The International
Portrait Gallery

150 East 50th Street • New York, N. Y. 10022
PLaza 1-3033 (area 212)

Nov. 15, 1973

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This is a request for a photograph of yourself for reproduction in
the International Portrait Gallery.

Some 2,000 schools and libraries throughout the United States and
Canada now possess IPG collections. As of this moment, the collection
includes 1,250 captioned portraits of famous men and women of all nations
and periods of history.

Each portrait is printed on an individual sheet of card stock the same
size as this letter, and kept in an alphabetical file for reference by
students and other researchers, including educational TV producers.

At the suggestion of educators and librarians, we are now compiling--
for early publication--a supplementary collection which will provide strong
coverage of contemporary men and women of interest to students and library
users.

What we require is a clear, black-and-white photograph, formal or
informal, as you prefer. (You might even provide a photograph of an oil
painting, bust or caricature if available.) Our main desire is to have
what you yourself consider a faithful likeness for this important use.
Incidentally, a fairly large photograph, say 8" x 10", usually reproduces
better than a small one, but we will be happy to work with whatever you
are good enough to offer.

Your generosity in supplying a photograph will not involve you in any
cost or obligation. In fact, if you wish we will be pleased to return
your photograph after our printing plates are made.

KG/fp

The
Spectator January 12, 1974

31

## Political Commentary

# The General Election Show

### Patrick Cosgrave

In the last week — and particularly since the announcement of a recall of Parliament, not to mention Lord Carrington's somewhat hasty remarks on the subject — debate about the imminence of a general election, which had been rife, has become rapid. I myself have continuously taken the view that, unless ministers lose their collective political and constitutional heads, there will be no early election. Nonetheless, the possibility of one, especially in the nation's present predicament (about the causes of which my colleague Tom Puzzle has something to say on another page), does raise some important questions, which deserve canvassing. Broadly, these are three. In the present situation, does the present government require a new mandate? My answer is, yes. Then, would an election, whatever the result, and particularly if it produced another Conservative majority, solve anything? My answer is, no, subject to a qualification which depends on your assessment of the Prime Minister. Finally, is it in the Prime Minister's interest — we must consider him, since he is the only one who can demand an election from the Queen — to call a general poll? My answer is no, whatever you think the result would be.

The answer to the first question depends on an understanding of the Government's present tactical position in respect of the miners. Now, there is, I think, little doubt that there are several and complex strands to that position. Most ministers do, quite genuinely, believe that, if the miners are not defeated, or persuaded to accept a settlement within the parameters of Phase Three, all hope of defeating inflation is at an end. They further believe that the miners, or important elements within the NUM, are out to destroy, not only this government, but the present parliamentary structure of this country. A few think that, the miners having defeated the Government badly in 1972, they must not be allowed to do so again, whatever the merits of the case: such men think that even quite responsible trade union elements would be driven from beneath by such a second victory to play highwayman with ministers. A further complication is added by the fact that Mr Whitelaw is new to his job: coming in as he does without a detailed understanding of what has been going on, he, however exceptional his character and ability, must hope — particularly as he is an ex-junior minister at the Ministry of Labour — and the media must hope for him, for a mollifying formula which may not be achievable. The inspired stories about a resolution by paying miners for spending time washing, provided they spent a great deal less time on their ablutions than the rest of us, is a sufficient indication of this syndrome of thought. The situation is, in any event, confused.

It is confused even more by the intervention of Mr Benn. On the whole, his facts have been knocked down; but I am not sure his argument has. The essence of the Benn thesis is that the three-day week is a covert method of introducing a deflation the Government feared otherwise to introduce; and that this deflation is, by Government decision, to be blamed on the miners' go-slow. I am as certain as I can be of my own name that ministers have had neither the time nor the cunning to think up any such scheme, but the looseness of their propaganda, their extraordinary carelessness with words, and the willingness of the Prime Minister in particular to argue the nonsensical proposition that a dispute

with the Coal Board is an attack on the constitution, have all led people to equate the three-day week with the miners. By arguing — out of confusion and worry and anxiety to do well and serve the nation well, rather than out of calculation, I am quite sure — themselves into tighter and tighter circles the Cabinet have ended up defending the last ditch of Phase Three. But Mr Boardman said on television the other night that the three-day week could not be ended even if the miners went back to full time work *pronto*. And anybody who talks to government spokesmen nowadays knows perfectly well that he gets entirely different emphases from each one. So, tackling their own inflation through deflation may be one motive of ministers.

But, if we are talking about the defence of a statutory incomes policy, then the Government of course needs a new mandate. For one of the clearest things about its manifesto in 1970 was its opposition to such a device and its conviction that such policies were unfair and unworkable. Moreover, the Prime Minister repeated that view in an interview with the *Sunday Times* on the first anniversary of his election triumph. A government that has made and repeated such statements, not as the expression of a prejudice, but as the outcome of a judgement, has itself no right, no moral right, to make judgements about the behaviour of others. If the Government says the miners are, and the miners say they are not, attacking the constitution, the government can have no moral nor political authority for saying it is better and wiser, having already admitted and proved its lack of ability in analysis. The miners say compulsory incomes policies are unfair; the government has said they are unfair: wherein lies the difference? It can, of course, lie only in an appeal by a Cabinet in sackcloth and ashes, admitting it was wrong, and begging on bended knees for another chance.

But, would an election achieve anything? If Labour won it would probably achieve the profoundly useful and important objective of getting Britain out of the Common Market, but it would be unlikely to solve the current

domestic problem. True, the Leader of the Labour party and his former Chancellor, Mr Jenkins, are powerless to achieve the commitment of Labour to an incomes policy; but the opponents of that policy in the Opposition are themselves the proponents of violently inflationary socialism. You cannot, as some Labour men seek to do, control prices without controlling wages: true mechanistic socialism, of which there are few proponents in this country, involves the control of both, as in Russia. On the other hand, even if Mr Heath and his colleagues were returned, their policy is as unlikely to produce results then as it is now. Moreover the lines would then be drawn for such a confrontation with organised labour as Baldwin feared and, by his brilliance, averted. On the larger questions of trade union monopoly power, which badly needs to be resolved, the Government would remain as helpless as it has been since its abandonment of its own industrial relations Act.

So, to seek a new mandate, while it would be morally desirable, would be nationally profoundly dangerous, for it would solve nothing. Further, it might exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the social wounds from which the nation suffers. These, however, are large questions, and most political generalisation since Machiavelli — always excepting that most important and fundamental final chapter of *The Prince* — has been created out of small rather than large considerations. Politics should be about national unity, prosperity and aggrandisement. More normally, it is about the gaining and holding of office by individuals. Only in moments of real and felt crisis do we pull out of the cupboard the rusty machinery of fundamental debate and discussion, always fearing we are too late to employ it. Since we have not yet arrived at that moment, or at least have only a superficial understanding of the possibility that we may have arrived at it, we must consider the imminence or otherwise of an election in terms of its effect on the man empowered to call it.

If the Tories were returned, in a who-runs-the-country election with a majority of 1959 proportions, and if I am right in supposing that every event by itself solved nothing, then no man in politics would be more vulnerable than Mr Heath. A renewed mandate and renewed failure would ensure his departure. And, even if recalcitrant unionists were momentarily cowed by the will of the people expressed in an election, there would be other matters to consider, and notably the continuing disaster of the Common Market membership of which he is the only begetter, Mr Heath's hope must be to ride this present storm out, and by doing so to quell the incipient storm over Europe. He would not long survive an election triumph.

And be sure he knows this. The Prime Minister does not have the large imagination of a great leader. But he does not suffer from the incurable small-mindedness of a Neville Chamberlain either. He is a man possessed at once of great will, and of considerable tactical sense. His tactical sense lets him down only when he has allowed his temperament, his angry will, as George Gale once described it, to get the better of him, as, indeed, it did during the last dispute with the miners. As long as he keeps his cool he is certainly the most formidable politician around, especially when he is concerned with his own party, of the whims and impulses of which he has an exact understanding. At the moment he is poised, not between success and failure, but between survival and extinction. He is always inclined in such situations to believe that he can will his way out; it is necessary, however for him to think his way through. If he calls an early general election, and if the industrial situation is not resolved immediately thereafter, we can put a brief term to his future.

[L]C]

33

United States cast another veto. The Security Council had been making a broad survey of the Arab-Israeli conflict and might have passed a resolution which, as usual, censured Israel alone. Against her Britain and France ganged up with Russia once more. And in August 1973 it was the prospect of another American veto which eliminated a threat of sanctions when the Security Council admonished Israel for intercepting an Arab airliner in Lebanese airspace and searching it on Israeli soil.

Unison between Paris and London against Jerusalem involved Washington. In the North Atlantic Alliance, however, no deeper breach yawned until the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. But when the EEC issued its pro-Arab statement in Brussels on November 6, this had not only been preceded by numerous try-outs in the two organs of the United Nations. Account must be taken of a still earlier episode, one divulged early in the winter of 1972. During the previous year a series of unusual conversations had been held at Luxembourg between members and would-be members of the European Community:

"The talks have been shrouded in secrecy," it was reported by the *Times* (February 4, 1972). "This is no doubt in part a reaction to the damage done by leaks last spring when the Six drafted a secret memorandum on the Middle East — their first joint foreign policy venture. The Israelis considered it to be too pro-Arab, accused the Germans of caving in to the French and vented their disappointment on Herr Walter Scheel, the West German Foreign Minister, when he visited Israel."

Dismay in Jerusalem was natural enough as the French and West Germans broke ground and, with other components, explored how, within the European Community, they might concur over world affairs. The French, West Germans and British are the prime components of the European Community. Each had pro-Arab leanings. Anti-Israel was the mood in which it all started.

The Community has done most in the West to stir things up against Israel, and France has done most to stir things up in the Community. About her motives there is no mystery. In a number of Arab countries — Syria, Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco — French banks, oil companies and commercial houses have long held sway; and as French economic imperialism thrives behind a nationalist, anti-colonial façade, it panders to pan-Arab feelings. Not that middle-rank officials or the French people as a whole nurse the anti-Israel sentiments that the upper echelons display. Nor has France always taken the same path. Bold zigzags mark her course towards NATO and towards entry by Britain into the European Community. She has not always been against Israel. *Sacro egoismo*, Gaullist style, was ostensibly what induced her during the Six-day War of 1967 to reverse herself.

Before his retirement, General de Gaulle's taunt over the 'domineering' qualities of Jews revealed the degree to which the anti-Dreyfus credo that was rife during his boyhood outlasted his struggle with Hitler — a German whose anti-Semitic furies consumed many of de Gaulle's own compatriots, famous and obscure alike, with Jewish antecedents. As for the General's political heir, Pompidou, he had not only steered clear of the French Resistance but exercised his right as President to pardon a Frenchman who collaborated with the Nazis during their occupation of France.

One gauge of Gaullist aims in this context has been downright bad faith over the sale of arms. The United States substituted her Phantoms for the French Mirage aircraft which Israel had bought and paid for but of which she could not obtain delivery. So too, there was a dispute between Paris and Jerusalem over missile-firing French patrol ships purchased by the Israelis and for which, nevertheless, an escape from St Nazaire was contrived. Under President Pompidou,

moreover, France had supplied Libya with Mirage jets, although with the pledge that Egypt would not use them against Israelis. Egyptians, however, were trained to pilot these and some of them were shot down during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 by Israel. There was also a significant incident at Djibouti where the French forbid an American destroyer to leave port and go to the help of a blockaded American freighter.

Then The Hague offended the Arabs by endorsing Community strictures of Israel and yet staying pro-Israel. The French, with the British, thereupon balked at sharing oil with the Dutch. This was scarcely a boost for the idea of a co-ordinated foreign policy by the Nine. Yet in the National Assembly only the Communist Party lent M. Pompidou unanimous support and everywhere French diplomacy flouted what, by the findings of opinion polls, was the will of the nation.

But the cruellest recent blows to emanate from Western Europe were West German in origin. Israeli athletes and trainers did not only die because of blunders by authorities of the Bonn Republic at the Munich Olympiad of September 1972; within seven weeks the rest of the Arab terrorists were released. And yet with Arab affairs Germans have had little to do since the first world war, except for a brief second world war interlude under Rommel. They were plunged into these, however, with the rise of Israel — a land to which a surviving remnant of European Jewry fled and where the Bonn Republic, ashamed and repent over calculable evil wrought in the German name, acquired a moral outcast. But even before the Munich Olympiad, with its grim sequel, the process of reconciliation between Israel and West Germany had been more erratic than is realised.

During 1971, for example, when the Six drafted their first secret memorandum on the Middle East, the aftermath suggested that the West Germans saw eye to eye with the French and were already letting the Israelis down.

What Israel wanted from the Bonn Republic was that it would always take up the cudels for her. As compared with the Nazi affiliations of his predecessor, Dr Kurt Kiesinger, there was Herr Willy Brandt's own valiant anti-Nazi record and the unparalleled gesture of the West German Chancellor when he knelt at the Warsaw ghetto memorial. Nazi atrocities had produced a special relationship between Bonn and Jerusalem. West Germany differed besides, from her European allies over one point with no precedent; a stipulation by the vanquished that a victor must undertake to evacuate occupied territory before a peace settlement had been signed. Yet *Ostpolitik* as a rapprochement between West Germany and the Soviet imperium, engendered a rapprochement between West Germany and clients of Russia among the Arabs. How special, under these circumstances, was Israel's special relationship with the Bonn Republic likely to be?

Henceforth, as between Arabs and Israelis, West Germany played no faveourites. The West German recognition of Israel seven

## Breaking the bank

*It is reported that in the present economic troubles there has been a notable decline in bank robberies*

For this at least be thanks

Bank-roppers lose their jobs.

The reason is the banks

Have nothing left to do.

And there is good for all

When petrol's down to nil,

Death on the roads will fall

With no cars left to kill.

Christopher Hollis

years before had prompted Arab states to cut ties with Bonn. These, with a Soviet mentor blowing hot and cold, were restored. When the European Community groomed itself for its debut as a major factor in world politics, a pro-Arab bias emerged at once. It was Herr Brandt himself, furthermore, who, a week before the Arab League acted upon overtures from West Germany, proposed a second Community effort — nothing less than mediation in the Middle East.

By June 8, 1972, Egypt and the Bonn Republic were officially in touch with each other again. Diplomats intimated that the Egyptian Government and other states of the Arab League had been pleased by Herr Brandt's attempt to conduct an impartial policy in the Middle East. But the rumble of conflict was what the Middle East first brought to West Germany. In September Cairo rejected an appeal for co-operation from Herr Brandt at the Munich Olympiad before Arab kidnappers, after killing two Israelis, slaughtered the rest of their victims. Yet a wrangle that supervised did not last long. Despite the backing that terrorist bands procured from most Arab states, Bonn hastily absolved the latter from complicity in what had happened. West Germany, as far as Israel was concerned, had found the road back with no difficulty. More awkward was her later quest in Arab-Israeli affairs for the middle of the road.

Salt was poured on raw wounds when, during October 1972, Bonn surrendered Arab gunmen, imprisoned since their crimes at the Olympic games in September, to hijacking liberators. West Germany had been making amends to Israel since the days of Conrad Adenauer. Yet even Herr Willy Brandt now vacillated. Jerusalem must have banked on Bonn's willingness to follow through. As it falters, there are no champions among the main components of the Community on whom it may count.

It was a noteworthy hour, all the same when, in June 1973, the West German Chancellor, unlike other foreign Heads of Government, went to Israel. If he exhibited moral courage, so did Mrs Meir, the Israeli Prime Minister, when she received a West German Chancellor on the soil of the Jewish State and accepted his invitation to pay West Germany a return visit.

Ambivalence, however, is what still typifies the attitude of the Bonn Republic towards Israel and, since the Arab Israeli war of October 1973, has done so as much as ever. Unlike other community allies, West Germany first permitted but then forbade the United States to fly war supplies out of her German depots for the succour of Israeli fighting services. Two Israeli ships also loaded up at Bremenshaven; the third, hoisting the Star of David, was stopped lest Arabs take it amiss. Oil for the Bonn Republic is refined at Rotterdam and Arab States notified West Germany that, with a pro-Israel public in the Netherlands, there must be no show of solidarity with her.

In the Upper and Lower House, Herr Brandt endeavoured (November 13, 1973) to rectify moral damage by restating the reasons for a special relationship with Israel. He also commended the Community pronouncement (Brussels, November 6) which overwrought against Israel the more balanced United Nations resolution of 1967. Confusion persists.

Nor are such fluctuations apt to abate. The two Germans have joined the United Nations but while they belong to competing global camps the problem of Israel is not likely to set them apart. After the first world war the German people rebelled against the stigma of war guilt. After the second world war it was guilt of another kind that elicited West German reparations to Israel and indemnities to such German-Jewish victims as were left. East Germany, as Moscow's principal European client, spurned any such

34

obligation. But all of this stems from a past that the younger generation of Germans, East and West, never knew.

Time, moreover, has also been working to Israel's detriment in world politics generally. Remorse after German infamy derived from the Christian conscience. There is no reflection of this today in most of the European Community or at the United Nations. In the world body Afro-Asians call the tune, and, with the Soviet bloc, Moslem states have been quick to exploit their opportunity. During the 1940s the immeasurably macabre statistics of Nazi iniquity were still fresh when the UN General Assembly authorised the creation of a Jewish state and admitted it to membership. In the 1970s no similar proceeding would be remotely conceivable.

Then there is Britain, a neophyte among major Community policy-makers, but one who prior to the independence of Israel had had with her the closest of associations. It was to create a Jewish National Home that she had been assigned a Mandate for Palestine by the League of Nations while derelict Turkish lands, infinitely more vast in extent, were carved out for Arab desert chieftains. London, though, had whittled down space for the Jewish Homeland before Nazi persecutions enhanced its value.

After the war of 1967, Israel would have negotiated with Arab neighbours under Security Council Resolution No. 242 as sponsored at the United Nations by the Wilson government. For the Heath government, however, a less equitable version was offered in a speech at Harrogate during November 1970 by Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Even more extreme, after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, were the pro-Arab dictio of the Community which by Brussels (November 6) the British, with the French, did most to formulate.

No doubt Sir Alec Douglas-Home has recognised Israel's right to existence. A rush to the rescue after she had succumbed would, all the same, not be worth much. The United States herself, moreover, had long been urging Europeanisation upon Britain and this was now put to the test of battle. In commercial morality London emulated Paris when it banned the export of ammunition and spare parts for Centurion tanks that Israel had bought from Britain. The Heath government did further harm when it debarred the passage to Israel via Cyprus of American war supplies and ferried fighter bombers.

From a time-table of the American precautionary alert, it may be gathered that in October 1973 Washington informed London of what it contemplated first of all and other European allies as soon as possible. But while this could have been treated as a courtesy with historic Anglo-American undertones, it no longer impressed Downing Street. Uppermost at Westminster now was a European commitment.

Life among the super-powers, though, still keeps Israel guessing. If the European allies of the United States do not soon make good ensuing deficiencies, a reduction in the number of American troops stationed across the Atlantic could invite Russian ascendancy beyond the Soviet imperium. The defence of non-Soviet Europe has, besides, its maritime as well as its territorial phase. When long-range weapons are also sea-based, the land and sea frontiers of Western Europe stand or fall together.

And in this connection the southern littoral of Western Europe has ports that must always welcome ships of the American Sixth Fleet — with those of its allies. They may not do this, however, if, bowing to Soviet predominance, Popular Fronts take over; if the French and Italian Left arrange matters with Moscow; if, in the European Community, anti-American Third Force neutralism, which Gaullism itself has promoted, gets the upper hand. American warships are older than those that Russia deploys. And what the Israelis may fear are

the onerous conditions the Kremlin might impose if, lest the Mediterranean becomes a trap, the American Sixth Fleet should ever be recalled and Israel is encircled.

Illuminating the triumph of history over geography, Israel has had a position on the map which, paradoxically, is both an asset and a liability. For the bulk of her sea traffic the best route is the one between southern Europe and northern Africa. More of a gamble for Israel since the war of October 1973 is transit between her various ports and the Orient. Even if Israeli shipping ever proceeds through the Suez Canal, Egypt has always been allowed to evade its rules with impunity. And today Israel cannot reckon as safely as she has with the Aqaba route to so vital a southern gateway as Elath. She does not relax her grip on the Sharm el Sheik —, Sinai locale in 1967 for a brazen violation of guarantees, Egyptian and American, in which the United Nations acquiesced. Nowadays, however, it is at the mouth of the Red Sea that traffic to and from Israel may also be menaced — if, that, is the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb pass under pan-Arab control.

What, on the other hand, the Red Sea artery does afford is quicker naval access to Indo-Pacific waters — from the Soviet naval base at Odessa and from the Mediterranean ports of the West. If the Suez Canal is unblocked and detente falls short of a full world settlement the United States and Russia will vie unremittingly for the oil riches of the Persian Gulf. Here, as in the Mediterranean and beyond, global counteracting power can maintain freedom of the seas. And if it does maritime communications through Elath, as through Haifa and Ashdod, may be renewed.

The Middle East, however, is a zone in which Western Europe desires to intervene again but where, as it has now demonstrated, it will only make mischief for the West as well as Israel. On home fronts it must get its priorities straight first of all. Abroad the EEC should recollect that it itself once favoured those "secure and recognised boundaries" which figure as much as "withdrawal" for Israel in Resolution No. 242 of the United Nations Security Council. And less self-righteous, too, might have been the European Community when, on November 6, 1973 it borrowed the phrase against "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force." Which among the West Europeans has been applying that axiom to the Soviet Union with its swollen post-Yalta frontiers and as it jumps from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific theatre? When, too, was strict territorial rectitude involved against Transjordan for tearing up the UN Partition Plan in 1948 and seizing the Arab half of Jerusalem?

As for the EEC, its components should have learned from the years of appeasement that when its pusillanimity is a danger to others it will be a danger to itself. Today, with all its pride in the civilised society it inherited, it defers to peoples as backward as the Arabs; and the Soviet Union pushing far afield, must perceive that West European compliance with a crack from the Russian knout may be even more servile. The European Community could not enforce its attempt (November 6, 1973) to cosset Arab states by redrafting UN Security Council Resolution No. 242. It should also have known how, above all, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter revalidates for Israel the right of self-defence. The security of that small land presupposes that in upholding world order the West will prevail. So does that of the European Community. And that the West itself should be riven over Israel's struggle for existence is, among ironies of history, far from trivial.

Lionel Gelber, the American historian and writer on international affairs, is the author of several books including The Alliance of Necessity. He has been resident in London for the last few years.

## Defence

# Only the navy

## David W. Wragg

Social service spending is the sacred cow of our society, demanding not only regular increases but increases of such a high order that they can be expected to outstrip inflation. The politician who forgets this takes a risk, while the man bold enough to make a few cuts might as well lay his head on the block there and then. By comparison, defence expenditure has few friends, and complaints about Mr Barber's £178 million cut in procurement expenditure are more likely to be on the grounds that the reduction is not big enough than that such a cut is excessive, ill-timed and dangerous.

Of all the reversals of policy, that on defence is probably the most blatant. The Government was able to boast in presenting its last Defence White Paper that it had increased expenditure by £523 million for the year, but of this £350 million was to allow for inflation. And while Mr Barber was even swinging his axe, Britain and the other EEC members were agreeing to do more in defence, largely to discourage the United States from leaving Western Europe to its own fate. Only 37 per cent of the British defence budget goes on equipment, with most of the remainder allocated to manpower — while in the Soviet Union the situation is reversed.

Just where the cuts could take effect is difficult to say even now, but the likely result is that almost every major procurement programme is to be affected. The navy can see at best a delay in the maritime version of the Harrier vertical take-off fighter and possibly the related Through-Deck Cruiser programme, while the frigate and destroyer construction programmes, the latest hunter-killer nuclear submarine, and plans for a new class of mine hunters, must all share the uncertainty which was already hanging over the new Sea Wolf missile. The army can expect further delays in supplies of armoured vehicles and new battlefield missiles and light helicopters. Most tempting of all must be to delay the Royal Air Force's new Hawk, Bulldog and Jetstream training aircraft as far as possible because, unlike the Jaguar strike aircraft and the Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft, such delays will not be so obvious operationally.

It is fashionable to present defence expenditure as money wasted, although the argument sometimes accepts that the nuclear deterrent is necessary. The four British Polaris submarines cost a total of just £49 million annually, which makes them a bargain indeed, but they would be lost without defending hunter-killer submarines, and anti-submarine helicopters to protect their bases, and these in turn require defending surface vessels and air cover.

Alas, the Russian army could be on the Rhine in just three days. Our trade routes are undefended south of the Tropic of Cancer, while the Royal Navy could not even provide adequate protection for British trawlers off Iceland, nor keep foreign fishermen from our own overfished waters. Between them, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force cannot provide an adequate air-sea rescue service without recourse to chartered civil help, and just four fighter aircraft protect this country at any one time from Russian aerial attack. The Russians could approach undetected and without risk of interception from the West, such is the range of their latest bombers. Against this, talk of converting Polaris sub-

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 23, 1975

Dear Mr. Minister:

I am pleased you and Mrs. Genscher could
come along with us to Berlin.

I have so often imposed on you and your
Government on previous visits that it was a
pleasure for me to at last be able to perform
one small favor.

Actually, I had a selfish motive: it gave
me another chance to talk to you, something I
always enjoy.

His Excellency
Hans Dietrich Genscher,
Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Bonn.

S/S 7525271

December 26, 1975

Dear Hans-Dietrich:

I want you to know how much I appreciate
all you did in arranging my parents' journey to
Fuerth and extending to them there a warm
reception -- which I know they found as touching
as I did.

Thank you, too, for your kind words at
the ceremony. I will remember it most
vividly for a long time to come.

My deepest personal thanks for your
thoughtfulness.

The Honorable
Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Bonn.

7614051

July 6, 1976

Dear Hans-Dietrich:

I want to thank you very much for the generous assistance of your government in helping to make the excellent arrangements -- several times, but in the end, most satisfactory -- for my discussions with Prime Minister Vorster. I realize that our needs imposed unusual demands, and can only tell you that the way things worked out contributed greatly to the success of my discussions.

Quite apart from the formal pretext for my visit to Germany, I very much appreciated the opportunity to talk with you in Munich. As ever I found our discussions useful and stimulating, and I hope to talk with you again before too long.

My particular thanks for your having so thoughtfully undertaken to arrange a sightseeing program for David. It was very clearly the high-point, for him, of this trip to Europe.

His Excellency
Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Adenauer-Allee 99-109,
Bonn.

COPIES TO:
S
RF-ws

Eaton, Ohio.
124 Woodland Drive,
Mr. Dean A. Genth,

Personal Assistant
Suzanne S. McFarlane

Sincerely,

card for you, which I return with my best wishes.
Secretary Kissinger was happy to sign the

Dear Mr. Genth:

October 12, 1976

Quest/77

December 23, 1976

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
The Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you very much for signing the "first editions" of your works for Mrs. Engelhard. Anthony and I gave them to her last night in thanks for her help to us. She was thrilled, especially because she has a fabulous American library which even includes the Louisiana Purchase document.

I am very sad that you will be leaving the Office of Secretary of State soon. I remember with much pleasure the interesting and exciting times I spent working with you. You were very kind to me. But more important, I feel the country is losing a great, its greatest, architect of American foreign policy. I appreciate the problems you had, and think yours was the best way.

My love to you and Nancy, and thank you for everything.

1133 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10036 • (212) 582-6341

S

Kenneth R. Gerhart
Box 85-A
Munich Campus
University of Maryland
APO, N.Y., 09407

March 4, 1976

Hon. Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
U.S. State Department
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Sir,

Enclosed you will find ten photos of your visit to
U.S. Headquarters in West Berlin last year. The pictures
are yours to keep if you desire to do so.

I am a student at the University of Maryland, Munich
Campus in West Germany.

My father is stationed in West Berlin. In photo
number one he is the person on the extreme left in the
you
background. The photo of giving your speech in the garden
was taken from his office window.

P.S. I hope your wife is feeling better now.

Mrs. George F. Getty II
10778 Chalon Road
Los Angeles, California 90024

February 26, 1974

Honorable Henry Kissinger
2201 C. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary:

Enclosed you will find an article from this week's Home Section of the Los Angeles Times showing some lovely pictures of the J. Paul Getty Museum.

I remember we discussed it when you escorted me to dinner at the Ash's home, and you showed a particular interest in it. I thought you might like to see the lovely results. It opened in the middle of January, and it is quite beautiful and popular indeed.

As I mentioned to you before, any time you would like a personal "special" tour I would be happy to arrange it.

Since our date I know you have been a very, very busy person indeed, and I must say that the great admiration you have of so many people extends itself to me and my family too. Your hard work is appreciated by all.

We say a little prayer daily that all goes well with you, that you have good fortune, and that your plans for peace work out well for everyone.

JMG/1s

ate valu

AVE 28% ON DINNE

A complete 45-piece dinnerware service in your choice of three patterns. Texas Ware. It's more stain-resistant than ordinary melamine. resistant; dishwasher safe. You'll get 8 each: dinners, bread and buttersoup-cereals and thermoplastic mugs plus 1 each, platter, serving creamer and covered sugar. Set also includes a bonus matching set of tumblers. 40.00 value, the set **28.88**

A. Cortez

B. Upsie Daisy

C. Blue Spring

SAVE 30.00, HEALTHY COOKING EKCO FL29.99

60.10 open stock value. A complete 9-piece cookset all made of stainless steel. Self-basting with vapor-seal rims lock in texture, flavor and vitamins for perfect cooking. Set includes 1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/2qt. covered saucepans, 4 1/2-qt. covered saucepot and 9 1/2"

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12.95 8" covered skillet ...
9.95 1-qt. saucepan ...
13.95 3-qt. saucepan ...

Telephone and mail orders invited. House

THE BROADWAY

SHOP TODAY, SUNDAY, 12 NOON TO 5 P.M.

Los Angeles Times Home magazine, February 24, 1974

COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS

680 PARK AVENUE NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021 • (212) 628-3200 • CABLE: COLATAM

June 10, 1975

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On behalf of the entire membership of the Council of
the Americas I would like to express our profound gratitude
for your appearance and remarks at our meeting in Washington
last Thursday.

The fact that you had virtually just stepped off
the plane after what must have been a less than relaxing
trip made your presence that much more meaningful. I can
assure you that our visitors from Latin America were deeply
moved by your recognition, not only in your words of welcome
but also by having the opportunity to meet with you personally
during the course of the reception at the Pan American Union.
I am sorry that Nancy couldn't be with you but I hope that
her mother is recovering rapidly from her broken hip.

Again, my personal thanks for having joined us on
this occasion. I sincerely believe that it will have very
solicitous repercussions in the hemisphere.

Best personal regards,

HRG:amv