MEMORANDUM

January 28, 1959

TO: Mr. Bowie

FROM: Mr. Matthias

SUBJECT: The Center's Program for the Fellows

1. I hesitate to reopen this subject. You have already been through this with some of us, and you have thought much more about it than I have. Moreover, what I have to say is based primarily upon my own experience and peculiarities, and I am sure that you will be able to tear it apart. However, I would like to set down my reactions and suggestions, if for no other reason than to give them the kind of orderly form I seem to be able best to achieve on paper.

2. I wholly approve the basic purposes of the Center. The problem, as I see it, is the role of the Fellows in the operation of the Center. How should they best spend their time? Should they do research? If so, of what type? How much of their program should be planned for them and how much should they be relied upon to develop their own programs?

3. Before answering these questions, I should like to point out a few things about the Fellows. First of all, they are bureaucrats. They are not scholars and they did not choose scholarship as a profession. They are, or should be, intellectuals who regard objectivity, knowledge, thought and careful analysis as essential tools of their profession. They are not, and probably should not be, themselves specialists or research analysts; they most often are, and probably should be, the consumers of research. If they do not already have, then it is the purpose of the Center to help them to acquire, broad perspectives and analytical capacities to enable them to utilize effectively the research of others. They are men who have come here primarily to learn, not primarily to add to the total of human knowledge.

4. Consequently, it is the training, and not the research, aspect of the Center's program which should be emphasized in connection with the Fellows. Instead of encouraging them to concentrate their efforts on one topic (it should be noted that such a topic, if it were to be properly researched within one academic year, would have to be a very narrowly-defined topic), they should be encouraged to spread their efforts over a variety of topics. A narrow study of one topic can be done almost anywhere. The peculiar thing about Harvard is not its library resources but its intellectual resources; it is more important for the Fellows to tap the latter than the former. Moreover, the peculiar thing about the

Memorandum for Mr. Bowie -- Page two -- January 28, 1959

Center is the variety of experience and backgrounds among its personnel;
this ought to be exploited by penetrating each other's thoughts on a wide
variety of topics, not on a few narrow ones.

5. With these considerations in mind, it would seem to me that the Fellows ought to be guided and regimented somewhat more than they have been. Instead of being encouraged to apply themselves to a particular research topic, they ought to be encouraged--even directed--toward a broader and busier program. At the moment, each one is, I believe, caught in a dilemma. His government is spending quite a bit of money on him and depriving itself of his services; he ought to justify his existence; this involves doing what is expected of him; what is expected is essentially what you establish as his program. It is not good enough to say to him--absorb the university, broaden your perspectives, produce some useful research, because producing research is in conflict with the other two. If you do one right, you miss out on the other.

6. If I were to set up my own program today--better yet, if I were able to go back to September and start over--I would give up the idea of producing any useful research report. One thing I have learned is that, while I possess a certain amount of wisdom, I have no monopoly on it, and there have been a lot of other people who have written books and articles on the subject I was interested in and who have written much better books and articles than I could. I would therefore divide my time consciously into roughly four equal parts: (a) absorbing the University, e.g., by attending lectures and seminars outside the Center, (b) reading on a wide variety of subjects related to international affairs, (c) mind-picking and mind-pricking within the Center and at its Seminars, and (d) writing on such topics as I felt some special interest in, either for the purpose of stimulating discussion or because I had developed some desire to pursue--not too deeply but largely for mind-clearing--some particular topic.

7. The latter two I have done, but it has been at the expense of a more industrious pursuit of my chosen topic. I now propose to narrow it, as I should have done in the first place, and to devote more time to other topics. Perhaps you might say that a confession of ignorance is what you were aiming to achieve and that if I have done enough work to arrive at such a point, it has indeed been useful. Yet, I feel that perhaps my colleagues and I would have spent our time more usefully if you had shown less confidence in us and treated us perhaps a bit more as students and not so much as independent scholars.

8. I do not mean to deprecate the intellectual qualities or the industry and curiosity of myself or of my colleagues. This is an exciting experience, and I am profiting a great deal from it. I do feel, however, that this experience would be more pleasant and profitable for all concerned if greater emphasis was placed upon a planned expansion of the Fellows' range of understanding.

# America and the Tragic Experience

by
Niles W. Bond

There can be little doubt that the American people tend to regard themselves as preternaturally endowed with the blessings of this world; as indeed they are. But before we accept our good fortune as the major premise of our national existence, it might be well to examine the question of whether one of the most notable of our blessings is entirely an unmixed one; and to ponder also on the fearfully fragile thing which that blessing has now become. This element of our heritage to which I refer is the lack of Tragic Experience in our history as a nation.

This is not to say that the thread of tragedy has not been woven into the fabric of our history; but it is to say that in the overall pattern of the ever-growing tapestry which is the chronicle of our national life it is difficult to discern any major tragic motif. As we stand back and view this tapestry from a distance, we see a pattern of consistent success and surging progress. And what are the predominating elements of this auspicious pattern? First, of course, there is the rare good fortune of our geographical position and the wealth of our natural resources--the foundation in which the entire pattern is rooted. But also, and of equal importance, there is the dynamic factor of the enterprise, the courage, and the imagination of the many generations of Americans, their stock continuously enriched and strengthened by infusions of foreign blood,

tinuously enriched and strengthened by influences of foreign blood, imagination of the many generations of Americans, their stock company, the dhammo factor of the enterprises, the courage, and the the entire pattern is rooted, but also, and of equal importance, tion and the wealth of our natural resources—the foundation in which of course, there is the rare good fortune of our geographical best- are the preponderating elements of this remarkable pattern? If so, see a pattern of constant success and ongoing progress. And what motif? As we stand back and view this tabernacle from a distance, we of our national life it is difficult to discern and major tragic overall pattern of the ever-growing tabernacle which is the chronicle woven into the fabric of our history; but it is to say that in the

This is not to say that the lines of tragedy has not been bereavement in our history as a nation.

element of our heritage to which I refer as the key of Tragic Ex- tournily tristful filing which that pleasing has now become. This our pleasure is entirely an unmixed one; and to bonder so on the well to examine the question of whether one of the most notable of fortune as the majorbreve of our national existence, it might be of this world? as indeed they are. But before we accept our good to regard themselves as preeminently endowed with the blessing There can be little doubt that the American people tend

Wiles W. Bond

who toiled to forge a great industrial democracy out of a vast wil-
derness; and who, in times of peril, fought to defend what they had
built. This then, in broad outline, is the majestic pattern of
our success as a nation.

As we approach the tapestry more closely, we do indeed
begin to see that, within the broad pattern, the tragic thread is
woven richly into the details of our history. We see the lurking
specter of tragedy which haunted the early settlers as they strove
to carve a foothold out of the inhospitable wilds of a new and mys-
terious continent. We see the grim despondency of Valley Forge, when
the fate of the Revolution hung precariously in the balance. We see
the unspeakable tragedy of a nation divided against itself in the
bitterness of Civil War--a tragedy looming large enough almost to
alter the broad pattern of our national success, and surely one
which constitutes our closest approach to the true Tragic Experience.
We see the tragedy and waste of other wars, the somber side of the
succession of victories of American arms through the years. And we
see also another kind of tragedy--the tragedy of witch-hunts, past
and present, of religious bigotry, of racial intolerance--like dark
stains on the bright tapestry of our history.

But the deeper meaning of tragedy must be sought in the
situation in which hardship and sacrifice, however searing and how-
ever nobly borne, end in failure rather than success. And in this
deeper meaning we have known tragedy scarcely at all.

And so, despite its elements of tragedy, the broad pattern
of our national existence depicts for all to see one of the great
success stories of modern history.

of our national existence depends for all to see one of the great
deeber meaning we have known tragedy understood at all.

ever natively borne, and in lifetime rather than success. And in this
situation in which verdant and sacrifice, however bearing and pow-
but the deeper meaning of tragedy must be sought in the
exists on the bright tabernary of our history.

and present, of religious dignity, of racial intolerance--like dark
see also another kind of tragedy--the tragedy of witch-hunts, best
succession of victories of American arms through the years. And we
see the tragedy and waste of other wars, the somber side of the
which constitutes our closest approach to the true traffic experience,
after the proud pattern of our national success, and surely one
bitterness of Civil War--a tragedy looking far more almost to
the unabsentable tragedy of a nation divided against itself in the
time of the Revolution just precisely in the balance. We see
terrestrial continent. We see the great debohency of Valley Forge, when
to curve a manifold out of the inunaptiable winds of a new and ma-
specter of tragedy which pumped the early settlers as they arose
woven rapidly into the details of our history. We see the luring
begin to see that, within the proud pattern, the tragic trend is
we approach the tabernary more closely, we do find
our success as a nation.

built. This then, in proud outline, is the majestic pattern of
democracy; and who, in times of beril, taught to defend what they had
who toffed to forge a great industrial democracy out of a vast will-

S

For all to see! And how does this pattern of success
appear to the rest of the world? Is it regarded by others as a
source of strength or a proof of virtue? Or is it considered an
unearned and undeserved dividend of the accidents of history? Are
we admired for it or is it a cause of envy and even hatred to others
who may regard themselves as less fortunate?

To some extent it is all of these things. But, wherever
the balance may lie, in an important sense it can be regarded as a
negative element in our relations with the rest of the world.

While we can be justly thankful for a history which has
been characterized by success and which has so far been remarkably
free from national disaster, we should not make the mistake of as-
suming that we are universally admired, even by our friends, for the
fact that we have been spared the Tragic Experience. It is a com-
monly held view in some parts of the world that what is often regarded
as our political immaturity as a people is a direct consequence of
the fact that we have never undergone the sobering and humiliating
experience of major defeat and enemy occupation, or even of major
destruction in war. It is part of this view that true wisdom can
come only through severe national adversity, and that until we have
known such adversity first-hand, we must continue to be regarded as
frivolous amateurs in the art of nationhood. It is also a part of
this view that, since our genius as a people has lain in improving
the material conditions of life, we can have no serious knowledge
or understanding of anything else, and that only through defeat and
destruction can we be taught that the enhancement of these material
conditions can never be an adequate end in itself.

conditions can never be an adequate and in itself.

destruction can be taught that the announcement of these material
or understanding of understanding else, and that only through defeat and
the material conditions of life, we can have no serious knowledge
that we have, since our being as a being has been in improving
radiophone equipment in the air and of nationwide. If it is also a part of
know and understand first-hand, we must continue to be regarded as
come only through severe national advantage, and that until we have
destruction in war. If it be part of this view that time wisdom can
experience of motor defeat and enemy occupation, or even of motor
the fact that we have never undergone the opening and毋樂ing
as our boffins' immunity as a being is a direct consequence of
which held view in some parte of the world that what it often regarded
that we have been abated the Traffic Experience. If it is a com-
cluding that we are universally abated, even by our friends, for the
free from national disaster, we should not make the mistake of as-

been characterized by success and which has so far been remarkably
negative element in our relations with the rest of the world.

To some extent it is all of these things, but wherever
who may regard themselves as less fortunate?

we abated for it on the cause of war and even further to others
measured and unobserved dividend of the accident of victory? The
source of strength or a blow of virtue? Or if it considered an
abnormal to the rest of the world? Is it regarded by others as a

for all to see! And how does this pattern of success

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Accepting the existence of this attitude as a fact of con-
temporary life, there are a number of observations which one might
make about it. In the first place, it can be said that there have
been occasions in recent history, notably during the two World Wars,
when other free nations have owed their very survival to our produc-
tive capacity and to the fact that our geographical isolation and
wealth of resources have made possible the full and unhampered utili-
zation of that capacity to turn the tide of war in their, and our,
favor. And this circumstance has not passed unrecognized and unap-
preciated by those who have been the beneficiaries. It is also
possible to question the universal validity of the thesis that poli-
tical wisdom is the inevitable fruit of national adversity. If this
were in fact a categorical truth, then we could expect certain nations
of Western Europe, for example, which have known the tread of hostile
armies over a period of two thousand years, to be paramount exem-
plars of political wisdom and statesmanship. This, we know, is not
always the case. In our own country, this thesis would seem to sug-
gest that the South, as the only part of the United States which has
known military defeat and enemy occupation, should be richer in the
qualities of wisdom and maturity than the rest of the country. If
this is true it is not overwhelmingly apparent from the record of
contemporary Southern statesmanship. It could be observed, too, that
a good deal of what appears in the guise of contempt for our lack
of tragic wisdom is probably little more than simple envy on the part
of those less richly blessed by geography and history.

of those fees strongly pleased by geographical and historical
of tragic wisdom is properly little more than simple enough on the part
of a good deal of what abates in the sense of consent for our lack
consequently southern statesmanship. It could be operated too, that
this is true if it is not overwhelmingly inherent from the record of
differences of wisdom and maturity from the rest of the country. It
knows sufficiently defeat and enemy occupation, should be richer in fine
beat that the South, as the only part of the United States which has
always the case. In our own country, this theme would seem to ask-
plane of political wisdom and statesmanship. This, we know, is not
armies over a period of two thousand years, to be paramount exem-
of Western Europe, for example, which have known the flux of battle
were in fact a categorical truth, then we could expect certain nations
to fall to the inevitable fruit of national advantage. It this
possible to question the universality of the theme that both-
prejudiced by those who have seen the beneficiaries. If it is also
favor. And this circumstance has not based unrecognized and unsub-
sistence of that capacity to turn the tide of war in their, and our,
warship of reason have made possible the final and unnumbered unfit-
time capacity and to the fact that our geographical isolation and
when other free nations have owed their early survival to our broad-
been occasions in recent history, notably during the two World Wars,
make a point it. In the first place, it can be said that there have
temporarily title, there are a number of operations which one might
accepting the existence of this attitude as a fact of con-

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5

All of these things and more can be said, truthfully I believe, without negating the fact that the successful and essentially non-tragic character of our history is in certain contexts a cross which we must bear. Whatever the objective truth of the matter may be, the fact would seem to remain that it constitutes a minus factor in the image of the United States which many others in the world carry with them.

But these is yet another and more important aspect of the problem which warrants comment, and that is the effect of the American experience on the attitudes of the American people toward our relations with the rest of the world. In making such comments one must accept the risks inherent in generalizing on a proposition which is not easily susceptible to proof one way or the other, and to which there are certainly many exceptions. It would seem apparent, however, that the traditionally self-sufficient position of the American nation during the first 175 years of its existence--situated begind the protective barriers of vast oceans to the East and West and with weak or friendly neighbors to the North and South, dependent on no outside source for the great majority of its essential needs, and isolated by the nature of its origins from the main stream of European history--was not one which was conducive to a lively appreciation of that interdependence which constitutes the basic assumption of the foreign policy process. Nor was the success of America in solving the problems of its own existence and development likely to make it easy for the American people to accept the trying fact that there were major problems in the field of our relations with other countries

were major problems in the field of our relations with other countries
as easy for the American people to accept the thinking that there
the problems of its own existence and development likely to make it
foreign policy process. Nor was the success of America in solving
that interdependence which constitutes the basic assumption of the
policy---was not one which was conducive to a lively appreciation of
fated by the nature of its origins from the main stream of European
side source for the great majority of its essential needs, and in-
or friendly neighbors to the North and South, dependent on no out-
fective barriers of vast dimensions to the East and West and with weak
during the first 152 years of its existence---attested behind the bro-
that the traditionally self-sufficient nation of the American nation
there are certainly many exceptions. It would seem inherent, however,
that not easily susceptible to break one way or the other, and to which
must accept the risks inherent in generalizing on a proposition which
relates with the rest of the world. In making such comments one
can experience on the attitudes of the American people toward our
problem which warrants comment, and that is the effect of the Amer-
but these is yet another and more important aspect of the
with them.

in the image of the United States which many others in the world carry
be, the fact would seem to remain that it constitutes a mine factor
which we must bear. Whatever the objective truth of the matter may
non-tragic character of our history is in certain contexts a cross
believe, without negating the fact that the successful and essentially
VII of these things and more can be said, truthfully I

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6

which it was beyond our capacity to resolve. From this it follows
almost inevitably that the limitations on our freedom of action which
are inherent in the nature of foreign policy tend to chafe and irri-
tate, and that we find it difficult to reconcile ourselves to cer-
tain fundamental and unavoidable truths about what can and what cannot
be accomplished through the instrument of foreign policy. At the
risk of laboring the obvious, it may be well to take a moment to
examine some of these simple truths.

To begin with, politics has been defined as "the art of
the possible," a definition which is eminently applicable to the
conduct of foreign policy, which is itself, of course, a form of
politics. If we accept this definition, we see that the area of
that which is possible is delimited primarily by the circumstance
that the external world with which American foreign policy must deal
is in fact external to the United States, not only geographically
but jurisdictionally as well. In dealing with this external world
we cannot order or command that things be done. We must instead
propose or request, using in place of the sanction of law the weight
of moral authority or traditional friendship, the incentive of re-
ciprocal advantage, or perhaps even the implied threat of consequential
action or inaction. But in the interplay of relations between states,
we are not only constantly exerting our influence in one direction
or another and for one end or another; we are also continuously the
object of influences and pressures brought to bear upon us by other
nations in the pursuit of their own foreign policy objectives.
There are some, it would appear, who would have us refuse to countenance

There are some, it would appear, who would have us refuse to concur in nations in the demand of their own foreign policy objectives.

object of influence and pressure brought to bear upon us by other or another and for one end or another: we are also continuously the we are not only consistently exerting our influence in one direction or in one direction. But in the intensity of relations between states, or between even the implied current of confidential or moral authority or traditional friendship, the incentive of re-proceed or reëquire, using in place of the sanction of law the weight we cannot order or command that things be done. We must instead put unreasonably as well. In dealing with this external world is in fact *extreme* to the United States, not only biographically that the external world with which American foreign policy must deal that which its belligerent primarily by the circumstance of war. If we accept this definition, we see that the area of combat of foreign policy, which is itself, of course, a form of the belligerent "a definition which is entirely applicable to the To begin with, belligerent has been defined as "the sort of examine some of these simple truths.

risk of favoring the opinions, if we may be well to take a moment to be accomplished through the instrument of foreign policy." At the far fundamental and unavoidable truth about what can and what cannot be done, and that we find it difficult to reconcile ourselves to certain inherent in the nature of foreign policy found to operate and interest almost inevitably that the limitations on our freedom of action which which it was beyond our capacity to realize." From this it follows

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non-compliance with our own desires on the part of other nations, while at the same time stoutly resisting the efforts of those same nations to achieve accommodation on our part to their wishes. But this, as we should all be aware, is not the way life is lived in the international community. The conduct of foreign relations is a continuing process of give and take, in which each nation must make concessions to the desires and needs of others in order to obtain concessions to its own desires and needs, with each striving to ensure that its own balance sheet is at least kept "in the black" in terms of its own essential interests. It is from this process of give and take that there must come the balance which gives to the international community whatever continuity and stability it possesses. And it is to this process that we as a nation must learn to accommodate ourselves more easily.

Closely related to our attitudes toward foreign policy, and also strongly conditioned by the character of our national past, are our attitudes toward the vital issue of war and peace, an issue which has never been more fearsome or all-engulfing in its ramifications. The splendid record of military success in every major war in which we have been engaged has tended to create in us a disbelief in the possibility of defeat, let alone destruction (an attitude which can provide a particularly comforting refuge from reality at a time when the consequences of a major nuclear war are too frightful for the mind to contemplate). This disbelief is buttressed by a moralistic faith that Right will in the end prevail, as it always has (for us at least) in the past. We do not, in other words, have in our national past that Tragic Experience the recollection of which

Our national diet that Tragic Experience the recollection of which (for us at least) in the past. We do not, in other words, have in mind that right will in the end prevail, as it should have wind to complete). The disappointment is expressed by a more definite. the consciousness of a major nuclear war are too frightful for the probability of defeat, let alone destruction (an attitude which can have been engrossed by focused to create in us a disappointment in the The abysmal record of military success in every major war in which has never been morelearsome or lifelooking in its ramifications. our attitudes toward the vital issue of war and peace, an issue which are strongly conditioned by the character of our national diet, are closely related to our attitudes toward foreign policy, and modulate ourselves more easily.

And it is to this process that we as a nation must learn to accommodate community, whatever continuity and stability it possesses, and take that there must come the balance which gives to the interest of its own essential interests. It is from this process of giving that its own balance sheet is at least kept "in the black" in terms of the desire and needs of others in order to obtain consistent process of giving and take, in which each nation must make consistent international community. The conduct of foreign relations is a conduct, as we should all be aware, it is not the way title is lived in the nations to achieve accommodation on our part to their wishes. But while at the same time adequately reserving the effort of those same non-compliance with our own desires on the part of other nations,

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8

would arm us with the awareness of present danger. And without such
awareness we are already half-disarmed.

The consequences of this failure to apprehend the danger
which confronts us can be serious indeed, for we are not now faced
merely with the alternatives of victory or defeat. The grim choice
now--it cannot be said too many times--is survival or destruction.
Recognition of this harsh fact does not mean that we should succumb
to war hysteria or give way to the hopelessness of defeatism. The
injunction upon us must be rather to comprehend the character and
magnitude of the threat and to think through its implications in
terms of the imperatives which it imposes upon our own conduct, un-
palatable though these may be to the advocates of "business as usual."
Specifically, and above all, we must not let ourselves be diverted
from the exacting task of creating and maintaining an invulnerable
retaliatory capacity as the most effective deterrent to the launching
of a major war by our adversary. But at the same time we must provide
ourselves also with the graduated capability of responding quickly
and effectively to lesser and more localized attacks around the peri-
phery of the free world, lest each such attack confront us with the
paralyzing dilemma of whether to capitulate or to make it the pretext
for unleashing the holocaust of unlimited nuclear war.

It is characteristic of the American people that we have
never been able to bring ourselves to prepare for war in times of
peace, a characteristic from whose consequences we have been saved
time and again by our superior productive capacity and our geographic
immunity from attack. But at the present juncture of history we must

immunity from attack, but at the present juncture of history we must
have time and again do our action productive capacity and our geographic
benefit, a characteristic from whose consequences we have been saved
never been able to print ourselves to prepare for war in times of

If it is characteristic of the American people that we have
for unseating the敌人 of unlimited war, basing differences of whether to cabilate on to make it the pretex
broadly of the free world, heat each and attack confront us with the
and effectively to lesser and more focalised attacks around the periy-
onelaiæ also with the brazened casuistry of rebelling ducyry
of a major war by our adversely. But at the same time we must provide
retaliatory capacity as the most effective deterrent to the launching
from the exacting task of creating and maintaining an invincible
specifically, and prove all, we must not let onnelaiæ be diverted
breakable though these may be to the advocates of "business as usual."
forms of the imperative which it implies upon our own conduct, un-
magnitude of the threat and to think through its implications in
injunction upon us must be further to comprehend the character and
to war matter or give way to the

The recognition of this past fact does not mean that we should succumb
now--it cannot be said too many times--its arrival or decimation,
merely with the alternatives of victory or defeat. The term choice
which confronts us can be serious indeed, for we are not now faced
The consequences of this failure to abdicate the gains
awareness we are already well-known.
would am I with the awareness of present danger. And without end

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rise above this encumbrance of the past and delay no longer in ac-
cording primacy to the complex intellectual and material demands of
our security. For we must realize that the factors which have ensured
the success of our war efforts in the past are no longer a guarantee
for the future, and that reliance on such factors can spell disaster.

It would indeed be the cruelest irony of our history if
the good fortune of our lack of Tragic Experience should now turn
upon us to sap the strength and undermine the determination needed
to provide ourselves with the means of fending off the ultimate Tragic
Experience, in whose shadow Man's mastery over matter has condemned
us all to dwell.

The answer to our dilemma is obviously not to seek disaster,
as an adolescent might seek sexual experience, for the sake of "coming
of age" as a nation. On the contrary, we should do all in our power
to avoid disaster and to strengthen our defenses against the Tragic
Experience. But in so doing we should strive to strip away from our
national character the remnants of self-righteous smugness which have
too often led us to believe that we are safe because we are virtuous,
and that because we have come through history so far unscathed we
have nothing to fear from the future. For unless we can do this we
may hasten the day when the balance of history will be redressed against
us in one final violent day of reckoning.

we in one final act of reckoning,
may happen the day when the balance of history will be rebalanced against
us all to dwell.

Experience, in whose shadow we have a maturity over matter has condensed
to provide ourselves with the means of lending all the ultimate Tragic
upon us to ask the strength and underlie the determination needed
the good fortune of our task of Tragic Experience should now turn
it would indeed be the clearest front of our history if
for the future, and that reliance on such factors can shell disaster.
the success of our war efforts in the past are no longer a guarantee
our security. For we must realize that the factors which have enabled
combining brimstone to the complex intellectual and material demands of
free speech this assurance of the past and delay no longer in so-

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