JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

STROM THURMOND, SOUTH CAROLINA

CHAIRMAN EMERITUS

JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE

JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA

RICK SANTORUM, PENNSYLVANIA

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, MAINE

PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS

WAYNE ALLARD, COLORADO

TIM HUTCHINSON, ARKANSAS

JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA

CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS

JEFF BINGAMAN, NEW MEXICO

ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA

JOSEPH L. LIEBERMAN, CONNECTICUT

MAX CLELAND, GEORGIA

MARY L. LANDRIEU, LOUISIANA

JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND

LES BROWNLEE, STAFF DIRECTOR

DAVID S. LYLES, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

MEMORANDUM

TO : Dr. Henry Kissinger

FROM: Kristin Dowley, Staff Assistant

DATE: January 5, 2000

RE : Galley Proofs Editing

Enclosed for your review/edit are the galley proofs from the
hearing listed below. Please make any corrections in red pencil
or red ink. This will be your last opportunity for review prior
to our final print.

Please return the edited galley proofs to the Committee to
my attention no later than five working days from receipt of this
information. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate
to call me.

Thank you.

Hearing Date/Time: April 22, 1999 10:00 a.m.
Transcript #: 99-52
Committee/Subcommittee: Full Committee
Classification: Open
Hearing Title: To receive testimony on worldwide threats to U.S. national security interests.
Witnesses: Dr. Henry Kissinger

Contact : Kristin Dowley
Telephone #: 202-224-7770
Room # : SR-228

WORLDWIDE THREATS TO U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY INTERESTS

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 1999

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in room
SD-106, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Warner [presiding],
Inhofe, Snowe, Robb, Lieberman, and Cleland.

Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; and Todd L. Payne, special assistant.

Professional staff members present: Charles S. Abell and Paul M. Longsworth.

Minority staff member present: David S. Lyles, minority staff director.

Staff assistants present: Stuart H. Cain, Keaveny A. Donovan, and Sharen E. Reaves.

Committee members' assistants present: John H. Miller, assistant to Senator Thurmond; Walter E. (Skip) Fischer, assistant to Senator McCain; Gregory McCarthy, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Patrick McCartan, assistant to Senator Snowe; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; Michael Ralsky, assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway, assistant to Senator Sessions; William G. Owens, assistant to Senator Robb; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Cleland; and Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman WARNER. The committee will come to order.

Dr. Kissinger, we welcome you, and I know that on short notice you had to make a number of arrangements with your personal schedule coming all the way from California to join us this morning. We have a number of colleagues elsewhere, but I am hopeful that during the course of this testimony that you will have the opportunity to speak to a larger circle of our Senators.

We thank you again for the efforts you have made to come before the committee today and share the views on the worldwide threats to the U.S. national security interests. Your wisdom and your insights are sorely needed as we struggle to find solutions to many tough military problems, most notably the situation we are facing in Kosovo.

(1)

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We have heard a great deal from the administration on Kosovo. Last Thursday, this committee spent 4 hours in a hearing with Secretary Cohen and General Shelton on this and related issues. I believe it is time to hear other opinions and to tap the best minds in this country, indeed throughout the world if necessary, in search for information and hopefully answers regarding this complex crisis.

As the air war against Milosevic's military machine enters its fifth week, we must assess the effectiveness of that campaign in achieving both the military and political objectives which NATO and the administration have established, and we must look to the future to determine our options if the air campaign is not ultimately successful in stopping Milosevic's tragic infliction of a rampage in Kosovo. Hopefully, allowing at some future date the refugees to return, the installation of an international military force, and the resumption of some degree of autonomy and self-government.

I note with great interest this morning this Senator—I have spoken out consistently on the need for NATO at least to start the planning for a ground option. The ground option is one that should never have been taken off the table. Now the Secretary General has announced this morning that those plans will begin in the NATO arena.

There are many questions that must be answered: What are the military and political ramifications of pursuing a ground campaign against Yugoslavia? How will the Russians react? Assuming NATO's military action is successful, what type of political structure should be established for Kosovo? How do we deal with Milosevic, a man who is now subject to world condemnation for his actions? Can we at any time, either directly or indirectly, resume some form of negotiations with Milosevic? Or should there be a goal of this action to remove him from power one way or another? What are the lessons learned thus far in this operation that should be applied to future NATO military missions?

We look to you, Dr. Kissinger. You draw on a wealth of experience and we are fortunate to have you today.

Much of our discussion will relate to Kosovo, but we must not lose sight of other areas of the world in which the United States has vital security interests and where our troops are now positioned and where we are seeing drawdowns of a degree of our military capability to provide for the ever-increasing needs in the Balkan campaign.

We must not lose sight of the fact that the United States has these interests worldwide and to assess the likelihood of another troublemaker seeing an incentive and an opportunity to come forward.

So, doctor, we welcome you. I look to my colleague to make such statements as he wishes.

## STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHARLES S. ROBB

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First I would request that whatever statement the ranking member, Senator Levin, might wish to submit for the record—

Chairman WARNER. He is at a leadership meeting right now.

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Senator ROBB.—be included. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

WHERE IS COMMITTEE INSERT?

Senator ROBB. I join you in welcoming Dr. Kissinger this morn-
ing. We have benefited from his analysis over many, many years,
and I appreciate the fact that he is never reluctant to continue to
be out front in helping the international campaign and those of us
who have current policymaking responsibilities to benefit from the
wisdom and insight of someone who has provided so much leader-
ship to this Nation in the past.

So I join you in welcoming him and I look forward to his testimony.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you.

Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, I have no opening statement. I
have a great deal of respect for Dr. Kissinger. In fact, I have met
with him on previous occasions concerning this.

I agree with everything. I have been using your quotes in the
past and I am anxious to hear if you have changed your position
and why. I hope that during the presentation you will stress what
our involvement, if it should become that, an accelerated involve-
ment in Kosovo, what effect that is going to have on the Pacific and
the Persian Gulf, where we already have limited assets and we
have already heard testimony before this committee as to how our
limited assets are being drained in those areas, where I feel we do
have vital security interests. So I look forward to your testimony.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Cleland.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MAX CLELAND

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it is an honor to be with you again. The last time
we met in this forum was on the subject of NATO and basically its
role in the post-Cold War world, and the issue before us was the
accession of three new members of NATO—Hungary, the Czech Re-
public, and Poland. I found our discussion illuminating and your
views insightful, and I look forward to our further discussion this
morning and we deeply appreciate you being here.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.

Dr. Kissinger, as we plan for today you have just a few remarks
to open up and then we will go directly to a colloquy on a wide
range of subjects.

STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER
SECRETARY OF STATE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen of the committee, it's
always a privilege for me to appear before this group which has
such major responsibility for national security of the United States,
and for whose members I have such great respect. In fact, it's my
great admiration and affection for the Chairman that permit me to
come here, interrupting a series of board meetings. Therefore, I

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want to apologize that I do not have a formal statement and will speak to you extemporaneously. What I suggest, if the Chairman agrees with it, is that I begin with Kosovo, answer your questions, and then, if you want to go on to other subjects, I will give my comments on those.

Let me begin with Kosovo. Let me deal with it in three parts: the prelude to the military operations, the military operations, and the possible exit from the military operations.

As some of you may know, I was extremely uneasy about the diplomacy preceding the military operations. I had very serious questions about the statement of objectives and the manner of achieving them, and I will only sum it up because that is not now the issue. It may have to be reviewed at some later time.

We faced in Kosovo a leader who had demonstrated his propensity for ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and whose commitment to Kosovo would seem to be much greater than it was to Bosnia which was, after all, never part of Serbia. But Kosovo is considered by Serb nationalists the place of their national origin and an integral part of Serbian history. So to detach Kosovo from Serbia is a more complex task than even Bosnia, and that was tough enough.

Second, there was the KLA, the regular army, which many people considered led by Marxists, passionately committed to independence for Kosovo. There was a cease-fire that had been negotiated by Holbrooke, which I thought was basically heading in the right direction, but which was broken by both sides more frequently by the KLA, more brutally by the Serbs.

It was into this hornet's nest that we landed with the intent of finding a comprehensive solution. Now, comprehensive solutions to 400-year-old conflicts are not easy to come by. Sometimes it is better to push the problem ahead of you without intending to solve it in one major effort.

Second, the means that was chosen, the so-called Rambouillet Agreement, which was really presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis without negotiation by either side, was undoubtedly a very clever document for an academic exercise. But given the passions that I've just described, it was not likely to be acceptable to either side, and indeed, it was not accepted by either side.

Had, by some miracle, it been accepted, we would have found ourselves projected into a conflict with both sides, because I do not believe the KLA would ever have disarmed to the NATO forces as they were supposed to; and I never understood how the Serbian forces would remain and how the NATO forces and the KLA were going to interact in that situation.

Finally, autonomy for Kosovo and independence for Kosovo must open up the question of Macedonia. These were all issues that were very difficult to resolve, and frankly, I did not believe could be resolved by an ultimatum. Attempt to resolve them by an ultimatum was likely to produce a conflict of great passion on both sides.

I was also uneasy about the NATO decision to demand the right to occupy a country with which it was not at war. It is unprecedented in NATO history to make such a decision, and it involved us in a diplomacy being managed by 19 nations, and a strategy being managed by 19 nations. Those were my concerns, and I wrote about them. The Republican senators here will remember that I

5

spoke to all of the senators about them, at their request. But even
then, I was faced with the dilemma that I'm now turning to.

At that meeting I expressed, in greater detail than I have here,
my great concerns about the direction of the Rambouillet process.
But when I was asked "How do we vote?" I found myself faced with
the difficulty the president has when he asks for the right to use
military force and has already convinced NATO to do so in that I
could not bring myself to urge the senators to vote even though my
analysis of the diplomacy made me uneasy. This is, again, where
we are today.

It is clear that there were two basic misjudgments made when
this war started. On the American side, a great underestimation of
Milosevic's reaction and his determination. On Milosevic's side, per-
haps based on our conduct in Iraq and the conduct of military oper-
ations in the Gulf recently, a gross underestimation of how far the
United States was willing to go. Ironically, both sides might have
thought all they had to do was stand 3 days of bombing. We may
have thought he'd yield after 3 days, and he may have thought
we'd quit after 3 days, which had been the pattern in the Gulf.

So now we find ourselves in a situation where 19 NATO nations
have committed themselves to a great course. Nine hundred air-
planes are involved without significant opposition, and a number of
countries have overcome great hesitations to join us for the sake
of NATO. So now I am in the position that, no matter what I
thought in March and however differently I would have rec-
ommended conducting the diplomacy, I think the National interest
requires that we prevail.

I came to Washington 30 years ago when the administration in
which I served had inherited a war in Indochina. We tried to extri-
cate ourselves honorably under the most violent opposition domes-
tically that rent the soul of our country. I don't want another presi-
dent ever to have to go through this experience again.

Therefore, I believe now one has to close ranks behind the ad-
ministration and, if anything, teach it to go in the direction that
is needed to prevail. There is no exit now from this war except suc-
cess, and success has been defined as follows and I share that view:

The Serb forces must be withdrawn from Kosovo. Refugees must
have a right to return. Some kind of international presence must
be established to supervise these procedures. Any other outcome
would be a defeat for NATO, and there is no spin that we can put
on it; there is no clever way we can defend it that will take away
this reality. Now, there is the issue of ground forces. I have, inci-
dentally, made this sort of statement in writing from the first day
of the war even though I had great doubts about going into the
war.

On the issue of ground forces, my view is as follows: I have no
way of judging what will ultimately be necessary. That is a mili-
tary decision. But, first, it is a mistake to preclude any category of
forces and to turn the conflict into an endurance contest.

Second, even if one believes that air power will ultimately suc-
ceed, which it well may, we nevertheless should make clear not
only that we are planning to use ground forces but we should as-
semble the ground forces that will be needed. This will put a safety
net under the bombing campaign because, under present cir-

6

cumstances, it is a question of endurance. Thus, Milosevic and the
Serbian leadership believe that they can simply outlast us.

If they know that at the end—not even at the end but at some
stage in this process—that we will insist on using ground forces,
I think it will shorten the air campaign. Therefore, I do not like
this process in which we now examine, then have 19 members dis-
cuss it, then shuffle plans back and forth. All of this can take place
while forces are moved to the place in which they're supposed to
be used, and therefore, I favor this resolution as a way to bring this
war to the most rapid conclusion.

Senator WARNER. If I may interrupt, you're referring, then, to a
joint resolution that was presented by Mr. McCain, Mr. Biden, Mr.
Hagel, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Luger, Mr.
Robb and Mr. Kerry?

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct.

Senator WARNER. Which provides that the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America, Congress assem-
bled that the President is authorized to use all necessary force and
other means in concert with United States allies to accomplish
United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's objec-
tive in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro)?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes. That is what I support. I might add also that
the impact on rogue states and threatened areas I'd say the Gulf,
Iraq, North Korea of the failure to achieve our objective under con-
ditions of total air supremacy could be disastrous. So, for all of
these reasons, I think we have no way out, and I believe, in fact,
that the hesitant way in which we conducted operations in the Gulf
has contributed to the misapprehension on the part of Milosevic
that he could endure this bombing campaign.

I'm also concerned about something in which I'm not technically
competent, but for years now we have heard about this capacity to
conduct two limited wars simultaneously. That has been described
for decades as the basis of our strategy. It is clear that our present
military establishment cannot do this and that we have to pull
forces from Iraq, from the Gulf and that we have to call up Re-
serves in a war in which we're suffering no casualties and prac-
tically no loss of equipment.

I think this requires another look—not so much at the strategy,
because the strategy is correct—but we don't want to be in a posi-
tion where now North Korea can challenge us or Saddam Hussein,
rather at our capability to implement our stated strategy in what
should not, after all, be an overwhelming military challenge.

Now, the way out of this war. I was a little disquieted about 2
weeks ago when I saw a whole host of NATO countries coming up
with various approaches. But, really, I think the way out now has
two aspects: one, how to bring the military operations to an end,
and second, the political settlement. I would make a distinction be-
tween those.

For the military campaign, there is no substitute for victory,
therefore, the military campaign should not end except with a
cease-fire in which the Serbian leadership accepts the conditions
that I have described, which are identical with the conditions that
the administration has put forward and that NATO has endorsed:

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withdrawal from Kosovo, the right of refugees to return an inter-national presence in Kosovo afterwards.

Senator WARNER. You also add moving towards a guarantee of some degree of self-government?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, absolutely, autonomy. This is to be part of the international settlement. Now, after this has been established, and NATO has clearly demonstrated its capacity to prevail, I think we should look at a political solution that is broader than NATO and broader than Kosovo.

I was a strong supporter of NATO expansion, and I did not accept the argument that this will wreck our relation with Russia. But I do believe that the war with Serbia, following so closely on NATO expansion, has created in Russia and throughout the Slavic world, even in the Ukraine, the profoundest doubts about the purposes of NATO and about the possibility of future cooperation.

I therefore believe that, in the political face of the settlement, not in the cease-fire, Russia should play a role. I'm concerned that the policy track on which we are now pursuing will wind up with American forces in Bosnia, American forces in Albania, American forces in Kosovo, and predictably, American forces in Macedonia; because we have to understand that autonomy for Kosovo, which I've endorsed, will open up the question of Macedonia in which a third of the population is Albanian—and all other surrounding nations have ethnic claims as well.

Therefore, I believe that after a cease-fire is achieved under the conditions that I described, there should be a Balkan conference. As a historian, I may take the precedent of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 which sort of redrew the map of the Balkans and kept it quiet for 30 years which is more than anybody else has been able to achieve in that region.

I do not think we should have American forces in every place as a Band-Aid, especially in view of the other challenges we'll be facing around the world. Therefore, I think that the issue of Bosnia should also be addressed by such a conference, and I think that if self-determination is applicable to Kosovo, it should be applicable to Bosnia.

By which I mean that perhaps each of the National groups should be permitted to go the way they wish to go with an independent state in Bosnia and with the Serbian-Croat parts joining, if they wish, their compatriots; rather than a multiethnic state which joins a state which has been broken up on the basis that there cannot be a multiethnic state.

Whether this solution is exactly the right one for Bosnia or whether it's a modification of it, it is important for the United States not to wind up as the heir of the empires that used to govern these territories and which found themselves eventually in conflict with the local populations whose passions went beyond stability.

So this, Mr. Chairman, extemporaneously, is my sketchy view of the present situation, deep concern on how we got into it, strong determination for national unity in support of the administration's objective, and broadening the framework for a political solution, but only after we have achieved our military objectives. We should not permit any other nation to enter into this and pretend that

8

they have eased our demands. Those demands are in my view, non-negotiable. Thank you very much.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger. You mentioned that you joined an administration 30 years ago, and I was privileged at a somewhat lower level in the Department of the Navy to be a part of that and you and I worked together with regards to the Soviet Union. You helped guide me through my negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Incidents at Sea negotiations, and indeed I was part of the delegation that went to Moscow in 1972 when you, along with President Nixon, guided us to the signatories of the ABM Treaty and SALT I.

So I remember very well and I am most respectful, as are many, many of us in the United States Senate, for your contributions to world peace and to the security of this country.

We will each take about 6 minutes here and go around on questions. I would start off.

You have very strongly endorsed the resolution by our colleagues, and two of those colleagues are here. But in the House there is some discussion of a declaration of war. Congress has not issued such a declaration since World War II. Now, the President has not asked for that declaration, and I would like to ask you to draw on such precedents as they are and what would be the ramifications should the Congress of the United States issue a declaration of war, and particularly the impact on the other 18 nations in partnership with NATO?

Would there be a distinction in your mind between a declaration and the resolution as proposed by Mr. McCain et al.

Dr. KISSINGER. I have not studied, Mr. Chairman, the legal implications of a declaration of war, of which there must be a considerable number or it would have been used more frequently. I note that in the Korean War, in the Vietnam War, in the Gulf War, we did not resort to a declaration of war. While I do not know what the legal implications would be, I believe that if we go to a declaration of war, the impact on most NATO nations, with the possible exception of the United Kingdom, would be very serious.

It would start a debate then that could not be avoided, and I doubt that every NATO nation would join us in such a declaration. In fact, we will have trouble enough if we move seriously to ground forces, which I think we should, to get a NATO consensus, but I nevertheless favor it.

I think a declaration of war at this late stage would raise issues that are unforeseeable, while on the other hand it seems to me the resolution put forward by Senator McCain, Senator Lieberman and others would fulfill the purpose that I believe is important of convincing Milosevic and his colleagues that there is no exit from this war, that endurance will not help them.

Chairman WARNER. Dr. Kissinger, I join you in your views on the use of the declaration of war. I have made some study of this and to have success in this operation in the Balkans, Kosovo in particular, it is essential that we maintain the unity and consensus among all 19 NATO nations. Were such a declaration to be issued by the United States Congress, I join you in your opinion that it would be destabilizing in the respective legislatures of the other 18 and could

9

well precipitate stresses and strains that could fracture the unity
that we are now experiencing.

Turning to Milosevic the individual, in reaching the objectives
that you have enunciated, the three objectives—and we will call
that for the moment achieving NATO's objectives and success—to
what extent can NATO directly or indirectly deal with him as a
person, given what he has perpetrated in the way of every denial
of human rights in Kosovo?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think this will be—it is a question which we
will face as the war draws to a conclusion. I would believe that if
we keep the conditions as I have described them, if he accepts
them and if he accepts a ceasefire under those conditions, that I
would believe that his tenure in Serbia would be extremely short,
and he would then have been the leader who lost every conflict in
which he was engaged. I would not recommend continuing the war
for the only purpose then of removing Milosevic from office, but I
would expect that our subsequent diplomacy would make very clear
that at the political conference and in the economic aid program
that has been talked about after the conference a defense leader-
ship would receive fuller consideration than Milosevic will be able
to achieve.

Chairman WARNER. I visited the Kosovo region last September
and since that inspection trip have consistently advocated the need
for an international military presence in the region to establish
such security as to allow these people to maintain some quality of
life and to allow a number of other organizations, UN and other
humanitarian groups, to come in and provide the assistance that
is desperately needed to rebuild the homes and restructure their
lives.

I have stressed the need to do that because if we continue to
allow the Kosovo situation to be unstable it will undo such modest
gains as have been achieved in the Bosnia region as a consequence
of the Dayton Accords. We are seeing some signs now that the Day-
ton Accords have all but come to a halt as a consequence of the
conflict in Kosovo.

Do you have some views on that?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, first of all, this military campaign was
started officially with the argument that it will continue until
Milosevic or the Serbs return to the conference table to accept the
Rambouillet agreement. But the Rambouillet agreement keeps sov-
ereignty in Serbian hands. It permits the presence of thousands of
Serb police and a smaller number of Serb border troops, and it re-
quires the KLA to disarm.

None of these conditions were realistic then and they are totally
out of the question in my view now. One cannot ask Albanians to
return to Kosovo under Serbian rule. So therefore some kind of au-
tonomy, self-government, quasi-independence or real independence
of Kosovo has to be the outcome, will be the outcome, of this, other
than a NATO defeat, which I cannot conceive.

Then the problem—but once that is achieved, one should look at
the next crisis and we have to make sure that we do not then get
into permanent conflict with the Albanians, because the next phase
of this ethnic crisis in the Balkans is very likely to be demands for
self-government of Albanians in Macedonia and maybe in Montene-

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gro. This is why we need a political conference that will draw some distinctions and some international forces to guarantee it.

Now, I would be very loathe to see the United States in that role. That was what I stated originally. I believe this is something that should be largely done by NATO forces, and some Russian presence would be helpful politically. But the fact is, as I understand it, that Russian troops in Bosnia are extraordinarily undisciplined because they have not been paid for so many years. So if Russian troops are introduced, one has to find some way, maybe through NATO or elsewhere, to pay them and discipline them.

But if that could be achieved I think an international force is necessary, but some guarantees for the remaining states will also have to be devised lest this ethnic crisis go from one country to the next and not stop until it reaches the Urals.

My time is up. Senator Cleland, you were the first one to arrive here this morning, before the doors opened.

Senator CLELAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for being here.

As I mentioned in my opening statement, the last time we were together it had to do with the question of NATO and the expansion of NATO and your views particularly vis a vis the Russian reaction to NATO expansion of Hungary—or NATO expansion to Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, was extremely helpful in me formulating my own personal view that that was a plus for NATO, a plus for the United States, and a plus for the area.

So I came to be an advocate for an expansion of NATO. I am not quite sure I am an advocate for an expansionist NATO. NATO essentially is a defensive alliance and has been for 50 years. I am less enthusiastic—I am very enthusiastic about that. I am not enthusiastic about NATO as an offensive alliance.

One of the things that I am struck with is in the bombing campaign, which I signed onto, because like you I was extremely conflicted about it, one of the things that I have been disappointed in is that the bombing campaign begins to be war by committee, that you have to have a consensus among 19 nations as to which targets to strike. So I think that has limited the effectiveness of the bombing campaign. So I think there are some inherent limitations in NATO becoming a regional policeman or waging a conflict or applying military force anywhere, because I am afraid they have to wage war by committee.

That having been said, I have two major concerns about NATO involvement in Yugoslavia: one, that action there is offensive, whether it is air or ground, across an internationally recognized border; two, that we are involving ourselves in what essentially is an internal conflict.

I am not convinced that Kosovo is ours to win or lose. Therefore I do not put the entire credibility of NATO on that stick, I do not at all.

I think the bombing campaign was an effort to try to do all we could to try to save the people of Kosovo. My view is that Kosovo the people are now in Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, and elsewhere, and that Kosovo itself territorially is pretty much a waste-land. So I am not convinced that we have a territorial imperative that ground forces would help to solidify.

11

So I am very leery about any further offensive military action in Yugoslavia. I am enthralled with your notion of a conference, though, allowing in effect the ethnic tendencies to solidify themselves into various states. I called for such a conference a few days ago on the floor of the Senate. So I appreciate your insight in that regard.

I am concerned about the end game militarily. One of the reasons I supported the bombing campaign was that I thought the exit strategy was a cessation of the bombing campaign. One could start a bombing campaign, one could end it. However, my concern with ground forces is you do create a certain territorial imperative. You also create targets that the Serbs can hit, particularly in Albania. That is my concern about the buildup there.

I understand your reluctance to get into a Balkan war and I share that. I guess what I would like to ask you is, with your no substitute for victory statement, your sense that NATO has to prevail, what in your opinion is the military objective that must be obtained in order to prevail militarily? Is it really a political goal that we are after and that we call that prevailing, namely the withdrawal of the Serbia forces and autonomy for Kosovo? Is the victory, or is victory something else, the degradation of Milosevic's capability, for example, to wage war on his neighbors?

What is your definition of "prevailing" and "victory"?

Dr. KISSINGER. I stated my definition. It is an agreement by the Serbs to withdraw their forces from Kosovo, to agree to autonomy or self-government for Kosovo, to permit refugees to return, Kosovans to return, and to permit—to agree to the establishment of an international trusteeship presence to be negotiated, but in which they do not have a veto over what that trusteeship is.

Now, I do share your concern about the way NATO was brought into this. I think it was unwise to tie NATO to a demand that NATO forces enter a sovereign country with which we are not at war before that country had done something yet that could be plausibly represented as disturbing the peace of the area. Therefore, I would have preferred had NATO declared that ethnic cleansing is a threat to the security of the area, which is demonstrably true, and that it would not tolerate ethnic cleansing, and that if any ethnic cleansing were attempted NATO would react as it has reacted, which would have made its defensive nature clearer and would have given the Serbs a way out.

This would have been—I think we had three reasonable general objectives: one, to end or, if not end, minimize suffering, human suffering; second, to contain the conflict within Kosovo; and third, to have an outcome that does not make us the permanent police-man of the area. Each of these objectives is in a certain way al-ready lost. But—therefore, I would have preferred to put the initia-tive of the provocation on the Serb side, rather than demand that they accept the Rambouillet agreement. I am uncomfortable with NATO saying that unless you accept our diplomacy we will bomb you.

But, having said this, this does not change my view as to desirable objectives. Anyway, this is now something for another debate. It is not relevant to the present debate.

12

I would not consider the use of ground forces in a war in which we are already engaged as another offensive act. I consider that an integral part of the fundamental objectives that have now been created by the conflict, by Serb actions, and for this reason I support the resolution that we have all been discussion.

Senator CLELAND. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, but if I could ask just one more question.

What do you see as the future of NATO, say in the next 5 or 10 years? Just given the last 50, what do you see? Where do you see NATO going, since they are coming here to discuss that very thing in the next day or so?

Dr. KISSINGER. Prime Minister Blair, who is in this building, has advanced the theory that NATO is now in a new and more advanced phase of foreign policy, "humanitarian foreign policy." I am very uneasy about such sweeping goals, because at the end of the day when you risk lives you have to tell the mothers in what way it matters to America in terms of our security and of our values, and open-ended general objectives, given the risks of modern war, seem to me to lead precisely to the kinds of imprecisions that led us into the present situation.

Now, the future of NATO is one of the subjects that would have been important to be able to discuss this weekend. There are two aspects to it. The military danger that was faced before has disappeared for the foreseeable future. Russia cannot come back as a threat to Europe in an overall way for two decades, if then.

On the other hand, in this world, this global world with so many conflicts are arising, the unity of the industrial democracies, the only part of the world where democratic and free market institutions spontaneously dominate, is extremely important. Therefore, were it not for the Serbia crisis I would have said out of area conflicts are one of the subjects we should discuss.

But I would say, precisely because out of area conflicts are so defense from the original nature, they should not be conducted as aspects of domestic politics in various countries and they make it even more important to come up with precise objectives that the Nations can support over an extended period of time, so that we can define what out of area conflicts engage us and why and with what strategy. If we cannot do this, then NATO will gradually become a talking shop.

Senator CLELAND. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, doctor.

We will return to that very important subject of the future of NATO, but, Mr. Inhofe, would you advise our guest and members of your plans for the next few days?

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your co-operation in that.

I had cancelled out, Dr. Kissinger, on the leadership trip over to this area for two reasons. One is I had already had all of the NATO briefings I thought I needed and Wesley Clark briefings, since I talk to him on a regular, almost a weekly basis. But the other reason is I knew that troops are on their way and I wanted to wait

13

until the troops got there so I could assess what the degree of risk
is on the ground.

I have been to Kosovo before. I plan to go to Albania this after-
noon and will go in on a C-17 with the troops. As I think the mem-
bers of this committee know, but the American people are not
aware of, we already have troops over there. The 82nd is over
there. Virtually most of them are there right now and the rest of
them are on their way, or about 700 are and the total of around
3,000. So that fortifies what I have felt all along which is that this
administration has always felt that it is going to take ground
troops and they have not been honest with the American people.

I have agreed with—I have such a great respect for you. I hesi-
tate to say it this way, but I agree with all your premises but not
with your conclusion. That is that—I have quoted you extensively
and I will throw out some of those quotes right now: "The proposed
deployment in Kosovo does not deal with any threat to American
security;" "Kosovo is no more a threat to America than Haiti was
to Europe;" "American lives should only be risked when there is a
demonstrable threat to the National security on behalf of clearly
defined objectives, and with forces proportionate to the objectives;"
"I have studied the history of this area and this is a fight that has
been going on for 600 years."

Dr. KISSINGER. This I wrote before it started.

Senator INHOFE. Yes. I am getting to the question now.

At that time you had this feeling in terms of where our national
security risks are. Is your change now in your position due to the
fact that we went ahead with the bombing and we are involved in
that today?

Dr. KISSINGER. It has changed, my position has changed, for two
reasons: mostly because we are in military action now and there-
fore the effectiveness of NATO is involved; and secorid, also because
of the extent and the brutality of Serb ethnic cleansing.

Senator INHOFE. All right. Dr. Kissinger, there have been several
of us, and in fact I thought there were even some quotes from you,
but certainly from George Tenet, and a week ago today we had a
hearing with Secretary Cohen and with General Shelton, and Sec-
retary Cohen agreed with the statement that was made by George
Tenet when he predicted that if we go in with bombs, that will ac-
celerate the ethnic cleansing. So I have a real confusion there. I am
not asking for—this is not a question. It is just a statement.

The question I want to get to—well, let us go back to this, this
recommendation for our involvement of troops over there. Have you
reached a point where you are willing to say that this is worth a
cost to go in and, if so, is that cost—can you quantify that cost in
terms of American casualties? Are you talking about 20,000 or
50,000? Have you thought that through?

Dr. KISSINGER. I am not competent to answer the question of the
casualties. I actually think that ground war will have relatively few
casualties, but still significant ones. The danger we will face is less
the casualties of fighting the organized Serb army; it is the prob-
lem of continuing guerrilla war that might arise if we keep sub-
stantial forces there.

Senator INHOFE. Dr. Kissinger, in your remarks, extemporaneous
remarks leading into this, the questions, you said there is one area

14

where you had very little expertise. That happens to be the area
that I work in and that is the area of our ability to carry out our
national strategy of being able to defend America on two national
fronts.

You have said before and I have quoted you as saying: "Each incremental deployment into the Balkans is bound to weaken our ability to deal with Saddam Hussein and North Korea." I agree with that wholeheartedly. In fact, the commanders of those theaters were in here before this committee and agreed that they are already giving up very scarce assets to General Clark's theater for this effort, which does weaken us in terms of strategic lift, in terms of fighting capability. So you are exactly right on that.

If I were to give you a hypothetical case that we cannot currently, without any involvement in or further involvement in Kosovo, defend America on two regional fronts simultaneously, does that impact your decision? Do you still feel that, if you were to accept that premise, that we still should go through and further weaken our ability to defend America on two regional fronts where our national vital interests are?

Dr. KISSINGER. It is so rare that I admit that I do not know something that I want to limit my admission. I did not say that I did not have a competence to judge the overall thing. I am not competent to judge the technical weapons systems.

But to answer your question, which is an important question, I believe that at this point American national security is best served by the most rapid ending of the war. I believe that the continuation of this war will lead to, at least in some European countries, to debates that may in the long term threaten our national—may threaten NATO. Our credibility in the Gulf and elsewhere will be severely weakened, and therefore I am focused on bringing the war to the most rapid conclusion possible, because if we simply continue the air campaign inconclusively we will at some point find ourselves confronted with endless proposals by various NATO and other countries on how to end it on various gimmicks that will nevertheless amount to failure.

This is what drives me, Senator. I would never have gone this route. I say this reluctantly. I would never have risked a war in the Balkans short of a degree of Serb provocation that had not yet occurred when the war started. But now that we are in it, there is no other way out.

Senator INHOFE. We are in it, but we are not on the ground in it.

I would hate to have members of Congress and the American people form their opinions as to the advisability of going in on the ground if it was predicated on the assumption that we can end this quickly. My concern is that if you look at the popularity of Milosevic within Serbia right now, he has skyrocketed. There is a nationalist spirit in Serbia that gives me the impression that, even if you knocked out Milosevic, you still—it may not end until the last Serb is dead.

I will not ask you to respond to that. It is just a statement that I feel I have to say.

The other question I wanted to ask, because I think it is very significant: Most of the American people, because of the way the

15

media has spun this war, are sympathetic for our involvement be-
cause of what they consider to be the humanitarian aspect, not the
vital strategic interest. I think you would agree, I think we would
all agree, that that is where the American people are coming from.

I have a very difficult time with this because when you ask the
experts, which we have asked from this committee, give us a round
figure as to how many Kosovar Albanians have died during this pe-
riod of time, we cannot get an approximate number. We talk about
1,000 to 10,000. Well, that is a big range. So I use 2,000.

I do not understand from a humanitarian—and you have expressed your concern for the humanitarian aspect of this—why we are much more concerned about, 2,000 Kosovar Albanians when for every one of those who has died some 400 have died in Rwanda. I just got back. I do an annual mission in West Africa, a part of Africa nobody even seems to care about or know about. But in Angola and Sierra Leone, if you take those two countries, for each one who has died in the Kosovar tragedy some 80 have died there.

Now, why is it that there is not that concern if it is humanitarian? What is your opinion on that?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, you raise precisely the questions that a so-
called humanitarian policy involves. You either write a doctrine for
universal intervention everywhere simultaneously or you will have
to make distinctions, and if you make distinctions you are back to
the old national interest point: Why does this one matter to us
more than the other one? Those are the questions you raise.

Now, the arguments that were made, as you well know, was that
this is Europe, this is close to the borders of NATO. I would not
object—I would share the argument—I would not have objected—
I would have supported the proposition that if massive ethnic
cleansing started in Kosovo that there should have been some
intervention.

I did not agree at a time when there were only 2,000 dead and
a sort of unpleasant guerrilla war, but not an overwhelming one,
was going on that the best way to proceed was to do a sort of self-
fulfilling prophecy. I would have preferred to wait until it had hap-
pened, especially as it has now been demonstrated that we could
not stop it even by bombing ahead of time.

But again I repeat, I regret that this was not done, but, just as
in Britain in 1940 you could not say, well, we have made some mis-
takes in '38, so we will now slacken in the prosecution of the war,
I would say we have made serious mistakes getting into this and
we should not again slide ourselves into such crises without careful
analysis of the sort of question you are raising.

But the alternatives are either indefinite continuation of the
bombing, which will lead to Vietnam, unless Serbia collapses be-
fore—I am not in favor of invading Serbia itself. I think if we can
push the Serb forces out of Kosovo we will have achieved our objec-
tive. It is not an analogy to Saddam Hussein because Saddam Hus-
sein has big resources of oil. It is a great threat to all the neighbor-
ing countries. After this campaign, Serbia is so weak, and its ambi-
tions are anyway defense from Saddam Hussein's, that I do not be-
lieve we should fight a military campaign to remove Milosevic,
though I would be delighted if this were the result.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[c]

16

I just want to make sure the record is very clear on the question that I asked, was purely humanitarian and drawing that comparison between the atrocities on the two continents.

Dr. KISSINGER. It is a very valid question.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Robb, you are next, but could we take a 1-minute intervention to consult the recorder here.

There has been a number of requests already from the press gallery and other Senators for your opening statement, and we are going to have it transcribed and circulated and made available today.

Dr. KISSINGER. Could you mark that it was extemporaneous?
[Laughter.]

That I translate from the German as I go along. [Pause.]

Chairman WARNER. Are we ready to resume? Fine, thank you.

Senator Robb.

I was reminded when the chairman talked about a 30-year association. Actually, the distinguished former Secretary and I have a 30-year association. We were both in the Executive Branch 30 years ago. However, he was at the top of the policymaking branch of government and I was well down in the execution phase of the food chain. But I do remember the briefings that you were kind enough to give then as national security adviser to former commanders in chief about the conflict from which I had just returned, still wearing marine green.

Let me say, Dr. Kissinger, first of all that I have, as many of my colleagues, I have read most if not all of the things that you have written about any number of areas of the world, but particularly with respect to Kosovo and the challenges that we face there. While I share your concerns and did prior to the initiation of the offensive or the military action by NATO, I came to a different conclusion, but it is not one that I am prepared to debate right now.

I will say that I appreciate very much the fact that you have accepted the reality, as indeed all of us must, that we are now in a changed circumstance and that, notwithstanding your previous reservations about where we were, I appreciate very much your support for the troops and the underscoring the need to bring it to conclusion.

You did mention, with respect to the so-called end game exit strategy, however we want to describe it, that you would hope that U.S. forces would not in effect become engaged in each of the regional conflicts in the Balkan areas. I think that is a feeling generally that is shared certainly by most of the American people and many policymakers.

My question is how do we achieve that objective, given the fact that most of the actions that have been taken to date have only been taken because the United States was willing to participate, and especially given the makeup of NATO, with a NAC requiring concurrence of all 19 countries? First of all, is it possible in your judgment to achieve that result and get the concurrence of all 19 countries?

Second, does it make sense to consider at some point a change in the NAC so that, with the possible exception of article 5 questions of self-defense, that some sort of a national security type ar-

17

rangement within an expanding NATO for making decisions that
clearly have been difficult for 19 nations to make under the cir-
cumstances be considered?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, take the first part of the question, if I could
answer it slightly anecdotally. I had not intended to enter the
Kosovo debate at all until the President announced that he was
willing to authorize the sending of 4,000 troops to a peacekeeping
mission in Kosovo, and this raised a profound sense of disquiet in
me because—and I, at that time, wrote an article saying this
should be left to the European nations.

It is very uncharacteristic of me, because I am a strong defender
of NATO. But it seemed to me the only reason to put Americans
there was not as a tripwire, because the Europeans had plenty of
force to deal with local opposition, but because of the European
doubt of their own self—of their own determination to stick the
course, and that they wanted us to give them backbone. This I
thought was not a good basis to go into something that could have
been dealt with by the Europeans with American logistical support.
I thought if we had said we will not do this, we might have seen
plan B, whatever that was.

I still believe that there has to be a certain division of respon-
sibility within NATO, in which certain functions—the Europeans
assume a greater responsibility. I do not believe that American
ground forces should be put into places where NATO—where Euro-
pean ground forces could do the job and where we will nevertheless
supply logistic and other backup.

Now, can the NATO Council be organized to reflect this reality?
Well, something has to be done to political and strategic planning
in NATO, not to permit it—not to make it so dependent on the day
to day decisions of 19 governments, driven by many different do-
mestic situations. I have not yet come to a clear conclusion of what
that should be.

But this is the sort of philosophical debate which hopefully we
can start this weekend, but if we cannot, if we are too preoccupied,
it must be started in the very near future.

Senator ROBB. Dr. Kissinger, if we are the leading member of
NATO, if we want to continue to play that role, though, how can
we avoid participating, not necessarily in relationship to the re-
sources that we are capable of bringing to the table, but if for in-
stance an approximate 85 percent European subsequent division of
responsibility was anticipated at one point, and if the members of
the alliance continue to say both publicly and privately with re-
spect to Bosnia and with respect to actions in Kosovo, if you are
not with us at least in some form in actions that we are going to
take as a matter of our collective responsibility, we are not going
to go either?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, but what does it mean that they say, unless
you are with us we will not act? Why are they saying it? In my
view it must be because—first of all, I think we should be with
them politically, I think we should be with them logistically. I did
not object, in fact I supported before various committees, sending
troops to Bosnia. But I am worried—although I do not like the fact
that they are there more or less permanently.

18

But I think a line has to be drawn in which more and more re-
sponsibility for the sort of operations that are local in scope, do not
involve risk of global conflict, that the United States does not have
to supply a significant proportion of the ground forces, especially as
in the Gulf. That relationship is totally reversed. In the Gulf we
are carrying 95 percent of the responsibility.

So I drew the line at Kosovo at that time. I do not draw it now.
One can argue this point, but conceptually it is important that in
those areas which do not involve global conflict, which could be
handled locally, in which we could be used as Reserve if they
should somehow get out of hand, that the Europeans have enough
confidence in themselves—this is really what it amounted to—that
they could handle something that they used to do with their left
hand traditionally.

Senator ROBB. Dr. Kissinger, conceptually there is no argument.

If I might be permitted one additional question, as others were,
you did not specifically mention Montenegro in your earlier com-
ments. This is a region that it is certainly part of the former Yugo-
slavia. The differences between the two are acute. It represents the
potential both with respect to the expulsion of refugees, the ten-
sions between the leadership, the loyalty of the Serb forces, the loy-
alty of the MUP if push comes to shove, etcetera.

Would you just comment on that particular part of this Balkan
equation?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me make a general statement first about the
Balkans and then get to Montenegro. I started out in these things
as a student of nineteenth century diplomatic history. So I have
studied various Balkan conflicts from the middle of the nineteenth
century through the various world wars and their extraordinary
complexity.

Chairman WARNER. Beginning really in 1389. That was the his-
toric battle.

Dr. KISSINGER. I did not study them that far back, but the ones
of the last century and a half I have studied.

So the fact is that the peoples in this area, having been overrun
by conquerors many times back and forth, the weak ones, the con-
ciliatory ones, have either been killed, converted, or left. The ones
that remain have refined their ethnic peculiarity and have rallied
it around religion to such an extent that when we use American
principles of ethnic coexistence that is an almost incomprehensible
idea.

Now, it is true they sometimes lived together quite peacefully, in
Sarajevo and elsewhere, so long as there was some outside force
that sat on them. What they cannot tolerate, apparently, is the
domination of one of the groups by another group.

Now, therefore I am very worried or reluctant to see America ref-
eree every conceivable conflict that could emerge there. I am also
worried about a permanent American presence, because the pas-
sions of the population are going to outrun our tolerance and our
understanding and we will be drawn into—so this is where I start-
ed from, and therefore I would have—this is why I urged a defense
policy before we got into it.

Therefore also I would like a political settlement on a broader
basis, in which we are not the ones that have to carry the whole

19

responsibility of keeping the various passions in check. Just look at Macedonia, the Albanians. Look at the reaction to the refugees. For them this is a matter in their mind of life and death not to augment the Albanians. The Bulgarians—much of the Slavs in Macedonia speak Bulgarian. There are Serbs, there are Greeks. The Greeks do not even recognize the name of “Macedonia.” So once that blows up, what are we going to do?

Therefore I would like to make some general settlement, if possible, which in Kosovo now the only route is something like independence, autonomy, something, and an international thing.

I frankly have never—I think the Dayton agreement was an important contribution in ending the war. I think the political attempt to bring together these three into a multi-ethnic state will sooner or later blow up and involve us in all kinds of political maneuvers, like when we try to influence the elections in the Serb part. Therefore I would prefer a Balkan settlement in which the various ethnic groups are separated in Bosnia rather than brought together.

But whether you agree with me or not on that point, I would like some international status in the name of which various issues can be dealt with.

Senator ROBB. Which begs the question of the effect of balkanization, if you will, in ethnic enclaves on minorities in other areas. But I will not proceed, given the comments of the chairman.

Dr. KISSINGER. Once that can of worms is opened, you can say there is no end to it before the Urals. If you look at Armenia and Azerbaijan, it just does not get covered on CNN, but you have large refugees, passionate feelings, and a very similar problem.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Snowe.

## STATEMENT OF SENATOR OLYMPIA J. SNOWE

Senator SNOWE. Thank you.

I thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for being here today. Getting back to the mechanics of NATO, I think that one of the disturbing developments as I see it is the way in which the decisions have to be made. It is obviously part of NATO's decisionmaking process, but we are now in a situation where we are running a military operation by committee. Obviously it requires a consensus. It is an operation that potentially faces veto and obviously it has from the outset with respect to the extent to which we would run an air campaign.

The decision was made to run a limited air campaign. I think that gave Milosevic the opening. It prevented NATO from achieving its goal of preventing the use of his war-fighting capabilities, his offensive capabilities, to repress the Kosovars.

So how do we get around this issue at this current time, because I do see it as problematic. It obviously hindered our ability to engage in wide-ranging bombing on a number of targets. We have yet to bomb and to target his media communications centers, which has given him another advantage within his own population that he has used very extensively. We have not been able to intercede on oil supplies going into Yugoslavia, so he is able to replenish his

20

war machine. Here we are targeting his industrial centers and then we turn around and he is getting oil to restock.

So we have a lot of those major mechanical problems at the outset. I hesitate to think about if we were to deploy ground troops into those circumstances, that we would now have this continuing military operation run by a committee, by consensus, by veto. I think that that really has hindered our ability to run the kind of military campaign from the outset that would be necessary, at least I think, to have had a much more extensive impact on Milosevic than obviously it has been to date.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I believe in part that the organization reflected the conviction, at least of everyone I talked to, that Milosevic would yield very quickly. I was told quite often that once the bombing started he would have the pretext to settle. I must say I never believed it, although I also would not have believed he could hold out this long against the combined NATO air force.

Now, I think in future military operations one should make a clear distinction between the decision to go to war and the conduct of the war. If one has decided to go to war, one must then have a strategy for winning. This graduated escalation has been the curse of American strategy from the Vietnam War on. We think it gives the other side a pause. What it really does is give the other side an incentive to endure, to see what the next level is like, and to see how much they can stand.

I think it was a mistake, that once the decision is made by the political leadership to go to war, which is really not a NATO Council function—the NATO Council is a group of ambassadors. The decision should be made at the highest level. Once that is made, I think that a military commander has to be established, has to be given authority to conduct the war to a definition of victory that is also agreed before one starts.

It is a very weird way to go to war to say, let us start bombing and see what happens, and then we will see again. That is the road to paralysis.

Senator SNOWE. So in your opinion, you do not believe that they had a strategy at the outset, that they did not have a military plan?

Dr. KISSINGER. They did not have a strategy for victory. Their strategy was to degrade—to prevent ethnic cleansing, which clearly did not work, or to degrade the capability to do it. But there was not a strategy for imposing our program—

Senator SNOWE. Based on the campaign—

Senator MCCAIN. In my view.

Senator SNOWE. On the air campaign since March 24th, obviously there have been changing objectives. We started out with maybe 350 aircraft. We are now up to about 1,000. We are now deploying Apache helicopters with 2500-plus troops, as Senator Inhofe referred to. We are up to 7,000 other types of air and Navy personnel.

So how would you describe that? Would you see this as a gradual escalation of our involvement in intervention?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, I would describe it as a gradual escalation, graduated escalation, because before Belgrade was bombed they needed another NATO decision, and I have read that the President

21

had to call some European leaders to get their acquiescence. But
then all of this signifies an enormous reluctance to take the next
step, and it also does not make clear what your objective is.

In fact, we have not yet clearly stated that the Rambouillet
agreement, so-called agreement, is no longer applicable. I keep
reading that we say that the longer this continues the more
Milosevic risks losing Kosovo. He has lost Kosovo by the acts that
have already been taken. Anything that retains Kosovo in Serbian
hands will now be a defeat for NATO, and this is a fact that has
to be faced, and I am in a position to do this because I would not
have gone down this route. I would have let autonomy develop over
a longer period of time.

Senator SNOWE. Do you think that we made sufficient efforts
with the Russians before the NATO campaign started to use their
leverage with the Serbians on this issue, and during the Rambuil-
let conference?

Dr. KISSINGER. I would have thought that the better strategy
would have been to elaborate on the agreement that Holbrooke had
negotiated last October, that is ceasefire, and add to it the political
provisions of Rambouillet, that is to say a definition of autonomy,
strengthen the unarmed inspectors which they did permit in there,
and couple it with a warning that any ethnic cleansing would meet
NATO resistance.

I believe on that route autonomy would have emerged more
gradually. At some point the Serbs might have decided it was not
worth it politically to keep going through this. Even if this is
wrong, if they had broken all of this, we would have been able to
launch a much more decisive counterblow than the one we did.
This would have seemed to me the wiser course than this com-
plicated procedure we chose, both politically and strategically.

Senator SNOWE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. For the benefit of other members, there will
be a vote in the Senate probably in 10 minutes. I would therefore
suggest that we try and conclude our hearing by the hour of 12:00
noon, and I know Dr. Kissinger has other engagements requiring
him to depart the city under uncertain traffic conditions to return
back to New York.

Dr. Kissinger, I have started a sort of an effort to engage the ad-
ministration in a colloquy and indeed an exchange of letters about
the future of NATO, a question my distinguished colleague Senator
Cleland raised. A part of the agenda at the fiftieth anniversary
summit is the revision of a document known as the Strategic Con-
cept. The last such document was issued in 1991 and it is the docu-
ment which guides the North Atlantic Council in its decision-
making with regard to military operations.

I felt very strongly that this fiftieth anniversary summit of
course should go ahead and cover all the ground that they could,
but they would be well advised not to write in stone a final docu-
ment on the future strategic concept, which document in a sense
could bind us for another decade, until we have learned and as-
sessed more of the outcome of the Balkan region problems, and
specifically the first military operation in Kosovo; that there would

22

be no disadvantage in my mind by delaying for say 6 months the
finalization of such a document.

I see distinct advantages in delaying the final document because,
as you pointed out, it is the United States that has the aircraft to
use precision guided munitions. It is the United States that has the
necessary airlift, now overtaxed, to provide for the essential assist-
ance to the refugees, at the same time fulfilling its missions to re-
supply and provide for the accelerated air campaign.

Why could we not just sit and study for 6 months, discuss a draft
here, issue the draft, let the member nations consider it, but also
assess a final draft in light of what we will learn out of this mis-
sion? Do you have any views on that?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I completely agree with you.
In fact, I would go further. I think we should spend, first of all, 6
months to understand what we think is right before we even throw
it into a NATO context. We have—as I have I believe testified be-
fore either this committee and surely the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, I thought this whole NATO structure is sort of a strange
mish-mash now of a defensive alliance, of a Partnership for Peace.

There are 40 nations here—I do not know. I forget now how
many nations are here this weekend. There are 19 members of
NATO and there are so many other nations in various different
statuses that it is very hard to know what is NATO, what is not
NATO, what is the real mission of NATO, where is Russia in rela-
tion to all of this.

So first of all, we ought to get clear what it is that NATO ought
to do, what do we want it to do, what is the relationship between
political and military objectives. Up to now, NATO had the benefit,
there was only one real threat and so everything could concentrate
on military planning against one threat. Now we have manifold
threats, different objectives, how to reconcile all of this.

We really need an American view clearly established. We need
a view about how we will react to European force. One of the cer-
tain consequences in my mind of the Kosovo operation is a greater
insistence by the Europeans on developing their own forces. It is
weird they draw us in and then they come to this conclusion. What
is the American attitude toward this? Are we uneasy about this or
do we cooperate?

So I think you have raised the key questions, and I really do not
see much sense in putting out a document now. I think we would
serve NATO better to have a year of debate starting at home.

Chairman WARNER. I agree. I am going to give you this if you
do not have it. It is today's Washington Post. It is showing the de-
fense spending in the total of billions by the various NATO nations.
You can see, I am sure, at that distance the large stack of $272
billions by the United States. The next country is France at less
than $50 billion, followed by Britain and Germany and Italy; and
then the other NATO nations, they are hardly a blip on the chart.

If we are going to sign up for another decade to carry out the
NATO missions, this chart tells you it is the American taxpayer
that is going to pay the bill.

Dr. KISSINGER. There is the curious phenomenon that military
forces are being cut while political objectives are being ex-
panded—

23

Chairman WARNER. That is correct.

Dr. KISSINGER—with these humanitarian assertions.

Chairman WARNER. Then it shows in the next chart that the United States stands at 1.44 million in uniform today and the next highest is Turkey.

Dr. Kissinger, this may be a little early to bring into the discussion, but I think for myself I am beginning to focus on the following. I agree with you to bring about as quickly as we can the achievement of NATO's goals, but the cost of rebuilding the destruction as a consequence of this military operation—and there was no way to avoid it and we are now for an indefinite period going to continue it—how best can that cost be allocated among the NATO allies, hopefully in a manner that does not reflect the proportionate contributions now by the United States being the largest in terms of the expenditures in NATO?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think the Europeans have to carry the major load for this.

Chairman WARNER. Well, I share that view. I mean, we read this morning that these precision weapons are very accurate and I think there are very few bridges standing in the Belgrade region and up in Novi Sad, which had to be done as a part of this operation.

I would like to visit two other parts of the world while we have the opportunity to get your views. Let us first take the situation in Iraq, which just continues a policy of containment. What could the United States and those allies, notably Britain, who are working with us do to try and bring back some resolution of that situation?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I must tell you I would have liked to see the sort of air campaign against Iraq that we are now doing in Serbia. I believe we have a strategic objective in removing the government of Iraq. There I believe we are facing a threat to all neighboring countries and the mere survival of this government in power is a symbol of our inability to bring about, after a defeat and after having a UN inspection system—and one has to remember that after that last military operation, which lasted 3 days, only at night, the inspection system was removed. So one can argue it is not self-evident that this was a great American victory.

Now, there are people who argue we should support guerrilla forces and I would not be averse to that, provided we understand that we then have to back them up. We cannot put guerrilla forces in there and let them be destroyed. So this is really just another way of triggering a confrontation with Saddam Hussein.

But right now we are on the road that I deplore and that I fear in the Balkans with Saddam Hussein. The support for the sanctions is eroding. The basis for a strong policy politically is becoming tougher and tougher, and the opportunity to resort to military force is diminishing. So if such an opportunity presents itself again, I think we should carry it to a conclusion.

Chairman WARNER. I concur in those views.

Now, let us turn to North Korea. I think you are aware of the very successful undertaking by Dr. Perry, former Secretary of Defense, to try and shed greater light on that situation. Could you comment on that?

24

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, North Korea is almost a psychiatric case, because here is a country that had 500,000 people starve to death each year and where a large part of the population is suffering from malnutrition, and yet they spend $60 million for a memorial to the dead leader and a huge military establishment and nuclear weapons and long-range weapons. So normal calculations of benefit do not seem to influence them.

I have not studied this problem in detail and I would take Mr. Perry very seriously. He is one of our best and thoughtful public servants.

The basic problem we have had is do we pay them in advance for not doing something they should not be doing in the first place. So do we give them food and oil in order to induce them not to build more missiles? Now, if they told us they are stopping their missile program and stop their nuclear program under international inspection, I would welcome economic aid to them.

But under present circumstances we have to walk a very fine—have to be very careful that they are not just stringing us along. After all, under the old agreement they nevertheless launched a long-range missile in the direction of Japan. Whether it was intended as a satellite, whatever it was, it raised great fears in Japan and great impetus to produce at least a missile defense, which I basically favor anyway.

So I would believe as a basic principle, unless they give us assurances that they have actually stopped what worries us, that I would not pay them in order to make them ready to promise it. That would be my feeling.

Senator CLELAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here. I know this was an imposition. You came all the way from California. Thank you so much for sharing your time and effort with us.

In your view what would be the mission of ground forces if they were committed in Kosovo? Would they be to secure Kosovo? Would they be to in effect remove the Serbian forces there? What would the mission be?

Dr. KISSINGER. To expel the Serbian forces from Kosovo. Now, I just cannot believe that 19 NATO nations with a population of 500 million plus cannot defeat 10 million Serbs. The Serbs are a heroic people and they have done extraordinary things in their history, but I find it hard to believe that we cannot, we should not be able to achieve the objective that I described: withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo—well, I have described them often enough.

Senator CLELAND. Well, thank you very much.

Dr. KISSINGER. But that would be—and I would hope that by assembling these forces we will accelerate the impact of the air war.

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Lieberman.

## STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

25

I regret that, Dr. Kissinger, I had to leave for a while. I thought
your opening statement was very powerful.

Chairman WARNER. We are having that transcribed, because a
number of Senators have already called in.

Chairman WARNER. Could you label it "extemporaneous"? I do
not want my English grammar teacher to get me.

Senator LIEBERMAN. But I would say that your extemporaneous
compares quite favorably to most other people's well planned state-
ments.

Particularly in light of your concerns about the diplomacy that
led us here, I thought your statement was very compelling. I appre-
ciate, of course, your support for the resolution that Senator
McCain and I and others have put in. I thought, at least for me,
you stated more clearly than I have heard done what the so-called
end game is here, not just your articulation of the objectives, but
your very clear division between the achievement of a ceasefire and
then to begin to have a conference on the Balkans to discuss the
political landscape, because there is a danger, particularly if the air
war goes on a bit longer, that people will begin to shave our objec-
tives. I presume that is part of what you are saying to us.

Dr. KISSINGER. That actually began at the last meeting of the
European Union. They then pulled back from it.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Dr. KISSINGER. But there was already this I think German pro-
posal that there should be a 24-hour bombing halt, withdrawals. It
was not incompatible with our position, but once we begin elaborat-
ing nuances to make it more acceptable you are on a slippery road.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Because you are then beginning a process
that leads to a negotiation with the Serbs about the terms of a
ceasefire, even though we have stated them quite clearly. I am con-
cerned that we will end up, hopefully not in too long a time, we
will achieve a military victory, but that we will end up depriving
ourselves of the fruits of that victory by getting into a bargaining
situation.

Dr. KISSINGER. This is why I would separate the ceasefire, in
which I would not see much room for complicated negotiations,
from a Balkan settlement.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

If I may—if this was asked before, please, I will consult the
record. But the question of what happens after the victory is
achieved and how we come to a circumstance where we do not, the
United States does not, take on the obligation of stationing for a
long period of time American troops, as you said, not just in
Kosovo, but in neighboring countries. What form—how do we avoid
that?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, in Kosovo probably we will now have to sta-
tion some forces for longer than I would have preferred. I believe
we should call a Balkan conference to first work out guarantees
and borders, and then allocate some responsibilities. I think the
European Union has to bear a larger role and we should get our-
selves out of the center of every diplomatic maneuver that goes on
there as these passions are working themselves out.

I have not worked out the details, but my experience here in this
town, which may no longer be so applicable, is that if you are presi-

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1 EXTEMPORANEOUS REMARKS OF

2 DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

3 FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

4 AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

5 BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

6 APRIL 22, 1999

7 Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen
8 of the committee, it's always a privilege for me
to appear before this group which has such an
major responsibility for national security of the
United States, and for whose members I have such
great respect. In fact, it's my great admiration
and affection for the Chairman to permit me to
come here, interrupting a series of board meetings.
And therefore, I want to apologize that I do not
have a formal statement and will speak to you
extemporaneously. What I suggest, if the Chairman
agrees with it, is that I begin with Kosovo,
answer your questions, and then if you want to go
on to other subjects, I will give my comments on
those.

22 Let me begin with Kosovo. Let me deal
23 with it in three parts: the prelude to the
military operations, the military operations, and
the possible exit from the military operations.

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Secondly, there was the KLA, the regular army, which many people considered led by Marxists, passionately committed to independence for Kosovo. There was a cease-fire that had been negotiated by Holbrooke, which I thought was basically heading in the right direction, but which was broken by both sides more frequently by the KLA, more brutally by the Serbs.

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was
into this hornet's nest that
find a comprehensive
intention to

of this hornet's nest that
find a comprehensive
intention to
end with an intent to

Now, comprehensive solutions to
find a comprehensive
solution. And it is into this
landed was

And sometimes it is better to push the problem
ahead of you without intending to solve it in one
major effort.

Secondly, the message that was chosen,
that I've just described, it was not likely to be acceptable by either side, and indeed, it was not acceptable by either side.

And had, by some miracle, it been
found ourselves projected
because I do not
have disarmed to the
supposed to and I never
how remained and
interact with each other.

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1 independence for Kosovo must open up the question

2 of Macedonia. These were all issues that were

3 very difficult to resolve, and frankly, I did not

4 believe could be resolved by an ultimatum. And

5 it was attempted to be resolved by an ultimatum, but

6 then it would likely produce a conflict of great

7 passion on both sides.

8 I was also uneasy about NATO decision

9 to demand the right to occupy a country with which

10 it was one is not at war. It is unprecedented in NATO

11 history to make such a decision, and it involved

12 ourselves in a diplomacy which was managed by 19

13 nations and a strategy managed by 19 nations.

14 Those were concerns, and I wrote about them. And

15 Republican senators here will remember I spoke to all

16 of the senators about them at their request. But

17 even then, I was faced with the dilemma that I'm

18 now turning to.

19 At that meeting I expressed, in greater

20 detail than I have here, my great concerns about

21 the direction of the Rambouillet process. But

22 then when I was asked "How do we vote?" I found

23 myself in the difficulty that when the president

24 asks for the right to use military force, and has

25 already convinced NATO to do so, that I could not

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1. bring myself to urge the senators to vote even

2. though my analysis of the diplomacy made me

3. uneasy, and this is again where we are today.

4. It is clear that there were two basic

5. misjudgments made when this war started. On the

6. American side, a great underestimation of

7. Milosevic's reaction and his determination. On

8. Milosevic's side, perhaps based on our conduct in

9. Iraq, the conduct of military operations in the

10. Gulf recently, a gross underestimation of how far

11. the United States was willing to go. And

12. ironically, both sides might have thought all they

13. had to do was three days of bombing. We may have

14. thought he'd yield after three days, and he may

15. have thought we'd quit after three days, which had

16. been the pattern in the Gulf.

17. And so now we find ourselves in a

18. situation where 19 NATO nations have committed

19. themselves to a great course. Nine hundred

20. airplanes are involved without significant

21. opposition, and a number of countries have
22. overcome great hesitations to join us for the sake

23. of NATO. So now I am in the position where no

24. matter what I thought in March and however

25. differently I would have recommended conducting

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1 the diplomacy, I think the national interest

2 requires that we prevail.

3 I came to Washington 30 years ago when

4 the administration in which I served, inherited a

5 war in Indochina, and the way we tried to extricate

6 ourselves honorably under the most violent

7 opposition domestically that went the soul of our

8 country. I don't want another president to ever

9 have to go through this experience again.

10 Therefore, I believe now one has to

11 close ranks behind the administration, and if

12 anything, teach them to go in the direction that

13 is needed to prevail. There is no exit now from

14 this war except success, and success has been

15 defined as follows, and I share that view:

16 The Serb forces must be withdrawn from

17 Kosovo. Refugees must have a right to return.

18 Some kind of international presence must be established to supervise these procedures, these

19 processes. Any other outcome would be a defeat

20 for NATO, and there is no spin that we can put on

21 it; there is no clever way we can defend it that

22 will take away this reality. Now, there has been

23 the issue of ground forces. I have said,

24 incidentally, I have made this sort of statement

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1 in writing from the first day of the war even

2 though I had great doubts about going into the

3 war.

4 On the issue of ground forces, my view

5 is as follows: I have no way of judging what will

6 ultimately be necessary. That is a military

7 decision. But, first, it is a mistake to preclude

8 any category of forces and to turn the conflict

9 into an endurance contest.

10 Secondly, even if one believes that air

11 power will ultimately succeed, which it well may,

12 we nevertheless should make clear not only that we

13 are planning to use ground forces but we should

14 assemble the ground forces that will be needed.

15 This will put a safety net under the bombing

16 campaign because under present circumstances, it

17 is a question of endurance. Thus, Milosevic and

18 the Serbian leadership believe that they can

19 simply outlast us.

20 If they know that at the end -- not even

21 at the end but at some stage in this process -- we

22 will insist on using ground forces, I think it

23 will shorten the air campaign. Therefore, I do

24 not like this process in which we now examine, then

25 have 19 members discuss it, then shuffle plans

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1 back and forth. All of this can take place while

2 forces are moved to the place for which they're

3 supposed to be used, and therefore, I favor this

4 resolution that I have seen to bring this war to

5 the most rapid conclusion.

6 Q. If I may interrupt, you're referring,

7 then, to a joint resolution that was presented by

8 Mr. McCain, Mr. Biden, Mr. Hagel, Mr. Lieberman,

9 Mr. Cochran, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Luger, Mr. Robb and

10 Mr. Kerry?

11 Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

12 Q. Which provides that the Senate and House

13 of Representatives of the United States of

14 America, Congress assembled that the President is

15 authorized to use all necessary force and other

16 means in concert with United States allies to

17 accomplish United States and the North Atlantic

18 Treaty Organization's objective in the Federal

19 Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)?

20 Dr. Kissinger: Yes. That is what I

21 support. I might add also that the impact on

22 rogue states and threatened areas I'd say the

23 Gulf, Iraq, North Korea the failure to achieve our

24 in its objective under conditions of total air

25 supremacy could be disastrous. And so for all of

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1 these reasons I think we have no way out, and I

2 believe, in fact, that the hesitant way in which

3 we conducted operations in the Gulf has

4 contributed to the misapprehension on the part of

5 Milosevic that he could endure this bombing

6 campaign.

7 I'm also concerned about something for

8 which I'm not technically competent, but for years

9 now we have heard about this capacity to conduct two

10 limited wars simultaneously. That has been

11 described for decades as the basis of our

12 strategy. It is clear that our present military

13 establishment cannot do this and that we have to
14 pull forces from Iraq, from the Gulf, and that we have

15 to call up reserves in the war in which we're

16 suffering no casualties, and practically no loss of

17 equipment.

18 And I think this requires another look

19 at this strategy and -- not so much the strategy,

20 because the strategy is correct, we don't want to

21 be in a position where new North Korea can

22 challenge us or Saddam Hussein, but that our

23 capability to implement our stated strategy in

24 what should not, after all, be an overwhelming

25 military challenge.

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1 Now, the way out of this war. I was a

2 little disquieted about two weeks ago when I saw a

3 whole host of NATO countries coming up with

4 various approaches. But really, I think the way out

5 now has two aspects: one, how to bring the

6 military operations to an end, and secondly, the

7 political settlement. And I would make a

8 distinction between those.

9 For the military campaign, there is no

10 substitute for victory, and therefore, the

11 military campaign should not end except with a

12 cease-fire in which the Serbian leadership accepts

13 the conditions that I have described which are

14 identical with the conditions that the

15 administration has put forward and that NATO has

16 endorsed: withdraw from Kosovo, right of refugees

17 to return, international presence in Kosovo

18 afterwards.

19 Q. You also add moving towards a guarantee
20 of some degree of self-government?

21 Dr. Kissinger: Yes, absolutely,

22 autonomy. This is to be part of the international

23 settlement. Now, after this has been established,

24 and therefore NATO has clearly demonstrated its

25 capacity to prevail, I think we should look at a

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1 political solution that is broader than NATO and

2 broader than Kosovo.

3 As you know, I was a strong supporter of

4 NATO expansion, and I did not accept the argument

5 that this will wreck our relation with Russia.

6 But I do believe that the war with Serbia, was

7 following so closely on NATO expansion, has
8 created in Russia and throughout the Slavic world,

9 even in the Ukraine, the profoundest doubts about
10 the purposes of NATO and about the possibility of

11 future cooperation.

12 I therefore believe that in the

13 political face of the settlement, not in the

14 cease-fire, Russia should play a role. I'm

15 concerned that the policy track on which we are

16 now will wind up with American forces in Bosnia,

17 American forces in Albania, American forces in

18 Kosovo, and predictably, American forces in

19 Macedonia because we have to understand that

20 autonomy for Kosovo, which I've endorsed, will

21 open up the question of Macedonia in which a third

22 of the population is Albanian and all other

23 surrounding nations have ethnic claims as well.

24 Therefore, I believe that after a

25 cease-fire achieved under the conditions that I

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1 described, there should be a Balkan conference.

2 As a historian, I may take the precedent of the

3 Congress of Berlin in 1878 which sort of redrew

4 the map of the Balkans and kept it quiet for 30

5 years, which is more than anybody else has been

6 able to achieve in that region.

7 And I do not think we should have

8 American forces in every place as a Band-Aid,

9 especially in view of the other challenges we'll

10 be facing around the world. Therefore, I think

11 that the issue of Bosnia should also be addressed

12 by such a conference, and I think that if

13 self-determination is applicable to Kosovo, it

14 should be applicable to Bosnia.

15 By which I mean that perhaps each of the

16 national groups should be permitted to go the way

17 they wish to go with an independent state in

18 Bosnia and with the Serbian-Croat parts joining,

19 if they wish, their compatriots; rather than a

20 multiethnic state which joins a state which has

21 been broken up on the basis that there cannot be a

22 multiethnic state.

23 And whether this solution is exactly the

24 right one for Bosnia or whether it's a

25 modification of it, I believe, that it is important

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1 for the United States not to wind up as the heir

2 of the empires that used to govern these

3 territories and which found themselves eventually

4 in conflict with the local populations whose

5 passions went beyond stability.

6 So this, Mr. Chairman, extemporaneously,

7 is my sketchy view of the present situation, deep

8 concern on how we got into it, strong

9 determination for national unity in support of the

10 administration's objective, and broadening the

11 framework for a political solution, but only after

12 we have achieved our military objectives. We

13 should not permit any other nation to enter into

14 this and pretend that they have eased our demands

15 those demands [out of discord] in my view,

16 nonnegotiable. Thank you very much.

17

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APR.22.1999

3:37PM

SENATE ARMED SERV COMM

NO.852

P.2/14

1

1 EXTEMPORANEOUS REMARKS OF

2 DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

3 FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

6 APRIL 22, 1999

7 Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen
8 of the committee, it's always a privilege for me
9 to appear before this group which has such an
10 major responsibility for national security of the
11 United States, and for whose members I have such
12 great respect. In fact, it's my great admiration
13 and affection for the Chairman to permit me to
14 come here interrupting a series of board meetings.
15 And therefore, I want to apologize that I do not
16 have a formal statement and will speak to you
17 extemporaneously. What I suggest, if the Chairman
18 agrees with it, is that I begin with Kosovo,
19 answer your questions, and then if you want to go
20 on to other subjects, I will give my comments on
21 those.

22 Let me begin with Kosovo. Let me deal
23 with it in three parts: the prelude to the
24 military operations, the military operations, and
25 the possible exit from the military operations.

APR.22.1999

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Secondly, there was the KLA, the regular
army, which many people considered led by
Marxists, passionately committed to independence
for Kosovo. There was a cease-fire that had been
negotiated by Holbrooke, which I thought was
basically heading in the right direction, which
was broken by both sides; more frequently by the
KLA, more brutally by the Serbs.

+

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And it is into this hornet's nest that we ended with an intent to find a comprehensive solution. Now, comprehensive solutions to 400-year-old conflicts are not easy to come by. And sometimes it is better to push the problem ahead of you without intending to solve it in one major effort.

Secondly, the message that was chosen, the so-called Rambouillet Agreement, which was really presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis without negotiation by either side, was undoubtedly a very clever document for an academic exercise. But given the passion that I've just described, it was not likely to be acceptable by either side, and indeed, it was not acceptable by either side.

And had, by some miracle, it been accepted, we would have found ourselves projected into a conflict with both sides, because I do not believe the KLA would ever have disarmed to the NATO forces as they were supposed to, and I never understood how the Serbian forces had remained and the NATO forces and the KLA were going to interact in that situation.

And finally, autonomy for Kosovo and

APRIL 22, 1995 5:38PM SENATE ARMED SERV COMM

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4 believe could be resolved by an ultimatum. And if

5 it were attempted to be resolved by an ultimatum,

7 passion on both sides.

8 I was also uneasy about a NATO decision

10 one is not at war. It is unprecedented in NATO

15 Republican senators here remember I spoke to all

16 of the senators about them at their request, but

18 now turning to.

24 asks for the right to use military force and has

9

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2 requires that we prevail.

4 the administration in which I served inherited a

5 war in Indochina and the way we tried to extricate

19 established to supervise these procedures, these

20 processes. Any other outcome would be a defeat

21 for NATO, and there is no spin that we can put on

22 it; there is no clever way we can defend it that

23 will take away this reality. Now, there has been

24 the issue of ground forces. I have said,

25 incidentally, I have made this sort of statement

©

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3 war.

7 decision. But first, it is a mistake to preclude

9 into an endurance contest.

13 are planning to use ground forces; we should

19 simply outlast us.

21 at the end, at some stage in this process -- we

24 not like this process where we now examine, then

8

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5 the most rapid conclusion.

6 Q. If I may interrupt, you're referring, then, to a joint resolution that was presented by

7 Mr. McCain, Mr. Biden, Mr. Hagel, Mr. Lieberman,

8 Mr. Cochran, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Luger, Mr. Robb and

9 Mr. Kerry?

10 Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

11 Q. Which provides that the Senate and House
12 of Representatives of the United States of

13 America, Congress assembled that the President is

14 authorized to use all necessary force and other

15 means in concert with United States allies to
16 accomplish United States and the North Atlantic

17 Treaty Organization's objective in the Federal

18 Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)?

19 Dr. Kissinger: Yes. That is what I
20 support. I might add also that the impact on

21 rogue states and threatened areas, I'd say the

22 Gulf, Iraq, North Korea, the failure to achieve

23 its objective under conditions of total air

24 supremacy could be disastrous. And so for all of

25

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6 campaign.

9 now we have heard about capacity to conduct two

14 pull forces from Iraq, from the Gulf, that we have

16 suffering no casualties, practically no loss of

17 equipment.

20 because the strategy is correct. We don't want to

21 be in a position where now North Korea can

25 military challenge.

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4 various approaches, but really I think the way out

8 distinction between those.

18 afterwards.

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2 broader than Kosovo.

6 But I do believe that the war with Serbia, as
7 following so closely on NATO expansion, has
8 created in Russia and throughout the Slavic world,
9 even in the Ukraine, the profoundest doubts about
10 the purposes of NATO and about the possibility of
11 future cooperation.

12 I therefore believe that in the
13 political face of the settlement, not in the
14 cease-fire, Russia should play a role. I'm
15 concerned that the policy track on which we are
16 now will wind up with American forces in Bosnia,
17 American forces in Albania, American forces in
18 Kosovo, and predictably, American forces in
19 Macedonia, because we have to understand that
20 autonomy for Kosovo, which I've endorsed, will
21 open up the question of Macedonia in which a third
22 of the population is Albanian and all other
23 surrounding nations have ethnic claims.

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15 By which I mean that perhaps each of the
16 national groups should be permitted to go the way
17 they wish to go with an independent state in
18 Bosnia and with the Serbian-Croat parts joining,
19 if they wish, their compatriots. Rather than a
20 multiethnic state which joins a state which has
21 been broken up on the basis that there cannot be a
22 multiethnic state.

23 And whether this solution is exactly the
24 right one for Bosnia or whether it's a
25 modification of it, I believe that it is important

APR. 22. 1999

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13

6 So this, Mr. Chairman, extemporaneously,
7 is my sketchy view of the present situation, deep
8 concern on how we got into it, strong
9 determination for national unity in support of the
10 administration's objective, and broadening the
11 framework for a political solution, but only after
12 we have achieved our military objectives. We
13 should not permit any other nation to enter into
14 this and pretend that they have eased our demands,
15 those demands out of discord. In my view,
16 nonnegotiable. Thank you very much.

17

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20

21

22

23

24

25