- 10 -

As a result of quiet diplomacy, the exit tax on emigration is not being collected. We have received assurances that it will not be reimplied; the rate of Jewish emigration has been set in the tens of thousands where it was a trickle in the '60's; over half the hardship cases submitted to the Soviet government has been permitted to emigrate within six months. We will continue raising these matters in private channels and by quiet diplomacy.

The current issue goes beyond this: it is whether the U.S. should now tie to agreements already concluded conditions which were never raised during the negotiations. Should the US make as a formal condition what has heretofore flowed from the informal relations festered by detente? We have concluded that to answer these questions in the affirmative would defeat its own purpose.

First, the very term "most favored nation" is misleading in its implication of preferential treatment. In reality it denotes the normal conditions of trade with other countries. We seek merely to put the Soviet Union and other communist nations on the equal basis they enjoyed up until 1951. Indeed at that time the Soviet government discouraged commerce because it feared the impact on its society of normal trading relations with the West.

- 10 a -

Second, this Administration has never maintained
that progress in trade should be unconditional. In fact,
when we emphasized in 1969 that political advance must
precede economic advance, this policy was attacked by some
on the grounds that trade growth was an end in

itself, and indeed would promote detente. Now, after
there has been substantial progress in relaxing international
tensions, many of these same observers insist on linking
trade with transformations in domestic policy.

Third, the issue is not strictly economic. It
must be seen in the context of continued negotiations
and reciprocal benefits to which the Soviet Union has
contributed its share. The condition that Moscow
modify its domestic policy was never raised in this
country while we were negotiating; now it is inserted
after both sides have carefully shaped an overall
mosaic. Our willingness to normalize trading relation-
ships is an inextricable part of our entire bilateral
relationship. We must weigh not just the merits of
the particular problem, but the consequences in terms
of our whole foreign policy.

Finally, this issue impinges not just on our
relationships with the Soviet Union, but also on our
posture toward many others whose internal structure we
find incompatible with our own. Conditions imposed
on one country could inhibit expanding relations with
others, such as the People's Republic of China.

We can never simply acquiensce in the suppression
of fundamental liberties. We must take our stand for
humane principles and do all we reasonably can to
promote justice. But there are limits to what we can

attempt. Deep human concerns must confront some critical
questions. What is our capability to change the domestic
structure of other nations? Would a slow-down of
detente or a relapse into tensions prompt greater
liberty? What are the implications and obligations of
getting directly involved? What would our reaction
be to attempts by other nations to change our society?
Do we really believe that the Soviet Union will change
its domestic structure for fear of losing a limited
amount of trade, much of which other nations are only
too eager to replace? And if the result is renewed
confrontation, are we ready to face the crises and
increased defense budgets that it would inevitably
spawn?

For half a century we have objected to ~~international~~
communism's efforts to interfere in the domestic systems
of states around the world. For a generation of Cold
War we sought to ease the risks of conflict produced
by competing ideologies. At the precise moment of
emerging detente is our foreign policy to come full
circle? Are we now prepared to propose that America
lead its own crusade? Are we to make peace conditional
on our prescriptions for domestic structures?

The United States deplores the deprivation of
human rights. It stands ready to use its moral and

- 13 -

influence to promote these right. We have had considerable success. But everybody including the peoples of our adversaries -- gains from peace. And we should not lightly risk the fragile structure that has been built by pushing demands beyond tolerable limits.

## Our Troops in Europe

The problem of detente is produced by the impact on each other of two sets of values. The issue of troops in Europe results from the need to redefine security in a period of rapid change.

Paradoxically and contradictorily at the precise moment that we are urged that detente must keep pace with Soviet domestic change, we are also told that detente makes possible the reduction of our preparedness, especially that it should enable us to withdraw some of our troops from Europe. It is argued that relaxation of tensions and European prosperity make it unnecessary to maintain substantial US forces in Europe twenty five years after the end of the war.

These arguments, tempting as they are, require careful analysis. The relaxation of tensions must be weighed against the change in the balance of strength, especially the growth

- 14 -

of Soviet nuclear power. When US forces were first sent to Europe, the United States had a near nuclear monopoly. American forces then served the primarily psychological function of symbolizing America's commitment to the defense of Europe. Today, the advent of nuclear parity and the strengthening of Soviet conventional forces have made general nuclear war an unimaginable catastrophe; they have thereby underlined the need for local defense forces. The argument for the withdrawal of US forces thus is less compelling on security grounds today than it would have been two decades ago.

The entire issue raises these questions for our consideration: How closely linked are European and American security? Granting a close linkage what strategy most effectively serves the common defense? Whatever the strategy, how should its burdens be allocated?

In a national debate about troop levels these seem preeminently the issues that require attention. We must not invoke slogans related to abstract concepts of where American troops should be stationed at what period of time.

The first question is essentially beyond debate: The security interests of the United States and Western Europe

- 15 -

are indissolubly linked. But the nature of the defense
and the allocation of burdens is at this moment the subject
of the most intensive and at the same time most hopeful debate
that has taken place in the Atlantic Alliance in two decades.

We believe it is possible to revitalize and improve our
partnerships with Europe, both to maintain our commitments
and more equitably to share the security burden. Within
NATO and in our relations to the European community we are
drafting principles designed to reflect new political, military
and economic realities a generation after World War II.

Together with our friends we intend to develop new guidelines
for our common defense, for our economic interdependence,
for our relations with the East. All of this will be severely
jeopardized if the United States unilaterally changes the
very basis of Atlantic relationships and in defiance of the evident
realities of our period.

With our adversaries we are working to negotiate a
network of durable relations, to move Europe permanently
away from confrontation toward cooperation. The Conference
on European Security and Cooperation seeks to promote
stability, freer movement of peoples and ideas, and wider

- 16 -

cooperation, in various fields. Mutual force reductions are designed to lower forces and tensions in the heart of the continent. In these negotiations our continued military presence is crucial both to underpin Western solidarity and to stress to the other side that while we seek mutual reduction of military expenditures, the West will not weaken itself unilaterally.

We are near the stage of major progress in consultations with our allies and genuine bargaining with our adversaries. At this very time we face great domestic pressures to remove both a crucial element of confidence in our consultations and a singular inducement to bargaining. Those who press now for our unilateral withdrawals must consider the overall impact on our future foreign policy. Would unilateral withdrawals help the process of negotiations with our adversaries or would it set it back, tempting them to take another tack? Would unilateral withdrawals encourage our allies to assume more of the common defense, or would it demoralize them and set off a serious unravelling? These questions must be answered convincingly in a serious debate.

- 17 -

The"Five-Power World"

In my address before the General Assembly of the United
Nations I described a global environment where poles of
power and blocs and balances no longer are relevant; where
justice, not stability, can be our overriding preoccupation;
where countries consider cooperation in the world interest
to be in their national interest. This remains our goal.

But our journey must start with the world as it is.
The challenge for our foreign policy is to move toward our
future vision while reconciling the competitive factors that
I have mentioned tonight. It is in this light that the term
the "five-power world" should be seen. It is a description
of realities, not our creation or preference.

Let me begin by stressing what the concept is not.
The concept is not one of mechanistic balance. The implied
parallel with the nineteenth

century is inaccurate. Then, the principal countries
shared an essentially similar philosophic perspective
and accepted the basic structure of the existing inter-
national order. This is not true today. Second, we
seek the element of consensus as well as balance. While
a certain equilibrium among the major powers remains
imperative to preserve mutual security, there must be
positive incentives to keep the peace as well as
deterrents against breaking it. Nations must have a stake
in the system if they are to be expected to maintain it.
Third, we are not engaged in the maneuvers of constantly
shifting alliances. We distinguish between friends
and potential adversaries; we hold to certain shared
ideals and ideas; and we know that the prosperity of our
friendships is crucial to the lowering of tensions with
our opponents.

Thus this concept describes a world in transition.
We have moved away from bipolar confrontation, when Moscow
and Washington each led a coalition of opposing states.
The Communist world, once perceived as monolithic, has
fractured into competing centers of power and doctrine,
while our allies have recovered their economic strength
and political vitality. Accordingly, we have begun to
build a network of relationships that should make peace
more difficult to disrupt and stability more worthwhile
to preserve.

The concept reflects the diffusion of power. While we and the Soviet Union continue to dwarf all other nations in the military spere, our ultimate power has limited political utility, and economic factors are growing in importance. So one must weigh other forms of strength in the current world. In economic terms, Western Europe and Japan, together with the Soviet Union and the United States, are relative giants, while Chinese strength is largely potential. In political terms, all five centers have leading roles to play.

The concept does not signify exclusive concentration on the big powers. Major concern for -- and the inevitable media focus on -- the realities I have described should not blot out our other pursuits: on-going cooperation with other friends; efforts to improve relations with other adversaries; the need to halt the potential drift between the affluent few and the impoverished many; the interdependent demands of a global society. We recognize that the world is made up of many forces. We are only acknowledging that in the present period five of its nations have relatively more impact on international affairs than the rest.

Finally, the concept is not one of mechanistic balance. First, the implied parallel with the nineteenth

This stable balance is hopefully a way station
on the route to a more positive world community. Our
immediate goal is to spare mankind the scourges of war.
But we view stability as a bridge to human aspirations,
not as an end in itself.

Thus we must build a foreign policy that can
endure in American hearts as well as our minds, one that
will earn the support of succeeding administrations,

one that rises above the passions and prejudices of partisan politics to shape a new American role in a new global environment.

To build a fresh consensus we need a more open and cooperative spirit between the legislative and executive branches, between the government and the press, between the people and their public servants. We do not expect or call for unanimity about methods, but we should strive for a common conception of our ultimate goals. To this purpose we will commit our best efforts, through more intensive consultation with the Congress and a broader dialogue with Americans.

## A Structure of Peace

If these are some of the contours of the world as it is, what is our conception of what it might become? What is the structure of peace we are seeking to build? Almost three years ago, the President described such a structure as one:

* "--which reflects the contributions and reconciles the aspirations of nations;

* "--which is cemented by the shared goal of coexistence and the shared practice of accommodation;

* "--which liberates countries and continents to realize their destinies free from the threat of war;

"--which promotes social justice and human dignity."

This is a vision which looks beyond the present toward a future in which the control of man's fears is supplanted by the achievement of his hopes. It recognizes that just as no society can remain entirely open in times of international insecurity, so no society can remain entirely closed in a world of stability and peace. It affirms that the imperatives of technology, the explosion of communications and the striving for knowledge respect no national borders, opening all societies to the world around them. It is a vision firmly rooted in the belief that just as a return to Cold War tensions would heighten the compulsion to restrict liberty throughout the world, a structure of peace can also bring a structure of freedom.

Most importantly it is a vision which acknowledges that in today's world it is impossible to build peace and justice by constructing walls.

In the encyclical for which this conference is named, Pope John foresaw "that no political community is able to pursue its own interests and develop itself in isolation ...and that there is a growing awareness of all human beings that they are members of a world community."

The challenges and the opportunities of mankind have overwhelmed nationalism, and can only be dealt

with by nations acting in concert:

--For the first time in history we may have the
technical knowledge to satisfy man's basic needs.
But do we have the political will to join
together in a global campaign to apply this
knowledge?

--For the first time nations throughout the
world are devoting more energy to resolving
old problems than to creating new ones. But
do we have the vision and determination to
maintain this momentum?

--And for the first time in memory the voices
of freedom and justice are louder than the voices
of oppression and hate. But do we understand
that liberty's greatest enemies are conflict
and war?

The answers to these questions will determine
whether we can bring about the only lasting peace, a
peace with justice; whether we can finally bring within
Man's grasp his eternal goal of a Pacem in Terris.

DRAFT 7

# PACEM IN TERRIS

## The Nature of the National Dialogue

I come before this conference to help define the nature of our national dialogue about our purposes and place in the world. No task before the American people is more urgent. No assembly is better suited for this task.

The need is impressed on us by the dramatic changes in international affairs of recent years:

- For most of the postwar period America operated against the background of vast and predominant resources. Now we are in the position, long familiar to less favored nations, of applying more limited means to carefully defined ends. We can no longer overwhelm our problems; we must master them with understanding.

- Throughout a generation our continual preoccupation was to keep the Cold War from degenerating into a hot war. Today, when the danger of global conflict has receded, we face fresh questions

- 2 -

about the nature of security and the criteria
for detente.

-- For two decades our alliances seemed as constant
as the threats to our security. Now when our
allies have gained strength and self-confidence,
new issues emerge concerning the balance in our
partnerships and their relationship to our
adversaries.

-- As crises have lessened, we have to consider
the nature of a more permanent international
order. Questions once obscured by more pressing
demands now demand our attention: What are our
ultimate purposes? To what end stability? What
do we mean by justice?

These themes suggest that we are in a time of profound
change. It is characteristic of such periods, however,
that they seem to those who live through them as only
a series of haphazard events. So before we can discuss
solutions we must understand our problems. And we must
be clear on what can reasonably be asked of foreign policy
and, equally important, at what pace it can be achieved.

- 3-

Failure to address these questions could turn our
dialogue simply into competing catalogues of the desirable
rather than informed comparisons of the possible. Our
exchanges would degenerate into a kaleidoscope of tactical
skirmishes.

Some recent developments point up the dilemmas
and ambiguities in our current dialogue. There have been
major shifts in perspectives:

- A foreign policy once considered overly moralistic is now judged overly pragmatic.

- Disapproval of American interventionism in recent years may now be swinging to disapproval of non-interventionism.

- Where there was criticism in 1969 over linking trade progress to changes in other countries' foreign policies, there is now criticism for not linking trade progress to changes in other countries' domestic structures.

Many positions held in the debate are inherently
contradictory:

- Detente cannot be pursued if both the inducements for progress and the penalties for confrontation are legislated away.

- Concern for human values in other countries

- 4 -

cannot be given practical expression if support
is withdrawn from the very programs designed to
help people improve their economic lot and to
provide a cushion against national disasters.

-- The objective of maintaining a responsible
American international role is inconsistent with
nationalistic positions in trade and monetary
negotiations.

The Competing Elements of Foreign Policy

A creative dialogue on foreign policy must begin
with the understanding that it involves the interactions
of sovereign countries. Sovereignty, which has been defined
as a will uncontrolled by others, gives foreign policy its
contingent and ever incomplete character.

Thus relations among states can be settled only
by negotiation or by power, by compromise or by imposition.
Which of these methods prevails depends on the values,
the strengths and the domestic structures of the countries
involved. A nation's values define what is just; its strength
determines what is possible; its domestic structure decides
what international decisions can in fact be implemented
and sustained.

- 5 -

So for every nation foreign policy reflects the tension between two partially conflicting endeavors: defining its interests, purposes and values, and relating them to the interests, purposes and values of other countries. Foreign policy is explained domestically primarily in terms of justice. But what is defined as justice at home becomes the subject of negotiation abroad. It is thus no accident that so many nations, including our own, view the international arena as a forum where justice is thwarted by the clever practice of foreigners.

This is particularly the case in a period of ideological conflict when the values of states are at least partially incompatible. For then the challenge of peace confronts nations in a particularly acute form: the attempt to impose absolute justice by one side will be seen as absolute injustice by the other; the quest for total security for some turns into total insecurity for the remainder. The pursuit of peace must begin with the pragmatic concept of coexistence. Policy making, in short, involves a balance between what is desirable and what is possible. Progress will always be measured in partial

- 6 -

steps and in the relative satisfaction of alternative
goals. There will be a constant tension between our
values, which are inevitably cast in maximum terms, and
our efforts to promote them, which inevitably involve
compromise.

We must, of course, avoid the extremes. An
excessively pragmatic policy is empty of vision and
humanity. It lacks direction and roots and heart. It
has no criteria for other nations to assess our performance
and no standards to which the American people could rally.
If we mean nothing to ourselves, we can mean nothing to
others.

An excessively moralistic policy, on the other hand,
can turn quixotic or dangerous. It would suggest an
American monopoly on truth, and create temptations for
crusades. It would obstruct essential efforts at negotiation
and accommodation. We would continually forego good results
because we were holding out for the best results. Or we
could be led into perilous adventures.

Thus, the policy-maker must be concerned with the
best that can be achieved, not just the best that can be
imagined. He must reckon with the penalties for failure

- 7 -

as well as the benefits of success. He foregoes certain
courses not because they would be undesirable if successful,
but because the risks of failure outweigh potential gains.
What is possible does not in the short term always coincide
with what is "right". We must often settle for the gradual,
much as we might prefer the immediate. We must compromise
with others, and this means to some extent compromising
with ourselves.

If this is not understood, debate becomes sterile.
Critics will then insist on absolute aims, contrasting
the best outcome with the inevitable imperfections of
the chosen path. They will seek to combine the advantages
of conflicting courses of action. They will fail to weigh
the hazards of failure.

There must be understanding, as well, of the crucial
importance of timing. Opportunities cannot be hoarded;
once past, they are often lost irretrievably. Improvements
in the international climate are always vulnerable; they must
be nurtured if they are to thrive. We cannot pull up young
shoots periodically to see whether the roots are still
there or whether there is some marginally better location
for them.

- 8 -

This has special relevance now, when we are at a
period of both great opportunity and tenuous beginnings.
Allied leaders in Europe and Japan have joined us in
a reaffirmation of relationships for a new period. The
Soviet Union has begun to practice foreign policy as
interstate relationships rather than international civil
war. The People's Republic of China has emerged from
two decades of isolation. The developing countries cannot
wait for the solutions of their problems. A new dimension
of challenges demands global cooperation.

We are at one of those fragile moments where man
seems truly able to determine his fate. We in this country
cannot afford to be consumed by acrimony or lost in confused
argument.

8A

Detente with the Soviet Union

No area of policy demonstrates more urgently the need for
calm debate than our policy toward the Soviet Union. The issues
involved provide a classic example of the clash of values and the
choices we must make among priorities.

This Administration has never had any illusions about the
Soviet system. We have always insisted that advancement in certain
areas, such as trade, could only follow -- and reflect -- progress
toward more stable political relations. While recognizing the
imperative of coexistence in the nuclear age, we have maintained
a strong and flexible defense posture as a buttress to stability.
We have judged progress in our relations by concrete achievements
and the willingness of both sides to meet certain principles of
peaceful international conduct.

To a considerable extent we have succeeded. The Soviet Union
and the United States have concluded an historic accord to limit
strategic arms. We have reached a series of cooperative agreements
in other fields designed to place our relationship on a broadly con-
structive basis. Of the crises we inherited, the problem of Berlin
has been resolved by negotiation; there is a cease-fire in the Middle
East; and there is a settlement for most of Indo-China.

9

This is a promising foundation. But now we face an intense
debate as to whether we should make changes in Soviet society a
precondition for further progress -- or indeed for following through
on commitments already made.

Until very recently the definition of detente was not an issue.
The necessity of shifting international tides away from confrontation
toward negotiation was so clear and immediate that the emphasis on
peaceful international conduct was uncontested. But now progress
has been made -- and taken for granted by some -- and eloquent appeals
prompt us to consider the internal as well as international behavior
of other countries. The cutting edge of the problem is the Congressional
effort to condition most-favored nation trade status for other countries
on changes in their domestic systems.

There is a genuine moral issue -- on both sides. So let us not
address this as a debate between those who are sensitive to moral
concerns and those who are not. There is no question that the United
States is deeply concerned about individual liberties. We have made
our attitude clear on many occasions; we have been effective on many
occasions. As a result of quiet diplomacy, the exit tax on emigration
is not being collected and we have received assurances that it will not
be reapplied; the rate of Jewish emigration has been in the tens of
thousands where it was a trickle in the 1960's; and over half the

1810

(4)

hardship cases submitted to the Soviet government have been permitted to emigrate within six months. We will continue our efforts on these matters.

The issue, however, goes far beyond this: Should we now tie to agreements that have already been concluded elements which were never raised during the negotiations? Should we demand as a formal condition internal changes that have heretofore flowed from the informal relations fostered by detente? The Administration believes that such action would be self-defeating and would do serious damage to our foreign policy.

Let us place this issue in proper perspective. First, the very term "most favored nation" is misleading in its implication of preferential treatment. In reality it denotes the normal conditions of trade with other countries. We seek merely to put the Soviet Union and other communist nations on the equal basis they enjoyed up until 1951. Indeed, at that time the Soviet government discouraged commerce because it feared the impact on its society of normal trading relations with the West.

Second, this Administration has never lost sight of the broader context of economic relations. In fact, when we emphasized

* Note: Are we specific enough about which list? On other lists (known to State) the % is closer to 10%.

18/11

in 1969 that political advance must precede economic advance, this policy was attacked by some on the grounds that trade growth was of mutual benefit in itself, and indeed would promote detente. Now, after there has been substantial progress in relaxing international tensions, many of these same observers insist on linking trade with transformations in domestic policy.

Third, the issue must be seen in the context of continuing negotiations with the Soviet Union and of reciprocal benefits to which it has contributed its share. The condition that Moscow modify its domestic policy was never raised in this country while we were negotiating; now it is inserted after both sides have carefully shaped an overall mosaic. What is now at stake is not a particular item of legislation but the nature of our entire bilateral relationship. We must weigh not just the merits of the particular problem, but the consequences in terms of our whole foreign policy.

We can never acquiesce in the suppression of fundamental liberties. We must take our stand for humane principles and do all

we reasonably can to promote justice. But there are limits to what
we can attempt. Deep human concerns must confront some critical
questions. What is our capability to force other nations to change
their domestic structures? Would a slow-down of detente -- or a
relapse into tensions -- prompt greater liberty or freer emigration?
If the result is renewed confrontation, are we ready to face the
crises and increased defense budgets that it would inevitably spawn?
What are the implications and obligations of getting directly involved?
What would our reaction be to attempts by other nations to change
our society?

For half a century we have objected to communist efforts
to interfere in the domestic systems of states around the world.
For a generation of Cold War we sought to ease the risks of conflict
produced by competing ideologies. At the precise moment of emerging
detente, is our foreign policy to come full circle? Are we now to make
peace conditional on our prescriptions for other societies?

The United States deplores the deprivation of human rights
and stands ready to use its moral influence. But everybody --
including the peoples most directly concerned -- gains from peace.
We cannot responsibly risk the fragile structure that has been built
by pushing demands beyond tolerable limits.

13

(4)

## Our Troops in Europe

Paradoxically, at the precise moment we are urged to tailor the face of detente to Soviet domestic change, we are also told that detente makes possible the reduction of the means for defending ourselves and our allies.

Why, we are asked, must we maintain substantial US forces in Europe -- twenty-five years after the end of World War II -- when tensions between East and West have been relaxed and our allies are so prosperous?

These arguments, tempting as they are, lack sophistication. Let us look at the questions any Administration must ask:

- How closely linked are Western European and American security?

- If the linkage is close, what strategy most effectively preserves the common defense?

- Whatever the strategy, how should its burdens be allocated?

The first question is essentially beyond debate: the United States has gone to war twice in this century to protect ourselves by preserving the independence of Europe. For more than twenty-five years since the policies

14

of this country have aimed at creating an indissoluble
link between the forces of our allies and ourselves.

The relaxation of tensions that has occurred in
the past several years -- real as it has been -- must be
weighed against the growth of Soviet military power --
enormous as it has been. And we must remember that relaxation
has not been shared in Eastern Europe as it has in Western
Europe.

Thus, while detente in Europe has marginally
improved the lives of some, its principal benefits remain
to be realized. And should detente prove to be but a
transitory interlude, Soviet military might in the heart
of Europe will have grown, and will continue as a major
threat to our Allies.

Today's objective conditions.

Throughout most of the two and one-half decades
that our troops have been in Europe, the US enjoyed over-
whelming predominance over the Soviet Union in strategic
nuclear weapons. That is no longer the case. The advent
of nuclear parity and the strengthening of Soviet con-
ventional forces have made general nuclear war an unimaginable
catastrophe; they have thereby underlined the need for
substantial conventional defense forces. Could any American
President, under such circumstances, lightly remove the
incentive that has led our adversaries to seek detente, and thus

removing at the same time, the tools to defend against
aggression should detente fail? The argument for the
<u>maintenance of American conventional forces in Europe is in fact more unilateral withdrawal of US forces is in fact less compelling, on security grounds, today than it would have been</u> two decades ago.

And what of our strategy and the sharing of burdens?
We are at this very moment in the midst of the most intensive,
and at the same time most hopeful, discussion of the common
defense that has taken place in the Atlantic Alliance in two
decades. We are on the threshold of a revitalization of our
Atlantic partnership, both in terms of <u>our commitment to the maintenance of each other's commitments</u> and a more equitable sharing of the security
burden. Within NATO and with the European Community we
<u>reaffirming</u> are seeking to affirm the shared principles of our political,
military and economic relationships <u>in today's world.</u>
Together we <u>are fashioning</u> new guidelines for our common
defense, for our economic interdependence and for our relations
with the East. But we shall fail in this endeavor if the
United States unilaterally undermines the agreed-upon defense
strategy, oblivious to allied concerns and oblivious to the
evident realities of our time.

16

(4)

We are at a similarly delicate point with our
adversaries. Through the Conference on European Security
and Cooperation we seek to promote stability, wider
economic and technological cooperation, and the freer
movement of peoples and ideas -- the latter being the very
essence of what opponents of MFN themselves seek to accom-
plish. The Mutual Force Reductions negotiations that will
begin soon seek to lower both forces and tensions in the
heart of the continent. But these negotiations cannot
succeed if we unilaterally take actions that will both
weaken the Western bargaining position and shatter the
cohesion of the Western Alliance.

Would unilateral withdrawals encourage our allies
to assume more of the common defense, or would they demoralize
them and set off a serious unravelling? Would unilateral
withdrawals help the process of negotiation with our ad-
versaries or would they eliminate any reason for them to
pursue it?

These are the questions that must be answered con-
vincingly in a serious debate.

DRAFT 11

# PACEM IN TERRIS

Today marks an anniversary most meaningful to this country and to me personally. A year ago today came the breakthrough in the Paris negotiations which soon thereafter (led to the end of American military involvement in Viet-Nam. It is strangely difficult now to recapture the emotion of that moment when there (suddenly) was hope that years of suffering and division might give way to new possibilities for reconciliation.

We meet, too, at a time when renewed conflict in the Middle East reminds us that international stability is

always precarious and never to be taken for granted. It reminds us that peace depends on objective conditions and not merely on our aspiration. Pacem in Terris (regrettably) remains elusive. But however well we succeed in containing this crisis, as we have contained others, we still need to ask ourselves, what we seek in the world beyond this.

The need for a dialogue about national purposes has never been more urgent, and no assembly is better suited for such a discussion than those assembled here tonight.

Dramatic changes in recent years have transformed America's position and role in world affairs.

- For most of the postwar period, America enjoyed predominance in physical resources and political power. Now, like most other nations in history, we find that our (most difficult) task is how to

- 2 -

apply limited means to the accomplishment of
carefully defined ends. We can no longer
overwhelm our problems; we must master
skill,
them with understanding, imagination and
patience.

-- For a generation our preoccupation was to prevent the Cold War from degenerating into a hot war. Today, when the danger of global conflict has diminished, we face the more profound problem of defining what we mean by peace and determining the ultimate purpose of improved international relations.

-- For two decades the solidarity of our alliances seemed as constant as the threats to our security. Now our allies have regained strength and self-confidence, and relations with adversaries have improved, giving rise to uncertainties over the sharing of burdens with friends and the impact of reduced tensions on the cohesion of alliances.

- 3 -

-- Thus even as we have mastered the art of containing crises, our concern with the nature of a more permanent international order has grown. Questions once obscured by more pressing needs now demand our attention:

To what end stability? What is true national interest? What is the relationship of peace to justice?

It is characteristic of periods of upheaval that to those who live through them, they seem but a series of haphazard events. Symptoms obscure basic issues and historical trends. The urgent tends to dominate the important. Goals may be presented as abstract utopias, as safe-havens from pressing events.

But a debate, to be fruitful, must define what can reasonably be asked of foreign policy and at what pace progress can be achieved. Otherwise it will turn into competing catalogues of the desirable rather than informed comparisons of the possible. Dialogue will turn into tactical skirmishing.

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The World We Seek

In the encyclical for which this conference is named, Pope John sketched a similar vision. He foresaw "that no political community is able to pursue its own interests and develop itself in isolation" for "there is a growing awareness of all human beings that they are members of a world community."

The challenges and the opportunities of mankind now transcend nationalism, and can only be dealt with by nations acting in concert:

- For the first time in history, we may have the technical knowledge to satisfy man's basic needs. But do we have the political will to join together to accomplish this?

- For the first time in memory the voices of freedom and justice are growing louder than the voices of oppression, and hate. But do we understand that liberty's greatest enemies are conflict and war?

- For the first time, most nations are devoting more energy to resolving old problems than to creating order. But do we have the wisdom and determination to carry this through? To maintain this still fragile momentum?

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(4)

The answers to these questions will determine whether we can build a world based on justice rather than power. Our vision is of a time when the control of man's fears is supplanted by the achievement of his hopes. It affirms that the imperatives of <u>the modern world</u>, <u>technology</u>, <u>the explosion of</u> <u>communications</u> and <u>the striving for knowledge</u> respect no national borders, <u>opening</u> all societies to the world around them. It is firmly rooted in the belief that, just as a <u>human</u> return to Cold War tensions would <u>engender restrictions</u> on <u>liberty</u>, so would a structure of peace <u>encourage</u> a <u>structure</u> of freedom.

If this vision is to be realized, America's role is inescapable -- because of our purposes as well as our power.

But this cannot be the work of any one country. History will judge us finally by our deeds, not our proclamations.

So let us work for a world community. Let us not take for granted what has been achieved, even as we recognize that it is not enough. Let us always remember what is possible, even as we look toward what is best. Let us respect the values of others, even as we value

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their respect. For we must cooperate with others to
achieve our national ends.

Nor can the task I have outlined be the work of
any one administration or one branch of government
or one party. We must shape a foreign policy that rises
above the passions and prejudices of partisan politics,
a policy that can be sustained by the future leaders
of this nation, a policy that will endure in American
hearts as well as American minds.

So let us search for a fresh consensus. Let us
recreate a more open spirit between the legislative and
the executive, between the government and the press,
between the people and their public servants. Let us
learn once again to debate our methods and not our
motives. Let us not expect unanimity on specifics, but
let us see ourselves as engaged in a common enterprise.
For we cannot help shape a world community if we have not
restored community at home.

With Americans working together, America can work
with others toward man's eternal goal of a Pacem in Terris.