TELCONE

Joe Alsop/Kissinger

9:20 a.m. - 5/11/73

K: Hello.

A: Hello, Henry.

K: Joe, how are you?

A: Well, I'm very well. How was your trip?

K: It was very interesting.

A: Well, I judged that you would have an announcement about this Watergate horrer.

K: Oh, come. You know don't you fall for the stupidities of the press.

A: Well, I don't know. I didn't know they'd said that.

K: It's all set and the only reason we haven't had an announcement is because I wanted to get the President some publicity and therefore we are making it tomorrow.

A: Uh, huh. You won't have any announcement yourself. The whole city is talking about it.

K: About what?

A: Your elevation.

K: I doubt it seriously.

A: I pray for it. If the President really wants to put a new face on his administration he's already gone very far but that would be the obvious thing to do and I know it's been recommended.

K: Well, but

A: And I just pray for it but I'm not going to write about it so there you are.

K: I do not want any more Alsopian articles.

A: No, I knew that and that's why I'm not even going to write about it until it's been announced. The other thing Henry, is that Nancy, the sweet thing, said that she'd love to come to lunch on Sunday.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
Dated NARAD, DTD 6/2/94

2

K: You're not free tonight which would be the best for me.

A: Tonight no, we have very dull friends of Susan Mary's dining with us and gee, I'd love to but I just can't. I'd be sort of ruthless to leave them.

K: Yeh.

A: And they're old, old friends and been very nice to me and I'm bored stiff by them.

K: I'll almost certainly do it - be able to do it. Let me call you on - later in the day. I've literally just come into the office.

A: Don't bother to call unless you can't come and we'll expect you one or 1:15. We'll just plan and do the best we can.

K: Good.

A: Good, good. And I'll see you on Sunday.

K: Marvelous.

A: Good. Good.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012858

D/AH NARA Dts 6/2/84

TELCONE

Amb. Von Staden/Kissinger

12:06 p.m. - 5/11/73

K: Hello.

VS: Good morning, Dr. Kissinger.

K: How are you?

VS: I hate to call you on a day like this. I want to ask you if there's a
chance to see you before Mr. Brezhnev is coming to Bonn.

K: Sure. Do you have anything particular to discuss?

VS: Well, my question would be whether there are any things you would
like to tell us before Brezhnev comes?

K: Right, I will be glad to do that and let's do it Monday or Tuesday.

VS: Wonderful, would your secretary be in touch?

K: Yes, we did have a discussion; we did very strongly support your
case on the envialability being connected with force.

VS: Oh, thank you.

K: But they did not agree. Now I don't want this all over Bonn. This is
only for the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister. Now secondly, as
long as I got you on the phone, we really take violent objection to the
press briefings that are coming out of the Chancellor's office. The
only thing we agreed on is not to use the word Atlantic Charter - not
to drop the idea - and this constant stuff which we read in *Der Spiegel*
which is now in *Time* and *Newsweek*, that you scored a great victory
over us with this communique, we have every intention of pushing
through with this policy and you should be under no illusions about it.

VS: Yeh. It is very unfortunate but I haven't yet seen the news - the two
articles you just mentioned.

K: Well, there's a *Spiegel* article about how the entourage of the
Chancellor was delighted that they had outmaneuvered us and told us
where we got off and how - and that's the same thing again in either
*Newsweek* or *Time*. I just don't want Bonn to be under any illusion
that we are going full speed ahead. You'll have to fight us publicly,
you can't fight us behind our backs if you want to oppose us.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.12958
Dated NARA Dye 6/2/73

2

VS: Yeh, but the only article I have seen was the one by Witner (?) in the _New York Times_.

K: But the same thing is in _Der Spiegel_ and the same thing is in _Time_ or _Newsweek_. I think it's in _Newsweek_. So it can't be an accident.

VS: You are certainly right, I have to see those. As far as the _New York Times_ story is concerned. . .

K: It is not possible - I'm going to be very honest with you - it is not acceptable to us to have public attacks made on us and then we receive private assurances and we are not eager to be praised privately and to be attacked publicly.

VS: Let me please have a look into these articles. It's very hard to make comment now as I haven't seen them.

K: I'm just leafing through _Newsweek_ - maybe it's in _Time_.

VS: Well, I will see.

K: But it's in either _Time_ or _Newsweek_ and you will see that it quotes extensively from unnamed German sources.

VS: Well, this was I thought in Witner's article in the _New York Times_ on which General Scowcroft called me. I saw that these particular things were not attributed to ______ but it said friends or opinions here, so I had the impression that was from other sources but I can't be sure.

VS: Well, Mr. Von Staben, we're both experienced men and we both know how these things happen and when a pattern develops there is a tendency then where you have to assume that somebody is putting out the word and well, I saw it in the international edition of _Newsweek_ so maybe they have a different version than in the American one.

VS: I will get this immediately.

K: Look at it in the - well the major point that I read in the idea - that I read in _Newsweek_ was that the Germans broke our idea of linking economic and defensive views which we have never really put forward as a formally structured one and stressed the European regionalism

DCC1S1S1CTED
 Authority EO12858
 D. J. H. SARA D34 6/2/84

3

and - well the major thing, leaving aside now - that we want to get
across is - we are intending to pursue this course and we want to
do it in the closest consultation and cooperation with Bonn. And we
don't consider anything that happened during the Chancellor's visit
as in any way deflecting us from that course.

VS: The course outlined. . .

K: In my speech and in the President's message. So we should understand each other on that point. Now we are willing to do it on the most cooperative basis possible and it's understood that we have every interest in doing it in the close consultation with Bonn all the more so as it seems to us to be in Bonn's interest to get arrangements which would keep our forces there for a rather extensive period of time.

VS: May I ask you one question, this is in the main, the main point does it relate to the idea of the Charter or to the substance of the idea.

K: Well, the Charter, whether we call it an Atlantic Charter, or not, we don't care about that. We want to emerge after the President's visit with a set of guiding principles that relate to various fields to each other. Whether we call it a Charter or not, that's a matter of indifference to us. But we are maintaining the idea, we don't insist on every word in it.

VS: Yeah.

K: But above all, we shouldn't leak triumph against each other in the press. That concerns us more than the--because we are going to have extensive confidential and very close contacts with each other. We are certainly not going to spring anything on you without the closest consultation. But we can discuss all of that when we meet. I will give you a rather full account of the President's conversation.

VS: Thank you so much, and --

K: I'll see you on Monday.

VS: Thank you, bye.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated NARA Dye 6/2/04

TelCon
John Oakes/Mr. Kissinger

12:56 pm, May 11, 1973

K: Hello.

O: Hello, Henry.

K: John?

O: Yes, hi.

K: I tried to get you when you were in Washington, did you ever get my message.

O: Oh, I did but so late that it didn't take. I called back, of course, when I got the message but it was already--I remember what happened, I called back and didn't get any answer and I assumed that the office was closed, and it turned out when I spoke to Mr. Campbell the next morning, cause I called him the following morning, he said that he'd been there all the time and I--evidently my telephone call just hadn't gone thru.

K: What a pity.

O: I should say I was in touch with your office about 20 times the previous couple of days--

K: You are kidding.

O: I don't mean twenty times, but I called--

K: More than once.

O: Oh, sure, early in the week, oh yes, oh sure.

K: Well we are having massive pressure--we've had this breakdown before with people calling five or six times and I'm told once at the last minute.

O: Oh yes, I don't remember exactly, but I called two or three days as a matter of fact, cause I was there for about 3 or 4 days. In fact, I even stayed over a day longer than I intended on the possibility that I might be able to--

K: The idiots, they are total idiots. There's just no chance of my not seeing you. You know, if you gave me a three hour period, I might be able to do it, but if you give me a three day period, there is just no chance that I wouldn't see you.

DECEMBER 9, 1973

DAILY NEWSPAPER

2

O: Oh, we've been in touch, as a matter of fact over several days. Don't think that I thought you were trying to--

K: No, no, I had other things to do, but--

O: I'm sorry, I really am sorry about that because--

K: No, no, I'm complaining about something else.

O: Because actually I intended to stay in Washington only a day or so last week, that ASME thing was so-- I didn't expect to stay, but I stayed over an extra day, so, primarily in the hopes that I may get a chance to see you, but--

K: But I'm going to raise hell as soon as I get off this phone.

O: Now, are you calling about our editorial this morning.

K: What I called about is that article in the TIMES on the editorial page. Now I would like to--couldn't we have an arrangement that if you write about something that is a statement of facts you check with my office.

O: Yes, I--

K: I didn't talk for more than one minute with the press at the airport as I was walking by, it was not a considered statement. The problem was-- I didn't want to say anything particularly newsworthy because I wanted to wait until I had a chance to report to the President. The meeting went extremely well as I said at the airport in London.

O: Yes, and we took that into--

K: There is no unsettled issue.

O: By the way, Henry, did the editorial that you have, have the quote from you that what you said was extremely satisfactory.

K: No.

O: Ah, this was revised, as soon as we got the story that said extremely satisfactory, we did some revision of it and I'm going to--

K: Because actually there was no tough bargaining, you know when you deal with the Russians there always is murderous bargaining, but there was nothing that was in anyway unusual.

O: I see.

DECLASSIFIED

Author's E01288

Dated 6/2/84

3

K: And, a--

O: Our interpretation was obviously a very different, but I want you ;to
know as soon as we got word about the extremely satisfactory--

K: What I'm trying to say, this is not a debatable issue. You can argue
about agreements, s but this is a case that I wanted to do something
for the people at airport without saying anything that I wanted to leave--
I mean your speculation that we wanted to announce things from the
White House is correct, but that was also the Russian desire.

O: Um hum, and the--

K: For your information, there is no hitch whatsoever that the summit
is exactly on schedule.

O: And the matter of the date and all that is purely a matter of--

K: There is no ;hitch. The date is agreed upon. The only thing that
remains to be done is to announce it.

O: Well the validity of the statement--

K: Well, it wasn't a statement, I was sort of walking along--

O: Well, I'm afraid that threw us off some and--

K: No, no, based upon what Hedricks misreported, it was a plausible
editorial. I just wondered whether we couldn't have an understanding,
if it's factual.

O: Well I thought yesterday of calling your office. I didn't think you were
back. When did you get back.

K: No, I wasn't back until ;midnight.

O: I thought of calling you yesterda, this is really so, but then I thought
you were probably not back.

K: It's npt a worldshaking thing because within a matter of days it will be
obvious that there is no hang up.

O: Well I'll tell you this, I am going to take you up, you have made--been
nice enough to make this suggestion before, I hate like hell to impose
on you at times, but on a thing like this I think that really--my thought
yesterday was to call your office.

4

K: Well, if you had talked to my deputy, he could have straightened you out.

O: Would your deputy have been able to straighten me out on this.

K: Yes, because the -- this is not subject to ambiguity.

O: I discussed with one of my colleagues this question, and I thought we really ought to call the State Department.

K: State wouldn't have known.

O: They wouldn't know a damn thing about it, they just wouldn't know. And I decided we were right and I didn't call State, then I thought maybe I should call your office but I assumed you weren't there.

K: At any rate, Johnny, regarding the other matter, you have a standing invitation to come down here for lunch and just call my office and pick the date and we'll make it.

O: That's very nice, I will, but believe me I made the effort--

K: It's not a damaging editorial, it's just wrong.

O: On this one, yes. Well I appreciate your calling and telling me that and I will--now I'm going to send you however, IUR revised editorial which -- it was revised last night, and you obviously don't have the revision.

K: I'll ask the press office to get it.

O: To get the last edition, the page that's marked "L", late city, you have an earlier one.

K: Good, John.

O: All right, I appreciate your calling me.

K: Good, bye.

DECEMBER 6/29/88

Authority: EO 12958

DISTRIBUTION: DTD 6/29/88

TELCONE

Walter Stoessel/Mr. Kissinger

2:30 pm, May 11, 1973

K: Hello, how are you?

S: Hi, welcome back.

K: Thank you.

S: Henry, I'm going off to this European Community thing.

K: When?

S: Tomorrow night. And I make my presentation to Sohm's (?) Monday morning. I'll be seeing Rumsfeld --

K: Good. I ought to see you.

S: Well, that's what I thought. I'd like to get --

K: Do you want to come in at 9:00 tomorrow for half an hour?

S: Sure.

K: Good. See you at 9:00.

S: Okay. Good.

K: Bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012858

D:HT NARA DRE 6/20/91

TELCORN

Tom Jarriel/Mr. Kissinger

3:20 p. m., May 11, 1973

K: Hello, Tom, how are you?

J: Fine, sir, how are you doing?

K: Okay.

J: Listen, a couple of newsmen here in Washington at the initiative of the Soviet Government were going to Moscow to do some preliminary background feature material on some of their officials. And everything was cleared for them -- they had visas and transportation and hotels all arranged and the Embassy turned around and cancelled the whole thing; said it's all off.

K: When?

J: Yesterday. And the news people tried to find out why and the only answer they could get from the Embassy was that it was too delicate to discuss. It, of course, raises the question of why they did and exactly howfar it may reach in terms of the summit meeting.

K: Look, this is the first I hear of this.

J: Okay. Well, it was Charles Bartlett and Nancy Dickerson who had made the arrangements.

K: Oh, yeah. Well, I have never heard of this particular event. All I can tell you is that everything I went to Moscow for has been accomplished. This will be apparent very quickly. But reading into what I said at the airport -- You know, the --

J: Right. On e additional conversation here.

K: The way it happened was I was walking along a group of newsmen and I just wanted to convey to them that I was going to report to the President first before we made any announcement.

J: I see.

K: There was no hitch. There was an extraordinary reception. I mean, I'm the first Westerner who's ever been in the Politburo hunting . . .

J: Right.

Tom Jarriel/Mr. Kissinger

3:20 p. m., May 11, 1973

- 2 -

K: Brezhnev spent 90% of his waking hours with me. There was no hang up on substance, on date, on procedures --

J: Okay. The date then is fairly satisfied, it's just a matter of announcing it. This was the point --

K: Exactly.

J: . . we were kicking around.

K: Look, I can't be more specific but you will see very soon that there's nothing to it.

J: Okay. Well, this --

I mean,

K: Really. You'd look silly if you gave the slightest implication that there's trouble about the summit date.

J: Well, that's why I called.

K: . . . virtually within a very short period of time that will be resolved. I don't want you to use that.

J: No, no; I'm trying to decide if this --

K: In fact, there's nothing left to resolve except to announce it.

J: Right. Okay. Their action with them seemed very, very strange and also I was having lunch with a fellow from the Embassy today and he seemed to think -- he didn't know anything but he seemed to think that the Watergate with the hearings on the Hill and so forth might be causing some uncertainty over when to come out and set a date. But again he didn't know anything.

K: Total nonsense.

J: Yeah, good. All right. I surely thank you very much.

K: I don't say it's nonsense that he believes that, I'm telling you that that issue will be resolved in a very brief period. I mean, it is resolved. I mean, any uncertainty in your mind --

J: Right.

K: Will disappear within a very brief period of time.

TELCORN

Murray Marder/Mr. Kissinger

4:17 p.m., May 11, 1973

M: Hello, Henry. How are you?

K: Murray, how are you?

M: You must be worn out, are you?

K: No, I'm all right.

M: Henry, a couple of things here if you could help for guidance. Some of the recurring questions, as you know. The reports are coming back again, as I'm sure you found as soon as you got back to town with increased vigor even today, of are you going to stay?

K: Am I going to stay?

M: Yes.

K: I haven't even seen the reports but I'm not aware of anything like that.

M: I didn't know if there's anything to it at all.

K: You know, I just don't know what changes the President may be planning in the future. I'm not saying that I know of any such changes but just so that I don't look -- I have no reason to think that and I have even no desire for it to happen.

M: This apparently has recurred as a result of whatever the Connally announcement ... which was not terribly clear anyhow but I believe that's what caused this to recur. Actually last night there were some very strong reports even coming from the Hill of people who claimed they knew this was definitely on and --

K: Well, as I know, Murray, is that since coming back the only thing I've discussed with the President is the planning for the summit and my report on my trip to Moscow and London.

M: Um-humm. And just for guidance so we're not pestering you from one day to another, which I wouldn't do anyhow as you know, all of these things of course are obviously up to the President's disposition. It has often been seen as a plausibility the one -- Could we rule it out as a conceivable thing? I would think not. I don't know what your current state of interest would be in that as a potential. I was just looking for some guidance so we would not be pestering you from time to time.

DECEMBER 12, 1973

HARRIS DEPT 6/20/73

HARRIS

Murray Marder/Mr. Kissinger

4:17 pm, May 11, 1973

2

K: Look, I think I had made it pretty plain that I was wanting to leave for a long time because I thought there should be a transition while the President was in office. Now I hadn't decided yet at what particular time. Now I frankly -- what duties this new situation imposes on one. I have no desires. If I followed my personal desires, I would leave at a reasonable time. But I think someday the newspapers must cover something other than Watergate. I'm not saying this critically but someday we're going to go back to governing.

M: I would hope so.

K: And when that point is reached, I think then I have to assess -- We really have a profound national problem now, the nature of which is not yet really determinable by anybody.

M: No, I acutally have held off writing about the --

K: I don't say this to be evasive. I have not thought -- You know, I've really not thought about my position. My major concern has been to hold the foreign policy together. I'm assuming you're not going to treat -- This is all off-the-record, you know.

M: Yes, this is for guidance so that we have some notion of --

K: I don't know what -- The President may be considering something like that.

M: Yeah, I understand the situation. I didn't know -- Well, actually we were trying to get some feeling from you as to whether anything in here can -- gave this permanent plausibility.

K: Certainly not imminent plausibility.

M: Right.

K: You know, Rogers is going away now for a three weeks.

M: Yes, and that frankly did seem to --

K: That alone makes it improbable that anything can happen.

M: That seemed -- The situation from a standpoint as you say of holding foreign policy together, this would seem to me an implausible moment but frankly there have been so many implausible things happening in town that --

DECEASED
Authority E012958
Dated NARA Ref. 6/2/01

Murray Marder/Mr. Kissinger

4:17 p.m., May 11, 1973

K: (laughter)

M: That nothing is ruled out at this point. Henry, if I can just for a minute here, one brief problem - I don't know if it's possible for you to clarify it. We apparently have a story coming out of the European end, which I haven't seen yet, it refers to the timing of the Brezhnev thing. I gather the point of it -- our story has not actually come in yet -- seems to be that the Russians want to hold off the timing of the --

K: Total nonsense, believe me.

Just let me finish --

M: Not to hold off the meeting but the report was to halt of the announcement of the timing of the meeting to avoid any complications that might arise in between to have the announcement come closer to the actual thing.

K: Look, this will be proved wrong so shortly that you really shouldn't go with it. I mean, go with it but it will make you look silly.

M: Right. There is no relationship of the --

K: Look, all I wanted to do at the Moscow airport I was walking along was to avoid having to say flatly that there would be an announcement and give me a chance to get back and report to the President.

M: This is what many of us thought was happening. That you obviously did not want to be announcing the meeting in Moscow.

K: No, because it would have to be a joint announcement. That is literally the only thing. And the Moscow correspondents have had nothing to write. After all, one thing I find interesting is that no one printed what is much more significant -- the announcement that Moscow in fact printed of my visit in which they said I saw Brezhnev, the talks were conducted in a friendly atmosphere and both sides commented about their constructiveness and comprehensiveness. Now these for Communists are very unusual words.

M: Yes.

K: And for your information, I put into the Communique Draft -- I said they were conducted in a friendly atmosphere and complete frankness and Gromyko took out the words "and complete frankness" because he said that's a code word for disagreement.

M: (laughter) That's right, it is of course.

Murray Marder/Mr. Kissinger

4:17 pm, May 11, 1973

4

K: So really I have not understood -- I didn't want to take away from that Joint Announcement. You must have the text of it.

M: I actually have not seen it but I'm sure we do. But I follow your point of course.

K: That is infinitely more significant than a chance remark I made at the airport.

M: The speculation of the report or whatever the hell it is that's coming is not in terms of any obstacle.

K: No, no; but on the other point, that's a question of fact, Murray. And for your own professional standing, I am urging you to stay away from that story because it would be proved wrong in a very brief period of time.

M: Right. Okay. The main thing I wanted to ask you here -- to my dismay I found myself obliged to do another explanation of Indochina, which I am sure you can not get into in a specific way at this point, but I wanted to ask if for guidance purposes you could possibly clarify one or two of these points.

Yeah, but can hurry up because I've got run.

M: Right. Yesterday Bill Sullivan in testifying said the problem was essentially Cambodia and related in its most flagrant violation of abstracts. The other side of the question that arose is whether this should be construed as something more basic than that as an attempt to try to make more precise many of the general -- deliberate ambiguities in the agreement in its broader context than simply Cambodia

K: The primary effort is to see whether the Articles that have caused the most trouble -- 15, 7 and 20 -- and from their point of view, 8 C -- can be put into some sort of a concrete operational status. But I have had somebody waiting, Murray, for 15 minutes and I must run.

M: Right, I appreciate it, Henry.

K: Good.

M: Many thanks, bye.

K: Bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01298
DATE NARADY 6/2/04
DATT

TELCOM

Fred Brisson/Mr. Kissinger

5:40 pm, May 11, 1973

B: Hi, Henry.

K: Fred, how are you?

B: I see you stopped off in my hometown.

K: Yeah, it's just about an hour.

B: And not for an ... Henry, are you going to be able to make it on Monday?

K: Almost certainly, yes.

B: Oh, that's wonderful. You free for lunch by any chance tomorrow?

K: Let me call you in the Morning.

B: All right, that will be fine. Are you going to Frank's by the way
tomorrow night?

K: I didn't know he was here.

B: No, he's not. He's coming in though. Maybe if you feel like it, we
can go there later if you want. He's having some kind of a cocktail
do, you know.

K: Right.

B: I'll tell you about it tomorrow. I think Agnew naturally is having him
and I think it must be connected with the son's birthday, you know.

K: Right.

B: So what happens on Wednesday? You going to be leaving for Paris?

K: Right.

B: You're not going to be able to make Stevens or Bradens naturally before --

K: I'm afraid not.

B: You're definitely going to go Thursday. That's good, I'm delighted.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Dated NARA Doc 6/2/74

TelCon
George Sherman/Mr. Kissinger

5: 40 pm, May 11, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Dr. Kissinger.

K: George, how are you.

S: Fine, how are you.

K: Okay.

S: Did you have a long trip.

K: Yes, but it was a good trip despite of what you guys are writing.

S: Yeah, I know that, ............ to have a story that because of technical difficulties, it says the trip is arranged.

K: Yes.

S: What I don't understand is why the delay in annou ncing it. I gather--

K: There's no delay, I always come back before we announce these things.
We've never yet announced a trip while I was abroad.

S: Right. But we didn't know--the interpretation of what you said in
Moscow--

K: But you know George, why don't you consider this. There was an
announcement published that day by the Soviets and us about my trip
It said I spent all my time with Brezhnev, that the meeting was extremely
friendly, it said both sides commented on the comprehensiveness and
constructiveness of the talks. Now that for a communist country is
amazing rhetoric. Nothing about frankness, you know the usual code
words for disagreement. Nobody picked that up, they picked a chance
SEP remark I made at the airport which I made only to avoid having to
say that there'd be a summit until I come back.

S: This is what I assumed, particularly after remarks last night in London
which I take it were meant to correct the impression the press gave your
remarks in--

K: Right.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0-2958
Dated NARRATE 6/2/73

2

S: And my question was is there some particular reason in terms of the protocol of the Pompidou visit, or--

K: None, there's no real delay.

at

S: You remember, we discussed San Clemente they were worried about security problem.

K: No, no, there's no problem. The announcement will be made imminently.

S: Uh huh. And is it June 25th.

K: I can't give you the date.

S: It's what we've been writing--the last week in June more or less.

K: More or less.

S: More or less?

K: I won't discuss it.

S: And is he going out to San Francisco, I mean--

K: Samantha sends her regards to you.

S: Who?

K: Samantha Eggar.

S: She angling for a trip aut to California?

K: No, she's in London right now.

S: Is she. Is he going out to California.

K: Bfe zhnev?

S: Yeah.

K: Probably.

S: Some one was saying that it would be easier--more control to go Houston Space Center for instance.

K: That much detail hasn't been worked out yet.

DECE 15 1969
Authority EO 12888
D. NARASIMHA RAO 6/20/69

S: Listen, Dr. Kissinger, I'm not sure you are aware that, this has nothing to do with your Moscow trip, the memorandum that the FBI sent out to the Ellsberg trial--are you aware that they say the surveillance of Halpern occurred between the spring of 1969 and June of 1971.

K: I haven't seen the memorandum.

S: Well the spring of 1969, Halpern was still working for you wasn't ~~I am~~ he.

K: He was working for me until September 1970, ah, until September 1969.

S: He was on a consultancy basis--

K: Well, but he really wasn't doing much work.

S: Does this come as a complete surprise to you.

K: I haven't seen thememorandum yet.

S: Well, in general, that would mean that they were tapping the telephones of members of your staff.

K: Look, I just don't want to talk about this subject.

S: Well, at some point, you know this gets close to the bone here. For instance, I'm not leaking it to you but it just happens to coincide with an AP Story about Winston Lord leaving. Now I am aware that he's been planning to leave for a long time.

K: Winston Lord is one of my close friends, and his plan to leave--he told me he would leave right after we made the peace agreement and he then decided to stay on at my request to help me finish the Annual Report.

S: All right. But you won't even say that you didn't know that Halpern's phone was being tapped.

K: First I want to see this--

S: I have the text of it, I can read it to you.

K: Well, let me get it and then we can talk about it tomorrow.

S: All right, for sure? Can I call you tomorrow?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Dated NARA Dkt 6/2/84

TELCONE
Prof. Weisner/Mr. Kissinger

6:30 p.m., May 11, 1973

W: Listen, I'm bothering you about a thing I shouldn't but have you heard anything about the invitation we extended from MIC to Sakrov (sp?) kids to come?

K: To who?

W: Sakrov (sp?)

K: Oh, no.

W: He passed word to me through mutual friends that he'd like to get the kids out of the country. He's got a daughter-in-law -- a daughter and a son-in-law -- they're by his first wife actually. They're his wife's children, not his, who are theistics and meteorologists and a son who is college age. And they're beginning to be sort of discriminated against and harassed because of what he has done and is doing. He says if they could get out of the country for a few years to work and study, it would be very good for them. And he has reason to think that they would be given visas. I don't know who protects him or who assured him of this but this was the message I got.

K: Why don't you drop me a note and I will when I see Dobrynin whether I can raise it.

W: Well, I was going to ask you whether you should or whether I should talk to Dobrynin. I didn't want to put you on the --

K: It would be better if you did it.

W: Uh-huh. But you think that the situation is such that it wouldn't just backfire on -- My question is really one of sensitivity --

K: I think they are getting very restive at all these Jewish pressures.

W: Uh-huh. Well, this isn't really a Jewish pressure.

K: Well, but they --

W: But Sakrov (sp?) must be a very special thorn in their side.

K: Well, they're getting very restive.

W: But is that good or bad? Can you tell?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Dated NARA Dkt 6/2/78

Prof. Weisner/Mr. Kissinger

6:30 p. m., May 11, 1973

2

K: Well, I would take it easy myself.

W: You would?

K: Yeah.

W: Right.

K: They feel they're being deliberately humiliated and that every time they yie on something, immediately another demand is made.

W: Yeah, right. What I'll do is send you a note but I think ______ it wouldn't make sense for you to do it. I was really just asking for guidance.

K: Well, why don't you talk to Dobrynin first in a friendly way and see what he says.

W: Um-humm. All right. You know, it's obviously in a world everybody's interest that this guy continue his fight and that we help him if we can but there's no point in doing things which are foolhardy or would backfire on him.

K: Yeah.

W: Okay.

K: Good, Jerry.

W: How are you otherwise?

K: Well, this is a hectic period down here.

W: Yeah. I must say you must be under some pressures.

K: Yeah.

W: Well, I --

K: I would prefer to meet Le Duc Tho under better circumstances.

W: When are you going?

K: Wednesday.

CLASSIFIED
DELEGATED
AND ASSIGNED

Authority E012958
Dated 6/2/94

TelCon
Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

7:12 pm, May 11, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Henry on that matter we discussed, what time is that meeting and what ________ so that we can begin to make a separate air arrangement. I assume what you want is the individual--

K: I want him there Friday night.

S: Friday night.

K: The meeting is Saturday and Sunday morning.

S: All right, so you want him there by Friday night and he gets there by his own means. All right, we'll take care of that then, and I will fill in--fill him in and so on.

K: But you can wait until Monday, can't you.

S: Oh, sure. There's no hurry on this at all. When do you want to get together again.

K: Maybe Monday afternoon.

S: Well, I'll call your office on Monday morning and make an appointment with you on Monday afternoon.

K: Excellent.

S: Good, fine.

K: Thank you Joe. Good to see you.

S: Fine.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: ED 12958

Dated: 6/2/73
P.O. Box 644

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Kraft

5/12/73 1:50 a.m.

JK: Do you know about the Halpern bugging?

HK: Ah, I made a statement today at a press conference which is all I am going to say until the whole situation is tated by the FBI. Which it will do Monday or Tuesday.

JK: I see. The main reason I wanted to call was to alert what-do-you-call-i
to that.

HK: But I also said I never say any information that cast any doubt on
his loyalty or discretion and that his separation from my staff had
nothing to do with any of that.

JK: Have you heard anything about these rumors that you will go to State.

HK: I've been constantly asked about them and I have not--you know, as
far as I can tell they're based on nothing.

JK: Well it would have a certain logic--but you have nothing at all.

HK: I have nothing--you know the situation here is in such a turmoil that I
don't want to say something that in two months may look wrong.
But I say this only really so that you don't accuse me of something later
on--I do not anticipate it--for that matter I don't want it.

HK: I have not been approached about it, I have no reason to believe that
Rogers is leaving in the foreseeable future.

JK: They come from the Republican sources on the Hill.

HK: No, they may know something that I haven't been told. But that
seems improbable to me.

JK: I take it there was a statement today on Brezhnev.

HK: Yes.

JK: And it's the 18th to 26th?

HK: That's right.

JK: Is there any kind of a schedule--will you be going to the West Coast?

HK: He almost certainly will be going to the West Coast--probably spend
five days in Washington and the rest of the time either on West Coast

CLASSIFIED

Authority: EO 12958
Date: 6/2/73
Dated: NARA ID: 6704

Page 2

or traveling about.

JK: I see. Are you going to see Le Duc Tho on Tuesday or--

HK: I'm leaving Wednesday--

JK: You'll be there for quite a while.

HK: No, I'm planning on being back on the 21st latest the 22nd.

JK: This is a very bad time for me and I think for you too. Any chance of seeing you next week?

HK: Let's try--can you call me Monday or Tuesday--I'll be unbelievably jammed up getting ready for this trip. But I'll make an effort to see you.

JK: Okay look I'm not that insistant on it--

HK: No you called me yesterday, that's why I'm returning your call.

JK: I mainly called to tell Campbell ttx what everybody was saying

HK: What? About state?

JK: No about--about the bugging. Didn't he pass that on to you?

JK:

HK: No./ I'll then call you direct or some other way--but I have a feeling he didn't understand what I was telling him. Is--I can understand what the Russians want from us--what do we want from them?

HK: Well we want from them restraint in the Middle-East and SEA. Some progress on SALT. What do you think they want from us.

JK: I assume they want trade and credits. Something more?

HK: No, no that's essentially right.

JK: But I would have thought for us the really interesting thing to get out of them is to start them walking back out of Europe.

HK: But I don't think that can be done--that we can do more than prepared the ground for that at this meeting.

JK: I take it you had a satisfactory talk with respect to the objectives you name

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01298
Date 6/2/89
HHS NARA No.

TELCOM

Senator Pastore/Mr. Kissinger

5/12/73 9:10 a.m.

SP: Doctor!

HK: How are you, Senator?

SP: Oh I'm fine--have a good trip?

H

HK: Yes very good.

SP: Yeh. Look I hate to be pushing you like this, but things are happening fast, you know there is a big, big demonstration here 10:00 a bunch of people are coming down. Not that that has anything to do with my conversation with you, but I was wondering if you had heard anything.

HK: No, I hadn't, but I was just checking on it.

SP: I see.

HK: Let me personally check on it first thing Monday morning. I just got back.

SP: All right. May I make a suggestion to you. I mean I've been around long enough to know, Doctor, that no Secretary of Defense whether it is Richardson or even Jimmy Schlesinger is going to have--can change this once the decision they claim is final without of course the President's ordering the review. You see.

HK: Right.

SP: And that's what we are trying to get. You see now I realize it will be difficult to get into see the President for the simply reason that then he might have to deal with 247 other bases. And he would be setting a precedent of course and that would be the only thing he would be doing for the next year and half. And he's left it up to reliable assistance. But we feel that we have a cause and we'd like to present it again to Jim Schlesinger and if we could only get some kind of assurance out of the WH, you see what I mean, that the President has ordered a review of this, you see, in a very quiet sort of a way and then we'd sit down with Jim Schlesinger and I think that the new imponderable which was never considered is the fact of the impact of the economy of RI.

HK: Mr. Chairman, let me look into this. I have already looked into the substance of it, but let me look into this procedural side of it first thing Monday morning.

SP: All right fine. fine.

HK: I'm really going to try to be helpful. It's out of my immediate
jurisdiction, but let me talk to both Schlesinger and the President.

SP: All right.

HK: And I'll talk to you no later than Tuesday.

SP: All right, and thank you. And I repeat again, what I would to do--

HK: You'd like just a sense that the thing is being reviewed and that you brought that about.

SP: The point is that the President ordered the review--I'm hoping that we'll get some changes made.

HK: Of course.

SP: But I'm quite certain that unless the President orders the review this is not going to happen.

HK: Right. I understand.

SP: As well as I know Jim Schlesinger, he's not going to do me a personal
favor, unless the President says well Jim well you look into this and take
into account the impact and see if maybe we did make a mistake.
He did that with Portsmouth, New Hampshire. You see.

HK: Right. Right.

SP: Okay.

HK: I'll take it up first thing Monday morning.

SP: Did you see that ad that was in the paper where the Committee to Re-elect the President?

HK: I can't face it--no what was it?

SP: Or it was a big ad--the Re-election--they say if McGovern is elected
at Quonset Point and have had the map and all that, these will have
to go, and it would be a staggering blow to the economy but Re-elect
Nixon and this won't be.

HK: You know that joke where somebody said that in 1964 people told me if I voted for Goldwater, we'd be in war--I voted for Goldwater and he was right--we got into war.

DCCLASSIFIED

~~Author~~y E01288

~~D.~~ NARA Dct 6/2/04

TelCon:5/12/73:12:30

Mr. Kissinger:
Charles Bartlett

K: Hello.

B: I want to thank you for your interception on behalf of the Barlett/ Dickerson voyage to the Soviet Union. Twenty-four hours after you got there - the missile (?) passed.

K: Why should I have all your Democrats running <u>loose</u> there.

B: That was a great day. Henry everything else went well and we were tempted to take the summit(?)

K: No, we announced the Summit.

B: Oh, yes this morning.

K: We announced it this morning.

B: Did you have a briefing down there?

K: Yes.

B: Oh, for Christ sakes!

K: June 18.

B: Boy their not getting the <u>world</u> word out anymore - I think they are isolating you. Well it is June 19.

K: 18th.

B: Oh that's good. So it's a week earlier than we thought.

K: That's right.

B: E They're in good mood aren't they.

K: There was no - you know there was no - it was excellent.

B: I thought I go - getting to the point though that people w shouldn't interpret this as a sign of - this is imperative with them. In other words there is going to be ______ now with the Russians are so fresh but that they will do anything to get on the right side of the American

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

Dated NARA Ref. 6/20/74

- 2 -

and get the deal.

K: But that isn't right either.

B: No that isn't right and I have got the economic factor to show that it isn't right.

K: No, I don't think that is right but there haven't been any reasons for them to cancel it, or to delay it and the meetings did go extremely well.

B: So this is a long term thing in which --------

K: Yes.

B: Henry I am going to India(?) on Sunday. Is there anything I should look for there?

K: No, I think we are trying to improve our relations and I think we are making some considerable progress.

B: This is a major goal at this point to try and get a little better

K: You can certainly - you know on your own say this is your impression.

B: Yes, OK. Good. Well congratulations on keeping everything on the track.

K: Well thank you.

B: I personally am fond (President)? ? Outside the city than it is in it now.

K: Oh God, it is a nightmare to come back here.

K: It's terrible. It is unbelievable here. ____________ one

K: Well it's - you know after - I know every time faces/gets attacked but after a point you know what good does it do.

B: Yes, well you know ________ young reporters and they are going to keep this thing going.

K: You know we all know now it was a horrible mess. You know between you and me Charlie - the first time I found out what was involved was after my speech at the Federal City Club. The next morning Len Garment came to my office and he said Jesus Christ do you realize

DECEMBER

Authority EO-12958

Dated NARA Ref. 6/2/04

what you said from this context.

B: Well you didn't catch any hell from that did you.

K: No, no no no. Oh no. But you know when one things back to even three weeks ago.

B: I know. ________ on the 5th. That is one reason I am getting out of the city. I think it is just a process and you don't see the bottom yet. That is the thing that is depressing to me. Well good Henry.

K: Well have a good trip Charlie.

B: And congratulations. I am glad you have this thing moving.

K: Thank you.

B: Good bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01288

Dated: 6/2/04

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Joan Braden

2:30 p.m. 5/12/73

JB: I thought you were already in Paris--you did sound far away.

HK: That's true.
Joanie--Nancy thinks that you think we are going to have dinner tonight but I already made a dinner date with Haig.

JB: No, that's fine. I just said --she didn't know what you were going to do and I said if you were not busy, we'd have dinner with you.

HK: It would have been--

JB: You go right ahead-- I always miss not seeing you/

Hk: Well have a good trip and I hope to see you on the 22nd.

JB: I'm not leaving until 5:00 that night, so we'll have lunch if we can.

HK: Good. Marvelous.

JB: Okay. Give my love to Nancy.

HK: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated NARA Dkt 612074

TELCON

James Keogh/Mr. Kissinger

2:40 p. m. 5/12/73

JK: Henry, how are you?

HK: Okay, Jim, how are you?

JK: Very well. Let me tell you what my problem is. As you may know we are opening that exhibit in Moscow Monday the 21st. We haven't yet--been walking up and down hills and doing everything and haven't yet lined up anybody to be the personality who will go there to ppen it. We had a proposition that we should send the Vice President.

HK: No.

JK: But we abandoned that. What do you think--what level or what kind of person.

HK: We shouldn't send too high a level person prior to the summit.

JK: O kay. What about a U. S. Senator.

HK: Like who?

JK: Well like Dole--Kansas; I had some trouble with that--Timmons suggested that I had some trouble with it because of the high political visibility, past records of the Republican National Committee.

HK: Yeh, but that wouldn't bother me too much.

JK: Or like Cannonball of Arizona--he's the ranking Republican on the Senate Interior Committee and this is all about parks and recreation--boating and camping and so forth. Or Hruska simply because he is a very good friend of the Agency.

HK: Yeh, but how is he going to behave there?

JK: I think he'll be all right there. If any one of those three would do.

HK: Yeh, I have no problem with any of them.

JK: Then another possibility would be Shirley Temple Black.

HK: Not with the Russians.

JK: How we got around to that is that she is--

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P.O. BOX 61209

Page 2

HK: I know but I'd rather have a Senator.

JK: You'd rather have a Senator.

HK: I don't have to have a Senator--I'd rather have one.

JK: Okay--well that gives me an idea--we are terribly late in trying to get anybody. I think we can line up *wirk* one of those fellows.

HK: Okay.

JK: Now we don't want to send a Democrat--I'd like to send Dale Magee who is also a good friend of the Agency.

HK: Well why don't you send a Democrat and a Republican although at this stage we'd be better off just having a Republican.

JK: I think so and also if I send Magee at this point, I'll get into a lot of trouble with a lot of Republicans.

an

HK: Why not just send a Republic/then.

JK: All right. I'll get to work and see if I can line one up.

HK: Good, Jim.

JK: Bye.

DEPT ASSIGNED

Authority ED12958

Dated NARA Doc. 6/2/01

TELCORN

Fred Brisson/Mr. Kissinger

10:30 a.m. 5/13/73

HK: .....I have to give a press briefing in a while and I'm not sure I'll
be free for lunch, I won't know until 12:30.

FB: That's perfectly all right Henry. I made no plans for lunch. I have
a meeting a 4:00 that I have to start for the rest of the day and that's
all.

HK: Right. Well, if I can't then we'll meet monday night.

FB: All right. Fine. Now--if I don't hear from you at 12:30--

HK: If you don't hear from me by 1:00 then you have to assume that I
won't be able to make it.

FB: But if you can that would be lovely.

HK: Marvelous.

FB: Now Monday night, should I come by and pick you up or will you meet
me there or what.

HK: Let's settle that in the morning.

FB: Okay fine. Because you can talk to me anytime tomorrow or Monday
because I'm not going over there till the afternoon.

HK: Good. I'll call you at the latest Monday morning,
If I don't see you for lunch. Good Fred.

FB: Thank you Henry.

DECEMBER 9, 1973

Authority E.O. 12958

DATE NARRATED 6/2/73

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Marvin Kalb
5/13/73; 11:08 a.m.

K: Hello.

MK: Henry.

K: Yes, Marvin.

MK: I'm so sorry to bother you on this.

K: Not at all.

MK: Henry, I've got a serious personal thing that I've got -- I must talk to you about. It will take about five minutes.

K: You mean face-to-face?

MK: Yes, if that is possible.

K: You want to come in. I am in my office.

MK: You are in the office now?

K: Yes.

MK: I mean is it all right?

K: Yes. Where are you?

MK: I am at hope but I could be down there inside of an hour -- 45 minutes or something.

K: Okay why don't you come in.

MK: Good. thanks very much.

K: I am assuming it's important.

MK: I assure you it is.

K: Okay.

MK: It's personal but I've got to talk to you.

K: Okay.

DECE ASSIGNED

Authority EO 12988
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

NARRATIVE 6/2/73

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Mrs. Phyllis Cerf
5/13/73; 1:00 p.m.

K: Hello.

C: Hello, darling Henry.

K: Phyllis, how are you?

C: I'm well. How are you?

K: Okay.

C: Tired I would think.

K: Yeah. I've just come back from a trip and I am going off again.

C: You are?

K: I am going off on Wednesday to Paris.

C: Oh, my God. I didn't realize it was so soon.

K: Yeah.

C: But then you will be back for your birthday celebration.

K: I'm counting on your coming.

C: I can't alas. I've invited guests. And what I was hoping is that maybe I could get you to come up either before the big festivities or after.

K: Well, let me look into that. I may do that.

C: That would be very nice.

K: The next day maybe.

C: Yeah. That would be terrific.

K: Good.

C: All right.

K: Now, Phyllis, do you still have something to do with Random House?

DECE ASSIGNED
Authority E012858

D# NARA Dkt 6/2/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Mrs. Phyllis Cerf
5/13/73: 1:00 p.m.

-2-

C: Well, I have in terms that I know everyone there but I don't physically have anything to do with it or monetarily to do with it.

K: Because I have been trying to get Bob Bernstein and he is on a boat and i'll be leaving before he gets back.

C: I see. You want someone to be in touch with you?

K: It doesn't concern anything that I'm myself interested in but there is a newspaper man here who has written a book about me.

C: Oh, really.

K: And which Norton was going to publish. And Norton in an excess of zeal is trying to get him to cut out all references that might be critical of me and he thinks that this will destroy the symmetry of his book.

C: Yes.

K: And I don't give a damn whether it is entirely favorable. It's Marvin Kalb. I have a lot of respect for him.

C: Yes.

K: So I just wanted to -- I haven't read the book.

C: Do you want to?

K: No, I just want to get him in touch with Random House.

C: I can reach -- let's see -- Jim Silverman is the Editor-in-Chief there and I can certainly reach him and then he can contact Mr. Kalk where?

K: At CBS in Washington.

C: Now give me his name.

K: Marvin Kalb. And I can get you his phone number.

C: Well, either that.

K: Or let him call my office. We will get him the phone number. I want to make clear I haven't seen the book and for all I know it may take me over the

DECE ASSIGNED
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P.O. Box 617
NAPLES, FL

6/2/73 1:00

-3-

coals. I just think it should be -- if he wants to publish a book . . .

C: It should be the way he wants it.

K: Yeah. I know him to be a decent and thoughtful man.

C: Yes. It's CBS in Washington, Marvin Kalb and probably the best time to get him would be tomorrow. Right?

K: Right.

C: Okay. I will do that dear Henry and then I will hear from you to see if I can get the pleasure of your company.

K: Good.

C: All right.

K: Marvelous.

C: And have a happy day.

K: Hope to see you soon.

C: And I you.

K: Bye-bye.

C: Be- bye.

CLASSIFIED

Authority E012858

D# NARA ID: 6/2/04

TELCONE

Fred Brisson/Kissinger

9:13 a.m. - 5/14/73

K: Hello.

B: Yes, Henry.

K: Freddie, how are you?

B: Fine.

K: Now tell me about what is planned for tonight. I didn't have a full focus on it last week.

B: Yeh. Between 6:30 and 7:30 the people are meeting in the North Gallery of the Atrium and it'll be the dignitaries and the winners and the presenters of the particular award. Then about 9:30 we go to the Eisenhower Theater where the presentations will be done and the program and then there will be a little reception immediately after until 11 o'clock.

K: If I come at 8:00 that's time enough?

B: Yes, if - it would be best if you don't come any later because - if that's convenient for you 8 o'clock is fine.

K: Right, well, I'll try to come as close to 7:30.

B: No, no, 8 o'clock is fine, but between 7:30 and 8:00.

K: Right.

B: Don't worry about it, Henry. So I'll meet you right there then at 8 o'clock. You just look for me and . . .

K: And I may bring Marsha Metrinko.

B: That's fine.

K: You wanted me to bring somebody, didn't you?

B: Yes. Is she in town?

K: Yeh.

B: Oh my gosh. Ok.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated NARA Doc 6/2/73

TELCONE

Donald Klopfer (Random House)/Kissinger

9:37 a.m. - 5/14/73

K: Hello.

DK: Mr. Kissinger, this is Donald Klopfer at Random House. I just wanted to have one word with you. I did talk to Mr. Kalb yesterday at your suggestion.

K: Right. Now you remember I haven't even seen that book.

DK: I know you haven't seen it. Now from what Phyllis told me, evidently there's some derogatory things in there that Norton wanted to take out, or am I wrong?

K: That I have no reason to know either. Apparently what they wanted him to do was to compress the Vietnam chapter and to take out all references to the President.

DK: Oh.

K: On the theory that the less they tie me with Vietnam, the better off I am. If I understand it correctly.

DK: How do you feel about it? Of course I can't talk intelligently without seeing the manuscript obviously, but...

it

K: I feel about/that a respectful author ought to be able to say anything he wants. I don't judge publishers - you know if they did a filibrose type book like the one on Nixon about me, that would affect me, but if a respectable person does a serious book that's not totally flattering in every chapter I don't...

DK: I think that's fine. I think that young fellow from Houghton Mifflin published a rather fascinating book about you.

K: Now that I thought was - you know I don't hold that against the publisher but that I thought had major errors in almost every other page.

DK: Yeh, well he's 24 years old and prone to error I guess.

K: Even that I wouldn't hold against the publisher.

DK: It was an interesting book though.

DELEGATED
Authority E.O. 12958
Dated: 5/2/73

K: I never read it from cover to cover. That book I found somewhat annoying but not enough to hold against the publisher.

DK: Right. Well, that's the main reason since I know that Bob Bernstein has been talking to you and since we are vitally interested, I didn't want to do anything that would offend you in any way.

K: I wouldn't have called you if I - I haven't seen the book and maybe after I see the book I will get offended.

DK: The whole thing is that we use our own judgment about that.

K: But I would say this - that unless the book was a deliberate hatchet job that a serious publisher should have seen through, I would not see any way a book could offend me.

DK: Good.

K: The author might offend me but certainly not the publisher, but...

DK: That's very good of you to give me this time, but I did want to check it directly with you, frankly, before even looking at the manuscript.

K: No, I think you should go ahead and deal with it on its merits.

DK: On the merits, only. Thank you very much.

K: Right.

DK: Bye.

DELEGATED
Authority EO 12888
P. A. Dye 6/2/98

TELCONE

Marvin Kalb/Kissinger

9:42 a.m. - 5/14/73

K: Hello.

MK: Hi, Henry.

K: Marvin, how are you?

MK: Fine, thank you.

K: I just talked to the Random House people who said they have already been in touch with you.

MK: Within 20 minutes after I got home.

K: Oh.

MK: Some guy called from New York and he said did I understand and I said yes and he said please as soon as you feel free, give us a call and he said...

K: Well, he checked - I just want you to know - they wanted to know whether I would be offended if they published something that was in part critical and I said "no" unless it were a hatchet job that the publisher should have known.

MK: Well, that isn't the case.

K: Which I knew was not the case here.

MK: Yeh, I mean this is something...

K: So I said they should take this entirely on its merits and there was no possible way it could offend me. And I told him I had cooperated with it because of my high regard for you.

MK: That's wonderful. That's stupendous!

K: So I think they're extremely interested.

MK: Well, God bless you and thank you.

K: Have you told Norton yet?

MK: I am sitting here, Henry, my stomach is turning over and I was just thinking how to quite say it, but I think that this call from you has given me new heart and I'm just going to do it. K: OK. MK: God bless you. Thank you.

TELCONE

Ziegler/Kissinger

9:45 a.m. - 5/14/73

K: Ron.

Z: Yes, Henry.

K: Two things: Joe Kraft phoned in three questions on Halperin's wire tap and said he's going to make a major issue of it.

Z: What are the questions?

K: When did I know about it? What did I do about it? I forget what the third one is. And John Osborne has been calling so I suppose it's about that too.

Z: Well, let us look this thing over. I wouldn't let Joe Kraft intimidate you.

K: That's a beautiful statement. My question is should I answer it.

Z: Not yet, I wouldn't. No sir. Not until after Ruckelshaus does - puts it in perspective.

K: Right. Have you seen the Ruckelshaus statement?

Z: No, I'm getting ready to look at it right now and then I'll talk to you, ok.

K: Will you get me a copy of it?

Z: Yeh.

K: Good.

TelCon

John Osborne/Mr. Kissinger

10:30 am, May 14, 1973

K: Hello.

O: Thanks for the call. Totally background off the record. Two things, one you said at your briefing Saturday you had nothing more to say about this tapping business until you had your full report.

K: I used that phrase wrongly, what I meant was Ruckelshaus as I understand it is going to make a public statement today

O: Oh, I see.

K: In which he explains the security investigations. That is whatever tapping may have occurred as a result of the specific security investigations

O: Right.

K: In the case of specific allegations of violations rather than the generalized stuff that was done outside regular channels.

O: I may have misheard it, I haven't reviewed

K: No, no, I've read it and it is capable of two interpretations. What I meant to say was that Ruckelshaus will give today; I haven't seen his statement, but he has been asked to give a statement on those investigations that were ordered by legal procedures in the case of specific allegations. How they were handled within the government, for your information, followed the exact procedures of previous administrations

O: Yes, that's what you said to me in the corridor Saturday. Number two-- if anything is written about you in the next-from now on--should one pay or not pay any serious attention. There has been rumors about you going over to State.

K: I can't really, you know, I know you well enough, not to play games with you, I have not--there's been no discussion with me on the subject by anybody who is in a position to do anything about it. I have obviously had a number of people talk to me who are not in a position to do anything about it, thinking that this would be a good step. I have not considered it, haven't been approached on it. If you had asked me this question three weeks ago, I would have said I refuse it.

O: Right.

K: For the reasons I've often explained to you.

TelCon
Robert Bernstein/Mr. Kissinger

12:32 p.m., May 14, 1973

K: Hello.

B: Hello.

K: Hello, Bob.

B: How are you. I'm sorry I couldn't get to you yesterday.

K: That's all right. It wasn't really anything that concerned me. And I've dealt with some of your people on it since then. There were two newsmen here that are doing a book on me that they were going to give to Norton.

B: Yeah.

K: And then it turned out that Norton, probably in order to protect me, wanted them to confess the Vietnam chapter to a point that they considered unreasonable. And also to disassociate me totally from the President. Which they correctly didn't want to do.

B: Yeah.

K: So I told them as far as I was concerned I didn't give a damn whether you know--I said the position I would take is, if a publisher does a deliberate hatchet job on me, you know to publish a Philip Rose type book on Nixon and me, that would affect my attitude towards the publisher. But if they publishes a book that has critical passages, that is up to the author, and since they wanted to leave Norton, I thought I'd call you to see whether you were interested.

B: Oh, all right. I spoke to my office and I wasn't sure of the facts, and they told me that Donald Klopfer who was, you know, <u>guy</u> was Bennett's partner, had spoken to you.

K: Yeah, he had spoken to me. It's really all settled. I haven't read the book, so I don't know whether it's favorable or hostile, or I would suspect in between. And I have no interest in it one way or the other. Don't publish it to please me. But don't fail to publish it if it's got critical passages.

B: I think what you are saying is, publish it if you would normally publish it, and don't publish it if you wouldn't normally publish it.

K: That's right. And anything that I might do later on isn't going to be in the slightest affected by

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Authority

Dated NARA Dye 6/20/73

2

B: By whether it's good or bad.

K: By whether it's publisher has brought out books that weren't--that
didn't share my high estimate of myself.

B: I understand completely. okay, I'll be back Thursday.

K: Well, I'll be in Europe, I'll be with the North Vietnamese.

B: Yeah, and you'll be there quite a while.

K: I don't think so, four or five days.

B: All right, well it was good talking with you.

K: Good, nice to talk to you.

B: Casper Weinberger is coming down here to speak to us. What kind
of a man is he.

K: To speak to--who is that.

B: The association--Im at the meeting of the Association of American
Publishers where I'm outgoing chairman.

K: He's a decent, not especially imaginative, solid guy.

B: That's good these days.

K: Yeah, but I would have said this about a lot of guys that turned out to be
otherwise.

B: Well, let's not get into it.

K: Okay.

B: When are you going to Europe.

K: I'm leaving Wednesday.

B: Okay, I'll have to wait on--thousands some good things coming. My book
is going to be a book by Gorvey Dowe on the time of Aarom Burr. I haven't
read it but I understand that it shows that Washington then was very little
different from Washington now. At any rate I'll send it to you when we get it.

K: Good, be glad to see it. Nice to talk to you.

B: Bye

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Authority E012958
Dated MAR 03 6/2/07

TELCOM

Dan Davidson/Mr. Kissinger

12:45 p. m. 5/14/73

HK: Dan, how are you?

DD: I was driving out to Silver Spring just now, I looked at the STAR. It said Ruckelhaus is scheduled to release at 2:00 the names of the NSC people whose phones were tapped. From what I was told last week it includes me.

HK: To the best of my understanding, Ruckelhaus--I don't know if that is true, incidentally--

DD: He's releasing any information --is itself a crime.

HK: I don't think he's going to release any names.

DD: That's what the STAR said, if he doesn't--it's another matter.

HK: I think what he is doing is the best of my information --first of all, I don't know if your name would be part--

DD: An ex-member of your staff told me that last week --there were a number of them and indeed that my name was one that doesn't show any adverse information and that Halperin's name did including some contact with foreign embassy, before Halperin's name came up. So I assume that this person knew what he was talking about.

HK: This could be--but what I would like to point out to you Dan is that no name will be mentioned.

DD: Okay. Can I see you in the next day or two? I think it is time we discuss what happened anyway--I've been meaning to call you for many months.

HK: Let's--do it next week when I return

DD: If that's the best you can do, we'll have to --in the mean time just assuming something comes out and I'm asked what--why I left, what is my answer?

HK: Because ah ah--

DD: Personal reasons.

HK: Personal reasons--I mean, I can assure you Dan nothing will be said from me that will cast any reflections of any member of my staff, as you could see on Saturday.

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*

DD: I could see that particularly, based on what I was told what the information was.

HK: That is correct.

DD: Okay.

HK: You can count on the fact, Dan, that there is no sense of destroying anymore lives or causing anymore anguish that has already been caused, and as far as anybody knows as far as any record shows, you left for personal reason.

DD: Let's talk next week, because I'd like to re-establish some record. Because I think particularly now, that I'd been informed what I've always thought was true that it didn't --it did not show that I ever said anything that I should not have said to a reporter. Which is a fact.

HK: I frankly cannot even affirm that that is true--I mean I am sure it is true, but I would have to check if it is.

DD: I wish you would--because I know it is true, but I think it important that check it.

HK: Okay.

DD: And then when can I see you?

HK: You see, I don't know when I am coming back.
Call me as soon as you read in the papers that I am back.

DD: Right. Good. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01288

Dated: 6/2/04

TELCONE

Brian McDonnell/Mr. Kissinger

3:02 pm, May 14, 1973

K: Hello.

M: Hello, Henry.

K: Brian, how are you?

M: Good. I just wanted to let you know I'm home.

K: Oh.

M: How are you?

K: Okay.

M: Are you okay?

K: Yeah, I'm fine. We've got a little hectic period but I'll be all right.

M: You're going to leave right away, right?

K: What do you mean?

M: Are you going to leave -- You know, I'm trying to read the newspapers; I'm just getting back. The Greek newspapers had you leaving again.

K: Yeah, I'm leaving on Wednesday.

M: On Wednesday.

K: But I'll be back in a week.

M: Okay. How about if we try and get together then? I'd like to do that.

K: That would be very nice.

M: How are you doing?

K: I'm doing fine. Will you call me when I get back?

M: I will. And don't worry about it. Henry, take care of yourself.

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P. NARA DR. 6/2/84

TelCon
Peter Lisagor/Mr. Kissinger

3"20 pm, May 14, 1973

K: Hello

L: Hwnry.

K: Yes, Peter. How are you.

L: You know about Ruckelshaus news conference.

K: I don't know what went on there.

L: Well he said he had a news conference about these tapes on Ellsberg and Halperin. And he said that you had had a meeting with Hoover, a conversation with Hoover about in 1969 and asked, because of your fear of NSC leaks, asked the FBI to take it out or take some action.

K: That I?

L: Yes. That you had had a meeting with Hoover back in 1969, and had asked him to check out suspicion you had that there might be some leaks. Out of that came the Hopper and Taft. He didn't say you suggested it at all but that it came out and you did get the summaries of those tapes. What I wanted to ask you, Henry, he said there were 12 other people involved and I wondered if you knew if they were other members of your staff or not.

K: Well, first I want to see what he said.

L: Yeah.

K: And why don't you call me back later.

L: All right. It will all be--he released a statement but the text of the statement just spoke about how they recovered the tapes in the files. But in answer to questions immediately, he said that you had met with Hoover in the spring of 1969 and the discussion of problems on foreign policy and the need for securing National Security information.

K: Right.

L: And out of this came the text of the Halperin phone. couldn't

K: You said that I requested specific taps, could he.

DELEGATED
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NARRATOR

TELCONE

Forrest Boyd (Mutual Broadcasting)/Mr. Kissinger

6:43 pm, May 14, 1973

B: ... You might have some reaction or maybe answer to some questions that this raises. I think that it was said there that the records had been sent over at your request, is that right or not?

K: That is not right. What records?

B: Wire tapping records. And one of them was Halperin, that's the only one that he named.

K: Summaries of the investigations of people that were in my jurisdiction or regarding documents in my jurisdiction were sent to me for a period in the early of the Administration, not for the whole period of these taps.

B: I see. Then you wouldn't have any idea of about how these got to Ehrlichman then? They wouldn't have come through your office?

K: Well, for the time that they came to me that part of them that came to me could have gone to Ehrlichman but I only received summaries. I never received records.

B: I see. Only summaries.

K: Yes.

B: Okay.

K: I have no idea how they got to Ehrlichman's office.

B: All right. And I'm wondering too why they may have been kept. Now the story I guess that ..... is saying --

K: I had nothing to do with it.

the

B: Yeah. Nothing on national security question there?
there

K: Well, I may have been a national security question outside my jurisdiction.

B: Not so far as you know?

B: Yeah. Now Saturday you said something about getting FBI reports and then maybe you would have something to say after that. Have you gotten that yet?

Forrest Boyd/Mr. Kissinger

6:43 pm, May 14, 1973

K: No, no; the FBI report to which I referred was the public statement that Ruckelshaus made today.

B: Will you have any comments at all then publically?

K: No. My comment is that it was my duty as head of the National Security to discuss with the Director of the FBI how to safeguard information. I didn't propose any particular investigation to him.

B: Yeah.

K: There has been an FBI liaison officer attached to the NSC staff since the Kennedy Administration. And it was only natural that I discuss these problems with the Director of the FBI.

B: Okay. That's about all there is to be said then I guess, isn't it?

K: I think that's right.

B: Yeah. When do you leave for Paris?

K: On Wednesday.

B: Okay.

K: I hank you.

B: Thank you for calling back.

K: Right.

B: Bye.

wgh

DEC 14 1973

~~DELEGATED~~

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TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

7:15 pm, May 14, 1973

K: Hello, Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Have I kept you waiting long enough now so that you know

D: That you are really busy.

K: That I -- where we rate Soviet/American relations.

D: (Laughter) So I notice. How are you.

K: I'm fine. When did you get back.

D: Yesterday, last night. I went to New York--around 12:00 o'clock.
I read with interest your _supper ??_ with Israel. (Ismail ?)

K: Well I don't think it should cause you any pain.

D: No, not at all.

K: I notice that Tass covered it more fully than the NY Times.

D: (Laughter) What! By the way if you would like to use some
Brezhnev gift to you, I think it's all right.

K: Oh, can we do it.

D: I think so. I didn't ask him, but I think in general it would be quite
all right.

K: I think it may be a good idea.

D: Yeah, I think it might.

K: Well you noticed what I did, and I noticed also that you--of course
you noticed because you picked it up in TASS about this principle thing.

D: What principle thing.

K: When I referred to the elaboration of the principles--

D: Oh, yes, yes, I -- so I notice, yes.

K: And in about 4 weeks, we can all pretend we did it all with ________.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012004
By: W.W.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01205
By: N.M. Soto
Date: 04/04/2004

That we informed everybody.

D: But I notice that the business press, the columnist yesterday I was flying from New York and just listened on the radio. They are building up something.

K: Oh, really.

D: Yeah, in a sense ________________ about a coming meeting and so and so, and all--have you read it now.

K: No.

D: I heard by radio.

K: Anatol, do you want to have lunch with me before I go off to talk to your allies.

D: I think it would be nice, but I couldn't why you __________ right now because we have a mess here--

K: You come over here. Come over here -- 1:00 o'clock.

D: Tomorrow.

K: Yeah.

D: Okay, I brought letter for the President.

K: Oh, isn't that nice. And he's going to send a letter to Brezhnev. And I want to tell you the President was extremely pleased by the conversation.

D: I think it was really good one, and

K: It was really good and the human atmosphere couldn't have been better.

D: Brezhnev said it was useful, helpful, and he said it was better ________________ characterize our relations with you. With the President but he refers to your conversation with him.

K: Are you going to give up a hundred SS-9s in spite of the SALT agreement.

D: A hundred, oh come on.

K: In the first phase, Anatol

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01205340
By: N.W. Laing

3

D: Be generous (laughter)

K: That's the only thing that's lacking for the Summit, to get the SALT Thing a little bit better.

D: Let's discuss tomorrow

K: Okay. We have to exchange some more views on the principles.

D: Yes, I would like to chat with you, this one and how you are going to --you really want to look about this on a general agreement, on the first one, to look if you have any

K: No, I haven't done that yet, but I will do it. But really you tell-- Gromyko is really unnecessary suspicious of his old friend.

D: (Laughter) And it my thought to, I mention to ______, it was really.

K: There's too much at stake after years of negotiations for us to come up with a clever lawyer's trick.

D: Well this was my impression really. I don't know why ______ but probably (laughter)

K: No

D: This is really with Brezhnev, everyone is ______ the other is just looking.

K: I was talking to my staff at breakfast the next morning, about the joke I made to Brezhnev that Gromyko drinks too much when Brezhnev isn't present. And the Foreign Office man whom I didn't even notice was sitting at our table, suddenly laughed so hard he nearly fell off his chair. He had always been so discreet I never noticed his being there.

D: Well you know, he is our second in ______ here. He is young fellow I know, I know his father, he is now ______ but it was unbelievable.

K: It was so incredible ______ falling off his ______.

D: Exactly, and no one there could tell such a thing in presence of Gromyko. He thought you serious about his problem, and then he began to understand. But really, now, I know him for twenty years but, you remember when ______

4

I really wouldn't be surprised you know on the ________.

K: On the what?

D: The ________ could be the staff of life.

K: Oh, yeah.

D: I was surprised, because she married him with ________. When I was next, when it was over, he invite me for dinner to see his wife and daughter, ________, and so we had a just a private dinner and ________ bring his ________ because she is member of politburo and really she ask him to drink a glass of ________, took it in all heart and be with his wife and daughter. They are going to be ________. He says no, no don't press me, I think I drink a little bit.

K: Well I really thought it was the best atmosphere we ever had.

D: Really I think it was good idea of - if he really accept idea to go to Bermuda because she was not really ________.

K: The President really was very pleased. Look, on that draft agreement I have not had a chance to have it checked on the legal side, but if there are changes, they will be such things as commas, there will be no substantive change

D: I understand

K: And you can really reassure Gromyko on that subject. We'll talk about it tomorrow.

D: Okay. On the principles, on the strategic-- could we discuss tomorrow or do you think it will take a little long.

K: What you have to do is accept our 4th principle and we are pretty well finished.

D: You making something compromise.

K: Let's go over it tomorrow and see whether we can finish it.

D: Okay, as for this 4 or 5--

K: Things I think are going well. ON the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which I had some doubt about, I think we can come to an agreement by the Summit. I have talked to our people and

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: EAI2058
Date: 06 Nov 1967
By: WW

TelCon

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

7:15 pm, May 14, 1973

K: Hello, Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry.

D: That you are really busy.

D: Yesterday, last night. I went to New York--around 12:00 o'clock.
I read with interest your _supper ? ?_ with Israel.(Ismail ?)

D: No, not at all.

K: Oh, can we do it.

D: Yeah, I think it might.

D: What principle thing.

K: And in about 4 weeks, we can all pretend we did it all with ________.
That

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NARA File:

2

That we informed everybody.

D: But I notice that the business press, the columnist yesterday I was speaking from New York and just listened on the radio. They are building up something.

K: Oh, really.

D: Yeah, in a sense ________________ about a coming meeting and so on, and all--have you read it now.

K: No.

D: I heard by radio.

D: I think it would be nice, but I couldn't why you ______ right now because we have a mess here--

D: Tomorrow.

K: Yeah.

D: A hundred, oh come on.

K: In the first place, Anatol

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3

D: Be generous (laughter)

D: Let's discuss tomorrow

K: No, I haven't done that yet, but I will do it. But really you tell--
Gromyko is really unnecessarily suspicious of his old friend.

D: Well this was my impression really. I don't know why ______
but probably ______ (laughter)

K: No

D: This is really with Breshnev, everyone is ______ the other
is just looking.

K: I was talking to my staff at breakfast the next morning, about the
joke I made to Breshnev that Gromyko drinks too much when Breshnev
isn't present. And the Foreign Office man whom I didn't even notice
was sitting at our table, suddenly laughed so hard he nearly fell off
his chair. He had always been so discreet I never noticed his being
there.

DECEMBER 1988

Authority ED12958

D: MARA D. 6/20/88

4

K: On the what?

K: Oh, yeah.

D: I was surprised, because she married him with ________. When I was next, when it was over, he invite me for dinner to see his wife and daughter, ________, and so we had a just a private dinner and drinking bring his ________ because she is member of politburo and really she ask him to drink a glass of ________, took it in all heart and be with his wife and daughter. They are going to be ________. He says no, no don't press me, I think I drink a little bit.

D: I understand

D: Okay. On the principles, on the strategic-- could we discuss tomorrow or tie you think it will take a little long.

D: Okay, as for this 4 or 5--

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