*

TELCONE
Roland Evans/HAK

October 8, 1973/~~8:51 a.m.~~

E: I just want to know whether this is serious business in the Middle East or what?

K: Serious.

E: Is this to embarrass you, the United States, does it expect the Security Council to move.

K: No they don't want the Security Council.

E: It makes no sense Henry.

K: I agree with you.

E: They are going to be bloodied or smashed by Israel before this is over. A few days I would say.

K: No matter what the Washington Post says we've been trying to get a ceasefire since Saturday. The only trouble is the Arabs don't want either a meeting or a resolution so they and their friends just won't cooperate. A This is not to be attributed.

E: I understand that. What about the Russians? Are they in on this at all as far as we know.

K: I'm not sure. I doubt it.

E: Then the upshot is going to be to restrain Israel from going to Damascus.

K: That could well turn out to be the problem later this week.

E: Can you see it clear on anything to--I mean the Israelis are so obviously militarily superior power that I can't understand this without some fallback position in Cairo. There's got to be something -- a backboard-- they're working against.

K: Well if there is they haven't revealed it to anybody

E: Do you believe the attack that they say the Israelis knew about made where the pipeline was ---

*

K: No, that's insane.

E: You sure.

K: Look, you know the Israelis with --that they attacked on their holy holiday at one place where there is a pipeline and then let the Egyptians and the Syrians at the same hour cross--

E: I know. Did you have any intelligence before this before it happened, Henry-- anything before it started.

K: Yeh.

E: And suddenly it looked possibly productive.

K: Something that looked--I would make it one much less than possibly productive but at least--I don't throw that down the drain.

E: And this was since the UN started meeting or did it go back before that.

K: I don't want to go into it.

E: That is my ______, you can tell me anything on it

K: I really can't Roland, I've got to run.

E: Am I going to see you tomorrow.

K: I don't know--call me

E: First thing in the morning.

K: Yeh.

E: Thanks a hell of a lot--Henry.

BELL A. CHRYSLER

AUTHOR: E012858
DATE: 6/24/07
D: AMARA DOD

*

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Chairman Morgan

9:46 a. m. 10/8/73

K: Mr. Chairman, we've had a difficult time getting together.

M: Yeh, I've been moving around

K: And I was at a meeting. Just wanted to give you a brief rundown on where we stand.

M: Right.

K: Mr. Chairman, ever since we got word of impending conflict, what we have been trying to do is to get--first to try to prevent it and that failed, and then we tried to get it stopped -- now we are still in touch with all the permanent members of the security council and constantly in touch with the Egyptian and Israeli foreign ministers, and very much contact with the Soviet Union, we tried on Saturday to get a security council meeting started asking for an end of hostilities and we couldn't generate any support for it from anybody and therefore a call for it would simply have meant that there would be no resolution and we would have been worse off. So we spent all our time trying to generate a consensus on some resolution that people might agree on, we also asked the President of the Security Council to have informal consultations and he couldn't get any support, so we went through that process all day yesterday and then finally late in the afternoon we decided to call for a meeting ourselves when no one else would do it with us and we are now going to have a meeting this afternoon and we will try to get the fighting stopped, but I wanted you to know that--

M: the resolution now--just--

K: We want to see what the security situation is, we don't think it is a good idea to have a resolution that doesn't have support, because then we're worse off, and we don't want if we can avoid to be in a confrontation with the Soviets and Egyptians and so we are now positioned that we are the only country that's in touch with all the parties--and we will put in a resolution just as soon as we think it has enough support to pass

M: Yes, ah huh.

K: But I wanted you to know that we are very active, and that as soon as we see anything jelling that can work, we'll propose it but I think you'll agree what we don't want is a yelling match that makes the situation worse;

M: I agree with that.

K: Right, Mr. Chairman, I'll keep you informed. M: Okay, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/8/73; 9:54 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Anatol!

D: Hello, Henry. I just received an oral message -- a very short one, but I think it is fairly urgent. An oral message from Brezhnev to the President and he asked me to tell you personally about it. The message is very short and I will just read it. "We have contacted the leaders of the Arab states on the question of ceasefire. We hope to get a reply shortly. We feel that we should act in cooperation with you, being guided by the broad interests of maintaining peace and developing the Soviet-American relations. We hope that President Nixon will act likewise."

K: I can answer that for you right away because I have just come from the President. This reflects our spirit and we will also -- we are eager to cooperate in bringing peace. I was going to call you. Just for your guidance -- with reference to the discussions we have had, we were not going to put in a resolution at the Security Council this afternoon.

D: Not going to?

K: No, we are just going to have a general discussion. But we would appreciate it since we are doing that, that you don't confront us with one without discussion.

D: I don't know -- I have a telegram from -- which will sent to our Ambassador to the delegation to the United Nations -- with instructions -- I don't know yet.

K: Will you let me know what you are going to do.

D: But I will right now mention to them that you are not going to put any -- you are not going to today, yes?

K: We have no intention to put one in today unless there is a drastic change.

D: Of the situation.

K: We thought that since you wouldn't agree with us on our proposal and since we wouldn't agree with you, it would be best to have a general discussion.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: EAI-20557
By: N.W. Baran Date: 10/07/04

Telecon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/8/73; 9:54 a.m.

-2-

D: I think so. Maybe there will be some reply and then we will be in touch with you, of course. But as of now my personal feeling is that the best thing to do is a general discussion without . . .

K: Why don't you inform Moscow of this?

D: I will do that right away.

K: Also, we will take a conciliatory -- you know not a conciliatory but . . .

D: I understand -- under the circumstances.

K: We will follow your line of not attacking you.

D: I understand.

K: And I will include finally some reference of the discussion of MFN in my speech tonight.

D: I think, under the circumstances, it would be a good idea -- from our side, too.

K: I will do that. Good.

D: What about the telephone? Couldn't you extend this particular telephone. Your own people probably know.

K: I will get it done within the next few days.

D: Yeah. It's just an extension of your telephone in your office to the department. There is nothing to be done on my side, really.

K: No, no, it will be done. You can be sure.

D: Because otherwise to call by . . .

K: No, no, I understand. You can count on it.

D: Okay.

K: Bye.

D: Bye. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By M.N. Atkinson Page 00304

TELCONE
Senator Stennis/HAK

October 8, 1973/10:20 a.m.

K: Never any lack of excitement Mr. Chairman.

S: You're at the right place though. You'll find a way.

K: Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to call you to bring you up to date on what's going on.

S: That's mighty nice of you.

K: What we are doing is, we're not making any grandstand plays. We could have called a Security Council meeting on Saturday but we first told the Russians we wanted to stay in step with them and have them act responsively. We then went to the Egyptians and Israelis and to the British and French and it turned out that there was no consensus for anything.

S: No what.

K: No agreement to do anything so rather than force a confrontation in which we would get out voted we stayed in contact with them and kept offering our good ______. Then yesterday afternoon we went ahead and unilaterally called a Security Council Meeting for today and now this morning we had a message from the Russians saying they want to stay in step with us and they would do their utmost to keep the situation from getting out of control. So even though you may not see much visible action, I think we've contained the crisis and we think that in another couple of days we'll have it quieted down.

S: That's fine.

K: So, we think the Israelis will destroy the military situation and just for your information we will be in favor of the restoration of the ceasefire lines as they were when the fighting started. That was our position Saturday afternoon when the Arabs were gaining territory. This will be our position tomorrow when the Israelis will be gaining territory. We'll apply it totally even-handedly.

S: Well you're referring back to the other war?

K: No, to this one. In other words we want them all to go back to where they were Saturday noon before the fighting started. You know when the Arabs were gaining they didn't want to go back to their lines. By tomorrow it is our judgment the Arabs will be pleading to get back to those lines. Or by Wednesday at latest and our position will remain constant.

*

S: Right.

K: we are in favor of everybody going back where they were before the
fighting started, whoever is ahead.

S: Yes. That's good.

K: Don't you think. And we will try to keep the Soviets from interferring,
we've used the 6th fleet, part of the 6th fleet out of Athens so that its
ready in case there is any problem with American civilians in the area
but we are not doing anything provocative.

S: No. Well, I have a lot of faith in your judgment and I certainly will back
you up in any way I can.

K: Well, you've been a tower of strength Mr. Chairman and the President
wants to thank you for everything you've done for the country.

S: Well, I've done very little.

K: You're one of the great patriots I've met.

S: You'll stay on this thing and you'll have an answer sometime.

K: We'll have it worked out Mr. Chairman. I'm quite confident now.

S: I'm jotting down a little note here with the date on it about your call and
I like your points here. That's fine.

K: Thank you Mr. Chairman.

S: If there is anyway I can help you let me know.

K: We'll keep you briefed Mr. Chairman.

S: OK. Bye.

*

TELCONE
Lord Cromer/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

11:00 a.. m.

K: I wanted to bring you up to date on what we are doing.

C: Thank you.

K: We have decided not to introduce a resolution this afternoon. We will state our general objective along the lines of a ceasefire and a return to the positions prior to Oct. 6 but not in the form of a resolution but in a form of a philosophical statement. We thought this would give you an opportunity to -- we will then not have votes and competing views. Our instinct is that by tomorrow this whole question will be mute.

C: As quickly as that.

K: Say Wednesday. My personal instinct is tomorrow. My recommendation to you is not too push for a straightout ceasefire because you may be ratifying Israeli territory again. I think our Saturday position will look better to you tomorrow night.

C: I have long thought this might be the case.

K: I would urge -- we will put ours forward constructively and ambiguously. If you could get your demon draftsmen in London to do the same thing --

C: Fine. Thank you for letting me know. Incidentally, I gather something is on the AP tape that says Fulbright and the British Ambassador are reluctant about what is going on. I am not reluctant. We are hand in hand with what is going on.

K: I have not seen that and I would think Fulbright is going along. I think you and I are in good standing.

C: Right.

K: We don't mind a shade of difference that would permit us to move to another position. Let's play it that way through the rest of the day and tomorrow we will see what will have crystallized.

C: Have you decided whether to do anything concerning the Lebanon plea to you to intercede on their behalf with the Israelis.

BELL AIRPORT
8
Author: E012255
Date: 09/07
D. AMARA

-2-

Oct 8, 1973

11:00 a. m.

K: I am not aware of that.

C: I think they made an appeal formally.

K: To us?

C: That is my understanding. That is what he told us he is going.

K: If so, we either have not received it or my associates are not keeping me informed about countries with less than 10 million population. If the Lebanese made such an appeal we would intercede on their behalf.

C: I will ask my people at a lower level to get in touch with yours.

K: Tell your people to get in touch with Sisco.

C: All right, Henry.

END.

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>RECLASSIFIED</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Author: E012958</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Date: 10/1/73</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Attn: SISCO Dues</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

TELCON
Stewart Alsop/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

11:20 a.m.

K: I know you have already talked to Sisco but I wanted you to have a word from me too about the situation. What we have tried -- I want to give you a sense of our strategy. First we tried to prevent the outbreak and when that failed, we tried to get it ended but the situation was that the Arabs did not want a Security Council meeting and therefore no other member of the SC wanted to have one. We canvassed all day Saturday both for a meeting and a resolution that might pass. Of course, we were in the closest touch with the Israelis. When it became apparent that all would happen in a Security Council meeting would be a shouting match and inconclusive, we continued this strategy. We tried to keep the Russians from doing anything rash by staying in touch. I think it is being worked out now. We moved it unilaterally to the SC last night. I think we will crystallize this thing over the next 24-48 hours.

A: Fine. I told Joe that in 1956 Dulles stopped them you know and Lescoff (sp), the field leaders, said they took a swim in the canal, and we stopped them. In 1967 I was with Alazar (sp). We were in a village close to Damascus. He now runs the whole show. On the ground he is the Commander in Chief. I said you made a mistake. He said you meant going to Damascus. I said yes. He said you know who pulled us off. You did. They have lost their greatest asset of 1967 and I listened to all of the plans. With their air superiority I believe they will get control. And that we should not try to stop them.

K: We have maneuvered in such away that they have not had too much interference.

A: As the Shah once said to me, "I am sympathetic with the Arabs. They can lose a hundred battles but the Israelis cannot lose one."

K: We have maintained a position and I think the Israelis are satisfied with what we are doing and yet we have not broken off with the Arabs and we are going to try to dance that line for awhile.

A: Wish you luck. Anyway that I can be of service, let me know.

K: Thank you. You have been a good friend and I will keep you informed.

END

*

TELCORN

MANSFIELD/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

11:25 a.m.

K: How are you, Senator? I wanted to give you a brief word on the state of play. We have now had information from the Russians saying they are using their influence to restrain and they hoped we are doing the same thing. Of course, we are already doing this. Also, very confidentially, I have made this exchange with the Egyptians and I have concerted with the British for the SC meeting this afternoon and with the Russians to keep it from degenerating into a shouting match. The reason we are not formally putting forward a resolution is because it does not do any good to have a lot of competing resolutions, all of which will fail. We are trying to crystallize a consensus and I wanted you to understand our strategy. As soon as a consensus exists we will support it as we were ready to do from Saturday on. For your own private information, we took the position that everyone should return to their position when the fighting started. The Arabs told us this would be very unsatisfactory to them. We took that position because we assume the Israeli position would change.

M: You mean last Friday.

K: I want you to know that whoever is ahead at the time of the resolution, we are going to be urging a return to the positions of Friday. My judgment is this will be working against the Arabs soon. You may be catching some flack on this. I don't see how we can have another territory grab.

M: Akin called me. He got wind of a resolution and he was much opposed to it. He wanted to support your position and not have something contrary to what you were trying to do. Scott came in later and agreed. We said we would take that position. It is impossible to have any resolution here until you get a chance to make your position known and make these contacts.

K: We don't object to a resolution that calls for a return to a position of Friday for the reason that we think that position will be reached certainly by tomorrow and after that the Israelis are going to be advancing into the Arab country.

M: I see. O.K. You can talk to Scott on that basis and I wish you would too.

K: I don't want to have it said that I urged it.

WELL COMING
AUTHOR EO 12958
DATE 10/1/73
BY AMARA DOL

TELCORN

Sen. Scott/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

11:35 a.m.

K: You are a mind reader. I was going to call you.

S: Mike and I were talking and of course to Akin and as Mike tole you
both of us are taking the position that you need all the elbow room you
can get.

K: Right.

S: There will be God knows any number of Senators coming in with any number
of resolutions and the major question -- the reason Mike is here with me now
is shall we continue to say no resolution as far as we are concerned or
should we give some thought to a resolution which supports you.

K: If you think you could get a Senate resolution supporting the course
we have taken and expressing the view that the Senate favors a ceasefire
and return to the positions the parties occupied Friday.

S: That is our position.

K: Before the outbreak of hostilities. We have not said that publicly
but it will be the position we will take. If we could point to strong
Senate support that would be helpful.

S: All right. Mike is right here. Suppose we do that. Most of the
resolutions are being sent in to me and they are very firey and partisan.

K: I think the best thing from our selfish point of view and from the
national point of view is if the Senate could express support for the
way the crisis has been handled and expresses the hope that the
Administration will seek an early ceasefire and return to the positions
occupied when the fighting started.

S: All right. I think that is all right with Mike. We will work out a
joint resolution. We will do that.

K: That would be very helpful.

END

RECLASSIFIED
8
Author: E 0 12855
Date: 10/1/73
Attn:

TELCON
McCloskey/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

11:45 a.m.

K: For your information in case it hits before you get briefed. I have gotten Mansfield and Scott to introduce a resolution into the Senate expressing the Senate's support for the Administration's handling of this crisis.

M: Good.

K: And urging a solution which involves a ceasefire and return to the position of ceasefire prior to the fighting. The reason I did that is so that when this turns against the Israelis we have some support with us.

M: O.K. That will be done sometime today?

K: Yes. Also it keeps a lot of other resolutions from being voted on.

M: Good.

K: Don't mention it.

M: No. No.

K: Just in case there is a question asked. You can say for the Senate to decide.

M: Can I say you have been in contact with them.

K: You can say I have talked to Fulbright, Mansfield, Scott, Stennis and Symington and also some others and Morgan from the House Foreign Affairs.

M: Fulbright, Mansfield, Stennis, Symington and Morgan.

K: Yes.

END

TELCOM

The President/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

11:50 a.m.

N: Regarding Scott and Mansfield, did you in effect tell them -- are they going to put out that we support such a resolution.

K: Yes. They are saying this -- they are not saying this is a resolution. They are saying this should be our objective.

N: They will indicate that the Administration favors that objection.

K: That we should favor that objective. I said this would not run afoul of anything we are trying to do. I did not tell them to do it. Otherwise they were going to do something much stronger.

N: Yes. Would it be helpful if I were to lean on them and to tell them not to go too far?

K: No. Mr. President, this is not going too far.

N: On their part.

K: No. No. Not going too far on their part. Scali will have spoken before they can get any resolution like this passed. This is essentially opposition. They are supporting you.

N: If I had to be in touch with them I could say we appreciate that support.

K: I think that would be appreciated. That would be a nice gesture.

N: Fine. Fine. O.K.

K: O.K.

N: One other brief thing. On Japan, how about Doug Dillon.

K: He would be excellent.

N: Sort of a hand across the sea. He is basically on the other side. He is a business man.

RECLASSIFIED
Author: E012958
Date: 6/24/73
DISTRIBUTION: All

2
The President
Oct. 8

K: I don't think he will take it. I understand he does not want to go back into Government.

N: You call him and tell him that the President wants him to take it.

K: Absolutely. Lynn Firestone is in Japan. I have not been able to nail him.

N: You are going to offer him Canada.

K: That is what you suggested.

N: Did you try Anderson.

K: I think we should have him to Britain.

N: You have not tried him. I would offer Dillon Japan.

K: That would be the best appointment.

If you talk to Mansfield and Scott the best would be to thank them. They have held off a lot of wild men who wanted to make extreme resolutions.

END

DEC 15 1964 11

Authorized
8
By AMBASSADOR
Date 01/25/64

*

TELCORN

Sen. Javits/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

11:55 a.m.

J: Has Hugh Scott talked to you about this resolution.

K: Yes.

J: Have you worked anything out with him.

K: I talked to him and to Dinitz too to make sure it did not bother them. We would welcome a resolution along the following lines. An expression of approval and recommendation that supported a restoration of the ceasefire at the line prior to the Friday hostilities.

J: They have one in here that exercises its full diplomatic ... and elsewhere to achieve a defensible border. Whatever the words of the 242 are. Does that bother you?

K: No.

J: We have two parts. Approving the way the crisis is being handled and supporting restoration of the agreed upon ceasefire line.

K: I would not use ceasefire line -- that creates confusion like in 67.

J: Support restoration.

K: Of the positions the two sides occupied before the outbreak of hostilities.

J: Last is the pragmatic phrase. O.K.?

K: Good.

J: Is that all right today.

K: That would be fine.

END

TELCOM
Ziegler/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

1:00 p.m.

K: Did you say at your briefing that the Israelis were attacked on a high holy day just as we were attacked at Pearl Harbor.

Z: No.

K: You are quoted on a ticker. He told newsmen that it is clear that the Israelis were attacked ...

Z: Nothing like that came up in the briefing. Ken Saba -- a fellow asked a question. I was making a point that we were in equal touch with the Israelis and the Arabs.

K: If you inflame the situation now...

Z: Henry, you are lecturing me on something that I did not say.

K: Perhaps they have clipped something together.

Z: I am going to find out the @#$%& at State that did.

K: It says Israelis were attacked on a high holy day and was caused...

Z: I said my reference is on a different part.

K: As long as you did not say it that is fine. It is on a clip. I have it
hear Mid East 40 is the lead. Don't worry about it if you did not say
it. We will just deny it.

Z: Is McCloskey with you now.

K: No. It was brought in by someone else.

Z: I think playing it the way I said it is fine -- Soviet contact, etc.

K: The first page of what I have is fine and the second page is wrong.

Z: I was asked a question. This guy said is there any doubt in your
mind that the Israelis did not start it because it was a high holy day
and I said my reference to equal contact.

*

-2-

Ziegler

Oct. 8

K: You were not violating what you were told. We should cut out the reference to Brezhnev. I now have another ticker someone brought me. It is apparent that Scott said this.

Z: Scott said this.

K: He got everything screwed up. It does not make any difference. I owe you an apology.

Z: Tell McCloskey if he is there...

K: He is not here.

Z: I have the AP 40 bulletin and they said what Scott said. O.K. I hope all went well.

K. It went o.k.

END.

TELCONE
Ziegler/Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
1:10 p. m.

K: I have traced the screw-up. Some eagerbeaver at the Operations
Center slapped this together and rushed it up here.

Z: There is no problem. It is Scott. I just checked and UPI said
Scott said it.

K: Someone at the Ops Center here put me together.

Z: You know I would not say that.

K: The way they had it pasted together, it followed right along. I
thought here is Ziegler; he will do anything for a headline.

Z: I have not done anything like that in four years.

K: You must admit it was quiet a story. It would have started
riots in the Middle East.

Z: Right.

K: O.K. Ron. My apologies.

end

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E 012958</td></tr><tr><td>DATE: 10/1/73</td></tr></table>

TELCORN
Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

1:14 p.m.

K: How are you?

D: Fine. How are you? Is this call from me to you.

K: It is from me to you.

D: With your permission I will give you the latest information I have
and the special thing from the Prime Minister. The situation on the
front looks considerably better. We have gone over from the contain-
ment to attack both on the Sinai and Golan Heights. Our military
people think that a good possibility we will push the Syrians all
the way across the ceasefire line and we are also moving out the
Egyptian forces in the Sinai.

K: I have seen a report that you have crossed the canal.

D: I have seen this too and I talked to the Prime Minister's office
an hour ago and I could not get any confirmation. I was waiting
confirmation on that. I will read to you this subsequent message.
Continuing with the military revue. It is all the more important
for us to gain time to complete the job. We will not only reject --
I am waiting instructions from the Prim Minister -- we not only
reject that which freezes the cease fire but which calls for return
which is unrealistic because there is no guarantee they will with-
draw their fordes. I want to tell you we suffered very heavy casualties
both in human and equipment. From the SAM-6s which were very
effective against our planes. I don't have an additional figure against
the 35 planes I told you about yesterday. The human casualties I
think are over 100 or maybe hundreds. We have no confirmation.

K:: Hundreds?

D: Yes. Hundreds. It is quite possible that we will take some
military positions on the other side of the canal. I am saying this
without confirmation. The earlier message from the Prime Minister
is that it is possible that we will take military positions on the
other side of the canal and on the former ceasefire line of the Golan
Heights in hot pursuit and to insure ourselves against new attacks and
to have some new political cards to play as we talked yesterday. I
don't have confirmation of any action such as this because the fighting
is still to the best of my knowledge still on our side of the ceasefire
line. Now I have a special message from the Prime Minister to you
which I will read and when we see each other I will take it to Peter

-2-

Dinitz

Oct. 8

so he can take it. "The Prime Minister wishes to convey to you her profound appreciation not only for your help but for your wise counsel. She says in the cable that you understand exactly the situation that goes on in our minds as if you were sitting with us here. The aims of our fighting are absolutely clear to you. It is our objective that the heavy blows we will strike at the invaders will deprive them of any appetite they will have for any future assault. Our extraordinary military efforts extolled a heavy price, especially planes. We are faced with a tremendous gap in quantity. Our planes are hit and being worn out. The Prime Minister urgently appeals to you that there is an immediate start of delivery of at least some of the new Phantom planes. End of message."

K: I will do my best and tell her for her information I have talked to the President this morning and to General Haig about the replacing of aircraft losses which as you know met some opposition yesterday and he has agreed in principle.

D: I see. How do we proceed. Shall I wait to hear from you.

K: You had better wait to hear from me. It might effect your own calculations.

D: That is very important. I will send a message right away.

K: I don't want to mislead you. We will maintain our position on the ceasefire line. We discussed this yesterday without prejudice to the immediate military operations. That is the position we will take at the Security Council. We will not introduce a resolution just a philosophical talk.

D: Of course.

K: One other thing. We have had a much more conciliatory Soviet message this morning urging us to urge restraint but we have answered that we are urging restraint. At any rate we are warning them against any action and I am giving a speech tonight in the Pacem in Terris conference and I am making two pointed references that detente cannot survive irresponsible actions. In one context I mention specifically the Middle East. I am going also in this speech to mention our MFN position and I hope to God this is not a week whenever Jewish league will start attacking me on this position.

*

-3-

Dinitz

Oct 8

D: To a degree I can speak in the name, that I don't think that it will happen this week in any way.

K: I don't think it would be very wise. That is not my major problem. The final question I have Mr. Ambassador is the Lebanese have asked us to appeal to you that you should not violate their sovereignty and rather than send you a message through the ambassadorial channel I thought it easier to tell you directly and not have too much paper work.

D: I am sure we have no designs to violate their sovereignty.

K: If you have no such designs and you could pass such a message to me that I could pass to them and to the British it would help establish the climate we all need.

D: I will confirm it to you. We will keep the British out.

K: Confirm it to me and if you could do it soon it would be helpful.

D: I have one item for you -- an additional item. I have received many calls during the morning from senators of all sorts. All with sympathy and request for help. I assured them all that American Government is urging peace, stability and seeing things eye to eye and that we have no problem. Some wanted to sponsor a resolution and instead of this I think what they are doing at this stage is coming out with a statement. Scott will be contacting you shortly.

K: He has done so and I have told him that I have no objection to the sort of resolution and I discussed it yesterday with him. I am not pushing it.

D: I am not either by the way. Sen. Bayh and Senator from Calif. and Kennedy came out with a statement. They are all lining up. I am not asking any initiative on their part. Just briefing them and many are asking whether they can help materially. I say to them I am in close touch with the Government and we have no outstanding problems.

K: Right.

D: Yesterday I gave you information from our intelligence re the Russians and the Syrians. I have a correction. They are not sure about it and ask me to tell you not to use it unless we have further confirmation,

RECLASSIFIED
Author: EO 12958
Date: 10/1/87
Dated: 10/1/87

-4-

Dinitz

Oct 8

K: O.K.

we

D: Whatever can be done on the planes and other equipment/would be grateful and it would be helpful.

K: The other equipment I will do something about today.

D: I will wait to hear from you and I will tell the Prime Minister what you have told me.

K: I will try to get the anti-tank and electronic stuff today.

D: Perhaps we should schedule to see each other -- you are going to...

K: We might be able to do it later this afternoon.

END

<table><tr><td>11-11-1944</td></tr><tr><td>8/12/55</td></tr><tr><td>Mon, Jan 3, 1945</td></tr></table>

*

TELCONE
Sen. Scott/ Sec. Kissinger
Monday., Oct. 8, 1973
1:45 p.m.

K: When you hung up it occurred to me there might be some slight ambiguity. The return to the ceasefire line is the one that existed on Friday night, Oct. 6, not in 1967.

S: In the legislative history we have covered the fact we were acting in support of what you had already done as well as what you were trying to do in the future. Javits has been in the meeting. I am with the VN legislators now. He will make more of a point of that. Resolution reads -- deploring of outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East. Resolved that it is the sense of the Senate that we deplore the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East and we support the good offices of the United States President and the Secretary of State to urge the participants to bring about a ceasefire and the return of the parties involved to lines and positions occupied prior to the outbreak of current hostilities and further that the Senate expresses the hope for a more stable condition leading to peace in that region.

K: Excellent.

S: We did not say more peaceful -- more stable position leading to peace.

K: Could not be better from my point of view.

S: We have made legislation history by saying we support what you have done as well as what you are trying to do. Javits, I think wants to be in on the act. But he is going to say on the floor what a great guy you are.

K: I cannot object to that. Tell him I agree with it.

S: Sure. A pleasure.

K: Good-bye and thanks.

END

WELLA SHIFTER
Author: E012858
D. AYARAB DATE: 09/04/04

TELCONE

Sen. Kennedy/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

1:40 p.m.

TK: You are very nice to call.

K: I tried to reach you yesterday. Were you calling me?

TK: No. Just returning your call.

K: I just wanted to bring you up to date. On Saturday, first our efforts were to prevent the outbreak of the war and after that to get it ended. The difficulty we faced was that the Arabs were opposed to a Security Council meeting and for their own reasons so were the Israelis. We tried to stay in touch with the Soviets, the British and not one member of the SC was ready to have a meeting. Therefore, no resolution could have passed ad we thought it a mistake to try to force a resolution which would just have exacerbated every body. Curiously enough the Arabs, Israelis, British and Soviets were pleading with us to take that course.

TK: You mean not to have a SC meeting.

K: Not to have a formal one. We held informal ones all day Sat. night and it enabled the Soviets not to be in opposition with us and it enabled us to say in close touch with the Egyptians as well as the Israelis. We decided yesterday afternoon just not to go to the UN. It would leave the UN totally discredited so we asked for a SC meeting and we are going to present not a formal resolution but our view which is the outbreak of hostilities should be ended and a return to the positions held by the parties before the fighting started. That is going to look more attractive to the Arabs today that it did Saturday because the Israelis are gaining the upper hand and it will look more attractive to them tomorrow. We are prepared to turn this into a resolution if it gets any support. In the meantime we have had active exchanges with the Soviets. We are trying to keep them out of this and it now looks as if we are in a pretty good position.

TK: What do you think, -- I don't know what that beep is --

K: Are you recording?

T: No. I did not know what the possibilities were that it might continue. What are the pressures going to be on the Israelis to slow down. Is that real?

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>RECEIVED</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Author: E012858</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Date: 09/24/73</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Subject: AT�</td>
  </tr>
</table>

-2-

Kennedy

Oct. 8, 1973

K: We have already told the Israelis we cannot support them beyond the present positions for mopping up, etc. But our judgment is by the end of this week it will be over. Both sides are suffering very heavy losses.

TK: I guess it is all going for the Israelis?

K: This afternoon it looks as though the Israelis are gaining the upper hand.

TK: You saw the resolution by Mansfield?

K: Yes. It looked all right to me. I understand that Eagleburger and your assistant are setting up a lunch or a meeting.

TK: Yes.

K: I will support that.

TK: Thanks, Henry. Appreciate that.

END

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E012958</td></tr><tr><td>Rec'd by: B. SAKA Date: 10/1/73</td></tr></table>