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--insofar as it has one--depends on the ability of an alliance composed of sovereign states to develop the confidence which will enable it to act in common in the face of a technology of unprecedented destructiveness.

2. It was a mistake to attempt to gear NATO policy to the projection of unstated German wishes. No significant demand for possession of nuclear weapons existed in Germany when the MLF was first proposed. Outside very restricted official circles, no significant backing exists for other "hardware" solutions. Even after three years of discussion and pressure only a small number of German officials--and no other public figures--are committed to the "hardware solution."

3. The nuclear control issue is not "solved" by any of the "hardware" solutions now being discussed nor can it be by any adaptation of them. If any of the common ownership schemes so far proposed were accepted the situation would be as follows: (a) No country presently *unable* to go to nuclear war will be enabled to do so as a result of the "hardware solution"--the existing vetos would remain. (b) No country presently *able* to go to nuclear war can be prevented from doing so by participating in a "hardware" solution. (c) No country presently *unable* to go to nuclear war can force its nuclear ally to go to nuclear war as the result of a "hardware" solution. All that participation in a commonly owned force buys is the ability to veto the use of the very small percentage of the total nuclear arsenal which it represents (about 3%) but *not* the remainder. If a "hardware" solution were accepted, this could not remain a permanent state of affairs especially if heavy financial sacrifices are involved. The probability is, therefore, that a commonly owned force will

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repeat within its framework all the arguments it was supposed to allay.
Pressures for altering the control mechanism are inevitable. A jointly owned
force will buy not a solution but a permanent crisis.

4. The nuclear issue diverts attention from the cardinal problem of political cooperation to an inherently divisive issue with respect to which formal pronouncements are likely to be highly misleading. Nuclear war--if it should occur--will come only at the end of a long diplomatic process and will involve the national survival of all participants. It seems contradictory to try to integrate nuclear strategy while leaving the process of diplomacy which precedes it bilateral. If a coordinated diplomacy can be achieved the problem of who presses the button will seem less crucial. If political confidence and cooperation cannot be developed, theoretical voting formulae for entering nuclear war will prove empty. No country will let itself be voted into nuclear war against its better judgment. No one can seriously believe that a United States President would risk hundreds of millions of lives after being outvoted in a committee--after, in short, having decided that nuclear war was not in the American interest. And the same is true of other countries. The primary guarantee for our allies is a harmonization of political objectives so that the conception of vital interests of various allies is virtually indistinguishable.
If we and our allies see our vital interests the same way, the nuclear control issue will be well on its way to a "solution." If we cannot achieve such a consensus, physical possession of a small jointly owned force will be irrelevant.
As will be discussed below, the major thrust of American policy should be to strengthen political consultation and for this the Special Committee (the McNamara committee) seems at present the best forum available.

"But it is only to posterity that evolution appears inevitable. The historian of evolution deals only with successful elements, and the blatantly successful ones at that. He has no way of knowing what was most significant to the participants: the element of choice which determined success of failure. He is bound by the nature of his evidence to dismiss the fact that for every successful adaptation thousands may have tried the road and for a variety of reasons - not necessarily essential to their own nature - have failed. He cannot determine in retrospect whether a very slight change in cur circumstances might not have meade recognized successes out of many failures or whether many brilliant innovations faded out simply because they could not be assimilated by the existing framework. In other words, many experiments may have failed not because they did not represent progress or history but because they anticipated it too much."

The evolutionary process goes on by means of two seemingly contradictory mechanisms. It is determined in the sense that the span of possible adaptations is delimited by the physical environment, the tradition, and the internal structure of the society concerned. This span may be large of small; it can in some instances even be widened by deliberate actions. But in its general scope it is fixed. At the same time, the process of evolution contains an element of choice.

Those who participate in the process of evolution appreciate through experience - as many current apostles of evolutionary theory do not - that evolution proceeds not in a straight line but through a series of complicated variations. At every step of the road there are turns and forks, which have to be taken for better of worse. The conditions governing the decision may be of the most delicate shading. The choice may appear in retrospect to be nearly random or else to be the only option possible under the prevailing circumstances. In either case, it is the result of the interaction of the whole sum of previous turnings -- reflecting history or tradition or values -- plus the immediate pressures of the need for survival. Moreover, however, random the choice may appear at any given juncture, every successful turn affects the range of options of the next crucial decision.

As society becomes more elaborate and as its tradition is firmly established, the choices with respect to the internal organization grow more restricted. Units at the beginning of the evolutionary road are in a position to make radical shifts of course that are wholly impractical at a later stage. If a highly articulated unit - a society, a people, a complex biological organism - were to make radical shifts, this would do violence to its internal organization, to its history, and values as embodied in its structure. At the same time, the more elaborate the structure, the greater in general will be the command over the environment. Then the society, though less adaptable to the environment, may gain an increased ability to shape it in the light of its values. And, if it cannot master the environment, it will become its victim.

The evolutionary movement towards greater internal elaboration and rigidity need not be inexorable. The more pluralistic a society, the longer can the trend towards petrification be deferred and perhaps even avoided. A pluralistic society contains many structues, all subject to more or less continuous change. In such a society parts of the intellectual, cultural, and political framework are dying while others are being reborn. If the collapse of the old occurs whithout catastrophic consequences, and if the new is helped through its infancy, the overall performance may show great vitality. As in the United States and Great Britain, the evolutionary process can accomodate changes which for other societies might have proved intolerable.

Yet it would be ide to deny the tendencis towards rigidity
even in a pluralistic society. Only constant vigilance and a
deliberate effort to foster creativity can prevent a decline which
history indicates has been the lot of all societies - and often
at the moment of their greatest achievement success. Seen in
evolutionary terms, there resides in every achievement the po-
tentiality of tragedy. The temptation is often overwhelming to
rest on one's accomplishments, all the more so when these have
been considerable. Any society can reach a point at which its de-
velopment where it runs the risk of having exhausted all the
possibilities of innovation inherent in its structure. Once that
point is reached, the society will lose its adaptibility. Sooner
or later, no matter how great and powerful it appears to be, its
environment will outstrip and eventually destroy it. The col-
lapse of nations, then, is due to two factors: internal rigidity
coupled with a decline in the ability, both moral and physical,
to shape surrounding circumstances.

The inextricable aspect of the evolutionary process is this
interplay between internal structure and environment. Close to
the beginning of an evolution, the participant has a maxiumum
number of choices and is in the best position to do something
about them. But he also has the minimum knowledge by which to
evaluate his actions and no tradition in which to set them.
Later this framework of understanding expands, as does the pos-
sibility of wise decision. At the same time the scope of
decision is progressively narrowed by the already elaborate
structure and the increasing weight of tradition. Once a thor-
oughly elaborated framework has evolved, it will be to some de-
gree irreversible. Generally, it can be drastically altered
only by a revolutionary upheaval which destroys, rather than a-
dapts, the old structure. Such a course almost inevitably has
temporarily catastrophic consequences."

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To the statesman, the prophetic approach must be reduced to
precise measures to be meaningful. Ideas get "used".

Prophet is a political fact.

Intellectuals and policy-maker--always somewhat inconclusive
relationship

Intellectual holds ideas because they are "right," statesman accepts
them because they are useful.

Leads to a frustrating dialogue because what seems most obvious to
XX one appears most dangerous to the other.

The prophetic approach seeks total solutions.

The statesman seeks to approach his goals in stages.

The prophet rejects negotiation except for symbolic reasons--therefore
in modern times diplomacy XXXXXXXXXXXX often becomes propaganda.

The statesman must seek an adjustment of conflicting interests through
negotiation. Begin by admitting potential merit in opponent.

Both approaches are possible and have succeeded.

19th century vs. 20th

Reformation vs. 18th century

Mohammedan triumphs

But prophetic approach leads to greater dislocations and more suffering.

Prophets though more concerned with morality also more intolerant.

Require tour de force --because most societies operates by standard of
average performance.

Revolution can be breaking existing mold but also by requiring
more than can be assimilated.

The greater the dislocation the greater the ultimate recourse to force.

Because of the rejection of timing prophetic approach is concerned principally with achievement of its goal.