INSERT A

Another cause for the nuclear debate in NATO is that the range and destructiveness of modern weapons run counter to traditional notions of national sovereignty. The risks of nuclear war may be too great to be combined with what has heretofore been considered a key attribute of sovereignty: the unilateral right of a sovereign state to alter its political or strategic views.

Thus NATO requires above all a more embracing **political** structure.

INSERT B

It must adjust its relations to the growth of European strength
and self-confidence. It must find a political mechanism to behave
purposefully during crises and without illusion during periods of
relaxation of tension. It badly needs an agreed strategic doctrine.
The issue of the NATO multilateral force requires the most careful
re-examination.

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in circumstances which might preclude consultation with the President.

(4) The President should give assurances that "concern for remote possibilities of accidental or unauthorized firing...will not result in the imposition of safeguard systems which impair our deterrent capability." This last recommendation was directed against the Permissive Action Links, electronic locks on nuclear weapons which can be unlocked only by a coded signal issuing from Washington.

These recommendations raise many perplexing questions which will be dealt with by grouping them into four broad categories: Emergency use of nuclear weapons; delegation of authority to the NATO commander over the use of tactical nuclear weapons; the problem of the Permissive Action Links; and the real issues before NATO.

## A. Emergency Use of Nuclear Weapons

It is natural to share former President Eisenhower's publicly expressed dismay that the issue was ever raised. No Administration could possibly comply with the demand that it reveal its procedures for the case of Presidential incapacity without giving a would-be aggressor vital information.

Since it is impossible to state the problem without exploring the most sensitive areas of national security, proposed remedies are inevitably misleading. Senator Goldwater and his task force suggest that the NATO commander be given authority to use "battlefield nuclear weapons" should communications between NATO headquarters and Washington be interrupted.

However, an attack of a magnitude great enough to interrupt communications between Washington and NATO headquarters would make

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short-range battlefield weapons almost irrelevant. The effectiveness of a counterblow would then depend primarily on strategic nuclear weapons which are specifically excepted from the emergency delegation envisaged by Senator Goldwater's task force. Is this because communications between SAC headquarters and Washington are thought to be more secure than between Washington and NATO headquarters? And what happens then to the strategic weapons which are already under NATO control?

If communications can be secured to every command except NATO--including those much more relevant to the mission envisaged by Senator Goldwater's task force--why not concentrate on improving communications to NATO headquarters? Finally, what makes Senator Goldwater and his advisors believe that an attack powerful enough to interrupt communications between NATO headquarters and Washington would leave intact communications between NATO headquarters and the field commanders? Or do they propose to delegate authority even further down the line?

## B. Delegation of Authority over the Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

When to use nuclear weapons is an important issue that the Atlantic Alliance will have to solve. But, delegation of authority to the NATO commander to initiate nuclear war does not resolve the problem. One reason is that the NATO commander is an allied officer; he is not in the American chain of command. He is responsible to the NATO Council, not to the United States President. [This distinction has been obscured in the past because the United States commander in Europe has heretofore doubled in brass as NATO commander. This is not inevitable, however.]

Even if the United States should delegate authority to the NATO commander, most of our allies are certain to insist on retaining their veto. This

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One of the reasons why former NATO Commander General Norstad has proposed that a civilian political body on which the major NATO countries including the United States are represented exercise control.

This proposal is in line with the strategic realities. No NATO commander would want to use nuclear weapons in Europe without alerting SAC. But if communications are adequate for this purpose, they are also adequate for political control to be exercised.

### C. Permissive Action Links

Senator Goldwater has expressed concern that the safeguards on our nuclear weapons--specifically the Permissive Action Links--may prevent their use. It is impossible to evaluate this charge without much more knowledge of the state of communications between Washington and NATO headquarters and NATO headquarters and the field commanders; this information, whatever the Administration, must be highly classified. However, this issue is essentially separate from the question of who has the authority to release nuclear weapons. Even if authority were delegated to the NATO commander, he would require safeguards with respect to his subordinates. If permissive links are removed, nuclear weapons would have to be deployed further back in order to prevent local emergencies from enforcing their use. Thus, any fair evaluation of permissive action links would have to weigh the constraints, if any, over their use against the greater flexibility they give to deployment.

### D. The Issue before NATO

Many other questions are raised by the task force report including the intriguing distinction between "theoretical" and "actual"

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Presidential control which is rejected for battlefield weapons. But the profoundest problem is the irrelevance of the recommendations to the very real problems before the Atlantic Alliance.

The nuclear debate in NATO is not primarily about military operations but about the relative weight of various countries within the Alliance. Our allies are more concerned about their influence in peace-time or during crises than about the mechanics of conducting a nuclear war. The nuclear issue has arisen in part because some of our allies believe that influence within the Alliance depends on the possession of nuclear weapons, while the United States fears that to recognize this proposition would make the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Alliance inevitable.

Insofar as the issue of nuclear control has a military foundation, it is produced by the large force of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles stationed in Russia and aimed at Europe. In order to counteract these, some Europeans have demanded nuclear weapons of their own. These would not be battlefield weapons, however, but essentially strategic ones; and they have been, in any case, specifically excluded from the recommendations of both Senator Goldwater and his task force.

Some of us have pointed out for years that the Atlantic Alliance faces serious problems. It must adjust its relations to the growth of European strength and self-confidence. It must find a political mechanism to behave purposefully during crises and without illusion during periods of relaxation of tension. It badly needs an agreed strategic doctrine. The issue of the NATO multilateral force

ROUGH DRAFT

To the Editor of the Herald

In a letter published October 13, Mr. Robert Anderson has described the criticisms of Senator Goldwater's views with respect to the delegation of authority over the use of tactical nuclear weapons to the NATO Commander as a "cruel libel".

I would like to offer a few comments. If Senator Goldwater's views are not correctly represented, this is due in large part to the difficulty of determining what they are. When he raised the issue, he spoke in terms of delegating authority to the NATO commander. Thus at a press conference on January 7, 1964 Senator Goldwater spoke as follows: *Insert A*

This argument was repeated on numerous occasions including Senator Goldwater's presentation to the platform committee at the Republican Convention.

Since then Senator Goldwater and his advisors have insisted that they are concerned only with "emergency delegation" in case the President is incapacitated by enemy attack on some other cause.

This raises two questions: (1) Does Senator Goldwater allege that no emergency provisions exist now? (2) Or is he dissatisfied with the

no emergency violations exist now. (2) Or is he disassembled with the
This raises two questions: (1) Has Senator Goldwater alleged that
is incapacitated by enemy attack on some other cause.

they are concerned only with "emergency delegation" in case the President
Since then Senator Goldwater and his advisors have insisted that

Republican Convention.

Senator Goldwater's presentation to the platform committee at the
This argument was repeated on numerous occasions including

follows:

> at a press conference on January 7, 1964 Senator Goldwater spoke as
> spoke in terms of delegating authority to the NATO commander. True
> difficulty of determining what they are. When he raised the issue, he
> views are not correctly represented, this is due in large part to the
> I would like to offer a few comments. If Senator Goldwater's
> to the NATO Commander as a "crusel pipeline".

to the delegation of authority over the use of tactical nuclear weapons
described the criticisms of Senator Goldwater's views with respect
In a letter published October 13, Mr. Robert Anderson passed

To the Editor of the Herald

ROCHE DRAYT

EX]

10/14/64