pluses that perhaps we ought to mention, as well as some of the
minuses that have surfaced."

Jim Hoge first asked Henry Kissinger to comment, who replied by
saying:

"Does the devolution of power to a local level have good attributes? I would say yes, for those problems that need to be solved on the local level. And, certainly, the exercise of local authority on those issues is an expression of a kind of mass democracy that did not exist previously so it is undoubtedly helpful.

"We were talking about foreign policy, which has to deal with political units. At this moment in our nation it has the capacity to change, to become something else, but it can not be local government and therefore it has to reflect the values or the interests of whatever you consider to be the accepted criterion of action of that unit. How do we form such an opinion?

"Right now, in the United States we have the problem of North Korean nuclear weapons. And this problem requires a certain knowledge of the facts and some conception of the options and of the possible historical evolution: for instance, will those nuclear weapons actually threaten the peace? All of these are conjectural elements, nor can the final opinion on them be formed on the local level.

You're quite right that on some issues it would have been better if intervention had not taken place. On the other hand, can you gear all of national politics to the avoidance of events (besides which, one would also have to know what types of intervention one is talking about). In America this usually goes back to the experience of the Vietnam War, though that represents a long and complicated history which was, initially at least, very popular, hence public opinion would not have imposed any restraint against it. Entry into Somalia was popular when it first happened as well; the debates occur only once the consequences of intervention become apparent.

"Thus the questions raised by Valéry about the disfunctions, among which I was most struck by the absence of an evaluating mechanism or of evaluating standards (so that nobody says, this is an argument you must not make), that that function seems to have disappeared from all of our societies. I could not say that the representation of that dialogue in images rather than in concepts - so that a day later you can't even tell exactly what it is that created the emotions surrounding the images - is not a worrisome phenomenon for the future".

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing replied by saying that direct democracy, had an enormous advantage on the one hand, to prevent the leaders from confiscating the democratic debates for themselves, which was a natural tendency for all leaders, because they think they are better informed, better qualified, and so on. He continued

12

by saying that the pressure of direct democracy to take back the
issues into the people's hands was something very positive. He
did not agree that judgement must be based on the immediate
reaction of public opinion, because, it needed an enormous
investment, which could not be afforded.

He went on to say not everyone can read foreign affairs. For
instance, if you take a problem like the future fate of Bosnia,
or the future fate of Ukraine, what would the public reaction
teach you - nothing. When there were polls about Bosnia, for
instance, in France at the beginning of January, if the question
had been asked, "do you think that France must call back its
forces?", Answer "yes". If you asked the question, "do you think
that France must act to prevent Bosnian Serbs to go on with the
siege of Sarajevo?", Answer "yes". All those answers were
justified in one sense. The President continued by saying that
to have a global view you need to have an investment, a
reflection, and a critical evaluation of your policy. He was in
favour of improving the system, and not of depleting it.

James Hoge commented:

On the issue of the press, or particularly broadcasting and
television, and the effect it has, he thought that one of the
real problems for policy makers was that it doesn't appear to be
consistent. Sometimes it was not known what sort of reaction
would be got from the public. He gave two examples. The more
the American public learned about Bosnia the less intrigued they
were with intervention for a whole series of reasons. In one
sense through pictures, it had been a restraining experience.
Exactly the opposite, a longer lasting impact of television,
were the pictures of the student revolts in Tiananmen Square,
which to this day still reverberate in the public mind of
America, and had a major effect on the emphasis that some put on
human rights as a linked part of their economic relationship
with China. He posed the problem, how do policy makers, how
does the government, get control back these days in a media
porous world that's not going to become any less porous? What
are some of the lessons that we have learned? Some policy
makers might say, you have to always have a policy thought
through and advocated so that there's not a vacuum, which sounded
fine, but was that realistic under all circumstances? He asked
for comments.

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing replied:

"You mentioned the role of the press. I am quite in favour of increasing (it doesn't depend entirely on us) the role of the written press. I think that for your actions, for everyone, memory is as important as intelligence. The media system doesn't provide people with memory, on the contrary, it's wiping out all the past all the time. You need to remember what happened, what the people did, what the people said, what were their actions before. We need to have a written text somewhere; it's very important, and it provides a delay for thinking and for analysing. About China, two days ago, there was a very good

13

paper by Henry on human rights and the policy for China ... just below another article saying exactly the opposite. That's very good, because the people could form their judgement, and they could compare arguments and reasoning. I think to have debates is something which enlightens democracy; to have, for instance, this problem between human rights and the relationship with China, is very sophisticated. It goes back to the cultural traditions of China, to the perception by Chinese of the Western intervention in the past century, and also of the practical way they handle the problem of human rights. So you need to have a complex set of facts for that. I think, it's very important to have references for debating."

He added that he would give his own reaction but after Henry Kissinger, because he had published an article on the subject!

Henry Kissinger replied by saying that he agreed substantially with what Valéry had said. In Bosnia, before the crisis occurred, he did not believe that two percent of the American public knew where Bosnia was. He did not believe that today 10 percent of the American public had any idea of the history of Bosnia, for example, that it had never been a nation. They keep reading of aggression against a nation which was really an entity of the Yugoslav State - which is composed of Serbs, Croats, and Moslems - who could not coexist in Yugoslavia, so why should it be surprising that they cannot coexist in Bosnia? That was no excuse for the crimes that are being committed there. But in order to form a judgement as to whether American troops should go to Bosnia, one has to be able to educate the public to some extent on why it should be important and precisely what the issue is. People keep talking about intervention in Bosnia - one sees such horrible pictures in the media - but it is rarely explained what exactly is the outcome that is supposed to be achieved.

China is infinitely more complicated. First of all, because you have what Valéry has already mentioned - the history of China. The origins of Tiananmen Square are very rarely explained, namely that two revolutions were really going on simultaneously: one by the students and one by the workers. And the workers were not fighting for democracy, but against austerity. All of this gets into a very complicated debate. Ultimately, it comes down to the question of how the United States can affect the political system of a society that has had uninterrupted self-government for three thousand years, a society of some billion 200 million people, and which has existed for most of its history without precise advice from the United States.

Then again, what is it exactly that we are trying to achieve over there? One sees a picture of Tiananmen Square and of course one is revolted by the events of that day. But it isn't a question of whether one is for human rights or not; what one has to do is to explain what was going on. The print medium, to which Valéry referred, gives some hope that the various points of view can be represented. The visual medium almost never has an historical background, nor does it have time for it. There are rarely enough competent people involved with it, hence it tends to evoke demagogic responses. As to the solution to all

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this, Henry Kissinger did not pretend to know because, obviously
the heaviest influence will come from television rather than the
print medium.

**James Hoge** thanked the President, for 'plugging' foreign affairs.
He said he would have done it if the President had not. He said
that he was pleased that both of them want to revive the print
press. Turning to the students, he introduced a rather
intriguing question as follows:

**Question**

"In Algeria the first democratic elections were won in 1990 by the Islamic party. The results of the election were overturned by military junta. Are we ready to accept, if this be a precedent. the results of all democratic elections in Eastern Europe?"

**James Hoge** thought there was also an assumption which was that
perhaps we were not right in Algeria. He asked the President
for his views.

**Valéry Giscard d'Estaing** replied by commenting that it was a
very interesting and fascinating question which he had almost
wanted to address when he made his comments. He went on to
remark that it is believed that voting by itself is enough to
make democracy function, but that was not true. Most of the
fascist regimes had at present or in the past approval by vote.
For instance, the war between Germany and France of 1970; just
before the war there was a referendum in France, which gave an
enormous majority to Napoleon III, and after the defeat he
disappeared. Thus, voting by itself must be accompanied by
information and by education; the crude process of voting by
itself doesn't constitute a satisfactory functioning of
democracy.

He instanced the problem for Algeria. Probably the elections
would have been won by the fundamentalists, and then what.
Ramon Aron expressed this in his sentence. He said, 'Democracy,
is the only system whose principles are such that they prevent
democracy to protect itself.'

What to respect then? The President's answer was, that when you
start a democratic process you must accept the result.
Initially you may hesitate. Referenda could sometimes be
ambiguous. You may hesitate to start the process, but if you
proceed you must respect the result. Problems may occur in the
Eastern countries because some of them would probably return to
power some Communist leaders because of frustration by their
people. But if they did so, we must respect this, if the
process was regular.

Turning to the question, the President said that his reaction
was that, when the process started in Algeria, the result of the
vote should have been respected, probably then the people in
charge should not have embarked on such a process, or announced

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in advance what principle would be respected. For instance,
human rights, civil liberties, and international commitments.
But, President d'Estaing emphasised that when a process is
started the result must be accepted.

James Hoge invited Henry Kissinger to respond and also to
consider a further question which asked if we should have
behaved as we did about the Algerian vote? Did it set a
precedent for Eastern Europe? And also a further question, is
entry into international organisations like NATO, the EC etc.,
going to be critical, whether democracy can flourish or not in
East Central Europe?"

Henry Kissinger replied:

"With respect to Algeria, it is more of a French problem than an American problem, and therefore I would have a tendency, as an American policymaker, to follow the French lead on Algeria. If it were deemed possible that a fundamentalist regime in Algeria could be a threat to security in France and Europe, then I would support an attempt to undo it. If that is not the case, then I think it would have been wiser to adopt a course of action which respected the democratic procedure. My impression is that the fundamentalists are actually regaining strength under present circumstances, though I would stress again that it would be my tendency to be heavily influenced, as I think American policy should be heavily influenced, by what France believes.

"As for Eastern Europe, I do not look at it exclusively - or even primarily - from the point of view of its domestic institutions. I look at it from the point of view that one should not create a security vacuum between Germany and Russia, which will tempt both Germany and Russia to deal with it unilaterally should it be rejected by the international grouping. I am struck by the fact that Chancellor Kohl, who is certainly the most pro-Western, pro-European, Chancellor we will see in Germany, has offered to pay half of the expenses of Polish entry into NATO. Why? Because he knows that sooner or later, if Poland is there by itself there will be temptations of a Russian-German arrangement. There will be temptations for Germany to look at the problem as a national issue. And so, for all of these reasons, I think it has been a big mistake not to fill that security vacuum to some extent.

"Now whether that means membership in NATO is another issue. If we had never put forward the Partnership for Peace - which includes practically everybody - and if we had said that the partnership for peace applies only to Eastern Europe as a transitional step into NATO, I could have lived with that. But personally what I do not find tolerable is the Administration's defining everything East of the German border as the same phenomenon. Poland and the former countries of the Soviet Union are all going to be lumped into the same institutions, and all of them might enter NATO at some point. But if that concept is developed and Russia gets a veto over membership in NATO as well as an option for membership into NATO, the security problems of

16

[L.C.]

Eastern and Central Europe can no longer be dealt with by NATO.

"It would have been wiser to find some arrangement which made it clear that NATO considers the security - in particular of the belt between itself and Russia - an element of its members' vital national interests. I would have compensated the Russians, if they needed compensation, by drawing them into other institutions, as of economic cooperation, in which the question of security did not arise as much. Only secondarily would I look at this in terms of the particular institutions that exist in Eastern Europe."

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing asked if Henry thought that the automaticity of NATO, which was the key to the system, because there are alliances in which it is decided to support or not to support one of your partners, and you have automatic alliances in which, one attack vis-à-vis one of the members is an attack vis-à-vis of all the others, could be applied to the Eastern part of Europe, in which the situation is probably more volatile than it was in the Western part of Europe?

Henry Kissinger in reply said that, in the end, any alliance can only operate if it can create a consciousness of common interests. In 1936, when the Germans reoccupied the Rhineland, which really overthrew the Versailles Settlement and made Eastern Europe defenseless, President Roosevelt asked Secretary Howell what that meant. Howell could have said, this now means that Eastern Europe is defenseless but instead he listed all the treaties which Germany had broken by going into the Rhineland, adding that none of them had been signed by the United States, hence it was not a matter of American concern.

Could the same automaticity hold for an attack on Poland, as it did on Germany? We must remember that there were many at the time of the Berlin crisis who were not all that convinced of the automaticity of the response over Berlin. Henry Kissinger thought it should be the objective of Western policy to make it very clear that military pressure against Poland would have the gravest consequences. Poland is really the key country whereas Hungary and the Czech Republic are not, though they would be more or less automatically protected. He believed we should create institutional links with Poland, as it is also in the long term interest of Russia to do. In his view, we cannot affect the domestic evolution in Russia significantly though we could affect the written Russian history, and remove Russia's temptation to use military pressure beyond its borders.

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, when asked for his final comment, posed the question:

"If you gave such a guarantee, for instance, to Poland, what would be the reaction if Ukraine says you did it for Poland, why not for Ukraine?"

Henry Kissinger said that the fact that you cannot answer every

17

problem does not mean that you should not solve some problems. He pointed out that Poland had been part of the West compared with Ukraine, which had rarely been a state. Though the independence of Ukraine was very important for the security of Europe, he said he would not extend the military guarantee there but would make sure that Russia paid a heavy price politically and economically for military pressures against Ukraine.

A question was put from a member of the audience:

"Gentlemen, in this single super power world, what value do you think representative democracy has to a country when the United States can, through the international monetary fund, dictate its fiscal policies? When the U.S. Treasury Department can dictate its monetary policies, its exchange rate policies, its straight policies, even down to the detail of determining how many Motorola cellular telephones they must buy from us? And also the American Congress and the American President can dictate the cultural and social policies of a country? After Uncle Sam, or maybe I should say the Emperor Samuel, decides all these policies, what's left for the people of a country to decide for themselves through their representative democracy ?"

### Henry Kissinger

"First of all, you are assuming a clarity of objectives in American government, the absence of which I have consistently deplored. Secondly, the United States has not been spectacularly successful in opening up Japan with all the tools that you described at its disposal. But, as surely, the United States has a preponderant influence in many institutions. And the results of these pressures, especially against significant economic powers, have not proved to be very effective. Theoretically you may have a point, that the basic problem of the United States is to understand that what we consider universal values are considered by other nations an intrusion into their domestic affairs. And how do we balance this in a new world where the ideological conflict has largely disappeared? That is the problem for the next phase of American foreign policy."

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing said that this was an element of what he called the ungovernability of the system. What was mentioned was true, but it was true also for instance, of monetary policy. What was the importance of a democratic debate on monetary policy, when in fact it was decided outside the borders? There was, therefore, a limitation of the field of the democratic process which was resented by the people.

### Question

"The world just described was one in which the motive and emotional matters seem to be reactions and are

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what determines policy; by which there is a method by
which most information is presented viscerally, and it
does not discriminate the value in which an elite in
fact says we can work with whoever the leader will be,
and in effect minorities become majorities that rule.
Did not this leave us open to a kind of fascism which
can in effect destroy the very roots of democracy? If
so, what are the institutional safeguards which any
democracy needs to have in place to deal with the
world that had just been described?"

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing affirmed that this fear was absolutely true. The question then was how to address this problem? Because we have a rise of some sort of fascism in the world of today and it's on the increase. Emotion can lead people to rapid or excessive reactions, and he thought that the first element was for the democratic leaders to be very careful about the democratic process. Not to use it for themselves in a too emotional a way, because if they do, it can be used by others in the opposite sense. Referenda could be used, but in a very selected and sophisticated way, on issues on which people have the right to speak, but not to determine the future, the fate of a country, or of a group. He thought also that we must limit or restrict the increase of power of the executive. It seems that in the relationship between the executive and representative democracy, the representative democracy is losing ground and the executive democracy is increasing at present. Also the power of the executive branch is increasing. It might be a danger, because if this power is overtaken by a minority group or by an extremist group, then you would have total power.

He stated that we must certainly try to balance our systems in a very careful way. It's the reason for which the ones in Europe were in favour of the subsidiary principle; to keep the maximum questions at the level of local authorities, or member states, and not to give all the power to the top. He shared the anxieties, which meant that the progress of democracy will not come easily by itself, which has to be kept in mind in the years to come.

## Question

"The spread of democracy to many places around the world has, for the most part, been accompanied by the spread of capitalism. In most cases, the pent up desire for capitalism, for economic and financial advancement, has been one of the primary causes of the spread of democracy. The question is what do you see as the major economic and financial implications of the kind of things that have been talked about today? With the spread of democracy, as well as the difficulties in governing or in executing foreign policy, the basic question is, what are the economic and the financial implications for the developed world, as well as for the developing or emerging market world, bearing in mind the new voices that are

19

being heard, the new technology, instantaneous information and also governing by impression and emotion."

Henry Kissinger joked that this was a question for a former finance minister! He said that, as he understood the question, experience shows that the desire for economic progress produced by capitalism has been one of the prime causes of democratisation around the world. What were the implications of this, especially in the developing countries? What financial and economic policies were most likely to spread democracy?

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing replied that he was not convinced that there was such a link between democracy and financial or economic policy. He was not sure. He went on:

"When you are in a phase of easy development, of course, you enjoy at the same time the development of democracy and the improvement of the economic situation. But most of the time you have to use a policy of adjustment, which is bound to be unpopular. So, the real question for development is how to handle two demands? One is a demand for political freedom, and the other is a demand for economic progress and adjustment. It is a famous debate between the Soviet way and the Chinese way, in fact, the countries who have at the moment the fastest economic growth enjoy limited democracy. For instance if you take, China it is well known, but Hong Kong is the same. So, if you introduce the whole democratic process I'm not sure it will make easier economic development, but by itself it's a goal for the people, for their freedom, freedom of choice, of vote and all that".

The President thought that was difficult to balance and the idea that capitalism will spread an easy democracy all over the world was not a realistic approach. He added that we must combine a more sophisticated combination of economic development and progress for democratic institutions.

James Hoge asked for some quick concluding thoughts on some of the problems that had been addressed which now faced democracies and democratic governments. He posed the question

"Are we facing a short term problem that can be explained cyclically by, say, the collapse of a familiar international order, by a deep recession, the deepest since the 30's, by new and unfamiliar or unexpected conflicts, or are we looking at a long term problem for democracies that are based on some very fundamental systemic flaws which will be much more difficult to resolve?"

Henry Kissinger replied:

"I believe we are looking at a long-term problem. Without any question, what you've described, or what has been described here - the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany,

20

the emergence of China, the comparative reduction in America's
influence during a historic period - would all produce enormous
dislocations in any system. But the biggest problem is how our
political system can generate a vision of the future and how to
get from here to there. Historically, great leaders -
Roosevelt, de Gaulle, Churchill - have emerged from out of the
existing system. Under present circumstances, I believe that the
political systems and the means by which we now communicate with
each other produce an almost institutionalised insecurity among
the top leaders. One observes this all around the world.

"Now, having said all of this, I don't have an answer. What will probably happen is that, if the problems do not get solved, if the political systems do not deal with, say, unemployment in Europe or the crises here, there will be a demand for a kind of demagogic leadership that I would deeply regret. And in this sense, there may be a trend toward a kind of fascism, which one has to remember was extremely popular in the 20's and 30's.

"That is my fear. That a kind of Caesarism will develop once it is obvious that the problems are not getting solved, and once the apparent solutions turn out to be empty over a very brief period of time. But I hope that I am wrong."

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had the same view. He said:

"I think it is a long term, and a lasting problem, and one which we will have to address in all of our countries, and even in the United States. Because our way of using democracy was adapted, as I mentioned earlier, to goals which were not the main goals of today. It was political freedom - we have it. And it was social equality, or the end of the excessive privileges in the 19th century - we did it more or less. We do not know how to address a society composed of divided and antagonistic groups. We know that we cannot do this just by the majority rule. We need something else, something more penetrating in the social fabric.

"The question for me is will we in the years to come develop common accepted values again, which might be different from the former common accepted values? Will we then look at what is called now by the political scientists, a social capital? That is the fact that we share institutions, organisations, associations in a way in which everyone is participating in the system. If we go this way we keep more or less the same democratic structure. If we do not, we will have in our societies very serious tensions".

The speakers then spent time with the press before joining the reception.

And finally, James Hoge asked the audience to join him in

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HAK made one
change to this version.

Version Containing Edited Kissinger Addres

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND THE POST COLD WAR

SPEAKERS: Dr Henry A Kissinger
President Valéry Giscard

Welcome from Andre Levy-Lang

"Ladies and Gentlemen; on behalf of Claude Bébéar and myself, welcome and thank you for coming to this symposium."

It could be said, that preparations for this meeting started 200 years ago. In 1794 France was shaken by the revolution, but had not forgotten the century of enlightenment that it had just lived through. The convention of the revolutionary government asked the mathematician Monge to create a school which would train the officers and engineers needed by the nation. This school would allow them to access the technology then available. One year later the school was named l'Ecole Polytechnique.

Thanks to the efficient help of Jacques Andréani, the French Ambassador to the United States, General Marescaux, the General Manager of l'Ecole Polytechnique, Christian Marbach, Chairman of the Association for the Celebration of the Bicentenary of l'Ecole, Polytechnique, Dick Jenrette, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Equitable Companies, and Philippe Blavier who is responsible for Bank Paribas North America, it had been possible to organise the symposium in The Equitable Tower.

Andre Levy-Lang said that for at least three reasons it was an honour to be present with his friend Claude Bébéar, who, like himself, was a graduate of l'Ecole Polytechnique.

The first reason being that comparable events took place in the United States to celebrate the 150th anniversary of l'Ecole Polytechnique in New York and in West Point. The bicentennial also reminded us of the other commemoration this year, the 50th anniversary of the Allied landings on the Normandy beaches on 6 June, 1944.

The second reason was that the symposium is part of a whole series of international events organized in Washington, Montreal, Sao Paulo, in Europe and the Middle and Far East for the bicentennial of l'Ecole Polytechnique.

The third and most important reason was that two exceptional people, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and Doctor Henry A Kissinger, who had both exercised high risk level political responsibilities, had agreed to address the symposium on the subject, "REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE POST COLD WAR WORLD".

Version Containing Edited Kissinger Add.

Welcome from Andre Levy-Lang

Version Containing Edited Kissinger Address

SPEAKERS: Dr Henry A Kissinger
President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing

Welcome from Andre Levy-Lang

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## l'Ecole Polytechnique

Andre Levy-Lang explained that l'Ecole Polytechnique is what is called in France a "Grande Ecole". The main features of the system are first, that the "Grandes Ecoles" are often separate and independent from the university system, and that the size of these "Grandes Ecoles" is limited and is comparable to a large department in an American university. The second is that the process of admission involves extremely competitive examinations. In the case of l'Ecole Polytechnique all the costs are met by the state. Finally, there is an innate reluctance to give the students too early a specialisation. Unfortunately, some never get any specialisation. But the exam to enter, in the case of l'Ecole Polytechnique, and the curriculum includes a truly polyscientific programme.

French engineers have traditionally occupied high positions in the civil service. As a consequence, a substantial fraction of the top French civil servants and a few business leaders have a scientific and sometimes an engineering background. Possibly that is not a bad thing. Both American universities and French "Grandes Ecoles" wish to keep up with the rapid expansion of knowledge and technology, and to have the best research centres on their campuses.

Does the French "Grandes Ecoles" system actually work? Andre Levy-Lang believes it does. First, it has contributed to some extent to some of the brilliant technical achievements in the domain of major projects, such as nuclear energy, aeronautics, high speed rail travel. Secondly, it does teach qualified young people in the sciences to work intensively, quickly, and methodically.

Before Claude Bébéar introduced the debaters, a short video was shown on the 200 years of l'Ecole Polytechnique. Claude Bébéar reported that he had just received, a proclamation from the office of the Mayor of the City of New York.

## Proclamation

Whereas the bicentennial of l'Ecole Polytechnique, the distinguished Scientific Academy and Research Center in Palaiseau, France is being celebrated in our city with a symposium at which Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, former President of France, and Henry A. Kissinger, former United States Secretary of State, will discuss "Representative democracy and the post Cold War world.

And whereas l'Ecole Polytechnique was founded on March 11, 1794 and given military status by Napoleon I in 1804, for two centuries its graduates have had an active involvement in French science, engineering, government and business, today l'Ecole Polytechnique graduates live and work in nations throughout the world. And the academy maintains cordial and reciprocal

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relationships with foreign institutions.

And whereas celebrations in more than ten countries are saluting the bicentennial and the school has announced plans to establish more exchange opportunities for students and professors from other nations.

And whereas alumni of l'Ecole Polytechnique live and work in New York where they make vital contributions to every sector of our city's economy.

Now, therefore, I, Rudolph Giuliani, Mayor of the City of New York, in recognition of this important anniversary do hereby proclaim Tuesday March 29, 1994 in the City of New York as l'Ecole Polytechnique Day.

Claude Bébéar handed the proclamation to the General Marescaux for it to take its place in the museum of l'Ecole Polytechnique.

## Introduction to distinguished guests

Claude Bébéar first introduced Monsieur le Président Giscard d'Estaing. Everybody knew that he was "Président de la Republique Française", perhaps it was not known that he was born in Germany - it was by accident - because he was and still is French.

At age 18, he joined as a volunteer, the French Army which liberated France with the Allies and mainly the Americans, continued the battle in Germany, won the Military Cross, and after that came back to study. He entered l'Ecole Polytechnique, then l'Ecole Nationale Administration, and became a civil servant as "Inspecteur des Finances", which is one of the most prestigious French "corps". In 1955 he became "député" under Général de Gaulle, Secretary of State for Finance, and then in 1962 at age 36, the youngest Minister of Economy and Finance France ever had. He was Minister of Finance for 14 years. He became Président de la Republique in 1974 at age 48, the youngest French "Président de la Republique".

During the seven years he remained in charge, he introduced the voting right at age 18 instead of 21. He extended health care for everyone and that's a big issue today. He started a huge programme of nuclear power that made France energetically independent. He created a Secretary of Women's Rights, "Ministère de la Condition Féminine". That was an event, even in France. At the European level he launched the European Presidents' Summit, initiated the universal vote to elect the European Parliament, and created the European monetary system. He's presently Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French Parliament. He will not forgive me, Claude Bébéar said, if he did not mention that he's "Député" of the Puy de Dôme, Chairman of the Auvergne Region and Chairman of U.D.F., one of the two parties of the present majority. He's also chairman of the International European Movement created by Winston Churchill

3

in 1948. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing admires writers, he loves
Flaubert very much. He personally wrote very well known books
about politics and "mémoire".

Secondly Claude Bébéar introduced Dr Kissinger. Henry Kissinger had his roots in Europe too. Like Président Giscard d'Estaing, he was born in Germany, he came to the United States in 1938 and was naturalised a United States citizen in 1943. He served immediately in the army up to 1946; graduated summa cum laude from Harvard College in 1950, received MA and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard University in 1952 and 1954 and from 1954 until 1969 was a member of the faculty of Harvard University. In 1969 he became Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and became, in 1973, the 56th Secretary of State, a position he held until 1977. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973, and the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1977.

After 1993 he had been called into service by President Reagan
many times. For instance, he chaired the National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America. At present Dr. Kissinger is a
consultant, and he serves on some of the most prestigious
commissions or boards of this country. Dr. Kissinger wrote
successful books, the last one, Diplomacy, quoted yesterday by
The New York Times, as "an elegantly written study of Western
diplomacy".

Thirdly, Claude Bébéar introduced Mr Hoge. Mr Jim Hoge, the
symposium moderator, received a Bachelor's Degree in Political
Science from Yale University, and a Master's Degree in Modern
American and European History from the University of Chicago. He
was editor of the *Chicago Sun Times* from 1968 until 1976, and
during his tenure, the *Chicago Sun Times* won six Pulitzer Prizes
for journalistic excellence. From 1984 until 1991 Mr. Hoge was
publisher and president of the *New York Daily News*, and today
he's Editor of Foreign Affairs.

James Hoge then told the audience that both speakers had been
asked to speak for about 15 -20 minutes in order to leave a lot
of time for queries. He asked the audience to think of some
provocative questions for both of the speakers.

Dr Kissinger was introduced to the assembly by James Hoge and his
speech is given in full.

Dr Henry A Kissinger

"Mr. President, Jim, Ladies, and Gentlemen, it is a great privilege for me to appear on the same programme with Président Giscard d'Estaing, who has done so much for his country, for Europe, and for the relationship between France and the United States. I remember my association with him as one of the greatest satisfactions of my public life; and the friendship that has characterised our relationship since then as one of the biggest rewards of my public service. Président Giscard suggested that I speak first, which reflects his enormous tact because he did not want the audience to realise too early that he speaks English

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with less of an accent than I do.

"I would also like to point out that, if I indeed keep to Jim Hoge's instructions and speak for 15 minutes, you can all say, regardless of the content, that you were present at an historic occasion.

"In fact, those of us whose native language was German have been known to go on for 15 minutes without planting a verb!

"The subject which we've been asked to address is one of the most perplexing of our period. And I have many more questions than I do answers with respect to it. We're witnessing a change in the nature of the international system that is of a scope unprecedented in history. Simultaneously, we're witnessing a change in the nature of the domestic institutions of nearly all societies, including the democratic societies, that is probably only at the beginning of its ultimate evolution. And I would argue that we are also at the beginning of a change in the nature of human perception that is comparable to the one which occurred when printing and the advent of books first emerged. It signifies a shift from policy-making by concepts, which was characteristic of the age of reading, to policy-making by impression and sentiment, which is increasingly characteristic of the age of television and the computer. All of these affect the subject with which we've been asked to deal.

"International systems have undergone revolutions in the past: whenever there was a change in the nature of what was considered a legitimate domestic order, a change in domestic structures, or a change in technology. All of these have now occurred simultaneously with the novel characteristic that they are occurring on a global basis. Before the French Revolution, the essential feudal organisation of Europe was considered legitimate and appropriate. After the French Revolution, states not based on nationalism gradually began to seem antiquated and had to struggle for their existence, indeed very few of them survived.

"In our period, the Communist systems have disintegrated and the nature of what had been deemed as the basis of international organisation on both sides of the dividing line is being modified. In the transition from a two-power world to a world of many states, several of which are of more or less equal strength, the pattern of thinking among statesmen has to be adjusted as well, especially of American statesmen who have always viewed national politics more as a moral than as a strategic exercise. And they have always attempted to justify American actions in terms of principles applicable to all mankind, even when they also represent self-serving motives.

"Thus we are facing an international system characterized by instantaneous communication, by global problems, without any clear-cut dividing lines, with no overriding ideological challenge, and no self-evident geopolitical challenge. This is a problem for every country though, and I repeat, it is a special problem for the United States.

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NOTE

"All countries, including the democracies, will have to come to grips with this situation at the same time that the very notion of democracy is being substantially modified. In the 18th and early 19th centuries, when representative institutions were first forged, the basic purpose of democracy was to elect national leaders. But the legislative parties did not assume responsibility, especially in the field of foreign policy, for the detailed management of day-to-day affairs. The suffrage was restricted in almost every country through the best part of the 19th century. And such dialogue as existed concerned fundamental, nearly philosophical, issues.

"In the modern period, leaders no longer come from the aristocracy or the high bureaucracy. They have not spent much of their lives in public service, at least to the same extent that was the case earlier. Or, if they have spent their careers in public service, they have had to take into account a public opinion which did not exist in its present form until fairly recently. For instance, events can now be viewed instantaneously as they take place. And it was not until recently that organised pressure groups could impose direction on foreign policy.

"In the United States, within the last two or three years the national interest has become identified with a country which 95 percent of the Americans had previously not ever heard of, namely Somalia. And American troops were sent to Somalia largely on the basis of televised images of starvation that could have, in fact represented footage from any of six or seven other countries of the world and which, in that sense, reflected a choice of the media rather than of statesmen. America withdrew from Somalia after suffering 18 casualties, which is one measure of the relationship between the perception of the national interest before and after it has to be defended.

"The ultimate task of leadership is to guide a society from where it is to where it has never been. And mobilizing a democratic constituency for contingencies that have not yet arisen is not something that can be achieved via pictures.

"There is within each government the additional problem that the gap between the experts and the policy makers is growing ever wider. When arms control was still a principal topic of national debate, the dialogue between various contending forces had all the attributes of theological quarrels in some distant, medieval monastery, since the public could not possibly understand all the technical fine points. But what was worse, those who had to make the decisions usually could not spend as many hours on the subject as the experts who had whole years for study.

"This leads to a certain insecurity compounded by political leaders becoming more and more conscious of the requirements of their day-to-day popularity. When I started out advising political leaders, they would ask me what they should do. Today, most candidates for office, if they ask for my opinion, ask me what they should say. That is a big difference and it has led to

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inherent insecurity. One of the key challenges of our period is how to find leaders responsive to the public will but with enough inward strength to head toward destinations which they, with the moral fibre of leaders, know better than those whom they are leading. All of this becomes even more complicated when, as in many countries including the United States, it is not just the practice of democracy in one's own country that is the principal objective, but the propagation of democracy in other societies as well; or when it is believed, first, that the spread of democracy automatically brings about universal peace, second, that we can do this by exercising unilateral decisions, and third, that there is a single definition of democracy applicable in even radically different cultures.

Now there's no question that we should have a predilection for democracy, but there is question as to what extent a nation can insist on the universal applicability of its institutions and value system, and above all, how to submit this conception to a standard in which the costs can be measured. In this sense, l'Ecole Polytechnique has raised an important, if not the most important, topic of our period.

"Today at lunch I found myself in the strange position of being more favourably disposed to the principles of l'Ecole Polytechnique than to almost anyone else in the room. I do believe that these sorts of problems require a kind of discipline, a kind of dedication, and inward strength that can only be based on experience gleaned at a stage when things are still formative and reflective - only thus can we learn things we did not know we could do. I think that this is the great challenge of our period; for the Post-Cold War World is as yet unknown to us, both in terms of its institutions as well as internationally and domestically. And to find answers to these questions will be the great drama of our period.

"I do thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak to you and, above all, in company I respect so greatly."

## Valéry Giscard d'Estaing

"I am Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, specialist of bicentennial commemorations!

"I came in the United States in 1976 for the bicentennial of the independence. And I come back in 1994 for the bicentennial of l'Ecole Polytechnique. So, to parody a famous line, 'If you have a bicentennial to commemorate just whistle!'

"What the motion picture didn't show you is that to enter this school you have to go through intellectual exams. But also, physical tests, to test your physical abilities. You have to jump, to run, to swim. And the set of rules was established by - probably the general - was written in a curious way. You get points according to your performance. So, if you swim 100 metres in less than one minute you get to one point, in less than 50

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seconds, two points, in less than 20 seconds, six points; and it
is written if you dive, you will get an additional four points;
and there's no connection between diving and swimming. So, when
the candidates come for the exam they go to the swimming pool,
and then the examiner asks them, do you know how to swim or not?
If they say yes, they go inside and they swim and they get their
notes. And if they don't know they go to the other side. And
they just obey an order which is, go. And then they dive. And
since they don't know how to swim it's a horrible spectacle
because they have to be extracted from the water; and then they
gain four points. And I think it's probably the most worthy
points you can get in such an intellectual examination.

Well thank you Henry for opening the fire - I heard that through
Claude Bébéar that you are a consultant, but for me you're mostly
a consulted person. And I remember very well when I was elected
at a young age, my first important foreign visitor was Henry. And
I was much impressed because I thought you will probably evaluate
me and my experience, which was limited in foreign affairs and
so I invited him for a breakfast at springtime in the "Roseraie
de l'Elysée" (amongst the roses), because I thought it might
modify him! And since then we had a very close understanding
when I was President, and friendship since. And I must say that
probably never has the American-French relationship been better
than during the time you were Secretary of State. And many
important problems and burning issues would have been addressed
in a more expert and competent way if they were addressed by you
(Henry Kissinger).

"I have to comment briefly (on) the question of representative
democracy in the Post Cold War World. We were taken by surprise.
And the German reunification, the collapse of the Communist
empire, was an unexpected event. I remember very well a
conversation with my good friend, and a good friend of yours,
Helmut Schmidt. And I asked him, do you think that Germany will
be reunited again? And he said to me in 1979: ' yes, I think it
will happen, but not in my lifetime'. So, the events were sudden
and created very strong commotions. In fact, we expected a
different evolution; a reduction of armaments and probably a
limitation and reduction of armaments; a balance of power between
East and West, and a lessening of tensions. And after that a
gradual evolution of the Eastern Block and the Soviet Union, more
or less along the Hungarian type of evolution or the Polish type
of evolution, but not the collapse of the Communist world and the
Communist doctrine.

"The consequences will be enormous and lasting. When you look at
the position of the world leaders now, since these events, all
of them have been in trouble. In Japan the liberal democratic
party, in charge for more than 30 years, was expelled from power.
In Italy yesterday the governing coalition of Socialist and
Christian Democrat disappeared because the socialists didn't
even have a single seat in the new Italian Parliament. And if
you take the leaders of the UK, of France or Germany, either
they lost elections or they have a very limited support in the
polls. When you see such a global situation it means something

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is on the way into the democratic process.

"Probably many of the problems were already in the making. But they were actually accelerated and accentuated by the end of the cold war. And like Henry, I would say that there are probably two major factors. The first one is the collapse or the fading away of the dominant ideologies of our time. Not only Communism on one side, but the group of the dominant ideologies. So, the democracies are living in a situation which is quite new for them, without adversity, but also without purpose. And this creates a sort of disorientation of the system. We have the vague concept that democracies can live just by themselves without having a clear purpose. But it didn't happen in the past. Democracies always had a main purpose. For instance, in the 18th century the political freedom, in the 19th century and the beginning of this one the social justice. But if one asks, what is the real purpose of the democratic system at the moment, there is not a clear answer.

"The second factor is what I would call the instantaneity of the Democratic system. By comparison with a computing world we are living now in real terms. There is an immediate reaction, an immediate choice, and not a delay in the democratic system. And this is due not only to the media society but also the communication society, which leads us to a global political economy to global perceptions of situations, as you mentioned, for instance, Somalia, and this creates for the leaders of democratic societies, a new position. They work with the polls, they work with media consultants, and they are independent political entrepreneurs. They are a people with programme or projects, which they propose to people, but they react in real time to these short term events.

"The political parties which have been the main links in the past between citizens and government for the last two centuries, don't play anymore this role. And if you look at the rejection of the dominating democratic party in Japan and Italy, you have a sort of demonstration of this. And if you think that probably in the next open election, the Conservative Party of Britain will get not more than 15 seats out of the 87 allocated to the UK, it shows that their political system of parties doesn't work now in a very adequate way. The political parties expressed a choice between options; left and right; conservation or movement; academic progress or social improvement; and it seems that now in democracy the choice is a vertical one. It's a sort of vertical confrontation between the people and the ruling group, even when it is an elected ruling group. It's very clear, in France last year the vote was a vote of a rejection of the governing people of the past decade, and in Italy the vote yesterday was a rejection of the political parties from the left and from the right of the president period. So, it's not the choice which is a classical instrument of democratic process, it's more now the rejection.

"In my remaining few minutes I would say that representative democracy must face three phenomenon and address two

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disfunctioning. The three phenomenon are first, declining governability, which is the incapacity of political institutions to solve, or even to address, essential problems. And with two good examples of this, one of this side of the Atlantic, the problem of the American budget deficit during all the '80 period, which the political institutions were not able to address. And on the other side, our side, the unemployment in Europe, which the political institutions were not, and are not either, able to address. And probably it's due to an evolution into the democratic system in which the perception of a common goal or of a common interest for all people prevails less than the additions of factions, local interest, social benefits acquired by various groups. And so, the idea that the democratic system was basically a way to impose the will of the whole society upon minority groups is probably less accepted now.

"The second point is the assertion of national or religious identities above the common democratic structure. We have the idea and we express it, that if we can have elections some way it would solve the problems. It doesn't solve the problem anymore. When you take the case of Czechoslovakia, for instance, it was a democratic country with a single government and a democratic process, but the functioning of the process was such that at the end it led to the split of the country. And when you take the very difficult handling of the Bosnia situation, it's very clear that any democratic process going through the classical means of voting or electing people will not by itself solve the problem, because the national and religious identities go above the common democratic structure. And the last element which is probably very preoccupying is that any democratic society needs to have common values. At the moment people believe that they don't need to have common values, and everyone can have his own set of values. Of course, a democratic society doesn't require unanimity, but it requires the existence of an accepted set of common values. Tocqueville in his famous work on democracy in America wrote: 'I will never admit that men constitute a social body because they obey the same head or the same laws. Democratic society can exist only when a great number of men consider a great number of things under the same aspect. When they hold the same opinions they vote many subjects. And when the same occurrences suggest the same thoughts and impressions to their minds'. And I think the democratic system suppose such a fabric of behaviour and now will not develop that but the attitude is to believe that any opinion is as much valuable as any of the accepted common values. So one of the basic elements of democracy doesn't function well.

"So my conclusion, that we must address two disfunctioning. First, the process of selecting the leaders, and Henry addressed this point. Look at the volatility of opinion and the process of selection should be a rather stable one. Yesterday President Clinton, for instance, gained 10 points in polls because of his press conference. And the Prime Minister of France lost 10 points in polls because of a student unrest in one day. So, it shows that we have a volatility of public opinion which doesn't permit the slow process of selecting the most qualified or

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adequate leaders.

"So, now we have a governing class which is not so much composed by people chosen by the others, which is the principle of democracy, but by professional politicians oriented towards a policy of seduction. And using their intellectual means or techniques to increase this seduction which demands short term results and not long lasting achievements. And the second disfunctioning is the lack of interposition of a system of critical evaluation. And in the democratic process which is at the end an act of judgement (the vote is a judgement), it is very important to have some system of critical evaluation that people can use to improve or to put some light into their own judgement. And this is due to the fact that the written press has much less influence than before, and there is no public debates. For instance, the Parliamentary debates are not creating this quality of critical evaluation that we should need to have a smooth functioning of the system.

"We have a situation in which the communication is enlarged to a greater number of people, which is certainly progress and an advance. But the substance of the communication is reduced to emotions and the instantaneous event. So, these are the problems I think we have to face and which means that certainly we're bound to know in our democratic institution, some strong commotions and needed improvements in the ten years to come."

## Comments from James Hoge

James Hoge, then said that he thought those were two very stimulating presentations, and started the questions by, in his own admission, playing devil's advocate. In his opinion he thought both Henry and Valéry had painted a fluent, gloomy picture of a lot of disfunction.

He said "Let me turn it on its head and suggest that the decline of political parties, and of power at the nation's state level, is not necessarily a bad thing, but just a reflection of the fact that there is a devolution in power, and in governments, going on in most of the Western world, where people are taking unto themselves power at the local level more than they used to. That we're moving from a representative form of government to a more direct one that has both formal and informal processes of referendum, and that this is not necessarily a bad thing. On the second point, the instantaneity of communications, and the pervasiveness particularly of broadcast, does this not result in a more informed public; and that, while it may have forced politicians into short term actions, can also restrain them from interventions, many of which have in the past proven to be disastrous, so it necessarily is a net loss."

"And the last point I think I would make is that public opinion polls, or knowing what's on the public's mind, may again, not be at all a bad thing for those who would govern. Because, in a democracy if you can't develop a public constituency, or find one for what it is you want to do, you're most likely to fail. In other words, some of the changes that we see today have their

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James Hoge commented:

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**Question**

"In Algeria the first democratic elections were won in 1990 by the Islamic party. The results of the election were overturned by military junta. Are we ready to accept, if this be a precedent, the results of all democratic elections in Eastern Europe?"

**Valéry Giscard d'Estaing** replied by commenting that it was a very interesting and fascinating question which he had almost wanted to address when he made his comments. He went on to remark that it is believed that voting by itself is enough to make democracy function, but that was not true. Most of the fascist regimes had at present or in the past approval by vote. For instance, the war between Germany and France of 1870; just before the war there was a referendum in France, which gave an enormous majority to Napoleon III, and after the defeat he disappeared. Thus, voting by itself must be accompanied by information and by education; the crude process of voting by itself doesn't constitute a satisfactory functioning of democracy.

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**James Hoge** invited Henry Kissinger to respond and also to consider a further question which asked if we should have behaved as we did about the Algerian vote? Did it set a precedent for Eastern Europe? And also a further question, is entry into international organisations like NATO, the EC etc., going to be critical, whether democracy can flourish or not in East Central Europe?"

**Henry Kissinger** replied:

"With respect to Algeria, it is more of a French problem than an American problem, and therefore I would have a tendency, as an American policymaker, to follow the French lead on Algeria. If it were deemed possible that a fundamentalist regime in Algeria could be a threat to security in France and Europe, then I would support an attempt to undo it. If that is not the case, then I think it would have been wiser to adopt a course of action which respected the democratic procedure. My impression is that the fundamentalists are actually regaining strength under present circumstances, though I would stress again that it would be my tendency to be heavily influenced, as I think American policy should be heavily influenced, by what France believes."

"As for Eastern Europe, I do not look at it exclusively - or even primarily - from the point of view of its domestic institutions. I look at it from the point of view that one should not create a security vacuum between Germany and Russia, which will tempt both Germany and Russia to deal with it unilaterally should it be rejected by the international grouping. I am struck by the fact that Chancellor Kohl, who is certainly the most pro-Western, pro-European, Chancellor we will see in Germany, has offered to pay half of the expenses of Polish entry into NATO. Why? Because he knows that sooner or later, if Poland is there by itself there will be temptations of a Russian-German arrangement. There will be temptations for Germany to look at the problem as a national issue. And so, for all of these reasons, I think it has been a big mistake not to fill that security vacuum to some extent."

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> "Gentlemen, in this single super power world, what value do you think representative democracy has to a country when the United States can, through the international monetary fund, dictate its fiscal policies? When the U.S. Treasury Department can dictate its monetary policies, its exchange rate policies, its straight policies, even down to the detail of determining how many Motorola cellular telephones they must buy from us? And also the American Congress and the American President can dictate the cultural and social policies of a country? After Uncle Sam, or maybe I should say the Emperor Samuel, decides all these policies, what's left for the people of a country to decide for themselves through their representative democracy?"

### Henry Kissinger

> "First of all, you are assuming a clarity of objectives in American government, the absence of which I have consistently deplored. Secondly, the United States has not been spectacularly successful in opening up Japan with all the tools that you described at its disposal. But, as surely, the United States has a preponderant influence in many institutions. And the results of these pressures, especially against significant economic powers, have not proved to be very effective. Theoretically you may have a point, that the basic problem of the United States is to understand that what we consider universal values are considered by other nations an intrusion into their domestic affairs. And how do we balance this in a new world where the ideological conflict has largely disappeared? That is the problem for the next phase of American foreign policy."

### Question

> "The world just described was one in which the motive and emotional matters seem to be reactions and are

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## Question

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**Henry Kissinger** joked that this was a question for a former finance minister! He said that, as he understood the question, experience shows that the desire for economic progress produced by capitalism has been one of the prime causes of democratisation around the world. What were the implications of this, especially in the developing countries? What financial and economic policies were most likely to spread democracy?

**Valéry Gissard d'Estaing** replied that he was not convinced that there was such a link between democracy and financial or economic policy. He was not sure. He went on:

**James Hoge** asked for some quick concluding thoughts on some of the problems that had been addressed which now faced democracies and democratic governments. He posed the question:

**Henry Kissinger** replied:

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the emergence of China, the comparative reduction in America's influence during an historic period - would all produce enormous dislocations in any system. But the biggest problem is how our political system can generate a vision of the future and how to get from here to there. Historically, great leaders - Roosevelt, de Gaulle, Churchill - have emerged from out of the existing system. Under present circumstances, I believe that the political systems and the means by which we now communicate with each other produce an almost institutionalised insecurity among the top leaders. One observes this all around the world.

"Now, having said all of this, I don't have an answer. What will probably happen is that, if the problems do not get solved, if the political systems do not deal with, say, unemployment in Europe or the crises here, there will be a demand for a kind of demagogic leadership that I would deeply regret. And in this sense, there may be a trend toward a kind of fascism, which one has to remember was extremely popular in the 20's and 30's."

Valéry Gissard d'Estaing had the same view. He said:

"I think it is a long term, and a lasting problem, and one which we will have to address in all of our countries, and even in the United States. Because our way of using democracy was adapted, as I mentioned earlier, to goals which were not the main goals of today. It was political freedom - we have it. And it was social equality, or the end of the excessive privileges in the 19th century - we did it more or less. We do not know how to address a society composed of divided and antagonistic groups. We know that we cannot do this just by the majority rule. We need something else, something more penetrating in the social fabric."

"The question for me is will we in the years to come develop common accepted values again, which might be different from the former common accepted values? Will we then look at what is called now by the political scientists, a social capital? That is the fact that we share institutions, organisations, associations in a way in which everyone is participating in the system. If we go this way we keep more or less the same democratic structure. If we do not, we will have in our societies very serious tensions."

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SPEAKERS:
Dr Henry A Kissinger
Former President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing

(NOTE: The main speeches of Dr Kissinger and President d'Estaing are reproduced verbatim. Other speeches, questions, responses and statements have been edited)

Welcome from Andre Levy-Lang

The second reason was that the symposium is part of a whole series of international events organised in Washington, Montreal, Sao Paulo, in Europe and the Middle and Far East for the bicentennial of l'Ecole Polytechnique.

The third and most important reason was that two exceptional people, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and Doctor Henry A Kissinger, who had both exercised high level political responsibilities, had agreed to address the symposium on the subject, "REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE POST COLD WAR WORLD".

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l'Ecole Polytechnique

Andre Levy-Lang explained that l'Ecole Polytechnique is what is called in France a "Grande Ecole". The main features of the system are first, that the "Grandes Ecoles" are often separate and independent from the university system, and that the size of these "Grandes Ecoles" is limited and is comparable to a large department in an American university. In the case of l'Ecole Polytechnique all the costs are met by the state. The second is that the process of admission involves extremely competitive examinations. Finally, there is an innate reluctance to give the students too early a specialisation. Unfortunately, some never get any specialisation. In the case of l'Ecole Polytechnique, both the exam to enter and the curriculum comprises a truly polyscientific programme.

Proclamation

And whereas l'Ecole Polytechnique was founded on March 11, 1794 and given military status by Napoleon I in 1804, for two centuries its graduates have had an active involvement in French science, engineering, government and business, today l'Ecole Polytechnique graduates live and work in nations throughout the world, and the academy maintains cordial and reciprocal relationships with foreign institutions.

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## Introduction of distinguished guests

Claude Bébéar first introduced Monsieur le Président Giscard d'Estaing. Everybody knew
that he has been the "Président de la Republique Française", perhaps it was not known that
he was born in Germany - it was by coincidence - because he was and still is French.

At age 18, he volunteered to join the French Army which liberated France with the Allies, continued the battle in Germany, won the Military Cross, and after that came back to France to study. He entered l'Ecole Polytechnique, then l'Ecole Nationale Administration, and became a civil servant as "Inspecteur des Finances", which is one of the most prestigious French "corps". In 1955 he became "député" under Général de Gaulle, Secretary of State for Finance, and then in 1962 at age 36, the youngest Minister of Economy and Finance France ever had. He was Minister of Finance for 14 years. He became Président de la Republique in 1974 at age 48, the youngest French "Président de la Republique".

During the seven years he remained in charge, he introduced the voting right at age 18 instead of 21. He extended health care for everyone and that's a big issue today. He started a huge programme of nuclear power that made France energy independent. He created a Secretary of Women's Rights, "Ministère de la Condition Féminine". That was an event, even in France. At the European level he launched the European Presidents' Summit, initiated the universal vote to elect the European Parliament, and created the European monetary system. He's presently Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French Parliament. He will not forgive me, Claude Bébéar said, if he did not mention that he's "Député" of the Puy de Dôme, Chairman of the Auvergne Region and Chairman of U.D.F., one of the two parties of the present majority. He's also chairman of the International European Movement created by Winston Churchill in 1948. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing admires writers, he loves Flaubert very much. He has written books about politics and "mémoire".

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of Freedom in 1977.

After 1993 he had been called into service by President Reagan many times. For instance, he chaired the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. At present Dr. Kissinger is a consultant, and he serves on some of the most prestigious commissions or boards of this country. Dr. Kissinger wrote successful books, the last one, *Diplomacy*, quoted yesterday by *The New York Times*, as "an elegantly written study of Western diplomacy".

James Hoge then told the audience that both speakers had been asked to speak for about 15 - 20 minutes in order to leave a lot of time for queries. He asked the audience to think of some provocative questions for both of the speakers.

## Dr Henry A Kissinger

"Mr. President, Jim, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great privilege for me to appear on the same programme with Président Giscard d'Estaing, who has done so much for his country, for Europe, and for the relationship between France and the United States. I remember my association and working with him as one of the greatest satisfactions of my public life. The friendship that has characterised our relationship since then as one of the biggest rewards of my public service. Now, Président Giscard suggested that I speak first, which reflects his enormous tact because he did not want the audience to realise too early that he speaks English with less of an accent than I do.

"I would also like to point out that if I indeed keep to Jim Hoge's instructions and speak for 15 minutes you can all say, regardless of the content, that you were present at an historic occasion.

"The subject which we've been asked to address is one of the most perplexing of our period. I know many more questions than I do answers with respect to it. We're witnessing simultaneously a change in the nature of the international system, of a scope that is unprecedented in history. We're witnessing also a change in the nature of domestic institutions of almost all societies, including the democratic societies, that is probably only at the beginning of its evolution. I would argue that we are at the beginning of a change in the nature of human perception, at least comparable to the development of printing and of

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books, in the shift from policy-making by concepts, which was characteristic of the age of reading, to policy-making by impressions and sentiments, which is increasingly characteristic of the age of television and the computer. All of these affect the subject with which we've been asked to deal.

"International systems underwent revolutions in the past: when there was a change in the nature of what was considered a legitimate domestic order, when there was a change in domestic structures, when there was a change in technology. All these elements have occurred simultaneously with one novel characteristic, they have occurred on a global basis. Before the French Revolution the essential feudal organisation of Europe was considered legitimate and appropriate. After the French Revolution, states not based on nationalism gradually began to appear antiquated and had to fight for their lives, and very few of them survived.

"In our period, the Communist systems have disintegrated, and the nature of what was considered the basis of international organisation on both sides of the dividing line is being modified. In the transition from a two-power world to a world of many states, many of which, several of which, are of more or less equal strength, the pattern of thinking of statesmen has to be adjusted, and especially of American statesmen, who have always viewed the national politics more as a moral than as a strategic exercise. they have always attempted to justify American actions in terms of principles applicable to mankind at large, even if they also served self-serving motives.

"So, we are facing an international system with instantaneous communication, with global problems, with no clear cut dividing lines, with no ideological challenge that is overwhelming, and no self-evident geo-political challenge. This is a problem for every country. But I repeat, it is a special problem for the United States.

"All countries and all democratic countries have to come to grips with this situation while the notion of democracy is substantially modified. In the 18th and early 19th century, when representative institutions were first instituted, the basic purpose of democracy was to elect the national leaders. But the legislative parties did not assume the right, especially in the field of foreign policy, of the detailed management of day to day affairs. The suffrage was restricted in almost every country, in every country, through the best part of the 19th century. And the dialogue concerned fundamental, almost philosophical issues.

"In the modern period, the leaders do not come from the aristocracy or the high bureaucracy. They have not spent much of their life in public service, to the same extent as was the case earlier. Or, if they have spent their careers in public service, they have had to take account of a public opinion which did not exist in its present form until recently. It was not until recently that events could be viewed instantaneously as they were taking place. And it was not until recently that organised pressure groups could impose directions on foreign policy.

"In the United States within the last two or three years the national interest suddenly became identified with a country that I'm convinced 95 percent of the Americans have never heard of, namely Somalia. American troops were sent to Somalia largely on the basis of television pictures of starvation. These were television pictures which could have been replicated in six

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or seven other countries of the world, and which therefore reflected the choice of the media, rather than of the statesmen. America withdrew after suffering 18 casualties, which is one measure of the relationship between the perception of the national interest after an event, and the perception of the national interest as it is being fought.

"The problem of leadership is to bring a society from where it is, to where it has never been. How to get a democratic constituency for contingencies that have not yet arisen, that cannot be represented on pictures, is one of the extraordinary dilemmas.

"There is within each government the additional problem that the gap between experts and policy makers is growing ever wider. When arms control was still a principal topic of national debate, the dialogue between various contending forces had all the attributes of theological quarrels in distant monasteries in the Medieval period, since the public could not possibly understand all the technical fine points. But what was worse, those who had to make the decisions usually could not spend as many hours on the subject as the experts who had years to study.

"Now, this insecurity is being compounded when political leaders become more and more conscious of the requirements of the day to day popularity. When I started out advising political leaders they would ask me what they should do. Today most candidates for office, if they ask my opinion, ask me what they should say. That is a big difference, because it leads to inherent insecurity, and it is one of the key challenges of our period, how to find leaders responsive to the public will, but with enough inward strength to go towards destinations that they must know better than those whom they lead there, and whose specific characteristic is the moral fibre to get from where they are to this uncertain future. All of this becomes even more complicated when, in many countries, including the United States, it is not just the practice of democracy in our country that becomes the principal objective, but the propagation of democracy in other societies. It is believed, one, that the spread of democracy automatically brings about universal peace; and two, that we know how to do this by the exercise of unilateral decisions; and three, that we can define what is democracy in radically different cultures. There's no question that we should have predilection for democracy. But there is a question, to what extent a nation can insist on the adoption of its institutions and value system, and above all, how to submit this issue to a standard in which the costs can be assessed?

"So, therefore, l'Ecole Polytechnique has raised an important topic, the most important topic of our period. Today at lunch I found myself in the strange position that I was more favourable to the principles of l'Ecole Polytechnique than almost anyone else in the room. I do believe that these problems require a kind of discipline, a kind of dedication, a kind of inward strength which can only be based on a selection and an experience in which, at an age when one can still be formative, when one can still be formed and when one can still reflect, one learns things one did not know one could do. I think this is the challenge of our period, the Post Cold War World is unknown to us, both in its institutions and internationally and domestically. To answer these questions will be the drama of our period. I thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak to you, and above all, in company I respect so greatly."

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Valéry Giscard d'Estaing

"I came in the United States in 1976 for the bicentennial of the independence. And I come back in 1994 for the bicentennial of l'Ecole Polytechnique. So, to paraphrase a famous line, 'If you have a bicentennial to commemorate, just whistle!'

"What the motion picture didn't show you is that to enter this school you have to go through intellectual exams. But also, physical tests, to test your physical abilities. You have to jump, to run, to swim. And the set of rules was established by - probably the general - was written in a curious way. You get points according to your performance. So, if you swim 100 metres in less than one minute you get to one point, in less than 50 seconds, two points, in less than 20 seconds, six points; and it is written if you dive, you will get an additional four points; and there's no connection between diving and swimming. So, when the candidates come for the exam they go to the swimming pool, and then the examiner asks them, do you know how to swim or not? If they say yes, they go inside and they swim and they get their notes. And if they don't know they go to the other side. And they just obey an order which is, go. And then they dive. And since they don't know how to swim it's a horrible spectacle because they have to be extracted from the water; and then they gain four points. And I think it's probably the most worthy points you can get in such an intellectual examination.

Well thank you Henry for opening the fire - I heard through Claude Bébéar that you are a consultant, but for me you're mostly a consulted person. I remember very well when I was elected at a young age, my first important foreign visitor was Henry. I was much impressed because I thought he will probably evaluate me and my experience, which was limited in foreign affairs and so I invited him for a breakfast at springtime in the "Roseraie de l'Elysée" (amongst the roses), because I thought it might mollify him! And since then we had a very close understanding when I was President, and friendship since. And I must say that probably never has the American-French relationship been better than during the time you were Secretary of State. And many of today's important problems and burning issues would have been addressed in a more expert and competent way if they were addressed by you (Henry Kissinger).

"I have to comment briefly (on) the question of representative democracy in the Post Cold War World. We were taken by surprise. The German reunification, the collapse of the Communist empire, was an unexpected event. I remember very well a conversation with my good friend, and a good friend of yours, Helmut Schmidt. I asked him, do you think that Germany will be reunited again? And he said to me in 1979: 'Yes, I think it will happen, but not in my lifetime'. So, the events were sudden and created a very strong commotion. In fact, we expected a different evolution; a reduction of armaments and probably a limitation armaments; a balance of power between East and West, and a lessening of tensions. And after that a gradual evolution of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union, more or less along the Hungarian type of evolution or the Polish type of evolution, but not the collapse of the Communist world and the Communist doctrine.

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leaders now, since those events, all of them have been in trouble. In Japan the liberal democratic party, in charge for more than 30 years, was expelled from power. In Italy yesterday the governing coalition of Socialist and Christian Democrat disappeared because the socialists didn't even have a single seat in the new Italian Parliament. And if you take the leaders of the UK, of France or Germany, either they lost elections or they have a very limited support in the polls. When you see such a global situation it means something is changing in the democratic process.

"Probably many of the problems were already in the making. But they were actually accelerated and accentuated by the end of the cold war. And like Henry, I would say that there are probably two major factors. The first one is the collapse or the fading away of the dominant ideologies of our time. Not only Communism on one side, but the group of the dominant ideologies. So, the democracies are living in a situation which is quite new for them, without adversary, but also without purpose. And this creates a sort of disorientation of the system. We have the vague concept that democracies can live just by themselves without having a clear purpose. But it didn't happen in the past. Democracies always had a main purpose. For instance, in the 18th century it was political freedom, and in the 19th century and the beginning of this one it was social justice. But if one asks, what is the real purpose of the democratic system at the moment, there is not a clear answer.

"The second factor is what I would call the instantaneity of the Democratic system. By comparison with a computing world we are living now in real time. There is an immediate reaction, an immediate choice, and not a delay in the democratic system. This is due not only to the media society but also the communication society, which leads us to a global political economy to global perceptions of situations, as you mentioned, for instance in Somalia. This creates a new position for the leaders of democratic societies. They work with the polls, they work with media consultants, and they are independent political entrepreneurs. They aren't people with programmes or projects, which they propose to people, but they react in real time to these short term events.

"The political parties which have been the main links in the past between citizens and government for the last two centuries, don't play this role anymore. If you look at the rejection of the dominating democratic parties in Japan and Italy, you have a sort of demonstration of this. And if you think that probably in the next european election, the Conservative Party of Britain will get not more than 15 seats out of the 87 allocated to the UK, it shows that their political system of parties doesn't work now in a very adequate way. The political parties used to express a choice between options; left and right; conservation or movement; academic progress or social improvement. But it seems that now in democracy the choice is a vertical one. It's a sort of vertical confrontation between the people and the ruling group, even when it is an elected ruling group. It's very clear, in France last year the vote was a vote of a rejection of the governing people of the past decade, and in Italy the vote yesterday was a rejection of the political parties from the left and from the right of the previous period. So, it's not the choice which is a classical instrument of democratic process, it's more now the rejection.

"In my remaining few minutes I would say that representative democracy must face three phenomena and address two shortcomings. The three phenomena are first, declining

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governability, which is the incapacity of political institutions to solve, or even to address, essential problems. There are two good examples of this, one of this side of the Atlantic, the problem of the American budget deficit during all the '80s period, which the political institutions were not able to address. And on the other side, our side, the unemployment in Europe, which the political institutions were not, and are still not, able to address. Probably it's due to an evolution of the democratic system in which the perception of a common goal or of a common interest for all people prevails less than the additions of factions, local interest, social benefits acquired by various groups. So, the idea that the democratic system was basically a way to impose the will of the whole society upon minority groups is probably less accepted now.

"The second point is the assertion of national or religious identities above the common democratic structure. We have the idea and we express it, that if we can hold elections some way it would solve the problems. It doesn't solve the problem anymore. When you take the case of Czechoslovakia, for instance, it was a democratic country with a single government and a democratic process, but the functioning of the process was such that at the end it led to the split of the country. And when you take the very difficult handling of the Bosnia situation, it's very clear that any democratic process going through the classical means of voting or electing people will not by itself solve the problem, because the national and religious identities go above the common democratic structure."

"The last element which is preoccupying is that any democratic society needs to have common values. At the moment people believe that they don't need to have common values, and everyone can have his own set of values. Of course, a democratic society doesn't require unanimity, but it requires the existence of an accepted set of common values. De Tocqueville in his famous work on democracy in America wrote: 'I will never admit that men constitute a social body because they obey the same head or the same laws. Democratic society can exist only when a great number of men consider a great number of things under the same aspect. When they hold the same opinions they can vote on many subjects. And the same occurrences will suggest the same thoughts and impressions to their minds'. I think the democratic system does suppose such a fabric of behaviour and now it will not develop that. But the attitude is to believe that any opinion is as valuable as any of the accepted common values. So one of the basic elements of democracy doesn't function well.

"So my conclusion is, that we must address two shortcomings. First, the process of selecting a country's leaders, and Henry addressed this point. Look at the volatility of opinion and see that the process of selection should be a rather stable one. Yesterday President Clinton, for instance, gained 10 points in polls because of his press conference. And the Prime Minister of France lost 10 points in polls because of a student unrest in one day. It shows that we have a volatility of public opinion which doesn't permit the slow process of selecting the most qualified or adequate leaders.

"Today we have a governing class which is not so much composed of people chosen by the others, which is the principle of democracy, but by professional politicians oriented towards a policy of superficial attractiveness. They are using their intellectual means or techniques to increase this kind of seduction which results in short term results and not long lasting achievements. The second shortcoming is the lack of interposition of a system of critical

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evaluation. In the democratic process which is in the end an act of judgement (the vote is a judgement), it is very important to have some system of critical evaluation that people can use to improve or to put some light into their own judgement. This is due to the fact that the written press has much less influence than before, and there are no such public debates. For instance, the Parliamentary debates are not creating this quality of critical evaluation that we should need to have a smooth functioning of the system.

"We have a situation in which the communication is enlarged to a greater number of people, which is certainly progress and an advance. But the substance of the communication is reduced to emotions and the instantaneous event. So, these are the problems I think we have to face and which means that certainly we're bound to see in our democratic institution, some strong commotions and requirements for improvements in the ten years to come."

## Comments from James Hoge

He said "Let me turn it on its head and suggest that the decline of political parties, and of power at the nation's state level, is not necessarily a bad thing, but just a reflection of the fact that there is a devolution in power, and in governments, going on in most of the Western world, where people are taking unto themselves power at the local level more than they used to. We're moving from a representative form of government to a more direct one that has both formal and informal processes of referendum, and this is not necessarily a bad thing. On the second point, the instantaneity of communications, and the pervasiveness particularly of broadcast, does this not result in a more informed public; and that, while it may have forced politicians into short term actions, can it not also restrain them from interventions, many of which have in the past proven to be disastrous."

"The last point I think I would make is that public opinion polls, or knowing what's on the public's mind, may again, not be at all a bad thing for those who govern. In a democracy if you can't develop a public constituency, or find one for what it is you want to do, you're most likely to fail. In other words, some of the changes that we see today have their pluses that perhaps we ought to mention, as well as some of the minuses that have surfaced."

"The devolution of power to a local level, does it not have good attributes? I would say yes, for those problems that need to be solved at local level. And certainly, the exercise of the local authority on those issues, is an expression of a kind of mass democracy that didn't exist, and it's undoubtedly helpful."

"We were talking about foreign policy. Foreign policy has to deal with a political unit. At this moment in the nation, it can change, it can be something else, but it will not be a local government. Therefore it has to reflect the values, or the interests of whatever you consider the accepted criteria of action of that unit: how do you form such an opinion? We in the

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United States, right now have the problem of North Korean nuclear weapons. This requires a knowledge of the facts, some concept of the options, some idea of possible historical evolution; will those nuclear weapons actually threaten the peace? All of these are conjectural elements, and the opinion cannot be formed on the local level. That is one issue. The second is when it is relatively easy on those issues to take some democratic position which is as unprovable as a more responsible position, and therefore generate some kind of a public debate. You're quite right, on some issues it would've been better if intervention had not taken place. On the other hand, can you gear all of national politics to avoidance -and one would also have to know what interventions you're talking about. In America this usually means the Vietnam War, but that was a long and complicated history that was in fact very popular when it happened, and so, public opinion would have been no restraint on it. As was the entry into Somalia, popular when it happened. The debate occurs when the consequences emerge.

"I think that the questions that were raised by Valéry about the disfunctions, of which I was most struck by the absence of an evaluating mechanism and of evaluating standards (so that there's nobody who says, this is just an argument you must not make) that this function seems to have disappeared from all of our societies. So I could not say that I believe that the fragmentation of the dialogue, the representation of that dialogue in pictures rather than in concepts, (so that on the day after you can't even tell exactly what it is that arose that created the emotion) that this is not a worrisome phenomenon for the future".

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing replied by saying that direct democracy had an enormous
advantage on the one hand, that is to prevent the leaders from confiscating the democratic
debates for themselves, which is a natural tendency for all leaders, because they think they
are better informed, better qualified, and so on. He continued by saying that the pressure of
direct democracy to take back the issues into the people's hands was something very positive.
He did not agree that judgement must be based on the immediate reaction of public opinion,
because, it needed an enormous investment, which could not be afforded.

James Hoge commented:

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pictures, it had been a restraining experience. Exactly the opposite, a longer lasting impact of television, were the pictures of the student revolts in Tiananmen Square, which to this day still reverberate in the public mind of America, and had a major effect on the emphasis that some put on human rights as a linked part of their economic relationship with China. He posed the problem, how do policy makers, how does the government, get control back these days in a media-porous world that's not going to become any less porous? What are some of the lessons that we have learned? Some policy makers might say, you have always to have a policy thought through and advocated so that there's not a vacuum, which sounded fine, but was that realistic under all circumstances? He asked for comments.

"You mentioned the role of the press. I am quite in favour of increasing (it doesn't depend entirely on us) the role of the written press. I think that for your actions, for everyone, memory is as important as intelligence. The media system doesn't provide people with memory, on the contrary, it's wiping out all the past all the time. You need to remember what happened, what the people did, what the people said, what were their actions before. We need to have a written text somewhere; it's very important, and it provides a delay for thinking and for analysing. About China, two days ago, there was a very good paper by Henry on human rights and the policy for China ... just below another article saying exactly the opposite. That's very good, because the people could form their judgement, and they could compare arguments and reasoning. I think to have debates is something which enlightens democracy; to have, for instance, this problem between human rights and the relationship with China, is very sophisticated. It goes back to the cultural traditions of China, to the perception by Chinese of the Western intervention in the past century, and also of the practical way they handle the problem of human rights. So you need to have a complex set of facts for that. I think, it's very important to have references for debating."

Henry Kissinger replied by saying that he agreed substantially with what Valéry had said. In Bosnia, before the crisis occurred, he did not believe that two percent of the American public knew where Bosnia was. He did not believe that today 10 percent of the American public had any idea of the history of Bosnia. For example, that it had never been a nation. They keep reading of aggression against a nation which was really an entity of the Yugoslav State which is composed of Serbs, Croats, and Moslems, who could not coexist in Yugoslavia, so why should it be surprising that they cannot coexist in Bosnia? That was no excuse for the crimes that are being committed there. But in order to form a judgement of whether American troops should go to Bosnia, one has to be able to educate the public, to some extent, why it should be important and precisely what the issue is. Because if that is known, it will be possible to measure the degree of American interest by the number of casualties that will evoke an American retreat ... People keep talking about intervention in Bosnia - one sees these horrible pictures - but it is rarely explained what exactly is the outcome that is supposed to be achieved.

China, is infinitely more complicated. Because first of all, you have what Valéry already mentioned, the history of China. The origin of Tiananmen Square is very rarely explained, that there were really two revolutions going on simultaneously, one by the students and one

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by workers; and the workers were not fighting for democracy, but against austerity. All of
this gets into a very complicated debate. It's a question of how can the United States affect
the political system of a society that has had an uninterrupted self-government for three
thousand years, of a billion 200 million people, and that has existed for most of its history
without precise advice from the United States? What exactly are we trying to achieve there?
You show a picture of Tiananmen Square and of course you are revolted by that one day's
event. It isn't a question whether you're for human rights or not, you have to explain what
it is. The print medium, to which Valéry referred, gives some hope that the various points
of view can be represented. The visual medium almost never has an historical background,
it doesn't have time for it, and it doesn't have enough people with competence in it, and
therefore, it tends to evoke demagogic responses; but what the solution is Henry Kissinger
did not know because, obviously, they will be heavily influenced by television and probably
much more so than by the print medium. But he could not have presented the point of view,
to which Valéry referred, on television. There would've been no time to present it in such
a coherent fashion.

**James Hoge** thanked the Former President, for 'plugging' foreign affairs. He said he would
have done it if the President had not. He said that he was pleased that both of them want to
revive the print press. Turning to the students, he introduced a rather intriguing question as
follows:

**Question**

He instanced the problem for Algeria. Probably the elections would have been won by the
fundamentalists, and then what. Raymond Aron expressed this in his sentence. He said,
'Democracy, is the only system whose principles are such that they prevent democracy to
protect itself.'

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ambiguous. You may hesitate to start the process, but if you proceed you must respect the result. Problems may occur in the Eastern European countries because some of them would probably return to power some Communist leaders because of frustration by their people. But if they did so, we must respect this, if the process was regular.

Turning to the question, the President said that his reaction was that, when the process started in Algeria, the result of the vote should have been respected. Then the people in charge would probably not have embarked on such a process, or announced in advance what principles would be respected. For instance, human rights, civil liberties, and international commitments. But, President d'Estaing emphasised that when a process is started the result must be accepted.

**James Hoge** invited Henry Kissinger to respond and also to the consider a further question which asked if we should have behaved as we did about the Algerian vote? Did it set a precedent for Eastern Europe? And also a further question, is entry into international organisations like NATO, the EC etc., going to be critical, whether democracy can flourish or not in East Central Europe?"

**Henry Kissinger** replied:

"With respect to Algeria I believe that, first of all, it's more a French problem than an American problem, and therefore I would have a tendency, as an American policy maker, to follow the French lead on Algeria. If it were judged that a fundamentalist regime in Algeria could be a threat to security in France and in Europe, then I would support an attempt to undo it. If that is not the case, then I think it would have been wiser to adopt a course of action which respected the democratic procedure. My impression is that the fundamentalists are actually regaining strength under present circumstances. But I repeat, I rarely look at Algeria, in my analogies of foreign policy. I would be heavily influenced, and I think American policy should be heavily influenced, by what France believes.

"Now, in Eastern Europe, I do not look at that exclusively or even primarily from the point of view of its domestic institution. I look at it from the point of view that one should not create a security vacuum between Germany and Russia which will tempt both Germany and Russia to deal with it unilaterally, if it is rejected by the international grouping. I'm struck by the fact that Chancellor Kohl, who is certainly the most pro-Western, pro-European Chancellor we will see in Germany, has offered to pay half of the expenses of Polish entry into NATO. Why? Because he knows that sooner or later if Poland is there by itself there will be temptations of a Russian-German arrangement. There will be temptations for Germany to look at the problem as a national issue. And so for all of these reasons, I think it has been a big mistake not to fill that security vacuum to some extent. Now, whether that means membership in NATO, if we had never put forward the partnership for peace for everybody and if we had said the partnership for peace applies only to Eastern Europe as a transitional step into NATO, I could have lived with this. But personally what I do not find tolerable is a situation in which we say that everything East of the German border is the same phenomenon. Poland and the former countries of the Soviet Union are all going to be lumped into the same institutions, and all might enter in NATO at some point, because if that concept is developed and Russia gets a veto of a membership in NATO, and an option on membership

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into NATO, the security problems of Eastern and Central Europe are no longer dealt with by NATO.

"I think it would have been wiser to find some arrangement which made it clear that NATO considers the security particularly of the belt between it and Russia, an element of its vital national interest. I would have compensated the Russians, if they needed compensation, by drawing them into other institutions of economic cooperation in which the question of security then did not arise so much. I think only secondarily would I look at this in terms of the particular institutions that exist in Eastern Europe."

**Valéry Giscard d'Estaing** asked if Henry thought that the automaticity of NATO, which was the key to the system, because there are alliances in which it is decided to support or not to support one of your partners, and you have automatic alliances in which, one attack vis-à-vis one of the members is an attack vis-à-vis of all the others, could be applied to the Eastern part of Europe, in which the situation is probably more volatile than it was in the Western part of Europe?

**Henry Kissinger** in reply said that in the end, any alliance only operates if it can create a consciousness of common interests. In 1936 when the Germans reoccupied the Rhineland, which really overthrew the Versailles Settlement and made Eastern Europe defenceless, President Roosevelt asked Secretary Howell what that meant. He should have said, this now means Eastern Europe is defenceless. But instead he listed all the treaties that Germany had broken going into the Rhineland, but he said that none of them were signed by the United States, and therefore the point was not a matter for America.

Could this same automaticity be created for an attack on Poland as it did on Germany? We had to remember there were many at the time of the Berlin crisis who were not all that convinced of the automaticity of the response over Berlin. Henry Kissinger thought it should be the objective of Western policy to make it very clear that military pressure against Poland would have the gravest consequences. Whether that is how automatically it can be made he was not sure. Because Poland was really the key country, Hungary and the Czech Republic are not because they would be more or less automatically protected. He believed we should create institutional links with Poland, as it is also in the long term interest of Russia, because in his view we cannot, affect the domestic evolution in Russia significantly, but we could affect the written Russian history, and remove Russian temptation to use military pressure beyond its borders. For all of those reasons he thought we had not done enough.

**Valéry Giscard d'Estaing**, when asked for his final comment, posed the question:

**Henry Kissinger** said that the fact that you cannot answer every problem does not mean that you should not solve some problems. He pointed out that Poland had been part of the West, compared with Ukraine which had rarely been a state. The independence of Ukraine was very important for the security of Europe, but he would not extend the military guarantee there, but would make sure that Russia would pay a heavy price politically and economically

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for military pressures against the Ukraine.

"Gentlemen, in this single super power world, what value do you think representative democracy has to a country when the United States can, through the International Monetary Fund, dictate its fiscal policies? When the U.S. Treasury Department can dictate its monetary policies, its exchange rate policies, its straight policies, even down to the detail of determining how many Motorola cellular telephones they must buy from us? And also the American Congress and the American President can dictate the cultural and social policies of a country? After Uncle Sam, or maybe I should say the Emperor Samuel, decides all these policies, what's left for the people of a country to decide for themselves through their representative democracy ?"

### Henry Kissinger

"First of all, you are assuming a clarity of objectives in American government, the absence of which I have consistently deplored. Secondly, the United States has not been spectacularly successful in opening up Japan with all the tools that you described at its disposal, although, surely the United States has in many institutions a preponderant influence. But the results of these pressures, especially against significant economic powers, have proved to be not very effective. So, I think theoretically you may have a point, that the basic problem of the United States is to understand that what we consider universal values are considered by other nations an intrusion into their domestic affairs. And how to balance this in a new world when the ideological conflict has largely disappeared? That is the problem for the next phase of American foreign policy."

### Question

"The world just described was one in which the motive and emotional matters seem to be reactions and are what determines policy; by which there is a method by which most information is presented viscerally, and it does not discriminate the value in which an elite in fact says we can work with whoever the leader will be, and in effect minorities become majorities that rule. Did not this leave us open to a kind of fascism which can in effect destroy the very roots of democracy? If so, what are the institutional safeguards which any democracy needs to have in place to deal with the world that had just been described?"

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how to address this problem? Because we have a rise of some sort of fascism in the world of today and it's on the increase. Emotion can lead people to rapid or excessive reactions, and he thought that the first element was for the democratic leaders to be very careful about the democratic process. Not to use it for themselves in a too emotional a way, because if they do, it can be used by others in the opposite sense. Referenda could be used, but in a very selected and sophisticated way, on issues on which people have the right to speak, but not to determine the future, the fate of a country, or of a group. He thought also that we must limit or restrict the increase of power of the executive. It seems that in the relationship between the executive and representative democracy, the representative democracy is losing ground and the executive is increasing at present. Also the power of the executive branch is increasing. It might be a danger, because if this power is overtaken by a minority group or by an extremist group, then you would have total power.

He stated that we must certainly try to balance our systems in a very careful way. It's the reason for which in Europe for instance people were in favour of the subsidiarity principle; to keep the maximum questions at the level of local authorities, or member states, and not to give all the power to the top. He shared the anxieties, which meant that the progress of democracy will not come easily by itself, which has to be kept in mind in the years to come.

## Question

"The spread of democracy to many places around the world has, for the most part, been accompanied by the spread of capitalism. In most cases, the pent up desire for capitalism, for economic and financial advancement, has been one of the primary causes of the spread of democracy. The question is what do you see as the major economic and financial implications of the kind of things that have been talked about today? With the spread of democracy, as well as the difficulties in governing or in executing foreign policy, the basic question is, what are the economic and the financial implications for the developed world, as well as for the developing or emerging market world, bearing in mind the new voices that are being heard, the new technology, instantaneous information and also governing by impression and emotion."

**Henry Kissinger** joked that this was a question for a former finance minister! He said as he understood the question it was that experience had shown that the desire for economic progress produced by capitalism was one of the prime causes for democratisation around the world. What were the implications of this, especially in the developing countries; what financial and economic policies were most likely to spread democracy?

**Valéry Giscard d'Estaing** replied that he was not convinced that there was such a link between democracy and financial or economic policy. He was not sure. He went on:

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debate between the Soviet way and the Chinese way, in fact, that countries who have at the moment the fastest economic growth may enjoy limited democracy. For instance if you take, China it is well known, but Hong Kong is the same. So, if you introduce the whole democratic process I'm not sure it will make easier economic development, but by itself it's a goal for the people, for their freedom, freedom of choice, of vote and all that".

**Henry Kissinger** replied:

"I believe we are looking at a long term problem. Without any question what you've described, or what has been described here, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the emergence of China, the comparative reduction in influence of the United States over an historic period, all of these would produce enormous dislocations in any system; but the problem is how our political system can generate a vision of the future, and the ability to get there. Historically there have emerged great leaders, Roosevelt, de Gaulle, Churchill. But this was made possible by the system. Not easy, but possible by the system. Under present circumstances I believe that the political systems and the means by which we now communicate with each other produces an almost institutionalised insecurity in the top leaders. One can observe this around the world."

"Now, having said all of this, I don't have an answer. What will probably happen is if the problems do not get solved, if the political systems do not deal with, say, unemployment in Europe, or the crises here, that there will be a demand for a kind of demagogic leadership that I would probably deeply regret. And in this sense there may be a trend towards a kind of fascism, which one has to remember was extremely popular in the 20's and 30's."

"That is my fear that a kind of Caesarism will develop when the problems turn out to be not solved, and when the apparent solutions turn out to be empty in a very brief period of time. I hope that I am wrong."

**Valéry Giscard d'Estaing** had the same view. He said:

"I think it is a long term, and a lasting problem, and one which we will have to address in all of our countries, even in the United States. Because our way of using democracy was adapted, as I mentioned earlier, to goals which were not the main goals of today. It was political freedom - we now have it. And it was social equality, or the end of the excessive privileges in the 19th century - we did it more or less. We do not know how to address a society composed of divided and antagonistic groups. We know that we cannot do this just

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And finally, James Hoge asked the audience to join him in thanking two outstanding Statesmen very much for sharing their views.

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