Straight Talk From Kissinger

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Henry A. Kissinger was back on the diplomatic circuit last week. Taking time out from his book-writing chores, Kissinger met with French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and British Prime Minister James Callaghan, and delivered a lecture in West Berlin on "International Perspectives in the 1980s." NEWSWEEK'S Arnaud de Borchgrave began an extensive interview with Kissinger before he left New York and completed a total of more than seven hours of conversation in Paris. It was Kissinger's toughest and most detailed critique of the Carter Administration's foreign policy since he left office two years ago. Excerpts:

**DE BORCHGRAVE:** President Carter recently said that U.S. prestige was low when he took over because of Vietnam, Watergate and CIA wrongdoing and he is trying to rectify the situation. What is your reaction?

**KISSINGER:** I regret it when the President as a national leader speaks as if history began when he was inaugurated. It makes bipartisan support very difficult. It confuses foreign leaders who didn't think U.S. prestige was low in 1976. Certainly not in the countries that mattered. It misconceives the problem. Many foreigners raised questions over Vietnam because we lost, over Watergate because it was inexplicable to them how a country could tear apart its Executive authority, and over CIA investigations—not because of what was discovered but because of the dismantling of an institution for no purpose whatsoever. The basic credit for overcoming the legacy of the Watergate era should go to President Ford.

**Q. How severely have we harmed our counterintelligence capability?**

**A.** We have seriously damaged our entire intelligence capability and I don't believe that what was discovered in the investigation warranted the wanton assault which took place. The effective dismantling of our covert capability is a calamity. I want to make clear, however, I am not justifying the actions that led to Watergate.

**Q.** Some critics suggest that one of our biggest problems is that new, younger policy planners in the Carter Administration think that any pro-Western leader, especially in the Third World, is probably not worth having as a friend. Any leftist or Marxist leader, however, assumed to enjoy the allegiance of the people. Is this hurting?

**A.** There is to me inexplicable self-hatred that denigrates everything we attempt and despises those who associate

with us. This was compounded by the President's Notre Dame speech, for example, when he said he would free our policy from the inordinate fear of Communism which had characterized it in the past. What were allies of the U.S., who had worked with us for a generation, to think? Had they become dispensable? Did our new attitude toward Communism weaken our previous commitment? These uncertainties account for some of the strains of the past year. We must take care not to erode the distinction between allies and neutrals.

George Walker—Gamma-Liason

*'Russia will press to the limits of its strength'*

**Q.** Soviet leaders appear to believe that the era of U.S. predominance is ending and that of Soviet supremacy beginning. What can be done to change these perceptions?

**A.** We clearly cannot accept the idea of Soviet supremacy. This would create so much chaos and uncertainty that it would threaten our own immediate security. Nor can we accept the proposition that the Soviet Union has the right of unlimited intervention, directly or by proxy, in every part of the world while in the name of relaxation of tensions we do not react. In other words, I believe in linkage. Russia must choose between expansionism and relaxation of tensions. It cannot have both ... Free peoples cannot survive if Moscow conducts a geopolitical policy while the U.S. has a stagnating policy.

**Q.** Even more important than the nuclear equation is conventional power and the political will to use it. Isn't this a critical advantage for the Soviet Union?

**A.** For the greater part of the post-World War II period we could defend most threatened areas by our nuclear superiority ... For a variety of reasons, that superiority has eroded ... That means that we and our allies must have a capacity for regional defense inside and outside the NATO area. If we don't develop this, then in the '80s we're going to pay a very serious price. The first installments are already visible.

**Q.** Détente, in Soviet eyes, seems to be continued U.S. retrenchment in the wake of the Vietnam defeat and acquiescence in Russia's geopolitical objectives. Hasn't their understanding of détente become the current coinage of appeasement?

**A.** Détente, properly conceived, is a necessity ... We cannot resist expansionism unless our people are convinced of our dedication to peace. We should have learned in Vietnam that we cannot sustain confrontation unless public opinion is convinced of its necessity. We have to demonstrate that we have made every reasonable effort to avoid a crisis. But détente must not lull us into complacency, slackened defense efforts and unwillingness to consider geopolitical consequences. Otherwise détente will turn into appeasement.

**Q.** Given President Leonid Brezhnev's latest "hands off Iran" warning to the United States, what risks do you see there?

**A.** The Iranian situation is a tragedy for the West. The Shah is a leader who on every critical foreign-policy issue has been totally on the side of the West and who has been a stabilizing factor in every crisis in the area. Beyond formal documents, it was a very close co-ordination of our respective foreign policies. The Shah never interrupted the flow of oil to anybody for political reasons. His economic-development program was a great success. He moved his country from feudalism into the modern age. The Shah is paying the price of modernization: he is being attacked by those who think he moves too fast and by those for whom he is not moving fast enough. Brezhnev's statement occurred when there had been no U.S. military move of any kind. It was gratuitous and provocative.

In this context, our own answer was not very strong. I don't think it came across as a ringing affirmation of a commitment to a country that is so vital to us or as a warning to the Soviets not to

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middle in Iranian affairs. It almost sounded as if we were declaring Iran an area of neutrality.

**Q. Is the United States, then, to blame for events in Iran?**

A. Much of the turmoil stems from the process of development. There are, however, three areas of U.S. responsibility: (1) The geopolitical decline since Vietnam has demoralized friends and emboldened enemies; (2) the human-rights campaign, as now conducted, is a weapon aimed primarily at allies and tends to undermine their domestic structures; (3) the assault on the CIA has deprived us of crucial information and vital tools.

**Q.** By signing some twenty agreements with the Soviets in 1972, you thought you could weave them into a web of mutual interest and temper their behavior. Since then we've seen defeat in Indochina, then Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan. What went wrong?

A. This is much too simple. In 1972 we were in the middle of Vietnam and in 1974 in the middle of Watergate. What went wrong was our domestic difficulties. We cannot ask the Soviets to restrain themselves if we deliberately emasculate ourselves. Between 1972 and 1974, the Administration certainly dug its own grave. The CIA investigations did not have to be conducted in so flagrant a manner. The Vietnam defeat was almost entirely a U.S. domestic affair. The Congress cut aid to Vietnam by 50 per cent in each of the peacetime years at a time when Hanoi was flagrantly violating the agreements.

Under those conditions, no peace agreement could ever be maintained. In the context of this weakness, some challenge was inevitable. It happened in Angola. That could and should have been contained. When it was not, Ethiopia followed as the next step. That sequence shook confidence in us not only in Africa but also in the Middle East. So I think the Soviet Union will certainly press to the limits of its geopolitical strength. That is its nature as a great power and as a Communist power. It's our responsibility to create the necessary counterweights.

**Q.** You once said that those who give an exaggerated estimate of Soviet power do a disservice to the United States. The total number of Warsaw Pact tanks shot up from 43,000 to 50,000 in the last year alone. The Soviet Union is now shipping more military hardware to African countries than France, Britain and the United States combined. Do you still feel the same way?

A. That comment was made with respect to Soviet strategic power. Russia has engaged in a massive buildup of its military forces which, if projected into the '80s and unmatched by the West, is bound to create a grave political weakness. This, in turn, is bound to be translated into political benefits for the Soviets. Either the Soviet buildup has to be stopped or we have to build up our own armed forces.

> 'Détente must not lull us into complacency, slackened defense efforts and unwillingness to consider geopolitical consequences. Otherwise, détente will turn into appeasement.'

**Q.** If we were spending 15 per cent of our GNP on defense, as the Soviets are now doing, our economy would be on a war footing. What should we do to force Russia into a credible reversal of its ongoing buildup?

A. Moscow has to understand that we are determined not to fall behind in an arms race. They cannot possibly win an arms race against the U.S. Our technology is far superior to theirs. Secondly, we have to prevent geopolitical expansion in its early phases when it is most ambiguous and when there is least proof of its consequences. If we had succeeded in preventing the Cuban action in Angola, there would be no Cubans in Ethiopia or in other outposts today. It cannot be accepted that the Soviet Union sends its planes to Cuba to free Cuban planes for service in Africa or other trouble spots. . . . If the Soviet Union is prepared to operate on acceptable principles of peaceful coexistence, then I think we should be generous and flexible in our response. But we cannot permit a gradual expansion by proxy forces which are being freed for overseas service by the redeployment of Soviet forces.

**Q.** You have compared Soviet-Cuban-East German interventions in Africa to the expansion of Germany prior to World War II, an expansion that owed its success, you said, to the paralysis of those whose mission it was to contain it. How can the Soviets be contained?

A. In 1936, when the Nazis reoccupied the Rhineland, one French division could have stopped them and the world would still be arguing today whether Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist or a maniac bent on world domination. One always has to balance moral certainty against insufficient knowledge. At a time when the scope for action is greatest, knowledge is usually at a minimum. When knowledge is greatest, the scope for action has disappeared. If one wants absolute moral certainty, one may pay a horrendous price.

In 1975, I was concerned with Angola because the first appearance of Cuban proxy troops thousands of miles from their Caribbean home, unopposed by the U.S., created a new reality that was bound to have serious long-term consequences. The take-over of Afghanistan . . . produced yet another new reality. I'm not saying we can change all unfa-

vorable trends everywhere. But, at a minimum, we must demonstrate that we understand the problem, and where we cannot affect a situation directly, as in Afghanistan, we can attempt to give courage to neighboring countries like Iran and Pakistan so that these friends have a sense that the U.S. is aware of their perils and ready to come to their assistance.

**Q.** Do you believe that Moscow plans to acquire control over West Europe's twin jugulars in the Persian Gulf and Southern Africa in order to induce reflexes of appeasement and the neutralization of West Europe?

A. I'm not sure that it's all that clearly articulated. Basic Soviet strategy is to achieve a maximum degree of influence and the gradual reduction of our own world position. The Soviets are very good at accumulating power, and power, in turn, creates its own reality. Therefore, the long-term impact may well be what you describe.

**Q.** Soviet officials have been saying in private conversations with Americans that we should practice unilateral restraint in the development of new weapons systems in order to help the doves in the Kremlin against a rival faction of hawks. Do you buy that?

A. No. If you look at the history of debates about Soviet intentions, almost invariably there has been a tendency to describe the top man in office in the Kremlin as a dove assaulted by some unnamed dark forces in the wings. We must conduct foreign policy, not psychiatry. A sound policy must be based on strict reciprocity. We will obtain no concessions for services already rendered—like the cancellation of the B-1 bomber or the neutron system.

**Q.** Won't a new era of détente with Russia, as advocated by the Administration, foreclose the Chinese option?

A. In this triangular relationship we have to be very careful not to be tempted by one side or the other into foreclosing our options. We must maintain an option toward both sides. It is not détente as such that will foreclose our Chinese relations; it would be the way détente is conducted, especially if Peking perceived it to constitute a Soviet-American partnership. At this point, it's not yet clear to me exactly what the Administra-

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tion is aiming at in its relationship with
the Soviet Union. That will be deter-
mined by how the new SALT treaty is
presented. In other words, will we insist
on some linkage or will we consider
SALT an end in itself?

Q. How do you feel about Western arms sales to China in general and U.S. ones in particular?

A. An increase in China's defensive capability, which would make invasion of China more difficult, is in our interest. This could be done by assisting in the transfer of technology or by some other methods. I certainly would not get in the way of our European allies who want to sell defensive weaponry to China.

Q. Carter's critics say that in Rhodesia we are guilty of undermining a compromise reached by black and white leaders and that we are facilitating a take-over by two Soviet-backed guerrilla leaders. Do you agree?

A. We have an interest in a moderate solution in which the races coexist in the

them from Cuban and Soviet support.
The theory is that these people are na-
tionalists and that once they've achieved
their objectives, they will repeat what
Sadat did in Egypt in 1972 when he
expelled all Soviet military advisers. But
this was after we had faced down the
radicals in a series of crises in 1970 and
had refused to adopt their program.

Q. Has Ian Smith lived up to his part of the bargain he made with you in 1976?

A. The issue should not be posed in
those terms because conditions have
changed. The plan has been implement-
ed in its formal aspects. On the other
hand, the premise of the plan was that
Joshua Nkomo would participate in the
government, so in one sense all its prem-
ises have not been fulfilled. Nkomo,
while not inherently a radical, has now
shifted to the Soviet-Cuban-East Ger-
man camp because he perceives it will
be the victor in southern Africa. His
natural inclination is to become Prime
Minister of Zimbabwe and he is lining

Q. Why are pro-Western blacks with large followings dismissed as Uncle Toms while guerrillas who terrorize their own are given the respectable label of "liberation forces"?

A. I cannot psychoanalyze the motives
but I would recommend that we watch
our language a little more carefully.

Q. Isn't one of the problems the assumption that when dictators fly leftist colors they must be standing for human progress?

A. The problem is whether you dam up
radicalism by embracing radical pro-
grams or whether you dam it up by creat-
ing moderate alternatives. I believe the
latter is the correct way. Others believe
you fight it most effectively by co-opting
radical policies as the wave of the future.
I think this feeds radicalism.

Q. Soviet spokesmen are criticizing us for abandoning the joint U.S.-Soviet aim of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement in favor of a separate peace. Do you think Camp David was the right approach?

A. Yes, in the sense that it represents a solution by stages. I always thought that a comprehensive settlement under the Geneva formula with the Soviets as co-chairmen would give a veto to the radicals. It would not advance a solution because it would produce a deadlock and make another explosion much more likely. Look at the problems that the Egyptians and Israelis encountered on just one agreement. On the Middle East, I would give the 'Administration high marks. The basic strategy is correct.

Q. What would be the consequences of a separate peace between Egypt and Israel?

A. I think Sadat was right in trying to establish linkage with the next phase of the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza. Now that the Israelis have accepted the principle—and are only holding back about the date of elections—all that seems to be left is to work out details. I can't believe it will fail on this issue.

Q. Should Jordan's King Hussein get involved in the next phase on the West Bank?

A. King Hussein has established a very complex and astonishingly good relationship with all the other Arabs, including the radicals. I can understand his reluctance to get involved without having some precise idea of what is going to happen. He might well conclude, for example, that an election on the West Bank will produce a PLO majority unless he represses them, and that would expose him again to all the perils he faced so courageously in 1970. I'm confident that once Hussein sees an evolution that opens up the way for a moderate settlement, he will join in the negotiation. I have great confidence in his judgment on this.

Q. If Sen. Jacob Javits retires from the Senate in 1980, will you enter the race?

A. I expect Javits to run in 1980.

Q. And if he doesn't?

A. I don't want to answer that.

'On the Middle East, I would give the Administration high marks. The basic strategy is correct . . . [Camp David was the right approach] in the sense that it represents a solution by stages.'

future. We must prevent another African
problem being "solved" by Cuban
troops and Soviet guns or we will lose all
capacity to affect events...

The strategy behind the so-called Kissinger plan was to bring about majority rule in Rhodesia while preserving minority rights and thus preventing the disaster of a racial conflict. The new U.S. team saw the problem somewhat differently. Their theory was that the best way to prevent yet another crisis being solved by Cuban troops was to take over the cause that the Cubans have been backing. They thought that would assure that the radical program would be limited; in fact, it made the radicals more assertive, without in any way diminishing their reliance on Cuban and Soviet support, which has actually increased. We should not support the proposition that only those who are prepared to go to war can determine the conditions of peace.

Q. I have personally heard Robert Mugabe say his forces won't stop fighting until they have imposed a one-party Marxist dictatorship. Why do some of our top officials still seem to favor guerrillas over moderates?

A. They believe that by supporting
radical groups, the U.S. can separate

up with those forces that seem to him
most promising. In a way, he is being
radicalized by the absence of a balance of
power. The U.S. should not throw all of
its weight behind those whose chief
claim is that they have Soviet arms and
thereby lose all incentives for restraints.

Q. What would be a proper policy toward South Africa in the years to come?

A. It should have three objectives: (1) to make South African institutions more compatible with widely accepted norms of human dignity; (2) to do so without a racial war; (3) to achieve this within a period of time that is relevant to the aspirations of the majority. It can be done only by giving the white minority a sense that we understand the dramatic challenge change will bring. It must have a sense that the beginning of its adaptation is not the beginning of its total collapse. It requires an understanding that a policy of confrontation with South Africa is tantamount to a policy of fomenting race war. Cyrus Vance, for whom I have the highest regard, showed a keen understanding of all these complex issues on his recent visit to South Africa. But so many domestic pressure groups want confrontation and conflict.

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