TELCORN

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

9:46 a.m., March 1, 1973

S: Was the reception pretty good? I would think it would have been.

K: Very.

S: Oh, that's wonderful. That's good. I appreciate that very much cause the guy is really worth it all. Secondly, is there anything more you need for this morning's meeting at all. Have we done everything we can in terms of --

K: No, you've done (laughter) -- She wanted to leave last night because of the Icao vote.

S: (laughter) Jesus. She got emotional I'll tell you, Henry.

K: Well, sensitivity is not our forte.

S: Yeah, yeah, I suppose not. Well, you know, it there was some way to delay the goddamned thing but there apparently wasn't up there.

K: No, I think it's in good shape.

S: I do too, Henry, and do the best you can.

K: I think the President may be willing to go a little further in the airplane business.

S: Well, Henry, (a) this does not surprise me and (b) this is music to my ears.

K: Okay.

S: Thank you very much.

K: Right. Bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Aero. E017458
By: R.A. Disley

TELCORN

Bill Safire/Mr. Kissinger

2:45 p.m., March 1, 1973

K: Bill, I need a goddamned ghost writer.

S: I'm sitting around here haunting my office.

K: And if you want me to leak stuff to you in your new incarnation.--

S: Yeah.

K: I'm going to the dinner for the China correspondents.

S: Oh, I thought that was last night. I was racking my brains trying to come up with some funny lines.

K: That's this coming S turday.

S: Right.

K: Can you give me some good lines? I'll take care of the serious part.

S: Okay. Did Dick Moore and the others chip in anything?

K: Well, Paul Keyes came in with stuff that is so appalling that that's out. Dick Moore I've asked for -- I haven't gotten anything from anybody.

S: Okay, I'll get working on some stuff.

K: Would you?

S: It has to be about China or can it be about anything?

K: It can be about anything but it you can somehow bring one or two in about China and then leading on to other things.

S: Okay. Think seriously about the humor for a minute, is there anything that you particularly like to make a point on? You know, knocking down rifts between you and the President or knocking down --

K: Yeah, that would be nice.

S: All right.

DECLASSIFIED

Autograph E017258
By: A. M. Theisley

Bill Safire/Mr. Kissinger

2:45 p.m., March 1, 1973

- 2 -

K: You know, you can say I want to make it clear I could not have achieved any of these things without the President's assistance.

S: (laughter)

K: As all of you saw.

S: (laughter) Oh-h-h-h. All right, I'll stick something in the typewriter now. Meanwhile, you've been getting my memos over the last couple of weeks?

K: No. No, seriously no.

S: I've been sending you memoranda about my book. Every now and then the President sends me a little note saying hey, this is a good decision, I want to remember it. Get Henry to help you dig up the information.

K: Where the hell are they?!! Did you really send me anything?

S: I sent you two memoranda on it, yeah. I'll send you the copies over right now.

K: Well, you know Campbell now has at least two of them in his scrapbooks. Maybe you can get me the others directly.

S: (laughter)

K: Or maybe it's filed under "S" and I will never get that far down the alphabet.

S: I'll send it to you right now. Tell you what, I'll attach them to some funny lines. That way you will have to see them, right?

K: Some funny lines or themes or something.

S: Yeah, I know what you mean.

K: And you deliver it. That's the usual gap with you, Safire.

S: When have I ever failed you before, Henry?

K: I haven't got the time.

S: (laughter) Thank you for the nice inscription on the picture, which I thought was nice.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal HARVEST / 05/04
BY DA

TELCOM

Secy. Clements/Mr. Kissinger

2:50 p.m., March 1, 1973

C: Henry, I have checked into this Bloomfield and Kaufman situation.

K: Yeah.

C: Quickly, Bloomfield, in as far as I have been able to determine, he is not in the building on any kind of a consulting or retainer or that sort of thing. Now if he's over here, I haven't been able to find him. He's certainly not working for Elliott and Jonathan Moore and that group.

K: Right.

C: Now, on the other one, Bill Kaufman, there was a conversation and that's really the context in which it should be put. There was no consulting fee there was no extended discussion, there was no work per se but there was a conversation that either Jonathan or Martin or Braunowitz (sp?) had with Kaufman relating to the Defense posture statement.

K: Well, it was totally unacceptable to us. He wrote the Defense statement for McNamara. That was his chief job for McNamara.

C: Humm. How about that. Does he work for you, Henry?

K: Kaufman?

C: Yeah.

K: No.

C: That was also some of the information they played back to me, that he was in fact working for you.

K: Baloney.

C: (laughter) Okay.

K: I once very early in the Administration used him for a day just to get whatever information he had.

C: Okay. What do you know 'bout that. Well, that was misrepresented to me grossly. And so, on him there was a conversation. On Bloomfield, the answer is no and they don't know where he might be in the building. I've felt around with other people and no one seems to know that he's around or is doing anything.

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. only EO17358
By a
HAROLD GILSON

*

Secy Clements/Mr. Kissinger

2:50 p.m., March 1, 1973

- 2 -

K: Tell me, do you have some body monitoring your call?

C: No.

K: Okay, because if you don't, there is one thing I wanted to tell you.

C: Oh, no, I don't. I don't ever.

K: Bill, Johnny Foster has -- you know, that submarine problem?

C: Yes, I do.

K: Now, I would like him to do a paper for me on what it's strategic implications are.

C: Fine.

K: But I don't want to run it through that six-man group.

C: All right.

K: And, therefore, if Johnny thinks -- If you ask him, then that covers him.

C: I have talked with Johnny. He's coming into my office this afternoon after I finish a group that's in there now, so we'll get it laid aside and we'll do it.

K: Just channel it the two of you because I don't want to have this thing receive high priority and get into every bloody newspaper.

C: That's fine. No problem at all and we'll handle it on that basis. And I want to tell you before you get away that I was extremely pleased with our discussion with Tom yesterday because I was getting thoroughly disgusted with that runaway down there in that....

K: Bill, you have to understand my role. These characters leak everything I say so I dance all over the map downstairs because I get my decisions made by talking to the President.

C: Sure. That's fine.

K: But I don't give anyone a clear point of attack down there.

C: That's fine.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO17258
Byron HARRISLEY

Secy Clements/Mr. Kissinger

2:50 p.m., March 1, 1973

K: So my views are the ones I express to you and you will hear them from the President at the next NSC meeting next week when he will be very clear about where he stands on the strategic balance.

C: That's just great, Henry. If you can just keep me clued in --

K: No, I'm getting you invited to the NSC meetings.

C: All right, fine. I would appreciate it very much.

K: So you will be invited to all the NSC meetings. The President and I settled that this morning.

C: That's fine.

K: Because we need you as a strong right arm over there and we can't get that unless you know what's going on.

C: That's really right. And until this signal came clear to me yesterday from you, I didn't really know what the hell was going on down there because I didn't like 99% of what I was hearing.

K: Well, I'm using it to find out where the bodies are buried.

C: Okay. That's fine. And I'll keep my eye open for these two fellows and if I hear any more about it, I'll let you know.

K: Excellent.

C: Thank you, Bye.

K: Bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED

Anon. E017258
Byron HARRIS GIBSON

TELCORN

Ambassador Rabin (Israel)/Mr. Kissinger

3:06 p.m., March 1, 1973

K: Mr. Ambassador.

R: Well, everything is fine.

K: God will punish us all someday.

R: What!

K: I said God will punish you someday.

R: Why?

K: (laughter) Okay. I'll talk to you tonight.

R: Why punish me?

K: Well, maybe me. Somebody.

R: No, I think --

K: I'm stuck with the whole goddamned mess now!

R: Now this is the problem, Sisco is now trying to find me.

K: Yeah.

R: I would like to consult with you what to do -- what to tell him.

K: Well, tell him what you heard the President say about defense.

R: To tell him?

K: About the arms.

R: To tell him what he had said?

K: Well, tell him he should call me. That's the easiest.

R: I see. But it's -- Because what I want is let's try to find a way how you'll convey to the bureaucracy.

K: I will write a memorandum.

R: Because I would like to finish it Thursday so I'll leaving.

TELCORN
Secretary Rush/Mr. Kissinger

3:13 p. m., March 1, 1973

K: Ken, I just wanted to check, do you think we got Rumsfeld under control now?

R: Well, I certainly hope so. We sent the cable and we also called.

K: Yes. I don't want them now to fall into the opposite extreme.

R: No, what we said was we want to keep the line we have --

K: Good.

R: But we don't want to fall into another trap of having dissention among the ally.

K: That's it.

R: And we want to take time with our allies for them to try their tactics, see whether their tactics work or not, and to stick to the line that we're on ourselves.

K: Good. Well, that's exactly what we have in mind.

R: In other words, Henry, what I told them was in the cable and then I told our people to call and say was that in the beginning our big objective was to avoid a stalemate where we're bound to lose and thereby look weak going into MBFR.

K: Right.

R: But the thing has now turned around to where instead of a stalemate with the Russians, we're running into a stalemate with our allies and we must take time for this to soften instead of solidifying and to have our allies feel that we've tried to follow their tactics to a point that they will come around to ours.

K: Right.

R: That basically is what we want.

K: Well, that's exactly right. Then Saunders and Dean have got the same word?

R: They have the same word.

DECLASSIFIED
Anon. EO17258
By DAVID HARRIS

*

Secretary Rush/Mr. Kissinger

3:13 p.m., March 1, 1973

2

K: Okay. Well, then everybody is lined up.

R: As a matter of fact, we sent the cable to all of the NATO capitals.

K: Right, right. Well, okay then. So in about two weeks we'll probably urge you to go fast again.

R: Well, Henry, I'm not mentioning the two weeks.

K: No.

R: I'm just saying for the time being.

K: No, but the British have told me they'd be more reasonable in two weeks.

R: Good, good.

K: Okay.

R: I think we're on the track.

K: Okay.

R: Okay.

K: Good, Ken, I'll see you for lunch tomorrow.

R: Looking forward to it very much.

K: Good.

R: Bye.

K: Bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Aero. O.S. 507258
By DAVID HARRIS

TelCon

Yuri Babenko/Mr. Kissinger

3:45 pm, Foe March 1, 1973

B: Hello.

K: Yuri?

B: Yeah, hello Henry.

K: How are you?

B: Oh, fine, how are you?

K: Are we ever going to see the Ambassador again?

B: That will be after the four, March 4. He will return between
and March 11.

K: Well, on the 11th I'm leaving.

B: On the 11th you're leaving?

K: Yeah.

B: My goodness where, this is not a--

K: I'm going to Acapulco for a week.

B: That's a wonderful trip. But my goodness, how long you be there?

K: About 10 days.

B: Oh my, oh my. Well I so report to Moscow and I see whether
they could shake out Anatoli from his retreat where he is staying.

K: Which retreat?

B: Ba ______, it's close to Moscow.

K: Oh, yes, that's the VIP place.

B: Oh very much so, and that's a beautiful place, indeed, especially
in the winter time.

K: So, you are not going to answer that letter until Anatol comes back
is that all right?

B: That's all right.

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. E017958

By: D. MARGOLIS

2

K: You can tell your leaders that of course in principle we accept it. And we just have to with pleasure and it's just a question of working out the day.

B: Oh, the details and the date and everything. All right, then.

K: But that will be easy and pleasurable.

B: Good. I'll mention that.

K: Good.

B: All right, Henry, about your willingness to receive our trade group. It's still there, the willingness I mean.

K: Absolutely, yes.

B: So they then will be able, actually they are putting aside the whole day on the 5th, Monday, maybe you'll find some minutes to talk to them.

K: Certainly on the afternoon of the 5th.

B: Afternoon of the 5th.

K: Right. We will call you with a time.

B: Okay, so I can tell them.

K: Definitely. How many are there.

B: Alkimov, Albarto, you met him? He's minister of Nat'l Economy.

K: Yeah, I know him.

B: Mr. Romanov, the second man in our Foreign Trade Bank, and Mr. Romanov who has high place Council of Foreign Minister on Foreign trade.

K: Good, and you.

B: And me. Okay.

K: We'll do it on Monday.

B: Fine, I'll inform them.

K: I look forward to it. Bye.

B: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumn 2023
By: A. M. B. F. S.

TelCon

Pat Buchanan/Mr. Kissinger

4:00 pm, March 1, 1973

K: Pat?

B: Henry.

K: You were gonna do some episodes for me about the China trip which only you know having been with these piranha fish.

B: I was going to try to get some of them up for you but the old man gave me another one of his briefing book assignments which has had me cracking for the last couple of days. I can get you that one up on Buckley which I think is pretty good, have you seen that.

K: No.

B: Well, I'll send it up to you.

K: Well if you could do two or three for me I'd really be grateful.

B: Oh, okay.

K: By tomorrow night, and I'd really be grateful.

B: Okay, let me see what I can do.

K: Good, I won't have time to do anything and I don't know anything these guys did anyway.

K: Good, you'd have my gratitude, that won't get you much, but--

B: Okay.

K: Good. I subscribe to human events.

B: (Laughter) Take it easy.

K: Okay, bye.

B: Bye.

RECLASSIFIED

Auto. July 20, 1973

By DAVID HARRIS/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

*

TelCon
Sec. Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

4:05 pm, March 1, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Hello, Henry. I must say I've been having some misgivings about going on this trip today. With the continuing thrashing around in these markets, I'm spending a lot of time piddling around with that.

K: Why don't you wait till Monday and make up your mind then. Not whether you should go on the trip but whether you should one of the periods rather than another.

S: Well, it may be that it may be better to do it sometime, say, in April or in May or something like that.

K: Well, May is a little late.

S: We would be better prepared with the Russians, we would have had our--I think have the prospect of the trip itself could precipitate getting some things beside it which we sort of have in place, and--

K: It can wait till April, it cannot wait until May.

S: Uh huh. Well let me get back to you on it, but I'm half inclined to cancel for now. Given all the different things that are going on, not only the int ernational stuff, but the trdde bill and various other pieces of domestic legislation that--

K: How about the names for that commission?

S: Oh God, I didn't--I'll get after that right away.

K: Okay, good.

S: Did you find out anything about Sonnenfeldt and the President?

K: Except he has no objections. He wants you and me to talk about it again only on the ground whether we should keep it.

S: But he has confidence in it.

K: Oh, yes.

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. city E017258
By: M. R. D. B. S. C. I. C.

TELCORN

Walter Kissinger/Mr. Kissinger

5:15 p.m., March 1, 1973

WK: Listen, thank you for that card from Peking. Did you ever send
one to our friend, Al Gordon.

HK: From Hanoi.

WK: You did!

HK: Yeah, but a lot of those cards never arrived.

WK: Right. You know who Al is?

HK: Yeah, I know who he is. He's an investment broker or something.

WK: Oh, no, why he's the Chairman of the biggest investment bank in
New York.

HK: Oh, bank. I thought he was an investment --

WK: No, no.

HK: No, I know him. He was head of the Harvard Club group.

WK: That's right. And he's a great admirer of yours and I guess when
Nixon was in Peking, he sent a postcard to a friend of his and the
guy has been pulling his leg.

HK: No, I sent him one from Hanoi. If you had told me from Peking,
it would been guaranteed to arrive.

WK: That's fine. He'll be thrilled and I appreciate it.

HK: Well, I'm not sure he'll get it because a lot of people I sent cards to
from Hanoi didn't get them.

WK: Right. And he's really a guy you ought to at some point if you think
about anything in industry, I'd like you to chat with. You know he's
on the Board of Overseers at Harvard?

HK: I know. I think very highly of him.

WK: He's a very fine guy. He's on my Board and he's a first-rate guy.

HK: No, I think very highly of him.

CLASSIFIED

Alexandria E017258
By: A. HARRIS/CLASSTED

5:15 p.m., March 1, 1973

WK: How are you doing?

HK: I'm overworked but otherwise fine.

WK: I watched your tv interviews. You handled them very well.

HK: Well, Barbara Walters asked a lot of idiot questions.

WK: Yeah. No, the other one was better with Kalb.

HK: Yeah. I mean, what did expect me to do? Say I disagree with the President.

WK: Does she give you the questions ahead of time?

HK: No.

WK: That right. Well, you handled them really terrifically.

HK: The Kalb I thought was much more intelligent.

WK: Much better, much better. Listen, I wanted to ask you about Peterson. I found it a little bit odd that he never even had the courtesy to answer my letter. What the hell is the matter with him? He could say no, you know. Is he interested, do you know?

HK: I have no way of knowing. He's conscious of it because he mentioned it to me. Of course, he's been in Europe on a mission for the President.

WK: I see.

HK: And, you know, he's without an elaborate office setup now.

WK: Yeah.

HK: So that may explain it. I'll mention it to him.

WK: Right. Very good.

TELCORN

Milton Viorst/Mr. Kissinger

5:42 p.m., March 1, 1973

V: Do you suppose we could sit down for a moment at some time in the future
to discuss whether you would be willing to see me in one of those extended
Playboy interviews.

K: Oh, I don't think I want to do a Playboy interview.

V: I mean, you know, a very interview.

K: I know they're serious.

V: I recognize that what stands on the other pages --

K: No, no, I know it. They're very serious and very serious people have done
it. I just think I ought to keep quiet for a while. Moreover, I promised
Scotty that the first written interview I would give him -- I mean, that's not
on television, I'd give him.

V: Scotty Reston?

K: Yeah.

V: Oh, yeah, but there wouldn't be any conflict because Scotty's would be a
few hundred words long and this goes on and on for 7 or 8 thousand words.
I mean, I would not see any --

K: Well, let me think about it. But I'm really --

V: If it is of any interest to you and I can imagine that a man of your
eminence would ever be materialistic -- they pay rather well, both to the
interviewer and to the interviewee.

K: Yeah, but I couldn't -- It's not a question of eminence,
but I can't take any money.

V: You're not allowed to take money?

K: I don't know whether I'm allowed or not but I never do.

V: I mean, this is conventional. This is not, you know, this is not bribery.

K: Yeah, but I just think I'm in the best position if I don't take any outside of
....

SANITIZED

DECLASSIFIED

Autograph E017758 By A. Kissinger

Milton Viorst/Mr. Kissinger

5:42 p.m., March 1, 1973

- 2 -

V: Okay. That's of course --

K: I never take fees for lectures or --

V: Okay. Because I raised this because it is most legitimate. You know, most everybody --

K: No, no; if I give it, I would give it because it might make some contribution to understanding what we're trying to do. And for that I don't want to get paid.

V: Let me suggest, Henry, that you might give it to your favorite charity.

K: Well, that I might do.

V: But would you please give it serious thought?

K: I shall.

V: You know, let me just point out that there are several interviews. There are several advantages which go above and beyond your unhappy experience with Miss Fallaci.

K: Well, whatever happened there, I've never taken her on but that could not have been correct.

V: Yeah, well, no, I know that. Number one, this is a joint excursion. In other words, it's not me trying to stick you.

K: Oh, I know that. That I would not --

V: I'm not just talking about my own personal -- I'm talking about the way they run these as an institutional thing in terms of our personal relationship. We will cover areas which you will find useful to cover and we will not necessarily talk about your sex life or any of the other things that the world may be interested in.

K: Right.

V: Number two, the interviewee, and I may even disapprove of this as a matter of fact, but it is their policy and I'm obligated to follow it, has the final word on everything that goes in. In other words, just because you say it and it's on tape doesn't mean you don't have a chance to revise it. So the final revision stands in your hands.

DECEMBER 8, 1973

Byron Parnell

Milton Viorst/Mr. Kissinger

5:42 p.m., March 1, 1973

K: Right. Well, I'll make my decision -- not before the end of the month, I'm going away on vacation for a week and then I'll think about it.

V: One way or another, would you get back to me? Perhaps we can use this as an excuse for lunch or something of that order.

K: And if I don't call you, will you call me?

V: Yes, I will.

K: Good.

V: All right. Nice to talk to you and thank you and think positively.

K: (laughter) Right, I'll do it. Bye.

V: Bye.

DEC15SIGNED

Aut. E017258
By DA HARRIS

TELCORN

Secy Kenneth Rush/Mr. Kissinger

5:50 p.m., March 1, 1973

K: Ken, we're involved again in one of these maddening things with your Department.

R: What's that?

K: We've promised the Chinese through our channel a list of the State Department requirements. You know, what office space, how many buildings, and so forth.

R: Right.

K: The President wanted to send it with a note.

R: Right.

K: Now I've been trying to bleed that out of Ted Eliot. He claims they won't turn it loose because it involves personnel. I don't give a damn about the names of the personnel.

R: Right.

K: They're not ready for the names of the personnel yet. What we want is to tell them -- give them an idea of what is needed.

R: Right.

K: Of course what I suspect is that they're cooking something up directly in Paris between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister.

R: That could be because Ted came in to see me and told me that he had been instructed by Bill Rogers not to release anything unless it went through Bill first, although Bill isn't here.

K: To release anything on anything?

R: Not to release this information. What I did is I called him in, Henry, because they sent the thing off in my name and I hadn't even seen the damn thing, which made me mad as hell. So I called him in and said why the hell wasn't this checked through me, I haven't seen this before.

K: That's the sort of game which is just intolerable. I don't give a good goddamn who does what but we cannot possibly run through two channels to the Chinese.

CLASSIFIED

Authority E017258
By a PARRERSLEY

Secy Rush/Mr. Kissinger

5:50 p.m., March 1, 1973

- 2 -

R: Why of course not.

K: And we can't let the Chinese judge which channels they're going to use.

R: That's exactly right. That's exactly right. Well, they brought this
in to me and what it did -- there were two cables. One of them putting
in personnel and another --

K: Now that's intolerable. The President wants to make that.

R: I see. One was a recommendation to Rogers on personnel.

K: We don't want the personnel recommendations, we already have made
some tentative ideas over here.

R: And the other one was -- one with regard to space and that sort of thing. And Eliot told me -- When I called him in, I said why the hell didn't you check this with me before you sent it? Because all this personnel and the like -- after all, if I'm going to recommend things to the Secretary, I intend to be in on the selection.

K: Well, no one is going to select anything. This is a matter of particular
concern to the President. Now this is another one -- you know, if the
Secretary wants to make recommendations to the President, that's one
thing.

R: Exactly.

K: He's got every right to do that.

R: Right.

K: But he can't sit over there playing games with us.

R: I couldn't agree more, Henry. I'll see what I can do. Of course, I
can't over rule the instructions Rogers has given Eliot but I'll see what
I can do. What you want is everything except --

K: I don't want the names of the personnel.

R: Okay.

K: I absolutely cannot have him, however, when we've told them something
is coming one way to tell them to just go ahead and do it another way.

DECLASSIFIED

Antony E017258
By A. M. D. A. S. F.

Secy Rush/Mr. Kissinger

5:50 p.m., March 1, 1973

- 3 -

R: I couldn't agree more.

K: If he wants to do it another way, let him discuss it with us.

R: Exactly.

K: Also, I cannot let him submit names to them because we've already discussed some with them.

R: Exactly. What Eliot told me was -- this cable went out last night under my name and of course I was quite annoyed so I called Eliot in and he said that Rogers had told him, Eliot, not to release anything on this without Rogers approving personally and therefore he had sent these recommendations over to Rogers, who then would send them back and they would then go to the White House. And these are to be sent to the White House but they're to be approved by Rogers, you see, as recommendations of Rogers. I, of course, said well, if I am going to initial things that go as a recommendation to the White House, I intend to be in on the selection and you should have --

K: We don't want any names. We are absolutely not ready to take any names.

R: I see.

K: Moreover, we will just will not stand for this.

R: Right. Well, Henry, let me see what I can do. I, of course, as I told you, I can't overrule Rogers.

K: The only thing that I find infuriating is it was an absolutely routine matter two days ago. All we asked for is office space.

R: Right.

K: So that we could transmit it in a way that the President -- that we had arranged.

R: Right.

K: I could not care less -- it's not a question of prerogative. What the hell do I care how office space information is transmitted.

R: Exactly.

CLASSIFIED

Security Code: 0123456789

Secy Rush/Mr. Kissinger

5:50 p.m., March 1, 1973

- 4 -

K: But we have something else we want to send with it.

R: Exactly. Well, these were two cables that were sent to Rogers. They are recommendations to the White House but Eliot says that Rogers said that they were not to go to the White House until he had personally approved them so that's where it stands. Now what I will try to do is to have the recommendation with regard to space sent over without Rogers approval.

K: That's right. That's the only one we want. The personnel we don't even want to receive because we're not ready for it.

R: Right. But, Henry, as you know, I'm not in a position to overrule Rogers.

K: Well, if he wants to send recommendations for names, we're not ready.

R: Right, right. I'll see what I can do.

K: Okay.

R: Now, Henry, is there anything I should know or that Joe Sisco know on the Egyptians?

K: Yeah. On the Israelis.

R: I mean on the Israelis, I'm sorry.

K: What you should know is that what the President did is he said to her -- on the only thing that's worth knowing is the military supply one.

R: Right.

K: The rest I can discuss with you at lunch tomorrow.

R: Okay.

K: He told her that on the production he, in effect, told her about the Defense recommendation.

R: Yes.

K: The Joint recommendation, just modifying it slightly.

R: Right.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumn 1973
By: J. M. DeMets

Secy Rush/Mr. Kissinger

5:50 p.m., March 1, 1973

- 5 -

K: To say that it should be at least 100. Saying that we are not committed to beyond 100 but if after that they have the right to raise it. I mean to raise the issue again without commitment from us that we'll accept. That I think is no general significance in modification.

R: You mean 100 planes over a period of years?

K: No, 100 planes on the production.

R: On the production, a total of 100.

K: A total of 100. At least 100.

R: Right, right. And we would help them on production?

K: We would help them on production.

R: On developing their own production capacity?

K: That's right.

R: Right. Well, that's very helpful.

K: The second one is on -- he said in principle he would agree that we would supply A-4s and F-4s in 74 and 75. That he would ask that the number be worked out after Mrs. Meir left. That we would approach it sympathetically to see how much of their proposal we can meet.

R: Right.

K: He, frankly, wants to do more than the 5% but less than what they asked for.

R: Right, right.

K: But he didn't give them any figures.

R: Well, that's good, Henry. And I think this was just the thing to do.

K: And that's where he came out.

R: I think that was excellent because they were very disappointed that they weren't getting anything out of Eliott or me. Of course, I saw them first.

DECLASSIFIED

Acting J. E. L. B. S.
By A. M. R. E. L. B. S.

*

Mr. Kissinger/
Secretary Schultz
3/1/73-6:40

K: Hello.

S: Hello Henry. Say I have discovered that the Ex-Im Bank people are going to sit down with this visiting Reckon(?) group tomorrow morning and complete negotiations on some things they have apparently been working and would pass through the NAC and

K: With the Russians?

S: NSC - having to do with the Kama(?) River truck project which is a large one.

K: Oh yes.

S: And a couple of others. A dishware factory, and so on. This deal comes to a total of about $211 million so it is a lot of money. And it is apparently all on track and going and so on in accordance with the policies. But - I have this piece of paper here to approve on behalf of the NAC.

K: Yes. When do you have to approve it?

S: Well they want to have the green light for their negotiations tomorrow. Now the only sense in this - I get the feeling that as you stated many times we haven't come through on anything. Well this is coming through. And it seems to me somehow it ought to be managed so that they realize that this is coming in.

K: Absolutely. Well let me call the Russians and say that we want them to know that we are approving this.

S: OK. You will just call them and say you know that they are going to be over at the Ex-Im tomorrow and you want them to know that you are fully taped in.

K: Right.

S: OK.

K: Good.

S: So you will take care of that.

K: Yes.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: ED17258
Date: 3/1/73
By: D. HARRIS-GLISER

S: Thank you Henry.

K: When Dobrynin is back you should do this sort of thing after discussing it with me.

S: Alright. I am less and less certain about making this trip with the problems we are having . . .

K: I can see - if there is a summit, I can see the argument for your going to Russia later.

S: OK. Well we will talk about that in the morning.

K: Right and the names.

S: Right.

K: And the press release about ______ the group.

S: That's around here somewhere. OK.

K: Right.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E01728f
By DAVID HARPER

TelCon:3/1/73-6:42

Mr. Kissinger/
Minister Vorontsov

K: Yuly.

V: Yes, Henry.

K: I wanted to tell you that we have had over here today a request for some loans for the Khama River project and for some diskware factory.

V: I see.

K: Amounting to $211 million and that I just wanted to give you advance information that we approved it today

V: Oh, good.

K: And your delegation will probably - when they go to the Ex-Im Bank tomorrow be told about that.

V: Right. That is wonderful. Thank you very much.

K: So they couldn't drive too hard a bargain knowing the outcome.

V: OK. I give them a hint. I send the word to Dobrynin about your going on vacation on the 10th. Maybe tomorrow I will get a reply from him when he is coming back.

K: Good. Wonderful.

V: Fine. Thank-you.

K: Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By: N.M. Parry Date: 06/04/73

TELCORN
The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:15 p.m., March 1, 1973

P: What's your report from Khartoum?

K: Well, the report from Khartoum is that they are still being held.

P: Right.

K: And that our Embassy is trying to start a negotiation with the Arabs.

P: Uh-huh. Well, we're not --

K: I don't think we should give them directions on that.

P: No.

K: I, myself, do not think it's a good idea for us to negotiation because
that gets us into the middle of their demands.

P: Yeah. You mean the Sudanese Government should do it?

K: That's right. Because if we negotiate, they are going to make demands
on us.

P: But we've already decided that. Is that done now?

K: Well, let me talk to the State Department.

P: Yeah. The problem that I see here is that I suppose that we'll get a
demand and I suppose the problem we have is the payment of blackmail
in one form or another.

K: Well, they've already demanded that we release Sirhan.

P: Yeah, I know. I know.

K: We won't do that.

P: Yeah. Well, we can't do anything like that at all anyway. Don't you agree?

K: Oh, absolutely. I don't think we can yield to anything.

P: That's what I mean. You start that and boy you're going to invite it.
It's too bad but that's part of the job of being an Ambassador there, isn't it?

K: That's right.

Diplomatic

By: AARON D. SMITH

*

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:15 p.m., March 1, 1973

- 2 -

P: It's too bad. Hope for the best, huh?

K: They have a lot of other diplomats too.

P: Why do we do the negotiating then?

K: Well, let me talk to the State Department. My instinct is that we should stay out of the negotiations if we possibly can.

P: Yeah.

K: Because we have no pressures here. I mean, there's nothing we can do except not yield.

P: No, we don't have anything on -- yeah, yeah.

K: These are Palestinians, they're not Sudanese.

P: Sure, sure.

K: .. can do nothing to the Sudanese.

P: Of course, of course. (laughter) It's a crazy part of the world, isn't it?

K: Yeah.

P: Okay. Nothing else new this afternoon? Will you be here tonight or you skipping us?

K: No, I'm coming.

P: (laughter) You're lucky.

K: (laughter) Well, no, I've seen enough of them to tell you the truth.

P: You coming up before?

K: I wasn't asked.

P: Huh?

K: I don't normally come up before.

P: Oh, I see, I see.

DECLASSIFIED

Agency E012358
By DAVID DICKSley

TELCORN
Senator Javits/Mr. Kissinger

7:35 p.m., March 1, 1973

K: Jack, I tried to get you -- yesterday I was all tied up with the POW thing.

J: Yes, I know. Well, it's all right. You tried me this morning and I tried you and you were busy. Anyway, I had my conversation with the Governor this morning and we're both going to look into it. He had some survey figures that he gave me, which was not too surprising from New York, and he'd like to see this happen but he realizes that there is a very, very long chance of it. And I told him that I would explore it down here in my own way.

K: I was rather favorably inclined when I thought about it.

J: Um-humm.

K: And I talked to Ehrlichman and he said that the President really meant it, whatever, you know, that means in your decision.

J: Yes. Well, if I should seriously entertain it, I'd certainly have to get a lot more than that. I'd have to know what kind of thing might conceivably be done. It's not just a campaign thing, you know. I think I can get elected if I choose to go that route with or without the President's endorsement but I think it's a question of what's to be done for New York.

K: Right.

J: So I'll probably have a glimpse of you there at the party and maybe have a word together.

K: Right.

J: Listen, by any chance -- Marion's here and Max and Marge Fisher are coming for a glass of champagne after the affair -- would you like to come? It's just going to be the four of us.

K: No, I'd love to come but I can't because there's a farewell party for Dick Helms which I promised I'd do my damnedest to get there.

J: Oh, sure, sure. Well, I'll have a word with you there. Wait a minute, Marion wants to say hello to you.

Mrs. J: Henry, you're a _Vogue_ man.

K: What do you mean?

Mrs. J: You look so gorgeous in _Vogue_. That's it, you're going to be the _Vogue_ ma-

DECLASSIFIED

Autograph
E017258
BY DAVID HARRIS/Alamy

Senator Javits/Mrs. Javits/Mr. Kissinger

7:35 p.m., March 1, 1973

- 2 -

K: Am I in <u>Vogue</u>?

Mrs. J: Yes, and it's a beautiful big picture of you and your staff and a charming article with Aileen Tally (sp?). She wrote very well. You're not mentioned as getting more .. (laughter).

K: Oh, I didn't --

Mrs. J: It's charming. It's this month, it just came out and it's really charming.

K: Oh, I didn't know she was ...

Mrs. J: ... picture.

K: With what?

Mrs. J: All of your office staff.

K: The girls.

Mrs. J: Yes, everybody is in it and everybody looks good and smiling and like which world now do you make happy?

K: What, the March issue?

Mrs. J: Yes, March, exactly.

K: Good, I'll look forward to seeing it. And I look forward to seeing you tonight.

Mrs. J: Henry, I'm bursting with pride still with you and, you know, great admiration.

K: Marion, you were a great friend before I had done anything.

Mrs. J: Nevermind, but you're beautiful. We'll see you with Golda and make her slow down a little bit.

K: Great.

Mrs. J: All right.

K: Bye,

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Act. fly E012258
By: D. HARRIS The Gliston

TELCON
Secretary Rush/Mr. Kissinger

Afternoon, March 1, 1973

K: Ken.

R: Rush, I'm sending over to you what you want on the logistics base and all that sort of thing.

K: I don't need the names.

R: It will have to come uncleared because Bill Rogers hasn't approved it.

K: Now the only thing that worries me, Ken, is there any way you can find out whether they pulled any hanky-panky tonight because I would just look like a horse's ass, if you forgive me, if I sent it in through my channels if they've already given it in Paris.

R: Well, what I did was this, I got Eliot in and said where does this thing stand?

K: Yeah.

R: He said he had sent it to Paris; he had just been in touch with Lissy that Lissy had said that the Secretary would be in very shortly and that he would bring it to his attention as soon as he got in; and as soon as the Secretary had read it and he had approved it, that he would send over a cable of either approved, not approved or changes.

K: Well, now I don't give a damn about the personnel because until we get the principle established -- What I want to get established is, you know, buildings and office space.

R: Right, that's what we have in this --

K: And the total number, not the names.

R: All right, I'll see you get the total number.

K: And when you want to send the advance party.

R: Right.

K: As soon as that is approved by the Chinese, I will then shift the shebang back to you. I don't want to have to handle the logistics discussions with them.

R: Right.

RECLASSIFIED

Authorized E017258

By: J.R. MacGlisher

DECLASSIFIED

Secretary Rush/Mr. Kissinger

Afternoon, March 1, 1973

2

K: But there is one wrinkle to it, which I will explain to you tomorrow.

R: Okay.

K: Which makes us desirous to keep this phase of it in this channel.

R: Right, right. Now, let me see, the logistics, the space, all that we've got. Then the total number of personnel and when we plan to send our advance party.

K: When you propose to send the advance party.

R: When we propose, right.

K: Right. But before I send this off, is there some way you could find out for me whether there has been some discussion of that already in Paris?

R: As a matter of fact, I said to Ted Eliot and he's the only source I have who's been in touch, you see.

K: Yeah.

R: I said when does the Secretary talk to the Chinese Minister, I think it's tonight. He said --

K: Yeah.

R: And I said, well, I hope he isn't discussing this there because this is only a recommendation to the White House.

K: And what did Eliot say?

R: Ted said, oh, I don't think so. He said unless he was going to show it to him and then send back the approval.

K: Yeah.

R: And I said, fine. There's nothing else I can find out, Henry, because I have no way of doing it, you see.

K: Well, we'll ask Eliot to find out whether they did it because we want to send it off.

R: Right. I said, well, is there any way of your knowing whether he'd send it to the Chinese -- talk to the Chinese? He said, no, there's no way I can

Secretary Rush/Mr. Kissinger

Afternoon, March 1, 1973

3

R: (cont'd) find out. Now all he could do is ask and, of course, Rogers would go up through the roof if he asked about it. However, you see, Lissy will not -- Nobody will be with Rogers I assume when he -- Well, maybe they will. We might find out.

K: Kubisch will have been with him. Anderson.

R: Yeah. But I don't even know Kubisch; never met him.

K: Yeah. I know Kubisch. When are they all coming back?

R: I think they're coming back Saturday. They sign tomorrow and the plan is they'll come back Saturday.

K: Okay.

R: But, of course, this is over there now before Rogers sees the Foreign Minister.

K: Oh, and he hasn't seen it yet?

R: He hadn't seen it when Eliot called.

K: Okay. Well, I'm just going to let nature take its course. I may wait till he comes back.

R: Well, I'll sure get this over to you.

K: Okay, I'd appreciate it. We'll have lunch tomorrow.

R: Right you are.

K: One o'clock at your office.

R: Good, I'm looking forward to it.

K: Good, marvelous.

R: Right. Bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. city E017258
By: D. R. Kissinger

TelCon:3/1/73-6

K: Yuly.

V: Yes, Henry.

K: I wanted to tell you that we have had over here today a request for some loans for the Khama River project and for some dishware factory.

V: I see.

V: Oh, good.

K: Good. Wonderful.

V: Fine. Thank-you.

K: Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. 11 03/21/73 11:00AM By: VORONOV

TELCONE

Amb. Rabin (Israel)/Mr. Kissinger

10:33 a.m., March 2, 1973

R: Hello, good morning.

K: Yes, Mr. Ambassador.

R: I asked last night how do you suggest that we proceed --

K: On what?

R: On how to bring about a decision.

K: But I'm sending out a directive this morning.

R: I see.

K: When I get it drafted, I will read it to you on the telephone.

R: Good.

K: And I've already told Rush and Sisco orally and I'll tell Richardson. And I've told them that the lower figure is unacceptable to the President and that it's up to them to work out a higher one.

R: Yeah. I distinguish between the two items.

K: No, I understand. The other one -- they'll both be mentioned.

R: Because I would like --

K: No, on the 100 they have to proceed immediately.

R: Oh, that's what I'm really interested to finish it within this week.

K: All right. Well, I can't order them to finish it by any given time period but I'll say this is the decision.

R: I see.

K: But I'll tell them to proceed with that immediately; to implement it.

R: That's what at the present is much more important to us.

K: Oh, I understand.

R: All right.

TECLASSIFIED

Amb. Rabin/Mr. Kissinger

10:33 a.m., March 2, 1973

K: And if not, then I don't understand your strategy, Mr. Ambassador.

R: Well, at least I know that they'll try to delay it.

K: No, they won't be able to.

R: You know the second item anyhow is bound to be delayed. This is the part of the deal.

K: Well, the production is agreed to and they can't delay it.

R: And this is much more urgent to start with as long as we are in hock.

K: I will get the instruction out this morning.

R: Fine.

K: Good.

R: Thank you very much.

K: Bye, Mr. Ambassador.

R: Bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. by EO 17358
Byr ARNOLD DeGloster

TELCORN

Mel Elfin/Mr. Kissinger

10:45 a.m., March 2, 1973

K: Mel, everyone tells me I'm giving a speech tomorrow, is that true?

E: Not a speech, just a couple of words, that's all. Not a speech.

K: Not a speech. Anyone else speaking?

E: I am.

K: Oh-h-h, God. You must be kidding.

E: Well, what I'm going to do is get up there and insult you.

K: Is that new? Do you have to get 80 people together for that?

E: Oh, I'm just going to tell them all the truth about you, Henry. No, the only thing I thought I would do -- I would get up and just that you're going to say how marvelous it was to be in China and I hope I can go again, thank you very much.

K: 5 minutes?

E: 5 - 10 minutes. You know, whatever's on top of the head. You know, read to them from the palms of Oriani Fallaci.

K: You think it might hold their interest if I describe the meeting with Mao?

E: Yeah. Look, just off the top and totally off-the-record.

K: I'm kidding.

E: We're now up to 160 people.

K: Well, now, who is that?

E: These were official members of the party. Scali is going to be there.

K: Oh, God, thank you. Now if I had known that, I would have of course have prepared a half-hour speech.

E: Ziegler's going to be there. And Diane Sawyer and Connie Gerard and Al Haig and Jenkins.

DECLASSIFIED

Aero.11111111111111111111111111111111
By: D. M. D. G. S. L. I.

Mel Elfin/Mr. Kissinger

10:45 a.m., March 2, 1973

- 2 -

K: And if Colson is going to be there, they don't have to tape me.

E: Ha.

K: Can I bring Nancy Maginnes if she's in town.

E: Of course, I'm bringing my wife. Everybody's bringing wives so that's how we got up to this enormous total.

K: Oh, I see. It's informal or --

E: It's totally informal. I got the list of the people who are coming -- Bob Considine, Kraslow, Kalb, Small, Manning, Elfin, Ziegler, Tom Ross, Tom Jarriel, Weston, Kaplow -- these are all people who were there. There are no outsiders.

K: Right. Plus families.

E: Plus family. Frank ________ called me with a terrible problem; his mother-in-law is coming to town, could he bring her?

K: How did you solve it?

E: Oh, I said I've got a date for your mother-in-law, that's the answer.

K: (laughter)

E: Hey, look, when you run operations, unlike yours, I run with a little efficiency you see. In my organization the left hand knows what the left hand is doing.

K: (laughter) Now you stole one of my cracks.

E: Well, of course, I've been reading all your gags. This is how I'm going to insult you.

K: Just remember, I only have 20 which I shuffle around for occasions so save a few for me.

E: You'll have some good new ones when I finish with you tomorrow.

K: Is Buckley coming?

E: No, Buckley is in Switzerland I thought. I got a note from him. He said he'd dearly love to come but he's in Switzerland. And Teddy White is finishing the book so he can't come but Considine is going to be there breaking another bottle of Mao Tai I think.

DECLASSIFIED

Ally's E01258
By: A. R. DeGleisdor

Mel Elfin/Mr. Kissinger

10:45 a.m., March 2, 1973

- 3 -

K: Well, I'll tell you I ran into Considine in a New York restaurant a few weeks ago and he was still blubbering about the China trip.

E: Henry, I also have tapes which I made of the music at the banquets and I sat there last night at 2:30 in the morning and I couldn't believe it. You know, can she bake a cherry pie Billy boy, Billy boy; I just said did that ever really happen. I mean, did I ever sit down in the Great Hall of the People and listen to the People's Liberation Army Band playing Cherry Pie.

K: Well, you know they made a documentary of the table tennis teams trip through the United States. The whole sound track of which are the songs played at the banquet for the President.

E: Is that right?

K: Yeah.

E: They are just fantastic. If they ever put that on an LP record here, we could balance the payments right on the spot.

K: And it's the biggest puff job for the United States that I've ever seen. They are just using the Table Tennis tour as an excuse to give a travelogue of the United States.

E: Wow, wow.

K: And it's really moving.

E: Well, the thing is we've got a lot of veteran newspapermen like Considine who has been bubbling for years but the people who were along on this trip, the combination of history -- it was something that has affected us for the rest of our lives and in quite a serious tone.

K: In other words, you'd just like a few informal comments of the experience we've had together.

E: What it means to all of us in a sense. That's the thing I'm talking about.

K: Exactly. No, no; I'll do that with pleasure.

E: Right. That's all I'm interested in.

K: No, I won't prepare anything.

E: No, I'm preparing some gags for you that's all.

CLASSIFIED

All rights reserved
Copyright 1973 by
Henry Kissinger

*

TELCORN

Sec. Shultz/Kissinger

11:35 a.m. 3/2/73

S: I have been thinking about this trip some more. I gather we have to
allow the Russians 5 days. Sonnenfeldt is thinking about not going
right now on the grounds that we have only bad news. That isn't
really quite true.

K: That isn't true at all.

S: We are signing off on a $21 million deal today.

K: Besides the good news is your attitude, not any deals.

S: I'm finishing up this announcement. We want to be sure the State
Department isn't going to blow his lid and so on, but there would be
a structure. Third,

K: The way to keep them from blowing their lid is to give them a
______ if you ask them their opinion they will blow their lid.

S: Yeah. The - we can sign a protocol on the gas deal that, in effect, says
all right.

K: Well, I'm not sure we want you to do that, we may want to save that
for the President.

S: Well, this is a kind of lets keep moving type of thing that the company
would sign with our permission.

K: That's fine.

S: It will keep the ball rolling a little bit and wouldn't be anything conclusive
but would enable us to show that we are continuing to explore this and
develop it and work with it.

K: That's fine.

S: And it kind of keeps the options open. And puts us in a posture to try to
have something ready for the President when he and Brezhnev meets.
So those are the things that we could--

K: I'm not worried about your--the major thing would be a very senior
official with an interest and a commitment to carry out what we agreed
to last year. That's the best news we can have for them.

CLASSIFIED

Aero. fly. E017235A
By: DA PARNELL 01/15/73

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO17958

By DA HARVEY Gibbs

S: I think we also have a breakthrough in the--in how to think about this MFN problem which ought to solve the problem. And it was suggested to us by Javits who's very ingenious as you know. What he suggests is this, that we ask in the trade bill for the right of the President to grant MFN treatment subject to a congressional veto within 30 days if either House votes him down.

K: Right.

S: Now, that gets rid of the Jackson amendment on the MSN for Russian problem. He says they are all signed up and they can't let go. On the other hand they could vote for this kind of initial authority and once the President proposed something, they don't have to vote for it. They just have to let it alone for 30 days and then it comes--

K: That's an ingenious idea, and it meets Ribbikofs point that they don't want to give carte blanche to the President.

S: Right. So I think that is something I could talk about and it would also show--we're thinking about--

K: I have no trouble with you going.

S: Well, why don't I go.

K: Okay.

S: I would take Sonnenfeldt with me and I would take a couple of people from the Treasury who--one who knows about the monetary thing and one about the trade, but that would be--

K: When do you leave.

S: I believe Thursday. I'd be gone for two weeks. And I would figure I wouldn't take somebody from the State Dept, from Commerce Department, or--

K: Well, when are you going to send us the bloody press announcement.

S: I worked on it this morning and it's being retyped, and I'll get it over there shortly.

K: Okay. How about the three names.

S: Well, on the names Weintrout checks out as a very good guy.

K: Controlable?

3

S: Inclined to be bureaucratic in the clutch toward the State Dept. but basically controllable and good. Marshallers we don't know a lot about so I don't have any particular reading for you one way of the other and I'm trying to dig up a good solid Treasury name which I don't have yet, but we are working on it.

K: Can I have it by early afternoon.

S: I'll try very hard to get it.

K: Good. Because I think on balance you should go next week, and I'd like to have a long talk with you, or at least a talk with you before you go.

S: Well, I certainly want to do that.

K: Good.

S: All right. So I will get people notified and maybe you can tell Sonnenfeldt.

K: Okay.

S: What is your--have you had anymore thinking about--

K: Well, I've talked to the President. The President said he would like to keep an ear, but if I want to work it out with you, he says you are a sly dog, but that doesn't surprise you. You're stealing all his good people. But he said if you and I come to an agreement, he'd be delighted.

S: Well, I have a feeling that this would in a sense keep him working within your framework, in some ways in a kind of a little better --

K: George, you raiding my staff with that argument and Richardson raiding my staff with that argument--

S: Who's he taking?

K: He's taking Cooper.

S: The guy we just talked to.

K: Yeah, he wants to grab him which is really a little rough

S: How did he get on to him?

K: Because I made the mistake of confiding in a Cabinet Member.

DECLASSIFIED

TELCOM

McGeorge Bundy/Mr. Kissinger

11:50 a.m., March 2, 1973

B: Listen, I called up Lou Harris yesterday and asked him to give me some expert opinion on the state of public opinion on aid to North Vietnam and other current issues. He has just done a poll, which will be breaking soon. But there's a great deal behind it that was of enormous interest to me and I thought I would just call you and say that I think it might be interesting to you and to your boss if either of you have a minute. I know he's been in and out of there a little, although he never tells me on what business. He really has got some thoughts about how difficult it's going to be and some of the ways of taking hold of this.

K: Good. I will talk to Lou Harris whom I know.

B: Good.

K: Mac, I talked to the President about your kind offer to put a group together. He appreciated it very much and he thinks that any time you want to do it, it would be helpful.

B: Which is one of the things that I talked to Lou about. He came back with one name that he thought -- he thinks this is going to be hardest to sell to Hawks and he said would John Connally play. You might want to think over whether at the right time -- you only play to one voice.

K: Yeah.

B: My thought was Ted Esburg (sp?) at the other end. The two of them together might really be very powerful.

K: I think John Connally would play. Ted Hesburg (sp?) sets off waves in this --

B: I know it. But you got to go for both kinds of people.

K: I agree with you.

B: Why don't you talk to Lou --

K: Mac, in theory my colleagues always agree with this until I come up with some names.

B: (laughter) That's the trouble.

K: (laughter)

B: I'm very familiar with that difficulty. Used to be called Marvin Watson.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E01745
By: DA HARRIS/Davis

TELCOM

Sander Vanocur/Mr.Kissinger

12:31 p.m., March 2, 1973

K: Sandy, how are you?

V: Fine, thank you. How are you?

K: Okay.

V: I have a letter from Robert Hutchins to the President, which I would like to deliver to you personally if I may, inviting the President to be the keynote speaker at ________ Three Foreign Policy Competition, which will be held here in October.

K: Right.

V: Can I drop it off? I'm leaving town on Sunday to take Edith away for a week. Could I do it in the next two days?

K: Well, let's aim for tomorrow morning, say around 11:00

V: 11:00.

K: Right.

V: If there's any change --

K: Yeah, lets' say 11:15.

V: Lovely, thank you very much.

K: Good, Sandy.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E017458
By DAVID HARRIS/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

TELCORN

Bill Safire/Mr. Kissinger

2:38 p.m., March 2, 1973

K: Listen, Safire, you can do better than that.

S: Better than that! That elicit paroxysms of last --

K: Well, try another set of paroxysms, will you?

S: As a matter of fact, that Connally line is a killer. I was refining it
this afternoon. You know the one I mean? We arranged to have lunch
tomorrow afternoon at 12:00.

K: Yeah, high noon.

S: He puts it in his quaint Texas way. High noon in the middle of the street
outside the Sans Souci.

K: (laughter) You think that's all right?

S: That's a killer.

K: You do. Okay.

S: You'll see to it that it doesn't have people doubled over.

K: No, my instinct is pretty good. I finally got you to do something good
for that correspondents dinner.

S: It took a lot of whipping and conjugaling and everything.

K: After you did that whole thing on the Howard Hughes theme.

S: That's right, that's right. If you had gone that way originally, you'd
have gone right over the cliff.

K: I would have been a disaster.

S: Absolutely. It was a lucky thing you restrained me.

K: So now will you try something again? Something that involves the void-
ables of the press in China.

S: Contrary to my expectations and beliefs I didn't go to China so embarrass
the ______ is not my bag on that one.

CLASSIFIED

Byron Deedes

2:44 pm /March 2, 1973

K: Hello

S: Hi, Henry. A draft of that announcement is over there.

K: Yes, I'm editing it--I'm taking out a lot of the crap like "it is done for the benefit of American workers".

S: Okay.

K: Excuse me for offending you.

S: I don't expect you to--

K: The other is "the implementat on of policy and agreements will be conducted by The Chairman, Office of East-West Trade". Don't put that in a press release. I mean maybe that's what you want to do, but why give him that charter in writing.

S: Well, in order to keep the Commerce Department bucked up a little bit, that they've got something to do, you think it's enough by saying he's the Chairman of the Office of East-West Trade.

K: Absolutely.

S: That would shorten the statement.

K: That's what I would do.

S: Now we didn't put the Under Secretary of the Treasury on that committee just because it's essentially departmentally listed, but it may be from the standpoint of Sonnenfeldt, if he is that guy, that he would like to be listed. We could always just make him a member of the committee.

K: Listen, if Sonnenfeldt is a member, he'll want to be listed, believe me. There is no way he would not want to be listed.

S: Well maybe he should be, because the--it talks about a working group under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of the Treasury.

K: Well, I wouldn't worry about a press announcement. So far, he hasn't been appointed yet, so--

S: Well, he's not aware of all this.

K: Right. So I think from that point of view--let me send it back to you in

CLASSIFIED

Autograph E017258
By D. HARRIS

*

a little while.

S: All right. Now, I have a brief press statement on my trip and let me read it to you if I may - that I would expect might go off tomorrow. "At the request of the President, Secretary of the Treasury, George P. Shultz, has accepted an invitation to visit Moscow, to discuss trade matters with officials of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic. The Secretary will visit Moscow from March 11 to March 14. He will be accompanied by a small working party. Shultz also expects to discuss long range monetary problems on his trip. He will consult with several finance ministers in Europe as part of his preparation for the monetary reform conference scheduled in Washington, by the committee of 20, March 26 to 28. The Secretary's itinerary will be announced when arrangements are complete."

K: Now, have you told the Russians you are going to make that announcement.

S: No, that's why I'm calling you first before I do anything.

K: Well you better tell the Russians, you'd better not make it until they have approved it. They might take it very ill. I mean, it's very bad diplomatic form to announce a trip to a country that hasn't formally approved it yet.

S: Well, who do I call, how do I do that. Is that the sort of thing Sonnenfeldt can do for me?

K: We'll do it for you.

S: Okay. Then I would hope to be able to put this but because as these preparations go on, there'll be talk about it. I'd expect to put it out tomorrow.

K: Well, if we get an answer by tomorrow.

S: Well, they came over here with a formal invitation.

K: But not from March 11 to 14.

S: I see.

K: Oh, you'll get the answer unless somebody is out of town, but you can't announce a trip to a country before you have the country's approval.

S: Well, now, what about these other places.

K: Well, you're not mentioning their names are you.

DECLASSIFIED

Antony EDWARDS
By D.G. HARVEY-GLEISLEY

3

S: They are not mentioned here. Well, their itinerary is being worked out with them presumably.

K: That's right.

S: Well, now hold my hand here Doctor, I'm not accustomed to doing this kind of business, so.

K: I'll take care of you George.

S: All right, I appreciate it.

K: You will come back a chastened man. Are you going to give me a God damned Treasury guy for the Economic Commission, or do I put you on it.

S: Well, let me tell you there are two pretty good possibilities, as I understand it. I know one of the fellows, I don't the other. There is a fellow by the name of Don Siberate who is a PhD in economics, has been a Treasury hand for quite a while, he's worked on EXIMBANK problems a lot, knows that kind of thing pretty well, so he would fit.

K: Is he filled with greed.

S: Yes. Then there's a fellow by the name of Ed Gordan.

K: Gordon, that's the one--

S: Who is a Treasury Attache in Saigon for a while, and I don't know how that cuts. On the one hand, he knows that part of the world, on the other hand, if he's been in Saigon maybe that makes--

K: I don't give a damn about that.

S: Does he sound better to you.

K: Well, I don't know, whomever you prefer. Can you get me a recommendation.

S: Well let me give that--I wasn't certain whether or not the Saigon business was good, bad or indifferent. I guess it's indifferent.

K: It's indifferent. Pick out your best man.

S: Okay.

K: Good. Thank you.

S: Thank you.

CLASSIFIED

Agency: E017458
By: A. M. D. 09/50

TelCon:3/2/73-5:39

Mr. Kissinger/
Mr. Bludhorn

K: Hello.

B: Henry.

K: Charles, how are you.

B: OK. I saw a piece by accident on your charming interview with Barbara Walters.

K: Oh, did you.

B: Yes. It was very serious, very ______ like. Very non-committal.

K: Well, what could I do. She asked me a lot of stupid questions.

B: XM But you were very very serious and very no-comment like. You sounded more like a North Vietnamese delegate. I think you spent a lot of time around Le Duc. I think it is OK.

K: Well, she asked me questions which were just senseless.

B: How are you Henry.

K: I am fine.

B: I just got back from Europe at the end of the week. As you probably know things are being somewhat chaotic in the monetary way.

K: Yes, that is right.

B: That is about putting it mildly.

K: That is putting it mildly.

B: It is the biggest tobacco(?) I have ever seen in my lifetime anyway.

K: Really.

B: Oh, sure. Absolutely unbelievable.

K: But what causes it?

B: Lack of confidence. You know it is like the stock market. It is like anything else. It is like the things that happened I am sure you

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal ED17258
By: HAROLD GLOSSER

studied after World War I. The kind of things where people go and put the European philosophy anyway - to put things under the lid you know for better days. But I think what really transpired was that when the United States devaluated within a matter of few days that the speculators were told the German ______. A lot of people made some very fast money in Europe and at the same time coming 14 months after the first devaluation it destroyed the credibility of the dollar. And today the first franc was quoted 25.5 percent over the dollar.

K: So it was a mistake to devalue.

B: I think it was a great mistake yes. But of course you understand that Mr. Schultz and I have never seen eye to eye on anything and this goes back to the time that I was at the White House with him and John Ehrlichman and Jim Roche(??) who was chairman of General Motors at that time. And I guess - you know - it is just a question of practicability and philosophy. I could always understand in view of these things ifx in your practicability in the things that you did, but I find it very hard to understand his logic. I didn't understand it at that time and he didn't understand me when I warned him about the Japanese threat(?). Because I did warn him about it he thought that it was Japanese obsession on my part. Jim Roche will remember that very well.

K: Do you think the Japanese were deliberately doing this?

B: Doing what:

K: Deliberately contributing to this run on the dollar?

B: No, definitely not. I think they are the principal cause of it because of the unknown balance of payments deficit that the United States is stuck with(???) The principal amount has come from Japan - 4 1/2 billion last year. And that - there were two things that happened. The combination of the announcement on a very untimely basis of phase III, together with a report of another record ______ in the ______ of the United States vizaviz foreign countries(?) The major major part of which was Japan's - a small part of which was Europe, very small and some part of it which was Canadian which is not too important, but the combination of the announcement of Phase III together with the announcement of that grave(?) deficit created a pure panic in Europe which was underlined and stimulated by the Italians who were running out of their currency at the time into Switzerland and converting into dollars and then the dollars were being converted into German marks. Now of course there is a tremendous pool of Europe/Bonn(?) money over here that

DECLASSIFIED
Acta. E.V. 12.54

- 3 -

is floating around and there is a tremendous amount of oil money
that is moving around like a thunder cloud. And I delivered
three speeches over in Europe and while I don't have your name
or your reputation, I understand I drew the biggest financial crowds
in the history of Germany or Holland and I warned them about the
Monte Carlo Casino ______ which they have adopted in a monetary
relation viz: viz: the United States, but I think an example - it is
only ten(?) weeks since we devalued at ten percent. And when
situations have arisen in Europe where you can't change dollars
at all, of course today the central banks were closed. But I don't
know whether you can imagine the impact when the Swiss franc
is quoted at ________ 20.5 percent over the
dollar. Which means that the Swiss franc was being sold today
ten and a half percent over the ________ revalue at a price of three
weeks ago.

K: Yes.

B: Plus the most colossal devaluation that we have seen in the dollar
at any time ever. And of course that is pure lack of confidence.
I think they may decide to float the currency over the weekend and
if they do, I personally think that the dollar is the ______ ??
currency around today, but I don't think that is going to solve the
problem until we do a number of things that have to be done which
is getting the Europeans - the Europe/Bonn ?? (Europe/bond)
holders have got our 80 billion of unconvertible IOUs and actually
getting them to take that in ______ thirty year money. If you were
running a company and you couldn't pay off tomorrow, you flee
to your crediters, your banks - you have got to take 30 year paper
for 5 percent. You say to the banks you worked with me for years,
you made a lot of money off me these years and that is how they
have made off the United States for years - when they were out of
official currencies, like the Japanese. And we bailed them out of
two world wars and you say to them you think our 30-year money
at 5 percent which is our Treasury and you sort that out of the
market. That is the first thing you do. The second is - and
it probably is very unpopular in your mind. - You start lowering
the boom on the Japanese which I said for four years we cannot
afford to live with a double standard system. Which means
the Japanese are putting every kind of ______ in American business
and at the same time they have a three-fold here. I think it is
time that we raise the ______ a foot at a time they way they do
and lower them at a foot when they do. And I think it has got to
be an eye for an eye and teeth for teeth. I think we have got to
ride our balance of payments because we need to devalue at 14
percent but only raise the price of their ______ 4 percent and you
know they are scorting(?) ______ around with your figures with the

CLASSIFIED

Authority ED 12758
By: HARRY D. GILLESY

CLASSIFIED

Autograph
E017258
By D.Y. BAR-Derelsley

-4-

help of the Japanese Government. And that the biggest problem
that we have is that we have got to import oils from abroad and
that the oil imports - we are going to be paying that to the Middle
East and that is the big trouble with this damn devaluation. It
has resulted in two things. The fixed imports that we have to have
from our fuel energy crisis are going to be coming in at higher
prices that is going to be going to the sky and all the shieks. We
are going to be speculating against us. The second thing is that
the sophisticated things that we ship abroad - the machinery -
the sophisticated way we ship abroad, we are just going to sell
it ten percent cheaper. Just like we have sold now the grains
ten percent cheaper to the Russians who are
sitting on their floggold. And the Henry the result
of it is that because of this lack of confidence people have rushed
and the commodities and you got the highest price in commodities
that we have seen in years and that is reflecting
itself in the super markets. This George Meany is going to be
more and more for his labor people so when the Japs artificially
fix 4 percent increases and in fact we have domestic inflation
rates based on food and higher wages that will be able to offset
it, me and Mr. Schultz.
It is test 22 that is what it is. Test 22.

K: Charles I must run.

B: Well, I'm sorry. I didn't call you for that. I called you to ask
you whether or not there has been any change in circumstances
- whether the matter was alive or whether it was dead. I didn't
call you at an economic waste of time.

K: No, you didn't waste my time. My problem is that a note has
just been brought in that some people have come in. I think it is
just too uncertain when I can leave to hold you up any further.

B: I see.

K: I mean I just have to see this thing through - through another round
and you have been too good. And I can't just take it - the responsi-
bility. You know maybe I can move in a few months. But it is
just too uncertain right now.

B: Well, would you like to talk about it some weekend when you can
talk a little more free or not?

K: Certainly.

B: Well, is there any place I can call you or not - this weekend and we can spend - after we have been spent some time on it - maybe we ought to give it the last try maybe five or ten minutes on the phone. And if you don't want to abandon it, it is fine with me. But then at least we will both know that we have

K: Why don't you call me this weekend through the White House board. That is the easiest. 456-1414.

B: When is the best time to call you.

K: Oh, call me tomorrow around 6 o'clock.

B: Six o'clock in the evening/

K: Good. I will talk to you then.

TelCon

Mr. Harold Brown/Mr. Kissinger

7:35 pm, March 2, 1973

K:
I was painfully aware of it this afternoon, and I had to take on
the whole gang united.

B: Well you know, Farley has been keeping very very quiet and I that as far as the reason is he figures that his agency is badly wounded and anything he says -- anything he speaks up to the court is actually going to bounce back and hurt his proposal. In anything he said is going to be jumped on by everybody else because they view ACA the wounded animal.

K: Well I know the syndrome, it's happened to me.

B: My advice Henry is, if you can save Thieu without paying too much politically, it's worth considering. Still more important is having an influence on who gets named to head that agency.

K: Right.

B: Agnew, I think would have been--I mean Harold Agnew, not the other Agnew would, I think, would have been a disaster. Foster would be better.

K: Yeah.

B: Okay.

K: Well let me see if I can find some respectable academician.

B: Okay. Second point, this regards my own relations in SALT. Alex clearly wants me to serve and I'm willing to, but I in my own much more peripheral way face a similar problem. At least CDA goes--it gets cut out.

K: Who's representative are you?

B: I'm nobody, I'm an external one and that's my question. I need some place to attack because I can only stand a few weeks of each session and I need to be able to go and talk to somebody to get caught up to date. In the past I've done it mostly with ACDA but I have spent some time with DOD. There aren't many possibilities. Your own office would be a possibility--I know you're very reluctant to do that.

K: Yeah, I am.

B: Because you don't want to be in a position where people start

CLASSIFIED

Aero.oly E017258

By DA HARRIS 03/15/73

DECLASSIFIED

Aero. Div. E 017258

By: D. M. Plesley

talking as NSC consultants.

K: And one--what are the other possibilities.

B: I don't know.

K: Well, let me look into that.

B: Because there has to be an answer. Well I have been perfectly happy getting my information from ACDA.

K: Right. Well I don't mind arranging a consulting thing here to let you see papers.

B: That's what I'm really thinking of and being able to talk to Phil O'Deen for example.

K: Yes. Let me see what I can do.

B: All right. Okay. That's quite important to me because otherwise although I may be able to have some effect on the Verification Panel and so on, and I've become ignorant and therefore my ideas won't be worth anything. I'm not willing to be in a situation where I get stuck with a policy that I hadn't added any inputs to, it just won't work.

K: No, no, that absolutely right.

B: Let me turn to a completely different subject that doesn't require quick action but I thought I ought to tell you about and you may have some suggestions or may want me to do something. I have been invited by Keldisch, the President of the Soviet Union, along with my wife and some people from CalTech, and I'm trying to get them to include some Trustees as well as faculty, so that we can go to some industrial places as well as academic ones. I don't know whether that will work. But in any event I'm likely to be going and I will be seeing Keldisch, I will be going to some of their laboratories--are there people whom you would like me to talk to, is there some things that you would like me to convey.

K: When are you going.

B: It hasn't been set. It will be this year, it may not be until, say, September.

K: Well why don't you get in touch with me about a month before it's set, and then we can make a more reasonable decision.

B: All right. That's fine.

K: I would at least like to have you fully briefed about what our views are.

B: Okay.

K: So that you might be able to drop them in a few places.

B: Right. Because I will see Keldisch, I will arrange to see, I'm sure to see Albadov and a few other people.

K: Good.

B: Okay, those were my points, Henry, and I appreciate very much your taking the time--

K: Not at all Harold. I seem to remember you always saw me when you were down here full time. And I admire your work.

B: Thank you very much.

K: Good, see you soon.

B: Right, bye.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Acting J. E. L. B. S.
By a H. M. D.

TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger

8:05 pm, March 2, 1973

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. Anything new on our friends out there.

K: No, you mean in the Sudan.

P: Yeah.

K: We don't have any of the details yet, they notified the Saudi Arabian Military Attache of the facts.

P: But they didn't kill the Belgian, just our people.

K

K: No they killed the Belgian too.

P: Well, Victor told me that the Belgian was not killed, would you check that and let me know.

K: Yeah, they didn't kill the-- Let me check all the facts and I'll call you back in five minutes.

P: Oh, take your time. Another thing, when does Rogers get back.

K: Tomorrow night.

P: Okay, fine.

K: Good night, Mr. President.

TECLASSIFIED

Aero.111 EO17258

By: a HAROLD Kissinger

8:30 pm, March 2, 1973

K: Mr. President.

P: Yeah, Henry.

K: Information is just very fragmentary. The Major who, the Sudanese Major who brought out the information now admits he didn't see any bodies. Now he admits, now he claims that the Belgian was alive.

P: But he says the Americans are dead.

K: Well that's what he says, but it is even possible, Mr. President, that nobody was killed.

P: Hmmm, really.

K: Well I wouldn't want to hold that out, but I would have thought that if these Arabs wanted to establish their credibility, I mean, why would they kill the Americans in order to--

P: That why I wondered, why they would kill us and not the Belgians.

K: They would do it to increase their credibility towards the remaining hostages. To do that it would be better for them to exhibit a body.

P: Yes, also to keeping them alive in order to keep squeezing us.

K: Well, if they keep them alive, people might think they wouldn't kill anybody. I can imagine that they'd kill somebody just to show they can do it, that they are determined. But then one would think it would be in their interest to produce a body.

P: Uh huh. Well, Henry, I guess we've got to go ahead--we've already put our statement out and lowered the flags and all the rest, and we just let that go, huh.

K: I think we should let that go. But I'm holding up on the cables a few hours, Mr. President.

P: I see. Yeah, because -- the cables--

K: To the families.

P: Yes, yes, yes. But my God, we've already ordered the lowering of the flags.

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E017258
By: HAROLD GILSON

2

K: Well, we were given official information from the Sudanese government.

P: So we'll go ahead and lower the flags.

K: We were told by the Vice President of the Sudan, who probably has an I.Q. of 25, that this happened, and he, in turn, it now turns out was told by a Major, who had been negotiating with us.

P: Well, I just pray it isn't true.

K: I think the probability is that it's true. That they are dead.

P: Yeah.

K: But there is a slight glimmer, and we'll keep you informed of course.

P: Well in any event, we are doing exactly the right thing in taking the hard line on it, Henry, we can't give in on this.

K: Absolutely not, Mr. President.

P: We can't do it, we can't do it, nobody can.

K: There wasn't anything--

P: Nothing to do with their ransom demands.

K: You wouldn't have yeilded anyway, but this wasn't a case where you had any choice because--

P: They didn't say, give us a hundred thousand dollars, they said give us Sirhan or whatever the hell his--

K: Sirhan was just one of many requests. Their basic request is to get those terrorists out.

P: That's right. And we had no control over that. Let's be damn sure that we get all thatout Henry and the crap that to be written about this.

K: Aboslutely, Mr. President.

P: Yep, Okay. Well--incidentally give some thought, and put your staff to work on this, what we may have to do with regard to some sort of an insurance policy or something with regard to Ambassadors and people in critical posts like this. What do you think.

RECLASSIFIED

Authority EO17951
By: D.R. HARRIS Gibbsley

3

P: You see what I mean. I just wonder if you can just frankly expect these poor bastards to be overthere and--at least they risk their lives, let's just show that we're caring about it. And of course when a man goes there, he's gotta go knowing he takes the risk.

K: Well, of course, the Sudan itself is a fairly quiet place. This is a bunch of Arabs who--

P: Yeah, but if it had happened in Libya--that part of the world is always dangerous. Christ, on the other hand, it happened to the Israelis down in Southeast Asia.

K: Yeah, in Bangkok, but they got out.

P: I know, but it happened.

K: Yeah. They said the Arabs had been in Thailand for too long, they got soft.

P: Isn't that something.

K: I said how long is that. They said five days.

P: Yeah. Well, anyway--

K: I'll keep you posted.

P: You follow up on this and if there's anything you'll let me know, if not, we'll just ride it through.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: But we're going to stand firm, we're not going to give an inch on this business of paying something for them, no way.

K: No, we can't.

P: No way, okay.

K: Right, Mr. President.

CLASSIFIED

Aero. E017258

By: HAROLD GILSON