Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
The President
10/26/73; 9:16 a.m.

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: How are things looking this morning?

K: They look fairly quiet. There is a fire fight going on along the Suez Canal.

P: Well, I mean how do things look between us and the Soviets.

K: Between us and the Soviets they look quiet. They are totally quiet.

P: Yeah.

K: And, the . . .

P: And the general reception to what has happened is -- has been adequately played or . . .

K: I think it has been adequately played. They are grudgingly saying that it was necessary and that it was well done. Reston has a shitty column today saying it was probably necessary but maybe we over reacted.

P: You should have laid on him a little harder, Henry.

K: Mr. President, if a Soviet paratroop division had beein in there, they would have said it was . . .

P: Reston, you have got to remember that when he calls you have to assume he is an enemy -- huh?

K: Exactly.

P: Enemy in the terms of posed war policies and so forth.

K: Mr. President, when one analyzes how it has played, it was basically, considering that most of the reporters are our opponents -- I think it was basically played extremely postively.

P: In other words it was played in a way that showed that well we had a little bit of a crisis but it was tied a little bit to the Watergate thing and all the rest.

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K: The tied it to Watergate but they it is clear that . . .

P: Wanted to get across that this was not a Watergate . . .

K: No, no, we got across that it isn't a Watergate related -- most all of them did. There is just a little nibbling around the edges of this thing which you expect from them. After all when you were in China before Watergate they were looking for things wrong there, too.

P: With regard to this, will you take the time to prepare a little statement for me for an opener tonight.

K: Right.

P: What do you have? Anything you can think of that is . . .

K: Well, I think that you can say . . .

P: What I mean is something new. I don't want -- I am not going to read it. I just want some talking points.

K: I think you can say -- I don't know whether I would announce that the alert is no longer in effect. They will ask that as a question and you can acknowledge it.

P: Yes, of course, of course.

K: But I think we can put down some basic principles on the Middle East.

P: Yeah, put down two or three things as to what has happened.

K: Right.

P: How working with the Soviets has been constructive and we must continue to and we've got to avoid it and now is the time for a permanent settlement and so forth.

K: Right. Right. I'd be constructive but not too specific on the settlement.

P: Oh, God, I don't intend to be specific. I won't say anything about borders or anything like that. But put down what you can in the way of talking points, will you please.

10/26/73; 9:16 a.m.

K: Absolutely, Mr. President.

P: And send those over to me as soon as you can.

K: Right, within the next hour.

P: Fine. You are feeling all right, are you?

K: I feel fine. I had a good night's sleep, Mr. President.

P: Fine, fine. Well, you did a fine job, Henry.

K: Well, you made the tough decision.

P: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Date 6/16/73
By CH

Telcon
Amb. Dobrynin/HAK

Oct. 26, 1973; 9:32 a.m.

D: You called me yesterday.

K: I just called you to make sure you wouldn't go to sleep early.

D: No, I was until 1:00 o'clock with your deputies.

K: I know. Can I give you one piece of advice?

D: Of course.

K: He has little influence with me.

D: It doesn't matter. He invites me and I am going.

K: I am glad you went. It is good for you. I didn't know whether I should
have Scowcroft call you every hour during last night, too.

D: No, he was calling me. I went to bed and asked Vorontsov to receive this
every hour on the hour during the operation - not to do anything.

K: OK. What I called you about was to tell you it isn't all that important,
that we have had no contact with Jackson whatsoever and he's been
operating entirely on his own.

D: Uh, huh.

K: In the inflammatory statements he's been making.

D: Well, he doesn't see in the future very much. What he is doing is make it
on special items is my impression. Only he is acting like directions to do.
There is not in combination of what he is doing. In his own, issued just in
his own behalf which is all well known. So for me it was nothing new in his
statement.

K: Right.

D: And, Henry, in connection with this United Nations Forces, Gromyko
sent a telegram yesterday late, but in connection with this thing, you know,
the United Nations is serious about sending UN forces...

K: Hold on a second. Hello, yeah, go ahead.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: NNPA 500-0034

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012958
By: WW. A. Spada
Date: 06/04/84

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It was

decision about

D: / In connection with the Security Council/sending UN <u>recognition</u> forces in the Middle East. And <u>judgment</u> will tell you that we can't see the importance of the composition of these forces, the United Nations force, is an important element, so we believe that these forces would be composed of the contingents from the, as you call it, communist and socialist countries and that this termination couldn't be justified in this <u>particular</u> case. We mention this because amongst other measures of relief, it is not quite clear whether to do so as if the American representatives are observant against inclusion in this personnel from the socialist countries.

K: No, we want to exclude countries that belong to existing military alliances.

D: In this case...

K: Regardless of social system.

D: Yes, but, the question is, in this case...

K: We don't insist that any members from Thailand.

D: No, I understand, but this rather looks from our side.

K: Not at all. Well do you consider Sweden as being on our side?

D: Well it was ______ whether Sweden alone, but the question around representation of two different kinds of areas too, not on just representation from other areas...

K: Why don't we let them argue about that in New York.

D: Yes, but it's important for them to know, to get some instructions, because otherwise they will argue for another recourse. They will say they don't know how many it will take.

K: Well our view was that they should be drawn in the first instance from maybe some of the forces on Cyprus.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: Because I like to have Swedes in warm climates.

D: Yes, I understand. On immediate basis.

K: And our basic view was that they shouldn't contain people that belong to existing military alliances, which would have excluded Canadians.

Telcon
Amb. Dobrynin/HAK

Oct. 26, 1973; 9:32 a.m.

D: You called me yesterday.

D: Of course.

D: Uh, huh.

K: Right.

CLASSIFIED

ACTION
DATE 6/16/73
BY CH

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It was

decision about

D: / In connection with the Security Council/sending UN security forces in the Middle East. And judgment will tell you that we can't see the importance of the composition of these forces, the United Nations force, is an important element, so we believe that these forces would be composed of the contingents from the, as you call it, communist and socialist countries and that this termination couldn't be justified in this particular case. We mention this because amongst other measures of relief, it is not quite clear whether to do so as if the American representatives are observant against inclusion in this personnel from the socialist countries.

D: In this case...

D: Yeah, I understand.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 6/10/65</td></tr><tr><td>REASON For</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td></tr><tr><td>FOR</td></tr></table>

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D: I understand.

K: But, I understand your point of view and I'll look into it.

D: Okay.

K: And then we can consider what else to do.

D: All right.

K: I think we should now both try to quiet this thing down.

D: Yeah.

K: And, you know, I didn't go to Moscow in order to produce a crisis between the Soviet Union and the United States. That wasn't the purpose of the trip.

D: Well, it looked as if...

K: I mean the way things are developing now I would have been better off never going there and letting the Israelis continue military operations.

D: Well, Henry, whenever you have the time, maybe I'll. Then I'll tell him my own point of view. But it's nothing really now for what is great importance. What was done was done. The other question was his special interest in terms of anything else onto this. All right?

K: Okay, fine.

D: Okay. Bye, bye, Henry.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger

Ambassador Dinitz

10/26/73; 9:38 a.m.

D: I understand you wanted me to call you, Dr. Kissinger.

K: That's right. Now we have our direct line.

D: Yeah.

K: We can yell at each other.

D: No, we should not do this.

K: I have a number of things and then I want to get to an important one.

D: Okay.

K: First, I hope that Jackson didn't get his information about what was in that Brezhnev letter from your Embassy.

D: Jackson was not in touch with us and none of our people were in touch with him for weeks now. And I can assure you no one in our Embassy except Shalev and myself knew about it.

K: Secondly, on every television I heard yesterday that Israeli intelligence was of the view that there had been no threat of Soviet intervention.

D: That I did not even hear.

K: I heard it from -- you know it was Israeli intelligence officials were not aware of any unusual activity.

D: That's ridiculous. I can tell you this, Mr. Secretary, two or three newspapermen called me yesterday, including Marilyn Berger, and I told them that that was a very serious threat and that how appreciative we were of the strong action by the United States.

K: Well, what I would like to stress to you, Mr. Ambassador, is this: If you could use whatever influence you have with the press here -- I don't give a damn for ourselves because the historical record will support us. But we are not out of the woods yet and if the Russians look at this and see that when there is a crisis we then get flyspecked by the press, they may try it again.

D: There is no doubt about...

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K: I mean if you look at the Czechoslovak evolution, they had a number of scares before they finally moved.

D: Of course, of course. . .

K: And I really think it is in your overwhelming interest. . .

D: Absolutely.

K: that you support first with your Senators and Congressmen and with the press our authority in this matter. It's the only threat we've got left.

D: No doubt. No doubt. We have done yesterday the same. We will do more of this today.

K: Because we really took enormous risks. You may not like what we do in the UN . . .

D: That's a different story. . .

K: But that is a question on tactics -- on strategy we took a fantastic risk.

D: Right. Right. Absolutely. No, I am in complete agreement with you. And yesterday ______ was done and we will do more of it today.

K: And I had convinced the President that if the Soviets had moved that we would have put forces into the Sinai.

D: Yeah, you mentioned this to me.

K: And, believe me, there was no one in the Government or in the Congress in favor of that.

D: Especially, probably not those Congressmen that, you know, that were at the White House now.

K: Well, not the leaders. They are the ones that the President has to see. So we always have to keep . . . Now, I have two important matters. One is, as you know, I am going to China.

D: Yes.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dinitz
10/26/73; 9:38 a. m.

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K: On the 10th.

D: Of November.

K: Yes. And I have offered the Egyptians that I will stop by in Cairo on the way there. You know they invited me urgently when I was in Tel Aviv and I turned it down.

D: Right.

K: And I am doing that as a means of keeping them quiet.

D: Right.

K: And they have accepted that. That's point one. Now point two . . .

D: That would be around the 9th then?

K: No, I will get there about the 7th or 8th.

D: I see.

K: Because I may stop in Tehran, too, on the way. We need some strategy with those Arabs that are not totally lost. I mean, of course, they. . .

D: Tehran and Cairo or and other countries or . . .

K: I haven't worked it out yet. Maybe an hour in Amman.

D: I see.

K: On the way. And I've got to look at a map on what Amman is on the way to.

D: It's a one-way street, Mr. Secretary.

K: Well, I don't think we will turn history in Amman.

D: No, I don't think so.

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K: Perhaps you will drive me over from Jerusalem.

D: That's easy, we have an open bridge, you know.

K: I told you once when I went to the A________ Bridge I thought if a man from the moon came and said there is a victorious army, there is a defeated army. There was the Jordanian looking like a world beater and the Israelis soldiers sitting there like a slob on a chair. He didn't get up when his general came up to . . .

D: I know the guys -- __________ in the university in Jerusalem.

K: Oh, really.

D: Yeah, during the ________.

K: I went there with General Narkiss and I tell you that private sitting on the bridge barely acknowledged Narkiss' existence.

D: . . . only a student. When they go without uniforms they expected Narkiss to salute him.

K: Whether he acknowledged his existence or not he certainly didn't think he needed to get up when the General came up to him.

D: That's the way it is.

K: Okay, but now, Mr. Ambassador, two things: one is Sadat sent us a rather hysterical message again.

D: This morning?

K: Yes, just right now.

D: On what?

K: Well first, he said he is working on a totally new comprehensive peace proposal which he may give me when I get there.

10/26/73; 9:38 a.m.

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D: Uh-huh.

K: Well that at least wastes a little time and since I am then on the way to China nothing can happen until I get back.

D: Yeah.

K: I just don't want to do anything without telling you.

D: Sure.

K: Second, and I want to sit down with you and tell you what the General, my General,

D: Yes, I heard yesterday in your press conference that you had a very fruitful talk with Dobrynin about procedure, sites and methods for the new negotiations.

K: Yeah, I want to talk to you about that in a minute -- that's all baloney.

D: Uh-huh.

K: The trouble with you, Mr. Ambassador, is that you go straight ahead and I go in circles. If I can teach you people tactics --

D: Yeah.

K: Now the hysterical message from Sadat is: that their third army is surrounded and that you are trying to get them to surrender and that they will have to take unilateral measures regardless of consequences and that you are not permitting UN observers in there. All of this may be true, but we want to give them an answer. Let me make a suggestion. First of all, of course you want to check with your Government. My recommendation is that we can tell him that you would permit observers in there and just tell me where they should go and just don't say in general. Secondly, I would consider it a very good move if you would say you would let non-military supplies in there of some kind because it can then be used against them if they start an offensive.

read

D: Well, what I did in the morning, they have already started shooting.

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K: Well, that may be but I think it is best to have a position that we can then later defend. And it is also a position which if a debate starts in the Security Council about what can move on these roads, we can then sustain having taken it previously and not being beaten into it.

D: Our -- I cabled, by the way, last night my Government asking them to think along these lines because I figured that's what would develop.

K: Could you get me an answer in an hour or so?

D: Yeah, I will try on these two points: on the observers and on the ...

K: On the observers, what I want from you is a very specific answer where I can then tell Sadat we have been urgently in touch with Israeli Government and you will -- then observers should report to this and this place.

D: I have one point, if I may . . .

K: And secondly, any proposition at all we can make on humanitarian supplies -- you know food and so forth, that isn't humiliating.

D: Yeah.

K: I mean you can still screw it up on the road -- I mean let's make a particular proposal.

D: Right. I will check what can be done on the second one. We had a very disturbing concern in Israel over the fact that the Russians are sending 70 observers which 50 of them are officers -- they snuck into these ____ places I told you about last night. I don't know really quite now but sometime soon it is possible during the day if I can get an impression from you, Mr. Secretary, of how do you view this hope situation of the connection between the observers and the emergency force.

K: Well, I want to -- we won't accept 70 observers and we have already told Waldheim. We told the Russians two things: all observers have been part of the UN Observers. There won't be -- we don't hold still for separate observers. And secondly all observers -- that number of 70 is not acceptable for us for the UN force.

D: They are there already, you know.

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K: Yeah, but you know, they haven't any status. We can't prevent the Russians from sending people into Cairo. Then if they send 70 officers we can't protest it.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: What we can do -- they asked us to send 70 of our own and join them. We told them we won't send 70 of our own. Two, we won't join them. Three, we won't have any separate U.S. -Soviet arrangement -- it has to be part of the UN. And fourth, 70 is too many. Now we have an arrangement with Waldheim that he won't take more than 20 of from each of the superpowers.

D: These 20 of each, how will they be related to the force.

K: They won't be related to the force at all. They will be part of the observer group. We will not permit any Soviet or American personnel in the force and we will insist on an absolute distinction between the observers and the force.

D: Yes, that is important because the Prime Minister thinks that is one way to infiltrate into the force.

K: We won't have them in the force in any...

D: Fine, I will get busy on these two problems.

K: Will you get back to me? Really since I don't believe the Crisis is over would you please make sure that we can get the necessary press support.

D: Yes, I will get...

K: At least that they don't--I mean Marvin Kalb, people like that, ought to be controllable.

D: That's a friend, Marvin Kalb, he speaks of you as the best friend in the world.

K: He isn't attacking me. But when they make all these insinuations that this was done for Watergate reasons they are weakening for the future.

D: As I told you two newspaper men called me and one of them was
Marilyn Berger and I worked on the telephone for about half an hour
to convince her, and I think she took out all the references. She
was going to write the story that the President needed this for
Watergate and I said....

K: Well, they are saying two things, the President needed it for Watergate and the second is that the President has lost his judgment. Now the fact of the matter is you know X who did this.

D: Of course. On her I think I corrected the story and I asked, also
issued instructions to all our counselors along these lines but I will
try to do what else I can today.

K: Good thank you but get me an answer on the other business.

D: Ok.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>originally</td></tr><tr><td>By: CHM. Date: 6/16/64</td></tr></table>

TELCONE
Secy Schlesinger/Secy Kissinger

9:55 a.m., October 26, 1973

K: Now, Jim, I'm a little bit concerned about the following. I have brought Defense in more under your stewardship than under any of your predecessors. In fact, never have we told anyone else about our messages, our strategy and so forth. Now I find that an exchange between Brezhnev and the President, which used to be kept in very secret channels, is in an alert order going to every commander around the world. And I find Jackson on television speaking about a Brezhnev -- about a Soviet note to us.

S: The Jackson thing must have come from elsewhere, Henry. The problem was -- and you're quite right and I was astonished --

K: I mean, the alert order says --

S: I know. On the alert order, I was amazed. First of all, we should not have had copies of that Brezhnev letter. Tom took one away and brought it back to the building and talked to the Chiefs about it during the JCS Conference. No that is an obvious mistake.

K: That's intolerable. These Brezhnev-Nixon exchanges we don't keep copies even in the State Department.

S: The Jackson thing I can't explain Henry. I think that came from the other side of the river -- quite bluntly.

K: You mean from State?

S: From somewhere over there because he announced this letter yesterday morning early. Now I just could...

K: It could only have come from Dinitz because I frankly didn't show-- there isn't one of my State Department people who's ever seen that letter.

S: When I saw that thing in the press clippings I said where the hell did Jackson get that. Was he at the meeting. Did they announce that letter at the meeting because it was a source of astonishment to me.

K: No, first of all he wasn't at the meeting and secondly as you...

S: I talked to Tom about the other thing but quite frankly...

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date</td></tr><tr><td>By: CHAR. Date 6/10/83</td></tr></table>

K: As you could see from my press conference I stayed miles from getting Brezhnev's name in there because the last thing I want is to have him publicly humiliated.

S: No, that's exactly right Henry. All I can say at this point is one that I agree entirely and two there will be no repetition.

K: I knew you would. OK. If you could, you know Tom writes every God damn thing down and then he had no right to take that letter with him.

S: That's right. Well, the problem was the thing should have been in one copy and passed around the table and left there.

K: That's what we're going to do in the future.

S: Right.

K: OK. You see what I'm trying to prevent.

S: You're quite right.

K: I'm not worried about this thing now but what I'm trying to prevent is people now think its all over. I am not at all sure. This could blow up right away again. Incidentally, just for your information, I've had a note from Sadat today saying they are working out a new comprehensive proposal for my visit.

S: Very good.

K: But he's also screaming about the Third Army.

S: We ought to do something about that Henry.

K: I have talked to the Israelis and said that we want them to let non-military supplies through.

S: They will do it.

K: I'll get an answer within two hours.

S: OK. Well, that's very good because in a way it's an opportunity for us.

K: Exactly.

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