SALUTE TO ISRAEL

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Rabin, distinguished
guests, fellow performers:

Before coming on stage tonight I was warned
that a speaker is someone who speaks less than five
minutes; anything more makes you an actor.

It is difficult for me to stand here in front of a
group of professionals -- many of whom are probably
trying to get my accent straight so they can use it in
their next act. It is, of course, a Harvard accent.

So it occurred to me that it might be
interesting if I talked as if this were a diplomatic
dinner in Washington, though this crowd is a little

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it has a historic obligation, even in the face
of domestic pressures here, to construct a new
international set of relationships which reduces the risk
of war. But the United States will not let this
effort be used by any country to try to achieve unilateral
advantages or to exploit local instabilities
by its military forces. So the Soviet Union will have
to choose. We are prepared for a positive policy of
genuine coexistence, but we are not prepared to have
coexistence used as a cover for seeking unilateral
advantages in various parts of the globe. (Applause.)

MR. BATES: We've spent a lot of your time discussing Angola, Mr. Secretary, but this may be a little different twist to it: Is it possible that the Angola issue is an internal matter? If so, why not let the Soviets find out, as we did in Viet-Nam?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There are two big
differences. The first is the United States would never
have got itself engaged even financially -- which is all
we have ever done in Angola, with very modest sums -- but
we would not have done even that much in an internal struggle
in Angola.

In Mozambique -- another Portuguese colony of
a similar evolution -- the United States, immediately
after independence, recognized a government very similar in

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composition to the one the Soviet Union is now supporting
in Angola. We are prepared to work with any government
that emerges by African processes. What concerns us in
Angola is the massive introduction of an amount of Soviet
military equipment larger than all the other African countries
received from all sources in the last year and the introduction
of 11,000 Cuban combat troops who are doing all of the
fighting. The fighting is not done by Africans; the
fighting is done mostly by Cubans. So what we face
is the imposition of a minority government by a foreign
force.

Now, the analogy to Viet-Nam would be
correct if we were permitted to give financial assistance
to those who are resisting -- which is what the Soviet
Union did for the North Vietnamese. In that case,
the Soviet Union and Cuba might well have found out
in Angola that this kind of action does not pay. But when
massive forces are introduced and the United States does not
even contribute financial support, then the outcome is
inevitable. And the inevitable outcome, we must now make
sure, should not lead to similar situations in other
countries. That is our overwhelming concern. And the
reason I speak so much about Angola is not to affect
decisions which the Congress has already made but to prevent

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similar situations from arising in other parts of the world. (Applause.)

MR. BATES: One more question on Angola, Mr. Secretary, and then we'll leave Angola aside: Why have the Cubans become involved?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I do not want to pretend that I can read the inscrutable Cuban mind. (Laughter.) I think the Cubans have become involved in Angola through revolutionary zeal, through their belief that they are a pristine revolutionary force that must support revolutions everywhere. And this is a phenomenon which we must reflect about very seriously. There are Cuban forces of much smaller size all over Africa. There are some Cuban forces in South Yemen.

These are matters to which we cannot be indifferent because it can lead to enormous instabilities all over the world, especially when it is done by a small Caribbean country backed by revolutionary zeal and Soviet logistics.

MR. BATES: To what extent has the secrecy abrogation in the United States adversely affected our diplomatic endeavors?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that every democracy has to strike a balance between giving its public enough information so that they can make meaningful

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decisions and to make sure that public understand the
real reasons for governmental actions but, on the
other hand, retain a capacity for some secrecy in its
diplomacy.

Nobody in this audience who runs a business or
a law office or any other enterprise could possibly conduct
his affairs if every memorandum that is written internally,
if every communication with some other organization,
were immediately put on the public record. And yet this
is the condition we increasingly face in Washington
today. Every memorandum that comes across one's
desk one has to look at not just from the point of its
merit but from the point of view of how it looks
in the newspapers and the result of that will
be not more openness. The result will be that no memorand as
will be written (laughter) and that the business will be
conducted largely orally and then people will put
unilateral memoranda in their files and
even more confusion will result. (Laughter.)

So I believe that other governments must be able
to tell us their candid assessments without having to
worry that every communication to us immediately gets
into the public domain.

Now, how to strike a balance between necessary
secrecy and the temptation of governments to cover up

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their mistakes behind the cloak of secrecy -- which is a
legitimate concern-- this is something to which we now
have to address ourself. But an element of secrecy
is absolutely essential. (Applause.)

MR. BATES: To what extent do you think that
the KGB has infiltrated the U. S. Congress? (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I may be courageous, but I'm
not reckless. (Laughter and applause.)

MR. BATES: When all is said and done, isn't
your Near East diplomacy basically a matter of taking American
money and paying both sides not to fight? (Laughter.)
SECRETARY KISSINGER:

We experienced in 1973 that a Middle East war
can have the most drastic consequences. The Middle East
war in 1973 cost us about three billion dollars directly,
about 10 to 15 billion dollars indirectly. It increased
our unemployment and contributed to the deepest recession
we have had in the postwar period. So we know what the
cost of a war is.

Secondly, the aid we are giving to Israel is not
a payment for agreements. In the postwar period, supporting
the survival and security of Israel has been a fundamental
national policy. And, therefore, it would have to be
continued, whether or not there are agreements. So the
aid to Israel should not be considered as a payment for
agreements but as part of a fundamental national policy.

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The only other large recipients in the Middle East are Egypt and Jordan. We believe that it is overwhelmingly in our national interest that Egypt has broken its long-standing intimate ties with the Soviet Union and that it has contributed to a moderate and peaceful evolution in the Middle East. And, there again, we're not paying Egypt for this. We're not paying Egypt for an agreement. We are contributing to the possibility of Egypt concentrating on a more moderate course because the alternatives for the United States would be much more drastic. Every war in the Middle East has involved the risk of a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Every war in the Middle East has strained our relations with our allies and created enormous international turmoil.

Our policy is not to pay people not to fight; our policy is to construct a more peaceful relationship in the Middle East and to use the sums that we would have to pay anyway under conditions of tension in a constructive way to bring about a peaceful settlement. (Applause.)

MR. BATES: What mutual concessions would enable Israel and the PLO to establish detente?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we have taken the position that until the PLO recognizes the existence of Israel, we cannot ask Israel to negotiate with it -- nor can

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we ourselves participate in a diplomatic process involving
the PLO. So we believe that the minimum condition
is that the PLO accept the existence of Israel
and accept the validity of the United Nations
Security Resolutions on which the peace process in the
Middle East is based. (Applause.)

MR. BATES: Why does not this country use
American wheat as an instrument of foreign policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We find very often
that we are told abstractly that we should use American
economic power in order to influence foreign policy decisions
of other countries. But we also find that when we attempt
to do so, we would inevitably interrupt private markets and
private arrangements because there is no way of using our
economic power without some degree of governmental
control.

Now, with respect to the wheat deal to the Soviet
Union, it is not generally realized that there was a
voluntary restraint on sales to the Soviet Union from July
through October while we were negotiating a long-term
agreement and that in many parts of the country and in
many sections of the Congress this voluntary
restraint is looked upon with great
disfavor. We believe that the long-term agreement that was
made with the Soveit Union over a five-year period introduces

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some stability into our markets. It creates a cutoff point
during emergency situations in which further negotiations
would have to be conducted before we would agree to the
sale of additional wheat.

We believe that the circumstances that have so
far existed have not justified the cutoff of wheat
because the cutoff would not have been effective in any time-
frame relevant to, for example, the issues of Angola.

We believe that -- and we have said so repeatedly
-- if the relations with the Soviet Union deteriorate
drastically -- which we would hope strongly to avoid --

it will affect our other relationships. But at the present
time it was an excessive reaction which would not have
helped in relation to the Angola problem.

MR. BATES: I have questions on what is our
Latin American policy -- which is a general question --
and then, specifically: Do we continue to plan to
give the Panama Canal away?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I could make a great headline
by saying "yes!" (Laughter.)

Let me explain what is at issue in the Panama
Canal negotiation. Our concern with the Panama Canal issue
is to avoid a situation in which the United States is
drawn into a confrontation with all of Latin America,
in which American military force will have to be used to fight

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a guerrilla war in the Western Hemisphere as long as an honorable alternative presents itself. What we are negotiating now -- and, incidentally, with the agreement of all of the agencies of the United States Government -- is an arrangement in which the defense of the Panama Canal will be jointly exercised between the United States and Panama for an extended period of time -- for a very extended period of time -- while the operation of the Canal is turned over during a shorter period of time.

But the essential American defense interests can be maintained, in our view, through this cooperative arrangement while avoiding a situation in which the Panama Canal becomes a rallying ground of all of Latin American resentment against the United States. We will not make an agreement in which our essential interests in free transit through the Panama Canal are jeopardized, but we will make a serious effort to see whether we can make a stabler arrangement. All of this *will* have to be put before the Congress and will be explored in the greatest detail with the Congress while we're negotiating it, and the negotiations are likely to take some period of time.

MR. BATES: Dr. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State: I have one more question to ask you. But before I ask it I want to thank you -- thank you

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very much -- for giving us so much of your valuable time.
I want to thank you not only on behalf of the World
Affairs Council and the Commonwealth Club of California
but also on behalf of our many members of our clubs
that are not here today but will be listening to your remarks
over radio and television.

And, Dr. Kissinger, my final question is:
Do you intend to be the Secretary of State forever;
and, if not, will you and your charming wife Nancy -- whom
we miss very much here in San Francisco -- will you come and
settle with us in San Francisco? (Laughter and
applause.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, for the morale of my
staff, I have to indicate a terminal point to my
services (laughter). But my wife, who lived many years
in the Bay area, is very devoted to it;
and I will transmit this request to her -- and there will
be strong pressures in that direction. (Laughter and
applause.)

[2:13 p.m.]