DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird (not verbatim)

March 4, 1971 9:35 a.m.

jlj

NARA, Dalo

L: I just wanted to chat with you about a minute or two about a couple of things. I am going to be up on the Hill all the rest of this week and all of next. I do not get a chance to talk with you as often as I would like to. There is one thing that I wanted you to be aware of because it might leak out and I want you to be aware of it. The Appropriations Committee was briefed by Helms on all of our intelligence operations. He was asked if there was evidence of prisoners at Son Tay and he said he would not want to get into that. Then he was asked if there was evidence of prisoners not being there. In response to that he said that this was a difference of opinion between Senator Fulbright andxx Secretary Laird and he did not want to get into it.

K: God Dam it!! That is disgusting.

L: Now don't get upset about it Henry. I will handle it and I didn't tell you so you would get upset about it. I just wanted you to know what had happened in case anything came out on it. I was at a party last night and several people came up and asked me about it.

K: Did you talk to Helms about it?

L: Yes.

K: What did he say?

L: Well, he said he thought it was a little indiscreet but he has been getting so much heat on intelligence questions that he said perhaps he did back away from this one. I told him I could tell him one thing well in advance, that if he and Fulbright had a difference of opinion that I would be the one defending Dick Helms.

K: He is not a neutral figure. I may talk to him about this.

L: No. I will handle it Henry. They are going to question me on this this afternoon and I will take care of it then. Helms said he did not react quite possibly the way he should have.

K: You and Fulbright are not on the same level as far as Helms is concerned.

L: I just wanted you to know in case the story might leak. Long talked to Rhoads.

K: Who is Long?

By

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5/26

L: He is a Member of Congress on the Committee from Maryland. He talked to Mahon (phonetic ?) and Rhoads and wanted to make it public but they convinced him that he shouldn't say anything until they had heard from me today. I think he will keep his mouth shut but he has not a friend and would like to embarrass the Administration if he can. Another thing Henry. Bud got into a little bit of trouble over the Enterprise.

K: That can happen and he is a good man.

L: Saying that the cable did come up here.

K: Rogers [was pretty upset over this thing.]

L: Well the thing was, Bud said the cable did come up here and he and the Ambassador got together and sent the cable so he know it did, but it never got to Irwin or Rogers. It was just unfortunate. Chapman has a visit to South America coming up and I am running into a little trouble. They want to cancel Chappie out in Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Chile (??) and -

K: Who does? We will back you. The President wants military types down there.

L: The State Department. I am having a bad time with State who want to cancel.

K: I will back you 100%.

L: I am just afraid if they cancel it out they will tie it up with this Enterprise thing.

K: We will back you on it. Are you through with your list?

L: OK I have the charts the President wants to use in his press conference tonight but I sure wish he would not use them.

K: You mean on truck traffic?

L: OK Yes, truck traffic. I do wish he would not use them though. There are conflicts between the bureaucracy and these figures are debatable.

K: I will try and get him off it. Get the charts to me so we can say you responded but I will get him off it.

By NARA, Date 5/26

L: There are problems with the timing on truck kill figures. [ We didn't keep them before and then started and there are differences within the bureaucracy . . . ]

K: Mel, there is a meeting on SALT of the Verification Panel on Friday. Could you tell Dave for reasons that I will explain to you separately - I figure your point of view is that 3 - 4 safeguard is better than MCA. Isn't this your point of view?

L: This is but I have never been successful on that point of view.

K: Would you ask him to hang a little harder on that point of view in the meeting on Friday? I need someone who will push it a little harder, and would like you to ask Dave to push it along. ???. Push . . . survivability - so we can keep the _______ link.

L: Sure. Going to the charts again Henry. There really should be some changes made in these charts and with the differences in the bureaucracy it could be difficult.

K: Just send them over. I will move heaven and earth to keep him from using them. I promise you they will not leave my office. Just send them over because it is better to say Mel sent you these charts but we both think you should not use them than not sending them over because then he thinks you are trying to <u>steal</u> [steamroller] it through.

L: We did not have a truck put (?) before this operation. I just do not want to get into this argument.

K: I understand and we should not do it.

L: Henry, I have a lot of stuff over here. If Al wants to get in touch with Bob and Dan they will be helpful.

K: Thank you Mel.

c. Long talked to

By. NARA, Date 5/26

FELCON
President/Haig
12:15 p.m. 3/4/71

P: Two statistical things. number of ______ in Jan. 69 -- how many at that time.

K: Right.

P: Number of <del>un</del> <ins>un</ins> rounds of ammunition they claim to have already captured or destroyed in Laos operation. Around 1 million I think. Not rifles. Or give me number of rounds, rifles and tanks. number of captured and heavy weapons. The other point. How long the cease fire in the M.E. has been going on. I need those facts for some other material.

K: Right, sir.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Zeigler/Kissinger

12:20 p.m.

3/4/71

Z: I was asked the question at the briefing regarding the sale of U.S. jets to Red China. The asked if the WH would have to approve. I said I would check.

K: They are completely barred right now.

Z: But the technical answer is that would have to apply for an export license.

K: There's none for now.

Z: What should my answer be?

K: It's now on a forbidden list. Get the technical term for the list.

Z: No decision by the 3rd party man in NY about this?

K: No, absolutely not. We don't know if it's a bona fide request.

Z: No contact with us on that.

K: None k whatsoever.

Z: And find out what the forbidden list is?

K: The technical term for it.

Z: Thank you.

*

Telecon
Admiral Moorer
3/4/71 1:40 p.m.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

M: The President said yesterday he was going to call me at about 1:00. I've been waiting...

K: They asked me to return your call. Anything particular?

M: Yes.

K: About the truck figures?

M: Also to contact Abrams and get a foundup before the press conference. Right afterward I called Abrams and told him I wanted the information this morning and to send Weyand up to One. Abrams said that today is the best day of the operations so far. The morale is high -- the scheduled contacts went off without a hitch. The best information comes by calling him in the morning because that's night for him. Lam is in good shape. . . . tough, determined, careful, spirits good. . . . General Don (?) . . . morale is high. President Thieu is involved personally in this operation. . . . intently interested. While they do have some tough fighting ahead, we are going to make it and accomplish what we set out to do. I . . . . . . . . first division.

K: They are the best division. . .

M: Chup operation going well. . . . ARVN is pausing for two or three days to reorganize. The enemy has taken severe losses. You will see in the regular report that B-52s have killed well over 100. General Minh and his troops have weathered a trying week. . . . great tenacity, determination and skill. . . . . . commander whose credentials are in excellent order.

K: Excellent.

M: Details will be in the regular 2:00 report.

K: I will get that to the President immediately and tell him you called, but I've given him the gist and told him you will be all very confident.

M: The encouraging thing is that they have done all their medevac, men are in place, moving forward.

K: Okay, we're calm here now. You worry about your nervous people there. We are not going to use any of these truck hills?

M: That can get us in trouble. In 914B that regiment is scurrying around. . . .

By

NARA, Date

page 2

K: Lot of traffic in 914B and not much in 914C. Either they are trying to supply regiments or we've cut 914C.

M: We are plugging along Henry

K: You have held us together and we are grateful to you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger

2:45 p.m. 3/4/71

K: I don't hear from you any more.

S: I know because I am snowed. I just put in the mail an Eliot to Kissinger
the paper you should get/

K: I have it.

S: Here's where we stand. We have done very well on the Secy. Gen.'s
report. Key part -- that's demonstrating what you can do when you keep
your feet to the fire. It's a far cry from condemnation and we can make a
good case if we hear from the Jewish groups. "Amb. Jarring has been
active over the past month and some progress on the M.E. question/
Problems to be settled have been identified. I wish to note with satisfaction
the positive reply by the UAR but Israel has not responded that it will be
(back) to the boundaries of the UAR. We ask Israel to reply positively to
Amb. Jarring. ? ? ? ? ? the issuance of a communique (at the end of the
meeting ?) to give time for further consideration I ask that they hold fire
and ? ? ? ? ? " Represents 4 victories. No condemnation, mild language,
SecGen's report first and fourth, after breaking his arm 4 times asking that
he make an appeal on cease fire. Now if I can do as well on this next step.
4-power appeal. The Secy. doesn't know we are on this.

K: Well don't

Telecon
Jee Sisco
3/4/71 4:55 p.m.

NARA, Date 5/26

K: On that cable you want to send to Sadat -- the President refuses to clear it today.

S: That's okay. Tomorrow will be okay too. It is all right in substance?

K: I don't think he wants to do it at all.

S: I handled it carefully so as not to go too far. Is there any cutback version?

K: I suggested a cutback version taking that "courage and statesmanship" part out but he didn't even want to talk about that today.

S: It would help to keep the Egyptians aboard. They are in a four-power meeting now; won't break up till 7:00 or 8:00 tonight.

K: Will you let me know when it does?

S: If I hear anything.

K: You'll hear something -- will you keep me informed?

S: Yes, but Henry Something would be helpful.

K: I recommended keeping sentences one and three and dropping the second sentence.

S: That's okay. If you can do it it will be very good, but the world won't come to an end if he doesn't.

K: I talked to him personally figuring he might get a phone call. But he said he didn't want to clear it at all.

S: He doesn't want to go on the record with this guy?

K: That is my impression. But he also is preparing for the press conference.

S: I'll leave it in your hands. See what you can do with one and three and if he decides not to do it, I don't think you will hear any screams from us. That's what I said to the Secretary. It's desirable but not essential.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger

6:18 p. m. 3/4/71

S: A reading on the 4-power thing. I sent instructions to George that he should open the meeting as follows: inform the other 3 that he is under strict instructions that he could not engage in writing of the 4-poer communique that says in principle that support of SecGen appeal is cease-fire -- it's a Russian tactic. For 3 hours they tried to get him to write. He said sorry. After 3 hours the French said no communique unless there's the cease fire in it? He said yes. The french then said, we will inform you we can go along with reference to cease fire. That made it 3-1. In light of that the Russians said they would look at it and reconvene at 3:00 tomorrow. I told Geo. we have power and let's use it.

K: You are playing it beautifully.

S: I am so angry! we are not being taken over the coals. The Secy. said Joe, stay with it.

K: You expect tomorrow there will be a report and 4-power communique.

S: It won't go beyond the text today. We are making changes every hour but not beyond. Essentially what we said. (Sisco then read the communique). Then the last paragraph on the cease fire. Not bad?

K: That's good. OK, Joe.

TELCONE
President/Kissinger
mid-afternoon 3/4/71

NARA, Date 5/26

P: This memo from Abrams or Bunker, I suppose hasn't gotten to Rogers and Laird.

K: They don't know I sent it. It would create -- they don't know I was in touch with Bunker.

P: Suppose I want it out? I want to buck them up.

K: I have one equally good thatIwas about to bring to you. Abrams sent in an answer -- you talked to Moorer and wanted an up date.

P: I talk with him every night.

K: Moorer called Abrams and Abrams says it's the best today with ARVN executing without difficulty. I could send that around because it came in in the regular way.

P: Do and send Bunker a back channel asking him at the President's request to up date and send his memo through channels as a regular report. Say at the request of the President I am sending this. To Helms, Secy. of State and to that.

K: I think we have broken the back -- don't be too sny optimistic but it looks like the first time in 3 weeks the initiative is on our side and another landing tomorrow. They advanced another 4 miles today. Along Rt. 9 towards Tchepone. Only 5 miles from Techpone. Will go closer tomorrow. They're over looking at the hills overlooking the country. They are pushing through on the road. We will still get some heat and some tough battles but muscle boundx posture of the last few weeks and they could hit us for being ? ? ? ? . It's a very, very optimistic report of Abrams'.

P: Fire it around. I don't want to take an optimistic report without Laird knowing. Tell him I will reflect it tonight.

K: I will see that he gets it right away and I will send it to State at your request.

P: Send it to Rogers rather than to State and say the President wanted it sent. Just send me that cable over so I will have it in my file as I work.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Gov. Rockefeller/Kissinger
12:10 p.m. 3/5/71

K: You certainly made our leader here feel good last night. Sorry I couldn't call myself.

R: I understand.

K: I was already half an hour late for a meeting.

R: I am coming to see him. I had an excellent meeting this morning. Looking forward to my visit with the boss this afternoon.

K: I have told Haig to bring you up to day on what's going on at SEA. Come in before or after.

R: I will try for before.

K: If you get here between 2:30 and 3:00 I will be here.

R: I will come directly from the airport. Great job last night.

K: If we don't panic we will be spectacular. In the M.E. it will be the same if we get the nervous nellies out of buxiness. If the President keeps the line of last night we will do great in the M.E.

R: I will drop in. Take care of yourself. We are for you and try to support you.

K: You are a great friend and supporter.

R: A common cause.

K: Look forward to seeing you later.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Jos/ Alsop/Kissinger
2:30 p.m. 3/5/71

A: There are 2 or 3 things I sort of like to have a quiet chat with you over the weekend on the get-Kissinger movement that's being organized. I don't think it's serious and from what Walt said about your reaction you are being too gloomy. It depends on the President and you have no worries there.

K: It depends on when oneself should not allow oneself to be the chief focus.

A: It depends on what Walt and I agreed on when you are indispensable you have to hang on and do the job. You have been very wise on what's going on.

K: I appreciate this very much.

A: I care about you. If it gets worse and goes on I may have something to say about it but not without talking to you. Will you be here for the weekend?

K: Tomorrow morning.

A: Would you like to have breakfast?

K: Let's aim for that.

A: In your damned office? Could we do it as late as 9:15 ?

K: Sure.

A: The second thing that is important is for me is Azar Berlin and ______ staying with me and I would like to have a special Sunday night supper for them. Whatever you are doing I hope you can come for supper.

K: I will put that down.

A: With Azar it's always worth the trouble. 7:30 and not dressed. I will be sure you see both of them. It's easy enough that you see both of them.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Sisco/Kissinger
2:35 p. m. 3/5/71

S: Just to fill you in on where we are we are where we left off yesterday.
The Secy. Gen. will put out a report for today which is as I read to you yesterday.
No changes. Whether there will be a 4-power communique is problematical.

K: There will be.

S: We will see. Even the Secy. Gen. is in on our behalf because we will
not budge. I will give you a reading tonight.

K: I appreciate that.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger

2:45 p.m.

3/5/71

R: I have been tied up since you called on these appearances. I am free
from 4:00 on. Will you be free after that?

K: How about tomorrow morning.

R: Let's see. I am --

K: If not, I will shift xxx something but I have something at 5:00 I cannot
change but I --

R: We could do it on Monday.

K: OK. You know I don't have any urgent thing. One way to kill these
stories is to be together on things rather than this seeming posture and
xkcd see what we can bring about.

R: Right. You are not free between 3:30 and 6:00?

K: How about 4:15? We can do it in half an hour.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Sisco/Kissinger
6:32 p.m. 3/5/71

S: I just spoke with Al.

K: I haven't even got a call into the President.

S: I know you don't. I will call our S/S people and explain to the Secretary
so he won't get nervous. Is there someone to call in the Pentagon?

K: We will handle it.

S: I will tell them in low key to call Rabin and say here's the indication and
what do you have?

K: How did the 4 go? They don't agree?

S: They are still in there. In these circumstances -- no wonder the Russians
have been playing this game. It's interesting Sadat was in Moscow on the
3rd and 4th of March.

wouldn't
K: I don't give it any concern. I have to talk to the President on another
thing and I will run it in.

S: I will play it low key to the Israelis and get a good look at the letter in
the morning.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Kay Graham/Kissinger
evening 3/5/71

G: I am in Chicago and just got notice that Connallys chopped for a WH State dinner. You have that to don't you?

K: I was going to miss it.

G: You have to go don't you?

K: Why don't you change it?

G: I am sure everyone is going. Mrs. Nixon's birthday. As well as the Prime Minister. I think the Colses were going. I will change it and get back to you on the date.

K: I don't think you could get too many people I probley would have come but if I can have both I prefer it.

G: Only govt people were you and the Connallys.

K: I frankly think it's better if we can have both.

G: I will get back to you. I will see you for lunch on Friday the 12th.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telcon

The President /Dr. Kissinger

6 March 71; 9:20 a.m.

P: I just got a brief report from Moorer. He said things are really jumping around there.

K: Our people just captured 1000 tons of rice. Did he tell you?

P: No, I just said what's going on. He is so honest, he would tell me (laughter). I just want him to know I am watching the military. What about the rice?

K: The radio reported they are already in Sepone. If not, it's just a question of hours.

P: He said it's an interesting thing. Not a word about the war on the front page of the Washington Post this morning.

K: It's gone to the back pages.

P: Isn't that something? Our allies are doing well. That would be bannered in World War II. These bastards - isn't it terrible?

K: They took 11 prisoners in one spot alone yesterday.

P: Is 11 prisoners quite a few?

K: Oh, yes. That is, in one engagement, Mr. President. That is very unusual. They have all the heights overlooking Sepone. Made another landing at the outskirts of Sepone. Probably the radio report is correct that they are in there.

P: One thing I told him -- you and Laird in everything you say make the point if you do get into Sepone we are not there to stay. Just to disrupt it and we will leave. And I think you should get that in a backgrounder because once we are in the papers will make something of it. Simply say we are only there temporarily for the purpose of disrupting the situation and then we will leave. Isn't that correct?

K: Absolutely. We are getting a lot of intercepts from the supply depots south. They are running out of supplies, ammunition; they don't have gasoline. Just one endless bitch of what they are short of. This was before we started moving so even the operation up to the time we started moving has had its results. Just for your information, Abrams has sent a backchannel to Moorer saying he would have all the roads around Sepone cut in the next few days, but don't tell anyone because he doesn't want to be held to it. Route 19 is the only one possibly open. He just reported it to Moorer.

NARA, Dato 5/26

President/HAK - page 2

P: They don't report it to us.

K: Yes, because if he makes a production and doesn't get there we start getting nervous. I think your Laos operation is going to turn out better than Cambodia. In the whole Cambodia operation we captured only 3000 tons of ammunition. I talked to my briefer this morning. He is an Army colonel in the Haig style -- a tough combat type. He says he sees no way by which we can lose it. I think that is right.

P: I mentioned to him, don't let's get into a position we are sucked in and think we are there and then let them pounce on us.

K: Since we are moving by helicopters they can't keep us from moving.

P: He told me as far as our air strikes being delayed, it's because of the weather. He says this is not the best of weather at this time of year. What do you figure? They haven't done anything yet have they?

K: No, they won't be able to do anything until 48 hours after yesterday noon. Monday morning. I had a talk with Dobrynin yesterday.

P: What did Dobrynin say.

K: He said I might have an answer by Tuesday on this thing. I told him I hope you noticed the President's press conference. Your communication had some influence on him. It was partially in response to your communication on Vietnam. I hope you also noticed what he said about the air -- that he will do exactly what he said he will. Dobrynin said his party leaders are now getting ready for the Party Congress, so they are only focussing on one thing. But he thought he would have an answer by Tuesday.

P: So that we could have an exchange of letters. If it doesn't turn out we can make a speech. I don't think SALT should start by some jackass statement by Smith again.

K: The way the instructions are for Smith, they will start and deadlock and then he will want to come to the rescue and our problem is to preempt him by two weeks. Just before the talks start, or by April 1, have you hake a statement to break the deadlock.

P: I would rather do it before because they are never going to agree with Smith, are they?

K: No. The talks are guaranteed to deadlock and they will deadlock for a long stretch. So you might want to save it for April.

P: I am talking to the newspapers on April 13.

X

By. NARA, Date 5/26

President/HAK, 6 Mar - page 3

K: Could conceivably have the talks announcement on the 6th or 7th and then on the 13th make your SALT proposal. We could keep it screwed up in Vienna until then. But I haven't given up on the exchange of letters.

P: I think there is a good chance. They need it and we need it. We have been conciliatory but firm. Didn't he feel that we were pretty evenhanded in the press conference, or did he mention that?

K: He did not make any comment on that. It was a very short meeting. I said, with March 16 approaching, when do you think you will have an answer? He said he noticed in your press conference you noted our original position on SALT.

P: We will agree on defensive and say next year we will discuss offensive -- the letter will say that - right?

K: Yes.

P: And then next year we will have another meeting to do that.

K: He brought that message to talk to the North Vietnamese again and I said, sure, they know how to get hold of me.

P: You told them through Walters, didn't you?

K: They know that. I did not tell him that. We won't make any move now.

P: No, don't make any move at all unless to get out of Paris. Make up a scenario whereby we break off the talks and make another move to talk about prisoners - in Geneva or some such thing.

K: The only other thing - the Egyptians have refused to extend the cease-fire. ...give us a year's breathing space. Up to now Sisco and Rogers have been reluctant. I think we should go for the partial solution.

P: That will give the Egyptians a reason. They don't want to break the cease-fire.

K: The end of the cease-fire puts the Egyptians under pressure. It gives us the running room here. At the same time we can move some of the general solutions into a private channel and give the Russians an added incentive for a Summit.

By NARA, Date 5/20

President/HAK, 6 Mar - page 4

P: Things on Berlin are going smoothly?

K: Yes.

P: How about getting the meeting, but not the full NSC. Apart from us, Rogers, Laird, Helms, Sisco -- that is all. If you get in Agnew he will want to argue about the merits, etc. Haig should be there to take notes. I don't like to get into this thing that Johnson was in - to have a lunch. These things are all NSC meetings. Eisenhower used to call them Executive Sessions. You don't have to have everybody.

K: The only ones you are scrapping are Agnew and Lincoln.

P: Should we have Moorer.

K: No, we don't need him on this. With Sisco's impetuosity-- the thing to do is slow the thing down.

P: Do you think I should inform Rogers to get at it in a subtle way?

K: There is an advantage to having it Tuesday or Wednesday so that they can't do anything until we have that meeting. I would recommend Wednesday in order to keep them from buck-shotting cables all over the place. It is the one area we haven't played the control game where we don't move until we know where we are going. If we had gone the other way a blow-up with the Israelis and then the cease-fire -- Sadat was in Moscow March 1 or 2. Dobrynin told me he had a file, private or otherwise on everything we had given to Cairo. I don't think he was bluffing.

P: Bob Finch, who is very close to the Jewish leaders in California said they were really reassured by the press conference when I said blankly I wouldn't impose a settlement.

K: I told Tricia on Thursday night that for diplomatic skill that Israeli statement was a masterful statement.

P: I have a feeling that the press conference came just about the right time on all these issues. On Laos it came at the right time because we had to have a time that would be followed by some news that would not be too bad. Just sticking it to the press in the way that they couldn't respond. The press corps needed to have that said to them.

K: They keep saying you were mad at them. I told them you were not made at them, you were just stating the facts.

President/Kissinger, 6 Mar - Page 5

NARA, Dato 5/26

P: I don't think they have ever been so frustrated.

K: We had had nothing but ... them, then you go on and speak with confidence and say it is going to work out as well as Cambodia and remember you people predicted that it wouldn't work. Strategically this is more important than Cambodia.

P: It is more important because Cambodia was already done. It is the second battle. We are really chocking their lifeline now.

K: They moved one battalion east -- the North Vietnamese do a flanking push on Route 9 and immediately ran into some of our reserves and lost 200 men. That is something that a week ago would have driven us crazy when we did not have enough men in there. I think the beggest turning point administratively was your decision to get that private briefing from Moorer a week ago on Thursday because when we called over to the Pentagon and said we needed that they felt they had to answer these questions and get ready for your briefing. And they pushed on together and got themselves a plan.

P: Abrams seems to feel better now does he?

K: Yes, he is on top of it now. Some day I would like to know whether there wasn't a private understanding with Laird and ... At any rate you were right, Abrams is now going like the Abrams of Cambodia and for a week there it looked like he was shell-shocked.

P: Maybe it was that he ran into those 100 tanks. It was an awesome thing. I think Laird has held back on the air strikes for two weeks. Now that we have ordered it they will give our people a shot in the arm.

K: The Russians I will have to tell you are going to scream a bit.

P: We know that.

K: Even if it slows down our discussion with them by a couple of weeks.

P: We know them. What is the Chinese political statement?

K: They haven't made it yet. The North Vietnamese in Paris said we don't want to go into a conference even if they are urging us to do it. We haven't urged them to do it lately so maybe the Russians or the Chinese did.

By NARA, Date 5/24

President/HAK, 6 Mar - Page 6

P: The Chinese must think there is not going to be any Yellow River concept. That is the reason they haven't moved in yet, don't you think?

K: They just can't be sure what you are going to do if they tackle you. The second thing - they still have these 36 Russian divisions sitting up there.

P: I will give Bill a call today and tell him we would like to have a meeting Wednesday. When do we have an NSC meeting?

K: On Monday and that will be on SALT.

P: All right, Henry. Thank you.

ms

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Secretary Sisco
Mr. Kissinger
1:00 p.m., 3/6/71

S: Good morning Henry.

K: Joe, you remain the only Assistant Secretary who will not get on the line first.

S: In view of the fact that we have established a principle, I will get on the line first from now on. Henry, we are sending over a memorandum which gives you an analysis of the Sadat message. We have made it low key. All the lights that lit up in Washington last night, we have been busy extinguishing. I am seeing Rabin later today. He and I have developed a sort of Suez Canal agreement. The time has come to have an agreement with Israel only. You should know that you will be seeing something in the cables tomorrow that will spell out the Sisco-Rabin Suez Canal proposal.

K: The President is thinking of having an NSC on this.

S: The Secretary, on Monday morning, wants to communicate this proposal to four or five people -- to you, to Laird, to Helms. He would like to have a little meeting in his office with you, Mel and Dick to see if there is anything in this proposal that can be sharpened before we get to the President. I said I would pass along this idea to you in my conversation today.

K: Okay. I have to reserve my position until I talk to the President.

S: I don't think the intention is to lock anyone in. The Secretary feels as we look at this thing we can improve it and sharpen it up. In any event, he has not said anything and I said I would pass it along to you.

K: Okay, fine.

mlh

By NARA, Date 5/26

telcon

MCGeorge Bundy/Kissinger

11:40 a.m. 3/8/71

B: Have you got a minute?

K: Certainly.

B: I have been talking with Mat Meselson and I have found myself persuaded that in the long run in what our Administration started in defoliation and tear gas the max ditch between these weapons and man I am in marginal disagreement with your statement that herbicides and ______ are okay. I want to talk but in a way as little complicating to you as possible. I talked to Farly and may be careful in relation to the Secy. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? and other people with their interpretations? Any advice on this point?

K: Countries will put their interpretations on it?

B: We suggest control events and then they become ______ and what we said in '65 and the 6 available combat uses of CS there is no difference between fixing a junle trail and --

K: We would suffer no pain here if you indicated what you said to me privately that good fences are ? ? ?. We have had tough arguements here. If you do it with compassion for the President.

B: The Administration made gains in '69. The reason I suspect that Messelson and Fulbright want me to testify is that you authorize in one context and the process of war and saving lives carry max you downstream in ways you cannot control. I don't think a Senate reservation is a healthy way. If I read the Secy's resume it would be hard for the President to work this out and I sympathize but a deep ditch and a stronger fence wouldn't bother me. One more year isn't the end of the world. Any communication with the committee that gives you a feeling for their thought?

K: Their thinking hasn't crystallized yet. But I am not the best witness on Congressional relations!

B: If you have Mark Childs on your side then a lot will follow you. That was a nice thing for him. It's a tempest in a teapot now. Max Lerner makes the same point in the NY Daily News.

K: I really do stay away from Congress for reasons which you know.

B: You don't have time in the day. If Max Fulbright has you testifying --

K: And eclipsing the Secy. of State --

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
McGeo. Bundy/Kissinger

11:40 a.m. 3/8/71

-2-

B: I hope they ask that question.

K: If we disagree we will have a merry time.

B: It's a clear cut case. It's a built in example where they fail to take an honest concern -- there's a problem but this is not the answer to it.

K: When you make farreaching decisions without anyone knowing that is a concern. Considering they have had Rogers on and he didn't tell them before then it's not going to help to have the Security Advisor not to tell them

B: Do you have a wise man on your staff who is handling this other?

K: Michal Guhin on my staff has been following this and he is sympathetic to your position. I will also check with our Congressional people.

B: I want it in the least harmful way.

K: I will let you know the feeling here.

And I am more year old, communication with the committee that gives me a nought?

I wasn't crystallized yet. But I am not the best witness on lations!

If we have Mark Childs on your side then a lot will follow you. That was a long for him. It's a tempest in a teapot now. Max Lerner makes the same to the NY Daily News.

I do stay away from Congress for reasons which you know.

You don't have time in the day. If Maxx Fulbright has you testifying --

and eclipsing the Secy. of State --

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Sen. Allot/Kissinger
11:48 a.m. 3/8/71

K: If you were not well treated on this trip then I quit.

A: What did you tell Kenneth Rush?

K: That you are a friend of ours.

A: You must have given him a load. I was absolutely delighted.

K: No one that deserves it more.

A: More than hospitable. Had lunch with him and a drive. Then had dinner with him and talked until 11:00 that night.

K: He is first class.

A: I didn't say this but I went to London after that and had a short meeting with the Ambassador and well, there isn't much comparison.

K: I know what you are talking about.

A: I want to thank you. I think I really made a new and good friend.

K: I thought you two would be on the same wavelength. I appreciate everything you did for us.

A: I wanted you to know how well it turned out.

K: I am delighted. Hope to see you soon.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

12:20 p.m., March 8, 1971

R: On the textile matter, I am not sure I am in accord with the draft press statement we worked out. I don't think the President will want to acquiesce so soon. It would be difficult for him to do it.

K: Are we acquiescing?

R: As the statement is drafted. Don't give him this statement yet.

K: I haven't see it, actually. We told Ziegler to say we are studying it.

R: We sent a statement over to you.

K: I will stop it. Flanigan is calling a meeting at 3:30 of all interested agencies. He, Stans, and the political people are pushing in the opposite direction of rejecting it.

R: Our posture is damned important. If we reject it tongue-in-cheek as everyone wants... We can't acquiesce or he will lose the benefit he is trying to get with the textile people. We have to take his political questions into account.

K: On our side here, I will hold to our position. We are studying it and have nothing to say until we have the interdepartmental meeting this afternoon.

R: Okay, Henry.

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

12:45 p.m., March 8, 1971

L: Yes, Henry.

K: Mel, on the President's request on more gunships for Vietnam, he doesn't want a memo that tells him what the program is and how we are fulfilling it. Frankly, he is getting teed off about fixed-wing aircraft. Moorer the other day was telling him about how gunships...

L: He saw the TV program yesterday. I told the President that 10 per cent of the sorties are destroying 80 per cent of the trucks. That was developed under my direction.

K: He wants more of them out there.

L: I ordered more on Friday.

K: Could you give us a memo saying you added to the program?

L: Yes. And we are turning some over to the Vietnamese. I do this over the dead body of the Air Force and just tell them to do it.

K: Could we have over here on a close-hold basis your projections of Air Force capabilities in Vietnam next year. My judgment is we should draw those down last.

L: You want to keep as much of the Air Force as you can. I don't think we want to make any reduction in Thailand.

K: We want to control the situation with regard to air power.

L: We have the same number of B-52's. The last thing to go is air support. We have gone from 23 to 33 squadrons, and by next summer, there will be over 50. We are keeping the pressure on. We are now putting gunships in and training people to take them. We have to keep the pressure on and we are, Henry. I will send you a memo.

K: As far as our own air support is concerned, keep as much as you can during 1972 so we can interdict offensives.

L: I agree on that.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

12:45 p.m., March 8, 1971

K: You did a great job at the NSC this morning.

L: Do you think they understood I want an option on land or sea.
Does he understand why I think the Minutemen will be in such bad
shape?

K: I have given him some of those memos. I think the Russians
have started a massive program.

L: Should I send another memo?

K: Send another one. You are responsible for this program.

L: I won't talk about it pessimistically publicly.

K: Not optimistically and not pessimistically. You have to be
realistic.

lds

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Alice Roosevelt Longworth
2:40 p.m. 3/8/71

L: They were charming flowers. Absolutely delightful.

K: You are very nice. You are one of the people I admire most.

L: I admire you more than anyone in Washington. A very old friend, John
Wheeler Bennett --

K: I know his writings and I admire them.

L: They are coming in to Washington for dinner on Wed. evening.

K: I am giving a speech but could I come afterward?

L: Certainly! When?

K: 9:30?

L: That will be fine. It may only be the Bennetts and myself. If you could
come earlier, fine. And I will ask Joe and see how he behaves himself.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Rogers/Kissinger
5:07 p. m. 3/8/71

R: I am going to be a little late for the meeting. My comments on ____
didn't mean I **were** favored --

K: Not a problem with us as much. We will not have trouble negotiating if
the Soviets want it.

R: We can't develop one for 4-5 years so why start it? The Joint Chiefs
wanted the (relation?).

K: I took your statement to mean there's not a problem holding up the
negotiations on our side because we want to ban them. I don't think the
President wants to change our position on that. My instinct is that the
President will stick with our present position with a few modifications
that Gerry recommended and we have the other for a later down the road.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
3/9/71 4:05 p.m.

R: Sorry to bother you; I understand you're in a meeting. But I wanted to talk about the meeting scheduled for this afternoon. I am afraid it would disrupt things. . .

K: I hadn't seen your memo when we talked or Ted Elliot's memo or I would have mentioned it.

R: What's the problem? We talked to the President about it and thought it would be best to go over this before the NSC meeting. I don't see why it should cause any problem.

K: I don't want to make a big issue of it and I don't object to everyone else getting together. It's the agreement everyone had two years ago about how things should be done. If we all agree it puts the President in an impossible position if he doesn't. If you and I disagree -- we don't want to be in that position; and if there are disagreements then the President has to arbitrate between us. So I think it best not to show up there.

R: I thought we should talk it over because, first we weren't sure this was the best position and second it's better to do it in the absence of the President than in his presence.

K: It's a question of the whole NSC machinery. If on every important issue we move out of it . . .

R: This isn't really out of it. I think it important for one thing because of the leaks.

K: Well all the Under Secretaries know about it now anyway.

R: No, I don't think all of them do. Jack and Joe Sisco and Mel and you and Helms. I don't think we should be so inflexible that we can't ever do it any other way. I think if you don't come . . .

K: The President is aware of this. If you and I understand this is a good one-time thing; I'm not trying to make any points here.

R: It is. There may be times when I don't want it to go through the whole machinery. I just thought because of the leaks and the sensitivity of this thing -- I don't think anyone can be sure he's right, and an exchange of views would be helpful under the circumstances. I thought it would be desirable for you to come.

K: Okay, let me see whether I can break up my meeting here.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

Telecon

Gerard Smith

3/9/71 6:30 p.m.

S: Yesterday there was a reference to some possible public statement on our subject. Can you tell me anything about that?

K: Nothing except what you put into his head.

S: Will one such ___________ ex

K: We have no intention of making such a statement. None such exists now. This is done ______ at some point.

S: Oh good. I thought he was talking about . . .

K: Do you want something?

S: No, not now.

K: Don't you think it would be a little premature now?

S: You're so close to the State of the World now it wouldn't be appropriate.

K: At any rate there is nothing planned and if anything is planned you'll have a chance to look at it.

S: Okay. Any guidance before we leave?

K: I'm trying to get to him.

S: Okay, we are postponing the briefing of Mac for a week or so.

K: I think that's a good idea.

By. NARA, Date. 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

6:45 p.m., March 9, 1971

K: I had one problem which I don't want to -- the message by Sutherland -- you know the message by Abrams which suggests that the South Vietnamese are slacking off a bit. I talked with the President this afternoon and the President feels they ought to stay in as long as they can stay in there. We will give them any support they need at least until they can get closer.

L: When Thieu briefed on this, he always thought 5-8 weeks. He thought he had a great security (?) and a political impact. I have a message going out to Abrams encouraging them to stay a little while. You know what Thieu's job is.

K: I don't but I suspect that it is what it is. I talked with the President and the President feels that when you are hurting the guy, make it pay as much as possible. You were the one that was telling us at the beginning.

L: Thieu put out that he has accomplished a year's work already.

K: But that's not true. Do anything you can do to make them stay as close to May 1st as you can.

L: I will do that.

K: Okay

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/ Admiral Moorer
6:50 p.m., March 9, 1971

K: I just talked to your boss.

M: Good.

K: And told him the President wants you to stay. Laird is getting
a message out to Abrams tonight expressing this same view.

M: After he got your phone call.

K: He said he got confused after the phone call with Thieu. Make
sure Abrams knows that he has our support. Tell him verbally
and tell him that I may have been bugging him at the beginning
and I may still bug him, but I will always bug him to go forward
not backward.

M: You don't have to bug him to go forward. I tried not to put in
that April 5th date but Laird rewrote the message. I will go out
to Abrams -- assure them that we will give them continuous air
support as long as they are in there.

K: They ought to have maximum effectiveness.

M: It is a lot easier to stop them than to start them. ______ on one
hand and the North Vietnamese strikes on the other, it is better to
have this continuous going on. We can always step in to stop them
easier than we can start them.

K: Don't do it because ......

M: Had authority to do it until this morning.

K: Don't you have the authority? You have the authority even if it has
to be retroactive.

M: Now I have the authority to renew it and I am doing that right now.
It is a stop and start operation. We will go out with it, don't worry
I'll get the word out to Abrams.

K: Good.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Director Helms

6:58 p.m., March 9, 1971

K: I just wanted you to know you are dead right and I hope you will speak up at the meeting with the President. I don't think these guys know what they are getting into.

H: This is correct. I am deeply concerned about the whole thing.

K: Frankly -- I agreed with your other statement. What the Arabs have agreed to _________ the others haven't agreed to anything.

H: The side effects haven't even been calculated yet.

K: What the Russians are going to do when the public brawl is developing.

H: If you want me to, I will say what I said today.

K: I will make sure the President calls on you.

H: I appreciate your call.

K: I talked to the President and he frankly doesn't know what else he can do. He doesn't have any others to give him any other choices.

H: There are an awful lot of people who feel as deeply concerned as you and I are. I think you felt that all along.

K: I have little doubt about it. At the beginning I was willing to give it a chance.

H: This next step is just going to turn us. I appreciate your call.

K: If you would rather say it alone with the President, I will get you that connection.

H: If I can't get a chance to come to the plate the way I think I should, I will whisper it and you can set it up accordingly.

K: Right.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Stans

7:45 p.m., March 9, 1971

K: I am sorry, Morrie, that I couldn't return your call earlier.

S: It's not really that important. I wrote a memo a week or ten days ago to the President about a trip to Europe to visit some of these countries.

K: I talked with the President about it. He is not very eager to have a trade delegation to go to Europe but he doesn't mind your going.

S: Oh, he doesn't mind my going.

K: He just doesn't want to have a trade delegation and give the impression that we are churning something up.

S: I'm taking no business men but some of the men from the Department with me.

K: What countries?

S: Ireland.

K: That's all right.

S: Spain.

K: That's okay.

S: Greece, which State has cleared.

K: Okay.

S: Romania and Iran.

K: None of these is any problem.

S: No problem with him about it.

K: No, no, he had the impression that you were going to some other countries.

S: No, that's all.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Admiral Moorer

8:08 p.m., March 9, 1971

K: .... made at you when I called before.

M: Oh, no.

K: I just wanted to give you quotes that you could use with Laird.

M: I just talked to Abrams and gave him a real fight talk. The April 5th date is not a factor with the South Vietnamese. He was to go and get this point across. I would suggest a backchannel to Bunker.

K: I will do it right away.

M: Explaining to him what the problem is and he can go to Thieu. What Abrams tells me is that they are not willing -- that they are not planning but might be willing if they get a good kick in the ass. They will go through Base 11 and down and so on and slowly out of there in the next few weeks. We can go out to Bunker and get him to put some starch in him and tell him not to be thinking about politics. This is their last chance. Abrams will send a message in the next 12 hours on Thieu's attitudes and so on.

K: Abrams recommends that we do it.

M: Absolutely. Put some starch in them. I think it would be a good idea if you went to Bunker.

K: I will get it out tonight. We haven't gone through all this agony to have it end now.

M: That's right.

K: They can't get out without our airlift.

M: That's right.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Yehuddi Menuhin/Mr. Kissinger

9:15 a.m., March 10, 1971

M: Is this Henry Kissinger? How are you?

K: How are you?

M: I hope I haven't intruded on your morning. My wife is in Washington. I am in Columbus but will be in Washington on Friday. My wife told me the President has made an interesting announcement about China. Some years ago, a contact of mine (M___) spoke to me about China and told me they were interested in inviting me at that time. I couldn't go because of our relationship -- I didn't want to do anything wrong. Another time -- about 15 years ago -- I had an invitation through the Polish people from China which I didn't follow up. Would it be a good idea to put out feelers on this as to whether we would think it would help?

K: I think it would be good, but there has been no formal Presidential announcement on travel to China. You are correct in assuming we are disposed to relaxing restrictions. But it's an excellent idea for you to go there.

M: We are going to Japan anyway on April 20th. I don't know whether it is precipitous to think of it now or whether we should wait until October.

K: It's probably impossible -- given the way they work -- to arrange it before April 20th and, secondly, I do not think U.S. governmental support of it will increase your chances of going in. I think we should find another way for you to approach it other than through the U.S. Government. But we will gladly facilitate it.

M: The French opening is still there.

K: You can tell them you have talked to me and we would be receptive.

M: You know, I will probably go to Moscow at the beginning of October. I am President of the International Music Council which is under UNESCO, and they are hold their annual thing in Moscow. I have not actually given the last word because I insisted on some of their artists being allowed to play with me before I go, but the chances are I will be going. It would be interesting to go to Moscow for a week and follow it up with Peking.

NARA, Dato

5/26

Yehuddi Menuhin/Mr. Kissinger

9:15 a.m., March 10, 1971

K: I recommend you follow it up with the French. I think if we do it as a formal governmental suggestion, the chances are it will work against you. And we would like you to do it.

M: If diplomatic relations are established, do you think there will be some modicum of respect between the countries on the official level?

K: I am sure there will be. But if we do it formally now, it will look like a political maneuver. It would be harder for them to accept.

M: Unfortunately, M_________ is no longer in the government, but I think the contact is still there.

K: If you have trouble, I will see if we can discover some other way. I will be glad to -- I am lunching with the Romanian Ambassador tomorrow, and I will tell him. They have diplomatic relations.

M: Nobody is cleverer than the Romanians.

K: Are you playing here?

M: I am playing on Saturday evening.

K: To my regret I have to go to a boring press dinner on Saturday.

M: Are you free on Sunday for lunch?

K: If I am in town, I would be in fact. I might be going out of town. How can I reach you?

M: I am staying with friends, the Burke Wilkinsons at 1344 -- 30th Street. Their telephone number is 338-4572.

K: I will be calling them on Friday if I can do it. Maybe we can have lunch on Sunday. I never had a chance to talk to you when we were are the Bruces. I would enjoy both of you. I look forward to perhaps seeing you on Sunday, and I will let you know what the Romanians say.

M: Thank you. Good-bye.

lds

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Adm. Moorer/Kissinger (secure phone)

9:27 a.m.

3/10/71

M: I just want to check with you and tell you I talked with Abrams and he
talked with Bunker and Vinh (?) and they are going to military region one and
talk with ______ and then talk with Thieu. I think we should give him a good
build-up.

K: I did last night to Bunker and he replied and I think I know what Thieu has in
mind. I don't like it. But I don't see what we can do. They are not going to
stop moving until ______ these conferences.

M: They moved one battalion across the Tchepone River. Down into a better
area. I do know that I read between the lines that these caches are thinking of
moving ______ down 914 to 611.

K: They didn't tell us that before, did they?

M: No, we thought they would stay until they are rained out. Maybe some
idea that we wouldn't support them during that time.

K: I told Bunker they will get support. I will let you see the backchannel to
Bunker. Haig can show it to Robbie. If you think I was rough with you yesterday --

M: I didn't think so.

TELECON
John Freeman

3/10/71 9:45 a.m.

NARA, Date 5/26

K: I heard about your new position 0- congratulations.

F: Very kind of you indeed.

K: And the TV network you are heading . . .

F: Interesting job -- the company has been in difficultie and I am trying
my best to help it.

K: That's the best kind of work there is.

F: Right. Meanwhile, when xxx you are not in business you'll not be far
away.

K: Right. Haven't heard from you; how have you been?

F: Fine. I took a long trip abroad which I really needed and then Catherine
had a serious operation.

K: Is she better now?

F: Yes, she is better now but still immobile.

K: Will your work bring you here?

F: Yes, if my successor will allow me.

K: Can he keep you out of the city or out of the country?

F: I would be hesitant to come to a party with you in Washington

K: No, but we could meet in New York or something.

F: Yes, and if you talk to the President later in the day, please give
him my compliments.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
U. A. Johnson/Kissinger
10:14 a. m. 3/10/71

J: I just wanted to exchange a word with you. Peterson sent over last night a draft of the proposed statement and it's about as bad as it can be. You should have it in your hands in the next few minutes a re-draft of what he is trying to do.

K: It's truculent.

J: x It has the President endorsing the textile industry. I don't think he wants to.

K: He shouldn't want to but I think wouldn't bet on it. It's interesting that the textile industry would not take on Mills because they know they have to live with him longer than us.

J: I have sent over a re-draft to you and Peters and you should have it in the next few minutes and also the letter to Sato.

K: I just talked with Peter when about the letter and I am editing the changes I recommend we go that route on the letter. I haven't seen your version of the statement but my suggestion is he make his statement more vague. Why don't we concert on it.

J: I would like to. I invite any suggestions from you on what we can do.

K: I will do what I can to keep the President from working on this matter until I can discuss it with you on what he is acting on and make sure of your reaction.

J: You should have the statement in a few mins.

NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM

Rogers/Kissinger

10:16 a.m. 3/10/71

R: I see the President is going away the next couple of days. I recommend we postpone the meeting until next week. We will continue to pressure Israel on the Suez and see what we can get on that and keep the other in abeyance and then talk to the President about the overall picture. When concluding that it's better to have the President do it with Rabin so they don't feel we have different approaches to it.

K: We have to avoid that in any event.

R: I thought perhaps what the President said to the President of Israel,---

K: I wasn't there in that fairness to the people around the table. I thought it was going to be a 10 minute courtesy call.

R: He means it well when he says it but could convey the wrong signals.

K: I think it's the wiser course. Since he will be away for 2-3 days, we haven't even if we made the 5:00 we won't have a decision.

R: I don't think it's the right time. The article in the paper shows they have us very concerned. They know our position and they are trying to help themselves and us and that position for a few more days is helpful.

K: I agree and we will cancel the meeting. If we have the Suez thing on the track we can use it for the bigger thing.

R: We want to be sure our people know the President's maybe tough.

K: The President isn't talking to any Israelis and no one else is here. I don't think he should see Eban unless we want to lay down the law and I don't think Eban is as influential as Rabin.

R: We will strengthen Dayan hand if we? ? ? ? ?. Otherwise he doesn't have any cards. Tell the President.

K: I will and I know he will be relieved that he doesn't have to fret about it for the next few days. You don't want to do much about it for the next few days?

R: If the Suez is in the picture it's a different matter. That would be better. There is no reason to have you and Mel and myself and thrash it around. Then if we exchange views we come out close together. Then if we argue we do it among ourselves. Helsms always sings the blues so much.

K: No intelligence chief ever got into trouble except when he failed to predict something awful.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Rogers/Kissinger

10:16 a.m. 3/10/71

R: He never mentions what happened the other way. It's the exact thing as happened in Laos. That was the best discussion in the government I have had. We all knew the risks.

K: It was all a question of what had to be emphasized and we all came out the same way. And because we were together has helped tremendously.

I think so.

signature

Jaysin

I will be relieved that he doesn't have to do much about it for the time being.

You don't want to do much about it for the time being.

In the picture it's a different matter. That would be the case if we have you and Mel and myself and thrash it around. Then if we challenge views we came out close together. Then if we argue or do anything else, Melms always sings the blues so much.

Intelligence chief ever got into trouble except when he failed to predict something awful.

By. NARA, Dato. 5/26

TELCONE
Gerard Smith/Kissinger

12:54 p.m. 3/10/71

S: Dobrynin was in here half an hour ago for a routine information on technical group on the wax hot line for ________. He launched into ABM and during the course of it he thought our proposal for a complete ban was just talk. ? ? ? ? ? he personally would intervene with his government to accept it. He also said a two safe-guard deal matching the Moscow system would be possible. A capital system like in the West might be possible.

K: Did you raise the issue?

S: I raised the question of whether Dobrynin at Helsinki said zero level is conceivable and when I said it was not propaganda he said it was possible. I didn't raise safeguard sites. He didn't know about missile deployment. He is going back for the Congress and he would find out.

K: Thank you, Gerry.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

J. Alsop/Kissinger

morning

3/10/71

A: The Sulzberger article was the most cogent and unpretentious statement of what American policy should be that I have heard in my life. Simply brilliant. So fascinating and marvelous.

K: I will see him in 5 minutes and I will tell him. And he did it without any coaching.

A: No one with any common sense can find something to disagree with.

K: Are you going to be at Alice Longworth's tonight?

A: She invited us. But we have something and a hard week.

K: I will be there after dinner.

A: I might try to be there after dinner if she will let me.

K: Then maybe we can get in a corner for 5 mins. and chat.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
W. Rostow/Kissinger
afternoon 3/10/71

R: You gave me a mission re the invitation to Britain. I have one to the English Speaking Union and Pat Dean sent it. The response was sent 15 Jan. and said he was busy and finishing his book and opening the library and said he couldn't do it. Nothing from the Primrose League. So that's his attitude that he will not take off in the spring. He likes Dean and would have been inclined to do it for him if for anyone.

K: You are terribly nice.

R: If you have a notion to do it, I would like to help. I will persue it and talk with you if I get anything.

K: When are you coming back?

R: Tomorrow. Giving a speech in a Va. college. Coming back next week to do a program on educational TV with ______ on the '61 Presidential decision. Max and I think it would be good today and let's people face up to what the issues were. Agronsky doing it.

K: He is intelligent.

R: Fundamental decision was after Tayler ______ and Max and I only people around to do it. I am finishing the chapter of the book on Kennedy era and now taking that forward from Sputnik to the present. It's a fascinating exercise because I am using ______ analytical terms. Quite explicit and using the same cr iteria for eveyone. I am now in the Johnson period. Writing it objectively. I am not doing anything funny. I have gone through the Kennedy period.

K: Why don't you give me a call tomorrow when you get in?

R: I could see you after if you wanted to or perhaps the next week.

K: How long are you here Friday?

R: I don't know. They are bringing me to Dulles for a 5:30 plane.

K: I was sorry to miss you last week. It was the first time in 6 weeks that the President wanted to see me at 8:00 a.m.

R: No problem with me. Anything I can do to strengthen your hand.

K: I could see you Friday afternoon. Let's try for 3:00.

By NARA, Date 5/26

W. Rostow/Kissinger

afternoon

3/10/71

-2-

R: I will see if it's feasible.

K: Otherwise I will see you next week.

R: I am sending you ideas on the readings you gave me last week. How's the operation going?

K: Well.

R: CBS is struggling to find negatives but the boys seem to be doing well.

Sorry to miss you next week. It was the first time in 6 weeks that I want to see you at 8:00 a.m.

I have a problem with me. Anytime I can do to strengthen your hand.

And see you Friday afternoon. Let's try for 3:00.

NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCORN

Laird/Kissinger

10:40 a.m. 3/11/71

L: I wanted to let you know I had a good visit with Helmut and said we didn't nominate anyone and said his man was well qualified and nominate one for deputy. Brandt is well pleased. Helmut was with the Chancellor.

K: It shows Helmut has influence too.

L: I think he was delighted to take the call where he did. Pleased with the Defens report this morning. Had a couple of hours to go over it.

K: We have -- I am trying to tear this press apart on the story of this --

L: Don't worry but make sure it doesn't happen. I have been tough on that.

K: You are right.

L: I understand there's some feeling that the Blakc Sea thing should be cut back so I am cutting it back.

K: Who wants it?

L: You and Alex Johnson wanted it cut to 3 destroyers.

K: A little later because of the Party Congress but not destroyers, because of the tender.

L: We have 4 programmed in their and if we pull them off then we will have 3.

K: Why not another.

L: We can't keep them there for that long. We will have to put in different ones because those have to be serviced.

K: They shouldn't go in right at the Party Congress but afterwards. It doesn't have to be April 15 but the President wants something more then before.

L: We have the Baltic visits going in. I will look at it again. We can take if off the screen of the carrier. We can operate with 3 for awhile. I think that matter is on the track with Southerland and Lam. They have a difficult program. Abrams is meeting with Vinh tonight. The situation looks good over ther.

K: It does.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Senator Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

11:02 a.m., March 11, 1971

J: Henry?

K: How is my favorite Democratic candidate?

J: My friend Stu is upset about the security information that I am alleged to have...

K: If Stu has any right to say anything about security information, that is news to me.

J: I met with the press and said if I didn't know what is classified and what isn't...

K: You were wise not to accept the Secretary of Defense job. It was good for you but bad for the country. I understand you are concerned. Why don't we have a talk. Whether you are concerned or not, I would like to see you.

J: I am fearful that these two positions are going to cause problems to put it mildly. I joked after the hearing was over with the group when they were up -- Gerard Smith's group -- off the record, I said you prepare a draft statement for me when I'm on the floor. I think serious consideration should be given to changes in the position you are going to take.

K: Are you free Saturday morning?

J: I am tied up Saturday morning. How about Saturday afternoon?

K: Are you going to the Gridiron thing?

J: XX No, my wife is sick.

K: Let's aim for Saturday afternoon. How about 3:00? Shall we meet in my office?

J: I will come down on the way home. It's more sensible. After all, you refused to appear up here in the proper places. I don't understand that.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Senator Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

11:02 a.m., March 11, 1971

K: I have met privately.

J: I am teasing.

K: I know. I don't like to talk with Senators. If we don't get something done about this Brezhnev thing. He's got a Party Congress coming up and he feels I'm undercutting him.

J: I know you can take care of yourself. I'm counting on it. I will come by at 3:00 on Saturday.

K: I Look forward to it.

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

11:37 a.m.

3/11/71

K: I read that message that Robbie showed me this morning in which they said they are going with a plan.

M: The plan overall is to come back down 914 and they will be there 5 more weeks. Then come back in 611.

K: Why don't they come out 611?

M: Terrain and roads. It doesn't make much difference. I will have them look at 609 near the Thai border.

K: From the President point of view -- strictly for you -- he is now planning to make his next troop announcement around April 7. If we could announce it's beginning on that day rather than then weeks of stories ahead of time.

M: We will have to be careful on how we select the words. There's no specific time when the withdrawal commences. It depends on what the weather does.

K: It will be evident from what they are doing if they can go through with their program.

M: They are cleaning out areas and moving --

K: I don't care about them coming out of Tchepone if they keep the traffic clogged.

M: They are coming down 914 and that will take 3 weeks. They will have lots more heavy fighting. I am going to discuss with Abrams and they have the initiative now. I would like to mention air attacks and B-52 attacks which have been successful and this was the idea and we got them to use ground forces.

K: We just want it to last longer.

M: I thought thought if they did so well on air, why ground troops.

K: That's what the President says. Don't be confused about what I ask the briefer. I am 100% behind you when I talk to the President. I only nitpick the briefer.

M: I authorized Abrams to assure Vinh and ____ that we will give support. I asked that we tell them the risks and options.

K: Just don't give him an option to bug out this month.

NARA, Dalo 5/26

Moorer/Kissinger

11:37 a.m.

3/11/71

M: We have to keep it a SVN operation. We don't want to go so far that they can blame it on us. At the same time we don't want them to say they are coming out because we won't support them.

K: If we stay in through April they can't build up for an Aug./Sept. offensive.

M: We agree on this.

K: The second thing is withdrawal. Abrams must answer and through your channel. The President wants to handle it and not Laird.

M: His people will be here Sat.

K: But they won't have the full story. You read that message. He says he has a separate channel to Laird and we must know what he thinks.

M: I know what he thinks and what the separate channel is.

K: If we don't get it in two days we will have to do it unilaterally.

M: Don't worry.

K: We are sending Haig to VN. (Something about troop withdrawal) and talk to Bunker about diplomatic moves.

M: I see no problem. The programs are going fine.

K: We are on the same team here. Of course, there are 6 other teams playing.

M: We will get the withdrawal information. I only objected to Haig going before but no problem now.

I don't give him an option to bug out this month.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON

Joe Sisco

3/11/71 11:46 a.m.

K: I wanted you to know I talked to the Radcliffe Dean and she was
going this afternoon to an Admissions Committee meeting.

S: I am most grateful.

K: I don't know what it will do.

S: No but I don't want to be unfair and presume on my friends and no
matter how it comes out I am most grateful and June is too.

K: I talked to Tom Braden last night at a party and he said you laid out
the whole thing to him.

S: I laid out the past OK -- he got a lot of details. He's getting good
briefings.

K: I didn't let myself be drawn into it.

S: I took a map and said here is Rogers' proporal -- not pressing Israel
to total withdrawal to pre-June 5 lines. Not pressing them to 1957 . . .

K: He was impressed. He was going to do a column saying if there were
peace in the Middle East it was all because of Joe Sisco.

S: Don't let him do that! There will be plenty of opportunity for everyone
to get credit if it works and plenty of running when the cream is on my face.

K: You and I are in the same position on that.

S: I'm in the same position in the Middle East as you are in Southeast Asia.

K: Except that four-fifths of the town is rooting for the North Vietnamese
for that reason.

By

D

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

11:50 a. m.

3/11/71

J: How are things over there?

K: Not favorable.

J: That telegram didn't help?

K: No.

J: I hoped it would.

K: I am not one of the principle factors in the decisions any more.

J: He is not asking on this one.

K: Whoever leaked that Rogers and I were together didn't help.

J: Rogers, Stans and you are the good guys. Stans got his denial out. He said he took no position on this.

K: The President is talking to John Burns. A number are pushing hard against quota legislations now.

J: That would be a help if we could get away with that.

K: But we can't help a scorcher on the Agreement. The other thing I have been asked to do and it's something I have to be able to work with as you but I have been told not to is he wants a hard letter to Sato through extra-diplomatic channels. Say we had an agreement. Yours is not acceptable and we delivered on our part. I am aware of what this might do if we turn the screw too hard. Could you draft a letter? I don't want to do it unilaterally although that's my instruction.

J: All right.

K: The toughest letter the traffic will bear.

J: I told Peter this morning --

K: I don't think he knows about this.

J: No, I told him the worst of all possible worlds is directly breaking off of

By NARA, Date 5/26

U.A. Johnson/Kissinger

11:50 a.m. 3/11/71

J: (cont) negotiations tied to legislation. If he is not going on that it would help.

K: I will work on that. Sato's statement to Meyer was cynical. I can't believe that.

J: I don't know the Midi bureaucracy. We have an industry on either end with a darkx suicidal tendency.

K: Ours a bit overplayed their plan yesterday. So you know they get out in front on legislation and then we don't get credit for us. Could you have something to us by 3:00?

J: I can.

K: Your old letter isn't bad if you could toughen it up.

J: I was thinking of that. I will draft on the assumption legislation will not go up.

K: They are meeting now and I will keep you informed. Could we keep it to oursleves? You could tell the Secy. but on our basis and ask him not to go to the President.

J: He won't. I will assume no legislation.

K: I will let you know.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

12:00 noon

3/11/71

K: Just one thing. The President wants to send Haig to VN next week. It's not to second guess the military.

L: I just don't didn't want it when --

K: You were right. It would have been the wrong moment. It would have been panicked. He wants a feel for the longer term.

L: You know how I feel about Al.

K: So if it's all right we will lay it on.

L: We will take care of over here. I will tell Moorer.

K: We are going to send a decision memo out on SALT which takes in most of your recommendations. We cannot accept NCDA completely but we are going to ask him to ? ? ? ? the other one.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

12:35 p.m, March 11, 1971

R: Did you get your hair cut? I wanted to suggest to you that we have a National Security Council meeting on China representation soon. The issue is building up. We are under pressure by the U.K.

K: One of the views at the SRG was we didn't need a meeting.

R: I didn't realize there was an agreement.

K: We could schedule it most conveniently on the 25th when we already have a meeting scheduled. Do you think it could hold until then.

R: I'm afraid not.

K: We'll do it next week.

R: There are two questions -- I have prepared a speech. If we decide to go that way, it's a good speech, with regard to universality.

K: It will have such consequences we should talk about it. I was leaning toward universality.

R: There are a lot of arguments against it. We have to start with the proposition that however we do it, we will lose in all probability. It is probable that Mainland China will be admitted and Taiwan expelled, if not this year, then the following year. We haven't taken polls of our friends this time. It could slip and go against us this fall, but certainly the following year. The universality thing is the right policy. We should have followed it sometime back.

K: It will get us into problems with the Koreans.

R: Not particularly attractive is the fact that if we change the policy and go through the throes of that, we still are going to get licked. People will say you not only lost your friends but were defeated in any event. You can make the argument that it is better to be defeated if you have a good policy.

K: When is your speech?

He is nutty enough to write

By NARA, Date 5/26

12:35 p.m., March 11, 1971

- 2 -

R: I haven't scheduled it. It's just a draft. If I did it, I wouldn't want to do it until after the Korean elections in May sometime, but it's urgent to start talking. We have begun to do that on a preliminary basis.

K: My feeling is similar to yours. Can we use the tactical advantage of getting off the present position. If it is leaked anyway, it may be better to get it leaked on that.

R: We should talk about it and have preliminary discussions with other nations about it.

K: There's an NSC on the 25th. Let me see if I can get it moved to the 18th.

R: On the speech with regard to universality, I have included that we would like to have both Vietnams, both Koreas, both Germanys. But I have included a lot of caveats.

K: If we had done it two years ago, it would have been a brilliant position -- very forward-looking.

R: The difficulty is if it's licked this year, it would mean we got defeated and have a bad policy, too. Nobody favors it really. Of course, the President's statements lately are all in the direction of...

K: I had two other things. (1) I had accepted weeks ago a luncheon invitation with Bogdan. I have no business; it's purely social. If there is any business discussed, I will let you know.

R: He was here the other day.

K: I have been raising hell here for KOREA accepting, because I don't have anything to discuss. (2) About Korry in Chile, I am worried that he is dangerous.

R: I told them to go ahead with the nomination for his successor.

K: We ought to find some job for him. I am terrified of his knowledge of some of these considerations in the 40 Committee and what he will do when he is defected. I don't like him; he has been a disaster there. If you could consider this... He sat in on two 40 Committee meetings when we discussed parliamentary ratification. He sent a long backchannel of what to do. He is nutty enough to write a long expose. He is broke, too.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM

B. McDonnell/Kissinger

3:07 p.m.

3/11/71

K: What's your view on Japanese textile issue?

M: We have a big issue.

K: You should join my staff. You are talking about like a staff member.

M: I have bad news. Tom Davidson talked with McCrory at the Star and she called me for a statement. I didn't give it.

K: Is he a conspirator?

M: Not indicted co-conspirator.

K: All right.

M: It's not all right.

K: What can I say? I met with him.

M: I guess what I want to say is that I feel had.

K: Is he quoting me?

M: I don't think so.

K: I wish the word of honor of some of these people would mean something.

M: It cancels my ability to be able to do that again in my own head. I mean it.

K: What's wrong with my meeting with people? Some of my colleagues will get restive.

M: I also need advice. I am saying no statement. If that -- the other feeling I had, it was a personal meeting and it was agreed no press coverage. Thaxxx

K: That's best. I will say nothing.

M: I am more upset then --

K: I have weathered worse things.

M: You don't need --

K: So long as there are no legal problems.

M: none. On textiles, can't you get them to agree? Our men don't leave you much room.

K: No, the Japanese. I think it's a great human pity they did this. In the Star today?

M: Tomorrow probably. She is calling.

By. NAFA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM

Johnson/Kissinger

3:00 ish p.m.

3/11/71

K: Two things. The President is on his way back and wont be in until 5:00 and I will authorize an adaptation of it. We have to get it off because Flanigan is seeing them now and probably handing it to them. I have edited it to g register previous understandings.

J: It's already plagued relations too long.

K: I will send it to you in 5 mins. I wanted to check with you -- did you write this knowing we are supporting textile legislation?

J: No, I understood we were not.

K: You have seen the statement?

J: On that --

K: I will have to change the one sentence.

J: I am sorry. I now see when we are supporting something but I don't know what. It disappears --

K: Only you Where you say that controls are not administered that meet our needs here. That has to go.

J: Yes it does. Let's be clear. The statement itself -- let me get the text. I just have to take that out. The last clause. I talked to Peter about that sentence. They really weren't very clear about it. What he did say was that the President wants to go to other countries and get agreements but better than we have here. I said let's talk about that tomorrow. Just eliminate that clause.

K: I will send over the slightly edited version or read it to you. I am getting it typed now.

K: I will get a girl on the phone.

K: Period after mutually satisfactory problem. And then take out at head and say "already then the issues had ______ their countries far too long and ? ? ? had not been realized." "Your message of March 8" I would begin "At the time I received your message of March 8 as well as that statement of the Japan Textile ? ? ? ? ?" "It had been my impression that ? ? "

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Johnson/Kissinger

3:00 ish p.m. 3/11/71

-2-

J: "? ? ? ? were finally making some real progress."

K: "and the two statements thus came as a complete surprise."

J: As you note, these statements were promptly ???

K: You send it out and we will hang together. The title is the only thing that ? ?

J: I will send this for immediate delivery.

J:

K:

L:

I:

h

I r

Tent

By

D

NARA, Dalo

5/26

TELECON

Mary McGrory/Mr. Kissinger

5:00 p.m., March 11, 1971

M: How are you?

K: I have missed seeing you. I don't get invited Chez McGrory
any more.

M: You are too busy running around town.

K: If I did everything they say in the papers, I would have a heart
attack. Incidentally, one thing I have on my mind is Joe Kraft said I
had met Sam Brown and company at your house.

M: The people in Cambridge told me about that, Henry.

K: It's conceivable I told it to a colleague. But I never said it to
a press person. It's a point of honor.

M: It's a point of honor with me too.

K: I know you wouldn't tell the press.

M: I'm calling about another meeting. I heard about your meeting
with the co-conspirators. I wonder if you have anything to say.

K: I don't really think so. It was arranged by Brian McDonnell
whom I like. I don't feel I want to talk about it. I much prefer that
it not be written about.

M: It won't hold in that group.

K: I had never met them. We made an agreement it would be on a human
level without any publicity. But I will leave that aside.

M: They have the impression you did not expect to discuss it, but
they were free to after a couple of days or so. That was their impression.

K: They are honorable people. It was a honest misunderstanding. That
was not my impression and not Brian's, but it could easily have happened.

M: Very well. It sounds very cordial and pleasant.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

McNamara/Kissinger

5:00 p.m.

3/11/71

K: That matter you talked to me about the other day. I raised it with my boss and he said there's nothing to it. He would be honored if you are willing to keep it. It's entirely up to you and the rumor is total nonsense. He might even drop you a note to that effect.

M: I didn't mean --

K: I didn't make a big affair of it. I just raised it and said you offered that if he thought it was that sort of position you would leave it now.

M: I don't want to be a lame duck here. You need a power base to get things done.

K: I wouldn't be surprised if he went you a note.

M: I nearly wrote him one yesterday. On that Sulzberger article --

K: Why don't you write him?

M: I don't want to appear to be praising him in that atmosphere.

K: I think he has written you.

M: I will wait until I get it. I really felt for him when he said that the foundation of foreign policy from the Second World War through the Johnson era that really xxx shaped ?? ?? ?? had defended him. I thought it was a cry for help and I wanted to respond.

K: On the human level I think it would be good to write in response to him.

M: You tell him and I will write it.

K: I will tell him. It would mean a lot if you wrote it. He has too little of that since he has been here. He was shocked at the suggestion when I said it to him.

M: I am pleased. The specific words were that the reporter had it on high WH authority.

K: He is sending you a copy of this World Report with a personal letter and he is not doing that to many. He said to tell you at the earliest opportunity. Hope to see you soon.

M: I will write it but you tell him.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Alex Johnson

3/11/71 5:08 p.m.

K: The President was very pleased with the letter.

J: Oh fine, good.

K: No problem with delivering it through the Ambassador either.

J: That's good too. I had Bill Breer sit in on Peter's conversation and he's on his way back over now to have Peter clear the reporting cable. I asked him to drop a copy by your office.

K: Great.

J: Peter has not yet seen it. And do you want our copy of the telegram?

K: Just for the President's personal files. This isn't going to leak is it?

J: I said "Deliver direct, do maximum to confine knowledge of it and it's contents to yourself and the Prime Minister." What the Prime Minister does with it we have no control over.

K: He is afraid of that Democratic part.

J: But Sato should like it.

K: He thought it was a beauty if it doesn't leak. But even if it does, so what. We'll know by tomorrow.

J: Yes -- I think he will have to resign. He built himself an on his relationship with the President. With a public challenge of this kind he's going to feel, given the Japanese approach, that he has to resign. I'd say there's a 70% chance now.

K: I know because when that cabuki player said if I was treated the way he was treated by Sato I would have resigned. So that's their thinking.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Kirk Douglas

6:51 p m., March 11, 1971

D: Thank you for sending me that report. I have been up on foreign policy of the United States.

K: (laughter)

D: Henry, are you free for lunch in Washington on Friday?

K: No, I have a lunch already. Wait a minute, are you going to be in town?

D: I am coming in late Thursday about 11:00. I have one appointment on Friday around 10:30 - 11:00 but after that I thought we might have lunch.

K: Well, look I had a lunch with Kay Graham but why don't you join us.

D: My, God, ask her if I can join you and I'll join you.

K: Then you two will be cooing all over. Save a 1/2 hour for me and come in for lunch.

D: What time?

K: My lunch with Kay Graham about 1:00. Come at 12:30.

D: I will come at 12:30 to your office.

K: I'll call her. She would rather see you than me but I wonder now if I can come.

D: That's a switch but I think we can arrange something.

K: Where are you staying?

D: At the Madison. I will call you and meet you at the office and we can go over together.

K: Come about 12:15 and then we will go over together.

D: Great, Henry.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Henry Brandon

3/11/71 a.m.

B: I have the uneasy feeling that I misunderstood the President and it was on the record.

K: No.

B: Because he gave another one and I thought I made a mistake.

K: No, you caught him in a moment when he didn't want to make one.

B: As long as I did the right thing.

K: Yes, you did. One thing, you and I had a dinner date for Monday. Now I have to go to dinner for Secretary Connally. I wonder whether Wednesday or Thursday would be all right.

B: Thursday is all right -- Wednesday I can't.

K: Can we do it Thursday?

B: Yes.

K: You sure it's all right?

B: Yes, fine. We'll leave it for Thursday. You know, what the President said it me was better than to Cy.

K: I hope so.

B: I thought it was quite a good statement.

K: It was.

B: I thought it was the best he has done.

K: It was a good statement.

B: I think he -- maybe I'm prejudiced because I agree -- he will get a lot of kudos.

K: I think it was well done.

B: But as I say, it was stronger and more searching what he said to me. The reflection of his mind came out stronger. But as long as I did the right thing . . .

K: No question about it.

B: And I'll see you Saturday?

K: Yes, at 1:00.

B: Good.