DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 22, 1958

NO. 547

Secretary of State Dulles today officially inaugurated a new advanced course for Senior Officers of the Department of State at the Foreign Service Institute.

The Senior Officer Course represents a further step by the Department to carry out recommendations for improving the training of career Foreign Service officers made in 1954 by the Public Committee on State Department Personnel, chaired by Dr. Henry Wriston, then President of Brown University. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs earlier had recommended that the Foreign Service Institute "provide adequate in-service training for Foreign Service Officers as well as for other officers and employees of the Service similar to that provided for Army and Navy officers in the command schools, and the Army and Navy War Colleges".

Inauguration of this Course completes a cycle of specialized training provided for officers beginning at junior grade through mid-career on to the policy-making level.

The Senior Officer Course will be the most advanced program in the field of international relations and foreign policy offered by the Department of State. Participation in the course this year is limited to twenty individuals comprising carefully-selected senior officers of the Foreign Service, with a small number of spaces for officers of equivalent rank from those other agencies of the Government particularly involved in different aspects of U.S. foreign policy. The course will continue through June 1959.

The purpose of the course is to prepare officers for the highest positions of responsibility in policy recommendation and execution, coordination, planning and administration in the Department, in diplomatic posts abroad, and in interagency and international organizations.

Mr. Harold B. Hoskins, Director of the Foreign Service Institute, announced that the Institute will call upon outstanding representatives of United States Government, industry and labor as well as academic specialists to participate in directing seminar studies and discussions. Special library and other facilities have been installed at the Institute to carry out the objectives of the Senior Officer program. The course is under the supervision of Mr. Willard F. Barber, a career Foreign Service Officer of Class One.

The course will include study of the following subjects:

1. The Bases for American Foreign Policy.

2. Domestic Influences on U.S. Foreign Policy.

3. Review

OFFICE OF FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1958

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I am most appreciative of the reports which your secretary was kind enough to send to me last month regarding the Center for International Affairs. I am also very happy to have, in your July 8 note, your acceptance in principle of an invitation to speak at the Senior Officer Course at the Foreign Service Institute. I made careful note of your desire that the date be left open until the end of August.

Cognizant of the fact that you have a heavy schedule, I thought that I might call to your attention the fact that we are leaving open the dates of October 21, 22, 23 and 24 in the hope that any one or two of those days or any one or two half days during that period would be acceptable to you. The topic which we tentatively recommend is "The Nuclear Revolution in Warfare." This would be one topic in a series, the others being "National Military Power as a Basis of International Relations", "The Role of Military Force in International Relations and the Achievement of National Objectives", and "Total War and the American Military Tradition". If you would care to make modifications in the topic "The Nuclear Revolution in Warfare", I would appreciate it if you could inform me so that appropriate reference and reading materials could be assigned to the student officers prior to your presentation.

If none of these dates are acceptable, could you give me an idea what other dates would be preferable from your point of view?

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Harvard Defense Studies Program,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

26 September 1958

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

This is to confirm your acceptance of the Commandant's
invitation to address the members of The National War College on
Monday, 17 November. We are delighted that you found it possible
to make a firm commitment for this date.

Since you are familiar with the procedure for our morning
sessions, I shall mention only that your lecture will be scheduled
at 9:00 a.m. and will also be attended by the members of the
Industrial College of the Armed Forces. It will be followed by the
customary question and answer period and the discussion group
meeting.

We regret that it will not be possible for you to spend the
entire morning with us and to remain as our guest at luncheon.
Be assured, however, of our deep appreciation of you arranging
your schedule to fit our needs.

A draft copy of the course syllabus is enclosed for your use.
The daily topic for 17 November is outlined on pages 23, 24, 25 and 26.

Undoubtedly you will recall from your previous visits the
emphasis which is placed on the privacy of the lecture program by
the college. I mention it again, however, so that you will feel com-
pletely free to express yourself with the assurance that your remarks
will be held in strictest confidence. The privacy of the lecture program
is outlined on page 15 of the enclosed booklet.

I would appreciate your letting me know if you have any objection to the attendance of additional guests from other agencies of Government who, from time to time request the privilege of attending the lectures.

We shall be happy to prepare any maps, graphs, charts, or
other visual material you may require in connection with your lecture,
if you will let us know your desires in this regard.

10 September 1958

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I take great pleasure in extending to you a most cordial invitation to address the members of The National War College at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, 17 November 1958, on the subject, "Total War."

On this day the class will examine the major aspects of total war, including: possible initiating cause and resulting effects; evolution from limited operations; means of reducing its totality; the means of surviving as victors; and causus belli which would lead the U. S. to resort to all-out nuclear war. It is desired that the students gain an appreciation of the problems facing the nation when confronted with the possibility of warfare under the extreme adversity of total war.

The sum of $150.00 is offered as reimbursement for your travel expenses and a modest honorarium.

Should you be able to accept this invitation, we shall communicate with you further regarding the administrative arrangements for your visit.

I sincerely hope we may have the pleasure of welcoming you back to The National War College on 17 November.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Director of Special Studies
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

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NOTICE

This is a document prepared and issued for
the Staff, Faculty and members of the Class
of THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE solely
for official purposes in connection with the
studies and operating procedures now in use.
It is NOT for general distribution. It may
NOT be released to other persons, quoted or
extracted for publication or otherwise copied
or distributed without specific permission
from the Commandant of The National War
College in each instance.

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COURSE FOUR
STRATEGY AND WARFARE

A - SCOPE OF THE COURSE

1. Introduction.

a. America's rise to world power in this century was marked by its participation in two major wars. However, in both cases our late entry reflected the sense of isolation which existed at the start of these conflicts. This isolationism was partly justified by the existing world balances of power and by the fact that the existing level of technology did not enable any power to endanger America's security or survival in an immediate sense. However, since the Second World War, the Soviet Union has confronted the U. S. with the capability and evident intent to threaten its survival. The U. S. S. R. and Communist China have become a threat to all other states in the Eurasian land mass by upsetting the traditional power balances in that vast area.

b. The military strength of the United States is analyzed at the beginning of this course through an examination of the forces of the major components of our armed services.

c. With this as a background, the problem of modern warfare, which now absorbs so much of our energy and wealth, will then be studied. The scope of national effort which is to be considered in this course covers political and economic warfare, limited war and total war. Emphasis will also be placed on current U. S. political and military strategy and alternate strategic approaches available to the United States. Since the scientific revolution has had such sweeping consequences in this field, we will study the impact of its advances as they affect warfare and our strategic concepts.

2. Purpose.

The purpose of this course is to examine (1) the entire spectrum of warfare, from political warfare to total military effort, which nations resort to in furthering their interests, and (2) the strategic application of national power, with emphasis on the impact of scientific and technological developments.

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B - ORGANIZATION OF THE COURSE

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Wed</td><td>5 Nov</td><td>Strategic Air Power</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>Thu</td><td>6 Nov</td><td>North American Air Defense</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Fri</td><td>7 Nov</td><td>The Employment of Naval Power</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Mon</td><td>10 Nov</td><td>Anti-Submarine Warfare</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>Tue</td><td>11 Nov</td><td>Holiday</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Wed</td><td>12 Nov</td><td>Land Warfare</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>Thu</td><td>13 Nov</td><td>The Nature of Modern War</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>Fri</td><td>14 Nov</td><td>Reserved for Work on Individual Research Papers</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Mon</td><td>17 Nov</td><td>Total War</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>Tue</td><td>18 Nov</td><td>Limited War</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Wed</td><td>19 Nov</td><td>Reserved for Committee Work</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Thu</td><td>20 Nov</td><td>The Impact of Nuclear Energy on Military Power.</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>Fri</td><td>21 Nov</td><td>The Impact of Guided and Ballistic Missiles on National Strategy</td><td>30</td></tr><tr><td>Mon</td><td>24 Nov</td><td>VIP Lecture</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Tue</td><td>25 Nov</td><td>Current United States National Strategy</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>Wed</td><td>26 Nov</td><td>Alternate Strategic Concepts Applicable to U. S. National Planning</td><td>35</td></tr><tr><td>Thu</td><td>27 Nov</td><td>Holiday</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Fri</td><td>28 Nov</td><td>Holiday</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Mon</td><td>1 Dec</td><td>Reserved for Committee Work</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

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<table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Tue</td><td>2 Dec</td><td>Political Warfare</td><td>39</td></tr><tr><td>Wed</td><td>3 Dec</td><td>Economic Warfare</td><td>41</td></tr><tr><td>Thu</td><td>4 Dec</td><td>The Control of Space</td><td>43</td></tr><tr><td>Fri</td><td>5 Dec</td><td>Reserved for Committee Work</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Mon</td><td>8 Dec</td><td>Reduction and Control of Armaments</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td>Tue</td><td>9 Dec</td><td>CBR Warfare</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>Wed</td><td>10 Dec</td><td>Reserved for Work on Individual Research Papers</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Thu</td><td>11 Dec</td><td>Committee Presentations</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

## 2. Academic Procedures.

a. There will be meetings of the discussion groups on the course topics as indicated in the weekly schedule. Groups will meet with the lecturer of the day in accordance with the provisions of the weekly schedule.

b. There will be a committee problem which will be issued separately.

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C - DETAILED PROGRAM

* * * *

FIRST DAY
WEDNESDAY, 5 NOVEMBER

* * * *

STRATEGIC AIR POWER

1. Introduction.

a. Strategic air power constitutes the most effective means of rapidly causing enormous destruction in the heartland of an enemy. Its possession by the U. S. provides a potent deterrent to military aggression against the United States and its allies. Moreover, in the event of war, strategic air power used against its enemy counterpart can serve an essential defensive function in reducing the enemy's ability to retaliate.

b. An essential and continuing objective in modern warfare is to win the air battle in order to permit relatively unrestricted use of the air and to deny this capability to the enemy. Strategic air power has the ability to make a major contribution to the winning of the air battle by destroying much of an enemy's air power on the ground--his bases, aircraft and missile launching sites.

c. The predominant characteristics of strategic air power are (1) long range, (2) tremendous destructive power, and (3) rapid concentration of mass. Modern technology is constantly increasing the effectiveness of these characteristics.

d. U. S. strategic air power can be brought to bear in any part of the world. Today one bombardment aircraft can deliver more explosive power (measured in millions of tons of TNT) than that contained in all of the bombs dropped in World War II on Germany and Japan. Science and technology have proven their ability to provide air-deliverable explosive forces of any magnitude which would presently appear to be militarily useful.

e. The great speed and range of strategic bombardment aircraft and their ability to operate under all weather conditions permit the rapid concentration of strategic air attacks against the vitals of any enemy.

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Programmed developments will considerably enhance this present capability.

2. **Scope and Purpose of Topic.**

To familiarize the class with the mission, organization, characteristics, capabilities, limitations and general operational doctrines of strategic air power.

3. **Suggested Topics for Class Consideration.**

(These questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups.)

a. What is the role of strategic air power as an instrument of national policy?

b. Is the U. S. S. R. overtaking the U. S. in strategic air power? If so, what effect will this have upon our policy of "massive retaliation"? Of "deterrence"?

c. What effect will strategic air campaigns have upon surface operations in total war? In limited war?

d. What influence, if any, will future developments in defensive weapons and weapons systems have on the relative effectiveness of strategic air operations as they are presently conceived?

e. What, if any, are the limitations of the capability of U. S. strategic air power to accomplish its mission?

4. **Lecture.**

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "STRATEGIC AIR WARFARE."

5. **Reading.**

a. THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND OF THE FUTURE, by General Thomas S. Power, USAF. A reprint from *Congressional Record*, January 13, 1958, p. 239-242.

b. USAF DOCTRINE AND NATIONAL POLICY, by General Thomas D.

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White, USAF. A reprint from *Air Force*, January, 1958, p. 47-51.

c. THE AIR FORCE JOB AND HOW WE ARE DOING IT, by General Thomas D. White, USAF. A reprint from *Air Force*, August, 1958, p. 36-42.

d. NO MORE LITTLE WARS, by Alexander P. de Seversky. A reprint from *This Week Magazine*, March 23, 1958, p. 8-9, 36-37.

e. A DYNAMIC PHILOSOPHY OF AIR POWER, by Donald Cox. A reprint from *Military Affairs*, Fall 1957, p. 132-138.

f. Additional reading may be found in the Classified Library.

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SECOND DAY
THURSDAY, 6 NOVEMBER

* * * *

NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE

1. Introduction.

a. Effective employment of national power requires a secure homeland base. In the past, the North American continent has been relatively secure although incidents of surface attack, sabotage, and subversion are a matter of historical record. Today, however, this relative security has been lost because within the last few years a devastating nuclear attack on this continent has become a definite possibility. It is this serious threat that has demanded the urgent attention of military and civilian leaders to the problem of continental air defense.

b. The military establishment bears the responsibility for continental air defense. In 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff created a joint service agency, the Continental Air Defense Command, to provide joint air defense planning and "to insure effective control and utilization during time of emergency" of all available equipment and personnel. In September, 1957, the Command was broadened to include Canadians as equal partners and the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) was established. Today this Command has interceptor aircraft, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, and air raid warning devices on land and sea and in the air. The locations of units over which it has operational control extend beyond the continental limits of the United States to Canada in the north and Newfoundland and Greenland in the northeast.

2. Scope and Purpose of Topic.

To consider the mission, organization, capability, weapons, and
equipment of the North American Air Defense Command.

3. Suggested Topics for Class Consideration.

a. How has the establishment of NORAD improved the air defenses

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of the United States?

b. To what extent does our air defense system as presently established provide defense in depth?

c. Are the weapons and control systems of the three services effectively integrated into the air defense system?

d. Is the present concept and organization for the defense of North America sufficiently flexible to develop apace with the increasing offensive threat?

e. What, if any, are the limitations of NORAD to cope with the air threat?

4. Lecture.

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA AGAINST AIR ATTACK."

5. Reading.

a. DEFENDING NORTH AMERICA (North American Air Defense Command). A reprint from *Air Force*, August, 1958, p. 102-108.

b. INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL EARLE E. PARTRIDGE. In *U. S. News and World Report*, September 6, 1957, p. 72-85.

c. OUR DEFENSE IS VERY POOR IF AN ATTACK WERE TO COME IMMEDIATELY. An interview with Dr. Ellis A. Johnson in *U. S. News and World Report*, January 31, 1958, p. 50-55.

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THIRD DAY

FRIDAY, 7 NOVEMBER

* * * *

# THE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL POWER

## 1. Introduction.

a. It is the Navy's basic mission (1) to insure control of the sea so that the nation's power in its manifold forms can be projected via the sea, and (2) to use such control to the fullest in inflicting damage on an enemy wherever he may be found.

b. The projection of naval power takes many forms and encompasses many specialized tasks. To name a few: anti-submarine warfare, amphibious warfare, offensive mining blockade, shore bombardment, logistical supply, tactical air support and interdiction of enemy supply routes by air and surface action. These merge with one another at times and are coordinated with the weapons systems of the other services to provide a cohesive national military effort.

c. Today the principal instrument of the Navy's offensive power is the carrier task force; tomorrow it may be the Polaris submarine. The aircraft carrier task force, composed of surface, subsurface and air forces, is a force which has the advantage of mobility, the ability to concentrate and the ability to achieve surprise. This force can operate from any point in the oceans at the will of national authority and without resort to diplomatic negotiation.

d. A navy in proper balance is able to provide package forces tailored to the job at hand. These package forces, which may include ground, sea, and air forces, provide a readily available means to exploit the seas in limited or "fringe" wars as well as in all-out war. They provide a ready, mobile police force in this, the cold war.

d. Nuclear power applied to navies has opened new horizons. Today there is the nuclear-powered submarine; tomorrow possibly the atomic-fueled task force equipped with missiles.

## 2. Scope and Purpose of Topic.

To consider naval power as an instrument of policy, with particular

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emphasis on the means, capabilities and future projection of a nation's
power via the sea.

3. <u>Suggested Topics for Class Consideration.</u>

a. What are the major threats to U. S. control of the seas?

b. How does division of the Atlantic into NATO areas of responsibility affect the U. S. concept of control of the seas in wartime?

c. How much effort should the Navy expend in missile ships such as Polaris submarines? How does this strengthen our deterrent capability?

d. What roles can the navy of the future play in supporting air and land power?

e. What are the major naval weapons that a modern navy may use in projecting its power?

4. <u>Lecture.</u>

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "NAVAL POWER IN THE
NUCLEAR AGE."

5. <u>Reading.</u>

a. ALWAYS THE SEA, by Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN. A
reprint from _U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings_, May, 1955, p. 497-503.

b. THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN SUPPORTING NATIONAL POLICY, an address by Capt. David L. Martineau, USN. A reprint of extension of remarks of Honorable Paul J. Kilday from _Congressional Record_, January 8, 1958, p. A43-A45.

c. MOBILE STRATEGY FOR THE MISSILE, by Major George Fielding Eliot. A reprint from _Military Review_, June, 1958, p. 3-11.

d. THE NAVY TODAY, by Rear Admiral R. E. Rose, USN. A
reprint from _Ordnance_, March-April, 1958, p. 793-795.

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FOURTH DAY
MONDAY, 10 NOVEMBER

* * * *

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1. Introduction.

a. The submarine, the undersea killer, has been a major component of naval power in two world wars. Its effectiveness against surface vessels has made the maintenance of sea lines of communication both difficult and costly. Today, technological developments (the snorkel, atomic power units, guided missiles, improved torpedoes and atomic warheads) have brought a tremendous increase in the submarine's capabilities. New developments and techniques in anti-submarine warfare have similarly increased the capability of the defenses against this threat to the control and use of the seas.

b. Current indications point to a considerable emphasis by the Soviet Bloc on the creation of a strong submarine fleet. How the effectiveness of this force can be destroyed occupies the minds of the military planners of the nations of the Free World. It is a major factor in determining the allocation of resources and in directing our research and development programs.

Through an examination of the current and projected means of reducing or eliminating the submarine threat, we will consider the significant aspects of submarine and anti-submarine warfare. This should contribute to a better understanding of the problems involved in securing and maintaining control and use of the seas.

a. Does it appear that technological advancements in anti-submarine equipment are keeping pace with the increasing offensive capability of the submarine?

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b. Assuming that Soviet submarines are the major threat to our control of the sea lines of communication, are we placing sufficient emphasis on research and development and anti-submarine force build-up?

c. How does the potential submarine threat in World War III compare to what it was at its height in World War II?

d. To what extent can air operations against submarine bases be expected to reduce the submarine threat?

e. What, if any, are the limitations of the U. S. Navy to cope with the Soviet submarine threat?

4. Lecture.

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS."

5. Reading.

a. COULD MISSILE SUBS OPERATE FROM NORTH POLE REGION? RED SUBMARINE THREAT TERMED "UNPARALLELED" IN HISTORY. A reprint from *Army-Navy-Air Force Register*, March 29, 1958, p. 12-13.

b. ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE. Special Issue of All Hands, April, 1958, 64 p.

c. Additional reading may be found in the Classified Library.

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FIFTH DAY
WEDNESDAY, 12 NOVEMBER

* * * *

LAND WARFARE

1. Introduction.

a. We will study later the nature of modern war, total war, and limited war as each affects a nation's power. Today we consider the employment of land forces in the denial or conquest of a major land mass in the nuclear age.

b. In some areas in the world, U. S. forces are already in strategic positions as the result of international agreements. These forces are reinforced by allied elements, but the combinations are still numerically inferior to the forces opposing them. In the event of war, overseas forces will require reinforcement. The reduction to manageable proportions of the hostile air and sea threat will be necessary before this overseas reinforcement is possible.

c. Military warfare on a land mass may occur in varying degrees of three general categories: (1) as an element of total nuclear war, (2) as a limited or localized war in which nuclear weapons are employed tactically, or (3) as a restricted war in which nuclear weapons are not employed. Inasmuch as any one of these three circumstances is possible, and because the requirements they impose on the design and combat doctrine of forces are in some respects conflicting, the attainment of maximum military flexibility is a paramount consideration in the design of modern land forces.

d. The strategic concept of nuclear warfare on a major land mass today embraces three essential elements of a position in readiness echeloned in depth: first, a barrier or lightly held shield based on natural and installed obstacles to channel the enemy advance and force him to concentrate; second, a series of local or tactical reserves of dispersed, highly mobile combat teams capable of rapid concentration to channel further the enemy advance or to exploit nuclear strikes on enemy concentrations; third, strategic reserves consisting of mobile, self-sustaining, powerful striking forces capable of blocking hostile penetrations, of withstanding enemy build-up and serving as bases from which counter offenses can be launched. Such forces must be modern, highly mobile, nuclear

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armed and capable of independent action over considerable periods of
time. They must be prepared to fight with conventional weapons should
political considerations so dictate. The entire area under the concept
must have adequate interdiction, close air, and missile support. Friendly
air and missile forces must also establish and maintain control of the air
over our land forces and rear areas. The logistic problems of supporting
such forces are among the most challenging in modern military art.

To familiarize the class with the characteristics, weapons, operational
doctrine, capabilities and limitations of land warfare in the denial or con-
quest of a major land mass.

a. Does it appear that the use of mass destruction weapons will alter radically the traditional concepts of land warfare? If so, how and to what extent?

b. What new concepts in organization should be considered for our
ground units to enable them to fight effectively a conventional and/or
nuclear war?

c. Discuss the adequacy of air transport and sea lift for rapid move-
ment of our land forces.

d. What, if any, are the limitations of our military forces in prose-
cutine a major land campaign?

4. Lecture.

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "LAND WARFARE."

5. Reading.

a. THE ARMY'S ROLE IN THE FUTURE, by General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA. A reprint from Army Information Digest, January, 1958, p. 4-11.

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SIXTH DAY

THURSDAY, 13 NOVEMBER

* * * *

# THE NATURE OF MODERN WAR

## 1. Introduction.

Today we consider some aspects of the nature and conduct of war in the nuclear age. The advent of nuclear weapons coupled with the capability to deliver them to any point on earth raises a number of basic questions regarding both the role and nature of war. First, do nuclear weapons rule out total war as a means of settling international disputes? Will the nuclear exchange phase of any present or future all-out war be decisive? Are limited wars possible where both sides employ nuclear weapons? Will a future war allow time for mobilization or will nations be required to fight with the forces they have at the outset? These and many related questions are pertinent to the discussion of the nature of war in the nuclear age. The answers are not readily apparent; nevertheless, the policy maker and military planner must provide tentative answers to them in order to establish some measure of national security.

To appraise the role of war in international relations and to study the extent to which the conduct of warfare has been revolutionized by recent scientific and technological advances, and the possible effects on warfare of those advances expected in the future.

## 3. Suggested Topics for Class Consideration.

a. Must we be prepared to conduct both nuclear and conventional wars? Why?

b. Does the availability of missiles and nuclear weapons in quantity and variety make it more likely that future wars will be limited or unlimited? Why?

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c. How will the development of the ICBM affect the nature of war?

4. Lecture.

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "THE NATURE OF MODERN WAR."

5. Reading.

a. STRATEGIC DOCTRINES FOR NUCLEAR WAR, by Roger Hilsman. A reprint of Chapter 2 from the book, *Military Policy and National Security*, edited by William W. Kaufman, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1956, p. 39-74.

b. TECHNOLOGY AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF GENERAL WAR, by Colonel G. A. Lincoln, USA, and Lt. Col. Amos A. Jordan, Jr., USA. A reprint from *Military Review*, May, 1957, p. 3-14.

c. AN ENGINEER VS WAR, by Howard G. Kurtz, Jr. A reprint from the *Penn State Engineer*, 1957, 8 p.

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EIGHTH DAY

MONDAY, 17 NOVEMBER

* * * *

TOTAL WAR

1. Introduction.

a. For the purpose of this topic, total war is defined as war in which all available weapons and resources are employed without restrictions. The modern concept of total war envisages such wholesale destruction that there may be no victor in the sense of military conflict and triumph between armed forces.

b. Prior to the introduction of nuclear weapons and modern delivery capabilities, the devastation of modern war against their homeland had not been of concern to Americans. Armed conflict never caused the upheaval, nor did war presage complete destruction of the community, such as is possible today.

c. Ludendorff wrote, "the totalitarian war, far from being the concern of the military forces alone, directly touches the life and soul of every single member of the belligerent nations. It is directed not only against the fighting forces, but . . . against the nations themselves." Total war, or all-out war, becomes no longer an extension of policy, but an end in itself whose ultimate aim will achieve the total destruction of the enemy as the only alternative to survival. In view of the scale of catastrophe which will be inflicted on both sides, many now question the ability to assure bare survival in total war. Many people believe that America's struggle with the U.S.S.R. will end in an atomic stalemate on the grounds that an atomic exchange is too horrible to contemplate and would result in mutual suicide where there would be no real victor. They also discount the possibility of further military action once the exchange has occurred. Their viewpoint should be subjected to critical analysis from three angles. First, the present day nuclear weapon, like yesterday's gunpowder, is not the last word in warfare and no stalemate, nuclear or otherwise, is likely to remain so forever. Second, the bulk of historical evidence points to the fact that war is not initiated on the basis of sound and unerring logic, but occurs rather as the result of faulty analysis, miscalculation or accident. Nor is there any evidence that Russian and Western logic are synonymous. Third, regardless of the degree of mutual devastation, and regardless of the seeming hollowness of victory, there will always be a victor; namely, the one

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who can salvage enough from the holocaust to impose his will on his
opponent.

To examine the major aspects of total war, including: possible
initiating causes and resulting effects; evolution from limited operations;
means of reducing its totality; the means of surviving as victors; and the
casus belli which would lead the U. S. to resort to all-out nuclear war.
Today's topic is for the purpose of gaining an appreciation of the problems
facing the nation when confronted with the possibility of warfare under the
extreme adversity of total war.

a. Many views have been expressed concerning the ability of the
apparent winner in limited war to prevent the loser from resorting to ever
more destructive weapons in an attempt to achieve a balance. Does this
inevitably always lead to all-out effort by both sides?

b. Given sufficient time, the defense has always been able to counter offensive weapons. Will it be possible to provide a defense which precludes, with reasonable assurance, that total war necessarily will always result in total destruction of civilization?

c. Under what circumstances would the U. S. resort to total war?

d. Has the U. S. military orientation and dependence on nuclear weapons systems placed us in a position where we cannot fight the U.S.S.R. with conventional weapons?

e. An ancient military axiom is that "the best defense is a good offense". However, as Russia and the United States approach the finite limit of offensive destructive weapons, wherein each has more than enough power to destroy the existing exposed and concentrated society of the other, will the key to survival of both the military and civil elements of society shift from offense to defense, from exposure to protection, from the stationary to the mobile, and from the concentrated to the dispersed? Or will the approach to the finite limit of offensive destructive power lead us in another direction--toward an increasing preparedness to strike the

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first blow?

4. Lecture.

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "TOTAL WAR."

5. Reading.

a. THE ESOTERIC STRATEGY--PRINCIPLES OF ALL-OUT WAR, by Henry A. Kissinger. A reprint of Chapter 4 from his book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York, published for the Council on Foreign Relations, Harper, 1957, p. 96-131.

b. IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN TOTAL WAR, by Bernard Brodie. A reprint from *Military Review*, June, 1958, p. 95-107.

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NINTH DAY
TUESDAY, 18 NOVEMBER

* * * *

LIMITED WAR

1. Introduction.

a. There is no question that the U. S. must be prepared militarily to prosecute successfully an all-out war involving the use of thermonuclear weapons. There is some disagreement, however, as to whether readiness to meet such an eventuality necessarily provides the best means for coping successfully with the Communist practice of subversion and nibbling away at the peripheral areas. Nevertheless, every nation requires a force which it can, and will, use in support of its diplomacy if that diplomacy is to speak with the voice of authority. Therefore, the U. S. must have the means to cope successfully not only with all-out war, but to apply graduated or limited force under appropriate circumstances. For this reason the study today is directed at the means which could be used for limited warfare, how successful these might be under various conditions and whether the U. S. is properly prepared militarily, psychologically and politically to meet the situation of limited warfare.

b. Some authorities argue that warfare can be limited only under very special and unusual circumstances. Others believe it is possible, and even probable, that wars of the future can be limited as to political objectives, the areas involved, the weapons employed, and the size and composition of forces engaged. Certainly the Korean War furnishes an example of a conflict for limited objectives in a restricted area and without the use of all available weapons. Similarly the war in French Indo-China was brought to a conclusion in a limited area and under certain political limitations. These two historical examples should be studied carefully to determine how and why they were limited with a view of determining the applicability of their lessons to wars in which the U. S. may be engaged in the future.

To study limited war as a means of employing U. S. power, and the requirements and capabilities of the U. S. Armed Forces to fight a successful limited war in any area of the world.

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a. What are the implications of the announced British policy to maintain forces suitable only for deterrence and massive retaliation with very limited capability to conduct small scale operations?

b. In limited wars against small nations which do not possess nuclear weapons, what would be the reaction of neutrals and other "have-nots" to the use of such weapons?

c. Would there be special emphasis on the use of conventional weapons in limited action involving racial differences?

d. If the United States places itself, through its self-imposed limited political objectives, into a position which results in a series of limited wars, how will this affect the economy and population of the future? How will this affect military planning?

e. Is limited war possible within the NATO area of responsibility?

4. **Lecture.**

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "LIMITED WAR."

5. **Reading.**

a. LIMITED WAR AND THE SCHOLARS, by Colonel G. A. Lincoln, USA, and Lt. Col. Amos A. Jordan, Jr., USA. A reprint from *Military Review*, January, 1958, p. 50-60.

b. THE LESSONS OF KOREA: WAR AND THE POWER OF MAN, by Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty. A reprint from *Orbis*, Spring 1958, p. 39-65.

c. LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR, by Prof. P. M. S. Blackett. A reprint from *New Statesman*, May 17, 1958, p. 625-627.

d. Additional reading may be found in the Classified Library.

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ELEVENTH DAY
THURSDAY, 20 NOVEMBER

* * * *

# THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY ON MILITARY POWER

## 1. Introduction.

a. Nuclear weapons, both fusion and fission, coupled with a capability for their delivery, constitute an impressive element of military power in the modern age. Having previously considered nuclear hardware and weaponology, we now turn to the military application of nuclear energy in its broadest sense. We will undertake to gain an appreciation of the impact that nuclear weapons are having on strategy and politico-military thinking and the problems inherent in their integration into the weapons systems of the armed forces. We will also take cognizance of the fact that nuclear energy has a significant and growing military potential outside the weapons field. As an example, the successful use of nuclear energy as a source of power for the propulsion of submarines has led to an expansion of this program to include larger ships of the fleet. Likewise, extensive experimentation in the use of nuclear fuels in aircraft propulsion might lead to expanded capabilities of air power. In still another field, small nuclear power plants for the generation of electricity are approaching feasibility for military use.

b. The accelerating development and expanding potentialities of the military applications of nuclear energy demand the continual reassessment of many of our political and economic, as well as military, concepts. By the use of nuclear weapons, the Soviets claim today to have the capability of causing great destruction to the population and physical plant of the United States. In turn, this country possesses the capability for massive retaliation in kind. The short time required for the effective implementation of such attacks raises fundamental questions such as the feasibility of industrial or military mobilization after the start of a general war and the validity of past concepts of wartime resupply to overseas theaters. Moreover, the far-reaching effects of the radioactive fall-out that could result from an exchange of massive nuclear blows would indicate that man has finally achieved the power to destroy himself. Whether there will ever be an unlimited war under these conditions and what ought to be done to plan for that eventuality are among the most profound questions of our age.

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To assess the importance of nuclear energy to U. S. military power and strategy, including consideration of the prospects for, and probable effects of, an era of nuclear plenty throughout the world wherein many states will possess a nuclear warfare capability.

a. What effect, if any, should integration of nuclear weapons into the armed forces have on military manpower requirements? On logistic problems?

b. Is it valid to say that we should now tailor our military forces solely in support of nuclear weapons? Why?

c. What in your opinion will constitute a condition of nuclear plenty in our armed forces?

d. To what extent should we equip our allies with nuclear weapons?

e. What are the effects of allied reluctance to have nuclear weapons and to deny U. S. use of bases for nuclear weapons systems?

## 4. Lecture.

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY ON MILITARY POWER."

## 5. Reading.

a. IF YOU'RE STILL WONDERING ABOUT FALL-OUT DANGER. In U. S. News and World Report, June 21, 1957, p. 46-48.

b. IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN TOTAL WAR, by Bernard Brodie. A reprint of Rand Study RM-1842, Santa Monica, Calif., The Rand Corporation, December 17, 1956, p. 1-33.

c. SOVIET BLACKMAIL AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, by Hans Speier. A reprint from World Politics, April, 1957, p. 307-318.

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TWELFTH DAY
FRIDAY, 21 NOVEMBER

* * * *

THE IMPACT OF GUIDED AND BALLISTIC MISSILES
ON NATIONAL STRATEGY

1. Introduction.

a. When the Germans started launching V-1 and V-2 missiles against the British Isles in 1944, few persons visualized that, in a few years, the major powers of the world would be engaged in a technological race which has produced missiles of supersonic speeds and intercontinental range.

b. Today, in all services, guided missile units for surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and submarine launched missiles have taken their place beside former conventional type units as an integral part of our operational forces. Batteries of guided missiles now help defend our major cities against air attack. Intermediate range ballistic missiles in their operational configuration have been flown successfully in test flights and intercontinental ballistic missiles are in an advanced stage of development. Flight testing of component parts is well on schedule.

c. In this transition period from older to more modern weapons, the problems of integrating new developments into our weapons systems are enormous. Fundamental to an understanding of these problems is a knowledge of the present status and future developments in the field of guided and ballistic missiles.

To examine the guided, ballistic, and aerodynamic missile programs of the U. S. to include their contemplated uses, their limitations and capabilities, and their probable effect on tactical and strategic plans of the future.

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a. What factors govern the extent to which missiles can replace other delivery systems?

b. Does it appear that strategic thinking will be altered in the next ten years as a result of the employment of missiles?

c. Will missiles replace manned bomber aircraft? If so, when and to what extent?

d. Should greater effort be exerted on the defensive guided missiles or on the offensive type, such as the intercontinental ballistic missile?

4. Lecture.

The subject of the lecture for this day entitled, "THE IMPACT OF GUIDED MISSILES ON NATIONAL STRATEGY," will be presented by a panel of Service experts.

5. Reading.

a. PILOTS, MISSILEMEN AND ROBOTS, by Paul Jacobs. A reprint from *The Reporter*, February 6, 1958, p. 14-21.

b. GUIDED MISSILE PROGRESS, by Rear Admiral John H. Sides, USN. A reprint from *Ordnance*, July/August 1957, p. 44-46.

c. *Scan*: SECOND ANNUAL GUIDED MISSILE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 1958. A reprint from *Missiles and Rockets, Magazine of World Astronautics*, July 28, 1958, p. 105-148.

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FOURTEENTH DAY

TUESDAY, 25 NOVEMBER

[LC]

* * * *

CURRENT UNITED STATES NATIONAL STRATEGY

---

1. **Introduction.**

a. National strategy is defined as the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological power of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and during war in working toward the attainment of the national objectives. Some persons would have us believe that events over which we have little control shape our strategy, and that no matter how well our plans are laid we must ultimately rely on our ability to react to these events. This constant reaction, essentially defensive in nature, relinquishes the initiative to our enemies, specifically to Communism. As Communism seeks eventual control of all areas of the world, the U. S. must not limit its strategy to a program of reaction to Communist thrusts.

b. We must, therefore, give continued thought to the preparation of dynamic long-range U. S. objectives and to the preparation of a national strategy which will constitute a "blueprint for victory". Today we examine the basis for, and application of, our present national strategy.

To examine the current U. S. national strategy.

a. To what extent does public opinion shape U. S. national strategy?

b. To what extent is our national strategy clearly defined in the public mind?

c. To what extent, if any, do existing U. S. policies, plans and programs appear to be in conflict with current U. S. strategy?

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d. What should be the respective roles of the executive and legislative branches of our government in the formulation of U. S. national strategy?

4. Lecture.

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "CURRENT UNITED STATES NATIONAL STRATEGY."

5. Reading.

a. **STRATEGY, WEAPONS AND POLICY--THE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE.** A reprint of a Panel Discussion from *Army*, December, 1957, p. 69-79.

b. **STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE**, by Michael Howard. A reprint from *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, November, 1957, p. 473-482.

c. **MUST U. S. TAKE THE FIRST BLOW.** In *U. S. News and World Report*, December 13, 1957, p. 54-58.

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FIFTEENTH DAY

WEDNESDAY, 26 NOVEMBER

ALTERNATE STRATEGIC CONCEPTS APPLICABLE TO
U. S. NATIONAL PLANNING

1. Introduction.

a. We have examined very briefly our current national strategy and have considered some of the policies, plans and programs designed to implement it. Whenever it has become apparent from time to time that certain of our actions or inactions were not well designed to further our national objectives, there have been rather widespread and open complaints, criticisms and proposals for changes in both the strategy itself and in its related policies, plans and programs. Particularly in our democratic government which leans over backward to insure a free press and a free expression of opinion is this criticism often outspoken and sometimes quite bitter.

b. For those who criticize our present strategic concept and the means by which it is being implemented, today's topic offers the opportunity of examining constructively the possible alternatives open to the United States in the achievement of its national objectives. This must be tempered with realism, taking into consideration the cost of alternate proposals, and the requirement that popular appeal is so often essential.

To examine alternatives to our present strategic concept.

a. While "Monday morning quarterbacking" proves little, lessons can be learned from a careful examination of past events. In this light, what were the lasting effects of our action in Suez and Hungary in 1956?

b. In examining possible alternatives to our present strategic

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concept, the deciding factor usually centers around the risk of war. How
can this risk be measured?

c. The blatant cries in the press for changes in strategy and policies usually get world-wide circulation. What are the effects of such wide-spread publicity?

d. What are the value and purpose of so-called "trial balloons" when changes are under consideration?

4. Lecture.

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "ALTERNATE STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND POLICIES FOR THE U. S."

5. Reading.

a. SHOULD U. S. EVER STRIKE THE FIRST BLOW?, by Capt. W. D. Puleston, USN (Ret). In *U. S. News and World Report*, December 13, 1957, p. 64-66.

b. POLICY AND GRAND STRATEGY, by Admiral E. Biorklund, Royal Swedish Navy (Ret). A reprint from *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, May, 1957, p. 183-191.

c. THE INFLUENCE OF WEAPONS ON MODERN STRATEGY, by Prof. Gordon B. Turner. A reprint of his lecture on 18 December 1956. 22 p.

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SEVENTEENTH DAY
TUESDAY, 2 DECEMBER

* * * *

POLITICAL WARFARE

1. Introduction.

a. Political warfare is not a recent innovation, but it is a dominant feature of the cold war. Its objective is the coercion of foreign states by methods short of military action. Its tools include such measures of persuasion and coercion as threats of military force and intervention, diplomacy, organizational operations, propaganda, economic pressures and covert operations.

b. As in military conflict, the tactics of political warfare are fashioned to meet the particular situation. It is the Communists who make the most unscrupulous use of political warfare, such activities being a basic weapon in their struggle for world conquest. For example, the Communist campaign in the Far East has included subversion, infiltration, joining in popular front governments, threats of war, peace propaganda, economic enticements and sabotage. The Communists have recognized the great desires of Asians, and have exploited such issues as nationalism, race consciousness and anti-imperialism, as well as industrialization and land reform. They exploit these appeals no matter how alien they might actually be to their own basic ideology or objectives. In Europe many of the same tactics have been employed, but with variations to suit the local situation. Examples of Communist political warfare in Europe include the conquest of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade, the thinly veiled threats of atomic attacks upon France and England during the Suez Campaign, the campaign to "ban the A-bomb", and the barrage of Khrushchev letters.

c. The possible use of "atomic blackmail" as a weapon of political warfare now exemplifies both the expanded range and the political seriousness of this method of exerting power. The Russian development of the ICBM will increase the possibilities.

To study the efficacy of U. S. methods of fighting the cold war with political weapons, including propaganda, to build up the Free World and

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to erode the Communist world.

a. What are the major limits to the actual and potential effectiveness of political warfare?

b. What are the capabilities and limitations of international propaganda as a tool of political warfare?

c. Are there any limitations as to the manner in which a democracy can carry on propaganda abroad?

d. What are the distinctions, if any, among psychological warfare, partial war, political warfare, and cold war?

4. **Lecture.**

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "POLITICAL WARFARE AND PROPAGANDA."

5. **Reading.**

a. THE MENACE OF COMMUNIST PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, by Ferreus (pseudo). A reprint from *Orbis*, April, 1957, p. 97-121.

b. AMERICAN POLICY IN THE BATTLE OF IDEAS, by R. C. Snyder and E. S. Furniss, Jr. A reprint of Chapter 16 from their book *American Foreign Policy*, New York, Rinehart, 1954, p. 632-661.

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EIGHTEENTH DAY
WEDNESDAY, 3 DECEMBER

* * * *

ECONOMIC WARFARE

1. Introduction.

a. Economic warfare is subject to many definitions. It is defined in the Dictionary of U. S. Military Terms for Joint Usage as, "the defensive use in peacetime as well as during war of any instrumentality by military and civilian agencies to maintain or expand the economic potential for war of a nation and its (probable) allies and, conversely, the offensive use of any measure in peace or war to diminish or neutralize the economic potential for war of the (likely) enemy and his accomplices." Economic warfare is like a spectrum--where at the one extreme you find economic measures coupled with armed force, such as blockade during war--and at the other you find highly subtle measures which are only identified as economic warfare by the country which feels it is being injured by the economic policies of another; for example, the withdrawal of trade agreement concessions.

b. The purpose of economic warfare is to weaken an enemy's economy and strengthen your own. This may be done by denying him access to markets and resources, impairing and dislocating production, subverting labor, lowering civilian morale, etc. Economic warfare measures are largely negative and it is difficult to appraise their effectiveness. They usually support, but are subordinate to, the diplomatic, military and strategic effort.

To examine U. S. capability to utilize our economic supremacy for political purposes in the struggle against Communism and to study the methods which could be employed in the conduct of economic warfare, including export controls, blockades, economic sanctions and embargoes.

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a. What factors place a country in a strong position to make use of economic sanctions in its foreign affairs? Compare the position of the Soviet Union and the U. S. in this regard.

b. What significant effects have resulted from the controls applied to Free World trade with the Soviet Bloc? How could these effects be intensified? What of the controls against China?

c. How important are the "costs" entailed in the use of economic sanctions? In what circumstances can they be kept to a minimum?

d. Is economic warfare effective in limited wars such as the Korean War where the home bases of the hostile forces are immune from attack?

e. What are recent examples of Soviet economic warfare? With what success has it met?

f. What are the pros and cons from the standpoint of economic warfare of increased trade between the Soviet Bloc and the West?

4. Lecture.

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "ECONOMIC WARFARE."

5. Reading.

a. EFFECT OF THE COLD WAR ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, by H. Struve Hensel. A reprint from *Vital Speeches*, March 15, 1955, p. 1097-1102.

b. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES. A reprint of the Summary of a Study prepared by the Council for Economic and Industry Research, Inc., March, 1957, for the Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program. Washington, U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1957, p. xiii-xvii. (U. S. 85 Cong. 1st sess. Senate Study No. 8)

c. SOVIET ECONOMIC AID IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Charles Wolf, Jr. A reprint from *World Politics*, October, 1957, p. 91-101.

d. MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S TRADE CHALLENGE--WILL WE MEET IT? by Douglas Dillon. A reprint from *Department of State Bulletin*, February 17, 1958, p. 265-268.

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NINETEENTH DAY
THURSDAY, 4 DECEMBER

* * * *

THE CONTROL OF SPACE

1. Introduction.

a. On October 4, 1957, the first artificial satellite was thrown into orbit around the earth. It was fired by a Russian two-stage liquid fuel, long-range ballistic missile which had been converted by the addition of a third stage. This launching caused widespread jubilation among the Communistic peoples, consternation in the Free World, and also added a new word to the English language, "Sputnik". This event ushered in an era which marked the first attempt at physical control of outer space, and started a chain reaction of discussions and proposals for the international legal aspects of control of future satellites which could presumably be used for purposes of war, surveillance, and intimidation as well as for peace.

b. As more satellites are fired to further upper atmosphere research, it becomes apparent that space travel will someday be possible in the real sense of the word. It also appears possible that the first nation to achieve such control of space will be in a position to assert its control over all other nations of the earth. Hence the control of space assumes the proportions of a race between the U.S.S.R. and the U. S.

To study the impact on international relations, particularly as
affecting the U. S. position, of the advent of the conquest of space by
manned and unmanned space vehicles in order to gain an appreciation of
the international problems which have arisen in connection with man's
assault on space.

a. What do we propose to gain by being the first to reach the moon?

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b. The Russians achieved world-wide acclaim for their technological success in firing their Sputnik I. Did we properly assess the propaganda effects of such achievements?

c. In connection with the race for control of space, is the U. S. making proper use of its scientists as a medium of exchange of scientific information with foreign countries? Should our ambassadors have scientific attaches on their staffs?

4. Lecture.

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "THE CHALLENGE OF OUTER SPACE." (The ICAF will be host for this joint lecture.)

5. Reading.

a. INTRODUCTION TO OUTER SPACE. An explanatory statement prepared by the President's Science Advisory Committee, The White House, March 26, 1958. Washington, U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1958. 15 p.

b. WHO CONTROLS THE MOON CONTROLS THE EARTH, by Brig. Gen. Homer A. Boushey, USAF. In U. S. News and World Report, February 7, 1958, p. 54.

c. NO COMPROMISE WITH AIRPOWER, by Martin Caidin. A reprint of Chapter 20 from his book, Countdown for Tomorrow, New York, Dutton, 1958, p. 264-277.

d. LAW OF THE SEA, AIR AND OUTER SPACE, by Sir Leslie Munro. A reprint from United Nations Review, February, 1958, p. 7-10.

e. Additional reading may be found in the Classified Library.

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TWENTY-FIRST DAY
MONDAY, 8 DECEMBER

* * * *

REDUCTION AND CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

1. Introduction.

a. Today we examine briefly the history of negotiations for regulating armaments, the function of the U. N. with respect to armament regulations, and the problems of reaching effective agreements in this area.

b. There is growing evidence that the devastating implications of nuclear war are becoming so apparent to the principal nations of the world as to offer some cautious hope that agreements might be reached leading to effective reduction and control of armaments. The problem of reaching workable agreements takes on an air of urgency when it is considered that many countries not now in possession of nuclear weapons have the capability to produce them and may actually have them within the next few years.

c. The meaning of the word disarmament has been so mutilated, broadened and stretched throughout the history of arms negotiations that its use has been avoided in this topic. The word disarmament, as used with reference to international negotiations, has political, economic, and psychological implications as well as military. The military connotation of the word now includes inspection systems, control and supervision of armaments and armed forces and even control of international traffic in armaments.

To examine the possibility and means of regulating armaments, the current problems in negotiating such regulation with the U.S.S.R., and the implications for U. S. national security policy.

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a. Under its present organization, is the U. N. an effective instrument for effecting the reduction and control of world armaments?

b. On the assumption that stage by stage agreements between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. can be reached, will they lessen the tensions and distrust existing between the two countries, or might they not lead to greater suspicion and intensification of differences?

c. How large a part must good will and trust play in the success of agreements to limit and control armaments?

d. Proposals for the reduction, limitation or control of armaments, no matter how irrational, have a tremendous impact on world public opinion. The U.S.S.R. has, in the past, used such proposals in furtherance of its propaganda campaigns. What criteria might be established by U. S. negotiators to determine the sincerity of Russian proposals for regulating armaments?

e. "Disengagement" has been suggested as a first step to further reduction of arms. What would be the effects on NATO and on our overseas bases?

4. Lecture.

The formal lecture for this day is entitled, "REDUCTION AND CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS."

5. Reading.

a. DISARMAMENT THE INTENSIFIED EFFORT 1955-1958.
Washington, U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1958. 65 p. (Dept. of State publication no. 6676)

b. WHY RUSSIA LIKES THE IDEA OF ARMS CUTS, by G. F. Hudson.
In U. S. News and World Report, July 19, 1957, p. 98-101.

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TWENTY-SECOND DAY
TUESDAY, 9 DECEMBER

* * * *

CBR WARFARE

1. Introduction.

In our preoccupation with nuclear weapons we are sometimes prone to think of them as the "absolute" weapon of destruction and in so doing lose sight of another family of weapons with a tremendous war potential. This is the family of chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) weapons. Each of these elements in turn or in combination has great military potential. In our study of warfare and strategy, a knowledge of CBR warfare is essential in order to assess its value as a weapon of war and as an instrument of national strategy.

To gain an appreciation of the problems and potentialities of CBR warfare as an effective instrument of a nation's military power.

a. What were the factors which inhibited the use of chemical warfare in World War II? To what extent might these and other factors serve to rule out or limit CBR warfare in future conflicts?

b. Is CBR warfare more difficult to justify publicly on so-called moral grounds than other types of warfare? Why?

4. Lecture.

The subject of the lecture for this day is entitled, "CBR WARFARE."

5. Reading.

a. CBR ATTACK BY INVISIBLE INVADER, by Maj. Gen. William M.

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TWENTY-THIRD DAY
WEDNESDAY, 10 DECEMBER

* * * *

RESERVED FOR WORK ON INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PAPERS

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography is arranged in order of daily topics and provides supplemental references. The items are on display in the Main Reading Room of the Library.

A. Books

AIR POWER, by Asher Lee. New York, Praeger, 1955. 200 p.

An English author's discussion of air strategy and the use of air power in the past, the present, and the future.

AIRPOWER; Report. U. S. Congress. 85th. 1st sess. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Washington, GPO, 1957. 128 p. (Document No. 29)

This report made January 25, 1957, constitutes "a current, thorough and objective survey" of United States and Soviet air power.

A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, 1907-1957, edited by Alfred Goldberg. Princeton, N. J., D. Van Nostrand, 1957. 277 p.

Chapters 11-12 describe the missions: "Strategic Air Command-- the deterrent force, " and "air defense of North America. "

SAC, THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, by Richard G. Hubler. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1958. 280 p.

A history and description based upon USAF sources.

THE ROLE OF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER, by Rear Admiral A. D. Torlesse, R.N. Chapter VII in *Brassey's Annual, The Armed Forces Year-Book*, 1955. New York, Macmillan, 1955. p. 72-82.

SEA POWER AND AIRCRAFT, by Captain H. H. McWilliam, R.N. Chapter XII in *Brassey's Annual, The Armed Forces Year-Book*, 1953. New York, Macmillan, 1953. p. 122-134.

SEA POWER AND THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER, by Air Marshall

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Sir R. Saundby, R. A. F. Chapter XI in *Brassey's Annual, The Armed Forces Year-Book, 1953*. New York, Macmillan, 1953. p. 114-121.

VICTORY WITHOUT WAR, 1958-1961, by George F. Eliot. Annapolis, U. S. Naval Institute, 1958. 126 p.

An analysis emphasizing the role of naval power.

THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD SEA POWER, edited by Elmer B. Potter. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1955. 963 p.

This study, prepared by members of the Department of English, History and Government, U. S. Naval Academy, gives a graphic and historical review of the rise of the U. S. as a major naval power.

ATOMIC WEAPONS AND ARMIES, by F. O. Miksche. New York, Praeger, 1955. 222 p.

Lt. Col. Miksche, a stimulating continental author, discusses land warfare and the effects of atomic weapons upon the organization of armies of the future.

ATOMIC WEAPONS IN LAND COMBAT, by G. C. Reinhart and W. R. Kintner. 2d ed. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service Pub. Co., 1954. 243 p.

A timely, well-illustrated discussion of the battlefield employment of atomic weapons.

ON LIMITING ATOMIC WAR. Royal Institute of International Affairs. New York, 1956. 46 p.

A discussion of an aspect of defense policy in this nuclear age.

POLICY OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY ACTION IN THE KOREAN WAR, by William W. Kaufmann. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corporation, 1956. 32 p.

Analysis prepared September 7, 1956.

U. S. MILITARY DOCTRINE, A STUDY AND APPRAISAL, by Dale O. Smith. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1955. 256 p.

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A thoughtful examination of U. S. military policy in the light of
his documented study of the evolution of American military
doctrine.

WAR - 1974, by Robert B. Rigg. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service
Pub. Co., 1958. 304 p.

An account of an imaginary future war based on actual present-
day scientific, military, and technical developments.

WAR AND PEACE IN THE SPACE AGE, by James M. Gavin. New York,  
Harper, 1958. 304 p.

General Gavin examines the present and future concepts of modern
war and discusses the organization and weapons needed for United
States survival.

IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN TOTAL WAR, by Bernard Brodie. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corporation, 1956. 33 p. (Rand Corporation Research Memorandum RM-1842)

A study issued December 17, 1956.

TOTAL WAR, by J. M. Spaight. Chapter XI in *Brassey's Annual, The Armed Forces Year-Book, 1954*. New York, Macmillan, 1954. p. 111-121.

BIBLIOGRAPHY ON LIMITED WAR. U. S. Dept. of the Army. Army Library. Washington, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, 1958. 53 p. (Dept/Army Pamphlet PAM 20-60)

A comprehensive bibliography issued February, 1958.

LIMITED WAR, THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN STRATEGY, by Robert E. Osgood. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957. 318 p.

An analysis of the problem of how the United States "can utilize
its military power as a rational and effective instrument of national
policy." Sponsored by the University of Chicago Center for the
Study of American Foreign Policy.

THE MEANING OF LIMITED WAR, by Bernard Brodie. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corporation, 1958. 25 p. (Rand Corporation

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RM 2224)

A memorandum issued July 30, 1958, contrasting limited war in the past with the present concepts.

THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, prepared for and in cooperation with the U. S. Department of Defense and the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission. Washington, GPO, 1957. 579 p.

An authoritative account.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY, by Henry A. Kissinger. New York, Harper, 1957. 455 p.

Produced under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE SPUTNIKS, IN THE WORDS OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND OTHERS, edited by Richard Witkin. New York, Doubleday, 1958. 96 p.

A collection of articles written in October and November, 1957, recording initial American reactions.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM, Hearings. U. S. Congress. 85th. 1st sess. House. Committee on Appropriations. Washington, GPO, 1958. 137 p.

Hearings held by the Subcommittee on Department of Defense appropriations, November 20, 21, 1957.

GUIDED MISSILES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. U. S. Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service. Washington, GPO, 1957. 73 p.

A study prepared by Eilene Galloway and released April, 1957, as a Senate Armed Services Committee print.

GUIDED MISSILES IN WAR AND PEACE, by Nels A. Parson. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956. 161 p.

An introductory survey of their history, technology, and military as well as civilian use.

INQUIRY INTO SATELLITE AND MISSILE PROGRAMS, Hearing. U. S. Congress. 85th. 1st and 2d sess. Senate. Committee on

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Armed Services. Washington, GPO, 1958. 3 v.

Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, November 25, 1957-July 24, 1958.

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE REPORT ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE, ITS TECHNOLOGY, LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY, edited by Kenneth F. Gantz. New York, Doubleday, 1958. 338 p.

A collection of articles which first appeared in recent issues of the *Air University Quarterly Review*.

AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY: STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF WORLD POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, by Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. New York, Rinehart, 1957. 494 p.

A carefully selected collection of recent periodical literature discussing ten aspects of the problem, each prefaced by the author's introductory essay.

CURRENT STRATEGIC THINKING AS TO FUTURE WARS. U. S. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. Washington, 1957. 74 p.

Prepared by Col. Charles H. Donnelly in May 1957, it includes a bibliography for further exploration.

THE GREAT ARMS RACE, A COMPARISON OF U. S. AND SOVIET POWER TODAY, by Hanson W. Baldwin. New York, Praeger, 1958. 116 p.

A comparison based on recent articles in the *New York Times* by its military editor.

SECURITY OF THE NATION; A STUDY OF CURRENT PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. Association of the United States Army, Washington, 1957. 29 p.

A survey with an appendix of pertinent documents.

UNITED STATES DEFENSE POLICIES IN 1957. U. S. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. Washington, GPO, 1958. 125 p. (U. S. Congress. 85th. House Document No. 436)

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Prepared at the request of Congressman Price by Col. Charles H. Donnelly, Senior Specialist in National Defense, January, 1958. Appendix A comprises a selected bibliography.

UNITED STATES DEFENSE POLICIES SINCE WORLD WAR II. U. S. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. Washington, GPO, 1957. 87 p. (U. S. Congress. 85th. House Document No. 100)

Prepared at the request of Congressman Price by Col. Charles H. Donnelly, November, 1956. It includes a brief bibliography.

BRASSEY'S ANNUAL, THE ARMED FORCES YEAR-BOOK, 1957, edited by Rear Admiral H. G. Thursfield. New York, Macmillan, 1957. 440 p.

A collection of authoritative essays including: "Defence in the Nuclear Age," "Limited War," and "Defence: A New Look for Nuclear War".

GLOBAL STRATEGY, by Edgar J. Kingston-McCloughy. New York, Praeger, 1957. 270 p.

A provocative discussion, by a British Air Vice-Marshall, of current problems based upon global military geography; and his concepts of an over-all strategy which can solve out strategic difficulties.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY; THE MILITARY ASPECT. REPORT OF PANEL II OF THE SPECIAL STUDIES PROJECT. Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc., Special Studies Project. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1958. 63 p.

The first of a series of studies exploring the problems and opportunities confronting the United States over the next decade. Dr. Kissinger was director of the project organized in June, 1956.

MILITARY POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY, edited by William W. Kaufmann. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956. 274 p.

An analysis of foreseeable contingencies when the U. S. and U. S. S. R. will have equality in nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.

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MILITANT LIBERTY; A PROGRAM OF EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT
OF FREEDOM. U. S. Dept. of Defense. Washington, 1955.
13 p.

Prepared by Mr. John C. Broger; based on a conference in
June, 1955, assembled by the Secretary of Defense.

TENTH REPORT; January 1 - June 30, 1958. U. S. Information Agency.
Washington, GPO, 1958. 24 p.

Includes a summary of activities.

POLITICAL WARFARE, A GUIDE TO COMPETITIVE CO-EXISTENCE, by
John Scott. New York, John Day, 1955. 256 p.

Designed for the general reader, *Time* reporter Scott presents a
middle-of-the-road review of the current situation. There is an
introduction by C. D. Jackson.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, by Paul M. A. Linebarger. 2d ed.
Washington, Combat Forces Press, 1955. 318 p.

A standard text which has been revised to include lessons derived
from the Korean War.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CASEBOOK, by William E. Daugherty, in
collaboration with Morris Janowitz. Baltimore, Md., published
for Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University,
by the Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. 880 p.

A comprehensive collection illustrating all aspects of operations
from the American Revolution through the Korean War.

ECONOMIC WARFARE, by Yuan-li Wu. New York, Prentice-Hall, 1952.
403 p.

The only postwar textbook available to the general student prepared by an American-trained Chinese scholar.

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE CONTROL ACT OF 1951, 10th Report.
U. S. International Cooperation Administration. Washington, GPO,
1958. 62 p.

Entitled "East-West Trade Developments 1956-1957", it covers

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the 18-month period ending June 30, 1957.

COUNT DOWN FOR TOMORROW, THE INSIDE STORY OF EARTH SATELLITES, ROCKETS AND MISSILES AND THE RACE BETWEEN AMERICAN AND SOVIET SCIENCE, by Martin Caidin.
New York, Dutton, 1958. 288 p.

A current popularly written account.

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ACT OF 1958. CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 12575. U. S. Congress. 85th. Conference Committees, 1958. Washington, GPO. 1958. 25 p. (House Report No. 2166)

An explanation of Public Law 85-686, approved August 20, 1958.

ROCKETS, MISSILES AND SPACE TRAVEL, by Willy Ley. Rev. and enl. ed. New York, Viking Press, 1957. 528 p.

The latest edition of a pioneer, popular historian's work.

THE SPACE ENCYCLOPEDIA; A GUIDE TO ASTRONOMY AND SPACE RESEARCH. General Editor, M. T. Bizony. New York, Dutton, 1957. 287 p.

A comprehensive compendium based upon the contributions of British and American specialists.

CONTROL AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS, A DECADE OF NEGOTIATIONS, 1946-1956. U. S. Congress. 84th. 2d sess. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Washington, GPO, 1956. 22 p.

Staff Study No. 3 of the Subcommittee on Disarmament issued July 22, 1956.

CONTROL AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS, Final Report. U. S. Congress. 85th. Senate. 2d sess. Committee on Foreign Relations. Washington, GPO, 1958. 42 p. (Committee Print)

A report of the Subcommittee on Disarmament made September 3, 1958.

DEFENCE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, by Stephen King-Hall. London, Victor

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Gollancz, 1958. 223 p.

Commander King-Hall analyses the nature of modern war in terms of the situation of Great Britain. He concludes that unilateral nuclear disarmament would be most advantageous for Britain which would then concentrate on political warfare.

**DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY:** A collection of documents, 1919-1955. U. S. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. Washington, GPO, 1956. 1035 p.

A comprehensive compilation of pertinent texts; includes a 24-page bibliography.

**FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEXT PHASE,** by Thomas K. Finletter. New York, published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper, 1958. 208 p.

An analysis and recommendations. See Chapter X "Disarmament and Peace - Conclusions".

**FIFTH REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION,** September 1, 1957. United Nations. Disarmament Commission. New York, 1957. v.p. (U. N. Doc. DC/113)

This report includes the working papers and proposals submitted at the fifteen London meetings of the Commission, August 2 - September 6, 1957.

**ANALYSIS OF CIVIL DEFENSE REORGANIZATION (REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 1 OF 1958); TWENTY-SIXTH REPORT.** U. S. Congress. 85th. 2d sess. House. Committee on Government Operations. Washington, GPO, 1958. 31 p. (Report No. 1874)

The Civil Defense Organization within the Executive Office of the President effective as of July 1, 1958, is discussed. Majority and minority points of view are included.

**ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1957.** U. S. Federal Civil Defense Administration. Washington, GPO, 1958. 77 p.

Administrator Hoegh's report covering the period July 1, 1956 to June 30, 1957.

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ATOMIC SHELTER PROGRAMS. U. S. Congress. 85th. House.
Committee on Government Operations. Washington, GPO, 1958.
22 p. (Report No. 2554)

The thirty-fourth report of the committee made August 12, 1958.

CIVIL DEFENSE: PART I - ATOMIC SHELTER TESTS; PART II - REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 1 OF 1958; HEARINGS. U. S. Congress. 85th. 2d sess. House. Committee on Government Operations. Washington, GPO, 1958. 519 p.

Hearings held between April 30 and May 7, 1958. Appendix A is the McKinsey and Co. report, Appendix B is the Rand Corp. Study, both relating to nonmilitary defense.

THE NATIONAL PLAN FOR CIVIL DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMY ATTACK.
U. S. Federal Civil Defense Administration. Washington, GPO,
1956. 118 p.

Designed as a base for further planning; reflects contemporary
civil defense thinking.

REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON THE
EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION. United Nations. Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. New York, 1958.
228 p.

This report presents a survey of these effects based upon the
information received as well as the conclusions reached by the
committee in the light of current scientific knowledge.

B. Periodicals

NOTE: These items will be found in the Periodical Section.

AIR POWER CAPABILITIES, by Gen. Thomas D. White, USAF. In
Ordnance, July-August, 1958, p. 41-43.

COMING DEATH OF THE FLYING AIR FORCE, by Fletcher Knebel. In
Look Magazine, October 1, 1957, p. 25-29.

OBSTACLES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN AIR POWER, by
Barton Leach. In The Annals, May, 1955, p. 67-75.

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NATIONAL POLICY AND THE TRANSOCEANIC NAVY, by Samuel P. Huntington. In *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May, 1954, p. 483-494.

NATURES OF WARS - LIMITED AND UNLIMITED, by Julian S. Corbett. A reprint of Chapter III from his book, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1918, p. 33-42.

RE-EXAMINE THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR, by James A. Huston. In *Military Review*, February, 1956, p. 30-36.

NUCLEAR PLENTY AND LIMITED WAR, by James E. King. In *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1957, p. 238-256.

TERRITORIAL WAR: THE NEW CONCEPT OF RESISTANCE, by Lt. Gen. Dushan Kveder. In *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1953, p. 91-108.

MORE ABOUT LIMITED WAR, by Bernard Brodie. In *World Politics*, October, 1957, p. 112-122.

PEACE AND DISARMAMENT, by Harold Stassen. In *International Affairs*, July, 1956, p. 283-286.

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