4.

following steps (or their equivalent) to be taken: (a) elections should be controlled by an international group or organization which is impartial in the sense it does not favor or oppose the candidate of any particular faction or party; (b) such group or organization should be supported by a military force, preferably international in character, capable of maintaining order and preventing coercion of any faction or individual; (c) the military power of the present government of Nicaragua would be neutralized during the electoral process in a manner to be agreed upon; (d) ballots would be secret; (e) foreign observers of the electoral process would be welcomed; (f) all Nicaraguan political parties and factions (including Marxists-Leninists using whatever name or names they wished) would be allowed to participate in the electoral process but popular fronts which include Marxists-Leninists would be prohibited; (g) political parties and factions, and the candidates of their choice, would be free to advocate, and the Nicaraguan people free to choose, whatever kind of political, economic or social system they wish but candidates would be required to pledge they would be nationalists and would not associate themselves in any way with the international Communist movement; (h) all Nicaraguan citizens, including civilians in the Nicaraguan bureaucracy, would have the right to vote - except members of the Nicaraguan police, military and militia which, being under discipline, may be expected to vote as directed.

6. As it has been demonstrated that promises of the present government of Nicaragua have little value, it would be necessary for that government to take positive steps adequate to convince a prudent person that elections will be held promptly under the conditions described (or their equivalent) - and to demonstrate that it has ceased to supply arms to Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in neighboring states or to give them other kinds of assistance.

7. If the Nicaraguan government should refuse to hold elections in the near future, and if the counterrevolutionaries should fail to achieve their goals, then, depending upon circumstances, the government of the United States should give consideration to invading Nicaragua for the purpose of restoring that country to full independence and sovereignty, and on the pledge that United States troops would be withdrawn as soon as this is accomplished.

8. In respect of the governments of other Central American states, the US should lend them such military and economic assistance as they may request, and which we think they require, for the purpose of defending themselves against Communist aggression.

9. In my opinion, all of the measures proposed would be legally permitted under rules of traditional law because they

5.

would be taken in the legitimate exercise of the right which all
states have to defend themselves against aggressions. The basis
of this opinion are described in two draft chapters of a book
which I am writing copies of which will be made available to
Commission staff. One of the chapters deals with the noninter-
vention rule. And the other deals with the individual right of
self-defense.

V.

1. The suggestions made in the paragraphs of part IV of this statement rest on two assumptions: (a) The US currently has nuclear weapons capable of wrecking great destruction on the USSR if that state should launch a nuclear strike on the US itself with long-range missiles based in Russian territory; (b) the USSR does not have, and will not have, shorter range nuclear missiles which could be launched from land bases in this hemisphere. I do not know whether these assumptions are correct.

2. If they are incorrect, then the US is already in great peril and our ability to prevent additional Communist penetrations in this hemisphere ought to be considered in light of this fact. I would then wish to reconsider the suggestions made in the paragraphs of part IV.

3. If the two assumptions are correct, then it seems prudent to assume that Soviet military reaction to US defensive actions in this hemisphere, if any, would come in the form of the use of conventional weapons. In this case, geography would give the US an important advantage.

4. Whether or not these assumptions are correct, before additional measures are taken in this hemisphere by the US an effort should be made by the US to reach an agreement with the USSR that both powers will refrain from intruding into areas that threaten the security of the other. Particular actions the US could take are described in the paragraphs that follow.

5. Even in the unlikely event that it would be possible to reach such an agreement, it would mean a temporary truce rather than an abandonment by the USSR of its doctrines, strategies and goals of world domination.

6.

VI.

1. At the end of the Second World War, the US was the most powerful state in the world both militarily and economically. This condition created what a perceptive English writer called "an illusion of omnipotence" - a belief there was literally nothing the US could not do. This misconception was gradually replaced by a feeling of complacency concerning our own security which is reminiscent of the popular mood preceding the months before Pearl Harbor.

2. It would be tedious to list the failures of our foreign policy even at the height of our power which were related to these popular attitudes. Illustrative of them are two misconceptions in a single year. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, an imperfect understanding by the US of Soviet doctrines, strategy and tactics led to the loss of the independence of a number of Eastern European states, and to an extension of Russian territory or control of territory that extended some six or seven hundred miles westward in Europe. In the same year, the same misconceptions led to the creation of the UN in the belief that the new world organization would usher in a long period of universal peace enforced by an international military force under the direction of the Security Council - a force which never came into being.

3. The failure of the UN to accomplish the primary purpose for which it was created was followed by a confident feeling on the part of Americans that the US should use its power to prevent aggressions which twice in a single generation had caused two world wars.

4. In the period 1947-1959, the US therefore entered into a number of defense treaties which were one-sided in the sense they committed the US to defend other states against aggression but did not contemplate that the other signatory states would help defend the US if it were attacked.

5. With minimal aid from other states, the US also defended states which were not signatory to the treaties mentioned and which were not demonstrably related to our own security. The wars in South Korea and South Vietnam are examples.

6. In addition, the US acquired military bases in far-away places, and attempted to act as world peacekeeper in places such as the Lebanon where violence was endemic and there was little or no prospect of a pacific settlement of the complex issues that separated warring factions and states.

7.

7. Meanwhile, the balance of military power gradually tilted in favor of the USSR. After 1945, the Soviet Union continued to give priority to the production of military equipment at the expense of consumer production; US industry was quickly reconverted to the production of consumer goods. The USSR maintained a large standing army by conscription and armed it with new conventional weapons of all kinds; the US demobilized its army and, having abandoned the draft, replaced it with a small volunteer army attracted by material rewards the quality of which has not been tested. The USSR enlarged and modernized its army and air force; the US neglected both. The USSR developed sophisticated nuclear weapons systems and space technology; the US neglected its nuclear weapons systems. The USSR launched an extensive and prolonged propaganda campaign designed to create fear in non-Communist countries and to weaken their will to resist Communist expansion and aggression; the US did little to counter this propaganda and, at times, appeared to promote it.

8. In relative terms, the US economy declined in strength. For many reasons which space does not permit to be listed here, the Soviet economy is inefficient and noncompetitive. But the total power which the Soviet government exercises over the minds and bodies of its people enables it to pursue its goals by reducing the living standards of the masses of its people to a subsistence level. By contrast, the American people have for decades been unwilling to exercise self-restraint in terms of living within their means. As a result of borrowing to cover budgetary deficits, the debt of the national government, and the percentage of the national budget required to service the debt, are now excessive and constantly growing. This is the greatest single internal threat to the viability of our economy in the future - a danger which our founding fathers, liberals and conservatives alike, warned against.

9. In sum, conditions in 1983 are not comparable to those which existed in 1945. The US is no longer a superpower able to act as the policeman of the world. Indeed, the US is today already overextended in both a military and economic sense. Conditions have changed. But foreign policies remain largely the same.

## VII.

1. Consideration should be given to withdrawing from all of the defense treaties negotiated in the period 1947-1959, including NATO and the Rio Treaty. The basic purpose of those treaties was to defend states against Communist aggression. Some of the states which are signatory to those treaties are now members of the Third World which initially expressed its neutrality in what was apparently viewed not as a struggle for individual liberties and national independence but as a power struggle between the US and the USSR. Others have expressed their dissatisfaction with particular aspects of the defense treaties.

8.

Other governments have supported guerrillas in the service of a Communist state. In other signatory states there appears to be significant opposition to the introduction of US missiles which are designed to deter the use of Soviet missiles already in place. These and other changes suggest that the treaties in question have been overtaken by events. Why should the US seek to convince other states they should defend themselves in the way we think best?

2. At the same time, the US should consider offering new mutual defense arrangements with governments that desire them and who have something of defense value to offer (e.g., the will and ability to defend themselves against the aggressions of their neighbors, materials which are in short supply in the US, a strategic location which is defensible). Generally speaking, the purpose would be to shift policy away from defending the weak and helpless to building positions of strength.

3. Consideration should also be given to withdrawing as many US troops currently assigned abroad as feasible and returning them to help defend the homeland. For example, if Indochina is not deemed vital to the defense of the US why should US troops be posted in South Korea? Another example: If Russian troops have the ability to march to the English channel using only conventional weapons, should not our troops be withdrawn from West Germany? - and should not the West Germans themselves have the exclusive right to decide whether or not to use nuclear weapons to defend themselves?

4. Each time the USSR extends the area which it controls it collides with nationalism and increases the drain on the Russian economy. The ability of the Soviet Empire to expand is not infinite.

5. A reorientation of US defense policy along these lines could be used as the basis of an approach to the Soviet Union to discover whether or not they would be willing to refrain from intruding (either directly or through surrogate states) militarily into the Western hemisphere, which is vital to the security of the United States, in exchange for our undertaking to refrain from intruding militarily into territory currently controlled by the Soviet Union or intervening in the internal affairs of such Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc., which the USSR obviously considers vital to its security. Other possible concessions which might be considered would be to withdraw the US military presence from Greece and Turkey, including US bases in those two countries and any US -controlled missiles that we currently might have there or which we could introduce if those states so desired. Still another inducement could be to refrain from introducing US-controlled missiles into West Germany without prejudice to the right

9.

of the US to sell such missiles to that or other responsible
democracy - provided the USSR made it clear that such an agree-
ment was considered by it essential to its security. Presumably
France has its own weapons and would not desire US assistance.
No other Western European state can reasonably be considered a
threat to the security of the USSR; all of them, including
West Germany, are, in any case, independent, sovereign states
which is all that we desire in the Western Hemisphere.

6. Whether or not proposals along these general lines (with
details to be determined) would be acceptable to the USSR is
questionable. If they were accepted, we should not deceive our-
selves that this would imply any change in Soviet doctrine,
strategy or tactics; all we could hope for is to decrease the
risk of dealing with the Central American and Caribbean problems
(except Cuba which would only be expected to discontinue its
support of subversion in the area). If it is rejected, the
Soviet Union would be put at a propaganda disadvantage. Neither
the US nor the USSR would lose a great deal by agreeing to
refrain from conducting military operations in areas geographically
adjacent to the other which would be folly in any case.

7. By agreeing to refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of other countries, neither side would agree to abandon support of its basic principles. In our case, it would simply mean returning to the policy which was followed for the first hundred years after our independence: we stand for individual freedom and national independence and sympathize with those struggling to achieve them but, in the words of John Quincy Adams, we *would* not go in search of monsters to destroy. We would not expect the USSR to cease to be Marxists-Leninists but only cease to commit interventions and aggressions in areas vital to our national security.

8. Consideration should be given to warning the USSR not to miscalculate the determination of the US to defend itself against aggressions in this hemisphere which threaten its security - or be misled by those Americans who appear to favor unilateral disarmament or believe that peace can be secured by being militarily and economically weak and indecisive.

VIII.

1. Only a brief comment need be made about the various
claims that have been made concerning the economic and social
problems of Latin America.

2. Every sovereign state has exclusive jurisdiction within its own territory. This means it has the right to choose its own government, its political, economic and social systems and policies and manage its own domestic and foreign affairs free of the coercion of other states. It follows automatically that, having the exclusive right to manage its own affairs, no state,

10.

including the United States, can escape primary responsibility
for the way it manages those affairs.

3. One of the malaises that affect some Latin American
economies at the present time is identical with our own -
mismanagement of our fiscal affairs with all the economic
ills that follow in the train of an individual or a government
living beyond its means and accumulating debts that it cannot
service. It is an exercise in futility for the United States or
any other country to attempt to pass the blame to some mysterious
force operating in the markets of the world, or to try to place
the blame on other states. In the words of the comic strip
character, Pogo, " I have met the enemy and he is us." It is
nonsense to claim that when the US, or US private banks, do not
lend money in the amounts other states may desire, they are
Shylocks demanding their pound of flesh; and, on the other hand,
when they lend large amounts to claim they are responsible for
the size of the debts accumulated. One cannot have it both ways.

4. Dean Acheson correctly observed that the United States
can, within the limits permitted by its resources, supply missing
components (principally foreign exchange) in a situation otherwise
favorable to rapid economic and social progress. But it cannot
create in another sovereign state the conditions that are essential
to rapid economic and social progress.

5. The countries, again including the United States, which
have the largest debts are not, generally speaking, the poorer
countries in the hemisphere. They are the richer ones. The way
they choose to distribute the national wealth is for them to
decide.

6. The United States is not responsible for the rate of
population growth in other states, or for graft and corruption
in official circles when it exists, or for any of the other
vices inherent in human nature. Nor can it force people in
other lands to practice the cardinal virtues; if it could it
would presumably begin at home.

7. No state in history has been as generous with its
neighbors as the United States or tried harder to be a good
neighbor. All of the international lending institutions were
formed at the initiative of the US. No American state has
trade policies which are more liberal; many have trade policies
which are protectionist. No other American state has tried
harder, or as long, to give technical assistance or financial
assistance on such favorable terms. No other state has made
greater efforts to stabilize the prices of raw materials at
a level fair to producer and consumer alike.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND RESTRICTIONS
ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL AMERICA

## Summary

There are only a few provisions of law dealing with security assistance which refer specifically to Central American countries. These statutes prohibit military assistance to Cuba, restrict assistance to Guatemala and permit assistance to Nicaragua and El Salvador only if the Administration certifies that certain requirements are met. Military assistance to Guatemala with funds appropriated in the supplemental appropriations act of July 29, 1983 is prohibited. Of greater importance to the formulation and execution of U.S. policy in the region are a number of statutory provisions of general, worldwide application. These provisions provide useful legislative authorities and impose certain restraints in providing security assistance. This paper provides general background information regarding U.S. security assistance legislation and summarizes the provisions which affect security assistance to Central American countries.

## General Background

"Security Assistance" is a phrase used to refer to selling, loaning, leasing, or granting military equipment and services to foreign countries by the United States Government. Almost all of the military assistance provided by the U.S. to foreign countries is subject to two general statutes--the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (the FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act (the AECA). Both of these laws are generally amended annually to reflect current Congressional concerns. This is usually done pursuant to annual authorization bills. Such bills are initially considered by the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. Other provisions are enacted in appropriation acts, including continuing resolutions and supplemental appropriations. These bills are under the purview of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.

There are five general types of security assistance under our current laws. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) financing program provides direct and guaranteed loans to enable eligible foreign governments to purchase defense articles and services, including training, from the U.S. Government. The Military Assistance Program (MAP) provides grant funding to assist friendly foreign governments to purchase defense articles and services. The International Military Education and Training program (IMET) provides professional military training and education in the U.S. and abroad to foreign military and related civilian personnel on a grant basis. The Economic

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Support Fund (ESF) program provides loan or grant economic
assistance to support important allies and friends. The Peace-
keeping Operations (PKO) chapter of the FAA authorizes the
President to furnish assistance for peacekeeping operations in
the national security interests of the U.S. Each of these
programs is authorized by specific provisions of law. Each
requires some form of authorization or funding by the Congress
on an annual basis.

The amount of proposed assistance to each country and the
types of assistance proposed are justified in advance to the
Congress by the Executive Branch in an annual document referred
to as the "CPD"--the Congressional Presentation Document. The
amount of assistance desired by the Executive Branch for each
country is specified by category (e.g., IMET, MAP, etc.).

The Congress authorizes and appropriates lump sums for each
category of assistance (such as MAP, IMET, FMS). An increas-
ingly large portion of the total is "earmarked" for certain
countries (i.e., specified sums must be provided to certain
countries, such as Israel and Egypt). As a general rule, the
Executive Branch may not raise the level or alter the mix of
assistance to a country in a fiscal year unless it provides
fifteen days prior notice to the foreign affairs and appropria-
tions committees.

This "reprogramming" of funds is frequently controversial. Increasing assistance to one country necessarily requires reducing assistance to others. More significantly, the appropriations committees have asserted the right to "disapprove" of reprogrammings; while the Executive Branch does not concede that the committees have a legal right to disapprove, it does attempt to accommodate Congressional concerns before obligating funds. In practice, Congressional opposition to reprogramming for Central American countries has hindered the Executive Branch's ability to increase assistance levels in that area.

## Grant and Loan Assistance

Furnishing defense articles and services on a grant basis is done through the "Military Assistance Program" (MAP). 1/

1. During the early 1950's, a large proportion of the U.S. security assistance program consisted of MAP grants. As foreign countries became more capable of sustaining their military requirements, however, the Congress began emphasizing cash sales or loans to assist foreign countries to finance purchases of defense articles and services from the U.S. For this and other reasons, only a handful of countries were provided with MAP assistance during the late 1970's and the program was being phased out. In the last two years, however, the Congress has been willing to provide funds for the MAP program for various countries.

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Grant training is provided under the "International Military Education and Training" program (IMET). "Economic support funds" (ESF), are funds which may not be used for military or paramilitary purposes. The ESF program is often used to provide budgetary support for countries of strategic importance. ESF has historically been provided to countries because of their military and political situation rather than for developmental or other economic purposes. Consequently, the ESF program primarily serves security goals, but also has economic effects.

With all of these programs, every dollar of assistance must be provided for in the annual appropriations legislation.

## Foreign Military Sales

Sales of defense articles or defense services directly by the U.S. Government ("Foreign Military Sales"--FMS) are authorized by the Arms Export Control Act. Sales or leases of defense articles may be made to countries or international organizations only after there has been a Presidential determination that the furnishing of defense articles and services will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace. Sales may be made only for certain purposes, such as for a country's legitimate self-defense needs, for its internal security or to permit it to participate in regional or collective defense arrangements under the U.N. Charter. Recipient countries and international organizations must accept numerous conditions on the use of weapons sold by DOD, such as controls over transfers to third parties. These conditions are generally reflected in an international agreement between the U.S. and the country concerned as well as in individual contracts of sale (i.e., the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) or "DD Form 1513").

These sales are made either on a cash basis or with U.S. Government financing (either FMS "credits" (appropriated funds) or FMS "guaranteed" loans (loans by the Federal Financing Bank which are authorized by the Congress but which do not use appropriated funds)). The latter loans are guaranteed against nonpayment. The authority and funds for this FMS financing are provided on an annual basis. The interest rate reflects the cost to the U.S.G. of borrowing the money and is usually comparable to the average interest rate paid by the Government on certain obligations (a statutory requirement), although "concessional" financing is authorized in exceptional cases.

## Emergencies

The Congress has provided certain important emergency authorities in the FAA facilitating provision of security assistance in emergencies or other extraordinary situations.

- 4 -

These authorities generally permit the President to waive
almost all of the requirements of the FAA or the AECA during
military emergencies which meet certain strict statutory stand-
ards. The use of these authorities is subject to close and
critical Congressional scrutiny, and these authorities are used
sparingly. None of these authorities permits the President to
exceed the total monetary amounts authorized or appropriated
for assistance.

These emergency authorities reflect a recognition by the
Congress that the President must act quickly during genuine
emergencies. They therefore permit the President to draw down
defense articles from the stocks of DOD in specified amounts
and to waive the provisions of law which require, for example,
Congressional consultation or notification of foreign military
sales. All such actions require a complete justification to
the Congress and generally require a formal Presidential deter-
mination which is published in the Federal Register. These
authorities are solely to address short term emergencies; the
President is expected to request and justify any increased
funding required by more sustained situations.

## Exports

Although commercial exports are not technically "security
assistance," the AECA also provides the authority to regulate
exports of weapons sold on a strictly commercial basis by U.S.
firms to foreign governments or foreign companies or indi-
viduals. The Department of State has regulations implementing
the AECA (the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
--ITAR). These regulations have historically been part of the
neutrality laws of the U.S. Congress has traditionally granted
very broad discretion to the Executive Branch with respect to
such exports. State Department licensing is required for
exports on all items on the U.S. Munitions List of the ITAR.
Technical data directly related to such articles are also sub-
ject to State's export regulations.

Unlike Commerce Department export regulations, the ITAR
system is relatively simple and brief. There are countries to
which all Munitions List exports are specifically prohibited in
the regulations (all Communist countries except China and
Yugoslavia) and countries which are not specifically listed but
to which all exports are denied because of foreign policy con-
cerns (e.g., Libya, Iran, Iraq). With respect to other
countries, exports are approved on a case-by-case basis.
Licenses may be denied for foreign policy or national security
reasons.

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Military Construction on Foreign Bases

It should be noted that most U.S. military construction at foreign military bases or facilities (e.g., construction in connection with access or basing arrangements) is not funded pursuant to the foreign assistance program and is not deemed to be security assistance. Because of the benefit to foreign countries, however, the GAO and some members of Congress have recently begun referring to military construction as a form of assistance which should be taken into account when considering how much security assistance should be provided to a country. Most of the construction is provided with "Milcon" (military construction) funds authorized through the military construction subcommittees of the armed services committees of the Congress rather than the foreign affairs committees. Such funds can only be used for construction designed to meet U.S. military requirements rather than those of the foreign country. (In the latter instance, AECA or FAA funding is necessary, a route followed in the case of the air base construction in Israel which the U.S. Government funded in connection with Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai.) The foreign country concerned generally acquires title to structures and facilities built by the U.S. with MILCON funds and the right to use the facilities, thus receiving a genuine tangible benefit, while the U.S. is granted the right to use the facilities constructed (as in the case of the Honduran Access Agreement of May 2, 1982). Because of the fact that the construction is for the direct benefit of the U.S. armed forces, Congress has been far more willing to provide large amounts of such funds for MILCON construction than for FMS construction.

All of the programs referred to above are administered under the general direction and supervision of the Secretary of State. The Department of State is by law responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of sales, loans, and grants of defense articles and defense services to foreign governments, as well as the ESF and PKO programs. DOD implements the military assistance programs, and AID is responsible for administering the ESF program.

SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING MOST SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Section 793 of the Second Continuing Resolution (CR) on Appropriations of 1983 ("Boland amendment"): This provision --which does not deal with security assistance funds per se--prohibits the use by the CIA or DOD of any funds appropriated to the Department of Defense under the CR to

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furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or
other support for military activities, to any group or indi-
vidual, not part of a country's armed forces, for the purpose
of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua, or provoking a
military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras. A currently
pending House bill would delete the language linking the prohi-
bition to the purpose for which the assistance is provided, and
flatly prohibit all covert support to factions fighting the
government of Nicaragua, thus eliminating the currently avail-
able basis for such assistance.

**Section 728 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, as amended by P.L. 98-53 of July 15, 1983:** Requires a termination of military assistance and arms sales to El Salvador unless the President certifies to Congress every six months that the Government of El Salvador is making a significant and concerted effort on human rights compliance, is achieving substantial control over all elements of the security forces, is making continued progress on land, economic and political reforms, is committed to free elections and to discussions to that end with all factions willing to find a political solution to the conflict, and is making good faith efforts to investigate the murders of U.S. citizens in El Salvador. The certification requirement was enacted with respect to security assistance programs for fiscal years 1982 and 1983. Efforts are underway in Congress to include similar or more stringent limitations in FY 84 legislation.

**Supplemental Appropriations Act of July 29, 1983:** Prohibits the use of any funds appropriated by the act to provide any assistance to Guatemala, except for development projects funded through private voluntary organizations. Although this provision applies only to funds appropriated under that act, we anticipate efforts in Congress to include a similar restriction that will be enacted with respect to FY 84 appropriations.

**Section 724 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981:** Prohibits assistance to the Government of Nicaragua if the President determines that that Government is cooperating with international terrorists or supporting acts of violence in other countries, or that there are foreign combat military forces within Nicaragua which threaten the security of the U.S. or any of our Latin American allies. This proviso was included in legislation initially authorizing aid to the Sandinista government. The President has made the determination specified in Section 724.2/

2. Soon after the Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua, the effect of this determination was partially waived pursuant to section 614 of the FAA to avoid the requirement of immediate repayment of debts owed to the United States by the Government of Nicaragua.

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**Section 502B of the FAA:** Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act restricts security assistance to countries engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. Section 502B does not contain a legislative list of proscribed countries, nor is such a list maintained by the Executive Branch. Rather, it requires in effect that the Executive Branch be prepared to demonstrate that any recipient of U.S. assistance is not engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. A special additional determination is required with respect to IMET or any security assistance to the police forces of such countries. This provision has restrained the Executive from seeking assistance to countries with controversial human rights records. Human rights considerations have been a factor in the past in decisions of the last two administrations not to seek assistance for Guatemala.

**Section 660 of the FAA:** Prohibits the use of funds provided under the FAA for assistance to foreign police, prisons, law enforcement forces, or foreign government programs of internal intelligence or surveillance. (This provision does not apply to certain DEA, FBI, or international narcotics control programs.) This statute inhibited U.S. ability to assist legal reform efforts in El Salvador and other countries in the region.

**Section 21(c) of the Arms Export Control Act and Section 503(a) of the FAA:** Prohibits any U.S. personnel engaged in security assistance-related activities from performing duties of a combatant nature, including any duties related to training and advising that may engage U.S. military personnel in combat activities. Further, the President is required to report to the Congress the existence of hostilities or terrorist acts or a change in the status of these factors which may endanger U.S. personnel or property. (The War Powers Resolution, which contains provisions relating to U.S. involvement in hostilities, is discussed separately in the attached memorandum.)

**Section 506 of the FAA:** Authorizes the President to draw down up to $75 million worth of defense articles, defense services, and training from the stocks of the Department of Defense in any fiscal year, if he determines that unforeseen emergencies require this and that the emergency requirements cannot be met under any other provision of law. (This means that the Army, Air Force, or Navy must provide items from their own inventories and risk the possibility that the items will not be replaced.) It has been used to provide assistance to El Salvador by President Carter (in January of 1981) and by President Reagan (in March 1981 and February 1982). Section 506 has been used sparingly and cannot be relied on as an alternative

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to the normal appropriations process. This section is highly controversial and overuse or misuse (as perceived by Congress) could result in its repeal.

**Section 614 of the FAA:** Authorizes the President to provide assistance, up to a fiscal year total of $250 million or $50 million per country, notwithstanding any contrary provision of law, if he finds it to be important to U.S. security interests; and to make FMS sales, notwithstanding any contrary provision of law, if he finds it to be vital to U.S. security interests. The President must make certain reports to the Congress before exercising these authorities. As a practical matter, the Executive must consult closely with the relevant Committees in connection with the use of Section 614. This authority is an extraordinary one, and is used very sparingly. It was used to provide additional ESF for El Salvador in June of 1981 by waiving requirements earmarking these funds for other countries.

**Section 610 of the FAA:** Authorizes the transfer of FAA funds from one account to another (for example, from ESF to IMET) within certain limits and if the President determines that this is necessary for purposes of the FAA and certain notifications are made to the Congress. ESF and development assistance funds cannot, however, be transferred to the MAP account. Although the statutory requirement of Committee approval for transfers is unconstitutional, consultation and negotiation with the Committees in advance of transfers is a practical political necessity.

**Section 634A and Section 523 of the 1982 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act:** Prohibit the obligation of funds appropriated to carry out the FAA and the AECA for activities, countries, programs and operations not previously justified to the Congress in the Congressional presentation documents (CPD's) or in excess of the amount justified unless the Congress has been provided with at least 15 days advance notice. Consultation and negotiation with the relevant Congressional committee is a practical (though not a legal) necessity. Reprogramming decreases funds available for other recipients and thus is usually resisted by Congressional and Executive Branch supporters of the other recipients.

## Additional Provisions with Potential Effect

### Arms Export Control Act

**Section 3(d):** Generally requires a 30-day advance notification to Congress of U.S. intention to consent to a transfer by a foreign country to a third party of any U.S.-supplied

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major defense equipment ("MDE") valued at $14 million or more, or any other defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more. (This and other notice requirements provide an opportunity for Congressional and public discussion of and in some cases objections to a proposed action.) The President may waive the requirement to wait 30 days after notification if he certifies that an emergency exists requiring an immediate transfer in the national security interests of the U.S.

**Section 36(b):** Generally requires a 30-day advance certification to Congress of any proposed FMS sales of MDE for $14 million or more, of any defense articles or services for $50 million or more, or of FMS sales of military construction services for $200 million or more. (As a result of an agreement with Congress, the Executive Branch provides 20-day informal notification in advance of the 30-day formal period.) Section 36(b)'s time limitations may be waived in the same manner as section 3(d).

**Section 36(c):** Generally requires 30-day advance notice to Congress of proposed export licenses for commercially-sold MDE for $14 million or more, or for many Munitions List items valued at $50 million or more. This may also be waived in the same manner as with Section 36(b). Because of the high threshold levels none of these provisions has constrained sales or transfers to Central America.³/

**Section 515:** Sets restrictions on the overseas management of security assistance and sales programs by members of the U.S. Armed Forces, including the number of military personnel that may be involved and the activities they may engage in. These restrictions do not apply to personnel engaged in training under the IMET or FMS programs. (It should be noted in this connection that the ceiling of 55 training personnel in El Salvador is one established as a matter of policy by the Administration and is not based on any statutory requirement.)

### 3. The Arms Export Control Act contains several "legislative veto" provisions in §36(c) and elsewhere. They provide that the Congress may disapprove of certain sales, exports, and transfers of defense articles and defense services by concurrent resolution (i.e., a resolution which can be passed by a majority vote in the House and Senate but which is not presented to the President for signature (i.e., as in the case of a joint resolution). In light of the recent Supreme Court Chadha decision, such provisions are deemed to be unconstitutional.

- 10 -

**Section 620:** Contains a host of restrictions, including prohibitions on assistance to any country that aids or abets international terrorists; on assistance to Communist countries (including, specifically, Cuba); and on assistance to countries expropriating U.S. property without adequate compensation.

**Section 517 ("Brooke amendment"):** Prohibits the furnishing of FAA and FMS funds for countries that are in default on any loans under the FAA or AECA from the U.S. Government for a period of more than one year. This provision is inserted in all foreign assistance appropriation acts on an annual basis, and is made applicable to Continuing Resolutions.

THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

(PUBLIC LAW 93-148)

GENERAL

The War Powers Resolution was enacted over the President's veto in 1973, primarily as a result of Congressional concerns about the involvement of the United States in Indochina. The Resolution does not prevent the President from introducing U.S. armed forces into hostilities on his own authority, but it does impose a series of requirements designed to involve the Congress in any decision by the President to do so.

If U.S. forces are introduced into a situation of ongoing or imminent hostilities, the Resolution requires: (1) that the President consult with Congress "in every possible instance" prior to their introduction (section 3); (2) that the President report to Congress within 48 hours after the introduction (section 4(a)(1)); and (3) that the President withdraw forces introduced into hostilities if 60 days elapse without express Congressional authorization (section 5(b)), (the 60-day period may be extended if necessary to ensure the safe withdrawal of U.S. forces). The Resolution also provides that Congress can by concurrent resolution direct the President to withdraw U.S. forces in hostilities at any time, but this portion of the Resolution is clearly unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in *Chadha*.

If U.S. forces are introduced into foreign territory while equipped for combat, but hostilities are not clearly imminent, the Resolution requires only (with some exceptions) that the President report to Congress within 48 hours (section 4(a)(2)). It should be noted in this connection that one of the exceptions relates to training exercises. It was because of this exception that the Executive Branch decided not to make a War Powers Report with respect to the ongoing exercises in Central America.

In addition to questioning the constitutionality of the requirement that U.S. forces be withdrawn upon passage of a concurrent resolution (now clearly invalidated by the Supreme Court's *Chadha* decision on legislative vetoes), the Executive Branch has also expressed doubts about the constitutionality of those aspects of the Resolution purporting to require withdrawal of U.S. forces introduced into hostilities after 60 days. The Executive Branch does not, however, question the constitutionality of the reporting and consultative requirements.

- 2 -

Each Administration has consulted and reported in situa-
tions where it believed the Resolution applied. The reporting
during the Ford Administration (the Indochina evacuations and
the Mayaguez incident), and once during the Carter Administra-
tion (the Tehran rescue attempt). Five reports have thus far
been filed by the Reagan Administration. One was made with
regard to U.S. participation in the Sinai Multinational Force.
Three have been made with respect to the U.S. Multinational
Forces in Beirut, the latest being done on August 30, 1983.
One was made on the deployment in August of 1983 of a fighter-
escort for the AWACS in connection with Chad.

The reporting and consultation provisions have created
controversy from time to time in Congress about Executive
Branch compliance in borderline cases. The issues have
involved questions of whether a report should have been filed
by the Executive Branch and, in some cases when a report has
been filed, whether it was filed under the appropriate sec-
tion. Among the recent situations which have raised War Powers
questions are: (1) the brief encounter between U.S. and Libyan
aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra (some in Congress felt a report
should have been filed); (2) the activities of U.S. military
training personnel in Central America; and (3) the participa-
tion of U.S. forces in peacekeeping activities in Lebanon.

The political significance which is attached to the filing
of a War Powers report has, at times, been a factor in Execu-
tive Branch decisions concerning the deployment of U.S.
forces. In short, filing of a report is perceived as an act of
independent political significance which may exceed the inher-
ent significance of the deployment itself.

Under the terms of current interagency procedures (which
have been provided to Congress), the Legal Adviser of the
Department of State and the DOD General Counsel are charged
with bringing to the attention of their respective Secretaries
any situations which raise serious War Powers questions. The
Secretaries of State and Defense in turn provide their
recommendations to the President as to whether the provisions
of the War Powers Resolution should be applied in any given
case.

# 1. War Powers

## a. War Powers Resolution

Public Law 93-148 (H.J. Res. 542), 87 Stat. 555, 50 U.S.C. 1541-1548, passed over
President's veto November 7, 1973

JOINT RESOLUTION Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,

### SHORT TITLE

Section 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers Resolution".

### PURPOSE AND POLICY

Sec. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

### CONSULTATION

Sec. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

(631)

632

REPORTING

Sec. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced—

(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

(2) into the territory, airspace of waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or

(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;

the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the House of Representatives a report, in writing, setting forth—

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and

(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.

(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Sec. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or

633

required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR BILL

Sec. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the years and nays.

(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by years and nays.

(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by years and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of

634

such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period.

### CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Sec. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such current resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

### INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION

Sec. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred—

(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or

(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities and stating that it is intended to

635

constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.

(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date.

(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.

(d) Nothing in this joint resolution—

(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties; or

(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.

### SEPARABILITY CLAUSE

Sec. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

### EFFECTIVE DATE

Sec. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its enactment.

MEMO

To: Herb

From: Herta

Date: Sept. 1, 1983

RE: ABC poll on public opinion of Central America/U.S. policies

The following are key points from the ABC public opinion poll as told to me by Sonia Selby Wright. I am getting a complete copy of the poll's findings from ABC.

There is a generalized lack of knowledge about Central America as well as our foreign policy toward the individual countries. Here's what they think:

Reagan's handling of Central American foreign policy is leading us toward war.

54% yes 29% no

48% disapprove of the way Reagan is handling the Central American situation

33% approve

59% oppose increasing military and economic aid

32% are in favor of increasing aid

62% oppose U.S. efforts to overthrow Sandinista government

20% approve of such efforts

44% approve of military exercises along the Nicaraguan border

46% oppose such maneuvers

In regards to whether current actions would improve the situation in Central America, 50% had no opinion whatsoever. Shows considerable indecisiveness.

About the Central American Commission:

48% approve of the appointment of a Commission

41% disapprove

56% approve that it be headed by Dr. H. Kissinger

38% disapprove

94% remember Kissinger

65% of those (above) approved of the job he did as Secretary of State

The public is pessimistic of the success of the CAC

61% doubt that it will bring peace to the region

35% think it can

CBS/NY TIMES POLL

June 20-26, 1983

Q34 How would you describe the importance of El Salvador and other Central American countries - like Guatemala and Nicaragua - to the defense interests of the United States? Are they important or not very important?

| | | |
|:---|---:|---:|
| | **WITH D.K.**<br>**EXCLUDED** | |
| Very Important | 68% | 80% |
| Not Very Important | 17% | 20% |
| Don't Know | 15% | -- |

Q35 If the Communists were about to overthrow the Government in El Salvador, would you support giving the present Government three times as much U.S. military aid to try to stop the rebels?

| | | |
|:---|---:|---:|
| | **WITH D.K.**<br>**EXCLUDED** | |
| Yes | 49% | 60% |
| No | 33% | 40% |
| Don't Know | 18% | -- |

Q36a If that did not stop them, would you support: Sending hundreds of U.S. military advisers to help the Government's troops?

| | | |
|:---|---:|---:|
| | **WITH D.K.**<br>**EXCLUDED** | |
| Yes | 43% | 49% |
| No | 44% | 51% |
| Don't Know | 13% | -- |

Q36b If that did not stop them, would you support: Sending U.S. combat troops to fight the rebels?

| | | |
|:---|---:|---:|
| | **WITH D.K.**<br>**EXCLUDED** | |
| Yes | 32% | 36% |
| No | 57% | 64% |
| Don't Know | 11% | -- |

0232B
9/1/83

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

GEORGE F. BAKER FOUNDATION

GEORGE C. LODGE
Professor of
Business Administration

SOLDIERS FIELD
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02163

August 29, 1983

Personal and Confidential

The Hon. Henry A. Kissinger
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Henry:

Thank you for your letter. It was good to hear from you after all these
years and I shall do my best to answer your questions, not necessarily in
the order in which you have listed them.

Let me say at the outset that my association with Central America has not
been as intense in recent years as it was in the 1960s and early '70s. I
have no access to intelligence data and have had only occasional conversa-
tions with my friends there. I visited the school we helped to establish
in Nicaragua, INCAE, a few years ago but have not been back since. At
that time, however, I had a full round of talks with embassy staff including
our ambassador.

Based on what I know, I believe that our policies in Central America in
the last few years have been dead wrong. Indeed we have contributed to
the fulfillment of Moscow's interests rather than detracted from them. In
1981 it would have been easy to have co-opted the Sandinistas, and it seemed
to me that we were achieving just that. Blind, moralistic, simplistic
ideology appears to have prevented us from doing so. Very dangerous.
(See my letter to the New York Times which is attached.) I hope you will
get us on the right track.

It has always been difficult for the United States to deal with radical
change in the structures of economic and political power in Latin America.
The Mexican, Cuban, Central American and other revolutions of the region
grow out of a process with which American foreign policy tools and

SEP 2 1983

The Hon. Henry A. Kissinger

Page 2

procedures are not well designed to deal. (See my book Engines of Change: U.S. Interests and Revolution in Latin America, Knopf, 1975.) For example, there is an inherent ambivalence in our foreign assistance programs. On the one hand, they serve to strengthen the status quo and to retard the reallocation of power. On the other, they seek to nourish engines of change, whose purpose is just such reallocation. Perhaps this ambivalence is inevitable but it needs to be managed better than we have done. The overwhelming effect of foreign assistance has been to strengthen the status quo.

I recall, for example, a breakfast with José Napoleon Duarte in 1968 when he was mayor of the city of San Salvador. A young progressive Christian Democratic leader, he had angered the then ruling military junta. He threatened change. The junta branded him a socialist and dangerous leftist which was enough to persuade the American embassy to cut off all aid to the city. A few years later with our approval he was exiled. We wonder why his political base was so thin when he returned.

It has long been clear that radical change--that is the permanent and irreversible reallocation of power--in Central America is inevitable. Samoza was bound to go as are the ruling oligarchies of El Salvador and Guatemala. The questions are: At what speed? Who will control the process? What form will it take? What will the relationship of the United States be in it? Will we continue to be in bed with yesterday instead of tomorrow?

The interests of the United States lie in encouraging the change process, minimizing its economic and human costs, and insulating it from the predatory ambitions of Cuba and the Soviet Union. This is best done by helping the change process, not by assisting the status quo suppress it. To help it, we must understand it. Conventional notions of economic development are not very useful because the process is insignificantly economic; it is much more political, psychological, social and cultural. Economic aid to the ruling group may result in a hospital or a schoolhouse or a road but it will do little to expedite the change process. It may even retard it.

Happily the United States has an organization which for the past ten years has developed extremely useful experience, knowledge and competence concerning the change process. It is the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) with which I am sure you are familiar. It should be greatly strengthened and encouraged. (I have heard rumors that instead it is being weakened.)

The Hon. Henry A. Kissinger

Page 3

I think I have answered questions 1-3. The answers to #4 are "very significant" and "yes". As to "democratic government" and "democracy" (Question 5), these are relative terms without much meaning in Central America, except for Costa Rica. Like South Vietnam, the region is so far from being able to sustain true democracy that efforts in that direction must be seen over a very long time period. But again the prerequisites for democracy are the kinds of engines of change referred to above: labor unions, cooperatives, church-sponsored groups, small and large businesses of certain types, etc. The answer to #6 is clear: help the IAF.

"Marxism-Leninism" seems to me an almost useless phrase. Under its banner a wide variety of groups and individuals operate; many of them have no loyalty to Cuba or the Soviet Union. Many of them represent no threat whatsoever to the U.S. Some feel some affinity to China, others to the Catholic Church. For the most part these groups are antagonistic to one another. The simplistic posture of the United States toward them is perhaps the only force that unites them. On many occasions we have forced engines of change unwillingly into the lap of Cuba or the Soviet Union because of our own ignorance.

As for guerrilla movements, I have no personal knowledge currently. My guess is that they are many and different. I suspect that the attached article about Peru applies in many ways to Central America. If they are receiving foreign military assistance, I believe that that assistance should be cut off but such action should be viewed in the context of the larger considerations set out above.

At Harvard this past June, Carlos Fuentes said of Franklin D. Roosevelt's approach to Mexico: "He did not try to beat history. He joined it." That seems to me to be a guideline for your commission.

All the best.

As ever,

GCL:jmp

Enclosures