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SIDE A

Q: I would like to ask you some questions concerning consequences of the U.S. election on foreign policy. To start with, President-Elect Bush said he wants to meet Gorbachev soon. What do you expect from such a meeting?

A: What he said, if I understood him correctly, was that he wanted a meeting to discuss the direction which they propose to take. That, I think, would be useful--a philosophical meeting in which they review objectives and maybe strategy. But a negotiating meeting, say about START, has two problems. First, I don't think heads of government should negotiate these things. That was the major difficulty with Reykjavik. If they disagree you have no place to appeal. And some issues are too technical to be settled by heads of government. Second, I think that the President-elect should have an opportunity to define his agenda before he gets into detailed negotiations, and above all he should try to come to an agreement with his European friends before he goes into a serious negotiation with the Soviets.

Q: How long will it take to define the agenda?

A: That's hard to judge until one knows the cast of characters. I would think maybe into the summer. He will be overwhelmed. Everybody in Washington who has a project and every ally who wants to make domestic points is going to rush to him with proposals on what to begin negotiating right away. The Soviets may want to stampede him into a rapid negotiation.

One would pay for that in the long run because... I think the fact has to be faced that arms control as now conceived is at the limits of its possibilities. As we stand now the Soviet Union is tempted to play all the allies against each other and to stampede us with technical proposals. But in the long run it doesn't solve their problem of control; it does not solve the problem of stability in Eastern Europe or in Central Europe and we are wasting years in which we might have a really fundamental negotiation.

Q: There's one thing which is... I mean, which should be done sooner, and that's the modernization of the short-range nuclear systems. What's your evaluation of the situation concerning this modernization debate?

A: I think it's an unfortunate debate.

Q: why?

A: First, it's a pity that we withdrew the weapons with which we can attack the aggressor and left only the weapons that can damage the victims. And therefore it is a very tough domestic debate for Germany. Now we are in the absurd situation that to modernize weapons that are already there creates a huge political issue.

I'm very worried about the principle that the Soviets are developing a veto over NATO deployment in the guise of preserving good relations with them.

They don't ask us what weapons they can put into Eastern Europe or into Western Russia. And we never comment on that. So for all of these reasons it's a pity that this should become a touchstone of allied relations. I'm not sure we should have asked for modernization. I think refusing modernization will cause enormous damage, because it will lead to the de facto denuclearization of

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SIDE A

Q: I would like to ask you some questions concerning the U.S. election on foreign policy. Will you support President-Elect Bush said he wants to meet Gorbachev soon. What do you expect from such a meeting?

A: That's hard to judge until one knows the cast of characters I would think maybe into the summer. He will be overwhelmed. Everybody in Washington who has a project and every ally who wants to make domestic points is going to rush to him with proposals on what to begin negotiating right away. The Soviets may want to stampede him into a rapid negotiation.

Q: why?

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BOTH SIDES

SIDE A

Q: I would like to ask you some questions concerning the consequences of the U.S. election on foreign policy. To start with, President-Elect Bush said he wants to meet Gorbachev soon. What do you expect from such a meeting?

Q: why?

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the Federal Republic. I know people will say we still have airborne weapons there, but that will be the next phase. Then Soviets will after to withdraw conventional forces in return for long-range aircraft, and the process will be unending.

Q: Most people in Germany would bet that this government wouldn't agree to modernization before the next election. If you take into account that Gorbachev will come to Bonn next April?

A: Well, I'm even more worried about another thing--that the Federal government has said that it will modernize unless there is progress on conventional arms control. But there will be progress on conventional arms control, so that is another way... because what if the Soviets withdraw two divisions from Eastern Europe? Nobody can say this isn't progress. So it will go again like the INF thing, that statements are made for very understandable reasons and then we get trapped by them.

Q: But do you think that the American government is fully aware of this trend?

A: I am personally in favor of modernization, even though I think it is a less important issue than was INF. The INF deployment I thought was strategically and politically important. Modernization is (ital) symbolically (unital) important. I would prefer it if that issue were not stressed in the first phase of the Bush Administration at least until we have a more coherent approach to the Soviets.

Q: I don't know whether you know that in public opinion polls in Germany Gorbachev is sort of a... ((German word? Sounds like Friedensfurst?-- Dan P.))?

A: Gorbachev is undoubtedly an important figure, a remarkable figure in many ways, but nothing has been done to help us. It is done because it is necessary to modernize the Soviet economy. And to lot him pay us off with domestic reform which he needs for his own reasons, has the practical consequence that the Russian people are held hostage for foreign policy purposes. That can't be our objective.

Q: But what is perhaps a little bit disturbing is for these people to hear what they heard two weeks ago, when President Reagan declared the end of Cold War...

A: I didn't happen to agree with President Reagan's policy in the last 18 months. I have stated so often in your newspaper. But again in fairness many European politicians were doing the same thing.

My opinion is it is our duty to look after the national security and the progress of our country. Properly conceived, that means we also have to take into serious consideration the national security concerns of the Soviet Union, because we cannot insist on agreements unilaterally to our benefit.

If the Soviet Union were to cut its military budget in half, and if it made a contribution in this way to its own reform, I would have no objection to our contributing to the Soviet evolution. But for us to say that peace will be achieved by helping the Soviet Union to become strong and that nothing else needs to be done, or nothing significant else needs to be done, that is an evasion of responsibility.

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This reflects PAGE 3

Q: What's your comment on the idea behind this policy that people say we have, the argument is like that: We have to have Gorbachev, and it is our duty to help him because if we help him he can implement his reforms, then the system gets more liberal and in the end he can... the whole system looks less threatening.

A: Threatening. Well, ahh, it's based on a whole number of assumptions not one of which is provable and most of which are contrary to historical experience.

Since the Rumanovs came to power in Russia, Russia has expanded in every century and has acquired most of its neighbors in every century one way or another. They've also often been invaded. But the key is that the Russian concept of security has been that its neighbors should be impotent.

This is a key problem. Now this has to be changed. It doesn't mean that the Soviet Union does not have legitimate security concerns--it does! But they have to be solved in a system of equilibrium, because that is the only protection for others. That is the foreign policy challenge of our period, and to say that automatically the transformation of the Soviet system will bring about peace really means that the Soviets are blackmailing us. It means that we are paying tribute to a weak Russia. I think that's a great mistake. I repeat: If the Soviet Union shows significant foreign policy changes, and if it changes its military arrangement so that it is less threatening, then we could well consider economic cooperation, to a much greater degree.

Q: What's your expectation now concerning the new administration? I mean the President-elect? What's your evaluation? How will he handle these problems?

A: He will be under tremendous pressure because all the established individuals in the current administration will defend their policy. And no doubt the outgoing President insofar as he has recommendations will urge this, and most of our allies will urge it, even when they don't mean it. That's on one side.

On the other side, I would hope that the new President ~~realizes~~ that he has a unique opportunity to make a contribution to permanent peace, not just to public relations, but to a real change in the relationship; but that requires a more sober policy than has been characteristic of the West in recent years.

Q: Could you name some elements of such an evolution?

A: I think there has to be a political negotiation with the Soviets about the future of Europe. I think this idea of a European home from the Urals to the Atlantic is an absurdity. What happens to the part of the Soviet Union from the Urals to the Pacific? It means Moscow is in and America is out. And obviously that.

Q: Just one more question about START. What's your expectation concerning these strategic arms reduction talks? What's your?

A: I think any student of the subject will have to agree that the best you can say for any of these agreements is that they do not change the situation. And the way they are defended domestically... it is always argued that they do not change the situation, because we have other weapons with different ranges. (and they work?)

When are we going to make an agreement that does change the

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situation?

Now about START in isolation, my concern is that it is part of a
process of delegitimizing nuclear weapons. That it makes the
initiation of nuclear war on the part of the democracies more
complicated, and since they need to initiate nuclear war if they're
going to defend Europe--the whole strategy being based on that--it
is from that point of view... it will lead to a revision of the
security concept, no matter how these numbers are balanced and
played out. So I would like to see it more brought into
relationship with conventional disarmament. But then I think
conventional disarmament has to be brought into some relationship
to political concepts for the future of Europe, or even the Soviet
point of view. Otherwise unexpected developments can blow up that
will change everybody's estimates.

Q: One of the latest...

A: ... Of course you understand I'm speaking entirely for myself. I'm not speaking for anybody here.

Q: One of the latest suggestions was sort of a European summit on conventional disarmament with NATO ((last summer,)) European nations I think all in all, some 20, 23 or so. Do you think Gorbachev has a fully worked-out concept?

A: No, I don't. Look at Gorbachev's problems. He has to undertake a revision of the Soviet governmental system, the Soviet economic system. That must take him 15 hours a day. So it is quite conceivable to me that he is manipulating foreign policy for two purposes: One, to get prestige successes at home so that he can show to his public, or to his leadership groups, that he's having great success. And he has had good success. He's gotten rid of some overseas deployment of strategic weapons. And he has sort of paralyzed SDI through the process of negotiation. And he has established certain ideas, defensive orientation of conventional forces.

I have gone around research institutes to try to find out what it could mean, and it's very difficult--because if you look at history you cannot really find an example where that has ever been done. So it will lead to endless negotiations in which numbers get thrown around, and I'm not against it, but I can't visualize what it means. And in the process there's this fundamental issue: Any reduction of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, that is enough to reduce the threat to Western Europe, will also reduce the Soviet capacity to impress Eastern Europe. Are they willing to live with that? That is a key question.

Q: Another question is this European development to the more... to the Common Market, the ((German word? sounds like 'binon market'--Dan F)) And what's your opinion? I mean, what do you expect from the new U.S. government in response to...

A: Yes, let me go back to the military thing first? I think we need... and in fact that's why I agree with your own government... we need a coherent concept of what we are trying to do. And so what I say shouldn't be taken as opposition in principle, but it is opposition to making one technical proposal after another without understanding what one is trying to achieve politically.

Now about the Common Market. I think it's a good thing. I think

an overall

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one of the elements that can prevent the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance is a strengthening of European cohesion, and its expansion into the political field. And indeed I would welcome it in the military field, too. ((P. One short-word here I can't get. Dan F)) It will undoubtedly have some opposition in the United States on the part of people familiar with the... more comfortable with the familiar. But it is in principle in our interest, and it will require some negotiations, and I think it's required some restraint by the Europeans, especially the economic ((field?)) Alisa

Q: If Europeans get closer, and better in the military field, couldn't one envisage a time when people say in the United States, 'Now they can defend themselves, by themselves? Why should we..?'

A: Well, this is either true or it isn't true. I can foresee no circumstance in which the United States can risk the domination of Europe by another major power. After all, we fought two world wars when we were isolationists. (We want there. So I don't think that a rational American foreign policy will ever get to that view, and I would hate to think that Europeans come to the view that only if they are weak can... will America defend them.)

Q: Couldn't the Europeans--I mean, 350 million people with all the economic power--couldn't they defend themselves without the Americans again?

A: No. I think the Europeans should be able to defend themselves against all but the most overwhelming threat, and especially... But they cannot do it in the nuclear field. So they need American support against nuclear attack, and they need enough American conventional support to make it clear that America will respond. But I do not believe that the structure of NATO as it has existed in the entire post-war period inevitably needs to continue for 40 years in the same way.

Q: What's your expectation from the new government concerning Israel and the Middle East?

A: The problem for Israel is that on the one hand they cannot yield to the uprising because that will start an endless process. On the other hand they cannot stay where they are. Those are two realities. I have never believed that an international conference can settle that unless there is already an agreement ahead of time what the international conference will approve. I can see an international conference to provide international assurances and support or even guarantees, even though I don't think much or guarantees. There was an international conference to support the Vietnam agreement, and not one nation came to the assistance when it was totally broken in every respect.

Secondly, I don't believe that peace negotiation as such can succeed, because it forces the Israelis... The minimum the Arabs can accept is a lot more than any Israeli can conceive. And conversely for the Arabs to recognize a state of Israel in a legal way, without having Jerusalem and major... and even beyond the '67 borders, is also going to be almost impossible. So I think it would be a better negotiation to proceed along the lines of some of the things Peres put forward in the last campaign--he shouldn't have put it forward as a political issue--in which Israel gives up

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certain territories, not in return for peace but in return for demilitarization and end of terrorism, and then let that development for a period of years and go from there.

Q: But wouldn't one pre-condition be some sort of acceptance of PLO? How should it work?

A: I think it could be worked out that the Arab states--like Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia--make themselves responsible for the acceptance of these populations. And defacto it could well happen that many of the officials in these territories are PLO, but not yet a PLO ((tape glitch--?--Dan F.)) organization because once you have created a PLO state, it will lead to endless problems with both Jordan and Israel. Nobody really wants a PLO state. No, they all talk about it, but nobody wants it.

Q: And what's your evaluation of the South African situation, apartheid, sanctions?

A: I wrote an article about that several years ago and my opinion hasn't significantly changed. The West on moral grounds has to be against apartheid in terms of segregation. On the issue of power-sharing, if the West expresses an opinion, it also is obliged to have a...

Q: But how will Bush judge --?--

A: One has to remember the vice presidency is an office that least lends itself to the articulation of a public philosophy, because you are not... you participate in the discussions that make decisions, but you have no decision-making power of your own. And you have to show total loyalty to your President, because otherwise it becomes impossible for both parties.

On the other hand you learn a great deal because you are the only man sitting in on those meetings who doesn't have to rush out and implement something. Now the question is... but... the President-elect has spent all of his adult life aiming for what he has now achieved. He has a high sense of public service, which I know from my own acquaintance with him. He has a high dedication to public service. Now how will he interpret that, now that he can make the decisions himself? You're always surrounded as a leading politician, and especially in our system, by people who are experts on the short term and on the tactical. And you tend after a while to begin to believe that the evening news defines history. But in reality people live in history for a lot longer than a headline, and the people who are remembered by history are those who have stood up often against strong opposition, and not the tacticians who know how to manipulate the day-to-day affairs.

The fundamental decision that will have to be made by the President-elect, either tacitly or explicitly, is what his basic posture is going to be. Men like DeGaulle or Adenauer are remembered because they had a few relatively simple ideas, but they said this is the truth and we will stick to them. And in time these became dominant.

But will Bush do this? I think he has the capacity to do it, but if circumstances will permit him to do it--that is the big issue.

Q: Just one last question. Latin America... what's your...?

A: I think we have a window of opportunity of about 18 months in Latin America. I'll put Central America aside... Mexico's with a

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new president will come into office Dec. 1. Then there are elections in Argentina in May, and their president will get in office the next December. And then there are elections in Brazil in November with the new president getting into office the following March.

Q: Then it would be 1990?

A: That will be '90. So we have... this is why I say we have about 18 months. It is absolutely essential that the United States' foreign policy gets identified with growth in Latin America and not with interest-collection. And while I have my doubts about the argument with respect to the Soviet Union that helping them domestically will solve all foreign policy problems, in the Western Hemisphere the United States needs to identify itself with the aspirations of the people.

Now we are lucky that the new Mexican president is willing to... reform, eager to reform the economy. America cannot do it alone. These countries have to be prepared to adjust their economies and their political structure, so we could have a successful policy with Salinas. That could be then a model for what we do in Argentina and Brazil as they come along. But if we let this thing drift and go from crisis to crisis and if the whole focus becomes the collection of debt, then I am very very worried.

Q: What's your evaluation of this trend of retreat of the Soviet Union--Afghanistan, Angola?

A: Even in Afghanistan and Angola, the West has a tendency to believe that when the Soviet alters its policy it is done as America did in Vietnam. The Soviets have not abdicated in either Afghanistan or Angola, or in Cambodia, and those political...

Q: Or in Nicaragua.

A: --competitions will continue, and the West needs... It will not be continued on the purely military level, but it will also not be continued. It will also not be without pressure. It is absurd to believe in a country like Afghanistan, where the Soviets have been, where the Russians have been since the last part of the 19th century, that suddenly Afghanistan will disappear from Soviet history.

Now in Nicaragua. There are two elements--one, what the Soviets are doing and why, second, what the Cubans and local leaders are doing. I hope that the contras can be resurrected, no matter what one's view might be of the issue. We have to define what we want. We have three choices in Nicaragua: one, to ignore it and wait for some offensive weapons to be deployed there which will never happen; and then, it was the unanimous view of the Central American Convention that I chaired,ibilization, that the pressure on the surrounding countries would become intolerable, and that therefore the process of revolution would continue and could not be contained in a passive way. It was the unanimous view of the Central American bipartisan commission.

Second, of course, would be to seek the overthrow the Managua government. I think we've given that up, too. So the third realistic option is to see whether one can tie the Managua government to a code of procedure that removes the threat to its neighbors, which means removal of Cuban advisers, reduction of armed forces, so that a balance exists in the area and

Soviet

conduct

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economic relationships that are primarily within the Western Hemisphere rather than with the Eastern Bloc. And, of course, no importation of significant amounts of Soviet arms. Now, is that achievable? Certainly not without pressure.

Q: What kind of pressure?

A: That the new President has to decide, but you know the phrase, 'Give Peace a Chance,' as if negotiations operated in a vacuum, is not supported by any historical experience.

###

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001

(CAUTION: This material is strictly embargoed. Its use is authorized only by subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column. With the exception of these paid subscribers, its contents must not under any circumstances be quoted, excerpted, summarized, paraphrased or in any way published in whole or in part. Precautions should be taken to prevent the disclosure of the contents of this material to third parties prior to publication)

HENRY KISSINGER INTERVIEW

For release Sunday, November 19, 1988

(c) 1988, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

This interview with Henry Kissinger was conducted by Manfred Geist, chief editor, of Welt am-Sonntag

Q: How will President-elect Bush handle the problems he is about to inherit?

A: He will be under tremendous pressure because all the established individuals in the current Administration will defend current policy. But the new President has a unique opportunity to make a contribution to permanent peace, not just to public relations, but to a real change in the relationship; that will require a more sober policy than has been characteristic of the West in recent years.

The President-elect has spent all of his adult life aiming for what he has now achieved. He has a high sense of public service, which I know from my own acquaintance with him. He has a high dedication to public service. How will he interpret that, now that he can make the decisions himself? You're always surrounded as a leading politician, and especially in our system, by people who are experts on the short term and on the tactical. And you tend after a while to begin to believe that the evening news defines history. But in reality people live in history for a lot longer than in a headline, and the people who are remembered by history are those who have stood up often against strong opposition, and not the tacticians who know how to manipulate the day-to-day affairs.

The fundamental decision that will have to be made by the President-elect, either tacitly or explicitly, is what his basic posture is going to be. Men like DeGaulle or Adenauer are remembered because they had a few relatively simple ideas, but they said this is the truth and we stick to it. And in time these became dominant.

But will Bush do this? I think he has the capacity to do it, but if circumstances will permit him to do it -- that is the big issue.

Q: The President-elect said he wants to meet Gorbachev soon. What would you expect from such a meeting?

A: What he said, as I understood it, was that he wanted a meeting to discuss the direction which the two leaders propose to take. As I said, that would be useful -- a philosophical meeting in which they review objectives and maybe strategy. But a negotiating meeting, say about Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), has two problems. First, I don't think heads of government should negotiate these things. That was the major difficulty with Reykjavik. If they disagree you have no place to appeal. And some issues are too technical to be settled by heads of government. The President-elect should have an opportunity to define his agenda before he gets into

A

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PAGE 2

Q: What's your expectation concerning the START negotiations?

A: I think any student of the subject will have to agree that the best you can say for any of these agreements is that they do not change the situation. And they are defended domestically on the ground that they do not change the situation. When are we going to make an agreement that does change the situation?

About START in isolation, my concern is that it is part of a process of delegitimizing nuclear weapons. That would make the initiation of nuclear war on the part of the democracies more complicated, and since they need to initiate nuclear war if they're going to defend Europe -- the whole strategy being based on that -- START will lead either to a revision of the security concept -- no matter how these numbers are balanced -- or to paralysis. So I would like to see it more brought into relationship with conventional disarmament. But then conventional disarmament has to be brought into some relationship to political concepts for the future of Europe.

Q: What's your evaluation of the debate over modernization of short-range nuclear systems?

A: I think it's an unfortunate debate. It's a pity that we withdrew the weapons with which we could attack the aggressor and left only the weapons that can damage the victims, making it a very tough domestic debate for Germany. Now we are in the absurd situation where modernizing weapons that are already in place creates a huge political issue.

I'm very worried that the Soviets are developing a veto over NATO deployment in the guise of preserving good relations with them. The Soviets don't ask us what weapons they can put into Eastern Europe or into Western Russia, and we never comment on that. So for all of these reasons it's a pity that modernization should become a touchstone of allied relations. I think refusing modernization will cause enormous damage, because it will lead to the de facto denuclearization of the Federal Republic. I know people will say we still have airborne weapons there, but that will be the next phase. The Soviets have already offered to withdraw conventional forces in return for long-range aircraft, and the process will be unending.

A: I'm even more worried about another thing -- that the Federal government has said that it will modernize unless there is progress on conventional arms control. But there will be progress on conventional arms control, so that is another road toward the equivalent of the zero option. What if the Soviets withdraw two divisions from Eastern Europe? Nobody can say that wouldn't be progress. So it will go again like the INF, with us getting trapped by statements that are made for very understandable reasons.

X

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PAGE 3

Q: Gorbachev stands high in public opinion polls in Germany.

A: Gorbachev is undoubtedly an important figure, a remarkable figure in many ways, but his actions are designed to help the Soviet economy, not to help us. And to let him buy off the West with domestic reform which he needs for his own reasons means that the Soviet people are held hostage for foreign policy purposes. That can't be our objective.

Q: Yet President Reagan has declared the end of Cold War ...

A: I haven't agreed with President Reagan's policy in the last 18 months. I have stated so often in your newspaper. But, in fairness, many European politicians were making the same declaration. It is our duty to look after the national security and the progress of our country. Properly conceived, that means we also have to take into serious consideration the national security concerns of the Soviet Union, because we cannot insist on agreements unilaterally to our benefit.

Q: What's your comment on the idea that we must help Gorbachev because if his system gets more liberal it becomes less threatening.

A: That idea reflects a number of assumptions, not one of which is provable and most of which are contrary to historical experience.

Since the Romanovs came to power, Russia has expanded in every century and has acquired neighbors in every century, one way or another. They've also often been invaded. But the key is that the Russian concept of security has been that its neighbors should be impotent.

This is a key problem. Now this has to be changed. It doesn't mean that the Soviet Union does not have legitimate security concerns -- it does! But they have to be solved in a system of equilibrium, because that is the only protection for others. That is the foreign policy challenge of our period, and to say that automatically the transformation of the Soviet system will bring about peace really means that the Soviets are blackmailing us. It means that we are paying tribute to a weak Russia. I think that's a great mistake. I repeat: If the Soviet Union shows significant foreign policy changes, and if it changes its military arrangement so that it is less threatening, then we could well consider economic cooperation.

Q: One of the latest suggestions was sort of a European summit on conventional disarmament with NATO. Do you think Gorbachev has a fully worked-out concept?

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PAGE 4

A: No. Look at Gorbachev's problems. He has to undertake a revision of the Soviet governmental system as well as of the Soviet economic system. That must take him 15 hours a day. So it is quite conceivable to me that he is manipulating foreign policy for two purposes: One, to accumulate successes to impress his public or leadership groups at home. And he has done that well. He has sort of paralyzed the Strategic Defense Initiative through the process of negotiation. He has established certain ideas, such as the defensive orientation of conventional forces. I have been trying to assess what conventional reductions could mean, and it's very difficult. There are no examples in history of this having been done. It has already led to years of nothing except numbers being passed back and forth and that may become endless. In the process the fundamental issue may be overlooked: Any reduction of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe by enough to reduce the threat to Western Europe will also reduce the Soviet capacity to repress Eastern Europe. Are they willing to live with that? That is a key question.

I think we need an overall concept of what we are trying to do. And so what I say shouldn't be taken as opposition in principle, but it is opposition to making one technical proposal after another without understanding what one is trying to achieve politically.

Q: What do you see developing from the Common Market?

A: I think the Common Market is a good thing. I think one of the elements that can prevent the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance is a strengthening of European cohesion, and its expansion into the political field. And indeed I would welcome it in the military field, too. It will undoubtedly have some opposition in the United States on the part of people more comfortable with the familiar. But it is in principle in our interest. It will require some negotiations, and it will require some restraint by the Europeans, especially the economic arena.

Q: If Europeans get closer, and do better in the military field, wouldn't people in the United States say, let them defend themselves?

A: I can foresee no circumstance in which the United States can risk the domination of Europe by another major power. After all, we fought two world wars when we were isolationists. So I don't think that a rational American foreign policy will ever get to the view that Europe can be abandoned. And I would hate to think that Europeans would come to the view that only if they are weak will America defend them.

Q: Couldn't the Europeans defend themselves without the Americans?

A: The Europeans should be able to defend themselves against all but the most overwhelming threat. But they cannot do it in the nuclear field. So they need American support against nuclear attack, and they need enough American conventional support to make it clear that America will respond. But I do not believe that the structure of NATO as it has existed in the entire post-war period inevitably needs to continue for 40 years in the same way.

Q: How do you see things unfolding in Latin America?

A: We have a window of opportunity of about 18 months in Latin America; I'll put Central America aside. Mexico's new president

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KISSINGER 11-15-88

will come into office Dec. 1. Then there are elections in Argentina in May, and their president will get in office the next December. There are elections in Brazil in November, with the new president getting into office the following March. That takes you to 1990.

It is absolutely essential that the United States' foreign policy gets identified with economic growth in Latin America and not with collection of interest on debt. And while I have my doubts about the argument with respect to the Soviet Union that helping them domestically will solve all foreign policy problems, in the Western Hemisphere the United States needs to identify itself with the aspirations of the people.

Now we are lucky that the new Mexican president is eager to reform the economy. America cannot do it alone. These countries have to be prepared to adjust their economies and domestic structure, so we could have a successful policy with Salinas. That could be then a model for what we do in Argentina and Brazil as they come along. But if we let this thing drift and go from crisis to crisis and if the whole focus becomes the collection of debt, then I am very, very worried.

Q: What's your evaluation of this trend of retreat of the Soviet Union -- Afghanistan, Angola?

A: The Soviets have not abdicated in either Afghanistan or Angola, or in Cambodia. Those political competitions will continue, and the West needs a political concept. It will not be continued on the purely military level, but it will also not be continued without pressure. It is absurd to believe that Afghanistan, where the Russians have been since the last part of the 19th century, will suddenly disappear from Soviet history.

In Nicaragua, there are two elements: First, what the Soviets are doing and, second, what the Cubans and local leaders are doing. We have to define what we want. We have three choices in Nicaragua:

One, to ignore it and wait for some Soviet offensive weapons to be deployed there, which will never happen; but it was the unanimous view of the bipartisan Central American Convention that I chaired that the pressure on the surrounding countries would become intolerable under that option and that the process of revolution could not be contained.

So the realistic option is to see whether we can tie the Managua government to a code of conduct that removes the threat to its neighbors -- which would mean mean removal of Cuban advisers and a reduction of Sandinista armed forces -- so that a balance exists in the area and economic relationships that are primarily within the Western Hemisphere rather than with the Eastern Bloc. And, of course, no importation of significant amounts of Soviet arms. Now, is that achievable? Certainly not without pressure.

Q: What kind of pressure?

A: That the new President has to decide, but you know that the phrase, "Give peace a chance," as if negotiations operate in a vacuum, is not supported by any historical experience.