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1 bit as to what we did and when, and I just think that we have
2 all been on this really difficult road of trying to deal with
3 what I call Migraine Hussein. I mean, he has really been
4 there throughout, and I think we are looking for the best
5 methods to make sure that he stays in a box that does not
6 explode and make the Middle East more complicated than it
7 already is.

8 Senator Allen: Madam Secretary, I just wanted to see if
9 there is consistency of thought and so forth since 1998.

10 I would ask Secretary Kissinger. You mentioned if not
11 now, why not now. It reminds me of Ronald Reagan's statement
12 about if not now, when. If not the United States, then who is
13 going to disarm Saddam Hussein for his clear violations. We
14 do need to have our allies.

15 Do you feel that if the United Nations does not act, that
16 we still should act with as many allies as possible in the
17 event the military action is necessary?

18 Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I do because if we do not, we
19 will face a worse problem a year or 2 or 3 from now.

20 Senator Allen: Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

21 Senator Sarbanes: Mr. Chairman, could I ask Senator
22 Allen, when he quoted whatever it was he quoted to Secretary
23 Albright, what was he quoting from?

24 Senator Allen: I was quoting from S.Con.Resolution 71,
25 which was a resolution passed in 1998 condemning Iraq's threat

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.
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1 to international peace and security. This was the second

2 resolved point.

3 Senator Sarbanes: Did that pass?

4 Senator Allen: I asked the Secretary if she supported it
5 and she said she did.

6 Secretary Albright: If I might ask. I was thinking we
7 were talking about what happened August 14th, 1998, which
8 became public law.

9 Senator Sarbanes: That is not this resolution. This
10 resolution did not pass, and the resolution that passed on
11 August 14th and the public law that passed on October 31 were
12 both more narrowly drawn. The public law on October 31 said
13 at the end: nothing in this act shall be construed to
14 authorize or otherwise speak to the issue of United States
15 armed forces except as provided in section 4(a)(2) in carrying
16 out this act. And 4(a)(2) talked about draw-down of military
17 defense articles for the Iraqi opposition.

18 And the other one, Public Law 105-235 at the end said
19 that the President is urged to take appropriate action in
20 accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the
21 United States, which of course includes, amongst other things,
22 the War Powers Act, and that was very carefully worked out in
23 the Congress.

24 And my understanding -- and if I am wrong, I certainly
25 want to be corrected -- is that the resolution from which the

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1. Senator is quoting in fact was not passed by the Congress.

2. Senator Allen: I would say, Mr. Chairman, to my good friend from Maryland I wanted to ask what her position was on this resolution. This resolution, I would say to my friend from Maryland, Senator Sarbanes, was sponsored by the following Senators who are still here and it had bipartisan support: Mr. Daschle, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Dodd, Kerry, Moynihan, Byrd, Wyden, Hollings, and Akaka, as well as others on our side of the aisle.

10. Senator Sarbanes: It did not have Senator Biden or me cosponsoring it or a number of others. In fact, it did not have Senator Lugar. I am looking at this thing. When the thing was finally worked out, there was much more narrow and careful language. That is the only point I am making.

15. And I do not know why the Secretary -- I mean, I am laying this out because I think the Secretary was put in the position of, in effect -- the premise that was given to her was that this was passed by the Congress, presumably acquiesced in by the administration. The language you quoted was not passed by the Congress. I have the language that was passed by the Congress. In both instances, the relevant paragraphs are far more narrow and pointed than what you quoted to the Secretary, which was an open-ended thing. The fact that some people went on it when it was introduced -- that was not the end product.

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I think we can all stipulate that matters in Iraq have not
 gotten less dire since 1998 when this concern was actually
 addressed by the Senate and with Secretary Albright as
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Maybe it is getting more dire, maybe it is not. I am just
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the premise of which was that that language had been adopted
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much the clarification because the language that I have here
that I was responding to was out of Public Law 105-235 that
does, in fact, have the final paragraph from which I quoted in
responding to your question.

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compliance with its international obligations, not the broad
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the administration that, as I said, gives carte blanche to the
administration to do what it wants in the Middle East. I
disagree with that, and I hope very much that that will, in

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1 the course of this, be redrafted.

2 But to the point, Senator Allen, I think that we have
3 all, over the years, tried to figure out how to deal with the
4 horror of Saddam Hussein and the mood in the country is
5 different at different times. I am very proud of what we
6 tried to do to keep him in his box.

7 Senator Allen: Well, as we develop this resolution and
8 fine tune it, if it needs fine tuning, the draft resolution --
9 and any legislative branch is naturally going to change
10 something. That is just the nature of a legislative branch of
11 the government. But it does say the President is
12 authorized to use the means he determines to be appropriate,
13 including to enforce the United Nations Security Council
14 resolutions that are referenced above in the whereas clauses.

15 But I do think that the Chairman does have some good
16 ideas that I would like to work with him on insofar as the
17 encouragement of having allies join with us.

18 The Chairman: I do not want to take up Senator Boxer's
19 time. She has been so patient.

20 But I was involved in that negotiation. I will not
21 characterize anybody else. I will speak for myself. The
22 reason why I felt comfortable in voting for the amended
23 resolution was the addition of the paragraphs that said the
24 government of Iraq is in material and unacceptable breach of
25 international obligations. Therefore, the President is urged

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1 to take appropriate action in accordance with the Constitution
2 and relevant laws of the United States.

3 The other one that we talked about, Public Law 105-338 on
4 October 31st, added the section which I may be mistaken but I
5 think I was in the room and helped draft, which was section 8,
6 rule of construction, which says, nothing in this act shall be
7 construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the issue of
8 United States armed forces except as provided in section
9 4(a)(2) in carrying out this act. And that was giving aid and
10 assistance.

11 Senator Sarbanes: To the opposition.

12 The Chairman: To the opposition.

13 Again, this is not a matter of argument. At least I am
14 not trying. Hopefully we can do what we have always done with
15 these resolutions, whether they have been sent up -- this was
16 not sent up by the administration -- but resolutions sent up
17 by the administration, going all the way back to the Gulf War
18 or as recently as 9/11. And that is, when we have got cooler
19 heads, we sit down. We have worked through it.

20 Administrations have cooperated. We have ended up with
21 something we could all live with that gave the President the
22 necessary authority needed to meet the limited objective he
23 stated. Hopefully that process is still underway and we will
24 be able to do that. I am anxious to work with the Senator to
25 incorporate, to the degree he agrees with Senator Lugar or me

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1 or anyone else, additional language.

2 But let me yield and apologize to the Senator from

3 California and blame the Senator from Maryland.

4 [Laughter.]

5 Senator Boxer: I think the Senator from Maryland is
6 right, these points are important. I cannot thank both of you
7 enough, because you have helped me cement my views, and I want
8 to tell you why. During yesterday's hearing with
9 Mr. McFarlane and Ambassador Holbrooke I spoke about how I
10 voted for force twice recently, once against Milosevic in your
11 day, Madam Secretary, and once after 9/11 under the current
12 administration, and I also spoke about my belief, very strong
13 belief in my whole life that the use of force should be a last
14 resort, and that I believe every President has an obligation
15 to lay out a path for peace before taking us to war.

16 In my view, I have not seen this President do that yet,
17 and in the view of my constituents, thousands of whom are
18 calling me -- it is unbelievable, every 2 days, we get 1,000
19 calls or e-mails They are saying they feel the President is
20 itching to go to war, and to put in a nicer way, a phrase that
21 Secretary Albright used, not pertaining to the President in
22 her opinion, but she said some in the administration have an
23 irrational exuberance for war, and I think that does speak for
24 a lot of my constituents.

25 Well, I want to thank you in particular, Secretary

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1 Albright, because you did for me something that I have not
2 heard yet before today from someone at your level. You have
3 laid out a path for peace, and I believe your statement was a
4 breath of fresh air in the drumbeat of war.

5 I also would say to Dr. Kissinger, for one brief, shining
6 moment in answer to Senator Sarbanes, I think you laid ut a
7 path for peace, a little bit more skeptically than Secretary
8 Albright, but nonetheless, it was there, and I can tell you
9 that I take pleasure in small victories as this debate moves
10 forward. For the first time, I have seen experts lay out a
11 path to avoid bloodshed, and I understand it is not an easy
12 path. I understand it might not work. I understand it will
13 take a strong, intrusive, unfettered inspection regime,
14 followed by dismantlement of anything found.

15 I personally demand that Iraq live up to the U.N.
16 resolutions, particularly regarding inspection and
17 dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction. They agreed to
18 it. They must live up to it, and the world must ensure that,
19 not just our Nation, because if it is just our Nation, I am
20 very worried, as the Senator from the largest State in the
21 Nation, about the risks and the cost borne by our people. The
22 world must step up to the plate, and I think the world will if
23 we do this right.

24 Yesterday, Senator Danny Inouye took to the floor. Danny
25 Inouye is a war hero. He has more medals than, I do not know,

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1 probably anyone that I know.

2 The Chairman: Including the Medal of Honor.

3 Senator Boxer: Including the Medal of Honor, and I want
to tell you what he said. He said, there are those who plan
war and there are those who fight war, and as we sit here
talking about post war regime in Iraq, as we sit and plan for
that, I want us to think for a moment the path we are taking
if we do not follow the path for peace that I heard outlined
here today, and I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman,
at this time to introduce into the record an article in
today's USAToday.

12 It is entitled, In Iraq's Arsenal, Nature's Deadliest
13 Poison. Botulinum toxin might be the most diabolical of
14 Saddam's terror tools, but the U.S. is far from ready to
15 protect its troops. I would like to put that in the record.

16 The Chairman: Without objection.

17 [The information referred to follows:]

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1 Senator Boxer: I think sometimes we are not paying
2 enough attention to this, at least in my opinion.

3 I want to say that I listened to Condoleezza Rice with
4 great interest, and I spoke to the Chairman about this, and
5 maybe I could get his attention on what Condoleezza Rice said
6 today about the presence of Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Madeleine
7 Albright, Secretary Albright, you referred to this, and to me
8 it was very interesting.

9 It seems a whole new line is developing here as a
10 rationale, and since she raised the question, which we have
11 been briefed on but none of us really raised it, I want to say
12 today what I believe to be the case. I believe there may be
13 some Al Qaeda there. I also believe, in my opinion, from what
14 I know, there is more Al Qaeda in Pakistan. There is more Al
15 Qaeda in Africa, and there is more Al Qaeda in the United
16 States of America itself, in this Nation, and so those of my
17 colleagues who bring up not taking our eye off the ball in the
18 war against terrorism, and to you, Madam Secretary, for
19 mentioning that, I think that is very important.

20 To me, the issue in Iraq is simple. Weapons of mass
destruction have got to be inspected. We have got to find
21 them if they are there. We have got to get them dismantled.
22 But all these other issues, I think, added now are very
23 interesting, and go to some of the cynicism that I hear among
24 my constituents, and I want to put that point out there.

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I have a question, believe it or not, that deals with the
Carnegie Foundation. The Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace released a study called, quote, Iraq, a new approach,
unquote, which advocates a policy of U.N.-sanctioned, coerced
inspections. This plan envisions that an armed inspection
implementation force would be added to support international
inspectors. I wonder if either of you have read this report,
or have a feeling about it, because as I search for a path to
peace, it is through the inspection regime, but I want to make
sure it is a strong inspection regime, and I think that the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace may have come up
with some idea that we can seize on and develop and I wonder
if you, Secretary Albright, and then Secretary Kissinger,
could respond.

Ms. Albright: Secretary Boxer, I think that -- I have
not read the report. I have read about it, and I do find it
an interesting concept, because part of the issue is how to
try to get intrusive inspections that actually have some teeth
to them, and while I think there probably are some technical
difficulties to it, I think it is certainly worth exploring.

If I might also say, I know this is not an easy subject
to bring up, but I do not think it would hurt if we considered
the fact that Saddam Hussein is a war criminal, and the War
Crimes Tribunal made a big difference when we were dealing
with Milosevic, and I think this is something we might also

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1 think about.

2 Senator Boxer: Actually, that was my next question. My

3 time has run out, but I will put it in the record and hope

4 that you can respond to it. I would greatly appreciate it.

5 The Chairman: Madam Secretary, I proposed that 5 months

6 ago. He should be declared a war criminal.

7 Senator Boxer: Can we hear from Dr. Kissinger?

8 Dr. Kissinger: I do not agree with the statements that

9 have been heard around here about the irrational exuberance of
10 the administration towards war. The administration is facing
11 the problem on which we all agree, the existence of weapons of
12 mass destruction. They are facing the problem that if we
13 acquiesce in that now, they will continue to grow. We will
14 face the same problem a year or 2 or 3 from now.

15 The President went to the United Nations and put the case
16 to the United Nations, and therefore started the process,
17 which I am confident he will let run to a reasonable
18 conclusion. We have all agreed here we are talking about
19 months and not years, so the difference in regard to all of
20 this is relatively small.

21 Now, with respect to that inspection system, I have
22 talked to General Boyd, who was one of the drafters, and I
23 have read the report, and I put a sentence in my statement
24 about a stand-by force and a stand-by authority when I
25 discussed the general requirement for inspection, so I think

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1 it is a useful idea, and if an inspection system were to be
2 worked out, that would be a possible element in it.

3 The only warning I would issue is not to use inspection
4 as a means of avoiding the problem and facing the same issue
5 2, 3, 4 years from now. We should in good faith see what can
6 be worked out. I cannot make a big contribution because I do
7 not know enough about it, and I think the administration will
8 do this because, in fact, they will have to answer the
9 question of the inspection system as it goes through the
10 process, but then we will have to face the issue within a
11 limited period of time of action if that does not prove
12 feasible.
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14 Senator Boxer: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
15 The Chairman: I apologize to the Senator from Rhode
16 Island for this additional intervention, and it will just take
17 a second, but I want to make sure the record is straight. My
18 understanding was, the comment was made earlier on that some
19 within the administration were engaged in irrational
20 exuberance about war. I do not think that was said of the
21 President.
22
23 The second point is --
24 Senator Boxer: I said that, Mr. Chairman.
25 The Chairman: I know. I just want to make sure what we
26 are talking about here, because we are trying to all -- and
27 the witnesses are incredibly helpful to this degree. We are

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1 trying to work something out here. We are trying to get this
2 cooperatively. We are not looking for disagreement. We are
3 looking for agreement to deal with what we all agree is a bad
4 guy and a bad situation, meaning Saddam.

5 Part of the reason why I think we are in this dilemma is
6 that as recently as today in the press -- and I can tell you
7 from my personal experience there is still real disagreement
8 within this administration about how to proceed. Now, I know
9 the Secretary of State is going to tell us there is not much,
10 but there is. There has been at least up until today, and so
11 part of our problem relates to whether or not we pick up the
12 paper and read a statement made by, say, Mr. Wolfowitz, as
13 opposed to a statement made by the Secretary of State.
14 Sometimes they are way apart.

15 The President is working his way through, deciding who he
16 agrees with on each of the things, but guaranteed there is a
17 fundamental difference being presented to the President on
18 these issues.

19 And the second point is, the Senator from Indiana and I
20 had an opportunity to meet with the Russian foreign minister,
21 Mr. Ivanov. We asked about amendments to a new resolution in
22 the Security Council. His initial response to us was, there
23 was no need for one.

24 As we pursued this along the lines of Dr. Kissinger's
25 comments and Secretary Albright's comments, we said the

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1 inspection regime as played out prior to them being removed

2 was not good enough. The point Dr. Kissinger made, we could

3 not interview potential defectors and/or collaborators because

4 Kofi had come along and said, you are allowed to have an

5 Iranian military person standing in the room. That is

6 unacceptable.

7 We also discussed the possibility of the need for a

8 military force to accompany the inspectors, and to that, and I

9 am anxious to hear what the Secretary of State has to say, the

10 foreign minister said he was open to that The Russians were

11 open to that. So I would not be so quick -- and I know

12 neither of the witnesses are suggesting it. I would not be so

13 quick to suggest that Secretary Powell may not be able to pull

14 off something very positive here to get us down this road we

15 all say we want to go down.

16 So I just want to make those two points as it relates to

17 how it is beginning to move, and hopefully, God Willing, and

18 my grandpop used to say, and the crick not rising, we could

19 end up at the end of the day with the same kind of resolution

20 agreement we had as we work through the 1998 resolution with

21 sufficient safeguards built into it.

22 But at any rate -- and Senator, you and the Senator from

23 Florida can take more time than anybody has had on this

24 questioning to ask your questions, because you have been so

25 patient.

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1 Senator Chafee: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I know we all share the same goals and had a good discussion about that, but one of the areas that does concern me is the international relations that have been, the dynamics that have been created by this initiative and, of course, the elections in Germany are, I guess, on the front burner as to how that became an issue in that country.

8 But one -- and you read the comments from the various international leaders from around the country, whether it is China, Japan, Kuwait, even our friends in Canada, they are all expressing concerns about this, but particularly one of the quotes was from President Mubarak, who is maybe one of the deans in the Arab world, has been there since the early eighties as the leader of his country, and he said just several weeks ago, if you strike Iraq, not one Arab leader will be able to control the angry outburst of the masses.

17 And maybe we should not argue, just for the sake of discussion, about whether he is right or wrong, but supposing he is right, then what happens, and from your experience, maybe you could take us down that path. What countries are most susceptible in the region to the angry outburst of the masses?

23 Jordan, certainly King Abdullah has expressed concerns, and where do we go? Then do we go into Jordan and help him out? Do we go into Saudi Arabia or Egypt to help him out?

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1 Maybe you could go down that path a little bit, if he is
2 right, just for the sake of argument.

3 Ms. Albright: First of all, could I just say I
4 appreciate Chairman Biden straightening out the business about
5 exuberance, because I did not say it about the President or
6 the whole administration, but I do think, as I said earlier,
7 that there are those who had an agenda even before this
8 started, so that concerns me.

9 I think Secretary Kissinger is right when he says that if
10 we go in and do this ultimately there will be some that have
11 said they would have nothing to do with us that will have
12 something to do with us, so I do not dispute that.

13 On the other hand, I do think that we have had many
14 signals from various Arab leaders in the region who are very
15 concerned about what the sparks of this might initiate, and
16 King Abdullah has made that very clear. I think the Saudis,
17 one of the reasons that they have backed off a lot of this is
18 that they are concerned about what happens on their street,
19 and that we do have to be concerned about how, that we find
20 ourselves in the rather peculiar position, if I can put it
21 this way, that we might be opposed to those who disagree with
22 their Governments, but are not necessarily extremists about
23 how this is carried out.

24 So I think again, as people consider what the effect of
25 this will be, we need to hear more from those who have up-to-

87

1 date intelligence as to what the effect of all of this will be
2 in those countries, because there is little doubt in my mind
3 that there will be outpourings of sentiment against what we
4 have done.

5 Dr. Kissinger: I am assuming we will not act unless we
6 believe it is in the overwhelming interest of national and
7 international security. If that is our judgment, if that is
8 the judgment of the administration, then it cannot be deterred
9 by threats of outbursts in the streets, because that will
10 happen. That will then be a permanent source of blackmail.

11 I also believe that the countries you mentioned have
12 shown a pretty good capacity to control their streets, but we
13 cannot be driven in the fundamental judgments of what is
14 necessary for international order by threats of
15 demonstrations.

16 The growth of these stockpiles is a serious problem and
17 must be dealt with. It hopefully can be dealt with through
18 the processes which are now being conducted, but I do not
19 think that the demonstrations are going to be a disastrous
20 element.

21 I also think that the German election was not caused by
22 our policy. There were many elements within German politics
23 that produced this reaction, and will almost certainly be
24 dealt with, will be resolved in the weeks to come in a
25 cooperative spirit.

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1 Senator Sarbanes: Would the Senator yield on that very

2 point for just a minute?

3 Senator Chafee: Certainly.

4 Senator Sarbanes: I am interested to hear Dr. Kissinger

5 say that, because on January 13 you wrote -- and I would only
6 make this point because earlier in this discussion you said we

7 should not engage in speculation about individual countries,
8 and I wanted to just quote what you said then. Talking about

9 building up this movement against Hussein you said, Britain
10 will not easily abandon the pivotal role, based upon its
11 special relationship with the United States, that it has
12 earned for itself in the evolution of the crisis, nor will
13 Germany move into active opposition to the United States,
14 especially in an election year, end of sentence.

15 Dr. Kissinger: I think all of us who have been concerned
16 with German-American relations were surprised by the fact that
17 an anti-American appeal could evoke such feelings.

18 Senator Sarbanes: But it does underscore, I think, the
19 warning you gave today about the danger of speculating about
20 individual countries.

21 Dr. Kissinger: That is right. I had not understood the
22 degree to which this feeling had evolved, but I think that
23 feeling has deeper causes than reactions to the immediate
tactics on this situation.

25 Senator Sarbanes: I thank the Senator.

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1 Senator Chafee: Thank you. I will just follow up a
2 little bit.

3 At a hearing we had earlier this month, I asked one of
4 the witnesses about spontaneous combustion that has happened,
5 and specifically I mentioned Iran, and how we were caught so
6 flat-footed. It just seemed to happen overnight. We did not
7 even get our embassy evacuated, obviously.

8 He responded, the witness responded by saying yes, as a
9 matter of fact, one of the leading scholars in the area wrote
10 a book, Iran Under the Pahlavis, by Professor Lenkowski, if I
11 have pronounced it right, and saying it is the most stable
12 regime in the region -- his book was not a best-seller -- so
13 we have to be aware of that, and when President Mubarak is
14 making these type of statements, no Arab leader will be able
15 to control the outbursts -- let me get it right, the angry
16 outbursts of the masses, I think we have to listen, and if we
17 are going down this road, go down it.

18 And I guess I will ask one more time, if Jordan is, the
19 Arab leader cannot control the outburst of the masses, or
20 Egypt, for the sake of argument, then what do we do?

21 Ms. Albright: Could I, Senator -- I think that -- I hate
22 to, I really do hate to disagree with Henry on this. I think
23 that as we look at what the causes of terrorism are -- I
24 remember, Chairman Biden asked me when I testified sometime
25 ago whether poverty was the cause of terrorism, and I remember

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1 saying, we do not know that.

2 We do know that there are people who are looking for

3 reasons to be opposed to us that are part of societies that

4 are dysfunctional, or where there is a great gap between the

5 rich and the poor, or people have no way of knowing what their

6 future will be, that they are out there as potential recruits

7 for terrorism and therefore, if the streets explode, it is not

8 just a matter of controlling them by the monarch or the ruler.

9 It may be impossible, and it may, in fact, create an

10 environment that hurts us in the overall fight against

11 terrorism, and that is my concern.

12 Senator Chafee: I would agree with that.

13 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 Dr. Kissinger: One has to go back to the fundamental

15 question, there are stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction

16 in Iraq, in violation of the U.N. resolution. We are engaged

17 in a diplomatic process to attempt to deal with him. Can we

18 be -- first of all, does Mubarak really mean this, and

19 secondly, even if he meant it, can we then in the end be

20 deterred from doing what we should do, and leave these weapons

21 undisturbed, and will that not create a worse problem with the

22 streets as time goes on? That is the question that needs to

23 be addressed.

24 Senator Chafee: I know my time is up, but I guess I did

25 not get an answer to the question, what does happen, just for

91

1 the sake of argument? Do we preemptively go into Jordan if
2 there is someone there, but I do not want to take any time.

3 Dr. Kissinger: The word preemptively is being thrown
4 around too loosely in the debate. It has always been
5 understood that if there is a fundamental threat to the
6 national security, that one reserves the option for military
7 action. There have been occasions in the past, when the
8 Jordanian Government was threatened, that the United States
9 was willing to give it very substantial support.

10 I do not know -- nobody would recommend moving American
11 troops into Egypt or Jordan on the basis of riots in the
12 streets. This will have to be dealt with when the issue
13 arises, in a way that is not determined by an abstract theory
14 of preemption, but by an assessment of the national security
15 and international security as it is perceived at that moment.

16 Senator Chafee: Thank you very much.

17 The Chairman: Senator Nelson.

18 Senator Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am intrigued
19 by the declaration of this preemption doctrine. As I read the
20 Constitution, the President in his role as Commander in Chief
21 can act preemptively for the protection of the interest of the
22 United States, so what is different in this declaration of
23 preemption, and if it is an emphasis on it, is there a
24 weakening of the actual constitutional rights of the Commander
25 in Chief?

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Dr. Kissinger: This is a question you should address to administration witnesses. I was traveling. I have only read it on the Internet. I have not had the document in my hand yet. I read it on the Internet, but I have read it. I have expressed my general view in my statement and elsewhere I do not believe it is in the American interest to proclaim a universal theory of preemption that any nation can use to protect itself against its definition of a threat.

I believe also that it would be wise -- I also believe that the kind of terrorism that now exists, that to deal with that is incompatible with some of the notions of sovereignty, as they had evolved in the 17th, 18th, and 19th Century, which govern the rules among nations, so that there is an element of preemption inherent in the nature of the terrorist threat and in the nature of the modern reference.

I therefore think it would be useful to initiate a general international discussion, or Security Council discussion of what principles of preemption could be universally applied so that not every major nation could attack every nation around its periphery, but I have not a resolution to this problem, but I think this is -- as I remember the statement as I read it, preemption is listed as an absolutely last resort in that document, and primarily aimed at terror, but one really ought to ask the people who drafted it. My view on preemption is the one that I have

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1 stated.

2 Senator Nelson: Madam Secretary.

3 Ms. Albright: Well, I think that it becomes a very kind
4 of shadowy area in terms of what the right of self-defense is
5 versus the preemption, and I think you raise a very important
6 point, that perhaps it does undermine the whole concept of
7 self-defense if, in fact, you begin now to see it as a new
8 doctrine, and that is what has concerned me, is that all of a
9 sudden -- you know, everybody has been looking for a term for
10 the post cold war era and whether deterrence still works, and
11 these are very important discussions, but I do not think they
12 should be superimposed on what we are trying to deal with now,
13 because it is so unclear, and I agree with Secretary Kissinger
14 that it would be worth having a national as well as an
15 international discussion of this, not in any kind of an overly
16 rapid or hysterical way.

17 Dr. Kissinger: I think in retrospect, though, I did not
18 argue that at the time. It would have been appropriate to
19 take preemptive action against bin Laden in Afghanistan, and
20 as these terrorist cells exist, it cannot be precluded, but
21 what it means in an international system as both a concept and
22 something that can be more or less universally accepted so
23 that it does not become arbitrary, that is something that we
24 are at the beginning of the problem, not at the solution of
25 it.

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1 Senator Nelson: Mr. Chairman, I have come away from this
2 discussion and others we have had both in this committee and
3 our other committee, the Armed Services Committee, thinking
4 that the draft resolution that was sent to us clearly needs to
5 be changed, that Ambassador Holbrooke had four suggestions of
6 change yesterday that I think were excellent, and I am just
7 curious as to our two witnesses here.

8 One was to delete the clause that would seemingly give
9 carte blanche to go into the whole area, and nail it down just
10 as a resolution as to Iraq, another one was to make reference
11 to a U.N. Security Council resolution, a third would be the
12 executive branch reporting clause to the Congress, and a
13 fourth was a statement, a clause as to the post conflict Iraq,
14 and what would be our responsibilities there.

15 Are we moving in the right direction with such changes to
16 the resolution?

17 Ms. Albright: Well, I do not think that as a private
18 citizen it is absolutely right to give you suggestions on
19 this, but my problem with the resolution that came here is its
20 broadness, and you all have in previous ways worked out a
21 resolution that makes clearer what the co-responsibility of
22 the executive and legislative branch is in this, and as
23 somebody that was in an administration that we always have had
24 discussions about the war powers, I do think that it is up to
25 you all to figure out how to refine this, and it is essential,

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1 frankly, but I am not sure it is appropriate for me to make
2 suggestions.

3 Senator Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 Dr. Kissinger: I have not studied the resolution enough
to make suggestions. As a general proposition, I think the
6 President should be given authority of a nature that makes
7 clear that the Congress understands the relationship of the
8 Iraq issue to other issues in the area, and does not just deal
9 with it or look at it in Iraq terms, and that the President is
10 given adequate flexibility to deal with this as to reporting
11 requirements.

12 Senator Sarbanes: I am not clear on that answer. Is it
13 your view the President should be authorized to take military
14 action with respect to issues in the region, and not just with
15 respect to Iraq?

16 Dr. Kissinger: I am now most concerned about the issue
17 of Iraq. I think the resolution should clearly indicate the
18 relationship of the Iraqi issue to others, but I really have
19 not studied it enough to make drafting suggestions.

20 The Chairman: Senator Brownback.

21 Senator Brownback: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
22 both very much for being here, and for lasting through this.

23 A couple of quick things. I want to apologize for not
24 being here during a portion of it. There were other hearings
25 I had to be at.

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1 A point that I would like to make is, at least for this
2 Member, if we need to narrow the resolution or add
3 restrictions or reporting requirements to that, I would be
4 open to any of that being done as long as at the end of the
5 day it allows the President the use of force, including
6 military force against Iraq if the administration decides it
7 is necessary to move on forward.

8 So working the wording on this to make it clear that it
9 is not expansive, it cannot be used in other places, I think
10 that is good, and if we can do that and get a large, positive
11 vote for it, because I think that is an important statement to
12 make, that it be a large vote in the Senate for moving forward
13 on this, I think it would be a very positive statement to do.

14 Secretary Kissinger, I wanted to ask you, in looking
15 through your statement about a post Saddam Iraq and the impact
16 on terrorism if we do move forward against Iraq -- and I
17 apologize if this question has been asked in another forum or
18 not while I was not here, but I see a problem if we do not
19 move forward -- and you articulate that some people will ask
20 why now, and you would ask, why not now in your original
21 statement. I can see a lot of difficulty if we move forward,
22 but I see a lot of difficulty if we do not move forward, and I
23 think there is a substantial positive scenario if we do move
24 forward on Iraq, not on the basis of a preemption doctrine,
25 but on the basis of what he has failed to do with U.N.

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1 resolutions, that we could have a substantial positive impact

2 on the Iraqi people and the war on terrorism if this is done

3 right, and with the right reasoning in place.

4 Dr. Kissinger: That is my view.

5 Senator Brownback: I would like you to articulate, how

6 do you see this impacting the whole region and its war on

7 terrorism if we do move forward with this war on Iraq?

8 Dr. Kissinger: There are many causes for why groups join

9 terrorism, and Madeleine has indicated some of them. I would

10 focus on the toleration by Governments of terrorist groups

11 because they are afraid of the consequences of not tolerating

12 them and, secondly, by the perception that in the end the

13 United States and its friends are too weak to defend their

14 fundamental interests.

15 So for all of these reasons, I believe that a

16 demonstration that the United States will insist on carrying

17 out the obligations that a country has undertaken in

18 particularly this region, and especially with respect to

19 weapons of mass destruction, will have a positive impact on

20 the war against terrorism.

21 I do not accept the proposition, as I have said, that

22 there is a distinction between the war on terrorism and this

23 problem. I believe the two are closely related. The war

24 against terrorism must be pursued energetically, and I think

25 our credibility with respect to it will be enhanced if we act

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.
1111 14th Street, N.W. Suite 400 · 1-800-FOR-DEPO Washington, DC 20005

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1 as I have indicated and, more importantly, as the

2 administration has indicated on the Iraq issue.

3 Senator Brownback: Previously I have worked a lot with
4 the Iraqi National Congress, the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998
5 that Secretary Albright, you worked on its implementation, and
6 with Senator Kerrey of Nebraska, Bob Kerrey, the former
7 Senator. Both of us concluded -- and this is somewhat wishful
8 thinking, but I do not think so, that Iraq will move to
9 democracy and will be, we would hope and think, clearly very
10 possible in the near future, a strong democracy. It has
11 resources underneath it. It has an educated population. It
12 is not without its difficulties and divisions within the
13 country, north and south and in the middle, but that this
14 could be a very strong force for democracy once Saddam is
15 removed in that region.

16 Secretary Albright, you would have dealt with that a lot
17 as Secretary, and probably had a lot of chance to think about
18 that recently as well.

19 Ms. Albright: Well, I think it would be much wished, and
20 clearly the population of Iraq is a little bit different in
21 terms of its modernity and education from some of the other
22 places, but the question that I think we have, and we raised,
23 was, what is the plan to get from here to there, that it will
24 not be simple, that there is not only the potential of
25 democracy, but also the potential of internecine fighting

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1 before we get there, and what I have wanted to hear a little

2 bit more from the administration, what is the plan from

3 getting here to there?

4 I am chairman of the board of the National Democratic

5 Institute, that has been working very hard at looking at

6 different ways that democracy might be possible in the Middle

7 East. We have programs in Yemen and Bahrain, and I am not one

8 of those people who believes that it is impossible to have

9 democracy in the Middle East, but I think that we have to get

10 there in a systematic way, and understand how we get there,

11 and I must say that while I have a great deal of respect for

12 those people who try to work with the Iraqi National Congress,

13 it is not a group that I think is quite -- has shown so far

14 that it has the continuity and the cooperation within it to be

15 ready to have democracy.

16 I have talked to the Kurdish leaders. They would so much

17 like to hear us talking about not regime change but a freeing

18 of Iraq, and I think we should be thinking about that, but I

19 think it is a long way between here and there, and that is why

20 we need to see a little bit more how we get there, and what

21 the role of the United States in that will be.

22 Dr. Kissinger: I would say that the choices with respect

23 to the weapons of mass destruction are relatively limited.

24 Our choices after a military operation require us to bring

25 about a substantial improvement in conditions in Iraq. I

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1 would consider it unlikely that one could move to democracy,

2 full democracy in a very brief time, but I think it is

3 essential to move to its accountability of the Government

4 institutions towards some type of constitutional system, and

5 to a substantial improvement in the lives of the population,

6 but we cannot do that alone. This requires an international

7 effort.

8 Senator Brownback: I would certainly agree with that. I

9 just -- I think there is a potential to do something

10 extraordinarily positive for a lot of people and

11 extraordinarily positive for our security here, not without

12 huge risks, substantial risks, but the risks of waiting I have

13 concluded are greater than those of acting now.

14 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15 The Chairman: You have been very patient. With your

16 permission, I would like to let Senator Sarbanes -- he says he

17 has another question, and I know you missed your shuttles, two

18 of them here.

19 Senator Sarbanes: Mr. Chairman, I am looking at a

20 dispatch from a Virginia paper reporting on a meeting at the

21 University of Virginia on Tuesday at the Miller Center, at

22 which General Scowcroft and Secretary Eagleburger spoke. They

23 had a crowd of, it says here of over 900 people, and the

24 director of the center says, I do not know of a larger

25 gathering, or an event of this kind in the city in a long

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1 time.

2 At that event, General Scowcroft said, America cannot

3 fight a global war on terrorism without the active assistance

4 of other nations, and must consider what the consequences of

5 actions taken in Iraq might be for that international

6 cooperation. Saddam is a terrible, evil man, he said, but he

7 is not a problem for us because of terrorism. If we

8 antagonize the world, it could cripple world support for the

9 war on terrorism. We cannot win the war on terrorism without

10 international support.

11 And, of course, earlier, a little over a month ago,

12 General Scowcroft had an article in the Wall Street Journal in

13 which he said, amongst other things, an attack on Iraq now

14 would seriously jeopardize our counterterrorist campaign.

15 Now, Secretary Kissinger, you have argued here this

16 morning just to the contrary. You think an attack on Iraq

17 would help the counterterrorism campaign, but General

18 Scowcroft is very strong on this point. I mean, he argues it

19 with considerable force, so what is your take on this,

20 Secretary Albright?

21 Ms. Albright: Well, I agree with what General Scowcroft

22 has said. That has kind of been my point, is that basically

23 the war on terrorism I think we have been told by the

24 President is our top priority, and I do think that in many

25 ways, either because assets are removed, or because we cannot

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1 get the kind of cooperation we need from the rest of the
2 international community for pursuing the terrorists, that this
3 in some ways is an additional task that we do not need right
4 now.

5 But I think, Senator, the problem that we are all having
6 in this is that there is nothing that is written in stone in
7 this, that there are answers that are not out there, and we
8 are all, I think, trying to seek them, and my personal opinion
9 is that, as you pointed out earlier, we have not finished in
10 Afghanistan. In fact, far from it.

11 Senator Sarbanes: We may not have finished elsewhere. I
12 was struck by Secretary Kissinger's statement here, and I just
13 alluded to it before, and I want to come back to it. At the
14 bottom of page 1 of your statement, bases for terrorists have
15 been established in several countries, and I am now quoting,
16 usually in areas where the Governments can plausibly deny
17 control, are actually not in control, such as in Yemen,
18 Somalia, or perhaps Indonesia and Iran, close quote.

19 Now, should we not be focused on that specific problem at
20 this time, if these terrorists have established these bases,
21 this infrastructure, a la what they had in Afghanistan,
22 although presumably not as fully developed, should not the
23 immediate focus of our attention be to figure out how to
24 destroy that infrastructure?

25 Dr. Kissinger: General Scowcroft is a long-time

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1 associate of mine, and friend, for whom I have very high

2 regard. We just have a serious difference of opinion on that

3 subject. I do not believe that the war against these bases is

4 competitive with the need to destroy the weapons of mass

5 destruction in Iraq and, indeed, I believe that a success,

6 either diplomatic or military, in destroying these weapons of

7 mass destruction will enhance our ability to conduct another

8 war. Scowcroft has a different opinion.

9 Senator Sarbanes: What do you think we should do about
10 these four countries here?

11 Dr. Kissinger: Well, one would have to deal with them,
12 and I do not think there is a general rule. Somalia has no
13 Government, really, no effective Government, and therefore the
14 question is, what are these places actually doing? Yemen has
15 a Government, but not in every region of the country. With
16 respect to bases from which terrorist attacks are being
17 planned against the United States, or might be making plans,
18 we cannot exclude, ultimately, the use of military action.

19 Now, obviously, a country like Indonesia is of a
20 magnitude where this is not something that should be done
21 except in the most extreme provocation, which does not exist
22 right now. It is not even clear whether there are bases, as
23 some people claim, on these islands, so one would have to do
24 this country by country, and depending on the nature of the
25 threat.

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1 The Chairman: Not that you ever need me to defend you,

2 Dr. Kissinger, but as I listened to Senator Sarbanes and your

3 response, am I missing something, or is there -- it seems to

4 me that your underlying premise is that if and when the

5 President takes action, he is not going to be antagonizing the

6 rest of the world, that he is going to have a sufficient

7 portion of the rest of the world with him. Is that -- I mean,

8 because I think everybody agrees --

9 Dr. Kissinger: That is my underlying premise.

10 The Chairman: Again, though there is a disagreement, one

11 of the things that I find the most difficult as I try to go

12 through this --

13 Dr. Kissinger: It depends upon how you define the rest

14 of the world, but as a general principle, if you take all the

15 major countries and all the other countries, I do not

16 believe --

17 Senator Sarbanes: What is your analysis if it is done

18 unilaterally?

19 The Chairman: In other words --

20 Senator Sarbanes: What is your analysis if it is done

21 unilaterally, American military action unilaterally?

22 Dr. Kissinger: I do not believe it will happen.

23 Senator Sarbanes: But we have to reason this through, do

24 we not?

25 Dr. Kissinger: But I am convinced that --

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1. Senator Sarbanes: Would you condition the President's ability to act on the premise that it not be unilateral?

3. Dr. Kissinger: I think we pay a higher price if we act unilaterally, but I would have enough confidence in the President, if he does act, that I think that I would assume that it will have been necessary.

7. Senator Sarbanes: Well, the rhetoric that has been used it seems is moving us increasingly to the position where we do not have options. If they do not act, then we say, aha, he did not act. He said he was going to act, unilaterally or not, and he did not do it.

12. The Chairman: Well, if I can, you have been here 3 hours You have been incredible. I just want to conclude by, 13 a) thanking you, but b), also pointing out what I think is a 14 fair statement, I hope is a fair statement, and that is that, 15 as it relates to Saddam Hussein in Iraq, as policymakers writ 16 large, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 17 Defense, they are never going to have more than 75 percent of 18 the facts they need to know to be certain. 19

20. There is no place we reach the point where there is 21. certainty, so where we peel off among us is the degree to 22. which it seems to me -- it is not observation, but the degree 23. to which we think certain things are going to fall into place. 24. I happen to agree with Dr. Kissinger on this point. I cannot 25. fathom the President going alone. I just cannot fathom the

106

1 President going alone.

2 If I am wrong about that -- and I am going to end up

3 having to take a chance here when I vote. If I am wrong about

4 that, I have made a tragic mistake, because he would be making

5 a tragic mistake if he went alone, but that comes down to a

6 little bit of faith here. I mean, it comes down to the point

7 where, at least for me, what I do not know I have to look at,

8 and based on my personal conversations, public conversations,

9 I have to take a chance. We all do at some point. We are not

10 going to get all the facts here.

11 One point I would make, though, and I publicly urge the

12 President, he made a very compelling case to the United

13 Nations as to why Iraq has violated the United Nations

14 standards. That is a different case than the case to the

15 American people of what he is asking the American people to be

16 prepared to do.

17 I will end where I began this hearing. I am absolutely

18 convinced that no matter how well-formulated a foreign policy,

19 it cannot be sustained without the informed consent of the

20 American people, and at this moment we do not have that

21 informed consent.

22 You go home -- and I will just read from today's paper,

23 the Washington Times. It says, an increasing number of

24 Republican lawmakers are saying that President Bush has not

25 made a convincing case of using force against Iraq, although

107

1 they expect the Congress to overwhelmingly approve a
2 resolution authorizing military force.

3 Representative Michael N. Castle of Delaware, a very
4 good, personal friend, said the same thing I have been saying
5 at home, and what I have been hearing at home. He said that
6 the administration lobbying job on Capitol Hill has been so
dismal that the best arguments by far thus far have been made
7 by Tony Blair. He goes on to say, there is almost no
8 discussion with the administration, said Mr. Castle, a member
9 of the House Intelligence Committee.

11 I do not know if we are all glued to the Sunday talk
12 shows, but we are not. Most of us have questions. Members of
13 Congress are not getting the information. Quote, no
14 Republican mentioned the public disagreements among the
15 Democrats. I am looking for more information, said
16 Representative Ray La Hood of Illinois, a Republican member of
17 the Intelligence Committee. You go on and on.

18 Now, that does not mean the case is not there. That does
19 not mean the case is not there. I have the advantage or
20 disadvantage of having access to, on a regular basis, the
21 Secretary of State, the President because of this job, but I
22 really think it is very important, very important that the
case be made in more detail, and not confuse having made the
23 case of a violation of U.N. resolutions as being synonymous
24 with having made the case to the American people that we may

108

1 be asking them -- not only, as my friend from Kansas says,
2 taking a chance here, we have to be prepared. Are we
3 prepared?

4 For example, we had testimony in our second set of
5 hearings from a retired executive director, Colonel Scott
6 Feil, F-e-i-l, whose job was after-conflict resolution
7 questions and what we do. He says, the requirements are
8 providing a core security for the largest city, about 10
9 million in population, in the largest State, which is about 40
10 percent of the population, and humanitarian efforts, securing
11 WMD and associated facilities, patrolling the Iranian border
12 areas, the Kurdish areas, protecting the Shat-el-Arab oil
13 fields, monitoring the region from the Tigris to the
14 Euphrates, and Syrian border -- the Tigris and the Euphrates
15 contain the bulk of the population -- and then conducting the
16 integrated disarmament and demobilization process is
17 coordinated with the integrated efforts.

18 He goes on to say, the total cost of this force, once
19 again based on U.S. equivalence -- there is wide variation in
20 the country -- could range up to $16 billion and a force of
21 75,000 to operate within Iraq.

22 Now, it may not be 75,000, but I will conclude by saying,
23 in my last meeting with the President, along with 10 other,
24 quote, congressional leaders, the President turned to me in
25 the presence of everyone, as he asked other people, and he

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1 said, Mr. Chairman, what do you think, and I said,

2 Mr. President, I will be with you as long as you make a clear

3 case to the American people, including telling them we are

4 going to have to be there for a while, we are going to have to

5 put American forces on the ground there for a while, and it

6 could cost a lot of money. His response was, I will do that.

7 That has not been done yet.

8 Senator Brownback: Mr. Chairman, you are very thorough.

9 Would you mind if I make just a quick comment on this regard, because I think you have got quite a valid point. I mentioned to other people the calls into my office, many are running against this, even though polling numbers say they are for it.

13 What the President did at the U.N. was, he spoke at the
14 U.N., and I did not hear new information come forward, but he
15 recited, here is the case. I think we should have the
16 President up to a joint session of the Congress and have him
17 say, here is the case, and here is what we will do, because
18 what the U.N. did, and what the President took advantage of
19 there was to say, okay, you want me to go to the U.N., I will
go to the U.N. Here is my case, and when you put it all
21 together, it stacks up that Saddam has made a great case
22 against himself. He is the one who has made the case.

23 I think if the President will come up to a joint session
24 of Congress, address the Congress and the American people
25 similarly, here is the case, and that you will cumulatively

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1 see, in the private briefings we have, and the public hearings
2 we have had, an extraordinary condemnation, but it does need
3 to be laid out collectively to the American public, because
4 you are right, no policy of ours, if it is to engage a war
5 effort in this country, can be sustained without the sustained
6 support of the American people, and I think that would be an
7 important thing for the President to do and for us to engage.

8 The Chairman: I am making that point, and I appreciate
9 the witnesses sticking around for our intramural discussion
10 here, but I am making an additional point, an additional point
11 not merely what the threat is, which is critically important,
12 but what we are going to ask of the American people to meet
13 the threat. I think they are prepared, but we have to tell
14 them.

15 What I worry about after being here 30 years, I do not
16 want to go through a process where we engage, we succeed on
17 the military front, we lose some or many American forces in
18 the process, but we will succeed and then find 18 months from
19 now we do not have the same people who called for going to war
20 refusing in the budget price to say, I am going to vote for an
21 extra $30 billion for Iraq this year, instead of -- which will
22 have to be made, instead of a tax cut, or prescription drugs,
23 or for whatever it is, because those are the choices we are
24 going to have to make.

25 And I watched in Afghanistan, Mr. and Mrs. Secretary, I

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asked, I sat with the President for literally hours, over

3 hours on this. The President said, we need a mini Marshall

Plan. The President said, we need to have forces there to

provide security. The President said, this was along term

obligation. The President said, we are in the there for the

long haul. We cannot get the House and we cannot get some of

our colleagues to vote the money we need there.

Now, I do not want to be around when my son, who just got

back from Kosovo, or his friends are sitting in the middle of

Baghdad and the United States Senate says, well, wait a

minute, you did not tell me that we had to vote for an extra

10, 20, 30, $40 billion to finish this job. I want everybody

on the line.

My father, who died 2 weeks ago, used to say, I like to

know who is in charge so I know who to hold responsible, and I

am prepared to do it, but I do not want to be part of -- I do

not want to be part of an outfit that votes to send us to war,

or give the President that authority, and then leave him

hanging, or be unsure he is willing to come back to us and

say, pay the price.

I promise you if we go, forget your permanent tax cut.

There is not enough money. If we go, forget the idea that we

are going to have a massive new health care program. Now,

that, I am prepared to make those choices, but let us not kid

the American people, because I am not in for a guns and butter

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1 routine here. I am not going down that route again.

2 I first met the distinguished Secretary of State when I
3 first got here as a 29-year-old kid, and our first meeting was
4 on the Vietnam War. I am not going to go there again. We
5 have to tell the American people what the likely price is,
6 even though we do not know for certain. It may be a lot less.

7 We will have the present Secretary of State at 2:30. I
8 thank my colleagues. This has been incredibly helpful, and
9 you have been here for over 3 hours. We owe you.

10 [Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

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2195 WORDS

9/24/02

Mr. Chairman:

Congress is considering one of the most consequential expressions of its views since the end of the Cold War: what action the United States should take to deal with the threat posed by illegal stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and their potential growth. President Bush has reaffirmed America's commitment to a cooperative world order by asking the United Nations to rectify Iraq's defiance of a large number of U.N. resolutions mandating the destruction of these stockpiles as well as Iraq's flagrant breach of its pledge to do so as a condition for the suspension of the Gulf War in 1991. But were the world community, by fudging its response, to opt

2

for the risk of a greater threat in the future, can America and a
coalition of the like-minded acquiesce in stockpiles of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq? Thus the Committee will need to consider not only
the risk of action but also the consequences of inaction.

The Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction will be
growing in an international environment in which their danger merges
with the threat of terrorism. For on September 11, 2001, the world
entered a new period in which private, non-state organizations
undertook to threaten national and international security by stealth
attacks. The controversy about preemption is a symptom of the
impact of this transformation. At bottom, it is a debate between the
traditional notion of sovereignty of the nation-state prevalent since the

3

Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the adaptation required by both
modern technology and the nature of the terrorist threat.

Osama bin Laden's base was on the territory of a national state,
though his was not a national cause. Highly disciplined operatives are
scattered around the globe, some on the soil of America's closest allies
and even within America itself. They enjoy financial and organizational
support from a number of states - most frequently from private
individuals ostensibly not under the control of their governments.

Bases for terrorists have been established in several countries, usually
in areas where the governments can plausibly deny control or are
actually not in control, such as in Yemen, Somalia, or perhaps
Indonesia and Iran. Having no territory to defend, the terrorists are
not subject to the deterrent threats of the Cold War; having as their

4

aim the destruction of social cohesion, they are not interested in the
conciliating procedures and compromises of traditional diplomacy.

Unlike the previous centuries, when the movement of armies
foreshadowed threat, modern technology in the service of terror gives
no warning, and its perpetrators vanish with the act of commission.
And since these attacks are capable of inflicting catastrophic damage,
traditional notions of sovereignty have to be modified with respect to
countries that harbor terrorist headquarters or terrorist training
centers. The problem of preemption is inherent in the nature of the
terrorist challenge.

The accumulation of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in
violation of U.N. resolutions cannot be separated from the post-
Afghanistan phase of the war against terrorism. Iraq is located in the

midst of a region that has been the hotbed of the special type of global
terrorist activity from which the attack on the United States was
organized. And the consequences of weapons of mass destruction
have many similarities to those of terrorism. They can be used
without warning; their impact is catastrophic. In some circumstances,
their origin can be uncertain. If the world is not to turn into a
doomsday machine, a way must be found to prevent proliferation –
especially to states whose governments have no restraint on the
exercise of their power.

Cold War principles of deterrence are almost impossible to
implement when there is a multiplicity of states, some of them
harboring terrorists in position to wreak havoc. The Cold War world
reflected a certain uniformity in the assessment of risk between the

41

6

nuclear sides. But when many states threaten each other for
incongruent purposes, who is to do the deterring, and in the face of
what provocation? This is especially true when that which must be
deterred is not simply the use of weapons of mass destruction but the
threat of them.

Suicide bombing has shown that the calculations of jihad fighters
are not those of the Cold War leaders. The concern that war with Iraq
could unleash Iraqi weapons of mass destruction on Israel and Saudi
Arabia is a demonstration of how even existing stockpiles of weapons
turn into instruments of blackmail and self-deterrence. Procrastination
is bound to magnify [such] possibilities.

The existence and, even more, the growth of stockpiles of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq poses a threat to international

7

peace and stability. The issue is not primarily whether Iraq was
involved in the terrorist attack on the United States. The challenge of
Iraq is essentially geopolitical and psychological. Its policy is
implacably hostile to the United States, to neighboring countries, and
to established rules that govern relations among nations. It possesses
growing stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, which Saddam
Hussein has used in the war against Iran and on his own population.

Iraq is working again to develop a nuclear capability. Saddam Hussein
breached his commitment to the United Nations by preventing the
operation of the international inspection system he had accepted on
his territory as part of the armistice agreement ending the Gulf War.

There is no possibility of a direct negotiation between Washington and
Baghdad and no basis for trusting Iraq's promises to the international

8

community. By what reasoning can the world community – or America – acquiesce in this state of affairs?

If these capabilities remain intact, they will become an instrument – actual and symbolic – for the destabilization of a volatile region. And if Saddam Hussein's regime survives both the Gulf War and the anti-terrorism campaign, this fact alone will compound the existing terrorist menace.

By its defiance of the U.N. Security Council resolutions requiring it to give up weapons of mass destruction, Iraq has in effect asserted the determination to possess weapons whose very existence compounds the terrorist threat immeasurably. Global terrorism cannot flourish except with the support of states that either sympathize or acquiesce in its actions. To the extent that these countries observe

9

the flouting of U.N. resolutions, the weakening of international norms,
and the defiance of America, they feel less restrained in acquiescing in
or ignoring terrorist activities. For the nations of the world to accept
the existence of growing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction
where the new form of terrorism has been spawned is to undermine
restraint with respect not only to weapons proliferation but to the
psychological impulse toward terrorism altogether.

The campaign in Afghanistan was an important first step. But if
it remains the principal move in the war against terrorism, it runs the
risk of petering out into an intelligence operation while the rest of the
region gradually slides back to the pre-9/11 pattern, with radicals
encouraged by the demonstration of the world's hesitation and
moderates demoralized by the continuation of an unimpaired Iraq as

10

an aggressive regional power. In short, the continuation of illegal
proliferation, the global dangers which it involves, the rejection or
infeasibility of a viable inspection system, and the growth of terrorism
require action, preferably global, but as an ultimate resort of
America's, together with those countries prepared to support it.

It is argued that dealing with weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq weakens the war against terrorism. The opposite is more likely to
be true. Eliminating such weapons in Iraq is an important aspect of
the second phase of the anti-terrorism campaign. It demonstrates
American determination to get at the root causes and some of the
ultimate capabilities of what is, in essence, a crusade against free
values. Enforcing U.N. resolutions in Iraq does not compete with the
capabilities needed to pursue the second phase of the anti-terrorism

campaign. In all likelihood, such action will strengthen it by additional
deployments to the region.

Nor should it weaken the cooperation of other countries in the
anti-terror campaign. Assisting in this effort is not a favor other
countries do for the United States but ultimately for themselves. And
what exactly will they decline to support without risking their entire
relationship to the United States? The fight against terrorism will take
many years. To wait for its end before acting is to guarantee that
stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction multiply.

At the same time, while reserving the option to act in concert
with only the nations it can convince, the United States is wise to
appeal to cooperative action of the world community. As the most
powerful nation in the world, the United States has a special unilateral

[Y]

capacity and, indeed, obligation to lead in implementing its
convictions. But it also has a special obligation to justify its actions by
principles that transcend the assertions of preponderant power. It
cannot be in either the American national interest or the world's
interest to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered
right of preemption against its own definition of threats to its security.
The case for enforcement of established resolutions should be the
opening move in a serious effort of consultation to develop
fundamental principles that other nations can consider in the general
interest.

President Bush's speech to the U.N. was therefore significant for
what it did not say as well as for what it affirmed. The President did
not assert a universal right of preemption; he based his case on the

M

13

special character of Iraq's conduct and its defiance of U.N. resolutions, which Saddam Hussein has been disregarding for over a decade. The President did not claim a general American right to impose regime change on other societies. He did insist that, in the specific case of Iraq, the rigorous measures required to implement the U.N.'s own resolutions are almost surely incompatible with Hussein's continuation in power.

— p. 14

The United Nations is therefore challenged to come up with a control system that eliminates existing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq - together with procedures to prevent their being rebuilt. The control system must go far beyond the inspection system negated by Saddam Hussein's evasions and violations. It must prevent any possibility for local authorities to harass informants or to impede free

14

access to the inspectors. It should be backed by standby authority
and perhaps a standby force to remove any obstacle to transparency.
Moreover, any system of inspection must be measured against the
decline in vigilance that accompanied the previously flawed system's
operation. Nor can it be achieved at the price of lifting sanctions while
Saddam Hussein stays in office. For that would provide the Iraqi
regime with the means of rearmament as a reward for ending its
violations. * from p. 13

In the end, enforcement of U.N. resolutions should be coupled
with a program of reconstruction for Iraq. Because of the precedent-
setting nature of this war, its outcome will determine the way U.S.
actions will ultimately be viewed. And we may find more nations
willing to cooperate in reconstruction than in enforcement, if only

15

because no country wants to see an exclusive position for America in a
region so central to international political and economic stability.

Reconstruction will require dealing with how to preserve the
unity and ensure the territorial integrity of a country that is an
essential component of any Gulf equilibrium. A federal system to
enable the Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish ethnic groups of Iraq to live
together without domination by one of them is surely appropriate. But
any serious planning would have to consider the means to prevent
autonomy from turning to independence, which, in the case of the
Kurds, would put Turkish support for the military phase at risk. And
all this would have to take place in the context of a government
capable of resisting pressures from the remnants of the old regime or

[x]

from neighboring countries determined to destabilize the emerging
system.

The United States has put forward a reasoned definition of the
dangers: the possession of weapons of mass destruction by
governments that have demonstrated their willingness to use them,
have professed hostility toward America or its allies, and are not
restrained by domestic institutions. Can the world community reject
that definition of the danger?

However the issue of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is
resolved, the longer-range goal must be to devise a system for dealing
with new attempts by additional countries to acquire weapons of mass
destruction or biological and chemical weapons. We are only at the
beginning of the threat of global proliferation. The nations of the

17

world must face the impossibility of letting such a process run unchecked. The United States would contribute much to a new international order if it invited the rest of the world, and especially the major nuclear powers, to cooperate in creating a system to deal with this challenge to humanity on a more institutional basis.

Congress has an opportunity to vindicate a system of international order. I urge you to give the President the authority to enforce the appropriate U.N. resolutions together with the world community if at all possible, in concert with like-minded nations if necessary.

SEP-23-2002 17:29

KAI DC

2158 WORDS

9/23/02

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Senators:

as well as

destruction of these stockpiles and Iraq's [flagrant breach of its own

pledge

agreement to do so as a condition for suspending the Gulf War in

as well as

1991. But should the world community prefer the risk of a greater

NR. 2720 S. 1

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

24. SEP. 2002 14:48

threat in the future, ~~should~~ the United States then enforce these
 resolutions together with a coalition of the like-minded? Thus the
 question the Committee will need to consider ~~is not only the risk of
 action but also the consequences of inaction.~~ In an age marked by
 a warning of the like-minded terrorism, can America and the world continue to acquiesce in
 stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?

These stockpiles will be growing in an international environment
~~of weapons of mass destruction~~
in which their danger merges with the threat of terrorism. For on
September 11, 2001, the world entered a new period in which private,
non-state organizations undertook to threaten national and
international security by stealth attacks. The controversy about
preemption is a symptom of the impact of this transformation. At
bottom, it is a debate between the traditional notion of sovereignty of

NR. 2720 S. 2

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

24. SEP. 2002 14:49

the nation-state prevalent since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and
the adaptation required by both modern technology and the nature of
the terrorist threat.

Osama bin Laden's base was on the territory of a national state,
though his was not a national cause. Highly disciplined operatives
were scattered around the globe, some on the soil of America's closest
allies and even within America itself. They enjoyed financial and
organizational support from a number of countries - most frequently
from private individuals ostensibly not under the control of their
governments. Bases for terrorists have been established in several
countries, usually in areas where the governments could plausibly
deny control or were actually not in control, such as in Yemen,
Somalia, or perhaps Indonesia and Iran. Having no territory to

NR. 2720 S. 3

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

24. SEP. 2002 14:49

Cold War; having as their aim the destruction of social cohesion, they

traditional diplomacy.

and since these attacks are capable of inflicting

Hence traditional notions of sovereignty have to be modified with

of the terrorist challenge.

This is why the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction in

NR. 2720 S. 4

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

24. SEP. 2002 14:49

SEP-23-2002 17:30

KAI DC

212 753 2248 P.24

9

Suicide bombing has shown that the calculations of jihad fighters are not those of the Cold War leaders. And the terrorists have no national base to protect. The concern that war with Iraq could unleash Iraqi weapons of mass destruction on Israel and Saudi Arabia is a less demonstration of these changes. It turns even existing stockpiles of weapons into instruments of blackmail. Procrastination is bound to magnify possibilities for further blackmail.

The existence and, even more, the growth of stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq poses a threat to international peace and stability. The issue is not primarily whether Iraq was involved in the terrorist attack on the United States. The challenge of

NR. 2720 S. 6

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

24. SEP. 2002 14:49

SEP-23-2002 17:31

KAI DC

212 753 7248

Iraq is essentially geopolitical. Its policy is implacably hostile to the United States, to neighboring countries, and to established rules that govern relations among nations. It possesses growing stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, which Saddam Hussein has used in the war against Iran and on his own population. Iraq is working again to develop a nuclear capability. Hussein breached his commitment to the United Nations by preventing the operation of the international inspection system he had accepted on his territory as part of the armistice agreement ending the Gulf War. There is no possibility of a direct negotiation between Washington and Baghdad and no basis for trusting Iraq's promises to the international community. By what reasoning can the world community - or America - acquiesce in this state of affairs?

24.SEP.2002 14:50

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

NR. 2720 S. 7

SEP-23-2002 17:31

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.27

with the support of states that either sympathize or acquiesce in its actions. To the extent that these countries observe the flouting of U.N. resolutions, the weakening of international norms, and the defiance of America, they feel less restrained in acquiescing in or ignoring terrorist activities. For the nations of the world to accept the existence of growing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction where the new form of terrorism has been spawned is to undermine restraint with respect not only to weapons proliferation but to the psychological impulse toward terrorism altogether.

NR. 2720 S. 9

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

24. SEP. 2002 14:50

SEP-23-2002 17:32

KAI DC

10

encouraged by the demonstration of the world's hesitation and
moderates demoralized by the continuation of an unimpaired Iraq as
an aggressive regional power.

It is argued that dealing with weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq weakens the war against terrorism. The opposite is more likely to
be true. Eliminating [such] weapons in Iraq is an important aspect of
the second phase of the anti-terrorism campaign. It demonstrates
American determination to get at the root causes and some of the
ultimate capabilities of what is, in essence, a crusade against our
values. Enforcing U.N. resolutions in Iraq does not compete with the
capabilities needed to pursue the second phase of the anti-terrorism
campaign. In all likelihood, [such action] will [cause] strengthen it by
additional deployments to the region.

[M]

NR. 2720 S. 10

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

24. SEP. 2002 14:50

SEP-23-2002 17:32

KAI DC

12

President Bush's speech to the U.N. was therefore significant for what it did not say as well as for what it affirmed. The President did not assert a universal right of preemption; he based his case on the special character of Iraq's conduct and its defiance of U.N. resolutions, which Saddam Hussein has been disregarding for over a decade. The President did not claim a general American right to impose regime change on other societies. He did insist that, in the specific case of Iraq, the rigorous measures required to implement the U.N.'s own

NR. 2720 S. 12

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

24. SEP. 2002 14:51

The United Nations is therefore challenged to come up with a
control system that eliminates existing weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq - together with procedures to prevent their being rebuilt. The
control system must go far beyond the inspection system negated by
Saddam Hussein's evasions and violations. It must prevent any
possibility for local authorities to harass informants or to impede free
access to the inspectors. It should be backed by standby authority
and perhaps a standby force to remove any obstacle to transparency.
Moreover, any system of inspection must be measured against the
decline in vigilance that accompanied the previously flawed system's
operation. Nor can it be achieved at the price of lifting sanctions while

24.SEP.2002 14:51

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

NR. 2720-S. 13

212 753 7248

KHI DC

SÉJP 11/33

13

P.31

[h]

question of how to preserve the unity and ensure the territorial integrity of a country that is an essential component of any Gulf equilibrium. A federal system to enable the Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish ethnic groups of Iraq to live together without domination by one of them is surely appropriate. But any serious planning would have to consider the means to prevent autonomy from turning to independence, which, in the case of the Kurds, would put Turkish support for the military phase at risk. And all this would have to take place in the context of a government capable of resisting pressures from the remnants of the old regime or from neighboring countries determined to destabilize the emerging system.

24. SEP. 2002 14:51

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

NR. 2720 S. 15

[4]

212 753 7248 P.34

16

The United States has put forward a reasoned definition of the dangers: the possession of weapons of mass destruction by governments that have demonstrated their willingness to use them, have professed hostility toward America or its allies, and are not restrained by domestic institutions. Can the world community reject the American definition of the danger?

However the issue of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is resolved, the longer-range goal must be to devise a system for dealing with new attempts by additional countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction or biological and chemical weapons. We are only at the beginning of the threat of global proliferation. The nations of the world must face the impossibility of letting such a process run unchecked. The United States would contribute much to a new

24.SEP.2002 14:51

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

NR. 2720.—S.

16-

The Senate and [House of Representatives] have an opportunity
to vindicate a system of international order. I urge you to give the
President [the power] to enforce the appropriate U.N. resolutions
together with the world community if at all possible, in concert with
like-minded nations if necessary.

TOTAL P. 35

24. SEP. 2002 14:52

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

NR. 2720 S. 17

M