August 17, 1957

Dear Mr. Stern:

Thank you for your very nice letter of August 13th.
I appreciated your comments and agree with most of them. I
have also received your book and look forward to reading it
for new insights. It was very courteous of you to send it to
me.

The problem about reserve forces is a troublesome
one about which I have not clarified my own thinking. I
would agree this far however, that reserve forces are likely
to be more significant in a limited war and not in an all-out
war.

I was very much struck by your comments about limited
nuclear war in Europe. You may be right that the outcome there
might well be decided eventually by the side with the largest
reserves.

With best wishes,

Mr. Frederick M. Stern
100 Forest Avenue
New Rochelle, New York

BLUE FILE COPY

August 17, 1957.

Dear Ham:

Thank you for your very nice letter of August 13th and the accompanying article. I have made fairly extensive marginal comments some of which are repetitious. Let me summarize my reaction.

As for my book, I think you have done a splendid and fair summary with one or two minor exceptions which I have noted in the margins. In presenting my thesis of limited nuclear war it would seem to me important to stress that I have defended it not only because it utilizes our talents to best advantage but also for three other reasons: (1) It is a more effective deterrent because it makes the calculations of an aggressor more difficult. This is above all true because the tactics of limited nuclear war make it more difficult physically to control territory and hostile populations. (2) In a war among nuclear powers I have come to the conclusion -- and this represents a big change in my own thinking -- that limited nuclear war may actually prove a more stable situation than a conventional war; thus if we are concerned with avoiding all-out war, limited nuclear war might be our most effective strategy. (3) While it is possible to create dual-purpose forces, I think it is almost impossible for the side which is on the defensive to shift from conventional to nuclear war on the aggressor's initiative. I have gone into this at some length in my chapter on limited nuclear war.

My other comment concerns your emphasis on thermonuclear weapons as the determining feature in the scale of a war. Everything you say in your first few pages about thermonuclear weapons is in fact true about the strategy of massive retaliation but I do not think it depends primarily on the type of weapons used. For example, it is now possible to make thermonuclear weapons of less than a megaton and nuclear weapons of many megatons. The mere fact that thermonuclear weapons were not used would not be

were fact that thermonuclear weapons were not need would not be less than a meteor and ancient weapons of many weapons. The for example, it is now possible to make thermonuclear weapons of I do not think it debends primarily on the type of weapon used. weapons is in fact true about the strategy of massive retaliation but Everything you say in your last few pages about thermonuclear nuclear weapons as the determining feature in the scope of a war.

My other comment concerns your emphasis on thermo-

vitational to nuclear war on the address, a initiative. I have done
impossible for the side which is on the defensive to shift from con-
front to possible to create dual-purpose forces. I think it is almost
limited nuclear war might be our most effective strategy. (2) While
conventional war: true it we are concerned with avoiding all-out war,
nuclear war may actually prove a more stable situation than a
and this represents a big change in my own thinking -- that limited
(3) In a war among nuclear powers I have come to the conclusion --
more difficult practically to control territory and hostile populations,
above all true because the tactics of limited nuclear war make it
it makes the calculations of an aggressor more difficult. This is
for three other reasons: (1) It is a more effective deterrent because
not only because it utilises our talents to beat advantages but also
war it would seem to me important to attack that I have defended it
noted in the margin. In presenting my theory of limited nuclear
and left summary with one or two minor exceptions which I have

As for my book, I think you have done a splendid
summarize my reaction.

summarize my reaction.

margin comments some of which are repetitions. Let me
and the socrasifying article. I have made fairly extensive
Thank you for your very nice letter of August 13th

Dear Herr

August 13, 1923.

BLUE LITE COBY

August 17, 1957.

- 2 -

decisive. What would matter would be the size of weapons, thermonuclear or nuclear, and the target. This I think can be fixed very simply.

As for the conclusions you draw, I am in complete agreement. You may be aware that there is a committee of outsiders under the National Security Council which meets your proposal to a limited degree. Its task is to analyze the role of Civil Defense but in order to do so, it has decided it must get into our over-all strategic posture. Roland Gaither is heading it and Jim Perkins is one of the vice-chairmen. You might check with him for fuller information but please do not tell him where your information is coming from.

I have indicated in one or two places where I recommend cuts. Thanks for letting me see this.

Kindest regards.

Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Council on Foreign Relations
58 E. 68th Street
New York, New York.

New York, New York.
28 E. 68th Street
Council on Foreign Relations
Mr. Hamilton Field Armatong

Kindest regards,

recommend one. Thanks for letting me see this.

I have indicated in one or two places where I
coming from.

information put please do not tell him where your information is
one of the vice-chairmen. You might check with him for fuller
strategic抱ture. Roland Gether is heading it and Jim Perkins is
put in order to do so, it has decided it must get into our over-all
limited degree. Its task is to analyze the role of Civil Defense
under the National Security Council which meets your proposal to a
agreement. You may be aware that there is a committee of outside
As for the conclusions you draw, I am in complete
fixed very simply.

thermonuclear or nuclear, and the target. This I think can be
decisive. What would matter would be the size of weapons,

- 3 -

August 17, 1957.

WICKLOW FARM
SOUTH WOODSTOCK, VERMONT

August 21, 1957

Dear Henry:

I am remiss not to have replied to your
very generous comment on my alliances thing
before this, and also not to have acknowledged
receipt of the check. Will you thank Mr. Alton
for me?

What are you up to? You can guess that I
have been reading the reviews, and indirect
reports on your book from Washington, with
ardor. It made its impact all right, and you
are entitled to feel pleased. At the same time,
it must be tantalizing to you to have the
question of the next step--the translation of
ideas into policy--poised on a knife edge as it
seems to be; and meanwhile so many earnest
commentators who don't quite get the point--
or rather, take the opportunity to make their
point in the name of stating yours. Even so
you are too old a hand at the business to be
distressed by that I am sure; it is the way
ideas do travel around the barn to get home.
(I thought Teller, in the Times, gave you the
simplest and plainest summary and best brought
out the issue, of reviews I've seen.)

Do you plan a follow up? I think one is
in order, when a bittmore time has passed, and
hope that you do. I would enjoy talking to
you about it, and indeed would reading the draft
of a ms if and when you do such a thing. Please
don't think this an annoyingly gratuitous
offer(or request for a privilege.) I would
very much like to have your idea go into policy;
and though I never seem able to succeed with
that in ideas of my own I have spent spent most
of my lifetime at it, with results for a few
other people. And you and I took off from pretty

much the same place, seven or eight years ago.

Ham asked to see my piece, and wrote me very nicely about it, but rejects the idea that NATO is in the condition I describe and needs to be underwritten. He says I don't "prove" it. But so long as an alliance is formally in effect, how can its insubstantiality be "proven"? Only the enemy can prove it, as only Hitler could prove the weakness of Benes' pacts. But Ham wants me to take up the German-French idea, for F.A. That I would like to talk with you about for my sake. I am truly fond of my old friend Ham, and do respect his political judgment on practical questions (he doesn't handle general ideas with comfort); but in regard to Foreign Affairs I am somewhat in the position of the Jesuit would could refute but not believe: I know the workings of the machinery too well.

You know, I have many times said to myself: how fortunate that Henry didn't take my old job. You would never have published your book.

Random reflections. But do tell me what you are up to--are you going to Chicago?--and why don't you and your wife schedule that trip to Vermont this fall, when it is so beautiful up here?

Yours,

P.S. Is there a publication schedule for the group of Rockefeller Fund papers?

FREDERICK M. STERN

100 FOREST AVENUE
NEW ROCHELLE, N. Y.
---
TEL. NEW ROCHELLE 6-3867

August 28, 1957.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Director of Special Studies
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

After having talked to you over the telephone, I received
a letter from Mr. Hans Staudinger of the New School for
Social Research. He and Dr. Hans Simons are eager to
have my book on the citizen army reviewed in Social Re-
search as soon as possible. In view of the importance
and timeliness of the topic, they are anxious to gain the
cooperation of the best expert in this field and as I
mentioned that I am already in contact with you, they want
me to ask you whether you would be prepared to write this
review.

Dr. Staudinger has explained to me that Social Research
has asked publishers not to send books for review (because
of limited space) and prefers to make its own selection.
He had received the book from me privately as I have been
close to the New School for many years.

As you are probably reading my book anyway, I thought
that Mr. Staudinger's request may be not unwelcome to
you, and I would be grateful if you would let me, or
Mr. Staudinger, have your reply.

P.S. I hope you have seen the review of your book in
the August issue of ARMY, and the article
"Deterrence and Limited War" by James E. King Jr.
in the same issue. King seems to agree with you,
though he mentions you only quite briefly. He
probably wrote his article before he had seen
your book.

August 29, 1957

Dear By:

Thank you for your very nice letter of August 21. I
quite agree with you about the reviews. The one in the
Times was a fairly intelligent one, and The Washington Post
did well by me. To balance it, The Reporter is just about to
run a really vicious one.

Ham, I am afraid, has given quite a few hostages to
the past with respect to alliances and I agree with your
comment about his facility with general ideas as well as
about his extraordinary judgment with respect to practical
problems.

You are right that it was a fortunate thing the Foreign
Affairs job didn't work out.

We must get together soon.

Best regards.

Mr. Byron Dexter
Wicklow Farm
South Woodstock, Vermont

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED AIR FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER

30 August 1957

Dear Henry:

To my regret, I still have not had sufficient time to devote to "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" as I would like. However, from a digest that was given to me back in Washington prior to my departure, plus the reading I have managed, and the very fine write up I saw in TIME, it is evident that you have every reason to be very proud of your work. I, in turn, am very proud for you.

I am taking the book with me on all trips I am scheduled for, not only in hopes of more concentrated reading myself but also to show to my fellow travelers.

Again, congratulations on your accomplishment.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Rockefeller Bros. Fund
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK

589 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 17, N.Y.

JOHN W. GARDNER
President

September 3, 1957

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Director of Special Studies
Rockefeller Brothers Fund
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Henry:

In our recent telephone conversation I did not
acknowledge your letter of August 21, which was ac-
companied by a memo on the Harvard Center for Inter-
national Affairs.

I heartily agree with most of the points which you
made in the memo. There are one or two points which
I should like to discuss with you sometime.

My recent illness gave me a long delayed oppor-
tunity to read your book through in a leisurely way.
I had read parts of it earlier, but in far too much
haste to get the full impact of what you were saying.
I must say that I admire more than ever the clarity
which you brought to this subject. I hope that the
book receives the careful reading it deserves in
policy making quarters.

JWG:jc

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW
HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
EDITOR

PHILIP W. QUIGG
ASSISTANT EDITOR

58 EAST SIXTY-EIGHTH STREET
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

CABLE ADDRESS: FOR AFFAIRS, NEW YORK

September 5, 1957

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, N. Y.

Dear Henry:

You asked me once about Dick Van Wagenen, who used to
teach at Princeton. I didn't give him very high marks. As
I recall he went after you at some meeting in rather emo-
tional terms, which seemed to me understandable at the time,
given his terms of reference.

I think you will be interested in seeing his review of
your book for _The Journal of Politics_. It is not a good re-
view, since it lacks perception and is an intellectual jumble,
but it is highly favorable -- and this I find quite extra-
ordinary. And in spite of its limitations, it does give some
idea of what your book contains -- which is more than can be
said for most of the reviews I have seen, favorable though
they were.

You're welcome to keep the review and Van Wagenen's
covering letter, which I have answered.

Thanks enormously, Henry, for that slew of letters re-
ceived this morning.

HARPER & BROTHERS

Publishers Since 1817

CHAIRMAN OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD

49 EAST 33D ST., NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

September 6, 1957

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I am glad to report that NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY is enjoying a healthy, continuing sale. On publication date (June 26th) we had shipped out 1070 copies to booksellers. Since then shipments to booksellers, representing orders from them, have amounted to the following, week by week (the weekly sales are given in order):

217
133
339
305
401
293
428

The total to date is accordingly 3186 copies.

While ordinarily we do receive from booksellers return copies which they have been unable to sell, amounting to around 10% of shipments, I don't think this will take place in the case of NUCLEAR WEAPONS. In fact, I look forward to the book's keeping its momentum.

In August I suggested to the Council that they schedule advertisements in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* and these ads ran. I also obtained permission from the Council to print a band for the book, which I am enclosing. The Council has just decided to order sizable ads in the *New York Times Book Review*, *Chicago Tribune* and *Washington Post*. There will also be ads in the Air Force magazine and in *Foreign Affairs*.

The reason that the Council is paying for the ads is that we receive a selling commission from the Council on Council books which only covers our actual shipping and sales expenses.

I am hopeful from what Richard McAdoo tells me that Harpers will publish the overall volume of the Special Studies Project. Also, as I told you, I would be very keen to discuss with you any future book projects you may have in mind. Will you let me know if and when you might be inclined to do this?

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
The Rockefeller Brothers Fund
22 West 55th Street, New York, N. Y.

Cass Canfield...rnh

"A book of major importance."
—WALTER MILLIS

[LC]

by Henry A. Kissinger

"Undoubtedly the most important book of 1957, perhaps even of the past several years. . . . Here, for the first time, is a probing, intelligent and challenging discussion of every conceivable aspect of 'the new dilemma of the nuclear period' in world history."

—The Washington Post-Times Herald

"It is a deeply thoughtful, hard-hittingly candid, examination of the challenges that the atomic breakthrough have posed for our statesmen and our military planners, and of the inadequacy of the response to them." —New York Herald Tribune

"No one who endeavors to talk in public (or even to think seriously in private) about the strategic problems of the atomic age can profitably do so henceforward without reading *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, not once, but again and again."

—GILBERT HIGHET

"By all odds, the best book yet written

to analyze the impact of nuclear explosives upon military
strategy and the conduct of world affairs."

—RALPH E. LAPP

"With acute penetration, fertile imagination, and impressive analytical skill Kissinger examines the whole realm of relevant military, political and psychological questions . . . and develops the unorthodox thesis that a strategy of 'limited nuclear war,' complementing our capability for massive retaliation, will utilize America's skills to best advance with the least risk of total war."

—Chicago Sunday Tribune

"No single book that I have read since the end of World
War II poses the dilemma of American and world policy
so well as this one." —Hartford Courant

"The patience, objectivity, and thoroughness of the argu-
ment, and its constant contact with scientific and military
fact, are altogether admirable." —CLARE BOOTHE LUCE

"Henry A. Kissinger has written a book that should prove
a landmark in the greater debate that includes all the 'great
debates' of our time." —The New Republic

N-22
ELIOT HOUSE
CAMBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS

September 6, 1957

Dear Henry,

Thank you ever so much for the copy
of your book. I called up at the office after
we telephoned, but unfortunately you had left
for New York. I've begun to read the book
and, of course, am enormously impressed by
it as everybody else is. Mac Bundy spoke
very highly of it when he was in the other
afternoon. I was at the Epstein's for dinner
last night and they told me about your
television appearance next week. I am
certainly looking forward to it. One of the
best aspects of my return to Harvard this
year is the realization that you and Ann
are going to be living in Cambridge once
again. Your absence has been a serious
loss for your friends. Please give my best
wishes to Ann.

Henry Kissinger, Esq.
22 West 55th Street
New York, New York

[N]

September 10, 1957

Mr. Carruthers phoned to give the following information re your
Washington Post luncheon:

He said that Mr. Lynch always leaves the subject to the
authors -- in other words, for the 10 minute period, the author
usually gives a very informal talk on his book and its theme
(some interesting information in writing the book -- or its particular
theme -- which he discloses), etc.

Gwen Teresaki - is an American woman whose book,
"Bridge to the Sun" just published by the University of N.C. Press,
is an autobiography of her life in Japan during the occupation --
telling of her marriage to a high Japanese official, etc.

Also Mr. Carruthers would like you to do a tape recording
-- an interview by Patty Cavin of NBC Washington Station -- who
will also be at the luncheon and this can follow the luncheon at
2:30 at the same place.

Mr. Carruthers will call back later this afternoon to find
out whether you will do this.

Also -- next Sunday *Times* your book will be on the National Best Seller List
in 14th place.

ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

[LC]

September 11, 1957

CHAIRMAN

Mr. W. F. Rockwell

PRESIDENT

Mr. John Slezak

EXECUTIVE

VICE PRESIDENT

Lt. Gen. W.L. Weible, USA-Rtd.

VICE PRESIDENT

Gen. M. B. Ridgway, USA-Rtd.

VICE PRESIDENT

Maj. Gen. L. J. Sverdrup, USAR

SECRETARY

Col. Arthur Symons, Arty-USAR

COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES

Lt. Gen. M. G. Baker, PaNG Ret.

Mr. Don Belding

Mr. Robert L. Biggers

Gen. C. L. Bolte, USA-Rtd.

Gen. Omar N. Bradley, USA

Gen. Lucius D. Clay, USA-Rtd.

Gen. A. M. Gruenther, USA-Rtd.

Gen. John E. Hull, USA-Rtd.

Brig. Gen. David Sarnoff, USAR

Maj. Gen. H. McK. Roper, USA-Rtd.

Miss Robbie Holley
Secretary to Dr. Kissinger
Rockefeller Brothers Fund
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Miss Holley:

In response to yours of September 5, I am enclosing a copy of ARMY for August. As usually happens when we get requests of this sort, this particular issue is about the scarcest of recent months, and if Dr. Kissinger gets the extra clipping which we sent to the publishers of his book I would appreciate it if this copy were saved and even returned, if not required.

Yours sincerely,

ARTHUR SYMONS
Colonel, Arty-USAR
Secretary

AS:eb

1529 EIGHTEENTH STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

September 12, 1957

Dear Mr. Millis:

I want to tell you how very much I appreciate your letter to *The Reporter* replying to Paul Nitze's review. It is remarkable how difficult it is to conduct a debate which is free of personalities, and how great is the temptation to con- strue what is intended as an analysis of a problem into a personal attack. Your letter meant a great deal to me not only because I felt rather deeply about the violence of Nitze's attack but also because your comments about my book were highly reassuring.

Perhaps we could have lunch sometime soon to dis- cuss your point that my model for limited war is essentially a conventional war with nuclear weapons added. No doubt I have failed to make myself clear for I do not really think that the tactics of a limited nuclear war can be so conceived. As a matter of fact, I consider this tendency the greatest single shortcoming in our present military planning.

With much appreciation and warm regards,

Mr. Walter Millis
Fund for the Republic
60 East 42nd Street
New York 17, New York

30 A HILL STREET,
LONDON, W. I.
GROSVENOR 5781.

September 16th 1957.

I am just back from my holidays to find
your letter of the 4th September. I shall of
course be delighted to see your friend, Mr. Quigg,
when he comes to London. Meanwhile, may I say
how much I enjoyed reading your book and what
excellent stuff I think it contains. You will
no doubt have seen the various notices of it in
this country, including the front page article
devoted to it in the Times.

Forgive me if I do not write more fully at
the moment but, as you may imagine, I am rather
overwhelmed with correspondence after a month's
absence.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Rockefeller Brothers Fund,
30 Rockefeller Plaza,
New York 20, N.Y.

September 18, 1957

Dear Andy:

Thanks so much for your nice letter of September 9.
I imagine commanding a Division must seem exhilarating
after some of your activities in Washington -- and the 4th
Armored Division is very fortunate in having you.

I greatly appreciate your comments about my book.
It was helped no end by the patient advice of people like
yourself and General Gavin. I still remember with particular
warmth the briefing you were kind enough to arrange for me
in Washington.

Kind regards.

Major General Andrew P. O'Meara
Headquarters 4th Armored Division
Fort Hood, Texas

HEADQUARTERS
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

24 September 1957

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Director of Special Studies
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I suppose this may constitute my first "fan" letter. For at least three of the four years of my present tenure, I have been concerned with the urgency of developing understanding, concepts and strategy for the conduct of "limitable" war.

Three years ago, in a first effort, I split the student body of the Command and Staff School into four planning staffs. Each staff was directed to develop plans for the separation of Red China from Kremlin influence by cold war, if possible, and limited war, if necessary, but calculating throughout the risks of total war and controlling solutions to avoid totality. It was a large order. Three of the four staffs concluded along lines approximating most of your own conclusions.

With this as a beginning we have continued our efforts to achieve understanding. I have found that one real barrier exists. As contrasted to the single circumstance represented by total war, which is pretty much devoid of strategy, limited war can be many things. Because this is so, each individual has a different example in mind. This results in an amorphous, frustrating generalization, out of which agreement or understanding is difficult to achieve.

Although I seem to stand somewhat alone, I have found that we can make some progress towards understanding by categorizing limited war into three distinct sets of circumstances.

A first category is what can be termed "local" war. Here, there is no evidence of communist participation and world peace is not at stake. From a U. S. standpoint the issue is first to keep the conflict localized, blocking out communist exploitation and then applying non-lethal persuasions and pressures to settle the situation.

At the other end of the spectrum lies an aggression launched overtly by organized communist military forces. This war has several unique characteristics.

First, there would be no aggression unless the aggressor felt
he was capable of achieving his objectives against the target state.

To thwart these objectives, the United States would have to
enter the war. Upon entry, our objectives are in no case "uncondi-
tional." On the contrary, they are simply to stop the aggression
on acceptable terms. Aggressive capability is represented by the
military forces committed to the war. Negotiation of terms can be
initiated at the time when the aggressor realizes one of two things.

First, that his force has been neutralized to the point that
he cannot achieve his objectives.

Second, that the costs of continuing the war are greater than
the dividends he had hoped to realize from his aggression.

In neither case do we seek destruction of the political entity
since that must be intact for negotiation. Neither do we want to
worsen the economic or socio-psychological circumstances vis-a-vis
the U. S. as these structures are an essential base on which to build
towards a stable and peaceful solution.

However, if we enter, it must be with the intention of achieving
our objectives. To do so, we must use the forces that best assure
success. From an airman's viewpoint, and risking over-simplification,
the decision rests on one fundamental formula. We can calculate with
reasonable accuracy the degree of neutralization we must assess against
enemy military forces. We know the number of sorties we can mount in
the target area with the force in being and without weakening the force
necessary to deter total war. The division of the first requirement by
the second capability dictates the munitions we must use. This could
vary from marbles to megatons, but we must employ that minimum level of
firepower indicated if we are to achieve our objectives.

For these reasons, your "Rules for Limited War" in the June 13,
Reporter, are completely correct in principle but perhaps too restrictive
to respond to the specifics. For example, your 50-mile limitation would
tend to nullify the Eisenhower policy for the defense of Taiwan. In
short, if we are to achieve the principle, we may not be wise to abandon
it to inflexible distance or yield limitations, for to do so could invite
rather than deter aggression and render greater the chances of an un-
manageable or unlimited situation.

In between the local war and the "little Pearl Harbor" war lies
our most difficult problem - the creeping war of guerrilla action,
internal strife of communist manufacture. This involves the problem
of identifying friend from foe, the reluctance to "fight dirty" in an

2

internal upheaval that many people might consider another Little Rock.

Here the problem is at its most complex. In a military sense
the solution lies in an indigenous willingness and capability to resist
with enough effectiveness to force the issue into the "overt" category
just discussed.

Approached from this route, certain steps seem open, all pointed
towards an ultimate in which indigenous capabilities present a defensive
effectiveness so great as to deter aggression. This might someday emerge
along the lines of Mr. Dulles' recent article in U. S. News and World
Report.

Pending this millenium of optimum deterrence, a prudent course
seems to be that of trying to identify deficiencies between the capa-
bility of defender and aggressor and seeking the means to correct them
in our favor. This is not the simplest task, I assure you, and it is
also one in which possible solutions probably should not be a matter
of discussion in an open letter.

Although I had not intended to write a volume, I do so in appreciation of the stimulating and thought provoking lectures and articles you have contributed towards a solution. I do so also on the chance you care to comment on the approach we have been taking here, for I have a profound suspicion for any approach which presents the hazard of a "pat" solution. I would be grateful for any "assist" I can find in better fitting myself for the job I am trying to do.

Very sincerely,

LLOYD P. HOPWOOD
Major General, USAF
Commandant

September 25, 1957

Dear Henry,

thank you very much for your letter. Your friend Mr. Quigg was here and we had a very nice time together. He is a wonderful man indeed. I liked him very much and I hope the contact will last. (Unfortunately it was raining all the time he was in Bonn).

Today I send some comments on your book I could get in the meanwhile. For some others I wrote to the different newspapers because I didn't keep them. I will forward these to you as soon as I get them. Enclosed is also an editorial, which deals with an outline of the military policy of Germany during the next four years. I think you will be interested.

Last week Roo Watanabe came to visit Gerhard Weck and me. He is on his way through Europe. We exchanged happy memories.

I am just writing a short analysis of the general elections and the consequences of their result. Some of our Seminar friends asked me for that. As far as Foreign Policy and Military Policy is concerned the consequences are out of question. But for some of our friends, the motives of this voting may be interesting and also which consequences for the different parties and domestic policy may arise. If you would like to get a copy, please give me a note.

With best regards

LIBRAIRIE PLON

LES PETITS-FILS DE PLON & NOURRIT
imprimeurs-éditeurs

REG. DU COMMERCE
Seine n° 55-8-4794

ADRESSE TÉLÉGR.
PLOEDIT - PARIS 6e

TÉL. DANTON 04-50
ET LA SUITE

C.P. (France et Union)
Française Paris 43-79
Étranger Paris 6233-96

Société anonyme au capital de 117.000.000 de francs

8 RUE GARANCIÈRE - PARIS 6e

PAR AVION

Paris, le 25 septembre 1957

Monsieur Henry M. KISSINGER

Cher Monsieur Kissinger,

J'espère que vous n'avez pas oublié les entretiens que nous avions eus concernant votre revue "Confluences", lors de votre passage à Paris en 1953.

Puis-je m'autoriser de l'identité de vues qui résultait de nos entretiens d'alors pour vous demander de bien vouloir nous accorder une option de 2 mois sur votre ouvrage, option que je vous ai demandée ce jour par télégramme ?

Si les droits étrangers appartenaient à votre éditeur, auriez vous l'obligance d'intervenir auprès de Simon M. Bessie, que je connais bien, pour que cette option nous soit accordée ?

Avec mes remerciements anticipés, veuillez agréer, cher Monsieur Kissinger, l'assurance de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

Charles Orengo
Directeur Littéraire.

L. P. - 4555, 66698, M. B. 8 lep P.

["T. 1. 1022. 00018 M 15 8 10 10", "Directeur littéraire.\nCharles Orenco", "meilleure.", "cher Monareur Klaninger, l'assurance de mes sentiments les\nAvec mes remerciements antérieures, venant s'agreer,", "due je consue bien, pour une cette option non ait accordée ?", "surdez von s'opfidence d'intervenir enprà de Simon M. Beaure,\naf les drotte étrangera abpartensent à votre éditeur,", "option due je von si demangée ce jour par téléphone ?\nvonjoir nona accorder une option de S moia anr votre onnage,\ntait de nona entretiens d'alors pour vona demanger de pien\npria-je m'amorfaer de l'identité de vona onf réan-", "de votre basseg à Bara en 1923.\nune nona avons une concernant votre revue \"Confluenca\",fors\nj'espère due vona n'avez pas onplié les entretiens", "Cher Monareur Klaninger,", "8 RUE GAVANCIÈRE - PARIS 9", "Boîte postale 10. cahier de 413.000.000 de France", "C.P. (Grenoble) -路易 6332-59\n(Paris) 42024\n(Paris) 42025\n(Paris) 42026\n(Paris) 42027\n(Paris) 42028\n(Paris) 42029\n(Paris) 42030\n(Paris) 42031\n(Paris) 42032\n(Paris) 42033\n(Paris) 42034\n(Paris) 42035\n(Paris) 42036\n(Paris) 42037\n(Paris) 42038\n(Paris) 42039\n(Paris) 42040\n(Paris) 42041\n(Paris) 42042\n(Paris) 42043\n(Paris) 42044\n(Paris) 42045\n(Paris) 42046\n(Paris) 42047\n(Paris) 42048\n(Paris) 42049\n(Paris) 42050\n(Paris) 42051\n(Paris) 42052\n(Paris) 42053\n(Paris) 42054\n(Paris) 42055\n(Paris) 42056\n(Paris) 42057\n(Paris) 42058\n(Paris) 42059\n(Paris) 42060\n(Paris) 42061\n(Paris) 42062\n(Paris) 42063\n(Paris) 42064\n(Paris) 42065\n(Paris) 42066\n(Paris) 42067\n(Paris) 42068\n(Paris) 42069\n(Paris) 42070\n(Paris) 42071\n(Paris) 42072\n(Paris) 42073\n(Paris) 42074\n(Paris) 42075\n(Paris) 42076\n(Paris) 42077\n(Paris) 42078\n(Paris) 42079\n(Paris) 42080\n(Paris) 42081\n(Paris) 42082\n(Paris) 42083\n(Paris) 42084\n(Paris) 42085\n(Paris) 42086\n(Paris) 42087\n(Paris) 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Metals & Controls Corporation

General Plate Division

Spencer Thermostat Division

Attleboro, Massachusetts

TELEPHONE 1-2800

September 26, 1957

Dear Henry:

I am thrilled that for two weeks in a row your book has been on the best seller list in the New York Times.
This is a great compliment to you as the author and is also a compliment to the effective distribution of the book and the intelligence of the American reading public in reading so formidable a tome. It is hardly light reading although I think you have dealt with the subject in a most interesting way.

I notice on the same list that Neville Shute's ON THE BEACH is No. 3 in the fiction. The reading public is getting a feel for some of the facts and problems in this atomic age, both through your book and through Neville Shute's "all too possible" novel.

CLW:hm

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Director of Special Studies Project
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc.
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

NOT CHECKED IN TALKS DEPARTMENT WITH 'AS BROADCAST' SCRIPT

Producer: Anna Kallin

THE NEW MACHIAVELLI

by Michael Howard

Recorded: Thursday 19th September 1957
Tape No.: TLO, 38699
Duration: 18 15"

TRANSMISSION: Third Programme Saturday 28th Sep. 1957 8.35-8.55 pm.

For nearly five centuries, everyone in Western Christendom except the student of political science, was shocked by the teaching that the real sanction of government was not Divine law interpreted by legitimate authority, but simply power, and that the basis of power was force. It was a notion appalling to the medieval mind; but Bacon did Machiavelli no more than justice when he praised him for showing, for the first time, how men actually did behave in society and not simply how they should.

The same praise is now due to a young American historian, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, whose recent book on *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* is perhaps the most penetrating and comprehensive work on international affairs to appear since the explosion at Hiroshima announced the advent of the nuclear age. Dr. Kissinger sets out to study the predicament in which American statesmen find themselves in attempting to combat the spread of Communist power; and in doing so he throws overboard all the traditional liberal conceptions about the nature of international relations as cavalierly as Machiavelli disposed of the traditional medieval teaching about the nature of authority. For him the states of the world do not live naturally in a condition of amity and concord disturbed only by the aggression of criminals and maniacs.

5.

In short we must not be afraid of using war as an instrument of policy; but this is only possible in the nuclear age if we clear from our minds all idea of war as something inevitably total, inevitably aiming at the complete defeat of the enemy, and prepare ourselves instead to aim at limited objectives, to adopt a strategy directed at the armed forces of the enemy rather than at his civil and industrial potential, and to offer terms for a settlement which he can be reasonably expected to accept.

I'm afraid that some of you may be beginning to stir uneasily in your chairs and mutter about "unrealistic nonsense". And your mutterings are likely to swell when I say that

Dr. Kissinger goes on to suggest that such wars might be conducted with nuclear weapons subject to certain mutually agreed restrictions devised to spare the homelands of the belligerents and, so far as possible, cities within the battle zone; and he must be admitted that Dr. Kissinger's discussion of the details of such restrictions carries at first sight about as much conviction as Erskine May's Rules of Parliamentary Procedure would if applied to a tribe just emerging from primitive barbarism. As Sir Hohn Slessor once said of similar proposals advanced in this country, "These are the sort of things that pundits may enjoy debating, but they do not make sense in real life."

But Sir John Slessor's proposition is arguable. All that he or anyone else can say is that they haven't made sense in real life yet. But Nor have we, in real life, had to meet the challenge of the hydrogen bomb. And we have no right to laugh Dr. Kissinger's well-reasoned thesis out of court until we have considered what the alternatives are.

We are dealing with a power - or rather, as Dr. Kissinger shows by his devastating quotations from the works of Mao-tse-Tung, with two powers - which regard peace as the continuation of the struggle by other means, for whom no detente can be anything more than a truce, whose strategy is subtle and endlessly patient, and which only by the most crass of miscalculations going to present us with a straightforward causa belli. A strategy whose emphasis lies on a deterrent involving mutual annihilation plays straight into their hands. It has now been publicly admitted. Indeed, official spokesmen on both sides of the Atlantic have now admitted the need for an infinitely flexible range of weapons for defence and counter-attack. The possibility of limited war has been officially admitted: in Korea and in Taiwan we have already fought two, and in both these cases the major powers showed themselves willing to accept limited defeat rather than raise the stakes any further. In principle there is no reason why we should not continue along these lines, wage our limited wars with conventional forces and keep the distinction between total and limited war identical with the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. But that is a course of action that we have already virtually abandoned. The Americans, determined to avoid at almost any cost another blood-bath like Korea, have made tactical atomic weapons completely and Mr. Dulles has recently made it clear that they will not be used in our conventional part of their armoury. We in Britain, not hesitating to fed up with the annuit and expense of conscription, have whittled down our capacity to fight limited wars and are also turning to nuclear weapons to replace the manpower which we are unwilling to provide. Once we abandoned the attempt to match Russia and China with conventional forces the choice before us was no longer whether to use nuclear weapons or not:

the question is now, whether some effort should be made
advance to ensure that our use of them for a limited object does not
spark off a total war, or whether we shall simply go ahead,
use them, and blindly hope for the best. It looks at the
moment as if we have adopted the policy of blind hope.
Dr. Kissinger's proposals may seem unrealistic, but this course
seems of action appears simply suicidal. The burden does not
now lie with Dr. Kissinger to prove that his proposals would
work; it lies with those who condemn him to suggest a
practical alternative.

The whole aim of our military policy should now
surely be this: to support our diplomacy in protecting and
furthering our interests throughout the world, and to do it
so effectively that we can stave off for ever the moment
when some sick and harrassed Prime Minister - or, rather,
President - is forced to choose between the sacrifice of some
interest really vital to the nation and the unleashing of
forces which will not merely destroy the enemy and his own
country, but bring unimaginable disaster to the whole of
mankind and its posterity. This moment can be postponed
indefinitely only if we are able and willing to fight for
peripheral areas, to keep our adversaries in play by resolute
but moderate frontier warfare; and any reduction in our ability
and our willingness to undertake this struggle brings the
moment of decision disastrously nearer. We have got, as it
were, to keep the ball[^1] away from our own goal; but
at the same time we must not try to score ourselves,
because ^[1] going to do any threat to the enemy's goal ^[1] impose on him the same
agonizing choice. And here Dr. Kissinger puts forward
another unconventional view - that we should never leave our
adversaries in any doubt about our intentions. The old
argument, that "it's always a good thing to keep the other
chap guessing" simply does not apply any longer.

We do not want "the other chap" to guess wrong. It would be bad enough if he were to see through our bluff and force us to humiliating surrender; but it would be far worse if he made the opposite mistake and mistook a bluff or a limited action on our part for the prelude to an all-out attack, and decided to get his blow in first. A frank avowal of our intentions is essential if limited war is to be kept limited and anything recognizable as civilization is to survive.

Dr. Kissinger is thus liable to be attacked on two counts. First, on the grounds of his Machiavellian frankness, his open assertion that force is a normal and indispensable weapon of policy. Frankly I believe that the refusal to face this fact has caused us quite enough trouble during the past twenty-five years, and any perpetuation of such an attitude, in the face of two communist powers which harbour no such illusions, will rapidly force us to the point of having to decide between annihilation or surrender. The second line of attack is one with which I must confess much more sympathy: the argument which, while admitting that we have got to be able to conduct limited war, alleges that it simply won't be possible to discriminate between different types of target and different sizes of nuclear weapons at all. But if we don't use nuclear weapons we must be prepared to use conventional forces on a very large scale; and that we are apparently not prepared to do. It looks unpleasantly as if our insistence on maintaining and improving our standard of living and the aversion to the splendours and misiries of military life which are undermining our ability to conduct conventional warfare are bringing the nuclear holocaust appreciably nearer.

If those who oppose the development of nuclear weapons want to be logical, they should demand that conscription should be re-introduced.

So I would urge you to read Dr. Kissinger's book, and to read it with patience. It is not easy going: quite frankly a lot of it is turgid in style and repetitive in content, and one grows at times rather impatient with his rather naive distress at the clumsy and illogical way in which high policy is formulated and the affairs of the world are run. But throughout the course of his long and often involved arguments his grasp of two realities never falters - the real nature of the danger offered by communism, and the full horrors of thermonuclear war. For his suggestions as to how we might steer a course between these two perils the Western world is heavily in his debt.

September 28, 1957

Dear Carroll:

Thank you very much for your nice note of
September 26. I am of course very pleased by the
reception of the book and I do find it tremendously
encouraging that it is possible to have a discussion
which cuts across partisan positions. I feel that
I owe a lot to the encouragement and advice of people
like yourself.

Oscar Ruebhausen tells me that you come
through New York from time to time. Couldn't we
have lunch or dinner together if your schedule
permits? I would enjoy it very much.

With best wishes,

Mr. Carroll L. Wilson
Vice President
Metals and Controls Corporation
Attleboro, Massachusetts