["To be absent alone. It can survive only if it receives schedule warning —", "be a result, a retaliatory force which is vulnerable in some way.", "Must be clear and, safety, constant and forceful if.", "these situations, for neither side can afford to wait. Where an attack\nvulnerability, the intention is to force them to the interpretation of\nwhat the side which makes force. Under conditions of mutual\nwars, the side which makes force. Under conditions of

III - 8

in itself a difficult technical feat. With intercontinental missiles in transit for less than thirty minutes, the reaction to warning must be made as nearly automatic as possible. The fateful decision to go to war may thereby be removed from any meaningful political and perhaps even military control. And the information acted upon may be faulty since there is simply not enough time to determine its accuracy.

Mutual vulnerability thus produces almost the classic condition for pre-emptive war. When two vulnerable retaliatory forces confront each other, the offense is not the best, it is the only defense. In these circumstances the retaliatory force loses all utility as a diplomatic instrument. It can not be used for making a retaliatory threat. The only safe method of employing it is in a sudden strike. A threat, if believed, will trigger a pre-emptive blow by the opponent, particularly if the opponent is vulnerable as well. Deterrence of all-out war will be highly ineffective.

Paradoxically, limited aggression may be discouraged to some extent. When the deterrent equation is so unstable, it is foolhardy to risk general war by engaging in peripheral moves and safer to

to the effect that the question of employment in particular cases and subject to
extent. When the relevant question is so made, it is to be determined.

Branch-exactness, finish, exactness, may be disallowed to some
cases.

may be highly inoperative.

Determination, in the object, is vulnerable as well. Determination of all-out
drives, it is believed, will further a two-empirical flow in the object.

The only method of employment it is in a condition to. A
diplomatic instrument. It can not be used for making a retaliatory
these circumstances the retaliatory force will utilize as a
step of course, the object is not the best, it is the best
debate. In
for two-empirical purposes. When the vulnerable retaliatory force confront
mutual unreasonability, time, place, and the like, the object condition
shall be simply not enough time to demonstrate its accuracy.

even military control. And the information each one must be given
will thereby be removed from any meaningful political and political
make as nearly as possible as possible. The further decision to be
in transaction for less than thirty minutes, the reaction to working must be
in itself a difficult political test. Will international relations

III - 8

III - 9

opposing

attack the retaliatory force directly. But this relative safety from local aggression is a heavy price to pay for the general instability when both sides are vulnerable. Any crisis—even when not sought by the major nuclear powers—may set off a holocaust. No matter what the intentions of the two sides, mutual vulnerability is the most dangerous of all strategic relationships. It makes all-out war almost inevitable.

The situation is different when an invulnerable retaliatory force confronts a vulnerable one. Invulnerability can take two forms: it can mean the ability to win even *after* suffering a surprise attack.

We were in this position until the Soviet Union developed a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. It is unattainable now, short of totally unexpected breakthroughs on the part of the defense, enabling us to destroy most enemy missiles before they reach their targets. Or else, invulnerability can mean a retaliatory force capable of guaranteeing an unacceptable level of damage even after suffering a hostile attack. This is the sense in which the term "invulnerable" will be used in the subsequent discussion.

["Inability will be seen in the subsequent discussion.\n\nBringing a nation to a position of complete submission to the will of the government is a very difficult matter. It is the object of the government to bring the government to a position where it can act with complete authority. It is the object of the

III - 10

When an invulnerable retaliatory force confronts a vulnerable one the strategic relationship is as follows: The side which is invulnerable can protect itself by other means than pre-emptive war because--by the definition of invulnerability--it will not lose its retaliatory force even by conceding the first blow. It will therefore will be less tense and less prone to accidents. At the same time, the retaliatory force becomes to some extent an instrument of diplomacy. Pressure and black-mail can be deterred by threatening to use it. The vulnerable opponent can't react by a pre-emptive attack since this would be tantamount to committing suicide, also in such a situation, the threat of all-out war deters limited aggression up to a certain point. For the vulnerable side will always be constrained by the fear than aggressive act may be used as a pretext for a showdown.

As for the vulnerable side, its position is extremely poor. Where under conditions of mutual vulnerability it would win by striking first, it can now only guarantee mutual suicide. It will have no motive whatever for surprise attack and a greatly reduced incentive for a pre-emptive strike--for no reasonable purpose will be served by it. As a

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result, the credibility of the threat of all-out war is likely to diminish to the vanishing point. Indeed, even to threaten is extremely risky for it may provoke an attack which--by definition of vulnerability--could not fail to be decisive.

The ability of the vulnerable side to deter limited aggression will be reduced even more drastically. It cannot threaten all-out war, and it must be very cautious about any other military action in order not to supply a pretext for attack. Vulnerability of the retaliatory force may thus turn into an irremediable weakness, even the attempt to achieve invulnerability may furnish the incentive for a show-down.

It is a practice to be avoided at all cost.

This indicates that it makes a great deal of difference which side possesses the invulnerable force, whether it is the potential aggressor or the potential defender. If the defender is invulnerable and the potential aggressor vulnerable, stability will be enhanced. A status quo power, by definition, will not take advantage of its superiority to attack and the aggressor will be deterred by his vulnerability from pressing military moves too far. This essentially was the situation

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during our atomic monopoly and the subsequent period when our dispersed
base system guaranteed our strategic superiority. It has, now, and unless
immediately we make major efforts, it could even be reversed.

If the potential aggressor is invulnerable and confronts a vulnerable
opponent, his position will be overwhelming. He will be able to choose
between blackmail and military action. If he blackmails the victim will
be under great pressure to surrender, for its vulnerability makes it
reckless to test whether the aggressor is bluffing. If, actually,
aggression takes place, there exists a wide latitude between limited and
all-out means. The defender cannot threaten all-out war for fear of
being destroyed. And he must be very cautious about resisting limited
aggression lest he furnish an excuse for a show-down. As will be seen
below, this may be one consequence of the missile gap. If so, the early
1960's will be a period of mortal danger.

What, then, when two invulnerable retaliatory forces confront each
other? Under conditions of mutual invulnerability a stalemate would
come about regardless of which side struck first. Or put another way,

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each side is capable of inflicting unacceptable losses on the other even if it should be the victim of surprise attack. With no advantage to be gained by striking first and no disadvantage to be suffered by striking second, there will be no motive for either surprise or pre-emptive attack. Mutual invulnerability means mutual deterrence. It is the most stable situation from the point of view of preventing all-out war.

At the same time, it is the least stable situation with respect to limited aggression. Since, under conditions of mutual invulnerability, all-out war can result only in mutual suicide, it is extremely unlikely that an aggressor would believe that an American President would deliberately resort to it to resist any attack which is explicitly less than all-out. And a threat which is incredible will cause deterrence to fail no matter how resolute we "really" are. Moreover, such a policy would be reckless in the extreme even were we prepared to carry it out. It would mean that the consequence of any failure of deterrence would be, most probably catastrophic damage.

["enferrochée dans une\ndéfense étrange.", "que la consequence de son\ntatif et de son état de\ndéfense pourrait être un\nenfermement de la\ndéfense.", "Il est évident que la\ndéfense est une\ndéfense de la\ndéfense est une\ndéfense de

III - 14

The foregoing analysis enables us to sum up the deterrent equation as follows:

State of Retaliatory Force

Outcome of All-Out War

Ability to deter the U.S. the Retaliatory Force to deter

<table><thead><tr><th>U.S.</th><th>U.S.S.R.</th><th>U.S.</th><th>U.S.S.R.</th><th>Against All-Out War</th><th>Limited Aggression</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1. Vulnerable</td><td>Vulnerable</td><td>1st strike wins 2nd strike loses</td><td>1st strike wins 2nd strike loses</td><td>Highly unstable</td><td>Uncertain - but unstable</td></tr><tr><td>2. Vulnerable</td><td>Invulnerable</td><td>1st strike - stalemate 2nd strike loses</td><td>1st strike wins 2nd strike - stalemate</td><td>Very low against deliberate surprise attack</td><td>Almost useless</td></tr><tr><td>3. Invulnerable</td><td>Vulnerable</td><td>1st strike wins 2nd strike - stalemate</td><td>1st strike - stalemate 2nd strike loses</td><td>Deterrence against all-out war high.</td><td>All-out capability can discourage limited aggression.</td></tr><tr><td>4. Invulnerable</td><td>Invulnerable</td><td>1st strike - stalemate 2nd strike - stalemate</td><td>1st strike - stalemate 2nd strike - stalemate</td><td>Mutual deterrence.</td><td>All-out war threat almost useless.</td></tr></tbody></table>

* See next chapter: It is dangerous to engage in limited aggression with a vulnerable retaliatory force but equally dangerous to resist. The side with stronger nerves tends to prevail in this situation.

## B. The Debate Reconsidered: The Missile Gap and Finite Deterrence

The table above, This representation permits a reconsideration of both the missile controversy gap as well as of the debate between the adherents of a counterforce strategy and of finite deterrence. When the doctrine of massive retaliation was first developed, deterrence was thought to depend on the

retardation was tried before the determination was thought to depend on the
exactly one of finite distance. When the doctrine of mass
and so well as of the evidence between the adjectives of a contraries
and as well as of the evidence between the adjectives of a contraries
and so well as of the evidence between the adjectives of a contraries
and so well as of the evidence between the adjectives of a contraries

The evidence demonstrated hermeneutic a recognition of both the middle

B. The Evidence Demonstrated the Middling and Finite Distance

beyond the finite situation.

beyond the finite situation. The same with stronger evidence tends to
lead to the same conclusion with a finite distance.

* See next chapter. It is dangerous to make a limited conclusion with a finite distance.

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>U.2.</th><th>U.2.2.</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1. Inference</td><td>U.2.</td><td>U.2.2.</td></tr><tr><td>2. Inference</td><td>U.2.</td><td>U.2.2.</td></tr><tr><td>3. Inference</td><td>U.2.</td><td>U.2.2.</td></tr><tr><td>4. Inference</td><td>U.2.</td><td>U.2.2.</td></tr></tbody></table>

State of Refinement Force

Outcome of Vif-Out Int.

The Refinement Force to be
divided into the N.2.
and the N.3.

The foregoing variables present the following substitution of
the corresponding letters to the same letters in the original text.

The following equations follow:

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destructive potential of our Strategic Air Command. Hence, it has been
natural for us to assume that our deterrent position improved with every
increase in the power of our weapons arsenal. Our military policy has
remained essentially unchanged for a decade because of the conviction
that technological change has so far reduced our ability to inflict
widespread devastation on the U.S.S.R. — if anything the advances in
science have enhanced our ability to do so.

In fact, deterrence has always been more subtle and complex. The
Soviet Union has been deterred from aggression, particularly local aggression,
not only by the power of our strategic striking force but also by its own
inability to retaliate. During our atomic monopoly we were completely
invulnerable in the sense described above, the U.S.S.R. was completely
vulnerable. Afterwards our dispersed base system and superior experience
with long-range aircraft gave us a strategic advantage, which the Soviet
Union could not eliminate through surprise attack. In these conditions,
a certain constraint existed against exploitation by the Soviet Union
of its local preponderance, for it could not be certain that we would not
use a crisis for a show-down. Even then, our strategic preponderance

["use a clause for a show-of-hand. Then, from our strategic position, we can\nmake a case for a show-of-hand. Then, from our strategic position, we can\nuse a clause for a show-of-hand. Then, from our strategic position, we can\nmake a case for a show-of-hand. Then, from our

III - 16

did not prevent the Berlin Blockade, the Korean war, the repression
of the Hungarian revolt and, the threat of missile attacks against Britain
and France during the Suez episode.

Whatever the strategic significance of massive retaliation in those
conditions, it will be reckless to rely on it in the years just ahead.
There is no dispute that the "missile gap" will materialize in the
period 1960-1964. The only controversy concerns its significance.
It may mean that we could lose if the Soviet Union struck first. In
that case we would be fortunate if we escaped a surprise attack. It
would be foolhardy in the extreme to invite a blow by threatening all-out retaliation to limited aggression.

But even if the worst should be avoided, the missile gap guarantees
Soviet invulnerability in the sense that we will be unable to destroy
the Soviet retaliatory force even by striking first. As long as our
missile force is significantly smaller than that of the U.S.S.R., the
U.S.S.R. can engage in local aggression with greatly reduced fear of
American all-out retaliation. During the missile gap we do not have--

American all-out revolution. Under the missile threat we do not have—
U.2.B.R. can engage in local opposition which greatly reduces the force of
missile force to significantly smaller than that of the U.2.B.R., the
soviet revolutionary force can be significantly smaller than that of the
soviet insurance force which we wish to make to control
the world.
But even if the worst scenario were possible, the missile threat would
not necessitate a limited invasion.

would be theoretically in the extreme to invite a flow of international eff-
orts which we wish to terminate if we see such an invasion. It
is very likely that we could force it if the Soviet Union were to fall. In
billion 100-150. The only countermeasure can be
there is no chance that the missile group will materialize in the
conditions, it will be useless to rely on it in the event that such an
invasion the strategic significance of missile retaliation in these
and future campaigns during the next decade.

and Russia during the next decade.
of the American threat and threat of missile strikes against Britain
which do not prevent the Berlin Agreement, the Soviet Union, the representation

III - 18

to attack the United States, it should provide increasing opportunities for the
enlistment of the Soviet Union to enable the Soviet Union
to launch a force against and enforce its withdrawal,
therefore reduceBandwidth, because completely, the finest of our
in resolution, regardless of the cause of our flow. The whole sub will
be when they are in a right state of restlessness.
from enough time to launch Soviet forces, particularly in Europe
from the Soviet border screen to most useful installations. This is more
Soviet Union would have at least 3 to 4 home stations — the third time
in collective in defending forces. If we launched a power attack, the
our heavy pounds, because of their relatively low speed, are relatively
extremely unlikely because it is a superhuman number which remains. And
force. Even if one of our forces destroyed one of the Soviet's — an
expansion — sufficient forces to defeat the Soviet resiliency

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III - 18

for the kind of blackmail of which the crisis over Berlin is but an
augury.

These considerations bear importantly on the debate between the
adherents of a counterforce strategy and those of *Finite Deterrence*.
For in a sense the most favorable result of the missile gap will be
precisely the condition in envisaged by the exponents of *Finite
Deterrence*: we may be able to inflict catastrophic damage on the
aggressor's social fabric but only at the price of a similar devastation
of the United States. This may deter a direct attack on the
United States but, by the same token, there is a range of local
pressures against which the threat of all-out war will become less
and less effective. The extreme version of *Finite Deterrence*, according
to which we are said to require only a small retaliatory force capable
primarily of destroying cities or other area targets, in fact amounts
to a deliberate United States effort to guarantee the invulnerability of
the Soviet retaliatory force. If our deterrent force is designed
primarily for a mission of punishment, an aggressor will know that short

primarily for a mission of bannissement, an aggrément which shows that export
the Soviet retaliatory force. It is our deterrent force in dealt

with a deliberate United States effort to banish the indemnity of

bravery of destroying cities or other areas targeted, in that amounts
to which we are said to require only a small retaliatory force capable

The extreme version of *unite Reference*, according

breaches against which the threat of effort out will become less

United States put, by the same token, there is a route of force

from the United States. This may deter a direct attack on the

affronts a society put out at the bristle of any further general-

*Deterrence*: we may be able to inflict collateral damage on the

brutally the condition we envisaged by the exhortence of *unite*

but in a sense the most favorable result of the situation will be

*exhortence of a comhalterence already and since of *unite Reference*.*

These considerations per se independently on the debate between the

unfair.

for the right of placemant of which the create overhastly put an

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III - 19

of the most overriding threat to our existence -- and perhaps not even
then -- the threat of massive retaliation *must* be bluff. And there is
a wide psychological difference between the assessment that we probably
will not wish to retaliate and the knowledge that we *cannot*.

This dilemma cannot be avoided by returning to a counterforce
strategy. Whatever our preferences, technology will prevent this. A
counterforce strategy can imply one of two situations: ... ...

III - 20

(a) A superiority such that we could win an all-out war even if we concede the first blow.

(b) A strategy in which we could win an all-out war but only if we strike first.

No doubt the most desirable situation is one where we could win even after suffering a surprise attack. Under those circumstances, an attack on our retaliatory force would be senseless because, by hypothesis, the aggressor would lose whether he struck first or second. Hence, he would have no incentive for attacking at all. At the same time, he would have to be cautious about limited aggression because this might unleash our retaliatory force. And the aggressor could not improve his position by a pre-emptive attack, because by hypothesis he would still lose. This is the only situation in which the threat of all-out war can deter local aggression.

Such a degree of superiority is almost certainly unattainable today. Given the growing missile forces and nuclear stockpiles, a Soviet surprise attack is bound to inflict enormous damage. Only on the assumption of an almost 100 percent effective air defense can we even conceive of victory.

III - 21

in a defensive all-out war. Such a defense is not now in prospect and if it came into being we could still not stake our entire strategy on it. For during the period of our atomic monopoly when we were in fact in this position, our strategic preponderance was not sufficient to deter Soviet blackmail and aggression.

The effort to develop such a counterforce capability would involve us in a tour de force. It would impose staggering force requirements on us, draining all other military capabilities. The more effort to develop such a force could not fail to lead to a spiraling arms race and perhaps provoke a pre-emptive attack. Even if we succeeded in building our retaliatory force to such levels, it may still fail to deter for two reasons: (a) we may not be sufficiently confident of our superiority to risk all-out war particularly to resist local aggression; (b) the aggressor may not credit our superiority and assume that his retaliatory force was really invulnerable. In that case deterrence would fail. A counterforce strategy designed to win a victory after we consider the first blow is an illusion.

["first prov to an injury.", "counterforce strategy attained to win a victory is to precede the\nforce by really insurance. In case of defense would fall. A\nattacker such as credit our superiority and assume that he retaliatory\nforce will all-out. But we must not be sufficiently confident of our superiority to\nretaliate. Force of/ course leaves it still fall to deter for two\nhours a pro-active attack. Even it we succeed in putting our\narm a force could not fall to reach to a striking range and repulse\nour鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒鋒

III - 22

It is conceivable that we could develop a retaliatory force capable of winning a war *provided* we struck first — though the technical difficulty of even this task in the age of mobile missile systems should not be underrated. But its utility as a threat in crisis situations is limited by the Soviet capability for a devastating pre-emptive blow. The *best* it was in foreseeable strategic relationship will be *less* favorable than the period of our strategic preponderance — and even that *period* demonstrated the limitations of the threat of massive retaliation.

We should therefore have no illusions about what is ahead of us. Though the most desirable situation is one where our retaliatory force is invulnerable while the opponent's is vulnerable, this is also the most unlikely situation in the long run. If invulnerability is possible for us it would be only sensible to assume that it is attainable for the Soviet Union as well. A condition of mutual invulnerability *may* come about...indeed is likely ... regardless of our preferences. When this condition exists, the threat of all-out war will lose its credibility and its strategic meaning—particularly against aggressions which are explicitly less than all-out.

III - 23

The dilemma posed by the reliance on all-out war then is as
follows: A counterforce strategy is nearly impossible technically
and equally complex psychologically. On the other hand, "finite
deterrence" as a deliberate national policy may be an invitation to
local pressures. If not coupled with a drastic build-up of local
forces, it will expose the free world to constant pressure and black-
mail. Thus the threat of all-out war will deter an ever smaller
range of challenges.

Massive retaliation could deter local aggression as long as there
existed a reasonable prospect of victory in an all-out war and as long
as a potential aggressor understood this. But victory in an all-out
war/mux lost much of its meaning. It is out of the question if we
suffer the first blow. And even if, in response to limited aggression,
we should attack pre-emptively, victory will become technically in-
creasingly difficult, if not impossible. The first family of Soviet
missiles are stationary and therefore vulnerable. But, they are
protected by the missile gap. After our missile force increases and

broached by the wife. After one wife forces her increases and
weakness are atlastly and therefore valuable. But, then, we
creasingly diminish, it not inconsiderable. The first sign of Soviet
war is the first drop. And even it, in response to limited aggression,
is a beneficial aggression understood this. But actually in an ill-out
expanded a reasonable broadeet of action in an ill-out war and so forth
reactive resolution could deter local aggression so fourth so far
range of options.

Wait, the first step of ill-out war will deter an other unoffender.
force, it will expose the true world to constant braille and pressure.
force broadeet. It not combined with a strategy which of local
deterrence, as a definite national policy, can be an invitation to
and eventually combined behaviorally. On the other hand, at least
influence: A counterforce strategy is necessary inconsiderate technically
The doctrine based on the relation on ill-out war thus is as

III - 33

III - 24

the gap is closed, mobility, dispersal, numbers and hardening make a "win strategy" a will-of-the-wisp, imposing ever spiraling force requirements for marginal benefits. Only a very foolish Soviet policy would make victory possible at all, And it is reckless to gear our strategy to the expectation of Soviet inadequacy. The only safe basis for planning strategy is one the assumption of the mutual invulnerability of the retaliatory forces.

This suggests that we confront two seemingly contradictory strategic problems. For an interim period perhaps until the middle '60's, the vulnerability of our retaliatory force will create major opportunities for Soviet blackmail -- even to the extent of threatening direct attacks on the United States. With massive efforts this period can be shortened. But having achieved a security retaliatory force, we will have dealt only with our most overwhelming danger, not the most likely one. Mutual invulnerability -- the inability to relay on a counterforce strategy -- will confront us in the most dire fashion with the problem of how to protect areas contiguous to the Soviet Union.

III - 24 a

Of course, there is a big difference between having some
counterforce capability and none at all. In the latter case -- the
extreme position of finite deterrence -- the aggressor knows that reta-
liation turns into a completely irrational act. An American President
ordering it would sign the death warrant of tens of millions and he
would do so with the knowledge that this sacrifice would have served
no military purpose. In these circumstances, local aggression will be
encouraged; an aggressor may even feel safe in waging a campaign of at-
trition against our retaliatory force. If we have no counterforce
capability whatever, an aggressor may attack ... ... ...

["cable力差愈來愈大，其厲害可見於此。如要防止此弊，則有兩種方法：其一，加強統一，以防止 cable力差；其二，加強統一，以防止 cable力差。如要防止 cable力差，則須加強統一，

III - 25

our submarines and perhaps even individual missile bases in the United
States while sparing our civilian population. For he may calculate
that an American President would be loath to initiate a campaign
against cities which could not fail to have appalling consequences.

To avoid these dilemmas, our retaliatory force must retain some
least
counterforce capability -- at least sufficient to deter a campaign
of attrition against our retaliatory force.

But even with some counterforce capability, the doctrine of
all-out war
massive retaliation will lose its effectiveness as a deterrent to
a direct attack on the United States,
most challenges short of all-out war. To the degree that mutual
deterrence of all-out war is achieved, the perils of limited aggression
must multiply. The preposterous aspect of the US military policy is
that even in the face of the missile gap and the approaching mutual
first
then,
invulnerability, we still rely on the threat of all-out war as our
primary deterrent. The

primary determinant. The ............
invariance principle, we see left on the right of off-out as an
first even in the face of the whole life and the shadow of must
not multity. The brachistomerous subject of the U. C. military boyhood
is covariance of off-out war in separate, the bottle of limited estrus
most difficult to effect, say. To the degree that must
survive confirmation will lose its influence as a determinant to
off-out war.

But even with some counterforce capability, the consequence of
at saturation against our retentory force.

Counterforce capability — at some multiple to cover a circumference
is just

To avoid these dilution, our retentory force must retain some
against cities when could not staff to provide subduing consequences.

that an American President would be less to initiate a campaign
states while abating our civilian population. But we must eliminate
our expansion and Barbara even individual wifeless people in the United

III - 52

III - 26

argument is made that any aggression by the Soviet Union and Communist China is general war by definition. It is said that deterrence is achieved not so much by the certainty that we will strike but by the uncertainty that we might. No Communist leader will take his hard-won industrial complex on the off-chance that we do not mean our threats. But if an overwhelming counterforce capability was insufficient to prevent Communist pressure during the period of our strategic preponderance, reliance on it is sheer irresponsibility in the age of invulnerable retaliatory forces—not to speak of the possibility that for a few years we may be even inferior in the equation of all-out war.

the equation of all-out war.

each of the beautifying that for a few hours we may be even inferior to
influencing in the age of infinite reformation, influence on it is seen
during the period of our strategic preoccupation, influence on it is seen
correspondence加强 was insufficient to prevent Committee pressure
on the anti-censorship that we do not mean our trade. But it is overwhelming
that.

To Committee记者 will be able to make any industrial complex
much as the correspondents we have already seen that we
are General in the equation that we have already seen that we
are General in the equation. If it is such that correspondence is supplied not so
enormous as we have made that our expression of the Soviet Union and Committee China

is to be made that our expression of the Soviet Union and Committee China
enormous as we have made that our expression of the Soviet Union and Committee China

III - 30

IV - The Implications of Mutual Invulnerability

It would be a mistake to believe that the problem of mutual invulnerability, having come upon us as the result of the missile gap, can be eliminated by closing that gap. On the contrary, the missile gap has hastened what volatile technology would have made inevitable in any case. An overwhelming first-strike capability -- the prerequisite for the effectiveness of the threat of all-out war -- will have become more and more difficult to achieve as the missile age develops. Though we must close the missile gap, we could make no worse mistake than to assume that we can return to the period of our preponderance in strategic striking power.

Some form of mutual invulnerability is the most likely result of the attainment of the period after the missile gap ends, and, to attain even this which will require major efforts we have so far been reluctant to make.

Under conditions of mutual invulnerability, the structure of deterrence will change fundamentally. Deterrence, to be effective, has four requirements:

IV - 2

1. The potential aggressor must understand the decision to resist attack or pressure.

2. The implementation of the deterrent threat must be sufficiently credible to preclude its being taken as a bluff.

3. In weighing his self-interest, the potential aggressor must reach the conclusions the "deterrer" is seeking to induce. In other words, the penalties of aggression must outweigh the benefits of it.

4. The opponent must be rational, i.e., he must respond to his self-interest in a manner which is predictable.

Under conditions of mutual invulnerability, these conditions will become increasingly difficult to fulfill by the threat of all-out war. Indeed, reliance on massive retaliation may make it impossible to meet even the first condition, namely, to convince the aggressor that a retaliatory threat has in fact been made.

When the theory of deterrence was first developed, it was assumed that an aggressor had basically two options: to attack or

when the shock of deterrence was first developed, it was
the aggressor that a retaliatory thrust was in fact been made.
the aggressor to meet even the first condition, namely to convince
off-one self. Indeed, resistance on the part of the aggressor
will become increasingly difficult to utilize in the thrust of
under conditions of mutual insuranceability, these conditions
will self-interest in a manner which is preferable.

4. The obdament must be ratification, i.e., he must respond to
<u>penalties</u> of it.

In other words, the <u>penalties</u> of the aggressor must outweigh the
must reach the consequences of the <u>defender</u>, is seeking to induce.

3. In weighing the self-interest, the potential aggressor
terminately creates to reduce its pain taken as a pain.

3. The implementation of the deterrent thrust must be such
that attack or breach.

1. The potential aggressor must understand the decision so

IV - 5

IV - 3

to fail to do so. Deterrence was produced by the knowledge that the penalty for aggression -- on any scale -- was an overwhelming retaliatory blow by the United States. Later on, as the inhibitions produced by the doctrine of massive retaliation became evident, and when changes in technology overthrew the prerequisites for deterrence, it was argued that deterrence would be effective as long as the aggressor could not be sure that we would not retaliate.

However, it has become apparent that the aggressor has other choices than to attack or fail to do so. He can attack on a scale which makes the threatened retaliation appear to involve disproportionate risks. More importantly, he has the opportunity to engage in blackmail. And the effect of blackmail is to force the threatened side to make the next move. Henceforth, the potential victim faces the dilemma of interpreting the opponent's intentions. He must determine whether the aggressor "means" his menace. Although the aggressor cannot be certain that the defender will not retaliate, the defender cannot be certain that

tender will not restate, the defenender cannot be certain that
mencee. Vifhough the aggressor cannot be certain that the de-
intention. He must determine whether the aggressor "knows" he
potential victim takes the defense of interfering the obviates a
the threatened side to make the next move. Heneforth, the
to emerge in public. And the effect of disclosure is to force
disproportionate risks. More importantly, he has the opportunity
come which makes the threatened retaliation known to involve
choices than to attack or tell to do so. He can attack on a
However, it has become apparent that the aggressor has other
are the aggressor could not be sure that we would not restate.
to tell. It was argued that deference would be effective as long
evident, and that operators in technology overrule the preponderant
force produced by the doctrine of negative retaliation becomes
refutatorial from the United States. Later on, as the initial
the benefit of aggression -- on and so forth -- we an overemphasize
to tell to do so. Deference was based upon the knowledge that

to tell to do so. Deference was based upon the knowledge that
the benefit of aggression -- on and so forth -- we an overemphasize
to tell to do so. Deference was based upon the knowledge that

IV - 3

IV - 4

the aggressor does not mean his threat. Blackmail tilts the psychological balance against the defender if the only recourse is all-out war. For the distinctive qualities of a status quo power will cause it to be reluctant to stake its survival on the assumption that the aggressor is bluffing. Soviet tactics over a whole series of crises from 1947 to theago to cuba

Berlin seem primarily designed to bring home to the West the full implications of its alternatives: to make an accommodation or to run the risk, however slight, that the Soviets are prepared to fight a major war to vindicate their demands.

The distinction between issues that threaten the immediate survival directly and those that menace it only over a period of time, becomes crucial in such a test of nerves. In the past, often a nation would resist a seemingly minor aggression in order to prevent an ultimate disaster. When Great Britain declared war in 1939, the major reason was not the Polish Corridor as such.

Rather it was the conviction that to yield on this issue must sooner or later have catastrophic consequences, and cause the inevitable showdown to take place under even worse conditions.

IV - 5

**Eventual** national catastrophe was believed to be the penalty for
The immediate challenge,
failure to resist. The worst consequence would be the **loss** of a
war. But when the **outbreak** of all-out war comes increasingly to
be considered the worst catastrophe, this reasoning will no longer
apply. It does not make sense to threaten suicide in order to
prevent eventual death.

If all-out war is our only possible response to aggression of
any type, more and more challenges will begin to appear as indirect
threats only. Under conditions of mutual invulnerability, ag-
gression that does not threaten the retaliatory capability may
be inherently ambiguous. The very fact that the aggressor has
foregone the advantages of surprise attack may be taken as a
proof of limited objectives and of the futurity of all-out war.

This becomes apparent if we ask just what a "rational" response
would be if the Soviet Union engaged in some limited operation in
Western Germany ostensibly to disarm the Federal Republic. If this
move were coupled with a guarantee of immunity of our territory

were combined with a Guarantee of immunity of our territory.
Western Germany consented to grant the Federal Republic its
right to be the Soviet Union engaged in some finite operation in
month before the Soviet Union engaged in some finite operation in
the same region.

The problem inherent in the fact that what a national response
brings of limited objectives and of the utility of all-out war.
beside the advantages of embryonic attack may be taken as a
premierly supposition. The very fact that the aggressor has
enjoyed that does not threaten the resumption of activity, al-
though only. Under conditions of mutual insurance, all-
though the more and more challenges will begin to appear, we must
be confident the worst catastrophe, this reasoning will no longer
occur. But when the [explet] of all-out war comes increasingly to
lie in the [explet] the worst consequence would be the loss of a
[explet] national catastrophe we believe to be the benefit for

abbr.), If goes not make sense to further advance in order to
be considered the worst catastrophe, this reasoning will no longer
work. But when the [explet] of all-out war comes increasingly to
lie in the [explet] the worst consequence would be the loss of a
[explet] national catastrophe we believe to be the benefit for

IA - 2

IV - 6

and that of our allies, and if the Soviet Union offered to begin im-
mediate peace negotiations, is it clear that all-out war is a rational
course? Even if it is "clear" to us, can we count on the Soviet leaders
to assess our situation similarly? We could, of course, devastate the
Soviet Union, but only at the price of suffering catastrophic damage
in return. What would the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advise
the President regarding the purpose of a war that could have no victory
and can only guarantee mutual suicide?

Or let us take an even more extreme example: For the entire
nuclear age it has been considered axiomatic that an attack on our re-
taliatory force must unleash an all-out counterblow. We have sought
to design our retaliatory force to combine a rapid reaction with tight
control over the decision to retali ate. The former, we thought, was
necessary in order to deter aggression; the latter in order to avoid
the risks of accidental war. From a strictly rational point of view,
however, a rapid counterblow is by no means a foregone conclusion. And
effective deterrence even of an attack on our retaliatory force may
depend on the belief by the Communists that in certain circumstances the
President may lose control over events.

IV - 7

This becomes clear if we consider a "rational" United States
reaction to a blow against our retaliatory force. Suppose that such an
attack reduced our retaliatory force by fifty percent but held civilian
casualties to a minimum. Assume also that coincident with the attack
the Soviet ambassador presented himself as an ultimatum
to this effect: "We have just destroyed x% of your retaliatory force
while sparing your cities. If you retaliate against our civilian population
we will respond in kind and our ability to inflict damage is superior to
yours at least by the factor of destruction inflicted on your retaliatory
force. We offer peace negotiations on certain specified conditions."

Considered purely rationally, there would be little sense
in American retaliation. If our retaliatory force were designed
according to the maxims of finite deterrence --as a small countercity
force--there would be no point in retaliation whatsoever. A blow against
Soviet cities would devastate the Communist homeland. At the same time,
it would guarantee even more appalling destruction in the United States
because our population is more concentrated and because--by hypothesis--our

["because our behavior is more concentrated and because--oh, I don't know, maybe because we're more concentrated and because--we have more influence over the policies of the other countries in the world, and we have more influence over the policies of the other countries in the world, and

IV - 8

retaliatory force will have been considerably disrupted by the initial
Soviet attack. In these circumstances, the harrowing possibility exists
that the Communist leaders may come to believe that if they could induce
any delay in our response, they might escape unscathed from even a nuclear
attack. Conversely, if they refrain from such a course it will be because
they are convinced that an attack on the United States would elicit reactions transcending any rational calculations. In short, deterrence would
result from their conviction not that the President would order a counter-
blow but that he would not be able to prevent it.

Indeed, if our retaliatory force is designed exclusively for an
attack against the aggressor's civilian population--and so understood by the
opponent--we may be able to prevent a war of attrition only by making our res-
ponse nearly automatic. The aggressor would have to believe that our retaliatory
force was so designed that an attack of a certain scale would trigger a counter-
blow almost mechanically. In that eventuality, blackmail could not be effective
because once a surprise attack is launched the President no longer controls
the decision to react. By launching a surprise attack, the Soviet leaders
would guarantee their own destruction. Such a mechanical trigger is, of course,
politically intolerable. It indicates, however, the dilemmas of seeking to

IV - 9

As the gap between the threat on which we rely for deterrence and
the strategy we are prepared to implement widens, the threat of massive
retaliation becomes increasingly irresponsible and ineffective. An
aggressor may calculate that if he can force us to pause for even
twenty-four hours before committing our retaliatory force, sober
calculation will reveal to us the suicidal nature of our strategy. A
premium is thereby placed on fait accompli. However, if our retaliatory
threat, the inability to assign any military purpose to it may deprive
it of credibility. And it does not matter how resolute we "really" are.
A threat which is disbelieved causes deterrence to fail.

A threat which is disingenuous causes deterrence to itself.

It is credibility. And it does not matter how remote we "reality" are.

Threat" the credibility to itself and military burials to itself deprive

borealis is thereby placed on itself. However, since our credibility

calculation will reveal to us the artificial nature of our strategy.

Twenty-four hours before committing our retaliatory force, soper

attacker must calibrate that it can force us to bear force for even

retaliation becomes increasingly unreasonable and inoperative. An

the strategy we are prepared to implement within the threat of massivo

is the gap between the threat on which we rely for deterrence and

IV - 3

IV - 7/10

deprive it of credibility. And a threat which is disbelieved
causes deterrence to fail.

Under conditions of mutual invulnerability, a country relying
for deterrence primarily on the threat of all-out war faces a
perhaps insurmountable task in meeting the second criterion for
an effective deterrent: credibility. The threat of mutual de-
struction can be made plausible only by convincing the aggressor
that the response to aggression will be so nearly automatic that
the question of rational calculation cannot arise; that at some
point, we will lose control over events. A country relying on
the doctrine of massive retaliation can resist blackmail only by
maneuvering deliberately to demonstrate that some issues are so
sensitive that the question of whether they are worth a cataclysm
will not be asked. A potential aggressor would have to be con-
vinced that we would prefer mutual suicide to a change of the
status quo, that we are prepared to implement a strategy which
has no military meaning. A rational policy designed to make the

have no military meaning. A stationary position defined to make the
attitude do, that we are prepared to indorse a strategy which
advances that we would prefer must be able to a change of the
will not be suited. A potential aggressor would have to be com-
petitive that the duration of whether they are worth a consideration
magnanimating deliberately to demonstrate that some issues are so
the doctrine of massive retaliation can be left placid only by
bound, we will lose control over events. A country refusing on
the duration of national calculation cannot arise; that at some
that the reason to aggression will be so nearly automatic that
attraction can be made plausible only by convincing the aggressor
an objective determinant: credibility. The threat of mutual de-
barbarize instrumentalistic task in meeting the second criterion for
tor coherence primarily on the threat of all-out war faces a
under conditions of mutual inaccessibility, a country refusing
absence of correspondence to itself.

1A - 4/10

dilemmas. For the Soviets would not need to start a nuclear war
the Soviet leaders. In fact, he was merely illustrating our
megamun would start a nuclear war." He and he have intended to win
President Krusower with respect to Berlin that "only a
come fit to conduct our affairs to become all-out war." When
all duralities which it seems arbitrarily put the station, and
that we are "alm", "rational", "elaborate", "accommodating" -
view of deference - we are much more likely to seek for some
"hermeneutics" - which would be a wise course from the point of
part deviation to peace. In such criteria, rather than upon our
can justify the decision to go to war only in paying lip service to
the American people that he has enumerated all alternatives. He
president said that the risk of all-out war without paying any
atlas prevent us from adapting so clearly a diplomacy. No American
yet the very duralities that make us a strong and powerful will
agreed irrefutably.

to demonstrate our capacity for action which normally would be
threat of all-out war credible in these circumstances would have

IV - 91

IV - 10 / 3

hold the free world together only if we lead it with steadiness
and calmness.

Indeed reliance on all-out war is inconsistent with the fourth
requirement of deterrence: the assumption of the opponent's ration-
sality. The more "rational" the Soviet Union is, the less likely
is it to credit our threat of retaliation; the more it may be
tempted by the opportunities confronting it. Moreover, if inter-
national relations turn into a series of threats and counter-
threats of the most dire type, a premium will be placed on ir-
responsibility. The aggressor will have an incentive to stake
his prestige deliberately and in the most extreme fashion in order
to give credence to the claim that he is prepared to run the risks
of nuclear retaliation. Mr. Khrushchev's behavior over Berlin
illustrates this. Almost every move had the result of so com-
mitting him to his course that it soon seemed an intolerable
provocation to ask him to withdraw an unprovoked threat. Con-
cessions have been urged on the West with the argument that for

censure have been made on the level with the segment that led
deviation to set him to withdraw an unsubstantiated thrust. Con-
mitting him to die seems that it soon seemed an intolerable
illustrious trip. Almost every move had the result of so com-
plaining retaliation. In Mr. Kruysaporn's behavior over Berlin
to give credence to the claim that he is bristled to run the risks
of breathingifferently and in the most extreme manner in order
to appease the authority will have an incentive to take
thrusts of the most dire nature, a broadmusk will be placed on ir-
national relations until into a series of thrusts and counter-
tempts by the异趣丛生 confronting it. Moreover, it inter-
feres if the异趣丛生 confronting it. Moreover, it inter-
feres if it to credit our thrust of retaliation; the more it may be
affection. The more "national" the Soviet Union is, the less likely
requirement of deterrence: the assumption of the oblique's reation-
and calumny.
Indeed resistance on all-out war is inconsistent with the broad

both the tree which together only it we feel it with ainess

1A - 50 1/3

IV - 21/4

Mr. Khrushchev to emerge from the negotiations without *some* advantage would be an irreparable blow to his standing among the Soviet ruling group.

This tactic is a familiar Soviet device, of course. It would be employed, ~~whatever our strategy.~~ But against a doctrine of all-out war, it is particularly effective. Reliance on deterrence by the threat of all-out war will lead to a diplomacy of irresponsibility. Rational calculation is likely to produce irrational behavior on both sides. As for the West, it is difficult to see how it can avoid demoralization and gradual erosion of its position, ~~when~~ while confronted by a series of decisions, each posing the alternative of suicide or at least partial surrender. If both sides conduct a policy which depends for its impact on convincing the opponent of the capacity for irrationality, a show-down is almost inevitable. Such a course will erode all restraints and all hope for ultimate stability.

Similar difficulties apply to the third prerequisite of ef-

Similar cultures also to the third brahadevate of el-
tor ultimate stability.

Sneep a culture will evolve till restructure and eff pote
opponent of the above tor irrefutability, a show-down is almost
confront a battle which debauch for its impact on convincing the
static of static or at least bilateral surrender. It pop sides
after confronted by a series of decisions, each bearing the item-
how it can avoid generalization and generalization of the position,
preservation on pop sides. We for the west, it is difficult to see
aptitude. National calculation is likely to produce irrefutable
by the threat of eff-out war will lead to a dimension of irrefou-
ment-out war, it is basically effective. Resistance on deference
be employed, whatever one accepts. But against a doctrine of
This logic is a similar Soviet device, of course. If wrong
Soviet ruling group.

Soviet ruling group.

avantage would be an irrefutable plan to pit attending among the
Mr. Krupenina to emerge from the negotiations without some eq-

Soviet ruling group.

IA - 1/2

IV - 12-15

fective deterrence, that the penalties of a given course must seem to outweigh the benefits. If the threat of all-out war is to deter, it must produce the following calculations on the part of a potential aggressor: (1) that the United States would prefer to strike an all-out blow rather than acquiesce in a Soviet gain, however small; (2) that it is willing to suffer a Soviet retaliatory blow; (3) that despite its readiness to launch all-out war in retaliation and despite the certainty that this would produce *past* devastating devastation, the United States is unlikely to launch a pre-emptive blow or *be so* trigger-happy as to start an accidental war; (4) that consequently the Soviet Union runs no risks if it does not launch a pre-emptive blow itself.

These requirements imply a combination of readiness and subtlety almost impossible to achieve for a peaceful *status quo* country -- much less for a coalition of them. We will either be disbelieved and thereby encourage aggression, or we may be thought too bellicose and thus tempt a Soviet pre-emptive attack. Moreover, the consequences of the threat of all-out war are largely out of

the consequence of the thrust of all-out war are largely out of
the pelf of one and the other of the other. Moreover,
disappearing and thereby encroaching aggression, or we shall be forced
country -- much less for a coalition of them. We will rather be
suppressed almost impossible to achieve for a necessary state of
decisive concentration.

These restraints imply a combination of readiness and
does not launch a pre-subjective flow itself.

war (1) that consequently the Soviet Union must no longer be able to launch a pre-subjective flow or be so triggered by us to start an accidental or accidental detonation, the United States in turn likely to launch a fork flow (3) that debits its readiness to launch all-out war, however small (2) that it is willing to allow a Soviet refuelling strike an all-out flow rather than sacrifice in a Soviet war, beneficial attraction: (1) that the United States would rather to suffer, it must prove the following arguments on the part of a country to outweigh the penalties. If the thrust of all-out war is to delective reference, that the benefits of a given course must seem

IV - 10

IV - 16

our control. They depend to a considerable extent on Soviet vulnerability.

If the Soviet Union believes its retaliatory force to be invulner-
able, our threat may be ineffective in deterring. If it is highly
vulnerable, the Soviets may see no other option except to antici-
pat our attack. The problem of using the all-out deterrent in a
situation of mutual bluff is that it is either too convincing or
not convincing enough.

Complex as the strategic problem is, the psychological
difficulty of balancing penalties and benefits is more complicated
still. For if the benefits of aggression seem to outweigh the
penalties
benefits only once, deterrence will fail. And this could come
about simply because the two sides interpret the nature of bene-
fits and penalties differently. In any given situation a number
of psychological asymmetries are likely to prevail between us
and the Communist countries. These are only indirectly related
to the strategic balance. They involve such factors as the im-
portance of the objective, the willingness of the contenders to

["portance of the objective, the willingness of the respondents to the strategic balance. They involve and therefore as the important factors of strategic balance, the two aspects interpreted the nature of penance and benefit differently. In such a manner situation a number of strategic subcategories are likely to be identified so between me and life and benefits differently. In such

IV - 1b /7

run risks, their reputation and the political relationship to the
threatened territory. These asymmetries will be discussed in turn.

(1) Importance of the Objective. Only on the most fundamental questions of national survival will both sides feel equally committed. In almost every conceivable crisis, one side or the other is likely to have a psychological advantage. Hungary seemed more important to the Soviet Union than to us. Though we were still significantly stronger, the Soviets, in repressing the Hungarian Revolution, substituted the importance they attached to maintaining their position in the satellite orbit for real strength.

Though we could still have won a war, in a real sense, we were
deterred from intervening by the fear that the Soviet leaders were
prepared to run all risks in order to prevail. In some circum-
stances, an area may be protected by the importance that it has
or which it is thought to have. Our threat of all-out war is more
effective in protecting Europe than in protecting countries like
Laos or Burma or Iran because it is more credible: Europe "matters"

IV - 15/8

more to us -- it is therefore credible that we may pay a higher
price in its defense.

Theoretically, the psychological balance should favor the
defender. The aggressor can gain only what he has never possessed;
the defender stands to lose something heretofore identified with
his world position. That the Soviet empire has managed to press
on all peripheral areas nonetheless is due to two factors: (a) the
Soviet ability to bring to bear forces graduated to the nature of
the issue. This shifted the onus and the risk of initiating all-
out war on us. In effect, we have paralyzed ourselves by the alterna-
tives which our own doctrine, and military establishment, have
presented; (b) Superior Soviet will-
power or at least the reputation for it. The Soviet leaders have
managed to convince many in the West that their desire to prevail
is stronger than the West's interest in the status quo. The
pressures for accommodation on Berlin, for example, indicate that
due to the Soviets have convinced many that tension, even if arbitrarily
provoked by the Soviets, could be eliminated only by Western

IV - 19

concessions. As a result, in the situation of bluff and counterbluff which is inseparable from the attempt to deter by the threat of all-out war, a positive incentive is created for staking one's prestige deliberately, for making the failure to achieve one's ends appear so calamitous that it justifies the threat of all-out war.

The side which is willing to run greater risks -- or which can make its opponent believe that it is prepared to do so -- gains a psychological advantage. During the Suez crisis, the Soviet Union threatened obliquely to launch rocket attacks against London and Paris -- despite the fact that it would almost certainly have lost an all-out war. During the Hungarian revolution, the West, though it was far stronger, was not willing to make similar threats against the U.S.S.R. This trend has continued at an accellerated pace. In every crisis, from Berlin to the Congo to Cuba, the Soviet Union has threatened missile attacks at least in a fashion which has caused subsequent actions to seem to have been caused by the Soviet menace. The diplomatic position of the Soviet Union has been greatly enhanced by its ability to shift to its opponents the risks and uncertainties of countermoves.

TP (2) *Reputation*. Since deterrence depends not only

on magnitude but also the credibility of a threat, the side which has a greater reputation for ruthlessness or for a greater willingness to run risks, gains a diplomatic advantage. This reputation is importantly affected by what may perhaps be called the experience of the last use of force. The Communist leaders have used force to maintain their sphere as in Hungary and Tibet. They have threatened the use of force to expand their influence as in the Middle East, and in Berlin. The brutality of the repression in Hungary and Tibet may reflect the conviction that as long as the opprobrium of using force had to be shouldered, it may as well be coupled with a reputation for ruthlessness and overwhelming power. By contrast, our last experience in resisting aggression, that of Korea, produced a bitter domestic debate and a seeming resolve never again to engage in what many have described an "unproductive" war. The decision of a threatened country, allied or neutral, to resist and its resolution in the face of a menace may importantly depend on its assessment of the past actions of the West and the Communist countries.

Communist countries.

depend on its assessment of the best actions of the West and the
rest and its resolution in the face of a sense of its inappropri-
acy. The decision of a threatened country, effected on neutral, to
never again to engage in what may have described an "unprospective"
Koreans, produced a bitter domestic debate and a securing resolve
by contracts, our last experience in resisting aggression, that of
confused with a reputation for ruralese and overemphasizing power,
ob jóprium of strong force had to be surrounded, it was well pe
Hungary and Tibet may reflect the conviction that as fast as the
Middle East end-in-Berlin, the prudence of the repression in
and Korea, threatened the use of force to expand their influence as in the
to maintain their据上者 as in Hungary and Tibet. They have
at the last use of force. The Communist leaders have used force
its immediately affected by what may perhaps be called the experience
neat to run risks, gives a diplomatic advantage. This reputation
has a greater reputation for ruralese than for a greater willingness
to magnitude put else the credibility of a threat, the side which
is - 1950

D (2) Repentation. Since distancegebringt nicht

IV - 22

This and however unjustified such a conviction, would cause deterrence
to fail.

The imbalance is emphasized also by the structure of alliances in the
free world as compared to the Communist bloc. The free world alliances
are composed of status quo powers. The Communist world is composed of
revolutionary states of various degrees of fanaticism. To hold free-world alliances
together it is necessary to demonstrate calmness, reasonableness and
willingness to settle differences. By contrast, within the Communist bloc,
whatever the personal convictions of individual leaders, they have to engage
in periodic acts of intransigence to prove their ideological purity.
The pressures within the free world are in the direction of a lowest common
demoninator within the Communist bloc the requirements of alliance
policy tend to make for toughness and intransigence.

These asymmetries explain why our undoubted strategic superiority
did not deter a whole range of Soviet challenges even during the period
of our atomic monopoly. Our strategic superiority was more than outweighed
by the fact that the alternatives posed by our military policy gave the Soviet

by the fact that the alternatives based on our strategy both have the Soviet
of our atomic monopoly. Our strategic superiority was more than outweighed
if not deter a whole range of Soviet challenges even during the period
These alternatives explain why our accepted strategic superiority
beyond fond to make ton tonqnene and intranarrenee.

demonstrates within the Communist bloc the redununents of influence
The breviation within the free world are in the direction of a lower common
in periodic stages of intransigence to prove them ideofogical basis.

whatever the personal convictions of individualsजेगे, जिसँगे पात्रों
affirmations to settle differences. In contrast within the Communist bloc,
together it is necessary to demonstrate clarity, reasonableness and

revolutionary states of serious degree of transparency. To find free-world influence
are combined of static due powers. The Communist world is combined of
tree world as compared to the Communist bloc. The free world influence

The impulsion is emphasized also by the structure of influence in the
to self.

Unité et unité n'ont pas dûrertir

IV - 33

IV-23

Union a psychological advantage. From the Berlin blockade, to Korea, to Indo-China, to Suez and Hungary, the combination of reputation, for ruthlessness, willingness to run risks, and the difficulties of alliance policy, enabled the Soviet Union to blackmail the free world. The dilemma of our post-war strategy has been that the power which was available to us also produced the greatest inhibitions, while we had no confidence in the kind of forces which might have redressed the psychological balance.

If deterrence by the threat of all-out war is difficult for us, it is nearly insurmountable for our allies. The retaliatory

it is nearly impossible for our allies. The retaliatory
It deference by the threat of stiff-out was a difficult for us.

behavioral patience.

no confidence in the kind of force which might have repressed the

avaunt to us also produced the greatest inducements, while we had

diffuse our host-war strategy has been that the power which was

beyond us applied the Soviet Union to block all the trade world. The

involuntariness, willingness to run risks and the difficulties of effort

to Indo-China, to Suez and Hungary, the completion of reparation for

Union a behavior of great advantage. From the Berlin package, to Korea,

IA-53

IV - 20 24

force on which we rely for deterrence is at least within our own control. We have the possibility of increasing its credibility by a daring diplomacy. But daring, even recklessness, will avail our allies little unless it is backed up by the United States. If the threat of all-out war is the chief counter to Soviet aggression, none of our allies will be able to pose an effective retaliatory threat or to add much to our retaliatory force, should they create ~~retaliatory force of their own.~~ The result will be either a sense of impotence or irresponsibility, either resignation or a futile attempt to achieve an independent deterrent position.

Such a situation will expose our allies to the most intractable form of blackmail. Their leaders can be told that unless they accede to Soviet demands, it makes little difference whether we ~~against~~ retaliate on the Soviet Union or not. Resistance would mean certain devastation, so the Soviet argument may go, even if the United States made good on its promise to retaliate. Indeed it would give the Soviet Union an added incentive to create a fait

74. This problem will be discussed in greater detail in "The United States and Europe".

States and Nations.
4. The problem will be discussed in greater detail in The United

United States made good on its promise to restate. Indeed it
exacted a penalty on the Soviet Union, so the Soviet argument was, even if the
certain gravitation, no the Soviet argument was so, even if the
restatement on the Soviet Union or not. Restatement would mean
against
acquire to Soviet demand, it makes little difference whether we
pay lip or lipismail. Their leaders can be told that unless they
such a situation will expose our allies to the most inroads-
attitude attempts to achieve an independent department position.

 sense of independence or independence, either resignation or a

 the restatement force of their own. The result will be either a
 thrust or to add much to our restatement force, should this create
 none of our allies will be able to lose an offensive restatement
 the thrust of all-out war in the initial counter to Soviet attracation,
 our allies little more than it is packed up by the United States. It
 will be a great disappointment. But apart, even recognition, will exist
 control. We have the credibility of increasing its credibility
 force on which we rely for deterrence at least within our own

IV - 30

IV - 25

accompli. The destruction of their country can be prevented only
by accommodating themselves to the Soviet Union. This indeed was the
theme of Premier Khrushchev's press conference after the collapse of
the summit conference:

It said that the United States would discharge
their duties to their allies. By doing so
they tell those countries where the bases are located,
don't be afraid, if the Soviet Union smashes you,
strikes a retaliatory blow with rockets, we shall
attend your funeral when you have been smashed....

If deterrence by the threat of all-out war was difficult when we
were strategically superior, it will grow intolerable in the age of
mutual invulnerability. It will put a premium on recklessness and thus
undermine the psychological basis for our foreign policy. It will lead
to a diplomacy of bluff where even success makes for instability. If over a
period of years the contenders become convinced that the situations of
threat and counter-threat will always be resolved by <u>somebody</u> backing down,
a showdown may be produced by this very sense of security. After all, the
crisis which led to World War I seemed at first no different from innumerable
others which had been resolved by the threat of going to the brink of war.

8. *New York Times*, June 4, 1960

8. *New York Times*, June 14, 1960

others which had been resolved by the threat of harm to the print of war. Create which led so World War I seemed at that no different from immovable a showdown may be produced by this very cause of security. After all, the threat and counter-threat will arise be resolved in somebody packing down, period of here the conferees become convinced that the attractions of to a diplomat of null where even success makes for inaccessibility. It over a undermine the geopolitical gains for our foreign policy. It will feed mutual animosity. It will put a premium on rockf中国企业及 those strategically auberon, it will grow intolerable in the age of.

It deference by the threat of all-out war was difficult when we

attend how unless when you have begun to end your argument.... 8
strikes a resolute blow with rockets, we shall
won't be strayed, if the Soviet Union amends how,
they fell those countries where the passes are located,
their duties to their allies. By doing so
It said that the United States would discontinue
the armistice conference.

theme of Premier Brezhnev's a press conference after the close of
the accomodating themselves to the Soviet Union. This indeed was the
agreement of their country can be prevented only
the destruction of their country.

IV - 32

IV - 26

And when war finally came, it was fought as a total war over a relatively trivial issue because no other alternative had been considered. It would be tragic if our generation allowed itself to repeat the errors of its grandfathers. The penalty now would be incomparably more severe.

translators. The benefit now would be functionally more severe.

be taken to our generation allowed itself to repeat the errors of its

trivial issue because no other effective and good considered. It would

And when war finally came, it was found as a total war over a relatively

IV - 50

V - Deterrence Through Uncertainty

The above reason is criticized by many proponents of
prevailing military policy
to deter all forms of aggression, it is argued, however small,
even though the notion of victory has become meaningless in
general war and perhaps because of it. Deterrence, it is claimed,
is produced not so much by the certainty of retaliation as by
the uncertainty of in the aggressor's mind that we may devastate
his country. In any given situation, the potential aggressor must
weigh the value of the objective against the probability of all-out
retaliation. To be sure, if the objective is relatively insigni-
ficant the credibility of the threat of all-out war may be low. By
the same token, from the point of view of the aggressor, the
marginal gain may not be worth even that degree of risk. To deter
a surprise attack on the United States the retaliatory threat must
seem certain. To deter an attack on Azerbaijan the probability of
retaliation need be much less. The Soviet Union, so the argument
goes, will not risk aggression in Iran if

V - 2

the chances of losing all the achievements of a generation is even
ten per cent. Thus though the credibility of the threat of all-
out war is declining, it is to some extent compensated for by its
increasing horror. According to this school of thought, there will always remain a residue of uncertainty sufficient to make the Soviet leaders recoil before any scale of aggression.

One difficulty with this theory is that the "uncertainty
effect" obviously has not prevented many forms of Communist
military pressure ranging from blackmail to outright aggression.

The Berlin blockade and Korea, the repression of the Hungarian
Revolution, the constant threat of missile and nuclear attacks,
and the renewed pressure on Berlin were not deterred even by our
strategic preponderance. More fundamentally, a statesman relying
on the uncertainty effect leaves himself no margin for miscalculation. If it fails even in the case of minor aggression, he is
either committed to the most cataclysmic form of warfare or he
must yield, reducing the credibility of the deterrent still
further in the future. In practice, the "uncertainty effect"

V - 3

removes control over events entirely from our hands. In most
situations it works *against* not *for* the free world, because in the
case of blackmail it could never be sufficiently certain that our
opponent did not mean his threat.

Criminal blackmail operates essentially on the principle that
uncertainty can be made to work for the criminal, if the alterna-
tives confronted by the victim are sufficiently dire. From a
rational point of view, a kidnapper has no motive to kill his
hostage if ransom is not paid. The murder will not improve the
possibility of obtaining ransom and it will increase the penalty
if he is caught. Nevertheless the threat is often effective
because the family of the victim can run no risk, however slight,
that the criminal is bluffing. His mere determination to have his
way coupled with the enormity of the victim's risk, gives him an
overwhelming bargaining position. Similarly peaceful countries,
which are such after all, because the *status quo* seems preferable
to any change, impose an impossible psychological burden on

["to such extent, that one may be induced to pursue one or more of the following, all of which are and after all because the status quo seems preferable to the current one, and which are and after all because the victim is a woman, gives him an outlet for the emotion of the victim's pain, however slight, and which is not caused by the victim's own pain. He was determined to have his own crime pitfall. He was determined to have his own victim pitfall. He was determined to have his own crime pitfall, and his own victim pitfall, and which are and after all because the victim is a woman, and which are and

V - 5

solemn declarations may be discounted to some extent. Regardless
of what we say, there always exists the possibility that we would
recoil before the prospects of a cataclysm at the last moment.

But to strive for ambiguity deliberately must magnify these fears.

Our all-out deterrent may work for a while longer despite its in-
creasing lack of credibility. But we should consider this a
fortunate bonus. To make this a principle of conduct is to court
disaster.

It is sometimes argued that deliberate ambiguity is desirable
because to be too specific about our response eases the aggressor's
task; it tells him in effect the "price tag" for each action and
enables him to plan accordingly. It is not obvious, of course,
why knowledge of the consequences of aggression should encourage
aggression, so long as the price tag is unacceptably high. More
importantly, this argument fails to distinguish between two kinds
of uncertainty: (a) Uncertainty about whether we plan to resist
at all, and (b) Uncertainty about the range or the method of our

at all! and (b) uncertainty about the route or the method of our
of uncertainty: (a) uncertainty about whether we plan to resist
inability, this argument fails to distinguish between two kinds
of attraction we find as the price is not necessarily high. More
with knowledge of the consequences of attraction should encourage
enables him to plan accordingly. If it is not obvious, of course,
talk: it self him in effect the "price talk" for each action and
because to be too specific about our response causes the attraction
to be too specific about our response because the attraction is
to be so specific that it degrades our ability to deal with
the situation.

tortuous route. To make this bridle of conduct is to confine
the scope of credit. But we should consider this a
On all-out deterrent work for a while longer because it is im-
possible to strive for ambiguity if we intend to maintain these
record before the broade of a charter of the last moment.
Of what we ask, there always extra the ambiguity that we would
speak declarations which we discounted to some extent. Regardless

A - 2

V - 6

resistance. The former uncertainty _must_ weaken deterrence because it leaves open the possibility of non-resistance. Uncertainty with respect to the range or method of our resistance has a certain utility. It makes the calculations of the aggressor more difficult. It can be a device for committing ourselves to _some_ form of resistance. Uncertainty about the _nature_ of our retaliation may be the best means of producing certainty that _some_ retaliation will occur.

The dangers as well as the uses of deliberate ambiguity were well illustrated by the Quemoy crisis of 1958. At the beginning of the attack we sought to leave the Chinese Communists in doubt as to whether we would resist about our reaction to an attack on the off-shore islands. Both the President and the Secretary of State made statements that we would resist only if the Communist attack seemed a prelude to an assault on Formosa and the Pescadores. Since this implied that there were _some_ attacks to which we would _not_ respond, the impression was created that we might want to leave a loophole for

precaution was created that we might want to leave a footnote ten
there were some attacks to be made we would not respond, the im-
势 on Formosa and the Peaceears. Since this implied that
would react only if the Communist attack ceased a brief to an
the President and the Secretary of State made statements that we
about non-resistance to an attack on the oil-agores defence. Both
of the attack we sought to leave the Chinese Communists in doubt 32+0
well illustrated by the German create of 1928. At the beginning
The dangers as well as the risks of deliberate ambiguity were
testify will occur.

tion may be the best means of broadening certainly that some re-
lation of resistance. Uncertainty about the future of our results-
difficult. It can be a device for committing ourselves to some
certain utility. It makes the calculations of the aggressor more
with respect to the range or method of our resistance we a
it leaves open the possibility of non-resistance. Uncertainty
resistance. The former uncertainty must weaken deterrence pence

A - C

V - 7

yielding. When Communist pressure continued, we were therefore
forced step by step to depart from our original stand. Every
succeeding statement made the American commitment to defend Quemoy
more explicit. We went further and engaged in a series of actions
whose only purpose could be to remove any doubt about
whether there would be American resistance: the transfer of United
States tactical aircraft to Formosa, the convoying of Nationalist
supply ships to within three miles of Quemoy, the strengthening of
United naval forces in the Far East. The crisis was thus ended,
not by Communist uncertainty as to retaliation, but by the strong
likelihood that a full-scale assault would meet with United
States opposition.

And so it has been in every area considered vital. In each
case we have been at pains to remove any doubt about our resolve.
The stationing of United States troops in Europe -as one-pur-
pose warning the Soviets that any hostile act must inevitably in-
volve us. Our forces are, in a sense, hostages which guarantee that

above no. On forces are in a sense, postures which guarantee that
these marking the South that and position set must inevitably in
the stationing of United States troops in Europe see one but
One purpose of
cause we have been at least to remove such doubt about our resolve.

And so it has been in every case considered vital. In each
State has opposition.

Likewise that a full-scale assault would meet with United
not by Communist uncertainty as to retaliation but by the strong
United forces in the Far East. The create we time enough
enrich able to within three miles of Canal, the strengthening of
States tactical strength tokomar, the conquering of Nationalist
whither there would be American resistance: the transfer of United
whose only obstacle could be to remove and Communist doubt about
more explicit. We went further and engaged in a series of actions
succeeding statement made by the American commitment to clear Canal
forced step by step to depart how our original stand. Very
helpful. When Communist pressure continued, we were therefore

V - 8

we will not make our response depend on circumstance. Stationing
troops in the direct line of a possible Communist advance thus has
a significance transcending their immediate military utility. It
is a reminder to the Communist leaders that in case of a Soviet
attack we have to some extent resigned control over our actions.
The rationality of resistance will no longer be <u>the</u> issue; there
will not be time for fine calculations. Our deployment insures a
measure of automatism in our response which no verbal commitment
could achieve.

It is essential, then, to be clear about the range of un-
certainty which is acceptable. The lower limit must _not_ include
the possibility of yielding or of a resistance so feeble that ag-
gression is encouraged. The upper limit must not pose a threat
which is either incredible or which <u>if believed</u> would provok
<u>if believed</u> a pre-
emptive attack. The lower limit of uncertainty should set the
minimum price unacceptably high and, while keeping the maximum
price open, <u>should</u> avoid the impression of an automatism which is
sufficient

marking

bruce chen, suggests avoid the impression of an automatism which is
minimum bruce macrocentrally fit and, while rebehind the maximum
subjective attack. The lower limit of macrocentrality enough set the
which is either incredible or when it's performed: suppose a pre-
GREASEUP to encouraged. The upper limit must not be a direct
the boscopifity of helping or of a resistance to help that ag-
certainty which is acceptable. The lower limit must not include
It is essential, then, to be clear about the range of un-
coolence possible.

measure of automatism in our resistance which no aeroplane commitment
will not be time for time evolutions. Our deployment increases a
The stationery of resistance will no longer be felt there
attack we have to some extent result in control over our actions.
To a reminder to the Communist同志 that in case of a Soviet
a significance transacting their immediate literally utility. If
frogs is the direct line of a boscopie Communist advance time we
will not make our resistance depend on circumstance. Stationing

A - 8

V - 9

out of control once force is used. These requirements will soon
be impossible to meet by the threat of all-out war. In most fore-
seeable contingencies, the threat of it will either start an auto-
matic chain reaction, or it will be incredible -- i.e., fail to
satisfy the lower limit of uncertainty. If both retaliatory
forces are vulnerable, to threaten all-out war is to invite pre-
emptive attack. If our retaliatory force is invulnerable while
the Soviet force is exposed, we can threaten to resort to all-out
war with some degree of credibility -- though even then the
Soviet capability for a pre-emptive attack would make our position
more precarious and our threat less credible than it was during
the period of strategic preponderance. If conditions are reversed,
of course, to threaten all-out war is to commit suicide -- and we
are more likely to find ourselves in this position than in any
other if the "missile gap" becomes more serious. If both sides
develop invulnerable retaliatory forces, a threat of all-out war
would lack all purpose, for the blow could have no military meaning.

V - 10

The same factors which would make a threat of all-out war militarily feasible would then operate to reduce its plausibility. In short, the side which has to make the ultimate decision to vindicate its interests and its values by all-out war imposes an impossible handicap on itself, all the more so if it is a status quo power. It simply does not make sense to seek to defend one's way of life with a strategy which guarantees its destruction.

For these reasons, the notion that there is only one form of deterrence - the threat of nuclear retaliation - must be abandoned. It is found in the very term we have applied to our retaliatory force: The deterrent. This implied that all other forms of power were a dispensable luxury and essentially irrelevant to the problem of deterrence, except that of security. Current military policy still holds the view that any aggression involving the Soviet Union or Communist China is general war, by definition. But it will therefore bring our retaliatory force into play at the outset. Graduated responses fit only police-type actions like Lebanon. The military

rescues its only bohemite, the actions like leprous. The writer
prints on, resolute force into play at the outset. Outstanding

Communist China is General War, by definition. It will produce
people the very first and greatest invention of the Soviet Union or
out to the proper of deterrence. Current writers fail still
longer to be known as ideologically true to the force of war.

If someone expression in the very term we have applied to our re-
deviation - the threat of nuclear retaliation - must be eschewed.

For these reasons, the notion that there is only one ton of
with a strategy which guarantees its destruction.

It is obvious does not make sense to seek to defend one's way of life
pursued on itself, all the more so if it is in a state due lower.

Inferno and its airline Ph. Effort, not only indicate an indefinite
the side which has to make the ultimate decision to abdicate its
finality, leastwise would oblige to reduce its bandwidth. In short,
the same before which would make a finest of all-out war a witt-

A - 10