Thurs., 10/3/74 12:01 a.m.

BACKGROUNDER BY SECRETARY KISSINGER
AT WALDORF, New York

(ON BACKGROUND UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

AMBASSADOR ANDERSON: This will be ON BACKGROUND -- i.e., no direct quotations; attributable to a senior U. S. official, or senior U. S. officials. And the Secretary may choose at some point to go ON DEEP BACKGROUNDED in which case there is no reference to direct or indirect statements to the Secretary or U. S. officials.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me do it by subject. Why don't you start?

Q Mr. Secretary, could you address yourself to a story that's in today's *Times* about --

A Well, Bernie, forgive me if I tell him I haven't read the *Times* yet. (Laughter.)

Q Well, this isn't Bernie's story. The story says the United States, at the meeting last weekend, requested that the consumers make a coordinated, substantial cut in their oil consumption; and the figure of 15 percent was cited in the story.

A Look, at the request of all of the other countries there, we have kept the content of the meeting and the various ideas that were being explored secret. This was at the urgent request of all of the governments involved and, therefore, I'm in a very difficult position either to confirm it or deny it. It's not necessarily our preference, but they all felt that they could study

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study the problem better and deal with it more effectively
if there were no public discussion of it now.

Q You mean it hasn't even leaked in Tokyo
yet, sir? (Laughter.)

A It's incredible -- (laughter) -- DEEP BACKGROUND -- OFF THE RECORD -- (laughter). It's the one meeting that I've attended with Japanese that hasn't leaked.

Q Did you discuss oil with Saqqaf today?

A I did discuss oil with Saqqaf.

Q In what terms?

A It was a very constructive meeting.

Q Did you discuss it --

A I mean, actually we did go to the further -- future -- evolution. It was a useful meeting.

Q Do you plan to be in Saudi Arabia next week at some point?

A No.

Q On this trip you will not go there?

A No. As I have said repeatedly, I am not engaged in a campaign on oil prices. I had to discuss the oil prices to define the nature of the problem.

Q Mr. Secretary, behind all this about the oil, there seem to be several stories that you feel we're facing a political-economic catastrophe involving

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totalitarian tactics of whatever nature -- with West
European governments -- of whatever result.

A Do you want to comment on this one,
Bernie? (Laughter.)

Q I leave it to you. (Laughter.)

Q Do you see this as your view?

A Well, let me handle this ON DEEP BACKGROUND
as part of the discussion. Let me put it in my words.

I believe that the economic consequences of the
balance of payments, as they have now developed, are
going to involve major political consequences within
the industrialized world, with the flow of investment funds,
and the difficulty of meeting the balance of payments,
and in the relationship of the advanced industrialized
world to the OPEC world of a nature that will involve
political consequences. And I think it is an obligation
of the countries concerned to look at these political
consequences to see what they choose to do about it
or what can be done about it.

I repeat: This is ON DEEP BACKGROUND.

Q Do you think that the nations are capable
of doing anything about it, given their current structures?

A I believe there are always two problems. I
think leadership has an obligation to make clear what the

problems are that are
soluble with difficulty, and we will see whether we
are capable of dealing with them.

Q Mr. Secretary, the article that I mentioned
earlier refers to reluctance on the part of some of the
consumers that you met with -- the representatives of
the consumer nations -- on grounds that any concerted action
they might take might provoke a confrontation with producers
and lead to some kind of renewal.

A I won't go into the meeting, but we went
into this problem at the Washington Energy Conference
and the basic choice before we made was whether we
will wait passively while others impose their solutions
on them or whether, if necessary, an attempt by them to mangle
their own fate is going to be considered a "confrontation."
I don't see why it should be considered a confrontation
to deal with problems that are produced by certain conditions
in a cooperative manner, and I don't believe that this is
an insoluble problem.

Q Mrs. Secretary, could you explain a bit
further what you mean when you say that the economic
consequences of balance of payments as now developed are
going to involve major political consequences? Could you
explain this a little further?

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A Well, again ON DEEP BACKGROUND -- well, simply analytically. When you have major balance of payments problems, there are three ways you can deal with them: either by an inflation -- in which case you are going to have obvious domestic consequences in terms of labor relations, disintegrating middle class and the whole party structure; second, you can do it by the cooperative effort of the countries concerned; or you can do it with the assistance of the countries that are producing the deficit.

If you do the latter, it has foreign policy consequences because it gives, for example, a country like Libya the right to determine under what conditions it will bail out the debtors. And this is a fact of life which has to be looked at.

When I say "like Libya," it gives the creditor country the right.

Q But I understand your original remark to imply that Libya, or a country like Libya which might have the right to decide, would not use this in a fashion that might be satisfactory to the debtor.

A It might or it might not.

Q Why not?

A At any rate, it would have the right to decide.

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I'm not saying it wouldn't be satisfactory.
I'm saying that the decision to put your political future
into the hands of another country is a major decision.

It may turn out this is a beneficent country --
as we all know Libya is. (Laughter.) I didn't want to
make any aspersions here.

Q You better put that ON THE RECORD though?

A Heh? (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Secretary, are you having any difficulty
within the Administration of convincing other people of
the seriousness of this?

A No. We have a group that has developed
this general approach -- which is unanimous.

Q But did the Faisal interview --

A Of course, they are all members of my
family. (Laughter.)

Q Did the Faisal interview cause any ...

Q Is everybody in the group?

A I am not conscious of any internal quarrels
within the Administration on this approach. I'm not aware
of any, but I don't know what every last domestic agency
thinks about all the long-term implications. My impression
is though that certainly Treasury, the Federal Reserve
Bank -- all the people that we have involved -- are unanimous

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in the approach.

Q Did the Faisal interview in Newsweek cause any concern? Has he applied any pressure to speed up a settlement in the Middle East, threatening to cut off oil or otherwise? No?

A No; there's nothing new in that.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you bring us up to date on your talks with the Turks and the Greeks since the other night?

A I'll do that ON DEEP BACKGROUND again.

Not much has happened since I met with you, except that I've seen Makarios today and then I saw the Foreign Minister of Cyprus again this afternoon. And Joe Sisco has been meeting with the political director of Mavros, and we are still in the stage that I described to you earlier -- of trying to define elements that might lead to progress. And, obviously, we still face the problem that I described to you earlier: that not all of the parties feel they are in a position to avow everything that is going on.

So we are keeping ourselves in this position in order to take into account the domestic exigencies of the various parties -- in which all of whom seem to be having elections. (Laughter.)

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Q How about the Middle East? Where does that stand?

A Well, I met with Allon today -- Saqqaf. I may see Bouteflika again tomorrow morning -- I will see Bouteflika again tomorrow morning.

Well, we're trying to define the elements of the next step, and I think we'll have to wait now until I get out there.

Don't expect the same sort of diplomacy as was characteristic of the first phase. I do not intend -- or I do not anticipate -- a shuttle diplomacy, as the initial element anyway of the negotiation.

Q Would you participate again in a shuttle diplomacy at a future date?

A Well, I can make my decision on this. My basic view is that it is not desirable for the Secretary of State to stake the United States on every negotiation in all its details from the very beginning. Now, if we come to a crucial point where, you know, one can plausibly feel that an effort of, say, an Aswan shuttle-type sale of wheat might be useful, I would certainly have to consider it. But a 32-day effort I would think extremely unlikely.

Q What if in the U. S. policy toward Palestinians -- toward creation of a Palestinian national state, or

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with the representation of Palestinians in Geneva
with the pre-conditions they have set for participation in
Geneva?

A Well, so far, we are not yet in Geneva
and we've got to prepare that conference very carefully.
So what our attitude will be in Geneva is hard to pre-
dict because I don't know yet what framework will be
established for this conference and how it will in fact
develop.

Q Mr. Secretary --

A Our attitude in general towards the Palestinian
question is the one that I explained at the press conference
in Jerusalem and I have attempted to reiterate since.
We believe that the most effective way to make progress
on the West Bank is to have negotiations between Jordan
and Israel. And I think it is most compatible with the
history; it is most compatible with the Israeli perception
of the problem; and it leaves open future evolutions which
can be discussed.

Q Why are you going back now?

A Back where?

Q To the Middle East. You have had three
rounds -- three rounds all preliminary -- and you take
back something to be ratified by the top leadership.

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A No, no; no, no. There will not be a dramatic outcome on this trip. I'll say the chances are 15,000 to 1. Bernie, do you believe that? A million to one?

Q That's translatable as 3 to 1.

A No. (Laughter.) We're not aiming for, and I could not describe to you what an announceable outcome of this trip would be. I haven't talked to Sadat and Assad. I haven't talked to the leaders there. I'm coming at their request. By that time also, the Israelis -- as Rabin has said publicly -- will have put some of their ideas into more concrete form than heretofore. So I think it will be a step forward towards negotiation more than the general -- and more specific and precise than the exploratory talks we've been having all summer.

Q But can you expect a decision on the next phase to come out of the next trip?

A Not in an unambiguous way.

Q Can you say at this time you are looking towards negotiations between the Israelis and the Egyptians

--

A I'd like to --

Q -- an opposed to the Jordanians?

A I'd like to defer judgment on that until I've

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been there -- for whichever of these negotiations will
come first, or if any of them will come simultaneously.

Q Can I get clarification? You did not expect an announcement to come out of the next phase of this, and you said "Not in an unambiguous way."

A No. Frankly, I don't expect an announcement of the next phase.

Q What do you expect?

A I expect the definition of the next phase but not necessarily the announcement.

Again ON DEEP BACKGROUND: Look at the problem all of these bodies have. They all have to go to the Arab Summit. They all have the problem of showing both unity and progress. And those two are not so easy to reconcile.

And, therefore, I don't expect that the various parties want extraordinary explicitness.

Q Well, when would you expect an announcement of the next phase? After the Arab Summit sometime?

A I think as events unfold -- I think some understanding of what comes next.

Q It sounds as though you're almost talking about the possibility of a Geneva Conference.

A No.

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Q No?

Q Are the Syrians going to be patient?

A It's not a trait you usually associate with Syrians (laughter), but it's --

Q Mr. Secretary --

A We're all going to have a merry year. (Laughter.) I don't know.

Q Have they agreed, or have you worked out any agreement, on the UN Observer Force extension with the Syrians?

A Let me go OFF THE RECORD. My experience with the Syrians is that whatever will get settled will be done rather late in the game; and the more nervousness you fellows show and the more often you badger them, the higher the price will go.

Anyone who has ever dealt with Syrians will tell you that to ask them three months before the decision is due on what they're going to do is impossible. They wouldn't do it if less were involved. So the answer is: You couldn't expect an agreement now.

Q You're putting the responsibility on us then.

A No. I'm saying -- I'm constantly being asked: "Have you got an agreement?" I'm not putting the responsibility on you. I'm saying the fact is -- this

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is still OFF THE RECORD, just to help you understand it
as this thing develops -- in all my experience with the
Syrians -- and those of you who were on the shuttle
with me will remember -- they make their concession ten
seconds before midnight (laughter). And I've never known
them to make -- you don't know whether it's a concession
or they make a move before you. They may make it a
week before - two weeks before, but they wouldn't do it
now.

Q If I can go back to oil for a minute --
after the round of speeches by you and the President and
Simon, there was some speculation in Washington that
you thought you could live with the current level of oil
prices but were really trying to hold off any increase.

A Look, first of all -- I hate to keep
putting everything on DEEP BACKGROUND, but I also have to
put this on DEEP BACKGROUND. If you look at the evolution
of oil policy, it is certainly over all the policies
we're pursuing; it's the one that we are trying to be
most long-range about.

That doesn't mean it's right; but, at any rate,
if you look at the Pilgrims speech, the Washington Energy
Conference, the speech to the Special Session of the
General Assembly, the negotiation of the Energy Agreement,

14

you can see a pattern that has been deliberately followed
here, and that had its own momentum. And the theme has
been essentially the same -- namely, that the oil prices
are producing an enormous dislocation.

We have to call attention to this -- one, in
terms of prices, of possibly getting them reduced --
but, secondly, even if they can not be reduced, of calling
attention to the imperative of action by the consumers
to deal even with their own internal problems among
each other.

After all, the shifting of some investment
funds by perfectly legitimate means in a totally non-malicious
manner could bring about the economic collapse of a country.
So something has to be set up to prepare against this
contingency, and this is what we're trying to do systematically.

We had to put the various building blocks into
place. We had to get the Emergency Sharing Program agreed
before we could take a next step. This is what has
driven the sequence of events.

Q When you were talking tonight with the
Chinese, did you bring up the speech that they made today --

A Yes.

Q -- and the references to oil in it -- which
were hardly the references they might make if they were

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really friendly toward us -- encouraging the Third World
to go right ahead and do it more? Did you in any way
sort of illustrate --

A The Third World depends to no extent
on what the Chinese say --

Q Yes.

A -- and the Chinese have a problem in
positioning themselves in terms of their security problem
on the twin pillars that are not necessarily consistent
on whatever relationship they have with us and the
support of the Third World. So I think the speech ought
to be seen in that context.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you care to expand
on your remarks today to the Latin American Foreign
Ministers, where you said --

A Do you think I remember them now? (Laughter.)

Q Sorry?

A Are you assuming that I remember them?
(Laughter.)

Q Well, let me re-read to you --

Q Maybe the African speech.

Q Let me re-read to you a quote. "We are
prepared to discuss" --

A Can I tell you gentlemen, OFF THE RECORD, the

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disaster that occurred at the African lunch that may not
have been obvious to you?

In the whole history of my incumbency as
Secretary of State, I have never yet given a toast that
was prepared for me by some others. At any rate, a
toast was prepared -- unbeknownst to me -- and given to the
Africans. (Laughter.) The Africans prepared a reply.
I gave a toast, to which the reply absolutely did not
fit. (Laughter.) And the poor girl from Uganda found
herself in the position that she had an eloquent toast
thanking me for things I didn't say -- taking exception
to things I also didn't say (laughter)-- and to frantically
re-vוּלɪוּ at while she sat at the table with me and get
it approved by the Organization of American Unity -- all
in the space of one hour. (Laughter.)

Now, what about the toast?

Q You said this afternoon: "We are prepared
to discuss our political relations with the Western Hemisphere
and the restructuring of the OAS with an open mind" --

A Right.

Q -- "and paying careful heed to the predominant
views of our American friends in the OAS."

A Right.

Q Now, I'm just a poor country boy and I have
difficulty understanding what you mean. Could you be more

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explicit?

A What I mean then is if the majority of the OAS has a view on something, we will take it very seriously. It doesn't mean, necessarily we will accept it; but it will certainly be one important factor in shaping our decision.

Q Are you talking about people saying --

A But we've been discussing restructuring of the OAS. It's not a new thing. We've been discussing this for at least a year.

Q Does that include excluding the United States from membership?

A No. I know that the new Assistant Secretary has written --

Q Yes.

A -- an article on that -- an article of which I was aware before I asked him to join us.

Q There was some mention of it over the weekend in Havana.

A Oh, really? Oh, yes -- but not in connection with Rogers. No, that is not under discussion.

Q Did you find the Javits-Pell trip helpful?

A They went there as private citizens. It's neither -- it wasn't unhelpful. It doesn't make any --

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Q Mr. Secretary --

A -- I don't think it's that tough a problem.

Q Mr. Secretary, last time we saw you on Monday, you said that you might have some thoughts to express to us about the Eagleton Amendment. And since then, of course, the Senate has passed the bill. Could you tell us now -- at least, FOR THE RECORD, if possible --

A FOR THE RECORD? No.

Q -- or ON BACKGROUND?

A What?

Q What you have to say about the Eagleton Amendment -- and, also, about the bill with the three amendments.

A Which amendment?

Q These amendments that have been tacked on.

Q It was two.

A I don't know.

Q One was Chile; the other was Turkey; and --

A Chile? I know about the Chile amendment. What about the other?

Q Chile, Turkey?

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Q Fertilizers for Viet-Nam.

Q Viet-Nam fertilizers.

A Oh -- the amendment on Turkey.

It is totally counter-productive. It does not help Greece; it doesn't help Karamanlis. And it is destructive of the negotiations. That is my firm conviction on the subject. And it is very unfortunate that these amendments have been at this particular moment.

Q Is this ON THE RECORD?

A No.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is the U. S. position on safeguards for the plants in Egypt and in Israel; and will the United States require inspection of all plants within these countries if we 'be to give them?

A We have submitted refined safeguards to both of these countries on the reactors and have run into some opposition with respect to them.

I would not draw the obvious conclusion necessarily -- not necessarily in Egypt -- so there are some objections to the safeguards we are asking.

Q From Egypt or from Israel?

A Well --

Q You said "not necessarily in Egypt"

A I would say there are some concerns in Israel, some concerns in Egypt.

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Q Well, what sort of opposition?

A Well, I don't want to go into the details but, at any rate, we have submitted them and we are trying to negotiate it; and we are trying to develop safeguards which we can then make a model of -- safeguards that could become internationally accepted.

Q Do these safeguards apply to other reactors than those you are proposing to supply?

A Well, that's one of the issues.

Q Mr. Secretary, if there's some concern or if there's some opposition to them and you proposed what I take to be serious ideas on safeguards, then what's the problem? They either accept them under our safeguards or they don't. And wasn't that the original understanding?

A That will be one of the decisions that has to be made, unless you can find equally good safeguards that meet a particular objection. I mean, we have an obligation to look -- we will make an effort to look at it with an open mind.

Q Mr. Secretary, it's been more than an hour since you had dinner with the Chinese, so you are hungry again.

A It's been Western food. (Laughter.)

Q Can you tell us some of the points of

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discussion that you exchanged with the Chinese that
might be helpful in furthering relations?

A Well, it was an extremely friendly
exchange of views, and it was really a good <u>au naturel</u> of the world and of our relationships.

Q Did you set a date for going there?

A We talked about it -- about possibilities
-- and we'll set it within the next two or three weeks.

Q Did you get any news about the health of
Chou en-Lai?

A No.

Q "Next two or three days," you said?

A Two or three weeks.

Q That you will set a date -- is that it?

A We will set a date, I would hope, by the
end of the month -- or early the following month
-- for the end of the year or early the following year.

Q There's no possibility of your
going from Japan or Korea?

A I really will have to see. What we've been
discussing is what I've said: the end of the year or early
the following year.--

Q Mr. Secretary, could I come back, just for
a moment, on the --]

22

A -- although I don't totally exclude
that.

Q John, could I ask a question just
on China?

Q Yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, you remember there was some
new formulation of language concerning a one-China
policy,at your last press conference --

A That's right.

Q As and at that time you had said that the
Department would study this and perhaps draft some kind
of a response -- or would have some kind of a statement
on that particular part of the communique.

A Not the statement. We would say -- we
would look at the significance of that phrase to see
whether it permitted a particular opening.

Now, the first thing to keep in mind -- again,
I'd rather do this on BACKGROUND -- is that the...
rubric of "normalization of good relations" for keeping
an Embassy is not an end in itself. The Chinese have
good embassies with India and a lousy relationship; they
have a Liaison Office with us and essentially a good
relationship. And, therefore, the question of normalization
is not an end in itself. Every time I go, there's a sort of

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self-induced deadline, and to a self-induced target --
as if that were the primary purpose.

The primary purpose is to have a good relationship.
What form that good relationship takes is really, basically,
a secondary issue. Obviously, we have in the Shanghai
Communique stated that normalization is our ultimate goal,
so we do review it from time to time and we did discuss it
today, but I think it's safe to say on a non-urgent basis.
I mean, not on the basis -- and it is certainly going to
remain a subject of current discussion between us.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q How can they be so patient with the Taiwan
problem still unsolved and not much progress being made
in solving it?

A Well, frankly, I would say that's
their problem and not ours. I mean, we don't have any
reason to be more impatient than they are.

Q No; but I marvel at their patience when
this particular issue --

A It may be a necessity.

Q Sorry?

A It may be a necessity.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q When you said you have no influence --

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Q I remember Secretary Rogers said we agreed in principle.

A Well, we agreed in principle last year -- it tends to get into some obstruse points, which I seem to learn every three months and then forget again. Right now I'm in a forgetting phase. (Laughter.) But I had it, really, clearly in mind last year when I was there; and I thought we had an agreement in principle. In fact, we did have agreement in principle.

Q Yes. Rogers announced an agreement in principle.

A Yes; there was an agreement in principle.

Q And there was another one there in November?

A In November there was an agreement in principle with some specificity, and then three months later it started unraveling.

I've now forgotten again what's involved. There's some Belgian money involved -- some money in a Belgian bank that has to be re-paid by somebody. I'll learn it again. On the trip there I'll be a tiger on the subject. (Laughter.) Why it has unraveled now, I don't know.

Q A paper tiger!

A It could be connected with internal Chinese --

25

Q You mean it is their unraveling, not ours?

A It is their unraveling, not ours.

Q Mr. Secretary, some months ago you said the Chinese were putting out unhappy signals about the Chinese Communique -- obviously referring to the Consulate in Taiwan and so forth. Has that displeasure now been removed?

A It is interesting that whatever these signals were -- and they were no doubt serious, since they came from many sources -- they never reached official channels; and no Chinese diplomat -- either to me or to any of my associates -- ever repeated the criticisms.

I know what you're talking about -- of sending Unger to Taiwan and opening two Consulates here. That Consequence simply never arose.

So in our dealing with them, it never really reached a point of stating displeasure.

My own sense of it is that, right now, the relations -- I mean, the tangible level -- are a few notches warmer than they were three months ago. But three months ago I wouldn't have felt any displeasure; I would just say they have made a special effort to be friendly.

Q Mr. Secretary, what will you propose at

26

SEATO tomorrow?

A What? (Laughter.)

Q Have you forgotten about that?

A I have a horrible feeling: As soon as I leave here I'll study that problem. (Laughter.)

Q Why are you discussing it again?

A There're only two.

Q Yet the last one was a scheduled one; now this is an unscheduled one. What are the main points?

A How can it be unscheduled if I announce it?
-- for God Sakes!

Q Well, I mean it was previously unscheduled and then you announced it. (Laughter.)

We were told originally you were only staying up for SEATO, and now you're seeing Bouteflika. What's going on?

A It's just going to be a brief meeting. He just wanted a brief exchange of views.

Q Mr. Secretary, is he going to help on oil?

A Really -- don't read these oil speeches as something that initiated a short-term solution to the problem. The oil speeches have to be seen at several levels: at the level of our own domestic actions -- relations to the consumers, other consumers -- especially advanced industrialized

27

consumers -- and ultimately relations to our consumers.

Until the first two stages are in shape, the
third stage is not likely to be very actively pursued.
So I do not, when I talk to the Ministers from the
producing countries, do more than just explain the general
approach of the speech. We're not making -- at least,
I'm not making -- a systematic effort right now to bring
prices down.

Q Are you going to go to Algeria?

A Maybe. There's no plan right now.

Q Do you feel he will be helpful in the Middle
East negotiations?

A Benteflika?

Q Yes.

A The Algerians are very helpful in Middle East
negotiations. And that, Marilyn, before you start
asking, is the basic purpose. Algeria has a special relation-
ship with Syria, and it has a great moral influence with
several other Arab countries.

Q How about with the Palestinian relationship?

A I haven't really had an exchange with
Benteflika in quite a while.

Q On the Palestinians, do you think that the
move that's going to be made to, in the General Assembly,

20

invite the Palestinians an, quote, "the representative
of the Palestinian people" is going to affect in any way
the prospect of your next round of talks -- especially
since the time that faces us is just going to be unbeatable?

A It's still going to be next week.

Q No. The debate is going to be in November.

Q No. The procedural resolution to invite them may very well come up on about the 10th -- after the 10th.

A I have stated my view -- that is to say, the U. S. Government view -- and that will not be changed by the vote of the Assembly.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q I don't mean U. S. Government view.

I mean, the capacity of the U. S. Government to do things.
Will that be changed when you see him?

A Well, we're not asking for the votes,
so we don't think that it's essential for the success of
our diplomacy. But --

Q Mr. Secretary --

A -- you know, anything that excites passions
isn't particularly helpful.

Q Mr. Secretary, since you appeared before the
Foreign Relations Committee, there have been allegations

29

in print that you are the chief strategist so called
-- for the opposition to President Allende in Chile. The
CIA helped bring about the strikes that helped pull him
down. Would you respond to those?

A I want to do this ON BACKGROUND. The
40 Committee is a watchdog committee; it is not an
operating committee. It meets, at most, once a month
-- and, lately, much less than that. And it is well
known that the 40 Committee does not design the detailed
operations but it gives policy guidance on general
approach.

The other allegations have been declared to be
untrue by all of the people who have much more detailed
knowledge of it than I do. And it is a serious problem,
as I've said before: whether it is proper to discuss
40 Committee work in this manner on a public basis and
on the basis of individual claims that are made by this
or that person.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you worried about the
allegations -- or even investigation -- of some of your
subordinates for perjury? I mean, for allegedly committing
a act on the Chilean operation.

A I don't believe that any of that allegation
has been made -- I mean, the allegation has been made; but

30

I don't believe that they are being investigated for
perjury.

This particular testimony, incidentally, occurred
before I became Secretary of State. But there is this
inevitable problem with covert operations. Every one
of the covert operations that is now being described was
given to Congressional Committees -- was briefed to the
appropriate Congressional Committees which were set up
specifically for that purpose.

One of them followed every legal procedure that
had been established within the Government -- and pro-
cedures that had been tightened after 1969.

Officials that are asked to testify in public
sessions about covert operations have a hopeless problem
-- if, indeed, they know about it -- which we would have
to check in these particular cases. And I think it is a
problem of some -- everything I'm saying about 40 Committee
work is on DEEP BACKGROUND -- it's a question of some self-
restraint within the public debate.

Q Mr, Secretary, this role --

A And when we put this whole issue -- the
President and I put this whole issue -- before the
Congressional leadership, we are willing to abide by any
arrangement that the Congressional leadership thinks in
desirable.

I agreed that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the

31

House be told from now on, in addition to the established
watchdog Committees, about those things that might have
foreign policy implications.

It is not a question of hiding anything, but it
is a question of how you can have democratic supervision of
something where the nature of things is extremely complex
and sensitive.

Q Mr. Secretary, in your description of the
role of the 40 Committee as "general oversight," several
years back I had been told that the 40 Committee approves
particular operations --

A That's right.

Q -- and that they can not go forward unless
there is approval.

A That's true.

Q When did this role change?

A No. It's always that way. It approves
particular operations -- not in the operating detail,
only in the concept.

Q Well then, what is the Watchdog Committee
told -- just the general overall thing or --

A Basically, it does not originate operations,

32

it does not supervise the day-to-day business. But I don't
believe I want to discuss 40 Committee work.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said the leadership would
be given this information on --

A The Congressional leadership.

Q The Congressional leadership?

A Was given the whole problem of how one
goes about briefing and what was involved and who knew what
and what the procedures were.

Q And the leadership would now be told of
covert operations?

A No, no. The Foreign Affairs Committee.

Q Just in terms of the House -- or both?

A Both. Just the House, but we have no problem
doing it for the Senate also.

Q Mr. Secretary, can I come back to the
remarks you made about the Eagleton Amendment and the
situation on Cyprus?

A Yes.

Q You said it was "counter-productive."

A I don't want to -- the 40 Committee approves
the operations, but it does not conduct the operations.
It is told what it is and it approves it, whenever it
meets -- which is, right now, too frequently.

33

Q And then the 40 Committee, or people on it, will tell the watchdog Committee what's happening?

A Then the CIA after that -- the 40 Committee has no role at all. The CIA briefs the Senate or Congressional watchdog Committees about every operation being conducted.

Q Before or after they are conducted?

A It is designed to do something. How they are going to do it we are not going to tell you.

Q Excuse me --you are saying that the policy is set?

A What?

Q I understood, or read, that it will not be until after the operations were over; is that so?

A I think they brief annually or semi-annually. I don't know; this you'd have to get from Colby. Whatever arrangement he makes with the Congressional Committees is not prescribed by the 40 Committee. That is between him and the watchdog Committees of the Senate and the House and whatever arrangement they have.

I don't even know what it is, except that I know they brief on every operation -- but not before it's completed; after it's completed.

34

Q Who initiates the operation -- I mean, the idea of the operation? The Agency?

A In 99 out of a hundred cases, the Agency -- in almost every case that I know.

Q Just to pin this down, the 40 Committee would know that money was being given to a particular group, party, organization? They would know that specifically?

A It would know that it is given to particular organizations. It might not necessarily know which organizations they are.

Q But for a particular purpose?

A Yes. It would know the purpose and the type of thing that is being done --

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Is the Agency obligated to carry out a specific recommendation that has been adopted by the 40 Committee?

A That's the wrong way of putting it because 999 out of a thousand of these things are submitted to the 40 Committee by the Agency -- under a general Presidential policy guidance -- but --

Q The reason why I raised this is because, if you remember the Harrington letter, that was sent to the

35

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Foreign Relations Committee mentioned that certain monies that are used for use in Chile were not ultimately used. What does that prove?

Q It would only prove that if the 40 Committee approves of a certain operation or of a certain --

A Oh -- they are not obligated to carry it out.

Q They are not obligated to carry it out.

Q Could I please ask: I just wanted to know whether you felt, with respect to the Eagleton Amendment, if you were at a stage in your talks -- specifically, with the Turks -- where the Eagleton Amendment, if it holds, would truly sabotage some concrete development.

A I believe that *is* being done is destructive of the negotiating process. I have said this before.

Q But it's only destructive if you reached a stage where the Turks are ready to take some specific step.

A Really, I have tried to tell you what the problem is. It's, after all, not primarily an American problem. I mean, the United States can survive without this thing moving forward. So we are, obviously, trying to help -- to help the parties. There's no particular reason for the United States to keep anything secret

36

here. And I have tried to tell you, as best I can, what
the obstacles are -- to explain exactly what is being done.
And they are not on our side. Therefore, I can't be more
explicit. But I do believe that the Eagleton Amendment
-- I don't want to pin it on Eagleton -- it's this general
effort to produce an obligatory result. It's counter-
productive of the very purposes it is designed to serve.

Q Mr. Secretary, Makarios had been excluded
from the negotiating process all along. You have now seen
him.

A No. Makarios has been informed by somebody
or other all along (laughter.) And, on an OFF THE RECORD
basis, how do you exclude Makarios from the Cyprus --
we've been in touch with him; the British have been in
touch with him. And God knows who's he's been in touch
with. (Laughter.)

Q What role has he played, and what has he fed
into the process?

A Well, as he left me today, he said he's
in full support of Clerides. That's another useful thing.

Q Well, you know, in response to a question,
that had all the drama of him saying, "I will cash Mr.
Clerides' checks up to the amount of 20 drahmas."

A Well, he said he's in full support of Clerides.

37

Now you can interpret it.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you turn, just for a moment, to SEATO, before we turn all of this off?

A I will turn to SEATO if you let me out of here.

Q Yes -- in terms of my colleagues. But what will you discuss tomorrow about SEATO? What is it all about?

A The future of SEATO. (Laughter.)

Q Does it have a future?

A Yes, it has a future.

Q What future.

A And there are a number of countries that have some specific ideas that are going to be discussed.

Q The last time it had a new future they were going to go into counter-guerrilla work or something, but nothing has ever been heard from them since.

A Well, it's my first meeting with the SEATO group (laughter) and I don't want to pre-judge the outcome.

Q Thank you very much.

Q Let me ask you another question on Cuba: What did you mean when you said it's "not a particularly tough problem"?

A Well, the impression that I get is that

38

if we want to normalize relations, there may be
possibilities of doing it.

The problem exists not so much between us and
Cuba -- I mean, how to communicate with Cuba --
but in the relationship to all the other Latin American
States.

Do you think it's going to be an insuperable
problem to communicate with Cuba?

Q Well, to normalize relations may be
difficult.

A Well, I was talking about the problem
of communication.

Oh, no -- normalizing; that may be extremely
difficult.

Q From what you said earlier about
China -- and you said they have absolutely no influence
on the Third World -- is this because --

A Did I say they have absolutely no --

Q I understood you to say they had no
influence.

A No, no -- on the contrary, I tried to say
they are trying to base their policy on the Third World
and on whatever relationship they can develop with us.

39

Q Oh. I thought it was perhaps they haven't got much to give.

A No, no. They are making a major effort to have a close relationship with the Third World, and they are being quite successful.

Q Mr. Secretary, did Makarios' speech yesterday complicate your work? He was rather tough on the matter of federation -- on the prerequisites for negotiation. It seemed to come out of the blue. You've been working with private sources.

(Discussion off the record ensued.)

(Whereupon, at 12:53 a.m., the BACKGROUNDER was concluded.)

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2

to determine what would be the most suitable next stage of
the negotiations.

It has always been understood that progress in
one area would have to be linked with progress in other
areas. And therefore we are talking about timing and the
particular stages that look most promising.

So, I am not going with any fixed ideas, and I
will discuss again with all of the leaders involved. And
then one can form a common judgment.

I would like to point out that there will be no
concrete results in terms of agreements or dramatic announce-
ments that can be expected out of this trip. The primary
purpose is to give concreteness to the negotiating process,
and perhaps to agree on some timing.

As long as we are talking about the trip, I would
like to add that I will also visit Saudi Arabia in connection
with the negotiations. And, on the way home, I will stop
in Algeria and Morocco. And I will be back on the 15th.

Q Mr. Secretary, there have been published re-
ports this morning, sir, that the agreement reached last
summer, I believe, by President Nixon with the Soviets to
limit underground testing may be broadened to include

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3

peaceful nuclear tests.

Are these stories accurate?

A I am reaching the point now where before I read my cables, I read the newspapers, because they have a better selection. [Laughter]

This one is not correct in all respects. There was an agreement at the time of the negotiation of the threshold test ban, that the threshold test ban would not be ratified unless there was also an agreement for the handling of peaceful nuclear explosions.

This had two aspects: peaceful nuclear explosions below the threshold and peaceful nuclear explosions above the threshold. "Below the threshold" presented no particular problem because explosions were permitted anyway, and it was primarily an issue of the site at which the explosion would take place.

"Above the threshold" required special negotiations for the development of criteria to distinguish a peaceful explosion from a military explosion and also to determine the compatibility of the explosion with a limited test ban.

These negotiations are now starting in Moscow, and the outcome will depend on how we can proceed with

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4

the ratification issue. But this has always been understood,
so there is no new decision involved. What is involved is
a clearer specification of the criteria by which these
distinctions might be established.

Q Dr. Kissinger, if I may follow that up. When
India exploded a peaceful nuclear device last May, I think
the U.S. position was that there was no distinction between
a peaceful device and a military one. The technology is
the same.

Is there now a distinction being drawn in this
country?

A I think one has to make a distinction between
countries that have not previously had access to nuclear
explosive technology, and those countries that have
elaborated nuclear explosive technology.

In the case of a new nuclear country, the mere
fact of an explosion is of significance because that is
what enters it into the club of those who have set off
nuclear explosions. And therefore in the early stages
of nuclear development, the distinction between military
users and civilian users may be in the mind of those that
set off the explosion, but it is very difficult, in fact,
it is impossible to establish a distinction.

PR #395

In the case of elaborated nuclear technology, there are at least some cases in which criteria can be defined by which the explosion is either of a more rudimentary technology than has already been tested for military purposes, or is of a nature that can be clearly demonstrated as not useful for military purposes.

So the distinction can be made only in cases of advanced nuclear countries. It cannot be made with respect to countries entering the nuclear club.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is your rationale for continuing as Chairman on the 40 Committee on covert activities and clandestine operations overseas? And isn't this compromising to your role as Secretary of State and the relatively open diplomacy of your other hat?

A The 40 Committee, in one form or another, has existed since 1948. The Department of State has always been represented on the 40 Committee.

The role of the 40 Committee is to review covert operations in order to determine their compatibility with the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States. It is not to operate the covert actions, and not, for that matter, to design them. It is

PR #395

6

to give policy guidance and policy review.

So, in one form or another, the Department of State is a participant in the decision, and the final approval is in every case given by the President in any event.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have repeatedly said that you do not desire confrontation with the oil producers. I would like to ask two questions about that.

If you do not want confrontation, why did you and the President use such harsh rhetoric in addressing yourself to the problem, rhetoric that apparently you can't back up with action? And, two, why a full year after the energy crisis really hit have you not made any serious moves to get together with the producers?

A Do you want me to agree with your conclusions, or can I state some of my own? [Laughter]

First of all, the definition of "harsh rhetoric" is, of course, quite a subjective one. The President and I stated that we are dealing with a very serious problem. If you look at my statements on the subject, you will find that I used substantially the same rhetoric in my Pilgrims speech last December in London, in the opening speech to

PR #395

7

the Washington Energy Conference in February, in the speech to the United Nations Special Session of the General Assembly in April, and now again in September.

We have stated, and I repeat, that present oil prices are putting a strain on the world economy that will, over a period of time, create an intolerable situation.

It was the intention to emphasize these points.

Now, whether or not it can be backed up, again, is a question that requires some examination. Ever since the first speech last December we have made a systematic effort to bring about greater cohesion among the consumers, to protect them against emergencies, to bring about conservation, to bring about cooperation on alternative sources of energy and in research and development, and ultimately a greater degree of financial solidarity, at least with respect to the recycling problem.

These measures are required whether or not oil prices come down, especially if oil prices do not come down. They also will provide a basis for further discussion with the producers.

Until there is a degree of a common view among the consumers, discussions with the producers are simply

PR #393

8

going to repeat all the debates with which we are familiar.
We have been talking with the producers. The Europeans
have been talking with the producers. The only new
element could be a greater degree of cohesion among the
consumers, and that, at this point, we are in the process
of forming.

Q Mr. Secretary, could I follow that up?

A Yes.

Q There have been statements by Arab spokesmen
in the past couple of weeks drawing a clear link between
the oil crisis and future Middle East negotiations.

In your statement, just a moment ago,
when you talked about your upcoming trip to the Middle East,
you didn't talk about the oil crisis, but just the negotia-
tion.

Is there any realistic way of separating the two?

A The major dynamics of the oil crisis -- well,
first of all, I wouldn't like the word "oil crisis" --
of the impact of the high oil prices is not inevitably linked
to the Arab-Israeli negotiations. And we are negotiating
these two issues separately because the high oil prices
affect many nations on a global basis that do not have the

PR #395

9

remotest connection with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

We believe that to some extent, these negotiations should be conducted in separate forums, and we are conducting them in separate forums.

Q If I may ask you, on Mr. Gierek's visit, in the spirit of the Polish Diet, would you care to elaborate on this visit in a more general, wider context of the East-West detente, if you may?

A Well, as you know, the improvement of relations between the East and West has been one of the cardinal goals of our foreign policy.

We have always held the view that this is not confined to relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but it must include some of our traditional friends in Eastern Europe. And therefore, we expect during the visit of the First Secretary to discuss and to agree on a number of cooperative projects in a variety of fields, economic and technological.

We realize, of course, the facts of geography and the realities of existing political relationships. But we believe that a considerable improvement in relations between Poland and the United States is possible and that this will contribute to the general easing of tensions and improvement of relations on an East-West basis.

PR #395

10

Q Mr. Secretary, on Soviet-American relations, over the weekend the Soviets have lost a major grain purchase. Can you say how this in your mind affects Soviet-American relations; and was the United States Government properly informed about the Soviet intentions? And, two, can you bring us up-to-date on the status of your discussions with the Senators on the Jackson Amendment which now seems to have run into some trouble?

A With respect to the grain purchase, this grew out of an attempt by the United States to contact major importers of grain, and to discuss with them a general level which we thought was consistent with maintaining American grain prices, and also with our ability to fulfill it.

In the process, I believe that a strong possibility exists that we may have misled the Soviet Union as to what we thought we could deliver over a period of time. And when a trading monopoly is given a certain level, it then may assume that it has the right to place orders for the whole amount immediately. This is where a disproportionate impact occurred. And therefore, we ascribed the events of last weekend to a misunderstanding

PR #395

11

between bureaucracies.

Secretary Simon will be in the Soviet Union at the end of the week and will discuss with responsible Soviet officials the grain exports, which we believe we are able to make, which are consistent with our attempt to fight inflation and with our other obligations on a global basis. So we are confident that this can be worked out on a constructive and cooperative basis.

With respect to the second question, the negotiations between the Senators and myself, the difficulty, such as it is, arises from the fact that there are some assurances that have been given to me that I can defend and which I can transmit. There are some interpretations of these assurances which some of the Senators would like to make. And that is their privilege. And we understand that they would apply their interpretations as a test of Soviet good faith.

What I cannot do is to guarantee things that have not been told to me. And so the question is whether we can work out something which makes clear that we take the Senators' views very seriously, but which does not put us into a position of having to guarantee something beyond

PR #395.

12

what has been discussed.

Now, the difficulty arose at a meeting with the Congressional leadership in which we presented what had been discussed and pointed out what we could guarantee in the area in which we were not sure of what in fact would happen. And the unanimous opinion of the Congressional leadership was that if we could not be sure about certain aspects, then some of the formulations that had been used might lend themselves to misinterpretation later on.

We have every intention on our side of working this out with good will. We have no intention of having any debate with the Senators concerned. We share their objectives. And we believe that a reasonable solution can be found among honorable men.

Q Mr. Secretary, was the figure of 60,000 or any other figure understood in your discussions with the Soviet Union?

A I have always made clear that I could not guarantee any figure. How you interpret certain administrative agreements into figures, I have always made clear, could not be guaranteed by us.

PR #395

13

Q Mr. Secretary, would you recommend Presidential intervention in the event that any of the oil-rich countries tried to make a wheat deal or a grain deal similar to the one that was blocked over this past weekend?

A Well, there has been a meeting in the Department of Agriculture this morning in order to work out a program of voluntary restraints and voluntary cooperation between agricultural exporters and the Department of Agriculture. That program will be announced this afternoon. And I believe that it represents a satisfactory compromise between the operation of a free economy and the overall global responsibilities of the United States.

Q Mr. Secretary, in reference to your earlier comments about the negotiations on the underground nuclear test ban, would you agree that the agreement has to be renegotiated fundamentally in order to get through the Senate, namely, that peaceful nuclear explosions also have to be limited to 150 kilotons. And secondly, also because it relates to U.S. negotiations with the Soviet Union, would you agree that the dispute concerning negotiations over emigration with members of the Senate represents a

PR #395

14.

diminution of their willingness to agree with you on many
of these issues which are in controversy recently?

A "They" meaning the Senators?

Q Yes, sir.

A Or the Soviets?

Q No -- speaking of the mood -- I was particularly referring to the mood in Congress as reflected recently.
I am trying to get --

A To confirm your article. (Laughter)

Q No -- you are entitled to a rebuttal if you wish. What I am trying to ascertain is -- we have discussed here two new issues: one, the emigration concept --

A I understand the question. I think I get the drift of its import. But first let me deal with the first part of the question.

I do not agree, nor is it the opinion of the President or of the Government, that the threshold test ban has to be renegotiated. We agreed with the Soviet Union in June that we would make a good-faith effort to develop criteria for nuclear explosions, for peaceful nuclear explosions, recognizing the difficulty of defining criteria for explosions above 150 kilotons. We will

PR #395

15

nevertheless engage in these negotiations in good faith.
And the judgment of whether it is possible to develop these
criteria can be made only after the negotiations have been
completed. It has not been affected by any consultations
in the Senate. It will determined entirely on the basis
of the negotiations that are now opening in Moscow.

With respect to the second question, we are
here in an area of ambiguity, in which I have to say in
fairness to the Senators concerned, they have always held
the view that there should be a fixed number. This is not
something new caused by recent discussions, but it is
something that they have always held. And I have always
held the view that I could not guarantee something that has
not been told to me.

The question now is whether we can formulate
a criterion that can be applied as a test without putting
the Administration into the position of having misled them.
This has nothing to do with any recent debate that has gone
on in the Congress.

But since you obviously also want an answer to
the implication of your question, I believe it was

PR #395

16

inevitable that during the Watergate period, when much
of the public attention and Congressional attention was
on domestic affairs, that there was a great reluctance to
have a challenge to foreign policy. As we now have a
more normal governmental process, it is also inevitable that
there will be a more normal debate on the subject of foreign
policy. And I consider that inevitable, and in the long-
term desirable.

Q Mr. Secretary, is the Nixon Doctrine still
an ongoing policy of the new Administration, and if so,
do you have the support of the Congress in seeing that
it is implemented?

A First of all, the Nixon Doctrine, defined
as strengthening the capability of countries to defend
themselves, is still the policy of the Administration. It is
also true as a result of the war in Viet-Nam and of
a generation of involvement in international affairs,
that the general attitude of much of the American public
towards foreign aid in general has become much more
skeptical. And therefore the Administration has
greater difficulties than used to be the case a decade
or two ago in its general ability to convince Congress to

PR #395

(LC)

17

appropriate these sums, especially at a period when we
have severe domestic economic strains.

We believe that it is our obligation to put before
the Congress what we believe is in the national interest,
just as it is the Congress's right to make its own judgment.

Q Sir, to clarify your earlier remarks
about the 40 Committee, has the recent controversy about
Chile caused any change in policy with regard to covert
political activities?

A As I pointed out, the covert political
activities have been carried out since 1948 under the
general supervision of the 40 Committee under various
names. These operations are also briefed to the Congress
by whatever procedures are established between the CIA and
its oversight committees, and these procedures are not
determined either by the 40 Committee or by the White House.
They are left entirely to the arrangements between the
CIA and the oversight committees.

Recently there has been an expansion of
briefing the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House
as to those activities that have foreign policy implications
that is, a small subcommittee of this [Foreign Affairs Committee]

PR #395

18

I do not think it would be appropriate for me, in the nature of what is a covert operation, to go into the scale, but I believe that if one compares the scale now or the scale even from the late sixties onward to the previous period, one would find that the political direction has been tightened up and the number has decreased

Q Mr. Secretary, before you became Secretary of State, you maintained that it was the job of the National Security Adviser to assure that the President got as wide as possible a range of foreign policy options and thinking within the Government. Why do you believe now, as you apparently do, that your holding of both jobs -- Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser -- is not inconsistent with that function?

A Contrary to what I have read in the press, I have not entered this debate. I did not request the President to make the statement that he made in New York, nor did this issue come up between the President and me until he had already written that statement. The operation of the national security machinery depends on the President and it must be organized in such a way that he feels comfortable in making those decisions. It is not a subject

PR #395

19

that any cabinet officer can or should negotiate with the
President. And therefore this is a matter that should be
more properly addressed in another forum than by me.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the criticism
that has been leveled against you in the past month
on a whole variety of issues is fair, and do you believe
that that criticism has to any degree affected your capacity
to run foreign policy?

A Well, I think it is fair to say that my
own estimate of myself may be at variance with that of
some of the critics. (Laughter) But then I can't
expect my critics to be right a hundred percent of the time.

(Laughter)

I think the fact of criticism is certainly fair
and was certainly inevitable. I think that there may
have been a period, as I pointed out, in which there may
have been excessive restraint, and this may be counter-
balanced now by finding the more critical aspects. I assume
that it will even out over a period of time. I don't
think it has affected my effectiveness.

20

Q Mr. Secretary, sir, you have in the past week met with the Turkish and the Greek Foreign Ministers several times in New York. Could you now tell us as to what are the prospects for resuming the negotiations in Geneva; and, also, what are the prospects for peace in Cyprus?

A The progress in the negotiations in Cyprus depends on many factors. It depends on the domestic situation in both Greece and Turkey.

Greece has elections scheduled, and Turkey is attempting to form a new government and may have elections scheduled.

It depends on the status of the communal talks on Cyprus. The attempt in the talks in New York with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers was to see whether some basis could be found by which negotiations could ultimate start in a manner that was also compatible with the dome necessities of each of the parties.

I do not have the impression that the resumption of the Geneva forum is imminent, and I don't think it will serve a useful purpose by making a prediction about when other talks will start. The United

PR #395

21

strongly supports the communal talks which are now going on and will in every other way do its utmost to enable the parties to reach a conclusion that is consistent with their dignity and self-respect.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have been reported widely as expressing concern that the economic crisis or the oil crisis might cause political upheaval towards Western Europe. Do you find that the Western Allies with whom you met last week agree with your analysis, and do you think that you have now made progress towards some consensus on dealing with the oil crisis?

A I have been reported correctly as believing -- indeed, I stated so publicly -- that the continuation of these enormous balance of payments deficits will force governments -- and especially those of Western Europe -- into decisions that will, over a period of time, have significant domestic or international consequences. I believe that this general analysis is shared, to a greater or lesser extent, by most of the countries with which we have talked. Therefore, I am basically optimistic that we are making progress in the objectives we have set

PR #395-

22

ourselves -- which is to enable the consuming nations
to withstand the impact of the economic situation in
which they find themselves.

Q Mr. Secretary, could I follow that up?
Would it be useful then for the major consuming nations
to cooperatively reduce their consumption of oil by a
specific amount, regardless of what that amount is?

A As I pointed out in the opening of the
Washington Energy Conference in February, a restraint
on demand is essential if progress is to be made in the
solution of the oil problem. Now, whether this restraint
is achieved by international agreement or whether inter-
national discussions provide the impetus for essentially
national decisions is not a major point. But a
restraint on demand, in one form or another, is an essential
component of the policy that we have sketched.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the $50,000 gift to
you from Nelson Rockefeller, is there any reason why you
did not disclose that when you were confirmed as Secretary
of State?

A When Governor Rockefeller made this proposal
to me, I asked the Counsel to the President-elect to give me

PR #395

a legal opinion in terms of existing statutes and in
terms of propriety. He gave me a written letter -- a written
statement -- in which he pointed out that it was neither
contrary to any law or statute nor involved any impropriety.
And only after I had that written statement did I proceed,
and then I put the money in trust for my children and did not
benefit.

Q Who was that Counsel, Mr. Secretary?

A I think it was Mr. Morgan. We will have
this letter available this afternoon.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East, some
Israelis have been insisting that the next stage should be
the final stage. Is that now just out of the question?

A That is not my impression of what other
Israelis have told me, and I don't want to speculate
what the next stage will be; but it is not the impression
that I have gained from my talks with all the parties.

Q Could you tell us from your assessment of the visit
to Cuba of Senators Javits and Pell whether you regard
the reception they got as a kind of signal to the United
States Government; and, if so, how you might respond to s

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24

a signal?

A We have, I think, a rather clear understanding of the attitude of the Cuban Government to the problem of normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba. We are also discussing this matter in inter-American forums; and there will be a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Quito, early in November, to discuss the problem of OAS sanctions. We will proceed, first, in the inter-American forums to discuss the views of our colleagues; and then we will form a judgment as to how to proceed thereafter.

Q Mr. Secretary, why didn't the United States accept an agreement on the nuclear cooperation with Israel and Egypt? And, second, do you hope to sign this agreement during the visit of President Sadat next month in Washington?

A We haven't reached an agreement because some of the parties have not responded yet to our suggestions for additional safeguards. When the agreement will be signed, we do not have a fixed timetable, and we have not come to an understanding with anybody as to a specific time to sign the agreement.

Q Mr. Secretary, on that question, would you be prepared to give the nuclear plants only to those countries

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25

that will agree to the additional safeguards, even if
some other countries did not agree to them?

A Well, we have not faced that question yet,
and we expect that the countries concerned will accept the
additional safeguards.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

(Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the press conference
was concluded.)

Department of State

TELEGRAM

POL 7 KISS

ACTION
S/S 10
INFO
CHRON

11/jc

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

STATE 222746

Oct. 9, 1974-2240

0 092005Z OCT 74
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TO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 9321
RUQMAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 2195
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1694
RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 7626
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 6469
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 9351
RUFHRS/USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 8347
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CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 222746

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S TRAVEL, PRESIDENT'S REMARKS

1. REMARKS OF PRESIDENT FORD ON SECRETARY'S DEPARTURE
FROM ANDREWS AFB OCT 9 FOLLOW:

QUOTE. IT IS NICE TO SEE YOU ALL. I JUST CAME OUT WITH ALL THE CABINET MEMBERS AND OTHERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR GOING ON THIS VITALLY IMPORTANT MISSION. HE HAS MY FULL SUPPORT AND THE SUPPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION FOR THE TREMENDOUS EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE IN AN AREA OF THE WORLD--AN AREA THAT HAS BEEN SO VOLATILE AND CONTROVERSIAL THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE WORLD, AS WELL AS THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED, THAT THE MAXIMUM EFFORTS FOR PEACE BE MADE.

QUOTE. THIS COUNTRY AND THIS ADMINISTRATION ARE GOING TO WORK WITH THE SKILL AND IMAGINATION OF DR. KISSINGER IN SEEKING THAT RESULT.

QUOTE. WE WISH YOU THE VERY BEST. END QUOTE.

2. YOU SHOULD BRING PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT TO ATTENTION OF HOST GOVERNMENT POINTING OUT THAT PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF CABINET PERSONALLY SAW SECRETARY OFF AT PAST MIDNIGHT DEPARTURE.

3. FYI: SECRETARY'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT'S REMARKS
FOLLOW:

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QUOTE. I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH MR. PRESIDENT, YOUR COMING OUT TO SEE ME OFF. THE PROBLEM OF CONTRIBUTING TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS A VERY COMPLICATED ONE BUT AS I HAVE HAD OCCASION TO SAY BEFORE IT IS A SOURCE OF PRIDE TO ALL AMERICANS THAT IT IS THE UNITED STATES THAT ALL PARTIES TRUST AND WE WILL ATTEMPT TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS. I WOULD LIKE TO SAY TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN A LONG TIME THAT ONE CAN GO ON THESE MIS-SIONS WITH AN AMERICA THAT IS AT PEACE WITH ITSELF. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. END QUOTE. INGERSOLL

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<table><thead><tr><th colspan="2">DISTRIBUTION</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>REIEKE</td><td>DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR GENERAL COWCROFT</td></tr><tr><td>USIS-2</td><td>AND MESSIN</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>R.O. 11652 N/A</td></tr><tr><td>AMB</td><td>TAGS : OVIP (Kissinger, Henry A.)</td></tr><tr><td>DCM</td><td>SUBJECT: Secretary Kissinger's Remarks Cairo Airport</td></tr><tr><td>PEC</td><td>ACTION : SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE { USINT ALGIERS</td></tr><tr><td>ADMIN</td><td>INFO : AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS } AMEMB AMMAN</td></tr><tr><td>CHEON</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>SS-10</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>RF</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>18/cfb</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>AMEMB RABAT</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>AMEMB JIDDA</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>AMEMB TEL AVIV</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>REF : STATE 221573</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">Remarks of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on arrival at Cairo International Airport, October 9, 1974: QUOTE I am happy to be starting my tour in Cairo and to have this opportunity to talk to my friends. I'm here to see what the United States can do to contribute to progress towards peace in the Middle East. President Ford is committed to continue the efforts that the United States has made and I will talk with my friends here in a spirit of making constructive progress. Thank you. UNQUOTE</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">B.F.L.</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">KILTS</td></tr></tbody></table>

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(Sadat): Dr. Kissinger is going to brief you.

(Kissinger): I was just waiting for the President. The President and I have both last night and this evening reviewed the entire range of Egyptian United States bilateral relationships as well as progress towards peace in the Middle East. I repeated to the President, President Ford's interest that progress towards peace in the Middle East be maintained. We reviewed the modalities both of procedures and of such various points of view, the various aspects in what I consider a very constructive and positive manner and in the usual friendly atmosphere.

(Question): What are these modalities, Dr. Kissinger?

(K): Well I'm at the beginning of my trip and I have to visit many other countries, of course, I will return here on Monday to review my conversation with President Sadat so I would think I would be going through them then.

(Q): President Sadat, what would you hope would be the next stage in the effort to secure peace in the Middle East?

(S): Well we have discussed this in broad lines and there are many items that we have already discussed -- and as Dr. Kissinger says -- the (garble) of the best relations that we have together -- I think it is premature to tell you any details.

(Q): Do you expect further disengagement or withdrawal of the Israeli troops?

(K): Well, I of course, haven't visited, as I said, any of the

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MEN

other countries but the Israeli Prime Minister has publicly stated that Israel is prepared to make territorial concessions in the proper context and that is what we are trying to discuss and explore.

(Q): Dr. Kissinger, please, do you think that your trip will come out with concrete steps towards peace, towards the Geneva Conference and complete Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories?

(K): Well before I left Washington I told the American Press Corps that there probably would not be any dramatic announcement on this trip and I never disappoint the American Press Corps. But I do believe that this trip will contribute towards progress, towards peace in the Middle East and I am encouraged by my talks with President Sadat.

(Q): Dr. Kissinger, a year ago you said that you thought the whole matter would take about a year. Now that a year has passed, do you think it will take another year?

(K): I don't think I should make any predictions as to any time period except what I have already pointed out that we reviewed all the modalities and possible approaches and we are committed to contributing to peace and progress towards peace and that I am encouraged by my talks.

(Q): Are you going to leave Mr. Sisco in the area or are you coming back yourself?

(K): I will take Mr. Sisco back with me as was always planned

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and of course I plan to come back periodically to the area whenever my coming here can make a contribution towards peace.

(Q): Dr. Kissinger, after your talks with President Sadat is the next step clearer in your prospectus towards keeping the peace momentum in the area?

(K): It is somewhat clearer in my mind.

ELLS

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RE 102016 FURTHER RE 102000--AS-SADAT-KISSINGER DISCUSSIONS CAIRO

VENA ARABIC 101955

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(CTEXT)) PRESIDENT AS-SADAT AND DR KISSINGER HELD A BRIEF PRESS CONFERENCE BEFORE THE SESSION. PRESIDENT AS-SADAT ANSWERED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

QUESTION: HAVE YOU DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT OF THE CONVOCATION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE?

ANSWER: MY DISCUSSIONS WITH DR KISSINGER WILL DEAL WITH THE SUBJECT OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. WE WILL MAKE A COMPLETE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE SITUATION, INCLUDING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.

QUESTION: MR PRESIDENT, IS THE GENEVA CONFERENCE EXPECTED TO BE HELD AT AN EARLY DATE?

ANSWER: I CANNOT SAY A THING NOW.

A JOURNALIST POSED A QUESTION TO DR KISSINGER: DO YOU CARRY ANY PROPOSALS OR IDEAS WITH YOU?

KISSINGER REPLIED: AS I SAID IN MY STATEMENT AT THE CAIRO AIRPORT, I AM PRESENT HERE TO CONTINUE THE PROGRESS THAT CAN BE ACHIEVED IN THE PRESENT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. WE WILL REVIEW THE ENTIRE SITUATION WITH THE PRESIDENT IN A SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP. ((VENA SAYS MORE)) 102000 RT/WACOONALD/RH 10/2023Z OCT

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ACCT DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT]
AND HEBSEN
DAMASCUS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652 N/A

TAG : OVIP (Kissinger, Henry A.)

@Cairo.

SUBJECT: Secretary Kissinger's Remarks to American Embassy

ACTION : SECRET WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO : AMBASSADOR DAMASCUS

REF : STATE 221573

Remarks of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at Cairo American Embassy, October 10, 1974: QUOTE Ladies and gentlemen, I've been coming here more often than I/remember in the last year and you've all been taking very good care of me. These young ladies here have been bossing me around in such a way that I'm a strong supporter now of women's liberation which, as I understand it, gives men equality. I came here for the first time last November, We had a very small/embassy section here that had to kill itself to help with the arrangements that were made for me. I am

DRAFTED BY:

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166

REF AND: M Fr Eilts

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particularly conscious of our Egyptian friends who worked
when
with us through all the difficult years *Suez* / *we* had no
formal relationships, who stuck with us and with whom we
are proud to be associated now that our relationship has
moved from one of coolness to one of growing friendship.
Since then we had an opportunity to re-establish relations
and to contribute to agreements between Israel and Egypt
which we hope will mark the beginning of a process towards
peace in the Middle East. I am here today because President
Ford and I are committed to continuing this process towards
peace. Now none of these efforts are possible without the
dedication and support of those of you who are working far
away from Washington, convinced that your reports are never
read and I must say, if the State Department Secretariat had
anything to do with it, that is exactly what would happen.
But, as it happens, to me the relationship between Egypt
and the United States is not just an assignment that goes
of State, but one of the
with the job of Secretary of State, which profound conviction that
the United States and the Arab people are natural friends.
We have no conflicting interests. We have been separated
for many years due to misunderstandings on both sides, but
now I think we have begun a new and lasting period in which
our relationship will grow ever closer. We are very dependent
on the support and the advice of people like yourselves in
areas like the Middle East. We are happy the individual

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still counts for something. The human relationships and played such an important role, / the function of our offices is decisive. For / long / I have wanted an opportunity to thank you all personally for what you have done and for the dedication which I have seen on my trips and for the wisdom of your reporting. Of course, I am a great admirer of your Ambassador, and I'd steal him from you and bring him to Washington if the President and the Foreign Minister here would let him go. So as it is, I am afraid you are stuck with him for a while. And I want you to know that the reporting we get from here is very much what I have in mind. Usually when I go to Embassies I tell them: don't tell me all the details of your conversations, I want to know what the trends are, I want to understand what the relationship of events is, and I want to know where we are going. I don't have to give you that instruction because that is what I get from here, and I want you to know that I appreciate it.

2. Now you may not know that your Ambassador has been in Foreign Service time. In the /tastungssendung for quite some /tastungssendung/fact, US-Arab relations go back several hundred years, and I think Hermann has been affiliated with them for the greater part of that period. But it says on his record, which I cannot believe, that he has been associated with the /tastungssendung for years. Since only 30 /tastungssendung/ that is what the records say, I

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would like to take this occasion to give him this
certificate of official recognition and appreciation
for his dedicated service of 30 years, and to thank you
all for being partners with us in Washington in what I
think is one of the most important, one of the/exciting
trends in American foreign policy that I can remember.
One that will continue and grow and we shall all look
back to it and remember that what we did made a difference.
Thank you. UNQUOTE

BILTS

HUSKINS

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(c)

(Question) - Mr. President you expect us to ask questions after the meeting?

(Sadat) - After the meeting.

(Q) - Would we wait at this stage?

(S) - Yes, if there is time.

(Q) - Can we ask questions now, Mr. President?

(S) - Before we start? (laughter)

(Q) - About last night.....

(S) - After the meeting the Foreign Minister will give a press release.

(Q) - Your Excellency, we will ask an innocent question. When are you going to the U.S.A.?

(S) - Well I shall be discussing this with Dr. Kissinger.

(Q) - Has it not yet been decided?

(S) - Not yet.

(Q) - Mr. President on your visit to the United States, will it be connected with the Geneva Conference? You will not go to the United States before the Geneva Conference?

(S) - This is not connected with anything at all.

(Q) - Are you also discussing the Geneva Conference, the possibilities.....

(S) - Sure, sure....we shall be making a survey of the whole thing including the Geneva Conference.

(Q) - Do you expect the Geneva Conference soon, Mr. President?

(S) - I can't say.

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(Q) - Another innocent question. Have there been any proposals presented by Dr. Kissinger? Or options? Or ideas?

(S) - Ask Dr. Kissinger.

(Kissinger) - As I said at the airport I am here to see what progress can be made at the negotiations in the Middle East and I will review the whole situation with the President in a spirit of friendship and an attitude of making progress.

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O R 11224GZ OCT 74 CITING URSVC 412S ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEH/C/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2700
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0248
RUFHRS/USINT ALGIERS 0354
RUESOR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3008
RUEHAN/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5421
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0383
RUQAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 6193
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UNCLAS AMMAN 6085

SECTO 62

DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE

FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

E.O. 1152: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KKSSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJ: SECRETARY KISSINGER'S REMARKS, AMMAN INTERNATIONAL

AIRPORT, OCT. 11

REF: STATE 22157

1. KISSINGER: QUOTE: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, FIRST OF ALL I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY GREAT PLEASURE TO BE HERE WITH OUR FRIENDS IN JORDAN. AS YOU ALL KNOW, I'M TAKING A TRIP THROUGH THE AREA IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHAT POSSIBILITIES EXIST FOR A SECOND STAGE OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND WHAT FRAMEWORK WOULD BE MOST SUITABLE. IN THAT EFFORT, OF COURSE, THE VIEWS OF OUR FRIENDS IN JORDAN WILL BE TAKEN WITH THE GREATEST SERIOUSNESS AND THE UNITED STATES HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED ITS VIEW AS TO A MANNER IN WHICH PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. SO I LOOK FORWARD VERY MUCH TO MY CONVERSATIONS WITH HIS MAJESTY AND WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. AND I'M SORRY I KEPT YOU ALL WAITING OUT HERE. THANK YOU.

END QUOTE.

2. QUESTION: QUOTE. MR. SECRETARY, I DON'T LIKE TO SOUND IMPERTINENT, BUT I REALLY WONDER WHY YOU ARE HERE WHILE JORDAN HAS FROZEN ITS DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES? END QUOTE.

3. KISSINGER. QUOTE. BECAUSE I WAS INVITED TO COME HERE.

END QUOTE.

4. PRIME MINISTER ZAYD RIFAI: QUOTE. AND HE'S ALWAYS MOST WELCOME HERE. END QUOTE. END OF KISSINGER STATEMENT.

KISSINGER

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O R 111025Z OCT UR
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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INFO RUFHRS/USINT ALGIERS 903
RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3263
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 350
RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 649
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2078
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 764
RUQMAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4101
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UNCLAS CAIRO 8066

DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
AND NESSEN

E.O. 11652: NA
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: DEPARTURE REMARKS OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AT
CAIRO AIRPORT, OCTOBER 11
REF: STATE 221573

PRIOR TO DEPARTING CAIRO AIRPORT ENROUTE DAMASCUS SECRETARY
MADE FOLLOWING REMARKS TO ASSEMBLED PRESS: QUOTE
I JUST WANT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO PRESIDENT SADAT
AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR THE EXCELLENT COURTESEY THAT
HAS BEEN EXTENDED, FOR THE WARMTH OF THE RECEPTION.
WE HAVE HAD GOOD TALKS AND WE PLAN TO CONTINUE THEM ON
MONDAY WHEN I COME THROUGH. IT IS ALWAYS A PLEASURE
TO SEE MY FRIENDS IN EGYPT. THANK YOU. UNQUOTE.
EILTS

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE #ASHOC IMMEDIATE 2713

RUEHIA/USIA #ASHOC IMMEDIATE 1458

INFO RUESOR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3010

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAVASCUS 250

RUFHRS/USINT ALGIERS 354

RUOMJR/AVCONSUL JERUSALEM 5424

RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RAPAT 384

RUOMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2761

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E.O. 11652: N/A

SUBJECT: SECRETARY KISSINGER'S REMARKS ACABA AIRPORT

REF: STATE 22157

REMARKS OF SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER ON DEPARTURE
AT ACABA AIRPORT, OCTOBER 12, 1974: QUOTE

I JUST WANTED TO THANK HIS MAJESTY AND THE PRIME
MINISTER FOR THE VERY WARM RECEIPTION THAT WE HAVE
HAD HERE. WE REVIEWED, OF COURSE, BILATERAL
JORDANIAN UNITED STATES RELATIONS, WHICH ARE EXCELLENT,
WE ALSO REVIEWED THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
WHICH MAY DEVELOP. AS IS WELL KNOWN, THE UNITED STATES
SUPPORTS JORDAN PLAYING A ROLE IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS THAT
MAY DEVELOP. THANK YOU. UNQUOTE.

PICKERING

AMMAN 6102

12 Oct 74, 1933

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THE SECRETARY
OF STATE Interview

Following is the transcript of an interview of
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger by
James Reston, as published in The New York
Times on October 13, 1974.

October 13, 1974

MR. RESTON: You have been sounding rather pessimistic in the last few weeks. Are you worried about the state of the West?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't mean to sound pessimistic. I think that there are huge problems before us, and I'm trying to define them. I believe that the problems are soluble, but they require a major effort and, in some areas, new approaches, but I'm not pessimistic about the ability to solve them. We have--

Q Could I interrupt there to say that in reading what you have written in the past, I have a sense of pessimism in your writings, even of tragedy. Do you regard your thought as being essentially tragic, when you look at the last two generations?

A I think of myself as a historian more than as a statesman. As a historian, you have to be conscious of the fact that every civilization that has ever existed has ultimately collapsed.

History is a tale of efforts that failed, of aspirations that weren't realized, of wishes that were fulfilled and then turned out to be different from what one expected. So, as a historian, one has to live with a sense of the inevitability of tragedy. As a statesman, one has to act on the assumption that problems must be solved.

Each generation lives in time, and even though ultimately perhaps societies have all suffered a decline, that is of no help to any one generation, and the decline is usually traceable to a loss of creativity and inspiration and therefore avoidable.

It is probably true that insofar as I think historically I must look at the tragedies that have occurred. Insofar as I act, my motive force, of which I am conscious, it is to try to avoid them.

## The Issue of Feasibility

Q Don't we have to bring this problem down to practical points, the difference between the ideals of a republic and what can be done? Is there a conflict now in America between the ideals of foreign policy that you see for the order of the world and what can actually be done in terms of public understanding and in actual votes in the Congress of the United States?

A I think almost every nation right now has the problem of reconciling its domestic view of itself with the international problem because every nation has to live on so many levels.

Certainly in every non-Communist nation--and probably even in Communist nations--public opinion in one way or another is becoming more and more important. But what public opinion is conscious of are the day-to-day problems of life. The remoter issues, geographically and in time, do not impinge on the average citizen.

Bureau of Public Affairs • Office of Media Services • Department of State

- 2 -

In foreign policy, the most difficult issues are those whose necessity you
cannot prove when the decisions are made. You act on the basis of an assessment
that in the nature of things is a guess, so that public opinion knows, usually,
only when it is too late to act, when some catastrophe has become overwhelming.

The necessity of the measures one takes to avoid the catastrophe can almost
never be proved. For that reason you require a great deal, or at least a certain
amount of confidence in leadership and that becomes difficult in all societies.

But, speaking of the United States, if one looks at the crisis through which
America has gone over the last decade--the assassinations, the Vietnam war, Water-
gate--it is very difficult to establish the relationship of confidence.

Then the United States also has particular problems in terms of its historical
experience. We never had to face the problem of security until the end of the
Second World War, so we could afford to be very idealistic and insist on the pure
implementation of our maxims.

To the average countries that were less favored, the problems of foreign
policy have usually appeared in a much more complicated form; that is, their
morality could not be expressed in absolute terms. Their morality had to give
the sense of inward security necessary to act step by step in less than perfect
modes.

Rebellion in U.S. Sensed

We are now in a similar position and therefore there is an almost instinctive
rebellion in America against the pragmatic aspect of foreign policy that is secu-
rity-oriented, that achieves finite objectives, that seeks to settle for the best
attainable, rather than for the best. In this sense, we are having domestic prob-
lems.

On the other hand, there is a strain in America which is curiously, extremely
relevant to this world. We are challenged by the huge problems, peace and war,
energy, food, and we have a real belief in interdependence--it is not just a
slogan.

The solution of these problems really comes quite naturally to Americans,
first, because they believe that every problem is soluble; secondly, because they
are at ease with redoing the world, and the old frontier mentality really does
find an expression, and even the old idealism finds a way to express itself.

In what other country could a leader say, "We are going to solve energy;
we're going to solve food; we're going to solve the problem of nuclear war," and
be taken seriously? So I think it is true that there are strains in our domestic
debate; I think it is also true that there are many positive aspects in our domes-
tic debate that can help us reach these larger goals.

Q Are you worried when you see the situation in Europe today? What's going on in Portugal, the fragility of Italy, the almost state of war between two members of the alliance, Turkey and Greece. Surely, from the point of view of Moscow, this looks like a fulfillment of their prophecy of the internal contradictions of the Western world.

A One of the troubles of the Western societies is that they are basically
satisfied with the status quo, so that when you have governments like the previous
government in Portugal, or the previous government in Greece, the tendency is not
to change it.

I think that's a mistaken conception. But what comes after is so uncertain--
and we really lack a philosophy for how to shape a new political evolution--that
one tends to leave well enough alone. In the process, the political base erodes
invisibly, and then, when the changes occur suddenly, there is no real base for a
democratic, liberal, humane evolution--or at least it can be put together only
with great difficulty.

- 3 -

So, in Portugal, after 50 years of authoritarian rule, the Communist party was the best organized, most purposeful opposition and therefore has a very large influence on Portugal's contemporary orientation.

In Greece there are also massive domestic pressures. The problem of Italy and other countries is different, in that you have there a residual vote that has never been reduced by prosperity and goes to the Communists. This shows that there is a significant percentage of the population that does not consider itself part of the system.

If you take the authoritarian parties in Italy on the left and the right, you have only about 60 percent of the spectrum to work with for a democratic policy. When that is split you have an inherent weakness, and it will be split, because that's the nature of the democratic process.

Q When you came to Washington in the first place after your study of history, it was said that you had a concept of how to achieve the order of the world, and yet in the last years, since you have been here, the tendency has been to say that you have not defined your concept, but that actually what you have been doing is negotiating pragmatic problems and not really dealing with the concept or making clear the concept. What is that concept? First of all, is the criticism correct, and second, what is the concept that you see?

A Well, I think you will find few officials who will tell you that any criticism you can make of them is correct, but I don't think the criticism is quite correct. I do not have the choice, in any position, between imposing a theoretical order or negotiating, because if you don't solve immediate problems, you can never solve long-term problems.

If you act creatively you should be able to use crises to move the world towards the structural solutions that are necessary. In fact, very often the crises themselves are a symptom of the need for a structural rearrangement.

I faced a number of problems partly of perception and partly of structure. I feel it is essential that when the United States acts in foreign policy, that it understands first what the American national interest is in relation to the problem. And, to define that, America has to know what the world interest is, not only in relation to the specific problem, but in relation to the historical evolution from which any solution of a problem starts.

## No Response From Europe

So I have tried--historians will have to judge with what success--to understand the forces that are at work in this period. My associates will confirm that when we tackle a problem, we spend the greatest part of our time at the beginning trying to relate it to where America and the world ought to go before we ever discuss tactics.

I think somebody would have to go through my speeches and press conferences to see to what extent I have articulated general propositions. I don't think I should be the judge of this here.

Q When you made your speech at the Waldorf, I regarded it at that time as something equivalent almost to the offer of the Marshall Plan. Yet we got no real response from Europe. Even when you went to London and talked about interdependence, there was no response. Now, something was wrong there. Could you define it?

A There are always at least two aspects to any problem. One is your definition of the problem. Second, how you solve it. Are you doing it correctly?

I believe that the issues that I've attempted to define are serious issues. Take my Waldorf speech, the so-called Year of Europe speech. It came at a period when we had opened to China and opened to the Soviet Union and when we had ended the Vietnam war.

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Until we had accomplished at least some of those objectives, I did not see how a creative period of relationship with Europe would be possible, because the disagreement with our Vietnam policy in Europe was too deep. The fear of nuclear confrontation was too great, as was the fear that the United States was somehow to blame for this state of hostility in the world.

So, in early 1973, I thought the time was opportune to move towards a serious dialogue with Europe, and I thought it was all the more essential because I did not want success to become identified in the public consciousness only with relations with adversaries, and I felt that the old Atlantic relationship would over a period of time become so much taken for granted and so much the province of an older generation that the next generation would consider it as something not relevant to itself.

## Debate Over Consultation

I think that this perception was essentially correct. Why did it lead to this intense dialogue? One reason is that, at that particular moment, Europe was enormously absorbed with itself. Every European country, it soon became apparent, had a leadership crisis of its own and was trying to sort out its own domestic problems. Beyond that, Europe was very much occupied in forming its own identity, and it had so much difficulty in doing so that any greater conception seemed a threat to whatever autonomy they had so painfully wrested from their deliberations.

So we became involved in an abstruse theoretical debate over the nature of consultation, something that could never be written down because you can't wave a paper at somebody and tell him he's obliged to consult if he doesn't want to consult.

Then the Middle East war occurred, and that had a tendency to emphasize national frustrations, so that the larger dialogue that I had sought took a long time to get started, but finally the end result was pretty close to what we had asked--though not completely in the spirit I had hoped to evoke. We got the documents we wanted, but we didn't get the spirit of creativity that, for example, the Marshall offer evoked.

Now, similarly, with the Pilgrim speech in London. It was not received very warmly because, again, it was looked at very much from the national point of view. Nevertheless, events have moved us inevitably in that direction. The emergency sharing program which seemed revolutionary in February, has now been accepted by all the countries. Even France, I hope, will find some way of relating itself to it.

And we are now engaged in discussions which will go far beyond what we could talk about last year. In the late nineteen forties the mere fact that the United States was willing to commit itself was a tremendous event. Now, this is probably not enough, and our aspirations have to be expressed in action rather than in debate.

On that point, when you offer, as a basis for discussion with the Europeans and the rest of the world, a sharing of oil in a crisis, do you believe that the spirit of this country will accept it? When you come down to a question of producing oil for other countries who are in worse shape than we are, is it politically possible in this country to do it?

## U.S. Disillusionment

A There is undoubtedly a profound disillusionment in America with foreign involvement in general. We have carried the burden for a generation. In fact, if you go back to the beginning of World War II, it doesn't seem to end. Most programs have been sold to Americans with the argument that they would mean an end of exertion. Now we have to convince Americans that there will never be an end to exertion. That's a very difficult problem.

And if you look at some of our recent debates you would have to say we could fail. I don't think that those in key positions at this particular moment have

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any real choice. At a minimum, we have to tell the American people what we think is needed. If they do not agree, at least they will know 10 years from now, if there is a catastrophe, what happened. And then there is a chance of restoring a sense of direction. But if 10 years from now there is a catastrophe and people say, "Why didn't somebody tell us about this and why didn't they ask us to do what they should have foreseen?", then I think our whole system may be in difficulty.

Q That's a critical point because I don't think the country--if one may presume to think about what the country thinks--has the vaguest idea of what it is called upon to do. We are complaining about how the oil-producing nations are using their resources, and yet we have larger reserves of food in North America than the nations of the Middle East have oil resources, and yet here we are now arguing our national interests. We are against high prices for oil, but we are still a very gluttonous wasteful country. Can that be made clear?

A I think it is fair to say that we ourselves--I say "we," those who have positions of responsibility at this moment--we ourselves are learning the magnitude of the challenges as we go along. In 1969, when I came to Washington, I remember a study on the energy problem which proceeded from the assumption that there would always be an energy surplus. It wasn't conceivable that there would be a shortage of energy.

Until 1972, we thought we had inexhaustible food surpluses, and the fact that we have to shape our policy deliberately to relate ourselves to the rest of the world did not really arise until 1973, when we did call for a world food conference.

But you are right. We have to tell the American people what they are called upon to do. That is our biggest problem. It's our biggest challenge right now. And will they support it? I hope that they will. I am, in fact, confident that they will.

## For the Country

Q Can you define what those questions are that should be put to the country? What does the government want the responsible citizen to do? He hasn't had much lead from you and your colleagues and the Government as to what you wish him to do.

A I am not sure that I agree with whether he has received leadership from my colleagues and me. I think it is also fair to say that the nature of our debate for many years now has been so bitter that it's hard to put forward a conception that doesn't immediately get ripped apart by an attack on motives.

But leaving that aside, I think in foreign policy we need a national understanding of what is needed, what is meant by peace, and an understanding that we are living in a world in which peace cannot be imposed on others, which means that sometimes the outcomes must be less than perfect. I have been concerned about the detente debate because so often the issue is put in terms of--did the Soviets benefit from a particular deal? Of course, they must benefit, or they won't feel a stake in maintaining the resulting structure.

So, we have to know what we mean by peace. We have to know what we mean by cooperation, and we have above all to understand these big issues which we have been discussing, like energy and food, in which our actions will crucially determine what happens in the rest of the world.

And, of course, what happens in the rest of the world will play back to us, so we cannot afford an isolated approach. If we try a solo effort in energy and, as a result, Italy collapses or Britain has a crisis, that is going to bring about so many political transformations that, within a very brief period of time, we would be affected in ways that even the average citizen would feel very acutely.

On food, the same is true in reverse. We there have an opportunity to demonstrate that when we talk interdependence, we are not just talking an American desire to exploit the resources of other nations. What we are saying is for our own benefit, of course. But it is also for the benefit of everybody else. Now,

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that requires many changes in our thinking. Of course, senior officials are always
so busy with the day-to-day problems that they always seem to think one can wait
for a day or a week to articulate the bigger issues.

It is also true that our people have been so preoccupied with domestic problems
that it is not so easy to get attention for the longer term.

## Vision of the World

Q If we do not see this problem of interdependence, what's the vision that you have of the world? What will happen to Western Civilization?

A If we do not get a recognition of our interdependence, the Western civili-
zation that we now have is almost certain to disintegrate because it will first
lead to a series of rivalries in which each region will try to maximize its own
special advantages. That inevitably will lead to tests of strength of one sort
or another. These will magnify domestic crises in many countries, and they will
then move more and more to authoritarian models.

I would expect then that we will certainly have crises which no leadership is able to deal with, and probably military confrontations. But even if you don't have military confrontations, you will certainly, in my view, have systemic crises similar to those of the twenties and thirties, but under conditions when world consciousness has become global.

Q Well, now, that is your nightmare.

A That's right.

Q What are your hopes? We are halfway between the end of the last world war, a little more, and the end of the century. As an historian, and not as a Secretary of State, looking back, if one can, from the end of the century to this era, how can the nations find some way of living together or going beyond the nation-state to something else?

A Looking toward the end of the century, I would hope that Western Europe, Japan and the United States would have found a way of not just overcoming the current economic crisis, but turning it into something positive by understanding the responsibilities they share for each other's progress and for developing cooperative policies that are explicitly directed towards world interests.

This requires a degree of financial solidarity, a degree of equalizing burdens and a degree of ability to set common goals that cannot be done on a purely national basis. This, incidentally, requires a united Europe because with a plethora of nation-states in Europe we'll never be able to do this.

## Must Halt Arms Race

In relation to the Soviet Union and Communist China, we should have achieved a position, not of having overcome all our difficulties, but having reached a point where the solution of these difficulties by war becomes less and less conceivable and, over time, should have become inconceivable. This means that there must be a visible and dramatic downturn in the arms race. Otherwise, that race itself is going to generate so many fears that it can be maintained only by a degree of public exhortation that is inconsistent over a historic period with a policy of relaxation, and maybe even with peace.

The underdeveloped nations--the now underdeveloped nations--should by then have lost their sense of inferiority and should feel not that they have to extort, but that they should participate. Thus, what I said earlier about the relationship between Western Europe, the United States and Japan should have begun to be institutionalized to embrace at least some of the key countries, and the Soviet Union and China must be related to that.

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Take the food problem. I do not believe that over an indefinite future, we
can solve the problem of world food reserves if the Soviet Union and Communist
China do not accept obligations of their own, or if they simply rely on the rest
of the world's production to solve their problems on an annual basis.

Q What should they be doing?

A Well, I think--and I will speak about that at the World Food Conference--we have to develop over the next five to ten years some conceptions of the reserves that should exist and the contribution that the major countries should make. Countries that will not participate should not then ask necessarily equal rights to participate in purchases of reserve stocks. But this is something that requires further study.

Q Do you foresee in the next decade the possibility of political disarray in Europe and of enormous human tragedy in other parts of the world?

A I think we are delicately poised right now. I genuinely think that the next decade could either be a period that in retrospect will look like one of the great periods of human creativity, or it could be the beginning of extraordinary disarray.

## Hope in Adversity

Q Is it possible--and it is obviously a Scottish Calvinist point of view that the greatest hope of progress is adversity--that we are now really up against economic, financial and social problems of such magnitude that we are suddenly being forced, even by inflation, into a view of life that could be more hopeful?

A While this period has more strain than, say, a decade ago, it has also infinitely more opportunities, because we really have no choice except to address our problems. Who would have thought of an international food policy or a world food conference 10 years ago, or could have been taken seriously if he had? Today, it is only a question of time until we develop it, and the real question is, will we develop it soon enough? I think we can.

Q Is there a danger that if we do not deal with the world problems that here at home we would become so frustrated that we would retreat, not into the old-time isolationism, but into a kind of chauvinism that would make the whole question of world order really quite impossible?

A It is a big problem. There is such a tendency in America, but at least part of our chauvinism is disappointed idealism, so it's always a question of whether one can evoke the idealism.

Q The charge is made, I think, that you have been so personal in the way in which you've dealt with the Department of State that you've not organized it; you've not put this great machine to work, but actually you've replaced it with yourself.

A One has to ask oneself: What is it that needs to be done in the Department of State? For a variety of reasons, one could make a case for the proposition that since Dean Acheson, the Department of State has really not been used as an institution. There have been a succession of secretaries of state, many of them outstanding individuals, who have tended to operate as Presidential advisers.

When I came in, I deliberately set myself the task of trying to turn the Department of State into an institution that can serve succeeding Presidents and succeeding secretaries of state. Now, in my judgment, this can work only if a number of requirements are met. First, the work done in the Department of State has to be so outstanding that the issue of who is the principal adviser to the President does not arise as a bureaucratic problem, because if the work is of the requisite quality, then inevitably the Department of State will be the organization for decision-making.

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The second problem has been to put into the key positions younger, more forward-looking and more creative people. That part of it, I believe, has been substantially accomplished.

## Need For Long View

The third problem is: How does the Department think of itself? What do the officers think their mission is? And this is where the difficulty has arisen. It exists on several levels. In calmer periods of American history the rewards, the incentives, the emphasis was on negotiating, not analysis. Therefore, the organization of the Department of State is more geared to producing cables and day-to-day tactical decisions than it is to getting a grip on national policy.

Now, I have attempted to get at the conceptual problem first and not to bother reorganizing the operational part particularly. I think the Policy Planning Staff is in a more central position in the Department of State today than it has been at any time since George Kennan. I believe the quality of its work is outstanding. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which in the past was a sort of adjunct to policy-making, has been given new vitality.

In the bureaus--in the geographic bureaus--the relationship between a more conceptual approach and a more operational approach has not yet been fully balanced. One of the results of having more power flow to the State Department has been that the assistant secretaries have spent so much more time with me--at least, those that I've worked with--that they have not had as much time to give to leading their bureaus. So, paradoxically, what some of the lower-level people complain about is the result of the greater involvement of the middle and upper echelons.

Now, I have had over the last two months a series of meetings. I have a small group that is dealing explicitly with the problem of how the Foreign Service and the Department of State can be turned into intellectual leaders of American foreign policy--not bureaucratic operators, but intellectual and conceptual leaders.

It is too early to tell what the legacy will be. I feel very strongly that, partly based on my study of history, individual tours de force by secretaries of state can be counterproductive if they don't leave a tradition behind, and the reason I have always admired Dean Acheson so much is because I believe he left a legacy of thought and of organization.

## Fewer Political Appointees

Q How do you rate the use of diplomatic appointments to this theme of superiority?

A Well, if you look at the diplomatic appointments that have been made since I became Secretary of State, in all the key departmental positions, I think we have outstanding personnel. In the overseas positions, we have reduced the number of political appointees and, quite frankly, have been quite resistant to purely political appointees in key posts, maybe a little less resistant in more peripheral appointments.

Q Is there anything to the charge that trying to be Secretary of State and head of the National Security Council is doing too much?

A Well, all of these positions have to be seen also in relation to the history from which they evolve. I was head of the N.S.C. staff for five years before I became Secretary of State. I think the two positions are really complementary. The basic responsibility of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is to make sure that the President receives the fairest possible statement of his alternatives. It is against the national interest, and it is against, for that matter, a correct perception of the self-interest of the Assistant to load the dice.

I generally open an N.S.C. meeting by presenting the options. The other heads of department or heads of agencies are there. If I loaded the definition of the

- 9 -

opinions, they would in a short time know I was cheating. I don't believe the N.S.C. job takes too much time. I do believe the two jobs complement each other. But, of course, every President must organize the decision-making process so that he is comfortable with it.

Contrary to what has been written, I never expressed to the President any particular view as to how he should organize himself. I never talked to the transition team, and I have always understood that the ultimate decision has to be the President's. He has to live with his decisions, and he has to live with the way these decisions are made.

## Implementing Policies

Q Always there has been a problem between defining policy and then seeing that the policy is actually carried out down through the departments. I gather this is still a problem?

A The problem, I believe, is that the difference between great policy and mediocre policy or substantial policy and average policy is usually an accumulation of nuances. The intellectual debate tends to be put in absolutes, but I believe in fact it is nuances that count.

Now, how you fine-tune a big bureaucracy to be responsive to little shifts and to understand the psychological intangibles on which major decisions often depend is very hard.

In addition, the key men in any government are there because they usually are men of strong will. Obviously, they believe in what they are proposing. If a decision goes against them, they may believe they haven't heard it right, or that the President didn't understand them correctly. Or they may subconsciously try to interpret it as close to their convictions as they can. I don't say this critically; it is unavoidable.

Thus, how you can have enough control to make sure that there is coherence in the actions, this is the big problem. But basically we have not done too badly in implementing decisions. I think in many respects -- in at least the key areas of policy-making -- we really haven't had too much to think of in getting it implemented.

Q I don't know how many years ago it was that Governor Rockefeller made Godkin lectures at Harvard. I always suspected you had something to do with it. He talked then about new concepts of confederation in the West. Now, one hears nothing about those concepts. Why is this?

A Because we have reached the paradoxical position that at the moment when the need for cooperative action is greatest, the national and regional sense of identity has also grown. Thus any attempt to institutionalize a new structure, within, for example, a confederal framework, would meet resistance out of proportion to what it could achieve.

Indeed, some of the efforts that were made last year tended in the direction of what Governor Rockefeller was talking about in 1961 without using those words. They were resisted for the reason that they seemed to be too formal and an intrusion into the sense of identity of others. Nevertheless, while the organization or the institution of a confederation may be more than the traffic will bear, the need for cooperative action is absolutely imperative.

## Soviet Union vs. China

Q When I was in Europe just a few weeks ago, the question was raised there about your concept of China and of the Soviet Union. The question was raised whether in your mind you have not actually chosen one over the other, and in the process were playing one up against the other. Could you clarify that?

- 10 -

A When one analyzes foreign policy, there is always the temptation to look at the day-to-day tactics and not at the underlying reality. Any attempt to play off the Soviet Union and Communist China against each other would have a high risk that, at least for tactical reasons, they would combine against us. The rivalry and tensions between the Soviet Union and Communist China were not created by the United States. In fact, we didn't believe in their reality for much too long a time. They cannot be exploited by the United States. They can only be noted by the United States.

The correct policy for the United States is to take account of what exists and to conduct a policy of meticulous honesty with both of them, so that neither believes we are trying to use one against the other. In the course of events, it may happen that one may feel that it is gaining benefit against the other as a result of dealing with us, but that cannot be our aim or purpose.

We have meticulously avoided forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union that could be construed as directed against China. We have never signed agreements whose chief purpose could be seen as directed against China, and conversely we have never participated with China in declarations that could be seen as aimed at the Soviet Union. We have developed our bilateral relationships with both, and left them to sort out their relationships with each other. In fact, we have rarely talked to either of them about the other.

## The Kissinger Legacy

Q When you leave this office, what is it you want to have achieved at the end of your service?

A It used to be that the overwhelming concern of any President or Secretary of State had to be to make a contribution to peace in the traditional sense. That is to say, to reduce tensions among nations or regions. That remains, of course, an essential preoccupation. History has, I think, placed me in a key position at a time when we are moving from the relics of the postwar period toward a new international structure.

The Administration did not invent that structure. It did have, however, an opportunity to contribute to it -- an opportunity that did not exist 10 years earlier and that may not exist 10 years later. Now, the difference between that structure and the previous period is that there are more factors to consider and that it has to be built not on the sense of the pre-eminence of two power centers, but on the sense of participation of those who are part of the global environment.

This has required a change in the American perception of the nature of foreign policy. What is described as excessive pragmatism is really a rather conscious attempt to try to educate myself, my generation, and my associates, insofar as I can contribute to living with the world as it is now emerging. Pragmatism unrelated to a purpose becomes totally self-destructive.

In addition, I would like to leave at least the beginning of a perception of a structure that goes beyond these centers of power, and moves towards a global conception. There is no question in my mind that, by the end of the century, this will be the dominant reality of our time. I believe we have to move towards it now.

Q Can you define it?

A Before I go to that, let me say one other thing that I have been very much concerned with. However long I stay, it will be but a temporary episode. To succeed in these objectives, I will have to leave behind a public understanding and, above all, an intellectual understanding in the State Department that can carry on not only the detailed policies, but an overall understanding of where America fits into the global scheme of things. I intend to give increasing attention to this problem.

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## Two Kinds of Ambitions

Q One of your close friends once said to me, "Kissinger has a weakness for becoming melancholy and leaving the job." What is your perception of how long you wish to stay in this job?

A I may have a predilection for becoming melancholy, but there are very few jobs I believed in that I have actually left. Jean Monnet once said that he isn't interested whether a man is ambitious; the question is whether he is ambitious to do something or ambitious to be something. I think the same is true of vanity or many other qualities that can be ascribed to people in key positions.

I'd like to leave at a moment when it is still clear that my ambition and my vanity are geared towards doing something and when holding onto the job does not become the central preoccupation or the chief focus of public debate. Now, when that is depends on many factors. Obviously, on the confidence of the President, about which I have no problem; the degree of public support; the degree of Congressional support.

I have felt very strongly that foreign policy must be a national effort and that while, of course, disagreements are inevitable, I'd prefer them to cut across party lines just as I hope the support would cut across party lines.

Now, if debate becomes too partisan, then I would have to look at the situation again and I do not believe anyone is indispensable or should develop a policy that makes him indispensable, because that would contradict the whole perception of what I --

## Waning Support on Hill

Q There has been a lot of talk on the Hill, since they cut your foreign aid bill and one or two other things, that the support you had on the Hill and in the country has been eroded recently. Is that true, in your judgment?

A Support in the country, I cannot judge. Whenever I appear in public, I seem to draw large crowds, but I am no expert on public support.

As to support on the Hill, I think one has to distinguish the very unusual situation that existed before President Nixon's resignation with what could reasonably be expected. Before President Nixon's resignation there was such a sense of horror at the disintegration of authority domestically that everybody had an interest in demonstrating that there was no debate on our foreign policy. There was a desire to preserve one island of authority in this general disintegration.

Therefore, I probably had an unusually favorable situation on the Hill that no one could expect to preserve in normal circumstances.

So I would think what has happened now, after President Nixon's resignation, is the opening of foreign policy to normal partisan debate. Probably in the excitement the pendulum is swinging a bit too far and there are intrusions in day-to-day tactical decisions which Congress really isn't best equipped to handle. But I think the pendulum will swing back -- not to where it was before, and that wasn't healthy, anyway -- but to a normal kind of political debate.

Q You mentioned Jean Monnet and he once said to me, not in recent years, in prior discussions about the C.I.A.: "A democratic country as open as America can never really run a secret service and, if it tries to do so, in the end probably its losses are really greater than its gains." What do you think of that?

A I think an intelligence organization is essential for a great power. I don't think there is much dispute about the part of the intelligence organization that collects information, analyzes it and tries to interpret the world to political leaders.

The debates arise where the intelligence organization is operational and attempts to affect political events in other parts of the world. In this case there is a

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serious problem, because there is a gray area between the exercise of diplomacy and the use of force. Admittedly, you may create political realities -- or political realities may come about -- of great magnitude.

There is no question that insofar as covert operations are conducted they should be carefully controlled, first of all within the executive branch to make certain there is no alternative and that they meet political goals, and, secondly, to the degree possible by Congress. How to do this, I think, requires careful study.

## A View of America

Q I'm more interested in the rising generation than I am in the contemporary problem, and for that reason I wanted to ask you this: A colleague of mine went to see Willy Brandt and asked, "What does the young generation in Germany now think of America?" And Brandt replied, "The magic is gone." And when he was asked what he meant by that, it was that we have used power, he thought, in a way that did not comport to our ideals, particularly in Vietnam, but there was something beyond that, a kind of sense that we were engaged in a kind of disintegration. He mentioned the drug culture in America as being profoundly worrisome and that somehow we had lost our ideals in the way in which we approach the world.

A I was told last year that the public opinion polls in Germany in the second half of the year dramatically changed from showing a declining image of the United States to increasingly favoring the United States. The explanation I was given was the end of the Vietnam war and the decisive handling of the Middle East crisis.

The Germans, the younger Germans, again saw the United States as a nation that could solve problems -- and that is one of the elements of the American appeal.

America has gone through many changes, dramatic changes, in the last decade. We even began to develop a new isolationism. The old isolationism was based on the proposition that we were too good for this world; the new isolationism was based on the proposition that we're not good enough for it.

When one looks at the process of growing up, it is largely a process of learning one's limits, that one is not immortal, that one cannot achieve everything; and then to draw from that realization the strength to set great goals nevertheless. Now, I think that as a country we've gone through this. We were immature in the sense that we thought the definition of goals was almost the equivalent of their realization.

Then we went to the opposite extreme, and I think from this point of view the Kennedy period is likely to be seen as the end of an era, rather than as the beginning of one: the last great flowering of the naive version of American idealism. And I don't say this as a criticism.

I think now that the drug culture, the student rebellion, are in that sense behind us. Of course, we still have the drug culture, but as problems that threaten the spirit of America, I think they either are behind us or could be behind us if we can now do what any adult has to do in his life. When you get to the recognition of your limits, then the question becomes whether you transcend them or wallow in them. That is a choice that is up to us.

Q From the period from Roosevelt through the Kennedy period, the central theme of this country was that we could do anything in the world, and then we ran into some disappointments and seemed to go into a phase of self-doubt in which we began to wonder whether we could do anything effectively. Now, do we have the self-confidence and the essential trust in one another and in our institutions to support the kind of foreign policy you want?

A I have to say this is the big question I ask myself. In some strange way, I think the American people have come through these recent crises in rather good shape. I would not have thought you could have assassinations, the Vietnam war, Watergate, and all that went with it, and still have basic confidence in government.

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(e)

Among the intellectual and political leadership groups, I'm not so sure. But even there, as I said earlier, during the Watergate period, there was support for foreign policy. There is still a remarkable sense of national cohesion, so I am basically optimistic. But above all, I don't think we have any choice except to try, and in this respect, the American idealistic tradition gives the United States a resource that exists in no other country in the world.

In this country, even with all the isolationism, when you talk about a sense of responsibility, you touch the core of people; you can mention very few other countries of the world where it could be even a plausible argument.

## Cohesion of the West

Q At one point the West was bound together by certain religious ideals, certain moral ideals. What is it that binds the free world together today, if anything?

A Well, what binds us together on an unsatisfactory level is industrial civilization which imposes common realities and necessities on all of us. We are also tied together by an approach to politics in which ultimately the fulfillment of human needs plays a central role. Now, the definition of what those needs are can be disputed, but that it does play a crucial role is clear. Indeed, much of the political turmoil in the industrialized world is caused by the uncertainty as to precisely what those deeper needs are.

We are tied together, too, by a perception of politics in which various groups and the individual play a crucial role. And the combination of industrial necessity plus the fact that a complicated society cannot be run by direction and must have a certain amount of consensus will in time begin to permeate even totalitarian regimes.

Q Do you see the possibility of a closer regional understanding, and even structural development of regionalism, within the Hemisphere in the foreseeable future?

A Since I've become Secretary of State, I've spent a considerable amount of time on Western Hemisphere relationships. If it is true that the relations between industrialized and developing nations are essential features of our period, then in the Western Hemisphere where we are dealing with countries of similar traditions, and indeed, similar history -- this is where a beginning must be made. If we cannot solve it creatively here, it is hard to know how we can be creative about it elsewhere.

How formal that structure can be, I don't know. I have found two things: One is that the mere act of dialogue in the Western Hemisphere has had an emotional response; and, secondly, I have been struck in my meetings -- I've now attended three foreign ministers' meetings in the Western Hemisphere -- by the fact that if one read the records without the mood of the meetings, one would find in them a litany of criticism of the United States. But if one actually was at the meetings, one had the sense that this was a family quarrel; that in some intangible way, one was talking as a member of the family.

So I think that in the Western Hemisphere we have the possibilities of a creative phase, provided the United States can shed its traditional predominance and recognize that the decisions that emerge must be genuinely felt by our friends in the Western Hemisphere to be theirs.

## Need for Sacrifice

Q Is it reasonable for the American people to go on assuming, in a hungry world where raw materials are increasingly scarce, that our standard of living each year can go on going up, or do we have to face new responsibilities and even some sacrifices in this country in order to bring about some kind of world order?

A Now, here I'm talking off the top of my head. I would think, if we look ahead to the year 2000 and beyond, we have to be prepared to face a world quite different from what we have now. We see it already in energy. I believe that the day of the 400-horsepower engine is over, whether it's this year or five years from now. You're going to see different types of automobiles, and that affects our style of life.

- 14 -

We will have to develop a global food policy. We cannot deal with issues like this week's grain sale to the Soviet Union on a crash basis every few months. To do so will affect our whole perception of the relationship of agriculture to our society and our foreign policy.

## Weakness of Communism

Q When you talk about cooperation between the Communists and the capitalist world, where do you see this leading? To the domination of one over the other, or to a combination of the two, or what?

A I think that any attempt at domination in a nuclear age is going to involve risks that are catastrophic and would not be tolerated. If we remain strong enough to prevent the imposition of Communist hegemony, then I believe that transformations of the Communist societies are inevitable. I believe that the imposition of state control of the kind that communism demands is totally incompatible with the requirements of human organization at this moment.

The pressure of this realization on Communist systems is going to bring about a transformation apart from any conscious policy the United States pursues, so long as there is not a constant foreign danger that can be invoked to impose regimentation.

What inherent reason is there that keeps the Communist societies in Eastern Europe from achieving the standard of living of those of Western Europe? The resources are about the same, the industrial organization is there. I think the reason is inherent in the type of society that has been created, and that I believe must inevitably change.

## Looking Back

Q Looking back over these almost six years, is there anything in the conduct of our foreign policy that you regret, that you would like to change?

A I'm quite convinced that I'll be much more reflective a year or two after I leave here than I can be today. What I regret is that so much of the time had to be spent on the Vietnam war. If we could have got that behind us more rapidly, we could have brought the more positive side of our foreign policy to fruition at a time when attitudes were less rigidly formed.

The real tragedy was Watergate, because I believe that at the beginning of President Nixon's second term, we had before us -- due to changing conditions -- a period of potential creativity. We contributed some of that potential, but some of it was inherent in the objective situation.

Instead, we had to spend almost all of our energy in preserving what existed, rather than building on the foundations that had been laid. Even the Year of Europe could have gone differently in a different environment. But you never know what opportunities may have been lost.

Those are my big regrets. There are many tactical things I would in retrospect perhaps do differently, but I think it's premature to speculate on those.

Now, what problems I leave to my successor depends, of course, at what time I leave, and I don't want to have this sound as a valedictory. If I resigned today, he would have the Middle East problem in mid-solution.

I think we are now at a point where the framework of the structure exists, if we can put it together. We have the raw material, we have the elements, we've identified them, I hope, correctly. We are at the beginning of building a consciousness of the global community that must come after us.

Q Can you see a settlement of the Middle East thing in, say, before we get to the Bicentennial, or the end of this Administration?

- 15 -

A Before we get to the Bicentennial I think we can make considerable progress, at least to a point where one can see the settlement emerging. But it could also go very badly. That is yet a delicate point.

## Role of Intellectuals

Q You once said to me that you were relying very heavily -- even when you were in the middle of your service in Washington this time -- on concepts and intellectual support you had got from your colleagues in Cambridge way back in '59, and that you felt a lack of this as time went on. Is that still true?

A I think it is true. As I look back, for example, at the area of strategic arms limitation, most of the creative thought with which I am familiar dates back to the late fifties and was then introduced into the Government first in the Kennedy Administration and then, I hope, in ours.

Two things are lacking now: One, the same sense of relationship towards the Government that intellectuals had then; now they volunteer less and participate less. Secondly, there is a lack of relevant intellectual work.

Intellectuals are now divided into essentially three groups: those that reject the Government totally; those that work on pure, abstract intellectual models which are impossible to make relevant; and a third group that's too close to power and that sees its service to the Government as residing primarily in day-to-day tactics. No outsider can be very helpful on the day-to-day business because he doesn't know enough of the current situation to really make a contribution.

The best service intellectuals can render is, first, to ask important questions and that's a difficult problem, and, second, to provide a middle-term perspective. But for that they need to have some compassion for the problems of the policy-maker, just as he needs an understanding of their needs. I feel the lack, and I hope that now that our domestic climate is somewhat better we can restore mutual confidence.

Q Was it not a great mistake to wipe out the Office of the Science Adviser who was bringing in objective thought? I felt that lack of it, for example, on the whole question of oil and other raw materials.

A I think it's a pity. I hope that some focal point is created which will look upon the intellectual community as its constituency, and that they will be listened to.

Q Just one last point: I take it that you are saying that you don't want this to be interpreted as a swan song?

A Yes.

DEPARTURE STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND
RESPONSE BY SAUDI ARABIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
SAQQAF AT RIYADH AIRPORT, OCTOBER 13, 1974

1. Secretary Kissinger:

QUOTE I would like first of all to express my appreciation to His Majesty, my friend Omar Saqqaf for the very warm and gracious reception we received here. His Majesty and I reviewed the steps that seemed feasible towards peace in the Middle East and I found His Majesty understanding and supportive. We also reviewed our bilateral relationships expressed in several of the joint commissions and in other matters and we found them to be excellent. Nevertheless we decided to strengthen the already close relationship even further. I explained to His Majesty our view with respect to the price of oil and the impact this can have on the whole structure of the world economy and the stability of the whole international system. His Majesty's attitude was constructive and enlightened. I believe the policy of the Kingdom will be in a constructive direction keeping always in mind what we also believe that the ultimate solution must be found on multilateral basis and cannot be found by isolated actions. I am very grateful for the opportunity that was given to me here to exchange ideas with my friend Omar Saqqaf, the audience that was granted to me by His Majesty and I leave here encouraged, and with the conviction that I am indeed among friends.

UNQUOTE

## 2. Translation of Response by Foreign Minister Saqqaf:

QUOTE I will start where my friend finished. I assure him that he is in a friendly country and among friends. We are proud of his friendship, as much as Saudi Arabia is proud of its friendship with the U.S. We appreciate the great efforts which our great friend is exerting towards peace under the guidance of the President of the United States of America for whom we have great appreciation and respect. We say in Arabic Quote each theologian has his own school of thought. Unquote. At the outset I used to have inhibitions and I might even say doubts about the method followed by our friend in his peace-making efforts. But with the passage of time and as events unfolded I began to be sold on his efforts towards solving problems. Not being a flatterer when I praise our friend Henry's methods, but it is a statement of fact. Suffice it to review a change which has occurred during only a few months in the way we used to be and are now received by the representatives of the press. Still while I say that we have achieved a lot, I must add that we are still at the bottom rung of the ladder in our efforts. But we believe that with the grace of god we shall achieve peace in the area, peace based on justice and the right to self-determination. At the same time we feel we have achieved a wider cooperation on a bilateral basis between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. It is my belief that these relations could not have been strengthened and realized had we not discerned a clear

light pointing in the direction of a complete solution to
the problem of the Middle East. A solution based on
complete withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied
in 1967 including Jerusalem and the restoration to the
Palestinian people of their rights. My relationship with
my dear friend has always been based on frankness. Time
has proved that mutual frankness is the only path leading to
friendship and solutions. Dr. Kissinger has heard from His
Majesty the King the viewpoint of Saudi Arabia and an
explanation of Saudi policy towards world questions and towards
the problems of the area. This policy as expounded by the
King is not an overnight policy its the traditional time-
honored policy of Saudi Arabia. I will continue to strive
to explain the details of this policy whether here or over
there during my visits. Our colleague Dr. Kissinger spoke
about the question of oil. I want to explain what the
attitude of Saudi Arabia on this problem is frank and
clear: it is there for everyone with eyes to see and
everyone with clean ears to hear. Saudi Arabia is
following a policy on oil which bespeaks a sense of
responsibility towards the welfare of the world community.
As part of the world we want to build the world and not
destroy it. And we hope that other members of the world
community come to appreciate the gravity of this responsi-
bility and the importance thereof. Oil is not everything,
but it is a great thing. We will continue in the direction

of the constructive policy laid down by His Majesty
the King. It is the policy of cooperation, negotiation and
constructive cooperation between us and friendly nations
of the world. Dr. Kissinger has expressed adequately his
government's attitude towards oil when he said that Saudi
Arabia should not be isolated in its oil policy. But we
sincerely hope and it is our prayer that all of the other
oil producing countries will come around to following the
policy of Saudi Arabia. I would like to welcome our friend
Dr. Kissinger and assure him of our welcome every time.

We also appreciate the great efforts towards peace that
our friend is exerting as well as his fathomless knowledge
and deep wisdom. We wish him success in his tremendous
efforts to achieve peace on the international level. All
I wish to say on closing that we hope he will take a few\more days, not just a few hours on his coming visit.

Bon voyage and good luck. UNQUOTE

INCOVING USINT ALGIERS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR GENERAL. SCOWCROFT
AND NESSEN

ALGIERS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: NA

TAGS: OVIP (KIRSINHER, HENRY A.)

SUBJ: REMARKS OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT SADAT
AT GIZA RESIDENCE, OCTOBER 14, 1974

REF: STATE 221573

FOLLOWING ARE THE REMARKS OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AND
PRESIDENT SADAT AFTER MEETING AT GIZA RESIDENCE, OCTOBER
14, 1974: QUOTE

(KISSINGER): FIRST OF ALL I WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE
PRESIDENT FOR
RECEIVING ME DURING THE FAST. I REPORTED TO
THE PRESIDENT THE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA AND ABOUT THE CONVERSATIONS THAT I HAVE HAD WITH VARIOUS LEADERS IN THE COUNTRIES
THAT I HAVE VISITED. I TOLD HIM MY CONCLUSIONS THAT THERE
ARE POSITIVE INDICATIONS THAT WE ARE MAKING AS MUCH PROGRESS
TOWARD A JUST PEACE IN THE AREA AS POSSIBLE. THE PRESIDENT
TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS THESE WITH HIS COLLEAGUES, WITH
THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT AND WITH THE OTHER ARAB LEADERS AFTER
THE SUMMIT IN RABAT. I THEREFORE PLAN TO RETURN TO THE AREA
DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF NOVEMBER. AND WE SHALL THEN ATTEMPT
TO SET THE PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON A FIRM
AND CONCRETE BASIS.

(QUESTION): DR. KISSINGER, DO YOU EXPECT THIS PROGRESS
TO BE MADE ON MORE THAN ONE FRONT OR ON ONE FRONT?

Classification

(KISSINGER): WE SHALL HAVE TO MAKE THIS JUDGEMENT AFTER
ALL THE CONSULTATIONS AMONG ALL THE LEADERS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED;
THEO I'LL RETURN TO THE AREA.

(QUESTION): COULD WE ASK ABOUT THE LINE IN SINAI?
HAS THAT BEEO DETERMINED MORE OR LESS?

(KISSINGER): I REPEAT, THERE WERE NO MAPS DISCUSSED AND AT THIS
STAGE WE ARE NOT DEALING WITH DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS BUT RAHTER
WITH THE FRAMEWORK AND THE SIMILAR PROSPECTS TOWARDS PEACE IN
THE AREA, ABOUT WHICH THERE ARE POSITIVE INDICATIONS.

(Q): DOES THIS MEAN, DR. KISSINGER, THAT NO FURTHER ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL WILL TAKE PLACE?

(K): WELL AS I SAID WHEN I WAS HERE LAST, THE NEGOTIATIONS
OBVIOUSLY WILL CONCERN THE SUBSTANCE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS
IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A GENERAL NEGOTIATION AND OBVIOUSLY A
TOPIC OF CONCERN.

(Q): MR. PRESIDENT, DID YOU DISCUSS THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
IN ANY SUBSTANCE?

(SADAT): WELL I HAVE DISCUSSED ALL THIS WITH DR. KISSINGER AND
AS HE SAID I AM GOING TO DISCUSS THEM WITH MY COLLEAGUES IN
THE SUMMIT MEETING.

(Q): TO FOLLOW THAT YP, MR. PRESIDENT, WILL YOU TELL
US HOW YOU SEE THE PALESTINIANS BEING REPRESENTED WHEN NEGOTIATIONS
IN GENEVA START?

(S): WELL, WE HAVE ALREADY, AMONG US, AS ARABS, WE HAVE ALREADY
ASKED FOR THIS AND WE SHALL ALWAYS BE ASVING FOR THE PALESTINIANS TO
BE REPRESENTED IN TENEVA. BECAUSE, AS WE HAVE SAID, PALESTINE
IS THE CORE OF THW EHOLE PROBLEM.

(Q): DR. KISSINGER, AT THIS STAGE WHAT IS YOUR POSITION ON
THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM?

(K) I HAVE POINTED OUT PREVIOUSLY THAT WE BELIEVE THAT
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WEST BANK WOULD BE MOST EFFICIENTLY CARRIED
OUT BETWEEN JORDAN AND
ISRAEL BUT IT IS THE VIOD OF DECISION
THAT HAS TO BE MADE BY ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

(Q) MR. PRESIDENT, WERE THE PLANS MADE FOR YOUR VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES TENTATIVELY?

(K) THE PRESIDENT IS ALWAYS MOST WELCOME AND WE ARE NOW
THINKING OF A VISIT EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR.