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both the Atlantic Alliance and European institutions. Gradually Germany may well seek for itself the role within Europe that France insists Europe should play within the Atlantic Alliance.

* Germany will always value its links to the United States. In that sense, it provides a balance between European institutions and Atlantic partnership.

* As Germany's relative role grows, and as Russia recovers, there will emerge opportunities for closer Russo-German ties.

These tendencies will be supported across a broad spectrum. Not only did the younger generation of Germans not experience the postwar trauma of World War II but the former Communist third of Germany did not participate in the democratic experience until the last decade of the twentieth century. Thus a new kind of national identity is

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likely to develop, not militarily aggressive but resistant to discrimination
based on a past which the vast majority of Germans never knew and
striving for a
insistent on political influence for Germany commensurate with its
economic and strategic potential. These trends are a healthy culmination
of German recovery. And they define the significant role played by
Germany in a unifying Europe and as a member of the Atlantic
partnership.

Visitors to the World Cup in 2006, which—unlike the last time
Germany hosted in 1974—will be held in a unified country, will thus
encounter a dynamic Germany. Having observed the country's evolution
my entire life and especially closely since the end of the war, I am aware
of the important role football has played. As a passionately pursued
sport, it has an inevitably unifying impact on the national consciousness

JODY WILLIAMS

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(in national-level play, though not at *Bundesliga* games). Even in that first postwar winter of food shortages, the traditional clubs began to activate their established competitions and thereby provided a sense that society still existed even as political structures had collapsed. Over the years, I have visited my hometown of Fürth several times and witnessed the reemergence of my home team, Spvg Fürth, to which, by the inscrutable workings of fandom, I had remained attached through all vicissitudes of history. German football immediately after the war was backward by modern professional standards, being largely based on prewar amateur technique; that nevertheless did not diminish my enthusiasm—especially as it produced more goals than today's style.

By 1954, football had made a great contribution to German pride when the national team won the world championship against Hungary,

JODY WILLIAMS

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8

which had heretofore been considered unbeatable. In 1974, Germany hosted, and won, the World Cup in a marvelously efficient manner in a still divided country.

German teams have been at the forefront of the international competitions, both on club and national levels, having won three World Cups and placing second three times. In 2006, the national team of a unified Germany will be playing in a World Cup for the first time on native soil before a committed public. It will be an extraordinary symbol of a country that has rebuilt itself in all dimensions and can proudly demonstrate its achievements to the world.

JUN-24-2003 19:23

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1109 WORDS

6/23/03

WC 2006 ARTICLE

I came back to Germany in 1944 with the 84th Infantry Division of the U.S. Army near Geilenkirchen. I then witnessed the collapse of the Third Reich from the vantage point of an ordinary soldier as my unit moved across northern Germany. It occupied Hannover and Salzwedel and met the Soviet armies on the Elbe. I finally wound up for two years with the army of occupation in southern Germany, first in Bensheim, then in Oberammergau.

I mention these events because they frame [Germany's] achievement [over] the past fifty years. When the war ended, [the country] was in ruins. Cities were destroyed to an extent unimaginable

JUN-24-2003 19:24

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to [today's] generation; in many quarters of the major cities, literally [not at] house was standing. There was a [critical] food shortage. Postal and telephone service had broken down. Central authority had collapsed. In the eyes of the world, Germany was not only an economic [shambles], it was morally isolated in a world still traumatized by the wartime experience with [the] Nazis.

For me, this is the base line against which the current German achievement must be measured. It required [exceptional] moral courage even to start reconstruction. But with extraordinary tenacity, dedication, and moral commitment, Germany launched itself on the road to reform. Without central institutions for four years and no immediate access to world markets, [it] reinvented itself politically and economically. In 1947, currency reform unleashed market economics. By 1949, the three

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Western zones of occupation had merged into a single unit headed by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. To achieve this, Germany had to brave the Soviet blockade of Berlin in strong alliance with the United States and other Western powers. It had to traverse the domestic and international debate regarding the creation of the Atlantic Alliance.

In the early 1950s, the Adenauer government made a heroic decision. Faced with an ambiguous offer [from] Stalin to unify the country in return for unification, Adenauer and his colleagues rejected the temptations of returning to Germany's historic national policy. They affirmed the priority of reliability and ties to the West. As the Cold War division of Germany stretched into decades, the Federal Republic emphasized both its Atlantic and European vocations. It sought security from Soviet military pressures by supporting American leadership

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4

in the Atlantic Alliance, and it strove for legitimacy vis-à-vis the East

German Soviet satellite by accepting French political leadership on

*European integration. Playing second角色 to the United States within*

NATO and to France within Europe, the Federal Republic emerged a few
decades after its unconditional surrender as the strongest military and
economic power in Europe and as a key building block of Atlantic
solidarity. These relationships were forged ever deeper through two

Berlin crises and the common experience in helping bring about the
unification of Germany after the collapse of Communism in 1989.

Unification has brought about an alteration in the Cold War pattern.

The political balance within Europe and NATO basically changed.

Germany's willingness to accept a subordinate status in NATO as well as

in Europe has diminished. As Russian recovery gains momentum, the

JUN-24-2003 19:24

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5

traditional temptation of special German relations with Russia has
reappeared.

Three basic trends are likely to emerge as Germany becomes less
dependent on the United States for security and on France for legitimacy:

* A greater assertiveness will become evident within both the Atlantic Alliance and European institutions. Gradually Germany may well seek for itself the role within Europe that France insists Europe should play within the Atlantic Alliance.

* Germany will always be far less prepared to put at risk its links to the United States, than is provided for by French prescriptions for Atlantic relations. In that sense, it provides a limit to the implementation of European institutions + Atlantic pathlines (French rhetoric).

* As Germany's relative role and power grows and as Russia recovers,

JUN-24-2003 19:24

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6

opportunity close to us there will emerge temptations for a special Russo-German approachment—based on the Bismarckian tradition that the two countries prospered when they were close and suffered when they were in conflict.

be supported even a broad speech by these tendencies will not be confined to the governing parties. Not only did the younger generation of Germans not experience the postwar trauma—not to speak of the Nazi one—but the former Communist third of Germany did not participate in the democratic experience until the last decade of the twentieth century. Thus a new kind of nationalism is likely to develop, not militarily aggressive but resistant to discrimination based on a past which the vast majority of Germans never knew and insistent on political influence for Germany commensurate with its economic and military potential.

shut up military potential.

But there trends are a healthy rehabilitation of human recovery and they define the situation for players by whom we in a unifacilny Europe and as a member of this planter partnerships.

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But it has also evoked a dedicated and extraordinary effort to turn Berlin into a [vital] capital for a united Germany and, in many ways, of a united Germany (?).

Visitors to the World Cup in 2006, which [-] unlike the last time Germany hosted in 1974 -✓ will be held in a unified country, will thus encounter a dynamic Germany. Having observed the [country's] evolution my [entire] life and especially [closely] since the end of the war, [I am aware of the] important role football has played. As a passionately pursued sport, it has an inevitably unifying impact on the national consciousness [in] national[-level play], not at league-games).

Even in that first [winter of food shortages, the traditional clubs began to [activated] their established competitions and thereby provided a sense that society still existed even as political structures had collapsed. [while]

JUN-24-2003 19:25

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Over the years I spent in southern Germany, I took the opportunity to visit my hometown of Fürth several times and witnessed the reemergence of my home team, Spvg Fürth, to which, by the inscrutable workings of fandom, I had remained attached through all vicissitudes of history. The football team miniscularly after the war of those early years was backward by modern professional standards, being largely based on prewar amateur [technique]; that [nevertheless] did not diminish my enthusiasm—especially as it produced more goals than [today's] style.

By 1954, football [had] made a great contribution to German pride when the national team won the world championship against Hungary, which had heretofore been considered unbeatable. In 1974, Germany hosted, and won, the World Cup in a marvelously efficient manner in a still divided country.

JUN-24-2003 19:25

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German teams have been at the forefront of the international
competitions, both on club and national levels, having won three World
Cups and placing second three times. [In 2006, the national team of a
unified Germany] will be playing in a World Cup for the first time [on
native soil] before a committed public. It will be an extraordinary symbol
of a country that has rebuilt itself in all dimensions and can proudly
demonstrate its achievements to the world.

TOTAL P.09

38 Henry Kissinger

to the other extreme, seeking to ensure security against all its
neighbors simultaneously. But if Germany was strong enough to
defeat all its neighbors if they were allied, it was clearly strong
enough to overwhelm them individually. Thus Germany's effort to
escape its strategic predicament produced its worst nightmare: a
coalition of all the neighboring states against it. Germany has been
for centuries either too weak or too strong for the peace of Europe.

In the end, this problem has been solved only twice in German
history: by Otto von Bismarck in the first decades of a unified Ger-
many in the nineteenth century, and after World War II by Konrad
Adenauer and his successor chancellors of the Federal Republic.
Bismarck opted for security via diplomatic dexterity. He sought to
arrange the relations of European states toward each other in such
a manner that Germany would always have more options than any
possible rival, thereby preventing the formation of hostile coali-
tions. This tour de force proved too subtle and complex for his suc-
cessors who substituted an arms race for diplomatic skill and slid
into the First World War by the excessive flexing of muscles.

Adenauer and his successors inherited a defeated, partitioned,
and devastated Germany, whose taste for solitary adventures had
been exhausted by two wars. They had learned that Germany's past
conduct had generated too much distrust to allow for the Bismarck
style of subtle combinations, and that the German romantic ten-
dency would overwhelm the sense of proportion on which the Bis-
marckian diplomacy was based. In any event, a national diplomacy
was precluded by the realities of allied occupation.

As the Cold War division of Germany stretched into decades,
the Federal Republic emphasized both its Atlantic and European
vocations. It sought security from Soviet military pressures by sup-
porting American leadership in the Atlantic Alliance, and it strove
for legitimacy vis-à-vis the East German Soviet satellite by accept-
ing French political leadership on European integration. Playing
second fiddle to the United States within NATO and to France
within Europe, the Federal Republic emerged a few decades after its
unconditional surrender as the strongest military and economic
power in Europe and as a key building block of Atlantic solidarity.

In the early stages of the Adenauer Social Democratic Party's
government, the German Democratic Party was included among its
German politics. In the 1950s, the Social Democrats and the
Garibaldi—now the German Democratic Party—influenced the
government's foreign policy.

By the 1970s, the Social Democrats, who had been in power since
terms with German Social Democracy being established in the
1930s, had reinforced their position with a greater will to
be a part of the West. They also had a greater will to be a part of the
Communist East, and they actively promoted their views with
gottings and meetings. In 1971, the Social Democrats and the
West German Democratic Party were merged, and the new party was
division and laid to the side. In 1974, the new party was formed,
which, in 1971, ended the West German Democratic Party's
eastern approach to militaryärztliche Entwicklung.
In 1988—after
took over the direction of the Green Party (Environ-
cally hostile to the
ties has stressed the
due in part to the
many of the debate
Inevitably, and
ternational alignment
German national
reduced (and, for a
the East and when
Soviet satellite, the

In 1998—after
took over the direc-
Green (Environ-
cally hostile to the
ties has stressed the
due in part to the
many of the debate
Inevitably, and
ternational alignm-
German national
reduced (and, for a
the East and when
Soviet satellite, the

Does America Need a Foreign Policy?

39

In the early stages of the Cold War, there was considerable opposition to the Adenauer course. It was expressed mostly in the Social Democratic Party, which had heroically resisted the Nazis and included among its members some of the most admirable figures in German politics. In the early days of the Federal Republic, its leaders advocated what amounted to a national policy in neutralist garb—in concrete terms, what they proposed was to give up Western military ties in return for unification.

By the 1970s, the SPD (in its German acronym) had come to terms with Germany's integration into the West. Two distinguished Social Democratic chancellors, Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, reinforced Germany's Atlantic and European ties, albeit with a greater willingness to explore diplomatic options with the Communist East, and supported by the United States, at first hesitantly, later with conviction. Brandt's "opening to the East" in negotiations with Moscow led to the formal acceptance of Germany's division and laid the basis for a four-power agreement on Berlin which, in 1971, ended the threat to that city. The lingering interest in Germany's eastern option as a road to unification and a different approach to military strategy on the part of the SPD's rank and file brought down Chancellor Schmidt when, in 1982, he was preparing to implement the NATO decision to deploy American intermediate-range missiles on German soil.

In 1998—after being out of office for sixteen years—the SPD took over the direction of Germany in coalition with the so-called Green (Environmental) Party, whose platform had been historically hostile to the Atlantic Alliance. In office, neither of these parties has stressed the issues that characterized them in opposition—due in part to the fact that the post-Cold War world has overtaken many of the debates of the 1980s.

Inevitably, and independent of the party in office, the new international alignment has brought about greater emphasis on the German national interest. When the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced (and, for a time, eliminated) the fear of military attack from the East and when, in 1990, unification destroyed the East German Soviet satellite, the political balance within Europe and NATO ba-

40 Henry Kissinger

sically changed. Germany's willingness to accept a subordinate status in NATO as well as in Europe has diminished. As Russian recovery gains momentum, the traditional temptation of special German relations with Russia has reappeared.

* Germany will always be far less prepared to put at risk its links to the United States than is provided for by French prescriptions for Atlantic relations. In that sense, it provides a limit to the implementation of French rhetoric.

* As Germany's relative role and power grow, and as Russia recovers, there will emerge temptations for a special Russo-German rapprochement based on the Bismarckian tradition that the two countries prospered when they were close and suffered when they were in conflict.

These tendencies will not be confined to the governing parties. Not only did the younger generation of Germans not experience the postwar trauma—not to speak of the Nazi one—but the former Communist third of Germany did not participate in the democratic experience until the last decade of the twentieth century. Thus a new kind of nationalism is likely to develop, not militarily aggressive but resistant to discrimination based on a past which the vast majority of Germans never knew and insistent on political influence for Germany commensurate with its economic and military potential.

These trends will tempt other European nations to court Russia, in part as a reaction to American dominance, in part as a counterweight to Germany—though, in such a contest, Germany's bar

gaining positive Were the Uni- lantic relation- like the tradit- penalties.

## THE CHANGING EUROPEAN ORDER

The leader of the crucible democracies, the long road they launch direct and in eventual defeat.

The generalization of experience set of experiments, American policy was to raise their attitudes against the background of 1970s that had and, indeed, had not already been set in motion. They identified as uncomfortable the thought that the majority of Germans never knew and insisted on political influence for Germany commensurate with its economic and military potential.

The generalization of experience set of experiments, American policy was to raise their attitudes against the background of 1970s that had and, indeed, had already been set in motion. They identified as uncomfortable the thought that the majority of Germans never knew and insisted on political influence for Germany commensurate with its economic and military potential.

CY]

FIFA FUSSBALL-WELTMEISTERSCHAFT
DEUTSCHLAND
2006

FIFA FUSSBALL-WELTMEISTERSCHAFT 2006™ Organisationskomitee Deutschland
Frankfurt Airport Center 1, D6, 60549 Frankfurt am Main

Miss Jody Williams
c/o Professor Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K Street
N.W. Washington D.C.
20006 USA
FAX: 001212 753 7248

FIFA FUSSBALL-
WELTMEISTERSCHAFT 2006¹
Organisationskomitee
Deutschland

Frankfurt Airport Center 1, D6
60549 Frankfurt am Main

Tel: +49 (0)69 20 06-0
Fax: +49 (0)69 20 06-26 26

www.ok-deutschland2006.de

27th February 2003

MAR 12 2003

Dear Miss Williams,

We are very pleased, that Professor Kissinger is willing to write an article for our World Cup brochure.

As mentioned in my first letter, we would like Professor Kissinger to make a statement in regards to the German image worldwide.

How do other countries regard Germany? What effect does football have? What statement can a World Cup make in a reunified country. How do people observe Germany worldwide also in regards to football? Is football an ambassador of our country?

As you can see, the article touches on many different subjects and should not only consider the sporting side. We would like to approach the Football World Cup 2006 in Germany from a different angle. Football is more than a game on green turf, but also part of our society, politics and part of our daily life.

That is the reason why the World Cup 2006 is such a great chance for Germany to present itself to the world. Which chance is this exactly? What does Germany have to do to use it? What does the world expect from Germany? All these questions can be answered by Professor Kissinger due to his experience and cosmopolitan attitude far better than by an author who was born and raised in Germany and has spent his life in this country.

Büro München
Königinstraße 23
80539 München

Tel: +49 (0)89 20 06-0

Fax: +49 (0)89 20 06-10 06

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Konto Nr. 92 2006 00

DEUTSCHLAND
2006

FIFA WELTMEISTERSCHAFT

FIFA FUSSBALL-WELTMEISTERSCHAFT 2006™ Organisierungskomitée Deutschland
Frankfurt Airport Center 1, D6, 60549 Frankfurt am Main

Herrn
Prof. Henry Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K Street
N.W. Washington D.C.
20006 USA
FAX: 001212 753 7248

27th February 2003

FIFA FUSSBALL-
WELTMEISTERSCHAFT 2006™
Organisationskomitée
Deutschland

Tel: +49 (0)69 20 06-0

Fax: +49 (0)69 20 06-26 26

www.ok-deutschland2006.de

FEB 27 2003

Dear Professor Kissinger,

First of all, we and especially our President Franz Beckenbauer hope that you are well and still have the tireless vigour and motivation to keep track with your new and impressive activities.

We would like to approach you today with a very special request. This year we would like to publish the first official World Cup 2006 brochure. It will be addressed to international decision makers worldwide, the media and should invoke a pleasant anticipation for this great event, which we were awarded by FIFA in July 2000.

We would like to include one of your essays in this brochure, in which you describe the possibilities for Germany in addition to the football-related issues. We feel, that if the political events of the last century still arouse a certain suspicion worldwide, then this can be described better by someone who looks onto Germany from the outside.

Isn't this a grand opportunity for a country to present itself as a peace-loving epicentre in the heart of Europe? Is it yet another platform to honour the non-violent revolution of the German reunification? Which contribution can football make in these troubled times? To these and other questions, we would love to receive an answer from you. It would be wonderful, if you could fit it into your busy schedule to write an article during the next two months and we would be most grateful to receive your kind confirmation.

Tel: +49 (0)89 2006-0

Fax: +49 (0)89 2006-10 06