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REFLECTIONS ON STONE

by Henry A. Kissinger

**Explanatory Note:** The following text is composed of two parts:

Part I --- The Chronology was composed as follows: During the conference I took rather full notes. At the end of each day I supplemented these with records of some private conversations. The statements attributed to individuals are drawn entirely from these notes. I made no effort to reconstruct conversations. No doubt I missed important comments in this manner. At the same time the chronology reflects what seemed to me significant at the time.

The portions dealing with the final plenary session were
dictated the day after the conference ended, September 18, 1961. It
reflects my best recollection at the time.

Part II --- The Evaluation was written over a period of weeks after-
wards. It reflects of course my own judgment. Many eminent men, whom
I respect, have drawn different conclusions from the conference.

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I arrived at the Stowe Conference after the second day, on Tuesday, September 12, 1961. I therefore missed one plenary session and one session of the working groups.

The evening I arrived a number of the American participants told me that the situation was extremely tense, and also that the Soviet delegates had made a number of significant concessions. The tension was said to be due to Soviet bad conscience about the resumption of nuclear testing and the insistence of the Americans on discussing it. The concessions were supposed to be three: an admission by the Soviet delegates that inspection could take place *during* disarmament, that minimum deterrent forces could be retained at the end of the first stage of disarmament, and that disarmament agreements could not be based simply on confidence but had to take into account the existing distrust.

Wednesday, September 13.

My first contact with the conference was at the plenary session Wednesday morning, September 13th. No particular tension was evident, perhaps because the session was given over to reports from the working groups.

Tamm reported for Working Group I and gave a good technical account of the problem of monitoring a nuclear cut-off, staying well

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within the limits of the existing technical discussion in the West.
I learned later that practically all of his data came from a paper
submitted by Penney (United Kingdom) and supplemented by Bethe.

Amron Kats reported for Group II, Delivery Systems, and
Blackett for Group III, Selected Next Steps in Arms Reduction.
Neither report went very deeply into the problem.

Towards the end of the morning, a Soviet delegate, Dubinin,
made an impassioned attack on France for its nuclear testing program
and a strong defense of the resumption of tests by the Soviet Union.
He followed the Khrushchev statement on that subject almost verbatim.
There was no Western reply. Throughout the session, the behavior of
the Western participants was extraordinarily circumspect and uneasy.
Although Tamm's report was essentially a compilation of familiar sci-
entific facts, it was greeted with immense relief and loud applause.

During the afternoon there were reports by Groups IV, V, and
VI, dealing with Problems of General and Complete Disarmament, Mea-
sures to Reduce Dangers of Unintended War, and Preconditions to Possi-
ble Success at Negotiations and Initiation of Disarmament Measures,
respectively.

Harrison Brown reported for Group IV, Sands for Group V.
I have no notes for Group VI, which in any case was soon to be aban-
doned. There was no discussion of Brown's report for Group IV, which

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was very brief and noncommittal.

In reporting for Working Group V, Sands listed five challenges to disarmament efforts: (1) How to overcome the existing crisis of confidence; (2) How to modify the simplified responses of both sides; (3) How to give effect to the realization that disarmament must be a high priority goal; (4) How outstanding political issues can be resolved; (5) How to develop alternative responses to the current crisis other than the arms race. Sands gave no answers to these queries.

Bazanov rejected points two and four. Point two did not apply to the UNSR, according to him, because Soviet policy was not based on simplified responses but on a correct appreciation of laws of historical development. As for Point four, he could not accept the implication of a freeze on political conflict. Political conflicts resulted not from the will of men, but from life itself. Life cannot be altered and its nature is to create problems. The Soviet Union could not accept a freeze on the political conflict or even an injunction on self-restraint.

Bowie commented that this was a most significant statement. No one picked up his point and the subject was dropped.

Rabinowitch launched into a disquisition about principles of coexistence which he had drafted and distributed to the conference.

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He then turned to the problem of Germany. He said that he agreed with "the way our Soviet friends had put the issue." Two German states exist and the West should accept them, admit them to the United Nations, and if possible withdraw military forces from them. He added that the great tragedy was the tendency of the U.S. to conduct 19th century power politics in the nuclear age. This turned many of our plans into empty rhetoric. For example, the U.S. had a tendency to say that it would fight if pressed too hard over Berlin. However, everybody in America understood that this was mere bluff. He hoped the Soviet delegates would understand it the same way.

There was no rebuttal.

The discussion then turned to the question of what was to be done with the working group reports. Bowie stressed that he could note but not endorse them because he had not the time to study all the details. Philip Noel-Baker urged that the reports be submitted to all heads of state. Some participants raised questions about the nature of the final statement, urging that it be a mere questionnaire of having met, discussed amicably and parted. Doty, who was chairing the meeting, prevented a discussion, urging that the question be put off until later.

After the meeting, I saw Rabinowitch sitting with the Russian delegation. I asked Robert Bowie to join me in correcting any misapprehension that might have been left by the afternoon session. We joined the group and asked Rabinowitch to explain to our Soviet

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colleagues that in order to avoid a public clash we had been silent at the plenary session. At the same time, we did not wish them to return to the Soviet Union with any misapprehension about our views. I said that I had seen something of the operation of our government and that I knew both the President and the Secretary of State. I could assure them that our threats over Berlin were meant utterly seriously. A Soviet policy based on the assumption that we were bluffing could only lead to disaster.

Rabinowitch at first refused to translate this. I told him that we were not asking him to agree, only to interpret. A number of the Russians understood English and Rabinowitch was finally prevailed upon to interpret. Khvostov said that my remarks proved the correctness of the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing. I said that if the Soviets were prepared unilaterally to interrupt our access to Berlin, they were indeed correct in resuming testing, because any interruption of our access would lead to war. However, it seemed to me that my comments could also be construed another way: namely, that the Soviet Union could avoid a clash by negotiating over disputed issues rather than proceeding on the basis of unilateral threats. At this point, Topchiev thanked me for the information and I left.

During the day it had become apparent in private conversations that the American group was very concerned about the possible break-up of the Pugwash meetings. This was one reason why Doty had avoided a debate about the form of the final statement. Members of the Continuing

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Committee with whom I spoke felt that the breaking point might come on this issue. This was the first time I heard of the requirement of issuing a statement.

After the encounter with Rabinowitch described earlier, I asked him about his meeting with the Soviet group. He replied that he was drafting a final statement for the conference with them. I told him that I hoped I would not be asked to sign a statement in the drafting of which I had had no part, and which had been cleared with the Soviets before it was shown to me. I also urged that there be some policy discussion about the wisdom of issuing any substantive statement. He remarked that he was just phrasing an innocuous press release and that of course everybody would have an opportunity to see it before it was published.

Thursday, September 14.

This day was devoted to meetings of the working groups. I joined Group III, composed of Panofsky, Feld, Polanyi, Talensky and chaired by Blackett. Sailard participated in part of the discussion.

Blackett opened the morning session by stating that both the West and the USSR had accepted the principle of complete and general disarmament. Moreover, the positions as presented at the last dis-armament conference in June, 1960, were similar in important respects.

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The chief problem, then, was to find means to reconcile the two approaches. The main challenge was to the West. It should take the Soviet proposals for disarmament and show what controls they implied. However, the West would have to show its good faith by agreeing to a substantial reduction of forces without inspection. Talensky said nothing, but took copious notes.

Panofsky agreed with the Blackett statement that the positions of the two sides were very close to each other. The major problem, then, was to find the technical means to give this agreement effect. This was a task for which scientists were particularly well fitted.

Panofsky then presented a highly detailed plan for first stage disarmament including a cut-off on nuclear production, a drastic reduction of strategic forces, an end to nuclear testing, etc. He explained in great detail the inspection requirements for each of these measures. Talensky was still taking copious notes while Blackett was showing great impatience with what he took to be Panofsky's pedantic concern with detail. He said Panofsky was proposing arms control and not disarmament, an approach explicitly rejected not only by the Soviet Union but also by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.

Talensky finally spoke after about one and a half hours of Western presentations. He produced a book which contained all Soviet

Western presentations. He produced a paper which contained alluvial
puddles and also by the Commonwealth Prime Minister's, Conference.
and not elsewhere, an address explicitly released not only by the
State concern with detail. He said definitely he was proposing some control
not involving Great Insubstance with what he took to be definitely a began
reduction of strategic forces, an end to nuclear fear, etc.,
agreement including a call-off on nuclear production, a draft
Nuclear arms presentation a highly detailed plan for first
self fitted.

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documents in Russian. He suggested that rather than talk about a
Western first stage as Panofsky seemed to have done, it would be more
realistic to take the Soviet first stage as a point of departure.
Abolishing all means of nuclear delivery was to the West's advantage
for it restored the significance of oceans. He could not understand
why the West had rejected so fair an offer. If the West agreed to
eliminate strategic delivery vehicles and foreign bases, the Soviet
Union would agree to adequate inspection. At this point Blackett
called a coffee break.

After the coffee break, Blackett made the following pro-
posal: Both sides should cut their forces by 50% with inspection on-
ly of the amount destroyed and not of the weapons remaining. After
that, full inspection should be established. Silard disagreed,
stating that a 50% cut was too small and total inspection after that
gave the West too much information.

Since the Western group was again arguing among itself,
I tried to throw the ball to Talensky. I asked him whether I had
understood correctly that at the meeting of the working group which
I had missed, he had agreed that residual retaliatory forces could
remain at the end of the first stage. He said yes, provided foreign
bases were abolished. I asked whether he meant strategic bases. He
replied that all overseas deployment of the U.S. forces would have to
end since as strategic weapons were reduced, other forces became

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increasingly significant.

I then asked Talensky whether he had ever heard of the
Sohn inspection proposal by which each country is to be divided into
a number of zones. Inspection is then limited to a given number of
zones chosen at random by the inspecting country. Talensky said he
had heard the proposal at the Moscow conference and asked a number of
penetrating questions--for example, what the consequences would be if
inspection revealed that a given zone contained *fewer* strategic weapons
than the declared number. Feld then gave a highly technical ex-
planation of theories of inspection and Blackett was asked to draft a
statement.

After lunch there was a joint meeting with Working Group IV,
covering again the ground of the morning session. Most time was taken
up by Panofsky and Purcell explaining statistical sampling to the Rus-
sians.

During the course of the day, a number of statements had
been circulating, with each drafter seeking to line up support for
his version. The ones I saw fell into two categories: (1) A brief
communique drafted by Donald Brennan, stating that we had met, dis-
cussed amicably, and parted; (2) Another statement which, at this
stage, was never shown to me in full. Rabinowitch and Ssilard read
me various paragraphs appealing to all governments to negotiate sin-
cerely and purposefully and to settle all disputes on the basis of

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their revulsion for war. These statements spoke of the Stowe con-
ference as a 'movement' and of specific agreements which were reached
and which governments should implement. They said too that the spirit
shown at Stowe could lead to a settlement of all disputes. None of
the substantive statements mentioned either nuclear testing (except for
general comments deploring the *causes* for the resumption of tests) or
Soviet political unilateral actions in fomenting crises. None of the
draft statements aluded to the fact that the Soviet delegation had con-
sistently refused to admit that political restraint was a pre-requisite
to disarmament and to their insistence that conflict was a law of life.

During the day, Brennan, Lipson, Bowie and myself, urged on
the American members of the Continuing Committee that appeals to govern-
ments were inappropriate, that substantive statements which did not in-
clude a reference to political tensions and unilateral disturbance of
the *status quo* were inherently misleading, that a communique speaking
of a spirit of friendship while the Soviets were setting off a test a
day and threatening us over Berlin was inappropriate. We were pre-
pared to say that we had had friendly discussions, but to go no further.

I also pointed out that revulsion for war could not be the
only criterion for settling disputes. There had to be some reference
to justice or freedom since otherwise any blackmailer could use the fear
of war for extortion.

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After considerable pressure on members of the Continuing Committee, a meeting of the American delegation was called by Harrison Brown and Rabinowitch for the evening of Thursday. At this meeting three statements were circulated: a substantive statement by Szilard, a substantive statement by Rabinowitch, which he had already cleared with the Russian delegation, and the communique by Brennan.*

Rabinowitch defended the procedure of clearing with the Russians a statement which the majority of Americans had not seen by saying that a channel of communication had to be left open. If we refused to agree to a substantive statement there was a real danger that the Soviet delegation would walk out. I asked him whether he was saying that the Soviets would come to these conferences only if they could use them for propaganda. He said I did not understand the spirit of Pugwash.

Bowie then suggested that we link a reference to the dangers of unilateral pressures, such as resumption of testing and Soviet actions in Germany with the general appeals for peace and friendship. We could then give the Soviets the choice of either accepting both statements or adopting the Brennan communique. Szilard, Rabinowitch and Brown lectured Bowie about the impossibility of dealing with the Russians by horse trading. When Bowie replied, "How else can you get a horse?" the acrimony only deepened. The spirit of Pugwash had always been frank human rapport, it was said, and Rabinowitch and Brown

* The draft statements by Rabinowitch and Brennan are attached in Appendices I and II.

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refused to take a proposition such as Bowie's to the Russians.

Kistiahowsky supported Bowie to some extent. He said that no one had specified in the beginning that new members had any lesser responsibilities than the older ones. Rabinowitch insisted that the Russians had to bring back something to Moscow or they would not be permitted to go to another conference. Kistiahowsky, supported by Bowie and me, said that, while it was important to take account of the Russians' difficulties, they also had to understand our attitudes if there was any sense in these meetings.

We pressed for a vote on the issue of communique versus substantive statement. Although no vote was taken it was clearly the sense of the meeting that Brennan's statement should be the basis for any declaration at the end of the conference. Brown said he now understood what was wanted and he would see what could be done with the Russians. Bowie stressed his understanding that Brown would talk to the Russians within the framework of the Brennan statement. Brown evaded an answer and simply repeated his previous statement of having understood the sense of the meeting.

During the evening I had a long discussion with Talensky, Khvostov and Sissakyan, at their initiative, about Germany. I have written this discussion up separately. This was to me the single most useful event of the conference.

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Friday, September 15.

This day was again devoted to a plenary session. Tamm once more reported for Group I on the nuclear cut-off. There had been a mix-up by the secretariat so that no Russian text was available. This led to a blow-up by Topchiev, who complained about the inefficiency of the secretariat and contrasted it with the operation of the secretariat when the conference was at Moscow. No Westerner commented.

Blackett reported for Group III, summing up the discussion of the previous day fairly.

Kistiakovsky reported for Group II on delivery systems, starting some general, unexceptionable principles. Tamm finally reported for Group I on the nuclear cut-off--a Russian version having been prepared--along lines similar to the Wednesday session. It was a workman-like job and was strongly applauded. It was noticeable that whenever a Soviet delegate agreed to something which was scientifically incontrovertible it was hailed by many of the Western scientists as major progress.

Controversy did not start until political matters were discussed. The discussion followed by-now familiar lines. The Soviet delegation, acting as a unit, pressed certain themes of Soviet foreign policy: complete and general disarmament; the threat to security represented by Germany; the need to admit Communist China to the United Nations. The American members of the Continuing Committee had urged

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us not to raise controversial issues and to confine working group re-
ports to issues directly relevant to disarmament. Nevertheless,
Working Group IV included a statement which put Germany into a spe-
cial category and implied that Germany's status could never be changed,
even by negotiations. Working Group V recommended the admission of
Communist China to the United Nations.

The relevant paragraph of Working Group IV read as follows:

In particular, in a disarmed world, the
importance of strategic problems connected
with national frontiers will substantially
diminish. Although some of the existing
frontiers are in dispute, any changes should
be made only by negotiation or other peace-
ful means. For instance, the existing Ger-
man frontiers could not be changed without
a great upheaval.

Bowie pointed out that this placed Germany in a special category, that it did not distinguish between internal and external German frontiers, and that the statement seemed to imply that Germany could not even negotiate about its frontiers.

He was strongly attacked by Khvostov. Khvostov could not
understand America's blindness to the German menace. Did Bowie support
German irredentism, etc.? The Soviet participants took the position
that they would not agree to any part of the paragraph unless there was
also the invidious reference to Germany. This amounted to saying that

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they would not agree to the peaceful settlement of any dispute
unless there was a discriminatory reference to Germany. Several
British members supported Khvostov.

It was finally decided that a small subcommittee composed
of two Russians and two Americans should redraft the paragraph. When
the subcommittee returned, the wording had been slightly changed
but the meaning was essentially the same and it was accepted by the
plenary session.

During the afternoon session, when Working Group V reported,
I took exception to the recommendation which stated that Communist
China should be admitted to the United Nations in order to promote
disarmament. I took the position that it was inappropriate to raise
only one political issue since I could think of several others, such
as ending unilateral Soviet acts in Germany, that would also help
disarmament discussions. I would not object to a recommendation that
Communist China join disarmament negotiations.

There was an impassioned reply by Philip Noel-Baker, who
argued that it was the sense of humanity that Communist China be
admitted to the United Nations and that he could not understand my
objection or the U.S. position on Communist China. No other dele-
gate supported my position. The working group report was accepted
by the plenary session.

Also during the afternoon session, Rabinowitch showed me a
brief paragraph which referred to the need for negotiations and asked

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me whether I agreed with it in substance. I told him that I could not
object to the phrases as they stood but that I could not agree to any
statement incorporating them unless it referred also to the danger
of unilateral political acts. I also told him that it was my under-
standing that we were proceeding on the basis of the Brennan statement.

During the evening, there was a banquet preceded by a cocktail
party. Topchiev sought me out during cocktails and said that he had
heard about the interesting conversation I had had with his colleagues
on the German question. I told him that I had found it extremely use-
ful. Topchiev then said he hoped that I had learned that not all
Russians were "horns." I replied that I had never doubted the personal
charm of Russians, but that I was glad to have the experience personally.
Topchiev then suggested that I visit the USSR under the auspices of
the Academy of Sciences, which would arrange everything. I told him
that I had a full schedule but that I appreciated the invitation and
would keep it in mind.

After some more small talk, Topchiev said that he was sur-
prised by my statements in the afternoon about Communist China. Why
had I opposed the admission of Communist China to the U.N.? I said
that my objection had been to singling out one political problem as
conducive to disarmament while I could think of a number, such as
Communist pressures on Germany, Laos and Viet Nam, which should be
included. My view was that either all or none should be mentioned.
Topchiev replied that he would have been content with a resolution to

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the effect that Communist China should be admitted to disarmament negotiations but that the Hungarian, Straub, had insisted on the more inclusive formulation of admitting China to the U.N. I told him, "I know how it is. Converts are always more orthodox than the original believers." Topchiev slapped me on the back and shook hands and we then went in for dinner.

During the dinner, many toasts were proposed. The Soviet themes were: the need to recapture the wartime U.S.-Soviet friendship, the need to achieve general and complete disarmament and many toasts of thanks to individual Americans. Most American toasts-- of which Rabinovitch supplied seven all by himself--concentrated on the world community of scientists thinking more clearly than their governments, the need for Soviet-American friendship, the unconquered frontiers of science, the spirit of Pugwash. It was evident that many American and British participants felt an enormous sense of relief-- even exultation--about Soviet joviality. Many acted as if the personal warmth was the real purpose of these meetings and all the technical and political discussions an irritating interruption.

## Saturday, September 16

When we assembled for the final plenary session, we found a draft statement which coupled the essence of the original Brennan communique with a summary of the original Rabinovitch statement. I had not seen this statement before and it is my impression that it was completely contrary to what the American group had decided two

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days earlier.

Harrison Brown opened the meeting by stating that it was the policy of the Pugwash Conferences not to pass resolutions which were opposed by a substantial minority. Doty read a brief statement which could be interpreted as a hint that a reference to nuclear testing should be included in the final statement.

Bowie then raised the issue of whether there should be a substantive statement at all. He argued that a simple communique would be the most appropriate step. Brown suggested in reply that we go through the substantive statement line by line to see if there were any objections and if there were, we could still face the question of the communique.

Lipson said that there were many who might be willing to go through the substantive statement line by line who would still prefer a communique, and he therefore suggested that the matter be put to a vote. Topchiev intervened to call for a vote of confidence in the Continuing Committee which had drafted the statement. He also said that the spirit of the Pugwash movement demanded a substantive statement. I replied that I could not accept an appeal to the spirit of the Pugwash movement since I was attending a conference, not joining a movement. No other delegate supported my position.

Finally, after about an hour of this discussion, the chairman, Brown, ruled that there would be no vote on the issue of communique versus substantive statement. Rather we would proceed by going through

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the substantive statement line by line. He appealed to those who would oppose the statement anyway to be most restrained in their comment.

In going through the document line by line, the pattern of the previous few days was repeated: namely, there were usually a sufficient number of Westerners to defend the Soviet position so that the Soviets could be very sparing in their comments.

For example, I questioned a glowing reference to the previous week's conference on scientific cooperation as a major contribution to peace on the ground that I had not read its communique and that it seemed to me irrelevant to disarmament. Noel-Baker asked whether I was opposed to scientific cooperation and did I not think the Antarctic treaty had been helpful in promoting international understanding.

I said, to a limited extent, but it has obviously not prevented the Berlin crisis. Several other delegates made a strong defense of the contribution to peace of the previous week's work. Since the consensus was clear, I dropped the matter.

Some others objected to the phrase in the statement which said that all discussions had taken place within the framework of implementing general and complete disarmament. It was recommended that the title of the conference, namely, 'Disarmament and World Security' be used instead to describe the framework. The Soviets objected violently, supported by many of the British delegation, and the final version turned out to be a very minor variation of the original draft.

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The debate then turned to the paragraph dealing with substance, which read as follows:

> The participants of the Conference are united in the realization of the danger of unleashing a nuclear war, which would cause untold destruction and bring death to innumerable people. We consider it, therefore, imperative that our governments should initiate sincere and purposeful negotiations aiming at the conclusion of agreements that could lead to complete and general disarmament, and to the creation of stable peace. We hope that the desire for peace and the revulsion against war, which are shared by all peoples, will make possible a peaceful resolution of the conflicts which have led to the present deterioration of the international situation.

Bowie made a strong statement about the essential asymmetry of calling for peace and friendship and settling disputes on the basis of the revulsion for war on the one hand without any reference to the political disputes on the other. He said we had an obligation not to confuse the public by creating the impression that all disputes could be solved merely by good personal relations.

Pavlichenko replied with the implication that Bowie had been connected with the foreign policy of Dulles. The world had two choices: security through an armaments race and security through disarmament. Since Bowie was obviously identified with security through an arms race he was not the best judge of the wisdom of making a substantive statement.

I replied that Pavlichenko's interpretation was precisely the reason why I opposed this paragraph. We were at Stowe as private citizens

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but we had a responsibility for the public impression we were creating. The conference had assembled in an atmosphere of threat of which the Soviet decision to resume testing was only one example. There had been a whole series of unilateral acts over Berlin and in South East Asia. During the conference, the Soviet delegates had maintained that conflict was inevitable and while there could be a moratorium on the arms race, there could be no moratorium on political conflict. I could not accept the notion that revulsion for war was the sole criterion for settling disputes though it was an important one. I rejected the appeal to negotiate sincerely and purposefully because I believed that our government had already been doing just that and because I could not admit an implication to the contrary. I would refuse to associate myself with any statement which implied that general disarmament was possible regardless of how many political crises were fomented, which failed to urge political as well as military restraint and which gave the impression that both governments were equally to blame for the present impasse.

At this point, a Canadian, Polanyi, suggested that everything in the substantive paragraph except the last sentence be eliminated. Before the Soviet group could reply to this, Rabinowitch intervened to say that in that case the Soviet group would be justified in walking out.

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A recess was then taken in which Rabinowitch and Brown were to meet with Sissakyan and Topchiev to see if they could redraft the paragraph. During this recess Rabinowitch asked me whether, since I was likely to object anyway, I would mind having an asterisk after my name saying I had not signed because of my governmental connection. I refused, saying that I would have objected regardless of my position in Washington. Rabinowitch rejoined the drafting committee.

When the session reassembled, Brown announced that only a half hour was left for deliberation and if no agreement could be reached on the paragraph we would have to disband.

The compromise paragraph contained the same asymmetry to which Bowie and I had objected originally. Since it was obvious that the paragraph would be approved and since there was so little time left, I refrained from further comment.

During the vote, Bowie, Lipson, Brennan and myself refused to agree to the resolution. Since some people felt that the phrase "refused to join in the resolution" was harsh, we agreed to the phrase "did not join in the resolution" for describing our position. We insisted that the word "abstained" was not appropriate because it might give a misleading impression of neutrality.

Most of the participants left shortly afterwards. Since I wanted to get some rest, I stayed overnight, until Sunday, Sept. 17th. During the evening of Saturday, Sept. 16, I went to the secretariat to

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pick up a few copies of the statement and found that those who had
opposed the resolution were listed in two, rather than in one, category.
Bowie was listed as opposed. Lipson, Brennan and I were listed as ab-
staining. This of course gave the impression that the abstainers were
basically in favor but for various reasons did not wish to vote. It
also gave the impression that only one man, a former associate of Dulles,
had opposed the resolution. I found Rabinowitch who had also stayed
over and asked him to explain this change. He said that he and Brown
thought the phrasing reflected our sentiments. I told him that if
this was not changed immediately I would be forced to make a public
statement about the method of operation of the Continuing Committee.
Rabinowitch promised to change the statement to accord with the o-
riginal phraseology. I have not seen the actual statement as it was
finally distributed.

tifully distributed.

Original braille: I have not seen the actual statement as it was
transcribed. Translated to English: I told the committee to send a copy
of the statement about the method of operation of the Continuing Committee.
This was not changed immediately. I would be pleased to make a duplicate
copy of the braille reflected on our comments. I told him that it
over and over again to explain this change. He said that he and Brown
had obtained the resolution. I told the committee who had also asked
why gave the impression that only one man, a known associate of Bulle,
pastely in favor put for various reasons did not wish to vote. It
stating. This of course gave the impression that the statement was
erroneous. The name given the committee that the statement was
obtained the resolution were listed in two, rather than one, category.
This is a few copies of the statement and found that those who put

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NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

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# 1. Was there progress towards disarmament?

Of course, a great deal depends on what is understood by "progress."

I believe that no conclusion can be drawn either way about the invocation of such phrases as "general and complete disarmament." They may be sincere. They can also be used to thwart progress. General and complete disarmament by itself is a slogan or a liturgy. In the present political climate substantial progress depends not so much on a settlement of old disputes, as on exercise of great restraint in formulating new crises.

Whatever one's judgment about the possibility of achieving general disarmament, the best way to make "progress" is to develop specific, detailed programs in order to get started. If these are substantial enough, they may bring about a new atmosphere. At any rate, they should be of a nature to create their own momentum. In the disarmament field, the ability to be concrete is crucial.

In this context, two conferences took place at Stowe. The plenary sessions were almost completely useless. The presentations of the Soviet delegates were entirely predictable. The group followed the Soviet position on all international disputes without deviation. As the week progressed more and more time was devoted to parliamentary haggling. Moreover, as time went on, the Soviet group established a psychological dominance. Many of the Western delegates acted as if they were

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in the presence of a bomb which might go off if not carefully handled. The natural propensity of the Soviet delegates to act as a unit was reinforced by the anxiousness of some of the Americans and the tendency of the chair to treat the Soviet delegates as a single group.

The situation was different in the working groups. Here the Soviet delegates made an effort to be reasonable. However, even the working groups should be seen in proper perspective. A fair amount of concrete technical material was presented. But the flow was almost entirely one-way. The intellectual contribution was made exclusively by the Western delegates. The progress was thus diplomatic, not intellectual. It consisted of the fact that the Soviet group was prepared to listen to expositions it had not entertained at previous conferences: the retention of minimum deterrent forces; inspection during, not after, the first stage and the admission that distrust had to be taken into account in framing disarmament agreements.

I do not believe one can equate Soviet willingness to listen to technical presentations with agreement on substance. The Soviet delegates confined themselves to asking clarifying questions. The report of Group III reflected the thinking of Panofsky, Feld and Blackett. Group I's report was almost exclusively the work of Penney and Bethe; Group II's of Kistianovsky.

The political working groups were different. Here the Soviet participants tenaciously presented views of their own. They were,

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however, without exception repetitions of the official Soviet line on
Germany, imperialism, general and complete disarmament, etc..

Given the manner in which the working group reports were as-
sembled, it seems to me dangerous to exaggerate the Soviet "conces-
sions." For one thing, at a scientific conference agreement to a
scientific fact should not be treated as a concession. More importantly,
it is difficult to assess what the Soviets were agreeing to. For ex-
ample, the reports of Tamm for Working Group I were enthusiastically
received. However, he did not say that a cut-off on nuclear produc-
tion was desirable. He agreed to what inspection system might be
appropriate if an agreement to stop nuclear production should be ne-
gotiated. The Soviet group specifically tied the nuclear cut-off to
general and complete disarmament and the abolition of foreign bases.

Similar escape hatches were left by the Soviet participants
in other working groups. The size of minimum deterrent forces was ne-
ver discussed. Though my inspection schemes were presented by the
Western delegates, the Soviet participants were non-committal even
after the conference had accepted the phrases of general and complete
disarmament. And every reference to inspection was linked to a general
and complete disarmament agreement and to the abolition of foreign bases
defined as overseas U.S. troop deployment.

Never having met Soviet scientists before I am of course in a
very difficult position to determine whether this represented progress.

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There is no doubt that several of the Soviet delegates were extremely attractive people who were undoubtedly sincere in their professed abhorrence of war. Whether this indicates an interest in disarmament as we understand the term cannot, in my opinion, be determined on the basis of the evidence afforded by the Stowe conference.

It was striking that no serious technical work had been done on disarmament by the Soviet group represented at Stowe. On none of the technical issues was any significant contribution made by any Soviet delegate with the possible exception of Tamm. Whether the discussion concerned inspection or methods of reduction, or residual forces, the almost inevitable Soviet reaction was to repeat the formal proposals made by their government. This may be due to the fact that the Soviet participants were not primarily in the disarmament business. In the case of some of them, it no doubt reflected a different conception of disarmament than was predominant in the Western group.

Pavlichenko, Basanov, Korneev--the party hacks--and to a lesser degree, Khvostov, who is a serious person, though a party man, probably regard disarmament not as a technical problem but as an aspect of over-all Soviet strategy. To them real peace probably presupposes the collapse of the capitalist system. They probably look at disarmament primarily as a problem of disarming the West.

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But whatever Soviet motives, the way the conference was con-
ducted permitted no conclusions about their sincerity. The insistence
on treating the Soviet group as a unit, the avoidance of detail, com-
bined to submerge substance in the phraseology of formal statements.

2. What was the utility of the Conference as a channel of communication?

During the meeting the veterans of these meetings made much
of the spirit of Pugwash and of the importance of keeping open chan-
nels of communication. We were told by many of our American colleagues
that these meetings had always been characterised by a special spirit.
The Soviet group, so the argument went, had fought a lonely battle for
disarmament (within the Soviet Union) and stood in danger of being
discredited. Because of this special position of the Soviet group,
the American members of the Continuing Committee asked us newcomers to
be very circumspect. We were told not to raise controversial issues
and to agree to statements in order to help out our Soviet friends.
There was an almost pathetic eagerness on the part of many Western
scientists to please the Soviets personally. The Soviet resumption of
nuclear testing, it was said, had come as a shock to the Soviet parti-
cipants and they deserved sympathy rather than censure.

It is, of course, impossible for an outsider who has never
been in the Soviet Union to judge the validity of this assessment of
the domestic role of the Soviet delegates at Stowe. I must confess to
some scepticism about considering policy-making in the USSR by analogy

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to the experience of the pluralistic West. It seems highly unlikely to me that in a Communist state the Academy of Science--and even less a group within it--could become a political pressure group. And it was surely inconsistent to argue that a high price had to be paid for keeping open the channel of communication with the Soviet delegates and to maintain at the same time that the group to which this communication was addressed was fighting for its life at home. If the Soviet delegates at Stowe knew about the Soviet resumption of testing in advance they were guilty of duplicity. If they did not, the argument that we had to meet their demands in order to save the conference were baseless.

Being now to these meetings, I was in no position to judge the Soviet scientists by anything except their actions on this occasion. Here a number of things were apparent: a) they always acted as a group in plenary session; b) in private conversations they never deviated from the official line--though they may have done so with people they trusted more than me; c) most of them were extremely attractive individuals; d) their public posture followed the Soviet pattern of mixing threats and blandishments. Thus Topchiev followed his outburst against the secretariat Friday morning with unusually charming and vital behavior during the banquet on Friday night. The attacks on Western war-mongering earlier in the week were followed by invocations of Soviet-American friendship later. I was told by some members of the Continuing Committee

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though I did not hear it myself, that at one stage Topchiev complained about the pressure of FBI agents and reactionary American delegates. The reaction to all of this from many Westerners was a form of nervous titter when the Soviets were harsh followed by a sense of immense relief when the Soviet tone was more conciliatory. And the change in Soviet tone was then generally taken as a reason for not insisting on our point of view.

The importance of the channel of communication depends not only on its existence but on what goes through it. On the positive side, I would list the open and friendly attitude of the Western, particularly of the American, scientists. It is hard to see how Soviet delegates exposed to this behavior can continue to take seriously the charge of the inherent bellicosity of the West. (They can, of course, rationalize the difference between Soviet propaganda and the behavior of our scientists by making a distinction between "imperialist" circles and intellectuals. In this sense, some of the attitudes of the Western delegation may have confirmed Soviet propaganda of a community of scientists, workers and other peace-loving elements as against the war-like capitalist governments.)

More useful still was the opportunity to present Western thinking about disarmament to a Soviet group. Despite the one-sidedness of the communication, it can only be helpful for the Soviets to do

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serious work on disarmament. The copious notes taken of Western pre-
sentations will no doubt be analyzed in the USSR and this is on the
whole desirable.

On the negative side some of the educational impact of Western
thinking on disarmament was no doubt mitigated by the insistence of some
of the Western delegates to seek to extort ever further concessions from
their colleagues. No matter how conciliatory the Western views on inspec-
tion, there was almost always someone to insist that they were too rigid.
(See for example Blackett's attitude towards Panofsky described earlier)
The Soviet delegates could well have come away with the impression that
progress in disarmament depended not so much on reasonable substantive
programs but on unrelenting psychological pressure. The possibility
was raised by some of the American attitudes that no position, however
reasonable, would be maintained over a period of time in the face of
determined Soviet opposition. The impression may have been left that
a substantial group of American scientists would lean over backwards to
find a grain of hope in even the most intransigent Soviet stand.

Even more worrisome was the general attitude of anxiety and
nervousness displayed by the Western delegations. The Conference met
in a tense international situation. The past months had seen Communist-
created crises in Berlin, Laos, Viet-Nam. The moratorium on nuclear
testing had just been ended. During the week of the conference the So-
viets exploded a nuclear device daily. There were Soviet rocket tests

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in the Pacific on several occasions during the conference.

Yet it would have been difficult for a man from Mars to come to the conclusion that the conference was meeting at a grave situation. For a considerable number of the American scientists good personal relations with the Soviets seemed to be the principal objective. Our views were stated if at all in a gingerly and apologetic manner. Though there were some references to nuclear testing early in the week, the tone was plaintive. I did not hear a single reference to Soviet unilateral actions in Central Europe from an American scientist. On the contrary, some spoke favorably of most of the Soviet proposals. The constant Soviet attacks on West German militarism went unanswered. Any outsider coming to the Conference could easily come to the conclusion that the crisis in Central Europe was German-made. Soviet charges almost never brought a rejoinder. I do not know of course what went on privately. From the plenary sessions and the working group meetings the Soviet delegates could hardly have derived the conviction that the current situation in Berlin was being viewed in the West as particularly critical.

The conduct of the meetings seemed to bear out the Soviet view of the world. The conduct of the meetings did nothing to discourage the Communist notion that "progressive" forces in the West could be united, by Communist pressure, against the so-called hard line (a term I detest). Bowie, Lipson and I stood almost invariably alone. Many scientists who knew us and who told us privately that they agreed with

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us nevertheless in any show-down were either silent or went along with the Soviets. At every critical juncture, the fear of a Soviet walk-out--which I believe was vastly exaggerated--produced concessions not otherwise warranted in order to keep open a channel of communication. Whatever useful lessons the Soviet delegates learned about disarmament, were more than counterbalanced by the harmful conclusions they must have drawn about our political sophistication, the seriousness with which we viewed the current situation, or our psychological resilience.

### 3. The attitude of American scientists.

The role of the American scientists was a complex one. For purposes of this discussion I will divide them into roughly three groups: a) the first was composed of 'old Pugwashers' to whom good personal relations with their Soviet counterparts were all that mattered and who were willing to do almost anything to keep what they considered Soviet 'good will.' This group though numerically small was over-represented in the Continuing Committee. It is responsible for some of the more exotic parliamentary devices. b) a group long associated with Pugwash but less sentimental and more objective. Still in a show-down this group was likely to be swayed by its colleagues on the Continuing Committee and by a sense of hospitality to the Soviets. c) a third group attending these meetings for the first time. These men were more objective. They generally understood what was involved but were reluctant to make an issue

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of it. The subsequent discussion will deal with the last two groups
since the first represents a very special case.

I must say in all candor that I came away from Stowe with
a feeling of deep depression. The American scientists at the meeting
were honorable, dedicated, attractive, extremely intelligent. They were
deeply devoted to the future of disarmament. Many of them have earned
great merit in pushing for an understanding approach to disarmament un-
der extremely difficult conditions. I have worked with some on various
committees where they have made major contributions.

Yet at Stowe their impact was unfortunate in the context of the
political situation. For one thing, they misconceived the problem. They
pretended or believed that the chief obstacle to progress in disarmament
was lack of technical knowledge which they were peculiarly able to sup-
ply. They refused to consider that the obstacles have been largely po-
litical and were not necessarily amenable to scientific ingenuity.
They took the position that there was a community of scientists looking
at problems objectively and presumably less hide-bound than their
governments. Few of our scientists seem to have been bothered by the
fact that the constant appeals to the community of science were belied
by the monolithic Soviet response and by their own eager approbation of
Soviet acceptance of scientific data.

At the same time our scientists were extremely ambivalent
about actual scientific discussions. For, many of them acted as if their
special contribution was not so much technical as therapeutic: they

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knew how to handle the Soviets better than short-sighted governments. They saw their task less as promoting knowledge about disarmament than as dispelling distrust and they identified this effort with their own personal relations with their Soviet counterparts. Many acted as if the discussions during the day were simply an admission price to be paid for the joviality of the evening. They were therefore impatient with any attempt to press even a technical argument against Soviet opposition, and they constantly sought ways to placate the Soviet delegates.

In their efforts at personal diplomacy our scientists were frequently hampered by a substantial ignorance of the factual situation. Thus on the evening I arrived an eminent scientist told me glowingly that he had detected a change in the Soviet position on Germany. The Soviet Union, he said, would agree to German reunification if we would accept disengagement in Central Europe. When I followed up his Soviet source, it turned out that the proposal was the familiar Soviet scheme: a Confederation of the two German states and withdrawal of all foreign forces from Germany.

The scientists on the whole refused to consider the political implication of their actions. They failed to see that the final statement, however innocuous it may have appeared in the West, could be used by Soviet domestic propaganda to prove the correctness of the Soviet approach to disarmament and the Soviet devotion to peace; it could also be

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used to refute any charges that the Soviets had unilaterally fomented
the current crisis. They did not appreciate that a number of Nobel prize
winners in a setting like Stowe are bound to play a political role,
whatever they may think of themselves. They did not see that present
and former members of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee are not,
in the context of Stowe, purely private citizens or that even private
citizens have public responsibilities in a crisis like the present one.

I am not suggesting that scientists should have come with a
party line or that a pluralistic society like ours should seek to imi-
tate the methods of the Soviet delegation. It would seem important,
however, that our senior scientists develop a sophistication with respect
to the political context more commensurable with their real understand-
ing of inspection problems. The impatient, sometimes arrogant, rejection
of political problems is bound to encourage what we should seek to avoid.
Disarmament conferences, public or private, will become safety valves
to mitigate the risks of Soviet political intransigence. They will
turn into a device to demoralize and confuse the West, an instrument
of political warfare rather than a means to arrest the arms race.

Part of the difficulty was the excessive importance attached
to good personal relations. I am not suggesting that impoliteness is
excusable, much less that it is desirable. Rather it seems to me that
a relationship, to be durable, must be based on mutual respect. It is
not very flattering to the Soviet delegates to imply that they will give

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up deeply held beliefs because of the personal charm of their Western counterparts. It is in the long run demoralizing for the Western scientists to agree to things simply to please the Soviets. Such attitudes are bound to bring out the worst qualities of both sides. On the part of the Soviets a premium will be placed on alternating bluster with their undeniable charm. On the part of the Americans there is a tendency to become emotionally dependent on Soviet moods and to confuse a pleasant atmosphere with substantive progress.

If these meetings are to make long-term sense both sides should be able to explain their views in perfect frankness and in a polite atmosphere. The Soviets should not demand a price for cordial behavior and our scientists should strive to be as concrete as possible. The Soviets should not be able to have it both ways: to act like a monolithic group and yet demand unwarranted concessions in order to create an atmosphere of personal good will. Real progress depends on the willingness of both sides to confront the enormity of the problem on its merits, not to confuse sentimentality with wisdom and not to tempt propagandistic pressures by a demonstration of inward insecurity.

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APPENDIX I--BABINOVITCH DRAFT STATEMENT

2nd Draft of Preamble for Conference Statement, September 14, 1961

The Conference on Disarmament and World Security which has taken place in Stowe, Vermont, U.S.A. from September 11 to September 16, 1961, was attended by 43 scientists from 11 countries. Their names are given in the attached list. Problems related to disarmament and world security were discussed at the Conference in a spirit of friendship and frankness, and guided by a desire for mutual understanding.

We discussed many problems related to the path by which general and comprehensive disarmament could be achieved. Such disarmament, which we believe to be necessary to achieve stable peace among nations, is a common aim of all peoples and has been unanimously endorsed by all states members of the United Nations.

We have reached agreements on a number of important questions relating to the quest for peace and security of nations; these proposals are listed below. Disagreements have arisen on some matters related to the present deterioration of the world situation and the estimation of the causes of this deterioration. Despite these disagreements, and in the face of growing danger of nuclear war, we reaffirm our belief in the principles expressed in

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the charter of our movement--the Vienna Declaration of September 1958.

All participants of our Conference are united in the realization of the danger of unleashing a nuclear war, which would cause untold destruction and bring death to innumerable people. We consider it, therefore, imperative that our governments should initiate at once measures which would make possible a rapid opening of negotiations on the now controversial issues. These negotiations should aim at the conclusion of an agreement that could lead to complete and general disarmament and the creation of stable peace. We hope that the desire for peace and the revulsion against war, which are shared by all peoples, will make possible a peaceful resolution of the conflicts which have led to the present deterioration of the international situation.

In our Conference we have touched upon many important problems and have reached agreement on a number of proposals aimed at positive and constructive measures for the stabilization of peace.

Before enumerating them, we would like to refer to the recommendations made a week ago in our Conference on International Cooperation in Science, which we consider of prime importance for the achievement of our aims. The following proposals have emerged from our present Conference on Disarmament and World Security.

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# APPENDIX II--Brennan Draft Statement

## SUGGESTED CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE

(Second Draft)

The Eighth Conference on Science and World Affairs was held at Stowe, Vermont, from September 11 to September 16, 1961, on the general subject of disarmament and world security. Participants included forty-nine scientists and scholars from the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and seven other countries. It is the custom of the Conferences not to publish any statement on which there is not substantially unanimous agreement. A wide range of specific topics was discussed, including nuclear production and stockpiles, nuclear testing, delivery systems, selected next steps in arms reduction, problems of general and complete disarmament, and preconditions to possible success at negotiations. Many individual views, which were often quite divergent, were explored in a frank manner. Most of the participants found the discussions helpful in clarifying points of view, and in suggesting possible avenues for further action. It was hoped that the group would continue to meet at suitable intervals in the future.

(This statement has been evolved in discussions with most of the American participants, but has no official status. D. G. Brennan)

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

September 22, 1961

To: Robert R. Bowie

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I am attaching some observations I made about the Stowe Conference. The first two pages are garbled, and I plan to rewrite the entire memorandum next week. Before I do so, your comments would be extremely useful.

I should add that I am not suggesting that you endorse it, and also that it is a personal record that I wanted to have while the events were still fresh in my mind. I do not intend to circulate it.

Dictated September 20, 1961

## Some Observations about the Stowe Conference

I arrived at the Stowe Conference after the second day, on Tuesday, September 12th. I therefore missed one plenary session and one session of the working group.

The evening I arrived a number of the American participants told me that the situation was extremely tense, and also that the Soviets had made a number of significant concessions about disarmament. These concessions were supposed to be an acceptance that inspection could take place during disarmament, that minimum deterrent forces could be retained at the end of the first stage of disarmament, and that disarmament agreements could not be based simply on distrust.

The tension was supposed to be due to the Soviet bad conscience with respect to nuclear testing and the insistence of the Americans on discussing it. I noticed no particular tenseness nor any particular conciliatoriness on the part of the Soviet group.

Tamm reported for working group #1 and gave a good technical account of the problem of monitoring a nuclear cut-off, staying well within the limits of existing technical discussions in the West.

Another Soviet delegate, Dubinin, made an empassioned attack on the French for their nuclear testing program and a strong defense of the resumption of tests by the Soviet Union, following the Khrushchev statement of that subject almost verbatim. There was no Western reply of any kind.

rely of any kind.

chev statement of that subject almost verbatim. There was no Western
of the resumption of tests by the Soviet Union, following the Khrush-
on the French for their nuclear testing program and a strong defense
Another Soviet delegate, Dubinin, made an unassessed attack
within the limits of existing technical discussions in the West.

account of the problem of monitoring a nuclear out-oft, staying well
Tamm reported for working Group #1 and gave a good technical
conciliatoriness on the part of the Soviet Group.

on discussing it. I noticed no particular tenoriness nor any particular
with respect to nuclear testing and the insistence of the Americans
The tension was embosSED to be due to the Soviet bad conscience
and that disarmament agreements could not be passed ably on distrust.
forces could be retained at the end of the first stage of disarmament,
abortion could take place during disarmament, that minimum deterrent
ment. These concessions were embosSED to be an acceptance that in-
Soviets had made a number of significant concessions about disarma-
told me that the situation was extremely tense, and also that the
The evening I arrived a number of the American participants
and one session of the working Group.

Tuesday, September 13th. I therefore raised one preliminary session
I arrived at the Stone Conference after the second day, on

Stone Operations about the Stone Conference

Dictated September 20, 1961

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The behavior of both the American and British delegations was extraordinarily circumspect. The Russian delegation behaved like a well-drilled football team, with various members playing various roles, but all aiming for similar objectives.

During the day it became apparent in private discussion within the American group that they were very concerned that the Pugwash meetings might break up. After a number of conversations with members of the continuing committee, it became apparent that the concern focussed on a statement to be issued at the end of the conference. This was the first time that I had ever heard of the requirement of issuing a statement.

I saw Rabinowitch sitting with the Soviet group drafting a statement. I asked him afterwards whether I would be asked to sign it and whether there could be some policy discussion about the wisdom of issuing an statement. He made some remark that he was just phrasing some innocuous release and that of course we would have an opportunity to see it.

At the end of the plenary session somebody raised the issue whether the working group reports would be adopted by the conference and also whether a statement should be issued. The chairman, Paul Doty, ruled this question out of order and no discussion was permitted.

By the second day, it was apparent that a number of statements were circulating, with each drafter seeking to line up likely support. The ones I saw fell into two categories essentially: (1) a brief statement, drafted by Donald Brennan, which was essentially a communique stating that he had met, discussed amicably, had some differences of opinion, and parted. (2) Another statement which was never shown to

opinion, and barbed. (3) Another statement which was never shown to
 stating that he had met, discussed uncapably, had some differences of
statement, drafted by Donald Brennan, which was essentially a commentary
The once I saw told into two categories essentially: (1) a brief
were circulating, with each graver seeking to line up likely abort.

By the second day, it was apparent that a number of statements
were circulating, with each graver seeking to line up likely abort.

By the second day, it was apparent that a number of statements
were circulating, with each graver seeking to line up likely abort.
Doty, ruled this question out of order and no discussion was permitted.
and also whether a statement should be issued. The chairman, Paul
whether the working group reports would be adopted by the conference
At the end of the binary session somebody raised the issue

one release and that of course we would have an opportunity to see it.
statement. He made some remark that he was just bashing some innoc-
there could be some policy discussion spont the wisdom of issuing an
I asked him afterwards whether I would be asked to sign it and whether
I saw Rapinowitch sitting with the Soviet group drafting a statement.

statement.

the first time that I had ever heard of the requirement of issuing a
on a statement to be issued at the end of the conference. This was
continuing committee, it became apparent that the concern focused
might preclude nb. After a number of conversations with members of the
the American group that they were very concerned that the Bungaw meeting
During the day it became apparent in private discussion within
roles, put alluding for similar objectives.

a well-drilled football team, with various members playing various
extraordinarily circumspect. The Russian delegation behaved like
The behavior of both the American and British delegations was

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to me in full consisted of various paragraphs in effect appealing to
all governments to enter into negotiations immediately and sincerely
and to settle all disputes on the basis of their revulsion for war.
None of the substantive statements mentioned either nuclear testing
or Soviet political pressure.

The Soviet delegation, throughout the conference, refused to
accept the proposition that one requirement for progress towards
disarmament was a standstill on political conflict. They always
maintained that conflict was a law of nature. They also argued that
personalities could not affect the conflict of social systems. None
of the draft statements circulated by the continuing committee aluded
to the differences of view.

During the day of Thursday, September 14th, a number of the
Americans, specifically Brennan, Lipson, Purcell and myself, argued
that appeals to governments were inappropriate, that substantive
statements which did not include a reference to political tensions and
unilateral of the *status quo* were inherently misleading.

After considerable pressure on members of the continuing committee,
a meeting of the American delegation was called by Harrison Brown and
Rabinowitch for the evening of Thursday. At this meeting three state-
ments were circulated: a substantive statement by Szilard; a substantive
statement by Rabinowitch, which he had already cleared with the Russian
delegation; and the communique by Brennan.

Rabinowitch defended the procedure of clearing a statement which
the majority of Americans had not seen with the Russians by saying
that a of communication had to be left open. There was a
real danger that if we refused to agree to a substantive statement
the Soviet delegation would walk out. I asked him whether he was

the Soviet delegation would walk out. I asked him whether he was
real danger that if we refused to agree to a subversive statement
that a
of communication had to be left open. There was a
the majority of Americans had not seen with the Russians by saying
Rapinowitch defended the procedure of clearing a statement which
debate; and the commune by Brennan.

statement by Rapinowitch, which he had already cleared with the Russian
ments were circulated: a subversive statement by Szelard; a subversive
Rapinowitch for the evening of Thursday. At this meeting three states-
a meeting of the American delegation was called by Harrison Brown and
After considerable pressure on members of the continuing committee,
of the status quo were inherently misleading.

of the draft statements circulated by the continuing committee included
bereavements could not affect the conflict of social systems. None
maintained that conflict was a law of nature. They also argued that
democracy was a standstill on political conflict. They always
accept the proposition that one requirement for progress towards
The Soviet delegation, throughout the conference, refused to
or Soviet political pressure.

None of the subversive statements mentioned either nuclear testing
and to settle all disputes on the basis of their regulation for war.
all Governments to enter into negotiations immediately and sincerely
to me in full consisted of various paragraphs in effect abating to

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Bowie then suggested that we include a reference to the problem
of unilateral moves, such as resumption of testing and Soviet pressures
on Germany, together with the general appeals for peace and friendship.
We could then give the Soviets the choice of either accepting both
statements or having no substantive statements whatsoever. Szilard,
Rabinowitch and Brown fell upon Bowie at this point and lectured him
about the impossibility of dealing with the Russians by horse trading.

The spirit of Pugwash had always been frank human rapport and they
refused to take such a proposition to the Russians. Kistiakowsky
supported Bowie on the point of being a new member of Pugwash and
that no one had specified in the beginning that new members had any
lesser responsibilities than the older ones. Rabinowitch insisted
that the Russians had to bring back something to Moscow or they would
not be permitted to go to another conference. Kistiakowsky, supported
by Bowie and me said that, while it was important to take account of
the Russians' difficulties, they also had to understand our attitudes
if there was any sense in these meetings.

We pressed for a vote on the issue of communique versus substantive
statement. Though no vote was taken it was clearly the sense of the
meeting that Brennan's statement should be the basis for any declara-
tion at the end of the conference. Brown said he now understood what
was wanted and he would see what could be done with the Russians.
Bowie said our understanding was that he would talk to the Russians

Bowie said our understanding was that he would talk to the Russians
was wanted and he would see what could be done with the Russians.

At the end of the conference, Brown said he now understood what
meeting that Breman's statement should be the basis for any declaration
on the part of the conference.

We pressed for a vote on the issue of communique with the communists.
It there was any sense in these meetings.

The Russians' difficulties, they also had to understand our attitudes
by Bowles and we said that, while it was important to take account of
not be permitted to go to another conference. Klatzimowicz, subordinated
that the Russians had to bring back something to Moscow or they would
leave their responsibilities to the older ones. Kapinowitch insisted
that no one had specified in the beginning that new members had any
subordinated Bowles on the point of being a new member of Pugwash and
refused to take such a proposition to the Russians. Klatzimowicz
The spirit of Pugwash had always been frank human rapport and they
about the impropriability of dealing with the Russians by horse trading.
Kapinowitch and Brown tell upon Bowles at this point and lectured him
statements or having no substantive statements whatsoever. Bailard,
We could then give the Soviets the choice of either accepting both
on Germany, together with the General absolution for peace and friendship.
of bilateral moves, such as resumption of testing and Soviet breaches
Bowles then suggested that we include a reference to the problem
of Pugwash.

Could we use them for propaganda. He said I did not understand the spirit
saying that the Soviets would come to these conferences only if they

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