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Ann Black

January 21, 1964

# CHILEAN ELECTIONS

Of all the countries of Latin America, Chile is facing the most serious possibility of a legal, nonviolent Communist take-over in the near future. On September 4, 1964, Chile will hold Presidential elections. These elections promise to have enormous national and international significance -- the Communist party, in league with other far leftists, has a very good chance of seeing its candidate elected President or of at least sharing control of the Congress.

## The Parties

There are seven political parties in Chile which, through coalitions, pose three major political forces. They are: (in order from left to right)

Socialists ) )
Communist ) Popular Action Front (FRAP) )
PADENA ) ) ) Opposition
Christian Democrats ) ) )

Radicals ) ) )
Liberals Democratic Front ) ) Government
Conservatives ) ) Coalition

The Socialist party is less monolithic and has elements both more moderate and more radical than the Communists. Presently, the main difference between the two parties is that the Communists are a member of the Third International.

A major section of PADENA, the National Democratic party, a former neo-Fascist group that drifted into FRAP in 1959, split under internal strife and left FRAP in July 1963, dealing a heavy blow to Communist hopes for winning in September. The PADENA splinter group, known as the Movement of Recuperation, leaving the front, reportedly represents about 60% of the party's voting power and is expected to join the moderately leftist Christian Democrats.

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The Christian Democrats are a Left-of-Center party, anti-Communist and pro-Alliance for Progress, so they can not ally themselves with the FRAP, whose largest unit is the Communist Party.

The Radical party, has withdrawn its four ministers from the Alessandri Cabinet. They held such important posts as Foreign Affairs and Economy. The decision of the Radicals to withdraw from the Government is believed to illustrate their fear of going before the electorate in a tight race with the label of a pro-Government party. It is thought that they want to disassociate themselves from the Government's unpopular austerity measures and its failure to check rising prices. (NYT 9/19/63)

## The Candidates and Their Platforms

The three leading candidates in the presidential race, representing the three major parties are all Senators. They are:

Salvador Allende -- FRAP

Eduardo Frei -- Christian Democratic

Julio Duran -- Democratic Front

There is another declared candidate, Jorge Prat, a nationalist of the right wing, who is running as an independent. At the moment almost no one rates him a winner, yet by drawing 10% of the votes his role could be crucial in splitting the anti-Communist strength.

1. Salvador Allende: 53 years old and a psychiatrist, has served for 25 years in the Congress and has run for the presidency twice before. The last time in 1958, he narrowly lost to the current incumbent, President Alessandri, who ran as an independent, supported by Conservatives and Liberals, The margin of defeat was less than the 30,000 votes received by a left-winger, the "Curate of Catapilco", whose campaign was, it is alleged, financed by the rightists.

Allende, despite his bourgeois background, is a convinced Marxist. Though unimposing in physical appearance, his leadership qualities become apparent in his vigorous speeches. He says that he is an intense nationalist and frequently repeats, "I am against no one, I am for Chile."

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If elected, Allende would call a plebliscite to approve
a new constitution. The present document he terms a "legal
dictatorship". He says that democracy will be strengthened by
extending the vote to those over 18, including the now
disenfranchised policy, military, illiterate and blind.

Monopolies and key enterprises would be nationalized.
Within these categories would fall the American-owned copper
companies (which control 60% of Chile's exports), a power
company, and the telephone company. Compensation would be
paid on the value of nondepreciated capital. Allende does
not anticipate bitter disputes over expropriations, as he
believes since Cuba the US can no longer impose its will. The
banks and local monopolies such as steel and paper would be
nationalized. The economy would be fully planned, and small
private businesses (both foreign and domestic) would be
encouraged only if they respond to the needs of the Development
program.

Tax, educational and agrarian reforms would accompany
the nationalization program.

Allende's government, he says, would pursue a
neutralist foreign policy, joining no bloc and having diplomatic
relations with all nations. (The Iron Curtain countries
are not now represented in Chile.) As a Marxist he leans
ideologically toward the socialist countries. As a nationalist,
he insists that Chile must develop from her own efforts. Aid
would be accepted only if it is offered unconditionally.
Allende admires Nasser's policies and the East-West financing
of the Aswan Dam. He views the *Alliance for Progress* as a
different expression for the same imperialism and says
that its emphasis on reform does not extend to foreign-
owned primary materials.

He admires the Cuban Revolution. He says that he
believes, however, that Chile will be an exception to Castro's
declaration of early 1963 that no revolution has been gained
without violence. Allende says he is proud of Chile's
democratic tradition, proud that he can walk on the street
and drive his own car without fear of violence.

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2. **Eduardo Frei**, a lawyer, agrees with much of the Socialist-Communist ideology, but he believes that an alliance with them would open the way to a Communist-style dictatorship while he and his party would be completely loyal to representative democracy.

Frei, unlike his Communist opponent, opposes nationalization, arguing that Chile lacks the resources to increase production.

He is not opposed to the Alliance for Progress in principle, but he feels that it has made little progress due to its excessive bureaucracy.

3. **Julio Duran**, 45, the candidate of the Democratic Front, believes that the time has passed when the Latin American countries were excessively jealous of their national sovereignty and highly suspicious of one another. He has said that Latin Americans demand economic integration, open markets to lower prices and complementary economies. He also favors an eventual inter-American parliament based on reciprocal respect without domination.

His program for Chile calls for an "accelerated evolution" of reforms and improvement "step by step" to aid the great masses of poor.

Although several years ago Duran and his party, the Radicals, participated in a popular front with the Communists, he now sees on the left a grave threat to Chile's traditional democracy. He feels that the only way to prevent an extreme leftist onslaught is to join with the right-wing conservatives and liberals.

At the same time he demands a speed-up in reforms to provide effective educational opportunities and land for the poor. He backed Chile's controversial land-reform law and is calling for an improved social-security system and for tax reform. Duran shares Frei's belief on the Alliance for Progress in that it is too slow and excessively bureaucratic.

Duran's campaign has not been too successful so far. His past tough attacks on leftists have created enemies and made the impression that he is pro-American. According to a Wall Street Journal report (11/29/63), "if the Duran candidacy doesn't catch fire soon, his parties may bolt elsewhere."

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## Political Situation

Ever since the 1958 presidential election when President Alessandri, running as an independent but with Democratic Front support, beat the FRAP candidate, Salvador Allende, by only 30,000 votes, it has seemed very probable that Allende could win in the 1964 elections. FRAP's popularity had been steadily increasing over the 6 years; however, the results of the municipal elections of April 1963 somewhat altered the outlook.

## Municipal Elections

These elections were considered a major test for the parties in 1964. The issues were national and international rather than municipal. The parties of the right-wing governing coalition hailed "democracy". The Christian Democrats stressed the need for a "revolution with liberty". FRAP insisted on a "people's government". President Alessandri, contrary to long standing tradition, intervened directly in the political process with a radio speech defending his regime and attacking his political enemies.

## Results:

The Christian Democrats and the Communists were the two parties that gained. The Christian Democrats increased their share of the vote from 16% to nearly 23%. Their gain was the loss of the two parties on the extreme right, the Liberals and the Conservatives. The Conservatives, the traditional party of the Roman Catholic Church, have experienced defections as the Christian Democrats have become the representatives of a more liberal Roman Catholicism. Also losing was a small non-Marxist party, PADENA, which is a member of the leftist coalition FRAP. The 1% gain by the Communists was offset by this loss.

The voting percentages tallied as follows:

<table><tr><td>Socialists</td><td>11.5%</td></tr><tr><td>Communists</td><td>12.7%</td></tr><tr><td>PADENA</td><td>5.2%</td></tr><tr><td>FRAP</td><td>29.4%</td></tr><tr><td>Christian Democrats</td><td>22.6%</td></tr><tr><td>Opposition</td><td>52.0%</td></tr><tr><td>Radicals</td><td>21.6%</td></tr><tr><td>Liberals</td><td>13.2%</td></tr><tr><td>Conservatives</td><td>11.4%</td></tr><tr><td>Government Coalition</td><td>46.2%</td></tr></table>

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The Christian Democrats won in Chile's three largest cities of Santiago, Valparaíso, and Concepción. They won in traditionally FRAP districts as well as in upper middle class areas. The Communists gained their strength in the country side. It is believed that the Christian Democrats gained an advantage from the large increase in new voters, and in particular from the greater participation of women. All parties actively courted the women's vote, but the Roman Catholic idealism of the Christian Democrats proved more attractive.

The election results were a disappointment for FRAP. Although all parties proclaimed victory by judicious use of combinations and arithmetic, the fact is that FRAP was barely able to maintain its share of the vote. The Socialists could not match the Communists' increase, and with PADENA's loss, the Communists emerged stronger than ever within the leftist coalition.

Despite FRAP's public announcement of "satisfaction", a sour-grapes attitude emerged in their official explanation that women were "more susceptible" to rightist propaganda. This brought an angry reaction from leading women spokesmen.

## Outlook for the 1964 Presidential Election

The results of the municipal elections appear to have solidified pre-election positions. The Christian Democrats have strengthened their hope of winning the presidential election alone. The 7% gain which they achieved has much significance for the country and for the party itself. Its larger meaning, according to some reports, is that the movement in Chilean politics is not towards the Communist left, but from the ruling rightist parties to a more liberal yet anti-Communist party.

However, FRAP still has great hopes of winning. It has been trying to win the Christian Democrats over to its side but has been repeatedly snubbed. FRAP is not aiming for a majority of popular votes, but simply for a plurality topping any other candidate. Therefore, since no candidate won by a 2/3 majority, Congress would choose between the top two. If it follows strong tradition, demonstrated during the last three elections, Congress would think it undemocratic and unsafe to pass over the leading vote-getter to favor the runner-up. Thus FRAP calculates its candidate could win.

The Government coalition is also courting the Christian Democrats. It seems that the Christian Democrats may hold the balance of power in the elections. If they join the three government parties in a joint ticket in the election, the FRAP chances will be destroyed. If they continue on their strategy with the separate candidate, the fight for the presidency remains an open race and the FRAP candidate still has a very good chance of winning.

It clearly puts him on record in favor of a policy line in Latin America which, while both necessary to his political future in Cuba, where he needs early successes, and congenial to his personal penchant for revolutionary violence, would appear to put him much closer to Peiping than to Moscow in what is becoming an increasingly bitter struggle. It is also not without interest that Cuba is the only Communist country tied closely to and dependent on Moscow that has not signed the nuclear test ban treaty. It is on the same side of the fence as Communist China and Albania on this issue. But we have seen how dependent Cuba is on the Soviet bloc economically. Castro's heart seems again to have shifted to Peiping, leaving his stomach in Moscow. This hardly seems a prescription for a long life.

It is interesting also that in view of the reluctance of most of the older Moscow-line Communist parties of Latin America to embark on violence, Castro has been forced to depend on assorted extremists—anarchists, Stalinists, Trotskyites, et cetera. His dogmatic imperative would appear to be violence and terror rather than any one of the Marxist ideologies.

## Meeting the Challenge of Communism

Regardless of Castro's immediate prospects with this new tactic, there remains in Latin America a combination of elements that, with or without him, promises to advance the cause of communism in the hemisphere unless checked by resolute action on the part of the forces of democracy and freedom. The social rigidities of many Latin American countries, plus widespread economic want, are, of course, most fertile areas for Communist incubation.

And Marxist teaching and Communist propaganda and infiltration, it should be remembered, did not arrive in the hemisphere with Castro. Even today Communist parties in Latin America have a life and a force of their own and are not wholly dependent on outside nourishment or guidance. A clear pattern has been established, for example, in accordance with which communism in recent years has been able to advance by making common cause with indigenous leftist, ultranationalist groups. Indeed, I often wonder which—the Latin American Commu-

nist or the destructive ultranationalist—is the more dangerous adversary to freedom and progress.

The steps we are taking in concert with our Latin American partners in the Alliance for Progress, which I shall touch on later, constitute the most effective long-term check on these subversive elements. The revolutionaries know this too, and the increased emphasis on violence reflects, first, the loss of hope of early access to power by political means resulting from the loss of popular support and sympathy at the time of the missile crisis, and second, a growing sense of the urgency of preventing the success of the alliance. Violence and terror are means to that end, whether they lead to such disorder that the private investment, on which the economic goals of the alliance so much depend, will not take place, or whether they lead to rightist coups, military or civilian, which not only stop violence but stop progress as well and thereby magnify the appeal of the Communists. We must remember that the leaders of the current terrorism in Venezuela got their training and their clear dedication to violence in fighting the Venezuelan military dictator, Pérez Jiménez.

To meet this challenge, we now have under way a number of specific programs for confronting and defeating communism in Latin America. Earlier I mentioned the United States military interdiction of Cuba, which is in part designed to thwart any attempt to export arms or men to other countries in Latin America in support of local subversion campaigns. The blocking controls limit the dollar assets which might be used to finance these campaigns. The absence of any free-world ship passenger service to Cuba and the very limited contact by air sharply reduce the means by which the regime can move agents into and out of these countries.

In the sphere of bilateral arrangements, at the request of the governments concerned the United States is supporting extensive internal security programs in most countries to increase the capability of the police and military forces to prevent and suppress Communist-inspired disorders, terrorism, sabotage, or guerrilla operations.

As part of our cooperation with the Organization of American States, the United States is working diligently to improve the capability of

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the hemisphere to counter effectively Castro
communism in Latin America. The Council
of the OAS last July approved an important
list of measures for attacking Communist sub-
version and urged their prompt implementation
by the member governments. The Central
American countries and Panama have worked
out special security arrangements for the
isthmian area, in which we are assisting.⁴

While in the aggregate these measures con-
stitute a formidable defense for the free nations
of this hemisphere, they are, I must repeat, only
a short-term defensive posture designed to give
us time to deal with the fundamental problems
which have produced the phenomenon of com-
munism in the Americas. Latin America can-
not realize its destiny by anticommunism alone.
In fact, if there were not a Communist ideology
to exploit these problems, something else would
take its place. The problems cannot be buried
or forgotten. People will find ways to make
their needs known and to get their demands met.

Objectives of Alliance for Progress

The real long-term solution, of course, lies in
the correction of these underlying problems,
and it is to this that the Alliance for Progress
is devoted.

A detailed outline of our mutual achieve-
ments so far and an appraisal of our prospects
for ultimate success would alone require a
speech or two, probably rather dull ones too. I
would like therefore just to philosophize a few
moments about what the alliance is really trying
to do and about the United States role in it.

While there are many facets to the alliance,
I group them under some five closely interre-
lated objectives:

1. Political development toward greater stability and wisdom.

2. Institutional change.

3. Social development.

4. Economic development.

5. Individual attitude change.

Many people think of the problems of the
developing world almost exclusively in terms
of economic growth. I put political develop-
ment first, because I think it comes first from

nearly every standpoint. For the individual to
be able to participate freely in a successful
political system is a good in itself. But political
maturity also is essential to sound institutional
change and to economic and social development.
Without it, private enterprise does not find the
assurances it needs to risk its capital. Without
it, resources cannot be commanded or wisely
utilized for public infrastructure. Social serv-
ices will be inefficient or lacking. The legal
framework for the life of the community will
be inappropriate, or laws will remain dead let-
ters. Our lives must be touched at every turn
by government in order for our complex modern
social system to function with a minimum of
friction and disorder. We all therefore have a
fundamental interest in the quality of govern-
ment in the developing countries which must
cope with the tensions of rapid change.

Institutional reform, a central feature of the
alliance concept, is largely a function of politi-
cal decisions and can be no better than the politi-
cal wisdom of the people and their government.
At the same time, basic reforms are essential to
political stability. Without a wider distribu-
tion of political and economic power, unrest and
tension can block the development of mature, ef-
ficient, perhaps even democratic political
institutions. And the continued lack of
opportunities for advancement on the basis of
ability, without regard to social or economic
status, will not only feed unrest but deprive the
society of urgently needed human resources.

There is something of a chicken-and-egg
problem here, and it will appear again, for
change will not wait but must take place before
conditions can exist for it to be surely sound and
wise. There will therefore inevitably be mis-
takes and injustices and disorder. And prog-
ress, as perhaps always in human history, will
be a sawtooth rather than a smooth curve—but
hopefully with an upward trend.

Closely related to institutional change is so-
cial development. Its importance derives from
the necessity for providing direct and immedi-
ate improvements in the lives of the underprivi-
leged. This is so not only for humanitarian
reasons, justified as these are in most cases. It
is also because we are in an era of rising expec-
tations in which it is not politically possible to
wait for improved economic activity to be re-

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, May 6, 1963, p. 719.

OCTOBER 14, 1963

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579

ress in equal treatment for Negroes, some hundred years after they were legally emancipated and given an equal treatment under the law.

Many kinds of changes in attitudes and values are involved. Among them is a view of the importance of precision in measurement, whether of time, or costs, or distances; a pragmatic rather than doctrinaire approach to the solution of differences and problems; an appreciation of the value of work with the hands and of scientific knowledge as compared to humanistic studies; a sense of public responsibility and public trust and through this of more respect for the contribution of good government to the public welfare; more team spirit and less individualism; an understanding of the importance of social and economic opportunity and mobility guided by performance rather than status.

Thousands of Latin Americans understand these matters and have made these changes, but it must become millions.

## The U.S. and the People of Latin America

So much for a general outline of the areas in which unprecedented progress must be made in the decade of the sixties if the Alliance for Progress is to succeed, or, even more important, if the minimum of essential improvements in the conditions and opportunities of life for the vast majority of the people of Latin America are to be made. That they must be made is beyond question. Latin Americans no longer are willing to accept a 20th-century standard of living that is one-tenth that of the average in the United States and one-half that of Western Europe. President Kennedy recognized this when he said, "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable."

What must we in the United States do as partners in this unprecedented effort, bearing in mind that we are the junior partners and that the vast bulk of the decisions and sacrifices and work falls on the Latin Americans themselves? Our problems are largely ones of attitudes too. The first requirement of us is that we be tolerant and patient of the turmoil, the disappointments, the disorder, the bitter criticisms of the alliance from both right and left extremes, that are as

⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 2, 1962, p. 539.

certain as history to accompany a period of change of the kind in store for Latin America.

Secondly, United States policy in Latin America puts primary emphasis on assisting the countries and peoples of the area to realize their aspirations for a richer and fuller life, for a greater participation by all citizens in the cultural, material, and spiritual benefits which the 20th century has to offer.

We want the peoples of each of the 22 countries of the area, including Cuba, to be free to choose the political and economic and social system which they think will best fulfill their aspirations and to be able periodically to review and revise that choice and elect those leaders who can help them reach their goals.

We believe there is no better way for a politically mature people to assure that their government is responsive to their needs. We also believe that no government which is not so chosen by its citizens can command the support and sacrifices necessary to enable a society to put its full energies into the task of breaking both the old habit patterns and the physical limits of the past.

We are therefore convinced that the drive to develop can only have real vitality if the end and means are of a people's own choosing as the best for them. We cannot look for carbon copies of the United States to succeed or even for all the Latin American countries to follow similar paths. Our resources, our histories, our individual wants and capacities are all different, and so must be our futures if they are to have depth and meaning and enrich the lives of those to come.

Rightfully proud as we are of the success of our way of doing things, we must therefore accept the fact that they will and often should do things differently. We must try to help them out of our own experience to reach their objectives, and by their own routes. Our role calls for an attitude of tolerance toward differences that will not be an easy one for a country as proud of its great achievements as we are to maintain.

A third attitude we will need to cultivate is that of patience. It is important for us to keep aware of our history, past and current, to realize how long it has taken us to solve some of the problems with which the Latin Americans are

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581

# The Gettysburg Address and Our Commitment to Freedom

## *Remarks by Secretary Rusk*¹

p3

One hundred years ago there came to this community a most remarkable man whose memory is revered by all of us who are the heirs of those who fought here—both in blue and in gray. He spoke here about ancient verities, not as a sophisticated philosopher but as a man who felt deeply about the hopes which lie in the heart of man. It was a speech of only 10 sentences, around 270 words. It disappointed many who heard it, and the man who gave it thought it was a failure. But it has become the most widely read speech ever made by an American and perhaps by anyone in the English tongue. It has been translated into every written language and is cherished around the world.

In accepting the Latin version for deposit in the Vatican Library in 1959, the Apostolic Delegate to the United States, His Excellency Egidio Vagnozzi, called the Gettysburg Address not

only "a great American document" but also "a great Christian document"—"one of the greatest documents ever issued by man."

What is there about those words which makes them memorable? In the original tongue they have beauty and cadence—"the vibrations of deathless music." They express tender sentiments. But these qualities are inadequate to account for their indelible imprint. What makes the Gettysburg Address great and enduring is the simple eloquence with which it restates the ideas to which this nation is dedicated: "Liberty . . . the proposition that all men are created equal . . . government of the people, by the people, for the people."

### What Lincoln Believed

Lincoln believed, with the authors of the Declaration of Independence, that the large principles it set forth were universal truths. As he saw the meaning of the American Revolution, "It was not the mere matter of separation of the colonies from the motherland—but some-

¹ Made at ceremonies commemorating the 100th anniversary of President Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, at Gettysburg, Pa., on Nov. 17 (press release 585 dated Nov. 16).

### DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1275 PUBLICATION 7627 DECEMBER 2, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic $8.50, foreign $12.25; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

842

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

thing in that Declaration giving liberty, not
alone to the people of this country, but hope to
the world for all future time."

Lincoln believed, with the authors of our
Constitution, that they were founding a "new
order of the ages."

He believed, with Washington, that "the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered, perhaps, as *deeply*, as *finally*, staked on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American people."

He believed that this experiment was the "last
best hope of earth."

He believed that the central issue in the
struggle in which this nation was engaged a
century ago was whether this or any nation
"conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the
proposition that all men are created equal"
could "long endure." And let us not forget
that his reaffirmation of the American commit-
ment to the "proposition that all men are
created equal" had been preceded by the Eman-
cipation Proclamation.

The advocates of democracy in many other
lands saw the central issue as Lincoln saw it.
From England, John Bright wrote: "... there
is no other political constitution now in exist-
ence, in the preservation of which the human
race is so deeply interested." From France,
liberal republicans spoke out—Edouard Labou-
laye said: "... the cause of America is the
cause of liberty" and "... should liberty be-
come eclipsed in the new World, it would be-
come night in Europe." From Italy, Garibaldi
and his friends hailed Lincoln as the "pilot of
liberty." Carl Schurz and other German demo-
crats, many of whom had come to this country
after the failure of their own revolution of
1848, saw the struggle in the same light.

After Lincoln's death a noted French liberal, Lucien Anatole Prevost-Paradol, wrote: "... he has not lived for his country alone, since he leaves to everyone in the world to whom liberty and justice are dear, a great remembrance and a pure example."

As our own Booker T. Washington put it:
"By the same token that Lincoln made America
free, he pushed back the boundaries of freedom
everywhere, gave the spirit of liberty a wider

influence throughout the world, and reestab-
lished the dignity of man as man."

Worldwide Symbol of Freedom and Democracy

Over the years, admiration for Lincoln has
spread over the earth. Sun Yat-sen, the father
of the Chinese liberal revolution, drew his three
principles of government from the Gettysburg
Address. The Lincoln Memorial is a mecca for
millions of visitors to Washington every year,
including tens of thousands from abroad.
Prime Minister Nehru has kept on a study table
a brass mold of Lincoln's right hand. A few
years ago high school students in Tokyo ranked
him as one of the most respected of all world
figures. And Tolstoi said that "of all the great
national statesmen of history, Lincoln is the
only giant" and predicted that his name would
live thousands of years.

Thus Lincoln is a worldwide symbol of free-
dom and democracy. And the Gettysburg
Address is the utterance through which his
dedication—and ours as a people—to freedom
and democracy is most widely known. Indeed,
the central commitments of the American ex-
periment are probably known to more people
in other lands through the words of the Gettys-
burg Address than through those of the Declara-
tion of Independence.

People all around the world not only know of
these central commitments but share them.
Liberty, equality, the dignity of the individual,
"government of the people, by the people, for
the people"—these are aspirations rising out
of the nature of man.

Freedom and Foreign Policy

Since the Second World War nearly 50 new
nations have emerged. Nearly all are republics
or democracies, at least in name. Unhappily,
some are in reality dictatorships. In some, the
early national governments have tolerated no
opposition. In others, democratic governments
collapsed or were overthrown. But the yearn-
ings for genuine political freedom have not been
eradicated. They are manifest in every nation,
including those behind the Iron and Bamboo
Curtains.

Our commitments to freedom are the source

DECEMBER 2, 1963

843

of our foreign policy. They explain our attitude toward colonial questions, our concern about the future of Eastern Europe, and why we are more comfortable in dealing with democracies than with dictatorships. They explain also our concern about our failures here at home to live up fully to our own great commitments.

The independence we won for ourselves we have favored for others. We have welcomed the rise of the former colonial peoples to "the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them." We want to see these new nations make solid progress—economically, socially, and politically.

Within the free world, old empires have been largely replaced by new partnerships between the less developed and the advanced countries—partnerships based on political equality.

But new empires have appeared, clothing their lust for domination with ideology which plunders the noble concepts of freedom to subvert freedom itself. There are large and dangerous questions which call for final solution, and there is no more enduring basis for settlement than the simple notion of self-determination: Let the people themselves decide.

For almost two centuries we have been opposed to dictatorship. We remain so today—and will be opposed tomorrow. We recognize that there are many possible forms of democratic institutions. But we believe deeply in political democracy, individual dignity, and the rule of law. We do not like it when democratic institutions are suppressed. We believe that the setbacks which democracy has suffered in many of the new nations, and a few old ones, will be temporary. For we know that ordinary men and women throughout the world respond to Lincoln's phrase "government of the people, by the people, for the people."

Likewise, we will not be at ease until every one of our own citizens enjoys in full the rights pledged by the Declaration of Independence and our Constitution. The National Government is heavily committed to insuring these rights for all.

The rest of the world is watching closely the struggle for full equality in this country. Our failures distress our friends and hearten our enemies. But this is not the main reason why we must complete this task. We must complete it as a duty to ourselves. It is past time to complete the task which Lincoln began with the Emancipation Proclamation.

We are a powerful nation, with almost incomprehensible power. Our farms and factories are ever more bountiful. We enjoy levels of well-being almost beyond the dreams of men a generation or two ago. But our greatest strength lies in the ideas about freedom and human dignity which gave birth to our nation and to which Lincoln renewed our dedication in the Gettysburg Address. These ideas, these aspirations, are shared today by a great majority of mankind. They bind us with others throughout the world. They are the mightiest force in the world today. They are the enduring memorial to the apostles of liberty for all men, of whom none has been greater than Abraham Lincoln.

## Letters of Credence

### Czechoslovakia

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Karel Duda, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on November 13. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 581 dated November 13.

### Uruguay

The newly appointed Ambassador of Uruguay, Juan Felipe Yriart, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on November 12. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 576 dated November 12.

844

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

These are some of the major actions taken in Sao Paulo. The results
could not have been achieved without a strong sense of realism and determination
on the part of most delegations.

Much has been written from and since Sao Paulo about criticism of
the Alliance on the part of some speakers and delegations. Little, and I am
afraid too little has been written about the substantial accomplishments which I
reported to you tonight.

In a similar vein, we have read for many weeks about the violent
attempts of Castroite terrorists to prevent the Venezuelan elections, but less
about the sustained, difficult and successful struggle of the democratic government
of Venezuela and its armed forces to foil the terrorist onslaught. Here is a
triumph of democracy achieved by a people that braved threats and bullets to vote.
It is also a triumph for the principles underlying our Alliance for Progress.

Turning to economic issues, there is generally blow-by-blow reporting
of disputes between American companies and Latin American governments, but
are you aware of the agreement we signed with Chile less than a week ago under
which virtually all new American investment in Chile can be guaranteed against
a wide range of political and commercial risks?

It is unfortunate that conflict makes news, while progress is taken for
granted as the normal and appointed way of the world. These criteria reflect a
confident and optimistic view of history, and perhaps this is all to the good. But
now and then one wishes that people found some thrill and excitement in progress!

III

I do not wish to hide the serious obstacles the Alliance for Progress
faces in its quest to revitalize the economies and societies of nineteen Latin
American nations -- each different from the other, each facing a different set
of problems.

In some Latin American countries, strong political leadership has
created favorable conditions for action, but inadequacies in project preparation
and shortages of skilled personnel hobble progress. In other cases, the resources
for performance are available in greater measure, but political indecision or
opposition inhibits action.

(more)

On the extreme right in several countries, we encounter criticism
couched in reasonable terms but motivated by deep-seated resistance to reform.
On the other side of the spectrum, the Communists and their allies are laboring
day and night to wreck the chances of the peaceful revolution sought by the
Alliance so as to increase their opportunities for a takeover by violent revolution.

Here in this country, much remains to be done, to gear our diplomacy
to the changing requirements of economic and social development, and our economic
relationships and investment patterns must be adjusted to the new political realities
in the region. What was good and valid in a placid past is not necessarily right
and effective in the turbulent present, dominated by a rising sense of self-assertion
and nationalism.

But despite the problems, the Alliance has moved ahead. And it could
not have achieved what it has accomplished in two years were it not for a great
deal of dedicated effort on the part of many people throughout the hemisphere.
Millions of Latin Americans have been affected by the Alliance in one way or
another -- be it that they own a home of their own, that they till their own land,
that they have clean water to drink, a hospital or school to go to, or that they have
a job in which they earn a decent living.

A beginning has been made. Now the need is to speed up the process
we have set in motion. This means more rapid accomplishment of the difficult
tasks to which our sister republics have committed themselves -- the basic reforms
they have pledged to carry out and the domestic resources they must generate for
their development. Under the Alliance compact, it also means that we must
continue to come through with timely and effective support.

It is in this connection that your senior Senator has rendered such
outstanding service to the Alliance for Progress. We have suffered a sharp cut
in our authorization for the Fiscal Year 1964, and we still have the appropriations
stage ahead of us. Had it not been for Senator Humphrey, the cuts might have
been so drastic as to endanger the very future of the program.

The Administration's request for the Alliance -- before any cuts were
made -- amount to less than one per cent of our total budget -- less than one per
cent to assist 200 million people whose security is vital to our own. Most of the
money will be spent right here in this country, for equipment and commodities to
be used in the development of our sister republics. Eighty five per cent of the
Administration request is in the form of long-term repayable loans, and only
fifteen per cent in outright grants.

(more)

[LC]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

FEBRUARY 15, 1963

NO. 86

FOR RELEASE AT 6:30 P.M., E.S.T., FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1963. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY.

EXCERPTS FROM ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE CHESTER BOWLES, PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND ADVISOR ON AFRICAN, ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS, AT THE INTERCOLLEGIATE CONFERENCE ON DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA, SWARTHMORE COLLEGE, SWARTHMORE, PENNSYLVANIA, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1963, 7:30 P.M., E.S.T.

## Democracy and Development in Latin America

As the Alliance for Progress begins to achieve the objectives laid down in the resolutions of Punte del Este, Americans should understand that we may well be confronted with a new pride, a new confidence, and a new sharpening of nationalism.

If we are to avoid being thrown off balance by such developments, we should clearly understand what the Alliance is designed to do and equally important what we cannot expect it to do.

If we expect the Alliance for Progress to win for us the gratitude of Latin American governments or to enable us to buy their votes in the U.N., we are headed for some shattering disappointments. By now experience should have taught us that any government whose "loyalty" can be bought through economic grants is not worth the price. Genuine loyalty and friendship are not for sale; they can only grow naturally out of common experience and common aspirations.

What we want in Latin America and elsewhere are nations with rising living standards and more stable political systems, nations genuinely concerned with social and economic justice and determined to maintain their national integrity against aggression or subversion from any source.

In other words, our efforts are designed to help create nations South of the Rio Grande in which the people are free to choose their own institutions and to make their own choices within the framework of their own cultures, religions and history.

This is the task of America's diplomacy and aid programs in all parts of the world, for only through the creation of such societies can our own peace and freedom be assured over the long haul. An understanding and acceptance of these facts is absolutely basic to a successful American foreign policy in today's world.

Therefore let us not be surprised in the next few years if the developing nations of Latin America take the opportunity, on occasion, to demonstrate their thoroughgoing independence of those who have assisted them. If this occurs, let us keep our perspective; for a strong show of national independence reflects the very sense of confidence and of democratic purpose that we are striving to create.

More than that, such national assertiveness is often the first essential step in the building of a solid foundation for growing interdependence: the partnership of free nations that can lead to an increasing willingness to work together toward common objectives of world peace and decency.

Against

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PR 86

Against this background, let us consider the practical problems of
helping the nations of Latin America achieve this new sense of progress
and purpose.

A politico-economic analysis of the essence of the problem in Latin America is deceptively simple to state; it is much, much harder to solve.

In many of the 19 Latin American nations which are participating in
the Alliance, three massive barriers now stand in the way:

1. The aching poverty of two-thirds of the people.

2. Apathy among many of the underprivileged, and a sense of hopelessness among some of their national leaders over the very magnitude of the challenge.

3. The assumption among many privileged groups that by one means or another they can defy the political and economic forces of our era and maintain the 19th Century *status quo*.

These three barriers to a future of dignity, peace, and plenty which we wish to secure for ourselves must first be recognized and then overcome.

This means that we North Americans and Latin Americans alike who are striving to assure the success of the Alliance for Progress must learn to utilize the natural riches of the earth for the benefit of all of the people; we must stop wasting the potential talents of men and women who are now sick and untaught; and we must free the human spirit now stifled by social and political systems which grossly distort the distribution of wealth, opportunity and power.

As we move to meet this challenge, we will do well to examine some of the myths and assumptions that have limited our success in the past. For instance, it is time to abandon the narrow assumption that economic growth by *itself* will assure a happy, creative, democratic society.

As we consider and compare the characteristics of individual Latin American countries, we see dramatic evidence that increased economic production will not automatically assure orderly political growth.

Some of the most productive countries of Latin America already have per capita incomes greater than several European countries. Yet the record shows that these nations may be as politically explosive as the poorest African or Asian countries whose per capita income may be no greater than $100 a year.

The record is clear: unless basic social and political reforms go hand in hand with economic growth, increased output may simply widen the gap between rich and poor, increase social tensions, and create the ingredients for a political explosion.

At this point, let me digress for a moment to stress that the reforms to which I refer are fundamental to the creation of an economy based primarily on private enterprise in which the businessman or investor is free to make, and continue to make, a fair profit.

By now enlightened businessmen in Latin America as elsewhere should know that they cannot depend on the extreme political Right, whose primary

interest

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PR 86

interest is in maintaining a privileged position in an unchanging
oligarchy, to create the necessary stable political environment, except
for brief uneasy periods under military rule. Since such governments
deny the natural rights and dignity of the majority of the people, they
are sitting ducks for the Castro-Communists who are committed to the
confiscation of <u>all</u> private property.

This means that by and large the only groups who can be counted
upon to develop and maintain opportunities for economic investment under
private enterprise are the parties of the center-left which are committed
to the kind of far-reaching but responsible reforms which have consistent-
ly brought new dynamism to our own American society.

A realistic understanding of these hard political facts is also
increasingly evident among American investors abroad who have learned
the hard way that the reactionary Right in Latin America, as in Asia and
Africa, is a weak reed on which to lean. Indeed, it may be expected to
act like a lightning rod that brings disruptive political forces into
focus and sooner or later creates a political explosion that wipes out
their interests without so much as "thank you."

Let me underscore this essential point:

The only real basis for political stability in these awakening
continents is a liberal center, determined to push through the essential
economic and social reforms, but keenly aware of the limitations of
government in creating and maintaining a viable economy.

In most Latin American countries the reforms necessary to produce
this political stability are dangerously overdue. Here are nations with
vast, untapped natural resources which have been free from colonial rule
for more than a century. Yet because the essential economic and social
revolution in many cases has not yet taken place, great wealth often
exists explosively side by side with the most abject poverty.

One and one-half percent of the people of Latin America, those with
15,000 or more acres each, are said to own half of all agricultural land.
Only a handful of countries have an effective, progressive income tax.

The vast majority of the people live in rural areas where the frame-
work of their lives is largely shaped by weather, soil, land ownership,
disease, and illiteracy, in a constant struggle against the exploitation
of landlords and money-lenders.

As the sons of peasant families crowd into the great cities in
search of jobs that will pay them their first cash wage, slum housing
becomes steadily more crowded.

Inevitably they join forces with young, idealistic university
students, themselves frustrated by the injustice which they see on all
sides, who parade and protest for change -- <u>any change</u> -- from the sterile
and hatred status quo.

In the meantime, with relatively few exceptions, the harried govern-
ments which they challenge lack the financial experience, the civil
service organization, and the political strength quickly to break the
chains of backwardness and prejudice that bind their people.

In much

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PR 86

[re]

In much of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, this political, economic and social pattern is well and widely established. It will not be easy to change. Yet if a rational world in which all men can enjoy a greater measure of opportunity and dignity is to be built, change must come and we should support it.

Our difficulties will be compounded unless we approach the problems of national development in realistic terms. Industrialization deserves a high priority. Yet in most Latin American countries political stability and increasing national purchasing power are dependent in large measure on what happens on the farms and in the villages.

Just as we find farm prosperity is essential to the health of our own economy, so it is in Latin America. As long as rural people lack the purchasing power to buy the goods which the new urban factories are producing, the economy will remain stifled and stagnant. Until they are brought into the main stream of national life as active participants in the process of nationbuilding, they will remain an explosive source of political instability.

As we have seen in most rural areas of Latin America the majority of people are now working as tenant farmers or landless laborers, with inadequate markets, schools, and clinics and few basic human rights.

The appalling slums which characterize so many of the large cities of Latin America are a reflection of this lack of rural opportunity. Men and women unable to make a decent living on their farms move to the cities in search of jobs; because inadequate urban housing and social services are lacking, the result may be even greater frustration, bitterness and political divisiveness.

Experience on three continents suggests that the following six points are basic to the development of dynamic, progressive, democratic societies in Latin America.

1. A national plan that takes account of national resources and establishes national priorities and objectives.

2. The determination that economic growth will be widely shared and that there shall be increasing opportunities for all citizens.

3. The courage to tax all citizens in relation to their ability to pay, to challenge old patterns of privilege, and to assure an increasing measure of social justice.

4. A realization that agricultural production is the foundation of every economy, and that every rural family should be made to feel an integral part of the process of national growth.

5. A pragmatic approach to economic investment that combines strong incentives for private investment and a recognition of the importance of individual initiative with an acceptance of governmental responsibility for national planning, priorities, and support for the private sector.

6. A sense of national morale and purpose that gives to all elements of society, public and private, that essential feeling of personal participation in the great adventure of human progress.

By and