I - 7

of another. Policies which were adequate when conceived become obstacles to clear understanding when new conditions arise. Paradoxically, the longer the interval of peace and the more novel the technology the more conjectural deterrence becomes.

The absence of aggression will create powerful pressures in favor of the prevailing military policy. It will be taken as proof of its validity. At the same time, a rapidly changing technology will inevitably change the conditions which accounted for the seeming success. What makes matters worse is that there is no experience to guide those charged with the final responsibility. In the nuclear age, deterrence is based on conjecture and what makes matters worse, one wrong guess can mean catastrophe.

Deterrence may fail simply because the contenders interpret available data differently. In the absence of conclusive experience the assessment becomes more significant than the reality. Or rather, the assessment becomes the only reality.

A changing technology has brought about transformations in the strategic situation more rapidly than they could be assimilated in

A considerable situation made nearly impossible, but could be eliminated in
some way. Technically, the problem is simple: that of eliminating the
occurrence of the only benefit.

The problem was significant from the start. Or, if you prefer, the assessment
was different. In the absence of a consecutive subordination of the assessment
benefit, it would be simply because the consecutive indicators available
occurred.

On the other hand, and that makes matters more complex, one must then
watch the first reaction to it. In the absence of a consecutive subordination of the
occurrence of the only benefit, it would be simply because the consecutive
occurrence of the conditions which accounted for the preceding success
occurred. With the first reaction, it would be simply because the first
occurrence of the reaction would occur at the same time, a subjectively
perceived benefit.

The experience of experience will create a new benefit in favor of
the breaking with the benefit. It will be taken as a precedent, of its
own, the breaking with the benefit.

The leader, the investor, of course, and the more recent the technology, the
opportunity to clean understanding when new conditions arise. Particularly,
the investor, the investor, who has some definite upon connected benefits

I - 1

I - 7

correspondence studies were highly successful, but such could be established in

A changing technology has brought about transformations in the
process of the only result.

become more significant than the result. Or rather, the assessment
date differently. In the absence of comparative experience the assessment
Determination may tell simply because the conference interpreter available
on conference and what makes matters worse, one would have to mean
with the first reproductibility. In the uncertain age, determination is each
what makes matters worse is that there is no experience to guide one's choice
independently change the conditions which accounted for the coming success.
Arbitrariness. At the same time, a rapidly changing technology will
of the prevailing method itself. If will be taken as a broad of its
the absence of aggression will create however present in the case
more contingent determination becomes.

the longer the interval of absence and the more novel the technology the
options go open underpinning when new conditions arise. Brachytherapy,
of course, policies which were adequate when conceived become

I - 3

I - 7

a strategy situation more reliably than they could be simulated in
a quantum technology that would allow transformations in the
future. Or rather, the assessment
becomes more significant from the reality. Or rather, the assessment
does differently. In the essence of cumulative experience the assessment
deficiency may still slightly cause the candidate individual available
consideration.

on consideration and what makes matters worse, one would have to mean
with the final responsibility. In the nucleus ago, coherence is poor
What makes matters worse is that there is no experience to build upon
involuntarily change the conditions which occurred for the first success.
Uniqueness. At the same time, a slightly uncertain technology will
of the prevailing military policy. It will be defined as a broad of life
The essence of aggression will create benefit because in favor
more contingent reference because.

the foundation of the interest of peace and the more novel the technology, the
opposition to clear understanding when new conditions arise. Bureaucracy,
of nation. Policies which were adequate when conceived because

1-3

I - 7

throughout the country more rapidly from which could be made available in
a corresponding technology the products of translation in the sense of
processes more significant than the reality. Or rather, the assessment
due to difference. In the absence of concrete experience in the assessment
of processes more significant than the reality. Or rather, the assessment
due to difference in the products of translation in the sense of
processes more significant than the reality.

The above discussion may be slightly summarized as the conclusion of the
conclusion above.

Determination may be said to be concerned with the conditions available
on contact and with the means available. One cannot know one can know
why the third responsibility. In the absence of experience it is based
on the third responsibility. In the absence of experience to give rise to
inability to determine the conditions which are encountered for the same case.
Arbitrariness. As the same time, a subjectively subjective arbitrariness.
Of the preceding settled policy. It will be seen as a basic or, if so
the advance of the above. It will be seen that the above
more contingent determination process.

The advance of the above responsibility will cause beautiful process in that
more contingent determination process.

I - 3

I - 10

increase in Soviet retaliatory power—or so the aggressor may calculate at least. In the age of nuclear plenty and of multiplying retaliatory forces on both sides, destructiveness may be vitiated by paralysis of will or by the low credibility of our deterrent threat. A gap inevitably opens up between deterrence and the strategy we are prepared to implement should deterrence fail. For purposes of deterrence we are tempted to threaten the most dire consequences for aggression. But in order to prevent a catastrophe, should deterrence fail we are to keep open the option of a strategy which reduces our risks. The more fact that the West feels constantly constrained to emphasize that its military establishment is designed to prevent war and that a nuclear conflict is unthinkable may raise serious questions about its resolve to resort to the chief strategy at its disposal.

And this doubt will be reinforced by the experience of the previous period of our preponderance. Long before the Soviet Union developed a nuclear capability and the means to deliver it, the doctrine of massive retaliation had failed to be implemented in the face of a considerable

["reconciliation must take place to be implemented in the case of a consolidated\nunified economy and the means to deliver it, the conduct of such a\npolicy of our economy. Let us reflect on the Soviet Union, which has a\nunified economy and the means to deliver it, the conduct of such a\nreconciliation must take place to be implemented in the case of a consolidated\nunified economy and the means to deliver it, the conduct of such a\nreconciliation must take place to be implemented in the case of a consolidated", "value system and the relation of its relation to the other systems\nrelated to the system, and that a material condition to the material and\nsocially necessary conditions of the system and that a material condition to\nthe material and social life of the other systems, and that a

I - 10

retaliation paid tailored to be implemented in the face of a considerable
nuCLEAR capability and the means to deliver it, the doctrine of massive
bombardment of our preconception. In that period the Soviet Union developed a
And this group will be responsible for the experience of the previous
at its headquarter.

these serious questions about its nature to resort to the other side of
getaway to <u>confront</u> us and that a nuclear conflict is the indispensable and
constant construction to compensate for the military adaptation it
a strategy which reduces our risks. The more that the West tries to
a catastrophe, a serious deficiency we are to keep even the option of
invasion the most dire consequence for agriculture. But in order to prevent
a serious deficiency fail. But purpose of deficiency we are supposed to
obey in between deficiency and the strategy we are supposed to implement
will or will not the nuclear capability of our defense future. A sad invention
forces on poor nations, generaliveness which be attributes to hitherto of
at least". In the age of modern biology and of multifaceted
increase in Soviet military power--or so the agglomerator and exagglomerator

tions on poor nations, generaliveness which be attributes to hitherto of
at least". In the age of modern biology and of multifaceted
increase in Soviet military power--or so the agglomerator and exagglomerator
increase in Soviet military power--or so the agglomerator and exagglomerator

I - 10

I - 10

["retention period that will be implemented in the case of a candidate with nuclear capability and the means to deliver it, the decision of a nuclear capability and the means to deliver it, the decision of a candidate with nuclear capability and the

I - 10

["ذكاء في أن يُؤَدِّي إِلَى الْخَمْسَةِ الْعَصِيَّةِ الْمُحْسِنِينَ وَيَكْتُمُونَ وَيَصْبِرُونَ فِي الْخُبُوْكِ وَيَصْبِ

II - 6

attack and (2) by protecting the retaliatory force so well that
the opponent, even if he should feel threatened, cannot substantial-
ly improve his position. In short, the smaller the gap between
first and second strike capability, the smaller will be the in-
centive to launch a pre-emptive blow against our retaliatory force.

The essential requirement for deterrence in ability to
guarantee unacceptable damage in retaliation regardless of the
scale of attack is not easy to meet in the missile age — even
with the best efforts. The structure of the retaliatory forces
may bring about an inherently pre-emptive situation. As long as
the striking forces are composed of stationary, liquid fuel
missiles and airplanes, they will be extremely vulnerable. They
represent a furious first strike capability. Their ability to
strike back is much more problematical. At the same time, it
becomes increasingly difficult to determine whether an attack is
in fact imminent. There will always be a temptation to escape
this dilemma by a blow which settles matters once and for all —

II - 7

all the more so if one side ever believes that it has an advantage.
And this incentive will be magnified by the very volatility of
technology. The side considering a pre-emptive attack will know
that the factors which enabled it to become superior also insure
that the superiority will be transitory. The greater the readiness
of the opposing retaliatory forces, the less the possibility and
significance of obtaining warning, the stronger may be the tempta-
tion to eliminate the constant fear of catastrophe once and for
all. The more vulnerable the opposing retaliatory forces, the
more the dividing line between a surprise and a pre-emptive
attack will be eroded. And protecting the retaliatory force will
be extremely difficult. When the age of nuclear plenty first
came into view, many commentators, including this author, con-
sidered that it ushered in a period of nuclear stalemate. It was
thought then that with modern weapons superior offensive power
would prove strategically insignificant because in a war between
major powers the two sides would probably have destroyed each

II - 6

The essential requirement for deterrence in ability to
guarantee unacceptable damage in retaliation regardless of the
scale of attack is not easy to meet in the missile age -- even
with the best efforts. The structure of the retaliatory forces
may bring about an inherently pre-emptive situation. As long as
the striking forces are composed of stationary, liquid fuel
missiles and airplanes, they will be extremely vulnerable. They
represent a furious first strike capability. Their ability to
strike back is much more problematical. At the same time, it
becomes increasingly difficult to determine whether an attack is
in fact imminent. There will always be a temptation to escape
this dilemma by a blow which settles matters once and for all --

The diameter of a flow which affects matters once and for all — in that moment. There will always be a temptation to enclose
people increasingly difficult to determine whether an attack is
strike back is more problematic. At the same time, it
reflects a unique first strike capability. Their ability to
measure and substances, they will be extremely accurate. Thus
the striking forces are combined or stationary, if not fuel
may print out an independently pre-emptive situation. As long as
with the past efforts. The structure of the retaliatory force
serves of attack is not easy to meet in the future age — even
ensurees unacceptable damage in retaliation regardless of the
The essential requirement for determination in ability to
conclude to launch a pre-emptive blow against our retaliatory force.
first and second strike capability, the smaller will be the in-
fla improve die position. In short, the smaller the gap between
die obsolescent, even it be enough to let threatened, cannot be satisfied—
attack and (S) by protecting the retaliatory force so well that
II - 9

4

II - 7

warior bowers the two sides would properly have contrasted each
would prove strategically insignificant because in a war between
thought then that with modern weapons superior offensive power
added that it happened in a period of nuclear equilibrium. It was
come into view, many commentators, including this author, con-
clude extremely difficult, when the age of nuclear power that
attack will be ended. And protecting the retaliatory force will
more the dividing line between a subcontinent and a pre-embassy
state. The more numerous the objective retaliatory forces, the
tion to eliminate the continent less of collateral once and ten
enormous consequences of opening warning, the stronger may be the tem-
oral of the objective retaliatory forces, the less the hostipidity and
that the subcontinent will be transected. The greater the readiness
to the before which enabled it to become superior to those
fashionable. The age considering a pre-embassy attack will soon
and this incentive will be fulfilled by the vast avariciousness of
all the more so if one side ever believes that it has an advantage.

II - 3

II - 6

The circumstances in a given situation may be the same once and for all —
in that imminent. There will always be a temptation to execute
become increasingly difficult to determine whether an attack is
accomplished. When more problematic. At the same time, it
reoccurs a unique first strike capability. Their ability to
mimic and strike, they will be extremely anteatable. They
the striking forces are combined or stationary, limit their
may print upon an inherently pre-ambiptive situation. We look as
with the best effort. The structure of the retentory forces
seems to attack in not easy to meet in the settle age — even
ensureee uncooperative damage in retaliation regardless of the
The essential requirement for deterrence in ability to
contribute to join up a pre-ambiptive plan against our retentory forces.
first and second strike capability, the smaller will be the in-
fer improve life benefits. In some, the smaller the bad between
the obponent, even it be enough left unrestricted, cannot outpace-
attack and (3) do protecting the retentory force so well that

II - 9

II - 7

warior bowers the two sides would properly have destroyed each
would prove strategically insignificant because in a war between
thought then that wtd modern weapons under superior offensive power
agreed that it happened in a period of unclear effectiveness. It was
somehow into view, many commentators, including this author, con-
be extremely difficult. When the age of most recententy first
attacked will be ended. When protecting the refusor force will
more the dividing line between a friend and a foe-embryo
all. The more accurate the objective refusor force, the
tion to eliminate the constant fear of敌袭范围 once and for
etiqueness of operating warning, the stronger will be the fends-
of the choosing refusor force, the less the bessibility and
just the superiority will be transferred. The greater the resistance
that the force upon engaged it to become superior also increases
focality. The side considering a pre-embryo attack will know
that this incentive will be magnified by the award effectiveness of
all the more so it one side ever believes that it has an advantage.

II - 3

II - 6

The essential requirement for deterrence is ability to
guarantee unacceptable damage in retaliation regardless of the
scale of attack is not easy to meet in the missile age -- even
with the best efforts. The structure of the retaliatory forces
may bring about an inherently pre-emptive situation. As long as
the striking forces are composed of stationary, liquid fuel
missiles and airplanes, they will be extremely vulnerable. They
represent a furious first strike capability. Their ability to
strike back is much more problematical. At the same time, it
becomes increasingly difficult to determine whether an attack is
in fact imminent. There will always be a temptation to escape
this dilemma by a blow which settles matters once and for all --

II - 7

major powers the two sides would probably have destroyed each
would have strategically insignificant consequences in a war between
thought that with modern weapons superior offensive power,
enhanced that it numbered in a period of one hundred years. It use
somehow, many commentators, inferring this author, con-
be extremely difficult. When the age of nuclear weapons there
attack will be ended. And protecting the retaliatory force will
more the dividing line between a Ukraine and a pro-embassy
all. The more vulnerable the objective retaliatory forces, the
situation to eliminate the constant fear of catastrophe once and for
eternity of opening warning, the stronger may be the fad-
ence of the objecting force, the less the possibility and
that the superiority will be transferred. The greater the resistance
just the faster when enabled it to become superior also inside
fascination. The age considering a pro-embassy attack will know
that the incentive will be magnified by the very difficulty of
all the more so if one side ever perceives that it has an advantage.

II - 7

II - 14

will require a count-down of less than ten minutes. In such circumstances, we can be certain that whatever else may happen, a surprise attack will not be preceded by a tense situation. The last thing an aggressor would do is to alert our retaliatory force

by disquieting us. There are many technical and political arguments against an airborn alert. But the possibility of obtaining warning is not one of them.

Even if warning is obtained, it is far from clear to what use it can be put. For one thing, the maximum warning available is likely to be less than fifteen minutes -- in which time information must be obtained, transmitted, evaluated and acted upon.

This is hardly an interval making for sober calculation. And the penalty of acting on the basis of incorrect information is enormous in the missile age. Airplanes can be launched as a defensive measure, for they can be recalled if the information turns out to be faulty. The decision to launch a missile is, however, irrevocable. The danger of accident is therefore high. Yet the effort to reduce this risk may increase vulnerability. The more carefully and strictly warning is interpreted, the easier it may be

unfair and strictly warning in interpreted, the manner in which he
may be to reduce this risk may increase ambiguity. The more over-
looked, the danger of accident is therefore prior. Let the effort
be taken. The decision to launch a missile is, however, irrevocable
measure, for which can be realized if the information turns out to
in the missile age. Virulence can be financed in a defensive
benefit of acting on the part of incorrect information in some-
where it is particularly unprofitable to open discrimination. And fine
tion must be obtained, transmitted, evaluated and acted upon.

It is finally to be seen that fifteen minutes — in which time inform-
ance it can be put. For one thing, the maximum warning available
is none of them.

Given it warning is obtained, it is for him either to wait
until he is notified of them.

Against an airborn alert. But the possibility of obtaining warning
inmediating us. There are many technical and political arguments

that bring an attraction which do not come sufficiently force
against attack will not be breached in a tense situation. The
omniscience, we can be certain that whatever else may happen, a
will require a count-down of less than ten minutes. In some cir-


II - 14

II - 14

will require a count-down of less than ten minutes. In such cir-
cumstances, we can be certain that whatever else may happen, a
surprise attack will _not_ be preceded by a tense situation. The
last thing an aggressor would do is to alert our retaliatory force
by disquieting us.

Even if warning is obtained, it is far from clear to what
use it can be put. For one thing, the maximum warning available
is likely to be less than fifteen minutes -- in which time informa-
tion must be obtained, transmitted, evaluated and acted upon.
This is hardly an interval making for sober calculation. And the
penalty of acting on the basis of incorrect information is enormous
in the missile age. Airplanes can be launched as a defensive
measure, for they can be recalled if the information turns out to
be faulty. The decision to launch a missile is, however, irrevoca-
ble. The danger of accident is therefore high. Yet the effort
to reduce this risk may increase vulnerability. The more care-
fully and strictly warning is interpreted, the easier it may be

unfair and arbitrarily warning is interpreted, the easier it may be
to reduce this risk may increase animosity/f Conflict. The more care-
ful the danger of accident is therefore high. Let the effort
be fair. The decision to launch a missile is, however, involves-
measure, for they can be received if the information turns out to
in the missile age. Viruses can be manufactured as a defense-
benefit of acting on the paste of incorrect information to encircle
the pilot in an interval making for proper orientation. And the
tion must be obtained, transmitted, evaluated and acted upon.
This is likely to be less than fifteen minutes -- in which time informa-
tion it can be sent. For one think, the maximum warning available
has it warning is obtained, it is ten times easier to write
a清楚ing note.

Just think an aggressor would do it to alert our resiliency force
embarrass attack will not be preceded by a tense situation. The
compliance, we can be certain that whatever else may happen, a
will reduce a command of less than ten minutes. In and off air-

II - 19

II - 14

will require a count-down of less than ten minutes. In such cir-
cumstances, we can be certain that whatever else may happen, a
surprise attack *will not* be preceded by a tense situation. The
last thing an aggressor would do is to alert our retaliatory force
by disquieting us.

to reduce this risk and increase universality. The more確
ate. The danger of accident is therefore high. Let the effort
be successful. The danger to launch a minute is, however, irrevocable.
measure, for they can be realized if the information turns out to
in the minute age. Ambulance can be financed at a defensive
benefit of spending on the病 of incorrect information is enormous
time is practically an interest writing for a proper calculation. And the
tion must be obtained, financed and carried upon.

It is likely to be less than fifteen minutes — in which time infor-
mal it can be put. For one thing, the maximum warning available
may it warning is obtained, it is then offered to what
is diabolizing me.

that bring an aggressor would do to offer our resolutely force
embarrass attack will not be breached if a tone situation. The
consequence, we can be certain that whatever else may happen, a
will require a count-down of less than ten minutes. In such cir-

II - 14

II - 14

will require a count-down of less than ten minutes. In such circumstances, we can be certain that whatever else may happen, a surprise attack *will not* be preceded by a tense situation. The last thing an aggressor would do is to alert our retaliatory force by disquieting us.

unfair and arbitrarily warning is interpreted, the operator may be
forced to reduce this risk by increasing bandwidth. The more omissions
are made, the greater the risk of increased bandwidth. Let the operator
be fully aware. The decision to launch a missile is, however, involves
measurements, for they can be received if the information turns out to
be false. The chance of launching a missile is, however, increases
with the missile age. Viralization can be prevented as a definitive
benefit of acting on the basis of incorrect information is enormous.
This is hardly an interval between proper calculation. And the
tension must be obtained, transmitted, evaluated and noted shown.

It is likely to be less than fifteen minutes -- in which time informa-
tion can be sent. For one thing, the maximum warning available
Even if warning is obtained, it is far from clear to what
point, deciding us.

First thinking an attraction would do is to alert our receptors to
an attractive attack will not be preceded by a tense situation. The
consequences, we can be certain that whatever else may happen, a
will require a count-down of less than ten minutes. In some cir-

II - 14

II - 15

to defeat it. A country the security of whose retaliatory force
depends on the ability to obtain warning will be torn between the
Seylla of being too cautious and the Charibdis of being too trigger
happy. In short in the missile age, a retaliatory force cannot
gear its security to the expectation of warning. It must be
sufficiently invulnerable so that it can ride out an attack and
still inflict unacceptable losses on the aggressor.

The discussion of the strategic requirement of deterrence
has led to three conclusions:

(1) The precondition of deterrence is an invulnerable retaliatory force. Invulnerability exists when regardless of the scale and timing of his attack an aggressor must expect unacceptable damage in retaliation. An invulnerable retaliatory force - particularly if invulnerability does not depend on warning — reduces the risk of accidental war. If properly designed it should be of such a nature that it does not supply a motive for a pre-emptive attack. For vulnerability is not an absolute term. It depends on numbers,

for immersiveness is not an absolute term. If damage on impact
amounts that it does not ably a active for a pre-emptive attack.
of accident was. It properly does not should be at least a
it immersiveness does not depend on warning -- reduce the risk
in retaliation. An immersiveness retaliatory force - basically
limit of the attack an aggressor must expect unacceptable damage
force. Immersiveness exists when regardless of the case and
(f) The consequence of deterrence is an immersiveness retaliatory
plan led to three consequences:

The consequence of the strategic requirement of deterrence
is that multiple unacceptable losses on the aggressor.
ultimately immersiveness so that it can ride out an attack and
bear its consequence to the expectation of warning. It must be
patently. In sport in thegende age, a retaliatory force cannot
schiff of being too cautious and the consequence of being too strong
debate on the ability to obtain warning will be from between the
to delect it. A country the security of whose retaliatory force

II - 12

II - 15

to defeat it. A country the security of whose retaliatory force
depends on the ability to obtain warning will be torn between the
Soylla of being too cautious and the Charibdis of being too trigger
happy. In short in the missile age, a retaliatory force cannot
gear its security to the expectation of warning. It must be
sufficiently invulnerable so that it can ride out an attack and
still inflict unacceptable losses on the aggressor.

For insurance it is not an adequate term. If dependence on numbers
results that it does not ably a motive for a bi- subjective attack.
of accidental war. It properly obtained it should be of such a
it insurance does not depend on warning -- reduces the risk
in resistance. An insurance resiliency force - basically
facing of the attack on an aggressor must exhibit unacceptable damage
force. Insuranceability exists when resistance of the scale and
(1) The prescription of deference is an insurance resiliency
rule led to three conclusions:

The direction of the strategic requirement of deterrence
still indirect unacceptable losses on the aggressor.
entirely immaterial so that it can ride out an attack and
stay its agency to the exasperation of warning. If must be
peasant. In short in the missile age, a resiliency force cannot
Schiff of paint too customs and the Grand prize of the trigger
debates on the ability to obtain warning will be torn between the
to defeat it. A country the security of whose resiliency force

II - 72

II - 15

for insurance. It is not an absolute form. It depends on moods, name that it does not, although a negative for a positive affect.

of confidence was. It probablyografed it should be of such a

it insurance. It does not depend on writing ... reduces the risk

in ratification. An insurance collateral force - basically

timing of the attack on the aggressor must exist in such a

force. Insurance suffix exists when reference to the case and

(f) the disqualification of deference is an immaterial collateral

has to be three consequences:

The consequence of the strategic requirement of deference

at first initiate unacceptable losses on the aggressor.

ultimately insurance so that it can lose an attack and

lose its security to the expectation of winning. It must be

punctual. In sport in the weight age, a collateral force cannot

get away with too cautions and the Grapelli of paint too fast.

debate on the ability to obtain winning will be form dependent on

to delete it...

V currently the security of whose collateral force

II - 72

II - 15

to defeat it. A country the security of whose retaliatory force
depends on the ability to obtain warning will be torn between the
Scylla of being too cautious and the Charibdis of being too trigger
happy. In short in the missile age, a retaliatory force cannot
gear its security to the expectation of warning. It must be
sufficiently invulnerable so that it can ride out an attack and
still inflict unacceptable losses on the aggressor.

(1) The precondition of deterrence is an invulnerable retaliatory force. Invulnerability exists when regardless of the scale and timing of his attack an aggressor must expect unacceptable damage in retaliation. An invulnerable retaliatory force - particularly if invulnerability does not depend on warning -- reduces the risk of accidental war. If properly designed it should be of such a nature that it does not supply a motive for a pre-emptive attack. For vulnerability is not an absolute term. It depends on numbers.

For insurance it is not an specific term. If depends on number, nature that it does not embed a motive for a pre-adaptive attack.

of accidental war. It properly defined it should be of such a

it insurance, does not depend on warning -- requires the risk

in resolution. An insurance retaliatory force - barterly

firing of life attack an aggressor must exhibit unacceptable quantity

force. Insurance exists when regardless of the cause and

(1) The breach of that insurance is an insurance retaliatory

has led to three consequences:

still initiates unacceptable forces on the aggressor.

sufficiently insurance so that it can ride out an attack and

bear its security to the expectation of warning. It must be

robbed. In a sort in the state age, a retaliatory force cannot

Scale of pain too excessive and the Government of point too trigger
debound on the spillover to obtain warning will be torn between the

to delete it. A country the security of whose retaliatory force

II - 12

II - 16

dispersal, hardening of bases and mobility of the defending re-
taliatory force and similar characteristics on the part of the
aggressor's striking power. Increasing the numbers of the de-
fending force reduced vulnerability even if each individual
weapon is highly vulnerable -- provided dispersal enables each
attacking vehicle to destroy only one defending vehicle. In that
case, it may be possible simply to out-produce the opponent and
to impose impossible force requirements on him.

On the other hand, the attempt to achieve invulnerability
through numbers alone would lead to a highly unstable situation.
For such a retaliatory force of such a size would represent a
powerful first-strike capability. It may therefore be interpreted
as designed for a surprise blow and tempt a pre-emptive attack.
Hence the second conclusion with respect to deterrence:

(2) If the goal is stability, invulnerability should be sought

MEASURES
through devices which in so far as possible convey a defensive
intent such as dispersal, hardening and above all mobility.

1. For further discussion see below p. : The Problems of Arms Control.

II - 17

These measures enhance the ability to strike backs they do not
They improve the defense, but the offensive capacity.
This increases stability because it provides an additional notice
improve the ability to strike first. Dispersal complicates the
aggressor's task by multiplying his targets. Its disadvantage is
that it complicates the problems of control. The more individual
decision points there are, the greater is the chance of an act
based on misinformation or overeagerness — in short the greater
is the risk of accidental war.

Hardening means protecting the target against explosion by
placing it in some form of shelter. Its effectiveness depends on
the attacker's accuracy. Given the power of modern weapons
hardening is not a protection against an attack of sufficient pre-
cision. Nevertheless it complicates the calculations of the ag-
gressor and imposes additional requirements of strength and ac-
curacy on him — thus adding to deterrence.

Perhaps the single most fruitful approach to invulnerability
lies in creating a mobile deterrent system. The proposed airborne
alert of the Strategic Air Command is a step in this direction.

II - 16

dispersal, hardening of bases and mobility of the defending retaliatory force and similar characteristics on the part of the aggressor's striking power. Increasing the numbers of the defending force reduces vulnerability even if each individual weapon is highly vulnerable -- provided dispersal enables each attacking vehicle to destroy only one defending vehicle. In that case, it may be possible simply to out-produce the opponent and to impose impossible force requirements on him.

(2) If the goal is stability, invulnerability should be sought through devices which in so far as possible convey a defensive intent such as dispersal, hardening and above all mobility.¹

1. For further discussion see below p. 3: The Problems of Arms Control.

Control.

I. For further discussion see below p. : The problems of time

interest and its disease, pertussis and spore of all病原性.

through devices which in so far as possible could be degenerate
(2) It the best to stability, invariance should be sought
Hence the secondary conclusion with respect to disease:
the desired for a substance flow and tend a pre-advantage attack.

powerful true-actinic electricity. It may therefore be interpreted
for one a reliafetord force of one a state would represent a
strong numpere same would feed to a highly unstable situation.

On the other hand, the attempt to achieve invariance

to impose invariable force requirements on it.
else, it may be possible simply to on-advance the obsolescent and
attacking vehicle to destroy only one determinant vehicle. In that
manner is a highly invariable ... broadened disease more and
lessening force reduces invariance even if one individual
aggravator's striking power. Increasing the numpere of the de-
fectsford force and similar characteristics on the part of the
disease, improving of disease and mortality of the degenerating re-

II - 10

II - 16

dispersal, hardening of bases and mobility of the defending retaliatory force and similar characteristics on the part of the aggressor's striking power. Increasing the numbers of the defending force reduced vulnerability even if each individual weapon is highly vulnerable -- provided dispersal enables each attacking vehicle to destroy only one defending vehicle. In that case, it may be possible simply to out-produce the opponent and to impose impossible force requirements on him.

1. For further discussion see below p. 3; The Problems of Arms Control.

Control.
1. For further discussion see below b. : The problems of virus
intent and its causes, presentation and scope of all moods.

through devices which in so far as possible convey a definitive

(2) If the host is at ease, inactivity should be sought

since the second conclusion with respect to determination:

as defined for aatura flow and fast a pre-embryonic attack.

beneath first-atrike capability. It may therefore be interpreted
for an shop a resistifactory force of such a size would represent a
strongly unshop alone would lead to a highly unshop situation.

On the other hand, the attempt to achieve inactivity

to impose unshop force requirements on him.

area, it may be possible already to out-broadcast the opponent and
attacking opponent to destroy only one defending opponent. In that
manner it is highly attractive -- provided that the opponent has
tending force reduced sufficiently even if some individual
attacker's striking power. Increasing the numbers of the de-
fectory force and similar characteristics on the part of the
difieracy, hindering of phase and mobility of the defending re-


II - 1c

II - 16

1. For further discussion see below p. ； The Problems of Arms Control.

Conway.

f. For further discussion see below b. The problem of via

intents and as character, purposes and above all mobility.

(2) If the user is atemp, inaccessibility should be omitted
through devices which in so far as possible combat a delimitation

hence the second conclusion with respect to deference:

as defined for a umbrella fan and for a broomstick fan.

powerful lift-strike attemp. If such therefore be interpreted
for such a refletory force or such a size would represent a
stronger numbers alone would lead to a highly material situation.

On the other hand, the attempt to achieve inaccessibility

to impose transverse force requirements on him.

else, it will be possible simply to out-broadsce the oblique and
attacking advance to reach only one detentive adaje. In this
manner is highly advantageous -- broadened character adaje and
tending force requires inaccessibility even if such individual
attrition a striking power. Increase the numbers of the de-
telator force and similar operators on the basis of the
character, perceiving of ease and mobility of the detentive re-

leather, perspective of ease and mobility of the detentive re-

II - 13

II - 16

1. For further discussion see below p. 7: The Problems of Arms Control.

Court of
f. For further discussion see below b. The problems of Van
intent and as general, pending and space all modifica

tions devices which in so far as possible concern a delimita-
tion of force and similar characteristics on the part of the
government, pertaining to pass and modifica of the deflecting re-

(2) If the force is attraction, invariance should be sought
since the second conjunction with respect to distance:
the desired for a subtle flow and want a bi-elastic attack.
henceforth fire-elastic attraction. If such therefore be intended
for such a resistive force of such a size would repress a
through mumps some would feel to a slightly more elastic attraction.

On the other hand, the attempt to separate invariance

to involve invariance force requirements on him.

since, if such be possible easily to out-broade the oblique and
attacking vehicle to direct only one deflecting vehicle. In that
way one is highly invariance --- broadened government even
leaving force reduce attraction even if such initiative
attenuates a striking power. Increasing the mumps of the de-
terrestrial force and similar characteristics on the part of the
government, pertaining to pass and modifica of the deflecting re-

II - 10

II - 17

These measures enhance the ability to strike back; they do not improve the ability to strike first. Dispersal complicates the aggressor's task by multiplying his targets. Its disadvantage is that it complicates the problems of control. The more individual decision points there are, the greater is the chance of an act based on misinformation or overeagerness — in short the greater is the risk of accidental war.

Hardening means protecting the target against explosion by placing it in some form of shelter. Its effectiveness depends on the attacker's accuracy. Given the power of modern weapons hardening is not a protection against an attack of sufficient precision. Nevertheless it complicates the calculations of the aggressor and imposes additional requirements of strength and accuracy on him — thus adding to deterrence.

error of the Strategic Air Command is a fact in this direction.

fies in creating a mobile deterrent system. The proposed strategic

because the single most unifying subject to insurance is

on pin — time shifting to deterrence.

Strategic and additional requirements of strength and so-
citation. Neverlose it. It combines the calculations of the ag-
purging is not a protection against an attack of sufficient br-
the attack, a strategy. Given the power of modern weapons

basing it in some form of shelter. Its effectiveness depends on

broadening means protecting the target against expenditure of

the risk of accident was.

based on misinformation or overestimation — in sport the 겹

decals bound there are, the 겹en is the chance of an act

first it combines the propens of contract. The more individual

agreement a task is multiplying the targets. Its greatest value is

improve the ability to strike true. Different combinations of

These measures enhance the ability to strike true; they do not

II - 13

II - 17

These measures enhance the ability to strike back; they do not improve the ability to strike first. Dispersal complicates the aggressor's task by multiplying his targets. Its disadvantage is that it complicates the problems of control. The more individual decision points there are, the greater is the chance of an act based on misinformation or overagerness — in short the greater is the risk of accidental war.

It is in creating a mobile deterrent there. The proposed airborne
strike the enemy most有利atmosphere to insurance/supply
currency on him -- fine adding to deference.

Grenadier and imbedded additional requirements of attack and so-
citation. Nevertheless it complicates the calculations of the ad-
plication is not a protection against an attack of sufficient pre-
the attack is secured. Given the power of modern weapons
braking it in some form of shelter. If its effectiveness depends on
Hiding means protecting the target against explosion by

the risk of accidently war.

based on misinformation or overassurance — in short the theater
decalsation because there are, the faster is the chance of an act
that it complicates the propense of control. The more individual
attacker's task is multiplying his targets. If damage is
improve the speed to strike first. Bettered complicates the
These measures enhance the speed to strike pack; they do not

II - 13

II - 17

effort of the Strategic Air Command is a job in the direction.
They in creating a mobile deterrent base. The proposed strait
passage is the single most unifying approach to insurance of
cohesion on him — him adding to reference.

Stratus and imposes additional requirements of strength and so-
citation. Nevertheless it configures the authorities of the as-
piring is not a protection against an attack of sufficient pre-
judice, a commodity. Given the power of modern weapons
by using it in some form of adhesion. Its effectiveness depends on
hardening means protecting the targets against exploitation by

in the risk of scientific error.

pass on transmission or overstatement — in short the theories
decals because there are, the transfer is the cause of an act
first it configures the program of control. The more individual
attrition, a task ph multiplying the targets. Its directness is
fvdove the spillo to strike true. Diabolical configuration is
These measures enhance the spillo to strike pack! they do not

II - 11

II - 17

facing of the Strategic Air Command is a step in this direction.

This is creating a more deferent atmosphere. The proposed air force

because the state most useful approach to insurance of safety
came on him — time adding to deference.

Reason and influence additional requirements of strength and ac-
cord. Nevertheless it configures the calculations of the af-
ferment if not a protection against an attack of sufficient bi-
lar the attacker, a reason. Given the power of modern weapons
bracing it in some form of attack. If the effectiveness depends on

hardening means protecting the target against expenditure of

the risk of accident at war.

based on manipulation or overestimation — in sport the faster
decision bounces here are, the faster is the chance of an end
that it configures the properties of control. The more individual
attacker's risk is multiplied if target. Its distance is
improve the ability to strike true. Diabolat configures the

These measures enhance the ability to strike pack; this does not

II - 13

III. The Design of the Deterrent Force

A. <u>Counterforce as Finite Deterrence</u>

The most fundamental problem is the purpose of our retaliatory
force specifically what threats it is supposed to deter and by what
methods. The attempt to answer this question has produced a debate
between adherents of what has been termed counterforce strategy and
proponents of what has come to be known as Finite Deterrence, the former
view held generally by the Airforce, the latter describing roughly the
position of the Navy. Proponents of a counterforce strategy argue that
deterrence is greatest when the aggressor faces not only the prospect
of damage to his industry and civilian population but of defeat. This
implies that the targets of the retaliatory force must in the first
instance be the strategic striking forces of the opponent. Once they
are crushed, victory is assured. A counterforce strategy therefore
requires a retaliatory force so large and so well protected that it can
guarantee the destruction of the opponent's offensive power. As the
opposing missile force grows, ours would have to multiply correspondingly
and at a ratio which retains the possibility of victory. In the age of

["and as a ratio which retains the best fit of Avotry. In the age of\nobserving aircraft force shows, and most due to suitably corresponding\nforce. Avotry is assumed. A counterforce strategy Avotry\ninfluence is the essential existing force of the opponent. Once this\nis done to the industry and civilian population but in the first\nplace caused, Avotry is assumed. A counterforce strategy Avotry\nrequires a resulting force to find and so well protected that it can\nsurvive. Avotry is assumed. A counterforce strategy Avotry\nensures the destruction of the opponent's offensive power. As the\nresulting a resulting force to find and so well protected that it can\nsurvive. Avotry is assumed. A counterforce strategy Avotry\nens

and at a ratio which retains the benefit of victory. In the case of
observing hostile force groups, one would have to multiply correspondingly
the guarantee the destruction of the opponent's offensive power. We do
not propose a relatively force so large and so well protected that it can
survive a relatively force so large and so well protected that it can
impose that the targets of the retaliatory force must in the first
of damage to the industry and civilian population put at risk. This
detachment is absent when the aggressor trace not only the target
position of the enemy. Proponents of a counterforce strategy agree that
any pay generally in the violence, the further describing roughly the
proponents of what has come to be known as Little Detachment, the force
between opponents of what has been counterforce strategy and
methods. The attempt to answer this question has produced a debate
force specifically what directs it to unknown to cover and put at
risk the most tremendous problem in the purchase of our retaliatory

V. Counterforce at Little Detachment

III. The Design of the Detachment Force

["and at a table which rotates in the benefit of Aviation. In the case of\nopposing missile force alone, one would have to multiply correspondingly\nthe number of the destruction of the opponent's cylindeiral power. As the\nrange a reflected force so far and so near protected that it can\nbe carried, aviation is seen. A counterforce strategy determines\ninfluence to the stationary force of the opponent. Once this\nincludes the damage to the aircraft and aviation destruction but of course\nof damage to the industry and aviation destruction but of course. This\ndetachment in Aviation when the opponent forces not only the projected\nposition of the Navy. Probes of a counterforce strategy are sent and\nwill find generality of the Virtono, the further considerable roughness the\nprobes of the Navy. Probes of a counterforce strategy are sent and\nwill find generality of the Virtono, the further considerable roughness the\npro

III - 4

of large Soviet population centers.

The dispute between adherents of a counterforce strategy and finite
deterrence repeats essentially the categories of the B-36 controversy of
1949 with the roles reversed. As in a stately mimet the services have
exchanged positions and only the old acrimony has remained. In 1949,
the Airforce insisted that deterrence depended on the threat of
devastating centers of population and industrial complexes. The Navy
described such a strategy as immoral and ineffective and called attention
to the need to destroy targets which affected military operations directly.
Today the same arguments are repeated though the Airforce is following
the Navy script of 1949 and vice versa. The irony of this situation
should not obscure the deadly seriousness of the issue. For on it depends
the shape of our military establishment and the nature of our diplomacy.

The difficulty with the dispute is that our options are often vastly
oversimplified. The choice is not between a complete counterforce
capability or none at all nor between a strategy of devastation or a
strategy of victory. Between these limiting conditions many intermediate

strategy of victory. Between these limiting conditions many intermediate
capability or none at all nor between a strategy of generation or a
overunsubstituted. The choice is not between a complete counterforce

The difficulty with the strategy is that our options are often easily
the same of our willfully capability and the nature of our capability.
Especially not operate the deadli seriousness of the issue. IOR on if debate
the heavy script of IQD and vice versa. The front of this situation

To each the same arguments are repeated through the Virtole is following
so the need to get rid targets which allocated military operations directly.
described and a strategy as immaterial and inoperative and called attention
generating centers of propulsion and industrial complexes. The heavy
the Virtole initiated that reference dependent on the first of
encumbered positions and only the big component due remained. In IQD,
IQD with the role revenue. As in a strategy which the service due
reference rebates essentially the categories of the D-30 counterforce of
the grade between appendages of a counterforce strategy and those
of large Seaplane Bomber centers.

III - 4

III - 4

["The choice is not determined by a complete consideration of the actual situation. Depending on the situation and the circumstances, the choice is not determined by a consideration of the actual situation.", "The choice is not determined by a consideration of the actual situation and the circumstances. The choice is not determined by a consideration of the actual situation and the circumstances and the

III - 4

The dispute between adherents of a counterforce strategy and finite
deterrence repeats essentially the categories of the D-36 controversy of
1949 with the roles reversed. As in a stately minuet the services have
exchanged positions and only the old acrimony has remained. In 1949,
the Airforce insisted that deterrence depended on the threat of
devastating centers of population and industrial complexes. The Navy
described such a strategy as immoral and ineffective and called attention
to the need to destroy targets which affected military operations directly.
Today the same arguments are repeated though the Airforce is following
the Navy script of 1949 and vice versa. The irony of this situation
should not obscure the deadly seriousness of the issue. For on it depends
the shape of our military establishment and the nature of our diplomacy.

["strategy of victory. Between these limited conditions may intervene\nindefiniteCopyright on none at all nor between a strategy of deviation on a\noverlap/ified. The choice is not between a complete counterforce", "The difficulty with the clause is that our objectives are often too\nfar above our military adaptation and the nature of our diploamt.\nShould not operate the deady season of the June. Est on it depends\nthe 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潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮潮

III - 4

The dispute between adherents of a counterforce strategy and finite
deterrence repeats essentially the categories of the B-36 controversy of
1949 with the roles reversed. As in a stately minuet the services have
exchanged positions and only the old acrimony has remained. In 1949,
the Airforce insisted that deterrence depended on the threat of
devastating centers of population and industrial complexes. The Navy
described such a strategy as immoral and ineffective and called attention
to the need to destroy targets which affected military operations directly.
Today the same arguments are repeated though the Airforce is following
the Navy script of 1949 and vice versa. The irony of this situation
should not obscure the deadly seriousness of the issue. For on it depends
the shape of our military establishment and the nature of our diplomacy.

["strategy of victory. Between these limited conditions may industrialize\ncompetitiveness or none at all, but between a strategy of development or a\noveremphasized economy a new trend may arise to establish a new\ninternational economic equilibrium.", "The difficulty with the dilemma is that our options are often rather\ncomplicated and a strategy as inherent and objective and clear as the direct or\nindirect consequences of population and industrial competence. The easy\nway to deal with that dilemma is to follow the Airborne in following\nToby the same arguments are requested from the Airborne in following\nthe easy route of IQ and vice versa. The trend of this situation\nshould not operate in the clearly competence of the item. For on it depends\nthe success of IQ and vice versa. The trend of this situation\nshould not operate in the clearly competence of the item. For on

III - 5

points are possible, each with its own implications for deterrence and for strategy should deterrence fail. Moreover, we have to consider not only the design of our retaliatory force but that of the opponent as well.

The impact of the opposing retaliatory forces on each other will determine the kinds of deterrent threats which are possible, for this affects the kinds of deterrent threats which are possible,

their credibility and their suitability for given objectives. It is necessary to take into account the impact of the two retaliatory forces on each other. Depending on their vulnerability, measures which are intended to be defensive may nevertheless be interpreted as threatening and thus tempt a pre-emptive attack. As between the retaliatory forces of the United States and the Soviet Union four different relationships are possible.

Table 1: Possible Inter-relationship of U.S. -Soviet Retaliatory Forces

<table><thead><tr><th>U.S.</th><th>U.S.S.R.</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1. Vulnerable</td><td>Vulnerable</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2. Invulnerable</td><td>Vulnerable</td><td>This was the situation during our atomic monopoly.</td></tr><tr><td>3. Vulnerable</td><td>Invulnerable</td><td>One interpretation of missile gap.</td></tr><tr><td>4. Invulnerable</td><td>Invulnerable</td><td>Minimum result of missile gap.</td></tr></tbody></table>

III - 5

points are possible, each with its own implications for deterrence and
for strategy should deterrence fail. Moreover, we have to consider not
only the design of our retaliatory force but that of the opponent as well.
For this affects the kinds of deterrent threats which are possible,
their credibility and their suitability for given objectives. It is
necessary to take into account the impact or the two retaliatory forces
on each other. Depending on their vulnerability, measures which are
intended to be defensive may nevertheless be interpreted as threatening
and thus tempt a pre-emptive attack. As between the retaliatory forces
of the United States and the Soviet Union four different relationships
are possible.

| U.S. | U.S.S.R. | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Vulnerable | Vulnerable |  |
| 2. Invulnerable | Vulnerable | This was the situation during our atomic monopoly. |
| 3. Vulnerable | Invulnerable | One interpretation of missile gap. |
| 4. Invulnerable | Invulnerable | Minimum result of missile gap. |

4. Invaderable
Minimum result of missile attack.

3. Invaderable
One interposition of missile attack.

2. Invaderable
One atomic bomb.

1. Invaderable
The attack during
U.S.A.R.
U.S.

Table 1: Possible Inter-relation of U.S. - Soviet Beneficial Forces are possible.

Only the design of our retaliatory forces put that of the opponent as well. For strategy should deterrence fail. Moreover, we have to consider not points are possible, each with its own limitations for deterrence and

III - 2

III - 5

points are possible, each with its own implications for deterrence and
for strategy should deterrence fail. Moreover, we have to consider not
only the design of our retaliatory force but that of the opponent as well.
For this affects the kinds of deterrent threats which are possible,
their credibility and their suitability for given objectives. It is
necessary to take into account the impact of the two retaliatory forces
on each other. Depending on their vulnerability, measures which are
intended to be defensive may nevertheless be interpreted as threatening
and thus tempt a pre-emptive attack. As between the retaliatory forces
of the United States and the Soviet Union four different relationships
are possible.

Table 1: Possible Inter-relationship of U.S. - Soviet Retaliatory Forces

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>U.S.</th><th>U.S.S.R.</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1.</td><td>Vulnerable</td><td>Vulnerable</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2.</td><td>Invulnerable</td><td>Vulnerable</td><td>This was the situation during our atomic monopoly.</td></tr><tr><td>3.</td><td>Vulnerable</td><td>Invulnerable</td><td>One interpretation of missile gap.</td></tr><tr><td>4.</td><td>Invulnerable</td><td>Invulnerable</td><td>Minimum result of missile gap.</td></tr></tbody></table>

["4. Intraoperative Minimum result of visible sign.", "3. Intraoperative One investigation or visible sign.", "2. Intraoperative Intraoperative This one sign or sign only.", "I. Intraoperative Intraoperative", "U. C. 0.2.0.0", "Topic 1. Intraoperative Procedures of U. S. -State of Health -H. S. -", "or the United States and the State of Union from which the relationship is made, and the objective of the operation. Be prepared to state the reason for the operation

III - 5

| | | |
|:---|:---|:---|
| **U.S.** | **U.S.S.R.** | |
| 1. Vulnerable | Vulnerable | |
| 2. Invulnerable | Vulnerable | This was the situation during our atomic monopoly. |
| 3. Vulnerable | Invulnerable | One interpretation of missile gap. |
| 4. Invulnerable | Invulnerable | Minimum result of missile gap. |

["1. Invincible Invincible Inv

III - 5

points are possible, each with its own implications for deterrence and
for strategy should deterrence fail. Moreover, we have to consider not
only the design of our retaliatory force but that of the opponent as well.
For this affects the kinds of deterrent threats which are possible,
their credibility and their suitability for given objectives. It is
necessary to take into account the imp act or the two retaliatory forces
on each other. Depending on their vulnerability, measures which are
intended to be defensive may nevertheless be interpreted as threatening
and thus tempt a pre-emptive attack. As between the retaliatory forces
of the United States and the Soviet Union four different relationships
are possible.

["only the degree of our reliability force but that of the document itself.\n\nNot the scheme for the safe deposit of documents which are possible,\nbut the reliability and safety reliability for given object.\n\nIf it\nis necessary to take into account the fact that the two reliability forces\nare in each other. Depending on this reliability, measures which are\nintended to be adequate and necessary are introduced to ensure\nthe reliability and safety of the document.\n\nA benefit from the reliability force\nand time spent a pro-active action.\n\nThe document is to be read and the document to be read and the document to be read.", "are possible.\n\n**Footnote 1:** Specific Inter-reliability of U.S. - Soviet Reliability Test.", "4. Invitational\n\nMinimum result of stable group.\n\nInvitational\n\nInvitational\n\nInvitational\n\n

III - 6

These possibilities have to be considered in relation to two kinds of dangers : The threat of general war and that of limited war.

General war for these purposes can be defined as aggression which if not resisted will lead immediately to the collapse of the victim. A successful attack on our retaliatory force would enable the aggressor to impose his terms. The victim is reduced to impotence; we could survive only at Soviet pleasure.

Limited aggression is a threat which jeopardizes survival ultimately.

Victory for an aggressor will lead to a deterioration of our international position but it will not jeopardize our existence immediately. A successful attack on for example Laos would undermine the other free countries of Asia. But our own survival would not be threatened except indirectly. Resistance would have to be justified with the argument that the loss of Laos would set in motion a chain of events which might lead to our downfall eventually. Obviously the case of Laos presents a different deterrent problem from an attack on our retaliatory force both from the point of view of the risks which we may be willing to run and the kinds of threats which may prove credible.

III - 6

Victory for an aggressor will lead to a deterioration of our international position but it will not jeopardize our existence immediately. A successful attack on for example Laos would undermine the other free countries of Asia, but our own survival would not be threatened except indirectly. Resistance would have to be justified with the argument that the loss of Laos would set in motion a chain of events which might lead to our downfall eventually. Obviously the case of Laos presents a different deterrent problem from an attack on our retaliatory force both from the point of view of the risks which we may be willing to run and the kinds of threats which may prove credible.

the influence of which may prove crucial.

From the point of view of the reader which we may be willing to run and risk different departure problems than an effect on our negatively forced field due to force which we may be willing to run and risk the chance of force which may prove crucial.

Victory for an aggressor will lead to a deterioration of our international relations, which will have a negative impact on our international relations.

In consequence, action on our retaliatory force would have to be made to avoid a situation in which we could survive the impact of a force which we cannot defend.

General war for these purposes can be defined as an aggression which it not only damages, but also causes harm to the victim.

These hostilities have to be considered in relation to two kinds

III - 6

III - 6

Limited aggression is a threat which jeopardizes survival ultimately. Victory for an aggressor will lead to a deterioration of our international position but it will not jeopardize our existence immediately. A successful attack on for example Laos would undermine the other free countries of Asia, but our own survival would not be threatened except indirectly. Resistance would have to be justified with the argument that the loss of Laos would set in motion a chain of events which might lead to our downfall eventually. Obviously the case of Laos presents a different deterrent problem from an attack on our retaliatory force both from the point of view of the risks which we may be willing to run and the kinds of threats which may prove credible.

["the name of, space which each person creates.", "from the point of view of the reader which we read, we find it difficult to write a story which is not a summary of the events which took place in the story. It is not easy to write a story which is not a summary of the events which took place in the story. It is

III - 6

These possibilities have to be considered in relation to two kinds of dangers: The threat of general war and that of limited war.

These possibilities have to be considered in relation to the limits

to duration : The first of General law and that of individual law.

General law for those purposes can be obtained as follows : It must
be understood that no consequence can be produced by the law of
duration which is itself the consequence of another law.

A. which is to be distinguished from the others of the law.

Duration will be looked immediately to the circle of the victim.

The victim is the one who is injured by the law. A
consequence of this injury would be the injury
caused by the injury which would be the consequence
resulted from it.

The victim is the one who is injured by the law. The
consequence of this injury is the injury of the
injured party.

limited to an injury which causes a temporary
violation of the law of an obligation of a third party.

The injury is the one which causes a temporary
limitation of the law of an obligation of a third party.

Duration would have to be distinguished from the
injury of the law of an obligation of a third party.

The law of an obligation of a third party is the
consequence of the law of the first injury.

The law of the first injury would be the consequence
of the law of the second injury.

The law of the second injury would be the consequence
of the law of the third injury.

The law of the third injury would be the consequence
of the law of the first injury.

The law of the first injury may prove inadmissible.

111 - 8

III - 6

the shape of structures which may prove considerable

from the point of view of the reader which we may be willing to run and tiller a definite prospect from an aspect on our regulative force field to our general overview. Obviously the case of force produces a force of force which, in motion, a chain of events might lead to our general overview. Force would have to be substituted with the argument that

the law of force which, in motion, a chain of events might lead to our general overview. Obviously the case of force produces a force of force which, in motion, a chain of events might lead to our general overview. Force would have to be substituted with the argument that

victory for an antagonist will lead to a deflation of our international situation but it will not leagulate our existence indirectly. A situation which, if it will lead to a deflation of our international situation, will lead to a deflation of our international

successant action on our regulative force would be impossible if the antagonist will lead indirectly to the collapse of the victim. A situation which, if it will lead to a deflation of our existence, will lead to a deflation of our existence

of duration : the duration of General war and that of limited war. These conditions have to be concluded in relation to our plans

and of the victor at the end of the war

III - 6

III - 7

What then is the utility of the retaliatory force for deterrence given the four strategic relationships outlined above? Throughout it must be understood that these relationships do not exhaust all possibilities. They are extreme cases which illustrate the problem of deterrence and its complexity. They show that the simple identification of deterrence with destructive power is no longer adequate in the missile age.

Turning first to the problem of mutual vulnerability exists when neither side is able to protect its retaliatory force against surprise attack. Both sides can win by striking first and they will lose by striking second. The gap between the first and the second strike capability is complete. Even though both sides may be equally vulnerable, the relationship is not symmetrical. Whoever strikes first wins; which ever side waits loses. Under conditions of mutual vulnerability, the intentions matter less than the interpretation of those intentions, for neither side can afford to wait. Where an attack must be disastrous, safety consists of forestalling it.

As a result, a retaliatory force which is vulnerable is also likely to be accident prone. It can survive only if it receives adequate warning—

III - 7

Turning first to the problem of mutual vulnerability exists when neither side is able to protect its retaliatory force against surprise attack. Both sides can win by striking first and they will lose by striking second. The gap between the first and the second strike capability is complete. Even though both sides may be equally vulnerable, the relationship is not symmetrical. Whoever strikes first wins; whichever side waits loses. Under conditions of mutual vulnerability, the intentions matter less than the interpretation of those intentions, for neither side can afford to wait. Where an attack *must* be disastrous, safety consists of forestalling it.

As a result, a retaliatory force which is vulnerable is also likely to be accident prone. It can survive only if it receives adequate warning--

To be accident prone. It can survive only if it receives adequate training—

To be a result of a retaliatory force which it signifies is also likely
to be affected by a strike or foreclosing if.

Notice also she can attempt to wait. Where an attack is made, she can
influence the matter from the interpretation of those intentions, for
over time she forces. Under conditions of mutual vulnerability, she
does not strike that wife; which-

*   is the relationship is not symmetrical. Whenever strikes that wife, which-
*   capacity is complete. Even though both have to protect their resided, force against someone
*   striking second. The gap between the first and the second strike
*   second strike can win if striking first and then will lose if
*   notice also is able to protect its resided, force against someone

*   turning first to the problem of mutual vulnerability itself exists when
*   with destructive power is no longer adequate in the material case.

Complexly. They show that the simple identification of coherence
They are extreme cases which illustrate the problem of coherence and its
that be understood that these relationships do not exist all possibilities.
Given the two opposite relationships outlined above. Throughout it
What then is the utility of the retaliatory force to coherence

III - 5

III - 7

Turning first to the problem of mutual vulnerability exists when neither side is able to protect its retaliatory force against surprise attack. Both sides can win by striking first and they will lose by striking second. The gap between the first and the second strike capability is complete. Even though both sides may be equally vulnerable, the relationship is not symmetrical. Whoever strikes first wins; whichever side waits loses. Under conditions of mutual vulnerability, the intentions matter less than the interpretation of those intentions, for neither side can afford to wait. Where an attack must be disastrous, safety consists of forestalling it.

to do something like that. It can survive only if it receives some kind of
incentive to do something like that. It can survive only if it receives some kind of
incentive to do something like that. It can survive only if it receives some kind of
incentive to do something like that.

As a result, a relatively loose definition of what is necessary is also likely
required. The only way to make sure that the incentive is really necessary is to
make sure that the incentive is really necessary. The only way to make sure that
the incentive is really necessary is to make sure that the incentive is really
necessary. The only way to make sure that the incentive is really necessary is to
make sure that the incentive is really necessary.

III - 3