TELCON
George Bush/HAK

August 16, 1973/9:35 a.m.

B: I've got a question. I'm working on an idea that would try to demonstrate continuity of party. And what it is to have the top party leaders of parties that are more akin to the Republican Party another words the liberal party in Australia. It wouldn't be on issues. It would be on party and on financing of campaigns and on party stuff. But before going too far with it I thought from my vast experience at the U.N. that I had better do a little...get some professional judgment because I......

K: Can I call you back in about 15 minutes.

B: It's not that urgent. So anytime today or tomorrow.

K: I'll call you back within the next half hour.

B: OK.

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Telcon

Fred Buzhardt/HAK

August 16, 1973; 9:45 a.m.

K: Hello.

B: Hi, Henry.

K: Fred, I see in the Washington Post that it is said that we admitted that I requested the taps on Halperin.

B: Henry, you ought to know the Washington Post by now. Your man Campbell is sending over to get a copy now. I just got them late last night.

K: Because I will not hold still for this.

B: Henry, read the pleading.

K: I requested an investigation. I don't even think I did that, to tell you the truth. My recollection is not at all that. My recollection is that the President, Hoover, Haldeman, Mitchell and I were sitting in the office, and Hoover said that Halperin had been a bad actor all along and that he would make him the number one suspect in his investigation. And after that he wrote me the letter. And his letter supports that version a hell of a lot better than that I requested anything.

B: Yeah, well, Henry, read the pleading. We changed the pleading as we agreed on yesterday. Now the Washington Post, as you well know - there is no way you can control how the Washington Post writes it. But read the pleading. Start at the beginning of the paragraph. It's got the President's direction in there. We changed it. I said and based on - with access plus other information in the hands of the Bureau they installed taps. We've got that in there, you know.

K: Because, you know, the Justice Department is interested in covering for the FBI. What is the proof, incidentally - I mean, they've been putting that out constantly-that I requested anything on May 9th.

B: Well, you had a conversation with Hoover.

K: Yeah, but in his letter to me all he said is that I requested him to look into leaks.

B: Well, we filed the letter with the court. So that's before the court.

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Telcon
Carl Maw/HAK

August 16, 1973; 10:17 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Good morning, Henry.

K: Carl, I've now got that plea they made and I would feel a lot better if you had a chance to look it over. They've already submitted it.

M: Right.

K: And, see, I think that the trouble is that the counsel to the White House has an interest in protecting the President.

M: That's right.

K: And the Justice Department has an interest in protecting the FBI. And he's already got a story in the Washington Post today saying that I requested the tap to be put on Halperin. Now I've shown you that letter which makes it clear that I didn't.

M: Oh, I don't think I would comment, Henry.

K: No, I won't comment, but I wonder whether I should submit a separate plea.

M: Well, put that in the mail to me and we'll come back to you.

K: Well, you see the facts are that this was ordered by the President in a meeting in his office which Hoover and Mitchell attended, and my role in the Halperin tap was really nothing. Now, I don't have to go as far as that. Technically, I didn't even give his name.

M: Yeah.

K: Didn't even give his name for investigation.

M: How did they get his name?

K: Because Halperin was on their list to begin with. They had refused to clear him.

M: How did they get the others? Did you give any names?

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K: I gave the names of others who had access to classified information. But I never requested formally a tap.

M: That information went to where - the FBI?

K: To the FBI. After the policy had been established.

M: I think I'd just sit tight, Henry, and whether we put anything now into the pleadings or the proof, all I want to be sure is that we have room to put it in eventually.

K: All right, then, I'll send this to you.

M: Send it up so that we can make sure that when it comes to proof that we can present our proof.

K: Because one other thing, they implied that I received these conversations during the whole period. Actually, I mean for your information, I don't know whether we want to get into that - after December '69 I had myself taken off any distribution list.

M: Yeah.

K: And after that I didn't know what they did.

M: Well, I don't think that's going to be relevant in this particular action, because I think the proof is did you have him tapped, what did you do - well, yes, it will be relevant. Well, we'll have to get into all of that. And just exactly the timing will depend on what they said in this answer.

K: Well in the answer they say that he was overheard from May '69 to February '71. I'm responsible, if at all, only from May '69 til December '69. But I'm not responsible. It was legal at the time, anyhow.

M: You might have your girl clip any press clippings and send to me, or references to this matter.

K: Okay. And I'll send you a copy of that letter from Hoover to me.

M: Yes, but I just need the references to you - where you are referred to in the clippings.

K: Right. Okay.

M: Good. And I'll follow it from there.

K: Good. Thank you Carl. Goodbye.

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Telcon
George Bush/HAK

August 16, 1973; 10:30 a.m.

K: Hello.

B: Henry.

K: Yes, George.

B: How are you? Uh, I just was needing a little advice. The thought is that we've got to find ways - I do, as a politician - to demonstrate the continuity and kind of something that would appeal to political scientists, and I thought of a conference involving just party people. And, you know, we could do it with the parties of NATO countries. We wouldn't want to say NATO, but I mean kindred spirit parties.

K: Yeah.

B: And I see that there could be a problem. Say, take Australia if indeed we did something and it would appear like we were trying to undermine the existing government or something. But I think it could be phrased and done on a kind of a nuts and bolts political party organization thing. It has enormous appeal to me because it will get the kind of intellectual thinking, you know, the political scientist thing, well gee, here's an interesting concept and all that. But what I want you to do is just think about it. We're not gonna do anything for a few months, but see if it would cause problems in our foreign policy area. I wouldn't want to go ahead with something that would end up having to be a lot of explanation because the parties in power say, or to those of minority parties outside thinking it was some kind of an Administration thing as opposed to party, you see?

K: Why.

B: So I was just trying to get a little free advice out of you.

K: Well, I think it's a good idea if you don't make it an Administration thing.

B: Yeah. It would be strictly the Republic Party head and two or three others meeting with party heads in Australia and Japan and...

K: My view is that given the Watergate situation I would put it off until a little later in the fall.

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B: Yeah, oh yeah, clearly. I was just thinking of planning. The reason I'm on it now is I was thinking of trying to get when our national committee meets here in early September to get a little group working on it there, to start working on it. But if it causes, if it would cause any enormous - even though we would structure it clearly as a nuts and bolts party...

K: No, it doesn't bother - no I think it's even good.

B: Okay, well I'll let you know as it develops just so it won't -- we'll handle it with enough discretion so it should avoid some phone ringing off the hook in your shop or someplace saying what the hell...

K: Well I'll blame you.

B: Huh? Well, that's the thing to do. How do you think it all worked out yesterday?

K: Well, I was going to ask you.

B: Well, we did an instant survey around the country and, one, it came out better than I thought sitting there when we saw you and Al. In other words, I was moderately enthused, and I think now it's a definite plus. But the problem is - and it's gotten mixed reviews by our own party people across the country saying he really didn't say much new, but on the other hand...

K: Yes, but what new can he say?

B: That's right. But on the other hand, what did he say. And generally, I'd say a plus, positive, the tone was good. It wasn't pedantic and yet it wasn't you know, this self-pitying kind of thing, and I think now the focus will shift to a press conference, which I guess has to be had and should be had. And maybe it's the first step in getting it behind us. God damn it, I hope so.

K: Yeah, well if not we'll be in deep trouble as a nation.

B: Well, I wish we could get - - I don't know how we get people to even - responsible people, small groups of responsible people to focus on the foreign policy aspects.

K: I'm going to talk to Goldwater when I'm on the West Coast and get him under control.

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TELCOM

Rowland Evans/Kissinger

10:35 a.m. - 8/16/73

K: Hello.

E: Hi, Henry. What did you think of it?

K: What did you think of it, you're the critic?

E: It was themeless. There wasn't a hardline attack, no appeal for sympathy, no warning that the country was going on the rocks. I see it as the first step of a long period of recovery.

K: That is all you could do.

E: That's right.

K: I really think people who are concerned about the country also have a certain obligation knowing it is an impossible situation. If he took the negative side, he could tear it apart -- everyone can do it and I'm sure the C______ after the Second Punic War had a helluva time proving what stupidities had been committed. Everyone is talking about the establishment. . . .

E: Much less self-pity in the speech.

K: That is right. Given what you had to work with, given the fact men of 61 don't change their personality he should have made it possible. It will be interesting to see what the people are going to take as the inevitable weaknesses and turn it about. It was a risky thing to separate himself from any constituency.

E: Do you think anybody had any influence on him or this was his own?

K: A lot of people had influence on him. They compared it to any other speech.

E: You think it was that different from his other speeches?

K: Yes and saying two or three times I deplore it, I regret it. . .

E: A bit of flashback to Kennedy's Bay of Pigs Speech.

K: That is what I think.

E: What is the reaction over there now?

K: I haven't fully assessed it.

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E: .......

K: The first step of a long road.

E: When will he have his press conference?

K: Next week.

E: That's going to be tough unless he takes a position that I am not going to comment as he did in his speech. Think he might?

K: I have no way of knowing?

E: Compared to what you thought last week?

K: I thought it was a terrific step forward.

E: What did you learn last week?

K: I don't want to go into it.

E: I think it helps.

K: . . . . to make counter attack and if the reaction now is to pick him apart from the right and left, he will be proved correct.

E: That's interesting. Did you see it?

K: I talked to him after the speech.

E: How did he react?

K: Well, he's always exhausted after a speech.

E: I think there is a solid foundation for the basic thrust in this themeless speech that the American people are fed up with Watergate. This is a very deep penetration in the American self-consciousness that this guy has been wrong, everyone knows it, he admits it but if they didn't stop it and he has to leave office what will be next. He has been a good President except for Watergate. That's an important safeguard for the President. He was playing on that. I think that is a valid political position to be in but ______ if everyone's going to tear him apart. What about tonight?

K: Probably yes.

E: Let me know.

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K: About 8:30.

E: 8:30 is fine but let me know. Katherine just got back.

K: I think I can do it unless the President nabs me.

E: When is he leaving?

K: Monday.

E: I think I will go down to New Orleans. Do you think it will be a flashing speech?

K: I doubt it but I don't know.

E: What about tonight?

K: Tentatively yes, I will. Where do you want to go?

E: The Rive Gauche. Do you want to go there?

K: Such a prestigious place. I am going to invite the people at whose house she is staying, do you mind?

E: No, not at all.

K: OK, see you then.

Telcon
Admiral Moorer/HAK

August 16, 1973; 11:07

K: Hello.

M: Hey, Henry.

K: How are you?

M: Fine, sir. I just want to call something to your attention and see whether the signals have been changed. You know, we are in the process of taking out one of the C-130 squadrons in Taiwan and the other three are coming out in December, according to your instructions.

K: Right.

M: Now, they're right on the verge of making a public announcement of this. You may or may not know that. And I just wondered whether your plans with respect to your forthcoming trip to China, or something, whether you wanted to wait until you got back or whether you want to just go ahead with the plan.

K: Well, thank you for calling that to my attention. I didn't realize they were making a public announcement of it.

M: Yeah, the Ambassador out there wants to make a public announcement. He's already talked to Chiang Chang-kuo and so they've got a message now that CINCPAC would make a public announcement. Now there's one squadron that's coming out on August 15. I don't know what the reasons are that State wants to make this announcement, but I just didn't know whether you might have...

K: Thank you, Tom. Let me check on that. I don't have a strong view on the announcement. I think we ought to pull these things out.

M: Uh, huh. Of course, the Chinese, as you know, the ChiNats, want them to stay as long as possible.

K: Yeah.

M: They understand though the impact of the communique and I think the Ambassador out there has already informed Chiang Chang-kuo this is going to happen. I just thought that in the event that you found after your trip that you wanted to shift the signals a little bit, this kind of...

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Sec. Schlesinger

11:10 a.m. 8/16/73

HK: Jim, how are you?

S: Okay.

K: Jim, Haig told me that you mentioned to him yesterday that you thought our SALT position was soft and that sort of astonished me and I'd be interested to know where--I think it is nuts but it isn't soft.

S: As you know my position all along has been--my personal position-- I don't know what the hell is going on with regard to the DOD interaction with the Verification Panel, my personal position is that the numerical base is represented by the SALT I agreement just is unacceptable to us in that we've got to make the Russians know that goddamn soon.

K: That is all agreed.

S: Well then we just got to hold in there. I did talk about our position as of the present time. It is our willingness to stick by it as the pressures build up on us.

K: Although on the other hand, on the interim agreement, you supported it at the time that we had no alternative. I mean we weren't

S: The provisional agreement--the proposal for the--

K: No, no, the interim agreement which we signed.

S: Ah--ohyeh, I supported that. But the thing I've underscored as you know is--

K: Not as a permanent agreement--

S: That it just has to be viewed as an interim agreement.

K: There is no question about--no one is contesting that. Now the thing that I know find unbelievable is the provision agreement that we proposed which would deprive the Soviets of land-based MIRV's and in return for it we would stop additional MIRVing of land-based missiles, which is almost totally completed--Brezhnev considered that an insult to his intelligence--

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S: He was quite right.

K: And he's been yelling and screaming but everytime I see Moorer and Clements they tell me it is a lousey proposal.

S: No it's a good proposal Henry.

K: It is so cynical that I'm embarrassed to put it forward.

S: Don't be embarrassed, the Russians are never embarrassed.

K: But the one thing that is for sure is that if we could get it it would be the coup of the decade. But there is no danger wasting our time on that one because no Russian leader could survive that who agreed to a thing like this.

S: I'm not sure what Russian leaders could survive--but

K: And--well I assure you from my conversations with Brezhnev, the provisional agreement fly and now with their new testing--irrelevant anyway.

S: I told John that about 20 times that this is so goddamn good the Russians can't accept it so if he is worried about limiting our development--our forces desirable as it may be, that is not going to come to pass.

K: That's right.

S: Now there is no problem on that--the problem is when you get beyond the provisional proposals and we have just got to recognize why in the long run the disproportion in --

K: I tell you Jim, based on my discussions at the Verification Panel--I tell you as a friend, it is not an official complaint. But the stuff that comes out of the JCS and DOD is

S: Is terrible.

K: It is really--if one of my students gave that, I'd give him a D--it isn't that I disagree with it--it is so goddamn stupid that you can't even get your teeth into it. And it is stupid and totally irrelevant and when the pressures build it means that it will have to be unilaterally decided by the President, because some of the garbage that I have been asking--I don't know myself, I'm puzzled as to what the meaning of a SALT agreement is--one MIRVing has in effect come unrestricted and we are pretty close to that. In fact we are probably there and I just want people to make an analysis of it and discuss it rationally--I mean you can keep

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equal aggregates with freedom to mix only so often--no one is contesting
it. But you also have to compare where we are likely to be and they are
likely to be absent x in agreement. Foreseeable weapons development
we are going to have and so forth so that we can make a rational decision
come late fall when it becomes apparent that the present approach won't
fly, and strapping the SALT negotiations all together which is what Tom
always says we ought to do, if they don't buy some outrageous scheme of
his, that is also going to have some major impact here.

S: That is the critical question and I certainly think it ought to be explored.

K: We ought to explore it but we ought to have some rational position--

S: You are quite right, we have not done anything to contribute to that
rationale

K: I haven't--this is not a case where I know I think what I think where
I think is right, I really am puzzled, maybe we can talk about it--we're
having breakfast

S: Right. Are we having it alone here?

K: I thought--could you have Johnning Foster there?

S: Oh sure.

K: At least for that one project and I'll have Brent and no one else.

S: You bet.

K: And after that, maybe we can talk SALT and a few other mutual problem

S: Very good. Okay Henry.

H.K: See you then.

S: Right =o.

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/John Scali

11:18 a.m. 8/16/73

K: Hello Jon, how are you.
JS: Hello Henry. Pretty good.

K:

S: I just wanted to call your attention if you had not already noticed, that we had very good reactions to the vote at the UN yesterday--even the NY Times for example in an editorial this morning -- says the unanimity was a justified and major response by the international community to a misguided act of illegality in disguise--says the UN/could lead to highly beneficial results in world councils for it exposed the blatant hypocrisy on both sides on an issue that is... all world air travelers--

K: Good.
S: Just wanted to--
K: I think it came out well.

S: Just wanted to note that despite all our travail

K: But because of our travail, I think you did a superb job.

S: Thank you Henry. The important thing is even partisans like the NY Times recognized that in the circumstances, there was nothing we could do and it is be interpreted in all the news stories that I have seen that--as a defeat for Egypt and Iraq in their effort to force an American veto.

K: It would have been a disaster if we had had to veto again.

S: I agree. But I also wanted to say that it was a pleasure to work with you on a close basis on an issue of this kind.

K: We will do that increasingly, --what do you think of the speech as a friend?

S: I think it is a start on the way back Henry and I think that what is important now is to get on with the work.

K: I agree.

S: But if we just say we're getting on with the work, and wedont' then it is just another speech.

K: I agree. Exactly right.

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TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Cong. Drinan

12:47 p.m. 8/16/73

D: This is congressman Drinan--thank you for taking the call.

K: Not at all.

D: How are you these days?

K: I'm pretty good.

D: Good. I had planned to go to Russia and the visa was withdrawn and this is the second or third time this has happened. And I was going there as a private citizen, ______ to Moscow and Leningrad and all arrangements were made and yesterday afternoon, the man in the Paris agency received this from ______ in Moscow. "Regret we are forced to cancel all arrangements for your above client due to unforeseen circumstances. Accept our sincere apology for inconveniences caused." And I had an interpreter going and I was just anxious to go and so--it's on my own money and ______ before there was a group of clergymen in January and February and that was understandable that all the arrangements were made for traveling and so on and then they withheld the visa from the whole group.

K: Yeh.

D: But now,

K: You were going on your own?

D: On my own. And as a member of congress with an official passport.

K: I'll raise it with Dobrynin. I'll see him today or tomorrow. I will raise this with him. I of course know nothing.

D: That's right. I checked with our State Department but

K: What do they say?

D: They--I haven't been in touch with anybody at a high level frankly, just the congressional liaison people--this just happened yesterday afternoon. So this morning--I was scheduled to go Monday and I don't know whether we could reinstate it for them, but--anyway it is just kind of an outrage. When you think about that--if I were going just as a private citizen--but I have the official passport and all these arrangements were made. If they want cultural exchange and that sort of thing

K: I don't know what possible basis they could have for keeping you out. I will tell them in case they got overeager that this isn't something--the fact that you criticized this Administration would affect us. Maybe we that is what--I'm just trying to figure out what they could have had in mind. I don't know before it was understandalb.e

D: All right. But if you could untangle it, I'd appreciate it.

K: Well, let me find out. I'm just speculating. But when I've talked to them, I'll call you.

D: All right, Doctor. Thank you very much.

K: Good. Nice to talk to you.

D: Thank you.

K: Bye. Bye.

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TELCOM
Roland Evans - Mr. Kissinger

August 16, 1973

5:00 p. m.

E: Hello, Henry.

K: Hello, How are you.

E: I think if the President is going to do this to you that he has a ______ on you.

K: He's not doing anything to me. Nancy just said I could take Xandra tonight.

E: Did you tell her what was going on tonight?

K: Yes.

E: I fell great concern for tonight. I don't want to be a part of something that would damage my friend in New York.

K: You bloody wasp.

E: Are you going down to get the award?

K: Yes.

E: I'll be there too.

K: I don't want to stay for the whole thing. I will just accept the award and say a few friendly words.

E: OK.

K: OK, see you tonight. It will be just Lady Gowrie -- not her host. You didn't seem to be too happy about the prospect of that.

E: No, I wasn't to be truthful. I want to see this girl. The last time I saw her she was in a darkened car.

K: Well, she's very beautiful.

E: OK, I will see you tonight.

K: O.K. Bye.

E: Bye.

TELCORN
Mr. Kissinger/Ron Zeigler
5:33 p.m. August 16, 1973

Z: I wanted to ask you this in the spirit of humility not in the spirit of

K: You got Dianne sitting there?

Z: No.

K: Okay, I just wondered whom you were impressing.

Z: (laughs) No one is here. Say listen are you going to Brussels in September?

K: I have accepted a speech to give there, but don't know what my plans are definitely.

Z: AP is asking about it.

K: You can say I have accepted a speech, but my--it depends on the rest of my schedule.

Z: I will just say you've accepted a speech in Brussels.

K: But subject to the uncertainties to my schedule.

Z: But it isn't finalized yet. Huh?

K: I have accepted it, but I might cancel it.

Z: I don't want to say that. The point they'll be asking is is this part of the European tour that you will be taking-

K: No, I will --if I go I will just go to Brussels and come back.

Z: And return. So I can say that.

K: Yes, but of course, if other European countries invite me, but that isn't going to happen.

Z: Okay. It is not part of a grand European swing by Henry Kissinger.

K: That is correct. Bye.

Z: Okay. Bye.

TELCORN
Ambassador Kahn/HAK

August 16, 1973/5:36 p.m.

K: Hello

AK: This is Sultan Kahn here. How are you?

K: How are you Mr. Ambassador?

AK: I am alright but I want to thank you, my wife and I, and others at the party Henry, we deeply appreciated your visit.

K: It was a joy to be there.

AK: I want to thank you. But you know what I told you yesterday about the flood situation and I have seen the detailed cable telegrams which the State Department has received from the Consulates in Lahore, Karachi and from the Embassy in Islamabad. These are also supplemented by the telegram which I have received and in fact what I submitted to you yesterday was... but it's not as much now by way of damage. I am sending you a letter, it's on the way now, because I wasn't sure if I'd be able to get in touch with you so I sent a letter to you enclosing the outlines of the big problems which have arisen from the floods and I'd deeply appreciate it if you could look at the letter and see if anything can be done. This scope is really vast. First of all for relief and for extricating people out of the areas where they are marooned and no communications is possible except by helicopters or by....

K: From whom is the letter?

AK: I've addressed the letter to you. I have sent the letter.

K: OK. Well I will do what I can.

AK: And I just wanted to say that this is really a time for some really imaginative action with about 8 or 10 million peoples involved in it and it is purely humanitarian and I don't think anybody could raise the slightest objection from the Congress in this operation. It's another field altogether and we do need assistance but speed is really the essence of the problem.

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K: OK. No, no, I mean Congress can't object to our giving humanitarian aid.

AK: Thats what I meant.

K: If you get that letter over I will do what I can.

AK: My chauffeur has left with the letter if you would be so kind as to tell your secretary that there be someone to receive and please to bring it up to you then you can see the situation.

K: I will do that. Now Mr. Ambassador. What is the situation in these negotiations with the Indians this weekend.

AK: The meeting is due to resume in Delhi on the 18th. That is day after tomorrow. It broke up in Islamabad on the question as to how Pakistan could help in admitting Bangladesh to United Nations. We said that we are prepared to discuss this question but we hope that by that time our prisoners will have come back. India's response was that the bulk probably could come back but we said that would not be good enough because If Pakistan helped in admitting Bangladesh to U.N. before the prisoners are back then we would be acting in violation of the General Assembly's resolution, last section, which bars to interdependent resolution saying that here Bangladesh is entitled to be admitted but at the same time saying that Bangladesh must fulfill obligations under the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions applying Geneva Conventions for the POW'S. So India said they would like to go back and discuss this matter with Raghuramaiah and suggested 18th as the date of the meeting.

K: The prisoner issue seems reasonably on the road to solution. Is that right?

AK: What has happened they said yes the prisoners can go back. The Bahalis in Pakistan we said can go back we also said that a certain category of Bahariyas can come back for instance those who are employed by the Federal Government of Pakistan and happened to be in Dakhla at that time. We will accept them. In the case of divided families we will accept and other hardship cases but we said not the bulk of the Bahariyas.

K: What about the war criminal issue.

AK: We insisted that that would have to be called off but the ______ worked out in Islamabad was that Raghuramaiah--that India would hold back 195 POWs. We would hold back 205 Bengalis in Pakistan who are accused of subversion and sabotage, that after the other prisoners in Bangalis and Bahariyas have come and gone then Pakistan would recognize Bangladesh and at that time these two categories would also be extinct.

K: Well that seems reasonable.

AK: It was reasonable but the Indians said that though they found it reasonable they could not say yes at that time. They would have to go back and discuss the whole range of proposals with Raghuramaiah. So this is where the matter rests and we'll know about it in about two days time if there has been any acceptance on the part of Dakhla.

K: OK. Many thanks and I will act immediately on your letter/

AK: Thanks very much.

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DECLASSIFIED

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Authority

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TELCOM

Henry Brandon/HAK

August 16, 1973/6:45 p.m.

B: Hello Henry how are you?

K: I've been rather busy.

B: What are your plans for tomorrow evening?

K: I was going to get some people together but do you want to talk to me alone.

B: I would, yes, but what are the alternatives.

K: Well, why don't you join us.

B: Who will be there.

K: Peterson and the people he staying with, myself and Winston Lord.

B: I would love to. Where?

K: Maybe I can fit a half hour in at the end of the day. I thought you did a fine job on the article.

B: Thank you.

K: I do think what you said is right. The Europeans don't know what the American position is. What makes them think we need them. This is off the record. It will do nothing for the popularity of the President. We do need them because if they want to ...

B: You know I have this uneasy feeling that they cannot cope with their own views.

K: Very perceptive. They don't know what to say and in the meantime history is marching on. I agree very much with you.

B: The editor said the article arose a great deal of interest from people who matter.

K: Really. I have no sense for the mood in the British Government. This Prime Minister must be the only one with a heart.

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B: He is a civil servant rebelling against the policy.

K: Who are the civil servants rebelling?

B: The Treasury and Bureau of Transportation.

K: On economic ground. How about the Foreign Office?

B: Very steady. They made the mistake that we would not go in early and they probably now have a very bad communication abroad. What do you think about the situation in Vietnam? I don't understand the statement of Congress.

K: Why no?

B: I don't think Congress is in the mood to do anything in Vietnam.

K: If they want to lose a war that we've already won. It makes no sense to me. I cannot say it would have lasted more than 5 years. It may still last but maybe not in Cambodia. Call me in the morning and we'll set a time for dinner.

B: OK.

K: Bye.

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TELCOM
Mr. Kissinger/Tom Braden
7:00 p.m. 8/16/73

K: What did you think of the speech?

B: I guess it was the best that could be done.

K: If you analyze it Tom, and I hate to use this word--have compassion --what could he do? If you analyze it in detail, he has to give a rebuttal. What can he say that is different than Ehrlichman or Haldeman. How do you prove you didn't know something? And by his standards, it was as conciliatory as it could be.

B: There is some merit there.

K: I told you before that the best that could be done is to leave it inconclusive--it couldn't be conclusive. And if the tapes are forced out it will still be inconclusive. I don't want to say what will be on the tapes.

B: If they (tapes) were conclusive, we may have heard about it.

K: Well as a friend Tom and not as a journalist.

B: Stu tells me that he is almost certain that the Vice President will be indicted. That is what is going around among the journalists.

K: That is what I heard.

B: I don't know who will lead this country. You can maybe.

K: Tom, all I call tell you is we have now an enormous national problem. Nothing will clear Watergate. It could just go to pieces if we don't get together to rally things. Now we need a lot of help.

B: I didn't quite make it clear when we talked the other day, but to the extent that you can use your powers of persuasion to see that he see--people who are really loyal and feel sorry for him, to open up the dialogue.

K: A Kennedy or Rockefeller could bring this off--what you have just described. This is a personality problem. In the five years that I have known him, I have not had more than 5 personal conversations with him at most. Let me talk to him out there. His feelings are that every time he makes amove someone kicks him in the teeth.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCONE

Rowland Evans/Kissinger

10:27 a.m. - 8/17/73

K: Hello.

E: You are really first class. Bright as hell, isn't she?

K: She's very bright.

E: What does she do? Does she write?

K: She's a sort of a dilettante. Sometimes she writes; now she's taking law.

E: We really enjoyed that last night. Katherine said I was very boring.

K: No, she enjoyed it. Xandra thought you were very intelligent.

E: Did she really? Very few people think that.

K: She did.

E: How did you like the piece this morning? You'll never get another piece like that out of Evans and Novak.

K: I thought it was good.

E: You know what?

K: What?

E: There is real fear going in this town. I talked to 15 people this morning on the reaction to that speech and what's going to happen. Did you read the Wall Street Journal?

K: No.

E: Read the Wall Street Journal wrapup on the speech this morning. It starts on page 1

K: What does it say?

E: It's just filled with quotes from citizens calling Nixon on a liar, cheat - it's an unbelievable piece. In the Wall Street Journal!

K: Really.

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E: And I think the fear level is high here because of how confident he was in that speech. I thought why was he so confident. Because he's got something and he knows it.

K: He's got what?

E: You read Bill Safire's piece. He just keeps talking like a man who's ready to throw the full power of the Presidency in this thin.

K: I'm just speculating but I just would assume that if he gets driven too far.

E: He's going to be.

K: Well, I tell you I had great sympathy but I think the people are now getting demented. You read the Washington Post editorial - what the hell do they want? Full disclosure. What do they want him to do? They won't accept anything as full disclosure that doesn't lead to impeachment.

E: Nobody wants impeachment.

K: What is full disclosure by the definition of the Post when your position is that you don't know anything how can you make full disclosure.

E: The tapes.

K: Oh, come on.

E: Let a judge hear them and then report.

K: The tapes are going to be inconclusive. I've not heard one of them and I bet you they'll be inconclusive.

E: I think that's right. That at least refutes...

K: Then so what?

E: I think that would clear up a helluva lot. The idea of hiding what might be evidence, that's what's got people. But what has really got them - and what's got me, is that that's really irrelevant. As I wrote this morning, that's totally irrelevant. That's been past; that's been forgotten in the White House; they're not going to release the tapes. What they are going for, and the President must know this, with utmost clarity, that even among the 69% who say they disapprove of the way he's conducted the Presidency, they would be overwhelmingly in favor of his staying on in office. That's what he's got and it's a helluva strong backboard. Right?

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K: I really don't know what he thinks but that seems reasonable.

E: Can I tell you something totally off the record. This is shocking.

K: What is shocking?

E: What I'm going to tell you.

K: You can count on my...

E: A very high White House official has been making telephone calls around the country to prominent Republicans saying don't get out in front of the Agnew thing, don't defend him. He's been doing it, he says, on his own, and I can't believe that. I think it might be on the assumption at the highest level to this government that the evidence is overwhelming and that he's going down the tube.

K: You know that's shocking news to me.

E: What I'm telling you is true, I know it. I don't know what it means though. I cannot believe that anybody in the White House is going to mount a campaign of that kind unless they knew he had no chance of surviving. Wouldn't you agree with that?

K: Yeh. Unless they've all gone crazy.

E: Well, they haven't. And you'd know it if they had. An

K: No, no, and this is a responsible bunch here whether you agree with me or not.

E: I think that. I agree.

K: And if they do it they are doing it to protect the guys, not to shaft Agnew.

E: Not to shaft him.

K: No but to protect the people who might get out in front of him.

E: That's right, I agree with that. That would only be done if they were pretty damn strong and if that happens do you think he'd pick Connolly? I think he would.

K: You know since I'm totally ignorant I would say there's a good chance. But that's really - my guess is as good as yours.

DECLASSIFIED
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Telcon
Marilyn Berger/HAK

August 17, 1973; 11:00 a.m.

B: How are you?

K: Okay. What did I do now?

B: Nothing. Why don't you ever let me see you?

K: Because I am scared of you, and besides we already have the
editorial support of your paper, so why should I waste time?

B: Is it American policy to pressure Israel to come up with some
new ideas?

K: No. We would welcome them but we don't pressure it. This is
deep background.

B: Are we calling on Israel to come up with new ideas.

K: I am not.

B: I know you are not. That is why I am calling. Is it true that
the energy crisis...

K: Marilyn, we are not going to be panicked by the energy crisis.
It would be a never-ending problem.

B: Would you say that some State Department people stepped out too
far on this?

K: I am not saying anything, but you people have written many things
that don't get the full approval of every agency.

B: I am with you. Did you speak to the State Department people about
what was said.

K: That is why I don't talk to you - before or after?

B: After it was said.

K: No, but as soon as we have established a liaison office over there,
as in Peking, I may communicate with them.

B: With State? You haven't yet?

K: I don't discuss internal things...

B: What I want to write, it seems to me like Sisco stepped out too far. It was suggested to him rather strongly that he need not have said this because he opens the door to pressures. would

K: I didn't say that.

B: Why?

K: Maybe a little too strong.

B: Too strong because what it was based on - made no difference. Which would be a better way to say it?

K: I would not necessarily say either.

B: Can I say no one in the White House is backing up the statement?

K: That's an imperical fact.

B: Are you coming over here so that we can do some business?

K: Where are you - at the State Department?

B: Yes.

K: No one has offered me the job. That means I have to deal with you if I come over there.

B: Seriously, I hear some decision will be made in a week or two.

K: I have nothing to say. I have stayed out of all discussions, out of all power clashes.

B: I am always the last person in town to hear about things.

K: I have no reason to believe it is in any imminent stage even if it is being discussed.

B: There are a lot of people over here who will welcome you. How about the Sonnenfeldt thing?

K: I am taking care of Sonnenfeldt.

DECLASSIFIED
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B: What are you doing?

K: Listen, I kept Sonnenfeldt on my staff. I knew all this stuff. I have been harassed about Sonnenfeldt for four years. We won't let him be rejected. There will be a bloody fight - if there is a fight. We would like to have it go through quietly.

B: That is what everyone thought - it would go through quietly.

K: It doesn't help Sonnenfeldt. Come and see me some time.

B: When do you want to have lunch?

K: Are you going to be in San Clemente?

B: No, but I can take you to lunch today.

K: Today I can't. Maybe tomorrow. Call me in the morning. I promised it to a former secretary of mine.

B: Tomorrow, or today?

K: I had promised it to her tomorrow, but if she can't make it I will see you.

B: That's the story of my life - it used to be wives.

K: I never go out with secretaries while they work for me.

B: That's what they all say.

K: No, it is true.

B: We are on for lunch tomorrow unless you are otherwise engaged.

K: Okay, call me in the morning.

B: Okay.

Telcon
Bill Jordan/Kissinger

August 17, 1973 - 11:42 a.m.

J: Hello

K: Bill?

J: Yes, Henry?

K: When you were working out with Rabasa about my trip down there --
I think we ought to plan whatever needs to be done.

J: Yes, Henry.

K: I think I'd be better off getting a hotel room rather than stay at his house.

J: Whichever you think. I think probably it would be better, although he
has plenty of space.

K: Well, what do you think?

J: Well, if you're going to arrive on Friday afternoon and go to the party
Friday evening and leave the next morning, it would be a lot more con-
venient just to stay with him. But, you know, it is just a matter of
personal preference. The hotel is not far away.

K: One advantage of the hotel is I can leave the party.

J: Yes, you can leave.

K: Why don't you do that? Tell him to arrange it. We'll have to tell our
Embassy, though.

J: Well, we can tell them later on, can't we?

K: Yeah.

J: They'll have to make some arrangements.

K: And I'll have to get Secret Service down there.

J: Yes, that's right.

K: Why can't I stay at the Embassy residence, because then he'll be
embarrassed to have not invited the Ambassador?

DECLASSIFIED
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By A6 NARA Dae 6/9/09

J: That's right.

K: But that embarrassment will exist anyway.

J: Well, it's just emphasized.

K: Well, there's no way I can go to Mexico without telling our Ambassador.

J: Oh, no, no, no. You'll have to tell him, but that makes it a, you know, it's strictly a personal, a personal occasion, an invitation between you and Rabasa. It would be a little harder if you stayed at the Embassy for him not to invite ---

K: Well, why don't you work it out with Rabasa and then tell Bonnie so that she can get the Secret Service organized.

J: Alright.

K: What time he wants me there and so forth.

J: O.K. I will do it.

K: Good, thank you.

J: Yes, indeed.

Telcon
Harlow/Kissinger

August 17, 1973 - 11:45 a.m.

H: Hello

K: Hello

H: Question. Do you know a man, his name is George Steele. In the
Rockefeller campaign very actively in 1960 and again in 1968, the
two conventions there?

K: No.

H: Then I'm a no.

K: What does he do?

H: Well, he's a head of a law firm here and the Governor of North Carolina was going to use it and he called me about it.

K: He couldn't have been very active.

H: And I think the fact that you don't know him at all suggests he didn't amount of a whole lot in the campaign.

K: You know, he could have amounted to a whole lot in North Carolina, but he could not have amounted to a whole lot in the Rockefeller entourage.

H: Cause you would have known him definitely.

K: No question.

H: O.K. Good to talk to you, sir.

K: It is always a privilege. What do you think about the reactions up to now to his speech?

H: I think it's like you and I thought and said in Camp David. That he'd make a speech and whatever the speech was, whatever the statement, that they would shred it until his press conference. Is that what you think?

K: Yeah. He would have been a lot better off having a press conference this morning and announcing on Wednesday. Of course they had to be careful what they said.

-2-

H: I assume, though, that he is not up to it physically, just physically up enough to do these things that rapidly together. I'm beginning to realize that he's probably just kind of down.

K: That was the limitations.

H: And that's the only thing that made it impossible, I guess.

K: Yeah and the tremendous psychological block he's got.

H: Yeah, I'll tell you this. I don't know. I don't know if he can get rid of that. He's got to get rid of it somehow.

K: Yeah.

H: Cause he can't get rid of the country.

K: Not this way. I couldn't agree more.

H: Alright, sir, I'll tell him since Kissinger doesn't know Steele, the hell with him.

K: That's more or less what I think.

H: O. K. Good.

K: Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCONE

Binder (NYT)/Kissinger

2:24 p.m. - 8/17/73

K: Hello.

B: Hello. it was nice of you to call. I'm calling in connection with the AP and CBS reports about Mr. Kissinger going to Europe.

K: It's just a restatement.

B: How about your trip to Brussels?

K: I had accepted it many months ago to speak to the Atlantic Treaty Association and I also agreed to meet with the NATO Council.

B: But it is mere coincidence that they are meeting September 10 in Brussels.

K: Complete coincidence.

B: There's nothing really new in the last 24 hours about Nixon's trip?

K: There's nothing new in the last 24 days about the trip. A restatement of what we had before said. I saw the UPI story about advance teams going over there and that is nonsense.

B: This AP story was so hard we thought something new happened.

K: No, I think they asked what is the plan and the idea was the plan is what it always has been to aim for the end of the year, but a lot depends on the meeting of the 9 and how the dialogue develops.

B: OK, I just wanted to stay in touch.

K: You were good to check.

B: All right, thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

8/17/73 4:13 p.m.

HK: Hello?

D: Hello, Henry.

K: You're giving up the SS-9 missiles?

D: Exactly. I just finished reading the press conference of your Secretary of Defense.

K: I haven't read it yet.

D: No, I know. He by the way, put it more than we discussed with you about what should be discussed on SALT, so you have to look at it all right (laughs)

K: Okay. I haven't seen it yet.

D: ...ahead of us in the negotiations, I should say.

K: He doesn't know what we are discussing.

D: He should make a general observation about if you should talk--make an announcement about ah---

K: Here, I got something.

D: I hope you ... make an announcement about some tests in my country. You haven't read it either?

K: No, I just got one ticker item here.

D: Well, it is interesting. What kind of changes should be implied in connection with this?

K: I'll have to get the text.

D: I was calling you this time as a joke really--

K: Well we have gone through this before. What I told you is our approach.

D: I understand. What I am calling about really--I just received a telegram about--you remember we discussed about--Afghanistan, Iran and India

K: Yeh.

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Date
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By: A. M. W.

Page 2

D: Nothing urgent--when are you leaving--Monday--

K: Can you get a chance later and send it over here?

D: Yes, I will try to do it--to summarize it really and then we could discuss in more detail, because I don't know everything--but the substance, I could make it in a summary. You are leaving on Monday?

K: Yeh.

D: After what o'clock?

K: Oh, very early. About 8:00 a.m.

D: I could get it to you today or tomorrow right?

K: That's right. What is the basic point?

D: Just continuation of a discussion--it is a one-by-one, on ..... of Afghanistan to look together on the basis of .... of this one and Iran, this one, this is going along the lines of...

K: Right.

D: Okay.

K: Okay, well that is a very good sort of exchange.

D: You see, I'll just make summaries and today or tomorrow, my people will call to your boys and they will find out--

K: Good. Excellent and then when you come out to the West Coast, unless there is something more urgent, we'll talk about it.

D: Okay.

K: And the President--I told him, of course, of our entire conversation--but he also thought that this sort of exchange we have had about Japan was very unfruitful.

D: I think it really, because it becomes more and more a necessary basis, in their present road, so to speak.

K: And we are seriously looking at the various projects we discussed and I'll have something to say to you when we meet.

D: Okay, Henry. ..... from the State Department about the.... end of the October and--

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Page 3

K: Nothing to it.

D: Nothing?

K: To Europe?

D: Yeh.

K: Now--

D: The whole story--

K: Total nonsense, there are no advance teams, the situation is just what I described to you.

D: I see.

K: We will wait until after the Europeans have met in September to decide.

D: This is kind of interesting.

K: Well in Copenhagen, they are denying European foreign ministers are meeting.

D: Nothing here--

K: Nothing--you can rest assured this will not be done without a...

D: Because our press agency will report the whole story--

K: You report to them that it is completely fabricated, there is no change whatsoever from what it was.

D: It was going in that direction.

K: It is going in that direction, but there are no dates fixed, there are no advance teams, there is no declaration, so it is going in that direction, but no with any special--

D: I understand. All right. Okay, Henry. I will send today or tomorrow and then we can discuss.

K: Good excellent.

A6

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

8/17/73 4:13 p. m.

HK: Hello?

D: Hello, Henry.

K: I haven't read it yet.

D: No, I know. He by the way, put it more than we discussed with you about what should be discussed on SALT, so you have to look at it all right (laugh).

K: Here, I got something.

K: I'll have to get the text.

K: Yeh.

Page 2

K: Yeah.

D: After what o'clock?

K: Oh, very early. About 8:00 a. m.

D: I could get it to you today or tomorrow night?

K: Right.

D: Okay.

D: Okay.

K: And the President--I told him, of course, of our entire conversation--but he also thought that this sort of exchange we have had about Japan was very unsatisfactory.

K: And we are seriously looking at the various projects we discussed and I'll have something to day to you when we meet.

D: Okay, Henry. ..... from the State Department about the ... end of the October and--

By: NARA Date 6/9/09

By AB NARA Date 6/9/69

Page 3

K: Nothing to it.

D: Nothing?

K: To Europe?

D: Yeh.

K: Now--

D: The whole story--

D: I see.

D: Nothing here--

K: Good excellent.

TELCONE

Marvin Kalb/Kissinger

5:32 p.m - 8/17/73

K: Hello.

MK: Henry. Just very briefly - to repeat our very, very great interest
in accompanying you wherever you go. I was just reading a story
today that you might be going off to Europe on September 10.

K: I'm giving a talk in Europe on September 10th.

MK: Is it just that one stop?

K: Well, I may go there and then I may stop one place on a personal
thing that I don't want any publicity on. But the town in which I was
born wants to give me their golden medal and I would be there only
so that my father could be there. It has no interest to me.

MK: That's a great story. How fantastic!!

K: But I don't want it used.

MK: No, I won't talk about it if you don't want me to but it's a great
human interest story. I want to go with you.

K: Why don't you check with me in a week, Marvin.

MK: I will do that. We're eager as hell to do that.

K: Do both?

MK: My thought is I just want to go with you period, wherever you go. But I would leave you to cut it up any way that you think proper. I would just love to go and cover you.

K: Well, I'm very tempted.

MK: I'll get back to you next week.

K: OK. Bye.

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A6

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TELCORN

Ambassador Kaul/HAK

August 17, 1973/5:50 p.m.

K: Hello

AK: Kaul here.

K: Hell Mr. Ambassador. How are you?

AK: Very well thank you. I tried to get you this morning but they told me you were not available.

at

K: Thats right. I was/a meeting / Mr. Ambassador two things. We have had words with the Pakistans XAKT in the sense of our discussion.

AK: Thank you.

K: I have the impression that if your Bangladesh friends are reasonable that a settlement ought to be possible this weekend.

AK: Good.

K: We have in any case made it clear to them that we would welcome it greatly.

AK: Thankyou very much.

K: Secondly on your seeing the Presdient on Tuesday.

AK: Tuesday.

K: No wait a minute I've not been able to get a final decision because he has left for Key Biscayne this morning but does your embassy have a number. Of you.

AK: They have my number. I'll be in Los Angeles.

K: Well, I will reach you in Los Angeles over the weekend I hope.

AK: Alright.

K: In any event I hope you on Tuesday.

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AK: Thank you very much. Will it be afternoon?

K: Well I guess it will be in the late morning.

AK: I will wait to hear from you then.

K: But I can't be sure yet because I frankly haven't been able to discuss it with his schedule people yet but we'll do our very best.

AK: Thank you very much.

K: It was good to see you.

AK: You too and we enjoyed having you on our Independence day.

K: It was a very informal and lovely occasion. I was really very pleased.

AK: It was lovely having you.

K: Talk to you soon Mr. Ambassador.

telcon
General Haig/Mr. Kissinger
6:47 p.m., August 17, 1973

K: Hello, Al.

H: Henry, what's up. We're incommunicado at the moment.

K: Oh, no, I just wanted to pass some things to the President which I can give you.

H: Yeah, if you would. You know, we're relaxing.

K: Yeah. Well, that's okay.

H: You understand?

K: Yeah. Oh, I understand very well.

H: All right.

K: Tell him that the Chinese have replied and they want me to come from September 6th to the 9th.

H: Great!

K: And that the British have pretty well caved; they're going to put out a statement on Monday strongly supporting our initiative.

H: Great!

K: On the Year of Europe. But we can't let up the heat yet.

H: No, no. That's great.

K: And I think, frankly, that in the light of our discussions yesterday that I shouldn't go at that day but move it back a month.

H: I think so too.

K: I just don't think it will look responsible to --

H: Too rushy.

K: First of all, they've kept us waiting four weeks.

H: Yeah, I agree with you. And you'll have too much to do and you can't afford to be away like that.

DECLASSIFIED
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General Haig/Mr. Kissinger

2

K: So actually we might even have to slip it to the end of October.
What do you think?

H: I think the theater a little later is better. That side of it.

K: As late as the end of October?

H: Well, we're mid anyhow.

K: What?

H: I think mid-October.

K: Well, you know, they have Pompidou there until the 17th.

H: I see. We want to get the UN thing out of the way, Henry.

K: Yeah. Well, then I'll propose to them any time from the 15th -- but
I won't reply at all.

H: Yeah.

K: But at least he should know that we are on course.

H: Right.

K: But I don't think it would be right that just at that time I should leave
the country.

H: No. And, of course, you've got a hell of a good excuse. They know
that. There's just no time in that transition with what you've got to
do.

K: Yeah. Well, that's what I think.

H: Okay. I wouldn't ordinarily interrupt your call but Bebe called me
a and said there's a problem.

K: No, no, no, I just thought it might make him feel good.

H: It will. I got a first reaction from ........ was very good on the
speech.

K: Oh, what is it? Really?

H: Well, he didn't give me statistics, he just said there is very strong
reaction and they haven't compiled the statistics.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

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TELCOM
JOE SISCO/HAK

August 17, 1973/10:48 p.m.

K: Hello.

S: Henry. Our mutual friend Sultan Kahn is coming in to see me at noon and I saw by the traffic this morning he apparently mentioned to you the other night or day this question of wheat.

K: That's right.

S: I want you to know that on this end I want to be sure that whatever I said wasn't in any way out of line. Our people here have been talking AID to see whether anything can be done on wheat and edible oils and of course, you know what the problem is there. It's very very difficult.

K: But he tells me also that he has -- that they have a terrible flood problem.

S: Yeah. Now this is the other thing. I just wanted to have a word with you on. He called me yesterday and what they really need at the moment are some helicopters and some rubber boats. We have been in touch with the Pentagon and we've got a few people that you know are beginning to look to see what the availability is. If there is anything -- little nudge -- that you could give to the right place in the Pentagon that you have an interest in this. I think we ought to try to do it if we can.

K: What is it that we want.

S: Helicopters and rubber boats.

K: OK we'll get it down. But will you tell him we'll get it done.

S: I'll tell him that we are looking at it and can I tell him that I've talked to you so that...

K: I would appreciate it if you... We want a little money in the bank.

DECLASSIFIED

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S: That's right. I happen to believe this is one of the nicest Ambassador's in town.

K: Well he put me on my plane for China.

S: He's a first rate guy Henry.

K: Would you tell him that there was a special White House in him

S: Yes and you and I talked this morning and not only are we working on it but you personally are trying to see what can be done on it.

K: Incidentally I think you handled that Security Council thing beautifully.

S: Thank you very much Henry.

K: It's come out well. The Israeli screaming has been moderate.

S: Yes it has.

K: And that's -- your judgment was right.

S: Thank you very much Henry.

K: Right. Bye.

- 2 -

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Mel Laird

8/18/73 9:30 a.m.

HK: .... Did you want to see me?

ML: Well, I just thought I'd drop down to see you for a second, but I can wait for a while--

HK: Can you wait? Say 45 minutes and I'll drop up?

ML: Yeh, sure. The only thing--and I can just give you one minute--the only thing I wanted to talk to you about a little bit is --I don't want to get into your business, but I think there has to be a strategy worked out on this foreign aid and foreign military assistance, because it is kind of dropping by the cracks here,

K: Okay.

L: With some of these guys up on the hill and maybe we can talk about it out in San Clemente.

K: Or I'll drop up in a few minutes.

L: Oh, no don't. It isn't that important, but sometime when you have some time, I'd like to sit down and visit with you about it because I have a few ideas and we can maybe do it in San Clemente if you are tied up today, oka

K: Okay, well I'll give you a call and see how you are set up.

L: All right.

A6

HAK/Marilyn Berger

August 18, 1973, 11:55 a.m.

HK: Mariylyn.

MB: I can't stand all of this attention.

HK: No, no. I just want to make sure. I can't have any stories coming out of any meetings with you. So you may want to put it off until September.

MB: No. I...

HK: Particularly in light of what you wrote today. I'm just taking the absolutely firm position that I'm not talking about it, any of these personnel matters.

MB: I really didn't call you about that. You remember when I called you yesterday we were going to talk about the Middle East.

HK: I know, but then everytime there is a story like this it starts a big debate. I like to take the position that I never discussed it, which is true.

MB: Everyone will know where that story came from. Who knows. It didn't come from you and you know that. Look, I'm making a great exception by eating lunch and I would love to have lunch with you.

HK: Okay, as long as we understand each other.

MB: I hope we can talk about some...if you want to tell me certain things in your life, that's fine, but I thought we might have a sort of intellectual discussion.

HK: Well, just as long as you don't write about it.

MB: Well, I can always learn something from you, you know, Henry.

HK: Well, wait two weeks and then you can write what you want.

MB: What's going to happen in two weeks?

HK: Nothing, but it will be decoupled from me whatever you write.

MB: I see. Well, I'm writing right now about the most opaque report you have ever seen in our multinational corporations and world development. Can anything be farther from your mind?

HK: I'll see you soon.

TELCOM
Mr. Kissinger/Marquis Childs

12:00 noon 8/18/73

C: I have heard some disturbing reports out of Peking about new conflicts developing. How serious do you take it.

K: I haven't had any serious reports on that, but there is clearly something going on.

C: But this Chang Chen is gearing things up again. I hope not.

K: We have no direct evidence of this, but we also have evidence in the last few weeks which would indicate that Chou en-lai faction has upper hand.

C: I hope to God That is true. Can't afford otherwise.

K: We're the only country that can afford it. Only one cultural revolution in the world at once.

C: But ours isn't so extreme. When are you going to China, Henry?

K: I am just trying now to decide when it would be best.

C: They (?) are coming home fairly soon. think so.

K: I don't think so. I might go in the first two weeks of September.

C: But their conference will still be on.

K: It will be an interesting experience for me.

C: You might address them --I would love to hear it. You will get a big hand. What are you doing for dinner?

K: I am taking my children to Camp David.

C: The President is in Key Biscayne, isn't he?

K: I'm going to San Clemente on Monday--let's do it when I get back, unless you get out there.

C: I may.

K: Call me if you get out there and we will have our usual lunch.

C: Good, Henry.

TELCORN
Mr. Kissinger/President
12:45 p.m. 8/18/73

N: Hi Henry, are you in New York?

K: No, I'm in Washington. But I'm going up to Camp David with my children.

N: I had forgotten--that's where you were going to go--are you going to drive up or helicopter or what?

K: I guess I'll go by helicopter.

N: Fine, whatever you like. Incidentally, use the heated pool if you like. And the sauna--it might be a bigger thrill for them--

K: That'd be a terrific thrill.

N: Heated pool is there and you are welcome to use it and there is a dressing room and sauna and everything--use the whole shabang.

K: I guess Al had told you about the Chinese--

N: Yeh, I was not feeling well yesterday, so I had a--I had a bad case of pleurasy.

K: Ahh.

N: Aftermath of that--pneumonia--don't tell anybody, but it'll __--I hope it is over in a few days. But I'm not going to do any work for a while. Give me a rundown--apparently you got some pieces of good news.

K: We had word from the Chinese--but--inviting me from the 6th to the 9th. And that's--and it was a very friendly note--6th to 9th of September.

N: You going to accept that or push it off.

K: I think it might be better to push it off a few weeks, Mr. President. But we might discuss it in San Clemente.

N: I'm inclined to think--to tell you right now that I think we'd better push it off for two weeks, if we can.

K: I'm sure I can.

N: Doesn't cause any problem to them does it?
Ah hell, they want you to come, let's put if off--you never know, something else may develop--on Vice Presidential--and other things, and I think it just

as well you not be running around China --

K: Right, Mr. President and the British are beginning to come around on this European thing. They are going to hold a press briefing on Monday in which they will speak very positively on the Year of Europe and they sent us the text of it.

N: Yeh. Yeh. Who did you hear that from.

K: They sent in their chargee. And gave us the text of it.

N: Good.

K: And of course the Italians are as busy as bees, doing things up. So I think it is really coming along. The Japanese were in panting about your coming this year.

N: Well we might do that.

K: And I still think Mr. President, there is a lot to be said for going to Japan this year and to Europe early next year,

N: Sure, hell yes. We'll see, we may just decide--if it is to our advantage--only if it is to our advantage.

K: That's right. Of course, we don't have to do either.

N: Good.

K: So things are falling into place.

N: You had some rushes from Dobrynin and Brezhnev--

K: Oh yes, I gave that to Al on Thursday--in which Brezhnev sent you a mess: says he wishes you well in all your endeavors and the date was not chosen by accident.

N: Ah ha. Good.

K: They have made a number of propositions to with what we might do at the summit next year.

N: Good. Good.

K: And they are really keep us meticulously informed now about their talks with the Japanese and other countries.

N: Yet they are building up their damn missiles like crazy aren't they.

DECLASSIFIED
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K: That is a program that has been going on for years. Oh yes, we can't let down our guards--in fact we probably have to do something and I think in our defense program next year, we ought to look--we have a possibility of putting 7 MIRVs on each Minuteman rather than three and we ought to look at that very carefully.

N: Yeh. Sure. Sure. Sure have to take a look at it.

K: I don't they have become suddenly converts to detente in the abstract.

N: Hell no.

K: But once we get this Chinese thing going again and the European, I think by early next year, we are going to have this thing humming again,

N: Sure well, those events are bound to do that because of what the nation is basically.

K: Also because the way your foreign policy has been designed--because the fact that it held together in the face of these totally irresponsible onslaught is in itself amazing.

N: Yeh yeh. Far as we are concerned, we cannot be concerned about our contemporaries--they are ordinarily wrong.

K: Exactly, they have been wrong for four year.

N: But we will be concerned about the historians, but as the case may be we shall see.

K: N: I strongly urge--I went over this with Ziegler, you have got to arrange your schedule. Any conversations you have, Henry, are loaded about--in a factor of about 10 to 1 with television people rather than with columnists--you know what I mean, they are more enjoyable and more interesting and more intelligent because basically you could do so much good with even these jackasses like Chancellor and Rather and so forth, in other words, just your sitting down with them means so much. You know?

K: N: I would like for you from now on to put that first and foremost than anything you every do. Howard Schmidt, John Chancellor, Jon Jarriell (TOM?) Cronkite, have you come down sometime for lunch?

K: Okay.

N: That's the game, Henry,

K: I'll get Ron to work out a program for me and he knows who the people are

N: But with the Chinese, how will you handle this?

K: Well they let us wait for three weeks, so I'll wait until the end of next week and suggest another date, say two or three weeks later.

N: That's right. They're going to be damn interested in having it. This indicates there isn't any question about their desire, doesn't it?

K: Exactly right.

N: Have you told Mansfield anything yet?

K: No, they won't have him until I've been there.

N: Cambodia is still surviving three days later.

K: Exactly.

N: Guess they aren't ready for their big push yet.

K: There will be a big push.

N: At least the government hasn't panicked yet,

K: Every week that passes that they are surviving is of course a great--

N: They don't panic psychologically, hell they can hold for a long time. That's right, Henry. Anyway, have a great time old boy.

K: Thank you Mr. President, I hope you do too.

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Ron Ziegler

1:00 p.m. 8/18/73

K: Ron, what is that story in the STAR about the Presidential trip out of Key Biscayne--the trip to Europe in the fall.

Z: Out of Key Biscayne?

K: Out of KB, UPI.

Z: Now I think that is probably a pick up of the stuff from the other day. Jerry hasn't said one goddamn thing and neither have I. Matter of fact, Gerry shot that down yesterday. I have the STAR in front of me and I can't find it.

K: Saturday--you probably have Friday. "Nixon's grand tour set for fall" Key Biscayne. President Nixon grand tour of western Europe will take place in late October and early November, the White House has disclosed.

Night news service.

Z: Oh its from Night News Service. No, it would not have been from us. The story may have been written out of Key Biscayne you know by ______ or Thomas but we have not announced anything or given any encouragement to that speculation.

K: Okay. You will lay off it?

Z: As a matter of fact Gerry did last yesterday. And he has instructions from your people to do so.

K: Right. How is old Ziegler doing?

Z: I hope that is gone. How is the President this morning.

K: Oh you and Haig are monitoring these calls?

Z: No, the only reason I knew, I placed a call to you to return it and they said you were on the phone with the President.

K: Well he was suffering no pain. No, he was find. He said he wasn't feeling well yesterday.

Z: Oh really?

K: And that he didn't intend to do work for a few days, so you may not get him into a press conference for a few days. He said he didn't intend to

DECLASSIFIED
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work, so you may not get him to do a press conference this week.
You want my frank opinion.

Z: Yeh.

K: What is your judgment.?

Z: Oh that is your frank opinion. --That we won't?

K: A press conference this week.

Z: I think you are right. But he should have had one. Okay, listen Henry
I'm going to be over there and see some of the press guys this evening,
tell me precisely the line you want me to take on Europe.

K: There are no knew developments. It is where it stood a month ago.

Z: [ Nothing set.

K: Nothing set and nothing will be decided until after the European
foreign ministers have met in Copenhagen. Copenhagen in September.

Z: Good. That's the way we'll do it.

DECLASSIFIED
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By A. NARA Date 6/9/69

TELCOM

Pete Peterson/Mr. Kissinger

8/18/73 1:05 p.m.

PP: Three quick items, first of all just on a personal note, I'd be careful not to take Alsop all that seriously about foreign policy--I think you can unify one hell of a lot of Senators and congressmen, if you approach this in a way I know you would--and I think it is easy to despair too much now, I just don't buy it, I think you can do it.

HK: Pete, could I call you around 3:00--because I'm already late

PP: All right, because I've got three substantive items that are reasonably serious, so--3:00 I'll be here.

HK: I'll call you between 3 and 3:30

PP: All right, fine.

HK: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

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By: A6 NARA Date 6/9/09

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
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TELEON

Mr. Kissinger/General Haig

2:36 8/18/73

H: Henry

K: Al, how are you?

H: Fine, you still in town?

K: I'm leaving in about 20 minutes.

H: Okay...-just wanted to touch base with you before you went. Did your discussion with the boss go all right?

K: Yeh, well we just discussed the matters that I told you yesterday.

H: Yeh, was he pleased?

K: He seemed to be very pleased, yeh.

H: I haven't talked to him today yet.

K: Oh you didn't tell him that--

H: Yeh, we passed it on to him last night.

K: Oh well he has been suffering from pleurasy--and he isn't going to do any work for a while

H: That's right.

K: Does that mean no press conference?

H: I hope not--that would be a disaster.

K: That's what I think.

H: We would just be mucking through with the press.

K: That's right.

H: I have gotten some material that indicates we are doing real well. But the press has remained very cynical through it all. And that is our problem.

K: I think if he does a press conference in which he is very confident just keeps that other thing that you discussed--they'll have something

Page 2

totally new to write about.

H: That is exactly right

K: And it will give them a new focus.

H: Yeh.
Well, it's not the ______ around here

K: I can imagine. Well he's got to do it sooner or later--he isn't going to escape it.

like

H: Well yeh, you know it's not right/before--you have a situation of a year and half--two years legacy. You know, no knowledge of anything.

K: Yeh

H: It's not easy.

K: You mean on any subject

H: Yeh.

K: Do you think that is his hesitation?

H: Yeh. Among others.

K: But do you think it will improve in a week?

H: Never. It'll get worse.
We've really got to push him to do this, which I'm trying to do, but

K: It's the other way--I don't think he'll get that many tough questions on the substantive matters.

H: I don't either. Well there are some good questions and answers and we'll see what he does.

K: Well we are doing some foreign policy ones.
I have somebody waiting--will you be around this afternoon?

K: Yeh, I will be around

K: Can I call you from Camp David, there is one matter I wanted to discuss with you which will take a little longer.

H: Okay, I'll be here.

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Page 3

K: But what we discussed this morning was entirely these two things.

K: Yeh.

K: And how to handle them.

H: Yeh, did he agree with the October.

K: Siad wait till two weeks, but if he faces--if he goes thru with the scheme, it is impossible

H: That's right
Okay, Henry

K: Incidentally, one other thing--Rogers held a backgrounder for 15 newsmen last night and left it very open that he was going to leave and so that is going to fuel speculation agian.

H: Yeh, I saw Marilyn Berger--

K: And she got it from Rogers himself

H: Don't worry about that.

K: Wanted you to know where it came from

H: Oh I knew

K: You did

H: Yeh, it obviously came from there.

K: But it came directly from him. I'll talk to you in couple of hours.

TELCOM
Mr. Kissinger/Pete Peterson

8/18/73 3:32 p.m.

P: Hi, Henry.

K: Pete.

P Yes, sir. I have three quick items for you--(1) I think Henry you better look into that STR situation. Don't tell anybody your source, but I know that Eberly is looking seriously into leaving. He is interviewing for jobs --that Maughngram is already interviewing, and that Bill Pearce, the third guy, is extremely unhappy--

K: For what reasons?

P They are unhappy for two reasons--the charter, under this new deal with CIAP is significantly cutting back--but what's more important,

SANITIZED

But the point is with all your problems and the gov government looking like it is non-functioning and with being reasonably important, I wouldn't think this is something you want to see happen right now--or it would look like you are not really in a position to negotiate seriously. I don't know if you knew that or not.

K: No, I didn't know it.

P: Have you heard about it?

K: No, I hadn't.

P: Okay. Maybe I should call George, Henry, what do you think?

K: Yeh, I would.

P: Two, I'm getting more and more noises on the mark--and the distress it is causing the Germans--I'd suggest you keep very close to that situation--through whatever sources you have. Because as you said last night, it you or we get blamed for screwing up their economy, it's going to make your trip this fall and the whole charter and good deal more complicated. Now I had a long talk with Burns who is much more "flexible" --hate to use the word--he is much more responsive to some of these foreign policy considerations.

K: Yeh, I just saw him too.

Page 2

P: But he can do a lot on intervening--I don't know if he told you about it. But he thinks he has the authority to intervene, by swapping and buying foreign currencies and so forth--stuff George doesn't like to do. But I really think you and he have to form some kind of alliance Henry or this goddamn thing could blow up on you.

K: That's my firm intention.

P Okay, third, can you give me anysense of your timing, Henry, on your situation?

K: I haveno way of knowing.

K:

P: Okay--I would guess by the middle of September.

K: ☐

P: You said something about the mid-east--that's where you'd put the priority.

K: No, my understanding is that you don't want to do anything permanent.

P: Right.

K: And that you would do some quick trips.

P Right. Right. That's certainly the one where I probably can help you the most.

K: It is the area in which I understand least--somebody with your insight could just get a quick look--we would have to set it up in such a way --there will be unbelievably hurt feelings here because I've been holding up missions to go to Saudi Arabia--from every department. But that wouldn't be decisive--what I want is something like you did for Europe. To look at the overall problem.

P: All right. Give me a sense of timing--let's assume your deal is announced September--and the more I think about it, the more I'm convinced, you'll see that the only guy who can do it. What kind of timing would you be thinking about because my calendar is really--

K: After that I have to be confirmed. And I would think within two weeks of my confirmation--

P Yeh. It's kind of toward the latter part of this year--November in there or somewhere--

K: Oh no, October.

P: October--na

K: October--quickly. Early October, late September.

P: Yeh.

K: You wouldn't need a big team, would you?

P: God no, I wouldn't want a big team and it could be done as quietly as you want to do it. I'm thinking of--you've heard of this fellow Aikens --I would just want one or two guys that knew their way around the area That's all.

K: I'd like to--assuming it were--I don't know how long it would take to confirm me--assuming it is announced the mid-September and I'd be confirmed the end of September, I'd want you to be over within a week of that.

P: Yeh. All right, then the first part of October. Fourth item, on the Defense in Europe, I have an uneasy feeling you are taking serious risks that that thing could fall on you. I don't know how much you studied the proposals I made or whether you have got others, but I am still persuaded that a package deal can be made with the Europeans. I don't know if you've got Eagleburger--

K: The trouble is the Europeans have managed to --

P: My proposal is you try to make it longer termed--you bring in the Congress which I think you'll have to do anyway and give them some stuff on R&D and you really got to think through how far you go on nuclear but I really think if anything your position, oddly enough, may be as stro as it was, because the Europeans are just terrified you know about some thing happening unilaterally, and the more they look at what's happened on the Floor the other day with Aspen (sp?) you know--the way they cut back the budget and put a ceiling on it -- I think in some ways they may be just as anxious as they were--

K: And I don't know--I suppose by the time I get back from the West Coast we'll see more clearly--

P: I wish I thought there was a way that could be accelerated--don't know

K: I think it would be a mistake from our side, don't you think?

P: Incidentally, I hope I didn't sound at all hostile last night to you in suggesting that you needed a consensus--is what I think you need Henry.

K: I think you are right.

Page 4

P: I know it is tough--but I just don't agree with Alsop, I think that with you in there and your listening and your having some of these defense reductions, you know, objectives that we talked about a week ago, I think you could get them with you.

K: I think we need new--I need you to come along, to help with it on what basis you can.

P: Yeh. Obviously with the Congress to the extent that I can, I'd be delighted.

K: And special missions and on some sort of special consultant basis. But we could work all of that out.

P: All right--give my--I wouldn't say my love--to ______ you wouldn't understand.
Okay, bye.