25/07/97 - 19:21

Folchi y Asociates, Abogados

Juan · Josi · Folchi Bonafonte

Suzanne S. McFarlane
Executive Assistant
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York NY 10022

July 25th 1997

Dear Ms McFarlane,

I have been passed a copy of your fax of July 23rd to Angela Gleason concerning Mr Baquero.

Firstly, please let me sincerely apologise for the apparent lack of response from our office concerning your request for a contact address of Mr Baquero. It would appear that there has been mix-up in inter-office communication, which has meant that your fax went unanswered. Please accept my apologies for the inconvenience which this has obviously caused.

I have ascertained that the problem has been that Mr Baquero returned only recently from Mexico and then left for England on holiday, forgetting to leave a contact number. Mr Vilanova has been trying to contact him, but it would seem likely that we shall not now have news of him until September. However, we shall keep on trying.

On the other hand, however, it seems that Mr Baquero was still very enthusiastic about going to the U.S.

We shall inform you immediately of any news we can.

Meanwhile, once again, I regret the problems you have encountered in contacting us and would like to assure you that this will not re-occur. Apart from myself and Mr Vilanova, the other persons who have been briefed in this matter are Carin Parker and Aurelia Fuster - both of whom speak English.

JUAN JOSE FOLCHI

CÓRCEGA, 366 - 08037 BARCELONA
TEL. (34-3) 459 27 00 - FAX (34-3) 459 32 80 / 90

HENRY A. KISSINGER

February 2, 1998

Dear David:

It has been on my mind that I never thanked you adequately for your marvellous recordings. I had intended to write you before leaving for three weeks in Asia but time ran out. I hope you will forgive this belated note of appreciation. I like to listen to music when I write and, since my book seems to be growing to gargantuan size, I am afraid they will be worn out by overuse by the time it is finished!

I hope we will have an opportunity to get together
again soon.

Mr. David Bar-Illan
Office of the Prime Minister
Department of Policy Planning
and Communications
3 Kaplan Street Hakirya
Jerusalem 91919
Israel

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR • 350 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 • (212) 759-7919

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE

WORLDWIDE PLAZA
825 EIGHTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10019-7475

TELEPHONE: (212) 474-1000
FACSIMILE: (212) 474-3700

SAMUEL C. BUTLER
GEORGE J. GILLESPIE, II
THOMAS D. BARR
MELVIN L. BEDRICK
GEORGE T. LOWY
ROBERT ROSENMAN
ALAN J. HRUSKA
JAMES M. EDWARDS
FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR.
CHRISTINE BESHAR
ROBERT S. RIFKIND
DAVID O. BROWNWOOD
PAUL M. DODYK
THOMAS R. BROME
ROBERT D. JOFFE
HERBERT L. CAMP
ALLEN FINKELSON
RONALD S. ROLFE
PAUL C. SAUNDERS

MARTIN L. SENZEL
DOUGLAS D. BROADWATER
ALAN C. STEPHENSON
MAX R. SHULMAN
STUART W. GOLD
JOHN W. WHITE
JOHN E. BEERBOWER
EVAN R. CHESLER
PATRICIA GEOGHEGAN
D. COLLIER KIRKHAM
MICHAEL L. SCHLER
DANIEL P. CUNNINGHAM
KRIS F. HEINZELMAN
B. ROBBINS KIESSLING
ROGER D. TURNER
PHILIP A. GELSTON
RORY O. MILLSON
NEIL P. WESTREICH
FRANCIS P. BARRON

33 KING WILLIAM STREET
LONDON EC4R 9DU ENGLAND
TELEPHONE: 44-171-453-1000
FACSIMILE: 44-171-860-1150

SUITE 2609, ASIA PACIFIC FINANCE TOWER
3 GARDEN ROAD, CENTRAL
HONG KONG
TELEPHONE: 852-2509-7200
FACSIMILE: 852-2509-7272

WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL NUMBER
(212) 474-1720

RICHARD W. CLARY
WILLIAM P. ROGERS, JR.
JAMES D. COOPER
STEPHEN L. GORDON
ROBERT A. KINDLER
DANIEL L. MOSLEY
GREGORY M. SHAW
PETER S. WILSON
JAMES C. VARDELL, II
ROBERT H. BARON
KEVIN J. GREHAN
W. CLAYTON JOHNSON
STEPHEN S. MADSEN
C. ALLEN PARKER
MARC S. ROSENBERG
WILLIAM B. BRANNAN
LEWIS R. STEINBERG
SUSAN WEBSTER
WILLIAM H. WIDEN

TIMOTHY G. MASSAD
DAVID MERCADO
ROWAN D. WILSON
JOHN T. GAFFNEY
PETER T. BARBUR
SANDRA C. GOLDSTEIN
PAUL MICHALSKI
THOMAS G. RAFFERTY
MICHAEL S. GOLDMAN
GEORGE W. BILICIC, JR.
RICHARD HALL
ELIZABETH L. GRAYER
JULIE A. NORTH
STEPHEN L. BURNS
KATHERINE B. FORREST
KEITH R. HUMMEL
DANIEL SLIFKIN
JEFFREY A. SMITH
ROBERT I. TOWNSEND, II

February 9, 1998

FEB 12 1998

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Herewith copy of my letter proposing (Nick Katzenbach has seconded) the nomination of Tom Barr for membership in the Century Association. I also enclose a copy of Tom's short-form c.v.

I would be grateful if you could let me know whether you would be able to write a supporting letter. To have Tom as a member of the Association would plainly be a good thing.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Encls.

MM

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE

TELEPHONE: (212) 474-1000

FACSIMILE: (212) 474-3700

SAMUEL C. BUTLER

GEORGE J. GILLESPIE, III

THOMAS D. BARR

MELVIN L. BEDRICK

GEORGE T. LOWY

ROBERT ROSENMAN

ALAN J. HRUSKA

JAMES M. EDWARDS

FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR.

CHRISTINE BESHAR

ROBERT S. RIFKIND

DAVID O. BROWNWOOD

PAUL M. DODYK

RICHARD M. ALLEN

THOMAS R. BROME

ROBERT D. JOFFE

HERBERT L. CAMP

ALLEN FINKELSON

RONALD S. ROLFE

PAUL C. SAUNDERS

MARTIN L. SENZEL

DOUGLAS D. BROADWATER

ALAN C. STEPHENSON

MAX R. SHULMAN

STUART W. GOLD

JOHN W. WHITE

JOHN E. BEERBOWER

EVAN R. CHESLER

PATRICIA GEOGHEGAN

D. COLLIER KIRKHAM

MICHAEL L. SCHLER

DANIEL P. CUNNINGHAM

KRIS F. HEINZELMAN

B. ROBBINS KIESSLING

ROGER D. TURNER

PHILIP A. GELSTON

33 KING WILLIAM STREET

LONDON EC4R 9DU ENGLAND

TELEPHONE: 44-171-453-1000

FACSIMILE: 44-171-860-1150

3 GARDEN ROAD, CENTRAL

HONG KONG

TELEPHONE: 852-2509-7200

FACSIMILE: 852-2509-7272

WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL NUMBER

(212) 474-1720

RORY O. MILLSON

NEIL P. WESTREICH

FRANCIS P. BARRON

RICHARD W. CLARY

WILLIAM P. ROGERS, JR.

JAMES D. COOPER

STEPHEN L. GORDON

ROBERT A. KINDLER

DANIEL L. MOSLEY

GREGORY M. SHAW

PETER S. WILSON

JAMES C. VARDELL, III

ROBERT H. BARON

KEVIN J. GREHAN

W. CLAYTON JOHNSON

STEPHEN S. MADSEN

C. ALLEN PARKER

MARC S. ROSENBERG

WILLIAM B. BRANNAN

LEWIS R. STEINBERG

SUSAN WEBSTER

WILLIAM H. WIDEN

TIMOTHY G. MASSAD

DAVID MERCADO

ROWAN D. WILSON

JOHN T. GAFFNEY

PETER T. BARBUR

SANDRA C. GOLDSTEIN

PAUL MICHALSKI

THOMAS G. RAFFERTY

MICHAEL S. GOLDMAN

GEORGE W. BILICIC, JR.

RICHARD HALL

ELIZABETH L. GRAYER

JULIE A. NORTH

January 21, 1998

Thomas D. Barr

Dear Ms. Hammond:

I would like to nominate for resident membership in the Association Thomas D. Barr, who is a lawyer and a senior partner in the Cravath firm.

I have known Tom since our days together at Yale Law School (class of 1958). We were moot court opponents and, later, fellow editors of the Yale Law Journal. He is certainly now one of the preeminent trial lawyers in the country, surely among the top four or five. His representation of IBM throughout the thirteen years of the government antitrust litigation and related private actions, and his representation of Time Inc. in the Sharon libel case are probably his most famous trial appearances; but he has won well over a hundred significant cases and has advised many institutions, public figures and individuals of all walks of life in his extremely interesting and varied practice.

Tom has devoted himself as well to many government and community activities. He was, for example, the Deputy Director of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1968-70), and the National Co-Chairman of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (1977-79), an organization for which he still serves on the Executive Committee. He is also a Director of the Salzburg Seminar, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Trustee of the Eisenhower Foundation.

To his friends, Tom is known as an avid and astute student of American and European history and a lover of theater and music. He and his wife, Connie, regularly attend the concert series at Lincoln Center as well as the

theater openings in Manhattan and London. It is far from
clear how he finds the time for the study of history, but he
plainly does. His knowledge of American and European
military history is encyclopedic. His perceptions regarding
geo-political history are as penetrating as any I've heard
or read from the spellbinders of the university lecture
halls.

What is most conspicuous, however, with regard to
Tom Barr is his natural capacity for leadership. He is a
person of such rectitude, stature, toughness and wit that
even the most senior officers and executives--leaders in
their own spheres--readily follow his direction. He has
certainly been one of the principal leaders of this firm for
more than thirty years. Indeed, whatever the institution or
group, or its problem, place Tom Barr in its midst, and
everyone, within moments, will look to Tom for the solution,
and happily follow his advice.

When we were in law school together, I and others
persuaded Tom to come to the Cravath firm rather than to
return to Kansas City, Missouri, to practice law and enter
politics. Despite Tom's subsequent extraordinary career as
a lawyer in New York, that decision might have been a
mistake. Had he returned to Missouri, he doubtless would
have become the governor of the State. And one might well
have wished to have had the entire country in such capable
hands as his during any eight-year period thereafter.

Tom, I might add, resides at 18 Meadowcroft Lane,
Greenwich, CT 06830-3823. He has been married for 45 years
to Cornelia Harrington Barr, and they have four children,
Daniel, Phoebe Anne, Robert and Sara Elizabeth. I believe
he would be a major contributor to the fellowship of the
Association. The nomination will be seconded by Nicholas
deB Katzenbach (906 Great Road, Princeton, NJ 08540; tel:
(609) 924-8536).

Ms. Mary Stewart Hammond, Chair
Committee on Admissions
The Century Association
7 West 43rd Street
New York, NY 10036

106A

THOMAS D. BARR

Born: January 23, 1931, Kansas City, Missouri

Married: Cornelia Harrington, September 26, 1953

Children: Daniel, Phoebe Anne, Robert, Sara Elizabeth

Business Address: Worldwide Plaza, 825 Eighth Avenue
New York, New York 10019

Profession: Attorney
1958-1965, Associate, Cravath, Swaine & Moore
1965 to Date, Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore

Professional Associations:
American Bar Association
New York State Bar Association
Association of the Bar of the City of New York
American College of Trial Lawyers
International Academy of Trial Lawyers
American Bar Foundation
Federal Bar Council
American Law Institute

Government and Public Service:
United States Marine Corps, served to First Lieutenant, 1953-1955
Deputy Director of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1968-1970
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Executive Committee, 1968 to Date; National Co-Chairman, 1977-1979
Board of Directors, Salzburg Seminar Council on Foreign Relations
Board of Trustees, Eisenhower Foundation

3-30-1998 12:52PM

FROM A. S. VICTOR 212 649 5758

30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10112

Tel: (212) 649-5622

Fax: (212) 649-5758

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

TO: Suzanne McFarland
FAX: 759-0042
FROM: Alice Victor
DATE: March 30, 1998

Total number of pages, including cover sheet:

Suzanne - the source of this is Francois Sauzey, who has been with Trilateral "forever". He called - longer ago than I would care to admit - to say that Barre's Paris staff is hosting an event on April 12th, celebrating Barre's 20 years as deputé of the Nat. Assembly. They are putting together an album, and collecting letters from those whom Barre admires most -- DR, HAK, and Miyazawa were names mentioned to me.

So, the attached is my first draft - and represents pulling teeth because I just don't know the angle DR might want to take. But at least it will be something in front of him to edit. Once/if completed, I will be faxing a copy, and DHL-ing the original to:

Mme. Yvette Nicolas
2, rue de Villersexel
75007 Paris

Fax: 011-331-4439-4566

Barre's card says DR addresses him as Mr. President, but I'm having a hard time figuring out that source. He will correct if necessary.

Separately - DR said that HAK's talk at Trilateral "was particularly moving". Did it by any chance survive on paper? If so, I'd love to read it.

3-30-1998 12:52PM

April 12, 1998

Dear Mr. President:

As someone who has had the pleasure of knowing you for many years, I would like to join those who are recognizing a milestone in your political life, that of having served as Depute in the French National Assembly for twenty years. Although your service to France covers a much longer period of time - and has included such leadership roles as Finance Minister, Prime Minister, and currently Mayor of Lyon -- your continuing service in the National Assembly, as well as your dedication to maintaining the position of France as a leader in both the European Community and the world at large, are commitments for which you deserve both admiration and gratitude.

I understand that you do not plan to run in the next elections for the National Assembly, but feel sure that you will continue to serve France in whatever capacity you deem most effective.

With best wishes from an admiring friend,

H. E. Raymond Barre
2, rue de Villersexel
75007 Paris
FRANCE

MAX BAUCUS
MONTANA

WASHINGTON, DC
(202) 224-2651

MONTANA TOLL FREE NUMBER
1-800-332-6106

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2602

February 5, 1998

Dr Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, New York 10022

Dear Henry:

I recently spent two weeks visiting the Philippines, Thailand, Brunei and Indonesia.

The economic crisis in this part of the world is one of the most serious international challenges we will face in the coming year. As we approach the debate on our response, I thought you might be interested in the Trip Report I filed with the Senate on my return. I hope you find it of use, and would be very much interested in hearing your views.

With best personal regards, I am

MSB/ebg
Enclosure

FEB 09 1998

BILLINGS
(406) 657-6790

BOZEMAN
(406) 586-6104

BUTTE
(406) 782-8700

GREAT FALLS
(406) 761-1574

HELENA
(406) 449-5480

KALISPELL
(406) 756-1150

MISSOULA
(406) 329-3123

HENRY A. KISSINGER

February 19, 1998

Dear Riley:

Several months ago, at the request of the President of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, I organized a small group of international business leaders who met for a day in Brasilia with the President and key members of his government. The goal of that effort was to create a richer dialogue between the President and top international businessmen as the Brazilian economy undergoes dramatic changes.

I am writing to invite you, on behalf of President Cardoso, to participate in a second such meeting which will be held in Salvador, Bahia, on May 8. This meeting will focus on tourism and will provide an opportunity to discuss with the President and his team how they hope to develop the country's potential to become a major international tourist destination. Once again, the idea is to gather a small group of business leaders—in this case of companies in the hotel and other segments of the tourism industry—to initiate a dialogue that will continue into the future. President Cardoso hopes not only to explain his strategies, but to benefit from the experiences of the participants and their companies. I hope your schedule will allow you to join this group in Salvador.

A former colleague of mine, Alan Stoga, is helping the Brazilians organize the meeting. He will shortly be in touch with you to explain further the program and the logistics. A formal invitation from President Cardoso will follow to confirm your participation.

I look forward to seeing you soon.

Mr. Riley P. Bechtel
President & CEO
Bechtel Group, Inc.
P.O. Box 193965
San Francisco, CA 94119

01-SEP-1998 11:47

FROM BGU-PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

TO

90012127590042

AVISHAY BRAVERMAN

BEN-GURION
UNIVERSITY
OF THE NEGEV

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

August 18, 1998

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022
U.S.A.

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

In the past you have indicated that you would welcome receiving the degree of doctor honoris causa from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Until now it has been difficult for you to arrange to receive this honor here at Ben-Gurion University Therefore, we have contemplated on a time and place that would be convenient for you and appropriate for such an auspicious occasion. We would be most privileged to have you join with us as a special guest of honor, and at the same time we would be greatly honored to have you receive the degree of doctor honoris causa from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev at a special Gala Dinner to be held in New York at the Pierre Hotel on November 22nd. This event would be a most appropriate venue for us to bestow this degree upon you for this occasion will mark the conclusion of Israel's Jubilee year as well as the 100th Anniversary of the First Zionist Convention.

Now, as we begin the next century of the Zionist experience, we would do well to reflect on the part that men of courage and vision have played in bringing security to our homeland. You personify such strengths and wisdom and have indeed demonstrated your consummate skills in leading our region toward peace.

Sharing the other events of this evening as special honored guests would be two other honored guests: your friend Lord George Weidenfeld, current Chairman of the Board of Ben-Gurion University and Mr. Robert Arnow, Chairman Emeritus.

I personally hold you in high esteem and I look forward to your joining us for this most important occasion.

With friendship and admiration,

Prof. Avishay Braverman,
President

cc: Lord George Weidenfeld, Chairman of the Board of Governors

BEER-SHEVA 84105, ISRAEL TEL: 972-7-6461211/9, 972-7-6233574/341 FAX: 972-7-6472991

TOTAL P.02

The New York Times

229 WEST 43 STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10036

October 20, 1998

The Hon. Mikhail S. Gorbachev
Moscow, Russia
Dear Mr. Gorbachev,

For some time, I have been working on a profile of you for The New York Times. As I am sure you are aware, the Times maintains a file of major world figures, which, of course, includes you as one of the most outstanding of our time.

I assume it will come as no surprise to you – and, I hope – no shock, that these profiles are eventually used as obituaries. Because of their length and because of the importance we attach to them, they are always prepared in advance. We take great care with them because these articles will have an influence on how history views the individual. I have done quite a number, but most of them remain in the files because the people I choose to write about tend to live long and fruitful lives -- some are over 100 -- so I am considered what you might call a good-luck charm.

When I write these profiles I make every effort to spend some time with each of the people I write about so that the finished product will fully reflect the personality, as well as the accomplishments of the subject. Therefore, I should like to propose that we meet at a time convenient to you, perhaps when you next visit the United States, or, if you so wish, in Russia or any other place where you might find yourself with enough time for a wide-ranging discussion of your life as one of the men who helped shape the twentieth century.

Henry Kissinger, who has known me and my work for thirty years, has agreed to convey this request to you. If you want to know more about me, I'm sure he will be able to answer any questions you may have.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

January 7, 1998

Dear Sandy:

Just a note to tell you how much I appreciated your cooperation in the arrangements for the required White House review and clearance of quote material for my forthcoming memoir of the Ford years. General Kerrick has been prompt and efficient in getting back to me on the various clearances for chapters 1-29, which has greatly smoothed the process of bringing the manuscript to a conclusion.

I am touching up a few concluding chapters and will certainly submit any further quote materials requiring review.

Many thanks for your effort, and best wishes for the New Year.

The Honorable
Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

02/13/98 FRI 17:44

FAX 202 456 9370

NSC Communications

002

As Prepared for Delivery

SAMUEL R. BERGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

FEBRUARY 13, 1998

My challenge today is to resist the tyranny of the news cycle and put the current crisis with Iraq in context. I want to make clear the danger Saddam Hussein poses to his people, his neighbors, America and the world. I want to explain what we're doing about it -- in terms of the current crisis over Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program. And I want to lay out our long term strategy for dealing with the chronic problem that is Saddam Hussein.

Throughout his time in power, Saddam has demonstrated again and again utter contempt for his people, the peace of his region and the security of the world. He pursued a horrific, decade-long war of attrition against Iran, costing at least half a million lives. He repeatedly unleashed chemical weapons against Iran's soldiers and fired SCUDs into its cities. In 1988, he gassed Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq. In 1990, his troops invaded Kuwait, executing those who resisted, looting the country, setting fire to 600 oil wells, spilling tens of millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf, firing SCUD missiles at Tel Aviv, Riyadh and Manama [mah-NAH-mah]. At war's end, he brutally put down in his own country the Kurds and Shia Arabs who rose up in revolt against him. He ordered an attempt on the life of former President Bush. Once again in 1994, he massed his army along the Kuwaiti border. He forcefully occupied Iraq in Northern Iraq in 1996. And throughout the last two decades, Saddam has worked to develop, maintain and conceal the most terrible weapons known to humanity -- nuclear, chemical and biological -- and the missiles to deliver them.

The United States has actively and consistently opposed Saddam because he has demonstrated the intent to threaten the stability of a region vital to our interests. A stable Middle East means we can better protect the free flow of oil, fight terrorism and build support for a comprehensive Middle East peace. There is no greater challenge to the region's stability -- and to America's security in that region -- than Saddam's reckless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. As President Clinton has said, the spread of these weapons to outlaw states, and from them to terrorists and international criminals, is one of the most dangerous security threats our people will face over the next generation. Other countries have weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With Saddam Hussein, there is one big difference: he has used them. Not once, but repeatedly. Not only against combatants, but against civilians. Not only against a foreign adversary, but against his own people. And I have no doubt he will use them again if his capacity to rebuild his arsenal is left unchecked.

For the better part of this decade, the international community has worked to discover and dismantle Iraq's WMD program. At the end of the Gulf War, Iraq was given 15 days to inventory and prepare for the destruction of its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. The U.N. set up a special commission of international experts, called UNSCOM, to make sure that the job got done -- and to monitor the situation so that Iraq did not reconstitute its program.

Ever since, Iraq's WMD compliance record had been a litany of lies, deceit and run-arounds. The full disclosure document on missiles Baghdad was required to produce in fifteen days, it delivered -- in five years. When UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency uncovered facts that proved Iraq's biological, chemical and nuclear weapons reports to be grossly inaccurate, Baghdad simply amended the reports. When Hussein Kamel [ka-MEL] -- Saddam's son-in-law and the architect of Iraq's WMD program -- defected to Jordan in 1995, Baghdad was forced to reveal additional weapons stockpiles and production capacity it had insisted it did not have. Throughout, Baghdad has engaged the UNSCOM

02/13/98 FRI 17:45 FAX 202 456 9370

NSC Communications

003

inspectors in a high stakes game of cat-and-mouse -- lying to them, harassing them, delaying their access to sites, flagrantly destroying evidence in plain view of the inspectors.

Yet despite Iraq's best efforts, the inspectors have done a remarkable job. They have found and destroyed more of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capacity than was destroyed during the Gulf War itself. This includes nearly 40,000 chemical weapons, more than 100,000 gallons of chemical weapons agents, 48 operational missiles, 30 warheads specially fitted for chemical and biological weapons, and a massive biological weapons factory at Al-Hakim equipped to produce deadly anthrax and botulinum.

But UNSCOM's job is not yet done. Stockpiles of chemical and biological munitions and a small force of Scud-type missiles remain unaccounted for. And most importantly, Iraq still has the capacity to rebuild its production program for biological and chemical weapons and the missiles to deliver them. As UNSCOM has come closer and closer to ferreting out Iraq's remaining weapons capacity, Saddam has become increasingly determined in his efforts to block the inspectors and end the inspection regime.

Which brings us to the current crisis. Over the last three months, Saddam has sought to end UNSCOM by any and every ruse. First he demanded that American inspectors be removed from the inspection teams. Then he tried to dictate a change in the teams' composition. Now he is denying UNSCOM the free and full access it must have to all sites by designating some of them "Presidential" sites or otherwise restricting the inspectors' access. But as the charts behind me show, some of his presidential compounds are literally city-sized -- one almost as large as the district of Columbia -- with dozens of separate buildings.

At the same time, Saddam is seeking to end the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations after the Gulf War -- and which should not be lifted until Iraq complies with all U.N. resolutions, including those on WMD. His gambit is clear and presents a stark danger to our national interests. Compromise UNSCOM's integrity by imposing debilitating conditions on the inspectors and Saddam keeps his remaining weapons of mass destruction and the capacity to produce many more of them. Lift the sanctions and Saddam gets the money he needs to rebuild his military.

It is a situation we cannot tolerate. If Saddam defies international controls here with impunity, he will roll on, as he has before, energized by the conclusion that the international community lost its will. Only our will has stopped him before. The will of President Bush to lead the Gulf War coalition that ejected Iraq from Kuwait and imposed tough conditions for the cease-fire.

The will of President Clinton to strike hard at Iraqi intelligence headquarters in 1993 after its agents plotted to assassinate former President Bush. The will immediately to deploy our troops, ships and planes to the region, as President Clinton did in 1994 when Saddam threatened to repeat his walkover of Kuwait. The will to take out Iraqi air defenses and extend the No Fly Zone when Saddam forcefully occupied Iraq in northern Iraq.

Now, once again, we must summon the will to respond firmly to Saddam's challenge to UNSCOM and establish a safe haven for programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. That is exactly what we are doing. From Europe to the Persian Gulf, there is widespread consensus that Iraq must meet all its obligations to the United Nations, that UNSCOM must be allowed to do its job effectively, and that, if diplomacy fails, Saddam Hussein will bear responsibility for the consequences.

Many of our friends and allies would prefer a diplomatic solution. So would we. The UNSCOM system works -- that's why Saddam is so desperate to end it. We will spare no diplomatic effort to gain unfettered access for UNSCOM and to assure it can do its job effectively. We will not accept any proposal that would weaken UNSCOM's effectiveness.

NSC Communications

004

In pursuit of these objectives, President Clinton has been in contact with his counterparts nearly every day over the past few weeks. He dispatched Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen to Europe and the Middle East -- and Ambassador Richardson literally around the world. If there is a peaceful way to convince Saddam to let UNSCOM complete its mission, we will pursue it until the end.

But if Iraq continues to tie UNSCOM's hands, as Chairman Butler has said, it doesn't much matter if the inspectors are holed up in a hotel in Baghdad, or in Bahrain, or in Boston. If they are not allowed to do their job unhindered, we must be prepared to deal directly with the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction -- with force if necessary. Either Saddam Hussein acts -- or we must be prepared to do so.

For the past several weeks, the United States has built up its forces in the Gulf. As I speak, two American carrier battle groups and over 300 aircraft are in the region. They are joined by the British aircraft carrier Invincible. And we continue to receive support for action, should it prove necessary. Our force posture in the region would not be possible without the support of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the GCC states, and Turkey. And many friends and allies -- including the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Australia, New Zealand and Canada -- are prepared to provide forces, bases or logistical support. That list is growing every day.

Should such a mission prove necessary, its purpose is clear: to deliver a serious blow that will significantly diminish Saddam's weapons of mass destruction threat, and reduce his ability to threaten his neighbors. That is the objective we can and must meet to protect our vital national interests.

The most difficult decision any President has to make is to put our troops in harms' way. No military mission is without risk and cost. Even the best prepared, best equipped forces will suffer losses. But should force become necessary, the safety of our men and women in uniform will be President Clinton's top priority. And let me say, too, that, if military action becomes necessary, we will do what we can to avoid civilian casualties.

If, in the aftermath of force, Iraq allows UNSCOM back in, so much the better. Unless it does so, there is no prospect for ending economic sanctions. But if it does not, here's how the world will look to Saddam in the weeks and months after force is used.

First, as I noted a minute ago, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction threat and capacity to lash out at its neighbors will be significantly diminished. We cannot destroy everything. But we can have a real impact.

Second, Saddam will know, by our actions and our warning, that we will be prepared to act again if we have evidence he is trying to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction capabilities. We will closely monitor Iraq's activities with our own intelligence methods. I have full confidence in our ability to detect significant cheating. The demonstrated certainty that he will pay a heavy price for his conduct will need to become part of Saddam's calculus in the future. The United States will not go away.

Third, sanctions cannot be lifted so long as UNSCOM is unable to complete its mission. Sanctions hurt the Iraqi regime. The proof can be found in Saddam's desperate attempts to lift them. They severely restrict the amount of oil Iraq can sell and give the United Nations control over Iraq's primary source of revenue. To date, sanctions have cost Iraq $110 billion in oil sales. Imagine the armed force Saddam would have today had he invested even a fraction of this money in rehabilitating his military.

02/13/98 FRI 17:46 FAX 202 456 9370

NSC Communications

005

Sanctions are aimed at the Iraqi regime, not the Iraqi people. From the start, we exempted food and medicine. To help Iraq generate revenue to pay for such food and medicine, the United States in 1991 proposed U.N. Security Council Resolutions 706, 712 and later 986.

They would have allowed Iraq to sell limited amounts of oil and use the proceeds for humanitarian supplies -- subject to U.N. monitoring. Saddam rejected that offer for five years, in effect taking the needs of his own people hostage -- while spending what resources he had on Italian marble for 48 new palaces and expensive automobiles for his cronies.

In 1996 Saddam finally and grudgingly accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 986. Since then, more than 3 million tons of food have been delivered to the Iraqi people. But to this day, Saddam hinders the program's operation and deploys his people as "human shields" around suspected weapons sites -- while appealing to international public opinion to lift the sanctions with images of starving Iraqi children and patients suffering from a lack of vital medicines. This is the mother of cruel deceptions.

Despite Saddam's cynical efforts to manipulate the plight of his people for political ends, we are determined to do all we can to make "oil-for-food" work better. We welcome the U.N. Secretary General's recommendation to increase the program. The more Iraqi oil goes to feeding the Iraqi people, the less Saddam can spend on arms.

Fourth, in the weeks and months ahead Saddam will know that we will strictly enforce the No Fly Zones in southern and northern Iraq. Already, our airforce controls the skies from the southern suburbs of Baghdad to the Kuwaiti border and over northern Iraq -- severely reducing the threat Iraq poses to the Gulf countries and Turkey. We have flown more sorties to enforce these "No Fly Zones" than in all of Desert Storm. And our forces in the Gulf are ready to respond to Iraqi aggression quickly and decisively -- countering any threat in a matter of days instead of the months it took in 1990.

There are alternatives to our approach. I do not think they best serve America's national interests.

Some suggest we should meet Saddam half way by agreeing to close our eyes to "Presidential" or "sensitive" sites or to render UNSCOM ineffective. Such a stunning reversal of the U.N. Resolutions imposed on and accepted by Iraq after the Gulf War would be unacceptable -- and pose a serious threat to our security.

Others suggest that the only effective solution is for U.S. ground forces to remove Saddam from power. But the costs and risks associated with such a venture are high and not essential to achieving our strategic interests -- containing the threat Iraq poses to the region. It would require a major land campaign and risk large losses of our soldiers.

There is no question that Iraq and the world would be better off if Saddam were out of power. As Secretary Albright said in March, we would gladly work with a successor regime ready to live at peace with its neighbors and resume its rightful place in the community of nations. The Iraqi people deserve no less. In the meantime, we have worked with Iraqi opposition groups -- and we will continue to do so.

But as long as Saddam Hussein is in power, we must be prepared to respond firmly to his reckless actions. When the international community weakens in the face of his threats, Saddam simply is emboldened. When we stand as one, Saddam is thwarted. That is the timeless lesson to apply to dangerous tyrants. Sustaining our policy will require constant vigilance. It will from time to time cause tension with our friends and allies. And it will require that we sustain the will to act each time Saddam seriously challenges the international community. We are on the right course. Staying with it offers the best prospects for protecting our interests and preserving stability in a vital part of the world. ###

C. Fred Bergsten, Director

## BOARD OF DIRECTORS

* Peter G. Peterson, Chairman

* Anthony M. Solomon
Chairman, Executive Committee

Leszek Balcerowicz
Raymond Barre

W. Michael Blumenthal
Jon S. Corzine
George David
Miguel de la Madrid

* Jessica Einhorn
George M.C. Fisher
Maurice R. Greenberg

* Carla A. Hills
W. M. Keck II
Nigel Lawson
Lee Kuan Yew

* Frank E. Loy
Donald F. McHenry
Ruben F. Mettler
Minoru Murofushi
Kaneo Nakamura
Suliman S. Olayan
Paul H. O'Neill
I. G. Patel
Karl Otto Pöhl
Edzard Reuter
David Rockefeller
Stephan Schmidheiny
Laura D'Andrea Tyson
Paul A. Volcker

* Dennis Weatherstone
Marina v.N. Whitman
Lynn R. Williams
Andrew Young

Ex officio

* C. Fred Bergsten
Richard N. Cooper

Honorary Directors
Alan Greenspan
Reginald H. Jones
Akio Morita
George P. Shultz

* Member of the Executive Committee

## ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Richard N. Cooper, Chairman
Robert Baldwin
Barry P. Bosworth
Susan M. Collins
Rimmer de Vries
Wendy Dobson
Juergen B. Donges
Rudiger Dornbusch
Gerhard Fels
Isaiah Frank
Jacob A. Frenkel
David D. Hale
Mahbub ul Haq
Dale E. Hathaway
Nurul Islam
Peter B. Kenen
Lawrence B. Krause
Anne O. Krueger
Paul R. Krugman
Roger M. Kubarych
Robert Z. Lawrence
Jessica T. Mathews
Rachel McCulloch
Isamu Miyazaki
Michael Mussa
Richard R. Nelson
Sylvia Ostry
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa
Jacques J. Polak
Dani Rodrik
Jeffrey D. Sachs
Lawrence H. Summers
Alan Wm. Wolff
Robert B. Zoellick

INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS

11 Dupont Circle, N.W., Washington, DC 20036-1207

Phone: (202) 328-9000 Fax: (202) 328-5432

http://www.iie.com

February 11, 1998

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
350 Park Avenue, 26th floor
New York, New York 10022
fax: 212/759-0042

FEB 17 1998

Dear Henry:

It was great to see you again yesterday. I always appreciate your good humor in introducing me and recalling our earlier incarnations together!

Per your questions during the meeting about Korean unification, you should know that one of my staff—Senior Fellow Marcus Noland—has become the acknowledged expert on the economics of that topic, and on the North Korean Economy, both here and in South Korea. Enclosed with the hard copy of this letter are several of his publications on the topic, which he is now pulling together for a book that we will release—hopefully as the definitive study on the topic—later this year. Marc is regularly consulted by both our government and the South Koreans, including the intelligence communities of both. You might want to meet with him at some point and involve him in any activities that you are pursuing on the topic.

You might also be interested to know that, on my last visit to Beijing in September, I was installed as an Honorary Fellow of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The meaning of that accolade is not quite clear but only a handful of foreigners have supposedly been so honored. I assumed they did it because of my working closely with them on APEC—and of course because I accompanied you to Beijing in 1995!

Again, it was good to see you yesterday. I appreciated being invited to meet with the group and hope you will call on me in the future whenever I or my Institute can be of help.

05/11/98 MON 11:35 FAX 202 328 5432

I.I.E.

☑001

C. Fred Bergsten, Director

## BOARD OF DIRECTORS

* Peter G. Peterson, Chairman

* Anthony M. Salomon
Chairman, Executive Committee

Leszek Balcerowicz
Raymond Barre
W. Michael Blumenthal
Chen Yunn
Jon S. Corzine
George David
Miguel de la Madrid

* Carla A. Hills
W.M. Keck II
Nigel Lawson
Lee Kuhn Yew

* Frank E. Loy
Donald F. Melleny
Ruben F. Mettler
Minoru Murofushi
Kaneo Nakamura
Sufiman S. Olayan
Paul H. O'Neill
J.G. Patel
Karl Otto Pöhl
Edvard Reuter
David Rockefeller
Stephan Schmidheiny
Laura D'Andrea Tyson
Paul A. Voleker

* Dennis Weatherstone
Marina v.N. Whitman
Lynn R. Williams
Peter K.C. Won
Andrew Young

Ex officio

## ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Richard N. Cooper, Chairman
Robert Baldwin
Barry B. Busworth
Susan M. Collins
Rinner du Veis
Wendy Dobson
Juergen B. Donges
Hudiger Dorubusch
Gerhard Fels
Isaiah Frank
Jacob A. Freinkel
David D. Hale
Maliub ul Haq
Dale E. Hathaway
Nural Islam
Peter B. Kenen
Lawrence B. Krause
Anne O. Krueger
Paul R. Krugman
Roger M. Kubarych
Robert Z. Lawrence
Jessica T. Mathews
Ruehel McCulloch
Isamu Miyazaki
Michael Musca
Richard R. Nelson
Sylvia Ostry
Tommaso Padon-Schioppa
Jacques J. Polak
Dani Rodrik
Jeffrey D. Sachs
Lawrence H. Summers
Alan Wm. Wolff
Robert B. Zaelick

http://www.iie.com

May 8, 1998

MAY 1 1 1998

Dear Henry:

In reviewing my notes of your fascinating presentation to our recent meeting at Chase, I focused on your apt observation that the relevant domains of economics and politics have become substantially different. You rightly note that economics are increasing globalized while politics are still largely circumscribed by traditional national boundaries, and that economic (especially corporate) strategies are much more sophisticated than their political counterparts.

You are certainly right that this is a critical current problem that requires extensive analysis and creative thinking. My Institute has already addressed at least part of it, however: the inherent clash between global corporations and national governments. Enclosed is a book on the topic by my colleague Monty Graham, based on ideas that I developed personally in an earlier book at Brookings in the late 1970s, which concludes by suggesting a new international regime for multinational firms (probably in the World Trade Organization) that would seek to reconcile the conflict between economic and political goals.

I suspect that you and your staff will be working on this topic in the months ahead so thought the book might be of interest. I would of course be happy to discuss the broader question, and will in fact be pursuing more research on it here as part of our major effort to construct a "globalization balance sheet." Your ideas on this count are stimulating, as always, and it would be a great pleasure to talk about them further if you would ever want to do so.

Enclosure

PROF. DR. KURT H. BIEDENKOPF

MINISTERPRÄSIDENT
DES FREISTAATES SACHSEN

MAY 0 4 1998

Zur Entscheidung über die Einführung des EURO

Bundestag und Bundesrat werden am 23. und 24. April 1998 darüber entschei-
den, für welche Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union (EU) die Vorausset-
zungen für den Eintritt in die dritte Stufe der Europäischen Währungsunion
(EWU) gegeben sind. Grundlage der Entscheidungen werden die Regelungen des
europäischen Vertragswerkes und die Entschließungen sein, die Bundestag und
Bundesrat aus Anlaß der Ratifizierung der Maastricht-Verträge gefaßt haben.

Den Entscheidungen beider Häuser kommt sowohl nach ihrem politischen Willen
wie nach dem Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zu den Maastricht-Verträgen
(EU-Urteil) entscheidende Bedeutung zu. Sie binden das Stimmverhalten der
Bundesregierung bei der endgültigen Entscheidung des Europäischen Rates über
die teilnehmenden Staaten am 3. Mai 1998. Die erneute Befassung des Bundesta-
ges mit der EWU ist nach dem EU-Urteil zudem Voraussetzung für die Verein-
barkeit der EWU mit dem Grundgesetz.

Mit der Bewertung der bisher erreichten Voraussetzungen für den Beginn der
dritten Stufe der EWU entscheiden Bundestag und Bundesrat über die **Teilnahme**
**Deutschlands** und über die Frage, ob im Blick auf die vorgeschlagenen Teilneh-
merstaaten zu erwarten ist, daß die EWU eine **Stabilitätsgemeinschaft** sein wird.
Nach dem EU-Urteil ist auch dies Voraussetzung für eine nach deutschem
Verfassungsrecht wirksame Zustimmung zur Einführung des EURO.

Schon aus diesem Grunde ist es unzulässig, der Entscheidungen beider Häuser
jede politische Bedeutung abzusprechen und sie als reine Formalität zu betrach-
ten. Ebenso unzulässig ist das Argument, aus europapolitischen Gründen bestehe
kein Entscheidungsspielraum mehr. Über den Beginn der dritten Stufe sei de
facto längst entschieden. Eine Abweichung vom eingeschlagenen Weg sei mit
kaum kalkulierbaren Risiken für Europa verbunden.

I.

1. Soweit derzeit erkennbar, beabsichtigt die Bundesregierung, der sogenannten großen Lösung der EWU zuzustimmen. Danach sollen alle teilnahmewilligen Mitgliedstaaten am Beginn der dritten Stufe und damit an der Einführung des EURO von Anfang an teilnehmen. Nach meiner Überzeugung ist der Beginn der dritten Stufe der EWU im Rahmen der "großen Lösung" zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt mit den Grundsätzen, die Bundestag und Bundesrat im Dezember 1992 beschlossen haben, und mit dem EU-Urteil nicht vereinbar.

2. Ohne einer abschließenden Bewertung aller vorgeschlagenen Teilnehmerstaaten vorzugreifen, erfüllen insbesondere auch die drei Kernstaaten der EWU, Deutschland, Frankreich und Italien, derzeit noch nicht die Voraussetzungen für den Eintritt in die dritte und endgültige Stufe der EWU, wie sie durch die Entschließungen von Bundestag und Bundesrat präzisiert wurden.

Der Beginn der dritten Stufe der EWU ist ohne diese Kernstaaten kaum sinnvoll. Deshalb begründet die Feststellung, daß sie die Voraussetzungen für eine nachhaltige haushalts- und finanzpolitische Stabilität noch nicht erfüllen, im Ergebnis die Notwendigkeit, die endgültige Einführung des EURO zu verschieben. Der Europäische Rat sollte einen entsprechenden Beschluß in Anlehnung an der EG-Vertrag durch die Festlegung eines neuen Datums für den Beginn der dritten Stufe fassen.

3. Eine geregelte Verschiebung hätte nach dem EG-Vertrag bis Dezember 1997 vom Europäischen Rat beschlossen werden können. Die Staats- und Regierungschefs haben auf ihrem Luxemburger Treffen einen derartige Beschluß jedoch nicht gefaßt. Seit Beginn dieses Jahres läßt der Vertrag die Änderung des Termins für den Beginn der dritten Stufe durch einen Beschluß nicht mehr zu.

Das schließt jedoch nicht aus, auf einen Beginn der dritten Stufe zum 1. 1. 1999 dann zu verzichten, wenn die wesentlichen potentiellen Teilnehmerstaaten sich noch nicht ausreichend für eine Stabilitätsgemeinschaft qualifiziert haben. In diesem Sinne kann der Europäische Rat am 3. 5. 1998 beschließen, daß die Voraussetzungen für einen Beginn der EWU von der Mehrzahl der Staaten noch nicht erfüllt werden.

4. Die unzureichende Qualifikation der wichtigsten Teilnehmerstaaten zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt ist nicht allein auf deren Unfähigkeit zurückzuführen, den in Maastricht beschlossenen Prozeß der Konvergenz zu bewältigen. Die Vertragsbeteiligten sind in Maastricht vielmehr von Annahmen über die europäische wirtschaftliche, soziale und finanzpolitische Entwicklung ausgegangen, die sich nicht realisiert haben.

2

Für die Bundesrepublik hat dies der Finanzminister selbst erklärt. Zur Begründung einer Gesamtverschuldung, die die Grenze von 60% überschreitet, verwies er auf die enormen Belastungen, die Deutschland aus der Wiedervereinigung erwachsen sind und noch entstehen. Sie seien bei der Vereinbarung der Kriterien nicht voraussehbar gewesen. Ob dies, wie der ECOFIN-Rat kürzlich entschieden hat, eine ausreichende Begründung für die Annahme sein kann, das Kriterium Gesamtverschuldung könne als erfüllt angesehen werden, muß geklärt werden.

Ähnliches gilt für die Entwicklung der Verschuldung der anderen EU Staaten, für den Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit in der EU, für die Auswirkungen der osteuropäischen Entwicklung, für die Verschärfung der demographischen Probleme und für die Folgen der Globalisierung.

5. Die seit 1991 eingetretenen, nicht voraussehbaren gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen haben die Konsolidierung der Haushalts- und Finanzpolitik in den Kernländern der EU nachhaltig erschwert. Die Gesamtverschuldung der Mitgliedstaaten nahm seit Maastricht nicht ab, sondern stieg weiter an. Die mit der zunehmenden Arbeitslosigkeit schnell gewachsenen Anforderungen an die sozialen Systeme und zunehmende politische Widerstände haben eine rechtzeitige und ausreichende strukturelle Konvergenz unter den Mitgliedstaaten weitgehend verhindert. Die sozialen Systeme der Kernländer sind bisher nicht an die Bedingungen einer EWU angepaßt. Insbesondere sind die Voraussetzungen für die notwendige Flexibilität und Mobilität der Arbeitsmärkte noch nicht geschaffen. Die für eine funktionsfähige Währungsunion notwendige Angleichung der Steuersysteme ist bisher nicht gelungen.

Wäre die tatsächliche Entwicklung seit 1991 in Maastricht bereits vorhersehbar gewesen, dann hätte man kaum vereinbart, die Voraussetzungen für eine Währungsunion im Rahmen des jetzt gültigen Zeitplans zu erfüllen. Man hätte wohl auch nicht auf die Verbindung von Währungsunion und Politischer Union verzichtet.

6. Vor diesem Hintergrund widerspricht der geplante Beginn einer "großen EWU" nicht nur den Intentionen des EG-Vertrages. Er widerspricht auch dem materiellen Gehalt seiner Kriterien. Er steht im Widerspruch zu den Bedingungen, an die Bundestag und Bundesrat ihre Zustimmung geknüpft haben. Er ist mit politischen Risiken verbunden, die zum Zeitpunkt der Ratifizierung der Maastricht-Verträge weder erkennbar waren noch in Kauf genommen worden wären.

Diese Risiken sollten zum Wohle einer weiteren Entwicklung eines integrierten Europas und seiner Friedensordnung auch heute nicht eingegangen werden dür-

3

fen. Nicht eine Währungsunion, sondern eine **Konfliktunion** wäre die voraussehbare Folge einer "großen EWU" zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt.

7. Sollte es zu einer geregelten Verschiebung kommen, dann muß sie mit der klaren Absicht erfolgen, den **Prozeß** der strukturellen **Konvergenz**, der weiteren Konsolidierung der öffentlichen Haushalte und der sozialen Systeme und der Überwindung der Arbeitslosigkeit **fortzuführen** und zu einem befriedigenden Abschluß zu bringen. Zugleich müssen inhaltlich und zeitlich definierte Fortschritte auf dem Wege zur **politischen Union** vereinbart werden.

Eine Währungsunion ohne politische Union bildet nach wie vor **das größte Rissiko** für den **Erfolg** dieses bisher bedeutsamsten politischen Projekts Europas. Wir gehen das Abenteuer ein, eine gemeinsame Währung einzuführen, ohne eine gemeinsame Regierung geschaffen zu haben. Der Werner Bericht von 1970, der erste Vorschlag einer EWU, sah diesen Zusammenhang als Notwendigkeit vor.

8. Wird die geregelte Verschiebung mit einem klaren Arbeitsprogramm verbunden, das sich an den heutigen Problemlagen orientiert und keinen Zweifel an der Entschlossenheit der EU zuläßt, nach Ablauf der weiteren Frist die dritte Stufe der EWU zu realisieren, dann werden sich die **Ausswirkungen der Verschiebung auf die Finanzmärkte in Grenzen halten**. Ich teile in diesem Punkt die Auffassung des Sachverständigenrates.

Zugleich wird deutlich werden, welche bisherigen **Konsolidierungserfolge nachhaltig** sind und welche auf **kurzfristigen Sonderbedingungen** beruhen. Soweit es um das Kriterium der Neuverschuldung geht, ist letzteres bei einer Mehrheit der Teilnehmerstaaten der Fall, auch bei Deutschland.

## II.

1. Mehrheitlich wird von den politisch Verantwortlichen in den Teilnehmerstaaten, der Kommission und dem Europäischen Parlament derzeit die Auffassung vertreten, es sei aus **gesamtpolitischen Gründen nicht möglich**, eine noch nicht ausreichende Qualifikation Deutschlands, Frankreichs und Italiens für den EURO festzustellen und den Beginn der EWU deshalb zu verschieben. Für eine geregelte Verschiebung fehle es nicht nur an den vertraglichen Voraussetzungen. Sie scheitere auch an den inzwischen geschaffenen Fakten. "Der Zug", so heißt es, "sei längst abgefahren". Der Euro-Prozeß könne ohne gewaltigen Schaden für Europa nicht mehr aufgehalten werden.

2. Folgt man dieser Ansicht, so muß - soweit es um die Willensbildung in Deutschland geht - zunächst erklärt werden, welche Gründe Bundestag und Bun-

4