TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger

April 18, 1974

5:20 PM

(Missed first part)

S: It's pretty useless and I'm in about 15 minutes as soon as I get out of a meeting, because I'm trying to take care of also this Max Fisher thing and I think I can get it straightened out for you.

K: There's nothing to be straightened out, just somebody call Fisher for Christ's sake. This is the 3rd day now that I've asked for it.

S: I've already done that. That's how I'm straightening it out. Look, never mind worrying you about that, we'll have a reaction to this resolution for you, what do you owe Fahmy, a comment?

K: Well, I owe him a comment, I'm not going to proceed with it, which I won't.

S: Of course, you can't proceed.

K: Well then, let's tell him what needs to be done to it.

S: That's how we're looking at.

K: How about the Lebanese thing?

S: See, what we're looking at....

K: What about the cable, for Christ's sake, now.

S: Well, we wrote you a little memorandum saying to you...

K: What.

S: Excuse me, Mr. Secretary, please, you asked me a question....

K: Somebody has to organize my office. You may have written me a memo but it hasn't come to me.

S: Alright. Let me tell you what we're telling you orally. We think going to be very bad. We recommend strongly against it.

K: That's Buffum's view.

S: Yes and mine.

By DECLASSIFIED
 Authority EO 12958
 NARA Date 6-8-74

Sisco - page 2

K: Why's that?

S: Because of that fact that (a) we've got a good cooperative relationship with this lawyer and secondly, he will resent it, it will be counter-productive and third, the relationship between the Foreign Minister and the President is, that the President will defer to this Foreign Minister the man on the spot. After tomorrow.....

K: OK, fine.

S: If you're not satisfied then, we might be able to do it a little bit later one.

K: OK, fine.

S: On this you want us to tell you how you think - we think - you ought to react to Fahmy and you dox need to call him tonight, is that the way it...

K: Well, yes.

S: Addx Alright. If you'll give me about an hour I'll be back at you.

K: Good, that's thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-94

TELECON

Arthur Burns/Secretary Kissinger

April 18, 1974

5:22 PM

(missed first part)

K: I'll tell you, the problem is, if there is no Syrian disengagement, then the war will start again, then the French and the Soviets will be able to tell the Arabs they told them so all along. The U.S. will be totally discredited, because if we can't -- the issue is whether Israel with withdraw say, 5 to 8 kilometers into the Golan Heights. If we can't get that, then of course how can we claim we can get anything. You see what I mean?

B: Yes.

K: Whether they're willing to give up the town of ____. Now, of course, if Israel had any sense, the Syrians have made a proposal which isn't really all that outrageous and if they gave the Syrians -- if I were Prime Minister in Israel I would give the Syrians 2/3 of what they've asked for and that would run the Russians out of there, but that's beyond Israel's capacity, even to imagine. So I'm not arguing on that. But if they could grudgingly give 5 to 8 kilometers, then at least we can prevent an outbreak. If I fail, the only one who's faced them up to now, is L. I mean, it's a personal thing. If I fail, I'm out of the negotiation, if I'm out of the negotiation, they'll be turquois down into international forums. Do you believe that this country in the future of another warm energy crisis will mount an airlift? I doubt it. So, it's a very serious matter. Portugal wouldn't give us the Azores again.

B: I'll have a talk with Dinitz.

K: I think basically he agrees with me. In fact I know he agrees with me. Don't give him the feeling I'm unhappy with him or with Golda, it's the political situation. Because I have great admiration for him -- really I like him very much.

B: No, I'll be sure of that alright.

K: OK, good. Thank you Arthur.

B: Good luck.

END

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Sec. Kissinger

April 18, 1974

K: Joe, I have Peter Ramsbotham here with me and he tells me things are going well at the Security Council. That we are canvassing a double hundred nations. Is he living in the same world I am.

S: I don't know what he is tal king about. Let me take a reading in New York, but we are right where we know we have been in terms of that draft.

K: No, that was this morning. As I understood it the Europeans came up with something that is totally unacceptable.

S: Well, that is what I showed you this morning, but I think our British friends have had, and I want to check this with Scali, some further discussions with the Europeans and I think what he means is that we gather the Europeans are coming along very nicely. Hold on a second, here is the draft that is coming right now. I understand it, I haven't looked at it, that the Europeans apparently have accepted something which the British have put forward which looks pretty good. I haven't looked at it but I'll give you a reading. It is practically our text, Mr. Secretary, so it is going pretty well. Here I have just read it, I'll be glad to bring it in to you. Would you like to look at it.

K: Sure.

S: We'll bring it right in.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-84

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

April 18, 1974

6:53 PM

D: Hello?

K: Anatol?

D: Hello, Henry. How are you?

K: OK.

D: Henry, I would like to check with you two points about your trip and suggestion to me from 28 and 29.

K: No, 28.

D: 28 and 29 I was told.

K: 29 yes, Monday.

D: Yes.

K: I would come in in about 9:00 in the evening so we could meet that evening.

D: Oh, I see and then Monday you could have another talks, yes?

K: We could have most of the day together Monday.

D: Most of the day.

K: Yes

D: Fine. The next question, you remember when you discussed __ he was with you alone and he asked you the ____ of meeting there or you're not quite now. I mean __ and the second meeting during the trip.

K: Well, he said that that was a different proposition from the Geneva one and I'd like to discuss that within him in Cairo, Egypt, Geneva.

D: While there.

K: Yes.

D: Fine. You are going to visit Israel, Egypt and Syria?

K: Probably. I'll let you know if there are any additional ones. I will almost

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By C0 KARA Date 6-8-74

Dobrynin - page 2

Dobrynin - page 2

go to Jordan. I will always do.

D: Jordan. So it will be four countries.

K: Yes.

D: What's your schedule. Egypt.

K: Egypt will be the first. Then Israel, then Syrian.

D: I think this is alright. What about SALT, Henry.

K: We have a meeting next Tuesday.

D: Would you tell me something then around Wednesday or Thursday?

K: I will do my best.

D: You will be back from this Latin American on Sunday.

K: Yes. Do you want to have lunch on Monday.

D: I would like to.

K: Monday or Tuesday -- which do you prefer?

D: What is more convenient for you.

K: We'll call you in the morning.

D: On Monday.

K: Tomorrow.

D: OK, thank you very much, Henry.

K: Good. Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-84

TELECON

Jack Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger

April 18, 1974

9:30 PM

K: Jack, how are you?

JK: Just landed in Atlanta. I'm at the airport.

K: Oh, God. It wasn't that urgent. I just wanted to find out how your press conference went.

JK: The press conference, I think, went very well. I talked for about 10 minutes at the outset on the record reviewing the background as to how the meetings originated and the background of Mexico and in Washington and then went through the communique, the highlightes and expressed the view that you were highly gratified by the results and the constructive attitude and indicated what the results have been of the meetings and then went on -- and then read the announcement -- a 2 sentence announcement towards the end.

K: That was probably a mistake.

JK: Probably a mistake?

K: Yes, We should have saved that for another day.

JK: Possibly. Over-shadowed the other.

K: Don't you think?

JK: It's possible. But the problem was that it was already leaking all over the place.

K: Was it.

JK: In any case, it gave us the initiative because news was going to leak it over night, it was better for us to get our two sentences out at least.

K: Yes.

JK: But then there was 30 or 40 minutes of questions and I felt very interested and they went very well. I thought everyone seemed quite pleased that in effect, I think we've handled as well, as far as the press is

concerned. They were expecting less and so we're somewhat pleased by things going better than they had intended to be. Rabasa was on the plane coming down. He said he thought it was a most successful conference.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Eo 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-85

Kubisch - page 2

Far more than anyone had anticipated.

K: Actually it turned out to be pretty good.

JK: I've got my fingers crossed. If we just don't get some kind of back-lash on these damn automobiles ______ and Argentina and so on. It just depends on how the press plays it.

K: Yes.

JK: And I just don't know how they will. For example, David Binder of the N. Y. Times said, well now if you are going to get license to do these companies, don't you really expect that the policy will now collapse. I said absolutely not, there's no reason to assume it will collapse. The fact is, we're treating these as an exception. He said how can you refuse anybody. I said, here you have -- he said you seem to have made these concessions to the Argentine government under duress ______, I said that's not true at all. There's been no question on U. S. Government from the Argentine Government, we've been really caught between the desire to have good relations with are Argentina.

K: Well, the basic point is how can we insist American Companies don't have to obey foreign laws.

JK: Yes. It's just an absurd posture and unsustainable position for us to be in. Really I think that these last two days have gone better since we had any reason to expect that we'll just have to see how the damn press plays it tomorrow. But thus far ______ lead into the meetings and the press yesterday.....

K: No, I think the conference itself will -- we're coming out superbly.

JK: I agree.

K: I'm just wondering now whether that Argentine thing is going to kill it.

JK: I don't think so. I think people who try and see wheels within wheels may think that you use this as a trump card to play to insure cooperation from the Argentines and the Mexicans and others who are prepared to prees for a lot more on Cuba. I don't know, we'll just have to see how they play it. Dudley Thompson was on the plane coming down and several others Venezuelan. They were all really, I won't say ______, but they were really quite pleased. Very happy with the outcome.

K: Because they like to jocular way the meetings were conducted.

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Kubisch - page 3

JK: Well that's what Dudley Thompson said. He said really the secret to the success, he felt, was your own personal -- your personality and the fact that when everything starts to get a little tense and a little formalistic, you would make some kind of remark that would relax the tension. I feel very good -- I feel like someone who's gone through about 2/3 of a difficult passage and I'm just keeping my fingers crossed and watching things.

K: If it was leaking anyway, we had no choice, unless the only other things we could have done was told -- we couldn't make a decision until Friday.

JK: Yes. It was just....

K: I don't know whether that would have worked.

JK: I have a feeling that there are really two stories that came out of tonight, or that came out of the meeting today. The wind up of the meeting and this license thing. They may play these two stories. I certainly did not relate them in any way. I said the matter never came up during the course of the conference.

K: Did you take questions on the conference first.

JK: Yes, Oh, yes.

K: And then you went into the licenses license thing.

JK: That's right.

K: OK, well, we did what we could. OK. Many thanks, Jack. I yell and scream at your group but so far you've always come through.

JK: Thank you for everything.

K: See you soon.

JK: OK. Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By 09 NARA Date 6-8-94

TELCONE
JOE SISCO/HAK

4/19/74 - 9:12

K: Joe, why does it take 5 days to get a memo over here on assistance to Israel?

S: Well, I don't really know other than the whole bureaucratic thing that you've got so damned many people involved in.

K: Well, but, that's what I want to end.

S: Alright. I don't...

K: Now, it was important to me to get this determination made before the Congress came back and all hell broke loose. And that was worth more to me than whether every G.D. SFO7 could sign off on something on which the decision was never going to be made at any level other than the President.

S: It got there, I think, yesterday, if I recall or.....

K: Well it got there last night and I had asked for it Monday morning and all we needed was a two page memorandum on which I told them what I wanted.

S: Well Brent called me late last night and he tells me there is a problem with this which.....

K: That's the second issue.

S: And the problem is in the Defense Department, I am told, that they feel that first of all, the instructions that I understood were given, they weren't given to me directly, was that you wanted for 1 billion dollars and then you leave the rest untouched. The problem is that apparently the bills have gone around that amount and therefore there is need to make a determination in terms of the overall amount so if you make the rest of the amount foreign military sales, that will mean that the Israelis I am told have to begin to pay on that because its a matter of credit. Now is that what you and Dinitz worked out. I'm not very clear what you and Dinitz worked out in this regard Mr. Secretary.

K: What we worked out was what I ordered which was 1 billion now and 1.2 later. Now this I did in part so that I could sell it to the Arabs.

DECLASSIFIED
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By: NARA Date 6-8-04

- 2 -

S: Well when you say 1.2 later you mean.....

K: That then we would give them the other 500 million in grant in the
effect after the Syrian disengagement when the Arabs could understand
it.

S: But the 1.2 in the meantime you would just call as XXXXX credit.

K: Well but....

S: Once its credit you can always shift it back to...

K: We would call it credit and then shift it back.

S: Well see this was what didn't come through and I don't think the
memo quite says this and that's just the point and that's what Brent
and I talked about late, late last night.

K: But we are now in the situation Joe, due to the G.D. bureaucracy of
the State Department. These memos always get written in some three
hour period. Its a very brief memo. Had that memo been done Tuesday
when I requested it we would have flushed out this problem on Tuesday.
I want this done before the Congress comes back and all hell breaks loose in Congress. So that we are reacting to the Congress.

S: Well, this I understand and I think as I say, part of it is some
confusion in the instruction and part of it is what I would agreeable
and it is not defensible is.....

K: Yes, but if there is confusion in the instruction all they have to do ask
me what I mean.

S: I understand Mr. Secretary. I'm not justifying, I'm trying to explain.

K: Joe, you are the number 3 guy in the Department now. Why must it
take five days to get a simple G.D. memo which is not controversial
since orders had been issued what we wanted.

S: Not controversial here Mr. Secretary but you've got other agencies
that are involved in this.

K: And why can it not be done in one day, that's what I want to know.

S: There is no excuse.

K: If I had done it in the W.H. I guarantee it would have been done in 2 hours.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 127958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-94

S: I have no excuse.

K: OK. Well you know it wasn't. I would like to get the people who did this called on the carpet and told to straighten out.

S: In any event I've already called George Newman this morning after brent talked to this has got to be revised somewhat to reflect what you've just said here.

K: But by that time it will happen just before I go to the Middle East. It will look like blackmail. It will happen just when the Congress is coming back and screaming its head off. In other words, the Department has again brought about the exactly the opposite of what I wantd.

S: Why don't we get this altered in the next hour which can be done in the next hour Mr. Secretary and then go from here.

K: If I then can get to the President who is raving around here on his own reasons.

S: I will try to give you a better answer as to why it got delayed. I don't honestly know.

K: Good. Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-64

TELECON

FM Fahmy/Secretary Kissinger

April 19, 1974

10:45 AM

K: Ismail, how are you? I'm just talking to the Lebanese.

F: You called me yesterday night?

K: Yes. I wanted to tell you that your resolution, really we can't go along with. I think that is too unbalanced and it will get us into...

F: This is too unbalanced?

K: Yes.

F: __ resolution much stronger than this, on the Lebanese issue too, before and 3/4 of this from the European and from the American talks.

K: Well, there's now a European draft which we...

F: A new one?

K: A new one which has 4 or 5 of (it has Australia), France agrees with it too which we would like to go along with.

F: Yes. But I mean there are some parts of that thing which I mean the non-aligned will not be able to support and then (Moscow) really will be forced to propose another version which will get the necessary votes. The point is, you see, if the Lebanese accept the European than you have no problem. If they accept anything, you see.

K: Yes.

F: It's up to them. The minute they tell the non-aligned or the Europeans or anybody that they are ready to accept any version, then this is the key for the whole thing. OK?

K: Well, let me see what I can do. I have the Egyptian Foreign Minister here now -- the Lebanese Foreign Minister. The Egyptian Foreign Minister is a pain in the neck, he's in N.Y.

F: You see, the main thing for them is, in my opinion, they will get a draft which you can support. This is in their interest.

K: I agree completely. Incidentally, I wanted to tell you something yesterday but that I wouldn't....

F: I'm here in the hotel, you know.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By CQ NARA Date 6-8-04

Fahmy - page 2

K: In New York?

F: Yes.

K: I'll send it by cable.

F: OK.

K: Because there are too many switchboards.

F: OK. Send it by cable to Cairo.

K: Yes, to Cairo. You're leaving today, aren't you?

F: I'm arriving tomorrow.

K: I'll have it for you by tomorrow.

F: OK, thank you very much.

K: It's just a point for you and for your President. Just a point of information about some Soviet activity here.

F: OK. Thank you very much.

K: The President was very pleased with his meeting with you.

F: Well, I was very pleased and honored and the President, I got a cable from him, he's very satisfied.

K: And you know we are receiving Ghorbal today.

F: Yes, thank you very much. You are going to meet Schlesinger?

K: Sunday, when he comes back.

F: And we're looking for you and Nancy, OK.

K: Terrific. Thank you.

F: Thank you for everything, Henry.

K: Ismail, you're a good friend in addition to everything else.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By CD NARA Date 6-8-94

TELECON
Mr. Donaldson/Secretary Kissinger

April 19, 1974

12:25 PM

K: I had been hoping to be able to see you before I went off, but I just wanted to ask you to hold up a decision until we have a chance to talk, which can be anytime next week. But I cannot talk to you until I get back from Atlanta.

D: Right. I'm supposed to lead our delegation of the executive committee session of the OECD, you know, we meet Sunday night. Is there any....

K: When would you be back?

D: I don't get from that until Thursday. Any chance of chatting with you this weekend?

K: I won't be back from Atlanta until Sunday afternoon, then I have to look at some houses and I just -- Bill, I know how it looks to you but you have to look at my problem. I've been working 15 to 18 hours a day and many things that bother you are in no sense directed at you. I could almost certainly see you Monday, or I'll see you as soon as you get back on Thursday.

D: OK, well let me -- you know the -- my only problem is that if I don't -- you know I leave everybody holding the bag and I don't go to the OECD.

K: Well, why don't you go to the OECD and why don't you not make a final decision. These early things always take awhile to shake down and you're in a little bit the same spot/I was in when I worked for Kennedy when things ought to be in a certain position and it really depends on the necessities that can be structured. Let's have breakfast Friday morning.

D: Alright, fine.

thing

K: We'll have breakfast Friday. Don't do any/irrevocable until we can talk.

D: Alright, fine.

K: Good trip. Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-74

TELCON
Amb. Annenberg/HAK

4/22/74 - 9:26 a.m.

A: Henry, how are you?

K: Alright.

A: Again, I wish you every possible happiness. As I said to you in the note, I earnestly pray that you'll have as much happiness in your life as I have with my wife.

K: I appreciate that very much.

A: Henry, last week Robert O. Anderson was here for a few days -- he was up to see me -- and indicated that if the Morton situation were not set solid, he indeed would very much like to be considered once again.

K: Let me raise that to the President.

A: As you know he is a tremendous situation. I know I don't have to underscore for you what a superb representative he would be.

K: Outstanding.

A: I don't mean to say that the Senator would not do good but I've known Bob Anderson intimately for 20 years and he is absolutely one of the outstanding citizens in our country.

K: No question about it.

A: So there you are.

K: I'll talk to the President today.

A: Bob is going on to Paris, May I have your permission to give him a call indicating that I've spoken to you and that you will approach the subject with the President.

K: Absolutely.

A: Fine.

K: The only problem is I don't know how far the President has gone with Wood

A: I recognize that. I mean if it is thoroughly well set there isn't anything we can do about it.

DECLASSIFIED
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By C0 NARA Date 6-8-87

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
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K: Exactly.

A: Now one further suggestion. I had indicated that I wanted leave as of June 30th. I now feel that it would be fitting for me to continue until I hold the formal July 4th Celebration at the residence where I -- where it is customary, you know, to have all the diplomats.

K: Absolutely.

A: I'm afraid were I to leave on the 30th, there would be no way of handling the official July 4th.

K: Why don't you make it July 15th or July 30th. Whenever you wish.

A: Let us target say about July 5th or 10th. I mean something like that.

K: OK.

A: Alright. Will you pass that on to Kenneth Rush.

K: Absolutely.

A: My people feel here it is obligatory that we continue the July 4th celebration.

K: Why don't we do it July 15th.

A: Alright. July 15th. And I'll give Bob Anderson a call at the Ritz in Paris and tell him that I have relayed the subject matter with you and at the earliest opportunity you would approach the President but that we -- of course, we have to understand that it could be too late.

K: Exactly right.

A: All the best Henry.

K: Bye.

TELCON
Senator Mansfield/HAK

4/22/74 - 9:50 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Good morning Henry.

K: How are you.

M: Fine. And you?

K: OK,

M: Bearing up.

K: Yes, we are getting along OK.

M: Good listen. Maureen would like to give a lunch for Mrs. Kissinger up here some time convenient to her.

K: Isn't that nice.

M: So, could you talk to her sometime and tell her what dates could be convenient beginning next week.

K: Absolutely.

M: She'd like to have Mrs. Scott and people like that in. It would be sort of a chance to meet the leadership and hopefully you can have some of the house leaders over too.

K: I know that Nancy would really be delighted. It's such a thoughtful idea.

M: Well.

K: She's going to the Middle East with me next week so it may have to wait until she gets back.

M: Just give us some dates Henry and lets see if we can work out something.

K: Good. I'll ask Nancy to call Maureen when she gets back from New York tomorrow.

M: OK. Fine Henry.

K: Many thanks. Bye.

By QNARA Date 6.8.04

TELCON
Admiral Moorer/HAK

4/22/74 - 10:33 a.m.

K: Hello Tom.

M: Good morning and the most important thing I have to say since this
is the first time we've been in town together for sometime is
congratulations on your wedding and certainly I wish you and Nancy
all the happiness in the world which you deserve so much.

K: Thank you. I appreciate it.

M: Well. Secondly, I think -- I've talked to Joe and Ken but sometime
before you leave on Sunday, it might be useful if I could talk to you
for a few minutes relative to the trip I just finished.

K: Absolutely.

M: And in the meantime I'm making you up a paper which with some point
...

K: What places did you visit.

M: Iran, Bahrain and Kuwait.

K: Did the Saudis send anyone out to your carrier?

M: No they refused the invitation. They said that -- but they were
given the invitation and we made arrangements with Oman to send
them through but -- I don't know whether the Ambassador over there
really wanted me to come over or not so I never did get to Saudi Arabia.

K: Yes.

M: But anyway I had a most successful visit Bahrain -- particularly
Kuwait where everybody said that they were going to be hostile. They
weren't. They just couldn't have been more hospitable beginning with
the Crown Prince who acts as the executive and right on down through
the Minister of Defense and all.

K: Yes, I'd like to see you because I am planning to go to Kuwait.

M: I know you are and so I'm going to write you up a paper but any time
you say, night or day, I'll come over.

you

K: Good. I'll call/within a day.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By C9 NARA Date 6-8-94

TELECON
Nelson Rockefeller/Secretary Kissinger

April 22, 1974

12:30 PM

K: ________ hear from you.

N: Back into our old areas, your old area, which was Europe.

K: Oh, you just came back, of course.

N: I just got back with David Golderberg and we were in Paris on Saturday and went to see you great friend, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

K: I hope you were reasonably tougher.

N: We had a lot of fun with him.

K: He's very bright.

N: Pretty good sense of humor if you kid him.

K: He's very bright.

N: That's what my impression was, he was talking about the United States ought to walk with the feet of gazelle not with those of elephants. I said, well, Mr. Minister it seems to me there are elephants in other countries besides the United States. Ah, he said, but they're smaller elephants. David's very good with these people. We went through a tense period but came out. But I'm terribly anxious to come down and give you some impressions sometime. I was at the meetings with your two men, Mr. Lord and ....

K: How did they behave?

N: Well, the lighting rod is definitely, what's his name - your counselor. Sonnenfeldt.

K: Was he tough?

N: Well, he was and he was tough and he's very articulate, of course, he's very brilliant.

K: Very bright.

N: But he wasn't about to let go of the fight.

K: Well, that's good. That's what his instructions were.

Rockefeller - page 2

N: Well, that's what he said.

K: No, there's absolutely what the Europeans want from us, that we now tell them all is well and there is no problem and that just isn't true. There is a massive problem and if we don't deal with it now we'll have to deal with it under much worse circumstances three or four years from now.

N: That's right. No question in my mind and the question is how to get that kind of cooperation in dealing with it. What one of them very cleverly said, this is an editor of a newspaper, very attractive, very bright, articulate guy.

K: What's his name?

N: I can't think right now. He's a good looking guy and he said, well he understood bombing Haiphong just before you went to the Soviet because he said that worked very well. He said he wasn't sure that bombing before discussions with European allies necessarily was the best way to get cooperation. But the only problem with this is that these Germans are very clever but they are petrified of being isolated.

K: But, Nelson, that's the only thing we've got going for us.

N: Well, I understand.

K: We tried for a year dealing with them in another way, then they just keep delaying decision and they give the French everything -- they give the French half of what they want and they give us 10 percent of what we want and it creates confusion and objective gain for the French policy.

N: Exactly. Well, let me say this, I'm going to be in Washington on Wednesday for a Water Commission meeting and I wonder whether at any time Wednesday there might be a chance of getting 15 minutes with you.

K: Absolutely.

N: I made notes and I talked...

K: I don't have my schedule, can I call you this afternoon.

N: Sure. I'm going to be there -- my meeting is at two to say four or five, but before that, lunch or in the morning.

K: Let me see whether I can arrange lunch.

N: Anytime.

DALLAS-DFW
Authority E0 12958
By C0 NARA Date 6-8-94

Rockefeller - page 3

K: And, if not, afterwards. Is that possible, for a drink?

N: Sure. Either way.

K: Good.

N: I think I've got some interesting little insights and so forth, plus some channels. I'd just like to give them to you and I don't like to do it over the phone.

K: No, and I'm anxious to talk to you about that situation anyway.

N: Excellent.

K: Wonderful.

N: I'm thrilled, Henry and I look forward -- just let me know whenever it's convenient for you and I'll drop by.

K: Right. I'll call in the afternoon.

N: Please give my regards to Mrs. Kissinger.

K: She's with you.

N: She is. Oh, she's up here.

K: Yes.

N: God, she ought to be in this meeting. I'll call her. right away. OK.

K: OK. Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority CO 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-67

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger

April 22, 1974

4:35 PM

K: Al, sorry to bother you, but I have Nick Thimmesch coming in this minute and he told Larry that he wants to talk to me about my not supporting the President. I want to be able to tell him that my public position on this is worked out closely with you and the President and has your full approval.

H: Always. He's always hit me on the same thing Henry and I've never done anything but told him that you've always done -- you've always been fully supported. Now you know, he's hung up on that because he apparently was the receptacle of the Scali-Colson business a year ago.

K: Oh, yes.

H: You know, that's the point you have to have in your call when you talk to him so you don't lose any credibility. I've talked to him at least 3 times since I've been here. He always raises that, I also deal with it the same way I know you would.

K: I just want to be able to say that I can say this and look at support.

H: Absolutely.

K: Good.

H: OK, Henry.

K: Sorry to get you out of the meeting.

H: That's alright.

K: Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12/95
By CO NARA Date 6-8-95

TELECON
Senator Mansfield/Secretary Kissinger

April 22, 1974

6:17 PM

M: Yes, Henry.

K: I just wanted you to know I had a talk with Huang Chen just now and I have the impression that your trip to China is again on. He asked whether we had any objection and I told him on the contrary we were strongly in favor of it. He said he would then talk dates with you when you see him at lunch, whenever that is.

M: Next week.

K: Next week.

M: Fine.

K: But I just wanted you to have that word.

M: Now listen, I was going to get up a written report to you and I still will because I went through it. But I made a courtesy call on Vice Premier (Teng?) for a half hour the day after you did and then Chou, Huan Hua and Huang Hua came out to Mrs. Englehart's for dinner that night. They had a good time.

K: Wonderful.

M: And at that time the Vice Premier extended an invitation twice and he said to see Huan Chen, so what you said makes it look better.

K: Good. I have the impression that they're very eager to get relations visably back on track. I mean, they were never off track.

M: No, the thing I emphasized again was that our policy was irreversible; that it was set and was going to continue because I remembered what you had said to me previously. It was beginning to sound like a phonograph record.

K: I'm not complaining.

M: Well, listen, will Nancy call Maureen tomorrow?

K: She'll call her tomorrow, yes. She's in NY today and she'll call her tomorrow.

M: Good, enough. OK, Henry.

K: Wonderful, thank you, bye.

END

April 22, 1974

6:55 PM

K: I'm talking to the British Ambassador who is worried that once more he's bringing me news that I haven't already had from you. Now, he wanted to know where we stood, whether there was anything we should settle while I'm here.

S: Did you get my little note on where it stood?

K: Where it stood was...

S: This is the council.

K: Yes, that there's an Australian and British draft.

S: Well, here's what it is.

K: Have we heard from the Lebanese, was his question.

S: Well, we've heard from the Lebanese, it's not beyond what I reported to you over the weekend, but what the British are doing they're seeking the co-sponsorship of Australia and Austria. My latest report as of an hour, an hour and a half ago is that on the whole, the Lebanese have been holding firm.

K: The Lebanese have been holding firm.

S: Yes, so far.

K: Meaning they'll support that draft.

S: That's what they told us. Now you see, Mr. Secretary, also what I wrote in this little note to you, remember that when this resolution goes beyond, the British, Austria and Australia, some of the mice will begin to get at it. I'm really worried about the Russians on this one.

K: I've told him that already.

S: But so far, so good.

K: I've told him that you expressed some doubt about the staying power.

S: Well, I repeated in the cable to you in Atlanta, my soft spaghetti__.

K: In other words, it's still exactly the same as your last note to me.

S: That's correct.

K: That's what I wanted. Thank you.. END

TELECON

April 22, 1974

7:10 PM

D: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you Anatol?

D: Thank you very much. How are you?

K: I am fine.

D: Are you going to listen to the concert given by Frank Sinatra?

K: That's my intention. Do you want to come along?

D: I intend to go.

K: I have tickets, come with me.

D: Really? No. They promised to give me two, for me and ____.

K: Well, I've got plenty of tickets.

D: Well, we'll check tomorrow, OK.

K: OK. You can come with me. I'll have the Mexican Foreign Minister with me and you can subvert him.

D: Well, thank you very much. We'll check tomorrow with you, OK.

K: I'm longing to know whether I'll see your Foreign Minister.

D: Well, I will give you tomorrow. All the answers. OK?

K: You have the answers already?

D: Positive.

K: Good.

D: Well, positive reaction. It's positive for all the way.

K: OK, good. And look we are going to try to work it -- we will proceed constructively. We'll discuss it tomorrow.

D: Yes. I feel a positive reply for you.

DELLAQUILLO
Authority EO 12958

By C9 KARA Date 6-8-74

*

Dobrynin - page 2

K: Good.

D: I simply didn't want to bother...

K: No, so I can proceed with my schedule. That's all I need to know today.

D: Yes, definitely.

K: And I have a new proposal for you on SALT.

D: Tomorrow, yes.

K: You can put an unlimited number of MIRVs on submarines.

D: You mean on the Mexican submarines.

K: Mexicans, any submarine, even your own.

D: You are meeting with the Foreign Minister of Mexico so I thought you even got the privilege to have unlimited access on the Mexican submarines.

K: Well, that too, yes. Now you've given me a new idea. I think our Joint Chief will like that.

D: I will know in what regards some talks with you two years ago.

K: OK, Anatol, see you at 1:00 tomorrow.

D: Yes, 1:00 tomorrow.

K: Good.

D: Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-9-84

TELECON

UN Secretary General Waldheim/Secretary Kissinger

April 22, 1974

7:20 PM

K: Hello, Mr. Secretary General.

W: Good evening, Mr. Secretary. I apologize for ringing you up so late.

K: Not at all. It's always a pleasure to hear from you.

W: You are very kind. You know that your statement here got an excellent reaction.

K: I've been very pleased.

W: Highly appreciated. This time I'm not bothering you with the Middle East but I ring you up because of a rather difficult situation here regarding the special session. The problem is that we have three aspects. One is the declaration of principles. For your information, I think this will work, that we can adopt these declarations on a consensus basis. They are difficulties but I think they can be overcome. Then there is the problem of action. The latest information is that the developing countries, those in the non-aligned group and the group of 77 are determined to push ahead with the document which the 77 had worked out sometime ago already. We hope that it will be possible to have it adopted by consensus, but and this is the dangerous thing, but failing that, I think it would be necessary to press for a vote. Now if they press for a vote they would get the necessary number of votes.

K: But it wouldn't be implemented.

W: But it cannot be implemented. It would be another paper without any real value. And it serves the problem. The third aspect which is the main reason why I thought I should ring you up. I have been contacted last Saturday or Friday by the Ambassador of -- by the Foreign Minister of Guyana, who flew with you, as I remember you, to discuss it when you had lunch here, he had told me that he was flying with you to Washington and the Foreign Minister of Sudan. They both came as well as the Finance Minister of Iran, asking me to help them in setting up, as a sort of a committee, to assemble, a special fund for the most affected developing countries. And they complained a little about the fact that the U.S. delegation, after your statement, was not really active. He had avoided discussion of the problem with the other delegations. In other words, they were very reserved and kept back with their own opinion. Some of the delegates said well, we had expected it after this very constructive....

K: Well, let me take a look at.... I will look into that and see what the problem is. Basically, I'm sympathetic.

W: Yes. Mr. Secretary, my complete request is this. We want a sort of complete ____ of this session, which will be over in one week, set up a special

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12958
By C6 NARA Date 6-8-74

Waldheim - page 2

fund which should get money from the Iranians. They have already told me that they have 150 million ready, the check could be given to us immediately. Venezuela and perhaps Algeria and Libya, whereas Saudi Arabia and Kuwait say, well we have already pledged to the Islamic fund and to the Arab fund so why should we pay to another new fund. But there religious funds, he said, want to pull them in this committee. They don't cover countries like Guyana, India, Sri Lanka, etc, therefore it would be logical to have a fund which could be, of course, administered by the World Bank. I talked to McNamara, he would be very happy to help us with his machinery and his...

K: Can I call you about this tomorrow after I have seen what we can do? Basically, I'm sympathetic.

W: That is very kind. I have a meeting tomorrow with donor countries and this petroleum producing countries so I hope that it will be possible that perhaps the USA could help us in this regard and make a contribution to such a fund because that would be very encouraging to the others.

K: I'll try to call you in the morning.

W: That is very kind and thank you very much for your understanding.

K: Not at all. It's a pleasure to talk to you.

W: Goodbye.

K: Bye.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority E0 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By CO NARA Date 6.8.84</td></tr></table>

TELECON

April 23, 1974

D: I received a telegram from Gromyko. He asked me to clear with you a sub-communique about his and your meeting in Geneva. He proposed to publish this short announcement. A meeting between Gromyko and Kissinger. An agreement has been reached that Gromyko, a member of the Politburo and USSR Minister for Foreign Relations and Dr. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will meet in Geneva on April 28 and 29. During the meeting an exchange of opinions will be continued on a number of issues in connection with the forthcoming visit of President Nixon to the Soviet Union.

K: Right.

D: That's all.

K: You don't want to mention the Middle East?

D: If you like.

K: No, it's up to you.

D: No, he proposes ____ because it implies that it's included in the Middle East after you may make, just put in general.

K: No, I accept this.

D: OK?

K: Good. What time should we publish it?

D: 25th or 26th, which is more convenience for you. 10:00 AM Washington time.
25th is Thursday, 26th, Friday.

K: Let's do it on Thursday.

D: Thursday, 10:00 AM Washington time.

K: For us noon is a little better.

D: Noon better. Then it will be 12:00. Our time it will be 7:00.

K: Yes.

D: OK, I think it could be done, really. At noon, Washington time on the 25th.

K: I will try to send something over to you this evening.

DECLASSIFIED

TELECON

Jerry Schecter/Secretary Kissinger

April 23, 1974

4:35 PM

S: Hi, Henry, how are you?

K: Jerry, how are you?

S: Say, I haven't had a chance to congratulate you. That's terrific. I'm never
going to joke with you again now.

K: I give you a great scoop and you blow it.

S: Well, you know, that's what happens when you try to realize that you're human. And try to let you have a little personal life. Everybody asked me why I wasn't in Acapulco and told them, well, I think I better let Henry take care of this one himself.

K: Were you going to offer technical assistance.

S: I don't think you need any. At any rate, I think it's really great news and I'm really delighted.

K: That message I got about what you want to do, I think you got that (Reston) article totally wrong. First of all, it's totally untrue that Bruce has requested to return and I have a long cable from him x in which he denies it, is outraged by the story and claims that he's very happy.

S: If you believe that he'll tell you another one.

K: No, I believe it. I talked to him about before he left. Secondly, the fact of the matter is, our China policy is absolutely on course now. Whatever of problems of Chou maybe, the policy is totally on course.

S: What does that mean?

K: What it means in, that it is exactly on the course that it was outlined last November, that exchange programs will be starting again very soon and that all the signals are positive and that the conversation with (Teng) was an extremely positive conversation -- really designed for reassurance. This is on the background

S: What about -- what do you mean starting soon?

K: Well, starting within the next month or so.

S: I see. I gather you also been seeing other Chinese too?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By CQ NARA Date 6-8-84

Schecter - page 2

K: I saw the Ambassador yesterday.

S: How did that go?

K: Very well. I mean, it's all part of the same pattern.

S: Well, OK, but I mean the general thrust is, you know....

K: Whatever Chou's problems may be, they have to do with domestic not foreign policy. And even that I'm not in a clear position to say.

S: In other words, my reading -- around town here the thrust was, well Henry's kind of put the ___ on Chou's neck. Now it seems to me...

K: Totally wrong.

S: That wrong. Well, my reading of that was, for goodness sakes that's not right. He's taken the pressure off Chou and said, you know, after all Mao's the one who made the policy.

K: Exactly.

S: And that's the way you should read it.

K: It should be read as a reaffirmation of the existing policy regardless of who is technically -- whose name is associated with it and it is a reaffirmation with Mao's backing. And that is the correct way. You're interpretation is absolutely the correct one. It was one of the most positive conversations we've had with the Chinese. I mean, you can't use this but just for your information.

S: The one with (Teng).

K: Yes. The other was really just a continuation of the first.

S: Is there any specific that I can point that? Quite frankly, there's a lot of disenchantment. It's very difficult to have a dialog with these people. If they're isolated, they've isolated themselves here in Washington. The academic community feels that this kind of ___ the people involved and...

K: Yes, but Jerry, this is sort of the existing melee in the country in which one can't bear the thought, you know, in which the thought that this thing may be working you know, this is being said about the Soviets, it's said about everything.

S: But also, you know I mean, a policy gets support from people who are involved aside from you. This is a sort of consensus that came out of the Asian Scholars Meeting up in Cambridge a couple of weeks ago.

Schecter - page 3

K: But the Asians got -- it has to do with their general attitude towards the Administration too.

S: Yes, but I think it's more than that.

K: The Chinese never looked at the policy with us on sentimental green grounds, they looked at it on practical grounds. They never did it for understanding of the abstract. In terms of that, it's working quite well. There was almost no or a few months in which nothing was happening, one way or the other. I mean, it wasn't going backward but it was sort of an hiatus, but it's now picking up again.

S: I don't see how. In other words, you say it's picking up but what can you point to specifically.

K: Well, I think we will see...

S: I mean, Teng's visit certainly is a specific thing.

K: And you will see that the exchange programs will be picking up again.

S: In what areas can you just give me...

K: Well, in all areas. I'd say we're foreseen were foreseen, but I cannot talk about things that haven't been announced yet.

S: Come on, that's why I called you.

K: I can give you my judgment if you wait a week or two, you'll see it announced.

S: I see.

K: OK.

S: Well, thank you very much.

K: OK, Jerry.

S: We'll be in touch. Bye.

K: Good, bye.

END

DELLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-94

April 23, 1974

4:45 PM

K: Have you got Cairo 2501? We'll, get it anyway.

S: I'll find it, what does it deal with.

K: Brandt's visit. Will you get a cable off to Brandt to see -- to tell him I'd
very much appreciated a readout before I go on Sunday.

S: There was a fairly good announcement this morning in the Post which
I hope was meaningful. They made positive noices of added economic...

K: Well, look at 2501. But I would appreciate if he could let me have any
comment before I go to...

S: Sure I'll do that.

K: Good. Because I'll be asked about it. And tell him I'll try to stop by
in Bonn on the way back.

try to

S: You'll/stop by on the way back.

K: OK, good. Thank you.

END

<table><tr><td>DEPARTMENT</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td></tr><tr><td>By</td></tr><tr><td>MO</td><td>NARA Date</td><td>6-8-74</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Mr. Hummel/Secretary Kissinger

April 23, 1974

5:50 PM

(Missed the first part)

K: Not while I was there.

H: Oh, I'm sorry. This was told to Dick Soloman as he was escorting him down. That was the way it happened.

K: OK, but that's not something we can tell the press yet.

H: No sir, no. Dick Soloman and the White House are working that end of it and very quietly.

K: Good. OK. Thank you.

END

<table><tr><td>DELEGATED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>ECO 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>CO NARA</td><td>Date</td><td>6-8-74</td></tr></table>

TELECON
William Colby/Secretary Kissinger

April 23, 1974

7:45 PM

K: Bill.

C: Yes, sir.

K: Where are you.

C: I'm home.

K: Good. Like to see your staff visably occupied. Look, I have to meet with the congressional leaders tomorrow. This should have been done earlier, but we didn't. I need the figures. Now, not matter how inaccurate they are on what foreign assistance North Vietnam is getting, both civilian and approximate dollar values. And the same for Cambodia, which is even mushier. Now I know your figures are mushy but the figures are going to better than anything I can invent and I think the most presuasive argument we can make in this town is to proof how world Communism is uniting, that we will not have detente in Vietnam.

C: We'll give you military and civilian separately and then totalled for X North Vietnam.

K: But can I have it by 7:00 in the morning ?

C: Sure. OK.

K: Scowcroft's office.

C: Alright.

K: Gives me also a good check on when he gets in.

C: I'll have them at the sitroom.

K: Have them in the sitroom, broken down into quantities because if the dollar value is hard to figure and if you can give me some idea how it compares to what we put into South Vietnam. Well, hopefully it will prove that more is going into North Vietnam.

C: No, it won't.

K: No sense having an intelligence system if it comes up with such confusion.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-84

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger

April 23, 1974

8:35 PM

(Missed first part)

D: I've finished now, so if you want I can stop over.

K: Well, will you -- have we got anything to talk about either than the security council?

D: That's just up to you to tell me it will all be straightened out, we don't.....

K: No, no. I told you, if you want to come by for 15 minutes.

D: OK. I'll stop by.

K: Good.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority E0 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By CO NARA Date 6-8-84</td></tr></table>

April 23, 1974

8:40 PM

(Missed the first part)

D: ______ dinner for Sunday of the Kennedy Center, something very unimportant.

K: And you will be....

D: I'll be home at 9:00.

K: You'll be home at 9:00. You know I get lonely when I don't know where you are.

D: You're very kind. I feel the same about you, Mr. Secretary. I haven't heard from you in two days and all things were happening in the UN.

K: Because they didn't make you Prime Minister, I've sort of lost interest in you.

D: Well, I don't think that Rabin will make it anyhow.

K: You don't think he'll make it?

D: No, I don't think he will be able to compose a ______.

K: But won't he then leave the party?

D: That is possible. But then when new elections come, many things can happen. I might even go back there.

K: No, I don't want that. But didn't Eagleburger keep you posted. I've been in meetings all day.

D: Eagleburger called me about 1/2 hour ago and said that you would want to talk to me later. ______ which I thought was really a very sad message.

K: Well, I know that but that's the situation which I've been trying to explain to you since Friday.

D: I understand this, Mr. Secretary, but here is a situation in which the Friday draft resolution which was inbalanced has now been corrected to be really outrageous. I mean there is not even a mention of ______. There is no mention of terrorism at all. You know, it's all acts of violence and it's like Moses who condemned murder in the 10 Commandments. Never mind what Eban cabled me

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By CO NARA Date 6.8.74

Dinitz - page 2

to talk to you, this is not the crucial thing. The point is, I'm very much concerned about a major reaction this ____ and then I get word from the UN that the British are against it, the Austrians are against, the Australians are against it so the US should be the one to push it in.

K: We are certainly not pushing it, that cannot be true.

D: But the fact is, ....

K: Look if we can get 5 ____ negative votes, if Austria, Australian and the British are willing to vote against it, we are gladly going to join them.

D: Yes, but the point is, you are not only not going to vote against it but you are going to......

K: If any of them are going to abstain with us, we are going to abstain with them. What we cannot -- I am not under the impression that we're pushing this.

D: No, you are not pushing it, but the fact of the matter is and Joe Sisco will confirm it to you, if you need any confirmation, that the British and Austrians and Australians think that this is one sided and they've said to you and as well as to us.

K: They haven't said it to us.

D: Yes, they did.

K: Well, I'll have to look into that.

D: They did and we know this. I don't give a damn about the UN resolution, I mean, you know my opinion of this, but I am only concerned with the reaction and it's not necessary. I mean, the Lebanese have done a vicious act of murder or the ____ terrorists. I don't need to go into the details. The fact that they will go out of the resolution of the UN with clean bill of health, this is really an unheard of situation. I mean, for what's it worth. The whole thing is worth nothing if you didn't have any resolution. If you can ____ bring it to the point where they there will be no resolution week after that.

K: No, that we've already tried. OK. Look will you call me when you leave the Kennedy Center.

D: I'll call you maybe as soon as I get home, about 9:00.

K: Well, I was going to say maybe you should drop by here for 15 minutes.

Dinitz - page 3

D: OK, we can do this. I'll come about 9:00 to your office.

K: Don't do it because I may not be here.

D: So, I'll call you before I go and see you there, I'll come. if are

K: That is right.

D: I did have a very nice evening last night with Gov. Rockefeller.

K: You did?

D: Yes. Very pleasant evening. I was in NY and I came especially to see him.

K: Good. Well, he's a great supporter.

D: Yes and he's a very nice man. He talked so highly about you and I found it so difficult to contradict.

K: I'm having lunch with him tomorrow. If I here of any -- if he comes with what happens to the 500 million in grant.

D: No, not a word about it. We talked about you, about Nancy, about the critical choices he's working on. We talked about what you're trying to do in the Middle. He expressed great affection for Mrs. Meir. W He wanted me to take a personal letter from him to Golda and we have a very lovely talk. In effect he said to me, if they ever kick you out of this job I'd like you to work with me. And I said, we'll be one big happy family.

K: He'd like her to work with him.

D: Me.

K: Like you to work with him?

D: Yes. He said he wants me to work on this critical choices business.

K: She's become a six symbol.

D: Who is this.

K: Your Prime Minister.

D: Against Rabin she's a sex symbol. It's all relevant, Mr. Secretary.

K: OK, give me a call when you're ready to come over.

END

April 23, 1974

10:04 PM

D: Hello.

K: Anatol?

D: Yes.

K: How are you?

D: And the same to you. You are not sleeping yet?

K: I've got a <u>xxx</u> paper for you if you want it tonight.

D: OK. Could you send it to me?

K: Yes, I'll send it over.

D: With your man.

K: Yes. You mind if he's black.

D: I think it's quite alright.

K: I give you two options in this paper and you understanding this is thinking out loud.

D: I understand.

K: I think of the two versions I give you this is just for your oral explanation.
The one going to 1983 is probably easier to manage here than the one going to
1980.

D: 83, yes?

K: Yes. Maybe easier to manage than the one going to 80.

D: I understand.

K: But you know, we say 82, 83 but just think of it in those terms.

D: Yes. I would really like my minister to try to check it <u>xxx</u> as a way of thinking.

K: Yes. We can play with the numbers if the concept becomes <u>acceptable</u> accepted
and the only other thing I want to say is this is what I would be willing to put

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12058
By N.W.aga

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

April 23, 1974

10:10 PM

K: Brent, I'd like you to do a back channel for Eilts to Fahmy and tell him to destroy the -- tell him if Fahmy now wanted to say that he x would not negotiate with the æX Israelis prior to Syrian disengagement. If he would say that publicly now this would be a good time.

S: OK.

K: If he would now say publicly what he told me he wanted to say in NY. I would not object.

S: OK.

K: You see what I mean.

S: Right.

K: OK.

S: I'll get it right off to him.

K: Right. Bye.

END

<table><tr><td>DELLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority EC 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By C. YARA Date 6.8.04</td></tr></table>

TELECON

April 23, 1974

K: Right.

D: That's all.

D: If you like.

K: No, it's up to you.

D: No, he proposes because it implies after you may make, just put in general.

K: No, I accept this.

D: OK?

K: Let's do it on Thursday.

K: Yes.

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TELCOM
Max Fisher/HAK

4/24/74 - 10:17 a.m.

K: Max, how are you.

F: Fine, how are you? Congratulations to you.

K: Thank you.

F: Hey buddy, I'm glad to see you got ten days of rest.

K: Well, I'll need it when I go to the Middle East next week.

F: I'm brining in the Wider group including some of the Soviets Jewish people tomorrow. And I just thought I'd check with you. What you might want to accomplish or what you had in mind so we could just check signals.

K: On the Soviet Jewish people do you think I should see them with that other group or do you think....

F: I'd tell you what you do. You're going to be meeting I understand with Jackson on Froday. I would do this Henry if I could suggest this. Bring the subject up at how its intertwined with the whole Middle East situation.

K: The reason I wanted them in was really not so much the Jackson thing. I first wanted to explain to them what I'm going to be doing in the Middle East.

F: I know that.

K: Now, can I trust the group you're bringing in?

F: Yes, you've been able to trust them so far.

K: Including the Soviet Jewish one.

F: I'm only bringing in one in and that is Stanley Llowll. I'm going to talk with him before he comes in and lay down the ground rules on it.

K: Because I would like to be fairly frank.

F: I tell you this.

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K: Look, you've never let me down. Your group has never let me down.

F: I've had to be pretty.... But that one of the reasons -- you know I have some control over these fellows. If they don't think they can get an appointment any time they want to. I have to exercise some degree of discipline with them. Now, what we'll do tomorrow. I'll go over that with them beforehand and then about a few minutes before you come in the meeting you call me and I'll give you the low-down on the whole thing.

K: Good, wonderful.

F: I think you can be very frank with them. You're going to have to see what problems you face and that and then I think you'll probably want to relate how that relates to the whole Russian situation.

K: That's what I thought I would do,

F: I think this is important. Now as long as Sanley Lowell is going to be there. He is coming in that group. You see I've been trying to break down this business. These people in the Soviet group are very, very radical and that's the reason I've just kind of have never wanted them in except that its just their leader. Knowing the politics of things. But now that this fellow is here I'll have a visit with him beforehand and then what we'll do is if you'll just call me in a few minutes before the meeting I'll give you the low-down on the whole thing.

K: Good, and you will guarantee their usual discretion.

F: So far over the years have I ever let you down.

K: You've never let me down.

F: We can't afford to let you down.

K: Well, you're a great friend.

F: Tell me, how are things going. Pretty rough.

K: It's a difficult period but I think we can manage.

F: Good. Well fine, I know that you have and I've been trying to do my best to keep things in control. By the way, when Jack was here we had a good visit.

K: He told me.

F: Let me say this to you Henry. I have my contacts in the overseas where I'm able to talk to anyone of the party members directly. You know I have that advantage because of my relationship over there.

and I can tell you this. No matter what takes place -- my own appraisal of it as of this moment is that you're going to be dealing with the same people that you've dealt with for the next few months.

K: That's my guess too.

F: And I think that no matter who it is -- I've talked with the members of La Cod even, no matter who it is going to be the policy on the disengagement situation. There isn't going to be much disagreement with. Now in terms of negotiation -- the frame of mind on that. That's something else but the fundamental policy is the same. Anytime you want to know the sort of the background on what the different parties think you can feel free to call me because I'm in touch with them because of my relationship with the Jewish agency over there.

K: Right. Well, we'll stay in close touch.

F: I'll see you tomorrow.

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TELECON

Kay Graham/Sec. Kissinger

April 24, 1974

11:23AM

K: To do an interview with me?

G: Listen, I was so nervous.

K: I am getting a little upset here.

G: You mean you have some competition going.

K: Yea, I get nothing but friendly comments, which is more than I could have ever managed in any interview that was done with me.

G: Listen, can I tell you something that I mean very very sincerely and strongly.

K: Yea.

G: That I, you know, I didn't really know Nancy. In a funny way you know having met her 50 times I really had never had an executive conversation with her.

K: Yea. It was always in big groups.

G: Yes. And I was really bowled over.

K: Aren't you nice.

G: I just thought she was very very special, Henry and extraordinary.

K: Well, I feel that way too.

G: And both Meg and I liked her so much that I hope it came through without

K: Oh, no, it really. I am only kidding. What really came through is

G: We had to tread a fine line you know between going in the..you know because you're my friend. You know everybody was watching.

K: No, no. I thought it was very warm and yet dignified and.

G: If you felt that. That is just great, KHK

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Graham/Kissinger 4/24

K: Very much.

G: Because you know we didn't have one of those

K: Good. I have been pulling Nancy's leg saying it was a very
Episcopalian interview and what other girl

G: No, it really wasn't. I'll tell you one thing, you know she
saying

K: Could I bring off/what the great frustrationx in my life is that
I couldn't join the polo team?

G: She didn't say it was a frustration.

K: But think about that for three minutes.

G: But she did not say it was a frustration. She said the line was
drawn when she wanted to learn polo.

K: I know. I am just pulling her leg. I thought it, you were
marvelous and really but I thought

G: But you know she was so, she was so tremendously intelligent
that she did that thing that a lot of people who haven't done a lot of
interview almost never do which is to be very open but verywise.

K: And she was terrified. You know she hadn't required that she
look at what you were going to quote. So she was really worried
worried what how this story would come out. And very pleased
with the way it did come out. She said she was going to call you.

KG: Yes, she called last night and Henry, I was rather pleased
because I just had to go up to the publishers meeting for one day
and I couldn't leave for any longer, but three, in fact that guy
that was sitting here Saturday. You know we were all exhausted
and tired by this time and I want to tell you a guy called from the
Newark Star Ledger, Mr. Benjamin C. Bradley is just walking in,
and this guy said, I can tell Henry. He said it is the best news

K: Is Bradley listening in?

G: No he is just starting too

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G: What a minute. Now shut up, Ben let me finish. You can listen. (BB)
The eggs involved are not to be believed Henry.

K: Listen I told Kay that I was tired of this upper class feeling that
came through in that article. Would you believe Ben if I said to a
reporter that k if I said the frustration of my life was that I couldn't
join the polo team. You think I could bring that off?

G: Henry would you and Ben both shut up for one minute.

whores

K: No but when I tried to get something on a part into a newspaper
you all made fun of me.

G: Henry, I just wanted to tell that this man from Newark Star
Ledger said Mrs. Graham I am putting this on the front page and so
did Pulman in Indianapolis and so did Oklahoma for Christ's Sake.

K: I am getting to the point for me to get on television I have to KEXX
stand next to my wife.

BB: Henry I have to listen egotistic appraisal of her own piece from
the lady publisher, really.

G: Henry, I want to tell you what Meg said, you know we were kidding
about being Woodward and Bernstein the new reporting team.
So when I said, oh Meg, everybody thinks it is marvelous, good we
will sell paper back rights and then she said we'll go to the movies.
She said I hope Lassie will play me.

BB: Listen Henry I haven't seen you to congratulate you.

K: Aren't you nice.

B: If I could say it privately if Katherin would hang up that I thought that
was a good piece and that Nancy came over....

K: I thought so too, that's why I called.

B: Warm and genuine and great human being.

K: I'll tell you Ben, if you'll publisher will let you come over here, I'd be
glad to give you lunch someday.

B: I'd love to do that, but we've got to ______ now it's occupying all
our time. As soon as it's done.

TELECON

Senator Cranston/Secretary Kissinger

April 24, 1974

11:30 AM

(Missed first part)

C: As you know, the tax bill seemingly is hung up for different reasons. The Energy Bill is in ahead of that and there's some feeling that it's a controversial...

K: Which bill - the Trade Bill.

C: The trade bill. That may not be moving anywhere and we may have no particular chance to do anything. A halfway measure is possible in terms of the export-import legislation which has to get through by June 30, so that will be coming to ______ to extend the export-import matter. Jackson added credits to his amendment so that we can quite appropriate ______ put in whatever modification of the Jackson amendment we might like to or seek to do that on that bill.

K: That would then take....

C: Not cover most favored nations.

K: No, but it would take care of the credits.

C: It would take care of the credit and would show the Senate position.

K: That would be helpful.

C: That would be one step. Now there's one other alternative. The Finance Committee is going to report 3 tax bills out in the next week or so. If we wanted we could try to amend one of them with our version of the Jackson thing and just do it rather if we have the capacity, which I think we have and the matter right then by adding on the Jackson language modified which would cover most favor nations and cover the export-import credit matter. That would go to the proper committee in the House so that we wouldn't have jurisdictional problems over there. The question is whether it's worth trying to move that swiftly or whether we should test the waters on export-import legislation.

K: My instinct is the latter but I'm not expert on legislative.

C: If we showed the Senate will on that, we, of course, will have not have vehicle to grant the most favored nation status to Soviet Union and the question is how long....

K: My impression is, that if we could get a quick show of preserving the credits that this would help us a hell of a lot.

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C: That may be the rightest and most orderly way to go then.

K: But I would be prepared to consider the other alternative. I'm having
breakfast with Jackson, Ribicoff and Javits on Friday and maybe we should
talk after that.

C: Fine. In connection with that business, the general feeling among people I've talked to here is that Jackson and Ribicoff are in __ and even if we confront them with it, the likelihood of beating them -- they're going to fight like hell and try to beat us. Whereas Javits might be detached from them and I've had a preliminary meeting with Bill Hildebrand who's Scott's key man up there. Scott is generally sympathetic to our view point and what I'm trying to put together next week, is early in the week, a meeting with Scott Mansfield and myself and Javits to bring him into our plans and we see if...

K: I think Javits can be detached. Ribicoff talks to me as if he could be
detached but that may be tactical.

C: I think it's conceivable if he -- I'm sure he's aware of the re-thinking
going on in the Jewish community...

K: Jackson I agree is in __.

C: I presume the meeting you'll have wouldn't come to any conclusions. Wouldn't leave us free to move these people, or try to move them.

K: I'm certain -- I don't expect we reach any conclusion. But I thought
if I could have a sense of __ I could make a better judgment after that.

C: That would be very useful. I will not be able to have this meeting until
next week so I can't talk to you before you take off again, after you've
talked to those 3.

K: Absolutely. I'll talk to you Friday morning, right afterwards.

C: Let me ask you two more questions. One on Sparkman, do you happen to
know his feelings. If we're going to do this in the banking committee, he's
one I haven't talked to you.

your


K: No, my instinct is, he would be in strong support of the __/position.

C: I think that he would be also. Now one other thing. The amendment - this
is the final thing I've got -- on the amendment that we're working on, I've worked
with Nelson and Himes a revision and it comes down in clear essentials
to this, first, we propose that if most favored nation is granted our credits by the
President there would be under the __ reorganization act a 90 day period in

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which one House of Congress could object to __ and thereafter the most favored nation thing would be subject to approval or disapproval each two years so that Congress would have that right to take a look every two years and the __ governing what we should take into account would include the following section D and this is really the meat of the __. When considering such a resolution of disapproval, the Congress shall take into account whether such country is evidencing reasonable progress and or is not retregressing from the observance of principles of human rights set forth in Section 402 which is __ including the principle of __.

K: Was the problem you have in addition with this, which we haven't raised this China.

C: Yes, I know. That's another little problem.

K: We don't want to get ourselves into discriminatory box with China, but maybe we can get Mansfield to introduce a special legislation for them.

C: He is going to. So that would cover that. Is that language I read to you sound reasonable?

K: That sounds possible. Now let me ask you, when you say, does it mean every two years the thing continues unless the Senate disapproves this.

C: That's right, yes.

K: It doesn't have a permanent __ for it.

C: It should be renewable for additional periods in the language we've got in now. Each not to exceed 2 years subject to the provisions...

K: So, there has to be a positive vote or it lapses.

C: The Congress would just have to reject this if it wanted. It would have the opportunity to object every 2 years.

K: That I would prefer.

C: That's the way it is.

K: The other thing on credits. Are you requiring that every credit no matter what the size be put before the....

C: That would be a different matter that is not in this portion of the bill.

K: That is not in there.

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TELECON

Ambassador Dobryna/Sec. Kissinger

April 24, 1974

11:55 am

D: Hello, good morning Henry.

K: Good morning to you.

D: In connection with the submarines and SALT things. I would like to check with you -- I sent already what you sent but, there are some things that I would like to attempt to add because there are some explanations in my opinion that are needed. First, this is my own statistics. Am I correct in understanding that what is really now you are proposing -- not the only MIRV limitations as it was before because up to now we were discussing without modifying the terms of the Protocol Interim Agreement but was saying of a MIRV limitation, now it looks though that you propose, in both ways for 80 or 83 double change or rather double bonus, if I may use this phrase. It means that not only ______ will be agreed upon between us on the MIRV but at the same time to change or modify the terms of an interim agreement. Is it so?

K: By thirty missiles.

D: Yes but it doesn't matter. I was speaking not for now, but in matters of principle because you change the principle really, if I understand correctly.

K: It arises out of the technical problem, Anatoly. The number of missiles on a boat.

L: I know, for me it is more of a political now; because up to now it was clear-cut situation.

K: No, no. A slight modification of the extension of the Interim Agreement. Until 7/ we would leave the agreement as it is.

D: Yes, but it is according to the existing agreement.

K: From 74 to 77, the Interim Agreement would stay as it is.

D: Until 77,

K: That's right.

D: But it needs to be changed.

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K: No no, but we are not asking that it be changed retroactively. For the extension period we want an increase of 30 missiles.

D: Yes, so really your proposal now is...

K: No, I would like you to tell me that Soviet survival depends on 30 American missiles, it would make me feel very good.

D: No, no no, Henry. But first I would like to know from a political point of view, what is changing now.

K: What is changing is that we would like 30 more missiles for the extension. No more submarines, but 30 more missiles.

D: So this is a new element yes?

K: It is a new element which arose when...

D: No, I understand. Up to now it was very clear-cut in Brezhnev's mind, but now it is changed in the Protocol itself - ok.

K: In the Protocol from 77 on -- from 77 onward.

D: Yes, I understand, but it was up to now, the whole discussion was without changing the Protocol. And second, you mentioned about the number of ___ is 44, you meant 41?

K: No 44, but we would get rid of the Trident. We would just carry out the Agreement.

D: There is some agreement about 41.

K: Well, that's a done agreement that lapses in 77 anyway.

D: I know, but you mean that this agreement should not be carried on after 77.

K: No, after 77 we fulfill literally what is in the written agreement which is 44 and 710 and we can reach the 710 by trading in old missiles.

D: But there was an understanding.

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K: That understanding would lapse after 77.

D: It will lapse?

K: After 77.

D: It will continue?

K: Lapse.

D: Not 44 but 41.

K: It will be 44.

D: 44.

K: Yes.

D: So this is the second change, not 41 but 44.

K: Right, but that is how we get the three Tridents.

D: I am aware of that. I understand. How you come to the number of Tridents by 40 or 43, I tried to calculate by the number of missiles and I couldn't come to the 740 -- where do you get that? What composition of the 740?

K: What figure did you arrive at?

D: It depends what kind of a submarine you are going to have. How many Tridents and how many, because it is a different kind of combination. If you take by 83, then 10 Tridents, then you will have 31 and then 736, but you are saying 740.

K: Then we would have 4 missiles -- 3 standing on the deck of some submarine. You figured it out correctly.

D: It should be 736.

K: Well, if you drive us to that point, we will yield. We will give you 4 missiles.

D: I want to know the real combination. -- because this question they will ask you. Are you thinking by 83 it will be 41 or 44?

K: XXX

K: That's a very good question, Anajoyl. It could be either. This is something we would have to discuss.

D: 41 or 44.

FREQUENT - D-

K: If you come to this figure of 740, it is 40 plus four or it stems from your idea...

K: Look, it gives us a number of combinations. It can be 40 plus four; it can be 31 plus 10. We can compose it in different ways.

D: I see, but still...

K: All of which amount to about 733.

D: 736 it will be in this case. To sum up --

K: I think they should send an Ambassador who doesn't analyse things and just transmits them.

D: Well, Henry, to sum up, one it is definitely a change, second, about the...

K: Look, it is a minimal change.

D: No, no, it changes the basic political approach. It changes now even the Protocol.

K: I thought I had made it clear that we wanted...

D: What?

K: I had made clear to Brezhnev that we wanted three Trident submarines added to the Agreement otherwise I wouldn't have had to raise it because under the Agreement we can...

D: By 80?

K: By 80. To reach 77 in 80. We don't want them now.

D: Yes, but is it correct to say that it will be by 80; by 80 it will be really in a sense what you mentioned -- but within 41 or 44?

K: Within 44.

D: So you change here too.

K: Yes.

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D: Even by 80.

K: Correct.

D: By 80 it will be 42 plus 3. Ok, I will send it. I don't see any chance it will be accepted but for your idea with Gromyko it will be interesting.

K: You would do me a great favor if you would reject it. It would protect my political future here much better if you reject it. If you analyze it we would trade in the 54 Tridents; we would trade in old missiles for the Tridents.

D: Yes, I know.

K: So the total number of missiles is only increasing in effect by 26.

D: Yes,

K: And I cannot quite believe that Soviet security hangs by such a narrow thread.

D: No, but what you discuss with Brezhnev...so if you are proposing to change the numbers from 41 to 44.

K: But, look, if you accept the numbers I gave to Brezhnev on MIRVs -- 870 for 650, or something like that.

D: Yes,

K: If you accept the throw-weight relationship, then we can modify the; then we are in a different proposition. Then we can extend the numbers of the Interim Agreement.

D: Heavy, the only difference -- but a big one is between what we discussed in Moscow and now. It says if you change -- you make it now instead of 100, 250 -- right?

K: Right.

D: And at the same time you add 3 more submarines from the basic agreement -- that is the second change, right?

K: The second change from your proposal. We never accepted your proposal.

D: On what?