CHINA - 1970

JANUARY

7. Chinese request Warsaw meeting with US, first since 1968.

8. HK, Rogers (telcon) agree that State, not White House, should make low-key announcement of Warsaw meeting

First Warsaw meeting with Chinese Charge produces agreement on administrative details for future meetings.
(Memo to President Jan 12)

13

15

HK tells President of report from US Ambassador to Kabul of contact with PRC Ambassador, who said (1) Warsaw talks could lead to talks elsewhere, (2) Vietnam has no bearing on US-PRC relations, (3) US would have to withdraw 7th Fleet from Straits but would not have to hand Taiwan over to them. (x1cm)

17

HK tells Marshall Green to tone down Warsaw instructions so we're not "trying too hard to prove our good intentions." HK thinks "we will be more impressive to them if we give the feeling of moderation produced by strength".

19

HK reports to President on favorable press treatment of announcement of relaxation of barriers on trade with Communist China (memo).

20

US Amb. Stoessel and PRC Charge Lei Yang meet in Warsaw in PRC Embassy. Stoessel tells Chinese that US "would be prepared to consider sending a representative to Peking for direct discussions...or receiving a representative from your government in Washington." PRC Charge expresses interest.

HK tells President that PRC has insisted on media coverage. "It's unprecedented... They must be scared out of their minds of the Russians." (x1cm)

21

HK memo reports that Warsaw talks represent serious opening of negotiation discussing direct bilateral issues and avoiding ideology. Chinese Charge's language on Taiwan characterized as "about the most forthcoming in the history of the talks".

26

HK report to President of Pakistani Ambassador's conversation with Chou En-lai reveals Chinese principal concern is possibility of Soviet attack. Also shows a willingness to hold talks with the US if US takes the initiative but pessimism on likelihood of resolving Taiwan issue.

CHINA - 1970

FEBRUARY

2 President decides to seek amendment of PL 480 legislation to obtain waiver authority to make local currency sales to Communist countries (practically to go into effect after Vietnam war) and to extend credits to all Communist countries including USSR and China. (HK memo recommended no action to amend at this time.)

3
HK asks State for game plan for Warsaw talks now talks have resumed and show prospect of continuing.

PRC asks for Warsaw meeting on February 20.

4
HK Q&A session with Washington Bureau of New York Times
includes USSR-China.

5
President approves message for PRC to be given to Derksen, Dutch Charge in Peking, who has been introduced to HK by Cabot Lodge.

6
President agrees to meeting with PFIAB at later date.
PFIAB report on USSR and Chinese Strategic Threat con-
cludes defense of homeland continues as Soviet principal
concern and that Chinese threat seems to be lagging behind
NIE estimate but is an added factor of great potential
importance to the international balance of power.

11
HK gives message to Derksen offering to PRC to establish a channel through Walters, giving Walters' phone numbers.

14
President approves guidance for Feb. 20 Warsaw meeting with Chinese, approves HK recommendation to ask State to take a more positive line to a Chinese proposal for higher level talks Peking or Washington. (Feb. 18 memo to State)

18 Foreign Policy Report.

20
PRC Charge Lei Yang tells Stoessel in Warsaw meeting at US
Embassy that, if the USG wishes to send a representative
of ministerial rank or a special envoy of the US President
to Peking for further exploration of questions of funda-
mental principle between China and the United States,
the Chinese Government will be willing to receive him.

22
Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief warns China against con-
tinued preparation for war.

China - 1970

2.

FEBRUARY

22

Hilaly relays to HK Yahya's assessment of Chinese thinking about US-PRC relations. Yahya thinks US initiatives have encouraged Chinese, who no longer see US-Soviet collusion. Chinese stress US should not construe their readiness for dialogue as sign of weakness. PRC response is likely to be measured, but they seem inclined for meaningful dialogue on all issues. Sino-US war now seems very remote, with lessened possibility of expansion of Vietnam conflict. HK says Yahya should tell Chinese that we can't control press speculation and that we are ready for direct White House channel to Peking.

CHINA - 1970

MARCH

6 State Dept. announces it will validate American passports for travel to PRC "for any legitimate purpose." (per NSDM17)

10
HK memo sends Pres. letter from Chiang Kai-shek
expressing "shock" with US position in Warsaw.
HK notes that this reaction "...illustrates the deep
concern which he and others like him in Taiwan un-
doubtedly feel with respect to the possible impli-
cations of the Warsaw talks.

13
Pres. tells HK (telcon) he wants serious talks in
Peking, not Warsaw. He wants serious emissary, not
"some half-assed Ambassador." It "would drive the
Russians up the wall."

17
HK mtg. with Marshall Green and Wm. Sullivan re higher
level talks with Chinese. Green reserved about send-
ing higher-level rep. to Peking before finding out
at Warsaw that we could make progress. HK indicated
Pres. favored more positive response to PRC and
wondered if this could be done while holding out
for a prior discussion of modalities. On other issue,
agreement reached to defer action against Chinese road
building in Laos given deteriorating in Laos.
(HK memo to State of March 18 conveys decision re
putting plan on Chinese road-building in abeyance.)

18
Staff memo to HK accords with view US should take
slightly more positive line vis-a-vis Chinese than
that being advocated by Rogers/Green. HK (on Mar 20)
sends directive to State conveying President's decision:
Pres. agrees it is too early to move to Peking but
believes "it is important for us to preserve the
positive approach to the question of raising the level
...and to avoid suggesting to the Chinese that we are
drawing back from the proposal for the meeting...which
we ourselves offered (January 20)...(therefore)...at
the next meeting in Warsaw, present our position on
seeking common ground in positive terms so that our
intention to proceed at the higher level is fully
affirmed...In addition, to underscore...we propose
opening discussions on the modalities which would
apply for higher-level meeting in Peking..."

CHINA - 1970

MARCH

23 In Peking, Prince Sihanouk announces formation of Cambodian 'government in exile' and promises to 'liberate' Cambodia.

25 HK directive to CIA requesting an analysis of Chinese attitudes and behavior towards Southeast Asian insurgencies "in order to obtain a sound basis for U.S. policies in Southeast Asia and China over the next five years...." (Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, included. Indonesia, Malaysia excluded from request).

26 HK memo to Pres. on Chinese road construction in Laos notes that "Chinese objectives appear to be both tactical and strategic in nature: in the short term, to demonstrate support for North Vietnam's war effort in Laos; and over the long haul, counter US and Soviet influence...road constructions represents a determined Chinese effort to consolidate and extend her influence in a traditional area of Chinese interest..."

27 Pres. letter to Chiang Kai-shek (in response to latter's) to allay concerns over Warsaw: "I wish, however, to assure you personally and in the strongest terms of my determination that there shall be no change in the firmness of our commitment to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores and of my earnest desire that these talks will not affect the friendship and close cooperation which has existed between our Governments."

CHINA - 1970

APRIL

10

✓ us proposes April 30 for Warsaw meeting.
Staff memo to HK on Sino-Soviet contingency planning.
Rogers Morris suggests precise steps for USG action
in event of hostilities. Options include (1) Shading
Toward China ✓"the premise of this option would be
a calculation that the Soviets cannot (or will not)
give us anything to justify our political acquiescence
in their attack" (scenario involves consultation
with Israel re Middle East); or (2) Exploitation
✓"premise of this option is that nothing decisive
can be done for the Chinese, and in any case that our
interest in an anti-Soviet China and an embarrassed
Soviet Union should be subordinated to an all-out
effort to end the war in Vietnam and damp down the
Middle East". (No indication if meeting held to
discuss plan.)

11

✓ HK memo sends President State memo of March 16 on renewing for another six months restrictions on the use of US passports for travel into or through Cuba, Mainland China, North Korea and North Vietnam, while also stamping in on passports US court decision that Americans cannot be prevented from travelling from restricted areas. Main point is an effort by State to both maintain restrictions on travel while at same time appearing to be more liberal on PRC (President had approved liberalization of travel there in connection with Warsaw talks).

13

Timmons memo to HK that the House Committee on Agri-culture rejected the Administration's request that PL 480 local currency sales be allowed for Communist countries and that the USSR and PRC no longer be wholly excluded from any PL 480 sales. Bergsten memo notes that this development was not unexpected.

18

✓ HK memo to President puts into perspective press reports (to which the President reacted and sought analysis) that Soviets and Chinese having slight thaw in relations, including mutual pullback of troops from the disputed border. HK assessment: "...appearance of a slight improvement in relations with Peking would be tactically helpful to the Soviets as they continue their negotiations with Brandt, at a time when the SALT talks resume, and as negotiations continue over the Middle East and they are involving themselves more in the defense of the UAR ... (Chinese) would probably welcome a respite to enable them to devote more of their attention to recovering from Cultural Revolution. But neither

CHINA - 1970

APRIL

18
(cont.)

side will be prepared to give up any fundamental
positions...Hanoi...will be relieved by these latest
developments. Their fears that the Sino-Soviet
conflict would lead to a loss of Soviet overland
supplies may be eased.... I doubt that these latest
developments portend any fundamental relief ...no
significant change in our strategy toward Communist
China is likely to be required..." (President notes
that we should make sure that State does not drag its
feet on higher level talks with the PRC.)

21 President meets with GRC Vice Premier D Chian Ching-kuo. Nixon assures the Vice Premier of US friendship and support for Taiwan and of US support for the GRC position in the UN.

22
- ✓HK in meeting with GRC Vice Premier discusses situation in Cambodia. The Vice Premier questioned whether the Chinese Communists' purpose was to keep the US busy on more than one front at a time by keeping up the pressures on Taiwan, South Korea and Vietnam. HK agreed this might be true: "There was something odd about a situation where the greatest country in the world had to worry about what a whole lot of fifth rate countries were doing to us."
- PRC suggests ~~15 May 20~~ for Warsaw mtg.

28

30
Ernst Winters meets with PRC reps. in Paris to hear
reaction to Cambodia events - pre Pres. speech. ("un-
Chinese intensity of their reaction. Clearly a nerve
has been touched..."). Reports to HK who tells him
to see PRC reps on May 4 on HK behalf. Walters to
be contacted as well. HK report (memo) to Pres. of
May 19 sums up these exchanges; says there has been
no further word to date from Winters or Walters.

29

US authorizes selective licensing of non-strategic
exports to PRC (per NSDM17)

CHINA - 1970

MAY

1 State memo on sharp upturn in PRC polemics against US, Japan and USSR in recent weeks. Staff memo to HK suspects real motive of State sending such a memo now is "to soften you (HK) up for a new attempt to take a more cautious line in responding to the Chinese invitation to meet in Peking."

3
Ernst Winter tells HK of Chinese queries about
Cambodian operation. Chinese want to know if its
tactical move or offensive, fear it's part of "overall
attack on China." They wonder who in America should
be gotten in touch with. (telcon) HK checks with President
and suggests Winter tell Chinese to contact Walters.
(telcon)

3
US assures PRC through Winter and Walters
PRC announces they will be "great rear area" for North
Vietnamese, which (HK tells NAR) is sign they won't come
in. (telcon)

20
Pres. tells HK to move into Formosa Strait any available
elements of 7th Fleet..."stuff that will look
belligerent. I want them to know we are not playing
this chicken game...It's an order..." (telcon).

20
Warsaw meeting scheduled for today is cancelled by
PRC. State's evaluation is that move was a tactical
device rather than an abrupt change in PRC policy on
talks with US, although State does point out that
Peking is using the cancellation to subject President
to further domestic US criticism on Cambodian decision.
HK feels low-key nature of the Chinese action reduced
the impact of that ploy. (Memo for Pres. May 28)

20
Rare Mao Tse-tung statement -- condemns US actions
in Cambodia. (Last Mao statement concerned negro
struggle in US and issued in 1968). HK view of Mao
intention: "In this, and in earlier such pronounce-
ments, he is highlighting what he sees as salient
developments in the death throes of the American
system -- and he wants history to see that he
correctly diagnosed the process...may..(also have
a) tactical issue in mind...help to check any
inclinations among the Hanoi leaders to seek a
political settlement..." (memo).

28
Staff memo that CIA estimate is that Chinese will
continue to support NVN to pursue the war but will
themselves keep out of the line of fire. (Report
done against backdrop of rumors that PRC troops would
actually engage in Laos and Cambodia). (chron)

CHINA - 1970

JUNE

1. HK analysis of Hanoi's reply to Mao Tse-tung's public statement on US actions in Cambodia points out differences between Hanoi and Peking: "We view Hanoi's reply to Mao as one of many continuing signs that the Hanoi-Peking relationship, although close, still suffers from various tensions resulting from conflicts of interest in the Sino-Soviet struggle, the future of Indochina, and the best tactics to be followed in the Vietnam war. These should not be exaggerated, but they should not be forgotten either." (memo for Pres.)

4. Soviet weekly New Times attacks China for interfering in Cambodian affairs and thus helping to bring about Sihanouk's overthrow.

5. Staff reports to HK that State will vote against a Czech resolution to permit the invitation of countries not presently invited to the ICAO conferences on liability and aircraft high-jacking. This would eliminate PRC, North Korea and East Germany. At issue is principle that UNGA, not specialized agencies, should be judge of membership.

10. Kosygin on Soviet TV reports Sino-Soviet border talks are deadlocked.

11. HK notes to Stew Alsop that the Chinese "are not kicking us around the same way now." (telcon)

12. HK tells Pres. that Chinese have said that around June 20 they would be willing to talk again. "I think we should have some visible activity in Warsaw." (telcon)

15. HK gives message for Walters to use as talking points with his PRC contact in Paris, suggesting a channel through Walters and our readiness to send high-level personal representative of the President to Paris or elsewhere for direct talks on US-Chinese relations. The message notes publicity surrounding Warsaw talks and suggests this alternative channel "for matters of the most extreme sensitivity", knowledge of which would be "confined to the President, his personal advisors and his personal representative unless otherwise agreed." Purpose would be "to bring about an improvement in US-Chinese relations fully recognizing differences in ideology."

18. ✓NYT reports (thenold EER diplomats PRC forecast response to dialogue)
18. HK asks Helms for follow-up to SNIE on Chinese perspectives (memo)

27. ✓PRC statements (20th anniversary of US "occupation" of Taiwan).

CHINA - 1970

JULY

9. HK reports to Pres. on July 2 incident of PRC attempt against US reconn flight. Not since 1965 have Chinese shown evidence of hostile intent. HK finds incident confusing and disturbing. Perhaps elements in PRC hierarchy want to disrupt Sino-US relations. HK recommends US ensure its flights not unnecessarily provocative, to "avoid playing into the radical's hands."

10. PRC releases Bishop Walsh (NCNA announcement)

10. Renewed Sino-Soviet talks on navigation of border rivers begin.

11. HK reports to Pres. that PRC has released Bishop Walsh, arrested in the 50s. Though this is a gesture to balance out recent suicide of another US detainee, HK feels this gesture shows effort to avoid a posture of total hostility, particularly after recent attempted effort against US recon plan. (July 11 memo)

13. HK recommends to Pres. (concurred in by Commerce, State, but disputed by DOD) that the US not oppose the presence of GM diesel engines in trucks from an Italian truck firm bound for PRC. (PRC wanted these trucks with US parts.) DOD feels trucks could be used militarily and also see sale as major liberalization of trading policy with PRC. Timmons reserved on grounds of possible Congressional reaction (which HK disputes). Pres. approves HK recommendation that sale go forward. (See July 28)

24. HK sends Pres. Rogers memo on Chinese representation issue at UN which argues that US continue with present policy even if it fails. HK agrees but suggests tack of continuing to emphasize our interest in protecting place for ROC in UN rather than posture as excluding PRC. Also, maintain Nixon doctrine line of avoiding confrontation mentality.

27. State Dept. announces US ready to resume Warsaw talks at any time.

28. (Communique)
US discloses approval of sale by Italy to PRC of 80 large dump trucks with General Motors engines, first such transaction since Dec. 1969 relaxation of trade controls on non-strategic US-made materials or commodities.

31. China accuses USSR of massing troops on Sino-Soviet border and warns of danger of war.

CHINA - 1970

AUGUST

4. Staff tells HK that Laotians have again made clear to US Embassy their desire to maintain a cloak of ambiguity around Chinese road-building. Embassy recommends political precondition be dropped and that blocking action go forward. Laos Action Group is considering. (chron)

17. HK tells Pres. that tensions rising between Soviets and PRC. Soviets have irritated PRC especially on issue of disputed territory. (memo)

17. Peking radio announced signing of an agreement with Sihanouk to provide him with "gratuitous military aid" in 1970. HK memo to Pres. on Actions on Cambodia dated Aug. 19 interprets this as part of Peking's psywar effort to show support for Sihanouk rather than indication of increased likelihood of Chinese war materiel being delivered to his sympathizers in Cambodia.

26. Restrictions on foreign ships to prohibiting US oil companies from permitting use of refueling facilities to and from PRC are lifted.

30. People's Daily "Commentator" denounces Agnew trip to Asia.

CHINA - 1970

SEPTEMBER

14

15

Memo to Pres: Contact with the Chinese

HK tells Pres. CIA assessment of mounds in China does not rule out that they are ground defense strong-points. (Memo)

16

HK in Chicago backgrounder analyzes Chinese view of world and nature of Sino-Soviet rivalry. "As far as we are concerned, we recognize the fact that China is a tremendous phenomenon in Asia. We can't talk it away. We can't pretend it isn't there. So we have adopted the posture that we don't judge countries on the basis of what they say so much as on the basis of what they do. And we are in principle willing to negotiate on a business-like basis the way we are willing to negotiate on a business-like basis with everyone else. ... Much as I would like to claim that it was the brilliance of our diplomacy that brought [the Warsaw talks] about, I must say that... it was also the Chinese self-interest. The Chinese faced with the growth of this Soviet power on their frontier like to show that they are not without resources of their own. And, therefore, because of the internal Communist rivalries and because of the greater flexi-bility on our part, there are now possibilities of dealing with the Chinese that did not exist two years ago." He notes that Chinese haven't undertaken military measures beyond their borders since 1962.

27

Sainteny tells HK that he frequently sees PRC Amb. in Paris, Huang Chen. HK asks Sainteny to try to set up channel to Ambassador. Sainteny says he will try.

29

Winter sends HK vague letter in which he says he frequently sees the Chinese "but they simply do not and increasingly believe in the efficacy of force." (There is no evidence he relayed the message.)

CHINA - 1970

OCTOBER

5. Edgar Snow appears with Mao on National Day.
   ✓ says: "If there is anything I want to do before I
die, it is to go to China. If I don't, I want
my children to."

Vasili S.

10. Tolstikov arrives in Peking as new Soviet Ambassador, marking restoration of full Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations.

12. HK speculates in Hartford backgrounder that Sino-Soviet conflict seems insolvable. "We are not encouraging in any sense at all Sino-Soviet tensions. We feel free to deal with both parties. ...We do not feel that the United States as such, has any overriding conflicts with China." Sino-Soviet war would create enormous upheaval.

✓ People's Daily denounces President's Oct. 7 cease-fire initiative.

13. Canadian recognition of Chinese People's Republic.

21. ✓ HK sends Winter a friendly, non-substantive acknowledgment of his message of Sept. 29.

22. ✓ In meeting with Pres., Japanese PM Sato said Japan would continue to support Taiwan, especially on UN issue. Pres. agreed on need for firm line now - but noted in the long run it might be desirable to recognize Communist China.

25. ✓ Pres. tells Yahya in Washington meeting that he should tell PRC leadership when he visits Peking that US-Chinese dialogue is "essential", we will make no condominium against them, and we are ready for high-level discussions. We are not talking of a hotline, but of sending senior person, such as Dewey or Murphy or HK, to mutually convenient capital for serious talks with absolute discretion.

26. ✓ Nixon and Ceausescu discuss China in Washington meeting. Ceausescu says several high-level Romanian delegations got impression that PRC wanted to improve relations with US. Nixon encourages Ceausescu's continued role as mediator and says US is ready for talks with PRC in more secure channel than Warsaw.

✓ Zengler statement says US opposes admission to Peking to UN at expense of expulsions from ROC.

CHINA - 1970

OCTOBER

26 (con't) Nixon mentions trade and travel measures as well as exchange of high-level representatives short of full diplomatic relations.

26 Nixm toast refers to "PRC"

27
HK reiterates to Ceausescu US' great interest in
establishing political contact with Chinese. We
have no long-term clashing interests. We are prepared
to set up channels which are free from any outside
pressures and any questions of prestige.

CHINA - 1970

NOVEMBER

1. China calls for a world conference on nuclear disarmament and re-affirms that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.

2. ~~HK back channels to Korry as follow up to Korry's meetings with Pres and HK that Pres wants Korry's history of events leading up to present Chile's situation.~~

3. Sainteny writes (thru Smyser) confirming the Ambassador's credentials, his own good relations with him, and his willingness to move ahead.

8. PRC congratulates USSR on 53rd anniversary of Bolshevik Revolution, appeals for normal relations despite differences of principle.

9. ☑ HK letter to Sainteny (thru Smyser) gives him green light.

12. ✓ *Phillips speech to UNGA*

13. Holdridge forwards to HK the UN Statement by Amb. Phillips on Chinese representation -- statement not cleared at WH. Holdridge notes nowhere is outright opposition to Communist China's admission expressed and comments on several press items on subject.

16. HK authorizes clearance of telegram to USUN and Embassy Bucharest authorizing after UN vote on Chirep., hints to Romanians that Romania might wish to invite Communist China to participate in 1971 Pugwas meetings it hosting.

17. HK informs Pres of likelihood of close vote in UN on Chirep issue and State belief its active effort may be successful in keeping Chinese Communist Govt out this year.

18. Staff memo forwards in accord with HK request, draft NSDM establishing China Policy Group chaired by Under Sec of State to make recommendation on aspects of China policy; also forwards draft NSSM for study of entire UN membership question. Staff memo notes Presidential Commission on the UN may raise the Chirep issue in their report to Pres.

18. Staff informs HK that as result of HK call Javits has deferred introducing his resolution in Chirep until after UN vote. Javits speech for Senate floor Nov 18 speaks of Nixon Administration "new" policy on Chinese representation aimed at keeping Taiwan in not Chi Coms out and recommends US take initiative in offering resolution to accept universality of UN membership/

CHINA - 1970

NOVEMBER

19. NSSM 106 asks study on US policy toward China and NSSM 107 asks study of entire UN membership question (Korea, Vietnam, Germany and China) including its relationship to US-China policy.

19. HK does not forward to Pres (but indicates "ok") memo agreeing with Rogers' views of seriousness of adverse voting trend in UN on Chirep issue and informing Pres he intends to discuss the situation with Taiwan official. HK memo notes he has already requested studies in areas of Chinese policy and UN membership.

20. Majority of UN General Assembly (51-49: less than necessary two-thrids) votes for first time in favor of PRC admission. PRC Statement

20. HK and Rogers agree on contingency press guidance in event Albanian Resolution (to give Taipei seat to Peking) receives simple majority. Suggested line emphasizes evolving UN position with focus on keeping Taiwan in rather than keeping Peking out, and makes clear we plan a full-scale review of our policy. (Memos for Pres).

22. USSR and China sign new trade and payments agreement.

22. Pres. asks HK to have NSC prepare a confidential study on Chinese representation in US "The question we really need an answer to is how we can develop a position in which we can keep our commitments to Taiwan and yet will not be rolled by those who favor admission of Red China." Nov. 27 HK informs Pres he has already directed preparation of two studies -- one internal NSC and other by State. (memo)

24. Holdridge proposes China scholars for follow-up meeting to last year's meeting with HK. HK approves, except for Michael Oksenberg of Columbia University.

CHINA - 1970

DECEMBER

1. Ethiopia recognizes PRC.

1. ✓ Derksen finally attempts to hand over message given him in February and is informed that it is "not necessary" for him to do this.

3. In backgrounder, HK discuss Sino-Soviet split and US-Soviet relations indicating US does not want Sovs. to tell US with whom to deal: "...we have a rather cold approach of engaging in discussions with Communist China partly as a way against the Soviet Union, but we are under no illusions about their motives..." (eg Sovs).

9. Hilaly tells HK of Chou's reply to President's oral message thru Yahya. Chou's reply coordinated with Mao and Lin Piao, cites Taiwan issued and says that "in order to discuss this subject of [vacating] Chinese territories called Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking." Chou notes previous U.S. messages, but says this is first "from a Head, through a Head, to a Head." PRC says it attaches importance to this because Pakistan is a great friend of China.

10. In news conference, Pres. says US has no intention of changing its position with respect to admission of PRC to UN. However, US "will continue the initiative that I have begun" to relax trade and travel restrictions and attempting to open channels of communication; "looking long toward the future we must have some communication and eventually relations with Communist China."

14. HK calls Ed Teller to have him look at Chinese construction which is "inexplicable." [mounds] "Either they are nuts or it's something new. I have wanted a genius to look at it. All the explanations I have received are absurd." Teller says he's not a genius but he'll look into it. (telcon)

14. ✓ Fairland cable to HK / Rogers on PRC Yahya on US-PRC relaxation, Ernst Winter tells Jon Howe in HK's absence that PRC asked on Dec. 8 for names and data on persons they could invite to China who would be "friends."

16. ✓ HK gives Hilaly memo to PRC through Yahya which states US pleasure at PRC offer, first extended at 2/20/70 Warsaw mtg, to receive senior US representative in Peking. US replies that it welcomes high level discussions (not limited to Taiwan question) and proposes mtg. of representatives at earliest possible moment to discuss modalities of higher level meeting in Peking.

CHINA - 1970

DECEMBER

17. Romanian Dep For Min Macovescu tells HK of Romanians'
general impression of cautious movement by PRC toward
greater involvement in international affairs. They
seem willing to have trade exchanges and to "make
efforts."

18 Mao in 5 hour interview with Edgar Snow (published in LIFE on 4/30/71 and not disclosed to US earlier)* says Nixon "should be welcomed" in China because "at present the problems between China and the USA would have to be solved with Nixon. Mao would be happy to talk with him, either as a tourist or as President." *(Nixon says we know about it. RN Memoirs, p.547)*

19. HK complains to Saville Davis of CSM about story saying State forced new China policy on reluctant White House, says Richardson would know it wasn't true. "It was really a case which the President initiated. I can't take the credit. I told Richardson we wanted to do this but wanted his Under Secretaries Committee to make the proposal." (telcon)

21. HK sees Doak Barnett for discussion of China policy (along with Lucian Pye, Cohen, Rosovsky, Vogel). Barnett feels US should adopt more positive position on UN membership question, lessen trade restrictions and recognize granting of formal equality to China is of great importance to handling problems between us.

23 Staff (Holdridge) sends HK CIA report on Chinese road building in No. Laos as follow-up to 12/11 WSAG. CIA suggests options of military action or political action. Staff points out risk of move that would involve RLG and possible USG, via support for RLG, in confrontation with PRC.

23. *Rogers (press conf) hopes Warsaw talks will resume.*

23 PRC announces breakdown of negotiations with Soviets concerning navigation on border rivers.

24. HK in end of year backgrounder says "We remain prepared, at Warsaw, or elsewhere, to talk to the Communist Chinese about differences that divide us." Would be on basis "of applying the same principles that I have indicated govern our relationship to the Communist world, which is to seek, on the basis of equality, to remove the causes that have produced the tensions..."

HIATUS IN WARSAW MEETINGS

February - May 1970

(1.) From Warsaw meeting Jan. 20, 1970:

Lei Yang: "I propose that the date of the next meeting be decided on later through consultation via the liaison personnel of our two sides. . . ."

Stoessel: "I accept."

(2.) From Warsaw meeting of Feb. 20, 1970:

Lei Yang: "Since this time our side proposed the date, it would be your turn to propose the date for the next meeting."

Stoessel: "We agree."

(3.) Rogers memo to President March 10 suggests we set next meeting for March 19.

(4.) On March 20, HK memo to State asks for next meeting to be set for March 23-27.

(5.) On March 21, Ted Eliot memo replies to HK:

"The time required to prepare and clear our position at the next meeting and Chinese need to obtain agreement from Peking on a meeting date as well as to prepare their position will make it difficult if not impossible to arrange a meeting prior to April 1-3."

Eliot sends draft State cable would authorize Stoessel to propose date up to April 8 ("since a later date would run increasing risks of complicating Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo's trip to United States").

(6.) On March 23, HK approves State cable above as proposed by Elliot.

(7.) PRC responds by proposing April 15.

(April 1)
(8.) US responds by proposing "April 30 or any date thereafter."

(9.) On April 28, PRC proposes May 20, and US accepts.

(10.) On May 18, PRC cancels meeting set for May 20. Chinese tone is much more restrained than in their previous year's cancellation of meeting set for February 20, 1969:

"The Chinese (a) clearly implied a continuing interest in the Warsaw dialogue, (b) attacked the U.S. actions in Indochina in milder terms than circumstances might have permitted, and (c) issued their public statement more routinely as an announcement by the New China News Agency rather than by the Foreign Ministry." (Rogers memo to President, May 19.)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**SUBJECT:** Dinner Meeting with Members of the Kennedy Institute of Politics at Harvard

**PARTICIPANTS:** Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Members of the Faculty and Fellows of
the Kennedy Institute of Politics

Invited Guests:

* Dwight Perkins
* Alex Woodside
* Ben Schwartz
* Ezra Vogel
* James Thompson
* Stanley Hoffmann
* Stanley Karnow
* Henry Rosovsky
* Craig
* Terrell
* Edwin Reischauer
* George Kristiakowsky
* Jerome Cohen
* Paul Doty
* Philip Areeda

**PLACE:**
Harvard Faculty Club, Cambridge, Mass.

**TIME & DATE:**
January 19, 1971; 6:10 pm - until 10:00 p.m.

The meeting was divided into two parts; one revolving around cocktails and dinner and the other around after-dinner drinks. The first part was on Vietnam with Dr. Kissinger making a presentation and then answering questions. The second part was on China with Messrs. Vogel and Cohen making presentations and then answering questions.

Dr. Kissinger opened the first part with the following remarks:

Our objective is to end the war in Vietnam as soon as possible and under conditions which are consistent with the maintenance of cohesion in our society and international stability. We do not believe that a precipitous or rapid withdrawal is in the best interest of international stability or in the best interest of our domestic cohesion. There is a dramatic difference in whether you end the war by making an immediate withdrawal of over 550,000 men or whether you do it gradually and only at the end pull out a number in the magnitude of 100,000. We believe that we can see an ending of the war within a time frame which is really not radically different from that of our critics. I am not talking about even as much as five years. We have

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never committed ourselves to maintaining a particular government
in South Vietnam against the wishes of its own people. We believe
that the objective I have set out above is within sight. That is, we
will be able to withdraw within a limited time frame and without
either domestic or international repercussions. We recognize also
that this time schedule may not be fast enough for some people, but
we do not believe that there is a dramatic difference.

**Question:** Would you elaborate on the stability point?

**Answer:** During the past two years I cannot think of a single non-communist foreign leader who has said to us that we should get out immediately and that it was their problem and that they would handle it. This would have been encouraging in some respects if they had. This includes Japan, India, Indonesia, and every other major leader that has met with the President either in Washington or abroad. On the other hand, this is not to say that we are required to stay there indefinitely in order to maintain stability. One must recognize the fact that in 1968 when this President came into office there were 540,000 troops in Vietnam and the number was increasing. The impact of a sudden reversal of this trend had to be measured and that is why we have taken the course we have.

**Question:** What is your view of the North Vietnamese?

**Answer:** They are an heroic, tough, disciplined and dedicated people and they have outfought us strategically. But the same characteristics which make them heroic may prevent them from being peaceful. They may not be capable of negotiating a peace.

There are probably no two countries which are less suited for
dealing with each other than the United States and North Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese have only one foreign policy problem. They
are not the agents of China or of Russia; neither the South nor the
North Vietnamese are the agents of anyone. There is a monomanic
obsession with the war on the part of each and the North Vietnamese
are especially single-minded. They are really heroes; they are not
negotiators. Their advantage, therefore, is in their belief of their
moral superiority. For them to admit to the process of negotiation
is to already admit defeat.

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The only way they seem to know how to negotiate is simply to say to us, "You must also do this, you must also do that." They have never said, "What do you mean by your proposal." If they did, we would have a negotiation. But they have never so much as asked us anything that we could explain and which could lead to a negotiation. When they do change their position they do it by great indirection. I remember when I was consulting for McNamara it took us two months of argument within the Defense Department to determine that a change in tense was meaningful in a particular statement that they had been making.

To them it is a political war, it is not a military war. They are profoundly suspicious of us and of all the West and in some respects I believe they would rather be defeated than look foolish. Their only way of negotiating is to demand that we adopt their position. They will not open a dialogue. I personally can understand their formal position being this way but they won't even enter into a dialogue privately. In some respects it is difficult to understand why they would not accept our ceasefire proposal and then wait for us to leave and then move in. They do not seem to be able to accept something less than their total program. They are profoundly suspicious of us. They are also caught in a political framework which does not allow them much maneuverability. And finally, it may be that there is no one that can fill Ho Chi Minh's place and take a major step toward a settlement.

**Question (Thomson):** How do you compare the relevant priority of international stability with the need for cohesion in our society?

**Answer:** I understand your concern and that you fear that the Administration might lash out massively. It is true that the President's credibility has been a casualty of the Vietnam war -- hopefully, however, only temporarily. For our part this President has kept each of his promises, but there is obviously still considerable suspicion. One, of course, cannot predict what a President will do when faced with a catastrophe. I would be amazed, however, if the eventuality which you envisage happened, and I would be far more amazed if the reaction were what you foresee.

I must add that I have found in the White House and in the Government types of people which I didn't know existed before I took this

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position. I must also admit in all candor that I am not sure that what is here is the majority of the country. During the time of preparing for the November 3rd speech in 1969, I suggested to the President that we not worry about the past and that we not try to explain it, justify it, or relate to it. The President replied that he felt he had an obligation to those who had suffered in the war; that he couldn't simply allow those who had suffered and given their lives and their families to think that it was an absurdity. The President felt the enormous fissures which were in the society and he was right. After the November 3rd speech one of the more significant reactions was the tremendous outpouring of cables. Admittedly, let's assume that some of them were contrived or programed. Even so, there was such a number which came in such different forms that they could not have been planned, which ran along the theme: Thank God my son did not die in vain in Vietnam, or, I did not lose my leg in Vietnam for nothing. It is interesting that Woodcock recently on television, though he was saying that he was for pulling out of Vietnam, was for the hardhats because they could not stand everyone saying that nothing mattered any more and that everything they had fought for was worthless.

The exit of France from Algeria was a great accomplishment not just because France managed to disengage, but because it managed to keep its society together at the same time. We are under no illusion that there will be changes from time to time and we will have our ups and downs, but there will not be any qualitative change in our conduct of the war. The danger which you mentioned could of course happen, but I do not believe it will. In the first place, North Vietnam is rather weak and unlikely to launch such a major provocation and I doubt that we would react as you fear.

**Question:** Is Lon Nol going to go under?

**Answer:** This is of course a possibility, especially in light of the likelihood of a North Vietnamese offensive. Their infiltration has been three times what it was a year ago, but they now have three fronts and they have directed a good part of this infiltration into Cambodia. An offensive launched against Cambodia, however, is not as much a problem as an offensive which opened access to the sea and thereby reestablished their supply route. If they can get a secure supply line to the sanctuaries, this is really the problem. They realize they need to get this and to knock over Cambodia before they

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can take on South Vietnam. It is my judgment that it will be extremely
difficult for them to knock over Cambodia during this dry season.
Next dry season they may be able to take over Cambodia and establish
or try to establish their supply lines. But they will then probably
have to wait for the following dry season to take on South Vietnam.
It is our belief that by then Vietnamization will have had a chance to work
and the South Vietnamese will be strong enough to defend themselves.
On Cambodia, however, even if it should collapse this year, no U.S.
ground forces will be sent in.

**Question:** Does not the fact that we are reducing our forces in Southeast Asia admit that maybe we shouldn't have been there in the first place and that it was in vain? Three questions ensue: (1) Is this true? (2) Was it an accidental or conscious involvement? (3) Should we have been there in the first place?

**Answer:** I personally have not fundamentally changed my views from the article which I wrote in January of '69. Nations, however, may not be able to undo the past. There are a number of factors in the policy-making process of government: (1) there is the intended strategy; (2) there are the flow of events; and (3) there are the bureaucrats. The interplay between these three elements will determine to what extent policy may be accidental or conscious.

President Nixon's approach is more systematic and more conceptual than any of the Presidents I have worked with. This obviously tends to make the decisions conscious and based on the facts. This is not to say, necessarily, that the decisions are always right. It is my hope, however, that when our disengagement in Vietnam is completed, we will all agree that we got to the right objective, though those who are more impetuous and believe that we should not have been there to begin with will think that we should have gotten out more quickly. We also have to be conscious of the impact of a precipitous withdrawal on the confidence in leadership in the country.

Our withdrawal therefore will have to be such that people won't think there has been a total collapse of leadership as was the case in Europe after World War I. It is absolutely ridiculous for one to pretend or to say that we are trying to find a way to expand the war.

No one in his right mind can believe that we think we can win without bombing, while reducing troops, what we could not win while we were bombing and adding troops. The line, however, which must be drawn is a very fine one and the situation is very complex. There are no good

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decisions left. The line has to be drawn between leaving some
ambiguity vis-a-vis the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong and making
it clear to the American public that we are going to withdraw. It
is also true that the whole process could be much quicker if negotiations
were serious and if it were settled by negotiations. But so far they
have not seen fit to join in a serious dialogue.

**Question:** What proportion of the people that you see do you think believe that we should never have been there at all?

**Answer:** People that come to see me are not a good test in that they are mostly there because they want something and so this would be an unreliable poll. But from what I read from the President's polls, it seems that if you add up those who want to win plus those who want to withdraw with control, you get about 70 percent of the public.

**Question:** Is the Administration pursuing its course regardless of whether or not the past analysis was correct?

**Answer:** This Administration is not pursuing policies to achieve the goals of either Kennedy or Johnson.

**Question:** (George Kistiakowsky) It seems as if the Administration built up the POW issue and set up the Sontay raid in order to gain support from the public at large. Was this intentionally done around election time and did you hope that some of the POWs would be killed, thereby creating a great outpouring of public support for the prisoners and for what you were trying to do?

**Answer:** I can tell you, first, we had to choose either before or after the election and that we chose to do it after the election so that we wouldn't be said to have tried to pull a political election stunt. Secondly, I can understand if you say it was a nutty idea, that is one thing, but it is absolutely ridiculous to say that our motive was to have some POWs killed in order to unite the country behind us emotionally.

[Kistiakowsky interjected here that corporations, when they are avoiding trust laws, never discuss antitrust. Kissinger simply replied that it was not a motive and that he was there.]

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**Question:** How are you going to get the POWs back if you make a complete withdrawal?

**Answer:** I did not say that we would have a final and complete withdrawal without solving the prisoner issue. Up until now we have wanted to go through with negotiations which would include the POW issue. If they will not negotiate then we have a different situation. It would seem that we would therefore not bring everyone home with a final and complete withdrawal until we knew that our prisoners were going to be released. One must on this whole issue of negotiating look at how the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong have negotiated in the past.

Every settlement has been preceded by a long deadlock, e.g., the site of the conference, the shape of the table. Each was preceded by months of deadlock and then settled in a matter of days. There were objective reasons for the settlement in each case. For example, on the shape of the table, they did not want to let the new Administration come into office and get credit for having settled an issue. The trouble is that I can't see any objective reason why they would want to settle at this point. Our objective is to keep open the possibility of negotiating the settlement as long as possible. We might have had negotiations if Sihanouk hadn't fallen, and whether you believe it or not we had nothing to do with the fall of Sihanouk. In fact, I for one thought that he himself had engineered the coup in order to be called back, but he hadn't and we wound up with a completely new situation. In the last analysis, the whole question of negotiations may resolve into an exchange of POWs for the withdrawal of our last troops.

**Question:** (Phil Areeda) Your description of this engagement seems to be inexorable but it does not seem to fit with the more or less indefinite commitment to get out. Why don't we make a definite commitment to get out?

**Answer:** No doubt the best way to get the other side to negotiate would be to keep a very large number of troops there. They are certainly more likely to negotiate with 500,000 troops sitting there than with 5,000 troops sitting there. This is something that Roger Fisher continues to remind me of. Last year there were enough troops there to make it attractive for them to negotiate. Now there are less and it is less likely that they will negotiate.

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On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet dispute works in favor of a settlement for if they really do have a clash it is going to make it very difficult for the North Vietnamese. Another factor which works in favor of settlement is the growing strength of the South Vietnamese. As they become stronger, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong must face the fact that they may be in for another protracted war. On the other side, of this question is the old problem of conditional recognition. Once the North Vietnamese recognize the South Vietnamese Government they lose one of their main bargaining points and they can't do it conditionally. Hence the North Vietnamese are very reluctant to take such a tremendous step. On the question of strength, just about everyone believes that the North Vietnamese are weaker today. They may even be as weak as they were in 1957 but they did come back between '57 and '65, and they may now come back between 1971 and 1976. If the South Vietnamese cannot do it then, then it is their problem. In respect to negotiations we just have not had any serious dialogue. If they said, "What do you mean by representative government?" we would have a negotiation, or "Let's talk about withdrawals," we would have a negotiation. But what they have said is simply a farce. Their proposal of a coalition government is made up of (1) one-third of the Saigon Government (without Thieu, Ky or Kiem) who stand for peace, independence and neutrality, which is genuine; (2) one-third made up of the PRG and, (3) one-third made up of persons with neither the Saigon Government nor the PRG who stand for genuine peace, independence and neutrality. They, however, are the only ones who can say who stands for "genuine" peace, independence and neutrality. In short, they want to be able to nominate one-third of the coalition and have a veto on the other two-thirds.

[The meeting then adjourned to the dining room. The discussion was continued.]

**Question:** What sort of credibility do you put into the reporting you are getting from Vietnam?

**Answer:** Under the old system there were five categories to determine the degree to which an area was secure. On this basis it was decided to what extent Vietnamization was working. These categories however did not take into account how subjective the

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writer was, how new he was, what experience he had had in a
completely different area, what were the detailed indicators of
pacification, what was it like in the daytime, what was it like at
night, etc. Consequently, we set up what is called the Vietnam
Special Studies Group in which we made elaborate and detailed
tests for determining the degree to which an area was secure. Military indicators were not our primary concern. The New York Times recently reported a meeting in which Secretary Packard and I had a difference. It was on this point, i. e., the degree to which the military's opinion was a prerequisite to a study. This is not what we are concerned about. We are concerned about the facts based on what we consider to be sound criteria.

**Question:** Why do you not prepare the U.S. public for the bad news of what is going to happen in Vietnam? It seems that Nixon believes more than even LBJ in the monolithic view of Communism; U.S. self-righteousness, and the domino theory.

**Answer:** The President does not believe in the monolithic approach to Communism. If you look at his world report in 1970 he specifically set forth a much wider view. Our attempt to open up a dialogue with China is, I think, an indication of the President's views. Your other contention that we are trying to deal with Hanoi from strength is simply not true. Our strength vis-a-vis Hanoi is not increasing; maybe the strength of the South Vietnamese is, but not ours. It just cannot be so when we are withdrawing troops and not bombing. On the monolithic point, it might be added that we do not believe that Hanoi is being directed by China or by Russia.

**Question:** It is very curious that you have not mentioned the suffering of the Vietnamese people in the North and in the South. Isn't this the price we are paying for prolongation of the war? Do you not feel any anguish?

**Answer:** Of course, I feel anguish. One cannot be in this position without being very much aware of the suffering and the price that is being paid, but I can't debate with you who anguishes the most. All I can say is that I recognize this as a serious question.

On the whole question of Vietnam, I must say that I would be
very pleased if I should return here in a year or two and be criticized
only because we didn't move fast enough. If we have the same
objective now, and if we reach that objective, I am satisfied.

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The meeting was next turned over to Ezra Vogel who gave about a 10 minute talk on China, the highlights of which were as follows:

- The recent and continuing Chinese Cultural Revolution had three stages:

  - the first involved the training of a few Red Guards, plus a cadre;

  - the second had as its objective getting control of local, municipal and regional governments;

  - the third stage has as its objective to build the party.

In the course of the third stage matters were taken out of the hands of the military, whereas in the first two stages decisions were made primarily by the military.

- The present trend with regard to foreign policy seems to be that they are less concerned with the Soviet threat and more concerned with the Japanese threat. Defense preparations therefore are in terms of Japan.

- Their interest in diplomacy since the Cultural Revolution has increased. The trend in diplomacy is likely to be less doctrinaire.

- With regard to the U.S., they will want to trade and to have cultural relations, but these will generally be quite superficial for they will continue to want to have the propaganda value of being able to criticize the U.S.

The next speaker on China was Jerome Cohen, who listed the following recommendations which had been stated in a China study group paper prepared a couple of years ago.

- China is going to dominate our foreign policy in the years to come.

- We should involve Peking in our negotiations on Vietnam.

- We should not get involved in denouncing Chairman Mao.

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-- We should try to be more conscious of how the Chinese look at our military measures. For instance, the extent to which they consider the ABM to be a hostile move toward them.

-- We should try to increase our trade with them.

-- We should restructure our relations with Taiwan and we should send a new Ambassador to Taiwan to explain the necessity of the shift. We should encourage Taiwan to explain the necessity of the shift. We should encourage Taiwan to have its people engage in the free political process.

-- We should reserve a seat for Taiwan on the U. N. General Assembly, and we should let China into the General Assembly and the Security Council.

**Question:** (Addressed to Dr. Kissinger) What is your reaction to these main points?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) One must always be conscious of the fact that at the very top in government there is a constant battle between the urgent and the important, and more often than not the urgent drives out the important.

[Thompson interjected here that this points up the need, which has been lacking for twenty years, to have some way of forcing decisions to be made with regard to China. Whether we like it or not, it is often problems raised by a desk officer which forces the policy makers to make decisions.]

**Dr. Kissinger:** I agree and might add that one of the obstacles has been that there has been no consistent input by the bureaucracy. It has been more a matter of force-feeding from the White House down.

Returning to the problem of the urgent overpowering the important, there is simply in the nature of things a tendency for one who is constantly under pressure of time to deal with the actions that routinely flow across his desk. There is, however, an "oughtness", and we have in fact articulated our position on China. By certain unilateral actions, such as the reduction or elimination of trade and travel

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restrictions, we have indicated our attitude toward China. Our objec-
tive simply is to move toward a dialogue and relationship with China
which is similar to that which we have with the Soviet Union. We do
not want to put the Chinese in a different category from other Communist
countries, and we will not let our policy be determined by the Soviet
Union.

I would like to ask the group to discuss what we should try to
talk to the Chinese about or try to bring about if and when they talk to
us. To begin with, one should realize that it is not very easy to talk
to them. We have to get a place where they have an Ambassador whom
they have confidence in and who has access to their policy makers. We
then must link up with him an Ambassador whom we have confidence in.
And finally they both most be in a place where we are sure that the
Russians are not listening.

On what we should talk about, we have probably done 70 percent
of what was listed earlier by Jerry Cohen. What then, aside from
Vietnam do we have to talk about?

<u>Mr. Vogel</u>: It is really hard to pinpoint what we can talk about.

<u>Mr. Cohen</u>: We could lower our activities around the borders
of China and we could discuss Taiwan.

Someone else added that we have to look at things from their point of view, e.g., where our bases are two miles from their border, and we could discuss reducing such an aggressive position toward them.

Another participant rejoined that perhaps it is the Chinese who are
aggressive. Some Burmese and Thais feel strongly that the Chinese
are belligerent, but there are of course other Burmese and Thais who
do not think so. Perhaps it is good to have our bases two miles from
their border when there is such uncertainty.

<u>Question</u>: What do we really think the Chinese intentions are
in Southeast Asia? When we settle Vietnam, will the Chinese move in?

<u>Answer - Ez Vogel</u>: The Chinese are becoming less likely to
support revolutionary governments. The trend seems to be that they
will become involved with the present governments and try to work
with them.

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**Question-Kissinger:** Aside from the Taiwan issue, what incentive do the Chinese have to negotiate with us?

**Answer - Ez Vogel:** If the Sino-Soviet conflict keeps up, they may want to talk with us quite a bit, all the way from wanting us to increase our trade with them to soliciting our support for their representation and participation in international forums so that the Soviets cannot dominate them on the international field. **Mr. Cohen:** They may also want to talk with us about nuclear weapons.

**Dr. Kissinger:** But what can we talk to them about in the nuclear field? Pugwash and that type of conference is one thing, but what as a government do you think they would be interested in talking to us about?

**Mr. Cohen:** They might be interested in talking to us about nuclear proliferation; possibly before that the first step would be educational in nature.

**Dr. Kissinger** then asked **Ed Reischauer:** What do you think should be our position in respect to the relationship between Japan and China?

**Ed Reischauer:** We should encourage Japan to trade with them. The trade is now less than two percent. There does not seem to be any restraint now from the Chinese point of view.

The other discussants suggested that the Chinese were really interested not in negotiating but in getting the U.S. to move to a lower profile in Asia, and that they may really become preoccupied with the Japanese by the end of the decade. There then followed some inconclusive discussion as to whether or not different members thought that the Chinese were or would become preoccupied with Japan

**Ez Vogel:** Maybe we should offer the Chinese recognition even though we know that the answer will be no.

**Dr. Kissinger:** We did say, in a way, okay to recognition in the UN if it did not involve expulsion of Taiwan. This is tantamount to recognition.

Other discussants interjected that if we did recognize the Chinese, we would have more leverage over the Russians.

**Dr. Kissinger:** Is it the judgment of the group that some hostility will exist between the Soviet Union and China even after Chairman Mao's death?

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The group's answer seemed to be yes, though one party felt strongly that this was not necessarily the case. He explained that what we were doing was simply predicting the present and that historically when a Mao type leader died there were drastic changes. Such could be the case here and there did not have to be specific points to talk about. We should approach the Chinese in the same way that we approach the Soviet Union; namely, in view of the size and military might of China there is something to talk about.

**Mr. Thomson:** There does not seem to be any effort on our part to participate in Chinese politics or to really understand the impact of our actions within China. President Nixon however does deserve credit for diffusing the China issue as a partisan issue. This is a significant accomplishment of which he can justly be proud. Why, however, could we not move with giant steps toward China? Why do we think that we have to move slowly? Why do we not bring our trade relations with China to the level and conditions we have with the Soviet Union? Why don't we welcome them into the UN and recognize Mainland China?

**Jerry Cohen:** The State Department wants the best of both worlds. They want to improve our relations with China but not to hurt in any way our relations with Taiwan. What is it to lose Taiwan? Is it not far more in our long-term interest to have Peking in? It seems that for years we have simply found different ways to keep the Chinese out. In the fifties it was the moratorium; in the sixties it was the important question; and in the seventies, it seems like it is going to be dual representation.

**Dr. Kissinger:** We understand clearly that Taiwan will be offended with whatever solution is worked out. No one is under any illusions on that point. However, our policy had been to try to open up a dialogue on issues that were agreeable and to let such issues as Taiwan wait, but it may well be that this won't be able to wait. Although we haven't come to the point where we can make major unilateral moves, it has been our intention not to speak provocatively. We are not simply waiting for them to change and shape up.

**Paul Doty:** It would seem that recognition is really the first and most critical step. It would give legitimacy to other actions and enhance China's self-confidence and identity in much the same way as with Russia in the 1930's.

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**Question:** It seems from what you said, Dr. Kissinger, that the Warsaw channel is really not too good. Is this so?

**Answer - Dr. Kissinger:** Until President Nixon came into office the Warsaw meetings were held in a bugged Polish castle. Now we meet either in our Embassy or in the Chinese Embassy. But, in any event the Soviets still know when the meetings are held and for how long. Under these conditions they are not useful for detailed or substantive discussions. The point that we should have good communications with them is a very good one, but it is more difficult than one realizes. We do not exclude the possibility of a flare-up along the Sino-Soviet border. Both sides have from time to time taken up threatening postures. What do we then do if there is a major clash? If for instance such a clash took place today, it would take us several days to establish reliable communications. The mechanics are not easy. We do not know who they trust or who they would rely upon to communicate with us, and they would have the same problem. From this point of view the establishment of the new Chinese Embassy in Ottawa is not a bad idea. For two years we have tried to get the Government to address this plan, but so far we have not been able to push it or ride herd on it to get anything done. [Dr. Kissinger explained to Jerry Cohen that if his group wanted to address this problem, he would give them an extensive hearing after they had studied it.]

**Question:** If we wait until Mao dies, will not the future leadership be less likely to be able to accept any major new initiative on our part?

**Ed Reischauer:** For exactly this reason I think that in some ways it is better to take small steps than to make dramatic major steps. In this way, by small steps we can outline our policy so that they know where we are going and are not taken by surprise.

**Question:** In the absence of major steps, will a series of small steps bring about an overt policy?

**Ed Reischauer:** Yes, our end objective is that we want friendship. This is the ultimate objective of our overt policy. I am not, however, in favor of kicking Taiwan out of the UN. I am in favor of universality, and I think that we have to find a way in which both Taiwan and China can stay in.

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**Mr. Cohen (not Jerome Cohen):** I am baffled at the inability to communicate with China. It seems that we are offering nothing and I am amazed at the discussion so far this evening. It has been very confusing and unproductive.

**Dr. Kissinger:** If that is the case then maybe you should tell us since you seem to know what we should talk about when and if we talk to the Chinese.

**Mr. Cohen:** I don't think there is anything.

At this point several of the members of the group jumped all over Cohen, saying that there was planty to talk to the Chinese about and that was what we had been discussing all evening. One participant then proceeded to explain that he felt very strongly that the U. S. did need to get together with China and he gave the following reasons:

-- China is closer to Hanoi this year than it has been in the past.

-- It is more likely that the Chinese would settle for a Bismarckian arrangement of Asia over an ideological one.

-- If China and the Soviets get inflamed in a clash, we would definitely want to be able to talk to the Chinese as well as to the Soviets.

-- If the UN Important Question goes against the U. S., we definitely will want to be able to talk to China.

**Stanley Hoffman:** Could we change the subject to the Middle East? If there is no renewal of a cease-fire and the hostilities are renewed, what steps are we willing to take?

**Dr. Kissinger:** This depends upon who is involved. If it is simply the Arabs and Israelis, we won't really face this issue. But if the Soviet Union gets involved then there is a tough decision which we must make.

A **Newsweek** poll, cited by one of the participants, showed there was not very much support for our intervening.

**Dr. Kissinger:** We really can't decide policy on the basis of polls. It should also be understood that there are many ways in which the major powers could become involved in the Middle East; this is not the

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case in Southeast Asia. During the Jordanian crisis last year, it was
made clear that if the Soviets got involved they ran the risk that the
U.S. would become involved.

**Question:** How was this attitude received by the Soviets?

**Dr. Kissinger:** For about a week the Soviets gave the impression of restraint either by events or collusion. But then Syria moved and Israel acted. Only then did the Soviets move rapidly. If the Syrians had been competent and had overrun the Jordanians, the Israelis would have moved; the Egyptians would have then come in and, on top of this, Nasser might have died and the Soviets probably would have had to come to the Egyptians' rescue and this would have brought in the U.S.

**Question:** Isn't Secretary Rogers' proposal responsible for bringing this contingency about?

**Dr. Kissinger:** On these sort of questions one must evaluate what would have happened without the proposals and we cannot really say in this case.

**Question:** What is your evaluation of the Soviet's long-range objectives?

**Answer:** This is a very difficult thing on which to make up one's mind. We often get a communique from the Soviet leadership and then immediately there are events which take place at complete variance. For instance, the actions of Syria during the Jordanian crisis. At times it seems as if we are dealing with two governments. It may be that it is the result of collective leadership. Each of the leaders has a carved-out area and each is trying to prove that he is more vigilant than the others. Different factions seem to become dominant at different times. There is therefore a series of pinpricks which accumulate and can look like a grand design from the outside but which are in reality only a series of isolated and unrelated decisions.

Dobrynin has told me, and I don't see any motive for him to lie on this point, that within the bureaucracy there is no lateral communication between the departments at the middle levels. The Politburo has no staff of its own. Each department has its own staff and only when it gets to the Politburo itself is there lateral communication. It is equivalent to every Cabinet member being able to read every cable. If this

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were the case in our Cabinet it also would lead to a series of isolated
moves. We even have reason to believe that during the SALT talks
some of the Soviet non-military negotiators learned about the number
and positioning of their missiles from the U. S. negotiators. It is
therefore my worry that this is really the leadership of a collective
mediocrity and that it cannot sustain any one policy over an extended
period. The present trend seems to have started last July and it is hard
to see what they are up to. But it seems that at about the time of the
postponement of the Party Congress they started to harden up or become
less predictable. Evidences of this were the breaking of the cease-fire,
their reactions in Cuba and in Berlin, etc.

**Question:** Why, when the cease-fire was being broken and the Israelis said it was, did we not react?

**Answer:** One of the big problems in government is that very often the intelligence community seems to follow the political inclinations of the Administration rather than guide them. There is an unconscious shading until there is an egregious violation which cannot in any way be explained except by changing one's position. During this episode we got reports right away from Israeli intelligence. One could say hypothetically that the Israelis were lying, but in my experience this has not been so. And in this case I didn't see any reason why they would. If one assumed that the Israelis were not lying, then the explanation was that it was simply a technical violation, or that the missiles were in the pipeline and they had to be put somewhere, or that they were there already. In any event, we had to make comparisons and then we had to figure out whether they were only being moved around within the zone. This all took about two weeks since everyone was reluctant to believe that there had been such a flagrant violation. At the beginning there had been only a few and the theory was that maybe it was better to ignore a few violations (as it really didn't make that much difference) than to upset the whole cease-fire. But after two weeks it became clear that they were continuing to pour them in until there was absolutely no doubt that there was a conscious, continuing and massive violation.

**Question:** What took place during the recent Jarring-Golda Meir talks?

**Dr. Kissinger:** I can answer this only in general terms. Prime Minister Meir did not speak specifically about withdrawal but about guarantees. The UAR position of course is just the opposite.

- 19 -

**Question:** Has the improvement of the UAR position along the Canal brought about stability, and could this be the conscious policy or objective of the U.S. and the USSR?

**Dr. Kissinger:** This is definitely not the result of collusion between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. One must realize that in a war of attrition it is not the Israelis who are going to win. They must win by a quick offensive thrust. To stabilize the situation is not in Israel's favor. Whether the situation stabilizes psychologically is a different question and it may be that the UAR Government right now is too weak to make either peace or war.

The meeting broke up at about 10:10 p.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 8, 1971

Dear Jerry:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of February 25, forwarding the memorandum on "Sino-American Talks and Sino-Soviet War."

I hope you will pass on to all who participated in the preparation of the memorandum my deepest appreciation for their efforts.

As you know, we are particularly concerned with these matters at this time and it is very helpful to have the advice of my friends in Cambridge.

Your frank statement of personal views in the last paragraph of your letter is also noted. I look forward to the opportunity to carry the discussion on these matters further when next we meet.

Professor Jerome A. Cohen
Law School of Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

26354

ACTION

For Signature (3/6/71)

March 3, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HERBERT LEVIN

SUBJECT: Memorandum to you from Harvard East Asia Policy Group

Jerry Cohen has sent you a memorandum (Tab B) which he writes you requested in connection with your January 19 dinner with the Harvard East Asia Policy Group. Its main points are as follows:

- The Administration should pursue more vigorously a policy of systematic unilateral steps toward "improved practical relations" with Peking; the first move should be to reduce restrictions on trade with China to the level of restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union.

- The Administration should make a renewed effort to resume talks with the PRC. The U. S. should scrutinize the records of the fifteen years of talks at Geneva and Warsaw to see if we can now act more positively on some of the topics in which the PRC has previously shown interest.

- The U. S. should indicate interest in the November 1, 1970, Peking call for a world summit conference on nuclear weapons. Our intent should be to bring about quiet bilateral discussions with Peking on this question.

- We should offer to make a no-first-use commitment regarding nuclear weapons in exchange for various guarantees by the PRC, such as its pledge to respect existing international frontiers in Asia. The U. S. should try to arrange mutual assurances regarding nuclear-free zones in Asia.

- "Our liquidation of U. S. bases in Thailand could be linked to China's willingness to cooperate in the neutralization of Southeast Asia."

-- Once we have completed the dismantlement of our restrictions of non-strategic trade with China we should discuss with them the extension of long-term credits.

-- We should discuss with Peking our willingness to see it enter the UN and the conditions for its entry.

-- We need to talk with Peking now about providing for swift, reliable, private communications during moments of crisis.

-- Our chief representative at the Warsaw talks should be a person whom the Chinese will see as a man of political significance with close personal ties to the President.

-- We should exchange resident American and Chinese trade missions, offer to re-establish consular relations, and perhaps have the Canadian mission in Peking developed into a recognized special channel of communication.

-- We should make great efforts to reassure the Chinese of our neutrality in the Sino-Soviet quarrel.

A non-committal letter for your signature is at Tab A, thanking Professor Cohen for his courtesy in sending you this memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to Professor Cohen.

HL:ejp (3/3/71)

Cambridge, Mass. 02138

February 25, 1971

Honorable Henry Kissinger
Assistant to the President
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

Enclosed is the memorandum you requested on two specific problems relating to our relations with China. This memorandum is the product of our January 19 dinner meeting with you plus two additional evening sessions that our group held after your visit.

Although not everyone attended all three sessions, the following members of our Institute of Politics' East Asian Study group participated in the discussions and join in sending this memorandum to you: Jerome Cohen, Albert Craig, Roger Dingman, Stanley Karnow, Roy Hofheinz, Dwight Perkins, Edwin Reischauer, Benjamin Schwartz, James Thomson, Ezra Vogel, and Alexander Woodside. John Fairbank was out of the country during this period but has read the memorandum and endorsed it.

The memorandum confines itself to the questions that you raised. We would be less than candid, however, if we did not here emphasize our belief that it is highly unlikely that there will be improvement in our relations with China so long as the United States continues to play a role in the conflict in Indo-China. Whatever our rhetoric, whatever our motives, whatever our immediate military gains, by extending our involvement in that war from Vietnam into Cambodia and Laos we have added to the already grave obstacles to achieving any reduction of tensions with Peking.

We hope this memorandum is helpful to you and that you will take steps to carry out its recommendations.

JAC:be
enclosure

MEMORANDUM

TO: Henry Kissinger

FROM: Harvard East Asia Policy Group

RE: Sino-American Talks and Sino-Soviet War

This memorandum responds to your request for our views on two specific questions. First, what is there for the United States to talk about with China and how should we do it? Second, what should be our response to a Sino-Soviet war?

I. Sino-American Talks

In addition to pursuing more vigorously a policy of systematic unilateral steps toward "improved practical relations" with Peking (our next unilateral move should be to reduce restrictions on trade with China to the level of restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union), the Administration should make a renewed effort to talk with the People's Republic. Here we will suggest topics for discussion with Peking and ways to advance such discussion. The purpose of both the unilateral steps and the efforts to talk is to offer China's present and future leadership the clear option of an improved relationship with America, an option not at all clear now despite despite our relatively conciliatory rhetoric.

A. Topics for Discussion

The record of fifteen years of talks at Geneva and Warsaw reveals an unfinished agenda ranging from the release of Americans still detained by Peking to arms control proposals. This record should be scrutinized to determine whether the U.S. can now act more positively on some of the

-2-

Chinese and American negotiators have been regularly out of phase--China more moderate in the 50's, more militant in the 60's; America the reverse. The 70's may provide a precious opportunity for synchronization.

## 1. Nuclear Weapons

A cluster of issues relating to nuclear weapons might be a topic of mutual interest.

### a. World Summit Conference

On November 1, 1970, Peking renewed its earlier calls for a world summit conference on nuclear weapons. The U.S. should indicate sufficient interest in this offer to warrant quiet, preliminary bilateral discussions with Peking. These discussions might yield clearer mutual understanding and even open up the possibility of our accepting this offer, if certain conditions were met. Bilateral discussions would lessen the chance that any subsequent public acceptance of this offer by the U.S. would be dismissed merely as insincere propaganda.

### b. No-First-Use Pledge

Since at least 1963 the PRC has been eager to commit the U.S. to a mutual pledge that neither nation will be the first to use nuclear weapons. Regardless of our attitude toward a world summit conference we should consider whether, in light of politico-military developments in recent years, it might now be feasible to make a no-first-use commitment in return for various

-3-

guarantees by the PRC (such as its pledge to respect existing international frontiers in Asia). Discussions of the terms of such a bilateral or multilateral arrangement would be a worthy subject for exploration at this time.

### c. Deployment

The future deployment of American and Chinese nuclear weapons is a matter of great mutual interest. Washington would undoubtedly like to discuss the nature of the deployment of Chinese ICBMs (questions such as the numbers and locations of those deployed and the types of site); and the PRC has an obvious interest in the specific implications of the Nixon Doctrine for the location of American nuclear weapons. There are probably areas, such as Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and Southeast Asia, where we will not wish to deploy nuclear weapons in the future. Assurances regarding a nuclear-free status for such areas could serve as bargaining counters in negotiating with the PRC. We know too little about the details of Peking's capacities and strategies, and it knows too little about ours.

## 2. Military and Political Accommodation in Asia

The Nixon Doctrine suggests a number of subjects of mutual interest to China and the United States. Our willingness to withdraw the forward deployment of our forces may open the way for conciliatory steps by the Chinese. For example, our liquidation of U.S. bases in Thailand could be linked to China's willingness to cooperate in the neutralization of Southeast Asia.

-4-

Similarly, the thought must have occurred to some
planners in Peking that U.S. withdrawal from the Western
Pacific might speed Japan's rearmament, including acquisition
of nuclear weapons, and that Washington and Peking might have a common
interest in avoiding this result. As yet, Peking's actions do
not reflect recognition of such a common interest. Although
we cannot explicitly focus Peking's attention on this problem,
we ought to stimulate its thinking along these lines through
conversations about the nature and implications of our
withdrawal.

### 3. Trade

We have belatedly begun to dismantle our non-strategic
restrictions on trade with China. Once this process is completed
(the sooner the better), there may be a number of points for
discussion. Foremost among them would be the possibility that
the United States might extend long-term credits to China.
Such a step would be in our national interest as a means of
involving China more in normal international
contacts and also of encouraging China's successful economic
development and thereby avoiding the danger that might be
presented by a poor but heavily armed China (much like Japan
of the 1930's). The Chinese may eventually come to see our
extension of credits to them as in their interest as well.

### 4. UN, Diplomatic Relations and Improved Communications

Pending the resolution of the problem of Peking's
representation in the UN, we should make clear to Peking
our willingness to see it enter that body and should discuss
the conditions for its entry.

-5-

Pending the establishment of diplomatic relations, we should explore prospects for peaceful coexistence and methods of improving communications between Washington and Peking. Diplomatic relations will take a long time to establish, and there are many clarifications to be sought, nuances to be explored and steps to be taken. It may, however, eventually prove possible to establish diplomatic relations even without reaching agreement on the legal status of Taiwan, so long as we no longer recognize the regime on Taiwan as the government of China.

As suggested in Part II of this memorandum (which deals with the contingency of a Sino-Soviet war), we need to talk with Peking now about providing for swift, reliable, private communications during moments of crisis. As suggested later in Part I, we also need to talk about increasing the quality, number and kinds of non-crisis communications.

One could list many other specific topics for discussion--scientific, and cultural exchange, access for newsmen and tourists, settlement of each other's property claims, release of U.S. nationals, etc. But the general point is that we must do much more than we have done to engage Peking in mutually educational discussions on more basic problems. The following section suggests some ways of proceeding.

-6-

B. Modes of Discussion

The previously-mentioned world summit conference on
nuclear weapons proposed by Peking is hardly an ideal forum
for serious arms control talks. Nevertheless,
the state of our communication with Peking is so fragile
and spasmodic that we ought to consider accepting this proposal
or responding with a serious counter-offer.

Other "enmeshing" techniques should also be improved
or developed. At Warsaw, for example, we ought to follow
the highly desirable change in the site of the talks with
other innovations. We should send as our special
representatives to the talks higher level
persons who might be more successful than earlier representatives
in engaging the Chinese in more wide-ranging, informal exchanges
of views. In particular, our chief representative should be
a person whom the Chinese will see as a man of political
significance with close personal ties to the President.
We should also improve our private rhetoric at Warsaw,
flavoring our presentations with greater empathy for
China's position and legitimate interests and recognizing China's
sensitivity to past indignities for which we bear responsibility.

Regardless of innovations, however, the Warsaw talks
may be insufficient, and we should expand our efforts to
seek additional channels. The opening of a Chinese mission
in Ottawa may present certain possibilities. Perhaps more can be

-7-

done to establish contacts in Hong Kong and elsewhere. Peking's entry
into the UN would make sustained informal and private contacts
more possible. Yet all contacts with Chinese representatives
abroad have their limitations. Traditionally Peking has tended
to lack confidence in its diplomats. Moreover, in periods of crisis,
as the Cultural Revolution demonstrated, communication
may break down between China's foreign missions and Peking.

Some consideration should be given to imaginative
proposals for establishing communication in China itself.
This could prove vital in a crisis. For example, the Canadian
mission in Peking might be developed into a special channel.
The exchange of resident American and Chinese "trade" missions
is another possibility. Our mission could be led by an experienced
"unofficial" figure in whom the Administration has confidence
Or the President could suggest that the leaders of the two
countries exchange unofficial personal representatives to
reside in the respective capitals. Or re-establishment of
consular relations might be broached.

Any of these techniques would probably be preceded
by temporary, ad hoc visits of one or more representatives
under one guise or other. And perhaps even such visits should
be preceded by an informal exchange of views between persons
at the highest levels of the respective governments, through
a summit conference, a foreign ministers' conference, or,
preferably, a secret meeting, or perhaps an informal meeting
in the course of a multilateral conference on another subject.

-8-

Bilateral talks may not be appropriate for the consideration of some of the issues that should be on our agenda. We may well want to engage friends such as Japan in discussions relating to their interests, and the possibility of multilateral talks including Moscow as well as Peking and Tokyo should not be overlooked.

We should also make renewed efforts to bring about unofficial binational and multinational meetings of intellectuals, scholars and specialists, such as the Pugwash conferences, in order to begin what will inevitably be a long educational process for all concerned. To this end we should remove all special travel restrictions upon American travel to China and Chinese travel to this country.

## II. U.S. Response to a Sino-Soviet War

Although serious, sustained Sino-Soviet military hostilities do not appear probable, they surely are possible and require that thought be given to the appropriate United States response.

Such hostilities might take a number of forms. For example, the USSR might initiate a limited border conflict, launch a full-scale conventional war, seek through conventional air attack "merely" to destroy Chinese nuclear plants and weaponry, or use nuclear weapons to accomplish the same objective. China is less likely to initiate serious hostilities, but the possibility cannot be excluded, especially if Chinese regional

-9-

leadership in an area contiguous with the USSR should act
in a way not authorized by Peking. Peking's response to any
Soviet attack would, of course, depend on the type of Soviet
attack and might range from a Maoist "people's war" to
conventional warfare or even resort to nuclear weapons.

Plainly, one cannot predict what form Sino-Soviet
hostilities might actually take. Although detailed contingency
plans should be formulated to meet the most likely possibilities,
here we simply address ourselves to some rather obvious principles
that would be applicable regardless of the precise form of the
conflict.

A. Avoid Involvement

We should not attempt to exploit Sino-Soviet hostilities.
The dangers of risking expansion of the conflict and long-range
involvement in China far outweigh any immediate gains that
our intervention might yield.

B. Announce Neutrality

Whatever the level of hostilities, we should immediately
make it clear to the belligerents and other states, both in
public and in private, that we will observe strict neutrality
and that we urge all other states to do the same so that the
conflict does not spread. We should take steps (such as
announcements and military dispositions) to discourage the
belligerents and third parties from broadening the war
(for example, into Korea, Taiwan and Southeast Asia).

-10-

In particular, we should make certain that our allies--
South Korea, Nationalist China, and South Vietnam--do not
attempt to exploit the opportunity that appears to be
presented for attacking their rivals.

If hostilities have begun by conventional means,
there should be no problem assuring the belligerents and
others of our non-involvement. But if missiles have been or
are being used, we must immediately make clear, by the
swiftest, most secure means possible, that they are not
ours. In a crisis atmosphere, this will be especially difficult
with respect to China, given the severe limitations upon our
present ability to communicate with Peking.

C. Urge Limitation of the Level of Hostilities

We should earnestly urge the belligerents to resist
the temptations to escalate the conflict and should seek to
persuade other states, including those of the Communist world,
to apply similar pressure.

D. Seek Peaceful Settlement

Until Peking is represented in the UN, it would
probably be unwise to attempt to invoke UN assistance in
settling the conflict, for the Chinese would surely resent
the interference of an organization in which the USSR plays
a prominent role and from which the PRC is excluded.

-11-

The U.S. should, however, publicly urge the belligerents to negotiate and indicate its readiness to facilitate a settlement. Privately we should go beyond this, offering our good offices and mediation to the belligerents. We should also quietly seek to obtain the assistance of third parties whose efforts would be more acceptable to the belligerents than would ours (e.g., Rumania, Yugoslavia or Western states that maintain diplomatic relations with both Peking and Moscow).

## E. Reassure Our Friends

We should reassure our friends, especially those in Asia and above all Japan, that Sino-Soviet warfare does not affect our relations with them.

In order to enhance the likelihood of swift, secure communication with Peking in the event of Sino-Soviet hostilities or other emergencies, we should now begin to raise with Peking, in general terms rather than with specific reference to Sino-Soviet hostilities, the problem of communication during a crisis.