JUN 23 1986

The Industrial Bank of Japan, Limited
(NIPPON KOGYO GINKO)

ESTABLISHED
1902

Marunouchi, Tokyo, Japan

CABLE ADDRESS
KOGIN TOKYO

KANEO NAKAMURA
PRESIDENT

June 11, 1986

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
New York

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Thank you very much for taking time out of your busy schedule to meet me on my last trip to your country.

Your views on the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and present conditions in the United States regarding trade frictions between our two countries were quite informative and instructive to me.

Back in Japan, the hot race has already started for the "double" election on July 6, and I, like you, am looking upon the turnout of this with quite an interest.

I do hope that I shall have a chance to benefit from your views again in the near future. Please convey my kindest regards to Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger and Ms. Beck. Mr. Ishihara, our Managing Director, also sends his best regards to you all.

KN/sao

INDIA/AMERICAN CONFERENCE

Mr. Dwayne O. Andreas
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.
4666 Faries Parkway
Decatur, Illinois 62525

He is one of the most imaginative of the food producing companies with excelent connections on both the Democrat and Republican sides.

Mr. Howard Baker
Vinson & Elkins
1101 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20036

Former Senate Majority Leader

Mr.W. Michael Blumenthal
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Burroughs Corporation
World Headquarters
Burroughs Place
Detroit, Michigan 48232

Former Secretary of the Treasury under Carter

Mr. Nicholas F. Brady
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Dillon, Read & Co.
535 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022

He is probably the closest friend of Vice President George Bush.

Judge William P. Clark
Rogers & Wells
1737 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

He is very close to President Reagan; formerly National Security Adviser and Secretary of the Interior

Mr. Ralph P. Davidson
Chairman
Time Inc.
Time & Life Building
New York, New York 10030

Mr. John C. Whitehead
Chairman of the International
Advisory Board
Goldman Sachs & Company
85 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004

Just retired as Chairman of Goldman Sachs. One of
the wisest of our businessmen.

Mr. Thomas H. Wyman
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Columbia Broadcasting System
51 W. 52nd Street
New York, N.Y. 10019

HENRY A. KISSINGER

February 26, 1986

To Whom It May Concern:

It has come to my attention that Mr. Philip Niarchos has contracted to purchase an apartment at 1, Beekman Place, and in this regard I am writing as a reference for him with regard to his character and attractiveness as a prospective resident.

Throughout the time I have known Mr. Niarchos he has displayed a constancy of responsibility and high ambitions in all his endeavors. There is no question he would be an asset to your building for I am confident the qualities he possesses in his professional capacity will be equally demonstrated should he be provided the opportunity for residency in your establishment.

Let me add that he is a young man possessed with skill and substantive background, and there are most certainly few others whose qualities of character could provide such a positive contribution to your high standards.

The Board of Directors
1, Beekman Place
New York, New York

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919

FEB 14 1986

PHILIP S. NIARCHOS

Transoceanic Marine, Inc.

39 East 51st Street
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

12th February 1986

I was wondering if you could kindly help me
out with the following matter :

I have contracted to buy an apartment at
1, Beekman Place. After years of staying at the
Hotel in New York and now with a growing family,
one child and another on the way, Victoria and
myself find this apartment a perfect residence
for all of us. As you know, all prospective
buyers in New York have to be accepted by a
Coop Board and could you possibly please act
as one of my referees.

I do realise you have done this favour for
Spyros very recently, and in fact he has been
accepted at 740 Park. I hope the repetition for
such a favour will not be too worrisome for you.

If possible, and you are in agreement, I
would appreciate it if you would forward the
letter in an envelope addressed to Mr Broad at
Transoceanic Marine in New York, eventhough the
letter itself should be formally addressed to the
Board of Directors of 1, Beekman Place, Inc. As
Victoria and myself are appearing before the
Board of Directors on March the 5th, it would be
extremely helpful if Mr Broad could receive your
letter in advance of that date.

Your assistance in this matter would be
gratefully appreciated.

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Suite 1100
55 East 52nd Street
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10055

JAN - 3 1986

SPYROS N. NIARCHOS

St. Moritz, 30 th December 1985

TRANSOCEANIC MARINE INC.
39 East 51st Street
New York, N.Y 10022

Dear Mr Kissinger,

I've contracted to buy an apartment at 740 Park Avenue. Having seen many apartments in New York, I'm awfully keen on this one, and therefore very anxious that this deal should go through. As you know all prospective buyers in New York have to be accepted by a Coop Board, and I wonder whether you could possibly be so kind as to act as one of my referees.

I hope you do not mind my asking this favour; but should
you have any objection in principle to do so, I would of course
understand.

Hoping not to bother you with this matter, I would like
to take this opportunity to wish you a very happy 1986.

Dr. Henry Kissinger
55 East 52nd Street
Suite 1100
New York, N.Y 10055
U.S.A.

OFFICE OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER

November 12, 1986

Dear Mr. Nielsen:

I tried reaching you by phone, but there was no answer.
I have wanted to let you know that Dr. Kissinger approved
your draft for the foreward to the catalogue of ARCO's
exhibition of paintings by young Chinese artists.

The quote as approved reads as follows:

"The opening, or reopening, of China to the West in the 1970s was one of the most momentous political developments of the 20th century. By the early 1980s it had led to a broad new national program of modernization which, under good leadership, has already brought important benefits to the economy and the society in general. There is no clearer prism through which to perceive these developments than in the art now being created by the new generation of Chinese artists.

"In assembling this remarkable exhibition of paintings, the Atlantic Richfield Company ** has made a major contribution to the improvement of Chinese-American understanding.

"The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger"

** Use ARCO if you prefer.

The only change made is the addition of the middle
initial "A" in Dr. Kissinger's name.

Mr. Waldemar A. Nielsen
250 Park Avenue South
Suite 5000A
New York, New York 10003

HAK:

Waldemar Nielsen, at the instigation of
Robert O. Anderson, forwards a draft of
a statement they would like to use in the
forward of the catalogue of ARCO's exhibition
of paintings by young Chinese artists.

The exhibition will start in Los Angeles
and probably tour the country.

OK as edited ✓

No, I don't want to be quoted
in the catalogue ____

ssm
...

WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN

NOV - 3 1986

Oct. 30, 1986

Dear Henry,

As I believe you know, ARCO at Bob Anderson's initiative has now assembled a considerable collection of paintings by younger Chinese artists. They will be exhibited first at a leading Los Angeles museum and then probably travel to other sites around the country. We have had very positive reactions to them by the experts, so we think the show will attract a good bit of attention.

When Bob showed you some of the pictures a few weeks ago in the ARCO offices, I gather your reaction was positive also. So Bob feels it would be very helpful if you would allow us to use something like the attached quote in the exhibition catalog.

Would you look it over and if you approve, your assistant can let me know so we can move ahead.

W. A. Nielsen
250 Park Ave. South
Suite 5000A
New York, N.Y. 10003

DRAFT - Corrected as
of July 18, 1986

30 - 1 -

FOREWORD

The opening, or reopening, of China to the West in the 1970's was one of the most momentous political developments of the 20th century. By the early 1980's it had led to a broad new national program of modernization which, under good leadership, has already brought important benefits to the economy and the society in general. There is no clearer prism through which to perceive these developments than in the art now being created by the new generation of Chinese artists.

In assembling this [REMARKABLE cross-sectional survey], the exhibition of paintings, the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO?) has made a major contribution to the improvement of Chinese - American understanding.

The Honorable Henry Kissinger

W. A. NIELSEN
250 PARK AVE., SOUTH
SUITE 5000 A
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10003

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EMBARGO 1800 HRS NY TIME

AUG 3 1 1985

Richard Nixon

SUPERPOWER SUMMITRY

F

Forty years ago, U.S. nuclear power was indispensable in ending World War II. In the postwar era, American nuclear superiority was indispensable in deterring Soviet probes that might have led to World War III. But that era is over, and we live in the age of nuclear parity, when each superpower has the means to destroy the other and the rest of the world.

In these strategic circumstances, summit meetings between leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union have become essential if peace is to be preserved. Such meetings will contribute to the cause of peace, however, only if both leaders recognize that tensions between the two nations are due not to the fact that we do *not* understand each other but to the fact that we *do* understand that we have diametrically opposed ideological and geopolitical interests. Most of our differences will never be resolved. But the United States and the Soviet Union have one major goal in common: survival. Each has the key to the other's survival. The purpose of summit meetings is to develop rules of engagement that could prevent our profound differences from bringing us into armed conflict that could destroy us both.

With this limited but crucially important goal in mind, we must disabuse ourselves from the start of the much too prevalent view that if only the two leaders, as they get to know each other, could develop a new "tone" or a new "spirit" in their relationship, our problems would be solved and tensions reduced. If history is any guide, evaluating a summit meeting in terms of the "spirit" it produces is evidence of failure rather than success. The spirits of Geneva in 1955, of Camp David in 1959, of Vienna in 1961 and of Glassboro in 1967 each produced a brief improvement in the atmosphere, but no significant progress on resolving major issues. Spirit and tone matter only when two leaders of nations with similar interests have a misunderstanding that can be resolved by their getting to know each other. Such factors are irrelevant when nations have irreconcilable differences, which is the case as far as the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned.

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## 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The obsession with style over substance among some observers is ludicrous. The fact that General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has a firm handshake, excellent eye contact, a good sense of humor and dresses fashionably is no more relevant to his policies than the fact that Khrushchev wore ill-fitting clothes, drank too much and spoke a crude Russian. Anyone who reaches the top in the Soviet hierarchy is bound to be a dedicated communist and a strong, ruthless leader who supports the Soviet foreign policy of extending Soviet domination into the non-communist world. We can "do business" with Gorbachev, but only if we recognize that the business we have to deal with involves intractable differences between competitive states.

President Reagan will be urged to prove to Mr. Gorbachev that he is sincerely dedicated to peace and that, despite his tough rhetoric, he is really a very nice man. President Reagan does not have to prove that he is for peace. Mr. Gorbachev knows that. What is vitally important is that he also understand that President Reagan is a strong leader, one who is fair and reasonable, but who will, without question, take action to protect American interests when they are threatened.

Debates about ideology will serve no useful purpose. Mr. Gorbachev is as dedicated to his ideology as President Reagan is to his. Neither is going to convert the other.

In the postwar era, no two leaders come to a summit with more political support at home or more endowed with charm and charisma. But for one to try to charm the other would bring not affection but contempt; this would certainly be Mr. Gorbachev's reaction. An essential element of a new relationship is not sentimental expressions of friendship but hard-headed mutual respect. In 1959, before I met Khrushchev, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan told me that he sensed in his meetings with the Soviet leaders that, above all, they "wanted to be admitted as members of the club." This is a small price to pay for laying the foundations for a new structure of peace in the world.

## II

Can two powers with diametrically opposed geopolitical interests avoid war and develop a peaceful relationship? It is important to recognize clearly the major dangers which could lead to nuclear war. In descending order of likelihood they are:

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SUPERPOWER SUMMITRY 3

1) War by accident, where one side launches a nuclear attack because a mechanical malfunction creates the mistaken impression that the other side has launched an attack;

2) Nuclear proliferation, which could put nuclear weapons in the hands of a leader of a minor revolutionary or terrorist power who would be less restrained from using nuclear weapons than the major powers have been;

3) Escalation of small wars in areas where the interests of the superpowers are both involved, such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf;

4) War by miscalculation, where a leader of one superpower underestimates the will of the leader of the other to take ultimate risks to defend his interests.

In all four of these scenarios, the United States and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in reducing the danger and risks which could lead to a nuclear war. They are, therefore, areas where tough-minded diplomacy culminating in agreements at the summit level can play a constructive role.

The next most likely danger is a Soviet preemptive strike to liquidate the Chinese nuclear arsenal. This is not a danger at the present time because China lacks the industrial base and military capacity to be a serious threat to the Soviet Union. But as China begins to develop such a capacity in the future, a Soviet leader could decide that it is better to strike before China becomes a major nuclear power. A nuclear war between major powers, like the Soviet Union and China, could escalate into a world war. That is why it is in the interests of the United States and the West to welcome, not oppose, efforts on the part of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to reduce tensions.

The least likely danger of nuclear war is a Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe or the United States. The Soviet leaders are and will continue to be dedicated to extending communist domination over non-communist nations. But they are not madmen, and they are not fools. No matter how confident they are that they can win a nuclear war, it would be at the risk of great destruction to the Soviet homeland. Having Europe and the United States reduced to nuclear wastelands would be the bitter fruit of such a "victory." World war has become obsolete as an instrument of policy between the two superpowers. That is why the primary danger, as far as the United States and Western Europe are concerned, is not destruction in war but surrender to nuclear coercion.

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SUPERPOWER SUMMITRY 5

arsenal. The United States has no missiles of this size which
would allow us to match such an action by the Soviets.

Looking to the future, without a new arms control agree-
ment, even if the United States were to continue its own arms
program at the levels requested by President Reagan rather
than the far lower levels approved by Congress, and if the
Soviets were to continue their programs at current levels, the
Soviet Union will be further ahead in nuclear missiles in 1990
than it is today.

If we are to prevent otherwise inevitable Soviet superiority,
our only option is to negotiate a new, verifiable arms control
agreement based on strict parity that denies a first-strike ca-
pability to the Soviet Union as well as to ourselves. What is
most urgent is to remove the threat of the SS-18s and the new
ICBMS, the SS-24 and SS-25, which are designed not to attack
our cities in retaliation for an attack on the Soviet Union but
for a decisive first strike against our missile sites. Many senators
and congressmen have voted for the 40 MX missiles in the hope
that they would be an effective bargaining chip in the Geneva
negotiations. But the Soviets are not philanthropists. They will
not cut back their 300 SS-18s to only 40 without getting
something in return.

That is why, contrary to the critics' contention, the Presi-
dent's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is indispensable to arms
control. Without it, the Soviet Union would have no incentive
to limit its offensive weapons. It is important, however, to
distinguish among three different defensive systems.

A defensive system to protect our entire population would
make nuclear weapons obsolete and thus replace deterrence as
our defense against nuclear weapons. But for such a system to
be effective against an all-out Soviet attack, it would have to
be virtually leakproof. In view of the dramatic scientific break-
throughs made in my lifetime, I do not contend, as some do,
that this is impossible. But we cannot base our *current* strategic
planning on a system which, at best, will not be ready for full
deployment until the next century.

A system that defends our missile sites, however, is possible
in ten years or less. Even if it is only 30-percent effective, it
would effectively deny the Soviet Union a first-strike capability
against our missile sites. The purpose of such a defensive system
would be not to replace deterrence but to strengthen it.

The third kind of system, a thin population defense, which
would not be adequate against an all-out Soviet attack but

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## 4 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Reducing the danger of nuclear war involves arms control, but it is a mistake to support arms control as desirable in itself and to believe that any agreement is better than none. The primary purpose of arms control is to reduce the danger of war. It is not the existence of arms, but political differences that lead to their use, which leads to war. A bad agreement that opens the way to Soviet superiority increases the danger of war. Even a good agreement will not prevent war if political differences lead to armed conflict. Thus, an agreement reducing arms but not linked to restraints on political conduct would not contribute to peace. If political differences escalate into war, it is no comfort to know that each side has the capacity to destroy the other only two times rather than twenty times.

President Reagan has been unfairly criticized for adhering to the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) treaty negotiated by President Jimmy Carter but not approved by the Senate. The critics contend that the reason the Soviet Union is ahead and that we are behind in land-based strategic missiles is because the Soviets are cheating on the arms control agreements and because those agreements restricted our strategic programs. There is no question that the Soviets will do all that is allowed under an arms control agreement and will stretch it to the outer limits and indeed will cheat if they can get away with it. But they gained their superiority in strategic land-based missiles not because of what *they* did in violation of arms control agreements but because of what *we* did *not* do within the limits allowed by the agreements. We must also face up to the hard reality that without a credible arms control initiative, it would be impossible to get congressional approval for adequate defense budgets to match the Soviet effort or to retain the support of our allies.

It is contended that because of the flaws in the agreements and the Soviet practice of violating them, the United States would be better off without any agreement. Yet, while there is strong evidence that the Soviet Union is probably violating provisions of SALT I and SALT II, it is complying with the limits on the fractionation of warheads agreed to in SALT II. If President Reagan had decided not to continue complying with SALT II, the Soviet Union would not consider itself to be bound by these provisions and limitations either; it could attach 30 warheads to each of its 300 giant SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles rather than the 10 allowed under the treaty. This would mean an increase of 6,000 warheads in the Soviet

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## 6 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

would be effective against an accidental launch or an attack by a minor nuclear power, is also feasible within the next ten years. This is an area where the Soviet Union could agree with us that developing and deploying such a limited system is in their interest as well as ours.

President Reagan is correct in insisting that research on all aspects of the SDI is not negotiable, both because a ban on research is not verifiable and because if there is even a remote chance to develop a total population defense it should be a priority goal of our defense establishment. We also must have in mind that the Soviet Union is spending twice as much as we are on defense against nuclear weapons.

But deployment, as distinguished from research, for defense of our missile fields is the ultimate bargaining chip, just as was the case with SALT I. We should agree to limit our deployment of defensive weapons *only* if the Soviets significantly reduce and limit their offensive weapons. The choice is Gorbachev's. Either the Soviets cut back on their offensive forces or we will deploy defensive forces to match their buildup.

### III

Arms control and political issues must go forward together. Progress on arms control can lead to stability and the reduction of political tensions. Reduction of political tensions can lead to a better climate for reaching an arms control agreement that is fair to both sides. Those who contend that we should seek arms control regardless of what happens on political issues should bear in mind that what destroyed any chance for Senate approval of the SALT II treaty was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Today, there is no chance that the Senate would approve an arms control treaty at a time when the Soviet Union is supporting anti-U.S. forces in El Salvador and Nicaragua.

A summit agenda, therefore, should have as its first priority not arms control but the potential flash points for U.S.-Soviet conflicts. It is highly doubtful that we would have agreed to SALT I in 1972 had we not settled in the Berlin Agreement of 1971 those issues which had led to so many crises since the end of World War II. A similar opportunity is presented in the Middle East and Central America today.

The most difficult and potentially dangerous issue which brings the two nations into confrontation is the Soviet policy of supporting revolutionary movements against non-communist governments in the Third World. The Brezhnev Doctrine