Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Schlesinger
10/30/73; 9:11 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Henry.

K: Yes, Jim.

S: Did you have any success with Dobrynin yesterday on the Med Fleet? They are up to 96 now and their naval infantry went through the Bosporus yesterday with the soldiers on deck kind of waving at the crowds and so on. It is not clear that they are proceeding in the desire to hold the God damned thing down.

K: That they are what?

S: That it is not clear that they are reciprocating in the desire to hold down things -- they are up to 96.

K: Yes. I mentioned it to him and he said and he said he would report it.

S: Well, they are reinforcing so I bring that to your attention.

K: Good. Incidentally, somebody told me that you seem to think that I talk to Kraft about the oil lobby in the Pentagon.

S: Well, it certainly struck me as a possibility.

K: Well, I haven't talked to that son-of-a-bitch in six months. Have you seen what he said about me? That I ran towns in Germany with the aid of Gestapo agents -- did that come from you?

S: It's news to me. Did you?

K: Of course not. I hadn't talked to Joe Kraft in months.

S: Okay. Very Good.

K: And the one thing -- I don't think anyone has ever heard me do is to discuss colleagues to the press -- directly or indirectly or through subordinates.

S: Yes. Well, very good. In any event we are somewhat concerned about the continuing buildup and you are aware of the skud and the ______ situation.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
10/30/73; 9:32 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Henry, on this SALT business, do you really want to have those SALT guys running around here while you are away?

K: I said yesterday that I don't want them running around here.

S: Well they apparently interpreted something you said at the staff meeting this morning as meaning that you . . .

K: I didn't have a staff meeting this morning.

S: Well we've just been told . . .

K: I didn't have a staff meeting! I couldn't have said anything!

S: Well anyway we've just been told that you said you didn't care whether they were here or not and that they could go ahead with the recess . . .

K: I said a few days recess. . .

S: Well, that's what we thought just for the week, but not to have them all troop back here while you are gone lobbying for proposals.

K: That's right.

S: Well we better get Larry on the horn because apparently they have already told Johnson he can come back for what, three weeks, anytime he wants.

K: Well that didn't come from me.

S: Well. All right, can I call Larry and make sure he understands that.

K: Yeah. Although I don't give a damn basically because I am going to tell Johnson I don't want any proposals.

S: Well, it's not just Johnson. You are going to have Nitze back here, you are going to Ralph Earl back here, you are going to have General Rowny back here and by the time you get back from your trip we will have a rolling consensus.

K: Well, talk to Larry.

S: Okay.

TELCONE

President/HAK

October 30, 1973/9:59 a.m.

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, I wanted to ask, is Mrs. Meir going to be here Thursday?

K: Thursday Mr. President.

she

P: I didn't know/was going to fly right over then. Fine. Alright then the Egyptian I made that 11:00 rather than 10:00. I didn't want it quite that early.

K: Right. In fact if it were the same to you could we do it early in the afternoon?

P: The Egyptians?

K: Yes. Say 3:00.

P: Sure.

K: Because I was going to testify in the morning. I can change it.

P: No, do your testimony. I don't even know who set the God damn thing in the morning. Who was it Steve or...

K: Well, I had probably asked for it and had forgotten that.

P: Fine, make it 3:00 in the afternoon then because its irrelevant to me.

K: Good Mr. President.

P: Now with regard to Mrs. Meir. What time do we want her.

K: It's up to you. Maybe also early in the afternoon.

P: You have to testify again huh?

K: No, but I thought the way it would work best is if I could talk to her first in the morning and explain our proposition to you and then come back to you and report.

P: Yes, so we'll have plenty of time to think about it.

K: That's right.

P: Right. Why don't we say 3:00.

K: Good.

P: I agree because we've got to play...

K: That's going to be a pretty tough session.

P: Sure. We're going to be on a tightrope. Alright, that will take care of that. Both of those will be at 3:00.

K: Right.

P: Now, let me ask. What is the situation with regard to Dobrynin? What would you like to do on that.

K: Well Mr. President. It's entirely up to you. Were you staying in Camp David today.

P: I haven't decided but we can easily do it here if it would be useful.

K: I think the best might be if he and I came up but that's not spend the night, and came back around 9:30 - 10:00.

P: Spending the night is fine. There's no problem there because nobody else is here.

K: It would give me a chance to get started earlier in the morning.

P: Yes, I see your point. In other words you'd like to just come up have a meeting and have dinner and go back.

K: And perhaps he and I can sit in a cabin for an hour after wards and then come back.

P: Bring him back with you. Fine. What would you like to do. Would you like to. What would you suggest as a time on it?

K: It's entirely up to you.

- 2 -

P: No but I mean in other words, have him up here. Now I don't want to come with him. I mean I'll have you and him ride in a separate helicopter see.

K: Coming back.

P: Both ways.

K: I thought you might be staying up there.

P: I may. That's my point. You'll have to bring him in a helicopter in any event which will leave me the freedom to either go back or stay.

K: Exactly Mr. President.

P: So you can go from the Pentagon strip or whatever but now, my point is when do you... Do you want to get up here to have a talk with me before

K: I think I should Mr. President.

P: Either that or....

K: I could ride up with him and we could put him in a cabin and then call for him when you and I are finished. That's no problem.

P: Unless I get back this afternoon for a little while. I may be back sometime this afternoon for a little while. Alright, what is the situation.

K: First of all with respect to Dobrynin Mr. President. He's running all over town claiming to be the injured party. Now I think they behaved inexcusably and we shouldn't let them up for air on that. I don't we gain anything by apologizing. We should say they made a threat. They poured forces, they put their forces on alert, their airborne forces, they sent a very tough letter and you had no choice but the problem is where we go from here. Now he's got two problems. One is what to do with the Egyptian third Army. The third is how we handle the negotiations. The negotiations are easy, that's all set up. The Egyptian Third Army we are going to settle directly with the Egyptians and the Israelis so we don't have to tell him that. What we have to avoid is that they get credit for everything we do. I am in the process of working something out with that Egyptian Foreign Minister which is if the Israelis play ball you may be able to announce after the visit with Golda Meir.

P: Having to do with the Third Army?

- 3 -

K: Having to do, speaking the proposal that I'm thinking of is like this and I've tried parts of it on the Foreign Minister yesterday and he seemed to be receptive. The Israelis let through nonmilitary supplies to the Third Army. Guaranteed, so that they don't have to apply every time and maybe even move off that road. The Egyptians release all Israeli prisoners and open the Straits of the Gulf of Suez from their blockade which they've put on. On that basis the Third Army wouldn't get any military supplies and couldn't become an offensive force. That's what the Israeli... are seriously playing with them. Now if we can get Mrs. Meir to accept that then we would have settled that problem. Now is she wants more.

P: She ______ going to get it.

K: What she wants is for the withdrawal of all Egyptian forces from the East bank of the canal. That's out of the question.

P: Nope. She cannot get her way this time. Too late. She's going to find a very tough problem when she walks into my office this time. You know what I mean. There is not going to be any of this horsing around anymore. I'll be courteous but she cannot come in and in that arrogant way again and say well they all withdraw and this and that. She doesn't have the cards anymore Henry.

K: That's right. I agree with you.

P: Too bad but that's the way it is. Now with regard to the Dobrynin thing we'll leave it that you and he will come up. Do you think it would be well to have dinner with him.

K: I can have dinner with him alone if you'd rather not/.

P: I'm just trying to figure what you want. I could have him come up and be here for a meeting but whatever you think is useful I could do. I'd just soon not bother with the dinner frankly but...

K: Then why don't you just have a good talk with him for an hour and he and I will have dinner at Laurel.

P: I'll just tell him I had some other plans.

K: I'll tell him you have plenty of other things to do.

P: Sure. What I may do. I may have to come back and then come back up but I'll come back separately a little early. I would say this. Perhaps we...

- 4 -

K: If you would rather not do Camp David at all we can do it in your...

P: No, I think, don't you think. Well, you thought Camp David was a good idea didn't you.

K: Right. Well, I just transmitted your original idea. It was better not to do it last night because, first of all I had to see the...

P: Well, let me say you thought it was a good...

K: But if it is in any sense inconvenient for you.

P: It isn't really particularly. It may be very convenient.

K: Because he has no right to come up there.

P: No, what I meant is that in terms of what would be useful on the diplomacy side. Well, let me put it this way. What we might do is to have you come up here and I'll be coming up earlier and you come in and we have an hours talk and then you and he could have dinner, sit around awhile and go back. I think it would mean alot to him and I think it would be mean alot to Brezhnev. It's a very small gesture. You see my point.

K: To have him up at Camp David.

P: Yes, don't you think so.

K: Yes.

P: Isn't that reason you thought well of the idea.

K: That's why I thought well of the idea.

P: I know we don't have to do it but my point is if it does.

K: If we pay some personal attention to him. The only thing is I'd be rather tough on what happened last week no matter what screaming he does.

P: I will. Don't worry. He gave me a hell of a problem.

K: They gave us a hell of a problem. They sent us a stinging note and we had every reason to suppose they were going to take unilateral action.

- 5 -

P: I know. Don't worry. We aren't going to mark off one inch.

K: XXXXX We have this problem Mr. President. We are in the driver's seat in the Middle East. For example, I've got the Egyptians yesterday. The Russians you know sent 70 observers in and were screaming at the Egyptians that they had to take them. Well I worked out with the Foreign Minister yesterday that they are going to send 40 of them back. The Egyptians are going to do it on their own so we're not involved because 70 is just too many in a 300 man force.

P: Yeah. Good. Don't worry, I'll be very. . . We'll take the line on Dobrynin. I know exactly what to do.

K: I would not get into too great specifics on the Third core.

P: No, that's our deal. No, my feeling is this. The Camp David exercise first is good P.R. It's look like something is going on that's a big deal. Second, it's good from the stand point that Brezhnev will think we are giving him some attention (special). It doesn't cost us a damn thing and then we give them X nothing on the hard side.

K: Exactly.

P: Basically, it's software. But I would suggest that unless you hear otherwise why don't you tell him that you will fly to Camp David to see me at 5:00 here. That gives you the whole day there. Or is that a bad time.

K: Maybe a little later.

P: Fine.

K: Together with him.

P: Yeah, I could have the meeting with him from 5:00 to 6:00 and then you can have dinner or when do you want...

K: Would it be good if we left at 6:00, and we'd be up at 6:30 and then I'd spend half an hour with you. That's too close to dinner.

P: No, don't worry about that because I'll probably... I'll probably have a chance to talk to you earlier anyway.

K: I can do it at 5:00 if that's more convenient for you.

- 6 -

P: No, I just thought you were going to talk and have dinner and so forth
you'd want to get back that's all. So, would you rather make it 5:30.

K: Good, we'll leave at 5:30.

P: Leave Washington at 5:30, see me at 6:00 and then we'll meet from 6 to 7 but I'll not have dinner. I'll have you have dinner with him.

K: I'll tell him you have some work.

P: I have other people. I have dinner plans, that's all. He doesn't need to know who it is.

K: Good. OK. Good Mr. President.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: Es 1/30/55</td></tr><tr><td>By: J.S. MARR, Date: 6/1/55</td></tr></table>

TELCORN
President/HAK

October 30, 1973/10:25 a.m.

K: Hello, Mr. President.

P: Henry, would it be just as well if we move Meir up to 12:00 noon because I may have to work in the afternoon on something else or I may have

K: Absolutely.

P: So 12:00 noon would give you the morning with her.

K: No problem.

P: You don't have to testify there.

K: No, the only reason I suggested is to have an interval between the time I see her and I see you but I can do that by having breakfast with her. That would be over by 9:30.

P: Fine. 12:00 noon is a good time because it will also make more news that way. We want it to make some news. 3:00 I told Zeigler that for that and I told him that Dobrynim would be here tonight and I said just don't indicate what it is. Just say we're going to have a meeting and the way I understand it you just get the helicopter lined up and come up and arrive around 6:00 and have a chat. We'll treat him well. You are going to testify tomorrow huh.

K: 10:00.

P: Which Committee.

K: Foreign Relations Committee.

P: Public.

K: No, Executive Session but they leak like crazy anyway. I've got a lot of television coverage from the Foreign Affairs Committee.

P: That's great.

K: I mean not for myself.

P: I personally think it's better to be public with the Foreign Relations Committee why don't you tell them.

TELCORN

Dobrynin/HAK

October 30, 1973/10:27 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Hello Anatol.

D: Henry.

K: How are you?

D: Fine.

K: I understand you are agitating against us at the Concert.

D: I left in the second act.

K: Was that in protest. Well, listen, I'm having Zeigler say something
at 11:00 about that fleet movement.

D: 11:00. I think that is fine because otherwise it goes on more and more.

K: No, he's saying it. He will say that it is a routine thing that is unrelated
to any of this. On the MFN, what you have to understand, I can't explain
all these maneuvers. Our basic intention is to get it taken out of the
House bill.

D: Yes.

K: We have the biggest gap between the House and the Senate bill but it has
nothing to do with the Middle East. I just want you to understand that.

D: I understand. But it is my understanding that the President said to the
leaders of the Congress on last week that he is going to veto the whole
bill, is that correct?

K: That is correct. Now if they include restrictions on credit to the Soviet
Union, we'll veto the whole bill. Now just a minute. The President
suggests if you don't mind, if you and I would go up to Camp David about
5:30.

D: From here yes.

K: Yes and then we will have a talk with him there. He has a meeting tonight
but you and I can have dinner up there and then come back later tonight.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012052
By: N.W.ARA F503-04

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
by M.W.aga 04/04/04

D: OK but when will he be there.

K: From 6:00 to 7:00 - 7:30. You'll have a good talk with him then.

D: He'll be there too.

K: Yes.

D: I didn't understand.

K: He will be there but he has something to do afterwards.

D: That's alright with me.

K: So the three of us have a relaxed hour together and then you and I have dinner or if you want to come back right away it's up to you.

D: No, I would like to have dinner but come back. Alright.

K: Yes. Do you want to see a movie up there or....

D: No Henry. I will just have dinner and afterwards it will be 9 or 10 is alright with me.

K: We'll come back around 10.

D: OK.

K: You and I just have another talk up there. And we will announce that you are going up to Camp David just to calm the atmosphere a little bit.

D: OK.

K: Do you object.

D: No, what are you going to say?

K: We are going to say you are coming up there to receive an ultimatum and you will be kept as a hostage.

D: If you like.

K: No, what we'll say is the 3 of us will have a general review of the situation

D: Ok. No problem. 5:30 where should I be?

- 2 -

TELCOM

Debrynin/HAK

October 30, 1973/10:27 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Hello Anatol.

D: Henry.

K: How are you?

D: Fine.

D: I left in the second act.

K: Was that in protest. Well, listen, I'm having Zeigler must say something at 11:00 about that fleet movement.

D: Yes.

D: From here yes.

D: He'll be there too.

K: Yes.

D: I didn't understand.

D: That's alright with me.

K: We'll come back around 10.

D: OK.

D: OK.

K: Do you object.

D: If you like.

K: No, what we'll say is the 3 of us will have a general review of the situation.

- 2 -

TELCON
Shultz/HAK

October 30, 1973/10:50 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Hi Henry.

K: How are you George?

S: Alright. Say I have a little bit of information for you that I don't know quite how to evaluate and you may. Helmut Schmidt called me up yesterday from Bonn and said that he wanted to send Poles, Poles is sort of the Paul Vaulker of West Germany, here as soon as possible this week to spend an hour with me. I said well Paul Vaulker is in Paris right now and if you want to transact any business they are there and Paul has been, we have him scheduled to go see Schmidt tomorrow anyway and he said no, it has nothing to do with our international monetary negotiations but he clearly did not want to discuss what this was about on the telephone and just dropped it at that and so I said, well, I'll be glad to see him. He has called since then and we have set up an appointment for Friday morning.

you

K: Good. Will/let me know immediately what he does want.

S: Yes, I'll let you know immediately. I know that I sent you over a toast that Schmidt gave particularly calling your attention to the last paragraph.

K: I saw that.

S: But Schmidt is very concerned about the Atlantic. He's very concerned about it and regards as highly important a strong U.S./Germany relationship.

K: Yes, but they are wrecking it.

S: Well, I'm just saying what Schmidt's, at least his apparent point of view is, as I have sensed it and it may very well be with regard to this in which case I would call your office right away and you might or might not want to talk with Poles.

K: I might well want to and I'm having lunch with you Thursday right.

S: I hope so.

K: I look forward to it. Bye.

TELCOM
The President - Secretary Kissinger

October 30, 1973

11:05

N: Hi Henry. I wondered if you could move Dobrynin up.
You could come up an hour earlier. What's your situation?
I don't want to....just tell me if....

K: You mean have both of us come up earlier?

N: What I meant is just come and be here about 5 instead
of 6. What's your situation, just tell me if it's not good.

K: No, we can make it.

N: I can talk to you on the phone in the afternoon to get
your read out and then you two can come right in when you
get here, we can have an hour and then you can have dinner.
Can you make it then?

K: I think 5:30 would be safer.

N: You mean be here at 5:30, leave there around 5:00, leave
on the helicopter at 5:00? Then in the afternoon you can talk
to me on the phone. I think I have got the background of what's
wanted.

K: I might come over for 10 minutes.

N: Why don't you send me some talking points.

K: OK, the major thing though, is not to back off on what was
done last week.

N: Say we can't have this kind of thing in the future. No sir.

K: No sir. and we both must learn from it or something like
that.

N: Exactly. You tell him I have other plans for dinner. It's
just as well not to be too cozy, don't you think?

K: Exactly.

DECLASSIFIED

ACCOUANT'S
By: OMA Cite

01/30/73 11:05

TELECON
Major General Scowcroft/Secretary

October 30, 1973

11:30

S: He said that they are no less upset about the Kraft article.

K: Oh, nonsense.

S: He said they expect to have an answer very shortly.

K: How about the ____.

S: I beg your pardon, oh... excuse me, I am not up to you today. He said if you want to broaden attendance with the Prime Minister he will of course do what you wish. He strongly urges

K: I have just had it with him.

S: He says they had nothing to do with it. They did know about your timing and they knew about your presentation at the UN, that we had given them the text, and that they had said nothing about it one way or the other.

K: I may have her come to the State Department.

S: He says if you want to invite Rush and Sisco, he will be happy to but urges that you reconsider. I think he is antsy.

K: He will have a good time for two weeks when I am gond. Let him be in real contact with the world.

S: OK.

END

<table><tr><td>CLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE</td></tr><tr><td>7-30-73</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>CH</td></tr><tr><td>REASON</td><td>Date</td></tr></table>

TELECON

Major General Scowcroft/The Secretary

October 30, 1973

12:30

S: They have just agreed to send an additional twenty to thirty trucks with general supplies plus an additional ten trucks with medical supplies.

K: Can I tell this to the Foreign Minister. Have they authorized.

S: They have already told the check-points that this is authorized. Apparently they haven't even finished with the first 100 and they will just add these on to the end of it.

K: OK.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date</td></tr><tr><td>By CMA, Date 6/1/73</td></tr></table>

TELCONE

Clements/Sec. Kissinger

Tuesday, Oct. 30, 1973

3:05 p.m.

K: I had some disputes with the Egyptians this morning. Where did the transport planes land in Israel. Do you have the exact list of airports?

C: Two standbys and only one which is the main Tel Aviv airport. I will have to check this. It is my understanding that none of those planes landed anywhere except the main Tel Aviv airport.

K: Did any land in the Sinai?

C: They did not. That was a report that came out of a damn newspaper I think and I think the source of it was in Cairo.

K: Did any of our Phantoms land anywhere else.

C: No sir.

K: They said Elarange (sp?)

C: I will have to double check.

K: Please let me know.

C: There is one plane that I know of that did not land where it was supposed to.

K: Where did the Phantoms land?

C: The main airport at Tel Aviv. One airplane had a wheel recovery problem and it landed in Turkey on an emergency basis.

K: That is not in the Sinai peninsula.

C: That is right. I will double check. If what I am telling you is wrong I will be back in touch with you.

K: Call me back any way.

C: I will do it.

END

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Origin</td>
    <td>05/23/73</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>By</td>
    <td>CH</td>
    <td>Date</td>
    <td>05/04/73</td>
  </tr>
</table>

TELCORN
Gen. Haig - Secretary Kissinger

October 30, 1973

3:20 p.m.

H: I am going to Camp David right now.

K: Good luck and have fun. (Let me go into another room and talk to you there.) Hello.

H: He's in a rush up there and he doesn't want to have dinner with Dobrynin. I guess he told you that.

K: Yes, I don't know why, but I understand.

H: He's bringing me up there for cover. You know Cox had a little problem today.

K: Oh?

H: He admitted before the Senate Judiciary Committee he had leaked to Ted Kennedy and Senator Hart the ITT thing, in egregious abrogation of his charter. did it in the excitement of the post-firing period. Hugh Scott really skewered him. Irvin and Baker verified publicly that the proposal was very just and fair.....after the Washington Post had really made an attack on my honesty. I told Eliot either he call the Washington Post and set them straight or I am going to unleash the facts, with corroboration of four others.....terrible thing. I've been more than fair with him. You know I have. He was going to call the Washington Post. I am going to call him when I get to Camp David If he hasn't, I am going to call the Post myself.

K: I haven't read the editorial.

H: It all came out of SANITIZED John Moore. Where do we stand. Everything all right?

K: Well, it's tough going with the Egyptians. They're real rug merchants. But tell him he's got to hang tough with Dobrynin, not pull away from what he did last week, not talk about his good relations with Brezhnev. He's got to put it back on the track. And, Dobrynin's going to unleash like a wild man, say it was totally unprovoked.....and that's crap. And, we've read every communication we've ever had from them.

TELCORN

Lord Cromer - Secretary Kissinger

October 30, 1973

4:30 p.m.

K: I just wanted to inform your government we will announce tomorrow
that I am going to Cairo next week.

C: I see, tomorrow.

K: We will stop in Rabat, Amman and Saudi Arabia on the way to
China.

C: Rabat, Amman and Saudi Arabia?

K: And Tehran.

C: I think that would be very constructive.

K: Egyptians are telling us astonishing things about what your
people are doing in the Middle East.

C: What things?

K: That you were the ones who recommended that they didn't accept
the resolution on the ceasefire.

C: I certainly find that amazing. I've read all the reports and...

K: They say the British and French are telling them not to accept
the US-Soviet auspices.

C: Well, I don't know what the French are up to, but I know what we
are up. Don't think we are talking to the Egyptians at all. What we
want basically is the US, Russian and UN.

K: That's fine with us.

C: Basically what we want. I would have thought the French would
come along with that. .....making other proposals I don't know who.

K: You know the Alliance has come to a bad pass when we even have
to talk about rumors like this.

C: I'm coming to see you tomorrow morning, we'll talk about it then,

2.

K: What time is that set for?

C: 9:00. Is that all right?

K: Fine, would you pass on the information to Whitehall. Keep it confidential until we announce it..at about 12 our time tomorrow.

C: About 12:00. Right. First stop is Rabat on the 5th?

K: Rabat on the 5th, Cairo on the 6th and 7th. Amman on the 8th... and China on the 10th

C: Thank you very much for letting me know.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td></tr><tr><td>By: AH</td></tr><tr><td>OMAR, Date: 6/1/89</td></tr></table>

TELECON

Ronald Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger

October 20, 1973

4:50

K: ... did you make the statement about the fleet today?

Z: It didn't come up.

K: I know it didn't come up. I promised Dobrynin that it would be made.

Z: Well, we can do it tonight.

K: Oh, come off that. It is impossible to do it now. I asked him to make it.

Z: He thought... about the questions.

K: I didn't give him guidnace on a question.

Z: He will do it right now... on the wires.

K: I promised Dobrynin last night and again in the morning. We would make a statement at the briefing. I expected we would plant a question and make a statement.

Z: We can do that.

K: Oh, it is senseless now. I have broken another promise.

Z: We can maintain it and do it now.

K: (He hung up)

END

TELECON
Major General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

October 30, 1973

4:55

K: After I gave.. my promise to Dobrynin last night and this morning, if they.. it will just hyper it

S: Well, tomorrow..

K: No. We can't do it tomorrow, it's senseless.

S: Well, you talked to Jerry and I thought .. and I talked to Jerry.

K: I want to understand what gave them the right to make a statement we didn't tell them to make. Keep them from putting it out now!

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: E. Scowcroft</td></tr><tr><td>By: J. S. W. D.</td></tr><tr><td>Date: 6/16/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Major General Scowcroft/ Secretary Kissinger

October 30, 1973

5:00

get

S: They did the word out on the MFN and he misunderstood you on the ... he thought it was to respond to a question... He said they did put it out again at Defense.

K: What do you mean?

S: He said they withdrew their previous statement and said what it was there for.

K: Now, just let him stay the hell out of it.

S: OK. He will call the wire services later and he can do it casually. He said he thought it was to just answer a question.

K: Is there any possible way he can answer a question when I am asking him to disavow the Defense Department?

S: I am just telling you what he told me. . but he did get out the MFN.

K: Well, you get it over to Dobrynin. . the relevant things.

S: OK.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 10-30-73</td></tr><tr><td>By: J.R. Cate</td></tr></table>

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger

Larry Eagleburger
10/31/73; 8:34 a.m.

K: Hello.

E: Yes, sir.

K: Are you going to the Senate Committee?

E: I was planning on it, yes, sir.

K: Can you give me all the consultations we had with NATO before then.

E: Okay.

K: You know, Cromer, Jobert, meetings with the NATO Council, and so forth.

E: All right. I've asked for it by twelve.

K: I know, I know. It will take at least eight hours. There must be some Goddamned guy who has got it.

E: Sir, I will get it. I will have it.

K: Okay, fine.

E: Right.

K: Oh, did you cancel Montana?

E: Yes, yes, and we told them we would like another date suggested.

K: Good.

E: Okay.

TELCON

The President/HAK

October 31, 1973/8:45 a.m.

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: With your Foreign Relations thing today. One thing I think is very important is that well of course you have to lay out the facts with regard to the Mid East and so forth. I think it was well with the way they leak and the way they like to play things that you emphasize the fact that the detente is breathing and strong and so forth and so. In other words, what really matters with these Russians is what we say to them privately and what we do to them. The public statements I think Dobrynin's point is well taken that, I mean it is a little rough for them to read all this crap you know and then they wonder well what the hell... do you see what I'm getting at?

K: Yeah.

P: I would play it in such a way that you aren't afterwards. They'll misquote you but if they quote that you are breathing fire about the Russians.

K: No, I'll play it in very low key with the Russians.

P: Yeah. Fine. How did you meeting go with him afterwards?

K: We mustn't forget they tried a big bluff last week and when they say about alert they had everything.

P: I understand.

K: But we had a very good meeting and I think we're substantially back on course now. See what they're trying to do is only we can really deliver the Israelis so they are constantly trying to get themselves into a position where they can claim by threatening us or by pressuring us by doing this or that they have made us do what we were going to do anyway but the meeting went very well and we parted very cordially.

P: You will get this message from me by 6:00 or 5:00 or whatever it is.

K: That's right. I thought I'd talk to you. When were you planning to come back?

P: I'm in Washington. I got back this morning.

Telcon
Gov. Rockefeller/HAK

Oct. 21, 1973; 9:44 a.m.

R: ...and I had talked with Kenny about going with you on this trip and I told him I'd, you know, we'd make all the arrangements if you wanted him, On second thought.

K: The one problem I have is whether I can take somebody under indictment on the trip -- to be quite honest.

R: Yeah.

K: He would do me more good than any other doctor I could have.

R: Well, there's no question about it. And, of course, I got asked by the lawyer why was I still going on with a man who's under indictment and I said...

K: No, no, there's no problem what I can do alone.

R: I see.

K: And there's not the slightest hesitation on my part to see him under the conditions that were arranged last week. The question is whether on an official State Department trip travelling in a government plane, and so forth.

R: Well, I hadn't thought of that.

K: That is the only thing that delays it.

R: I got you. Well, now, Henry, have you got a counsel or somebody looking that up?

K: Yeah.

R: You do?

K: Yeah. Why?

R: I personally think the American tradition that a man is innocent until proven guilty is a pretty strong one and that indictment does not mean, and he's salvaging the thing and saying, you know those stories, that it was his accounting firm who prepared his thing, and he just signed it. But I understand what you're saying. Well, when you find out, you'll know.

-2-

K: Right. I have to go and testify right now before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Could I call you back later today?

R: Yeah, I'll be here until 1:45. Until 2:45.

K: I was going to ask you something else.

R: Good. I'd like to talk to you.

K: About -- were you going to be at that Family of Man Dinner tomorrow night?

R: Family of Man...

K: I mean, where I'm getting an award.

R: I think so.

K: Because the problem that I face is I may not be able to get away. And if I didn't and you were going to be there anyway, I was wondering whether you would agree to accept it for me.

R: Oh, aren't you nice! Well, now, that's a very interesting idea. What I told them was, you see I had declined it first - I was going to be away. Then I said if you'd come, I'd come. Now you're asking me that - I don't see why not. I think that's beautiful.

K: It would mean a lot to me. But I don't want to make you go there if you weren't gonna go there anyway.

R: I think it's beautiful and I don't think that I can do the kind of speech I should, but...

K: See my trouble is, first of all the strain that next week...

R: Oh, no, I don't think you should come up, Henry.

K: I'm going to visit four Arab capitals in three days - and China.

R: Yeah, no, no, no, I don't think you should come. And I'd be delighted to do it.

K: And also my schedule is getting to a point where I just don't know whether I can make it. And Finally, Golda Meir is here. And considering the fact that what we will have to do to the Israelis If I don't go to see her that's gonna be considered another slap.

-3-

R: I understand what you're saying. Let me handle this one for you, if they'll accept it. I don't know whether they'll accept it.

K: Well, I think they probably will.

R: Well, maybe ______ as the Governor of the State, and coincidentally as a friend.

K: I'm delighted. The Governor doesn't mean -- I mean the Governor impresses me, but the friendship is what would mean something to me.

R: Well, you're just great, Henry, and if you want me to do it, you've got me.

K: Good. Well, we'll talk around noon, we'll talk about it then.

R: Good, let me just say one thing. I read in the paper about the leaks in the Congress on your closed session discussion. I think you've got to tell these legislators if they want you to talk, frankly, they've got to goddam well keep their mouths shut.

K: Well, first of all, I didn't say what they alleged that I said.

R: Well, that's even worse.

K: Yeah.

R: Well, you're great, Henry. I'm not doing anything, and I'll be here.

K: Fine. Talk to you later.

R: Thanks a lot. Bye, bye.

Telcon

Amb. Robert McCloskey/HAK/JOE SISCO

October 31, 1973; 12:30 p.m.

McC: I got your word on the New York Times story, and I'll handle that. I've talked to one of the staff members who reaffirmed to me that Morgan will back it up.

K: Yeah, Morgan said that's correct.

McC: Now, in doing this, I'm certainly gonna be asked well what did you say about NATO.

K: Say I thought it was an Executive session. I expressed our general views, with which they are familiar.

McC: Okay. Anything new I should know about the Middle East?

K: Not that I know.

McC: Are you going to be seeing Mrs. Meir separately?

K: Yeah, I'm having breakfast with her tomorrow morning.

McC: Okay. One of the things I'm likely to be hit with today is atrocities against Israeli prisoners. I think George Vest has heard that Valeriani had some whiff of this from I don't know where. He hasn't done anything with it yet.

K: Well, I wouldn't get into that.

McC: Yeah, okay. I had done up a little bit more on Europe and I wondered what you think of it.

K: No, I think we should just get off now.

McC: Uh, huh. How about the point of consultation. Larry told me he was pulling together some material for you to use up there.

K: Say that our own records show that we've had some most extensive consultations.

McC: OK. I'll make a point...

K: And if necessary we'll put out every conversation we've had, but it wouldn't really...

-2-

McC: I don't think we have to prove our virility.

K: Yeah, that's what I think.

McC: Isn't it true that the visit of Mrs. Meir was on their initiative?

K: Yes. But why go into that?

McC: I won't, but if people get into my office and start arguing about it.

K: I would not say that publicly.

McC: Yeah, Okay.

Joe Sisco is on the other line. He needs a word with you.

K: Okay.

S: Fahmi has just called and would like -- he's just had an urgent message from Sadat. He would like if possible to move up the 2 o'clock meeting by any period that you can, 15 minutes...

K: Well the earliest is 1:45.

S: All right, I'll call him back and tell him.

K: Well, now, wait a minute. Let me get you on something. Dobrynin yesterday proposed to the President that they and we send a high-level official to Cairo to help supervise the ceasefire. Now that again puts us into that special role on one side of the line. I am opposed to this. What I think though, we can do is to appoint somebody to begin talking with them about arranging the joint auspices. It's best thought that we don't always say no.

S: Well, I think that you could...the only one who can really talk to them sensibly in terms of the joint auspices, and you will have to find ways during the trip.

K: Joe, will you give me a one-sentence answer then, because the President is waiting. Who, you? How about Atherton?

S: Fine. We're both going to be on this trip. In the next day or two?

-3-

K: Whom did you think?

S: I didn't think either. What kind of timing are you talking about?
Today? Tomorrow?

K: I'm talking about maybe announcing it Friday to begin operating
a week from Monday. And I think I can't spare you.

S: Oh, you meant in terms of who would be the man named at Geneva.
I misunderstood you. I thought you meant to begin to consult with
the Russians right now. Is that what you're talking about?

K: The man who would then maybe eventually wind up in Geneva.
But just so that we can deflect this one proposal.

S: Well I had in mind myself and Atherton.

K: Both of you?

S: Well, or one of us. It depends on what level they're going to appoint.

K: They will appoint whomever I...I thought we'd appoint Atherton
and keep you here.

S: Well, it's up to you. If that's what you want to do, it's all right
with me. But it's not something that ought to be decided in 5 minutes.
I've got a memorandum for you in terms of outsiders and insiders.

K: So, I've got the problem of a Brezhnev letter to the President, of
a Presidential insistence on answering it this afternoon, of a proposal
of two men going to Cairo, which I'm trying to deflect. That does not
have to be our final word. This has to be our preliminary exploration.

S: Well then why don't you tell them that you will name either me or
me and make your proposition as you've indicated.

K: Is that a possible proposition?

S: Certainly it's possible, for a period of time it is, yes. You and I
can clarify this in three minutes alone.

K: Joe, if I had three minutes, I wanted to come to the Department
to talk to you about this.

S: I'll come over there.

K: Joe, I've got a 12:45 meeting, for which I'm late.

-4-

I've got a 1:45 meeting with Fahmi. I don't see any possibility of talking to you.

S: Well, the other question is, do you want me there at 1:45?

K: Yes. Absolutely.

S: I'll get two minutes with you at 1:43.

K: If I'm back by 1:43.

S: Well, there's a problem in the Schlesinger meeting and I have to take 30 second more. That is, the letter to Hussein, as you know, we stopped because he was going to answer a letter to Hussein which was negative on the question of the military assistance. We are working out with the Pentagon a set of proposals so that you will be able to tell Hussein that we can do XY and Z. If Schlesinger shows you a letter which is a <x> holding action letter which says we're looking at your request that's the kind of reply that ought to go so that you actually give the reply when you arrive in Amman.

K: Good, I agree with you.

S: And I'll be there at 1:40 so that if you want a few minutes with me, we can talk. One last thing, Mr. Secretary. Pompidou has proposed a Common Market summit.

K: Who?

McC: Pompidou, in a broadcast this morning. Would you have any reaction to that?

K: Well, that doesn't include us. No, we have no comment.

McC: Good, thank you sir.

K: Right.

TELCOM
Gov. Rockefeller/HAK

October 31, 1973/12:53 p.m.

K: Hello.

R: Henry.

K: Nelson, how are you?

R: How did the meeting with the Senators go?

K: Very well, I'm taming Fulbright. He stepped out with me and complimented me on the policy and ...

R: No kidding, good for you. Oh that is the best news because I was worried about his position.

K: No, I've got him under good control right now.

R: Marvelous. Now I got a call from the Israeli Ambassador saying that Golda Meir is coming over with, you knew of course, come to see you, you invited her but he wanted me to come down on Saturday to call on him.

K: I think it would be good.

R: You do.

K: Yeah.

R: I'm very fond of her.

K: No, I think that would be very good. Then maybe if I could talk to you for a half an hour before.

R: That would be marvelous. You are going to be here Saturday.

K: Yes I will.

R: I'll check out on time with your office and see when I could get down. Henry, we are facting very serious oil problems here in this state which is things are going to be worked out in the next month or so its not going to be so bad but if they're not we've got to do some drastic stuff. We'll continue anyhow to plan.

K: I think you should continue to plan. I am trying to get them worked out. Also trying to get Gov. Love here to do something but he's not our most energetic man.

R: No he isn't I'm afraid and he didn't get off to a very good start on the hill either.

K: He's a nice guy but he's lethargic to a point that's ;not to be believed.

R: I guess that high altitude, you know when you come down out of thie high altitude unto the plains.

K: I'm told that at his last meeting he had 55 people.

R: You're kidding.

K: I don't see 55 people bureaucrats in a year.

R: Well it sounds to me like he's going the road of Pete Peterson.

K: Exactly.

R: Is there a legal opinion?

K: No yet. I will try to get it this afternoon.

R: Well, you may be right on that. You can't afford to take any chances.

K: Well, that's my real worry. Otherwise I would love to have him because I really need, I don't need a doctor, they want to send a doctor with me.

R: It's just exactly what he does is what one needs under pressure.

R:

K: That's right. /Maybe he could go incognito with a beard.

K: As an Arab. Anything I can do on my own I'm proud to be associated with him. It's just the association with an official trip that worries me.

R: I understand.

K: Nelson, I was wondering... I just don't think I ought to come up tomorrow night.

R: That's fine. I don't think you should either.

- 2 -

K: Because first of all the exhaustion of running back and forth on top of what I'm going to have next week.

R: No, then being with all these people, shaking hands, making speeches and so forth, unnecessary.

K: And secondly if I skip a Golda Meir dinner here in which I was supposed to make the toast, even though I have a good excuse, ...

R: You can't do that.

K: All the Senators will notice that I'm not there.

R: No, you can't do that Henry. So this is fine. If they'll accept it I'm delighted.

K: I'd be proud of it.

R: Will your office handle it.

K: I'll get my office to handle it.

R: Just have your office say that you can't be there that if they would like I would be delighted to receive it.

K: You're really a great friend. And let's try to have a good talk on Saturday morning. I'll give you our whole strategy so that you have some understanding.

R: Marvelous. Listen Henry, while you're on the phone ... are you going to be there in the afternoon?

K: Yes, I'll be there all afternoon but I'll be tied up until about 4:00 - 4:30.

R: You will.

K: Yes.

R: And what about the morning?

K: Tomorrow.

R: Saturday.

K: I'll be there all day.

R: You will

- 3 -

K: Yes.

R: They want me to come down Saturday. I was thinking of Friday afternoon but has she got a schedule for Friday afternoon?

K: I don't know. I don't think so.

R: Are you going to be there Friday afternoon?

K: Yes I will.

R: I'm going to see if I can get there Friday afternoon. I'll check and be out then and see you. You're not considering John Cooper for anything X are you. He's very anxious as you know to go to Russia, Germany, go somewhere.

K: Russia I can't give him. The relations are too tense now.

R: That's what I was wondering.

K: Germany we might consider.

R: He's tremendous. He doesn't hear anything so that he probably wouldn't cause any trouble.

K: Yeah. I've got the President calling.

R: Take care.

TELCON
The President/HAK

October 31, 1973/12:58 p.m.

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

PL: How did your mission go?

K: Very well. They all came bubbling out their supporting you on television. Fulbright supported the policy.

P: Did they support detente.

K: Well he supports detente also. I took it very low key. I said what was done was necessary. They are all for detente in that context.

P: Right. Incidentally I just talked to Timmons and I want you to arrange to have an Executive Session, and it won't take you too long, but to give House Arm Services and Senate Arm Services the same kind of treatment. You know what I mean. Those are our friends and they are entitled to have it. And that can be very helpful in some other directions.

K: Absolutely Mr. President.

P: What is your situation the rest of the week. You're going to be leaving when.

K: Next Monday.

P: Well, you could do one of these things. We could just even bring them down for Blair House sessions things like that. Or State Department sessions. You know, invite them over.

K: I think it should be a White House thing.

P: Of course, not State Department because this is basically there but if you could bring them to Blair House you'd invite them all down for a briefing.

K: Let me talk to Timmons to see how we can work it out.

P: Good. But it went well.

K: Extremely well.

P: I saw your Egyptian briefing paper. I think I'm all set on that.

K: Right. I'll drop in 10 minutes before because he's got an urgent message from Sadat he's bringing in now.

P: Oh boy. Did the Israelis attack on them again?

K: No, I don't know what it is.

P: Well, Sadat seems to send messages regularly.

K: He has a high level of hysteria.

P: Poor guy. When you get some message to Brezhnev by this afternoon because...

K: Absolutely Mr. President

TELCOM

Ambassador Scali/HAK

October 31, 1973/1:28 p.m.x

K: Hello.

S: Hi Henry. I'm about to go into a meeting with Malick who has just finished talking with Dobrynin. Malick insists that the meeting be held right now. I'm at the Security Council and its in recess. Before I go in and talk with him I want to know if the instructions I had are still the same.

K: Well, we told him we would agree to the largest number that any other single contingent has.

S: Same position then.

K: That is right. Now what is that number?

S: Well, the Sweeds are authorized for 36 but they have only 32 so lets stay with 32.

K: Right. You know I wouldn't fall on my sword for those four.

S: I wouldn't either. I understand but I'm going to try to keep them to 32. Now how about the other?

K: That never even came up.

S: Romania is against the others.

K: That we never even raised with me.

S: OK. Well, he's already been into the Security Secretary General and beat the hell out of them for the fact that he's sending Canadians over there as truck drivers. He claims that when the Secretary General announced this on Saturday at the open meeting of the Security Council he didn't hear it. So he's trying to get the Secretary General to reverse that and Canadians out. Can you imagine.

K: Well, he's a pain in the ---.

S: This is the only thing here to discuss I need to know.

K: The only thing we discussed yesterday. He was screaming about 32 or 36 and so they came down to that.

TELCOM

Carl Albert - Secretary Kissinger

October 31, 1973

6:02 p.m.

K: Just wanted to tell you where we stand on that trade bill.

A: Right.

K: Our problem is we have not been able to get enough of an
indication from the Jewish Community if they would support dropping
Title IV. Our view on it is that if they would, we would want to
have it voted on now.

A: Well, we can put it on or put it off.

K: I was wondering if we can do it the week of November 12.

A: We were going to do it next week, put we probably could do it
then, let me talk to ________

K: Then let us ...

A: We'll try to put it on then.

K: If you could put it on the week of November 12, we would then
take the liberty of letting you know next week.

A: Fine.

<table><tr><td>Dec. 30, 1973</td></tr><tr><td>Annex to MOA, Date 6/18/73</td></tr><tr><td>By: J. Kissinger</td></tr></table>

-2-

D. I think it is invention.

K. My suggestion is if this is inspired it is not all that helpful.

D. Henry, I can tell you this is not the way we are doing that kind of inspiration... You could easily check an American correspondent. It is very easy to be checked. He will immediately tell you and your embassy who mentioned it from our side. I doubt very much that they would tell an American correspondent about their grievances. He would make his own deductions. First there was an agreement and afterwards a confrontation. It doesn't take a very wise man to figure that out.

K. It had a lot of detail. You know, it sounded---I normally don't pay any attention but it sounded very plausible.

D. I don't believe...if they wanted some fellow not from America... Maybe some of the fellow said something, even I doubt this one quite frankly.

K. Well it sounded very plausible. It repeated many things that you said.

D. From...it is not only my point of view. I told you they feel the same, that is very clear Henry. I am telling you...

K. Look, I am not asking to be loved. I am saying we are in a very difficult situation. The two people who helped put the detente together is the President and me and there is no sense in attacking the two of us while we are trying to do this. Whatever mistakes were made last week were not unilateral. Mistakes were made on both sides. Although I can tell you, having to deal with Egyptians is enough to test anyone's nerves.

D. I'm not arguing about that. I think it is not worthwhile to argue. If you look in perspective at the big things we have done and have to do in the future, all of these things were very small but got out of proportion in sense of word which Brezhnev had given to them.

K. We now have the art of statesmanship. Now is for us to keep this thing together and to go back to the big things we did together rather than let it be split completely. We did important things for three years and shouldn't let three days get in the way. On behalf of the President pass on his message to your leadership that he feels, that he attaches the greatest importance to continuation of what has been known as the detente policy and the greatest importance to the confidence established between him and the General Secretary.

D. Yes, he said that he is going to write a letter.

K. He asked me to reiterate.

D. Will he write a letter?

K. Yes, he will write a letter but we haven't had a chance. It may be Friday. We have been preparing for the Egyptian and Israeli visits. It will be a very positive letter.

D. I understand, you need some time...I understand.

K. On your specific proposal, we are prepared to designate somebody to meet with somebody you designate to discuss how to implement Article 3 of Security Council Resolution 338.

D. Where?

K. They can meet in Geneva, or here, whatever you decide.

D. You are here.

K. Let them meet wherever. Should he go to Moscow? Eventually they can take a trip to the Middle East.

D. Why don't they begin with the Middle East?

K. We have another idea that hasn't been fully decided yet. We may upgrade the head of the Interest Section in Cairo and send a more senior person there with the agreement of Egypt and he could get together with whoever you have.

D. Just trying to develop ideas you mentioned...

K. We don't exclude a trip to the Middle East.

D. Just to give them something. I know for instance, Gromyko will hardly like the idea. When he is in charge, you are in charge. ...people in Cairo, just to put Atherton. I don't know, maybe I am wrong. That is my impression. Do something we ask you.....

K. Then let me raise this tomorrow with the Israelis.

-4-

D. I think it would be better. I mentioned to Gromyko and Brezhnev your discussions with... but thinking aloud, they are waiting for their reaction.

K. Let me raise it with the Israelis tomorrow.

D. Yesterday it was one thing, today another.

K. Let me see what the Israelis reaction will be.

D. They didn't react negatively, but they are waiting further because you said you haven't discussed anything...

K. I will give you a definitive answer tomorrow.

D. I will send to Brezhnev the message from the President, but on this particular issue I won't say anything until I here from you.

K. We have given strict instructions to this department to keep their mouths shut. Now it turns out you have over a hundred ships in the Mediterranean. If that keeps up we will be driven into--

D. How many have you?

K. Less than 50. Look, you used to have the same number of ships as we had and then it increased.

D. Is this a number game or a word game?

K. In the past your number was about a third of what you have now.

D. Are they military or commercial?

K. No, military. We don't object to commercial. These are submarines and others. You have double the submarines you normally have and nearly three times as many surface ships.

D. I will.... just thinking aloud.

K. That is right. It would certainly be noticed if there was some reduction and would be reciprocated. You can tell them that.

D. I will tell them. What really they want up to now we didn't...
What about the second proposal?

K. What second proposal?

D. Using UN helicopters.

K. Let me discuss that with the Israelis. I understand.

D. All right. UN business not ours....I have a small matter that became apparent. We discussed with you about 36, or 32. Malik went there and the Swedish officials say they have 37. Could we finish this. Malik asked me today if we could settle on the 36 and forget about it.

K. Yes, we will settle on 36.

D. Could you get Scali these instructions.

K. Yes, I shall, You can tell Gromyko but don't tell Malik until I have told Scali which will be another hour.

D. I will wait two hours more. Our information is nothing, nothing really new....mentioned staying until Golda Mier is out.

K. There aren't going to be any spectacular results. I will see him again tomorrow.

D. How are things with Golda Mier? I hope you will tell....

K. We will tell you about it tomorrow, or Friday. She will be here today.

D. All right, Henry, the President said he is going to tell us.

K. We will tell you tomorrow.

D. O'k. Nothing else I guess, Henry.

K. That is all.

TELECON
McCloskey/Kissinger

October 31, 1973

6:33 p.m.

K. You mean they are not going?

M. No.

K. Well, that wasn't my understanding of our conversation.

M. It Well, I am sorry. It was not my understanding and several
times I said we had no additional space.

K. And I said we would cut the names down in some way.

M. Mr. Secretary, I don't see how we could have done that after
notifying Time magazine it had already been chosen.

K. It was my understanding that something could be done.

M. The only way it could have been done was when you asked that
three of the film crew be taken off the plane. It could have been
done then but I came to you and said we were asking for a hell of
a lot of trouble.

K. Now, my understanding was that I had explained my situation
with Kay Graham and something could be done. Either to remove
what seemed to be arbitrariness or to put them on.

M. There has never been an additional seat since then and to
remove arbitrariness.... to remove someone who had been told they
were going.... and tell them they were in a drawing and that they
have to take their chance.

K. In addition to your credibility, there is the problem of my
relationships too.

M. I just think you were---

K. Even if I was wrong.

M. All right. Unless we are prepared to take someone off to put
Newsweek on.

K. That we obviously cannot do.

M. If we now include them we are going to get hell from people.

The White House already got in trouble from knocking off USIA to put on the New York Daily News....I thought I had calmed everybody down by saying there were other trips and they would all get to go next time. My impression now is that Newsweek has settled down to a degree.

K. Maybe because I had told Kay I would look into it. She is a formidable enemy to have.

M. Mr. Secretary, if she would become a formidable enemy on something like that...

K. It doesn't make any differences. That is no consolation.... if she shows she is a shit. She was a strong friend in very difficult period in early Watergate phase when she leashed her people against me.

M. Of course I have none of the antecedent. If you want this done instruct me. We will find some way to do it. It will mean bumping one of the officials. I must say I disagree with doing it.

K. You have disagreed for two weeks and I have not up to now interfered with your judgments. I am not sure at this late stage it would create more havoc. It was just a misunderstanding. I had assumed it was done.

M. I never did get a direct answer from you.

K. She and McNamara were behind me when it was very tough and I was thinking of leaving giving me a lot of moral support. She was a good friend. This is the first thing in five years she asked something of me.

M. She is putting your friendship on a narrow----

K. We don't know that and will never know.

M. We will if they don't go.

K. What will that prove?

M. Would you like me now to find some means to get them on.

K. Let me think about it at this stage.

M. On a separate matter about Newsweek. Truett has asked twice this week if you could see him. He is doing something on the Middle East.

K. I couldn't have agreed to see him. I haven't seen him since I
came to State. I used to see him. That is independent of my
relationship with Kay Graham.

M. My position has been I don't think you should see any newsmen
alone. We disagree on that. I don't know what your relations with
him are. He will want to bring van Voorst with him.

K. I see no need to see him.

M. We can decide in the morning on what to do about the magazine.

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Authorized</td>
    <td>5 6/55</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>By</td>
    <td>OMARA CATE 6/16/55</td>
  </tr>
</table>