FINCH & SCHAEFLER

36 WEST 44TH STREET
NEW YORK 10036

LEON SCHAEFLER
EDWARD RIDLEY FINCH, JR.
RICHARD HENRY PERSHAN
CHARLES M. ARAK
GEORGE A. NELSON, JR.
---
EDWARD R. FINCH
1873-1965

TEL. MURRAY HILL 7-3636

CABLE ADDRESS: FINSCHA, N. Y.

February 11, 1974

Dear Don:

Thanks for your letter of January 24, 1974 and your personal note which accompanied it. I have written today to Honorable Peter Rodino, Honorable Edward Hutchinson and, of course, spoke with Chesterfield Smith, President of the American Bar Association at our midyear meeting in Houston expressing the sentiments in your letter and more from a strictly legal point of view which were reflected in last week's issue of The New York Times.

Please call me at the number on this letterhead so we can work out a convenient date to lunch together.

As you know, I was in Moscow during the recent missile crisis bearing word to high Soviet space officials from H.K. I also have some very interesting news for you about the Pepsi situation in the U.S.S.R.

Let's get together soon.

Donald M. Kendall, Esq.
Porchuck Road
Greenwich, Connecticut 06830

ERF/dm

P.S. I am holding my letters to Honorable Peter Rodino and to Honorable Edward Hutchinson. I do not think it would be in good taste for me to do this in view of the fact that my nephew is married to the President's daughter.

Ed.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1974

Dear Don:

Nancy and I want to thank you for the
vodka set you recently gave us. It is a
handsome combination and along with the
excellent vodka we have received will be
a marvelous addition to our home.

With our best wishes and appreciation.

Mr. Donald M. Kendall
Porchuck Road
Greenwich, Connecticut

To reach 6805 Meadow Lane, Chevy Chase, Md.

Drive north on Connecticut Avenue beyond
Chevy Chase Circle to Bradley Lane, the first stop
light after the circle (ignore it) and continue on
Connecticut one block north to blinther light; then
turn left into Rosemary Street and immediately bear
right into Meadow Lane. 6805 is a red brick house,
the third on the right-hand side.

(If coming from north, turn card upside down.)

OCT

PAGE 24

THE JEWISH WEEK-AMERICAN EXAMINER

WEEK OF MAY 9-15, 1976

# Kissinger did more for Israel than 10 predecessors-Kenen

EDITOR'S NOTE: The Jewish Week has on occasions criticized Secretary of State Kissinger. We have been criticized by a number of readers

I.L. KENEN

for our position on Kissinger. Most critics have felt that we have been too mild; a few have considered us unfair and even extreme. Since we have at times published stories critical of Kissinger emanating from a group headed by Prof. Hans Morgenthau, we have decided that we should publish a pro-Kissinger statement. We asked I.L. Kenen the founder and executive head of the American Israel Public

Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and now its honorary chairman and editor emeritus of 'Near East Report' to do so. His article follows:

By I.L. KENEN

This is an evenhanded reassessment of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, written at the request of the Jewish Week.

Since the 1973 war I have addressed some 200 public meetings and I am invariably asked for my opinion of the Secretary and his policies in the Middle East. Usually I point out that there are 2,880,000 Kissinger points in Israel who might have more to offer, and that this is an assignment for a psychoanalyst rather than a psychology major.

Flippancy aside, I have always emphasized the contrast between Dr. Kissinger's Middle East record with that of his ten predecessors who served as Secretaries of State since I became involved in this struggle in 1943. The truth is that not a single one of them ever matched the Secretary's remarkable ability to support and strengthen Israel even as he simultaneously manages to win the confidence of some of the leaders of Arab states.

Ever since oil was discovered in the Middle East in the 1930s, our State Department, hostile to the creation of the State of Israel, tried to block its establishment and denigrate it as a liability to U.S. policy.

## 1967 war changed attitude

That negative attitude changed with Israel's spectacular victory in 1967. That demonstration of Israel's capacity to overcome Soviet-equipped Arab forces showed that Israel was in fact an asset — a situation of strength in the Middle East helping to protect a strategic area from the pressures and expansion of Soviet influence.

During this period, Israel's supporters concluded that the United States blundered by withholding aid from Israel, that the Soviet Union — not the United States — would be the beneficiary of that kind of policy, for the Arabs would attribute the American policy to competition with the Soviet bloc. Israel's supporters have always argued that if the United States strengthened Israel the Arab states would recognize the wisdom of courting Washington.

This strategy was finally adopted by Washington after the 1967 war. And in 1973, for the first time, the United States made arms available to Israel in substantial quantities, as a grant. In other words, the Kissinger policy sought to maintain the balance of strength while at the same time securing the balance of influence.

Thus, the United States could claim credit for helping Israel survive and still find an open door in Cairo. Since then American policy has been motivated by the determination to maintain influence with both sides and to delegate the Soviet Union to the sidelines — and ultimately to promote an Arab-Israel settlement.

The record of American assistance shows that in the three years since Kissinger has been Secretary of State the United States has approved grants and loans to Israel approximating $5.4 billion. Most of this was recommended by the Administration; only a small fraction resulted from congressional or lobbying initiatives. This three-year figure is more than what Israel received in loans and grants in the previous 25 years (4 billion), much of which was due to the

initiative of Congress and the pro-Israel lobby because of the Administration's fear of Arab reaction and setback in the cold war.

Most of Kissinger's critics overlook this diplomatic and fiscal realities. They ignore the extent of U.S. support and the proportion of the total foreign aid program that has been allocated to Israel. It cannot be denied that as a result of this policy Israel has gained both strength and time.

## Discusses Kissinger motives

So much for the Kissinger strategy. What about his motives?

Kissinger has come in for criticism largely at the hands of those who believe that Israel should give up none of the territory she won in 1967, although Israeli diplomats made it very clear to the United States in 1967 that they were willing to give up substantial areas in exchange for a peace settlement. Much of Kissinger's attitude towards the territorial problem is a legacy from Secretaries Rusk and Rogers.

Criticism also comes from Jews who believe that Kissinger, because of his Jewish origin, should not be courting President Sadat and other Arab leaders. And precisely because of his Jewish background, he has incurred the animosity of many Israelis who have subjected him to an unkind barrage never manifested in the past toward any of his predecessors.

With Kissinger has repeatedly sought to reassure Israelis and American Jewish leaders that he is concerned about Israel's security and survival. His recent speech to the American Jewish Congress was a strong reaffirmation of that concern. He has told me that he could not live with himself if he were to prejudice Israel's survival, and he has made similar statements at formal gatherings in toasting distinguished Israeli visitors to Washington.

But there is another side to the story: Kissinger's tactics and his day-to-day relations with the parties to the conflict.

## Ambiguity brings misunderstanding

Perhaps few can match his audacious wit, for he delights audiences when he tells them that he lights a candle on the anniversary of Mertmetich's death or that he is comforted by the assurance that President Ford "is behind me 1,000 percent." But wit can become acidulous and derisive. And critics of Kissinger charge him with arrogance and exaggeration — and especially with ambiguity which leads to serious misunderstandings.

Early in my Washington experience I came across a position paper which instructed diplomats to have on rationalization for the Arabs and another for the Israelis. Thus, Kissinger did not invent diplomatic double talk; he improved on it. In private briefings Kissinger has tended to exaggerate Israel's danger, and this is sometimes regarded as indirect pressure on Israel to further concessions.

The main issue has to do with the conflicting visions of the Arab states and Israel over the map of the future. It will be recalled that in the long debate over UN Resolution 242 the Arab states always contended that they could not negotiate with Israel or make peace with Israel unless Israel made a commitment in advance to withdraw completely from all occupied territories. They insisted that there was no requirement for negotiations and that Resolution 242 was automatically self-implementing.

When Kissinger went to Moscow in 1973 to negotiate the UN cease-fire resolution, he was able to write in the concept of negotiations. While he did not use the phrase "direct" — negotiations he came close to it when he injected himself into the negotiating picture with his shuttle diplomacy.

But in his dealings with the Egyptians, he apparently never dissipated their conviction that ultimately Israel must withdraw completely. And in his dealings with the Israelis, while he emphasized the importance of withdrawals, he left them with the clear impression that he agreed with their view that withdrawals must not imperil their security.

Put in another way, Kissinger did not want the Arabs to believe that he was using them as tools to perpetuate the 1967 borders, and conversely

he never wanted the Israelis to believe that they were being subjected to a salami operation.

## Not for imposed settlement

To his credit, it should be said that he refrained from advocating an imposed settlement, such as is frequently urged by critics of U.S. policy, for Kissinger knows that anyone who seeks to impose a policy must be ready to enforce it. After the Indochina experience, Americans would not be ready to send troops to implement an imposed settlement, however glibly advocated.

Israelis were angered in 1975 when Kissinger pressed them to accept Sadat's terms in the second disengagement agreement. Some observers believe that Kissinger was then at a nadir because of reverses in Indochina and that Sadat took advantage of Kissinger's weakness and upped his terms. Kissinger then appealed to the Israelis to accept them, lest the negotiations collapse completely and the Soviets regain leadership of the bargaining process. The Israelis rejected Kissinger's plea.

Kissinger promised to blame neither side but soon after he left Israel he was the source of dispatches which heaped blame on Israel. At the same time the United States called for a "reassessment" of its policy — a gratuitous blow at a democratic ally.

During the subsequent debate over reassessment, members of the Senate decided to contribute their views, and 76 senators joined in a round robin letter calling on the President to continue support for Israel. The Administration complained to the press that it was highly improper for Congress to interfere with its conduct of foreign policy and that it was handicapped as a result.

I was astounded by the Administration's attempt to denigrate the congressional role in the crystallization of American policy toward Israel, for often during the last 25 years Administration spokesmen have preferred to have Congress take the initiative on Middle East issues lest our diplomats incur the displeasure of the Arabs.

## Subservience to oil power

We who worked in Washington during 1975 were aware that top-flight correspondents and commentators were being briefed by State to devalue the Israel-U.S. connection. The word "erosion" was introduced into the diplomatic dialogue. Apparently the issue was resolved in the subsequent August negotiations and the Israelis believe they gained as a result of the stand they took.

This is not the whole story by any means. I have not touched on the debate over responsibility for delay in the airlift in October 1973 and other major conflicts. Space forbids it here. But I am convinced that much of U.S. policy has been influenced, regrettably, by our growing subservience to Arab oil power and our seeming ability to achieve energy independence.

In the 25 years I have served in Washington it has always been my view that a major purpose is served by bringing the United States and Israel closer together. And while there is every justification for arguments and debate over issues, I believe that our objective must be to reconcile differences, if that is possible, and to avoid vilification of personalities which tend to exacerbate rather than heal wounds.

Fortunately, America's basic friendship for Israel is broad, and public opinion polls and the roll calls in Congress demonstrate continuing understanding and support.

Golda finds 78th birthday only a 'small blessing'

TEL AVIV—Two days before Israel's celebration of its 28th Independence Day, Golda Meir, who had a lot to do with the achievement of independence in 1948, marked her 78th birthday. Shrugging off the congratulations that poured in from all over the world, the former Prime Minister said "I am happy to have made it. But with all the aches and pains there is not much to celebrate." She said "at 16 or 40, a celebration was one thing, but 78? That's only a small blessing."

# Rosenwald leads Jerusalem trip; 1,000 expected

William Rosenwald, president of the UJA-Federation Joint Campaign Board, is writing a lot of letters these days. They're invitations to friends and associates to be with him "This Year in Jerusalem," at the UJA National Conference in Israel, from October 24 to 31.

Reports from the Missions Office of the Joint

William Rosenwald

Campaign indicate that "This Year in Jerusalem" is shaping up as a great reunion of new and old friends. At least a thousand New Yorkers are expected to join in the Conference (which is actually not a conference but a combination of open-air celebrations with the Israelis and a unique tour of the country's cultural, educational, industrial and social welfare facilities), and another two thousand Jews from all over America will

also be there.

Many of the Joint Campaign's most active people have already made their reservations and, like Rosenwald, are busy encouraging their friends to come along. It will be one of the biggest gatherings of UJA people ever to take place.

Information about the trip may be obtained from a friend or from the Missions Department of the Joint Campaign. Call CO 5-2200, ext. 409. Prices range from $760 to $1,625, with the more expensive trips including visits to Iran, Poland and Rumania.

## Mexicans dedicate forest to Israel

MEXICO CITY. (JTA)—The first trees in the new State of Israel forest were planted at La Marquesa near here to commemorate Israel's 28th anniversary. The forest was dedicated to Israel by the association of former scholarship students in universities and research centers in Israel and the Mexican-Israeli Cultural Institute. Israeli Ambassador Hanan Aynor and Dr. Jorge Jiménez Cantu, Governor of the State of Mexico, participated in the ceremonies.

Al Rapuano, General Manager

Ask an Atlanta hotel manager where to stay in San Francisco.

In Atlanta, there's a new Fairmont. We're working to be a part of the city. In San Francisco, there's a famous Fairmont. It is the city. And it's atop Nob Hill. The perfect location for a hotel so good it has won the coveted Mobil 5-Star Award for 15 consecutive years.

THE FAIRMONT
ATLANTA
DALLAS
NEW ORLEANS
SAN FRANCISCO

Call toll free 800-527-4727

In Atlanta call 800-527-4727

Or call your travel agent

NEAR EAST
RESEARCH

NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING • 529-14TH STREET, N.W. • SUITE 990 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20045 • (202) 347-6222

President: I. L. KENEN

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein, Rochester
Irving Kane, Cleveland
I. L. Kenen, Chevy Chase
Harry Linowes, Bethesda
Bernard White, Chevy Chase
Treasurer

Stanley Davis, Silver Spring
Secretary

July 27, 1976

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I was very grateful for your friendly greeting last night.

You will recall that I referred to an earlier article, which was published in the Jewish Week in New York (circulation more than 100,000) and which embodies a statement that I made to the five editors of Israel newspapers, in Israel late in December 1973.

Just yesterday I received a letter from Dr. Israel Goldstein, who used to head New York's most influential Conservative congregation and who has been president of practically every major Jewish organization. His reaction to the Jewish Week article will be of interest to you.

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

ILK/c

NEAR EAST RESEARCH, INC.

(a non-profit corporation)

Fact Finder in a Field of Controversy

Publisher of the widely-read Near East Report established in 1957.

WEEK OF MAY 9-15, 1976 THE JEWISH WEEK-AMERICAN EXAMINER

PAGE 24

I.L. KENEN

On our position on Kissinger: Most critics have felt that we have been too mild; a few have considered us unfair and even extreme. Since we have at times published stories critical of Kissinger emanating from a group headed by Prof. Hans Morgenthau, we have decided that we should publish a pro-Kissinger statement. We asked I.L. Kenen the founder and executive head of the American Israel Public

By I.L. KENEN

This is an envenomed reassessment of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, written at the request of the Jewish Week.

Since the 1973 war I have addressed some 200 public meetings and I am invariably asked for my opinion of the Secretary and his policies in the Middle East. Usually I point out that there are 2,880,000 Kissingers in Israel who might have more to offer, and that this is an assignment for a psychoanalyst rather than a psychology major.

Flippant aside, I have always emphasized the contrast between Dr. Kissinger's Middle East record with that of his ten predecessors who served as Secretaries of State since I became involved in this struggle in 1963. The truth is not a single one of them ever matched the Secretary's remarkable ability to support and strengthen Israel even as he simultaneously manages to win the confidence of some of the leaders of Arab states.

## 1967 war changed attitude

During this period, Israel's supporters contended that the United States blundered by withholding aid from Israel, that the Soviet Union — not the United States — would be the beneficiary of that kind of policy, for the Arabs would attribute the American policy to competition with the Soviet bloc. Israel's supporters have always argued that if the United States strengthened the Arab states would recognize the wisdom of courting Washington.

Thus, the United States could claim credit for helping Israel survive and still find an open door in Cairo. Since then American policy has been motivated by the determination to maintain influence with both sides and to relegate the Soviet Union to the sidelines and — ultimately to promote an Arab-Israel settlement.

Most of Kissinger's critics overlook these diplomatic and fiscal realities. They ignore the extent of U.S. aid and the proportion of the total foreign aid program that has been allocated to Israel. It cannot be denied that as a result of this policy Israel has gained both strength and time.

Criticism also comes from Jews who believe that Kissinger, because of his Jewish origin, should not be courting President Sadat and other Arab leaders. And precisely because of his Jewish background, he has incurred the animosity of many Israelis who have subjected him to an undivided barrage never manifested in the past toward any of his predecessors.

But Kissinger has repeatedly sought to reassure Israelis and American Jewish leaders that he is concerned about Israel's security and survival. His recent speech to the American Jewish Congress was a strong reaffirmation of that concern. He has told me that he could not live with himself if he were to prejudice Israel's survival, and he has made similar statements at formal gatherings in "toasting distinguished Israeli visitors to Washington."

Perhaps few can match his audacious wit, for he delights audiences when he tells them that he lights a candle on the anniversary of Mettamich's death or that he is comforted by the assurance that President Ford "is behind me 1,000 percent." But what can become acidic and derivative. And critics of Kissinger charge him with arrogance and exaggeration — and especially with ambiguity which leads to serious misunderstandings.

Early in my Washington experience I came across a position paper which instructed diplomats to have on rationalization for the Arabs and another for the Jews. Thus, Kissinger did not invent diplomatic double talk; he improved on it. In private briefings Kissinger has tended to exaggerate Israel's danger, and this is sometimes regarded as indirect pressure on Israel to make further concessions.

The main issue has to do with the conflicting visions of the Arab states and Israel over the map of the future. It will be recalled that in the long debate over UN Resolution 242 the Arab states always contended that they could not negotiate with Israel or make peace with Israel unless Israel made a commitment in advance to withdraw completely from all occupied territories. I insisted that there was no requirement for negotiations and that Resolution 242 was automatically self-implementing.

When Kissinger went to Moscow in 1973 to negotiate the UN cease-fire resolution, he was able to write in the concept of negotiations. While he did not use the phrase "direct" negotiations, he came close to it when he injected himself into the negotiating picture with his shuttle diplomacy.

But in his dealings with the Egyptians, he apparently never disabused them of their conviction that ultimately Israel must withdraw completely. And in his dealings with the Israelis, while he emphasized the importance of withdrawals, he left them with the clear impression that he agreed with their view that withdrawals must not imperil their security.

## Not for imposed settlement

To his credit, it should be stated that he refrained from advocating an imposed settlement, such as is frequently urged by critics of U.S. policy, for Kissinger knows that anyone who seeks to impose a policy must be ready to enforce it. After the Indochina experience, Americans would not be ready to send troops to implement an imposed settlement, however glibly advocated.

Israelis were angered in 1975 when Kissinger pressed them to accept Sadat's terms in the second disengagement agreement. Some observers believe that Kissinger was then at a nadir because of reverses in Indochina and that Sadat took advantage of Kissinger's weakness and upped his terms. Kissinger then appealed to the Israelis to accept them; lest the negotiations collapse completely and the Soviets regain leadership of the bargaining process. The Israelis rejected Kissinger's plea.

Kissinger promised to blame neither side but soon after he left Israel he was the source of dispatches which heheaped blame on Israel. At the same time the United States called for a "reassessment" of its policy — a gratuitous blow at a democratic ally.

I was astounded by the Administration's attempt to denigrate the congressional role in the crystalization of American policy toward Israel, for often during the last 25 years Administration spokesmen have preferred to have Congress take the initiative on Middle East issues lest our diplomats incur the displeasure of the Arabs.

## Subservience to oil power

We who worked in Washington during 1975 were aware that top-flight correspondents and commentators were being briefed by State to devalue the Israel-U.S. connection. The word "erosion" was introduced into the diplomatic dialogue. Apparently the issue was resolved in the subsequent August negotiations and in the Israeli believe they gained as a result of the stand they took.

This is not the whole story by any means. I have not touched on the debate over responsibility for delay in the airlift in October 1973 and other hotly爭 conflicts. Space forbids it here. But I am convinced that much of U.S. policy has been influenced, regrettably, by our growing subsistence for Arab oil power and our seeming ability to achieve energy independence.

## Golda finds 78th birthday only a 'small blessing'

William Rosenwald

also be there

Campaign indicate that "This Year in Jerusalem" is shaping up as a great reunion of friends and old friends. At least a thousand New Yorkers are expected to join in the Conference (which is actually not a conference but a combination of open-air celebrations with the Israelis and a unique tour of the country's cultural, educational, industrial and social welfare facilities), and another two thousand Jews from all over America will

MEXICO CITY, (JTA)—The first trees in the new State of Israel forest were planted at La Marquesa near here to commemorate Israel's 28th anniversary. The forest was dedicated to Israel by the association of former scholarship students in universities and research centers in Israel and the Mexican-Israeli Cultural Institute. Israeli Ambassador Hanan Aynor and Dr. Jorge Jimenez Cantu, Governor of the State of Mexico, participated in the ceremonies.

Al Rapuano, General Manager

## Ask an Atlanta hotel manager where to stay in San Francisco.

In Atlanta, there's a new Fairmont. We're working to be a part of the city. In San Francisco, there's a famous Fairmont. It's the city. And it's atop Nob Hill. The perfect location for a hotel so good it has won the coveted Mobil 5-Star Award for 15 consecutive years.

THE FEMMONT
BOSTON
ATLANTA
DALLAS
ORLEANS
SAN FRANCISCO

Call toll-free (800) 527-4727
for information
800-527-4722

Or call your travel agent

June 20, 1976

Mr. I. L. Kennen
American Israel Public Affairs Committee
515 Park Avenue
New York City, N.Y.
U. S. A.

Dear Si,

The "Jewish Week" reaches me by surface mail about a month after date of publication. So the issue of May 9-15 reached me only a few days ago. I read with great interest your article on Kissinger. It is about time that a balanced affirmative statement on Kissinger, made by someone whose credentials of knowledgeability and of friendship to Israel cannot be questioned.

These days when I am spending considerable time in organizing my archives which I have brought to Jerusalem I often come across items relating to the American Jewish Conference, - and so I have been "Kennen" conscious.

I trust you are looking and feeling no less vital than the last time I saw you in Israel.

As ever,

Dr. Israel Goldstein

IG/PC

MISS ANN M. KENNEDY

2680 So. E. 5TH STREET
POMPANO BEACH, FLA. 33062

"SPIRIT OF "76" February 25, 1974

Mr. Clayton Fritchey
% Los Angeles Times Syndicate
Los Angeles, Calif.

RE:YOUR ARTICLE-"WHY BAR KISSINGER
FROM BECOMING
PRESIDENT"

Dear Mr. Fritchey:

"YOU DON'T MEAN IT?"

You can't tell me that you do not know Kissinger's background, schooled under **HITLER** in a STORM TROOPER ARMY as a boy. Then set such a man up for **PRESIDENT** of THESE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?

I quote from Readers Digest, February issue 1974--"**LETS NOT FOOL OURSELVES** about U.S. and SOVIET "**DETENTE**".

"There are disqueting indications that Soviet Union may look upon "DETENTE" as an opportunity to **LULL THE U.S.** into complacency while going **STRATEGIC GLOBAL ADVANTAGES**. "This is what our **American Security Council** is trying to tell our people in WASHINGTON.

Mr. Brezhnev said in June, "DETENTE" IN NO WAY IMPLIES THE POSSIBILITY OF **RELAXING THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE**, on the CONTRARY, we must be **prepared FOR THIS STRUGGLE TO BE INTENSIFIED**, and become an **ever SHARPER FORM OF CONFRONTATION** between the **TWO SYSTEMS**".

This Kissinger knows, he is making secret agreements and treaty's that the U.S. knows nothing about-**UNTIL ITS DONE**, we are losing ground every day thru KISSINGER'S "**THINK TANK**" under the management of Jerome Kahan, a former staffer with the arms control, his strategic doctrine for **Liberal Brookings Institute**.
Kahan's doctrine has brought open **HAND-WRINGING** from the Pentagon, officials are now certain that Kissinger, bolstered by such **DISARMAMENT THEORETICIANS** as KAHAN, is determined to undermine the military at **SALT 11**.

Kahan appears to have few worries, regarding **SOVIET PROVOCATIONS** including RUSSIA'S **MASSIVE BUILDUP** of **OFFENSIVE WEAPONRY**- even since **SALT 1**.

In short, what Kissinger's new disarmament adviser believes is that America, in order to reach a productive outcome at **SALT 11**, **MUST RESTRAIN ITS PROTECTIVE IMPULSES**, **ENGAGE IN UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT**, **REFRAIN FROM PROVOKING the SOVIETS** with high confidence, **DEFENSIVE MEASURERS** and **VIRTUALLY IGNORE** what even TIME MAGAZINE now sees as the **GROWING** and **OMINOUS NUCLEAR THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION**.

MISS ANN M. KENNEDY

Mr. Clayton Fritchey
Los Angeles Times Syndicate

#2

February 25, 1974

RE- The death of your Ex-Senator William F. Knowland, he was one who helped on the formation of the United Nations, he no-doubt had secret information which he couldn't divulge to the American people and which prayed on his mind heavily. I happen to have had the pleasure of meeting Senator Knowland years ago, he was a very fine man.

Truly, the above account of Henry Kissinger shows what <u>incompetent</u> "<u>THINK TANKS</u>" the <u>American people</u> have had forced on them through the years.

"PLEASE THINK ON THESE THINGS" and hadn't you better apologize to the people of America for suggesting such a man as KISSINGER!

[LC]

THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS

47 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
U. S. A.

DAVID M. KENNEDY
Special Representative
of The First Presidency

August 16, 1974

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I was pleased to learn that you and Mrs. Kissinger and family have been invited by the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to visit the new Washington Temple of our church on Wednesday, September 11.

Mrs. Kennedy and I look forward to greeting you at the temple that day. If we can be of assistance to you, please let us know.

The completion of the Washington Temple is an event of great importance, we believe, to the citizens of this nation and to peoples throughout the world; for the Washington Temple, like the fifteen other Mormon temples in the United States, Switzerland, England, Canada and New Zealand, is more than a building of impressive size and beauty. It is a sacred sanctuary wherein impressive teachings emphasize the dignity of the individual and the sanctity of the family.

Your coming visit to the temple will, we trust, help you to understand the teachings that motivate the members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints on their quest to become exemplary citizens and faithful servants of God.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 17, 1974

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Department of State
Washington, DC

Dear Henry:

I want to add my congratulations on your excel-
lent work in bringing about a disengagement of
Israeli and Syrian forces. What you have done
establishes a firm base for seeking a lasting
settlement of the Middle East conflict.

Please be assured, also, of my continuing high
regard for you and for your efforts, especially
during this difficult time for you. I was
happy to cosponsor the Allen Resolution, and
hope that it will help speed the resolution
of this matter, so that you can again devote
your full attention to your important work
on behalf of world peace.

With best wishes,

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 19, 1975

The Honorable
Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, DC

Dear Henry:

Many thanks for testifying to the Energy Sub-
committee this morning. You were splendid,
and gave us all a much better idea of what
you are trying to do in foreign energy policy.
I know I speak for all my colleagues in saying
that we will work together with you to provide
sound energy policies to achieve our work in
both domestic and foreign policy.

I know that this was an unprecedented visit
to a Subcommittee. I am personally very
much obliged to you, and know that your
appearance has given the Energy Subcommittee
an excellent start.

You may profess to know little economics,
but your performance this morning
certainly disproved it!

With best wishes,

from the office of
Senator Edward M. Kennedy
of Massachusetts

ADDRESS BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY
OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB. NEW YORK CITY

FOR RELEASE: MONDAY, 12:00 NOON/EST

APRIL 12, 1976

Mr. Chairman:

For more than a year, many thoughtful Americans have called for a great national debate on foreign policy. The issue is now firmly part of the Presidential campaign; and every day there is new effort in Congress to understand the place of the United States in the world, and to shape effective policies for the future.

This debate comes none too soon. For now that the cold war is over --- now that the tragedy of Indochina is behind us --- we are a nation in search of guiding principles --- a guiding purpose --- that will help us meet the new and insistent challenges posed by a restless and changing world.

I believe that these guiding principles --- this guiding purpose --- can only be found through a basic effort to understand what is happening in the world, the impact of events on our nation, and the imperatives for thought, for decision, for action.

For a quarter-century after the Second World War, our foreign policy derived from a few simple facts: we emerged from the war the most powerful nation the world has ever known. The burdens of leadership --- in rebuilding ravaged economies, in countering a Soviet challenge to our security and that of many other nations --- fell almost entirely on our shoulders.

With a few exceptions --- notably Vietnam --- we succeeded at what we sought to do. Today, we have unsurpassed military strength. Europe and Japan have become towers of industrial strength. We have helped nearly a hundred new nations begin the long road to economic development. And we have even managed to move beyond the basic cold war confrontation with the Soviet Union.

It should be no surprise, therefore, that Americans are looking for new directions, for new purpose. And success itself has bred new challenge. For as the cold war has waned, new centers of power and action have emerged on the world scene. Our power has not lessened, but that of other nations has grown. And a host of new problems --- new concerns --- has emerged: in the management of the global economy, and in insistent demands for greater economic justice on the part of developing nations. The wind of change is blowing everywhere; and no one can shelter from it.

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The debate we are just beginning thus raises a multitude of questions --- about the imperatives of power; about what we can and cannot do --- should and should not do --- in the outside world; about new forms of acting, and a new selectivity about any involvement at all in the affairs of particular nations.

But of all the questions that are raised, two have assumed central importance in this year's Presidential campaign: can we, as a nation, continue to act in our national interest in the outside world? Can we --- will we --- meet each and every challenge posed by the growth of Soviet military power and involvement in the outside world?

This is not the first time the United States has been faced with similar questions. After the First World War, we rejected responsibility; after the Second, we accepted it. Can we --- will we --- again accept those responsibilities that are inescapably ours to bear?

I believe the answer is a clear and decisive "yes". The American nation has the capacity to act; and the American people have the will to do so.

It is only the terms of this action --- the where, the how, the why --- that is at issue.

Here is the source of today's questioning about American foreign policy --- here is the source of insistent demands for a fundamental debate about our future course in the world. For as the old certainties of the post-war world have been left behind --- as other countries have grown in power and other challenges have emerged --- there is no clear set of ideas and principles to bind together our foreign policy; no basic inspiration that speaks to the hopes, the ideals, the understanding of the American people.

I believe that our difficulties, today, do not derive from any lack of national power --- in any of its forms; rather it comes from a widespread sense that our foreign policy is too often conceived and implemented without due regard for our fundamental purpose as a nation.

Too often, this underlying dimension of foreign policy ---this deeper moral sense --- is left to last --- or ignored altogether. Too often, the expediency of power has become an end in itself, untempered by a sense that power is only a means, and not the end, of national purpose. Too often the American people have become confused by policies that seem to conflict with the goals we proclaim for our nation in the world. It is therefore no surprise that other nations become equally confused by those American actions that seem to belie our own self-interest, that do not reflect the capacity of our nation --- of our people --- to help shape a vision of the future in which all people can share.

In this bicentennial year, we remember our unique heritage as a nation --- the ideals we ceaselessly pursue whatever the failures, the setbacks of the moment. And we must ensure that American involvement in the outside world also reflects what is best in our heritage, and in ourselves.

Only in this way can we expect that the American people will support the foreign policy --- any foreign policy --- of this country. Only then can our military, economic, and political power regain the moral support of our people that alone turns power into strength.

For what lies behind the call for debate on foreign policy is a lesson that derives equally from the two great national crises of our time--- from Vietnam and from Watergate.

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This is a lesson of leadership: the most basic responsibility to maintain the bonds of trust between American leaders and our people that weave the fabric of government . . . the "consent of the governed." In both Vietnam and Watergate, our leaders failed to heed this lesson, at great cost, not just in those areas, but throughout our national life. And only by coming to terms with these two crises . . . and their lesson . . . can we come to terms with our future as a nation.

Yet in this sense, we can use our experience in both Vietnam and Watergate --- in today's debate on domestic and foreign issues --- to recreate the fundamental trust of our people for their government. Our democratic institutions eventually did meet the challenge of both Vietnam and Watergate; now we must use that experience to strengthen our institutions of domestic and foreign policy.

The way in which US foreign policies are made, therefore, is just as important as *what* they are.

There can be no effective Administration action in foreign policy at all unless the people's representatives in Congress are fully involved in shaping the underlying principles of our involvement in the world. There can be no effective action unless the American people understand and support the moral wellsprings of our policy.

Thus there is no inherent conflict between the Congress and the Administration in foreign policy. There is no paralysis of American will and action, as some of our leaders have charged. While many Members of Congress have tried to restrain excessive growth in military spending, the Congress has backed real increases in the Defense budget. And last year we approved every single major weapons system, except for the unneeded and useless ABM.

--- We support vigorous efforts to control the arms race, and to reduce risks of conflict with the Soviet Union.

--- We support the search for peace in the Middle East; and steadily improving relations with the Peoples' Republic of China.

--- We have taken the lead in trying to strengthen the US economy and hence our vital alliances with Europe and Japan;

We led this important democratic experiment in Portugal; and we have led in the effort to restructure the global economy, through positive efforts including rich nations and poor alike.

Congressional challenges in Cyprus, Angola, and over the abuses of the CIA are not national paralysis: they are an assertion of good sense and moral concern, a necessary complement to strong Congressional support for every vital American commitment.

In many of these areas, the Administration has accepted the Congressional position as the wisest course for American foreign policy; in others the Congress has accepted the Administration's lead; in still others the debate continues. The system is working as it should --- as the Constitution provides.

The congressional role is not a challenge to Administration preogatives in the day-by-day conduct of foreign policy; it is rather an essential link in the chain of debate and decision. It will not weaken the United States, at home or abroad. It will strengthen us, both in our own eyes, and in the eyes of other nations.

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The role for Congress goes beyond necessary involvement
in those issues that do not respect lines of division between
foreign and domestic concern --- issues like food and fuel and
trade and the law of the seas. It is a role in understanding the
basic purposes of our nation.

At the same time, we should not seek to recreate a
national consensus on every policy. In a world that is increasingly
complex --- where the pluralism of our domestic life affects issues
that involve us both at home and abroad --- no rigid doctrine
covering every subject is possible; it is not even desirable. But
a basic sense of direction is not only desirable, it is imperative
--- if the people of the United States are to lend their support to
any foreign policy of any Administration --- to give again their
trust to their leaders.

This issue of trust goes to the heart of Congressional
concern over obsessive secrecy in foreign policy --- and Adminis-
tration concern with leaks. For recreating trust in our basic
purposes means that fundamental issues can and must be fully debated
in the open. And if this is done, the incentive to leak secrets
that must be kept for our national security would simply fade
away.

I am confident that we can rebuild that basic trust;
that our leaders can regain the confidence of the American people;
and that as a nation we will then respond to the challenges of the
future.

Creating a foreign policy that has deep roots in our
beliefs as a nation requires allegiance to a number of specific
principles.

First, and most important, we must continue to meet the
imperatives of power: but only where this power is a means to
preventing war --- most important a nuclear war --- and to
securing the peace. For this is a moral as well as a practical
responsibility: the highest responsibility of our foreign policy.

It is clear that the United States must continue to meet
real threats to our security, and to that of other nations vital to
us.

We have built the military strength we need to achieve
this goal; and I have no doubt that we will continue to do so. But
simply increasing the defense budget is not the answer; making raw
comparisons of numbers in the military strength of the Soviet Union
and ourselves tells us little of what we need to know. For the
fact is that we remain the strongest military power on earth ---
and no artificial inflating of Soviet defense spending, no casting
of dark fears for the future --- can alter that fact.

Is it the balance of military power with the Soviet
Union?

--- We have nuclear power at least equal to theirs . . .
while we have three times as many warheads. Our nuclear power is
far greater than we need --- with a capacity to destroy each major
Soviet city nearly 40 times over. A single Poseidon submarine
could destroy 160 cities, each with a warhead three and a half
times the size of the Hiroshima bomb --- and we have thirty-one
Poseidon boats.

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--- We have the most powerful navy in the world, with a firepower and reach that is the envy of the Soviet Union. While we have fewer ships than we have had in the past, they pack a punch that was almost inconceivable only a few short years ago; and that is unavailable to the Soviet Union now.

--- The Russians maintain more men under arms as they have always done, except at the height of the Vietnam War. But that advantage is diminished by the great Soviet commitment of forces to the Chinese front; by the rapid turnover in Soviet draftees; by the need for garrison forces in Eastern Europe; and by our superiority in the quality of weapons and manpower that the Soviet Union simply cannot match.

--- And along with our NATO Allies, we have almost as many forces in Europe as the Warsaw Pact--- forces and a military doctrine that would make a Soviet attack an act of madness, and bring inescapable ruin on the Soviet Union.

Therefore we must understand clearly the true nature of threats to us and to our friends and allies abroad; then build and maintain the forces we need.

This includes breaking the bureaucratic hold of particular interests in the Pentagon that would give us a B-1 bomber --- even while seeking cruise missiles; that would give us more nuclear ships --- and more aircraft carriers we do not need for the world of the 1980s --- instead of attack submarines and smaller surface ships. Increasing the size of the defense budget will give us no extra strength, if what we buy is not relevant to what we need.

This year, the President has asked for an increase in the Pentagon budget of 14 billion dollars --- including 7 billion dollars for real growth.

The Pentagon even included 3 billion dollars as insurance against Congressional cuts. Unfortunately, in this election year, the Congress has not even taken away this unneeded spending.

This afternoon, there will be an effort in the Senate to reduce the budget ceiling for the Pentagon by 2.6 million dollars. I believe that this is a basic step towards the right priorities; and it will still give us more money than we need to build the forces we need.

More important, it is deeply disturbing to hear once again a Pentagon rhetoric to justify the defense budget that grossly inflates Soviet strength, and deflates our own. Not only does that rhetoric distort the facts; but it also is helping to erode basic understandings about the imperatives of working to reduce conflict with the Soviet Union now and for the future. Indeed, the inflated size of the defense budget is less a problem than the terms in which it is justified.

The fact is that we must live together on this planet with the Soviet Union --- whatever conflicts of interest and of ideology divide us, and will continue to do so. Neither nation can hope to win a nuclear war; for in such a war, there would be no winners --- there may even be no

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A critical charge ... our efforts must be to seek
real and positive controls on the nuclear arms race and a
reduction of those tensions that could otherwise lead to
mankind's final war.

We have done much to achieve this goal ---
including a series of arms control agreements that began
with the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. And these agree-
ments are clearly in our national interest.

Now discussions continue to reach a new SALT
agreement. Yet there are voices counselling us to go slow,
to delay, because of the Election Campaign and the risks of
corrosive debate.

I believe that the next SALT agreement is too
important to be a casualty of election politics. When an
Administration is inaugurated next January, there will be
only nine short months in which to replace the 1972 Interim
Agreement on Offensive Missiles, before it expires. That
is simply too much risk to take with the hopes and fears of
mankind. The conclusion last week of the Threshold Test
Ban --- including some on-site inspection for the first time
--- shows that arms control can more forward. And I believe
that the Senate of the United States would ratify a SALT
agreement this year that genuinely advances our interests in
arms control. And we should press on to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

At the same time, I am deeply concerned about a
new weapons development --- the strategic-range cruise
missile --- which could make far more difficult any future
efforts to bring the arms race under control. When we begin
deploying this revolutionary new weapon, the Soviet Union will
inevitably follow suit, and the nuclear spiral will rise out
of control once again.

For this reason, in February I joined with Senators
Humphrey and Javits in proposing that we offer to the Soviet
Union a mutual moratorium on flight-testing of these cruise
missiles: until such time as the issue is resolved at SALT.
In this way, following the precedent set with nuclear testing
in the early 1960s, I believe we can create the climate
needed to reach firm understandings with the Soviet Union
on this new weapon. But if we do not reach those understand-
ings, the resulting problems of verifying and counting nuclear
weapons may require a whole new approach to the SALT talks,
or there will be no arms control at all.

A rapid conclusion of the next SALT agreement is
vital for another reason --- a compelling practical and moral
reason. For if the United States and the Soviet Union do not
back away from their futile competition in overkill, they will
only increase the incentives for other nations to build the
bomb. It does not take the Soviet and American arsenals ---
equivalent to more than a million Hiroshimas --- to wreak a
Hiroshima: It takes just one bomb in the hands of a country
disposed to use it. Yet both we and the Russians are helping
to bring about just such a world of madness, by failing to
take the opportunities we have to end our own nuclear com-
petition, once and for all.

Our need to develop relations with the Soviet Union
does not end with strategic arms control. For it is clear
that there are many other areas in which we must try to
regulate competition:

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— 7 =

--- We need to work more purposefully towards the mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe;

--- We need to challenge the Soviet Union to a practical commitment to peace in the Middle East;

--- We need to draw the Soviet Union more deeply into those economic and commercial relations with the West --- which are in our own economic interest, and with due regard to issues of human rights --- as part of a long-term effort to shape Soviet foreign policy in benign ways;

--- We need to draw it into sharing responsibilities for meeting the great global problems facing mankind --- in food, fuel, the law of the seas, population, the environment, and the oldest scourge of all: the poverty that afflicts most of the world's people.

--- And we need to make clear to our allies in Western Europe, to the nations of Eastern Europe, and to the Soviet Union, itself, that we take seriously the Helsinki Agreement.

There is one particular area where immediate action is needed. Three days from now, moneys appropriated last year for construction of the US naval base at Diego Garcia will be released. Yet this money was originally impounded by the Congress in hopes that the Administration would approach the Russians directly, to seek control over future military and naval deployments in the Indian Ocean. I am deeply concerned at the lack of visible signs that approaches have been made. We are still waiting for the President's report on efforts to raise this issue with the Russians. For on the basis of my own talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow, I believe that this is an area where we can make real progress --- where we can head off yet another arms race, and reduce tension in yet another area of the world.

In recent months, there has been a widespread debate about the word *detente*. I believe it is healthy to question each and every aspect of our relationship with the Soviet Union --- reaching agreements in our mutual interest where we can, meeting Soviet challenge where we must. It is important that the Russians understand the consequences of their actions.

They must understand that the process of our building relations with them cannot and will not go on in isolation from what they do in the outside world. Their involvement in places like Angola --- or ours in Vietnam --- inevitably makes it more difficult to reach understandings elsewhere, that can reduce the chances of conflict between us.

But we must not permit the air to be poisoned with artificial debate about an abstraction --- we must not deny the real benefits we have gained --- the ABM Treaty, the Offensive Missiles Agreement, reduced tensions in Europe, and the reduced threat of nuclear war. For if we do so, we may be unable to seize real chances to further reduce tensions; to further regulate competition; and to gain a final end to the nuclear arms race. And no one would forgive us --- or the Russians --- for opportunities lost to move the world away from war.

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[LC]

As we seek to influence the future course of Soviet policy, we must also see clearly where our interests are truly at stake --- as in Europe, Japan, the Middle East, and Latin America --- and where they are not. It is clear to me that in seeking to become involved in Angola we did nothing to advance our larger purposes. Had the Congress not acted as it did, we would have placed ourselves on the wrong side in Southern Africa. We would have been remembered there only for having supported the white-dominated regime of South Africa.

Nor do I believe that we lost any opportunity to shape Soviet policy in the future; or advertised that our national will was weak. For showing friend and foe alike that we have the will to defend our vital interests --- and those of our friends and allies --- does not mean matching the Soviet Union in self-defeating adventures in far-off corners of the world. Rather it means showing that we know the difference between important challenges to our interests, and actions by the Soviet Union that do not have a significant impact on those interests. If our will is now being questioned abroad, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. It can only be undone by the Administration's showing it understands where it is important to act, and where it is not.

In southern Africa, we can help deny future opportunities to the Russians and Cubans by recognizing that a moral policy --- support for majority rule --- is also in our self-interest. There is little merit in now issuing warnings to the Cubans, when a practical alternative lies in finally building a policy for southern Africa that is in our interest, and in the interest of that region's future, as well.

The Administration's Angola policy was also a vivid example of the wrong way to conduct foreign policy, in the interests of gaining the trust of the American people. Covert action and a misperception of American interests: This was a sure recipe for losing the confidence of the American people; and for needlessly raising doubts about American purpose in the minds of our friends abroad.

Let us not be no mistake: The American people will stand behind our vital commitments, because they share a common understanding about what is most important to us. But they will not support policies unless they reflect our interests, and are decided in a way that is consonant with our democratic process.

As part of a foreign policy that will gain the -first- support of the American people, we must be directly and vitally involved in the search for peace in areas where we have deep and legitimate concerns. Above all, this means continuing our efforts to help bring peace to the Middle East --- to help lift the yoke of continuing conflict from the shoulders of Arab and Jew alike.

The support of the American people for peace in the Middle East --- and for Israel's security --- is real and deep. Progress has been made in the Sinai agreement; and we must miss no opportunity to move forward.

We must also be prepared to offer our good offices in the interests of peace --- as in the Lebanon, today. Yet at the same time, we must not act anywhere in ways that will make conflict more likely. Today, we are clearly violating this principle by contributing to the massive flow of weapons to the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the developing world. Instead, we must work with arms buyers and sellers alike, to prevent new arms races that could lead to bloodshed, untold human suffering, and the risk of direct US involvement in local conflict.

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Our involvements of any kind must be selective; they must involve interests of the United States that are clear to our people; they must be turned in the direction of peace. I believe the American people will support this approach to American involvements; but they will rightly reject an approach that exaggerates our interests, that involves us where we are not wanted, that frustrates efforts for peace.

A foreign policy that has a true popular basis must also go beyond these concerns with power and peace. It must also enable us to play our part in meeting the great economic and other challenges facing this country --- and all of ... mankind. While we must meet the demands of our relationship with the Soviet Union, we must not be so preoccupied with these issues that we neglect our allies, overplay the significance of great power politics, and ignore both the problems and the possibilities that exist elsewhere in the world. We also risk exaggerating the significance of the Russians' military power, and both missing the significance of its economic weakness, and our own political, economic, and moral potential as a nation in the outside world. It is not the Soviet Union that is able to work to restructure the global economy, involving both rich countries and poor. It is not the Soviet Union that is grappling with problems of an interdependent world: it is the United States.

Yet we have missed the critical opportunities --- particularly in our relations with Western Europe and Japan. Two years ago, the energy crisis hit other industrial states far harder than it did us. And the US recession exported unemployment to those countries, following unprecedented inflation.

But we have not used the last two years as effectively as we could to build new political, economic, and energy relations with our partners that will sustain and promote a vital cooperation for the future.

We must understand that much of the uneasiness in Europe and Japan about American national will does not relate to our actions in Vietnam or Angola, but rather to a neglect of essential ties --- both political and economic --- and of underlying issues.

--- We need to revive the US economy, which is still the world's leading engine of economic growth.

--- We must end our ambivalent attitude towards the European community, and finally give it our strong and unwavering support.

--- We must do our part in meeting the problems of energy, where we lag behind in the vital area of conservation;

--- We must challenge our trading partners to join in avoiding a new surge of protectionism, in which all of us would lose;

--- And we must lend our support --- but not our warnings --- to European efforts to grapple with problems facing countries like Italy.

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We can help: through our own economic recovery; through major economic support for Italy; and through showing a basic confidence in our European allies' good sense . . . in their deep devotion to democratic values.

Our economic relations with the outside world begin with our industrial trading partners --- but they do not end there. For we find in our own backyard --- in Latin America --- a continued estrangement, because of paternalistic policies, that strikes at our vital interest in the development of that continent and its many peoples. A long-delayed trip by the Secretary of State, after 7 years of Administration neglect towards friends to the South, cannot by itself right the balance. We have yet to define a policy that reflects our own preference for democratic governments which are committed to social justice --- a policy that rejects intervention like that in Chile which sullied our image --- a policy that reflects the wide diversity in development which is the reality of the hemisphere today.

There is something wrong with a policy which accords a government, like that in Brazil, primary visibility in the hemisphere, while human and political rights in that nation continue to be abused. And there is something wrong with a policy that has permitted military aid to be a major fulcrum of our influence and involvement in the hemisphere.

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We are still distant from a policy that responds
to the development needs of the hundreds of millions of
poor people in Latin America.

We also find in Africa and Asia a similar rise
in the aspirations of people that will not be denied. And
we find a world of growing interdependence: where far more
countries are important to us than ever before; where human
concerns are uppermost in people's minds.

After two years of fruitless efforts to confront
the oil-producing states, the Administration last year finally
agreed to pursue a cooperative approach with nations of the
developing world. The results have been remarkable.
At the North-South Conference last December, and in
meetings since then, rhetoric has been replaced with
reason; acrimony with a desire for common action. Together,
developed and developing states have taken the first steps
towards forging a basis of common understanding on the problems
and the interests which are shared by rich nation and poor
alike.

The rebuilding of the global economy will also
benefit us through benefitting more nations and peoples than
ever before. It will not happen overnight. It will require
give and take on both sides. And it will not be without
sacrifice. Yet the alternative is a world of growing anarchy
--- a world in which the demands of the disadvantaged reduce
even our ability to sustain our own prosperity. For it is
now clear that the United States is firmly, finally, and
forever involved in the global economy. The possibility of
an economic Fortress America has been ended just as surely
as our military Fortress America was ended forever in the
Second World War. Isolationism may remain a slogan for a
few; it is a practical policy for no one.

A forthcoming approach to the demands of interdependence also reflects our moral interest in the outside world. It contains the basis for support by the American people, reflecting our values as a people. Meeting the challenges of interdependence --- responding with generosity to the have-not peoples of the world --- is part of the same American spirit that led us to begin the Marshall Plan, and to provide help without precedent to the developing world. This is an effort worthy of our ideals as a nation; it involves the energies of our people, on the farm and in the factory; and it is clearly and firmly in the pursuit of peace.

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As we look beyond the importance of power --- the demands of interdependence --- there are other principles for a foreign policy that can engage the moral concerns of the American people --- that can meet the demands of the late 1970s.

--- We must understand that particular acts of our nation --- based on moral grounds --- can also be in our direct self-interest. This is clearly true in Southern Africa. It is true in Southern Europe, where our support for dictators in Portugal, Spain, and Greece struck at European efforts to increase security, in the broadest sense, through a community of democratic states. And our support for democratic efforts in Portugal today is vital to the future of European society. The coincidence of moral and self-interest is also true in Korea, where systematic repression erodes American public support for that nation, and threatens to erode Korea's cohesion and security. By contrast, our support for human values in South Korea is not only right, it is also likely to strengthen that nation.

--- We must also increasingly seek to understand other countries in their own terms, instead of seeing them as extensions of American experience. This is a responsibility shared by all our institutions --- by government, our schools, the media. For it is clear that our continuing involvement in the outside world --- and the need to be selective in our involvementss --- requires far more understanding than ever before of other nations and peoples.

--- We must increase public education about the demands of power in the modern world; but at the same time increase the education of our leaders about the equally compelling demands for a moral basis to policy and action:

--- We must demonstrate our concerns --- at home and abroad --- for basic issues of human rights. But at the same time, we must not over-estimate our ability to act; ignore the dilemmas that often arise; or seek to impose our own form of society on other nations.

--- We must abandon our belief that everything that happens in the world affects us, and that our influence or involvement can everywhere be decisive. A foreign policy that can gain the support of the American people must be as precise in limiting US involvement as in accepting it.

--- And we need to understand an entirely different aspect of our foreign involvement: that undertaken by individuals and institutions outside the government. This applies especially to corporations abroad --- where their impact on particular nations can be just as decisive as actions by our government itself. Here too, an effective foreign policy must have a moral dimension, as part of the overall fabric of our relations with other states and peoples.

Finally, we in the United States must recognize our great potential for leadership. In today's world, this often means leadership shared with other nations; but our responsibility is no less real.

As I have travelled to many nations around the world, I have been impressed by the widespread belief in our basic political and economic strength; by the search for American leadership in meeting the great global issues facing mankind; by a continuing sense that this nation can inspire others to great deeds.

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In view of the storms we have weathered in recent
years, it may be natural that I often find a greater confi-
dence in the United States --- in our potential for leader-
ship and constructive effort --- when I travel abroad, than
when I hear America characterized by many of our leaders.

For despite the tragedy of Vietnam --- despite
compromises with expediency or to meet the demands of power
--- we must recall what the American experience has meant to
the world. This is the nation whose gallant men of Lexington
and Concord fired the shot heard round the world: The nation
Lincoln called "the last best hope of mankind"; the refuge
for tens of millions of people fleeing oppression abroad,
and seeking a new beginning; the nation whose ideals --- if
not always whose actions --- still inspire hope in men and
women in the farthest corners of the most distant land.

Our own experience has been tempered by tragedy,
by the burdens of responsibility, by a foreign policy that
has too often been cut loose from its deep moral roots.
Yet in that experience of two centuries the seeds of common
cause with the rest of mankind remain. We are not a people
too paralyzed to act in the outside world; too preoccupied
with our own problems; too calloused by the past. Rather we
are a people whose time of inspiration, of leadership, is
still unfolding; a nation of basic strengths requiring only a
renewed sense of moral purpose to lead us to new greatness
in the future.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

September 11, 1975

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As all Americans, I watched prayerfully your most recent
Mid-East endeavors. I only want to add my congratulations
to the multitudes you already have received.

Your personal efforts have done so much to bring us closer
to a time when peace can be more a reality than a hope that
it is hard to find words to express the heartfelt appreciation
which so many feel. Knowing as I do the depth of your
commitment and the extraordinary effort which is involved
in the process, it is even harder to find a way to say we
are grateful and congratulate you.

Jean joins me in sending our very best to you and Nancy.

Warmest personal regards,

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL
1776-1976

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 109

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ACTION SS-20

INFO OCT-01 EUR-06 ISO-00 DRC-01 RSC-01 029 W
033719

R 071547Z JAN 74
PM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6834

UNCLAS LONDON 00195

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: UK, PFOR
SUBJ: LETTER TO SECRETARY FROM LORD KENNET

1. AMBASSADOR ANNENBERG HAS RECEIVED A LETTER FROM LORD KENNET, CHAIRMAN OF INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE AND LABOUR MEMBER OF HOUSE OF LORDS, SAYING THAT WHEN DR. KISSINGER WAS IN LONDON LAST MONTH HE ASKED LORD KENNET TO COME TO WASHINGTON TO SEE HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER JANUARY 10, 1974. KENNET FURTHER STATES THAT HIS LETTER TO THE SECRETARY REQUESTING A CONVENIENT DAY HAS RECEIVED NO REPLY AND ASKS AMBASSADOR TO MAKE INQUIRY.

2. REQUEST APPROPRIATE REPLY TO PASS TO LORD KENNET.

SOHM

UNCLASSIFIED

Dear Wayland:

I found your letter of June 24 when I returned
from the Soviet Union and Western Europe. I am sorry
that both in Ottawa and London I was not left a free
minute to see or talk with you because I really do
want to have a long talk.

The so-called secret SALT deal, which later
became a "loophole," was a canard the minute it was
raised. I have tried in lengthy press conference
statements, which I enclose, as well as Congressional
testimony and discussions with European leaders to put
it to rest. My impression from the meetings with var-
ious Western leaders is that the insanity that produced
this non-issue has not traveled across the Atlantic.
So far, it has not been raised again here, though in
the present climate I cannot vouch that it will not be.
The Soviets, incidentally, never asserted the rights
they allegedly acquired, nor have they undertaken any
weapons programs even remotely pertinent.

On the general question of US-European relations,
I was quite encouraged by my trip. I think there has
been a healthy clearing of the air and the spirit is
better than I have known it for years. This of course
does not in and of itself solve problems but it does
establish a much better basis for dealing with the
issues, especially the tough economic ones. My only
regret is that a year had to be wasted before we got
to this point.

Lord Kennet,
100 Bayswater Road,
London W.2.,
England.

24th June, 1974.

Dr. Henry Kissinger.

Dear Henry,

Nearly made it that time! I mean nearly made it to see you when we were in the same hotel in Ottawa.

This letter is simply to record something obvious: our extreme alarm at the Nitze episode. Obviously the allegations of a private deal at odds with the public deal on SALT I are extremely dangerous for relations between the United States and Western Europe, and this is simply to say how important I think it is that this issue be laid to rest by a fuller rather than shorter account from you yourself of what happened. The kind of figures mentioned fit unpleasantly closely to those of the U.K. and French SLBMs that the Russians have claimed, unilaterally, on various occasions, to include in the Interim Agreement.

For us over here of course it's about a thousand times as important as the bugging nonsense: whenever I hear you attacked by them my blood boils. I should like to hear some of your detractors give their opinion of how you can run a sovereign state without secrets.

Love from Liz and to Nancy. I was hearing from Mr. Rockefeller about her role in the Commission on Critical Choices for Americans, and was somewhat impressed between the similarity between that and my Europe plus Thirty operation.

Dictated by Lord Kennet
and signed in his absence.

Clearwater, Fla.

Jan. 20, 1970.

William P. Rogers,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Honorable Sir:

I am just a retiree from
Michigan, spending my winters in
Florida.

I have just read your inter-
view with the editors of the U.S. News
& World Report.

I want to congratulate you
on your very precise and intelligent
replies to their questions. I enjoyed
the article very much.

Wishing you continued success
as Secretary of State, I am