HENRY A. KISSINGER

April 29, 2006

Dear Al:

I join the Palm Beach Pundits' standing ovation - a terrific speech. Many thanks for sending me a copy.

And I appreciated as well your sending me the summary of the excerpts Jeffrey Kimball has compiled. I shall take your advice and ignore it, as that seems to be the best route to take with efforts such as these.

With all good wishes to you and Pat,

The Honorable
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Worldwide Associates, Inc.
Suite 300
4301 North Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22203

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919
FACSIMILE (212) 759-0042

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Selected Tape and Document Excerpts
Relevant to the Decent-Interval Solution and the Prolongation-of-the-War Question

Jeffrey Kimball

(Underlined portions relate most directly to the decent-interval and prolongation issues.)

Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, July 20, 1970.

Our present policy continues to hold open the two options of a negotiated end to the war if possible and a gradual U.S. disengagement from Vietnam in the absence of a settlement. . . .

While we don't have to choose now, we should at least recognize this fork in the road ahead. . . .

At some point, we might judge that negotiation offers better prospects than the alternative of unilateral disengagement. . . .

If we decide to work toward a compromise political settlement there are several alternatives. . . .

Both the options of sharing power and de facto territorial accommodation establish a framework for continued struggle. . . . Any arrangement . . . must leave both the Communists and the GVN the potential for eventual national control and leave the U.S. with a reasonable period after its extrication during which the final outcome is at least in doubt.

Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Xuan Thuy, September 7, 1970.

Kissinger: What I meant to say was that if we withdraw our troops unconditionally and quickly what happens in Saigon is your problem and you will have to decide whether you can win a war with the Saigon government or not.

Haldeman Diary and Journal entry, December 21, 1970.

Henry was in for a while, and the president discussed a possible trip for next year. He's thinking about going to Vietnam in April, or whenever we decide to make the basic end of the war announcement. His idea would be to tour around the country, build up Thieu, and so forth, and then make the announcement right afterwards. Henry argues against a commitment that early to withdraw all combat troops because he feels that if we pull them out by the end of '71, trouble can start mounting in '72 that we won't be able to deal with, and which we'll have to answer for at the elections. He prefers, instead, a commitment to have them all out by the end of '72, so that we won't have to deliver finally until after the elections and, therefore, can keep our flanks protected. This would certainly seem to make more sense, and the president seemed to agree.

Oval Office Conversation, Nixon and Kissinger, February 18, 1971 (transcribed by J. Kimball).

Kissinger: What I think we can do; what I would recommend, Mr. President, in our game plan is [unclear]: I ask for a meeting with Le Duc Tho and have it on October 15 and tell him, look, we are willing to give you a fixed deadline of total withdrawal next year with the release of all prisoners and a cease-fire. What we can then tell the South Vietnamese, they have a year without war to build up, uh, and I think that we can settle. We may have a fifty-fifty chance of an agreement.

Nixon: Yeah, it's a good deal if we can get it. . . .

Kissinger: And I think [unclear] It's too early [unclear] to tell [?] the South Vietnamese, but after Thieu's election, uh, I think we may be able to do it.

Nixon: OK.

Oval Office Conversation, Nixon and Kissinger, March 11, 1971 (transcribed by J. Kimball).

Nixon: And because, uh, it's quite clear that, uh, [unclear] how strong they are. I'm not going to allow their weakness and their fear of the North Vietnamese to, to, to delay us. On the other hand, let me say, though, you see, we've been thinking all along [unclear]. Now we, we've tried everything; we've done everything the military wants. We have, we have, we've done everything to our own satisfaction in order to bring the war to a successful

conclusion. I think, I think it's going to work. I think it will, I think, I agree with you that there's a 40 to 50 percent chance, maybe 55, that it will work, that we might even get an agreement. But what of an agreement? I think, I think, in other words, I guess, in other words, of course there will still be war out there, back and forth, but the South Vietnamese are not going to be knocked over by the North Vietnamese—not easily, not easily—

Kissinger: —Not easily, and this we could bring about—[both talking]

Nixon: —That's all we can do.

### Oval Office Conversation, Nixon and Kissinger, March 19, 1971 (transcribed by J. Kimball).

Kissinger: I think that there's a chance of a negotiation [unclear]. Again, it's less than even, but it's still—

Nixon: It might be. [Unclear] boy, [unclear] negotiation, but I think we've played the game down to the nut-cutting. It's very much to their advantage to have a negotiation to have us get us the hell out of there and give us those prisoners.

Kissinger: That's right. That's why—

Nixon: And we've got to do it, and, uh, we know that if they are willing to make that kind of a deal, we will make it better[?]—anytime they're ready.

Kissinger: Well, we've got to get enough time to get out; it's got to be because—

Nixon: Well, I understand—

Kissinger: —because we have to make sure that they don't knock the whole place over—

Nixon: —I don't mean [unclear: both talking]. But—

Kissinger: —Our problem is that if we get out, after all the suffering we've gone through—

Nixon: We can't have them knocked over brutally.

Kissinger: —we can't have them knocked over brutally, to put it brutally, before the election.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: And, uh—

Nixon: So that's why, that's why this strategy works pretty well, doesn't it?

### Oval Office Conversation, Nixon, Haldeman, Kissinger, and Ehrlichman, June 23, 1971 (transcribed by J. Kimball).

Nixon: —because, because, you've gotta remember that everything is domestic politics from now on. And, uh, [unclear]. Everything's domestic politics. Maybe, maybe, maybe, Henry, we have got an excuse, I mean, they have to do it. To hell with the whole thing. You know what I mean? Even if we thought we didn't have that after, we wouldn't have it after November. uh, November '69. I said, all right, we gotta decide now, either, either stand up or flush it. We stood up, and we stood up again in April the next year. We didn't, we never had this opportunity again. Maybe. We've got to remember this one solid thing: LBJ couldn't be more right—talking about staying in until December of next year. August of next year, and so forth. This is frankly now moot. It is moot. Oh, I don't mean to tell, tell Thieu we're getting out in the fall. But it's moot, because we are without question gonna get out—cut off this [unclear: "fucker"]? ...

Nixon: ... and as far as the date, we can do it. It's the one thing we can do.

Kissinger: Mr. President, the date, that's not the issue. The date was always gonna be around nine months, because we've offered them twelve previously, and they have offered six, and it's got to be nine. So, you know, so that's no—

Nixon: [Unclear], yeah.

Kissinger: It's not gonna break down on three months. There's only one issue, and one only: must we impose a Communist government in Saigon?

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: If they settle that one, everything else will be settled in, in a month. If they're willing to leave Thieu in place while we get out and then let them, let them go at each other afterwards, uh—

Nixon: Yeah, [unclear].

Kissinger: —let us continue giving military aid or let both sides cut off military aid.

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Briefing Book, Indochina section, Kissinger's July 1971 China trip.

On behalf of President Nixon I want to assure the prime minister [Zhou] solemnly that the United States is prepared to make a settlement that will truly leave the political evolution of South Vietnam to the Vietnamese alone. We are ready to withdraw all of our forces by a fixed date and let objective realities shape the political future....

We want a decent interval. You have our assurance. [Written in Kissinger's hand in the margin of this paragraph.]

If the Vietnamese people themselves decide to change the present government, we shall accept it. But we will not make that decision for them.

Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Zhou Enlai, July 9, 1971.

Kissinger: I would like to tell the prime minister, on behalf of President Nixon, as solemnly as I can, that first of all, we are prepared to withdraw completely from Indochina and to give a fixed date, if there is a cease-fire and release of our prisoners. Secondly, we will permit the political solution of South Vietnam to evolve and to leave it to the Vietnamese alone.

We recognize that a solution must reflect the will of the South Vietnamese people and allow them to determine their future without interference. We will not re-enter Vietnam and will abide by the political process.

Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Zhou Enlai, July 10, 1971.

Kissinger: What we require is a transition period between the military withdrawal and the political evolution. Not so that we can re-enter, but so that we can let the people of Vietnam and other parts of Indochina determine their own fate.

Even in that interim period, we are prepared to accept restrictions on the types of assistance that can be given to the countries of Indochina. And if no country of Indochina is prepared to accept outside military aid, then we are even prepared to consider eliminating all military aid.

I have told the prime minister yesterday, and I am willing to repeat this, that if after complete American withdrawal, the Indochinese people change their governments, the U.S. will not interfere.

Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, September 18, 1971.

We recognized from the beginning the uncertainty that the South Vietnamese could be sufficiently strengthened to stand on their own within the time span that domestic opposition to American involvement would allow. It has always been recognized that a delicate point would be reached where our withdrawals would coincide with maximum domestic uncertainty to jeopardize the whole structure at the final hour.

Therefore a negotiated settlement had always been far preferable. Rather than run the risk of South Vietnam crumbling around our remaining forces, a peace settlement would end the war with an act of policy and leave the future of South Vietnam to the historical process. There would be a clear terminal date rather than a gradual winding down. We could heal the wounds in this country as our men left peace behind on the battlefield and a healthy interval for South Vietnam's fate to unfold. In short, Vietnamization may be our ultimate recourse; it cannot be our preferred choice.

Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Andrei Gromyko, May 27, 1972.

Kissinger: The North Vietnamese are heroic people and personally very attractive people. On the other hand they will not rely at all on the historical process. They want everything written down and today. . . . I think the evolution is even more important than the agreements. If North Vietnam were wise I'm being candid-it would make an agreement with us now and not haggle about every detail, because one year after the agreement there would be a new condition, a new reality....

If they don't want a comprehensive settlement, then let us agree on a cease-fire, let us agree to exchange prisoners of war, and we would withdraw all our forces, and let them work out a political solution with the South Vietnamese. We would then guarantee, except for economic and military aid, to keep our hands out of it; we would be neutral in the political process....

Gromyko: My impression sometimes from the president and Dr. Kissinger [about the] the official position

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of the United States is that it is impossible to leave Vietnam to some kind of Communist or Socialist government.
This by itself throws a shadow on statements. Is your main preoccupation the character of the government?

Kissinger: That is a good question when it is posed by reasonable people. What we mean is that we will not leave in such a way that a Communist victory is guaranteed. However, we are prepared to leave so that a Communist victory is not excluded, though not guaranteed. I don't know if this distinction is meaningful to you.

Oval Office Conversation, Nixon and Kissinger, August 3, 1972 (transcribed by Ken Hughes and J. Kimball).

Kissinger: If a year or two years from now North Vietnam gobbles up South Vietnam, we can have a viable foreign policy if it looks as if it's the result of South Vietnamese incompetence. If we now sell out in such a way that, say, within a three-to four-month period, we have pushed [South Vietnamese] President [Nguyen Van Thieu over the brink—we ourselves—I think, there is going to be—even the Chinese won't like that. I mean, they'll pay verbal—verbally, they'll like it—

Nixon: But it'll worry them....

Kissinger: So we've got to find some formula that holds the thing together a year or two, after which—after a year, Mr. President, Vietnam will be a backwater. If we settle it, say, this October, by January '74 no one will give a damn.

Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Zhou Enlai, June 21, 1972.

Kissinger: I believe that if a sufficient interval is placed between our withdrawal and what happens afterward that the issue can almost certainly be confined to an Indochina affair. It is important that there is a reasonable interval between the agreement on the cease-fire and a reasonable opportunity for political negotiation.

The outcome of my logic is that we are putting a time interval between the military outcome and the political outcome. No one can imagine that history will cease on the Indochina peninsula with a cease-fire.

Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Le Due Tho, September 26, 1972.

Tho: We don't understand why you propose that the timing for reunification will be decided upon "after a suitable interval following the signing of an overall agreement." How you propose that—I don't understand the reason why. I think that this formulation of yours is vague and not necessary.

Memorandum of Conversation, Graham Martin, Lawrence Eagleburger, W.R. Smyser, H. Kissinger, July 19, 1974, subj: [situation in So. Vietnam]

Martin: Militarily, they [the South Vietnamese] are holding. Politically, they are more solid than I had the right to hope.

Kissinger: When I made the agreement, I thought it might be a two-year thing.

Additional source: Jeffrey Kimball, The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy (2004).