Sadat... only thing to do... send
telegram right away... Why not press....

K: I am pressing. They will call back in three hours.

D: Under the circumstances think it should be shown that
both our countries...

K: We are still pressing the British to put it in anyway.

D: We are definitely....going to keep our word...up stand,
something of political significance. Don't you think?

K: Yes.

D: Problem is now that they are not deciding... bridges...

K: British are reluctant. They say the Egyptians will never
agree to it.

D: With in the next three hours. Never get an answer in three
hours... can't do it by ordinary telephone you see... nothing really
has changed, even if he said so... Why not go...

K: British are afraid with Sadat having said no.

D: Then go to the Australians...

K: That's what we will do. The Australians have nothing to lose
with Egypt. I will be in touch with you in three hours, we will try
to get something done within three hours.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12957
By: N.M. Gatz

TELECON
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

9:50 p. m.

D. Hello.

K. I just talked to Hume. They have been talking to Sadat and Sadat says they will never accept a straight ceasefire.

D. They discussed directly with Sadat? I must send a telegram to Moscow right away....

K. I am pressing them and they will call me back in three hours.

D. Both our countries will abstain. Even in this case it is my firm decision....

K. We will still press the British to....

D. If Sadat even told them so, we will definitely abstain and will keep our word in this case. If we both abstain it will be of political significance. What is now the problem? The British are not decided?

K. The British are reluctant because they think that Sadat will not agree to it. If Moscow could talk to him.

D. In three hours I will not get an answer unless I go by ordinary telephone.

K. No, that is too dangerous.

D. I think so. Really, even if he said so....

K. Because the British are afraid of Sadat saying no and going ahead....

D. Maybe we should go with Australia.

K. That is what we will do. Australia has nothing to lose Egypt. I will be in touch with you in three hours. I will try to do something by tonight.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority EO1295C</td></tr><tr><td>By: XARA Dated: 6/13/73</td></tr></table>

TELCONE

October 13, 1973

9:50 a. m.

D: Under the circumstances think it should be shown that
both our countries....

D: We are definitely.... going to keep our word... up stand,
something of political significance. Don't you think?

K: Yes.

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

10:15 a. m.

K. Do we have to get permission to refuel American planes in the Azores?

S. I will have to check. I don't believe so.

K. If the answer is yes, then why do we have a base there?

S. The U.S. Military does not need permission.

K. I want to know the name of the person who is inventing obstacles and have him removed from this operation immediately.

S. Did you hear this from the Israelis?

K. Yes. The Israelis are here now and were told the planes could not leave because of refueling. Whoever told them that will have to be removed from this operation now. Can you do that immediately?

S. I can do that.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12950
By XARA Date 0/17/01

TELCORN

Lord Cromer - Secretary Kissinger

October 13, 1973

10:26 a. m.

C: How did your talk go?

K: Very unsatisfactorily because you are now negotiating separately
with the Egyptians.

C: Don't know about negotiating exactly...

K: Well, trying to sign separate resolution with the Egyptians.
Both sides will accept ....... thought you might get word to him
while he is thinking.

C: Take your point entirely.

K: After talking to Alec, I talked to Dobrynin. Dobrynin claims
you have misconception of the situation.

C: ...that Egypt will agree.

K: Misconception about some kind of Soviet trick, but they
didn't even know who we were going to to set up the resolution.
Alec said Dobrynin's word against Sadat's, why take Dobrynin's?

C: I see what's happening and of course I take your point.

K: What we have decided to do, if you are still dancing around
and will not go along with any resolution other than what we have
proposed. You are trying to come up with an idea of a peace keeping
force of peace conference, we will veto it. Too complicated.

C: Yes, well what I said yesterday... simplicity...

K: If you can press .... to participate in the maneuver, which
could not have had you as an object, we will move to Australia or
France.

C: Quite. I don't think that will make a whole lot of difference.
Don't think it will work any better.

K: Well, it probably won't with France, but it might with the
Australians.

C: I don't think they will do it, still...

K: I will tell you honestly, if I can't get .... to introduce the
resolution, we will pour in supplies and see when the battle breaks.
If the West can't get together....

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
Date 6/13/94
By XA RA

telcon
Sec. Kissinger/Sec. Gen. Waldheim

10/13/73 1:13 p.m.

W: I was calling to congratulate you on your press conference, I think it was really well handled, the way you answered all these delicate questions.

K: Thank you.

W: And I wanted to thank you for the way you dealt with the UN.

K: Well, I think you are very nice.

W: It was very helpful--Dr. Kissinger, but what I wanted to tell you is the following. I had a long talk yesterday with El Zayyat after the Security Council meeting--and they decided the following which I wanted to let you know--apparently they feel very strong militarily, whether it is justified or not, at any rate, he put to me the following points. He said they are ready to accept a ceasefire, if the Israelis give a commitment to withdraw to the 1967 lines.

K: Yeh, well that's out of the question.

W: I told them this. I said I don't think there is any chance to get this. But I thought I should tell you because he mentioned quite a number of points, point one, commitment to withdraw to the 6th of June lines, point two--this commitment --the help could be done indeed by the United States, then three, he would give an Egyptian commitment to international forces in Sharm ash Shaykh and also to international buffer zones these international troops in the Golan Heights--not in the whole area but in an area along Syrian border and then he said we would accept an international conference to negotiate details, etc., but some sort of arrangement for the Palestinians would be found and the Palestinians would have--participate in such a conference. I thought I should let you know this. I am of course fully aware that especially the first point is not acceptable to Israel because I have spoken to Aba Eban the day before. And I told him this first point is as far as I can judge, definitely not acceptable to Israel. He said but why should we not be more flexible since we have military advantages before.

K: Right.

Page 2

W: They apparently feel militarily strong now and believe they are able to keep what they got under East Bank and don't want to be more flexible.

K: Right. Well I appreciate this very much, Mr. Secretary General and if I have anything to report to you I will take the liberty of calling you.

W: Well thank you very much. Do you have the impression that it sounds a major progress in your talks with the Russians.

K: I'll have a little better judgment of that later this afternoon and I'll call you if there is anything to report.

W: Thank you very much. I'm sorry that I have --

K: No, no it is important for you and me to keep in touch.

W: Thank you very much.

K: Good bye.

W: Goodbye, Dr. Kissinger.

DECLASSIFIED
Authorized EO 1295C
B:

SARA Dated 6/13/67

TELCOM

October 13, 1973

1:40 p. m.

D: I have had telegram from Moscow which says the Australian
variation is not really a good one.

K: Isn't?

D: That's all I received is the telegram and it says further
explanation will come. I would like simply to tell you what I have
as of now.

K: Maybe the British are trying to become a world power as a
result of this.

D: Could be. Anyway, the telegram says we will send you further
instructions on this point. I simply am trying to tell you. I don't
know why they are objecting, I only wish you to know what I have
just received.

K: You have seen the press coverage of my press conference.
It was very moderate with respect to our relations. I think it
achieved the objective. Don't you?

D: To a certain extent, yes.

K: On the other hand, really, I hope, I see the massive airlift
is continuing today.

D: On the same scale.

K: Now 105 planes flown in.

D: Altogether, from the very beginning you mean?

K: An that's a terrific amount.

D: I know, I don't know the figures but it is....

K: ...beyond a certain point, and we are approaching a point where we
will have to do something, not done fully yet. I mean we are beseiged
by Senators yelling and screaming. I hope Moscow understands. I
am saying this as a friend, if we are played with we will have to do
something, with all reluctance, you should try to pick up some easy
victories -- well, you know there are no easy victories.

D: No, that's very clear.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12955
Date 10-04-73
By MW

TELCOM

October 13, 1973

1:40 p. m.

K: Isn't?

D: That's all I received is the telegram and it says further explanation will come. I would like toply to tell you what I have as of now.

K: You have seen the press coverage of my press conference. It was very moderate with respect to our relations. I think it achieved the objective. Don't you.

D: To a certain extent, yes.

D: On the same scale.

K: Now 105 planes flown in.

K: ... beyond a certain point, and we are approaching a point where we will have to do something, not done fully yet. I mean we are beseeched by Senators yelling and screaming. I hope Moscow understands. I am saying this as a friend, if we are played with we will have to do something, with all reluctance, you should try to pick up some easy victories -- well, you know there are no easy victories.

D: No, that's very clear.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized EO 1295R

D: MARA Data: 6/13/73

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

2:25 p. m.

K. .... and if they are moving ahead would you move ahead. I
have talked with Dinitz.

S. Yes, he has called me and summarized your conversation. I
will call him back and keep him posted when the planes leave.

K. Good. Fine.

S. On the Romanian visit. Apparently there is no problem with the
dates.

K. I will just offer them.

S. Fine. The Israelis said the Egyptians 25th armor division has
crossed the canal. They feel they will try to break out.

K. The Russians will not accept an Australian proposal. It is
either the British or nothing. They probably figure that the
British won't move. We may be forced to pour stuff in there.

S. We may. That is a very different strategy but it may be
necessary to try.

K. We can't let Israel lose.... If the Soviet side wins we will be in
very bad shape. Then we will have to break the detente and go to
a higher defense budget.

S. No question about it. It is very serious if it goes that way.
I am trying to stay on top of this thing now and I will keep bugging
them.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 1295C
Date 6/12/01
By KARA Dae

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

3:15 p. m.

H. ... He just was very concerned about the remark by the President that he wanted them to turn in their resignations. He wanted to know if we....

K. I just hope you backed it up.

H. I said that was exactly what the President told him. ... later their policy and spirit of it there were some suggestions that there was no spirit being followed. He said while these problems are not State's and I don't think Henry knows....

K. There was one problem for three hours on Tuesday night and it was all about care of as soon as it was understood.

H. One of our problems with Ward and Clement was that WSA G hadn't met enough and they weren't talking with him on the problems.

K. I had him over every day.

H. That may be one of the problems.

K. I deliberately didn't want to because I was afraid they would leak. I am having them daily now.

H. Kennedy was a great help in those things and put deadlines on each one of the problems.

K. What more could be done than having him in every day?

H. I told him to get professional military men in the cornerstone of the action groups because they don't have hangups to get in the way.

K. It was probably a mistake not to have the meeting. We didn't think there would be any problems every day. They told us they had gone.

H. He was shocked to know that it hadn't moved to the Azores. He told me last night it was there. That was a case of an interdepartmental snafu. Your people weren't handling that they were working on the pick up problem.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12951
By: XARA Date: 6/13/91

TELCON

Sir Alec Douglas-Home - Secretary Kissinger

October 13, 1973

3:35 p. m.

DH: We have been over and over your suggestion with the Prime Minister. We don't think that the time is right for this initiative and we don't think we could take it now although for the next few days we will try to wrack our brains to see if we have other suggestions. Our contact with Sadat has gone so far as to say that he feels so strongly he would invoke a Chinese veto if anybody proposed something of this sort. Therefore, the Russians would in our view have no chance whatever of looking on Sadat and forcing him to do so. This, at least at present. If you really want to do this, if you and the Soviet Union were to abstain, of course we would do our best, if you wanted to get the Australians to try this line.

K: Let me get back to you if we want to revive it. If we have any other ideas we will be in touch with you.

DH: If we have any other ideas I will give you a ring tomorrow. At the moment, haven't got any idea. Didn't think we could take initiative of a simple resolution of cease fire as you ask because we think Sadat really doesn't want to accept would reject it, what's more he would reject it vehemently. I have talked to the Russians and told them this. It doesn't look really too be a starter. Australians of course might be willing to do it. MacIntyre is in a particularly good position to do it. If you want to launch it. Having gone over it again and again, don't think you can get the support in the Security Council, Anyway are you very worried about the effect generally about detente with the Russians?

K: ... massive resupply for Israel on our side....

DH: Two other things. The French have exactly the same impression as us of Sadat. We think relations being what they are with Sadat if there had been a glimmer of hope in a move like this he would have said so, on the contrary he gave us a totally, worse than negative signal.

K: I understand this. As to your question about whether detente is our motivating consideration... Detente is not an end in itself. I think developments now are going to drive us towards a confrontation.

DH: I know, this is a great worry. Couldn't you fix this with

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

4:00 p. m.

K. Anatoly, I have just heard from the British and they do not feel they can proceed. They were told by Sadat 1) he did not want a resolution and 2) if such a resolution were put in he would call the Chinese to veto it. He would consider any ....

That leaves two possibilities. Either you tricked us

D. It was always easy to check with us. After all it was very clear... all the day before yesterday when our answer came. It was very easy to be approved two days ago when we came to the General Assembly but

K. First we have to get somebody to put it in.

D. I understand that. If it came to the floor we would abstain.

K. I don't doubt that you would abstain. What is the sense of such a maneuver if you thought the Egyptians wouldn't accept it. You engaged in our discussions with the Israelis.... At any rate the British won't introduce it and you don't want the Australians to introduce it.

D. .... give our instruction. I am now waiting for instructions....

K. We are not going to do anything. We are now going to wash our hands of it and let nature take its course.

D. I will be in touch.

K. I was until an hour ago operating under the instructions.... and I interpreted your airlift as a show of good will to the Egyptians. .... It looks as if you want this war to continue and let us go through three days of meetings with the Israelis and British in the meantime.

D. Before then how could we know that the British would wait to give a firm decision. I am sure that the British would tell you we were not in touch with them at all.

K. You might have known what Sadat would do....

D. I am just telling you that it is a very wrong assumption.

K. We operated on the assumption when you told us you had discussed with Egypt that they would accept it. There is no reason....

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
By: XARA Date: 6/13/73

D. At this very moment... would held under the pressure so to speak.

K. Now when they say they are going to ask the Chinese to veto

D. Maybe Sadat changed his mind and...

K. And they told the British they had said the same thing to you. That is

D. No

K. To gain time.

D. For whom, for them?

K. That's right.

D. For Israel to ... the Syrians. It was a very interesting presumption.

K. There is no sense discussing it.

D. I was waiting for the reply. What they wanted to tell us.

K. Of course how we have to look at your airlift as a continuing thing and consider the possible that we will be ...

D. Let us wait. Maybe in an hour or two. You

K. You might as well tell Moscow that nothing is going to happen today.

D. Will you call me when you have something.?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
By: XARA Date: 6/13/94

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

4:05 p. m.

K. Hello. And they don't want to lose that much prestige. The Russians don't want Australia to introduce the resolution. As I understand there are now 15 C-4l and 3 C-5s underway. The Portugese have ... now. You start the charters. Since we are going to be in a confrontation we should go all out. I am going to call.... I want to warn him in the event you might get.... Ask how long it will take the 82nd Airborne to get ready.

S. Of course.

K. Not to do anything. I think those bastards understand only brutality.

S. I was just talking to Dinitz and they are very pleased with the report that things are on their way.

K. Are you getting the two ships loaded?

S. There is one in Boston at the present time and it is almost loaded.

K. Get that on the way.

S. The other is to be in on the 15th.

K. If they want to play, we will play.

S. I think under the circumstances we have no other choice.

K. It could be that the Egyptians were willing to do it. I told Dobrynin that they were diddling us along to gain time. He told me he thought we were diddling them along for the Syrian offensive.

S. That is possible too. I will call you back on the 82nd.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12951
Date 10/13/91
By: SARA D.

TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger

October 13, 1973

4:15 p. m.

K: Portuguese have agreed to use of the airfield.

S: For charters?

K: For anything.

S: Jesus Christ, that's a surprise. What did you tell them?

K: I just told them we wouldn't bargain. If they reject we will remember. When the crisis against which they want to protect themselves occurs. This is for your own personal information.

S: That means we can go over to charter by Monday... continue to fly the stuff into the Azores.

K: One problem you have to remember... looks like our diplomatic initiative is coming apart. The British won't play because Egypt won't play according to the British. We may be getting into a confrontation posture with the Soviets. Soviets may just figure that if they have the whole Arab world against us... you know the 21st armoured division crossed the Canal, we just got the word from the Israelis.

S: ... leave them alone in the ... part of the Sinai. When they get out the Israelis will look better.

K: Israelis lined it up. Russians assured me Egypt was lined up.

S: I don't get the Brits. Why not tell them we are not going to give them any Poseidons or Polaris?

K: No, they're going to get them anyway, these things have to be done in cold blood. No, don't share your information yet, do it tomorrow morning.

S: Well, I'm going to tell Clements about the Portuguese. Can I tell you something funny. One hellLOT of stuff ready to move. We've got it on the planes in case we got the word to fly it direct to Israel. Then we found out the stuff was still sitting right here in the United States. We didn't get a clearance from the State Department. We've moved the stuff off to the Azores now, 15 Cl4ls and 3 C58s will be airborne at noon.

K: Moving into to Tel Aviv?

S: Yes, Henry.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12955

By: XARA DEO 6/13/97

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

4:25 p. m.

K. Anitoly, I just talked to the President and he asked me to tell you that under these circumstances he can no longer observe any restrictions that I gave you yesterday on flying American plans.

D. Under what circumstances?

K. The plan we worked out is not being implemented because we didn't know the Egyptians real feelings. We are prepared to stop when you are.

D. What?

K. We are prepared to stop our aerial supplies when you are willing to stop.

D. I will send that right now.

K. So what I told you yesterday as of an hour from now will not be accurate.

D. You don't want to wait even an hour?

K. We can always stop it. It will not be that massive that quickly.

D. O'k.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12950

D: NARA Doc 617/01

TELECON
Cromer/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

4:35 p. m.

K. Hello.

C. Henry, I still haven't heard anything.

K. I talked to Alec and your people won't do it. They have talked to the Egyptians and they say they are violently opposed to it.

C. They won't give any.... Maybe the Egyptians have changed their minds in the delusion that they may win.

K. At any rate I have just talked to the President who is taking it extremely ill. When we look over the crisis of the last three years we just don't seem to be able to get together.

C. Our clients are quite different but our objectives are the same.

K. No right for you to do to us.... We wanted to tell you we are starting an airlift into Israel. There will probably be a confrontation.

C. That was inevitable. I told our people in London that you would have no alternative. It is very disturbing.

K. Especially, since what we asked you to do is what you proposed last week.

C. I think what has changed since then is that the Egyptians obviously got all above themselves.

K. The one consolation one has is whatever the tactical... the West has... we will all go down together, at least we are doing it with the worst possible grace.

C. What will be your posture vis-a-vis when the Arabs start screaming oil at you.

K. Defiance.

C. Just defiance? It is going to be rough won't it?

K. We have no choice.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12950
Dated 12/1/73

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Klessinger

October 13, 1973

8:00 p. m.

K: I have just heard from the British who don't want to proceed. They were told by Sadat, one, that he did not want the resolution and two, such a resolution were put in, they would ask the Chinese to veto it. They would consider it an unfriendly act if it were put in. Leaves two possibilities. Either the Russians tricked us or.

D: It was very easy to check with us.

K: What do you mean.

D: It was clear this particular resolution.... our answer again. It was very easy to be both, even two days ago. Move to the General Assembly, both abstain.

d

K: Got to get somebody to put it in.

D: As it.....

K: Don't doubt that you would abstain. What's the sense of such maneuver if the Egyptians wouldn't accept it. At any rate, British won't introduce it and you don't want the Australians to introduce it.

D: In this connection, please wait until I receive instructions.

K: We're not going to do anything. We are now going to wash our hands of it and let nature take its course.

D: Second possibility was nature.

K: Until about an hour ago, we operated on the assumption you wanted to settle it and the airlift to the Arabs was to show your good will. ..... we can't let war go on three days getting Israel lined up and the British.

D: Before ... Henry, how could we make that ... I have no knowledge at all.

K: You might have known what Sadat would do.

D: In this case it was easy.

K: No sense debating it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12058
By: N.M. Aikins Date: 10/13/73

TELECON
Cromer/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

5:25 p. m.

K. Rowley. I hope you understood what I was telling you before was
under instructions. That was not my own although I am not saying I
disagreed with it.

C. I took it that way.

K. I have an intelligence report I don't want to read over the phone.
It substantiates that we were not lied to. Would you like to come by
for about five minutes?

C. Where are you? The State Department? Why don't I come in
20 minutes or so. I have some things I would like to talk to you about.

DECLASSIFIED
Authoriz.
E01295C
Date: 6/13/73
By: MARA

TELCORN

B/G Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger

October 13, 1973

5:25 p. m.

K: Brent, tell Simon to come to the WSAG with an oil plan ready.

S: Henry, he has a plan ready.

K: I want a plan, not an analysis...

S: We've got a conflict... Simon and Love.

K: Oh Christ, don't bother me with details like that...

S: Well, I got hell from Haig because Simon and not Love....

K: All right. Get Love in and ... if he can do anything in 24 hours...
Just make sure to get the plan by tomorrow. Make sure he can do it
with out getting the whole town worked up.

S: We'll have somebody there who can have a plan ready.

K: And somebody who can keep his mouth shut.

S: Right.

TELCOM

October 13, 1973

5:30 p. m.

S: On the oil contingency plan. Al talked to Love, calling him in now.

K: Haven't got anything against Love, just don't want to give it to
Rogers Morton. In that case prefer to call the New York Times directly.

S: Well, Simons has done a plan and he gave it to Charlie deBona two
days ago to work on...

5:45 p. m.

K: ...got to get to Clements.... protect his oil interests.

S: Talked to Love...had Charlie deBona working on the plan.

K: Is Love going to be there?

S: Yes.

K: Ooooh.

S: Do you want DeBona too?

K: Going to be a slow meeting. Just have him there during that part.
Don't want him to hear the rest of it.

S: OK.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 1295C

By: XARA Dated: 6/13/97

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

6:45 p. m.

S. That might be a little drastic right now. The helicopter carrier will be leaving on Monday. The one that is going to release the one in the Med. That will be some movement in that direction. I just think that the news about the 82nd shouldn't break at the same time resupplies does. It may be..

K. I don't want that to happen. How ehe dirt is going to start flowing.

S. That is too bad.

K. I had to use the British refusal with Russia to justify the airlift which you knew we were going to do anyway.

S. That's right. Let's see, the first airplane will not get to Israel the earliest before 6:00 in the morning our time. I think the meeting is about right.

K. O'k. Thanks.

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12951

Authority

BY: ARA Date: 6/17/01

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

7:33 p. m.

K. I am going to see the President in a little while and he asked
me to check with you about any information you were waiting for.

D. I expect it in five or ten minutes. I will get it. No more.

K. Sadat told the British Ambassador that he had told your Ambassador that he would not accept the resolution.

D. Just a little while. The message is already here but I will not get it for about 10 minuets at the latest.

K. All right.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01295C
BY NARA Doc. 6/17/04

TELECON
Eban/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

7:35 p. m.

E. I have thought about the political action we discussed today.

K. You understand it is not possible today. Hasn't Dinitz told you about the British.

D. He told me about the British refusal on... and the Soviet's refusal of the Australians. I only wonder whether the Soviet refusal is so strong that there is no chance they will change their minds... and if they want it it seems to indicate....

K. I am no longer so sure they want it and I am assuming you don't want us to present it.

D. I gave Mrs. Mier a negative answer and she endorsed that.... The other proposal is that the privilege of appearing in the Council is not limited to the Council. I thought vaguely about Denmark, Brazil, but I don't think they would be any more reasonable to the Soviets than Australia. The British refusal you think is quite final. It either does not happen at all unless the U.S. presents it and even then the Chinese veto is a possibility. If you think their objection to Australia is as firm as that all I ask is confirmation from him. The only possibility is that you.... I am also trying to find out from home what the urgency is. We have managed to overcome the trouble this morning. I will find out if there is any.... I am not recommending the second one at all. I will let you know.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO12951
BY XARA Date 01/13/73

TELECON
Clements/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

7:40 p. m.

K. Bill, I was talking to Jim about your problem. I knew you were
going to get charters together once we convinced you of what we needed.

C. I didn't know that was what you wanted. It is all done.

K. Can we find a better cover than the Defense Department?

C. That is a tough one, Henry. I will think about it and see what I
can do.

K. If we could announce that we are switching from military command
charter flights, except a one day emergency flight, then we will be
o'k.

C. I have raised this question with the airlines and they prefer
some kind of cover. Another name which would represent a pool
in which all the planes would be shown.

K. Who is paying for it is the question.

C. That is a serious question. These people will not function
except under DOD auspices and their guarantee of repayment. We
can use a cover but--

K. Iven if we guarantee the repayment?

C. No, they will not charter to Israel.

K. Excuse me I have another call. I will get back to you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01295C
Date 01/13/73

By: XARA Date:

TELCORN
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

October 13, 1973

7:55 p. m.

D: Oral message --- First Brezhnev refers to our discussion I
had yesterday with your boss during reception

K: Told me about that.

D: Expresses great satisfaction ... about things what said the
President to the Ambassador. Sure... shared his view and he would like
me to tell to Dr. Kissinger he adheres exactly to the same points
of view, Hope, no matter what difficulties, ... many good things
done and will... to keep it.

K: Good, Hope ... going to prove that.

D: Situation in Middle East and Security Council ... for days, US and some countries with which they consulted don't come to the conclusion of immediately convocation of Security Council. We don't know exactly reson of that. Question, reply.... military situation in Middle East how it develops, it develops different, can only through last days. In one day don't have time. Don't think try to follow us ... our part. We concerned on position about cease-fire. Same time tells ... use bombardment of civilian tartets in territories by Israel. Make it more difficult. Indication argued ... Arab capitals and peoples. That's why difficult to discuss on this, questions specifically...nw Arabs are objecting... to accept Security Council resolution which deals only with cease fire. They insist should be accompanied simultaneous cease fire and should be another additional part of solution which had to say about, be stages withdrawals of Israeli troops from Arab territories, which was occupied in 1967. Isn't finished yet, finally consultation with Arab countries about, insist on position ... don't have text yet.

K: We have worked for three days on assumption you are now cancelling.

D: For two days might ... have been quite prepared to do, now Arabs are objecting to this. Like to decide situation on bit scale... which means will remove cause of all conflict. This will be really major decision which will have to decide thing ...

K: Well, where does this leave us? Nowhere.

D: ... now with Security Council.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized EO 1295

BY XA RA Date 0/13/97

2.

K: Now we are right back to where we were last Monday.

D: Looks so...

K: ...took 48 hours to make possible

D: For two days, the day before yesterday and yesterday and in the morning yesterday, I give you reply...even I was shaken up with you...you know I was shaken up...telegram from Gromyko don't receive any for some days. Two days our position very close, we were prepared to abstain...no other interpretation. Very firmly, don't want to have complication. for two days, then Arabs changed position. Telegram from Gromyko say ehck with Kissinger, reply or not. We are complaining you don't...Really waiting until you get the British or something. For two days we are on record not not to vote at all...abstain with you. ...Arabs categorically objected.

K: In the meantime, you sent in 140 airplanes. May be why the Arabs are so tough now.

D: Not really. Security Council resolution two days ago...no connection with airlift. Holding from your side. maybe you relied too much on British. Maybe Australians ...prepared yesterday.

K: Yesterday the British talked to Sadat...what caused delay. Sadat never would have accepted...

D: Yesterday morning ...sent telegram yest4rday...I was shaken last time I talked to you. How we really have known if it wasn't mentioned to you yesterday. Very clear Security Council yesterday morning, I know up until today Malik had instructions very clear -- abstain. Sent very strong telegram to Malik, when you have complained. Immediately called to Scali, going to abstain.

K: Point is, now objective military ...despite very friendly words of Brezhnev, trying to avoid collision, you have 140 airplanes. still much ...we cannot not supply our friends while you are supplying yours.

D: Well, you had made decision.

K: You waited for 5 days. Tonight Egypt launching attack in the Sinai. ...tomorrow when some American airplanes reach Israel

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951
D: 12 MAR 1971
Date 6/17/71

3.

Arabs are going to start yelling. We will not under any circumstances let detente be used for unilateral advantage. No illusions about that. I have ... airlift for four days. ... way of getting political settlement. Friends have refused to participate in something took you two days to get Arabs... they change their minds. I think once we were in it with you, Arabs, if President had given the word to Brezhnev... believe at last moment on day it was supposed to be implemented say they wouldn't do it. We made agreement this summer, friends objected to, sex went ahead with it. ... important to us. you can tell Moscow to save itself the effort, we are not going to accept the Egyptian position. Only exacerbate the situation by proposing it to us.

D: All right, fair enough.

K: ...want to accept Egyptian position, deal directly with it. I have had Egyptian position since Wednesday.

D: Did they propose this to you before or on Wednesday.

K: On Wednesday Egyptians sent us a proposal, of which they said they gave you a copy. and which is totally inconsistent with your proposal. Israel return to '67 borders, peace conference of great Powers, Palestine and Arabs, discuss only international ... and security and future of Palestine.

D: Wednesday, quite prepared to support...

K: I told the President, despite this message from Ismail, I relied on your word. Quite inconsistent to what Arabs told us. I assume Arabs... you knew Egypt would agree in no sense, how you support, if Egypt wouldn't agree.

D: I understand this point of view. Change ... few days ago.

K: Fine with us and we just have to see what happens now.

D: Is completely unacceptable, two part resolution.

K: Well, what's the second part?

D: Stages, back to borders.

K: ... secure and recognized borders.

D: '67.

K: No, unacceptable, may be in ... in Moscow not to ... add obligation not to exacerbate situation. Until this afternoon I believed ... had

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12950
D: 12 MARA Date 01/17/97

4.

possibility of pressing for settlement. pressing for a cease fire. Now hasn't happened, you are pulling in, ... unable or unwilling to produce ceasefire...are obviously on collision course no matter how many ... what do you think we can say to the people on Monday, had them quieted down of the weekend ... so utility of detente ... to both of us. You don't think we will accept a military set back in the Middle East, can't believe it.

D: Wouldn't believe it.

K: I recognize you have problems. ... have to... No law that says you have to send in 140 airplanes.

D: I understand, is a problem.

K: Until this minute not one American airplane has landed in Israel. Not one. ... My whole strategy based on reliance on you. I can tell you, in addition to whatever else is achieved, my own credibility with respect to what ... not exactly high at this moment. ... but not from you personally, put in ... to me yesterday afternoon, getting contrary report from Sadat than I was from you. I said I had absolute confidence ... never liked to us before.

D: Could you imagine the situation. You are taking position proposed to other countries. Circumstances to be changed. This is the situation...exactly I should put it on really stake much while people involved have two days making new suggestions. Now we are in a situation to do it.

K: Why do we have to deal with you, that depends on Sadat, why not deal with Sadat directly.

D: Up to you and the President to decide. ...disastrous results. As you now changed situation we will not ...

K: ... work out this when finished able to demonstrate that special relationship. Developed would have concrete results, if you read the press conference, this was the line I took.

D: I did.

K: On Monday this will be done to ...

D: ... public relations.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized E01295C

BY XA RA Date 6/12/94

K: Monday you will have sent in 50-100 airplanes.

D: You are now free.....

K: Only inflame Arab leaders...victory for you. Only strategy is to make Arabs don't feel they can ... so three or four days from now we'll see what the situation is. ...many proposals like 67 borders, make the situation worse.

D: All right, send back telegram.

K: President is extremely agitated. I know you ... to make favorable according...

D: In my telegram, I will quote, unquote you. I can assure you... otherwise, is dangerous.

K: We had understanding to work on this basic issue in January. This has been completely disregarded now. Will not let ourselves be pressured into it. It would not be ... not be unhelpful. Hear something today, tomorrow. NSC meeting... Don't have to get it today, meeting isn't till Monday

D: All right.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 1295C

By XARA Date 01/14/07

TELCORN

K: The President asked me to call Home.

C: Good.

K: I just didn't want you to think I was going behind your back or anything.

C: No, no. I am very glad you are going to call. I was going to suggest it myself, I was not sure you were going to.

K: He was thinking of calling Heath, our only interest is that we have these maniacs in some sort of balance now...

C: Can't agree more.

K: Going to didle around and one or the other of them may jump off...

C: I'm not a military expert by any means, but I would have thought the crucial moment ... before the Israelis move from one front to the other.

K: Exactly.

C: Thank you for letting me know. Very glad to do it.

K: If you could push from your end.

C: Quite.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12951

BY XARA Date 0/13/09

October 13, 1973

K: We are going to have an NSC meeting on Monday morning.

S: OK

K: We don't know yet at what time. Will let you know.

SOK

K: It would be helpful if we could get an accurate report of Israeli military situation from somebody. Can your Defense Attache handle it? Or should we send somebody out there.

S: Our attache is pretty good, as a matter of fact we are about to reward him for his reporting...

K: Could we get a comprehensive report by tomorrow evening.

S: Supply situation ... up to his ears in stuff. Did you hear the comment Gen. G______ made to our people. "Stop worrying about ammunition, don't want to jam up airports with that. Much more interested in other things." ...wise to send it in. Once trade fields...tied down in the Azores.....

K: We could represent the American airlift as a legitimate temporary thing.

S: This charter thing was no use to us until the Portugues cracked.

K: Monday morning.

S: May be able to use publicly or ...privately. Announce publicly willing to turn off military airlift. Charters will not work for government of Israel. Only work for Department of Defense. Part of problem with Brinegar. ...national emergency.. in effect as favor to government. I would, say require DOD to pay for it.

K: What do we achieve by charters.

S: Not a hell of a lot. Thin cover at this stage.... permitted Government of Israel to hire them...our government disengaged. Supply less effective cover in which we were going to hire them on behalf of Israeli, requested to do so by Department of Transportation. ....
shifting to charters, public announcement.

K: Yes, but somebody will ask who chartered what. Defense Department still American military planes, what do we achieve.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority EO 1295C
 By: NARA Date 01/13/73

2.

S: We achieve the ability to reduce the uniformed military role in this operation.

K: OK, that's worth something.

S: It's not worth a hell of a lot. Worth something to use it to get something more...Soviets in there with military people and...

K: Trouble is facing Soviets alone. Don't give a goddamned....

S: Its the Arabs

K: Arabs worry me on airlift ....

S: I think you can turn it into a virtue.

K: Keep in mind tomorrow at the WSAG how to handle that. What achieve with charters. Find a better cover for it.

S: Would permit more effective use of Israel air fleet. What we would do is to have charters fly the stuff to the Azores.

K: I would prefer that.

S: We have a number of options -- for charters to fly into Tel Aviv, rather than US military personnel. Likelihood of government taking .... with US government or private chartered by US government.

K: Chartered by US government. Don't know what to gain from it.

S: What ...10 short fall. Israel no support ... everyone treats them as .... or pariahs.

K: This thing continue to point out what a... I wanted to avoid. Arabs wanted it to achieve.

S: Coudn't agree more.

K: How could we have avoided it?

S: Don't think you could.

K: OK, we'll discuss the charter principal tomorrow.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authentic</td></tr><tr><td>EO 1295C</td></tr><tr><td>By: ARA DATE: 6/14/67</td></tr></table>

TELECON,

October 13, 1973

Secretary/General Scowcroft

S. On the M letter we haven't sent a date
because of a possible trip.

K

K. Why don't we set it around the 20th when there isn't a trip.

S. Christmas?

K. 20th of November.

S. Yes, I guess we can do that.

K. You think we can do it before M comes? In the
next two hours?

S. I don't know when there won't be a trip.

K. It is idiotic to keep a Government waiting four months
--they aren't boys from Iowa.

S. Thanksgiving is the 23?

K. That is impossible.

S. No, its the 29 . . no the 22nd.

K. How about the 20th or 21st? Can you check?

~~Approved by:~~

~~BY:~~ NARA Doc. 6/12/73