Henry A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Summary of Conversations in Germany - January 24-30, 1966

The following persons were seen in Bonn: Dr. Hans Ruete, Foreign Office, and his staff, Minister Heinrich Krone, Minister Erich Mende, Herbert Wehner, Minister Westrick, Minister Johann Gradl, Secretary of State (Defense) Gumbel, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard (separate memorandum). In Munich: Franz-Joseph Strauss, Minister Heubl, Helmut Schmid. The conversations will be summarized by topic.

NATO Nuclear Problem

**Foreign Office and Defense Ministry Position:** At the Foreign Office, Ruete, joined at times by two assistants, explained the German view as follows: In the weeks immediately following the German elections, responsible Americans had told Bonn to formulate its demands for nuclear co-ownership with the argument that consultation, to be effective, required a specific subject matter and a share of hardware. A mere governmental agreement to consult was not enough--according to these Americans--since such consultations could easily peter out. Bonn had been led to believe (a) that the MLF could be resurrected if Germany stated its demands sufficiently clearly, (b) that failing that a "hardware solution" involving the British nuclear force was definitely in the cards. I asked whether these arguments had been made by American officials. Ruete replied that they came from individuals whom Bonn had every reason to consider as reflecting Administration views. Also it was the impression brought back by Bonn emissaries from Washington.

Henry A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Once German proposals had been formulated, it became obvious that the American commitment to a "hardware solution" was less intense than had been represented. This produced considerable disappointment in Bonn. Nevertheless the Foreign Office was inclined to persist in exploring the "hardware solution". Specifically there would be an attempt to obtain some British commitment in principle in informal bilateral talks on the occasion of the meetings of the NATO special nuclear committee in Washington in February. After British agreement was obtained, the plan was to approach Italy and perhaps the Netherlands in order to broaden the base of membership. According to present thinking, the four British and U.S. submarines were to comprise a jointly owned NATO force. Initially, these submarines could remain manned by crews of the nationality supplying them.

I asked Ruete what the Federal Republic hoped to gain by such an arrangement. Ruete replied that it was a foot in the door subject to further evolution. I asked Ruete to be more specific. He said that after a reasonable interval the issue of mixed manning could be raised again. This was all the more true because the basic inhibition to mixed manning was the fear of compromising security. This was bound to diminish with the passage of time. In response to a question, Ruete said that two years seemed to him a reasonable time period before mixed manning could be implemented. He knew that senior Americans concurred with this view. At that time, too, the issue of multiple vetos could be reconsidered perhaps by having the European component of the

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force vote by majority.

Ruete said that the prospects of a non-proliferation treaty made a "hardware solution" all the more essential. Otherwise, the FRG could easily feel that its interests have been sacrificed. Finally, the approach of 1969 and the possibility of a revision of the NATO treaty underlined the need for co-ownership. If NATO was drastically modified in 1969 or if it collapsed, a jointly owned force could provide an element of cohesion. I asked whether Ruete really thought that a NATO force could survive the collapse of NATO. Ruete replied that he thought so and that in any event such a force would establish a nuclear option for the FRG. He declined to be more specific.

As for the McNamara committee, Ruete said that it was his understanding that it would be confined to technical military questions. Moreover its membership was too large. He knew that the State Department agreed that an attempt to introduce political questions into the McNamara committee would ruin it. Its proper subject matter was the area of responsibility of Defense, not of Foreign, Ministers. The McNamara Committee, in short, was not the answer to NATO cohesion.

The conversation at the Defense Ministry with Secretary of State Gumbel indicated much less support for the "hardware solution." Gumbel said that the FRG had three options: (1) the status quo, (2) the "hardware solution" and (3) increased consultation. The status quo was unacceptable. The "hardware solution" ran the risk of repeating all the MLF dilemmas. In any event, the German military were leery of sea-based weapons systems and really preferred

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a land-based MRBM. Then, too, the military procurement agreement with the United States had demonstrated to what extent a hardware decision could produce political strains. Gumbel thought that nothing had undermined Franco-German relations so much as the Hassel-McNamara agreements.

For all these reasons Gumbel preferred to explore the consultation route. He wanted to stress that Minister Hassel was more inclined to the hardware solution; he, however, reflected the views of German military leaders.

On the return to my hotel I was accompanied by Captain Trepetsch, the personal assistant to von Hassel. He said that von Hassel would be glad to have hardware but was not pressing for it. The German Defense Ministry would be content with improved consultation.

**_Other Governmental and Opposition Views:_** Outside the Foreign Office --and the luke-warm support of the Defense Ministry--the attitudes of leading Germans ranged from indifference to hostility. These arguments can be grouped as follows (Erhard's views are reported separately):

(1) The "hardware solution" jeopardizes relations with France without giving Germany any additional meaningful security. (Westrick, Krone, Schmid, Wehner, Strauss, Gradl and Heubl)

(2) The "hardware solution" is militarily senseless (Strauss, Mende, Schmid)

Henry A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

(3) It makes unification that much more difficult. (Mende, Westrick, Gradl and Wehner)

(4) It foreclosed a European atomic option. (Krone, Strauss & Heubl)

(5) It placed Germany into the wrong position of pleading for nuclear weapons (Wehner, Gradl, Mende, Strauss, Westrick & Krone)

(6) The FRG should press for improved consultation and not invest its prestige on schemes of co-ownership. (Westrick, Krone, Schmid, Wehner, Mende & Strauss) Strauss urged the improved consultation as an interim solution to a European Atomic Force.

(7) The advocates of the hardware solution misjudged British readiness to agree in a meaningful way. (Westrick, Krone, Mende, Strauss)

(8) The hardward solution was intended as a sop to Germany while other unacceptable schemes such as de-nuclearized zones were being prepared. (Krone, Westrick--more guardedly, Strauss)

To sum up: (1) Outside the Foreign Office not a single leading German political figure—including the Chancellor—indicated any desire for the hardware solution.

(2) Outside the Foreign Office, every significant German political figure believed that top priority should be given to improved consultation.

(3) Not a single German leader—including the Foreign Office—used the argument of equality with Great Britain.

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(4) Outside the Foreign Office *every* leading German would be relieved, not disappointed, if a concrete, detailed, comprehensive consultation scheme settled the nuclear issue for a few years.

(5) The issue causing greatest confusion is not nuclear control but non-proliferation.

**Conversation with Birrenbach:** Birrenbach called me in London to ask my impressions about Germany. I summed up the five points listed above. He agreed that they were a fair summary--though he thought that Wehner had become more positive after a lunch with Monnet. I said that it seemed to me that top priority should be given to working out precise consultation arrangements on arms control, strategic doctrine, targetting, crisis management, German unity and assessment of problems outside of Europe. Birrenbach said he had --somewhat reluctantly--come to the same conclusion. He was prepared to shelve the hardward solution for the time being as long as such an act did not involve a formal renunciation of the German claim. He wanted to add intelligence collection and evaluation to the subjects for joint consultation. He did not go into details about this.

## Non-Proliferation

I was amazed by the depth of German feelings on this subject and by the confused interpretations of its significance. The following were the principal arguments advanced.

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(1) Non-proliferation was primarily directed against the FRG. Therefore a specific price would have to be paid to Bonn for its adherence. (Krone, Ruete, Schnippenkoetter, Strauss, Mende, Westrick, Erhard)

(2) In 1954, the FRG had renounced the production of nuclear weapons towards the West *in return* for a promise that unification should be fostered by its allies. If a similar undertaking were now to be undertaken towards the East the USSR would have to commit itself to some progress on reunification. (Erhard, Krone, Westrick, Schnippenkoetter, Ruete, Strauss)

(3) If the FRG agreed to the non-proliferation treaty it might be forced to go to a conference of signatories in which the GDR would be treated as an equal. This was unacceptable. (Westrick, Krone, all Foreign Office personnel, Wehner)

(4) If the FRG signed the treaty, where would it be if countries like India and Israel acquired nuclear weapons. (Erhard, Westrick, Foreign Office)

(5) If the FRG does sign the treaty, it must incorporate its WEU pledge into it thus making the undertaking not to produce nuclear weapons subject to the go-day abrogation clause. (Foreign Office, and Westrick in the presence of Erhard)

(6) A non-proliferation treaty would not disrupt the Alliance only if it included provisions for a hardware solution. (Ruete, Schnippenkoetter)

Henry A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

When asked whether this meant that there should be a clause making
such a force possible or whether the force actually had to be created,
Ruete and Schnippenkoetter argued for the latter. In short, they tend to
construe the non-proliferation treaty as creating a moral obligation to
bring about a NATO force (not just permitting it).

The above points do not do justice to the uneasiness, confusion and
insecurity engendered by the non-proliferation debate. A full and frank
discussion seems essential.

German Domestic Situation

Every political leader--without exception--agreed that six months after
scoring a great personal election victory, Erhard's position is again very
precarious. There is consensus about his incapacity to govern. His
position is weakened by the fact that the strongest men in the CDU are
outside the government, and thus free to snipe at it. Conclusions about
the implications of this state of affairs vary. All agree that Erhard cannot
contest the next election and that, therefore, his already limited authority
will diminish further. Mende, Gradl and Schmid thought that the present
coalition would serve out its term with Erhard being kicked upstairs in
1969 to the position of Federal President. Wehner, Krone and Strauss
leaned towards a Grand Coalition by the end of 1967. Strauss claimed that

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he and Barzel were working along parallel lines in this respect. Barzel simply did not want to commit himself to a formal arrangement this early. Candidates as Chancellor of a Grand Coalition were Kiesinger, Barzel or Gerstenmaier.

Schmid thought that Hassel was certain to be dropped before the end of 1967 since he was too stupid for the post.

Wehner, Schmid, Krone, Strauss and Gradl agreed that Schroeder would be removed if a Grand Coalition came into being. Wehner was especially caustic about Schroeder. He claimed that all of Schroeder's policy was basically designed (1) to make Germany the dominant power within Europe on a national basis and (2) to prepare the way for a bilateral Soviet-German deal based on the proposition that the pro-Atlantic orientation of the FRG had failed. Americans did not understand that Schroeder was basically a nationalist. He was so vain that he subordinated everything to looking good. In all his conversations, he was above all eager to demonstrate that he had never been wrong. This was the only explanation Wehner had for Schroeder's obsession with the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

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Franco-German Relations

There was a mixture of exasperation, fear and unhappiness about the deterioration of Franco-German relations. Few went so far as Krone and Strauss who blamed the present state of affairs entirely on Schroeder and American instigation. Nevertheless, it is predictable that if current strains continue first the Erhard government and American pressure will be blamed for producing Germany's isolation in the center of Europe. For example, both Schmid and Wehner felt that the Hassel-McNamara agreement tying German military purchases to the U.S. were a profound mistake. Schmid argued that the French view of European organization was gaining ground; in fact he shared it. He had abstained from voting for the Treaty of Rome because he feared it would prevent unification. Therefore, he thought a confederate solution to European unity was preferable. Countess Donhoff --heretofore a violent opponent of De Gaulle--said that she had come to the conclusion De Gaulle's concept of Europe was right and that Schroeder was too intransigently anti-Gaullist. In fact, the only thing wrong with De Gaulle was his anti-Americanism. Westrick felt that German policy in the Common Market had been unnecessarily hard and that the United States had created needless dilemmas for German policy. Gumbel thought that the United States had a tendency to thwart autonomous European research. If Franco-German strains continue, it is predictable that the United States, however unfairly, will receive much of the blame.

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German Unification

With the exception of Strauss all leaders agreed that this would grow into the biggest issue in Germany over the immediate future. Though no precise plans were advanced, attitudes were less rigid and legalistic than in the past. Mende developed his familiar scheme for unification especially supporting Schutz' scheme for East-West German contacts by downgrading ministries to technical committees. He said that he was willing to have the surprise attack posts if the GDR agreed to freer movements between East and West Germany. Schmid said that unification required four major changes: (1) military arrangements--arms control, (2) NATO ties, (3) Eastern frontiers and (4) economic sacrifices.

Random Observations

(1) European political unity retains a powerful political appeal. Commitments to the Monnet form of supra-nationalism seems to be declining in favor of a Fouchet plan type of solution and arrangement which could be opened to Eastern Europe. There was growing interest in a European Atomic Force.

(2) There are frequent complaints across the political spectrum about heavy-handed Embassy interference in German domestic affairs. For example, Heubl claimed that he and Prince Constantine had been urged to form a counterweight to Strauss in the CSU.

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(3) German political leaders seem convinced that the United States is urging them to send military--or at least para-military--formations to Vietnam. They are determined to resist this though they are prepared to extend considerable non-military assistance.

(4) German leaders seem convinced that these pressures may be a prelude to the withdrawal of some American forces. Foreign Office people seem to accept or even welcome this as strengthening their case for a hardware solution.

## Some Conclusions

(1) Pursuing the hardware solution will lead to the same impasses that bedeviled the MLF. The degree of British willingness to agree to a meaningful co-ownership scheme is vastly overestimated. The likely British tactic is to delay and to shift to others the onus for failure. Italy can undertake no nuclear sharing which requires Parliamentary approval. If the FRG is encouraged to pursue the hardware solution, it will again stake its prestige on something which is likely to fail. This is bound to strain the political fabric of Germany.

(2) Within the FRG, a hardware solution would accentuate domestic splits. The CSU, FDP and about a quarter of the CDU would oppose it. The SPD will stand on the sidelines playing for a maximum split of the governing coalition. Nuclear control is thus likely to be extremely divisive.

(3) If the hardware solution leads to further Franco-German strains, the U.S. will eventually be blamed even by those who now favor this policy.

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(4) The further evolution of the hardware solution with respect to manning or veto will only accentuate inter-allied differences.

(5) Almost all German political leaders would be relieved if a concrete, detailed consultation program replaced the hardware approach. To be effective, this program must be specific. It should apply to a specified range of hardware, i.e., the nuclear weapons now assigned to NATO which we would undertake not to remove without consultation. It should give the FRG fuller access to strategic planning and arms control planning.

(6) A full exchange on the issues raised by non-proliferation seems essential if we are to avoid a major crisis should the USSR suddenly accept our treaty draft.

(7) The United States should go on record as encouraging Franco-German ties in order to avoid being made the butt of later criticisms.

(8) Efforts should be made to avoid fighting internal U.S. struggles by lining up factions in Bonn. The long-term impact on Germany must be disastrous.