intervention was out of the question. The alliance with Moscow was dealt
war had certainly convinced the Chinese Communists that American military
war to carry the war to the west. American behavior in China during the civil
the United Kingdom or the United States to attack, but because it intended
divided the world as the enemy. It was their own political de-
the United States and the Soviet Union as members of the "socialist camp" and
from the very moment they faced power the Chinese Communists identified
what they had been doing for thirty years.

Communists had always been linked with Moscow and were merely continuing to do
work on the frontiers of widely arming external influences. The Chinese
link Beijing to Moscow, as has been argued only to avoid a sense of facts-
seeming more territory and more people to the Communist movement. He did not
in August of 1940 as the ruler of the whole of mainland China, he was merely
a Communist statesman. When Chairman Mao signed the treaty with the Soviet Union
power they turned to the Soviet Union as an example of how to set up and run
Marxism and Leninism, and it is hardly surprising that when they came to
signing, shared with their Russian counterparts the same ideological dept to
dependent entirely upon Moscow. The Chinese Communists, from the very pe-
ple immediately signed a treaty with the Soviet Union in which he made China
the national interests of his country within the Communist bloc, his nationalis-
on Moscow. It was to be pictured as a Chinese nationalist fighting for
originality, put there is plenty of evidence of al燕安 doctrinal dependence

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(110)

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not for the protection of Peking from its enemies, but for the further
expansion of communism.

It makes a great deal of difference to our policies whether we see the
Chinese and Russian Communist parties as competing nationalist groups or
as allies who, when the chips are down, will help each other against their
own peoples. By the same token it makes a great deal of difference whether
we see the international Communist movement as something that is dangerous
only as an appendage to Russian and Chinese policy or whether we see it as
a continuing struggle within and without the Communist orbit; a struggle
to manipulate old cultures, make captive old nationalisms, and impose values
and institutions which are retrogressive from any western, humanistic point
of view.

The Sino-Soviet Alliance is based more upon the mutual interests of two
Communist parties than on those of two nation states. The Chinese Communists,
by conquering China, improved their own position, but they also
position of the Communists in the Soviet Union. The Chinese and the Russian
Communist parties working together occupy a strategic position of un-
paralleled strength and have combined resources of gigantic proportions.
Nothing succeeds like success. Few things in fact did more to consolidate
the grip of the Russian Communists over the peoples of the Soviet Union than
did the conquest of China by the Chinese Communists. In 1949 the Chinese
Communists restored the prestige of the "movement"; they gave communism
once more its international posture; they made it easier for the Russian
Communists to recover from the appeals they made during the second world war to
traditional Russian nationalism. If American policy had succeeded in creating
a strong, democratic, and united China, how different would have been the
world picture of the Soviet Union. Soviet armies in Eastern Europe would

world brocade of the Soviet Union. Soviet armies in Eastern Europe would
be strong, democratic, and united China, how different would have been the
traditional Russian nationality. It American definitely had succeeded in creating
Communists to recover from the abdication they made during the second world war to
once more its international beam; they made it easier for the Russian
Communists restored the breath of the "movement"; they gave communists
did the condensation of China by the Chinese Communists. In 1948 the Chinese
the grip of the Russian Communists over the beacons of the Soviet Union thus
Nothing succeeds like success. New turns in fact did more to consolidate
barrelled strength and have confined resources of gigantic proportions.
Communist parties working together oomblay a strategic position of un-
position of the Communists in the Soviet Union. The Chinese and the Russian
by condensing China, improved their own position, put fully imbedded the
Communist parties then on those of two nation states. The Chinese Communists.
The Soviet-Soviet Alliance is passed more about the mutual interests of two
of them.

and institutions which are retrograde from any western, imperialistic point
to manipulate old countries, make captive old nationalities, and impose upon
a continuing strangle within and without the Communist orbit; a strangle
only as an abberance to Russian and Chinese policy, or whether we see it as
we see the international Communist movement as something that is dangerous
our beacons. By the same token it makes a great deal of difference whether
as allies who, when the chips are gone, will help each other against their
Chinese and Russian Communist parties as combating nationalistic groups or
If makes a great deal of difference to our policies whether we see the
expansion of communism.

not for the protection of Berlin from its enemies, put for the American

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ELC

then have stood out much more plainly for what they are; instruments of
Communist aggression. The real tie between these two greatest of the
Communist elites is that each has a vested interest in the success of the
other. The Communist movement, indeed, has been much more successful in
getting the Communist elites of the world to unite than in uniting the workers
of the world. Both in power and in opposition Communist parties have had
many years of experience in united and coordinated action.

It is very important to understand the nature of the Moscow-Peking
alliance. The stresses and strains that may arise in a phenomenon of this
sort are certainly quite specific. The Communist parties of Europe and Asia
are governing a very complex empire, and the struggle for power, Communist
style, is now complicated by the very vastness of that empire; by differing
regional problems, both domestic and international; by the unevenness of
development; and by the shift in the world balance of power. One thing is
quite clear, however, that the inner compulsion for ideological conformity
still remains because it is an essential part of the power structure of the
Communist type of state, and power struggles are still fought out in doctrinal
terms. The victor decides the doctrine. Mao Tse-tung, for example, made
extravagant doctrinal claims for the commune movement in August, 1958, claims
from which he had to retreat ignominiously in December of the same year.
Was he trying to show the superiority of the "Chinese" as against "Russian"
development, or was this a bid for ideological leadership stemming from his
own megalomania? When he was forced to retreat, it is worth noting, the
Chinese Communist party did not stand behind him; it forced his retirement from
the chairmanship of the government. Communists usually pay a high price for
failure of this sort. The fact that nothing more serious happened to Chairman
Mao is due, it can be assumed, to the new factor in the situation -- the

Mao is one, it can be assumed, to the new factor in the situation — the failure of this sort. The fact that nothing more serious happened to Chairman the chairmanship of the Government. Communists naturally pay a high price for Chinese Communist party did not stand behind him; it forced his retirement from own megamillions? When he was forced to retire, it is worth noting, the development, or was it a bid for ideological leadership stemming from his being forced to show the authority of the "Chinese" as against "Beijing" from which he had to retire immediately in December of the same year. Exemplifying doctored claims for the commune movement in Vankle, 1938, claims name. The victor decides the doctrine. Mao Tse-tung, for example, made Communist the of state, and power struggles are still fought out in doctored still remains because it is an essential part of the power structure of the regime clear, however, that the inner combination for ideological conformity development? and by the shift in the world balance of power. One thing is regional problems, both domestic and international; by the weakness of style, is now complicated by the very vagueness of that empire? by differing are governing a very complex empire? and the struggle for power? Communists sort are certainly quite specific. The Communist parties of Europe and Asia alliance. The attitudes and strains that may arise in a phenomenon of this sort is very important to understand the nature of the Maoist-making many years of experience in mixed and coordinated action.

of the world? Both in power and in opposition Communist parties have had great the Communist parties of the world to make their way in meeting the workers' other. The Communist movement, indeed, has been much more successful in Communist efforts to that end has a heated interest in the success of the Communist agreement. The real tie between these two greatest of the states have a good out much more认真 for what they are: instruments of

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[10]

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existence of a Communist Chinese State. Any further loss of prestige to Chairman Mao would have had a damaging effect upon the international position of the Communist movement. Trotsky was not so fortunate.

Doctrinal development is extremely complex. We have to remember that both the Russian and the Chinese Communists are attempting to remold traditional societies which have great inner strength and considerable inertia. The Communists who are building socialism in Russia have different problems from those who are doing the same in China; thus different conditions will produce different emphases in practice. Differences in practice may put strains on unity of doctrine. The Communists have set up a new power system and made a return to pre-Communist society extremely difficult, if not impossible, but the non-Communist values are far from having been extinguished. Nor can they be completely eliminated perhaps until they are exterminated in the non-Communist world. The effort to maintain unity of doctrine, the great strength of the alliance, may also create very serious problems.

The Moscow-Peking alliance makes sense from an economic point of view only if we remember that to the Communist, economics is a branch of politics. The strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese economy are to be measured in terms of the political objectives of the Chinese Communist Party and the economy of the bloc as a whole. Put very simply, the economic objectives of the Communist Party in China are to build up a power economy for the purposes of the state, that is, of the Communist Party, while maintaining a subsistence economy for the bulk of the population, and to further the international position of the Communist movement. There are those who would seek to justify trading with Communist China on the grounds that trade will have beneficial political effects by improving our relations with the Chinese Communists. We may or may not have good reasons for opening up trade with

Communists. We wish or wish not have good reasons for opening up trade with
penetrating political alliances, effecting by improving our relations with the Chinese
to greatly straining with Communist China on the ground that trade will have
superficial economy for the bulk of the population, and to further the inferior-
boles of the state, that is, of the Communist Party, while maintaining a
of the Communist Party in China are to put up a power economy for the busi-
economy of the people as a whole. But very simply, the economic objectives
terms of the political objectives of the Chinese Communist Party and the
The strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese economy are to be measured in
only if we remember that to the Communist, economics is a branch of politics.
The Moscow-Peking alliance makes sense from an economic point of view
of the alliance, may also create very serious problems.

Communist world. The effort to maintain strength of doctrine, the great strength
they can be completely eliminated because until then are eliminated in the non-
the non-Communist states are far from having been extinguished. Nor can
a return to pre-Communist society, extremely difficult, if not impossible, put
on strength of doctrine. The Communists have set up a new power system and need
different empires in practice. Differences in practice may but产生
those who are doing the same in China; some different conditions will produce
Communists who are putting society in a state have different problems from
societies which have great inner strength and considerable inertia. The
the Russian and the Chinese Communists are attempting to remedy traditional
mistaken development into extremely complex. We have to remember that power
of the Communist movement. Probably was not so far-faraway.

Chairman Mao would have had a amazing effect upon the international position
existence of a Communist Chinese State. And further loss of prestige to

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Etc.

-8-

Communist China, but to justify it on these grounds is to invite the mockery of both Peking and Moscow, and put ourselves at the service of their political ambitions. The political strength of the Sino-Soviet alliance rests on firm economic foundations of intra-bloc trade, credits, and technical assistance. If the Free World permits trade with Communist China under normal conditions then Peking will get the best of both worlds. From its position as a fully integrated member of the Communist bloc it can use trade and aid with the Free World for political ends.

Communist China is an important power today mainly because she is a member of the Communist bloc. Standing alone she would be a heavily-armed but underdeveloped country. What, then, it might be asked, of the future of Communist China if she becomes an industrialized country with her own atomic weapons? Will she not be more independent of the Soviet Union and will not the differences between them which now seem small become more significant? No one can say for sure, but it is useful, for perspective, to remind ourselves that the United States is presently allied with nuclear powers; and that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by our allies does not necessarily mean the breakdown of alliances. On the contrary, when two powers have a military alliance and both have nuclear weapons, they are almost automatically compelled to develop an interdependent system of defense. Communist China and the USSR have settled the frontiers that separate their territories -- frontiers that for centuries have been a source of dispute -- and they have bridged the vast buffer zones of Mongolia and Turkestan with railroads and air lines whose strategic significance is clearly much greater than their economic justification. It would be much more difficult to break bonds of this sort than it was to dissolve the military alliances of the 19th century.

There is nothing final about military or political arrangements, and

There is nothing final about military or political arrangements, and
the term centimetre.

Pounds of this sort than it was to dissolve the military alliances of the
than their economic justification. It would be much more difficult to break
railroads and air lines whose strategic significance is clearly more far-
and they have prided themselves on Mongolias and Turkistan with
territories — frontiers that for convenience have been a source of dispute —
Communist China and the USSR haveeffected the frontiers that separate their
most automatically compelled to develop an independent system of defense.
batteries have a military alliance and power have nuclear weapons, just as al-
necessary mean the preemption of alliances. On the contrary, when two
batteries and that the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not
remind one that the United States is presumably affiliated with nuclear
alliances? No one can say for sure, but it is naive, for benevolent, to
will not the differences between them which now seem small become more aft-
atomic weapons? Will she not be more independent of the Soviet Union and
of Communist China if she becomes an industrialised country with per cent
put underdeveloped country. What? then, it might be asked, of the future
member of the Communist bloc. Standing alone she would be a heavily-armed
Communist China is an important power, today mainly because she is a
trade and aid with the Free World for political ends.

its position as a fully integrated member of the Communist bloc it can use
under normal conditions then Beijing will get the rest of the world's. From
technical reason. It the Free World benefits trade with Communist China
leaps on its economic tombstone of intra-pole trade, credits, and
political ambitions. The political strength of the Soviet-German alliance
mological of both Berlin and Moscow, and but ourselves at the service of their
Communist China, put to justify it on these grounds is to invite the

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ELCJ

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it is well to remember that relations can become strained between the closest of allies. But there is nothing to suggest that the next ten or twenty years will bring about any serious deterioration of the Moscow-Peking alliance. The nearest parallel to it, the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis, which was a very loose confederation in comparison, survived a world war and ended only with the surrender of Japan. It is significant that it was only in the case of Japan that an organized surrender was possible because there was an alternative authority, the Emperor, who could take precedence over the military. But in Germany and Italy, where the Nazis and the Fascists had absolute control, there was no alternative authority which could take over, and the people were powerless to take the initiative away from the ruling party.

The example of the Fascist powers provides the clue to the real significance and strength of the Moscow-Peking alliance. The alliance is essentially between two parties, each of which has removed all organized opposition and holds a monopoly of power, each of which is at war with its own people, and each of which needs the political, psychological, and military support of the other. That is why the alliance is really more than an alliance in the conventional sense of the term. That is why it will last a very long time.

The strength of the state in Communist countries is so great that any expectation of successful revolt from below, certainly if unaided from the outside, is practically out of the question. The internal conflicts are much more likely to come from within the elite, as they did in Nazi Germany. It is important to have an hypothesis as to how these divisions arise, over what issues, and along what lines. We have derived some satisfaction from the apostasy of Belgrade, but this came about neither through our efforts, or by the wish of the Yugoslav Communist party. It was due almost entirely to crude

the war of the Information Communist party. It was one almost entirely to end
abuse of Belfrage, but this came about neither through our efforts, or by
fiascs, and along what lines. We have derived some satisfaction from the
is important to have an philosophy as to how these divisions arise, over what
more likely to come from within the state, as they did in West Germany. It
outside, if basically out of the question. The internal conflicts are much
expectation of successful revolt from below, certainly if marred from the
The strength of the state in Communist countries is so great that and
very long time.

alliance in the conventional sense of the term. That is why it will last a
相当 of the other. That is why the alliance is really more than an
beads, and each of which needs the political, psychological, and military
obstruction and holds a monopohy of power, each of which is at war with its own
essentially between two parties, each of which has removed all organised
utility and strength of the Moscom-Belgrade alliance. The alliance is

The example of the Fascist powers provides the clue to the real sig-
bomeless to take the initiative away from the ruling party.

there was no alternative authority which could take over, and the beacons were
But in Germany and Italy, where the Axis and the Fascists had separate control,
five authorities, the Emperors, who could take precedence over the military.

Japan that an organised surrender was possible because there was an alterna-
tive surrender of Japan. It is a significant fact that it was only in the case of
loose delegation in comparison, availed a world war and ended only with
The nearest parallel to it, the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis, which was a very
Europe will print apart and serious deterioration of the Moscom-Belgrade alliance
of allies. But there is nothing to suggest that the next ten or twenty

it is well to remember that relations can become strained between the victors

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LTC

-10-

miscalculations in Moscow, and to this day the Yugoslav Communists have
little sympathy for the Western way of life. In the long run, schisms are
bound to develop, but it is likely, to judge from other movements, to be a
very long run; and the schisms will not necessarily fall neatly into
nationalist conflicts.

The struggles for power will certainly be influenced by the strong
imperial structure of the Communist bloc. When problems arose for Khrushchev,
for example, in Poland and Hungary, Chou En-lai went to speak with Communist
leaders in these countries. Was this a case of Chinese intervention in the
affairs of Europe, as some have suggested, or was he induced by Khrushchev
to bear witness to the solidarity of the empire? Suppose the situation were
reversed. If a struggle for power should develop in Peking, what would be
more natural than for one side to enlist the support of Moscow against the
other? There is nothing in communism to deepen that love of country which
would, according to Western standards, prevent a patriot from appealing to a
foreign power. The spirit of nationalism, in its modern, western sense,
never had time to make much headway in China before the Communists took over.
Where it did develop — in the national revolution led by the Kuomintang —
the struggle for national independence followed a familiar pattern. The
Nationalists accepted help from Moscow, but clashed with the Communists in
1927 and have been fighting them ever since. In the post-war years, Chiang
Kai-shek's government, whatever its faults, and they were many, did not sell
its independence to any other country. The Chinese Communists, on the other
hand, imported a foreign ideology, rose to power with foreign help, and,
once in control, put the fortunes of China pretty much into foreign hands.

Because Peking has been unable to conquer Formosa, there are still two
poles of attraction for the Chinese people. This may have important con-

["because Beijing has been unable to condense forcess, there are still two\ncases in control, but the forces of China pretty much into foreign bands,\npaid, imported a foreign Ideology, rose to power with foreign people, and,\nits independence to and other country. The Chinese Communists, on the other\nfront, a government, whatever its name, and they were many, did not sell\n1981 and have been fighting them ever since. In the boat-war years, Guang\nNationsstates accepted help from Moscow, put clasped with the Communists in\nthe struggle for national independence followed a similar pattern. The\nwhere it did develop — in the national revolution fed by the Communists —\nnever had time to make much progress in China before the Communists took over.\nforeign power. The spirit of nationalism, in its modern, western sense,\nwould, according to Western standards, prevent a war of war from abating to a\nother? There is nothing in communists to geeden that love of country which\nmore natural than for one side to exploit the advantage of Moscow against the\nrewards. It is a struggle for power should development in Beijing, what would be\nto peer witness to the solidarity of the empire? Suppose the situation were\nsimilar to Europe, as some have suggested, or was he induced by Khrushchev\nleaders in these countries. Was this a case of Chinese intervention in the\ntor example, in Poland and Hungary, Chen En-fai went to ask with Communists\nin the example, in Poland and Hungary

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sequences for the future of the Chinese people if serious differences develop within the Communist elite on the mainland. Under certain conditions the Nationalists on Formosa might be, for one of the competing groups, an alternative source of political support. Under good leadership the Nationalists could well become the "conscience" of China and thus exert a steady influence over the course of events. It is interesting, for example, that students from Overseas Chinese groups in Southeast Asia, who at first went in overwhelming numbers to Peking, now go to Taiwan for their education. Much depends on political developments on Taiwan, but it would be unwise to write off the political importance of the Nationalist Government; Peking does not.

## B. Ten Years of Communist China.

The objectives of the Communist regime on the mainland have been declared. They are: (1) To create a very strong, all-powerful state, controlled by the Communist Party, with unchallenged authority over every aspect of the lives of the Chinese people; (2) To carry out an economic revolution designed to make China a highly industrialized country and a great power in her own right; (3) To drive American influence out of Eastern Asia and dominate that part of the world.

1. Communist China today is ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, and that party is controlled by a small elite. The party today has between twelve and thirteen million members, a three-fold increase since coming to power. In structure, the party is modeled after the Russian Communist party, the basic operating principle is that of "democratic centralism", and all important decisions come from the party elite. A few other parties are permitted to exist, although they are limited in size and their function is purely ceremonial, to maintain the myth that this is a multi-party and multi-class

ceremonial, to maintain the custom that China is a multi-party and multi-class
elite, although they are limited in size and their function is briefly
decisions come from the party elite. A few other parties are permitted to
operating principle is that of "democratic centralism", and all important
structures, the party is modeled after the Russian Communist party, the party
thirteen million members, a three-fold increase since coming to power. In
party is controlled by a small elite. The party today has between twelve and
1. Communist China today is ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, and that
dominate that part of the world.

in per cent right (3) To drive American influence out of Eastern Asia and
tion desired to make China a highly industrialized country and a great power
best of the lives of the Chinese people; (5) To carry out an economic revo-
lied by the Communist Party, with unchallenged authority over every as-
cient. Today are: (1) To create a very strong, all-powerful state, cou-
the objectives of the Communist regime on the mainland have been de-
B. Ten Years of Communist China.

Beijing does not.

wise to write off the political importance of the Nationalist Government,
that depends on political developments on Taiwan, but it would be un-
ment in overwhelming numbers to Beijing, now so to Taiwan for their equiva-
lent students from overseas Chinese groups in Southeast Asia, who at that
time had influence over the course of events. If it is interesting, for example,
Nationalists could well become the "conscience" of China and thus exert a
an alternative source of political influence. Under good leadership the
from the Nationalists on the basis might be, for one of the combatting groups
develop within the Communist elite on the mainland. Under certain conditions for the future of the Chinese people it serious differences

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government.

When a Communist party is in power, revolutionaries must become bureaucrats, professional soldiers, and builders. The Chinese Communist Party has had the tremendous advantage of having been in administrative control of millions of people and a sizable army for a long time before gaining control of the whole of China. One consequence of this is that there has been an appearance of unusual unity in the party during the past ten years, but this must be put in a perspective of forty years during much of which there was bitter internal strife and violence. Given the nature of Communist parties there is no reason to expect more peaceful coexistence among the party elite in China than there is in the Soviet Union. We can expect that the pressure from the Soviet Union will be exerted in favor of the Chinese Communist leaders who are supporters of the clique in power in Moscow.

The Chinese Communist party has succeeded in exercising its control over the government, the army, and the people by a combination of violence, persuasion, and new institutions. Control has been extended through mass organizations which flank the Communist party and are basically similar in structure. At the lowest level they are cell type associations which may be based upon neighborhood or functional groups. There are mass organizations for women, for youth, for workers, for peasants. Through these organizations the cadres transmit the policies of the party and carry out the ideological training of the people; or arrange for "spontaneous" demonstrations against American imperialism, in favor of visiting dignitaries, or for the elimination of flies. In a famous passage Mao Tse-tung made it clear that he felt that a revolution could not take place without shedding blood, and that the people must cooperate with the revolutionaries in murder, disappropriation, and general social violence. In this way the people participate actively

and general social violence. In this way the people participate actively
who must cooperate with the revolutionaries in murder, disappropriation,
that a revolution could not take place without shedding blood, and that the
of life. In a famous passage we see that made it clear that he left
American imperialist, in favor of violating dignities, or for the effemin-
training of the people, or arrange for "abnormal" demonstrations against
the cases transmit the policies of the party and carry out the ideological
tions for women, for young, for workers, for peasants. Through these organisa-
be passed then neighborhood or functional groups. There are many organisa-
tions at present. At the lowest level they are cell the associations which may
organizations which link the Communist party and are basically similar
bmanisation, and new institutions. Control has been extended through mass
over the Government, the army, and the people by a combination of violence,
The Chinese Communist party has succeeded in exercting its control
authorities of the cities in power in Moscow.
Union will be exerted in favor of the Chinese Communist leaders who are
there is in the Soviet Union. We can expect that the breake from the Soviet
no reason to expect perfect coexistence among the parties elite in China than
fernal strike and violence. Given the nature of Communist parties there is
in a benevolent of forty years dming much of which there was bitter in-
of mutual trust in the party during the best ten years, put this must be but
whole of China. One consequence of this is that there has been an absence
of people and a расспе arm for a long time before gaining control of the
the tremendous advantage of having been in administrative control of millions
brotherly soldiers, and soldiers. The Chinese Communist party has had
When a Communist party is in power, revolutions arise which become tyrannical,
Government.

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-13-

in creating the new order. Bringing the Chinese masses into politics in this manner has nothing to do with democracy as we understand it. The masses ratify decisions already taken and participate in pageants to celebrate them. There is no question but that this system releases a great deal of social energy and to some provides psychological satisfaction; but it is also true that for many it brings frustration, boredom, and total weariness.

The release of social energy is closely associated with the vast social changes that the regime has brought about. In effect, China has now only two classes, those who rule and those who are ruled. The so-called land reform movement in the countryside destroyed the influence of the gentry by appropriating their properties, killing them, or reducing them to penury. In the cities the commercial and industrial classes were treated in the same way, and the workers, who had played a passive role in the revolution, were given the status that theory demanded. They were paid much more in prestige than in goods or shorter hours. The Communists dealt roughly with the intellectual classes of China. The only place for intellectuals in the Communist society is either as a member of the party or as a close ally. Some were liquidated. Those that failed to adjust to the new situation were compelled to write public confessions denouncing practically every view that they had held up to the coming of communism. It is not too much to say that the Communists have failed miserably in their efforts to win over the older intellectuals of China, and that according to their own admissions they have suffered serious reverses with the younger generation. There is no question that the regime was truly alarmed at the contempt and hatred shown for the party and communism by the intellectuals who spoke up during the famous period of the hundred flowers. Whatever the reason for starting this apparent liberalization of expression, the attack upon the regime was so powerful that

tipoffulation of expression, the attack upon the regime was so powerful that
of the hundred thousands. Whatever the reason for starting this abhorrent
barby and communism in the intellectual sphere during the terrors barbed
that the regime was truly alarmed at the content andature shown for the
entertainedBJouline reverse with the longer generation. There is no direction
reflected in China, and that according to their own statements they have
Communists have failed successfully in their efforts to win over the older in-
they had held out to the coming of Communism. If it is not too much to say that fine
combelled to write bapite conlangtions denouncing basically every man that
some were liquidated. Those that failed to adjust to the new situation were
Communist society is either as a memper of the barby or as a close ally.
intellectual classes of China. The only place for intellectual in the
fan in Boogie or anorger home. The Communists desist roughly with fine
given the afatme that therby demanded. They were paid much more in breatherly
way, and the workers, who had played a passive role in the revolution, were
in the cities the commercial and industrial classes were treated in the same
abroducting their properties, killing them, or requiring them to be bunny.
tom movement in the community desecrated the influence of the Benly in
the classes, those who rule and those who are ruled. The so-called land re-
changes that the regime has brought about. In effect, China has now only
the release of social energy is closely associated with the vast social
that for many it brings frustration, porosity, and total messiness.
energy and to some broadside psychological antagonism, put it is also true
there is no direction but that this system releases a great deal of social
rapidity,ecaufons already taken and barbiturate in because to celebrate them.
this manner has nothing to do with democracy as we understand it. The masses
in creating the new order. Bringing the Chinese masses into politics in

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stern measures had to be taken against the "rightists". The intellectual,
unless he is allied with the military, is not a serious threat to the regime,
but he is essential to its success and must eventually be satisfied. The
Peking regime has not yet solved this problem.

The Chinese Communists are perfectly frank about the fact that military
force is the basis of political power. They got into power through military
force and intend to use it to stay in power. The Chinese Communist Army
is not comparable to the American Army in its social and political outlook;
political and military affairs are one. The army is used for every sort of
purpose from foreign aggression to land settlement, farm labor, and construc-
tion projects. There are a standing army of possibly two and one-half million
men, and a very sizable militia which is now being trained through the commune
organization. There is not much evidence as to the behavior of the army in
domestic affairs, and it must be assumed that in the suppression of discontent
at home, the army is reliable. The only test we have of the Chinese Communist
army on foreign soil indicates that if they are given the opportunity most of
the troops taken prisoner do not choose to be repatriated. The loyalty of the
army and the attitudes of the peasantry are closely related. It is not easy
to generalize about the peasant. It is worth recalling, however, that many
of the peasants were promised land during the time when the Communists rose
to power and have now had that land taken away from them. They have been
organized into communes and live on carefully rationed food and under semi-
military conditions of life and work. On the basis of what evidence we have,
the peasantry is most certainly in no position to express discontent in any
form other than spontaneous and ineffective uprisings against the local cadres.
It is clear, however, that they certainly cannot be counted upon as loyal and
enthusiastic supporters of the regime. And this situation is likely to con-

enigmatic ambiguities of the regime. And this situation is likely to continue if it is clear, however, that they certainly cannot be counted upon to rely and form other than spontaneous and collective行动 against the local orders. The besaunty is most certainly in no position to express discontent in such military conditions of life and work. On the parte of what evidence we have organized into communes and five on carefully rationed food and water semi-to power, and have not had that land taken away from them. They have been of the besaunty were brought land during the time when the Communes rose to generalise upon the besaunty. It is worth recalling, however, that such army and the attitudes of the besaunty are closely related. If it is not easy the troops taken prisoner do not choose to be rebranded. The loyalty of the army on foreign soil indicates that if they are given the opportunity most of at home, the army is rebrand. The only fact we have of the Chinese Communist domestic armies, and it must be assumed that in the atmosphere of discontent organization. There is not much evidence as to the behavior of the army in men, and a very asshole military which is now being trained through the commune from projects. There are a standing army of possibly two and one-half million burghers from foreign aggression to land settlement, farm labor, and consumer-borhical and military armies are one. The army is need for every sort of it not comparable to the American Army in its social and political outlook; force and influence to use it to stay in power. The Chinese Communist Army force is the parte of political power. They got into power through military force. The Chinese Communists are perfectly frank about the fact that military being regime has not yet solved this problem.

but he is essential to its success and must eventually be satisfied. The unless he is allied with the military, is not a serious threat to the regime, and then measures had to be taken against the "rightists". The intelligentsia,

-Jt-

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tinue because all Communist states try to change the peasant beyond recognition, to make him into a rural proletarian, and to divorce him from practically every link with the past. If the police power of the Communist regime were broken, the peasantry, whether in uniform or not, could probably not be relied upon.

The general question of loyalty in a Communist regime is very complex. Most observers have pointed out the extravagant use of psychological appeals by the Communist regime in handling its own people. The brain washing techniques, with which we have had some experience during the Korean conflict, were used not only on American prisoners of war, but also on the Chinese people themselves. The intellectuals, for example, are organized into groups for "study" and "self criticism" and reform through labor. Officers in the army are made to serve periods in the ranks, townspeople are sent to work in the country, students are taken from the universities for work on the farms, recalcitrants are put into labor camps from which they emerge if they give sufficient evidence of reform. Through the mass organizations the process of indoctrination goes on day and night; year in, year out. We have a picture of a regime conducting mass psychological warfare on its own people. Some refer to this as a new dimension in political power.

Some of the short-range appeals which the Chinese Communists have used, such as the offering of land to the peasants, participation in the government by all classes, education and opportunity for the young, have been mentioned. It has been suggested that the long-range appeal of the regime to nationalism has been of great importance, but this seems too simple an answer. Elements in nationalism such as pride of race, domination over minority groups, and cultural arregance certainly have an appeal, especially to those in power. Nationalism includes many other things too, such as tradition, commonly-held

Nationalism includes many other things too, among them, commonly held
enforcement certainly have an abscissa, especially to those in power.
in nationalities such as bridge of race, discrimination over minority groups, and
have been of great importance, but this seems too simple an answer. Elements
It has been argued that the fourth-range abscissa of the regime to nationalism
is all classes, education and obsolescence for the low class, has been mentioned,
and so the offering of land to the masses, participation in the government
Some of the short-range abscissa which the Chinese Communists have used,
refer to this as a new dimension in political power.

of a regime comprising mass politicalarlity on its own basis. Some
of independence goes on daily and right? year in, year out. We have a picture
sufficient evidence of reform. Through the mass organizations the process
recognition are put into place, which which itself emerge it finally give
the country, students are taken from the universities for work on the farms,
army are made to serve berrie in the ranks, formation are sent to work in
for 

Most open areas have been put out the extraneous use of political abscissa
The general question of loyalty in a Communist regime is very complex.

not be referred to.
regime were broken, the masses, whether in minority or not, could properly
benefitly evenhly link with the mass. If the force power of the Communist
you, to make him into a nationalist professorian, and to divorce him from
force because all Communists are tied to change the masses behind record-

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-16-

values, cultural unity. But the Communists are uprooting Chinese culture,
breaking down the old fashioned family unit, rewriting the classics, and
imposing respect for the sterile culture of the Soviet Union. If the
Communists are appealing to nationalism, they are also putting great strains
on it by their slavish imitation of the Soviet Union, by their one-sided
relationship with it, and by the imposition on all of Marxism and Leninism,
to say nothing of Stalinism and Maoism. In the view of many Chinese, they
have sold their culture and their country.

The future of nationalism in Communist China is not easy to anticipate.
It will certainly be sufficiently different from the old that we have to
beware of sweeping generalizations to the effect that the Communists have
brought "nationalism to its zenith", that they have forged the "most tightly
knit nation-state that has ever existed in this area", except for Japan.
(See the Conlon report). It is often suggested that the call to make China
a great power is all the stronger because of the recent history of foreign
invasion and defeat. The Chinese Communists, it is said, have formed
nationalism, industrialism and communism, and imposed upon the peoples who
live within the confines of the old Manchu-Chinese empire the strongest
centralized state in history. These categories are too vague to be meaningful.
The imposition of Chinese rule over all minority groups, the crushing
of Tibetan resistance, the establishment of state power may appeal to those
Chinese who are making policy or carrying it out on the higher levels. The
appeal does not necessarily intoxicate the common man, as was shown during
the Korean conflict when Chinese prisoners chose not to return to Communist
control at a time when Chinese arms were supposed to have successfully
countered those of the United Nations. When nationalism and communism are
spoken of together it is wise to remember the special relationship that the
Chinese communists have to the Soviet Union and the peculiar structure of the
Communist state. The power economy of Communist states is certainly im-

Communist states. The power, economy of Communist states is certainly in-
Chinese communes have to the Soviet Union and the beneficial structure of the
abnormal of together. It is wise to remember the special relationship that the
considered those of the United Nations. When nations and communities are
control at a time when Chinese areas were embroiled to have successfully
the Korean conflict when Chinese borderlines chose not to return to Commu-
heits does not necessarily intoxicate the common man's awareness during
Chinese who are making patch or carrying it out on the higher level. The
of Tito's resistance, the adaptation of state power was essential to those
of the occupation of Chinese area over all minority areas, the ruling
centralized state in history. These categories are too vague to be meaningful
five within the continuity of the old Manchu-Chinese empire the strongest
nations, industries and communities, and indicated how theبقs who
invasion and disease. The Chinese communes, if they have a combined
a Great power, is all the stronger because of the recent history of foreign
(See the Conion report). It is often alleged that the call to make China
emit nation-state that has ever existed in this area, except for Japan.
proving "nations" to its members, that they have forged the "most fictitious
pamela of sweeping generalisations to the effect that the communes have
It will certainly be sufficiently different from the old that we have to
The future of nations in Communist China is not easy to anticipate.
have said their culture and their country.
to say nothing of Stalinism and Maoism. In the view of many Chinese, fdp
relationship with it, and by the imposition on all of Marxism and Leninism,
on it by their alacrity imitation of the Soviet Union, by their one-sided
Communes are abating to nationalities, which are also bugging Great Britain
imposing respect for the entire culture of the Soviet Union. It is the
preserving down the old traditionedism, remitting the class, and
aimes, cultural drift. But the Communists are shooting Chinese culture.

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pressive and it brings some satisfaction to the managerial and professional classes who have to run it. The economic interests of these groups, the scientists, factory managers, educators, technicians and professionals of all sorts, lie with the party rather than with the common people from whom, in many cases, they have come, but whom they fear.

The common people, among whom there has been a great deal of leveling, are controlled by institutional and psychological techniques; they are organized and aroused against American imperialism and in favor of Soviet culture and leadership, against Tibetan resistance to the Chinese government and in favor of revolutionary action against other governments. The Conlon report, which argues that the foremost appeal to the Chinese people is nationalism also points out very well that "participation in Chinese politics at the mass level today is based essentially upon ratification, not decision-making; it is more ritualistic, induced, and collective than free-flowing, self-interested, and independently derived". We have pointed out that even the symbols of nationalism are not clear (anti-American and pro-Soviet) and that the Communist social and political system leaves very little nationalism to appeal to among the common people. The danger is that by using the term nationalism we may project on to this sort of society values which it does not have, we may see unity where there is none and confuse pageantry with political support. It is not so long ago that many Americans thought that Japan would be incapable of organized surrender, would fight to the last man, woman, and child, and would create tremendous difficulties for the occupying power. The parallel is worth keeping in mind because there is the same tendency in America today to believe Communist propaganda about the Communist states as there was to believe Japanese propaganda about Japan.

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2. The achievements of the Communists in building up a power economy are quite impressive, although other countries have done as much, and in some cases much more, without the same violence, bloodshed, and hadrdships. The first few years were spent in reviving the economy which they had done so much to destroy, and in effecting party control over all the decisive elements in the economy. Then began a succession of five-year plans. Communist statistics are not easy to handle, partly because they are presented so often in propaganda form, and partly because the gathering of statistics in Communist China today is still a very unreliable affair. A country that announces a grain production of 375,000,000 metric tons and later reduces the estimate to 250,000,000 tons does not inspire confidence in its statistics. The goal for 1959 in grain production was first set at 525,000,000 tons and later reduced to 275,000,000 tons; and the goal for steel production was reduced from 18,000,000 to 12,000,000 tons. These reduced figures are probably more reliable, but it is still difficult to know exactly how reliable they are. According to official statistics, the gross national product of Communist China averaged an annual increase of 9% between 1952 and 1957, but it may have been closer to 7%. The main emphasis has been on increasing the production of grains, steel, and coal, and there is no doubt that advances have been made. If the figures for grain are correct, the increase the one year of 1959 was from 185,000,000 to 275,000,000. Steel production is claimed to be going up from 5.35 to 8 million tons, and by now is expected to be up to 12 million tons of industrial grade steel. In coal production, Communist China claims to be surpassing the output of the United States, the goal for 1959 being 335 million tons. Peking announces that within ten years it will achieve a higher productive capacity than the United Kingdom.

Certainly, if statistics and concrete undertakings are listed, the impact

-19-

on the reader is impressive. There has been a great improvement in communications, three times the railway and highway mileage, for example, as compared with ten years ago, and airlines and telephones have made formerly inaccessible regions part of the national economy. Some of the most spectacular and necessary achievements are the flood control measures along the Yellow, the Yangtse, and Huai rivers. A whole new economic region has been built up in the northwest from the great steel making center of Pao tow in Inner Mongolia to the oil producing center of Karanai in Sinkiang.

Realizing that it is impossible to industrialize without general education, the Communists now claim that three quarters of the population can read and write. Four times as many students are in some sort of school today as there were ten years ago. A hundred thousand graduate every year from institutions of higher learning, fourteen thousand have been sent for training in the Soviet Union, half of whom have already returned.

During these ten years the number of Chinese scientists, technicians, and trained administrators has steadily increased with a corresponding decrease in the reliance upon foreign experts. Chinese factories today make a wide range of industrial goods including locomotives, power generators, machine tools, electronic equipment, planes and ships. China has an atomic reactor and can be expected to become a nuclear power. So far less has been done for the physical comforts of the people, in fact these may very well have deteriorated. There has been a tremendous increase in the field of mass communications, especially in newspapers, pamphlets, and books, all, of course, under state control. There has also been a great deal of government attention to athletics, drama, and public pageantry. Such activities are characteristic of totalitarian regimes, both Fascist and Communist.

The future of the Chinese economy is a subject much in dispute. China

the future of the Chinese economy in a better man in future. Chinese
characteristic of industrial relations, political and commercial.
attention to agriculture, drugs, and public health. Such activities are
concern under state control. There has also been a great deal of Government
mass communications, especially in newspapers, magazines, and books, etc., of
have deteriorated. There has been a tremendous increase in the field of
done for the hydroelectric comfort of the people, in fact these work very well
reactor and can be expected to become a nuclear power. So far less has been
machine focal, electronic equipment, planes and ships. China has an atomic
a wide range of industrial goods including locomotives, power generators,
creases in the traffic of foreign experts. Chinese factories today make
and trained administrators has already increased with a corresponding ge-
during these ten years the number of Chinese scientists, technicians,
Scots Union, part of whom have already returned.

of higher learning, fourteen thousand have been sent for training in the
there were ten years ago. A hundred thousand graduate every year from institutions
and write. Four times as many students are in some sort of school as
from, the Communications now claim that three quarters of the population can read
referring that it is impossible to industrialize without General education.

in the northwest from the great steel making center of Pittsburgh in Inner
Pennsylvania, and Great rivers. A whole new economic region has been built up
necessarily achievements are the flood control measures along the Yellow, the
rivers part of the national economy. Some of the most outstanding and
with ten years ago, and airlines and telephones have made formerly unsuccessful
fions, three times the railway and highway miles, for example, as compared
on the reader's imprecise. There has been a great improvement in commuics-
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-20-

does not have the resources of her partner, she has the disadvantage of an
enormous population, and merely to keep up with the increasing population
in food production and industrial development is a tremendous task in itself.
That is why birth control is still official policy, Marx to the contrary not
withstanding, but per capita levels of production are very low and likely to
remain so. While Peking has received decisive technical and financial help
from the Soviet Union, by far the largest part of the capital for industrial
development has come from the agricultural sector. It is too early to tell
whether the serious bottlenecks that developed in transportation and power as
a result of the headlong thrust into industrialization will be satisfactorily
solved, or whether the agricultural sector will continue to meet the demands
that will have to be made upon it. What we can be sure of is that the regime
will continue with its relentless efforts to build up a power economy whatever
the cost to the Chinese people.

3. The Chinese Communist regime has expanded its control to the frontiers once held by Imperial China, except for those parts of Mongolia which the Soviet Union dominates. China today extends from the Amur River and the China Sea to Sinkiang, Russian Turkestan and the Indian frontier. The old sphere of influence, Korea, is half-occupied, and the northern half of Vietnam always is a valuable appendage. At the same time, Peking has settled its boundary with Burma and probed into Indian frontiers. It has not taken over Hong Kong or Macao, but the issue of their return can be raised at any time that may seem convenient. Peking, in other words, has restored the unity and the military prestige of the Chinese Empire.

It is clear that the Chinese Communists are making a bid for the domination
of Asia, and that this involves getting rid of the power and prestige of the
United States in the western Pacific. The United States is the principal
enemy both in fact and in propaganda. But Japan is also high on the list for

-21-

the very good reason that Japan is an essential pivot of American power in the western Pacific, and every effort must therefore be made to disassociate Japan from the United States and to prevent her from recovering her industrial and military might. Taiwan is not even considered a matter of foreign policy, but a piece of unfinished business in the civil war.

One way to drive American influence out is to encourage revolution in the countries of southeastern Asia. The Chinese Communist approach to this problem has undergone several changes. In 1949, when they were coming to power, efforts were made in most southeast Asian countries to overthrow by force of arms the existing governments of India, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, all newly independent Asian states. These efforts were generally unsuccessful. In Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the Communist uprisings were finally halted, and the same was true in Malaya, although the terrorists in the jungles cost the British very heavily in men and money. These failures, among other factors, led to the new strategy of peaceful coexistence which was marked by the famous "5 principles of coexistence" which were incorporated in an agreement with India in April of 1954. Among other things, Peking pledged itself to non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. At the Bandung Conference of Asian-African nations in early 1955, Chou En-lai announced that "revolution is not for export", and that the whole Communist bloc was one great "zone of peace".

This strategy is still generally in effect, and as long as it brings results, is likely to remain so. By establishing diplomatic contacts, trade relations, and cultural missions with the countries of southeast Asia, the Communist bloc has been able to infiltrate these countries in a way that would have been impossible if the militant revolutionary policy had continued.

The fact that Peking has probed into Indian frontier territory should not

-22-

be seen as a deviation from the general strategy. On the contrary, intimidation and pressure always go along with pursuasion and diplomacy. Having used these methods to make a frontier agreement with Burma, Peking is in a position to imply that if India does not accept a frontier compromise, favorable, of course, to Peking, it is India that is being recalcitrant. Although a certain truculence in Peking's policies, such as the suppression of the Tibetan revolt, the bombarding of Quemoy, and the pressures on Laos, may bring about some loss of good will, this is an expendable commodity. It is more important for Peking to be counted a great power with whom it is advisable to be on good terms than a friendly and benevolent purveyor of sweetness and light. The more China can build up its prestige the more likely it is to pursue other neutrals to be friendly and the committed countries to become neutral. These are steps toward the ultimate objective of eliminating American influence.

The Chinese Communist concept of foreign policy is similar to that of the Soviet Union. Peking sees the world as engaged in a protracted revolutionary struggle. It would be dangerous in the extreme to assume that Peking is interested in stabilizing the international situation or reaching a permanent solution of any outstanding problem. The Chinese Communists want to keep the pot boiling. Seeing the world-wide struggle as one in which two competing systems are struggling for supremacy, they view international relations as a battleground in which every available technique should be used to influence opinion, direct social and economic change, and, where possible, promote revolution. War to them is not a simple concept of the exchange of nuclear weapons; it includes the control of social forces, the changing of the climate of opinion, the effort to paralyze the will of the enemy. The Chinese Communists consider it essential to have great military power,

-23-

and this much, at least in relative terms, has already been achieved in Asia. With an army of two and one-half million men, with millions in reserve, a sizeable airforce, and a growing navy, they outclass every other power in Asia. To achieve their objectives, they also use conventional diplomacy, subversion, trade, the assistance of Communist parties in Asian countries, and, where possible, the overseas Chinese.

The Chinese Communists play their part in the Communist bloc's economic offensive against the west which has been gathering momentum during the last five or six years. First of all they engage in cut-throat competitive trade in southeast Asia in order to disrupt, to gain foreign exchange, and to acquire political prestige. Their use of economic potential for political purposes is clearly indicated in their relations with Japan, against whom they are applying economic pressure in order to achieve trade on their own terms. In order to support neutralism Communist China is also giving foreign aid to such countries as Cambodia, Nepal, Egypt and Ceylon, and loans to Indonesia, Burma, and Ceylon. It is estimated that some $250,000,000 of foreign aid will be given this year to Communist and non-Communist countries.

Although some of Communist China's economic relations with non-bloc countries may be designed to secure foreign exchange, the main motive is political.

The aim is to keep alive anti-colonial sentiment, reinforce neutralism, and to build up ties between the non-aligned nations and the Communist bloc.

Of particular concern to American policy are the overseas Chinese communities in Southeastern Asia. It is generally known that the ten-million overseas Chinese who live in Southeast Asia have acquired an important economic role in the countries where they live. In some countries they are more important than in others. In Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, they make up the bulk of the population. The local Communist parties in these areas are mainly Chinese in membership, and in Singapore they are particu-

-24-

larly powerful. The overseas Chinese in Indonesia and Burma, two countries recognized by Peking, are particularly dangerous channels for both overt and covert subversion. The local Chinese embassies are used for intelligence purposes, for financial aid to local Communists, and for support of Chinese schools under Communist domination. In countries such as the Philippines, which does not recognize Communist China, the overseas Chinese community does not have to resist such pressures and is much more uniformly anti-Communist although Peking's covert activities are not to be underestimated there.

It is clear that the United States is locked in a wide-spread and pro-tracted struggle with Communist China all over Asia. This struggle takes place on every level; it has a thousand fronts, including the United States, where the nature of the challenge is not always very clearly understood.

## II Trends.

A. We have noted that one of the most serious defeats suffered by the Chinese Communist regime has been the failure to enlist the intellectuals on its side. This was revealed by the "Hundred Flowers" movement, during which Mao Tse-tung invited a competition of ideas in which he expected that Marxism would necessarily win out. It seems that Mao Tse-Tung, in his secret speech of February 1957, lay down directions for the re-education of the aggressive cadres who had aroused the hostility of the non-Communist intellectuals. The wave of violent criticism of the regime that followed is a matter of history. In the Communist Peoples' University itself, disillusioned professors, and even party members, said that Communists maintained themselves by force alone, that they were hated by the people, and that unless they changed they would be killed, and this would be no loss to China. A few Communist cadres were kidnapped, and some were even killed. In answer to

Communist cells were killed, and some were even killed. In answer to
enlarged calls would be issued, and this would be no loss to China. A few
people alone, that they were killed, and that they were killed
by communists, and even by soldiers, and that Communists met these
damned things would be killed. In the Communist People's University itself, staffed by
fascists. The wave of violent criticism of the regime that followed is a
surprising cache who had aroused the ire of the non-Communist inter-
section of the National Party, and down directions for the re-equification of the
Merrimac would necessarily win out. If some of that Mao-Tse-Tung, in his secret
which Mao Tse-Tung invited a competition of ideas in which he expected that
on its side. This was revealed by the "hundred flowers" movement, arising
Chinese Communist regime has been the outcome to arise the ineffectual
V. We have noticed that one of the most serious declines occurred in the
where the name of the challenge is not always clearly understood.

II. Trends.

Brace on every level! If we have a thousand brothers, including the United States, traced勾连 with Communist China off over Viet. The struggle fake is clear that the United States is locked in a white-aparad and pro-mated fire.

suff-Communists strongly Beijing's covert activities are not to be underestimated. Community does not have to react and because and if may be mitomach Bureaucracy, which does not recognize Communist China, the overseas Chinese schools under Communist control. In countries and so the Chinese are being said to be so Communist, and for some of them are being further alienated from the people.

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this Mao Tse-tung carried out a tremendous purge within the Communist party and claimed that the whole Hundred Flowers movement had been nothing but a trap to find out who was loyal and who was not. In Hangkow some faculty and student leaders were executed and others were removed and publicly defamed. According to Communist figures 3,000,000 students and faculty of the schools and colleges were dismissed because of lack of qualification and "volunteered" for work in agriculture. Among these were over one-third of the faculty and student body of the Communist Peoples' University in Peking. It is difficult to imagine graver indignity for intellectuals in China than to be compelled to become manual workers.

These events are important for several reasons. In the first place there is no question but that the threat of an Hungarian type uprising in China was much in the minds of the leaders, and they hit back in panic. Events in the rest of the Communist orbit are obviously important for developments in China and will continue to be so. Second, the Chinese Communist line against all forms of revisionism, particularly that of Tito, has become tougher than that in the Soviet Union. During the next decade we can expect that Chinese Communist policy will continue to be hard and uncompromising. Third, it is clear that the intellectual unrest in China is not limited to that country, but extends throughout the Communist orbit. The inadequacies of the Communist doctrine and the growing contrast between theory and practice have become obvious even to the younger generation.

A regime that must have trained minds for the scientific and industrial tasks that it has set itself cannot, in the long run, provide the atmosphere in which they can flourish and at the same time maintain Communist orthodoxy. Yet it is impossible to give enough freedom for scientific work without endangering dogma. The dilemma nags at the Russian leaders, but for various reasons the issue may come to a head sooner in Communist China. The back-

-26-

wardness of the country, the frantic pace of change, the ruthless military handling of intellectuals, and the dim prospects for any general economic betterment in the next ten years make it possible that Communist China will be the weak link in the chain. The possibility of serious trouble within Communist China should not be excluded.

B. The prestige of communism as a scientific system that can provide the answers for economic and social problems is in many ways stronger outside of Communist China than it is within. Communist theory still has many attractions for intellectuals in many of the countries of Southeast Asia, in Japan, and in India. More recently, however, counter trends have developed, and some are looking for alternative answers to the problems of their societies. As the Communist myth is more and more exposed, we can anticipate a search for new ideas and beliefs that can be related to the cultures of the past and yet will provide answers to the questions about the purpose of human life and organized human effort. We can anticipate that the less communism appeals to men's minds, the more it will depend upon military pressure, economic subversion, and political infiltration. It therefore becomes more important for the United States to help provide the answers for which men are looking, and to pay more attention to the area in which the struggle may very well be going our way -- the struggle for men's minds.

C. According to Communist doctrine, there cannot be a problem of overpopulation in Communist countries. Increase of population means increase of labor, the main factor of production, and the more labor is available the more can be produced. According to this view, population problems resulting in shortage of food and unemployment are phenomena limited to capitalist countries. The Chinese Communists chose to overlook their Marxism

-27-

in 1957 when they initiated a program of birth control. Officially they claim that Marxism is still correct, but that birth control measures are dictated by a concern for the health of women and children. An examination of the available sources on Chinese population growth does not encourage any great reliance upon the figures, but it looks as if there might be a minimum rate of increase of 2% per annum. According to this the Chinese population in 1965 would be 739,000,000 and in 1970, 804,000,000. It is difficult to see how the process of industrialization and of agricultural growth can take care of the feeding and employment of a population of this size. The Communists have tried to meet this problem through their birth control campaign and by changing their five-year plan to put greater emphasis on agricultural development.

The population problem has led some commentators to argue that the need to find new land for the people will lead to conflict with the Soviet Union, which is relatively underpopulated. Allen Whiting has pointed out that there is very little indication that the Soviet Union is disturbed about the problem. In fact, Moscow helped Peking to construct the railroad linking Peking with the Soviet Union, traversing the Mongolian Peoples' Republic. This helped the movement of Chinese into "an area which had been an exclusive Russian sphere of influence for more than 30 years". Again it was Russian assistance and possibly initiative that led to the joint Sino-Soviet survey of the upper Amur River which may help to develop the Soviet Far East and also offer new possibilities for Chinese migration into Soviet borderlands. There is very little room for many more people in Soviet Central Asia. Peking must therefore solve its population problem by the more rational allocation of manpower through the communes, by the birth control campaign,44 supervised abortion, sterilization, and restriction of early marriage. Even if the population is stabilized during the next twenty years, however, it will still be big enough to prevent any serious improvement in general conditions of life.

-28-

D. During the next decade it is possible, if there are no political upheavals and no war, that Communist China will become a second rate industrial power. There will be considerable progress in the production of power, steel, coal, oil, and machine tools. She may even catch up with Japan. Needless to say her production will not suffice for the needs of her people if they are to have a standard of living comparable with other industrialized countries. As the gap between the technologically advanced and the underdeveloped countries is increasing rather than decreasing, the relative position of China may not be very much better ten years from now than it is today. One political consequence of this may very well be to spur Peking on to even more desperate efforts, at the expense of the Chinese economy, to undermine the Japanese economy and American aid in Southeast Asia. This will be done by dumping in the markets of Southeast Asia, by threats of war to force higher expenditures on military power, and by grants and foreign aid to neutrals. We can also expect an increase in the activities of Communist parties in the rest of Asia, the provocation and the threats of provocation that will lead to economic dislocation.

E. Communist China will press more for participation in the formulation of bloc policy than for greater autonomy from the Russian Communist party. There seems to be little likelihood of Titoism. We can expect the Chinese leaders to establish their influence in Moscow by making more and more theoretical contributions to Communist doctrine. Mao's formula of the different types of contradiction within the Communist world was not original, but it was a useful and timely pseudo-scientific explanation of current difficulties in terms of historical necessity. The Chinese Communists have more to gain through the maintenance of the monolithic unity of the Communist world than they have by encouraging centrifugal forces. They are, therefore, particularly bitter against Tito for his implication that Marxism-Leninism

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Communist China will breach more for arbitration in the competition\nfor economic dislocation.", "Real of Vata, the provocation and the furrows of provocation that will lead\nwe can also expect an increase in the activities of Communist parties in the\nexpenditures on military power, and PhD grants and largess aid to neutralia.\n斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤斤

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is not a universal truth. As the Chinese are going to face many more problems
than any other member of the Soviet bloc and probably are going to have more
failures, they need the solidarity of the bloc and they need the prestige
of the Communist myth.

Peking can be expected to exercise the main direction over the Communist
parties in Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaya, Vietnam, Cambodia, and
even perhaps India. It has certainly become the center of training for many
of the future cadres of the Communist parties in these countries. China is
obviously in a much better position to carry on the anti-colonial propaganda
campaign and to exploit the idea of Asian solidarity than is the Soviet
Union.

F. If the Chinese rely increasingly on military power as they decline in
political attractiveness, then we can expect a growing cultural struggle be-
tween the materialist doctrine of communism on the one side and the cultural
traditions of Buddhism, Islam and Hinduism on the other. This has already
been going on in Burma and in some other countries. It is likely to be in-
tensified. The struggle is particularly significant in Indonesia. One of
the facts we shall have to keep in mind here is the dual role of the overseas
Chinese. If the non-Communist countries of Asia turn more and more to their
own indigenous traditions as a source of spiritual strength, the question
arises as to whether the culture-bound overseas Chinese communities will be
absorbed. If these countries continue their present policy of attempting to
destroy the economic grip of the overseas Chinese, to exploit them economically
and yet make it difficult for them to become citizens, the situation will be-
come very complicated. In this connection we should not underestimate the
importance of the flow of overseas Chinese students to Taiwan, to which
reference has been made. American financial assistance was important to the
Nationalist Government of China in providing facilities for these students.

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The Chinese colleges in Singapore, in Hong Kong, and in Taiwan, together provide an in
an impressive alternative to overseas Chinese students. Ten years from now
these colleges will have graduated many thousands of students who might be
of some political importance in Southeast Asia.

### III. U. S. Policy in Communist China.

Few decisions are more important to the future of the United States in the
Asian world than those which relate to policy toward China. There are some
very difficult choices to be made in view of the nature of Chinese Communist
foreign policy and the possible trends in the next ten years.

United States policy towards Communist China is so often stated purely
in terms of the question of diplomatic recognition or admission to the
United Nations that it may be wise to put it in its broader setting. The
general objective is to force Peking to conduct her foreign relations in a
manner acceptable to the U.S., to observe international agreements, to avoid
interference in the internal affairs of other countries through force and
subversion, and to demonstrate that she is interested in the maintenance
of world peace. There are conditions, in other words, under which the United
States would recognize Peking, admit her to the U.N., and remove the embargo
on trade. The conditions are not likely to be met in the foreseeable future
but it is important to state the matter in this way: since so many commentators
see U.S. policy as fixed, static, and inflexible.

#### A. The United States policy in operation falls into three categories.

1. There are those measures considered essential to prevent further military expansion of Chinese Communist territorial expansion. These date for the most part from the Korean war and the important policy statement made by President Truman on June 27, 1950 in which he indicated the steps that the U.S. would take to meet Chinese Communist aggression in Korea. It was at this time that the U.S. began to re-arm and to place considerable forces in the western Pacific, particularly on Okinawa and the Philippines and to provide

western Pacific, particularly on Okinawa and the Philippines and to broade
the time that the U.S. began to re-arm and to place considerable forces in the
U.S. would take to meet Chinese Communist aggression in Korea. It was at this
President Truman on June 5th, 1950 in which he introduced the idea that the
most basic from the Korean war and the important policy statement made by
expansion of Chinese Communist territorial expansion. These date for the
1. There are those measures considered essential to prevent further military
A. The United States policy in operation since into three categories.

put it in a position to state the matter in this way so many commentators
on trade. The conditions are not likely to be met in the foreseeable future
States would recognize Beijing, admit her to the U.N., and remove the emperors
of world peace. There are conditions in other words, under which the United
supervision, and to demonstrate that she is interested in the maintenance
interference in the internal affairs of other countries through force and
manner acceptable to the U.S., to operate international agreements, to avoid
General objectives to force Beijing to conduct her foreign relations in a
United Nations that it may be wise to but it in its broader setting. The
in terms of the creation of diplomatic recognition or认 statement to the
United States policy towards Communist China is so often stated merely
foreign policy and the possible trend in the next ten years.

very difficult choices to be made in view of the nature of Chinese Communist
world view than those which relate to foreign policy toward China. There are some
new decisions are more important to the future of the United States in the

III. U. S. policy in Communist China.

of some political importance in Communist China.
these colleges will have graduated many thousands of students who might be
an impressive alternative to overseas Chinese students. Ten years from now
The Chinese colleges in Singapore, in Hong Kong, and in Taiwan, together provide an
in

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military assistance to the National government of China on Taiwan, the French forces in Indo-China, and the Philippines. The Truman statement of June 27 outlined a strategic plan for strengthening the military position of the United States and its friends and allies along the eastern and southern frontiers of the Communist orbit in the Far East.

President Truman said, among other things, "The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces will be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area." From this time on, the protection of Formosa became a stated policy of the United States government. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peaceful settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations." These decisions led logically to the peace treaty with Japan and the security treaty with that country signed on the same day as the peace treaty, to a new mutual assistance treaty with the Philippines, and later to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which, among the Asian powers, included Thailand and Pakistan. In brief, we have provided sufficient military power in Asia to discourage overt Communist military ventures, and thus to permit the new nations to remain independent; we have backed this up with an intricate system of military alliances to indicate that our intentions are serious.

The problems which are bound to arise when great military establishments are set up on foreign soil tend to obscure the unglamorous, non-newsworthy fact

The problems which are bound to arise when great military eatitudes emerge are set at na on letter in soft tend to open the megamorons, non-newsmanship itself.

Insecure system of military alliances to indicate that our intentions are not the new nations to remain independent; we have packed these up with an American in Vila to discontinue Communist military ventures, and thus to ber-uncused Traffic and Bekatan. In brief, we have provided sufficient military later to the South Sea Vila Treaty Organization, which, among the Vila boma, becase treaty, to a new mutual salatance treaty with the Philippines, and Japan and the security treaty with that country aligned on the same side as the United Nations." These decisions fed logically to the becase treaty with security in the Pacific, a beneficial settlement with Japan, or consideration of determination of the future status of Okinawa must await the restoration of tion of Okinawa became a stated policy of the United States Government. The lawful and necessary motions in that area." From this time on, the protec- security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their the occupation of Okinawa by Communist forces will be a direct threat to the insured to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances, war. If has deeded the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations alteration to condense independent nations and will now see armed invasion and it plain beyond all doubt that communists have based beyond the use of and sup-

President Trumau said, among other things, "The attack upon Korea makes frontiers of the Communist orbit in the Far East.

United States and its friends and allies along the eastern and southern outlined a strategic plan for strengthening the military position of the forces in Indo-China, and the Philippines. The Trumau statement of June 21, military assistance to the National Government of China on Taiwan, the French

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[LC]

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that the attempts of the Communists to extend their influence by force were severely limited by the rapid re-armament of the United States after the Korean War and the system of alliances which came to include Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and France. Indeed, the relative stability of affairs in the Far East and the Pacific since the division of Vietnam is almost entirely due to the military posture of the United States. The problems that arise from the establishment of military barriers to Soviet and Chinese Communist expansion, especially the potentially dangerous issue of extraterritoriality, are part of the price that we pay for the essential job of containing the terrible forces of destruction which now flourish in Asia.

2. There are the measures of economic and technical assistance which we have extended to both enutrals and allies in order to nourish their independence. The Communist threat in Asia impinges upon an environment very different from that in Europe. In Asia the threat is in many ways more serious because it affects one of the world's greatest colonial areas where the nationalist movements, directed mainly against European countries, are open to exploitation, and the rapid transformation of the social and political institutions of the new countries, combined with the weaknesses of dependent economies and low standards of living, make it difficult for these countries to stand alone, or even to make constructive use of economic aid. The building of alliances similar to the NATO in the Atlantic is much more difficult in the Pacific.

The Communist aggression that brought about a quickening of military aid to Southeast Asia also brought about a new approach to the problem of strengthening the economies of that area. The promise to promote "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development..." had already been made in Article 55 of the United Nations Charter. But little had been done beyond measures for direct

United Nations Charter. But little had been done beyond measures for direct
progress and development..." had already been made in Article 22 of the
agreement of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social
enjoyment of the economies of that area. The bromide to promote a stronger
to southeast Asia also prompted a new approach to the problem of

The Communist aggression that brought about a deepening of military aid
similar to the NATO in the Atlantic was much more difficult in the Pacific.
or even to make constructive use of economic aid. The building of efficiency
assemblies of living, make it difficult for these countries to stand alone,
new countries, combined with the weaknesses of dependent economies and low
and the rapid transformation of the social and political institutions of the
movements, directed mainly against European countries, are open to exploitation,
sales of one of the world's greatest colonial areas where the nationalistic
that in Europe. In Asia the threat is in many ways more serious because if
The Communist threat in Asia implies an environment very different from
extended to both annuities and allies in order to nominal their independence.
S. There are the measures of economic and technical assistance which we have
forces of destruction which nowloom in Asia.

of the brute that we had for the essential job of containing the terrible
effectively the potentially dangerous issue of extraterritoriality, are past
effectiveness of military barriers to Soviet and Chinese Communist expansion,
the military presence of the United States. The problems that arise from the
East and the Pacific since the division of Vietnam is almost entirely due to
Kingdom and France. Indeed, the relative stability of Asia in the Far
the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, VNрадia, New Zealand, the United
Korean War and the Vietnam of alliances which came to include Japan, Taiwan,
severely limited by the rapid re-armament of the United States after the
first the attempts of the Communists to extend their influence by force were

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relief, for the assumption was that communism flourished best in conditions of poverty. Events have shown that this assumption was an inadequate analysis of the problem.

It is difficult to exaggerate the complexity of the problem of aid to underdeveloped countries. While the need for outside capital assistance is obvious, neither foreign nor domestic capital can be put to work constructively until the political leaders are able to formulate and carry out long-range programs, involving considerable sacrifice, with the support and cooperation of their own people. In the revolutionary language of the United Nations experts, "Asian philosophies have to be scrapped; old institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of cast, creed, and race have to be burst; and large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to pay the full price of rapid economic progress." The slender body of theory which has developed about the economic growth of underdeveloped areas includes considerable reference to the so-called "cultural factors." In other words, it is clear that any improvement in the conditions of underdeveloped countries depends as much on the skill and capacity of leadership as upon the availability of outside assistance. It is at this point that the contrast between the Soviet and the American approach appears. The Soviet Union, which has very little foreign aid to give, has a great deal of experience in the theory and method of developing local leadership capable of forcing underdeveloped countries through periods of intense economic development. The position of the United States is the reverse. Except in areas over which we have had political control, the United States has a long-range and non-manipulative approach to the problem of leadership.

The strength of the United States approach to the problem of giving

The strength of the United States approach to the problem of sharing
four-range and non-munipalative approaches to the problem of leadership.
areas over which we have had political control, the United States has a
development. The position of the United States is the reverse. Except in
of totaling underdeveloped countries through periods of intense economic
of experience in the theory and method of developing local leadership capable
the Soviet Union, which has very little foreign aid to give, is a great deal
point that the contrast between the Soviet and the American approach abides.
leadership as shown the availability of outside assistance. It is at this
of underdeveloped countries depends as much on the skill and capacity of
facilitators." In other words, it is clear that and improvement in the conditions
assembled areas increase considerable reference to the so-called "enormous
body of theory which has developed apart the economic growth of under-
seaffffffing to build the luff brice of rapid economic progress." The absence
their expectations of a comfortable life transferred. Very few communities
and far large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have
functions have to disintegrate; pounds of cast, creed, and race have to be paid!
United Nations exiles. "Aryan philosophies have to bescratched! or in矣-
cooperation of their own begetre. In the revolutionary language of the
race programme, involving considerable effort, with theaborst and
tively until the political fiefdoms are able to communicate and carry out long-
ta opinions, neither foreign nor domestic capital can be but to work confron-
to underdeveloped countries. While the need for outside capital assistance
If it is difficult to exasperate the complexity of the problem, and so to
survive of the problem.

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technical and economic aid to underdeveloped countries is the respect for
the political independence of the countries concerned and the acceptance
of the conditions laid down by local governments. In the long run, there
is no question but that it is a better policy than that of the Communists,
but several points must be mentioned. a) It is dangerous to draw a distinction
between overt Communist expansion on the international plane and covert
revolutionary activities within countries. Communist parties are not like
ordinary political parties; they are military, or para-military in nature,
and associated with a world-wide revolutionary movement. This point has been
accepted by SEATO, any member of which may now call upon any other member
for aid against internal subversion. b) There is no excuse for the lack of
coordination between the various arms of American policy -- the military,
political, economic, and cultural. Every one of these methods of implementing
policy, particularly that of nourishing the independence of underdeveloped
countries, should be used in a coordinated manner for the achievement of clear
political objectives. c) Because it was the growing threat of communism
that made the program of assistance acceptable to the Congress, the emphasis
on military aid tends to grow. When the Korean conflict began, military
assistance represented about one-quarter of the total of American aid;
but by 1952 it was over two-thirds, and this trend has continued. But the
American system of alliances and military bases cannot be stronger than the
economic foundations upon which they are built. As the administrators of
the U. S. Mutual Security Program phrase it in their report to Congress in
August, 1953, "Coalitions for resistance to aggression and the strengthening
of defenses constitute the first requirements for survival and progress.
Such measures are inescapably tied in with the economic advancement and
development of free nations. Enduring military strength cannot be built on
a shaky economic foundation. Nor can freedom itself live for long in an

a quick economic combination. Not can freedom itself five for five in an
development of three nations. Burning miffily strength cannot be put on
such measures are insufficient tied in with the economic advancement and
of defense constitute the chief requirement for annuity and progress.
Vital to 1923" Conditions for resistance to aggression and the strengthening
the U. S. Mutual Security Program hence if in their report to Congress in
economic combinations show which they are put. As the administrators of
American system of alliances and military power cannot be stronger than the
put in 1925 it was over two-thirds, and this trend has continued. But the
saturation represented about one-half of the total of American aid;
on miffily said sense to know. When the Korean conflict began, military
first made the program of saturation acceptable to the Congress, the subseque
political objectives. c) Because it was the growing threat of communist
countries, should be need in a coordinated manner for the achievement of clear
buffer, particularly just of nominating the independence of underdeveloped
bofficial, economic, and official. Every one of these methods of implementing
cooperation between the various areas of American buffer -- the miffily,
tor aid against Japanese expansion. d) There is no excuse for the lack of
accepted P. SEATO, and member of which may now call show and other member
and associated with a world-wide revolutionary movement. This point has been
originally bofficial buffer! they are miffily, or para-military in nature,
revolutionary activities within countries. Communist buffer are not like
between overt Communist expansion on the international plane and covers
put several points must be mentioned. a) If it is dangerous to draw a distinction
it no direction put that it is a better buffer than that of the Communists,
or the conditions laid down by local governments. In the form of, there
the bofficial independence of the countries concerned and the acceptance
technical and economic aid to underdeveloped countries is the respect for

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atmosphere of socialist stagnation and marginal living standards." The
strength of the Communist orbit lies not so much in its political and doc-
trinal monotheism as in its economic unity. If economic foundations are
strong, there can even be a great deal of political disunity. It is im-
portant to note that the bloc not only trades mainly with itself, but also
organizes its economic relations with non-bloc countries on a systematic
basis to further the political objectives of the bloc as a whole. The bloc's
economic offensive is aimed at the weakest part of the foundations of western
unity.

3. The United States, in addition to the two general measures already dis-
cussed, pursues certain specific policies towards Communist China. The
two most important are the refusal to accord diplomatic recognition to
the Peking regime and the refusal to admit it to membership in the United
Nations.

a) Recognition of Communist China. The State Department's explanation of U. S. Policy on non-recognition of Communist China is based on the conviction that such recognition would produce no tangible benefits to the United States or to the Free World as a whole, and would be of material assistance in the Chinese Communist attempts to extend Communist domination throughout Asia. At the present time forty-five non-Communist countries recognize the Republic of China and nineteen have recognized Peking. On what terms would Peking accept recognition? By implication we would have to forget the U.N. resolution denouncing Peking as an aggressor in Korea, accept Chinese influence in North Korea, and give up any hope for free elections and unification. In other words, the U.N. would acknowledge defeat of its bravest effort to enforce collective security.

According to its own statements Peking would not accept any solution
for Taiwan short of American withdrawal and abrogation of our existing treaty

for Taiwan short of American withdrawal and aspiration of our existing treaty
Vocating to its own statements Beijing would not accept any solution
prevent effort to enhance collective security.

and multiplication. In other words, the U.N. would acknowledge defeat of its
Chinese influence in North Korea, and five mb and people for free elections
forget the U.N. resolution denouncing Beijing as an aggressor in Korea, accept
terms would beking accept recognition? By implication we would have to
use the Republic of China and nineteen states have recognized Beijing. On what
out basis? At the present time forty-five non-Communist countries recog-
nize in the Chinese Communist attempts to extend Communist domination through
United States or to the free world as a whole, and would be of material use-
action that any recognition would produce no tangible penalties to the
of U. S. policy on non-recognition of Communist China is based on the con-
sent) Recognition of Communist China. The State Department's explanation
follows.

the Beijing regime and the return to admit it to membership in the United
two most important are the refusal to accord diplomatic recognition to
ones? braves certain specific policies towards Communist China. The
3. The United States, in addition to the two general measures already dif-
ferent.

economic alternative is stated at the westmost part of the frontlines of Western
parts to further the political objectives of the bloc as a whole. The bloc's
organize its economic relations with non-bloc countries on a systematic
basis to note that the bloc not only trades mindfully with itself, but also
strongly, there can even be a great deal of political diamity. It is im-
possible monologue as in its economic minif. It economic tensions are
strongly of the Communist orbit lies not so much in its political and doc-
amesphere of socialist alignment and margins of living standards." The

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obligation to the Republic of China. For us to accept either of these
terms would demoralize those Asian countries and those Asian leaders who
have come out in the open against international communism, and it would not
win over those who have not.

There is the argument that some of our allies would prefer to have us
recognize Communist China. This would be a powerful consideration if it
could be shown that differences on this issue endangered NATO or our other
alliances. We differ from our allies on issues much more serious than this;
we have no reason to be impressed by the results of British recognition;
and we have shown our willingness to keep the peace in the Pacific in spite
of the most arrogant provocation by the Chinese Communists. There are those
who plead that it is rediculous not to "recognize" the existence of 600
million people. But recognition of foreign regimes is an instrument of
national policy and all great powers, particularly the USSR, use it as such.
It is possible to deal with a regime by fighting, trading, negotiating, and
communicating with it; but the exchange of diplomatic representatives brings
many privileges, the implication of legitimacy, and consequently, great pres-
tige.

It is not to our interest to do anything that would increase the pres-
tige of Peking or assist it to persuade the Overseas Chinese who control so
much of the economic life of Southeast Asia, that they should turn to
Communist China. The communists depend very much on creating the /impression
that they are riding the wave of the future, that they express the inevitable
forces of history, and that nothing can stand in their way. Why help them?
Why do anything to assist a dangerous, aggressive, and brutal regime whose
announced intention is to throw us out of the Pacific? We shall not help the
Chinese people, for whom we retain a traditional friendship, by giving "face"

Chinese people, for whom we retain a traditional friendliness, pay great attention to us. We shall not help the announced intention to show us one of the Pacific. We shall not help the forces of history, and that nothing can stand in their way. We help them? That they are raising the wave of the future, that they express the inevitable Communist China. The communique behind very much on creating the awareness of the economic file of Chinese China, that they should turn to file of Beijing or assist it to because the Overseas Chinese who control so

If it is not so our interest so do anything that would increase the pressure.

many privileges, the implication of justification, and consequently, great pressure communicating with it; put the exchange of diplomatic representatives private. If it be possible to deal with a regime of lighting, trading, negotiating, and national policy, and all great powers, particularly the US? then it is and must million people. But recognition of foreign regime is an instrument of who behind that it is regions not to "recognize" the existence of 200 of the most ardent advocates of the Chinese Communists. There are those and we have shown our willingness to keep the peace in the Pacific in spite we have no reason to be embarrassed by the results of British recognition; alliances. We differ from our allies on issues more serious than that! could be shown that differences on this issue engendered NATO or our other recognized Communist China. This would be a powerful consideration if it

There is the argument that some of our allies would prefer to have us win over those who have not.

We come out in the open against international communism, and it would not seem would demoralise those Soviet countries and those Soviet leaders who opposition to the Republican of China. For me to accept either of these

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to their conquerors and withdrawing moral and political support from the millions of Chinese who live in relative freedom.

We can best help them by refusing to give any material or political assistance to the Communist regime, by blocking further military expansion, and by helping to build, in the new and old nations surrounding Red China's borders, societies that can continue to achieve more for their peoples under conditions of political independence and peaceful revolution than can the Chinese communists with all their bloodshed and total control.

The most powerful argument in favor of recognition is that we have to accept the fact of Communist control of China, and that sooner or later we must negotiate with Peking for the terms on which we can live together. It is urged that there is now a nuclear statemate, that war is therefore unthinkable and there must now take place a long, tortuous and involved period of negotiation between the two main coalitions to remove all major sources of tension between them and thus avoid the possibility of nuclear destruction through misunderstanding, accident, or unresolved antagonisms. It is also part of this argument that the Nationalist government on Taiwan has no future as a contender for power on the mainland and is more of a political liability than an asset. The weakness of this argument is that it defines war in a very limited manner. There is no question but that nuclear war would be mutually destructive, but this merely means that both sides will avoid such a catastrophe to the best of their power. In every other shape and form, however, the war will continue.

Another weakness of the argument is that it assumes the Communists will draw the same conclusions from the same facts. There is no indication, and no ground for hope, that the Communists will agree that sources of tension must be removed. On the contrary, as the United States has made it clear

must be removed. On the contrary, as the United States has made it clear
no ground for pode, that the Communists will agree that source of tension
arise the same consequences from the same face. There is no indication, and
Another message of the argument is that it assumes the Communists will
will continue.

to the past of their power. In every other state and form, however, the war
destructive, put this merely means that both sides will avoid such a catastrophe
limited manner. There is no direction put that nuclear war would be mutually
an asset. The message of this argument is that it defines war in a very
contender for power on the mainland and is more of a political flexibility than
this argument that the Nationalist Government on Taiwan has no future as a
numbered island, accident, or unresisted antagonism. If it is also part of
between them and time avoid the possibility of nuclear destruction through
tiation between the two main consequences to remove all major source of tension
and there must now take place a font, formless and involved period of negative
that there is now a nuclear asset, that war is therefore unnecessary
must negotiate with Britain for the terms on which we can live together. If
accept the fact of Communist control of China, and that sooner or later we
The most powerful argument in favor of recognition is that we have to
communize with all their problems and total control.

tions of political independence and basic revolution than can the Chinese
societies that can continue to achieve more for their peoples under condi-
tions to put forth, in the new and old nations surrounding Red China's borders,
free to the Communist regime, by proofing further written expansion, and by
We can past help them find relating to five and material or political aera-
millions of Chinese who live in relative freedom.

to their condignors and withdrawing worst and political anchor from the

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that her military doctrine does not include taking the initiative, they can
proceed by every other means, short of nuclear war, to achieve their ends.

There are those who argue that we cannot maintain a moral posture to-
wards Communist China on the basis of her flouting of the United Nations
and her many international commitments. While we believe that the success
of our foreign policy is in the general interests of morality, success,
it is argued, depends upon proper tactics. The Conlon report suggests that
these tactics might involve trying to bring a government that we consider
immoral into some framework of negotiations, agreements, or international
organizations where more varied pressures could be exerted upon it. Con-
tainment of Communist China, it is suggested, prevents the possibility of any
message reaching the Chinese people and leaves us with little opportunity to
present to them a well-rounded and favorable image of the United States. In
support of this argument there is the fact that our diplomatic recognition
of the Soviet Union has permitted, especially recently, the enlargement of
communication between the two peoples and governments and the growth of a
possibly more realistic estimate of American society by the Russian people.
It is also suggested that our defenses must be strong enough to compel the
Communists to act upon their declared policy of peaceful competition, whether
they believe in it or not. The Conlon report says, "We should be aware that
U. S. policy does influence and affect Communist tactics just as their policy
influences ours. We must therefore offer them other incentives to rely upon
peaceful competition. Like every Messianic movement the world has ever known,
this is likely to fall short of its goal and be changed many times in the
course of pursuing it."

The argument of access to the Chinese government and people through
diplomatic recognition must be taken seriously, but the presumed advantage

diplomatic recognition that be taken seriously, put the presumed advantage
The argument of success to the Chinese Government and people through
come of burning it."

that it is filed to start short of its goal and be changed many times in the
besetful competition. Like every realistic movement the world has ever known,
influences one. We must therefore offer them other incentives to refocus on
U. S. policy does influence and affect Communist tactics that are their policy
they perceive in it or not. The Coufou report shows, "We should be aware that
Communists to set their declared policy of besetful competition, whether
It is also anguished that our defenses must be strong enough to combat the
besieged more realistic estimate of American society by the greatest people.
communication between the two peoples and governments and the growth of a
of the Soviet Union has benighted, especially recently, the arrangement of
subport of this argument there is the fact that our diplomatic recognition
brought to them a well-rounded and favorable image of the United States. In
message receiving the Chinese people and leaves us with little opportunity to
firmment of Communist China, if it is anguished, prevents the besieged from and
organisations where more armed pressures could be exercised about it. Cou-
tumorsist into some framework of negotiations, agreements, or international
these tactics might involve trying to print a government that we consider
if it is signed, debuta show proper tactics. The Coufou report suggests that
of our foreign policy is in the General Interests of虫虫氏, success,
and per se international commitments. While we believe that the success
wars Communist China on the part of per capita of the United Nations
there are those who argue that we cannot maintain a worst policy to-
proceed by every other means, short of no further war, to achieve their end.

that per se policy does not include taking the initiative, fully can

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must be weighed against the disadvantages. One disadvantage is that
Communist diplomatic representation in the United States would give to the
Peking regime increased opportunities to bring pressures to bear upon the
large Chinese population in the United States, much of it of a highly
trained and professional character. Another is the prestige that this
would give to the Peking regime with its own people and among Asian peoples.

It is quite possible to send journalists and scholars to Peking with-
out recognition, just as trade is also possible if we so desire. The
United States is free to use every possible means, short of recognition,
to increase the contacts between the two countries for the purpose of im-
proving the flow of information about Communist China and of modifying the
image that the Chinese people have of the United States.

b) The arguments against the admission of Communist China to the United Nations rest mainly on the grounds that Communist China was labeled an aggressor by a majority of that body, that there has been no treaty settlement of the Korean War, and that Peking has violated most of the Panmunjon armistice arrangements. Difficult problems would also arise as to the future of the National Government of China and the terms that Peking would insist upon in return for admission.

Those in favor of admitting Communist China in the U.N. have suggested
that these arguments are sound but irrelevant. For those who think that the
United Nation's charter should be taken seriously, the problem is not one
of admitting Communist China, but of retaining the Soviet Union, which has,
of course, violated both the spirit and the letter of the Charter. To those
who belong to this school, the important fact is not that the Soviet Union
has committed actual aggression, but that Communist China has been labeled
an aggressor by a majority in the United Nations, whereas the Soviet Union
has not. For those who see the United Nations as an international forum

has not. For those who see the United Nations as an international term
an aggressor by a majority in the United Nations, whereas the Soviet Union
has committed actual aggression, but that Communist China has been labeled
who belong to this school, the important fact is not that the Soviet Union
of states, isolated both in the spirit and the letter of the Charter. To those
United Nations' charter should be taken seriously, the problem is not one
that these arguments are said to irrelevant. For those who think that the
Those in favor of admitting Communist China in the U.N. have anguished
about in return for admission.

of the National Government of China and the terms that Beijing would admit
as a separate arrangement. Difficult problems would also arise as to the future
settlement of the Korean War, and that Beijing has violated most of the Pumwun
an aggressor by a majority of that body, that there has been no treaty
United Nations rest mainly on the basis that Communist China was labeled
p) The arguments against the admission of Communist China to the
image that the Chinese people have of the United States.

b) The flow of information about Communist China and of modifying the
to increase the contacts between the two countries for the purpose of im-
United States is free to see every possible means, apart of recognition,
out recognition, that as trade is also possible if we so desire. The
If it were possible to send journalists and scholars to Beijing with-

would give to the Beijing regime with its own people and among Soviet peoples,
trained and professional character. Another is the breath that this
large Chinese population in the United States, much of it of a highly
beijing regime increased opportunities to bring treasures to bear on the
Communist diplomatic representation in the United States would give to the
that be weighed against the disadvantages. One disadvantage is that

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to which all should belong, however they behave, the case for admitting
Communist China is quite clear. They argue that the legal distinction be-
tween Peking and Moscow is not meaningful. If the USSR had not absented
itself from the U.N. in the summer of 1950, the designation of Communist
China as an aggressor would have been impossible. There are also some mem-
bers of the Free World who think that Chinese armies would not have moved
in to assist the North Koreans if U. S. forces had not crossed the Thirty-
eighth parallel, a move which they consider to have gone beyond the original
intentions of the United Nations in Korea.

Would admission into the U.N. raise Communist China's prestige? There
is no question but that it would; but it can be argued that no material
difference would result because prestige is ultimately based on effective
power. Prestige in this sense, however, is perhaps not the real point.
Communist China in the United Nations would give the Communist bloc a greatly
improved political position for bargaining and manipulation, especially of
such groups as the Afro-Asian bloc. It is difficult to see how Communist
China could be admitted without face-saving compromises that would do a
great deal of damage to the prestige of the U.N.

In summary, there are two alternatives with respect to the United Nations
and Communist China. One is to deprive the Soviet Union and its satellites
of membership and to make it a league of non-Communist states, using the
organization to construct a political, economic, and military unit that can
deal on equal terms with the Communist bloc. The other alternative is to
change the charter of the United Nations to permit the admission of any
government that is in control of people and territory, whatever its character
and behavior, and make it an international forum for the purposes of nego-
tiation.

B. Policy Considerations

B. Policy Considerations

As China and Asia. The reaction of the Asian states to United States
policies towards China is a factor that must be taken as seriously as the

bottles toward China is a factor that must be taken as seriously as the
# China and Japan. The reaction of the Asian states to United States
# policy considerations
# in Asia.

and behavior, and make it an international term for the purposes of the
# China and Japan. One is to derive the Soviet Union and its satellites
# from theCommunist China. One is to devalue the Soviet Union and its satellites
# in America, there are two alternatives with respect to the United Nations
# great deal of damage to the breath of the U.N.

China could be shifted without face-saving consequences that would do a
# great damage as the Viet-Vietnam proc. If it is difficult to see how Communist
# improved policy position for perestroika and reunification, especially of
# Communist China in the United Nations would give the Communist proc a great deal
# power. Breathing in this sense, however, is perhaps not the real point.
# difference would result because breath is ultimately placed on elective
# its not direction put that it would put it can be argued that no material
# would be accomplished into the U.N. since Communist China's breath? There
# intentions of the United Nations in Korea.

eroughly berated, a move which furtherester to have gone beyond the original
# in to affect the North Korea's U. S. forces had not crossed the threshold
# of the Free World who think that Chinese allies would not have moved
# China as an aggressor would have been impossioble. There are some mem-
# iteft from the U.N. in the summer of 1970, the designation of Communist
# between Beijing and Moscow is not meaningful. It the U.S. had not appointed
# Communist China is done clear. They argue that the legal distinction be-
# to which all should belong, however, they perceive, the case for submitting

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reactions of our European allies. The importance of maintaining confidence in the stability and reliability of the United States is obviously important. There are certain of our allies to whom a change in our present China policy would be extremely unpopular. The republics of China, Korea, and Vietnam, and to a very large extent the Philippines and Thailand, would be alarmed at any relaxation in American attitudes towards Communist China, and in varying degrees, they would be demoralized. The official policies of these governments are based on the assumption that we are engaged in a "protracted conflict" with the Communist bloc and that more, rather than less, pressure should be put upon it. If the Communist bloc is stressing the lowering of tensions and the possibility of competitive coexistence, then this, they would argue, is merely a tactical device to bring about political division within the non-Communist world in order to facilitate infiltration and economic warfare. It has been pointed out that most of these governments are highly dependent on American aid and would, if necessary, be compelled to adjust to changes in American policy, but this ignores their importance to our military position in the Far East and the effects of their demoralization upon it and upon other countries.

The attitudes of those Asian states now non-aligned with the West are much more difficult to estimate. These include by far the larger group in population and resources. Such countries as India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, Malaya, Singapore, constitute a tremendous bloc if considered together. There is not a great deal, however, upon which they all agree. Pakistan is a member of SEATO but recognizes Communist China, while Japan, which is allied to the U. S. does not. While some of the others, such as India, Indonesia, and Burma, have been outspoken in their criticism of U. S. policies towards Communist China, it could be argued that they have

U. S. boffices forward Communist China, it could be argued that they have
se India, Indonesia, and Burma, have been outpacing in their criticism of
Japan, which is affirmed to the U. S. does not. While some of the others, and
agree, take part in a member of NATO but recognizes Communist China, while
agreed together. There is not a great deal, however, shown which they aff
Burns, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, constitute a tremendous bloc it com-
boradion and resources. Such countries as India, Indonesia, Egypt,
more more difficult to estimate. These include all the larger states in
the world, and now non-aligned with the West are

to own military position in the Far East and the effects of their demoraliza-
tion to adjust to changes in American policy, put this infor more directly
are highly dependent on American aid and would, if necessary, be combatted
and economic nature. It has been pointed out that most of these governments
divided within the non-Communist world in order to facilitate infiltration
this, they would argue, is merely a tactical device to print spent blocs of
the lowering of tensions and the belligerent coexistence, then
less, pressure should be put on it. It the Communist bloc is spreading
"propagated conflict" with the Communist bloc and that more, rather than
of these governments are based on the assumption that we are engaged in a
and in arming degrees, they would be demoralized. The official boffices
be formed at and relaxation in American attitudes towards Communist China,
and Vietnam, and to a very large extent the Philippines and Thailand, would
China beoch would be extremely unappealing. The repudiation of China's Korea,
tant. There are certain of our allies to whom a change in our policies
in the belligerent and belligerent of the United States is obviously inadvis-
able to our European allies. The importance of maintaining confidence

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much more sympathy for the United States position today than they had pre-
viously because each has its own problems with Communist China, and it can
be expected that, as time goes on, they will have more, rather than less,
to fear from that source. The matter of the Indonesian government's policies
towards the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia and of the Indian government's
involvement with Peking on the border issue, and of Burma's problem with
Chinese-supported local Communists are cases in point.

Asian governments have found that friendly relations, diplomatic recognition, and trade have not, apparently, been enough to prevent Communist Chinese intransigence. This does not necessarily mean that these governments will be in favor of reversing their policies; it may even mean that these governments, under increasing pressure from a strong China, will argue for the reversal of United States policies on the grounds that issues must be negotiated and containment of Communist China cannot possibly last or achieve its objectives. The situation is one which must be watched very carefully. There are few governments today, however, that do not share the estimate of Chinese Communist intentions that the United States made in the Truman statement of July 27, 1950.

2. The most important issue is rarely mentioned. The uncommitted countries are vitally interested in the question as to which of the two major power blocs is the stronger. So long as it was thought that the United States and its allies were the stronger, there was no need for the uncommitted nations, it was thought, to commit themselves because they were in no fear of attack from the West, and expected that they could count upon its support in case of trouble. If the Communist bloc succeeds in making the same countries believe that it is militarily the stronger, then the need to make a choice is more urgent. Under these conditions, the United States can anticipate much

more responsible. Under these conditions, the United States can anticipate much
that it is wisely the stronger, then the need to make a choice is
of principle. It the Communist bloc succeeds in making the same countries peo-
from the West, and expected that they could count upon its support in case
it was thought, so commit themselves because they were in no fear of attack
its affluence were the stronger, there was no need for the uncommitted nations,
piece in the stronger. So long as it was thought that the United States and
are aptly interested in the question as to which of the two major powers

2. The most important issue is rarely mentioned. The uncommitted countries
Truman statement of July 51, 1950.

estimate of Chinese Communist intentions that the United States made in the
unily. There are few governments today, however, that do not share the
society its objectives. The situation is one which must be watched very case-
negotiated and containment of Communist China cannot possibly last or
the reversal of United States policies on the basis that issues must be
Government's, under increasing pressure from a strong China, will argue for
will be in favor of reverting their policies; it may even mean that those
Chinese influence. This does not necessarily mean that these governments
will not, and should have not, inherently, been enough to prevent Communist
Tainan Government have found that friendly relations, diplomatic recog-

Chinese-embassy local Communists are cases in point.
involvement with Beijing on the border issue, and of Bumma's problem with
power the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia and of the Indian Government's
to fear from that source. The matter of the Indonesian Government's policies
be expected that, as time goes on, they will have more, rather than less,
officially because each has its own problems with Communist China, and it can
much more rapidly for the United States position today than they had pre-

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stronger attacks upon its policies towards Communist China from the uncommitted nations than it has had up to the present time, but for different reasons.

3. Weakening the Sino-Soviet alliance is an objective of both major schools of thought — the one that assumes the world is composed of nation-states which can shift alignments and the other that assumes the Communist movement, based on the Soviet bloc, is a new phenomenon.

a) One view is that China and Russia are allies and that no alliance is permanent. We can expect the normal tensions in any alliance to work in our favor, particularly Chinese arrogance and xenophobia. According to this view we can weaken the alliance by behaving in such a way as to convince Peking that it has an alternative course of action and that when ready to divorce itself from present dependence on the Soviet Union the West will accept and protect it. The way to do this is to establish normal diplomatic relations with Peking, open up trade, offer technical help and investment, and involve Peking as much as possible in the affairs of the rest of the world. New influences will flow into Communist China, considerations now ignored will have to be taken into account, cooperation between Moscow and Peking will be that much more complex, Chinese nationalism will flourish to the discomfort of Moscow.

A case can be built up for this view. The Chinese Communists have certainly gone out of their way to increase their international prestige and on one occasion seem to have forced Khruschev to withdraw from a proposed summit conference which would have included India but not Red China. According to some, there is a challenge to the English and Russian languages in the creation of a written form of the Chinese language which uses the Latin alphabet, as this indicates that the Chinese see the ultimate linguistic conflict as being between Chinese and English, Russian having been eliminated

conflict as pointed between Chinese and English, Russian having been eliminated
Latin alphabet, 92; see this indicates that the Chinese see the ultimate fluctuation
in the creation of a written form of the Chinese language with one of the
According to some, there is a difficulty to the English and Russian languages
emmit conference which would have included India but not India.
on one occasion seem to have forcedRENCH to withdraw from a proposed
certainly gone out of their way to increase their international brevity and
A case can be made up for this view. The Chinese Communists have
of Moscow.

that may be more complex. Chinese nationals will follow the diphthong
have to be taken into account, cooperation between Moscow and Beijing will be
influenced will flow into Communist China, considerations now favored will
be kept as much as possible in the interest of the rest of the world. New
with Beijing, open to trade, offer technical help and investment, and involve
project it. The way to do this is to establish normal diplomatic relations
itself from present dependence on the Soviet Union the Rest will accept and
that it has an alternative course of action and that when ready to divorce
we can weaken the alliance by persisting in and a way so to convince Beijing
to favor, certainly Chinese arrogance and xenophobia. According to this view
movement, based on the Soviet bloc, is a new phenomenon.

states which can build alignments and the other that assumes the Communist
schools of thought — the one that assumes the world is composed of nation-
reasons.

mitted nations than it has had up to the present time, put for different
stronger attacks upon its buffer states towards Communist China from the north-

-44-

earlier. This may be reading too much into the adoption of the Latin alphabet.
It may have been a concession to the intellectuals rather than a play for inter-
national politics. In any case, it is certainly true that China has been one
of the great independent civilizations of the world, and that the Chinese have
great pride of race and culture, which the Communists are exploiting for their
own purposes, but which may ultimately prove to be stronger than Communism.
But only, it should be added, if we are able and willing to help keep it alive.

There is no doubt that many Chinese are already disillusioned with
communism and would prefer a strong China to be a member of the Free World.
But these views are not likely to be held by the non-disillusioned Communist,
the man in power. The lines of cleavage, therefore, within the Communist elites
are not necessarily between Chinese and Russians; there may be an alliance of
Chinese and Russian die-hard Communists in control against "reactionary
nationalist" tendencies in both countries. Something akin to "nationalism"
will be important, but in a context rather different from the traditional one
of the nation-state. That is why it is doubtful whether a policy based on the
assumption that Red China will behave like a nation-state, to the exclusion of
other considerations, is not likely to be effective.

A further difficulty in the way of applying a policy of friendly relations
with Peking in the hope of wooing it away from Moscow is that of resolving the
problem of our present relations with Communist China. It is difficult to
see why Peking should be interested in U.S. recognition on any terms that would
be acceptable to us. If we were willing to overlook all other matters, such
as Korea, the treatment of Americans on the mainland, and the prestige argu-
ment, the status of the National Government of China is a very difficult
stumbling bloc. The "two China's" solution would be very costly to us even if
Peking were willing to accept it, which is very doubtful. To impose it upon
Taiwan would make that island valueless as a military and political factor and

Tainan would make that demand without difficulty and without difficulty, and
helping were willing to assist it, which in itself is complete. To impose it upon
attempting proc. The "Two China's" solution would be very costly to me even if
many, the status of the National Government of China is a very difficult
one, the treatment of Americans on the mainland, and the breathe again-
be acceptable to me. It we were willing to overlook all other matters, and
see why helping should be intimated in U.S. recognition on any terms that would
be proper to our present relations with Communist China. If it is difficult to
win being in the hope of winning it away from Moscow that of resolving the
further difficulties in the way of adding a buffer to friendly relations
other considerations, is not likely to be effective.

Assumption that Red China will preserve a nation-state, to the execution of
the nation-state. That is why it is complete whether a buffer based on the
will be important, put in a context rather different from the traditional one
nationalist, tendencies in both countries. Something akin to "nationalism"
Chinese and Russian state-level Communists in control against "reactionary
are not necessarily between Chinese and Russians; there will be an effusion of
the man in power. The lines of cleavage, periphery, within the Communist elite
but these areas are not likely to be held by the non-dissatisfied Communists,
communism and world brother a strong China to be a member of the free world.

There is no doubt that many Chinese are freely dissatisfied with
But only, if should be added, it we are able and willing to help keep it alive.
our economies, put which may ultimately prove to be stronger than Communism.
Great bridge of race and culture, which the Communists are exploiting for their
of the great independent nations of the world, and that the Chinese have
nationalities. In such case, it is certainly true that China has been one
If we have been a concession to the intellectualiser rather than a bit too inter-
eader. Unless we be resuming too much into the ablation of the Latin alphabet.

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and cause widespread demoralization not only among our allies in Asia, but
also among those men in uncommitted countries who have taken an open stand
against communism. In order to be able to impose the "Two-China" solution on
Taiwan and thus damage our own position, we would first have to have the
agreement of Peking, and for this we would also have to pay a high price. But
why should Peking agree to such a solution except on terms that would be an
obvious victory for her and give promise of acquiring Taiwan by peaceful
means within a short period after the agreement? It is much more likely that
Peking would prefer to whittle away at our position and compel rather than
negotiate us into surrendering it piece by piece. In this context it can be seen
that the suggestion that we voluntarily withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu is a
matter that raises questions of very high policy. If we take the view that
it is neither possible nor desirable to compromise with Peking, there would be
no withdrawal from the islands. The Communists, it would be argued, would
exploit the withdrawal as a retreat under force, Nationalist China would take it
as the sign of a change in U. S. policy, we would be giving up a symbolic po-
sition of political importance, and there would be nothing in return. The
position of Quemoy and Matsu is no more exposed than that of Hongkong or
Macao and much more defensible, for example, than West Berlin. If we take
the view that a negotiated settlement of outstanding issues with the Communist
world is essential to the preservation of world peace, then it would be logical
to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu as a first step towards a settlement which
would then revolve around the alternative solutions of the future of Formosa.
An exposed position would be evacuated and written off as indefensible. The
weakness of this argument, even in terms of stated objectives, is that it would
be taken as a sign of retreat and would make arrival at an acceptable settle-
ment that much the harder. Perhaps it might be wiser to achieve some sort of
settlement first before giving up positions of any sort.

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b) The other view is that policy must be based on the assumption that the Communist orbit will continue to behave as a unit in all major strategic decisions. The present policy of the United States seems to be based on this assumption. It is quite consistent with the differential treatment of Communist China and the Soviet Union that exists today. This is sometimes referred to as a policy of containment (see Conlon report), but this would imply that it was devised for the specific purpose of isolating Peking and forcing it into the arms of Moscow in order to increase tensions between the two. It may have that effect, but it was not so conceived. Chinese Communist actions more than anything else brought about the absence of diplomatic relations and the embargo on trade. That is why the position gets increasingly harder to maintain as the Korean conflict sinks into history and American businessmen feel that the embargo robs them of opportunities which their competitors are using to our disadvantage. The embargo is probably doing Peking very little harm economically, but this is not the point. The main point of non-recognition and economic embargo should be to identify Communist China with the Soviet Union, to keep the spotlight on the international transgressions of the regime and to rob it of further opportunities to parade itself as an independent power. The counter-argument that trade and cultural intercourse will increase understanding and improve relations is still effective in some quarters in spite of the discouraging memories of the recent case histories of relations with totalitarian powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan, before the last war. It could even be argued that full diplomatic and economic relations with these countries tended to strengthen wishful thinking on our side and to obscure understanding. The Communists are much more skilled than were the Fascists or the Japanese at using vested economic interests in the United States for their own political purposes.

for their own benefit and purposes.

Bascate or, the Japanese at least, economic interests in the United States
oppose understanding. The Communists are much more skilled than were the
with these countries tended to arrange themselves with respect to our side and to
that end. It could even be argued that full diplomatic and economic relations
of relations with totalitarian powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan, before the
decades in advance of the disconsolate memories of the recent case histories
will increase understanding and improve relations to a still effective in some
independent power. The counter-argument that trade and cultural interconnections
of the regimes and so on, do not affect itself as an
with the Soviet Union, to keep the spotlight on the international transactions
non-recognition and economic emporium should be to identify Communist China
very little harm economically, put this is not the point. The main point of
benevolence are making to our disadvantage. The emporium is properly going being
putting aside that the emporium rope them of opportunities which their com-
border to maintain as the Korean conflict strikes into history and American
lations and the emporium on trade. That is why the position has been increasingly
sacred more than anything else brought about the absence of diplomatic re-
to. If we may have that effect, put it was not so conceived. Chinese Communist
taking it into the sums of Moscow in order to increase tensions between the
inquiry that it was devised for the specific purposes of realizing being and
referred to as a buffer of conservation (see Couffou report), put this would
Communist China and the Soviet Union that exists today. This is sometimes
assumption. If it were consistent with the differential treatment of
hotlines. The present buffer of the United States seems to be based on this
Communist credit will continue to prove as a unit in all future strategic ge-
p) The other view is that buffer must be based on the assumption that the

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The main reason for treating the Communist bloc as a unit is that it behaves as one. The non-Communist world is certainly not a unit, nor are the combination of powers allied together in NATO and SEATO or in the bilateral security arrangements that the U. S. has with several countries in the Pacific. It is very difficult to compete successfully with the Communist bloc without machinery for joint action in economic and political affairs that is at least as effective as the present limited arrangements for military security.

The Communist bloc can shut off or open up trade and cultural intercourse at will, as it has done in the past, for specified political objectives; the non-Communist world cannot. More important still, the other side can plan on very long-range political strategy with reasonable expectation of being able to follow through with appropriate tactics. Our present organization of states in the Free World is too vulnerable, especially economically, to use its resources effectively in taking counter measures against Soviet economic or propaganda offensives or to pursue aggressive and positive policies designed for long-range objectives. Under these conditions, to speak as the Conlon report does, of negotiation and probing operations in relation to Communist China (which in effect means the Communist bloc) is premature.

The predominance of the United States in the Free World is challenged more today than it was ten years ago because of the recovery of the United Kingdom and western Europe. The relative position of the U.S. is likely to change again during the next ten years if the recovery continues and if the U. S. comes to depend more and more on external trade. The United States, therefore, has a strong interest in consolidating, on a basis of mutual respect and freedom, the institutional ties that now hold the hard core of Free World allies together. This is necessary, not only for purposes of competing with the Soviet bloc, but also for building up the pattern of the sort of the world in which we wish to live. The two go together. The economic

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competition of which Moscow speaks is not for higher standards of living, it is an economic offensive designed to disrupt our aid to underdeveloped countries and if possible the already weak economic foundations of the Free World alliances. Communist China is a partner in this economic offensive.

### C. Conclusions.

1. The most important aspect of our policy towards Communist China is our policy towards the non-Communist countries of Asia. Put in other terms, what we do to help create the sort of world we want to line in, where and when we can, is much more important than direct actions against those who are trying to shape a different world. The most difficult of our problems is that of conceptualization, of defining in simple political terms the sort of world we want, taking into account the technological revolution and the revolution in man's level of expectation, especially in Asia.

2. Communist China is both a regional and a global problem. It is essential that the Communist orbit be thought of as a unit, which it is, a unit which is different in kind from traditional alliances between national states. We can expect a division of labor between Moscow and Peking in their joint attack on the Free World. This division of labor will be partly regional, such as Peking taking primary responsibility for direction of Asian Communist parties, partly tactical, such as Peking creating diversions in Asia to assist Moscow in achieving objectives in Europe or the Middle East. There is a very shrewd division of labor in the Soviet bloc economic offensive. The Soviet Union provides most of the credits, but the East European satellites and China provide many of the technicians and Red China, in Southeast Asia, conducts most of the trade.

3. The nature of the Soviet bloc calls for a coordinated policy on our part towards all the various parts of the bloc. It is appropriate to have differential treatment of parts of the bloc, for example, East Germany

have differential treatment of barter of the bloc, for example, East Germany on our part towards the various barter of the bloc. If it is appropriate to J. The nature of the Soviet bloc causes for a coordinated policy

Southeast Asia, combines most of the trade, safetyfirst and China provide much of the manufacture and food China, in spite. The Soviet Union provides most of the credits, but the East European There is a very broad division of labor in the Soviet bloc economic often- Varsa to satisfy Moscow in achieving objectives in Europe or the Middle East. Communist parties, largely left, such as Belgrade crossing divisions in regions, such as Belgrade taking primary repositioning for direction of Varsan Joint attack on the Free World. This division of labor will be largely stable. We can expect a division of labor between Moscow and Beijing in their a unit which is different in kind from traditional alliances between national its essential that the Communist orbit be thought of as a unit, which it is, S. Communist China in both a regional and a global problem. It revolution in man's level of expectation, especially in Vars

of world means, taking into account the technological revolution and the
that of conceptualization, of defining in simple belligerent terms the sort
who are trying to shape a different world. The most difficult of all problems
and when we can, is much more important than direct actions against those
forms, what we do to help create the sort of world we want to live in, where
is our belligerence toward the non-Communist countries of Asia. But in other
I. The most important aspect of our belligerence toward the Communist China
of Asia.

C. Conclusions.

oltensive.

Free World alliances. Communist China is a partner in this economic
compares and it bespeaks the already weak economic foundations of the
it is an economic alternative designed to diamant om aid to underdeveloped
competition of which Moscow bespeaks is not for higher standards of living.

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and Communist China, but preferably in implementation of an overall strategy
towards the bloc. At the present time the coordination of military policies,
in NATO and SEATO is far ahead of coordination in any other sphere, such as
economics.

4. The general strategy of our China policy is sound, but the
future calls for serious shifts in emphasis. Military containment is
essential, especially as the military threat is likely to increase rather
than diminish. But there is need for increased emphasis upon political
objectives in non-Communist Asia. The first problem is to clarify our ob-
jectives. This is not too difficult. The next problem is to subordinate
all the main arms of American policy -- political, military, economic,
cultural -- to the achievement of these objectives. This calls for a body
of theory and practice which, as of now, is not sufficiently articulated.
It also calls for the supremacy of the political agency in the implementa-
tion of policy, a condition which is rarely met in the field.

tion of policy, a condition which it rarely met in the life of the
U. S. statecraft for the administration of the policy agency in the impromptu-
ity of theory and practice which, as of now, is not sufficiently articulated.

The statecraft for a policy agency -- to the achievement of these objectives.

The statecraft for a policy agency which is not sufficiently articulated.

The main source of American policy -- political, military, economic,
technical. This is not too difficult. The next problem is to subordinate
objectives in non-communist States. The first problem is to clarify om-
sumption. But there is need for increased emphasis on political
essential, especially as the military threat is likely to increase rather
future calls for serious shifts in emphasis. Military containment is
not the general strategy of our China policy in any sense, put the
economics.

in NATO and SEATO is far ahead of coordination in and other areas, and as
forward the process. At the present time the coordination of military forces,
and Communist China, put differently in implementation of an overall strategy

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