CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL ISSUES

The deepest disagreements in the Atlantic Alliance concern not issues of strategy but competing political conceptions about the shape of the Alliance, the relative role of its members and the future organization of the West. The chief protagonists have been the United States and France now debating the wisdom of negotiating with the Soviets, now contesting the role of nuclear weapons, sometimes arguing about the shape of Europe, always disputing the nature of Alliance. The two countries have sometimes acted as if each had a psychological need to use the other as a foil. Both have developed elaborate devil theories of the designs of their opponent. French spokesmen have charged that a primary goal of the United States policy is to keep its hands free for some super-Yalta of the future. American commentators have dismissed French policy as reflecting the illusion of grandeur of a bitter man who cannot forget the slights, real or fancied, of over two decades ago. French critics have accused the United States of seeking to maintain its own dominant position by disguising its aspirations behind high-sounding phrases of community, which must, in time, dissolve Europe's

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identity. Leading Americans have replied by emphasizing the futility of
seeking to base policy on past glory, the vanity of trying to base European
unity on French hegemony.

yet both professionals make the same objections.

The professions of objectives are as similar as the accusations.

Both France and the United States avow the goal of European unity. Both insist that their policy will lead to a closer Atlantic partnership. Each side argues that its policy will finally cause the Communist dictatorships to become more tractable and return the Soviet Union to the community of nations.

It could be thought, then, that the dispute is primarily one of tactics.

In fact, the controversy goes deeper. At issue are two conflicting concep-
tions of international order, two different views of the historical process,
two variant visions of the future. What gives the controversy its tragic
stature is that each approach might have succeeded but for the existence of
the other. Each side has the power to prevent the other from realizing its
objective, neither can create an alternative structure--France even less than
the United States. Any discussion of Atlantic policy must therefore begin

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II. <u>The United States and the Atlantic Community</u>

American policy towards Europe in the post-war period has been remarkably consistent. Greatly influenced by such wise Europeans as Jean Monnet, four post-war American Administrations have supported movements towards European integration. The United States sought first to create a European organization to divide European economic aid among the individual European countries. It strongly pressed the European Defense Community which would have brought about an integrated European army. When the French Parliament hesitated to ratify that treaty--to which, of course, the United States was not a party--Secretary Dulles threatened a "painful" re-examination of American foreign policy.

an "agreeing reappraisal"

In the end the French National Assembly failed to ratify the treaty.

American policy *did not change*, however. The United States welcomed the formation of the Common Market as a step toward European political union.

It threw its considerable prestige against British efforts to dilute the European Economic Community. As late as 1962, Under Secretary of State Ball warned against the danger of turning the Common Market into a largely

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economic enterprise. He was referring to the efforts of the Scandinavian
countries and Austria to enter the Common Market without making a commitment
to political unity. The United States threw its weight behind the Common
Market on the theory that Britain could be induced to join Europe only if
European economic integration was so successful that Britain would have no
alternative.

European unity was pressed so urgently because it was considered an
essential prerequisite to the formation of an Atlantic Community. On
July 4, 1962, President Kennedy proclaimed the Declaration of Interdependence
between the United States and a United Europe. A politically and economically
integrated Europe would become an equal partner with the United States sharing
with us the burdens and obligations of world leadership.¹ To its fervent
enthusiasts, such a partnership seemed realizable by only one method: a
politically unified Europe in close association with the United States.
Similarly, a single solution was offered for the achievement of European unity:

¹ "The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership," DOSB, XLVII, 1204, (July 23, 1962), pp. 131-133.

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supra-national institutions operating on the basis of majority vote and con-
trolled by a European Parliament.

Prominent among the factors producing so single-minded an approach
was the conviction that the American experience was directly applicable to
the European situation. "The United States of America with its balance of
power and Federal State divisions is the unique political experiment in
federation about which we are proud and self-conscious," said Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Schaetzel. "We believe that our system works.
It is a natural human reaction to believe that it might also work for other
people."¹ A similar note was struck by President Kennedy in 1962:

> The debate now raging in Europe echoes on a grand scale the
debates which took place in this country between 1783 and
1789. Small states are sometimes fearful of big ones. Big
states are suspicious for historical reasons of one another.
Some statesmen cling to traditional forms--others clamor for
new ones. And every eye is on the hostile powers who are never,
far away. All this reminds us of our own organic deliberations.²

¹ J. Robert Schaetzel, "The United States and the Common Market," speech to 1962 Summer Institute of the Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada, August 18, 1962, in _DOSB_, XLVII, 1210, Sept. 3, 1962, p. 351. See also Christian Herter, _Towards an Atlantic Community_, Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, N.Y., & Evanston, 1963, p. 55-56.

² John F. Kennedy, "Trade and the Atlantic Partnership," remarks to Conference on Trade Policy at Washington, D.C., May 17, 1962, _DOSB_, XLVI, 1197, June 5, 1962, p. 907.

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The incentive to urge the American model was especially great because
the nation-state, according to American spokesmen, had become obsolete.

Walt Rostow, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council of the State Department,
has argued:

> The major historic lesson of the Second World War...is namely, that in the world of the second half of the 20th century the individual national-states of Europe could only execute effectively a major role on the world scene if they were to unite. The arena of world affairs had widened out to embrace the whole of the planet; and the technology of effective power had outstripped the scale of the old states of Europe.¹

The American attitude was very ambivalent; it exalted the nation-state in emerging areas and looked to nationalism in Eastern Europe as a counterweight to Soviet Russia while denying its validity in Western Europe where the concept had originated.

The argument for a federal Europe was pressed for four reasons:
to end Europe's internecine wars, to provide a counterweight to the U.S.S.R.,
to bind Germany indissolubly to the West and to provide an adequate partner
for the United States.²
American pronouncements always equated a united

¹ W.W. Rostow, "The Atlantic Community: An American View," Speech to Belgo-American Association, Brussels, May 9, 1963, DOSB, XLVIII, 1249, June 3, 1963, p. 856.

² Douglas MacArthur II, Ambassador to Belgium, "The New Europe--Its Challenge and Its Opportunities for the United States," address to Young President's Organization, Inc., Phoenix, Ariz., April 9, 1962, DOSB, XLVI, 1192, April 30, 1962, p. 711.

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Europe with full integration on the basis of supra-national institutions.

Anything less than that was considered to be not unity at all.

There is no evidence that any serious consideration was given to whether a united Europe would necessarily act in harmony with the United States or whether a partnership among equals was really likely to operate as smoothly as official pronouncements suggested. Occasionally the question was posed hypothetically only to be rejected. McGeorge Bundy explained the disarmament view as follows: "In the end our confidence in Europe rests on deeper and more solid political grounds. These peoples are our cousins by history and culture, by language and religion."¹ Considering the record of internecine wars of these "cousins" some questions might have been raised about the solidity of such confidence.

The notion that there was a harmony of interests between the United States and Europe remained unquestioned. Dean Rusk was expressing the conviction of three post-war Administrations when he said:

1. McGeorge Bundy, "Policy for the Western Alliance--Berlin and After," speech to Economic Club of Chicago, December 6, 1961, DOSE, XLVI, 1185, March 12, 1962, pp. 422-423.

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In 1947, the American Government decided that it would link
the recovery of Europe to efforts at European unification.
We chose quite consciously not to play a balance-of-power
game with the nations of Europe but to build toward a strong
partnership in the affairs of the West.¹

As the years went by confusion emerged between the particular form of European
organization and the substance of the policy a united Europe was likely to carry out. In the
American view, "integrated" Europe would be "outward looking"; a less cohesive
Europe would be parochial. An integrated Europe would be a partner to the
United States; a less cohesive one would remain turn into a burden or perhaps an
opponent. In short, an integrated Europe was essential to complete the Grand
Design. This was expressed by Under Secretary of State Ball:

As we have felt the increasing weight of the burdens and res-
ponsibilities of leadership--increased geometrically by the
existence of a real and present danger from Communist ambitions--
we have wished, sometimes wistfully, for a closer and stronger
Atlantic partnership. Yet a strong partnership must almost
by definition mean a collaboration of equals. When one partner
possesses over 50 percent of the resources of an enterprise and
the balance is distributed among 16 or 17 others, the relation-
ship is unlikely to work very well. And so long as Europe re-
mained fragmented, so long as it consisted merely of nations
small by modern standards, the potentials for true partnership
were always limited.²

¹ Dean Rusk, "Some Issues of Contemporary History," speech to the American Historical Association, Washington, D.C., December 30, 1961, DOSB, XLVI, 1177, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 86.

² George Ball, "Toward an Atlantic Partnership," Speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, February 6, 1962, DOSB, XLVI, 1184, March 5, 1962, pp. 366-367.

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This too was the theme of President Kennedy in his speech at the Paulskirche
in Frankfurt in 1963:

> It is only a fully cohesive Europe that can protect us all against fragmentation of the alliance. Only such a Europe will permit full reciprocity of treatment across the ocean, in facing the Atlantic agenda. With only such a Europe can we have a full give-and-take between equals, an equal sharing of responsibilities, and an equal level of sacrifice.¹

Partnership presupposed equality of strength; to a strong Europe
the United States would concede responsibilities withheld from a collection
of nation-states. Thus Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, as well as Secretary
Rusk, have hinted that the United States was prepared to concede to a united
Europe the nuclear autonomy which it had resisted giving individual allies--
even though many of the arguments made against national forces would seem to
apply as strongly to a European nuclear force.

Although United States spokesmen extolled the virtues of partnership
with a united Europe, they were rather vague about its nature. Under Secretary
McGhee spoke of a "tightly integrated Europe" and a "somewhat looser Atlantic
association." Though he described common tasks in aiding underdeveloped nations

¹ John F. Kennedy, Address at Paulskirche, Frankfurt, Germany, June 25, 1963, DOSB, XLIX, 1256, July 22, 1963, p. 122.

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and defending the frontiers of freedom he did not spell out the content of
these objectives or how the partnership was going to function in practice.
There was an implication that the partnership would apply to a sharing of
the burdens but that the goals would remain those set by the United States
during its period of hegemony--not indeed because we had aspirations to dominance
but because unchallenged leadership had accustomed American leaders to believing
that their views inevitably reflected the general interest. The goals were
self-evident. They grew naturally from a sense of world responsibility. Coopera-
tion would supply its own rationale.

The American view, with all its optimism, ignored those factors which
made the American experience unique. The American federal union was formed
on a new continent by states of similar historical experience. The American
colonies had recently fought a war together to achieve their freedom. They
were roughly of the same size. They had no tradition of sovereignty in the
conduct of foreign relations. Their peoples were of similar cultural background
and spoke the same language.

The situation in Europe differs fundamentally. Every European nation

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is the product of many centuries of a history in which identity was often advanced
through identified with what distinguished them from other European countries. Though
of the same cultural root, independence for many European states required
a long process of struggle, often against their neighbors. The sense of identity
of the countries of Europe was established in a manner which emphasized national
peculiarities. The conduct of foreign policy and the assumption of responsibility for national defense have been considered among the key attributes of
European sovereignty. Any attempt to abolish the nation-states, or to reduce
their role drastically, represents a much more profound wrench with the past
in Europe than the establishment of the United States of America two centuries
earlier. Unification in Europe inevitably would have to allow for more plus-
realistic forms than federalism in the United States.

The attitude of the European states towards unity and the form which
it should take is as different as their history. Smaller countries with a
habit of dependence find supra-national institutions easier to accept than those
which were major powers at one time. The Federal Republic of Germany, whose
sense of identity was smashed in the war, is less reluctant to be amalgamated
in a supra-national entity than France or Britain.

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The relative weakness of the nation-state in Europe in the post-war period had in any event been due partly to phenomena which proved to be temporary: the exhaustion of the countries of Europe through the war and the fear of Soviet invasion. Both of these factors emphasized Europe's dependence on the United States. As Europe recovered economically, traditional political vigor--and some of its traditional political concepts--returned. The success of economic recovery tended to reduce Europe's receptivity to America's political maxims. This coincided with the belief that the Soviet threat was ending--a development also fostered by American policy.

These factors might have been counterbalanced had Europe wished to play the global role envisaged for it by the Grand Design. But the process of colonization has sharply reduced Europe's interest in extra-European affairs. And to play a European role, the nation-state is not so obsolete as is sometimes alleged. If European countries are willing to confine their foreign policy to Europe, those joint efforts that modern conditions require are mostly technical or economic in nature. These may be left to experts without bringing about the supra-national institutions favored by the United States. This serves to explain

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why some of the impetus behind European political integration has been lost
and, above all, why the American preference for supra-national institutions
was almost certain to be challenged.

Moreover, the assumption that economic integration would inevitably lead to political unity and that institutions if unified would be similar to those of its economic organs has been proved wrong. There is no inevitable connection between economic cooperation and supra-national political institutions. In the economic field, problems were primarily technical. Within each European government, there had been a well-established tradition of entrusting these matters either to the automatic operation of a market economy or to a group of experts. But questions of foreign policy involved matters of the most essential sovereignty. There was little precedent for entrusting these matters to a group of experts. Nor is it self-evident that supra-national experts would necessarily conduct a more "outward looking" policy than established political leaders. Finally the relative impotence of European national parliaments in foreign affairs suggests that a supra-national European parliament would be unlikely to function as an effective organ of control.

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But whatever the structure, origin or degree of European integration-- whether it was the Europe of de Gaulle or the Europe of Monnet--one question could not be begged indefinitely: what kind of policy a united Europe would pursue. The assumption that a united Europe and the United States would inevitably pursue identical policies and have similar views about appropriate tactics ran counter to most historical experience. A separate identity has usually been established in opposition to a dominant power: in Europe it was as likely to emphasize that which distinguished it from America--and the more tightly "integrated" Europe grew the more true this was likely to be. This was likely to be all the more true because a European sense of identity could not be nourished by fear of the U.S.S.R., partly because the Soviet threat was thought to be diminishing, partly because when its reality was accepted, it provided an impetus to Atlantic, not to European, conceptions.

As Europe grew stronger, two possibilities for Atlantic relationships emerged. If Europe disagreed with the United States, either over objectives or over tactics, a unified Europe would become a much-more formidable negotiating partner. Its policy then might be similar to that of Gaulist France.

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If there was agreement between the United States and Europe, an Atlantic unit under American leadership would seem to many Europeans more convenient than a dramatic political upheaval within Europe. Atlantic partnership and European unity were not, of course, incompatible. But a united Europe always contained the seeds of opposition to the United States. A United Europe would not be without a major share in the political direction of the Atlantic world--which is another way of saying that it was bound to challenge American leadership.

This has nothing to do with the intentions of those dedicated Europeans and Americans who have been pressing for European integration. Institutions develop their own momentum which cannot be judged from the declaration of its founders. A common market--by definition--is always somewhat discriminatory towards the outside world. In negotiation to minimize the impact of this discrimination, a common market is naturally a more difficult negotiating partner than the individual nations comprising it. If, at our urging, a united Europe increases its programs of economic assistance to the emerging nations, it is inevitable that American political influence will be reduced in areas where it has been predominant, such as Latin America. European assurances that this is not

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their policy are irrelevant; the tendency is inherent in the policies we are urging. This may be desirable; the price may well be worth paying. But it is incumbent on United States policy to recognize that there is a price.

Had it not been for General de Gaulle as President of France these problems might have remained dormant for many years. But his emergence as President of France precipitated a fundamental change in the United States-European dialogue. Deliberately, often cynically, exploiting the weaknesses of the American conception, creating new ones by his intransigence, President de Gaulle has proclaimed a completely different view of Atlantic partnership and European unity. Inevitably this has produced a bitter, often personal, reaction among those who had considered the previous formula as the only possible one. But outraged pride is not a good guide to policy-making. European-American relations will never again be the same as they were before de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, excluding Britain from the Common Market. Waiting for his disappearance is not a policy but an evasion. It, therefore, becomes essential to try to assess without rancor the policies of the French President.

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### III. The Illusionist: De Gaulle's Challenge to the "Grand Design"

If an international system could be designed with the symmetry of a geometric axiom, allies would consider primarily the requirements of a common undertaking and adjust their efforts on the basis of division of labor. But such a perfect symmetry is the illusion of Utopians--or of island powers. Historically aloof and geographically isolated, such nations consider that the primary purpose of foreign policy is to remedy the peril which has caused them to involve themselves in Continental affairs. Secure in their identity, they expect their allies to find fulfillment as components of an over-all design. Such was the attitude of Great Britain towards the Continent during the Napoleonic wars.

This, too, has been the tendency of the United States since it assumed major international responsibilities after World War II. To the United States, security seemed to depend on distant defenses coordinated with the defense of other non-communist countries. We therefore expected our allies to fit into an over-all strategy or Grand Design essentially devised in Washington. This led to an egalitarian conception of the international order: states tend to be judged according to their contribution to our

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conception, with relatively little concern for their history or tradition,
while any attempt on their part to manipulate their position relative to
each other is considered out-dated nationalism.

To itself, however, a society represents something other than
serving as a contributor to an over-all division of labor; it is the
expression of an historical experience and a certain set of values. An
international system, no matter how rational, cannot be vital unless it
conforms, at least to some extent, to the values and the historical image
of the states comprising it. Over-all efficiency is one value; but to many
countries it is not the decisive one. Over-all security is an essential
goal of our allies, but centuries of history have also made them conscious
of their relative position towards each other and towards the United States.

The clash of old values with new concepts becomes a particular problem
when the international system is in a state of transition. Then old loyalties
may clash with the requirements of new organization. If the new structure
represents too drastic a break with the past, it will never achieve the
spontaneity required for organic growth. (This was in part the problem with
the unification of Italy.) If the traditional pattern grows too rigid, a
society may break in the face of the need for adaptation.

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A society whose sense of identity is highly developed may find it psychologically easier to adapt itself than a society marked by doubt. Change does not threaten the meaning of existence for such a group as it does for those less sure of their identity. Adaptation, in that case, can become a matter of prudence and calculation; it turns into an essentially technical problem. The case is different when a society has undergone traumatic experiences. Such a society must balance the benefits of a new set of international arrangements against the dangers of moral disintegration. Its calculus of prudence is quite different. Before it can risk what it wishes to become it may have to rediscover what it is. France has had this problem since the end of the First World War.

Few countries have experienced the travail which France has suffered since it lost much of its young generation in World War I. Victorious in 1918, France knew better than any of its allies how close to defeat it had been. The survivors of the catastrophe felt in their bones that France could not stand another trial like the one just surmounted. Deprived of its youth, fearful of its defeated antagonist, feeling misunderstood by its erstwhile allies, France experienced the inter-war period as an almost uninterrupted

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succession of frustrations. Domestically, the Third Republic witnessed mounting governmental instability. In foreign policy, France was torn between its premonitions and its sense of impotence. Nothing could have expressed France's sense of insecurity better than that it began to build the Maginot Line at a moment when its army was the largest in Europe and that of Germany was limited by treaty to 100 thousand men. What made the action all the more poignant is that France's East European allies could not possibly survive without the prospect of French offensive support and that Germany would never be in a position to attack the Maginot Line without having remilitarized the Rhineland in violation of the Treaty of Versailles.

As if paralyzed by seeing her fears come true, France stood by while Germany rearmed and broke one after another of the limitations put on it by the Peace Treaties of 1918. The collapse of 1940 was as much moral as military. Even though France emerged among the victors of World War II, its leaders were aware, despite all rhetoric and perhaps because of it, that France had been saved largely through the efforts of others. Once more peace brought no respite. Instead, the Fourth Republic underwent the same governmental instability as the Third, and it had to go through the searing

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process of decolonization. Humiliated in 1940, the French army had barely been reconstituted when it had to engage in nearly two decades of frustrating colonial wars each of which ended in defeat.

President de Gaulle's brutal tactics sometimes give the impression that a powerful, self-confident France has been a permanent feature of the post-war landscape. But it is only a few years since the war in Algeria threatened to plunge France into Civil War. So well has de Gaulle succeeded in his *tour de force* that even his critics act as if the only problem for Europe were to moderate excesses of French assertiveness. But less than a decade has passed since a wise (and pro-Western) French author could write:

> The pretension to indifference is never completely absent. It is our real nostalgia. At the very moment that we are torn out of our solitude we go on dreaming of it; we want to stand by the wayside and watch the traffic go by.... Our victory in 1918 has cost us too dearly. Since then we have wanted to recoup by counting our pennies; the result is we have lost everything. Strictly speaking the French nation no longer exists. She is disintegrating at this moment. She proved unable to secure her land against invasion because she was no longer strong enough to do so alone, and because her allies were not able to come to her aid quickly enough to prevent occupation. This is why France has had such strong inclinations to declare herself neutral. Then no one would have a right to enter her.... We are living like a ruined land unwilling to seem bankrupt.... We have not been so unhappy in France for a hundred years; our literature has not been so sad; because during this time we have experienced not but disappointments: the Republic in difficulties, socialism bankrupt, our wealth gone, our wars badly conducted.¹

¹ Parrain, Brice, "Against the Spirit of Neutrality," *Confluence*, January, 1956, p.

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This spiritual malaise must be understood for it is the well-spring
of President de Gaulle's policy. For the greater part of his career, he
has had to be an illusionist. In the face of all evidence to the contrary,
he strove to restore France's greatness by his passionate belief in it.

At first he was the leader of an insignificant faction of Frenchmen casting
their lot with the Allies. His primary task, as he saw it, was to re-establish
the identity and the integrity of France. Churchill and Roosevelt could
concentrate on the tangible goal of winning the war. To de Gaulle victory
was empty if it did not also restore the position, indeed the soul, of
France. Churchill and Roosevelt inevitably considered this quest
peripheral to their central objective.

The conflict between the pragmatic and the intangible which started
during the war has continued to this day. The United States, blessed with
stable government, its sense of identity enhanced by its war experience,
could single-mindedly pursue whatever technical schemes its bureaucracy
has thought up at any given moment. To de Gaulle, governing a country
wracked by a generation of conflict and decades of frustration, the mode
of accomplishment has been as important as the objective. A policy, however

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meritorious from the over-all point of view, could not support de Gaulle's objectives unless it also enhanced France's sense of identity.

Though de Gaulle often acts as if opposition to United States policy were a goal in itself, it is likely that his deeper purpose is pedagogical: to teach his people and perhaps his Continent the habit of independence and self-reliance. The "folly de grandeur" of which de Gaulle is so often accused is a peculiar kind, for it is tied to a profound awareness of the suffering and disappointments of his country. This caused him in 1960 to speak as follows:

> Once upon a time there was an old country all hemmed in by habits and circumspection. At one time the richest, the mightiest people among those in the center of the world stage, after great misfortunes it came, as it were, to withdraw within itself. While other peoples were growing around it, it remained immobile. In an era when the power of States depended upon their industrial might, the great sources of power were stingily meted out to it. It had little coal. It had no petroleum. Furthermore, its population was no longer growing as, in some years, it numbered fewer births than deaths. In the doubt and the bitterness which it came to have about itself as a result of this situation, political, social and religious struggles did not cease to divide it. Finally, after two world wars had decimated, ruined and torn it, many in the world were wondering whether it would succeed in getting back on its feet.¹

¹ Charles de Gaulle, Address on June 14, 1960, *Major Addresses, Statements, and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958 - January 31, 1964* (henceforth referred to as *Major Addresses*), French Embassy Press and Information Division, New York, 1964, p. 79.

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The means chosen by de Gaulle to get France back on its feet was an act of faith powerful enough to override a seemingly contrary reality. In de Gaulle's view, an almost mystical communion had been established during the war between himself representing the general interest and the French people. Thus during an uprising in Algiers de Gaulle could say: "Finally, I speak to France. Well, my dear country, my old country, here we are together, once again, facing a harsh test."¹ The aspiration to greatness required that France regain--wherever possible--the right of independent decision. France could agree with the decisions of others; but it had to be clear that its action represented its own volition and not the abdication of the impotent.

This is why de Gaulle never tires of insisting on his imperturbability in the face of Soviet threats or American criticisms. Thus during the height of the Berlin crisis of 1960, de Gaulle spoke as follows:

> But however resounding these commotions may be, obviously they could not succeed in upsetting or intimidating France. We are today strong enough, stable enough, sufficiently self-assured not to allow ourselves to be impressed by word battles or gesticulation.²

1. __________, Address on January 29, 1960, *ibid.*, p. 74

2. __________, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, *ibid.*, p. 84

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A great nation, in de Gaulle's concept, moves at its own pace; its objectives are dictated by its interests. Its sense of purpose enables it to become the master of events instead of their prisoner.

Part of the dispute between France and the United States, therefore, concerns the philosophical point of the nature of community. Washington urges the advantages of a structure in which each partner performs an assigned task in the common interest, making separate action impossible.

Paris insists that a community can be meaningful only if each partner has a real choice and, therefore, the technical means of autonomous behavior.

Washington, postulating a community of interests, looks to "consultation" as a major solvent of all disagreement. Paris insists that influence depends not only on the intellectual content of arguments but also on the options available. Washington considers that the insistence on autonomy is divisive and that it implies a desire for separate, perhaps antagonistic, policies. Paris regards the attacks on its independent stance as hiding hegemonial designs.

Both sides have pressed their arguments with such vigor that their debate has taken on the overtones of what Europeans call a "dialogue among

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the deaf." De Gaulle is probably correct in insisting that independence
does not exclude cooperation. But he has stressed his autonomy so insistently
and with such abrupt methods that French separateness at times seems to have
become an end in itself. The United States is correct in affirming an
underlying community of interests. But our emphasis on technical remedies
blinds us to psychological realities. One particular method of European
integration and Atlantic partnership has become as much an end to America
as the affirmation of independence has to France. What is involved,
finally, is differing conceptions of truth. The United States, with its
instrumental approach, often has analytical truth on its side. De Gaulle,
with his consciousness of the trials of France for the past generation, is
frequently closer to the historical truth.

Disagreement, of course, is not confined to theoretical issues.
In his effort to vindicate a more autonomous role for France, de Gaulle
challenges many fundamentals of American policy--in Atlantic relations,
European unity, nuclear policy and East-West relations. Where United
States spokesmen stress the concept of partnership, de Gaulle tends to
emphasize the concept of equilibrium. Many United States officials assert

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that all disputes can be settled by talking things over around a table
in a "community spirit." To de Gaulle sound relationships must be based
on the proper assessment of an existing balance of forces. If it is
correctly calculated, an arrangement is always possible. If not, good-
will cannot serve as a substitute. Philosophic convictions thus combine
with personality to produce de Gaulle's aloof and uncompromising diplomatic
style. To him, being swayed by personal emotion is a form of servitude or
of irresponsibility:

> Man "limited in his nature" is "infinite in his desires."
> The world is thus full of opposing forces. Of course,
> human wisdom has often succeeded in preventing these
> rivalries from degenerating into murderous conflicts.
> But the competition of efforts is the condition of life.
> Our country finds itself confronted today with this law
> of the species, as it has been for two thousand years.¹

The art of statesmanship is to understand the nature of the world
and the trend of history. The great leader is not so much clever as
lucid and clear-sighted. Grandeur is not simply physical power but
strength reinforced by moral purpose. Nor does competition inevitably
involve physical conflict. On the contrary, a wise assessment of mutual

¹, Address on May 31, 1960, ibid., p. 75.

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interests should produce harmony:

> Yes, international life, like life in general, is a battle. The battle which our country is waging tends to unite and not to divide, to honor and not to debase, to liberate and not to dominate. Thus it is faithful to its mission which always was and which remains human and universal.¹

De Gaulle's nationalism is in the tradition of Mazzini, who thought that nations having achieved their independence would respect the dignity of others. His diplomacy is in the style of Bismarck, who strove ruthlessly to achieve what he considered Prussia's rightful place but who then tried to preserve the new equilibrium through prudence, restraint and moderation.

Inevitably, however, de Gaulle's conception of the role of the nation-state clashed with the American conviction of its obsolescence. It is not that de Gaulle wishes to reactivate Europe's traditional national rivalries as so many of his American critics allege. He affirms the goal of unity for Europe as passionately as his detractors. But the American and European "integrationists" insist that European

¹Ibid., p. 78.

III - III - 13

unity requires diminishing the role of the nation-state, de Gaulle
argues that unity can be reliable if based on the strength and
vitality of the traditional states of Europe. To de Gaulle the states
are the only legitimate source of power; only they can act responsibly.

> It is true that the nation is a human and sentimental element, whereas Europe can be built on the basis of active, authoritative and responsible elements. What elements? The States, of course; for, in this respect, it is only the States that are valid, legitimate and capable of achievement. I have already said, and I repeat, that at the present time there cannot be any other Europe than a Europe of States, apart, of course, from myths, stories and parades.¹

> The States are in truth certainly very different from one another, each of which has its own spirit, its own history, its own language, its own misfortunes, glories and ambitions. These states are the only entities that have the right to order and the authority to act.²

Thus de Gaulle's proposals for European unity invariably urge a confederation of states rather than supra-national institutions. In his press conference of September 5, 1960, President de Gaulle called for regular consultation between the European governments, for specialized subordinate agencies and for an assembly formed of delegates from the

1. Press Conference on May 15, 1962, *ibid.*, p. 176.

2. Press Conference on September 5, 1960, *ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

III - III - 14

national parliaments. He urged a European referendum "so as to give
this launching of Europe the character of popular support and initiative
that is indispensable."¹

This affirmation of the need for European unity has been repeated
regularly:

> France. . . must help to build Western Europe into an organized union of states so that gradually there may be established on both sides of the Rhine, of the Alps and perhaps of the Channel the most powerful, prosperous and influential political, economic, cultural, and military complex in the world.²

> Western Europe must form itself politically. If it did not succeed in doing so, the Economic Community itself could not in the long run become stronger or even continue to exist. In other words, Europe must have institutions that will lead it to form a political union, just as it already is a union in the economic sphere.³

1. , Press Conference on September 5, 1960, *ibid.*, p. 93.

2. , Address on February 5, 1962, *ibid.*, p. 159.

3. , Press Conference on May 15, 1962, *ibid.*, p. 174.

III - III - 15

Western Europe appears likely to constitute a major entity full of merit and resources, capable of living its own life, indeed not in opposition to the New World but right alongside it.¹

Most of these ideas were incorporated in the Fouchet plan for European integration submitted by France in 1961.

It is often argued that de Gaulle's philosophy is in reality a subterfuge for a design to establish French hegemony in Europe--the mirror image of the French claim that American conceptions camouflage our thirst for domination. It is impossible, of course, to be certain about de Gaulle's "real" designs. It is clear, however, that if his hegemony is his aim, he has chosen a curious road toward it. If a united Europe takes its decisions on the basis of a unanimous vote of its member states--as de Gaulle has proposed--it can be dominated, if at all, only by moral leadership. French pre-eminence in Europe would depend on whether French leaders succeeded in identifying themselves with the main currents of opinion in Europe. The other states are not likely

¹ Press Conference on July 23, 1964.

III - III - 16

to be so blind to their interest or so unsure of themselves as not to
cast a veto. De Gaulle's European policy is thus a gamble on the
reality of intangibles.

Differences between France and the United States over the future
of Europe have been compounded by disagreements over Atlantic policy.
These have gone through two contradictory phases. During his first
three years in office (from 1958-1961), de Gaulle repeatedly urged the
coordination of Western policies on a world-wide basis. In September,
1958 he proposed a global Directorate composed of the U.S., Great Britain
and France. The United States rejected this with the argument that
it could not designate one of its European partners to speak for the
others; no attempt was made to explore de Gaulle's reaction to a wider
forum.

De Gaulle returned to the theme of the need for coordinating
in his press conference of March 25, 1959, when he pointed out that NATO
was incomplete because its sphere of action did not extend south of the

III - III - 17

Mediterranean.¹ He made yet another plea for a common Western world-wide policy in 1960.

> We feel that, at least among the world powers of the West, there must be something organized--where the Alliance is concerned--as to their political conduct and, should the occasion arise, their strategic conduct outside Europe, especially in the Middle East, and in Africa, where these three powers are constantly involved. Furthermore, if there is no agreement among the principal members of the Atlantic Alliance on matters other than Europe, how can the Alliance be indefinitely maintained in Europe? This must be remedied.²

It was pressed particularly urgently with respect to the Congo crisis in 1960.

When nothing came of these proposals, de Gaulle reverted to his usual, perhaps preferred, tactic of acting unilaterally and trying to force his partner's hand. After 1961, he stopped urging concerted Western action. Instead, he stressed that only a strong Europe would receive a respectful hearing in the United Nations or from the United States and the U.S.S.R. Increasingly, de Gaulle seemed to count on the development of Europe's strength and sense of identity to leave the

1, Press Conference on March 25, 1959, *ibid.*, p. 49.

2, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, *ibid.*, p. 96.

III - III - 18

United States no choice except to concede a coordination of policy.

This is not to say that de Gaulle's policy was basically a reaction
to being rebuffed by the United States. Rather, two changes in the
international situation made American support seem less crucial to
him and made independent action appear extremely rewarding. When
de Gaulle proposed the Directorate, a global show-down seemed likely.
The Lebanese crisis had just occurred; the Berlin ultimatum was imminent.
Europe's colonial difficulties were being brutally exploited by the Soviet
Union. This caused de Gaulle to try to make sure of American support in
case a show down would prove unavoidable. Since 1961 the threat from
the Soviet has seemed to recede, and the need for concerted action has
diminished proportionately. Indeed, with the growth of American involve-
ment in Asia and Latin American, the shoe is now somewhat on the other
foot. It is the United States which presses its European allies to
share its global responsibilities and the Europeans who are reluctant
to assume world-wide risks.

III - III - 19

But while de Gaulle has insited on developing a French and ultimately
a European identity he has never ceased affirming the need for close
association between Europe and the United States. He opposes, not the
Alliance, but the concept of integration which he sees as eroding
France's identity. And he has insisted that France must control its
own atomic armament--regardless of the strategic theories dominant
in the United States.

De Gaulle has rejected integration because:

> It is intolerable for a great State to leave its
destiny up to the decisions and action of another
State, however friendly it may be. In addition, it
happens that in integration...the integrated country
loses interest in national defense, since it is not
responsible for it. The whole structure of the Alliance
then loses its resilience and its strength.¹

Integration would lead to an abdication of responsibility and a sense
of impotence. It would oblige France and Europe to accept forever
the tutelage of the United States:

¹ , Press Conference on April 11, 1961, *ibid.*, p. 124.

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III - III - 20

France had been morally and materially destroyed by the collapse of 1940 and the capitulation of the Vichy people....

That is why, with regard to the United States--rich, active and powerful--she found herself in a position of dependence. France constantly needed its assistance in order to avoid monetary collapse. It was from America that she received the weapons for her soldiers. France's security was dependent entirely on its protection. With regard to the international undertakings in which its leaders at that time were taking part, it was often with a view to dissolving France in them, as if self-renouncement were henceforth its sole possibility and even its only ambition, while these undertakings in the guise of integration were automatically taking American authority as a postulate. This was the case with regard to the project for a so-called supranational Europe, in which France as such would have disappeared, except to pay and to orate; a Europe governed in appearance by anonymous, technocratic and stateless committees; in other words, a Europe without political reality, without economic drive, without a capacity for defense, and therefore doomed, in the face of the Soviet bloc, to be nothing more than a dependent of that great Western power, which itself had a policy, an economy, and a defense--the United States of America.¹

In pursuit of this policy de Gaulle, in 1959, withdrew the French fleet from NATO command. He argued that naval power by definition was designed for use in areas where the United States itself had insisted that NATO commitments did not apply. According to de Gaulle, this was the reason why the major portion of the American and British fleets remained under national control. When the French army returned from Algiers, ¹_________, Press Conference on July 29, 1963, *ibid*., pp. 233-34.

[N] III - III - 21

most of it was stationed in France and not "integrated" into NATO.

The reason was not only de Gaulle's objection to the concept of integration but a reason less flattering to the often proclaimed image of a powerful, cohesive France:

> ...it is absolutely necessary, morally and politically, for us to make our army a more integral part of the nation. Therefore, it is necessary for us to restation it, for the most part, on our soil; for us to give it once again a direct responsibility in the external security of the country; in short, for our defense to become once again a national defense.¹

After twenty-five years of humiliating conflict and several military coups against legitimate authority, it was in de Gaulle's judgment, more important to integrate the French army into French society than into NATO.

De Gaulle's views on nuclear policy are the natural outgrowth of his attitude toward NATO integration:

¹ __________, Press Conference on May 15, 1962, *ibid.*, pp. 180-181.

[Y]

III - III - 22

We are in the atomic age and we are a country that can be destroyed at any moment unless the aggressor is deterred from the undertaking by the certainty that he too will suffer frightful destruction. This justifies both alliance and independence. The Americans, our allies and our friends, have for a long time, alone, possessed a nuclear arsenal. So long as they alone had such an arsenal and so long as they showed their will to use it immediately if Europe were attacked--for at that time Europe alone could be attacked--the Americans acted in such a way that for France the question of an invasion hardly arose, since an attack was beyond all probability.... It is impossible to overestimate the extent of the service, most fortunately passive, that the Americans at that time, in that way, rendered to the freedom of the world.

Since then the Soviets have also acquired a nuclear arsenal, and that arsenal is powerful enough to endanger the very life of America. Naturally, I am not making an evaluation--if indeed it is possible to find a relation between the degree of one death and the degree of another--but the new and gigantic fact is there. From then on, the Americans found and are finding themselves confronted with the possibility of direct destruction....

Few of de Gaulle's policies have so embroiled him with America as his insistence on an autonomous nuclear strike force. He is charged with fomenting distrust of the United States and lectured on his ignorance of the technical requirements of nuclear strategy. Actually, de Gaulle's analysis of the situation does not differ radically from Secretary McNamara's. Both agree that the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal confronts the United States with an unprecedented challenge. Both insist that NATO strategy must be adapted to new realities. They disagree less in their analysis than in the conclusions to be drawn from it. Looking at NATO from

1 ______, Press Conference on January 14, 1963, *ibid.*, pp. 216-217

III - III - 23

the point of view of division of labor, Secretary McNamara considers French
resources better spent on conventional forces than on nuclear arms. From
the perspective of vindicating France's identity, de Gaulle is not concerned
with the technical aspects of strategy so much as with the political problem
of choice. McNamara strives for strategic options; de Gaulle seeks
political ones.¹

American Franco-United States relations have been further irritated by conflicting
views of East-West relations. As in most other controversies, each side has
accused the other of the same charge: of planning a settlement, if not at
the expense, at least to the exclusion of the other. In the United States,
de Gaulle's comment that Europe extends from the Atlantic to the Urals
is often cited as proof of a thinly veiled desire to deal directly with
Moscow. In France, United States bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union
are taken as an indication that the United States is seeking a separate
accommodation with the U.S.S.R., perhaps as detrimental to Europe as the
Yalta agreement is said to have been.

At times both sides seem primarily concerned with scoring debating

¹ For a fuller discussion of the strategic problems see Chapters II and IV.

III - III - 24

points. De Gaulle's statement that one day Europe would again extend from
the Atlantic to the Urals did not imply a deal with the Soviet Union:

The reorganization of Europe to which de Gaulle refers is to take place
after Communist ideology no longer dominates in the Soviet Union, in other
words, when Russia is once more a national, and not an ideological, state
pursuing a policy dictated by its national interests. By the same token,
our French critics do us an injustice when they read a complicated master
plan into groping efforts to adjust to complex situations. United States
policy towards the Soviet Union does not reflect a devious desire to settle
all issues unilaterally. Basically, it seeks to implement one minimum
interest which the two great nuclear powers have in common: to prevent a
general holocaust.

Indeed, French and American analyses of Soviet trends are not so
different as the controversy sometimes suggests. Both are of the view that

1

III - III - 25

at some point the Soviet system will be transformed. Both believe that
this transformation will mark the starting point for fruitful negotiations.
They disagree not over the fact of evolution but its nature, not over the
ultimate desirability of a diplomatic settlement but about who will be the
spokesman for the West when it takes place.

United States policy towards the Soviet Union has oscillated between
two opposite approaches: During periods of tension, the United States
attitude has been that Soviet policy is conducted by highly purposeful,
ideologically inspired men operating according to careful, long-range
plans. During periods of détente, American leaders have often acted as if
a settlement could be achieved by good personal relations with their Communist
opposite numbers. Great stress is placed on creating a proper atmosphere.
One result is an avoidance of concreteness during periods of tension because
it is thought to be useless to negotiate and during periods of relaxation of
tension because of reluctance to disturb the atmosphere of détente.

De Gaulle's attitude towards Moscow is less geared to reacting to
Soviet policy. To him, the chief characteristic of the Soviet leadership
group is that it lacks legitimacy.

III - III - 26

During my lifetime Communist ideology has been personified by
many people.... Each of these holders in turn condemns,
excommunicates, crushes and at times kills the other. In any
event, he firmly fights against the personality cult of the
others.¹

Having erected an unnatural system, the Soviet system becomes a prisoner
of the pressures it has generated.²

...there is in this uproar of imprecations and demands organized
by the Soviets something so arbitrary and so artificial that one
is led to attribute it either to the premeditated unleashing of
frantic ambitions, or to the desire of drawing attention away from
great difficulties: this second hypothesis seems all the more
plausible to me since, despite the coercions, isolation and acts
of force in which the Communist system encloses the countries which
are under its yoke, and despite certain collective successes which
it has achieved by drawing upon the substance of its subjects,
actually its gaps, its shortages, its internal failures, and above
that its character of inhuman oppression, are felt more and more
by the elites and the masses, whom it is more and more difficult
to deceive and to subjugate.³

Since Soviet pressures do not reflect a real grievance but domestic
instability, they must be resisted by the West. To yield to Soviet blackmail
would only aggravate the internal Soviet instabilities which caused Soviet
aggressiveness in the first place. Thus during the Berlin crisis, de
Gaulle spoke as follows:

1 ______, Press Conference on July 29, 1963, *ibid.*, p. 236

2 ______, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, *ibid.*, p. 84

3 ______, Press Conference on September 5, 1961, *ibid.*, p. 140

[Y]

III - III - 27

...we do not allow ourselves to be moved by all the tumult, all the flow of invective, of formal notifications, of threats launched by certain countries against other lands and especially against ours. This is all the more true in that we realize the tactical element that enters into all this staging by those who, so to speak, make their job to upset others.

...in their camps the struggle between political trends, the intrigues of clans, the rivalries of individuals periodically lead to implacable crises, whose sequels--or even whose premonitory symptoms--cannot help but unsettle them. Moreover, we know that in those countries there are conflicting national grievances in spite of the absolutism of their ideology. We realize therefore only too well that they readily indulge in virulent utterances and sensational outbursts in order to lead people astray--within their own country and outside--without, however, overstepping certain bounds.¹

It follows that de Gaulle has rejected the diplomatic method of "exploratory" conversations urged by the United States and Britain to determine Soviet intentions. He refused to join the "exploratory" talks on Berlin because:

> ...so long as the Soviet Union does not put a stop to its threats and its injunctions and bring about an actual easing of the international situation, we believe that we have spared our allies and ourselves the catastrophic retreat, dramatic rupture or tragically engulfment in which the conference would obviously have ended.²

And he did not participate in the Geneva disarmament conference, predicting that it would do nothing except present irreconcilable plans.³

The disagreement over tactics towards the East involves perhaps above all a question of style of leadership. United States leaders have taken the

1, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, *ibid.*, pp. 84-85

2, Address on February 5, 1962, *ibid.*, p. 160

3, Press Conference on May 15, 1962, *ibid.*, p. 181

III - III - 28

view that the outcome of a conference could not be known until an effort
had been made to probe Soviet intentions. De Gaulle saw no point in
making the effort because he thought he _knew_ the outcome. American
leaders are pragmatic and experimental; de Gaulle bases his claim to
leadership on the assumption that a statesman's greatness depends on his
understanding the course of history. Experiments are unnecessary or
dangerous. If Soviet leaders are responsible they will make their inten-
tions plain; if they are not, divining these intentions is not very help-
ful. In either case, the duty of the statesman is to become clear about
his own purposes rather than make himself dependent on the purposes of
others. The fact that events have often proved de Gaulle's maxims correct
does not make this attitude easier to bear for those who must deal with him.

The central issue here, as in other Franco-United States controversies,
is whether Europe is to constitute an autonomous center of decision or
whether its primary role is to influence essentially American decisions.

De Gaulle is all the more insistent on his autonomous role in negotiations
because his view of the nature of a settlement differs importantly from that
prevalent in the United States. Many American statements depict a

[N]

III - III - 29

settlement in terms of a final, general reconciliation as if it were
possible to define a definite point from which peace can be said to have
broken out. The goal is said to be a permanent end of conflict and a world
living under what is often described as "the rule of law."

De Gaulle's view is more historical and less legal. Peace to him
is not a final settlement but a new, perhaps more stable balance of forces.
"Now, in the last analysis and as always, it is only in equilibrium that the
world will find peace."¹ No equilibrium can ever be permanent but must be
adjusted in constant struggles. But however temporary a balance, France
and Europe must find their proper place in it, not as objects of policy
but as its author. De Gaulle is concerned not only with the fact of a
settlement but also with its nature. De Gaulle would therefore object to
any settlement which France did not help to formulate--regardless of what
view he took of its substance.

For this reason the nuclear test ban treaty has been a constant
source of friction between the United States and France. To de Gaulle it is

1 __________, Address on May 31, 1960, *ibid.*, p. 78

III - III - 30

an example of an American decision to ignore, and even jeopardize, a major French interest in order to promote an American conception of the general interest. The inevitable corollary is that a similar situation could arise in other fields as well. The major thrust of de Gaulle's policy is to put France, and perhaps Europe, into a position where settlements against its wishes are impossible.

In short, whatever the area of policy, de Gaulle's conclusions are similar: Unity whether in Alliance with the United States or in association with European countries depends on the vitality of the components of the international system. Only those capable of taking responsible action can form meaningful associations. There is no inconsistency between the affirmation of the Atlantic Alliance and the insistence on the peculiarity of France or the identity of Europe. The two notions are complementary--

dissimilar even though this may seem cynical or Machiavellian to many Americans.

For centuries, one of the chief problems of Western political thought has been how to build unity while respecting diversity. One does not have to agree with the methods or policies of President de Gaulle to recognize that he has posed an important question which the West has yet to answer.

III - III - 31

There is merit in his contention that a political unit must mean something to itself before it can have meaning to others. To American spokesmen the French insistence on autonomy is a prima facie proof of distrust of American intentions. To France's President, the United States reluctance to concede this autonomy appears to be a device to perpetuate our hegemony.

While de Gaulle's tactics have often been brutal, the United States has shown extremely little understanding for the special psychological situation of France. In the best of circumstances, a country which has been ravaged by two world wars, and which barely avoided civil war in 1958, in 1960 and again in 1962, could not be expected to find its fulfillment in the Grand Design of others. No matter who governed in France, he would have had to face the problem of restoring France's faith in herself. To argue the technical aspects of de Gaulle's policy is to miss his central purpose. Many of his actions are designed to rediscover a sense of purpose for France--a goal that transcends any specific policy issues. How well de Gaulle has succeeded in this task is proved by the fact that two years after the end of the Algerian war France, far from being torn to pieces by internal schisms--as it well might have been--is the most active European country on a global scale.

III - III - 32

Although de Gaulle has often exaggerated this essentially psychological mission, there is merit in his view that no theoretical conception of European or Atlantic unity can become a reality if all the diverse loyalties and convictions which have formed historical Europe must be destroyed in order to achieve it. The tendency of his opponents to refuse to take his challenge seriously and instead to treat de Gaulle as a relic to be outwaited, has prevented a meaningful discussion from which a new common conception of Atlantic relations might have emerged. Difficult as it may be to deal with de Gaulle's France, we would do well to remember that it is more in the interest of the West than a France wracked by dissension or abdicating from the international stage.

But if his critics have shown little compassion for his special circumstances, de Gaulle has often thwarted his own aims by his abrupt tactics and his imperious style. Not comfortable with the give and take of negotiations, the French President has moved through a series of faits accomplis to force his allies to accept his objectives. A rationalist, he has acted as if his views had to prevail by their inner logic and that the feelings of other statesmen were therefore irrelevant. A profound

III - III - 33

believer in historical necessity, he has acted as if the inevitability of
events was bound to be stronger than the sensibilities of others.

No doubt, this is a heroic posture. However, man is not governed
by reason alone. And history, however inevitable it may appear in retrospect,
is created by men, most of whom lack the vision of the French President--
though they do not lack his power. The paradox of de Gaulle's position is
that he claims to speak for Europe, but he has not found it possible to
create a following outside of France that sees him as a European statesman.
He has alienated many potential supporters by his excessive rationalism and
abrupt unilateral tactics. Many individuals who share his dedication to
developing a European identity have been driven into opposition by de
Gaulle's wounding insistence on scoring what often amount to debating points.
De Gaulle's rigid defense of an extreme conception of sovereignty has
antagonized even those who do not see the choice between a federal and
confederal Europe as an issue of principle. Though the French proposals
for European political unity actually offer a better guarantee against the
hegemony of a single European state than the dominant American schemes,
de Gaulle's methods suggest that he will cooperate only if others accept

III - III - 34

his unilateral pronouncements. Although France and the United States seem
to agree on the principle of a strong and autonomous Europe, de Gaulle's
tactics give rise to the impression that he desires autonomy not to
enhance the unity of the West but to be free to pursue policies contradictory,
if not hostile, to those of the United States.

Ironically, de Gaulle has become a symbol on both sides of the
Atlantic of principles contrary to his pronouncements and probably to his
intentions. He has enabled many in Europe not heretofore noted for their
devotion either to European unity or to Atlantic partnership to use some
ideal model of either relationship in order to avoid making whatever
progress is possible. By evoking so many memories of authoritarian rule,
de Gaulle has polarized the discussion within Europe in a manner that makes
it next to impossible to come to grips with the substance of his thought.
A strong Europe was bound to present a challenge to American leadership.
But by couching this challenge so woundingly, de Gaulle has spurred American
self-righteousness rather than the objective re-examination of Atlantic
relationships which the situation demands.

History will probably demonstrate that de Gaulle's conceptions--

III - III - 35

as distinct from his style--were greater than those of most of his critics. But a statesman must work with the material at hand. If the sweep of his conceptions exceeds the capacity of his environment to absorb them, he will fail regardless of the validity of his insights. If his style makes him unassimilable, it becomes irrelevant whether he is "right" or "wrong."

In the meantime, there is something of a Greek tragedy about the dispute between the United States and France. Each chief actor following the laws of his nature is bringing about consequences quite different from those intended. Either the "American" or the "French" concept of Atlantic relationship might have succeeded. Competing as they do--with no comprehension of the real intention of the other--they may bring on what each side professes to fear most: a divided, suspicious Europe engaged once again in the working out of its ancient rivalries. This has already been shown by the manner in which both Germany and Great Britain have been drawn into this rivalry. We must now turn to their roles prior to the fateful January 14, 1963, when France excluded Great Britain from the Common Market.

III - IV - I

IV. <u>The Problem of Germany: Events leading up to the French-German treaty</u>

Arrangements in Germany have been the key to the stability of Europe
for at least three centuries. In the twentieth century the peace of Europe
has been violated twice by a powerful and unified Germany. But prior to 1871,
when Germany was composed of a group of competing states, it was the arena of
conflict for other European powers which sought to perpetuate its divisions,
thwart its national aspirations and prevent one another from gaining a prepon-
derant influence,

Considering this history it was inevitable that Germany when it was
finally unified in 1871, should identify security with sufficient strength to
defend itself against all of its neighbors simultaneously. But this effort,
however understandable, proved fatal to the stability of Europe. Germany's
strength coupled with its central position produced a vicious circle. A country
sufficiently powerful to defend itself against all its neighbors simultaneously
would also be strong enough to defeat each of them singly. Moreover, the effort
to develop such strength required a mobilization of resources and an exaltation
of national feelings certain to disquiet all other European countries. Bismarck,

III - IV - 2

the last great German statesman before Adenauer, spoke of "the nightmare of hostile coalitions." It was Germany's tragedy that the effort to prevent these coalitions made them inevitable. Germany has been either too weak or too powerful for the peace of Europe.

Ideally Germany should be strong enough to defend itself but not to attack; it should be united so that its frustrations do not erupt into conflict and its divisions do not encourage the rivalries of other countries, but not so national-istic that it disquiets its neighbors. To bring about such a Germany has been a major goal of Western policy since the end of World War II.

The effort to define Germany's role faces major psychological problems. Every German above fifty today--and influence in Germany is related to age--has experienced three revolutions. He has lived under four different regimes, each claiming to be morally antithetical to its predecessor. He has experienced two lost world wars and two catastrophic inflations. Every German above thirty-five has lived through the trauma of the Nazi period, of World War II and of the post-war collapse. The Nazi experience has been so completely suppressed in public consciousness or sublimated into a vague feeling of generalized guilt

III - IV - 3

that it is no longer a problem as such. But the rootlessness produced by blot-
ting out twelve years of history is important. There have been too many breaks
in historical continuity and too many shocks. Great national prosperity has
developed at the same time that national, political and territorial integrity
has been lost. The incongruity of this situation contributes to the insecurity
of German leadership groups, the stridency and legalism of whose disputes often
hides a lack of inner assurance.

Chancellor Adenauer's great achievement--just as de Gaulle's--was that he understood the psychological needs of his country. He was aided by wise and far-sighted American statesmen, among whom Secretaries Acheson and Dulles, General Clay and Mr. John McCloy have an honored place. In order to prevent the latent nihilism in Germany from again menacing the peace, Adenauer sought to give the Federal Republic a stake in something larger than itself. The so-called rigidity decried by many of his critics was in fact the reverse side of his attempt to teach his people habits of reliability in international affairs. He realized that Germany was too exposed geographically and to vulnerable psychologically and politically to be able to sustain a very active policy. He understood that

III - IV - 4

Germany divided, viewed with suspicion and rootless, would be excessively tempted by either nationalism or neutralism, or both, if forced to shoulder primary responsibility for an essentially national foreign policy. The fabric of German political life might not withstand the temptations and pressures of such an exposed position.

Adenauer, therefore, sought to submerge narrowly German interests in a wider community. First he developed a close association with the United States which earned him the opposition's epithet that he was Chancellor of the Allies. Later, when United States policy on Berlin seemed to threaten minimum German interests, he renewed his always strong tendency for close association with France. This culminated in the Franco-German treaty of friendship of January 1963. In both cases his major concern was to assure for the Federal Republic the moral and physical protection of a senior partner. Perhaps Chancellor Adenauer's most notable achievement was to bring about the optical illusion that conditions in the Federal Republic were as firm and stable as his own policy.

This is not the case, however. For the first twenty years after the collapse of the Third Reich, German energies were absorbed in reconstruction

III - IV - 5

and German politics were dominated by a man whose formative experience was in
the last century. But Germany's uncertain sense of identity could take sure
prising forms. This is all the more true because, since 1961, the German situ-
ation has become more fluid under the impact of four events: (a) the Berlin
crisis and Anglo-American negotiating tactics until 1962; (b) the Berlin Wall;
(c) de Gaulle's European policy and the United States reaction to it; and
(d) United States pressures for diplomatic flexibility.

The Berlin crisis was crucial because it emphasized a serious potential
for tension within the Alliance: the difference between the inevitable German
quest for national unity and the equally understandable concern of the rest of
the allies for stability. As a result, NATO, an Alliance designed to preserve
the status quo powers, has as a principal partner a country one of whose prin-
cipal goals has to be a drastic alteration of the status quo. Of course, no
alliance can perfectly reconcile the goals of all of its members. But the
minimum condition for effectiveness is that the requirements of the alliance
should not clash with the deepest aspirations of one or more of the partners.

The Berlin issue has proved so sensitive not so much because the city

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is physically vulnerable, but because all of Germany is psychologically vulnerable. Not all of Germany's allies accept the division of Germany, and some might prefer a unified Germany; but none makes reunification a major goal.

Thus during the Berlin crises of 1959-60 and 1961-62 many in the West argued that the logical solution was to negotiate new access procedures to Berlin in return for accepting the "fact" of a divided Germany. To many influential Americans and Britishers the continuation of a status quo which had persisted for a decade and a half appeared a small price to pay for a promise of stability.

However, acceptance of the division of Germany as permanent would upset the domestic equilibrium of the Federal Republic; this is one of the reasons why the Soviets are so eager to secure Western recognition of the status quo in Germany. The division of Germany may be unavoidable; but the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance requires that there is no ambiguity about the reason. If the West tacitly or explicitly abandoned the principle of German national unity--collaborating with the Soviets in keeping Germany divided--Germans would consider it a sacrifice of their basic interests. No German political leader can accept as permanent the subjugation of seventeen million of his compatriots by

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Communist guns. His minimum goal must be to ameliorate conditions in East Germany--a goal which he will be under increasing pressure to pursue independently if his allies prove indifferent to it.

This is why the building of the Wall in Berlin and the hesitant Western response to it gave such a shock to the German public. Many in the West looked on the Wall primarily as another unilateral abrogation of a treaty obligation by the Soviets and an act of inhumanity to the people of Berlin. In Germany, the Wall symbolized the end of the previous hopes for unification. For better or worse, the policy of the Federal Republic had been based on the premise that there was no inconsistency between Germany's national aspirations and its Western orientation. In fact, the Western Alliance had been sold to the German public with the argument that it represented the best method to achieve these aspirations.

This belief was badly shaken by the Wall. It marked the end of the belief that there was an automatic relationship between German unification and a strong Atlantic Alliance. The policy of the Federal Republic has affirmed ever more explicitly that German unity or at least the alleviation of conditions in Eastern Germany had to be consciously sought if necessary by unilateral

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initiatives. The West is increasingly confronted with the choice whether these goals are to be pursued by the Alliance as a whole or by Germany as a separate national policy.

Many in the West find either prospect disquieting. Remembering two world wars and the atrocities of the Nazi period, they are uneasy that international tensions should focus on Germany for the third time in fifty years. But the West must rise above its memories, keeping in mind that the disasters of this century arose in part because Germany strove to assert its own narrowly conceived interests against both East and West. Ten years after the decision to rearm Germany, it is too late to invoke Germany's past transgressions in discussions of policy alternatives. It is possible to argue that other choices should have been made a decade ago. Today, the sole hope for having Germany be a responsible member of The Atlantic Community is to treat her like one.

The fate of the seventeen million people in Eastern Germany is one of those intangible issues that can remain quiescent for many years, only to erupt suddenly and dramatically, Although few West Germans expect to achieve unity rapidly, fewer still are prepared to accept as permanent their country's division.

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Growing prosperity in the Federal Republic tends to magnify their uneasy feeling of guilt and responsibility. Any determined, perhaps demagogic, group could suddenly bring the issue to the fore. Coupled with setbacks in other fields, this could severely shake the political stability of the Federal Republic. A so-called Rapallo policy--a change of fronts toward the East--is extremely unlikely; but the transformation of the Federal Republic into a sullen, reluctant ally, or even into one maneuvering for its own national advantage, would be serious enough. The Soviet Union would then be able simultaneously to use a national appeal to Germany and to invoke their fear of Germany to the other Western countries.

In its own interest, the West should make sure that Germany faces its future within the framework of the Western Alliance and not apart from it. The best hope to prevent a latent nihilism in Germany from again menacing the West is to give the Federal Republic a stake in something larger than itself. The future of the Federal Republic depends on two related policies by the West:

(1) recognition of the psychological and political dilemmas of a divided country, and (2) the ability to make the Federal Republic part of a large community. These

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policies are interdependent; to pursue one without the other is to defeat both.

This is why the Franco-United States rivalry has had such an unfortunate impact on Germany. When the Federal Republic becomes the balance wheel between competing nations of Atlantic organization, the practical consequence is to emphasize the national aspect of German policy—if only because constant wooing causes the suitors to marshal the arguments which they believe to be most seductive.¹ As Germany's policy becomes less anonymous, it also grows more vulnerable. A Germany wooed on all sides and simultaneously urged to deal directly with the East, which controls the future of seventeen million Germans, is subject to extraordinary blackmail or exceptional temptations. The challenge to Western policy is to prevent the Alliance from seeming an obstacle to legitimate German aspirations while being careful to keep German national aspirations from transcending all other imperatives.

This balance would be difficult to establish even in a cohesive Alliance. It has proved impossible to achieve in the face of the competition between the United States and France. President Kennedy had been in office less than six

¹ See below, Chapter V

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months when Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum confronted his Administration with a direct challenge. The Kennedy Administration thereupon coupled a drastic build-up of American military strength with a diplomacy based on the unexceptionable proposition that a show-down could not be faced until all honorable means of compromise had been exhausted. It was widely assumed that the primary Soviet goal was to stabilize conditions in Central Europe. The United States was, therefore, inclined to seek some way to deal with the immediate irritant--the problem of access to Berlin--by making concessions which might enhance the status of the East German authorities without impairing the physical means of access. American policy assumed that progress on the national question would be achieved by increasing technical contacts between the two parts of Germany. In these contacts, it was supposed, the superior moral strength of Western Germany could not fail to make itself felt.

All of these elements were contained in the United States plan which the Germans leaked to the press in April 1962 in order to torpedo it. It provided for an International Access Authority in which East Germany would enjoy the same status as the Federal Republic; a number of East-West German commissions to deal

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with technical problems; a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; and an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries

The position of the Federal Republic in the face of this initiative was extremely ambivalent. Conscious of the danger of being accused of bellicosity, it accepted the need for negotiations. But Chancellor Adenauer and his associates were extremely uneasy about the way the issue had been posed. They held that Soviet "salami tactics" had already curtailed West Berlin's margin of safety so sharply that any further concessions were likely to undermine its viability. They were torn between the desire for progress on the German question and a suspicion that any proposal would only mask further concessions on Berlin. They remembered that at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva in 1959 the Western powers first coupled a proposal on German unification with some concessions on Berlin. When the Soviets refused even to discuss unification, the West refrained from pushing the German plan, but still kept possible modifications of Berlin's status on the agenda.

The German Government, having based its entire postwar policy on close ties with the West and especially with the United States, chose not to make public

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the full extent of its disquiet. Similarly, the United States Administration preferred to stress German agreement to specific formulas in order to maintain the appearance of allied unity. However, nominal German agreement has frequently depended on Chancellor Adenauer's knowledge that President de Gaulle would exercise his veto in allied councils.

One result was that much of the polemic between Washington and Bonn was conducted by means of inspired leaks to the press. During the summer and fall of 1961, many American newspapers pointed out that Germany's bills for World War II would be coming due. The United States was said to be delaying proposals until after the German elections scheduled for that fall so that a new government would be able to bear the brunt of the unpleasant decisions which were required. There were demands for "initiatives" and "imagination" from the Germans. It was safe to press the Germans for concessions because as the saying went, "where are the Germans going to go?"

On the German side, the suspicion was frequently voiced that sooner or later the United States would confront Germany with a *fait accompli*. Planted stories expressed doubt about the validity of the United States nuclear guarantee.

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The frequent demand that the Germans undertake "initiatives," it was said, really was a euphemism for American desire that they should offer unpalatable concessions which we were reluctant to make ourselves.

A more important result of this atmosphere of distrust between Bonn and Washington was the emergence of France as guardian of the Federal Republic's interests--thus answering the rhetorical question of where Germany might go. This, in turn, laid the basis for the close Franco-German cooperation which existed during Chancellor Adenauer's term in office and which gave France psychological support for the exclusion of Britain from the Common Market. France's role was not without its own ambivalence. French leaders are not likely to have transcended their historical reflexes so thoroughly as to have become passionate believers in a united, powerful and self-confident Germany for its own sake. But President de Gaulle has understood that France by itself can no longer have a determining voice in world affairs, that it needs the backing of other European countries.

This is why from the beginning of his tenure de Gaulle has sought to demonstrate to Germany that the Federal Republic would not stand alone when

III - IV - 15

rejecting--sometimes brutally--the American efforts to devise negotiating formulas, de Gaulle came to express the true convictions of the German government better than it dared to do itself. In his press conference of March 25, 1959, de Gaulle strongly advocated German unification. Later he was the only Western head of state to accept the present German-Polish frontier as final--thus opening a tentative option towards the East European states and accepting what will surely be the minimum price that Germany will have to pay for a European settlement.

The conflicting policies of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic created a diplomacy which combined the disadvantage of allied disunity with the inability to gain any real benefit from negotiations with the Soviets. France refused to negotiate. The Federal Republic approved diplomatic contacts with the Soviets only with great misgivings. The "exploratory talks" were first conducted by Secretary Rusk and later by Ambassador Thompson with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Thus, the Federal Republic, on an issue affecting it most immediately, stood on the sidelines, in a position to criticize the unfavorable features of specific proposals without having to weigh them against alternative courses. By assuming the role of chief negotiator, the

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United States played into the hands of de Gaulle and disquieted the Germans, and all without being able to bring about a settlement. Since we could not commit the West as a whole, the Soviets were in a position to treat our offers as fishing expeditions or to engage in fishing expeditions of their own. If they considered allied discord a feint, this gave them an incentive to be rigid. If they took it seriously, they could, in effect, bank every concession and use it as the starting point for the next round of talks.

The longer negotiations were conducted in this matter, the more relations between Bonn and Washington suffered. The mere fact of bilateral negotiations raised the specter of a U.S.-Soviet accommodation at the expense of our allies. Our tactics thus encouraged the Franco-German entente. The French inclination to create a Third Force would probably have been pursued in any case; but it was given impetus and opportunity by German uneasiness about our course.

This was the situation when Chancellor Adenauer finally put an end to the "exploratory talks" by publicly expressing his dissatisfaction with them. Throughout 1962, American-German relations remained wary, while the Federal Republic moved ever closer to an intimate association with France.

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Thus, by the end of 1962, while NATO was still going through the liturgy of unity, serious fissures had appeared. France had formulated an explicit challenge to American pre-eminence within NATO. The Federal Republic was torn between disquiet over American policy and the knowledge that its security required American support. Great Britain's application for membership in the Common Market was stalled.

Matters were brought to a head by de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, excluding Britain from the Common Market. This was followed within two weeks by the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation.

The first United States reaction was stunned outrage at what was seen as an embryo European organization based on de Gaulle's conceptions. This was succeeded by a deliberate policy of wooing the Federal Republic from its French ties. More and more the focus of America's European policy shifted towards Germany. In the military, diplomatic and economic fields strenuous efforts were to forge new United States-German links. Their practical consequence--whatever the intention--was to reduce the significance of the French alliance in German eyes. Where the previous policy ran the risk of a German estrangement

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from the Alliance, the current policy by giving the impression a special United
States-German relationship is in danger of eventually producing an estrangement
of the other allies. Before dealing with this problem, it is important to exa-
mine the role of Great Britain, another ally, which in the entire post-war
period has prided itself on its special relationship to the United States
during the entire post-war period.

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V. <u>Great Britain and Europe: The Nassau Agreement</u>

Great Britain's relations to the Continent in the post-war
period have been extraordinarily ambivalent. In the years immediately
following the war, the countries of the Continent were on the verge of chaos.
The quest for a modicum of stability overrode all other considerations.
Great Britain alone seemed to possess a structure capable of sustaining a
long-range, orderly policy. During this period, Britain could have had
the leadership of Europe for the asking. It would have seemed inconceivable
that Europe might exclude Britain from its community--assuming that it would
ever be able to form one.

Yet it was precisely the memory of its recent isolation that prevented
Britain from seizing its opportunity. Throughout Britain's history, the
threats to its security had come from the Continent, which in Britain
significantly is called Europe. Britain's historic policy had been to prevent
the emergence of a powerful and united Continent. To promote a united unity,
to submerge Britain in such a structure, and to substitute European for
American and Commonwealth connections, was a wrench with tradition which
many Britains were reluctant to make. The memory of the war reinforced this

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hesitation because the Continent contained the countries which had collapsed
during the war and forced Britain to fight alone. In the late Forties, the
continental countries were still wracked by internal dissension. Britain's
geographic location might be close to Europe, but its emotional ties were
to its recent ally across the sea and to the Commonwealth. The special
relationship with the United States was not only an act of policy but
also a psychological necessity. Long before anyone on the Continent could
even imagine excluding Britain, Britain had made a tentative choice against
the Continent.

As the post-war period progressed, it became apparent that total defeat in the war
may be more conducive to making a new start than partial victory. For
Great Britain, the tremendous exertions of the war did not lead to a
well-deserved respite. On the contrary, Britain was obliged to undertake
another major effort to adjust itself to a loss of international influence--
a task which was made even more difficult by the memory of the recent
heroic effort.

I am particularly indebted to Stephen Graubard for this point.

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By contrast, defeat enabled the Continent to free itself from the shackles of traditional nostalgia. In many countries--though with varying success--there emerged new leadership groups determined to shape the future. Courageous and steadfast during a difficult two decades, Britain's policy now began to turn stagnant. Its exertions had consumed so much energy that Britain never seemed able to decide which alternatives to pursue: close relations with the United States, a new concept of Commonwealth, or an unreserved entry into Europe. By trying to combine all three, Britain ran the risk of losing each. The roots of Britain's exclusion from the Continent go deeper than an individual's arbitrary decision.

This ambivalence has been described by some as Britain's search for identity. But the real problem is not that Britain lacked an identity. Rather it is that the sense of identity it had was incompatible with an unreserved entry into Europe. Great Britain had always considered herself primarily a world power rather than a European power. Her sense of identity was bound up with her connections across the sea, more than with her relations across the Channel.

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Britain's ambivalence towards Europe was a consistent feature of the post-war period. She refused to join the Schuman Plan. She opposed the Common Market applying for membership only after its success was assured. Even then, Britain's views on the organization of Europe were quite different from those of the European integrationists who so passionately championed her entry into Europe. They were in fact not easy to distinguish from those of de Gaulle except that they were stated in a more accommodating fashion. Thus in proposing that Britain enter the Common Market, Prime Minister Macmillan told the House of Commons:

> A number of years have passed since the movement began which culminated in the Treaty of Rome and I am bound to say that I do not see any signs of the members of the Community losing their national identity because they have delegated a measure of their sovereignty. This problem of sovereignty, to which we must, of course, attach the highest importance is, in the end, perhaps a matter of degree. I fully accept that there are some forces in Europe which would like a genuine federalist system.... They would like Europe to turn itself into a sort of United States, but I believe this to be a completely false analogy.

> ... The alternative concept, the only practical concept, would be a confederation, a commonwealth if Honorable Members would like to call it that--what I think General de Gaulle has called Europe des Patries--which would retain the great traditions and the pride of individual nations while working together in clearly defined spheres for their common interest. This seems to me a concept more in tune with the national traditions of European countries and, in particular, of our own.

1

Hangard, Fifth Series, Commons, Vol. 645 (July 24-August 4, 1961), cols. 1490-91.

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The same thought was expressed by Reginald Maudling, then President of the Board of Trade:

> ...we have seen in the last year or two the development of the European patrie of General de Gaulle and it is clear, I should have thought, that the Governments of the Six are not supporters of the conception of a political federation. Therefore, it is fair to say that neither by the terms of the Treaty itself nor by the expressed views of the Governments concerned in the Community would our membership commit ourselves in any way to ultimate political federation.¹

Britain's emotional ties were not with Europe but with the "special relationship" with the United States. This relationship is difficult to define, depending as it does on a series of intangibles. Unquestionably the enormous prestige gained by Britain during the war played a major role. Unique ties of language and culture encourage many informal connections. United States-British relations would therefore be "special" whatever the formal agreements.

British diplomacy skillfully exploited these assets. De Gaulle's tactics consist of submitting a proposal pre-emptorily and with a minimum of explanation. If the proposal is rejected, de Gaulle then proceeds to

¹
[Hansard, Fifth Series, Commons, Vol. 645, July 24-August 4, 1961, cols. 1597-98.

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implement it unilaterally in order to create a *fait accompli* to which his
allies must adjust. British tactics have been more subtle. Britain never
contests an abstract point. It almost never fights fundamental American
objectives openly. Instead, British policy usually concedes us the
theory and the liturgy while seeking to shape its implementation through
intensive formal and informal consultation. Where de Gaulle has often been
difficult so that he would not be overlooked, Britain has been conciliatory
so that it seemed natural to solicit Britain's views before major action was
taken. Whatever the "real" status of the special relationship, Britain
throughout the post-war period has tried hard to give the impression to the
outside world that American policy was strongly influenced, if not guided,
by London.

In the Sixties, this policy became less effective for a number of
reasons. For one thing, the special relationship has never had the same
psychological necessity for the United States as for Britain. The prestige
of Britain's wartime effort, enormous as it was, was a diminishing asset.
As the post-war period progressed, Britain began to appear to many influential
Americans to claim influence out of proportion to its power. Consequently

III - V - 7

they pressed Britain to seek its future in connection with Europe rather than
in special ties across the Atlantic. To this school of thought, it seemed
that Britain should not be permitted to claim a preferential voice on all
issues while its capacity to assume international responsibilities grew
constantly smaller.

The two events which underlined the decline of Britain's influence
in Washington most vividly were the Suez crisis and the cancellation of the
Skybolt missile. The former demonstrated the end of Britain's capacity
for major independent diplomatic action; the latter showed the hollowness
of Britain's aspiration to military autonomy. In both instances, the wounds
were to some extent self-inflicted--more in the case of Suez than in the case
of Skybolt. In both cases, brutal and unfeeling American actions aggravated
an already difficult situation. After Suez much of the previous assurance
disappeared from British diplomacy. Britain increasingly tended to substitute
maneuver for commitment and tried to increase Britain's influence while
reducing its responsibilities--an impossible assignment.

By 1962 the only special tie which Britain had with the United States
was in the nuclear field. An amendment of the United States Atomic Energy

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Act in 1954 permitted United States assistance to the British nuclear program. And American technology was made available to help with the development of delivery missiles for the British retaliatory force. The "independent" British deterrent has been composed of about 175 V-bombers which were threatened with obsolescence. In 1957, the British accordingly began to develop a missile called the Blue Streak--similar to first-generation American liquid-fuel missile such as Jupiter or Thor. Because this development--as all first generation weapons--was extremely expensive, it was scrapped in February 1960 in favor of a weapon then under development in the United States, the ill-fated Skybolt. The cancellation of Skybolt at the very least complicated Britain's entry into Europe and seriously undermined what had heretofore been the basis of British defense policy.

But the "special relationship" lasted long enough to bring about a number of illusions in Allied relationships. Where Britain tended

It is interesting to compare the reaction of Britain and France to Suez. Britain, having based its entire policy on close association with the United States, suffered a severe psychological blow. France, having had fewer illusions about its determining role in Washington, decided to accelerate its autonomy. The French nuclear program was much more the result of Suez than of the British example as is so often claimed.

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to exaggerate its special influence in Washington, the United States may have
overestimated the extent of Britain's pliability. It came to be an axiom
of United States policy that Britain's entry into a supra-national Europe
would be a guarantee of Atlantic partnership. This is why Washington
championed Britain's entry into the Common Market so passionately and why
it was so outraged when this policy was thwarted.

It is possible, however, that the American view was over optimistic.

To be sure, Britain's political maturity would have weighed heavily in Europe's councils. With Britain playing a leading role, the policy of a united Europe would have been more subtle, more skillful and at least in form less demanding. Still, the argument made on behalf of Britain's entry into Europe always emphasized that only as part of a united Europe would Britain carry weight in the United States. One ironic result of Britain's entry into Europe might well have been that Europe would henceforth have to be conducted by de Gaulle, a man who values methods.

If Britain overestimated its special ties with the United States, de Gaulle
took them at face value. He has never forgotten Churchill's statement that
if Britain were forced to choose between Europe and the open sea, it would

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unhesitatingly opt for the latter. The tenacity with which Britain contested the economic issues of its entry into Europe, while holding on to its special relationship with the United States in the nuclear field, suggested to de Gaulle that the Anglo-American condominium over Europe of the war-time years might be re-established. Britain's special relation with the United States in the nuclear field either challenged de Gaulle's contention that a united Europe required its own defense or seemed designed to give Britain a pre-eminent place in Europe. Neither contingency was attractive to de Gaulle.

Thus the Skybolt cancellation could not have been more ill-timed, if Britain's entry into Europe was a prime United States objective. And the situation was further complicated by the domestic pressures on the Macmillan government. Throughout the spring and summer of 1960, the Conservative government had been under constant attack by Labor on two grounds: (a) by relying on a weapon to be developed by a foreign country, Britain admitted

1
Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs*, Vol. III, p .

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that an "independent" British deterrent was impossible and (b) if there really was a need for an independent deterrent, it was dangerous to rely on Skybolt since the weapon did not even exist and since, as George Brown, then Labor's spokesman on defense matters, said, "the Americans have not bought it." The Conservative government countered by referring to an "agreement" by the United States to supply Skybolt. This was never contradicted by either the Eisenhower or the Kennedy Administration.

This debate became more intense after the Kennedy Administration took office. President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara publicly deprecated the utility of independent nuclear forces within NATO. They were supported in this stand by the British Opposition. Harold Wilson, then foreign affairs spokesman for the Labor Party, claimed after a visit to Washington in 1962, that he had been told that the United States did not consider the British retaliatory force of strategic significance and that the British defense effort would make a greater contribution if channeled in other directions. This was denied by the Conservative government. Labor then challenged the Conservative government to produce a single official United States

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statement affirming that the United States valued the British deterrent.

This the Conservative government was unable to do.

Thus, when the Kennedy Administration cancelled the Skybolt program
in December 1962, conditions were not favorable for calm deliberation.

Governments are notoriously slow to appreciate the technical merits of
arguments which threaten their existence. The uproar which the cancellation
produced was not the result of concern over a possible gap in the deterrent
posture of Great Britain between the time the V-Bombers became obsolescent
and a new weapons system could be developed to replace Skybolt. What was
at stake was a fiction on which Britain's post-war policy had been based and
for which successive British governments had expended ten billion dollars.

British independence in the field of strategy--whatever its "real"
significance--was to the Conservative government literally a matter of
life and death. As a result, a conference between President Kennedy
and Prime Minister Macmillan originally scheduled to review the world
situation after the Cuban missile crisis was transformed into redefinition
of nuclear relationships, which goes under the name of the Nassau Agreement.

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The Nassau Agreement is a document of extraordinary ambiguity; it reflects the attempt to reconcile the American quest for the integration of all the nuclear forces of the Alliance with the British desire to maintain a measure of independence. The United States agreed to supply Polaris missiles to Great Britain. Britain was to construct the submarines and provide the warheads. Great Britain and the United States agreed to create a NATO nuclear force initially to be composed of allocations from United States strategic forces, from the United Kingdom Bomber Command and from tactical nuclear forces in Europe. The British Polaris submarines, armed with American missiles and British warheads, were to be subscribed to this NATO "multilateral" force (a term which within a few months was to change its meaning). Great Britain agreed to use these forces "for the purpose of the international defense of the Western Alliance" except "where the supreme national interest was at stake." The same qualification appeared in a provision according to the effect that both governments agreed that Western defense "is indivisible and ... in all ordinary circumstances of crisis or danger [emphasis added] it is this very unity which is the best protection of the West." Finally Great Britain and the United States

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agreed that NATO in addition to having a nuclear "shield" should have a non-nuclear
"sword," thus reversing the traditional NATO strategic concept.

This agreement was transmitted to President de Gaulle after it was
published. In an accompanying memorandum, the United States offered to sell
Polaris missiles to France on the same terms as to Great Britain.

The Nassau Agreement attempted a _tour de force_. It tried to reconcile
integration with independence, the American belief in the need for an
indivisible nuclear strategy with a British desire for autonomy.

The price was high, however, and in practice its various clauses
tended to cancel each other out. For example, what was the significance
of subscribing the British retaliatory force to NATO while at the same time
reserving the right of independent action when the supreme national interest
was at stake? As President Kennedy pointed out shortly after, the supreme
national interest is automatically involved when nuclear weapons are involved.
Similarly, what was the meaning of the phrase that a unified strategy was
the best protection in "ordinary" circumstances? To what contingencies did

1
Text, _DOSB_, Vol. XLVIII, 1229 (January, 1963), p.

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the escape clause refer? Finally what was the meaning of the reversal of
the traditional notions of "shield" and "sword" in NATO strategy? Did it
imply that the United States and Great Britain were proposing to resist
a conventional attack in Europe primarily with conventional means?

Thus even an individual less prone to exploit Allied discord than
President de Gaulle was likely to view the Nassau Agreement with suspicion.
Indeed, reaction to the Nassau Agreement all over Europe ranged from cool
to hostile. In Germany, the grouping of NATO's nuclear forces in a special
nuclear command revived fears of a possible nuclear disengagement. The
British opposition took it as proof of the validity of their previous
contention that British nuclear independence was a sham. It did not
satisfy those in the United States who had been pressing for an integrated
strategy. And it was, of course, rejected out of hand by President de Gaulle.

The debate about military integration demonstrated how abstract and
doctrinaire the strategic dispute had become. Many influential Americans
objected most strongly to the escape clauses regarding the disposition of
nuclear forces. They implied that without these clauses the "assignment"
of the British Polaris force to NATO would have been irrevocable. In fact,

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"assignment" in NATO has never been irrevocable; it has always had a largely symbolic quality as all forces in NATO are normally under national command. NATO eadquarters are planning outfits that control the forces "assigned" to them only during specified maneuvers or in war. Each ally retains the right to go to war according to its own constitutional processes.

The right of withdrawal is inherent, and "assignment" does not significantly restrict the independent disposition of NATO forces. This has been proved abundantly by the United States withdrawal of forces from Germany for action in Lebanon, by French withdrawal of its fleet from NATO, by the use of NATO-assigned forces by both Greece and Turkey during the Cyprus crisis and by the withdrawal of British forces from Germany for use in Malaysia.

The escape clauses gave Britain no additional rights; they were significant above all in terms of British electoral politics.

If integration did not go far enough for some Americans, it was much too sweeping for President de Gaulle. The debate having taken on its scholastic tone, President de Gaulle was likely to object to the term "assignment" whatever its actual significance. He said that the proposed

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assignment of nuclear forces to NATO involved:

...a web of liaisons, transmissions and interferences within itself ... such that, if an integral part were suddenly snatched from it, there would be a strong risk of paralyzing it just at the moment, perhaps, when it should act.¹

And he asked how in practice integration could be reconciled with independent disposition, putting his finger on the key evasion of the Nassau Agreement. At the same time, he agreed that cooperation between the national nuclear forces within NATO was both possible and desirable.

It is symptomatic that, while arguing, sometimes vituperatively, the relative merits of integration and coordination, neither side has defined what concrete meaning these phrases would have in practical terms or said specifically what common action might be possible under a different label.

The timing of the Nassau Agreement and the way it was negotiated created still greater problems than its content. Its impact on Britain's application to enter the Common Market was disastrous. Given de Gaulle's wartime experiences and his view of France's role in the world, it was against all probability that he would accept a proposal negotiated by

¹ Charles de Gaulle, Press Conference on January 14, 1963, *Major Addresses*, p. 219.

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the "Anglo-Saxons" without consultation with him and transmitted to Paris
only after it had been released to the press. It should have come as no
surprise that de Gaulle acidly commented at a press conference: "Of course,
I am only speaking of this proposal and agreement because it has been
published and because their content is known."

Moreover, the actual terms of the agreement must have appeared to
de Gaulle to perpetuate the discriminatory treatment which he had opposed
throughout his public career. Since France possessed neither submarines nor
warheads for the Polaris missiles, the Nassau Agreement could bring benefits
to France only after many years. And Britain's experience with the
Skybolt program reduced the already small incentive of France to make
itself dependent on the promise of future delivery of United States missiles--
all the less so as France was not offered the privileged information about
the construction of nuclear warheads for these missiles which had been
available to Britain since 1954.

1, Press Conference on January 14, 1963, *ibid*., p. 218.

III - V - 19

But the most profound impact of the Nassau Agreement was on Britain's
application for membership in the Common Market. There have been endless
debates whether the Nassau Agreement precipitated de Gaulle's decision
to veto British membership, whether it was a pretext or--as is most likely--
whether it was simply a contributory cause. Without deciding this issue,
it is clear that the Nassau Agreement exacerbated an already difficult situation
and posed the issue of British membership in Europe under the most adverse
conditions imaginable.

Whatever their other differences, de Gaulle and the European integrationists
were agreed that Europe, to be properly organized, must have its own defense
program. Britain's application for membership in the Common Market
inevitably raises the issue whether it was consistent with the aspirations
of a united Europe for one of its members to have an exclusive relationship
with the United States on so vital a subject as nuclear strategy or whether
it should share its nuclear competence with its new partners.

The Nassau Agreement brought this issue to a head while Britain was
still negotiating its entry into Europe. Britain had received an abrupt

III - V - 20

rebuff on the Skybolt issue. Yet it never seems seriously to have considered
using this opportunity for closer cooperation with its European partners
in the military field. Instead, it concluded an agreement with the United
States without even consulting France, the other European nuclear power,
and it developed a nuclear plan for NATO without the participation of its
prospective partners in the Common Market. It agreed to reverse the
traditional significance of "sword" and "shield" in NATO doctrine without
consulting any other NATO ally. Perhaps de Gaulle had decided on a veto
in any event. But if he still hesitated, the Nassau Agreement was likely
to tip the scales.

In retrospect, the failure of Britain to consult with France and its
other European allies before committing itself to the Nassau Agreement seems
an historic missed opportunity. It will never be known what the reaction
would have been if Britain had made such an overture before the Bahamas
meeting. Even had it failed, it would have placed the subsequent debate in
a far better context.

As it was, de Gaulle, in his press conference of January 14, 1963,
abruptly and brutally vetoed British membership in the Common Market and rejected
the Nassau offer. The shape of Atlantic relations will never be the same

[Y]

III - V - 21

as it was before that date. De Gaulle's action exploded the premises on which much of previous thinking had been based. The belief in an automatic progression from economic to political integration suddenly stood in need of re-examination. The concept of an Atlantic partnership between the United States and a united Europe, including Great Britain, was seriously challenged. It was now clear that conflicting approaches to Atlantic relationships were confronting each other.

The debate was confused by the way the lines were drawn, which made it dangerous to take either criticism or support of United States positions at face value. The French claim to speak for Europe was belied by the fact that on economic issues Germany and the Netherlands tended to side with Great Britain and in the field of strategy the Federal Republic leaned towards the United States. Many in Europe were disquieted by de Gaulle's tactics even when they basically agreed with his policies--as in the case of the recognition of Communist China and the neutralization of South East Asia.

At the same time, opposition to de Gaulle does not guarantee support of United States policies. British policy often differs from that of

III - V - 22

de Gaulle only in the greater suppleness of British methods. Much internal French criticism is due to the frustration that the Opposition's policy is carried out by the incumbent. The major difference on defense matters seems to be a question of timing: when the French nuclear force is to be turned into a European one. All over Europe left-wing groups violently oppose de Gaulle's imperious style, seeing in him a direct descendent of the dictators of the Thirties. But this does not mean that they object to Third Force policies as such or that their alternative is close ties with the United States. The Federal Republic maneuvers uneasily between relying on the military protection of the United States and the diplomatic cover of France.

The press conference of January 14, 1963, ushered in a period of frantic diplomatic activity in which the United States strove hard to vindicate its previous conception and France aloofly pursued its own course. The result may well be contrary to the intentions of each of the rivals. What started out as a dispute about the internal structure of Europe and its role runs the risk of fragmenting Europe or of shifting the balance within Europe in unexpected directions. Both the United States