CHAPTER II

THE STRATEGIC DEBATE

I. Background: The Change in United States Strategic Doctrine.

Structural problems inevitably emerge as policy issues. Debates, which really concern political evolution, can easily appear as a strategic challenge to strategic doctrine.

So it has been with the debate about strategy within the Atlantic Alliance. To be sure, disagreements about strategy have been real enough. But their urgency is due to the fact that something deeper than the analysis of weapons systems is involved. Disputes have grown particularly intractable because the United States and its European critics have rarely talked about the same thing.

The United States has stressed the technical adequacy of its strategic views and the analytic accuracy of its strategic assessments. Our European critics have emphasized the political and psychological framework within which these decisions had to be implemented. The United States has reiterated its legal and moral commitment to the defense of Europe. Our European allies have less confidence in even the most solemn undertakings; too many of them have betrayed allies of their own not to be concerned that the stress of events might

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override obligations incurred years previously under completely different circumstances.

The sense of insecurity of most of our European allies reflected the one-sided relationship which had grown up with the Atlantic Alliance. In no other area was the dependence of Europe on the United States so great or so prolonged as in the military field. The pattern of United States-European relationships differed importantly between the economic and the military field.

With respect to European economic recovery, the United States, in effect, asked its allies to develop a common program and a method for dividing up the total available aid. Though United States representatives played an active and important advisory role, the basic scheme was European. This encouraged the emergence of a responsible group of European leaders, dedicated to Atlantic partnership and experienced in working without complexes with the United States.

In the military field the situation has always been different. Through-out the existence of NATO, strategy has been based on more or less unilateral American conceptions. The consultative role of our European allies has been

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confined in effect to the technical implementation of American views. In
contrast to the economic field, no specifically European concept of defense--
and no real sense of responsibility--developed. The West European Union,
which originally had been expected to play a role similar to that of the OEEC,
remained inactive.

There were many reasons for this state of affairs. Initially, our
European allies actively encouraged a predominant United States role.

America's hegemonial position seemed the best guarantee of our commitment to
the defense of Europe. We, in turn, were psychologically more heavily engaged
in the military than in the economic field. Heavy as the material sacrifices
required by Europe's economic chaos were, they could not compare to the con-
sequences of an eventual military occupation of Europe, which was rightly
considered a challenge to our survival. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the United States possessed a monopoly of the weapons on which by consensus of
the Alliance the common safety depended.

However valid the reasons, they brought about a relationship, which for
the long term could not be healthy. It was unprecedented that the defense of

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an area so rich and potentially so powerful as Europe should be the primary
responsibility of a country three thousand miles away and with a recent
history of isolation. On the part of our European allies this produced a
tendency to cling to the familiar as a guarantee of American constancy. It
undermined the European sense of responsibility. Our allies saw their role
as that of lobbyists trying to sway a decision not their own. The rigidity of
our European allies was inevitably a source of tensions, because in the face of
a rapidly changing technology it was impossible for any strategic doctrine to
remain static. Had our allies considered the problem of strategy as a technical
issue, they would have been concerned not when we changed our views but if we
had rigidly clung to them in new circumstances. It has been a measure of
Europe's sense of dependence that the opposite has been the case.

The United States, in turn, fell into the habit of dealing with its
European allies, except Great Britain, almost psychotherapeutically. It
tended to confuse periodic briefings and reassurance with consultation and
to muffle expressions of concern, rather than deal with the underlying causes.
This is the psychological background for the strategic debate which has been
raging since 1961.

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The impact of the change of United States strategic doctrine in 1961, is examined here. This makes it necessary to sketch the views being replaced. When the Korean War first raised the specter of a Soviet attack on Europe, NATO developed the Lisbon force goals which envisaged a largely conventional defense of Europe. These envisaged some 35 - 40 regular and some 55 - 60 reserve divisions for a total of ninety-six. It soon became apparent, however, that no European ally was prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to raise these forces.

At the same time, the advent of the Eisenhower Administration in 1953 led to a new defense policy--called the New Look--which placed much greater emphasis on nuclear forces. In 1957 the United States submitted to NATO--initially to the dismay of the Europeans--what came to be known as the Radford Plan. According to it, NATO was permanently inferior in conventional this conception in terms of strength to the hordes of easily mobilizable Soviet manpower. To try to resist a Soviet attack with conventional weapons was to adopt a strategy that emphasized Communist superiority. The defense of NATO depended on nuclear weapons. Any attack on Europe would involve general nuclear war. The purpose of local defense was primarily to delay a Soviet advance long enough for the

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To offset Soviet superiority in conventional forces, the effects of strategic nuclear war to make itself felt. Tactical nuclear weapons would be an integral part of whatever local defense might be attempted.

As a result, large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons were shipped into Europe under the so-called double-veto system, which required the consent of both the United States and the host country for a nuclear weapon to be used. Moreover, the definition of "tactical" was such that SACEUR (The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) was to be able to destroy all Soviet weapons capable of attacking Europe. The nuclear arsenal in Europe thus included weapons of a range and destructiveness indistinguishable from some of those in the arsenal of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). They could be called "tactical" only in the sense that they were stationed in Europe and not in the United States and that they were commanded by SACEUR and not by the commanding general of SAC.

According to this strategic concept, conventional weapons played a minor role. Their function was to deal with minor incursions or to determine that a full-scale Soviet attack was taking place. Though there was some talk of a "pause" before nuclear weapons might be used, the logistic system of NATO made clearer than any public declarations where the real emphasis of

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NATO strategy was. None of the conventional forces had supplies for more
than two weeks, and several national contingents had supplies for considerably
less than a week. In case of large-scale Soviet attack, nuclear weapons
would have to be used practically from the outset. "The pause," General
Norstad was reported to have observed, "will probably take place before the
outbreak of hostilities." In NATO doctrine, conventional weapons were the
"shield", nuclear weapons the "sword" of the Alliance.

Almost concurrently with the revelation of the Radford Plan in 1957,
the United States came to believe that it was inferior in long-range missiles.
In order to close this "missile gap," the United States pressed its NATO
allies to permit the installation of intermediate-range ballistic missiles on
their territory. It was argued that these were essential to the over-all
strategic posture of the West. The vulnerability of the sites was not con-
sidered decisive because the Soviets would not be able to launch a blow against
our European bases without an unacceptable risk of an all-out United States
counterblow and because a coordinated Soviet attack against U.S. overseas and
domestic bases might prove difficult to stage.

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These policies were drastically changed with the advent of a new United States Administration in 1961, Starting early in 1961 and continuing with increasing insistence, the Kennedy Administration developed a four-pronged strategic theory which has remained essentially unchanged under President Johnson.

a. **Flexible Response:** When it took office, the Kennedy Administration found itself confronted by a strategy for general war which emphasized a single, all-out response. The goal of general nuclear war, if it was forced on us, was to destroy the opposing society essentially in one blow.

The Kennedy Administration sought to replace this conception with a more differentiated approach. It attempted to develop the maximum number of options even for the contingency of general nuclear war--a strategy summed up in the phrase "flexible response." This strategy was summed up as follows by Secretary McNamara in 1962:

...our forces can be used in several different ways. We may have to retali ate with a single massive attack. Or, we may be able to use our retaliatory forces to limit damage done to ourselves, and our allies, by knocking out the enemy's bases before he has had time to launch his second salvos. We may seek to terminate a war on favorable terms by using our forces as a bargaining weapon--by threatening further attack. In any case, our large reserve of protected firepower would give

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an enemy an incentive to avoid our cities and to stop a war. Our new policy gives us the flexibility to choose among several operational plans, but does not require that we make any advance commitment with respect to doctrine or targets. We shall be committed only to a system that gives us the ability to use our forces in a controlled and deliberate way, so as best to pursue the interests of the United States, our Allies, and the rest of the Free World.¹

Administration statements about the purpose of this capability for
would be used changed from time to time and
flexible response have fluctuated and have not always been consistent. When
criticizing the nuclear forces of Britain and France, Secretary McNamara has
argued that the United States proposed to rely on a counterforce strategy,
confining its attacks to military targets:

> The United States has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.²

Throughout 1962, Secretary McNamara insisted that the United States
would be able to destroy the entire Soviet military target system even after

¹ Robert S. McNamara, Address before the Fellows of the American Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois, February 17, 1962. Quoted in

² Robert S. McNamara, Address at the Commencement Exercises, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 16, 1962.

See also statement on RS-70, *The New York Times*, March 16, 1962.

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A damage-limiting strategy appears to be the most practical and effective course for us to follow. While there are still some differences of judgment on just how large such a force should be, there is general agreement that it should be large enough to ensure the destruction, singly or in combination of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Communist satellites as national societies, under the worst possible circumstances of war outbreak that can reasonably be postulated, and, in addition, to destroy their warmaking capability so as to limit, to the extent practicable, damage to this country and to our allies.

b. Hostility to National Nuclear Forces: Whatever interpretation

objectives are defined, preconditions of flexible response was dominant, the minimum requirement for it was a [add a sentence saying why] highly centralized system of command and control. This, in effect, was inconsistent with the existence within the Alliance of strategic nuclear forces not under United States control. Thus a great deal of the opposition to the British and French nuclear forces--especially within the Pentagon--was based on considerations of strategic doctrine rather than the political concerns of nuclear proliferation. Said Secretary McNamara:

> We are convinced that a general nuclear war target system is indivisible, and if, despite all our efforts, nuclear war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vital nuclear capabilities, while retaining reserve forces, all centrally controlled. We know that the same forces which

1

House Appropriations Subcommittee, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965, 88th Congress, 2nd Sess., Part 4, pp. 25-28.

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are targeted on ourselves are also targeted on our allies. Our own strategic retaliatory forces are prepared to respond against these forces, wherever they are and whatever their targets. This mission is assigned not only in fulfillment of our treaty commitments but also because the character of nuclear war compels it. More specifically, the U.S. is as much concerned with that portion of Soviet nuclear striking power that can reach Western Europe as with that portion that also can reach the United States. In short, we have undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on a global basis. This will continue to be our objective. In the execution of this mission, the weapons in the European theater are only one resource among many.¹

President Kennedy described the French nuclear program as "inimical" to NATO. Secretary McNamara called European nuclear forces "dangerous," "expensive," "prone to obsolescence" and "lacking in credibility." Under Secretary Ball has criticized these nuclear forces because "the road towards nuclear proliferation has no logical ending."

At first, these attacks were directed against the French nuclear program alone. However, they logically apply also to the British strategic forces which have been in existence for over a decade. Robert Bowie, one of the most eloquent defenders of official nuclear policy, has made this

¹ Robert S. McNamara, University of Michigan, June 16, 1962, op.cit.

² George Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Summer 1964, p. 211.

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 explicit. The provision of the Nassau Agreement, which permits Britain to
use its nuclear forces at its discretion if "supreme national interests are
at stake," has been strongly criticized. In short, the requirement of
central control is interpreted to mean that strategic nuclear forces should
be "integrated" in a way that forecloses the technical possibility of inde-
pendent use: If the nuclear forces of our allies are to exist at all--and
the clear United States preference is that they be abolished--they must be
an adjunct to United States strategic forces and under what amounts to
American control.

c. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: United States strategic doctrine has shown considerable ambivalence about tactical nuclear weapons--previously considered the key element of the military establishment on the Continent. On the one hand, the tactical nuclear weapons on the Continent have been increased--according to official Pentagon estimates by some sixty per cent.

Robert Bowie, "Tensions Within the Alliance: Atlantic Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1963, pp. 66.

, "Strategy & Atlantic Alliance," *International Organization*, Special issue on the *Atlantic Community*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1963), pp. 722-726.

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On the other hand, tactical nuclear weapons do not really fit into the Administration's strategic concept. In the spring of 1961, Secretary McNamara said that limited war in effect excluded the use of nuclear weapons. "I think by 'limited war' we simply mean war that is carried on, for the most part, with non-nuclear weapons. . . " The same theme was repeated by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric: "I, for one, have never believed in a so-called limited nuclear war. I just don't know how you build a limit into it once you start using any kind of nuclear bang."

If any nuclear war was likely to be general, it followed that the Administration's strictures applied to national nuclear forces also applied to the tactical nuclear weapons on the continent of Europe. Tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of front-line units are extremely difficult to subject to the central command and control envisaged by Pentagon doctrine. Moreover, they are too vulnerable to serve as reliable second-strike weapons.

1 Robert S. McNamara, U.S. House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee, Department of Defense, Appropriations for 1962, Hearings 87th Congress, 1st Session 1961. (Part 3), p. 136.

2 *New York Times*, June 7, 1961, p. 9.

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Thus Administration statements insisted that the tactical nuclear

nuclear weapons in Europe were not required to fight a general nuclear war. And they

have warned against relying on tactical nuclear weapons for local defense.

Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis)

said on February 10, 1963:

> There has been in recent years the development of small nuclear weapons having yields equivalent to a few thousand tons of TNT or less. The day will come, if it has not already when there will be nuclear weapons of smaller yield than the largest high explosive weapons. When that day comes, will there no longer be a distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons? Some have argued to that effect. But they are mistaken. There is and will remain an important distinction, a "firebreak" if you like, between nuclear and non-nuclear war, a recognizable qualitative distinction that both combatants can recognize and agree upon, if they want to agree upon one. And in the nuclear age they will have a very powerful incentive to agree upon this distinction and limitation, because if they do not there does not appear to be another easily recognizable limitation on weapons--no other obvious "firebreak"--all the way up the destructive spectrum to large-scale thermonuclear war.

Secretary McNamara pursued a similar theme when he spoke without much confidence

of the prospect for tactical nuclear war:

> Even if tactical nuclear warfare can be limited, below some ill-defined threshold of strategic exchange, the key fact is that if the West initiates such warfare in the

1

Speech reprinted in U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Military Procurement Authorization: Fiscal Year 1964; Hearings on H.R. 2440, 88th Congress, 1st Session 1963, pp. 166-174.

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future, it must be expected to be bilateral in any
theater which engaged the Soviet Union. 1

d. Conventional Defense: If European national forces were irrelevant or worse and tactical nuclear weapons overvalued, the major contribution of Europe has to be in the field of conventional defense. This argument has been pressed insistently. "The decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons," testified Secretary McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee in January 1963, "should not be forced upon us simply because we have no other way to cope with a particular situation."

The corollary was that the most desirable objective would be to resist a Soviet conventional attack with purely conventional means. Secretary McNamara added that existing NATO conventional capabilities were adequate to deal with any "major incursion." Nevertheless, he urged that they be strengthened to give us "capabilities for dealing with even larger Soviet attacks"-- in other words a massive, sustained Soviet offensive. This view was made explicit by Alain C. Enthoven a little later that year:

¹ Department of State Bulletin, 9 December, 1963, XLIX, 1276, p. 917.

² Robert S. McNamara, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, January 30, 1963

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We will have no sensible alternative to building
up our conventional forces to the point at which they
can safely resist all forms of non-nuclear aggression.
Our forces will be adequate if we can never be forced
because of weakness to be the first to resort to nuclear
weapons. 1

The shift in emphasis of United States strategic doctrine was vividly
symbolized most strongly by the Nassau Communique which reversed the
traditional concepts of "shield" and "sword" in NATO doctrine. In this
unilateral change, the nuclear weapons became the "shield" and the conven-
tional weapons the "sword" of the Alliance--implying that the United States
envisaged an essentially conventional defense for Europe.

1 Alain C. Enthoven, Address to the Loyola University Forum for National Affairs, Los Angeles, February 10, 1963.

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## II. The Nature of the Strategic Debate.

The debate produced by this new doctrine was at first given a slightly unreal quality by the desire of all parties to maintain an appearance of unity. Thus when the Kennedy Administration early in 1961 sought to induce NATO to strengthen its conventional forces up to the thirty divisions agreed upon in 1957, our allies inquired whether the United States was reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons. We replied that the proposed build-up did not involve any reduced reliance on what had come to be called "The Deterrent." On the contrary, the strategic striking force was being expanded and made more invulnerable. The non-nuclear build-up, far from diminishing the credibility of our nuclear power, would actually enhance it.

According to official American statements, the NATO policy being promulgated was not news. We were simply asking our allies to live up to their previous commitment. The goal was flexibility of response.

1. Speech by Secretary of the Army Stahr to the NATO Parliamentarians Conference, November 13, 1961. Cited in *New York Times*, November 14, 1961.

2. Secretary of Defense McNamara, February 17, 1962, Speech to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Chicago. Cited in *New York Times*, February 18, 1962 and Department of State Bulletin

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This curious dialogue, in which a change of emphasis in United States policy was defended in terms of traditional doctrines of NATO, in many ways increased the uneasiness of our allies. The question was inescapable why conventional forces had to be strengthened if the reliance on nuclear deterrence remained unimpaired. If NATO doctrine continued to envision the use of nuclear weapons almost from the outset, did not the American effort to build up conventional strength involve a dual risk? Even thirty divisions would probably not be enough to stop a full scale Soviet attack, And such a build-up might raise doubts about the American nuclear commitment and thus might make aggression more likely. The result was a paradoxical argument about whether an increase in NATO's strength would weaken its over-all defensive posture.

Some thoughtful observers have argued that this was due to the over-emphasis on nuclear weapons in United States strategic doctrine prior to 1961.

As the degree to which the United States reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons, our European allies would soon take a more balanced view of the strategic problem.

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The opposite is likely to be more nearly correct. As long as NATO strategy was nuclear and the United States had no obvious alternative to nuclear retaliation, the Europeans were ready to acquiesce in the hegemonial position of the United States. They reasoned that this was the price to be paid for the automaticity of the American response. However, one of the essential characteristics of the doctrine of flexible response was that American nuclear reaction would occur--if at all--deliberately and in stages.

The very qualities that made the new doctrine desirable for Americans were bound for Europeans to raise issues of sovereignty and questions of how the American commitment would be interpreted under the stress of nuclear war.

This, in turn, brought to a head a difference in perspective between the American and the European conception of NATO which had existed since its beginning. What gave the dispute its particular urgency was that the advent of a new, highly analytical American Administration coincided with the growing strength and self-confidence of Europe and the deliberate policy of President de Gaulle to assert a more independent role.

The basic psychological problem was that throughout the existence of NATO the military establishment on the Continent was seen in symbolic terms

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by the Europeans and in military terms by the United States. When the Korean
War seemed to indicate that Soviet aggression might be imminent, both sides
of the Atlantic made a serious effort to turn NATO into a more effective
military instrument. However, given the enormous disparity in military and
economic strength between the United States and Europe, the primary concern
of the European countries was to commit the United States to their defense.
They saw in NATO above all a means to obtain American protection, by which was
meant American nuclear protection.

However, the Europeans had too much experience with the tenuousness
of formal commitments not to strive for more tangible guarantees. This led to
pressures for the stationing of American troops in Europe. European reasoning
was similar to that ascribed to a French marshal in 1912 when he was asked how
many British troops he wanted for the outbreak of a European war. He is re-
ported to have replied: "We need only one, who we will make sure is killed
on the first day of the war." In the nuclear age, the price of a guarantee
has risen to something like five divisions.

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With so many American troops permanently stationed in Europe, it was
only sensible to try to give them some meaningful military mission. Even
during the period of the doctrine of massive retaliation, NATO forces were
larger than the prevailing strategic concept seemed to demand. Indeed, the
number was somewhat inconsistent with it. Dispite the United States commit-
ment to a strategy of massive nuclear retaliation, we constantly pressed for
a European contribution of ground forces. The Europeans, though they agreed
to a succession of NATO force goals, never really believed in the doctrines
used to rationalize them. Rather they considered their military contribution
a form of fee paid for United States nuclear protection. The Europeans agreed
to our requests. But they tried to see to it that their actual contributions
would be large enough to induce us to keep a substantial military establish-
ment in Europe, yet not so high as to provide a real alternative to nuclear
retaliation. They were opposed to giving the conventional forces a central
military mission; but they also resisted any hint of American withdrawal.

This ambivalence was brought into the open by the shift in United
States strategic doctrine in 1961. The American attempt to strengthen

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conventional forces had the paradoxical consequence of bringing to the fore
the issue of *nuclear* control which for many Europeans had always been the
crux of the matter. For the first time, U.S. strategic views were publicly
challenged, at first hesitantly, then ever more explicitly. Europe had now
gained sufficient strength and confidence so that the mere enunciation of an
American policy no longer guaranteed its acceptance. The pre-emptory way in
which the United States proceeded added ruffled feelings to substantive con-
cerns. And France added fuel to the flames by giving European misgivings
their most extreme formulation.

But, if French policy has deliberately sharpened conflicts, the United
States tendency to turn an essentially psychological issue into a technical
one has unintentionally exacerbated disagreements beyond their intrinsic
significance. United States spokesmen often leave the impression that dis-
agreement is due to the ignorance of our allies and that it is destined to
yield ultimately before extensive briefings and insistent reiteration.

But the real issue is not that the Europeans fail to understand the
notion of flexible response. They simply reject it for themselves. When

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the issue is Asia or Latin America, Europeans favor an even more flexible
response than the United States. With respect to the defense of Europe,
their attitude is more rigid. Europeans are likely to agree with the premise
about Soviet intentions which was offered by Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze
(then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs):

Communists demonstrate both a proclivity for bold political actions against a background of impressive military force and also careful calculation of risks and a staunch desire to keep events under their own control. Because they can be expected sensibly to avoid high risks of nuclear war or events leading to it, their military actions against the West at any one moment are likely to be controlled in size and aimed at limited objectives. In such circumstances, NATO will surely wish to have the choice of avoiding immediate use of nuclear weapons; it would be neither wise nor credible for us to build our doctrine and our forces on the premise that every pinprick must be met by nuclear war.¹

The problem is that most Europeans refuse to consider an attack in Europe as
confined to limited objectives. If Secretary Nitze is correct in his view that
the Soviets recoil before a high risk of nuclear war, then a limited attack
in Europe is likely only if the American nuclear guarantee has lost some of
its credibility. The European reaction to this state of affairs is more likely

1

Paul H. Nitze, Address before the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, Cleveland, Ohio, March 2, 1963, Department of State Bulletin

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to be to provide themselves with nuclear forces of their own than to build
up conventional strength.

The American response has been to argue that a build-up of conventional
forces, far from weakening the resolve to use nuclear weapons, in fact demon-
strated an increased readiness to resort to nuclear weapons. Said Secretary
McNamara:

> If we have shown ourselves able and ready to engage in
> large-scale non-nuclear warfare in response to a Communist
> provocation, the Soviets can hardly misconstrue two
> things: first, that we regard this provocation as a chal-
> lenge to our vital interests; and second, that we will
> use nuclear weapons to prevail if this becomes necessary.¹

This estimate has left many Europeans unconvinced. There is no
question that increasing the reserve of conventional divisions in the United
States by three or four divisions does enhance the credibility of nuclear
threats for the defense of, say, South East Asia because it gives us the
means to commit our prestige. In Europe, however, where the United States is
already physically committed, a few additional divisions may appear as too

Robert A. McNamara, *Address before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Chicago, Illinois, February 17, 1962.*

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little to affect the conventional balance and increase the concern about
possible American reluctance to face nuclear war in the defense of Europe.

But while European concerns were understandable and inherent in the
relationship which had grown up between Europe and the United States in the
strategic field, some reassessment of NATO doctrine had become inevitable by
1961. It was not in our power to avoid it. It would have been inexcusable not
to draw conclusions from the increasing nuclear forces on both sides. The
American failure was psychological obtuseness and the inability to realize that
this reassessment was bound to raise explicitly the issue of sovereignty which
had been muted as long as the United States possessed an effective monopoly over
the weapons considered relevant to the defense of Europe. The European
mistake was to attempt to ensure our constancy by freezing us into a posture
made
okale
superceded by a new technology. The growth of Soviet retaliatory power and
improvements in its invulnerability made a reconsideration of NATO strategy
inevitable. The original NATO strategy was based on United States strategic
preponderance. Throughout the Fifties, the United States was in a position to
win a general war whether it struck first or second. It could destroy the

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Soviet means of retaliation at first at minimum, later at acceptable cost.

This superiority enabled us not only to prevent an attack on the United
States but also to protect our allies by what amounted to a unilateral

American guarantee. The Soviet Union did possess superior conventional strength.

But it could not use its ground forces because such an action might have triggered the Strategic Air Command. It could not attack the United States at the same time as Europe--even after it became technically feasible--because, while this would have increased American losses, a Soviet defeat would nevertheless have been inevitable. Throughout its history, the security of NATO had thus depended essentially on the ability of the United States to destroy the Soviet retaliatory power--technically speaking, on the American capacity to conduct a counterforce strategy.

Any prudent planning for NATO in the 1960's was bound to start from the assumption that the utility of a counterforce strategy for the defense of Europe was bound to decline. Indeed, Secretary McNamara's statements in 1962 about the efficacy of a counterforce strategy, while technically correct, was misleading about the real state of affairs. It is possible to accept the

[N]

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statements of American defense leaders that the United States is superior in strategic striking power and intends to remain so. But the strategic and political significance of this superiority is certain to diminish. For the immediate future--as long as the Soviet missile force remains relatively small--a counterforce strategy may remain technically feasible. This situation should be treated, however, as a temporary respite permitting an adjustment to inevitable realities, not as an excuse for continuing to depend on traditional policies.

For one thing, if a counterforce strategy is to retain any chance of success, the location of the targets must be known in advance. This is particularly true of missiles, which cannot search for their objectives. Given the nature of Soviet society and the vastness of Soviet territory, our knowledge of Soviet launching sites is likely to be incomplete. Moreover, the more sophisticated missile systems now in operation are dispersed, thus preventing one attacking missile from destroying more than one on the ground. Also, many missiles are protected in hardened underground sites, thus requiring more than one attacking missile to destroy a defending one. Other missiles

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will be mobile or based at sea, creating the need for coordinating many dif-
ferent forms of attack. These factors will greatly magnify the force required
for a successful counterforce strike.

The constantly growing complexity of staging a missile attack is bound
to reduce the political utility of a counterforce strategy--perhaps even faster
than is warranted by purely military considerations. In the face of risks which
are certain to mount dramatically, it will grow ever more difficult to con-
vince political leaders that they should rely on a strategy based on intel-
ligence which is fragmentary and using large numbers of weapons for which there
is no operational experience in wartime. Even if the percentage of the opposing
strategic force, which we are able to destroy, remains constant throughout
the 1960's--an unwarrantedly optimistic assumption--the absolute number which
is left will rise. Thus, the Soviet capability to devastate NATO countries
in a counterblow will inevitably increase.

To pretend that these factors will not reduce any President's readiness
to initiate general war would be sheer irresponsibility on our part and a
convenient delusion for some of our allies. Even our best efforts will not

[Y]

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prevent the credibility of a counterforce strategy from declining in the years
ahead. It will grow ever more difficult to convince the Soviets that such a
capability exists or that we are prepared to run the risks it involves. This
problem has been described by Secretary McNamara as follows:

> Fully hard ICBM sites can be destroyed but only at great
cost in terms of the numbers of offensive weapons required
to dig them out. Furthermore, in a second strike situation
we would be attacking, for the most part, empty sites from
which the missiles had already been fired.

> The value of trying to provide a capability to destroy a
very high proportion of Soviet hard ICBM sites becomes
even more questionable in view of the expected increase
in the Soviet missile launching submarine force. . . ¹

But if the United States was correct in insisting on the implications
of its new vulnerability, it was less sensitive to the political and
psychological implications of its new insight. When both sides possess
reasonably well-protected inter-continental missiles, the structure of NATO
as it has developed in the Fifties must alter. The traditional impetus to
alliance policy that the *immediate* risk of conflict was less than the ultimate
danger of facing a preponderant enemy alone is bound to erode to some extent.

1

Senate Armed Services Committee, *Hearings, Military Procurement Authorization Fiscal Year 1964*, 88th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 40-41.

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When nuclear war risks the lives of tens of millions, it is at least conceivable that the outbreak of a conflict will be considered the worst contingency by some allies. It is not necessary to agree with General Gallois that this condition ends _all_ possibility of the Alliance to recognize that it brings about a drastically changed situation. Ultimately, it _should_ lead to a merging of sovereignty within the Atlantic area. But until this comes to pass, the age of mutual invulnerability of retaliatory forces and of mutual vulnerability of civilian populations is bound to require a serious readjustment of traditional Alliance patterns.

A gap has grown up between the technical requirements of the new strategy and the political realities of an alliance of sovereign states. The trend of the new United States military policy made the United States nuclear commitment depend less and less on the automaticity of military operations and more and more on a decision to be taken in the circumstances of the moment.

The United States tendency has been to try to escape this issue by maintaining that no difference of views between us and our European allies could possibly arise. But since the decision would have to be made under the unprecedented

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stress of nuclear war, the reassurance lacks persuasiveness. Instead, the
dilemma of sovereignty--of the unilateral right to change one's views--has
inevitably been emphasized.

The central command and control system which is the key feature of the
doctrine of flexible response is American. The United States would deter-
mine--to the extent that the enemy cooperates--how and with what weapons the
war is to be fought and on what terms it will be concluded. The "hot line" is
in operation only between Washington and Moscow. To entrust the most fateful
decision any nation may have to make to another sovereign state creates
enormous insecurities side by side with pressures to change what must be
considered as an unnatural relationship according to traditional notions of
sovereignty.

The notion that this particular difficulty can be avoided by the build-
up of conventional forces has proved to be mistaken. This is well illustrated
by the concepts which have been used to justify the strengthening of NATO's
conventional forces each of which finally raised the nuclear issue, simply in
another form. The purpose of the conventional forces was claimed to be to

[Y]

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enforce a "pause" in military operations in order to permit the Soviets to "appreciate the wider risks involved." The ground forces, in other words, are supposed to define a "threshold" below which nuclear weapons would not have to be used.

These arguments inevitably raised questions about the continued validity of the American nuclear guarantee. If American nuclear superiority was unimpaired, a conventional build-up was unnecessary. If a conventional build-up did prove necessary, it must be because the nuclear balance had shifted against the United States, at least relatively. The tendency by American spokesmen to try to carry water on both shoulders--to insist on the preponderant power of the American strategic arsenal and also on the need for a conventional build-up--added fuel to suspicions.

Moreover, it was at least questionable that at the end of a given period of conventional operations the Soviets would confront more clearly the wider risks of nuclear war--as official American spokesmen mentioned. If a full-scale conventional attack were to occur, the Soviets presumably would have discounted the threat of nuclear retaliation.

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attack in Central Europe is hardly likely to occur inadvertently. But if the
attack did take place, why should our bargaining position be better at the
end of the period of 30 days (the usualtraget date for the build-up)--when
our forces would have presumably been decimated--than at the beginning? What
if at that point the Soviets offered to negotiate after having gained possession
of their prize? If nuclear war was too risky at the start of the conflict,
why should it not be even more risky when the local issue has in effect al-
ready been decided and when the devastation caused by a nuclear exchange may
make the local situation seem irrelevant?

If, on the other hand, it was argued that the Soviets would never dare
to defeat NATO's ground forces lest this trigger a nuclear exchange, what was
gained by increasing the number of NATO divisions? In other words, strength-
ening conventional forces does not avoid--and it may even sharpen--the political
problem
aspect of nuclear control.

The same difficulty applies to the concept of a "threshold." This
was defined by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric, as follows:
"The current doctrine is that if NATO forces were about to be overwhelmed by
non-nuclear attacks from the bloc countries, NATO would make use of nuclear

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arms.¹ This raised two questions: (a) Who determines whether the NATO conventional forces are being overwhelmed? (b) Assuming this determination is made, how are nuclear weapons then to be used?

With respect to the first of these issues, the question arose about situations in which NATO forces were simply pushed back without being overwhelmed. Was this then the threshold for nuclear war? What if the Soviets massed clearly overwhelming power in Eastern Europe but had not yet launched an attack? If nuclear weapons were useful to prevent this contingency why not others? Or it could be that in an otherwise successful defense, individual units of, say, division size would suffer setbacks. Given the dispersal of nuclear weapons in Europe to divisional levels and below, it was likely that the location of nuclear stockpiles and delivery vehicles would decide the question of using nuclear weapons. In short, the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe has been inconsistent with the announced United States strategic preference. This raised doubts about what was a better key to United States

¹ *New York Times*, June 7, 1961.

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intentions: the pronouncements of our highest defense officials or the
disposition of our forces?

Assuming, however, that it is possible to make a clear determination
that NATO's conventional forces are being overwhelmed, this only shifted
how nuclear weapons are to be used and who makes the decision.
the concern back to the issue of nuclear control. If nuclear weapons were to
be used only when NATO forces were at the point of being defeated, what was
the sense in the nuclear establishment in Europe? If we assume that both sides
have tactical nuclear weapons in adequate numbers and sizes, it is far from
clear that the employment of these weapons would favor the defense at that
stage of a battle. After a breakthrough has been achieved, battlefield
employment of nuclear weapons may well favor the offense, whose units can by
then be dispersed while the defense has to move its units into predictable
areas. In short, if nuclear weapons are to be used tactically at all, it is
likely that the optimum, perhaps the only appropriate, moment is early in
military operations, or at least while the ground forces are reasonably intact
and Soviet reserve forces have not yet appeared on the battlefield. If
nuclear weapons are not to be used tactically, what is the sense of increasing

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their number in Europe? Failure to answer these questions--or to treat
tactical nuclear weapons as merely a form of psychological reassurance for
Europeans--guarantees a perpetuation of all insecurities.

Finally, in the debate over the level of conventional forces, Europeans
were bound to be less restrained than they had been in discussions about
nuclear strategy. With respect to nuclear weapons, the United States was
recognized to possess superior technical knowledge and the advantage of more
intensive studies. No such advantage is thought to exist with respect to con-
ventional war. Rightly or wrongly, many Europeans have been convinced that
American claims about the feasibility of conventional defense are exaggerated
or at least too mechanical. For example, some United States analysts have
argued that a sustained conventional defense is within reach, assuming that
the offensive requires a superiority of about 3 : 1. This assumption, strangely
reminiscent of certain French theories prior to World War II, cannot, even if
valid, be applied so literally. The attacker does not require a three to one
supriority all along the front. He can win by massing troops suddenly at a
decisive point and overwhelming it. In conventional war, victories have very

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often been won when forces were roughly equal. (Germany, after all, achieved
its victories in World Wars I and II with numerically inferior forces.)

1

The stress on conventional defense also emphasized crucial political
factors. European history is replete with examples of the brittleness of
alliances. In too many wars—including World War II—the collapse of one
national contingent led to the defeat of all others. Europeans cannot forget
that an alliance can be no stronger than its weakest link. Whatever effort
individual countries may make in the conventional field, they will—if they
are serious about national defense—consider the consequences of the collapse
of one or more of their allies. This will turn their thoughts to obtaining
reinsurance, and, among the available means, some form of nuclear autonomy is
likely to suggest themselves.

This will be magnified by the fact that the choice between nuclear
and conventional war is no longer entirely up to the West. Whatever its
preference, NATO has to prepare for the introduction of nuclear weapons by

1
For a splendid analysis of this problem of the conventional defense of Europe see Bernard Brodie

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the opponent. Any war will be nuclear, whether or not nuclear weapons are used, in the sense that deployment--even of conventional forces--will have to take place in a nuclear environment. The risk of escalation can never be eliminated, and this, too, leads to pressures for independent nuclear forces.

The issue of conventional forces has been muted since 1964 because revised United States intelligence estimates indicated that Soviet ground forces had been vastly overestimated and that a conventional build-up was not necessary after all. (The fluctuations of U.S. intelligence estimates raised the question, however, whether they guided or followed American policy.) But it lasted long enough to make the issue of nuclear control one of the central unresolved problems of the Alliance.

In that debate, the United States made the error of treating the sovereignty of its partners as an unfortunate historical relic of no real significance for strategic planning. As long as the United States insists on central control over the nuclear weapons of the Alliance, as well as undiluted sovereignty, the European incentive is bound to be exactly the opposite of ours. Rather than permit a "pause" for "appreciating the wider risks

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involved," Europeans prefer to force us to make our response as automatic as
possible.

This problem has little to do with whether the United States could
afford to give up Europe. It is rooted in the nature of sovereignty and made
more acute by the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Robert Bowie, one of
the most eloquent spokesmen of the dominant school of U.S. thought, criticized
British nuclear policy before the Assembly of the Western European Union as
follows: "Britain has retained its national command structure and the right
to withdraw them at its option. This means that they certainly could not be
counted on by any of the others to be available in case of need." (Emphasis
added.) If this concern is real regarding British nuclear forces, which are,
after all, assigned to NATO, it must be even stronger regarding U.S. strategic
forces which remain under exclusive American control.

At the same time, the rigid adherence to past doctrine on the part of
some European critics and the deliberate tendency of others--especially the

¹ Proceedings of Western European Union Assembly, Ninth Ordinary Session, December 3, 1963.

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French--to score debating points has not helped matters. The growing strength of Soviet retaliatory power was bound to affect a strategic doctrine based on the concept of Western nuclear hegemony. Whatever the validity of American strategic views, the tendency to treat established NATO doctrine as sacroscant is dangerous. European ambivalence is reflected in the demands for increased responsibility which are not coupled with an equivalent readiness to assume commensurate burdens. United States proposals for a strengthening of conventional forces have been treated with the same panic as later hints that some American troops might be withdrawn. Most Europeans do not want to give conventional force a larger role because they fear it will diminish the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent. But they also have resisted a reduction of United States forces because to many Europeans these represent the surest guarantee of American nuclear protection. It is just as difficult for Europeans to face the fact that, in the long run, these attitudes are incompatible as it has been for Americans to admit that increased emphasis on local defense is inconsistent either with United States hegemony on nuclear matters or with undiluted American sovereignty.

[Y]

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The problem can then be summed up as follows: Exclusive U.S. control of nuclear strategy is politically and psychologically (incompatible) with a strategy of multiple choices or flexible response. The European refusal to assign a meaningful military mission to conventional forces in Europe is (incompatible) with the indefinite retention of large U.S. forces there. If the United States prizes a conventional response sufficiently, it will have to concede Europe autonomy in nuclear control. Or else it will have to move to an effective sharing of sovereignty. If the Europeans want to insist on an automatic nuclear response, a reconsideration of our conventional deployment on the Continent will become inevitable. Refusal to face these facts will guarantee a perpetuation of present disputes and increasing disarray within NATO.

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### III. National Nuclear Forces.

The already difficult issue of adapting NATO strategy has been further complicated by the United States onslaught on the national nuclear forces of its close allies, Great Britain and France. Great Britain, since 1951, and France since 1958 have been engaged in a program to develop nuclear capabilities under their own control. In 1954, an amendment to the McMahon Act made possible United States nuclear assistance to Great Britain. This corrected an inequity in the original law which, despite close war-time collaboration in nuclear research between Britain and the United States, prohibited cooperation with foreign countries. The provisions of the amended McMahon Act have never been extended to France. This discrimination has been a constant source of irritation in Franco-American relations--and would have been regardless of which government was in power in France.

¹ Of course, the U.S. position was far from capricious. It was brought to a head by the proposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to replace his tactical aircraft with medium-range missiles. This seemed to many American officials to open the door another crack to nuclear proliferation. This problem will be discussed below. See Chapter IV, p.

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Starting in 1961 United States policy, which had been tolerant of the nuclear programs of its allies, grew increasingly hostile. The French nuclear program was described as irrelevant and harmful to the Alliance. The same criticisms, if more muted, were applied to the British nuclear program.

The tension inherent in an attack on major defense programs of two close allies exacerbated the debate about other aspects of NATO strategic doctrine --particularly the role of conventional weapons.

United States opposition to the British and French nuclear programs took the form of the following major arguments: There was no strategic need for national nuclear forces other than those of the United States within NATO, since all significant targets were already covered by United States strategic forces. National nuclear forces were divisive because only distrust of United States intentions could induce a country to develop a nuclear arsenal of its own. They were wasteful and would divert resources from the conventional build-up which should be the primary NATO effort. They would promote nuclear proliferation. Just as France imitated the example of Britain, the argument ran, so Germany would follow the lead of France. Italy and other

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European countries would then not be far behind. Finally, it was argued that national nuclear forces would make impossible the flexible response which was the key to United States strategy for general war. National nuclear forces were too small and too vulnerable to concentrate on military targets. But if they struck population centers, the enemy in rage and frustration would retaliate against the civilian population of the United States.

Regardless of the merits of these arguments, they made a bitter, divisive debate inevitable. A full-scale theoretical onslaught on major programs of close allies impelled their governments to elaborate a doctrine to justify them, and this was bound to stress differences in perspective with the United States. The impact of United States views thus went far beyond the technical arguments in which they were couched. To ask a government to confess the bankruptcy of a policy which has been pursued for over a decade at heavy expense is to undermine its domestic position and to produce reactions of hostility. We might ask ourselves how we would react if an allied government publicly and repeatedly insisted that a major U.S. program is "divisive," "dangerous" and "useless."

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Thus United States strategic doctrine became involved in the domestic disputes of close allies. This led to a curious reversal of electoral positions within these countries. Groups, heretofore not noted for their interest in defense programs, began to use American arguments against governments which had until then been most responsible for close NATO ties. Those comfortable with United States views were often those who had in the past had neutralist leanings. They did not find it difficult to reconcile themselves to an American assumption of almost exclusive responsibility for their defense. Those taking the defense problem seriously were driven to one of two conclusions: Either the United States had to be prepared for a surrender of sovereignty similar to that it was urging on its allies. Failing this they were driven increasingly to demand some degree of autonomy in the nuclear field

Moreover, United States arguments, while presented against the background of great technical competence, suffered from a difference in perspective between us and some of our European allies. A capacity to conduct counterforce nuclear operations is likely to appear attractive to a country of

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continental extent like the United States. In densely populated Europe, the distinction between military and civilian targets becomes more ephemeral. While not objecting to such a strategy as *one* possible option, our European nuclear allies see no compelling reasons to subordinate *all* considerations to what may well be a very remote contingency.

This is all the more true because United States pronouncements are postulating a scenario for general nuclear war that hardly appears as the most probable danger. In his presentation to the Armed Services Committee in 1963, as well as in 1964, Secretary McNamara described only *one* contingency for general nuclear war: a full-scale Soviet nuclear attack on the United States and (perhaps) Europe concentrating on military targets. The United States would then respond in kind.

But it is not clear what could possibly tempt even a rash Soviet planner into such a course or why the Soviets would pursue a counterforce strategy if they did. As long as the present disparity in numbers between Soviet and American strategic forces remains, there is no conceivable gain for the Soviets in launching a blow against the United States strategic

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forces. Even if every Soviet missile destroyed an American one, the Soviets
would have disarmed themselves while attacking and find themselves con-
fronted with a large residual American force.

If it is argued, however, that the United States would resort to a
counterforce strategy first in response to a major provocation, such as a
full-scale conventional attack on Europe, then it is far from evident that
the Soviets would have the incentive to spare United States cities on which

1
American doctrine seems to count. For the strategy outlined by Secretary
McNamara cannot be an optimum strategy for both sides. Soviet military

1
In fact, in his testimony before the Armed Services Committees in January
1964, Secretary McNamara has usually associated the defense of Europe
with **tactical**, not **strategic**, nuclear weapons should the conventional
forces prove inadequate. Thus, in his report to the Armed Services Com-
mittees in January 1964, Secretary McNamara said:

"A large-scale Soviet attack on Western Europe . . . would be extremely dangerous to our own security and would compel us to respond immediately with whatever force was needed to halt the onslaught, even with **tactical nuclear weapons, if necessary**."

And a little further on, when discussing General Purpose Forces,
Secretary McNamara said:

"(1) The forces envisioned in NATO plans for the end of
1966 . . . could hold an initial Soviet attack on the central front
using non-nuclear means alone. (2) Until these requirements are met,
the defense of Europe against an all-out Soviet attack, even if such
an attack were limited to non-nuclear means, would require the use of
**tactical** weapons on our part."

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theorists have consistently denied the possibility of the kind of war described by Pentagon officials. This would not be decisive were it not in accord with the realities of the strategic equation. For a war of attrition, even if it were technically feasible, cannot be in the interest of the weaker side. As the United States reduced the Soviet retaliatory force, the sensible strategy for the Soviets would be to begin attacking American cities, perhaps "controlling" their response by destroying some smaller towns first. To be sure, we could retaliate in kind. But whatever the significance of the notion of superiority in a war confined to military targets, there can be little doubt that a saturation point is reached relatively rapidly when civilian populations become the objective.

This is why the allies of the United States have been so unenthusiastic about the argument that national nuclear forces are dangerous because they are unsuitable for discriminating targeting. As has been frequently pointed out by Pentagon spokesmen, the Soviet delivery vehicles aimed at Europe far exceed in number those deployed against the United States. It has also been emphasized that even a "controlled" nuclear war would produce far greater

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casualties exceeding the tens of millions estimated for North America. In
these conditions, the prospect of "controlling" general war cannot be an
incentive to the Europeans to give up their own nuclear programs; the
contrary is likely to be the case.

This is not to say that all United States arguments have been mistaken
and the attitudes of the defenders of European national forces have been
correct. The danger of nuclear proliferation is real though it may be doubted
that nuclear weapons would have spread to Germany simply by a kind of
logical extension of French arguments. Also, the French have not helped
matters by pressing their case with a Cartesian rationalism that sometimes
threatens to turn valid arguments into parodies. It is one thing to argue
the undeniable fact that in the age of nuclear plenty the old notions of
nuclear protection must be modified and that a redistribution of responsi-
bilities on nuclear matters is required. It is quite another to insist that
this ends all possibility of one country's coming to the assistance of another.
Both sides have had a tendency to set up straw men for debating purposes: the
French, the bogy of our complete unreliability; the United States, the futility
of the French quest for complete self-sufficiency.

nuclear

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[Y]

The strategic debate between Europe and the United States on nuclear matters has thus had some of the attributes of what the French call "a dialogue of the deaf." Misunderstanding has been persistent because the two sides have spoken of different things. Frustration has mounted because within its framework both partners have been right. The United States has by far the better of the technical arguments. Efficiency is indeed promoted by a division of labor. On strictly strategic grounds, the United States doctrine is probably more nearly correct than the alternative of its European critics.

What the United States has overlooked is that NATO is not a single political unit, nor is it likely to be one in any foreseeable future.

The blind spot of the United States has been its unwillingness to face the political implications of its strategic views: an Atlantic area strategically integrated, as we propose, requires a merging of sovereignty far beyond anything proposed so far. It is impossible for the United States to demand that its allies give up what has, heretofore, been considered a chief attribute of sovereignty--the possibility of an autonomous defense--while the United States jealously guards its complete freedom of decision. The

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blind spot of America's European critics has been their reluctance to confront
the strategic consequences of their political views: that the present scale
of their national effort is inadequate for the role envisaged by them.

In this manner, the strategic debate is a symbol of a more central
problem: whether the United States is willing to move towards a real
merging of sovereignty. Or, failing that, whether the United States is
prepared to face an autonomous European center of decision in strategy and
policy and to rely on a political process to relate European purposes to our
own. If the United States is ready for either of these steps, much of the
frame-work of the current debate will be drastically altered. If not, the
dilemma outlined in this chapter is likely to continue. The United States
will be forced to suggest remedies which may temporarily obscure the issue,
only to have it reappear in (more acute forms) later.

Of course, we may have no choice and Europe may become autonomous what-
ever our policy. Insofar as European developments depend on American
actions, however, it is important to realize that each choice has its problems
An autonomous Europe--whatever its internal structure--may become increasingly

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ready to differ with our views perhaps on a global scale. A Europe which
continues in the state of dependence of the Fifties may develop another form
of Third Force policy: based on the resentments of the impotent and the
manipulations of the irresponsible. The challenge to Atlantic policy then
is whether a responsible mode of cooperation, consistent with the self-respect
of all partners, can be devised. This is not primarily a problem of strategy;
it is, above all, a challenge to the political conceptions of the West.