TELECOM

Debryna/Kissinger

10:40 a.m. - 11/26/72

D: White.

K: Anatol.

D: Oh yes. Hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

D: Well, thank you. I was sleeping and then at eight o'clock I hear
on the radio that you are . . . . . . . . . . .

K: Well, your friends have gone crazy.

D: I look at the things . . . . . . . and I figure that Thou - you couldn't
handle him from this point of view. You know from both sides I
don't need to tell you because you know them probably the best
because you have a chance to observe them on a . . . . . . . from
a short distance. I only from a long distance.

K: Right. Well, where we are - you know I don't know what influence
you have over them. We will give a rather moderate response to them.

D: Yeh.

K: To keep open the possibility that if they go on an offensive for the
next few weeks, you know we'll take it for two weeks, but they'll
pay for it afterwards.

D: You mean offensive in general.

K: Diplomatically and so forth.

D: Yeh. I think this is the way . . . . . . to take a position really
rather quiet.

K: We will give a very restrained reply.

D: You will give statement by White House.

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K: No, it will be a press conference by me. And if we can't outmaneuver them here then. . .

D: (Laughs) So today you decide it.

K: Yeah.

D: I think you intend in any case to make this press conference.

K: But I wanted to see what they would do first.

D: Oh I see. Now it's easier for you to handle. You see they do that really to help you.

K: No, we're getting all the benefits now. Now we can put out the agreement and we don't pay any of the price for implementing it.

D: Because before it was very difficult to handle. You have only one side of the story, now you have two sides of the story.

K: That's right.

D: And with these two sides of the story you will go. . . . .

K: Exactly.

D: That is my feeling.

K: But quite seriously if Moscow can exercise any restraining influence on them - I'm not asking it for us because you know the situation here.

D: Well, you see I will put it this way. I know what was done up till now and it was really a . . . . . . clear positions and restrain in terms of

they

K: It's very stupid because if such had followed what we told them there would certainly have been an agreement in three weeks.

D: Well, you see I think one of the reasons was that they really wanted you to come there. This was my impression. And if you come and if you explain them the same position I think it was much better. They would be much more quiet because in this sense they see that you refuse to go to Hanoi and I still don't see - well I know your reasons.

E: Because it would have led to an explosion in Saigon.

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D: It will not change very much

K: I'm a better judge of what can be done in Saigon.

D: No, no, I'm not arguing with you. I thought it be better for Hanoi
from their point of view.

K: I would have been - well, it's done now.

D: Well, I don't know what is now because I am going to write today
about the statement. You know I am sorry about it but there is
a lot of fear with our people because our point was wrong to them.
They have really high emotions . . . . . in Hanoi. This I can
tell you quite frankly. But we let them know - we tell you our
point of view once again . . . . . . today they are all looking for
where we stand. They themselves would like to know.

K: We will maintain our offer of having another session with them.

D: Yeah, I understand. It will be on the record your press conference?

K: Oh yes.

D: Direct quotation.

K: Yes.

D: It is better. . . . . . . . . . .

K: Right.

D: Because . . . . . . when you finally come to Hanoi you have completely
different kind of picture. It is better to be straight on the record
what you said because they really think of you as a man whom they
respect but now they are angry with you.

K: With me personally.

D: Yes, with you because you deal personally with Le Duc Tho. They
respect you but they're angry with you because they feel that it was
. . . . . . . . and Le Duc Tho make this report. Now everything
is OK except with Henry and . . . . . . . . From the point of view
I receive a report from Moscow how they react.

E: I will let you see the transcript. I've told them again and again that
I would have to get the approval of Saigon and elsewhere. They just
always said no, you can always do what you want.

D: I brought one telegram to Haig. . . . . the President had said while you were there and I have everything. . . . . . . . . . . we got the impression that everything is all right. And after while you say everything is agreed but now it looks. . . . . . . So they were so sure that they make a report to Moscow. . . . I don't know what you mention to the Chinese but I guess just about the same. And then we receive message from Hanoi for my leadership saying here we are, everything is all right and they leave us. . . . . . over the schedule so to speak, you know. That for your information. I read the whole schedule to Haig because I have it from them.

K: We had every intention to do it. It just couldn't be done.

D: Yeah, well I understand. So I think it a good idea - it's my personal observation - about a moderate response.

K: It will be a very moderate response.

D: Because mutual accusations are not good anywhere.

K: Oh no, I'll make a very moderate response. I'll maintain our position but it will be very moderate.

D: I understand. OK. Henry. Epe. Epe.

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TELCON
Secy Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

12:45 - Oct. 26, 1972

R: Henry?

K: Yes.

R: I think you did a very good job, I think your tone was just right and you covered the ground as well as could possibly be covered. I don't know how you could have been better.

K: Aren't you nice. I really appreciate that. I hope we can still pull it off.

R: Yes, well I think we will.

K: It was a God damned stupid thing of them to say you must sign it on October 31st.

R: Yeah. Well both of them were bastards, I mean, Thieu making that beligerant kind of a speech which barely was very effective with his own people, but he didn't have to--you know--he dug his feet in so it's going to be a little tough for him to get around.

K: Well, they're both insane. I want only to get rid of them.

R: That's right, same here. Okay, Henry.

K: Thank you, Bye.

R: Bye.

SINCE 1947

AUBURN UNIVERSITY

TELCOM
Robert Evans/Mr. Kissinger

12:53 - 10/26/72

K: Hello.

E: Henry, you've been vacationing too much. (laughter)

K: How are you?

E: Okay, and yourself?

K: Okay.

E: I haven't spoken to you for so long.

K: That's right, I thought maybe something had happened to you.

E: I was in Paris, as a matter of fact, when you were there.

K: Maybe you should have done some of the negotiating for me.

E: Ah, how are you.

K: I'm fine.

E: Good. I suppose until election time --are you going to take some rest?

K: Well, it depends on how my negotiations goes. I'm planning to be on the West Coast the weekend after this.

E: Well, can we plan to be together?

K: I'd love to see you.

E: I'd love to see you too, Henry, I really would.

K: It has been much too long.

E: Much too long, and I feel very badly about it. I've gone through a terrible--

K: Oh, it must have been.

E:

K: How are you.

E:

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K: That I didn't doubt.

E:

K:

E:

K:

E:

K:

E:

K:

E: I still--well when I see you I'll clue you in on it.

K: Right.

E: I hope we can spend some time alone as well.

K: Let's, by all means.

E: I'm at your disposal whenever you are free.

K: Well, I'll be there--I'll get there Saturday night and guess I'll be there Sunday and Monday.

E: Which Saturday night?

K: The weekend before the elections.

E: That's the 4th?

K: Right.

E: And you'll be here Sunday and Monday.

K: That's right. I'll be in San Clemente.

E: Well, is Sunday better?

K: Let's plan on that.

E: I'd like to come down to see you if you like--whatever you like.

SANITIZED

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K: Good. Well let's do one or the other.

E: Well, either way.

K: No, no, it's better if you come down there generally.

E: Well, I'll be happy to come down this time. You come up to see me often enough.

K: Right. Let's have in mind that you'll come down. But if I have to be in Los Angeles, then I'll come up.

E: Okay, either way. I have some very nice talent here, I must tell you.

K: I don't doubt it.

E: And, there's is some very nice talent.

K: Well, we'll discuss it next week.

E: I think you have more important things to do this week. Well, let's try and spend that Sunday together.

K: Good. Will you be in Los Angeles during the week?

E: I'll be here all week at the house.

K: Good.

E: And, I'll be there all this week as well.

K: Well, we'll get in touch next week.

E: Good, Henry. When are we going to Acapulco?

K: Oh, that'd be terrific.

E: I'd love to set a time that you could get down there.

K: Well, some time after the election.

E: Any time you'd like in November?

K: Well, maybe December might be--

E: That would be good too. But let's do it before Christmas, though.

K: Good.

E: And, I can make some very nice arrangements.

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TELCOM

McG. Bundy /Mr. Kissinger

2:34 - 10/26/72

K: Hello.

B: Hello, Henry, you're good to return my call. I'm calling because the CBS people are coming. I think what you've done so far as it goes is magnificent. I just hope the next few steps turn out to be workable.

K: Well, you know, we are dealing with two maniacal Vietnamese parties.

B: I know it.

K: I mean, if Thieu had any brains he would have given me a decoration and let me settle it right there. If Hanoi has any brains, it would have given me two weeks to bring Thieu aboard which I would have done, too.

B: Sure, sure. What I don't know--this doesn't matter--but for my purposes--the second question they are going to ask--the first question is what do I think, and that's easy. I think we are nearer than we've been at any time and I'm certainly encouraged. The second question is going to be "could all this have been done four years ago." and I think it couldn't, but I'm not as well informed as I ought to be. It's just this particular issue to call their attention to.

K: No, absolutely not, it could not have been done four years ago.

B: I know that.

K: The essence of this agreement is that they have split the political and military. The political is really as thin as fig leaves. The South Vietnamese parties will negotiate among each other-- selling

B: So you get two administrations dealing with themselves--

K: That's right. In negotiating the settlement with each other they will agree on elections for offices not to be determined yet, at a time not decided yet.

B: Yeah. With the principle of unanimity which makes it hard as hell and so forth.

K: With the principle of unanimity in the electoral commission that's to supervise it. In effect, we are the hell out of South Vietnamese politics. And what was re-negotiated was the military settlement of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

2

B: Yeah.

K: And that, they never agreed to do in the four years of negotiations--

B: Unit1 October

K: Until October.

B: That's the way it reads to me. That's the underlying and fundamental
difference.

K: That is the basic difference. Of course, they never agreed that Thieu
could stay.

B: That's right.

K: They never agreed that we could give economic and, in effect,
this military replacement---

B: The replacement is terribly important. There are three basic
things--they accept a standstill without a political settlement
favorable to them, they accept continued re-supply, they accept the
continuance of Thieu as the head of one of the dominant administrations.
That's a starting point. Now whether he can survive is his problem.

K: But we have never said that we were committed to preserving him.
We have said we were committed not to push him out, and, another
thing that's in the agreement that we don't want to crow about is
that they had always linked the release of our prisoners to the release
of South Vietnamese civilians.

B: I noticed that. And I notice that's still in Dong's interviews.

K: That's right, and that's being dropped.

B: Yeah. That's important. There was a question of which agitators
get let out of the jug--it's a Vietnamese question.

K: It's a Vietnamese question and in effect it means that 30 thousand
of their cadres are being left in Thieu's jails.

B: Yep. Will they call them military and insist that they come out?

3

K: No. no. That's absolutely clear.

B: Well, that is terribly important. You don't mind if I mention that.

K: No, no. I can't mention it, but you can on the basis of what was said.

B: Yeah, yeah. And that *can't* can never breach you before--

K: *Can't* No---

B: Are they hurting so badly or are they frightened of your horrible threats of what you'll do in November -- in December.

K: You know, we *might* are in a position now where we both had an incentive to settle because they were afraid what we might do and I was afraid of what I knew we couldn't do.

(Laughter)

B: That part I'm *saw* about. I knew more about your whole cause than I knew about theirs. I still think it's amazing. I really do.

K: Well, I tell you, on a proper age where you are one session away from my giving an extra concession--you know, they threw in their cards one round too early.

B: Well, that's great. I don't understand it, though, it's just out of character for them. That's the part that is extraordinary.

K: Well, I think we've had some Chinese and Russian help.

B: I see.

K: Especially Chinese help, strangely enough.

B: Well that is consistent with the re-focusing of the Chinese view of the world--it's one of the more interesting things that's going on in the last---

K: That's right, that's right. And for a change, they now welcome us staying in Japan. And that may be our strongest NATO ally.

(Laughter)

4

B: If you can only make sure that they'll give you all that Saudi Arabian oil that we are going to need over the next 15 years, you're all set.

K: That's right.

(Laughter)

B: Henry, thanks very much. You told me what I need to know.

K: Thank you,

B: When they ask me that second question, I'll simply say well I think it's probably---no, I've not been a political supporter of President Nixon, but I just think that this is not a fair statement.

K: Right.

B: Cause I do think--I think that you're so near now that no matter what happens in the election, it's just terribly important not to lose this moment.

K: Well, and I also think, that we should use the end of the work to try to heal some of the wounds.

B: I see. Are you getting Democratic flack. Do the wires tell you much yet.

K: Not yet. I don't think we'll get--you know, we'll get McGovern's flack but=-

B: Sure.

K: If he were wise, he would lay off.

B: I agree with that.

K: Will you let me know;ow when you next come down.

B: I surely will. I'm --Ihaven't been in Washington for the last month or so, but I will.

K: I'd love to have lunch with you.

B: Good. Thank you, Henry, very much for taking the call.

K: Nice to talk to you. Bye.

B: Bye.

TELCORN

James Reston/Mr. Kissinger

3:05 p.m., October 26, 1972

K: Scotty, how are you?

R: You feel better now?

K: I tell you -- Not until it's completely done.

R: Well, your country owes you a great debt, Henry.

K: Well, you're a good friend, it's really meant a lot to me.

R: What are the sticking points?

K: Well, I enumerated them this morning. The point is this, Scotty, if we had wanted -- you remember when we talked at breakfast?

R: Um-humm.

K: This is all personal now.

R: Yes, I understand.

K: If we had wanted to hulk up an agreement, nothing would have been easier than to sign now. What we want to avoid is that we sign this agreement, all hell breaks loose by defining where the ceasefire line is, what this Committee means, and so forth. So the sticking points are really in my view manageable if the other side shows anything like the attitude it has shown earlier. We would like some international supervisory machinery in place when the ceasefire is proclaimed. So that the two parties that have been fighting each other don't have to be the ones to demarcate the ceasefire line. We would like some clarification of where the troops that leave Cambodia and Laos are going to withdraw to, whether they are going into South or North Vietnam. Some of the stuff is minor. They want to make it a two-party deal between us and them and then just say with the concurrence of the South Vietnamese and the DR G. We believe that we cannot really deprive the country in which we've been fighting of the right to sign its own peace treaty. And therefore we would like to turn it into a four-party document. That requires two-three hours of work but it's not a great intellectual exercise. We'd like -- for example, there is one -- there are some ambiguities that we'd like to straighten out. We have accepted their term for this National Committee which said it's an administrative structure to make clear it's not a governmental body. Now we have found that this translates in an ambiguous way in Vietnamese and we'd like to get that straightened out so that that doesn't lead to endless controversy.

TELCON

James Reston/Mr. Kissinger

3:05 p.m., October 26, 1972

R: You mean it translates in Vietnamese into the possibility that it might mean a government structure?

K: That's right. And we'd rather get that settled before than after. Now all of this if they approach it in anything like the spirit we had the previous discussions, is soluble. Of course if they want to drive us into a rapid settlement and, you know, make a tremendous propaganda effort, they can delay it. But those are the principle issues. There is a few, you know, there's a lot of crappy stuff that always comes up at the end of an agreement. For example, there is a section on the reunification of Vietnam. That mentions one article of the Geneva Agreement and when we examined it, we found there are really two articles that are relevant and we want to get both of them mentioned. Now that's going to be a half hour discussion. I just want to give you a feel.

R: Yeah.

K: When you and I talked in your garden, we were talking about philosophical problems, can this thing ever be settled by negotiation, who is going to give when and what. Here we are talking about the last phase of the negotiation in which the nuances suddenly become apparent and in which you want to make that when you sign it, it doesn't immediately lead to another turmoil.

R: Sure. What in your judgment brought about the switch in the offer of 8th?

K: I think, Scotty, that -- my impression is and I really had very long talks with Le Duc Tho when we finally broke this thing up -- I mean when we finally wound up these negotiations -- I think that they have made a very fundamental decision that if they keep going like this, they are going to so exhaust their country and that they'll just never get to the reconstruction. I think it's a combination of May 8th, pressure from the Soviet Union and China, plus the fact that it was hard to predict a purely military outcome no matter what they did. We couldn't win but they couldn't win either and so they are shifting to a political contest. But I really --- you know, maybe they have bamboozled me but I really think that they have made a decision to try to move towards normalcy with us.

R: Well, it's in their interest and I think they will get a generous response from this country in their reconstruction problem if they do.

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TELCON

James Reston/Mr. Kissinger

3:05 p.m., October 26, 1972

- 3 -

K: And that's why at the end -- I don't know whether you've had a chance to listen to my briefing --

R: Well, we're still waiting for the transcript.

K: Well, you know, I made an appeal that we don't want an armistice with them, we wanted peace and we want to move from hostility to cooperation and that we would pursue that with the same intensity as the previous course.

R: Yeah. If we get caught with troublesome Thieu, are we prepared to sign without him?

K: We don't have to face that yet but we have made our decision too. You know what's needed now is some wisdom in both Vietnamese capitals. If Hanoi can just curb its impatience, I think we can bring everybody along. Of course a lot of this fearful rhetoric of Thieu is directed at propositions we haven't made to him so that he can later claim a victory.

R: Was there a slip up in the announcement out of Hanoi?

K: No, I think it was -- they really thought probably they had it wrapped up. We've told them since Sunday that we wanted another meeting and they've refused it. But they might have had a lot of people on their -- with ceasefire expectations whom they had no means of reaching except by radio.

R: Yeah. Well, no more news today about another meeting?

K: No. No, we haven't had any communications from them. And I don't exclude, Scotty, two things. One, that they will dig in and try to play our elections, you know, for the remaining week and refuse to meet. Or that they will be pretty bloody when they do meet but I think -- It's hard for me to conceive their having come 95% of the way, we shouldn't be able to do the remaining 5%.

R: Well, what could they -- well, they can't possibly gain anything on the election by being bloody minded between now and a week from Tuesday, can they?

K: I can't imagine it. No, my own personal judgment is that by the end of November we'll have this thing wrapped up. And that's, you know, giving us a lot of latitude.

TELCON

Taft Schreiber/Mr. Kissinger

4:20 p.m., October 26, 1972

S: Henry, how are you?

K: Okay.

S: I didn't want to call you until I had gotten a call from my friends and people who had seen your broadcast to see what they thought and therefore I can make a report now.

K: What do they think?

S: You were great, just great.

K: (laughter) You guys are all a little prejudice.

S: No, there were a couple of Democrats I talked to and people that don't know you. They thought you were wonderful in words of one and an extraordinary man and a talented man in another. I talked to Lou Lauglin (sp?) who is, you know, a very impartial kind of a man; he's very indebted to the present but he's a very meaningful Democrat although he's done nothing to oppose the President and won't give a penny to oppose him thought you were just brilliant. I saw the broadcast with him in his room -- we had a meeting and we decided to tune in -- we got word that you were on the air.

K: Right.

S: And we watched it and he just said, "Geez, this guy is just brilliant." This was his conversation constantly. And I thought -- my own calculated look at it, I will say this -- that you were superior, you were warm, you came across with full integrity, nothing seemed to be tricky, you were careful and you gave the feeling that you worked hard, you still have work to do -- you know, the others are spouting off, that's typical but you have to be the total statesman to try to bring it all together.

K: Right.

S: And that's what came off and I thought I should tell you.

K: Aren't you nice. That really means a lot to me, Taft.

S: Well, after all if I'm going to be your agent I got to know . .

K: Absolutely.

S: . . . if you ______ or what but you don't need anything. All you need is

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TELCONE
Taft Schreiber/Mr. Kissinger

4:20 p.m., October 26, 1972

S: (cont'd) the good fortune right now to help you accomplish what you set out to do.

K: Aren't you nice. No, we'll bring it off.

S: I'm sure you will. I must tell you, as you know, two things -- One, we had a party all set up honoring you but then it couldn't be done, you had left. We decided to call it off but then when I got back, Ray Stark -- I don't know whether you know him.

K: Yes, I've met him.

S: Ray insists on putting an ad full page in the New York Times. The thrust of his ad is if you want Dr. Kissinger, who has been so great an asset to our country in what he's done in Peking, in Moscow and in Paris, then vote for Nixon as I am and signed Ray Stark, Democrat.

K: (laughter)

S: So I sent it back East. He had offered to run the ad and they were very slow; I never got an answer so the Democrats for Nixon were bugging me so I finally had Jimmy Roosevelt who represents them here go and see him and he made the offer again and Jimmy said, "What's wrong with it?" and I said nothing, just get it cleared from John Connally. He's running his own campaign.

K: Right.

S: And he said, "Well, do you think Henry would dislike it?" I said don't ask him because if you ask Henry, he's going to say look, I'm not in politics.

K: That's right.

S: So I said look, there's nothing wrong with saying it, which is a very bright idea. You know, because what you want to do is appeal to the literate and the Democrats and some people who haven't thought of this thing.

K: Yeah.

S: So that's all the news I can tell you.

K: Taft, it's a pleasure to talk to you and I hope to see you soon.

4:20 p.m., October 26, 1972

S: I hope so. And when you get back, I have an invitation from some
friends of ours who said that they would like to take us, you and myself,
to Japan after you get through with this for a holiday. This is a Japanese
gentleman from Hawaii who is a Democrat, who has been working for
the President, I've got him enlisted and he's doing a great job. He keeps
calling me every few days from Hawaii and saying when are you going.
I said, let's settle the world first before taking time off.

K: Taft, I hope to see you soon.

S: I hope so and take care. And anything I can do, Henry, please let me
know.

K: You're a terrific friend.

S: Okay, my friend.

K: Bye.

wgh

TELCON & Marilyn Berger

Murray Marder/Mr. Kissinger

5:43 pm - Oct. 26, 1972

K: Murray?

M: Hi, how are you, Henry?

K: Okay.

M: Is it all right if Marilyn gets on here?

K: No, because she's too clever. I'd rather deal with a dumb boy.

M: Okay. Do you mind?

K: No. But, it's got to be very brief.
(Marilyn Berger joins here)

M: Patolivich there was mentioned in January about the reconstruction proposal which was said to be allegedly at $5 Billion. $7.5 Billion. Actually, is that thing still okay, Henry.

K: We haven't discussed any particular figures.

M: Referring back to it---

K: you can certainly mention that's the last one you know.

M: Right. You make a reference to October 23rd you referred to--
ah-- you were in Saigon at that time.

K: That's right.

M: Did he say

K: We did it through Washington. It wasn't much difficulty--we asked for another meeting.

M: There was no meeting with reporters or anything of that kind.

K: No.

M: Is there any exchange with ______ have you reached--

K: Oh, yes, many.

M: The way you left it with us was on some---

K: There has been some exchanges since then

BECOME KNOWN
By Name, Date, and Time

5/10/72

*

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B: Before I got on the phone, have you gotten to the kind of election that are to be set up by--

K: The elections are to be negotiated between the two parties. That's not part of the agreement.

B: As to whether they would be constituent from a local etcetera.

K: Whether -- they'll be national--I mean the only thing that we are part of is that should be national. But what national office--wehter for the Presidency, whether for the National Assembly, for the Referendum--it's got to be settled between the parties.

M: Right. One thing I want to ask you for research purposes--I don't want to get into any arguments--researchers have been loathsome to separate the military and the political, and of course, reconstruction. We are obliged to go back to the statement--you recall, the Le Duc Tho interview--they were all ready to separate parties one and two and take them back away from---umm--phrase easy with that with me.

K: Well, they never in any negotiation with me before indicated that they'd separate points one and two, Never.

M: This is what I asked you if there was an objection. You never did

K: In any official meeting, they always insisted that the two were linked and that the political had to be settled first.

M: Is it possible that you--- on the question of the union of the National Council of Reconciliation, did that not cover an automatic block when --- can you clarify that a bit, Henry.

K:q Well that could be, but that also could mean the coalition seat is a sort of a fig leaf. I don't want to be quoted.

M: Right.

B: Did they say who demanded the unanimity? and when?

K: Unanimity that was picked out of a previous negotiation.

B: I just don't understand that, maybe Murray does.

K: No, no, as we were discussing coalition governments, there was at some point an idea of unanimity and we then transferred it to the electoral commission.

M: That goes back to an earlier sequence on the electoral commission, right.

B: did you say who demanded the

B: did you say who demanded the unanimity? and when?

3

K: Right. But once this Committee on National Reconciliation is in effect, the Electoral Commission--

M: Which in effect is a ploy.

K: That's right.

B: Well, now, in their point where they discuss this very question of the--this National Reconciliation, they go on to say which will then set up a three segment---

K: That's certainly not in the agreement.

a council called t

B: It says here, you said this part where they say point 4, /a National Reconciliation Council of three equal segments will be set up to promote the implementation of the signed agreement. You say that is not in the agreement?

K: Oh no, report the implementation, that is in there.

M: This cease-fire---

K: You know, there has to be somebody that deals with the cease fire.

M: Which will be this National--

K: Well, there is disputed issues about the cease fire. The Council has no governmental functions, it has no executive role in relation to any domestic or foreging jurisdiction, it has no police, no army or anything of the kind.

M: When you were referring to some misunderstanding there, some ----over the Pham Van Dong thing, was this references to the coalition?

K: Yes.

M: You also mean the references to the six month because that---

K: That's right. That's also not in the agreement.

M: You also mean his reference to this simultaneous release of military in Peking.

K: Yes, but that's cleared up. We cleared that up.

B: Well ________ said that this National Commission will be more powerful than what we said. They said yesterday they did not object to the commission rather than government, but it enjoy "full and genuine power" in contract to inadequacies.

4

K: Well if that is their view, then we have something important to talk about. It's not in the text of the agreement.

M: On the cease fire about Cambodia, will it presumably be silent freeze(?) or not necessarily.

K: Not necessarily, but very close together.

B: Talk about withdrawal of foreign sources from Laos and Cambodia that means that North Vietnam will have to withdraw from there but not South Vietn; am, is that correct.

K: Yes, but it can be infiltrated into South--

B: Yes, what's to prevent them from withdrawing into South Vietn; am.

K: That's one of the issues to be discussed. That's not part of the understanding.

M: Is there involved in here any fact with the withdrawal of the North Vietn; amese forces.

K: I think if the agreement is maintained without infiltration, that's got to be the practical consequence, and that is a provision--

M: Exactly why would it be--I mean do you feel these things or what?

K: Well how are they going to maintain a 100,000 troops down there without replacements.

B: They will have to replace?

K: That's right.

B: They will have to re-supply?

K: One for one, they have to take something out for whatever they put in.

B

B: But not one man for one man.

K: No. Men cannot be replaced. And secondly, there is some demobilization provisions to be negotiated.

M: The United States wouldn't be barred from this thing that Laird raised which Le Duc Tho focussed on at a session I had. The United States coming back in the event of a violation of the cease fire.

K: That depends how you interpret that.

M: I interprete the language here because there is language about United States being cut off from coming back in.

K: Well it's not the likeliest possibility.

M: Do we incorrectly interpret what you were saying that U.S. definitely goes ahead with this.

K: What I was saying is that we need one more round of negotiations and in this round of negotiations we will also include the objections that have been made and we are certain we can have everybody go along with this negotiation.

B: In other words, what you are saying is what Thieu's is yelling about is much more than he should be yelling about.

K: I have said that we agree with some of his points and not with others.

M: You were not intending to say I guess going back and letting them talk with Al Haig. You are not intending to say that if they refuse to sign that there is no agreement.

K: No, that's a very good point, but I don't believe that's going to happen.

B: Could you wrap it all--

K: I have to go-- Marilyn you have the unhappy quality of wording on and on and on, and I must go.

M: Henry, let me ask this if I may--What would you, as a physical matter, in there any possibility in practicality of doing this by the 31st.

K: Highly unlikely. I don't-- I think that now that they say--and I think we are going to resume negotiations and I think we're going to settle it.

M: It would take some time for Le Duc Tho to get back. What would be the first--

K: I don't want to guess.

M: Physically, I was saying

K: Well it usually takes them three or four days to get back.

M: Could you help in guidance this physical likelihood--

K: I don't want to guess at it but I have every confidence and I don't say this lightly that the negotiations will be resumed. I have every confidence

that they will succeed.

M: The question here is whether we cannot try to indicate that it is physically unlikely before November 7th.

K: What, that they'll be resumed.

M: No, that they be concluded.

K: We are not pressing for November 7th.

M: I realize that, but

K: I think it's probably physically unlikely, but I don't to tie myself to it. It's not an unreasonable assumption.

M: Okay, thank you.

K: Bye Murray.

CLASSIFIED
BY
NANCY DERE 5/1/68

Authentic

TELCONE

Rogers/Kissinger

6:09 p.m. - 10/26/72

K: Bill, I just wanted you to know we heard from the North Vietnamese and . . . . . for a two pages on the three page. ! They are ready to resume negotiations and they affirm all provisions of the agreement already agreed to.

R: Will you do it next week?

K: I will propose to them next week. They haven't given us a date but I will propose

R: I think it's better to do it next week along the lines we talked about before. That's good news. You aren't going to say anything about it.

K: Absolutely not.

R: OK. Thank you, Henry.

B: OK, MIRA. Date: 10/26/72

TELCORN

Senator James Buckley/Mr. Kissinger

6:25 p.m., October 26, 1972

B: Henry.

K: Jim, how are you?

B: Fine. And you?

K: Okay.

B: I hope I will be in a position to offer you the Nobel Peace Prize.

K: I don't know, but I think we're going to make it.

B: Fine. I understand the President is going on at 9:00.

K: But not on national television -- I mean, he's in Kentucky -- it's a political thing.

B: Oh, I see.

K: No, we're not saying any more than what I've said today.

B: I see, I see. Fine, because I misinterpreted it. May I assume that what has been done will not pull any rugs out from any regime?

K: Absolutely, totally 100%.

B: Great.

K: There is unlimited economic aid, in military aid we can replace all existing equipment and we are going to pour another billion dollar's worth in before an agreement is signed so that the base is very high. And it can in other words be modernized.

B: Great.

K: Unlimited numbers of economic advisors, regular Embassy with 50 military attaches', Thieu stays in office, his whole government stays in office. There is an electoral commission, which we've always proposed --

B: Right.

TELCORN

6:25 p.m., October 26, 1972

K: On which the Communists are equally represented. But it votes by unanimity so I don't think it can be a particular disturbance to anybody. But the election has to be agreed to by Thieu.

B: Uh-huh.

K: For offices which the two sides have to agree to. In other words, there is no political decision in the document other than that there will be some elections to be agreed to by the two sides and that this will then be supervised by that committee. We did give them the tripartite aspect for that electoral commission but only as a fig leaf; that has no executive functions and it votes by unanimity and its members are appointed.

B: Right. Now supposing that unanimity were not forthcoming, then the --

K: Then it can't act.

B: Right, right. But as I understand it from the earlier reports that those North Vietnamese troops that are in place would stay there.

K: That's right. There can be no additional infiltration.

B: No additional infiltration.

K: And you have to remember that -- well, the practical consequence of this must be according to all military judgment that they will have to withdraw many of them. Because how can they keep them in place without replacements.

B: Right, right, right.

K: And they are now at their lowest point.

B: Well, that is terrific. Are congratulations in order?

K: Well, you know, we have to go another round.

B: Right, right.

K: But having come this far, there's no chance of it -- you know, no chance is not correct but it's 80% done.

95CLASSIFIED

8/27/72 10:03

Anita
BANKRUPTCY

5/10/72

TELCONE
Senator James Buckley/Mr. Kissinger

6:25 p.m., October 26, 1972

B: Right. Well, you must be a very relieved man.

K: Well, we got to go another round and the bastards might get bloody
in the last lap.

B: Right.

K: But they don't make that impression.

B: Uh-huh. Well, what about, Henry, have you got time now or not?
If I ask you a couple more questions?

K: No, no; you go ahead.

B: There will be pockets (?) within South Vietnam that will be under the
control of the Vietcong?

K: Yes, but our estimate is that 90 to 95% of the population will be under
Saigon control.

B: Fine. Well, thank you. I know you've had a terrific day.

K: Nice to talk to you. Bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED
E012958
Authorized
BY ORDER OF THE
President

TELCOM

Chuck Colson/Mr. Kissinger

7:26 p.m., October 26, 1972

C: Henry, I should have called you early in the day to congratulate you on what has to be one of the most brilliant performances I have ever seen in my life.

K: Aren't you nice.

C: With a result that I -- Well, there aren't words to describe it.

K: Really? I mean, about the results.

C: Oh, my God, utterly spectacular!! Absolutely spectacular, but more importantly, you put it across in such a way that no matter what happens now for the next 10 days, the election is settled. You've settled it.

K: Really?

C: Oh, well, I just got through watching it again. It is a masterful performance. I listened to it this morning; I did not watch it but I was just watching it on film tonight. Brilliantly done.

K: Aren't you nice?

C: I've talked to George Shultz, who said that there's a state of near euphoria in Chicago where he is. I talked to Lew Harris this afternoon, who I was going to suggest you call at some point cause he's been awfully helpful to us.

K: Okay.

C: Matter of fact, I flattered him tonight by telling him you had taken his stuff over there that weekend.

K: That happens to be true.

C: Remember when I --

K: Oh, yeah. That's true, and that really was an important factor.

C: Well, at some point you might call him because it will influence his poll over the next week. I'll call him tonight; he's going to call me very late. And the poll for this weekend if it says any closing, he will not print.

TELCON

Chuck Colson/Mr. Kissinger

7:26 p.m., October 26, 1972

K: (laughter)

C: That's not bad. To have him on our side like that.

K: That's not bad.

C: I think what it will show is no closing because I think Lou will want to print a poll.

K: Yeah, yeah. Has McGovern said anything about Vietnam now?

C: He looks like a man who had 4 large Turds for lunch. He came on the tube tonight and said well, if this is really peace, fine. We could have gotten it four years ago but this is what I've been trying to get accomplished and so therefore I'm very happy. He just looks ...

K: But there's no goddamn newsman who believes that we could have gotten it four years ago.

C: No, absolutely not. No, when McGovern does something like that, that just means that the inherent credibility problem that he has and makes it worse.

K: Yeah.

C: No, he's dead. He's gone, you finished him; you killed him. I mean, all of the stuff I've been worrying about doing next week that deserve a lead, what the hell, I'm just going to relax.

K: Aren't you nice. I appreciate that.

C: No, in all honesty I must say that I never thought that you would be able to negotiate a deal as good as this, I really didn't. I thought it would have to end some other way.

K: Well, I frankly, to tell you the truth, I wasn't sure we would come out that well and now I'll improve it a little more in the next round. You know, just enough to let the South Vietnamese say they did something.

C: Well, I feel, I must say honestly that I feel privileged and honored to be serving with you in an Administration that I think you have played a very, very large role in making it as historic as it will be.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: E0172958
Date: 5/1/91
By: NATA DRE

TELCONE

Chuck Colson/Mr. Kissinger

7:26 p.m., October 26, 1972

K: Well, Chuck, that means a lot to me. I really appreciate this, it's very generous of you.

C: I say that with all the sincerity in the world. I'm just very, very proud of you, I really am. Honest to God, I'm proud and I feel privileged to be part of it, because to me this is master diplomacy at its very ultimate best and I feel kind of spine tingly about it and I just wanted to call you and tell you.

K: Well, you're very generous.

C: You're great!

K: Thank you, Chuck.

C: Keep it up, Henry.

K: Bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED

E012958

Anon
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

SANITIZED

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 2 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
Contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:52 a.m. - 10/27/72

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: How are you?

K: OK.

D: I call you yesterday but you were already resting. I watched your performance on TV and it was, I should say, quite a presentation of your point of view.

K: I warned your friends.

D: No, no, I think there was nothing to be warned. I think it was a fair presentation really.

K: I tried to be constructive. I tried to give them a face-saving way out.

D: Yeh, there was nothing particularly . . . . . . . the countries as an offensive or otherwise. I didn't find anything. Of course it depends on the point of view. Sometimes

K: Well, I tried to be reassuring to them that we weren't kicking over the whole agreement.

D: Yeh, that's what my impression was.

K: So actually I thought what I was trying to do was to get it back in a framework where we could now get it settled.

D: Yeh, well I don't know. You know . . . . . . . . . . that Mr. Kosygin and they delivered him officially and informed that North Vietnam and National Liberation Front . . . . . . . to South Vietnam and their two Ambassadors in Moscow. The note is . . . . . . . . officially on the 5th or 6th; They publish statement in this connection or communique in which Kosygin express the hope that the talks on Vietnam would be continued until the signature of an agreement ending the war.

K: Well, that's very good.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By MWAP 500-00304

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By MWBaca 5-20-94

*

2

D: And then . . . . . . . . . . . I think you understand when our officials express hope it means something.

K: Right. We appreciate the role you have played in this.

D: And Henry, usually I don't want to bother you because I see your presentation, I rather not judge but it definitely was written before your appearance on television. My officials (?) are concerned that addx both of you, North Vietnam and United States try to give an oral message to the President in the sense that he expresses general appreciation of the whole thing but at the same time saying . . . . . . . . . carrying out the promises but after all he's still asking you to straighten your points. . . . . . . . . . but in any case I read this statement to you or whichever you like, I could drop in or

K: You can drop in or send it over whichever you prefer.

D: Well, it doesn't matter. Now I am invited for the first time in three months, invited to be at 10:30 to the Secretary of State. He is going to show me something; what I don't know but it's got to do with the force reduction.

K: Yes, it's got to do with the force reduction and the European . . . . . .

D: Oh, with the force reduction. Well, I have to do it in a half an hour so we could do it this way. I could give just an oral statement through you to the President from Brezhnev. If you could send somebody over or I could send one of my men to yours. I call you back.

K: OK. OK. Either way. Should I send somebody or will you send somebody.

D: It doesn't matter. You may care to send yours here because your man can come and receive it and we won't have to go through all your policemen and so on.

K: I'll send somebody.

D: Just send him in 15 minutes.

K: I'll send somebody in the next 15 minutes.

D: Yes, and then when I get back from

K: You call me or I'll call you. D: I'll call you immediately when I get back

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:52 a.m. - 10/27/72

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: How are you?

K: OK.

K: I warned your friends.

K: Well, that's very good.

9:52

5/27/72

BANA DIO 5/27/72

2

D: And Henry, usually I don't want to bother you because I see your presentation, I rather not judge but it definitely was written before your appearance on television. My officials (?) are concerned that both of you, South Vietnam and United States try to give an oral message to the President in the sense that he expresses general appreciation of the whole thing but at the same time saying . . . . . . . . . carrying out the promises but after all he's still asking you to straighten your points. . . . . . . . . but in any case I read this statement to you or whichever you like, I could drop in or

D: Oh, with the force reduction. Well, I have to do it in a half an hour so we could do it this way. I could give just an oral statement through you to the President from Breshnev. If you could send somebody over or I could send one of my men to yours. I call you back.

K: I'll send somebody.

GIESSERWASSER

9502103

BIBLIOTECA DA UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SÃO PAULO

TELCONE

Connally/Kissinger

10:08 a.m. - 10/27/72

C: Henry.

K: John, how are you?

C: I'm fine. How the hell are you?

K: I'm fine.

C: We're happy you're home.

K: Thank you. I was wondering whether you wanted to get a little
briefing - more detailed than I could give today.

C: Henry, I'd love to and I'll be back up there Monday or Tuesday
if you're going to be there.

K: Good. Where are you now?

C: In Houston.

K: I always get you down there.

C: And I'll be back up there Monday night or Tuesday. I'll be available
Tuesday if you're going to be in town.

K: I'll be in town unless I'm off in Paris. Do you want to call my
office or should I call you.

C: No, I'll call you on Tuesday. And if you're gone that's fine.

K: I'll bring you up to date but just for your information this represents
really an almost total cave by the other side.

C: That's wonderful!

K: And it's the payoff of May 8th so - which with you had more to do
than any other single person.

C: That's wonderful! That's just great! It sounded awfully good to me
Henry.

9500.000000

BRADE 5/27/72

CLASSIFIED

1970

E3

AUTHOR'S
BROTHE

2

K: Well, you know they're getting out of Laos and Cambodia.

C: Goddam, that's the best news.

K: And they're stopping infiltration into the South. We can give unlimited economic aid and we can replace all the military equipment that's in South Vietnam which means an army of one million, one hundred thousand and we are pouring in another billion dollars worth before this thing becomes effective.

C: Oh, great.

K: We are not going to settle it before the election, incidentally.

C: Well, that's fine.

K: We are going to have one more round with them.

C: Yep. I assume he's agreeable to this, it's a hell of a lot better than he thought he was going to get.

K: It's so much better than he thought he was going to get, what I think he's doing now, John, he's posturing himself for his domestic opinions.

C: Oh, sure.

K: So, that it doesn't look as if the American Emissary came there, handed him a plan, he signed it and that makes him an American stooge.

C: Yes, I understand that.

do

K: Lot of the things he's attacking k we haven't asked him to/so he can claim that he made us stop doing this.

C: Right.

K: But, I think in a couple of weeks he's going to come along with us.

C: Well, that's good. He's made his case and established his independence and he already knows that a lot of the things he's raised are straw men, you've already got him to agree not to do it in the first place, he knows you are not going to have a coalition government.

K: Exactly. But what he has is an electoral commission, votes by unanimity, half whose members are appointed by him and that supervises an election to which he first has to agree. So you can imagine that that's going to be a very active party.

C: (Laughter). No, I don't think so. Well, that's great. Henry, you are damned nice to call and I'll call you on Tuesday, and my congratulations to you.

K: Thank you

C: I think you did one hell of an accomplishment, my friend, and you are entitled to all the acolades that I hope you'll get--you'll damned sure get them from me, if you don't get them from anybody else.

K: Well, it's the President who went the lonely road, though.

C: I know, I know. You know I give him credit for the courage he's shown because God damn he did walk that lonely path.

K: He sure did. He got the advice--if it works, I'm fore it, and if it doesn't work I'm against it.

(Laughter)

C: That's right, that always helps. Okay, thanks Henry.

K: Bye.

3

TELCONE

Henry Brandon/Mr. Kissinger

10:12 - 10/27/72

K: Hello.

B: Henry!

K: You ~~might~~ want to meet your God damn deadline.

B: Yes, I do. I do appreciate your cooperation. Henry, it was a brilliant performance yesterday.

K: Thank you.

B: Really, it had all the right tones and emphases, really was, nobody has curbed on that.

W: Well, I don't know, at least with that accent.

B: Well, you know, you're better than---. Tell me, have you *knew* heard from Hanoi yet?

K: No, but, well I don't comment on that, but this thing is under control.

B: Yeh, that's good.

K: And they're not going to kick over--this is not just speculation-- we are going to have another round, I am certain, and we are going to fix these few--and then I think we are going to get it done.

B: Yes, Henry, can you present an agreement, I mean what happens when you, when Thieu only agrees to a cease fire?

K: Well, you know, that's sort of a--these political provisions, I think that many of our commentators are going to make it their own separate piece. What are the political provisions? There will be elections for offices to be negotiated, at a time to be negotiated, to be supervised by a council whose members are appointed 50/50 by the two sides and which operates by unanimity. Now whether he agrees to these provisions or not, he has a total veto over every State system. And I think Pham Van Dong was much more intelligent, he said these are essentially cosmetic principles with an electoral commission. That's exactly right.

B: What is the incentive, do you think, to present this---

K: What, after the settlement?

B: Yes.

2

K: The incentives to prevent a stalemate is that, you know, we are aggressive politically. We are as aggressive politically as we are militarily. We're talking off the record. Willy controls 90% of the population, all the provincial and district towns. We ask the political assets under his control that are required to establish ligitimacy. We have never said it's our obligation to keep him or any one person in office. We have always said that we would not make a settlement that's a disguised way of overthrowing an ally. And to give him a fair chance to win a political contest. I think he's got more than a fair chance now.

B: Yeah. That's what the President said on the 8th.

K: That's right. We have essentially achieved the provisions of the 8th.

B: Once the international commission on the council of reconciliation is established the U.S. really has no directorate responsibilities anymore, ~~which~~ has it?

K: No.

B: So then, it's just Vietnamese bodies. Who's going to be on that international commission?

K: Well, until the countries have signed, I don't think it would be proper for us to mention this.

B: Do you have any difficulties getting news?

K: No.

B: When do you think they'll be signed now?

K: Oh, within the next week.

B: No problem?

K: No.

B: You said we don't see the Council of Reconciliation as a coalition.

K: It isn't. The only stated functions are to promote observance of a cease fire and to supervise elections. It does not--the twelve established the time or the subject of the elections. It's in effect an electoral commission we were talking about.

B: Well, in the ahhh

DECLASSIFIED
Auth: E012958

B: NARA Date 5/1/68

3

K: We have always said--on January 26th we said the electoral commission will have a presentation of all political tendencies or whatever the phrase was we used. And that's in effect what we are doing. With a high sounding title. It has no police, no courts, no executive functions, no administrative responsibilities.

B: Yeah. And the police and the Army remain on the truce control,

K: That's right. Look at the Hanoi statement, they said that the existing administrations in all their internal/external functions will be maintained, until after the elections.

B: Yeah. That's a big concession, isn't it?

K: You know, the proposal was that a provisional coalition be formed that the supercede the existing government that would be abolished. And that this coalition government would then determine the elections and organize them and have all executive functions, including foreign policy.

B: Or executive functions?

K: Or executive functions. After the agreement is finally concluded, I will go through all the positions we are taking by the other side and the legislative history leaves absolutely no [illegible] questions.

B: Yeah.

K: What started out as a coalition government which would supercede the existing government has become, in effect, an electoral commission which would supervise elections to which the existing governments first agree, and that all administrative and executive functions, foreign policy defense, police, courts, would stay with the existing governments.

B: Yeah. The only real concession you made was to accept the occupational part of the South Vietnamese territory, and

K: But that's a defacto situation. And when--not to accept wouldn't change that fact.

B: Yeah. Well it simply what you can't win on a battlefield you can win at the conference table, isn't it.

K: That situation hasn't changed in six years, and to continue the war for that objective, is as you know, almost impossible in America. Moreover, there only two ways of achieving it; one is through military conquest by the South Vietnamese which they haven't been able to do; or by bombing the North so badly that they will surrender.

B: Right.

95CLASSIFIED
Author E0172958
BY order of the
BANA DUE 5/1/01

4

K: Before they surrender, and that way they could always get us to stop bombing by offering our prisoners for transfer as an end to the bombing. So, I think we achieved what was obtainable.

B: Yeah. Have you already agreed on the plans of the cease fire lines.

K: No, that has to be--

B: Well, Henry, I'd like to get a little bit more into detail maybe in ten day's time.

K: Well, I don't know whether I'll be available in ten day's time but you can count on it, I would think, by December.

B: Well I can't ---I putting together, say, on the 10th of November, and then I can research some things---

K: Well, let's see how--why don't you check with me then?

B: Do you think there will be an agreement before the 10th.

K: That's a possibility, but I wouldn't --- you know, we

B: Will you be taking General Haig to Paris if you go or wherever you are going?

K: I doubt it. Well, I won't be gone all that long, I don't think.

B: No. Well, if we could, you know,

K: I'm not going that way, and I won't be gone long.

B: Okay, Henry, it's my last chance, but I would appreciate it if you would hurry things up a bit.

K: Well you told me to---okay.

B: Many thanks.

K: Bye

B: Bye.

DECEMBER 5, 1944

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TELCONE

Gov. Ronald Reagan/Mr. Kissinger

11:55 am, October 27, 1972

K: Governor, how are you?

R: Henry, Nancy and I were thinking of taking a few days off for a little rest and we've always wanted to see Hanoi. Would it be all right to leave say Sunday?

K: (laughter)

R: Henry, congratulations!

K: Thank you.

R: Listen, this was just wonderful.

K: I was going to call you, this morning in fact. I was just asking my secretaries whether they had put in the call to you because I was going to wait until after 9:00 your time.

R: Oh, well, say now aren't you kind. I want to tell you, Henry, yesterday I didn't get to see all of you on television because I was in a TV station recording in Sacramento and then had to catch a plane for down here but at the station they had some prisoner of war wives who were watching and I went in and spoke to them and saw them and I want to tell you they were smiling through tears. But also some of those fellows on the crew -- you know, you're aname in the paper and so forth to them but they were standing there watching the monitor and one of these guys, and I'm quite sure a Democrat, but he was standing there and you were talking and he said, "Goddamn, he's brilliant!"

K: Because I used these long words.

R: (laughter) No, not at all.

K: Well, aren't you nice. I was going to call you to see -- well, first of all to tell you as I tried to make clear yesterday there's no coalition government involved at all.

R: That's wonderful.

K: The Liberal press is trying to give the impression that this election commission on which all parties are represented is like a coalition government. But the fact is that it has no -- first of all, it votes by unanimity so it can't do a goddamn thing. Secondly, it only supervises elections to which Thieu has first to agree. So he both has a veto on the commission and first he has to agree to an election.

TELCONE

11:55 a.m., October 27, 1972

R: Well, then there's nothing to all these stories that he is sitting there balking?

K: Well, he is going through a complicated maneuver trying to prove to his people that he's not an American stooge.

R: Uh-huh, yeah. Well, I wanted to find out from you some things. I'll tell you what -- Because, of course, the press last night -- Nelson was out and he and I both shared the platform at a great big political rally out here.

K: Right.

R: To the press had at us and I'll tell you what I've been saying and then I also wanted to find out from you what else you would like to have me say. But they have been getting at of course the timing of this political and, you know, and isn't this --

K: The answer is Hanoi put it out; we didn't.

R: Well, and I have said to them -- I took not too many liberties but I said to them, the answer to this is as obvious as the question. Hanoi dictated the timing of this. And I told them, I said that I've been privileged to have some briefings because of my trips for the President and I said I have heard predicted several months ago that once the enemy, if the polls continued and the enemy was convinced that they were not going to have a change of Presidents, one who would settle on their terms, that come October and closer to the election they would soften their position and attempt to realistically negotiate because the only bargaining power they would have left if they would rather face this President before he was re-elected than the day after he was re-elected.

K: Absolutely, absolutely.

R: Well, now is there anything else you would like to have me say?

K: First, I would of course in connection with this say it is Hanoi that put out the peace plan; not we, we were going to wait till it was all done.

R: Yeah.

K: Secondly, I would brutalize McGovern on the argument that we could have had peace terms four years ago.

TELCON

11:55 a.m., October 27, 1972

R: Oh, I did that in a speech last --

K: Because again I say Hanoi is calling him a liar, because Hanoi says it made a totally new proposal on October 8th accepting our position.

R: Yeah. Well, I said last night in my speech, I said to those who say that we could have had it four years ago or even four months ago, I said for the better part of the year they've listened to a man who has been seeking the Presidency and who has told them that if they would hang on and wait for him, they could win a major --

K: No, they could win on terms better than they asked for because he actually offered them better things than they asked for.

R: I see. Well, all right, we'll brutalize him.

K: Good.

R: Anything else?

K: No. I think those are the main items.

R: Well, very good. Henry, again as I say this has just been brilliant.

K: Well, thank you very much. It was the support of people like you in the dark periods that made it possible. No, I feel very strongly about what you and Nancy did and I remember, you know, these talks with you may not have been so frequent but we didn't have too many friends in this country for long periods as you know.

R: Yeah. You know, Henry, you might have forgotten about this but I reminded the crowd last night that in the President's first year in office the Chairman of the National Democratic Party Senator Harris said if Richard Nixon turns South Vietnam over to the Communists, we will hold him responsible.

K: Huh, I didn't know that.

R: Yes, that was a public statement. So all this talk that the concernment engendered by McGovern has been prevalent for a long time is just not true.

K: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:12 p.m., October 27, 1972

K: Anatol.

D: Yes, you are still in session. I thought that you already get a rest at least for 24 hours.

K: No, no.

D: Oh, you should. Really you are working too hard; you shouldn't. You at least need one day or two days vacation.

K: Well, that is the truth. Where do you want me to go, Siberia?

D: Well, I think that really is a nice place to go.

K: I'd like to go to Siberia.

D: Really. Especially I think if you and Le Duck Tho were sitting there, you could come and nobody else around.

K: Le Duc Tho?

D: And you.

K: Yeah.

D: And it will be quite a nice place.

K: You're trying to punish me.

D: Oh, on the contrary, I try to insure that you have a chance to enjoy each other and until you come both of you smiling and waving, shaking hands saying now everything is okay.

K: (laughter)

D: You could imagine how many people will be coming there and we will build a new city in Siberia in this connection because we have broken out a nice reception as it was with Eisenhower, if you remember.

K: Yeah, I remember.

D: When we were preparing for him, they build -- I don't know -- somebody told to ______ that Eisenhower is a great fisherman so he decided to build a house. Now they have a very nice rest house there.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By MWAGA 00304

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:12 p.m., October 27, 1972

K: Oh, really, I didn't know that.

D: Yes, we have it. Just on the Lake Baikal.

K: Oh, really.

D: Very nice really. So you see we have [entered this cover and by
surrounding it,] this is Eisenhower house.

K: Oh, isn't that nice, isn't that nice. Well, maybe sometime I can see it.

D: Yeah, you see, of course. The we will call Eisenhower and Kissinger's house.

K: (laughter)

D: Or maybe in different order, Kissinger/Eisenhower house.

K: I told your joke about me to some people the other day.

D: Yeah.

K: They thought it was very amusing.

D: Those I mentioned to you.

K: Yeah.

D: (laughter) Yeah, I was told by people who came from Moscow so I think you really became famous because in Russia when you became a subject of any joke, you are really famous. (laughter)

K: Anatol, I've shown your leader's notes to the President and he appreciates
the spirit in which it is written.

D: Yes, uh-huh.

K: I will send you today another note we've sent to them. I think really now where perhaps you can be of some help is if we would stop yelling now. We tried to make our contribution yesterday. Get these talks started again.

D: I think today is 27th.

K: Yeah.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958
By: J.N. Kissinger

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:12 p.m., October 27, 1972

- 3 -

D: Until the circuit will make this -- can be to the talks I mean.

K: Well, that's all right.

D: Yeah.

K: And then let's get a schedule that's realistic. If they keep stampeding us, we'll come up with unrealistic schedules. We will need after they and we have come to an agreement -- if they would keep quiet and give us two weeks, we will get it implemented.

D: Oh, you mean after you are agreed?

K: Yes.

D: Well, as you mentioned before --

K: Yeah, that schedule I think we can meet and we are making all preparations along that line.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: Perhaps sometime your leaders could explain to them the facts of American life.

D: I understand.

K: Because what needs to be done we really can do effectively only after November 7th.

D: I understand, yeah.

K: I mean, you understand.

D: No, no; it's very clear. And, Henry, did you receive anything from them?

K: I received a message from them yesterday which vilified us for two pages but on the last page said they are ready to resume negotiations.

D: So it is already.

K: So I think the thing is in motion.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: MW

C0304

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: M.W. Page Date: 06/04/94

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:12 p.m., October 27, 1972

D: Yeah, well, this is the point. Because this we think is rather silly. Of course, they have a ground for their own.

K: No, no; Look they --

D: But otherwise we feel it's silly not to comment.

K: It's not my custom to say that they had some reason for complaint but I said it publicly yesterday.

D: Yeah, I understand. No, no; it's clear. So it looks rather -- The only thing here now is waiting for the date involved?

K: Yes, or whether they will make it as a condition that we sign the agreement on a specific date or --

D: I understand. ______ doesn't mean specifically on a date or something concrete?

K: No, but they did say -- they reaffirmed the agreement and they said they were willing to resume negotiations.

D: Oh, this is the point because this is what the plan -- the message to resume negotiations.

K: Well, resume -- I don't know whether they -- Let me see whether I can find -- I suffer from the fact that my staff never has the documents that I need in front of me.

D: But sometimes it's helpful. Then you have to learn your own memory. Because if you receive too quickly all documents, you will not learn your memory.

K: (laughter)

D: You see how I defend your girls. They don't know it.

K: (Speaking to someone in office) The message from the Vietnamese yesterday.

Speaking to Dobrynin: One of these days I'll kill one of them --

D: Well, give them a chance; a second chance. (laughter)

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:12 p.m., October 27, 1972

- 5 -

K: Well, they ought to have a file -- you know, not that it's the least important thing I'm doing.

D: (laughter) You do too many things at once. It's very difficult to follow you.

K: (laughter)

D: You haven't seen Souvanna Phouma yet?

K: I saw him last night at Harriman's.

D: He brought with him his answer?

K: His answers to what?

D: His answer, his answers.

K: Oh, his answers, no. Has he got the answers?

D: I believe he has a very nice one. [his house boy would know.]

K: No, I --

D: This time he is ...

K: [Speaking to someone in office -- It can't be so hard.]

To Dobrynin: No, he didn't bring them with him. So did you have a good talk with the Secretary this morning?

D: Yes, it was a clear cut talk. He gave me a paper, it's very clearly written what it is. It's just exactly information what you discussed with Brezhnev.

K: Not exactly?

D: Exactly.

K: Exactly. Well, that's what he was supposed to do.

D: Yes, exactly and there was no -- any error. Because there was in the press and they were really preparing this. . . . . . crystal clear

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:12 p.m., October 27, 1972

D: (cont'd) since there was a conversation but there was nothing really controversial. Everything was exactly as I mentioned to him, it was exactly as it was to my --

K: Because that's what he was supposed to do.

D: Yeah.

K: Now, here is that Vietnamese note. There were two pages of calling us names which you don't have to hear.

D: Yes, what is the last part?

K: The last page is, "While giving information about the private meetings, the Government of Democratic Republic of Vietnam still affirms that the best way to rapidly end the war, restore peace in Vietnam is to negotiate seriously. The DRVN side undertakes to maintain in full the agreements with the US side. The DRV side will continue the negotiation with its consistent goodwill and serious attitude, with a view to bring an early end to the war."

D: So it's willing to continue negotiations.

K: Yeah, that's what I would interpret it, wouldn't you?

D: Well, it looks so. It's not very precise but it is in this way because after all what are you going to negotiate if everything is settled.

K: That's right.

D: So it may be their way of presenting everything. I hope this is it.

K: That's how I interpret it.

D: This is what we're trying to tell them.

K: That's at least the interpretation I will put on this.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: Okay.

D: Okay, so you will just send me this much in an envelope as usual.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: MWAPD 00304

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:12 p.m., October 27, 1972

K: Right.

D: Right, just for me personal.

K: Exactly.

D: Yes.

K: And I want to tell you that the attitude of your leaders in this will not be forgotten here.

D: No, I think it's in common agreement really.

K: It's constructive.

D: It's common agreement for both of us.

K: Right.

D: Well, Henry, goodbye and best wishes. Have a nice weekend. I hope you will have a quiet weekend.

K: I hope so.

D: (laughter) Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:12 p. m., October 27, 1972

K: Anatol.

K: No, no.

K: I'd like to go to Siberia.

D: Really. Especially I think if you and Le Duc Tho were sitting there, you could come and nobody else around.

K: Le Duc Tho?

D: And you.

K: Yeah.

K: (laughter)

K: Yeah, I remember.

CLASSIFIED
By: NARA Dae 05/10/72

*

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:12 p. m., October 27, 1972

K: Oh, really.

K: (laughter)

K: I told your jokes about me to some people the other day.

D: Yeah.

D: Those I mentioned to you.

K: Yeah.

D: Yes, uh-huh.

D: I think today is 27th.

K: Yeah.

TELCON

Amb. Dohrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:12 p. m., October 27, 1972

- 3 -

K: Well, that's all right.

D: Yeah.

K: Yes.

D: Yeah, I understand.

D: I understand.

D: I understand, yeah.

K: I mean, you understand.

D: So it is already.

DECLASSIFIED

Date: 20-12-95

By: NARA Doc 51040

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:12 p. m., October 27, 1972

K: No, no; Look they --

D: I understand. ____________ doesn't mean specifically on a date or something concrete?

K: (laughter)

RECLASSIFIED

30172958

Author's Signature

5/10/72

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:12 p. m., October 27, 1972

- 5 -

K: (laughter)

K: His answers to what?

D: His answer, his answers.

D: I believe he has a very nice one. . . . . . . . . . [his house boy would know.]

K: No, I --

D: This time he is . . . .

D: Yes, it was a clear cut talk. He gave me a paper, it's very clearly written what it is. It's just exactly information what you discussed with Breshneve

K: Not exactly?

D: Exactly.

there was

D: Yes, exactly and there was no -- any error. Because at some reports in the press and they were really preparing this. . . . . . . crystal clear

DECCLASSIFIED
Date 01/29/88
By J. M. D. B. K. M. A.

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

1:12 p. m., October 27, 1972

D: Yeah.

K: The last page is, "While giving information about the private meetings, the Government of Democratic Republic of Vietnam still affirms that the best way to rapidly end the war, I restore peace in Vietnam is to negotiate seriously. The DRVN side undertakes to maintain in full the agreements with the US side. The DRV side will continue the negotiation with its consistent goodwill and serious attitude, with a view to bring an early end to the war."

K: That's right.

K: That's how I interpret it.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: Okay.

TelCon
Gov. Rockefeller/Mr. Kissinger
3:05 - 10/27/72

K: Hello.

R: Henry!

K: Nelson, how are you.

R: Great guy, what marvelous editorials today. Scotty Reston
was fabulous.

K: Well, it makes him very kind.

R: Well, you're the greatest, God damn it, you're fabulous, Henry. I want to tell you. I said last night - I was at this dinner out in Los Angeles, I just want to just say. Don't we all feel proud to be American when you listen to Henry Kissinger. There was a tremendous response, including your friend Zsa Zsa Gabor.

K: She's not as much a friend of mine as she says I'm a friend of hers.

R: How's it going.

K: It's going all right. We've got to keep our two men over
Vietnamese factions alive.

R: You do. Are they going to be willing to talk some more.

K: Well, they are already beginning to cave. They sent out a message saying the negotiations had to be continued. They now said publicly that they would see me on November 1st to initial the agreement.

R: Well, the 31st has already passed.

K: No, they said on October 31st to initial the agreements. But, they have to---and I would guess in a couple of days they'll say they need me.

R: Marvelous, Henry.

K: They've already sent us a message in which they say, in effect, they are willing to tonegotiate.

CLASSIFIED

Authentic
30/12/85
BY JAMAICA DATE 5/1/85

2

R: Well, you know Henry, In my opinion, what North Vietnam did in leaking this is the greatest possible for you and the President. Isn't that right.

K: Yes, it's putting the heat on Saigon, it gave us a chance to put our whole story out rather than let it leak out.

R: It was your finest hour, yesterday, Henry, two hours, it was fantastic.

K: You know you are marvelous to say this because

R: Oh, it's true.

K: It hit us so suddenly, I had to do it extemperaneously--

R: Well, that's what I know, and as I said to everybody, he just got up there and just talked. I talked to Kennedy--what you said at the end, those last two sentences was just you and just the greatest. I'm just thrilled.

K: Well, you've been such a tremendous friend.

R: Well, listen, Henry, I'm just excited about our country and what you've done for it.

K: If these maniacs will cooperate with us in Hanoi, if they will come--my proposal to them is to come to a session to finalize an agreement between them and us and then shut up about it, and give us two weeks to get Saigon to come along.

R: That's right.

K: Then we can do it.

R: Yes. I understand you're having a briefing on Sunday.

K: Well--

R: And she said no, he's got some appointments. I said well--

K: No, no, they arranged a briefing for me. I'm hoping that she's coming down. Are you going to be there?

R: No.

K: There's no reason for it.

R: If you don't mind, I'd just as soon not go over to Washington.

CLASSIFIED

E0172958

Anhui
B. NARA DATE 5/14/94

3

K: I think it's an insult to actually bring from all over the country, or whatever--

R: Oh--a Haldeman deal.

K: You know, they never leave well enough alone. They think I can now go out everyday and repeat the same thing. The reason I could do is because I have never done it.

R: That's right. They way you handled the sensitivity of the South Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese, the American political scene the President, ever-- just fabulous, really your finest hour. I was just thrilled, I tried to call you.

K: Well I'm afraid that--

R: Well, I want to tell you Nancy has prepared, I think, a fabulous speech.

K: I saw it and I really thing it's excellent. I think it should be left pretty much as it is.

R: But the last part on economics in Latin America, we did that going out on the plane. And we got that torn down and much better. But I think the first part --the interpretation of this policy--how to understand which is the thing that made possible the Vietnamese settlement. I got so excited reading and working on it, that it isn't even funny.

K: Yes.

R: I cut it down to 20 minutes, but I'm going to put it out in the full form,

K: Well I think it's a really good job and I look forward to being there with you.

R: Well, listen, I'm sure you going to be the happiest coming down. I

K: Oh, marvelous, can you stay for dinner.

R: Well, that would be nice, we'll see if we can do that. I'm going to bring Nancy down. I told Nancy, I said I want to sit between you and Henry, and if they ask any questions, I'm just going to refer them to you two.

K: Well, maybe the four of us can handle --

R: wouldn't that be nice. Let's plan on it.

95CLASSICS

30/2/95

5/14/95

4

K: Terrific.

R: This is great Henry.

K: Good, I'll see you on Tuesday.

R: Listen, do you think anything more is going to happen than what's happened now.

K: No.

R: We can trade with this--within that framework.

K: That's right.

R: Excellent, Henry, will I'll be talking to you when I come down.

K: Terrific.

R: Now, listen, I'll talk to Happy and let you know about Monday or Tuesday night.

K: That would be marvelous.

R: Great, Okay, Henry, Bye.

K: Bye.

6CLASSIFIED

Anthony E012958

B. NARA DUE 5/14/64

Telcon

Mrs. Kirk Douglas/Joan Braden/Mr. Kissinger

3:16 - 10/27/72

K: Hello

Ann: Henry!

K: Ann, how are you?

D: I'm very well. Henry, Kirk and I wanted to be invited among the millions of people who congratulate you. We are so proud of you, I can't tell you, but

K: Thank you

D: Because of Bernice, we wanted so bad to talk to you. It is so typical of you to call back when Joan Braden and I are alone in the house.

K: (Laughter) That's right.

but we are going away

D: We would love to see you and we would like for you to come out here and take the house any time you feel like it.

K: You're great.

D: I mean that. I have a wonderful cook and she's a good girl, and she will take good care of you and you'd have the house to yourself.

K: I may really take advantage of that in November sometime.

D: Any time, I mean that very sincerely.

K: Are you going to be in Los Angeles next week.

D: Yes.

K: Because just before the election for a couple of days I may be there. And I'd love to see you.

D: Please do. We would love to see you. Will you call and let us know.

K: I'll let you know. I promise to be there Sunday and Monday.

D: A week from this Sunday.

K: That's right.

TELCOM

Marvin Kalb/Kissinger

3:28 p.m. - 10/27/72

K: Hello.

MK: Henry.

K: Marvin, how are you?

MK: Fine, I just wanted to tell you that for the first time this morning my mother thought I was a genius.

K: For what reason?

MK: The reason was that she heard on the radio your news conference yesterday. She thought you were such a genius the way you explained it the way she could understand it. She now understands our desire to write a book about you means that we're smart because we're dealing with you.

K: (Laugs) That's nice.

MK: Listen, just very briefly and it's not to hold you up, but for the sake of accuracy, have you any responses yet from them?

K: We've been in touch with them, yes.

MK: Oh, I see so

K: We've been in touch with each other.

MK: In other words it is no longer right to say that there has been no response to Sunday's request for a meeting.

K: That was never absolutely right.

MK: Oh, I misunderstood.

K: No, I didn't make that clear. I think it's going to evolve the way I indicated yesterday.

MK: Meaning that you will be seeing them very soon.

K: I don't want to give any dates, but meaning something like that, yes.

CLASSROOM
AUTHOR: E. O. B. 30127

BOSTON
MARIA DR.

5/1/70

MK: Right. And there was an item on TASS today which I read as
suggesting that Kosygin came down very much on your side.

K: That's exactly right.

MK: That is correct?

K: Yes.

MK: OK. And the final point, I was told over here in the Department
by some guy who claims to know, that South Vietnam has a rifle
ammunition supply that runs from two to three weeks and Thieu
understands this and this kind of factions is eventual agreement
to what you have decided.

K: I don't even know what their supply is and we are far from that
point.

MK: Do you feel that you're making any progress with Thieu?

K: My commitment publicly is to gear progress with him to progress
with the others. And I have every hope of doing that.

MK: That's excellent.

K: You know when I say hope it also requires determination.

MK: That you've got. Listen, will you allow us to come to Paris
with you.

K: (Laugs)

MK: You still going to go alone?

K: Yeh.

MK: Oh well, maybe we'll see you there.

K: That'd be nice.

MK: (Laugs) Thank you, Henry.

K: Bye.

TELCORN

Bernard Gwertzman/Mr. Kissinger

3:43

10/27/72

BG: How are you?

HK: Okay.

BG: You've had a busy time--I was just wondering--what kind of guidance would you give on Hanoi's statement today.

HK: I have yet to see a fully authorized text, but you know, everyone just has to keep his cool now.

BG: Yeh. Would you say that--I remember that whole thing in '68 over the ________--is it a sort of diplomatic minuet kind of thing we are in?

HK: That's right. We will hear darling things from both Vietnamese sides now. And I think the task of a journalist is to look at the print and not at how these parties are posturing themselves.

BG: Uh huh. Yeh.

HK: You know, from a deman to sign, the demand that they'll, you know, they'll need to drink champaign or whatever--

BG: Yeh, the fact that they're saying now they'll be in Paris is sort of a positive step, I would expect.

HK: I have ever confidence that it's going to work in the direction that I described. And if it breaks up over this issue, then there wasn't much to there to begin with.

BG: Can I say administration remains confident this will be worked out?

HK: That's right. But you know maybe it'll take another week because-- to get everybody lined up.

BT: Sure. Sure, no very good. I must say on a personal basis I thought your conference yesterday was really a historic one--I hate to use that adjective but,

HK: I appreciate that.

BG: I must say many people including your friends in the bureaucracy today were talking about it.

DECLASSIFIED
Auth: E012958
Date: 10/27/72
By: AATA Dae

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

5:30 p.m. 10/27/72

HK: Anatol. You called me earlier.

AD: Hello Henry. Oh yes, well you see just earlier after I finished talking with you I received a telegram from Brezhnev--it's really not an urgent matter--he just asked me to give you when it will be convenient--his answer for the President--he thanks the President for the letter--you remember--about lend-lease.

HK: Oh yes.

AD: And so it is a letter to the President, saying he is thankful that everything was all right and that--in accordance with agreements and he is thankful for the President for doing these things--nothing else. So when I see you next time, I will give you--

HK: Good, and I finally have this letter for Brezhnev--I'll get it signed and get it over to you.

AD: Okay, that's fine. When are you going to do it.

HK: Tomorrow.

AD: Then let's make it in the morning, if possible, all right?

HK: Definitely in the morning.

AD: It's a mutual agreement?

HK: Absolutely.

AD: Because I promised already my wife from mid-day I am at her disposal. Otherwise she make a slogan--she is working definitely for you--I mean for the Republicans--today she tells me --she's democratic, but vote republican--(laughing)

HK: (laughing)

AD: I said well

HK: Actually there's nothing in the letter that I haven't told you already.

AD: I understand.

HK: The only point, I have in the letter that I haven't said to you orally is

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: MW. N. S. Dyer, Jr.

Page 2

HK: in your note you said something or Brezhnev or your leadership said something that we wanted this signed before the election and we pointing out that it wasn't we who wanted it signed before the election but your ally.

AD: He mentioned in one point here, at the early stage, the President or you just mentioned--I remember there was one long, long ago you said you had nothing against it -- should not be against it.

HK: Ah, that's right.

AD: It was a good idea--so there is a reference in this connection--not we are trying to hold you on your--but saying they think you too want or rather prepare to sign it before--

HK: That's true--it's not a major--

AD: It's not that our ____! are trying to give you--no, no, no, it's just I am saying that both interests are at heart.

HK: No, no, Anatol the real problem as I see it is this--if your maniacal friends in North Vietnam--

AD: hm, hmm--how do you call South Vietnam?

HK: Maniacal also--they are both maniacs--if they could be persuaded after we meet, if they would set up for two weeks, then we can quietly work on Saigon and in two weeks the pressures we have available will work if however, they start screaming all the time now, and say we must initial the agreement with them, we have the leave the impression that it isn't decided yet--after we meet they have to keep quiet.

AD: I think my personal understanding of the emissaries of Hanoi is one they agreed to have a meeting with you, but then I then I think the problem will be much more easy--it is my maxx impression I couldn't give 100% guarantee--it still is my impression the most important point is to have them come to this to discuss with you because afterwards if everything comes as I think it will I think it will be much more easier to them to be quiet.

HK: Yeh, because if they are quiet and let me work, then I can deliver--I made the mistake to agree to such an accelerated schedule to begin with and frankly, I should not show up in Saigon until we have already got their commitment to yield.

AD: Yeh, I understand

HK: Because otherwise they will use my presence there to hold me up.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: MWAPSA-50404

FELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

5:30 p. m. 10/27/72

HK: Oh yes.

HK: Tomorrow.

AD: It's a mutual agreement?

HK: Absolutely.

AD: Because I promised already my wife from mid-day I am at her disposal. Otherwise she make a slogan--she is working definitely for you--I mean for the Republicans--HUK today she tells me --she's democratic, but vote republican--(laughing)

HK: (laughing)

AD: I said well

AD: I understand.

Page 2

AD: He mentioned in one point here, at the early stage, the President or you just mentioned--I remember there was one long, long ago you said you had nothing against it--should not be against it.

HK: Ah, that's right.

HK: Manical also--they are both maniacs--if they could be persuaded after we meet, if they would set up for two weeks, then we can quietly work on Saigon and in two weeks the pressures we have available will work if however, they start screaming all the time now, and say we must initial the agreement with them, we have to leave the impression that it isn't decided yet--after we meet they have to keep quiet.

AD: Yeh, I understand

TELCON

October 27, 1972

The President

5:30 p.m.

HAK: Mr. President

The President: Any late developments?

HAK: I don't know whether I've had a chance to tell you that Kosygin has come out publicly for a resumption of negotiations.

The President: Oh, he did?

HAK: Yes

The President: Good

HAK: And the North Vietnamese are back-peddling crazily in Paris; they had a few press people in. And they said that all they want from me now is that I initial the agreement so that its basic provisions are maintained and after that they are willing to renegotiate things and ________ isn't so important to them. But they'll get off that one too. They're not in an offensive spirit.

The President: I had just a couple of thoughts. I just finished an hour's reception with a lot of these ethnic editors and so forth, and two or three were expressing some concern about I think it was a CBS broadcast in it we just hope you don't, you know, agree to a coalition communist government. [unclear]

Anyway, that's one of the reasons why I think it's very important in our public relations, you see, that's the kind of people we can... that we could really cool them awfully fast if they got the idea....

HAK: But actually the press hasn't one serious newspaper that says that... [unclear]

The President: The other thing is that I think they're going to have this period when the North is, I suppose, going to try raise doubts.... But their options are so darn limited because when you really come down to it they say some pretty terrible stories don't they.

HAK: They cannot break off the negotiations.

The President: Wouldn't think so.

HAK: Because with the whole public pusstering, they'll do a little needling here and there but they won't... the news came out yesterday, we have one problem, and that's Thieu. Because I think that madman is heading for a confrontation. We got another intercept that he's going to send a slew of ambassadors

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E01725F
By: HAR.Duglesn

2

around to line up support against you in various capitals.

The President: Well, just so we know the capitals, we just have to be world we'll just give them all the cold shoulder, because they're all on our side. And, also, just as quickly as we possibly can if Buckley and some of these others come out with poems, we've got to flood them out...

HAK: Buckley is doing a column; Alsop is doing a column ...

The President: Anyway, whatever his situation is he's ... we just don't want him to say anything now, and if he does he's broken the sticks.

HAK:Can we answer when Souvanna says that recapitulations. He lives there, he would be the first to go if we were wrong. He's more vulnerable by far than Thieu is.

The President: Sure, he's doesn't have any army.

HAK: That's right

The President: Correct. I know, I thought that was a very significant thing. Well, the main thing now if you will is you and Al watch the PR side of it and just keep things... We have two things to worry: One: Is that we're not selling... we don't care about Thieu, nobody cares about that, but that we're not going to a Communist coalition. In other words, the idea that we won basically has got -- won our objectives, that this is a settlement that we won. And the other thing is, of course, not to have the thing -- too much uncertainty but we're going to have some, I know that.

HAK: I think the uncertainty will be all right, Mr. President.

Pres: I think it will in the end, Henry. I think it's going to come out --

HAK: Yeah, but I think they'll agree to a meeting next week because I think they want a bombing halt.

P: Ah-ha, yes, yeah.

HAK: If we have a meeting and stop the bombing, everyone will figure it's done.

P: That's right, that's right. That's what I figure too, that it will be a very effective ploy. At that point we'll say because of the very significant progress that was made, we're now stopping the bombing --

HAK: No, we wouldn't even announce it. I think it's even more effective if we just don't announce it.

DECLASSIFIED

Advisory Board E017258

By: HAK - Rep. Del. S.Y.C.

- 3 -

P: I know, I know. I mean, if it breaks, then we'll say that's why we did it.

K: Right, right.

P: Good. How's -- did you talk to anybody else today of interest, that I should know about?

K: No. Well --

P: I thought ............ with the little fellow is always interesting. He's the smartest one of the bunch, isn't he?

K: Oh, by far. And a great gentleman.

P: Yeah, he really is.

K: No, I think we're in good shape. I talked to Time, they're doing a story and I read them parts of your letter.

P: Good. I think the thing they're interested in is that it was handwritten in the middle of the night.

K: Oh, yeah. I said it was given to me in the airplane and they asked me --I told them I was in touch with you almost every night and that was one of the -- you know, the way the time zones were running, it was all --

P: Great, they love that sort of thing.

K: Oh, yeah.

P: And they like the handwritten note thing too. Good, good.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Okay, get a good night's sleep.

K: Right.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E01728-8
By: HAROLD GILSON

TELCORN

Tom Braden/Mr. Kissinger

5:45 p.m. 10/27

TB: Gee, you a good guy to call me.
I just --tonight in a piece about this and one I heard on the radio
broadcast this afternoon, is it very serious trouble?

HK: What's the radio broadcast?

TB: About the NVN saying that you could come over and drink champaign
or you could come over afterwards, but if you weren't there on the 31st,
that was the end of it, they never wanted to see you again.

HK: No, they didn't say that.

TB: That's what I was told by a---

HK: They didn't say anything--not even--they said that--I read what they
are saying that they are posturing themselves for the resumption of
talks. And I have information from them which indicates that--

TB: That that is so?

HK: Yeh.

TB: So we are not in trouble--we're on the track.

HK: We are on the track--remember now that they are both maniacs--
north and south--this is all off the record and they are all posturing
themselves like crazy--but I think this thing is essentially going to
stay on track.

TB: Okay, now I want to read. you three quotations from you--and if you
don't want me to use them, I won't. I am writing a piece about you--
I said it would be unwise on the record of the last four years, it would
be unwise to bet against Dr. Kissinger and his listed are the following
examples--When he came to Washington in 1968, this war will end
in negotiations, mark my word he told friends, who thought the only way
to end it was to get. Second at the time of the invasion of Cambodia
when colleagues came from Harvard to Washington to protest, "They
do not understand that I agree with them, the war is a ghastly error
we have to end it. But it would be an equally ghastly error to end it
in such a way that no nation could take us seriously again.

HK: And you say the war is a ghastly experience, we have to end it--

TB: Yeh, a ghastly experience, right. Is that all right?

HK: Right.

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E01725&
By DAVID HARLAN Kissinger

Page 2

HK: That's fair enough.

TB: More or less what I remembered you saying.

HK: No, no, that's exactly right.

TB: Thanks Henry.

HK: You're really a good friend.

TB: And we really are all right huh?

HK: We are all right, we must not panic--they'll be posturing and basically we are all right. All the messages we have would indicate that. Doesn't mean that we'll meet necessarily next week, but I think we are on exactly the course that I described yesterday.

TB: Great, I am awfully proud of you and so is everybody else.

HK: Thank you from Tom.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal EO1725f
By DAVID HARRIS

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Ron Zeigler

5:47 p.m. 10/27/72

RZ: I have Helen Thomas over here who's dying to see you.

HK: Yeh, but not this minute--I have a meeting.

RZ Oh, you're with someone?

HK: No I have a meeting to which I have to go.

RZ: She trying to press me on you and I told her that I don't have anything
to say ~~any~~ beyond what you said yesterday--right?

HK: That's right. I can see her maybe later around 5:30 or so.

RZ: You want to see her?

HK: Yeh, but not this minute.

RZ: No, you know, you can't trust her?

HK: I know that.

RZ: You want to see her at 5:30--I'll have her in my office at 5:30

HK: Good and I will call.

RZ: Okay, fine.

CLASSIFIED

Autograph E017258

By A. MANNED-01/25/72

TELCONE

Marvin Kalb/Kissinger

approx. 6:30 p.m. - 10/27/72

K: Marvin.

MK: Henry, I'm sorry to bug you.

K: You know her name?

MK: Whose name?

K: Who I'm going to see tonight?

MK: In Paris?

K: Yeh.

MK: Le Duc Tho. I really am sorry to bother you but Walter called and
he said

K: Now really, you should really all keep your shirts on. I'm not going
to leave for Paris tonight. It isn't going to develop all that rapidly.
There's got to be a lot of posturing still going on.

MK: Until it works out.

K: Until it works out. It may take a few days - it may take a couple of
weeks, but I really have not great sense yet as to the timing. It will
not be tonight.

MK: Thank you very much.

K: Right.

CLASSIFIED

Ad. 40758
By: HARRY GIBSON

TELCORN

Jay Lovestone/Mr. Kissinger

7:10 p.m., October 27, 1972

K: Hello, Mr. Lovestone.

L: Yes, sir, how are you?

K: Okay, how are you?

L: Oh, I'm trying to survive.

K: Where are you?

L: I'm in New York.

K: Well, I was wondering whether you wanted to come in next week sometime to let me talk to you about these negotiations with the Vietnamese.

L: Well, I'll be in Tuesday -- beginning around noon time Tuesday and then I stay Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. You figure out sometime mutually convenient, fine.

K: Let's get together Tuesday afternoon because, you know, the press has such a vested interest and has been so wiped out in things that they predicted would happen. You know, they all said Thieu would have to be sacrificed, he's maintained. They all said a coalition government.

L: Oh, yeah.

K: They all said a coalition government would have to be set up. There is no coalition government.

L: Yeah, I've got a number of questions I wanted to -- that's one of the things I want to get cleared up, you know, about the administrative council and so on.

K: Well, it's not an administrative council. It's called -- what it is in effect is the electoral commission that we've always proposed. It's a commission that will be set up through negotiations between Thieu and the NLF. It's their presentation, its members will be appointed by the two sides.

L: When you say the two sides, you mean --

K: By the Communists and --

L: . . . . provisional government and the Thieu government.

K: That's right. And it operates by unanimity.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E01725f By AARON D. CLIFFORD

TELCONE

Jay Lovestone/Mr. Kissinger

7:10 p.m., October 27, 1972

L: Uh-huh. Yes, that's right; that was clear.

K: It's only function is to supervise elections, which elections however have to
be negotiated between Saigon and the NLF. In other words, until those election
are agreed to, it has no functions at all.

L: Um-humm. Well, was the ceasefire --

K: Therefore, Thieu has a double veto in it. And it's the thinnest kind of
figleaf to permit the Communists to get off the coalition government. They
started out with demanding a coalition government which would absorb the
existing government --

L: No, that would be the end, sure.

K: Now there is no coalition government. In their own statement they said
"all executives -- the existing government would remain in its whole
executive and external relations until after the elections."

L: Um-humm.

K: In many respects the political provisions of this agreement are more
favorable than what we publicly proposed on January 25th when we said
elections had to be within six months. In this one, there's no time limit
on elections.

L: I get you.

K: In the January 25th proposal, Thieu would have had to resign a month before
the election. In this case there's no requirement for him to resign at all.
In fact, there's no requirement for him to agree to elections.

L: You don't think he'd object to elections?

K: In my view, he controls 90% of the population.

L: When I see you, I'll give you a copy of a report that we had our collaborating
organization in France .................... just came back from a
mission in Vietnam, and they have a fascinating report.

K: My judgment is if he plays the political game aggressively, he is bound to
win. I mean, if you were a Communist cadre in South Vietnam now, having
fought for 10 years, what the hell have you got? You don't have any share
in the government, not even a minority share in the government; you don't
have any control of anything that you haven't always had; and all the

DECLASSIFIED
Act. No. E017258 -
By: D. HARRIS / G / S / L / O / T

TELCORN

Jay Lovestone/Mr. Kissinger

7:10 p.m., October 27, 1972

- 3 -

K: (cont'd) Communist cadres that Thieu has in jail stay in jail because under
the provisions of the --

L: They're not being released; there's no general political release or amnesty?

K: No, only military POWs are released. So, you know, I don't think that
the VC are in extremely high morale right now.

L: No, you see the argument of McGovern "could have had it 4 years ago" is
a fraud.

K: McGovern -- What did McGovern propose? That we would pull our forces --

L: That's right -- No, we run out.

K: That we run out and then hope they'll give us something. But we'll cut off
economic aid here, we have unlimited economic aid --

L: Yeah. No, no; there's no question on it. I think Goldwater hit him pretty
well but much more can be said to refute that argument.

K: And we have almost unlimited military aid.

L: Yeah.

K: And we can keep unlimited economic advisors there. And 50 military attaches'.

L: Yeah. Let me make a suggestion, the moment I get in Tuesday --

K: Call me and --

L: At your office.

K: Look, I'll save time around 3:00.

L: Fine. Suppose I set it for that.

K: Good.

L: Fine. I'll be over to your place at 3:00.

K: Good, Jay.

L: Will you note it, please.

K: Good.

L: Bye, bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED

["TELCON", "Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger", "7:20 pm, October 27, 1972", "W: Hi, where have you been?", "K: Goddamn you, Barbara, since when do you communicate with me through your secretary?", "W: Because you're too important and busy and I just had to get word to you and I figured this is not the time, I'd wait until it was all over.", "K: And you figure that I'm more likely to talk with your secretary than with you.", "W: I didn't have my secretary call you -- I had my secretary call your secretary.", "K: I know, I was very pleased.", "W: The whole press conference yesterday was just sugars because I'm listening now to the news pick it all apart.", "K: Oh, are they taking it apart?", "W: No, they're just -- you know, they're talking about the . . . . . . the North Vietnamese saying that --", "K: It's going to work --", "W: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TELCONE

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

7:20 p.m., October 27, 1972

W: Yes, I did think that you kind of made a big deal out of cancelling a date.

K: Well, you know, when I do it, I do it in style.

W: I don't mind your going to Paris because I could have understood that but --

K: Going to Saigon.

W: Saigon, I thought it was excessive.

K: (laughter) When are you going to be down again?

W: Don't know. The first that I know that I'm definitely coming down is to
cover the inauguration and --

K: Well, you are going to come before then, aren't you?

W: I don't have any plans to come out at this point?

K: Well, I have a proposal for you. Why don't you say something nasty about me some morning and then come for lunch or dinner. Then no one will think that you are getting rewarded.

W: Yesterday, do you know who Earl Wilson is?

K: Yeah.

W: Well, he's a synicated columnist --

K: I know him.

W: Okay. In yesterday's paper at the top of his gossip -- "What's this between Henry Kissinger and Barbara Walters?"

K: I'm flattered.

W: You are. That's why I can't come for lunch.

K: (laughter) Dinner?

W: I will. I'll come to Washington one day, I will. I really would love to see
you but I'm just so happy. I'm thrilled for us obviously but I'm so pleased
that you worked it out and the way you worked it out, and that it just happened.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E017258
By DAVID B. CHISKEY

TELCONE

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

7:20 p.m., October 27, 1972

- 3 -

K: Well, you know we still have a few weeks.

W: What is this whole October 31st thing? I don't understand why they're sticking
why that date is so important.

K: Because they want to get us nailed down before the election.

W: Why?

K: Because they're afraid we're going to go ape after the election.

W: They have that little faith?

K: Well, Vietnamese are unbelievable suspicious.

W: They also said that everything is over -- you know, they showed a copy of it obviously and said that it's all there; that there are no changes necessary.

K: Well, you know that's their version. We said changes are necessary. You know, they can show the document but what does that prove? I've agreed that there is a document that we worked on.

W: What do you think is going to happen to Thieu? When do you think he's going to start to change?

K: Oh, I think -- if the North Vietnamese would just shutup now and meet us again, which eventually they'll do after they've made enough noise, then we can work on both of our customers in tandem.

W: Why don't you tell them -- don't you have any way of saying this to them?

K: I think they understand it but they've got a lot of face to save now themselves. It's inconceivable to me that we would have come this far and that it would get kicked over on an essentially procedural detail.

W: It's inconceivable to me too. The only thing I can think of is that Thieu could just be -- I don't know what kind of a man he is, you do.

K: Well, Thieu might kick it over but I can't imagine that Hanoi will kick it over.

W: Can he kick it over?

K: No, No, I think --

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. E01745f
By D.M. HANNA/CHS

TELCOM

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

7:20 p.m., October 27, 1972

- 4 -

W: ... hysterical enough to --

K: No, I think we all have to stay steady and I think we're going to make it -- you know, considering what we've gone through and what we've overcome, this is the last --

W: I thought when you finally said yesterday that those who were saying that this is for the election, that it's unworthy, I thought the choice of words was -- when you say "it's unworthy of what we've gone through", it was very good and it seemed to me it set them up.

K: Yeah. It hasn't, yeah. I think so far it's been pretty quiet on that --

W: Why did the President decide to have you do it and not make a speech last night?

K: Well, because he felt -- what was he going to say?

W: What you said.

K: Well, but then we cannot yet say it's an agreement.

W: Um-humm. I just think it's very interesting in terms of everything, that he chose to have you do it and to remain kind of the statesman and above it --

K: Well, and you know, he may not have thought this would have all that tremendous an impact.

W: Humph, but how could it not. It isn't the same as getting up one morning and seeing headlines that say "Peace", no but did you hope that it would be -- did you want to be quiet until it was all done?

K: Absolutely. We had absolutely no intention of revealing it.

W: And you would not have if the North Vietnamese hadn't?

K: We had absolutely no intention and if the North Vietnamese had strung it through the election, we would never have said a word of it other than what these speculations were in the newspapers.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E017258
By D. HARRIS

TELCON

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

7:20 p.m., October 27, 1972

W: If they hadn't insisted on the October 31st date?

K: They went public, they published the essence of the agreement so then I had to either confirm it or deny it.

W: You think they did this --

K: I had no intention -- I had an intention of giving a press conference on Thursday or Friday but I was going to do it in very low key and give no substance at all, I was just going to try to give a mood of where we were going.

W: And you think they just did this to press you into doing -- that they're so frightened that you're going to change?

K: Well, not so much press us into a date but force us to say yes, we stood by the agreement or we didn't.

W: Before the election?

K: Yeah.

W: Okay, McGovern.

K: (laughter) He deserves it though, Barbara. He really is a second-rater.

W: Yes, that's unfortunately what's happened. I mean, --

K: You know, it isn't -- When Stevenson was running, whether you agreed with him or not, you had to say that he made a lasting impact.

W: Yeah. And no matter how you felt about Lyndon Johnson and there were people who despised him, no body said he was second-rate.

K: That's right, he was a big man.

W: But I never thought that McGovern really was until the last month -- And you didn't either?

K: No, I liked -- I respected him. And I think -- you know, I urged -- not urged him, but some of my Democratic friends in the primaries asked me whom they should work for and I recommended McGovern because I thought at least he'd put some issues clearly and force a good debate. And I did think then wrongly that he'd be our most formidable opponent.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: ED
By: HARRADavis

TELCON

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

7:20 p.m., October 27, 1972

- 6 -

W: Yeah. I remember when we talked in June, you did.

K: That's right. But he's just come apart. He hasn't done anything that indicate any statute.

W: Of course, you know, I just hate to see any President walk in with the kind of vote that this President's going to get. I hope he's got the temperance to understand.

K: Well, we'll have to see that.

W: You think I'm talking over your party line?

K: If only Haldeman and a few other close friends are listening --

W: Speaking of Haldeman -- I guess now you'll never do an interview?

K: (Laughter)

W: I think the least you could have done is to come on and say it just to me.

K: And 3 million others.

W: By the way, Barbara, you know, there's something I --

K: I intended to do it if I had stayed here that week.

W: What did he say? Did he ever say yes?

K: No, he said no.

W: He did say no.

K: Yeah.

W: Did he say why?

K: Well, they said that I was -- that they had to put me into the right spot and that I was going to be -- I'm so well known there is going to be a tremendous fight when I go on national television. He had forgotten that I've already done it.

W: Yeah.

K: But they never set a date for anything so I think they just didn't want me to.

DECLASSIFIED

Automatically E01258
Byron HARTley/press

TELCON

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

7:20 p.m., October 27, 1972

- 7 -

W: Do you think you ever will now? Should I even bother to keep asking?

K: Oh, yes. No, I will now. After the election, I'm my own man and I promise you I'll do it after the election.

W: Okay.

K: Before the election I did it only to give them a chance to -- I mean, I want --

W: ... after the election?

K: After the election I'll do it.

W: First?

K: First with you, yes.

W: Okay.

K: Definitely.

W: Thank you. Martha Mitchell called me yesterday. Remember her?

K: Yeah, how is she?

W: Wanting to come on the day after the election. She said I told you that I'll come on, will you put me on on the 8th and I'll tell everything I know. I said, we sure will.

K: Are you going to do it?

W: Yep. How could I say no?

K: I think she's nuts.

W: I think she's nuts too but if you were a reporter --

K: No, no; you have to do --

W: ... and you say, no, I think you're nuts lady, don't come on -- I don't think she's going to say anything. She said to me, I've got a great deal to say; I've done a lot for this country. I don't think she's going to say anything but I think just the fact that --

K: Well, she needs publicity. She wants it. I mean, she's dying without it.

DECLASSIFIED

Actively E017258
By: D.R. DeSantis

TELCONE

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

7:20 p.m., October 27, 1972

- 8 -

W: Well, you'd think that he'd shut her up. You know, at this birthday party that I gave that they came to -- he was going to come on the program the next day and then he changed his mind. And I thought he was a darn fool to come on the program; I wouldn't have told him but you know, you leave yourself open for those questions, it's a very different kind of thing than making a statement. Anyhow what do I care -- she said she wants to come on; it's fine for me, it's good for the program --

K: I'll watch. But I hope to see you before then.

W: How do you like your Cosmopolitan picture?

K: In the Lampoon?

W: Yes.

K: I wish I were as thin.

W: When I first saw it, a producer showed it to me and he said, you know, I know you like him but I really think he's gone too far. I got so upset. I thought, how could you do this. I mean, have you really gone this crazy since the last time I saw you -- is this what happens when --

K: (laughter)

W: Then I saw the appendix scar and everything.

K: Is there an appendix scar in it?

W: Yes.

K: I didn't see that.

W: Do you have an appendix scar?

K: I do.

W: Then I'll take another look, for all I know, it may be the real picture.

K: (laughter) This was a previous incarnation.

W: It was awfully funny. I am so pleased that you called.

K: Barbara, let me know when you can come down. I'd love to see you.

W: I will, I will as soon -- you know, I just don't have any reason to now.

RECLASSIFIED

Authority E017258
By: BARBARA GILSON