THE GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY FORUM

Washington 7, D. C.

AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY: 1956

January 29, 1956

Participants:

Dr. Henry Kissinger,
Lecturer on International Relations,
Harvard University, Editor "Confluence
and International Quarterly" at
Harvard University, Author of numerous
articles on military and foreign
policy, Study Director, Nuclear
Weapons and Foreign Policy, the
Council on Foreign Relations

Dr. James D. Atkinson,
Assistant Professor of Government,
Georgetown University, Author of the
recent article, "Pearl Harbor-America's
Maginot Line?"

Dr. Eugene H. Bacon,
Assistant Professor of American
History, Georgetown University, Co-
author of the book, "American Military
Policy."

Moderator:

Mr. Matthew Warren

MR. WARREN: "American Military Policy: 1956" is the topic for
the 480th consecutive broadcast of the Georgetown University Radio Forum,
another in a series of educational and informative programs from Washington.
The Georgetown University Forum was founded in 1946.

This is Matthew Warren speaking by transcription from the Raymond
Reiss Studio, on the campus of Georgetown University, historic Jesuit seat
of learning in the Nation's Capital.

Today's discussion will be, "American Military Policy: 1956."
The participants are Dr. Henry Kissinger, Lecturer on international
relations, Harvard University, editor, "Confluence and International
Quarterly" at Harvard University, author of numerous articles on military
and foreign policy, Study Director, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,
the Council on Foreign Relations; Dr. James D. Atkinson, Assistant Professor
of Government, Georgetown University, author of the article, "Pearl Harbor-
America's Maginot Line?"; Dr. Eugene H. Bacon, Assistant Professor of
American History, Georgetown University, co-author of the book, "American
Military Policy."

Transcripts of today's broadcast are available. Send ten cents
to cover the cost of printing and mailing, with your name and address to
Georgetown University Forum, Washington 7, D. C. Please mention also the
subject matter of the transcript desired.

The temper of the times, with its emphasis on new-style warfare, nuclear weapons and global conflict, either of the cold or hot variety calls for a calm discussion of America's military policy. That policy is related to national security, to victory or defeat in our efforts to win over uncommitted nations. Even the humble and oft-times forgotten taxpayer must be vitally concerned. For you, therefore, we have invited three outstanding authorities on this topic, "American Military Policy: 1956."

Dr. Kissinger, it has been stated that there is no alternative to peace. Would you agree?

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. Warren, I think that one of the most dangerous notions that exists at the moment is the notion that the only objective of our foreign policy is the attainment of peace. It is a very dangerous notion because we are confronted with a revolutionary power, which is not interested in peace but in victory. And because throughout of history there have been certain interests which nations had to defend, and which were considered more important than peace by these nations.

If one tells another power that one has no alternative to peace, one gives that power the whiphand in all its dealings, because it permits that power to threaten war to attain its objectives. And it is for this reason that I am a little disturbed by the phrase, "there is no alternative to peace," because it may be interpreted by the Soviets that they could expand without a serious challenge and thereby gradually isolate the United States and achieve their objective of overthrowing the American system through a series of limited steps and finally face us with a showdown.

DR. BACON: Would you say, Dr. Kissinger, that there is a distinct relationship between military force and diplomacy?

DR. KISSINGER: I would say, Dr. Bacon, that one of the most difficult things for the American people to understand perhaps is the close relationship between military policy and foreign policy, that diplomacy is not something separate from military policy, but on the contrary the possibilities and capabilities one has of employing force are always taken into consideration by the other side in evaluating its risks. There is the closest relationship between military policy and diplomacy.

Now, Dr. Bacon, perhaps I can ask you a question: Is there any historical reason why there is so much talk today that diplomacy is something separate from military policy?

DR. BACON: I would say that would be a fault perhaps of some of our historians themselves who have failed to realize the close connection between military and diplomatic aims and objectives to the contrary, I think in our schools and our teaching and our courses that often our teachers have failed themselves to realize the very close connection. I think that is quite apparent in many of our so-called standard diplomatic textbooks in which the military force and military capabilities of a nation are very often ignored. I think it is a rather tragic mistake because certainly a nation in trying to obtain its national objectives does need and must have an adequate military establishment.

I think Dr. Atkinson would agree with me there, perhaps in their dealings with foreign nations even that has been reflected, perhaps in

- 2 -

the way we deal with China and Japan in the past ages.

DR. ATKINSON: Dr. Bacon, I should say that is quite right, but I don't believe that we can stop merely with professors, although this is a very valid point. Unfortunately, many of our statesmen likewise seem to believe or have believed often in the past that war and diplomacy were something which could be put into separate compartments.

Very few of them seem to have felt like Mr. Forrestal, who said, and I quote: "Defense is a function of foreign policy and vice versa." I say very few of them. Perhaps that is being uncharitable, but unfortunately at least not too many of them have taken Mr. Forrestal's view, I would say.

Dr. Kissinger, would you agree?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, I would agree that there has been, for very understandable reasons, the belief that one could achieve through mere diplomatic maneuvering what one can only achieve through the balancing of risks for the other side.

I have said before that the Soviets are a revolutionary power, which means that in dealing with the Soviet Union we are engaged as much in a contest of will as in anything else. Unless we can project this determination to them through our military capabilities, our diplomacy will be deprived of its flexibility.

This has been one of the major problems we have faced in this period. Maybe I could ask you, Dr. Atkinson, how you think the Soviets would react to a greater appreciation on our part of the role of force in international relations?

DR. ATKINSON: Frankly, I believe that from the Soviet record, both from Marxist theory and from actual Soviet practice, we can say with a good deal of validity, that the Soviet Union seeks to attain its objectives, and I would add here likewise the Chinese Communist regime, by measures short of total war. In fact, I think you can say quite clearly that in no instance have the Soviets from 1917 onward to the present, taken the risk of a total war deliberately. They have instead sought to use all other means of carrying out their objective. Of course, we all know what their objective is. But I think what is less known is the way in which they go about that objective.

If I may, I should like to quote from a Chinese Communist leader who exemplifies this thing. Mao Tse-tung, the leader of the Chinese Communists, has said: "There are some militarists who say we are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms. It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. The military action is but a method used to attain a political goal."

Mao Tse-tung is simply reiterating what Lenin has said, what Stalin has said, what Khruschev and Bulganin are saying right now, namely, that primacy belongs to all methods short of war or just on the edge of war, in other words, limited warfare.

DR. BACON: May I ask at this point, you mentioned that the Soviets

- 3 -

are using all methods short of all-out or total war; just what methods,
may I ask, is the United States using to combat this Soviet thrust at
world domination? Are we relying on our own military might, or are we
relying on military aid of allies? Just how heavily committed are we
to withstand the Soviet thrust?

DR. ATKINSON: It seems to me, Dr. Bacon, that we have to ask
the question here, and I think everybody in our audience should consider
it very seriously: Are we relying too much perhaps on one particular
aspect of force to meet the Soviet challenge, and I would like to throw
this at Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: We have always considered that the way to stop
Soviet aggression is to make it too costly for them. But we are living
now in a period of very fast developing technology, in which the weapons
systems grow more and more terrifying with every year. So that a strategy
which still made sense in 1948 might become less meaningful by 1955 and
1956.

It seems to me that we have relied very much on the power of
our strategic Air Force, and the power of our strategic Air Force is an
absolutely essential component. On the other hand, it can inflict so much
damage now, and even more important, the Soviets can inflict so much
damage on us in return, that strangely enough, it has tended to paralyze
our decisions in certain areas which did not seem to us worth the risk of
war. For example, the Chinese could threaten to intervene, and did in
fact intervene in Northern Viet-Nam, and we were faced with the question
of whether Hanoi was worth the destruction of New York. So, I would say
that we should develop capabilities which can resist on the spot and
which do not always face us with the question of whether we want to go
into a city-to-city bombing.

One of the most important questions for this country to face is
whether we can develop capabilities for a limited nuclear war and not to
fall into the Soviet trap of "Ban the Bomb Propaganda" which gives
their mass man power the best chance of operating.

I would like to ask the other panel members, perhaps, particularly
Dr. Atkinson, whether you think we have the capability of developing a
strength which can resist on the spot?

DR. ATKINSON: Well, Dr. Kissinger, I believe that we certainly
can. But here the question is, do our leaders have enough confidence in
the people that they believe the American public will be willing to bear
the burden of an increase in military strength? This is a question I
should certainly like to ask Dr. Bacon. I want to return to it, but I want
to ask him in the light of our past military history, do you think, Dr.
Bacon, the American people will bear this burden, if they believe it is
necessary to increase our armed forces in order to meet the Soviet challenge,
will they do it?

DR. BACON: I think that is a question very fundamental not only
to our republican system of government, but also to our own survival as
a nation. I say, first of all, it is fundamental to our republican system
of government, because, after all, our government is founded on the
people, and of the tenets of our democratic institutions is the belief.

- 4 -

that if the people are properly informed, the people will react and will react wisely. So I think you gentlemen will agree on that tenet.

The second part, do you think the people will continue to bear the burdens of heavy taxation necessary.

Well, certainly none of us like taxes. Even poor university professors pay a large share of taxes and we would like to see some relief. But it is certainly not a question of relief from taxation. To my point of view it is a question of national survival. I am quite convinced if the American people are given the full and comprehensive story, if they realize the challenge that faces them, I think there will be no hesitation on the part of the American people in meeting that challenge.

Certainly the American people have in the past demonstrated a vast capacity to rise to the occasion. What I am more afraid of is that our leadership will lack the necessary courage and vision to tell the American people the truth and the burdens which will be necessary.

DR. ATKINSON: Mr. Warren, I would like to return to one point of Dr. Kissinger's statement, which I believe is particularly well taken, and that is, what types of force do we need to have the flexibility to meet particular Soviet challenges. It seems to me that we must look again at what methods the Soviets are using.

I should like to quote a statement which Mr. Khruschev, the Soviet leader, made to the Turkish Ambassador on the fourth of November last: "Turkey was foolish to remain in NATO, since if there is any difficulty, Turkey will be the first to be eaten up and your friends will not be able to help you."

It seems to me that Khruschev is positing his statement on the basis of the fact, as Dr. Kissinger so clearly said, that the United States will have only one kind of capability, namely, the capability of eliminating Moscow from the map or eliminating Leningrad, or whatever cities you want to take, and that we will not have the capability of interposing sufficient force to help our friends, for example, Turkey, in a limited way. Would you agree, Dr. Kissinger?

DR. KISSINGER: I would agree this is one of the major problems we are facing, and perhaps I could expand on your remarks this way: One reads a lot about the difficulties we are facing with our NATO allies and in many of the uncommitted areas. One of the difficulties we are facing is this: Our allies are not interested who is the eventual winner in a war. What they above all are interested in is to avoid a Soviet occupation: They know if the Communists take over their country it will mean the moral and material destruction of everything they believe in and that they possess.

For this reason we have to be able to develop a strategy that not only assures ultimate victory but protects them against Soviet occupation. Such a strategy requires some power on the spot. Maybe I could make another remark here.

The American people, because of the experience in Korea, have very much come to believe that limited wars are bad wars, and that

- 5 -

all-out wars are the only good wars we can fight. This may have been true during the period of our atomic monopoly. Right now we have to realize that this country would take a lot of devastation also, and a limited war may offer the best opportunity to reduce the Soviet strength without exposing this country to the devastation that a thermo-nuclear war would involve.

Do you, Dr. Atkinson, think that we could develop the capabilities to engage in a limited war?

DR. ATKINSON: Frankly, at the present time, it seems to me, Dr. Kissinger, we do not have much capability in the way of carrying on a limited war. It seems to me that our ground forces at the present time are so weak that we would be very seriously limited. I would like, however, to throw this also at Dr. Bacon.

DR. BACON: Since we have been talking about our allies, and how perhaps in the event of an emergency we can come to their aid, before I answer your question, Dr. Atkinson, I would like to raise another point, that it seems to me the American approach toward our allies, while in many respects is a generous approach and a desire to aid their economies, has largely concentrated on two phases or two sections of our allies' anatomy.

First of all, we come to their aid with the Marshall Plan. We are concerned with their stomach. And a second phase is a growing concern with their trigger finger. I think a great discrepancy has been our, shall we say, our neglect of their minds. I think we have really failed to win the mental and moral support of our European allies.

MR. WARREN: Dr. Kissinger, you were speaking a few moments ago of limited warfare. Would you say that any war is an all-out war?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I would not say that any war is an all-out war. I think there has developed in this country a certain mental bloc about nuclear war. There is the notion that any explosion of a nuclear bomb will mean the destruction of a city. This is no longer in keeping with the facts of the technology. There exists nuclear weapons of all sizes now, fit for all purposes. We have, therefore, to become clear about the objectives which we want to employ them for, much more than to assume that any nuclear weapon necessarily, and any nuclear war necessarily, means the destruction of our major population centers.

The Soviets have very skillfully played on this fear, both in this country and, more importantly, abroad. They have put out a great deal of propaganda about "Ban the Bomb." Only yesterday, the eight satellite nations and the Soviet Union have made a proposal that we withdraw our nuclear weapons from Germany. This would play directly into their hands. I would feel that the diplomacy we should follow and the psychological framework we should create is this, that we use nuclear weapons in a graduated way, that we will not discuss with them banning the bomb, but we will discuss with them limiting the effects of it. This notion has often been called the notion of graduated deterrents, a notion which has been opposed to the concept of massive retaliation but which really supplements it. It supplements it because unless you have the capability of massive retaliation, you cannot carry it out because it is

-- 6 --

the fear of city bombing that will keep the Soviets from expanding the war.

Would you like to comment on this, Dr. Atkinson, in view of your studies of Soviet psychology, whether this is a meaningful approach?

DR. ATKINSON: Yes, I believe very much it is. Among other things, I think that we must never overlook the fact that the Marxist idea of historic inevitability of their success leads them along with certain practical considerations, to believe that there is no necessity for this kind of destruction. In other words, it seems to me that they have always given an indication that they want to take over western productive capacity not as a burned-out cinder but as a going concern, which leads me to this point: It seems to me that Americans must realize that we are indeed at war, that we have been at war for a long time. It isn't a kind of war, unfortunately, that we have been used to fighting. It seems to me, and if I seem rather strongly determined about it, I hope you will forgive me, that a danger that we have is always projecting the next war in terms of the last war. From all the evidence, we have actually been at war for a long time with the Soviet Union, as far as they are concerned, not as far as we are concerned. But from their standpoint, we have been at war.

DR. KISSINGER: We read a lot now in the press of statements by Soviet leaders about peaceful coexistence, and the fact that they do not consider themselves at war with us. Would you like to comment on that, in view of your statement?

DR. ATKINSON: They do not consider themselves at war in our terms of war. But in their terms of war, that is, a ceaseless conflict between systems, they do definitely, and they have never in any way repudiated the fact that this struggle between systems go on. Dr. Kissinger, would you agree?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, I would personally feel that their whole record indicates that they think, and this is a strange situation, that they think because of their whole philosophy that they live in a hostile world, and that they cannot escape this unless they have crushed the whole outside world, and they think they live in a hostile world because their philosophy teaches them that the capitalistic system must inevitably generate certain crises. There is nothing we can do about this. There is nothing we can reassure them through our policies. It is this which in my judgment leads to this state of tension and this state of war.

DR. BACON: Certainly you would say then that we certainly can't let our guard down in this period of crisis?

DR. KISSINGER: I would say that if we let our guard down the Soviets will think it is rather foolish of us and they will use every opportunity to fill every vacuum we leave for them. I would also say that every statement we make about peaceful intentions will be considered by the Soviets as either foolish or hypocrisy.

DR. ATKINSON: I would strongly reinforce that by saying that in view of their own systems idea of this irrepressible conflict which is always going on, whether there is any declaration of war or not, that you are quite right, Dr. Kissinger, and that indeed all of our statements have

- 7 -

been considered by them essentially as hypocrisy since they believe, in
accordance with their own philosophy, that this is simply a capitalist
evasion and an unwillingness to state openly that we intend to come to
grips with them.

DR. BACON: Then we have this diplomatic problem, and the
successful waging of diplomacy. I hope we have made it clear as one of
the concomitants of diplomacy that we need a strong military establishment.

At the beginning of the program Dr. Kissinger remarked that
perhaps there was a danger that we were placing too many of our nuclear
eggs in one basket. Perhaps we do have to make a reappraisal of our
military establishment and some of our concepts. Certainly again I think
we should emphasize the very close relationship between the military and
the diplomatic.

MR. WARREN: Dr. Bacon, by way of prediction, what do you say we face in the way of demands on our armed forces?

DR. BACON: With troops in some 45 countries of the world and
with our NATO obligations and our SEATO obligations, I think we will have
a continuing heavy drain upon manpower, and that of course means a con-
tinuing heavy drain on our budget. So this is not a short-term emergency;
it is a long-term emergency.

DR. KISSINGER: I would also like to add to it that one should
not have the idea that there is going to be a very quick and magic end
to it and that we are going to face a variety of problems. We are cer-
tainly going to face internal subversion in many areas. We may even face
Communist electoral victories, and this is going to be a tough problem
for us, whether we are going to permit any other nations to fall under
the Communist rule by any means. We are almost certain to face aggressions
by proxy, that is, by Soviet satellite nations, and we may even have to
face Soviet military ventures themselves.

The best way to discourage this is to have the capability to
resist every conceivable kind of political and military move that the
Soviets may make. Dr. Atkinson, do you think this country would be will-
ing to support such a move?

DR. ATKINSON: Yes, I do, very much. I would like to add to
that just one thing, and that is this: Let us not be afraid to listen
to the counsel of military people in our diplomacy. If Washington, a
very balanced and just man, was willing to listen to military advice,
certainly we today as civilians should not feel that we are so superior
to military people that we cannot take their advice. After all, they
have to bear the brunt of any fighting.

MR. WARREN: Thank you very much, gentlemen. Our time is up
for further discussion of "American Military Power--1956." Our thanks
to our guests today on this program of this very vital discussion, Dr.
Henry Kissinger, Dr. James D. Atkinson, Dr. Eugene H. Bacon.

Next week we will discuss, "Are World Resources Adequate?"
Our panel at that time will consist of Mr. Ennis L. Chestang, Instructor
in Geography, Georgetown University; Mr. John R. Fernstrom, Instructor

- 8 -

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
RESEARCH PROJECT

2001 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON 7, D. C.

HANS W. WEIGERT, DIRECTOR

7 February 1961

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Kissinger:

I understand that you are presently engaged in setting up plans for the kind of research on limited warfare which has been conspicuous by its absence so far. In this connection I would like to call to your attention the military intelligence research group of ours which, for the past ten years, has been working on classified studies, in particular target analysis, for the Departments of the Army and the Air Force. For many years our work was in the area of special warfare and the studies completed by this office cover the entire Sino Soviet orbit and fringe areas of it, with special emphasis on limited warfare problems. Our group consists of some 20 people, with all of our analysts having graduate degrees. Its main asset must be seen in the fact that the majority of our personnel have been associated with us for periods ranging from over five to almost ten years and are therefore highly specialized in all phases of military intelligence. I hope that their background and experience and their immediate availability in the Washington area can be utilized.

We are interested in and capable of expanding our present activities.

With kindest regards,

HWW:cab

Georgetown University NEWS SERVICE (20)

WASHINGTON 7, D. C.

FEederal 7-3300

HOLD FOR RELEASE

June 3, 1962

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Announcement of the establishment of a Center to integrate and foster research on national growth and the responsible use of national power will be made by the Very Reverend E. B. Bunn, S.J., President of Georgetown University, at commencement exercises, Monday, June 4, 1962.

The new research organization, to be known as the Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies, will be headed by Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret.), former Chief of Naval Operations. It will open on September 1, 1962.

The Center "will coordinate and conduct studies related to the strategies by which free societies can utilize their total strength to preserve and further develop the values underlying Western civilization." Part of the Center's function will be to collate more specialized research efforts in university and research centers, as well as to synthesize the study papers and testimony before Congress related to the many aspects of the cold war. This will point up research and information gaps, as well as enable a better view of overall strategy problems. The products of these efforts will be available to the public and are expected to be of special interest to policy-making officials in government as well as to industrial and university groups.

Areas of research will include: military resource studies, domestic economic strength, international economics of national security, uses of national power, communist strategy and aims of Western strategy. Other areas, for example, scientific resources, will be introduced after the Center moves into full operation.

Appointment of the following Research Associates was announced: Dr. Henry Briefs, Georgetown University, Associate for Domestic Economic Studies; Dr. James D. Atkinson, Georgetown

(more)

University, National Power Studies; Dr. Stefan Possony, The
Hoover Institution on War Revolution and Peace, Communist
Strategy Studies. Other associates will be announced for
scientific resources and for the Western philosophical heritage,
as well as for international economic studies. In addition,
more than twenty-five consultants will be appointed from other
universities throughout the world.

Assisting Admiral Burke in the formation and
operation of the Center is an Executive Board made up of
Reverend James B. Horigan, S.J., Dean of the Georgetown
University Graduate School; Dr. W. Glenn Campbell, Director
of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace;
Dr. Howard R. Penniman, Chairman of the Department of Government
at Georgetown; Mr. William J. Baroody, Treasurer of the Insti-
tute for Social Science Research; and Dr. David M. Abshire,
Executive Secretary for the Center.

An Advisory Board is also being formed to assist
the Executive Board in delineating areas for research.

# # # # # # #

ARLEIGH BURKE

SUITE 413

1025 CONNECTICUT AVENUE

WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

As I already told you a story
will accept principle. Defect for me
& commit myseg & saying
paper, lewder.

August 10, 1962

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Department of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

As you may know, the President of Georgetown University announced, at Commencement in June 1962, the establishment of the Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University. I am the Director of the Center.

Although the Center will be opened officially on September 4, 1962, we are already planning our first Conference, entitled NATIONAL SECURITY: THE DEMANDS OF STRATEGY AND ECONOMICS, which will be held in late January, 1963.

It is clear that problems of strategy, international politics, and economics are all too frequently compartmentalized at a time when economics and international politics have become, in fact, weapons of strategy. The purpose of this conference, therefore, is to bring together noted students of strategy, international politics, and economics into a confrontation on key issues emerging from papers which they will be asked to write in advance.

On each issue arising from the papers, we hope to bring out various points of view, develop the conflict of viewpoints, and identify clearly the alternatives and options. The conference are not, of course, in a position to say what strategic lines of action the Sino-Soviet bloc or the United States will actually follow in the next ten years, but we hope the conference will be able to define specific problems, the options in approaching those problems, and the ways by which the U.S. economy can best meet, within the context of a free society, the strategic demands which may be placed upon it.

We would be honored to have your participation in this conference, and for that reason we extend to you an invitation to be with us on January 23-25, 1963.

- 2 -

We would like you to write a paper of twenty to forty pages (as outlined in the attached prospectus), to attend the five panel sessions, and to read all the papers beforehand. In return for your participation for the three days, we would be happy to offer you an honorarium of $750 and travel and hotel expenses.

The enclosed prospectus will give you the necessary information pertaining to the organization of, and procedure for, the conference. In addition, you will be able to determine from the prospectus precisely what we hope to accomplish during the three days. I would like to emphasize, however, that the prospectus is but a rough outline of the subject matter to be covered in your paper, and is by no means all inclusive. We would therefore welcome any suggestions you may have concerning the scope and content of your paper.

The proceedings of the conference will subsequently be published in book form.

In a few days I will telephone you to ask if you will be able to attend the conference. If, in the meantime, you should care to communicate with me regarding the conference, you may call collect (Washington) 347-4849, or write me at this address.

I am hopeful that you will accept this invitation, and look forward to hearing from you in the near future.

Conference Memorandum 1

October 10, 1962

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

1316 36th Street, N.W.

Washington 7, D.C.

MEMORANDUM TO CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

The purpose of this memorandum is to bring you up to date on the Center's plans for the Conference of January 23-25. We would appreciate your noting the following items which are designed to aid the Center in its administrative procedure for the Conference.

## STUDY PAPERS

We feel that we have inadequately emphasized to participants that we want the Conference agenda to concentrate on the decade ahead. In the study papers, and during the three days of panel discussions, the range of problems the United States may face, and the options and alternatives available to meet those problems should be identified and examined thoroughly. For this reason we should like to request that you direct your attention to the immediate future by considering the major possibilities and choices with which the United States may be confronted.

The aim of the Conference is not to attempt predictions, but to analyze possible future problems, possible strategies to meet them, and the economic ramifications of these strategies. The economic aspects comprise the assignment of the last two panels.

One major function of the study papers is to aid our staff to identify what the participants consider to be the major problems that could develop. The participants have been selected with the design that they will not all have the same viewpoint. Some will raise questions, issues, and problems which other may not raise. These questions, issues, and problems will be placed on the agenda for the appropriate panel discussions.

This further guidance on the purpose of the study paper should clearly indicate that we are not concerned with the length of the paper; in fact, the more briefly the issues can be outlined, the more helpful will be the paper. Therefore, while the original prospectus for the Conference suggested that study papers be from twenty to forty pages in length, we should like to point out that there is no objection to adhering to the lower limit.

CM/1 p.2

DEADLINE FOR STUDY PAPERS

In order that the papers can be reproduced and forwarded to Conference participants as soon as possible, it is requested that all participants send their study papers to the Center by November 1. All participants will be allowed a period of two weeks following the Conference for extension and revision of papers before final submission for inclusion into the Conference proceedings.

SUMMARY OF PAPER

Each participant is asked to forward the two or three page summary of his
paper to the Center at his earliest convenience. It is not necessary to
send the paper and the summary together since the latter will be of
great assistance during the next month in establishing an agenda of
issues. In addition to preparing for us the summary of the paper, we
ask you to read carefully the scope of all papers in each of the five
panels, and to call to our attention any issues which you feel should
be put on the agenda for the panel discussions.

FOOTNOTES

Should participants wish to use footnotes, the Center requests that they be appended to the paper, and that the number of footnotes not exceed twenty.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

A brief biographical sketch is requested of each participant. This will be used in connection with publicity for the Conference, and in the published proceedings.

A revised Conference program and list of participants will be mailed to you within the next ten days. Other memoranda concerning procedure for the Conference, transportation and accomodations, and general information will be mailed in the next weeks.

Should you have any further questions concerning the Conference, please
do not hesitate to communicate with us.

ARLEIGH BURKE
Director

AB:jm

enc: Information on the Center for Strategic Studies

Growth and Stability: International Economics of National Security:
research areas were initially declassified: Elements of Economic
With the opening of the Center in September 1965, the

Research Areas

spread.
work and scope specialist in this country and
not to duplicate but to utilize good research
Center for Strategic Studies emphasize its sim
institutions. This functional concept of the
made to have studies done at other centers and
University, more often arrangements will be
by the resident staff of the Center or at the
initiated by the Center will sometimes be done
subjects of that problem. While the studies
put an absence of studies on one or more
lack of primary research on a given problem,
should be understood not necessarily a total
the research and information dabs. By "dabs"
(2) To initiate conferences and studies to fill
identity research and information dabs.
overview of strategy problems and will also
assets of the Center, a material to gain an
present conflict. This function should aid the
before the Congress related to strategy in the
 synthesize study, debater's testimony, and reports
university and research centers, as well as to
(1) To correlate specific research efforts in
functions.

The efforts of the Center can be divided into two basic

political, and philosophical subjects.

The scope will include military, scientific, economic, psychological, to strategies for the preservation and enlargement of free societies. The Center will coordinate and conduct studies related

The functions of the Center for Strategic Studies

officially opened on September 4, 1965.
which Admiral Arleigh Burke would be the Director. The Center
of the Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, of
June 1965, the President of the University announced the formation
At the Georgetown University Commencement exercises in

Washington 7, D. C.

1310 32nd Street, N.W.

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

- 2 -

Use of National Power; Communist Strategy; Aims of Free World
Strategy. Other research areas, e.g., on Military Power and on
Science and Technology, are anticipated. These research areas
will form a system of classification of studies and of expertise.
Initially, one Research Associate will be assigned to each of the
research areas and numerous scholars and specialists in this
country and abroad will be asked to serve as consultants.

Research Analysis Group

To aid in the surveying and synthesizing of research
efforts in each study area, there will be a Research Analysis
Group consisting of a Research Associate and some full-time
personnel, in addition to numerous specially selected individual
part-time research specialists. This Research Analysis Group
will not become fully functional until the second year of operation,
and it is anticipated that eventually some type of bulletin will be
issued as a status report on the Center's activities and on the
research activities with which it is in contact. The Research
Analysis Group, with the study area Research Associates, will aid
in opening communications with all related centers throughout the
world, so as to determine what projects have recently terminated,
are in progress, or are planned. At some future date, the Center
hopes to convene a conference of representatives of various research
centers throughout the world to discuss mutual problems of research.

Research Sources

On the one hand, products will emanate from academic and
non-academic research centers, and on the other hand, from govern-
ment sources. In both cases the materials received will be analyzed
and catalogued for future reference, and disseminated for the use
of those interested. Government materials, consisting of committee
hearings and reports, agency bulletins, and special studies will be
condensed in an easily understandable and readily accessible form.
Assisting in the analysis of government materials will be specially
selected competent individuals in the Washington area. These persons
will be associated with the Center on a project basis, and each will
devote his attention to the monitoring of one or more sources of
materials, depending upon his area of specialization.

Other Services

One of the Center's principal missions will be to assist
other centers by cataloguing, serving as a clearing house in
Washington, and receiving and giving suggestions on research needs
and products. Another mission will be to answer requests from
public policymakers for research by directing the request to the
best possible sources, and by undertaking necessary syntheses
of studies received from those sources.

of studies received from those sources.
Past valuable sources, and by undertaking necessary authorities
bundling bibliographies for research by directing the request to the
and producers. Another source will be to unknown sources from
Washington, and receiving and dividing annotations on research needs
other centers by cataloguing, serving as a clearing house in
One of the Centers' principal sources will be to assist

Other Permanents

materials, depending upon the area of specialization,
demands his attention to the monitoring of one or more sources of
will be associated with the Center on a project basis, and each will
selected competent individuals in the Washington area. These persons
verifying in the analysis of government materials will be especially
condensed in such a manner as understandable and readily accessible form.
Heritage and reprints, agency bulletins, and specialist studies will be
of those interested. Government materials, consisting of committee
and catalogued for future reference, and disseminated for the use
ment sources. In both cases the materials received will be analyzed
non-academic research centers, and on the other hand, from general-
on the one hand, products will emerge from academic and

Research Sources

centers throughout the world to discuss mutual problems of research
hopes to convene a conference of representatives of various research
are in business, or are planned. At some future date, the Center
world, so as to determine what projects have recently terminated,
in opening communications with all related centers throughout the
Analysis Group, with the study area Research Associates, will aid
research activities with which it is in contact. The Research
institute is a institute report on the Center's activities and on the
and it is anticipated that eventually some type of bulletin will be
will not become fully functional until the second year of operation,
bar-time research associates. This Research Analysis Group
hereafter, in addition to someone specially selected individual
Group consisting of a Research Associate and some full-time
collaborators in each study area, there will be a Research Analysis
To aid in the surveying and analyzing of research

Research Analysis Group

country, and spread will be asked to serve as consultants.
research areas and numerous scholars and associates in this
laboratory. One Research Associate will be assigned to each of the
will form a system of classification of studies and of expertise,
science and technology, are anticipated. These research areas
strategically. Other research areas, e.g., on Military Power and on
Use of National Power; Communist Strategy; Aims of Free World

- 2 -

5. Meeting Strategy Requirements in the Free Economy
6. Economic Strategies
7. Military and Para-Military Strategies
8. Political Requirements of U.S. National Strategies
9. Sino-Soviet Strategy

Participants on the following:
in the next decade. There will be based discussions among the
scion which the United States and the Sino-Soviet bloc may follow
discussions will examine the implications of the various concerns over
**Security: The Demand of Strategy and Economics**. The various panel
international politics, and economics, to discuss the basic National
conference bringing together twenty-seven eminent students of strategy
In January 1963, the Center will sponsor a three-day

Conference of Strategists and Economists

early in 1963. Plans on this subject will be announced
activities of the Center. Plans on this subject will be announced
courts and seminars in the Graduate School related to the
the 1963-1964 academic year. The Center has plans to sponsor
the Center plans to enlarge its fellowship program. Beginning in
Graduate School will be announced shortly. In subsequent years,
two graduate fellowships, and the names of the recipients in the
For the 1963-1964 academic year, the Center was available

Graduate Fellowships and Studies

(Strategy)
on War, Revolution, and Peace (Communist
Stefan T. Pasappa, The Hoover Institution
and Stability)
Georgetown University (Economic Growth
Henry M. Briefs, Department of Economics,
(National Power)
Government, Georgetown University
James D. Atkinson, Department of

(Group)
Richard M. Allen (Research Australia)
Executive Secretary: David M. Abshire

Operations
Arlington Burke, former Chief of Naval
Directors:

Studies have been made:

The following appointments to the Center for Strategic

Staff

- 3 -