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PARTICIPANT: Good afternoon, friends.

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It's indeed a tremendous pleasure and a very, very
special privilege for me and the Institute of Defense
Studies Analysis to welcome Dr. Henry Kissinger with
us our guest in India, and particularly to this
luncheon round table discussion on issues of mutual
interest.

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I am certainly not going to try and be
presumptuous enough to try and introduce Dr.
Kissinger. And as far as the people on the table,
sir, there's a list here in alphabetical order, and
they also have their cards in front of them. So when
they do speak and get into discussion, perhaps that
might be an easier way. Otherwise, it will take a lot
of time --

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With your permission, Dr. Kissinger, I'm
going to try and moderate this somewhat to the extent
that we can and see how far we can discuss some
serious issues as pragmatically as we can that
interests the United States and India, and also where
we possibly differ.

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I hope to be able to broadly keep it in four general areas. One on discussion -- a set of discussions, questions, answers on what is the international situation -- which way is the world moving, the relationship between states, some of what we had an opportunity yesterday morning to talk about. Secondly, well what happens in Asia -- more particularly in Asia as we see it (inaudible) more or less in the center, not Asia as seen by many other country that ends at the (inaudible) and the border.

Thirdly, to look at the -- more specifically, which you had asked for, how do we look at India's strategic and security concerns so that -- Mr. Kissinger had asked me this question yesterday morning, and I promised that we will try and put across our points of view.

And fourthly, to look at this question of the Indo-U.S. relations in the broader framework over a longer time frame. This is generally what I hope to achieve. So let me first (inaudible) put a few remarks on the table to get the discussion going as long as the first item is concerned.

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My own view has been that the
international order -- this order, as some people
might like to call it, has been moving towards what is
very clearly now a (inaudible) order with a half a
dozen centers of power, India not just probably in it
-- not even at the future level, but already in it,
although I am sure many Indians have yet to discover
it, and many more Americans have yet to discover India
itself.

I certainly am glad to notice that Dr.
Kissinger is not one of them who has yet to discover
that process. He only has views on this subject. But
more important, perhaps, at this point in time is that
if you look at these polycentric system, there are
(inaudible), in my judgement.

One major is there's still a gross
asymmetry of power amongst them. Some -- perhaps the
United States is the only complete power, but then
there are increasing limitations to the degree to
which that power can be exercised. Dr. Kissinger, you
mentioned some of that yesterday evening.

But more important here is that this

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asymmetry -- political, diplomatic, economic,
technological and military terms -- is what creates
the situation where concurrently a level of
competition and cooperation will continue to coexist
for quite some time.

There is a risk, of course, that somewhere
down the line the competition could shift towards a
matter of conflict between a group of states or more
than a group of states. And I'm really still talking
about this half a dozen centers. Not that the rest
don't matter, but this is the key element.

Is there a balance of power amongst these
leading -- this polycentric system? I'm afraid no.
The asymmetry itself makes sure that there cannot be
a balance of power framework. Dr. Kissinger, you,
sir, mentioned yesterday about equilibrium. Perhaps
that is true. But I think that will be an equilibrium
not so much conditioned by the actions of one power;
however, that single power may wish to try and impose
or encourage the equilibrium, but more of what might
be termed concert of powers in a state of equilibrium.

There is, of course, an underlying risk

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that this polycentric system over a period of time,
perhaps a few decades, could move towards a multi-
polar system which will require -- which will involve
polarization of the international system, which will
have its own sets of challenges and problems in the
time to come.

My own view is that I think it will not be
in the interest of any of these centers of power or
the international community to see polarization
happening either too early or too rapidly or in too
linear sort of a direction at any point in time. The
development and growth of a polycentric system as the
model for the 21st century perhaps offers the greatest
opportunities for the type of challenges that the
world faces in all respects.

Which also means that we would have to
look at many aspects which are more in terms of
pragmatic issues. Very less likely that across the
board there will be just cooperation and all as we had
the (inaudible) process at some one time. That is
unlikely with any group of states.

The differences will keep on occurring.

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The management of that will require two or three
fundamental issues -- a level of flexibility and a
level of responsiveness to the change of situation,
and the ability to manage it well.

Frank, welcome, welcome. Sorry I just
started off. So glad you've come. So I was basically
talking about my (inaudible) of the world's system.

So this is what I have, and I think we may
-- might like to get into this right away. Then I'll
come back to the Asian situation and the other aspects
if that is all right. Otherwise, we might be mixing
up many of the aspects. Dr. Kissinger, would you like
to make a remark or two?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, first of all, I
would like to thank the institute and its director who
are my hosts here for the really extraordinary
arrangements that have been made and for giving me an
opportunity to meet so many different points of view
and to arrange the meetings in such a way that it is
a real dialogue and not simply a presentation of my
point of view with a few questions about it.

And I'm really very grateful for this.

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Now, let me make a -- two general observations. The first observation is of course the official U.S. point of view is presented to you by Ambassador (inaudible). And I speak for myself. I sometimes agree with the administration, and I sometimes disagree.

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In principle, I try to support a bipartisan foreign policy and not to criticize only for political reasons and a whole host of key issues -- NAFTA, (inaudible) for China, restoration of overcoming the crisis of last summer with China, aid to Latin America last year -- a whole host of issues I have supported the administration.

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And secondly -- the second point I want to make is that American thinking right now is or should be in a state of transition. That is to say, America has to learn to adapt or change its approach from the bipolar world with which it was familiar to the world that we are now experiencing, which (inaudible) has begun to describe.

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This is a very difficult matter for the United States because the whole experience of the United States has been either of isolation or of

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dominance. We have never had to conduct foreign
policy in a system in which there were no final
solutions in which one had to adjust at the margins
and in which one could not indicate a terminal point
for our efforts.

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If you look at the great initiatives of
the post-war period that the United States engaged in,
even though they lasted a long time, they were all
presented to the Congress as reactions to a specific
emergency after which there would be no need for a
continuing American effort.

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Then the notion of balance of power is
always attacked in American textbooks on foreign
policy. And in fact, in many official state
department documents about the post-war period, it was
the world that we said we wanted was always contrasted
favorably with the balance of power world that the
British inflicted on mankind according to the American
perception.

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I think it was in any event an
unhistorical (sic) approach, but it was the American
approach. And it led to great achievements. The

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post-war world -- I can't think of any other nation
that would have had the enthusiasm and the dedication
and the willingness to sacrifice that America showed
in the post World War II world.

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Now, however, we are in a multi-polar
world. But before -- or a polycentric world. Could
I interrupt you for a moment and ask our chairman to
explain the distinction he seemed to make between a
polycentric world and a multi-polar world so that I
know what I am reacting to?

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THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Dr. Kissinger. My
understanding and explanation for a multi-polar world
is -- say these are poles, but each of the poles
(inaudible) degree of influence and possible control
over a group of counties as much as the bipolar had
that done in many ways. There's a polycentric still
is simply a center of power which may not necessarily
be exercising influence and control over one or a set
of countries as such.

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Therefore, it is a concept, I think, which
is far more in equilibrium with the rest of the states
rather than a continuing attempt to influence and

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1 control.

2 MR. KISSINGER: As I understand it, you
3 say a polycentric system is one which every state more
4 or less equal status and doesn't try to dominate any
5 other state?

6 THE CHAIRMAN: It doesn't try to dominate
7 any other state, nor does it try to create a group of
8 states under its own influence to accumulate its own
9 power on the basis of a group of states or a line
10 system where the line system (inaudible) for some
11 time. But in essence, that diffusion itself is a
12 process which (inaudible) even further down to a
13 polycentric system.

14 A line merely for self defense is a
15 slightly different framework. But the point that I
16 would like to emphasize is that the multi-polar does
17 imply to me a polarization. A polarization which then
18 is strengthened and built upon by exercising influence
19 and control, each one in more or less in some level of
20 competition of each other.

21 Polycentric means a central power and
22 influence in a broader sense, but not creating a

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(inaudible), not creating a group as -- not creating
an alliance against another single nation or a group
of nations. Reducing polarization in the
international system to the bare minimum -- ideal
state, but yet it's a big question mark as to which
way you go.

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MR. KISSINGER: Well, I would have to say,
if I'm frank, that I think the world is heading to a
multi-polar, not a polycentric system. And I believe
that it's the nature of major powers to try to
influence the states in their neighborhood. And as
India has shown, to be quite frank, in relation with
the states in its area, and I find that natural. I
mean, I agree with every last manifestation of this.

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But to say that -- I don't believe -- it's
physically impossible to have a perfect (inaudible)
that's equality of influence. It's certainly possible
to have a (inaudible) equality of state. But as a
practical matter, it seems to me that the influence of
states will differ and that the realistic world to
which we are heading is a multi-polar world and not a
polycentric world in that definition in which every

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nation is sort of in isolation.

But that is what I expect will happen.

And it is the basis of my -- essentially the basis of

my analysis. And I believe that there will emerge

five, six, seven major powers. And I believe that the

interaction between them will determine the

possibility of stability, progress, peace, and maybe

war.

I think with modern technology war is

becoming less likely for the solution of international

disputes because in the past one could always argue

that the fear in war was worse than the war itself or

that surrender without war was worse than war. Today,

because the cost of war is so great. Every

(inaudible) of war is so (inaudible).

And at the same time, the economy has

changed. In the past, a nation could increase its

power primarily by the acquisition of territory and

population. Today, as we have seen on innumerable

occasions, nations can develop their power much more

effectively within their territory. And whatever the

territory is and the acquisition of additional

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territory very rarely adds to the economic strength of
a country.

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It may add to the defensibility of a
country. That's a different issue. But the motive
for which wars were often fought to increase ones
power by acquiring territory has become much less.

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So I believe that -- I believe we are
heading into a multi-polar world. I believe India
will be one of those major powers. And I agree, it
already is one of the major powers, although it does
not always act that way. And that reflections on
polycentric (inaudible). Does that respond to what
you were saying?

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THE CHAIRMAN: No, no, no, Dr. Kissinger;
you're right absolutely. And I don't think we are
that far apart because I also say that the world will
move towards a multi-polar world. Although, I think
it's possible to delay that process. I'm don't
necessarily think multi-polar system is better than
the polycentric system, but let me not dominate the
discussion.

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PARTICIPANT: I would say that we will

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move to what is (inaudible). Because as a result,
from bipolarity, we are now moving towards multi-
polarity because each one of the major powers are
still trying to regain their hold on the regions where
they are dominant.

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But as international interactions
increase with each other and the significance of
military power in international decision making
decreases, each of the other nations will start trying
to optimize their own autonomy. And in the course of
that, they will try to use the other -- the power of
another nation outside their own area of influence in
order to reduce the power of -- the impact of the
power of the area in which they exist.

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And therefore, it is quite possible that
multi-polarity will move towards polycentric system.
But at the present moment, we like to think in terms
of transition from the present -- the aftermath or the
bipolarity to the multi-polarity.

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Of course, I have gone through your book
and the problem in India has been -- just as you
mentioned about the American schools, in India too,

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the balance of power has been associated with the 18th or 19th century build up of (inaudible) around the world.

And the reason why there was balance of power in Europe was the various countries of Europe were busy building empires elsewhere. And therefore, because of this association of they do things -- in India, it was not a popular concept. But at the same time, most of the people here do not realize (inaudible) was in fact practicing balance of power in a bipolar world where the two main aggressors cannot go to war.

But in spite of practicing such a sophisticated balance of our concept, we have instead used an order (inaudible) which was against the balance of power, and I think to some extent the Indian population has been conditioned by it. What we are trying to tell the Indian population that with the collapse of one of the two super powers in the bipolar system, the world has not become polar, but the world has become multi-polar.

Because in the process of fighting the

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cold war, the other -- the dominant, the surviving
super power has also got weakened in relation to the
rest; and therefore, the world is today not really
polar but multi-polar.

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The point we have to look at is, given the
limitations on each one of the powers including the
most powerful nation, the United States, you rightly
argue that the Americans themselves should accept the
balance of power concept. I would say it would be a
good thing if most of the other nations also would
come to accept the bipolar -- the balance of power
concept, and especially in a world where wars can no
longer be fought.

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Because in the 19th century, at least
people used to think that you can have balance of
power wars. Even that is no longer feasible today.
And therefore, it should be possible to move towards
the balance of power. But the main question which I
would raise, which we'll likely discuss in the
subsequent sessions when we discuss the balance of
power in Asia, because you find the role of America
now is like the role of Britain in the 19th century.

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Britain was involved in the balance of
power adjustments within the continent of Europe.
That is because Britain had the safety of the sea.
Now similarly, when we look at the six powers, five of
them are in the Eurasian subcontinent, and America is
on a separate continent by itself.

Therefore, that gives America an advantage
in dealing with the balance of power system in
Eurasia. But at the same time, the question is in
doing that, one can understand United States trying to
keep the (inaudible) in its hands and be the
(inaudible) to the extent if it is possible our
balance out -- ultimate balance.

But at the same time, the issue which we
have to discuss is how is the United States going to
look at the growth of the (inaudible) influence of
each one of the actors in this part of the world, and
especially the four in Asia.

Thank you.

PARTICIPANT: Thank you. Do you mind a
few more comments?

MR. KISSINGER: Okay.

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PARTICIPANT: As brief as we can.

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PARTICIPANT: Dr. Kissinger, on page 76,

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77 of your book --

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MR. KISSINGER: Oh, my God!

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(Laughter.)

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PARTICIPANT: -- you make a very perceptive remark which could be made only by a person who has a deep insight into history. You have tried to compare the problems which pertain to the emergence of a new world order or a world order after a traumatic event. You tried to compare how in 18th and 19th century the problems being faced are somewhat similar to the problems being faced by the post cold war world.

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And the point that you -- the question that you raised is that a new world order in a situation of this kind can either be brought into existence by design or it can grow out of a series of trials of strength. Now the point now is, since it's somewhat obvious that the leading powers of the world of today are not in a mood to -- and since you -- since by a desirable world order which you have in

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mind is a kind of equilibrium which implies a kind of
a fair distribution of power among leading powers of
the world.

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Now, the present leading powers do not
seem to be in a mood to allow that kind of an order to
emerge by design -- by an agreement, by a consensus.
By implication, therefore, there can be a (inaudible)
over a series of trials of strengths to take place.
Now what is -- how do you visualize if you agree with
this postulate that since it is not going to be by
design, what kind of trials of strengths do you
visualize which might then lead to the emergence of
some kind of an order or whatever?

PARTICIPANT: Thank you.

MR. KISSINGER: We'll do one more and --
otherwise, my mind cannot encompass all these
considerations.

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

PARTICIPANT: Chairman, I think the
analysis that Dr. Kissinger gave is the correct
analysis. I think this (inaudible) is a bit of a
sophistication which at least I do not understand.

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There was a bipolar world. I do not believe that we
are at a unipolar stage. We are in a stage of
transition from bipolarity to multi-polarity.

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It's in the nature of power to exert
influence, so (inaudible) that you are a multi
(inaudible) world in which a center of power doesn't
exert influence makes no sense to me. So I agree
basically with that analysis. But Dr. Kissinger, I am
an Indian and I am an Asian.

The fluidity of the situation as it
affects India in the Asian context, that's of primary
concern to me. I think the aim of goal should be the
modern world is dominant by -- dominated by the United
States of America -- it's a dominant power -- without
the world being unipolar.

The ultimate shape will depend on this
(inaudible) of equilibrium of balance that can be
struck among four major centers of (inaudible)
landmarks. That's Moscow, Beijing, Tokyo, and Delhi.
Europe, of course, is a very important chapter. It
will be Germany centered Europe. It's a situation of
evolution there.

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Now in this context, the role of the
United States, which to my mind has been one of
limiting (inaudible) to the South Asian region
balancing India off with Pakistan and so on and so
forth, that's something that bothers me. And ultimate
final American objectives in this regard are not clear
to me.

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I believe they're not clear to many
Indians. Now when we come to either Indo-American
relations or some other of these four items, I would
like you to throw some light on your thinking on this
subject.

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Thank you.

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MR. KISSINGER: Maybe I should begin to
answer some of these considerations. First, let me
make one comment. And I cannot emphasize it enough.
The big problem in the United States is to get an
understanding of what we are talking around this
table. It is not the case that in our policy
discussions we are worrying about how to balance
Pakistan and India.

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I would consider this great progress if we

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had reached that level of sophistication. Not to be
-- I might come to a different conclusion. Policy is
not made that way in America, I regret to tell you.

PARTICIPANT: Or in India.

(Laughter.)

MR. KISSINGER: And so, for example, the
notion that we use Pakistan as a kind of ailing
influence to India -- it's simply not true. We began
to use Pakistan as a barrier to the Soviet Union.
This is what triggered us into the relationship with
Pakistan at a time when we were trying to replicate
the NATO alliance around the world and we had a Middle
East alliance, the Baghdad Pact, and we had SETO
(phonetic), and we had a whole structure of alliances.

And that was the original motive of it.
After that, it was more living from hand to mouth as
crises occurred. Of the American presidents that I
have known, the only one who could be said to have a
strategic conception was President Nixon. And none of
the others -- the others were trying to survive.

And that doesn't mean they did not
occasionally do right things. But in terms of a

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design that would globally be carried out, especially
one that was geared to a balance of power, that was a
peculiarity of the Nixon administration.

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Today, when you participate in American
discussions, I have said that American (inaudible)
foreign policy is between those who consider foreign
policy a (inaudible) of psychiatry, and those who
think foreign policy is a (inaudible) of theology.
And those two groups are combating each other. The
psychiatrists believe that relations among nations are
like relations among people, and you have to show good
will and willingness to compromise and you must not
insist on throwing your weight around.

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And it's the foundation for the fact that
we have never known how to end a war. You would have
thought that in Korea we stopped military operations
when the negotiations started under theory that this
would speed negotiations. It prolonged them by two
years.

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In Vietnam, we stopped bombing when
negotiations started, but the same theory was again
wrong. In the Gulf, we stopped, in my view, 72 hours

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too soon because of -- there was a real view that we
were excessively applying force. The theologians
believed that if we blow the trumpet hard enough, the
walls of Jericho will tumble by themselves.

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And so, these -- look at what happened
last summer. Suddenly we are in a confrontation with
China over what? Over Taiwan. No relation in the
balance of forces. No conceivable American interest
in creating a state there, especially when it wasn't
threatened. Nobody was attacking Taiwan.

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The theologians would like to bring down
communism in China. There is no communism in China.
China is an authoritarian state that uses Marxism as
a means of keeping a central authority. It has
nothing to do with Marxism in any other way. So you
must understand that a sort of analysis of now using
Pakistan to use an out of the area nation to balance
other regional power and trying to confine India to
South Asia, that's not the way they think.

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The thinking is much more in general
principles, non-proliferating on a global basis. Now
that's something that people get their teeth into. I

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have said to my friends in Washington, I said stop talking to the Chinese about non-proliferation as a moral principle. Talk to them about weapons to Taiwan against weapons to Pakistan. That's something we understand.

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But they don't understand why they cannot deliver weapons to Pakistan (inaudible) but we can deliver weapons to Taiwan which (inaudible). So it's a question of approach. And so, in response to you, the biggest change that has to take place in the United States is to get an operation of concept of foreign policy to the affect of what we're talking about here, because that does not exist.

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The concept that does exist is spreading democracy, defending human rights, preventing non-proliferation, helping the environment. Those are the concepts on which people -- that make the blood course through their veins. And I would like to say the Republicans are different. The Republicans are different, but not in the approach -- I mean, the Republicans would emphasize bringing down communism, and they'd emphasize (inaudible) and rights a little

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1 -- or at least as much.

2 So this is what we have to get to. I
3 think reality is going to force us in that direction
4 because we are going to be involved in more and more
5 crises, which are impossible to analyze in terms of
6 the categories which must of the American debate is
7 conducted in. Much of the American debate on Bosnia,
8 for example, was triggered by people who thought this
9 was like World War II.

10 And they looked as the Serbs as Nazis.
11 Now we suddenly wake up and find they're all
12 criminals, or they're all human rights violators. So
13 now what do we do? There are no good guys. We can't
14 line up the good guys against the bad guys in Bosnia
15 because given a chance, they'll all murder each other.

16 So this is with respect to your question.
17 Now in operating a balance of power, I agree with you
18 that we are like Britain except on a global basis. I
19 would also tell you -- make our ambassador shudder --
20 that it is totally beyond our capacity to do this on
21 a global basis.

22 We don't have the personnel, we don't have

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the (inaudible). So therefore, I believe we should
separate the issues with respect to Europe and the
Western Hemisphere. We can conduct policy in the way
Americans are comfortable, collective organizations.
Because the reasons we can do it is because there's no
possibility of strategic conflict between the nations.

And therefore, free trade areas, judicial
settlements and so forth, they work well enough there
so that you don't have to spend time dealing with the
rivalries and so we can limit ourselves in effect to
Asia, which you mentioned. Because in Asia, we have
Russia, China, Japan, and India. Maybe in time,
Indonesia will come up, but it isn't there yet. Now

--

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

MR. KISSINGER: In Asia?

PARTICIPANT: Eurasia and --

MR. KISSINGER: No, I'll include Europe in
the Eurasian land mass, but Europe needs -- Europe is
really spending most of its energies now organizing
itself. There is no real European --

PARTICIPANT: At the moment, no.

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MR. KISSINGER: -- policy. But once Europe
is organized, I would certainly put -- apply it into
Eurasia and include Europe. And there in a sense, you
can talk of a -- I know APEC keeps -- every APEC
meeting speaks of a specific community. And there is
no specific community. It's Asia, China, Japan,
Russia, India don't think that they are part of the
same community.

They consider themselves as potential
rivals, not necessarily military, but not even totally
excluding military. So -- and there the United States
does have to play something like the role of Britain.
But the balance of power, there are two ways of doing
it. The way the British did it and the way
(inaudible) did it.

The way the British did it was to stay
aloof and to let a crisis occur and then they would
throw themselves in on the side of the weaker. That's
a totally amoral policy. The British -- I mean,
Churchill said in 1930 -- he listed all the alliances
that Britain had had over the centuries, and he said
there are -- I'm not pro-French and anti-German. If

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circumstances were reversed, I'd be pro-German and
anti-French.

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He said I'm not defending a person of prejudice but a basic principle of policy. Now, this is not something the United States does very well. That is, to stay aloof and then come in and then have neither good guys nor bad guys but simply say we support the victim or the weaker against the stronger.

The other method that was used and then it was abandoned by the Germans was to have relationships with all of the countries simultaneously and to have better relations with each of them than they had with each other. This actually would be the normal -- what the United States should do.

Because in fact, the United States has no fundamental quarrel with any of the nations that we have identified here. And it can afford to maintain friendly relations with all of them until something happens, and then it can decide. And this is what I would like the United States to come to.

Again, my (inaudible) friends will tell you we are not anywhere -- we are not -- this is a

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proposition that's not even rejected because it's not
discussed. You know, in both parties. This is not a
party issue.

PARTICIPANT: That's right.

MR. KISSINGER: But we have to come to it.

We have absolutely no choice. Because what's our
alternative? We can't run around the world being --
giving lectures on environment and women and human
rights and -- all which are important issues, but they
are not the issues on which the future (inaudible) of
the world depend. We are not (inaudible) of humanity.

PARTICIPANT: In 1969 or '68 when Mr.
Nixon broke the law (inaudible).

MR. KISSINGER: And that would be dead.

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

MR. KISSINGER: That's right, try to
practice it.

PARTICIPANT: Why I think, Dr. Kissinger,
you're not giving enough credit to yourself. I think
that policy is being (inaudible) between Russia and
China and Japan and China and between India and
Pakistan.

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MR. KISSINGER: Yeah, it's -- no, no, not between India and Pakistan.

(Laughter.)

It's not -- it's being followed -- it's sort of -- it's not realistically followed because you take the problem of Russia. Let me make a comment about what you said on the -- we're trying to isolate India and South Asia. That's not correct.

PARTICIPANT: No, I said you are trying to confine India to South Asia.

MR. KISSINGER: Confine India to South Asia. You know, for 50 years we've heard from India that it didn't want to participate in international politics. So we've never had --

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

MR. KISSINGER: But we've never had the sense that India was dying to project itself abroad. The American-Pakistan policy is not aimed at India. If it's aimed at anything, it is at Moslem fundamentalism, Afghanistan. It's also not aimed at Central Asia. I have never heard anyone say that Pakistan is our bridge into Central Asia.

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And I know all the presidents of the
Central Asian (inaudible). And I tell you, one reason
I saw them is because nobody paid a hell of a lot of
attention to them. And they were desperately eager to
talk to somebody. And if we were that eager to
dominate Central Asia, as some of your newspapers say,
they would have been paid more attention to.

But anyway, we do not look at -- none of
them mentioned Pakistan to me as sort of (inaudible).
A number of them mentioned -- a number of them asked
me what I thought India's role would be. And they
were looking more towards India and China and Iran and
us to counterbalance Russia. Literally not one of
them mentioned Pakistan to me one way or the other.

And that's, after all, an interesting
fact. And I do not know an American policy
consideration that tries to use Pakistan against India
or as a bridge into Central Asia. If we have any
consideration, it is to keep it from becoming
fundamentally in cahoots with Iran. And some general
feeling that an injustice was done to Pakistan -- I
remember in 1971 -- no, but in 1971, we -- this is an

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1 internal American problem. It's got nothing to do
2 with India.

3 PARTICIPANT: No, that's an India-America
4 problem.

5 MR. KISSINGER: No, no; what I want to
6 mention is an internal American problem. We cut off
7 aid of military supplies to (inaudible). And we meant
8 no new supplies could be given. We, in the White
9 House. But some of our bureaucrats applied it to mean
10 that --

11 [Tape change.]

12 But it's not a very long range
13 consideration. And in my view, it is not aimed at
14 either Central Asia or India. Now design -- how do we
15 design -- is it design or is it done by force? It's
16 awfully hard to design. First of all, you have to
17 believe in it before you can design it. For us really
18 to run the system the way it should be run, you'd have
19 to believe that this is the right thing to do, which
20 we do not now relate.

21 Secondly, we would have to train a
22 generation of foreign service officers who really know

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how to do this and who really operate that way and who
will write us reports that reflect this reality. That
isn't happening now either. And so, we'll have a hell
of a time designing it.

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Still, as I look at this administration
which started out, as far as I was concerned, out of
this world, it is moving gradually towards a position
that I would generally agree with. They're improving
relations with China, they're strengthening relations
with India, they're maintaining -- they're trying to
maintain good relations with Japan.

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They're a little overboard still for my
tastes on Russia because I don't think one can deal
with Russia by trying to manipulate domestic politics
in Moscow. The way to deal with Russia is to deal
with it as a foreign policy phenomena. The future of
Russia will depend how scared it becomes by Asia.

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Then it will become conciliatory to
Europe. And if Asia is weak, then Russia will become
more aggressive with Europe, and I think that is a
reality. So, --

22

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.) You said the

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1 United States is moving towards a design.

2 MR. KISSINGER: It is moving, yes.

3 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

4 MR. KISSINGER: Well, with whom do you want them to share it?

6 PARTICIPANT: With India, for instance.

7 MR. KISSINGER: You will not suddenly --
8 I don't think you would find an American ambassador
9 coming in to your offices here and talking like I'm
10 doing here. I think it will happen gradually.
11 Indeed, I believe on the type of visits that are now
12 taking place, the type of exchanges, in fact we are
13 moving towards attempting to (inaudible) strategic
14 objectives.

15 And we have a problem in America defining
16 what a strategic objective is. So I'm not saying it's
17 going to be an easy conversation, but I think in fact
18 -- I'm surprised that Indians still believe Americans
19 are trying to hold India down. You can accuse
20 Americans of being indifferent. Americans don't know
21 enough about India, and they haven't got a clue to
22 what India -- many of them represent.

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But those who do are feeling their way
towards a -- what I would call a geopolitical
relationship. But you know, we have the same problem
with the Chinese. What the Chinese want to discuss
with us is geopolitics and geostrategy. What we
discuss with them is drugs, human rights, education,
women, everything other than what they want to
discuss.

I think we are moving in the right
direction now. And I think it is moving in the right
direction. So you're not being discriminated against.

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

MR. KISSINGER: I think the Americans --
the secret dream of Americans was at the end of World
War II to play the role that (inaudible) came to play.
And one reason we were so mad at him is because --

(Laughter.)

-- we would have loved to join the
(inaudible) movement.

(Laughter.)

PARTICIPANT: Mr. Kissinger, there's still
an opportunity --

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MR. KISSINGER: In 1945, when the war ended, the belief in America was that England and Russia would balance each other out, --

PARTICIPANT: Right, yes.

MR. KISSINGER: -- and that the United States would act as a mediator. And we were meticulous not to be on the British side. And I think I've mentioned --

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

MR. KISSINGER: And then we were forced into confrontation.

PARTICIPANT: Because England collapsed.

MR. KISSINGER: It was in mid-collapse, so we had to take over Britain's role.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think (inaudible) had a point.

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

THE CHAIRMAN: Just one second, sir. I think -- allow me to moderate a little bit, otherwise it will be free for all.

PARTICIPANT: You mentioned the role of Russia and the U.S. and the way you look at -- now

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1 Russians today seem to have a feeling that their

2 initial enthusiasm for being rapidly integrated with

3 --

4 MR. KISSINGER: For being what?

5 PARTICIPANT: For being rapidly integrated

6 with Western Europe has been frustrated. And the

7 price being asked of them is that they should become

8 a second rate power. Now there are two main issues

9 that seem to be there. One is the expansion of NATO

10 on which, from what I understand, you have strongly

11 supported that and (inaudible) to be too sensitive to

12 their feelings.

13 And the other is what seems to be from the

14 statements of the U.S. statesmen a somewhat horrid

15 attempt to loosen the links of the Central Asian

16 countries whose leaders you met in New York with

17 Russia. Both of these are points where the Russians

18 feel quite strongly about.

19 Now, I just wondered, in operating a

20 balance of power system where you see the Chinese as

21 a force on the (inaudible), would you see what seems

22 to be a weakening of Russia as against a (inaudible)

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power as an appropriate cause, or should we in India
-- I mean, I would imagine logically from this system
we should see U.S.-Russia relations not (inaudible)
beyond the point being in our interest.

Because otherwise, the whole cold war
structure starts coming into shape and the -- China,
Pakistan come into the containment business. So for
us -- for you not to push things beyond the point
(inaudible) the expansion of NATO, not to push Central
Asian countries or not to be in too much of a hurry
about it seems to be of some interest in our -- and
I'd appreciate a comment.

MR. KISSINGER: Should I answer that?
Yeah, well, let me -- the problem of Russia is
complicated by the fact that Russia for the first time
since Peter the Great is within Russian National
borders. So they have to adjust to a new
international reality. And if their strategy is to
recapture all the republics that they have lost, then
they are going to create enormous disquiet.

And after all, Ukraine has a population of
58 million. It may be a little larger than France.

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And if Ukraine should suddenly go back to Russia, then
I think it will have profound impact on the European
perception of security. So in a way, Russia has
(inaudible) aspirations which other national states --
I mean, there's no territory that China has to acquire
or that India feels it has to acquire.

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Russia among the major powers is unique in
having a foreign policy in which they aim for -- at
least from a security point of view, reintegrating
about ten other states into their system. And that
gives -- that makes it harder to cooperate with them,
not on NATO.

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I'm struck by the similarity of Russian
foreign policy today with (inaudible) in both Central
Asia -- if you take Russia in 1850, in both Central
Asia and towards the west, their policy is very
similar to that of the Czars. Now, let me talk about
the west first, and then I'll talk about Central Asia,
because the problem is not the same.

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In the west, the reason I am in favor of
NATO (inaudible), I don't believe Russia can become
part of Europe. Because Russia will out balance the

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rest of Europe. Russia can have friendly, cooperative
relations with Europe, but it is too big and its
interests are too different in different parts of the
world to be an organic part of Europe.

Secondly, I believe that if the border of
NATO is the border of Germany and a vacuum is created
between the German border and the Russian border, then
inevitably Germany and Russia will try to fill it by
national policies. The countries of Eastern and
Central Europe will begin to maneuver between them,
and we will have returned to the kind of diplomacy of
pre-World War I and II.

And precisely -- even now, the West
Europeans are scared to death of the Germans. And the
Germans are doing some odd things like buying a lot of
land east of the (inaudible) line and resettling
employees of these agricultural (inaudible). Now,
they are free to do this on the purely national basis.
All hell is going to break loose.

So this is why I am in favor of defining
where the border of Europe is and not leave that as a
vacuum. But we cannot expand NATO into countries that

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1
2
used to be republics of the Soviet Union. So I would
exclude the Baltic states and Ukraine.

3
4
PARTICIPANT: Would you then limit the
expansion of NATO to provide any insulation for
Germany, or would you consider kind of an open ended
business -- whoever wants this to be considered?

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8
MR. KISSINGER: No, I would -- I basically
would think that if I could design the strategy, what
I would do is include Poland, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and maybe Slovakia. I'd leave Bulgaria and
Romania out, and I would -- as a sanction, in case
they begin to put pressure on the Ukraine. So that
would be my instinct, but that's a tactical
(inaudible).

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16
Now on Central Asia, that's a different
issue.

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PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

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MR. KISSINGER: I tell you though, we stop
getting into the business of giving away frontage of
58 million, then there is -- but you are right, I
don't know any Russian -- and it's a real problem. I
do not know any Russian who accepts the independence

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of Ukraine. I've never met a Russian who accepts it.

Now, Central Asia, all we want in Central Asia -- I don't believe that this is an area for military. And I would not provoke the Russians in Central Asia. But I would like to prevent Russia from being totally dominant there. And I would like to prevent the Russians from (inaudible) the only ones that are controlling all the energy that comes out there by controlling all the pipe lines.

But I would not try to encourage those republics into an anti-Russian policy. I think the purpose as I'm interested in, and I think the purpose of equilibrium in the world only require that they not become totally dominant.

PARTICIPANT: And between Russia and China, sir? I mean, would you not say that the weaker at the moment particularly Russia be perhaps supported against their (inaudible)?

MR. KISSINGER: Who is weaker, Russia --

PARTICIPANT: Russia and China.

MR. KISSINGER: In the long term, in Siberia, Russia will be weaker. In the short term, I

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think China is technically weaker. But in the long
term, the advantage is on the Russian side -- the
Chinese side.

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PARTICIPANT: You had a quick one? I want to move away from the Czars and the arenas back to this part of the world.

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PARTICIPANT: Well, if we move back -- I thought I could really quickly hop back to the possibly somewhat semantic question of multi-polar and unipolar systems. No, I'm merely going back to that because I have not had an opportunity to speak earlier. But the person I wanted to ask there was -- question, Mr. Chairman, of the --

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MR. KISSINGER: We were negotiating food here. He's showing me a menu, not one word of which I --

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PARTICIPANT: First things first, Mr. Chairman, quite right. I was saying that hopping back to this business of multi and unipolar worlds, all this is predicated on the present sort of, you know, (inaudible) state system. Do you think it (inaudible) over the next ten -- two to three decades? Because

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already there's a European union possibly as a center
of (inaudible). (Inaudible) may develop as another.

And perhaps there is some kind of
continental drift is taking place, and the shape of
the whole state system. And therefore, the question
of unipolarity and multi-polarity may also change.
That was one question.

The other observation was regarding your
-- you said that Pakistan's been in fact only -- your
only interest in Pakistan was as a barrier to the
Soviet Union. Possibly much more importantly,
especially in the context of our recent history was
the use of Pakistan as a conduit to China.

Now, I think that has played a very
important role in the U.S. foreign policy
calculations, particularly in our region, and possibly
continues to do so. Because the third point again
here is this brings us to the relationship between
China and the U.S.A. I think there is a kind of --
over the years, the U.S. perception of China -- you
know, the U.S. world view has included China in a
somewhat mystical manner, if I may say so.

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You know, there is a consciousness of
China that seems to go beyond your geopolitical
calculus. And we in India, sometimes some of us feel
surprised that the U.S.A. does not see the emerging
reality of China. For example, its growing military
power possibly out of proportion to its legitimate
national security interests.

Do the U.S. policy makers sometimes see
China as an emerging rival for power on an
international scale?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. KISSINGER: Well, on the first point,
have we thought of Pakistan as a conduit towards
China? I think the idea of using Pakistan as a
conduit towards China occurred to nobody, including
me, except to Nixon. I've never heard that
proposition.

PARTICIPANT: First occurred to you.

MR. KISSINGER: No, it occurred to me only
-- no, I have to give Nixon credit. I was trying to
use Romania, Poland, Holland, and -- I didn't
understand that the Chinese didn't trust communists.

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1 (Laughter.)

2 And they didn't take Holland seriously.

3 And when there was a Dutch ambassador there -- but

4 they thought he was a little flaky and he probably

5 was. So it was Nixon on a trip through Pakistan who

6 told the -- whoever the --

7 PARTICIPANT: Yaya (phonetic).

8 MR. KISSINGER: Yaya. And I then used it.

9 I mean, I operated it. But there was no -- and Nixon
10 -- no previously policy of Nixon's had anything to do
11 with the China -- if Nixon had -- it just popped into
12 his head because he was stopping in Pakistan on a trip
13 around the world.

14 PARTICIPANT: He was here before going --

15 MR. KISSINGER: He was in Delhi first,
16 yes. And then he went from here to -- so that's how
17 the Pakistan connection came up. Now about China --
18 do we have mystical view about China. In 1971 --
19 whatever you can say about Nixon, mystical views were
20 not his forte. We had very cold blooded reasons. We
21 wanted to split the American peace movement.

22 And we wanted to separate the ones who

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wanted peace in Vietnam from the ones who wanted peace
in the world by showing that we were capable of
developing our own strategy. We wanted to isolate
Vietnam, and we wanted to set up a relationship in
which Russia had to start worrying about what we might
do with China.

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Those were our motives. And actually the funny thing is we wrote it all up -- there were annual reports that the President submitted to the Congress, most of which my staff and I wrote. Nobody paid any attention to them. But if you read those reports of that period, you will see that we were saying in all of them that we wanted to have better relations with China and gave more or less the reason for it.

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Today, do we recognize that China is an emerging power? Well, some people do. Most of those who want to take on China want to do it on human rights grounds and on Taiwan grounds. But assuming we recognize that China is an emerging power, what should we do?

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Until they do something provocative, we
could theoretically form alliances around China. And

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what would we achieve? Who would join us? India

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wouldn't join us. Southeast Asia wouldn't join us.

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Japan wouldn't join us. And Russia might join us, but

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what would we achieve?

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If you were attacked, we have to assume
you will resist whether or not you have an alliance
with us. And if our policy is properly designed, we
will not -- we will resist a Chinese attempt to attack
a major country in Asia. So I don't know what the
operational consequence would be of our recognizing
China as becoming stronger.

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Ten, 15 years down the road, it will be a
real problem. But today what should we do?

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PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

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MR. KISSINGER: Means we have to leave an
American (inaudible). When you talk about
(inaudible), don't you think that within ten years
Japan will be a major military power? I do. I think
India will become a stronger power. So what other
(inaudible) force should we create?

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PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

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THE CHAIRMAN: Just one second. I think

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it by our policy, because we have a lot of people
supporting the Armenians who are harassing the
(inaudible). The problem -- you take Azerbaijan. Of
course, the first thing you have to remember is that
whenever I used a Harvard word of more than two
syllables, President Nixon used to say don't use it,
the American public will think you're talking about a
soft drink.

(Laughter.)

And if you say Azerbaijan, I don't think
2% of the American people have ever heard of
Azerbaijan. Now, the problem with Azerbaijan is
similar to that of all other countries. If the
Russians get control of the Azerbaijan oil, they can
then -- then Ukraine has no access to oil except which
is controlled by Russia.

Or maybe Iran. But for Iran, it would be
very difficult to transport oil to Ukraine because all
the pipe lines are going east-west. It would then be
very difficult. And the independence of Ukraine would
then be really severely damaged. So I think we have
an interest in the autonomy of Azerbaijan -- it

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doesn't have to be pro-American. That's not our concern.

And I would say the same for the other Central Asian republics. Because one thing that is going to happen also is that as India and China industrialize, the oil needs -- the energy needs are going to quintuple. And where is it all going to come from?

And if one country controls all the pipe lines in Central -- out of Central Asia, that would be a serious matter even more for India and China than it would be for the United States. That's what this -- this is what Azerbaijan talk about. Look at what the Russians are doing. They're really trying to control how the oil from every former republic gets to the market.

And they want to have a monopoly over it. And what the other countries ought to do is to prevent the monopoly. They don't have to get a monopoly themselves.

PARTICIPANT: H.K. and then Raj, would you take the questions and comments together?

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PARTICIPANT: Dr. Kissinger, in the west
lately, there has been almost a movement -- I won't
say a movement -- which amounts to questioning the
concept of sovereignty of other nations while there
are nations in Asia and Africa which are product of
post second World War.

Now, sometimes this questioning of
sovereignty is getting (inaudible) into movements of
self determination in various emerging nations. Now
while there's a need for more integration in these new
nations, there's questioning of sovereignty. The
concept of sovereignty is leading to problem in
foreign policy in connection with your foreign policy,
other western nations' policy.

Sometimes it's getting human rights
movement. So don't you think there is a need in the
west to -- not to question the concept of sovereignty
at this stage when the new nations are yet to
consolidate their freedom and nationhood?

MR. KISSINGER: But where are we
questioning it?

PARTICIPANT: There isn't a -- so many

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right things and speeches -- amount to questioning
when they're supposed to self determination movements
in various parts -- human rights movements.

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MR. KISSINGER: It's a serious question.
It's already difficult enough that political loyalties
in no area that I know go beyond the nation state
while economic realities are global and communications
are global. And the breakup into ethnic groupings
will lead to a more and more limited conception of
sovereignty and also to an extremely brutal foreign
policy.

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Because ethnic groups, once ethnicity
becomes the key, then compromise becomes impossible.
And we find even within the United States now
tendencies towards ethnic (inaudible). It's just at
the beginning, but they're being encouraged by any
intellectuals.

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PARTICIPANT: I just wanted to ask you a
brief question on the role of nuclear weapons in the
Asian balance of power which you have been talking
about. You often said in the recent past that Japan
is likely to acquire nuclear weapons. And that's been

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many Americans -- the realists have often said that
(inaudible) wars and others -- it seems to be in the
logic of all great powers who eventually have to
double up on nuclear weapons.

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There have been two major tendencies that
have been (inaudible). On the one hand, you have the
Chinese nuclear and missile mobilization that is
taking place which should definitely concern the
Japanese on a clear basis. Do you think whether you
would see whether the Japanese would be satisfied with
an extension of the (inaudible) missile defense
supplied by the U.S. to the Japanese?

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Would that be enough to really in the long
term to maintain a balance with the Chinese, or would
they eventually need nuclear weapons themselves? So
how do you see the -- an architecture for a nation
balance of power? What role nuclear weapons play, and
whether other powers gaining would actually help
structure it in a more stable basis?

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MR. KISSINGER: No, I think there's no
possibility whatever that the United States will help
a nation with nuclear technology. Under no

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1 foreseeable circumstance.

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PARTICIPANT: No, (inaudible) for nuclear
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weapons. But if (inaudible) stabilizing the balance
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of power here?

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MR. KISSINGER: Well, we have
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realistically -- I believe Japan is moving towards a
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nuclear (inaudible), which is strenuously denied by
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the Japanese. But they have 21 nuclear power stations
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all designed to produce plutonium. They're buying
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plutonium around the world for storage or they're
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offering their sites for storage.

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That's not a normal offer. They're
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developing satellites, rockets for launching,
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satellites, and I suspect they're studying the entry
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vehicle. So for all of this, I'm assuming they're
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developing a nuclear option so that whenever they
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decide to do it, they can do it very fast.

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But that's not your question, will that
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stabilize Asia. I think the nuclear capability --
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nuclear capabilities tend to cancel each other out.
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I do not see how advanced nations, which all of the
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rationally go to the decision to go to a strategic
nuclear war.

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That is a war (inaudible) populations.
Even a practical war is going to be very difficult to
visualize because you don't -- nobody can imagine what
the next phase will be after you drop one bomb, even
if it's on all military targets. What happens to
communications? It's very hard to -- I've never seen
a good explanation of what the next move would be.

So I think in practice, the nuclear
weapons among Asian nations will cancel each other
out. Except in cases where a country is totally
desperate. I mean, Israel has a credible (inaudible)
if the alternative is that they'll all get pushed into
the sea, then they might do it.

But short of such extreme situations, I
think nuclear weapons are not useable. But that
doesn't mean that nations won't acquire them. And
there may be nations that are much less (inaudible),
and they may use them too. But it's not a stabilizing
influence, I don't think.

PARTICIPANT: No, Dr. Kissinger, it may

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not be stabilizing from that perspective, but because
they are likely to cancel out as you say, particularly
at the level where they may get used, the (inaudible)
position then itself points to the direction that
there would be some form of balance between those who
have it and the ones who don't have it, especially
when there is a perceived security concern.

And as you say, Japan itself is --

MR. KISSINGER: No, I understand the motive for acquiring them. If you are confronted by a nuclear power or more than one nuclear power, you have a motive for acquiring them.

PARTICIPANT: Right. So, which --

MR. KISSINGER: I don't question the motive.

PARTICIPANT: Which we'll go into perhaps
later in a discussion as to what are India's strategic
-- but (inaudible), you had some point?

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

PARTICIPANT: In the mike, please.

PARTICIPANT: Do you feel, Dr. Kissinger, that all hopes of nuclear disarmament, say, in the

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1 next century is (inaudible)?

2 MR. KISSINGER: I think nuclear

3 reductions are not a pipe dream. The total

4 elimination of nuclear weapons is a pipe dream because

5 it is not possible -- first of all, the lower you set

6 the limits, the greater becomes the danger of

7 invasion. And therefore, the inspection requirements

8 would become more and more intrusive.

9 Secondly, nobody will ever be able to

10 convince a country that really feels threatened that

11 some weapons are not hidden. So we'll always have an

12 incentive to hide some weapons of its own. So I would

13 think that total elimination of nuclear weapons is

14 impossible.

15 Reduction of war heads and of weapons to

16 low levels is possible.

17 PARTICIPANT: Would it be -- the Chinese

18 nuclear monopoly in Asia which is the current

19 situation barring what the U.S. (inaudible) its

20 presence, is that a stable situation, or would it be

21 better for the U.S. interest too to have three or four

22 nuclear powers in Asia trying to balance each of them?

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MR. KISSINGER: Well, I tell you, it's already tough enough to calculate how two nuclear powers balance each other. You get into a three corner (inaudible), and it becomes very complicated. And you know, in Bosnia, the British commander in Bosnia became quite convinced that some of the shells that killed Bosnians were fired by Bosnians in order -- maybe you people thought that too -- were fired by Bosnians in order to trigger the Americans to attack the Serbs.

So you imagine a four cornered nuclear situation where somebody lobs a shell into another country and they're all triggering a counter attack. So I'm not wildly happy with the United States encouraging this spread of nuclear weapons. But I recognize -- what I am most interested in from India is that it not proliferate its own weapons.

And if in due course we may be able to come to a concept where India joins a non-proliferation treaty limiting its proliferations -- on the other hand, you will never see America encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia.

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PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

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MR. KISSINGER: Well, is it possible? I don't know. I had an Indian once told me that he would be willing to settle for an agreement with Pakistan that limited the nuclear weapons in some ratio that committed some extra Indian nuclear weapons for the Chinese contingency. An Indian gentleman. An Indian thought that that was the way one could negotiate a limit for both India and Pakistan.

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THE CHAIRMAN: I think, Dr. Kissinger -- I think let's get a few things straightened out since we are on the nuclear issue. One is that for Indians -- and I thought that will come up anyway a little later -- in the nuclear equation, the total calculus for India is essentially the Chinese factor.

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The Pakistan factor is totally immaterial. It's a bit of a nuisance once in a while. It attracts the headlines a lot, but that is not what is -- drives policy or would like you to drive policy. If anybody suggested to you that an equation between India and Pakistan on the nuclear issue will be something that any Indian would be seriously thinking about, then

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