with most unstable group.

(p) Partition which leaves SAV with urban population would leave it
city population of rootless intellectuals and raising middle class;

bina countrywide make revolution. Conclusion: (s) very hard to place
especially in underdeveloped countries. Cities make opposition. Cities

Political process: History indicates that most usually starts in cities.

Lindbergh pays good case of too many cooks can destroy negotiations

Who should negotiate?

What can we make DRA less?

that the price does up the ladder the war lasts.

Why do we not approve North Vietnam with negotiating pressures and indicate

Can we pomp radio transmitters?

Can direction be moved to Hainan? Laos?

What is purpose of pumping? Will AC unit to spare DRA damage?

Can DAV make AC unit? If not, what can they do to affect outcome? If not,

up it they delay?

Even if DAV is negotiating partner, why not threaten them that price does

RANDOM NOTES:

[A]

[Y]

## RANDOM NOTES

Rather than ask for regrouping wouldn't we be better off if we would define things we want to be able to do during cease-fire.

(a) Free movement of GVN. What else?

****

****

****

****

If we win VC have three choices

(1) accept *fait accompli*

(2) negotiate to salvage what they can

(3) lie low

Lie low incentive

-- Do not want to acknowledge defeat

-- Don't trust negotiations

****

****

****

****

Problems of cease-fire:

(1) contested areas

(2) Recognized VC control in some areas. Either
SVN falls apart or, what is the same thing,
VC get recognized areas and legitimization.

****

******

****

Individual participation of VC in S. Vietnamese political affairs is
amnesty. But how do you keep them from coalescing under some other name.

Keyser: What incentive does OAU have to negotiate?
If we stop bombing & they stop infighting then we
get no little

CATEGORIES OF OUTCOMES

I. Victory

A. If you believe that this is worth the effort, then you want to affect convictions of others about risks of such a course. In that case, is it enough to "win" in S. Vietnam. (Assumption it is directed from outside) Have shown (a) that Soviets don't dare do anything significant; (b) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant; (c) willingness to do punitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Lesson for Indonesia. Do we want to have humiliation plus defeat of VC?

B. Free and stable S. Vietnam

C. Discredit Communists depends on how it is viewed.

D. What exactly is criteria for defeating VC?

["## CATEGORIES OF OUTCOMES", "I. **Victory**", "A. If you believe that this is worth the effort, then you want to affect anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? 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(p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? 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(p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Reason for Indonesians: Do we want to have anyみs-- significant? (p) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant? (c) willingness to do primitive

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

RANDOM NOTES (continued)

- 2

Assuming that military victory is possible, what does it take to
preserve it? How many American troops? How long?

Unilateral Outcomes

A. Victory

1. Criteria

2. Per cent of country under control

3. What can we realistically expect

a. How much of it is maintainable without American support?

(b. Bundy July 26 memo - page 4. My reading of French interviews here is not peace at any price.)

B. Victory plus settlement. Why settlement at this point?

1. To reassure N. Vietnam about absence of foreign bases.

2. To obtain agreed status for S. Vietnam

3. Who should negotiate?

4. What forums are available? Which are most desirable?

Criteria for Victory:

A. Do North Vietnamese have control and what does it take to shake their expectation of victory? Why should Hanoi be more inflexible than we? Why should we assume that we will quit before they do?

B. Schelling: What is our real objection to VC victory. Do we want unified South Vietnam (or unified Vietnam) closely tied to us?

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

RANDOM NOTES (continued)

- 3

[N]

Q C. Do the VC prisoners have political line? What is political motivation?

Q D. Are VC slowing down? Or are we not contesting areas?

E. Do we want N. Vietnamese to acknowledge influence or do we settle for tacit outcome?

Can they let it atrophy quietly or must they make formal agreements?

Is it in our interest to let DRV maintain posture that S. Vietnam war is indigenous?

Talk to them about stopping outside interference.

We then defeat and/or negotiate with VC to arrange their surrender.

F. Do we know who culprit is, VC or DRV. (1) Do we know they carry out agreement? (2) Do we know they do _not_ carry out agreement? If we don't know, we are really in trouble. Cheating may be lesser of problems. (3) What does it take to destroy authority of VC in hard-core areas.

G. What does it take to defeat VC and maintain it?

H. What do they have to risk to continue?

## II. Negotiated Outcomes

A. Four issues:

1. Preconditions for cessation of attacks on DVR

2. Political structure SVN

3. International Status of SVN

4. Policing and supervising machinery for the above

Are there any conditions in which we would stop pumping?

What are we willing to settle for exactly?

How to keep it stopped, what do we have to do to find out?

**UNRESOLVED QUESTION:** If we don't know what we want DRA to stop and the vote.

NTE? If they have self-government and a bar they can deliver PROBLEM: Can we conclude local self-government and national bar to the vote.

q. Economic assistance

c. Vote

p. Ceaseful military operations

s. End of air attacks

3. U2 does?

p. Terrorism

s. Fighting

Why so explicit?
Withdrawal agreements

2. AC atob:

q. Planning

c. Training

p. Sanctuary

recruit them
surrounded people--canimska

s. Infiltration

1. DRA atob:

C. Summary of negotiation issues:

Who among negotiator?

B. With whom do we negotiate?

CATEGORIES OF OUTCOMES (continued):

[A]

VNA Statement on Nonaligned Countries Appeal
Hanoi VNA International Service in English 1604 GMT 19 April 1965

To settle the Vietnam problem at present, the only correct way is to carry out the points laid down by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong on 8 April 1965.

It is the unswerving policy of the DRV Government to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:

1--Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, cancel its military alliance with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam, completely cease all enroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.

2--Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones, the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected (while?) the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries; there must be no foreign military bases, troops, and military personnel in their respective territory.

3--The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the NFLSV program, without any foreign interference.

4--The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

This stand unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace- and justice-loving governments and peoples in the world.

The DRV Government is of the view that the above-expounded stand is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference in the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam.

The DRV Government declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure a U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

EXTRACTS FROM OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF
GVN FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN VAN DO'S SPEECH ON THE OCCASION OF
THE "DAY FOR INTERNATIONAL AID" ON JUNE 22, 1965

For so many years now South Viet-Nam has been engaged in a war waged by the Communists. It has succeeded in maintaining the integrity of its territory and its liberty, thanks to the gallantstry of its sons and to friendly countries of the free world which are their sympathies and generous assistance.

To representatives of these countries are present here at the ceremony I express, on behalf of the Republic of South Vietnam, the expression of profound and heartfelt convey to their Government.

I deem it but fitting and proper to tell them what we do with their aid. Some is destined to relieve our people from the misery and puries of war, to lift up our ruins and reconstruct our country; some to help us to defend ourselves against Communist aggressors. I precisely said "to defend ourselves," because our primary objective remains search for peace and not extension or prolongation of war. We desire peace, but not peace at any cost. For peace to be just and durable the following points must be realized:

1. Since the present war in Viet-Nam was provoked by Communist aggression and subversion, first of all, it is important that subversive and military activities undertaken, directed and supported by outside forces against the independence and liberty of the people of South Viet-Nam must cease. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the two parts—principles declared in the Geneva Accords of 1954 as well as by international morality—must be respected. Consequently, the Hanoi Communist regime must dissolve all the puppet organizations it has formed in South Viet-Nam under the names of "Front for the Liberation of the South." "Liberation Radio" and the "People's Revolutionary Party." Also it must withdraw from South Viet-Nam troops, political and military cadres it had illegally introduced into South Viet-Nam.

2. South Viet-Nam must be left alone, to choose and shape for itself its own destiny in accordance with established democratic processes without any intervention of whatever form and whatever source. Obviously those could be realized only when the aggression initiated by the Hanoi regime is ended and its intimidation campaign against the South Vietnamese people decisively suppressed.

-2-

3. Only when aggression has ceased, and only then, it will be possible for the government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and for nations which provide it with assistance, to withhold defensive military measures on the territory of South Viet-Nam and outside its borders. Such measures are presently necessary for defending the territory of South Viet-Nam against Communist aggression. Besides, the government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is ready to ask these friendly countries to withdraw their military forces from South Viet-Nam. However, it shall reserve its right to take all measures to restore order and law on the entire territory of South Viet-Nam and to assure security for the people of South Viet-Nam as well as the right to call again for foreign assistance in case of renewed aggression or renewed threat of aggression.

4. Finally, the independence and liberty of the Vietnamese people must be effectively guaranteed.

If the Communist regime of Hanoi sincerely wants peace; if it is willing to place the interests of the nation above that of ideology or party; if it wishes that the Vietnamese people and the other peoples in Southeast Asia could enjoy peace instead of war, prosperity instead of misery, freedom instead of slavery, it has merely to put an end to aggression.

This is the only path which appears to us likely to lead to peace so that the South Vietnamese people can thoroughly profit from the assistance the friendly nations have so generously provided them.

[N]

Conversation with A -- September 28, 1965

A -- Unsolved question: After military have swept through area, what
does it take to bring it and maintain security and civil control?

Criteria for control: prevent large VC unit movement in daytime--
VC until recently had superior control of area.

HK -- Supposing they go down to smaller units, how do we deal with them?

A -- If SVN patrols aggressively, we can root VC out. Also use intelligence.
Everything depends on intelligence. (Question: Just what do we know about
the VC?) Our role is to keep large units from operating. Until now VC have
been withdrawing into safe areas. We propose to make these untenable by
B-52 raids and ground force sweeps. Question mark remains the ability to
maintain control over countryside. This is not an American, but a Vietnamese
problem.

Four phases

(1) Main operations

(2) Bringing security: regional & popular forces

(3) Maintaining security: national police

(4) Civil administration

note: (1) and (3) are the unsolved questions

Rivalry in VN among various American agencies. For example, Political Action
Teams (PATs) are useful. But suffer from two limiting conditions:

(1) Availability of personnel

(2) Ability to turn over province to police? And move out to new provinces.

(R.N. Make case study of Chui-Lai and war zones. Who is doing what to make sure the area remains safe?)

ensure the area remains safe.)

(G.M. Make case study of Chut-Lay and war zone. Who is doing what to make

(3) Ability to turn over province to police? And move out to new provinces.

(f) Availability of personnel

Teams (BATS) are useful. But suffer from two limiting conditions:

note: (1) and (3) are the unresolved questions

(4) Civil administration

Four phases (1) Main operations

problem.

maintain control over countryside. This is not an American, but a Vietnamese
B-23 raids and ground force swept. Question mark remains the ability to
been withdrawing into safe areas. We propose to make these intenapie dy
the AC?) Our role is to keep large units from operating. Until now AC gave
Everything depends on intelligence. (Question: Just what do we know about
A -- If SAM patrol aggressively, we can root AC out. Also use intelligence.

HK -- Undergoing they go down to smaller units, how do we deal with them?

AC until recently had superior control of area.

Criteria for control: prevent large AC unit movement in daytime--
dose it take to bring in and maintain security and civil control?

A -- Unresolved question: After military have swept through area, what

Conversation with A -- September 28, 1962

[N]

- 2 -

B-52 attacking morale of VC

Strategy:

(1) We employ our forces almost constantly

(2) Clean up base areas

(3) VC can't stand being in combat constantly because of
supply situation

(4) Rates of resupply must be increased. VC now fight only three days out of thirty. Requires more intensity of our effort.

Population leans to GVN.

U.S. troops not committed in IV Corps area. This is large population
and we prefer not to be source of constant friction.

Believes it is possible to win.

Probability that we can drive VC underground.

Probability is high that we can maintain civil administration.

Bombing of DRV - Purpose

(1) Hamstrings with Laos operations

(2) Raises question for VC whether game is worth candle

(3) Limited supplies may explain limited use of 325th Div.

(4) Have already imposed ceiling on forces they could bring in.

This applies to Chinese Communists as well. They can bring on large units
only via Laos and Burma. This could well explain the risk of general war to
intolerable levels.

Reaction to cease-fire in place

Our forces would be in great danger. Our forces would be very exposed.
Agreeable to cease-fire in which (a) we have freedom of movement and (b) we
accept surrender of VC units.

accept surrender of AC units.

Agreeable to cease-fire in which (a) we have freedom of movement and (b) we
Our forces would be in great danger. Our forces would be very exposed.

intolerable levels.

This abhorrance to Chinese Communists as well. They can bring on large units
only via Laos and Burma. This could well explain the risk of General war to

(3) Limited абbrüfie may explain limited use of 323rd Div.

(2) Ratese questionator AC whether game is worth candle

(1) Hamstring with Laos operations

Bomping of DRA - Purpose

propability is high that we can maintain civil administration.

propability that we can drive AC underground.

U.S. troops not committed in IV Corbe area. This is large population

Population leams to GAN.

effort.

three days out of thirty. Reduces more intensity of our

(4) Rates of resupply must be increased. AC now tight only

substant situation

(3) AC can't stand pelting in combat constantly because of

(2) Clean up base areas

B-23 attacking morale of AC

- 5 -

- 3 -

VC-DRV connection

Staff work is done in Hanoi.

Control of operations is from Hanoi.

Rate of fighting requires 10-15 tons of outside supplies a day.

Must force them to increase expenditure of supplies by 10 by constant
fighting. This we can stop. (Note: Others think rate of supplies is only
4.5 tons a day. Difference is that those who accept larger figure believe
that food for VC is brought in from outside.

Two conditions for pause of Rusk:

(1) Withdrawal of 325th

(2) End of infiltration

Chiefs reject it.

Package

(1) Amnesty

(2) End of terrorism

(Chiefs consider it very risky)

Questions to be asked of military

Military concepts: Phase I & II of Vietnam

- Pacification

- Bombing of North

Bombing of North

Pacification

(3) End of terrorism (Chiefs consider it very risky)

Package
(1) Amnesty

Chiefs reject it.

(3) End of infiltration
Two conditions for base of Risk: (1) Withdrawal of 352nd

4.2 tons a day. Difference is that those who accept larger figure believe fighting. This we can stop. (Note: Others think rate of subblies is only (CIA))

Must force them to increase expenditure of subblies by 10 dy constant
rate of fighting requires 10-12 tons of outside subblies a day.

Control of operations is from Hanof.

Staff work is done in Hanof.

AC-DRA connection

- 3 -

Conversation with B -- September 28, 1965

Questions to Vietnamese

Whom are you fighting?

Why?

What is successful outcome?

What is acceptable settlement?

What is to be done with indigenous VC personnel?

What contact exists between MLF and government?

B -- Believes that large percent of rice captured on way to cities indicates high degree of collusion. VC seize it at this late stage so that villagers can bet PL 480 rice as a substitute.

Why are we not controlling more roads? How can one be convincing at a distance of 10,000 miles that one is prepared to stay as compared to indigenous people who have no place to go.

a distance of 10,000 miles that one is prepared to stay as compared to
Why are we not controlling more roads? How can one be convincing at

so that villagers can get 480 rice as a bribe?

indicates high degree of collusión. AC seizes it at this late stage
B -- Believes that large percent of rice captured on way to cities

What contact exists between MIL and Government?

What is to be done with indigenous AC here?

What is successful outcome?

Why?

Why are you fighting?

Questions to Vietnamese

Conversation with B -- September 28, 1962

Conversation with C -- September 28, 1965

Nature of Government

All Presidential statements about negotiations have been cleared with
GVN. Depth of their agreement is questionable. Maybe even fail to understand
what we are doing.

-- As far as GVN foreign minister is concerned, he accepts what we are doing.

-- As far as generals are concerned, they will go along without understanding it. What they fear most is peace. They are right.

-- They recognize how divided now-Communist side is.

-- Feel no confidence in handling Communists in political contest when
a split SVN must handle united SVN.

-- Leadership mediocre. Same is true of NLF

-- Turmoil in Saigon concerns not whether to carry on war but how?

-- Utter lack of political experience of Vietnamese leaders. Experience
such as it is is conspirational.

-- Three C's of any government: consultation, conciliation, consensus.

In VN we are just at beginning of consultation. Vietnamese have Samson
complex: pulling temple down around themselves. For example, Quat--Chief
of State--conflict was pursued even though it meant end of civilian government.
Overwhelming fact of situation is regionalism. Works for us vis-a-vis. No,
against us because of refugees.

Overwhelming fact of situation is regionalism. Works for us via-s-via. No
of state--conflict was burred even though it meant end of civilian Government.
complex: bulging temple down around themselves. For example, Qat--Chief
In AN we are just at beginning of consultation. Vietnamees have Samsen

-- Three C's of any Government: consultation, conciliation, consensus.
and as it is its constitutional.

-- Utter lack of political experience of Vietnamees leaders. Experience
-- Turnoff in Saigon concerns not whether to carry on war put how?

-- Leadership mediocre. Same is true of MLK

a split SAM must handle united SAM.

-- Feel no confidence in handling Communists in political contest when
-- They recognise how divided now-Communist side is.

-- As far as Generals are concerned, they will go along without under-

-- As far as GVN foreign minister is concerned, he accepts what we are doing.
what we are doing.

GVN. Depth of their agreement is questionable. Maybe even fall to understand
VII Presidential statements about negotiations have been cleared with

## Nature of Government

Conversation with C -- September 28, 1962

Why do they fight?

(1) Northern refugees--especially Catholic--hate Communists

(2) To avenge casualties

(3) In part--anti-Chinese

More clear what they are against than what they are for. Local loyalties are strong. If division is moved out of its region of recruitment desertion rate goes way up immediately.

Degree of control of central government is tenuous. Corps commanders and province chiefs carry out orders if they feel like it. Khan was a schemer and maneuverer who finally discredited himself. Khan used to say there were three problems in Vietnam: DRV, VC and himself. He was right. Military remain united for time being. Danger will come when Thi hears "call of people." Generals having stood together during student demonstration there will be brief respite. Etnical have life of two-three months. Directorate about a year and longer if military situation continues to improve. Ky likely to be in that position because most easily discarded.

Challenges: Buddhist
Catholics not decisive as long as military stick together
Primary impetus for what we are fighting comes from North. Can stop VC if they want to. Should save our position on pause of bombing.

## Is Victory Possible?

Does not exclude it. Not because we can kill every VC but because of discouragement of mass of VC. Smells signs of that.

disengagement of mass of AC. Smells signs of that.

Does not exclude it. Not because we can kill every AC put because of

**In Victory Possible?**

they want to. Should save our position on base of pommig.

Primary投入 for what we are fighting comes from North. Can stop AC if

Challenge: Buddhist
Catholics not decisive as long as military stick together

apout a year and longer. It military situation continues to improve. Ky likely

there will be brief reabsorption. Kungfl have life of two-three months. Directorate

"call of people." General having stood together during student demonstration

Military remain united for time being. Danger will come when Thp hears

schemeer and maneuverer who finally discredited himself. Khan need to say

Degree of control of central government is tennous. Corba commanders

(3) In bart--anti-Chinese

(2) To avenge casualties

(1) Northern refugees--especially Catholics--hate Communists

Why do they fight?

- 2 -

[x]

It will take at least six months before impact of present troops can be felt. To make our troops effective two things need to be done. (1) invigorate defector program and (2) improve treatment of prisoners.

What should keep VC from going back to old tactics of simply melting away?

(1) Americans should not do pacification (i.e. clearing and holding a guerrilla infested area by rooting guerrillas out of population. It is a hopeless role for foreigner.

(2) Role of US forces is to defeat main force units. Pacification has hitherto been thwarted by raids of main force units. If these can be stopped local security can be handled by police and militia.

(3) In the highland area it is hard to mainforce units to melt into population because sparsely settled. (HK: Why won't they melt into population?)

(4) What if they avoid combat? Intelligence problem. In Delta it requires support of pupulation. In highlands there is need for better technical intelligence. At some point VC must defend their supplies.

We are in race for time?

-- 6 months before forces are effective

-- 6 more months before mainforce units are defeated

-- 1 year before visible improvement--if not we will have trouble with presence of our forces.

with presence of our forces.

-- I year beforeklep improvement--it not we will have troupe

We are in race for time?

technical intelligence. At some point AC must defend their subordinates.
require subport of population. In highlands there is need for better

(4) What if they avoid combat? Intelligence problem. In Delta it
population?)

population because abrassly settled. (HK: Why won't they melt into

(3) In the highland area it is hard to mainforce units to melt into
stopped local security can be handled by police and militia.

(2) Role of US forces is to defeat main force units. Bacification
a homeless role for foreigner.
use pitherto beem thwarted by raids of main force units. It these can be

a guerrilla intessted area by rooting guerrillas out of population. It is
(1) Americans should not do bactification (i.e. clearing and holding
away?

What should keep AC from going back to old tactics of simply melting
invasorate detector program and (2) improve treatment of prisoners.

- 3 -

- 4 -

N. Vietnamese feel tricked by 1954 accord.

HK -- If we win VC have three choices

(1) Accept *fait accompli*

(2) Negotiate to salvage what they can

(3) Lie low

Lie low incentive:

(1) Do not want to acknowledge defeat

(2) Don't trust negotiations

Problem exists even in case of negotiations. Assuming VC lie low when do we stop bombing? We have to reach judgment when incidents have stopped. Some withdrawal of troops. The more we talk about negotiations the harder it is for Hanoi to accept.

*What kind of a forum?*

Full dress Geneva is worst outcome: (1) we are not going to improve our military position through a conference (2) VC never give up territories (3) There will be a maximum number of intermediaries--not likely to stick on essential fine points.

(1) Nominal military meeting GVN-DRV is best. Technical military meeting. The purpose would be to withdraw VC mainforce units.

Drawbacks:

-- Technical competence of GVN to negotiate something like this is dubious

-- Verification

US ability to control positions taken by incompetent GVN

US agility to control boeitions taken by incompetent CAM
-- Verification

Drawbacks: -- Technical competence of CAM to negotiate something like meeting. The burboose would be to withdraw AC mainforce units.

(1) Nominal military meeting CAM-DMR is beat. Technical military likely to stink on essential time points.

territories (3) There will be a maximum number of intermediaries--not
improve our military position through a conference (3) AC never gives up
Full these Geneva is worst outcome: (1) we are not going to

What kind of a forum?

the harder it is for Hanot to accept.
atobed. Some withdrawal of troops. The more we talk about negotiations
when do we stop poming? We have to reach Judgment when incidents have
Problem exists even in case of negotiations. Assuming AC life low

(2) Don't trust negotiations

(3) Lie low

(3) Negotiate to salvage what they can

(1) Accept <u>fait accompli</u>

HK -- If we win AC have three choices

M. Vietnamese feel tricked by 1924 accord.

- 4 -

- 5 -

To do this DRV would have to admit:

-- that it controls VC

-- that it has been defeated

-- defeated by GVN

Everyone in Vietnam is agreed that VC cannot participate as political unit.

We don't know who can negotiate for VC

(2) Next best forum is to add US to previous scenario

(3) Geneva type forum - big multinational. Do you seek a new
international regime for SVN and SE Asia? Are not going to improve in
'54 accords.

Stop of Bombings

Rusk hint in press conference of end of infiltration and withdrawal
of organized DRV units is not enough--Cannot get intelligence about units.

Might settle for withdrawal of some mainforce units.

Pause prior to negotiations: If they go to conference <u>during</u> pause, it
will be impossible to start again. Stoppage of infiltraation is not enough
because (a) it cannot be controlled and (b) VC can conduct operations with what
they have. Therefore must have test of withdrawal which is physical withdrawal
of mainforce units.

of mainforce units.

they have. Therefore must have test of withdrawal which is physical withdrawal because (a) it cannot be controlled and (b) AC can conduct operations with what will be impossible to start again. Stobage of intitration is not enough

banae prior to negotiations: It they go to conference <u>during banae</u>, it

> Might settle for withdrawal of some mainforce units.

of organised DRA units is not enough--Cannot get intelligence about units.

Risk print in press conference of end of intitration and withdrawal

<u>Stob of Bompinga</u>

'24 seconds.

international regime for SAM and SE States? Are not going to improve in

(3) Geneva type forum - pig multinational. Do you seek a new

(3) Next past forum is to add US to previous scenario

We don't know who can negotiate for AC

Everyone in Alesund is agreed that AC cannot participate as political unit.

-- defeated by GAN

-- that it has been defeated

-- that it controls AC

To do this DRA would have to submit:

- 2 -

- 6 -

Cease-fire

(a) A cease-fire as a preliminary to negotiations in present stage is throwing in the sponge.

(2) Stopping shooting is throwing in the sponge.

(3) No way of observing much less controlling what VC are doing during that period. VC could regroup, redeploy during cease-fire while government forces wouldn't have same freedom.

HK -- Problems of cease-fire: (1) Contested areas and (2) recognized VC control in some areas. Either SVN falls apart or, what is the same thing, VC get recognized areas and legitimization. Conditions under which you stop shooing should be end of process not beginning. Government must have chance to exercise sovereignty over entire territory. Recognition of NLF. Fundamental that it can't be recognised.

C -- If there is amnesty VC are likely to coalesce under some other name. Saigon is not equipped for handling well-organized dissident group.

Can't negotiate internal political status of SVN

(1) Why don't we say price is going up the longer they delay?

(2) Make demands on status of N. Vietnam.

Military status of SVN - not get into it because too difficult

Withdrawal of US forces - regrouping & withdrawal

Withdrawal of US forces - reintegration & withdrawal

Military status of SAM - not yet into it because too difficult

(3) Make demands on status of U. Vietnam.

(1) Why don't we say brice to going up the longer they delay?

Can't negotiate internal political status of SAM

is not equipped for handling well-organised disorientated Group.

C -- If there is ammety AC are likely to coalesce under some other name. Saigon
ammety. But how do you keep them from coalescing under some other name.

Individual participation of AC in S. Vietnamese political affairs is
that it can't be recognised.

to exercise sovereignty over entire territory. Recognition of North. Fundamental
shooting should be end of process not beginning. Government must have chance
AC get recognised areas and legitimisation. Conditions under which you atob
control in some areas. Either SAM fails abart or, what is the same thing,
HK -- Problems of cease-fire: (1) Contested areas and (2) recognised AC

Government forces wouldn't have same freedom.

during that period. AC could regrond, redeploy during cease-fire while

(3) No way of observing much less controlling what AC are doing

(2) Stopping shooting is throwing in the aboage.

stage is throwing in the aboage.

(4) A cease-fire as a preliminary to negotiations in present

Cess-offire

- 6 -

[N]

Conversation with D -- September 28, 1965

VC lull in summer produced by Hanoi not by US actions. Deliberate
tactic to deny platform to Johnson for step-up of US military effort and to
think through negotiations.

Deal with NLF has the following disadvantages: (1) proxy of Hanoi --don't even pretend they are conducting autonomous operations, (2) it is better to deal with experienced partner, i.e. Hanoi. No Chinese direction of VC. Advice goes to Hanoi--not to VC.

NLF is hard on negotiations because its position depends on the belief
of its men that maximum terms will be insisted upon. Peking supports NLF
because of ideological position. Tactically Peking has no leverage--leverage
will come when they begin to die or when their aid becomes critical. Critical
point where negotiations were possible has already passed.

July 28-August 31 -- Hanoi seemed interested in negotiations. Indication of difference between Peking and Hanoi. Hanoi never engaged in public denunciation of US July 28 terms simply calling them insincere.

DRV dropped out of Chinese press after August 9th. August 31 tough line
appeared again. Depending on how our terms are spelled out and how we conduct
military operations another critical point may come. Mistake was to step-up
air operations while DRV was deliberating--gave them the feeling we were trying
to bomb them into negotiations. Rusk note during May pause taken as insult because
it simply threatened and offered nothing but end of bombing.

Interesting aspects of July 28th Soviet speech.

(1) Guarantee of ultimate withdrawal

(2) Amnesty for NLF

(3) Reunification on the basis of free choice

(3) Renunciation on the part of free choice

(3) Amnesty for MLF

Interesting aspects of July 28th MBA speech.

it simply threatened and offered nothing but end of pumping.
to pump them into negotiations. Risk note during May base taken as insult because
air operations while DRA was deliberating--gave them the feeling we were trying
military operations another critical point may come. Mistake was to ateb-nb
abashed again. Debating on how own terms are abetted out and how we conduct
DRA dropped out of Chinese press after August 9th. August 31 tough line
of 28 July 28 terms simply calling them insincere.

of difference between Peking and Hanot. Hanot never engaged in public denunciation
July 28-August 31 -- Hanot seemed interested in negotiations. Indication
point where negotiations were possible has already been.

will come when they begin to die or when their aid becomes critical. Critical
because of ideological position. Tactically Peking has no leverage--leverage
of its men that maximum terms will be insatiable upon. Peking supports MLF

MLF is hard on negotiations because its position depends on theผล
of AC. Advice goes to Hanot--not to AC.

better to deal with experienced partner, i.e. Hanot. No Chinese direction
--don't even pretend they are conducting autonomous operations. (3) it is
Deal with MLF has the following disadvantages: (1) proxy of Hanot
think through negotiations.

tactic to deny platform to Johnson for ateb-nb of 28 military effort and to
AC full in summer produced by Hanot not by 28 actions. Deliberate

Conversation with D -- September 28, 1962

- 2 -

[N]

Doesn't think N. Vietnam is hurt too badly:

(1) food supplies adequate

(2) bridges probably repaired with Chinese & Soviet help

(3) industry is largely long-term problem of long-term aid

(4) bombing hurts in Laos; delays in S. but that in time becomes normal

(5) long since expected bombing, therefore, not surprised

Will become interested in negotiations again only if (a) they do well in the air-war and (b) if they have some success in the South

Disagrees with notion that when VC can't win they will negotiate. Partly because if they yield to airpower now it makes their negotiating task harder later.

Three US misconceptions:

(1) Monsoon offensive was never designed to win this year

(2) Communists never doubted our resolve in the short run. Do doubt our ability to last five years.

(3) Will negotiate when they realize they cannot win.

Will negotiate if they think political track is cheaper than military track.

Will negotiate if they think political track is cheaper than military track.
(3) Will negotiate when they realize they cannot win.

don't our ability to last five years.

(3) Communique never doubted our resolve in the short run. Do
(1) Monsoon offensive was never designed to win this year
Three U2 misconceptions:

task harder later.

Partly because it they yield to airpower now it makes their negotiating
disagree with notion that when AC can't win they will negotiate.
well in the air-war and (p) if they gave some success in the South

Will become interested in negotiations again only if (a) they do
(2) long since expected pumping, therefore, not surprised

become normal

(4) pumping hurts in last; delays in 3. put that in time

(3) bridge properly repaired with Chinese & Soviet help

(1) food subsidies adequate

Doesn't think M. Aitoum is hurt too badly:

- 5 -

[A]

Conversation with E -- September 29, 1965

Outcomes: Cease-fire; Forums, Pause

Three problems about negotiations:

(a) In saigon: GVN feels we should not negotiate. If military situation is good GVN may feel no sense to quit now. Negotiations lead to collapse of government.

(b) Problem with Lodge opposed to negotiations for the same reasons.

On this side the conservative sector of opinion that supports
Administration takes same view as GVN and Lodge.

Need public support for proposition that this kind of war has no
victory add, if we come out where we came in we do well.

Must recognize that even a settlement implies

(1) Continued existence of DRV

(2) Continued existence of VC

Must realize that only possible outcome is limited one. Granted that
you come to some kind of settlement in which VC have same kind of role.
Doesn't know whether this will be (1) control over provinces, (2) membership
in government or (3) participation in electoral process.

At that point, in the process both sides bet that their preferred
solution will prevail under conditions of peace. Thus must have program of
political development.

political development.

solution will prevail under conditions of peace. Thus must have program of
At that point, in the process both sides get that their preferred
in Government or (3) participation in electoral process.

Doesn't know whether this will be (1) control over provinces, (2) membership
you come to some kind of settlement in which AC have some kind of role.

Must realize that only possible outcome is limited one. Granted that
(2) Continued existence of AC

(1) Continued existence of DRA

Must recognize that even a settlement implies
victory add, if we come out where we came in we do well.

Need duplicate subport for proposition that this kind of war pass no
Administration takes same view as GAM and Lodge.

On this side the conservative sector of opinion that supports
reasons.

(p) Problem with Lodge proposed to negotiations for the same
collaboration of Government.

situation is good GAM may feel no sense to quit now. Negotiations lead to
(s) In addition: GAM feels we should not negotiate. If military
Three problems about negotiations:

Outcomes: Cease-fire; Forum, Peace

Conversation with E -- September 29, 1962

- 2 -

-- Have some kind of long-range planning in economics

-- How do you create a society in such a divided country.
Not just VC-GVN but many other divisions: Buddhists,
Catholics, etc.

One of the problems is that we know nothing about nation-building.
Vietnamese have to do it. We can help. Perhaps create institnttes, etc.
Society building is even harder than nation-building.

GVN should have own group studying this problem.

GVN problem is (1) shortage of people. Perhaps we can deal with
top people now out of government because of Diem affiliation. Dip into
Diem reservoir. Have concentrated on short-term requirements of winning
war rather than society building.

Might settle for a Cambodia about 10% better.

Should have concept of goal & work back from that to negotiatons
What people must be trained for peace?

Should have concept of goal & work back from that to negotiatome

*   Might settle for a Cambodia spont 10% better.

Diem reservoir. Have concentrated on short-term requirements of winning
tob people now out of government because of Diem utilization. Dip into
GAM problem is (1) shortage of people. Perhaps we can deal with
GAM should have own group studying this problem.

Vietnamese have to do it. We can help. Perhaps create institutes, etc.

Catholics, etc.

Not just AC-GAM but many other divisions: Bussihiate,

- 3 -

[A]

[Y]

Conversation with G - September 29, 1965

Continuing facts of S. E. Asia if war ends.

Assume that war has halted. How it has halted will affect future.

As for negotiations must remember that Communists do not negotiate
with same motive as ours.

Least likely is formal end of war.

More likely is endless conference to dismantle our effort and maintain
their political and military infrastructure. Or else slow decline of military
operations to achieve same objective.

VN has great sense of peoplehood but little sense of nationhood.

Throughout history have had sense of belonging to group of which they are
proud, but not compulsion to work together. Three groups: N; Annamites;
S. have great suspicion of each other.

Religious differences.

Division between urban and rural population. Roughly division between
literates and illiterates.

Peasant very shrewd. Tends to equate all of political life with what he can affect.

Notion of elite with sense of responsibility foreign to educational system
which--such as it is--was designed to train French civil administrators.

Unlikely to have democratic process--more likely to have continuation
of military government for better or worse.

Unlikely to have democratic process--more likely to have continuation which--and so it is--was designed to train French civil administrators.

Notion of elite with sense of responsibility foreign to educational system can select.

Pesant very ahrend. Tends to equate all of political life with what he literates and illiterates.

Division between mpau and rural population. Roughly division between Religious differences.

2. have great ambition of each other.

brough but not compulsion to work together. Three groups: U: Ansmites; Throughout history have had sense of belonging to group of which they are VN has great sense of peoplehood but little sense of nationhood.

Operations to achieve same objective.

their political and military infrastructure. Or else slow decline of military More likely is endless conference to diamantie our effort and maintain Lessat likely is formal end of war.

with same motive as ours.

As for negotiations must remember that Communists do not negotiate Aanme that war has halted. How it has halted will affect future.

Continuing facts of S.E. Asia if war ends.

Conversation with G - September 29, 1962

[A]

-2

Economic: Credit more important than land reform.
More land can be brought under cultivation.
Can increase productivity.

Urban social revolution going on because leaders have lost touch with
people.

Chinese problems in extending political writ:

(1) Extremely doctrinaire and have no applicable theory.

(2) Chinese disliked

(3) US strength respected if we use it. Inaction is also form of decision.

H--Three questions:

(1) Military structure--does it unify country?

(2) Can rural development grow out of conduct of war?

(3) Is there civilian equivalent to military leaders?

G--As to (1) - Military are to some extent breaking down regional loyalties--
though must remember gap between officers and men.

(2) - Rural reconstruction goes on. But cleaning out main-force VC
is only beginning.

(3) There are young civilians in Vietnam analogous to military.

I --Generals are in this war as divided as civilians if on different lines.

J --Is motivation of youth in army used to achieve political indoctrination,
i. e. give sense of nationhood?

G--Some is done but not enough.

J --What is done? An hour, a week, a year, what?

1 --What is done? An hour, a week, a year, what?

I, e. give sense of nationhood?

1 --Is motivation of youth in army made to achieve political indoctrination,
I --Generals are in this war so divided as civilians it on different lines.

(3) There are homed civilians in Vietnamphanhodona to military
is only peabody.

(2) - Kursl reconstruction does on. But clean up main-force AC
though what remember dsb between officers and men.

G--Vs to (1) - Military are to some extent presaking down regional loyalties--

(3) Can rums development grow out of conduct of war?

(1) Military structure--does it imply country?

H--Three questions:

(3) US strength respected if we lose it. Action is a prior form of decision.

(3) Chinese disliked

(1) Extremely doctrine and have no applicable theory.

people.

Urban socialist revolution going on because leaders have lost touch with

Csu increase productivity.

-5

[A]

-3

[Y]

I -- More in paramilitary forces than in regular forces.

E-- Must remember that at end of effort VC will still exist. Must be realistic about goals in VN after cessation of hostilities. Must realize that outcome will be limited.

F-- estimate to Thomson that VC control 800th including dependents.

J-- Congress not ready for G presentation. Oriental long-term view doesn't apply to Congressmen who are elected every two years. Overestimate what we can expect in S. Vietnam even if we are successful militarily. If they got more information wouldn't leak so much of it.

K-- Would they continue to support our policy if they got all the facts?

J-- Doubtful--particularly if they got it at once. Any negotiated settlement is going to be considered a sell-out, not a compromise.

L-- Have mastered economic development techniques. Do not know techniques of political development even of economic programs.

Three programs: (1) Counterinsurgency - 400 individuals out of 1000 are working on it. Ranges from Chui Hoi program thru refugee program, medical program, hamlet schools, repairing war damage.

(2) Commercial import program - Through counterpart funds pay for military program. Reduces inflationary pressures even if it lines pockets of fat cat Chinese merchants.

(3) Long-range economic and social development - largely de-emphasized since 1962.

farther de-embarrassed since 1963.

(2) Lend-range economic and social development -

Chinese merchants.

tionsally breatherve even if it lines pockets of 1st est
lungs by for military program. Reduces inff-

(3) Commercial import program - Through counterparty

schools, rebuilding air FORCE.

through refundee program, medical program, pamjet
are working on it. Ranges from Chun Hoi program

Three programs: (1) Counterterrorism - 400 individuals out of 1000

I--Have mastered economic development techniques. Do not know techniques going to be considered a self-out, not a compromise.

I--Doubtful--particularly if they dot it at once. And negotiated settlement is
K--Would they continue to ambport our policy if they dot all the facts?

we can expect in 3. Vietnam even if we are successful militarily. If they dot
subly to Congressmen who are elected every two years. Overestimate what
I--Congress not ready for G presentation. Oriental lend-term view doesn't

E-- estimate to Tuition that AC control 800th including dependents.

will be limited.

spontaneous in VN after cessation of hostilities. Must realize that outcome

E--What remember that at end of effort AC will still exist. Must be realistic
I --More in parismilitary forces than in rearmament forces.

-3

[A]

-4

## Political Development

1. Push self-help. Make local people select program they most want in counterinsurgency program. Have local self-help team in provinces thus get 44 country teams.

2. Limitations: Can't win war alone. But with others such as PATS have established 160 new hamlets. But half were obliterated last year. Learned that economic deve. can't substitute for physical security.

3. Administrative inefficiency of GVN--occasional bad behavior of ARVN. In short, we can't take over country. Working with student groups; Buddhists; labor groups.

I -- Highly integrated nature of problem. Can't say military is stressed too much. Unless every member of team is winning everybody is losing. Sometimes felt smothered by weight of Washington support. Fragile governments can't handle complex pressure of US bureaucracy.

J -- What is effect of air attacks in SVN on infrastructure?

I -- Area of judgment. Have never heard GVN gov't complain about excessive use of airpower. Have always had problem of civilians in war. Must be careful but not stop. Indications are that it has had suppressive effect on VC morale. N. Vietnamese inS. welcome bombing of N. Has never heard complaints.

A -- B-52 raids without exception have been in areas which had no habitation.

A--B-52 raids without exception have been in areas which had no population complaints.

AC worse! N. Vietnam's in. Welcome pumping of N. Has never heard carefully but not stop. Indications are that it has had appreciable effect on sales of airpower. Have always had problem of civilians in war. What be I--Ares of judgment. Have never heard GVN dov't complain about excessive l--What is effect of air attacks in GVN on infrastructure? can't handle complex breather of US bureaucracy.

times felt smothered by weight of Washington support. Fragile governments miscalc. Unless every member of team is winning everybody is losing. Some- I --Highly integrated nature of problem. Can't say military is stressed too Bungkata! Ispor dronba.

ARAN. In aport, we can't take over country. Working with student dronba;

(3) Administrative inefficiency of GVN--occasional bad behavior of Leamed that economic deve. can't appreciate for physical security. have accomplished 160 new hamlets. But half were obliterated last year.

(2) Limitations: Can't win war alone. But with others auch as PATB get 44 country teams.

in countermandancy program. Have local self-help team in provinces thus (1) Lay self-help. Make local people select program they most want Political Development

-4-

Conversation with N -- October 1, 1965

If we were willing to stop Korean war with a linear stabilization
already achieved then Chinese will calculate we stop anything. Unless
they fear nuclear war won't negotiate.

NLF must become negotiating partner -- Can play on S & N differences.
Thinks in the Front there are many people who don't believe objective is
to unify S.VN. Isolate elements in opposition.

What about side-door negotiations with Front? Easiest group to deal
with may be NLF under cover of Cambodian or Laotion border conference.

Rusk position:

Plebiscite in unification

Free elections in S.

Military accords of '54 carried out

How can we convince N. that we mean to stay?

How can we convince M. that we mean to stay?

Military accord of '54 carried out

Free elections in S. Korea

Pleasant in unification

Rear position:

with may be UN under cover of Cambodian or Laotian border conference.

What about side-door negotiations with Front? Easiest group to deal to unity S. VN. Isolate elements in opposition.

Think in the Front there are many people who don't believe objective is UN must become negotiating partner -- Can play on S & N differences.

They fear unclear war won't negotiate.

Conversation with M -- October 1, 1962

Conversation with P -- October 4, 1965

Phang Nyu - Grey emminence of Ky group.

This group pops up in lots of unexpected ways.

Chui Hoi program head under Quat had worked beautifully with USOM man Perry.

Ky put it in with Ministry of Psychological Warfare. Americans outraged that their man was being thrown out.

McNamara and Taylor then pressed for Chui Hoi as separate ministry because they wanted to push it. Chui Hoi on American side was staffed by only one man John Perry -- too old.

P thinks Chui Hoi was member of cabal. Cabal may have reason for picking personnel and we should be sensitive to that.

Issues: (1) Judgment about Upper Level Saigon Politics

(2) To what extent do you strengthen ministries as against province chiefs.

(3) Pacification program. USOM programs are competing against each other. CIA competitive--Relationship to province chief. Shortage of personnel. VN government programs--Ministries--provinces.

Infrastructure must be changed.

Once we put in resources may be garden hose hooked up to fire hydrant.

Could fail by having too many resources.

Lodge should work out coordination on pacification. Must have coordinated approach.

Abbrach.

Lodge should work out coordination on pacification. Must have coordinated
Could fail by having too many resources.

Once we but in resources may be garden hose hooked up to fire hydrant.

Intrastructure must be changed.

Ministries--provinces.

Chief. Shortage of personnel. VN Government programs--

each other. CIW competitive--relationship to province

(3) Facilitation program. U20M programs are competing against
province chiefs.

(2) To what extent do you strengthen ministries as against
Issues: (1) Judgment about Upper Level Saigon Politics

bicking personnel and we should be sensitive to that.

P thinks Chut Hot was member of capal. Capal may have reason for
by only one man John Perry -- too old.

because they wanted to push it. Chut Hot on American side was stated
McNamara and Taylor then proposed for Chut Hot as separate ministry
outraged that their man was being thrown out.

Ky but it in with Ministry of Psychological Warfare. Americans
man Perry.

Chut Hot program head under Qaat had worked beautifully with U20M
This group bobs up in lots of unexpected ways.

Phang Wun - Grey emmence of Ky Sronb.

Conversation with P -- October 4, 1962

- 2 -

[4J]

Pacification program must be geared to military operations and between them can break back of VC. Would take VC a year to go back to old-style methods of political action.

Thinks increase in combat in Delta is greater aggressiveness of ARVN. If ARVN div. gets badly mauled NCO's hard to replace.

We have shifted our position: bomb in order to stop infiltartion.

Now we say bomb in order to get them to negotiate.

Must avoid de facto recognition of VC control. Should avoid control of territory and go after main forces.

Hanoi may de-escalate rather than negotiate.

VC moved from regional units to main forces--Undermined cohesiveness of local groups. Therefore, hard to de-escalate.

Free elections will come out on the basis of who controls
machinery.

Must be careful not to call into question legitimacy of Saigon
government.

Government.

Must be careful not to call into question legitimacy of Salton
machinery.

Free elections will come out on the basis of who controls
of local groups. Therefore, hard to de-escalate.

AC moved from regional units to main forces--Undermined cohesiveness
Hand may de-escalate rather than negotiate.

Must avoid de facto recognition of AC control. Should avoid control
Now we say pomp in order to get them to negotiate.

We have shifted our position: pomp in order to stop infiltration.
ARAN. It ARAN div. gets badly mauled MCO's a hard to replace.

Thinking increase in combat in Delta is greater aggressiveness of
methods of political action.

Pacification program must be geared to military operations and between
them can preak pack of AC. Would take AC a year to go pack to old-style

Conversation with Q -- October 6, 1965

If Hanoi thinks it can take over government without American pressure then incentive for following (1) US withdrawal, no more infiltration; end of bombing.

What happens to NLF? Can Hanoi get them to agree? NLF pressure for recognition - perhaps by stepping up incidents.

As for bombing, Hanoi might feel worst has happened and it is not unbearable.

Withdrawal of American troops is abandonment of our position.

Hanoi incentives: (1) GVN can't survive without massive American troop support.

(2) Therefore, let's get them out and then take over country.

Can Ho Chi Min deliver a slow take-over?

What assumptions can we make about US withdrawal.

(1) Phased withdrawal with NLF legal. In that case, NLF would press for our withdrawal.

(2) Phased withdrawal with NLF illegal.

Phase our withdrawal on basis of ICC report.

What do we do if we don't want to accept report. Hanoircan play up any settlement as political victory.

Having in this long period not succeeded in forming stable government.

What opportunities would GVN have vis-a-vis VC if there is stand-down in incidents plus political activities.

in incidents <u>blow</u> political activities.

What opportunities would CNN have via-a-vis AC if there is a stand-down
Having in this long period not succeeded in forming a stable government.
no any settlement as political victory.

What do we do if we don't want to accept report. Hanoir can play
Phase our withdrawal on basis of ICC report.

(3) Phased withdrawal with MLR illegal.

bless for our withdrawal.

(1) Phased withdrawal with MLR legal. In that case, MLR would
What assumptions can we make about US withdrawal.

Can Ho Cu Min deliver a slow take-over?

over country.

(2) Therefore, let's get them out and then take
troop export.

Hanoi incentives: (1) CNN can't survive without massive American
Withdrawal of American troops is abandonment of our position.

unbearable.

As for pumping, Hanoi might feel worst it has happened and it is not
for recognition - perhaps by stepping up incidents.

What happens to USA? Can Hanoi get them to agree? USA breather
infiltration; end of pumping.

breathe then incentive for following (1) US withdrawal, no more

Conversation with Q -- October 9, 1992

- 2 -

[Y]

Two choices: (1) Trade-up. More bombing. Risk of escalation. Have done worst--now they will take it.

(2) Make clear we plan no permanent occupation.

If we are planning a permanent occupation DRV has no incentive to settle for anything.

Ho Chi Min can't have global interest in humiliating us.

Assurances of end to infiltration and incident stand-down. Establish criteria.

NLF's power does not depend on its recognition. Thus some form of it will exist whatever the formal settlement.

Regrouping technically impossible.

Questions to ask:

(1) What would village and country be like if infiltration stopped and there is no fighting?

(2) How long would it take a Saigon government to do the right thing? What procedures can one devise to handle legal democratic parties?

Laos solution not possible because central government matters too much. Laos solution makes us look worse than when we say outcome is up to political process. Indefinite occupation is bad for us. Casualties hard to take domestically.

What staging can one envisage for withdrawal? Can one say 2-3 years? Does this give a fighting chance to get government established?

Does this give a fighting chance to get Government established?

What staging can one envisage for withdrawal? Can one say 3-5 years?
to take domestically.

Political process. Indefinite occupation is bad for us. Casualties hard
much. Lao solution makes us look worse than when we say outcome is good to
Lao solution not possible because central Government matters too
thing? What procedures can one device to handle legal democratic parties?
(2) How long would it take a Saigon Government to do the right
and there is no fighting?

(1) What would village and country be like if infiltration stopped
Questions to ask:

It will exist whatever the formal settlement.

What a power does not depend on its recognition. Thus some form of
criteria.

Assurances of end to infiltration and incident stand-down. Established
Ho Chi Minh can't have global interest in humiliating us.
to settle for anything.

It we are planning a permanent occupation DRA has no incentive

Two choices: (1) Trade--no. More pumping. Risk of escalation.

- 2 -

[4]

QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED

-- How can we convince N. that we mean to stay?
long-term programs

-- Result: What if they first stand down?

Might lead to cease-fire?

-- Just what do we know about VC?

-- In the highland area it is hard for mainforce units to
melt into population because sparsely settled. Why won't
they melt into population?

-- Three questions:

(1) Military structure - does it unify country?

-- Are we better off when it is officially US-VC war? How do
we look when we need 500th men to contain indigenous force.
Whatever control of DRV over VC, might VC have incentive to stop
to save DRV?

-- Tacit agreements -- Are there any conditions in which we would
stop bombing without formal agreement? What other tacit outcomes are
possible?

Tacit means - DRV must do something specific and we may be forced
to explain under what conditions we would resume.

QUESTIONS

-- Do the VC prisoners have political line? What is political
motivation?

-- Are VC slowing down? Or are we not contesting areas?

-- Do we want N. Vietnamese to acknowledge influence or do we settle
for tacit outcome?

-- Can they let it atrophy quietly or must they make formal agreements?

-- Is it in our interest to let DRV maintain posture that S. Vietnam
war is indigenous?

-- Talk to them about stopping outside interference.

-- We then defeat and/or negotiate with VC to arrange their surrender.

-- Do we know who culprit is, VC or DRV

(3) What does it take to destroy authority of VC in hard-core areas?

-- What does it take to defeat VC and maintain it?

-- What do they have to risk to continue?

(3) What does it take to destroy authority of VC in hard-core areas?
we are(3) easily in trouble. Cheating may be lesser of problems.

(2) Do we know they do not carry out agreement? If we don't know,

-- Do we know who刑brit is, AC or DRA

-- We then defeat and/or negotiate with AC to arrange their surrender.

war is indigenous?

-- Is it in our interest to let DRA maintain posture that S. Vietnam

for tacit outcomes?

-- Are AC slowing down? Or are we not contesting areas?

motivation?

-- Do the AC prisoners have political line? What is political

QUESTIONS

QUESTIONS

-- What would village and country be like if infiltration stopped
and there is no fighting?

-- How long would it take a Saigon government to do the right thing?
What procedures can one devise to handle legal democratic parties?

What procedures can one device to handle legal democratic parties?
-- How long would it take a Saigon Government to do the right thing?

and there is no fighting?

QUESTIONS

Questions to Raise

1. Are we looking for excuse to stop or to continue?

2. How important is pumping?

3. How do we know all units have been installed?

4. How much does it take per day to supply one AC?

5. Why cannot AC units build

[N]

Questions for Military

1. What is Chinese capability to intervene in S. Vietnam? Land?
   Air?

2. Unsolved question: After military have swept through area, what
does it take to bring in and maintain security and civil control?

Criteria for control: Prevent large VC unit movement in daytime
--VC until recently had superior control of area.

3. Military concepts:

Phase I & Phase II of Vietnam

Pacification

Bombing of North

4. Why are we not controlling more roads?

[Y]

THINGS TO DO

1. Take provincial report with me on trip. Spend an evening with them, when in IV Corps.

2. Coastal towns in II Corps area -- refugee problem

Qui Nhon-NhaTrang-Pleiku--overwhelming number of Americans in little towns.

3. Camean Bay

4. Mac V people in field - sector advisors -- problems of province

5. 3rd Group refugee settlement in new territories

THINGS TO DO

1. Take provincial report with me on trip. Send an evening

with them, when in IV Corps.

3. Little towns.

4. Mac A people in field - sector advisors -- problems of province

3. Canadian Bay

2. 3rd Group refugee settlement in new territories

[y]

PEOPLE TO SEE

Tran Van Do

Quat

Diem Secretary in PM's office

Thieu

Tri Quan - Mel Levin

Father Quinh

Co - Minister of Defence

General Chieu - Secretary General - National Directory Committee

General Ky

Burr (Labor Union)

Chin - Secretary of Psychological Warfare

General Nguyen Khanh

Ton Tat Tin - Economist & Journalist GVN '54 delegation

Diplomats: Blair Seaborn - Canadian ICC

David Amderson - Australian Ambassador

Ed Rice - Consulate General

John Holdridge - Chief, China Section

William Wells - Station Chief CIA (small briefing)

William Weile - Station Chief CIV (small printing)

John Holridge - Chief, China Section

Ed Rice - Consulate General

David Vandereen - Australian Ambassador

Diplomate:

Blair Seaporn - Canadian ICC

Tom Tat Tin - Economist & Journalist GVM '54 delegation

General Nguyen Khanh

Burr (Labor Union)

General Ky

General Chen - Secretary General - National Directory Committee

Co - Minister of Defence

Father Gump

Tru Quan - Mel Levin

Thien

Drew Secretary in MW's office

Qust

Tran Van Do

PROFESSION TO SEE

[A]

(513) GR 601541

Los Angeles
1461 Sunset Boulevard
Bel Air Sands Hotel

much smaller than others mentioned
180 rooms, 1st class, not too small

Beverly Hilton

(513) 578-0500

Beverly Hills
Bico Boulevard at Beverwill Drive
Beverly Hillicrest Hotel
120 rooms, the works

(513) Greatorew P-5521

Beverly Hills
3641 Sunset Boulevard
Beverly Hills Hotel

$14 and nb for a single
Sardens
very nice, dining, dancing, pool,

HOTELS IN BEVERLY HILLS

9

about what we are after. We are interested in starting a political
process, even if the outcome of that process is not to our advantage.

COHEN asked what is the basis of Pye's optimism.

PYE: I am not optimistic, but I am not pessimistic. The
Viet Cong may have made a mistake in deciding last November to go
to stage three and to make itself utterly dependent on supplies
from the North. They are now operating at the batallion level.
They have depleted their guerrilla force, their rate of defection
is up, their pressure on the countryside (taxes, manpower demands,
etc.) is increasing. Psychologically they cannot go back to the
guerrilla level. We are heading for a "real hard crunch." The
Saigon governmental picture is not pretty but on the other hand
it is not too bad.

Regarding what Shulman said about the desirability of
negotiations, we should consider the possibility that negotiations
will make the parties adopt a hard line. If we force the Chinese
to the conference table, they might become more rigid and
intransigent. It may have been a mistake for us to move from the
linkage between bombing and infiltration and supplies to the linkage
of bombing with negotiations.

CAVERS: There has been one glaring omission in our discussion.
The problem involves the rest of the world, not only the parties
immediately concerned. Our involvement in Vietnam is creating
tension and misunderstanding for us all around the world--and the

10

establishment of enclaves might increase this tension. We need
the intervention of others to help settle the problem. Possibly
the UN.

KATZ (mostly to Shulman): We need to state--or at least
to know--our aims in order either to negotiate or to fight
intelligently. Anything this group can contribute to the clarification
of aims could be useful. If we enter negotiations without knowing
what our objectives are, we will cut a sorry figure and we will
fall flat on our face.

PADELFORD: Vietnam is the wrong war at the wrong time in
the wrong place.

Regarding a future meeting, it was agreed at Brown's
suggestion that a small steering group composed of Cavers,
Kissinger and Brown and possibly a few others would consult
widely with the group in September and decide whether, in the
light of the situation at that time, another meeting would be
useful and what documentation would be required. There was
general agreement that we had gone as far as it would be useful
to go in general discussion and that any future meeting should
be based on prepared papers or at least a careful delineation
of the issues.