The Secretary
of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[ic]

Statement

LATIN AMERICA, EUROPE, AND AFRICA

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the House International Relations Committee.*

I am happy to be able to report to this committee on our foreign policy with regard to three important areas which I have recently visited—Latin America, Western Europe, and Africa.

I believe that our relations with Latin America and with Western Europe are stronger and more promising than they have been in a decade. In Africa we have responded to a dangerously deteriorating situation with a policy that offers hope for southern Africa to undergo peaceful change with justice without submitting to external intervention, and opportunities for progress in the rest of Africa without following radical doctrines.

Let me take up with you our policy toward each of these areas.

Latin America

In March I reported to you on the vast changes evident to me during my trip to Latin America in February. These changes are opening the way to a new constructive relationship between the United States and Latin America. The quality of that relationship was evident at the meeting of the Organization of American States [OAS] General Assembly in Santiago, from which I have just returned. The atmosphere—of mutual respect and perceived common interest—was better at the 1976 OAS General Assembly than at any other inter-American meeting I have ever attended.

June 17, 1976
Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

Ours is a special relationship in this hemisphere. The unique experience we share in the Americas—the finding and opening of new continents, the forging of nations free from colonial domination, the shared human and moral principles of the New World—creates special ties for the United States and Latin America.

As in all families there are periods of creativity and times of stress. Ours is no exception. The United States has passed through a variety of phases in its relationship to Latin America. Not all have been productive in recent years. Sometimes when we were active, when we attempted to organize massive transfers of resources to meet Latin American development needs directly, we were seen as attempting to dominate the hemisphere. When our policies were otherwise, when we were less involved in Latin American problems and more inclined to let Latin American nations work out their own solutions alone, we were looked upon as neglecting our obligations.

The 1930's, the 1940's, and even the 1950's were decades in which this nation indulged in the pretense of tutelage. In the 1960's the Alliance for Progress rallied the energies and enthusiasms of people throughout the Americas to the development effort. But by 1969 its promises had begun to fade. Thus even as Latin America began to realize its own maturity and experience a period of massive growth, and with it greater self-respect, the United States moved into a period of lower profile, which we maintained until the inauguration of the new dialogue in 1974.

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That period drew to a close with the meeting at Tlatelolco, in Mexico, in which we began a process of dialogue with the hemisphere once again. At the outset, admittedly, the dialogue had a character of inquiring into what the United States could do for Latin America. But it became obvious that, as a result of the major changes and considerable progress in Latin America during the 1960's and early 1970's, we were now able to deal with the major nations of Latin America with a new mutuality of respect and equality of sovereignty quite impossible 20 years ago or even 10.

In the last two years we have built steadily on this new relationship. We have taken advantage of it to put forward new initiatives, in the political and the economic area, which we could not have considered a decade or more ago. The culmination of this new policy effort was the meeting at Santiago last week.

The constructive attitude in Santiago and the remarkably good tone to our relationships throughout the hemisphere are attributable in great part to three factors:

* The United States, since the inauguration of the new dialogue early in 1974, is again active as an equal partner in inter-American councils;

* We have a coherent policy that addresses the entire catalogue of hemispheric issues; and

* We have a vision of the future of our relationship.

It is that, I believe, which has reassured Latin America that the political relationship with the United States—the basic solidarity of the Western Hemisphere—is again increasingly vital.

With our political and moral relationship once again sound, we have a basis for cooperation with Latin America in the area of most pressing concern—that of economic development. The countries of Latin America are among the most developed of the developing nations, and have been growing rapidly. Latin America has quintupled its collective gross product since 1950. At this rate, in 10 years Latin America will have attained the economic strength which Europe had in 1960. Its economies, furthermore, are increasingly important in world commodity, mineral, and energy markets and in trade in manufactured goods. Success in the struggle for development of the poorer countries of

the world, when it comes, will come first in Latin America. For this reason we must focus our attention and our energies there.

To address the changing nature of our relationship with Latin America and to deal with the expanding range of our common concerns, I set forth in Latin America last February six elements of our policy. I said the United States would:

* Take special cognizance of the distinctive requirements of the more industrialized economies of Latin America and of the region as a whole, in the context of our efforts to help shape a more equitable international order;

* Assist directly the neediest nations in the hemisphere afflicted by poverty and natural disaster;

* Support Latin American regional and subregional efforts to organize for cooperation and integration;

* Negotiate on the basis of parity and dignity our specific differences with each and every state, to solve problems before they become conflicts;

* Enforce our commitment to collective security and to maintain regional integrity against attempts to undermine solidarity, threaten independence, or export violence; and

* Work to modernize the inter-American system to respond to the needs of our times and give direction to our common action.

Since February, in furtherance of these objectives, the United States has introduced trade, investment, and technology proposals of special relevance to this hemisphere at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation [CIEC] in Paris and at the fourth U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD IV] in Nairobi. We responded to the efforts of the Guatemalan people to recover from the earthquake that devastated their land. We have provided fresh support to subregional cooperation in Central America and are exploring ways of relating more effectively to the Andean Pact. And at last week's General Assembly of the Organization of American States at Santiago we advanced our common interests in three important areas: cooperation for development; reform of the inter-American system; and human rights.

To speed cooperation for development in the Americas, we stressed three major topics for

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action: commodities, trade, and technology.

The economic aspirations of most countries in Latin America depend upon stable conditions for the production and marketing of primary commodities. At Santiago we proposed a three-point program designed to: improve regional consultations on commodities markets; derive greater hemispheric benefits from global commodity arrangements; and improve resource financing, either on a global or regional basis.

To expand trade opportunities and capabilities we offered proposals to help developing nations expand and diversify exports of manufactured and semiprocessed goods; promote the hemisphere's trade position through the Geneva negotiations; and support needed regional and subregional economic integration.

And we proposed a number of new ideas to stimulate the development, acquisition, and utilization of technology in the modernization of the hemisphere.

To improve the inter-American system, we circulated proposals—the most far-reaching the United States has ever put forward—which would simplify the organization by strengthening the foreign ministers' meetings in the periodic General Assemblies; eliminate the standing councils; open the OAS to wider membership in the hemisphere, particularly the new states of the Caribbean; and increase the Latins' share of the budget. Such steps, we believe, could lead to a leaner, more flexible and responsive organization which could better promote the mutual security, economic progress, and human rights of the Americas.

And on the centrally important issue of human rights, I addressed the special responsibility of our nations to preserve, cherish, and defend fundamental human values—for if such values cannot be preserved, cherished, and defended in this hemisphere, where the rights and the promise of the individual have played such a historic role, then they are in jeopardy everywhere. At Santiago, the United States reaffirmed our unequivocal commitment to the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. We endorsed the reports presented there by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission: its annual report which cites the rise of violence and terror in many nations of Latin America; its report on Chile; and its report, submitted too late for official consideration by the

OAS Assembly, concerning the inhuman treatment of political prisoners in Cuba and the refusal of Cuba to cooperate with the Commission.

The United States emphasized our belief that the protection of human rights in the hemisphere is an obligation of every nation and not simply of particular nations whose practices have come to public attention or whose ideology, on whichever side of the political spectrum, is unpopular. The contrast between the respective treatment of the human rights commission's work by the Governments of Chile and Cuba demonstrates the importance of this principle. The Government of Chile cooperated with the Commission; the Government of Cuba did not. The Government of Chile did nothing to prevent widespread publication in that country of information about the Commission's report and about the OAS discussion of the issue. Needless to say, there has been nothing comparable in the government-controlled media in Cuba. Most important, the Commission noted a quantitative improvement in the situation in Chile since its last report.

For these reasons, I believe we can best enhance the prospects for further human rights progress in Chile by continuing a balanced policy by working in the area of human rights and by assisting that government to meet the economic problems before it. We have made it clear to the Government of Chile that the condition of human rights in that country impairs our relationship. Actions which would further undermine our relationship could eliminate the practical possibilities for betterment of economic conditions.

Mr. Chairman, our efforts in Latin America over the past several months have considerably advanced our practical progress and provided a firm foundation of policy for the years ahead. We have moved into a new phase of profound interest, active initiatives, and comprehensive proposals for altering the inter-American relationship, a phase which is more compatible with the new cooperative spirit in the hemisphere. We have come to the end of a critical era and are marking the beginning of a new one. The United States can now deal with Latin America in a new spirit. We need not hold back on major initiatives for fear of inspiring old notions of paternalism. With consultation and cooperation, our hopes of meeting the challenges of economic and social progress in an age of inter-

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The Imperative of Cooperative Action

The nations assembled in this room proceed from two main premises: the in-
terdependence among the OECD nations, and our common desire to help shape a new
era of global economic cooperation among all nations.

The central task before the industrialized democracies of the OECD is to give new focus and purpose to our own cooperative economic action. Economics is only part of that enterprise. The choices before us and the decisions we take will above all reflect our perception of ourselves as peoples and as nations. The tasks are long-term, and they demand that we extend our line of sight beyond immediate technical issues or political controversies to more distant horizons.

Ours is a time when the centers of global power and influence are many and
diverse. And ours, therefore, is a choice between cooperation or chaos. Today
more than ever the industrial democracies require leadership determined not to
adapt to reality but to shape it. Circumstances have provided us with a clear
understanding of our interdependence, and our efforts to translate this reality
into common progress are well begun. We have every reason for confidence in our
capacities.

Our cooperative endeavor, which has accomplished so much in the past, can be
even more dynamic as we turn to the new and long-term challenges of interdepen-
dence. What we elect to do together is bound to have vast meaning to a world
that seeks progress and justice and needs from all of us in this room a fresh
demonstration of what strong and free nations working together can accomplish.

Printed by:

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PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

June 22, 1976

No. 315

EXCHANGE BETWEEN
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
NBC CORRESPONDENT, RICHARD VALERIANI, PARIS
FOLLOWING AFTERNOON MEETING, OECD

JUNE 21, 1976

(First question and part of first answer were inaudible.)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is up to them to coordinate their activities so that they can grow and so that East-West trade can be conducted to their benefit and that North-South relations can be conducted to the benefit of all mankind.

**QUESTION:** You mean to their benefit in East-West trade; what do you mean?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** East-West trade is growing. It is going on in all countries. It is important that we conduct it in a coherent fashion for the benefit of the peoples of the West, and, of course, the eastern countries won't engage in it unless it is to the benefit of their countries.

**QUESTION:** What do you think is the meaning of the fact that East-West trade has grown so much recently?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It means that any part of the world, including the socialist side, if they want to develop they have to rely on Western technology; and Western ingenuity can be a force for peace if we use it intelligently and if we use it together.

**QUESTION:** Are you saying that the West should get something in return for its willingness to trade with...

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am saying that the West should know what its purposes are, should be aware of the dangers, and should also be aware of the opportunities, and if it approaches it in this fashion then it can make a positive contribution.

**QUESTION:** You are having a meeting tomorrow night with the American Ambassadors from the Middle East?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That is correct. The purpose of this is to discuss the situation in Lebanon, its impact on peace in the Middle East, the relations of the Middle East countries to the United States. It will deal exclusively with the situation in Lebanon and not with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

**QUESTION:** Thank you.

For further information contact:

* * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 22, 1976

No. 316

EXCHANGE BETWEEN
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
CBS CORRESPONDENT IN PARIS
FOLLOWING MORNING MEETING, OECD

JUNE 21, 1976

**QUESTION:** This morning we were not able to get a clear idea of what you said about Lebanon. Could you just repeat what you said this morning about the peace conference on Lebanon in Paris?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We said we favor anything that will bring the various factions together, that brings about a Lebanon that is independent, whose territorial integrity is respected, where the Christian and Moslem communities can live side by side. If the parties can agree to a meeting in Paris given France's historical association in the area, we think this is certainly one way for them to talk. We are not pushing any particular method, but this is one that can work.

**QUESTION:** Thank you, sir; and are you having a meeting tomorrow with American Ambassadors from the Middle East in Paris?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Yes, we are thinking of having one.

* * * *

[L.C.]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 22, 1976

NO. 317

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AMERICAN EMBASSY
PARIS, FRANCE

JUNE 22, 1976

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** This was supposed to be a joint conference with the Secretary of the Treasury but because of bureaucratic confusions we hadn't realized about his plane -- he has a fixed departure for Poland and he got delayed at OECD. So I will answer all technical economic questions and produce a major crisis in international finance.

Basically, our attempt at the OECD meeting was to call attention to the fact that the industrial democracies possess the resources to have produced the highest standard of living for their peoples of any group, the resources to advance the growth of the developing countries, and indeed the resources to which even countries of different economic philosophy appeal if they want to accelerate their own advance. Therefore the industrial democracies have the opportunity if they coordinate their efforts, to contribute to the overwhelming problem of our period which is to construct an international order, for the first time in history on a global basis, in which all, or at least most nations, have a sense of participation. And at a time when there is so much talk about who is on the rise and who is on the decline, it is important to take stock of the fact that, in the main element of what makes life worthwhile for people, it is the industrial democracies that have the capacity to help both their own people and all of the rest of mankind if they coordinate their efforts and that this is well within their capabilities. This was the major theme of our approach. This is what we asked OECD to join us in doing, and this is the basis for an optimistic appraisal about the prospects of world order in the next decade or so.

With this I will be glad to answer your questions.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I am sure there will be a lot of questions about OECD, so I don't suppose you'll mind if I ask for your comments on the Italian elections.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** You know, I didn't see the final results of the Italian election until this morning and we have not yet had an opportunity

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to analyze all its nuances and to discuss it with our colleagues here and in Washington. I would call attention to the fact that the democratic parties, that is the non-Communist, non-fascist parties, have something over 56 percent of the vote, so that the possibility of forming a majority based on democratic parties exists; but the Italian parties will now have to discuss among themselves about how to proceed.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, what practical measures has the Congress of your country provided for the survival of the Cyprus Republic?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has repeatedly stated its views that a settlement of Cyprus must respect the dignity and self-respect of the population, that the dividing lines cannot be the existing dividing lines on Cyprus, and that we are in favor of an independent and united Cyprus. We have attempted to bring the two parties together in negotiations at various forums. I think it is safe to say that the Greek and Turkish negotiators throughout history have not found compromise the easiest road for dealing with each other. But the United States strongly supports a negotiated settlement; urges the parties to return to negotiations as rapidly as possible; and we do not exclude putting forward ideas of our own once the positions of the two sides begin to approach themselves more. But as long as the gap between the two parties is as wide as it is, it is very difficult for the United States to put forward a compromise proposal.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you feel that we are any closer to a settlement of the Lebanese crisis today than we were three days ago?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't see what has changed in the last three days that would make a settlement of the Lebanese crisis easier. The problem remains substantially what it has been all along. The differences between the warring factions in Lebanon have proved extremely complicated to reconcile. Secondly, even when there is a central government there is the problem of how to supply it with a security force that would enable it to make its writ run in all of Lebanon. We strongly support any initiative that brings the conflicting groups together. We favor a negotiation among these factions and among the various groups, and we strongly support a united Lebanon whose independence and sovereignty is respected and in which the various communities can live in security.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, in Nairobi the United States expressed reservations concerning the final agreement. Here the United States has refused stabilization of raw materials. Are you intending to place back into question the matter of the consensus secured at UNCTAD?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't know exactly what you're referring to. The United States has supported an approach on a case-by-case basis to commodities. It has agreed at UNCTAD and it continues to agree to a schedule by which these commodities should be negotiated. It has suggested that buffer stocks were the most efficient way of doing this and it has agreed to examine funds for each commodity with which to do it. The United States has expressed reservations about a common

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fund for all commodities and has not agreed to proceed with this. But
the United States is not putting into question the consensus that was
achieved at UNCTAD.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could you supply something which may be a footnote or may be more than a footnote, to the Lebanese evacuation? Did the United States Government directly contact the PLO or any agency of the PLO to first arrange for the evacuation and, second, to thank them for their support and cooperation during it?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States at no time has been in direct contact with the PLO during the evacuation. The United States, of necessity, had to deal though various intermediaries with the PLO. That is to say, other countries that have relations with the PLO contacted the PLO about the physical arrangements in an area that was controlled by Palestinians. It wasn't only the PLO, there were other Palestinian groups that controlled the area from which the evacuation took place. There has been, to the best of my knowledge, no direct contact between the United States and the PLO on the subject, before or subsequent, at any time during the Lebanese (inaudible). All communications have been through intermediaries. And in all cases, except for a general expression of thanks to all people who helped, there were no messages at all. We left it to the intermediaries to arrange what needed to be arranged.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, coming back to the OECD, does the United States subscribe to the OECD thesis that the strategy for the rest of this decade calls for only moderate growth, which implies continued slack and slow improvement in the unemployment rate?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am sorry that my friend Bill Simon isn't here. But I would suppose that any document that we signed we subscribe to. Most of the time that is true.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, there has been a lot of talk about the CIEC Conference in Paris. What concessions would you like to see from the OPEC countries on energy and do you agree with the OPEC analysis that nuclear power cannot make a considerable contribution to the energy balance of the industrialized world?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We are at this moment formulating our detailed positions for the CIEC Conference. We have always believed and continue to believe that the CIEC Conference is a principal instrument through which the dialogue between the developed and the developing countries should take place. And we welcome the initiative that brought it into being and brought it to Paris. We will make serious proposals in all of the categories, in all of the four commissions in which CIEC is operating. We don't want to put it in terms of what concessions do we want from any particular group. We will rather put it in terms of a coherent program in which the concessions of both sides are balanced. With respect to nuclear power, I think it is probably correct that nuclear power by itself cannot replace oil as a principal source

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energy. And it is for this reason that in my remarks yesterday I called attention to other substitutes for oil. But the fact is that with or without the energy crisis the reserves of petroleum are limited and the industrialized countries, and indeed the rest of the world, have at most the rest of this century to develop significant alternative sources for energy. And this must be a major part of our energy program.

**QUESTION:** With regard to your remarks in favor of negotiations on Lebanon, how would you assess the prospects for a negotiation now? And two, is your meeting with American Ambassadors from the Middle East tonight related in any way to any new international initiative on a negotiation?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Actually, the meeting with the Ambassadors was arranged before the tragic deaths of the two American diplomats in Beirut. It seemed to me then that it was important to have an opportunity to get a first-hand view of our Ambassadors in those countries in the Middle East that are most concerned with the Lebanon crisis. And also to give us an opportunity how to avoid misconceptions about what role the United States may or may not have played in particular events. Out of this meeting today I do not expect an American peace initiative for Lebanon; but we will continue, as we have in the past, to support any peace initiative in Lebanon that is promising. The tragedy of Lebanon must be ended as rapidly as possible, and our Ambassadors will be instructed to use their maximum influence and to offer their fullest cooperation to the governments in the area in that effort. But the meeting today is confined to Lebanon and is not dealing with Middle East peace in general.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, in all your negotiations do you find it more difficult now to negotiate since it is an election year?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** My megalomania, of course, reaches levels in which an admission of inadequacy is next to inconceivable. But it is obvious that in an election year other countries are asking themselves as to the continuity of American foreign policy. It is my belief that the main lines of our foreign policy reflect the permanent interests of the United States and will be continued. And I must honestly say I have not found that there is a significant inhibition to the conduct of our diplomacy, despite the excitement that is occurring in the United States.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, regarding Lebanon, can you tell us if there is any promise in either the French proposal for a roundtable or for the French proposal for a French force in Lebanon?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** With respect to the idea of a roundtable in Paris, the United States does not want to commit itself to any one particular formula. We would certainly think that a roundtable in a place that appears neutral to most of the participants would be an obvious solution. And if all of the parties were to agree to come to Paris, we would think

[L.C.]

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that was a reasonable venue and we would support it. We have not put
forward any particular locale, but we would not only have no
objection to Paris, we would think it has something to commend it.
With respect to the French force, as I understand the French proposal,
it is that if all the parties ask for French participation, as well
as the states most concerned, like Syria and Egypt, and if there are
conditions of cease-fire, then France would be prepared to send forces
to help assure the cease-fire for a limited period of time. If all
of these conditions are met, the United States would believe that a
French force, especially under the conditions which now exist, might
play a useful role. It is not, however, for us to say whether a French
force should go to Lebanon. It depends, as President Giscard himself
has pointed out, on the wishes of the Arab parties concerned and on a
prior achievement of a cease-fire. If all of those conditions are
met, the United States would certainly not object to such a force.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how did the OECD meeting contribute to the Puerto Rico summit that is planned for this weekend, and what do you see as the relationship?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The major topics that were raised at OECD will also be raised at the Puerto Rico summit, and the OECD meeting gave an opportunity to exchange in a wider circle some of the issues that will be discussed intensively in Puerto Rico, and they raised the questions which the heads of governments will deal with in greater detail. The basic reason for the summits that have taken place within the last year has been the conviction that the industrial democracies owe it to their people to demonstrate that they are in control of their destinies and that they are willing to coordinate their policies both for growth and for development and perhaps also in other spheres of economic activity. That will be the basic theme of the Puerto Rico summit and in this sense the OECD meeting should be viewed as a preparatory conference, although it was obviously not scheduled for that reason.

**QUESTION:** You spoke of possible political pressures "in the East" as a result of the rapid expansion of East-West trade, on particular Western countries. Can you provide us with some examples of either where this has taken place in the past, or hypothetical illustrations of how it can happen in the future?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** What I attempted to do in my remarks yesterday, was to call attention to a series of problems that can arise over the future. I did not refer to any particular difficulties that have in fact occurred. It seems to me, however, that when the trade between the industrial democracies and the state trading systems is increasing at the rate that it is, it would be foolhardy not to look at the problems that could develop over the future. Obviously state trading systems, being centrally controlled and subject to immediate political direction, can switch their purchases rapidly from one country to another; and they can, therefore, if the trade has reached a certain level, bring about a situation that could have economic consequences.

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They could cut off deliveries of what they have agreed to do, rapidly; and therefore what we would like to do is to review the whole range of problems that could arise and to establish for ourselves some guidelines by which the industrial democracies could cooperate; because many of these difficulties that one foresees could theoretically be dealt with by some of the methods that were tried out in the IEA without any detriment to the overall level of trade, and indeed, to its encouragement.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we might ask you again a little bit more about your reaction to the Italian election. Now you said you have not yet had a chance to study the nuances. However, the bare numbers are there. I wonder if you could categorize your reaction in some way. For example, do the results in any way justify the alarm that you expressed prior to the vote -- the alarm, that is, of a possible Communist participation in the government?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I never expressed unprovoked alarm. And I think it would be important for the European press to understand that almost all of my comments on the subject were elicited with my, I must say, not very excessive reluctance. But nevertheless the essential problem which we confronted in the spring has not been fundamentally changed by the Italian election: namely, whether the necessary reforms in Italy should be carried out by a coalition of democratic parties or whether they should be carried out with a participation of the Communist party. The possibility exists, as I pointed out, on the basis of the election, to form a coalition of democratic parties, since there is something like 56 percent of parties that are neither Communist nor fascist. It is now up to the Italian political parties to decide which way they want to direct Italian politics, and beyond this I am not prepared to go today.

**QUESTION:** Will the EEC participate in the Puerto Rico summit?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The participation of the EEC is a question that is for the Europeans to resolve and not for the United States, and therefore we will wait to get a European reaction.

**QUESTION:** Regarding your statements on energy yesterday, do you expect non-IEA countries like France to join the IEA in an attempt to form a common front?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have in fact acheived a high degree of cooperation between France and the IEA, and we are prepared to proceed on a pragmatic basis. That is to say, we are interested in the results and not in the legal structure, and I believe it would be possible to work out a parallel program between the IEA and France within either the framework of the OECD or through bilateral arrangements. We do not

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insist that France join the IEA, and we believe that the program we propose is achievable without formal participation of France.

**QUESTION:** Can you elaborate on your statement on Cyprus with particular reference to the dividing line?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have said before that it seems to us that the present dividing lines should not be the permanent dividing lines on Cyprus. What the exact dividing lines should be is what the negotiation is supposed to accomplish; and we have urged both parties to negotiate these issues as rapidly as possible for the sake of the population of Cyprus, which has suffered enough, and for the sake of peace in the eastern Mediterranean.

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**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could you give us some idea of the impact of the events in South Africa on your approach to your talks with Prime Minister Vorster?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The purpose of my meeting with Prime Minister Vorster has been to contribute to a peaceful evolution of the problems of South Africa, an evolution which would enable all communities there to live with each other, with recognition of each other's dignity, and which at the same time would avoid outside intervention and move toward a majority rule, respect for the minority rights and negotiations. The meeting with Prime Minister Vorster resulted from the fact that all black African leaders with whom I spoke on my recent trip urged me to bring South Africa into this process. And within the United States I was urged by the Black Caucus to bring South Africa into this process. Last week, after the riots in South Africa, I met with 40 African Ambassadors in Washington, and they unanimously asked me to go ahead despite the riots, because the riots underline the urgency of the situation. As far as the United States is concerned, I expressed our strong opposition to the system of legalized separation of the races that is taking place in South Africa. We joined the United Nations Security Council consensus and made a separate statement expressing our strong opposition to the violence that was used in the face of the demonstrations. And we regret that the meeting with the Prime Minister is taking place in these circumstances. But precisely because South Africa is such an essential part of any attempt to bring about a negotiated solution in southern Africa, because the problems will not be easier four or eight weeks from now, we have decided to go ahead with these meetings -- in full consultation with all interested black African states, with whose leaders we have been in close contact prior to this meeting, and with whom we hope to be in close contact after this meeting. The United States is attempting to move matters to a solution through negotiation rather than through violence. And it will attempt to do what it can to avoid outside intervention and to permit a solution in which African problems are solved by African nations, and we are doing this in the closest cooperation with all the states of Africa. It is in this spirit and not in any sense as an endorsement of anything that is going on in South Africa -- quite the contrary -- that I am meeting the South African Prime Minister tomorrow.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, back to the Middle East for a moment, please. There is a report -- I have not seen the report fully -- out of Israel, that you have told Ambassador Dinitz that for the transitional quarter Israel will have to get along with $200 million instead of the $500 million voted by Congress. Now I realize that reports get garbled; and as I say I have not seen the report, so could you clarify this? Has there been such a decision made by the Administration to cut Israel's aid during the transitional quarter, and if so, why?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First of all, it is incorrect to characterize this as cutting Israel's aid. The problem has been how much should be added to aid for Israel during the transitional quarter. The President has been attempting to work out a compromise with interested members of the Congress on the amount of aid for Israel, between the sum of $500 million that has been requested by Israel as an addition to the sums

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that have already been appropriated and what he feels is possible and
will still meet his budgetary ceiling. To the best of my information
this sum is still under negotiation and therefore any particular figure
would be incorrect.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you refer to intermediaries between the United States and the PLO. May I ask if Egypt played a part in this capacity? May I ask you about the prospect for a Geneva meeting?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, "intermediary" between the United
States and the PLO is perhaps too sweeping a word. The United States
had the practical problem of evacuating citizens from areas that were
controlled by Palestinians, and therefore it was necessary to make
certain technical arrangements with the Palestinians. In this respect
the Government of Egypt played an extremely helpful role for which we
are very grateful, and we dealt with it by stating our requirements to
the Government of Egypt, which then dealt with whatever group they felt
was necessary to achieve it. But they did not pass any messages from
us to any other group. It was done by the Government of Egypt on its
own authority. There were other Arab governments such as the Govern-
ments of Saudi Arabia and of Tunisia that were extremely helpful in
arranging the evacuation, and we have thanked them. The President
has sent messages to all of them. With respect to the resumption of the
Geneva Conference, the United States has expressed its view that an
extended stagnation of conditions in the Middle East would be dangerous
to the peace of the area. We, therefore, support a peace process which
in our view now should proceed on all fronts, either in stages or toward
the final settlement, whichever the parties agree to. We are prepared
for a resumption of the Geneva Conference; we are prepared to do it in
any other forum that indicates progress. We at one point proposed the
preparatory conference in order to examine what could be done, but
we are open-minded in this matter. The major objective is to make
realistic progress, and we are in touch with all of the parties in order
to achieve it.

Thank you.

* * * *

UNCLASSIFIED
STATE

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SECSTATE FOR S/PRS AND EUR/CE; DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR
MR. SCOWCROFT AND WHITE HOUSE FOR MR. NESSEN; USIA
FOR IOP/M; IPS; IBS; IEU; FC/STRICKER, NEW YORK

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: GW, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: TEXT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S REMARKS ON
ARRIVAL AT HOTEL SONNENHOF, GRAFENAU, FOLLOWING TALKS
WITH PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, JUNE 23, 1976.

QUESTION: HOW DID THE TALKS GO TODAY?

SECRETARY: WE'VE HAD A DETAILED REVIEW OF THE
SITUATION AND WE'RE GOING TO MEET AGAIN TOMORROW, SO
IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO CHARACTERIZE THEM, ONE WAY OR
THE OTHER.

QUESTION: IN GENERAL TERMS DID YOU LAY OUT YOUR
FEELINGS ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA AS WE'VE HEARD THEM
EXPRESSED IN VARIOUS PUBLIC FORUMS?

USIS:PA/WWMarsh/am

6/23/76

3131

USIS:OD:JPClyne

UNCLASSIFIED

Distrib

USIS-1

AMB-1

DCM-1

CRU

75-15

19/88

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LC

June 24, 1976

No. 327

PC 103

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
FOREIGN MINISTER HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER
AT FÜRSTENFELDBRÜCK AIRPORT
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

June 24, 1976

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Ladies and gentlemen: I primarily want to take this opportunity to thank the Government of the Federal Republic and the Foreign Minister for the arrangements that were made for my meeting with the Prime Minister of South Africa. The arrangements could not have been better and all the technical arrangements were extraordinarily efficient, and with the complicated transportation arrangements we would like to express our appreciation to the Government of the Federal Republic, to the Chancellor and to the Foreign Minister for the personal interest they have taken in this. I have had a discussion with the Foreign Minister here and, of course, as you know, the state of our consultation is now such that when we don't see each other for three days we both become very lonely, and we will see each other again this weekend. But I reported to the Foreign Minister about my conversations with the Prime Minister of South Africa and his colleagues, and we also discussed the preparations for Puerto Rico, where we will of course meet again this weekend. That is all I want to say now.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, can you tell us a bit more about your discussions with the South African Prime Minister?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I can't really add a great deal to what has already been said. The Prime Minister and I reviewed in great detail all of the aspects of the situation in southern Africa. From the point of view of moving matters towards a solution and avoiding the threatening conflicts in that area, we looked at all the possibilities that have been suggested by various parties. The Prime Minister has to return to South Africa to talk to his colleagues and to reflect about matters, and we will follow up through other channels and stay in close touch to see what can be done to move matters forward. The United States stands by the policy which has been enunciated in Lusaka, and any solution in which we participate will be in that framework.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how would you characterize the Prime Minister's reactions?

PR # 327

-2-

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't think it would be appropriate for me to characterize the reactions in any other way than that there was a full and detailed exploration of all the methods that might be used to bring about a solution, and I believe there is an understanding of the seriousness of the situation and of the need for -- and of the urgency -- with which the solution must be sought.

**QUESTION:** (Unintelligible)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I think it is premature to discuss this until further discussions can have been held, and I will also send the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs to Africa to report to the leaders of the black African countries that are most concerned with these matters, and ask if we can have their opinion. Then we can be more specific.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, your speech in Lusaka put an emphasis on Rhodesia. Were your talks primarily about Rhodesia, or did you spend a great deal of time on South Africa itself?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We said that all the problems of southern Africa -- which includes Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa -- were discussed.

**QUESTION:** Could you expand on the problems of South Africa. I am not so sure of what it is (unintelligible).

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we have stated, I stated, in Lusaka that the United States is against the institutionalized and legalized separation of the races, and we, I repeat, discussed all the problems of southern Africa.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you said before the meeting began that you believe that South Africa's participation was necessary to the peaceful resolution of the problems of (unintelligible) it is your impression that the South African (unintelligible) are prepared to participate in a peaceful resolution?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I think that the Government of South Africa will have to speak for itself, but the discussions started from that assumption, and were carried out in that framework. What in fact can be done and what will be done will be determined in the next weeks and months, but we believe that the process that we have started in April is still under way after these discussions.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, did the Prime Minister give much inspiration about ... whites (unintelligible).

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have always stated that a solution in southern Africa must take into account not only the claims of the majority but the rights of the minority, and a solution must be sought in the framework in which all communities can exist within a framework of dignity and self-respect.

PR# 327

-3-

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has stated its views on that subject in the United Nations Security Council debate last Saturday, and these views are unchanged.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you mentioned you will talk with Callaghan tomorrow ... (unintelligible)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course, I cannot speak for the British Government. I plan to see Mr. Crossland and Mr. Callaghan tomorrow, and then over the weekend in Puerto Rico we will have an opportunity to talk to our other colleagues from other West European countries. I would think that Britain has an important role to play, especially with respect to Rhodesia, and I would hope that Britain will participate and play a leading role in the evolution of the Rhodesian question. But I would first like to discuss details of this with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, your South African ... (unintelligible)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I don't think matters have reached a point where any specific decisions can be communicated to anybody, and of course you will have to keep in mind that in this whole process we have to stay in touch, both with the Government of South Africa as well as with the governments of black Africa. We also have to be, we intend to be, in the closest touch and consultation with West European governments that have an interest in this subject, and it is quite premature to talk of any intermediaries.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you said before you set out that one of the things you wanted to find out was (unintelligible) separate Rhodesia from South-West Africa. Do you have a better idea what that is now?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I have a better idea of the views of the South African Prime Minister and his colleagues, but of course he will have to speak for himself. I think we have made clear that the framework, that the process, in which we are engaged, is continuing, and that the framework for it is unchanged, and you may be able to draw some conclusions from that.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, as a result of these meetings have you decided when you will ask for ... (unintelligible)?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, this is a question for the President to decide in the light of the assessment of his legislative advisors as to the situation in the Congress. I have not so distinguished myself in my understanding of Congressional sentiment that my recommendations would be decisive. But we will undoubtedly ask for it, and ...

PR# 327

-4-

QUESTION: There is indeed, but the point is, do the discussions do anything about accelerating or delaying your recommendations?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The discussions that took place are essentially not relevant to the decision that we will make with respect to the Byrd Amendment.

QUESTION: (unintelligible)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I really think that is a question that the Government of South Africa has to answer, which perhaps is put this way in a slightly extreme form. The problem is, whether it is possible to start an evolution in southern Africa in which there are sufficient guarantees for minorities, so that the political evolution that the majority of the people want is bearable for the minorities. This is the essence of the problem, and it should not be viewed in terms of separating oneself from any particular group.

QUESTION: And did you get an answer to that question?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, as we have announced, we discussed all aspects of the problems in southern Africa.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you spoke before of setting up a process as a result of these meetings. Did you get any final answer? Do you feel that you have established this process . . . (unintelligible)?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not know whether there will be any solution, but we believe that the process is in motion, and we hope, as we have hoped from the beginning, to contribute toward a resolution that is achieved by negotiation and not by violence, and which respects the dignity of all the peoples in the area. And I believe that this process is in motion.

FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER: I should like to add that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, like the Government of the United States, is undertaking efforts to make its contribution toward a peaceful solution of the problems besetting southern Africa, and we are undertaking these efforts together with our partners in the European Community. And that is why the information we received from the Secretary of State was very important for us, since the Chancellor is seeing the Prime Minister of South Africa tomorrow to express and put before him the views of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, as I did last Tuesday to the Foreign Minister of the Republic of South Africa. Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity again to thank the Secretary of State for the information he has been making available to me. Thank you very much.

* * * *

The Secretary
of State

Speech

June 25, 1976

London, England

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES:
THE IMPERATIVE OF COOPERATION

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger's address before the
International Institute for Strategic Studies
inaugurating the Alastair Buchan memorial lecture
series.

Ladies and gentlemen, friends: On my arrival in Washington seven years ago, one of my first acts was to gather a group of senior scholars of European affairs to have them give their advice to a new President on relations with our allies. The chairman of that group was Alastair Buchan.

He should not be held responsible for the
results. But it was only natural to seek his counsel.
For Alastair was more than a distinguished expert;
he was a consummate man of the West. A Scot by
birth, he considered himself, and referred to him-
self, as a European. He lived many years in the
United States and visited us often, applying his
incisive mind to the study of America and its role
in the world. He was a champion of the import-
ance, indeed the inevitability, of the transatlantic
tie between North America and Europe.

Beneath the skeptical air was a passionate
commitment to the values and traditions we
cherish as Western civilization. Sir Peter Rams-
botham [U.K. Ambassador to the United States]
said in his eulogy of Alastair in Washington that no
other countryman of his had contributed more to
the understanding of international affairs and the
strategic implications of nuclear power in the latter
half of the 20th century. But Alastair's focus was
not simply the structure of global politics and the

roots of war; it was the central role of the West in
preserving peace and giving it more purpose.

This institute is a monument to his quest.

Alastair had that combination of intellect and
compassion known as wisdom. It motivated the
great contribution he made to scholarship and to a
generation's understanding of the transformation
of international relationships. He has left his mark
on every person in this hall. During the last seven
years, he never hesitated to scold me in all friend-
ship when he thought that American policy did not
do justice to the great cause of European-American
cooperation. I would like to think that, had he
lived, he would feel that, after many starts, we
have made great strides in strengthening the unity
of the West. And if that were his conviction, I for
one would be very proud.

"Structural changes," Alastair wrote, "are oc-
curring in the relative power and influence of the
major states; there has been a quantitative change
of colossal proportions in the interdependence of
Western societies and in the demands we make on
natural resources; and there are qualitative changes
in the preoccupations of our societies." He then
posed the question: "Can the highly industrialized
states sustain or recover a quality in their national
life which not only satisfies the new generation,
but can act as an example or attractive force to
other societies?"

All of us who wish to honor Alastair's
memory must do so in the way he would want
most of all—by proving that the answer to his ques-

PR 329

2

tion is yes. A world that cries out for economic advance, for social justice, for political liberty, and for a stable peace needs our collective commitment and contribution. I firmly believe that the industrial democracies working together have the means, if they have the will, to shape creatively a new era of international affairs. Indeed we are doing so on many fronts today, thanks to the clarity Alastair brought to our purposes and directions.

A generation ago Western statesmen fashioned new institutions of collaboration to stave off a common threat. Our progress after 30 years has been striking. Global war has been deterred, and all of the industrial democracies live with an enhanced sense of security. Our economies are the most prosperous on earth; our technology and productive genius have proven indispensable for all countries seeking to better the welfare of their peoples, be they Socialist or developing. Our societies represent, more than ever, a beacon of hope to those who yearn for liberty and justice and progress. In no part of the world and under no other system do men live so well and in so much freedom. If performance is any criterion, the contest between freedom and communism, of which so much was made three decades ago, has been won by the industrial democracies.

And yet at this precise moment we hear in our countries premonitions of decline, anxieties about the travail of the West and the advance of authoritarianism. Can it be that our deeper problems are not of resources but of will, not of power but of conception?

We who overcame great dangers 30 years ago must not now paralyze ourselves with illusions of impotence. We have already initiated the construction of a new system of international relations—this time on a global scale. We must summon the determination to work toward it in unity and mutual confidence.

For America, cooperation among the free nations is a moral, and not merely a practical, necessity. Americans have never been comfortable with calculations of interest and power alone. America, to be itself, needs a sense of identity and collaboration with other nations who share its values.

Our association with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan thus goes to the heart of our national purpose. Common endeavors with our sister democracies raise the goals of our foreign policy beyond physical survival, toward a peace of human

progress and dignity. The ties of intellectual civilization, democratic tradition, historical association, and more than a generation of common endeavor bind us together more firmly than could any pragmatic conception of national interest alone. The unity of the industrial democracies has been the cornerstone of American foreign policy for 30 years, and it will remain so for as far ahead as we can see.

So I would like to pay tribute to Alastair this evening by addressing the issues he raised: Can America, Europe, and the industrial democracies meet the challenge of the world's future? What is the state of our relationship?

## The U.S. and a United Europe

In 1973, with Viet-Nam at last behind us and fresh from new initiatives with China and the Soviet Union, the United States proposed that the collaboration of the industrial democracies be given new impetus. Military security, while still crucial, was no longer sufficient to give content or political cohesion to our broader relationship or to retain support for it from a new generation. We faced important East-West negotiations on European security and force reductions; a fresh agenda of international economic problems; the challenge of shaping anew our relationship with the developing world; and the need to redefine relations between America and a strengthened and enlarged European Community.

It is academic to debate now whether the United States acted too theoretically in proposing to approach these challenges through the elaboration of a new Atlantic declaration, or whether our European friends acted wisely in treating this proposal as a test case of European identity. The doctrinal arguments of 1973 over the procedure for Atlantic consultations, or whether Europe was exercising its proper global role, or whether economic and security issues should be linked, have in fact been settled by the practice of consultations and cooperation unprecedented in intensity and scope. The reality and success of our common endeavors have provided the best definition and revitalization of our relationship. There is no longer any question that Europe and the United States must cooperate closely, under whatever label, and that the unity of Europe is essential to that process.

In its early days, the European Community

3

was the focus of much American idealism, and perhaps of some paternalism, as we urged models of federal unity and transatlantic burdensharing on our European friends. By now, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have come to understand that European unity cannot be built by Americans or to an American prescription; it must result from European initiatives.

The evolution of European initiatives—both its successes and its setbacks—inevitably gives rise to new questions about whether the United States still welcomes European unification. Let me take this occasion to emphasize our conviction that European unity is crucial for Europe, for the West, and for the world. We strongly support and encourage it.

We have perhaps become a little more sophisticated about our contribution to the process. We no longer expect that it will grow from the desire to ease American burdens. If Europe is to carry a part of the West's responsibilities in the world, it must do so according to its own conceptions and in its own interest. Alastair Buchan wrote: "It is impossible to inspire Western Europe to political unity or to encourage Japanese self-reliance unless they have the freedom and confidence to define their interests in every sphere, interests which must be reconciled with those of the United States but not subordinated to them."

The United States endorses this principle wholeheartedly. It is not healthy for the United States to be the only center of initiative and leadership in the democratic world. It is not healthy for Europe to be only a passive participant, however close the friendship and however intimate the consultation.

We therefore welcome the fact that Europe's role in global affairs is gaining in vigor and effectiveness. A vital and cohesive Western Europe is an irreplaceable weight on the scales of global diplomacy; American policy can only gain by having a strong partner of parallel moral purposes.

Of course we do not want Europe to find its identity in opposition to the United States. But neither does any sensible European. Of course there will be disagreements between us of tactics, and sometimes of perspectives, if not of ends. But I do not believe that Americans have so lost confidence in ourselves that we must inhibit the role of others, with whom we may have occasional differences, but who share our highest values. The wisest

statesmen on the two sides of the ocean have always known that European unity and Atlantic partnership are both essential and mutually reinforcing.

So let us finally put behind us the debates over whether Europe's unity has American support. We consider the issue settled. Let us rather address ourselves to the urgent challenges of mutual concern which a uniting Europe, the United States, and all industrial democracies must face together—common defense, East-West relations, and the international economy.

## Security and the Democracies

Security is the bedrock of all that we do. A quarter-century ago, the American defense commitment to Europe provided the shield behind which Western Europe recovered its economic health and political vitality. Today our collective alliance defense—and the U.S.-Japanese relationship—continue to be essential for global stability. But the nature of security and strategy has fundamentally changed since the time when our alliances were founded:

* The Soviet Union has recovered from the devastation of World War II and pressed vigorously ahead on the path of industrial growth. Possessing resources on a continental scale, and imposing on its people enormous sacrifices in the name of its ideology, the U.S.S.R. has developed its economic strength and technology to a point where it can match the West in many sectors of industrial and military power. It shows no signs of changing its priorities.

* For centuries it was axiomatic that increases in military power could be translated into almost immediate political advantage. It is now clear that in strategic weaponry new increments of weapons or destructiveness do not automatically lead to either military or political gains. The destructiveness of strategic weapons has contributed to the emergence of nuclear stalemate. Neither side, if it acts with minimum prudence, will let the balance tip against it, either in an arms race or in an agreement to limit arms.

* Beneath the nuclear umbrella, the temptation to probe with regional forces or proxy wars increases. The steady growth of Soviet conventional military and naval power and its expanding global reach cannot be ignored. Conventional forces and

4

military assistance to allies assume pivotal importance. We must insure that the strength and flexibility of all forces capable of local defense are enhanced. And we must conduct a prudent and forceful foreign policy that is prepared to use our strength to block expansionism.

These new realities demand from us steadiness, above all. Democratic societies have always fluctuated in their attitude toward defense—between complacency and alarmist concern. The long leadtimes of modern weapons and their complexity make both these aberrations dangerous. We cannot afford alternation between neglect and bursts of frenzy if we are to have a coherent defense program and public support for the necessary exertions. We need an allied defense posture that is relevant to our dangers, credible to both friends and adversaries, and justifiable to our peoples. And we must be prepared to sustain it over the long term.

It is imperative that we maintain the programs that insure that the balance is preserved. But we owe it to ourselves to see the military balance in proper perspective. Complacency may produce weakness, but exaggeration of danger can lead to a loss of will. To be sure, there has been a steady buildup of Soviet military power. But we have also seen to the steady growth and improvement of our own forces over the same period.

* We have always had to face Soviet ground forces larger than our own—partly because of the Soviet Union's definition of its needs as a power in the heart of the Eurasian landmass, with perceived threats on both flanks. Its naval power, while a growing and serious problem, is far weaker than combined allied naval strength in terms of tonnage, firepower, range, access to the sea, experience, and seamanship.

* The United States, for its part, is expanding its army from 13 to 16 divisions through new measures of streamlining forces; we are increasing our combat forces in Europe; we plan to station a new army brigade on the critical sector of the north German plain; we are augmenting our naval forces. Our European allies have completed major programs to build common infrastructure: We have undertaken new joint efforts of standardization and interoperability of allied forces.

* U.S. strategic forces are superior in accuracy,

diversity, reliability, survivability, and numbers of separately targetable nuclear warheads. We have a commanding lead in strategic bombers. In addition there are American deployments overseas and the nuclear forces of two Atlantic allies.

* Even with our different priorities, the economic and technological base which underlies Western military strength remains overwhelmingly superior in size and capacity for innovation. The Soviet Union suffers endemic weakness in its industry and agriculture: Recent studies indicate that this chronic inefficiency extends even into their military sector to a much greater extent than realized before.

These strengths of ours demonstrate that our present security posture is adequate and that it is well within our capacities to continue to balance the various elements of Soviet power. To maintain the necessary defense is a question of leadership more than of power. Our security responsibility is both manageable and unending. We must undertake significant additional efforts for the indefinite future. For as far ahead as we can see, we will live in a twilight area between tranquillity and open confrontation.

This is a task for both sides of the Atlantic. Our defense effort within the alliance will be importantly affected by the degree to which the American public is convinced that our allies share similar perceptions of the military challenge and a comparable determination to meet it. The greatest threat to the alliance would occur if, for whatever reason—through misreading the threat, or inattention to conventional forces, or reductions of the defense efforts of allies, or domestic developments within NATO members—U.S. public support for NATO were weakened.

The challenge of building sufficient hardware is easier than those of geopolitical understanding, political coordination and, above all, resolve. In the nuclear age, once a change in the geopolitical balance has become unambiguous, it is too late to do anything about it. However great our strength, it will prove empty if we do not resist seemingly marginal changes whose cumulative impact can undermine our security. Power serves little purpose without the doctrines and concepts which define where our interests require its application.

Therefore, let us not paralyze ourselves by a rhetoric of weakness. Let us concentrate on build-

5

ing the understanding of our strategic interests which must underlie any policy. The fact is that nowhere has the West been defeated for lack of strength. Our setbacks have been self-inflicted, either because leaders chose objectives that were beyond our psychological capabilities or because our legislatures refused to support what the executive branch believed was essential. This—and not the various “gaps” that appear in the American debate in years divisible by four—is the deepest security problem we face.

## East-West Relations

As long ago as the Harmel Report of December 1967, the Atlantic alliance has treated as its “two main functions” the assurance of military security and realistic measures to reduce tensions between East and West. We never considered confrontation, even when imposed on us by the other side, or containment an end in itself. Nor did we believe that disagreements with the Soviet Union would automatically disappear. On the contrary, the very concept of “detente” has always been applicable only to an adversary relationship. It was designed to prevent competition from sliding into military hostilities and to create the conditions for the relationship to be gradually and prudently improved.

Thus alliance policy toward the East has had two necessary dimensions. We seek to prevent the Soviet Union from transforming its military power into political expansion. At the same time we seek to resolve conflicts and disputes through negotiation and to strengthen the incentives for moderation by expanding the area of constructive relations.

These two dimensions are mutually reinforcing. A strong defense and resistance to adventurism are prerequisites for efforts of conciliation. By the same token, only a demonstrated commitment to peace can sustain domestic support for an adequate defense and a vigilant foreign policy. Our public and Congress will not back policies which appear to invite crises; nor will they support firmness in a crisis unless they are convinced that peaceful and honorable alternatives have been exhausted. Above all, we owe it to ourselves and to future generations to seek a world based on something more stable and hopeful than a balance of terror constantly contested.

However we label such a policy, it is imposed by the unprecedented conditions of the nuclear age. No statesman can lightly risk the lives of tens of millions. Every American president, after entering office and seeing the facts, has come to President Eisenhower's view that “there is no . . . alternative to peace.”

Our generation has been traumatized by World War II, because we remember that war broke out as a result of an imbalance of power. This is a lesson we must not forget. But neither must we forget the lesson of World War I, when war broke out despite an equilibrium of power. An international structure held together only by a balance of forces will sooner or later collapse in catastrophe. In our time this could spell the end of civilized life. We must therefore conduct a diplomacy that deters challenges if possible and that contains them at tolerable levels if they prove unavoidable; a diplomacy that resolves issues, nurtures restraint, and builds cooperation based on mutual interest.

This policy has critics in all our countries. Some take for granted the relative absence of serious crises in recent years, which the policy has helped to bring about, and then fault it for not producing the millenium, which it never claimed. Some caricature its objectives, portraying its goals in more exalted terms than any of its advocates, and then express dismay at the failure of reality to conform to this impossible standard. They describe detente as if it meant the end of all rivalry; when rivalry persists, they conclude that detente has failed and charge its advocates with deception or naivete. They measure the success of policy toward adversaries by criteria that should be reserved for traditional friendships. They use the reality of competition to attack the goal of coexistence, rather than to illustrate its necessity.

In fact, this policy has never been based on such hope or gullibility. It has always been designed to create conditions in which a cool calculus of interests would dictate restraint rather than opportunism, settlement of conflicts rather than their exacerbation. Western policies can at best manage and shape, not assume away, East-West competition.

A pivot of the East-West relationship is the U.S.-Soviet negotiation on limitation of strategic arms. Increasingly, strategic forces find their function only in deterring and matching each other. A continuing buildup of strategic arms, therefore,

6

only leads to fresh balances, but at higher levels of expenditures and uncertainties. In an era of expanding technological possibilities, it is impossible to make rational choices of force planning without some elements of predictability in the strategic environment. Moreover, a continuing race diverts resources from other needed areas such as forces for regional defense where imbalances can have serious geopolitical consequences. All these factors have made arms limitation a practical interest of both sides, as well as a factor for stability in the world.

We have made considerable progress toward curbing the strategic arms race in recent years. We will continue vigorously to pursue this objective in ways which protect Western interests and reflect the counsel of our allies.

In defining and pursuing policies of relaxing tensions with the East, the unity of the industrial democracies is essential. Our consultations have been intensive and frequent, and the record of Western cohesion in recent years has been encouraging—in the negotiations leading to the Four Power Agreement on Berlin; in the mutual and balanced force reduction talks; in the SALT negotiations [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]; and in the preparation for the European Security Conference.

Allied cooperation, and the habits of consultation and coordination which we have formed, will be even more important in the future. For as the policy of relaxing tensions proceeds, it will involve issues at the heart of all our interests.

No one should doubt the depth of our commitment to this process. But we also need to be clear about its limits and about our conception of reciprocity:

* We should require consistent patterns of behavior in different parts of the world. The West must make it clear that coexistence requires mutual restraint, not only in Europe and in the central strategic relationship but also in the Middle East, in Africa, in Asia—in fact, globally. The NATO foreign ministers, at their Oslo meeting last month, stressed the close link between stability and security in Europe and in the world as a whole. We must endorse this not only by our rhetoric, but above all by our actions.

* We should make clear the tolerable definition of global ideological rivalry. We do not shrink from

ideological competition. We have every reason for confidence in the indestructible power of man's yearning for freedom. But we cannot agree that ideology alone is involved when Soviet power is extended into areas such as southern Africa in the name of national liberation, or when regional or local instabilities are generated or exploited in the name of proletarian internationalism.

* We should not allow the Soviet Union to apply detente selectively within the alliance. Competition among us in our diplomatic or economic policies toward the East risks dissipating Western advantages and opening up Soviet opportunities. We must resist division and maintain the closest coordination.

The process of improving East-West relations in Europe must not be confined to relations with the Soviet Union. The benefits of relaxation of tensions must extend to Eastern, as well as Western, Europe.

There should be no room for misconceptions about United States policy:

* We are determined to deal with Eastern Europe on the basis of the sovereignty and independence of each of its countries. We recognize no spheres of influence and no pretensions to hegemony. Two American presidents and several cabinet officials have visited Romania and Poland as well as nonaligned Yugoslavia, to demonstrate our stake in the flourishing and independence of those nations.

* For the same reason, we will persist in our efforts to improve our contacts and develop our concrete bilateral relations in economic and other fields with the countries of Eastern Europe.

* The United States supports the efforts of West European nations to strengthen their bilateral and regional ties with the countries of Eastern Europe. We hope that this process will help heal the divisions of Europe which have persisted since World War II.

* We will continue to pursue measures to improve the lives of the people in Eastern Europe in basic human terms—such as freer emigration, the unification of families, greater flow of information, increased economic interchange, and more opportunities for travel.

The United States, in parallel with its allies,

7

(lc)

will continue to expand relationships with Eastern Europe as far and as fast as is possible. This is a long-term process; it is absurd to imagine that one conference by itself can transform the internal structure of Communist governments. Rhetoric is no substitute for patient and realistic actions. We will raise no expectations that we cannot fulfill. But we will never cease to assert our traditional principles of human liberty and national self-determination.

The course of East-West relations will inevitably have its obstacles and setbacks. We will guard against erosion of the gains that we have made in a series of difficult negotiations; we will insure that agreements already negotiated are properly implemented. We must avoid both sentimentality that would substitute good will for strength, and mock toughness that would substitute posturing for a clear conception of our purposes.

We in the West have the means to pursue this policy successfully. Indeed we have no realistic alternative. We have nothing to fear from competition. If there is a military competition, we have the strength to defend our interests. If there is an economic competition, we won it long ago. If there is an ideological competition, the power of our ideas depends only on our will to uphold them.

We need only to stay together and stay the course. If we do so, the process of East-West relations can, over time, strengthen the fabric of peace and genuinely improve the lives of all the peoples around the world.

## Our Economic Strength

One of the greatest strengths of the industrial democracies is their unquestioned economic preeminence. Partly because we are committed to the free market system which has given us this preeminence, we have not yet fully realized the possibilities—indeed the necessity—of applying our economic strength constructively to shaping a better international environment.

The industrial democracies together account for 65 percent of the world's production and 70 percent of its commerce. Our economic performance drives international trade and finance. Our investment, technology, managerial expertise, and agricultural productivity are the spur to development and well-being around the world. Our enormous capacities are multiplied if we coordinate our policies and efforts.

The core of our strength is the vitality and growth of our own economies. At the Rambouillet economic summit last November, at the Puerto Rico summit next week, in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], and in many other forums, the major democratic nations have shown their ability to work together. But an extensive agenda still summons us. We will require further efforts to continue our recovery and promote noninflationary growth. We will need to facilitate adequate investment and supplies of raw materials. We must continue to avoid protectionist measures, and we must use the opportunity of the multilateral trade negotiations to strengthen and expand the international trading system. We need to reduce our vulnerability and dependence on imported oil through conservation, new sources of energy, and collective preparations for possible emergencies. And we must build on the progress made at Rambouillet and at Jamaica last January to improve the international monetary system.

Our central challenge is to pool our strengths, to increase our coordination, and to tailor our policies to the long term. On the basis of solid cooperation among ourselves, we must deal more effectively with the challenges of the global economy—such as our economic relations with the centrally planned Communist economies and with the scores of new nations concerned with development.

East-West economic interchange, while small in relative scale, is becoming an important economic and political factor. This growth reflects our fundamental strength. It carries risks and complications, both political and economic. But it also presents opportunities for stabilizing relations and involving the Communist countries in responsible international conduct. If the democracies pursue parallel policies—not allowing the Communist states to stimulate debilitating competition among us or to manipulate the process for their own unilateral advantage—East-West economic relations can be a factor for peace and well-being.

We must insure that benefits are reciprocal. We must avoid large trade imbalances which could open opportunities for political pressure. We should structure economic relations so that the Communist states will be drawn into the international economic system and accept its disciplines. When dealing with centrally controlled state eco-

8

nomies, we have to realize that economic relations have a high degree of political content and cannot be conducted solely on the normal commercial basis. Obviously, profitability must be one standard. But we need a broader strategy, consistent with our free enterprise system, so that economic relations will contribute to political objectives. The industrial democracies should coordinate their policies to insure the orderly and beneficial evolution of East-West relations. To these ends the United States has proposed to the OECD that we intensify our analyses of the problems and opportunities inherent in East-West trade with a view to charting common objectives and approaches.

If the economic strength of the industrial democracies is important to the Socialist countries, it is vital for the developing world. These nations seek to overcome pervasive poverty and to lift the horizons of their peoples: They ask for an equitable share of global economic benefits and a greater role in international decisions that affect them.

The process of development is crucial not only for the poorer nations but for the industrial nations as well. Our own prosperity is closely linked to the raw materials, the markets, and the aspirations of the developing countries. An international order can be stable only if all nations perceive it as fundamentally just and are convinced that they have a stake in it. Over the long term, cooperative North-South relations are thus clearly in the interest of all, and the objectives of industrial and developing countries should be complementary.

However, the North-South dialogue has been far from smooth. Tactics of pressure and an emphasis on rhetorical victories at conferences have too often created an atmosphere of confrontation. Such attitudes obscure the fundamental reality that development is an arduous long-term enterprise. It will go forward only if both sides face facts without illusions, shunning both confrontation and sentimentality.

Far more is involved than the mechanical application of technology and capital to poverty. There must be within the developing country a sense of purpose and direction, determined leadership and, perhaps most important, an impulse for change among the people. Development requires national administration, a complex infrastructure, a revised system of education, and many other social reforms. It is a profoundly unsettling process

that takes decades. For many new countries it is in fact even more difficult than similar efforts by the Western countries a century ago, for their social and geographic conditions reflect the arbitrary subdivisions of colonial rule. Some face obstacles which could not be surmounted even with the greatest exertions on their own. Their progress depends on how well the international community responds to the imperatives of economic interdependence.

It is senseless, therefore, to pretend that development can proceed by quick fixes or one-shot solutions. Artificial majorities at international conferences confuse the issue. Confrontational tactics will in time destroy the domestic support in the industrial countries for the forward-looking policy which the developing countries so desperately need.

The industrial democracies have special responsibilities as well. Development requires their sustained and collective cooperation. They represent the largest markets and most of the world's technology and capital. They have an obligation to show understanding for the plight of the poorest and the striving for progress of all developing nations. But they do the developing countries no favor if they contribute to escapism. If they compete to curry favor over essentially propagandistic issues, contributions will be diluted, resources will go unallocated, and unworkable projects will be encouraged.

The developing countries need from us not a sense of guilt but intelligent and realistic proposals that merge the interests of both sides in an expanding world economy:

**First,** we must develop further the mechanisms of our own cooperation. To this end the United States has made a number of concrete proposals at the recently concluded OECD meeting.

**Second,** the industrial democracies should coordinate their national aid programs better so that we use our respective areas of experience and technical skill to best advantage. President Giscard's proposal for an integrated Western fund for Africa is an imaginative approach to regional development.

**Third,** we should regularly consult and work in close parallel in major international negotiations and conferences. The Conference on International

(Lc)

9

Economic Cooperation, the multilateral trade negotiations, U.N. General Assembly special sessions, world conferences on food, population, environment or housing, and UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] all can achieve much more if the industrial democracies approach them with a clear and coherent purpose.

**Fourth,** we should stop conducting all negotiations on an agenda not our own. We should not hesitate to put forward our own solutions to common problems.

**Finally,** we need a clear, longer term strategy for development. The diverse elements of the process, including various forms of assistance, technology transfer, trade and financial policy, must be better integrated.

Cooperation among developed countries is not confrontation between North and South, as is often alleged. The fact is that a responsible development policy is possible only if the industrial democracies pursue realistic goals with conviction, compassion, and coordination. They must not delude themselves or their interlocutors by easy panaceas, or mistake slogans for progress. We make the greatest contribution to development if we insist that the North-South dialogue emphasize substance rather than ideology, and concentrate on practical programs instead of empty theological debates.

## Future of Democratic Societies

In every dimension of our activities, then, the industrial democracies enter the new era with substantial capacities and opportunities. At the same time, it would be idle to deny that in recent years the moral stamina of the West has been seriously challenged.

Since its beginnings, Western civilization has clearly defined the individual's relationship to society and the state. In southern Europe the humanism of the Renaissance made man the measure of all things. In northern Europe the Reformation, in proclaiming the priesthood of all believers and offering rewards for individual effort, put the emphasis on the individual. In England the sense of justice and human rights and responsibilities evolved in the elaboration of the common law. Two hundred years ago the authors of our Declaration of Independence drew upon this heritage; to them every human being had inalienable rights to

life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The state existed to protect the individual and permit full scope for the enjoyment of these rights.

Today in the West, 30 years after the Marshall plan, our deepest challenge is that a new generation must explore again the issues of liberty and social responsibility in an era when societies have grown vastly in size, complexity, and dynamism. The modern industrial society, though founded in freedom and offering prosperity, risks losing the individual in the mass and fostering his alienation. The technical complexity of public issues challenges the functioning of democracy. Mass media and the weakening of party and group structures further the isolation of the individual; they transform democratic politics, adding new elements of volatility and unpredictability. The bureaucratic state poses a fundamental challenge to political leadership and responsiveness to public will.

Basic moral questions are raised:

* How do we inspire a questioning new generation in a relativist age and in a society of impersonal institutions?

* Will skepticism and cynicism sap the spiritual energies of our civilization at the moment of its greatest technical and material success?

* Having debunked authority, will our societies now seek refuge in false simplifications, demogogic certitudes, or extremist panaceas?

These questions are not a prediction but a test—a test of the creativity and moral fortitude of our peoples and leaders.

Western civilization has met such tests before. In the late 15th century Europe was in a period of gloomy introspection, preoccupied with a sense of despair and mortality. The cities which had sparked its revival following the Islamic conquests were in decline. Its territory was being diminished by the depredations of a powerful invader from the East. Its spiritual, economic, and cultural center—Italy—was a prey to anarchy and dismemberment.

And yet Europe at that very moment was already well launched on one of the world's periods of greatest political and intellectual advance. The Renaissance and Reformation, the great discoveries, the revival of humanistic values, the industrial and democratic revolutions—these were all to create the character and the dynamism of the

10

Western civilization of which we, on both sides of
the Atlantic, are the heirs.

Similarly today, the West has assets to meet
its challenges and to draw from them the material
for new acts of creation. It is our nations that have
been the vanguard of the modern age. Intellectually and morally, it is our societies that have
proven themselves the vast laboratory of the
experiment of modernization. Above all, it is the
Western democracies that originated—and keep alive
today—the vision of political freedom, social
justice, and economic well-being for all peoples.
None of us lives up to this vision ideally, or all the
time. But the rigorous standard by which we judge
ourselves is what makes us different from totalitarian societies of the left or the right.

This, then, is our moral task:

First, as democratic governments we must
redeem, over and over again, the trust of our peoples. As a nation which has accepted the burden of leadership, the United States has a special responsibility: We must overcome the traumas of the recent period, eradicate their causes, and preserve the qualities which world leadership demands. In Europe wherever there has been a slackening in governmental responsiveness to the needs of citizens, there should be reform and revival.

Second, we must confront the complexities of
a pluralistic world. This calls for more than specific
technical solutions. It requires of leaders a willing-

ness to explain the real alternatives, no matter how
complicated or difficult. And it requires of electorates an understanding that we must make
choices amidst uncertainty, where the outcome
may be neither immediate nor reducible to simple slogans.

Third, we must clarify our attitudes toward
political forces within Western societies which appeal to electorates on the ground that they may
bring greater efficiency to government. But we cannot avoid the question of the commitment of these
forces to democratic values, nor a concern about
the trends that a decision based on temporary
convenience would set in motion. At the same
time, opposition to these forces is clearly not
enough. There must be a response to legitimate
social and economic aspirations and to the need for
reforms of inadequacies from which these forces
derive much of their appeal.

Finally, the solidarity of the democratic nations in the world is essential both as material support and as a moral symbol. There could be no greater inspiration of our peoples than the reaffirmation of their common purpose and the conviction that they can shape their fortune in freedom.

We cannot afford either a perilous complacency or immobilizing pessimism. Alastair Buchan posed his questions not to induce paralysis but as a spur to wiser action and fresh achievement.

We know what we must do. We also know
what we can do. It only remains to do it.

TRIBUTE TO ALASTAIR BUCHAN
ON BEHALF OF ALL AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE IISS

"Alastair Buchan earned a special place in the hearts of all who knew and worked with him. Through his inspiration and leadership, strategic studies became a serious discipline, a high art; and thousands of people throughout the world gained new perspective on the impact which military power and technology have on domestic and international society. From the highest councils of government to his mass newspaper and television audience, Alastair gained universal respect and admiration.

We in the United States have particular reason for remembering Alastair with deep affection. From his days in Washington as a journalist -- to his writings on American history, policy, and society -- to his close ties with so many of our countrymen -- Alastair had a real and lasting impact on all our lives. Few Americans had such decisive influence on efforts to shape constructive defense and foreign policies for the United States: Few people in any nation did so much to promote a clear and rational view of complex issues, and the search for effective controls on military power and its uses.

-2-

Alastair Buchan's legacy is not only the IISS, which he founded and guided to a state of excellence; but also is found in the many people who follow his approach to strategic studies, and who emulate his toughness of mind and clarity of the written and spoken word. Those of us who knew him valued him as a friend; and all of us feel his loss."

The Secretary
of State

Speech

June 25, 1976

London, England

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

PR 329

2

3

4

This is a task for both sides of the Altantic. Our defense effort within the alliance will be importantly affected by the degree to which the American public is convinced that our allies share similar perceptions of the military challenge and a comparable determination to meet it. The greatest threat to the alliance would occur if, for whatever reason—through misreading the threat, or inattention to conventional forces, or reductions of the defense efforts of allies, or domestic developments within NATO members—U.S. public support for NATO were weakened.

5

## East-West Relations

However we label such a policy, it is imposed by the unprecedented conditions of the nuclear age. No statesman can lightly risk the lives of tens of millions. Every American president, after entering office and seeing the facts, has come to President Eisenhower's view that "there is no . . . alternative to peace."

6

7

## Our Economic Strength

8

First, we must develop further the mechanisms of our own cooperation. To this end the United States has made a number of concrete proposals at the recently concluded OECD meeting.

Second, the industrial democracies should coordinate their national aid programs better so that we use our respective areas of experience and technical skill to best advantage. President Gissard's proposal for an integrated Western fund for Africa is an imaginative approach to regional development.

Third, we should regularly consult and work in close parallel in major international negotiations and conferences. The Conference on International

9

10

Similarly today, the West has assets to meet
its challenges and to draw from them the material
for new acts of creation. It is our nations that have
been the vanguard of the modern age. Intellec-
tually and morally, it is our societies that have
proven themselves the vast laboratory of the
experiment of modernization. Above all, it is the
Western democracies that originated—and keep alive
today—the vision of political freedom, social
justice, and economic well-being for all peoples.
None of us lives up to this vision ideally, or all the
time. But the rigorous standard by which we judge
ourselves is what makes us different from totali-
tarian societies of the left or the right.

First, as democratic governments we must
redeem, over and over again, the trust of our peo-
ples. As a nation which has accepted the burden of
leadership, the United States has a special responsi-
bility: We must overcome the traumas of the
recent period, eradicate their causes, and preserve
the qualities which world leadership demands. In
Europe wherever there has been a slackening in
governmental responsiveness to the needs of citi-
zens, there should be reform and revival.

ness to explain the real alternatives, no matter how
complicated or difficult. And it requires of elec-
torates an understanding that we must make
choices amidst uncertainty, where the outcome
may be neither immediate nor reducible to simple
slogans.

Third, we must clarify our attitudes toward
political forces within Western societies which ap-
peal to electorates on the ground that they may
bring greater efficiency to government. But we can-
not avoid the question of the commitment of these
forces to democratic values, nor a concern about
the trends that a decision based on temporary
convenience would set in motion. At the same
time, opposition to these forces is clearly not
enough. There must be a response to legitimate
social and economic aspirations and to the need for
reforms of inadequacies from which these forces
derive much of their appeal.

Finally, the solidarity of the democratic na-
tions in the world is essential both as material sup-
port and as a moral symbol. There could be no
greater inspiration of our peoples than the reaffir-
mation of their common purpose and the convic-
tion that they can shape their fortune in freedom.

We cannot afford either a perilous compla-
cency or immobilizing pessimism. Alastair Buchan
posed his questions not to induce paralysis but as a
spur to wiser action and fresh achievement.

PR # 336

**MR. SOMMER:** Mr. Secretary, the United States is celebrating its Bicentennial. During the past two centuries, it's been vacillating between isolationism and expansionism. What does America mean to the world on the threshold of its third century?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I wouldn't agree that America has been consciously expansionist. I think America has been alternating between isolationsim and a kind of conception in which we assumed great responsibility for the world's security and economic progress. This got us involved in many places, but it was not based on a conscious strategy of expansionism. It is my belief that the biggest change in American foreign policy has been that we are now permanently involved in foreign affairs. This is a new experience for America. Previously, whether we were isolationist or interventionist — it was always justified in America on the grounds that we were dealing with specific crises which had particular solutions after which we could return home. At least we had the option of non-involvement. That is now over.

**MR. SOMMER:** You don't think we are going to see another retreat of America?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think that even if we were to see another retreat of America the consequences would be so grievous — it would have such traumatic consequences, that it would only underline what I have said. But I don't believe we will see another retreat of America.

**MR. SOMMER:** Does the intrusion of domestic politics and the conflict between the legislature and the Executive Branch maim your capacity to conduct a rational and calculable and reliable foreign policy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The conflict is not simply an Executive/Legislative conflict. It was produced by the weakening of Executive authority as a result of Viet-Nam and Watergate. It reflects also the disorganization of the Congress, where there are no longer any clear power centers and a large number of Congressional committees can assert jurisdiction. And any number of individual Congressmen can push their preferences. So we are dealing here with a more fundamental problem than an Executive/Legislative conflict.

**MR. SOMMER:** Do you regret the passing of the imperial Presidency and of the "Grand Visier?"

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well...I think the imperial Presidency is a phrase that was invented after the fact. You cannot conduct foreign policy without authority, or without some central focal point. And in fact it has been conducted this way even in the midst of Executive/Legislative conflict. The real problem these days is not the dismantling of the central point of authority, but how a central point of authority can relate itself to Congressional concerns. That has to be worked out. I regret a state of affairs which made possible events like the Turkish arms embargo, the manner in which the Angolan problem was handled, and several other setbacks.

**MR. SOMMER:** Is America going to be a reliable partner? Is it? Does it have the means and the resolve to pull its weight and, more specifically, what kind of a situation in a foreign country would justify a United States intervention?

PR #336

-2-

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I believe that after the present turmoil is over the United States will probably be an even more reliable partner because it is through this turmoil that the post-Marshall Plan generation is getting its feel for foreign policy and adjusting to the new realities of international life. I am basically optimistic that when this debate is behind us -- and we are in its last phase -- our foreign policy will be steadier.

On your second question, it depends on what you mean by intervention. I think what any great power needs and what America needs, is to understand which geo-political changes are against our interests and should be resisted. What to resist and how to resist it, you cannot do in a blueprint in the abstract.

**MR. SOMMER:** Are we back to containment?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Containment has always been one aspect of foreign policy in the sense that we cannot permit the Soviet Union to gain a preponderant strategic advantage. On the other hand, whereas in the 40's and 50's containment was considered an end in itself, it is now just the beginning of wisdom; it is the condition on which other constructive policies have to be based. We used to think that if the Soviet Union could be contained long enough, peace would break out at some magical moment and all problems would disappear. Today we know that we cannot permit the Soviets to gain military and strategic preponderance. But that doesn't solve our foreign policy problem,

**MR. SOMMER:** Which side is the United States on,...? Zbig Brzezinski, an academic and political critic, as well as a rival of yours, has recently said that the curious thing is that the nation committed from its birth to independence now feels troubled and even threatened by a world based on self-determination and striving for equality and he says that the Administration is taking refuge in the notion of a hostile world as it used to take refuge in the notion of the Cold War,

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** This is an election year and many people have to say things to distinguish themselves from the present policy. I recognize no element of our foreign policy in this description. Nor could it be supported by anything I have been saying in my speeches. Where do we say we are living in a hostile world? This is not reflected in our policy towards Europe, towards Latin America, towards Africa. Our initiatives at the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly and in other international forums were all based on the assumption that the United States has a particular responsibility to help construct an international environment in which nations can develop themselves along their own lines. I simply do not recognize this description as applying to our policies.

**MR. SOMMER:** How do you reconcile the postulates of Realpolitik and moral considerations in your handling -- no, let's say stabilizing, the Colonels' regime in Greece, destabilizing Allende, or in your, some people feel, rather late awakening to the African problems?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First, I can't accept your description either that we stabilized the Colonels' regime in Greece or that we destabilized Allende. This is a bit of folk-lore that, after having been repeated so often, is now an

-3-

unshakeable part of general mythology. You can say that we did not move all-out
against the Colonels, but both our military aid and our diplomatic contacts were
reduced; to say that we actively stabilized the Colonels is totally incorrect.

The same is true with Allende. Allende destabilized himself. We did not produce
the inefficiency of his regime. We did not procure the decisions of the leaderships
of the National Assembly. And the President of the Supreme Court declared his
acts unconstitutional and refused to vote for his programs. Those were Chilean
decisions. We did try to keep the democratic parties alive in the face of much
governmental harassment so that they could put forward candidates in the election
of 1976. But we also kept open the economic pipeline to Chile, and Allende
received over 200 million dollars of aid, plus 100 million dollars of
debt rescheduling to which the United States agreed. That is a lot more aid
disbursements than his successors have received from the United States.

Now with respect to your specific question on the relationship between Realpolitik and morality. This is usually stated as a dichotomy. Either you conduct Realpolitik or you conduct a moral policy. The fact is that all foreign policy actions whatever their motivation, whether moral or cynical, take place in some objective context. And it is the obligation of the statesman to understand what that objective context is. However principled he may be, if he cannot use the material at hand he cannot be effective.

On the other hand, a policy based only on so-called Realpolitik is likely to be
driven by events. And it's likely to become totally random, I would argue that
without strong moral conviction it is very difficult to conduct a Realpolitik, and
I believe that you need strong moral convictions and a clear sense of moral
purpose to define the objectives of foreign policy. Then in every individual case
you still have to determine what you can achieve and how to go about it. And the
dilemma of the statesman as contrasted with professors, is that a professor
can afford to put down the full complexity and elegance of his moral elevation.
A statesman has to achieve his objectives by stages, each one of which is likely
to be imperfect. So there is no inevitable opposition between Realpolitik and
moral principles entirely.

MR. SOMMER: If you look at the African situation in this context...

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Okay, let's take the African situation. When foreign policy is discussed today, people speak totally in the abstract, as if all foreign policies could have been conducted simultaneously, and as if nothing else were going on in the United States. People forget now that we went through internal upheavals that had revolutionary manifestations during the Vietnam war; that when we came into office we found 550,000 Americans in Vietnam, we confronted a total freeze in our relationship with the Soviet Union and no relationship at all with the People's Republic of China; that relations with Europe were in rather poor shape. It was inevitable that we had to settle the Viet-Nam war first, redo our relationships with Western Europe and with the Communist countries before we could turn, with energy, to the problems of the developing world. No one in America would have understood if we had suddenly turned our full energies to Africa at a time when we had all these other priorities.

-4-

MR. SOMMER: But now you do,

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Now we do.

MR. SOMMER: And what are the yardsticks by which you measure the situation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There are several aspects to our African policy: of course there is the overwhelming problem of southern Africa, and the challenge of basic orientation of the rest of Africa; and finally there is the relationship of Africa to the rest of the world.

With respect to southern Africa we are attempting to bring about a situation in which the solution is found through negotiations rather than conflict, and by African nations rather than by outside powers. Hopefully, such a solution will achieve the aspirations of the African peoples and protect the rights of minorities, And if that succeeds, that will remove one of the greatest incentives, in fact almost the only opportunity, for outside intervention. Simultaneously, we are trying to encourage the elaboration of programs that give the aspirations to development a positive content by such proposals as the Sahel development scheme; support for President Giscard's idea of an African fund; and by the expansion of our own development program. And so far I'm rather encouraged by the progress we are making with respect to southern Africa, or at least I think it is possible we can make progress,

MR. SOMMER: Did your meeting with Mr. Vorster yield any prospects for improvement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It's an extremely delicate situation which presents everybody with serious dilemmas. I, therefore, do not want to characterize it at this moment except to say that the process which I've described to you is still going on, that is to say, the possibilities of achieving what I described exist and I would say that with the full knowledge of my conversation with Prime Minister Vorster,

MR. SOMMER: What is the role in all this for Europe and what future do you see for the trans-Atlantic relationship?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, today I'm giving a perhaps excessively long speech on that subject at the Institute of Strategic Studies. I believe that Europe, finding its political unity, should become a major participant in many global problems. I would think with respect to southern Africa, for example, the cooperation or Europe is almost essential. It cannot be done effectively as a purely American policy. I think Great Britain, with respect to Rhodesia; Great Britain, the Common Market and the United States, with respect to other aspects of southern Africa, can give perhaps an element of guarantee and of stability that the United States by itself could not provide. On the whole issue of development, the close cooperation between Europe and the United States is essential. And I think reality will bring us to a point where, in East-West relations, both political and economic, we will have to synchronize our strategy.

-5-

**MR. SOMMER:** Given the difficulties of progressing toward greater unity in Europe, given the problems on the northern and the southern flanks, and given the spectre of Eurocommunism, do you still believe that Europe will be Marxist in ten years time?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have never believed that Europe will be Marxist in ten years time.

**MR. SOMMER:** The sentence is ascribed to you,

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The sentence may be ascribed to me but it is part of a general mythology of...

**MR. SOMMER:** You never said it,

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I never said it and...

**MR. SOMMER:** And you don't believe it,

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** And I don't believe it,

**MR. SOMMER:** There are some people in the United States who feel that Europe is just too bothersome and probably it will break up anyway, and NATO might come unstuck, and that our best bet would be a strengthening of a Bonn-Washington axis. How do you feel about that?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Throughout my public life I have been a strong advocate of the closest ties between Bonn and Washington. German leaders, in and out of office, are personal friends of mine. Nevertheless, I think it would be unfortunate for the Federal Republic, unfortunate for NATO, and not in anybody's interest to turn NATO into a special Bonn-Washington relationship. It would be too heavy a burden on the Federal Republic. It would raise all the suspicions in the rest of Europe that a generation of responsible German foreign policy has been erased. And it would encourage the splitting up of the West rather than be an element of stability. I don't believe it is necessary, I don't favor it, I know no German leader who favors it.

**MR. SOMMER:** Do you see a special role for Germany?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Germany, because of its strength, inherently plays a vital role. And you don't get a special role by being handed a piece of paper, Germany has a very major role which it has exercised responsibly and which it should continue to exercise in the existing framework,

**MR. SOMMER:** You've involved yourself in so many election campaigns this year. Would you care to comment on the German election campaign?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** (Laughter) I said I'd confine myself to one election campaign at a time and I have to give preference to the United States,

PR #336

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MR. SOMMER: What is your comment on the Italian election results?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Italian election result has polarized the situation that led to the election by having in effect an anti-Communist party and a Communist Party with the intermediary parties substantially weakened and some of them brought to the edge of extinction. There is now almost exactly the situation that produced the election except that now most of the opposition forces have moved toward the Communists and the anti-Communist forces have moved to a slightly lesser extent toward the Christian Democrats. But the electoral arithmetic is almost the same as in the previous parliament.

MR. SOMMER: So we are not, in your view, any nearer to a solution, or to greater stability.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the dilemma remains exactly the same. Major reforms are necessary in Italy. If they are carried forward with the Communists, will it set a predicate for many other situations? On the other hand, can the non-Communist forces create sufficient cohesion to carry out the necessary reform programs? We of course hope that the democratic forces will form a government without Communist participation and carry out the necessary reforms.

MR. SOMMER: Looking back at nearly eight years formulating and implementing American foreign policy, which were your greatest satisfactions and which your deepest frustrations?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have to begin by saying that my present judgments are quite unreliable because when you are in this office you react almost athletically. Events keep crowding in on you and you have to respond...

MR. SOMMER: Athletically -- ?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: ... almost like an athlete and I'm sure that once I'm out of office I will be more reflective. The danger is that if I am out of office a long time I may be reflecting on things that never happened. But, I would think the greatest immediate dramas were the first time I met Chou En-lai, or the moment when Le Duc Tho handed over the proposals which permitted the existing governmental structure in Saigon to survive, and therefore I knew that the settlement of the Viet-Nam war had at last become inevitable. People forget now the enormous emotional investment we all had in ending the war in Viet-Nam. Other great sources of immediate satisfaction were the moments when the various Middle East agreements were achieved.

What will probably give me satisfaction in the longer-term are structural achievements: the attempt to create a foreign policy based on permanent values and interests; in this category I would evaluate our relations with Western Europe and Japan, as well as our relations with Latin America quite positively.

PR #336

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**MR. SOMMER:** Isn't your China policy in tatters already with the death of Chou En-lai?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Absolutely not. Everything depends on what you understand by our China policy. I believe that without Watergate we probably could have made more rapid progress in the China policy. But on the other hand, it is remarkable how well the China policy has survived all the turmoil in both countries. And the basic relationship between China and the United States, which is based on certain fundamental common interests in the world situation, has been for all practical purposes, unaffected. Things like cultural exchange, trade, these are symptoms. They are not the underlying reality.

**MR. SOMMER:** Do you have pangs of conscience at night about Viet-Nam, or about Cambodia, or about other things?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** What is there to have pangs of conscience at night about with Viet-Nam? We found 550,000 American troops in Viet-Nam and we ended the war without betraying those who in reliance on us had fought the Communists. And to remove 550,000 troops under combat conditions is not an easy matter.

**MR. SOMMER:** You don't think it took too much time?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It was important that the war not be ended with the United States simply abandoning people whom we had encouraged to resist the Communists. No one could foresee that Watergate would so weaken the Executive authority that we could not maintain the settlement that in itself was maintainable. And if you look at what our opposition was saying during that time, their proposals were usually only about 6 months ahead of where we were going anyway. Some said we should end the war by the end of '71. Well, we ended it by the end of '72. After all, it took DeGaulle five years to end the Algerian war. And it was a very difficult process.

Now, with respect to Cambodia, It is another curious bit of mythology. People usually refer to the bombing of Cambodia as if it had been an unprovoked, secretive U.S. action. The fact is that we were bombing North Vietnamese troops that had invaded Cambodia for many years, that were in unpopulated areas of Cambodia, that were killing many Americans from these sanctuaries, and we were doing it with the acquiescence of the Cambodian government which never once protested against it, and which, indeed, encouraged us to do it. I may have a lack of imagination, but I fail to see the moral issue involved and why Cambodian neutrality should apply to only one country. Why is it moral for the North Vietnamese to have 50,000 to 100,000 troops in Cambodia, why should we let them kill Americans from that territory, and why, when the government concerned never once protested, and indeed told us that if we bombed unpopulated areas, they would not notice, why in all these conditions is there a moral issue? And finally, I think it is fair to say that in the six years of the war, not 10 percent of the people had been killed in Cambodia as had been killed in one year of Communist rule.

**MR. SOMMER:** To change the tack, How do you account for the fact that so many of your policies which used to be widely acclaimed are now rather unpopular? For

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instance, detente. Is that due to shifts in public mood, or is it due to problems inherent in these policies? Has detente been a one-way street? What is the position of the USSR today, compared to what it was when you started? Has detente reached the end of the road? How is it going to continue?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would judge that a year from now, the policy that has been called detente, will be seen to be reflecting the existing realities, and the only realistic and, for that matter moral policy that the West can pursue, Memories are brief. Think back to the period of the 50's and 60's when we had endless crises over Berlin, and other issues, crises that led to the edge of confrontation. It seems to me axiomatic that when two countries possess the capacity to destroy civilized life, they cannot conduct their affairs on the basis of a constant test of strength with nuclear weapons. They have an obligation to attempt to avoid crises, if possible, to moderate crises if they occur, and to search for a constructive relationship. If they do not do this, it will demoralize their publics. They will create "peace movements" in every country, that accuse their governments of having failed in its principal obligation of protecting them against a nuclear catastrophe. The very fact that there are no significant such movements in any Western country today, is an important tribute to existing policy.

Secondly, where, exactly, has detente been a one-way street? What concrete agreement was to the unilateral benefit of the Soviet Union?

**MR. SOMMER:** Your critics quote SALT.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** What was the alternative to SALT? And indeed, what was the essence of SALT? In 1971 the United States was involved in the war in Viet-Nam; the United States had for five years not begun one single new strategic launcher program. The Soviet Union was building 120 sea-based and about 90 land-based missiles a year. The numerical balance was therefore shifting with every month against the United States. Given long lead times, the United States had no possibility for at least five years to redress it. I, therefore, fail to see why an agreement that stopped ongoing Soviet programs but no United States programs, could have been against the interests of the United States. A much more persuasive case can be made that it was unilaterally to the Soviet disadvantage. But what the Soviets obviously calculated was that they were balancing our capacity for long term build-up, not what we were actually doing.

**MR. SOMMER:** You said in your Dallas speech that detente is not paradise, that as far as you can see ahead we will be living in a twilight between tranquility and confrontation.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That's right. That is inherent in the large nuclear arsenals, the conflicting ideologies and in the reality that the Russia of its present extent and power, even with a different leadership, would still be a security problem for us. It is not, after all, an invention of the Communists that Russia has been a security problem for Europe. It has existed at least since the Napoleonic war, if not before then, but every statesman has an obligation to ease this condition of confrontation. And I have every confidence that whoever is President next year, will in this respect, pursue substantially the same policies,

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**MR. SOMMER:** For Germans, the Berlin problem is a litmus test of detente. Are you satisfied with the situation in and around Berlin?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have to separate two issues: the legal situation and how agreements are being carried out. I believe that the four-power agreement was a big step forward in regularizing the status of Berlin and in ending the cycles of crises that existed in the '50s and '60s. In the implementation of that agreement I believe improvements are possible and conversely that opportunities remain for what have up to now been minor harassments. On balance I prefer an existing explicit agreement to a potentially explosive situation. The Western powers must insist on the scrupulous observance of the agreement. And they must defend with great tenacity the right of Berlin to live. That was true in the '50s, and it is true today. But we have a better legal basis to do it today, and on the whole I think the situation from the legal and political point of view is better than it was previously.

**MR. SOMMER:** Now our recurrent squabbles about the West German right to strengthen the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, to establish institutions or offices there. Did the Russians say that this was not what they had bargained for and this is not the meaning of the Quadripartite Agreement? How do you feel about this and how do you feel about the suggestion that has been made recently that perhaps there should be a second round of negotiations trying to refine the finer points?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** A new negotiation on Berlin may generate new demands by the other side. Our general policy has been to support the Government of the Federal Republic. The management of the situation for them requires wisdom and restraint by all parties.

**MR. SOMMER:** Restrained in putting more ...

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't want to say restraint in putting institutions there because obviously the viability of Berlin has to be demonstrated. Our general policy has been to support the Federal Republic.

**MR. SOMMER:** You have never counseled taking it easy in that respect.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Certainly not as a matter of principle. We may have on individual occasions expressed our views as to the other two allies with special responsibilities for Berlin.

**MR. SOMMER:** Let me ask you a two-pronged question. If President Ford wins and if he offers you the job again, would you take it? And the other part of the question: if not, what are the tasks you leave to your successor?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I can't go beyond what I've already said on this subject. In terms of tasks, I think it is fair to say that in foreign policy you can never define a terminal point after which problems end. I think that the problem of arms control, even if there should be a SALT agreement, will remain before us. I think that while considerable progress towards peace in the Middle East has been made, the task will have to be completed. We have moved the African policy in the right direction, but it would be arrogant to pretend that it could be finished in a three- to six-month period. So a successor of mine will not lack excitement.

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**MR. SOMMER:** Will the rules of detente have to be extended to outlying areas?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Yes. In fact, I'm speaking about that tonight at the Institute of Strategic Studies.

**MR. SOMMER:** What nefarious developments do you fear most? Do you foresee a North-South confrontation?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** What worries me most is a possible loss of will by the industrial democracies. I believe that the industrial democracies should mobilize their resources and coordinate their efforts to deal with the vast range of problems before them. They have the means to do so. The North-South problem can be moved increasingly in a positive direction because it will become increasingly clear that it is a long-term process requiring complex solutions and therefore particularly susceptible to the kind of solutions that the industrial democracies are particularly well able to produce.

**MR. SOMMER:** How do some of the tenets held by Dr. Kissinger at Harvard look in the light of your experience in Washington? You complained about statesmen being mired in the crises of the moment. You said there was a conflict between short-term goals and long-range purposes. And you said the 20th century was not a time for statesmanship. Does your experience bear that out?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** If you conduct foreign policy, you cannot avoid dealing with details because if you do, you get overwhelmed by events. The problem is whether you have enough of a long-range conception so that the details do not become ends in themselves. I have tried — with what success historians will have to judge — to have an overriding concept. It can be found in innumerable, maybe pedantic, speeches I have given over the years. I don't think it is for me to judge the success. It should be done by others.

**MR. SOMMER:** You criticized Castlereagh for ignoring the domestic situation of his country, and Metternich for over-taxing his. Now didn't you sometimes simultaneously commit both mistakes?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** But you have to remember the evolution of our domestic situation. I went through a period of maybe exorbitant praise, and then through a period of maybe exorbitant criticism. But my public opinion polls have held remarkably steady at about 60 percent support even in the middle of an election year. So when you speak of public support, it hasn't been all that lacking and much of the debate of foreign policy has resulted from domestic conditions that were substantially extraneous to foreign policy.

**MR. SOMMER:** You once told Scotty Reston that as an historian you were inclined to look at the fate of mankind in deep pessimism. But as a statesman you were battling every day to justify a more optimistic view. Now has the result of your own labors changed your pessimistic outlook?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have never said that I have a pessimistic outlook. I have said, what is after all empirically true, that most civilizations that we know anything about have eventually declined. All you have to do is travel around the world and look at the ruins of past cultures to confirm that fact. As an historian

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one has to be conscious of the possibility of tragedy. However, as a statesman, one has a duty to act as if one's country were immortal. I have acted on the assumption that our problems are soluble. The agenda we have set — in East/West relations, in arms control, in development, in Africa, Latin America, Europe and Japan, all on the same canvas and more or less at the same time — shows considerable optimism that our problems are soluble, that our country can master its problems. If setting big tasks is a sign of confidence, then I would say we have conducted an optimistic policy. But I would be irresponsible to pretend that success is guaranteed.

**MR. SOMMER:** But you do not in your policies, in your actual policies, indulge in Spenglerian visions of a decline of the West and a rise of the new barbarians.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** These quotations are invented by overambitious and unscrupulous political candidates. These are not my views.

**MR. SOMMER:** How much freedom would a new Secretary of State or, for that matter, a new President have to conduct a new foreign policy, American foreign policy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It would be basically unfortunate for the United States to pretend that every four to eight years it has the opportunity to begin a new foreign policy. Nothing could disquiet our friends more than the belief that every eight years, no matter what they do, the United States starts on an entirely new course. A great power lives in the real world. At some point its assessment of that world must reflect permanent realities. And, therefore, its margin for maneuver is limited. Of course, new people coming in can bring new ideas to familiar problems. They may be able to be more imaginative about achieving agreed ends. I'm not saying that a new Secretary is bound by the same tactics, only that one of the most important necessities for American policy is to give other countries a sense of stability. If we bring new people in from time to time, they must not rip up every tree to see whether the roots are still there. Whenever I leave office, I would certainly do my best to help my successor achieve this continuity. I do not believe that the basic references of foreign policy should be regularly challenged, unless there is an overwhelming moral issue involved.

*****