[LJ]

JAN 26 1988

FEITH & ZELL, P. C.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
SUITE 750 SOUTH
1800 M STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
(202) 293-8956

DOUGLAS J. FEITH (D. C.)
L. MARC ZELL (D. C., MD., VA.)
MICHAEL H. MOBBS (D. C., ALA.)
MONA M. MURPHY (D. C., MD., VA.)
HARRIET KRASNOW (N. Y.)

TELEX
4932260

TELECOPIER
(202) 293-8965

OF COUNSEL
HELAINE G. ELDERKIN (VA.)

January 25, 1988

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Counselor
Center for Strategic International Studies
1800 K Street
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

As Richard Perle discussed with you recently, several of us have been developing an analysis of the INF Treaty. We have enclosed the current working draft for your consideration. It might be useful to you as you prepare your Senate testimony on the Treaty.

We request that you hold this document very close as we have not yet completed it. Work remains to be done on the two protocols and Memorandum of Understanding. We hope to make the finished product generally available by week's end and would welcome, at your earliest convenience, any comments you might have on our draft.

With best wishes, I am

sr

Enclosure

February 3, 1968

THE INF TREATY: ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE REVIEW
HIGHLIGHTS

This paper analyzes the rights and obligations of the Parties to the INF Treaty, not as advertised in statements or declarations about the treaty, but as set forth in the Treaty language itself. This review of the Treaty text does not aim to evaluate whether the Treaty's purposes are well-advised from the points of view of strategy or diplomacy. Rather, it examines whether the Treaty's terms actually accomplish the Treaty's stated (or clearly implied) purposes, chief among which is the complete, verifiable elimination of the intermediate- and shorter-range (500 to 5500 km.) ground-based nuclear missiles of the U. S. and USSR. It focuses on ways the Treaty might be improved to enhance the chances that it will achieve its aims and to minimize unintended side-effects detrimental to U.S. interests.

The key points are listed below, accompanied by references to the relevant Treaty provisions and the pages of the Article-by-Article Review on which they are discussed.

1. VERIFICATION PROBLEMS.

a. The Data Gap.

Article IX.3 (pp. 15-16)

Article XI.3 (p. 21)

Article XI.5 (pp. 21-22)

b. Loopholes that could facilitate either SS-20 violations or breakout preparations.

Article IV.1 (pp. 5-6)

Article VI.1 (pp. 7-8)

Article X.1 (pp. 17-18)

Article X.5 (p. 18)

Article XII.3 (pp. 24-25)

c. Inadequate basis for judging accuracy of Soviet- supplied data

Memorandum of Understanding (p. 48)

2. NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE

Article XIV (p. 26)

3. PROHIBITION ON CONVENTIONALLY ARMED CRUISE MISSILES

Article II.1 and II.2 (pp. 2-3)

Article VII.4 (pp. 10-11)

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THE INF TREATY: ANALYSIS AND COMMENT

Introduction

This analysis of the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty,
entered into December 8, 1987 between the United States and
the Soviet Union and currently being reviewed by the U.S.
Senate, was prepared by a working group convened at the
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and
chaired by AEI visiting fellow Frank Gaffney. The members of
the working group are listed on the following page.

The purpose of the working group's analysis is not to
support or oppose ratification of the INF Treaty; indeed the
group includes individuals on both sides of the ultimate
issue before the Senate. The aim here is rather to examine
rigorously and in detail the effectiveness of the Treaty's
provisions and protocols in achieving the Treaty's own goal:
to eliminate all intermediate-range and all shorter-range
nuclear missiles. Regardless of the wisdom of this goal it
is clearly in the interest of the United States that the
Treaty's requirements should be as transparent as possible
and that its verification provisions should protect against
undetected violations. Mindful of the Soviet Union's
exploitation of ambiguities and loopholes in past treaties,
and concerned that differing interpretations could lead to an
unequal exchange of rights and obligations in the future, the
authors have sought clarity, precision, and the timely
assessment of ambiguities in the Treaty's text.

The members of the working group believe that a number
of the INF Treaty's deficiencies discussed in this analysis
could be exacerbated if an agreement limiting strategic arms
were concluded and if certain of this Treaty's provisions
were regarded as a precedent for the later agreement. They
have thus identified problems which may strike some readers
as minor details -- but which could become critically
important in the context of the more ambitious agreements
currently being negotiated.

This analysis is offered in a constructive spirit on the
premise that the Senate will wish to understand the Treaty in
detail before deciding whether to ratify it unreservedly or
to amend or adopt reservations to it. Where there are
ambiguities the Senate may wish to clarify them by eliciting
an indication from the Soviets of how they interpret those
provisions. In all events the sort of close scrutiny offered
here should assist in placing the final disposition of the
Treaty on a firmer basis than if the issues identified were
not squarely addressed.

Christopher C. DeMuth
President
American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research

MEMBERS OF THE

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

WORKING GROUP

ON THE INF TREATY

Chairman:

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.

Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Designate

Members:

Richard N. Perle

Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense

Seymour Weiss

President, SY Associates
Former Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
Department of State

Michael Mobbs

Partner, Feith and Zell, P.C.
Former Assistant Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

Douglas J. Feith

Partner, Feith and Zell, P.C.
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE
REVIEW OF THE INF TREATY

INTRODUCTION

This paper reviews provisions of the INF Treaty, its two
Protocols and Memorandum of Understanding. Comments are offered
regarding a number of key issues. Where it is not yet possible to
ascertain satisfactorily the meaning or implications of a given
provision, we have highlighted the need for clarification by
setting forth the relevant questions.

ARTICLE I - PRINCIPAL OBLIGATION

In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty
which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and
Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each
Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and
shorter-range missiles, not have such systems
thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set
forth in this Treaty.

Comment:

The primary obligation of the Treaty parties is, according
to this article, the complete elimination of all
intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and other specified
items. This is the standard against which the Treaty's provisions
must be judged. If, for example, as a result of the cumulative
effect of allowed production, inadequate inspection and permitted
R&D, the Soviets can retain or produce prohibited missiles and
other systems, the Treaty would fail to achieve its purpose.

ARTICLE II - DEFINITIONS

Analysis of the Article II definitions should take into
account not only their suitability in the context of this INF
Treaty, but also the implications of their use as precedents for a
START Treaty. It should be noted that the provisions of Articles
VI and VII significantly add to and in some cases alter the
definitions of terms dealt with in Article II.

The Treaty does not define "elimination" as such, though
it does specify procedures for eliminating specific items. The
problem is that the specified procedures will not in every case
result in the actual elimination of these items. In fact, in some
cases items "eliminated" according to the specified procedures may
even be able to continue to perform their prohibited functions.
See comments on Article IV.1.

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Article II, Paragraphs 1 and 2

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

2. The term "cruise missile" means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

Comment:

Taken together, the definitions of ballistic and cruise missiles in Paragraphs 1 and 2 do not capture every possible type of missile. For example, a hyper-velocity glide vehicle appears not to be within the definitions. This should be confirmed, as some work is being done in the United States on that technology. What other missile technologies are similarly excluded by these definitions? Were all such exclusions intended by us? What uses can the Soviets make of such exclusions?

This provision permanently prohibits **conventionally-armed** ground-launched missile options that could contribute substantially to the non-nuclear defense of Western Europe. (See **Report of Commission on Long-Term Integrated Strategy.**) The INF Treaty makes such contributions more important than before. The breadth of the definitions -- that is, the fact that they cover conventionally-armed as well as nuclear-armed ground-launched missiles -- is said to be justified by the verification difficulties that would be created if conventionally-armed missiles were not prohibited. This verification benefit, however, has largely been negated by the fact that the definitions do not cover drones (remotely piloted vehicles) or any other ground-launched missiles that do not carry weapons.

The operative assumption evidently is that the Article VII counting rule, which specifies that such systems may not be flight-tested for weapon-delivery, will prevent prohibited missiles from being developed in the guise of drones. Is this assumption valid? In other words, is it possible to flight-test a weapon-delivery system in a manner that would not be distinguishable from the flight-test of a drone? For further

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Given that major verification problems still inhere in these
definitions, the wisdom of permanently banning
conventionally-armed missiles should be reassessed.

## Article II, Paragraph 3

3. The term "GLBM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.

### Comment:

A key issue of the Treaty is its application to Soviet GLBM launchers. See comments on Article IV, Paragraph 1.

## Article II, Paragraphs 5 & 6

5. The term "intermediate-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers.

6. The term "shorter-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers.

### Comment:

These definitions refer to "range capability," but that phrase is misleading. In the case of ballistic missiles, as Article VII, Paragraph 4 makes clear, the range is considered to be not the maximum range of which the missile is capable, but only the maximum range to which it has been tested. As for the case of cruise missiles, see comments on Article VII.4.

## Article II, Paragraph 8

8. The term "missile operating base" means:

(a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located within a deployment area, at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and

(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located any place, at which

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shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located.

Comment:

"Normally operate" is not defined in the Treaty. Its use here implies that missiles and launchers may legally operate outside the missile operating bases. This may mean that missiles that qualify under the Treaty as "non-deployed" may nevertheless be operational, though it is clearly the intention of the Treaty that all operational missiles be deemed "deployed." Is there an agreed meaning for this term? What if anything do we know about the meaning the Soviets attribute to "normally" here?

Ambiguous or unclear terms of this kind may or may not have great significance in the context of the INF Treaty. But we can expect many such terms to be transplanted into the START Treaty, where their significance might increase greatly. It is elementary but bears emphasis that it is very bad practice to allow terms of an arms control Treaty to remain ambiguous or undefined.

ARTICLE III - Treaty-LIMITED SYSTEMS

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IA, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

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Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively.

**Comment:**

On the assumption that the SSC-X-4 was at more or less the same early stage of development as the U.S. Pershing IB, the U.S. consented to have the Treaty treat these two missiles in the same fashion, different from the treatment of the "existing" items. The information about the SSC-X-4 in the Memorandum of Understanding -- that 84 SSC-X-4 missiles and six launchers have been produced and are located at a storage facility -- suggests that that assumption was erroneous.

This evident intelligence error raises questions about our ability to monitor the subject matter of the Treaty. How do we know that the 84 SSC-X-4 missiles that the Soviets have acknowledged are all the SSC-X-4 missiles that they possess? For that matter, what confidence do we have about the accuracy and completeness of the other data supplied by the Soviets? See comments on the Memorandum of Understanding.

Is there any significance to the difference between those inspection provisions applicable to the systems "never deployed" (i.e., Pershing IB and SSC-X-4) and those applicable to "existing" (i.e., deployed) items? See Article X.6.

**ARTICLE IV - ELIMINATION SCHEDULE (Intermediate-Range Systems)**

**Article IV, Paragraph 1**

Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

**Comment:**

The Treaty says that all Treaty-limited systems are to be "eliminated," and no such systems are to be "possessed" by either Party after three years. The actual obligation of the Parties, however, is to follow certain "elimination" procedures, custom designed for each banned item, and such procedures amount only to alteration rather than elimination of several Soviet launchers.

Whereas the "elimination" procedures for all Treaty-limited U.S. systems will ensure that such systems are reduced to scrap,

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the procedures for several Treaty-limited Soviet launchers have been designed to allow the "eliminated" launchers to be used for other purposes. Given that these "eliminated" Soviet launchers will be permitted to operate throughout the Soviet Union, the question is whether, even if we observe them through overhead reconnaissance, we have the capability of ascertaining whether the alterations have been reversed so as to allow the item to perform a prohibited function.

It may be that the Soviets would find it easier to produce a new launcher from "scratch" than to undo the elimination procedures on an old launcher. This raises the question: Do we have any confidence that we would detect clandestine production of Treaty-limited launchers? See comments on Article VI, Paragraph 1.

Some of the Treaty's language implies a greater comprehensiveness of its scope than is, in fact, the case. In drafting the Memorandum of Understanding, the Parties excluded from the list of items to be eliminated certain elements of an INF capability -- certain facilities and equipment -- that can be used for other purposes, too. With respect to the U.S. facilities and equipment being so spared, this seems a sensible, financially responsible measure. The United States can be expected to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty not to retain an INF capability, and will not put such items to prohibited uses. The exclusion, however, may on the Soviets' side facilitate the concealment of Treaty violations or may enhance their ability to effect a rapid "break-out." For example, the Treaty allows the Soviets to retain without alteration SS-20-related multiple-bay garages and support structures for shorter-range missiles.

Each exclusion from the elimination schedule, gerrymandered definition, and exception to the non-production rule may seem minor in itself, but taken together such provisions mean that the Soviets, even without violating the Treaty, can remain rather close to a militarily significant INF capability. And the violations that would be required to maintain an INF capability are less extensive (and thus easier to conceal) than the Treaty's comprehensive language leads one to believe.

## ARTICLE V - ELIMINATION SCHEDULE (SRMs)

### Article V, Paragraph 1

Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support

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**Comment:**

Regarding the possible significance of this Article's failure to mention the elimination of support structures for shorter-range missiles, see comments on Article IV, Paragraph 1.

# ARTICLE VI - COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS

## Article VI, Paragraph 1

Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall:

(a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or

(b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

**Comment:**

The ability of the Intelligence Community (IC) to monitor Soviet performance under the terms of this provision and the Treaty in general is a major issue. In this connection, the following questions, among others, must be addressed:

Can the IC accurately represent that it knows the location of all the facilities that have been used to produce the Soviets' Treaty-limited systems? Would it know if the Soviets actually began production of banned items at other facilities? Would it know if the Soviets created the capability at other facilities to begin production of banned items?

To what extent could permitted SS-25 production and testing mask or substitute for SS-20 production/testing?

It has been argued that this Article's prohibition of flight-testing serves to guarantee against covert deployment of the SS-20. The contention is that without flight-testing the Soviets would have no confidence in the reliability of their missiles and therefore would not deploy them. But our experience with the SS-16 missile, deployment and flight-testing of which were banned under SALT II, argues to the contrary. According to the Administration, the SS-16 was probably deployed over a long period of time even though we detected no flight tests.

It is also presumably the case that the Soviets will be able to obtain useful reliability information from the permitted launches to destruction and static fire burns prescribed by the

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Treaty's elimination provisions.

Furthermore, flight tests of the SS-25 will provide the Soviets some data relevant to the SS-20 because the first stages of those two missiles are essentially identical. Indeed, the Soviet Union's ability to use their unregulated SS-25 program as a vehicle for getting around the prohibitions of the INF Treaty or concealing violations of the Treaty is an intractable problem which arises repeatedly throughout this agreement. Some have sought to minimize the gravity of this issue by contending that the Soviets have little incentive to maintain a prohibited, concealed SS-20 capability because the SS-25s themselves, which are not prohibited, can perform the same military function as the SS-20 does.

This argument ignores, however, the possibility that the Soviets may value highly the specialized characteristics of the SS-20 -- in particular, its multiple warheads, high accuracy, and short time of flight. Such considerations may constitute ample incentive for the Soviets to exploit opportunities to maintain an SS-20 capability despite the Treaty. Also, if a START agreement is concluded, limiting or banning SS-25s and other strategic systems, the Soviets' incentives to violate the INF Treaty would increase substantially.

## Article VI, Paragraph 2

Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

## Comment:

This provision attempts to address the problem caused by the fact that the Treaty-limited SS-20 and the unlimited SS-25 ICBMs have first stages that are so similar that no practical inspection regime would be able to distinguish them. As a result of this provision, the Soviet Union will be allowed to produce first stages that are "outwardly similar to" the SS-20 first stage, thereby vitiating somewhat the general prohibition on production of any intermediate-range missile stage in paragraph 1. Although the Soviets say such stages are "not interchangeable with" SS-20 first stages, the absence of any definition of that phrase makes it meaningless.

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Furthermore, it is unclear how -- if at all -- this Article would affect a future intermediate-range missile that might be developed using the first two stages of the SS-25 (just as the first two stages of the SS-16 gave rise to the SS-20). Could the development, testing and production of such a system be concealed using the SS-25 program as "cover"? In any event, it will be difficult for the U.S. to determine whether anomalous activities within the SS-25 program indicated a surreptitious intermediate-range missile development program.

This paragraph contains a noteworthy drafting error. Read literally, it permits the production of an "SS-25" second stage that is "outwardly similar to, and interchangeable with" the second stage of an SS-20. This problem arises because the paragraph begins with a "notwithstanding" clause that overrides the general prohibition on intermediate-range missile stage production of paragraph 1. This point should be clarified with the Soviets. What the last clause of the Paragraph meant to say (and should be revised to reflect) is: "... provided that that Party does not produce any other stage which is either outwardly similar to, or interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM."

## ARTICLE VII - COUNTING RULES

As was pointed out in the comments on Article II, the Article VII counting rules have an important bearing on the definitions of key Treaty terms, and analysis of these rules should take into account both their suitability in the context of this INF Treaty and also the implications of their use as precedents for a START Treaty.

### Article VII, Paragraphs 1 & 2

1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.

**Comment:**

The Treaty does not define the word "type." This suggests that the Parties were unable to arrive at a common understanding

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of the term. In light of the controversy relating to whether the SS-25 is a new type of ICBM, and thus a violation of SALT II, it is important that the sides not hold to inconsistent definitions of so critical a term.

In the absence of such a definition it is impossible to know how different a new missile must be from a Treaty-limited missile in order for that new missile to be excluded from the Treaty's prohibitions (i.e., in order for the new missile to be considered either (1) not a weapon-delivery vehicle, or (2) not a vehicle of intermediate- or shorter-range).

## Article VII, Paragraph 3

If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.

### Comment:

The following questions arise from this provision:

With what effectiveness could a missile now designed for ABM, ATBM, or anti-air purposes be used in a ground-to-ground, weapon-delivery mode?

Could the Soviets develop a new intermediate-range or shorter-range missile in the guise of an ABM, ATBM, or anti-air missile?

## Article VII, Paragraph 4

The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles.

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## Comment:

The counting rule for GLBM range capability provides a significant loophole: a new GLBM could be tested to 490 km in a non-minimum-energy trajectory and thus would have much greater actual range. The U.S. would have no grounds to object to such a system, even though it would unquestionably have the ability to strike targets over 500 km away.

The counting rule for GLCM range is taken from the SALT II Treaty (Article II.8, 2nd Agreed Statement). As Secretary Vance's published analysis of SALT II (Document 12B, p.19) makes clear, the U.S. interpretation of this definition was not confirmed by the Soviets. Was there, in the course of the INF negotiations, any agreement on the meaning of "flying to fuel exhaustion"?

In any event, this provision is not verifiable. If we observed a new Soviet GLCM flying 490 km in a test, how would we be able to know how much fuel it had on board when the flight was terminated? Replacing a large conventional warhead on such a GLCM with a small nuclear warhead would allow it to fly INF ranges -- even if the fuel would have been exhausted carrying the first payload to only 490 km.

## Article VII, Paragraphs 7 & 8

7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs.

8. If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM.

## Comment:

Is there any engineering or mechanical reason why the launcher for the SS-25 could not be used to launch an SS-20? Do we know whether any such launcher has ever been used for this purpose -- including during development of the SS-25?

If an SS-25 launcher during development testing carried an SS-20 canister, it would be captured by the counting rule in Paragraph 8. Can we be certain no such launcher ever did?

## Article VII, Paragraph 10

Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination, the following shall apply:

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(a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile;

(b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and

(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile.

Comment:

Because the first stage of an SS-25 is externally indistinguishable from that of an SS-20, the counting rules for U.S. missiles differ from those for Soviet missiles. They impose a more rigorous standard on the U.S. side (the largest stage of the Pershing II missile alone counts as a full-up missile) than on the Soviet side (only a full-up Soviet missile -- or its canister -- counts as a missile).

The difference between the counting rules for U.S. missiles and those for Soviet missiles affects the relative values of U.S. and Soviet inspection rights under the Treaty. Because of these counting rules, the U.S. side's rights to conduct continuous monitoring of a Soviet production facility apply only to a Soviet final assembly plant. The corresponding rights of the Soviets, however, apply to a U.S. plant that actually manufactures missile stages. (For further discussion of this point, see Article XI, Paragraph 6.) This means that the Soviet facilities that now manufacture SS-20 second stages (or first stages for that matter) are not subject to monitoring by the United States under the Treaty.

Given that the Treaty effectively permits the Soviets to continue manufacturing first stages of the two-stage SS-20 (see Article VI, Paragraph 2), it is not a minor matter that we have no inspection rights at all at whatever facilities manufacture SS-20 stages.

ARTICLE VIII - SITING LIMITATIONS

Article VIII, Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3

1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment

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areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas.

3. Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

Comment:

This Article describes where intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers shall be located during the period between entry into force and the end of the elimination period. These requirements raise the following questions:

Will we be able to tell that Treaty-limited items are not located elsewhere? For example, could they be stored without risk of detection in warehouses or other installations? Do we know that all areas in the Soviet Union where operational missiles exist have been identified by the Soviets as "deployment areas?"

How many intermediate-range missiles have the Soviets produced? How confident are we in our estimate?

Article VIII, Paragraph 5

All deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of a deployment area.

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Comment:

If the Soviets have continued after November 1, 1987 to maintain SS-20s or support equipment at any missile support facility previously associated with these missiles but not listed in the MOU, they would be in violation of this provision. Is there evidence that any such items continued to be present at any such facility after November 1, 1987?

Article VIII, Paragraph 6

Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, including stages of such missiles, or launchers of such missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Comment:

The word "locate" in this provision seems to mean "to allow something to be at a location." On the other hand, it could be read to mean "to move something to a location." This point should be clarified by the Parties especially if consideration is being given to creating a parallel provision in START.

Article VIII, Paragraph 8

A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities.

Comment:

This provision seems altogether unmonitorable. And, in any event, even if we were to detect an apparent violation, the loophole (viz., "except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities ... ") would make it impossible to establish the point. Is it clear that, for purposes of this provision, a missile can be placed on its launcher only at a repair facility?

Article VIII, Paragraph 9

Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article.

14

[Y]

**Comment:**

This provision contains the Treaty's first reference to "training" missiles and launchers. No definition or clarification of such terms is provided in Article II, Article VII, or elsewhere. Have the Parties agreed that training missiles must be inert — i.e., without propellant? If all missiles must be either deployed or non-deployed, where do training assets fit in? How will we be able to tell the difference between such missiles and "real" ones. This point is particularly important in light of last-minute Soviet reallocation of a number of deployed SS-20s into the training category.

# ARTICLE IX - DATA AND RELATED NOTIFICATIONS

## Article IX, Paragraph 1

The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to this Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and notifications required by this Article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

**Comment:**

The quality of the data contained in the MOU is fundamental to the viability of this Treaty. If such data represent only a portion of the actual Soviet force then the remainder of that force will not be subject to any of the inspection provisions. Issues that need to be explored include: the quality of our intelligence; the likelihood that actual Soviet capabilities are higher; the significance of apparently wide discrepancies in the number of refire missiles associated with each of the several Soviet systems limited by the Treaty; and the extent to which our estimates are being altered on the basis of Soviet-supplied information (despite the fact that the factors which gave rise to these estimates in the first place do not appear to have changed).

## Article IX, Paragraph 3

No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

15

[Y]

## Comment:

The United States insisted on reviewing before Treaty signature -- and retaining the right to reject -- the data provided for in the MOU. The data in the MOU, however, are not the data that form the basis of the Parties' obligations under the Treaty. The data that really count are those to be exchanged by the Parties 30 days after the Treaty's entry into force; the Treaty does not afford us the right to reject Soviet data supplied at that time. In fact, if the United States is unsatisfied with the information provided in the data update -- e.g., if we judge the Soviets to be understating their INF force -- and the Soviets fail to convince us of the accuracy of their new data, then the United States would have no effective recourse. As a practical matter, we would feel compelled to continue to fulfill our obligations under the Treaty.

Under Article X.8, the Soviets will be allowed to remove missile support facilities and operating bases from this data base if they claim to have accomplished certain elimination procedures by the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Since there is no prohibition against eliminating Treaty-limited items during this period, the Soviets may choose to remove missiles and launchers from the updated data base contending that they have been eliminated. However, we will not have any inspection rights with regard to such missiles and hence will not be certain that they have, in fact, been eliminated. It is, moreover, unclear whether the Soviets would be obligated to follow the procedures in the Protocol on Elimination with respect to systems eliminated during this period.

Two of the advertised verification strengths of the Treaty are the agreement on data before Treaty signature (as reflected in the MOU) and the inspection rights applicable to the elimination of Treaty-prohibited items. In light of the foregoing paragraph, one cannot reach a judgment on the contribution these "strengths" make to the Treaty's verification regime until we have received the updated data from the Soviets 30 days after the Treaty's entry into force. In order to minimize the problem, the United States could insist upon a commitment from the Soviets either that, should they eliminate Treaty-limited systems prior to entry into force, they will follow the provisions of the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection or that they will refrain from such eliminations until the Treaty enters into force.

## Article IX, Paragraph 5

Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall provide the following notifications to the other Party:

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[Y]

***

(f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including:

(i) the number of missiles or launchers;

(ii) the points, dates and times of departure and arrival;

(iii) the mode of transport; and

(iv) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit.

**Comment:**

It should be noted that the provision on notification of transit is not as valuable as it might have been, since it does not require that notification be given until 48 hours after the transit is completed.

# ARTICLE X - ELIMINATION PROVISIONS

## Article X, Paragraph 1

Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

**Comment:**

Unlike Article VI (production) and Article VIII (location of Treaty-limited items), this paragraph does not specifically apply its terms to the stages of Treaty-limited missiles. Section I.3 of the Protocol on Elimination does state that "all stages of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs shall be subject to elimination." It might be argued, however, that this Protocol language applies only to the stages of full-up missiles that are listed in the updated data base and whose elimination is observable pursuant to the Treaty's inspection provisions. That reading would allow the Soviets to separate, before the Treaty's entry into force, the two stages of the SS-20 and retain the separated stages indefinitely. This would greatly facilitate the

17

reconstitution of a Soviet INF capability.

To fix this problem, the Parties could agree to add to
Paragraph 1 the words "and stages of such missiles" after the
phrase "intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles."

## Article X, Paragraph 5

Each Party shall have the right, during the first
six months after entry into force of this Treaty,
to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100
of its intermediate-range missiles.

## Comment:

This provision was included because the Soviets insisted that they would otherwise be unable to eliminate all their intermediate-range missiles within the allowed period. The Intelligence Community should assess whether any benefit might accrue to the Soviets in terms of establishing a useful data base on SS-20 reliability. (See comments on Article VI, Paragraph 1). Does the U.S. expect to destroy any of its intermediate-range missiles by launching them?

## Article X, Paragraph 6

Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry into force of this Treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. Such missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4.

## Comment:

The significance of this paragraph is discussed in the

18

[x]

comments on Article III.

## Article X, Paragraph 7

Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this Treaty.

## Comment:

This paragraph makes it clear that the term "elimination" in the Treaty does not mean elimination in the common sense of the term but rather fulfillment of the elimination procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. The adequacy of such procedures was called into question in the comments on Articles II and IV.1.

## Article X, Paragraph 8

Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities. A Party shall notify the other Party pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled:

(a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed;

(b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and

(c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there.

Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this

19

[Y]

Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this Treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated.

### Comment:

This provision must be read in conjunction with Article XI.5(b), which deals with the inspection of former missile operating bases and support facilities. It opens the door to the possibility that facilities which currently have a role in Treaty-limited activities can be exempted from inspection if the Party claims to have fulfilled the three conditions listed and hence omits them from the data exchange which must be made 30 days after entry into force.

Are all the conditions listed in subparagraphs (a)-(c) discernible by national technical means of verification? If not, how will we have confidence that facilities known to be associated with Treaty-limited activities meet these conditions before entry into force? If so, what is the perceived need for close-out inspections at facilities eliminated after entry into force?

## Article X, Paragraph 9

If a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted.

### Comment:

It seems intended, but is not made explicit, that a missile operating base must be "eliminated" before it can be converted for the use of a non-limited GLBM or GLCM. This possible ambiguity takes on special importance given that the Treaty allows the Soviets to retain such structures as multi-bay garages and other SS-20-related items at "eliminated" operating bases.

## ARTICLE XI - VERIFICATION: INSPECTION PROVISIONS

The utility of this inspection regime is limited by the fact that it does not provide any right to conduct short-notice, on-site inspections at suspect sites, i.e., sites other than

20

[Y]

declared (or formerly declared) facilities. Thus, all of the
effort described in this article is directed only at those places
that the Soviets have in fact listed and thus chosen to make
subject to inspection.

## Article XI, Paragraph 3

Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this
Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct
inspections at all missile operating bases and
missile support facilities specified in the
Memorandum of Understanding other than missile
production facilities, and at all elimination
facilities included in the initial data update
required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this
Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no
later than 90 days after entry into force of this
Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be
to verify the number of missiles, launchers,
support structures and support equipment and other
data, as of the date of entry into force of this
Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article
IX of this Treaty.

## Comment:

If a facility is not included in the updated data base to be
provided 30 days after the Treaty's entry into force (which
Article X.8 says it need not be if it is "eliminated" prior to
entry into force), do we still have the right to inspect it? On
the one hand, this provision is said to apply to all facilities
listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, but, on the other, the
purpose of the inspections it authorizes is said to be the
verification of the data in the updated data base. A related
ambiguity is discussed under paragraph 5(b) of this Article.

## Article XI, Paragraph 5

Each Party shall have the right to conduct
inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years
after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party
shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections
per calendar year during the first three years
after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such
inspections per calendar year during the subsequent
five years, and ten such inspections per calendar
year during the last five years. Neither Party
shall use more than half of its total number of
these inspections per calendar year within the
territory of any one basing country. Each Party
shall have the right to conduct:

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[Y]

(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry
into force of this Treaty, of missile operating
bases and missile support facilities other than
elimination facilities and missile production
facilities, to ascertain, according to the
categories of data specified in the Memorandum of
Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers,
support structures and support equipment located at
each missile operating base or missile support
facility at the time of the inspection; and

(b) inspections of former missile operating bases
and former missile support facilities eliminated
pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty
other than former missile production facilities.

Comment:

Subparagraph (b) provides the right to inspect former missile operating bases and support facilities "eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X." This right constitutes a major element of the entire inspection regime. Its value, however, could be severely limited depending on how one interprets the ambiguous term "pursuant to." In particular, the question is: Is a site that has been "considered to be eliminated" under the last sentence of Article X.8 ipso facto deemed eliminated "pursuant to" that paragraph? If not, then the Soviets can severely limit the value of this inspection right by "eliminating" as many sites as possible prior to entry into force of the Treaty. This problem would be solved if the Parties agreed to add the following sentence to the end of subparagraph (b): "Any site considered to be eliminated under Article X, Paragraph 8 shall be deemed eliminated pursuant to Article X, Paragraph 8."

This section's negotiating history needs to be carefully
reviewed. In particular, what is the rationale for the
diminishing quota of inspections?

Article XI, Paragraph 6

Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this
Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13
years after entry into force of this Treaty, to
inspect by means of continuous monitoring:

(a) the portals of any facility of the other Party
at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages,
any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a
solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this
Treaty, is accomplished; or

(b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals

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[Y]

of an agreed former missile production facility at
which existing types of intermediate-range or
shorter-range GLBMs were produced.

The Party whose facility is to be inspected
pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the
other Party is able to establish a permanent
continuous monitoring system at that facility
within six months after entry into force of this
Treaty or within six months of initiation of the
process of final assembly described in subparagraph
(a). If, after the end of the second year after
entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party
conducts the process of final assembly described in
subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive
months, then neither Party shall have the right to
inspect by means of continuous monitoring any
missile production facility of the other Party
unless the process of final assembly as described
in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry
into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be
inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in
accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United
States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at
Magna, Utah; in accordance with subparagraph (a),
for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic.

Comment:

This provision establishes the asymmetrical monitoring rights discussed in connection with Article VI.2 and VII.10.

ARTICLE XII - VERIFICATION: NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

Article XII, Paragraph 2

Neither Party shall:

(a) interfere with national technical means of
verification of the other Party ...; or

(b) use concealment measures which impede
verification of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty by national technical means of
verification carried out in accordance with
paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does
not apply to cover or concealment practices, within
a deployment area, associated with normal training,
maintenance and operations, including the use of

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[Y]

environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

**Comment:**

Given the fact that the Soviets have in the past not complied with the corresponding non-interference provisions of other treaties, there is reason to doubt the value of this provision.

**Article XII, Paragraph 3**

To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a Treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5500 kilometers, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at which cooperative measures shall be implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) no later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and

(b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation.

Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time.

**Comment:**

We can expect that this provision will be hailed as a major accomplishment in the field of cooperative verification measures. While it does represent a new approach -- one designed to obviate on-site inspection of certain suspect facilities -- it does not

24

[Y]

under the circumstances accomplish its purpose, namely to allow us to monitor SS-25 bases to check whether SS-20s have been deployed there in violation of the Treaty. But Subparagraph 3(a) in effect affords the Soviets six hours in which to remove from a challenged site any illegally deployed SS-20s. Given that the SS-20 is a mobile missile designed to be movable upon short notice, it is unreasonable to suppose that, if the Soviets decided to cheat in this manner, they would not be able to effect a timely removal of the SS-20s after a challenge.

Other issues that merit attention in this regard include:

What is the value of this provision relative to the value of the short-notice, on-site inspection regime the United States was proposing up till the final days of the Treaty negotiations? It is noteworthy that, although the United States in the INF negotiations dropped its insistence on on-site inspection of suspect facilities, the Gorbachev-Reagan Summit Statement commits the Soviets to agree to procedures for such inspections in the START agreement. With this commitment in hand, perhaps the United States can now find a way to use it to strengthen the verification regime in the INF Treaty.

Does the negotiating record reflect some understanding about what a fixed structure for a launcher is, and indicate what would happen in the event new fixed structures for launchers appeared which did not have openable roofs? Is it physically possible for the Soviets to open the roofs of all fixed structures at SS-25 bases which are capable of containing SS-20 launchers? What about maintenance facilities, other garages, etc. in which a launcher could be located?

Does the Soviet obligation to show us the "missiles" on SS-25 launchers mean simply that we will be allowed to observe the SS-25 canister which will be judged (applying the standard INF Treaty counting rules) to contain an SS-25 and not an SS-20, or does it constitute an obligation to display the missiles removed from their canisters? If not, what value would this provision have as an aid to verification?

## ARTICLE XIII - RESOLUTION OF COMPLIANCE ISSUES

### Article XIII, Paragraph 1

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with

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[Y]

the obligations assumed; and

(b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

**Comment:**

Given the poor record of the Standing Consultative Commission established under SALT I in resolving serious concerns about Soviet violations of past treaties, it is unclear on what basis one should expect the Special Verification Commission established by this paragraph to do better.

It is also unclear what types of "measures ... to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty" are envisioned that the parties will agree upon pursuant to subparagraph 1(b). It should be ascertained whether this provision can be used to circumvent the amendment process (described in Article XVI), which properly requires that any proposed amendments to the Treaty be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

## ARTICLE XIV - NON-CIRCUMVENTION

The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

**Comment:**

The fundamental question about this provision is: Does it create any obligations over and above those contained in other parts of the Treaty? If not, then it merely emphasizes the Parties' commitment to comply with the Treaty, and, from a legal point of view, is surplusage. We assume that the Administration takes the latter position. However, under international law, if there is a question regarding the interpretation of a Treaty provision, then a reading which entails the creation of an additional obligation of the Parties is presumed correct as opposed to one that regards it as redundant (or "surplusage"). Consequently, if the Administration regards this provision as surplusage, then it must be clearly established now that the parties deem it as such in order to defeat the legal presumption that would otherwise apply. If this is not accomplished, then the provision could be cited as barring various Western defense efforts that, while not prohibited by the Treaty's terms, are said to be somehow "in conflict with" them.

26

# ARTICLE XV - DURATION

## Article XV, Paragraph 1

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

### Comment:

Although the Treaty is of unlimited duration, the inspection rights it grants last for only 13 years (3 years in the case of the verification enhancement provisions relative to SS-25 bases, possibly less for portal monitoring at Votkinsk under certain circumstances). The working assumption seems to have been that a START Treaty would be signed within 3 years. Should a START Treaty not be signed in that period, should thought be given to ensuring that the verification regime for this Treaty will be extended?

## ARTICLE XVI - Amendments

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

### Comment:

See the comment on Article XIII.1(b) concerning the potential uses of the Special Verification Commission to circumvent the requirement that all amendments be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

## SIGNATURE SECTION

***

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

### Comment:

Given the haste with which the final texts were prepared, and in view of the significant difficulties we have had in the past with divergent translations being cited as a pretext for Soviet behavior we judged to be inconsistent with their commitments, a careful review of the consistency of the two texts is in order.

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[N]

Postscript on THE PREAMBLE

The United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to
as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating
consequences for all mankind,

Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic
stability,

Convinced that the measures set forth in this
Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of
war and strengthen international peace and
security, and

***

Have agreed as follows:

Though preambular language is often dismissed as having
little significance, it can have a bearing on public attitudes
about the subject matter of the Treaty and on questions of Treaty
interpretation. It is troubling that the preamble here focuses on
the threat of nuclear war rather than the threat of war in
general. Any major European war would have devastating
consequences. The focus on the special threat from nuclear
weapons lends itself to use as a criticism of NATO's flexible
response policy, which entails reliance on nuclear weapons as a
deterrent against aggression.

The preamble implies that the elimination of nuclear
weapons as such enhances strategic stability. This could have
dangerous effects on attitudes toward the remaining nuclear
weapons in Europe and toward strategic arms, all of which are
critical to Alliance security -- indeed, more critical in the
aftermath of the INF Treaty than before.

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[y]

ELIMINATION PROTOCOL

INTRODUCTION
=============

This protocol specifies the categories of items associated
with Treaty-limited systems that the Parties agree to eliminate
and the procedures that will be deemed to constitute "elimi-
nation." Two points merit particular attention: First, the
Parties have agreed that *not all* the equipment or facilities
associated with Treaty-limited missiles are to be eliminated.
Second, they agreed that some of the items to be "eliminated" are
not actually to be destroyed but simply modified or altered in
designated ways so as to allow them to be used for other purposes.

SECTION I

Section I, Paragraph 4

For both Parties, all stages of intermediate-range
and shorter-range GLBMs shall be subject to
elimination.

Comment:

Notwithstanding this provision, the Soviets are permitted by
the Treaty (see Article VI.2) not only to retain but even to
produce the first-stage of the intercontinental SS-25, which is
virtually identical to that of the first stage of the SS-20.
Article VI.2 of the Treaty vitiates this section of the
Elimination Protocol as far as a key element of the most important
Soviet INF system is concerned.

SECTION II

Section II, Paragraph 3

Prior to a missile's arrival at the elimination
facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance
elements may be removed.

Comment:

This provision spares from elimination the nuclear warheads
of the Treaty-limited INF missile systems. Given the serious
concerns on the U.S. side about whether there could be effective
verification of nuclear warhead destruction and whether important
net intelligence benefits would flow to the Soviets from measures
to verify such destruction and, given the Parties' apparently
mutual interest in recovering and recycling warhead materials,

29

[Y]

this provision seems on balance to be desirable.

## Section II, Paragraph 4

Each Party shall select the particular technological means necessary to implement the procedures required in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section and to allow for on-site inspection of the conduct of the elimination procedures required in paragraph 10 of this Section in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty, this Protocol and the Protocol on Inspection.

### Comment:

What is involved in allowing the inspected party to "select the technological means necessary ... to allow for on-site inspection of the conduct of the elimination procedures"? Is it clear that this right cannot be used to hinder the ability of the inspecting party to conduct a useful inspection?

## Section II, Paragraph 7

A missile stage being eliminated by burning in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section shall not be instrumented for data collection. Prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the inspecting Party shall confirm that such missile stages are not instrumented for data collection. Those missile stages shall be subject to continuous observation by such an inspector from the time of that inspection until the burning is completed.

### Comment:

It is unclear whether we can have confidence that the Soviets are complying with this provision.

## Section II, Paragraph 10

The specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows, unless the Parties agree upon different procedures to achieve the same result as the procedures identified in this paragraph:

For the Pershing II:

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[Y]

* * *

## Launcher:

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and

(d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

* * *

## For the SS-20:

### Launcher:

(d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;

(e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) a portion of the launcher chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

## Comment:

The procedures "eliminating" SS-20 and other Soviet launchers

31

[Y]

# PROTOCOL ON INSPECTION

## INTRODUCTION

This protocol details the rights and responsibilities of the Parties with respect to the inspections called for in the INF Treaty and its associated documents.

## SECTION III

### Section III, Paragraph 7

Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, inspectors and aircrew members shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the State on whose territory an inspection is carried out and shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. In the event the inspected Party determines that an inspector or aircrew member of the other Party has violated the conditions governing inspection activities set forth in this Protocol, or has ever committed a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, or has ever been sentenced for committing a criminal offense or expelled by the inspected Party or a basing country, the inspected Party making such a determination shall so notify the inspecting Party, which shall immediately strike the individual from the lists of inspectors or the list of aircrew members. If, at that time, the individual is on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, the inspecting Party shall immediately remove that individual from the country.

### Comment:

There are two types of problems relating to this provision. First, the obligation of inspectors "to respect the laws and regulations of the [inspected] State" appears to offer the Soviets the opportunity to circumscribe narrowly the on-site activities of U.S. inspectors. Carrying out the legitimate functions of an inspection (e.g., demanding access to areas off-limits to individuals without necessary clearances) could be characterized as a failure to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected Party. Moreover, this paragraph permits the parties great latitude in deciding whether to expel an inspector.

Second, there is the larger question of ensuring that the inspectors will be able to operate in the Soviet Union in the intended manner and without personal risk. There have been

33

[Y]

problems in other contexts with Soviet treatment of U.S. (and other Western) inspectors (e.g., when Soviet troops in 1985 insisted on restricting the activity of -- and ultimately killing -- Major Nicholson, who was serving in East Germany as an inspector under the Four-Power Military Liaison Mission agreement which was concluded in the late 1940s). Have the Parties arrived at any understanding on how to resolve disputes about the proper bounds of the inspectors' activities so that incidents like the shooting of Major Nicholson will not occur?

## SECTION IV

### Section IV, Paragraph 5

Either Party may change the point or points of entry to the territories of the countries within which its deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities are located, by giving notice of such change to the other Party. A change in a point of entry shall become effective five months after receipt of such notification by the other Party.

### Comment:

This paragraph appears to give the Soviets the right to make a unilateral change in the point of entry into the German Democratic Republic. This issue -- a highly sensitive matter dating back to the earliest days of the Four Power occupation of Germany -- gave rise to particularly difficult negotiating during the last days of the INF Treaty negotiations. The result was Soviet agreement to name an airport other than Berlin-Schoenefeld (which the United States regards as a part of Berlin and hence subject to Four Power control) as the point of entry into the GDR. If the Soviets have given private assurances that they will not use this paragraph to change the point of entry to Berlin-Schoenefeld, it would be desirable to make them part of the record, lest this subject cause needless friction in the future between the FRG and its friends in the West.

## SECTION V

Several paragraphs under Sections V and VI of this Protocol give the inspected Party wide powers to influence the inspection process, e.g., the right to appoint in-country escorts with wide powers; to control in-country transportation; to provide telephonic communications for the inspectors' use; to specify "safety regulations" that the inspectors must observe, etc.

Can the U.S. prevent the Soviets from exploiting these provisions to frustrate effective inspection? What lessons were learned about likely Soviet behavior in the course of such

34

[Y]

inspections from the visit to Gomel?

## Section V, Paragraph 4

Equipment and supplies which the inspecting Party brings into the country in which an inspection site is located shall be subject to examination at the point of entry each time they are brought into that country. This examination shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to conduct an inspection. Such equipment and supplies shall be examined by the in-country escort in the presence of the inspection team members to ascertain to the satisfaction of each Party that the equipment and supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. If it is established upon examination that the equipment or supplies are unconnected with these inspection requirements, then they shall not be cleared for use and shall be impounded at the point of entry until the departure of the inspection team from the country where the inspection is conducted. Storage of the inspecting Party's equipment and supplies at each point of entry shall be within tamper-proof containers within a secure facility. Access to each secure facility shall be controlled by a "dual key" system requiring the presence of both Parties to gain access to the equipment and supplies.

## Comment:

Equipment and supplies brought in by inspection team may be examined by the "in-country escort" in order "to ascertain to the satisfaction of each Party that [they] cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. If it is established [query: by whom?] upon examination that the equipment or supplies are unconnected with these inspection requirements, then they shall not be cleared for use and shall be impounded...."

The Parties cannot intend that this language be taken literally. Any kind of inspection equipment can perform functions "unconnected" with the Treaty; e.g., a camera can take pictures of things other than limited missiles and launchers. Presumably what is meant is that equipment will not be cleared for use if it cannot perform any functions connected with the Treaty. This would be worth clarifying with the Soviets.

## Section V, Paragraph 5

Throughout the in-country period, the inspected

35

[Y]

Party shall provide, or arrange for the provision of, meals, lodging, work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew of the inspecting Party. All the costs in connection with the stay of inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, on the territory of the inspected Party, including meals, services, lodging, work space, transportation and medical care shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

### Comment:

This provision, as well as other provisions which envisage that the Soviets will supply services for U.S. inspectors and bill the United States for them, should be evaluated in the light of our experience with similar arrangements in connection with the construction of the new U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

Use in-country of host aircraft for transport to inspection sites conflicts with policy statements made following agreement at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe that the precedent established in that accord for host-aircraft use would not be applied to further, "serious" arms control agreements. This has possibly still more unsatisfactory implications for the START negotiations.

## SECTION VI

### Section VI, Paragraph 3

In discharging their functions, inspectors shall not interfere directly with on-going activities at the inspection site and shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of a facility or taking actions affecting its safe operation.

What is the implication of this "non-interference" provision for the "stand-downs" (pursuant to Section VII.1) needed to give the on-site inspectors an opportunity to assess what is at the site? Will inspectors be able to enforce the rules requiring that missiles, launchers, etc., not be moved during the pre-inspection period?

### Section VI, Paragraph 6

Inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be allowed to travel within 50 kilometers from the inspection site with the permission of the in-country escort, and as considered necessary by the inspected Party, shall be accompanied by the

36

[Y]

in-country escort. Such travel shall be taken
solely as a leisure activity.

Comment:

The intelligence by-products of this provision will not be
the same for the two Parties. While it appears that nothing of
importance lies within 50 kilometers of Votkinsk, Salt Lake City,
an increasingly important commercial and defense center, lies well
within the range of "off-duty" Soviet inspectors.

Section VI, Paragraph 7

Inspectors shall have the right throughout the
period of inspection to be in communication with
the embassy of the inspecting Party located within
the territory of the country where the inspection
is taking place using the telephone communications
provided by the inspected Party.

Comment:

This provision, requiring the use of host-country
communications systems, may allow the Soviets to hinder effective
inspection by U.S. personnel. It gives the Soviets the
opportunity to deny U.S. personnel secure communications (or any
at all) with their government while in the USSR.

Section VI, Paragraph 9

The inspection team may bring onto the inspection
site such documents as needed to conduct the
inspection, as well as linear measurement devices;
cameras; portable weighing devices; radiation
detection devices; and other equipment, as agreed
by the Parties. The characteristics and method of
use of the equipment listed above, shall also be
agreed upon within 30 days after entry into force
of the Treaty. During inspections conducted
pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5(a), 7 or 8 of
Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team may
use any of the equipment listed above, except for
cameras, which shall be for use only by the
inspected Party at the request of the inspecting
Party. During inspections conducted pursuant to
paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, all
measurements shall be made by the inspected Party
at the request of the inspecting Party. At the
request of inspectors, the in-country escort shall
take photographs of the inspected facilities using
the inspecting Party's camera systems which are
capable of producing duplicate, instant development

37

[Y]

photographic prints. Each Party shall receive one
copy of every photograph.

Comment:

This provision requires agreement within 30 days of entry
into force of the Treaty on the "characteristics and method of use
of" equipment brought by inspection teams. Given that the
"initial" inspections (pursuant to Article XI.3 of the Treaty) are
to start 30 days after entry into force (and to be finished 60
days thereafter), it is necessary that such agreement be reached
promptly; will the fact that these discussions will be going on
under such great time pressure create a problem for
us? Why were these matters not agreed to before Treaty signature?

Section VI, Paragraph 14

For inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, pre-inspection procedures, including briefings and safety-related activities, shall begin upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site and shall be completed within one hour. The inspection team shall begin the inspection immediately upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures. The period of inspection shall not exceed 24 hours, except for inspections pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty. The period of inspection may be extended, by agreement with the in-country escort, by no more than eight hours. Post-inspection procedures, which include completing the inspection report in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of this Protocol, shall begin immediately upon completion of the inspection and shall be completed at the inspection site within four hours.

Comment:

The inspections under Treaty Article XI, Paragraphs 3-5
(i.e., the bulk of the inspections provided for in this Treaty,
except for the permanent portal monitoring) are limited in
duration to 24 hours. This creates an incentive for the Soviets
to delay and quibble. What recourse will the United States have
if its inspectors are subjected to dilatory maneuvers?

SECTION VII

Section VII, Paragraph 1

Within one hour after the time for the

38

[N]

specification of the inspection site notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section IV of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement pre-inspection movement restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team arrives at the inspection site. During the period that pre-inspection movement restrictions are in effect, missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment subject to the Treaty shall not be removed from the inspection site.

Comment:

Pre-inspection movement limitations are to be imposed within one hour of notification of the specific site to be inspected; will it be possible to verify that such a "stand-down" order has been issued on behalf of the inspecting Party by the inspected Party and that that order has been obeyed? See comments on Section VI.3 of this Protocol.

Section VII, Paragraph 8

A missile, a stage of such a missile or a launcher subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation, including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher. A container that the inspected Party declares to contain a missile or stage of a missile subject to the Treaty, and which is not sufficiently large to be capable of containing more than one missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation, including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a container to confirm that it cannot contain more than one missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. Except as provided for in paragraph 14 of this Section, a container that is sufficiently large to contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty that the inspected Party declares not to contain a missile or stage of such a missile subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by means of weighing or visual observation of the interior of the container, as necessary, to confirm that it does not, in fact, contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. If such a container is a launch canister associated with a

39

[x]

type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, it shall be subject to external inspection only, including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation and linear measurement, as necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister.

Comment:

The last sentence will allow the Soviets (except at Votkinsk) to declare any suspicious canister to be a canister for an SS-25 (or for some other non-limited missile) and, it appears, we will be unable to look inside it, weigh it or x-ray it. As a result of this provision, the Soviets could keep any number of undeclared SS-20s in SS-25 canisters.

Section VII, Paragraph 9

A structure or container that is not sufficiently large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a structure or container to confirm that it is not sufficiently large to be capable of containing a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty.

Comment:

It is unclear how small a structure or container must be in order for this provision to exempt it from inspection other than by external visual observation. For instance, it is not clear whether the counting rules of Treaty Article VII.10 apply to this provision and, if so, how.

Section VII, Paragraph 10

Within a structure, a space which is sufficiently large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, but which is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the inspection team not to be accessible by the smallest missile, stage of a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall not be subject to further inspection. If the inspected Party demonstrates to the satisfaction of the inspection team by means of a visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed space from its entrance that the enclosed space does not contain any missile, stage of such a

40

[Y]

missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, such an enclosed space shall not be subject to further inspection.

**Comment:**

The language of this provision is not clear. Does the prohibition on further inspections apply only to the inspection then underway, or would it apply to subsequent inspections of the same facility, as well? In the latter case, would it be overridden by any evidence that a party had increased the dimensions of the space so that it could now contain a Treaty-limited item?

## Section VII, Paragraph 14

During an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to demonstrate that a shrouded or environmentally protected object which is equal to or larger than the smallest missile, stage of a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty is not, in fact, a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. This may be accomplished by partial removal of the shroud or environmental protection cover, measuring, or weighing the covered object or by other methods. If the inspected Party satisfies the inspection team by its demonstration that the object is not a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, then there shall be no further inspection of that object. If the container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, then it shall be subject to external inspection only, including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation and linear measurement, as necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister.

**Comment:**

Rules about inspecting containers, shrouded objects, etc. have the following anomaly: as noted in connection with paragraph 8 above, if the inspected Party declares that a given container is a launch container for an unlimited missile, then said container is subject to a less stringent inspection regime.

# SECTION VIII

41

[Y]

## Section VIII, Paragraph 1

Inspections of the process of elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in this paragraph and the Protocol on Elimination.

***

(c) Subject to paragraphs 3 and 11 of Section VI of this Protocol, inspectors shall observe the execution of the specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems as provided for in the Protocol on Elimination. If any deviations from the agreed elimination procedures are found, the inspectors shall have the right to call the attention of the in-country escort to the need for strict compliance with the above-mentioned procedures. The completion of such procedures shall be confirmed in accordance with the procedures specified in the Protocol on Elimination.

### Comment:

Exactly what does the "right to call the attention of the in-country escort to the need for strict compliance" with the inspection protocols procedures mean?

## Section VIII, Paragraph 2

Inspections of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in Sections II, IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination or as otherwise agreed by the Parties.

### Comment:

The Protocol contains no inspection rules for inspections of elimination of training missiles and launchers.

## SECTION IX

The precedents established in this Treaty for continuous monitoring will be important for START. They should be rigorously assessed in that light.

42

[y]

## Section IX, Paragraph 1

The inspected Party shall maintain an agreed perimeter around the periphery of the inspection site and shall designate a portal with not more than one rail line and one road which shall be within 50 meters of each other. All vehicles which can contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall exit only through this portal.

### Comment:

The last sentence of this paragraph, as well as other paragraphs of this Section, apparently incorporates the fundamental inequality caused by the counting rule (Article VII.10 of the Treaty) according to which a Pershing II first stage counts as a whole missile, while only a full-up missile or its canister counts as an SS-20 on the Soviet side. In other words, all U.S. vehicles and containers large enough to contain a Pershing II first stage (length 3.7 meters) will be subject to inspection at the Magna facility's portal while only those as large as (or larger than) an entire SS-20 (length 16.5 meters) will be subject to inspection at the Votkinsk gate.

Furthermore, it is not clear whether there is agreement as to what constitutes an "agreed perimeter." Is there an accord reflecting certain minimum Soviet security standards, or are we making assumptions about the character and quality of such standards based on past practice?

## Section IX, Paragraph 13

Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section that are large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party but that are declared not to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be subject to the following procedures.

***

(c) If inside a vehicle there are one or more containers or shrouded objects large enough to be or to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party

43

[Y]

to demonstrate that such containers or shrouded objects are not and do not contain intermediate-range GLBMs or the longest stages of such GLBMs of the inspected Party.

## Comment:

What does "responsibility...to demonstrate" mean? To inspectors' satisfaction? What is the significance of this choice of words when elsewhere the requirement is spelled out with specificity?

## Section IX, Paragraph 14

Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section that are declared to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be subject to the following procedures.

***

(c) The inspecting Party shall have the right to weigh and measure the dimensions of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage and to image the contents of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage; it shall have the right to view such missiles or missile stages contained in launch canisters or shipping containers eight times per calendar year. The in-country escort shall be present during all phases of such viewing. During such interior viewing:

(i) the front end of the launch canister or the cover of the shipping container shall be opened;

(ii) the missile or missile stage shall not be removed from its launch canister or shipping container; and

(iii) the length and diameter of the stages of the missile shall be measured in accordance with the methods agreed by the Parties so as to ascertain that the missile or missile stage is not an intermediate-range GLBM of the inspected Party, or the longest stage of such a GLBM, and that the missile has no more than one stage which is outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

44

[N]

**Comment:**

The last sentence suggests that the Parties now know of some non-intrusive and non-damaging way to discriminate between the largest stage of the SS-20 and that of the SS-25. Is this the case? What is this technology? Is it currently available? What is its assessed reliability?

By what mechanisms are the Parties to agree to the methods for measuring SS-20/25 stages at Votkinsk? Do they include the non-damaging image producing equipment mentioned in Section IX.6? If so, why not say so? If the Soviets have not yet agreed that the methods to be used include such equipment, this lack of agreement should be noted.

## SECTION X

An inspection shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, it cannot be carried out. In the case of a delay that prevents an inspection team performing an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, from arriving at the inspection site during the time specified in paragraph 2 of Section VII of this Protocol, the inspecting Party may either cancel or carry out the inspection. If an inspection is cancelled due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure* or delay, then the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

**Comment:**

This section foresees the possibility of a delay that prevents the inspecting Party from arriving at the inspection site within the 9 hour period specified in Section VII.2. The inspecting Party may cancel (and not have an aborted inspection count against its quota) or continue anyway (and presumably have it count against its quota). In either case, this section appears to be an all-purpose loophole; the inspecting Party has an incentive to cancel since the presumably less worthwhile, delayed inspection still counts against the quota; even if it does not, the inspected Party will have been able to hide anything it wishes before the delayed inspection occurs. (Note that "delay" is distinguished from a *force majeure* circumstance in which the inspection presumably cannot be carried out at all.)

## SECTION XI

### *Section XI, Paragraph 1*

45

EJ

For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, during post-inspection procedures, and no later than two hours after the inspection has been completed, the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with a written inspection report in both the English and Russian languages. The report shall be factual. It shall include the type of inspection carried out, the inspection site, the number of missiles, stages of missiles, launchers and items of support equipment subject to the Treaty observed during the period of inspection and any measurements recorded pursuant to paragraph 10 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection in accordance with agreed procedures, as well as the inspection site diagram provided for by paragraph 6 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be attached to this report.

## Comment:

The written inspection report is to be provided to the in-country escort within 2 hours of the completion of the inspection. This hardly allows for any serious analysis of observations. It seems to assume that the inspection report will simply verify the inspected Parties' information.

In any case, it should be made clear that failure to list an anomaly in the inspection report will not prevent the inspecting Party from raising the issue subsequently, either in the Special Verification Commission or elsewhere.

## Section XI, Paragraph 2

For inspection activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, within 3 days after the end of each month, the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with a written inspection report both in the English and Russian languages. The report shall be factual. It shall include the number of vehicles declared to contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party that left the inspection site through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of Section IX of this Protocol during that month. The report shall also include any measurements of launch canisters or shipping containers contained in these vehicles recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. In the event the inspecting Party,

46

under the provisions of paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of this Protocol, has viewed the interior of a launch canister or shipping container declared to contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, the report shall also include the measurements of the length and diameter of missile stages obtained during the inspection and recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection in accordance with agreed procedures shall be attached to this report.

Comment:

In addition to the aforementioned shortcomings of this Section, a further mechanical one merits mention. The problem of having competent translation and conforming of report texts performed under the time pressures stipulated here is not a trivial one. If these reports take on the importance one might expect, then having them done properly and consistently may prove to be as daunting a task as ensuring that they are technically sound.

47

[Y]

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING INF DATA

Serious questions can be -- and have been -- raised about the
accuracy of the data provided by the Soviets in this MOU. This is
a matter that can be explored usefully and properly only through
an examination of classified estimates and analyses.

However, it should be noted that the State Department stated
in the Spring of 1987 that:

In addition to the approximately 400 SS-20 missiles now
deployed, there may be as many as 200-400 (or more) such
missiles in the USSR's inventory.

Thus, it would seem that our intelligence estimates on these mat-
ters fall within a wide range of uncertainty. It is also the case
that our estimates have, for some time, been a matter of public
record. Consequently, we should not take particular comfort from
the contention that the Soviet-provided data fall within that
range.

48