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Q Mr. Secretary, to what extent is politics interfering today with your attempts to work out a new SALT agreement?

And do you see a deadline beyond which it would be, because of the political campaigns, impossible to make any real progress on a treaty?

A As Secretary of State it is my obligation to recommend to the President what I believe to be in the national interest. My recommendations are not affected by the political situation and I have, so far, seen no evidence that his decisions are affected by the political situation.

I cannot say that the debate that is going on greatly enhances the atmosphere of confidence in the country, but our recommendations are not affected by the political situation. We are not operating against a deadline.

Q Mr. Secretary, can I just change the subject for a moment?

Have you proposed to the Israeli Government, as reported today, that it should drop its boycott of the Security Council debate?

And also, do you see any indications the PLO may be shifting its attitude with regard to its recognition or nonrecognition of Israel's right to existence?

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A I will answer this question, but may I then
recommend that we take all SALT questions, and then go to
all other questions? I will answer this one, though.

The United States has indicated to the Israeli
Government that it would be better served if it participated
in the Security Council debate, though it is of course clear
that the Israeli Government may not wish to be in the room
while the PLO delegate is actually speaking.

This position of ours has been clear.

Our attitude with respect to the PLO is unchanged.

I haven't reaffirmed it for about forty-eight hours, so
it is about time that I do it again: We will not deal with
the PLO, negotiate with the PLO, or urge Israel to deal
with the PLO, as long as the PLO does not

recognize the existence of Israel and as long as the PLO
does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and

338. That will be our attitude during the Security Council
debate and I would like to stress again that the only
resolutions that the United States considers relevant for the
Security Council debate are Resolutions 242 and 338, and
we will not accept any resolution that tries to introduce
any element that goes beyond 242 and 338.

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Now on SALT?

Q Yes, now on SALT -- do you have any evidence today that the Soviet Union is prepared to offer, in your own words, a reasonable and serious counterproposal to the last American proposal that was made to the Russians?

A The exchanges which we have had with the Soviet Union since November indicate that the Soviet Union realizes that no settlement is possible on the basis of its present proposal, and that it is willing to negotiate on the basis of the proposition that it must modify its position and that we are then also prepared to look at our position. And it is on this basis that a trip by me to Moscow has been discussed.

Q Are there plans for such a trip in the immediate future?

A I would expect such a trip to take place within the next four weeks --

Q Mr. Secretary --

A -- four to five weeks.

Q Mr. Secretary, in your discussion earlier, you made some reference to the fact that at one point

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as I recall, after the evidence had emerged that the
Soviets were building a certain kind of silo -- at one
point the Soviets raised some questions about American
practices that we, as I understood you, were not anxious
to publicize.

Could you tell us any more about what those
practices might have been?

A No, the basic point that I wanted to make
is this: It was in our interest -- we were interested,
as long as there was no conclusive evidence, to keep the
debate on the confidential level, and to permit both sides
to raise with each other technical issues in which they
could raise questions and clarify questions.

I would say that the issues that the Soviet Union
raised did not in fact involve violations of the
agreement by the United States, but from the point of
view of Soviet photography they might not have been self-
evident.

And it is, therefore, one of those issues where an
uous evidence is produced in good faith, that can be clarifi
by further exchanges.

There have been no American violations of the
agreement except in the technical sense that I have describ

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Q Are they satisfied with your response to that?

A It is still being discussed, but I think we
are making progress.

Q Mr. Secretary, you touched most lightly on
the strongest issue, which is a continuing one in Congress,
which is a claim that Soviet performance on the agreement
has failed to live up to your own assurances of what you
told Congress the Soviet Union was expected to do.

A I said --

Q You referred to the unilateral agreements --
one of the issues which is a continuing one up there, of
course, is the question of conversion of Soviet light
missiles to heavy missiles.

Could you deal broadly with the question which
you only touched on earlier, of the unilateral statements
and the Soviet nonagreement and nonperformance on those
unilateral statements?

A All right, let me first deal with another
issue:

One of the arguments that is being made is that

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the SALT agreement was sloppily negotiated -- between myself
and Dobrynin, usually -- and that we are now suffering
from the draftsmanship, from that draftsmanship.

Well, first of all, I do not believe that the
SALT agreement was sloppily negotiated.

But in any event, the text of the agreement was
negotiated in Helsinki. There is not one paragraph in that
document that was drafted by any other group than the
negotiating teams in Helsinki, which included representatives
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Department, the
State Department -- and indeed, all interested agencies --
and which was backstopped by a technical panel here.

So that the charge that documents were drafted in
the absence of technical advisers is absolutely ludicrous.

Now the exchanges that took place between
Dobrynin and me, first of all, were confined
to very few matters

and usually concerned a question of principle, such as
whether offensive weapons should be dealt with simultaneously
with defensive weapons or whether they should be dealt with
separately. That question, strange as it may seem today,
took three months of exchanges to settle, and those of
you who followed SALT matters will remember that at the end

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May, 1971, it was settled with an agreement in principle that offensive and defensive negotiations should proceed in parallel.

That did not require great technical knowledge.

As soon as that decision was made, it was shifted to the SALT delegation in Helsinki, and all the implementing negotiation of that was conducted in Helsinki.

Then on my visit to Moscow in April 1972, the Soviet Union made a proposal and, for the first time -- in which for the first time they agreed to include submarine missiles in the offensive count, and proposed a procedure by which this could be accomplished by the retirement of land-based or other missiles.

I might add that one of the most ardent advocates of this particular solution is a prospective candidate for the Senate --

-- from Virginia, in case any of you have any question of whom I am talking about [Laughter] --

-- because he did not wish to build any additional nuclear submarines at that time.

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This general proposal was brought back by me from Moscow, was put before the National Security Council at a meeting in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Arms Control Agency and our chief negotiator were represented. Specific instructions were given how to work out the technicalities of it and it then was worked out in detail in Helsinki.

Those were the two areas in which I was most active.

Now let us deal with the specific issue of the conversion of light to heavy missiles.

In the agreement there is a provision which was also put in, in part at our request -- but at any rate which we accepted without any difficulty -- to the effect that the existing silos could be increased by 15 percent in the process of modernization.

This is the only legal requirement of the agreement, that is, if either side increased any of its silos more than 15 percent it would be in violation of the agreement.

There is no charge that this has been done. In fact, it has not been done. The intelligence community agrees that the increase in silo dimensions in the modernization

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program of the Soviet Union does not exceed 15 percent.

The United States added another unilateral statement to the effect that if in these SS-11 holes a missile were placed which was significantly larger than the SS-11 that we -- I don't know what phrase we used, at any rate, that we --

Q "Significantly larger?"

A "Significantly larger" was the phrase.

I don't know whether we used the phrase, "We consider this a violation --"

Q Substantially larger --

A No, "significantly larger" is the phrase.

But I don't know whether we said it's a violation or what we said, what the specific --

Incidentally, that statement was drafted by the delegation.

Q But wasn't it on your instructions from --

A That unilateral statement?

Q That was issued by the delegation, as I recall the last day of the negotiations, just to finish up the piece of paper.

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A Wait a minute, let me make clear --
I don't want to play a game.

I agreed with everything the delegation did.
I think the delegation did a good job. Everything that
the delegation did was finally approved in the White House.

The text of it, however, was not drafted by me,
but approved by me and I am therefore fully behind it.
I am simply trying to get the sequence straight.

Now for about a year, our intelligence indicated
that the two new Soviet missiles that were being developed,
the SS-17 and 19, were about 15 to 20 percent larger than
the ones that had existed in 1972.

Q Yes.

A Fifteen to 20 percent -- don't hold me to these
precise figures, because I am doing it from memory. But
it is in that range, and it is always with an inaccuracy
factor.

Starting in the middle of 1974, it became
apparent that at least one of them, the SS-19, could be as
much as 40 percent larger. So we had the dilemma

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that we have a missile that is larger, by that percentage, than the SS-11 put into a hole that is not, however, in violation of the agreement by a better utilization of existing space and more efficient use of fuel; and that raises a serious question.

We are attempting -- the assurances I gave in 1972, which were based on the provision of the agreement obviously dealt with the missiles we then knew. We obviously did not know in '72 what missiles the Soviet Union would be testing in '74; and the questions I was asked were always concerned with whether the Soviet Union would be able to put the SS-9 into the SS-11 hole.

The SS-11 hole being the smaller one.

And all of my answers, obviously, had to be directed toward the missiles I knew, and not toward the missiles that came along two years later.

With respect to the SS-19, we are attempting to put limitations on this in the current round of SALT negotiations and it is in that category, which Secretary Schlesinger has also described, of no specific violation but of being sufficiently ambiguous to raise some questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, a three-part question:

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30

What evidence do you have that the Soviet Union
realizes no settlement is possible on the basis of its
last known existing proposal?

Secondly, do you have reason to believe that there
is now, or soon will be, a new Soviet proposal?

And what are the prospects for a new SALT agreement
within the next three or four months?

A If I go to Moscow -- or the fact that
I say that I will in all probability go to Moscow --
indicates that I have evidence that the Soviet Union will not
insist on its last proposal, because otherwise, there would
be no point in going.

Q But is there a new one in the works?

A When that proposal will be surfaced --
whether it will be surfaced then, when I am there, or whether
it will be surfaced ahead of time -- that remains for discussion.

Your second question? What was it?

Q The second part: Is there a new proposal?

A At any rate, since I have stated that we
will not accept their last proposal, if there is no new
proposal, there will be no settlement. There is no
possibility of our accepting the last Soviet
proposal.

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Now, what do I think the chances are?

I believe that if both sides make a serious effort
that the differences should be solved. The Soviet Union
must make a serious effort and we are prepared to make a
serious effort.

I am moderately optimistic.

Q Well, even to be talking about going to
Moscow, you must know something that we don't. You would
not go there just for the winter weather.

Do you have a reason to believe that if you --

A I said I had reason to believe that they will not
insist on their last proposal.

Q Mr. Secretary, the news reports in connection
with Admiral Zumwalt's testimony carry the phrase here that
the Admiral suggested that Mr. Kissinger's lack of candor
-- and I am quoting from a news report, sir -- "sprang from a
personal and political commitment to the success of the
detente policy" which made him, quote, reluctant to report the
actual facts. How do you react to that, sir?

A I have stated how we have handled information
and I think my statement makes it absolutely clear
that the Admiral got carried away by his political ambitions.

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Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned among the
possible violations Soviet interference with national
means of inspection.

Have they interfered with our --

A No, I have listed that as a --

Q A possibility, yes.

Have they interfered, or are they now attempting
to interfere, with our national means of inspection?

And while I have the floor, how are you doing on the
threshold test ban, and what are the prospects in that
agreement?

A The question of interference with national
means of detection: there has been a
Soviet program from the middle -- it dates back from
the middle of the 1960s -- to make photography and
other means of detection more complicated.

There have been some actions since the SALT agreement
in that category. Several of those have been raised with
the Soviet Union. Some of those that have been raised
have been ended. None of those, up to now, have fundamentally
interfered with our national means of detection.

Q Are they currently trying to interfere?

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A Well, you know there are so many separate things going on, there is always an effort. We have several things before them at this moment. I have said that up to now, nothing has decisively interfered with our national means of detection.

And the second question is? How are we doing on the test ban?

Q And what are the prospects of getting a settlement on that quickly? There is a deadline on that, I believe coming up.

A We are negotiating it. There are only one or two issues left and therefore, it can be settled any time but it hasn't been settled yet.

Q Aren't those the same issues, though, that existed last July?

A That's true.

And so either they will be settled, or they will not be settled. And I know that is going to be the headline tonight. [Laughter.]

Q Mr. Secretary, I think you know that this issue to which you have addressed yourself here this afternoon

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34

is so complex that many of us, and probably most of the
members of the public, are unable to understand the details
that you are referring to. I wonder if --

A Yes, but they can understand the procedures
to which I am referring, and those are perfectly plain.

Q I am just wondering, Mr. Secretary, if you
would address yourself to the various political charges,
or the various charges, that you claim arise from political
motives -- and in simple language, categorically deny them,
if that be the --

A Well, I am not saying all of them arise from
political motives. Some do, some don't.

But I don't want to go into the question of
motives. I think I have dealt with
all the essential charges. The charge that
information has been deliberately withheld is false.

The charge that the President was not briefed is
false.

The charge that either
I as Secretary of State or as Assistant to the President
have refused to deal with compliance issues is false.

The charge that there were secret agreements is
essentially false.

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35

And I think these are the major items; if
there is anyone else who wants to ask -- or if I have left one
out I will be glad to --

Q If I may just follow up: Why do you say
"essentially" false?

A Because there was an interpretative statement
that for some reason was not distributed to the bureaucracy,
even though the essence of
it was distributed to the bureaucracy and even though the
bureaucracy was instructed to testify as to its contents.
Why it was not distributed, I cannot for the life of me
remember now.

But the bureaucracy was told that such an
interpretative statement would be negotiated, its content was
distributed to it, so technically speaking this was not
seen, but the content was known.

Q Mr. Secretary, two questions:

On SALT Two -- just so that I am clear -- you said
you would probably go to Moscow within four to five weeks.
Is it a fair assumption that you are not going on this trip
you leave on, tomorrow?

A That is correct.

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36

Q And if so, what has happened?

I think you left the impression you would go to Moscow before Christmas. Was there some slippage, or some bureaucratic problem here, or in the Soviet Union?

A Well, I think there is no sense going to Moscow until we have our positions prepared in great detail and until we are confident also that on the Soviet side there is sufficient understanding of what is needed.

And given the travel schedules of all of the key members here, it seemed on the whole best not to hurry the process, and to move at a pace that permitted a very detailed examination of all of the issues.

Q Mr. Secretary, the second part of that question deals with another ambiguity, or what have you; it's the charge that the Soviets have perhaps built another ABM test site at Kamchatka. Can you address this?

A This is an issue that is now under discussion with the Soviet Union and I simply want to explain the issue. It is one of these technical issues. There is no dispute that the radar in Kamchatka faces the Soviet Union, and not the United States. And therefore,

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we are dealing with a test radar.

The ABM treaty requires that ABM testing could
take place only at agreed test ranges, and we listed ours.
The Soviet Union didn't list theirs.

Q You listed one for them.

A We unilaterally listed one for them and
the Soviet Union gave an ambiguous reply to that, saying
what their test ranges were, was generally known, but they
would not confirm or deny the one we gave for them; and
I think we claimed two for ourselves.

If the Soviet Union had claimed the Kamchatka
range for itself at that time, there would be no problem.

If the Soviet Union told us today that the
Kamchatka range is an ABM test range, then-- supposing we were
satisfied about the characteristics of the radar-- there
would be no significant problem.

So here we are dealing with a technical issue
of what an agreed test range is -- since there is no disagreement
that the radar in Kamchatka faces into the Soviet Union and
therefore must be used for some sort of internal tracking.

Q Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that you wouldn't

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38

have made these very important announcements here today
and this report on intelligence and evaluation and how
it all works if it hadn't been for the investigations
on Capitol Hill?

A I didn't say anything about the investigations
on Capitol Hill.

Q Yes, I know you didn't -- but I mean
this obviously is a reply to them. Right?

A I did not criticize the investigations.

Q No, I didn't say you did.

But I say, isn't it a good thing that we have
had all this come out today, and isn't it true that it
wouldn't have come out had it not been for the investigations
up there?

A Well, then the question is whether it could have
come out without some of the wild charges that were made.

But be that as it may, I am not criticizing the
effort of the Congress to get clarity about how the
intelligence process operates. And to the extent that my
briefing today was elicited by the Congress, I have no
objection if you give some credit to them.

PR #596

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Q Do you think this will take care of the subpoena now? You say you think this will be --

A No, no, on the subpoena -- the subpoena has nothing to do with this. The subpoena concerns covert operations and recommendations of Secretaries of State when I was not in office -- it has nothing to do with any recommendations I made -- recommendations of a previous decade to previous Presidents.

The President has exercised Executive Privilege with respect to that. I am under instructions from the President with respect to it. The resolution of this issue is between the White House and the Committee. It is not an issue that concerns any actions while I have been Secretary of State and it has nothing to do with the SALT issue. It has to do with the subject of covert operations and the reason the President has exercised Executive Privilege is because he believed that recommendations of Cabinet members to the President should be protected.

But I am not expressing a personal opinion on that subject.

Q Mr. Secretary, can we turn to another subject?

A Can we wind this up fairly soon? I have some luncheon guests upstairs who are getting restless.

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41

should stay out of Angola, and especially extra-
continental powers should stay out of Angola.

Q What do you mean, Mr. Secretary, when you say
whatever we have done started long after the massive --
What has the United States done?

A I have said that we try to give some assistance
to neighboring countries -- not South Africa -- but I
don't want to go any further.

Q Mr. Secretary, before we say "thank you", some
of my colleagues seem about to bury Mr. Brezhnev. Can you
give us your latest estimate of the state of his health?

A I have received no communication from the
Soviet Government about the health of Mr. Brezhnev, as has
been alleged.

My visit to the Soviet Union has absolutely nothing
to do with any comments regarding his state of health.
Our impression is that he is in active charge and that he
will continue beyond the Party Congress.

Q Thank you, sir.

[The briefing ended at 1:40 p.m.]

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40

Q All right.

Mr. Kissinger, on the subject of Angola, you and
the President have made some accusations. A protest has
been made to the Soviet Union about alleged intervention.
There's comments about Cuban intervention there.

Isn't it about time that you told us roughly what
the United States has done in the way of helping forces
in Angola and since when?

A I have said that the United States has tried
to be helpful to some neighboring countries. Whatever
we have done has started long after massive Soviet involvement
became evident. So this is not a case that really lends itself
to great dispute on that subject, because the Soviet Union
has been active there in this manner since March.
But I would rather not go any further until we see what can
be done in the present diplomatic effort.

Q What can be done, Mr. Secretary?

A Well, that's what we are trying --

Q What are the available opportunities open to
the United States --

A That's what we are trying to find out.

We have stated repeatedly that outside powers

Soviets reject new US bid for SALT II pact

By William Beecher
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The Ford Administration attempted last week to persuade the Soviet Union to agree to a SALT II treaty wrapping up what already has been negotiated and deferring tougher issues to a subsequent round of talks.

But for the second time in seven months, well-placed officials disclosed, the Soviet Union flatly rejected the idea, in terms even more emphatic than before.

Sources say that when Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in New York last week, Gromyko brought up the question of the stalled SALT talks by suggesting they begin their discussion with what he described as "the No. 1 issue."

Presumably Gromyko hoped for a new American proposal because last March the Russians turned down this half-a-loaf treaty concept and called for fresh US suggestions. No American response had been provided until the Kissinger-Gromyko meeting.

But instead of offering a modified SALT package, knowledgeable officials relate, Kissinger stressed continuing Ford Administration preference for deferring the thorny issues of how to deal with Russian Backfire bombers and American Cruise missiles.

During his debate with Jimmy Carter on Wednesday night, President Ford said, that at their subsequent meeting in Washington last weekend, Gromyko "indicated to me that the Soviet Union was interested in narrowing the differences and making a realistic and sound compromise."

The Soviets in March, and again last week, insisted that no SALT II treaty would be considered that failed to constrain American Cruise missiles. They also have consistently argued that their Backfire bomber has only medium range and thus should not be counted against the ceiling of 2400 long-range bombers and missiles.

A major debate has been under way within the American defense and arms control community over whether Backfire has the range to require that it be treated as a strategic weapon in the next treaty and what sorts of limitations could be accepted on US Cruise missiles.

The President provided significant insights into his thinking during the debate with Carter when he said the new treaty must include Backfire and can include Cruise missiles.

He thus seems to be siding with those in the Defense Department who have argued that the Backfire bomber has an un-fueled range of about 6000 miles, rather than the 3500-mile estimate worked up recently by McDonnell-Douglas in a study commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Some officials have argued that if it appears unlikely the Russians will agree to have the Backfire counted as a strategic bomber, and thus limited in number, the

same effect might be achieved if they would agree to cut down, by 300 to 400 weapons, the permissible ceiling tentatively set at 2400 strategic weapons. Since the Soviets have more than 2500 strategic missiles and bombers already deployed, such a reduction would force them to compensate for being allowed to have Backfire outside SALT, some State Department and National Security Council officials have contended.

But Ford seemed not to be prepared to

pursue that tack. He declared: "We have to make certain that the Soviet Union's Backfire, which they claim is not an intercontinental aircraft and which some of our people contend is, must also be included if we are to get the kind of agreement which is in the best interest of both countries."

On Cruise missiles, sources say the Russians appear to be less concerned about the air-launched version, which has a range of only 700 miles, than about naval models — carried by surface ships and submarines — which are being designed to fly 1500 to 2000 miles, dip below the view of early warning radar and strike within at least 100 feet of target.

The Russians have urged that such naval missiles be restricted to a maximum of 375 miles, at which range they could not attack targets inside the Soviet Union. Some officials in the Defense Department and arms control and disarmament agency are much opposed to such limitations.

Ford said Cruise missile limitations "can be included" in the SALT II agreement.

The American SALT proposal of last spring, reiterated last week, would have codified in treaty form the overall ceiling at 2400 or less, a subceiling of about 1320 for multiple warhead missiles, clear definitions of what constitutes the difference between heavy and light missiles, and an agreement on how to count those missiles and submarines believed to contain multiple-warhead missiles.

One effect of the not-unexpected Soviet rejection of this approach last week was to deny the President whatever political boost an imminent SALT agreement might have provided his presidential prospects.

Some Administration officials, sources say, had urged the President to force a consensus on the various agencies prior to the Gromyko meeting so that a new initiative could be attempted. But Ford was reluctant in recent months to permit even a verification panel to attempt to narrow differences, they say, for fear word of this effort might leak and give the politically damaging impression that he was preparing to make additional concessions to the Russians.

Carter has made one of the central themes of his campaign the charge that the United States has allowed detente to become a one-way street. As he put it Wednesday night: "The Soviet Union knows what they want in detente, and they've been getting it. We have not known what we wanted, and we've been out-traded in almost every instance."

Soviet-built surface-to-air missiles parade past Cairo monument to Egypt's unknown soldier during parade marking third anniversary of start of 1973 war with Israel. (AP photo)

Nuclear conflict called inevitable

Reuter

STOCKHOLM — About 35 countries will be able to make atomic weapons within nine years and nuclear war will become inevitable, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute said yesterday.

The institute said also that scientists in both East and West were striving for a lead in nuclear technology that would make a pre-emptive atomic strike tempting to either the United States or the Soviet Union.

The statements came in a new publication, "Armaments and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age," which marks the institute's 10th anniversary. The institute is an independent organization with an international governing body. It was set up by the Swedish parliament in 1966 to commemorate 150 years of unbroken peace in Sweden.

Stating that several "near-nuclear" countries felt themselves in grave danger because of their geopolitical circumstances, the institute predicted that pressures on them to go nuclear would become irresistible.

In such a situation, maintaining the present balance in Soviet-American relations would become impossible, the institute said.

Because of differing levels of nuclear sophistication, "there will therefore arise many situations in which a successful pre-emptive strike will either be possible or at least seem to be possible," it said. "In such a world, stable nuclear 'deterrence' as we have known it will become impossible, and war will become inevitable."

III. 2 Jan 76

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
DISARMAMENT & SALI

AA 1

PRAVDA OBSERVER ON U.S.-USSR ARMS LIMITATION

Moscow TASS in English 1837 GMT 31 Dec 75 LD

[Text] Moscow December 31 TASS--Follows the full text of the article "Limitation of Strategic Arms and its Opponents" from the January 1st issue of the newspaper PRAVDA. The article is signed by "Observer".

The international public, all people of good will respond with satisfaction to the current process of relaxation of tension in the world. The strengthening of relations of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, the development of mutually-advantageous constructive cooperation between them is becoming the dominant feature of the international situation. A number of important international agreements aiming at eliminating the danger of war and ending the arms race were signed in recent years. The hotbed of war in Vietnam exists no more. The European Conference on Security and Cooperation was concluded with success and signified a new stage in the improvement of the situation in Europe. Talks are underway on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe.

Relations between the USSR and the United States hold a considerable place in the overall process of positive changes in the world. In recent years they accomplished a turn from the cold war and confrontation to the easing of tension, normalization and improvement of mutual relations.

The elaboration of joint measures to eliminate the danger of war and end the arms race is the principle direction of Soviet-American relations. And this is natural for the future of all states without exception, of the entire human civilization, depends on how strong is the barrier protecting the peoples from the threat of nuclear war.

In the document "Basic Principles of Relations Between the USSR and the United States", signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972 as a result of the first Soviet-American summit meeting, the sides declared they will proceed from the common conviction that in the nuclear age there is no other basis for the maintenance of relations between them than peaceful coexistence.

In this connection they agreed to continue efforts to limit armaments both on a bilateral and multilateral basis and to make special efforts to limit strategic armaments.

These fundamental provisions provided the basis for the conclusion between the USSR and the United States of a number of concrete agreements aimed at curbing the arms race and lessening the war danger.

The most important place among them belongs to the June 22, 1973 agreement between the USSR and the United States on the prevention of nuclear war. In this agreement the sides declared that the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is the aim of their policy and agreed to do so in such a manner as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between each of the sides and other countries.

III. 2 Jan 1974

R.2

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
DISARMAMENT & SALT

It was noted in the document of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers on the results of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's visit to the United States in the summer of 1973 that the conclusion between the USSR and the United States of this agreement, that has no time limit, is an important step on the road to lessening and, in the long run, removing the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, to creating a system of real guarantees of international security.

Already a year before that, as a result of the Soviet-American summit talks in Moscow in May 1972, the first agreements on the limitation of strategic arms were concluded between the USSR and the United States--the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM) that has no time limit and the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. These operative agreements were important measures helping to lessen the threat of nuclear war, to hold back the arms race and opening up prospects for advance to universal disarmament. It should be noted that as a result of the Soviet-American summit talks in Moscow in the summer of 1974, a protocol was supplemented to the ABM treaty in which the two sides undertook to further limit the ABM systems permitted to each of them.

The understanding to draft a long-term agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms for the period from October 1977 to December 31, 1985, reached as a result of the working meeting between the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, L. I. Brezhnev, and the President of the United States, Gerald Ford, in November 1974 in Vladivostok, was a major step along the road of further limiting strategic armaments.

The new agreement is called upon to become a considerable contribution to the cause of improving relations between the USSR and the United States, to the cause of lessening the war danger and cementing international peace. It follows from the principled Soviet-American understanding on its content that it will be broader by its scope than the existing interim agreement and include commitments in respect to certain types of armaments that are not yet limited in any way. Under the new agreement the sides are to have for the first time limitations on the number of their inter-continental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles with MIRV (Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle) war heads. The new agreement, including thus limitations both on a quantitative and a qualitative nature, should be based on the principle of equality and undiminished security of the sides.

After the attainment of the Vladivostok accord talks were continued on the drafting of the text of the new agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. Strictly keeping to the spirit and letter of the decisions reached at summit level, the Soviet side is constructively pursuing the line of precisely embodying the above-mentioned accord in its entire volume in the draft agreement that is being prepared. It is not the Soviet Union's fault that despite the existing advance there still remain at present several unresolved questions of the substance of the new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

All who treasure peace on earth sincerely wish success to the present Soviet-American talks that are directed at the attainment of agreement on a new important step in the limitation of strategic offensive arms. As to the Soviet Union, its line in this question is clear and unambiguous. It is determined by the peace programme adopted by the 24th CPSU Congress.

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Speaking at a dinner in Vladivostok in honour of President Gerald Ford of the United States and summing up their talks, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L.I. Brezhnev stressed: "To make international relaxation really firm, it is necessary to consolidate it by relaxation in the military field. New progress in this direction will have immense importance for universal peace. I believe in this sense we have done useful work in Vladivostok. If this work is carried out to the end and the new agreement signed then, Mr. President, you and I will be thanked not only by the Soviet and American peoples but also by all the peoples of the world".

Unfortunately, there still exist serious obstacles in the way of the police of relaxation. They are being created by certain political forces, including in the United States, which have not given up their attempts to frustrate the cause of relaxation.

Reactionary circles in the United States are trying, in particular, to hamper the current Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. A loud propaganda campaign was started lately in the United States Congress and mass media with the obvious aim of casting aspersions on the Soviet Union as regards fulfilment of concluded agreements, of sowing doubt among the American public and members of Congress as to the viability of the documents that are being worked out in this field, and of impeding the process of strengthening trust between the peoples of our countries. As is known, most of the initiators of this campaign have long earned the reputation of outright opponents of the improvement of Soviet-American relations. Among them, for instance, are the Democratic Senator Henry Jackson, the Republican Senator James Buckley, the former Defense Secretary Laird and the Retired Admiral Zumwalt.

The concoctions by these people are as numerous as they are groundless. They include allegations about the construction in the USSR of launch silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles contrary to the interim agreement, about some sort of counter-action to technical means of control and other concoctions having nothing in common with the actual state of affairs.

What is the real purpose of such contentsions? There is only one answer--they are intended to obstruct the current, very complicated by their subject matter, Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, to put spokes in the wheels of the policy of relaxation.

In reality, of course, there have been no violations and are no violations by the Soviet Union of the ABM treaty and the interim agreement. The USSR's adherence to commitments undertaken by it under these agreements has been repeatedly admitted, including by the top leaders of the United States. At a press conference in the White House on June 25, 1975 President Ford stated that he had conducted a special investigation and found that the USSR had not violated the agreements. At a press conference in the Pentagon on June 20, 1975 the then U.S. Defence Secretary Schlesinger admitted that the United States had no grounds to allege that the Soviet Union violated the interim agreement. Secretary of State Kissinger, in particular at the press conference on December 9, 1975, has also repeatedly refuted allegations that there had been some sort of violations in the Soviet Union of the provisions of the operative agreements on the limitation of strategic arms. Such contentsions were also refuted by the U.S. defence secretary, D. Rumsfeld, at a press conference on December 22, 1975.

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Of course, certain questions may arise on the part of the sides in the process of fulfilment of such agreements containing commitments of complex content as the ABM treaty and the interim agreement. All such problems should be resolved on a mutually-acceptable basis within the framework of the Soviet-American standing consultative commission that was set up to assist the fulfilment of the above-mentioned agreements and which assembles for its regular sessions in Geneva twice a year. Also undoubtedly in the objective study of the arising questions [as received] without the creation around them of an unhealthy atmosphere without any grounds whatsoever. As it was noted by the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, F. Ikle, the instances of lack of clarity that the American side had in the process of fulfilment of the operative agreements between the USSR and the United States had been thoroughly studied and "fruitfully resolved" by both sides in Geneva.

One can only add to this that unfortunately not all the Soviet side's instances of lack of clarity in respect of some actions of the United States in connection with the commitments undertaken under the ABM treaty and the interim agreement are, as yet, fully eliminated.

The Soviet Union stands for the strict and conscientious fulfilment of earlier signed agreements and for the drafting and conclusion of a long-term agreement on the limitation of strategic arms on the basis of the accord reached in Vladivostok.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are a matter that is too serious and vitally important to be used for the conscious sowing of mistrust, as it is done by certain people in the West, or for various selfish political aims.

The successful conclusion of the drafting of the new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms would serve the interests not only of the USSR and the United States but also of all the peoples of the world.

from the office of
Senator Edward M. Kennedy
of Massachusetts

SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY TESTIFIES AGAINST U.S. COUNTERFORCE DOCTRINES

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

OCTOBER 21, 1975

Senator Edward M. Kennedy today charged that the Defense Department "is perpetrating a dangerous fraud on the American public," by advocating a doctrine of attacking Soviet missile silo, and pointed to "an unholy alliance between the arms builders" on both sides. He also warned that putting off an Arms Control Agreement now could "lead to the collapse of the Vladivostok Accords.

Testifying before the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control, Senator Kennedy based his argument primarily on a new Defense Department study that indicates U.S. casualties of 20 million or more if the Soviet Union launched a militarily-significant strike against the U.S. land-based deterrent. Earlier Pentagon figures argued that "only" 800,000 Americans would die in such an attack.

"In such a war," Senator Kennedy said, "there could be no winners. In fact . . . there might not even be any survivors."

Accordingly, Senator Kennedy argued that when US counterforce "programs come up for appropriations in the Senate, we should reopen the debate, and decisively reject them." These programs include the maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MARV), the new Trident warhead, and new, highly-accurate guidance systems. As Senator Kennedy indicates, "the issues being raised by the Department of Defense concerning counterforce . . . were debated at great length during previous administrations and soundly rejected --- for the same reasons they are invalid, today." These reasons also include the likelihood that a "small" nuclear war would quickly escalate to strategic nuclear conflict, as testified to by the Commander of the Strategic Air Command and the new Commandant of the Marine Corps.

On broader strategic issues, Senator Kennedy charged "a void of leadership" in the United States on arms control. "Only if those people with ultimate responsibility for the security of their people will take a more active, forthright concern with problems of controlling the arms race, will we be able to break the hold that the arms builders have on nuclear policy." Senator Kennedy continued: "Let us try to settle these issues at the bargaining table in Geneva, and not in the Halls of the Pentagon and the Soviet Ministry of Defense. For otherwise we will foster an unholy alliance between the arms builders, while the arms controllers watch in helpless impotence as the risks climb and safety falls."

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Senator Kennedy also emphasized the dangers of postponing a SALT II agreement until after the US Presidential election, as speculated recently in many press accounts. "We must understand the consequences of not applying our best efforts --- our top leadership --- to current negotiations", he said. "It could well be the collapse of the entire Vladivostok agreement of last November." In such a case, "we and the Russians (could) so poison the political atmosphere that it would be hard to salvage positive value in *detente*, itself." And, the Senator concluded, "History will judge us and the Soviet Union harshly if we lose this opportunity for moving forward in this vital realm."

In addition to decisive, top political leadership --- and effective control over the Pentagon --- Senator Kennedy proposed that the United States "accept a prohibition on strategic cruise missiles" at SALT, as part of efforts to break the logjam of negotiations. He also proposed a mutual moratorium with the Soviet Union on nuclear testing, the prompt negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and mutual restraint on both sides in arms developments and deployments. We should also demand Soviet restraint in its nuclear programs, including large missiles and the Backfire bomber.

Senator Kennedy also commended to the Senate the 1974 protocol to the ABM treaty, reducing sites from two to one, and urged its ratification. He reviewed the Vladivostok Resolution, introduced by himself and Senators Mondale and Mathias, which now has 42 cosponsors in both parties. (This resolution ties the current SALT talks to future efforts in arms control). He explained the dangers of nuclear proliferation if the superpowers do not limit and then halt their own nuclear arms race. He indicated that it is "inconceivable that we could need both strategic cruise missiles and the B-1 bomber, even if one or the other were otherwise justified."

Senator Kennedy concluded by raising the dangers of uncontrolled nuclear technology, and that "we seem better able to solve difficult technical problems than we are to generate the necessary political will to control this technology." He criticized the so-called "bargaining chip" theory of negotiating: "We are getting the worst of both worlds: we are buying weapons we do not need for military purposes and we are then unable or unwilling to abandon these so-called "bargaining chips" under almost any circumstances."

The full text of Senator Kennedy's testimony follows:

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TESTIMONY OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY AGREEMENTS

FOR RELEASE 2:30 PM

OCTOBER 21, 1975

I am pleased to meet with you this afternoon, to discuss critical issues of nuclear policy and arms control. These hearings, based on work done by the Office of Technology Assessment, can make an important contribution to public understanding of the most vital problem facing the United States: the need to prevent nuclear war, and particularly strategic nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

I have welcomed the chance to take part in the founding of the Office of Technology Assessment, and to support its work in studying the complex technical questions related to nuclear effects and arms control. This, I believe, is a valuable and proper use of OTA, helping to provide a much more enlightened and knowledgable basis for Congressional action. And I particularly value your leadership, Mr. Chairman (Senator Symington), as well as that of Senator Case, in the important debate facing the United States in this area.

In your first day of hearings, on September 18, three members of OTA's Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Effects spoke eloquently on the grave problems raised by a doctrine of limited war, or "selective counterforce strikes." A year ago we were told by the Defense Department that a Soviet attack against US missiles might "only" cause 800,000 deaths --- a figure more than 3 times U.S. combat deaths in World War II, and clearly a catastrophe for the nation. Now, through the research and other efforts of OTA, the Department admits that a militarily significant attack would cause far more casualties, perhaps 20 million or more, with untold effects on the rest of the population, and with high levels of casualties in Canada, as well.

Furthermore, even in inflicting these enormous civilian casualties, a significant Soviet attack against U.S. retaliatory forces would not destroy our air borne bombers or any of our missile launching submarines at sea. Thus Soviet motives for such an attack would be difficult, if not impossible, to understand.

Your other witnesses have documented this case, and I do not need to repeat their arguments this afternoon. Let me only draw one inescapable conclusion: that a so-called "limited" Soviet attack on US missile silos would cause such incredible destruction that, for many Americans, there would seem to be little difference between that and direct attack against American cities, themselves. Such an attack by the Soviet Union would still be an act of madness; and it could call forth from this country a devastating attack in return.

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Thus, Mr. Chairman, I feel that the new estimates of casualties released by your Subcommittee vividly illustrate the folly of the "counterforce" strategy currently being advocated by the Department of Defense. This strategy is founded on the false assumption that a "counterforce" war could somehow keep civilian casualties to "acceptable" levels and could prevent the war from expanding to a point where cities were attacked directly. The new estimates, however, show once again that nuclear warfare is starkly unlike anything we have ever known in the history of conflict. Even small nuclear attacks can result in enormous casualties. Moreover, a small nuclear exchange is likely to lead to a larger war which would effectively destroy both societies and inflict serious damage on other nations. In such a war there could be no winners. In fact a report released recently by the National Academy of Sciences shows that there might not even be any survivors.

The reality of civilian casualties, even in a so-called "limited counterforce" attack, make nonsense of the view, expressed by the Defense Department, that the Soviet Union might try to disarm the US land-based deterrent, and leave us with the awesome decision of beginning an attack against people. The Soviet Union must know that even a silo-busting attack will kill millions of Americans, and would be difficult if not impossible for us to distinguish between a limited attack against strategic targets in the United States and a direct and deliberate attack on US cities, particularly in the confusion that would necessarily accompany any strategic nuclear attack. Even the Commander of the Strategic Air Command, General Dougherty, has indicated that an attack on Minute-man "has to be put in the context of the kind of decision that one would have to make in order to attack the heartland of the United States."

Mr. Chairman, as I meet with you, today, I have a strong sense that we have been through all this before, in the 1960s. I need not remind you that the issues being raised by the Department of Defense concerning counterforce are not new. They were debated at great length during previous Administrations and soundly rejected. In 1960, then Senator John F. Kennedy argued emphatically that we should not drive "ourselves into a corner where the only choice is all or nothing at all, world devastation or submission." When he became President we developed and deployed the most devastating and flexible military force ever assembled. All of this was, of course, done with the constant support, advice, and cooperation of men like you, Mr. Chairman, on the Committee on Armed Services. We built over 1000 ICBMs protected in underground silos. We built 41 nuclear missile launching submarines, each with 16 missiles. We maintained a force of nearly 500 long-range bombers. During that Administration and those which followed, we have made every attempt to increase the flexibility of our strategic forces, to improve our command and control capabilities, and to provide strong conventional defenses. Today our nuclear forces give us great confidence to deter and thus to prevent a nuclear holocaust. At the same time we have acted to keep the nuclear threshold as high as possible; and we have begun an unprecedented cycle of arms control efforts with the Soviet Union.

At the same time, it became clear to the experts and officials who worked in this area during the 1960s that a doctrine of counterforce could not enhance the security of the United States and might diminish it by increasing the apprehensions of our opponents.

Perhaps the most dramatic change of view in this area was that of Robert McNamara. He began his tenure as Secretary of Defense as an advocate of counterforce and, after spending nearly eight years studying the doctrine and the weapons and reasons to support it, abandoned the effort because of what he called the "blunt inescapable fact that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can now attack the other even by complete surprise, without suffering massive damage in retaliation.

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Since that time our policy for building and deploying weapons
has centered on a requirement to maintain what was called "a clear
and present ability to destroy the attacker as a viable 20th
century nation and an unwavering will to use these forces in retaliation
to a nuclear attack upon ourselves or our allies." We adopted
this policy out of necessity; a recognition of the unique character
of nuclear weapons, the unprecedented challenges to world peace that
they pose, and the impossibility that any country could "win" a
nuclear war.

Previous Administrations also recognized that the demands of
stable deterrence have required that both we and the Soviet Union
give up efforts to gain a true defense against nuclear attack:
as technologically impossible and politically destabilizing --- as
a threat, in short, to bring on the very nuclear war we are seeking
to prevent. This necessary principle was enshrined in the ABM
Treaty of 1972, and the protocol to it of 1974, to which I hope
the Foreign Relations Committee will give prompt and favorable
consideration.

The ABM Treaty and the protocol to it recognize the "blunt
inescapable fact" understood by Secretary McNamara. And it is
this fact that leads inescapably to the widely-shared belief that
the Department of Defense is perpetrating a dangerous fraud on the
American public, by suggesting that it has found some way to change
the basic nature of the nuclear relationship through its counterforce
doquence.

It is important to understand, however, that established
US policy does not mean that the United States has no alternatives
following a Soviet nuclear attack on us, other than attacking the
Russian population. The decision to abandon a policy of building
weapons capable of threatening the Soviet retaliatory capability
never meant that the United States would only use its weapons
against civilians. To argue otherwise is a gross distortion of the
record. No one has ever disputed the fact that we should have
adequate flexibility to attack a variety of targets. I have
tried to make it clear that this was a central objective of the
forces deployed during the 1960s. In fact, we have had enormous
flexibility in our forces and targeting doctrine for many years.
There has never been a rule saying that a first nuclear salvo must
bring forth retaliation against cities. There is nothing to prevent
the improvement of command and control arrangements and of means to
permit rapid retargeting of missiles and aircraft. Indeed, we
should continue to improve our capability to respond flexibly in
the event of a nuclear attack.

Mr. Chairman, as we have built added flexibility into our
strategic forces, we have been concerned that the first nuclear
explosion not lead automatically to a strategic nuclear holocaust
that would mean the end of civilization as we know it. But can a
nuclear war be controlled once it has started? This is a problem
that has plagued us since the dawn of the nuclear balance. For
years, our best experts have cautioned against thinking that there
can be a "cheap" or "clean" nuclear war of any kind. This view has
been echoed recently by the new Commandant of the Marine Corps.,
General Louis H. Wilson. He finds it "very, very difficult to
believe" that a nuclear war could be contained following the use
by either side of even small nuclear weapons on a battlefield.
If this is so, how much greater risk either side would run by
making "surgical nuclear strikes" against enemy missile silos a
part of its policy. This is an argument against a counterforce
strategy that is as compelling as the high number of civilian
casualties in a first nuclear exchange, even one limited to strategic
targets.

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But gaining added flexibility is a far cry from improving our capacity to attack Soviet missile silos, and from pushing the qualitative arms race down to the point where we would have a significant chance of destroying the Soviet land-based deterrent. For such a policy not only flies in the face of evidence about civilian casualties --- whether intended or merely "incidental" to a counterforce strike. It also will raise grave questions in the minds of Soviet leaders about our overall political and military intentions and, I believe, erode the basis for effective control of the nuclear arms race. Any sustained Soviet effort to be able to threaten our deterrent would also raise profound questions.

Are the Russians seeking to acquire such a capability? Many people argue that this is so, on the basis of new, large missiles now being deployed. Of course, concern with these deployments --- as well as Soviet concern with US counterforce programs --- ignores the rest of the two strategic arsenals: including bombers and all the invulnerable missiles based in submarines at sea, with each submarine packing more explosive power than was used by all sides in World War II. Even with Soviet large missiles and our counterforce programs, neither side could launch a nuclear attack without risking almost total destruction in return. I am therefore deeply disturbed by the comment by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, in his letter of October 3rd to Senator McClellan, that we might have to return to a "launch on warning" concept to insure the long-term survivability of our land-based missiles. By introducing this highly-destabilizing concept, in ignorance of our bombers and submarines, I believe we would only tend to heighten tensions, and reduce the chances for real arms control.

It is also important to note another element of the strategy being proposed by the Department of Defense. New nuclear weapons programs are justified to a large degree on what can only be considered to be political judgments, rather than on analysis of military needs. For example, according to the most recent "Posture Statement" issued by Secretary of Defense, the first requirement for deciding on new strategic weapons is the requirement for maintaining "equivalence" with the Soviet Union. It is explained that we must match Soviet programs, not just in terms of substantial overall equality, which we surely have, but rather item by item, detail by detail. Supposedly, this is necessary to support foreign policy in other areas and to insure success in the SALT negotiations. Likewise, judgements about the "acceptability" to the United States of different levels of civilian casualties are surely political rather than military decisions.

Mr. Chairman, these issues must not be left to military analysts; rather, they belong squarely in the political realm, if civilian control of our armed forces is to have any meaning. In particular, greater weight should be given to the views of the Department of State. In fact, what Secretary Kissinger has said in the past appears to contradict the judgments of the Department of Defense in some critical political areas of nuclear policy. He told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations last year, for example, that: "When nuclear arsenals reach levels involving thousands of launchers and over ten thousand warheads, and when the characteristics of the weapons off the two sides are so incommensurable, it becomes difficult to determine what combination of numbers of strategic weapons and performance capabilities would give one side a militarily and politically useful superiority." If we have reached this point, there is little merit in trying to produce an exact balance of forces, in each aspect of these-forces: I, for one, would also like to see primary involvement of the State Department in making political judgments for nuclear policy, and direct comment on positions of our military planners, especially in regard to counterforce.

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We are, indeed, in an era of "substantial overall equality" with the Soviet Union in strategic terms. In some areas we are ahead; in some they are; but in sum there is a realistic military and political balance of weaponry. There is simply no merit for either side in attempting to match all of the other's advantages, when the overall balance is so equal. There is no merit in singling out one element of nuclear power --- generally one in which the other side has the "lead" --- and saying that it would be decisive in determining the actions of political leaders in a crisis. For the fundamental facts of nuclear balance and overkill make folly of the notion that one side is "ahead" because it can destroy the other 35 times over instead of only 34. Such an arcane calculus has no strategic merit; it has no political or psychological merit unless we say it does, and decide to act on that basis; it provides us with no answer to the question: How much is enough?" In fact, the answer comes back from the Pentagon: "Nothing is too much" --- an answer thoroughly discredited in the 1960s, as we recognized the imperative need for arms control, not arms anarchy.

Mr. Chairman, there are two appropriate responses for the United States. The first is to give up the folly of a "limited, counterforce attack", which as I have argued would only reduce the stability of the nuclear arms balance and invite the very nuclear crises we seek to avoid. Instead, we should be emphasizing those weapons based at sea that are our ultimate guarantee of deterrence. There is no value in increasing the risks for all by adopting the counterforce programs put through the Congress this year --- on what we now know to be the false assumption that "only" 800,000 Americans would die in a Soviet counterforce attack. For that can only contribute to a further cycle of madness in the nuclear arms race, while actually reducing the overall security of all concerned.

Perhaps an even greater danger inherent in the counterforce strategy, however, is its potential for interfering with arms control negotiations, which offer the only real prospect for ending the recurring cycles of arms buildup --- of arms anarchy. Our second response to the new Soviet programs should therefore be to demonstrate that our approach to nuclear weapons policy is less focussed on arms building than on arms controlling.

If we persuade ourselves that we must build new weapons to support the counterforce strategy, how can we offer proposals for limiting new types of weapons? Indeed, even a small US program designed to attack the Soviet ICBM force is likely to lessen Soviet interest in arms control, by increasing Moscow's interest in replacing its ICBM force with less vulnerable systems such as mobile missiles or new submarines. The Department of Defense argues that we can increase Soviet interest in arms control by pursuing a counterforce strategy, but it is unable to explain exactly how this strategy will work. Once we test and develop highly accurate guidance systems, terminally guided MARV, (or precision-guided re-entry vehicle --- PGRV), the large Trident missile, or any of the proposed versions of the MX --- the new US ICBM --- negotiations on these and other issues could become impossible. The United States has taken the lead in most new types of nuclear technology: therefore, the decision whether to expand the competition in arms into new areas is largely in our hands.

Let us then try to settle these issues at the bargaining table in Geneva --- in the interests of both sides and of all mankind --- and not in the halls of the Pentagon and the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Let us reopen the issue of funding counterforce programs: and decisively reject them. And let us demand equal restraint on the part of the Soviet Union. For otherwise we will foster an unholy alliance between the arms builders, while the arms controllers watch in helpless impotence as the risks climb and safety falls. The way to reduce any Soviet threat to any part of our deterrent is not in mimicking the follies they may commit. It lies rather in demanding in the SALT talks that neither side increase by any measure the chances that the world will be engulfed in nuclear war

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I am confident that this can be done. But it can
only be done if the issue of arms control is taken in hand and
settled by the political leaders in both countries. Only if those
people with ultimate responsibility for the security of their
people will take a more active, forthright concern with problems
of controlling the arms race, will we be able to break the hold
that the arms builders have on nuclear policy. This is not a novel
view. Many of us in the Senate --- including you, Mr. Chairman ---
have argued for strong Presidential leadership for many eyars. And
General Secretary Brezhnev, in the conversations I had with him last
year, professed to understand that only top political leadership
can end the nuclear spiral, in the mutual interest of both our
peoples.

Yet Soviet leadership has not exercised the decisive
influence on its military bureaucracy that is needed. I cannot
speculate on the reasons for this lack of action. However, it is
a void of leadership that is also apparent in our own country.
Here, the answer seems to be largely the lack of attention accorded
to vital issues of arms control. With Vietnam, Watergate, the economy,
and energy, our leaders have too often failed to realize that the
arms race is not over, the risks are not over, the important work
will not be completed without sustained and effective top-level
political leadership. Furthermore, as Secretary Kissinger himself
has said:

"My impression from what I have observed
is that both sides have to convince their
military establishments of the benefits
of restraint and that it is not a thought
that comes naturally to military people on
either side."

And as Dr. Fred Ikle, Director of the arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, has recently written: "... a new generation of
nuclear planners is discussing nuclear strategy" in a very stylized,
simplistic fashion," and tends to "ignore the risks inherent in
nuclear war."

It is for all these reasons that last January I joined with
my distinguished colleagues, Senators Mathias and Mondale, in
introducing the Vladivostok Resolution. It now has 42 cosponsors,
from both sides of the aisle, and in similar form has strong support
in the US House of Representatives.

In this resolution, we seek to take responsibility for
nuclear policy --- and arms control --- out of the Pentagon and put
it back where it rightly belongs: with our top political leadership.
We seek to provide the President with advice on the conduct of the
SALT II talks before a treaty or other agreement comes to the Congress
for approval. In this unprecedented act, we do not seek to tie
the hands of the Administration, but rather to give it firm support
in negotiating an effective, enduring agreement to begin halting
the nuclear arms race. This, I believe, is a right and proper
exercise of congressional prerogatives in cooperation not
confrontation with the Executive Branch. I am pleased that this
resolution has been endorsed by the Departments of State and
Defense, and by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Our primary concern in the Vladivostok Resolution is to
ensure that the agreement concluded in Vladivostok last November,
between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev, becomes a
major event in a continuing process of arms control, not the end
of that effort. We are particularly concerned to begin placing
limits on the qualitative aspects of the
arms race. The agreement on limiting MRVs is a welcome step.
But both countries must go far beyond, if the race in numbers is
not simply to be replaced by an equally dangerous and frightening
race in technology.

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I therefore commend this resolution to the Senate, and wish to make clear that, when any agreement comes to the Congress for approval, many of us will look for real evidence that the objectives of the Vladivostok Resolution were pursued by the United States in the SALT II negotiation.

Yet even if real talks on the qualitative arms race were to begin before the expiration of the 1972 Interim Agreement --- in October 1977 --- it is critical that neither side now take steps that could make these talks almost worthless. For our part, as the OTA report and these hearings make clear, we should give up the folly of building counterforce weapons, and of changing US strategic doctrine to imply that a limited nuclear war is possible. We should exercise the utmost restraint in introducing new strategic systems.--- and should accept a prohibition on strategic cruise missiles. Not only would these missiles vastly complicate the problem of verification, perhaps making it impossible to solve, but they also add only marginally to our deterrent capabilities. Even in seeking to maintain the third leg of our deterrent triad --- manned bombers --- it is inconceivable that we could need both strategic cruise missiles and the B-1, even if one or the other were otherwise justified.

We must also make clear to the Soviet Union its own responsibilities --- both in the weapons it deploys, such as the new, larger missiles and the Backfire bomber, and in recognizing that without rapid efforts to control both quantitative and qualitative improvements, both they and we will suffer from a new era of strategic doubt and political uncertainty.

In particular, both sides should give immediate and serious attention to slowing or preventing further competition in nuclear technology, by placing a ceiling on the number of permitted missile flight tests and by prohibiting new generations of ICBMs. In this regard, I was interested to note that Secretary of the Air Force McLucas last year told you, Mr. Chairman, that limits on missile flight testing would virtually eliminate improvements in missile accuracy.

Mr. Chairman, as we look to the SALT II talks, I am increasingly disturbed by reports that there may be no agreement this year. While Secretary of State Kissinger said on Meet the Press a week ago that "About ninety percent of the negotiation is substantially completed," other Administration sources seem to be preparing the American people for failure.

I agree with the argument that each SALT agreement should be judged on its own merits, to determine that it is genuinely in the interests of our national security. Each agreement must "have value in its own right," going beyond any positive impact that it could have on the overall political process we call detente.

Yet we must also understand the consequences of not applying our best efforts --- our top leadership --- to the current negotiations: it could well be the collapse of the entire Vladivostok Agreement of last November. Would we be able to join with the Soviet Union to revive the Vladivostok Agreement following the US Presidential election? Or would the pace of the arms race have gone so far forward --- would the whole process of arms control be in such doubt ---that any future agreement would be far worse for both sides? And would we and the Russians so poison the political atmosphere that it would be hard to salvage positive value in detente itself.

- MORE -

I believe that the time has come for the President of the United States to take firm control of the SALT negotiations, and seek, now, the completion of the Vladivostok Accords, and the groundwork needed for the next positive step in trying to halt the deadly nuclear spiral. There is now widespread questioning in the United States about some steps in detente. But however that issue is resolved, there can be no questioning about the imperative need to continue the work of arms control. Of course, agreements on arms control will be achieved only if they are in our mutual interest. This is no "zero-score game": it is a process of gaining security for both sides. And history will judge us and the Soviet Union harshly if we lose this opportunity for moving forward in that vital realm.

I believe that the debate on detente has itself ignored some important realities: including the reality of how far we have come in relations with the Soviet Union since the CUBan Missile Crisis and the days of an unstable balance of nuclear terror. As Secretary of State Kissinger said recently on Meet the Press:

"The fact of the matter is there are certain basic conditions that bring about this policy (of detente). The fact that the Soviet Union and the United States possess nuclear weapons capable of destroying humanity. The fact that we impinge upon each other in many parts of the world, so that we are, at one and the same time, rivals and yet we must regulate our conduct in such a way that we do not destroy humanity in conducting our disputes. We are ideological opponents, yet in a way we are doomed to coexist.

Those are the realities. They cannot be removed by rhetoric, and those are realities to which every President has been brought back throughout the history of the post-war period.

This, I believe, states in a compelling way the urgent need for us to get on with the SALT II talks.

Mr. Chairman, issues raised about the future of the US-Soviet nuclear arms race must be seen in a broader perspective. For it might be possible for Washington and Moscow to dig increasingly deeper into third- and fourth-generation problems of bilateral nuclear balance and yet invoke a greater danger: the danger of an indiscriminate spread of nuclear weapons around the world. Certainly, it will profit us and the Russians nothing to regulate the forward thrust of our own arms race, if a failure to stop that race, once and for all, only encourages other nations to build the bomb. It does not take the equivalent of 700,000 Hiroshima bombs, in the arsenals of the two superpowers, to have a nuclear war: it takes only one Hiroshima bomb in the hands of a country disposed to use it. Regretably, it is all too easy to forget Hiroshima; and half the people on earth had not yet been born in 1945. We can only hope that the leaders of the world will remember the terrible consequences of nuclear war, as portrayed so vividly in John Hersey's book, Hiroshima.

Of course, a round non-proliferation strategy must have many elements, including an immediate, mutual moratorium on nuclear testing by the superpowers, and the prompt negotiation of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. One other critical element is a rapid end to the Soviet-American nuclear arms race--- not the tortoise-like efforts of the year since Vladivostok. For only in breaking loose from old and sterile preoccupations of the past can we meet the real challenges of the future in this vital area of nuclear weapons.

- MORE -

- 9 -

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise a broader issue: One of the great ironies of contemporary civilization is that we seem better able to solve difficult technical problems than we are to generate the necessary political will to control this technology, even when we have an overwhelming incentive to do so. We have built weapons which use the terrifying energy processes of the sun, and have devised automatic navigation systems able to steer missiles a third of the way around the globe to within a fraction of a mile of their intended targets. Yet it is rare that decisions leading to technological achievements such as those are governed by anything other than the internal logic of science and engineering. The "next step" is often taken simply because it could be taken; not because there was a conscious, balanced judgment that our security --- or the world's --- would benefit as a result.

What we have done so far in arms control is significant mostly in setting the stage for real limits in the future. Achievements so far have been cruelly disappointing to those who expected them to have a significant impact on the momentum of the arms race. If anything the pace is now accelerating. Even with limits forecast for a new SALT agreement, we can expect the United States and the Soviet Union to develop an enormous number of new weapons technologies during the next few years. The United States is developing maneuverable reentry vehicles, advanced propellants, air-launched ballistic missiles, land mobile missiles, new warhead designs, new inertial guidance technologies, long range cruise missiles fired from aircraft or from ships at sea, and a variety of other small improvements which, taken together, could lead to substantial improvements in throw-weight, accuracy, and target coverage. On the Soviet side we are seeing new ICBM systems (possibly including a land-mobile ICBM), deployment of large number of MIRVs, improvements in missile accuracy, and the development of a new bomber, the Backfire. And there are the risks of new developments, by other nuclear powers, plus the spread of the bomb to yet more nations.

Mr. Chairman, arms control negotiations have simply been unable to keep pace with the furious pace of strategic technology. New devices are being developed so rapidly that we are scarcely able to find ways of managing one generation of technology, before we are overtaken by the next. In fact, it is possible that protracted negotiations have actually encouraged arms competition in some areas rather than reducing it. And it is clear that we and the Soviet Union are building some weapons less for their military value than for their supposed usefulness in political bargaining. As the bargaining drags on, these weapons mature and are deployed: few if any are ever bargained away. There is also a temptation to use the negotiations to inflate the importance of "nuclear numerology" --- such as matching numbers of warheads and the weight of missiles. Similarly, there are times when the urge to "get in under the wire" tempts us to rush through programs before they are limited by the negotiations process. We have seen this trend, for example, in our program to accelerate nuclear testing above the 150 kiloton limit which might be imposed by the "threshold test ban agreement."

In general, by delaying negotiations through all of these means, we are getting the worst of both worlds: we are buying weapons we do not need for military purposes, and we are then unable or unwilling to abandon these so-called "bargaining-chips" under almost any circumstances.

- MORE -

- 10 -

Even worse is the attitude of cynicism and hopelessness which these difficulties and repeated failures have engendered in many observers. It is easy to become discouraged by the energy and resourcefulness of the people and institutions working on weapons technology and by the enormous economic incentives which motivate some of them. With increasing frequency, therefore, we hear the argument that it is simply impossible to stop or even to slow the arms race. Yet this is an argument which mankind cannot accept. We cannot indulge in prophecies of doom --- for the consequences of failure are too great to allow us to make anything less than our best efforts to halt the arms race: and do it now. It is becoming abundantly clear that only negotiated arms control --- combined both with judicious use of self-restraint on each side, and a deflation on rhetoric extolling nuclear weapons as instruments of national policy --- can turn us back from the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I welcome this chance to meet with you, today, and again commend your efforts to bring to the American people the potentially horrendous consequences of a change in American strategic doctrine and deployments towards the myth of a limited nuclear war. Based on the new facts you have presented, I believe we should reopen the questioning of funding counterforce programs, and decisively reject them. And I believe we should demand of our leaders the decisive action in the budget and at the bargaining table that will help end the nuclear arms race, once and for all.

- 30 -

WASHINGTON STAR - Sunday

August 10, 1975

## Zumwalt-Bagley on the Kissinger Legacy

# Soviets Cheat, and We Turn Our Back

By Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr.
and Worth Bagley

Soviet violations of the SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and Interim Offensive Agreement signed in Moscow in 1972, together with President Ford's acceptance of the violations, have created a new strategic arms relationship — one that is appreciably different and less desirable than the one defended before the Congress, and one which has no congressional sanction.

The process of public discovery of this evasion of the constitutional process is a fascinating demonstration of the democratic system at work.

In the fall of 1974, Admiral Zumwalt wrote a letter to Melvin R. Laird, former secretary of defense,

pointing out that press information indicated the Soviet Union was violating the SALT understandings by deploying missiles heavier than were permitted. In December 1974, Laird replied that "There is no question that if information is available indicating that the SS-X-19 missile deployment will go forward in 1975 with a volume 50 per cent greater than the SS-11, such deployment would be in violation of the 1972 interim agreement unless ... amended."

By the summer of 1975, Laird was writing that the U.S.-Soviet SALT I Treaty "explicitly forbids testing any radar for ABM use ... yet ... the Russians have cheated on the treaty." Laird further stated that "the Soviets have cheated on ... the clear American understanding that neither side would appreciably increase the size of the intercontinental ballistic missiles."

Regrettably, when asked on June 25 about the Laird article, President

Ford erroneously reported that the Russians "have not used any loop-holes, and in order to determine whether they have or they haven't,

Admiral Zumwalt, chief of naval operations from 1970 to 1974, retired last year, but has continued to be outspoken on defense issues, especially in warning of a growing Soviet threat to the ability of the U.S. Navy to control the seas. Admiral Bagley retired this year after serving as vice chief of naval operations.

This article was distributed by New York Times Special Features. © 1975 Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. and Worth Bagley.

there is a Standing Consultative Group that is an organization for the purpose of deciding after investigation whether there have been any violations, and (it) came to the con-

SALT (Cont'd)

-2-

clusion that there have been no violations."

Properly alarmed, two senators sought to correct the public record. Sen. Henry Jackson immediately issued a statement expressing surprise at the President's answer in the light of information from the director of the CIA and the secretary of defense. Sen. James Buckley said that Ford's "statement ignores the enormous amount of intelligence" concerning a "persistent pattern of apparent Soviet violations of numerous elements of the first round Soviet accords and the ABM Treaty." Admiral Zumwalt subsequently agreed with Laird, Jackson, and Buckley and disagreed with the President.

Why is it that four honorable men can take a position which disagrees so markedly from the account presented by an honorable President? The answer lies in the terrible complexity of the strategic agreements and in the Byzantine nature of the negotiation

process used by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

The original SALT agreements were a patchwork of shockingly loose language, with loopholes big enough to drive a truck through. They came about in the following way.

The two sides, over many months, argued over the language of the prospective strategic contracts. As the Moscow Summit of May 1972 ap-

proached, President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger found themselves under pressure to bring home the deals to which they had committed themselves a year earlier. The re-election campaign was bearing down upon them.

Under this pressure, both men made numerous attempts to win support within the Executive Branch for

-3-

SALT (continued)

the draft language which the Soviets had indicated they would buy. But Secretary of Defense Laird and the Joint Chiefs were unwilling to leave obvious loopholes in the language.

Nixon and Kissinger knew that such reservations would come to light in congressional hearings during the approval process. The device hit upon to allay defense concerns without actually clarifying the language was to arrive at separate interpretive statements, initialed by both the U.S. and Soviet delegations, as well as other "understandings" which were not set down formally. In those cases where the Soviets would not agree formally with the proposed interpretive language, the U.S. issued "unilateral declarations" construing key provisions in the agreements, and stating that Soviet conduct at variance with those U.S. statements would be considered inconsistent with the agreements.

President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger gave the strongest kind of assurances to witnesses in the Executive Branch who were scheduled to go before Congress, that the U.S. would insist on meticulous Soviet observance of the "agreed interpretations" and "unilateral declarations." The testimony of these witnesses, the language of documents presented to the Congress, and the assurances given by the President and Kissinger in their briefings to the congressional leadership and the press, represented this patchwork deal with the Soviets as much more precise than its terms warranted.

Kissinger, in a June 1972 briefing to congressional leaders, categorized the interpretations as assurances that we had succeeded in placing a limit on expansion of the Soviet strategic forces. There is no question Congress believed it was approving strategic arms limitations of a precise nature which the administration was committed to enforce.

Viewed in this light, President Ford's reply on June 25 is seriously misleading in several ways. The Soviets have violated the basic contracts, the attached protocols, the agreed interpretations, and the unilateral declarations.

The U.S. has protested to the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). That group — the President's answer notwithstanding — is not an investigative or fact-finding body, nor can it form conclusions about violations. It is essentially a negotiating forum, containing U.S. and Soviet members. Many senior U.S. officials have spent hours in private and in official councils deliberating Soviet violations. In the SCC meetings the Soviets have lied to us, until confronted with unarguable evidence from our intelligence community. In contrast to what the President has said, this is the picture with which the commission has been presented:

* The USSR continues to deploy the SS-19, a missile 50 per cent larger and three to four times heavier in throwweight than the SS-11 it replaces, and therefore in clear violation of the U.S. declaration that such deployment would be inconsistent with the Interim Agreement. We are acquiescing to Soviet acquisition of greatly increased throwweight — in direct contradiction to what the administration told the Congress the 1972 agreement would accomplish.

We complained of this Soviet action in the SCC. The Soviets continued their SS-19 deployments. We then told them that we would be very disturbed if they committed still larger violations by deploying missiles even heavier than the SS-19. In this way, the U.S. effectively condoned Soviet cheating on the contract approved by

the Congress. But Congress has not even been informed of this action which substantially amended the agreement the Congress earlier approved.

* The Interim Agreement specified that missile silo dimensions would not be increased more than 15 per cent. Our negotiators made it clear that this meant an increase of 15 per cent in one dimension. Congress approved the agreement with this understanding. The Soviets have violated the 15 percent limitation. They have argued that all silo dimensions can be increased by 15 per cent, which would give them silos 50 per cent larger in volume than before. But Congress has not been officially informed of these violations or asked to approve the new strategic relationship which derives from failure to redress the violations.

* The Soviet violation of the ABM treaty's prohibition against upgrading air defense is most serious. By testing unauthorized radars in an ABM mode, they have violated the treaty. After we protested the ABM cheating, they stopped their testing. But no one can be sure that the Soviets haven't, by that cheating, already learned what they need to know. Assurances previously given Congress about Soviet inability rapidly to expand their ABM network beyond authorized limits are, at a minimum, less valid as a result. But Congress has not been so informed.

* There have been other actions by the Soviets sufficiently serious to warrant a protest to the SCC, such as development and possible deployment of land-mobile ICBMs which the U.S. specifically stated would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Interim Agreement; violations such as the construction of silos in greater

Congress has not been informed of the new, weaker strategic relationship which derives from violations and certain side agreements.

Salt (cont'd)

Soviet strategic missile in silo.

numbers than authorized under the treaty. These violations have been protested. The protests have been ignored, or the facts denied, or the claim made that the activity is allowed by loopholes in the agreement's language. Again, the Congress has not been officially informed.

"Don't come back again without strategic parity."

But when we examine the fine grain of Vladivostok it is clear that the relationship that will result from the "breakthrough" is a four-fold superiority in missile megatonnage, for the Soviet Union and a 2.7-fold superiority in missile warheads when the Soviets complete deployment of their huge new systems. These advantages for the USSR are similar to the ones the U.S. had at the time of the Cuban missile crisis — when both sides clearly perceived U.S. strategic superiority.

But not content with this advantage, the Soviet Union — this time in advance of the submission of a contract of the U.S. Congress — is in the process of modifying the Vladivostok accord.

First, possibly as a result of sloppy negotiating, the U.S. may not be able to count as a strategic vehicle the Backfire, a Soviet intercontinental bomber. We say "possibly" because there continues to be evidence that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger secretly gave away Backfire even before Vladivostok. In his December 1974 backgrounder, and on return from Vladivostok, he told reporters it had been agreed that Backfire would not count against the Soviets' overall limit.

When a majority of NSC members objected to this one-sided concession, Kissinger "reversed" his position; and when the December backgrounder was, several months later, pried from his office under the Freedom of Information Act, it was noted that the text had been altered to eliminate Kissinger's earlier admissions on Backfire.

Our SALT delegates at Geneva continue to argue that Backfire

Thus, with another summit set for later this year to flesh out another ambiguous strategic arrangement loosely agreed upon by President Ford at Vladivostok, there are major, unexplained issues which must be resolved by the Congress:

What is the long-term value of the administration's formal interpretations and assurances to Congress?

How can the Congress fairly deliberate upon the consequences of a new strategic relationship when the existing one has been changed in major and disadvantageous ways by Soviet disregard of the contracts as they were explained by the President?

Does the President have the authority to redefine Soviet obligations under existing agreements in a way that significantly alters the strategic balance without consulting with the Congress?

How can the U.S. continue to vest its security on such imprecise contracts?

Let us now examine the deal currently in the making. At Vladivostok, in his first act of summitry, President Ford achieved what was called a great conceptual breakthrough. It was announced that both sides had agreed to have 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,320 MIRVed (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle) missiles. This was made to appear responsive to the Jackson Resolution which told the U.S. administration in essence:

SALT (cont'd)

-5-

should be included. But the knowing
smiles of the Soviets suggest that
Kissinger's earlier deal remains in-
tact.

As bad as the Vladivostok asymmetries are for us, Russia's 2.7-fold missile warhead superiority represented an upper limit as long as the 1,320 ceiling on MIRVed missiles remained verifiable. Under fire from critics of the Vladivostok summit, Kissinger in December 1974 assured us that the U.S. would not enter into any SALT II agreement without tough verification provisions. He went so far as to say that, "If the Soviets reject our verification formula, it is very hard to conceive how there can be a deal."

The Soviets have rejected Kissinger's verification formula, stating that verification provisions are not needed. They hint they might accept a weak verification provision if we pay for it with other concessions. Thus, although U.S. experts all agree that nothing weaker than the current, already watered down U.S. verification proposal will work, the Soviets seek to plant the seed of future ambiguities in this forthcoming deal — ambiguities which would make it possible for them to MIRV all of their missiles, not just the authorized 1,320.

Logically we could expect the Soviets, after rendering largely meaningless the "parity" of 2,400 strategic vehicles by excluding from their total the Backfire bomber, to imbalance the relationship still further by cheating and proceeding to MIRV most of their 2,300 ICBMs.

This is where Soviet cheating under SALT I and our attitude toward it become relevant to the Vladivostok negotiation. The administration's decision not to disclose Soviet cheating on the contracts approved by the Congress in SALT I is a grave blow to those who believe in continuing sensible arms control arrangements. It destroys U.S. leverage to achieve resolution of "ambiguities." It emboldens the Soviets to fight still harder for even greater ambiguities in future agreements. It puts the Ford seal of approval on very bad Soviet conduct. And it makes unlikely any real teeth on verification.

There remains to be explored the
question of why and how President
Ford has failed to focus on the differ-
ences between the agreements as
portrayed to the Congress, in con-
trast with the way they have been ac-
cepted in practice by the aministra-
tion.

The question is how Ford has been
misled. It is, we think, the result of
his being relatively isolated from
other experts in these matters by the
duality of Kissinger's role. Receiving
information from his secretary of
state — Henry Kissinger — on the
one hand, which is vetted and vali-
dated by his assistant for national se-
curity affairs — Henry Kissinger —
on the other, has destroyed the natu-
ral give and take designed to prevent
a President from becoming captive to
a single view. Of course, there is
nothing in theory to prevent Henry
Kissinger from providing accurate
information to the President.

The rise and decline of Henry Kissinger must be discussed in four phases. His character has not changed but his attitude toward his job has modified remarkably as his power has increased.

Phase I was the objective phase. Soon after Mr. Nixon was elected he brought Gen. Andrew Goodpaster to Washington to work out with Kissinger a formal system for the National Security machinery to supersede the very loose system which both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had preferred.

The system which Goodpaster and
Kissinger recommended was design-
ed to bridge the interface between
the various agencies to insure that all
were represented, all had their "day
in court," and that an adversary
process existed to distill the issues.
Organizational entities, appropriate-
ly constituted with membership from
responsible agencies, were created to
accomplish these objectives — the
Washington Special Action Group;
the VP (Verification Panel) to deal
with arms control issues; the SRG
(Special Review Group); The Forty
Committee in the covert intelligence
field. Each of these organizations
had a different charter. There were
members who had seats on several of
these organizations. Kissinger
emerged as the chairman of each of
these committees.

Kissinger's job was to compile
alternatives, listing the pros and cons
of each, and to distill in that way the
complex issues in order to make it
possible for a busy president to make
decisions.

In Phase I, the system worked reasonably well. Henry Kissinger, in the proper subordinate role, presented balanced views and distilled the issues fairly.

Phase II began in 1970, after the shakedown period was over and the players began to become familiar with their assignments. It continued until the election of 1972. This phase was characterized by an increasing power struggle. Kissinger had been discovered by the press. He began spending long hours with chosen reporters and commentators, giving brilliant dissertations on foreign policy issues. "Frank" revelations of the president's thinking were made. Bureaucratic struggles were described. The problem that a "highly qualified" national security assistant had in dealing with an "unsophisticated" secretary of state was subtly demonstrated. The problem that the same NSC assistant had in "controlling for the president" a secretary of defense (Laird) with an independent power base in Congress was gently revealed. If the reporter was of the left he heard of Kissinger's battles with the right; if of the right, of Henry's battles with the left.

Delicately, the web was woven.
The stories of Kissinger's successes
began to emerge — at first in tandem
with praise for Mr. Nixon, and later

SALT (Cont'd)

-6-

'If God had meant man to fly ...'

increasingly presented as singlehanded achievements by Kissinger. As the press image began to develop, Kissinger felt more and more confident that he had an independent power base. There was a gradual erosion of the Goodpaster staff system. Kissinger began to by-pass the system.

Important communications were set up between Moscow and Peking to which no one except the president was privy. As an example, the announcement of the conceptual breakthrough in SALT I, issued in May 1971, came after four months of backchannel discussions between Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin and Kissinger. But Kissinger misled the responsible agency, the Verification Panel, two days before that announcement was issued, so that its members had no inkling of the major accommodation about to occur — and of course, none of the participation which their staff function had been set up to produce.

These by-passings became more frequent. And in most cases, the decision represented a weakening of U.S. positions as Nixon and Kissinger pressed to achieve SALT I prior to the '72 election.

Some of these decisions from on high led to the emergence of "ambiguities" in the SALT agreements. Staff protest of these decisions led to some of the "agreed interpretations" and "unilateral declarations" with which Kissinger, after the fact, sought to regenerate support for risky decisions.

SALT I was achieved. Assurances were given to all that U.S. firmness of purpose would insure Soviet performance. But even as the ink was drying on SALT I agreements, the ambiguous language which had resulted from by-passing the system began to haunt Kissinger.

For example, the U.S. SALT delegation and his own NSC staff concluded that identification of the specific "older" launchers that the agreement allowed the Soviets to trade in for modern submarines... launched ballistic missile launchers was dangerously vague.

Kissinger went to Dobrynin and executed, without informing anyone in the chain of responsibility, an "agreed clarification." This specified that "launchers of older ballistic missiles on diesel-powered submarines... cannot be used for purpose of replacement." This language was intended to make clear that the Soviets could go from 740 to 950 SLBMs only by retiring 210 older land-based ICBMs.

At the same time, however, this "clarification," executed in secret and without proper agency scrutiny, created a new loophole by defining a modern SLBM as one "deployed on a nuclear-powered submarine commissioned since 1965." This wording would have made it possible for the Soviets to build any number of diesel submarines and install new nuclear

SALT (Cont'd)

-7-

In 1973, the rest of the U.S. government discovered the "secret covenant, secretly arrived at" when the Soviets told our SALT negotiators about it 11 months after the fact. We paid a price to renegotiate this sloppy clause.

By the end of Phase II, Kissinger had risen so high in public esteem that Richard Nixon, H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman jealously were about to return him to private life in the first blush of re-election victory.

These personal tensions between Kissinger and Nixon provided a check on the power the former had acquired.

Phase III began with Watergate and continued to the resignation of Nixon. Early in this period, in one of those dramatic reversals of fate, Kissinger was made secretary of state, while keeping his assignment as national security assistant. This appointment was designed to restore a tarnished presidential image with Kissinger's reflected glory.

The appointment intensified a phase characterized increasingly by the most severe misuse of his position. Kissinger's ego and his president drove him to continue foreign policy "successes." Now, at last, Kissinger had the legal authority to match the responsibility he had assumed through his committee chairmanships.

During this phase, a number of dedicated public servants concluded that they could no longer serve under such a system and, in varying ways, began to terminate their services. As the June-July 1974 Moscow summit approached, the distinguished Paul Nitze terminated his service, stating publicly that he could no longer see how arms control negotiations could be carried out until respect for the Constitution was restored. This resignation and other opposition led Mr. Nixon, with his eye on the need for anti-impeachment votes, to pull back at Moscow. He refused to sign an agreement which would have signalled permanent strategic inferiority and limited himself to a conceptual agreement on the test ban.

Kissinger, in implicit protest, issued his famous lament: "What in the name of God is the meaning of strategic superiority? What do you do with it?" — forgetting in his eagerness to gain a negotiating objective that you use strategic superiority to back the other side down

in a crisis as in Cuba 1962; forgetting that with it you frighten the allies of the inferior superpower into changing their political relationships.

Phase IV began with the accession of Mr. Ford to the presidency. Ill-prepared in the foreign policy field, having in his first year to concentrate on restoration of domestic tranquility, Mr. Ford chose initially to keep Kissinger on in both jobs. Ford was aware of the increasing congressional distrust of Kissinger's word and policies. But to date, he has chosen to support Kissinger.

He has been ill-rewarded. The information Kissinger provided which led Ford on June 25, 1975, to deny any violations of SALT was badly misleading. It is inconsistent with Kissinger's private admission recently that the Soviets lied to us at the 1972 summit when they assured us they would only deepen (not also widen) their silos and by not more than 15 per cent.

At this point, in order to avoid continuing Soviet strategic superiority, real and perceived, and to evaluate Soviet performance and integrity in the strategic portion of detente, there are major actions that need to be done to redress Kissinger's disinformation campaign and to insure that the President and the public are aware of the facts:

* First, Congress should hold hearings to measure the performance of the Soviet Union in SALT I against the assurances the administration gave the Congress when the agreements were ratified, in order to have a basis for judging what might occur under SALT II

* Second, the President should reduce his risk of being misled in the future by terminating the dual status of Henry Kissinger and installing a new national security assistant in whose honesty the country and the Congress may have full confidence.

FBIS 80

ISRAEL REPORTEDLY GIVES VIEWS TO SYRIA ON POSSIBLE WITHDRAWALS
TA111659 TEL AVIV HA'AREZ IN HEBREW 11 SEP 75 P L TA

(ARTICLE BY DAN MARGALIT, U.S. CORRESPONDENT)

(EXCERPTS) ISRAEL HAS TRANSMITTED TO SYRIA ITS VIEWPOINTS REGARDING THE POSSIBLE RANGE OF WITHDRAWALS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND THE ESSENCE OF ITS VIEWPOINTS REGARDING A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT. THE UNITED STATES HAS TRANSMITTED THESE IDEAS TO DAMASCUS, BUT HAS RECEIVED NO REACTION AS YET.

DIPLOMATIC SOURCES TODAY REVEALED THAT THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES IN REGARD TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

IT APPEARS THAT THE UNITED STATES THINKS THAT, ON THE ONE HAND, ONE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL THE SINAI NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED AND THE PROTOCOL FINALLY SIGNED IN ANOTHER 2 WEEKS, WHILE ON THE OTHER HAND ONE SHOULD WAIT FOR DAMASCUS' DECISION ON WHETHER IT IS AT ALL INTERESTED IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. IF DAMASCUS PROVES INTERESTED, THEN THE UNITED STATES WILL START POLITICAL CONTACTS WITHOUT DELAY.

11 SEP 1803Z TEF/CAJ

‡‡‡R216

R 12913)1BYLZ@TCYN

‡NIDEAST - AMERICAN‡

WASHINGTON, SEP 11, REUTER - SENATOR HENRY JACKSON

SUGGESTED TODAY THAT AN AMERICAN OBSERVER TEAM TO BE STATIONED
IN THE SINAI DESERT AS PART OF THE NEW ISRAELI-ARAB AGREEMENT
MIGHT BE IN DANGER OF ATTACK FROM THE PALESTINE LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION.

THE WASHINGTON STATE SENATOR, A CONTENDER FOR THE
DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION, VOICED HIS CONCERN AFTER HE
AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
RECEIVED A BRIEFING ON THE ACCORDS FROM SECRETARY OF STATE
HENRY KISSINGER.

SENATOR JACKSON, WHO HAS SAID PREVIOUSLY HE HOPES TO VOTE
FOR THE AGREEMENT DESPITE HIS MISGIVINGS, TOLD REPORTERS, "I
THINK IT WOULD BE TOP PRIORITY FOR THE PLO TO MAKE AN ASSAULT
ON THE AMERICANS IN THIS AREA."

HE SAID THE AIM WOULD BE TO CAUSE AS MUCH TROUBLE AS
POSSIBLE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EGYPT AND
ISRAEL AND TO GET THE AMERICANS OUT OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

‡

MORE 1340

‡‡‡R217

R 12812)2BYLZ&TZSA

‡‡MIDEAST - AMERICAN 2 WASHINGTON‡

SENATOR JACKSON ALSO SAID THERE WAS A DANGER OF A COUNTER
MOVE BY THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN RESPONSE TO THE
PLAN TO STATION UP TO 200 AMERICAN TECHNICIANS TO MAN EARLY
WARNING SYSTEMS BETWEEN EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI LINES.

HE HAS SAID PREVIOUSLY THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT DEMAND A
PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE FUTURE, THREATENING A BIG
POWER CONFRONTATION IN THE REGION.

BOTH SENATOR JACKSON AND COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN JOHN STENNIS
(DEMOCRAT, MISSISSIPPI), INDICATED THERE WAS LITTLE ALTERNATIVE
BUT TO APPROVE THE PLAN.

SENATOR STENNIS SAID HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE ARMS PACKAGE
FOR ISRAEL TO BE SUBMITTED AS PART OF THE MIDDLE EAST AGREEMENT
DID NOT JEOPARDISE AMERICAN DEFENCE SUPPLIES.

WHILE DR KISSINGER WAS TESTIFYING TO THE SENATE PANEL,
UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE JOSEPH SISCO WAS GOING THROUGH THE
AGREEMENT WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS COMMITTEE.‡

MORE 1342

‡‡‡R218

R 12924)LBYLZ@TRYR

‡‡MIDEAST - AMERICAN 3 WASHINGTON‡

BOTH COMMITTEE MEETINGS WERE CONDUCTED BEHIND CLOSED DOORS
BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE DETAILS BEING DISCUSSED.

CONGRESSIONAL OBSERVERS BELIEVED THAT BOTH CHAMBERS WILL
EVENTUALLY APPROVE THE AGREEMENT DESPITE MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE
U.S. PRESENCE AND THE THREE BILLION DOLLAR AID PACKAGE FOR
ISRAEL AND EGYPT.

SOME MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE ALSO RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT
SECRET PARTS OF THE AGREEMENT BUT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS
PROMISED TO WORK OUT WITH CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES HOW AMERICAN
UNDERTAKINGS IN THE AGREEMENT ARE TO BE MADE PUBLIC.

‡

REUTER 1343

FBIS 69 (SEE 66)

CAIRO ISSUES STATEMENT ON VOICE OF PALESTINE TRANSMITTER

LD 111532 CAIRO DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ARABIC 1500 GMT 11 SEP 75 LD

(TEXT) THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND INFORMATION HAS ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

SOME ELEMENTS HAVE TRIED TO EXPLOIT THE VOICE OF PALESTINE RADIO FROM CAIRO, WHICH EGYPT HAD PLACED IN THE SERVICE OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION, AND TO DIVERT THIS RADIO FROM ITS AIMS AND TURN IT INTO A PARTY TO THE FABRICATED INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST EGYPT--A CAMPAIGN ORGANIZED BY ELEMENTS WHOSE INTERESTS DICTATE THAT THE PALESTINE ISSUE AND THE CONDITIONS IN THE AREA BE FROZEN IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH PAN-ARAB INTERESTS.

THE EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT EGYPT, OUT OF ITS ARAB AND NATIONAL COMMITMENTS TO THE PALESTINE QUESTION AND IN LINE WITH ITS CONSTANT ARAB STRATEGY, TO WHICH IT HAS DEVOTED ALL ITS MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC CAPABILITIES FOR SERVING THIS CAUSE, HAD PLACED ITS INFORMATION FACILITIES IN THE SERVICE OF THE CAUSE AS IS KNOWN TO ALL ARABS IN THE CONTEMPORARY HISTORY OF EGYPTIAN INFORMATION SUPPORT FOR ALL ARAB LIBERATION MOVEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ARAB HOMELAND.

SINCE 1965 EGYPT HAS BEEN PROVIDING THE PLC WITH A SPECIAL FREQUENCY FOR BROADCASTING THE VOICE OF PALESTINE, WHOSE AIM HAD BEEN SET AS SERVING THE PALESTINE QUESTION AND ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH THE STRUGGLING PALESTINIAN PEOPLE INSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY.

IN THE FACE OF THE ATTEMPTS TO DISTORT THE AIMS OF THIS RADIO AND TO USE IT AS A MEANS OF DIVIDING THE ARAB RANKS AND HARMING THE FRATERNAL EGYPTIAN AND PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S, AND OUT OF ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PALESTINE QUESTION, THE EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE TAKEN THE NECESSARY STEPS TO INSURE THAT THE FREE PALESTINE VOICE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE ITS STRENGTH, HONESTY AND EFFECTIVENESS.

ALL EGYPTIAN INFORMATION MEDIA WILL CONTINUE TO DEVOTE ALL THEIR EFFORTS FOR THE SAKE OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EGYPT'S HISTORIC ARAB COMMITMENTS TOWARD ITS NATION AND UNTIL THE RESTORATION OF THE ENTIRE ARAB TERRITORY AND THE RIGHTS OF THE FRATERNAL PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

11 SEP 1969Z TEF/CAJ

......

U 13015)1BYLZYRZ&T

±URGENT »»» ASSEMBLY - TESTS±

UNITED NATIONS, SEP 11, REUTER - THE SOVIET UNION TODAY CALLED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY BANNING ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS.

THE PROPOSAL WAS CONTAINED IN A LETTER FROM SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO TO SECRETARY-GENERAL KURT WALDHEIM ASKING FOR A NEW ITEM TO BE PLACED ON THE AGENDA OF THE REGULAR GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION OPENING ON SEP 16.

THE ITEM WOULD BE TITLED 'ON CONCLUDING A TREATY ON THE COMPLETE AND GENERAL PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.'

THE LETTER FROM MR. GROMYKO, HANDED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BY SOVIET U.N. REPRESENTATIVE JACOB MALIK, WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE TEXT OF A PROPOSED TREATY.

±
MORE 1410

‡‡‡R232

U 13022)2BYLZYREYL

±ASSEMBLY - TESTS 2 UNITED NATIONS±

MR. GROMYKO SAID THE FORTHCOMING ASSEMBLY WOULD BE HELD IN AN INTERNATIONAL SITUATION CHARACTERIZED BY 'MAJOR POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS.'

''TO SUPPLEMENT AND CONSOLIDATE POLITICAL DETENTE BY MEASURES IN THE MILITARY FIELD, TO PUT AN END TO THE ARMS RACE, TO ACHIEVE A REDUCTION IN ARMS PRODUCTION AND, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, TO EMBARK UPON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT -- THIS IS THE ORDER OF THE DAY OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE.''

THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO WILL ATTEND THE FORTHCOMING ASSEMBLY SESSION, SAID PREVIOUS IMPORTANT STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION WERE THE 1963 PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY OUTLAWING NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE ATMOSPHERE, OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER, AND THE JULY 1974 SOVIET-U.S. TREATY LIMITIING UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS.

UNDER THAT TREATY, THE PARTIES UNDERTOOK NOT TO CARRY OUT UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTSWITH A YIELD OF MORE THAN 150 KILOTONS (150,000 TONS OF TNT) AFTER MARCH 31, 1976.

THAT IS ABOUT EIGHT TIMES THE YIELD OF THE ATOM BOMBS DROPPED ON HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI AT THE END OF WORLD WAR TWO.

±
MORE 1413

‡‡‡R237

R 13033)3BYLZYRZSA

‡‡ASSEMBLY - TESTS 3 UNITED NATIONS (R-232 ... WAR TWO.)‡
ON THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION; ALWAYS A MAJOR STUMBLING
BLOCK TO POLICING UNDERGROUND TESTING; THE SOVIET UNION'S
PROPOSED TREATY WOULD RELY ON THE PARTIES' 'OWN NATIONAL
TECHNICAL MEANS OF CONTROL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERALLY
RECOGNIZED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.'''

THE WESTERN POWERS HAVE IN THE PAST MAINTAINED THAT, IN THE
ABSENCE OF AN IRON-CLAD VERIFICATION SYSTEM, IT IS NOT ALWAYS
POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH UNDERGROUND TESTS FROM EARTHQUAKES AND
OTHER SEISMIC DISTURBANCES.

THE PROPOSED SOVIET TREATY WOULD EXEMPT UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIONS CONDUCTED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

THE TREATY WOULD BE IN FORCE FOR AN UNLIMITED TIME BUT ANY
PARTY WOULD BE FREE TO WITHDRAW, ON THREE MONTHS' NOTICE, IF IT
DECIDED THAT 'EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS' JEOPARDIZED ITS SUPREME
NATIONAL INTERESTS.‡

MORE 1426

‡‡‡R245

R 13166BYLUIVWYD

‡‡ASSEMBLY - TESTS 4 UNITED NATIONS (R237...NATIONAL INTERESTS)‡

THE SOVIET UNION HAS ON A NUMBER OF PREVIOUS OCCASIONS
PROPOSED NEW AGENDA ITEMS, OFTEN DEALING WITH DISARMAMENT
QUESTIONS, ON THE EVE OF A GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

BUT BECAUSE MOST STAND LITTLE IMMEDIATE CHANCE OF
IMPLEMENTATION, THEY HAVE BEEN REGARDED BY THE WESTERN POWERS
AS LARGELY PROPAGANDA EXERCISES.

CHINA HAS BEEN EVEN MORE CRITICAL, CALLING THEM A FRAUD.

THE LAST MAJOR SOVIET DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE WAS A PROPOSAL
TO CUT MILITARY BUDGETS BY 10 PER CENT AND TO USE PART OF THE
PROCEEDS TO AID DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

THIS HAS REMAINED A DEAD LETTER DUE TO THE DIFFICULTY IN
VERIFYING THE EXACT SIZE OF THE BIG POWERS' MILITARY SPENDING.

‡

REUTER 1455

DURING FLIGHT OVER DRY LAND THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDANCE SYSTEM IS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPARISON OF DATA FED INTO THE ON-BOARD COMPUTER MEMORY RELATING TO THE SHAPE OF THE TERRAIN OVER THE PLANNED ROUTE AND THE ACTUAL READINGS OBTAINED FROM THE SPECIAL RADIO ALTIMETER INSTALLED ON BOARD.

THE TOPOGRAPHICAL DATA, THE JOURNAL OCEAN SCIENCE NEWS HAS REPORTED, ARE PREPARED IN ADVANCE BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY ON THE BASIS OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE TERRITORY TAKEN FROM STATELLITES. THE TASK IS SET OF INSURING THAT THE DATA FED INTO THE COMPUTER ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SEASONAL CHANGES IN THE TOPOGRAPHY. THIS GUIDANCE METHOD SHOULD INSURE ACCURACY IN HITTING THE TARGET WITH A CEP OF 160 METERS (THE RADIUS OF THE HYPOTHETICAL CIRCLE WITHIN WHICH HALF THE MISSILES ARE EXPECTED TO STRIKE).

THE MISSILE'S FLIGHT ROUTE IS PLANNED TO LIE THROUGH THE LOWEST-LYING PLACES, BETWEEN HILLS, BELOW THE ZONE OF OPERATION OF GROUND RADAR STATIONS. IT WAS PRECISELY FOR THIS THAT A FLIGHT ALTITUDE OF A FEW DOZEN METERS WAS CHOSEN. BUT, FROM THE RANGE VIEWPOINT THIS ALTITUDE IS VERY INCONVENIENT. THUS, IF THE MISSILE FLEW AT AN ALTITUDE OF 6,000 METERS WITH THE SAME STOCK OF FUEL ITS RANGE WOULD BE NOT 2,400 BUT 3,300 KM. FLIGHT AT LOW ALTITUDE, IN THE DESIGNERS' PLAN, SHOULD INSURE THE OVERCOMING OF "ALL KNOWN AND HYPOTHETICAL GROUND AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS," THE JOURNAL UNDERWATER LETTER HAS WRITTEN.

PRELIMINARY TESTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN CARRIED OUT ON THE GUIDANCE SYSTEM. THE APPARATUS WAS FITTED TO A CORSAIR II A-7 CARRIER-BASED ASSAULT AIRCRAFT. IN FLIGHT OVER THE NEW ENGLAND REGION, WHOSE TERRAIN AND SEASONAL CHANGES, INCIDENTALLY, ARE BELIEVED TO BE CLOSE TO CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION, THE AIRCRAFT RECEIVED COMMANDS FROM AN AUTONOMOUS GUIDANCE SYSTEM AND ZEROED ACCURATELY IN ON THE TARGET. ACCORDING TO FOREIGN PRESS REPORTS, THE RESULTS OF THE TEST WERE DEEMED EXCELLENT. HOWEVER, ALLURING AS THIS SYSTEM MAY BE, IT IS STILL INTENDED TO DEVELOP AN ADDITIONAL PASSIVE UHG RADIO GUIDANCE SYSTEM.

AS IS EVIDENT FROM PRESS REPORTS, MOCK-UPS HAVE ALREADY BEEN LAUNCHED FROM TORPEDO TUBES UNDERWATER. LAUNCHES HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT FROM AN UNDERWATER PLATFORM AT DEPTHS CORRESPONDING TO THE PERISCOPE DEPTH OF A SUBMERGED SUBMARINE. FLIGHT TESTS CALCULATED TO LAST 2 YEARS WILL START WHEN DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPERIMENTAL MODEL IS COMPLETED IN 1976. IT IS PLANNED TO BRING THE MISSILE INTO SERVICE IN 1979.

ALL THESE PLANS ARE WIDELY ANNOUNCED BY THE PENTAGON AND CONFIRMED IN STATESMEN'S SPEECHES. AND THIS IS DONE QUITE OPENLY.

(MORE)

11 SEP 1979 TEF/CAJ

FBIS 72

ONLY ADD 71 (SHASKOLSKIY ARTICLE)

XXX DONE QUITE OPENLY.

(TEXT) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE MOST IMPORTANT "JUSTIFICATION" FOR THE NEED TO DEVELOP THE NEW U.S. MISSILE NOW IS THE FACT THAT STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES DO NOT COME UNDER THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT. WHICH LIMITS ONLY BALLISTIC MISSILES. ANOTHER "INCENTIVE" FOR THE PENTAGON IS THAT INSPECTION AND LIMITATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH WEAPONS ARE EXCEPTIONALLY DIFFICULT.

FIRST, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH THE STRATEGIC MISSILE BY APPEARANCE FROM A TACTICAL ONE WHICH, UNDER A U.S. NAVY ASSIGNMENT, IS TO BE DEVELOPED IN THE SAME PROGRAM AND IN THE SAME OVERALL DIMENSIONS (THE MISSILE IS DESIGNED TO STRIKE AT SURFACE SHIPS AT A RANGE OF UP TO 550 KM AND WILL HAVE A CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVE CHARGE).

SECOND, IT WILL BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO FOLLOW TESTS OF CRUISE MISSILES SINCE THEY FLY AT LOW ALTITUDE.

THIRD, NOT ONLY A MISSILE-ARMED BUT ALSO ANY TORPEDO-ARMED SUBMARINE--OVER WHICH NO CONTROL AT ALL IS ENVISAGED--WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY THE NEW MISSILES.

ACCORDING TO THE LATEST PRESS REPORTS, THE PENTAGON HAS ALREADY REQUESTED $45 MILLION FOR THE NEW MISSILE IN THE 1975 FISCAL YEAR. CONGRESSMEN HAD NO SINGLE OPINION WHEN DISCUSSING THE REQUEST IN BOTH HOUSES. HOWEVER, A COORDINATING COMMISSION COMPOSED OF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RESOLVED TO ALLOCATE $38 MILLION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE, WHICH IS 15 TIMES THE SUM ALLOCATED THE PREVIOUS YEAR, AND FOR THE 1976 FISCAL YEAR THE PENTAGON IS ALREADY REQUESTING $100 MILLION...

ALTHOUGH THE PROJECTED NEW STRATEGIC MISSILE HAS NOT YET RECEIVED THE TRADITIONAL EXOTIC NAME AND IS KNOWN SIMPLY BY THE LETTERS SLCM, U.S. MILITARY LEADERS ARE ALREADY STATING THAT IT IS DESIGNED TO BE A SUBSTANTIAL ADDITION TO STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE ALREADY WELL-KNOWN POLARIS, MINUTEMAN, POSEIDON AND TRIDENT MISSILES. AT A TIME WHEN THE WORLD HAS ENTERED A PERIOD OF RELAXATION OF TENSION AND THE STRENGTHENING OF GENERAL SECURITY, THESE PLANS OF THE PENTAGON CAN BE REGARDED AS NOTHING BUT A DESIRE TO WHIP UP THE ARMS RACE AND PUT THE BRAKES ON THE POSITIVE CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

(ENDALL)

11 SEP 1716Z TEF/CAJ

‡‡‡R241

R F2583)1BYLUIVZ&T

‡‡NIGHTLEAD WINE‡

‡BY DAVID LAWDAY‡

PARIS, SEP 11, REUTER - FRANCE TODAY PLUNGED THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET INTO AN INTERNAL TRADE CRISIS BY IMPOSING AN 11 TO 12 PER CENT TAX ON IMPORTS OF ITALIAN WINE, A MOVE WHICH UNDERMINES THE COMMUNITY'S FARM POLICY.

PRIME MINISTER JACQUES CHIRAC ANNOUNCED THE MEASURES TO PROTECT THE FRENCH WINE INDUSTRY AFTER MARATHON NEGOTIATIONS IN BRUSSELS THIS WEEK FAILED TO PREVENT A "WINE WAR" -WITH ITALY.

THE TAX WAS ADOPTED BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DESPITE ADVANCE WARNINGS FROM ROME THAT ITALIAN AUTHORITIES VIEWED IT AS ILLEGAL AND A BLATANT VIOLATION OF E.E.C. PRINCIPLES.

BUT MR CHIRAC TOLD REPORTERS AFTER ANNOUNCING THE TAX: "I DO NOT BELIEVE THE ITALIANS WILL TAKE REPRISAL MEASURES AGAINST FRANCE."

THE CRISIS DEVELOPED OVER THE PAST YEAR WITH VIOLENT OPPOSITION OF FRENCH WINE GROWERS, WHO CLAIMED CHEAP ITALIAN WINE WAS FLOODING THE FRENCH MARKET. LAST MONTH ALONE MORE THAN 70 MILLION LITERS (MORE THAN 15 MILLION GALLONS) OF THE LOW-PRICE ITALIAN PRODUCT ENTERED FRANCE, ITSELF A MAJOR WINE PRODUCING NATION.‡

MORE 1435

±±±R242

R F2662)2BYLUIVEBYL

±‡NIGHTLEAD WINE 2 PARIS±

PRESIDENT VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING AND HIS CABINET DECIDED ON THE TAX YESTERDAY, BUT MR CHIRAC KEPT IT SECRET UNTIL HE HAD INFORMED THE LEADERS OF WINE GROWERS' ASSOCIATIONS THIS MORNING. IT TAKES EFFECT TOMORROW.

THE PREMIER HELD THAT THE FRENCH MOVE DID NOT BREAK THE E.E.C. CONTRACT BECAUSE ITALY HAD IMPOSED SIMILAR RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF FRENCH MEAT LAST YEAR.

BEFORE THE TAX WAS ANNOUNCED THERE WERE THREATS FROM ITALY ABOUT HITTING BACK WITH SPECIAL TAXES AGAINST FRENCH PRODUCE, NOTABLY MEAT AND MILK, RAISING PROSPECTS OF A TRADE WAR THAT COULD UPSET E.E.C. FARM POLICY.

FRENCH OFFICIALS ARGUE THAT THE TAX COMES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF A SAFEGUARD CLAUSE ALLOWING INDIVIDUAL E.E.C. MEMBERS TO TAKE THEIR OWN ACTION IN TIMES OF DIFFICULTY. BUT MOST OF FRANCE'S MARKET PARTNERS CHALLENGE THIS.

ANNOUNCING THE WINE LEVY, MR CHIRAC SAID: "'THIS IS INDISPENSABLE TO ASSURE OUR WINE GROWERS A NORMAL REVENUE...I UNDERSTAND THEIR PROBLEM PERFECTLY WELL.'"‡

MORE 1437

‡‡‡R243
R F2668) LBYLUIVZYR
‡§NIGHTLEAD WINE 3 PARIS‡

THE REBELLIOUS FRENCH GROWERS HAVE LITTLE TO DO WITH THE
NOBLE BORDERUX AND BEAUJOLAIS VINTAGES. THEY RUN PEASANT-
COOPERATIVES IN SOUTHERN FRANCE THAT PRODUCE CHEAP TABLE WINE
-- THE VARIETY MOST SERIOUSLY THREATENED BY THE ITALIAN INFLUX.

THE ITALIAN WINE IS IMPORTED BY WHOLESALERS MAINLY FOR
MIXING PURPOSES. ITS ROCK-BOTTOM PRICES HAVE DEPRESSED PRICE
LEVELS HERE AND JEOPARDIZED THE LIVELIHOOD OF THE SMALL FRENCH
GROWERS.

SPOKESMEN FOR THE GROWERS SAID AFTER THE MEETING WITH MR
CHIRAC THAT THEY WERE NOT FULLY SATISFIED WITH THE SCOPE OF THE
TAX -- THEIR TARGET HAD BEEN NEARER 20 PER CENT -- BUT THEY
WERE PLEASED THE GOVERNMENT NOW APPEARED FULLY AWARE OF THEIR
PROBLEM.

THE GOVERNMENT HAD THE CHOICE OF A TAX LEVY: A QUOTA ON
IMPORTS OR A BAN ON WINE IMPORTS AS A MEANS TO PROTECT THE
GROWERS. INFORMED SOURCES SAID IT CHOSE THE TAX BECAUSE MARKET
OFFICIALS SUGGESTED THIS WOULD POSE THE LEAST DANGER TO
COMMUNITY FARM POLICY.‡

REUTER 1439

FBIS 85

PRAVDA TEXT OF SOVIET DRAFT TREATY ON TOTAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST BAN

LD 161350 MOSCOW PRAVDA IN RUSSIAN 12 SEP 75 P 4 LD

(TEXT OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT "DRAFT TREATY ON THE TOTAL PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS").

(TEXT) THE STATES PARTY TO THIS TREATY,

STATING THEIR INTENTION TO ACHIEVE THE ENDING OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AND TO TAKE EFFECTIVE STEPS TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND TOWARD ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICI AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL,

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE APPEALS OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON ENDING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN ALL MEDIA,

NOTING THAT THE PROHIBITION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS WOULD ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND THE WEAKENING OF THE ARMS RACE AND WOULD BE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL DETENTE,

MAINTAINING THAT THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM ANY PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS SHOULD BE AVAILABLE TO STATES BOTH POSSESSING AND NOT POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THIS PRESENT TREATY,

NOTING THE GREAT POSITIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 1963 TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, OUTER SPACE AND UNDERWATER,

STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNCONDITIONAL OBSERVANCE OF THE SAID TREATY RIGHT UP TO THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS PRESENT TREATY,

STRIVING TO ACHIEVE FOREVER THE ENDING OF ALL TEST EXPLOSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY ALL STATES,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

## ARTICLE I

1. EACH PARTY TO THIS TREATY UNDERTAKES TO PROHIBIT, PREVENT AND NOT CARRY OUT ANY TEST EXPLOSIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ANY PLACE UNDER ITS JURISDICTION OR CONTROL IN ALL MEDIA--THE ATMOSPHERE, OUTER SPACE, UNDERWATER AND UNDERGROUND.

2. EACH PARTY TO THIS TREATY UNDERTAKES TO REFRAIN FROM CAUSING, ENCOURAGING OR IN ANY WAY PARTICIPATING IN THE CARRYING OUT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS PROHIBITED IN POINT 1 OF THIS ARTICLE.

## ARTICLE II

1. CONTROL OVER THE OBSERVANCE OF THIS TREATY IS IMPLEMENTED BY THE PARTIES BY USING THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF CONTROL AT THEIR DISPOSAL IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ACCORD WITH THE UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

2. IN THE INTERESTS OF HELPING TO INSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AIMS AND PROVISIONS OF THIS TREATY THE PARTIES WILL COOPERATE IN THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA.

3. TO ASSIST THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AIMS AND PROVISIONS OF THIS TREATY THE PARTIES WILL, WHEN NECESSARY, CONSULT WITH EACH OTHER, MAKE REQUESTS AND OBTAIN THE APPROPRIATE INFORMATION IN CONNECTION WITH THESE REQUESTS.

4. EACH PARTY TO THIS TREATY WHICH ASCERTAINS THAT ANY OTHER PARTY IS ACTING IN VIOLATION OF THE COMMITMENTS STEMMING FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY CAN SUBMIT A COMPLAINT TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS COMPLAINT MUST CONTAIN ALL POSSIBLE PROOFS CONFIRMING ITS SUBSTANTIATION AND A REQUEST THAT IT BE EXAMINED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE COUNCIL WILL INFORM THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY CONCERNING THE RESULTS OF THE EXAMINATION.

### ARTICLE III

1. THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I DO NOT APPLY TO UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS CARRIED OUT FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES BY STATES POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON TERRITORY UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENTS BY VIRTUE OF WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, STATES WHICH DO NOT POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL OBTAIN BENEFIT FROM ANY PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS.

2. THE EXPLOSIONS MENTIONED IN POINT 1 OF THIS ARTICLE ARE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE:

A. FOR STATES WHICH DO NOT POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE V OF THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

B. FOR STATES POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PROCEDURE WHICH WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY A SPECIAL AGREEMENT WITH REGARD TO WHICH THE STATES POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL HOLD TALKS WITH DUE CONSIDERATION FOR THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ON THIS QUESTION, AND WHICH AGREEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

### ARTICLE IV

THE PROVISIONS OF THIS TREATY DO NOT AFFECT THE COMMITMENTS WHICH THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY HAVE ASSUMED IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

### ARTICLE V

1. ANY PARTY TO THIS TREATY CAN PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO IT. THE TEXT OF ANY PROPOSED AMENDMENT IS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS WHICH WILL CIRCULATE IT TO ALL PARTIES TO THE TREATY. THEN, IF ONE-THIRD OR MORE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY DEMAND IT, THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS WILL CONVENE A CONFERENCE TO WHICH THEY WILL INVITE ALL PARTIES TO THE TREATY TO EXAMINE AN AMENDMENT.

(MORE)

16 SEP 1652Z DD/CAJ

FBIS 86

ONLY ADD 85 (TEST BAN DRAFT)

XXX EXAMINE AN AMENDMENT.

(TEXT) 2. ANY AMENDMENT TO THIS TREATY MUST BE APPROVED BY A MAJORITY OF VOTES OF ALL PARTIES TO THE TREATY, INCLUDING THE VOTES OF ALL STATES PARTY TO THIS TREATY POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE AMENDMENT WILL ENTER INTO FORCE FOR EVERY PARTY TO THE TREATY WHICH DEPOSITS ITS INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OF THE AMENDMENT AFTER SUCH RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS HAVE BEEN DEPOSITED FOR CUSTODY BY THE MAJORITY OF ALL PARTIES TO THE TREATY--INCLUDING THE STATES POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT SUBSEQUENTLY ENTERS INTO FORCE FOR ANY OTHER PARTY TO THE TREATY AFTER THIS PARTY HAS DEPOSITED FOR CUSTODY ITS INSTRUMENT ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE AMENDMENT.

ARTICLE VI

1. THIS TREATY IS OPEN FOR SIGNING BY ALL STATES. ANY STATE WHICH DOES NOT SIGN THE TREATY BEFORE IT ENTERS INTO FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH POINT 3 OF THIS ARTICLE CAN ACCEDE TO IT AT ANY TIME.

2. THIS TREATY WILL BE SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION BY THE SIGNATORY STATES. THE RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS AND THE INSTRUMENTS OF ACCESSION WILL BE HANDED IN FOR CUSTODY TO THE GOVERNMENTS.... WHICH ARE DESIGNATED BY THIS TREATY THE DEPOSITORY GOVERNMENTS.

3. THIS TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE AFTER THE DEPOSITING FOR CUSTODY OF THE RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS...BY THE GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENTS OF ALL STATES POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

4. FOR STATES WHOSE RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS OR INSTRUMENTS OF ACCESSION ARE DEPOSITED FOR CUSTODY AFTER THIS TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE, THE TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE ON THE DAY ON WHICH THEIR RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS OR INSTRUMENTS OF ACCESSION ARE DEPOSITED FOR CUSTODY.

5. THE DEPOSITORY GOVERNMENTS WILL IMMEDIATELY INFORM ALL SIGNATORY AND ACCEDING STATES OF THE DATE OF EACH SIGNATURE AND THE DATE OF THE DEPOSIT FOR CUSTODY OF EACH RATIFICATION INSTRUMENT OR INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION, THE DATE OF THIS TREATY'S ENTRY INTO FORCE, THE DATE OF RECEIPT OF ANY DEMANDS FOR THE CONVENING OF A CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY, AND ALSO OTHER INFORMATION.

# Further Violations of SALT Seen

## Soviets have continued ABM component tests since summit at Vladivostok that U. S. officials believe forbidden by pact

By Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.

Washington—Soviet Union has continued since the Ford-Brezhnev Vladivostok arms agreement in November to test improved anti-ballistic missile system components in a manner that U. S. officials believe may be further violations of the May, 1972, strategic arms limitations agreements (AW&ST Oct. 21, 1974, p. 14; Nov. 25, 1974, p. 18).

USSR actions within the past two months include:

* Unveiling of a new, more powerful mobile radar that has been tested at a power aperture product—the mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters—exceeding the 3 million permitted in the treaty.

* Netting of mobile ABM radars at test sites at Sary Shagan on Lake Bal-khash near the Sino-Soviet border and Kapustin Yar to other ABM radars for ABM interceptor launches that have been conducted.

* Test-firing either modified versions of the SA-5 Griffin and SA-2 Guideline missiles to altitudes in excess of 100,000 ft., too high to claim as tests for anti-air-craft intercepts.

* Testing ABM systems against mis-siles simulating trajectory of U. S. subma-rine-launched ballistic missiles using ABM equipment and modifications to earlier systems some U. S. officials be-lieve is precluded by the permanent ABM treaty.

The Soviets also appear to be launch-ing an accelerated systematic effort to conceal ABM developments from U. S. detection systems. Jamming level of the Soviets against U. S. electronic reconnais-sance systems has increased in volume and effectiveness in recent weeks.

Both sides agreed at the signing of the ABM treaty and interim offensive strate-gic arms agreement that each would not undertake to interfere with the detection capability—referred to as national techni-cal means of verification in the treaty—of the other party. This was to include the use of concealment measures that impede verification of compliance with the treaty.

The continuing trend of Soviet efforts may give them an ABM capability U. S. officials believe will be extremely difficult to overcome as Soviet offensive strength is increasing with the deployment of a new family of intercontinental ballistic missiles with MIRV warheads.

Most U. S. officials are unwilling to call the Soviet activities outright violations of the agreements because of the ambiguity of the wording in the agreements, a con-dition the Soviets use to their advantage.

"A man would have to be an idiot not to see the increase in the level of Soviet development in the ABM area, but it is difficult to call it a violation," one official

said. The Soviets are working to thwart the U. S.'s ability to verify treaty com-pliance, the official added, but he believes the effort is directed more at obtaining the capability to jam U. S. detection sys-tems as it suits the Soviet need than to sustain that effort over a relatively long period of time.

Some U. S. officials believe the Soviets gleaned information from the U. S. mem-bers of the SALT delegation over the pe-riod of SALT-1 meetings in Helsinki and SALT-2 negotiations in Geneva and these data provided the basis for develop-ing jamming techniques that are now being displayed to the surprise of the U. S.

The Soviet effort at deception is con-centrated in the research and develop-ment areas and is much more extensive than anything previously experienced. The deception efforts have become a source of concern to U. S. intelligence of-ficials.

But the problem runs much deeper

## Explanations Requested

Washington—U. S. members of the Standing Consultative Commission have asked for explanations of USSR ICBM silo construction and mobile anti-ballis-tic missile testing programs that could be violations of the 1972 SALT agree-ments (Nov. 25, 1974, p. 18). The com-mission met last week in Geneva.

President Ford instructed his nuclear weapons disarmament negotiators to seek Soviet explanations of the alleged violations after reports in AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY prompted congres-sional inquiries into possible SALT viola-tions.

Soviet explanations were demanded of construction activity of missile silos in the USSR's missile belt along the trans-Siberian railway, detected by U. S. satel-lites.

The commission met with the Soviet delegation headed by Giorgi Ustinov and the U. S. delegation headed by Sidney Graybeal. The two delegations met shortly before the start of negotiations of a new SALT agreement based on the Vladivostok accord reached by Ford and Brezhnev last November.

than simply intelligence, an official said, because it is eroding confidence at policy levels in the Ford Administration in the integrity of the agreements with the So-viets.

Part of the concern being expressed is because of the poorly defined areas of the agreements where the violations "are al-leged to have occurred."

One agreement states that each party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mo-bile land-based.

It adds that to enhance effectiveness of the ABM limitations, the parties will not give missiles, launchers or radars—other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars—capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and will not test them in the ABM mode.

U. S. officials said that until recently, U. S. electronic intelligence equipment had not detected power aperture products in excess of the stated limits in the ABM treaty. They now believe that the Soviets have had the capability for some time to increase the power, but have avoided us-ing it when U. S. electronic detection sys-tems were operating. This capability would provide earlier detection and tracking of reentry vehicles to enhance data processing functions by providing additional time to launch and guide in-terceptor missiles to their targets.

One U. S. official who served on both the SALT-1 and SALT-2 delegations is former Navy Secretary Paul H. Nitze. He resigned from the delegation June 14, 1974.

Nitze said in a recent speech at Los Al-amos, N. M., that from the very first ses-sion in Helsinki, it was clear the Soviets had a highly one-sided negotiating strategy and were prepared to use a wide range of tactics to achieve their goals.

The executive secretary of the Soviet delegation, Nikolay S. Kishilov, was a senior KGB agent who earlier had been thrown out of Finland when it was re-vealed that he and a woman said to be his wife were involved in espionage work. At least a third of the Soviet delegation's staff had KGB experience, and many of the military advisors had intelligence affi-liation.

Soviet SALT delegation tactics in-cluded use of a room overlooking the U. S. delegation offices in Helsinki, rented by a Tass correspondent, that was equipped with telescopes, antennas and various other gadgets. U. S. telephone communications were monitored, Nitze said.

"In the actual substantive negotiations

Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 3, 1975

they employed amazing tactical versatility," Nitze said. Words were used in negotiations in other than their normally accepted sense, quotations out of context, or subtly modified wording, he added. Nuances between Russian words and the English equivalents were exploited, he said.

Elements of a problem were packaged together in a manner advantageous to their side, Nitze said. For example, expectations were created by the Soviets that if the U. S. conceded a given point, then other important points would be easy to resolve.

"They would use imprecise language in presenting provisions which would limit their side and precise where the object was to limit U. S. actions," Nitze explained. "They liked the tactic of presenting a full draft of an agreement at the earliest opportunity so that subsequent negotiations would be on the basis of their text, not a U. S. text."

Nitze said the Soviets understand thoroughly the value of endless repetition, of taking an extreme position to gain trading room, of making concessions grudgingly and only for equal or greater concessions, of moving to stronger positions rather than compromising, and of unexpected shifting of the subject of negotiations from one field to another.

He said that all of these negotiating techniques can be countered by an experienced cohesive team on the other side.

"But when one is negotiating in this kind of ambiance, the most extreme care and almost perfect coordination are required to avoid errors. In my judgment this has not always been achieved, even to the somewhat limited extent possible in a democratic society," Nitze said.

The most difficult problems, Nitze said, came from reconciling what appeared to the delegation to be the optimum approach in dealing with Soviet negotiating tactics with instructions from the Administration in Washington, and in obtaining clarifications or amendments to those instructions.

Errors in judgment by officials in Washington on both strategy and tactics caused the delegation's efforts to be less than optimal, Nitze said, and the development of two levels of negotiation—the delegation's, and the higher level between Kissinger/Nixon and Brezhnev/Soviet Ambassador to the U. S. Anatoli Dobrynin—added to the problem.

Nixon's passion for secrecy and lack of confidence in the reliability and judgment "of what he considered to be the bureaucracy [is such] that not even the head of the U. S. delegation was kept precisely informed of what was happening at the higher level," according to Nitze.

The former president went to such lengths that at discussions at the highest level, "Nixon would rely on the Soviet interpreters rather than the more competent

American interpreters whose notes might be made available to the U. S. side."

The consequence was that the President and his staff were deprived of expertise and the ability to fine-comb the relevant detail. "This resulted in unnecessary difficulties, some of significant consequence in parrying Soviet strategy and tactics," Nitze said.

## Secret Protocol

Washington—Secret protocol, officially called a "record of terms," is being used by the SALT Standing Consultative Commission in its discussions in Geneva of alleged violations of arms limitations treaties. The protocol was assembled during the SALT negotiations as a list of definitions, weapon characteristics and other factors that would permit interpretation of the treaty.

In some respects, it functions similarly to a history of legislation, which is occasionally used in legal cases to determine the intent of lawmakers in passing a law. During the negotiations, it was agreed that all transcripts of the talks would be kept secret, so only members of the negotiating teams and senior officials of each government have access to the protocol.

## Three-Year Slip in Trident Predicted

Washington—Navy's Trident ballistic missile submarine completion date of late 1982 for the 10th vessel may be delayed up to three years. Delivery of the initial submarine scheduled for December, 1977, is expected to be delayed until April, 1979.

According to a General Accounting Office (GAO) report on Trident requested by Rep. Les Aspin (D.-Wis.), the new delivery dates have been set because of uncertainty in obtaining vendor materials and trained manpower in time to meet the initial delivery schedule.

Electric Boat Div. of General Dynamics is having difficulty getting materials and components from vendors because of increasing lead times and prices, the GAO report noted. Longer lead times are caused by material shortages that have developed in many industries in the past few years, it added. Because of price increases, some Trident vendors have initially refused orders placed by Electric Boat under contract options, and negotiations with the vendors are in progress, GAO said.

The Navy has a contract with the company for the lead Trident and options for the next three boats. Submarines 5 through 10 are not under contract, and awards could be made to either Electric Boat or Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.

Electric Boat also has Navy contracts to build 18 SSN-688 nuclear attack submarines. The company expects to construct 16 of the attack submarines at its existing facilities in Groton, Conn., and the two remaining SSN-688s and all Tridents it builds at a new facility designed to accommodate Trident construction.

The new Groton facility is running at least six months behind schedule because of late receipt of steel rails for a submarine transfer system.

Material prices have climbed substantially in the past two years and will drastically increase cost of the SSN-688 submarines as well as the Trident program. Some examples:

* Eight-inch copper nickel bars are up from $1.86/lb. in 1972 to $3.21/lb. in 1974.

* Air-conditioning plants for the first SSN-688 that cost $326,122 each for the first submarine were up to $551,213 in April, 1974.

Trident suppliers have had related problems and have requested relief in the form of increased prices for equipment under contract and option. Their requests were based on unprecedented increases in material costs. Electric Boat notified the vendors that their refusal to accept the options were unjustified and that they are expected to perform in accordance with their contracts.

The Soviets came away from the Moscow 1972 summit meeting with quite a different view of the interim agreement than the U. S. had—it was their view that the interim agreement was not just a temporary freeze, he said. The Soviets believed the unequal missile launcher numbers and unequal throw weight capability had been agreed to at the highest levels to compensate the Soviets for other inequalities in the positions of the two sides. Nitze pointed out. They believed the interim agreement should be carried over unchanged into the replacement agreement, he added.

Nitze said the Vladivostok accord, even though the Soviets made some substantial concessions and it gives the appearance of equality, does not deal with throw weight—the most useful verifiable measure of missile capability.

"...It is difficult to see how the [Vladivostok] accord reduces, in a meaningful way, the U. S. strategic defense problem posed by the new family of Soviet missiles and bombers which are now completing test and evaluation and whose large-scale deployment is now beginning," Nitze said.

Unless new strategic programs are added to those now programmed, the U. S. will end its 10-year program with a half to a third of the Soviet ICBM throw weight, Nitze said.

13

# CURRENT NEWS
## SPECIAL EDITION

THIS PUBLICATION IS PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL NEWS ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; IT IS NOT INTENDED TO SUBSTITUTE FOR NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS AND BROADCASTS AS A MEANS OF KEEPING INFORMED ABOUT THE NATURE, MEANING AND IMPACT OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NEWS DEVELOPMENTS, USE OF THESE ARTICLES HERE. OF COURSE, DOES NOT REFLECT OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT. FURTHER REPRODUCTION FOR PRIVATE USE OR GAIN IS SUBJECT TO THE ORIGINAL COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS.

14 OCTOBER 1976

No. 148

FOREIGN
POLICY

NUMBER 24 FALL 1976

VERIFYING
SALT

by Jan M. Lodal

Since the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have not yet resulted in agreement on the substance of a new treaty, the public has paid little attention to the equally important problem of insuring that the United States can verify Soviet compliance with the treaty. Quite properly, the focus has been on the outstanding issues—the Soviet Backfire aircraft and the U.S. strategic cruise missiles. But verification has always played a key role in arms control efforts, and if a SALT II agreement is reached this year, it is almost certain that our ability to verify Soviet compliance with the agreement will become a major issue in the ensuing debate.

Soon after World War II, the United States' first major effort to contain the danger posed by nuclear weapons, the Ba'ruch Plan for international control of all nuclear materials, failed because of a verification problem—Soviet refusal to permit inspection of their nuclear plants. Later, efforts to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty were also abandoned because of verification problems. U.S. seismic networks could not distinguish between small underground nuclear explosions and earthquakes.

Jan M. Lodal, formerly the Director of Program Analysis at the National Security Council, 1973-1975, is Executive Vice-President and Director of American Management Systems.

and the Soviets again refused to permit direct inspection. This situation led to the compromise of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which required no "on-site" inspection, but permitted underground testing to continue. As a result, the nuclear build-up continued essentially unabated.

Even the most successful arms control measures to date—the 1972 antiballistic missile (ABM) and interim offensive SALT I agreements—were largely shaped by verification considerations. Both the Soviet Union and the United States would probably have preferred permitting modest nationwide ABM deployments to ensure against accidental or Chinese attacks, but the ABM treaty, for verification reasons, permits each side only one small "local" ABM system. Permitting the radar system necessary for even a "thin" nationwide defense would have made it impossible to verify that a larger defense was not being clandestinely deployed. On the offensive side, the SALT I agreement focused on freezing the number of missile launchers, again primarily because of verification considerations, although direct limits on missiles and missile characteristics would clearly have been more meaningful strategically.¹

This history alone would lead one to expect verification to be a major issue in the debate over SALT II. However, two additional factors guarantee that verification will be intensely debated as part of any congressional and public consideration of a

¹ Notably, the senior level interagency panel set up by the Nixon administration to deal with all substantive issues during the process of negotiating these agreements was christened the "Verification Panel."

JAMES KILLINGBECK, CHIEF, CURRENT NEWS BRANCH, OX 78765

HELEN YOUNG, ASSISTANT CHIEF

FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH SERVICES OR DISTRIBUTION CALL HARRY ZUBKOFF, CHIEF, EXECUTIVE AGENCY SERVICE, OX 52884

SPECIAL EDITION -- 14 OCTOBER 1976

SALT II treaty. First, the Vladivostok Agreement, which will almost certainly form the basis of any SALT treaty negotiated this year, is intrinsically more difficult to verify than the SALT I agreements. Second, charges have been made that the Soviets have "cheated" on the provisions of the SALT I agreements. This has sensitized the public and the Congress to the issue of verification, led to charges that the Soviets simply "cannot be trusted," and resulted in demands for essentially airtight verification provisions in any follow-on treaty.

The present sensitivity to verification considerations was dramatically demonstrated in a press conference held on February 27 of this year by Fred C. Iklé, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Iklé called his press conference for two purposes: to issue a report prepared by ACDA which details the importance of verification in arms control agreements, and to complain about verification problems associated with the cruise missile provision of a Senate resolution introduced by Senators Kennedy, Humphrey, and Javits supporting completion of the Vladivostok accord. Iklé said:

> By proposing to limit most cruise missiles to 600 kilometers in range it would not only fail to draw the proper distinction between cruise missiles that can be used for strategic purposes that belong into SALT from those that might be used in a conventional role and a naval role for regional purposes, but it would also create for the future of SALT potentials for ambiguities, uncertainties, disputes, problems of verification. By comparison with these problems, the dispute we now have on occasion about the questions of violations or compliance of SALT I agreements would be a Sunday school picnic.

Coming from America's chief arms control official, this struck many as incredibly strong language. Since some similar form of cruise missile limit is almost certain to be a part of a SALT II treaty, Iklé cast doubt on the prospects for verifying any new agreement. But such a pessimistic view of SALT II verification is simply not justified by a careful review of the facts. In the long run, verification constraints may play a major role in limiting the scope of new arms control agreements. But if one reviews in detail the more immediate verification problems related to SALT II, they do not appear insurmountable. An examination of Soviet compliance with the SALT I agreements indicates that both our verification capability and Soviet compliance efforts have held up reasonably well. With respect to the specific verification problems associated

with a likely SALT II agreement, care must be taken to include certain special provisions, such as a requirement that unMIRVed missile launchers be specifically identified in order to help distinguish them from launchers containing MIRVed missiles. Furthermore, in some cases specific approaches should be taken to facilitate verification, such as setting a single range limit above which cruise missiles of all types are banned and below which they are permitted without limit. But if these steps are taken, a SALT II agreement can be verified; only after SALT II do major problems emerge.

## Charges of Soviet Cheating

There have been numerous accusations made against the Soviets, of which the following five are clearly the most significant:

1. Constructing so-called III-X silos which allegedly are capable of launching missiles, although new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo construction is prohibited by the Interim Agreement.

2. Testing a radar which is part of the SA-5 Tallinn air defense system "in an ABM mode," reopening the possibility that the Tallinn system might be upgraded to an ABM system—an issue which plagued the SALT I negotiation.

3. Increasing the number of "heavy" missiles above the permitted number by deploying new SS-19 ICBMs which are significantly larger than the largest missile understood in SALT I to be a "light" missile.

4. Concealing activities from U.S. "national technical means" of verification.

5. Failing to dismantle older ICBM launchers being replaced with launchers on ballistic missile submarines.

Perhaps the most significant point to be made is that only the last of these charges can be made to stick on legal grounds. In this case, the Soviets have admitted that they violated a protocol signed in 1974 by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Kissinger. This protocol, the terms of which were submitted to Congress but not made public, contains a number of procedures related to the operations of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), the joint U.S.-Soviet body set up by the 1972 agreements to monitor their implementation and settle disputes. The protocol specifies that older SS-7 and SS-8 missile launchers which are replaced by modern submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers must be dismantled within four months after the new submarines enter "sea trails"—i.e., four months after the time they first sail out to the open sea. The 1972 Interim Agreement permits the Soviets to

2

replace all of the 210 older SS-7s and
SS-8s with SLBMs on new submarines.²

Sometime in mid-September 1975, the
Soviets apparently sent the first such re-
placement submarines to sea. As a result,
about 20 SS-7 and SS-8 missile launchers
should have been dismantled by around
mid-January 1976. The actual missiles had
been removed from the launchers some
months earlier, so the U.S. expected the
launchers to be fully dismantled on time.

In late January, it appeared that the So-
viets had not made the deadline, but the
evidence was inconclusive. By March, the
evidence was conclusive. The Soviets had
launched additional submarines after Sep-
tember, leading to a requirement that 51
ICBM launchers be fully dismantled. The
Soviets had only about 10 completely dis-
mantled. Thus, the administration decided
to raise the issue at the March session of the
SCC, only a few weeks hence, when the So-
viets would be required to report on the
status of the dismantling.

At the March 29 meeting, the Soviets
were scheduled to make the first formal pre-
sentation. The American commissioner, Sid-
ney Graybeal, sat down with General Usti-
nov, the Soviet commissioner, and ex-
changed the usual opening pleasantries. Us-
tinov then began his report by presenting
numbers which corresponded precisely with
U.S. intelligence estimates. He readily and
openly acknowledged that the Soviet Union
had failed to meet the required deadline for
dismantling the older ICBM launchers.

In a subsequent meeting, Graybeal re-
sponded by insisting that the Soviets halt
deployment of further ballistic missile sub-
marines until the dismantling was complete
and that the dismantling program get quick-
ly back on schedule. The Soviet Union ac-
cepted the U.S. demands; they promised to
complete the dismantling by June 1, and,
more importantly, halted submarine launch-
ings. The Soviets formally reported that by
June 1 they had carried out the promised
dismantling.

In the other cases of alleged violations,
the Soviets have been able to demonstrate
that their activities are not explicitly in
conflict with mutual agreements. With re-
gard to the III-X silos, the Soviets claim
that these are command and control fa-
cilities, not covered by SALT I. Several of
these silos had been started before the
SALT I Interim Agreement was complete, and

U.S. intelligence confirms the likely com-
mand and control function. The SA-5 ra-
dar "testing," which the Soviets promptly
stopped when the issue was raised by the
United States, was, from a strategic stand-
point, potentially the most significant ac-
tivity. But this radar was almost certainly
being used for range instrumentation pur-
poses, and the United States had explicitly
stated that range instrumentation radars
should be excluded from limitations of the
SALT I ABM treaty.³ With regard to heavy
missiles, the definition of a "heavy" mis-
sile was contained only in a U.S. unilateral
statement rejected by the Soviets, and even
then the definition was ambiguous. Final-
ly, there never was any widespread new So-
viet concealment of their strategic system
after SALT I, and the Soviets have been able
to point out similar U.S. activities.

Soviet Intentions

There is no serious disagreement between
the administration and its critics on these
facts. Rather, the debate concerns Soviet in-
tentions—whether they have “pushed the
agreements to their limits,” “violated the
spirit of the agreement,” or “ignored U.S.
unilateral statements.” But charges of this
nature are intrinsically difficult to deal with.
For example, as mentioned above, the III-
X silos were probably designed in the late
1960s, long before the SALT agreements
were reached, and several of them were es-
sentially complete at the time the agree-
ments were signed. Thus, the Soviets cer-
tainly did not start this program as a way
to test U.S. will or to take advantage of
some loophole in the agreement.

With respect to the SA-5 radar, the re-
sults are similar. The Soviets clearly had
a need for a continuous-wave (CW) range
instrumentation radar at the test range
where the SA-5 radar was observed, and
the SA-5 radar is the only radar in the So-
viet inventory which could easily be used
for these purposes. Whether they intention-
ally took advantage of the exemption on
range instrumentation radars provided by
the U.S. interpretation of the agreement
can never be known. But one need not pre-
sume a Soviet attempt to test U.S. resolve
or push the limits of the agreement to ex-
plain their behavior. This seems particu-
larly true in light of the fact that the So-
viets stopped the activity soon after the
United States expressed a concern about it.

³ The agreement also permits the United States to re-
place its 54 Titan missiles with new missiles on sub-
marines, but in a 1972 letter, President Nixon in-
formed General Secretary Brezhnev that the United
States had no intention of doing so.

ª Range instrumentation radars are those used to measure the trajectories of missiles and warheads flying through the test range. Such measurements are a necessary part of any missile test program.

3

The Soviet's failure to dismantle SS-7 and SS-8 launchers as new ballistic missile submarines were deployed is technically closed, but its meaning remains unclear. The Soviets complained that unspecified "technical difficulties" prohibited meeting the original deadline. Perhaps they did have troubles, but this seems a weak excuse. The missiles themselves had been out of operation for some months, so the dismantling could have begun long before sea trials of the new submarines began. Furthermore, U.S. intelligence later verified that at least in some cases, the dismantling could have been completed in 6 to 8 weeks. It appears that either the Soviet military failed to carry out the decisions of the foreign ministry and civilian leadership, leaving the civilians to find out that the agreements had not been complied with only when it was too late, or the Soviets chose to test America's ability and will to respond. But the latter possibility seems unlikely, since the Soviets unilaterally acknowledged their failure and immediately promised rapid rectification.

In the end, the incident remains an enigma. It demonstrates that the Soviets can be honest even when it is embarrassing to them, since they admitted their failure. But at the same time, it clearly raises questions about Soviet willingness to abide scrupulously by terms of arms control agreements. In this respect, the incident is analogous to Soviet treatment of the "venting" provisions of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. The treaty permits underground explosions, but only so long as the radioactive "debris" which escapes the earth's surface remains within the national borders of the nation conducting the test. There has been an argument about what constitutes "debris"—the United States says it includes "gaseous" radioactivity while the Soviets say it includes only "particulate" radioactivity—but the Soviets have frequently committed minor violations of the provision even by their own definition. (By the U.S. definition, they regularly violate the agreement; even we have violated it once or twice.) The violations are extremely slight and of no health or military consequence, but they go on nonetheless. It appears that it is simply more trouble to the Soviets than it is worth to dig their underground test holes deeper—the only action they would have to take to stop the venting. Apparently, the silo dismantling case was similar. It was more trouble than it was worth to meet the schedule. Such behavior is at best annoying; at worst, it is

a further indication of the need to be vigilant about Soviet compliance. But it does not indicate, as some people have claimed, that the Soviets have no regard for the treaties that they sign. The "violations" are simply too minor to permit that conclusion.

Two other points should be made with regard to the charge that the Soviets have "pushed the agreements to their limits." First, in several cases one could as easily apply this charge to United States activities. We have kept our force levels up to the limit permitted by the SALT I agreement, and we have chosen to interpret provisions on concealment in a way that suited our purposes. Second, it comes as no surprise that after a difficult negotiation both sides chose to take advantage of all the flexibility permitted under the agreement.

Even some critics who acknowledge that there has been no real Soviet "cheating" nevertheless charge that the SALT I accords were poorly negotiated. In particular, they charge that the reliance on unilateral statements has proved to be folly, and that this is most dramatically demonstrated by the Soviet deployment of the SS-19, a MIRVed missile designed to replace the "light" SS-11 but with three times the throw-weight and one and a half times the volume of the SS-11.

Of all the criticisms, with hindsight this has the most validity. The U.S. unilateral statement concerning the permissible size of "light" missiles, especially in the context of congressional testimony explaining what the United States expected in this area, was not observed by the Soviets. Again, this is not surprising since the Soviets categorically rejected our "heavy" missile definition in the SALT I negotiations. We have learned what we should have known from the beginning—a unilateral statement which is unacceptable to the other side is of no benefit. Not that unilateral statements are never of benefit;⁴ to give up this device entirely would eliminate a powerful negotiating tool. But it should be used only when the two sides mutually agree to its use.

Nevertheless, it seems clear in retrospect that a more careful handling of unilateral statements in SALT I would have had little effect on actual Soviet deployments. Almost certainly, the Soviets would have been

⁴ As an example, use of a unilateral statement effectively resolved the thorny SALT I issue of land-based mobile ICBM deployments. For a more thorough discussion of the proper use of unilateral statements, see Walter Slocombe, "Learning from Experience: Verification Guidelines for SALT II," Arms Control Today, February 1976. This issue also contains a review of charges of Soviet cheating and a bibliography of works discussing them.

4

unwilling to give up their SS-19 missile as part of a SALT I agreement, since this missile was already fully designed and about to enter testing. The SS-19 was, at the time, their main prospect for developing a workable MIRV, and they had many legitimate security interests in deploying MIRVs.⁵ To have insisted upon our definition of a "heavy" missile as a condition for SALT I would have eliminated the possibility of reaching agreement—something President Nixon would have been unwilling to do.

Events since SALT I do not support the view that the Soviets are cheating, that they are unreasonably pushing the limits of the agreements, that they are attempting to use "loopholes" to their advantage, or that our verification capabilities are inadequate. Rather, the record demonstrates the strength of our verification capabilities, that we are willing to raise questions related to compliance promptly, and that the basic terms of the agreements are being observed. Thus, there is no need to set out, a priori, tougher verification requirements for SALT II, because of alleged Soviet cheating on SALT I.

### Verifying the Limit on MIRVed Missiles

At the beginning of SALT II, U.S. studies indicated that if the ABM Treaty remained intact and antisubmarine warfare remained technically infeasible for strategic use, the most significant potential threat to a stable "mutual assured destruction" relationship would be Soviet deployment of large, accurate, MIRVs. True, these MIRVs could threaten only U.S. land-based Minuteman ICBMs but not submarines at sea or alert bombers, and accuracy improvements would eventually make even small MIRVs a threat to land-based silos. Nevertheless, obtaining Soviet agreement to limit the deployment of large MIRVs would at least buy time for Minuteman while other arms control and technical measures could be explored to ensure its long-term survivability. In any event, constraints on MIRVs were about the only militarily significant measure that seemed negotiable, and thus were a high priority.

Verification remained a major stumbling block to MIRV limits. Initially, only one approach seemed promising: if the Soviets never tested MIRVs, or if their MIRV testing were stopped after a small number of tests, they could not deploy a MIRV system

operationally with any degree of confidence. But such an approach was totally unacceptable to the Soviets in light of the advanced U.S. MIRV program. Had the Soviets agreed to forgo MIRVs, they would have relegated themselves to permanent inferiority in total deliverable warheads. The targeting flexibility of their force would have been seriously limited, as well as their capability to ensure penetration of any possible ABM defense the United States might deploy should the ABM treaty be abrogated. Thus, a new approach to MIRV verification was necessary if MIRVs were to be controlled.

In a sense, the Soviets themselves provided the answer to the dilemma of how to verify controls on MIRVs. As U.S. intelligence on the new generation of Soviet MIRVed missiles improved, it became clear that these missiles differed significantly from the single warhead missiles they would replace. In particular, all the new MIRVed missiles are larger and require silos significantly different from those constructed for older missiles. They also require changes in command and control systems, support equipment, and other facilities, all of which would be observed by U.S. satellites. Finally, the new missiles have design characteristics which make it virtually impossible to transfer the MIRV payloads from the new missiles to existing SS-11 or SS-9 missiles.

In combination, these system characteristics opened the door to the possibility of verifying a numerical MIRV limit. The United States would be able to detect deployment of the new MIRVs by observing changes in silos and support equipment, and existing missiles could not be converted to MIRVs without major testing, which we would observe. It was this reasoning which led to a series of U.S. proposals for numerical limits on the number of MIRVed missiles, and eventually to the 1,320 limit negotiated at Vladivostok.

The 1,320 limit itself ameliorates the verification problems. Even with a crash program, the Soviets could not approach the 1,320 limit in the number of deployed MIRVs before about 1981. Thus, the relevant U.S. verification capabilities to be evaluated are those which we can reasonably expect to have in 1981, by which time surveillance systems will be greatly improved.

As implied above, the most difficult potential verification problem concerns the possible Soviet development of missiles which are essentially identical to each other except that one is MIRVed and the other is not. In at least two cases, this problem has to be faced immediately: the SS-18 (the

⁵ See my "Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternative View," Foreign Affairs, April 1976, pp. 467-469. for a more thorough discussion of why the Soviets needed MIRVs in their force.

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replacement for the SS-9) and the SS-17 (one of the two replacements for the SS-11) have been developed in both single warhead and MIRVed versions.

This potential problem has apparently been solved by obtaining Soviet agreement that if any missile is developed in two versions, one of which is MIRVed and one of which is not, all such missiles would be counted as MIRVs, regardless of which version is deployed. Thus, any unMIRVed missile (such as the unMIRVed SS-18) which is otherwise the same as a MIRVed missile (such as the MIRVed SS-18) will have to count as MIRVed. Furthermore, the possibility that the Soviets might develop a new MIRVed missile identical to older SS-11 or SS-9 missiles is also effectively eliminated, since should they do so, they would then have to count all the older missiles as MIRVed, putting them over the 1,320 limit.

U.S.-Soviet agreement on this point has eliminated the most difficult problem associated with MIRV verification. However, a less difficult but still significant problem remains—distinguishing between two missile launchers which are identical, except that one contains MIRVs and the other does not. While this problem exists to some extent for land-based silos, it is most difficult for missile launchers on submarines. It is conceivable that the Soviets will develop SLBM MIRVs which fit only in new launchers on a new class of submarines. But if they develop a MIRVed SLBM missile which also fits in older launchers on existing Soviet ballistic submarines, it would be difficult to tell which submarines contained MIRVs and which did not. This difficulty would persist even if the MIRVed SLBM were of a different type than the SLBMs now deployed.

One possible way to handle both these problems is to insist on a provision requiring that any launcher capable of launching a MIRVed missile must be counted as containing a MIRVed missile. Thus, should the Soviets develop a MIRVed missile which could be launched from their existing submarine launch tubes, they would have to count all existing tubes within the 1,320 limit. The Soviets might also wish to modify their land-based silos, perhaps to increase their hardness. But if they did so in such a way that permitted launching the SS-19 or SS-17 MIRVed missiles from the modified silos, they would have to count the silos as containing MIRVs, even if they actually contained unMIRVed SS-11s.

The problem with this approach is that it is completely inconsistent with U.S. deployments. In particular, with minor modifications,

our Minuteman II silos are all capable of launching the MIRVed Minuteman III missile. Thus, to insist upon such a provision in the SALT II agreement would require either that we count all 1,000 of our Minuteman silos toward the 1,320 limit, or that the Soviets be willing to accept a one-sided constraint.

Given this situation, perhaps the best that could be achieved would be to obtain Soviet agreement to designate each individual missile launcher which will remain unMIRVed for the duration of the agreement. The remaining launchers, which could number no more than 1,320, could then contain either all MIRVs or a mixture of MIRVs and single warhead missiles.

If the Soviets would agree to identify the individual launchers which remain outside 1,320 permitted to contain MIRVs, we would be required to verify only that the launchers in fact contain no MIRVed missiles. Finding a MIRVed missile in any one such launcher would prove a violation. This is a much easier task than proving that the aggregate count of MIRVs exceeds 1,320.

For silo-based ICBMs, a designation of unMIRVed launchers could be made by geographic coordinates. For mobile missiles, either land-based or on submarines, it would probably be necessary to require that the designation be made by "class." If any one launcher of a particular class or type contained MIRVs, all launchers of that class would be counted within the 1,320 limit.

When added to the agreement apparently already reached to count all versions of a missile capable of carrying MIRVs as being MIRVed, these two additional provisions —counting SLBM MIRVs by classes and declaring which ICBM silos are unMIRVed—should provide an adequate basis for verification of the 1,320 MIRV limit. It is extremely difficult to conceive of a situation in which it would be worth the risk to the Soviets to cheat under such provisions. A Soviet attempt to cheat would certainly be caught by the time they had deployed more than 100 to 200 missiles above the limit. They could obtain no strategic advantage by deploying an additional 100 to 200 MIRVed missiles, while getting caught cheating would leave deep diplomatic scars.

### Verifying the Limit on Delivery Vehicles

Counting the number of strategic delivery vehicles—basically ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers—presents perhaps the least difficult verification problem associated with the Vladivostok accord. The limit of 2,400 on aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles requires essentially the

6

same verification capabilities as are required
for the Interim Agreement. There is little
doubt that we can continue to count accu-
rately the number of Soviet missile silos,
missile-carrying submarines, and heavy
bombers. Nevertheless, the 2,400 provision
does raise some verification questions.

First, there is a potential verification prob-
lem associated with mobile land-based
ICBMs. With projected improvements in
intelligence capabilities, the United States
could count the number of Soviet mobile
land-based ICBMs deployed to within 10
to 20 per cent of the actual number, pro-
vided that the deployment did not involve
deliberate concealment. However, should the
Soviets choose to deploy a mobile land-
based system which relied on deceptive
basing, such as the "multiple aim point"
land-based mobile options now being con-
sidered by the United States, it would be-
come much more difficult to verify the num-
ber of missiles deployed.⁶ There is no ques-
tion about our ability to detect that the
Soviets have deployed a mobile land-based
system. But if the system uses concealment,
we will not be able to count directly the
missiles deployed and will have to rely on
indirect measures, such as the size of support
and operations facilities and programs, to
estimate the number of missiles. If the pro-
gram is small, say 100 to 200 missiles, even
a large percentage error in this estimate
would not be terribly significant, so we
could probably live with the uncertainty.
The Soviets are very unlikely to deploy a
large land-based mobile system (each mobile
missile deployed would require dismantling
an existing missile in order to stay within
the 2,400 limit), so perhaps the most fruitful
approach, short of banning all mobile
deployments, would be to insist on a low
numerical limit on the number of mobile
missiles permitted.

A second problem related to mobiles con-
cerns the difficulty of distinguishing between
intermediate-range mobile missiles (IRBMs)
and intercontinental-range mobiles (ICBMs).
The Soviets appear to be developing and
deploying a new mobile IRBM for use against
targets in Europe and China. The difficulty

is that it may well be deployed on a launcher
which is capable of launching a larger
ICBM. Thus it is important to obtain Soviet
agreement that any mobile IRBMs deployed
on launchers capable of launching ICBMs
will have to count within the 2,400 limit.

A second set of problems related to veri-
fication on the 2,400 limit on strategic de-
ivery vehicles is posed by heavy bombers.
There are three difficulties associated with
bombers: "bomber variants," the Backfire
aircraft, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles.

The Soviets have maintained for some
time a small number of aircraft, known as
"bomber variants," which are nearly identi-
cal to their 140 strategic bombers, but
which are used either as naval aircraft or
as tankers. Some have argued that these air-
craft can be readily fitted with bombs and
used as strategic bombers and should there-
fore be counted as heavy bombers. It would
be extremely surprising if the Soviets chose
to do this, since to use these aircraft as
bombers would require eliminating their
strategic tanker force and an important part
of their naval reconnaissance force. But
nonetheless, the verification question re-
mains. All one can say is that we would
detect such a change over time if it were
made on a permanent basis, and that it
would make no sense whatsoever for the So-
viets to make the change on a temporary
basis. In any event, because of the relatively
high Vladivostok limits, a switch would not
add materially to overall Soviet capability.

The Backfire aircraft raises similar prob-
lems. There is little disagreement about the
intended use of the Backfire. The Soviets
claim it is not intended for use against the
United States, and all available evidence in-
dicates that this is true. The Soviets appar-
ently are willing to give us assurances that
the aircraft will not be used against the
United States. But even without a tanker
force, the Backfire could probably reach the
United States on some missions. Thus, as
is the case with bomber variants, we will
never be able to verify that the aircraft has
no capability against the United States.
Rather, the issue is whether we can accept
the argument that the Backfire fits more
logically into the category of "noncentral
system," such as our nuclear-armed forward-
based aircraft (which can attack the Soviet
Union), or do we insist upon counting it
as a heavy bomber, even if doing so risks a
breakdown in the agreement.

It was agreed at Vladivostok that any
ballistic air-to-surface missiles with a range
greater than 600 kilometers would be
counted within the 2,400 limit. This raises

⁶ Most "multiple aim point" schemes involve construc-
tion of many (perhaps several thousand) relatively
inexpensive "shelters" which would conceal the mis-
sile and provide some protection against nuclear blast.
A much smaller number of missiles would then be
stationed in positions to move into these "shelters"
should an attack look imminent or, alternatively,
would be rotated in an undetectable way among the
shelters. Without on-site inspection, it would be vir-
tually impossible to determine which shelters contain
missiles and which are empty, and counting all the
shelters would clearly put the side deploying the sys-
tem above the 2,400 limit on aggogate launchers.

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two problems: how to determine the missile range, and how to count the number deployed.

In practice, neither of these problems is likely to arise. There is virtually no strategic use for a ballistic air-to-surface missile of a range anywhere near 600 kilometers. There is a use for a very short range ballistic air-to-surface missile such as our 120 kilometer short-range attack missile (SRAM). But above that range, the only systems which make any sense would be Skybolt-type 3,000 kilometer range ballistic missiles, or air mobile ICBMs—i.e., ICBM-size missiles mounted on a large strategic aircraft. Skybolt-type systems were proved undesirable in the late 1960s and are unlikely to be revived by either side, but such missiles are relatively large and would be relatively easy to count should they be deployed. ICBMs carried on strategic aircraft are extremely large and there would be essentially no ambiguity whatsoever in counting these.

## Verifying Limits on Cruise Missiles

As is now widely known, the Soviets interpreted the Vladivostok Agreement on air-to-surface missiles more broadly than the United States, claiming that it extended to air-to-surface cruise missiles as well. Furthermore, they have proposed limits on other types of cruise missiles in the SALT talks subsequent to Vladivostok, although even they seem to acknowledge that cruise missiles not launched from aircraft were never discussed at Vladivostok.

Because of cruise missiles' relatively small size and the nature of cruise missile technology, verification problems are undoubtedly greater than with most other types of weapon systems discussed in SALT. In the context of Vladivostok, there are three potential issues related to cruise missiles: determining the range of a particular missile, counting the number of missiles deployed, and distinguishing between nuclear and non-nuclear cruise missiles.

The United States and the Soviet Union have already deployed many tens of thousands (probably even hundreds of thousands) of "tactical" short-range cruise missiles, such as the many air-to-air anti-aircraft missiles on each side. Thus, some range limit must be set below which cruise missiles are exempted from the provisions of SALT. The difficulty is that a cruise missile is basically a small pilotless aircraft, and if the engines will operate over a 600 kilometer range, they will probably continue to operate for another 600 kilometers. The guidance systems

and other key systems do not change their method of operation with greater range, so these can be fully tested at short range. System endurance can be tested by running the engines and components for long periods of time in a fixed test stand without flying the missile at all. Finally, the size of the missile is not even a good indicator of range. For example, the Soviets have deployed many short-range cruise missiles which, because their small turbofan engine technology is several years behind that of the United States, are much larger in size than the long-range cruise missiles now being developed by the United States. Should missiles of anywhere near the size of current Soviet naval cruise missiles be developed with new technology, their range could be very high.

This does not mean it is impossible to determine cruise missile ranges. In the course of observing testing, we are likely to learn certain engine characteristics which, taken together with the size of the missile, would provide a reasonable estimate of the maximum range of the missile. This could be off by as much as a factor of two.

Even if range is known, the problem of counting the number of deployed cruise missiles remains. The number which can be accommodated on an aircraft, submarine, or surface ship varies widely. For example, a submarine could conceivably carry as many cruise missiles as it can carry torpedoes, since they can be designed to be completely interchangeable in the torpedo tubes.

Finally, there remains the most serious problem: distinguishing between conventionally armed and nuclear-armed cruise missiles. There is no practical way to distinguish between missiles which differ only in that one carries a nuclear warhead and the other a conventional warhead. If conventional cruise missiles are permitted without limit, verification of either cruise missile ranges or the number deployed will become essentially impossible for nuclear missiles.

Since some range limit must be set to distinguish tactical from strategic cruise missiles, there is no practical way to eliminate all of the verification problems associated with cruise missiles. But the problems can be greatly reduced if the final agreement includes a ban on the development and deployment of all cruise missiles above a specified range limit, while allowing unlimited numbers of missiles below the limit. This would eliminate altogether the problem of counting, since no missiles would be counted below the 2,400 total. It also reduces the conventional versus nuclear

8

armed problem, since conventional missiles above the range limit would not be permitted; if they were permitted, it would be impossible to know for sure if they had conventional nuclear warheads.

Verification would also be facilitated if the range limit dividing those missiles banned and those missiles permitted were set at the same level for all types of cruise missiles—land-based, sea-based, and air-based. Otherwise, it is conceivable that a cruise missile could be developed in one mode and transferred to another mode without the testing which normally permits the United States to know what was happening.

Taken together, these provisions—setting a single range limit above which all types of cruise missiles are banned and below which they are all permitted without limit—should reduce cruise missile verification difficulties to tolerable proportions, despite the inherent uncertainty in cruise missile range determination.

### Can a SALT II Treaty Be Verified?

If one postulates a need for certainty concerning Soviet compliance, there is no choice but to reject any SALT II treaty based on the Vladivostok Agreement. But uncertainty about compliance must be balanced against other considerations: the strategic consequences should cheating occur, Soviet motivation to cheat, and the value of the agreement. When this balance is struck, it seems clear that verification should not be allowed to stand in the way of Senate ratification of a SALT II agreement.

Consider first the possible strategic consequence of Soviet cheating. There is not a single case in which undetectable Soviet cheating would make a significant strategic difference. Cheating would certainly be caught before enough systems had been deployed to threaten seriously the U.S. deterrent. The most significant emerging Soviet threats to our deterrent capability—accurate missiles, antisubmarine warfare capabilities, and air defense systems—are not part of the current negotiations at all. A Soviet ABM system, which would be a major threat, is limited in the permanent ABM Treaty, not the Vladivostok accord. Thus, while lack of limits on programs threatening strategic crisis stability is perhaps one of the most disappointing aspects of SALT II, it does have the advantage of lowering the importance of verification.

As to Soviet motives to cheat, it is hard to find them. This is partly the other side of the same coin—Soviet cheating neither threatens America's strategic position nor

benefits the Soviets. The Soviets run extremely high risk if they cheat. As experience to date has shown, our "national technical means" of verification are quite capable. Furthermore, the Soviets must always consider the possibility of a defector.

This leaves the value of the agreement to be balanced against the verification uncertainties. In all likelihood, the final SALT II agreement will not do much to improve "crisis stability," but it will set some limits on the arms competition of the two sides, eliminating the "worst case" threats from strategic planning consideration and providing a basis for future reductions. Each senator will have to evaluate the final agreement in his own terms to decide how much this is worth to us. But I believe the above analysis, which can be supported in thorough classified hearings, makes it clear that the verification problems should not represent a serious argument against ratification.

### Verification and Future Agreements

Although verification need not present an obstacle to a SALT II agreement, its effect on additional arms control agreements is much less certain. On the one hand, our "national technical means" will get increasingly better. We will have more frequent and more reliable surveillance, both electronic and photographic. We will be able to make better use of specialized surveillance such as infrared photography and radar. In many cases, the combination of methods available will greatly increase our ability to identify and understand certain activities.

At the same time, improved technology will make it easier to avoid surveillance by "national technical means." Electronic minaturization and dramatic reductions in the cost of small computers will make it possible to encrypt almost all electronic signals. With time, activities can be shielded from photographic observations, although this is not as easy as is often assumed, given the size of the projects and systems involved. Finally, as both sides gain experience with surveillance systems, it may become easy to decoy and spoof them. Thus, which of the two types of technological improvements—better surveillance or improved countermeasures—will win out is not yet clear.

Whether or not verification capabilities improve, further arms control agreements will present more difficult verification problems than have past agreements. This is true not only for a SALT III agreement, but for the other key agreements frequently discussed. For example:

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> **The Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB):** Verification has been and will continue to be a stumbling block. National seismic networks can distinguish earthquakes from extremely small explosions, perhaps as low as one kiloton, provided that the side carrying out the test has not attempted to spoof the network. But if the test is carried out in very soft soil, or inside a large underground cavity, the explosion can be "decoupled," reducing the seismic signal. Thus, it is simply not possible, despite the claims of many CTB advocates, to verify the CTB with high confidence. The threshold in the present test ban treaty could be reduced from the present level of 150 kilotons to 1 to 5 kilotons with high confidence verification. But for the United States to give up all testing without air-tight verification could leave open the possibility, albeit remote, that the Soviets would discover new physical effects which would threaten our deterrent capability.

> **European Force Reductions:** Very little attention is paid to verification problems associated with mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). But relatively modest troop reductions, such as those most commonly discussed for an MBFR first step, cannot be verified with high confidence by "national technical means."

> **Reduced Defense Budgets:** In this case, verification is close to impossible. Even if the tremendous problem of comparing the defense budgets of the United States and the Soviet Union were solved, or if limits were set in Soviet roubles and U.S. dollars, verifying reductions in spending would be next to impossible.

> **Reduced Force Levels in SALT:** The United States could easily verify a reduction in the numbers of permitted strategic delivery vehicles—i.e., ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. But the lower force levels become, the more important other verification becomes. At the force levels proposed for SALT II, potentially undetectable cheating makes little difference to either side. But if force levels were halved, a small amount of cheating could make a difference.

> **Qualitative Limitations in SALT:** It is often argued that SALT should focus more directly on the key determinants of the strategic balance, such as accuracy of missiles, rather than aggregate numbers, systems, and launchers. But it is difficult to know the true accuracy of our own missiles, much less verify the accuracy of the other side's.

Many believe that these problems can be solved by increasing reliance on on-site inspection, especially since the Soviets have

accepted limited on-site inspection as a part of the recent agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). In my judgment, much of the enthusiasm for on-site inspection is not justified. Many of the potential problems discussed above cannot be solved with on-site inspection. For example, concealed low-yield underground tests could not be detected much more easily with on-site inspection. To begin with, we would not know where to send our inspectors. With regard to MBFR, distinguishing troop withdrawals from a rotation of troops is also difficult without a massive inspection force stationed at every rail yard, road junction, and airport in Eastern Europe. On-site inspectors are no help at all with budget reductions, and very few SALT difficulties are resolved by any but the most intrusive on-site inspection. For example, externally examining Soviet guidance systems would tell us almost nothing about their accuracy.

Apart from these problems, there is the question of how much inspection either side would permit. The inspection permitted by the Soviets in the recent PNE agreement is quite modest when compared to what is talked about for the more complex SALT and CTB agreements. I see no reason to believe that the Soviets' willingness to open the door to inspectors in this case signals a complete reversal of their policies. It should be remembered that the PNE agreement permits no inspection at a military test site—inspectors are permitted only when the PNE takes place at a civilian site. Finally, it is not clear that U.S. security interests would permit any significant number of Soviet inspectors at U.S. military facilities.

One might conclude from this discussion that the verification difficulties associated with potential follow-on arms control agreements leave little hope for carrying the arms control process much beyond present accomplishments. But such a conclusion would be too pessimistic. First, air-tight verification should not be the sine qua non of all arms control agreements. Rather, one must weigh risks. Failing to control the strategic arms build-up is a risk almost without parallel in the history of mankind. Thus, within broad limits, it seems clear that the desire for air-tight verification should not be permitted to determine our entire policy.

In many cases (e.g., MBFR), potential agreements are more a political symbol than anything else, and air-tight verification seems to be of little relevance. We do not know today exactly how many troops the Soviets have stationed in Eastern Europe; thus, an

10

MBFR agreement calling for withdrawal of 20,000 to 50,000 troops, which might be a significant step in reducing East-West tensions in Europe, would not change the military balance appreciably.

These possibilities notwithstanding, our inability to verify increasingly more complex agreements means that the dreams of many arms control advocates must await a more fundamental change in the political relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. If a true détente can be established, we can probably accept more risks related to verification. A true détente would imply a significant opening of Soviet society to outsiders, a loosening of internal controls, and a greater economic dependence on the West—circumstances which would make it both more difficult to cheat on agreements and more costly to get caught.

Such changes will take many years; in the meantime we must live with the constraints our verification capabilities place on new arms control agreements. But the greatest mistake would be to fail to acknowledge that all alternative courses of action involve risks. No more arms control agreements would mean no more verification uncertainties. But it would also mean little prospect of reducing the tensions standing in the way of achieving a safer world.

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