# Stennis Panel to Probe Document Shift

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Armed Services Committee decided yesterday to investigate the unauthorized funneling of secret White House documents to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1971

Committee Chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) said it was decided to hear testimony by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and the chairman of the joint chiefs, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, "as soon as possible on this matter."

In a statement issued after the closed-door meeting, Stennis said that after these two officials have been heard, "the committee will decide what further steps to take."

This leaves open whether the committee also will hear from several other figures central to allegations raised in recent weeks about a military spy ring operating within the Kissinger-run National Security Council that was bent on keeping the military brass informed about Kissinger's activity.

There was no mention in the Stennis statement of deliberate plans to ask Navy Yeo-man 1/C Charles E. Radford to testify. Radford allegedly was involved in accumulating documents to be sent back to Adm. Moorer's office, and in passing material to columnist Jack Anderson.

Radford, who has denied these allegations, was transfer-

red but never punished. It remains unclear if the yeoman was simply "overzealous" in his duties, as has been alleged, or if he was ordered by superiors to use all methods to collect data.

Similarly, Radford's boss in the joint chiefs' White House liaison office, Adm. Robert O. Welander, was not mentioned, nor was former White House aide David Young.

Young was a member of the White House "plumbers" group formed to investigate news leaks and later, the military document-passing operation.

Young is also the author of a report that allegedly describes the liaison office operation as a military spy ring.

In a recent press conference, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger said his own informal investigation indicated there had been some "improprieties" but not "illegalities" and no military "spy ring" operating.

Schlesinger indicated that while he had not read the Young report, the Pentagon's own investigation led him to believe the episode had "been blown out of all context" and that if Young had concluded there was a "spy ring," such a conclusion was wrong.

Yet the former chief of the plumbers, Egil (Bud) Krogh, said in Seattle last week that Schlesinger would not have made such remarks if the Pentagon chief had read the Young report.

HAK: Relationship with David Young

Secretary Kissinger first met David Young when the Secretary was working with Governor Rockefeller in New York. David Young was an attorney with the law firm that worked for the Rockefeller family. The Secretary also knew Mr. Young's family, and had a very high opinion of him. [HAK: Confirmation Hearings]

After he came to Washington in 1969 to serve as the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Mr. Kissinger asked David Young to work for him as his personal assistant and appointments secretary, which Mr. Young agreed to do. He worked as appointments secretary approximately from January 1970 to January 1971, when he asked to be transferred to more substantive work. Because Mr. Young's experience had been exclusively in domestic affairs, no substantive position at the NSC was immediately found for him, and between January and June 1971 he worked in the NSC files. [HAK: Confirmation Hearings]

In early July 1971,* during Mr. Kissinger's first trip to China, Mr. Young transferred to Mr. Ehrlichman's staff, either at his own or Mr. Ehrlichman's initiative, for the announced purpose of working on a project concerned with changing the Government's declassification procedures. Mr. Kissinger was told initially that this project would last approximately three months. However, after the project was concluded, Mr. Ehrlichman told Mr. Kissinger that David Young would remain on Mr. Ehrlichman's staff. [HAK: Confirmation Hearings]

Mr. Kissinger was not informed of any of Mr. Young's responsibilities or activities after June 1971 except for the declassification project. Mr. Kissinger neither recalls nor has any record of any communication or contact with David Young between June 1971 and March 1973, except for the receipt of three memoranda in May, June and August of 1972, each of which dealt with declassification. In March 1973, David Young

*On Sept. 7 at his Confirmation Hearings, HAK said the transfer took place in June, 1971; he also said the transfer took place during his first secret trip to China, which took place July 7-9. On Sept. 10 in those hearings he agreed with Chairman Fulbright that it occurred in July 1971.

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requested Mr. Kissinger's assistance in finding another
job, a request made presumably because Mr. Kissinger had
originally brought him to Washington. [HAK: SFRC Ex.Sess.
1/29/74; to be publ.]

In two instances during this period David Young
was brought to Mr. Kissinger's attention, although
there was no contact between them. The first was on
December 13, 1971 when he received from General Haig
a note putting through a routine promotion for David
Young. Mr. Kissinger wrote on that note "Why are we
carrying him when he is working for Ehrlichman?"
The second instance occurred on December 24, 1971,
when Mr. Ehrlichman asked Mr. Kissinger to listen to
a portion of a taped questioning of Admiral Welander
in connection with security leaks leading to the
Jack Anderson stories on the India-Pakistan conflict
and with the unauthorized transfer of NSC documents to
the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Kissinger
recognized the interrogator's voice as that of David
Young. In this instance as well there was no contact
of any kind between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Young.

[HAK: Press Conference, 1/22/74; dates added in SFRC Ex.Sess. 1/29/74; to be publ.]

Press Conference Statement - 1/22/74

Confirmation Hearings Statement

I. Knowledge of David Young's activities

Mr. Secretary, while you were away, it was disclosed here through the White House and the Pentagon that the U.S. military had been receiving certain unauthorized National Security Council documents by such devices as going through your briefcase, because they were worried about your policy on China and the Soviet Union, and further that when you heard about it, that you were furious and demanded the transfer of the guilty parties.

This becomes a matter of curiosity to me because I found myself wondering and wanting to ask you how you knew that these things were happening, when I recall your sworn testimony before the Senate was that you didn't know about the existence of the Plumbers, had no contact with David Young, and thought he was doing something else.

Mr. Kissinger....To be specific, I did not know that David Young was conducting an investigation into the matter of the Anderson leaks. He never talked to me about this, or any other subject, while he was conducting what I now know was his investigation. I did not instruct him, nor did I request it. I never saw the report, nor did I know that the report existed until I read it in a newspaper

Senator Percy....I think for the record, Dr. Kissinger, it would be well to have your comments about a former employee of your own, Mr. David Young, who has been indicted for conspiracy and burglary.

Did you, when he left your employment and was transferred to Mr. Ehrlichman, have any idea at that time or any subsequent time that he was to be requested to engage in illegal activities -- burglary, conspiracy to burglary, or whatever they might be.

Mr. Kissinger. Senator, I have no knowledge of any such activities that David Young may have engaged in. I did not know of the existence of the "Plumbers' Group," by that or any other name. Nor did I know that David Young was concerned with internal security matters.

Perhaps I should explain for the record my connection with David Young. I hired David Young because I had met him in New York when I was associated with Governor Rockefeller, and he was a member of the law firm that worked for the Rockefeller family. When I came to Washington, I was looking for a man of high moral standards, whom I knew personally, who could work as a personal assistant and appointments

early last week.*

I have called both Senator Fulbright and Senator Stennis and told them that I would be prepared to meet with their committees to answer any questions that they might have on this subject.

Q. One quick follow up, who interrogated Admiral Welander?

A. I believe he was interrogated by David Young, but from this one could not suppose that David Young was conducting an investigation.

Q. Did you know David Young had performed the interrogation?

A. I knew that David Young had performed the interrogation, but I had assumed that since we had sent Admiral Welander to Mr. Erlichman's office, Mr. Erlichman had designated one of his staff members to take whatever report Admiral Welander had to give.

I repeat again, we were not told about either the investigation preceding it or the investigation following it, and I had no contact whatever with David Young during that period....

*General Haig has himself assured me that he had no contact with David Young on the report or related matters.

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secretary. David Young worked in that capacity. He was very highly recommended. I also knew his family, and I thought extremely highly of him. And I must say that in my own experience I never had any reason to change my mind.

He worked in this capacity as my appointment secretary for a year, from roughly January 1970, to January 1971. That position is one of the more exhausting ones in the Government, for both practical and I suppose psychological reasons. David Young therefore asked to be transferred to more substantive work. We could not find any substantive work for him immediately because all of his experience had really been in domestic affairs. So David Young worked in the files; he didn't even have an office from January 1971, through June 1971. He accompanied me occasionally to meetings, but basically he was no longer working in my outer office; he was working with people located in the files.

In June 1971, David Young -- on his own initiative or Mr. Ehrlichman's, I don't know which -- transferred to Mr. Ehrlichman's staff. David Young had met Mr. Ehrlichman because Mr. Ehrlichman and I sat across from each other on Air Force 1 and David Young sat next to me and Mr. Ehrlichman's assistant sat next to him. In fact, the transfer occurred while I was on my first secret trip to China.

At that time I was told that David Young would work on a project for 3 months concerned with changing the declassification procedures of the Government, a project that was publicly announced and which published a public report [Executive Order 11652, March 8, 1972]. After this project ended, I was told by Mr. Ehrlichman that David Young would stay on his staff, and I had no contact with David Young either by telephone or in my office or in any other way after he left my staff, although I continued to have high regard for him.

In short, I did not know either from him or anyone else about the existence of the "Plumbers," as I said, by this or any other name, or about his activities in connection with internal security matters. I think it was a deplorable event...pages 51-2 of SFRC Report, Part I - September 7, 1973.

The Chairman. I have one last question growing out of your questioning the other day. I did not have an opportunity to ask you about this. You testified that Mr. David Young left your office and went to Mr. Ehrlichman's office in July, I believe, of 1971.

Mr. Kissinger. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman. Did he continue on your payroll, carried as an employee of your office during the period that he was in Mr. Ehrlichman's office.

Mr. Kissinger. As I was looking over the transcript, Mr. Chairman, I was tempted to add an explanation about that, and I am, therefore, glad that you give me the opportunity to add to this.

Mr. Young continued to be paid from National Security Council funds for the technical reason that employees in the various organizations in the White House are very often carried on payrolls of other organizations. The Domestic Council at that time did not have independent funds and, therefore, an administrative arrangement was made for him to continue to be paid out of those funds. Also, there was the expectation that eventually he would return to the staff.

I must say that I was not aware of this until after about 7 months, when a routine request for promotion came into my office, and I wrote on it, and asked what we were paying him for if he was working for Mr. Ehrlichman.

It was a technical, administrative arrangement. It had nothing to do with his obligations. And I must repeat what I said on Friday, that I was not aware even of the location of his office or his duties beyond the declassification exercise I mentioned yesterday, nor did I have any contact with him.

The Chairman. It is very unusual procedure, though, to have a man engaged in setting up an organization which has come to be called the plumbers being on the payroll of the National Security Council, is it not?

Mr. Kissinger. Well, it would be a very unusual procedure if he had been hired for that purpose. It is not such an unusual procedure if he is being transferred to another section of the White House, particularly, Mr. Chairman, if you keep in mind my perception of what he was doing. My understanding was that he would work for Mr. Ehrlichman on the new declassification system, which is, of course, a matter in which the National Security Council has an interest. That was publicly announced, and indeed, Mr. Young held a press briefing together with Mr. Ehrlichman on that subject.

The matter to which you refer is something I knew nothing about, and he would not have been paid from funds controlled by the National Security Council if I knew that he was engaged in any such activities. pages 68-9 of SFRC Report, Part I, September 10, 1973.

## II. Knowledge of Existence of the Plumbers

This incident arose out of the leakage of highly classified documents containing minutes of meetings of the Washington Special Action Group on the India-Pakistan crisis to a columnist. As a result of this leak, Mr. Erlichman, who was in charge of all internal security investigations in the White House, started an investigation of this particular leak.

Sometime after this, Admiral Welander, who was in charge of the JCS Liaison Office at the NSC, came to General Haig and told him that the internal evidence of at least one of the documents suggested to him that the leak to the columnist had occurred from his office.

I was out of town at the time. When General Haig informed me of this, I told him to turn that matter over to Mr. Erlichman.

Sometime later, I don't have the exact dates, several weeks later, Mr. Erlichman let me see -- or rather listen -- to the interrogation of Admiral Welander with respect to this particular incident. And, in the course of this interrogation, there was developed an allegation not only with respect to the source of the leak, but also about the unauthorized transfer of documents from my office to the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Kissinger.... After some months of this procedure, in the summer of 1970 it was decided that the internal security aspects of national security should be separated from the foreign policy aspects, in other words, that my office should no longer have anything to do with the internal security aspects of national security. From then on all these reports went to Mr. Haldeman's office and not to mine. Also, from that time on my office did not participate in any of the other internal security operations that have recently come to public attention.

Informal liaison was maintained, however, in the one area that had predated this decision, between General Haig and Mr. Sullivan of the FBI. If the wiretaps that continued developed information of sufficient gravity, Inspector Sullivan would call up General Haig and either inform him of that fact or call his attention to the fact that a report containing that information had been sent to Mr. Haldeman.

At this point I remember only one such event, but there may have been others.

This is the extent of the participation of my office in a program that we had reason to believe followed procedures of preceding administrations, and that was carried out by procedures believed to be legal at the time, and in which every individual action was individually authorized by both the Director of the FBI and the

Beyond this one interrogation, I was
told nothing about the investigation,
either preceding or following this
interrogation.

....I must add that I was not aware of
the fact that a report was being prepared
by Mr. Erlichman, and I have never seen
that report. Nor have I seen the report
of the investigation that was conducted
by Secretary Laird's office. And
therefore what I am saying is based on my
personal knowledge of the incident which
is confined to this one interrogation
of one individual who volunteered his
information first to my office. These
reports must have come to conclusions
similar to the ones I have outlined
here, because no disciplinary action
was taken by the addressees of this
report.

....I repeat again, we were not told
about either the investigation preceding
it [interrogation of Admiral Welander] or
the investigation following it, and I
had no contact whatever with David Young
during that period.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to clarify, you
said you participated in the interrogation.

A. I did not participate in the
interrogation.

Q. Could you clarify that you read
or listened to a tape of the interrogation?

A. I listened to a portion of the tape
of the interrogation.

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Attorney General, and in which the results
of the investigation came to my office only
for a while, only when they concerned
national security matters, and after that
not at all...pages 12-13, SFRC Report
Part I, Sept. 7, 1973

Mr. Kissinger. Senator, I have no
knowledge of any such activities that David
Young may have engaged in. I did not know
of the existence of the "Plumbers' Group,"
by that or any other name. Nor did I know
that David Young was concerned with internal
security matters....page 51, SFRC Report
Part I, Sept. 7, 1973

Mr. Kissinger.... In short, I did not know
either from him [David Young] or anyone else
about the existence of the "Plumbers," as I
said, by this or any other name, or about
his activities in connection with internal
security matters. I think it was a
deplorable event....page 52, SFRC Report
Part I, Sept. 7, 1973

Mr. Kissinger.... The matter to which you
refer is something I knew nothing about, and
he would not have been paid from funds con-
trolled by the National Security Council if
I knew that he was engaged in any such
activities....page 69, SFRC Report
Part I, Sept. 10, 1973.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, why didn't you find
out the total results of the investigation and
the interrogation of Admiral Welander?

A. Because I was told that I was not to
be informed of it.

Q. By whom were you told?

A. I have said all that I will say on
this subject. All internal security matters
in the White House after May 1970 were
handled by Mr. Erlichman's Office, and
therefore it was not unusual for this to be
conducted in the established framework.

CONFIDENTIAL - NODIS

PROFILES OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE MEMBERS

STENNIS - Personally and genuinely concerned about the defense "spying" issue; generally supportive of the President but the extent of his activity on behalf of the war powers bill shows that he is deeply troubled by the executive-legislative balance.

SYMINGTON - Has evolved into one of the Pentagon's most pungent critics; tough, combative, and very well-informed.

JACKSON - Almost as critical of the military as Symington, but more in favor of big defense spending; very critical of our approach to the energy crisis, MFN, detente, and the wisdom of less than all-out support for Israel.

ERVIN - Has largely maintained traditional Southerner's support for the President on foreign and security issues; his *Pacem in Terris* speech showed his concern for unilateral presidential action in foreign affairs, especially executive agreements. One of the few Democrats to vote *against* the War Powers Bill.

CANNON - Thrust into recent and temporary prominence as Chairman of Rules Committee which heard Ford nomination; strong supporter of the military. A highly responsible moderate.

MCINTYRE - Influenced strongly by Symington and Kennedy.

BYRD - One of the Senate's strongest fiscal conservatives; support of military second only to that.

HUGHES - Has openly criticized Stennis for not holding open hearings on their "spying" issue; the Committee's most consistently liberal voice, and skeptical of military costs and extent of military influence on foreign policy.

CONFIDENTIAL
NODIS

CONFIDENTIAL - NODIS

2.

NUNN - Freshman protege of Jackson, with whom he co-sponsored amendment on NATO offset which bears their names. A sensible, thoughtful individual striving to become known for his responsible, statesmanlike approach.

THURMOND - Perfervid supporter of the military establishment; leader of Senate opposition to any changes in the Panama Canal status quo.

TOWER - Strong supporter of the Administration and the military establishment; Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee with whom you will have lunch on February 19.

DOMINICK - Conservative who has been strongly pro-Administration; Watergate has visibly shaken that loyalty.

GOLDWATER - Another strong supporter of the military; even-handed on the Middle East, but fiercely his own man.

WILLIAM SCOTT - Makes the other Senator from Virginia look like a liberal; conservative to such a degree that his natural bent toward the military conflicts with fiscal tightfistedness, and he comes out against, for example, security assistance.

TAFT - Just named to this Committee to replace Saxbe; thoughtful, responsible, moderate.

CONFIDENTIAL
NODIS

January 29, 1974

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER

SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Kissinger. Mr. Chairman, if you would permit me, before we get into the Middle East, I would like to say a few words to the Committee about a matter that was in the newspapers while I was gone and about which I made a press statement. I should like to make this statement since it concerns testimony I gave before this Committee, and because my relationships with this Committee mean a great deal to me. I wondered, therefore, whether you would let me make a short statement.

The Chairman. Certainly.

Secretary Kissinger. The subject is my relationship with David Young. If you remember, Mr. Chairman, at my confirmation hearings Senator Percy asked me the following question:

"Did you, with respect to David Young when he left your employment and was transferred to Mr. Ehrlichman, have any idea at that time or any subsequent time that he was to be requested to engage in illegal activities, burglary, conspiracy to burglarize or whatever that might be?"

I then gave a long answer explaining my relationship to David Young, the gist of which was that I did not know about the "Plumbers" by that or any other name; that my knowledge of David Young's assignment was that he was to work on the declassification of

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documents. I also said, "I did not know from him or anybody else about the existence of the 'Plumbers' by this or any other name, or about his activities in connection with internal security matters."

My answer was in the context of the question that was asked. Let me now sum up my knowledge of the so-called spying activities on my staff and then you gentlemen can decide for yourselves whether my knowledge of David Young's activity constituted knowledge of internal security matters.

I repeat, I stand by every word I have said before the Committee. I did not know about the "Plumbers", I did not know that David Young's assignments included investigation of internal security matters. It was my belief that David Young was assigned to John Ehrlichman's staff to work on declassification and whatever other assignments John Ehrlichman might give him, but I did not know what these other assignments were.

I stated before the Committee, and I repeat again, that based on my recollection and on my logs, which is the only evidence I now have, I never saw David Young after he left my staff, I never telephoned David Young after he left my staff, and I never communicated by any other means with David Young after he left my staff.

I received from David Young three memoranda after he left my staff. They are dated May 11, 1972; June 15, 1972; and

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August 11, 1972. Each of them dealt with declassification. I had
no other communication with David Young.

It is, of course, not precluded -- because my logs would not
show it -- that I ran into him in the halls of the White House on
some occasion, or at a cocktail party. I have no such recollection,
but I do want to leave some margin, since something of that sort
could have occurred. But I have no recollection of any meetings with
David Young until he had resigned in March of 1973 and asked me
whether I could help him find another job.

He came to me because, as I have told this Committee, I had
brought him to Washington to work for me originally.

The only other memorandum in my files dealing with David
Young is a note to me from General Haig on December 13, 1971,
which put through a routine promotion for Young. I wrote on that
note "Why are we carrying him when he is working for Ehrlichman?"
These are all the records that I have on David Young.

Now, let me turn to the matter of the alleged spying. You
gentlemen are all familiar with the Anderson stories on the India-
Pakistan War, stories in which there were very substantial leaks of
National Security Council documents in early December, 1971.

Around December 12th or 13th -- I do not have the exact date --
John Ehrlichman called me and said that he was conducting an

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investigation into these leaks, that I was not to be told about this
investigation, and that I was not to do anything in connection with
this investigation. He also told me that as part of that investigation
he might have to investigate members of my staff and security
procedures in my office. I told him, through General Haig, that
if there was an investigation of security procedures in my office I
would not object so long as I saw a copy of the report.

They then assigned a man called John Sither, from the
Department of the Air Force, to study the security procedures
in handling classified documents in my office. Sither wrote a
report, a copy of which went to General Haig. I never read that
report because Haig told me there was nothing in it that deserved
attention.

As for the investigation of the leaks themselves, I had
assumed -- although I cannot recall if I had any basis for so assuming --
that this would be conducted by the FBI and other investigative agencies
reporting to John Ehrlichman.

The first knowledge I had of any substance in connection with
this investigation was when I was away and General Haig called me and
told me that Admiral Welander, who was in charge of the JCS Liaison
Office on my staff, had reported to General Haig that, on the basis of
internal evidence, one of the documents that had been leaked to

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Anderson had to have come from Admiral Welander's office. General Haig asked me what he should do with that information. I told him to send Admiral Welander to John Ehrlichman because John Ehrlichman was in charge of the investigation. I heard no more for about a week. Then on December 24th John Ehrlichman asked me to come to his office where he played a portion of the tape in which Admiral Welander was interviewed by David Young about his knowledge of the allegedly stolen material. The part of the tape I heard was the new information that was developed as a result of this interview, according to which someone on the staff of the JCS liaison office was reportedly stealing documents from me and transmitting them in an unauthorized way to the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I listened to about 15 minutes of that tape.

You have to remember, gentlemen, that at that time I paid no particular attention to the fact that David Young was conducting the interview. I assumed that he was doing it in his capacity as an Ehrlichman staff member; that he was interviewing a man I had sent to Ehrlichman's office -- a man who had volunteered the information. I frankly attached no importance whatever to the fact that David Young was conducting the interview. I did not construe from that that David Young was conducting an investigation; the "Plumbers" were

beyond my imagination, and I was much more interested in the substance obtained from that interview than I was in who was conducting the interview of a man whom, I repeat, I had sent there, and whom I would have had interviewed by one of my staff members if I had not previously been told that Ehrlichman was in charge of the investigation, and that I was to stay out of it.

Except for that interview, I was given no other information about the investigation. I did not know that David Young had written a report until I read it in Seymour Hersh's article about two weeks ago. I have never seen the report, I have never had it described to me, nor have I seen the report that was made of this matter to Secretary Laird.

When I said that I did not know that David Young was engaged in internal security matters, what I meant to say was that I did not know that a part of his duties was to investigate internal security affairs. I could not exclude that in his capacity as a member of Ehrlichman's staff he might be given an assignment for a day that included interviewing an individual who had been sent to Ehrlichman's office. Therefore, I maintain what I have said to this Committee. No member of this Committee has asked me -- and I appreciate your courtesy in this respect -- but because our relationship

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depends not only on the formal but also on the intangible, I thought I
should tell you everything that I know about this investigation. This
is the totality of my knowledge of what David Young did.

I call your attention also to the fact that David Young gave
press conferences on March 8, 1972, and in September, 1972, in
which he publicly described his duties as having been declassification.
I repeat, this was what I understood his duty to be, plus whatever other
assignments John Ehrlichman might give him that I did not know about.

Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman --

The Chairman. Senator Percy.

Senator Percy. I appreciate Dr. Kissinger starting right off
with this issue. I asked the question during the confirmation hearings
because I felt we should have on the record in sworn testimony an
opportunity for Dr. Kissinger to put on the public record statements
that he had already made to a number of press people about this. I
obviously have had a great many questions since then. I have refused
to comment in any way, have refused to even call Dr. Kissinger about
it, feeling that an answer should be provided in this forum because it
was in the official hearing forum that the question originally came up.

I am absolutely satisfied with his reply, and I should like
permission from the Committee to at least respond to questions now

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT BY
ADMIRAL THOMAS H. MOORER, USN
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
WEDNESDAY, 6 FEBRUARY 1974

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Some two weeks ago in letters to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, I offered to provide "all of the information available to me" concerning the anonymous allegations of "military spying," the so-called unauthorized transfer of papers and the publication of documents in the media which could affect national security -- either through the Staff "or at a Formal Hearing as you deem it appropriate or desirable."

I stand ready to do so.

It is, personally, very, very distasteful and certainly 'out' of character to find myself discussing the attacks and insinuations appearing in the media that I was "spying" on the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It is distasteful and out of character because I have served this Nation for 45 years as a member of a profession where honesty, integrity and devotion to country are the measure of the man. I have risen during this period from Midshipman to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have seen peace, and I have been a part of three wars. As an

experienced apolitical professional, I bow to no one in or
out of uniform in terms of devotion to duty, to country,
or to the Constitution of the United States.

Therefore, I hope you can understand why these insinuations
and allegations sicken me as a man, concern me as a military
officer and deeply disturb me as the nation's senior uniformed
official.

The rationale advanced for this so-called "military
spying" has been that since the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
denied a free flow of National Security Council information
which we were entitled to receive in order to fulfill our
statutory responsibility, a "spy ring" was established to
thwart or inhibit the development of policies with which they
allegedly disagreed.

In the interest of placing this matter in proper context,
I appeared on national TV and publicly denounced this allegation
for what it is -- ludicrous and ridiculous. I stand by that
statement. In the first place, there is and always has been
a free and complete flow of information between Dr. Kissinger
and me as required by Presidential directive. Secondly, with
respect to foreign policy and military operations, there has
been no one who has been more active in the support of our
national policy. I respectfully call your attention to my
many appearances before this and many other Congressional
Committees, my speeches and press conferences. Furthermore,

I have frequently been requested by the President to brief
individuals and groups from the Congressional Leadership,
including the Distinguished Chairman of this Committee, the
Speaker of the House and many others. I have also been the
senior military spokesman charged with explaining United
States national policy to our Allies. In short, I have
continuously been engaged in steadfastly supporting initiatives
which it is now alleged that I opposed. This allegation
simply does not make sense.

At the outset, let me emphasize that I have never seen
any of the reports of investigation supposedly submitted
on the matters at hand. I have not had the privilege of
listening to any tape of any interrogation relating to
these subjects. I have only been briefly advised orally
by Mr. Buzhardt, then General Counsel of the Department of
Defense, as to the contents of an interview with Yeoman
Radford and Rear Admiral Welander. Just yesterday, for the
first time, I did receive for review some bits and pieces
of the Defense Investigative Service investigation. As you
know, this sheaf of unsigned narratives is far from an
Investigative Report.

My letter of 30 January to you, Mr. Chairman, sets out
in detail my recollections of the circumstances surrounding
the various allegations. No useful purpose would be served
by repeating at this time all that has been said. Yet, I
would like to emphasize a few points.

First, I must speak about my relationship with Dr. Kissinger and the National Security Council Staff. The exchange of information, the coordination of effort, and the mutual feeling of confidence was and still is excellent. I am sure Dr. Kissinger will attest to this fact. I have always been privy to full information on all subjects with military implications and on the multitude of subjects where coordination between the NSC Staff and the JCS is necessary. Whatever contribution I have been able to make toward the development and implementation of national security policy in the past four years has been served well by the mutual exchange and confidence which exists between Dr. Kissinger and myself.

Subsequent to the initiation of this investigation, I have been informed that on two occasions, over two years ago, I was shown papers by one of my staff officers -- papers which, as it turned out, were acquired in an irregular way incident to clerical duties performed for Dr. Kissinger and General Haig while traveling with them. As I recall, they were treated as I treat any paper handed to me by my staff officers. I quickly scan the paper for subject matter; if the subject matter is one with which I am already fully informed, the papers are simply handed back or set aside. These particular papers, as I explained in my letter of 30 January 1974, were on subjects with which I was already

In my most recent letter of 30 January 1974 to you, I discussed the facts and circumstances concerning the leaks of highly classified material to the press and Yeoman Radford's suspected involvement. In fairness to Yeoman Radford, I want the Committee to understand that this is circumstantial evidence and does not, under military judicial standards, establish guilt. On two occasions I recommended orally that investigative procedures under the Uniform Code of Military Justice be invoked in order to establish the guilt or innocence of Yeoman Radford. I was advised that no disciplinary proceedings would be conducted and that Yeoman Radford would be transferred from Washington.

Obedience, integrity, and loyalty to country are the standards of our military services. The people of our great country deserve nothing less than absolute adherence to these standards from all of us who serve. The allegations and insinuations of "spying" subvert these standards and grossly distort the truth -- which I am confident this Committee will establish to the satisfaction of the American people.

The trust and confidence of our people in their military forces must not be weakened. It is absolutely indispensable to the safety and well being of our country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

completely familiar; so they were, as is my custom, routinely
returned. These papers were only momentarily scanned, and
I did not focus on any irregularity. The irregularity
simply did not register. Let me again emphasize, there is
no substantive relationship between the leak of official
documents which appeared in the media and these miscellaneous
papers which were retained by Yeoman Radford in the course
of his clerical duties during two trips several months before
the leak to the press. Yet, for some reason unknown to me,
it is these miscellaneous internal papers which are being
spotlighted rather than the documents covering a different
time frame which were leaked to the media, boldly displayed,
with their Secret stamp clearly visible. These are the
documents which, in my opinion, did have an adverse effect
on national security.

Perhaps I should have been more alert in following up
as to the precise origin and transmission of the "trip reports";
but, these were busy times, and I was dealing rapidly with
literally thousands of papers, dispatches, and documents --
in fact, a deluge of information.

It is important that I stress to you that I gave no
orders, issued no instructions, gave no encouragement -- either
direct or implied -- to anyone to collect or retain in any
irregular or unauthorized manner any information, papers or
documents from the National Security Council or any other
agency or individual.

THE WEATHER

Sleet, rain or snow today; cloudy,
colder tonight. Sunny tomorrow.
Temp. range: today 26-32; Saturday
27-33. Additional details Page on 55.

SECTION ONE

New York Times

R, SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1974 —

73s beyond 80-mile sons from New York City, except Long Island. Higher in air delivery cities.

50-CENTS

# Spying in the White House
Said to Have Begun in '70

## Operation by Military Allegedly Started
Shortly After Moorer Took Post,
a Year Earlier Than Reported

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 2— Military spying inside the White House began in the fall of 1970, a few months after Adm. Thomas H. Moorer became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and more than a year earlier than has been previously reported, closely involved sources said.

The spying involved as many as five high-ranking officers who regularly received and delivered over the next 15 months classified documents pilfered by a Navy yeoman, these sources said.

A New York Times investigation shows that the spying began within weeks after Yeoman 1st Cl. Charles P. Radford was assigned in September, 1970, to the military liaison unit set up by the Defense Department inside the National Security Council.

The sources said that Petty Officer Radford confessed to Pentagon investigators In December, 1971, shortly after he was suspected of leaking White House documents on the Indian-Pakistan war to Jack Anderson,

the columnist, that he had begun pilfering documents more than a year earlier at the express directions of Rear Adm. Rembrandt C. Robinson.

Admiral Robinson, who was replaced in March of 1971 by Rear Adm. Robert O. Welander in the military liaison position, was killed in a helicopter crash in Southeast Asia In 1972.

Petty Officer Radford has repeatedly denied leaking any material to Mr. Anderson and he has also denied knowing of any security leaks to Admiral Moorer's office.

## Refuses to Comment

Admiral Moorer's spokesman, Navy Capt. J. C. Mackercher, issued the following statement today after being informed of The Times's account: "The chairman's office has no comment on these charges any more than it has had on the innumerable other charges that have been made by unidentified sources."

As chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Moorer is a statutory member of the National Security Council. The documents and materials in question, however, were explicitly denied to his office and to high officials in the State Department on the orders of Mr. Kissinger and President Nixon.

During the period of Yeoman

Continued on Page 41, Column 4

## Con Ed Curbs Urged

The Public Service Commission yesterday proposed several energy-conservation measures in New York City and Westchester County, including a ban on new electric heating in buildings. Page 32.