MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DEX to Colonel Kennedy in San Clemente

December 30, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL KENNEDY

FROM: General Haig

SUBJECT: Christian Science Monitor Article

The following is the letter and enclosure I talked with you about
on the phone.

By Courtney R. Sheldon

White House aides in any administration can learn with guillotine swiftness that they must accommodate themselves to a President's style of decision making.

Those President Nixon has summoned to the White House apparently have done so in good grace. They may find it enormously draining, but also often personally pleasant and certainly viable.

In these last hectic days of preparation of budget, economic and state of the union messages, aid and comfort from White House advisors is vital to the presidency.

In one sense they are middlemen -- between the cabinet members and the president -- sifters of opinion and bureaucratic regulators who supply the president with all the relevant facts for decision making.

But the elite of the White House inner circle is also closer at hand than the cabinet and the president does ask their advice, too. Everyone recognizes that the president must take the ultimate praise or blame. Any aide who is over anxious to have the public know of his personal good works obviously destroys his value to the presidency.

The press plays games at who originated what opinion and the president and his aides read the speculation sometimes grimly, sometimes approvingly, sometimes laughingly.

How can such diverse personalities, such independent, intellectual powerhorses as a Kissinger, Moynihan and Shultz find

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the magical formula for serving the presidency without impairing
their own integrities and futures?

One way is to neither play the role of an antagonist, at least
not early in the decision making process, or to give substance to
any suspicion of supplanting, duplicating or undermining the role
of cabinet members.

As one would expect, the inevitable result of the growth of
influence of the staff of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, assistant to the
president for National Security Affairs, is common wonderment if
the role of Secretary of State William P. Rogers is severely inhibited.

Unable to get assistance from either Dr. Kissinger or
Mr. Rogers in finding supporting facts, one source of information
has been the informal views of the assistants of the two men.

And this method, it must be candidly admitted, can be as
vulnerable from an accuracy standpoint as it is objectionable to
Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Rogers.

Are they as strongly opposed on a broad range of fundamental
foreign policy questions as has been portrayed in reports in this
newspaper and in other periodicals?

Staff assistants, if as independent minded and from varied
backgrounds as they must be, sometimes see the actions of their
bosses through tinted lenses. Some are conservative, others liberal.
They know much but not all. They can not be expected to know what
goes on when Mr. Rogers, Dr. Kissinger and President Nixon consult
in private.

The available facts today seem to indicate that at the hour

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of crisis in foreign affairs, there has been a better working
arrangement at the very top levels of government than is generally
assumed.

This applies to such sensitive judgments as how to respond to
the Soviet missile crisis in the Middle East and how to improve
relations with Communist China, for example.

And, in any event, it is difficult to put Dr. Kissinger in
the role of a direct competitor of the State Department, for his
job entails rustling around in military and intelligence areas as
well as diplomatic. In other words, he is called upon to look upon
issues from a somewhat broader perspective than is the State
Department.

It is clear that a continuing, across-the-board Kissinger-Rogers
confrontation could open a no-man's land in the Nixon administration
through which its enemies, at home and abroad, could drive a
truckload of positionous defoliants.

Are there personality differences between Dr. Kissinger, an
acknowledged expert in foreign and military affairs, and Mr. Rogers,
who has advised Mr. Nixon in other matters of import earlier,
beyond those that men of good will mutually tolerate, recognizing
that those of differing background can make a contribution to the
president's knowledge?

This question is almost beside the point when one takes into
account President Nixon's mode of decision making as explained
by Dr. Kissinger and reported later in this story.

Fragments on Kissinger-Roger relations which Kissinger and

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Rogers staff members can uncover, and many are shared willingly with them of necessity, have given a picture of rough, even rude division. These are subject to telling rebuttals by the principals involved.

The role of Dr. Kissinger, particularly is easily misunderstood. As he explained it on TV recently, "the secretaries of state and defense have a responsibility to make specific recommendations to the president. I have two responsibilities. One is to make sure that the President gets as many choices put before him as possible -- as many realistic choices put before him as possible."

"The second is to see to it that when issues overlap various departments that each department gets an opportunity to present its case to the president."

"My basic position cannot be that of an advocate. My position has to be that of helping the president make his decisions."

And at another point, Mr. Kissinger commented:

"The first thing to understand is that nobody gets to be president who suffers from a weak will. And, therefore, no president is likely to take only one person's advice. No president can afford to take only one person's advice."

"If my view differs from that of one of the cabinet members then the president would hear the cabinet member. But the way the president makes decisions, in any event, isn't that he calls in a series of people individually. What he generally does is to call all the interested parties together. In my field that is inevitably the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense; almost always the

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Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"Then he asks me, on the basis of preliminary work that has been done in subordinate bodies, to explain what the issue is. Then he almost inevitably calls on the Secretary of State first to state his recommendations. Then everybody else has an opportunity to state their views.

"If I agree, if no view is stated -- if I have a view no one else has stated, then I'll say what I think. If my view has already been expressed by somebody else, I don't say anything, unbelievable as it might sound."

The president, Dr. Kissinger reports, "takes copious notes, and he goes out and after thinking about it for a few days, he announces his decision."

If perhaps somewhat overstated or a bit flowery, the valedictory of Daniel P. Moynihan, retiring counsellor to the president, has further relevance:

"It is not enough to know one subject, one department. The president's men must know them all, must understand how one thing relates to another, must find in the words the spirit that animates them, must divine in the blade of grass the whole of life that is indeed contained there, for so much is at issue."

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Columbia University in the City of New York | New York, N. Y. 10025

RUSSIAN INSTITUTE

622 West 113th Street

November 26, 1969

Mrs. Zuzana Libich
Marsopstrasse 36
Munich 60
Germany

Dear Zuzana:

I was glad to have your letter, and to know how
things are with you.

In answer to your question about what the
possibilities would be for either work in a documentation
center or in translations in the United States, I will
make some inquiries as quickly as possible and try to let
you know what the prospects might be in time for you to
make a decision soon. At the moment, I do not know of any
openings, but there are always chance elements in turning
something up and I will let you know after I have done some
exploration.

Incidentally, last week in Europe someone told
me that Snejdarek had also come to Germany to live.

Recently I was in Washington and I told Henry
Kissinger that I had heard from you. He sends you his
warm regards, and says that he would be glad to help you
in any way he can. As you probably know, he is now in The
White House as a Presidential Advisor. I am sure he would
be glad to serve as a reference, if you should need one.

Keep me advised of your progress. I will write
again as soon as I have further information.

All best wishes from Colette and myself.

MDS:ajf

Munich November 15, 69

Dear Marshall,

How kind you both are and I suppose, what a cry_baby I
am. The only justification for my panic is that a) I have
sole reposibility for mother and daughter and I imagine that
our non_competitive system is not the best preparation for
this at my age, especially since the last 5 - 6 years had
been pretty easy what with teaching at the University and
doing translations and interpreting on the side. But you
are right, of course, things are bound to be tough in the
beginning and something will work out later. The only thing
is I will be forty-two next year and that does not give much
time for starting a new job, at least not in Germany, where
45 and more consigns you to the scrap heap, unless you are
in.

You will perhaps be annoyed with me when I tell you that I do not want to work for Radio Free Europe, who sent me a questionnaire referring to your letter. The main reason is that my husband has stayed in Czechoslovakia and is divorcing me. While I am not happy about his decision and I had hoped that things would turn out differently, this is a decision that everyone must make for himself and he remains Catherine's father. While I am not an optimist for the near future I think she will see him again ( she is 10 now) and I should not like to do anything that would bring the security people on his back, having left Czechoslovakia may in itself cost him his job. Another point is, and this is very evident when you talk to Czechs here in Munich, especially those in my category i.e. intellectuals who left after 68, the people who work in RFE are the eternal refugees, quite naturally. They are deeply involved with what happens at home and to some extent also in what must be termed as internecine battles between the 1948 and 1968 group. This applies more, of course, to commentators etc., and less to people who would be doing the sort of work I would, but I would very much like to try and make a new start. I shall, however, certainly go and see Dr. Boiter who wrote saying he had no job for me, but could perhaps give me some advice. Dr. Braun, also mobilized by you, and I am really very grateful, has told me what I have discovered in the meantime, i.e. that there was no great chance of any teaching jobs, as only native speakers were accepted, but has suggested that I write to a friend of his in the Chamber of Commerce, which I shall do, of course, though I am not very optimistic, I have really been going the rounds everyday and think that the only thing I could do in the economic field would be secretarial work, but I have no shorthand and my typing while quick is not perfect.

The only sensible thing I can do now is going on looking;
I have found some odd jobs to do so far, i.e. private English
lessons, translations into English for one of the Czech auth-
ors here, etc. Then I imagine the application for German
citizenship should be through by about January at the latest,
there seem to be no problems as to the principle, in view of
my parents nationality, in March or April I will therefore be
able to travel and then I shall make one big try to get into
the interpreting market, unless something permanent turns up
in Munich before then. I have after all worked for WHO,
ILO, ITU etc., in Geneva and for the IAEA and UNIDO in Vien-
in the last 20 months; still the market for interpreters is
not easy to get into and it is a job that while it does offer
very good earnings, does not provide much security. If all

this should fail or not look too secry there is one
other possi bility I had in mind and I would be very grateful
for your opinion on that. After all, besides interpreting
my only other skill is that I have a good knowledge of
English, French, German, Czech, a fairly good passive know ledge
of Russian and a very good knowledge of the east-west context
in the political and social sciences. The Geneva University
Diploma of "Interprete Farlementaire", which is the result of
a three-year university course, does not come up to the M.A.
and since what I tought in Prague was interpreting and
translating into English, this is of no great value university-
wise either. But the thing I had thought I would be able to
do here in Germany ( and this is impossible, since they do
not have anything of the kind either at the university or in
other research centers, except for highly computerized informa-
tion services in industry) was work in a documentation cente
where I would imagine the two abilities referred to might
prove useful. My query then is this, do you think that this is
something that would be any good in the US? I have a distant
relative who is professor of economic history at Michigan, who
would certainly give us an affidavit, or with a German passport
I imagine I might get in on a visitor's visa, so that would
perhps not be the problem, but I do not know whether this
sort of thing is needed at all. That was actually my query to
Mrs Persons, who then wrote to you. I would be perfectly
willing to take an extension course while working and I could
give a No. of references in the US and UK. The reason why
this letter is so long, please forgive me, is that in the
spring I have to make up my mind what to do, where to go etc.
Asking for work in an intellectual community is perhaps XXX
asking for too much, and if I find this is impossible I shall
not insist, but since except for responsibility for and
pleasure in the family, the main thing in life for the coming
years will be work, I would very much like it to be something
that I would find interesting and could do well. While
coming to the US ( if that is at all possible) would be XXXXX
another big upheaval, if I feel from what I know of it and
comparing it to Germany, that it would be easier to integrate
and make a new life there.

Now enough of this outpouring of middle-of-the-night
reflections, I would be very grateful if you could tell me
what you think of this last idea of mine, I shall keep on
making contacts here and looking for things and shall certain-
ly let you know how I get on. For the first time on my life
I wish Christmas etc., was over as quickly as possible and
the winter too, but I am certain that in years to come these
months will as me a heroic proportion and I shall bore my
grandchildren with the tale, My very warm regards and thank
you s to you both,

Zuzane Libich
München 60
Marsopstrasse 36

CBS
TELEVISION
NETWORK

A Division of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
51 West 52 Street
New York, New York 10019
(212) 765-4321

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

This is probably the most difficult letter I have ever written. What's worse - it's probably one of many that you receive daily. My name is Jane Simons. As you can tell, I work at CBS. Being a close observer of the news and its import, I have admired your ability and style for a long time, and hoped someday to be able to meet you.

Here comes the impossible part: you are going to be a presenter at the News Emmy Awards, May 22nd, in New York. Being interested in News, I was most excited that you were attending. There is no earthly reason for you to take me seriously, but because there is supposed to be something to the "American dream" theory, I have worked up the nerve to write to you and ask if you would consider escorting me to the awards, if you didn't have previous plans.

Now you can laugh - as well you might. You've never seen me, met me, or heard anything about me. I can only tell you that I am in my late 20's, am considered attractive and intelligent by others and come from Atlanta.

People who have dreams run a daily risk of being disappointed. But if you ever seriously considered my invitation, please know that you would have made one girl from the South the happiest she could be.

May 9, 1973

RECEIVED
DEC 9 1975

CENTRAL FILES

B:Gombert:jh

New Delhi,
Ministry of External Affairs,
Foreign Secretary,
Kewal Singh,
His Excellence

Henry A. Klauder

Best regards,

thanks to you for your contribution to this end.
positive relationship in the future. I extend my
improvements, they also set the course for a more
only did our discussion in New Delhi solidify recent
course of relations between our two countries. Not
I look forward with confidence to the future
come process.

we the important role you have played in this wel-
beat months. Ambassador Moynihan has described to
on behalf of improved Indo-American relations over
I have deeply appreciated your personal efforts

Dear Mr. Foreign Secretary:

3 NOV 1974

P760 193-1694

KEWAL SINGH

AMBASSADOR OF INDIA

WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 31, 1976

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I am enclosing herewith a Greetings Card from my Foreign Minister addressed to you, which unfortunately was delayed in the post and has reached me only today.

I would like to take this opportunity to convey again my own sincere and warm greetings and good wishes to you and to Mrs. Kissinger, for the New Year as well as the years to come. I was, in fact, hoping to have an opportunity to do so in person, but since I was aware of your heavy preoccupations and the pressures on your time imposed by the transition, I have refrained from even requesting for an appointment.

There were also other reasons for my wishing to have a few moments with you: to express appreciation for your remarkable efforts in recent years to defuse tensions and encourage the removal of the causes of conflict in various trouble spots in the world, and to seek your guidance and advice on our own bilateral relations, which I frankly do not consider to be of a level which adequately reflects the actual or potential importance that either country has for the other. Perhaps we may still have an opportunity to meet before you relinquish charge as Secretary of State. If not, I do hope, there will be many occasions during the next few years for exchanges of views between us on this as well as other subjects of mutual interest.

Once again with all our good wishes,

His Excellency
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, DC

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1977 JAN 31 AM 11:22

FIBRO
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

ACTION
is assigned

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 29, 1972

Henry:

Bill Small of CBS called concerning your TV show with Kalb. He stated that they are having impossible obstacles getting an appropriate time during the week of 21 September. He stated that because it is the start of the season they have been able to uncover only two options. They are both on Sunday nights. The first would be Sunday, September 17, from 6:00 pm to 7:00 pm. The other would be Sunday, October 1st at the same time. Small stated that this was really prime time and it is always a period of great viewer intensity. He pointed out that you could have the show taped on the Friday preceding the date you selected if it was in-convenient for you to have a live broadcast on a Sunday evening. I told him I would be back to him.

Al Haig

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1982 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# *Memorandum*

TO : Mr. Peter Rodman, Dr. Kissinger's Office DATE: November 10, 1972
West Wing, White House

FROM : Michael Smolik, EA/EX
Department of State

SUBJECT: Billing from MACV Guest House, Saigon

In accordance with our telephone conversation of November 10, I am enclosing the original receipt invoice for billeting and mess covering your stay at the MACV Guest House at Saigon.

The amount of $14.45 was paid by the Administrative Officer, Mr. James B. Moran, at the Embassy and the reimbursement check should be forwarded to him c/o American Embassy, APO 96243.

Attachment:

Original Receipted Invoice

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID YOUNG

FROM: William Richard Smyser

SUBJECT: The Students from Harvard and MIT

I have talked to Miss McFarland who is acting for the students from Harvard and MIT. They want to gain some insight into the subjects which they might be able to discuss with Dr. Kissinger.

Specifically, Miss McFarland said they wanted to pose the following questions:

1. Is Dr. Kissinger prepared to discuss why the students feel that the war in Southeast Asia is morally reprehensible from the American viewpoint and in the diplomatic context?

2. Could they present to Dr. Kissinger their arguments as to why they believe the social consequences of the war in this country are disastrous?

3. Would Dr. Kissinger be interested in having them describe for him the current state and nature of the anti-war movement?

4. Which of the intellectual arguments of the war (with which Dr. Kissinger is undoubtedly familiar) does Dr. Kissinger consider faulty and in need of discussion?

5. Could a discussion be useful as to why the political dialogue about the war in this country is taking place in an atmosphere of deepest distrust of the Administration and its spokesmen?

I asked Miss McFarland two questions: first, were they trying to impose an agenda under which they would refuse to entertain any remarks of Dr. Kissinger's which did not specifically address their five questions; and second, would they still wish to meet with Dr. Kissinger if he did not agree to discuss these five questions, or at least did not agree to discuss them in the way they had been put.

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Miss McFarland said that they would be delighted to hear Dr. Kissinger say anything he wished to say whether or not it addressed these five questions. She also said that they had many other questions if Dr. Kissinger did not want to discuss these five. Most important, she said, was that they wished to meet with Dr. Kissinger, and they were posing these five questions in advance so as to give him an idea as to their principal concerns.

I told Miss McFarland that I would pass this on to you.

I think the best thing would be for you to ask Henry about these questions and then to tell Miss McFarland what he says. She claims that she and her group are definitely not interested in talking to anybody else.

DIE ZEIT
WOCHENZEITUNG FÜR POLITIK · WIRTSCHAFT · HANDEL UND KULTUR

The Secretary of State
Mr. Henry Kissinger
State Department
Washington D.C.
U.S.A.

Dr. Theo Sommer

Hamburg, den 6.January 1977

This is simply to assure you that my thoughts are going out to you in these days when you are packing your cases and preparing to leave an office to which you have brought such distinction, stamina and incisiveness. I hate eulogies, so just let me say very simply that I think you were one of the great Foreign Minsters of our century.

I have always considered it a privilege to be your friend. On this occasion, however, I would especially like to thank you that you have taken so much trouble throughout your strenuous years in office to nurture that friendship. I remember with great pleasure the many times you took your time to see me, both in the White House and in the State Department - thanks ever. I am determined to keep our association alive, the more so as it was never primarily the office-holder but rather Henry Kissinger whose thoughts and judgements I was interested in.

Let me assure you, from one historian to another, that I am very much looking forward to your memoirs. As a German saying goes: "In Geldsachen hört die Gemütlichkeit und die Freundschaft auf". For this reason I have never made an effort to bid on behalf of DIE ZEIT for the copyright of

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ZEITVERLAG GERD BUCERIUS KG · 2000 HAMBURG 1 · POSTFACH 10 68 20

Hamburg 1 · Pressehaus · Telefon 3 28 01 · Telex 2 162417

Banken: Deutsche Bank AG, Kto. 08/12 461, Bankleitzahl 200 700 00 · Conrad Hinrich Donner, Kto. 2/05 245 · M. M. Warburg-Brinckmann, Wirtz & Co., Kto. 251 690 · Postscheck Hamburg 1290 00-207

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your book; we just are not playing in that
league. Only if you were positively wallowing
in money would I dare to ask whether you
would entertain a poor man's bid from us.
In the absence of such positive knowledge,
I think we simply have to keep out of the
race.

On the other hand I would like to put in a
good word for the joint tender filed by the
STERN, the biggest German magazine, and
Bertelsmann, the biggest German publishing
house. I am not privy to the figures but
rumor has it that they are willing to put
up 2 million marks. Henri Nannen, chief of
the STERN, is extremely interested in your
manuscript. Personally, I think that the
STERN would be a much better outlet for you
than would be the SPIEGEL (the best, of course,
would be DIE ZEIT - but, then, this is neither
here nor there). Nannen will be in the States
for the inauguration party - not in honor of
the new President, but of the new STERN office
in New York - between January 18 and 24. Do
you see any chance for meeting with him and
talking this thing over? He would be very
grateful. In case of a positive response,
please contact his office. (Tel. Hamburg
41183624 or Telex 211824)

I know that you must be feeling somewhat elegiac
at this time. I wish you a smooth transition
from official to private life - and apart from
that a world of luck.

With warmest regards to you and with greetings
to Nancy, I am as always

PERSONAL

January 4, 1972

11:45 a.m.

Henry:

The last of the series of conferences on forces shaping international relations that I have been attending at Ditchley over the last two years is scheduled for weekend after next, January 12-14. I have decided not to go to this one but before telling them so, I wanted to check whether you would want me to go and use the occasion to see anyone at Whitehall in connection with the Heath visit. You had mentioned that Burke Trend might come over shortly but I don't know if that is still on in view of your own travels. Could you let me know since I want to call Ditchley to decline their invitation by this weekend.

I assume since I have heard nothing further either about the Defense job or the plans here that no decisions have been made. In any case, if you have a moment before you leave for Paris, there are a couple of substantive matters to discuss: (1) preparations for the Heath visit; (2) energy/Soviet gas and煤精 precisely how far you want me to go with Schultz (kennedy says you want me to talk to him) on what has been said to Brezhnev and the political reasons therefor; (3) European policy; (4) SALT preparations; (5) status of Brezhnev visit and whether to push ahead on preparations of bilateral agreements -- also what is to be done with the chairmanships of the Commercial and Science Commissions with Peterson and David out; (6) what if anything you want me to do with Peterson in regard to his trip -- is the Rockefeller trip still on, also?

Sonnenfeldt

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 23, 1973

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Watergate and Foreign Policy

This is a first cut.

There are two broad sets of questions:

-- How do we run foreign policy under the new, not yet clearly defined circumstances?

-- How will other countries deal with us and we with them -- how do we best protect our interests at a time of domestic uncertainty and disorientation and against the background of what is already a dangerous deadlock between two coordinate branches of Government?

How is Foreign Policy Conducted?

The axiom to work with is that this is a Presidential government and therefore needs a Presidency to make it function. The alternative is government by bureaucratic interest groups, Congressional compromise, or simply inertia. It is true -- although the point has been grossly and at times maliciously exaggerated -- that excessive power in the foreign/ national security field has accumulated in the White House staff. It would have been wisé, not least because it might have helped to ensure some continuity after the lame-duck President leaves office, to begin "institu- tionalizing" the major policies and projects which this President set in train. That is to say, at the moment of his greatest triumph and power, in the opening period of his second term, the President should have moved to "broaden" the Presidency, to provide for a greater sharing of the powers of the office, and to divest his staff of some portion of its far-flung role. The sense of participation, involvement and shared power could be great assets for a President whose own power, authority and, perhaps, interest are likely to wane as the time of his departure approaches. But such a divestiture can be successfully managed -- itself a fearfully difficult task -- only from the heights of power and moral authority and while

EYES ONLY