TELCONE (San Clemente)

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

8:37 a.m. - 4/2/73

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol, how are you?

D: Well, you are an early bird.

K: Absolutely.

D: (Laugs) Well, I understand you have a busy day today. Only two things - first, I receive from my boss the answer in connection with our last two talks.

K: Yes.

D: One is that he is prepared to receive you in Moscow between May 4 to May 7. This is exactly what you mentioned.

K: Right.

D: Because you gave me 4th or 20th.

K: Oh, is that what I said?

D: Yes.

K: That's fine.

D: You mentioned two possibilities: the 4th you said, 4th or 5th or 20th.

K: All right, from the 4th to the 7th, right.

D: From 4th to the 7th and he said that you could devote all the three or four days entirely to the talks or maybe 2 or 3 and then it give you a chance to break.

K: Good. That's very nice.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0112658
By: N.S. Salerno Date: 4/2/73

2

D: Second, I mentioned about the possibility of your talks to the trans-Atlantic, you know with your other Prime Minister.

K: Oh yes.

D: Quite frankly he said he is concerned that maybe it is better to postpone all this consultation until you will be in Moscow and then it will be easy to handle it because he is a little concerned and the President thought so himself that he is mentioning about the leak before.

K: You mean the consultation about that piece of paper you gave me?

D: Yes, yes, with those, you remember.

K: Yeh, I understand.

D: Yes, well he said maybe - he just returned the concern that you want to express that there shouldn't be any leak, you understand?

K: You're talking now about the matter that affects MFN?

D: No, no, no, I'm speaking about the paper you promised to give me today.

K: Oh, I see, I see. Right.

D: You remember?

K: Oh yes, I understand.

D: So he put it this way as he said I remember that the President and Dr. Kissinger himself express

K: No, no, we will not have any discussions until he and I discuss this.

D: For the time being you stop it, yeh?

K: That's right. What I mentioned to you on Friday were just some general considerations they gave us. It was not related to any text.

D: Oh, I see, but that's why he was saying maybe because you ask me how, because you express before that it could be dangerous about the leaks. You understand.

K: Yeh, we'll make sure.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FA12058
By: N.W. LaBeau
Date: 00304

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: W.W.ага Ыс

D: OK, so it is better. Of course he mentioned about - this of course is No. 1. He feels that when you will be back here in Washington to continue to discuss some other things but this of course is the primary one. I mention that you will give me today.

K: Exactly. By the end of the day.

D: As to exactly the date for the President I hope to receive it within two or three days.

K: Excellent.

D: So this is a message to make it short because it was a long one but I make it short.

K: Is it an oral message that you can leave with us?

D: No, he just send me a telegram telling me what I have to say so I just sum up it.

K: But you didn't give me an answer yet on other things.

D: On the MFN matter.

K: No, the MFN matter whether I can mention that?

D: Yes, this I'm expecting because I send only yesterday really so I probably receive by the end of today or tomorrow and I will give you a call back on this because this is all I'm telling you today in connection with our discussion on another paper.

K: Exactly, I understand.

D: Only it's the particular one. As to this one I will give you immediately call back when I receive.

K: Right.

D: As for the paper, when do you expect me to get it?

K: Oh, you see I'm busy with Thieu this morning. I will call you this afternoon and let you know, but before the end of the day. By midnight as I promised you.

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Billy Wilder/Kissinger

9:22 a.m. - 4/2/73

K: Hello.

W: Good morning, Henry.

K: Billy, how are you?

W: Fine.

K: I was wondering whether you and your wife wanted to come down here for dinner tomorrow.

W: Well, it's sort of a long trip. We talked with the Douglases about it. Wouldn't it be better and simpler if you came up here either today or tonight, tomorrow, Wednesday, Thursday or any night.

K: How about half way, like Newport?

W: I haven't been there all my life. This is a sort of ghoulish place, what we call it. We stay away from that; that's for the ______ crowd. John Ford goes there and John Wayne.

K: That's right. Well, we just thought they should be exposed to you a little bit.

W: They should - no, I'm their friends actually, but it makes it too complicated, Henry. Aren't you going to come to town at all?

K: Probably - I wanted to save myself a trip every day, you see.

W: I know what you mean, but when are you going to be through with your business down there? About Tuesday or Wednesday?

K: Well, but even then I'd have to go up and back. I mean I have to be here.

W: Oh, every evening?

K: Not evening, but you know it's a question of who goes where.

W: Yes, did you talk to Anne?

K: No, let me talk to them later.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951

DE
SARA DE: 6/13/01

TELCOM (San Clemente)

Don Kendall/Kissinger

3:31 p.m. - 4/2/73

K: Hello.

DK: I just wanted to find out if you wanted a franchise in Acapulco or China.

K: (Laugs) I'll take - I think I'll take the Acapulco franchise.

DK: You've got to know some money too. Henry, I'm very anxious to see you about something with regards to the Soviet Union. I'm coming down tomorrow and I know that's a helluva early date to do it but you happen to have

K: Well, I'm on the West Coast.

DK: Oh, you are. When are you going to come back?

K: Next week.

DK: Well, let me ask you - if you can answer it then I can delay. Is there anything getting close on who's going to be our Ambassador to the Soviet Union?

K: Not that I know.

DK: Because I would like to make a recommendation on it which at the outset will - you might just immediately rebel at, but if I explain the thing why I think, if possible it should be done and I'd like to talk to you personally about it and then if it's something pressing. I have not discussed this with anybody and I don't want to discuss it with the President unless you agree. The guy that I want to recommend I think he damn well owes it to but I wouldn't want to make that point unless you agree that there weren't other problems that would be caused.

K: Can you tell me who it is?

DK: Yes, Stans.

K: Oh no.

DK: Well, see I knew this was why - Henry, let me tell you this: I'm talking if you can get over this present problem.

K: No, no I'm not talking about the present problem. He just has no sense for the subtlety of that relationship.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized EO 1295

Dated: 6/12/73

MARA

2

DK: Well, he went over first of all on the first trip, as you recall, on the trade side. He made some terrific statements when he came back. Now I don't know...

K: Look, anything you raise I will mention to the President.

DK: Henry, I'd rather discuss it with you. You've got a marvelous feel for it because I mean if you say the thing is a disaster after you hear me out, then I'll drop the thing. I don't want to

K: Let's talk next week about it. Nothing will be done before that.

DK: OK, because I'd like to tell you why - on the trade side I know there'll be no problem. Obviously on the political when you get to Brezhnev and the others I don't know, but I know for example that Patolichev and that group just think that Stans is fantastic because he was the first guy that came back and came outright and said what he thought the opportunities were, he didn't waffle on it. For example, Peterson - hell Patolichev has told me when he came back he waffled on his statements and they always felt that he was looking for something for himself rather than a government to government thing. And I mean he told me that. Where I know they feel very strongly on Stans and I know that group would welcome him with open arms, now I don't know how the others would react. But then there's the human side of it which - here is Stans who has devoted his life to government, Henry, and a good part of it during the Eisenhower period and during this period. He in two campaigns raised more money than the government raised in their history, if the President told him to jump out the window, he'd jump out the window. You know it killed him to go from Commerce to raising money. He wanted no part of that this time and he had to do it. And then he gets caught, even though he has nothing to do with it, in the Watergate thing and his whole career has been wiped out. Now he's at the end of his life and the only thing that - I know this guy because he's mentioned it to me, that the one thing he would love more than anything else is to be Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

K: Yes.

DK: I would love to see that guy's dignity restored. Now obviously if you say it's an impossible situation because of the political thing...

K: Well, the political thing - I will mention it to the President.

I*

3

DK: I just think that if there isn't that other factor, Henry, which God I can't judge it, I mean you know that situation a lot better than I do. I know the trade side as well as anybody but when you get into the other part of it, I don't. So I can't factor that in but if there wasn't a problem I don't think there's anybody that sure as hell deserves it more than he does.

K: Yeh.

DK: And I know the President does not know that he wants it. He has said this to nobody and I've said to nobody in the Administration.

K: OK. Well, let's talk about it next week.

DK: OK, if you'll let me know whenever your schedule will permit, I will be there.

K: Good. Fine. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

JSS

Authority

E012557

By: NARA Doc. 6/13/67

["TELCONE (San Clemente)", "Lloyd Shearer/Kissinger", "4:05 p.m. - 4/2/73", "K: Hello.", "S: Dr. Henry, how are you?", "K: OK, how are you?", "S: Fine, we were looking for you yesterday. We had this lovely Vietnamese girl with this long dress slit all the way up to her thighs.", "K: My god.", "S: And he she wanted to thank you for helping to release her father from jail and we thought that would make a lovely cover with her shaking your hand or kissing your cheek, or whatever way one thanks somebody. So you know", "K: I'm sure we could have worked that out one way or the other.", "S: Maybe we can still do it.", "K: No, I'm kidding. I don't think I better do that.", "S: You think not.", "K: Where was her husband released, in South Vietnam?", "S: Yeh, well it's Su's daughter.", "K: No, I can't do that.", "S: You think we should do it with Bunker?", "K: If he's willing to do it, yeh.", "S: Anyway she was convinced that your intervention and his intervention.", "K: Well, that's true, but that doesn't mean we want to have publicity on it.", "S: Well, anyway, she was most grateful and we thought that would make a lovely picture.", "K: Aren't you nice. How have you been?", "DECLASSIFIED", "JSS33 012345678901234567890123

2

S: Well, you know we don't get around to Acapulco on the social highlights as some people do.

K: Yeh, you got a good point there.

S: What the hell you're a social lion and you do the best you can.

K: But you keep at a more steady level. I'll be going up and down.

S: I don't know. How long you going to hang around?

K: Well, it's going to be a race whether they'll get me before I get out.

S: I don't know. One of our publishers is coming to see Ehrlichman I guess on Thursday down there. He was supposed to see him at the White House but Big John wants to tell him what a miserable prick I am.

K: Oh really.

S: I'm sure, you know. But as Jock Whitney says, we've been told that before.

K: (Laugs)

S: So anyway we wonder if there's some chance of seeing you either up here or down there.

K: Sure.

S: How long you going to be?

K: Until Sunday. Maybe you want to come down for lunch some day.

S: All right. Let's see how does Thursday strike you?

K: Thursday or Friday, let me call you tomorrow after we are through with the meeting here.

S: You're not coming up to the Reagan dinner, are you?

K: No. So we'll make i either Thursday or Friday.

S: OK.

K: Good. Bye.

Telcon - San Clemente
4/2/73, 4:55 p.m.
Mr. Duc - Mr. Kissinger

...

**HAK:** I am aware of it because I have the text here. He took a crack at me about this alleged comment about being a cowboy. Somebody said he was a cross between Ziegler and Kissinger and he said being compared to Kissinger doesn't flatter Nha.

All I want to tell you is that we are going to make an official protest about it. While you are in this country you cannot attack American officials. If this is going to be your attitude you can deal with the State Department or the Defense Department. If you want a relationship with the White House you have to stop this sort of behavior.

**Duc:** Let me tell you at this point that I share your views on the basic principles and I do not believe it myself. I will have to verify it.

**HAK:** We are certainly making every effort. I have listened to just about as much as I can. I could understand it if we had some disagreements.

...

**HAK:** No, he said something here.

**Duc:** I see, when and where?

**HAK:** Today, to ABC television. What he says in Saigon is bad enough, but that I can overlook. It's on the evening news in the East which is on at 7:00. Now it will be here at 7:00 too. It's already been on the news programs in the East.

**Duc:** Was he supposed to say this in Honolulu or in Los Angeles.

**HAK:** I guess he said it in Los Angeles. It doesn't say where he said it.

**Duc:** Did they have him live on TV saying that or just somebody . . .

**HAK:** I will give our report to your foreign minister tonight. So he can take a look at it.

**Duc:** I just cannot believe it because I'm sure Mr. Nha . . .

**HAK:** Well, I will give you the text of what was said tonight.

**Duc:** Because I could believe it only when they have Mr. Nha live on it.

XXX

DECLASSIFIED
Authorize E01255
BY: NARA DCS: 6/17/73

- 2 -

**Duc:** If it is a report second hand it is possible that some newsman wanted to exploit the talks about some differences of views and ... just to blow it up.

**HAK:** Look, whatever differences we had in the past I told you this morning I think it came out fine. I have no bad feelings about the differences in the past because I think the three months that were gained were very important.

**Duc:** I quite agree on that. It is essential that there is harmony, at least publicly. We are privately and there is no reason that it cannot be also publicly.

**HAK:** You certainly defended your principles with great toughness when you were in America and we understand it completely. Look, I've just been called to the President so I have to run off. I will give it to the Foreign Minister tonight.

**Duc:** I shall find out and verify it and we shall talk about it this evening at dinner.

**HAK:** Are you going to be at the President's dinner.

**Duc:** Yes, your President wants Ambassador Bunker to come over.

**HAK:** Good, so I will give you this.

**Duc:** Good, and also the details of whether this was reported second hand and if it is, by whom, the name of the correspondent and so on because I ...

**HAK:** I will give you all the facts we have. I'll see you tonight. Look forward to it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authoritatively E012955

By: NARA DEPT: 9/17/67

Telcon - San Clemente

4/2/73, 5:20 p.m.

Jerry Schecter - Mr. Kissinger

Schecter: Hi Henry, I know you want to see me but Thieu won't let you, right?

HAK: Exactly, I can hardly wait to see you.

Schecter: How are you?

HAK: OK

Schecter: How's Liv Ullman?

HAK: She sends you her regards.

Schecter: Well, if you like Swedish serving girls, I guess...

HAK: You really made a deep impression on her, standing there drooling.

Schecter: How's it going? Did you have a good day?

HAK: Yes, what did you want to see me about today? The meeting?

Schecter: No, you know, the world.

HAK: Well, it can be later this week, can't it.

Schecter: The problem is I'm leaving. I've got to go back to Washington with him. So I was wondering if maybe we could do it tomorrow.

HAK: Well, let's try late tomorrow afternoon.

Schecter: That would be great.

HAK: Good, I'll call you in the morning.

Schecter: All right, thanks a lot, appreciate it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E01265J

By: MIRA Dae 9/13/73

Telcon - San Clemente

~~10/3/78~~ 10:00am. April 2, 1978 - 1825

Mr. Kissinger - Dobrynin

**HAK:** Anatole?

**Dobrynin:** Hello Henry, how are you?

**HAK:** I'm OK. I just wanted to tell you that I am sending you a draft.

**Dobrynin:** I already have it.

**HAK:** Good.

**Dobrynin:** Well, do you have any additional comment?

**HAK:** No.

**Dobrynin:** You see, at first glance - I just looked for two minutes at this one and Article I is a complete disappointment to me quite frankly, because it really changed from what even you mentioned to me on Monday - on Friday - excuse me. On Friday, it was only a question of order of two paragraphs, with whom should we deal would be the last one. . .

**HAK:** Yes, but we have turned it around.

**Dobrynin:** Yes, you turned it around, that's true, but you changed the second or third (?) article in this paragraph of this article completely.

**HAK:** Well, not completely. We added one clause.

**Dobrynin:** Yes, but you create conditions - its worse really than what you have me on Friday. Could we just change as you gave me on Friday but just change the places, within the first paragraph.

**HAK:** Well no, one of these clauses we really need or we will have an absolute uproar.

**Dobrynin:** Well, its your organization (?) I mean . . .

**HAK:** No, No, but that's not the turning around . . .

**Dobrynin:** Only, I have heard what you gave me on the 30th, on Friday.

**HAK:** I know.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
E01700
By: W.W.

**Dobrynin:** So the one thing on article I which I think is more or less all right is the development of our exchanges. It was just to change two paragraphs in Article I.

**HAK:** Yes, but I told you that then the President wanted to go over this and modify... XXXX I unfortunately don't have it here with me. XXXX KXXE azaz I'm calling you from home because I didn't think that you would already have it. I just wanted to tell you it was coming.

**Dobrynin:** Yes, I have it. Now in Moscow it will look like a step back from what we already discussed two weeks ago. I am perfectly sure of this reaction because its from the text from your declaration which was a half a year ago. You made a suggestion, we accept first, really your paragraph Article I and then we make suggestion to make it look more bilateral. So you gave me on Friday which looks your version but to me it looks more or less further development but only I rather have some doubts because you changed the paragraphs because it begins with the short one and then information (?). But now as you gave it, it really is quite a development from what we gave. You just come back, cross everything we discussed and come back to the declaration which we had in October of last year. I'm sure Mr. and my boss will ask me directly what happened. Now it is exactly the text of the declaration.

**HAK:** Well no, it adds one phrase from the declaration, and the rest is from the rest of the paragraph.

**Dobrynin:** No you see its again a question of to create conditions in conduct of policy -- all this kind of thing... we accepted your paragraph as you gave us really and then we just want to make it more clear that it should be within not only general but bilateral kinds of things too. It was along those lines and what you gave us looks to me like a really good KKKKXX working paper on Friday, but now it looks again as if we are back where we were...

**HAK:** Well no. That's certainly not true because the first sentence was not in the declaration.

**Dobrynin:** No, no, I mean the first paragraph, because now you change it...

**HAK:** The first paragraph was not in the...

**Dobrynin:** I understand, I'm speaking about the second paragraph in article I.

**HAK:** The second paragraph in Article I contains only one clause that is new or even slightly new.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: MWAGLA Page 00304

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: MWAGA 50-0304

- 3 -

**Dobrynin:** No, it isn't new, it's a rather old one.

**HAK:** That's what I mean, that you hadn't seen on Friday.

**Dobrynin:** Yes, it's different from Friday.

**HAK:** That is the only one that's different. All the rest is the same.

**Dobrynin:** Yes, I agree with you.

**HAK:** I mean all the other points we put in Article 51 and I think in the preamble we put back most of your language.

**Dobrynin:** Even by the end of the article you remember the words there was a proposal made about ...

**HAK:** That we have our questions about.

**Dobrynin:** Yes, I understand. So this one would be discussed further but this is really Article I ... and really this second paragraph of Article I Why couldn't you take it as it was on Friday.

**HAK:** Because frankly because the British attach enormous importance to that one sentence. Now they haven't seen this draft at all.

**Dobrynin:** ? ??

**HAK:** Well, because they always tell us because this is the one clause if we ever do this. This is the one clause to which they have always attached importance. And it therefore would make it a lot easier to sell it if the British would join us.

**Dobrynin:** But really this is ... I understand your point but this is the point which really Brezhnev today tries to convey to the President.

**HAK:** Well, we haven't discussed that particular formulation with them.

**Dobrynin:** Well, that's why you really should. That's why I called you today in the morning - first we have to discuss between us and then analyze so to speak, and then afterwards you could explain you own analysis to your allies view ...

**HAK:** But we have totally disregarded it. If we had taken a substantial view of that and added to it, that's one thing. If we totally reject their view,

I mean everything else in Article I they have never seen. You see what
my point is.

<u>Dobrynin:</u> I see your point, but there is another point you see.

<u>HAK:</u> Well, when I see Mr. Brezhnev I will tell him that you said that
you saw his point. And I'm sure he will be very pleased.

<u>Dobrynin:</u> He was rather impressed that we were moving forward but
now its backward...

<u>HAK:</u> Well then the only thing I can do is to ask you to wait 24 hours so
that I can discuss it with the President after Thieu leave tomorrow. I
know what hell is going to break loose in NATO even with this draft.

<u>Dobrynin:</u> I think you can handle it.

<u>HAK:</u> No, we cannot handle it easily. We have no support at all.

<u>Dobrynin:</u> But we are asking you...

<u>HAK:</u> I know but that is the one I told you right away on Friday afternoon
not to send.

<u>Dobrynin:</u> I didn't send it. I wasn't specifically complaining...

<u>HAK:</u> Because the difficulty that arises...

<u>Dobrynin:</u> And I am now glad that I didn't send it because otherwise it
was quite a shock to Moscow. Now I'm really glad that I didn't send it.
It was a temptation, but then I decided to follow your advice not to send it.

<u>HAK:</u> Well, after all, Anatole, all we are adding is one little clause.

<u>Dobrynin:</u> It's not a little clause. It's rather a clause - well you know the
point we discussed several times. Well, if you feel better to wait 24 hours...

<u>HAK:</u> Let me wait 24 hours and discuss it with the President tomorrow
afternoon.

<u>Dobrynin:</u> OK, I will not discuss anything.

<u>HAK:</u> I will call you tomorrow afternoon Anatole.

<u>Dobrynin:</u> You will call me tomorrow afternoon?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By: N.N. Patsin
Date: 06/24/84

**HAK:** Thieu leaves here at 1:30, that's 4:30 your time. But then I have to have about an hour or two with the President, so I'll call you around 8:00 or 9:00 your time.

**Dobrynin:** OK, it's quite alright. I will await your call.

And I will hold until then - you will give me the final opinion of the President. I do really ask you and the President to look into this matter again and look as close as possible to your present version but with the change of paragraphs.

**HAK:** OK, good.

**Dobrynin:** Try your best. It is better for you not to spend the time with Brezhnev on this paragraph there but to finish it here.

**HAK:** No, I like theatrical performances.

**Dobrynin:** Well, I am sure you will have enough other performances, on other subjects. I'll await your call tomorrow.

**HAK:** Right.

DECLASSIFIED

Telcos - San Clemente

27375 pm. April 2, 1973 - 1825

Mr. Kissinger - Dobrynin

HAK: Anatole?

Dobrynin: Hello Henry, how are you?

HAK: I'm OK. I just wanted to tell you that I am sending you a draft.

Dobrynin: I already have it.

HAK: Good.

Dobrynin: Well, do you have any additional comment?

HAK: No.

Dobrynin: You see, at first glance - I just looked for two minutes at this one and Article I is a complete disappointment to me quite frankly, because it really changed from what even you mentioned to me on Monday - on Friday - excuse me. On Friday, it was only a question of order of two paragraphs, with whom should we deal would be the last one. . .

HAK: Yes, but we have turned it around.

Dobrynin: Yes, you turned it around, that's true, but you changed the second or third (?) antithesis paragraph of this article completely.

HAK: Well, not completely. We added one clause.

Dobrynin: Yes, but you create conditions - its worse really than most what you have me on Friday. Could we just change as you gave me on Friday but just change the places, within the first paragraph.

HAK: Well no, one of these clauses we really need or we will have an absolute uproar.

Dobrynin: Well, it's your organization (?) I mean . . .

HAK: No, No, institution but the turning around . . .

Dobrynin: Only, I have heard what you gave me on the 30th, on Friday.

HAK: I know.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority EO 12950
 By: NARA Date: 6/17/97

- 3 -

**Dobrynin:** No, it isn't now, it's a rather old one.

**Dobrynin:** Even by the end of the article you remember that there was a proposal made about ...

**Dobrynin:** Yes, I understand. So this one would be discussed further but this is really Article I. . . and really this second paragraph of Article I Why couldn't you take it as it was on Friday.

**HAK:** Because Frankly because the British attach enormous importance to that one sentence. Now they haven't seen this draft at all.

**Dobrynin:** ? ? ?

**Dobrynin:** But really this is. . . I understand your point but this is the point which really Breshnev today tries to convey to the President.

**Dobrynin:** Well, that's why you really should. That's why I called you today in the morning - first we have to discuss between us and then analyse so to speak, and then afterwards you could explain you own analysis toxxx allies view . . .

**HAK:** But we have totally disregarded it. If we had taken a substantial view of that and added to it, that's one thing. If we totally reject the other view

DECLASSIFIED

Author E01295R

Date 06/13/94

By: XARA

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12957
By: NARA Doc. 6/13/91

**Dobrynin:** I see your point, but there is another point you see.

**HAK:** Well, when I see Mr. Brezhnev I will tell him that you said that you saw his point. And I'm sure he will be very pleased.

**Dobrynin:** He was rather impressed that we were moving forward but ask now its backward...

**HAK:** Well then the only thing I can do is to ask you to wait 24 hours so that I can discuss it with the President after Thieu leave tomorrow. I know what hell is going to break loose in NATO even with this draft.

**Dobrynin:** I think you can handle it.

**HAK:** No, we cannot handle it easily. We have no support at all.

**Dobrynin:** But we are asking you...

**HAK:** I know but that is the one I told you right away on Friday afternoon not to send.

**Dobrynin:** I didn't send it. I wasn't specifically complaining...

**HAK:** Because the difficulty that arises...

**Dobrynin:** And I am now glad that I didn't send it because otherwise it was quite a shock to Moscow. Now I'm really glad that I didn't send it. It was a temptation, but then I decided to follow your advice not to send it.

**HAK:** Well, after all, Anatole, all we are adding is one little clause.

**Dobrynin:** It's not a little clause. It's rather a clause - well you know the point we discussed several times. Well, if you feel better to wait 24 hours...

**HAK:** Let me wait 24 hours and discuss it with the President tomorrow afternoon.

**Dobrynin:** OK, I will not discuss anything.

**HAK:** I will call you tomorrow afternoon Anatole.

- 5 -

**HAK:** Then leaves here at 1:30, that's 4:30 your time. But then I have to have about an hour or two with the President, so I'll call you around 8:00 or 9:00 your time.

**Debryin:** OK, it's quite alright. I will await your call.
And I will hold until then - you will give me the final opinion of the
President. I do really ask you and the President to look into this
matter again and look as close as possible to your present version
but with the change of paragraphs.

**HAK:** OK, good.

**Debryin:** Try your best. It is better for you not to spend the time with Breshnov on this paragraph; there but to finish it here.

**Debryin:** Well, I am sure you will have enough other performances, on other subjects. I'll await your call tomorrow.

**HAK:** Right.

DECLASSIFIED
Author's E012951
BY SARA DUE 6/17/01

Telcon - San Clemente

4/2 - 1900

The President - HAK

HAK: Mr. President.

Pres: There seems to be a screw-up here that Steve said got out of the
NSC and they got on departure remarks. As you know we haven't done
that for about . . .

HAK: No, there's no need for it.

Pres: You see, I said everything I can and he has too and I don't want
want him to read some nuance into something other than what's in the
communique.

HAK: Right. Absolutely.

Pres: I'm just afraid to have more said, that's all. Is it all right then?
He's been told that he's to have departure remarks.

HAK: No, I'll check on that Mr. President.

Pres: Try to work it out so that - Steve said they did it because I did it
with Sato, but Sato was a different matter. We really should never have
departure remarks. We haven't had them for two and a half years now.

HAK: That's right. I frankly was not aware of the fact. I was even
wondering whether you were participating in the departure but apparently
you are.

Pres: I'm just taking him out to the car, to the heliport helicopter. But
I do feel we should get out of this if we can, so would you check to see if
we can just knock off the departure. Just say that it's our mistake, just say
that the commune, when we have a commune we don't have any remarks.

HAK: Well, we'll say we never have remarks which happens to be the truth.

Pres: That's true, except Steve - our fellows don't know a damn thing. One
of your fellows at NSC apparently told him that we had it with Sato. So I told
Steve the Sato thing I had forgotten about, but that was a special circumstance
as you remember. That was added only for the reason he was leaving
government and all that sort of thing.

HAK: Of course, and we were having a difficult period with them.

DECLASSIFIED
Autodial EO1295C
B: 1A XARA Date: 6/13/91

w 2

**Pres:** That's right. But you know with this, we said it all when we came in, don't you agree?

**HAK:** I think so, but in any event if it should turn out that it can't be changed, if it's set up, we will tell them that they should be very brief.

**Pres:** No, no, let's not have it, that's all. Say that that was by mistake that we don't have - that it will take away from the communique.

HAKX

**HAK:** Right, good, Mr. President.

DECLASSIFIED
Authorizing EO 12950
BY: XARA Date: 6/17/91

Telcon - San Clemente
4-2-73 p.m.
HAK - Hal Sonnenfeldt

**HAK:** Hal, I just talked to Dobrynin. He is shedding bitter tears over the phrase "conditions in which nuclear war would not be justified". I told him he should wait 24 hours before transmitting it; I'll talk to the President again, which doesn't mean that we'll have to change it. You know there is in fact an argument to be made that even if we are going to drop it out we could drop it out in Moscow.

**Sonnenfeldt:** Well, I started to talk to you and I got off the subject. There is a real question you know on the way things are going now. What the hell you are going to do there. And there is a chance if we hang in there and tell them that this is just how its got to be that they may accept it.

**HAK:** And there is an advantage in showing the British we submitted it.

**Sonnenfeldt:** Yes, because we're going to have a big problem when this thing surfaces so we might as well show the agony that we went through. Because it's in there twice now, in the preamble and the article.

**HAK:** Which is one reason why we could drop it from the article.

**Sonnenfeldt:** Yes, I think though that their objection is largely bureaucratic and can't really be substantive because they got the first sentence and this thing is almost total logical.

**HAK:** Well no, I think the trouble they have is that Gromyko had rejected that sentence when we put it in the declaration.

**Sonnenfeldt:** But then it was the SALT sentence.

**HAK:** I know, but I can just see how ______ will point out to him that we are sneaking back the sentence again. But can you think about just what the operational significance of that paragraph now is?

**Sonnenfeldt:** The first paragraph?

**HAK:** Yes, and let's talk about it tomorrow.

**Sonnenfeldt:** OK.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295
B: XARA Dts: 6/13/67

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Jerry Schecter/Kissinger

4:05 p.m. - 4/3/73

K: Hello.

S: Am I going to see you?

K: Tomorrow if you can stay.

S: Well, I can't, I've got to get back for this Thieu business.

K: Why do you think I'm offering it? No, but I have really too much work and I have to get some work on the Annual Report.

S: Yeh. Well, I have a problem, I've got to - obviously there are a lot of things I wanted to talk to you about.

K: Can't they wait til next week? I'll certainly see you next week.

S: All right. But there's one thing - I hate to talk to you about this on the phone but I've got to do it now. Apparently Scowcroft talked to or got some work back to this fellow McKulick who wants to go to Hanoi with this Star of Peace ship and he's going. Xuan Thuy has invited him to a party in Paris this week.

K: I don't know anything about that. Who's McKulick?

S: He's a fire extinguisher manufacturer from Buffalo, New York, who is working with Carol Hanson and that

K: But what did Scowcroft tell him?

S: Well, Scowcroft, according to him, told him that if he wanted to go as an American citizen it's all right, but I don't know if Scowcroft talked to him directly or not.

K: Yeh, but what's that got to do with me?

S: Well, the reason I asked you is they asked me to go along and they're also concerned - this fellow is not a peacenik and as I say he worked with Carol Hanson's group and this fellow

K: I think I have enough influence with Le Duc Tho so that they won't use the leg irons on you.

S: Yeh, well that's OK, that's all right.

DECLASSIFIED
Author E01295R
Date 6/13/73
By: XIAA Dae

2

K: The nylon robe maybe.

S: You know the point is that they're going to

K: What do you want me to say, whether you should go along?

S: No, whether you think - they want to go in at Easter time. Do you think this - and they're very concerned about getting some kind of private reading about what to do.

K: My impression is that this is not the most settled time in our relations with them but if you can get in I wouldn't see any reason not to go.

S: What this guy is concerned about is whether this is going to help our relations with them or not.

K: What does he want to do again?

S: Frankly, from the point of view of the White House, in other words he wants to bring in - originally he wanted to do this during the war before the harbor was mined.

K: What does he want to bring in?

S: He's going to bring in pharmaceuticals and first-aid supplies.

K: Oh, we leave that up to him. We cannot take a position on that.

S: Of course not. The question is whether or not - you know Rogers has put this thing out in the Federal Register about American citizens going there.

K: Saying what?

S: Saying that clearance for travel is not conducive at this time. It's a very interesting kind of statement. On the other hand something like this from a private group like this might make sense at this point.

K: I have no objections, I don't recommend it and I don't oppose it. I think it has to be a strictly private effort.

S: That's what I told this guy. He doesn't understand what that means.

K: It means we certainly won't attack him if he does it, but we certainly won't say he's doing it at our behalf.

3

S: Yeh.

K: I mean he can be - we won't make any statements saying he's hurting American foreign policy.

S: OK.

K: We won't say anything.

S: OK. Ok. Well, that's helpful. I've explained this to him that he's got to do this on his own.

K: That's right. Now Jerry I'll be happy to see you next week or later this week.

S: OK. That's kind of you and I know that you're jammed up. I've got a thing going on this whole intelligence reorganization.

K: Yeh, but that can certainly wait til next week.

S: Henry, if you get a minute could you see Dean Fisher who's going to be out here.

K: Sure. Towards the end of the week.

S: OK. I'll tell him to get in touch with Campbell then.

K: Good.

S: OK. Thanks a lot.

K: Have a good trip back, Jerry.

S: OK. Bye.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized EO 12952

Date: 09/13/94
By: JNA

TELCOM (San Clemente)

Bob Toth/Kissinger

4:16 p.m. - 4/3/73

K: Hello.

T: Hi. This is Bob Toth.

K: Yeh, you called me.

T: Yeh, I was just wondering about that date we were going to have.

K: Well, let me call you tomorrow because I've been tied up with Thieu the whole time and I've got to get some time on the Annual Review.

T: OK. Well, I've got to go up to Los Angeles tomorrow so

K: Then call me Thursday.

T: Call you Thursday?

K: Good.

T: One just quick question - this is reference to the communique to the Nixon Doctrine. It seems to be the first time you've applied the Nixon Doctrine specifically to South Vietnam. Is that true?

K: I think publicly it's probably the first time, yes.

T: And the implication would be that no men whether they fly airplanes or on the ground will be going back in under normal circumstances.

K: Certainly in normal circumstances.

T: I mean it's kind of withdrawing one step further from the situation. I mean that's the way I read it, is that fair?

K: Yeh, but I wouldn't say totally.

T: No, but there's still the potential there.

K: Right.

T: The other thing is Henry, I understand that they asked for $700 million a year. Is that in the right ball park? That's what they've been saying in terms of economic aid.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized E01295C

By: A XIRA Date: 6/13/73

Telcon - San Clemente

April 3 - 1830

Dobrynin - HAK

HAK: Anatole, how are you?

Dobrynin: How are you? You have a rather sad voice. Does it mean that you are disappointed or what is it?

HAK: No, I had to run up the stairs to get to my telephone.

Dobrynin: Oh, I see.

HAK: And I am too old for so much exertions.

Dobrynin: Oh, come on, you are much younger than I am.

HAK: Yes, but I am in much worse shape. I have lost too many negotiations.

Dobrynin: Well, you have to lost at this one, then it will be better for you because otherwise it will be difficult for you.

HAK: About what we discussed yesterday, Here is what the President said. He would like to submit the document as it is.

Dobrynin: As you gave it yesterday?

HAK: On the other hand, he will look with great sympathy at counter-proposals from Mr. Brezhnev. But he feels that he must at least submit it - that one phrase.

Dobrynin: But this phrase is three times repeated (?) now. This phrase appears in three about - in the preamble, in article I and in article II. So it's not just one phrase, it's three times.

HAK: Well, I can tell you that we will be very receptive to deleting it from article I. I mean I tell you that on an informal basis.

Dobrynin: I will __?__ it as it is.

HAK: Yes, I would __?__ it as it is.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012047

By: WW. P. Page 504

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12058
By: N.W. Pa. Date: 06/04/2024

**HAK:** But I will tell you informally that there is a good chance of getting it deleted from article I. So to have it substantially back to what it was.

**Dobrynin:** Was this why . . . ???

**HAK:** Well, in the preamble will we have to have it.

**Dobrynin:** This is rather ???, as you mentioned. All right?

**HAK:** Right.

**Dobrynin:** Then second, you agree your President left Article IV ??? It is the same reason you mentioned to me and the same explanation given to article IV - now its article V ???

**HAK:** Yes, well on Article V on that we feel somewhat more strongly but again we are really willing to listen to your counter proposal.

**Dobrynin:** But you made it already. This was yesterday.

**HAK:** Well, but we want you to consider it again.

**Dobrynin:** All right, if its this kind of thing. Because practically, from what you propose to use ??? Article 51 over ??

**HAK:** No, we accepted . . .

**Dobrynin:** There are two things - ???

**HAK:** Well, no and in the preamble we restored all of your language from the preamble.

**Dobrynin:** ???

**HAK:** Well I think that what we now have is Article V . . .

**Dobrynin:** KKK Henry, let me put it this way, I understand it now that you don't want to argue because of certain practical things. It's all right.

**HAK:** Well, tell them that we want - this is not a way to prevent it coming to a conclusion. We really want to bring it to a conclusion. And I may have a chance to talk to the President. I frankly did not focus on the new Article V today with him. I may have word for you on that tomorrow or the day after.

["3", "**Dobrynin:** Well, I will put it this way. On article I you are prepared to go closer to what we propose to do, yes?", "**HAK:** That is correct.", "**Dobrynin:** But in the preamble you prefer to ???", "**HAK:** Well, you noticed we put into the preamble that phrase XXX about third countries which you had in Article III.", "**Dobrynin:** Yes, but we still don't understand why you took it off from article III.", "**HAK:** Because it really belongs more in the preamble than in - you don't put an explanatory sentence into an article.", "**Dobrynin:** Well, I think it is more precise and more clear for the third country to know because in the preamble it sounds rather XXXXX en passant but there is more precise. You still don't want to put it back in one way or another.", "**HAK:** Well, I think it fits better into the preamble. WXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 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4

a... this particular question ???? and how the White House may refer to it
to the members of the congress.

HAK: Oh, all right.

Dobrynin: ??? and you other point ???

HAK: Well I can't do anything about it till I getback.

Dobrynin: OK, because there is some explanation of all the things we can prepare for you but everything is...

HAK: Well, let us discuss it on Monday or Tuesday when I return. And when then we will agree on a precise strategy also.

Dobrynin: OK, because I have...

HAK: And for your information I have already told the Israeli Ambassador that we would take the gravest view if the Israelis did not help us. And he said if we can give him anything at all that gives him an excuse to intervene, he would look at it very favorably.

Dobrynin: Well, our position is of course its up to you to do the...

HAK: No, no, we will do it. I just have to have your authority. You don't have to do a thing.

Dobrynin: I understand.

Dobrynin: We will do it, I just have to have your authority. We would take a communication from you that you authorize us to use. You not dealing with them, you are dealing with us.

Dobrynin: Yes, because we don't recognize?. on this occasion

HAK: Frankly, neither do we.

Dobrynin: I understand. You remember you asked me about what about ???

HAK: Can you give that to me on a sheet of paper too, like the other one.

Dobrynin: OK. Could I wait until you come home.

HAK: Of course.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 102-9
By N.A.S.A. 1970

Dobrynin: ???

HAK: You can do either one. I don't think I should until I can do it personally.

Dobrynin: OK, I will give it to you when you come back in a form just for your information. Now I think you and the President have enough

HAK: We will certainly use an absolutely maximum effort.

Dobrynin: Now you have a very serious level to do this.

HAK: Well, I don't see how we can ask for more.

Dobrynin: Ok Henry, for the time being you don't have anything new.

HAK: See you soon.

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon - San Clemente

April 3 - 1939

Dobrynin - HAK

HAK: Anatole, how are you?

Dobrynin: Oh, I see

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01295C

By: X MARA Date: 6/12/91

**Dobrynin:** This is rather ???, as you mentioned. All right.

**HAK:** Right.

**Dobrynin:** Then second, you agree your President left Article IV ??? It is the same reason you mentioned to me and the same explanation given to article II IV - now its article V ???

**Dobrynin:** All right, if its this kind of thing. Because practically, from what you propose to use ? ? ? Article II over ??

**Dobrynin:** There are two things - ? ? ?

**Dobrynin:** ? ? ?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: EO 12950

D: 12 MARCH 1994

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: EO 12951
Date: 6/13/04
By: MIRA DEC

**HAK:** That is correct.

**Dobrynin:** But in the preamble you prefer to ? ? ?

**HAK:** Well, you noticed we put into the preamble that phrase about third countries which you had in Article III.

**Dobrynin:** Well, I think it is more precise and more clear for the third country to know because in the preamble it says rather XXXXXXXXXXXX en passant but there it is more precise. You still don't want to put it back in one way or another.

**HAK:** Well, I think it fits better into the preamble. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX

**Dobrynin:** Well I really have no choice but to tell it - there is nothing else really. When will you be back.

**HAK:** I will be back Monday and I am sure you will be back with agreement to every word we gave you.

**Dobrynin:** Well you will have a lot of things to do in Moscow on the same text.

**HAK:** Anatole, we have never failed to complete an agreement and we will not fail this time. We will not fail this early in the Administration and this late in our relationship. But we have to go through some steps and you have to go through some.

**Dobrynin:** I understand. All right.

**HAK:** Particularly when we have to discuss the history of this at some point.

**Dobrynin:** I understand. All right. Well, Henry I have an answer to a question you asked me. You remember that don't you. Well, this is

4

a... this particular question ???? and what the White House may refer to it to the members of the congress.

**HAK:** Oh, all right.

**Dobrynin:** ? ?? and you other point ? ??

**HAK:** Well I can't do anything about it till I get back.

**Dobrynin:** OK, because there is some explanation of all the things we can prepare for you but everything is . . .

**HAK:** Well, let us discuss it on Monday or Tuesday when I return. And then we will agree on a precise strategy also.

**Dobrynin:** OK, because I have . . .

**HAK:** And for your information I have already told the Israeli Ambassador that we would take the gravest view if the Israelis did not help us. And he said if we can give him anything at all that gives him an excuse to intervene, he would look at it very favorably.

**Dobrynin:** Well, our position is of course it's up to you to do the . . .

**HAK:** No, no, we will do it. I just have to have your authority. You don't have to do a thing.

**Dobrynin:** I understand.

**SSA HAK:** We will do it, I just have to have your authority. We would take a communication from you that you authorize us to use. Your not dealing with them, you are dealing with us.

**Dobrynin:** Yes, because we don't recognize . . . on this occasion

**HAK:** Frankly, neither do we.

**Dobrynin:** I understand. You remember you asked me about what about ? ? ?

**HAK:** Can you give that to me on a sheet of paper too,一样 like the other one.

**Dobrynin:** OK. Could I wait until you come home.

**HAK:** Of course.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951
By: XIRA Date: 6/13/01

Dobrynin: ???

Dobrynin: OK, I will give it to you when you come back in a form just for your information. Now I think you and the President have enough ???

HAK: See you soon.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951
By NARA Date 6/13/04

Telcon - San Clemente
4/4/73 - 11:25 a.m.

Amb. Sullivan - HAK

Sullivan: Hello Henry.

HAK: How are you Bill?

Sullivan: Fine, how did the visit go?

HAK: I think it went quite well.

Sullivan: Good, I think the press has been surprisingly good in view of the snide efforts to sort of make it appear as if they weren't going well.

HAK: You know, the President promised him that somehow we'd find around 650 million dollars for him.

Sullivan: Over the costs of this year and the next year?

HAK: Well, whatever the period is that he asked for.

Sullivan: Right.

HAK: Pieced together from various funds, and we don't want it to be nickels and dimes when they get to Washington.

Sullivan: Right, I hope John Hannah's got that word.

HAK: Well, Nutter has the word, I mean Neuter.

Sullivan: Yes, well he's positive, he'll be helpful.

HAK: Godd, well I'll tell John Hannah too. Bill, I saw in the newspaper that some official who was present at the negotiation said that I wanted the KX North Vietnamese about continued bombing. Was that you?

Sullivan: No, I fear that what happened is that George Aldridge sometime back, when he was approached by Gwirtzman on the plane I gather it was, was trying to get some indication what the understandings were, and was trying to explain to him that there were no secret understandings, and that this was the sort of thing that was meant and apparently Gwirtzman kept his notes on it and dug back into again the other day and made it a timely story.

- 2 -

**HAK:** Well, we should just shut up.

**Sullivan:** Well, George is terribly unhappy and embarrassed and apologizes.

**HAK:** No, that's alright. George is a decent guy.

**Sullivan:** Gwirtzman just is a smart, clever cokey. He dug this back up again when it suited his purpose. Henry, what about Cambodia?

**HAK:** Well, when do you think we should send Haig out there?

**Sullivan:** Well, I think he better go in the next couple of days.

**HAK:** OK, I'll get it launched.

**Sullivan:** We're starting now. I've told them to get funds together to institute an air lift of petroleum there but we've got to get that river cleared so we can get the damn convoy up. And that needs to be done. I think pronto.

**HAK:** I'll get Haig very soon.

**Sullivan:** OK.

DECLASSIFIED

Autentic

EO 12957

B: NARA Dct: 6/13/64

Telcon - San Clemente

4/4 - 11:50 a.m.

Ronald Ziegler - HAK

K: In case I would say yes.

Z: O.K. You don't want to do it today to you? Listen, Deakin would like to have lunch with you.

K: Who-?

Z: Jim Deakin. His cousin is a very sharp gal. They want to join you.

K: Well, are you recommending against it?

Z: I am not recommending for or against. Apparently the gal is pretty sharp.

K: Are you taking an interest in my love life?

Z: No. Just passing something on.

K: Are you at work? Is that why you are speaking with such gravity?

Z: (Laughter) Well, what shall I tell them?

K: They I will do it on Saturday. I don't think I can do it before that.

Z: O.K.

DECLASSIFIED

E012957

Authority

NARA Doc. 6/13/61

By:

Telcon - San Clemente

4/4/73 - 12:15 p.m.

V.P. Agnew - HAK

HAK: Mr. Vice President.

Agnew: Hello, Henry, how are you?

HAK: Fine, how are you?

Agnew: OK.

HAK: I just wanted to call you about your meetings with Thieu and give you a little flavor for what went on out here. I didn't sit in on the plenary session so I don't know what was done in Rogers' meeting, but in the meetings with the President, the President made the point to Thieu that we were determined to have him succeed. And that we did not believe that ... we did not end the war just to get our troops out and our prisoners back, but that we wanted him to succeed and that our foreign policy was intimately linked with his survival and that we would do what was necessary but that we were in a tough public position to give formal public assurances because they would just lead to Congressional restrictions.

Agnew: I understand.

HAK: But he did promise him to go for higher figure on economic aid by piecing it together from various funds and to be very receptive to his needs in the military field. And he left the strong implication that in case of an all out attack we would take drastic measures.

Agnew: He understands why we can't go trumpeting this around, doesn't he?

HAK: Yes, he understands. He was in good shape. Now, I don't know what meetings you are planning to have with them.

Agnew: Well, I have a meeting with him at 10:00 tomorrow morning.

HAK: Will that be essentially alone or ...

Agnew: Well, it will be I imagine with parties present.

HAK: The smaller the group, the more freely you can talk. And in any event I think it might be good if you took him aside alone for half an hour.

Agnew: I'll do that at the close of the meeting.

**HAK:** And talk to him in a friendly and positive manner.

**Agnew:** All right, what is his general attitude?

**HAK:** He is very relaxed and very confident. But of course you know he is a courageous man.

**Agnew:** Well, that certainly should have reassured him to a great extent.

**HAK:** Oh yes. It was a good meeting.

**Agnew:** I had to move the reception from the elapse up to Andrews in a hangar because the weather here is abominable. They are expecting flash floods and severe storms right about the time of his arrival. So we moved it out to the hangar. We're trying to bus some of the Vietnamese out there, but it's not going to be a big arrival.

**HAK:** But you don't have any choice, do you?

**Agnew:** No, but I was a little disappointed in the cabinet. I have one exception. Secretary Brennan is the only guy that accepted. Now a couple of them are out of town but the rest of them said no, only if a command performance.

**HAK:** I'm going to get some of them out there.

**Agnew:** Well, I told Brennan not to come because I felt that if just one cabinet officer showed up we'd be better off...

**HAK:** Well, wait, I'm going to get Steve Bull to call the Cabinet members. Or is there enough time?

**Agnew:** Well, they don't have much time. I'm leaving the office in another five minutes to get out there.

**HAK:** It's a disgrace.

**Agnew:** I sort of feel Henry in view of the weather conditions and in view of the fact that they made all these bad excuses about not coming -- Richardson's testifying on the Hill, somebody's here, somebody's there, we'd be better off just forgetting about it.

**HAK:** But are they coming to your dinner?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01255J

By: A MRA Date: 01/14/01

Telcon - San Clemente

4/4/73 - 12:40 p.m.

Secy Peterson - HAK

Peterson: Henry, how are you?

HAK: Pete, how are you?

Peterson: Fine. You had a deep impact on Miss Ullman I must say. Did you do that just to upset me?

HAK: Of course.

Peterson: It was very impressive.

HAK: She is madly in love with me.

Peterson: Have you ever checked out your ??? or do you just come to this conclusion automatically?

HAK: Well, you know we run tests.

Peterson: But I think your feedback mechanism is very faulty. You've got a persistent bias.

HAK: No, she shares my admiration for me. It was unanimous - all three of us love me - my two personalities . . .

Peterson: I think two is an understatement Henry, you're much more complex than that. Don't you think?

HAK: I don't know.

Peterson: I think to characterize you as just another schizophrenic with two personalities is to understate the complexities of your psyche. Have you got a minute?

HAK: All right, now that you have insulted me, Pete, go ahead.

Peterson: Listen, some personal stuff first. I am leaving a week from Saturday for - I'm taking the kids for spring vacation and I've got an absolute commitment. For ten days. Now, this is important, I think, to me at least, for this reason: I think we ought to try to get this thing presented before I leave.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: FO 1295L
Date: 6/13/73
By: XURA

**HAK:** To the President.

**Peterson:** Yes, and what I have in mind is about 20 minuted - very compact - short presentation that makes the key points that I want to make. I am trying desperately now to try to simply this very complex issue.

**HAK:** Look, I am going to do my damndest to arrange it.

**Peterson:** All right, this would be on the 13th hopefully.

**HAK:** I mean there is a total preoccupation right now with domestic matters.

**Peterson:** Yes, I'm sure. All right, but at least I'd appreciate your trying for the 13th or the tail end of next week and I hope I can make it.

**HAK:** Yes, I'll make a major effort.

**Peterson:** Now, I'm seeing George on Saturday, and I thought I ought to review at least some aspects of this thing with him to make sure that I'm not way off the reservation. Is that all right with you or what do you suggest?

**HAK:** That's all right with me.

**Peterson:** OK, the next subject. The more I think about it, the more our conversation about where we go from here the more I have the following difficulties: first, in a sense, I'm an Ambassador without portfolio, and I'm trying to put together a negotiating plan, and while I'm nearly as presumptuous and arrogant as you are, the more I live with this (a) I'm not an expert in some of these businesses, like Agriculture and Energy and so forth, I hope I'm asking the right questions, but I'm not an expert. Secondly, even if I were, no one else would believe it and in any event I think the bureaucracy simply has to review what are we going to ask for in agriculture. The thought that we make a proposal involving agricultural policy without involving the bureaucracy, Agriculture Department and energy policy without involving whoever is involved there, strikes me as kind of unrealistic. Whereas on the Russian deal, you and I could more or less decide it. I have a feeling that this problem is more complex than that, and the more I live with it. Probably what I could do is to lay out a direction and a strategy and say here's one approach to it in specific terms, but I just wonder if you aren't going to have to get the departments at least consulted with on their own areas.

**HAK:** Oh yes, I will do that eventually, once I know where I'm going.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized EO 12957

D: 12 NARA DEc: 6/13/94

**Peterson:** But that then raises the question of how you get them involved because there isn't much time obviously. I just want to convey to you that (a) I don't have any staff, (b) I obviously don't have any standing and I'm trying to put this together literally by myself.

**HAK:** Well, what I want to do is have you present this to the President and then have me present to the President the idea that you might take this on.

**Peterson:** All right, now I want to come to that. I've thought about what you said about doing it on the outside. The more I live with it given our textile friends and some of the things you and I have said about that, and the whole conflict of interest thing, even if my future employer were willing to do it I just wonder if we wouldn't be soiled, by my having an apparent conflict of interest. You suggested that I think about it. The more I think about it the more concerned I am about . . .

**HAK:** But would you be prepared to do it full time?

**Peterson:** Well, then you get down to two issues: (1) how long would it take; and (2) what kind of support would I really have? I talked with your friend, you know your dear friend and mine the other night, very generally about this, Joni, you know and I think the point she makes is the point the point that . . .

**HAK:** I wish you'd stay away from her.

**Peterson:** Well, why don't you ask her Henry to do that. I feel I'm in a passive role, a receptor, it's hard for her to keep away -- she calls me all hours of the day and night. Then she tells me she has lunch with you which is awful. But the main point is that first as a friend what are the chances of really getting the bossman's support? in a way that anybody would believe it, given all that's happened. And secondly, what are the chances of anybody else believing that? Because there's an enormous amount to do here in just a few weeks and it would require the kind of charter that . . .

**HAK:** Well let me - whenever I get some time with him, which doesn't look very good, let me see what I can do. Let me see whether I can get a reading on that.

**Peterson:** Yes, but I think you and I know the answer.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012957

Date: 6/13/01
By: MIRA

**HAK:** Well, I am not so sure. Things are a little different now.

**Peterson:** They may be. Now as to what I'd be willing to do, I don't know. But if it were a very limited period, a month or so, maybe, but we're talking about an extended period. I wouldx wonder if too much hasn't gone under the bridge for me to get back involved in that. Because what I could be doing is just setting me up for another you know.

**HAK:** No, not if you do it on a clearly -- even if you do this one job - if it were to take 3 to 6 months -

**Peterson:** Well, I'll want to talk to you as a friend when it comes to that.

**HAK:** Well, let me find out first what the general mood is because as your friend I wouldn't want you to get involved in a rought situation again.

**Peterson:** And you know I have some marvelous opportunities now.

**HAK:** Yes, but those you'll have at any time.

**Peterson:** I don't know, it depends on what the situation is.

**HAK:** And I can't let you get too far ahead of me financially in any event.

**Peterson:** In a curious sort of way you know I'm not so sure that my interests would be served once there was an initial very favorable kick-off if you follow me. A reaction to what I'm recommending could be identified with you. I won't elaborate on that but . . .

**HAK:** But your interests would not be served by being identified with me.

**Peterson:** My interests might be served by being identified with you on a high professional, substantive . . . I don't want to elaborate on this but just think about it a little bit.

**HAK:** Are you being facetious?

**Peterson:** No, I am not.

**HAK:** Because I think seriously they might be served.

**Peterson:** They might be. In other words, if we are going to do it with other fellow involved, I think it would probably serve my interest to have a very favorable reaction, very impressed and all that sort of thing.

**HAK:** No question.

**Peterson:** Very quickly thereafter, it could just become known that you and I are doing this. You follow me. I don't think I want to get all this involved, emotionally or any other way.

**HAK:** Well, let's see how that works. And I may not be able to sell it at all.

**Peterson:** I think the first thing is to try to get a session in. See what he says about that.

**HAK:** Yes, but right now even I can't get a session. I mean they are all spending their time on important matters.

**Peterson:** Yes, I understand. Could I ask you to do one other thing and that's to ... I keep getting noises that they're going to say something about international energy in a message, and I think it would be a crazy mistake to do that.

**HAK:** No, they are saying something about domestic energy.

**Peterson:** No, but in that message there's supposed to be something about international energy, I'm told. Henry, what I want to try to urge you to do is as you know, I think we've got to make this part of a very bold comprehensive new era and if we diddle these things out one at a time, unilaterally, we lose the leverage we've got. And believe me we've got tremendous leverage on this.

**HAK:** Yes, let me get after that.

**Peterson:** And if he's going to talk about cooperation, make it very, very general, please.

**HAK:** Right.

**Peterson:** What are you doing/mostly?

**HAK:** Well, I'm working on the Annual Report mostly.

**Peterson:** How did your visit go the last couple days?

**HAK:** They went all right.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12951

By: ARA Date 01/13/01

**Peterson:** That must be an awkward situation for you personally.

**HAK:** I don't think I'm going to get their medal of freedom.

Change tapes

**Peterson:** I have some more irreverant comments on this kind of thing . . .

**HAK:** But, it's not supposed to be very heavy stuff.

**Peterson:** No, I would assume three or four minutes. As I understand it you are the senior awardee and Senator Cooper and Mrs. Longworth are the junior members. How they could have arrived at that, I don't know.

**HAK:** Pete, I'll see you next week.

**Peterson:** All right, and let me know if you get a date.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951
D: 12 MARA Date: 6/17/01

TELCORN

Sen. Javits/Mr. Kissinger

1:35 p.m. 4/4/73

SJ: Henry, how are you?

HK: Jack, how are you?

SJ: Good trip?

HK: Yes.

SJ: I called you to just check up on the two things we discussed--one was the Japanese bill which came in for a good word from the State Department to testify up here on appropriations--

HK: Right. No we are in favor of that.

SJ: All right. I won't quote you in any way, but I'm about to take it up with Roy Ash and Shultz.

HK: And I'll talk to them also.

SJ: And then my standing with the press--

HK: I think that Nelson did report it correctly in the sense that -I talked to Ehrlichman about it and he felt that Nelson had reported it correctly-- he was at the meeting.

SJ: Well, that's it. You remember I told you about I rather suspected he had.

HK: Oh yes, and I didn't put it on any other basis.

SJ: That's the way it is going anyhow. We are in a terrible mess up there

HK: Oh really?

SJ: Terrible mess. Don't know how it will come out but the whole party set up is really in disarray because now Nelson is of a difference of the party structure--the Republicans have a candidate he is not for--at least so far. Anyhow he is going to be here tomorrow and I'll have a chance to talk. But I am very interested in getting your confirmation on that point.

HK: No, it was correctly reported.

SJ: Now, one last thing, you know I have this committee functioning in the NATO field which is gathering strength and also getting ready to do something major in the way of reporting and I am looking for two people to help me

DECLASSIFIED
Author: EO 12952
Date: 6/12/91
BY: NARA

Page 2

--one on the politics and one on the security. The two people I had in
mind was a fellow named Gelp who was at Brookings and came out of
Defense

HK: Yeh, I know him.

SJ: And the other is Brezinski--

HK: I would rate Brezinski about Gelp, but Gelp isn't bad.

SJ: See I need one for each--or would you use Brezinski for both?
I need a really informed military fellow and I think that's where we
have got the biggest clout

HK: Let me think about that.

SJ: This could be a really excellent channel for really top level pronouncement--
you see the Europeans resent any joining of security and economics,
so a report like this, they would simply face the facts not a theory.

HK: Yeh. Jack, I unfortunately, have to run off right now. I will call you in a
couple of days.

SJ: That's fine, thank you so much.

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12957

Authority: E012957

By: NARA Date: 6/13/04

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/McGeorge Bundy

3:35 4/4/73

HK: Mac, how are you?

MB: I didn't mean to call you--you are still out West or --

HK: I am out West, yes.

MB: I didn't mean to bother you out there. But if you have 30 seconds I'll tell you what the problem was--

HK: Of course, actually it is easier for me-- never any need to apologize

MB: Jim Perkins is carrying the candle for a group of people interested in foreign aid program and people like David Rockefeller, Bob McNamarra --Peterson who is a UN DP. And he is wondering whether it would be-- he has talked to Casy or rather people from this group have talked to Casey and part of it was about the NVN problem and part about generic problem of adequate public support for any kind of aid program, wherever it may be. And the question that he came in to put to me is who should they really be in touch with in D.C. and I said clearly--I know of your interests

HK: Right.

MB: And I told him in broad outline about our earlier conversation, but--and I was going to call going to call you on Monday to see whether you wanted to catch up with popele like that when you got back.

He is a little puzzled because nobody in the State Department or AID end --Hannah was up in NY at the meeting that all these people had to talk about how troubled everybody is about levels of US action and congressional indisposition.

Nobody really seemed to be that clear as to when and how the signal was going to be called from the WH and I said if you have that problem, why not talked to Henry.

HK: On aid to NVN? Or aid in general.

MB: Two thinks interlock--I think what actually happen, was the people concern with aid got together and thought we mustn't have a meeting without asking John Hannah and he came with pleasure and emphasized the point that the politicaally tough and at the same time important part as he understood it now --was the NVN part and this particular part of people didn't have any trouble saying we'd like to help on that although they tended, I think, to think the problem was more with another sector of opinion than with the old NY establishment which is a little more mobile on people who torture prisoners--must have gotten harder in the last week or so.

DECLASSIFIED

Author EO 1295

By XAARA Date 6/13/73

Page 2

HK: It certainly has and of course if they don't get their troops out of Cambodia or Laos, I don't see how we can--finance their military operations in Indochina.

MB: I agree with that. It may be that what I ought to say to Jim is that this situation is politically so interlocked with events on the ground that he'd do a lot better to wait and

HK: Well, I would be glad to talk to him - I think the problem is bigger than aid to North Vietnam myself

MB: In what sense?

HK: We have the whole problem of foreign aid and the congressional attitudes towards and also we have to get some aid for South Vietnam--

MB: It is almost more important than the immediate--if you are going to have a defacto breakdown of the prospect of real progress toward living together and the other people don't need any of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th act, then your problem is aid to SVN.

HK: Exactly. Right. So if Perkins wanted to come in sometime within two weeks after my return and --I'd be happy to see him.

MB: I will tell him that--we both agreed that we'd watch events over the weekend--he is not the perfect guy to carry the ring for an interested group of citizens simply for the reason that he is going to New Zealand for five weeks April 16--the more I heard of that, the less I thought it was necessary for him to go and make an exploration in a situation which is likely on present form to reverse itself three times.

HK: Exactly and in that time period. Because that is the period in which we should go before Congress.
I--Our plan is that by the middle of May we ought to see how they are acting on Laos and Cambodia--

MB: You've given yourself roughly another six weeks.

HK: That's right. And we have no intention of presenting a program if their present rate of infiltration continues--or they maintain their troops in Laos and Cambodia.

MB: Yeh, so it really ought to wait.

HK: If it's primary focus is aid to NVN then it ought to wait.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized 012951

BY NARA Date 01/13/69

Page 3

MB: I think the reason the primary focus was that was that because it was John Hannah's focus as of--you know these are delays of signals in the bureaucracy--three weeks ago, that was the natural signal for him to be carrying. What you are saying is that the general aid problem may have to be faced first and separately, right?

HK: That could easily be the case. I must say this is the first year we haven't been able to buy Passman off by doing something for his constituency

MB: You have not be able to?

HK: Well, we will eventually, but his price is going much higher.

MB: He's like the Arabs--And you have that problem too, haven't you. Energy policy between now and--

HK: That's right.

MB: I think Jim may decide not to be the busybody in this--

HK: Really, I think it would be better to have a spokesman who would be available within that time frame.

MB: Let me find out--perhaps Rockefeller who really would carry it.

HK: I think it would be very helpful.

MB: David's connections good, as far as you understand them with the management.

HK: Oh yes, much better than Jims.

MB: M Jim thought that too.

HK: Jim won't hostility, but he'll certainly meet indifference.

MB: Whereas David would meet receptivity.

HK: Mild receptivity.

MB: Who would be better?

HK: Nobody I can think of--David would be fine.

MB: All right very fine. I'm sorry--

HK: No, I'm working here, but much less than this day in day out stuff as in Washington. Hope to see you soon.

DECLASSIFIED
Author E012957

Date 0/3/94
By: NARA

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Ron Ziegler/Kissinger

11:00 a.m. - 5/5/73

K: Hello.

Z: Hi, Henry.

K: What did you decide about Sherman and Lisagor?

Z: I think you should see them on an off-the-record basis.

K: OK.

Z: It would be very detrimental for you and for me for a source story to come out of San Clemente over Sherman's byline or over Lisagor's. So see them on an off-the-record basis.

K: OK.

Z: That means - you know, don't tell them anything, but that means that they are seeing you for non-story purposes. If they want to see you on that basis fine.

K: Good. OK.

Z: Ok, what about the lunch?

K: I'm going to see Deakin on Saturday.

Z: Did he call you?

K: Yeh, he said you set it up.

Z: No, I didn't.

K: He's been claiming that you told him it was set.

Z: No I said - you know what I told him. Anyway you're going to see him Saturday.

K: Yeh.

Z: Good. Ok. You want to see anyone else?

K: Well, there are a number of them that want to have dinner with me but I don't think that my social schedule permits that.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized EO 1295R

Date: 6/13/69
By: XARA

Telcon - San Clemente

April 5, 1973 - 11:37 a.m.

HAK - Diane Sawyer

**Diane:** I'm sorry, this is a reckless intrusion into your meeting, but Ron is really getting pressed over here on whether or not Pompidou has been invited and he's not going to give an answer but he feels he's in an untenable position not knowing, and everyone he knows in your meeting.

**HAK:** Say there have been general discussions for a long time.

**Diane:** Are we thinking in terms of before Brezhnev? That's the thrust of their questioning.

**HAK:** Well, that's fine but we don't want to discuss it.

**Diane:** Yes, but I'm talking about just for Ron to know how to stonewall.

**HAK:** Probably, but what I want Ron to say is there have been general discussions and there has been nothing specific. But we've always valued discussions with a French President.

**Diane:** OK, that's what he'll say. Thank you.

**HAK:** You're more than welcome.

DECLASSIFIED

Date: 01/23/73

By: DANA DAE

Telcon - San Clemente

April 5, 1973 - 11:45 a.m.

HAK - Diane Sawyer

HAK: Diane, if Ron wants to say something about these meetings, he ought to be slightly aggressive about the claim that we summoned Brandt over here. He should say that as Chancellor Brandt very knows these discussions have been going on for weeks and that Chancellor Brandt was fully aware of other visits that are planned, of all scheduled visits, when he agreed to come. But he should say something rather sharp about the New York Times report.

Diane: You said that these discussions have been going on for weeks, and what did you say about the other meetings?

HAK: They make two points: that he is getting summoned over here and second, that he didn't know that other leaders were scheduled to come.

I said any leader that scheduled to come has been announced for weeks and no one else that hasn't been announced has as yet been scheduled. Can you get that to Ron. Tell him he's in good voice from what I hear here.

Diane: That's Secretary Morton's voice.

HAK: Well, then, tell Morton he's in good voice.

Diane: All right, thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: EO 1295C

Date: 6/13/73

By: XARA

DECLASSIFIED
Authoriz

EO12957

By: XARA Date: 01/13/91

**Evans:** Well, not for a long time. And Farcas, his main donor, is petering out. And he's been getting terrible reactions to every transfusion. It's really very distressing. But we did talk about you, he and I and Polly.

**HAK:** Polly Wisner?

**Evans:** Yes, and Tish had a delicious lunch and we spent half of it talking about you.

**HAK:** Yes, but you know what does to that Episcopalian puritan.

I

**Evans:** What doesn't he like about the column Henry? I had a letter from Mel Laird raising hell with it.

**HAK:** Did Mel Laird raise hell with it?

**Evans:** Yes, he did. He said he'd had the best relations with you and that I never should have thrown the Defense Department in there.

**HAK:** Well, that is true. That's point one. Point two, Haldeman has really done no damage to any of my associates.

**Evans:** He hasn't been any help.

**HAK:** No, he's helped. That's not true. It is true that the State Department has probably dragged its feet on promoting former staff members. But, first of all, if you look at the list of my associates, after all, Haig is Vice Chief of Army Staff.

**Evans:** Yes, but he's special. Vaky is in Costa Rica.

**HAK:** Vaky is in Costa Rica, which is where he wanted to be. And when I asked Haldeman for assistance, he gave it. It was held up by the State Department. The people that get penalized are people where Haldeman cannot use his influence. I mean Haldeman cannot insist that Negroponte and Rondon, who are at the middle level of the State Department, he cannot force the State Department to place FSO-3's and 4's in particular jobs. And those are the guys that get it in the neck. But the top guys -- Holdridge, people that are subject to Presidential appointment, I really have to say in defense of Haldeman that that wasn't fair.

**Evans:** Well, what about the other ___, the use of the White House Mess,

3

the lack of transportation, the second class citizenship. Now he as the
Chief of Staff made the decision/

HAK: Yes, well that may be my fault, I may not have pushed hard enough for it.

Evans: I doubt that, Henry. I doubt that very much. We thought it was an important column because . . .

HAK: Yes, but I think . . .

Evans: The ? in the White House are responsible for the worst excesses in this Administration, moving in and running the whole God damn government, and the foreign policy experts who work for you and who had a . . . who made such a success the last four years, who will make the record of this Administration if there is a record, get shafted.

HAK: But from their Departments, not from the White House.

Evans: Well, listen, I'm telling you the truth that my partner did most of the work on this and he is now in Japan and if it is not a fair portrayal, I'd better like to correct it. And I'm sorry.

HAK: You know, I've had my own problems. But I don't think this is correct.

Evans: Well, let me put it this way. That the jix guys, or at least some of the guys, on your staff and those in the White House who are sympathetic to you and your staff, feel that this is an accurate portrayal. Otherwise, there's no point in writing a column.

HAK: I didn't think it was malicious. Now, Mr. Evans, I'll be back next week.

Evans: Well, we're going to have a party, aren't we?

HAK: On the 15th.

Evans: Yes, on Sunday.

HAK: At Joan Braden's.

Evans: Is that where it is? I thought you were taking us out for dinner.

HAK: It's my party. I'm just using Joanie's house.

Evans: Oh, I see. Well, who's coming besides Joanie and R Stu and Tish?

HAK: A whole gackle of Alsops.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
E01295

Date: 6/13/91

By: A XA

Evans: Have you got a lot of people coming?

HAK: No, only about 10 to 15. Really, only special friends of Nancy's. It's her birthday. But she doesn't want a present. Now don't bring a present. You'll ruin my relations with her if you bring a present, really.

Evans: Couldn't I just bring a sixteenth of a milimeter of Nuit de Jour, which is probably the sexiest perfume ever made.

HAK: No, no present.

Evans: You mean it seriously.

HAK: Yes.

Evans: What did you think of the George Stevens fiasco.

HAK: The movie. Well, I don't think he is the brightest man.

Evans: I think he did the right thing though.

HAK: He did the right thing. I think it would have been outrageous to ... I mean I think it was a grave mistake to schedule it.

Evans: Henry, let me ask you one leading question. Before I left the office to drive out to Stu's for lunch, there was a bulletin on the UPI saying that the North Vietnamese had launched an all out attack on South Vietnam. Is that accurate.

HAK: No, if it is, I haven't heard it yet.

Evans: It was about three hours ago.

HAK: No, I would have heard it.

Evans: You know nothing like that?

HAK: NO.

Evans: This is a big story on the wire.

HAK: Well, you know, given the way things run ...

Evans: You know what Mel told me. He said that Vietnamization had been originally programmed to a level of 400,000 NVA troops maximum in South Vietnam. And that there were only -- and he used the same figure that you had three months ago to me -- 110,000 active NVA fighting front

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
By: XARA Date: 6/13/91

line troops. And that with only 110,000, that there was no question that
Thieu's army ought to be able to handle it.

**HAK:** That's right. We cannot imagine that for the next six months they
can have a decisive all out attack. At this time next year, it may be
different. They are still only at about 50% of their strength.

**Evans:** I had never heard that before. He said that Vietnamization was
aimed at building a force that could cope with 400,000 NVA.

**HAK:** And VC, both.

**Evans:** When are you coming home?

**HAK:** I'll be back Sunday.

**Evans:** Did you go to the Hollywood party?

**HAK:** Yes,

**Evans:** Was Nancy out there?

**HAK:** No.

**Evans:** Who was your girl?

**HAK:** Liv Ullman.

**Evans:** I know her. I saw her on television the other night. She's not
nearly as pretty as Nancy. And not as young. And I don't think anywhere
near as intelligent.

**HAK:** Now listen, Evans, there is a God damned conspiracy of the Alsops
and Evans that whenever I'm seen with another girl, you come after me.

**Evans:** We like Nancy. Did you read Joe's piece? on the Watergate?

**HAK:** Yes.

**Evans:** Have you ever read so much nonsense in your life? If you ever repeat
this, I'll stick a dagger in your heart. But you know what I think has happened.
You know who he is cultivating right now. He is cultivating Bob Haldeman.

**HAK:** I can't imagine that.

**Evans:** He's had him over for dinner a couple of times.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: EO 12957
Date: 6/13/94
By: NARA

HAK: XXXXX Really?

Evans: Yes. Now listen, that's between us.

HAK: You can count on that. On the 15th.

Evans: On the 15th, and if that piece bothered you, I'll do whatever I can to correct it.

HAK: Well, in one third of it, it bothered me. XX

Evans: Well, I think . . . we'll talk about it when you get back.

HAK: OK.

DECLASSIFIED
Authoriz
E012957
By: NARA Doc. 6/13/01

TELCONE (San Clemente)

George Sherman/Kissinger

12:40 p.m. - 4/5/73

K: Hello.

S: Yes, Dr. Kissinger?

K: Yeh.

S: Right. It's about seeing Peter and myself for lunch or dinner?

K: Lunch is probably impossible. Can we do it on an off-the-record basis?

S: Certainly. I understand your problem.

K: I mean so it's just that you can write brilliant columns then under your own name.

S: No, and presumably I suppose you're worried about having it come from San Clemente while we're here.

K: That's right.

S: Yeh, well which would you prefer?

K: Maybe you just come in and talk to me. Can you call me tomorrow morning? I'll definitely do it.

S: OK. Can we schedule lunch for tomorrow?

K: No, I have a lunch for tomorrow.

S: All right, well as you like.

K: Maybe we can do it now. Where are you?

S: Over at the San Clemente Inn.

K: Call me in 20 minutes, will you?

S: OK.

K: Good.

S: Thank you.

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Sec. Rush/Kissinger

2:19 p.m. - 4/5/73

K: Hello.

R: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: Good, how are you?

R: I'm fine. I'm calling you about a bureaucratic snafu that I think is of great importance.

K: Yeh.

R: As you know when I was in Defense Mel had the concept of moving NASA over to the Defense Department because he thought there was no chance of getting it through the Foreign Relations Committee. And Stennis at that time was very much opposed to it. He said that it would hurt him with the Defense budget and there would be a jurisdictional fight that would be very bad all the way across the board.

K: Right.

R: When I went before the Foreign Relations Committee on my confirmation I was asked twice what my position was with regard to this issue. In both cases I said that I had a degree of reservation and that I told Secretary Laird that I differed with him on it.

K: Right.

R: I was talking to Doc Morgan this morning. I made a speech at the Interparliamentary Union. He knows all about it and of course he is really embittered over the concept that it might come out of the White House. Now the problem really - I'm not interested in who handles what, I'm interested in what is best for our Administration.

K: Of course.

R: And the key point is that this is going to be a complete failure in the House and in the Senate. Morgan told me that he had talked to the Speaker and the Speaker said he would under no circumstances resume jurisdiction in this way.

K: But are we doing it actively?

2

R: It's going to come to you I think, or you'll be deeply involved in this.

K: Yeh.

R: And what will happen will be this: If the White House recommends this, it is going to deeply embitter, of course

K: Well, if this is Albert's view, that's going to settle it because there's no sense in our embittering Doc Morgan only to wind up with a defeat anyway.

R: That's the point and our best friends in the House, our best friends in the Congress on this thing will be embittered but he will still have jurisdiction because he told me definitely that he had the word of the Speaker that he would never go along with it. In the end we'll embitter Morgan, we will embitter further into Fulbright and several other members, Stennis was against it and the whole thing will be a defeat for us leaving the White House holding the bag with what they will consider an attempt to step into a jurisdictional thing in the Senate and also, in all honesty, this is a proposal of the Defense Department where in essence you cover up, as you know, by not increasing your total authorized expenditures but get a lot more by transferring equipment in essence as wholesale costs so that the purchase price is just going to look like a deception to the Senate and into the House. So you have two things - that it looks like a deception and you have secondly our stepping into a jurisdictional problem that will not succeed and will do us a lot of harm.

K: Yeh. Ok.

R: I just thought you had to know that.

K: I'm less sympathetic to that accounting device.

R: Oh, that accounting device is for the birds, Henry. There's no one who is going to be fooled by that.

K: Well, let me take a look at the paper when it comes. If we should be inclined to rule against you I will consult you before we do it. In other words, nothing will be done contrary to your recommendation without discussion with you.

R: I appreciate that very much.

TELCON (San Clemente)

Ron Ziegler/Kissinger

4:05 p.m. - 4/5/73

K: Ron, are we doing the g______ act again?

Z: No, sir, I'm sorry I was

K:

Z: We just withdrew Gray's nomination.

K: Oh, did we?

Z: Yeh, that's what that was about, I'm sorry.

K: Two things - one, you know we're sending Haig ou to Phnom Penh and you want to announce that Saturday.

Z: If that's what you want, fine.

K: Is that a good day to announce it?

Z: Yeh, that's ok.

K: Good. And Lloyd Shearer told me he was coming down to see Ehrlichman and wanted to drop in. Then it turned out he wasn't seeing Ehrlichman after all.

Z: So you saw him?

K: Yeh, that's fine. But there was no business it was entirely -- but as it was there's no article or anything that he's doing.

Z: Fine. It's good to see him anyway.

K: I think in fact, that he is fairly favorable.

Z: Yeh, I agree.

K: OK, good. I just want you to know about that. Now how about these guys, Knapp, Valeriani and Trewhitt who want to see me?

Z: Don't do anything on that yet.

K: There're only two day left.

DECLASSIFIED
Authoriz
E01295F
By: A XARA Data: 6/13/19