3

to foreign pressure. But North Vietnam, a regional enemy, used our domestic divisions to complete its conquest of Indochina.

The Clinton Administration does not confront a global challenge; its adversaries are local rogues-- if anything, even more ruthless than the Hanoi of the 1970s. At the same time, there are no domestic inhibitions to any decision to resist depredations of Saddam Hussein. Uncertainties about the international impact of the impeachment process exist because the Clinton Administration has established neither the record nor the coherence of Nixon's. It is the difference between a president whose overwhelming preoccupation was foreign policy and one who ran his campaign on the slogan "it's the economy, stupid" and who has shown little indication of broadening his

4

interest since. During Watergate, I was often able to
act on behalf of the president because there was never
any question in my mind as to Nixon's foreign policy
priorities or strategic design. I doubt that any of
President Clinton's associates in the field of
national security could make this claim or possesses
the machinery for implementing it if he did.

Allowing for these differences, I believe that
certain patterns are likely to be recurrent.

The first is the growing preoccupation of the
president with the crisis and the consequent decline
in the attention span he can devote to other issues.
This was not necessarily apparent at the beginning of
either crisis because both Nixon and Clinton seem to
have lacked any grasp of the gravity of what they were
facing. Thus, at some point, both presidents became

5

passengers rather than pilots of the vehicle.

That point marks a decisive psychological threshold. The agony, exhaustion and occasional exaltation of the quest for the presidency is made bearable only by the candidate's near-obsession with control and his dedication to service. When both these possibilities begin to evaporate--against the backdrop of a realization deep down that one's own actions provided at least the mechanism of the decline--a feeling of resentment, bitterness and frustration is the inevitable consequence.

During Watergate, this stage was followed by a kind of fatalism that brought with it a reduction in the intensity with which Nixon handled policy issues. He continued to deal with the day-to-day issues firmly and systematically--albeit without the sometimes

6

frenetic quality with which he tackled foreign policy
in normal times. His phone calls to me declined in
frequency. The demands for the exhausting explorations
of options grew somewhat less intense. And, as time
went on, I began to notice in our daily meetings a
faraway look steal across Nixon's eyes, as if the
enormity of what he was facing (and surely knew he had
wrought) trivialized the subject we were discussing.
And, especially in the last weeks, I felt a deep
melancholy, as if Nixon at each meeting was bidding
farewell to what had heretofore been the purpose of
his life and would now be forever denied him.

The real decline in the quality of presidential
leadership occurred less in the day-to-day decisions
than in the level of decision-making which goes beyond
the statement of the issues as they emerge from the

7

bureaucracy. Nixon found himself more and more driven
into choosing between options presented by
subordinates rather than insisting on his own. Major
progress continued to be achieved, especially in
Middle East negotiations, but they resulted basically
from strategies designed and implemented before
Watergate's full force. But even there, Nixon
occasionally roused himself to his old decisiveness as
when, during the Yom Kippur War, he ended a
bureaucratic debate about how to supply arms to Israel
by ordering the use of the American military airlift-
-a decision which was as personal as it was
unprecedented.

The area which suffered most was that of overall
strategic design. Before Watergate, Nixon had been
indefatigable in urging a consideration of long-range

8

goals and perspectives. As impeachment gained momentum, these demands diminished and eventually ceased altogether, I suppose because Nixon came to feel that he would not have time to see them through. I did my best to fill the vacuum, but there is no substitute in our system for presidential leadership—especially in foreign policy.

Finally, there occurred a fallout from Watergate I had not expected. It was in the willingness of friendly democratic leaders to stake their political capital on ostentatious association with Nixon dramatically diminishing, constricting the scope for certain kinds of initiatives—for example, in the 1973 initiative to revitalize the Atlantic relationship on the basis of a summit between the leaders of the North Atlantic nations. That summit never materialized, and

9

the initiative remained bogged down in the various
national bureaucracies. There were many contributing
causes for the failure, but surely the declining
benefit of dramatic joint declarations with a wounded
president was a factor. I would be amazed if these
tendencies were not even more pronounced with respect
to the much more tactically oriented Clinton
Administration, whose central direction is so much
more diffuse and hence less predictable.

Against this background, let me answer the
questions with which I started this article. I believe
that the capacity of the president to deal with
direct threats from abroad remains high. Clinton's
severest critics will (or at least should) rally in
resistance to rogue efforts to challenge either our
security or our values. Leaders such as Saddam Hussein

10

and Kim Jong-il of North Korea should be left in no
doubt that our domestic divisions will not keep the
American people from uniting behind the president to
resist their challenges.

Ambiguous threats will be more problematic. But
I hope that the Administration, the Congress and the
media will make every effort to insulate domestic
controversies from foreign policy.

To ease that process, a number of measures seem
appropriate.

The president may find it helpful to constitute
an inner group of the National Security Council to
raise policy from the ad hoc to at least the medium-
and, hopefully, the long-range. When Watergate blew
up, Secretary of Treasury Shultz, Federal Reserve
Chairman Arthus Burns and I constituted ourselves as

11

such an informal group which, with Nixon's

concurrence, sought to insulate decision-making from

the storms raging around it.

The Congress should constitute a group - probably
the leadership - to receive regular National Security
Council briefings. This is to prevent excessive
instability during unforeseen or unforeseeable crises.

The impeachment process we have just begun is one
of the awe-inspiring aspects of our political system.
Only a strong and constitutional society could afford
it. One must hope that it will be as swift as is
compatible with our constitutional necessities. And
that it will be conducted with compassion to a just
end.

SENT BY:

OCT-07-98 WED 19:33

GOLDHAMMER

10- 8-98 ; 14:02 ;PENINSULA BEVERLY HL→

FAX NO. 5617450358

212 753 7248:# 4/11

P. 04

foreign pressure.

The Clinton Administration does not confront a global challenge; its adversaries are local rogues, if anything even more setless than the Reno of the perhaps less restrained but also less dangerous than theEVENTS. Soviet Union. At the same time, the Clinton Administration has established neither the record nor the coherence of Nixon's. It is the difference between a president whose overwhelming preoccupation was foreign policy and a president who ran his campaign on the slogan A STupid? and has shown little indication of broadening his interest since. During Watergate & more was often able to act on behalf of the President himself, never any question in my mind of Nixon's foreign policy priorities and strategic design. I doubt that any associate in the field of national security possesses the machinery for implementing it if he did.

Allowing for these differences, I still believe

SENT BY:

OCT-07-98 WED 19:34

GOLDHAMMER

10- 8-98 ; 14:03 ;PENINSULA BEVERLY HL→

FAX NO. 5617450358

212 753 7248:# 7/11

P. 07

a certain melancholy, as if Nixon at each meeting was

of his life.

and would be forever denied to him.
The real stake in the quality of the deliberated

leadership but is the day-to-day decisions were effectively
made less invidious.

than say
handled (if with some intangible reduction?), this was

not true of the second level of decision-making which

goes beyond the statement of the issues as they emerge
transcending and redefining the issues as they came up

from the bureaucracy. Nixon found himself more and more
driven into choosing between options presented by
subordinates rather than insisting on his own. Major
progress continued to be achieved, especially in Middle
East negotiations, but they resulted basically from

full force. But even there Heimann occasionally raised
the issue of his olddecisions as when during
the Yom Kippur war he ended a conference debate about

Less and supply aims to be realized
by ordering the use of the Americans
military aircraft - a decision which
was as personal as it was
unprecedented

SENT BY:

OCT-07-98 WED 19:35

GOLDHAMMER

10- 8-98 ; 14:04 :PENINSULA BEVERLY HL→

FAX NO. 5617450358

212 753 7248:# 9/11

8

contributing causes for the failure, but surely the dramatic first declarations with declining benefit of dramatic summits was a factor. I

would be amazed if these tendencies were not even more with respect to the more tactically oriented administration

pronounced even more diffuse, central direction is now more with a much more diffuse central direction is now more

diffuse and less predictable, let me with this as a background, it may be possible to

I believe that the capacity of the President to deal with from abroad American interest evaluations direct threats remains high. His severest critics will

(or at least should) rally in resistance to rogue efforts to challenge either our security or our values. Ambiguous

challenges will be more problematic. But I hope that the Administration, the Congress and the media will make every effort to insulate domestic controversies from foreign policy.

In order to ease the process, a number of measures

SENT BY:
OCT-07-98 WED 19:35

GOLDHAMMER

10- 8-98 ; 14:05 :PENINSULA BEVERLY HL→

FAX NO. 5817450358

212 753 7248:#10/11

9

might seem appropriate.

The President may find it helpful to constitute an inner group of the National Security Council to raise policy from the ad hoc to at least the medium- and, hopefully, the long-range. When Watergate hit with full force, Secretary of Treasury Shultz, Federal Reserve Chief Arthus Burns and it constituted ourselves as such an informal group which, with Nixon's concurrence, sought

to stabilize our decision-making from the stunts they are around it

The impeachment process we have just started is one of the awe-inspiring aspects of our political system. Only a strong and constitutional society could afford it.