REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION

DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM, 1956 - 1957,

HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. OBJECTIVES 1

II. THE UNIVERSITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM 3

III. PERSONNEL 5

IV. ACADEMIC OFFERINGS

A. Defense Policy and Administration in the United States 8

B. Defense Policy and Comparative Government 10

C. History 138b 13

D. Research and Reference Collection, 1956 - 1957 22

V. EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES OF THE DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM

A. Lectures and Broadcasts 26

B. Staff Publications 29

C. Use and Distribution of Defense Studies Program Materials 31

VI. APPENDICES

Appendix I. Defense Policy Seminar Students by Schools

Appendix II. Defense Policy Seminar Student Papers

Appendix III. Defense Policy Seminar Sessions

Appendix IV. US Defense Policy and Administration: Proposed Syllabus

Appendix V. History 138b: Reading List and Sample Examination

Appendix VI. Recipients of Defense Policy Seminar Materials to 1 July 1957

Appendix VII. Comparative Defense Policy: Sample Reading List

[LC]

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# I. OBJECTIVES.

"... The universities have their role to play, not merely in training physicists and metallurgists or even in training political scientists to aid the armed services to carry out their proconsular functions. The universities have a wider function, to train the educated public in an understanding of the problems of military power in an atomic age, problems to whose solution Sam Adams or Thomas Jefferson or even Calvin Coolidge can contribute little but pious hopes.

"For we must remember that the university tradition has been almost as indifferent to the problems of the military as the military have often been to the problems of civil life and civil education ... "

From a lecture by Denis W. Brogan
"Democratic Government in an Atomic
World." Ohio State University,
April 24, 1956.

The objectives of the Defense Studies Program, a program operating under a grant from the Ford Foundation for a three year term, are:

1. to carry out experimentation in courses dealing with defense policy as a problem in public administration, to the end that in our democratic society defense policy, like farm policy, tax policy and foreign policy, be made a matter of enlightened public discussion,

2. to prepare teaching materials and guidance for others interested in making a study of defense policy a part of the University curricula,

3. to make available a program within the Graduate School of Public Administration to which those currently in the public service may come to broaden their perspective on the positions they currently hold and in which those interested in the public service may study for positions in the many agencies of government which are directly or indirectly concerned with our national defense.

The Defense Studies Program is in only its third year of development and therefore a report on its activities will tend to underline the changes which have taken place over the period of any given year, rather than the essentially stable elements in the Program.

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## II. THE UNIVERSITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM.

During the course of the academic year 1956 - 7, the Defense Studies Program has continued to have a Faculty Advisory Committee working closely in association with it. This University committee is responsible for recommending to responsible University officials action to be taken with regard to the entire Defense Studies Program. This committee comprises:

Dean McGeorge Bundy, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.

Dean Edward S. Mason, Graduate School of Public Administration
(In the absence of Dean Mason, Acting Dean Paul M. Herzog
was a member of the committee.)

Professor David F. Cavers, Law School.

Professor William Y. Elliott, Department of Government.

Professor Franklin L. Ford, Department of History.

Professor Lincoln Gordon, Business School, Acting Chairman.

Professor George B. Kistiakowsky, Department of Chemistry.

Professor W. Barton Leach, Law School.

Professor Arthur Smithies, Department of Economics.

After a period of a year and a half of close scrutiny, the University Committee on the Defense Studies Program met on March 27, 1957 in full committee to decide on the extent to which the Defense Studies Program had made itself into a responsible part of the University's intellectual capital. Their conclusions* as reported in a summary record of the

*University Committee on Defense Studies Program, Summary Record of Meeting, March 27, 1957, page 1.

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meeting are as follows:

"The Committee was in vigorous and unanimous agreement that the Program has been remarkably effective first, in demonstrating that serious scholarly work in the field of defense policy is possible; second, in producing and organizing materials which will facilitate such study, both at Harvard and at other universities, well beyond the range of the members of the Program itself; third, in establishing effective cooperation with the Department of Defense, the three military departments, and the higher Schools of the armed services; fourth, by operating an inter-disciplinary seminar on defense problems at a level of quality and vitality which has seriously stirred the interest of talented students in several Faculties. There was likewise unanimous agreement that the Defense Studies Program was a very desirable University activity for the long-run future and that every effort should be made to secure resources for carrying it forward on a permanent basis."

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III. PERSONNEL.

There have been several changes made in the personnel structure
of the Defense Studies Program during this past year.

The Associate Director, Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., became the Director
of the Defense Studies Program on 1 July 1956.

Professor W. Barton Leach, Story Professor of Law, relinquished his
Directorship, although he continued to be very closely connected with the
Program as an Associate.

Dr. Harry H. Ransom has continued as a Research Associate but has
devoted his time to a lesser degree than heretofore as a curator of
defense policy materials. During the past year he has largely concerned
himself with active participation in the Defense Policy Seminar, especially
in the preparation and revision of seminar reading material.

Dr. William R. Emerson, an Assistant Professor of History at Yale
University, has been associated with the Program this past year as
a Lecturer in the School of Public Administration. He organized and
administered a course in "The Emergence of the United States as a World
Military Power" (History 138b), one new to the college curricula. The
Program was also fortunate to have had his active participation in the
US Defense Policy Seminar.

Dr. William C. Wiseley has been a Research Associate of the Defense
Studies Program and has lectured in the History Course mentioned above
as well as in the Defense Policy Seminar itself. Dr. Wiseley has also
been closely associated with the Advanced Seminar on Comparative Defense
Policies.

Mr. Maury D. Feld has been designated as Curator of Defense Policy
materials and in this capacity has been responsible for the maintenance of

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our rapidly accumulating materials, including files of Congressional hearings, newspaper clippings and other items, press releases, speeches, etc., of current interest.

For the proper functioning of a program which has undertaken to create its own teaching materials, a large proportion of the budget has also had to go toward the employment of multithird operators, typists, and personnel of a like nature.

We continue to believe that the Program is best served by having for its academic staff men with diversified backgrounds. Dr. Katzenbach is an historian turned political scientist. He has had considerable experience as a Marine Corps officer at various levels of command. Professor Leach is a lawyer with a wide Air Force background. Dr. Ransom is a political scientist. Professor Emerson is an historian. Dr. Wiseley took his M.A. in International Relations and his doctorate in history. And finally, one of the research assistants, Donald B. Keesing, is a trained economist, and the other, John A. Ballard, is a lawyer with considerable experience in the problems of civilian defense.

Next year there will be a considerable cut in personnel. Although we hope in the future to be able to invite personnel of Dr. Emerson's quality to Harvard for a year of study and research, we have not felt it wise to replace him for this coming academic year. Some cutback in personnel is presently possible in view of the relatively advanced state of preparedness, as far as reading material for students is concerned, in which we now find ourselves.

Dr. Katzenbach will continue as Director of the Program next year, and Professor Leach, Dr. Ransom and Mr. Feld will also continue in their present capacities.

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To work on those reading materials which we do not consider up to
those high standards which we want, we have hired two new research assistants
for next year, and one for full time work during the summer months.

Of the two new research assistants for next year, one, Franklin G. Balch III, is taking his degree at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The other, Mr. Peter Ogloblin, is taking his Ph.D. in government. Both have studied extensively with the Defense Studies Program and one, Mr. Ogloblin, has worked on matters of national defense with Mr. Paul Nitze. It is expected that the reading materials and the instruction in the United States Defense Policy and Administration seminar and in the seminar on comparative governments will remain at their present standard.

Professor Arthur Smithies has been closely associated with the
Defense Studies Program from its inception. This year as previously, he
as a scholar in the field of economic policy, contributed much to the
success of the Program. We expect that Professor Smithies will continue
as heretofore.

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IV. ACADEMIC OFFERINGS.

A. DEFENSE POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

"... as we are not governed by soldiers and sailors but by civilians, civilians who are likely to play a part in the government in time of war should study the principles of war, and particularly the great mistakes which civilian governments have made in military and naval strategy in past history."

Viscount Gray of Falladon, University College, November 12, 1925 in the introduction to *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens* by Major General Sir George Aston, London 1927.

The philosophy behind the Defense Policy seminar is similar to that of other courses of instruction within the Graduate School of Public Administration. We are concerned, that is to say, with policy rather than with operations. The teaching problem which we face is this: Should we strive to give some overall view of the problems which inevitably come across the desks of those civilians in policy making positions in the Pentagon, or should we strive from year to year to take one set of Pentagon problems and to delve into these deeply and thoroughly?

Quite consciously we have chosen to look over the whole gamut of problems which together make up our defense policy. Inevitably, this has meant that students cannot delve as deeply as we could wish, except in their research papers, into any single set of questions.

Again we have felt, and this is in pursuance of GSPA policy, that we should lean quite heavily on guest lecturers. Either through what they say or, conversely, through what they do not, the guest lecturer gives an informative academic session. The process of inculcating a critical turn of mind can, we feel, be better brought about in discussions with a guest lecturer than in discussion of a given set of reading materials in and of themselves.*

*For further details see *Report to the Ford Foundation 1955 - 6*, p. 11, ff.

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The students this year came to us with the same different backgrounds as they have in the past. A breakdown of the students by school and civilian and military background may be found in Appendix I. The topics of student papers this year may be found in Appendix II, and the titles of the individual sessions and lecturers may be found in Appendix III.

There was one marked change between the Defense Policy Seminar as conducted this year and in the past. This past academic year a conscious effort was made to stick to a syllabus which was prepared last fall. While we realize that in part the seminar must bow to the availability of guest lecturers, the staff generally believes that we should continue our efforts to develop and adhere to some format of instruction so that we may be assured an adequate coverage of what we consider to be the central problems of US defense policy. In short, the trend toward some final structure will be continued during the course of this next academic year.*

Next year there will be one other experimental change in the Defense Policy Seminar. In the past we have not given adequate time to the discussion of seminar sessions. We have broken the large seminar group down into sections, but these separate sections have been used primarily as a device to give close attention to student papers and to develop discussion leaders for a given session of the whole seminar. Next year we plan to use these small sections to a greater extent than heretofore as small discussion groups in which individual seminar sessions may be discussed as fully as they deserve to be. These sections will meet bi-weekly for a period of an hour or more, depending upon the availability of student time.

*One particularly thought provoking working paper for the discussion of next year's seminar will be found in Appendix IV.

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B. DEFENSE POLICY AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Despite the large number of courses presently given on comparative
government, virtually no attention has been paid to the study of defense
policy as an inescapable component of it. The explanation is, of course
that prior to World War II, there was a general tendency to regard war
and military policy as aberrations in the functioning of western political
institutions; while the immediate post war era cherished the conviction
that such occurrences had at last become obsolete. Only in recent years
have military institutions achieved recognition as a normal component of
the governing power and only more recently still have materials become
available which make possible the study of the warfare state on a
comparative basis.

The comparative approach offers in this as in other fields infinite
possibilities for gaining fresh insight into the evolution and nature of
defense policy and of the institutions which embody it. Moreover, this
element in the study of states must, if that study is to be balanced,
receive its just share of classroom and scholarly attention. To achieve
its just place the study of comparative defense policy must receive
isolated attention. It was to this end that the Program began this
experimental study.

During the course of this past year an attempt was made to study
comparative defense policy by spending several weeks reading and dis-
cussing a series of topics which were drawn up at the beginning of the
year. The list of these follows:

1. Comparative Government

2. Comparative Military Systems

3. The Procurement of Men

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4. The Procurement of Arms

5. The Procurement of Money

6. The Procurement of Leaders

7. Leadership and the Coordination of Resources - Staff

8. Conflict and Collaboration at Civil Military Levels

9. The Conditions of Revolt

10. The Concept of the War Office

11. War Office and Executive

12. The Budget

13. The Executive and Legislative

14. Public Opinion and Army

15. Systems of Persuasion and Control

16. Total War, Limited War and the Problems of Planning
Sample experimental reading lists may be found in Appendix VII.

By the end of the year, however, those on the Defense Studies staff who were primarily responsible for the course, Messrs. Katzenbach, Wiseley, Feld and Ballard, felt that a more general approach should be tried in the future. After considerable discussion amongst themselves and with the students, it was finally concluded that the seminar for next year should be divided into three parts. The first part should be devoted to the study of military theory which, in view of previous studies, must be covered from sources in terms of the history of strategic thought. To be more precise, the seminar next year will begin with an attempt to analyze the place of the tank on the one hand and navies on the other in the strategic thought of the United States, France, Germany, Great Britain and Japan. The immediate problem which will confront the seminar will be the extent to which a given set of social values tends to

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limit national thinking with respect to a given weapons system. National "ways" in warfare, that is to say, the differing value systems imposed on the six components of strategy (weapons systems, manpower, supply, time, space and will) will provide the grist for a comparative study here.

The second topic will concern the institutional framework for the creation of doctrine and for the creation of conditions for its acceptance. Under this general topic will be included personnel selection and education both military and civilian, and the organization of departments and staff within which these work. This topic is conceived broadly so that the organizations which shape, limit and expand military doctrine to political necessity and to scientific and economic possibilities are included.

A third and final topic will be the coordination of military and foreign policy, a special case in view of the problems created by coalition warfare. In short, to quote one of the many memoranda which have been submitted during the course of the year on the teaching of comparative defense policy,

Thus the first area will be given over to the study of preferences, the second to the instruments which record and adjust them, and the third will attempt to add the third dimension to a study of the subject, its final adjustment in the compromise of an alliance system. In short, a course on Comparative Defense Policy must be one the focus of which is on the adjustment of military in reality (i.e. doctrine) to political reality under different forms of government and under governments of varying ranges of military potential.

Any course in comparative defense policy must of necessity be experimental. The experiment this year concluded first that there was great student interest in the subject, secondly that there were ample materials for its study but third, that the subject needed much greater clarification and definition than it had during this past year. It is both hoped and believed that the subject will be developed during the course of next year into something which merits a more detailed discussion in this report.

C. HISTORY 138b

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Professor Emerson, who was altogether responsible for the administration, largely responsible for the planning, and took a major share in the teaching of History 138b, submitted the following memorandum* on the course. It is included almost _in toto_, because of its value to others who may be interested in courses in military history. The readings for the course and sample examinations are included in Appendix V.

## I. <u>Origins of the Course.</u>

'In its origins, History 138b, "The Emergence of the United States as a World Military Power," arose from diverse sources. On the one hand, there was a need felt for a preparatory course for the Defense Policy Seminar, which by grounding graduate students and others in recent military history might strengthen the Seminar. A second source lay in a desire, long felt in certain university circles, to expand Harvard's offerings in military history and allied subjects. The immediate cause of the course lay in certain personnel changes in the Harvard History Department which raised the need for a course in this general European and American period; as Professor Gilmore's letter to Professor Leach of 3 February 1956 shows, the Department expressed the hope that a course beginning with the period immediately after the Treaty of Versailles and thus concluding three decades could be offered. In this sense, History 138b in its origins reflected both long-term and short-term considerations.

## II. <u>Planning.</u>

'The main outlines of the new course were established in informal discussions between Professors Leach, Katzenbach and Emerson in the early

*From DSP Folder on History 138b, compiled by William R. Emerson.

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months of 1956. These discussions were formally presented to the History
Department in a memorandum of 30 March 1956 in which Professor Emerson
outlined the planning bases which the staff envisaged. From the instructional
point of view, History 138b was envisaged as a "showcase" of DSP; it was
hoped that all or most members of the staff could participate in the course,
thus giving DSP a rightful place in the undergraduate curriculum. From
the point of view of subject matter, History 138b was planned to cover the
background and the major incidents in American Emergence in the 20th Century
as a World Military Power. Thus, in the initial stages, it was laid down
that History 138b, after fully covering the European politico-military
background for America's entry into the first World War, the subsequent
events of the Versailles period and the political issues of the 1930s,
would concentrate very largely upon World War II and the American role in
it.

'In the initial outline of the course it was laid down that it should deal broadly with the "politics, strategy and technology of the two World Wars, with the emphasis resting upon American participation in these wars and the reciprocal effects which this has had upon our American policies and institutions." With some modifications, this was in fact the form which the course ultimately took in 1957.

### III. **Execution.**

'On this preliminary basis, the structure and emphasis of the course were further discussed among the members of the Faculty during the fall term of 1956 in Cambridge. In its final form, the course is outlined in the attached Phase I, Phase II reading materials* and in the list of lectures attached to this memorandum.

*See Appendix V.

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'About sixty students enrolled for the course, a very high enrollment for a new offering in the Harvard History curriculum. These students in their rank ran the gamut from graduate students, of whom there were eight enrolled, all the way down to freshmen of whom three enrolled. There were in addition numerous auditors of the course, including — much to the gratification of the Faculty — some members of the Harvard History Department.

'Both student and faculty reactions to History 138b were complimentary and enthusiastic. From the point of view of the faculty, it was the impression of the instructional staff that such a course has a definite part to play in Harvard's History curriculum. Far from being a course dealing with "one battle a day," as seems to have been a wide-spread impression, History 138b dealt instead with power politics and grand strategy in addition to military technology. From the point of view of faculty reaction to this new offering, the course appears to have been an unqualified success. On this heading, the strictness and toughness of the grading standards in History 138b proved a matter of wide favorable comment among Harvard faculty people.

'Student reaction to the course seemed even more enthusiastic. Numbers of students enrolled, undergraduates and graduate students alike, stated that History 138b was one of the best, if not the best, history course that they had ever taken. Students likewise felt that this course, with its emphasis on American participation in foreign wars, filled what had previously been "a vacuum" in the History Department's offerings at Harvard. This enthusiasm for the course was reflected in the high standard of industry and work which the students therein put forward. As the principal instructor in the course, I was impressed and

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indeed amazed by this student reaction. Perhaps the most rewarding result of the course was the decision of three of the enrolled graduate students to specialize in military history in the future.

'From all sides, then, History 138b may be considered a success in the first year of its operation. In my opinion it could in the future become one of the largest and most influential undergraduate courses at Harvard.

#### IV. Comments and Proposals for the Future.

'The author of this memorandum is not inclined to be dogmatic about the form that History 138b should have in the future. Its structure and its emphases as a course should depend upon the individual, or individuals, who happen to be giving it in the future. These comments, I put forward merely as general impressions and suggestions based upon my own personal views of the future of this course.

'First, I strongly feel the course should if possible be expanded to the length of one year. It is an unfortunate fact that a too close study of recent, that is, 20th Century, wars may be misleading to the students. From both theoretical and practical points of view, the course should be extended backwards to cover the period of limited war, from the 18th Century forward, as well as the total wars of this century. The "lop-sidedness" arising from a too narrow concentration upon very recent military events was quite apparent in the students' final examinations; the nearness of the events which they discussed, and their lack of any distant points of perspective on which to hinge their judgement, severely handicapped the students in dealing with the examination material. On all grounds, then, I urge that the extent of the course be expanded to cover the late 18th and 19th Centuries.

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'Similarly, more emphasis upon the theory of strategy, without lessening the emphasis upon the technical and operational sides of war, would have been well advised. In this sphere, a definite weakness in undergraduate apprehension of geographical and logistical factors was noticed. In the future greater emphasis should be laid upon these points, the weakness of the undergraduates' grasp of them handicapping their performance on the examination.

'Thirdly, I suggest in the future History 138b be made primarily a one-man project. Guest lecturers, along the lines of this year, can be very useful. The problems of intellectual co-ordination among a joint instructorial staff, however, proved very difficult this year and will, it is presumed, be no less difficult in the future. For these reasons, and to add more unity to the course, it is urged that henceforth it be very largely the project of a single instructor, or, in the event it is expanded into a two-term course, of no more than two instructors.

'A final point on planning priorities for the Defense Studies Program. In spite of its excellencies as a course, I would be inclined to think that a graduate seminar in Military History should take priority over History 138b as a DSP project. The need for well-trained military historians should be a high priority project. History 138b is indeed a good introduction for graduate students to this little-studied and little-understood field. If however a choice has to be made, I would urge that DSP funds be put into a select graduate-school seminar to train along sound lines the military historians who will take up the battle in the future.

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'If I may be permitted to intrude a final and personal note, I should like to express my gratification in teaching History 138b this year. The cooperativeness and industriousness of my colleagues and the enthusiasm of our students have been a source of great personal satisfaction to me. History 138b, I feel, and military history at large, have a great future at Harvard. It has been for me a distinct personal pleasure to participate in the first year of what will in the future become a great project at Harvard.'

In rethinking the recommendations which Professor Emerson submitted, the Director is inclined to agree with Professor Emerson's suggestion that 138b be expanded to a full year course. He does not, however, agree that a course which is largely 20th century military history is not a practical one-term course. On the whole, Dr. Katzenbach agrees with Professor Emerson that more emphasis should be put upon the theory of strategy, but he feels that this can be done best by limiting the scope of the lectures to more particularly military subjects. He feels equally strongly that geographical and logistical factors should be stressed to a greater degree than they were during the course of last year. He would also, however, like to see greater emphasis placed upon the political handling of military affairs within the structure of the services themselves, rather than simply on the very highest rungs of governmental policy making.

However, the Director disagrees with Professor Emerson's suggestion that in the future History 138b be made primarily a one-man project. Indeed, it seemed to Dr. Katzenbach that student enthusiasm was largely engendered by the different approaches which different lecturers brought to the subject of military history. It was this, which more than any other factor stimulated their interest. He does not feel that the additional

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information which might be imparted to students in a one-man course would
be as valuable to them and to their appreciation of the meaning of
military history as is the variety of approach laid before students in
contact with a diversity of lecturers.

Finally, the Director would like to reserve judgement on the
advisability of teaching a graduate seminar in military history vis-a-
vis a graduate-undergraduate course such as History 138b.

There can be no gainsaying the fact that this experimental course was
nothing short of a remarkable success and that every effort should be
made to encourage its reintegration into the History Department curriculum.
Next year, because of the cutback in personnel, History 138b will unfor-
tunately have to be bracketed. However, it is hoped that the History
Department will continue to want to see this subject amongst their offerings,
and the Department has been assured of the enduring interest and enthusiasm
of the Defense Studies Program for its continuance. It is felt that the
Defense Studies Program will, within roughly its present personnel limits,
be able to reinstitute the course from its resources, if the History
Department so desires, for the academic year 1958 - 9.

On the following page is a list of lecturers and lecture topics for
History 138b.

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D. RESEARCH AND REFERENCE COLLECTIONS, 1956 - 1957

A. <u>Nature of Collections: Their Value During the Past Year.</u>

The development of the Research and Reference Collections during 1956 - 1957 was shaped by the experience of the previous year. A clear cut distinction was made between areas of primary and subsidiary interest. A new category, bibliography, was added.

The addition of a bibliographic index, covering both subjects and authors, came in response to a growing awareness on the part of both staff and students of the absence of such a scholarly tool in any of the available academic publications. It had, moreover, become evident that the development of the Defense Studies field as an area of discussion and comment went hand in hand with the systematic organization of the data and opinions advanced for the doctrines under debate.

Considerations of relative utility, based on the experience of the first year, have furthermore demonstrated that the clipfile and pamphlet collections present a much more profitable field of concentration than books and journals. The reasons are quite obvious: (1) the collection of books and journals duplicates activities of the university library (2) their accumulation and maintenance require personnel and financial resources beyond those available to the program (3) the clipfile and pamphlet collection represent areas in which the Defense Studies Program is unique, certainly in terms of Harvard, and in all probability, nationally (4) comprehensive coverage in the clipfile and pamphlet collection is a reasonable goal.

The demands made on the research and reference facilities of the program during the past year have born these arguments out. The clipfile and pamphlet collection were not only in constant use by students of the

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Defense Policy Seminar and of the Advanced Seminar in Comparative Defense Policy, but also were heavily drawn upon by students in the college and graduate schools, in particular, those enrolled in Government 159 — Government and Defense (Professor Huntington) and Government 185 — The United States in World Politics (Dean Bundy).

## B. Perspectives for the Coming Year.

The clipfile, pamphlet and bibliographic collections represent a unique contribution to the field of Defense Studies, one which, in a geometrical ratio, becomes more valuable as the collections gain in depth by being kept up to date over a period of years. They not only provide an instrument for the conduct of the courses directly affiliated with the program but also one for emphasizing the defense policy aspects of courses in adjacent fields. It can, therefore, be assumed that the value and the utility of these collections will increase steadily, provided that they are maintained on their present footing. A detailed description of the collection and of its administration is to be found in DSP Report to the Ford Foundation, July 1956, Appendix 4B, p. 45.

The collection of books and journals should continue on its present modest basis, serving primarily as a reference library for the use of DSP staff and for making available to students supplementary copies of standard books.

## C. General Conclusions.

During the past year, academic and industrial organizations have consulted with the Harvard DSP on the problem of establishing and administering a defense studies research and reference collection. In meeting such requests, several general conclusions as to the nature of such collections have been reached. We, therefore, take the liberty to quote from a letter to authorities

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at the Ohio State University which embodies the experience of the
Program Director and other staff members, particularly, of course, that
of Mr. Maury D. Feld the author of the letter;

Much depends on the already existing facilities of the general
university library; particularly if the program is established on a
permanent basis with long range teaching and research objectives. The
Harvard Defense Studies Program is, as you well know, of uncertain
tenure. Moreover we have in Widener Library one of the outstanding
book collections in the world. Our budget then was designed with
these facts in mind: to permit the collection of vital current
literature and to supplement, in terms of the practical needs of the
staff, existing collections.

From my informative talk with Dr. Stevens I have gathered the
impression that Ohio State University plans to build up a Defense
Policy library as a comprehensive unit. The funds listed in your
enclosed budget seem to be quite adequate for maintaining and servicing
an excellent Defense Policy library, if you are not starting more or
less from scratch. May I take the liberty of suggesting that the
excellent bibliography of Professor William Emerson, "European
Military History 1500 - 1950" be employed as a checklist for the
present adequacy of the Ohio State University libraries. In addition,
a comprehensive collection of military periodicals, including bound
volumes of back issues, should be assembled. This is an area in
which my particular experience might be of value, and I would be
glad to provide you with a list of relevant journals.

There is another point in the proposed plan which arouses
certain misgivings; namely the physical separation of the library and
the teaching staff. Of course, the practical difficulties in the way
of setting up a separate library may be unanswerable, but I feel that
an excellent case can be made for housing teaching and reference
staff and the collection of current documents in the same building.
Beyond the publicity value in establishing a Defense Studies Program
as a focus for active research — and for a new field I believe this
sort of identification is most important — there is, I believe, much
to be said for scholars having their working tools immediately at hand
and organized in a manner best fitted to the purposes for which they
are to be employed. This factor has been elevated into policy at
Harvard not only in the Defense Studies Program but also in other
ad hoc scholarly organizations such as the Russian Research Center,
and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. It seems to me essential
that students of contemporary problems have the necessary materials
organized in such a fashion as to be immediately and easily at hand.

Aside from these two rather general and sweeping points I view
your proposed program with admiration. The important thing of course
is persistence. A library of the kind required by defense studies
gains in utility as it grows in depth.

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For institutions with limited funds, collecting emphasis should concentrate on congressional documents, particularly on the hearings of Armed Services, Appropriations, Government Operations and Foreign Affairs committees and on the British White Papers. Besides representing the heart of the matter, these have the advantage of being available free of charge or for a nominal fee.

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# V. EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES OF THE DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM.

## A. Lectures and Broadcasts.

The Defense Studies Program has assumed four missions outside its responsibilities at Harvard University. The first of these is to help establish, strengthen and participate in defense studies programs elsewhere. In this connection the following lectures and talks have been given:

- Katzenbach, "The US Constitution and Legislative Executive Relations," Ohio State University, August 1956.

- Katzenbach, "Congressional Organization for Defense Policy Making" and "Problems and Opportunities in the Teaching of Defense Policy," Syracuse University, February 1957.

- Leach, "Military History as a Guide to Defense Policy," Ohio State University, August 1957.

- Leach, "Pentagon Organization and the Future of Unification," University of Wisconsin, January 1957.

Along this same line the Director has together with Associate Dean Hayden Williams been responsible for planning a series of lectures in defense policy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Four lectures were given, the first by Mr. Thomas. K. Finletter on "Power and World Policy," a second by Professor Hans Morgenthau on "The Role of Military Policy in US Diplomacy," a third by General Thomas R. Phillips USA (ret.) on "The Balance of Military Power," and a fourth given by the Director of the Defense Studies Program in substitution for Professor Lincoln Gordon on "The Weapons Problem in Peacetime Coalitions."

A second area of responsibility which the Defense Studies Program has undertaken lies in giving lectures at institutions in which defense policy

- 27 -

probably may never be a subject for specialized study. We have attempted not only to see that our materials are put into the hands of interested professors, but to give lectures whenever requested. In this connection the Director has spoken at Principia College on "Astigmatism and Geo-politics," at Bates College on "The Atom — Revolution in Warfare?" and at the Institute of World Affairs on "The Role of Power in Foreign Policy." Dr. Ransom has lectured to the International Relations group at Tufts College on "The Inter-action of Civil and Military Authority in the Decision Making Process."

It is not unnatural that a program such as this should feel impelled to do as much as possible in the interests of the more general public. This has been done through lectures, publications, television and radio. Several of the recorded broadcasts given by the members of the Harvard Defense Studies Program have been used as teaching materials. Mr. Jerome Spingarn of the National Planning Association and Fairleigh Dickinson University has borrowed the tapes, and so has Professor Phillips Bradley of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University. Indeed, these broadcasts might be considered a third enterprise of the Program in view of the extensive time which has been devoted to them particularly in connection with a series of five broadcasts on US Defense Policy given during the course of July and August 1956.

Following is a list of the telecasts and broadcasts which have been given by members of the Harvard Defense Studies Program:

Katzenbach, Leach and Ransom, "Defense at the Crossroads," a series of five half-hour telecasts on Channel 2, WGBH, Boston, July and August 1956.

- 28 -

Katzenbach, "Comments on the Symington Report," Channel 2, WGBH, February 1957.

Katzenbach, "What US Military Strategy in the Nuclear Age?" World Affairs Council DECISIONS 1957, Channel 2, WGBH, March 1957; broadcast on same subject over WBZ, March 1957.

Leach, "The US Air Force Approaches the Missile Age," broadcast on B.B.C. Home Service, London, January 1957.

Leach, "British Defense Policy for 1957," Backgrounds, Channel 2, WGBH, April 1957.

A fourth enterprise of the Defense Studies Program has been offering instruction at the higher service schools. In this connection the following lectures have been or are soon to be given:

Katzenbach, "Elements of Military Power in the USSR," Junior School, Marine Corps Schools, January 1957.

Katzenbach, "DOD Organization—The Continuing Conflict," Naval Post Graduate Schools, Monterey, California, January 1957.

Katzenbach, "Presenting Legislation to Congress," Advanced Research Group, Marine Corps Schools, October 1956.

Katzenbach, "Some Thoughts on Department of Defense Organization," Naval War College, August 1956.

Leach, "The Job of a Service Secretary," Air Command and Staff College, May 1957.

Leach, "Are American Forces Adequate to Support Strategy?" Imperial Defence College, London, July 1957, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London.

The Director has also participated in the following symposiums:

National Military-Industrial Conference, Chicago, Illinois — "Public Responsibility and Defense Policy," March 1957.

- 29 -

Association of the US Army — "The Army in the Missile Age," October 1956.

American Political Science Association Convention, Washington D. C.
— "Problems in Coalition Warfare," September 1956.

Twenty-fourth Joint Civilian Orientation Conference, Department of
Defense, May 1957.

Four members of the Defense Studies staff attended the Social Science Research Council Conference on National Defense Policy, Hanover, New Hampshire — Committee on National Security Policy Research, June 1957.

## B. Staff Publications.

### Books Published.

Stanley, *American Defense and National Security* (foreword by Robert Cutler), Public Affairs Press (Washington, 1956).

### Articles and Reviews.

Katzenbach, "Time, Space and Will: The Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung," *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1956.

Katzenbach, "Military Policy as a National Issue," *Current History*, October 1956.

Katzenbach, "Some Thoughts on DOD Organization," *Naval War College Review*, December 1956.

Katzenbach, "The Military Lessons of Suez," *The Reporter*, November 1956.

Katzenbach, Review of Preston, Werner and Wise, *Men in Arms*; Walter Millis, *Arms and Men*; and F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China*; *The Yale Review*, Winter 1956.

Katzenbach, Review of B. H. Liddell Hart, "The Red Army: The Red Army 1918 to 1945, The Soviet Army 1946 to the Present." *Political Science Quarterly*, January 1957.

- 30 -

Leach, "American Problems of Forces and Organization," Royal United Service Institution Journal, February 1957.

Leach, "Midway," a Chapter in Public Policy, 1956.

Leach, "High Defense Organization: Some British Viewpoints," Air University Quarterly Review, Winter 1956 - 7.

Leach, "To the Next Secretary of Defense -- A Respectful Memorandum," Air Force Magazine, January 1957.

Leach, "The Central Blue," review article in Air Force Magazine, February 1957.

Ransom, "US Defense Organization -- Retrospect and Prospect," Revue Militaire Générale (Paris) 1957.

Ransom, "The Harvard Seminar in Defense Policy and Administration," Journal of Legal Education (Association of American Law Schools), Vol 9, No. 4, 1957.

Ransom, "Scientific Manpower and National Security," Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers, November 1956.

Ransom, "Scientific Manpower and National Strategy," Military Review (Army Command and General Staff College), December 1956.

In addition to the articles prepared by members of the staff, we are particularly pleased to report that one of our student papers from last year is being published in the Detroit Law Review in October or November of 1957. The paper deals with "The NATO Status of Forces Agreement."

Another seminar paper from this year, that of Gordon Henderson on "The Bill of Rights in Courts-Martial," has been accepted for publication by the Harvard Law Review, probably in November or December, 1957.

(LCS)

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C. <u>Use and Distribution of Defense Studies Program Materials.</u>

The reading materials which are prepared by the staff of the Defense
Studies Program have been widely used outside the Harvard Community.
(A list of the recipients of this material may be found in Appendix VI.)

Both the University of Wisconsin and Duke University have received
multiple copies of this material for courses given at these two universities
in US Defense Policy.

Professor Robert Connery who teaches this course at Duke University
has been kind enough to write a very detailed letter concerning his
criticism of these materials. It is such a valuable commentary on them
that with his kind permission, Professor Connery's letter is reproduced
virtually <u>in toto</u> herewith:

I thought you would like to know something about our experience
at Duke University in using the Harvard Defense Studies material.

Last semester I used your mimeographed material in a seminar-
type class with twelve students most of whom were seniors, although
there were some graduate students. At the end of the course, I asked
each student to write a brief commentary. This is a summary of their
remarks to which a few thoughts of my own have been added.

Some portions of your materials were read by all members of
the class but occasionally individual members read and reported
on special assignments adding supplementary data that they discovered
outside. We had some outside visitors -- at least one from each of
the three services who gave us especially-prepared talks on the views
of their respective service of national defense strategy. Our
professor of public finance joined the group when we discussed the
military budget, and a graduate student from Canada, who holds a
naval reserve commission, sat with us when we discussed military
organization of Great Britain.

We found your material perfectly usable, very current, and much
more interesting than the usual textbook. From the teaching point
of view, it had a further advantage in that it trained the student
to use materials that he will have to depend upon once he leaves
school. By this, of course, I mean government documents, magazine
articles, and newspaper stories. This material is not pre-digested
as in a textbook and has more special pleading. A student ought to
develop ability to examine this type of material and reach his own
conclusions. It is important to train people to use this normal
communication medium.

[LC]

- 32 -

We found some repetition, as one might expect, particularly concerning the Soviet Air Force, which seemed to be described in three or four places and possibly in too much detail. We found very little on the industrial aspects of defense problems. I don't think the term logistics covers what I have in mind. In Navy usage, this means determining requirements to fit war plans, and storage and distribution of material. It is handled pretty much through CNO, but the management of the vast industrial establishment, the procurement of materials, all important matters of plant construction, scheduling of contracts, pricing, and re-negotiation lies in the field of what the Navy calls procurement. This is handled through the Office of Naval Material in the Secretary's office. The whole industrial problem of converting plants and building new ones, determining priorities and recruiting industrial manpower is touched upon very lightly. I think that you could with profit pay more attention to this field.

We particularly like the serial entitled, "The Job of a Service Secretary." As one student said in his comments, "This article is imaginative, well-written, and instructive. The humorous vein, which pervades throughout, makes it more interesting reading. The material is well-organized and clearly demonstrates the complexity of the job and the problems with which a service secretary is faced."

Sometimes the student is "bogged down" because of the sheer weight of facts. Indeed, there is probably too much for a college undergraduate student to digest in a single semester. Spread out over a year, it would be quite feasible.

The discussion of budgetary problems is good in that it shows the difficulty of controlling military expenditures. I wonder if public finance people would not have some suggestions which might help to answer this problem.

In the main, as you can see from the fact that we had so few adverse comments, we found the material valuable as a teaching device. I know of no other place where this type of material could be obtained. Certainly it is much more efficient to have a single center search it out and make it available for university teaching. I sincerely hope that the project is continued.

Besides the institutions mentioned above, Defense Studies Program materials have been used for background, or, selectively, as standard readings at the University of Virginia, Syracuse University and the war colleges. The office of the Secretary of Defense in its "Schedule of initial 60-day Orientation for Executive Trainees" has ten Defense Studies Program serials included in its required reading, and in addition Defense Studies Program readings have been used by the Army's General

- 33 -

Staff, the RAND Corporation, the Glenn L. Martin Company, the Raytheon Corporation, and as background reading for a notable series of articles in *The Christian Science Monitor* by Robert Brunn. Some of the comments on these materials are perhaps worth reproducing here. A member of the RAND Corporation has written recently,

> Apart from its general interest to me, I have had many occasions to use this material in my work. It is a conveniently organized source of items which, even if one knew what to look for, would take days or weeks to dig out from libraries.

A member of the Department of the Army made a somewhat similar comment,

> I have found the papers of the Program, both those of last year and those I received this year, frequently useful to me in my official duties. In some fields, such as Defense Department organization and unification, there is simply no other comparable source of information.

The basic material which was reproduced this year will be used next year. Some of it will be rewritten, and some additions will be made. Indeed, in order to keep the subject up to date, it is felt absolutely necessary in a program such as this that fresh materials should be prepared on a yearly basis to add to the basic materials. The freshness and originality of the materials must at all cost be maintained. As evidenced by the quotations noted above this is one of their most noted characteristics. And it is one which takes time, work, and thought to produce.

Appendix II.

1956 - 1957.

AMAN, Capt. William G. Jr. USAF, "Retention of Highly Qualified Officers in the Armed Forces."

AMOS, Capt. Harry O. USA, "Some Urges to Unification of the Armed Forces."

CONLON, Joseph T., "Constitutional Doctrine of Civil Control of the Military."

CRABBE, Capt. William M. Jr. USAF, "Formation of the Policy of Unconditional Surrender."

CUNNINGHAM, Lt. Col. Hubert S. USA, "The Army Budget: The Need for a More Comprehensive Structure."

DAVIS, Major Richard L. USAF, "Retention of Highly Qualified Officers in the Armed Forces of the United States."

deCAMP, Major John T. Jr. USA, "Modern Supply Systems in Army and Air Force."

EMERLING, Lowell, "Mathematical Analysis and Military Strategy."

GODDARD, Major George J. USAF, "The Principles of Change in United States Military Doctrine. A Case Study of the Acceptance of the Principle of Strategic Bombing into the United States Military Doctrine."

GRABOWSKY, Capt. Fred USMC, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff."

GRANT, Lt. Myles S. USA, "Promotional Policy in the US Army -- A Case Study."

HADDEN, Richard R., "Unconditional Surrender: Casablanca 1943."

HARRINGTON, Capt. George F. USAF, "A Study of the Army and Air Force Modern Supply Systems."

HEERWAGEN, Lt. David D. USN, "Compromise and the Interim Concept."

HENDERSON, Gordon D., "Constitution, the Original Understanding and Courts-Martial."

JENNINGS, Capt. Allen B. USA, "British Thoughts on Land Warfare."

KEEVER, Charles J., "An Analysis of the Training Conducted Under the Reserve Forces Act of 1955."

LARSON, Capt. Larry J. USAF, "Delay Factors in the Establishment of the United States Air Force Academy."

LIBHART, Wayne P., "Some Problems in Defense Planning."

- 2 -

LOFORTE, Lt. Comdr. Robert J. USCG, "Management Aspects of the Coast Guard Budget."

MOYLES, William P., "Retaliation and 'The New Look': A Critical Study."

PATTERSON, Capt. Clyde H. USA, "The Army ROTC Program."

POOLE, Rawlings S., "The Search for National Security."

PURSLEY, Capt. Robert E. USAF, "Iran — A Strategic Evaluation."

ROBBINS, Comdr. Spencer E. USN, "Navy Budget."

SCHULZ, Charles G., "Immunity of Department of Defense Property and Business Activity from State and Local Taxation."

SHARP, Walter P., "Congressional Supervision and Intelligence."

SOLON, Daniel P., "International Security Affairs: Focal Point for Conflict Management."

SPIRA, Herbert L., "Paul Kelday MC: His Impact Upon National Security Policy."

STEELE, George S. Jr., "The CIA and Popular Government Defeat of the Mansfield Resolution."

WEISS, Arnold M., "The Informer Privilege."

WILSON, Capt. Brooks C., "A Comparison of the US and Russian Economic and Technical Assistance Given to Countries of the Middle East Since the Bandung Conference."

WOHLGENANT, Richard G., "SEATO: A Consideration of Views Held by the United States Government."

WOOD, John, "Techniques in Congressional Investigation of Defense Policy."

WOODWARD, Lester R., "Conscientious Objection: An Analysis and Appraisal of Exemption from Military Service Under the United States Draft Laws."

YEOMAN, Major Wayne A. USAF, "United States Aid for Iran."

Appendix III.

1956 - 1957.

<table><thead><tr><th>Lecturer</th><th>Topic</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>26 September 1956</strong><br>Dr. Harry H. Ransom with:<br>Capt. R. T. Spofford USN,<br>Professor of Naval Science; Col.<br>D. P. Armstrong USA, Professor<br>of Military Science and Tactics;<br>Professor Arthur Smithies,<br>Department of Economics;<br>Professor W. Barton Leach;<br>Dr. Edward L. Katzenbach Jr.;<br>Dr. William C. Wiseley.</td><td>Global and National Strategy as<br>the Foundation of US Military Policy;<br>Objectives and Commitments.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>3 October 1956</strong><br>Dr. H. H. Ransom, and panel of<br>experts (above).</td><td>Forces for Total and Limited War.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>10 October 1956</strong><br>Dr. William R. Emerson.</td><td>US Military Doctrine and its<br>Development.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>17 October 1956</strong><br>Mr. Bayley Mason, formerly on<br>the Staff of the Defense Studies<br>Program, now with Harbridge House;<br>Professor W. Barton Leach; Dr.<br>Edward L. Katzenbach Jr.</td><td>The War in Korea: A Case Study<br>in the Problems of Limited War —<br>I. The Genesis of the Conflict.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>24 October 1956</strong><br>Dr. Edward L. Katzenbach Jr.;<br>Professor W. Barton Leach;<br>Mr. Bayley Mason; Assistant<br>Professor Samuel P. Huntingon,<br>Department of Government.</td><td>The War in Korea: — II. The<br>Establishment and Pursuit of<br>Objectives.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>31 October 1956</strong><br>Dr. William Wiseley.</td><td>Military Transport: A Specific<br>Problem in the Determination of<br>Force Requirements.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>7 November 1956</strong><br>Assistant Professor S. P.<br>Huntington; Assistant Professor<br>Ernest R. May, Department of<br>History.</td><td>Theory and Concept of Civilian<br>Control.</td></tr></tbody></table>

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14 November 1956

Dr. Harry H. Ransom.

Unification: The Development of
the Concept.

21 November 1956

Professor W. Barton Leach.

Advice to a Service Secretary.

28 November 1956

Dr. E. L. Katzenbach, Jr.;
John A. Ballard; and committee.

Comparative Defense Administration:
Its Possible Usefulness to US
Defense Policy Making.

5 December 1956

The Budget Process: I.

12 December 1956

Professor Arthur Smithies.

The Budget Process: II.

17 December 1956

Professor W. Barton Leach.

The Armed Forces and the Budget:
How to Question the Adequacy of
a Budget.

9 January 1957

Mr. John R. Blanford, Counsel,
House Armed Services Committee.

The Role of Congress.

23 January 1957

Mr. Fowler Hamilton, Counsel, and
Mr. Ramsay Potts, Counsel,
Symington Investigation on Air
Power.

The Symington Committee: A Case
Study in How to Conduct an
Investigation.

30 January 1957

Hon. Charles A. Coolidge,

The Secretary of Defense:
Committee on Classified Information.

6 February 1957

Dr. William R. Emerson.

The Impact of Science on War:
The Historical Experience.

20 February 1957

Mr. Frank Pace Jr., President,
General Dynamics.

Weapons Development by Industry
(General Dynamics); and Problems
of a Secretary of the Army.

27 February 1957

Dr. William Siebert, MIT.

The Scientist in Defense.

6 March 1957

Dr. Karl Harr, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ISA).

The NSC and the Coordination of
Policy.

- 3 -

13 March 1957

Dr. E. L. Katzenbach, Jr.

Intelligence: The Historical
Experience.

18 March 1957

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor.

Strategy for the West: A 1957
Reappraisal.

27 March 1957

Drs. William R. Emerson
and William C. Wiseley.

Military Coalitions: The Historical
Experience.

10 April 1957

Professor Lincoln Gordon,
Harvard Business School, formerly
Minister of Economic Affairs,
London.

Foreign Economic Policy and
National Security.

22 April 1957

Lt. Gen. Charles B. Stone III
USAF, and Staff (Joint session
with Professor Sterling Livingston
of the Harvard Business School).

The Measurement of Performance in
the Continental Air Defense Command.

1 May 1957

Mr. John H. Ohly, Associate
Director of ICA.

The Military Assistance Program:
Organization and Issues.

8 May 1957

Dr. William R. Emerson; Dr.
Harry H. Ransom; Dr. William C.
Wiseley; Mr. Maury D. Feld.

Future Problems and Issues of
Military Policy.

## Appendix IV.

Harry H. Ransom

# US Defense Policy and Administration: Proposed Syllabus

## Statement of Objective

The objective of the Defense Policy Seminar is to inject into the stream of academic life to the greatest possible extent study and understanding of the problems of national defense. One way to express this objective is to state that the purpose is ultimately to cause defense policy to be treated academically in much the same manner as foreign policy has now been treated for some decades. Both areas of study present issues of substantive policy, of relationships between executive departments, of internal departmental administration, and of legislative participation. Both draw upon political science, history, economics, law and other disciplines.

In the present state of the University curriculum the Defense Policy Seminar must do several things simultaneously:

(a) It must provide a wide range of information on a subject which does not fall within the informational background of most students — including career officers, whose study and experience has been in the operational rather than policy making field.

(b) It must deal with the subject broadly enough to provide a fairly comprehensive view; yet it must deal with individual problems in sufficient detail to assure an appreciation of the realities.

(c) It should raise fundamental questions and consider theoretical alternatives, yet be certain that discussion is relevant to issues actually presented in practice.

(d) It should provide the means and incentive for individual work of graduate quality on selected topics.

The student group comprises career officers from all services. The treatment of the subject must not be elementary in their eyes, but must also be comprehensible to civilians with no military background.

## Approach to Subject

As a joint staff enterprise, with a composite group of students, the subject matter of the Seminar will be approached by inter-disciplinary methods, as it has been in the past three years. Thus historians, economists, lawyers, political scientists, career officers, and others may be expected to contribute to the discussions. The emphasis will vary during the year on the several approaches: In some sessions, organizational concepts will be stressed. In others, theoretical considerations will be discussed. In still others, attention will focus upon the process of decision making. In most sessions, whatever the emphasis, the approach to a subject will be through specific, concrete issues of public policy. The general aim is to present a survey of the problems of a representative form of government in the nuclear age in its attempt to maintain military power effective as an instrument of national policy.

- 2 -

## Requirements

In addition to required weekly readings, and recommended readings, members of the Seminar will be expected to meet the following requirements:
(a) a critical analysis of a pair of assigned books;
(b) special and intensive preparation for selected meetings of the Seminar and
(c) a long research paper.

The research paper will be due on April 1, and will be written under the supervision of your committee adviser. The topic for this should be selected early in the year and its outline, thesis and tentative bibliography should be discussed with your adviser in January - February.

An additional requirement will be attendance at bi-weekly meetings of your committee to follow up questions raised in the weekly Seminars. Further details on these requirements will be given in a subsequent memorandum.

-3-

# OUTLINE

Proposed Syllabus: Harvard Defense Policy Seminar, 1957-58

## I THE SETTING AND THE STRUCTURE

1A. Military Policy as a Component of National Policy: the inter-dependence of foreign policy, military policy and domestic political and fiscal policy.

1B. National Policy: U.S. objectives, international commitments and national resources.

2. Machinery for Coordination of National Policy, Strategy and Operations: the Presidency, National Security Council and adjuncts.

3. The United States Congress: organization and functions.

4. The Department of Defense.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. The Armed Services- THE ARMY: organization, role, doctrine.

7. The Armed Services- THE NAVY: organization, role, doctrine.

8. The Armed Services- THE AIR FORCE: organization, role, doctrine.

## II CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES

9. U.S. National Strategy and Military Doctrine.

10. Science, Technology and Modern War.

11. The Concept of Civilian Supremacy in Military Affairs.

## III ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS AND ISSUES OF MILITARY DEFENSE

12. The Military Budget: economics of national defense.

13. The Military Budget: the budgetary process.

14. Strategic Intelligence: role of the intelligence community.

15. Public Information and Defense Policy: the flow of information.

16. Research and Development: organization for military R & D.

17. Logistics: selected problems in military procurement, supply and service.

18. Manpower and Personnel: selected problems in human resources.

19. Economic Mobilization and Civil Defense: selected problems.

20. Collective Security: problems in coalition security systems.

21. Foreign Military Assistance: problems in foreign economic policy.

22. Disarmament: alternative to the arms race?

## IV FUTURE TRENDS AND PROBLEMS

23. Challenges to American Strategy: deterred, limited or total war?

24. Future problems in defense organization, procedures, and substantive policy; the problem of synthesizing objectives, technology, and organization.

-4-

# A Proposed Syllabus

## Harvard Defense Policy Seminar

### I THE SETTING AND THE STRUCTURE

1A. National Policy: United States Objectives, International Commitments and Resources.

The military policy of the United States has been expressed in a defense program for 1958 involving four basic missions in which "each of the military services has an active role." Such a program presumably takes into account the objectives, resources, national traditions and international commitments of the United States. The four basic military missions have been announced as (1) maintenance of "ready nuclear-air-retaliatory forces so strong that they will deter a potential aggressor from initiating an attack." (2) creation of "a defense system which will minimize the chances of a successful attack on this continent." (3) maintenance of "mobile and versatile forces suitably deployed and ready for immediate action in case of aggression." (4) "control of the essential sea areas and lines of communication in case of war." This program also provides for support to the defense forces of other nations in furtherance of the objective of collective security. The forces of the United States are designed to be "a bulwark for world peace and freedom." This is national security policy as expressed by the President in the 1958 Budget Message. This discussion aims to delineate specific national objectives which this program is designed to attain, the nature of the Soviet or other threats to their attainment, and the relevance of the defense program and missions of the armed forces to these objectives.

**Readings:**\* (NOTE: Supplementary reading lists will later be issued for each section of the syllabus.)

Beloff, Max, *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1955.

Dulles, Foster R., *America's Rise to World Power, 1898-1954*, New York, Harper, 1955.

Dulles, John Foster, Recent Foreign Policy Statements:

Eisenhower, President, Recent Foreign Policy Statements:

Elliott, Wm. Y., (Chairman), *U.S. Foreign Policy: Its Organization and Control*, Columbia University Press.

** Feld and Keesing, "Forces of the Communist Bloc," Harvard Defense Policy Seminar Serial No. 82.

Kaufmann, Wm., (Ed.) *Military Policy and National Security*, Chapter 8 "Force and Foreign Policy," Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956.

Kennan, George F., *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press, 1951.

\* Items marked with a double asterisk (\*\*) will normally be distributed as mimeographed serials of the Harvard Defense Policy Seminar.

-5-

Marshall, Charles B., *The Limits of Foreign Policy*, N.Y., Holt, 1954.

Osgood, Robert, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations*, University of Chicago, 1953; also *Limited War*, Chicago, 1957.

Perkins, Dexter, *The American Approach to Foreign Policy*.

Reitzel, Kaplan, and Coblentz, *U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945-55* (Brookings Institution), August 1956.

1B. Military Policy as a Component of National Policy: the interdependence of foreign policy, military policy and domestic political and fiscal policy.

There is an intimate interdependence of military force and foreign policy. Yet in American history this interconnection has often been denied. Force has been regarded in many periods of United States history as merely an instrument of self defense. At various periods we have renounced the use of force, attempted to control it through degrees of world government or disarmament, or have been captivated by neutrality or outright pacifism. In the contemporary scene, force is widely recognized as a necessary instrument of policy, yet little agreement exists as to the circumstances in which it may be used. Even less agreement exists on the question of the usefulness of certain weapons in our military arsenal as effective instruments of national policy. And the difficulty remains of distinguishing between "military" and "political" questions in national policy making. This discussion will center upon this statement: "Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a purely military matter, and certainly those areas in which we can speak of a national security policy unconnected with force are not the important ones." *

Readings:

Dupuy, Col. Trevor N., "War Without Victory," *Military Review*, March 1956.

Elliott, Wm. Y., "Government Organization for Foreign Policy Decisions," *Social Science*, October 1955.

Elliott, Wm. Y., (Chairman), *United States Foreign Policy: Its Organization and Control*, (Report of Woodrow Wilson Foundation Study Group), N.Y., Columbia University Press, 1952. Chapter IX, "The Problem of Force in Foreign Policy."

Gordon, Lincoln, "Organization for the Conduct of Foreign Policy," *Foreign Service Journal*, August 1955.

Halle, Louis J., "The Role of Force in Foreign Policy," *Social Science*, October 1955.

* This quotation is from the Report of the Woodrow Wilson Study Group cited below under Elliott.

-6-

Hankey, (Lord) Maurice, _Government Control in War_,
(Cambridge 1945).

Hoopes, Townsend, "Civil-Military Balance," _Yale Review_,
Winter, 1954.

Katzenbach, E.L., "The Diplomatic Cost of Military Penny
Pinching," _Reporter_, February 2, 1954.

Katzenbach, E.L., "The Military Lessons of Suez," _Reporter_,
Nov. 29, 1956.

Kissinger, Henry A., "Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age,"
*Foreign Affairs*, April 1956; also *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy*, N.Y., 1957.

MacMahon, Arthur W., _Administration in Foreign Affairs_, Esp.
Chapters 1,4.

McCamy, James L., _The Administration of American Foreign
Affairs_, N.Y., Knopf, 1952.

** Mason, Bayley F., "The War in Korea," Harvard Defense Policy
Seminar Serial No. 85, Parts I and II.

May, Ernest R., "The Development of Political-Military
Consultation in the United States," _Political Science Quarterly_,
LXX(June 1955), pp. 161-180.

Metzner, Franklin, "Formulation of Policy in Military Affairs,"
*U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1954.

Murphy, Robert, "Inter-relationship of Military Power and
Foreign Policy," Dept. of State Bulletin, August 30, 1954.

Oppenheimer, J.R., "Atomic Weapons and American Diplomacy,"
*Foreign Affairs*, July 1953.

Reinhardt, George C., "Policy: Matrix of Strategy," *U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings*, August 1954.

Sapin, Burton and Richard C. Snyder, _The Role of the Military
in American Foreign Policy_. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co., 1954.

Snyder, Richard C., and Edgar Furniss, Jr., _American Foreign
Policy_, N.Y., Rinehart, 1954.

Stanley, Timothy W., _American Defense and National Security_,
Esn. Chapters 1-5, (Part I), Washington, Public Affairs Press,
1956.

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2. Machinery for Coordination of National Policy, Strategy and Operations — The Presidency, National Security Council and Adjuncts.

The post-war years have seen a rapid growth of the Presidency as an institution and particularly that part of the Presidential office concerned with the coordination of national security policy and operations. The President sits at the apex of the structure for military policy making. He is Constitutional commander-in-chief of the armed forces, chief executive and chief foreign policy agent of government, but he also is extra-Constitu- tionally the chief legislator, party chief, and leader of public opinion. In the field of national security policy he intimately oversees the Bureau of the Budget, the National Security Council and its important adjuncts — the Central Intelligence Agency, the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board — and the Office of Defense Mobilization. The President also is "boss" of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and the other officials concerned with national security policy. Yet with a proliferation of institutional devices for bringing together all elements which should be considered in policy making and effective implementation of that policy, many real problems remain. There is the serious question of whether a fully coordinated policy can be arrived at speedily without being hopelessly watered down in the process and whether the President can count upon its effective implementation by the operating agencies. There is the question of whether National Security Council "policy" papers are worded in such general terms as to be impossible of precise interpretation or susceptible to conflicting interpretation. There is always the question of whether proper balance of political, economic and military factors is achieved in the system. Our discussion will question the efficiency and effectiveness of the top-level machinery for defense decision-making.

Readings:

Anderson, Dillon, "The President and National Security,"
*Atlantic Monthly*, CXCVII (January 1956), 42-46.

Annals, September 1956, "The Office of the American Presidency."
Cutler, Robert, "The Development of the National Security
Council, Foreign Affairs, XXXIV (April 1956), 441-458.

Donovan, Robert J., *Eisenhower, The Inside Story*.
House Document No. 443, "The Powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief," June 14, 1956.

Rossiter, Clinton, *The American Presidency*, New York, Harcourt-
Brace, 1956.

Stanley, Timothy W., *American Defense and National Security*,
Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1956.

** Stanley, T.W. and H.H. Ransom, "The National Security Council,"
Harvard Defense Policy Seminar Serial No. 104.

Wilson, Woodrow, *Constitutional Government*.

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### 3. The United States Congress -- Organization and Function

At the risk of oversimplification, it may be said there are two views on the role of Congress in military affairs. One view commonly expressed on Capitol Hill is that "Congress can do it all." As Congressman Carl Vinson has said, it is the Congressional province to "choose the weapons which shall be provided for our armed services." The other view may be called the "Congress Go Home" attitude characteristic of those who look at the problem from the vantage point of the Executive Branch. This view holds that Congressional assertion of power in foreign-military policy is a "disease" of our governmental system. Delineating the respective roles of Congress and the Executive is a perplexing task under a "separation" of powers system of government. This system not only divides powers, but also divides functions. Congress and the President have independent sources of power. But the Constitution also divides their functions, giving to Congress, broadly speaking, the legislative function, and to the President the executive function. Yet the Constitution also allows each a foot in the door to the other's domain. In effect the distinction between legislative and executive functions is blurred. In reality the President has important "legislative" power and Congress, through its control of the purse strings and investigative and appointive power, is continually involved with administrative affairs within the Executive Branch. Given this imprecise distribution of power and the somewhat blurred lines of Congressional-Presidential jurisdiction, what then, should be the role of Congress in military policy making? Discussion will center upon what that role currently appears to be, and the question of what it should be.

### Readings:

Acheson, Dean G., _A Citizen Looks at Congress_, N.Y., Harpers, 1957.

Bailey and Samuel, _Congress at Work_, N.Y., 1952.

Dahl, Robert, _Congress and Foreign Policy_, N.Y., 1950.

Galloway, George, _Congress and Parliament_, National Planning Association, 1955.

Huntington, Samuel P., "Radicalism and Conservatism in National Defense Policy," _Journal of International Affairs_, VIII, (1954), pp. 206-222.

Huzar, Elias, _The Purse and the Sword_, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1950.

Katzenbach, E.L., "How Congress Strains at Gnats, Then Swallows Military Budgets," _The Reporter_, XI, July 20, 1954, pp. 31-35.

**Katzenbach, E.L., "The Pentagon and the Hill," Harvard Defense Policy Seminar Serial No. 98.

Shackelford, Francis, "The Separation of Powers in Time of Crisis," _Government Under Law_, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass., 1955.

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Taylor, Telford, *Grand Inquest*.

Thomas, Morgan, *Congress and Atomic Energy*, Ann Arbor, 1956.

Westerfield, H. Bradford, *Foreign Policy and Party Politics*,
*Pearl Harbor to Korea*, New Haven, 1955.

Williams, J.D., *The Impounding of Funds By the Bureau of the Budget*, University of Alabama, ICP Case Series, No. 28, 1955.

Young, Roland, *Congress in Wartime*, N.Y., 1955.

4. The Department of Defense

The Department of Defense is the embodiment of "unification"
of the armed forces, an evolving concept given institutional form
in the National Security Act of 1947 -- several times amended.
This act was a compromise culminating two years of inter-service
negotiation and debate after World War II. Unification is a
deliberately ambiguous concept as demonstrated by the language
of the organic act aimed at "unification not merger" of the armed
forces. The intent of Congress is to provide "integrated policies",
<u>but</u> for service departments "separately administered." These
departments are to be under "unified direction" of a Secretary of
Defense, <u>but</u> not merged. And the armed forces are to be under
"effective strategic direction" <u>but</u> not by means of a single chief
of staff nor a truly general staff. Thus the principle of
federalism is imbedded into the present military structure.

Meanwhile the powers and office of the Secretary of Defense have
in reality steadily increased. From an office with a few assistants
it has become a large bureaucracy with a staff of over 2,000 and
numerous assistant secretaries, their deputies and executive
assistants. Formerly concerned theoretically with "policy" OSD
today is heavily involved with "operations." Secretaries of the
three services have long since lost their Cabinet status. The
integrity of the departments has tended to atrophy. In the
strategic planning process, however, the several service chiefs
hold their own in the semi-autonomous corporation—the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Even here, however, power has tended to accrete
in the JCS Chairmanship. Discussion will center upon the major issue:
To what extent, and where, should power be centralized in the
Department of Defense? What are the organizational concepts of the
Department of Defense? By what criteria do we measure the effectiveness
of current organization?

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Readings:

Leach, W. Barton, "American Problems of Forces and Organization,"
*Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, February 1957.

**Ransom, Harry H., "Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,"
Harvard Defense Policy Seminar Serial No. 101.

Ransom, Harry H., "U.S. Defense Organization -- Retrospect
and Prospect," *Revue Militaire Generale*(Paris), 1957.

** Ransom, Harry H., (ed.) "Unification of the Armed Forces,"
Harvard Defense Policy Seminar Serial No. 89, *with extensive
bibliography*.

Stanley, Timothy W., *American Defense and National Security*,
1956.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military
advisers to the President, the National Security Council and the
Secretary of Defense. Each member of the JCS, except the
Chairman, is the uniformed chief of his service, and thus has
a dual responsibility: that of commanding his service and that of
membership on JCS, in which the strategic planning process is
centered. A fundamental precept of this system is that it
theoretically assures the preparation of realistic war plans
attuned to the capabilities and responsibilities of the forces
which would have to do the fighting. The JCS operate by means of
a complex of committees and inter-departmental groups, serviced by
a Joint Staff of some 200-odd officers representing equally the
three services. It is a well known fact that each of the three
services has its own military philosophy and that there is
considerable divergence of inter-service opinion about future
warfare and how it best can be deterred or fought. In addition
to varying predictions on future warfare, there are serious
jurisdictional disputes involving control of new weapons. Many
of such issues are compromised within the JCS structure; others
must be resolved by higher authority. A major question about
existing strategic planning procedures is whether they can, in
fact, produce adequate and timely plans. It has been said that
the JCS: (1) approach all questions as service partisans (2) resolve
vital issues by barter or compromise (3) engage in "operation
paperclip" in creating only nominally "joint" plans. At the root
of the problem are the endless issues of roles and missions and the
present tri-service military structure. This discussion will
center upon those issues in light of the present structure and
functions of the JCS.

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Readings:

Burke, Adm. Arleigh, "The JCS" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1957. p. 357.

*Congressional Record*, July 23, 1956, (daily edition), pp. 12752-12760. (Statements by Senators Bridges, Douglas, Humphrey, et. al. on JCS concept)

Goerlitz, Walter, *The German General Staff*, N.Y., Praeger, 1953.

Hittle, J.D., *The General Staff*.

Nelson, Otto, *National Security and the General Staff*, Infantry Journal Press, 1946.

Radford, Adm. Arthur, "We Give Military Advice Only," *U.S. News and World Report*, February 25, 1955, pp. 42-50.

[LC]

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## 6. The Armed Services — THE ARMY.

"The decisive element of victory in war," according to Army doctrine, "is still the trained fighting man who, with his feet on the ground, defeats the enemy's ground fighters, seizes his land, and holds it."

Of the three major services, the Army has, by official assignment of function, "primary interest in all operations on land," except those otherwise assigned. For 1958 the Army will have about one million men organized into 17 divisions, 9 regiments, 126 antiaircraft battalions and 6 atomic support commands; cost, about $9 billions. A major question of the dawning nuclear age is: What role will ground warfare, and the footsoldier, play in future warfare? A corollary question is: Will the rapidly changing technology of warfare, altering radically the relationships among time, space and firepower, call for fewer ground troops in the future? The governments of most major military powers are answering these questions similarly. The trend is toward greater emphasis on nuclear weapons (particularly air power) and a whittling down of the size of future ground forces. Official Army doctrine, in effect, resists this trend and challenges some of its assumptions and implications, arguing in official literature that the Army "is the only force which has the strategic and tactical flexibility and versatility required to gain permanent control of the land, people and resources of an enemy, which represent his warmaking potential." In face of the Soviet threat, the Army is also said to be a most effective deterrent. The major argument for maintaining a large Army is that its forces will in the future, as in the past, provide the most useful and finally, decisive, instrument of national policy. It is said to represent force which can be applied to the degree needed and thus becomes the most useful instrument of war as a "continuation of politics." Issues of role, composition and size were intensified by the advent of airpower; were further complicated by development of nuclear weapons. The role, organization, doctrine and capability of the past, present and future Army — as an instrument of national policy — will be the subject of this discussion.

### Readings:

* *Army Magazine*, various issues, especially February 1955, "Mission of the Army."

* *Army Basic Doctrine (official)*, various publications, esp. Army Field Manual 100-5; and Dept. of Army Pamphlet No. 21-70, June 1955, *The Role of the Army*.

* *The Army in the Nuclear Age* (Report of British Army League Subcommittee-London, 1955).

* *Cassibry, Col. Robert C.*, "Development of Doctrine," *Military Review*, May 1956.

* *Dupuy, R. Ernest* and *Trevor N. Dupuy*, *Military Heritage of America, N.Y.*, McGraw-Hill, 1956.

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Kaufmann, William *et al.* *Military Policy and National Security*.

Kissinger, Henry A., "Military Policy and Defense of the Grey Areas," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1955.

Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, N.Y., 1957.

Leviero, Anthony, "Army's Case Against Fortress America" *Reporter*, Sept. 6, 1956.

Magathan, Wallace C., "In Defense of the Army," *Military Review*, April 1956, v. 36, pp. 3-12.

Millis, *Arms and Men*, N.Y., 1956.

Osgood, Robert Endicott, *Limited War*, Chicago, 1957.

Parsons, Nils A., *Guided Missiles in War and Peace*, Ch. 9 (*Guided Missiles in Land Warfare*).

Phillips, Thomas R., "Our Point of No Return," *Reporter*, Feb. 24, 1955.

*The Role of the Army* (official document).

** Ransom, Harry H., "General Ridgway's Farewell Letter," Harvard DPS Serial No. 41.

Ransom, Harry H., "The Continuing Debate," *Military Review*, April 1956.

Ridgway, Gen. M.B., *Soldier*, Chs. 35-38.

*The Security of the Nation*, Association of U.S. Army. Washington (1957).

Senate Armed Services, Subcommittee(Symington) on Air Force, *Study of Airpower Hearings*, Part XVII, Washington 1956.

Train, Brig. Gen. William F., "The Tactical Side of Atomic Warfare." *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Feb. 1955. (See also various issues of this *Bulletin*, one of the best sources for modern strategic thought).

## 7. The Armed Services -- THE NAVY.

Separated from allies and enemies, potential and real, by vast expanses of water, the United States traditionally has regarded the Navy as the "first line of defense." Half way around the world from raw materials vital to our economy and security, the United States long has needed an instrument of force to command access to necessary sea lanes. "Command of the sea" is primarily the function of the Navy. But with the advent of the airplane, the submarine, and nuclear power, this function has, in a sense, become tri-dimensional. And with the advent of airpower, a separate United States Air Force and nuclear weapons has come a host of jurisdictional problems and issues.

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Control of the seas today requires the control of the air over them as well as control of the sub-surface threat. The Navy's primary "weapons system" for sea control is the aircraft carrier. With these huge and costly devices the Navy plans to maintain use of the seas "for our purposes and in case of war deny their use to any enemy." Like the Army, the Navy claims to maintain a deterrent force for big or "little" wars, its big carrier task forces and ready Marine Corps capable of covering the whole spectrum of military force -- from "showing the flag" at propitious times to a nuclear bombing capability. Navy plans for 1958 call for a Navy strength of 675,000 and 200,000 marines; about 1,000 ships and 10,000 planes; cost, about $10.5 billions. The Navy points to a Sino-Soviet intention of isolating the U.S. politically and militarily and calls attention to a growing Soviet Navy, "second only to that of the U.S." The heart of the Navy's plan to combat this is the 15-carrier "weapons systems," gradually phasing in nuclear-powered carriers, beginning in 1961. The Navy's organization, role and doctrine is built around the carrier program. This discussion will center on the question of the utility of presently-constituted Naval forces as instruments of national policy.

**Readings:** (NOTE: Basic readings are suggested in bibliography. Harvard DPS Serial No. 78 cited below under Mason.)

Carney, Adm. Robert B., "Principles of Sea Power", *USNI Proceedings*, September, 1955.

Corbett, Sir Julian S., *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, N.Y. & London, 1938.

Hellmer, Maurice H., "Sea Power and the Struggle for Asia," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1956.

Hayes, Capt. John D., "Peripheral Strategy: Mahan's Theory Today," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Dec. 1953.

Huntington, Samuel P., "National Policy and Trans-Oceanic Navy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1954.

**Mason, Bayley F., "The Composition and Role of the Navy" Harvard Defense Policy Serial No. 78, (with bibliography).

Smith, James H., "Mobile Sea Base Systems in Nuclear Warfare," *USNI Proceedings*, February 1955.

(See various issues of *USNI Proceedings*, issued monthly.)

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8. The Armed Services -- THE AIR FORCE.

"Operating in the medium of space, unrestricted by the definitive boundaries of land or sea," says Air Force basic doctrine, "air forces are inherently capable of operating anywhere and at any time." Another fundamental precept of the Air Force is that "an in being air/atomic strength is the most effective deterrent to Communist exploitation of their military might."(Secretary Quarles, February 20, 1957) Since the advent of the military airplane in World War I, the more extreme advocates of air power -- the Billy Mitchells and Severskys -- have claimed that air power could deter or win wars, with little need for, or help from, armies and navies. Responsible leaders of the U.S. Air Force today make no such claims. Yet official Air Force doctrine states, "With air forces and modern weapons systems avialable, it no longer is necessary to defeat opposing armed forces as a prerequisite to conducting major operations directly against an opponent either in his sovereign territory or in any other locality." The threat and capability of strategic bombing are at the heart of the Air Force role, organization and doctrine with attention also given to air defense, tactical operations and troop transport. Air Force doctrine regards aviation as the "dominant military means of exercising the initiative and gaining decisions in all forms of international relations, including full peace, cold war, limited wars of all types, and total war." The 1958 Air Force program calls for a total of 128 wings- 45 Strategic, 32 Air Defense, and 51 Tactical, with troop carrier forces included in the latter category. The cost will be about $17.7 billions. Discussion will center upon two overriding issues: (1) What is the capability of the U.S. Air Force vis a vis the Soviet Air Force? (2) How effective is our Air Force as an instrument of national policy?

Readings:

U.S. Air Force Basic Doctrine, AFM 1-2, April 1, 1955.

Air University, Readings on the Functions of Military Air Power, Documentary Research Division, Research Studies Institute, 1957.

Air Power, Report of the (Symington) Senate Subcommittee on the Air Force, Armed Services Committee, 85th Cong. 1st Sess., Doc. No. 29, Washington, February 1957.

Anderson, Maj. Gen. Orvil A., "Air Warfare and Morality," Air University Quarterly Review, Vol. 3, Winter 1949.

Brodie, Bernard, "Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine," World Politics, April 1953.

Doolittle, James H., "Airpower vs. the Dead Hand of Tradition," Air Force, Vol. 35, Oct. 1952.

Various writings of Douhet, Mitchell, Trenchard, Slessor, Possony, De Seversky, Asher Lee, Dale O. Smith.

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Emme, Eugene M., "Some Fallacies Concerning Air Power," *Annals*, May 1955.

Fitzwater, Col. John T., "Air Force and the Totality of War," *Air University Quarterly Review*, Fall, 1952.

Healy, Lt. Col. John P., "Air Power and Foreign Policy," *Air University Quarterly Review*, Vol. 2, Fall, 1948, pp. 15-26.

Kuter, Gen. Laurence S., "An Air Perspective in the Jetomic Age," *Air University Quarterly Review*, Spring 1956.

Leach, W. Barton, *The New Look*, news articles, editorials and speeches in cooperation with Air Command and Staff College, October 1954.

Leach, W. Barton, "Obstacles to the Development of American Air Power," *The Annals*, May 1955.

Lee, Asher, *Air Power* (also books on Soviet and German Air Power.)

Ransom, Harry H., "Trenchard - Architect of Air Power," *Air University Quarterly Review*, Summer 1956.

Richardson, Robert C. III, "Atomic Weapons and Theater Warfare," *Air University Quarterly Review*, Winter, 1954-55.

Slessor, Sir John, "Air Power and World Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1954.

Slessor, Sir John, "Place of the Bomber in British Policy," *International Affairs*, July 1953.

Smith, Dale O., *U.S. Military Doctrine*, esp. Chps. 5-8.

Tedder, Arthur W., *Air Power in War*, London: Hodder, 1953.

Vines, Major S., "Air Power: The Political Aspect," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, V. 98, Nov. 1953, pp. 594-596.

Wermuth, Lt. Col. Anthony, "Twelve Myths About Air Power," *Harpers*, June, 1956.

(See various issues, *Air Force* magazine, issued monthly.)

## 9. United States National Strategy and Military Doctrine.

**National Strategy:** The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation, during peace and during war, to afford the maximum support to national policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. *

United States strategy is based upon the assumption that the two major Communist Powers, Russian and Chinese, are aggressive and expansionist and will use military force as a major instrument

* From *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage*, Washington, Depts. of Army, Navy, Air Force. May, 1955. The adequacy of this definition is debatable.

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of attaining objectives. Our strategy also assumes that it is
in the vital interest of American security to check these expansionist
goals in almost all parts of the globe. Our national strategy is
therefore designed to "stabilize" the world power balance by
programs of "deterrence", "containment", including specifically
military and economic measures to bolster by a system of collective
security the defensive capabilities among non-Communist nations.
We have established an elaborate set of sub-strategies to achieve
the goal of world stability. These reflect the military doctrine
of the several armed services. Military doctrine is thus embodied
in the various strategic war plans. Yet it remains an interesting
question whether a "U.S. military doctrine" in fact exists. A
dynamic world politics, an accelerating technology which produces
tradition-shattering weapons, and progress in economics and weaponry
of the Soviets raise questions about the adequacy of current
strategy and the implicit military doctrine. This discussion will
center on questions of strategy and doctrine, including these:
Are weapons still the servant of policy or vice versa? Are current
strategy, and the doctrine and capability of implementing forces,
attuned to political and technological realities?

Readings:

United States Army, Navy, Air Force Basic Doctrine. See
Readings under Army, Navy, Air Force.

Brodie, Bernard, "Nuclear Weapons and Changing Strategic
Outlooks," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1957.

Brodie, Bernard, "Strategy as a Science," *World Politics*,
July 1949.

Brodie, Bernard, "Strategy Hits a Dead End," *Harpers*, Oct. 1955.

Earle, Edward Meade (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1943.

Eisenhower, President, "Major National Security," portions
of President's Budget Message for Fiscal Year 1958.

Haines, Charles Grove(ed.), *Threat of Soviet Imperialism*,
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954.

Huntington, Samuel P., "To Choose Peace or War," *United States
Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1957.

Kaufmann, William (ed.) *Military Policy and National Security*.

Kissinger, Henry A., *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*,
N.Y., 1957.

Millis, Walter, *Arms and Men*, N.Y., G.P. Putnam's Sons (1956).

Nitze, Paul, "Atoms, Strategy and Peace," *Foreign Affairs*,
January 1956.

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Osgood, Robert E., *Limited War*, Chicago, 1957.

Ransom, Harry H., "Scientific Manpower and National Strategy," *Military Review*, December 1956.

Reinhardt, Col. George C., "Air Power Needs Its Mahan," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 78, April 1952, 363-367.

Reinhardt, George C., *American Strategy in the Atomic Age*, University of Oklahoma Press, 1955.

Roberts, Henry L., *Russia and America*.

Roussel, Col. Royal H., USAF, "The Air Force Doctrinal Manuals," *Air University Quarterly Review*, Vol. 7, Spring 1954, 126-131.

Royal Institute for International Affairs, (Chatham House Study Group) *On Limiting Atomic War*, London, New York [1956] 46 p.

** Slessor, Sir John, "Strategy for the West — A 1957 Re-Appraisal," Harvard DPS Serial No. 108.

** Slessor, Sir John, "Total or Limited War," Harvard DPS Serial No. 107.

## 10. Science, Technology and Modern War.

Previous discussions have indicated that an issue underlying most of the debates over military strategy, forces and weapons is how to assess the impact of technology upon modern warfare. The destructive potentialities of the hardware of warfare emanating from scientific "progress" raise continually the question of the utility of these weapons as instruments of national policy. At the highest levels of national policy this question concerns decision makers. At lower, operating levels, planners, programmers and operators are struggling with the problems of accommodating today's technological changes with yesterday's concepts and organization. Organization and doctrine historically have tended to lag behind technology. The dangers of falling behind in the armament race with our chief potential adversary are real if the proper organization and attitude — civilian and military — do not exist towards radically new weapons systems. History tends to be discouraging in this regard.

In analyzing the relationship, historically, between technological change and the development of modern warfare, several related topics must be considered: (1) effects on military doctrine of weapons produced by an accelerating technology (2) effects upon grand strategy of science, technology and resultant changes in weapons systems (3) and consequences of scientific and technological changes upon governmental organization as well as upon national politico-military policies. This discussion will include these questions: What are the lessons from history regarding technoligical impact upon military strategy and doctrine? Do military institutions adapt themselves adequately and quickly to modern weaponry?

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**Readings:** (NOTE: A well-developed bibliography, largely the work of Asst. Prof. William R. Emerson, Yale University, is appended to Harvard DPS Serial No. 39, cited below under Ransom.)

Aron, Raymond, *The Century of Total War*, N.Y., Doubleday, 1954. (Available in Boston, Beacon Press edition, at $1.50, 1955.)

Brodie, Bernard, "Strategy vs. Tactics in the Nuclear Age," in *Brassey's Annual*, N.Y., MacMillan, 1956, (Ch. 14).

Bush, Vannevar, *Modern Arms and Free Men*, N.Y., Simon Schuster, 1949.

Falls, Cyril, *A Hundred Years of War 1855-1954*, 1953.

Fuller, J.F.C., *Armament and History*, 1933.

Millis, Walter, *Arms and Men*, N.Y., Putnam, 1956.

Price, Don, K., *Government and Science*, N.Y., N.Y.U. Press, 1954.

** Ransom, Harry H. (comp.) "Science, Technology and Modern War," Harvard DPS Serial No. 39, (1955), with *bibliography*.

** Ransom, Harry H., "U.S. Military Research and Development," Harvard DPS Serial No. 105 (1957).

"Science and Military Strategy," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, v. 12, May 1956, (entire edition, various authors).

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer*, (Transcript of Hearing) April-May, 1954, Washington, G.P.O., 1954.

## 11. The Concept of Civilian Supremacy in Military Affairs.

The theory and practice of civil-military relations in the United States are subjects for never-ending discussion. One theorist, Samuel P. Huntington, argues that the United States Constitution"does not provide for civilian control. . . . it does not permit the objective civilian control compatible with a high level of military professionalism." Huntington further argues, in his *The Soldier and the State*, that the "only theory of civil-military relations which has had any widespread acceptance in the United States is a confused and unsystematic set of assumptions and beliefs derived from the underlying premises of American liberalism," Another observer of military affairs, Walter Millis, retorts that Huntington's concepts "both of 'liberalism' and of 'military professionalism' just do not seem to me to correspond to the realities of American life as I have been able to follow them."

Yet Millis develops no theory of his own. What are these concepts at issue here? Precisely what are the prevailing "realities" and "theories" of civil-military relations? The common concept of civilian control seems to be this: a governmental system in which clear distinctions are made between political and military authority and responsibility, with military authority subordinate to that of

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those who hold office by popular consent. Basic to an understanding of this problem is the question of the nature of the military function in government. Where does this function end and the political jurisdiction begin? Our discussion will center upon this question and upon the search for useful criteria for ascertaining proper civil-military balance.

Readings:

Anon., "The U.S. Military Mind," *Fortune*, February 1952.

** Ballard, John (ed.), "The Job Concept of the Civilian Secretary," Harvard DPS Serial No. 93, with *bibliography*.

Donovan, Robert, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story*, N.Y., Harpers, 1956. Esp. pp. 51-54, 64-72 and Ch. 24.

Dulles, John Foster, *War or Peace*, N.Y., 1950.

Fox, William T.R., "Civilians, Soldiers, and American Military Policy," *World Politics*, April, 1955; see also his SSRC Bibliography *Civil-Military Relations*. N.Y., Columbia, 1954.

** Harvard Defense Policy Serial No. 90, "Readings on Theory and Concept of Civilian Control."

Herring, Pendleton, *The Impact of War*, N.Y., 1941.

Huntington, Samuel P., *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957.

Kerwin, Jerome E., (ed.), *Civil-Military Relations in American Life*, 1948.

Kingston-McCloughry, E.J., *Direction of War, Chaps. XI through XIII*, N.Y., F.A. Praeger, [1955].

** Leach, W. Barton, "The Job of the Service Secretary," Harvard DPS Serial No. 103.

Leach, W. Barton, "Midway," *Public Policy*, (Harvard University Graduate School of Public Administration), Cambridge, Mass., 1956.

Mansfield, Sen. Mike, "The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy," *Congressional Record* (Febraury 21, 1955, daily edition) pp. A1091-A1093.

Marshall, George B., "Present Day Relationships Between Military Powers and Civilian Authority," *Department of State Bulletin*, 27: 348-352(Sept. 8, 1952).

Masland, John W. and Laurence I. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and Public Policy*, Princeton University Press, 1957.

Millis, Walter(ed.) *The Forrestal Diaries*, N.Y., 1952.

Mills, C. Wright, *Power Elite*. esp. Chaps. 8, 9, 10-12.

** Ransom, Harry H., (ed.) "Military Policy and Civilian Control," Harvard Defense Policy Serial No. 51.

Ridgway, Gen. Matthew B., *Soldier*, esp. Chaps. 31, 33, 34 and pp. 330-332, N.Y., Harper [1956].

Rogers, Lindsay, "Our Brass-Bound Foreign Policy," *The Reporter*, Oct. 28, 1952.

Sapin, and Snyder, *The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy*.

Smith, Louis, *American Democracy and Military Power*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951.

Stimson, Henry L., and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service*. N.Y., Harpers, 1948.

Vagts, Alfred, *A History of Militarism*, N.Y., Norton, 1937; also *Defense and Diplomacy*, N.Y., King's Crown, 1956.

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### III ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS AND ISSUES OF MILITARY DEFENSE

#### 12. The Military Budget: Economics of National Defense.

How much can the nation afford to spend for military defense? The stage in the decision making process at which this question is answered is a most crucial one. Its answer is derived from a complex set of factors which may be grouped into two usually antithetical categories: military requirements vs. fiscal ceilings. Into the military "requirements" category go a mixture of national objectives, commitments, strategic plans and assumptions, comparative estimates of U.S.-U.S.S.R. military capabilities, and previous programs, normally calculated with one eye on assumed or known "ceilings." In the fiscal "ceilings" category are found most of the elements of the other category, but with greater attention to the national economic picture, the total government expenditures program, and assumptions about political as well as economic facts of life. Certainly there is a dynamic inter-relationship between requirements and ceilings in the decision process. Congressmen and Pentagon witnesses before their committees can always be found paying lip service to two major threats — the Communist military threat and the domestic economic "threat" of heavy defense spending to the national economy and tax program. How do we balance defense needs against fiscal requirements? A simplified version of alternatives has been given in the Symington Subcommittee Report (Airpower, Jan. 25, 1957):

"One way is to ascertain defense needs and then see if the funds can be made available to meet them. The other is to predetermine, as a matter of fiscal policy, a dollar limit for defense expenditures; and thereupon refuse to satisfy any defense needs that cannot be compressed within that limit." This discussion will center upon a questioning of whether these, in fact, are the "two ways" of balancing fiscal needs with defense requirements.

**Readings:**

** Keesing, Donald B., (comp.) "Problems in the Budgetary Process," Harvard DPS Serial No. 96 (1956), with bibliography.

** Leach, W. Barton, (comp.) "The Air Force and the Budget-How to Question the Adequacy of the Budget," Harvard DPS Serial No. 96(1956).

Lincoln, Colonel George A., et. al. The Economics of National Defense, N.Y., Prentice Hall, 1954.

Mosher, Frederick C. Program Budgeting: Theory and Practice, Chicago, Public Administration Service, 1954.

** Ransom, Harry H., (comp.) "The Budgetary Process and Defense Policy," Harvard DPS Serial No. 31 (1955), with bibliography.

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Smithies, Arthur, *The Budgetary Process in the United States*, N.Y., McGraw-Hill, 1955.

U.S. Senate, Armed Services Subcommittee (Symington) on the Air Force, *Study of Airpower*, Hearings and Report. Check Index (pp. 1869-70) for items relating to budgets and fiscal ceilings.

(See also *Economic Report of the President*, various years; *Report*, of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Economic Report, various years; *Budget Message of the President*, issued annually in January, along with the President's Budget for the coming fiscal year; *Hearings* of the Congressional subcommittees on defense appropriations and their *Reports*; and also special reports and studies of the National Planning Association, Hoover Commissions, and studies of private research groups and organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.)

## 13. The Military Budget: the Budgetary Process.

The annual defense budget embodies the President's program for national military security. Not only is the budget the regulator of the national program for military strength, it is also the most effective tool for planning, programming and administration. The military budget, and the process of its creation, is at the heart of defense policy and administration. The budget and the budgetary process should provide the means by which the President, his Secretary of Defense and other Executive agents, can review control and unify national security programs and keep them attuned to national policy. The budget and appropriations process should serve Congress as instruments of popular control over national policy and programs. Budgeting should provide bases for rational choice in relation to the objectives of national military policy. This discussion will center upon an analysis of the process of military budgeting with reference to the theoretical purpose and function of budgeting. The following questions will be included in the discussion: (1) Does the present budget process provide the essentials for rational choice in terms of objectives? (2) Does the process serve as the most efficient instrument of planning, programming, review and control? (3) What steps can be taken to improve the budget process so that it may serve better to produce military economy, effectiveness, and rational choice.

**Readings:** (NOTE: Readings are the same as those indicated under 12, above; special attention is again called to the bibliographies in the readings by Keesing and Ransom cited above.)

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14. Strategic Intelligence: the role of the intelligence community.

The strategic intelligence ingredient is vital to the successful and effective use of all the major instruments of national policy -- diplomacy, economic "warfare", military force, or psychological warfare. Adequate foreign intelligence is a key to success in the Cold War. Consequently, the national intelligence community has assumed an increasingly important status in the planning, programming and operations for military defense. An accelerating technology which has compressed time and space and equipped antagonistic world powers with mega-death weapons has created an urgent need for accurate information on almost all aspects of world affairs. At every level of the structure for national decision making, the intelligence estimate is a prime requisite. The role and goal of intelligence is to provide decision makers with the best possible foreknowledge of capabilities and intentions of foreign powers. To supply this a national intelligence community of great size and complex structure has evolved in the decade since World War II. At the apex of this community is the Central Intelligence Agency, an organization shrouded in secrecy but with generally known structure and functions. This discussion will center upon a general description of the intelligence community, the major elements in the intelligence process, the issue of Congressional surveillance, and major problems of organization, procedure and performance. Major questions include the following: (1) What are the potentialities and limitations of national intelligence estimates? (2) Is intelligence a distinct function to be separated from overall decision making and then fed back into the decision making process? (3) How best can be compromised the intelligence needs of individual agencies of government versus the need for centralized intelligence?

**Readings:** (NOTE: a detailed and annotated bibliography is appended to Harvard Defense Policy Serial No. 102, cited below under Ransom.)

Hilsman, Roger, *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1956.

Kent, Sherman, *Strategic Intelligence*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951.

** Leach, W. Barton, William C. Wiseley, et. al. "Fact Finding and Analytical Facilities Available to Policy Makers in the Defense Establishment," Harvard DPS Serial No. 106.

Pettee, George S., *The Future of American Secret Intelligence*, Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1946.

Platt, Washington, *Strategic Intelligence Production*, N.Y., Praeger, 1957.

** Ransom, Harry H., and Bayley F. Mason, "Strategic Intelligence and Defense Policy," Harvard DPS Serial No. 102, *with bibliography*.

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The public information function is a problem peculiarly acute within the Department of Defense. Spending two-thirds of the national budget and employing three-fourths of the government's personnel, the military defense program has profound influence upon the lives of millions of Americans, upon the industrial and scientific community, indeed upon the sum of American society. Moreover, in order that Congress play an active and meaningful role in military policy making, its membership must be informed of details in recommended policies and programs. Democratic government can be debilitated if those who control the Executive Branch enshroud its operations behind a "paper curtain", just as scientific and military progress can be suffocated by rigid compartmenting of information. But there is a parallel danger, namely in disclosing to a potential enemy, openly or inadvertently, information which may enable him to surpass us or surprise us with modern instruments of force. The problem, then, is to make a distinction between information rightly belonging to every man and information which for every man's safety and security must be protected. Balancing these often conflicting needs is the basic problem of public information policy and administration. This discussion will center upon the Defense Department policy and organizational attempts to achieve this balance; upon problems and issues involved in fulfilling the "positive" (or propaganda) informational function; upon the proper limits of disclosure to Congress and the public; and upon the problem of "freedom of speech" by military officers representing the armed services before Congressional committees and the public.

Readings:

American Civil Liberties Union, *The Denial to the American Press of Access to Information in the Federal Government*, Report by Allen Raymond, N.Y., November 1955.

** Berry, Robert W., (comp.) "The Press and the Pentagon," Harvard DPS Serial No. 50, (1955).

Binder, Carroll, "Secrecy vs. Security in a Free Society," *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, June 4, 1955, (Vol. 57) pp. 666ff.

Cutler, Hon. Robert, "The Seamless Web," *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, June 4, 1955 (Vol. 57), pp. 663 ff.

Denfeld, Adm. Louis E., "Why I Was Fired," *Collier's*, CXXV, March 25, 1950, p. 47 ff.

Katzenbach, Edward L. Jr., "Should Our Military Leaders Speak Up?" *New York Times Magazine*, April 15, 1956.

** Ransom, Harry H., (ed.), "Defense Policy and Public Information," Harvard DPS Serial No. 100.

U.S. Congress, *House Government Operations Subcommittee On Information, Availability of Information From Federal Departments and Agencies*, various Hearings & Reports, esp. Part 8, "Department of Defense," (March, 1957)

Wiggins, J. Russell, *Freedom or Secrecy*, N.Y., Oxford, 1956.

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The government's organization for military research and development has been in a state of flux since World War II. The structure seems continually to change -- only a few months ago (1957) there was an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development; this office no longer exists. A new office, designated ASD for Research and Engineering has been established. With all the changes in structure, certain basic problems and issues remain. The area of research and development is a critical battlefield on which national security may be won or lost. The structural and functional arrangements which tend to govern the relationships between science and weaponry and between scientists and military planners and operators confront us with vital public administration problems. A close and effective liaison between the scientific and military communities is a prime requisite for effective defense policy and programs. This discussion will include consideration of the following basic problems: (1) How best can be organized the machinery for advice from scientists to defense decision makers? (2) What are the best administrative arrangements to overcome organizational conservatism and traditional resistance to radically new weapons systems? (3) How can the proper balance be decided upon and achieved between research for specific military needs and "basic" research? (4) How best can be coordinated research efforts and national objectives? (5) What are the most feasible administrative devices for smooth relationships between scientists and soldiers?

*Readings:* (NOTE: Many of the readings under Section 10 are also appropriate for this section.)

*An Air Power Bibliography*, Air University, (Research Studies Institute), March 1956. (Section on "Research and Development," pp. 117-121.)

Army Library, Research and Development (And Related Aspects) in Foreign Countries. Special Bibliography No. 8, 21 August 1956, Part A.

Army Library, Research and Development (And Related Aspects) in Foreign Countries. Special Bibliography No. 8, 12 Sept. 1956, Part B.

Brewer, Cary F., *Science and Defense*, Harvard Ph.D. dissertation, 1956.

Defense Department, "Leading Patron of the Sciences," *Business Week*, Jan. 12, 1957: 96-104.

Dupree, A. Hunter, *Science and Federal Government*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Feb. 21, 1957.

Hoover Commission Reports, 1955.

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Research and Development Within the Department of Defense. 21 October 1953. L54-46.

*Organization of the Federal Government for Scientific Activities*, National Science Foundation. Washington, 1956.

Price, Don K., *Government and Science*, N.Y., 1954.

** Ransom, Harry H., "U.S. Military Research and Development -- Organization and Mission," Harvard DPS Serial No. 105.

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Organization and Administration of the Military Research and Development Programs. Hearings and Report, 1954.

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By far the largest amount of activity of civilians within the Defense Establishment is in the area of **logistics**. This word, originally limited in meaning to "quartering, supplying and transporting troops" is now used to cover the wide area of management of ** materiel, personnel, facilities and services**, as well as the planning of any of these activities. The logistics process involves the ways in which military force (weapons, equipment, manpower) are procured, made ready, transported, supplied, served and maintained. Clearly such activities are intertwined with national objectives and with strategy and tactics. The **support** of capability for military operations becomes one of the most vital links in the chain of national security. And although less romantic than questions of strategy and tactics, the logistics capability of a nation may provide the difference between failure and success in the pursuit of national objectives. There are important interconnections between logistics capability and national strategic objectives, development of weapons systems, and ability to execute in timely fashion national security programs. This discussion will center upon specific and concrete problems in the broad logistics area. Possible subjects and questions include: (1) What is the national "strategic mobility" capability? (2) How much "unification" should there be in military procurement? (3) What is the nation's military air transport capability? (4) What is the state of military logistics doctrine today? (5) Is the defense establishment best organized to achieve timely and realistic military procurement integrated with national policy and resources and objectives?

**Readings:** (NOTE: A more specific reading list will be issued when the specific topic for discussion has been selected.)

Army Department, National Defense Review, Sept., 1955, Vol. 17, No. 3, (Section on "Logistics", pp. 24-29.) Also sections on "Logistics" in the following issues of National Defense Review, (Washington, Army Library Library): Jan. 1956, pp. 23-29; July/August 1955, pp. 26-30; Jan. 1953, pp. 28-30.

Ballantine, Duncan S., U.S. Naval Logistics in World War II, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947.

Carter, Rear Admiral Worrall Reed, USN, *Beans, Bullets and Black Oil*, U.S. GPO, 1953.

Hayes, John Daniel, "A World with Cargo Aircraft," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 82, pp. 497-503. May 1956.

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Hoover Commission, Task Force Report on Military Procurement, 1955.

Hoover Commission Staff Study (Lindsay et. al.) "Defense Procurement: The Vital Roles of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff." [mimeographed] (1955)

Magruder, C.B.H. (Gen.), "Logistics Planning -- The Long View," *Army*, Dec. 1956.

Millett, John D., *The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces* (U.S. Army in World War II), OCMH, Dept. of Army, Washington, D.C., 1954.

Palmer, Lt. Gen. W.B., "The Evolution of Management for Logistics," *Armed Forces Management*, July 1956.

Rawlings, Gen. E.W., "Logistics and the Technological Race," *Air Force*, Sept. 1956.

Ten Eyck, John C., "Whence and Whither Logistics?" *Military Review*, Vol. 36, Sept. 1956, pp. 14-18.

** Wiseley, William C., et. al. "Military Air Transport: A Specific Problem in the Determination of Force Requirements," Harvard DPS Serial Nos. 86(1956) and 86A(Supplement,1957).

## 18. Manpower and Personnel: selected problems in human resources.

The rise of the United States to a position of world responsibility and power created military manpower problems during and since World War II which have never been adequately resolved. A national tradition of isolation, small standing armies and unwillingness to look upon force as an instrument of national policy still has impact upon national manpower policy. Now committed to a three-million man military force with higher requisite skills than ever before, we are constantly faced with the problem of manning this force-in-being. The problem is accentuated by the fact that three areas — higher education, industry and the armed forces — make simultaneous demands to an extent upon the same national manpower pool. Each of these areas is vital to national security and thus the proper management of our manpower resources is an important key to achievement of national objectives. In addition to forces-in-being, national policy also incorporates a reserve program into national plans. Discussions on the general manpower problem area will center upon specific and concrete issues to be selected later. These may include: (1) How is the Executive Branch organized for manpower policy-making? Is the organization adequate? (2) What is the nuclear age impact upon manpower requirements? (3) Is our reserve policy and program adequate? (4) What should be the future status and role of the National Guard? (5) Are adequate plans being made for scientific and engineering manpower in the future?

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Readings:

Adams, Leonard P., *Wartime Manpower Mobilization*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1951.

Fitzpatrick, Edward A., "Manpower and Atomic War," *The Annals*, November 1951, pp. 126-136.

Galloway, Eilene, *History of United States Military Policy On Reserve Forces, 1775-1957*, House Committee on Armed Services, Committee Print, (No. 17), Washington, G.P.O., February, 1957, (with bibliography).

Lincoln, Col. George A., et. al. *Economics of National Security*, N.Y., Prentice-Hall, 1954, Chs. 5 and 6.

Ransom, Harry H. "Scientific Manpower and National Security," *Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers*, November 1956.

U.S. Government, *A Program for National Security*, Report of the President's Advisory Committee on Universal Training, Washington, 1947.

National Security Training Commission, *Universal Military Training*, (A Report), Washington 1951.

National Security Training Commission, *Twentieth Century Minutemen*, Report to President, Washington, December 1, 1953.

Manpower Resources for National Security, Report to President by Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, Washington, January 6, 1954.

U.S. Congress, various hearings, reports and special studies, Committees on Armed Services, especially House Committee.

U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, *Sarnoff Commission Report*, "Manpower Utilization in the Armed Services," Washington, February 17, 1953, (Committee Print).

Although not of primary concern or responsibility in the Pentagon, the economic mobilization and civil defense functions of government are obviously integral parts of a national security program. The Federal Civil Defense Administration, an independent agency of the government, and the Office of Defense Mobilization, an adjunct of the Presidential office, are the administrative agencies for policy and programs in their respective spheres. The advent of the jet-atomic-missile age has tended to "civilianize" preparation for war as well as war itself. Thus the functions of civil defense and defense mobilization have become an increasingly important part of the national security program. Any program for national security must include planning for mobilization of the nation's total economic resources, for in the event of war the government would play a predominant role in the coordination, direction, and management of the total economy. Just so would civil defense, in the present age of "live frontiers," become in time of war a centrally directed function of government. In each of these spheres, there are numerous issues

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of policy, plans and programs. Discussion will center upon selected problems in this general area.

**Readings:** (NOTE: A list of readings will be distributed later when specific problems have been chosen for discussion. For background material, annual reports of the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator should be consulted, as well as hearings and reports of Congressional committees. In the Senate, subcommittees of the Armed Services Committee have held hearings and issued reports on the Civil Defense program in 1955 and 1956. In the House, the subject has been studied by the Government Operations and Joint Atomic Energy subcommittees. On the subject of defense mobilization, in addition to the Office of Defense Mobilization, numerous studies and reports have been issued by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. For a general consideration of civilian defense issues, see Klaus Knorr, *Passive Defense for Atomic War*, Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Memorandum No. 6, October 1, 1954. For a general treatment of economic mobilization problems see William Y. Elliott, "Mobilization Planning and National Security, 1950-1960," Public Affairs Bulletin No. 81, Library of Congress, Washington, 1950).

## 20. Collective Security: problems in coalition security systems.

Trends in military technology, and in economic and political affairs today closely link the security and prosperity of the United States with the security of other non-Soviet nations. International communism today controls vast manpower resources, has great capacity for creating weapons for mass destruction, and controls diversified staging areas for possible attack. Aware of these facts, the United States, in the decade since World War II, has become partner to an elaborate collective security system, embodying a strategy of multiple deterrents mutually reinforcing. Included in this strategy are our defense treaties with 42 other nations, and the Middle East resolution of early 1957 authorizes further extension of the area of common defense. Thus our international commitments are global in scale and collective security arrangements serve as a major foundation stone of our national defense program. In seeking to achieve our overall objective -- international peace and security -- we have recognized the needs, aside from the moral aspects of our foreign policy, of military bases to implement our strategic plans, territories for testing new weapons and for mounting radar defense facilities, as well as the manpower and materiel resources of other nations. Any collective security system involving numerous sovereign nations and super-imposed upon a complex United Nations organization is certain to experience

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at times international quarrels and complications along with
periods of mutual cooperation. This discussion will center
upon a specific problem in the field of collective security,
which may include the following questions: (1) The future
prospects of NATO. (2) The role of the United Nations in
preventing aggression and war. (3) The historical experience
of the United States with coalitions. (4) The organization,
structure and functions of the Office of Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs.

**Readings:** (NOTE: A bibliography on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is appended to the item below under Ballard.)

** Ballard, John A., (comp.) "Readings on NATO," Harvard DPS Serial No. 112, with bibliography.

Dulles, John F., "Developing NATO in Peace," Dept. of State Bulletin, April 30, 1956.

** Emerson, William R. and William C. Wiseley, (comp.) "Coalitions -- The Historical Experience," Harvard DPS Serial No. 113.

Haas, Ernest, "Types of Collective Security -- Organizational Concepts," American Political Science Review, March 1955.

Ismay, Lord, NATO:First Five Years.

Johnson, Howard, "Collective Security: Validity of an Ideal," International Organization, Vol. 8, No. 1.

Matloff and Snell, (U.S. Army in World War II) Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare.

Spaak, Paul H., "The West in Disarray," Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1957.

Thompson, Kenneth, "Collective Security Re-Examined," American Political Science Review, September 1953.

"U.S. Representation Abroad," The American Assembly, 1956.

Vagts, Alfred, Defense and Diplomacy, esp. pp. 147-163.

Wolfers, Arnold, "Collective Security and the War in Korea," Yale Review, Summer 1954.

## 21. Foreign Military Assistance: problems in foreign economic policy.

In the dozen years since World War II, United States foreign aid expenditures have totaled more than $55 billions. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957, expenditures are expected to exceed $4 billions. These amounts suggest the size and scope of our foreign aid program, and military aid has taken the largest portion of these sums. As the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in 1957: "...the military aid program is part and parcel of the U.S. Defense Department program. The expenditures abroad in support of our alliances

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do not differ in purpose, scope or objective from our own military expenditures." Yet just as there are differences of opinion on our foreign policy and military strategy, so are there differences of opinion on the foreign aid program. A certain amount of economic and military assistance to nations joined with us in collective security pacts is inescapable. But how much, what kind and to whom? Possibly the United States relies too heavily upon foreign military assistance; possibly too little. What are the military aid lessons from the events in 1956-57 in the Middle East; in Formosa? This discussion will center on these and other questions, possibly including: (1) Is our mutual security program achieving its purpose of bolstering allies and containing Communism? (2) What about aid to such nations as India, Yugoslavia, Spain, Poland? (3) Has the emphasis, up to now, favoring military aid over economic assistance been correct in view of the Soviet's new policy of promises of economic aid? (4) Does the accelerating weapons technology challenge the basic assumptions of our military aid program?

**Readings:** (NOTE: Detailed bibliographies are found in the items listed below under Keesing and Ransom.)

American Assembly, *The Representation of the United States Abroad*, Columbia University, June 1955, (papers by W.T.R. Fox, Lincoln Gordon, et. al.)

Brown, William A. and Redvers Opie, *American Foreign Assistance*, Washington, Brookings, 1953.

Elliott, William Y., (ed.) *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy*, Report, Study Group, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, N.Y., Holt, 1955.

Fox, William T.R., and William W. Marvel, Jr., *Military Assistance and the Security of the United States 1947-1956*. Issued as part of Committee Print No. 10, Senate Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, "The Military Assistance Program of the United States," Washington, G.P.O., March, 1957.

Gordon, Lincoln, (ed.) *International Stability and Progress: U.S. Interests and Instruments* (to be published in 1957).

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, *Economic Warfare - A Selected List of References*, Washington, January 1950.

**Keesing, Donald B., "Economic Warfare and National Strategy," Harvard DPS Serial No. 111, with bibliography(1957).

*Mutual Security Program, 1957, A Summary Presentation by Departments of State and Defense and International Cooperation Administration, Washington, April 1956.*

**Ransom, Harry H. "Foreign Military Assistance and National Policy: Background Materials," Harvard DPS Serial No. 114, with bibliography(1957).

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U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Policy and Mutual Security*, Report and Hearings, Oct. 9-Nov. 28, 1956, Washington 1956. (Committee Print).

U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, 1956-57. Hearings, Special Studies and Reports. 84th Congress and 85th Congress. For a listing and description of 21 separate research projects commissioned by the committee, see its *Report* (May 13, 1957, Senate Report No. 300) pp. 33-38, which also describes extensive hearings. See also the annual authorization and appropriations hearings of the Senate and House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Appropriations.

## 22. Disarmament: alternative to the arms race?

In this jet-nuclear-missile age, nothing strikes a stronger chord of hope in the heart of man than the ideal of multi-lateral, effective and foolproof disarmament. Disarmament is a magic word, but perhaps not a very useful term. It is more realistic to speak of the limitation and control of arms rather than "disarmament", for an early elimination of national armaments down to the level needed only for internal domestic order seems out of the question. Another point to underscore is that armaments are a symptom rather than a cause of international differences, although it must be granted that growing military capability can inflame suspicion and distrust among nations. The assumption of U.S. strategic planners that the Soviet Union is actively prosecuting a program of ideological and territorial expansion in which the use of military force is always a possibility makes it extremely difficult to set in motion negotiations for some degree of disarmament. Military technology and the complex international political and economic situation make disarmament at once both more difficult and more desirable than ever before. But national experience, both with disarmament schemes in the past and post-World War II dealings with the Soviet Union, has tempered hopes for armaments reduction with suspicion, doubt and cynicism. As this is written, negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on disarmament continue with somewhat more hope for success than in ten previous years. This discussion will center upon the disarmament question as it confronts national decision makers, particularly those within the Pentagon. The basic question is: What should be the reaction of Pentagon officials to the search for limitation, reduction and control of armaments?

## Readings:

Bolte, Charles, *The Price of Peace: A Plan for World Disarmament*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1956.

Cavers, David F., "The Challenge of Planning Arms Control," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1955. (See numerous other articles by this author, Associate Dean, Harvard Law School.)

Clark, Grenville and Louis B. Sohn, *Supplement to Peace Through Disarmament and Charter Revision*, Dublin, N.H., Feb. 1956.

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The Disarmament Question, British Information Services, Reference Division, I.D. 1251, September 1956.

Disarmament, Report of Arden House Conference, Dec. 14-17, 1956.

Dulles, Hon. John Foster, "The Problem of Disarmament," Dept. of State Bulletin, March 12, 1956. (See more recent press conferences, speeches, and statements of the Secretary of State. See also statements by President Eisenhower, Harold E. Stassen, et. al.)

Frye, William R., Disarmament: Atoms Into Plowshares? N.Y., Foreign Policy Association, 1955. (See numerous other articles by this writer, a leading authority on disarmament.)

Harvard University, Defense Policy Seminar, Serial No. 70(1956) Statements on disarmament by David F. Cavers, Carl J. Friedrich, W. Barton Leach, Max F. Millikan, W. W. Rostow and Louis B. Sohn, before Senate Disarmament Subcommittee, April 9, 1956.

Sohn, Louis B., World Disarmament, A Short History, 1956.

Spingarn, Jerome H., Is Disarmament Possible? N.Y., Public Affairs Pamphlets, 1956.

U.S. Congress, 84th and 85th Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament, various hearings, reports, special studies, especially staff studies Nos. 1-4; Hearings, Parts 1-12; Interim Reports, I (Sen. Rept. No. 1397) and II (Sen. Rept. No. 2829).

United Nations, Disarmament Commission, Official Records, N.Y., various issues.

Warburg, James P., Danger and Opportunity, N.Y., Current Affairs Press, 1956.

Wilcox, Francis O., The Search for Disarmament, Dept. of State Publication 6398, Washington, November 1956. (See also numerous other publications of Department of State; also Department of State Bulletin, various issues.)

and

24. Future problems in defense organization, procedures and substantive policy: the problem of synthesizing objectives, technology and organization.

The discussion in the last two meetings of the seminar will return to questions underlying all of our meetings: How can the United States use military power as a rational and effective instrument of national policy? What are the implications of modern weapons to force as a useful instrument of policy? How best do we organize our forces and higher organization for defense? How can war best be deterred? If undeterred, how can meaningful "victory" in future warfare best be attained? Can nuclear weapons be used, and yet the war be limited?

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On each of these questions it is clear that areas of disagreement and
uncertainty are large. Certainly we shall not produce the answer here
and now. Yet producing a capability for identifying and phrasing the
important questions has been a major aim of this seminar. As Secretary
of Defense Wilson stated in 1956: "...each of the armed services has
its own particular military philosophy and believes with certainty that
it knows how wars should be fought and how they best can be won." Out
of such fundamental differences come opposite views on how best to deter
war, how best to organize the defense establishment, and how to assign
properly men, money and materiel to various forces and functions. These
discussions will identify such issues and will survey the various
possible answers.

23 and 24 Readings:

(NOTE: Many of the readings listed in previous sections are obviously relevant to these discussions. The following is a general collection of materials related to current thinking on military strategy, organization and forces. To keep up to date on the literature, consult forthcoming issues of *Army*, *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, *Air Force*, *Military Review*, *Air University Quarterly Review*, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Revue Militaire Generale*, *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, as well as the more popular news and opinion journals.)

Association of the United States Army. The security of the nation.
Washington, 1957, 29 p.

Brodie, Bernard. Strategy versus tactics in a nuclear age.
Brassey's Annual, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1956. Ch. 14,
p. 144-54.

Implications of nuclear weapons in total war, The Rand Corporation: RM-1842: ASTIA Document No. AD 112401, December 17, 1956. 33 p.

Donnelly, Charles H. Current strategic thinking as to future war.
Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Washington, May, 1957,
(Mimeographed).

Finletter, Thomas K., Power and Policy. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954. 408 p.

Galloway, Eilene. Guided Missiles in Foreign Countries. Senate
Armed Services Committee, Washington, G.P.O., April, 1957, 73 p.
(Committee Print).

Kaufmann, William W., and others. Military Policy and National
Security, Princeton,N.J.,Princeton University Press, 1956. 274 p.

LeMay, Gen. Curtis E. Strategic Air Command and world peace.
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Un-American Activities. Soviet
Total War. Washington, Government Printing Office, September 23, 1956.
V. I, p. 386-390.

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Miksche, Lt. Col. F.O. Atomic weapons and armies. New York, Praeger, 1955. 222 p.

Millis, Walter. Arms and men. New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1956. 382 p.

On limiting atomic war. Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Broadwater Press Limited, 1956. 46 p.

Osgood, Robert Endicott. Limited war; The Challenge to American Strategy. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957. 315 p.

Packman, Martin. Changing defense concepts, *Editorial Research Reports*, May 15, 1957, pp. 365-382.

Reinhardt, Col. George C. American strategy in the atomic age. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1955. 236 p.

Ridgway, Gen. Matthew B., U.S.A. Ret. Soldier: The memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956. 371 p.

Skopin, V.I. Militarizm; istoricheskie ocherki. [Militarism; historical sketches] Moskow: Military Publishing House of the Soviet Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union, 1956.

Slessor, Sir John. Strategy for the West. London, Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1954. 162 p.

Smith, Brig. Gen. Dale O., USAF, U.S. Military doctrine. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1955. 256 p.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on the Air Force, Committee on Armed Services. Report, together with minority views. Document no. 29, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957. 128 p. (see also Hearings, Parts I-XXIII).

Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Control and reduction of armaments. Especially testimony of Thomas E. Murray, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956. Washington, Government Printing Office, p. 333-370.

Weyland, Gen. O.P. Tactical Air Command and peripheral war. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Un-American Activities. Soviet Total War. Washington, Government Printing Office, September 23, 1956. V. I, p. 391-394.

## Periodicals

Amster, Warren. Design for deterrence. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, May 1956: 164-65.

Aron, Raymond. Can war in the atomic age be limited? Confluence, v. 5, July 1956: 99-114.

A half century of limited war? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, April 1956: 99-104.

Atkinson, James D., The single-weapon fallacy. Army, v. 6, June 1956: 23-27.

Baldwin, Hanson W. The new face of war. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, May 1956: 153-158.

Arms and the atom. Series of 4 articles. New York Times, May 14, 1957: p. 21; May 16: p. 11; May 17: p. 2.

-36-

Brodie, Bernard. Nuclear weapons and changing strategic outlooks.
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 13, February 1957: 56-61.

Burke, Adm. Arleigh A., U.S.N. H-bomb cannot wipe out U.S. Navy.
U.S. News and World Report, v. 40, May 4, 1956: 82-90, 92.

Bush, Dr. Vannevar Bush. We're arming for the wrong war.
Nation's Business, v. 43, August 1955: 21-23.

Buzzard, Sir Anthony. The strategic issues of nuclear energy.
Atomic Scientists Journal, v. 5, July 1956: 362-69.

Massive retaliation and graduated deterrence. World
Politics, v. 8, January 1956: 228-37.

Cagle, Comdr. Malcolm W., USN. A philosophy for naval atomic
warfare. United States Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 83, March 1957:
249-58.

The case of tactical atomic weapons. Army, v. 6, March 1956: 24-25.

Coblentz, Stanton A. H-Bombs: new Maginot line. The Christian
Century, v. 73, November 28, 1956: 1386-87.

Crosbie, Squadron Leader Michael, RAF. The deterrent: defense
or delusion? Air Force Magazine, v. 40, March 1957: 65-66,69.

DeWeerd, H.A. The case for weapons limitation. Army, v. 7,
February 1957: 23-27.

Dulles, John Foster. Policy for security and peace. Foreign
Affairs, v. 32, April 1954: 353-64.

Eisenhower, President Dwight D. Message to Congress asking
authorization for U.S. economic program and for resolution on
Communist aggression in Middle East, January 5, 1957. Department
of State Bulletin, v. 36, January 21, 1957: 83-87.

Ernle-Erle-Drax, Adm. Sir Reginald. World War III, some pros
and cons. Journal, Royal United Service Institution, v. 100, May
1955: 218-28.

Frye, William R. The disarmament dilemma. Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, v. 12, March 1956: 81-83.

Fuller, Maj. Gen. J.F.C. The changing face of war. Ordnance,
v. 41, March-April 1957: 772-75.

Gallois, Pierre. The policy and strategy of Air-Nuclear weapons.
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, June 1956: 202-207.

Graduated deterrence? The Economist, v. 177, November 5, 1955:
457-58.

Gunther, Hans Karl. Pacifism and the atomic bomb. National Review,
v. 3, March 2, 1957: 205-6.

Healey, Denis. Can warfare be limited? The Manchester Guardian
Weekly, v. 74, January 19, 1956: 3.

Henn, Lt. Comdr. Carl L. Jr., (SC) USN. Sustaining an air-atomic
navy. United States Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 83, May 1957:
471-78.

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Hoag, Malcolm W. Is "dual" preparedness more expensive? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 13, February 1957: 48-51.

Hodes, H.I., The role of ground forces in the atomic age, Revue Militaire Generale, (Paris), Feb. 1957.

Huntington, Samuel P., To choose peace or war. United States Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 83, April 1957: 359-69.

Inglis, David. Armament decision in a democracy. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, October 1956: 284-86.

Interavia Study Group. Little wars need big battalions. Interavia, v. 11, October 1956: 773-776.

Jackson, Senator Henry M. The increasing threat of ballistic missiles. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, March 1956:90-92.

Katzenbach, Edward L., Jr. The military lessons of Suez. The Reporter, November 29, 1956: 11-13.

King, James E. Jr. Nuclear plenty and limited war. Foreign Affairs, v. 35, January 1957: 238-56.

Kissinger, Henry A. Military policy and defense of the "grey areas". Foreign Affairs, v. 33, April 1955: 416-28.

____ Force and diplomacy in the nuclear age. Foreign Affairs, v. 34, April 1956: 349-66.

____ Strategy and organization. Foreign Affairs, v. 35, April 1957: 380-94.

Leach, W. Barton. American problems of forces and organization. Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Feb. 1957: 29-43.

Leghorn, Richard S. No need to bomb cities to win war. U.S. News and World Report, v. 38, January 28, 1955: 78-94.

LeMay, Gen. Curtis E. What 35 billions a year buys in defense for U.S. U.S. News and World Report. v. 40, January 6, 1956.

Leviero, Anthony. The Army's case against fortress America. The Reporter, September 6, 1956: 24-30.

Liddell Hart, B.H. Military strategy vs. common sense. The Saturday Review, March 3, 1956: 7-8, 45-49.

Lincoln, G.A., and Amos A. Jordan, Jr. Technology and the changing nature of general war. Military Review, v. 37, May 1957: 3-13.

Lowenthal, Richard. The H-Bomb: massive retaliation or graduated deterrence? International Affairs, v. 32, April 1956: 162-65.

Meier, R.L. Beyond atomic stalemate. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, May 1956: 147-152.

Military Tasks - Military Services, series of articles by W. Barton Leach, Albert P. Sights and Wendall E. Carter, Air University Quarterly Review, v. 9 (Winter, 1956-57).

Millis, Walter. Utimate weapons -- ultimate questions. New York Times Magazine, April 14, 1957: 9, 67-70.

Montgomery, Field-Marshall The Viscount of Alamein. Organization for war in modern times (lecture). Journal, Royal United Service Organization, v. C, November 1955: 509-31.

-38-

Morgenthau, Hans J. Has atomic war really become impossible?

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, January 1956: 7-9.

Murray, Thomas E. Reliance on H-bomb and its dangers. Life, v. 42, May 6, 1957: p. 181.

Nicholas, Col. Jack D., USAF. The element of surprise in modern warfare. Air University Quarterly Review, v. 8, Summer 1956: 3-20.

Nitze, Paul H. Atoms, strategy and policy. Foreign Affairs, v. 34, January 1956: 187-98.

Norris, John G., Series of 5 articles in Washington Post: The nation lacks a fire brigade. September 30-Oct. 4, 1956.

Norstad, General Lauris. A warning to Russia: "We are not bluffing" [Interviews] U.S. News and World Report, November 30, 1956: 30-32, 35.

Parsons, Dr. Edgar A. Must our cities be battlefields? Marine Corps Gazette, v. 41, May 1957: 48-53.

Pergent, J. Les principales conceptions strategiques atomiques. Revue de Defense, Nationale (Paris), March 1956: 2-6.

Rabinowitch, Eugene. Ten years that changed the world. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, January 1956: 306-20.

Science and military strategy (ed.) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, May 1956: 138-39.

Ransom, Harry H., The continuing debate, Military Review, April 1956, 24-32.

U.S. defense organization - retrospect and prospect. Revue Militaire Generale. Paris, 1957.

Richardson, Col. Robert E., III, USAF, Atomic weapons and theater warfare; Parts I and II. Air University Quarterly Review, v. 7; Winter 1954-55: 3-24. Parts III and IV, Air University Quarterly Review, v. 7, Spring 1955: 91-117.

Sherwin, C.W. Securing peace through military technology. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, May 1956: 159-164.

Simpson, Col. O.R. Limited war. Marine Corps Gazette, v. 41, March 1957: 34-38.

Slessor, Sir John. The great deterrent and its limitations. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, May 1956: 158-162.

The H-bomb: massive retaliation or graduated deterrence? International Affairs, v. 32, April 1956: 158-162.

Spaak, Paul-Henri. The atom bomb and NATO. Foreign Affairs, v. 33, April 1955: 353-39.

Speier, Hans. Soviet atomic blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance, World Politics, v. 49, April 1957: 307-28.

Sulzberger, C.L. Foreign Affairs - should all our nuclear eggs be in one basket? New York Times, November 26, 1956: p. 26.

Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D. The atomic army [interview]. U.S. News and World Report, February 3, 1956: 64-73.

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Teller, Dr. Edward. Key to military power: extreme mobility and dispersion. Army, v. 7, December 1956: 63-64.

______ The nature of nuclear warfare. Air Force Magazine, v. 40, January 1957: 43-47.

Underhill, Garrett. The Army's case against itself, Esquire, v. 47, May 1957: 48-50, 99-100.

Wentworth, W.C. Winning the broken-back war. Air Force Magazine, v. 37, December 1954: 25-29.

Wermuth, Col. Anthony L. Ready - but not eager. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, September 1956: 278-79.

Wolfers, Arnold. Could a war in Europe be limited? Yale Review, v. 45, winter 1956: 214-228.

Wynne, Lt. Col. Edward P. The case for non-nuclear weapons. Air Force Magazine, v. 40, February 1957: 78, 81.

Zhukov, Marshal Georgi K. Speech on western policy and Soviet-armed forces. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v. 8, April 18, 1956: 10-11, 37.

Harry H. Ransom

May 27, 1957.

* * * * *

## Appendix V.

### History 138b: The Emergence of the United States as a World Military Power.

### Reading List and Sample Examination.

#### I

History 138b is a middle-group history course surveying the politico-military experience of the 20th Century with special emphasis upon America's role in these events.

For undergraduates a course in modern European or American history is a pre-requisite except by special permission of the instructor. All undergraduates requiring such permission are requested to speak to Mr. Emerson after lectures or during his office hours in the first or second week of the term.

All Graduate School students are requested to speak to Mr. Emerson after class.

#### II

**TEXTBOOKS.** There are three required textbooks for the course. Students will be required to have read, and will be examined at mid-term upon all of Aron's *Century of Total War* and of Millis' *Arms and Men*, and upon so much of Cyril Falls' *Hundred Years of War* as lies before the outbreak of World War II. The mid-term examination will fall on Friday 22 March 1957.

The textbooks are:

* Raymond Aron, *Century of Total War* (Beacon)

* Cyril Falls, *A Hundred Years of War* (Macmillan)

* Walter Millis, *Arms and Men* (Putnam)

In addition to textbooks, the staff do not require, but recommend, the following standard works:

* Asher Lee, *Air Power* (Praeger)

* Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Combat Forces Press)

* Dwight Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City)

* James Edmonds, *A Short History of World War I* (Oxford)

* Gordon Craig, *Politics of the Prussian Army* (Oxford)

* John Slessor, *The Central Blue* (Praeger)

* John Wheeler-Bennett, *Nemesis of Power* (St. Martins)

* Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe* (Harpers)

#### III

**SPECIAL SUBJECTS.** In addition to the assigned reading, the student will be required to concentrate his work during the latter part of the course on one out of the six Special Subjects listed below. The student must in

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this connection complete a Special Subject syllabus set and administered
by one of the staff members. A short syllabus for each of the Special
Subjects is attached for information.

At the end of the course, the student will be examined upon his Special
Subject in the final examination, his examination papers on this Subject
to comprise two-thirds of his final examination grade and one-half of his
grade in the course at large. The questions set in the Special Subject
papers will require that the student show, first, a mastery of the facts
and the alternative historical interpretations bearing upon the general
field which he has chosen, and, secondly, an ability to treat the Subject
in a general paper in its proper relationships to the subject matter of
the course as a whole.

There will be no term papers in this course

The Special Subjects are as follows:

I. American Diplomatic and Military Policy before and during World War I.

II. German Strategy and Direction of War, 1939 - 1945.

III. Allied Strategic Planning in World War II.

IV. Air Power, 1935 - 1957.

V. The War At Sea in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

VI. The War in the Pacific.

IV

Lecturing duties in History 138b will be shared among members of the staff
of the Harvard Defense Studies Program. Names of the staff members with
their special fields and office hours are:

W. R. Emerson, American and Allied strategic planning,
Office hours, Room 15, Institute of Geographical
Exploration, Monday, 10 a. m.

Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., The War at Sea,
Office hours, Room 13, IGE, Monday, 10 a. m.

W. Barton Leach, Air Power,
Office hours, Room 13, IGE, Monday, 10 a. m. (telephone first)

Harry Ransom, Air Power,
Office hours, Room 20, IGE, Monday, 10 a. m.

William Wiseley, German and Axis strategic planning,
Office hours, Room 24, IGE, Monday, 10 a. m.

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Special Subject I: United States Diplomatic and Military Policy in World War I.

The first World War marked the emergence of America as a world power after a century of peace and relative isolation from European broils. In itself an important historical event, our participation in World War I at the same time reveals -- in the political, the diplomatic and the military spheres -- American tendencies and patterns in international affairs which are still more or less characteristic of our policies in the changed conditions of the 1950's.

Critics of these policies call them overly idealistic and impractical, and condemn American unwillingness to accept the necessary role of power considerations in world politics. Their defenders point to the "unselfishness" of American motives or, alternatively, to domestic American political considerations. The student will be asked to come to some general conclusions on these controversies, which are today of more than antiquarian importance to observers of American foreign policy.

Required Reading

(six of the following eight books)

George Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (1950), 101 pp.

Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters*, (1923),
Volume VIII: *The Versailles Settlement*.

Edward H. Buehring, *Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power* (1955),
325 pp.

Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign
Relations: the Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century*
(1954), 491 pp.

Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era* (1955),
pp. 81-282.

Walter Millis, *The Road to War: America 1914-1917* (1935), 460 pp.

Otto L. Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff* (1946)
pp. 1-231.

Peyton C. March, *The Nation at War* (1932), 407 pp.

Supplementary Reading

Samuel F. Bemis, *America as a World Power: a Diplomatic History,
1900-1950*. Chapters 1-10.

Walter Millis, *The Martial Spirit: a Study of Our War with Spain*.

Frederick L. Palmer, *John J. Pershing*.

Charles Seymour, ed., *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*.

Charles Seymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War*.

A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for the Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918*.

- 5 -

Special Subject III: <u>Allied Grand Strategy in World War II, 1942-1945.</u>

Never in history has a military coalition displayed the unity shown by
the Anglo-American alliance in World War II. Nevertheless, beneath the
surface of Allied relations there remained fundamental differences of
approach to political and strategical questions of total war. These
differences, which made themselves felt at every turning point of the war,
have since been exhaustively analyzed in post-war critiques of Allied strategy
of which the most prominent examples form the reading matter of this Special
Subject.

The British by and large favored approach to Germany through the "soft
Mediterranean underbelly," a strategy which in retrospect may be seen
to have contained considerable political advantages but also, as American
critics have charged, an ominous possibility of dispersed effort and
military stalemate. The American strategy featured massive concentration
in North-West Europe and a search for decisive military victory over the
Germans, but, as post-war critics have pointed out, destroyed the European
balance of power and thus had the effect of merely replacing one tyranny
by another.

The books in this special subject present the arguments on both sides
of the case. The student should examine these arguments and attempt to
reach his own conclusions on their merits and their practicability under
conditions of war-time strategic planning.

Required Reading

(read <u><b>all six</b></u> of the following books)

Hanson W. Baldwin, _Great Mistakes of the War_ (1949), 108 pp.

Robert E. Sherwood, <u>Roosevelt and Hopkins</u> (1948), Parts II - V,
713 pp.

Henry Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, _On Active Service_ (1948), Part III, 261 pp.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, <u>Crusade in Europe</u> (1948), 521 pp.

Cyril Falls, <u>The Second World War</u> (1948), 304 pp.

Supplementary Reading

James MacG. Burns, <u>Roosevelt: the Lion and the Fox</u>.

Harry Butcher, <u>Three Years with Eisenhower.</u>

Winston Churchill, <u>The Second World War</u>, 6 vols.

Russell Grenfell, <u>Unconditional Hatred.</u>

Frederick Morgan, <u>Overture to Overlord.</u>

Eliot Janeway, <u>The Struggle for Survival.</u>

- 6 -

Special Subject IV: <u>Air Power. 1938 - 1957.</u>

Winston Churchill has said (MIT, 1949), "Air power ... is not the only expression of military power, but it has been, and will remain in the future, the truly decisive element of modern war."

The development of air power faced the trials characteristic of all major changes in warfare. It was suppressed by the built-in conservatism of senior officers wedded to older weapons. It was misunderstood and under-rated by civilian leaders unable to break through the negative advice of these same senior officers. Its own advocates tended to overstate its potentialities, partly through frustration but also partly through over-rating their own weapons. When it was finally put into operation there was a long period of trial and error before air power in its various forms (strategic attack, air defense, tactical support of armies) became fully effective. And now it faces the imposing problem of adapting itself to a situation where a big war would be bound to be nuclear but a little war probably not. This Special Subject seeks to examine these present problems of air power in the light of its history.

<u>Required Reading</u>

(Read all of the following)

Asher Lee, <u>Air Power</u> (1955), 200 pp.

Sir John Slessor, <u>The Central Blue</u>, (1957), 228 pp.

Sir Winston Churchill, <u>Second World War</u>, Vols 1-6, 324 pp.

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, <u>Summary Reports, European and Pacific Wars</u> (1946) complete, 60 pp.

H. L. Stimson & McG. Bundy, <u>On Active Service</u> (1948), 43 p.

Senate Military Affairs Com. Hearings, 79th Cong., <u>Department of Armed Forces</u> (1945), 16 pp.

President's Air Policy Commission, <u>Survival in the Air Age</u> (1948), 40 pp.

House Armed Services Com. Hearings, 81st Cong., <u>Unification and Strategy</u> (1949), 46 pp.

Report, same committee, <u>Unification and Strategy</u> (1950), 59 pp.

Air Force Magazine, April 1951, <u>Ground-Air Operation in Korea</u>, 9 pp.

The Annals, May 1955, <u>Obstacles to Development of American Air Power</u> (Leach) and <u>Air Power and Foreign Policy</u> (Finletter), 19 pp.

Subcommittee of Senate Armed Services Com. Hearings, 84th Cong., <u>Study of Airpower</u> (1956), 603 pp.

Report, same Subcommittee (1957) est., 75 pp.

<u>Supplementary Reading</u>

H. H. Arnold, <u>Global Mission</u> (1949)

P. Brickhill, <u>The Dam Busters</u> (1951)

E. M. Emme, <u>Hitler's Blitz Bomber</u> (1951)

A. T. Harris, <u>Bomber Offensive</u> (1947)

G. C. Kenney, <u>General Kenney Reports</u> (1949)

F. C. Sherman, <u>Combat Command</u> (1950)

Craven & Cate, <u>Army Air Forces in World War II</u>, 6 vols., (1948 et seq.)

S. E. Morison, <u>U. S. Naval Operations in World War II</u>, 10 vols., (1948 et seq.)

R. Sherrod, <u>Marine Corps Aviation in World War II</u>. (1952)

- 7 -

Special Subject V: **The War in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean.**

Unlike World War I, World War II could by no stretch of the imagination
have been won by seapower alone -- at least in western waters. But
World War II could have been lost at sea. On this there was general
agreement among U.S. and U.K. planners at the time. And time and
afterthought have never changed this judgment. On the grey stretches of
the Atlantic the whole war effort could have been quite literally scuttled.

The reason, of course, lay in the fact that this was a problem like
so many others to which there were multiple solutions. The submarine,
the greatest but not the only threat, might have been best controlled
by land based air. Or it might have been best controlled by the pro-
duction of more anti-submarine craft. Or it might have been alleviated
by the building of greater numbers of cargo ships, and then greater
numbers still. The whole problem being one of human judgement was one
in which frightening errors were made. And being one which had to do
with command and control of the means of solution, it was one on which
interservice bitterness was greater within the Joint Combined and Enemy
Chiefs than on any other.

Required Reading

(read all of the following)

Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, _Statesmen and Sea Power_ (1947),
Chapter IX, p. 277 ff., 85 pp.

Anthony K. Martienssen, *Hitler and His Admirals* (1949), 275 pp.

Samuel Eliot Morison, *Operations in North African Waters* (1947), 280 pp.

Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Battle of the Atlantic* (1947), 432 pp.

Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate* (1950), Book I: Chapters 7, 11, 15, 21; Book II: Chapters 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 19; 315 pp.

David Woodward, *The Tirpitz and the Battle for the North Atlantic*
(1953), 225 pp.

Admiral Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope, *A Sailor's Odyssey* (1951),
Chapter XIX p. 218-Chapter XLIV p. 606 incl., 388 pp.

Supplementary Reading

Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King*
Chapter 35.

Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World
War II, Vol. I* (1948), Chapter 15.

C. Becker, *Defeat at Sea* (1955)

Russell Grenfell, *The Bismarck Episode* (1949)

Francis H. Hinsley, *The Naval Side of British History, 1935 - 1945.*

S. W. Roskill, *The War at Sea 1939 - 1945.* (1954)

Samuel Eliot Morison, *Sicily-Salerno-Anzio* (1954)

- 8 -

Special Subject VI: <u>The War in the Pacific.</u>

The Pacific War seems, in the light of afterthought, a curious one indeed. It was many wars, not one war, because seapower created alternatives. Thus the war was subdivided into one which raged from East to West — the Marines' War — and another from South to North — MacArthur's War. And there was a war on the mainland of China and another in Southeast Asia.

These wars were never really tied together in the minds of the planners except by occasional decision at a point of total *impasse*. The Pacific War was a war then between commands as well as with the enemy. If looked at in this way the Pacific theater is curiously exciting history, a romantic stage on which the most flamboyant of the military — General "Dugout Doug" MacArthur, Admiral "Bull" Halsey, General "Howlin' Mad" Smith, "Vinegar Joe" Stillwell — played out their role. It goes without saying that this is not history on which there is or can be general agreement — which is to say that what divides men tends to divide historians.

<u>Required Reading</u>

(read all of the following)

Louis Morton, _The Fall of the Philippines_ (1953), 626 pp.

M. Fuchida and M. Okumiya, _Midway_ (1955), 266 pp.

Samuel Eliot Morison, _Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions_ (1949), 307 pp.

J. A. Iseley and P. A. Crowl, _The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War_ (1951), 636 pp.

Charles F. Romanus and R. Sutherland, _Stillwell's Command Problems_ (1956), 518 pp.

<u>Supplementary Reading</u>

C. Vann Woodward, _The Battle for Leyte Gulf_ (1947).

James A. Field Jr., _The Japanese at Leyte Gulf_ (1947).

F. F. Liu, _A Military History of Modern China_ 1924 - 1949 (1956)

Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, _Combat Command_ (1950).

General C. L. Chennault, _Way of a Fighter_ (1949).

Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, _MacArthur 1941 - 1951_ (1954).

- 9 -

# Sample Final Examination for History 138b:

## Special *Subject I: United States Policy and Strategy in World War I.*

1. (30 minutes) Identify and discuss briefly the historical significance of *five* of the following:

a. *Lusitania*

b. Tasker H. Bliss

c. William Jennings Bryan

d. Mount Vernon address

e. St. Mihiel

f. "The Inquiry"

g. Chaumont

h. The Mexican Border Expedition

2. (30 minutes) Answer *one* of the following:

a. "Pershing, by his stubbornness, contributed as much as Ludendorff to the possibility of Allied defeat in 1918."

How far, and in what specific respects, would you agree with this statement.

OR

b. What were the strategic role and the strategic effects of the Meuse-Argonne campaign in the Allied Offensive of 1918?

3. (One hour)

a. "American strategic aims, like American intervention in World War, were essentially negative in character. This was so because both American strategy and American policy in World War were shaped by the collapse, rather than the fulfillment, of Wilson's political ideas."

Comment.

- 10 -

Special Subject II: *German Strategy and Direction of War, 1939 - 1945*

1. (30 minutes) Identify and discuss briefly the significance of <u>five</u> of the following.

a. The "Stab in the Back" legend

b. Colonel-General Hans von Seeckt

c. The Fritsch-Blombery Crisis

d. The "September Campaign"

e. Field-Marshall Wilhelm Keitel

f. Festung Europa

g. Colonel Count Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg

h. The "Battle of the Bulge"

2. (30 minutes) Analyze Hitler's strategic planning during <u>one</u> of the following periods:

a. The Balkan campaign, 1941.

b. The first six months of the war against the Soviet Union, 1941.

3. (One hour) "Unconditional surrender was my greatest propaganda windfall during the whole war. Without this, I doubt whether morale could have sustained the disasters of 1943. This alone made it possible for Der Fuehrer to continue the war and to control the country."

— Joseph P. Goebbels

From your knowledge of the German war effort, how far do you think
Herr Goebbels' judgement on Hitler's control of the war is borne out
by the fact?

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Special Subject III: <u>Allied Grand Strategy in World War II, 1942 - 1945</u>

1. (30 minutes) Identify and discuss briefly the historical significance of <u>five</u> of the following:

a. Casablanca

b. POINTBLANK

c. ANVIL-DRAGOON

d. Joint Chiefs of Staff

e. "The Battle of the Bulge"

f. Ljubljana Gap

g. "Mulberry"

h. Teheran-EUREKA

2. (30 minutes) Answer one of the following:

a. Compare the structure and the historical background of the British and the American high command and staff systems.

OR

b. What, in your opinion, was the single most significant Anglo-American strategic decision during World War II?

3. (One hour)

"In retrospect, if I were granted the power to make one single change in our war-time strategy, I would ..."

Fill in the blank, in twenty-five words or less, and defend your opinion.

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Special Subject IV: Air Power, 1938 - 1957.

a. The Casablanca Conference

b. Giulio Douhet

c. Rabaul

d. Radar in 1940

e. The Consolidated B-32

f. Operation MALLORY

g. Operation ARGUMENT

h. The B-36 Hearings

2. (30 minutes) Answer one of the following questions:

a. What mistakes in the application of air power may be found in the German performance during the Battles of Britain?

b. "Aircraft procurement is more important in war than air strategy." How far does the history of World War II bear out this statement?

3. (One hour) "Whether we like it or not, air power is today the supreme expression of military power, but it has been, and will remain in the future, the truly decisive element of modern war."

— Winston Churchill

How far do you agree with this statement as concerns the military history of World War II? How far do you agree with this statement as concerns present-day (1950 - 1957) military affairs?

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Special Subject V: The War in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean.

1. (30 minutes) In a brief paragraph describe the results of five of the following:

a. The Landing at Fedhala

b. The "Hedgehog"

c. Adm. Doenitz promotion

d. The escapade of the Hartland and the Walney

e. The Destroyer-Naval Base deal with Britain

f. U.S. Air Attacks on German Sub-pens

g. The March 1942 Appeal by the Navy to the Army Air Corps to help in anti-submarine warfare

a. It has often been maintained that it was the German General Staff which lost the war for Hitler. Is this true from a Naval point of view? Is there any basis for this contention?

b. The Germans never should have expended the time and energy they did in the period between the wars on surface warships.
Discuss.

3. (One hour) Take any single allied decision as to the conduct of operations in the European theater, lay out the alternative courses of action which were open at the time and argue the pros and cons of each from the naval point of view.

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Special Subject VI: The War in the Pacific.

1. (30 minutes) Describe in a brief paragraph why it was that each of the following was, for one reason or another, a failure. Choose five.

a. The Japanese Aircraft Carrier at Midway

b. The invasion of Peleliu

c. The invasion of Tarawa

d. Halsey's policy at Leyte Gulf

e. The policy of invading the Phillipines

f. MacArthur's Air Policy during the fall of the Phillipines

g. The LVT at Saipan

a. It is frequently said that U.S. soldiers and sailors do not adjust themselves to conditions but conditions to themselves. What technical innovations were attempted in the Pacific Theater which tend to justify such an observation?

b. "In the Pacific War there were four mutually exclusive strategies being carried out simultaneously." How true is this?

3. (One hour) The real war in the Pacific was the war between U.S. Commands.

Discuss.

Appendix VI.

Recipients of Defense Policy Seminar Materials to 1 July 1957.

<table><thead><tr><td>Name</td><td>Organization</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Mr. Najeeb E. Halaby</td><td>Servomechanisms, Inc.</td></tr><tr><td>Mr. J. Wayne Fredericks</td><td>Ford Foundation.</td></tr><tr><td>Mr. George A. Graham</td><td>Ford Foundation.</td></tr></tbody></table>

Harvard University

Members of University Advisory Committee (Dean Bundy, Dean Mason, Assoc. Dean Herzog, Assoc. Dean Cavers, Profs. Elliott, Gordon, Kistiakowsky, Smithies, Ford.)

Littauer Center Library
Professor J. Sterling Livingston
Graduate School of Public Administration.
Graduate School of Business Administration.

Other US Educational Institutions

Mr. Chadwick F. Alger
Brig. Gen. Edward Barber
Professor Thomas C. Blaisdell
Professor Phillips Bradley
Center of International Studies
Dean Harlan Cleveland
Professor Robert H. Connery (15 sets)
Professor W. T. R. Fox
Professor Edgar S. Furniss, Jr.
Professor Harold A. Harding
Professor Martin Lichterman
General James McCormack, Jr.
Professor John Masland
Admiral W. C. Murdaugh
Professor Frederick C. Mosher
Professor James R. Roach
Assistant Dean Carl Runge (5 sets)
Stanford University Law School
Library
Professor Paul P. Van Riper
Professor Warren B. Walsh
Department of Economics
Library
Lt. Col. Angus M. Fraser
Library
Captain Jay B. Durst
Mr. M. S. Reichley
Swarthmore College
University of Maryland
University of California
Syracuse University
Princeton University
Syracuse University
Duke University
Columbia University
Princeton University
The Ohio State University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dartmouth College
University of Virginia
Syracuse University
University of Texas
University of Wisconsin Law School
Stanford University
Cornell University
Syracuse University
Air Force Academy
Armed Forces Staff College
US Marine Corps Headquarters
Army War College
West Point
Industrial College of Armed Forces