HAK:

Woolcott has supplied his own blurb for the
book he discussed with you:

"No Australian diplomat I have known combines a comparable range of experience and such a range of contacts, especially but not only in SE Asia, as Richard Woolcott."

OK ____ No ____

But grammatically and stylistically, the
following might be a better way to say it:

"No Australian diplomat I have known combines a greater range of experience and breadth of contacts, especially in - but not limited to - SE Asia, as does RW."

Prefer this one ✓ Prefer other ____

ssm

Attached is the chapter on East Timor, as discussed.

FROM : S

PHONE NO. : 062953066

Jul. 17 2002 05:57PM P1

JUL 18 2002

WOOLCOTT ASSOCIATES

P.O.Box 3926, Manuka, A.C.T. 2603
Ph: 02-6295 3206 Fax: 02-6295 3066
Email: rwoolcot@ozemail.com.au

61-21

17 July 2002.

Dr Henry Kissinger,
Kissinger Associates
26th floor. 2350 Park Avenue,
New York. N.Y. 10022.

It was as always a great pleasure to meet with you over breakfast in Washington. Thank you.

I am sending, as I said I would, the draft chapter on East Timor by International Express Post. I hope you find it of interest.

Following the Australian American Leadership Dialogue for which I was in Washington and our conversation I am expanding the chapter "Pre-eminent America". You have the draft but I am sure that the changes I will make will not cause you any problems. They simply take account of what Chaney, Armitage, Wolfowitz and Zoellick said at the Dialogue.

Following up my letter to you of 26th June, Harper Collins and I are delighted that you are willing to give the book an endorsement. I would suggest the following words: -

"No Australian diplomat I have known combines a comparable range of experience and such a range of contacts, especially but not only in South East Asia, as Richard Woolcott".

I hope the above does not strike you as immodest. It is widely acknowledged in this country and I have deliberately made it less fulsome than Whitlam's (attached for your information) or Peacock's endorsements.

I am also enclosing a copy of an interview Ramos Horta gave to the International Herald Tribune, which you might find both of interest and helpful on the East Timor question.
I am faxing this letter only.

With thanks and best wishes,

Richard Woolcott

FROM : S

PHONE NO. : 062953066

Jul. 17 2002 05:57PM P2

"I have known all the men who in the last forty years have represented Australia as Secretaries of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade or as Ambassador to the United Nations or to Indonesia. Not one of them has been more accomplished than, Richard Woolcott, who had held all those positions.

He was a trusted adviser to Prime Minister Menzies, Holt, McMahon, Hawke, Keating, Howard and myself. He ascertained the facts and faced them. He spoke well and he wrote well. He has represented Australia long and well. I hope that this informed account of half a century of Australian diplomacy will be widely read."

Gough Whitlam

Chapter 13 The Tragedies of East Timor.

"Those students of foreign affairs who are not saddled by responsibilities for a national policy are led by an optimistic desire for the betterment of mankind to forget or ignore the realities. But official diplomacy must carry on in the world as it is and not in the world as it should be."

From the Handbook of the Perfect Diplomat by Daniele Vare, first published in Italian in 1929.

In the world as it should be the four tragedies that have befallen the people of East Timor should have been avoided. Those tragedies were Portuguese colonial neglect, Japanese occupation, Indonesia's invasion and corrupt mal-administration, and the death and destruction in September 1999 after the United Nations vote on autonomy. As we know, the world is not an ideal place and the East Timorese have had to live with the realities of the world as it is. These realities ultimately resulted, however, in the independence that many had sought.

Only nine months after I arrived in Jakarta as our Ambassador, Indonesia invaded the turbulent and neglected Portuguese Colony of East Timor on 7th December 1975. Even before I left Australia the storm clouds were gathering.

No single issue in my diplomatic career, with the exception of working at Prime Minister Hawke's request as his Special Envoy for the establishment of a consultative Asia Pacific economic forum (APEC) throughout 1989 attracted as much publicity or was as exacting as the handling of the East Timor situation. The APEC experience, although complex and tiring, was entirely positive. APEC was an important foreign and trade policy success for Australia. The Timor experience was by contrast disappointing and negative.

Situations change and evolve. The bipartisan policy towards East Timor and Indonesia followed by the Whitlam and Fraser Governments was appropriate and in Australia's national interest at that time. Moreover, given the way that the situation unfolded in 1975 and 1976, I believe there were no practical policy alternatives despite some assertions to the contrary. Looking back after 25 years, it is clear that Indonesia's administration has been disastrous for the East Timorese people and for Indonesia itself, leading to the very outcome – an independent East Timor – which Indonesia and the countries of the South East Asian region had sought to avoid in 1975.

A detailed account of the evolution of the inter-related situations in Jakarta, Lisbon, Canberra and in East Timor itself, with their shifting policy nuances and emphases would require a separate book. I can do no more in a single chapter than outline with complete

1

objectivity the reasons why Australia followed the course it did in 1975 and 1976.
Moreover, most of the Australian official documents from this period are already in the
public domain

Unfortunately a mythology has grown up around the East Timor question. Armed with the advantage of hindsight, cloaking themselves in moral rectitude and unsaddled by any responsibility for advising Government on national policy, a number of armchair critics, usually partially informed academics or writers enjoying the exposure of alleged official and Government deception, have chosen to condemn Prime Ministers Whitlam and Fraser and later Hawke, Keating and Howard (until late in 1998) as well as Foreign Ministers Peacock, Evans and Downer (also until late 1998) for pursuing an immoral policy of appeasing an Indonesian dictatorship and encouraging its military intervention in East Timor, a course which had visited enormous suffering on the people of East Timor. Although the two Ambassadors who preceded me and those who followed me, broadly shared the same views that I held as Ambassador to Indonesia from 1975 to 1978, I became something of a scapegoat for what critics regarded as a bad policy, or the "archfiend" of the left, as one essayist wrote.

The six main elements of this mythology are that Prime Minister Whitlam "gave the green light" to President Soeharto to invade East Timor, or at least indicated privately, as distinct from his public statements, his support from this course; that Australia could have prevailed on Indonesia to accept an act of self-determination organised by the United Nations; that I as the Ambassador and the so-called "pro-Jakarta lobby" within the Department of Foreign Affairs exercised an improperly dominant role in the formulation of Australian policy; that other voices in Canberra urging self-determination for East Timor and persuading Indonesia to accept an independent East Timor should have been heeded; the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was in some way compromised, even complicit, because of the knowledge it had acquired about Indonesian intentions; that a deceitful Australian Governments kept the truth about their policies towards Indonesia and East Timor from the Australian public; and finally, that Australian intelligence was aware that five journalists working for Australian media were in Balibo in October 1975, where they were murdered by Indonesian forces, implying they could have been saved.

Complex situations are often reduced to simple propositions that through repetition take root in a partially informed community. Much of the writing about East Timor has been so inaccurate and prejudiced that I believe it is both important and overdue for a true account to be put forward for the historical record by one of the insiders and a principal participant in the tragic developments surrounding East Timor.

First, however, it is necessary to place the East Timor situation in its historical context. In 1974 and 1975 the cold war was at its height. Opposition to communism, real or imagined, was a major aspect of United States and Indonesian policy. Saigon had just fallen to the Vietcong and there were real concerns in Indonesia and some other ASEAN countries, fanciful as they may seem now, that a weak, unstable, left leaning and aid dependent East Timor could become "a South East Asian Cuba", possibly even with

Soviet supplied missiles directed at Jakarta. This would weaken further the fragile security of the region.

Soeharto's Government had been in power for nine years. Indonesia was doing well. It was relatively peaceful and stable after the upheavals of the mid-sixties. Western and Japanese investment was flowing in and the economy, managed by American trained technocrat civilian Ministers, was developing well. There seemed to be no intrinsic reason then why the people of East Timor would not be as comfortable within Indonesia when it was decolonised as were the people of West Timor, all of whom spoke Tetum and, indeed, those of the neighbouring province of Flores, which had also experienced Portuguese colonial rule and who were mostly catholic. In retrospect, this judgement may seem misplaced but it was widely accepted at the time. Moreover, another neglected Portuguese colony on the West coast of India had been invaded - or "liberated" as the Indians put it - by India in 1961 and had become within a decade accepted internationally as a state of the Republic of India.

I attended all Prime Minister Whitlam's meetings with President Soeharto; in Jakarta on his State visit in February 1973; his private meetings in Yogyakarta and Wonosobo in September 1974; and his meeting in Townsville in April 1975, for which I travelled from Jakarta. While it is true that Whitlam held the opinion that when East Timor came to be decolonised it would be logical for it to become part of Indonesia, he also put the view clearly to Soeharto at each of these meetings that incorporation should be the outcome of an act of self-determination. This view was held at that time by every leader in the region. Moreover, it had been endorsed by Menzies and Barwick, when the Australian Government considered the future of the Portuguese colony as early as 1963.

In retrospect the Whitlam Government's approach to East Timor in 1975 is almost identical to that adopted by the Menzies Coalition Cabinet in 1963. It is surprising that this decision was based, in part, on a cable sent on 5 February 1963 by James Dunn, (Consul in Dili from January 1962 until August 1964) and later one of the principal advocates of East Timor's independence. Curiously Dunn does not mention his secret telegram of 5th February in his book "Timor a People Betrayed".

In his telegram Dunn makes the assessment that the Portuguese had little real support in East Timor and that if pressure to set up an independent State developed "the majority would probably favor Indonesian rule." Dunn added that Portuguese Timor was "extremely underdeveloped" and it was difficult to see how an independent East Timor "could exist as a viable economic state".

This view was widely shared throughout the 1970's by those in the region and outside of it and one is led to the conclusion that the Whitlam Government's policy in 1974/75 was appropriate to that time. What made it look wrong in retrospect was in essence Indonesian maladministration after 1975.

3

When I travelled to Jakarta to take up my appointment as Ambassador, I carried a personal letter from Whitlam, dated 28th February 1975 and which I handed to President Soeharto on 8th March, the day on which I presented my credentials. In that letter Whitlam wrote, referring to their earlier discussions about East Timor in Yogyakarta and in Wonosobo, "We agreed that the solution we preferred was that the territory should become part of Indonesia but that this outcome would need to result from the properly expressed wishes of its people. Both of us recognised the importance of self-determination in Portuguese Timor, a principle that both our governments have strongly supported in the United Nations and elsewhere". This reiterated what Whitlam had said at the three previous meetings. He had also made it clear on a number of occasions that Australia could never condone the use of force.

During the discussion I had with President Soeharto on 8 March 1975 he said categorically that Indonesia had no intention of attempting to integrate Portuguese Timor by military force. He asked me to pass this assurance to Mr Whitlam, which I did. I also said to the President that Mr Whitlam had not moved away from the position he had adopted in Yogyakarta and Wonosobo, namely that "the future of Portuguese Timor, including the possibility that it become part of Indonesia, would need to be the outcome of the properly expressed wishes of its people".

As I reported to the Fraser Government in Canberra in January 1976, Indonesia's invasion of East Timor a month before did not take place because Australia had given Indonesia "the green light". The Indonesian Government had decided it "must act even if the lights were amber or red." It was motivated not by any wish for territorial expansion but by its national security interests. In fact a senior General remarked to me later "the cure for indigestion is not to eat more."

Critics have argued that two decades of East Timorese suffering and abuses of human rights could have been avoided if Australia had stood up to Indonesia in 1975 and demanded an act of self-determination for the colony at that time. It is always satisfying to be on the side of what one judges to be morality, to defend the rights of the weak against the strong and to support freedom against what one sees as repression. There are natural attitudes in a democratic, stable and unthreatened society like Australia. If only policy formulation was that uncomplicated. In foreign and national security issues that often have geopolitical dimensions, as was the case in East Timor, simple moral solutions have rarely been available.

I do not believe that the Australian Government could have obliged Indonesia in 1975 to conduct an appropriate act of self-determination or to accept the possibility of an independent East Timor given the way the situation unfolded in Portugal, in East Timor itself and in Indonesia. This proposition overlooks the wider situation in the region at that time, it fails to acknowledge the depth of Indonesia's concerns about the direction in which the situation was moving on the ground, it overstates Australia's influence and it largely ignores the attitudes in 1975 of other regional countries and the major powers.

Unfair and disheartening for those East Timorese who wanted independence it may be but the harsh fact in 1975 was that Indonesia's neighbours in ASEAN, especially Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei and the Philippines were anxious to avoid the emergence of a potentially weak, left-leaning, mini-state in the Indonesian archipelago and within the South East Asian region. Indonesia also correctly assessed that the major powers, who might have been able to influence Indonesia, namely the United States, the former Soviet Union, China and Indonesia's major aid donor, Japan, would not act to prevent the incorporation of East Timor.

The United States, involved in the Middle East, mired in the aftermath of Watergate and exhausted by its failure in Vietnam, was simply not interested in the fate of East Timor. The American Ambassador in Jakarta was actually asked in 1975 to reduce the Embassy's reporting on the subject. It is also instructive that in the concluding volume of Henry Kissinger's memoirs, "Years of Renewal", which covers the period 1974 to 1976, there is not a single reference to East Timor in a work of over a thousand pages about American foreign policy at that time.

President Ford and Secretary Kissinger visited Jakarta briefly on 6 December and had a meeting with President Soeharto. According to the US State Department's declassified record Soeharto had referred to the "likelihood of a small guerrilla war" and had asked for America's "understanding" if Indonesia considered it "necessary to take rapid or drastic action". Ford is reported to have replied "we will understand and will not press you on the issue."

I do not think this revelation substantially alters the American attitude. The United States simply had not focused on the issue and to the extent that it had, this meeting was just hours before the invasion. Soeharto had already made the assessment that the United States would acquiesce in a military takeover and had approved the invasion. I do not believe that even if Ford had urged Indonesia to desist at the eleventh hour, the operation would have been called off.

China and the Soviet Union did not like the Soeharto government, which was firmly anti-communist but they were also opposed to Portuguese colonialism, which they regarded as doomed. China intended to absorb Macao, which it has since done. Our Ambassador in Beijing, Stephen Fitzgerald, reported in 1975 that China would be "firing off empty cannons", by which he meant China would criticise verbally Indonesia's actions but take no other action. I recall asking the Soviet Ambassador how the Soviet Union would react if Indonesia moved to incorporate East Timor. We went through a revealing charade. Taking me over to the map of Indonesia on his office wall he said, "where is East Timor"? Playing my part I pointed to it on the map. "It is very small and surrounded by Indonesia isn't it"? He said and then changed the subject. The Soviet Union had, it should be remembered, acquiesced in India's invasion of Goa in 1961. This episode exposes an ugly aspect of great power attitudes but it was the prevailing reality at that time.

5

Japan, which might have been able to exert some influence on Indonesia, as its major aid donor, chose not to involve itself. It regarded the matter as one essentially between Indonesia and Portugal. In these circumstances it is naïve to postulate that Australia could have mounted a diplomatic campaign that could have changed the course of events in the second half of 1975.

I have dealt previously with the idea that I had improperly dominated policy on East Timor. It is flattering to think I had such influence but it is not so and I do not intend to waste space rebutting it, other than to note that, if this was the case, then I would not have been appointed Ambassador to the United Nations by the Fraser Government in 1982, or Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade by the Hawke Government in 1988. Moreover, I was in Indonesia for over three years and either the Whitlam or the Fraser Governments could have recalled me at any time between 1975 and 1978 had they considered that I was failing to implement or exceeding my instructions. The Australian Embassy at that time was a professional, well-informed and effective organization. I have no doubt it was highly regarded in Canberra and its reporting and views were taken seriously. But it did not make policy. That is the role of Government.

Also, the idea that there was a cabal or "pro-Indonesian lobby" in the Department of Foreign Affairs working hand in glove with the Embassy in Jakarta is a distortion of the facts. All senior officers of the Department would have analysed the East Timor issue in the context of what policy would best serve Australia's national interests. It was self-evident then – and is now – that it was in Australia's national interests to develop as sound and cooperative relationships as possible with major regional powers, such as Japan, China and Indonesia. This should not necessarily involve any compromise of our values but it does involve seeking to understand – not necessarily to approve but at least to understand – the policies and motives of these important nations. It also involves facing the realities of the world as it is rather than as it should be.

It is true that other voices in Canberra were raised, arguing that the East Timorese would be unlikely to choose to become part of Indonesia. Bill Pritchett, a foreign affairs officer who had transferred to Defence and was head of the Defence Planning Division, suggested in February 1975 that in these circumstances we should try to persuade Indonesia that the best solution would be for Indonesia, Portugal and East Timor to arrange, at the time of East Timor's independence, for it to enter into a treaty relationship with Indonesia. With hindsight this seems an attractive proposition and Pritchett was correct in suggesting that East Timor would not choose to join Indonesia.

Pritchett's proposal did not, however, gain support. It was rejected by the Secretary for Defence, Sir Arthur Tange and the two Ministers for Defence in 1975, Lance Barnard and after June, Bill Morrison. I once discussed the idea with Pritchett after we had both retired. He conceded that while he had believed the proposal was worth exploring, it would not, in retrospect, have been acceptable to Indonesia and probably other regional countries in 1975 especially given the way the situation developed in the second half of that year. It was an option, which should have been put forward and considered. It was and deemed to be impractical at the time.

The authors of *Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra*, Desmond Ball and Hamish McDonald, acknowledge in their book that the Australian Embassy was better informed about Indonesian plans for Portuguese East Timor than the Indonesian Foreign Ministry or other agencies outside a tight circle of senior generals and intelligence officials. They refer to the "astonishing insights" obtained through the Embassy's contacts in the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). They describe the prior warning of the Indonesian attack in Maliana and Balibo area in mid-October 1975, obtained by the Embassy, as "an intelligence coup of a lifetime".

The authors, however, have portrayed this flow of information from CSIS to the Embassy as creating a form of blackmail, of "compromised diplomacy". The Embassy and the Australian Government, allegedly, became compromised by having received such sensitive intelligence. It was rendered powerless to do anything to stop the Indonesian plans because "an objection at any point raised the threat of previous compliance being revealed", Ball and McDonald wrote.

A year before I arrived in Jakarta, the Embassy had early in 1974, correctly identified CSIS as the most important source of accurate information on Indonesian policy and plans in relation to the future of Portuguese Timor and on a range of other sensitive issues. CSIS was able to provide us with intelligence not available from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry (DEPLU) or other Indonesian Ministries. Such information was not handed out by our contacts in CSIS easily. Embassy officers over a long period had to gain the trust and confidence of the key CSIS personalities.

The information gained from CSIS was so sensitive that the Embassy had to take special care not to compromise its sources in CSIS in case those sources had not been specifically authorised to pass such information to us. Thus at no time did the Embassy tell, for example, General Benny Moerdani or the other key Indonesian figures involved in Portuguese Timor that CSIS had provided such intelligence to us.

In our dealings with DEPLU and other Indonesian Ministries we never referred to information given to us by CSIS. This led to bizarre situations, when, for instance, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik denied to me that Indonesian forces had been involved in the attack at Balibo. When I continued to press him on a daily basis about the fate of the five journalists he said disingenuously that I was directing my enquiries to the wrong Government. East Timor was still a Portuguese colony. We should be making our enquiries in Lisbon.

The "astonishing insights", to which Ball and McDonald refer, obtained by the Embassy from CSIS did not compromise either the Embassy or the Australian Government. The Embassy, using intelligence from CSIS, took every opportunity in its dealings with key Indonesian government figures and especially the generals directly involved in the operation, to warn them of the consequences of the use by Indonesia of armed force in Portuguese Timor as the documents published by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade make clear.

7

It was open to the Australian Government at any time to take a number of measures – such as United Nations involvement – but such steps were ruled out at the time by the Australian Government as either impractical or inappropriate, especially in relation to the UN given that Portugal was the colonial power, not Australia. The point is that at no time, did anyone either in the Embassy or in Canberra, decide that no action could be taken to stop Indonesia's plans in relation to Portuguese Timor because of the fear that such action risked the threat of "previous compliance being revealed".

The implication that to avoid "compromised diplomacy", the Embassy should not have sought and obtained timely intelligence about Indonesian plans in relation to Portuguese Timor and, instead, left itself and the Australian Government uninformed of the unfolding drama and without the information on which Ministers could base decisions, is quite misguided.

The two main tasks of the Head of Mission and the political officers at any Embassy are to ensure the Government and those who can influence policy in the country to which they are accredited are fully aware of the policies and views of the Australian Government on issues of mutual interest; and to report accurately and objectively on domestic and foreign policy developments of interest to Australia to which our Government might need to respond. The performance of both these tasks requires ready access to Ministers, key officials and the heads of the armed forces and intelligence organizations in a country like Indonesia, as well as to other influential opinion formers, such as leading journalists and informed academics. Access to policy makers is a prized tool in the conduct of effective diplomacy.

I consider that the Australian Embassy in Jakarta fulfilled these two tasks brilliantly between, say 1974-1977. No other Embassy in Jakarta served its capital as effectively as we did. Only the Singaporean and US Embassies had comparable – but not as good – contacts and access to information compared with the Australian Embassy. Our degree of access, our ability to gather, sift and assess sensitive information and our capacity to put Australian views was unparalleled in Jakarta at that time. It was also unequalled in my diplomatic experience with the possible exception of our Mission in Kuala Lumpur under High Commissioner, Tom Critchley, (whose deputy I was from 1961-63) between say the mid-fifties and early sixties when in much easier circumstances we had a wide range of key contacts at all levels in the Malaysian Government and society which ensured the Australian Government was very well informed during the lead up to the formation of Malaysia.

It is not difficult to imagine the criticism, which would have been directed at the Australian Embassy if the Government had not been well informed of Indonesia's policy and intentions in respect of East Timor and if the Government had been taken by surprise by Indonesia's military preparations to incorporate East Timor. For example, the coup in Fiji in May 1987 and again in 2000 and the violence in the Solomon Islands early in June 2000 seem to have taken the Government by surprise and provoked newspaper headlines like "Australia Snoozes as the Pacific Explodes" and "How we dropped the Coconut". It seems that the Embassy in Jakarta is being criticised by some for doing its job too well!

The authors, Ball and McDonald, also seem to overlook the fact that while officials advise, it is Ministers and the Cabinet – not officials – that decide policy and are responsible for the decisions they take. Officials are only culpable if they do *not* provide the Government of the day with relevant and accurate information.

One of the most offensive insinuations that surfaced in the media and in other writings was that the Embassy may have been aware that five journalists working for Channels 9 and 7 were in Balibo and could have been saved if it had intervened. Whether or not there may be some intercepted communication in the Defence Signals Division, which is occasionally alleged but has never been documented, about the presence of the journalists in Balibo, I do not know. I can only state that I have never seen such an intercept or been made aware officially that one exists. What I can assert categorically is that neither I nor any other officers in the Embassy in Jakarta was aware that there were any journalists working for Australian media in the Balibo area. My first knowledge of this event was on the night of 17 October 1975 when an Australian Secret Intelligence Officer came to the Ambassador's Residence in Jakarta with an intercepted message, which he said I must see immediately.

I was hosting a dinner and I read this message on the top step outside the front door on that humid and still night. I cannot recall the exact wording of the brief message, but it was to the effect that "four white men," had been killed on 16 October in Balibo and all traces had been removed. Actually five journalists had been killed as we discovered but this message referred to "four". Apart from the tragic deaths of these young men, I knew instinctively that, if they were Australians, which seemed likely, a massive blow had also been dealt to the Australia Indonesia relationship even if they had been killed by East Timorese fighting with Indonesian troops.

I had sent a cable to the Department of Foreign Affairs on 13 October reporting that the Embassy had gathered intelligence that military activity, including Indonesian army personnel, was impending in the border area around Maliana and Balibo. It would have been clear in Canberra that, if there were any Australians known to be in the border area, they should have been advised of the danger. At that time of civil war and Indonesian clandestine involvement we simply did not know at the Embassy that there were any Australians in the Balibo area.

That night, the 17th October, was I think the first totally sleepless night of my life. The next morning I felt tired, tense and depressed. Five young men, two Australians, two Englishmen and one New Zealander, all working for Australian TV Channels 7 and 9, were dead. That the journalists had identified themselves with one side in the civil war, Fretilin, and that they should not have been where they were is sadly true but this did not alter the fact that their lives had been prematurely snuffed out. That night, lying awake, I wondered if action had been taken in Canberra on the warning cable I had sent on 13 October. If not, why not? I sensed even then that in Australia attitudes towards Indonesia would be poisoned for years to come. East Timor now had its first western martyrs.

The deaths of the five journalists was a major reason behind the preoccupation of the Australian media with East Timor. However the media's contribution to the creation of a damaging mythology about Australian policy should be examined. There are many well-intentioned people with genuine and justifiable concerns about abuses of human rights in East Timor, a corrupt and essentially military Indonesian administration and the denial of self-determination for the East Timorese people until 1999.

There were other forces at work too. These forces include latent racists still harbouring fears of the "yellow peril" who are hostile to Indonesia, angry persons on the political left who had never forgiven Soeharto for the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965 and 1966 after the attempted coup and the removal of Soekarno. Regrettably some members of the media made their own contribution to anti-Indonesian bias and to what former Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, has described as a "vendetta against Indonesia" and the late Professor Heinz Arndt of the Australian National University as "a no-holds barred propaganda war" against that country.

I have many friends in the media and Australia is blessed with a number of perceptive, principled and objective columnists and writers. Sadly, however, there has been a history of bias and exaggerated reporting and comment on East Timor and Indonesia. Perhaps it is exacerbated because our societies so close geographically but so different and so far apart culturally.

Some of the falsehoods that gained public acceptance through repetition, apart from those already mentioned, are that the Government's response to Indonesia's invasion of East Timor was inconsistent with our response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; that Indonesia was guilty of "genocide" and had been by 1990 responsible for the deaths of more than 200,000 East Timorese, one third of the population (in a recent program shown on ABC television the figure was escalated to 250,000!); and that only Australia had recognised Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor because of its interest in oil reserves in the Timor Gap. "Blood for oil" was the catchcry.

The analogy between Indonesia's invasion of East Timor with Iraq's invasion with Kuwait is not sustainable. In the case of Kuwait, a sovereign member of the United Nations recognised by Iraq, was invaded by Iraq in one of the most clear-cut cases of aggression in recent history. A major multi-national force was mounted in conformity with United Nations resolutions to roll back that aggression. While the use of force by Indonesia cannot be condoned, the abandonment of the colony by Portugal in August 1975, the outbreak of civil war and Frilin's unilateral declaration of independence in November established the conditions in which the invasion took place. East Timor was not a member of the United Nations. It was an abandoned Portuguese colony situated within the Indonesian archipelago. No multinational force under UN auspices was established. The closest parallel would not be Kuwait but India's annexation by force of Goa in 1961, although even in that case there was no civil war there and Portugal had not abandoned its colony.

Regarding allegations of genocide in East Timor, the fact is that nobody knows authoritatively how many people died in East Timor during the civil war, as a result of tribal strife, before, during and after the Indonesian military intervention and as a result of famine. That many people died is tragic but the exaggeration of the number for propaganda purposes does a disservice to the historical record. In 1976 Francisco Dacruz was quoted as saying that 60,000 people had been killed in East Timor. The next day Dacruz said he had been misquoted. What he had said was that 60,000 people had "lost their lives or their homes" and that this figure included some 30,000 refugees who had fled the civil war to West Timor. Through what is known as incestuous interquote in the media and with the active assistance of critics of Indonesia this figure has gradually been escalated to 200,000 or more.

It is a minor point but an element in the mythology that has been built up by commentators in the media is that only Australia had recognised Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. This was intended to demonstrate Australia was in the wrong and out of step with the international community. In fact more than thirty countries had explicitly or implicitly recognised East Timor as part of Indonesia by 1990. It was a statement of fact that it would be simpler and more practical to complete the complex seabed boundary negotiations with Indonesia than it would have been with Portugal or an independent East Timor. However, I doubt whether oil was not a major consideration in the Fraser Government's *de facto* or the Hawke Government's *de jure* recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.

Perhaps the worst single example of biased and erroneous reporting appeared in the Melbourne Herald Sun on 16 January 1997. On the front page under the bold headline "*The Secret of an Execution*" an article appeared dealing with the deaths of the five journalists in Balibo and a funeral service for them in Jakarta twenty-two years earlier. This short article contained no less than nine false or questionable statements, something of a record in my experience of the media. It was accompanied by what was said to be the "first" picture of how "five Australian murdered journalists" were laid to rest in a "paupers grave".

The word "secret" in the headline was quite unjustified. The interment and memorial service in Jakarta was public and attended by some 35 persons, including representatives of the Australian, British and New Zealand communities, as well as the ABC, Reuters and Indonesian Newspapers. The word "execution" is emotive and not justified by the findings of Justice Sherman's independent *Report on the Death of Australian based Journalists in East Timor in 1975*.

The reference to the "first" picture was nonsense. The ABC had televised the service in Jakarta and footage had been shown twice in Australia on TV news bulletins. Another News Limited publication had previously published photographs of the grave. Indonesian papers had published similar photographs, in December 1975.

The remains of the journalists were not buried in a "paupers" grave. The grave was paid for by the Australian Government in the Christian section in the Kebayoran Cemetery.

11

Another assertion in the article that the families were not told of the funeral "until
afterwards", is also untrue. The consent of all the bereaved families to the service was
obtained in advance, otherwise the Australian, British and New Zealand Embassies
would not have allowed the service to go ahead. I refer to this report in some detail
because it is such a clear example of mendacious reporting which readers would probably
have assumed to be true. As Charles Hadden Spurgeon once observed, "a lie travels
around the world while truth is putting on its boots".

I also resented the suggestion in sections of the media and in the ALP left that I was
representing Indonesia's views to Australia rather than Australia's views to Indonesia.
This attitude towards my role had been prompted in the main by an article in the
Canberra Times of 16 January 1976 by Bruce Juddery and based on selected extracts
from a leaked cable I had sent from Jakarta on 5 January reviewing the situation for the
recently elected Fraser Government. This is an important document, which a quarter of a
century later, has, I believe, stood well the test of time and I have included the full text in
the *From my Diplomatic Notebook* section that follows this chapter.

Senator Primmer, an ALP Senator from the left faction and a critic of the Government
had made such an allegation in the Senate on 24 February. The cartoonist Ron Tanberg,
of whose work I am normally an admirer, also had a cartoon in the Age Newspaper,
implying the same attitude and this is also reproduced in *From my Diplomatic Notebook*
at the end of this chapter. I lower my colours to no one as a representative of my own
country and its interests abroad and I resented this. In a profile on my career, published in
Time magazine shortly after I retired in 1992 I was described as "wattle proud patriot". I
do not always agree with what I read in Time but I believe Time got that right.

As the Ambassador I always put the Government's views as clearly and as firmly as I
could on many occasions and at different levels to the Indonesian Government. I was also
obliged to ensure that the Australian Government understood the attitude of the
Indonesian Government, especially as we knew the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra was
unlikely to be fully briefed on Indonesia's policy.

I have searched my conscience over the years and while I am appalled at the sufferings of
the East Timorese between 1940 and 2000 and shocked by Indonesia's failure to
administer East Timor sensitively and humanely between 1976 and 1998 and while I
admire the skill and persistence of Jose Ramos Horta and Xanana Gusmao in keeping the
flame of the East Timorese independence alive, I stand firmly behind the reporting and
recommendations of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 1975 and 1976 in the
circumstances of that time. I also consider Whitlam and Fraser acted in what they
assessed to be the best interests of Australia, which is after all the role of Prime Ministers
in foreign policy. Alternative courses of action, so attractive in retrospect, were simply
not practical then.

As the situation unfolded in 1975 I realised the Embassy and indeed the Australian
Government was caught between a rock and a hard place; between what was seen as our

12

national interest and the attitudes and interests of other regional countries, on the one hand, and the right of the East Timorese, on the other, to determine their own future.

On 2nd June 1975 I wrote about this dilemma to Foreign Minister Don Willesee. I noted the policy that Portuguese Timor should be integrated into Indonesia, would, given the likely time frame and the situation in Portugal prove inconsistent with the policy to which we were publicly committed, namely that the colony's future should be determined by the wishes of its people. I added that a genuine act of self-determination would probably result in eventual independence, which may be hoped for by a majority of East Timorese but a result that countries of the region wanted to avoid. I concluded that the outlook contained "the seeds of real difficulty for Australia".

In August the Timor situation deteriorated further and I and my senior colleagues at the Embassy sensed that our persistent efforts over the previous five months to persuade Indonesia to accept an act of self-determination had run their course. Diplomacy is always a hostage to fortune. Unexpected events can erode the most carefully crafted plans. I recall a discussion with my deputy, Malcolm Dan and the political counsellor, Allan Taylor, during which we came to the conclusion we had hoped to avoid, namely that Indonesia's attitude was hardening. It would invade East Timor if that was the only way to secure the fundamental goal of incorporation.

The potential contradictions between the two main aspects of Whitlam's policy, the logic of incorporation into Indonesia on the one hand and the need, on the other, for this to be an outcome of self-determination was daily becoming more obvious. An act of self-determination in East Timor, which would result in a vote to join Indonesia would require Portugal to remain as the Administering Authority for a number of years and involve a substantial educational program. Our Ambassador in Lisbon, Frank Cooper, was still being told as late as June by the Portuguese that they would remain there from three to five years for this purpose. In fact, the Portuguese and the Indonesians had agreed at an earlier meeting in London that the timetable for decolonisation should be from three to five years. Portugal was unable to deliver on this commitment with disastrous results.

In brief, the unstable and shifting political situation in Lisbon, following the revolution in 1974, which overthrew the Caetano Government resulted in the descent of Portugal's decolonisation program into chaos. This chaos was worse in Africa but it also affected East Timor. On 11 August, one of the two main political parties, the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) staged a "show of force" against Fretilin. This was in fact a coup and the Portuguese Administration, including Governor Mario Pires, fled to the island of Atauro effectively abandoning its role as the administering authority of the colony. Fretilin naturally reacted. It captured an arsenal of Portuguese weapons, which had recently been shipped from Mozambique, another Portuguese decolonisation disaster area.

The civil war had begun. At the Embassy we could only watch as in a matter of weeks our worst fears were being realised as Portugal virtually abandoned the colony, mutual distrust between Portugal and Jakarta sharpened and a civil war between the two main

13

parties, Fretilin and UDT, was under way. Indonesia's resolution to prevent a Fretilin victory and to integrate the colony had hardened and contingency plans for covert operations in the border area that it had developed as early as July 1974, were brought into play. I knew we were sliding into the unavoidable and forceful incorporation of East Timor, which we could not stop unless we were to use force, an impossible option as we had recently withdrawn our forces from Vietnam and it would have destroyed our relationship with Indonesia for decades.

In September our relations were already deteriorating. Acting Foreign Minister, Mochtar, Foreign Minister Malik and General Moerdani and other senior persons were increasingly critical of what they argued was popular support for Fretilin in Australia and our failure to appreciate the growing threat to Indonesia's national interest and to the security of the region posed by Portugal's abandonment. When Fretilin, having gained the upper hand, made its Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1975 and executed a number of its East Timorese political opponents, we knew that a full scale Indonesian military intervention was inevitable in the near future. It occurred on 7 December.

Whitlam never really had to address the issue of incorporation of East Timor by force and without a proper act of self-determination. The Australian Government was paralysed by the decision of the Fraser Opposition to block supply in the Senate that led to the dismissal of the Whitlam Government on 11 November 1975. Preoccupied by a domestic political crisis of this magnitude the Government tended to shift its focus away from foreign policy issues

On 20th November I was asked to convey a message from Mr Fraser to President Soeharto stating that Australia attached "great importance to its relations with Indonesia". If elected to Government on 13th December Mr Fraser would want to establish "close personal ties" with the President. Importantly, he recognised "the need for Indonesia to have an appropriate solution for the problem of East Timor". The message was also critical of Australian trade union action against Indonesian shipping, foreshadowed an early visit by the new Foreign Minister, should the Coalition win the election and undertook that Ministers would not receive Ramos Horta or other representatives of Fretilin should they come to Australia. The Prime Minister also wanted the fact that he was sending such a message and its contents kept secret. I was somewhat concerned about the text, especially the absence of any reference to the non-use of force.

I telephoned the Secretary of the Prime Minister's department, John Menadue, to seek some elaboration. I said that the President would be likely to ask what a solution appropriate to Indonesia's needs might encompass. I was telephoned by Menadue a day later to say the Prime Minister did not want to elaborate. "His words stood by themselves", Menadue said, implying that any Ambassadorial interpretation should be avoided.

I arranged to call on the President at his private residence to maintain the secrecy the Prime Minister wanted. The President said he was "pleased" Mr Fraser recognised Indonesia's need for an appropriate solution to the East Timor question. As expected the

14

President asked me if I could elaborate. In the light of my discussion with Menadue I said I was not in position to interpret the Prime Minister's words. I added, however, on my own initiative that I would assume that they did not encompass any change of policy towards the use of force. It was disingenuous in the light of what was to happen only twelve days later but Soeharto responded that there was "no change" in Indonesian policy. Portuguese Timor should be "decolonised properly".

In diplomacy as in conflict discretion is the better part of valour, and I did not refer directly in my report of the meeting to my comment about the use of force. I did, however, mention it in a personal telephone conversation with Graham Feakes, a friend of long standing, who was head of the South Asia Division in the Department at that time. Graham said that even if I felt I had exceeded my instructions it was important that I had made the point. I do not know what the Indonesians really made of Fraser's message and whether or not they may have regarded it as a "green light" from Australia to intervene, although it is clear that intervention was already planned by the time I conveyed Fraser's message to Soeharto.

It is also clear that they expected more by way of support and understanding, especially after the Coalition had won the election on 13th December with a huge majority in the House of Representative and even a majority in the Senate. In particular Indonesia was angry that alone amongst its regional neighbours Australia voted in the General Assembly on 12 December for a resolution "strongly deploring" Indonesia 's armed intervention in East Timor and calling on it to withdraw its forces without delay so that "the people could exercise their right to self-determination". Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Japan voted against the resolution while the United States and Singapore abstained. This resulted in arranged demonstrations outside our Embassy on 17 December. It was a difficult time for me, my staff and our families.

One result of Indonesia's disappointment was that Indonesia did not agree to a visit by Mr Fraser to Bali in 1977 at the time of the ASEAN Summit commemorating the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the organization. Mr Fraser had lobbied hard to go to Bali so he could meet the ASEAN heads of government and emphasise that, despite our differences over East Timor, he wanted to work closely with Indonesia and the other ASEAN countries.

After I completed my posting in Jakarta at the end of March 1978 I was less directly involved with Indonesia and East Timor although I was increasingly aware of Indonesia's mal-administration of the territory. Fretilin's continuing resistance with external support was undermining the viability of incorporation. A decisive event, after which it seemed to me it would be highly unlikely that Indonesia could ever win the hearts and minds of a majority of East Timorese, was the Dili massacre in 1991. I was in Seoul for the third APEC Ministerial Meeting when the first newsagency report of the shootings in the Santa Cruz cemetery came through. I remember saying to Gareth Evans that Indonesia had a new disaster on its hands. To underline the gravity we went straight to the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, who was representing his country at the same conference. He was clearly shocked by the news which he had not yet received from Jakarta.

15

I had been retired for nearly six years when East Timor was once again projected into the spotlight. The East Asian economic crisis of 1997 was the catalyst. President Habibie became the third President of Indonesia on 21 May 1998 following the widespread demonstrations and the resignation of Soeharto. As Chairman of the Australia Indonesia Institute I had taken members of the Board to call on President Habibie in August. Habibie was a mercurial, intelligent and unpredictable figure. He had been a loyal acolyte of Soeharto's and he was not popular. I always regarded him as an interim President.

Habibie, however, believed it was his destiny to lead Indonesia and when he became President, although it was virtually by accident, he was determined to seize the moment. He set out to differentiate himself from Soeharto and to show that he was, as one of his Cabinet colleagues told me "a new force in Indonesia dedicated to reform and democracy". He promoted greater press freedom, improved observance of human rights and the release of political prisoners. These were encouraging developments. However while he did open up Indonesia after the stagnation of the later years of the Soeharto period and Indonesians welcomed this, suspicions remained that his reforms were opportunistic and insincere. He wanted desperately to be elected President. Despite his public advocacy of reform he was siphoning off government money for his own electoral purposes.

Habibie also wanted to solve the East Timor problem, about which he knew very little, during his presidency. In June 1998 Habibie announced Indonesia was ready to consider a "special status" for East Timor. This meant autonomy and it was a major change in policy. For years efforts had been made behind the scenes to persuade Soeharto to take that route by distinguished Indonesians like Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and a catholic confidant of the President's and a former Minister under Soekarno, Frans Seda.

An initiative towards autonomy was set back when, in 1997 as Chairman of the Australia Indonesia Institute, I took a group of Australian editors to call on Soeharto. After a private briefing on Indonesia and its future, he agreed to take some questions on the record. The ABC representative, unaware of sensitive discussions ongoing behind the scenes, asked the President whether he would consider granting East Timor autonomy. Confronted with this direct question, Soeharto replied "No", thereby unfortunately closing off that option at that time.

While Habibie had spoken publicly about a special status for East Timor his private thinking was more far reaching. I understand on reliable authority that he intended to report to the Parliament in October 1988 on his success - or, if necessary on his failure - to resolve the East Timor question. Habibie considered that if the choice was between autonomy and independence it would be illogical for Indonesia to go on subsidising a costly autonomy which might well lead to independence later. He had said privately to colleagues "why do we have this problem when we have a mountain of other problems? Do we get any oil? No. Do we get gold? No. All we get is rocks. If the East Timorese are ungrateful after what we have done for them, why should we hang on?"

16

(w)

At the fateful Cabinet meeting on 27 January Habibie, brandishing Howard's letter said Indonesia should move straight to a choice between autonomy and independence. Surprisingly the only dissenting voice was Foreign Minister Alatas who felt such precipitous action was dangerous, including for the East Timorese who were ill prepared for independence if the vote went that way. Alatas apparently received no support. The economic Ministers were glad to be rid of the cost. Some of Habibie's stronger Islamic Ministers were happy "to be rid of 600,000 Catholics". The Minister for Defence, General Wiranto reportedly agreed to Habibies decision on condition that there was no suggestion that the 1975 intervention by the armed forces was wrong. It is also suggested that Wiranto had another private agenda. He would not oppose Habibie in the belief that his policy would fail as would his attempt to be elected President. This would keep Wiranro's own political ambitions alive.

That such a major decision about Indonesia's future could be taken without full consideration and with such limited discussion by an impatient, erratic interim President can only be regarded as irresponsible. The reference in Howard's letter to the Matignon Accords between France and its colony of New Caledonia as a possible model in East Timor, apparently particularly angered Habibie. He regarded it as gratuitous to draw an analogy between French colonialism and Indonesian dealings with what had been for twenty three years one of its provinces. While this was a marginal issue it may have contributed to Habibies irritation during the consideration of East Timor at the Cabinet meeting.

As far as possible, foreign and trade policy needs to be aimed at securing predictable and achievable outcomes. I feared that the accelerated process towards East Timorese independence that an agitated Habibie had launched was likely to have disastrous consequences for the East Timorese themselves and to a lesser extent for Australia. I did not, however, realise the extent of the consequences. I was sickened by the images of the anti-independence Militia rampages, supported by elements of the TNI, in September 1999. Many Indonesians were also shocked and ashamed by these acts.

Although I had no policy role at that time I still had an involvement with Indonesia through my Chairmanship of the Australia/ Indonesia Institute. I had tried to forewarn the Government of the dangers of hasty action as early as August 1998. Because of her position at that time as a key advisor to Habibie and the likelihood that she would replace Alatas as Indonesia's Foreign Minister if he managed to win the Presidential election, I arranged to meet with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, whom I had known for some time, at the Grand Melia Hotel in August.

Dewi told me then that if Australia pressed for self-determination or independence in response to pressure from the Catholic Church, amongst other groups and individuals, then we would "end up with another Angola on our hands for which we would meet most of the cost for years to come. Portugal, as the former colonial power would again "wash its hands of the situation as it did in 1975 after a possible initial period of limited financial support." She continued "if you press us on an act of self-determination after a

17

period of autonomy, we won't wear it. Why should we? Why should we subsidise the
development of East Timor for another five or ten years of autonomy?" Normally a petite
and thoughtful woman who chose her words carefully, she was unusually direct on this
occasion.

I passed this information in August 1988 to the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. I do not know what weight was given to it by the Government but it was clearly prescient. In retrospect it was an early and authoritative warning of Habibie's likely attitude. Indeed, this was demonstrated in his precipitate response to Howard's letter of the 19th December 1998.

It may well be that once Habibie had changed publicly Indonesian policy the genie could
not be put back in the bottle. Xanana Gusmao, Bishop Carlos Bello, the head of the
Catholic church in East Timor, and Ramos Horta had all expressed the opinion as late as
1997 that for independence to be viable in East Timor there would need to be a
preparatory period of five to ten years of autonomy. Most South East Asian leaders
shared this view and were concerned about the sudden rush towards a vote in East Timor
precipitated by Habibie and encouraged by the Australian Government. Some, including
Lee Kuan Yew, believed it was unwise for Prime Minister Howard to write his letter of
19 December which, given Habibie's temperament and the fact that he was a temporary
President, elicited the reaction it did.

It is a hypothetical question now but had my advice been sought I would have suggested
that key countries that might have been able to influence Habibie, such as the United
States, Germany, Japan, the other ASEAN countries and Australia should have
immediately urged him to change course while there was still time. The dangers were
already evident. Habibie could have been pressed not to offer a vote on autonomy that
would in effect be a vote for early independence but, instead, to offer a period of
autonomy for, say, five years during which the cost of the administration of East Timor
would be born by Indonesia's major aid donors.

This may have prevented the spiteful devastation after the UN vote in August and would
have been much less costly to donors, including Australia, than financing the UN
Assistance Mission to East Timor (UNAMET), followed by the force led by Australia to
restore order (Inter-FET), the United Nations force which replaced it and the repairs to
infrastructure damaged in September. Whether or not it could have been avoided by less
hasty action and more thoughtful policies, the reality is that East Timor endured yet
another tragedy in September 1999 on its painful path to independence.

It was not in Australia's national interest, nor in the interest of the South East Asian
region in 1975 for an unstable, left wing, independent East Timor to appear on the map of
South East Asia. This may also be true of 2000 in theory but interests can be identified
and defined more readily than they can be advanced or achieved. The practical realities
Australia and the countries of South East Asia faced by late 1998 were quite different
from those of 1975. The cold war and fears of the Soviet threat were behind us, East
Timorese leaders, in particular Xanana Gusmao and Ramos Horta, had been highly

18

effective advocates of East Timor's right to self-determination, Vietnam so feared by the ASEAN countries after the American defeat there had since become a member of ASEAN and Indonesia had completely failed to win the hearts and minds of the East Timorese people, despite considerable investment in infrastructure and education, in a way which had not been anticipated in 1975.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on the instructions of Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and with the approval of Prime Minister Howard, published in 2000. *Australia and the Indonesian incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-76.* While the Government was in breach of its own thirty year rule on the declassification of official documents and its motives were questionable, I was glad that the documents had been published. The government's motives were questionable because of an underlying political purpose. The government had changed its policy towards East Timor in late 1998. While it suited the Government to claim the moral high ground it had no alternative but to change its policy because of Indonesian maladministration and especially because Habibie had dramatically changed Indonesian policy.

The Howard Government saw in President Habibie's interim presidency an opportunity to redress what many Australians considered to be the hardships inflicted on the East Timorese people and the denial of a proper act of self-determination since Indonesia's incorporation of the former Portuguese colony in 1976. Australia could never have brought about a proper act of self-determination in East Timor on its own, as was clear in the 1974-76 period. However, Habibie's wish to relieve Indonesia of a continuing and costly problem, which was damaging Indonesia's international standing and, at the same time, his belief that he could strengthen his chances of becoming Indonesia's democratically elected President in 1999, by offering the East Timorese a chance to determine their own future, opened the way for an Australian initiative. The government believed it could engineer a regional diplomatic success, comparable to the previous government's establishment of APEC or the Cambodian peace settlement, through resolving the East Timor problem, which had troubled relations with Indonesia for 25 years.

The coalition government also had its own domestic political agenda. The shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Laurie Brereton, made a strong statement criticising the East Timor policy of Australian Governments, especially the Whitlam Government in August 1998. This was a factor in the Government's decision to announce a changed policy. It also suited the Government to promote the theory that the Whitlam, Hawke and Keating Governments had behaved immorally and improperly in the seventies, eighties and early nineties.

It was unfortunate that the Fraser Government, in which Howard himself had been a Minister, had to be tarred with the same brush. But Fraser was expendable. Howard donned the mantle of a belated supporter of an act of self-determination in East Timor and of what he is prone to call true Australian values. It was a matter of regret to me that my former Department sought to play a similar role. Journalists have told me that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, including the Secretary, sought to imply in

19

briefings for them that Australia had adopted the wrong course in its relations with Indonesia between 1975 and 1978. Senior officers giving the briefings argued that the Department was now recommending a more transparent and proper policy towards Indonesia than the secretive and less moral approach the Embassy and the Department had adopted in the seventies.

It was correct and inevitable that Government policy be changed in 1998 but it was unnecessary to present the change in this manner. I have no doubt that had Howard been Prime Minister in 1975 and 1976, instead of Whitlam and Fraser, and had one of the department's present senior executives been the Ambassador in Jakarta at that time instead of me, the same policies would have been followed as were adopted then.

Personally, I was pleased when the documents were declassified and published. The some 840 pages of cables, letters and records of conversation will enable historians and serious scholars to examine critically some of the mythology and conspiracy theories that have gained such currency in the Australian community over the last 25 years. Up until this publication they have had to rely on selective leaks to a media, understandably influenced by the deaths of the five journalists in Balibo and receptive to the views of the advocates of an independent East Timor.

When the documents were first published a few academics and journalists used the event to quote selectively from them in order to reiterate their already established criticisms of previous governments and policies. It is never easy to alter perceptions once they have taken hold. I am confident, however, that as objective historians and serious researchers study in detail the 840 pages of text, a more accurate appreciation of Australia's policy responses in the 1970's will emerge.

The only comprehensive analysis of this official publication, printed in the December 2000 issue of the Australian Review of Books, by the foreign editor of the Australian, Greg Sheridan, concluded with the comment "these compelling and extraordinary documents disclose a group of talented, dedicated diplomats" who "did their best by Australia". The reviewer added "I only hope our diplomats today are as good".

Prime Minister Howard has described his leadership of Australia's involvement in East Timor since 1998 as "the most positive and noble act by Australia in the area of international relations in the last twenty years". The fact that he was addressing his faithful supporters at the Liberal Party Council does not excuse this comment. Most South East Asian leaders have a different perspective. For example, Malaysia's mild mannered Deputy Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi has said publicly the Australian Government was "not sensitive to South East Asian feelings". The Senior Minister in Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, has said it was imprudent for a Prime Minister to write in the terms he did to an erratic and temporary President. I have encountered similar views at senior levels on visits to Thailand and the Philippines

The Government believes that through its decisive action and with East Timor clearly on the road to independence it has achieved a diplomatic triumph. It considers that the

20

widespread public support for its policy demonstrated its correctness and the incorrectness of previous policies aimed at what is alleged to be the appeasement of Soeharto's Indonesia under both Labour and Coalition Governments. I accept that Howard and Downer believe what they did to be right in the circumstances as they interpreted them; but the road to hell is often paved with good intentions.

The likelihood of the violence which erupted in September and which was widely predicted was unfortunately overlooked. Our style was also offensive to many in our neighbourhood, although it struck a responsive cord in sections of the Australian community. We chose to take the lead, to force the pace and to issue ultimatums. In Indonesia and the wider region as well as to some extent in Australia our style was seen as excessively assertive, jingoistic and triumphalist. I believe the government would have been more effective and generated less animosity in Indonesia and our neighbourhood if we had been less prominent, more persuasive, less insistent on taking the lead and less demanding in pursuing its objectives.

Sensitive to criticism that the Government had not done enough to avoid the devastation in East Timor in September 1999, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade produced on behalf of the Government another volume of documents in 2001 entitled "East Timor in Transition 1998 - 2000". This was a slim book, which was widely seen as defensive and intended to justify the Government's policies during this period.

As I have said publicly and written previously policy should be judged by outcomes. In the afterglow of what it regards as a success in righting a wrong and bringing independence to the people of East Timor, the government still needs to live with the consequences of its policy. The first and most obvious consequence is the emergence of an independent East Timor to our immediate North, an outcome all of Howard's and Downer's predecessors since Menzies in 1963 had hoped could be avoided. But independence is what the majority of the people of East Timor wanted and what many Australians supported. While it may not be in our national interest it is reality to which Australia, Indonesia and the countries of East Asia and the South West Pacific must now adjust.

The second major consequence is that our relationship with Indonesia, described in the government's own 1997 White Paper "In the National Interest", as one of our four most important bilateral relationships - along with those of the United States, Japan and China - has been substantially damaged and will take years to repair. While some of the anger is due to Indonesia itself seeking to find scapegoats to blame for problems largely of its own making in East Timor, the fact is that a large section of the Indonesian community is now alienated from Australia while a large section of the Australian community is alienated from Indonesia. As an Indonesian Minister said to me in 2002 about Australia, "we are neighbours. We have to work together but to be honest we do not trust you and we do not much like you". It is simply not in Australia's national interest to have such a troubled relationship with its largest and closest neighbour.

(c)

An unpalatable fact, which Australians also need to acknowledge, is that we are seen as
having had an excessive and unbalanced focus on East Timor. To other countries,
including Japan, China and the nations of ASEAN, as well as India, Pakistan, and even
the United States, the paramount issue in the region is the successful transition in
Indonesia to a more stable, moderate representative Government and the recovery of the
Indonesian economy. Despite the moral outrage in the Australian community over the
shocking events in East Timor in early September 1999, the reality is that East Timor is
seen in the wider scheme of developments in Asia as very much a secondary issue
compared with the future of Indonesia. One of Australia's continuing problems is the
extent to which our policy towards Indonesia has been and still is observed through the
prism of East Timor.

Thirdly, there is the legal consequence in that the Timor Gap Treaty has unravelled and has had to be renegotiated initially with the United Nations and later with an independent East Timor. This is a complex process because the Treaty signed in 1989 was a temporary Treaty; a compromise because the outer limit of Australia's former bipartisan sea bed claim is the northern boundary of Zone A; the Zone in which resources were to be equally divided with Indonesia but which we have since agreed to give East Timor 90% of the revenues. The unravelling of the Timor Gap Treaty also has commercial implications for the private companies that invested in the area in good faith under the original Treaty, the validity of which had been upheld by the Australian High Court and the International Court of Justice.

A fourth consequence is that Australia now faces an indefinite period of substantially increased expenditure related to supporting and aiding an independent East Timor after the United Nations Authority leaves. We have a moral obligation to do so having made ourselves a party-principal. At best we may see in the future an economically struggling, quasi-democratic state with a benign relationship with its large neighbour, Indonesia. There is, however, a danger that we could find ourselves supporting indefinitely a factionalised, unstable mini-state of chronic dependency and ongoing problems with its large neighbour. I hope not. Otherwise we will see that evangelical altruism can have a high price tag, without necessarily achieving the hoped for results, as the United States has found in Haiti. While the Government's aspirations may have been altruistic, the price tag in terms of national interest and the impost against future budgets is likely to be very substantial. A senior member of the present Bush administration has already made this analogy. He told me in Washington in July 2000 "East Timor will be your Haiti". Australians can only hope he is wrong.

For me personally, however, there is a fitting epilogue to the East Timor issue. After consulting Xanana Gusmao, Ramos Horta personally invited me to attend East Timor's independence celebrations in Dili on 20 May 2002. This was a symbolic, pragmatic and friendly gesture on his part, which would have surprised my Australian critics. It also brought to a conclusion a disagreement, which had continued intermittently for more than twenty years.

22

I had been criticised during this period by those who continued to support a proper act of self-determination and independence for East Timor after its formal incorporation as the 27th province in Indonesia in 1976. I had known Ramos Horta since I entertained him to lunch in Canberra in 1974. I also had a long private discussion in my office in 1990, when Secretary of the Department, during which we tried to work out a way forward on East Timor, the details of which I passed on privately to Ali Alatas at Horta's request.

I did not meet Xanana Gusmao until July 2000. Given the very different attitudes we had adopted in 1975 when I was Ambassador to Indonesia and Xanana was in the hills above Dili, fighting as an insurgent against incorporation, we got on surprisingly well. The reason was that I had been arguing in public for some time after September 1999 that the current issue was how best to accommodate an independent East Timor, which had become inevitable, into the existing South East Asian and South West Pacific regional architecture.

In Wellington at a public conference attended by Xanana Gusmao in July 2000, I said:

> "Ultimately the measure of East Timor's success as an independent state will be its capacity to govern itself. The main objective as I see it now will be for Indonesia, Australia and East Timor, as immediate regional neighbours, to work closely together to underpin East Timor's independence and to maintain a close cooperative and cordial triangular relationship."

Xanana and Ramos Horta said they were pleased to hear these views from a former senior diplomat who had in the past accepted the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. I also said that whatever regional Governments, including Australia and New Zealand may have hoped for in 1975, the global and regional situation had been transformed since then. Once it became clear that an independent East Timor was inevitable Australia and Indonesia had to prepare to deal with that reality. Xanana is flexible, forgiving and magnanimous. Having fought against Indonesian forces and having been imprisoned in Jakarta he nevertheless recognised that Indonesia would be of critical importance to an independent East Timor's future. Xanana, Ali Alatas and I discussed at length the need for East Timor and Indonesia to heal the wounds of the past and look to the future over a private lunch in Jakarta in June 2001. It was a productive occasion.

Because I visited Indonesia regularly, where our daughter, Anna and her Philippine husband and their four children have lived for the past ten years and because I knew personally Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri, who was widely seen as the "President in waiting", I was asked if I would urge her to adopt a more flexible and accommodating attitude to East Timor and to meet with Xanana Gusmao and Ramos Horta which she had declined to do previously.

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I was visiting Jakarta and sought to call personally on Vice President Megawati on 22 March 2001. She was alone. Our Ambassador, Ric Smith a long-standing friend who had been my deputy at our Embassy in Manila, Head of the Department's Gulf War task force and Ambassador to China before his posting to Jakarta, accompanied me. I discussed with Megawati relations between the Australian and Indonesian Governments, which she described as "troubled", which they were at that time. She said both governments needed to work on improving the relationship. Her manner was relaxed and friendly and during the latter part of the conversation I raised the East Timor question. I said I was aware she had not welcomed the separation of East Timor from Indonesia or the way in which it had occurred but it was a reality.

She agreed with the view I had expressed for some time that Australia, Indonesia and an independent East Timor needed to cooperate closely in the future in an effort to ensure a sound relationship with Indonesia. I also suggested it would be important symbolically if Megawati were to receive Xanana and Horta when they made a subsequent visit to Jakarta. She smiled but did not say she would do so. That is not the Javanese way but the point had certainly registered with her and I believed she would do so.

I telephoned Horta in Dili and told him that I had discussed East Timor and its future with Megawati. I thought there was more flexibility in her attitude than a year ago. Megawati received Xanana on a subsequent visit shortly after she had become President in July 2001. East Timor formally celebrated its independence in Dili on 20 May 2002. Megawati, despite quite strong political opposition in the Indonesian Parliament, wisely attended. The symbolism of Xanana and Megawati, arms raised and hands clasped, being cheered by the East Timorese crowd in Dili early on the morning of 21 May gives some grounds for optimism about the future.

The Indonesian intervention in 1975 had been provoked to some extent by the shambles into which Portuguese decolonisation policy degenerated and by Fretilin's unilateral declaration of independence. The failure of integration after 1976 was due to effective Fretilin resistance and Indonesia's brutal, corrupt, insensitive and predominantly military administration. The tragedy of September 1999 was largely due to Habibie's hasty decision to set East Timor on the road to early independence and the brutal but predictable reaction of the East Timorese Militias supported by elements of the TNI. Australia did not have the ability to change any of these major events, although it was a catalyst in Habibie's decision when it might have played a more restraining and constructive role.

After 25 years the people of East Timor have achieved the independence the majority had wanted. This was the reality of 2002, a different and more principled reality than the reality of 1975. That reality was based more on Realpolitik in the circumstances of that time. The focus would now need to be on assisting East Timor to succeed as an independent state. A diplomatic cycle had come full circle. A new phase has begun.

A diplomatic career is unavoidably episodic. Each posting is like a different chapter in a book. I had been through a diplomatic minefield. I may have been wounded by the

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Q: All the documents are out now that show clearly that Ford and Kissinger when they were in Jakarta in that critical period in December 1975 basically gave the covert green light for the Indonesian invasion to go ahead. On the eve of East Timor's independence, what do you feel about that? Do you think that the US has since made amends?

A: Yes, it has. Xanana and I have met with Dr Henry Kissinger and he has been kind in offering us help in different ways in putting us in contact with the US administration and business sector.

But also let us not forget that the Cold War era blinded the two sided in the Cold War – the US and the Soviet Union – into disregarding fundamental values and sacrificing nations in the course of their rivalry. It was not only the US that committed sins; the Soviets (too) in our particular case.

The number one culprit at the time was Indonesia. From the very beginning, it sought to undermine the Portuguese effort to decolonise East Timor. But, at the same time, we, the East Timorese, in 1974 and 1975 were inexperienced, immature and irresponsible in not grasping the opportunity of independence with wisdom. Instead we engaged in civil war, the first time ever in our history. Thus we played into the hands of the hardliners in Indonesia who wanted an excuse to invade.

So blaming Australia, the US is a bit one-sided. I always hope that the East Timorese side can be humble enough to say that we were inexperienced, immature and stupid. I hope that we don't repeat these mistakes again in the future.

**Q:** I guess also that the unilateral declaration of independence, in retrospect, was a mistake; it was like waving a red rag to a bull - the bull being Indonesia?

**A:** The unilateral declaration of independence was an act of desperation, essentially forced upon the leadership of Fretilin in the face of abandonment by everybody. As the Indonesian incursions into East Timor were increasing, the leadership of Fretilin decided to declare independence. I objected. I was a dissenting voice at the time on the unilateral declaration of independence. For many years, I had to explain away that UDI. Yes, it was a tactical error forced upon us; but it was a tactical political error.

**Q:** Going back to Ford and Kissinger in particular. When you and Xanana Gusmao met Kissinger and talked to him, did he express any regret, any remorse, for the compliant US attitude at that time?

**A:** Essentially, Dr Kissinger explained that they knew very little about East Timor and that they (the US) were preoccupied with the post-Vietnam situation in Asia and the Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa. They thought that East Timor was no different from Goa, which was taken over by India in the 1960s. But, at the same time, he added - which I thought was a very nice comment on his part - he expressed his admiration to us, to Xanana and myself, saying that he has great admiration for the East Timorese, how we struggled all along without the support of any American administration. And he said at one point: I want to make up for the past lack of support.

**Q:** And he's done that by helping to open doors for East Timor?

**A:** Yes, I have met with him a number of times. I hope that in October, when East Timor joins the UN, that he will also host an event where we will be introduced to American business, bankers, publishers and so on. It is something that we are exploring with his office.

**Q:** When did you and Xanana meet Kissinger and hold these discussions?

**A:** I think it was May last year (2001) and then we met him again in January this year in New York.

**Q:** And Xanana had the same forgiving attitude that you have?

**A:** Oh yes, absolutely. Xanana was very warm, very pleasant to Dr Kissinger. We had a very friendly discussion. We did not at all raise the 1974-75 US support for Indonesia. We didn't go to see him to discuss the past but to talk about the future. We went to see him as an influential elder statesman, seeking his support with the US administration, with the Republican establishment, to support us. And he readily agreed to offer a hand, if and when necessary.

Q: But did he raise the part that he played in 1974-75?

A: He was the one who took the initiative in talking about the past, in a way to explain his views at the time. We accepted that.

Q: One last question on that particular period of time. Do you think that if the US and Australia had taken a strong stand against Indonesian invasion, or plans for invasion, and told Soeharto and the generals in Jakarta of that opposition, would it have made a difference, do you think?

A: It could have made a difference. But that is rather academic because none of them -either Australia or the US - at the time believed in the viability of an independent East Timor. They were obsessed with the communist threat and viewed Fretilin as pro-communist. Their views at the time were in favour that East Timor should be absorbed by Indonesia.

Ends.