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the authority to use nuclear weapons to a single center, so that "massive retaliation" is to have some concrete meaning. The mechanics of this may involve a responsible body of Allied representatives sitting in Washington, properly delegated in this respect by their governments, whose sole function would be to study the problems of nuclear weapons in strategy and who would be completely empowered by their governments to decide upon the question of using or not using nuclear weapons on the spot: they would be in a position to advise the President of the United States immediately. Possibly this might not work, possibly the problem is politically insoluble. But an understanding among the Allies to make the threat of nuclear weapons an effective deterrent is necessary to make NATO militarily viable.

The same will be true in even greater degree when SAC bases are established in other regional defense systems. The issue will then be one of inter-regional agreement. To consider the magnitude of the problem, one has only to consider the number of actual and potential Allies available to the United States:

* 1. Great Britain (NATO, SEATO, UN) U.S. Troops

* 2. France (NATO, SEATO, UN) U.S. Troops

* 3. West Germany (NATO) U.S. Troops

* 4. Italy (NATO) U.S. Troops

* 5. Canada (NATO, UN) U.S. Troops

* 6. Belgium (NATO, UN)

* 7. Netherlands (NATO, UN)

* 8. Luxembourg (NATO, UN)

* 9. Denmark (NATO, UN)

* 10. Norway (NATO, UN)

* - had troops in Korea.

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it is a ready-made possibility begging of armored exploitation. The strain on
the rest of the defensive structure is correspondingly increased, and the
burden on "rear area defense" is pressured to the breaking point. Net effect-
iveness of the system as a whole drops greatly. And this is the situation
with respect to tactical defense of exposed allies -- the more so since the
great majority of allies are so exposed. The Soviets can use this like a lever
to pry apart the alliance, and use it as a threat to achieve other objectives.
For this matter, it must be emphasized, relates to the very raison d'être of
the alliance.

The problem of tactical defenses as noted earlier, falls into two categories: (1) the case of use of nuclear weapons tactically and (2) the case of use of HE weapons only.

(1) The Use of Nuclear Weapons Tactically

A summary of the probable nature of the theory was made in an earlier
paper. The conclusions were, briefly, that a static situation was likely in
the event that both sides were relatively equal in the possession of, and the
ability to use, nuclear weapons tactically. On this level of argument
(i.e., "pure theory") it need only be added that the conclusion of Gen. Gavin
that Force = firepower X maneuver² only reinforces the general conclusion,
since the enormous increase in firepower would call for a substantial increase
in maneuver, which condition has not been met in terms of present-day ground
warfare.

The other general conclusion from that paper was that if a decisive
result was required in a nuclear-weaponed war, that result could be achieved
only by a strategic use of nuclear weapons: in other words, the classical
"war of annihilation" (we are still limiting our schema to weapons and physical