YJ

deal from that base with some of the causes. There will inevitably
have to be a major Palestinian initiative upon the conclusion of the
Iraqi military operation. And thirdly, there will have to be enormous
pressure on these religious groups supporting the schools, which is not
easy within democracies because these religious groups are
undermining our own societies too. It's not just in the Muslim world.

But this has to happen. So we are facing something where there is a
difference between an intellectual priority and an operational priority.

G: Yes, so for you, yes, an intellectual obligation, an intellectual
priority, an operational priority...

H: The immediate necessity is to destroy the momentum of the jihad,
even if Iraq is not itself part of the jihad.

G: If I understand you well, Iraq, since, okay, Iraq has attacked one
of your allies in Kuwait, okay, events since March 1991, Iraq did not
attack you, but you said you were going to protect all allies, so, yes,

15

[Y]

Iraq in a way is attacking one of your allies, Israel, in giving money to
societies to...well, just tell me, do you think...

H: The question is not that they are attacking Israel. The question is
that they are building weapons of mass destruction in the middle of an
area which is financing terrorism and where terrorism is more or less
originated. And even if there is no immediate connection today, is it
this combination of defiance of the West on a secular basis plus
weapons of mass destruction in an environment that defies the West
for religious reasons that makes it necessary to break that image.

G: And what about that Saudi and Emirates' financing?

K: It must be dealt with.

G: Is, can Saudi Arabia be considered a truthful ally of the United
States?

K: What's a truthful ally in the Middle East? The Saudi Arabian
government is a kind of ally of the United States floating on a massive,

16

[x]

on a sea of passion, attempting to survive by conciliating any conceivable group that might threaten them, but within those limits it is an ally of the United States. It knows it will not survive if it is the last group on the barricades. So there are always leakages in the Saudi behavior, and I believe that maybe twenty-five years ago, the Saudis thought they could pacify their own country by buying off this religious establishment, and they had no idea of the huge impact that that would have around the world. They are not revolutionaries, but they are producing revolution.

G: How about Israel, I mean, America is using its might to change Iraq, or the regime in Iraq, and so on, but don't you think America should use its might to tell to the Israelis and the Palestinians, "Listen to me...there is fifty years that you are bothering us, [UNDISCERNABLE] you are a small people, small nation, small territory, you are just bothering us. So now, I take the Taba

17

[4]

Agreement, Taba negotiations, I give, okay, you want the wall, you
have the wall, you want the mosques, you have the mosques,
settlements, okay, 80 percent can be given to Israel, one square
kilometer, one square kilometer, da da da da, we cut. You don't like
that, Mr. Sharon, you don't like that, Mr. Arafat. I don't care. I just, I
am able to hit you, I separate it, just accept it because you have no
choice. You have no choice because I am America. We'll bomb you,
and we'll fight with Israel [INDISCERNABLE] if you don't accept. And
you, Israel, I will give you sanctions or I will stop my economic help if
you don't accept." That's it. Why you don't do that?

K: I know the European view is that there is one dividing line that we
can define and that we can impose it, and then everybody will
guarantee that line. And then peace will happen. Now, when you
make peace in the Middle East, it is important to keep in mind that
there is enormous inequality. On the one side Israel is preponderantly

18

V

superior militarily. But the Arabs are preponderantly superior
demographically. And in the long run, they will catch up with enough
technology, especially as weapons become long-range. Therefore, the
agreement must be one that goes beyond simply defining a dividing
line. And actually I believe that while the Israeli day to day conduct
looks truculent to Europeans, one has to perceive it against a
background of a fear of total destruction. And if Israel were rapidly
forced into what Europeans want - giving up all their settlements,
partitioning Jerusalem, and other similar things - it would be in return
for exactly what? The psychological shock to the society may make it
impossible to sustain unless there is a conviction that the Arabs
actually are reconciled to the existence of a Palestinian state. So I
think it is important to get a negotiation started. I think actually its
outcome is not so hard to perceive. If you start from the present
borders of the Palestinians, there are a number of things that have

19

changed. One is that the Israelis cannot want more Arabs as part of
Israel for demographic reasons. That puts a limit to the territory they
can want to acquire. And indeed the 1967 borders were drawn partly
on a democratic basis. So therefore, I'm fairly optimistic about a
Palestinian negotiation, and I think it is important that it is done with
Arab and Israeli acquiescence. But it's also important that it happens.

If you look at the wall the Israelis are building, that isn't so far from
the Taba line. So you have a psychological problem _______. The
problem is that among the Arabs there is no real acceptance of the
existence of the state of Israel. They can't bring themselves to do it in
a formal way. There is always a trick phrase in it. And they surely
can't do it in an emotional way. So the Arabs could easily solve their
problems if they could produce a Sadat who convinces the Israelis that
he really wants to live in peace with them. But they have not been

20

able to do it; they cannot produce such a man; at least they haven't

_______ since Sadat.

G: Have you met Arafat?

K: I've met Arafat.

G: Do you think he can strike a deal, or no?

K: Arafat is also floating on top of a mass of contending groups. So, at the end of an Iraq war, we have to address the funding and the propaganda of these religious schools, and we have to address urgently the Palestinian problem. It's a pity that we and the Europeans can't come to an understanding. What the Europeans want from us is a plan which can then be opposed. What I believe might work is a process that will acquire its own pressures, but in which those who have to live with the agreement can at least believe it is mostly their own.

21

[Y]

G: You don't want to do to the Israelis and the Palestinians what you did to us in Yalta, if I summarize.

K: We have to be very careful—what did we do to "us", meaning Europe?--

G: Europeans, yes. ______ or Germans or....

K: Actually, in my view the big mistake was Tehran, not Yalta. Yalta, it was already gone.

G: So Tehran, 1943?

K: Well, that was a little different. The mistake that was made was not to demand from the Russians during the war when they were under pressure, the restraints that could have made a different Europe. I think Roosevelt misunderstood the nature of Stalin. Now, I think here one has to understand that on the Palestinian issue that this is a profound psychological problem. The Israelis claim that if Arafat were replaced by a democratically elected leader, he would conduct a

22

different policy. I think it's very possible in an Arab world that a
democratically elected leader would be more anti-Israel than the
others.

G: Frankly speaking, if there were free elections in all Muslim-Arab countries...

K: It would be a nightmare.

G: In all the Muslim countries, don't you think that Islamic lists
parties would be number one, which doesn't mean absolute majority,
you can be number one in all countries...

K: No, very, very probable...

G: Even in ______ they are number one.

K: Very probable. Not sufficiently understood here.

G: What, what do you think, what will be...Jim Baker in 1991 dropped
Lebanon to Syria, because he wanted Syria in his coalition. So
Lebanon is still, Lebanon was a kind of an ally of France and of

23

America, left to Syrian occupation. And do you think that America is
ready to do the same now? And just let, "No you can't have blackmail
from Syria; you leave us alone with Lebanon, and we will not activate
hezbollah against Israel, or..."

K: I don't know the answer to that. I think right now, with the
present constellation in the world, America is not looking for new
enemies and new crises.

G: So maybe it is ready to abide by Syria's demands?

K: New demands?

G: No, just let us do as we want in Lebanon. America is ready to
let...there is no American policy in Lebanon. Is there an American
policy in Lebanon?

K: I don't believe it has the same priority as Iraq and North Korea will
have to have.

G: So first we deal with Iraq.

24

K: And North Korea.

G: And North Korea.

K: But I'm not saying we won't deal with Lebanon. I believe a case can be made for the proposition that if Iraq ends with a collapse of the Baaht system in Iraq, and if it is possible to create a respectable alternative, that this must affect the domestic situation in Syria profoundly. In that case, the Syrian capacity to bring pressure on Lebanon will be reduced and then in that matter, greater freedom of maneuver may emerge from Lebanon.

G: Do you think that the change of regime in Iraq will have a positive impact on the Palestinians and Palestinian leadership?

K: At the end of the 1973 war, we managed in a space of eighteen months to negotiate three major agreements, even though we had helped Israel to survive the 1973 war. And the reason was that the Arab leaders had come to the conclusion that if they wanted any

25

[Y]

progress, they had to work with Americans. I think at the end of an
Iraq war, we have a comparable possibility.

G: In 1974, why you didn't stop the Turkish invasion of Cyprus? Or
why you didn't tell your ally Harold Wilson who, as you know, was part
of the agreement...

K: What did we do in 1974?

G: In 1974, you could, on Cyprus, we are speaking on 1973, in 1974,
in Cyprus, you could have said to Harold Wilson, "Okay, listen Harold,
you are, you know that, you know that, you know that, you know that,
the three, the, the, the [FRENCH TERM]." I don't know the word in
English...

K: The guarantee of power.

G: The guarantee, the guarantee of power of Cyprus where, number
one Turkey, number two Greece, number three Britain, so Britain was

26

totally entitled ________ to intervene, and Harold Wilson said, "I don't want you to..." Why you didn't, why you didn't...

K: Intervene for what end, to do what?

G: To, to, to, tell the Turks "No, you don't, go back"?

K: To the Turks?

G: Yeah.

K: They didn't have enough forces on the island. First of all, you have to remember the Cyprus crisis occurred in the last three weeks of the Nixon presidency. There was no way Britain could go to war without the assistance of the Sixth Fleet, absolutely. The British only had, I think, 1,000 troops in Cyprus and maybe ten airplanes. I forget what the numbers were, but very small. Secondly, the crisis in Cyprus was started by the Greek junta, and the Greek junta was extremely unpopular. And all the pressures that were on us were to side with

27

[y]

Turkey not with the Greeks. And the first invasion occurred when the junta was still in place and...

G: [UNDISCERNABLE]

K: And therefore there was the idea that we should have intervened against the junta. I was considered to be too pro-Greek because I foresaw that the outcome would be unfortunate, and I did not want America to be blamed as the cause of it - we were anyway. So then the only question was whether we could have stopped the second attack. That occurred two days after Nixon resigned, with a new president, so what might have been possible with a fully formed American Government one can argue forever. But there are objective realities in international politics. I couldn't leave Washington; President Ford was not even elected.

28

G: What do you think of, don't you think that an intervention in Iraq will multiply the destabilization actions in Afghanistan against American soldiers?

K: In Afghanistan there are inherent difficulties. The composition of Afghanistan society is entirely of various warlords, leads to a situation whereby civil conflict is certain when somebody wants to impose a central government. So if one wants a coherent central government, one will face the challenges Russia did of a prolonged guerrilla war.

On the other hand, if one doesn't, one faces the gradual erosion of authority. We will have to decide after the Iraq war how much we ______ in Afghanistan.

G: What motivates this creation of joint regional teams in Afghanistan? It is the ______, is it the ______ change in the Administration that didn't believe in nation-building or that does believe in nation-building?

29

Y

K: The Administration has concluded that it must do something, but I don't think they have a fully formed plan of what they mean by that.

G: What do you think, do you think Musharraf has got the full control of his country, and do you think that he controls...

K: Who?

G: Musharraf, President Musharraf, the ASI, the army really?

K: Well, nobody has ever had full control of the northwest frontier. I think that Musharraf is the best leader that I know in Pakistan, but probably nobody has 100 percent control, especially in some of the poorer areas. But we'd better not get into too many other issues.

G: Yes, let's, yes, yes, you're right, let's keep on, what will be for you the reaction on Iran to the American intervention in Iraq?

K: They will analyze it in quite different terms from the way we will analyze it for ourselves. They will analyze it as the movement forward of American power, now having reached all but one of their frontiers.

30

M

Then they have the option of drawing two conclusions: they can either
try to begin a dialogue with us, or they can plan to disrupt whatever
strategic benefits to us they may see. Or they might do both. So it
could be that we will see, simultaneously, confrontation and movement
toward discussion or movement toward discussion disguised as
confrontation. At that point, it is important whether we understand
what is going on. The second problem we will face is this: assuming
there's a movement for accommodation, should we deal with the
ayatollahs and thereby keep them in power, or should we confront the
ayatollahs in the hope of producing democracy in the one Middle East
country where it has a clear social base and where fundamentalism is
discredited? So Iran is a country in which, if you had a free election,
the Islamicists would not be first. Now, I would be, I would prefer the
second option. But before I chose it, I would want to learn more about
Iran, whether there is a real democratic - I have no doubt there is a

31

[Y]

democratic option - I'm not sure whether the democrats can do to the ayatollahs what the East Europeans did to the Communists.

G: Do you think that Iran should have been put in the "axis of evil" as well as Iraq and Northern Korea?

K: It's different than Iraq. Iran is a different ______.

G: So now we are going, I have two more questions about Security Council and France and Germany. For Iraq, should, before waging a war and invasion of Iraq, should America go again to the Security Council as France wishes?

K: I think what is likely to happen...Well, America has agreed to consult with the Security Council, so America will go to the Security Council, but I don't think it will be as extended a consultation as took place in October.

G: Do you see a need for a second resolution to wage a war, an invasion of Iraq?

32

K: I would make that decision after consultation starts.

G: Don't you think it's kind of dangerous that America decides alone and does not abide a minimum with international law?

K: I don't think that is true, that it does not abide by
international law. I mean, legally, Iraq has broken a whole series of
UN resolutions. Legally, the status of Iraq was - there's a technical
term "a suspension of hostilities" - so legally we have a right to reduce
the hostilities if we feel that the agreement was broken. It's not a
case I have made, but it is a legal case.

G: What do you think of the Germans' position, what do you think of
French position, and then what do you think of the German position?

K: I interpret the French position as saying that, if France is to go to
war, it must do so on the basis of a policy it has helped articulate and
not simply endorsing a powerful country, however friendly. I interpret
the German position as using Iraq for domestic policies and really not

33

[Y]

being tied to any particular strategic concept, either European or
Atlantic. My view of the French position is that, whatever reservations
France thinks it has, it also realizes that it is part of a larger system
and that it will take that into account. And, therefore, I think that
France in the end will make considerable efforts to participate in
American policy.

G: Aren't you afraid that in the...

K: Germany, I believe, has foreclosed that option for itself. But nor
does Germany participate in a dialogue of its strategic implications.

G: Aren't you afraid that in the Muslim-Arab world even moderate
people will say American policy is double standard because yes, Iraq
has violated many, sixteen, as the President said, UN resolutions, but
Israel has ______ by much more. So, don't you think that there is a
double standard?

34

[Y]

K: Yeah, but if these people are fair they will also recognize that every peace agreement that has been achieved between Arabs and Israelis has been achieved under American initiative or under some sort of American pressure and that, at the end of the day, whatever they may say about our double standard, their only hope is in active American participation in the negotiations. So whatever the rhetorical argument would be at this stage, the ultimate judgment will be in where we are two, three years from now.

G: Did you think, after the assassination of Rabin, America should have put Clinton to put more pressure to, onto, upon, Netanyahu so that he applied the White House, the Oslo Agreement?

K: The Oslo Agreement had - it was a great moment of hope - but it had too many weaknesses. It was never really secure so that a Palestinian police would do Israeli security work, which was one of the premises. On the other hand, it was also a difficult negotiating

35

[4]

process, where every year or two Israel had to give up a slice of
territory for nothing in effect, which undermined the people who were
negotiating it. And that's why Barak wanted to cut through it into one
conclusive negotiation. So, and after the assassination of Rabin, there
was nobody with enough authority in Israel. If Europe and we could
agree on an outcome and a process, there would be more hope. I
think it is sort of banal that every few weeks some European foreign
minister shows up in the region and pronounces some new plan as if
this were a seminar at some university. And it doesn't help with the
Arabs, it just shows long-term weakness.

36

Transcript of Dr. Henry Kissinger's interview
with Mr. Renaud Girard of Le Figaro

Tuesday, January 7, 2003

New York

G: When one is America, why waging a war to this small country, Iraq?

K: Well, of course, you cannot talk of America as a unit in a case like this. I think the question is, what does the Administration, why is the Administration convinced that we should go to war if necessary. The September 11th was a traumatic experience for America, it was not simply that it was an attack on the United States; Pearl Harbor was also an attack on the United States, but Pearl Harbor came from an adversary of which we were aware. This came from an enemy we did not know we had. And it therefore has had a profound impact on the American psyche. When America deals with a problem - this may be

1/9/03

with HAK

handwritten edits

[Y]

somewhat different from Europe - it wants to solve it definitively. It
fights a war to end all wars, like World War I. And so the
determination was to end terrorism. And I believe that President Bush
thinks that this was almost an act of destiny that required him to help
solve the problem. For about ten years, America had dealt with
terrorism as if it were a criminal event. That is, one waited until
something happened and then one tried to find the perpetrators and
bring them to justice. The difficulty with this approach was that the
perpetrators often committed suicide in doing it and, in any event
were low-level people. America did not understand, through the
1990s, that we were at war with the system. The terrorism as it
evolved did not particularly attempt to inflict individual damage; it
tried to convey the notion that the West was a rotten system capable
of being attacked. So after September 11th it began to be understood
that we were dealing with a new form of warfare. And in such

2

[4]

conditions what some Europeans say is, "We Europeans have experienced a lot of problems, and we have lived through them, and we have to live through this one". It is a policy where one of passively waiting, living through it, the political cohesion would disintegrate. So the analysis that thoughtful people are making is this: the soldiers of terrorism are really private groups. And it is a war conducted by private groups based on the national territory of national states. The groups themselves have nothing to defend and nothing to protect except themselves. As a result, the lessons of the past have limited applicability. Deterrence does not work against groups that have nothing to lose. And diplomacy does not work with groups that have no program as such and certainly do not believe in compromise. Even if we wanted to negotiate with the terrorists, we wouldn't even know how to identify an interlocutor.

3

[Y]

So the strategy that was evolved was that one has to drain the swamp, one has to prevent the terrorists from having bases of territories, and one has to keep them on the defensive; one has to make them fugitives and one has to make supporting them more painful than tolerating them.

G: I understand but...

K: That is the basic strategy...

G: The basic strategy, but we understand that terrorists came from several countries: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and many countries the governments of which have very good relations with the United States.

What we notice is that not one terrorist was from Iraq and, number two, that they are Islamists, okay, they are waging a jihad, they are...they tell us, "Who are the enemies?" The enemies are the Christians and the Jews. Okay? They tell us. And now America is

4

[Y]

waging a war against a regime who has never been linked to Islamic terrorism, never. And was well...

K: But it has been linked to terrorism.

G: But not to Islamist terrorism, to terrorism, but not to Islamic terrorism. Yes to terrorism. Vaguely, yes. Less, less, much less than Syria, much less than other states, much less than Iran, only Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal is the only example. And who as a regime which has been founded by Christians, as a matter of fact, ______ okay, and whose vice number two is a Christian ______. So, yes, I make an attack but you are getting back to a country which is a secular, one of the rare secular, secular states of the Iraq Muslim-Arab war.

K: Well, let's get to the second point. Of course Iraq has a history of dealing with America, and there are many, including me, who believe that the 1991 war was ended prematurely. I believe that - that the quest for weapons of mass destruction, even in a secular state,

5

[Y]

contains the danger of the merging of the weapons of mass
destruction with the terrorists, even if the weapons of mass
destruction are initially in the hands of a secular state. The very
existence - continued existence - of a defiant state like this proves that
the West cannot protect its interests. I think that is the basic rationale
for trying to deprive Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.

G: So you agree with President Bush when he said very recently that
Saddam Hussein was a threat to his neighbors and to America's allies
in the region? So it was a reason for America to eliminate this threat?

K: Yes.

G: But ...

K: I basically agree with the Bush strategy.

G: But, yes, maybe, maybe, maybe Iraq is a threat. We don't really
know. What we know is that Northern Korea is a real threat and you
said that in his recent speech, President Bush did not mention that Kim

6

[Y]

Jong Il is a threat to American allies, ______ is allies South Korea, Japan. I mean...

K: I believe that nuclear weapons in North Korea are absolutely intolerable and cannot be accepted. And the combination in North Korea of this type of government and nuclear weapons will create a nightmarish situation. Never mind how we can handle this immediate threat. It's unfortunate that these two events are coming together.

There are two huge problems in the world today: terrorism and proliferation. And proliferation has become the more immediate problem. But the terrorism campaign has its own momentum, and you cannot just stop it and say, "Now we'll go and deal with North Korea for a while." But once the issue of North Korea is fully analyzed, all these discussions of "let's have a dialogue" will be seen to be very dangerous. If you have a dialogue and they gain something from their

7

Y

nuclear threat, then every time they want something we'll see a
nuclear threat.

G: But aren't you, your, your, I mean are your priorities right? I mean, you have a real threat - Northern Korea. Everybody agrees on that. On, on Iraq, for the moment, nothing is clear. There is a threat.

K: I think they're different kinds of threats. The threat from Iraq is political and psychological and will be military only two, three years down the road. The threat from North Korea is strategic and will change the whole balance in Asia because it will lead to the nuclearization of Japan, may lead to a redisposition of American deployments in Korea. So there are two huge threats happening simultaneously. It would be nice to be able to say we do one and we won't do the other but we now will suspend the Iraqi thing.

8

[Y]

G: Should you start by Northern Korea or you don't do it because it's not as easy there? Should you start by North Korea? That's the question. Start by North Korea and then put Iraq in second position.

K: We no longer have that choice.

G: Why?

K: I think Iraq now has to go its route on which it was sent at the UN Security Council. And, in any event, there are only two or three things that can happen with Iraq. One, there could be a coup before a final American decision. Then we would have to decide whether to accept the coup or treat with the successors. Then, there could be a war or there could be a surrender by Saddam in which he says, "Okay, take all my weapons". Those are conceivable policy choices. Finally, there is the option of war. It cannot really end anymore, in my view, with the continued rule of Saddam. I'm speaking of what you French call "the logic of events".

9

[Y]

G: So do you think that now America must succeed in changing the
Iraqi regime?

K: Look, theoretically, and in terms of the UN Resolution, if Saddam
came to us tomorrow and said, "Tell me the place where I should
deposit the weapons of mass destruction", we would probably have to
accept it. And we probably would accept it. But, if you then imagine
that sanctions are lifted and in two years Saddam has the resources of
Saudi Arabia, what has been achieved?

G: You started this interview...

K: But I'm, you see, I don't speak for the Administration. And I'm not
saying I would necessarily have pursued all these steps. I'm uneasy
about the possibility of democratizing Iraq by occupation.

G: You don't believe in this kind of eighteen-month American pro-
consulate [?] in Iraq?

10

[Y]

K: I don't see the relationship between the occupation of Germany and the occupation of Iraq. They are two different scenarios. I wish the administration well; if it could be done, it would be a historic event. I don't disagree with the objective. I don't think it's an eighteen-month job.

G: It's a much longer job?

K: Yes, and it may not be doable at all.

G: You think there is a ...

K: But in the immediate phase, there is no choice.

G: You think there is a risk of, remember Israel coming to South
____ in 1982 being greeted by Shiite population with flowers?

Remember that also, and then six months later you have hezbollah in
____? Don't you think that the same thing can happen to the

Americans, that you have a kind of jihad, a united Shiite front against

11

[Y]

Americans? Shiites from Iran and shiites, of course, from the south of
Iraq.

K: I would certainly, in our plan, provide for that ______. Tell me,
when will this be published? About when? Next week, two weeks?

G: No, it will be published around - it will be sold - around 25th of
January. Before Blix's ...there is a long time, it is a luxury thing.

[UNDISCERNABLE]

K: But at this stage, we cannot stop what is in train, and we should
not, because that would be a retreat of a huge magnitude and an
admission. Nor would it be correct because the analysis with respect
to terrorism is right. And the sequence with respect to it is right. We
are now suddenly confronted with a new problem, in Korea. We will
have to integrate the North Korean problem into the Iraqi crisis. That
will require great thought.

12

[Y]

G: Are your priorities right in America because if you rate the region _______. In Middle East you have several problems. Number one problem today is Islamism - Egypt, Saudi Arabia. It's a problem because they attacked Americans here. Then the second problem, which is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and maybe there is a third priority, which is not as big. It is to have this country, Iran, back in the international community.

H: No, that is a deeper ______ that has to be the outcome. You cannot have a permanent occupation of a traditional Islamic capital by Christian nations in the midst of such turmoil. So at some relatively brief period of time, Iraq must be back in the community of nations.

G: But, don't you think that before dealing with Iraq, the Administration should have, number one, settled the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and, number two, dealt with the roots of this attack on New York which are the teachings in Saudi schools and Saudi universities,

13

[Y]

which are the Saudi and Emirates' financing of international Islamic terrorism, the roots of this attack? We know that Saddam is not at all in the root of this attack. So your priorities are not right.

K: No, no, no—the priorities could be, the solution to the problem of the schools is a long-term problem; the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is that there is no solution, only an amelioration possible, and a solution is a long-term problem. You cannot fight an immediate enemy by saying I'll do something that in ten years may or may not alleviate the situation. Especially with respect to the Palestinian problem, the key test of the effectiveness of our policy, we will find ourselves having created an alibi for terrorists to keep up the pressure on a global basis. So we first have to establish the principle that, if you attack the United States or its allies, you'd suffer consequences that are so dramatic that it destroys all your other possibilities.

Secondly, once that is accomplished relatively quickly, then we need to

14

[Y]

15

M

K: It must be dealt with.

16

[Y]

17

[Y]

..there is fifty years that you are bothering us, [UNDISCERNABLE] you
are a small people, small nation, small territory, you are just bothering
us. So now, I take the Taba Agreement, Taba negotiations, I give,
okay, you want the wall, you have the wall, you want the mosques,
you have the mosques, settlements, okay, 80 percent can be given to
Israel, one square kilometer, one square kilometer, da da da da, we
cut. You don't like that, Mr. Sharon, you don't like that, Mr. Arafat. I
don't care. I just, I am able to hit you, I separate it, just accept it
because you have no choice. You have no choice because I am
America. We'll bomb you, and we'll fight with Israel [INDISCERNABLE]
if you don't accept. And you, Israel, I will give you sanctions or I will
stop my economic help if you don't accept." That's it. Why you don't
do that?

K: I know the European view is that there is one line that we can

defuse
create and that we can impose it, and then everybody will guarantee

18

[4]

that line. And then peace will happen. Now, when you make peace in
the Middle East, it is important to keep in mind that there is enormous
inequality. On the one side Israel is preponderantly superior militarily.

But the Arabs are preponderantly superior demographically. And in
the long run, ~~they will~~ catch up with enough technology, especially as
weapons become long-range. Therefore, the agreement must be one
~~simply defining a diversity line~~ that goes beyond the position. And actually I believe that while the

Israeli day to day conduct looks truculent to Europeans, one has to
perceive it against a background of a fear of total destruction. And if
Israel were rapidly forced into what Europeans want - giving up all
their settlements, partitioning Jerusalem, and other similar things - in

return for exactly what? The psychological shock to the society may
~~unless all is a conviction that CH kids actually are smart~~ make it impossible to sustain. And so that was an issue at the end of
~~the Vietnam War which we didn't assess properly, although our~~
domestic pressures had gotten out of hand. So I think it is important

19

[Y]

to get a negotiation started. I think actually its outcome is not so hard
to perceive, because, if you start from the present borders of the
Palestinians, there are a number of things that have changed. One is
that the Israelis cannot want more Arabs in part of Israel. That puts a
limit to the territory they can want to acquire. And indeed the 1967
borders were drawn partly on a democratic basis. So therefore, I'm
fairly optimistic about a Palestinian negotiation, and I think it is
important for it to last, that it is done with Arab and Israeli
acquiescence, but it's also important that it happens. If you look at the
wall the Israelis are building, that isn't so far from the Taba line. So
you have a psychological problem. The problem is that among
the Arabs there is no real existence of the state of Israel. They can't
bring themselves to do it in a formal way. There is always a trick
phrase in it. And they surely can't do it in an emotional way. So the
Arabs could easily solve their problems if they could produce a Sadat

20

[Y]

who convinces the Israelis that he really wants to live in peace with
*they haven't been able to*
them. But they *can't* do it; they cannot produce such a man; at least
they haven't ______ since Sadat.

G: Have you met Arafat?

K: I've met Arafat.

K: Not any more. I'm not so much against Arafat as ______. He is
also floating on top of a mass of people [2]. So I accept the
*an*
*proposition that*, at the end of the Iraq war, we have to address the
*funding and the propaganda* of these religious *sels* and we have to
address urgently the Palestinian problem. It's a pity that we and the
Europeans can't come to an understanding. What the Europeans want
from us is a plan which can then be opposed. What I believe might
*agrees* to be a process that will require its own pressures, but in which

21

K: Actually, in my view the big mistake was Tehran, not Yalta.
it was already gone.

G: So Tehran, 1943?

Europe, because one thought the alliance had to be maintained and
one misunderstood. I think Roosevelt misunderstood the nature of

22

[Y]

Stalin. Now, I think here one has to understand that on the
Palestinian issue that this is a profound psychological problem. The
Israelis claim that if Arafat were replaced by a democratically elected
leader, he would conduct a different policy. I think it's very possible in
an Arab world that a democratically elected leader would be more anti-
Israel than the others.

K: It would be a nightmare.

K: No, very, very probable...

23

[Y]

G: What, what do you think, what will be...Jim Baker in 1991 dropped Lebanon to Syria, because he wanted Syria in his coalition. So Lebanon is still, Lebanon was a kind of an ally of France and of America, left to Syrian occupation. And do you think that America is ready to do the same now? And just let, "No you can't have blackmail from Syria; you leave us alone with Lebanon, and we will not activate hezbollah against Israel, or..."

K: New demands?

24

[Y]

K: And North Korea.

G: And North Korea.

Baath in Iraq

baht [?] system, and if it is possible to create a respectable

profoundly

alternative, that this must affect the domestic situation in Syria so that

In that case

(Syrian capacity to bring pressure on Lebanon will be reduced and then in that matter, greater freedom of maneuver may emerge from

Lebanon.

25

K: In the conclusion, at the end of the 1973 war, Israel managed in a space of eighteen months to negotiate three major agreements, even though we had helped Israel to survive the 1973 war. And the reason was that the Arab leaders had come to the conclusion that if they wanted any progress, they had to work with Americans. I think at the end of the Iraq war, we have this possibility. People season [?].

K: What did we do in 1974?

26

[Y]

K: The guarantee of power.

G: The guarantee, the guarantee of power of Cyprus where, number one Turkey, number two Greece, number three Britain, so Britain was totally entitled ______ to intervene, and Harold Wilson said, "I don't want you to..." Why you didn't, why you didn't...

K: To the Turks?

G: Yeah.

K: They didn't have enough forces on the island. First of all, you have to remember the Cyprus crisis occurred in the last three weeks of the Nixon presidency. So the idea, there was no way Britain could go to war without the protection of the Sixth Fleet, absolutely. They only had, I think, 1,000 troops in Cyprus and maybe ten airplanes. I forget what the numbers were, but very small. Secondly, the crisis in Cyprus

27

[Y]

was started by the Greek junta, and the Greek junta was extremely unpopular. And all the pressures that were on us were to side with Turkey not with the Greeks. And the first invasion occurred when the junta was still in place and...

G: [UNDISCERNABLE]

K: And therefore there was the idea that we should have intervened
on the ~~side~~ of the junta. I was considered to be too pro-Greek
because I foresaw that the outcome would be unfortunate, and I did
not want America to be blamed as the cause of it - we were anyway
so then the only question was whether we could have stopped the
second attack. That occurred two days after Nixon resigned, with a
new president, so what might have been possible with a fully formed
American Government one can argue forever. But there are objective
realities in international politics. I couldn't leave Washington;

28

K: In Afghanistan, in Afghanistan there are inherent difficulties.

Afghanistan the composition of Afghanistan society is entirely of ~~whereby current conflict is~~ various warlords leads to a situation [FIRST SIDE OF TAPE ENDS]

when somebody wants to impose a central government. So if one wants a coherent central government, one will face the challenges Russia did of a projected guerrilla war. On the other hand, if one doesn't, one faces the gradual erosion of authority. We will have to decide after the Iraq war how much we ______ in Afghanistan.

29

[Y]

K: Who?

K: They will analyze it in quite different terms from the way we will analyze it for ourselves. They will analyze it as the movement forward of American power, now ~~surrounding~~ all but one of their frontiers.

30

Y

Then they have the option of drawing two conclusions: they can either
try to begin a dialogue with us, or they can plan to disrupt whatever
strategic benefits to us they may see. Or they might do both. So
it could be that we will see, simultaneously, confrontation and
movement toward discussion or movement toward discussion
disguised as confrontation, so that it doesn't look like that. At
that point, it is important whether we understand what is going on.
The second problem we will face is this: assuming there's a
movement for accommodation, should we deal with the ayatollahs and
thereby keep them in power, or should we confront the ayatollahs in
the hope of producing democracy in the one Middle East country where
it has a clear social base and where fundamentalism is discredited? So
Iran is a country in which, if you had a free election, the Islamicists
would not be first. Now, I would be, I would prefer the second option.
But before I chose it, I would want to learn more about Iran, whether

31

(Y)

there is a real democratic - I have no doubt there is a democratic
option - I'm not sure whether the democrats can do to the ayatollahs
what the East Europeans did to the Communists.

K: It's different than Iraq. Iran is a different ____.

32

[Y]

33

[Y]

not simply endorsing a powerful country, however friendly. I interpret
the German position as using Iraq for domestic policies and really not
being tied to any particular strategic concept, either European or
Atlantic. My view of the French position is that, whatever reservations
France thinks it has, it also realizes that it is part of a larger system
and that it will take that into account. And, therefore, I think that
France in the end will make considerable efforts to participate in
American policy.

34

[Y]

35

[Y]

Palestinian police would do Israeli security work, which was one of the premises. On the other hand, it was also a difficult negotiating process, where every year or two Israel had to give up a slice of territory for nothing in effect, which undermined the people who were negotiating it. And that's why Barak wanted to cut through it into one conclusive negotiation. So, and after the assassination of Rabin, there was nobody with enough authority in Israel. If Europe and we could agree on an outcome and a process, there would be more hope. I think it is sort of banal that every few weeks some European foreign minister shows up in the region and pronounces some new plan as if this were a seminar at some university. And it doesn't help with the Arabs, it just shows long-term weakness.

36

1/8/03 (edited)

Tuesday, January 7, 2003

New York

2

[Y]

3

[x]

G: I understand but...

4

[Y]

G: But not to Islamist terrorism, to terrorism, but not to Islamic terrorism. Yes to terrorism. Vaguely, yes. Less, less, much less than Syria, much less than other states, much less than Iran, only Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal is the only example. And who as a regime which has been founded by Christians, as a matter of fact, ______ okay, and whose vice number two is a Christian ______. So, yes, I make an attack but you are getting back to a country which is a secular, one of the rare secular, secular state of the Iraq-____ war.

5

[y]

K: Yes.

G: But ...

6

[Y]

7

[4]

8

[y]

G: Why?

9

10

G: It's a much longer job?

G: You think there is a ...

Remember that also, and then six months later you have Hezbollah in
____? Don't you think that the same thing can happen to the

11

[y]

G: No, it will be published around - it will be sold - around 25th of
January. Before Blix's ... there is a long time, it is a luxury thing.

[UNDISCERNABLE]

12

[y]

G: Are your priorities right in America because if you rate the region ______. In Middle East you have several problems. Number one problem today is Islamism - Egypt, Saudi Arabia. It's a problem because they attacked Americans here. Then the second problem, which is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and maybe there is a third priority, which is not as big. It is to have this country, Iran, back in the international community.

13

[Y]

14

[Y]

-15

K: It must be dealt with.

16

[Y]

G: How about Israel, I mean, America is using its might to change Iraq, or the regime in Iraq, and so on, but don't you think America should use its might to tell to the Israelis and the Palestinians, "Listen to me..."

[MORE]

17

1/8/03

with HAK

handwritten edits

Tuesday, January 7, 2003

New York

K: Well, of course, you cannot talk of America as a unit in a case like this. I think the question is, what does the Administration, why is the Administration convinced that we should go to war if necessary. The September 11th was a traumatic experience for America, it was not simply that it was an attack on the United States; Pearl Harbor was also an attack on the United States, but Pearl Harbor came from an adversary of which we were aware. This came from an enemy we did not know we had. And it therefore has had a profound impact on the American psyche. Now when America deals with a problem - this may be somewhat different from Europe - it wants to solve it. It fights a

war to end all wars, like World War I. And so the determination was to end terrorism. And I believe that President Bush thinks that this was almost an act of destiny that required him to help solve the problem versus the psychological thing. Then the practical phases were that for about ten years America had dealt with terrorism as if it were a criminal event. That is, one waited until something happened and then one tried to find the perpetrators and bring them to justice. The difficulty with this approach was that the perpetrators often committed suicide in doing it and, in any event were low-level people, America did not understand, through the 1990s, that we were at war with the system. The terrorism as it evolved did not particularly attempt to inflict individual damage; it tried to convey the notion that the West was a rotten system capable of being attacked, and so after September 11th it began to be understood that we were dealing with a new form of warfare. And in such conditions what some Europeans

2

[Y]

say is, "We Europeans have experienced a lot of problems, and we
have lived through them, and we have to live through this one". Live
It is the policy where one of passively waiting, living through it, the
political cohesion would disintegrate. So the analysis that thoughtful
people are making there are a lot of other analyses is this: the
soldiers of terrorism are really private groups. And it is a war
conducted by private groups based on the national territory of national
states. The groups themselves have nothing to defend and nothing to
protect except themselves. As a result, the lessons of the past have
limited applicability. Deterrence does not work against groups that
have nothing to lose. And diplomacy does not work with groups that
have no program as such and certainly do not believe in compromise.
Even if we wanted to negotiate with the terrorists, we wouldn't even
know how to identify an interlocutor. So the strategy that was evolved
was that one has to drain the swamp, one has to prevent the terrorists

3

[Y]

from having bases of territories, and one has to keep them on the
defensive, one has to make them fugitives and one has to make
supporting them more painful than tolerating them.

G: I understand but...

What we notice is that not one terrorist was from Iraq and, number
two, that they are Islamists, okay, they are waging a jihad, they
are...they tell us, "Who are the enemies?" The enemies are the
Christians and the Jews. Okay? They tell us. And now America is
waging a war against a regime who has never been linked to Islamic
terrorism, never. And was well...

4

Y

K: Well, let's get to the second point. Of course Iraq has a history of dealing with America, and there are many who believe that the 1991 war was ended prematurely, including me. I believe that - that the quest for weapons of mass destruction, even in a secular state, contains the danger of the merging of the weapons of mass destruction with the terrorists, even if the weapons of mass destruction are initially in the hands of a secular state, and that the

5

[Y]

very existence - continued existence - of a defiant state like this
*protest its interests*
proves that the West cannot give ______. I think that is the basic
rationale for trying to deprive Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.

K: Yes.

G: But ...

G: But, yes, maybe, maybe, maybe Iraq is a threat. We don't really
know. What we know is that Northern Korea is a real threat and you
said that in his recent speech, President Bush did not mention that Kim
Jong Il is a threat to American allies, ______ is allies South Korea,
Japan. I mean...

6

[4]

K: I think, I tell you, I believe that nuclear weapons in North Korea are absolutely intolerable and cannot be accepted. And the combination in North Korea of this type of government and nuclear weapons will create a nightmarish situation. Never mind how we can handle this immediate threat. It's unfortunate that these two events are coming together. One is a challenge to terror; there are two huge problems in the world today: terrorism and proliferation. And proliferation has become the more immediate problem. But the terrorism campaign has its own momentum, and you cannot just stop it and say, "Now we'll go and deal with North Korea for a while."

dangerous. If you have a dialogue and they gain something then from this number

7

[M]

K: I think they're different kinds of threats. The threat from Iraq is political and psychological and will be military only two, three years down the road. The threat from North Korea is strategic and will change the whole balance in Asia because it will lead to the nuclearization of Japan, may lead to a redisposition of American deployments in Korea, and so there are two huge threats happening simultaneously. It would be nice to be able to say we do one and we won't do the other but we now will suspend the Iraqi thing.

8

[Y]

G: Why?

Samirouchi
General Assembly.

things that can happen with Iraq. One, there could be a coup before -

a final American decision.

---

and then we should decide --we'll have to decide
would have to do.

Then,
the successors, of
with

whether to accept the coup or treat [A] the successors, of, there could
with

take all my weapons.
"Okay __________ inspections". Those are conceivable policy choices.

Finally there is the option of war.

And once, but it must end with the visible disarmament of Saddam and

9

[y]

K: But I'm, you see, I don't speak for the administration. And I'm not saying I would necessarily have pursued all these steps. I'm uneasy

about the idea of democratizing Iraq by occupation.

K: I don't see the relationship between the occupation of Germany and the occupation of Iraq. They are two different outcomes [?]. I

wish the administration well, if it could be done, it would be a historic event .. I don't disagree with the objective. I don't think it's an eighteen-month job.

G: It's a much longer job?

10

[7]

G: You think there is a ...

G: You think there is a risk of, remember Israel coming to South
______ in 1982 being greeted by shiite population with flowers?

Remember that also, and then six months later you have hezbollah in
______. Don't you think that the same thing can happen to the
Americans, that you have a kind of jihad, a united shiite front against
Americans? Shiites from Iran and shiites, of course, from the south of
Iraq.

K: I would certainly, in our plan, provide for that _______. Tell me, when will this be published? About when? Next week, two weeks?

[UNDISCERNABLE]

11

[M]

K: But at this stage, we cannot stop what is in train, and we should not, because that would be a retreat of a huge magnitude and an admission, nor would it be correct because the analysis with respect to terrorism is right. And the sequence with respect to it is right. We are now suddenly confronted with a new problem, in Korea. We will have to integrate the North Korean problem into the Iraqi crisis. That will require great thought.

12

H: No, that is a deeper ____ that has to be the outcome. You cannot have a permanent occupation of a traditional Islamic capital like Baghdad. Christian nations in the midst of such turmoil. So at some relatively brief period of time, Iraq must be back in the community of nations.

G: But, don't you think that before dealing with Iraq, the Administration should have, number one, settled the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and, number two, dealt with the roots of this attack on New York which are the teachings in Saudi schools and Saudi universities, which are the Saudi and Emirates' financing of international Islamic terrorism, the roots of this attack? We know that Saddam is not at all in the root of this attack. So your priorities are not right.

13

[4]

enemy by saying I'll do something that in ten years may or may not
alleviate the situation, especially when, if you make the solution of the
~~with respect to~~ especially the Palestinian problem the key test of the effectiveness of
our policy, we will find ourselves having created an alibi for terrorists
to keep up the pressure on a global basis. So we first have to
establish the principle that, if you attack the United States, ~~you will~~

suffer - and its allies - you'd suffer consequences that are so dramatic
that it destroys all your other possibilities. Secondly, once - ~~and~~ that
~~is exemplified relatively quickly~~ can be done relatively quickly as history has _______ - then we need

to deal from that base with some of the causes. There will inevitably
have to be a major Palestinian initiative upon the conclusion of the

Iraqi military operation. And thirdly, there will have to be enormous
pressure on these religious groups, which is not easy within

14.

[4]

between an intellectual priority and an operational priority. [I find it a

little warm here; with all the rent we pay we don't have an

automatic—(to secretary) it's getting a little hot here.]

G: If I understand you well, Iraq, since, okay, Iraq has attacked one
of your allies in Kuwait, okay, events since March 1991, Iraq did not
attack you, but you said you were going to protect all allies, so, yes,
Iraq in a way is attacking one of your allies, Israel, in giving money to
societies to...well, just tell me, do you think...

H: No, no. That is not...no, that is not....I think. The question is not
that they are attacking Israel. The question is that they are building

15

weapons of mass destruction in the middle of an area which is
financing terrorism and where terrorism is more or less paid. And
even if there is no immediate connection today, is it this combination
of defiance of the West on a secular basis plus weapons of mass
destruction in an environment that defies the West for religious
reasons that makes it necessary to break that image.

K: It must be dealt with.

K: What's a truthful ally in the Middle East? Saudi Arabian

government is a kind of ally of the United States floating on a massive,
on a mass of passion, attempting to survive by conciliating any
conceivable group that might threaten them, but within those limits it
is an ally of the United States, but it knows it will not survive if it is the

16

[MORE]

17

Page 1 of 1

Theresa Cimino

From: Theresa Cimino [tcimino@kmaglobal.com]

Sent: Monday, January 27, 2003 12:36 PM

To: 'jesse.levine@latsi.com'

Cc: 'john.simpson@latsi.com'

Subject: Dr. Kissinger's Le Figaro interview

Dear Mr. Levine:

This is to update you on the status of Dr. Kissinger's January 7 interview with Renaud Girard of Le Figaro. We are still waiting for Mr. Girard to forward us the English translation of the finished piece, as he agreed to do in advance of publication. In the meantime, he has told us that the piece will appear in a special commemorative issue of Le Figaro about the possible war in Iraq. The issue will be dated Saturday, February 1 and will be on newsstands on Monday, February 3. It will be published in "book form" and will sell for approximately $6.00.

We do have a very rough draft transcription of the interview that was done here in New York, but I understand that what you need is the English translation of Mr. Girard's final version, as published.

As soon as I receive the translation from Mr. Girard, I will e-mail it to both you and John Simpson.

Thank you,
Theresa Cimino
212/759-7919

1/31/2003

OFFICE OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER

January 7, 2003

The undersigned agree that the interview Dr. Kissinger grants on Tuesday, January 7, 2003, to Renaud Girard of Le Figaro shall be on a one-time basis only. Le Figaro agrees to advise Tribune Media Services International of the interview publication date as soon as it is known and also agrees to provide Tribune Media Services International with a transcript in both English and French of said interview as much in advance of the publication date as possible.
[Transcripts are to be emailed to jesse.levine@latsi.com]

Dr. Kissinger retains all syndication rights outside of France.

Renaud Girard for Le Figaro

Henry A. Kissinger

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR • 350 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 • (212) 759-7919

KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, INC.

350 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10022
(212) 759-7919
FAX (212) 759-0042

1/5 HAK said to get
language from Jesse Levine
for an agreement we will ask
reporter to sign before intvw.

NUMBER OF PAGES (Including cover): 1 DATE: January 4, 2002

RECIPIENT:

NAME: Dr. Kissinger
FAX NUMBER: Kent

SENDER: Theresa
Home telephone: 201/689-1622

MESSAGE:

Sir:

I thought I should report to you my conversation with Jesse Levine regarding the <u>Le Figaro</u> interview scheduled for Monday.

Mr. Levine was surprised to hear you were doing the interview, because he said he recently went to Paris to meet with <u>Le Figaro</u> and <u>Paris Match</u> in an effort to sell your column to either publication. (It does appear, however, that <u>Le Figaro</u> submitted its request before this.) He said he would prefer that you not do the interview and allow the Syndicate (now Tribune Media International) to leverage <u>Le Figaro</u>'s request with the possibility of syndication. He said he would like you to explain to the reporter that if in fact <u>Le Figaro</u> was a column client, the interview would not be a problem. However since they are not a client, he would want us to refer the reporter to the Syndicate's London office to negotiate terms for their becoming one.

Levine said he is working hard to get your column back into the French market, and your granting an interview for _Le Figaro_ would hurt his chances for success. I explained that you had already agreed to the interview, but he asked that I give you the message in any event.

Thank you, Theresa

Theresa Cimino

From: John Simpson [john.simpson@latsi.com]

Sent: Friday, January 31, 2003 5:22 PM

To: tcimino@kmaglobal.com

Subject: Re: Le Figaro

Theresa,

It should not. And there is a message stressing that point going to
clients right now.

Someone here hit a send button, when the file was supposed to be queued up
for automatic transmission Sunday.

We aborted the tranmission; obviously a few got through.

I don't think there will be a problem, though.

John

tcimino@kmaglobal.com writes:

>Hi, John:

> I haven't heard back from Girard, but I see you went ahead without the
>biographical information. Sorry I couldn't help in that department.

> Will get back to you about the remainder of the interview transcript.

> One question: this won't come out here before it does in France, will
>it?

> Thanks,
> Theresa

>

John M. Simpson
Executive Editor
Tribune Media Services International
e-mail:john.simpson@tribune.com
www.tmsinternational.com
www.tms.tribune.com

202 West 1st Street, 10th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90012

Tel: +1-213-237-3216

Fax +1-213-237-4614

E-mail: john.simpson@latsi.com

1