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to reverse a new President's recommendation on a matter of such magnitude would magnify these dangers and jeopardize the entire design of our foreign policy.

The long-term relationship with Saudi Arabia and the methods by which our two friendly countries can best support each other's real interest is among the most vital issues facing American foreign policy. It deserves serious analysis within our country and between the United States and the Kingdom. But a negative decision on AWACS would embitter such discussions before they have fairly started.

Saudi Arabia is a key element in the design of a moderate Mideast policy. It does not deserve a rebuff. However, it would be in our interest to do so, force Saudi Arabia & any comparable equipment from other countries, and supply it with oil. It would be unwise to let us meet with any Arab country, but we cannot be sure if any will be in our interest to do so.

Finally it would be a tragedy if Israeli opposition to the sale and our effort to overcome it soured the possibility of the long overdue strategic dialogue between Israel and the United States. The current uproar should tell us that

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problems swept under the rug today are the crises of tomorrow. The AWACS did not go away by being in effect ignored for months. A similar lack of consensus can be detected on crucial peace negotiations just before us; and the impasse will be even more intractable and the passions even deeper if we do not face it in time. The much touted strategic cooperation requires less the prepositioning of equipment than the coordination of purposes. And that will be endangered to everybody's immense peril if an end is not rapidly put to the bitterness of the present debate.

To sum up: The Administration acted prudently in fulfilling the commitments of its predecessors on the AWACS sale. The damage of a negative vote to our position in the Middle East to a moderate evolution of the area and to a constructive peace process would be grave, perhaps irretreivable. The Congress must not undermine the

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President's authority in international affairs by a rejection
of the sale; the consequences would haunt us for many
years in many fields, we cannot afford this--especially
after a decade and a half of domestic division.

There are many who speak of a compromise. In the
abstract it is a tempting prospect especially if all
parties agree to it. At this remove two cveats are in
order. If the sale is worth doing we should get the
maximum benefit from it. We must not encumber it with
makeshift pseudo-solutions that ease a domestic problem
without changing the strategic realities. A sale of the
AWACS hedged by meaningless conditions sufficient to
embarrass and perhaps humiliate those whose security and
stability we are seeking to enhance by the sale. In
particular I have serious doubts about the permanent
stationing of Americans on these planes (other than trainees
for a minimum period of time). This could involve us in