ASSOCIATED HARVARD ALUMNI

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Taggart Whipple '34, President, New York, N.Y.

Henry E. Russell '39
First Vice-President '39, Cleveland, Ohio

Frank S. Streeter '40
Secretary, New York, N.Y.

James Jackson, Jr. '28, M.B.A. '30
Treasurer, Boston, Mass.

Elliott H. Phillips '40, LL.B. '43
Vice-President, Detroit, Mich.

Philip W. Chase '25
Vice-President, Bend, Ore.

George W. Varn, 2d '42
Vice-President, Jacksonville, Fla.

WADSWORTH HOUSE • CAMBRIDGE • MASSACHUSETTS 02138
(617) 868-7600

July 11, 1969

Howard F. Gillette '35
General Secretary

Peter D. Shultz '52
Associate General Secretary

James M. Lombard '61
Assistant General Secretary

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Doctor Kissinger:

The turbulent events of the past year at Harvard have caused perhaps as much concern, confusion and questioning among the University's alumni as they have inside the Harvard community. I am, therefore, especially grateful for the valuable assistance to the alumni programs which you and many other members of the Harvard family have given in speaking to meetings of Harvard Clubs, class reunions, and other alumni gatherings. In this difficult period your generous giving of time has significantly helped to reinforce alumni loyalty and the continuing moral and material support which is sometimes forgotten but which is so essential.

More effective communication among all parts of Harvard - the alumni included - is an urgent necessity today. We would appreciate any observations stemming from your meetings with alumni that may help the Association and the University improve understanding between those who study and teach at Harvard now and those who have graduated. My successor, Henry E. Russell, and Peter Shultz in Wadsworth House will be most grateful for your ideas and suggestions.

With my warmest thanks for your valuable contribution during this past year.

Sincerely,

Taggart Whipple

RECEIVED

AUG 1 1969

CENTRAL 33, LL.B. '36; PRESIDENT
OF THE HARVARD ALUMNI BULLETIN, Philip S. Weld '36.

Ex officio FORMER PRESIDENTS OF THE ASSOCIATED HARVARD ALUMNI, J. Harris Ward '30, M.B.A. '32; N. Phillips Dodge, Jr. '33; William G. Saltonstall '28, A.M. '31, LL.D. '53; CHAIRMAN OF THE HARVARD COLLEGE FUND, Albert P. '33, LL.B. '36; PRESIDENT OF THE HARVARD ALUMNI BULLETIN, Philip S. Weld '36.

## DIRECTORS-AT-LARGE

Richard T. Flood '27, A.M. '42
Charles C. Abbott '28, A.M. '30,
Ph.D. '33

Paul Brooks '31
Dr. Irad B. Hardy, Jr. '33, M.D. '38
Brent M. Abel '37, LL.B. '40
Maurice Lazarus '37
Dr. Oglesby Paul '38, M.D. '42
Phil C. Neal '40, LL.B. '43
Walter T. Ridder '40
Samuel P. Goddard '41
Dr. Loren G. MacKinney '42, M.D. '45
Walter N. Rothschild, Jr. '42
Richard W. Mechem '45, Ed.M. '50
Francis W. Hatch, Jr. '46
Robert M. Pennoyer '46
Alexander Aldrich '50, LL.B. '53
Charles W. Bailey, II. '50
Winthrop Knowlton '53, M.B.A. '55

## REGIONAL DIRECTORS

Malcolm G. Adam '22
Richard D. McMullan '27, A.M. '29
Allen W. Williams '27
Sherall Stearns '31, LL.B. '35
Louis McClennen '34, LL.B. '37,
S. Walter Stern, Jr. '35, M.B.A. '37
Raymond P. Lavietes '36
Paul T. Rotter '37
John B. Viets '38
Charles Cary '39
John Grindle, Jr. '39, LL.B. '43
Frederick W. Griffin '40
Jacob Dana '42
George N. Prince '43, LL.B. '45
Stanley H. Durwood '43
Donald Forté '43
Tener R. Eckelberry '46
Frederic H. Courtenay '47
Henry S. Birdseye '50
George C. Briggs '51
John L. Moore, Jr. '51, LL.B. '56
John C. Pittenger '51, LL.B. '58
Kingsley H. Murphy, Jr. '52
Brooks C. Wilson M.B.A. '57
José Represas '58-'59

## APPOINTED DIRECTORS

THE HARVARD CLUB OF
NEW YORK CITY
John H. Limpert, Jr. '55

THE HARVARD CLUB
OF BOSTON
David W. Lewis '35

HARVARD GRADUATE SOCIETY FOR
ADVANCED STUDY AND RESEARCH
William C. Greenough A.M. '38,
Ph.D. '49
Wallace A. Sprague A.M. '39

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL ASSOCIATION
Edwin S. Pillsbury LL.B. '21
William H. Schofield '33, LL.B. '36

HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL ASSOCIATION
George K. Whitney '29, M.B.A. '31
Thornton F. Bradshaw '40, M.B.A. '42,
D.C.S. '51

HARVARD MEDICAL ALUMNI ASSOCIATION
Dr. Leonard W. Cronkhite, Jr.
M.D. '50

HARVARD DENTAL ALUMNI ASSOCIATION
Dr. David J. Farrell '45, D.M.D. '51

HARVARD PUBLIC HEALTH ALUMNI
ASSOCIATION
Dr. Charles A. Berry M.P.H. '56

HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF DESIGN
ALUMNI ASSOCIATION
Dr. David A. Page M.C.P. '62,
Ph.D. '65

HARVARD DIVINITY SCHOOL
ALUMNI ASSOCIATION
Rev. Dan H. Fenn '19, S.T.B. '22

HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
EDUCATION ALUMNI ASSOCIATION
E. Alden Dunham, 3d. A.M. '58

RADCLIFFE ALUMNAE ASSOCIATION
Mrs. John G. Williams '39

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
William Bentinck-Smith '37

ASSOCIATION OF HARVARD COLLEGE
CLASS SECRETARIES
William D. Weeks '49

FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE
ASSOCIATED HARVARD CLUBS
Thomas F. Mason '30

PRESS, jlp, 1/23/73

ISSUES & ANSWERS
GENERAL
FC6-11-73 KISSINGER, HENRY A.
KISSINGER, HENRY A. W

Peggy Whedon, of Issues & Answers, called to say that HK told them to keep on asking him and so they are checking again to see if they could do an interview between him and Howard K. Smith.

They would like to do it in the next couple of days, in time for this coming Sunday broadcast, but if that is impossible then they would like to do it some time in the near future.

Contact Peggy Whedon on 393-7700.

RECEIVED

JAN 8 1973

CENTRAL

The White House
Washington, DC

1973 AUG 24 PM 12 53

WHB027(1134)(2-261532E236)PD 08/24/73 1134

ICS IPMMTZZ CSP
2023937700 TDMT WASHINGTON DC 71 08-24 1134A EST

PMS DR HENRY KISSENGER
WHITEHOUSE DC

CONGRATULATIONS YOUR EXCELLENCY. CAN THE AMERICAN BROADCASTING CO CAJOLE YOU INTO APPEARING ON "ISSUES AND ANSWERS" FOR YOUR FIRST NETWORK INTERVIEW PROGRAM AFTER YOUR CONFIRMATION? WE KNOW YOU WILL HAVE MANY REQUEST. BUT YOU HAVE ALREADY APPEARED ON NBC AND CBS AND OUR ABC AUDIENCES ARE CLAMORING TO SEE YOU. I WOULD ARRANGE ANY DETAILS TO SUIT YOUR CONVENIENCE. VERY BEST WISHES TO YOU AS OUR NEW SECRETARY OF STATE
PEGGY WHEDON PRODUCER ISSUES AND ANSWERS

FORM 0805 PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U. S. A.

DEGGY WHEDON PRODUCER ISSUES AND ANSWERS

WISHER TO YOU AS OUR NEW SECRETARY OF STATE

I WOULD ARRANGE ANY DETAILS TO SUIT YOUR CONVENIENCE. VERY BEST
ON NBC AND CB2 AND OUR ABC AUDIENCES ARE CLAMORING TO SEE YOU.
KNOW YOU WILL HAVE MANY REQUESTS. BUT YOU HAVE ALREADY APPEARED
FIRST NETWORK INTERVIEW PROGRAM AFTER YOUR CONFIRMATIONS WE
GO CAJOLE YOU INTO APPEARING ON "ISSUES AND ANSWERS" FOR YOUR
CONGRATULATIONS YOUR EXCELLENCE. CAN THE AMERICAN BROADCASTING
WHITEHOUSE DC

PMS DR HENRY KISSENGER
SOS 3937500 TOMT WASHINGTON DC 11 08-54 1134A E2T

IG2 IBMT22 029
WHB05(1134)(5-56125E53E)BD 08/54/53 1134

Official -- 5/19/71

PORTH -- open

Type of Request & Date

(Last name and pending date)

Name: Betsy Porth, Whitney Park High School, New Jersey

Request: REMINDER: has a request in for Mr. Kissinger to grant a 15-minute telephone lecture to the class -- the class, in turn, could ask questions of him via microphone.

201/887-3004

DRH's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer:

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

Resolution:

["A PRESIDENTIAL CLASSROOM FOR YOUNG AMERICANS", "POST OFFICE BOX 19084\nWASHINGTON, D. C. 20036\n(202) 638-2234", "March 21, 1972", "GENERAL", "KISSINGER, HENRY A.", "KISSINGER, HENRY A./W.", "Dr. Henry A. Kissinger\nCounselor to the President for National Security Affairs\nThe White House\n1600 Pennsylvania Ave., N. W.\nWashington, D. C.", "My dear Dr. Kissinger:", "On behalf of the National Student Body I would\nlike to take this opportunity to thank you for your\nimpromptu appearance on the dormitory floor Wednesday\nevening.", "I fully appreciate that the annual Radio and\nTelevision Correspondents dinner is a purely social occa-\nsion and that it was an imposition on our part when we\ninvited you to visit with our young representatives.", "That you were willing to give up even a few moments\nof your time, is a tribute to you as well as to Presidential\nClassroom. Needless to say, it was a gratifying and memor-\nable evening for them, as well as those of us on staff who\nwere present that evening.", "We look forward to your continued support and\nhope that during the 1973 program we may arrange for a\nscheduled appearance at one of our seminars.", "EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR\nANDREW WHITAKER", "BOARD OF DIRECTORS", "CHAIRMAN", "JACK R. JONES\nPRESIDENT & CHAIRMAN\nJOHNSON & MORGAN CORPORATION", "SECRETARY", "JOHN B. TIMES JR.\nVICE PRESIDENT & CHAIRMAN", "TREASURER", "F. LUCK BARRY\nSECRETARY & TREASURER", "BOARD OF ADVISORS", "MR. JUSTICE THURGOUD MARSHALL\nUNITED STATES SUPREME COURT", "THE HONORABLE JOHN A. VOLPE\nSECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION", "SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.\nREPUBLICAN REPUBLICAN REPUBLICAN REPUBLICAN REPUBLICAN

KISSINGER, HENRY A. /W*

The White House
Washington

WHD002 WAA013(0215)(2-140862E 108)PD 04/18/73 0215

ICS IPMMTZZ CSP

3013777488 NL TOMT BALTIMORE MD 100 04-18 0215A EST

PMS DR HENRY A KISSINGER, DLR

WASHINGTON DC

MCCALL'S NOVEMBER ISSUE "I KNOW WHAT I AM DOING". PUBLICLY
DENIED THAT YOU KNOWN TERRY A MEEUWSEN AND THAT YOU WILL NOT
HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH HER OR FACE A SENATE INVESTIGATION.

REV. DR. DAVID C WHITE, PRES. BETHLEHEM CENTER, INC. 719 WALKER
AVE. BALTIMORE MD 21212

RECEIVED

APR 24 1973

CENTRAL FILES

AVE. BALTIMORE MD 51515

REV. DR. DAVID C WHITE, PRES. BETHLEHEM CENTER, INC. 119 WALKER

HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH HER OR FACE A SENATE INVESTIGATION.
DENIED THAT YOU KNOW TERRY A MEETING AND THAT YOU WILL NOT
MCCALL '2 NOVEMBER 12UE "I KNOW WHAT I AM DOING". PUBLICLY

WASHINGTON DC

PM2 DR HENRY A KISSINGER, OTR

301233488 ML TDMT BALTIMORE MD 100 04-18 0512A E2T

IC2 1PM1122 C2P

WHDOOS WAA012(0512)(S-1408eSE 108)PD 04/18/72 0512

JAN. 6 1969

Department of Psychology

January 3, 1969

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I was glad to receive your letter of September 10 saying that you were basically in agreement with the proposal for a strong, large-area holding policy in Vietnam, as described in my book *Nobody Wanted War*. Your article in *Foreign Affairs* also seemed generally in accord with such a policy.

On the other hand, I have not yet seen any specific, public discussion of this as an alternative clearly distinguished from General Gavin's enclave policy. While a number of people have expressed ideas similar to yours, that our strategy should reduce casualties and concentrate on protecting the population, I have seen hardly any specific public discussion of how this ought to be done. This great gap in the discussion of how to get out of the Vietnam mess, and get out honorably, is still a great gap. I was delighted therefore to hear that the group you are now heading is planning to study just this kind of specific problem. I hope very much that the group will give consideration to my proposal.

In order to facilitate such consideration, this letter includes two maps representing the proposal in updated form, a condensed and updated statement of the proposal itself, and an outline of its pro's and con's as I see them.

THE
GEORGE
WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY

Washington, D.C. 20006

[LC]

The original proposal was that our side should hold two large areas, one in the South and one in the Center. The updated form abandons the one in the Center and proposes a single large "consolidation zone" in the South, protected by a broad buffer zone.

In other words, three zones are now proposed instead of two:

1. A central "consolidation zone" (Map II) containing nearly all of the two great heavily populated areas in the Delta and around Saigon (Map I). About half the people of South Vietnam would be in it. Judging by my observations in 1967 this is also, with some notable exceptions, the area within which our side is relatively strong now. Military action, police power, and efforts to promote economic progress and political reform would all be largely concentrated here.

2. A "security zone." In it our objective would be simply prevention of any effective attack on the consolidation zone. This would probably mean continuing to occupy all the provincial capitals and larger towns, and continuing reconnaissance and spoiling operations, but no attempt to root out the VC from hamlets in which they are strong. In other words, Huntington's hamlet-status-quo policy. There would probably be many "tacit accomodations" of the sort you mention in your article.

3. A "zone of gradual withdrawal," including all of I and II Corps (except perhaps certain strong points such as Danang and Cam Ranh, which could be the last to be given up). Anti-VC persons could be encouraged and helped to leave with our troops, while pro-VC persons could be encouraged and helped to move the other way. Everyone would have a chance to "vote with his feet."

## Advantages:

1. Unlike escalation, it would involve virtually no risk of an enlarged war. It would be in line with President Nixon's crisis-prevention policy.

2. Unlike withdrawal, it would protect our friends, fulfilling our essential commitment to them. Unlike withdrawal, it would also go far toward preventing a bandwagon or domino process elsewhere. Here too it would be in line with the crisis-prevention policy.

3. Unlike a coalition government, it would be politically feasible. It's hard to get mortal enemies to cooperate effectively.

4. Unlike General Gavin's enclave proposal, it would be militarily and economically feasible. Small enclaves would be vulnerable to mortar fire, rocket fire, and infiltration. Each could be another Hue. The large consolidation zone, protected by broad buffer zones,

[L.C.]

would not. Economically it would be viable, since it contains most
of the best land in South Vietnam and would be balanced as between
city and rural areas.

5. It would not require any agreement by Hanoi or the VC. It could be done unilaterally by our side. This does not mean turning away from negotiation; it would help rather than hurt the negotiation process. As you said, "For purposes of negotiation we would have been better off with 100 percent control over 60 percent of the country than with 60 percent control of 100 percent of the country." Real consolidation of control in the area indicated, plus retention of Danang and Cam Ranh, would represent a major gain in bargaining leverage. But the process could begin immediately, without waiting for or depending on Communist agreement. The initiative would be ours.

6. It might make possible a major reduction in American troops - not immediately, perhaps, since that would be interpreted by the Communists as the beginning of complete withdrawal, but at least within a year or two. As you put it, "80 percent of American forces came to be concentrated in areas containing less than 4 percent of the population." Concentration of our side's troops within the terrain in which they have the advantage could lead to a drastic change in this ratio.

7. In any case it should lead to an early and drastic reduction
in casualties, civilian as well as military, on both sides.

8. There could be a major shift from a military to a political and economic emphasis, within the consolidation zone. It could become a showcase of more genuine democracy and economic progress, and a magnet that would in the long run attract the doubting, apathetic majority in the "security zone," with the result that both together would become a healthy, viable nation. In the longer run, all of Vietnam might well be united around this healthy nucleus. There is a basis here for realistic hope - and no other policy offers it.

9. Since coalition is not politically feasible, partition is the only remaining policy that would be fair to both sides. My own estimate of the attitudes of the South Vietnamese people - a very fallible estimate, but based on a more systematic study of the evidence than anyone else seems to have attempted* - is that something like 20% are strongly pro-VC, something like 10% are strongly anti-VC, and something like 70% are indifferent or ambivalent. In other words, the balance apparently tips against our side. If this is true, victory for the 10% would be a violation of our own democratic principles. A solution that gives about half of the population of the country and more than half of the good land to our side is all we have a right to ask for. In the eyes of the world, and in our own eyes, it is important whether we are right or wrong.

* Nobody Wanted War, pp. 29-84.

[LC]

If the 20-10-70 estimate is at all close to the truth, it also counts against coalition or one-man-one-vote as a solution. To the extent that a unified South Vietnam was genuinely democratic, it would be likely to go Communist, our friends would be very roughly treated, and the domino process would operate with a vengeance. This is a very unpleasant reality, but it should be faced. Even assuming military victory, we are confronted with a choice between an undemocratic election process, a democratic election process (which would probably lead to a Communist political victory) - or partition.

10. Experience in Korea, Germany, Kashmir, Israel and elsewhere has shown that although partition of a country is regularly, predictably denounced by both sides, it is often in the end the only feasible solution of an irreconcilable conflict. If it is to be the solution in the end anyway, it would be better to arrive at it sooner than later.

## Disadvantages:

### *Positive Aspects*

1. Both Saigon and Hanoi would almost certainly denounce it - officially. (But in their hearts probably at least 90% of the people of Vietnam would be relieved.)

2. It would be "dismemberment", which is always painful for a proud people like the Vietnamese. (But in the long run it offers the only realistic basis for unification of the whole country on a non-Communist basis.)

3. If Saigon refused to cooperate, we would be forced to take the initiative, saying to them something like: "You are of course free to conduct any military operations you like in the North - I Corps and II Corps - but we are going to concentrate ours in the South." (This would be embarrassing but not fatal.)

4. It would hurt our own pride. Having grossly misjudged the actual situation inside South Vietnam, and having rashly spoken as if our commitment were to the "integrity" of all of South Vietnam, the Johnson Administration was understandably unwilling to admit publicly its own basic error. (But the Nixon Administration has more freedom to admit error - one the part of its predecessors - and to redefine our commitment on the basis of more realistic assumptions.)

5. At first it probably would encourage the Communists and increase their aggressiveness. Given the present state of public opinion in the United States, Hanoi and the VC would probably leap to the conclusion that it was the beginning of a total withdrawal, and would redouble their efforts. (But when they found that we were not yet withdrawing any troops, and were vigorously consolidating power in the South, they might soon learn that we meant business and intended to stay.)

[L.C.]

6. At first it probably would have a bad effect on the Saigon government. They too might see it as the first step in total withdrawal. (But they too might be reassured if we proved we meant business about consolidating power in the South.)

On balance, it would seem that the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages.

Although most of these points are elaborated in Nobody Wanted War, especially pp. 291-331, the situation has changed, and a number of points call for more discussion than the book contains. For example, there is the question of the Cambodian salient (Svay Rieng) and of whether we could work out with the Cambodian government an amicable arrangement for policing it and making it in effect a part of the "security zone".

Since I am in Washington I would be glad to discuss these points with you or a member of your staff. Also, if you have doubts about the correctness of any of the propositions stated in this letter, I would welcome an opportunity to discuss in more detail the evidence on which they are based.

RKW/evf

Office phone: 676-6313 (or 6320)

Home phone: 554-7380

AUG 22 1968

Department of Psychology

August 19, 1968

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

There is still a great gap in public discussion of ways
of getting out of the Vietnam war, and getting out honorably.
There has been little or no public consideration of a strong,
large-area holding policy, as an alternative clearly distin-
guished from General Gavin's enclave proposal.

A specific proposal of this sort is spelled out in my book,
just published, entitled _NOBODY WANTED WAR: Misperception in
Vietnam and Other Wars_. The publishers, Doubleday and Co.,
tell me they have sent you a copy. (If you didn't get it,
please let me know). If you don't read any of the rest of the
book I hope you read pp. 291-311, in which the large-area
holding policy is discussed. In your contacts with Governor
Rockefeller (who must still have a good deal of influence on
the thinking of the Republican Party, even if it is not publicly
apparent) you may be able to do much to fill the gap.

The case for a large-area holding policy seems to me so
compelling that the absence of public discussion of it is puz-
zling. Pared to essentials, the case includes these points:

1) Unlike General Gavin's enclave proposal, it would be
militarily feasible. It would avoid the quite valid
military objection raised against small enclaves -- that
they would be unduly vulnerable to mortar fire, rockets
and infiltration.

2). Unlike a pull-out, it would achieve the two most essen-
tial objectives of our fighting in Vietnam, which (to
me) are protection of our friends and prevention of a
domino process (broadly defined) elsewhere.

Washington, D.C. 20006

Department of Psychology

3) Unlike a policy aiming at military victory in the South, it could be achieved without a politically impossible number of American troops.

4) Unlike a coalition government, it would not expect mortal enemies to cooperate amicably with each other; and, unlike a coalition government, it could be done even if the Paris talks get nowhere. It could be done on our own initiative, without waiting for the Communists to agree to it and without trusting them in any way. It is our ace in the hole if the Paris talks fail.

The book contains several other things that are relevant to what our policy ought to be. For instance, Chapter II, "The Conflict as Seen by the South Vietnamese," is a more systematic and factual treatment of that problem than I have seen elsewhere. Evidence on both sides is examined in some detail, including for example the CBS survey. Its main conclusion -- that probably some 20% of the South Vietnamese are emotionally committed to the Viet Cong side, with some 10% similarly committed on the side of Saigon and perhaps 70% relatively indifferent -- has a bearing on any proposals about what can and should be done now. But the one part of the book that deals directly with our present impasse, and suggests a way out that does not yet seem to have been seriously considered, is the part about a large-area holding policy.

The possibility that the last best chance of reaching an honorable peace may be disappearing, simply because the responsible people are not thinking or talking about it, is very disturbing.

RKW:lnk

Washington, D.C. 20006

THEODORE H. WHITE

168 EAST 64 STREET

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021

October 7, 1971

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

I was planning to be in Washington the week of the
17th and hoped to talk to you then about China which is,
as you know, my old area of scholarship and concentration.
I read in the papers that you will probably be yourself
in Peking while I am in Washington and so, if I may be
presumptuous enough to offer you a suggestion, I must do
so now by mail:

I urge on you that by all means you try to see Jack
Service while you are there. Jack is now in Peking and
I know of no American diplomat who speaks Chinese better,
or is more affectionately and warmly regarded by the
Chinese Communist leadership. I am sure you know his
record--his troubles at the State Department during the
McCarthy period, his final, complete exoneration, and
his scholarly work since then. I have known Jack for
thirty years in Chungking, in Yenan, in Washington and
in Berkeley. This man has enormous historical perspec-
tive, absolute knowledge of and loyalty to our own gov-
ernment and the intimacy of Peking's leadership. He is
a national resource. I urge you to use that national
resource.

THW:hhg

THEODORE H. WHITE

168 EAST 64 STREET

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

May 10, 1973

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

I send you the accompanying pages as a friend and for your eyes alone. I would like to have this exchange between us be as private as we can keep it; and I'm going to be bold enough in this letter to impose not only on our professional relationship but on our personal friendship for I am, I must say, in as much torment as I have ever been.

Let me explain. I have been postponing the closing of this book ever since early April and now I am faced with an absolutely inexorable deadline. I must be locked up in proof by May 20th--and I cannot press my publishers, or the Literary Guild which is distributing the book, any further. Meanwhile, of course, Watergate goes on. I don't think that even with the anguish you must have suffered the past few weeks you can imagine the pressures I am under here in New York.

The atmosphere here is that of a lynching mob. The leading voices of this town want to get Nixon and to destroy him completely. And I seem to have been chosen, by what accident I don't understand, as the semi-official chronicler of American presidencies. My publisher, my staff, my friends, everyone who has read this book, thinks it's perilously pro-Nixon. I myself insist that it's as fair a picture as I can draw, that Nixon and his staff will find one helluva lot in it that disconcerts them, that makes them exquisitely unhappy; but I don't propose to join the pack of hounds at this point, or convict anyone in my book until proven guilty. But the telephone calls and the pressures that are being exerted on me are sometimes emotionally unbearable.

I write all this in order to explain to you why the Prologue in the accompanying pages is written as it is. There is an insistence on the part of everyone I am connected with that the story of this book cannot proceed unless the Prologue refers to Watergate; and

RECEIVED

JUN 13 1973

CENTRAL FILES

[10]

- 2 -

Dr. Kissinger:

May 10, 1973

informs the reader that I will indeed at some point in
the book delve into the matter. Thus, then, my entire
plan for the Prologue has been changed and I think you
will find your own so-generous contributions to my un-
derstanding given short space.

My thinking in this book is that there have al-
ways been three great issues in American politics--
war and peace, bread and butter, and the race problem.
This Prologue, in my original concept, was to run about
thirty pages and strike the note of Nixon's greatest
achievement--the diplomacy of the past four years.
Thus the book would start with the story of what Nixon
and Kissinger had achieved in the four years of this
administration and would continue in the text of the
book to show the affirmation by the people of that
diplomacy. You will see that I have had to abandon
that original plan. The Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy,
above all the master act in China, is reduced to less
than fifteen pages in this Prologue and then I go on in
the Prologue, as you shall see, to take note of domes-
tic matters so as to give the reader the illusion he
will hear the truth--as nearly as I can descry it--
about Watergate somewhere else in the book. All through
the rest of the book, of course, there are pages and
pages, section after section on the impact of the war
and the foreign policy triumphs on domestic politics.
But the introductory pages contain all the material I
have specifically drawn from our private conversations,
and on which I am beholden to you.

I feel embarrassed for having taken up so much of
your time and used so little of it. But under these
deadlines and with the developments in Watergate, my
original concept of an entire first chapter, opening
with fanfare, trumpets and a complete assessment of the
Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy, has collapsed.

My original understanding with you was that any-
thing you told me yourself could be withdrawn from the
record and I send these pages to you to keep that prom-
ise. I really hope that you will let stand all the
quotations I have from our conversations, and the other
background material you gave me, which you will recog-
nize. You will recognize, also, that I have spoken with
the President about his conversation with Mao; and there,

- 3 -

Dr. Kissinger:

May 10, 1973

I believe, since he laid no strictures on what I was to use of my conversation with him and since we carefully did not talk about the substance of his conversation with Mao, his remarks and his reflections can stand as they are.

I am, as you must be and as all of us are these days, very sad and disturbed. But the final deadlines on the book are absolutely unbreakable at this point and I must go on to finish it now. The sooner you can get back to me about this and we can talk about it, the easier it will be to lock it all in press. Eleven of the fourteen chapters are now irrevocably so locked up. There remain this Prologue and two more chapters, half written, which have to be completed. So that whatever speed you can muster, under the pressure of your own burdens, will be highly appreciated by your old friend, Teddy White.

THW:hhg

encl.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

THE EMPORIA GAZETTE

August 28, 1971

Dear Doctor Kissinger:

At the Century's forthcoming
New Member's Dinner (Thursday, October 7th at 6:30),
the friends of Bill Buckley are organizing a table in
his honor. Because of what you did in his behalf you
certainly belong there. Business will keep me in
Kansas until just before the meeting, so table arrange-
ments are being made by Dick Williams. Just telephone
him that you would like to be at our table for Bill,
and he will give Mario the final count. His phone
number is

C. Dickerman Williams -
Whitehall 4 - 5800.

Sorry I can't sign this.

WLW:wg

OFFICIAL

SOCIAL xxx jlp, 6/29 1/21

Type of Request & Date

WHITING

(Last name and pending date)

GENERAL

FEB-11-71 Kissinger Henry

Name: Professor Allen Whiting (University of Michigan)

KISSINGER, HENRY A. /W

Request: Is in Washington; has been testifying on the Hill on U. S. - China policy. He would like to see Mr. Kissinger for 15 minutes. He will be in Washington the remainder of today and could stay over another night if he had a firm commitment to an appointment tomorrow. (Is busy today 2:30-3:30)

Can be reached at (or through) 544-1763

DRH's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer:

Date and Time: Not possible 6/29

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

Resolution:

RECEIVED

JUN 6 1971

CENTRAL FILES

EMBAJADA DEL PARAGUAY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

CENTENARIO DE LA EPOPEYA NACIONAL

1.864-1.870

December 3, 1969

Honorable
Nelson A. Rockefeller
Governor of the State of New York
Executive Chamber
ALBANY, New York 12224

Dear Governor:

I have the great honor of acknowledging
receipt of your Report to the President of the United
States, titled "The Quality of Life in the Americas".

Let me take this opportunity to reiterate
the points of view expressed in my last letter written
to you in Spanish.

As Ambassador of Paraguay to the United
States of America and the Organization of the American
States, I feel compelled to express to you my deepest
and most sincere congratulations for your Report. It
reflects objectiveness, courage and personal valor.

As a citizen of the Americas I express my
solidarity with your country in its efforts to promote
economic and social development in the Americas.

Whatever may be the final destiny of your
Report, it represents a further step to strenghten the
relations among ournations and it will be of oustanding
importance for the future of the Hemisphere. There are
common goals to achieve: health, education, peace, social
justice to promote a real and true Democracy.

No doubt, that with the inspiration of
our great heroes like Bolivar, Washington, San Martin,
Juárez, Martí, Francia, Morazan and others, our efforts
will succeed.

Mister Governor, I am a personal witness
of your great efforts in the field of Hemispheric Cooperation
since your years as Coordinator of Interamerican Affairs.
At that time, I was awarded a scholarship as part of the
Cooperation Programs.

I was present at your Conference in the Press
Club on December 2, and I fully agree with your points
of view.

Please accept my sincere and kindest regards.

International Basic Economy Corporation

RODMAN C. ROCKEFELLER
President

Room 5400
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10020

December 10, 1969

Mr. Hugh Morrow
The Governor's Office
22 West 55th Street
New York, New York

Dear Hugh:

Enclosed is a clipping from the San Antonio, Texas newspaper where I spoke before the Inter-American Cattlemen's Association.

The gist of the article is obvious, that President Nixon was too busy going to the Texas Football Game on Saturday to open the Fourth Inter-American Cattlemen's Association Meeting on Friday. Agriculture Secretary Hardin was rendered ineffective by a disastrous translation system that interrupted him repeatedly. No other representative from the Federal Government attended.

This is another perfect example of the degree to which our friends from the south deal in symbolism and judge themselves according to how they think they are being judged. I don't see anything for us to do but I thought you and Father would be interested in this item.

I have sent Father's report to several of the officers of the organization.

RCR/ttb

Attachment

Nixon Snubbed in Latin America

By ARTHUR MOCZYGEMBA
Farm and Ranch Editor

Sensitive and often tradition-bound Latin Americans were visibly irritated last week by what some knowledgeable persons feel may have been President Nixon's "Latin American snub of the year."

Some of the most important and influential people from 17 Latin American countries attended the fourth general assembly of the Inter-American Confederation of Cattlemen (CIAGA) meeting in San Antonio.

President Nixon was formally invited to open the 4th general assembly of CIA- GA, but declined on grounds he was too busy, CIAGA sources said. But Nixon found time to go to the Texas-Arkansas football game Saturday, and the sensitive Latins became highly indignant and vo- cal.

By Friday evening, many of them be-
gan searching for American newsmen to

criticize Nixon's Latin American attitudes.

CIAGA is a loose federation of live-
stock associations in 19 nations stretching
from Canada to Chile. It is considered
in Latin America as one of the few major,
effective voices of moderation in a region
that is polarized between the radical left
and the conservative right.

In each of the three countries where
the CIAGA has met, El Salvador, Mexico,
and Colombia, the president of the host
nation opened the CIAGA general as-
sembly meetings. In tradition-bound Lat-
in America, Nixon's absence not only
broke tradition, but offended the 700-plus
Latin Americans attending the meeting.

When U.S. Sen. John Tower did not
appear on the program as scheduled due
to a Senate tax bill vote, and Secretary
of Agriculture Clifford Hardin delivered
a warmed over speech in what many
thought a cold manner, the Latin Ameri-

cans became more confused, more bitter
and by Saturday morning, more adamant
in pressing for total free trade with the
U.S.

After New York Gov. Nelson Rockefeller's visit to Latin America, which was punctuated by riots, the CIAGA delegates felt that Nixon would welcome a "moderate voice from Latin America."

"I feel that President Nixon is not
well advised," said a Mexican delegate.

"We are the only hope of peaceful transition to a better life, and we have been ignored. I have lost much influence because Nixon will not recognize us, but pays more attention to football, your own problems, Vietnam. I think President Nixon is an isolationist," a Central American rancher said.

Over a dozen of the CIAGA meeting
visitors felt that Nixon's presence, no
matter how short, would have given the

See CATTLEMEN, Page 2A

treated for

as the Alta-
niles east of
was picked
us plans to
traceway and
fell through.
Stock West,"
the Woodstock
August at
attended by
event created
'miles to the
' to the east
lands of cars
traceway median
's.
bes, the con-
ups like the
ne and the

crowd was
be are buying
dal Gowns and
at La Feria,
ride," 802 W
133