PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation with Herbert Wehner - Chairman of the SPD, June 21, 1965.

On June 21st I had dinner with Herbert Wehner at his house alone. The evening lasted until about 2:00 a.m. despite repeated attempts on my part to leave. Most of the time was taken by extremely detailed, enormously plastic anecdotes of political tactics and of Wehner's life in Moscow during the purges in the Thirties.

The high points of the conversation were: (1) A devastating and graphic critique of almost all leaders of every party. For example: Erhard--a pastry cook (konditor) who loves to bake large cakes and put candles on top; Schroeder--an obsession with a clean vest made him an anti-Nazi for esthetic, not ethical reasons. If we get into trouble we will find that he has a clean vest again. Brandt--when things get rough he starts bawling (flennen) on the shoulders of whoever has strong nerves; Erler--he is so accommodating (verbindlich) that he sells everything twice; Mende--Wehner had been told that the American press had praised that nihilist for flexibility. This proves that Americans are political idiots.

The insecurity of German leaders was proved by their pilgrimages to Washington. Getting pictures taken with the President was a new form of consecration. He pitied any American who took what these people said too literally.

To complete matters, Wehner made scathing references to his fellow Socialists: Spaak, (a balloon who will fly away unless tied down and who punctures at the slightest prick; Gaitskell--a pedant confusing a walk to the podium with the march of history.

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(2) <u>German unity</u>. Germany was now in a prison. It could not survive without unity and it could not achieve unity in the foreseeable future. Americans and other allies could live perfectly well with a divided Germany; but Germany would collapse morally if it remained divided. German leaders had been lying to their people for a decade and the only interest of the Allies in Germany was Germany's military contribution. The result of endless frustration would be an emergence of dilettantism according to which Germans always try to achieve big end with little ploys. This tendency is furthered by super-sophisticates like Brezinski who asks the Germans to ameliorate the fate of every Communist population except of their own compatriots. It was compounded by Western intellectuals who speak of a basic transformation of the Soviet system. He knew how Communists operated and they despised no one so much as sentimentalists trying to act as brokers between them and their own governments. There was one good rule to follow: when Communist governments are in trouble they do not talk about it to the outside world; when they talk about internal troubles to the outside world it usually means that they blackmail us.

Any recognition of the East German regime would only lead to a
competition of two nationalist states. Nevertheless, the Federal Republic
would have to conduct a very active unification policy if it was not to lose
all moral cohesion and if it did not want to see extremist parties emerge
again on the left and on the right. He said that the new generation no longer
had the morbid fear of Communists (Kommunistenschreck) and they might start
playing with the East. People like "that dilettante" Bahr were already toying

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with such ideas. The trouble in Berlin was that Bahr did not speak for Brandt, though Brandt occasionally spoke for Bahr. As for the Oder-Neisse line, he violently objected to recognizing it. Germany had renounced the use of force but any peace plan had to start with the 1937 boundaries.

I asked about arms control in Central Europe. Wehner replied that any discriminatory treatment of Germany was absolutely out of the question. If Germany was exposed to any additional humiliation, radicalism was inevitable.

He said that he had recently re-read accounts of people imprisoned in the Soviet Union. Only fools could believe that the essential character of that system had altered. The task was to keep East Germany from becoming so strong that it could insist on terms.

(3) **General foreign policy.** Here Wehner was voluble but not very precise. He was extremely critical of De Gaulle, whom he called a vestige of past centuries. He said Vietnam was not a war but a bottomless morass. He argued that American policy struck him as confused but that the Federal Republic had no choice but to go along. He refused to offer alternatives.

(4) **German internal politics.** Here Wehner was at his most emotional and plastic explaining the confusions and maneuvers of German domestic politics. His basic thesis was that the CDU was a corrupt party which had neglected real German problems as long as it had been in office. I asked why, if this was true, he was in favor of a coalition with them. Wehner replied practically shouting: "Because we have to consume them." However to achieve this, there was need for discipline and a strategic concept. This was not easy with a

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leadership group split between men so eager to please like Erler and nihilistic idealists like the trade union leaders. In the debate about emergency legislation Erler had tried to show how reasonable he was only to find himself deserted by the trade union leaders who prefer posturing to electoral victory. If the SPD remained disciplined, it would inevitably become the strongest party.

(5) Visit to the United States. Wehner insisted that he did not want to visit the United States because he did not wish to be fingerprinted and because he had been humiliated on his only previous visit. Nevertheless, I have the impression that he would welcome an invitation especially if it came from a non-governmental body, say a university.

These notes do not do justice to the passion and power of Wehner's presentation. His national feeling is more intense than that of any other German leader. His description of the bankruptcy of Western policy during the week that the Berlin wall was built is full of anguish and, I must say, potential danger. He is a formidable man--since Adenauer the only man of real stature in Bonn--and there is no telling what direction his resentments and his passionate nationalism will take.