September 24, 1965

Dean Harvey Brooks
Engineering & Applied Physics Department
Pierce 217

Dear Harvey:

I accept almost automatically any
invitation from you.

I will be glad to join the Council
study group. I will be out of the
country on November 9th. However, the
other dates seem free and I will put
them down on my calendar.

With warm regards.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021

58 EAST 68TH STREET

CABLE ADDRESS: FOR AFFAIRS, NEW YORK
AREA CODE 212 LEhigh 5-3300

JOHN J. McCLOY
Chairman of the Board

HENRY M. WRISTON
Honorary President

GRAYSON KIRK
President

FRANK ALTSCHUL
Vice-President & Secretary

DAVID ROCKEFELLER
Vice-President

GABRIEL HAUGE
Treasurer

GEORGE S. FRANKLIN, JR.
Executive Director

Directors

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
ELLIOTT V. BELL
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
WILLIAM A. M. BURDEN
ARTHUR H. DEAN
C. DOUGLAS DILLON
ALLEN W. DULLES
THOMAS K. FINLETTER
WILLIAM C. FOSTER
CARYL P. HASKINS
JOSEPH E. JOHNSON
WALTER H. MALLORY
JAMES A. PERKINS
PHILIP D. REED
WHITNEY H. SHEPARDSON
CHARLES M. SPOFFORD
CARROLL L. WILSON

September 20, 1965

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

The pervasive impact of science and technology on international relations is referred to by many but little understood. Indeed the whole concept of what constitutes the national interest of states may have been irreversibly altered by scientific developments and may be even more altered in the future. To try to illuminate some of these problems a discussion group is being organized by the Council on Foreign Relations to bring together scientists and others of diverse backgrounds to examine the interaction of science and international relations in a way which cuts across many fields of interest.

Here are a few of the kinds of questions with which we hope to deal:

What past and prospective developments in weapons technology are likely to be stabilizing or destabilizing in international relations?

What is the significance to national interest of the control of territories and populations in the environment of modern weapons system and communications? Is it still valid to think of hegemony over territories and peoples in traditional terms of occupation and control? If not, in what ways does it make sense to try to control the political or economic behavior of peoples, and for what ends?

What is the ultimate political significance of the unequal pace of technological advance around the world? What is the meaning of the "technological balance of payments" in favor of the United States, and to what extent is it really in the national interest? Is it stabilizing or destabilizing in international relations? Is it in fact growing, or is it temporary?

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Is it possible to apply science and technology so as to gradu-
ally remove the sources of tension in world affairs, for example by
alleviation of poverty, or will tensions merely be aggravated by ex-
pectations outrunning accomplishments? Can technology be used to
substitute resources so as to remove tensions, for example by sub-
stituting desalting for control of water resources?

What impact are new technologies such as weather modification,
artificial control of heredity and development, psychogenic drugs,
biological control of pests, etc. likely to have on international
relations of the future?

The discussions will be led by individuals who have been giving
special thought to these problems. The secretary of the group will
be Mr. Eugene B. Skolnikoff of M.I.T. who is just completing a lengthy
study on "Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy." He will
help to organize the meetings and write some of the background papers.

The first meeting of the group has been set for Tuesday, November 9.
Subsequent meetings will be held during the winter and spring on the
second Tuesday of the month skipping December (November 9, January 11,
February 8, March 8, April 12 and May 10). The meetings will start at
5:00 with tea served at 4:45 and they will continue, with a dinner break,
until 9:30, so you would be able to catch the 10:00 p.m. shuttle. They
will be held at the Harold Pratt House, 58 East 68th Street, New York
City. As with all Council functions, these meetings will be off-the-
record.

I hope that you will find it possible to participate. Your own
contributions to the discussions would be of great help, and I feel
also that you would find the views of others stimulating. If we can
develop some ideas or conclusions that may be helpful for American
foreign policy, so much the better. Please let me know at the Council
whether you can join the group and whether we can expect you on
November 9.

[L]

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE

58 EAST 68TH STREET

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021

CABLE ADDRESS: FORAFFAIRS, NEW YORK
AREA CODE 212 LEhigh 5-3300

OCT 26 1965

October 25, 1965

TO MEMBERS OF THE DISCUSSION GROUP ON
SCIENCE AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST:

Enclosed is a background paper prepared by
Mr. Skolnikoff for the first meeting of the Discussion
Group on Science and the National Interest.

As you know, the meeting will take place on
Tuesday, November 9, starting at 5:00 (with tea at 4:45)
and continuing through dinner until not later than 9:30.
If you have any change in plans regarding your attendance
at the meeting, please let us know.

Lorna Brennan
Administrative Secretary

Please call Miss Farlow
at LEhigh 5-3300.

Background Paper Number 1
For Meeting of
November 9, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL: Not for publication
Not to be quoted or cited

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

THE MAJOR PROBLEMS

by Eugene B. Skolnikoff

I

It has become a commonplace notion to observe that the pace of change
in science and technology in this century has in turn brought about revolu-
tionary changes in the conditions of life and in the public affairs of nations.
The evidence of these changes surrounds us all, and is no less evident in the
relations among nations than it is in domestic affairs.

Yet it is not as clear whether the changes that have occurred have
(or should have) fundamentally altered basic concepts of what constitutes
the national interest of states or whether the changes have simply altered
the subject matter that must be taken into account when attempting to protect
or advance the national interest. Certainly, quite traditional attitudes
appear to prevail in policy making for issues that touch on matters of power,
alliances, international organizations, control of territory, bargaining,
sovereignty and influence.

Or is that only an illusion? Have concepts of the national interest
been gradually and adequately evolving to accommodate new relationships and
situations, and can we confidently say that the assumptions today effectively
take into account the likely impact of future developments in science and
technology? These are, it seems to me, the central questions before the
discussion group, best stated as:

(a) To what extent have changes brought about by science and technology altered the assumptions and principles which should underlie the concept of national interest?

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(b) To what extent do the _present_ implicit assumptions as to what constitutes the national interest reflect the altered state of international relationships which we believe to have been induced by science and technology?

(c) Do these assumptions adequately recognize the pace of change and the implications of future developments in science and technology?

It is proposed that the discussion group examine these questions by focus-
ing on a series of topics that can serve to bring out some of the most pertinent
issues. To this end, five topics have been tentatively isolated for study, each
of which is heavily influenced by science and technology, and each of which
raises some central issues with regard to the determination of the national
interest and thus also to the formulation and conduct of foreign policy.

II

The five topics are presented below for discussion and sharpening at the first meeting of the group. For each, it is expected that one or more papers will be prepared to help to bring the major issues into focus.

1. The Instability of Power

The advent of nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery systems was an obvious discontinuity in weapons development and in the meaning of military power. It has also been a much studied and discussed discontinuity, especially from the point of view of strategic military policy, which there should be no need to recapitulate. However, many elements of the present situation, and questions of future trends are of continued or heightened importance in the context of evolving concepts of what constitutes the national interest.

The basic issue for the discussion group in this topic is to explore the
effects on international political relationships of past or prospective weapons
developments, and to derive from that exploration an understanding of how these

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developments are, or should be, influencing our perception of the national interest. The most useful part of the task is not simply what will happen to relationships as a result of weapons developments, but whether there are certain more or less inevitable trends (e.g., can it be said that the technology of atomic weapons is "certain" to develop to the point at which it will become relatively easy and inexpensive for most nations to acquire?) that should be influencing our foreign policy in important ways today.

Thus, we will be attempting to step back and re-examine what the implications of weapons developments, such as the ability to project military power over global distances, have been for world politics. Building on that, we will want to attempt to chart gross future developments or trends and their likely meaning for American freedom of action, for the international organization of power and its stability, for the significance of international mechanisms for joint action, and so forth. Finally, it is hoped that we can draw practical conclusions about the long-term policy courses we should be contemplating today in the light of the technical developments and their political implications we see coming in the future.

This statement implies a more precise analysis than will no doubt be possible, but it would appear that this is the target at which we should be aiming. As preliminary background for the discussion at the first meeting, it may be useful to list in brief form some of the elements in international political relationships that have been altered from the past, or raised as new factors, as a result of scientific and technological advances applied to armaments.

Geographical position, for example, remains a factor in international politics, but one that appears to have vastly changed characteristics. For the major powers, developments in transportation, in communication and, of

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course, in speed and ease of delivery of highly destructive weapons have greatly reduced the significance of natural barriers to attack, or of proximity as a prerequisite for bringing power to bear. On the other hand, sheer size retains some importance not as a necessary requirement for the production of food and natural resources as in the past, but as a measure of a nation's vulnerability to atomic attack. The contrast between Russian and Western European vulnerability on this score is striking, though the significance of physical size is largely washed out in a U.S./U.S.S.R. comparison.

For smaller countries, geographical factors continue to hold more importance, but even then may be quite suddenly overshadowed by acquisition of modern weapons or by promises of protection by larger advanced countries.

For the future, new developments in military technology would seem to continue the trends already established with regard to the importance of geography; e.g., large troop-carrying aircraft to shorten worldwide reaction time, nuclear-powered ships independent of forward bases, and global reconnaissance coverage. Similarly, with regard to local war not involving the major powers, the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or of development of new generations of conventional weapons would serve to alter the traditional importance of geography in the same direction as has already happened for the major powers.

Another element considerably modified from the past is a nation's dependence on resources from outside for its military strength. Modern arms and modern life require new patterns of material and resource inputs and thus quite altered dependency by one nation on others. The effects pull in two ways: modern technology and economic power make possible massive reallocation and substitution of resources, but they also create new dependencies in specific resources peculiarly needed by modern technology.

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For the United States and a few of the other technologically-advanced nations, the dominant trend appears to be that leading to greater actual (or potential in times of crisis) self-sufficiency. For technology can be focused on developing substitutes for imports, on the exploitation of food and mineral resources from international waters, on the development of economical means for recovery of minerals from low-content ores, and on new geological exploration techniques that can lead to the discovery of alternative mineral resources.

The development of synthetic rubber in the United States and gasoline substitutes in Germany during World War II are good examples, as are the development of nuclear propulsion and new techniques for the discovery and exploitation of off-shore gas and oil resources.

For smaller or less-advanced countries, modern arms would appear to increase dependency on external resources. The Indian-Pakistan engagements earlier this year were severely limited by the lack of availability of resources needed for the armaments with which forces were equipped.

In another sense of this same question of resource dependency, modern technology may make it increasingly possible to reduce or resolve conflicts arising over competition for scarce resources. By creating new ways of obtaining resources, in effect by multiplication or substitution of resources, technology can serve to change scarcity into plenty. The prospect of economical desalination of sea water is a case in point.

The sheer destructiveness of modern arms is, of course, one of the major discontinuities from the past, and it is necessary to ask what likely future developments along these lines may mean to military power and to the stability of international relations. The interest here is not only with the scale of physical destruction possible, but also with the possibilities for technical developments that could limit destruction, that might put nuclear power more

[L.C.]

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easily in the hands of many more countries, and that might result in new categories of weapons systems (e.g., biological or chemical) that may be as significant internationally as atomic weapons have been. The group may also want to consider, in the context of possible new weapons environments, the significance of the ease with which the American public accepted a deterrent military posture that carried with it the logical threat of self-destruction.

The elements that are considered to determine the national power of states typically include geographical position, natural resource base, industrial capacity, population, armaments, national character and so forth. Now, the strength, vitality and scope of a nation's scientific and technological resource base must be added. Not only is such a base an actual determinant of military strength, but it has also come to be a psychological measure of a nation's power and future potential. Thus the scientific and technological base (or some public demonstration that is assumed to represent that base) is a new and important element in determining national power and influence.

However, the national interest does not necessarily lie in attempting to be entirely "self-sufficient" in science and technology. This is obviously true for all but the major powers since the resources necessary to cover all fields of science and technology would be prohibitive. But even for the United States, it is necessary to make choices in the allocation of resources to scientific and technological objectives. Thus, complete self-sufficiency is not feasible; some reliance on work done elsewhere is inevitable. This is necessarily the case in scientific fields requiring study across national boundaries.

Beyond that inevitability, however, it may be in the national interest to choose international cooperation instead of competition because of the political

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or economic gains that may be achieved. One of the other proposed topics for the discussion group will face that question directly: is it in the long-run U.S. interest to increase the technological gap between the United States and other nations (assuming one exists), or does the national interest lie in attempting to reduce the gap.

The new importance to international politics of the pace of scientific and technological advance in each country raises another set of questions: to wit, can the pace or direction of technology be controlled and, in some cases, dampened? To date, technological development in armaments proceed singlemindedly (with but a few exceptions) with the view that the national interest requires rapid technological progress in promising (for weapons) fields wherever it might lead.

Now, however, the question must be asked as to whether all such technological leads should be followed. The H-bomb controversy was, in effect, one of the few examples of an attempt to limit technological development. The motivation for the test-ban treaty also had some of this desire to slow development because unbridled competition might be politically destabilizing.

To what extent is this control of technology a feasible or necessary element of the national interest in the future? Obviously, such decisions can only rarely be unilateral national decisions because of the risk of continued development by other powers. What are the implications for multilateral action? Can, for example, the development of new and inexpensive processes for producing fissionable material -- processes which might exacerbate proliferation problems -- be headed off?

Another aspect of technological control of concern for the future is the possibly increasing danger of international diffusion of technology when that technology has military as well as peaceful applications. The United States

[L]

recently prevented the sale of two unclassified commercially available computers to France because the French planned to use them for the *force de frappe*. Is the possibility of "dual-use" of technology going to increase in the future, with possibly deleterious effects on national security so as to require new attitudes toward secrecy, cooperation, international industrial activity and the like?

These are some of the elements underlying power relationships that have been altered by science and technology, and are likely to undergo more alteration in the future. Do the sum of these and others mean a change in kind in what constitutes the long-run national interest, or simply difficult but easily assimilable changes that need not affect underlying concepts? In either case, can lessons be drawn to help illuminate policy choices that must be made today because of discernible long-run trends?

## 2. The Control of Territory and Populations

In 1952, a major political party could talk of liberating the Eastern European satellites from Russian control, yet today such talk would appear odd and irrelevant in all but extremist circles. Was the gradual, sometimes sudden, loosening of the bonds from the Soviet Union an inevitable result of the modern world of communications, transportation, armaments, and interdependence? Or was it a development peculiar to that situation?

The issue for the discussion group is essentially this one. Does control of territories and populations mean the same now as it once did? Is it still valid to think of hegemony over territory and people in traditional terms of occupation and control? If not, in what ways does it make sense to try to control the political or economic behavior of peoples, and for what ends?

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There is not, of course, any simple concept of what is, or was, meant by
control of territory and populations. The range of situations is very great,
covering internal control of a population by a dictatorial regime, occupation
of territory and enslavement of the citizenry of one country by another, or
control of one society by another from a distance through economic, military
and political measures. Still, there is a sense in which we normally speak
of one country controlling another, or of an expansionist regime attempting
to dominate others for its own ends through some form of physical and ideological
control. It will be necessary for the discussion group to be precise about the
parameters of the subject, but it does seem to be worth examining what this
concept means today, or is likely to mean in the future, and where the national
interest lies in confronting such attempts at control.

What are the elements that are different today from the past? Geo-
graphical separation, for one, clearly has less significance. Distance or
natural barriers to travel and communication were once the primary factors in
enabling a society to be insulated from the power and friction of ideas enter-
ing from outside. Today, and no doubt more so in the future, geographical
separation has much reduced effect as a barrier to outside influence.

The communications revolution in particular has made it possible to
penetrate societies from afar regardless of the wishes of that society's leaders.
And likely developments in communications technology apparently will emphasize
that capability. However, a contrary case could be made that with the aid of
modern technology, it might be possible to provide communications for a society
by means of a closed system that prevented outside penetration. Communist China,
for example, is said to rely heavily on centrally-controlled loudspeaker systems
for communications, rather than radios that could pick up external transmissions.

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In addition to the physical technology of communications, however, it
is also necessary to explore possible developments in psychology, for the
application of research in that area could conceivably provide powerful new
instruments for domination.

One must also ask how cultural differences affect the importance of ideas entering from outside a society. What kind of penetration can we expect American ideas to have in a society such as China's whose values are so different? Is this cultural barrier capable of being overcome with a greater and different kind of effort?

Another changed factor affecting control of territory and populations
is armaments. These can pull in several directions, however. Weapons of mass
destruction can, in principle, be used as terrorizing instruments, but as long
as a virtual nuclear stalemate exists, these are not readily utilizable.

On a smaller scale, however, modern arms give a major technological nation
an enormous advantage in the use of force. But that, too, must be qualified
if the forces of resistance have access to external sources of supply, or if the
dominating nation has political limitations on the amount or character of the
force it can apply. Viet-Nam illustrates that only too well.

Lastly, in looking to the future, the possibilities of new kinds of
weapons must be considered. Particularly relevant are the possibilities in BW,
CW, and psychological warfare. How are these likely to affect the ability of
one man, or one party or one nation to obtain and exercise dominion over terri-
tory and people?

Other new factors also affect the ability to maintain control. The
growing interdependence of economies means that external influences are bound
to enter a society, and that external events are bound to affect the interests
of a society whatever the wishes of the dominating element.

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Similarly, the enormous increase in international travel, trade, organization and intercourse of all kind, in large part made possible and imperative by scientific and technological developments and their effects, also works to reduce the degree of control possible in a society.

Do these and other elements lead to any changes in our concepts of how to confront conflicts over control of territory? For example, to oversimplify, should we have relaxed in Southeast Asia on the grounds that Chinese control could have been easily undermined later? To what ends is control sought in any case? Are we and other nations simply after influence, not control, to insure our domestic needs and advancement? Are economic and technological domination just as real, albeit more subtle, as actual military domination, and are those the real goals of expansionist powers? These are the issues for the discussion group.

### 3. Technological Domination

France, and to a lesser extent other countries of Western Europe, are basing their current scientific policies and their policies toward foreign investment on the calculation (assumption?) that unless the trend is halted, it is only a matter of time until the growing gap in science and technology between the United States and other countries gives the United States technological domination. The inference is drawn that technological domination makes possible economic and political domination. The French see such domination now in electronics, food processing, space, computers and atomic energy, and expect the U.S. advantage to grow quite rapidly in these and other fields because of the "unfair competition" of heavy U.S. government investment in R and D.

This subject is a new one in international affairs, and is deemed worthy of separate treatment by the discussion group because it raises many novel

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questions of potentially far-reaching significance. Basically, the issue is to determine whether such a technological gap exists; if so, what are its long-term political implications; and ultimately, where does the U.S. national interest lie with regard to maintaining, exacerbating, or diminishing the gap. Is this an opportunity to expand U.S. influence? Will it in time force unification in Europe, and possibly other parts of the world? Is this a transitory phenomenon of little significance?

Certainly, the situation is different for Western Europe than it is for the less-developed countries. For the latter, a technological gap clearly exists, and this gap imposes certain responsibilities upon the United States, as well as a degree of influence in other countries. From the point of view of the smaller countries, advanced nations, particularly the United States, are inevitably going to determine the technological characteristics of their societies on into the indefinite future. Technology must be largely imported, and what is available is shaped by the objectives of the advanced countries rather than their own. In addition, to the extent the less-developed countries must rely on advanced nations to make their technological choices for them, to that extent are they submitting their own independence of action to the value systems of other nations? And, of course, technological domination can lead to economic domination through manipulation of resource needs (e.g., potential for substitution of resources that constitute a major export of a small nation).

For Western European countries the situation is not as clear. The French measure what they call the technological balance of payments (the net flow of patents, licenses, etc., into or out of a country) and find that they import five times as much from the United States as they export. This they believe is unacceptable, though it is far from clear whether or not this is to their net advantage in economic and technological terms.

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The French also believe that it is the enormous American investment in R and D, mostly in defense and space fields, that provides the basis for the heavy American industrial investment in France. Here, the argument is that government subsidy of R and D gives American firms a competitive advantage in the sophistication of their products, and hence the opportunity to compete with, or take over European industry.

Clearly, this train of reasoning is too narrow, for it is far from certain just what the spin-off is from American defense and space R and D investment. Also, it leaves out of account factors of industrial size and resources, market scale, the technological performance of smaller countries like Japan, and so forth. But, is there some justification for the argument? Where does the truth lie and what are the implications for American interests in the future?

### 4. Removing Sources of Tension

It is often said that the United States could satisfy overnight the expectations of the underdeveloped two-thirds of the world by applying its scientific and technological knowledge and resources to their problems. And, it is averred, our national interest requires that we do so.

This is one example of a view that it is possible to apply science and technology so as to gradually remove the sources of tension in world affairs. Is this, in fact, a reasonable policy alternative? Do we have the resources and knowledge to do that, or will tensions merely be aggravated by expectations outrunning accomplishments? Are the technical elements the heart of the problems or are other elements -- cultural, economic, political -- equally limiting?

The issue here is probably best stated as whether our concept of the national interest should be leading this country to devote a much higher proportion of its scientific and technological resources to the removal of sources

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[LC]

of tension, in particular to the needs of the poorer people and nations, than we do now.

Certainly the advances of science and technology have been instrumental in exposing formerly isolated traditional societies to modern life and technology. This exposure, through instantaneous communications and greater mobility, has been a major factor in the rise of the expectations of underdeveloped societies, and has helped to bring about international political tensions and strains as the new nations strive for their place in the sun, and as their people strive for benefits only dimly seen and little understood.

Moreover, the enormously stronger scientific and technological base of the United States is also a major factor in making the economic, as well as the technological, gap between the rich and poor nations ever larger. Will this continue on into the future? What are the political implications? Should we be re-evaluating our concept of the national interest with regard to the North-South gap, and applying much more of our resources to its reduction? Is this a practical alternative?

Another factor related to this subject and sharply changed from the past because of science and technology is population size and growth. Traditionally, population size was one of the measures of a nation's relative international position. Large populations, expanding at a good pace were considered elements of strength. Now, this factor has taken on new dimensions.

For one, the population "explosion" clearly poses threats to all nations with regard to the conditions of life enjoyed by their citizens. For another, population growth in many of the economically depressed countries is a heavy drag on economic growth and strength. Instead of adding to the nation's potential, it is becoming a source of tension and conflict.

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For the first time, population control issues have become important foreign policy matters. What are the long-range prospects and the lessons for conceptions of the national interest today?

## 5. New Technologies and International Relations

In addition to the changes in the elements of international political relationships brought about by advances in science and technology that have already been mentioned, are others of considerable importance. The growth of international institutions, for example, can be attributed in large part to the requirements for international action posed by new technologies (e.g., use of the radio-frequency spectrum). Harlan Cleveland recently said: "While nations may cling to national sovereignies . . . science has created a functional international society whether anyone likes it or not."

Similarly, the very conduct of foreign policy has been drastically altered. The ease of communications and transport has reduced the independence and responsibility of the ambassador, has speeded up the pace of diplomatic events, has multiplied the issues with which a foreign office must deal, and has forced him to cope with a rate of change absolutely unprecedented. It has also created an information-handling problem, and has greatly increased the difficulty of selecting what is timely and relevant from what is merely descriptive.

and

These/other changes such as the blurring of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, are interesting and important, and the discussion group may want to follow one or another of these to understand better their implications for the national interest.

But, perhaps the most important development to explore is how the new technologies and capabilities now in prospect are likely to affect world politics and thus concepts of the national interest. For example, national

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boundaries, sometimes inconvenient and artificial, are now often ludicrous when viewed in the light of man's present means to alter his environment on a global scale. Fallout from atomic tests, and the globe-girdling effects of experiments such as Project Westford (belt of copper filaments for communications purposes) and Project Starfish (high altitude atomic explosions) are examples. (President Kennedy's response to the problem of endangering the earth's Van Allen belt of electrons as a result of Project Starfish: "Van Allen hasn't complained about losing his belt, why should anyone else?" doesn't constitute a universally applicable solution.)

This is but one example of a category of technological developments in existence or likely to be realized that will have important implications for concepts of national interest and for future trends in international relations. Others that must be considered include weather modification, artificial control of heredity and human development, psychogenic drugs, biological control of pests, etc.

All of these will serve to increase the demand or need for international control over national activities, and will undoubtedly serve to limit the freedom of any single nation to act independently of consultation or approval by others. Concepts of sovereignty and independence of action almost surely will have to be adjusted in the light of more fundamental national objectives. In fact, it may be that these concepts should have already changed drastically, and that our failure to realize it will return to haunt us.

The Westford and Starfish tests illustrate the point. Both were carried out for national security purposes, hence international "approval" was not contemplated. We proceeded unilaterally, though with extensive advance publicity and scientific analysis in the case of Westford, But we have now set

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the precedent of carrying out an action with effects on the entire planet's
environment without international approval when security interests were involved,
no matter how weakly. Would we grant the same prerogative to an "irresponsible"
nation?

Thus, these new technologies and capabilities, and their likely gross
political effects need to be spelled out, for their implications for America's
international posture as time goes on, and hence their implications for long-
term policy trends now, may be of the highest importance.

These are the five topics tentatively posed for the discussion group
as a means of evaluating whether the advances of science and technology have
fundamentally altered concepts of what constitutes the national interest, or
whether they have simply complicated the problem of determining the national
interest.

The first meeting on November 9, 1965, will be devoted to a general
discussion of the scope and purpose of the task before the group. Hopefully,
the discussion will refine further these questions or others that may be
submitted in their stead.

DATES OF COUNCIL DISCUSSION GROUP ON
SCIENCE AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST:

November 9

January 11

February 8

March 8

April 12

May 10

Meetings will start with tea at 4:45 p.m. and
continue, with a dinner break, until 9:30.

RESTRICTED TO GROUP MEMBERS ONLY
NOT TO BE QUOTED OR CITED

**CONFIDENTIAL**
*Not for publication*

DISCUSSION MEETING REPORT

Chairman: Harvey Brooks
Secretary: Eugene B. Skolnikoff
Rapporteur: Arthur Levine

First Meeting

November 9, 1965

Digest of Discussion

(This digest has not been edited by the participants.)

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68TH STREET

NEW YORK 21

[L]

The first meeting of the Discussion Group on Science and the National
Interest was held at the Harold Pratt House on Tuesday, November 9, 1965 at
5:00 p.m. Present were: Harvey Brooks, Chairman; Eugene Skolnikoff, Secretary;
Arthur Levine, Rapporteur; Jacques Barzun, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Harry Boardman,
Detlev W. Bronk, W. Samuel Carpenter III, James B. Conant, Franklin S. Cooper,
W. Phillips Davison, Richard A. Falk, William T.R. Fox, Caryl P. Haskins, Robert
Jastrow, John K. Jessup, Herman Kahn, Col. Immanuel Klette, Thomas S. Kuhn, Roger
Lewis, David W. MacEachron, J. Robert Oppenheimer, John G. Palfrey, Emanuel Piore,
Oliver Townsend.

********

The Chairman opened the meeting at approximately 5:00 p.m. He stated
that this was the first of six meetings, with the subsequent sessions scheduled
in 1966 on January 11, February 8, March 8, April 12, and May 10. The discussions
are private and off-the-record. The rapporteur will furnish a summary of the
discussions which will not be edited prior to submission to the participants,
but which may be corrected by the participants.

The format for each session will be to have approximately two hours
of discussion before dinner and one hour after dinner. The subject for the
Discussion Group, the Chairman continued, is Science and the National Interest,
that is, what is the impact of science and technology on the national interest
and on the conduct of foreign affairs. If a nation changes its foreign policy,
the Chairman stated, it does so because it is convinced that its national interest
is different from what it thought it was previously. The question is, how has
science and technology affected the concept of the national interest and thus
the conduct of foreign policy? To obtain background on this question and to
set a possible framework for the discussion, Mr. Skolnikoff has written a back-
ground paper, copies of which were distributed to participants several days prior
to this meeting. The paper is divided into five main parts or topics. Each of
these could form the basis of a future meeting, but it is up to the group to decide
what course to follow.

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The Chairman also noted that in discussing science and technology the question arises as to whether the social sciences should be included in "science."
The Chairman stated that he believed that the social sciences cannot be excluded.
The problems under discussion are too "mixed" to be limited to the physical or biological sciences, since many of them deal with psychological, economic, and management questions. The members of the Discussion Group agreed that the social sciences would be included in the term "science."

The Chairman then introduced Mr. Skolnikoff and asked him to give a brief review of his paper.

Mr. Skolnikoff gave a general review of his paper. He noted that the central questions of his paper were: (1) have changes brought about by science and technology actually changed basic concepts of what constitutes the national interest of states or their national objectives? (2) if the answer to the first question is "yes," have such changes been reflected in the shaping and conduct of foreign policy? Mr. Skolnikoff then reviewed his discussion of the five topics he treats in his paper: (1) The Instability of Power; (2) The Control of Territory and Populations; (3) Technological Domination; (4) Removing Sources of Tension; and, (5) New Technologies and International Relations. (A detailed review of each topic is contained in the paper.) Mr. Skolnikoff's review focused on how developments in science and technology have tended to alter significantly the elements of traditional areas of foreign policy and raise major new international issues and relationships. The review left open the question of whether advances of science and technology have basically altered concepts of the national interest, or simply complicated the problem of determining the national interest. [During the discussion, the lights in the room went out due to the general power failure in the northeast United States. The balance of the meeting was conducted by candle-light.]

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The Chairman noted that it was a type of "conventional wisdom" to ascribe everything new to science and technology. He said that while this may be true in a broad sense -- i.e., industrialization, population growth, improved transportation and communication have their origins in advances in science and technology -- we must distinguish between the direct and indirect effects of science and technology.

Mr. Skolnikoff observed that a sharp distinction between direct and in-
direct effects cannot be made. For example, he noted that technological domina-
tion by one nation over others may be due to political and economic advantages
in the nation which enjoys technical dominance, as well as due to technological
superiority.

Mr. Bronk observed that human desires and preferences must be considered
in determining causations -- science may determine the best methods for birth
control, but desires of the husband and wife will help determine the size of
the family.

Mr. Oppenheimer pointed out there was an ambiguity in Mr. Skolnikoff's
paper. The paper implies that the national interest is the same for all nations.
Actually, the national interest of the United States, for example, is much dif-
ferent in practice from that of the Soviet Union or Communist China. Mr.
Oppenheimer asked if Mr. Skolnikoff was aware of this ambiguity and what he
meant by "national interest."

The Chairman replied that both he and Mr. Skolnikoff may have "fallen
into a trap" with regard to the term "national interest." They were thinking,
he continued, of the national interest of the United States, rather than the
national interest of other states or of all states. He asked, however, whether
in an ultimate sense, all states do not have common national interests.

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Mr. Fox observed that a distinction should be made between national objectives and the national interest. While it may be in the national interest per se to internationalize the machinery for, let us say, settling disputes, it may not suit the particular objectives of the nation to do so at a particular time. Similarly, Mr. Fox continued, a distinction should be made between those changes in international relations which science and technology produce that cannot be modified and those changes which can be minimized so as to cushion their deleterious effects. In other words, distinctions must be made between what are the trends and developments and what are the methods of dealing with the trends and developments.

Mr. Davison asked how far did the group wish to go in dealing with such broad terms as national interest, national objectives, national goals and science and technology. It seemed to him, he continued, that these concepts were being used in such a broad and ill-defined sense that the discussion was rather vague.

In an attempt to narrow the discussion to a specific time frame, Mr. Kahn asked what period the group was considering in its discussion of scientific and technological impact.

The Chairman responded that the time period he had in mind was 1955-65 and 1965-75, that is, the ten years just past and the ten immediately in the future. He observed that going beyond ten years in the future might be unsatisfactory since we cannot predict with any confidence what the situation might be then. Besides, he noted, in order to get to the year 2000, we must go through the next ten years. Nevertheless, he continued, we should not be indifferent totally to considering the situation in 2000, since what we think will happen will influence what does happen in the next ten years.

Taking up this point, Mr. Kahn reflected upon the probability that by the year 2000, there may be a total "jungle-like atmosphere" in the world, with many

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nations possessing nuclear weapons. The next five to ten years, he observed, may still be manageable and therefore we must try to devise policy solutions which may contribute to stability for the next five to ten years.

Mr. Piore questioned whether it could be predicted what the technical situation will be in ten years.

We can predict this in a gross way, Mr. Kahn responded.

Mr. Piore doubted whether even gross predictions would be accurate. The predictions of 1945 as to the technical advancements by 1955 were not accurate, nor were these in 1955 for 1965.

The Chairman offered the opinion that predictions should improve as time goes on.

Mr. Carpenter observed that prediction is not difficult if one assumes continuity in technological developments. Where major discontinuities occur, however, there is no way of predicting these in advance. The real question then, is, can we now see a major discontinuity developing?

Recalling that nuclear developments were not foreseen in 1935, although the neutron had been discovered in 1932 and there was some knowledge of nuclear science, Mr. Piore raised the question of whether a discontinuity can be foreseen.

Mr. Falk pointed out that the way in which the next ten years are viewed is dependent upon the dangers which are seen in the present international situation. If it is believed that the international situation is very unstable and highly dangerous, then the next ten years may be viewed as one in which drastic revisions of the international system are needed. If, on the other hand, it is believed that the international situation is basically stable, then little effort will be made to try to alter the international system. The impact of science and technology on international affairs, he concluded, will therefore depend largely

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on what changes are made in the international system. This in turn depends
more upon how the international situation is viewed today than on how the
probable impact of science and technology over the next ten years is viewed.

Mr. Davison observed that changes in domestic systems in the concepts
and practices of democratic government in the United States and in other nations
may have to precede any changes in the international system.

In summary, Mr. Skolnikoff observed that whether or not accurate predictions
are possible, clear trends are identifiable: e.g., increased power to alter en-
vironment, diffusion of nuclear and other modern military technology, development
of "global" technology requiring international agreement, increasing technological
gap.

Turning to a different aspect of the problem, Mr. Jessup asked whether the
group should not begin by trying to define the national objectives of the United
States, rather than by trying to define what might be the developments in science
and technology.

Mr. Barzun agreed with Mr. Jessup's suggestion. He further remarked that
a distinction must be made between the effects of foreign policy and the foreign
policy itself. U.S. foreign policy has remained much the same for many years,
he observed, but the effects of this policy are very different today from what
they were in 1900. Are we, he asked, conscious of the effects of policy as
distinguished from the policy itself? Contending that there is great inertia
in the policy process, he pointed out that the basic foreign policy of France
is still very much the same as it was in the early 1900s and that Russia still
pursues a basically Czarist foreign policy, despite the changes in science and
technology within the past fifty years.

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The Chairman observed that perhaps what appear to be changes in foreign policy are in reality only changes in the "tools" by which policy is conducted. He further commented that the static nature of basic foreign policies may account for situations in which the policies are not attuned to the scientific and technological realities of our time. Science and technology, he observed, also may have made certain national objectives obsolete, such as economic control of one nation by another.

Mr. Cooper asked whether it could be determined to what part of the problem science and technology are pertinent -- so that the group could isolate the areas where scientific and technological changes are crucial to policy changes.

Mr. Carpenter commented that since science and technology have helped to create many problems -- for example, longevity and overpopulation -- science help and technology should be able to solve them. Changes in science and technology, he remarked, do not create new policies or new goals. Rather, science and technology should be viewed as tools of the policy maker, who directs their use to achieve his ends.

The Chairman asked whether there are certain "leverage" points in society on which science and technology exert key forces. He suggested that population growth, food production, and education may be such "leverage points." On the other hand, he continued, perhaps the key is not to be found in the "leverage point" approach, but rather in the "nucleation" approach, in which an impact of science and technology begins in a small area, but sets off a growth process which in turn affects national interest and foreign policies.

Mr. Kahn suggested that it would be best to focus on specific issues. By doing so, it might be possible to determine what impact science and technology

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has actually had and how science and technology can play a useful role. To illustrate his point, he referred to research on population problems in South America. The assumption was that children were desired by families in Colombia in order to assure additional agriculture workers and wage earners. The study showed that this assumption was false -- that large families were not desired (by the wives in particular) and that therefore birth control practices were readily accepted by the women. A careful study of the problem clarified the role technology can play. In order to approach the general question under discussion then, we must improve the formulation of specific issues. We must concentrate on trying to describe realistically the issues which we can identify as importantly affected by science and technology. We must ask ourselves Mr. Kahn continued, "Can we realistically describe the international system in 1980?" While Mr. Oppenheimer is correct in saying that most Americans want the United States to pursue an idealistic policy leading to World Federal Government, this desire is now very much in the back of people's minds. What confronts them is the reality that "only nations work." It is necessary to describe reality before the role of science and technology can be assessed within that reality.

Mr. Fox commented on Mr. Kahn's statement by noting that the listing of issues should not obscure the basic ethical questions involved in the relationship of science and foreign policy. He further commented that the fast rates of change caused by science and technology have an effect on how policy is made.

Picking up the last point, Mr. Kahn related how the lightning-fast repercussions of the use of modern weapons have caused the President to assume the role of field commander in crisis situations. He recounted that President Kennedy

was directing the actions of ensigns during the Cuban blockade and President Johnson was designating sites for bombing in North Viet-Nam. In both cases, the consequences of rapid action necessitated top-level attention to detailed matters.

Reflecting on the discussion thus far, Mr. Oppenheimer expressed the view that the group had diffused its subject and had been unable to focus on any definite points. He suggested that there should be some "robust themes" upon which the group might concentrate. One such theme might be that the concept of national powers checked only by national power is inadequate. A second is that there is a gap between the desire of most people in the United States (and of the Government) to pursue a policy of helping people in developing nations and the realities of the international situation. This gap makes it very difficult to actually carry out these desires. Can we not, he asked, come to grips with this problem, rather than discussing national interest and national goals as abstractions. Scientific knowledge has contributed to an ability to help developing countries, he remarked, but we are not using this knowledge effectively to understand how to resolve the conflict between humanitarian impulses and international tensions.

How can we understand, Mr. Oppenheimer continued, what developments in science and technology have inspired opportunities to bring about policy changes which move toward the goal of a "better world" and what developments have limited the opportunities to do so. In France, General de Gaulle sees science and technology as a tool to bolstering nationalism (i.e., France as a nuclear power). This is sharply different from the way in which we may conceive of science and technology as contributing to a world system of decreasing nationalism and increasing cooperation.

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Mr. Oppenheimer emphasized that it isn't important to distinguish between what can be accomplished by science and technology and what can be realistically accepted. It is all well to say, for example, that the Congo does not need to sell its uranium in order to bolster its economy, since it can substitute the sale of hydro-electric power as an income source if uranium production were outlawed. But, in reality, the Congo feels that its uranium deposits are bound up intimately with its national economy and image.

Mr. Kahn cautioned the group to consider whether advances in science and technology have effects on value systems. Shortened work weeks, made possible by automation, he noted, may cause the values in the United States to shift from a concentration on going up on the business or organizational ladder to a concentration on obtaining greater satisfaction from leisure time. This is happening, he said, in Europe, where the middle-class works mainly for "the next vacation."

Similarly, Mr. Kahn went on, while in 1905 the effects of the automobile on American cities and the economy (i.e., growth of suburbs) might have been predicted, the automobile's effect on American patterns of dating and social relationships, and thus on social values, could not have been predicted.

Mr. Barzun offered the view that prediction was not so much the problem as formulating realistic policy -- there were many predictions of the impact of the automobile on American life, but there is still no policy on how to deal with the problems associated with the automobile.

The central questions he continued, are (a) how can science and technology be used to develop new policies or change existing policies and (b) who determines the uses of science and technology.

Mr. Jastrow asked the group to focus on the question of who will control specific technological developments. Who will control weather modification programs? Who will determine the course of programs in genetic manipulation?

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In both these programs, the effects go far beyond the immediate environment. When one modifies the local weather, he automatically affects the weather of others. When one develops a scheme for genetic manipulation, he opens up untold possibilities for control over the lives of people all over the world. It would seem, he continued, that we should try to understand how the machinery for the control of important scientific and technological discoveries is developed. Referring to a suggestion made earlier by Mr. Palfrey, Mr. Jastrow proposed that the group focus on the development over the last 20 years of the machinery for the control of nuclear energy. This study might yield a good appreciation of the mesh of scientific and political considerations and decisions which make up the nuclear energy control system in the United States.

Responding to Mr. Jastrow's remarks, the Chairman stated that he felt that weather modification and genetic control are in such early stages of development that it is not possible to see how they will evolve and that any predictions would probably be quite unreliable. He suggested instead that the development in communications technology may be amenable to the kind of analysis Mr. Jastrow suggested.

Concentration on communications technology seemed to meet with general approval of the group. Mr. Barzun commented that this problem is a good one to deal with since it involves practical political questions. Col. Klette added that communications also has a strong impact on the military and on industry, and therefore this might be the best topic with which to start.

Mr. Falk joined in the general agreement on the advisability of focusing on communications technology, since it met his criterion of dealing only with subjects in which science and technology have a causal relationship to political developments.

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Mr. Fox proposed desalination as another subject with similar advantages to the subject of communications. The technology of desalination is fairly well developed, and its effects can be easily seen.

The Chairman commented that desalination also has the advantage that it is an example of how science and technology may be used to alleviate international tensions, as in the Middle-East which is troubled by the scarcity of fresh water sources.

Mr. Conant added that desalination is also a subject in which the effect of alternative courses of actions for U.S. foreign policy may be seen. What are the consequences of a decision by the United States to support with financial and technical aid a desalination project in a particular country? What are the consequences of not giving such support?

The Chairman then summarized the discussion on whether to focus on issues or on specific aspects of science and technology. The group, he said, wants to stick to issues and then see how the technology affects them rather than looking at the technology and how it will affect policies.

Both communications and desalination in his opinion are issues in which science and technology exercise leverage and in which the role of science and technology are amenable to specific delineation.

Mr. Kahn noted that the problem of desalination in most countries is tied to economic and social problems. He raised the question of how the role of science and technology may be delineated in the context of large social and economic problems. He asked, what is the role of science and technology in Colombia? The problem of poverty and unemployment are so great that the major question confronting the Government of Colombia is whether to bring the poor to the cities and thus create new urban difficulties or to attempt to "hide them in the countryside."

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Mr. Carpenter also wondered what is the role of science and technology
in Colombia, where large-scale American aid did not seem to bring results favorable
to American national goals. He said that perhaps the problem was that science
and technology were not properly integrated into the political phases of the
aid program.

Speaking to this point, Mr. Jessup asked whether science and technology
should be used to try to help people who themselves do not feel they need help
and training. In Appalachia, he said, there is a feeling among the people that
they do not wish government aid. Should not people be allowed to live as poorly
as they wish, he asked?

Mr. Fox proposed concentrating on the problem of nationalism, and how
science and technology have accentuated it and also made it logically obsolete.

The Chairman noted that it would be a mistake to think of science and
technology as independent of the political environment; rather science and
technology must go through the political system in order to be an effective
element in society.

Commenting that science and technology may indeed have changed the concept
of what constitutes the national interest, Mr. MacEachron and the Chairman each made
the following points in different ways: Science and technology have contributed
to an emotional feeling in favor of national sovereignty and freedom of action.
At the same time, however, science and technology have contributed to creating
a world in which nations are highly interdependent. The Chairman added that
science and technology have also increased the ability of nations to perform
helpful acts for other nations.

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After the dinner break, attention turned to obtaining a better definition of the objectives of the Discussion Group. Messrs. Barzum and Oppenheimer asked the Chairman to define the "yardstick" by which the relevancy of discussion can be measured.

The Chairman replied that the yardsticks were whether the topic was (a) related to foreign policy (b) related to technology (c) related to alternative choices for the United States in how to use science and technology to further the national interest of the United States.

Mr. Boardman referred to an earlier remark by Mr. Bissell that certain topics (such as the problem of nuclear proliferation) are so highly political that the discussion would become burdened with political overtones. How can one avoid politically-burdened topics if the proposed yardsticks are used, he asked?

Mr. Oppenheimer appealed to the group to center upon the question of the "mismatch" of policy with the felt needs of the American people (and other peoples) for a different kind of world system. How can science and technology contribute to the answer to such questions as "What are the recognized and desirable limits of the unrestricted power of nations?" -- "What do the lessons of the immediate past in developing policies for science and technology teach us about the way we should shape policy for the immediate future?" -- "Should governments have absolute control over science and technology or should there be a more open system?"

Mr. Palfrey said that the group should not try to answer questions, but rather to identify interactions by looking at problems in the immediate past. One such problem might be that of nuclear proliferation in the periods 1945-55 and 1955-65.

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Mr. Jessup pointed out that in 1945, U.S. foreign policy advocated the internationalization of the atom. This is even a more urgent problem today; therefore this question (as proposed by Mr. Palfrey) may be important to study in terms of the national interest today.

Mr. Piore raised the question of whether the whole discussion really revolves around the nuclear problem, with other problems being secondary.

The Chairman and others disagreed with Mr. Piore's observation. They expressed the view that other problems, such as communications and desalination, were of primary importance in the impact of science and technology on the national interest.

Mr. Kahn offered the view that it would be worthwhile to look at the international system as it was 20 or 30 years ago and then compare this with what we think the system might be in the year 2000. He remarked that there may be a certain amount of confidence about what will happen in the next 5 to 6 years, but there is pessimism about the long-range outlook. In effect, we have a breathing spell. He felt that it might be best to concentrate on the long-range outlook, using the past as a general guide, but not concentrating overly on immediate short-range issues. We should ask whether the present system is compatible with the way science and technology are going. He emphasized that, in any event, one's view of the future colors one's view of present policies and problems. Unless we think about the shape of the future international system, we will have no reference points for judging present policy decisions.

In an attempt to clarify the question of concentration on the past or the future, Mr. Barzun stated that he believed the purpose of the Discussion Group is to come up with "operative wisdom." He explained that he felt the group was called together to act as "politicians" rather than "novelists." It was his hope,

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he continued, that the group would be able to develop the kind of knowledge
for the use of science and technology for political and policy purposes which
Machiavelli, Hobbes or Rousseau had developed for use of other techniques and
sources of power. He emphasized that it was not enough simply to discuss issues
in general terms. The goal should be to "squeeze" practical guidelines from a
discussion and study of the issues. With the use of such guidelines, one would
be able to say, "If such and such a situation in international affairs occurs,
science and technology should be used in the following manner. . . ."

Referring to Mr. Kahn's proposal to pay major attention to prediction of
future international systems, Mr. Barzun stated that one needs to look ahead in
order to "get scared," but must look at the past and the present to know what to
do to shape the future.

Mr. Skolnikoff pointed out that the intention was to look ahead, to see
trends, and _then_ see how these should be reflected in policies today, rather
than starting with current policies.

Mr. Falk cautioned the group to differentiate between strategies for ob-
taining objectives and the objectives themselves. Science and technology may
be used as strategic tools, or may themselves be objectives. In studying an
issue, an attempt should be made, then, to make this differentiation and then
to study each element as distinct from the other. This may be done, he suggested,
by assuming that one element is a constant and the other a variable. The
political objectives, for example, may be viewed as a constant and science and
technology as a variable used to attain the objective. Only by adopting this
kind of methodology could the problems be held to manageable dimensions.

Mr. Oppenheimer said that he felt strongly that there is an overwhelming desire among the people and in the government of the United States to legitimatize and internationalize all foreign policy actions (witness the events in the Dominican Republic and Viet-Nam), that this attests to a national conscience, and that in further discussions the group should analyze how science and technology may be employed to reconcile foreign policy actions to the national conscience. We must ask what are the unrecognized but desirable limitations on the exercise of military power. He said that an analysis of the past issues with particular reference to the "clinches" or key decisions (in which some of the participants in the group were themselves intimately involved) would be very helpful for achieving this purpose. For example, he and Mr. Conant could re-collect issues, asking the basic questions: how limit, how moderate, how legitimize national power.

Mr. Falk said that we should be questioning basically the viability of the nation/state system in a technological age. The focus should be on subjects that will highlight the issues pertaining to that subject.

At this point, the allotted time for the discussion was nearly up. The Chairman said that he considered it the consensus of the group that there be a concentration on a recent issue involving the impact of science and technology on the national interest and foreign policy, but that the prospects for future developments should not be ignored. He indicated that he and Mr. Skolnikoff would confer during the interval before the next session (January 11) to prepare a specific topic for discussion.

The Chairman concluded the session by thanking the participants and inviting them to the next meeting on January 11, 1966.

Respectfully submitted

Arthur Levine
Rapporteur

Background Paper Number 2
For Meeting of
January 11, 1966

CONFIDENTIAL: Not for Publication

Not to be Quoted or Cited

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BACKGROUND NOTES FOR MEETING

by Eugene B. Skolnikoff

The next meeting of the discussion group will attempt to come to grips with one of the subjects discussed at the November session and in the introductory paper: the control of new technology. The purpose will be to explore the new imperatives for national and foreign policy created by the emergence of technologies with unprecedented global implications. In particular, the concern will be with the possibility of suppressing or preventing the diffusion of the technology, and with new forms of international organization and international decision making that may be required. As before, our underlying question is whether present concepts of international organization, decentralized decision making, nationally oriented research and development, et al., are adequate in relation to the character and implications of emerging technologies.

To help to focus the discussion, we will use atomic energy as a case example, hoping then to ask similar questions of the younger field of space. Our intention is to re-examine some of the critical choices faced by the U.S. government since 1939 and, with the benefit of present perspective and present concern with proliferation, to ask if the right issues were surfaced or given adequate weight at the time. In a sense, we will be asking if we would make the same choices if we had it to do over.

Dean Brooks will be the discussion leader, assisted by Dr. Oppenheimer, Commissioner Palfrey, and Dr. Conant (if he is able to attend). For the space

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discussion, Dr. Jastrow (and hopefully Dr. Glennan) will assist. As background, I have prepared a selected chronological history of what appear to be critical branch points in the development of atomic energy policy. Where possible, a few of the principle issues of concern at the time are noted, though the list does not pretend to be complete. In particular, it is hard to know what policy alternatives may have been proposed inside or outside government that were discarded without formal record. More emphasis has been given to the early period than recent history, in the expectation that our discussion will turn primarily on decisions made as the technology first emerged.

# Selected Chronology in Atomic Energy Development

## In the Beginning

**Late 1938:** Fission experiments by Hahn and Strassman, and interpretation by Meitner and Frisch.

**Early 1939:** An effort, instigated by Leo Szilard, to induce Western scientists to impose a voluntary censorship on the research stimulated by the fission experiments. The motive was primarily to keep German scientists from knowledge of progress because of the possibility of an atomic explosive. Generally accepted in the United States and the United Kingdom, the censorship foundered on the unwillingness of Joliot-Curie in France to go along.

Heisenberg apparently later said: "In the summer of 1939, twelve people might still have been able, by coming to mutual agreement, to prevent the construction of atom bombs."

**March-October 1939:** Efforts by the scientists to interest the military and then the president in the possibilities of a bomb. The approach to Roosevelt was successful. Fear of progress toward a bomb under Hitler was the motivating force. Approaches in Britain were more enthusiastically received.

**Early 1941:** U.S. work directed more at using fission for power and radiological warfare than at the possibility of a bomb. At this time, the British M.A.U.D. group was more optimistic with regard to a bomb.

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**October 1941:** Disputed Heisenberg talk with Bohr in Copenhagen, in which Heisenberg presumably attempted to convey information that German physicists intended to frustrate rather than aid development of a bomb. Whatever the intention, the effect on Bohr apparently was to convince him that Germany was making progress on a bomb.

**October 9, 1941:** Vannevar Bush briefing to F.D.R. on U.S. program, now moving better, included mention of "problem of postwar control."

**September 1942:** Possibility of fusion bomb raised officially. Research on thermonuclear reaction laid out.

Primary motivation throughout: beating Germans to the bomb.

## U.S./U.K. Cooperation

**Late 1942, Early 1943:** U.S./U.K. disagreements as to extent of cooperation. British unhappy about blockage of information from the United States, and anxious to consider questions of control during and after war. British proposed a common patent policy and a joint U.S./U.K. nuclear energy commission to which other countries could be added later.

Bush believed international control should not be discussed in context of wartime problems. Also a general feeling that the British were after a postwar disadvantage. U.K./U.S.S.R. agreement to exchange new weapons information convinced Americans not to tell British too much.

**August 1943:** Quebec agreement calling for free interchange of scientific information, neither country to employ weapon against other, no proliferation without consent of other, no use of weapon without common consent, and the president to have final say on commercial and industrial uses.

General Groves still attempted to dampen U.S./U.K. cooperation.

## Postwar Planning 1944-1945

To a surprising degree, there appeared to be acceptance in policy circles of the idea that atomic weapons created a revolutionary situation in international relations which would require unprecedented solutions. The debates often focused on the extremes of complete secrecy vs. complete openness, and, with some

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notable exceptions, the idea was widely accepted that other countries could duplicate atomic developments quite quickly even without help from the United States.

The attitude of the Soviet Union and how to influence its evolution from a closed society was a recurrent theme. Also, questions of how to control atomic energy without stifling science or preventing peaceful applications constantly cropped up. Actual mechanisms for control, and their political ramifications, appeared to be little studied or understood in this period.

1944: Concern over postwar depletion of U.S. ore supplies led the United States to sign agreement with Belgium for "first refusal" on all Congo ore.

November 1944: Jeffries Committee (of Metallurgical Project) wrote report on "prospectus on nucleonics": argues that worldwide organization was necessary to prevent the atom from being the "destroyer of nations." Also argued that the United States must stay in the forefront of research.

Parallel Tolman Committee concluded that the need to maintain military superiority controlled planning for atomic energy.

1944 (Bohr incident): Bohr believed that one could not have effective control of atomic energy which would permit useful application, and a free science and a free spirit of enquiry, without a very open world. In principle, everything that might be a threat to the security of the world would have to be open to the world. He understood it would not be in character for the Soviet Union to make an open world. Thus, he felt it was essential to attempt to engage that government by very early friendly consultation in which we were prepared to offer full cooperation in scientific progress and industrial exploitation in an open world in which there were adequate safeguards. He hoped the situation and our approach might alter the whole character of Soviet policy and thus set a new model of international relations.

Justice Frankfurter talked to F.D.R. of Bohr's ideas, but left F.D.R. worried about a security leak. When F.D.R. and Churchill met at Hyde Part in September 1944, they rejected what they thought Bohr was suggesting, namely that the world be told of the development. They did not consider the actual message, that F.D.R. approach Stalin about the problems of the future, about the need for a common responsibility and about the need for an open world.

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Late 1944,

Early 1945:

More intensive discussions with regard to postwar options.

Bush and Conant pressed for an international association with unimpeded access to laboratories, industry and military.

(January 3) Secretary of State Stettinius told of bomb project for first time.

(March 15) Stimson and F.D.R. lunch discussed alternatives of complete secrecy or international control based on free exchange of information and free access to laboratories.

Bush recommended a scientific section in the proposed UN that would establish full interchange of information, recommend ways of policing scientific activities, then gradually extend interchange of information to actual military applications.

(April 25) Stimson and Groves developed imperatives of A-bomb to Truman: (a) proliferation possibilities even beyond U.S.S.R.; thus, the future of civilization at stake; (b) effective safeguards meant unprecedented inspection and controls.

(May 2) Interim Committee appointed by Stimson to discuss problems of international control (Stimson chaired, Bush, Conant, K.T. Compton, Under Secretary of the Navy Bard, Assistant Secretary of State Clayton, James Byrnes). Scientific Panel: Arthur Compton, Lawrence, Oppenheimer, Fermi.

## U.S./French Problem

1944: Auger, Gueron, and others wanted to return to France. Grave concern that through Joliot-Curie, secret information would be transmitted to Russia. Also concern that France would have to be treated as a third partner, and that patent problems would be raised. Stimson opposed telling French anything.

## Use of the Weapon

1945: Issue was seen, by Stimson and most others, as how to end the war quickly, not whether the weapon should be used at all.

Szilard believed there had to be a demonstration of the bomb if there was to be sufficient public understanding of its power.

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[L]

Consideration of harmless demonstrations instead of
use against people foundered on fear of misfire, possibility
Japanese would put U.S. POWs in target zone, reduced impact,
etc.

Decision made to concentrate on military-production
area in Japan.

Franck Committee believed use of bomb without warning
or demonstration would make international control less likely.
United States would lose support of other countries, and
atomic competition would be set off.

## Approach to the Russians, 1945

One of the major questions in postwar planning was how to allay Soviet mistrust and win her cooperation.

General agreement on telling Russians *before* using bomb; but how much to say? Stimson, especially after Potsdam, concerned about whether inspection could be effective when it depended on cooperation of a totalitarian power.

Byrnes objected to telling Russians too much. The United States, he said, should stay ahead, but work to improve U.S./U.S.S.R. political relations.

Interim committee recommended against telling Russians much until after
first bomb used. Re: international control, each country should promise to make
all work public under an international control committee with power to inspect.

Truman informed Stalin at Potsdam, but in extremely low key.

Byrnes took a hard line in Russian negotiations and tended to want to
use the A-bomb and potential H-bomb as bargaining chips.

## Postwar

The major questions were:

1. Does the Russian closed society make any attempt at cooperation doomed to failure or worse?

2. How can the Russians be led to alter their traits of secrecy and distrust?

[L]

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3. How strong will the UN be?

4. How would inspection and sanctions actually work? Can U.S. security be protected in the transition to international control?

5. Should information be released, or held tightly? Should it be released on a *quid pro quo* basis? How to distinguish between that which is easily known, and that which will contribute to weapons development. Will U.S. openness contribute to establishing trust, or to losing atomic lead?

6. Does a gradual approach or a "bold" approach to questions of international control hold more promise of acceptance and safety?

7. What should be U.S. domestic policy re: research and weapons stockpiling?

8. What is the significance of the veto by a great power in atomic energy matters?

9. (Was the "real" world adequately appraised? How could the Russians accept an international AEC which was effectively under American domination?)

November 1945: Truman, Attlee, King Declaration

1. exchange basic scientific information with any nation that would reciprocate fully

2. no release of industrial information until enforceable safeguards

3. UN should establish commission to:

a. extend exchange of basic information

b. control AEC to ensure use for peaceful purposes

c. eliminate atomic and other mass destructive weapons from national armaments

d. set up safeguards to protect against violations and evasions

Work to proceed by stages to develop confidence.

Approach to U.S.S.R.

December 27, 1945: Foreign Ministers Meeting in Moscow brought Russian co-sponsorship of UN resolution, and agreement that each stage must be successfully completed before starting next.

U.S. senators concerned about any exchange of information without ironclad guarantees.

**January 24, 1946:** UN set up the UN AEC.

**Early 1946:** Problem of how to square U.S./U.K. collaboration with requirements for multilateral action. The United States refused engineering aid to United Kingdom on grounds it was inconsistent with multilateral approach.

**January 14, 1946:** Secretary of State's committee to study controls and safeguards established (Bush, Conant, Groves, McCloy, Acheson). Board of consultants: Lilienthal, Oppenheimer, Thomas, Winne, Barnard, Carroll Wilson, secretary.

**March:** Consultants proposed international development authority, not just a control commission.

**Functions:**
* a. control of raw materials
* b. operation of primary-production facilities
* c. research
* d. regulatory responsibility

**May 17:** Baruch, U.S. representative to UN AEC, bought most of the plan, but insisted on adding question of sanctions for violators.

**June 14:** Baruch presented to UN, emphasizing, more than expected, question of violations and penalties. Also emphasized need for removing big-power veto on violation matters.

**July:** Bikini tests held two weeks after presentation of U.S. plan to UN.

**July:** Gromyko presented Russian plan: outlawing production and use, no enforcement, based on cooperation.

Accused the United States of wanting to maintain secret information and monopoly while other countries had to voluntarily accept second-class status. Balked at removing veto.

**September:** Scientific panel at UN met on "facts" of control, while other committees could make no progress. Russian signed scientific-panel report.

**September 18:** Henry Wallace letter (of July 23) to Truman published in which he said the United States was asking others to renounce development of atomic energy while we kept our weapons. Objected to Byrnes' "get tough" policy and said the U.S.S.R. did not trust the United States.

- 10 -

Eisenhower's motive apparently was to make a dramatic new start in the dialogue over control of atomic energy. In particular, he wanted to balance a report to the American people on the horrors of weapons, with a prospect for controlled peaceful applications. Seizing the diplomatic initiative in the face of the Soviet H-bomb probably also loomed large.

1954: Atomic Energy Act revised to enable exchanges of information on peaceful uses, and on military applications (aside from weapons information itself).

The United States proceeded with bilateral atoms-for-peace program providing research reactors under bilateral safeguards. Obvious conflict with objectives of new international organization, which was slow to materialize.

1955: Atoms-for-peace conference led to release of much classified information, and a continued reduction in barriers to exchange of basic scientific information in atomic fields.

1955: More serious disarmament negotiations begun, with atomic stockpiles now linked to broader disarmament questions.

1955: French nuclear program moved in direction of independent weapons. U.S. refusal to help.

1955: Euratom proposed.

1957: Test-ban talks opened, motivated by:

a. first-step toward disarmament

b. worldwide reaction to fallout

c. prevent further proliferation

d. further atomic weapons development would be destabilizing (or favorable to U.S.S.R.)

3. détente desirable

Russians had been pressing for test-ban talks since 1955, but the United States resisted on grounds that it was not bona-fide disarmament and should be part of package.

1958: Moratorium on testing (after the United States and the U.S.S.R. had each carried out "one-more series").

1958: Modification of Atomic Energy Act to allow full cooperation with United Kingdom. France assumed modification would apply to her when she had her own capability. Thus, an incentive to France.

February 13, 1960: First French atomic explosion.

For Meeting of
February 8, 1966

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Discussion Group on
Science and the National Interests

SOME QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

Eugene B. Skolnikoff

As noted in the background memo for the meeting, our discussion of the history of atomic energy is intended to focus on some of the key decisions or branch points in U.S. policy that appear to have been crucial in determining the impact of the new technology on international affairs. Our concern is to examine the forces at work, or the assumptions made at the time, that appear by hindsight to have been important to the policy choices made. In the light of the results, "should" these have been the determinants of policy or can we identify alternatives that may not have been perceived or may not have appeared either possible or practical at the time? Ultimately, we want to ask if there are parallels today that should alter our current views about other actual or prospective technologies.

As an aid in focusing and delimiting the discussion, there follows a series of questions about the history of atomic energy that the group may want to use as starting points.

1. Was there ever a possibility of drastically curtailing research in nuclear physics? (Heisenberg said after the war that in 1939 twelve men, if they got together, could have prevented the development of an atomic bomb.) To pose a hypothetical example with greater contemporary relevance: suppose there were a not entirely implausible prospect that research in high energy physics might lead to the development of a matter-anti-matter reaction which could be harnessed as an energy source with an order of magnitude greater

- 2 -

yield than thermonuclear fusion, should or could research which might
lead in this direction be curtailed, limited, or controlled either by
international agreement or voluntary action? Remember too, that research in
high-energy physics now *requires* massive government support in a way that was
not true for the early nuclear experiments.

2. In retrospect, was the postwar U.S. approach to the control of nuclear emergency realistic? Many questions are raised here, but a few stand out:

a. would the U.S. government and people in fact have accepted the degree of inspection and control called for by the AE authority, including being outvoted in the authority itself, destroying weapons stocks in the face of large Russian ground forces, etc.?

b. could we expect the Soviet Union to accept implied second-class status because the United States would have been the only nation able to develop atomic weapons?

c. did continuation of U.S. weapons development and testing while proposing the Baruch plan significantly influence the failure of the negotiations? What would have been the cost to the U.S. military posture, had we suspended development and testing during the early phases of the negotiations?

d. as grandiose and far-reaching as the Baruch plan was, could the Russians accept an authority dominated in effect by Western nations?

e. were the assumptions about Russian obsession with secrecy accurate?

f. in sum, was an international authority the right approach to start with, or were there other more likely possibilities such as a series of carefully planned and timed unilateral actions on the part of the United States, or bilateral treaties?

3. During and after the war there was an extreme emphasis on secrecy. How much did this color postwar attitudes to international control, to the United Kingdom, to France? For example, did the assumption that secrecy could preserve or prolong the U.S. monopoly lead to a more inflexible and over-detailed approach to international control than was realistic? Did the U.S. posture encourage England and France to accelerate the development of their own independent capabilities? What, if any, were the military benefits to the United States arising from extreme secrecy?

- 3 -

4. If the war had not come when it did, what would have been the history of nuclear energy?

5. Could power applications of atomic energy have been stopped or delayed? Would this have been a wiser course? How does the atoms-for-peace program look in this context?

6. Was there at any stage a realistic possibility of reaching an international agreement **not** to develop the H-bomb? are

7. What/the principal arguments against proliferation? Should our policy be realistically only to delay it or to prevent it? Will the political effects of proliferation be greater or less the longer it can be delayed?

8. What kinds of leverage does the United States actually have to prevent proliferation by its own unilateral actions? Were there further actions we could or should have taken to impede the French program? How effective are American or IAEA safeguards against diversion of fissionable material?

9. Are new technological developments foreseeable that will make proliferation easier?

10. Is there any likelihood of success in attempts to restrict export of non-nuclear equipment such as advanced computers that are useful for nuclear armaments or other military purposes? Or is the political provocation of such attempts likely to more than compensate for their effectiveness?

11. What other technologies are in the offing which ought to be controlled or limited because of their possible deleterious effects? Can we foresee all the results and implications of such technologies well enough at an early stage to permit practical regulation or control? Possible candidates for discussion: cloud seeding, climate modification, overharvesting of the oceans, gigantic earthworks, changing the chemical composition of the upper atmosphere, pesticides in international waters or across national boundaries, genetic manipulation in plants, animals, or man, limitation of populations, gross as opposed to local atmospheric pollution.

[L]

The second meeting of the Discussion Group on Science and the National
Interest was held at the Harold Pratt House on February 8, 1966, at 5:00 p.m.
Present were: Harvey Brooks, Chairman and Discussion Leader; Robert Jastrow,
Discussion Leader; J. Robert Oppenheimer, Discussion Leader; Eugene B. Skol-
nikoff, Secretary; Arthur Levine, Rapporteur; R. Gordon Arneson, Richard M.
Bissell, Jr, Harry Boardman, Detlev W. Bronk, W. Samuel Carpenter III, Franklin S.
Cooper, W. Phillips (Davison), Peter F. Drucker, William T. Fox, George S.
Franklin, Jr., John K. Jessup, Herman Kahn, George B. Kistiakowsky, Col. Immanuel
Klette, Franklin A. Lindsay, David W. MacEachron, Hans J. Morgenthau, Gerard
Piel, Roger Revelle, Joseph E. Slater, Oliver Townsend, Robert LeRoy West.

The Chairman opened the meeting at approximately 5:00 p.m. The topic for
tonight, he began, concerns the control of new technology. Should new technological
developments which threaten international stability be stopped or slowed? If so,
how can this objective be achieved? If it is agreed that stopping or slowing
the development of the atomic bomb or the hydrogen bomb would have been desirable,
were there any turning points at which this could have been done? In the history
of atomic energy, do we now see any major errors that stemmed from the accepted
views of international political relationships? The Chairman asked Mr. Oppenheimer
to start off the discussion on these questions.

Mr. Oppenheimer said that prior to the start of World War II, there had
been no chances of stopping or slowing developments in nuclear energy. Toward the
end of the war, at the time the A-bomb was developed, and in the immediate post-
war period, a number of scientists tried very hard to keep things open -- that
is they tried to keep the flow of basic scientific information unhampered among
scientists of different nations. Further, they favored a policy of keeping allied
nations informed of U.S. actions in the nuclear field so as to minimize the possi-
bility of mutual distrust and competition. This was not the policy adopted for the
United States atomic weapons programs.

- 2 -

On the other hand, Mr. Oppenheimer continued, it is not really possible
to stifle science in a humane and liberal society, for this would render the
society inhumane and illiberal. Totalitarian or dictatorial states may do so, as
the Spanish did during the Inquisition, but this can lead only to harm for society
as a whole. At any rate, it is very difficult to keep basic scientific discoveries
secret. For example, during the work on the A-Bomb at Los Alamos, the S-1 Committee
headed by Lyman Briggs tried to keep British scientists at Los Alamos from learning
the technical details of how the bomb works. The British scientists, however, "out-
flanked" the Committee and simply figured the details out themselves. Therefore, it
would seem that the real problem is not in trying to stifle research on new tech-
nology (which probably cannot be done, anyway), but rather in keeping the channels
of communication open so that mutual distrust and suspicion do not arise. If
this is done, one does not have to feel so uncomfortable about the future.

The Chairman asked whether it is feasible to interfere with research and
development, even if this were desirable. Does the process of R & D really lend
itself to interference?

Mr. Oppenheimer replied that any interference is a highly political act.
In actuality, there are two levels of interference -- what you say you will do,
and what you actually do -- both of these actions are highly political.

Mr. Revelle offered the view that basic research and its applications are
nearly inseparable. It is highly impractical to try to put a wall between them.

In the field of nuclear physics, it is possible to separate basic research
and application, Mr. Oppenheimer observed, but this is not very practical. Could
you have kept Fermi from seeing the reactor he conceived go critical?

Mr. Kahn noted that since the process of fission cannot really be kept
secret, and therefore all nations potentially can have atomic weapons, is it not

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- 3 -

better in a chaotic world for the more stable nations to have atomic bombs?

Mr. Oppenheimer considered the question of why the nuclear arms race began, not only between the United States and the U.S.S.R., but also among the Allies of World War II. He offered the view that the world was basically unprepared to deal with the postwar realities. At the end of the war, there was an illusion of false hopefulness among both statesmen and scientists. They believed that a new era had dawned and that a way would be found to control the development of atomic weapons because there was mutual good feeling among the victorious nations. Churchill should not have been expected to be prepared for this problem, Mr. Oppenheimer said, because he did not understand the meaning of atomic weapons until later, but F.D.R. might have been expected to be better prepared. Perhaps the state of his health and his weariness made him less alert to the problems than he would have been normally.

Mr. Carpenter observed that in 1939 there was no possibility of stopping the development of new weapons. It would not have been possible to go to the Germans and say "let us stop weapon development." In the future, however, such agreements might be feasible politically, as indeed they might have been immediately after World War II if things had been approached differently. Mr. Carpenter agreed with Mr. Oppenheimer, however, in opposing any stifling of research programs. The answer, he continued, is to prevent the deleterious effects of research, not try to stop research itself.

The Chairman asked whether the group could foresee any crisis points coming up in the future for which such agreements should be obtained.

Mr. Oppenheimer replied that in the relationship of the United States with Communist China there is the potentiality of a "crisis point" coming up. A

[L.C.]

- 4 -

similar "crisis point" was reached some time ago in the relations of the United States and U.S.S.R. but the only attempt to approach the problem came from the "Pugwash" movement. In the situation which is emerging with Communist China, there should be a more comprehensive attempt to solve the problems of control and limitation of weapons development.

Mr. Carpenter commented that immediately following the economic depression which began in 1929, there was a chance to limit arms technology because nations did not have the fiscal capacity to support arms programs. But no one seemed interested in such a movement at that time.

Mr. Davison inquired whether an agreement between the United States, its allies and the U.S.S.R. to arrest the development of atomic bombs would have slowed or changed the atomic bomb development of the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Oppenheimer felt that this might have been the effect of such an agreement. He remarked, however, that the Chinese atomic bomb does not appear to be a copy of the U.S. bomb, thus indicating that the Chinese had their own independent nuclear R & D program and were capable of producing the bomb themselves even if other nations voluntarily ceased such development.

Mr. Kahn observed that the proliferation problem may be attacked indirectly. The way to have discouraged proliferation of atomic development programs among smaller nations was to have "priced nuclear power out of the market" by reducing the price of conventional power sources. This would have removed the incentive for countries such as India and Israel to develop nuclear power sources.

Mr. Piel wondered whether such discouragement is useful in the long run, since in, say, twenty years all nations would have nuclear power programs anyway.

The Chairman said that the emphasis of the U.S. atomic energy program on "atoms for peace" at home and the U.S. promotion of power applications of atomic

[L.C.]

energy in other nations may have forced the pace ahead by about five years. This
may have been unduly expensive, both in money and in proliferation problems.

Mr. Oppenheimer observed that the power applications efforts accelerated
the development of the nuclear submarine. Fossil fuels were developed more rapidly
also due to these efforts, Mr. Revelle added.

The Chairman, having briefly summarized some of the history of the nuclear
weapons race, then asked where did we go wrong. Why was there no definitive
move toward limiting the nuclear arms race? Was obsession with secrecy the reason?
Did the strong advocacy by the United States of the Baruch plan preclude a
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement to control atomic arms development?

Mr. Oppenheimer commented that there was a very difficult practical problem
in dealing with the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar years. There might have
been a chance to obtain a "quiet" agreement with Russia (as Niels Bohr had ad-
vocated). Such "quiet" discussions would have been best started during the war when
Russia was still in trouble militarily, and therefore more receptive to agreement.
But even after the war, discussions should have been sought. Many people at the
time hoped that General Marshall in 1947 would stop in Moscow (on his return from
negotiations in China) for discussions with the Soviet government on nuclear
development limitations. The spotlight approach of the Baruch plan, however,
precluded this possibility. Such a "quiet" agreement accompanied by further ex-
ploratory discussions between the United States and the U.S.S.R. might have led
to a satisfactory approach to an international solution to the problem of atomic
energy control. On the other hand, Mr. Oppenheimer continued, the big issues of
policy and goals which divided East and West could not be settled by such agree-
ments, and it is very doubtful whether the Russians would have believed the
statement that the United States would not stockpile atomic bombs.

- 6 -

Mr. Lindsay said that nothing would have made a difference as far as U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations were concerned. The U.S.S.R. was not interested in any agreement.

In the same vein, Mr. Kahn observed that an "open world" could not be attained under any circumstances while Stalin led the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Oppenheimer stated that he believed it had been "unpardonable" for the United States to have terminated its relations with Britain in 1946 insofar as cooperation in atomic weapons development was concerned and then not to tell Congress about this termination (not to make it public) until 1949. This set of circumstances hurt U.S.-U.S.S.R. chances for reaching an accord on limiting atomic weapon development, Mr. Oppenheimer continued, because it showed that the United States lacked trust even in its allies. If the United States had kept up its association with Britain in nuclear weapons research and had extended this association to France as well, there might have been a chance to approach the Russians successfully.

Mr. Drucker then posed what he called the "real question." Is the mistake the United States made in its relations with Britain, France and Russia -- in part intellectual arrogance -- likely to be repeated again with reference to new technological developments?

Reflecting on this question, Mr. Oppenheimer recounted that the "mistake" may have occurred partly because many people in high positions in the United States did not believe Russia could develop an A-bomb quickly. In 1949, President Truman could not believe, he recalled, that the Russians had successfully exploded a "real" nuclear weapon.

Mr. Kahn added that in the past the United States has made two types of miscalculations. First, it assumed that certain nations could not develop technological

[Lc]

- 7 -

quickly. (In short, it gave the U.S.S.R. or China too little credit.) Second, it assumed that certain nations could develop technologically much faster than they could, in reality. (In short, it gave the U.S.S.R. or China too much credit.) For example, he continued, while the U.S.S.R. did develop a thermonuclear weapon in 1953, it was not until 1957 that the U.S.S.R. had attained the type of H-bomb which the United States succeeded in testing in 1952. Nevertheless, in 1952, the U.S.S.R. was credited unduly with having caught up fully to the United States. For these reasons, it may be a mistake to use "countermeasure escalation" as the method by which the United States reacts to the supposed strength of other nations, for the estimate of their strength is likely to be based on arrogance of the extent of the U.S. lead, or exaggeration of the accomplishments of other nations.

Mr. Arneson commented that the reasons why no definitive move toward U.S.-U.S.S.R. discussions was made are extremely hard to discover. One of them, however, may be that Secretary of War Stimson, although strongly desiring atomic weapons limitations (Stimson was a "dove" in today's terminology said Mr. Arneson), felt that the U.S.S.R. had a "military posture" which deterred him from pushing for bilateral discussions. Stimson was not sure that "trust begets trust" when it came to dealing with the U.S.S.R.

Trust is a matter of degree, the Chairman observed. How much information did the United States actually have to give the Russians (about the U.S. A-bomb development) during the war or immediately after it? How much information, that is, so that the Russians could be sure that the United States would abide by an agreement?

In response, Mr. Oppenheimer observed that it would not have been necessary to give out detailed information. Only information of a general technical nature

- 8 -

was needed to give the U.S.S.R. an idea of U.S. capabilities and progress. It would not have been necessary to give away "secrets" of detailed design and development techniques.

The problem did not involve revealing "secret" information, several members of the discussion group agreed. Rather, the difficulty was that there was a complete lack of mutual trust. Mr. Carpenter pointed out that the prevalent attitude in the United States during the 1945-50 period was that (a) the Russians were not to be trusted, (b) it is wisest therefore not to talk with them at all, (c) if no discussions are conducted, they will not be able to develop their own bomb.

Mr. Bronk recalled the belief that any talks with the Russians would result in giving them a large military advantage. Mr. Arneson added that there was no intention of letting the Russians in on secrets; but rather consideration was given to informing them during the war of the U.S. program. Lack of trust ruled out this course.

The policy of informing the Russians would have recognized them as political equals, Mr. Oppenheimer said. This could have been dangerous, yes. But the past several years have shown that it is dangerous also not to do so.

If the question of secrecy was not really involved, why was there so much reluctance to talk with the Russians, the Chairman asked. Did the feeling of mistrust account for this reluctance in full, especially since there was no intention of trusting the Russians with secrets?

In reply, Mr. Arneson observed that there were two related factors. First, the Russians were "strange creatures." (Mr. Oppenheimer compared the U.S. attitude to the Russians in 1945-50 as similar to the U.S. attitude toward Communist China today). Second, there was a kind of "euphoria" in the world immediately after the end of World War II, a trust in the UN as the only way, and a feeling that any bilateral, quiet talks would undermine the new openness of the reformed world system.

[Lc]

Mr. Kahn added that at the time it would have been "unthinkable" to make
a deal with the Russians.

Mr. Skolnikoff asked whether the United States believed that the open way --
the Baruch plan--could have forced the Russians to negotiate an atomic weapons limita-
tion pact. Mr. Cooper observed that the idealism of the Baruch plan backfired, the
Baruch plan did not take into account the realities of the world political situation.
At the same time, however, the advocacy of the plan prevented the United States
from undertaking separate bilateral discussions with the U.S.S.R. The period im-
mediately after introduction of the Baruch plan, Mr. Carpenter continued, was the
crossroads point in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship. After this point, there was
no chance to get agreement.

Mr. Oppenheimer summarized his views by saying that the United States
published a negotiation manual -- the Baruch plan -- but it did not negotiate, in
part because the negotiation manual prevented negotiations rather than facilitating
them. At the same time, the United States did not understand that it was _the_ great
power of the world and that it alone was a nuclear power. Therefore, negotiations
had to be carried on from a different set of premises than is usual -- the U.S.S.R.
did not feel equal and hence extra effort was needed to make it drop its suspi-
cions. The Baruch plan did not accomplish this, nor did the United States allay
the U.S.S.R. suspicions by either informing them of U.S. action or carrying on
discussions.

Mr. Drucker observed that probably no matter what the United States did,
the Russians would not have acted differently. The power balance had shifted so
drastically that they had no choice. The Chairman and Mr. Oppenheimer agreed that
probably the U.S.-Russian nuclear arms race could not have been prevented, regard-
less of what the United States had done. Nevertheless, had the United States

[Lc]

- 11 -

Mr. Kistiakowsky observed that in molecular biology, basic research is going well and there is no need for a large-scale international program. But in ten to twenty years, he added, the present basic research program may lead to extraordinary consequences and to large-scale technological development efforts. At that time, this field will be in serious danger of going astray -- of turning into the type of problem which characterized nuclear technology development in the years immediately after World War II. Serious consideration should be given to the idea of international cooperation now to help control the situation later.

Mr. Revelle observed that weather modification is another area with the same potential problems as molecular biology. Mr. Cooper added population control as another candidate.

Mr. Oppenheimer observed that the problem is in part that we were unready to deal with atomic energy -- thus it is hard to determine what were the mistakes. Therefore, it is hard to equate the nuclear problem with other areas of technology.

The Chairman wondered whether some type of international machinery can be set up to accomplish the purpose of getting ready, of having the UN capture a science before it raises problems.

Mr. Bronk said that it is imperative to "get ready" in the field of molecular biology.

Mr. Slater suggested that a way be found to "marry" international organization and science. Could the oceans be developed by the UN with the profits derived from the products and uses of ocean technology being used to finance the UN?

Mr. Oppenheimer offered the view that the problem is not so much to internationalize the approach to these fields as it is to "politicize" the approach -- that is to get the leading statesmen involved.

- 12 -

The Chairman and Mr. Skolnikoff agreed that unless political reality was mingled with scientific solutions, the solutions would not be meaningful, and Mr. Skolnikoff added that specifically the foreign ministries must be interested.

Mr. Bissell raised the question as to whether it is possible to "politicize" international science agreements in conjunction with Communist countries.

Mr. Kistiakowsky felt that the term "politicize" is not quite accurate. Rather the goal is to institutionalize -- to develop an authority or consortium. He expressed concern that an attempt to "politicize" an international effort to limit technological development would result in throwing it into the international power struggle.

There followed a general discussion of the question of how to institutionalize such an international effort without involving it in international political battles. Mr. Kahn pointed out that since foreign ministries are by nature extremely cautious, they will reject any plan for international limitation of technology which has not been thought out very carefully and very fully. Foreign ministries will not accept as long-range solutions an idea which a group of people have thought about for "only twenty minutes." Full time, careful, long-range thinking over a long period is needed. The group meeting tonight, he said, should be meeting continuously for several months, not for two hours once a month.

Reflecting on these remarks, Mr. Oppenheimer pointed out that by the term "politicizing" he did not mean to throw the efforts at limiting technology into world politics. Rather, his intention was to convey a sense of putting the limitation effort into the "norm of a nation's good society" -- that is "humanizing" it -- raising it to a high ethical or moral level of activity.

Earlier remarks made by Mr. Kahn and other members of the group indicated

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Scientists from developing nations can study and do research abroad without getting involved in competition between U.S.-U.S.S.R. aid, technical assistance or fellowship programs, as they would if they studied in the United States or U.S.S.R.

The Chairman suggested that a vehicle to accomplish the purpose the group had in mind might be an international science foundation which would be free to use its funds for fundamental research. All nations would participate. The foundation would have the opportunity to develop plans for the control of technology as a consequence of cooperative international research programs.

Mr. Revelle added that an international science foundation could also be useful in supporting research and development efforts in developing countries which do not have the financial resources to support such efforts.

Taking stock of this phase of the discussion, Mr. Kahn warned that the proposals put forth thus far contained certain implicit assumptions which were not being recognized. First, such an organization implies trust among the member nations. Second, "politicizing" or "humanizing" the scientific problems dealt with by the organization implies that "pure" science research will be discussed and treated in "applied science" terms -- that is, in terms of the effect of pure science on the future of mankind. Third, the two basic purposes of the international organization as proposed are incompatible -- the organization cannot be a detached research and planning body devoted to developing nonpolitical plans to control technology and at the same time conduct programs to help poor nations which are the targets of the East-West struggle.

If these assumptions are recognized, Mr. Kahn continued, a clearer picture of the limitations and problems of such an organization is seen. If it is important to keep the foreign ministries out of the picture until solutions are well developed --

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if it is important to keep pure science out of cabinet debates then the organization must demonstrate clearly that (a) there is mutual trust, (b) that the organization has machinery to think through scientific and technological problems, and (c) that the organization limits itself to questions of technical expertise to be solved by experts of various nations working together.

Under these conditions, the foreign offices may allow the organization to operate without their direct interference, Mr. Kahn said. On the other hand, if the foreign offices feel that the organization would be likely to grasp at politically attractive solutions in order to make a "splash," they will intervene. Therefore, he concluded the foreign ministries cannot really be kept out by keeping things quiet or technical. Rather they must be kept convinced that there is no reason to step in.

Mr. Revelle and Mr. Kistiakowsky reinforced Mr. Kahn's remarks by pointing out that as soon as the foreign offices suspect that the balance of power may be altered, they will reject the international approach. A case in point, said Mr. Revelle, is the communications satellite program.

Mr. Cooper emphasized Mr. Kahn's point by suggesting that an effort be made to limit the size of the proposed international organization as well as its potential for upsetting the world balance of power.

Mr. MacEachron endorsed Mr. Kahn's remarks also by saying that unless solutions are well thought out, any international venture becomes purely "an act of faith" -- a type of naïve move which foreign ministries should rightly try to prevent. On the other hand, a well thought out plan of action might be carried out with good result and without a foreign office desire for intervention.

Despite his warnings concerning the way in which an international organization for the control of new technology should develop and operate, Mr. Kahn

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another angle, Mr. Slater indicated that scientists can help to solve such problems,
as in the case of nuclear weapons for West Germany, and therefore the scientists'
contribution should not be discounted.

Mr. Fox pointed out that in the case of the unsuccessful attempts to limit
nuclear weapons development, that the "thin layer" of thought accorded to the problem
came up with two solutions, each of which was poor. They were: (1) don't talk to
the Russians about the bomb to avoid the appearance of dividing up the world, and
(2) keep the Russians in the dark so that they will not be able to find out how to
make an A-bomb. Both of these approaches were unrealistic. Today, Mr. Fox con-
tinued, we face similar problems in new fields of technology. We must obtain a
heavier intellectual layer of thought. Yet, any international organization for
controlling new technology must be able to sidestep the problem of having each
nation in the world have a share of the staffing of the international organization.
This would lead to a meaningless heavy layer of administration rather than a
meaningful layer of thought.

The discussion then turned to the problems which an international organiza-
tion could tackle and the way in which such an organization would be set up.

Mr. Piel suggested that either oceanography or an "international buoy"
program would be a suitable initial task for such an authority.

Mr. Skolnikoff proposed that areas of engineering and development be under-
taken. For example, he suggested an engineering and development program in support
of high energy physics which would seek to capitalize on the international interest
in this field.

On the questions of financing and structure, Mr. Townsend pointed out that
it would be well to have part of the funds come from nongovernmental sources, so as
to give the authority a degree of independence. Mr. Kahn proposed that an arrangement

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whereby the members of the authority had voting power proportional to their
financial contributions (one dollar-one vote). This would be logical, he said,
since the authority is envisaged as nonpolitical and hence more sensitive to prag-
matic considerations than to questions of international law and national sovereignty.

Mr. Carpenter agreed with Mr. Kahn's reasoning, but pointed out that only
if the "one dollar-one vote" principle was openly accepted by all concerned at
the outset could it be viable. Otherwise (if for example the one dollar-one vote
rule was adopted *after* the authority was organized by pressure from the wealthier
members) the relationships among nations in the authority would be hopelessly
impaired.

By way of summary, Mr. Oppenheimer pointed out that in the history of
attempts to control and limit nuclear energy technology, no one approach or event
had been decisive, or had constituted the "whole story." Thus, it is not possible
to go back and find out how a future disaster might have been precluded by having
done things differently. The problem now that is significant is how to prevent
disaster caused by our own present actions.

After the break for dinner, the group began to take a more intense look
at the international authority or consortium that had been suggested and of the
specific role of scientists within such an authority.

Mr. Drucker stressed that there was a serious inherent obstacle in achieving
the goals of such an international effort. This obstacle arises from the fact
that actions of scientists characteristically create both opportunities and dangers
with which policy makers must deal on an immediate or even crisis basis.

Foreign-policy makers, Mr. Drucker continued, try to deal with these

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Mr. Fox pointed out that in the case of the unsuccessful attempts to limit nuclear weapons development, that the "thin layer" of thought accorded to the problem came up with two solutions, each of which was poor. They were: (1) don't talk to the Russians about the bomb to avoid the appearance of dividing up the world, and (2) keep the Russians in the dark so that they will not be able to find out how to make an A-bomb. Both of these approaches were unrealistic. Today, Mr. Fox continued, we face similar problems in new fields of technology. We must obtain a heavier intellectual layer of thought. Yet, any international organization for controlling new technology must be able to sidestep the problem of having each nation in the world have a share of the staffing of the international organization. This would lead to a meaningless heavy layer of administration rather than a meaningful layer of thought.

The discussion then turned to the problems which an international organization could tackle and the way in which such an organization would be set up.

Mr. Skolnikoff proposed that areas of engineering and development be undertaken. For example, he suggested an engineering and development program in support of high energy physics which would seek to capitalize on the international interest in this field.

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immediate problems in terms of short-term trade-offs. The goal of the international authority we are discussing tonight, however, is to establish machinery for obtaining long-term advantages (in the control of technology and the lessening of dangerous world crises) in exchange for immediate sacrifice (of national technological development). This is a more difficult type of trade-off for foreign ministries to achieve, because it implies confidence in predicting future technological developments and trusts in the ability of scientists to understand the social and political as well as the technical consequences of technological development and limitation.

The foreign offices, Mr. Drucker went on, are not prone to consider seriously such long-term trade-offs because scientists in the past have not been very good at foreseeing future social and political problems resulting from scientific advancements. Neither have scientists been effective in communicating with or educating policy makers in the realities of, and implications of, technological development.

Mr. Kahn is correct, Mr. Drucker said, in emphasizing that the proposed international authority's first job is to study carefully the problems of technological control and cooperation before proposing solutions. As an example of the lack of thought in this area he pointed to the difficulties being experienced in the financial arrangements for the communications satellite effort. Suddenly, it is "discovered" by the planners of this effort that many European governments operate communications services through the public postal service rather than by private industry.

Scientists must recognize, he concluded, that in each nation the old-line agencies which deal with foreign affairs wish to run their programs in the

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international arena in the same way that they run their domestic programs. Such an approach is incompatible with international efforts to control technology. Scientists must be able to show the heads of the old-line agencies why their approach is inappropriate. But this, in turn, requires much more political sophistication on the part of the scientists and much thought by them on the shape of the future.

Mr. Fox observed that one way to achieve the objective the group was discussing is to emphasize the approach of "functionalism." The concept of obtaining "peace by pieces" is at least half a century old, he continued, but it is still a useful one for the kinds of international problems under discussion. For example, the question of how to get the foreign office out of the picture until a workable solution is found to a technological problem was handled successfully in World War I in the problem of Allied shipping control. The approach is to bring the experts together. Are science experts any different from others in this regard?

Colonel Klette pointed out that large international corporations are examples of successful functionalism.

The Chairman observed that functionalism is a valuable approach since once the habit of cooperation is built up in functional -- that is, nonpolitical -- areas, it is likely that this habit pattern will carry over to areas where political issues may become involved.

Mr. Boardman criticized the group for being too naïve about the effectiveness of a functional or nonpolitical international authority. As soon as a serious political problem develops, the authority will be broken up by the conflicts of an international power struggle. The international authority can only survive if it is aware of the political realities and does not depend overly on "functionalism" or agreement among scientists of various nations.

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Mr. Oppenheimer reflected that the heart of the question, then, is how to include the scientist's "life" in the "life" of international relations. This is not a question of inventing something new. In fact the mistaken belief that the involvement of scientists into the mainstream of society's activities is a new problem has hurt the chances of achieving the involvement. Both scientists and policy makers have allowed the supposed novelty of this problem to interfere with common-sense solutions.

At the same time, Mr. Boardman added, this supposed novelty makes politicians feel that they cannot understand the dynamics of scientific progress, which in turn deprives them of early awareness of the significant potential effects of scientific research.

Mr. Kahn offered the view that functionalism cannot be meaningful unless it is combined with an understanding of political realities and with the inclusion of the foreign offices when necessary. Nevertheless "no matter what it is, if people do it together" the result is likely to be a reduction in tension and an increase in understanding. When scientists are involved, functionalism should work as well as with any other set of experts.

Mr. Revelle brought up the point that the control of technology is not a concern of scientists alone. It is a general problem, for which a knowledge and appreciation of social science and many other fields is needed. The actions of scientists have created many problems, but the question is what can anyone, not only the scientists, do about these problems?

Mr. Oppenheimer observed that although Mr. Revelle's point is well taken, scientists have a special role to play in helping nonscientists to cope with the problem of technology control. This control is even more significant than in the

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past because scientists of various nations no longer have the type of close-knit
international community they had until World War II. During that war, the texture
of the international scientific community, which had been unviolated by international
activities for centuries, came apart. It has not become whole again. Nevertheless,
because of the tradition of international scientific cooperation and the charisma
of science itself, scientists have an advantage over nonscientists in dealing with
the problem of how to avoid technological shock -- an advantage which should be
used before it is too late to prevent the worse effect of new technological events.

Mr. Oppenheimer suggested that the objectives of the international scientific
institutions under discussion should be: (1) creating the knowledge and concern
on the part of the public, statesmen and politicians about the implications of new
science, and (2) creating a presumption that an international approach to the problem
of the application of science is required. The main difficulty seems to be how
will technological shocks be anticipated and by whom will this be done, Mr.
Carpenter said.

The Chairman pointed out that some technological shocks had been anticipated
perfectly, but that the action needed to cushion the effects was not taken. For
example in 1946, Project RAND analysts predicted both the feasibility and political
repercussions of an orbiting space satellite. The RAND study indicated that the
launching of the satellite by the United States would gain it a tremendous advantage
in world opinion. What went wrong, asked the Chairman. Was there a lack of communica-
tions between scientists and politicians?

Mr. Kahn said that he disagreed with the conclusions of the RAND analysis
in 1946 and he still does. If the United States had put up the first satellite,
little international excitement would have been created since the United States
was expected to be the technological leader of the world.

[Lc]

Mr. Jastrow agreed with Mr. Kahn on this point. If Von Braun had been given the go-ahead to launch a satellite in 1956, Mr. Jastrow said, the chances are that neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. would have a large space program today. The United States would have stolen the big thunder, and the Soviets would not have thought that big space exploits were worth the expense and difficulty. Because the United States had not been first, however, the Russians went ahead and did gain the advantages the RAND study predicted (for the United States), particularly with regard to impact on the underdeveloped and uncommitted nations.

While recognizing the problems and limitations of an international authority to control and limit new technology and to achieve international cooperative development of new technology, the discussion group seemed to agree on the value of exploring further the possibilities of such an international authority. Mr. Piel suggested that cooperative international development of the Sahara would be a model project for the proposed authority. The Sahara has oil; it is a veritable reservoir of fossil fuels and has great agricultural potential. Its exploitation could make a tremendous difference to the standard of living of the nations surrounding the Sahara.

The Chairman added that the exploitation of the ocean bottoms held a similar potential. Computerism -- the information revolution -- was offered by Mr. Piel as another area for development and control by an international authority or consortium.

Focusing on what he considered the central point in the entire evening's discussion, Mr. Kahn argued that, more than anything else, it is necessary to improve our ability to foresee the shape of technological and social developments. He suggested that a "journal of the future" be established. Contributors to the

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Journal would be obliged to concentrate on trying to predict the content and import of scientific advances. That such prediction can be amazingly accurate is known. What is needed is a method to improve the average accuracy of predictions and to develop thinking habits which look to future possibilities rather than to "winning the last war" or solving past problems.

With the allotted time for the discussion at an end, the Chairman summarized by pointing out that the group had exposed many of the complexities of gaining a real understanding of how past technological developments (e.g., nuclear weapons and power), could have been controlled and of how new technology may be limited and directed. The discussion showed, he continued, that the problem requires a much greater effort than has been made and calls for a political sophistication of scientists far greater than they possess now on the average. At the same time, the politicians and foreign-policy makers (and scientists) are still far too little aware of the potential impact of new technological developments in molecular biology, weather modification, exploitation of the deserts and oceans, and many other areas of scientific change.

At the next session of the discussion group, the Chairman concluded, the group will have an opportunity to concentrate on one of these areas of great potential impact and to explore further the possibility of control and direction by international arrangement. The subject under discussion then will be the opportunities and limitations of applying science and technology to the needs of the underdeveloped nations. Mr. Piel will present a paper on the subject.

The Chairman adjourned the discussion by thanking the participants and inviting them to the next session on March 23.

Arthur Levine
Rapporteur

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February 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Harvey Brooks
David MacEachron

SUBJECT: Notes on the February 8th meeting

FROM: Eugene B. Skolnikoff

The following are a few of the general points that it seems to me emerged from the meeting of February 8th. This is not intended as a summary of the session; Arthur Levine's notes will, I hope, provide that. See especially point 4 with regard to the April meeting.

1. There was little discussion, and no disagreement expressed, about Dr. Oppenheimer's judgment that we can't (and shouldn't) contemplate interfering with scientific progress as a way of controlling "undesirable" technology.

2. With regard to the major decisions in the history of atomic energy, the judgment of the group seemed to be that political issues simply overshadowed and "dictated" the atomic energy developments. That is, the basic situation in the Soviet Union, and between Russia and the West, essentially made any different approach irrelevant to the outcome. (e.g. if the U.S. were more forthcoming re A-weapons, if we had held off on further weapons development and testing, etc.) This is not to say other policies might not have been wiser in the long run. Intellectual arrogance was singled out as perhaps our major mistake at the time.

3. The group was taken with the notion of "internationalizing" science at an earlier stage of the development of a field. There was some confusion about the meaning of this. The scientists, at least, seemed to be thinking of

[Lc]

2.

involving international organizations directly in supporting research as a
way of avoiding "technological shock" and as a way of creating a presumption
for international cooperation in handling the implications of science. In
addition, internationalizing might reduce the danger that one nation or
group of nations could capture a new development for its own selfish ends.

At first, this idea was interpreted by some as meaning that international
communication among scientists could solve political problems. The idea,
however, was both broader and more modest than that. Rather, it was to
force involvement by governments in an international framework at an early
stage in scientific development.

Dean Brooks raised the specific question of the desirability of an
international science foundation, along the lines of NSF. This was discussed
only in general terms.

4. The subject of whether it was possible to do a better job of predicting the future of science and technology and their policy implications also came up several times. This, too, did not receive much direct comment, though it is a subject that may be worthy of the group's more extended discussion. Herman Kahn is the one who most frequently raises the question.

[Note: I wonder if this wouldn't be a good focus for our April meeting? I would think Herman would be delighted to explore the question on the basis of the study the Hudson Institute is now making on prediction. We have to be careful, though, to keep our eye on our major objective].

5. One conclusion that I come to is how extremely difficult it seems to be to challenge, or simply discuss, some of the "truths" that we presumably are concerned about. No one questioned *at all* the judgment of Dr. Oppenheimer that you couldn't and shouldn't interfere with science. And on the political

3.

side, we never seriously raised fundamental questions about the underlying assumptions in the U.S. attitude toward international control of the atom in the early postwar period. I now feel that the history of atomic energy may have been a poor one to use as a case study; but as Harvey said in the cab after the meeting, it's not clear that we could have known this in advance.

Somehow, I feel that we must be more direct in our approach. Possibly by focusing on future predictions as proposed above, we can more clearly isolate the issues that trouble us, and then work back to a discussion of whether present approaches to international political organization are in the face of future developments.

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021

58 EAST 68TH STREET

February 28, 1966

MAR 2 1966

Change in Date of April Meeting

Unfortunately, due to an unexpected conflict we
find it necessary to change the date of the group's April
meeting. Instead of being on April 12, as originally planned,
it will take place on Thursday, April 14. You will receive
a reminder notice, with information as to the topic to be dis-
cussed, prior to the meeting.

The dates of the remaining meetings of this series
therefore are: March 23, April 14, and May 10.