Henry V. Klaarner

Sincerely yours,

With best regards.

and in the peephole that our objective was a submarine force.)
minus (I said this with respect to the Garp/aird proposal)
did not seem to make the ideal launching platform for Polaris
variation with Andretti. I did point out that contact aids
recent discussions to do much more than this. In my con-
In Italy, I was not well enough acquainted with our

relations.

use the opportunities for a new approach to Franco-American
coal as an excuse to challenge our good faith or whether to
France was whether to use technical imperfections in our bro-
open mind and on the part of five-and-a-half. The choice before
would prove soluble if France entered the discussions with an
problems to be solved out. It seemed to me, however, that they
other was serious. To be sure, there would be many technical
the Administration. However, I was convinced that the Massau
I had not seen eye-to-eye on a number of occasions with
worth, here is the line I took in my conversations in France.

It may not be too helpful now, but for whatever it is

Thank you for your letter of February 23rd.

Dear Mac:

Washington, D. C.
The White House
Mr. McGeorge Bumby

March 2, 1963

May 10, 1963

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mac:

This is a note to inform you that I will be in Europe from May 12-24 visiting Brussels, Bonn, London and Paris.

The occasion is to attend a conference sponsored by the Institute of Political Science in Brussels and to give a talk in London. I have made appointments on my own with various governmental and political figures.

In Bonn I have appointments with the Chancellor, the Defense Minister, Carstens, some lower ranking Foreign Office and Defense Officials and some industrialists and other political figures. I will see similar groups in Brussels, London and Paris.

Needless to say, my disagreements with the Administration stop at the water's edge. I shall report any significant conversations to the appropriate embassies or, should that prove technically difficult, I shall write some memoranda of conversations upon my return.

I have already informed the embassies of the countries I am visiting. However, if there is anything you particularly want me to know, either to stress or to avoid, please communicate with me in Europe. I am enclosing an itinerary for your convenience.

Henry V. Kleberg

Stucrersly kons,

sustenance.
with me in Brussels. I am enclosing an itinerary for my con-
ment to know, either to stress or to avoid, please communicate
I am visiting. However, it there is anything you particularly
I have already informed the embassies of the countries

versations about my return.
technically difficult. I shall write some memoranda of con-
ferences to the appropriate embassies or, should that prove
satisfactory at the water's edge. I shall report any significant con-
Needless to say, my disagreements with the Administration

London and Paris.
political figures. I will see similar Groome in Brussels,
and Defense Ottocafis and some industrialists and other
Defense Minister. Carstensen, some lower ranking Foreign Office
In Bonn I have appointments with the Chancellor, the

various governmental and political figures.
a talk in London. I have made appointments on my own with
the Institute of Political Science in Brussels and to give
The occasion is to attend a conference sponsored by

Paris.
Europe from May 13-14 visiting Brussels, Bonn, London and
This is a note to inform you that I will be in

Dear Mac:

Washington, D. C.
The White House
Mr. McGeorge Bunbury

May 10, 1963

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1963

Dear Henry:

Thank you for your note of May 10 with its
enclosure showing your itinerary. I hope
you will have an interesting and productive
time, and that our differences may be
reduced and not expanded by your trip.

Anything you may write on your return will
be read here with interest.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Henry V. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

memoranda at the end of this week.
discreetly. I will send you a few more
General Steinhin were handled particularly
conversations with General Martin and
formation. I would be grateful if the
of conversation for your own personal in-
I have written up some memoranda

of May 14th.

Thank you for your gracious note

Dear Mac:

Washington, D. C.
The White House
Mr. McGeorge Bundy

May 29, 1963

July 26, 1963

Dear Mac:

It was very nice to see you up here. If I may say
so, I thought your speech was just right for the occasion.
I particularly liked the humanity and generosity of your
tribute to Bill.

The quotation from the letter from Germany which I
mentioned to you reads as follows:

"The trip of the President was an extraordinary success. The reaction was incomparably more enthusiastic than that to the trip of General de Gaulle. Three of his speeches were true masterpieces. I think particularly of the speech in Frankfurt, the one at the Free University of Berlin and one in the City Hall at Schöneberg. The last subject has moved the masses in a way which I have not seen in decades. I believe that the immunization to the French temptations occurred at the right moment."

The author is Birrenbach. He is extremely influential among
German industrialists and one who has been sent over here on
several exploratory expeditions.

About "trusting the Germans", I am delighted at the
progress that has been made. My general feeling is that the
psychological situation in Germany is not as stable as Adenauer
made it appear and I think we have to be careful not to put
too much stress on it. However, this is the subject of a
longer conversation.

With every good wish and kind regards.

Henry V. Kieinger

Sincerely yours,

longer conversation.
too much stress on it. However, this is the subject of a
made it appear and I think we have to be careful not to but
psychological situation in Germany is not as stable as Adenauer
progress that has been made. My General feeling is that the
About "triumphing the German", I am delighted at the
several exploratory expeditions.

German industrialists and one who has been sent over here on
the author is Burrenbach. He is extremely influential among
occurred at the right moment."

I believe that the immunization to the French temptations
moved the masses in a way which I have not seen in decades.
one in the City Hall at Schöneberg. The last subject has
in Frankfurt, the one at the Free University of Berlin and
were true masterpieces. I think particularly of the speech
to the trip of General de Gaulle. Three of his speeches
The reaction was incomparably more enthusiastic than that
"The trip of the President was an extraordinary success.
mentioned to you reads as follows:

The quotation from the letter from Germany which I
tribute to Bill.

I particularly liked the humanity and generosity of your
so. I thought your speech was just right for the occasion.
It was very nice to see you here. If I may say

Dear Mac:

Washington, D. C.
The White House
Mr. McGeorge Bungy

July 29, 1963

November 27, 1964

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mac:

I thought it might prove helpful if I summarized some of the
points I tried to make in our conversation today.

Germany: It is simply wrong to allege that the future
orientation of the Federal Republic depends on pushing through the MLF.
Even if the original MLF is ratified before the German elections, this
will have only a negligible impact on the outcome. If present trends
continue, neither Schroeder nor Erhard will survive the next election
(even if the CDU gains a narrow plurality). At any rate, the MLF is
not an election issue between the parties. Forcing matters to a head
may, however, wreck the CDU, particularly in the light of foreseeable
British proposals. This in turn will cause the SPD to veer into a more
leftist and nationalist course.

The significance of the MLF in German politics is not that
there is a popular demand or a partisan issue but that Erhard and
Schroeder at our urging have staked their prestige on it. It would not
be good for our reputation if we could be blamed for having abandoned
our friends. We must therefore navigate between the shoals of excessive
pressure for a version of the MLF which is becoming less and less
acceptable in the rest of Europe and which only a part of the CDU supports
and abandoning individuals who have staked their careers on an American
project.

It is also important to keep in mind that German politics
are more fluid now than at any other time since the war. Any flat
statement about German desires is an oversimplification. My real
concern is not the MLF, but that in three to four years we may have
a situation in Germany similar to that which today obtains in Italy.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

- 2 -

November 27, 1964

**Britain:** My impression is that the Labor government would like to kill the MLF. Failing that, they may join but with provisions likely to lead to acute unhappiness in the Federal Republic. For example, it seems improbably to me that the MLF will have the support of a majority of the CDU without a European clause. This, I am reasonably certain, Britain will not accept. Similarly, the Federal Republic will strive for some form of majority voting in the control body (although granting the United States a veto). This, too, will be rejected by Britain, which I believe will insist on an absolute veto for itself over every part of what it calls the Multilateral Force. Other aspects of the British position, such as the disengagement schemes in Germany, will not become immediately apparent. But the possibility for mischief is obvious.

**France:** Judging from my conversation with Lucet, it seems to me that the Quai D'Orsay may be readier now than in the past for serious discussions. However, Lucet admitted that he did not know what De Gaulle intended. (I will send you a summary of my talk with Lucet separately.)

**Overall Impression:** My overall impression of Europe is that the present State Department line is likely to fail and to fragment the Alliance still further. Moreover, so many American officials abroad seem so committed to their preferred solutions that I am not sure they can always distinguish their wishes from reality.

**Recommendations:**
(1) European affairs should be handled more directly from the White House.
(2) Before we seek to press Britain with the MLF, we should get a clearer idea of Wilson's long-term plans.
We should not let him buy the pretense of American support for some of his pet projects by a formal acquiescence to the MLF--all the less so if he is not specific about what he means by multilateral. My instinct would be to use the meeting on December 7 to learn British ideas rather than to press them to a decision. A low-key approach may take them by surprise and may in fact elicit more useful offers than an attempt to settle everything. Above all, we should avoid the impression that the Anglo-Saxons are arranging the affairs of the Alliance among themselves.
(3) With respect to Germany, a relaxation of our pressure is essential.
The German structure is not stable enough, their sense of identity too uncertain for the Federal Republic to become the balance-wheel of our European policy. We could use British hesitations on the MLF as a means of gaining time. Simultaneously, we should broaden the discussion from the MLF to such issues as unification and giving Germany a greater role in East-West negotiations. This will put the MLF in a different perspective and identify us with the policies which few Germans can

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

- 3 -

November 27, 1964

reject. It will also give Erhard and Schroeder much more useful
campaign material should this be an American objective. (4)
Exploratory talks with France should be started. A meeting at the
highest level seems to me inadvisable until there is some area of
agreement. At the same time, lower level official channels seem to
me to be clogged. The best method might be a semi-official contact by
an individual or a group enjoying the confidence of the White House
but who can be disavowed if the French prove difficult.

Please forgive these hasty notes. They sound dogmatic, it
is at least in part because of my (unsuccessful) effort to be brief.
Not being aware of the cables, many of the recommendations are perhaps
beside the point.

I do feel reasonably certain of one thing, however: The MLF--
whether it succeeds or fails--is irrelevant to most of NATO's problems.
Some form of reduced MLF is probably now inevitable, perhaps even
desirable. But a great deal depends on how this happens and whether
we can put it in its proper political framework. A continuation of
pressures and insistence on premature solutions runs the risk of
dangerously fusing all anti-American, anti-German, and anti-Nuclear
feelings in Europe. If the present course is not changed, a crisis
seems inevitable.

I will not mention either our conversation or this letter to
anyone.

With high regard.

Dear Mac:

**Germany:** It is simply wrong to allege that the future orientation of the Federal Republic depends on pushing through the MLF. Even if the original MLF ~~is ratified~~ before the German elections, this will have only a negligible impact on the outcome. If present trends continue neither Schroeder nor Ehhard will survive the ~~next election~~ (even if the CDU gains a narrow plurality). At any rate, the MLF is not an election issue between the parties. Forcing matters to a head may, however, wreck the CDU, particularly in the light of foreseeable British proposals. This in turn will cause the SPD to veer into a more leftist and nationalistic course.

It is also important to keep in mind that German politics are more fluid
than at any time since the war. Any flat statement about German desires is an
oversimplification. My real concern is not the MLF, but than in three to four
situation in
years we may have a/Germany similar to that which today obtains in Italy.

**Britain:** My impression is that the Labor government would like to kill the MLF. Failing that, they may join but with provisos likely to lead to acute unhappiness in the Federal Republic. For example, it seems improbable to me

We could use British hesitations on the MLF as a means of gaining time. Simultaneously, we should broaden the discussion from the MLF to such issues as unification and giving Germany a greater role in East-West negotiations. This will put the MLF in a different perspective and identify us with the policies which few Germans can reject. It will also give Erhard and Schroeder much more useful campaign material should this be an American objective. (40) Exploratory talks with France should be started. A meeting at the highest level seems to me inadvisable until there is some area of agreement. At the same time, lower level official channels seem to me clogged. The best method might be a semi-official contact by telephone with a group of individuals or a group enjoying the confidence of the White House but who can be disavowed if the French prove difficult.

Please forgive these hasty notes. They sound so dogmatic at least in part because of my (unsuccessful) effort to be brief. Not being aware of the cables, many recommendations are perhaps beside the point.

I do feel reasonably certain of one thing, however: The MLF--whether it succeeds or fails--is irrelevant to most of NATO's problems. Some form of reduced MLF is probably now inevitable, perhaps even desirable. But a great deal depends on how this happens and whether we can put it in its proper political framework. A continuation of pressures and insistence on premature solutions runs the risk of dangerously fusing anti-American, anti-German and anti-nuclear feelings in Europe. If the present course if not changes, a crisis seems inevitable.

With high regard.

that the MLF will have the support of a majority of the CDU without a European
clause. This, I am reasonably certain, Britain will not accept. Similarly, the
Federal Republic will strive for some form of majority voting in the control
body (however, granting the U.S. a veto). This, too, will be rejected by
Britain, which I believe will insist on an absolute veto for itself over every
part of what it calls the Multilateral Force. Other aspects of the British
position, such as the disengagement schemes in Germany, will not become
immediately apparent. But the possibility for mischief is obvious.

**France:** If Lucet, as any criterion, the Quai D'Orsay seems to be readier than in the past for serious discussions. However, Lucet admitted that he did not know what de Gaulle intended. (I will send you a summary of my talk with Lucet separately).

**Overall Impression:** My over-all impression of Europe is that the present State Department line is likely to fail and to fragment the Alliance still further. Moreover, so many American officials abroad seem so committed to their preferred solutions that I am not sure they can always distinguish their wishes from reality.

**Recommendations:**
(1) European affairs should be handled more directly from the White House.
(2) Before we seek to press Britain with the MLF, we should get a clearer idea of Wilson's long-term plans. We should not let him buy the pretense of American support for some of his pet projects by a formal acquiescence to the MLF -- all the less so if he is not specific about what he means by multilateral. My instinct would be to use the meeting on December 7 to learn British ideas rather than to press them to a decision. A low-key approach may take them by surprise and may in fact elicit more useful offers than an attempt to settle everything. Above all, we should avoid the impression that there are Anglo-Saxons arranging the affairs of the Alliance between themselves.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 31, 1964

Dear Henry:

I will be glad to see you on January 11,
perhaps about 11:30, but suggest that
you call my office earlier that morning
to see if there has to be any change in
time.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

March 30, 1965

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mac:

I am enclosing my notes on my conversation
with Minister Krone.

He made one point which I did not include:
He thought that his conversation with you was the
most useful he had and that the one with Rusk was
the least satisfying. He thought that you showed a
better understanding of the problems raised by the
Franco-American rift than some of the other officials.
This is the only report of the conversation that I
will make.

Let me take this opportunity also to tell you
that I think our present actions in Vietnam are
essentially right and to express my respect for the
courage with which the Administration is acting.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1965

Dear Henry:

I am slow in acknowledging yours of
April 13. As you suggest, Bahr's
remarks are disconcerting. I did not
have much time to probe while Brandt
was here, but what he said in our brief
talk was a considerable distance from
Bahr was saying. I suppose we are deal-
ing with incompletely formed opinions and
a certain amount of probing.

I am grateful for your remarks about the
President's policy in Vietnam, and have
been using your name in vain with a few
people who want to know whether any
respectable professors are with us.

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 27, 1965

JUN 2 REC'D

Dear Henry:

Just a short note to thank you for sending
me the interesting report of your conversa-
tion with Jean de la Grandville.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts

May 28, 1965

Dear Mac:

I neglected to mention in my letter to you the
other day that I would hope very much to keep the material
I sent you about De La Grandville out of official channels.
It would be highly embarrassing if it got back to him.

Secondly, I would like to introduce Mr. Ernst Kux,
the Soviet expert of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung which, as you
know, is one of the leading German language newspapers in
Europe. He has been studying North Vietnamese problems for
many years. Several years ago he wrote in German a book on
North Vietnamese strategy, most of which has proved to be
extraordinarily accurate. He feels very sanguine about our
policy there.

In any event, I thought you might be interested to
get his impressions. Since he is leaving for Washington,
I have taken the liberty of suggesting that he call your
office for an appointment when he gets there.

Of course, both he and I will fully understand if
your schedule makes it impossible for you to see him.

With every good wish.

Henry V. Kieinger

Sincerely yours,

With every good wish.

Your schedule makes it impracticable for you to see him.

Of course, both he and I will fully understand it.

Office for an appointment when he gets there.

I have taken the liberty of suggesting that he call hour
get his impressions. Since he is leaving for Washington,

booth there.

extraordinarily accurate. He feels very sincere about our
North Vietnamese strategy, most of which has proved to be
many years ago he wrote in German a book on
Europe. He has been studying North Vietnamese problems for
know, is one of the leading German language newspapers in
the Soviet press of the News Zürcher Zeitung which, as you
secondly, I would like to introduce Mr. Ernst Knauf.

It would be highly embarrassing if it got back to him.
I sent you a copy of La Grandjeune out of official channels.
Other day that I would have very much to keep the material
I neglected to mention in my letter to you the

Dear Mac:

Washington, D. C.
The White House
Mr. McGeorge Bunch

May 28, 1962

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1965

JUN 2 REC'D

Dear Henry:

I will not pass de la Grandville's remarks to anyone. As a matter of fact, although he is very careful about it, he has allowed his views to be known to one or two trusted officials already, so that if anything gets back out of the U. S. Government, he is unlikely to hold you responsible.

I would like very much to see Mr. Kux, and I will be expecting his phone call.

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

July 20, 1965

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mac:

In my last note I indicated that I would let you have a few
impressions of my trips to Europe in which over a period of six
weeks I visited London, Paris, Rome, The Hague and Bonn. Let me
group my observations by category:

(1) The MLF decision: It is often alleged that we abdicated our leadership position by removing the pressure for the MLF.

I believe this judgment to be mistaken. The people who were
hurt by the MLF decision were a small minority mostly in the Federal
Republic--and even there the MLF was not the most important factor
in the relative decline of Erhard and Schroeder. Had we pressed the
MLF, there would have been no country--except Germany--where a reliable
majority for the MLF could have been found within the government. In
every country--including Germany--the MLF would have been the subject
of acrimonious partisan debate. The failure was the one-sided pressure
of the months before and not the Presidential decision of last December.
Most leading Europeans were relieved and not disappointed by that step.

If you look at the situation country-by-country the case becomes
clearer still:

--In Britain, the majority of the Labor government was strongly
opposed to the MLF. Even if we had succeeded in pressuring Britain
into formal acceptance, the Labor government would have spent the next
months trying to scuttle the scheme by dragging their feet in its
implementation.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

- 2 -

July 20, 1965

--In Germany, if De Gaulle's recent actions could have been presented as having been provoked by the MLF, the CDU might well have been hopelessly split.

--In no other country did there exist the kind of support which could have withstood a real crisis. The Netherlands was at best lukewarm; its interest, if any, was to isolate France.

--Italy's actions would have depended entirely on domestic considerations. My conversation with Saragat left little doubt that even he--whom the State Department had always described to me as one of their staunchest allies--had little stomach for a showdown with France.

(2) The current state of the MLF/ANF Debate. It is my impression that the group which dominates the State Department's European policy is systematically blocking alternatives by carrying out the President's directives to avoid any semblance of pressure in its most literal sense. In this manner, they prevent the crystallization of any other project. After the German election, I expect them to surface a variation of the old proposal with the argument that it has now been demonstrated that there is no alternative.

Secretary McNamara's recent proposal to constitute a select committee to consult on nuclear matters is a case in point. The idea was well received in Europe. Many felt that, if anything, it did not go far enough and should have included political consultation. At the same time, senior Europeans say that they have been told by United States officials that the proposal was made without the knowledge of the State Department; that it was a minor initiative; that the MLF/ANF remains the top priority. (Of course, now that the proposal has been cold-shouldered in Paris, our official line may shift.)

I think it is a mistake to start in again where we left off last year and head once more for the same impasse. It seems to me that the McNamara proposal, carefully elaborated, would be a constructive way to get discussions started in a different framework. Even if the consultations he envisages prove unsatisfactory, their failure would be a better justification for a new nuclear structure than the obsessive reiteration of the old slogans about nuclear control. France will find it much more difficult to stay out--and if she does such a framework would create least obstacles for a post De Gaulle government to join eventually.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

- 3 -

July 20, 1965

(3) The Position of Germany. I cannot begin to do justice to this complicated problem in a letter. Suffice it to say that the impact of events of the past few years has been almost wholly unfortunate. President de Gaulle bears a heavy responsibility. But our officials are not a little to blame because of their almost complete lack of comprehension of German psychology. Most of our eminent men encountered Germany in the Adenauer era. It is easy for them to believe that Germany is the most stable ally, the most reliable, the natural pillar of our European policy. Another-- smaller--group is professionally anti-German; to them Germany is still largely unregenerate. Between these two groups the Federal Republic is subjected to oscillations which it is ill prepared to handle. The pro-German group makes demands which exceed the psychological strength of present-day Germany; the professional anti-Germans restlessly develop schemes which shake German confidence.

The dominant group in the State Department uses the Federal Republic, as the alibi and the battering ram for its one-sided, almost obsessive, anti-French bias. In their eagerness to isolate De Gaulle, eminent Americans engage in extremely dangerous anti-French tirades towards the Germans. It simply cannot be in our interest to stimulate German distrust of France or to lecture the Germans on the implications of their superior strength vis-a-vis France. (I am speaking of conversations which I heard--not reports by others.) De Gaulle's provocations are real enough; little is gained, however, if we compound his errors with our own.

If Germany is constantly asked to choose between the United States and France it will ultimately opt for unification by methods which are bound to be disruptive. To be sure, the decision is not entirely up to us. De Gaulle may force a showdown whatever our policy. In that case, we should be clearly on the defensive; the showdown should be demonstrably imposed on us. This is why I believe that the President's tactics of ignoring provocations wherever possible are essentially correct. By the same token, there is no question that the dominant group in the State Department and influential individuals outside encourage every anti-French move--sometimes openly, always tacitly. Their major objective seems to me to be to isolate and if possible to humiliate De Gaulle.

Their obsession with De Gaulle causes our officials to spend too much of their time on inventing pinpricks. It causes them constantly to overestimate the degree of opposition to De Gaulle in Europe and to misjudge the support for our favorite solutions. For months Europeans were encouraged (if not formally then privately) to use the agricultural issue to make advances toward supranationality. The judgment was that

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

- 4 -

July 20, 1965

De Gaulle always yielded to superior strength and that French farmers badly needed the Common Market. The fact is that De Gaulle rarely bluffs on fundamentals. The crisis which has resulted is unnecessary because it jeopardizes what has already been achieved. And the final result is likely to be closer to De Gaulle's conception than to ours. Have we thought through this passionate commitment to supranationality? Even if it is correct, are our methods likely to further it? I am not saying that De Gaulle's actions are the result of our provocations. My concern is that faced with a profound, philosophical challenge too many of our officials concentrate on scoring debating points and on expedients which defeat their own purpose.

The present tendency of the State Department forces it to woo the Federal Republic in order to thwart France. This excessive obeisance to the short term swings of German opinion will conclude by alienating both Paris and Bonn. It is futile because the ultimate orientation of Germany cannot be determined by a dramatic confrontation. It is dangerous because our seeming pressure magnifies the German sense of insecurity and may produce an exaggerated impression of the options available to the Federal Republic. Beneath the seemingly placid surface of Germany, all kinds of disquieting currents are developing. It would be the gravest error to turn NATO, in effect, into a German-American alliance--as I have heard it suggested.

(4) The Role of the State Department. The gropp which dominates European policy in the State Department does not seem to me responsive to the real issues in Atlantic affairs. They are focusing on one problem--that of nuclear control--which is likely to prove the least significant issue. My objection to the MLF/ANF schemes is not that they are wrong, but that they are essentially irrelevant. Some of the Grand Old Men of the early days of NATO--men whom I respect greatly--compound this tendency. And the few foreign service officers with a sense of history and a feel for Europe--like Bill Tyler--have been shunted off where they cannot affect basic decisions. The result is a single-minded absorption with one particular scheme and--I regret to say--a reporting system about the reliability of which I have serious doubts. Almost all briefings which I have received about the alleged state of mind of Europeans have been one-sided or simply wrong.

Most of the premises of the dominant group in the State Department seem to me wrong. The long-term danger in Europe is not an excessive assertion of European will but the opposite--a tendency to abdicate all responsibility.

....

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

- 5 -

July 20, 1965

Whatever the provocations, our response tends to break the back of
those elements in Europe ready to play a serious international role.
The result is that we are likely to lose whether we fail or succeed.
If we fail, Europe will organize itself against us. If we succeed,
ten years from now Europe may have lapsed into the situation of Italy
--only too eager to turn over foreign policy to us but unreliable in
any period of stress. I cannot believe that it is in our interest to
be the only country in the West conducting a serious foreign policy.
It will, in my view, exceed our psychological resources even before it
overstrains our physical strength. Even in the nuclear field, I cannot
persuade myself that our non-proliferation effort should begin by pressing
our oldest allies at a moment when nuclear weapons threaten to spread
to much more dangerous countries.

I am not suggesting that I have a master scheme which would
magically remove all difficulties. Indeed, it seems to me that we
should avoid any grandiose projects for a while. What is most needed
is an analysis of where our long-term interest lies, specifically what
kind of structure in Europe and in the Atlantic area it is in our interest
to promote, how we visualize the role of Europe in the evolution of the
East-West dialogue, how Europe and the United States can share responsibilities
globally. Cliches about community spirit and indivisible interests obscure
the issue. If we could be precise about what we want, we might distinguish
better between those aspects of French policy which are irritants and
those which are dangerous and between what is significant with respect to
the Federal Republic rather than what is convenient.

Reading these notes over I find that they repeat in large part
what I have often said elsewhere. In all likelihood I am no more immune
from finding what I expect in Europe than the people I criticize. Also,
I recognize that my views are rejected by most of the established experts
in the field (certainly within the government) and there is no reason why
you should accept my analysis rather than that of others with stronger
credentials.

With every good wish.

December 31, 1965

Dear Mac:

I do not want to let any more time go by without
telling you with what regret I read of your decision to
leavd the White House.

Those of us who had the privilege of working with
you are in a particularly good position to know with
what intelligence, subtlety and moral concern you carried
out your delicate tasks. No one is ever irreplaceable
simply because he will, in fact, be replaced but you come
closer than anyone else I know.

It was always reassuring to know that you played
such a crucial role in shaping national policy. Though
in the immediate future your impact will be less direct,
I have no doubt that in the years ahead you will make an
even greater contribution.

Perhaps this is an appropriate time to tell you also
that I think back to my association with you on the White
House staff with the greatest warmth.

With every good wish and high regard.

Henry A. Kiseinger

Sincerely yours,

House staff with the greatest warmth.
that I think back to my association with you on the White
Pergament this is an appropriate time to tell you also

even greater contribution.

I have no doubt that in the years ahead you will make an
in the immediate future your impact will be less direct,
such a crucial role in shaping national policy. Though
It was always reassuring to know that you played

simply because he will, in fact, be replaced but you come
out your delicate tasks. No one is ever irreplaceable
what intelligence, subtlety and moral concern you carried
you are in a particularly good position to know with
Those of us who had the privilege of working with

leave the White House.

telling you with what regret I read of your decision to
I do not want to let any more time go by without

Dear Mac:

December 31, 1962