CHAPTER V

# The Esoteric Strategy -- Principles of All-Out War

Of course, stalemates have occurred frequently in the history of warfare. Usually they have been brought about, however, by a balance between offense and defense on the battlefield. The distinguishing feature of the current use of the term is that it refers not to a balance on the battlefield, but to a calculus of risks; with each side possessing the capability to inflict catastrophic blows on the other, war is said to be no longer a rational course of action. To be sure, even if a nuclear stalemate does exist, it would not make for stability in the present volatile state of technology, much less for a sense of harmony. The spectre of a technological breakthrough by the other side would always loom large; it would give an apocalyptic quality to all international relations.

It is important to be precise, however, about the effect of the nuclear stalemate. A great deal will depend on the correctness of our assessment of what the stalemate deters and whether this exhausts the strategic options of either side.

The whole notion of a stalemate is repugnant, of course, to our military thought, based as it is on the literal application of Clausewitz's dictum that the purpose of war is to break the enemy's will to resist. It has been overlooked that Clausewitz had considered his postulate merely as an expression of pure theory which would never be realized in actuality. He had asserted, to be sure, that war tends towards maximum violence but he had added that, in practice, it never reached maximum violence because

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of the state of international morality, or the complexity of alliances or
most importantly because of a limitation on war aims. ¹) And the history
of warfare prior to World War I seemed to confirm this. For over a century
prior to World War I war was considered an extension of policy. Because
it was fought for specific objectives, there existed a rough commensurab-
ility between the force employed and the goal sought. But with the out-
break of World War I war suddenly seemed to become an end in itself. After
the first few months of the War, none of the protagonists would have been
able to name an objective other than the total defeat of the enemy or at
least they would have named objectives, such as the German demand for the
annexation of Belgium, which amounted to unconditional surrender. This
was all the more remarkable because none of the political leaders had pre-
pared for anything but a war in the 19th century style with rapid movements
and quick decisions so that the stalemate of the first winter was due
primarily to the exhaustion of munitions supplies. ²) There had in fact
occurred a hiatus between military and political planning which has never
been bridged. The military staffs had developed plans for total victory
because in such plans the political leadership proved incapable of giving
this conception a concrete expression in terms of peace aims. It was
forgotten that the rapid decisions of 19th century warfare had been due,
above all, to the readiness with which defeat was acknowledged. And defeat
was acknowledged relatively easily, because the consequences of it did not
threaten national survival. When the purpose of war became total victory,
however, the result was a conflict of ever-increasing violence which

1. Clausewitz - *Vom Kriege*, p.8

2. See Aron - *A Century of Total War*, p.

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carried its hatreds into a peace treaty that considered more the redressing of sacrifices than the stability of the international order.

It was overlooked moreover, that total victory was made possible only through a fortuitous combination of circumstances. For the strategy of the two world wars presupposed two related factors: a productive process which yielded a substantial surplus above bare subsistence and weapons of relatively small destructiveness so that any increment in the strength of one side could prove strategically significant. Even then the insistence on all-out victory would probably have produced a stalemate had not the addition of the United States to the Allied side given them a crushing margin in industrial potential. The purpose of war can be equated with total victory only if at the end of the war, the victor possesses an unambiguous advantage in relative strength and sufficient physical resources to make this margin effective. And the margin has to be great in proportion as the defeat sought to be imposed is total. The objective of 19th century warfare was to bring about a calculus of risks according to which continued resistance would appear more costly than the conditions sought to be imposed. The more moderate the peace terms the smaller the margin of superiority required to reach this point. The war ended when a sovereign government agreed to the victor's terms and thereby assumed responsibility for their execution. The victor's task in these circumstances was to supervise the actions of a government which in turn retained control over its own population.

With the coming of total war, however, war ceased to be an effort to affect the actions of a government; its goal has become, almost invariably, to overthrow the enemy leadership. This has not only transformed

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every war into a variety of civil war, it has also increased the margin of
superiority required to impose the victor's will. For success in over-
throwing the enemy government has in effect forced the victor to assume
the responsibility for the civil administration of the defeated. We could
afford to do so at the end of World War II because neither our social nor
our material structure was seriously impaired by the war; if anything,
they were strengthened by it. But at the scale of catastrophe produced by
an all-out thermo-nuclear war it is doubtful whether any society will
retain either the physical or the psychological resources to project it-
self abroad. When energies will be absorbed in problems of bare survival,
it is difficult to conceive a sustained effort to assume responsibility
for the government of an enemy country, Where, moreover, the social
disintegration and physical destruction is likely far to exceed that of
Germany and Japan after World War II. And in the absence of physical
occupation, victory may prove illusory. It may create a vacuum exploited
by powers whose position relative to the contenders has been improved by
the thermo-nuclear exchange. The decline of Europe started with the
exhaustion produced by the first World War in which even the victors were
weakened in relation to the non-European powers.

Thus the destructiveness of modern weapons deprives victory of
its historical meaning because even the side which inflicts a greater devas-
tation than its opponent may not have a sufficient margin left to impose
its will. And the same exorbitant destructiveness has altered the signifi-
cance of the industrial potential on which we have traditionally relied for
victory. Our strategic doctrine had always been built around the proposi-
tion that our forces-in-being at the beginning of a war need only be large

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enough to avoid disaster and that we could then crush the enemy by mobil-
izing our industrial potential presupposed a fortuitous combination of
circumstances, however; our invulnerability, the existence of allies to
hold a line while we mobilized, and above all a certain stage of technical
development. When weapons are very simple and easy to manufacture and
when their destructive power is low, trained manpower is scarcer than
military equipment. Under such circumstances the significant attrition is
in manpower and military superiority depends on human rather than material
resources. Thus Russia became a major power in the 19th century despite an
almost complete lack of industry, therefore too the decisions in war until
the middle of the 19th century reflected superior manpower or superior
strategy, rarely a superior industrial capacity. In order to put a premium
on industrial potential weapons must be sufficiently complex to require a
substantial production effort, but not so destructive as to drain the
national substance before industrial mobilization can make itself felt.

As a result our industrial potential proved strategically most significant
when there existed a balance between the destructiveness of weapons and the
complexity of means of delivery. Then any increment either in the power of
weapons or in their number could be translated into a strategic advantage.

But when weapons become extremely powerful there is an upper limit beyond
which increased destructiveness pays diminishing returns. When both sides
are capable of inflicting catastrophic losses on each other with their
forces-in-being, any increment of destructive power may be strategically
insignificant. Moreover, the greater the power of individual weapons the
greater the relative advantage of the side with the weaker delivery system.
When one plane can carry a weapon capable of destroying a city, the side

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with the larger number of planes will derive little benefit from them if its
opponent has a quantity sufficient to inflict a devastating blow.

Thus an all-out war fought with thermo-nuclear weapons will be
decided by the forces-in-being -- this was perhaps the only point on which
all the witnesses before the Symington Committee agreed. The importance of
forces-in-being coupled with the destructiveness of modern weapons also
makes inapplicable Douhet's classic description of air strategy: "In air
war we must resign ourselves to offensives the enemy inflicts on us while
bending every effort to inflict heavier ones on him." The identification
of victory with a superior offensive effort which was in effect the air
strategy of World War II made sense as long as a superior load of explosives
represented an absolute margin of effective power; it could be effective
only to the degree that attrition of industrial potential was significant.
In a thermo-nuclear war, however, the significant attrition is that which
reduces not the industrial potential, but the forces-in-being, for the
social structure is likely to reach a breaking point long before the stock-
piles of weapons are exhausted.

The importance of forces-in-being compared to industrial potential
has another paradoxical consequence: that war can continue long after
victory has become meaningless. It is possible for example for a surprise
attack to destroy the 50 most important metropolitan centers in the United
States with the consequences described in the previous chapter. While this
could produce social disintegration, it would probably not affect the
ability of our Strategic Air Command to retaliate and the result of such
an exchange of blows might well be the social collapse of both contenders.
The fact that an all-out strategy can be implemented after the social basis

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for it has disappeared gives its esoteric quality to the strategy of all-out
war. It has been compared to a situation where two hostile tribes armed
with poison darts face each other across a canyon. The poison takes several
hours to be effective but is fatal afterwards. In these circumstances,
landing the first blow will be strategically insignificant: it will ruin
the "economy" but the weapons are still useful and they can launch a
corresponding counterblow,³) Thus victory can be achieved only if one side
succeeds in destroying the other's poison darts -- its forces-in-being --
before they are launched.

This, however, merely defines another dilemma of all-out thermo-nuclear war. In the past, the strategy for avoiding defeat differ. Victory, in the sense of being able to impose one's will on the defeated can be achieved only by destroying the opponent's force-in-being or by reducing it to a size which can be contained by the defense system. The destruction of the retaliatory force in turn almost requires a surprise attack. For if the opponent has adequate warning he can disperse or launch his force-in-being and alert his defenses. He will then be able to start his retaliatory strike even before the first bombs of the aggressor have hit their targets. By contrast, the strategy for *resisting* a surprise attack is different from that which aims for victory. The side which has suffered a surprise attack has already received a heavy and perhaps a devastating blow. Its task is not so much to wipe out the enemy retaliatory force as to deprive the aggressor of the fruits of his assault. It may seek to counteract the *threat* of thermo-nuclear extinction by inflicting it on the enemy. To be sure, such a strategy cannot achieve victory; but it can avoid defeat by

3. C.R. Sherwin. "Securing Peace Through Military Technology," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, May 1956.

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depriving the enemy of the resources to impose its will.

It is necessary to consider the strategic problem of all-out thermo-nuclear war against this background. An all-out war will primarily be an air war or at least a war of strategic striking forces and it will be decided by the forces-in-being. As for the United States, our strategic problem is complicated by the fact that we have explicitly rejected surprise attack as an instrument of our policy. This is confirmed, not only by every statement of policy, but by our whole past behavior. If we did not utilize our atomic monopoly at a time when the Soviet capability to retaliate was almost non-existent, it is against all probability that we should do so now. But the side which concedes the first blow also concedes the margin for imposing its will; unless our air defense is capable of a rate of attrition which reduces the enemy blow below the level of catastrophe, the strategic problem of all-out war presents itself for us not in terms of a strategy to achieve victory but of a strategy to avoid defeat. The purpose of our all-out war capability will be to deter war by developing a retaliatory force of a size which can inflict an unacceptable amount of damage on the enemy, no matter what destruction he accomplishes by surprise attack. "A deterrent force" said General LeMay is one that is large enough and efficient enough that no matter what the enemy force does either offensively or defensively he still will receive a quantity of bombs he is not willing to accept. Therefore, he never starts a war."⁴)

⁴. Symington Hearings, p. 202.

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II

In determining the nature of a deterrent force, it is not suffi-
cient to compare the opposing retaliatory forces, for deterrence reflects
a complex interrelationship of offensive and defensive capabilities. Theo-
retically at least, the destruction of the enemy's forces-in-being can be
achieved by an effective defense as well as by a sudden offense. In certain
circumstances indeed defense may be the most efficient strategy. In 1940,
for example, Britain was saved by its Fighter and not its Bomber Command.
It can be argued, of course, that this was due to the British weakness in
bombers. But given the relative geographic positions and the state of
technology it is doubtful that even a much larger British bombing effort
could have staved off disaster: The German forces-in-being were so large
and so well-dispersed, the attrition to be achieved by conventional bombs
so slow that Britain might well have collapsed before its offensive effort
could have become effective. To be sure, in World War II the defensive
problem was simpler than today for a rate of attrition of 10 per cent was
considered unacceptable. With conventional weapons the cost of producing
the plane and training of the crew were so high in relation to the damage
which could be inflicted by them in a single raid, that unless a plane could
perform several missions on a statistical average before being shot down,
strategic bombing became a wasteful operation. When one plane can carry a
weapon capable of destroying a city much heavier demands are placed on an
air-defense system, however. To produce significant attrition, it must be
able to reduce the damage an enemy can inflict to a level society can accept.
Against a strategic air force armed with thermo-nuclear weapons even an
attrition rate of 80 per cent may not prevent devastating blows.

["statutory rate of 60 per cent. may not prevent generating flow, against a stationary air force composed with these non-combatants even an able to reduce the damage an enemy can inflict to a fewer society and asset, and defense strength, however. To provide significant assistance, it must be weapon capable of directly affecting a city, much larger than the stationary force. Then the plane can carry a bomb and training of the crew note so high in relation to the damage caused by acceptable. With conventional weapons the cost of progressing information is smaller than that for a rate of attrition of 10 per cent. per day, and the crew can become effective. To be sure, in World War II the defensive can show that Britain shall have no difficulty before the alternative effort and so well-organized, the staff should be完善的. The German forces in the Pacific are now in great demand, and they have already put out of operation: The German forces in the Pacific were so far behind it is difficult that even a small force could put out of operation. But from the relative technological differences and the age of the planes, the planes, that this time, are due to the United States in our opinion, the planes, of course, that this

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Does this mean then that the balance of all-out war depends entirely on the relative strengths of the opposing retaliatory striking forces? The difficulty of complete attrition should not be confused with the strategic importance of an effective air defense system, however. A country which staked everything on its offensive airpower would be simplifying the strategic problem of its opponent. Against such a country, it would be possible to calculate precisely the number of planes required for maximum destructiveness. They could operate at optimum levels of performance and use the most efficient tactics. They could feint at one target and hit another. Except for mechanical failure they would suffer no losses and their bombing accuracy would be high. Nor would the country which placed all its bets on offensive air power gain a significant advantage by being able to utilize the resources it could have devoted to defense for its strategic striking force. For with thermo-nuclear weapons the point of diminishing returns in increased offensive power is reached fairly quickly. Thus the best strategic posture for an all-out thermo-nuclear war depends on the proper "mix" of offensive and defensive capabilities. If so many resources are devoted to defense that the offensive striking force can no longer inflict an unacceptable degree of damage, the enemy may be tempted to attack. For freed of the danger of retaliation the worst that can happen to him would be his inability to reach the target. If the defense is slighted, too great a demand is put on the powers of resistance of the social fabric. The ideal offense-defense relationship is one in which the defense can reduce the enemy thrust to acceptable levels while the offense cannot be so contained by the enemy's defense.

["while the offense cannot be considered by the enemy as a consequence of his conduct.\n\nIf the defense is a fair one, too great a damage has been done on the power of the enemy that can be compensated for by the injury to the enemy caused by the injury to the enemy.\n\nIn many cases the damage caused by the offensive can be so great that the offensive would be a fair one. If the enemy is not allowed to defend himself, the enemy may be forced to attack. For this reason it is difficult to defend himself against an offensive force. On no longer can he defend himself against the enemy. If he is forced to defend himself against the enemy, he has no power to defend himself against the enemy. The enemy can reduce the enemy's power to acceptable levels. The defense of the enemy consists in the defense of the enemy against the enemy. This defense consists in the defense of the enemy against the enemy. The defense consists in the defense of the enemy against the

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This ideal mix is unattainable in practice of course. Nevertheless the mere existence of an air defense system forces the enemy to divert more resources to his offensive striking force in order to inflict the equivalent damage of the unopposed case. A defense capable of exacting 50 per cent attrition will require an enemy to more than double his offensive striking force in order to inflict the damage he calculates as necessary to achieve his objectives against no opposition. The effort will have to be twice as large as the unopposed case, because the very existence of an air defense throws off an attacker's calculations. It introduces a factor outside his direct control; he cannot be certain about the effectiveness of the defense until he has tested it and he must, therefore, allow a larger margin for error than in the unopposed case. Against a determined defense, moreover, an enemy cannot pursue his most efficient tactics; his destructiveness will, therefore, be reduced. Thus let us assume the enemy calculates that in order to destroy the United States he requires 300 high-yield weapons.⁵) In the unopposed case, the enemy might then build his long-range air force and stockpile to a level of about 300 to 450 long-range bombers. In the absence of attrition he might be able to count on each plane performing two missions and such a force would leave him a margin for mechanical failure, bombing inaccuracy and navigational error. An air defense capable of exacting a 30 per cent attrition would probably force him to double this figure; and air defense capable of exacting 50

5. He would have to include in his attack pattern both the bases of the Strategic Air Command and the major industrial centers. A successful attack on SAC bases would not prove decisive if it were not known at the same time that the enemy has a remaining stockpile and delivery system to devastate the United States.

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per cent attrition would require a striking force of probably 1000 to 1200 planes; and an air defense capable of exacting 80 per cent losses (considered to be a feasible level) would push the enemy investment in offensive air power to over 2000. And this increase in offensive strength would enable the enemy only to stay even with the rate of damage he could have inflicted in the unopposed case. Moreover, the larger the enemy striking force the more obvious the preparation he has to make, the easier to detect the attack, and the greater the chances of obtaining warning.

Finally, as the defense gains in effectiveness the attacker has to divert resources to combat it and this will further decrease the strategic effect-iveness of the offensive. To be sure, as Paul Nitze has shown in a brill-iant paper, the attrition rate of defense will not remain fixed at the same percentage regardless of the nature of the attack.⁶) Beyond a certain scale of attack, it is possible to overwhelm the opposing defense: it may exact 80 per cent attrition of the first 2000 planes but only 20 per cent of the next 1000. But the basic relation still holds: at a maximum to reduce the enemy attack to acceptable levels; at a minimum it is the task of defense to force the enemy to devote the maximum amount of resources to his offensive mission without improving his strategic position.

These objectives can be achieved by two kinds of defense: active and passive defense. Active defense involves the direct attrition of enemy planes; in the intermediary period until Ballistic Missiles are developed it requires a system of early warning, fighter planes with performances superior to the bombers and anti-aircraft missiles, either fired from the ground or from planes. Because of the high speed of modern planes, the

6. Paul Nitze

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interception by manned fighters is becoming increasingly difficult: both the Bison, the Soviet heavy jet bomber and the B-52, our intercontinental jet bomber, approach the speed of sound; and opposing fighter plane must therefore be able to maneuver very quickly to get into position and even in the best of cases will be able to make only one pass. On the other hand, the rapid development of missiles operating at speeds well above that of sound will soon make the life of a manned bomber exceedingly difficult. Equipped with automatic "homing" devices which electronically direct them to the target, these missiles will be able to exact a substantial attrition which many experts estimate may reach 80 per cent. While such a rate of losses might not discourage pilots in the first wave of attack who are presumably unacquainted with the risks confronting them, there is at least some doubt about their morale once the attrition rate becomes known. Thus the limiting condition of strategic air attack with manned bombers may well be not the shortage of planes and weapons but pilot morale.

In addition to the attrition of enemy personnel and equipment defense can use up hostile resources through passive measures. The destructiveness of the new weapons tends to give an advantage to the offense because even a single successful attack can inflict catastrophic damage. It is the task of passive defense to disperse the targets as much as possible so that the enemy is forced to devote the maximum number of weapons to the destruction of the target system. A country whose steel industry can be wiped out in one attack is more vulnerable than a country whose steel industry is dispersed over twenty different locations. A country whose strategic airpower is concentrated on a few bases, is more vulnerable than an opponent whose striking force is better dispersed. Thus an offensive

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striking force of 1000 planes dispersed over 100 bases may prove strategically more significant than 2000 planes which have available only 30 bases, for the smaller force has much fewer targets to attack.

In addition to forcing the enemy to expend more resources on the same target system, passive defense can mitigate the consequences of a successful attack. Against an unprepared population a thermo-nuclear explosion could be devastating. An attempt to evacuate a city like New York would clog all traffic arteries and prevent effective assistance. In the absence of shelters the casualties from heat and blast would be enormous. Without knowledge of fall-out effects people might behave in precisely the manner calculated to bring about the highest level of casualties. For example, an attempt to flee the fall-out area during the first two days of maximum radioactivity would expose an individual to the largest dosage of radiation. An insufficient awareness of the nature of radioactive contamination would multiply casualties. The absence of a tested communications system, would put the population at the mercy of rumor and prevent any concerted effort to allievate suffering. Conversely, updelta could reduce casualties both from the blast and from fall-out; an educational program would make possible the most rational behavior; a communications system built with an eye to the greatest immunity from nuclear attack would permit organized activity at the earliest moment. In short, passive defense will reduce the effectiveness of an attack and therefore contributes indirectly to the attrition of enemy resources.

But the psychological effects of passive defense may prove even more important. One of the great dangers of an all-out thermo-nuclear war is social disintegration and panic. In a previous chapter panic has been

["The effect of this classification and the effect of the information contained in the abstracts on the public has not been determined. One of the questions raised by the abstracts is whether it is possible for the government to require the publication of information which would otherwise be confidential.", "The question of the applicability of the abstracts to the information contained in the abstracts has been considered by the courts. The courts have held that the abstracts are not subject to the provisions of the act. In other cases, the courts have held that the abstracts are subject to the provisions of the act. In some cases, the courts have held that the abstracts are not subject to the provisions of the act. In other cases, the courts have held that the abstracts are subject to the provisions of the act. The courts have also held that the abstracts are not subject to the provisions of the act. In other cases, the courts have held that the abstracts are subject to the provisions of the act. The courts have also held that the abstracts are not subject to the provisions of the act. In other cases, the courts have held that the abstracts are subject to the provisions of the act. The courts have also held that the abstracts are not subject to the provisions of the act. The courts have also held that the abstracts are subject

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defined as an attempt of an organism faced with catastrophe to escape into
a familiar environment. If it cannot find a familiar environment it may
disintegrate or at least act irrationally. Since the physical effect of
an all-out war with modern weapons will inevitably be devastating, the
individual will therefore necessarily be confronted with the collapse of
all the material objects which he had associated with the ordered flow of
life. His reaction will depend to a considerable extent on how well he has
been prepared psychologically. For the break in what has come to seem
natural reflects a state of mind as well as a state of fact; it will appear
vast in proportion that the catastrophe is great but also to the extent
that it is unexpected. A disaster which is foreseen may shake confidence
in the physical processes of society; it may also bring home to the indi-
vidual the resilience and the value of the intangible relationships of
society as well. World War II produced a much smaller social dislocation
than World War I although its destruction was at least as great, because
the peoples entered it with fewer illusions: the psychological crisis af
after World War I was caused as much by the incongruity between perform-
ance and aspiration as by the casualty lists, as much by the fatuousness
of the ideals of a rational harmonious world as by the realities of trench
warfare with which they were inevitably compared.

A thermo-nuclear war which broke over a psychologically un-
prepared population might lead to a loss of faith in society and in
government. It is important, therefore, to prepare a "familiar environment"
in advance of such a catastrophe; to prevent panic by intellectual
discipline even when many of the physical objects which confer a feeling of
security have disappeared. Even then the effect on society of a catastrophe

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on the scale of a thermo-nuclear attack should not be underrated. History
seems to prove that suffering beyond a certain point inevitably leads to
political or social transformation. For society can exact a measure of
sacrifice because of a consensus on the importance of maintaining it and a
shared historical experience. However, suffering which is caused not by
natural disasters but by the existence of society itself, such as war,
tends to undermine the social fabric: However just a war may appear at the
beginning, it may be ascribed in retrospect to inadequate leadership if the
losses it causes are thought excessive. Nevertheless passive defense within
limits can contribute to the cohesiveness of society in the face of shock;
while it will not be able to eliminate the traumatic effect of the physical
destruction, it may make the difference between survival of society and its
collapse.

Thus the strategic equation of all-out war cannot be determined
merely by the comparative size of bombing fleets. It is compounded from the
relationship of offense to defense and the relative vulnerability of the
contenders. The crucial problem for a policy of deterrence then becomes
whether the U.S.S.R. can calculate a sufficient margin of certainty to make
an all-out war seem a worthwhile risk. To be sure, such a question assumes
a certain amount of rationality in an enemy. But planning can only calculate
with a somewhat rational enemy; nothing can deter an enemy bent on self-
destruction.

III

What is a sufficient degree of certainty and how can it be achieved?
Obviously the ability to inflict greater damage than one suffers no longer

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supplies the basis of victory; a margin in damage inflicted will be mean-
ingless if the victor does not retain sufficient resources at the end of the
war to impose his will. An enemy trying to decide whether to launch an all-
out war must therefore be able to count on a combination of the following
factors: he must be certain that he will reduce our forces-in-being to a
level where his defense can contain them or they are no longer able to
inflict unacceptable damage; he must make sure that attrition will not
reduce his attacking force to a level where it will no longer be able to
inflict the amount of damage he calculates as necessary to impose his will.
The degree of certainty, moreover, must be almost foolproof: a slight
probability will not be sufficient, for the attacker is staking not his
chances of victory but his national survival.

An aggressor will have great difficulty, however, in achieving a
strong probability of success if we behave reasonably effectively. A
moderately good defense system will make enemy calculations more uncertain;
a dispersal of bases and industrial facilities will complicate his offensive
task; and even our present retaliatory force will not be easy to eliminate.
Moreover, the psychological equation will be on the side of the defensive.
The attacker will be animated by a will to victory -- a desire to _improve_
his relative position. The defender's impetus is to avoid defeat -- to
_maintain_ his national identity. The attacker will have two choices: to
attack or not to attack; the defender can resist or surrender. Thus the
alternatives will present themselves much more unambiguously to the side
which is attacked and the decision to launch the first blow will always be
inhibited because the margin of success may not seem sufficient. In fact,
the task of the side which concedes the first blow is so to balance the

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The Soviet Long-Range Airforce is a comparatively recent develop-
ment, dating in effect from 1954. To be sure, ever since 1948 the U.S.S.R.
possessed a moderate quantity of TU '4's' (for which the NATO code name was
Bull). This was a copy of our B-29, one of which had fallen into Soviet
hands during the war when it had to make an emergency landing in Siberia.
The range of these planes was 2,200 miles and their performance made them
highly vulnerable to jet interceptors. The TU-4 could therefore not reach
the U.S. from Soviet territory except on one-way missions and even then only
a very small portion of the U.S. There was a great deal of speculation at
the time that the destructiveness of nuclear weapons make one-way missions
a profitable strategy and this argument was repeated during the Symington
Hearings with respect to the present Soviet heavy bomber. But one-way
missions are uneconomical biven the cost and complexity of modern bombers.
They can be successful only if the aggressor possesses a really staggering
number of planes. Even then unless the attack is crushing, every raid
would shift the strategic balance against the aggressor: the side which used
up its striking force on one-way missions would have done all the damage it
is capable of doing; it could not pose any additional threat and if the
opponent has any offensive resources left he would have a decisive advantage.
Even should only part of the striking force be utilized on one-way missions,
the opponent will know that the enemy offensive power would decline with
every attack. One-way missions are suitable for a strategy of desperation.
They represent the most wasteful and difficult means of imposing a power's
will.

8. Symington Hearings, p.

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The development by the U.S.S.R. of long-range planes capable of undertaking two-way missions therefore represented the basic strategic transformation of the post-war period. Henceforth, in every decision of peace or war we had to weigh our risks in terms of the destruction of our major cities. The growth of the Soviet Long-Range Air Force which occurred at the precise moment that weapons reached their present destructiveness, therefore, reduced the credibility of our deterrent policy based on all-out war and they increased our reluctance to engage in any other conflict which might lead to all-out war. The Soviet Long-Range Airforce is composed of two basic types of present planes: a turbo-propeller-driven plane of very long range, for which the NATO code word is Bear and a heavy jet bomber, for which the NATO code name is Bison. The U.S. Airforce has no equivalent to the Bear, whose major asset is its long range. Because of its relatively slow speed compared to that of modern jet planes, its losses against high performance fighters and missiles would be considerable. The Bison was first seen in quantity during the May Day parade of 1955 when 13 flew over Moscow. The Bison is estimated to have a range of around 3,500 miles and a top speed of 560 miles per hour.⁹) Thus the Bison cannot reach the U.S. even from Soviet advance bases without aerial refueling except on one-way missions. The Bear can cover a third to one-half of U.S. territory from advanced Soviet bases without aerial refueling. With one aerial refueling the Bison can cover seven-eights of the U.S. from the Chukotski peninsula and all of the U.S. with two refuelings. From the Kola peninsula the Bison can cover one-third of the U.S. with one refueling and all except the southern tip of Texas in a twice-refueled mission.¹⁰) (See map.)

9. Stockwell Soviet Airpower (Appendix).

10. Symington Hearings, p. 175.

V - 21

The U.S. strategic Airforce possesses three basic types of planes: the B-47 which has a top speed of ____ miles and a range of ____; the obsolescent B-36 which has a top speed of ____ miles and a range of ____ miles and the new B-52 which has a range of ____ miles and a top speed of ____.

The B-47, of course, is not an intercontinental bomber. It requires aerial refueling to reach Soviet targets from U.S. territory although it can cover most of Soviet territory from our overseas bases. The B-52 is an intercontinental bomber whose effectiveness will be increased by our overseas base structure. We now possess 33 wings of B-47 with 45 planes in a wing; 5 of these are reconnaissance wings so that the effective bombing force of B-47's is 1,410 planes. ¹¹) Our B-36's are organized in 11 wings of 30 planes. As they are replaced by B-52's, the number of planes in a wing will go up to 45. By 1959 when our heavy bomber wings will be all jet, we will have about 500 B-52's. ¹²) The consensus of Airforce testimony at the Symington Hearing, however, was that by 1959 the Soviet Long-Range Airforce would outnumber ours and that for this reason we would be in dire peril. ¹³)

Strategic superiority cannot be determined numerically, however. It depends on Soviet ability to destroy enough of our retaliatory power so that our resulting counterblow can be contained or reduced to acceptable levels. This could be achieved only by a crushing surprise attack coupled with a highly effective air defense. Neither condition seems in prospect for the U.S.S.R. The numerical superiority of the U.S.S.R. is confined, to begin with, to the category of heavy bombers: the B-52 as compared to the

11. *Ibid.*, p. 1810

12. Symington, *op.cit.*, p. 117.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 212, (General Le May), p. 818 (General Twining).

V - 22

combined numbers of Bison and Bears. To be sure, the Soviet Airforce also has a substantial number of medium-range jet bombers, code-named Badger, but since they do not have the range to reach the U.S. even on one-way missions, from present Soviet bases, they do not enter the strategic equation of all-out war. Our medium bombers, on the other hand, are capable of striking Soviet targets either from our overseas bases or by using aerial refueling from the U.S. As a result even quantitatively the strategic equation is not as foreboding as a comparison of heavy bomber forces would make it appear.

Moreover, a Soviet attack on the U.S. is technically more complex than performance figures of planes indicate. In order to achieve maximum surprise and to cut warning time to a minimum, an all-out attack should be launched from the airfields where planes are based for training. But neither the Bison nor the Bear can reach any part of the U.S. except the tip of Maine from the interior of the U.S.S.R. without aerial refueling.<sup>14)</sup> To launch a massive blow they would have to be staged to advance bases on the Kola or Chukotski peninsulas: This in turn would give us strategic warning; at a minimum it would cause a larger proportion of the U.S. Strategic Airforce to be placed on the alert than usual, under certain conditions it might induce us to launch a preventive attack.

Even from advance bases the Soviet heavy bombers cannot reach major U.S. targets without at least one aerial refueling. There is little evidence, however, that the Soviet airforce has mastered the intricate technique of aerial refueling; indeed it is not certain even that they possess any substantial number of tankers. Moreover, even if the Soviets

14. Symington Hearings, p. 175.

V - 23

have a capability for aerial refueling, they may be prevented by geography
from deriving full benefits from it. A plane which is refueling is
extremely vulnerable; it should therefore do so in an area relatively
immune from hostile interference. This is all the more important because
the meeting between tanker and bomber must be precisely calculated and has
to take place on schedule. Diversionary tactics forced on either plane can
wreak havoc with refueling plans. A look at the map demonstrates that in an
attack on the U.S., the Soviet Long-Range Airforce would leave its safe
areas with its advance bases. It would have to refuel over hostile territory
exposed to constant attack. This would reduce the effectiveness of the
attack, increase the rate of attrition and minimize the possibility of
surprise. Aerial refueling, in short, is not an efficient Soviet tactic
and one-way missions are strategically unproductive.

These considerations apply, of course, only to the present family
of airplanes. New bombers with longer range which are almost certainly on
the drawing boards, might eliminate the refueling problem and perhaps enable
the Soviets to launch their attack from the interior of metropolitan Russia.
Even then complete surprise will be difficult to achieve. For one thing,
there is only one direction from which a Soviet attack on the U.S. can take
place -- across the Polar Icecap. Since we are able to gear our air defense
to only one threat equivalent resources put into defense will yield greater
strategic returns for us than for the U.S.S.R. which has a periphery to
defend.

Work on the U.S. air defense system did not start seriously until
1952, when we first became concerned about the Soviet Long-Range Airforce.
Its primary functions are detection, identification, interception and

V - 24

destruction of hostile aircraft. The magnitude of the problem is shown by
the fact that on the average day there are 30 thousand domestic and 600
foreign in the U.S. which have to be monitored at least as they approach
sensitive areas.<sup>15)</sup> Detection is crucial not only for effective inter-
ception but also to give sufficient warning time to prevent our retaliatory
force from being caught on the ground and to reduce civilian casualties by
passive defense measures. By 1958, the U.S. will possess a detection
system against which surprise attack will be almost impossible and it will
be supported by a defensive effort that should impose a substantial
attrition.

The U.S. air defense system is based on four lines: two primarily
for detection and the other two for interception as well. The first
detection apparatus is at the Distant Early Warning Line which extends
across the Arctic circle. This is a network of heavy radar stations
supported by an elaborate communications system. When fully developed, it
should be able to detect a Soviet attack very soon after it leaves Soviet
advance bases on the Kola and Chukotshin peninsulas. The DEW Line is backed
up by another series of detection stations from the base of Hudson Bay
across Canada. The mid-Canada line like the DEW Line is designed for
detection only, although given the power of modern weapons and the effects
of fall-out, it would be desirable to destroy hostile planes as far away
from their targets as possible and over relatively uninhabited regions. It
has been proposed for this reason to move the first fighting line into
Canada and this may be the case by 1961 when the detection system is fully

15. For a very good description of our Air Defense System, see Symington Hearings, p. 303 and testimony of General Partridge.

V - 25

developed. At present, the first sustained interception -- except for Canadian efforts -- will occur at a line along the U.S. - Canadian borders. Facilities here include more complete radar installations for detecting, tracking and vectoring aircraft supplemented by picket ships and planes and "Texas Tower" radar stations along both coasts. By 1959 the air defense system will be coordinated by a semi-automatic control system -- the so-called SAGE system which will track planes and direct interception. From its first contact with this line, enemy planes will be exposed to sustained inter-ceptor attacks. As they approach sensitive areas, they will be subject to anti-aircraft fire which by 1959 will be almost entirely composed of guided missiles: either the Army Mike or the Airforce TALOS and other missiles still under development. With a range of 60-100 miles, soon to be extended, and atomic war-heads which can destroy anything within a cubic mile of air, the missile defenses are becoming increasingly formidable.

Two conclusions emerge from this brief sketch of the U.S. air defenses: (1) The strategic significance of the Soviet Long-Range Airforce besides not in its total numbers but in that part of it which can escape attrition. Estimates of the attrition rate are as high as 80% by 1959 -- the time when according to testimony the Soviet heavy bomber fleet is supposed to exceed ours. (2) Whatever the attrition rate, the U.S.S.R. will find it almost impossible to achieve complete surprise. Against the present family of Soviet bombers targets in the northern part of the United States should have at least two hours warning and targets in the southern part where most of our SAC bases are located¹⁶⁾ would have 3 to 4 hours warning. If we are reasonably effective, such a warning time in turn should

16. Symington Hearings, p.

V - 26

enable us to launch a substantial proportion of our retaliatory force and
this together with the portion of SAC airborne at any moment on training
missions should enable us to inflict a devastating counterblow.

There exists, moreover, another reason why the U.S.S.R. will have
great difficulty either in achieving surprise or wiping out our force-in-
being: our system of overseas airbases. Since the aggressor cannot know
the precise pattern of dispersal of our retaliatory force, he must, in order
to have a calculable margin of success strike all our bases in the
continental United States and abroad, preferably simultaneously. But their
geographic location to all practical purposes prevents a simultaneous attack
on all U.S. bases. Most SAC bases in the continental U.S. are located at a
distance of three to four hours from the DEW line while many of our overseas
bases are much closer to Soviet territory. Thus the Soviet Long-Range
Airforce would have two options: It could launch its attacks simultaneously
with the result that our overseas bases would be hit before our domestic
ones, thus adding to our alert time. Or they could attempt to arrange their
flight plans in such a way that all planes would reach their targets
simultaneously, in which case our overseas bases would have the same warning
time as those within the territorial U.S.; the time it takes a jet bomber to
cover the distance between the DEW Line and the target. The former
contingency is the more rational course of action, because an attempt to
strike all targets simultaneously would expose the Soviets to a U.S. counter-
blow launched from our overseas bases while the Soviet planes are still
crossing Canada. But surprise against our overseas airbases will not be
very easy to achieve. Because they are located at the periphery of Eurasia,
any attack against them must cross intervening friendly territory and this
in turn should give them between 1-2 hours warning. And even a successful

V - 27

attack against our overseas bases would still leave the retaliatory force
in the U.S. to be reckoned with.

To be sure we possess several vulnerabilities of which the
inadequate dispersal of our SAC bases is the most dangerous. Our Strategic
Airforce of over 2,000 planes, of which the B-52 for example costs $8,000,000
each, are located on some 30 bases. In 1952, when we had only 18 SAC bases
a tornado disabled 85% of our strategic bombing force. And today equipment
costing 300 million dollars is often located on a base costing 40 million
dollars. The expenditure of another 40 million dollars would halt the
vulnerability. The concentration of so much expensive equipment on such few
bases is the only part of the situation which gives the Soviets even a
slight chance to succeed with a surprise attack. The inadequate dispersal
of our Strategic Air Force, improves the economics of a Soviet attack
because it enables them to obtain a greater return for the same investment
of attacking resources. Another source of vulnerability is the inadequacy
of our civil defense. An all-out Soviet attack in the present state of
public education and the absence of effective shelter program would produce
appalling casualties, close to the maximum figures for fall-out and blast
described in the previous chapter. Although this would not be decisive by
itself if we retain a sufficient force-in-being, an aggressor may count on
social disintegration in the face of such a catastrophic blow.

Nevertheless, despite these vulnerabilities, it is difficult to
see how an aggressor could calculate on victory from a surprise attack
alone. He would know that complete surprise is unattainable at least until
the advent of ballistic missiles, that our force-in-being could not be
destroyed if it acts effectively. Hope for victory would therefore have to

V - 28

derive from the aggressor's confidence that his air defense could reduce
our counter-blow to acceptable levels and that this coupled with the losses
inflicted on us in the surprise attack would induce us to surrender.

But the Soviet defensive problem is much more complicated than
ours. While we have to defend only one approach, the Soviet Union must
be prepared to repel raids from all directions because our overseas bases
ring the Soviet periphery. The existence of our carrier task forces soon
to be equipped with attack planes with a combat radius in excess of 1,500
adds to the Soviet problem. And our control of the seas makes aerial
refueling a much more useful tactic for us than for the U.S.S.R.; even
should we be forced to launch our retaliatory blow from the U.S. our planes
could refuel over friendly areas out of range of Soviet detection. Finally
while the Soviet Airforce can reach its targets in the U.S. only across some
1,500 miles of hostile Canadian territory, many of the targets of our Strategic Airforce in the U.S.S.R. are much closer to the Soviet early warning
line. While we can expect a warning time of about 2 hours, the minimum
considered necessary for passive defense measures, the Soviets will have no
such assurance. To be sure, if the Soviets launch a surprise attack, their
defensive system can be expected to be alerted for our counteblow. Nevertheless, the need to disperse their defenses due to our superior base
system and other geographic advantages makes it highly unlikely that the
U.S.S.R. will be able to reduce our retaliatory blow to acceptable levels.

In fact, in assessing the relative capabilities of both sides for
winning an all-out war, it seems that for a limited period of time until
Soviet Long-Range Airforce grows stronger and until the development of
Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, we could probably impose our

V - 29

will on the U.S.S.R. through a surprise attack. If we launched a surprise
attack, the Soviet Long-Range Airforce might be seriously crippled and the
short warning time would cause an attack on industrial installations to have
maximum effectiveness. Even then the U.S.S.R. could probably inflict
serious but perhaps not crippling losses on us. This is not an argument
for preventive war; it is inconceivable that an American President would
order a surprise attack on the U.S.S.R. It is simply to indicate the real
nature of strategic relationships. In the short term then the stalemate
is a balance between our unwillingness to use all-out war to achieve our
goals and the Soviet inability to do so. With the growth of the Soviet
Long-Range Airforce and thermo-nuclear stockpile, the stalemate will be
between the ability of each side to inflict catastrophic blows on the other,
but only at the risk of its national substance.

IV

Will new technological developments be able to ALTER this
relationship? There has been a great deal of discussion of the danger of
a technological breakthrough by either side, and given the rate of techno-
logical change, it is a real problem. It is important to be clear, however,
between a technological advance and a technological breakthrough. A tech-
nological advance adds to an existing capability or it enables one to carry
out more efficiently a mission one is already capable of performing. It is
therefore helpful but not decisive. A technological breakthrough is either
the development of a new capability which can prove strategically significant
or the improvement of an existing one to a point where it can overwhelm its
enemy counterpart. In these terms the development of a superior bomber is a

V - 30

reassuring testimony to the state of our aircraft design; it will not amount
to a technological breakthrough if the opponent's inferior planes retain the
ability to launch a devastating counterblow. An intercontinental ballistic
missile will greatly augment the strategic striking power; it will not confer
a decisive edge if manned bombers are already capable of destroying its
likely targets. Thus the significant technological breakthroughs are likely
to occur in the relation of offense to defense: either through the discovery
of a defense which can contain the opposing offense or through the development
of an offense which can overwhelm the opposing air defense and eliminate the
retaliatory force before it has been launched.

In assessing the significance of new technological developments,
moreover, it is necessary to examine the advantage they would give to the
side which discovers them first as well as the implications for strategy if
both sides possess them concurrently. For paradoxically a technological
breakthrough is possible even if both sides develop a new weapon concurrently.
thus the almost simultaneous discovery of the thermo-nuclear bomb added more
to the Soviet strategic balance than to ours because henceforth the threat
of all-out war against Soviet peripheral aggression lost a great deal of its
credibility.17) So, too, the development of an air defense capable of in-
flicting an attrition rate of 100 per cent would help the Soviets more than
us, because they are so much more ... Similarly an atomic
submarine developed by the U.S.S.R. will pose a greater threat to an ocean-
going nation like ours than to a land-locked power like the U.S.S.R. Moreover,
the fact that our strategic doctrine concedes the first blow to our enemy
places a particular burden on us in the technological race: it means that

17. See below Chapter VI.

V - 31

we cannot fall behind even for an instant or in any strategically signifi-
cant category and that we cannot use any technological breakthroughs we may
achieve to obtain a strategic transformation.

Do technological developments which seem in the offing affect the
strategic balance in an all out war? On the offensive side the next basic
advance will be the nuclear-powered airplane. Its advantage over the
present family of planes is its extraordinary range, in fact its range will
be limited only by crew fatigue. (The atom-powered submarine Nautilus for
example has traveled 5000 miles on its original supply of fuel.) It will
also probably be able to carry a heavier bomb load, although given the
power of modern weapons, this is a marginal consideration. Such a plane
would make our overseas bases less important and it would eliminate the
difficult refueling procedures. It would also greatly complicate the enemy
defense, for it could circle just outside the range of enemy detection and
strike at a moment's notice. Because nuclear planes can remain aloft for
so long, the vulnerability of the retaliating force will be reduced by its
ability to keep a larger percentage of its planes in the air at any given
time. Because a nuclear striking force could attack from its training
bases, it has a greater possibility of achieving surprise.

Nevertheless the development of the nuclear airplane will not by
itself upset the strategic balance. If we develop it first, it would simply
enable us to do more efficiently and from the continental U.S. what we are
already capable of doing by aerial refueling and by the use of overseas
bases. It would not add a decisive increment to our strategic power. If
the Soviets develop the nuclear plane first -- which is unlikely -- it would
complicate our defensive problem; we would lose the warning time which is

V - 32

now conferred by the necessity that the Soviets stage their planes to advance bases. But the basic relationship described above would continue. The speed of the first family of nuclear planes is not likely to exceed that of the present family of jet planes. The Soviet Long-Range Airforce therefore still has to negotiate 1500-3000 miles exposed to our air defense before they reach their targets. Our present detection system therefore would probably continue to give us 2-4 hours warning. In the most likely contingency that both sides develop nuclear planes concurrently (or that we develop them first), the effect would be that the increase in the possibility of surprise will be made up by the decreased vulnerability of the forces-in-being. Thus the stalemate in an all-out war cannot be broken by the possession of nuclear-powered airplanes.

This is all the more true because over the next 10 years the defense is likely to be gaining relative to the manned bomber. The utilization of missiles for air-defense, which is still in its infancy is likely to be spurred by research into the offensive uses of guided missiles. The electronic guidance systems of these missiles, will become increasingly sophisticated. Their speed relative to that of any manned plane now in prospect is enormous; they can be launched in such quantities as to make the life of manned bombers exceedingly difficult. They will soon be fitted with atomic warheads which can destroy any plane within a cubic mile of air and as nuclear technology advances each missile can be engineered to contain an even bigger radius of destruction. The attrition rate of the air-defense against manned planes however powered is likely to continue to rise. It is already sufficiently high that strategic attack with conventional explosives would be uneconomical. Were the offense restricted to manned planes one might make even thermo-nuclear attacks marginally effective. But long before

V - 33

this point is reached, a new family of offensive weapons will be developed
which will pose extraordinary difficult problems for the defense: the
ballistic missiles of various ranges.

A ballistic missile is a weapon which after it receives its initial
impetus pursues a fixed trajectory; it is therefore analogous to an artillery
shell. The ballistic missiles which will be used for strategic bombing are
propelled by rockets: the first such weapon was the German V-2 which could
fire ______ ton explosive charge for a distance of 200 miles. The distin-
quishing feature of ballistic missiles is their speed and the altitude at
which they fly. The highest point of the trajectory of German V-2 was
______ feet and its speed approached ______ times the speed of sound. An
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile would fly at a speed 20 times that of
sound, the highest point of its trajectory would be ______ and it would have
a range in excess of 5000 miles. It would be in transit only about 30 minutes
between Soviet and U.S. territories. Against such a weapon our present
detection apparatus is not powerful enough and our air-defense system has
neither the weapons nor a sufficiently rapid reaction time. Do the ballistic
missiles constitute a technological breakthrough then? It is necessary to
distinguish first the kind of missile whether it is intercontinental or of
intermediary range (around 1500 miles) and the consequences of which side
develops it first.

If the Soviets develop a 1500 mile missile first, it will not
fundamentally upset the strategic balance. A 1500 mile missile would be
useful primarily to blackmail our allies or to threaten our overseas air-
bases. Both tasks can now be accomplished by Soviet light and medium jet
bombers (the Beagle and the Badger). To be sure, a 1500 mile missile would

V - 34

carry out these missions more rapidly; it could reduce the warning time to practically nothing and, if it were sufficiently accurate, it might make some of our advanced overseas bases untenable. On the other hand, it could do so only by provoking an all-out war; it could not forestall a retaliatory blow in Soviet territory from U.S. bases; it could therefore not decide an all-out war. To be sure submarines could launch such a missile against the U.S. But apart from the fact that any substantial movement of Soviet submarines could hardly escape detection, it is doubtful whether ship-launched missiles could achieve sufficient accuracy to wipe out our retaliatory force.

By contrast possession by us and our allies of a 1500 mile missile would add substantially to our strategic capability. From present U.S. bases or from ships, a 1500 mile missile would reach all of Soviet territory except a small portion of Asiatic Russia. Even if both sides possess a 1500 mile missile concurrently it will add more to our effective strength than to that of the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, it will not be a decisive advantage. Unless we strike the first blow, and perhaps not even then, the U.S.S.R. would still retain the capability to inflict devastating blows on us. Moreover the intermediate range missile will not arrive in sufficient quantity or with adequate accuracy before the development of another weapon which will make it almost impossible for either side to achieve total victory by all-out war: the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.

It is expected that both sides will possess Intermediary Range Ballistic Missiles by 1961 and Intercontinental Missiles by 1965. Even if one side develops one of these missiles a year or two before the other,

V - 35

the first prototype will not have sufficient accuracy and they will not
exist in sufficient quantity to confer a decisive advantage. It is
reasonable to assume then that sometimes after 1965 both sides will possess
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles with thermo-nuclear warheads in quanti-
ty. The paradoxical consequence of this development will be that while it
will enable both sides to achieve complete surprise -- or reduce warning
under optimum conditions to a maximum of 20 minutes -- it will also remove
the advantages achievable by surprise. For the reason behind a surprise
attack in a strategy based on manned bomber is that a bomber is most vul-
nerable while on the ground. The launching mechanism of a bomber -- the
airfield -- is so costly relative to an airplane that it must house a
minimum number of planes for efficient operation and an upper limit is thus
placed on the dispersal of the retaliatory force. Since there will always
be fewer airbases than planes and thus the most efficient strategy in a war
based on manned bombers to destroy the opposing force-in-being on the ground.
With the advent of ballistic missiles, dispersal will be almost complete,
however, because the launching mechanism of an Intercontinental Missile is
less elaborate than an airfield, it is more maneuverable; easier to camou-
flage. When Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles exist in a quantity, many
of their launching sites will undoubtedly be underground; others will be
mobile. Under such conditions a surprise attack can have no purpose. It
would be next to impossible to identify all launching sites or to destroy
them were they identified. Thus even the maximum surprise could at best
destroy the opponent's national substance but not reduce his ability to
inflict a similar retaliatory blow. All-out war could still be devastating
but it will have lost its object.

V - 36

V

Whatever the calculation then, whether it is the feasibility of a surprise attack with present weapons and delivery systems or whether it is the impact of imminent technological trends, it is difficult to see how either side could count on achieving its objectives throughout all-out thermo-nuclear war. It is possible to calculate relative advantages in base structure or delivery capabilities but they do not add up to a margin which would leave either side sufficient resources to impose its will on the other.<sup>18)</sup> The essence of the nuclear stalemate then is that it enables the two super-powers to keep themselves from losing an all-out war by forcing the opponent to pay an exorbitant price for victory. But the same power which is capable of avoiding defeat is incapable of imposing victory. All-out war has thus turned into a paradoxical relationship: a contest, the only outcome of which can be that *both* contenders lose. Thus the nuclear stalemate should not be confused with nuclear parity; it is brought about precisely by the fact that after a certain point increments in destructiveness no longer pay strategic returns. Under almost any conceivable circumstances an upper limit of destructiveness is reached before attrition can become effective and the forces-in-being on both sides will be able to inflict losses out of proportion to any objective likely to be in dispute.

In such a situation, deterrence becomes a complex relationship. For the threat of all-out war deters not only aggression but also resistance to it, not war as such but all-out war. From now on, the decision of

18.

peace or war which is never an easy one is complicated by the consciousness that all-out-war risks national catastrophe. Obviously no power will start a war it thinks it is going to lose. But it will also be reluctant to start a war if the prize may be its national substance. All-out-war is therefore likely to turn into a last resort: an act of desperation to be invoked only if national survival is unambiguously threatened, and what is an unambiguous threat will be interpreted increasingly rigidly as the risks of all-out-war become better understood. The capability for all-out war thus operates as a protection against a sudden onslaught; it also furnishes a threshold below which the decision to initiate all-out war may become INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT; impossible. The side which can present its challenges in less than all-out form therefore gains a psychological advantage: it can pass to the other side the agonizing choice of whether a challenge which is explicitly less than all-out war should be dealt with by an all-out response.

And if the decision to engage in all-out war is difficult for us, it is next to impossible for most of our allies. We have, for a little while at least, the protection of distance; while it cannot prevent a heavy attack it can give us a measure of warning and permits a degree of defense. Most of Europe, however, is only some forty minutes flying time from advance Soviet bases; and the greatest Soviet air strength is in light or medium jet bombers. Moreover, while the size of the U.S. makes it at least conceivable that our society could withstand a thermo-nuclear onslaught, both history and geography combine to cast doubt on Europe's ability to do so. Thermo-nuclear devastation after the ravages of two World Wars might lead to the collapse of the European social structure. And the density of population would involve fearful casualties both from heat and blast and from fall-out. A Prime Minister who knows that some 10 megaton weapons

V - 38

properly distributed could kill or injure over half the population of his
country will not resort to all-out war except as a very last resort -- and
perhaps not even then. For this reason, nowhere is the disparity between
deterrence and the strategy for carrying out the war more glaring then
among our European allies. They can consider an all-out strategy only as
long as they believe that war is unlikely or that it makes war unlikely;
they will recoil before implementing it because they know that a thermo-
nuclear war, whatever its effects on the chief protagonists, would mean the
end of Europe.

The nuclear stalemate finally affects not only relations among
the nuclear powers but their relations to powers which do not have a nuclear
establishment. And here too the impact of the thermo-nuclear capability is
paradoxical. While the relations of the two great powers are shaped by the
consciousness that their thermo-nuclear capability enables them to avoid
defeat but not to achieve a meaningful victory, the role of the smaller
powers is strangely exalted by the increased strength of the super-states.
This is true not only because the rivalry of the two blocs gives an
increased importance to the uncommitted; it is equally due to the fact
that vis-a-vis the underdeveloped countries the thermo-nuclear capability
confers no meaningful increase of strength. Because the underdeveloped
areas are hopelessly inferior to the major powers even in terms of conven-
tional weapons, they will not be impressed by the fact that modern techno-
logy can encompass their destruction even more efficiently. Thus although
the margin of superiority of the industrialized over the underdeveloped
nations has never been greater, it has also never been less effective. For
in every crisis from Korea to Suez, the non-nuclear powers have behaved as

V - 39

if nuclear technology did not exist. They could do so because they knew
that two considerations would inhibit the major powers; the consciousness
that the employment of nuclear weapons would bring about a feeling of moral
revulsion in the rest of the world, and the fear that the employment of
nuclear weapons anywhere might set off a chain of events ending in all-out
war. Thus the minor powers are in a sense protected by the incommensurab-
ility between the power of nuclear weapons and the objectives for which to
employ them and by the inhibitions produced by all-out weapons systems
coupled with an all-out strategy.

All-out war has thus ceased to be an instrument of policy. It
cannot be used against the minor powers for fear of the moral implications
and also because its intricate strategy is not appropriate for dealing with
peripheral situations. And it cannot be used against a major power for
anything except negative ends: to prevent the opponent's victory. Thus
an all-out war which starts as an all-out war is the least likely contin-
gency although it is the only one for which we have an adequate doctrine.
To be sure, an all-out war could come about as the result of an irrational
decision or of miscalculation or because a small war gradually spreads.
There is no protection against irrational decision except to deprive the
other side of the power to hurt us with it -- a possibility which ended with
our atomic monopoly. Miscalculation and the gradual spreading of little
wars will be considered in a later chapter, although with national catas-
trophe the penalty for miscalculation, all the pressures will operate on
the side of caution. The fact remains that under present or forseeable
conditions, it is difficult to think of a national purpose that could be
advanced by all-out war.

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This is not to say that we can do without a capability for fight-
ing an all-out war or that maintaining the conditions which make such a
war seem unattractive will be easy. Obviously without a capability for
massive retaliation, the of risk described in this chapter with
respect to all-out war would shift; it might then seem worth the gamble to
launch a surprise attack. It does mean, however, that if we behave effect-
ively we can always make the risks of all-out war seem prohibitive. The
control over whether there is going to be a thermo-nuclear war therefore
depends to a large extent on us. Whether we keep up in the technological
race or not, whether our retaliatory force is well dispersed, whether our
air defense inflicts the maximum attrition and our civil defense is capable
of preventing panics -- all these decisions are within our exclusive control.
But although these conditions are in our control, they will not be easy to
achieve. At the current rate of technological change, the side which has
conceded the first blow to its enemy will always live on the verge of
catastrophe, for an adverse technological breakthrough is always possible.
Thus the stalemate is always precarious; it will impel a continuous race
between offense and defense; it will require a tremendous effort simply to
stay even.

It is the complexity of maintaining the nuclear stalemate which
gives its esoteric quality to so much of our military thought. The military
must plan on the basis of the opponent's capabilities and in a period of
budgetary squeeze they must devote resources in the first instance against
the worst contingency which is all-out war. This leads to a concern with
surprise attack, with destroying the enemy's force-in-being, with all the
things in short that are least likely to occur. As a result, high powered
detection apparatus sweeps the skies on thousands of miles of perimeter;

V - 41

hundreds of planes are poised on airfields ready to hurtle into the sky to launch the retaliatory blow. A fearful responsibility falls on an ever smaller group of men: the officials who have to interpret the information of the detection systems; is a flight of planes a lost training mission, a reconnaissance mission or the precursor of a surprise attack? On the correct answer to this question depend the lives of tens of millions on both sides. And given the speed of nuclear weapons, there is no margin for error. There will not even be the moral consolation of unambiguous aggression. For, given the distribution of the base system, our retaliatory blow is likely to reach the Soviet territory before their first planes have reached their targets from the Distant Early Warning Line. Because all-out war is so intricate and so sophisticated, and because its risks are so fearful, the necessary concern with it leads to a psychological distortion: it tends to transform the modes of a war which can only be a last resort into a doctrine for the only feasible strategy; it leads to an identification of every technological advance with strategically significant progress. In every crisis, short of direct Soviet attack, it furnishes arguments for a policy of minimum risk not only because of the dangers of all-out war but also to reserve our all-out capability either against a principal enemy or against a more unambiguous challenge.

In the process, the relationship between policy and strategy is lost. For the more stark the alternatives posed by thermo-nuclear war, the more reluctant will the responsible political leaders be to employ force, between total peace & total war; above all if their strategic doctrine presents them no alternatives. They may invoke our all-out capability as a deterrent, but they will shrink from it as a strategy for conducting a war should deterrence fail. The more

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the military emphasize the most absolute Soviet capabilities, the more the responsible officials who will have to make the decision of peace or war will be tempted to escape their dilemmas by asserting Soviet peaceful intentions. This is well illustrated by the Symington Hearings: the military leaders, particularly from the Air Force, described Soviet power as if all options were equally open to them and as if every increment in Soviet air strength were immediately translatable into a strategic advantage. But Secretary Wilson insisted that the growing Soviet nuclear stockpile and long-range air force were less significant that the transformation of Soviet society which made all-out war increasingly unlikely.19) Thus the concern with a war fought on the basis of "purely" military considerations has as its counterpart the emphasis on "pure" diplomacy or a reliance on historical trends. As a result, the crucial problem of modern strategy was never explicitly considered: what kind of military superiority is strategically significant and what strategy can give an impetus to policy rather than paralyze it?

The dilemma pointed up by the Symington Hearings has been defined as the alternative of Armageddon or defeat without war. The enormity of modern weapons makes the thought of all-out war seem repugnant; but the refusal to run any risks would amount to giving the Soviets a blank check. We can overcome the paralysis induced by such prospects only to the extent that our strategy can pose our policy-makers less absolute alternatives. To be sure, we require a capability for all-out war, sufficient so that on no calculation could an aggressor hope to profit by surprise attack. But we must also realize that such an establishment is the condition of policy and

19. Symington Hearings, p. 1666, testimony of Secretary Wilson.

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not its end. A capability for all-out thermo-nuclear war can prevent
disaster; it cannot be employed to achieve positive ends. We thus return
to the dilemma which has characterized our whole post-war military thought:
whether the nuclear age permits the establishment of a relationship between
force and diplomacy, whether it is possible to conceive applications of
power less catastrophic than all-out thermo-nuclear war.