402

The Years of the Mandarin

Republican Party, returned to power, Kissinger was seen by the new admin-
istration as the man of détente and the SALT agreements, much more a dove
than a hawk in his actual conduct of foreign affairs.

Was this criticism (or praise) well founded? The answer is not self-evident.
Kissinger gave the impression of being fundamentally different from the
president's entourage, and from the American political class in general, by
his personal qualities, his ability to articulate his views, and his gift for
analysis, leavened by the humor that American journalists (and all American
audiences) find so attractive. Simplifying, one might say that his intellectual
superiority automatically imposed itself.

Does my judgment in 1982 differ essentially from that of 1977? For a half
century, I have limited my freedom of criticism by asking the question: In his
place, what would I do? Could Nixon accept the "coalition government" in
Saigon? If he could not, the prolongation of the war was inevitable. The fall of
Prince Sihanouk was almost a necessary result and hence the spread of
military operations to Cambodia. When I read Kissinger's memoirs, I am not
always convinced by his arguments, but I feel strengthened in my impres-
sions as an observer. The President and his adviser, pressed by internal and
external enemies, attempted to bring about a negotiated peace. To pacify
internal opinion, they gradually brought back American forces; to save the
Republic of South Vietnam, they strengthened its army; to bring the North
Vietnamese leaders to compromise, they used their air force. The Paris
agreements preserved the appearances; in any event, the fall of Nixon cut
short the existence of those appearances.

The approaches to Peking and Moscow did not have to do exclusively with
the search for a way out of Vietnam. In any event, sooner or later, the United
States would have resumed diplomatic relations with Peking, relations all the
more normal and useful because the quarrel between the two capitals of
Marxism-Leninism, public since 1963, offered obvious opportunities to
American diplomacy. Moscow and Peking both aided North Vietnam, with-
out reconciling their differences. The American dialogue with Peking could
influence Moscow's attitude toward the United States and toward Vietnam.

In retrospect, it does not appear that this diplomacy, which remains
completely intelligible, changed the course of events in Vietnam. In 1972,
the Communist regime in the North lacked neither artillery and missiles
against the bombers nor tanks and ammunition for the spring offensive. The
SALT agreements ratified parity between the United States and the USSR;
the good faith requirements set out on paper did not prohibit Moscow from
offering "fraternal aid" to "national liberation" movements. Détente changed
to some extent the style but not the substance of the rivalry between the two
superpowers. If Nixon and Kissinger had not themselves been conducting
the diplomacy of the United States, they would have denounced the illusions

KISSINGER AND THE

of détente. Thus, Nixon's 198
philosophy of international rel-
détente with Peking and Mosco

Did Kissinger himself believ
through which he hoped to res
ter? Perhaps, but he added
America, ready to respond to a
Moscow. Once this policy appea-
ica, weary of its imperial burd
1976, during and after the Wat
call all external affairs. It refused to
to spend to avoid the victory in
supported by Cuban troops.

Even after Nixon's resignation
advocate détente. He advised
When I criticized him for his c
oligarchs in the Kremlin, he ar
received our dissidents?" I ans
their dissidents, and he did not
power oscillated between two a
compatible: on the one hand, th
most resolute form—to prevent
Italy, Angola—and on the other
mercial and technical agree-
Soviet Union as a revolutionary
Union, as one of the two great r
the world in conformity with its
certain concessions, which the
means to block. Resistance to
hand, integration of the United
on the other—neither of these
two ideas do not demand the
democratic society; and, beca
 domestic dissension—Kissing
erprises.

1. They demonetarized gold in a
had no reason to attack those who v

10

U

KISSINGER AND THE END OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY 403

indarin

ger was seen by the new admin-
agreements, much more a dove
affairs.

? The answer is not self-evident.
ndamentally different from the
can political class in general, by
ilate his views, and his gift for
can journalists (and all American
ne might say that his intellectual

ally from that of 1977? For a half
ism by asking the question: In his
pt the "coalition government" in
the war was inevitable. The fall of
result and hence the spread of
ead Kissinger's memoirs, I am not
feel strengthened in my impres-
s adviser, pressed by internal and
out a negotiated peace. To pacify
back American forces; to save the
ened its army; to bring the North
y used their air force. The Paris
n any event, the fall of Nixon cut

did not have to do exclusively with
y event, sooner or later, the United
ations with Peking, relations all the
barrel between the two capitals of
offered obvious opportunities to
s both aided North Vietnam, with-
nerican dialogue with Peking could
United States and toward Vietnam.
at this diplomacy, which remains
urse of events in Vietnam. In 1972,
cked neither artillery and missiles
nition for the spring offensive. The
n the United States and the USSR;
aper did not prohibit Moscow from
tion" movements. Détente changed
stance of the rivalry between the two
ad not themselves been conducting
would have denounced the illusions

of détente. Thus, Nixon's 1981 book, *The Third World War*, develops a
philosophy of international relations far removed from his enthusiasm for
détente with Peking and Moscow.

Did Kissinger himself believe in détente, in the network of agreements through which he hoped to restrain and then tame the revolutionary mon- ster? Perhaps, but he added that this policy required a strong, vigilant America, ready to respond to any attempt at aggression or subversion from Moscow. Once this policy appeared to be the expression of a divided Amer- ica, weary of its imperial burden, it was condemned. Now, from 1973 to 1976, during and after the Watergate scandal, the Senate closely controlled all external affairs. It refused to appropriate the funds that Kissinger wanted to spend to avoid the victory in Angola of the party connected to Moscow and supported by Cuban troops.

Even after Nixon's resignation, while preaching firmness, he continued to advocate détente. He advised President Ford not to receive Solzhenitsyn. When I criticized him for his concern not to offend the sensibilities of the oligarchs in the Kremlin, he answered first: "What would we think if they received our dissidents?" I answered that we did not have the equivalent of their dissidents, and he did not insist on the point. At bottom, Kissinger in power oscillated between two attitudes that he considered, or hoped, to be compatible: on the one hand, the pursuit of the policy of containment in its most resolute form—to prevent Communists from coming to power in Chile, Italy, Angola—and on the other, strategic arms limitation treaties and com- mercial and technical agreements for Soviet-American cooperation. The Soviet Union as a revolutionary power, had to be contained; the Soviet Union, as one of the two great military powers, aimed to occupy a position in the world in conformity with its strength, and it was appropriate to grant it certain concessions, which the United States, incidentally, did not have the means to block. Resistance to an ideological-military imperialism on one hand, integration of the United States's alter ego into the concert of nations on the other—neither of these ideas calls for criticism. Unfortunately, the two ideas do not demand the same language-weakness can be fatal in a democratic society; and, because of circumstances—Vietnam, Watergate, domestic dissension—Kissinger achieved only imperfect success in both enterprises.

NOTES

1. They demonetarized gold in a certain sense, but the holders of the yellow metal had no reason to attack those who were responsible for this step.

LC

EPILOGUE

475

rcome, or at least to with-

or celebrate it as the origin
according to his feelings and
kind should be left to the
ists, or even to a philosopher
anda. These historical judg-
cal judgments.

rough and suffering from the
ying and a culture that they
fers the path to power and
at the West no longer knows
what it destroys. Deprived of
the same responsibilities; they
so less through their actions
humanity is strewn with dead
finished in living memory.

is, the Aztecs? Who can doubt
amples on the corpses of men.
ow even justify the suffering of
one can answer. Today, in this
ialism characteristic of all past
also from facile relativism. The
of all, nobles and commoners,
of the century have dissipated
rantee of the progress of men or
and Stalin, contrary to current
progressivism. We know that
, but also that the worst is not
e.

e arrived at a more thoroughly
is in thought and action."⁵ How
all cultures to exist and resolute
reconcile in practice my belong-
and my loyalty to my Jewish
of the use of nuclear arms against
ions of innocent people? Could I
oduction: "Human existence is
es in an incoherent world, com-
fleeting truth, with no assurance
and formal thought"?
between social values and moral

virtues, I would strengthen the foundations of scientific truth and human
universalism. As for action, I would describe our historical condition more
concretely, but not in fundamentally different terms. In quiet periods,
within modern democratic societies, the citizen has few occasions to live
through the terrors of adventurous decisions. When we hesitate between
American and Soviet protection, we are involved in an incoherent world, we
choose one social configuration against another, both of which are imperfect,
and we resign ourselves to a possible horror that we should perhaps reject
absolutely.

About fifty years ago, I wrote that our historical condition was dramatic.
Should we say dramatic or tragic? In some respects, tragic is more appropri-
ate than dramatic. Tragic is the necessity to establish security on the basis of
the nuclear threat; tragic, the choice between the accumulation of con-
ventional weapons and the nuclear threat; tragic, the destruction of old
cultures by industrial civilization, but tragedy would be the final judgment
only if a fortunate conclusion, beyond tragedy, was not even conceivable. I
continue to think a happy end possible, far beyond the political horizon, an
Idea of Reason.⁶

Have I felt regret for not having been the Kissinger of a Prince, as some
have suggested, notably Jean d'Ormesson? I would answer them in a friendly
way that they are wrong. Roger Martin du Gard, in his still unpublished
memoirs, sketches an excessively flattering portrait of me, and explains why
I "will not rule."⁷

As for me, I think that I simply never possessed the qualities necessary to
exercise power, even at the level of an adviser. Prudent in my writings, I have
difficulty in controlling my speech. I allow myself to express extreme ideas,
to respond to circumstances or to express moods which do not represent my
deepest thoughts and risk discrediting them. A political man has to hold his
tongue as well as his pen. I am not incapable of adapting my words to my
audience, but diplomatic language is painful to me. I like to speak without
weighing my words, and even the most trivial lie costs me an effort: I lack
imagination in refusing a dinner invitation or a request for a lecture.

There is more. I never claimed to have the competence of a professional
economist. To be sure, most finance ministers themselves do not have the
competence of those who teach or administer the economy. Why should a
minister, if he were seeking an adviser outside the administration, choose a
man like me, on the periphery of all disciplines, a free spirit inclined toward
passions that are hardly compatible with the duties of adviser?

The case of Henry Kissinger obsesses commentators, because of my rela-
tions with him and his feelings toward me, which he expresses freely, even in
my absence. My grandchildren will proudly preserve the copy of his

476

The Reprieve

*Memoirs* with the inscription: "To my teacher" (unless historians remove Kissinger from his pedestal and I share with him in the fickleness of fate). Presiding over the National Security Council in Washington, informing the President of the United States every morning about the state of the world, negotiating for him in Peking or Moscow—such a role would have fascinated me if I had been an American citizen. All the more so because Bundy, Rostow, Kissinger, and Brzezinski, professors at Harvard or MIT, whose status was comparable to mine, acceded to the post without an electoral campaign, without laying siege to the Prince. Of course, as an American citizen, I would have sought the experience of power, but I would—I hope—have understood in time that I did not have the stuff of a Kissinger.

Intelligence, knowledge, and judgment are not enough. Performance is also required, of which I would most probably have been incapable: to impose oneself in the jungle of Washington disputes, personal and political, to seduce the press or at least avoid its hostility, to make or inspire often necessary decisions that send young men into battle and death. Not that I reject the use of force, in theory or in practice. But it is one thing to agree abstractly to the recourse to arms, and another to convince the president here and now to take that step. My scrupulous nature and my hatred of violence would have told against me in the post occupied by an exceptional intellectual like Kissinger.

Enough of these confessions about the unreal. Let us imagine a position in France comparable to that of adviser for diplomacy and defense. None of the presidents of the Fifth Republic has needed such an adviser, and none of them would have accepted him. And the position would not have been very exciting. A substantial part of General de Gaulle's diplomacy did not go beyond stage management. What remains from his journeys to Latin America, Rumania, or Poland, but the memory of acclaim? A few of his decisions remain: leaving the integrated command of NATO, attempting and failing at a Franco-German alliance designed to remove the two countries from "American hegemony," reestablishing relations with Moscow (neither understanding nor cooperation followed from this détente). Since then, French diplomacy has been composed of two aspects: permanent negotiations with our partners in the European Community and action in the rest of the world.

In Africa, France is attempting to preserve its sphere of influence, to maintain its links with Francophone countries. From time to time, crises arise, in Chad, the Central African Republic, Kinshasa. Decisions, correct or not, require neither clairvoyance nor uncommon courage. In the Near East, French diplomacy has hardly gone beyond declarations, for lack of the means necessary to have a direct effect on events. France is absent from no part of the world but, even though the presidents of the Fifth Republic, like American presidents, act as their own foreign ministers, they delude them-

selves. Since the death of the European Community, French This is not what gives France themselves, the quality of their

I envisaged neither a ministry of the Conseil Constitutionnel, which, with its and still occasionally awakens it constantly asked myself: Did people who listened to me? Did my country, the instruction of nationalism outside France? Did I say which, in all circumstances, I

During my dozen years at the influence I might have. I brought to of industrial society, the political interpretation of Montesquieu's teaching may not have had the effect of a specialist in questionnaire careers as sociologists. But, transition between the Sorbonne exploded in 1968, a more traditional following the path from analysis to no better than I. Better for some technical training of sociologists and, in the last analysis, its fact

The question I asked myself political content of my teaching alluded to my contacts with the Saint-Cloud. A few months ago I received from a former student he did not intend to publish, a

Here we are in the twilight of a Société française de philosophie an enormous forehead and a great Raymond Aron—in an awkward prominent nose, a mouth both with cool detachment, on the uncertainty of the future of human Basch, his whole body trembling conviction: freedom was born in progress, it is a light that will never replies with cold courtesy that