THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN

Volume LXXI • No. 1831 • July 29, 1974

PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT TO NATO AND THE SOVIET UNION

Remarks by President Nixon and Foreign Leaders
and Texts of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Statement and Communique 165

News Conferences Held by Secretary Kissinger 196

Texts of Agreements Signed at Moscow 216

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

## President Nixon Visits NATO Headquarters and the Soviet Union

President Nixon left Washington on June 25 for a visit to Belgium and the Soviet Union. While in Brussels June 25-27, he met with NATO heads of government and signed the Declaration on Atlantic Relations. In the Soviet Union June 27-July 3, he met with Soviet leaders, signed several agreements, and addressed the Soviet people on television and radio. Following are his remarks upon departure on June 25, his exchanges of remarks with foreign leaders, his address to the Soviet people, his report to the Nation upon his arrival in the United States on July 3, and remarks to the press at Brussels by Presidential Assistant and Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler, together with the texts of a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on dangers of military use of environmental modification techniques and a joint communique signed at Moscow on July 3.

### PRESIDENT NIXON'S DEPARTURE REMARKS, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, JUNE 25

*White House press release dated June 25*

Members of the Cabinet, members of the diplomatic corps, and ladies and gentlemen: I first want to express my appreciation to all of you for taking the time to come off to see us as we take off on another journey for peace. This time we go first to Brussels, as you know, and then to Moscow.

Our purpose in Brussels will be to meet with old friends and to renew our support of the great NATO alliance, which for 25 years has been responsible for and indispensable for keeping the peace in Europe. We expect to give new purpose and new direction to that alliance on the occasion of visiting with the heads of government of most of the NATO countries.

From Brussels, we go on to Moscow. There we shall have the opportunity to meet again with General Secretary Brezhnev and his colleagues. The purpose of this summit

meeting, as was the purpose of the other two—the first in Moscow two years ago, and in Washington and in other parts of the United States last year—is threefold:

- First, we expect to strengthen the bilateral relations between the two strongest nations in the world;

- Second, we hope to develop areas of cooperation to displace confrontation in other critical areas of the world that might be those places where conflict could develop between the two great powers; and

- Third, we hope to make more progress on a goal that we began to achieve and move forward toward in 1972, of limiting both the burden and also the threat of nuclear arms over our two nations and over the world generally.

These are very great goals, and like all great goals they are very difficult to achieve, just as was the case of the goals we sought to achieve on our first trip to the Mideast. But we are confident that when we look at

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165

these goals, not only must we seek to achieve them but we believe that we can achieve them, because when we speak of the two strongest nations, the Soviet Union and the United States, cooperation between these two great peoples is indispensable if we are to build a structure of peace in the world that will last.

And we know that with American strength, American resolve, and above all, American determination and dedication, that we will be able to make progress on this long but vitally important journey for peace, not only for America but for all mankind.

And we have appreciated particularly the messages that we have received before each of these trips from people all over America, because your prayers, your good wishes for our success, means that the American people, the great majority, are united behind the efforts we are making to attempt to resolve differences that otherwise would lead to a runaway arms race, that otherwise would lead to confrontation not only between two great powers but all over the world, that otherwise would dash all the hopes and the ideals that Americans have had from the beginning of this country—the ideal of a world of peace so that we can devote the energies of all great peoples to the works of peace and not simply to preparing for war.

Thank you.

## THE VISIT TO BELGIUM

### ARRIVAL, BRUSSELS, JUNE 25

White House press release (Brussels) dated June 25

### Remarks by King Baudouin

Mr. President: Because Belgium has for several years been the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, during which time it has also been the host of the European Communities, it is my duty and pleasure to welcome you again this evening on the soil of my country.

You have just completed a tour in the

Middle East in the course of which the happy results of untiring diplomacy have been confirmed. We all hope that the efforts made will be the prelude to final peace in that region.

In two days' time you will be in Moscow, where you will carry on conversations the outcome of which is important for us all. Before starting them, you have desired not only to come here to sign the Ottawa Declaration of Atlantic Relations, which again precisely states our convergent objectives, but also to make confident contacts with the heads of the governments of friendly and allied nations in order to explain your views and obtain their opinions.

We are delighted with the action you have taken. It shows once more that however much times may change, there is still between our peoples the same fundamental understanding based on so many common memories, and so many peaceful contests or deplorably cruel battles waged side by side, and on faith in the same essential values.

Mr. President, throughout the world all men feel increasingly bound together by the same destiny. We know that they eagerly wish hostilities to cease, tensions to be reduced, and a just and lasting peace to be established.

We wish you and Mrs. Nixon a cordial welcome and express our hopes for the success of the work we shall carry out together.

### Remarks by President Nixon

Your Majesty, Mr. Secretary, and all of our distinguished guests: Your Majesty, I wish to express our grateful appreciation for your gracious welcome and also for your eloquent words with regard to the hopes we all share for building a structure of peace in the world.

And it is indeed an honor for me to join with my colleagues in the Atlantic alliance in tomorrow reaffirming our dedication to the great principles of that alliance. What we must all recognize is that the Atlantic alliance has been indispensable in keeping

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the peace in Europe for the past 25 years.

As you have noted, this visit to Brussels comes midway between two other visits, the first to the Mideast and the next to the Soviet Union. It is significant that this is the case, because this symbolizes the central role that the Atlantic alliance plays in pursuing our goal of a lasting peace in the world. Without the alliance, it is doubtful that the détente would have begun, and without continuing a strong alliance, it is doubtful if the détente would continue.

It is also very significant that this meeting will take place in Brussels, now the capital of Europe, and in Belgium, a nation which has suffered so much in two world wars. And I am sure that all of those attending the meeting tomorrow will have in their hearts these sentiments that we wish that whatever we do there and whatever decisions we make and whatever we say may contribute to the goal we seek, not only for each of our own countries, but for all nations in the world, a peace that will last.

Remarks by Joseph Luns,
Secretary General of NATO

Your Majesties, Mr. President: It is with very great pleasure that I welcome you, Mr. President, on your arrival in Brussels for the forthcoming high-level meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

It is five years since you last sat in the Council that was in Washington. Then you spoke of entering into negotiations with the Soviet Union on a wide range of issues on the basis of full consultation and cooperation with American allies.

In the five intervening years, aided by your distinguished Secretary of State, you have given dramatic effect to that policy.

As His Majesty has just remarked, you come from the Middle East, where your journey has opened new prospects for the future in that area and for the world at large. You go on to Moscow to take one more step along the road of negotiation with the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow you will consult with your

friends and allies and sign with them the Declaration on Atlantic Relations. Your visit will once again mark a page in the history of the Council and of our alliance.

LUNCHEON HONORING NATO LEADERS,
BRUSSELS, JUNE 26

White House press release (Brussels) dated June 26

Toast by King Baudouin ¹

Mr. President, Your Excellencies the heads of governments, and gentlemen: It is a great pleasure for me cordially to welcome you to Brussels, the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

You have this morning signed the important declaration which the Atlantic Council approved a few days ago at Ottawa and have thus, on the occasion of its 25th anniversary, drawn attention to the youth and vigor and cohesion of the alliance.

On April the 4th, 1949, President Truman declared when the Washington treaty was signed that:

> For us, war is not inevitable. We do not believe that there are blind tides of history which sweep men one way or the other. . . . Men with courage and vision can still determine their own destiny.

We today, who no longer feel afraid, can estimate how much the situation has changed. What was happening 25 years ago now appears to be as far behind us as would the events of a period we had not lived through.

The panic in which our defense was hastily set up so that we might survive has given way to a feeling of security which goes so far as to make us skeptical about the existence of any danger.

By their determination and by the choices they made, the men with vision of whom Mr. Truman spoke have allowed our younger people to have no experience of war. They have also rejected the old rules of political action, under which fixed purpose often took the place of law and power that of ethics.

¹ King Baudouin began his toast in French and concluded in English.

July 29, 1974

167

By entering into a system of collective
defense, Belgium has made a fundamental
option in order to avoid a recurrence of the
wars which twice within 35 years had rav-
aged the country, to participate in the quest
for a lasting peace, and to foster the con-
struction of a united Europe.

Owing to the safeguard provided by the
solidarity and indivisibility of our defense,
it is possible to conduct a policy whose pri-
mary objective is peace and, more particu-
larly in Europe, the pursuit of understand-
ing and cooperation with all the countries
of the continent.

To be sure, the alliance is not altogether
identical with defense; since a few years
ago, a correlation has been established be-
tween the notions of defense and détente.
They had until then been separate.

Defense, for its own sake, seemed to ex-
clude détente. The outcome of détente seemed
to be to destroy defense. Since then, the
delicate threads which bind them together
and strengthen the significance of them both
have been grasped.

Without defense, there can be no equilibri-
um of forces, and no coexistence is possible.
Without détente, there can be no progress
toward peaceful solutions. The Atlantic
Treaty, which is an instrument of security,
thus appears as a combination of forces
tending to peace.

Belgium, moreover, has always hoped that,
in the spirit of friendship and solidarity
which ought to mark the relations between
allies, the progress made as regards the po-
litical unification of Europe should favor
the establishment of a transatlantic dialogue
between two equal partners.

The idea is, in any case, recognized by
all, since in the Ottawa Declaration we wel-
comed the beneficial effect that the further
stages toward unity which the member states
of the European Community are determined
to pass through will have for the Atlantic al-
liance.

From Belgium's point of view the two
choices—European and Atlantic—are com-
plementary. Without the achievement of a
genuine European union on the political level,

the European states and the European Com-
munity will be unable to assume the respon-
sibility imposed on them by their economic
success.

Unless they speak with one voice, how
can they play a part in diplomacy, make
original contributions to more equitable re-
lations between the industrialized states and
those that are trying to develop, and finally,
uphold the essential democratic values?

The assertion of that European identity
will foster more thorough cooperation and
will give the transatlantic dialogue the na-
ture of a conversation between equal part-
ners who take care to show respect for each
other and are united in a joint venture.

The alliance is permanently confronted
with the internal problems of states, the
loosening of bonds, and the weariness of
efforts. But, due to Western solidarity and
to the habit of living together, it may be
stated—and seems rather paradoxical—that
after adding up the problems before it the
alliance has always been in better health
than might have been feared.

Of course, the alliance is challenged, and
if it were not, anxiety would have to be felt
about its vitality. No viable and active in-
stitution fails to make headway between the
pressures of opposing forces.

Twenty-five years after its establishment,
the governments have confirmed the com-
mitments entered into and have placed them
in the context of the new requirements. After
having justified its existence in the past,
the alliance remains one of the guarantees
of our future.

It is with a thought to that future that I
request you to join me in raising your glasses
to our continued cooperation.

Toast by President Nixon

Your Majesty, my colleagues from the At-
lantic community and distinguished guests:
Your Majesty, we are all most grateful for
your eloquent remarks, and we can think
of no more appropriate place or time in
which to celebrate what in effect is an an-
niversary.

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As I stand in this place, I think back five
years when you so graciously hosted a lunch-
eon on my first visit to NATO. I think back
over what has happened over those five
years. It is perhaps safe to say that more
profound changes have occurred in the world
in those five years than have occurred in
any peacetime period in this century.

There has been the opening of a dialogue
between the United States, as well as other
nations, but between the United States, and
the People's Republic of China, where one-
fourth of all the world's people live. We
have substituted for a period of confronta-
tion with the Soviet Union a period of nego-
tiation, and other nations as well in the
European and Atlantic community have done
so.

The very long and difficult war in Viet-
Nam has ended, and most recently, develop-
ments have occurred in the Mideast which,
while only a first step, are nevertheless a
most hopeful step toward a goal that every
nation around this table represented has
an interest in—the goal of a permanent and
just peace in that critically important part
of the world.

And as we look over those five years of
developments, we of course can see how much
the world has changed. We also can see
how much the world can change and be
changed in the future, provided we continue
the strength, the purpose, of this great al-
liance without which most of these great
initiatives could not have been undertaken
and would not have succeeded.

Today in the brief talks I have had with
some of my colleagues in the Atlantic com-
munity and also in the meeting this morning
—the plenary session—I have heard raised,
very justifiably, the issues that are on the
minds of every leader in the industrial, more
advanced nations of the world today: the
problem of inflation, the problem of energy,
the problem of international monetary mat-
ters, balance of payments, economic prob-
lems generally.

And, of course, all of us are recognizing
the fact that in various nations, in addition
to economic problems, there are the continu-

ing political problems which will always be
present in free societies.

If we look at those problems that we pres-
ently confront, by themselves—and at the
moment—they seem overwhelming. But to-
day, around this table, we can be thankful
that the problems we face today, as dis-
tinguished from five years ago, are primarily
the problems of peace rather than the prob-
lems of war. And this is progress.

It is progress, although it does not mean
that the task we have as leaders is easier,
because in fact it is more difficult—more
difficult because peace is not something that
is achieved at a certain time and then signed
and sealed by a treaty which brings it into
being.

Peace is a process in which agreements
and treaties and understandings must con-
tinually be made and continually be reaf-
firmed, whereas in the case of war, once it
ends then peace in the sense of absence of
war begins as the result of the signing of
a document or some other kind of agreement.

And so to those gathered here on this
historic occasion, I recognize, as all of you
recognize, that the challenges that we con-
front today in building a structure of peace
are as great in their way and in some ways
more great, because they are more complex,
than the challenges of leading nations in
war.

This is an anniversary, a 25th anniver-
sary, and usually we think of an anniver-
sary as an end of an era; this, I think, we
would all rather think of as the beginning
of an era. This great alliance in its first
25 years came into being and was indis-
pensable for the purpose of saving freedom
and preserving the peace in Europe. This
alliance for the next 25 years will have a
greater goal and a broader one of preserv-
ing freedom wherever it exists but also of
building a structure of peace not only for
Europe and the Atlantic community but
for all the world. This is a great goal for
an alliance, and it is a great goal to which
all of us as leaders can be proud that we are
dedicated to it.

I think, for example, back 15 years when

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169

a very young, but very wise, king addressed a joint session of the Congress of the United States, when I was then—I thought I was— a young Vice President presiding along with the Speaker over that session. And I remember well what he said. He said that it takes 20 years of peace or more to make a man. It takes only 20 seconds of war to destroy him.

And so when we think of peace we are thinking not only of ourselves—looking back on the years we have been privileged to serve our nations—but we are thinking of generation upon generation of young people all over this world, young people who have not known a full generation of peace in this century, young people who live in nations who share totally different philosophies from ours, but young people with the idealism, with the hopes, with the drive that is so characteristic of youth wherever they are in whatever nation anyplace in the world.

And we, in this great community of ours, can be proud that for the past 25 years we have served the cause of preserving peace. For the next 25 years we can broaden that cause, as I have indicated, to serve the cause of peace not only for Europe and the Atlantic community but for all mankind.

When I spoke at the beginning of the new relationships that have been developed between the People's Republic of China and, for example, the United States, between the Soviet Union, where I will be tomorrow, and the United States, I did not intend to leave with this distinguished company, or any others who may listen to these words, any illusions.

We live in a world where there are still deep and basic differences about philosophy. We live in a world, however, where whatever those differences are, statesmen must find ways to solve them without resorting to the use of force that could destroy civilization as we know it.

When we negotiate, for example, with the Soviet leaders, we can and will negotiate on such matters as arms control, on troops, on European security, on trade, on health, on the environment, on energy. But there

is one thing that is not negotiable, and that is the great principles that are the foundation of the Atlantic community, principles of freedom, of justice, principles which we have inherited in many instances, and some have acquired, but principles which we deeply believe in, must be defended and, we trust, preserved for generations to come.

That does not mean to suggest that those we negotiate with will not have the same determination to stand by their philosophies and their principles as we will by ours.

What it simply does mean is this: that in the world in which we live, with the nuclear power that overhangs it, there is no alternative to peace, there is no alternative to negotiation.

And you can be sure that, as far as we are concerned, we not only will consult with our allies in this great alliance before but also afterward, to make sure that our negotiations serve not only the cause of peace but also the cause of freedom and everything it means to those who are privileged to be members of this great alliance.

Your Majesty, we are grateful for the hospitality that you have extended to all of us who are members of this community, and consequently, it is for me a very great honor on behalf of all of my colleagues in the Atlantic community to respond to your remarks and to propose a toast. But before doing so, I should like to add one word about the sometimes unsung heroes in this whole area of negotiations, communiques, declarations, and the rest.

When history is written many years from now, it may well be said—it probably will be said—that the leaders of nations were the architects of peace. That may be true; it may not be true. But of this I am sure, and every one of my colleagues in a position of head of a government I am sure will agree: While the leaders and the heads of government may be the architects of peace, the builders of peace are their ministers, the foreign ministers, and all of the others around this table who devote their lives to the art of diplomacy, to carrying out whatever programs or policies will contribute to

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a goal of peace for not only our time but
for all times to come.

And so then, on behalf not only of my
colleagues the architects, but also on behalf
of all those who are here, the builders of
this new world which we trust will be a
world of peace, I ask you to raise your
glasses to our host, His Majesty the King:
To the King.

REMARKS BY PRESS SECRETARY ZIEGLER 2

The President was pleased and impressed
this morning with the discussions of the
North Atlantic Council. All of the delegates
in various ways spoke of the vitality of the
alliance, of the continued need of a strong
common defense while we pursue better
East-West relations.

President Nixon found the general harmony of views expressed in the NATO Council this morning most gratifying. He welcomed the support around the table to full and frank consultation on all issues in which the interest of the allies are involved.

President Nixon also noted with interest,
as did others who attended the meeting this
morning, the remarks of Chancellor [of the
Federal Republic of Germany Helmut
Schmidt regarding the importance of eco-
nomic problems that the NATO countries are
facing. The President, incidentally, also re-
ferred to this matter, which I will get into
in a moment, in his own remarks.

President Nixon appreciated the positive
comments around the table as each represen-
tative spoke concerning the role that he
had played and that Secretary Kissinger
played in the Middle East negotiations and
also the expressions of confidence and sup-
port for our policies in East-West issues on
the eve of the Moscow summit.

The President began his remarks follow-
ing Secretary Luns' opening comments at
about 10 minutes after 10. He spoke for
about 25 minutes. We will not provide a

text of the President's remarks, because this
was of course a consulting session and a
private session, but I will provide to you
at this time the general framework of what
the President said to the NATO Council and
generally the President's views regarding
the declaration that was signed today.³

In President Nixon's remarks to the Council, the President, of course, welcomed the signing of the declaration in this 25th anniversary year of the alliance, stating to the Council that it lays the groundwork for another quarter century of Atlantic cooperation, solidarity, and security. And the President pointed out that the declaration forms the foundation for even a brighter future.

The President pointed out that the dec-
laration signifies that as NATO enters its
second quarter century, the alliance stands
stronger and more united than ever before.

In his opening remarks to the Council,
the President made the point, which has
been made before, that the world we face
in 1974 is, of course, very different from
the world of 1949. At that time, the Presi-
dent said, peace was in serious jeopardy and
the sovereignty of many of the nations of
Europe was in jeopardy. The prime need,
the President went on to say, was for unity
in the common defense so that a period of
rebuilding could go forward.

Today, he said that the very success of
NATO over the last 25 years provides the
security for the pursuit of national, regional,
and global interest but there is no less a
need for security and no less a need for
unity in pursuing our common objectives.

Indeed, the President pointed out, it is
more important than ever to keep before us
the recognition of our common objectives, re-
ferring to the alliance, as to reconcile our
interests as individual nations with our in-
terests as allies.

Again, referring to the document signed
today, the President pointed out that it
demonstrates recognition by all members

² Made at a news conference at Brussels on June 26 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 8).

³ For text of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations adopted by the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Ottawa on June 19, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1974, p. 42.

July 29, 1974

171

that if we are to successfully pursue our in-
dividual national interests, again referring
to the alliance, then we must do so in essen-
tial harmony and, above all, remain united
in the common defense of every member of
the alliance.

The President also discussed the signifi-
cance of the declaration signed today in the
context both of his forthcoming visit to the
Soviet Union and his recent visit to the
Middle East.

The President, again referring to the dec-
laration, noted that the declaration reaffirms
the foremost purpose of the alliance: that
of assuring the common defense. He em-
phasized the importance of each alliance
member devoting the efforts and resources
necessary to maintain NATO forces at the
proper strength.

He said that, for the U.S. part, that he
would again, and did, renew our pledge that
the United States will maintain and improve
our forces in Europe if there is a similar
effort by our allies and the United States
will not reduce forces unless there is a recip-
rocal action by the other side.

The President pointed out that reductions
in conventional forces in Europe can have
repercussions far out of proportion to the
number of men involved and the amount
of money saved. They can set into motion,
the President said, a chain of reductions
whose consequences could be tragic, and went
on to make the point that the price of peace
is continued strength.

He said that defense and détente are es-
sential to each other and that only by
strengthening détente can we eventually re-
duce the defense burden our people must now
support, of course, addressing the NATO
conference and referring to the nations in-
volved.

Beyond that, he said the United States is
encouraged by the direction and pace of
recent efforts, as reflected in the declaration,
to give fresh impetus to NATO's partner-
ship.

In particular, he cited the recognition
given to the importance of meaningful con-
sultations to the work of the alliance, and
he indicated the U.S. full preparedness to

consult on matters of alliance interest.

He pointed out and reiterated the position
that Secretary Kissinger stated in Ottawa,
and again recently in his press conference:
that consultation should not be viewed as
a legally binding obligation.

That is not the purpose of the declaration;
rather, it is to symbolize a spirit of coopera-
tion within the alliance which the United
States hopes will grow into a recognition
that no member of the alliance should con-
sider taking any actions or action affecting
the alliance without seeking the support and
understanding of its members.

He went on to point out—and I am not
directly quoting the President, but para-
phrasing—that while it is true that the legal
obligations of the alliance are confined geo-
graphically, events that occur outside the
formal area of obligations can affect us
all.

This is a point that Secretary Kissinger,
as you recall, made in Ottawa, and the
United States recognizes this reality and
affirms today our determination to consult
fully on all matters which affect the interest
of the allies. I call your attention again to
Secretary Kissinger's comments and also the
pool report last night where reference was
made to this point.

The President also said—and this is recog-
nized in the declaration of our common de-
fense and political association—that these
elements of the common defense and political
association must be sustained by cooperative
and constructive economic relations.

He said that the United States will ap-
proach economic issues in a spirit of friend-
ship and in the conviction that the common
goal is to benefit all peoples and those of
the world at large, including the less devel-
oped countries.

A few more concluding comments—the
President in his remarks emphasized the im-
portance of the alliance to the efforts being
made toward greater international peace and
stability, and in this context he cited the
importance of the new declaration to the
current efforts being made to ease East-West
tensions and to improve relations with the
Soviet Union.

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Western cohesion, the President said, provides the basis on which the policy of détente can be conducted in the common interest. He noted, for example, the opportunities to bring the arms race under control and to build a network of East-West cooperative agreements contributing to mutual restraint and expanded contacts between peoples and said that the meeting today of the NATO Council provides significant evidence of Western solidarity and forms a vital backdrop for the upcoming summit in Moscow.

In discussing the upcoming Moscow summit, the President made reference, of course, to the extensive briefing that Secretary of State Kissinger provided to the Foreign Ministers in Ottawa and spoke in general and long-range terms about the summit. Addressing the summit specifically, the President told the Council that he felt there were three aspects to the Moscow summit. He said that we will exchange views on, of course, the major international issues and that we will have an extensive review of the entire state of our bilateral relations. He said that he expects that a number of agreements will be signed in various cooperative areas and that there was difficult negotiating ahead in relation to arms control, but that he hoped there would be progress also in that area.

He discussed each of these categories, of course, in more detail than I am providing.

In reference to détente and what détente means to the alliance and what détente means to the United States, he said that it gives us a chance to try to bring the nuclear arms race under control before it can get out of hand.

Secondly, he said it creates an environment in which problems ranging from energy to peace can be addressed outside the context of bipolar confrontation, and third, it builds up a network of East-West trade and cooperative agreements that should reenforce mutual restraint and may gradually ameliorate conditions in the East.

In discussing also the upcoming Soviet talks, the President assured the NATO Council that the United States would continue

to consult fully and again made reference to the fact that Secretary Kissinger will return to Brussels on July 4 to consult with our allies.

In discussing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the mutual balanced force reduction and all other issues in which the interests of our allies are engaged, such as strategic arms limitation talks, he said that American positions will continue to be developed in full consultation and in concert with our allies. He made a point of emphasizing that we will never sacrifice the interest of our allies to achieve agreements.

He talked then, in concluding his remarks, about the Middle East and the recent Middle East trip. He pointed out that the recent crisis there and the first tentative steps toward its resolution have provided the clearest possible demonstration that all of us have a stake in maintaining peace outside our own boundaries, of course referring to the countries present in the NATO Council.

He said that because of its unique position—referring to the United States—and the desires of the parties in the area, the United States must continue to play a central role and will continue to play a central role in the process of seeking realistic diplomatic alternatives to war.

He went on to say that at the same time there is no American intention of attempting to exclude anyone from the area, that we, the United States, recognize that our European allies have vital interests there and will wish to play substantial roles of their own, and we hope that our activities in the area, he said, can be coordinated so that we can work together for peace and economic progress.

Then, finally, in summing up, the President feels that this morning's session of the North Atlantic Council provided the President with the occasion to express the very great satisfaction of the United States with the new Declaration on Atlantic Relations, which underlines the continuing strength, spirit, and unity of purpose of NATO at a time when the nations of the alliance are facing major challenges and opportunities.

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173

THE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION

DINNER HONORING PRESIDENT NIXON,
MOSCOW, JUNE 27

White House press release (Moscow) dated June 27

Toast by General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev ⁴

Esteemed Mr. President, esteemed Mrs. Nixon, ladies and gentlemen, comrades: We are glad once again to greet here in the Kremlin as guests of the Soviet Union the President of the United States of America and Mrs. Nixon, as well as the American statesmen accompanying the President.

This is already the third meeting between the leaders of our countries in just a little over two years since a cardinal turn became evident in Soviet-American relations toward normalization and the development of peaceful cooperation.

On the firm basis of the fundamental agreements which were signed in 1972 and 1973 and are known all over the world, we have made tangible progress. Probably never before have ties and contacts between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States in different areas of political, economic, and cultural activity been as lively as they are today.

Nowadays thousands of people annually travel from America to the Soviet Union and from the Soviet Union to America. Mutual visits of ministers, contacts among businessmen, meetings between scientists and public figures, concert tours, various exhibitions, and tourist trips have become customary events. Parliamentary ties are beginning to develop.

We have been glad to welcome in the U.S.S.R. Senators and Congressmen belonging to the two biggest parties of the United States, and a delegation of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet recently visited America.

The material foundation of our good relations is becoming stronger as well. The volume of trade has increased several times

over during the last two years, and several important long-term contracts have been signed.

At the same time, we all know that much remains to be done here both in the sense of making economic ties more balanced and stable and in the sense of clearly establishing the principles of equality and respect for each other's interests in this area of relations. Credit is certainly due to those farsighted members of the business community of the United States who correctly understood the mutually advantageous nature of the development of economic ties between our countries and their importance for both our peoples and who actively support their government's line in this matter.

The biggest contribution, however, which we, Soviet and U.S. statesmen of the seventies of the 20th century, can make to the cause of greater well-being and happiness for our peoples and for all mankind is undoubtedly the reduction and subsequently the complete removal of the possibility of war between our two states.

To insure stable peace between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. is the chief task in the development of Soviet-American relations, and the leaders of both countries are continuing to devote unflagging attention to its solution. For all the useful things that we can achieve in this direction, future generations will remember us with kind words.

If we fail to solve this task, however, all other achievements in the development of mutual relations may lose their significance.

The new Soviet-American summit meeting, as it is usually called, is a new step in the great endeavor which we jointly initiated with you, Mr. President, two years ago and which we resolutely intend to pursue, for it meets the fundamental interest of the peoples of the two countries and the interests of world peace.

Experience shows that progress along this path requires effort—sometimes quite a bit of it. The relaxation of tension in Soviet-American relations, as in international rela-

⁴General Secretary Brezhnev spoke in Russian.

174

Department of State Bulletin

tended to us tonight but for the very generous words of friendship you have just spoken.

And I am very gratified that I shall have the opportunity to see more of your great country on this visit, and I trust that on your next visit to the United States, next year, you will be able to see more of our country as well.

All of us gathered here tonight are fortunate to be present at a moment of great historical significance. Two years ago, in this place, we began the process which has resulted in a profound change in the relations between the two strongest nations in the world.

We have moved in those two years from confrontation to coexistence to cooperation. And while—as the General Secretary has correctly pointed out—we have many problems yet to negotiate on, the success of our negotiations to date gives a good indication of the progress we can and will make in this third summit meeting.

To see the extent of the progress that has been made, we can point to the fact that over the past two years more agreements have been negotiated and signed between our two countries—in those two years—than in the entire history of the relations of our two countries up to that period.

And it is significant to note the character of those agreements. In part, they have dealt with the concern that both of our nations have with regard to the need to avoid war. And motivated by that desire—the desire to avoid war—we have begun the process of limiting nuclear arms.

And in 1973, we negotiated and signed the historic agreement with regard to the prevention of nuclear war. But that is only one side of the equation as far as our agreements are concerned. We both seek peace, but we seek peace that is more than simply the absence of war. We seek peace because of the positive progress it can bring to both of our peoples.

And that is why we have negotiated a number of agreements in the areas of peaceful progress. They are too numerous to mention, but they cover all fields of human en-

deavor—health, science, the environment, the peaceful exploration of space, agriculture. Many others could be added, but together, what they mean is that both our great peoples now have a stake in peace from a positive standpoint.

And now, looking to the future, we wonder how history will judge the leaders of these two nations and their people during this period. Too often in the past, history has judged those nations to be great which were engaged in aggressive war and in conquest. But what we are doing is establishing a record where the two strongest nations in the world and their leaders will seek greatness not by what they might accomplish in war but greatness by what they accomplish in the works of peace.

And without the cooperation of these two strongest nations in the world, the cooperation of both their leaders and their people, there can be no lasting peace in the world.

176

Department of State Bulletin

tions generally, comes up against rather ac-
tive resistance. There is no need for me
to dwell on this subject, since our American
guests know better and in more detail than
we about those who oppose international
détente, who favor whipping up the arms
race and returning to the methods and pro-
cedures of the cold war.

I just want to express my firm conviction
that the policy of such individuals—whether
they themselves know it or not—has nothing
in common with the interests of the people.
It is a policy that attests most likely to the
unwillingness or inability of its proponents
to take a sober look at the realities of the
present-day world.

We are confident, however, that the peo-
ple also will support those who seek to as-
sure their peaceful future and a tranquil
life for millions of people, not those who
sow enmity and distrust. That is why we
believe that the good results it has proved
possible to achieve in Soviet-American rela-
tions in the last two years shall not be
erased, particularly since their improvement
has already justified itself and has in many
respects given practical proof of its useful-
ness for both sides and for the world as
a whole.

Today the task, as we see it, is to con-
solidate the successes already achieved and
to advance further along the main road
that we have jointly chosen to follow. The
third round of Soviet-American summit talks
has begun. We shall be discussing both the
further development of bilateral relations
and a number of international problems.

Although we have different viewpoints on
several matters, we shall seek—and I feel
not unsuccessfully—agreed ways toward the
further consolidation of peace and mutually
advantageous cooperation. I believe it can
definitely be said that our talks will proceed
in a businesslike and constructive spirit. We,
for our part, express the hope that this
time, as well, our meeting will be as fruit-
ful as the preceding meetings in Moscow
and Washington.

Esteemed Mr. President, I do hope that

you and Mrs. Nixon feel well on Moscow
soil in the Kremlin residence with which you
are already familiar. Soon you will be see-
ing the southern coast of the Crimea where,
on the Black Sea shores, hundreds of thou-
sands and even millions of our country's
workers, farmers, and office employees an-
nually spend their vacations at health re-
sorts. I do hope you like the Crimea. We
certainly love it.

For my part, I shall be glad to reciproc-
cate to some extent the hospitality that
was accorded to us last summer on the Pa-
cific coast in San Clemente. I trust that in
the Crimea there will be no less comfortable
conditions for quiet and productive discus-
sions.

I also hope that the visit to the Hero City
of Minsk, the capital of Soviet Byelorussia,
will also be interesting for you, Mr. Presi-
dent. This title of honor has been conferred
upon the Byelorussian capital for its out-
standing feat of arms in the years of our
joint struggle against the Hitlerite aggres-
sors.

Of course we would have liked you to
see more of the Soviet Union and to travel
around our country, but since you have
not been able to make your visit a longer one,
I should like to express the wish that it
should prove to be at least as useful and
pleasant as possible.

May I propose a toast to the health of
the President of the United States, Mr.
Richard Nixon, and Mrs. Nixon. To the
health of all the American guests present
in this hall. To peace and friendship be-
tween the peoples of the Soviet Union and
the United States of America. To lasting
peace all over the world.

Toast by President Nixon

Mr. General Secretary Brezhnev, Presi-
dent Podgorny, Premier Kosygin, all dis-
tinguished guests: To you, Mr. General Sec-
retary, on behalf of all of your American
guests, I express our grateful appreciation
for not only the hospitality you have ex-

July 29, 1974

175

And consequently we believe that these meetings that we have had and those that we will have in the future will lead to our meeting the challenge of history for a strong nation to be remembered as a peacemaking nation rather than as a warmaking nation.

Let this be our legacy for the generations ahead. And that is why I say that we should raise our glasses to our host, the General Secretary, and his colleagues, to peace between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, and to peace for all peoples in the world, the peace to which the relations between our two nations can make such an enormous contribution.

LUNCHEON HONORING PRESIDENT NIXON,
MINSK, JULY 1

White House press release (Minsk) dated July 1

Toast by Fedor A. Surganov ⁵

Esteemed Mr. President, esteemed Mrs. Nixon, ladies and gentlemen, comrades: Permit me on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Government of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic to welcome you, Mr. President, in the capital of our Republic.

We hope that your stay on Byelorussian soil will be pleasant and that it will give you an opportunity to get some idea about our people and their life, about their history and present-day successes.

Your visit to the Byelorussian Republic is coinciding with the celebration of a date that is very dear to us, the 30th anniversary of the liberation of Byelorussia from the German Fascist invaders, and today we recall the grim days when the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the other countries of the anti-Hitler coalition fought courageously against the common foe, nationalism, which threatened the freedom of the peoples and indeed civilization itself.

The Byelorussian people are well aware and remember what war means, and they

cherish the benefits of peace and creative effort.

Every fourth citizen of this Republic perished in the heroic struggle against fascism, about nine and one-half thousand towns and villages were destroyed, and our capital, Minsk, was almost totally devastated, about 3 million people remaining homeless.

In the past 30 years, thanks to the selfless labor of our people and the paternal assistance of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, we have not only rehabilitated the war-ravaged economy but have also achieved significant new successes in economics and in the development of culture, science, and health and in raising the living standards of the people.

Like other towns and cities in this Republic, the Hero City of Minsk has been reborn out of ruins and is today vigorously developing. Having defended their freedom and independence, the Soviet people, engaged in peaceful creative labor, are vitally interested in preventing war and in strengthening international peace and security.

And that is why they wholeheartedly welcome the favorable changes that are taking place in the international arena and the cardinal turn that has become discernible of late in relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The constructive development of Soviet-American relations, in our firm conviction, meets the interests not only of the Soviet and American peoples but also the interests of the peaceful future of all mankind. The joint desire of the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the United States to live at peace with one another has already found its practical embodiment in concrete deeds which have been registered in a series of joint documents, and this has indeed become an important factor of international relations.

Your new visit to the Soviet Union, Mr. President, and your new meetings and discussions with the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, and with other Soviet leaders, are regarded by the Byelorussian people, as they

⁵ Mr. Surganov, who is Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, spoke in Russian.

July 29, 1974

177

are by all the peace-loving people, as a new
and important landmark in Soviet-American
relations and as the further concrete em-
bodiment of the line aimed at insuring peace
and establishing in international practices
the principles of peaceful coexistence and
mutually advantageous and equal coopera-
tion of states.

We are confident that this is the line of
the future, regardless of all the efforts made
by the forces of the past to reverse the proc-
ess of international détente.

Permit me to propose a toast to the health
of the President of the United States of
America and Mrs. Nixon, to the health of
all the members of the President's party, to
peace and cooperation between the Soviet
and American peoples, and to the consolida-
tion of peace and international security.

Toast by President Nixon

Mr. President of the Republic, Mr. Chair-
man of the Council of Ministers, and Mr.
Secretary of the Party: And for those Amer-
icans who are here, that translated in terms
of Byelorussian means Mr. Podgorny, Mr.
Brezhnev, and Mr. Kosygin. [Laughter.] On
behalf of all our American guests, I wish
to express our appreciation for this beautiful
luncheon. And I want all of you to know
that when the General Secretary, Mr. Brezh-
nev, picked the city and the Republic in
which we would come, I now know why he
picked Minsk.

I thought first it might be because Minsk
and Byelorussia is famous the world over
for a tiny girl, a pretty girl, Olga Korbut.
[Laughter.] But I have found in my con-
versations with my friends from the right
and left seated here that not only are the
women of Byelorussia beautiful but they are
strong and courageous.

It is difficult to know the meaning of war
until one has an opportunity to come in
contact with it on an individual basis. And
I find that both the Secretary on my right
and the President on my left have come
into contact with war as fighters in the
war, but also who know war because they

have close relatives and, in their case, their
own mothers who were killed in the war.

And the question is why has this city been
designated a hero city for the Soviet Union?
First, because it suffered so much, along
with the whole Republic of Byelorussia.
Second, because not only the men but the
women fought and were courageous through-
out the war. And third, despite the long
years of occupation, the city and the Re-
public has come back, until now it is on
the way to its greatest years in the period
ahead.

And so, this is truly a hero city and a hero
Republic. And I think General Secretary
Brezhnev wanted Mrs. Nixon and me to
visit this city in order to help you celebrate
this great day in which you complete 30
years since liberation.

How do we best celebrate such a day?
With a magnificent luncheon like this, with
fine food, good wines, and good company, by
a parade yesterday and by visits to memo-
rials that we will be privileged to make later
in the afternoon.

But the best way to celebrate a day which
marks the ending of a war is to build peace.
And the greatest and best memorial that
we can build to the one-fourth of all the
citizens of this Republic who were killed in
World War II is to build a structure of peace
so that their children and grandchildren will
not die in another war.

As I saw these fine-looking young men
who served us, this thought crossed my
mind: What we who served in World War
II have on our hands is the responsibility
of determining whether these young men will
grow up in a period of peace or whether they,
too, will have to go through the horrors of
war, and I can assure you that in our first
two meetings—the first in Moscow, the next
in Washington and other parts of the United
States—and the third here in the Soviet
Union, that the General Secretary and his
colleagues and the members of our party
have been devoting our full time toward the
great goal to see to it that the two strongest
peoples and the two strongest nations in the
world will not devote their efforts and waste

178

Department of State Bulletin

Aviation

Amendment of article V of the agreement of Sep-
tember 25, 1956 (TIAS 4048), on the joint financ-
ing of certain air navigation services in Iceland.
Adopted at Montreal by the International Civil
Aviation Organization Council April 10, 1974. En-
tered into force April 10, 1974.

Amendment of article V of the agreement of Sep-
tember 25, 1956 (TIAS 4049), on the joint financ-
ing of certain air navigation services in Green-
land and the Faroe Islands. Adopted at Montreal
by the International Civil Aviation Organization
Council April 10, 1974. Entered into force April
10, 1974.

Oil Pollution

International convention on civil liability for oil pol-
lution damage. Done at Brussels November 29,
1969.¹

*Accessions deposited:* Algeria, June 14, 1974; Morocco, April 11, 1974.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the United States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization that ratification deposited:* Ecuador,
June 14, 1974.

Telecommunication

International telecommunication convention, with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the United States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267.

Ratification deposited: Colombia, April 27, 1974.

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex and
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973.¹

Notification of approval: Australia, April 18, 1974.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final
protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1978.¹

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense
assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS

2010). Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels
June 21 and 27, 1974. Entered into force June 27,
1974.

Canada

Agreement amending the treaty on extradition of
December 3, 1971.¹ Effected by exchange of notes
at Washington June 28 and July 9, 1974. Enters
into force on the date of entry into force of the
treaty of December 3, 1971.

Ethiopia

Agreement relating to the payment to the United
States of the net proceeds from the sale of defense
articles by Ethiopia. Effected by exchange of notes
at Addis Ababa May 13 and June 26, 1974. En-
tered into force July 1, 1974.

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement relating to the reciprocal acceptance of
airworthiness certifications. Effected by exchange
of notes at Bonn-Bad Godesberg and Bonn March
12 and May 31, 1974. Entered into force May 31,
1974.

Agreement for the reciprocal recognition of certifi-
cates of airworthiness for imported aircraft.
Signed at Bonn December 11, 1958. Entered into
force December 11, 1958. TIAS 4145.

Terminated: May 31, 1974.

Agreement for application to Land Berlin of agree-
ment for reciprocal recognition of certificates of
airworthiness for imported aircraft of December
11, 1958 (TIAS 4145). Effected by exchange of
notes at Bonn May 24, 1961 and January 23, 1962.
Entered into force January 23, 1962. TIAS 4960.

Terminated: May 31, 1974.

Greece

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of
atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 12,
1974. Enters into force on the date on which each
government receives from the other written noti-
fication that it has complied with all statutory and
constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Iran

Agreement relating to the safeguarding of classified
information, with annex. Effected by exchange of
notes at Tehran May 28 and June 6, 1974. Entered
into force June 6, 1974.

¹ Not in force.

224

Department of State Bulletin

# Henry Jackson's Cold War Message

## Tom Braden

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) is taking a lot of lumps these days for sounding like the voice of the cold war. Everybody from President Nixon to the New Left is hopping all over him for interfering with detente, arms control, hands across the sea and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. But if it is true that Jackson sounds like the voice of the cold war, maybe we ought to look upon him as a useful voice. For most adult Americans were cold warriors once upon a time, and Jackson provides us with a checkpoint. How far have we come since those days, and in what respects have we changed our views?

Realists is what we call ourselves now. We realize that we can't roll back curtains and go to brinks. John Foster Dulles is a faintly embarrassing name now, and the rhetoric and dirty tricks even more so. Most of us understand that in fighting an ideology we became intolerant and ideological ourselves.

But are the revisionist historians entirely correct? Were we entirely wrong? Listen for a moment to the last voice of the cold war and ask yourself the question.

Jackson is telling us that he is suspicious of detente for the following reasons:

### SECURITY ... CONTINUED

The Madrid declaration speaks of "territorial integrity" as one of the "fundamental principles which both countries will scrupulously respect." Some Spaniards think this to be an oblique reference to the Gibraltar issue.

Agreement on the declaration of principles initialed here was not easily come by. It is thought that one snag was insistence by the Americans that Spain agree to accept in the Madrid draft Article 12 of the NATO declaration.

The Ideological gap that separates the West Europeans from Spain is brought out by this article.

It speaks of "dedication to the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, justice, and social progress," described as "the fruits of shared spiritual heritage" of the signing countries, which declare their intention "to develop and deepen the

First, because he is fearful of the possibility that one of the weakest Presidents in our history might make agreements for the purpose of keeping himself in office. Is the suspicion totally unreasonable?

Second, Jackson thinks Russian foreign policy is expansionist. Might he not be right about this? We all know that Russian foreign policy used to be expansionist. It seems to be in the process of change. But memory serves as a warning.

Third, Jackson thinks we ought to get more out of detente than a smile and a handshake. What's the point, he asks, in effect, of giving the Russians what they want—food, technology, credit—unless we get something in return?

And what do we want to stop in return? In Jackson's view, we want to stop feeling guilty as human beings about how the Russians treat human beings. We want them to stop doing things which make us wince at the thought of shaking hands with those who do them.

Is this so wrong? Secretary of State Henry Kissinger would argue—and has argued—that we can't expect a nation to "transform its domestic structure" for the sake of foreign policy, and Jackson says in return, "Why not? Doesn't it depend upon the nation's priorities?"

Elsewhere around the globe we are not adverse to using the carrot technique in order to bring about changes in internal policies of other nations. Why should we not use the same technique with the Russians?

There is some evidence in the exodus of the Jews that the technique works; and for that exodus Sen. Jackson can take a lot of the credit. But he would be among the first to point out that the exodus itself is painful. How far have we progressed since the 10th century that in the 20th we should be talking, like so many ancient Spaniards, of the exodus of the Jews?

We need detente, Secretary Kissinger argues, in order to survive in the nuclear age. And Jackson replies that, detente or no detente, mutual fear is the only thing that enables us to survive in the nuclear age.

So the voice of the last cold warrior is very tough and not very hopeful. I don't see how his argument will ever bring about a reduction in the defense budget.

But I think it is not an unreasonable voice. We can argue with it, oppose it, try to answer the doubts it raises. But it is a useful antidote to overoptimism and a good thing to have around.

### KISSINGER ... CONTINUED

ciations with President Nixon and his most intimate White House aides.

The worst stories about Dr. Kissinger's role in the wiretap operations and the plumbers' case have been put out by former White House officials. It is notable that John Ehrlichman called Dr. Kissinger to testify in his own case about prior knowledge of the plumbers. What Mr. Ehrlichman has done through the courts is only a sample of what other former White House aides have done in leaks.

No matter how vehement he is, no

application of these principles to their countries."

Such high-sounding pledges were set to a lower key in the Madrid parallel declaration, which refers simply to "values, ideals, and aspirations based on the dignity and freedom of the individual" and expresses approval of "social justice for all peoples and universal respect for human rights."

matter how articulate, Dr. Kissinger cannot confidently defend himself against their charges. For at bottom he doesn't fully know what happened. The true pathos of Dr. Kissinger's situation lies in the identity and character of the only two people who can truly clear him on wiretapping and the plumbers. They are the President and Gen. Alexander Haig, Kissinger's former assistant and now White House chief of staff.

The President was ultimately responsible for the wiretapping and the plumbers. Gen. Haig handled the detailed arrangements for Dr. Kissinger.

The Secretary of State does not have total knowledge of what either man did. But he cannot expect them to clear him. To do that they would themselves have to step into the line of fire.

In these circumstances, Dr. Kissinger should stop forcing the issues. Confrontation can only make matters worse for him. What he needs is a couple of weeks off to regroup his intellectual forces for the difficult times which lie ahead.

© 1974, Field Enterprises, Inc.

WASHINGTON POST

11 JULY 1974 Pg. C7

By Jack Anderson

Military Madness—Rather than question a Defense Department directive, the brass hats have destroyed millions worth of surplus equipment that was as good as new.

The directive was issued in 1970 to keep surplus weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. But the obedient brass, with appalling lack of judgment, have been scrapping surplus parts which don't have the remotest combat use.

Several sources, who are di-

cluding such innocuous items as doors, wheels, tires and even paper cups.

Yet the terrorists, in the meantime, have had little hindrance getting weapons, sometimes stealing them right out of U.S. arsenals. Other resourceful terrorists have fashioned make-shift weapons such as flame throwers from aerosol cans and bombs from the cardboard centers of toilet paper rolls.

The Defense Department would do better assigning as security guards the men who are now busily engaged in destroying perfectly good equipment.

Many of the parts, which have been destroyed, have had to be replaced with new parts from

checked into dozens of silly destruction orders. Here are just a few examples:

* The F-4 fighter is still one of the most widely used planes in the Air Force. Yet surplus parts, including wheels, tires and fuel attachments, are being destroyed daily despite the fact that replacements are constantly in demand.

* Hill Air Force Base, Utah, placed an order for 257 fuel tank noses of the same type that had been destroyed in the base's salvage yard. Had these fixtures been spared, it would have saved the taxpayers more than $18,000.

* Engine access doors, which

* Incredibly, 250,000 paper cups were destroyed, according to competent sources, because they had been intended for use in fighter jets.

* At least one 60-foot truckbed was destroyed because it had been used to haul tanks.

* The S-2F, a Navy aircraft, is considered combat worthy, so its surplus parts are smashed into junk. Yet these planes are being used to fight brush fires. Without surplus parts, the planes will soon be grounded. Planes used in agricultural spraying and dusting also depend heavily on surplus military parts.

One way to stop this senseless destruction, if we may suggest a

WALL STREET JOURNAL 10 JULY 1974

Postscript to the Moscow Summit

By ROBERT KEATLEY

LONDON — The Moscow summit has come and gone, and detente survives if not entirely thrives.

President Nixon journeyed to the diplomatic mountaintop, kicked up a molehill of agreements and got back safely. The work accomplished was far from momentous but most of it seems useful and none seems dangerous—either to America's national security or to Mr. Nixon's political security.

Thus the third annual Soviet-American leadership meeting shouldn't be considered a failure; it may even have furthered that highly touted cause of peace for which the President gives himself so much credit. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for one, suggests bold new moves to bring nuclear weapons technology under political control could materialize before long, based on last week's concluding Moscow talks.

Yet there seems to be more questioning than ever about this Nixon-Kissinger effort to relax tensions with the Soviet Union, and build mutual vested interests in peace and stability—the complex process called detente. From both left and right back home, they are accused of demanding too little from the Russians, whether on nuclear or humane issues. Many now ask if detente is, after all, worthwhile.

An October Warning

It is almost certainly worth pursuing if the alternative means return to bombast and tension of the Cold War era. The Soviet Union and United States since then have both increased their ability to project political, economic and—above all—military power beyond their borders. If their interests, clash in faraway places in the jockeying for marginal advantages, war or war scares could result. Their brief brinkmanship during last October's Mideast war provides the most recent example of such danger.

But the two got through the 1950s and 1960s without fighting, despite hard feelings, and they both seem to realize that nuclear weaponry makes restraint more important than ever. Thus some argue this thing called detente isn't really necessary. They look over the balance sheet and conclude detente is even dangerous to the West.

Eight conservative scholars, for example, recently defined it as a Soviet strategy to shift the world power balance Moscow's way. In an article distributed by Sen. Jackson (Dem., Wash.)—a leading critic of Nixon foreign policy—the eight warned detente may "permit the Soviet Union to attain further expansion without recourse to general war, largely by the use of methods of internal subversion and external intimidation."

Such doubt and criticism is understandable. There's a gulf between the rhetorical flourishes of the Nixon administration, when it discusses detente in public, and what it seems to produce after talks with the Russians in private. This was illustrated by Mr. Nixon's remarks at a Maine Air Force base when he stopped to report, fresh from Moscow, what he brought back.

"... Both sides committed themselves to this goal, the imperative necessity of making the process of improving U.S.-So-

viet relations irreversible," the President said. He added that an arms control pact was brought "significantly closer" by his efforts.

That may yet prove true; Mr. Kissinger argues with much sophistication that a

> The work accomplished was far from momentous but most of it seems useful and none seems dangerous—either to America's national security or to Mr. Nixon's political security.

new approach in negotiations could before long produce effective controls running through 1985 (the year 1984 wasn't chosen for obvious reasons). But the new approach was selected only because the old one obviously wouldn't work despite a year or more of negotiations. Though the Secretary contends the new approach evolved logically from extremely frank summit talks last week, it has an ad hoc, adlibbed quality about it. The impression lingers that all previous discussions didn't really have the candor and common purpose which senior officials often ascribe to them. That's not entirely reassuring.

Neither is it reassuring to learn Mr. Kissinger isn't certain why the Soviets are talking about arms control in the first place. His most recent efforts made clear Moscow doesn't want any restriction on warhead production and deployment for at least five years. The Americans hope—and it seems not much more than hope—the Russians will sign limitations which stretch over a longer period. It's claimed this would provide a decade of stability and overcome intense Soviet fears about remaining militarily inferior to the U.S.

If true equality is the Soviet goal, the talks could yet be successful. But if catching up, then lurching ahead to "military superiority" (whatever that is in the nuclear age) is the purpose, there is only trouble ahead. Unfortunately detente doesn't answer this crucial question, and those who talk to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues wonder if the Soviets themselves have decided just where they're going. One result is increasing American suspicion about the wisdom of it all.

For all the uncertainty, however, detente has its supporters. Among them are some Western diplomats in Moscow who, unburdened by detailed knowledge of arms control problems, take a broader view of why the Soviets have grown so involved with the West. If they're right, the outlook isn't as gloomy as often portrayed.

The main motives, as they see it, include a Russian wish to gain equality and respectability. This involves more than missiles, though military parity is an essential part. "Security is what detente is all about," notes one Westerner, though he includes economic and political security as well as that bought by force of arms.

Behind this is a Russian national, and historical, sense of inferiority. For centuries the country has been considered by the West as one not quite developed, not quite civilized. This is realized, it's

claimed, as much as Leonid Brezhnev as by Peter the Great. Today's ruling elite knows it runs a second-rate society. The economy works but not well—the gap with the West isn't closing. Its politics are disdained by those who should be close ideological allies—witness Eastern Europe. Its ethical standards are better left unmentioned.

"Brezhnev is very conscious of the need to give the country a respectable history," says a Westerner, a history that doesn't repeat the "dark side" of Stalinism. "The Russians have an awful guilt complex about the past; they want a present they can be proud of."

By Western standards of decency, they are far from it. The system is rude and crude, not just to dissenters and would-be Jewish emigrants but to everyone. The bureaucracy and police apparatus push and shove the populace in unneeded and unexplained ways; they seem to defy common sense. Many citizens apparently realize it. When asked why a museum is closed on a day when it's normally open, a retired worker answers "because it is the Soviet Union," as if that alone explains why something illogical has happened.

Detente may offer the Soviet Union the chance to move away from this, toward the acceptability it desires. This is not to argue the discredited theory of convergence, that the two, East and West, are evolving into something alike; they aren't. Neither is it to view Soviet motives as benign; amidst the hypocrites of the ruling elite, ideologues also abound. They'll work hard to spread their version of socialism.

"They still expect to win the war of history," notes a diplomat.

No One-Way Relationship

And detente cannot be a one-way relationship. It would be foolish for the U.S. to curb its military developments, as Moscow wishes, unless there are reciprocal curbs on the Soviet side. There's no reason for the West to ratify the status quo in Europe with a 35-nation summit meeting, as Mr. Brezhnev seeks, unless the U.S.S.R. makes worthwhile concessions about the movement of persons and information between East and West. There's no reason at all to give the Soviets foreign aid, though exchanges on commercial terms can be encouraged—while remaining cautious about extracting a political price for economic ties and thus endangering the whole relationship.

The proponents stress the important payoff of detente is peace. "After the Thirty Years War one would never have thought that Catholics and Protestants could live together," says a European ambassador. "The same could apply to East and West. If we have peace for 30 years, the world and its problems will change so much that something durable might result. We should see."

As the current arms control talks prove, getting from here to there is difficult, perhaps yet impossible. These same talks prove detente can be faulted. But though in many ways it may not be much, detente for now still seems to be the best policy we've got.

Mr. Keatley, a member of the Journal's Washington bureau, covers foreign affairs.

Soviet Emigration Assurance,
Trade Bill Linked

By Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writer

Two key senators in the East-West trade controversy have told Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger that he would have to get Soviet assurances of substantially increased emigration before they will consider any legislation to grant trade concessions to Moscow.

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) and Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff (D-Conn.) met early Friday with Kissinger to press their views before the secretary goes to Moscow next week. Kissinger had invited them to breakfast at the State Department to discuss the trade bill now before the Senate.

Sources on Jackson's staff said the senator had set two stipulations: that the Soviet Union end harassment of persons who apply for permission to emigrate, and that the number of persons permitted to leave be "substantially increased." Jackson also stressed that the intent of his proposals was that permission be extended not only to Jews wishing to leave the Soviet Union but other persons as well.

It is understood that Jackson discussed with Kissinger specific numbers that would be considered satisfactory. Although the rate of emigration being demanded is said to be high, this appeared to be the first recognition by the senator that the Soviet Union could not be expected to agree to the kind of unlimited emigration he had previously demanded.

Jackson, who declined to comment directly on the substance of his conversations with Kissinger so as not to jeopardize forthcoming negotiations, said his discussion of numbers is rather a recognition that those who want to leave could not leave all at once, nor could Israel absorb them all at once.

Sources in Ribicoff's office said the Connecticut senator associated himself completely with Jackson's position.

Jackson has led the battle in

Congress to deny most-favored-nation tariff treatment and government credits to the Soviet Union until it liberalizes its emigration policies. The trade bill passed by the House has incorporated this prohibition.

A Jackson staff member said the senator would oppose any compromise language now apparently under consideration by the administration that would permit granting most-favored-nation status and credits subject to subsequent congressional review.

Kissinger has privately credited Jackson's pressure up to now as a major factor in bringing about an increase in the rate of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. But beyond a certain opint, he has

said, pressure would be counterproductive.

In his appearance before the Senate Finance Committee on March 7, Kissinger said that if Jackson's proposals to deny credits and most-favored-nation status are adopted, "it will not enhance emigration but stop it altogether."

He said: "Over the past five years there have been breakthroughs in Soviet emigration practices unimaginable during the years of confrontation." In March, 1973, he said, the President received assurances that the increased emigration would continue indefinitely and that the "education tax" would be waived.

An aide to Jackson said emigration from the Soviet Union has declined somewhat this

year. This was confirmed by State Department officials, but they refused to provide any figures.

Emigration figures provided by Jackson's office—which cover only emigrants arriving in Israel—show that in January, 1974, 1,900 persons emigrated, compared with 2,507 in January, 1973. The figures for February are 1,581 in 1974 and 2,770 in 1973. In 1973 the average monthly emigration was 2,800, with the larger proportion leaving in the last months of the year, reaching a peak of 4,200 for the month of October.

The Soviet Union is currently eligible for Export-Import Bank credits, which would be denied if the Jackson proposal is approved by

the Senate. The House voted 318 to 80. to make credits and most-favored-nation status dependent on liberalized emigration.

In a related matter, Export-Import Bank officials said yesterday they expected a favorable ruling this week from the Attorney General that would permit the extension of new loans and credit guarantees to the Soviet Union and three other Communist countries.

These were suspended last week when the General Accounting Office ruled that the President must find and report to Congress that each loan is in the "national interest." The general counsel of the Export-Import Bank last week rendered an opinion that the bank had complied with the law in all its dealings with

the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia.

The GAO ruling has already resulted in a delay in credits for Yugoslavia's purchase of four Boeing aircraft. On Friday, Yugoslav officials renouncing two major banks and the national airline signed

documents in Washington making their participation in the deal official. However, Export-Import Bank representatives did not sign. As a result, American banks which had planed to extend commercial credits also withheld their approval of the loans.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 27 JUNE 1974

# Repaired NATO backs Nixon visit to Moscow

## Atlantic allies patch up differences on consultation, military stance, Mideast

By Dana Adams Schmidt

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Brussels

President Nixon will be arriving in Moscow Thursday for his seven-day visit with a renewed declaration of NATO solidarity in his hand.

In a sense, this will help Mr. Nixon to negotiate from a position of added strength with Soviet party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev.

The declaration, ceremoniously signed here, does little to change the relationships that have existed since the time of the Atlantic Charter-drawn up by President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill 25 years ago. But it is meaningful in several ways:

* It strengthens the commitment among its 15 members to consult one another.

* It takes a more vigorous stand toward the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc than most military men had dared hope.

* It brings up to date a 25-year-old treaty which had begun to dis-integrate - particularly after the differences between the United States and most Europeans over aid to Israel in the October war.

Apart from all that, the President, relatively free from the pressures from Watergate, seems to be having a good time on his second major trip within the space of one month.

He demonstrated his fitness after the signing ceremony at the head-quarters of NATO by walking briskly the two long blocks from the resi-dence of the U.S. ambassador to Belgium, Leonard K. Firestone, to the palace.

On the way he indulged his favorite

pastime of shaking hands with the public who in this case were crowded against a fence near the palace.

Moments later the President stood with King Baudouin beneath three enormous crystal chandeliers on the second floor of the palace, greeting the guests who had been forbidden to the royal luncheon, including Prime Min-ister Harold Wilson of Britain, Chan-cellor Helmut Schmidt of Germany, Prime Minister Jacques Chirac of France, and Premier Mariano Rumor of Italy.

During the flight across the Atlantic, to Belgium Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger came from his quarters next to the President in The Spirit of '76 to visit five "pool" reporters who customarily occupy the coach seats next to the galley. The "pool" writes up an account of what they learn and it is distributed to all the other 123 media people accompanying the President.

### Kissinger's comments

Usually Dr. Kissinger's remarks are veiled behind attribution to a "senior official" or a "White House official." But this time Ronald Zieg-ler, the President's press officer, holding his own news conference in Brussels, by mistake blew the Sec-retery of State's cover. So now his words are attributable.

Dr. Kissinger said it was "impossible" to conclude a permanent agree-ment at the coming summit on the control of strategic arms. He said there is still a lot of negotiating to do and that the two heads of government would have to reach an agreement on "where they want to go."

He added that he might have to

return to Moscow in this connection to resolve the key question: how to relate warheads to numbers of missiles.

One reason for the delay, he pointed out, is that the number the Russians gave him at meetings last spring proved to be "all wrong." The prob-lem of number did not relate to "throw weight" he noted. If our missiles have less throw weight than the Russians, he asserted, it is be-cause we chose to build them that way.

### A visit to China?

[It was also learned that Secretary Kissinger had seen the representative of mainland China in Washington shortly before leaving for Moscow and the secretary probably would be visiting China later this year. He was also considering a visit to India before the end of the year.]

The new Atlantic declaration, according to Dr. Kissinger, is "substantially - give or take 10 percent" - what he had in mind when he proposed the new declaration last year.

On the question why the Moscow summit is being held now, Dr. Kissinger had this to say: "It was scheduled last year. We had no reason to cancel. It had to be held. If we did not go to the summit we would be saying we are not a functioning government."

Dr. Kissinger asserted that Water-gate must be regarded as "an attack on central authority. But the President could not allow that to affect his foreign policy."

"The President has on the whole had a successful foreign policy," he said, and you can't just stop that. "We turned around the whole Middle East in the middle of Watergate. It is to the interest of the President's successors in 1977 that they inherit this kind of foreign policy."

( DETENTE ... CONTINUED.)

the AHA in 1972. But still the AHA remains mute. Instead of acting under the 1972 standard, the new president has inexplicably appointed a committee to prepare a "position paper for early study by the council." Is the council waiting for historians to be drawn and quartered in Red Square before it decides to venture an objection?

I am at a loss to explain this extraordinary behavior on the part of the historical establishment. It may perhaps be related to a desire to maintain what one member of the council described to me as "collegial relations" with Soviet historians approved by the regime. There are plans, for example for a 1974 Soviet-American historical colloquium to be held in the United States. As for the New Left historians, who used to see themselves as the keepers of the professional conscience, they may fear that the condemnation of Brezhnev's Russia

could suggest there was good reason to oppose the Stalinization of Europe in the 1940s. Their unaccustomed aphonia compares most unfavorably with the forthrightness of the English radical historian E. P. Thompson who recently wrote, "We must make it clear again, without equivocation, that we uphold the right of Soviet citizens to think, communicate, and act as free, self-activating people; and that we utterly despise the clumsy police patrols of Soviet intellectual and social life.... Solzhenitsyn has asked us to shout once more. And we must, urgently, meet his request."

### Remembering 'Animal Farm'

The relish of the American government and, in a far less momentous way, of the American historical establishment infrat-izing with their Soviet counterparts makes one wonder how it all looks to Soviet dissenters. In a recent discussion of the Soviet intellectual underground in "En-counter" the Dutch journalist Karel van

het Reve, contemplating this point, was reminded of the last paragraph in Orwell's "Animal Farm." The once revolutionary pigs are sitting around the table with the farmers against whom they had made the revolution. The lesser animals, now exploited by the pigs as once they had been exploited by the farmers, begin to see a curious blurring phenomenon as they watch the scene through the window. "The creatures outside looked from pig to man, and from man to pig. and from pig to man again; but already it was impossible to say which was which."

Mr. Schlesinger is Albert Schweitzer professor of the Humanities at the City University of New York and winner of Pulitzer Prizes in history and biography. He is also a member of the Journal's Board of Contributors, four distinguished professors who contribute periodic articles reflecting a broad range of views.

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