442

ALL THE BEST, GEORGE BUSH

if any one event—Poland, Hungary or East Germany—had taken place, people would say, “This is great.” But it’s all moving fast—moving our way—and you’ve got a bunch of critics jumping around saying we ought to be doing more. What they mean is, double spending. It doesn’t matter what, just send money; I think it’s crazy. And if we mishandle this and get way out [in front] looking like [the rebellions are] an American project—you would invite crackdown, and invite negative reaction that could result in bloodshed. The longer I’m in this job, the more I think prudence is a value and experience matters....

November 10th

We get a message from Gorbachev yesterday urging that we not overreact. He worries about demonstrators in Germany that might get out of control, and he asked for understanding. I think Kohl and the other leaders know we’re being restrained, but Kohl’s only suggestion is that we get the IMF* to move before the end of November to help Poland. He thinks the Polish leaders are naïve. They are good people, and they really want to succeed. Moscow warns me in the same letter about letting this talk of reunification get out of hand. It causes them real problems, but what I’ve been saying is, this is a matter for self-determination, and a matter for the German people, and I don’t think he could object to that.†

November 13th

Lech Walesa came to town, and we had a very moving ceremony.‡
... We presented him with the “empty chair,” symbolic of the hon-
orary degrees that he once could not receive at various universities
but where they placed an empty chair on the stage to honor him. So
we did the same thing.

The labor group is in town for the AFL-CIO convention; and
from Lane Kirkland on down the heads of all the unions were there.

*The International Monetary Fund, which we had asked to help Poland with its financial crises.

†Now that East Germany appeared to be collapsing, Moscow was worried about a unified Germany again. Actually, it wasn't only Moscow, but almost all of Europe, whose memories of World War II were still rather raw.

‡I gave Lech the Medal of Freedom.

“M!

We surprised Lane Kirkland below the Medal of Freedom very moved. In the receiving another told me how nice it touched by this.

... Now I'm under fire from Berlin, and the posturers me on lack of emotion, but

Meanwhile, with all this whirli-
Chambers. I attended the funer-
Marvin to deliver my eulogy insi

Dear Marion,

I hope I haven't let you down got a good pinch hitter lined up Bushes loved Fred. Oh, I loved played and giggled like best from and the kids—all of us loved you

There are so many funny ways
down.

Remember when we caught
Bar to clean & cook (unfair I
steam.) Anyway we had the st
the whole house smelled. Re-
eat this s—t, do you?" She cri
us. I blamed Fred, but that's v
together—bar b que together

And the politics—I'd lose it
off. He made me understand
and sure enough he was righ
e around my shoulder.

God Bless you and Yours.
him—my true, ever true, bes

*Lane, president of the AFL-CI
idarity movement and deserved a g


†Senator from Maine and Sen-
respected George, I found him par

460

ALL THE BEST, GEORGE BUSH

We go back to the White House after this marvelous dinner at Peking Duck, and then we hear the helicopter. I can tell Bar is nervous. It worries me a little, but I give her a hug and she worries about my going. I hate to leave her when she needs somebody to have their arms around her and lift her up...

In any event, it's 9:40 PM, the night of the 14th, and in another six hours, they will be pulling this plane out of this great big hangar; and in another seven hours we'll be on our way to Cartagena [Colombia]. I know it's the right thing to do, and I'm not afraid; and yet, I worry that some journalist might get zapped or somebody else (not us) might get hit. We'll get the blame, so then we'll wonder—why did they do this? ... And then I think Barco* is risking his life for the kids in Chicago and Texas every single day, so we've got to do it. Sometimes you've got to do what you think is right.

They say I live by the polls and want to be popular ... well, Panama might not have gone down well, and certainly this isn't the popular decision, and clearly China wasn't popular, so you've got to do what you think is right, take the heat, and that's what I'm trying to do.

*[The summit was successful in that it renewed our determination to cooperate on the drug problem. Everyone got home safe and sound without incident.]*

February 24th

... The concern about a unified Germany has intensified ... Thatcher now has much more concern about a unified Germany than about a Soviet threat. We're in this fascinating time of change and flux...

Mulroney points out, "You're the only one to lead this alliance—you must do it." Kohl, I think, recognizes the key role of the United States, and I think we have a disproportionate role for stability. We've got strong willed players—large and small in Europe—but only the United States can do this...

I told Jim and Brent yesterday that I don't want to move to isolation, but I don't want to see us fettered by a lot of multi-lateral decisions. We've got to stand, and sometimes we'll be together with them; but sometimes we'll say we differ, and we've got to lead, so we

*Colombian president Virgilio Barco, who was fighting a courageous battle against the drug lords.

01

should not be just kind acquiescing in a lot of looking after the U.S. international isolationistic or stupid world.

Who's the enemy? I inability to predict action; and its events that There are all kinds of NATO, and there's all strong U.S. presence.

Mr. Dan Jenkins*

Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida
Dear Dan,

Your article came in the news when I got off the bus and picked in the turf. The long, long one has given me some automatic 4 putt greens. No, I'm not ready for a guy to plan—Keep throwing "big bles but recognize that he hit," are sending me a card more of it. Fishing—big more fishing time. quality of the fish should not be deducted that). Baseball—watch the dynasty that The National League has.

Skeet and Quail Hook times a week, 2 miles each way, so keep phasing in with So there it is—My life

*Dan is a great friend
Bubba Talks.

ON THE FRONT LINE

461

is dinner at
| Bar is ner-
| orries about
| o have their

I in another
big hangar;
Cartagena
t afraid; and
mebody else
I wonder—
king his life
've got to do

ar . . . well,
this isn't the
you've got to
it I'm trying

*m to cooperate on
incident.]

ensified . . .
ed Germany
one of change

is alliance—
of the United
ability. We’ve
—but only the

move to isola-
lateral deci-
gether with
o lead, so we

us battle against the

should not be just kind of watered down, picking up the bill, and
acquiescing in a lot of decisions that might hurt us . . . I've got to
look after the U.S. interest in all of this without reverting to a kind of
isolationistic or stupid peace-nik view on where we stand in the
world.

Who's the enemy? I keep getting asked that. It's apathy; it's the inability to predict accurately; it's dramatic change that can't be foreseen; and its events that can't be predicted like the Iran-Iraq war. . . . There are all kinds of events that we can't foresee that require a strong NATO, and there's all kinds of potential instability that requires a strong U.S. presence.

March 9, 1990

Mr. Dan Jenkins*
Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida 32983
Dear Dan,

Your article came in two days after I decided to take up golf again. It all happened when I got 3 fairway short irons off the turf without sticking my pick in the turf. The long putter paved the way. I don't sink putts now but the long one has given me confidence to follow through, thus avoiding the automatic 4 putt greens. Now there is light at the end of the short-game tunnel. I'm not ready for a guy that shoots 77 or *ever* shot 77. Here's my sports game plan—Keep throwing 'shoes'—try to improve. Tennis—keep playing doubles but recognize that the kids of mine, by tying their shoes when I say “let's hit,” are sending me a clear message that I better think “phase out”. Golf—more of it. Fishing—bitch more at the schedulers around here demanding more fishing time. quote Isaac Walton a lot “Time a man spends fishing should not be deducted from the time a guy spends on earth” (something like that). Baseball—watch it as much as possible pointing out to the scheduling dynasty that The National Past-time demands A President's respect.

Skeet and Quail Hunting—beg for time. Jogging—stay with my current 3
times a week, 2 miles at about 9 minutes per. Hips and knees hurt more now
so keep phasing in with cycles, stairmasters, fast walk up hill, tread mills etc.
So there it is—My life its ownself. . . .

George Bush

*Dan is a great friend and a great author of books such as *Semi-Tough, Life Its Ownself*, and *Bubba Talks*.

From *My Life* by Bill Clinton

THIRTY-TWO

Though most of the headlines of my early months in office concerned the effort to define, defend, and pass my economic plans; to equip the military; and Hillary's health-care work, foreign policy was always there, an ever-present part of my daily routine and concern. The general impression among Washington observers was that I wasn't too interested in foreign affairs and wanted to spend as little time as possible on them. It's true that the overwhelming focus of the campaign had been on domestic issues; our economic troubles demanded that. But, as I had said over and over, increasing global interdependence was erasing the divide between foreign and domestic policy. And the "new world order" President Bush had proclaimed after the fall of the Berlin Wall was rife with chaos and big, unresolved questions.

Early on, my national security advisor, Tony Lake, had declared that success in foreign affairs is often defined by preventing or defusing problems before they develop into headaches and headline grabbers. "If we do a really good job," he said, "the public may never know it, because the dogs won't bark." When I took office, we had a whole kennel full of barking hounds, with Bosnia and Russia howling the loudest, and several others, including Somalia, Haiti, North Korea, and Japan's trade policy, growling in the background.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism in the Warsaw Pact nations raised the prospect that Europe might become democratic, peaceful, and united for the first time in history. Whether it would happen turned on four great questions: Would East and West Germany be reunited; would Russia become a truly democratic, stable, non- imperial nation; what would happen to Yugoslavia, a cauldron of diverse ethnic provinces, which had been held together by the iron will of Mar- shal Tito; and would Russia and the former Communist countries be integrated into the European Union and the transatlantic NATO alliance with the United States and Canada?

By the time I became President, Germany had been reunited under the visionary leadership of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, with the strong support of President Bush and despite reservations in Europe about the political and economic power of a resurgent Germany. The other three questions were still open, and I knew that one of my most important responsibilities as President was to see that they were answered correctly.

During the election campaign aid to Russia. At first prodding by former president seven largest industrial nations, the United Kingdom, Italy, to support democracy. Yeltsin came to Washington, grateful and openly supporting Yeltsin did agree to a court case, thanks to the friendship and Toby Gati, one of my friends. Yeltsin was supporting Bush would support him.

In November, a coup congratulate me and to update America's supposition at home. Yeltsin was president of Russia in June, bling Soviet Union. In April put under house arrest at his intent on staging a coup streets in protest. The decision in office for just two months in White House, the parliament. He urged the Russians. In effect, he was telling but you'll have to do it carefully to galvanized domestic and December, the Soviet Union, states, and Russia have Security Council.

But Yeltsin's problems from their loss of power, troops from the Baltic, economic disaster, loomed, were exposed to free-market sale of state-owned assets. Men called "oligarchal" late nineteenth century networks also moved into Soviet state and spread destruction of the old system. He also had not developed

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he could deliver by the fact that the French prime minister and his governing coalition, who controlled economic policy, were from opposing political parties. Carlo Ciampi, the Italian prime minister, was a former governor of the Italian Central Bank and a modest man who was known for riding his bicycle to work. Despite his intelligence and appeal, he was hampered by the fractured and inherently unstable Italian political environment. Kim Campbell, Canada's first female prime minister, was an impressive, clearly dedicated person who had just taken office after the resignation of Brian Mulroney. She was essentially finishing Mulroney's long run at the helm, with the polls showing a rising tide of support for the opposition leader, Jean Chrétien. Our host, Kiichi Miyazawa, was widely regarded as a lame duck in a Japanese political system in which the long monopoly of the Liberal Democratic Party was coming to an end. Miyazawa may have been a lame duck, but he was an impressive one, with sophisticated understanding of the world. He spoke colloquial English about as well as I did. And he was also a patriot who wanted the G-7 meeting to reflect well on his country.

The conventional wisdom held that Helmut Kohl, the long-serving German chancellor, was also in trouble, because his poll numbers were down and his Christian Democratic Party had suffered some recent losses in local elections, but I thought Kohl still had plenty of life in his leadership. He was a huge man, about my height and weighing well over three hundred pounds. He spoke with great conviction in a direct, often brusque manner, and he was a world-class storyteller with a good sense of humor. And in more than size he was the largest figure on the European continent in decades. He had reunified Germany, funneling massive sums of money from West to East Germany to lift the incomes of those who had made far less under communism. Kohl's Germany had become the largest financial supporter of Russian democracy. He was also the leading force behind the emerging European Union, and he was in favor of admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into both the EU and the NATO alliance. Finally, Kohl was deeply troubled by Europe's passivity in Bosnia and thought, as I did, that the United Nations should lift the arms embargo because it was unfair to the Bosnian Muslims. On all the great questions facing Europe, he was on the right side, and pushing hard for his point of view. He felt if he got the big things right, the polls would follow. I liked Helmut Kohl a lot. Over the next several years, through many meals, visits, and phone calls, we would forge a political and personal bond that would bear great fruit for Europeans and Americans alike.

I was optimistic about the prospects for the G-7 because I was bringing a strong agenda to the meeting and because I believed all the other leaders were smart enough to know that the best way to get out of trou-

per President had been scheduled were conclusively traced to the arrest of the arrested Iraqis confirmed he was behind the plot. I asked him, and General Powell came to the scene headquarters as both a current. I felt we would have to be prepared to meet with the prime minister to discuss the terrorism, and that dropping all palaces, would have been certain to kill more innocent people, but four of them overshot, الشرity and killing eight of them, and how careful the planning of firepower is unleashed,

at a national meeting, the six-day meeting had been talks and little follow-up of another meeting where dragging, with growth in trade in Japan the slowest in the world, led to a slow economic recovery for the Americans had found itself produced in the previ-

sionment of European and economic policies with ours, trade Europe and Japan to help create jobs in all our industries by the end of the year. In May we set the seven-year-old goal of 1986-1989, and I was in charge of the planning and the financial support for Yeltsin,

and so much less all three, were there particularly strong policies in my economic and financial plans. John Major, who was in charge of the administration, imagined, my public lecture. John Major was in charge of the administration. He was a favorable comparison of the Iron Lady with the previous Administration, and the Iron Lady did not seem to be fascinating, brilliant or was limited in what

orchestra
now he

*

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lue of the peso had dropped
ening, Rubin and Summers
etta and Sandy Berger, who
ity Council. In blunt terms,
ight hours to live." Gingrich
for another two weeks, if at
they had tried, as had Tom
on was too strong.

und-raiser at about 11 p.m.
ssage. Rubin and Summers
ican default, then said we
s, not $25 billion, because
chel Camdessus had put
IMF would extend if the
contributions from other
he total aid package to just

dy Berger and Bob Rubin
ed poll in the *Los Angeles*
g Mexico by 79 percent to
n we have another million
Mexico, and lots of people
t, when they ask me, 'Why
t there was a poll that said
is something we have to

e aid package with money
an agreement was signed a
g, to howls of protest in
who were upset that the
itment to Mexico, and to
ey was released in March,
cursements, even though
ral months. By the end of
exican markets again and
up. Ernesto Zedillo had

e worked. In 1982, when
nost a decade for growth
ision, the Mexican econ-
cen seven years for Mex-
1995, it took only seven
an in full, with interest,

more than three years ahead of schedule. Mexico had borrowed $10.5 billion of the $20 billion we made available, and it paid a total of $1.4 billion in interest, almost $600 million more than the money would have earned had it been invested in U.S. Treasury notes, as other Exchange Stabilization Fund monies were. The loan turned out to be not only good policy but also a good investment.

*New York Times* columnist Tom Friedman called the Mexican loan guarantee "the least popular, least understood, but most important foreign policy decision of the Clinton Presidency." He may have been right. As for popular opposition, 75 percent of the people had also opposed the Russian aid package; my decision to restore Aristide in Haiti was unpopular; and my subsequent actions in Bosnia and Kosovo met with initial popular resistance. Polls can be helpful in telling a President what the American people think, and which arguments may be most persuasive at a particular time, but they cannot dictate a decision that requires looking down the road and around the corner. The American people hire a President to do the right thing for our country over the long run. Helping Mexico was the right thing for America. It was the only sensible economic course, and by taking it, we proved ourselves to be, once again, a good neighbor.

On February 9, Helmut Kohl came to see me. He had just been re-elected, and he confidently predicted that I would be as well. He told me we were living in turbulent times, but the end would bring me out all right. At the press conference after our meeting, Kohl paid a moving tribute to Senator Fulbright, who had died shortly after midnight at the age of eighty-nine. Kohl said he came from a generation who, when they were students, "wanted nothing more than to obtain a Fulbright scholarship," and that, across the world, Fulbright's name was associated "with openness, with friendship, and with people striving together." At the time of his passing, more than 90,000 Americans and 120,000 students from other countries had been Fulbright scholars.

I had gone to Senator Fulbright's home to visit him not long before he died. He had had a stroke and his speech was somewhat impaired, but his eyes were bright, his mind was working, and we had a good last visit. Fulbright would loom large in American history—as I said at his memorial service, “Always the teacher and always the student.”

On February 13, Laura Tyson and the other members of the Council of Economic Advisers, Joe Stiglitz and Martin Baily, gave me a copy of the latest *Economic Report of the President*. It highlighted our progress since 1993, as well as the persistent problems of income stagnation and inequality. I used the occasion to push the Middle-Class Bill of Rights

786

BILL CLINTON

After the Indian tests, I urged Pakistan's prime minister Nawaz Sharif not to follow suit, but he couldn't resist the political pressure.

I was deeply concerned about India's decision, not only because I considered it so dangerous, but also because it set back my policy of improving Indo-U.S. relations and made it harder for me to secure Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. France and the UK had already done so, but there was a growing sense of isolation and unilaterality in Congress, as evidenced by the failure of the fast-track legislation and the refusal to pay our UN dues or our contribution to the International Monetary Fund. The IMF funding was especially important. With an Asian financial crisis threatening to spread to fragile economies in other parts of the world, the IMF needed to be able to organize an aggressive and well-funded response. The Congress was compromising the stability of the global economy.

While the nuclear testing controversy was unfolding, I had to leave on another trip, to the annual G-8 summit being held in Birmingham, England. On the way, I stopped in Germany for a meeting with Helmut Kohl at Sans Souci, the palace of Frederick the Great; for a celebration marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Berlin airlift; and for a public appearance with Kohl at a General Motors Opel plant in Eisenach, in the former East Germany.

Kohl was in a tough fight for reelection, and my appearances with him beyond the airlift ceremonies raised a few questions, especially since his Social Democratic Party opponent, Gerhard Schroeder, was running on a platform that was a lot like what Tony Blair and I were advocating. Helmut had already served longer than any German chancellor except Bismarck, and he was behind in the polls. But he had been America's friend, and mine, and no matter how the election came out, his legacy was secure: a reunited Germany, a strong European Union, a partnership with democratic Russia, and German support for ending the Bosnian war. Before I left Germany, I also had a good talk with Schroeder, who had risen from modest beginnings to the summit of German politics. He struck me as tough, smart, and clearheaded about what he wanted to do. I wished him well, and told him that if he won I would do whatever I could to help him succeed.

When I arrived in Birmingham, I saw that the city had undergone a remarkable revival and was much more beautiful than it had been when I first visited there almost thirty years earlier. The conference had a useful agenda, calling for international economic reforms; greater cooperation against drug trafficking, money laundering, and trafficking in women and children; and a specific alliance between the United States and the European Union against terrorism. However important, it was overshadowed by unfolding world events: the Indian nuclear tests; the political and eco-

nomic collapse of Indonesia, the looming prospect of the Good Friday accord. firmed our support for the sive Test Ban treaties, a production of fissile material, and the need to occur because the country was in the short run. Within Indonesia's problems did more of my time. Not the moment, until the Israel

In Kosovo, the south people were Albanian. After Serbian attacks on Nations had placed an and Montenegro) and on Serbia. A Contact Group of several European nations ported the Contact Group.

Again, the only good 90 percent of Sinn Feil accord. With both John Catholic vote in favor of was more closely divided to go from Birmingham to Limerick, didn't want to give Ireland to the North with reporters and media, and CNN supporting

On May 20, two days after an address to the people they voted for "a last time" exactly what they did. One cent of the people in the poll voted for it. I was never

After a stop in Croatia, we adopted a more open and environmental code of conduct as representatives of ordinary people flew home to America.

William J. Clinton Foundation "Speech by President at Presentation of Medal of Freedom..."

Speech by President at Presentation of Medal of Freedom to Helmut Kohl

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 20, 1999

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
AT PRESENTATION OF MEDAL OF FREEDOM
TO FORMER GERMAN CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL

The East Room

2:37 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Secretary Cohen, Mr. Berger, distinguished ambassadors, Senator Roth, Congressman Pickett, other members of the Congress -- retired members of Congress -- present and former members of the Diplomatic Corps; and to our German and American exchange students who are here -- welcome to the White House.

Today it is my privilege to confer America's highest civilian honor on a great statesman of the 20th century, the Federal Republic of Germany's longest-serving Chancellor, Helmut Kohl.

President Kennedy first saw the design for the Medal of Freedom on July 3, 1963, just a week after he had gone to Berlin and challenged a new generation of Germans to forge a future of freedom and unity, of European integration and American partnership. No one did more to fulfill the hopes that President Kennedy expressed on that trip than Helmut Kohl.

Very few non-Americans have received the Medal of Freedom. The last year a foreign leader was honored was 1991, when President Bush presented the award to Margaret Thatcher. That day we celebrated a partnership among nations and leaders that helped to end the Cold War with a victory for freedom.

Today we honor a partnership dedicated to building a 21st century Europe that can preserve the freedom and peace, and find genuine unity for the first time. Today we honor the leader whose values and vision have made that possible.

In 1991, the world was very different. The Berlin Wall had come down, but a profound gulf separated the Eastern half of Europe from its more affluent neighbors to the West. Everyone agreed that something had to be done to bring Europe together, but not everyone had a clear idea of what that something should be.

Some people thought NATO should go the way of the Warsaw Pact, and that in its place we had to build something new -- untested, unproven -- a community that embraced everyone, but imposed no true obligations on anyone. Others felt that our challenges in Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe consisted simply of sending assistance and plenty of advice. They were in no hurry to open our institutions to nations and people they thought of as distant and foreign.

But Helmut Kohl understood that we needed a bold vision, backed by a practical blueprint, grounded in the institutions that had served us so well for so long. He said, "We are all called upon to construct a new architecture for the European house, a permanent and just peace order for our continent."

Consider the splendid house that has risen since then. Germany is united. Europe has achieved economic and monetary union. NATO has three new members. The European Union soon will embrace nations from the Baltics to the Balkans. What a remarkable few years it has been.

The story of Helmut Kohl is the story of 20th century Germany. He was born in 1930 in Ludwigshafen, a small city on the Rhine. He saw firsthand the ravages of Nazism. His brother, Walter, perished in the war that tore Europe apart. But the young man, then called "der Lange" -- the tall one -- was quick to see the possibilities of hope and rebirth in the postwar world.

http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/042099-speech-by-president-at-presentation-of-...

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William J. Clinton Foundation "Speech by President at Presentation of Medal of Freedom... Page 2 of 5

Through the Marshall Plan, he saw firsthand what Europeans and Americans could do together to spread goodwill and support for democracy among young people.

When he was only 16, he was one of the very first people to join the Christian Democratic Union. Indeed, his membership number was 00246. And 50 years ago, at the age of 19, he and his friends were actually briefly detained at the French border for causing what must be the friendliest border incident in history: they tried to remove some of the barriers between the countries, and carried banners in support of Franco-German friendship and European unity. Der Lange was not your everyday teenager.

As Helmut Kohl's political star rose, he never wavered from those convictions. He believed young people were crucial to the future; he still believes that. And we thank him, and we thank the young Germans and Americans who are here to honor him.

He championed the Franco-German friendship as the linchpin of the new Europe, a friendship crystallized in the unforgettable moment he and Francois Mitterrand clasped hands at Verdun. He always maintained that the new architecture of Europe must be built on the foundation of transatlantic partnership. And he reached out to Russia, to Ukraine, to the other former communist countries, to make them a part of 21st century Europe.

He served as Chancellor for 16 years. Future historians will say Europe's 21st century began on his watch. In the months that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, he conceived a generous vision for Germany's unification, and for a new partnership between the West and a democratic Russia. He saw the imperative of Europe's unification, politically and economically. He saw the need to embrace other nations into Europe's family, putting Germany in the center, not on the edge any longer, of a united, democratic Europe – a Europe where borders do not limit possibilities and where nationhood is a source of pride, not a crucible of conflict.

It is to protect that vision that the NATO allies are in Kosovo today, to defeat the cynical vision embodied by Mr. Milosevic in which the most primitive hatreds and brutal oppression are more important than mutual respect and common progress.

Anyone who respects the legacy of Helmut Kohl knows that for peace to survive in Europe our alliance of democracies must stand, and stand together, against dictators who exploit human differences to extend power. And we must stay true to our vision long after we achieve military goals. Germany was buoyed by hope through the Marshall Plan; Greece and Turkey rescued by the Truman Doctrine; Central Europe helped by the West in this decade, after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Those were wise investments. We must be equally farsighted toward Southeastern Europe.

Among all the success stories of the late 20th century, none is more dramatic or instructive than the rebirth of Germany as a free and democratic nation. Germany's story has taught the world two profound truths: First, that it is possible for a people who love light and laughter to descend into the blackest darkness; and second, that it is also possible for a people to return to the light and lead others by their example.

Germany is proof that war and ethnic hatred are not inevitable; that they do not represent a permanent aspect of the human condition; that the unacceptable is not written by fate into our destiny. But we can and must remain willing to act, because the work of building a new world never ends. That is the lesson of America, the lesson of Germany, the lesson of the 20th century.

In three days, the leaders of NATO and its partner nations will gather in Washington to mark the 50th anniversary of our alliance and to chart NATO's future path. The challenge we face in Kosovo has demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that America and Europe need an alliance that combines our strength to protect our values, and project stability eastward in Europe; an alliance ready to meet new challenges to our security, with allies able to contribute to the effort; an alliance open to new democracies making the right choices; an alliance that continues to work with Russia despite tensions that arise when we disagree.

As Helmut understood so well, our vision of a Europe whole and free will not succeed unless it embraces a partnership with democratic Russia. And it will not succeed unless it is embraced by Russia. That is the kind of alliance that must and will emerge from the Washington summit.

I can think of no better way to begin this week of allied solidarity than by honoring Helmut Kohl. When I was elected President, Helmut had been Chancellor for a decade. Seven years later, I find myself the senior leader of the G-8. In countless ways, I learned from him. In Bonn, I once told an audience that my opinion on

most issues could be summed up in four words: I agree with Helmut. (Laughter.) Those words have never failed me.

After our first meeting in 1993, he summed it up when he said "the chemistry is right." Well, the chemistry was right every time we met. Right when we planned NATO enlargement. Right when we discussed our shared hopes for Russia. Right when we talked about multilateral issues over a multicourse dinner at Helmut's favorite Washington restaurant, Filomena's. (Laughter.) Even right when he made me eat Saumagen. (Laughter.) And in spite of that -- (laughter) -- I hope our dinners continue far into the new century.

With the 21st century breaking over the horizon, we can look back on the 20th century, with its grave threats to our common humanity and its great leaders -- Churchill, Roosevelt, de Gaulle -- for unifying Germany and Europe, for strengthening the Western alliance and extending the hand of friendship to Russia, Helmut Kohl ranks with them. His place in history is unassailable. And he has been a true friend of the United States.

In 1989, the year of Germany's rebirth, we heard Beethoven's "9th Symphony" as if for the first time, with Schiller's "Ode To Joy" capturing the feeling of a world coming together. In that same poem, ironically written just after the American Revolution, Schiller wrote that the circle of universal freedom begins very simply with the friendship linking two people.

Helmut, President Kennedy stirred the world at the Berlin Wall when he said, along with freedom-loving people everywhere, "Ich bin ein Berliner." Today, a grateful United States says to you, "Du bist ein Americaner." (Applause.)

In countless ways you have been an American. It is my honor to award you the Medal of Freedom.

Commander, read the citation.

(The citation is read.) (Applause.)

CHANCELLOR KOHL: Mr. President -- let me wait for a few minutes, until everyone has his and her headsets on.

Mr. President, excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, this is indeed a very moving moment. I am very deeply touched to be with you here today -- to be with the President of the United States, with all of you in the audience, and to be together last, and not least, with my friend, Bill Clinton, here in the White House.

Bill, you were so kind as to describe my way through life, as it were, in very moving, very touching words, and I believe it's the same with all of us, isn't it? If you look back into the past, back on your lifetime, again and again this brings home the different stations of your life, the different markers that you have put down. And to me, and the members of my generation -- and I think I speak here on behalf of many members of my generation -- the experience that we have made while we were children, during the barbarity of the Nazi regime, during the years of the war -- and when the war ended I was 15 years old -- this is an indelible memory.

Whoever may have lived through those years -- and you, the Americans, experienced a similar event during the Vietnam War -- knows what war actually means, and has a deeper appreciation for what peace means. And peace means more than just an absence of war. It has something to do with freedom, with justice, with being able to determine the way you wish to live, yourself, without any outside interference.

And this is why I think, Bill, it is so important that we in NATO should never forget that NATO was not founded first and foremost as a military alliance, but as an alliance of free nations, nations that wish to guarantee and uphold the peace and prosperity of those nations.

What is necessary in order to do that is the military and soldiers. And nobody should believe or be deluded as to the world having changed in the meantime. It is quite true that, a few years ago, we may have believed that war was a thing of the past. But now, every evening when we watch television and we see the news, we see images of refugees, of people who were displaced from their homes, people who have been slaughtered, women who have been raped, lives that have been crushed, and we are aware, yet again, of the fact that freedom and all the power and strength that it entails is so important, and needs to be upheld and guaranteed by the nations that feel committed to it.

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William J. Clinton Foundation "Speech by President at Presentation of Medal of Freedom... Page 4 of 5

And this is why I am so deeply honored by this great award that you bestowed upon me today. For me, all of my meetings here in the White House with all of the Presidents that were my counterparts during my term of office — Ronald Reagan, George Bush and Bill Clinton — it was always great to meet with them. You know very well that these were very different men, with very different personalities. And I, just this morning, met members of the Senate on the Hill, and you feel the undercurrents that are currently going on during the election campaign. You hear all kinds of noises, and you know that I have been in so many election campaigns I have a deeper appreciation for that. But it has always been absolutely crucial to me that these United States, this great nation that, obviously, again and again had its own problems to contend with, was a refuge, sanctuary for freedom.

And the fact that in this house here, particularly ever since the end of the second world war, we always had Presidents, but also members of their staff, who, in a most unusual way proved that they had learned the lessons of history. Harry S. Truman and George Marshall offered a helping hand to us, the people that had been devastated at the end of the Nazi era. And this, against all — or even in spite of Auschwitz — they offered a helping hand to the Germans, because they thought that one would have to prevent, at all costs, the terrible events unfolding after the first world war to happen again. And this is why we have stood fast throughout all of these decades.

And let me tell you, these were not always easy times, because there were many instances where people were deeply afraid. I would just like to remind you of the deployment of the INF missiles in 1983. Part of this chapter of our history is also the fact that — and I address myself to you, Secretary — that American soldiers throughout these decades, far away from their hometown, far away from their home region, far away from their families in many instances, stood up for our freedom. And I know that to a lot of people over here, it seemed as if they had to go to some faraway place to do so.

And it was very much a natural kind of cooperation, together with the representatives of the German Bundeswehr. They did their duty and they were able in this way to guarantee peace and freedom for us. And we were, because of this contribution, able to regain peace and freedom for all Germans in 1990.

Well, from time to time, I feel that there are a number of people in my own country who tend to forget too easily who helped us, really. One of the greatest philosophers of our time, Romano Gardeni, once said, gratitude is the remembrance of the heart. And part of this remembrance of the heart is remembering the great contribution of the soldiers — also, I would like to remind you, of the taxpayers, who have not always been all that happy to pay with their hard-won dollars. But they were ready to say, peace is indivisible. And the same goes for the current crisis in Kosovo.

Thank you. Thank you very much for making this possible over the years. Thank you, also, for the ongoing support that I have received on the other big issue of my generation, building the common European house.

For many people in Washington, and in the United States, this may not have been an issue that they had a ready understanding for, and many, I think, did not really believe that the Europeans finally would get their act together, would forget about old divisions, about old hostilities, overcoming them. They probably would not have believed that Germans and French — and you, Bill, mentioned this image, this very vivid image of Verdun, where Francois Mitterrand and I held hands — that the Germans and the French together would embark on the road towards the future.

And now, I'm gratified to note that we are repeating this exercise of what was possible with France with Poland; that not only across the Rhine, but also across the Oder, a new kind of relationship is burgeoning. Young people grow up on both sides of the border for whom one day it will be almost inconceivable that wars and hatred once divided their people. These will become, then, truly a thing of the past.

And what Wall Street had never thought possible will become a reality — the Euro, the common European currency will be there, will be legal tender all throughout Europe, even in London — maybe not in Downing Street, they may hold on to their pounds for a few more years, but in the city, the city of London, I think I can venture to tell you they will certainly accept the Euro as legal tender. And something new will come out of this.

And I'm saying this to the President as a representative of the American people. Our choice can never be either Europe or our partnership and friendship with the United States. Both are important. If we were only to say we're building the common European home, but we leave this transatlantic bridge to go to wreck and ruin, that would mean that we would truly not have understood the lessons of history. We need both and we will only be successful if this transatlantic bridge between Europe and the United States — but also, in a particular sense, between Germany and the United States is further widened and broadened.

That apart from the military and security aspects and that particular lane, we add an economic, a cultural lane
that we add the exchange of young people, that this becomes a matter of course -- people wishing to meet
and getting to know one another. And I think that's an absolutely fantastic perspective that is opening up in
front of us, ladies and gentlemen.

I think the Americans have never really imitated this particularly European kind of virtue, if we will call it that, but people seem to be culturally so pessimistic. It is something that the media in Germany have made a particular business of. (Laughter.) For somebody who is no longer in office, it is much easier to say that, that people in Germany, and in the media, particularly, love to paint the world in gloomy pictures, love to predict that the world's just about to go under once and for all, but they are obviously absolutely secure in their knowledge that this will never come about.

You are not at all familiar with this way of thinking, thank God. What is very important is -- and I think you can
count the days -- is that in a very few period of time, a new century will begin and, indeed, a new millennium.
And I think in spite of all of the sober assessment that is obviously also at place here, I think we will be able to
enter here a new century in very much a different way than it happened at the turn of this century.

At the time, people were almost blind in believing in the great changes that technology would bring about and
the great progress. I think we have gone a little bit further than that. I would like to share my experience here
with you, and you know that I have been very much a champion of German-American friendship and
European-American friendship. The one thing that I'm most gratified about is that this century proves that the
visionaries are the true realists, and that somebody who no longer has any sort of vision, somebody who
understands the sort of life and what makes this country tick only in the sense of pursuing what is actually
useful in politics, that this person will not prevail.

And we have, after all, lived this. We are living testimony that after terrible destruction, after terrible hatred and enmity, a new nation, new hope arises. And now we have a new generation that almost doesn't remember what happened.

And I must tell you, we have had -- I have had my troubles in my time of office, and I know that all of you
specialists here understand what I mean, but it is, I think, still, because of what I said earlier on, a gratification
to be able to serve your country, to live through all the defeats and successes, and to still see something new
is happening.

I would like to thank all of my friends here in the United States who helped me along the way, and the three
masters of this mansion, if I may call them that, who presided over the United States during my term of office;
and last but not least, you, dear Bill. Because it was not, I think, a matter of course that we would actually
strike up such a great rapport, but we have been able to do so. We have been able to work on a number of
projects very successfully together. And I hope that we shall be able to continue to do so -- that we both, if
the good Lord gives us strength, continue this, and also our successes in office. And let me tell you, I hope
that they will remember the lessons of history.

Thank you very much for this great honor. (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: I would like to invite all of you to join us in the State Dining Room for a reception in honor of Chancellor Kohl. Thank you very much, and we're adjourned.

END 3:07 P.M. EDT

3/18/2005

BUILDING A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE

From **Madam Secretary:**
*A Memoir* by Madeleine Albright

In mid June, we gave the consensus-building process a nudge by going public with our position. This move reflected the importance of timing in U.S. diplomacy. We had waited so that supporters of the other candidates would feel they had been given fair consideration, but now we had to make a decision. As long as we continued saying maybe, others would continue saying oui.

Since NATO acts by consensus, our declaration essentially settled the matter. However, Chirac, who would never lose an opportunity to distinguish French policy from that of the United States, was determined to play his losing hand to the end. When the summit convened in Madrid, Chirac and Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi made the case for admitting five new members. President Clinton outlined our reasons for limiting the initial round. The battle lines were drawn, until Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl persuaded everyone to put the heavy artillery away.

Previously the Germans had been careful not to offend France or anyone else. Now Kohl made an eloquent plea for consensus. He said it was “a miracle” that NATO had agreed to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. “Two or three years ago such an agreement wouldn’t have been a simple matter,” but clearly, “there won’t be agreement on more than three countries.” The Alliance should focus instead on the public message it would convey. Romanians should know that, if they continued to reform, they would be considered seriously for membership, as would the Baltics, Slovenia, and other candidates. Following Kohl’s lead, the Madrid communiqué limited invitations to three countries but established the “open door”—a process for the consideration of future applicants.

The summit was also the occasion of the first meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council and an inaugural lunch for leaders of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The creation of these new groups was just part of the institutional rejiggering that characterized the entire decade. The end of the Cold War had been like a gigantic mix-up at the European laundry. All the old labels fell off, and every nation had the chance to try on clothes with a different brand. “Satellites” had become emerging democracies, old adversaries had become allies and partners, and dull old institutions had begun to pull on bright new socks. The effect, we hoped, would be to create a twenty-first-century look that, for all the national differences, would be characterized by a common commitment to democracy, mutual security, shared prosperity, and peace.

AFTER MADRID, the President went to Warsaw to congratulate Poland on its invitation, then to Bucharest to reassure Romania. These were

it, and parading that difficult higher, of gain-

ended to be knew. One was Jacques reform as Romanian p than, I ant seven 1996, its it things,

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nisters in ; I didn't My col- had been n foreign countries. ; isolated, eland had

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259

Text 2+4 Chronik

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25. Februar 1990

# BUSH AND KOHL SEEK TO ALLAY CONCERNS OVER UNIFICATION (Two leaders join in press conference near Camp David) By Al Sullivan USIA White House Correspondent

Quelle: Public Diplomacy Query TL129968

File Date/ID: 02/25/90 WF-U22 Text Link: 129968 129968

(DIAL-UP MATERIAL: FOLLOWING ALSO MOVING VIA COMPUTER-TO-
COMPUTER COMMUNICATION

BUSH AND KOHL SEEK TO ALLAY CONCERNS OVER UNIFICATION (Two leaders join in press conference near Camp David) By Al Sullivan USIA White House Correspondent
Washington -- President Bush and West German Chancellor Kohl in a joint press conference February 25 sought to allay concerns in East and West alike that a unified Germany might become an unchecked aggressor, with Bush declaring that the United States seeks "a stable Europe."

Speaking at Camp Greentop, a recreational area near the presidential retreat at Camp David in the nearby Catoctin Mountains, the two leaders tried in differing ways to address specific concerns about a unified Germany's border with Poland and a more amorphous unease derived from two world wars in this century.

Kohl and Bush had met at Camp David for two days of informal talks about the future of East and West Germany, future security arrangements in Europe, arms control, and East-West relations.

Bush cited as the U.S. position on future borders the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act which state that any changes must be accomplished peacefully, by agreement of the nations concerned. He said the United States "formally recognizes the current German-Polish border." The president later added the pledge that "no agreement would ever be reached that affects Polish borders without Polish involvement."

But, he ruled out expanding the "two plus four" arrangement agreed upon at Ottawa to "two plus five," that is, including another nation in upcoming talks between the four World War Two allies, and talks between the two Germanys.

The U.S. president said he expects "there will be a lot of consultative mechanisms" to deal with the interests of U.S. allies as well as of Poland.

Kohl declined to state that the present border is final, noting that the freely-elected parliament of a unified Germany would have to make that determination.

But, he expressed confidence that a unified Germany would respect the sensitivities of its neighbors, "especially Poland."

Although each leader stated his Polish position in his own terms, Bush told a questioner, "I think we're in alignment." He again rejected a reporter's suggestion that Kohl had been equivocal. "I did not interpret what he said as equivocating at all," the president said.

On the matter of recalled German aggression, Bush said he preferred to remember West Germany's four decades as a loyal and reliable democratic ally, and suggested Bonn's full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be a safeguard against a repetition of 1914 or 1939.

Bush told a questioner the U.S. position favoring unification "clearly" would be different if Washington shared a questioner's suggestion about an aggressive Germany.

"I do think that one way to help with stability -- not in relation to this question -- but European peace and stability," he said, "is to have a strong NATO and to have U.S. troops....stationed in Europe....If I shared the fears that you're talking about, clearly, we might well have a different policy."

One questioner noted that the present lessened theat from the Soviet Union leads to questions about a reason for keeping U.S. troops in Europe and to the question of who is the "enemy."

Bush rejected the suggestion that Germany might fit that role. "The enemy," he said, "is

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unpredictability. The enemy is instability....What I think we want to do in a period of exciting
change is to have a stable Western Europe...."

Bush said he does not believe withdrawal of all U.S. and Soviet troops in Europe would "provide
for a stable Europe."

He said that while there may be "nuances" of difference on unification among the allies, there is
more common ground.

Kohl said Germany wanted fuller integration with Europe, not only economically in the
European Communities, but politically as contemplated by the postwar Treaty of Rome. He
suggested a unified Germany would be willing to "delegate" some of its sovereign powers to the
European parliament.

Questioned several times about talks leading up to German unification -- the so-called two-plus-
four discussions involving East and West Germany as the two; and World War Two allies, the
United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France as the four -- Bush said "details have
not been fully worked out" on such matters as when the four powers would meet and whether
the two Germanys would meet with the four.

Furthermore, he added, he and Kohl did not discuss the matter since the arrangement had been
agreed upon by the six foreign ministers at Ottawa, He suggested it would be "wrong" for two
nations to try to dictate timing and meetings to the other four.

Bush said the Camp David talks had reinforced his view that Bonn and Washington "share
similar views" on reunification and on the economic and monetary union expected to follow the
East German elections March 18.

"We share a common belief that a unified Germany should remain a full member of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization," Bush said, "including participation in its military structure. We
agreed that U.S. military forces should remain stationed in a united Germany and elsewhere in
Europe as a continuing guarantor of stability."

The president said he and Kohl also agreed that the former territory of East Germany should
have "a special military status" taking into account "the legitimate security interests of all
interested countries including those of the Soviet Union." Bush told a questioner later he could
foresee the possibility of Soviet troops remaining on former East German territory. (Leningrad
minimize considered) NNNN

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Conclusion

## Interviews:

Nitze,
Paul H

# INTERVIEW WITH INTERVIEW WITH INTERVIEW WITH DR CONDOLEEZZA RICE - (17/12/97)

Rice,
Condoleezza

Continue

Sigler
John F.

INT: There was a real legacy, though, in the Soviet Union from the Second World War, if you like, and that seems to me a good part of their fears about reunifying Germany. Was there not a fear in the United States about uniting a very strong Germany?

CR: The United States really had no fear of a united and very strong Germany. In fact, I think the United States was more worried that if you left Germany with a lot of constraints and fetters after it was unified, that it couldn't play an active role in Europe. So in fact, it was just the opposite from the European fear in France and Britain and the smaller states in Europe, and indeed the Soviet Union, of a strong Germany, and that had to be balanced. The fact that we never suffered under German occupation - we had to understand that these were real fears in the rest of Europe. But it also helped that when we talked about unifying Germany within NATO, people realized that the democratic Germany that had grown up into the FRG, had largely grown up because of its integration into NATO and indeed into Europe. It was also very helpful that the Germans were so anxious to have Germany viewed as a part of a unified Europe, to have German unification and European unification move simultaneously, and I think that helped to diminish some of the fears - but clearly the fears were there.

INT: A major problem for the Soviet Union was clearly having a united Germany within NATO, which you told me about. Can you tell me the story of the Washington summit, about how you gave the Soviet delegation the copy of Bush's final speech?

CR: The biggest problem with the Soviet Union and German unification - for the United States, in any case - was the issue of unifying Germany in NATO. After all, this meant that East Germany, which had been the fulcrum of Soviet power, was going to be a part of the Western alliance. Not surprising that they were unhappy at the prospect. So, during the first session at the Washington summit, President Bush had just

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introduced the notion that after all, countries under the Helsinki Accord had the right to choose their alliances, and Gorbachev said, "That's right." And there was stirring, and Bob Blackwell wrote a note to President Bush and said, "Could you get him to say that again?" And Gorbachev said, "Yeah, that's right: countries should choose their own alliances." President Bush tried a third time - he said, "Does that mean that if we supported Germany... if Germany wanted to be in NATO and we supported Germany in NATO, but you didn't, that it wouldn't matter?" He said, "Countries have a right to choose their own alliances." So now the trick became to try to get that in writing somehow, to try to get that on the record. And so after that meeting, we drafted a press statement that President Bush would make at the press conference on that Saturday, that would say: "And President Gorbachev and I are in agreement that countries have a right to choose their alliances, and if Germany chooses NATO, that's that." So we drafted the language, and I gave it to the Foreign Minister of Russia, and... Bessmertnik... and the... sorry, to Shevardnadze, and also to Bessmertnik, to look at it, and I said, "Let us know if you have any problems with this." And then we went up to Camp David, we had a lovely dinner. I didn't sleep at all that night, wondering when was I going to hear from them that they'd finally figured out what we were trying to do. I never heard from them. The next day, Bob Blackwell said one more time: "Did you read the statement?" They said, "Yes." The President made the statement, Gorbachev nodded, and we felt at that point that we'd broken the issue of German unification in NATO.

**INT:** Wonderful. I'm going to return to the Washington summit very briefly, but did you anticipate the Kohl-Gorbachev announcement the 16th of July 1990, that a united Germany would be in Europe? Had you expected it would come so fast?

**CR:** We did not expect the Kohl announcement in July... in February of 1990 until we were at Camp David. And the thing to understand about the Kohl announcement is that it was really an agreement between Bush and Kohl that came out of the meeting. I don't think that the Germans came to Camp David in February 1990 expecting to say a unified Germany would be in NATO. What happened was that during the discussion, President Bush said to President... to Chancellor Kohl, "We have to have an affirmation of German intentions to be a part of NATO." And President Bush was someone who could be incredibly persuasive one on one. He himself often said he wasn't the best speech-maker in a large audience, but he had no parallel, and probably has no parallel, in one-to-one negotiations with another head of state, and he convinced Helmut Kohl that this had to be done. And at the press conference, Helmut Kohl, in answer to a question, said: yes, Germany would be unified in NATO, fully into its military institutions. And he was challenged on that by a member of the German press, and he stuck to his guns. And that was another, very important turning point for us in German unification.

**INT:** Just to carry on, did you anticipate, if you like, the

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announcement between Kohl and Gorbachev in July 1990, when
they were in the Caucasus, I think, that a united Germany would be
in Europe, and Gorbachev finally sort of acceded to this? And what
was the significance?

CR: In July of 1990, I think that for us the turning point in German unification was the... we believed was the London summit. We believed that we had done enough at NATO to change the character of NATO, so that the Soviets could save face in effect and agree to the unification of Germany in NATO. When, on the heels of that, President Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl met in the Caucasus, Stavropol, and Gorbachev apparently acceded to those terms, I think it didn't come as a surprise that those were the terms. The timing, though, came as something of a surprise. We knew that the meeting was going on - the Germans had told us that the meeting was going on - but Chancellor Kohl himself believed that this was a deal, as he put it, that Gorbachev would want to deliver to the American President, not to the German President, and so we were somewhat surprised at when it happened, but delighted. There was, to be quite truthful, a little bit of pique that we had not been told by the Germans, and that we'd sort of read it in the press, but things were moving pretty fast and everybody got over that really pretty quickly. But, yes, given how tight and close our relations had been with the Germans, people were a little unhappy.

INT: And VE Day 2?

CR: We called the agreement between Gorbachev and Kohl "VE Day 2" because it really was... that was the end of the Cold War. I think to have the German Chancellor receive the news directly from the Soviet President, that Germany was going to be unified from his point of view, that the Soviet Union was not just going to accede to it, but indeed was going to have a ceremony in Moscow, had to be quite a moment. And I've read and talked... read and then talked with (unclear) abhis remembrances of that moment, and it must have been an extraordinary time to be a German.

INT: Wonderful - thank you. So you said that was the end of the Cold War, but in fact what Gorbachev was now facing was that, if you like, the Eastern satellites had disappeared and now the crumbling was moving in, if you like, towards the center. When he was at that Washington summit, was there a sense in which he was out of control, he was preoccupied, he really wasn't able to deal with the full sort of amount of power with some of the issues he'd like to have?

CR: The remarkable thabout Gorbachev is, he never seemed out of control - not during this entire difficult time. He was a person of tremendous confidence, and if anything struck you it was that he believed that he could make this work, he could reform the Soviet Union. He once said, "I can do what Alexander II did not do: I can

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reform Russia without blood." He was that confident. And he was like an
athlete who wanted the ball at the end of the game, you know; he was
just somebody who believed that he could get it done. So at the
Washington summit he was not showing any particular signs of strain,
although in some of his conversations with President Bush about the
financial and economic conditions in the Soviet Union, you could begin
to see that he was really, truly worried. I think if signs of strain finally
started to show with Gorbachev, it was in November of 1990, and I
really count November of 1990 as the beginning of the end for
Gorbachev and the beginning of the end for the Soviet Union. After a
career in the time between 1985 and 1990, of always choosing to do the
more liberal thing whenever challenged, Gorbachev suddenly tried to
react and tried to bring around him people who wanted to turn the clock
back, people who ultimately betrayed him, like Pugo; and he did this in a
way that frightened us all: Yakolev leaving the government suddenly;
then, in December of 1990, Shevardnadze resigning, and with dark talk
about coups in Moscow. Indeed, I will never forget the morning of
December 21st, because I was awakened at about 4 o'clock in the
morning by the situation room, and I was supposed to be leaving that
day for my Christmas vacation here in California, and the situation room
said, "Let me give you a moment to clear your head," and they never
said that if it was good news. And so they said that Shevardnadze had
resigned, and there were these dark forebodings of coups and so forth.
And I remember getting to work, and for the first time being really
frightened that the end was coming in the Soviet Union, and we waited
for several days to see what was going to happen. But I'm now
convinced that Gorbachev's decision to isolate himself from those who
had helped him to bring about *perestroika* is perhaps the one most
important, most fateful decision that he made, and one that did not serve
him well.

INT: Were there fears about a revival of the Cold War?

CR: The fears for the Soviet Union in November and December 1990
were less about the international context, about the Cold War. After all,
Germany was now unified, Eastern Europe was liberated, the Soviet
Union was going home. I don't think that there was anyone who really
believed that they could, in immediate terms in any way, re-establish
their power in Europe. But the question was: was the Soviet Union going
to now break up in a way that was not peaceful, in which stability in
Europe would really be threatened? And there were great fears at that
moment about that. In September of 1990, we had begun doing a kind of
contingency planning for what might happen if the Soviet Union broke
up. We looked at all kinds of contingencies. The one we never looked at
was a peaceful break-up of the Soviet Union, because nobody ever
believed it possible. And so, by the fall of 1990, we were very, very
nervous about what was going to happen there. There were other points
at which we were frightened as well. Really going to German
unification, the day after the Wall fell, the Soviets sent a letter in which
they were clearly very, very nervous about what had happened there,
almost panicked about what had happened. So it wasn't as if this was all

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smooth. But I think from November 1990, it was mostly downhill, and
we really did believe by that time that the Soviet Union might break up,
and break up violently.

INT: Did the United States support Baltic nationalism?

CR: The United States certainly supported Baltic independence. It had been American policy for almost 50 years to not recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union; and indeed, we acted that way, having no representation in the Baltic states, for instance, not permitting our people to go to the Baltic states on official missions. But the Baltic states have an unfortunate geography: they're right next door to a power that will always be bigger and always be more powerful; and the concern was not to incite the Baltic states to do something that the United States could then not help them with. I think that President Bush in particular was very influenced by what had happened in 1956, when John Foster Dulles's hot rhetoric had led to an uprising in Hungary, and the United States could only stand by and watch as Hungarians were slaughtered by Soviet tanks. The fact was, the United States was not going to be able to intervene on behalf of the Baltic states, and to incite them to do something that might then lead the Soviet Union to crack down, seemed incredibly foolhardy. But it was a very hard policy to manage, because there were people who believed that that meant that we were backing away from Baltic independence.

INT: And indeed at the Washington summit, President Bush almost dared not, because of the charged atmosphere, the sort of economic embargo, mention the war of words with Gorbachev.

CR: The very delicate problem was to support the Baltic states in a way that would not incite the Soviets to crack down, and that also allowed us to continue to carry out the very important agenda that we were carrying out with the Soviets: the unification of Germany and so forth. At the June summit, this was particularly hard, in 1990, because there was an economic embargo, an energy embargo, that had been imposed in March. The Baltics were beginning to lobby for independence openly, the Soviets were getting more and more nervous, and the issue was: what could you say legitimately and helpfully about Baltic independence, about lifting the embargo, and what could you actually back legitimately? And that was the difficult thing at the June summit. We did refuse to fully agree to terms of a trade agreement and "most favorite nation" status, and that was very much wrapped up with the Baltic issues.

INT: And in fact you used the wonderful metaphor before: "He dared not light a match in a gas-filled room." Could you say that for me?

CR: Yes. At one point, I wrote a memo to President Bush, in which I said: "The problem is that the Baltic question is like a gas-filled room,

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LC

and the United States has to be careful not to light the match."

INT: Wonderful - thank you. Can you just tell me your assessment of Yeltsin, if you like, and his support, or why he was on this bandwagon, if you like, of supporting independence for the republics?

CR: In retrospect, Boris Yeltsin emerges as one of the most important figures in this entire period. Without Boris Yeltsin's challenge to the Soviet Union from a Russian nationalist base - something that I think none of us ever thought possible - I think it would not have had the smooth transition to a semi-democratic country out of the collapse of the Soviet Union. I think Boris Yeltsin has turned out to be extremely important. I have to admit that my first encounter with Boris Yeltsin was not a good one. He came in September of 1989; he wanted to see the President. We had decided that since the President had not yet met with Gorbachev, it was inappropriate for him to meet the President. So we did what we often do: we were going to have a presidential dropby; Yeltsin would meet with Brent Scowcroft and the President would drop by. Yeltsin arrived that day 30 minutes late. He got out of the car; he said, "This isn't the door that you go in to see the President," because he wasn't going in the diplomatic entrance, he was going in the west basement entrance. And I said, "You aren't going to see the President, you're going to see General Scowcroft." And he carried on and carried on about, was Scowcroft important enough to see him? He threatened to go back to his hotel. And finally I said, "I think you're... I'm going to tell General Scowcroft you're not coming, and you can go back to your hotel." And he decided then he would go, and ION the President stopped by, and everything was just fine. But later on, I met Yeltsin again in Moscow, and he remembered that time, and he mentioned that it had not been a happy meeting. And I think we can let bygones be bygones; he's done pretty good things for Russia, and I think I have to admit that, even though the first encounter with him was really pretty horrible.

INT: But for Gorbachev he was a terribly destabilizing influence. I mean, he was massively popular, something that Gorbachev had wanted to be, and had been to a great extent, and then of course this support of Russian nationalism, if you like...

CR: History...

INT: ... he undermined... Sorry.

CR: History sometimes puts the right people at the right place, and then it passes them by. Gorbachev was the right man to bring about enough change in the Soviet Union to begin its unraveling. Gorbachev was a utopian in many ways; he believed fundamentally that if you could remove coercion, remove the myths, de-Stalinize the country and go back to a kind of Leninist Soviet Union, that you could stabilize it and then it could be a worthy country for incorporation in Europe. Because

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he believed that, he unraveled many of the instruments of state power,
and they were therefore not available to him later, when one might have
expected him to crack down. Boris Yeltsin, coming along just behind
him, was creating the basis on which the new Russia would be born. He
was tapping into Russian nationalism. I think it's less important that he
was a challenge to Gorbachev, or that he was more popular than
Gorbachev, than that he found this little opening to tap into Russian
nationalism against the Soviet Union, and therefore to create a basis for a
new Russia. These were men who were extremely important to history,
in different ways, at different times. This cannot have turned out
peacefully without either of them.

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"Kohl's actions are misguided, even in his own domestic terms. Leaders must not be afraid to lead. They must not follow their electorates and follow the mood of the moment. That's a prescription for defeat." Kohl had been arguing that his coalition government would collapse if we pushed modernization. While I was sympathetic to the substance of her argument, my inclination almost invariably was not to second-guess the instincts of others with respect to their own domestic politics. I always figured they probably knew their countries better than any foreigner could. But she pressed ahead: "If we're firm with Kohl, we could restore his natural instinct and encourage him to go ahead and work out the issue prior to the NATO Summit."

On Gorbachev, she was very pessimistic. She felt the forces aligned against him, both psychologically and politically, would prevent him from succeeding. Geoffrey Howe had been Chancellor of the Exchequer when I was White House Chief of Staff, and Foreign Secretary when I was Treasury Secretary. I knew him well as a first-rate intellect, and liked him. I told Howe that we needed to push Gorbachev to make hard choices in favor of reform and new thinking. "We must work together to find initiatives to correct the public perception that we are reacting to Gorbachev," I said, echoing my earlier meetings. Howe agreed, but was convinced Gorbachev had more initiatives to come: "He's got a well-stocked hat full of well-armed rabbits."

Needless to say, my trip to Bonn produced a diametrically opposite position on SNF. Flying across the channel to Bonn, I might as well have crossed into another world. Helmut Kohl, a superb politician, with a quick wit and engaging manner, had been as staunch an ally of Ronald Reagan as Margaret Thatcher had been during the 1982-83 Euromissile crisis. But now he was under strong domestic pressure, and wanted us to agree to negotiate with the Soviets on SNF levels, irrespective of modernization. The public row was also a private dispute. He clearly was in no mood to take London's counsel. "Mrs. Thatcher is rid of her missiles," he said. The divide between Britain and Germany on this issue put us in an extraordinarily difficult position, and finding a satisfactory solution to it that did not diminish our "special relationship" with our closest ally or strain our good relations with our German friends was an imperative.

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher took a more indirect route than Kohl. He wrapped the issue in a larger context and stressed that SNF should not be made a test of Germany's loyalty. Moving ahead on modernization in 1989 or 1990 would cause the government to fall in the December 1990 elections, he said, and a decision could be put off until 1991 or 1992. During the past few months, the State Department's European Bureau had warned me about what it perceived as the dangers of "Genscher-

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92

JAMES A. BAKER, III

worked closely with diverse congressional leaders such as Howard Baker, Bob Dole, Alan Simpson, Bob Packwood, Bob Michel, Trent Lott, Newt Gingrich, Bill Bradley, David Obey, Pat Moynihan, Dan Rostenkowski, Lloyd Bentsen, George Mitchell, Chris Dodd, Sam Nunn, Robert Byrd, Tom Foley, Jim Wright, and many others, to ensure Republican Party discipline on key votes and build coalitions with diverse and constantly changing blocs of Democrats.

In foreign policy, President Reagan had resolutely managed the Euro-missile crisis in the first years of his presidency. He had shown that the key to alliance unity was consistent American leadership. During the Cold War, that was the persistent paradox in transatlantic relations: While Europeans publicly complained about the imposing nature of American leadership, in private the political elite was consistently far more worried about a leadership vacuum caused by American disengagement or vacillation.

The danger was growing that NATO would fragment in the face of Gorbachev's charm offensive and a diminishing Soviet military threat. The centripetal forces working on the U.S.-European concord were increasing, while the centrifugal forces were diminishing. Without West-West unity, East-West relations would be controlled primarily by the Soviets, as Gorbachev played one side of the Atlantic off against the other.

Returning to Washington, however, I was stymied in efforts throughout the rest of February, and into March and April, to get any movement on a serious conventional-forces proposal. The bureaucratic impediments to movement were great. I knew that Scowcroft was working on Cheney and on Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to be more expansive in how they looked at the CFE negotiations. There was little point in pushing too hard in the first hundred days of the administration, anyway. Those are some of the most hectic times for any administration, and I knew, with everything else he had to deal with, the President would not focus on the arms control issues until the summit was closer at hand. My sense of timing also made me believe that as the May 29-30 dates for the NATO Summit approached, the President's competitive instincts would come to the fore, and we'd be able to break the logjam then.

## Time for Some "New Thinking" of Our Own

The time became ripe in early May as three events converged.

First, on May 5, Chancellor Kohl and the President spoke by phone. Kohl asked the President to send a special emissary to Bonn to try and solve SNF. He was blunt about his objectives: "First, I want the summit to be successful. Second, I want you to have a success. It will be your first trip to Europe as President. You are a proven friend of the Europeans and, in particular, the German...

it."

Speaking as a first step, "We are in a history of Gorbachev as the riddle ever, you and I are logical breakdown of our triumph. A trial. This is why I think the cohesion of NATO is being eroded."

Second, on March 14, I argued that we should new proposals other than skies" over Europe was clear we would be.

The third event, which I irritation me, but it is with the Soviets' launching for the V-j yet another proposal into Europe.

By the time that primed. He had already to put together a long curve," I told the any proposal had cut of 25 percent five percent would look for, while...

Over the next few days the Bush family and his senior advisers, Leonid Brezhnev and other leaders in Moscow every proposal to Gorbachev was given that we needed to exert all we could to make SNF ensure alliance unity in Moscow (CFE quite badly, ing. Scowcroft and I...

THE

950

THE POLITICS OF DIPLOMACY

93

 particular, the Germans. I have never forgotten this fact and never will forget it."

Speaking as a friend, he went on to set the context for George Bush. "We are in a historical position," he said. "It is far from my mind to see Gorbachev as the new hero, and I do not mistake words for deeds. However, you and I are witnessing events beyond our wildest dreams, the ideological breakdown of a political and economic system. This is the hour of our triumph. A triumph, due not least to the efforts of the United States. This is why I think your role should be brought to the fore. This is linked to the cohesion of NATO, and to the success of the NATO Summit."

Second, on May 12, the President gave a speech on Soviet affairs. He argued that we should move "beyond containment," but he presented no new proposals other than to resuscitate an Eisenhower proposal for "open skies" over Europe. The press coverage was less than enthusiastic, and it was clear we would need to do more if the summit were to be a success.

The third event was Gorbachev's SNF ploy in Moscow. It may have irritated me, but it also catalyzed the President. George Bush knew that with the Soviets' massive advantage in short-range nuclear forces (1,400 launchers for the Warsaw Pact to 88 for NATO!), the Kremlin might present yet another proposal before the NATO Summit, and upstage his first venture into Europe as President.

By the time the President and I sat down for lunch on May 17, he was primed. He had already asked Brent to talk to Cheney and Admiral Crowe to put together a bold CFE proposal. "You need to get ahead of the power curve," I told the President, which meant starting from the standpoint that any proposal had to have political impact first and foremost. I suggested a cut of 25 percent in both equipment and manpower made sense. Twenty-five percent would, I thought, generate the kind of political effect we were looking for, while not endangering us militarily.

Over the next week, in a series of meetings at the White House and at the Bush family home in Kennebunkport, Maine, the President listened to his senior advisers thrash out possible proposals. Crowe acted as though Leonid Brezhnev were still running the Kremlin, and he fought virtually every proposal tooth and nail. Cheney was far less dogmatic, but Dick felt Gorbachev was going to come our way anyway, so why move? I argued that we needed a radical initiative for three reasons: First, the President needed to exert leadership over the alliance. Second, a bold CFE proposal would make SNF basically irrelevant, allowing us to resolve the issue and ensure alliance unity. And, finally, Gorbachev's conventional proposal to me in Moscow (which received little press play) showed that he wanted CFE quite badly, and we could move him even further if we were forthcoming. Scowcroft and I were in fundamental agreement. He had been pushing

s Howard Baker, it Lott, Newt Gin-kenkowski, Lloyd Byrd, Tom Foley, discipline on key hanging blocs of

managed the Euro-down that the key to the Cold War, while Europeans in leadership, in about a leadership.

the face of Gor-threat. The cen-vere increasing, est-West unity, viets, as Gorb-a-

fforts through-movement on impediments to on Cheney and the more expan-s little point in ition, anyway. n, and I knew, d not focus on l. My sense of for the NATO 'ould come to

l. e by phone. try and solve mmit to be ir first trip to sand, in par-

THE POLITICS OF DIPLOMACY

299

the load. Germany had been singled out for special criticism, and while I didn't say so publicly, I shared the view that Germany's response to the crisis up to then had been disappointing. Their reluctance was even more perplexing because, two days earlier in Moscow, I had participated in the treaty ceremony where the four Allied victors in World War II had terminated their occupation rights in West Germany, clearing the way for the reunification of Germany after nearly a half-century. It was essentially an American-brokered agreement, and the Germans knew it. Now we needed some help in return.

Before I arrived, the Foreign Ministry had begun leaking word that Germany was prepared to be more responsive, but I wanted to make sure Chancellor Kohl understood the stakes. It was just the two of us and interpreters.

"We've worked very closely in the last year to meet your needs," I said. "I think we've done a good job, and it wasn't always easy. We worked closely together, and we kept you informed every step of the way. It's a wonderful achievement for all of us, but we have some needs now."

"You're not going to contribute any forces because your constitution prohibits it, and then if it looks like you're being skimpy on the money, you're getting all the benefits of this and you're not contributing. And even if I don't believe it, that's the way it's perceived. You have to put me in the position where I can argue when I appear before the Congress that Germany is doing its fair share. I know how important the U.S.-German relationship is to you, and you know how important it is to me. But you can't leave me hanging out there."

The Chancellor was a confirmed Atlanticist, a strong supporter of the United States and its presence in Europe, a close friend of President Bush, and a leader who was very grateful for what America had just done. He showed it by providing assistance of almost $2 billion in value. In addition to providing millions of dollars' worth of support equipment for U.S. forces in the Gulf, the Chancellor agreed to substantially increase the amount of German military and economic aid to Turkey, and to provide German ships to transport Egyptian armored troops and their heavy tanks to the Gulf.

When I returned to Washington at three in the morning on September 16, I believed there was ample evidence that our diplomacy was working. Later that day, the U.N. would pass its seventh resolution condemning the invasion. The diplomatic coalition was hanging together. Sanctions were beginning to take hold in Iraq, and our partners had pledged billions of dollars to share the financial burdens of Desert Shield. But Saddam was still in Kuwait, and his rhetoric suggested he was in no hurry to withdraw.

Allison's involvement in the decision toinvolve many more Syriar than Assad the right tomake the right decision." I have heard it today, fully in agreement with it. It was a very strong position to take, and I think it was the right one.

The title of the old regime was the rule of the man who made it. It was a recognition of the power of the regime, and a new era of unlimited power to be exercised by the regime.

In the hope that real change would come to the Middle East, I have been working with the PLO.

Many PLO leaders were still active at the time, and I had the chance to meet with some of them.