TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/ George Shultz

12/1/72 9:40 a.m.

HK: Hi, George, I was going to call you.

G: I think we have got to try to <u>fish or cut</u> bait with Pete somehow or other now.

HK: I am beginning to leav towards cutting bait--I don't want that quoted to Peterson--first of all he is so totally disaffected; and second, I really don't quite know how this thing is going to work.

G: He has himself involved at least in six major responsibilities--

HK: On this charter?

G: In his charter, and I don't quite see how it will be possible to manage all of that. So, something that comes closer to the original proposal, and is much more modest--he------the more workable thing, but he clearly doesn't want that.

HK: I mean he wants to be in charge of OECD, European Community and NATO--

G: US/Polish--

HK: And US/Polish

G: And coordinate all European economic things, including energy problems which is a hell of a bundle--

HK: It could be done if he were in my job--you know what I mean? But to do it without a real power base and without very clear lines of authority, I have serious questions about--I like Pete--if he were set up in Washington as the special representative of the President for Europe,

G: I think we could put it another way--that somehow or another the things that he is telling us need to be done, do need to be done.

HK: That's right.

G: And he is right the first time in that they need to be done in Washington primarily, although we do need to have people in NATO, EC and so forth who are there and who can act as eyes and ears and interpreters and so forth there--but I think this job has to be done in Washington.

HK: But you ask yourself, how can he formulate European foreign policy

DISTRIBUTED

Autumn 1972

B.J.

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sitting in Europe--

G: Right, that was his point in the first place, but the trouble is the President doesn't want him in Washington--

HK: That's right.

G: And that is a fairly firm thing so you work within those parameters and you come out no where.

HK: I must say when I read that charter yesterday, It was funny I was going to call you within 10 minutes to discuss it with you.

G: I got it this morning.

HK: That's why I dexed it down--so that I could discuss it with you.

G: Well, we could get back to Pete and say "no go"--why don't you go ahead and accept one of those million dollar offers--

HK: Goerge, let me put it this way--if it's so desirable that he go to Europe, we can make it go--I do not think it will work--he will resign within the year--he will find out he's not going to have a major policy formulating role--because I've never known that to work from Europe; don't you think

G: Yeh.

HK: On the other hand, he doesn't seem to want the major representative role--

G: The chairmanship of these commissions would seem to locate the day-to-day policy on those things with him rather than

HK: He wants an office in the EOB.

G: That seems to me all right--I think if he can do all these things--he better have one. But--

HK: No, no, I think he would do the chairmanship--his plan, I think, is to keep Sally here and I think what he would plan is to spend a week, a month in Washington--

G: I see. So he'd keep his house, and Sally would stay here and he'd establish an apartment abroad.

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G: Well, that's not what the President wants.

HK: We can make it work for a year--he will certainly leave within a year.

G: I think it's better for him to leave now then along with everybody else because if he leaves within a year, it's likely to be in a flap.

HK: I have great difficulty visualizing how this will work.

G: I agree with you. So do I.

G: Shall we tell the President that you and I have discussed this--we discuss it with Peterson, this seems to be the sort of the ultimate counter-proposal, we don't think it will work and we think we should stop now. What the President proposed to him mainly overbroad, work with NATO and The EC and help us formulate European policy, and the eyes, the ears and representative over there. He doesn't want that. And continue to be involved in the Russian and so forth, but that's involvement--that's not being in charge of it. That he doesn't want. See the way he has the things lined up for EC, OECD and NATO it makes it hard to --for example the discussion about Rumsfeld going to NATO--well it's hard to get Rumsfeld to go to NATO if he reports to Peterson. I suppose on the other two posts it wouldn't be a problem, because this guy is there right now anyway -- a civil service type. But if we decided to change that it would become something of a problem.

want to

HK: On whether Rumsfeld should go to NATO, I really have a voice in who gets to be Ambassador-- I don't think we should shuffle people around that I have to work with--

G: What do you think about Rumsfeld and NATO?

G:

HK: I am not one of Rumsfeld's admirers--you would rather have him stay at EC--he would like the NATO job.

HK: Oh, he would?

G: Yeh. He's done quite a good job in the Cost of Living Council, I think.

HK: Has he?

G: Yeh, he works at it, he has a good sense of able young people, he attracts them and gets them working hard and he thinks outside the boundaries of the particular ruts that the existing bureaucracy has and he's responsive and loyal--he wants to report in; then if you say all right, now you handle, he's not afraid to go ahead and do it--he's

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Date: 01/05/05

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very good to work with.

HK: All right, well maybe I've got him wrong.

G: So I wouldn't be surprised but that he'd make a very good Ambassador in NATO.

HK: Well, one thing for sure he won't become Ambassador if Pete is super Ambassador--

G: No, no. Pete is an enormously energetic and capable person.

HK: And I think what is being done is a terrible injustice.

G: So do I--he's turned in a hell of a good performance--

HK: He handled--

G: The guy we've nominated for Secretary of Commerce is not in his class.

HK: Who is he?

G: His name is Fred Dent--

HK: Oh, it is going to be Dent

G: Who oddly enough was born and brought up in Connecticut and went to Yale

HK: There is no question that the economic negotiations with the Soviets would not have reached this point without Pete--he did a superlative job. Subtle able, in fact, I don't know how we will set up the economic relations with the Soviets--

G: You and ax I have to spend a lot of time together here in planning a way in which this is all going to work.

HK: What do you mean--in Key Biscayne.

G: No, I mean whenever we can find time together--I am coming back to Washington this afternoon. I gather you are coming down--I probably be coming back on the plane you're coming down on.

HK: We couldn't be both there at the same time--the status problem. You outrank me anyway.

G: Not in seniority on the White House staff--as a labor relations fellow, I recognize seniority--

U.S. DEPARTMENT TO THE PRESIDENT

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HK: Yes, but you got yourself a Cabinet position too..

G: I also recognize --I hate to inject this note into a somewhat humorous exchange--the tremendous ability you have--and as an old academic I tend to give precedence to overriding ability.

HK: George--the only people who say flatly doesn't get you anywhere are the people who have never had flattery.

G: (laughing) In this case it isn't flattery, because its meant.

HK: We should get together, when I come back from Paris next week, we should have a talk.

G: All right. As far as this--

HK: My instinct--let me tell you a cowardly thing--I'm a friend of Pete's and therefore I don't want to get in caught in the position where it is said I thought It couldn't work. I'd rather have it on the basis where the President says he didn't want something that had somany facets to it and its either the original job or nothing.

G: Hm huh. Well, we have to make a report to the President.

HK: No, I don't mind both of us making a report to the President, I'm talking about what will be said to Pete.

G: All right. Now this decision process is apining wildly here--Rumsfeld --see they are announcing all the WH staff changes and so forth, and somehow--he's got to fit into the picture--stay, leave, do something and so the decisions are tracking around. So I think you should think very carefully about the NATO business and Rumsfeld--You don't seem as though you feel like saying right now whether he would be acceptable to you.

HK: Oh hell, I suppose I can live with Rumsfeld--I don't have that much to do with the NATO ambassador.

G: You would find him quite--he fishes around at you some, but basically he takes orders and carries them out.

HK: Based on that--

G: He's bright.

LIE ASSIGNED

Author: E.R. 9-58-B
Date: 9/10/93
By: B.S. Spada

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HK: Yeh, he's bright. I think he is a little--frankly my objection is I found him to be on the soft side of most issues and what we need in Europe now is really some stern--but I might be wrong on that.

G: I think there--the political side, the thing that appeals politically right now is to be a pretty tough guy, so that being the case, that's the way Rumsfeld is going to be. Because his basic orientation is to his political future.

HK: Okay.

G: All right. You wouldn't be upset about him--then--

HK: No, but I will be upset if a lot of ambassadorial appointments are made without my being consulted, even if I were to approve.

G: Yeh, this is something that I'm not involved in on that subject--

HK: This is just the WH reorganization--

G: I only know about the Rumsfeld thing because of his Cost of Living Council and so on and what is he going to do and the President talked to him about this possibility. But the structuring of the ambassadorial business and so on, I

HK: I'll talk to Haldeman about it tomorrow--

G: Haldeman and I understand Flanigan is marketing names around too.

HK: Okay good.

C-562107

TELCONE

The President/Mr. Kissinger

November 1, 1972, 10:03 am

P: I was just calling to get the morning report. Anything new on the--

K: No, I'm seeing the South Vietnamese at 10:30.

P: At ten, huh. That's good.

K: We've had a cable from Bunker in which he thinks they are going to come along. But ungraciously.

P: I don't care how they come along.

K: They've been leaking in that direction. They've been saying you gave them an ultimatum. That's been on NBC, that doesn't do any damage in Paris, and that they were going to see how we did next week before they make their final decision.

P: Well, I think that's what they are going to do. Let's be sure that none of our people get back people leak that I'm giving an ultimatum. Tell State, Sullivan and all the rest I don't want that conversation because that was a son of a bitch and tough conversation, and that was really rough.

K: That was rough.

P: Be sure that Haig and everybody knows that I didn't tell the Chiefs or anybody.

K: Right. I'll make sure that nothing gets to State.

P: Or anybody. Just don't let it out, because we don't want to embarrass them publicly. Then we'll build a backfire here on the Right Wing, you know, and we just can't have that.

K: Right, right. Well, nobody---

P: Incidentally, I've been thinking a little about our meeting tomorrow just so that you can prepare, I think on the negotiating strategy this time that you ought to begin, not with the easy one but with the tough one. And I think that, for example, on the priority you've got to say, now, let's get one thing settled once and for all, we say first they will have seen the picture of the Joint Chiefs, that will I assume be carried in The World--

K: :Yes, it's been in every paper.

P: Has it.

DREASPHONE
Author: F012655-
Date: 11/01/72
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P contd:

Good. All right. Then I'd be cold as ice, the President is frankly
very relaxed about it but he's very disappointed in the progress of
this, and this is it. This is, as far as you are concerned, the last
meeting.

K: Right.

P: Then you go on to say, Now we've got to begin with one proposition
and that is the President is very disappointed and cannot understand
your backing off of your proposal with regard to the key point of the
prisoners. If we back off--that's important now. What are you going
to do about that. You've got to get that settled right away because
we can talk all we want and settle 12 points, if we don't settle that
we have no deal.

K: Exactly. I think, Mr. President, what we might consider, you might
want to think about it until tomorrow, is that I ask for a private meeting
with him first--

P: Oh, sure, sure.

K: With some of your stronger words that way so that there are not too
many people in the room when I say it. It's easier for them to take
it that way.

P: That's right. Well, I'll go, I think I'll write a very tough note too
with what you have with your instructions. That may be helpful.

K: That would be very helpful.

P: What you can do is to have something prepared along that line. Let
him, you know, spend some time, you've got things to do. When I
get it, I'll edit it, then I'll send that with you. Now there a few other
brief points here, Henry. At least the North Vietnamese have indicated
in their message a willingness to discuss. Right.

K: Absolutely. Let me get you the exact wording.

P: Right, Okay.

K: I'll -- you know, there's the usual palaver which isn't worth repeating
about the history of --

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P: Oh yes. I ought to make a lot of palaver too, but now the damned thing is going to be settled.

K: Well, here is the operative paragraph. "If the U.S. is really determined to end the war rapidly and restore peace in Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will also make resolutely advance in that direction. The DRV side will come to the private meeting on December 4th with good will and a very serious attitude. If the U.S. side also shows good will and makes great effort like the Democratic Republic of Vitenam is prepared to do, it is certain that the Vietnam question will be rapidly settled in the interest of both sides." That's pretty forthcoming by their standards.

P: Yeah, yeah.

K: Because that in effect--

P: I just trust they don't think coming there with more concessions.

K: Well, we have to come with something along the lines of--that we discussed, Mr. President, on restoring some of the original language on this committee.

P: Well the language on the committee is--you're getting from Duc his priorities or not.

K: That's right.

P: Or is he going to give you priorities.

K: My--

P: We know what his priorities are, what the hell, he just wants it to look good and frankly we can make it look good. Now the other thing that you've got to really hammer out with him is whether or not there is going to be a meeting between me and-- here's a way you can hurry their decision a bit, because I can't--you can say the President can make, you know, you're putting this first, but he admits to his budget preparations and so forth and he can't just take off and go on 24 hours notice. Now if Thieu wants this meeting, we ought to do it. I think he should want it, and I think the time to do it is before.

K: Well, I think he should want it, I think the time to do it is--you ought not to consent to doing it before because you could make the commitments in a framework where it wouldn't look provocative, and it could be done in the surge of peace and it would set up the subsequent trip to Hanoi in a much better framework. But we'll get an answer to that in an hour, I hope, but I will press it on him immediately.

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Author: ED 12 655-
Date: 11/05/95

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P: Well, in an hour he's going to come in with his usual plaintive answer and say well that business about being--we are going to die six months from now, we'll die now. That's just nonsense, and they want to talk that way, well there's just no deal.

K: Now, on the concessions, Mr. President, we cannot have--there are four outstanding issues, we can't have our way on all four of them.

P: I understand that.

K: Because, say, for example, they want the PRG mentioned in the document once, they've agreed to delete it every place except in the preamble. Now, I have found a formula which I've now checked with the lawyers which will work which is that everybody except Saigon signs the preamble mentioning the PRG, and Saigon has a different preamble. That way the North Vietnamese gets three quarters of their way, and then we make a unilateral statement saying --

P: We recognize only one government.

K: Exactly. Then we have shown our good will towards--

P: Well, don't tell him that tomorrow. Don't tell him that today.

K: Oh, no, I won't tell---

P: Don't tell him that today. That's something that you wangle out of them next week and then say we've made a great big deal here.

K: Exactly. I wanted to tell you that that's the way this one has to go, we cannot get--

P: I understand that. Anyway that doesn't make a damn bit of difference whether it's mentioned or not. If we put out a unilateral statement that we don't recognize them. That's the point they've got to understand.

K: Now the second thing is I think of all the outstanding issues, the one we've got to get back is the prisoner one.

P: Well, that is why you've got to start with that.

K: But, on the other hand, on that three segment committee, it's just insane for the South to make--

P: Well, how about putting in a phrase that this is not a coalition government or something of that sort.

K: Well, they won't agree to that.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

AUGUST 21 1967
B-1349

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P: Well, then we'll state it.

K: Oh, yeah, that's easy. They have stated it. I have it in the protocol that they have stated it. And, we can put out what they said.

P: I know they've already made statements. I was just thinking of any way that you--well go ahead.

K: On the rest of the issues we can win.

P: On the withdrawals, like what.

K: Well, I think we can get them to withdraw some of their prisoners--some of their troops on a de facto basis. I think we can get a statement in there with respect for North Vietnamese territory--Vietnamese territory which is a sort of a code word for no troops.

Why don't

P: Why do we say for the respect of the territory of both sides.

K: That's how this would be done.

P: That's right.

K: And you can get a clause in there that the demobilization should be done within a three month period so that that's hooked to everything else so if there's no demobilization, they don't have to have a committee.

P: Well, I assume I wouldn't expect anything when you see him today because he's, I mean, they are obviously waiting--Bunker doesn't know anything anyway does he.

K: No. It was just his instinct.

P: Well, from what we heard from that conversation yesterday, after what we had told them, that was--

K: No, that was--by that time it was pretty mild.

P: Well, I know toward the end he began to back off, but he doesn't have any authority. You know, if you could tell by looking at him and the Ambassador, I think that he and the Ambassador were making a deal we would have it right now. Don't you agree?

K: Oh yes, no question. Not a question about it. Well, what they are going to do, Mr. President, is to wait until he gets the deal in Paris and then they'll accept it.

JUN 21 1975 8:00