St. George's Theological College
in Christ the King
Missouri Theological College

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KMH, NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Max Frankel/Mr. Kissinger

9:36 a.m., June 30, 1972

K: Hello

F: Hello Henry, welcome home.

H: Thank you, Max.

F: How are you.

K: O.K. Max, I'm off again. I'm going to the West Coast with the President.

F: Right.

K: I know you called that you wanted to see me, and I'd like to see you.

F: I'd like very much to see you.

K: You're not going to be out there because I'm always much more relaxed.

F: I know you are and I would gladly make a detour but we've got to take a whole large crew to Miami.

K: I see.

F: And I just don't think I'd be able to make it although if I can -

K: Well look, if you can, feel free and we'll have lunch.

F: Thank you.

K: At any rate a good session.

F: O.K., thank you very much.

K: Otherwise let's get together shortly after my return.

F: Right. I appreciate that very much. By the way, Eileen Hanahan is going to be covering you out there and I think you might find her both interesting and fun.

K: I don't know who she is.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

K: Who is she. Is she a new -

F: She's our tax expert.

K: I see, I've never met her.

F: And very fine at economic coverage. I mean she knows Connally
and Walker and that whole crowd. But

K: But if I can be of any help to an economist, you're in bad ____

F: (Laughter) Who's been doing nothing but reading your backgrounders
for the last six months. Because she's not only going to be helping
cover the President, she's going to be active in our campaign coverage.

K: Well I'll make a point to see her for fifteen minutes - will you ask her to call me?

F: Great, I sure will. Thanks so much.

K: Max, one other really absolutely trivial point just to show you that
I'm reading you.

F: O.K.

K: You know I've always had the view that one difficulty with intelligence
is that it makes the opponent look smarter than he is because they
always have to/fnd a devious reason.

F: Right.

K: And I think that's sometimes true of newspaper men.

F: Sure. Except I don't deal in opponents.

K: NO-NO, I mean in describing the people they describe.

F: Right.

K: You said, for example, that resuming the talks on the thirteenth
______ the Democrats fits, which is of course true.

F: Uh-huh.

I mean really

K: But, actually, /this is strictly off the record. But this date was not
picked by us, it was picked by them.

F: Interesting.

K: We had picked an earlier date.

- 3

F: Right.

K: This is really only for your education.

F: Sure.

K: Because we, we didn't want to pick that date, and it's amusing how the thing worked out.

F: Very much so. And, well, you know the Democrats couldn't avoid that situation in any case. Once you establish the premise of negotiations through the campaign period.

K: Exactly.

F: They're going to have to sit on -- they're going to have to worry that you're pulling a rabbit out of the hat. And

K: No, no, your basic analysis is right, and they also face the problem you know that whatever they do casts them as you said, I think, as unwitting accomplices or supporters or --

F: Bearers of the hope -- it took me a while to come up with that

K: Bearers of the hopes is better.

F: Right.

K: But insofar as we could that wasn't our design in this particular -- I mean as far as the exact date is concerned.

F: Right. Well I appreciate - you know

K: And in fact once when we can put this whole diplomacy together, it all works out that way, but if you think, if you analyze all the pieces that had to be put into place to get to give this the maximum opportunity to succeed.

F: Right.

K: It took about that amount of time.

F: Sure, you know I

.....

Hanoi, June 12, 1968

President's Note:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

- 4

By: KVLV NASA Date: 5/13/64

K: No, you were not saying it critically, you were not saying it was a devious move.

F: Right.

K: You were simply stating the consequence and I trust that a semi-amusing <u>kind of</u> sidelight was telling you

F: Right.

K: That the result was achieved by Hanoi.

F: Right. It's all in the situation <u>it shows</u>

K: But it strengthens your basic case, actually, because/once you are in that situation, there is no way even Hanoi can avoid it perhaps even its own interest.

F: How do you rate your own hopes?

K: I feel, you know its hard to say this in a way that doesn't sound wrong.

F: Un-huh

K: I feel that if it weren't for the election.

F: Right

K: The chances would be better than even.

F: Right.

K: My own estimate now is that the chances are better than even for a serious talk and about even for a settlement.

F: Uh-huh.

K: But I'll know it better once the talks really start.

F: Is it your guess - how fine tuned will they get in making their own basic decisions about watching this election?

K: But look they have a real problem which is this. They can fine <u>in</u><u>ix</u> tune it as much as they want. If it looks however as if the Democrats have no chance of winning -

F: Right.

H. G. W. Bush, former President
4th President of the United States
Reagan's Vice President

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KMLV NARA ID: 5/12/04

K: Then they are playing an empty game.

F: Uh-huh.

K: If what they do cannot affect the election, they are playing an empty game.

F: Right.

K: And if they get so weakened by January 20th that they couldn't take advantage even of a withdrawal of American forces and support in any previous period of time -

F: Right

K: They have a problem.

F: That's right.

K: So it is not a foregone conclusion. You know the obvious thing to say is wait until the election.

F: Oh no, no, I don't think it's obvious at all. ...

K: You haven't said this, but you know most people that one talks to off the top of their heads say Well, why shouldn't they wait, having fought 27 years.

F: Right

K: For four more months.

F: Sure

K: But first it's seven months, not four months, they have to wait.

F: No, I'm just curious as to how much you think they will still vary their response depending on whether Gallup comes up with a ten-point margin.

K: What I think they will do, and I'm now speaking as Henry Kissinger, and all of this is off the record.

F: Of course, sure.

speaking

K: And I'm speaking merely strictly as Henry Kissinger.

F: Right.

The president of the republic is the
President of the Republic

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: KHLV NASA, Date: 5/12/04

K: Not as an Administration. My view is that they will start seriously

F: Uh-huh

K: That they will get themselves the option of a rapid settlement.

F: Right

K: And they will not get stonewalled waiting for the polls.

F: Right.

K: And that they will not settle until they see how the polls go. A lot closer in the election campaign. But even that gives them a problem because if there is some progress, that in effect will affect the polls. So - but this I think is going to be their strategy.

F: How late can they carry this game?

K: Not much beyond September.

F: That's what I would think.

K: Because if they play it into October and the polls stay unfavorable, we might just decide the hell with it.

F: Yeh. But we need a phrase for brinkmanship in reverse. Sort of away from the brink, Henry.

K: It's one of the most complex diplomacies, you know, that I know anything about.

F: Well, I week wish you well.

K: Thank you, Max.

F: And thank you for your call.

K: And let's get together the week -- you'll be here the week of the 17th?

F: I will be here -- no probably not until the week after. I'm traveling through the South politically after the convention.

K: Well, let's get together the week of the 23rd. That will be better for me anyway.

F: Thanks so much.

K: Good - Max have a good time.

F: Thank you. K: Goodbye

The New York Times and United Press International
Published on June 30, 1972

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

TELECON

Mr. Newbold Noyes / Mr. Kissinger

11:27 AM, June 30, 1972

By: KHN, NASA Date: 5/13/72

K: Mr. Noyes

N: How are you?

K: I just ran into Dave Kraslow and he told me in confidence that he was joining you.

N: Yes he is.

K: And I just wanted to tell you that while he is a pain in the neck in his integrity and while I was hoping that a new job would take him out of town, you couldn't have done better.

N: Well, thank you very much. Kraslow

K: He really is a man of outstanding integrity.

N: Yuh

K: If you read his writings you know that he hasn't given excessive comfort to us. I'm not saying this because he's supporting the Administration necessarily. But he's fair and a first class reporter. I knew him when he was a Neiman fellow at Harvard.

N: Yeh. Well I'm delighted that you feel that way about him and I think you're right, that he is somebody who will ... help us.

Kx

K: I think he will be a great addition and so I took the liberty of telling you.

N: Well, good, when are we going to see you again?

K: I'd be delighted any time.

KxK: I can't do it for the next two weeks because ..

KxN: You can't do it for the next two weeks -- can I write you a letter then?

KxK: I'll be back the week of the 17th. Why don't we aim for that?

N: OK, fine.

K: Good, marvelous.

N: Great.

Re: please don't call me a day
Mr. Kissinger, you're not a person of commercial
not commercial
Please call me Henry

CLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

TELECON

Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

11:30 a.m., June 30, 1972

By: KM.Y NASA Date 5/13/72

K: Hello

Kr: Hi Henry, good morning to you.

K: How are you. I just talked to Noyes and told him that ______ what a pain in the neck and only his ______ to put this in folders may do it. ______ use x-rays. And while I was hoping you would get out of town, he made a good choice.

Kr: Well, you're very kind, what was his reaction.

K: He was delighted.

Kr: Well, good.

K: And I told him to read your writing so that he could see that I'm not saying this because you had given us excessive comfort.

Kr: (laughter) Did he also tell you that I had demanded a certain quota of exclusives?

K: No.

Kr: Well, I will.

K: I didn't think it would help you if I indicated too close a relationship.

Kr: Well, I think everybody knows this. But I will determine to extract something from you anyway. Would it be possible to visit for just two or three minutes before you pull out for California?

K: I doubt it. I'll try, but I really think it's going to be tough.

Kr: All right. In case we cannot do it, I have a request for you. I don't give a God Dam about the Los Angeles Times anymore, but there are certain people in this Bureau for whom I have a very special fondness, and I feel a very special responsibility. I feel kind of naked with your office now that I'm going and they have asked me as a personal favor if I could arrange a dinner with you which I would attend upon your return from California for four or five people in the office.

K: Washington Star?

Kr: No, no, of the LA Times Bureau. Get these people as individuals. Rudy Abramson and Bob Toth.

The position of the operator is
in the House of Representatives
of the United States.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

- 2 -

6/14/64 NASA Date 5/12/64

K: Good.

Kr: So can I set that up when you get back from California?

K: Yes.

Kr: O.K., you're very kind. What else can I tell you. Dear friend, this thing will be announced in Sunday's paper.

K: Good, delighted.

Kr: And I'm looking forward to it and I hope we can maintain contact.

K: Well, you can count on that.

Kr: All right.

K: And I congratulate the Star and it's good for you and it's good for the country.

Kr: Very good. Now I think we need you know

K: It's a good position.

Kr: I intend to do a hell of a job over there Henry and I

K: I know you will.

Kr: and I mean this very seriously; I hope I will have your help.

K: Of course you will, you know, within the limits of my profession.

Kr: Well I don't give a God Damn about national security, I--

K: O.K. Dave.

you know

Kr: But whatever I get/will be treated responsibly.

K: Right.

Kr: And again I appreciate your assistance.

K: No, not at all, and all the best to you.

Kr: You know that there's a word for it -- it's called

K: No, no, no, I've respected you for a long time.

Kr: Well, thank you dear friend.

Kr & K: Goodbye

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOL2568
By CH NARA Date Stator

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., June 30, 1972

K: Hello, Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry. How are you?

K: Okay. Two things -- One, about the Vietnam talks. I wanted to say one thing about your friends there.

D: Where?

K: Hanoi. And I must say it very seriously to your leadership. One is they're already starting again what we told you at great length we would never tolerate.

D: What namely?

K: Well, now they've made a statement today saying they have forced us back to the conference table.

D: Henry, you know I mentioned to you the other day when we went over this, some kind of statement they will do it. They didn't specifically tell us what kind of statement.

K: Now they've invited Joe Kraft and some Labor leaders to Hanoi.

D: Joe Kraft?

K: Yeah. And you know what the purpose of this is.

D: No.

K: You know, they are going to float whatever proposals they're going to make publicly before they speak with us.

D: No. On this particular point, I don't know really but I am quite prepared to send through us to them -- if they are going to do this one, you will take your own conclusion from this one.

K: If they play domestic politics here, we will do what we did in May. We will break off and escalate because we have nothing to lose that way. Then we will have to try to force them to their knees. I mean, we literally would have no choice. I mean, I am telling you frankly. This is not to be transmitted in quite this brutal language.

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., June 30, 1972

- 2 -

D: Yeah, I understand. Well, the only thing we should really put in the promise is what you said in the middle. I mean, if they are really going to tell everything to all the people who come to them having nothing to do with the Administration and just give out publicly, then there is no sense to negotiate.

K: And then we will have to break off.

D: Yeah, this I am prepared to ask on your behalf of my people in Moscow to tender to Hanoi. This I could do.

K: I think if you could do that, it would really --

D: Of course, nothing about the first time because nobody could -- Well, you know, they make a statement after all it's really perfectly clear and without any specific threat. As you know, the statement that was released by the Chinese. I mean, on the last threat.

K: Let them try to talk seriously. He has never tried it in four years.

D: Yeah. This I am quite prepared to ask my people to send to them. I mean, without any specifics that says you will bring them to their knees, as you know.

K: No, no; you know, this is for your information.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: I mean, we will have to do something.

D: Who is from Labor going there?

K: Well, I think from the Teamsters Union.

D: Oh, Teamsters. It doesn't really matter about names really.

K: I think it's Gibbons.

D: Yeah. I mean there is no specific -- it doesn't matter. On this I am prepared to tell what you mentioned to me about if they are going to start out publically that you are going to break, there is nothing new but it will be once again confirmation of your position.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E1-02382
By CHNARA Date 6-20-72

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012587
By CHNARA Date 05/01/87

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., June 30, 1972

K: That's right. We will under no circumstances yield to domestic pressures here.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: Now, you heard about Baltimore. I mean, I sent over that note to you yesterday. You haven't had word yet?

D: Not yet, but it wasn't in on time.

K: There's no hurry. We can sign it.

D: Actually, maybe even today I will receive quite frankly but if not, we could sign because you have a text. I really don't see any -- In my opinion, it's quite all right. Maybe they find some others but otherwise I think it's really exactly what was wanted.

K: The other one we wait till you hear from Moscow.

D: When I do, I will be in touch with you. In this case, [each one while it will be varied, we'll just initial] and sign it here in this case.

K: Exactly.

D: But if I receive today -- when are you leaving today?

K: About 3:30.

D: Oh, 3:30. It's practically -- I will have no time. In this case, I will be back in touch with you.

K: Right.

D: And we could do it really.

K: Right.

D: Okay. You have nothing else, Henry?

K: You're coming out around the 10th, right?

D: Yes. What's your telephone number?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E112358
By CHARA Date 6/1/72

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., June 30, 1972

K: Call the White House, they are connected directly with me. I can give you a number. Area Code 714/492-0011.

D: Approximately you imagine the . . . . . . . . . . . next Tuesday.

K: Right.

D: Los Angeles one day if possible I would like to see. I would like to see San Clemente.

K: They way I thing we might do it -- If you say arrive in Los Angeles Monday night, then I would come up on Tuesday and we would go to some movie studios together on Tuesday. And then in the evening we could have dinner in Los Angeles and Wednesday you can go to San Clemente.

D: Oh, I see.

[Break in Tapes]

D: I will give you a call anyway 4 or 5 days before.

K: Good. Because I want to invite some people.

D: Not to make it too big but nevertheless I would like somebody.

K: No, I would invite about 10 to 14.

D: Yes, I leave that entirely up to you. You know the people really so I rely on your opinion and judgment, which is usually a good one (laughter).

K: You don't want to have a detailed political discussion, do you?

D: Not at all.

K: Okay.

D: Okay, Henry.

K: It will be a fairly serious one. You know, it will be what is considered socially acceptable.

D: No, it will be just a social event. Just to have a nice evening.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Eulalia
By: CH. NARASARAYA
Date: 6-26-72

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., June 30, 1972

- 5 -

K: It will be a social event.

D: Yes, nothing to do with politics. It's really very clear.

K: No, I will give it at the house of the head of Paramount. I've talked to him already so it will be at a private house.

D: I think it would be better, yes. Well, also I think everything is arranged. We don't have anything specific on our agenda. All you're going to think about is no news business.

K: No, no; that's right.

D: Because when you come to Moscow, Mr. Brezhnev will ask you.

K: No, no; we'll discuss it when you come to San Clemente.

D: Between us, I noticed how you and the President now and noticed with interest how you, as you say, in ______ with Mr. Brezhnev in alliance with Mr. Laird.

K: I have stopped it; it will not happen again.

D: (laughter) I don't know whether Mr. Brezhnev will like it or not. I rather guess he will not. But it looks rather ridiculous between us. Mr. Brezhnev supporter of Mr. Laird.

K: I have never said this. I never said it.

D: I know but the President, why should he say it? He used it rather persistently and I think it's not really a very good idea, between us.

K: You can tell your leaders that already this morning steps were taken to stop it.

D: Because it sounds rather ridiculous.

K: It will never happen again.

D: Rather ridiculous.

K: It won't happen again; you've shown great restraint.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01258
By CNAR Date 05/30/72

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., June 30, 1972

D: Yeah. Well, on this grain business I think it's going quite all right for the time being. I don't see any specific difficulties, do you?

K: No. It looks fine.

D: What else do we have? Well, on this fellow (?) you will tell me later on. There is nothing specifically otherwise. Of course, on the Middle East but I am afraid you will not spend the Thursday on this problem while I'm in California.

K: No, that is correct.

D: We are not going to spend -- (laughter)

K: That is correct.

D: Well, it's still as it stands. Okay, so if I have something I will be in touch with you. Okay.

K: Good. Bye.

D: Bye, bye.

The telephone tree of the world
is the tree of life
A personal tree
of the President

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.5

By KVL WFAA, Date 5/12/84

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p. m., June 30, 1972

K: Hello, Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry. How are you?

D: Where?

D: What namely?

D: Joe Kraft?

D: No.

Request for reissue of this record
by the Secretary of Defense
Nuclear War?

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

By: J.H. V NASA Date: 5/12/94

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., June 30, 1972

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: I think it's Gibbons.

H. J. Dobrynin/Mr. Klasinger
Mr. Dobrynin and Mr. Klasinger

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.5

By: KM. V. NASA Date: 5/12/94

- 3 -

TELCOM

Asst. Dobrynin/Mr. Klasinger

12:25 p.m., June 30, 1972

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: Exactly.

K: About 3:30.

K: Right.

D: And we could do it really.

K: Right.

The President's Office is open 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. except on Federal holidays.
Please call ahead.

By: K.M.V. NASA Date: 5/12/94

- 4 -

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., June 30, 1972

K: Right.

K: They way I think we might do it -- If you say arrive in Los Angeles Monday night, then I would come up on Tuesday and we would go to some movie studies together on Tuesday. And then in the evening we could have dinner in Los Angeles and Wednesday you can go to San Clemente.

D: Oh, I see.

[Break in Tapes]

D: Yes, I leave that entirely up to you. You know the people really so rely on your opinion and judgment, which is usually a good one (laughter).

D: Not at all.

K: Okay.

D: Okay, Henry.

It is unknown how the report came to be made public, but it seems to be true, and the report is correct.

McIntosh, Mr. and Mrs. and Mr. and Mrs. McIntosh?

By: KMLV
NARA Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Klaasinger

12:25 p.m., June 30, 1972

- 5 -

K: It will be a social event.

K: No, no; that's right.

D: Because when you come to Moscow, Mr. Breshnev will ask you.

D: Between us, I noticed how you and the President now and noticed with interest how you, as you say, in ______ with Mr. Breshnev in alliance with Mr. Laird.

D: (laughter) I don't know whether Mr. Breshnev will like it or not. I rather guess he will not. But it looks rather ridiculous between us. Mr. Breshnev supporter of Mr. Laird.

D: Rather ridiculous.

A. M. E. T. C. of the 4th Bn. of the 2nd Divisional Medical Corps Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.5

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p. m., June 30, 1972

By: K.H. W. NASA Date: 5/13/72

K: No. It looks fine.

K: No, that is correct.

K: That is correct.

K: Good. Bye.

D: Bye, bye.

TELECON: 12:46, 6/30/72

Sidney Gruson, Sr VP, NYT/
Mr. Kissinger

Re: Telephone calls to the open lines
of the New York Times Staff
Preliminary Report

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

By: KJLW

NARA. Date: 5/13/04

K: Hello

G: Henry

K: Sidney, how are you?

G: I'm well, and you?

K: OK

G: You're not all tired out and have slanted eyes?

K: Slanted eyes, yes.

G: I want to talk to you sometime. It has nothing to do with East Asia.
Did you ever get a message.

K: Yes, from Barbara Walters?

G: Yeh.

K: Yes.

G: Did she tell you what I wanted to see you about.

K: Yes in very general terms. It's not something that's going to happen
in the next six months.

G: I don't expect it to happen in the next six months. In fact, she and I
made a bet. Did she tell you that.

K: Yeh. I forget though. She thought it might happen.

G: I said it wouldn't happen for three more years. But that doesn't
change my interest in the subject I want to talk to you about. I don't
need much time. If you were coming to New York anytime in the
future we could do it that way.

K: All right, well I won't be in New York until the 26th some time.

G: 26th?

K: 26th of July.

G: Could we - could I take 15 minutes of your time then?

K: Certainly. Let me call you before I come up.

By: Joyce Haber/Mr. Kissinger
Date: June 30, 1972
Time: 12:55 p.m.

By: K.H. W.
NASA Date: 5/12/64

TELCONE

Joyce Haber/Mr. Kissinger

12:55 p.m., June 30, 1972

H: Hello, Henry.

K: Joyce, how are you?

H: I'm fine. Sort of checking on whether you're still there or here?

K: No, I'm coming out either late today or tomorrow.

H: It suddenly occurred to me the way my schedule is getting, I might not see you unless we set something. I don't know why but it's filling up terribly.

K: Oh, really.

H: Yeah. You're going to be here for two weeks.

K: Yeah. I'll be there until the 17th.

H: I see. For one thing, I was thinking whether you could do a small dinner on either Saturday the 8th or Sunday the 9th. Which would be good for you? I'll have 8 or 10 people.

K: Sure but do you want to go to that much trouble.

H: Sure. Well, I don't know why not. I would just do it small because I'm trying to keep my couples through this whole thing and I don't want to give too many big parties. But that's easy enough to do.

K: Yeah, that would be nice.

H: Okay. Would you like to bring someone or would you like to be my date or what?

K: I haven't frankly thought about it. I have nobody particular in mind right now.

H: Either way. If you change your mind, let me know.

K: Right.

H: Which would you prefer, Saturday or Sunday?

K: Could I call you tomorrow?

Re: what's the open line
8:00am or 10:00am
Please call us

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12938, Sec. 3.6

TELCOM

Joyce Haber/Mr. Kissinger

12:55 p.m., June 30, 1972

H: Sure, there's no problem. I would love to come to San Clemente one day.

K: I'd love for you to do that next week some day for lunch. Or the week after it that's easier for you.

H: Yeah, the week after would be easier.

K: Do you want to set it now?

H: Okay.

K: Monday, or you name the day.

H: Well, my good days are Wednesday, Thursday and Friday -- the 12th, 13th and 14th.

K: Well, let's say tentatively the 12th.

H: Okay.

K: Unless something intervenes, in which case I'll call you. But I can't imagine this now.

H: Okay. Have you seen a movie called the Candidates?

K: No.

H: It got a great review by ____ Kaplan for Sunday's upcoming calendar and I thought I might try to get that for the night we have the dinner.

K: You can assume that I've never seen anything.

H: There's also a sequel to a marvelous film about rats. Did you ever see Williard?

K: No.

H: Well, this is called Ben (?). And there's something by Alfred Hitchcock called Frenzie.

K: Yeah, that sounds quite interesting.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Fob 1287
By CNRA Date Stetol

TELCORN

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:02 p.m., June 30, 1972

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Yes, Anatol.

D: I would like to discuss with you the question with this grain. Just now Mr. Kuzmin he returned from Peterson and probably there has been some kind of misunderstanding. Before you leave, I would like to ask you what it is about. He and Mr. Butz mentioned to our Minister Kuzmin that they would like to hold all this until Peterson will come back from Moscow.

K: No, no need.

D: No need?

K: No.

D: Because we are quite prepared to do it. I mean, in a sense, as you know, there is a two-fold declaration. One is a agreement for three years. The other is to sign it now while Kuzmin is here for one year. So we are quite prepared to delay the announcement, so to speak, for the three years when Pete will be back. We have nothing against it because we think it is quite all right with us.

K: Actually the President's present thinking, which I haven't told Peterson yet, is to announce it around the 18th.

D: The 18th of what?

K: July.

D: Well, it doesn't really matter whether it is July 18th. It is quite all right with us.

K: You can do it for the three-year deal?

D: Yes.

K: It is completed by then?

D: No, the question really is on a practical thing. We will sign it. There is no real problem within a few days on this three-year deal. We will sign it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01258
By CHNARA Date 03-06-72

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:02 p.m., June 30, 1972

- 2 -

K: Oh, you will sign it.

D: Yes. I mean, sign it but without announcement. We could sign it here while Mr. Kuzmin is here.

K: Right.

D: So there is no problem about it. We will have a document but actually we will announce it on 18 or 12 or whenever you really like it.

K: Right.

D: But the practical point is Mr. Kuzmin while he is still here, he would like to sign it with the companies -- American companies who really deals for the first year without telling them he is going to buy for another extra two years.

K: Yes.

D: But your people -- Peterson mentioned, well, you prefer he not negotiate now with the American private companies until the announcement has been made but then the whole idea of his being here is nonsense really.

K: No, I will get that straightened out.

D: Yes. So really the question is we are prepared to sign the three-year contract. It will be announced on a date which you prefer, no problem from our side. But the only thing we would like now when he has all the experts here to begin the negotiations for only one year and it will be really with a different companies so they will not learn about the big deal so to speak.

K: I'll call you about it this afternoon.

D: Yeah. Okay. Please look into this matter because otherwise the whole delegation is holding because -- except for Mr. Kuzmin, all the others are expert to deal with the companies not with the negotiations.

K: Good. I will call you before I leave.

D: Okay. Bye, bye.

A report on the open line
in the North Sea of the North Atlantic
(Prepared for) 

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

TELCOM: 2:17 - June 30, 1972

Mr. Kissinger/Ron Ziegler

By: KHLW
NASA, Date: 5/13/04

K: Yes.

Z: This is Ron

K: Yes Ron

Z: I've already -- There's a story out that this former U.S. Treasury Secretary John Connally, a tough negotiator at world financial conferences, is likely to head the U.S. team when the Vietnam peace talks reopen next month.

K: Total nonsense.

Z: Diplomatic sources said today.

K: Where. From where is that?

Z: Washington, President Nixon said last night he had a very important government assignment in mind for Conally who arrived in Kuala Lumpur today.

K: Out of the question.

Z: Now, you'll level with me - if you can't tell me

K: It is perfectly conceivable that, you know, here I see it; they just handed it to me.

Z: It's conceivable what, Henry?

K: Look it's never inconceivable to me that some of our associates are playing little games that no one else knows about.

Z: Well, you would know about this, Henry.

K: It is conceivable to me that a thing like this would be planned without my knowing it. I know nothing about it. It isn't being planned. I would violently oppose it if it were.

Z: Well, it wouldn't make sense.

K: But there is no chance of it happening. I don't see any chance of this happening at this point.

Z: I'll deny this. I'll flat deny it.

K: Yes. Well the only possibility is that the President wouldn't have told me, and that is

The telephone is the most important invention of the 20th century. Make a call today!

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.1

TELCORN

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

2:17 p.m., June 30, 1972

NASA Data

Z: I'll raise it with him then.

K: Raise it with him, but I think it should be denied because it will screw things up.

Z: Right.

K: Let me know, will you?

Z: Where in the God's name in Heaven did -- who gave him those 15,000 French force things?

K: Unless it comes from his first trip to Indochina.

Z: Your operation didn't get this ______?

K: No, I don't know where these figures comes from.

Z: I hope you're absolutely confident on that dike and dam thing, aren't you?

K: Yes, absolutely.

Z: Okay, Henry.

K: I'm not saying that it isn't possible that a bomb dropped on one.

Z: We have no information that suggests that though.

K: Well, I would not absolutely say no bomb ever dropped on a dike.

Z: No, I --

K: I would say it's against our policy; we have no evidence of it and it is not part of --

Z: That's basically what I said. At the moment, if you said it, it would be banner headline. If I said it, it would be a lead story that there is a possibility accidentally one of our bombs hit the dikes. The moment we say that, we leave it open. I've tried to skirt around even having to say that without, you know, ruling that possibility out.

K: That's right. But I think you should screw down that other one. And fast.

Z: Okay. I'll be out there. When are you leaving, today?

K: This afternoon. I've got to go.

Z: Bye.

The President of the Republic of Peru, Mr. Kissinger, has requested a meeting with the President of the National Assembly, Mr. Perón.

By: KHLW NAVAQ. Date: 5/13/64

TELCORN

General Goodpastor/Mr. Kissinger

2:30 p.m., June 30, 1972

G: Henry.

K: Yes, Andy.

G: How are you?

K: Okay. How are you?

G: Boy, I'll be things have been in a whirl.

K: They certainly have.

G: What I called about was this. I'm just here for a short time on this trip. I'll be going back tomorrow at Noon. Along about the next time I'm back or maybe the time after that, I'd like to stop in if the President is free and if he's got some little time when he would just like to have a quiet discussion on how things look in Europe and where some of the rising problem areas seem to be.

K: I think it's essential.

G: I'm not pressing on it but I think it would be timely now. There's quite a lot new that is forming up and so on. I'm going to be back again the 7th & 8th of August.

K: That's a good time because he'll be back here.

G: Suppose I try to get in touch and --

K: I'll tell you, get in touch the week of the 23rd.

G: All right, fine. And we can lay something on then.

K: Right.

G: Very good. By and large, I don't think we have any acute problems coming up but some of them that aren't acute are still important and we do have these negotiations in prospect -- MBFR, CSCE, and so on.

K: So it's essential. I want to talk to you about that too and how we can stay in close touch with you during them.

G: Exactly. Because you know all too well how negotiating groups sometimes develop a momentum of their own.

The President's Office in the Senate
The Senate of the Republic of Peru
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

By: KHLV NASA Date: 5/13/64

TELCOM

2:30 p.m., June 30, 1972

K: Well, that's why it's so essential. First, that we keep them focussed on security issues.

G: Right.

K: And secondly, that we keep a tight control over them.

G: And I think there are some potentials now for either drifting apart or separating -- losing some of our effective ties there in Europe.

K: Right.

G: And I'm not saying that in a romantic sense but more in the sense of keeping in step with them in a way that will not expose shots and opportunities for the other side to exploit. That kind of thing.

K: Right.

G: And I think we have to be alert to that as we look on down the road now. One other thing that I think is of some interest. I'm sure that you have talked to him on this and this relates to the posture that we ought to be maintaining and any evolution in that as the EEC goes forward and in light of the -- what I would take the greater stability that has been achieved at the strategic nuclear level through SALT. I think these are important questions for us for the future.

K: I think they're very important. And I think you and I have to have a good talk when you come back.

G: All right.

K: And I'll schedule it.

G: Fine. And I'll be in touch then.

K: I would suggest the week of the 23rd which will be the first full week that we are all back here.

G: Okay. And then try to lay something definite on for either the 7th or the 8th.

K: Exactly.

G: Very good. How've you been?

A report on the results of the study of the effect of a momentum transfer on the pressure drop in a circular tube.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

By: KHLW
NASA Date: 5/13/64

TELCONE
General Goodpastor/Mr. Kissinger
2:30 p.m., June 30, 1972

K: I've been fine.

G: (laughter) Getting in your flying time. But I'll tell you the results of this, subtle as they are, I think are beginning to show. You're in a better position to evaluate that of course but even from where I sit I see signs of it.

K: I tell you, if it weren't for McGovern, we would end the war in Vietnam this year.

G: I would think so. But I trust that comes under the heading of last straws that they are grasping at.

K: Oh, yeah. You know, they may be too weak to do much with a victory by him when we get through with them.

G: Yeah, yeah.

K: But he won't win. I don't see how he can win.

G: It's pretty hard to see with the hodge-podge of the positions and so on that have been coming out there. It seems to me that the contrast between the responsible and very sober way in which the President has put this together, I just don't see how that contrast could fail to be seen and understood.

K: Right. I agree. Andy, see you at the end of July.

G: Yeah, very good. And it's good to talk with you, Henry.

K: Nice to talk to you.

G: And keep it up.

K: Thank you. You started me on it.

G: Yeah.

K: Okay, bye.

1k

I know all too well how negotiating groups develop a momentum of their own.

["A. M. E. T. S. U. C. A. S. O. U. C. A. S. O. U. C

H. W. REED, CHIEF, DIV. OF INTERPRETATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12959, Sec. 3.6

TELCONE

Amb. Shen (China)/Mr. Kissinger

2:35 p.m., June 30, 1972

By: K.M.L. NAEIA, Date: 5/12/72

S: I see. What are some of the things you discussed with him? I mean, concerning us?

K: We didn't discuss you.

S: I see. And how about your bilateral things?

K: It was mostly a general review of the international situation.

S: I see. About trade and so forth?

K: I don't think there will be a significant advance.

S: .... credit?

K: No. And that's not under consideration.

S: I see. How long will you be away? You're leaving -- I understand the President --

K: I'm leaving in the next hour.

S: I see. And you expect to be away for a week?

K: Two weeks.

S: I see. Could I see you after you return?

K: Of course.

S: It's kind of late for you to call me now. I mean, I've been waiting for this call for the past week, you know? I mean, my government wanted me to see --

K: Well, there's been a <u>skew</u> in this office and I'm sorry about that. Can you come out to the West Coast?

S: Pardon?

K: Do you want to come out to the West Coast while I'm there?

S: Why not? I may.

K: Well, I'll get Mr. Campbell to call you on Monday and set something up.

["H. E. T. U. T. S. A. U. C. C. C. C. C. C. C. C

H. J. S. M. J. M. H. E.
S. N. A. P. O. B.
M. P. O. C. A. S. U.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

TELCOM

Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger

2:45 p.m., June 30, 1972

By: K.M.V. NASA Date: 5/12/72

H: I was wondering if you'd ask. Well, you know Elliott, don't you?

K: Yeah but I don't know anything about his views. I guess he's a little less passionate than Lanser.

H: He has a more newsman approach to the thing than the philosophy professor approach that Kermit had. You know Kermit's a good guy and a resonant man but he just didn't think like a newsman. He would ignore reporting and go for opinion and analysis but Oz is much more -- Oz thinks like a reader which is nice.

K: Yeah. I like him personally very much. I've just never had a feel for his views.

H: He's not crazy about Nixon and he's not crazy about the war but it doesn't affect his judgement as well. He takes refuge in facts.

K: Right.

H: Which is nice.

K: Right.

H: Well, all right, see you next week.