liberation movements, namely, the
MPLA, currently installed in power by
the Soviet Union, and the FNLA.

**Mr. Brown:** In other words, you were not just an exile movement. You were a movement within the country all through this period. You were in a struggle against colonialism.

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes. In fact, this is the reason why our founding leaders of UNITA, especially Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, who at one time was the foreign secretary of the FNLA, broke away from this organization which did not believe in leading the struggle from within the country, suffering with the population, struggling with the population.

**Mr. Brown:** At one time Mr. Savimbi was in this same organization that you mention—FNLA—with Holden Roberto?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes. Historical, political and other reasons led to the creation of these various national liberation movements at one time or another. Portuguese colonial rule was very restrictive, and did not permit the free movement of people within the country of Angola. You had to have a travel document in order to move from one village to the next.

**Mr. Brown:** How long was Angola under the occupation of Portugal?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Angola was first discovered by the Portuguese in 1492.

But Angola did not really become a true Portuguese colony until the late 19th century, since there has always been resistance by the local people, by the Africans themselves, to submit to Portuguese domination. The wars of occupation lasted until 1913 and later. In the beginning, the Portuguese settlers had to confine themselves along the coast to some small trading posts. But once the colonial administration operators were entrenched in place, their many repressive restrictions prevented much movement of the people. Education was severely limited. I think the Portuguese understood from the beginning that, as soon as they taught Africans to read and write, the sooner they would be able to read the universal declaration of human rights and revolt against the Portuguese colonial rule. So we can see that there were these restrictions, and it was not possible for the Angolans in the Center or South to communicate with the Angolans in the North or vice versa although the national liberation sentiment was already evident among the Angolan population where there was so much suffering. You could see that when the armed struggle broke out in the Northern part in 1961.

**Mr. Brown:** But isn't it true that during the colonial occupation by Portuguese there was, according to the Portuguese, a high degree of assimilation?

**Mr. Chitunda:** It was a unique

experience of the Portuguese colonial rule, different from the British colonial rule. The Portuguese would not allow much education for the Angolans, but, for those who managed to struggle and get some education, the Portuguese would embrace them and bring them over to their side, thereby separating them from the vast masses of the African population, and transforming them into "Black Portuguese."

**Mr. Brown:** In order to use them for their own purposes?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Absolutely. The "Black Portuguese" elite was naturally created to serve Portuguese colonial interests. The influence of these intellectual Africans, their influence over the vast masses of illiterate Africans could have accelerated these very processes of national liberation which turned out to be inevitable.

**Mr. Brown:** Would you say, however, that in the struggle that began in 1961 there were quite a number of intellectuals who led the fight for independence?

**Mr. Chitunda:** On the part of the MPLA, which was the movement dominated by the intellectuals, by the assimilados...

**Mr. Brown:** The MPLA is now the party in power in Luanda?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes. It is most important to see quite clearly how this movement which was dominated by the assimilados—the Black Portuguese

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October 1980

No. 10

2

—did not, from the beginning, satisfy the aspirations of the overwhelming masses of these oppressed Angolans. The major fighting force during all the years of the anticolonial struggle consisted of the vast peasant population of the countryside. They were very much alienated from the intellectual assimilado elite of the MPLA.

**Mr. Brown:** Would you say that one of the main differences between UNITA and MPLA—which is, roughly translated, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola—would you say the main difference is precisely that the movement of MPLA is led by what you call the *assimilados*?

**Mr. Chitunda:** The first difference was the fact that it was a movement based outside. It was a movement based in Portugal or in the neighboring African countries. Second, it was a movement that believed too strongly in a foreign ideology. Some MPLA leaders, including Agostinho Neto himself, served jail terms in Portugal not because of their commitment to the Angolan national liberation struggle but rather due to their being members of the Communist Party in Portugal in the underground during the years of the Salazar dictatorship. The MPLA was an organization relying heavily on Soviet ideological orientation—at a time when we understood clearly that Angola had its own unique conditions. The process of national liberation had to be based on these conditions and the leadership should not alienate the overwhelming population from the countryside, as opposed to what the MPLA was doing in depending too heavily on the urban proletarian groups. Let me illustrate MPLA's heavy dependence on foreign ideological orientation. In 1967, to illustrate the heavy handedness of the Soviet Union in the MPLA, when President Savimbi went to the Soviet Union to seek assistance, he was told by the Soviet leaders that they would not help him if he did not accept the vice presidency of the MPLA under Agostinho Neto's leadership; Neto was the former president of the MPLA.

**Mr. Brown:** And died some time ago.

**Mr. Chitunda:** He died in September 1979 in Moscow. It is amazing that at that time, 1967, the Soviets had already arrogated to themselves the right to pick the vice president of an Angolan national liberation movement.

**Mr. Brown:** Let's make that clear. You were not opposed to getting aid from the Soviet Union, but what you opposed was their attempt to intervene in your internal affairs.

**Mr. Chitunda:** No, we were struggling for our freedom, for the freedom of our country. In spite of UNITA's early practice of self-sufficiency and self-reliance, there was an immediate need to count on the sympathy, support and friendship of all countries in the world—without accepting their domination. Thus UNITA never had Soviet support.

**Mr. Brown:** Without accepting foreign domination which meant, in the case of the Soviet Union, rejecting any form of a totalitarian ideology?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Absolutely.

Dr. Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA.

**Mr. Brown:** In other words, the UNITA movement, according to you, differed primarily on the basis of the fact that you were working inside the country, and the others were an exile movement and were related to a foreign ideology. But what you also say is that your movement, as distinct from the MPLA, really had a closer relationship with the masses of people. That's what I meant about the difference in the leadership of your organization.

**Mr. Chitunda:** Certainly. The MPLA alienated itself from these masses even in their attempt to do

some work within the country. Even culturally there were clear differences. Most MPLA leaders do not speak any African languages. They speak only Portuguese. Most of them were assimilados in the very strong sense of the word. The Angolan population, where 95 percent speak only their own African language, have always wanted to relate themselves to their leadership in the country. Now it was not fair for an MPLA African leader to address the Angolan population in a foreign language, Portuguese at that time, through an interpreter. This did not happen with the UNITA leadership or UNITA cadres. They are proud of their cultural heritage, they speak the language of the population, of which in fact they are a part, they believe in the contribution of the population to the struggle, and this is what has earned UNITA such a vast base of popular support. This was very obvious in 1975, as soon as Portuguese colonialism was to end. After April 1974, when Portugal had changed its own regime and the new regime in Portugal was willing to talk with the National Liberation Movements in Angola and negotiate the cessation of hostilities and put an end to colonialism, UNITA was the organization which spearheaded a reconciliation of these three antagonistic Angolan movements. President Jonas Savimbi took a very active role and initiative. He was the dynamic element, the main force that made it possible for these liberation movements to get together in late 1974 and go to Portugal to negotiate with the Portuguese government the terms of the transfer of power from the Portuguese colonial rule to the Angolans themselves.

**Mr. Brown:** In other words, you're saying that your President, Mr. Savimbi, was the dynamic force seeking a form of unity of all the liberation movements—which you do not have today.

**Mr. Chitunda:** He was the champion of a reconciliation process which brought these liberation movements together for the first time and made possible negotiations with Portugal. This was widely recognized all over Africa, and it simply increased dramatically and tremendously the popularity of UNITA.

**Mr. Brown:** What happened? Who was responsible for breaking it up?

**Mr. Chitunda:** It happened right after the summit conference in Alvor, which is the small town in Portugal where the negotiations between UNITA and MPLA and FNLA, on one side, and Portugal, on the other, took place in January 1975. Here it was agreed to set the date for independence of An-

3

gola, November 11, 1975. In order to assure a smooth transition, a transitional government made up of representatives of Portugal and the three liberation movements should be installed to organize elections. Free elections were to be held in Angola prior to the November 11 date.

**Mr. Brown:** Did this ever come about?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Unfortunately, no. As early as February or March 1975, as soon as the Soviets sensed that their client organization, the MPLA, would not win the election—and I would like to point out that at this time polls had already been taken by neutral observers and by the Portuguese which indicated that, if the free elections were held in Angola, UNITA could have won by 45 percent, as opposed to 20 percent for the MPLA and 25 percent for the FNLA—

**Mr. Brown:** FNLA was the organization led by Holden Roberto.

**Mr. Chitunda:** Polls taken in April again indicated that UNITA had more popular support than the other two liberation movements put together. I think it was exactly in the light of such statistical realities that the Soviet Union decided to choose the bullet instead of the ballot in order to put the MPLA in power. So, as early as March 1975, we started seeing Cuban elements. Cubans were already training at a very accelerated rate to join the MPLA forces. Cuban forces started arriving in very large numbers by June 1975. By early September, we could count some 7,000 to 8,000 Cubans in the country. They were already engaged in fighting.

**Mr. Brown:** Would you say that the present regime could not remain in power without the support that they received from the outside?

**Mr. Chitunda:** I think it was very obvious from the start of 1975, the Cubans overwhelmingly tilted the scale of the conflict. They installed the MPLA in power in November.

**Mr. Brown:** Well, let me ask you a question. Isn't it true, however, even before the Cubans came in that elements in the Portuguese army at that time were pretty left wing and also played a role later in the attempt to take power in Portugal itself?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes.

**Mr. Brown:** Isn't it true that, to a large extent, the Portuguese military leaders in Angola gave support to the MPLA?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes, but what was most significant was the relationship between Portugal and the Soviet Union. At that time, Portugal was being governed by staunch pro-Soviet ele-

ments who had just taken over in the April 1974 coup in Portugal. So there was a strong leftist control of the military. There was no civilian rule as yet.

**Mr. Brown:** But wasn't that especially true of the military leaders in Portugal itself? In Angola itself?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes, but there was no really Portuguese military or civilian leadership during the phase of the transition. The events were being coordinated and led almost directly from Portugal. The Portuguese High Commissioner in Angola tried to play an impartial role, but was by-passed by the Lisbon officials who dealt directly with the MPLA. Portugal had a heavy hand in the affairs of Angola. It was obvious. In July 1975, for example, as a Minister of the Transitional Government, I visited Lisbon, and met the then Portuguese Prime Minister, General Vasco Gonçalves. He told me very straightforwardly that he was not at all impressed by UNITA's appeal for the cessation of hostilities in Angola, and the reconciliation of the three liberation movements, UNITA, MPLA, FNLA. He said that to recognize the FNLA, an organization that they, the radical Portuguese leftists, considered to be strongly reactionary was a betrayal of their revolutionary principles and duties. He told me they could accept the idea of reconciling MPLA and UNITA, but not MPLA and FNLA. Therefore, since the revolution in Portugal would depend very strongly on the success of the revolution in Angola, it was their duty to insure in Angola the installation of a really "progressive" regime. So they were doing everything they could to make it easy for MPLA, against the majority of the Angolan people. Thus the Portuguese Communists, under the Soviet diktat, were arrogating to themselves the right to determine which Angolans should reconcile with other Angolans, or which segment of the Angolan population should annihilate the other!

**Mr. Brown:** In other words, the actual Portuguese military leadership which was left wing, pro-communist, was already representing, or in a certain sense acting as agents for, the Soviet interests and the Soviet ideology?

**Mr. Chitunda:** It was, Mr. Brown, fully committed to the Soviet ideology.

**Mr. Brown:** And, therefore, when the Cubans came in, it was a continuation of what had already begun in Portugal and Angola through pro-communist leadership in the government of Portugal which also had leadership of the armies of Portugal in Angola itself?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes.

**Mr. Brown:** This development was

then carried on, and reinforced by, the introduction of Cuban troops, and Soviet support and now, I understand also from East Germany.

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes. Popular support in Angola for UNITA was manifest as early as the year 1975 and throughout the 1975 civil war. This was due first to the fact that, throughout the years of Portuguese struggle, UNITA was not a newcomer, as were the MPLA and FNLA leadership. Secondly, it was the commitment of UNITA to insure peace to the population of all Angola. The people of Angola were tired of fighting. They wanted, after the end of Portuguese colonial rule, to have peace, to have dignity, and to get on with the task of national construction. They saw UNITA as appealing very strongly toward that goal. So this, too, earned a lot of sympathy of the Angolan people for UNITA, but things didn't work out. We did not have unity. We had to continue the struggle because, after massive foreign intervention, we lost the civil war in 1975. By February 1976, we finally lost all the cities that were under our control, we lost them to the Soviets and the Cubans and to the MPLA. The MPLA gained diplomatic recognition from many countries throughout the world but we did not give up our commitment to justice and freedom in Angola. This is why UNITA simply had to retreat back into the countryside and reorganize its current phase of resist-

4

A mass rally of UNITA supporters.

ance to the new Soviet and Cuban
domination. It is important to point out
that there are at the present moment
40,000 Cubans in Angola, as com-
pared to the 12,000 to 15,000 in 1975
which installed the MPLA in power.
There are three times as many Cubans
now as there were during the 1975
war.

**Mr. Brown:** Since you say that you represent a great bulk of the masses, most of the masses, inside Angola, what role did the Organization for African Unity play? After all, they are the representative organization for all the African countries. Did they play any role at all?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes. We can see that in 1975, due to the massive presence of these forces, the OAU tried to mediate and play a role to reconcile these factions in Angola. The OAU sent a reconciliation commission in August 1975. Rather than underline the failure of the OAU to bring about peace in Angola, we should emphasize that they, too, the OAU, pointed out once again the popular support in Angola for UNITA. In their report, they said, if an election were held, as much as 60 percent of the population would vote for UNITA.

**Mr. Brown:** Did the OAU commission make any recommendation in order to bring about reconciliation?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Whatever recommendation it tried to make, and I really don't recall details, the situation was

totally overwhelmed by the state of
war which was in full swing through-
out the country. So the outcome of the
war was pretty much going to dictate
whatever decisions other international
organizations might take. In early Jan-
uary 1976, the OAU met again in
Addis Ababa. It decided, among other
things, that all foreign forces should
leave Angola. Cubans, Russians and
South Africans at that time were among
the foreign forces invading Angola. It
was very significant. Unfortunately,
the events in Angola already tran-
scended the Africans' ability to bring
about an African solution to the prob-
lem of Angola or to the problems of
Africa. This is significant in that the
internationalization of the Angolan
conflict transformed the Angolan situ-
ation into a problem of the world.

**Mr. Brown:** I think the very important point is that the African organization itself was bypassed by events and by these external forces. I believe they had recommended some formula to bring about a coalition government with the three movements. Is that true?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Well, they tried to support such an approach, but it failed.

**Mr. Brown:** But isn't it true that Savimbi did not oppose this?

**Mr. Chitunda:** No, we did not
oppose this. Savimbi has always stood
for a government of national unity.

**Mr. Brown:** But who blocked that
coalition?

**Mr. Chitunda:** The MPLA could

not go for such a coalition. The Soviets
do not believe in sharing power, even
if the democratic framework appeared
to be the only acceptable formula for
Angola's peace and stability.

**Mr. Brown:** They refused?

**Mr. Chitunda:** The MPLA and the
Soviets did not want to share power.
They expressed in the very beginning
their interest to exclude all nationalist
movements in the governing of the
country. They opposed the sharing of
power and they have sought every
avenue to impose themselves.

**Mr. Brown:** In other words, the OAU, the organization of the Africans themselves, was powerless to do anything about the Angolan situation because of the outside forces, mainly from the Soviet Union?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes.

**Mr. Brown:** Would you say that because of that situation they found it impossible to bring about a possible unity or coalition government which Savimbi advocated? I think that's extremely important.

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes. But I would like to point out that shortly after the OAU decision to condemn the presence of all foreign forces in Angola in January 1976, the South African forces, encouraged also by the West, withdrew from Angola. So, by March 1976, there was not a single South African soldier on Angolan soil. The Cuban forces had tripled, however. Now, if the OAU in Africa had been able to influence events, the Cubans could have been forced to abide by an OAU decision. They were not because they obeyed other outside forces.

**Mr. Brown:** Now I think you have established very clearly that the Organization of African Unity, the Africans themselves, were prevented from acting by this external force, which was not only an external force but also representative of a totalitarian ideology. Now you have mentioned in this connection the South African force as one of the external forces. I would like to ask you to answer as frankly and honestly as you can the charge that has been made that UNITA, as led by Mr. Savimbi, has been supported by the South African regime and that you have received aid and assistance from them. This has been criticized by certain of your African colleagues in Africa itself. I think it is important for you to clarify this question, since it has been one of the points used by some of our African friends to justify their opposition to UNITA.

**Mr. Chitunda:** The South African intervention in 1975 was totally beyond the control of UNITA. South Africa was not invited by UNITA to come into Angola. South Africa was not in An-

5

A house in the town of Cuangar (Cuando-Cubango Province) with an inscription on its wall: Forward with the Cuban people who are fighting for the liberation of the people of Angola. This photo was taken in May 1979

gola in our behalf. So many factors compelled South Africa to point its guns at the very same targets as ours during the 1975 civil war. South Africa came to Angola, invited by Western powers. The Western powers didn't really have to be accountable to UNITA at all. They had made their decision to ask South Africa to go into Angola to fight the Cubans, so South Africa did. It was also in South Africa's own interest to flex her muscle at Communist aggression in a neighboring country. Later Western orders were to force South Africans to get out of Angola. So South Africans did.

**Mr. Brown:** You're saying South Africa came as a result of their own decision and left when the Western powers brought pressure on them to leave. But did they or did you at any time have a close relationship in terms of assistance or aid for your fighting forces?

**Mr. Chitunda:** We never sought aid from South Africa. The South African forces during the intervention in Angola never fought with our men, never fought with our people. It is also good to point out that South Africans never fought a battle directly with the Cubans. The Cubans fled when the South Africans approached. We fought with our own funds, with our own re-

sources, with our own means, and it is true that during the Angolan civil war in 1975 we were not short of material means—not enough but not short. We had a few friends who managed to help us. There was a brief period of covert aid from the United States. It is not a secret. It was not enough to make us win the war, but it was enough to keep our forces, during that brief period, committed to our struggle. As of now, since early 1976, the relationship of South Africa to all Africans, especially the Black African countries and organizations, is something delicate that requires realism, objectivity, and correct analysis. You remember that, in April 1980, the Black African countries, especially those so-called Front-Line States met in Lusaka to discuss ways and means to break away from their economic dependence on South Africa. At the end of their discussion, they concluded that it was not possible for these countries to break away or to do without their South African assistance. It is also obvious that the railroads, ports, etc. from Mozambique could not function without the presence and assistance from South Africa.

**Mr. Brown:** Which continues to this day?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes, at an increas-

ing rate. It is also true that this economic relationship with South Africa on the part of many of these Southern African countries is dictated by the needs of these African countries more than that of South Africa. Still a few weeks ago, when President Machel of Mozambique visited in Zimbabwe, again this issue was included in the discussions. Machel and Mugabe discussed ways and means to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa, but there were no new formulas.

**Mr. Brown:** It would be rather difficult for Machel or Mozambique to survive without the gold from South Africa.

**Mr. Chitunda:** Certainly, and there is more. In 1977, the MPLA, with the Soviet-Cuban military assistance in Angola, nationalized the assets of the Angolan diamond company. In doing so, the MPLA nationalized all the shares belonging to private holders except those of South Africa's De Beers corporation. The South African De Beers corporation retains the pre-rogative and the privilege to have it private shares in the "progressive" Soviet regime in Angola. Also, the MPLA has expelled most Portuguese mining engineers and geologists from this Angolan diamond mine operation. At the

6

same time, the MPLA has hired 26 South African geologists and engineers who are now running that operation in the Lunda Province (Angola). Moreover, in early February 1979, a South African delegation was invited by the MPLA government officials to go and inspect the Benguela railway line, and South African assistance was sought to repair this railway line and put it into operation. Finally, we are aware of MPLA's increasing import of foodstuff and spare parts from South Africa, especially over the last ten months. On all such products the labels are removed to avoid embarrassment.

**Mr. Brown:** In other words, you would say that the Soviet-supported regime in Luanda, in Angola, today is really the one that has strong economic relationships with South Africa?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes.

**Mr. Brown:** Which is also true to some extent of Mozambique?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes. Even more so of Mozambique and of other countries in the area. Some of these countries have already been independent for 15 or 20 years and are still working out their own way toward economic independence; in the meantime, they trade with South Africa. It does not affect Africa's determination to fight against apartheid. Our organization struggles on the basis of principles of self-sufficiency and self-reliance depending essentially on resources within Angola, but we do have a border with Namibia, which is South African-controlled. The populations in the southern part of Angola are UNITA people, and they are the same ethnic group as the population in the northern part of Namibia...

**Mr. Brown:** You mean the same South African group...?

**Mr. Chitunda:** This border cuts across an ethnic group that belongs to Angola and Namibia at the same time. So our populations have to find their own means of survival. They grow their own food; they have their own elephant tusks to sell. We have diamonds to sell, things like that. But there are products they need to buy from foreign markets, such as salt, sugar, medicine, other things. Now, if these things are not available in the Angolan so-called "people" shops, the shops run by the MPLA which are empty most of the time, then the people have no scruples about crossing the border to get the products wanted — in Zaire, Zambia, Namibia or South Africa. It is a simple thing with us. If we can find such products in the Namibia market, or any other country in the area, we are going to buy them. We are not getting hand-

outs from South Africa. It is an inescapable geopolitical and economic reality.

**Mr. Brown:** In other words, your answer to this question about cooperating closely with the South African regime is that it is the official regime of Luanda and other African regimes like Mozambique which, without this aid, would be in serious economic trouble, more trouble than they are at the present time even with that economic relationship.

Now, let us turn this question to relationships between the United States and the western world. What is our interest in this problem? What does it mean in the larger political, international sense for the United States?

**Mr. Chitunda:** I would like to say that Angola with such a massive Cuban presence has already become Russia's most powerful base of aggression and expansion in the African continent. The destabilizing factor caused by this presence of Russia and Cuba in Angola is very strong. All the neighboring countries, the entire African continent are affected by so many recent events linked to Angola. There is, for one, the invasion of Zaire, twice, by forces who were trained, organized and led from Soviet-Cuban bases in Angola, first in 1977 and then in 1978. The Soviet installation in the Horn of Africa, in Ethiopia in 1977, was made possible by airlifting equipment and personnel facilities from Soviet and Cuban bases in Angola.

**Mr. Brown:** You're saying it has strategic significance.

**Mr. Chitunda:** I would like to point out the historical and political significance of this. The use of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and, more recently, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—all these were encouraged by events in Angola. On the other hand, the Soviets seek economic advantages in Angola and the region. Angola like most other countries in Southern Africa is very rich in strategic minerals. There are copper, uranium which is indispensable for most nuclear weapons, basic raw materials. There are iron, zinc, lead, phosphate. Angola has 10 percent of the world's reserves of diamonds. It has vast resources in oil. All these are important for Russia which faces some shortage of these raw materials in the future. Strategically, Angola's significance in relation to oil shipping sea lanes should not be underestimated. Two-thirds of the oil to the West comes from the Gulf States and has to go through the Strait of Madagascar, which is between Mozambique and Madagascar, then around the Cape,

on to the Atlantic Ocean off the West Coast of Africa, and, finally, to the West. The Soviets already have a position of strength on this East Coast of Africa on the Strait of Madagascar because Madagascar and Mozambique are already pro-Soviet regimes. So the Soviets already have a link there through which they can influence the security of this vital sea route that brings oil to the West. The Soviets are accelerating their building of naval bases in Angola. When they do that, they will succeed in controlling these vital sea lanes that bring oil to the West. So the Soviets see the strategic, economic and political significance of Angola.

**Mr. Brown:** In other words, strategic, economic and military...

**Mr. Chitunda:** The Soviets are committed to achieve their objectives, militarily if necessary. In other words, we should not expect them to accept a political or effective democratic solution to Southern Africa's problems unless it is in the Soviet's immediate interests. That is why we have accepted the Soviet military challenge which they have already imposed on us in Angola. The West should see its vital interests at stake in Angola.

**Mr. Brown:** We should be concerned because of our strategic, economic and military interests. But let me ask you this. Shouldn't your African friends in other governments in Africa be concerned about this question, and are they? What should the United States do, and can we do anything if the rest of Africa is not concerned?

**Mr. Chitunda:** We Angolans understand quite well that the economic progress of our country has to be considered within the framework of the free world, of the West. Our country has always shown a yearning for freedom, for sound economic policies. On the other hand, we perceive that the problem of Angola is not just a national one, it is an international one. It requires understanding and cooperation from the international community; it requires understanding and cooperation from the countries that share the same values of human liberties and freedom. At the same time, the developed countries in the West have a lot at stake. It is their interests that are threatened. The Soviets want to strangle the West.

**Mr. Brown:** I understand, the United States or the West is not going to be able to cope with this problem if all of Africa is opposed to our doing something, as you are suggesting. So perhaps you ought to elaborate a bit on your relations with the rest of Africa

7

and what Africa thinks about this question?

**Mr. Chitunda:** I think the resistance to Soviet-Cuban expansionism in Africa is a very strong element that today unifies more countries than you may probably think of.

**Mr. Brown:** In other words, you feel that this is growing?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Absolutely. We believe that because of the insecurity that Cuban expedition forces have already introduced into the region, especially after the invasions of Zaire, the awareness of African heads of state has increased severalfold concerning the importance of our struggle in Angola. Through 1976-1977, our resistance was pretty much isolated; there were probably two or three African countries who had sympathy for our cause. But after they realized that the presence of Cuba and Russia was a threat to the survival of their national independence, and with the invasion of Shaba, most of these countries changed their positions. Today, more than one-half of the African countries are again open to us. Some of these countries are actively engaged in helping us materially. Others are helping us politically and diplomatically. It represents a very impressive turning point in the awareness of all African countries to the danger of Soviet-Cuban expansionism.

**Mr. Brown:** There is a growing awareness of the Soviet threat and

therefore also a growing appreciation of what you people are doing. If the United States or some western powers should decide to pursue an active policy to assist movements like yours, what would be the reaction in Africa? Would they talk about Soviet and American intervention? Most of these countries consider themselves non-aligned, and we have seen how non-alignment has been used in many cases to support Soviet intervention.

**Mr. Chitunda:** When speaking of non-alignment—indeed perhaps only two countries in the world are really non-aligned, the United States and the Soviet Union—but all other countries have to choose or have to define their positions.

**Mr. Brown:** Yes, I understand that is your opinion. But suppose that, on the basis of the case you have made for the strategic significance of your area and of Africa itself in terms of sea lanes, there was some decision to go back to try to do what we did for a certain period of time and then backed away from, what would happen in terms of the reaction of the other African countries?

**Mr. Chitunda:** I think unless there is a positive policy, a positive stand, on the part of all countries in the world who would like to help bring about a just and lasting solution on the Angolan problem—and that includes the United States and other powerful countries—there would be

fear of deception for many of these African countries. Many of these countries, if they were sure that there would be a very positive action taken by countries outside of Africa to help the situation, would not then worry about immediately voicing their support for such an action. But, of course, most of the moderates in many of these African countries are caught in a dilemma, seeing the role of the Soviet Union everywhere, threatening, disruptive, subversive, throughout the continent. And what do most of these leaders do, if they cannot lick or effectively resist Soviet expansionism? They join it—they dance to the Soviet music to appease the beast. To most of these countries, to accept aid from the United States, they fear might provoke Soviet hostility toward them, unless they are assured through deeds that the United States is a good ally to rely on in a time of crisis.

**Mr. Brown:** What you are saying is that what is needed is a total positive policy, one which would include not only material assistance but an effort to arrive at a political solution—for example, by going back to the proposal which Savimi has always supported of bringing together some kind of coalition or transition for the holding of free elections. Let the people decide. In other words, the West and the United States should endorse a policy which involves not only economic and military assistance for your movement but also a political policy—a policy that tries to bring about a solution based upon the voice of the people of the individual nations involved.

**Mr. Chitunda:** In fact, Mr. Brown, military assistance would not be essential. The United States need not intervene militarily in order to bring about a just peace. But a consistent political and diplomatic stand of leadership on the part of the United States is desperately needed in order to encourage moderate and democratic forces to increase their efforts for the just cause—ultimate guarantee to the triumph of freedom and democracy.

**Mr. Brown:** But we also have to get the support of our allies in Europe and many of the nations of the Third World. We would have to bring about a policy endorsed by peoples and nations throughout the world. We could then deal more diligently and more effectively in such bodies as the United Nations. You are not seeking purely military or economic assistance but mainly a political arrangement, which means a diplomatic and international solution, which would prevent the continuation of this interference by the Soviet powers that you have pointed out is a threat to the strategic and eco-

Items captured in combat by UNITA forces include large quantities of money.

8

nomic interests of the democratic na-
tion. I would like to emphasize that the
AFL-CIO is a trade union federation,
and we are primarily interested in the
role of trade union organizations in
any society. What is your attitude to-
ward the trade union question, and
what is the status of the trade unions
in Angola as a whole and in your own
part of Angola, where, to some extent,
UNITA rules?

**Mr. Chitunda:** On our part, em-
phasis has been placed on seeking the
opportunity to try and prepare the
cadres for adequate labor and trade
union leadership in our country.

**Mr. Brown:** You have training
programs in your country?

**Mr. Chitunda:** We have been
seeking training opportunities outside
the country. Inside we have SINDACO,
which is our trade union organization.
Given the situation of the war which
disrupts a great deal of these social
and labor organizations in the coun-
try, emphasis is placed at the present
moment on the military side. They are
at the same time officers, soldiers, per-
forming various priority tasks. But the
party is nevertheless very strongly
committed to sending young men and
women for training opportunities any-
where in the world to prepare them-
selves for adequate leadership in the
future.

**Mr. Brown:** I take it you would
like to see the AFL-CIO undertake
some kind of program to assist in train-
ing? Is there any possibility of helping
inside or is it impossible under these
war conditions? For example, is it pos-
sible for someone to come in from the
AFL-CIO or other trade unions in the
free countries to help you on the spot
with your training programs?

**Mr. Chitunda:** I think it would
definitely not be as profitable as we
hope it will be under normal condi-
tions once peace has come into An-
gola. Due to the war conditions,
sending AFL-CIO instructors into the
country would have to be postponed
until some other time, but there is a
great deal of cooperation that could
be initiated right away. AFL-CIO ob-
servers could look into this issue, and
should be able to visit the country.

**Mr. Brown:** That would be pos-
sible?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Yes, it could be
arranged so that they could see for
themselves the situation that prevails
in the country—at the same time,
working out a plan as to how such a
training program could be implement-
ed in the future, and more importantly,
to emphasize the need to prepare for
the training of such individuals out-
side. As for the MPLA, we see that its

labor organization, which is called
UNTA, has become a mere instrument
of repression against the workers,
against labor, against the working
people in Angola.

**Mr. Brown:** Their officers are ap-
pointed by the government?

**Mr. Chitunda:** They are appoint-
ed by the government. As in the Soviet
Union, they are not elected, and they
do not defend the rights of the working
people.

**Mr. Brown:** If UNITA were in pow-
er, if you were the government, what
would be the role of the trade unions?
What would be their relationship to
the political party—to the government,
would they be completely indepen-
dent? Would they be free to choose
their own officers? Would they have
the right to strike?

**Mr. Chitunda:** We think there
would have to be a certain degree of
partnership, a certain degree of coop-
eration, a certain degree of growing
together within the framework of de-
mocracy, within the framework of lib-
erty, within the framework of protect-

ing their rights. We have to see that
we are dealing with an environment,
with a society that is very distinctly
different from, let's say, the United
States.

**Mr. Brown:** In other words, they
would have to assist in the nation's
building process?

**Mr. Chitunda:** In the nation's
building and the molding of these very
same organizations.

**Mr. Brown:** At the same time,
would they be free and independent
of employers and government? Would
they elect their own officers? Would
they have the right to strike?

**Mr. Chitunda:** Absolutely.

**Mr. Brown:** You are pledged to
the recognition of the trade union
movement as an independent force
but, at the same time, they would have
to participate in the building of your
economy and the creating of a nation?

**Mr. Chitunda:** There would have
to be some cooperation between the
trade unions and the government.

**Mr. Brown:** It is true the trade

(Continued on page 16)

UNITA sabotage crews are permanently at work on the Benguela railway line to thwart any efforts of the Luanda puppet regime to reopen it.

9

Labor and
Defense Spending

By WILLIAM A. DOUGLAS
and ROY GODSON

The lives of American workers are vitally affected by decisions on defense and social spending.

United States security requires that we deter any conventional or nuclear attack on our territory and maintain a world balance of power which does not give the upper hand to our super-power adversary, international terrorists, or other opponents of the democratic way of life. To maintain such a balance, Western Europe, Japan, and the Middle East must be kept from Soviet control. This requires a United States military establishment which can deter and contain Soviet military power.

The Soviets are engaged in a massive military build-up. Every year they are spending more real resources on their armed forces and devoting a higher percentage of their national product to military purposes. The Soviets are now beginning to reap the benefits of this increased investment. At considerable cost to Soviet workers, they are improving and increasing missiles and warheads which in the 1980's could give them the capacity to destroy almost all of our land-based retaliatory force. They are increasing their advantage in conventional military strength over NATO on the European front, and they are building amphibious and paramilitary forces as well as the transport facilities necessary to project their power in distant lands.

United States defense spending,

meanwhile, in real terms, has not substantially increased during peacetime periods within the last 25 years. This has meant a large drop in the percentage of our total national product and of the government budget devoted to the military. While the military burden on our economy has declined dramatically in percentage terms, weapons have become more complex and therefore more expensive. We have maintained our military force levels only by skimping on logistical support for them. If we are to increase our force levels to meet the Soviet challenge and get our existing forces in fighting trim, unfortunately, we will have to spend more money.

In the absence of mutual disarmament, U.S. labor has long supported a strong military establishment and the funding necessary to maintain it. In the 1970's the AFL-CIO advocated development of such modern weapons as the B-1, neutron warheads, and the cruise missile. In providing this support, labor has stressed that military spending levels should be determined by the forces needed for specific missions, not by arbitrary percentage cuts or increases. Labor has also stressed the importance of avoiding waste in the military and has opposed making military funding decisions on the basis of their effects on employment.

Spending on social programs by all levels of government, especially the federal government, has increased

dramatically in the 1970's, both in current dollars and in real terms. In contrast to military spending, social spending is up sharply both as a percentage of our national product and as a portion of the federal budget. Social programs now are the single largest category in that budget, accounting for 39 percent of it, while defense expenditures have dropped to only 24 percent, their lowest since Pearl Harbor. Social spending is now the largest single determinant of the total level of federal expenditures. The U.S. labor movement has strongly supported the increases in social spending, and in fact still feels that there are pressing social needs unfilled which require further increases in government social expenditures.

Historically, there has been no direct relationship between social and defense spending. Sometimes they have risen together, and sometimes one has gone down while the other went up. Each category seems to have a life of its own. Some conservatives, however, contend that the portion of our production spent through the government has reached the maximum permissible level. From now on, they say, increases in one category must be balanced by cuts in the other, and the Soviet build-up means military spending must rise. Some liberals, who feel that increases in social spending are vital, while there is no real need for even the present levels of defense spending, have proposed financing the increases in social spending by cutting the Pentagon's budget.

The AFL-CIO denies that any necessary trade-off exists. Until now labor has rejected the notion that there must be some arbitrary limit on total government spending. The United States, it is argued, is rich enough to finance both social and military needs, and therefore labor has supported increases in both categories. Views vary on whether these increases may require higher taxes, a greater deficit, or economic controls, taking into consideration the economic situation at a given time. Labor opposes both cutting social programs and calls for slashing defense spending. Our job, says the AFL-CIO, is both to "provide for the common defense" and "promote the general welfare."

The extract above is taken from The International Labor Program Papers No. 4, published from time to time by the International Labor Program, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Copies of the complete study may be obtained by writing to the FTUN.

10

Learning from the
Polish Workers

By RICHARD T. DAVIES

U.S. Ambassador to Poland, 1972 to 1978, in a speech
before the Georgia State AFL-CIO.

About a month ago, Art Buchwald wrote one of his excellent columns, providing "New Punchlines for the Old Polish Jokes" (The Washington Post, September 18, page D1). One of the latest of these new punchlines, he wrote, provides the answer to the question: "How many Poles does it take to make a government fall in Warsaw?" The answer is: "A few hundred in Gdansk, providing they stick to their demands."

Well, they stuck to their demands
and for the first time in the Soviet bloc

they forced the Communist government to agree to the formation of independent, self-governing trade unions—the Solidarity Unions.

In the West, the two months of strikes in Poland at first aroused concern that the strikers were demanding so much that they would end up by getting nothing. When it became clear that the Polish government would have to accept the workers' demands, many expressed concern that the Soviet Union would use force to stop a development which was so much in

conflict with Moscow's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism.

But the Polish workers had learned through sad and repeated experience. That experience included the great wave of strikes in the summer and fall of 1956, which led to the fall of the Stalinist government of Poland—and, indirectly, to the bloody Hungarian Revolution. That experience included the strikes of December, 1970, when more than 200 strikers were killed in Gdansk. It included the strikes of June 24-25, 1976, when the government was forced to cancel its abrupt and steep price rises on basic foodstuffs.

The result of all that experience was that the Polish strikers learned something that a Russian labor leader wrote in 1899. "No economic fight can give the workers a permanent improvement of their situation, it cannot, indeed, be carried on on a large scale unless the workers have the free right to call meetings, to join in unions, to have their own newspapers..." (V. I. Lenin, "Our Programme," in Emile Burns [editor], "A Handbook of Marxism," International Publishers, New York, 1935, p. 574). Those are the words of a leader of the Russian Social Democrats, Lenin, before he became a Bolshevik.

That is what the long and hard ex-

Stanley Walesa, center, father of Polish trade union leader Lech Walesa, presents a T-shirt to AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland. The shirt imprinted with the Polish word for "solidarity" is displayed by Kirkland and Illinois State AFL-CIO President Robert G. Gibson.

12

perience of the Polish workers taught them. It is a lesson that has been learned by all workingmen and women who struggle for their rights. In the West, workers long ago won the right to organize, to hold meetings, to have their own newspapers. That is what the Polish workers won in the agreement signed at Gdansk on August 31.

Since Lenin was a Social Democrat demanding the formation of free trade unions, a lot has changed in Russia. One thing that has not changed is that there are still no free trade unions there. And the Soviet government not only practises, it also preaches, a doctrine that makes the formation of free trade unions a violation of the state dogma, Marxism-Leninism.

So observers and government officials in the West were correct to watch warily the Soviet reaction to the Polish events. And, of course, there were a lot of people who claimed they knew better than the Polish workers themselves what was good for those workers. So there were voices in the West counselling them not to go too far, to be cautious, not to provoke the Soviet leadership to move into Poland. These people, in perfect good faith, I am sure, practise what I call the strategy of "preemptive appeasement."

It is very much in the interest of the Soviet leadership—and of the Polish Communist leadership, too—to encourage people to believe that the Soviets will respond with force to the kind of challenge which the Polish workers posed in July, August, and early September this year. After all, a very large part of Soviet political strategy consists in applying the ancient maxim, "Divide and rule," in a cunning and effective manner.

Thus, it was only a week after the Gdansk workers formulated their 21 demands that the Soviets began to jam Western broadcasts in Russian and other Soviet languages in order to prevent Soviet citizens from learning what was going on in Poland. The principal Polish Communist newspaper published an article on August 30 warning that "forces hostile to socialism" were trying to subvert Poland's political system. On September 3, this Polish Communist newspaper article was picked up by TASS, the Soviet wire service, and thereby given the Soviet seal of approval. Later that same day, Secretary of State Muskie urged President Lane Kirkland not to go ahead with the AFL-CIO's plans to help the new independent Polish trade unions by contributing to their support. Not only did the Secretary take this peculiar step, he also caused it to be

## Kirkland Protests South Korea's Denial of Trade Union Rights

AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland appealed to President Jimmy Carter to intervene with the government of South Korea whose labor policies suppress traditional free trade union rights. Kirkland's letter of September 16 to Carter follows:

The AFL-CIO is deeply concerned over the evolving labor policy of the new South Korean government.

The government of President Chon Doo Hwan appears determined to erode and abrogate fundamental free trade union rights. Recently, it forced the resignation of the presidents of 12 of the 17 industrial unions affiliated with the Federation of Korean Trade Unions.

Over the years, the AFL-CIO has worked closely with the FKTU and its affiliates to build and strengthen free institutions in that country. The FKTU leadership recognizes that workers must have the right to elect their own representatives, the right to bargain collectively, the right to strike, the right to communicate, and the right to assemble.

Unfortunately, the actions of the South Korean government resulted in the denial of these basic free trade union rights.

The AFL-CIO strongly requests that the United States government discuss this serious problem with the government of South Korea and urge that government to reconsider its labor policies and encourage, rather than attempt to stifle, free trade unionism for its workers.

announced by the State Department spokesman.

Meanwhile, Chairman Lech Walesa of the Solidarity Unions had appealed to trade unions elsewhere for help. In an interview with a Norwegian reporter, he asked for financial help. Later, to a correspondent writing for the Washington Post (September 9, p. A1), he said, "We need everything. . . We need chairs, tables, telephones. Above all we need duplicating machines, typewriters, paper. Money, too, but that is less of a problem." He concluded by saying to the reporter, "You must make a noise about it," thereby trying to ensure that the message would be conveyed clearly to the non-Communist world.

Consistently, the Polish workers on strike in Gdansk knew something that so-called experts and observers in the West did not know. They knew, first

of all, that if they stuck to their demands, the government in Warsaw would have to grant them. They knew that the Soviet Union would not intervene by force. They knew that the Soviet and Polish Communist regimes would make a lot of propaganda, attacking their aims and seeking to tar them by association with alleged "anti-socialist forces." They knew they would not only not be helped by the government whose Vice Premier had signed the agreement with them on August 31, but that that government would soon start trying to hinder them in their effort to organize and maintain independent unions. Finally, they knew they could count on themselves alone.

As one who worked in the American Foreign Service for 33 years, most of that time on relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist governments in Eastern Europe, I cannot explain Secretary Muskie's involving himself in this indiscreet way in a perfectly straightforward attempt by the AFL-CIO to help the new Solidarity Unions in Poland. All the American government had to do about this effort was—nothing: just keep quiet and let it happen.

Chairman Walesa and his colleagues in the leadership of the Solidarity Unions know one other thing which people in the State Department don't appear to have thought about. Once the Polish and Soviet governments accepted the existence of the new trade unions—as they did in the agreements signed by officials of the Polish government in various places in Poland at the end of August and beginning of September—they had swallowed the bitterest pill. Of course, both regimes would then try to keep the Solidarity Unions from acquiring the means that would enable them to organize effectively. But why should Western governments collaborate with them in that game?

On August 7, Secretary Muskie spoke to the United Steelworkers of America in Los Angeles. He said that human freedom was "America's vision" and described three kinds of freedom which America must promote. "First is the freedom of nations . . . second . . . : the political freedom of people within nations. . . . third . . . : freedom from poverty and human misery." Continuing, Secretary Muskie said, "A narrower approach, an approach which ignores the hopes and needs of people within nations, cannot succeed. For it would ignore the political stirring of humanity, the current of human freedom that is gaining

(Continued on page 16)

13

Garment Workers Raise Dues, Organizing Sights

New York—Delegates to the Ladies' Garment Workers' Convention in September voted overwhelmingly to raise dues rather than cut back on organizing and the ILGWU's union label campaign.

In the three years since its last convention, the union has fought the re-emergence of sweatshops in the South Bronx and in Los Angeles, pressed

with some success at the highest political levels for reasonable limits on clothing imports, and worked with all segments of the trade union movement to advance social causes that have been a hallmark of the nation's garment unions.

The 1,000 delegates to the convention gave President Jimmy Carter a warm reception, responding enthusiastically when Carter characterized himself as the "union label candidate" and gave a fighting speech tuned to

the labor movement's most pressing concerns.

Delegates followed up their demonstrative welcome to Carter with unanimous adoption of a resolution formally endorsing his candidacy.

The convention re-elected President Sol C. Chaikin and other top officers; called for the "most material and moral support" for Polish workers; condemned racism in South Africa and "persistent contempt" for human rights by the Soviet Union; urging strong relief efforts for the "victims of the holocaust in Kampuchea (Cambodia)."

Clothing & Textile
Reach Landmark
Accord with J. P. Stevens
& Co.; Boycott Ends

A landmark agreement between the Clothing & Textile Workers and J. P. Stevens & Co. was signed by union and company leaders in New York City on October 19, in what both sides hope will lay the foundation for "a harmonious relationship for years to come."

Hours after the signing in New York City, workers gave overwhelming approval of 30-month collective bargaining contracts at 10 Stevens plants in North and South Carolina and in Alabama.

ACTWU said in a statement that the settlement "marks what we look forward to as a turning point in our 17-year struggle with a company that

Following President Jimmy Carter's address to the delegates, ILGWU President Sol C. Chaikin presented President Carter with a symbol of AFL-CIO support for the struggle of Poland's workers for free trade unions, a T-shirt carrying the word "Solidarity" in Polish. The T-shirts were also worn by members of the ILGWU's chorus who were asked by Chaikin to sing the trade union anthem, Solidarity Forever, so that Polish workers "could hear it 3,000 miles away."

14

has long been the symbol of militant
resistance to workplace rights, human
dignity, and the improved standard of
living which flows from union con-
tracts."

AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland,
who took part in the signing ceremony
called the accord "a major victory for
all the working people of America."

"The AFL-CIO and the rest of the American labor movement have been part of this long effort for union recognition," Kirkland noted. "We proudly gave our support, as trade unionists and consumers, and we are gratified at the results."

Saluting ACTWU and its members for "a job very well done," Kirkland termed the settlement a "tremendous forward step for the textile and apparel workers of the South who have been denied, through illegal repression and coercion, their basic right to be represented by a union and to participate in the collective-bargaining process. Negotiations over wages, hours, and working conditions are fundamental to the well-being of working people."

As part of the contract settlements, some 3,500 Stevens's workers will receive an immediate 19.3 percent retroactive increase in hourly and incentive rates. The company granted the raises last year to workers at its non-union plants but withheld them from its unionized employees. ACTWU estimates that bargaining unit members will receive back pay checks averaging $1,300.

The company also agreed to make
up back payments due to union pen-
sion funds. It further agreed to offer
the same economic package to work-
ers at any of its 70 other plants who
in the next 18 months organize a union
that is certified by the National Labor
Relations Board. Most of Stevens's
plants are in the South.

The settlement also spells out seniority rules, health and safety and checkoff policies, and other procedures to protect workers' rights and security, and provides for arbitration of unresolved grievances.

In return, the union will end its
worldwide consumer boycott of Ste-
vens products and call off its "corpo-
rate campaign" begun four years ago
to isolate the notoriously anti-union
firm from the rest of the American
business community.

ACTWU also agreed to drop certain
court-ordered organizing remedies in-
volving special access to company
property during the period that the
new contract is open to newly certified
units and to treat the billion-dollar
corporation no differently in all other

respects than any other organizing
target in the textile industry. The boy-
cott and the corporate campaign were
largely credited for achieving the new
national agreement.

While the union agreed that it will
not single out Stevens as its primary
organizational target, it said that it "is
determined to use the momentum that
this settlement produces to accelerate
and broaden our southern organizing
program so that the benefits of trade
unionism may be shared by all southern
textile and apparel workers, no
matter who their employer may be."

The drive to organize Stevens began in 1963 when a predecessor union of ACTWU, the Textile Workers Union of America, set its sights on bringing economic justice to the textile chain's low-paid, mostly female workforce. The historic campaign ran into a stone wall from the company, which insisted that it would never sign a union contract and went out of its way to obstruct union organizers. Last year's Academy Award-winning film, "Norma Rae," depicted the organizing battle that took place in Roanoke Rapids, where the union finally won its first representation victory at a Stevens site.

In 1976, when the Textile Workers
and the Clothing Workers merged to
form a single, stronger union, ACTWU
launched a massive consumer boycott
against the company, with the full
support of the AFL-CIO.

The AFL-CIO, in a letter from Kirk-
land to all national and international
affiliates, accordingly advised that the
boycott had ended "effective at once."

Carter's Plan for Steel
Viewed as Pattern for
Other Industries

Washington—President Carter's plan to help the nation's steel industry rebuild and modernize to restore its strong position in world markets may set the pattern for other U.S. industries, Legislative Director Jack Sheehan of the Steelworkers observed on the network radio interview, Labor News Conference.

Sheehan stressed that while the pro-
gram is not a cure-all it does give the
industry a chance to get back on its
feet, if it follows through on its obli-
gation to apply investment capital to
the five-year effort. He pointed out that
the Carter plan pulls together into a
coordinated package existing tax,
trade and environmental policies and
programs, with inducements for the
industry to move ahead aggressively
and safeguards to assure that it fol-
lows through on commitments.

Sheehan said that one major ele-
ment of the program—automatic en-
forcement of the anti-dumping laws
that ban the sale of imported steel in
U.S. markets for less than production
costs—has already been implemented.
He said other elements of the pro-
gram—such as tax policies and depre-
ciation speedups, relaxation of time-
tables for water and air pollution
abatement, and improved aid for
workers and communities hit by pro-
duction cutbacks and shutdowns—will
need congressional action.

At the signing in New York City of the agreement between J. P. Stevens & Co. and the Clothing & Textile Workers are, from left, ACTWU Sec.-Treas. Jacob Sheinkman, AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland, ACTWU President Murray Finley and Senior Executive Vice President Sol Stetin.

15

## ANGOLA

(Continued from page 9)

unions are the most suited in many ways for nation building. Since you have many tribal differences, many differences in language, people united in the trade union movement cut across tribal lines, or ethnic lines, or language lines, because they have a common economic and social interest. You would recognize, therefore, that the unions in their independence toward the government party would have at the same time a duty and responsibility to assist in unifying and bringing together the peoples of Angola into a national unity.

**Mr. Chitunda:** We believe it would be a very desirable and necessary complement to the efforts of UNITA to have SINDACO undertaking these efforts.

**Mr. Brown:** But you do recognize the importance of trade unions as one of the elements in this process, even though it retains the high degree of independence from the party and the government as distinct from the kinds of regimes we have seen in Luanda and another part of Africa. From the point of view of our government, this is extremely important because we are concerned certainly with the interests of our country, with the interests of the free world, but we are also interested that in bringing about changes, these changes will not lead to the destruction of the trade union movement which is essential for modern economic development. Well, Mr. Chitunda, I think you have made some essential points which, if I could summarize, are, first, that you are fighting for a free and democratic society in Angola. Secondly, that what you are doing in Angola is of importance for us in the free world because your part of Africa and other parts of Africa are threatened by external elements, especially by the Soviet Union which also threatens the strategic, economic, military and political interest of western Europe and most of the free countries of the world. And, thirdly, you have emphasized that increasingly the African nations are realizing this danger, and therefore recognizing that your struggle is more and more a struggle that should be supported, but that they are in a difficult position to do anything if they do not receive the encouragement and guarantee of support of the big nations of the free world, especially in the international arenas like the United Nations and other inter-governmental bodies. And, fourthly, you are not asking for any military aid, you are asking the free world to be strong enough and able enough to bring about a political

solution which, in the case of Angola, could lead to some form of transition coalition that could bring about free elections by which the people of Angola could express themselves and choose the government they want.

And, last but not least, what you are asking for is an overall positive policy toward those nations like yours which are in the front line of what is not only your struggle but our struggle for a world that is really peaceful within a

system of freedom. I think this summarizes in the main your positions and I want to thank you once again for this opportunity and wish you luck. Give my best regards to your great leader, Mr. Savimbi. I hope what we have discussed here today will help clarify the position of the free world and assist in the objective to which we are both dedicated. Thank you once again.

**Mr. Chitunda:** Thank you. ☐

## POLISH WORKERS

(Continued from page 13)

strength in the world. And when peaceful change is frustrated, violent and radical change can explode in a storm that damages America's interests and creates opportunities for our adversaries."

In that speech in Los Angeles, the Secretary of State spoke about the help which the United States has been giving to the brave Afghan people.

### Appeal for Klebanov

Following is the text of a samizdat appeal issued by the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement and circulated in the Ukrainian SSR in the Information Bulletin of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group (no. 2/1980).

We Ukrainian dissidents are supporting Amnesty International's appeal on behalf of the repressed Donetsk miner Vladimir Klebanov, the founder of the Free Trade Union Association of Workers in the Soviet Union. We demand the immediate release of Vladimir Klebanov and all those who were repressed for raising legal demands concerning workers rights. We are issuing the following call to Ukrainian workers: Demand the release of Vladimir Klebanov; organize trade unions independent of the government. Only such free trade unions can defend your interests as workers. Struggle for the strict implementation of labor legislation, demand an increase in wages, refuse to work on "black Saturdays" which prolong your 41-hour work week. The living standards of a Soviet worker are among the lowest in the world. Your sacred right is to struggle against the brutal exploitation of your labor by the state.

He praised the establishment of the AFL-CIO Cambodia Crisis Campaign. But less than a month later, when it came to the needs of the Polish workers, he strongly advised the President of the AFL-CIO against helping them.

The Secretary was right on August 7 and wrong on September 3.

The Washington Star published an editorial on September 22, which concluded, "For independent American labor to show solidarity for a formerly oppressed group trying to achieve the same kind of independence seems beyond the constraints of Machiavellian calculation. When in doubt, do right."

The American trade-union movement is doing right when it helps the Polish workers carry out that provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which reads: "Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interest" (Article 23[4]).

You can be proud of the leadership you have received on this issue from the General Board of the AFL-CIO. ☐

AFL-CIO
POLISH WORKERS' AID FUND

Poland's new free trade unions need our help to get off the ground. You can help by contributing to the AFL-CIO'S POLISH WORKERS' AID FUND. Make check payable to the Polish Workers Aid Fund, and send

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16

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IV

Deputy Under Secretary Lawrence S. Eagleburger advised me in a few days that it was the President's and the Secretary's desire that I continue in service. He raised the possibility of my going to Switzerland, where Ambassador Peter Dominick had just retired on account of ill health. I had planned to go on leave during August in any case, and expressed the hope that it would be possible to work out my transfer during the time I was to be away. In particular, the next in a series of Senate Foreign Relations African Subcommittee hearings, an overview on U.S. policy toward southern Africa, was due the following Monday, July 28, 1975. Mr. Eagleburger and I agreed that it would be advisable that I already be on vacation by that date, as my resignation and the reasons for it were not publicly known and a necessity for me to testify could result in disclosures that the Administration wished to

⁵ Actually, I was told the President had made the decision somewhat before I now believe he finally and formally did so. This word came orally. I went home, spent a sleepless night trying to figure out what I should do, and typed out my letter of resignation to the Secretary and the President at about 5:30 the next morning. As I subsequently learned, I had submitted my resignation—believing the issue decided—before the President made his conclusive determination.

118 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

avoid, or could result in a public refusal on my part to answer sensitive questions.⁶

On Labor Day, just before my return to work, the story of my resignation broke in a piece by Murray Marder in *The Washington Post*. The "cover story" put out by senior officials at the Department was that I had decided that I was "working against too many psychological obstacles" in overcoming African and congressional opposition. Although prepared to bear up with the only possible explanation of my resignation that would not "blow open" the Angola intervention, I must admit that I found the weeks that followed galling. I was entirely willing to acknowledge that the controversy over my appointment in early 1975 made it difficult for me to do the job of Assistant Secretary. But I did believe I had been overcoming these handicaps, both in Africa and at home. My contacts with African leaders, including most of the founder presidents on the continent, had been constructive. Regarding the Black Caucus on Capitol Hill, I found that once the nomination fight was over, its members treated me with generosity and consideration.

In the weeks that followed, I declined to comment on the subject to anyone. In those same weeks I passed from being a very lame duck in the Department to being a student at the Foreign Service Institute, resuscitating my German.

On September 25, 1975, Leslie H. Gelb of *The New York Times* reported that both "East and West," including the United States, were pouring millions of dollars covertly into Portugal and Angola. The Gelb report continued: "... sources said that the funds earmarked for two anti-Soviet liberation fronts in Angola had been dispersed mainly through President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre. ... What was learned was that American funds were being used to buy arms for both Mr. Roberto and Mr. Savimbi...."

It was, and still is, a mystery to my why the Gelb report had so little public impact in the United States when it was published. Perhaps this was because the main emphasis was on Portugal—where there was considerable U.S. public approval for covert help to the non-communists—and because Mr. Gelb emphasized Soviet actions in support of the leftists in Angola and linked the United States and the People's Republic of China as opponents of them. In any case, the report came and went without creating a great public uproar.

⁶ Wishing to guard against the fact and appearance of doing anything that might result in unauthorized disclosure, my wife and I agreed that I would not even tell her the country in Africa to which my policy difference with the Secretary pertained.

Covert action when both the *Washington Post* and The Washington Times reported that the U.S. government was providing assistance to anti-apartheid freedom fighters in South Africa, as revealed by the appearance of these disclosures.

On December 13, 1975, *The Times* revealed that the substance of the American Ambassador's report to London on the situation in South Africa indicated that the American government was adding its own vision and advice to the British government's.

I do not know the introduction of the American Ambassador to South Africa, Tunney Am- ing to report the actions of the South African government to the United Nations, but I認為 the time that a commitment to non-violent action by South Africa, blocking and clining to supply of arms to the government of South Africa, and finally the decision to withdraw the American Ambassador to South Africa, did not depend on the action of the United Nations.

Virtually all of the information available to me, however, over- iria tion,lies on facts of inte- raction, said the Adre- spondent. It was only after it by stealth.

⁷ The *New York Christian Science Mail*

THE ANGOLA DECISION OF 1975 119

Covert U.S. aid to Angola surfaced again on November 7-8 when both Mr. Gelb of *The New York Times* and Walter Pincus of *The Washington Post* reported that Under Secretary Sisco and CIA Director William E. Colby had defended covert U.S. military assistance to Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi in a closed-door appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I was surprised, once again, by the relative lack of public reaction to these disclosures.

On December 14, 1975, Seymour M. Hersh of *The New York Times* revealed my opposition to the covert intervention in Angola, the substance of my reasons for it, and its relation to my resignation as Assistant Secretary. This did create a stir. I had been in London at a meeting between Secretary Kissinger and U.S. Ambassadors in Europe when the Hersh story broke. On my arrival back in New York, CBS News was waiting for me at the airport. Although my response to the interview was to say "no comment" about eight times, CBS ran footage of me without sound, adding its own commentary. Peter Lisagor, on the Agronsky television show of December 27, 1975, was asked: "What was the best advice given in 1975?" Mr. Lisagor answered: "Nathaniel Davis' advice to Henry Kissinger."

I do not know whether Mr. Hersh's December 14 story triggered the introduction and Senate passage on December 19 of the Tunney Amendment against further covert aid to Angola. According to reports, Senator Dick Clark and a number of other key members of the Congress had already expressed strong opposition to the involvement in executive session.⁷ It was also clear by that time that a large and rapidly escalating military and financial commitment would have been necessary to have any hope of blocking an MPLA victory. For whatever reasons, Congress declined to support further covert intervention; in Angola, opposition to the MPLA collapsed.

Virtually everybody has subsequently characterized our Angolan involvement as a costly failure. There has been much argument, however, over where to place the responsibility. The Ford Administration blamed congressional unwillingness to face up to the hard facts of international life and Soviet power. Congressional critics said the Administration's secret policy and the effort to implement it by stealth were doomed from the start.

⁷ *The New York Times*, November 7, 1975; *The Washington Post*, November 8, 1975; and *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 8, 1976.

part to answer the story of my *The Washington* at the Department too many congressional only possible *ow open*" the weeks that edge that the made it difficult I believe I had said at home. My *the* founder Regarding the *e* nomination *enerosity* and

on the subject of a very lame foreign Service

*New York Times* United States, and Angola. The funds earnt Angola had been these Seko of s were being imbi...." The report had so been published. In Portugal - *or* covert help *asized* Soviet *d* the United *s* of them. In *ting* a great

it might result in *e* country in Africa

120 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

v

Besides the ex post facto political debate in the United States about the wisdom or unwisdom of covert military intervention in Angola, and the debate over responsibility for its failure, there has been another controversial issue. This has been over the question of cause and effect, as between the successive outside interventions which occurred. Which side provoked the reaction of the other?

On December 19, 1975, Mr. Hersh of *The New York Times* revealed the January 1975 Forty Committee decision to give Holden Roberto $300,000 in covert funds. Mr. Hersh wrote that this authorization came

more than two months before the first significant Soviet build-up.... The Soviet Union has been involved in Angola since 1956, but according to well-informed American intelligence officials, did not substantially increase its support for one of the liberation armies in Angola until March and April of this year [1975]. At that time at least two shiploads and two planeloads of Soviet war materiel were sent.

The implication of the foregoing and considerable other subsequent comment by critics of the Ford Administration was that the United States made the first move and that the Soviet buildup was a reaction.

Perhaps evidence will come to light in the future showing that the January 1975 Forty Committee decision really did trigger the step-up in Soviet aid and arms supply, but I do not believe the case is made. As already noted, the $300,000 was for political action, not weapons, and only part of the money was expended between January and the Soviet arms buildup of March/April—probably decided upon in Moscow somewhat earlier. Considerable sums of money and quantities of arms were filtering into Angola during that period from a multiplicity of sources and to all three movements.

If one is looking for externally visible actions that might be said to have triggered the Soviet buildup, one should perhaps also consider Holden Roberto's movement of troops into northern Angola and the capital city of Luanda, and the Chinese support for Roberto in 1974-75, which no doubt had an impact on Soviet thinking. By March-April 1975, it was clear that the Alvor Accord—which postulated cooperative administration of the country by all three factions—was breaking down. Moreover, fighting between the FNLA and MPLA escalated sharply during that period.

After March-April of 1975, the difficulty of establishing causality

becomes more and more参见 even before the intervention of the CIA program be helpful over a dozen periods of almost a year that the trouble is caused by ships.

July 1975, advisers from Brazzaville, mando corrente and into intelligence fighting against the U.S.S.R., the Washington Intervenções implementadas.

August 1975, Zairian party moved just complex intervention troops to the capital to consult with the government been made possible by the United States and advised.

September 1975, rockets were launched by two more Angolan shipping units had established a landing strip in the littoral area of the north coast of Angola and advised that number to

⁸ There had been

THE ANGOLA DECISION OF 1975 121

becomes more complicated, rather than less so. Indeed, there had been varying degrees of involvement by most of the major actors even before the 1974-75 time frame. Nevertheless, the major interventions by Cuba, Zaïre and South Africa—and the covert CIA program—all occurred during the latter half of 1975. It may be helpful to take a careful look at the chronological sequence of over a dozen actions by a half-dozen intervening powers over that period of about six months. One should bear in mind, however, that the time sequences are not always exactly known, and that cause and effect do not necessarily conform to the time relationships.

**July 1975:** In the course of the month, 40 to 50 additional Cuban advisers for Neto and the MPLA came to Angola via Congo-Brazzaville.⁸ In mid-July, President Mobutu of Zaïre sent a commando company and an armored-car squadron across the border and into combat in northern Angola. By then, according to intelligence reports, South Africa was supporting the two factions fighting against the MPLA. In Luanda, the MPLA, strengthened by heavier and more sophisticated weapons supplied by the U.S.S.R., was successfully driving the FNLA from the city. In Washington, the Administration decision in favor of covert military intervention was being made on or about July 17, and concrete implementation followed very quickly.

**August 1975:** In the second week of August, two additional Zaïrian paratroop companies were committed to action in Angola. At about the same time, South African troops (which may have moved just inside Angola in June) occupied the Cunene Dam complex in southern Angola. The Cuban decision to send combat troops to Angola was being made in Havana, presumably in consultation with Moscow. (The decision in Havana must have been made before the end of August if one considers when troops carried by ship arrived in Africa, as discussed below.)

**September 1975:** Early in the month, Soviet-made 122-millimeter rockets were committed to battle north of Luanda. In mid-September two more Zaïrian battalions were sent across the border to Angola. By the latter part of September the South Africans were shipping military material to the FNLA and UNITA forces, and had established a training base for the FNLA in southeast Angola. In the latter part of the month, Cuban troops arrived by ship in Pointe Noire (Congo-Brazzaville) and additional Cuban trainers and advisers arrived by air.

⁸ There had been up to 100 Cuban advisers in Angola for at least a decade, and the buildup from that number to roughly 250 had already started in the late spring of 1975.

United States intervention in the question of the other? The *York Times* reported to give it wrote that

up.... The report to well-informed sources increase its value. On April of this year, the *Times* of Soviet war

other subse- quence was that the buildup was

following that trigger the event, the case to be decided between the two—probably the sums of Angola during three move-

ings. It might be said perhaps also to northern Africa, but no support was given on Soviet Alvor Action. The fighting during that was very causality

122 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*October 1975:* A South African-led strike force was committed to battle in the latter part of the month and made spectacular advances in south-central Angola. In late October, an additional Zairian battalion went south. Cuban troops arrived in greater numbers.

*November-December 1975:* In the first days of November, a mixed Angolan-Zairian force moved against Cabinda, which was successfully defended by MPLA troops reinforced by Cuban advisers. Americans were evacuated, and the American Consulate General closed on November 3, eight days before the Portuguese retired and the MPLA proclaimed Angolan independence in the capital. FNLA forces were advancing south toward Luanda, and the South African-led column was rolling north. The Cuban airlift stepped up to as many as five troop flights a week, and there was an increased Cuban sealift. Cuban troops were soon committed to battle in large numbers and threw back the advancing columns on the north and south.

*January 1976:* By the latter part of the month, there were 10,000 to 12,000 Cuban troops fighting in Angola, backed by increasingly sophisticated Soviet weaponry. The FNLA-Zairian forces in the north gave way; the South Africans in the south withdrew; and UNITA was overwhelmed in the sense of conventional combat.

Does the foregoing chronology answer the question of which side caused the other to intervene? This depends, to some extent, on the perspective of the beholder. Angolan spokesmen and Fidel Castro have their answer: it was South African "aggression and invasion" that triggered the Cuban military intervention.⁹ However, if this refers to the South African-led strike force that rolled across south-central Angola in October, it must be noted that Cuban troops had been sent to Angola considerably earlier. It could be true that large-scale commitment of Cuban troops to battle was a reaction to the South African-led strike, but the speed and size of the commitment suggest that the troops would have been used if needed in any case.

There is little question that smaller-scale South African involvement in Angola preceded the dispatch of large numbers of Cuban troops from the Caribbean; but small-scale Cuban intervention preceded South African involvement.

The Soviets and Cubans were no doubt aware of both the U.S. covert intervention of July-August 1975 and the open incursions by Zaire before the final decision was made to dispatch large

numbers to decide whether escalation would covert into by Zaire.

So the answer to the counter-argument must find the commitment means judgment. NATO implies colonies in Africa. No unencumbered, very good,

It is obvious the results, at some time, have to come from America. But and policy carry some

So far as I know, there is no such thing as the interaction of the struggle cannot conflict with the system that the Department was also out of

As for the mystery to be explained on a course not attempting to give his own understanding of the struggle, permit me to only on A. unlinked to the weeks of the Secretariat better to re-

⁹ *The Christian Science Monitor*, October 19, 1977; United Press International, October 18, 1977, quoting a Fidel Castro speech in Jamaica on October 17, 1977.

THE ANGOLA DECISION OF 1975 123

numbers of Cuban troops—if one accepts the probability that this decision was made in August. On the other hand, the massive escalation in the supply of Soviet weapons antedated the U.S. covert intervention of July–August 1975 and the open incursions by Zaïre.

So the answer seems to be that the escalations mutually produced counter-escalations. One would have to go much further back to find the original intervention. Colonialism preceded the Soviet commitment to support "national liberation" movements, by means judged differently by the interested parties and observers. NATO imperatives influenced U.S. policy toward the Portuguese colonies in ways which compromised our policy alternatives in Africa. None of the major actors entered the drama of 1975 unencumbered by the baggage of the past. Nobody can make a very good claim to have been uninvolved until provoked.

VI

It is obvious that the United States made mistakes. Judging from the results, the substantive decisions made were wrong somehow—at some times and at some places in the structure of power in America. Perhaps not only the substance but also the machinery and policymaking processes were flawed in ways which should carry some lesson.

So far as the processes were concerned, my perspective is better than some, but partial at best. I shall not presume to comment on the interaction between President Ford and Secretary Kissinger. My struggle was for some impact on the Secretary's mind, and I cannot complain on that score. Perhaps it was a weakness in our system that Secretary Kissinger's intellect and will so dominated the Department of State. But I am not so sure. In many ways it was also our strength in those times.

As for the substance of the decisions made, it has remained a mystery to me why the Secretary was so determined to push ahead on a course which I thought was so clearly destined to fail. I shall not attempt to speak for the Secretary—as he will undoubtedly give his own account of the Angolan intervention. I hope I understand the depth of his conviction that it was dangerous to permit the Soviet Union to conclude that détente placed restraints only on America, and that the Third World was fair game, unlinked to the totality of our relationship. Both during the final weeks of the Vietnam War and during the Angolan crisis of 1975, the Secretary and the President seem to have believed that it was better to roll the dice against the longest of odds than to abandon

as committed to make spectacular, an additional move in greater

number, a mixed bag. It was success- Cuban advisers. Insulate General Miguel retired in the capital. And the South airlift stepped in. There was an offer to be committed to bring columns on

the order 10,000 by increasingly strong forces in the withdrew; and final combat. Decision of which to go on, some extent, men and Fidel aggression and prevention.⁹ How-eve, that rolled up the notes that only earlier. It was clear that Cuban troops to but the speed would have

American involvers of Cuban intervention

both the U.S. and incursions dispatch large

4, October 18, 1977,

124 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

the competition against our great adversary. The Secretary would
freely acknowledge, I believe, that he saw Angola as part of the
U.S.-Soviet relationship, and not as an African problem.

The foregoing argument is part of the greater question whether containment is a doctrine of universal, inherently interrelated worldwide applicability, or should be limited in the military sense to interests in Western Europe and a few other places which we regard as vital.

The strategic world overview of U.S. policy is the responsibility of the President and the Secretary of State. Necessarily, my focus and argument had to be on a different level. The question I was principally addressing in my memos to the Secretary was whether covert intervention in Angola could work. This issue also led to larger questions, of course, connected with the nature of American society, secret action abroad, and the kinds of foreign policy initiatives the United States can effectively undertake.

I might add a last word to complete the circle of argument and to return to the point where this article began. As noted at the beginning, the veneer of restrained international behavior seems to be thin in the best of circumstances in today's world. It is also true that the responsible answer to the problem cannot be to mistake the veneer for the whole reality—in weakness or self-deception. But it may be one of the higher tasks of statemanship to work to thicken that veneer when the possibility exists.

Angola was a tragedy. It was a tragedy for moderate blacks, for
radical blacks wishing to fend off alien influences, for whites in
southern Africa, for Mobutu, Kaunda, Roberto, Savimbi, soldiers
of fortune, Zaïrian infantrymen, and countless others. Perhaps
America's choices were impossible ones. I cannot assert any easy
confidence in the likely success of the course of action favored by
most of our task force on Angola in June 1975. But I think we
would have done better at least to have tried that other course.

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["CQ House Votes 13-19", "13. **HR 8069. Labor-HEW Appropriations, Fiscal 1976.**\nPassage, over the President's Dec. 19, 1975, veto, of the bill to make fiscal 1976 appropriations of $36,073,748,318 and transition period appropriations of $8,953,070,000 for the Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare and related agencies. Passed 310-113: R 49-92; D 261-21 (ND 195-1; SD 66-20), Jan. 27, 1976. A two-thirds majority vote of those present and voting (282 in this case) is required to override a veto. A \"nay\" was a vote supporting the President's position.", "14. **HR 9861. Defense Department Appropriations, Fiscal 1976.** Giaimo (D Conn.) motion to concur in the Senate amendment sponsored by Tunney (D Calif.), to the amendment reported in disagreement Dec. 10, 1975, by House-Senate conferees to the Defense Department appropriations bill, barring U.S. aid to the anti-Soviet factions fighting in the civil war in Angola except for intelligence gathering. Motion agreed to (thus clearing the bill for the President) 323-99: R 72-69; D 251-30 (ND 190-7; SD 61-23), Jan. 27, 1976. A \"nay\" was a vote supporting the President's position.", "15. **S 2718. Railroad Rehabilitation.** Adoption of the conference report on the bill to authorize $6,098-billion in grants and loans for the nation's railroads and to ease federal regulation of the rail industry by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Adopted 353-62: R 107-29; D 246-33 (ND 183-9; SD 63-24), Jan. 28, 1976.", "16. **HR 5247. Public Works.** Brooks (D Texas) motion to delete from the conference report on the bill Title II, which authorized a countercyclical aid program to help state and local governments continue to provide basic services. Motion rejected 133-268: R 86-44; D 47-224 (ND 15-173; SD 32-51), Jan. 29, 1976.", "17. **HR 5247. Public Works.** Adoption of the conference report on the bill authorizing $6.1-billion for job-creating public works projects and anti-recession aid to state and local governments. Adopted 321-80: R 62-67; D 259-13 (ND 185-5; SD 74-8), Jan. 29, 1976. A \"nay\" was a vote supporting the President's position.", "18. **HR 10680. Renegotiation Act Amendments.** Hansen (R Idaho) substitute amendment for the bill to extend the Renegotiation Act for five years, through Dec. 31, 1980, to allow the board to subpoena materials it needed for its renegotiation determinations, and to strengthen the board chairman's administrative authority. Rejected 129-251: R 104-17; D 25-234 (ND 7-175; SD 18-59), Jan. 29, 1976. (The bill to make the Renegotiation Board a permanent federal agency and to increase its power was subsequently passed by voice vote.)", "19. **H Res 982. Intelligence Report.** Rules Committee amendment to the resolution authorizing the House Select Intelligence Committee to file a report on the CIA and other intelligence agencies by Jan. 30, but barring the release of classified information until the study had been certified by the President as not containing information that would adversely affect the intelligence activities of the CIA or other agencies. Adopted 246-124: R 119-2; D 127-122 (ND 58-116; SD 69-6), Jan. 29, 1976. A \"yea\" was a vote supporting the President's position.", "<table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><

In December 1975, when it became clear that there would be no interference by the United States, Soviet ships loaded with military supplies appeared in Luanda, and what had appeared to be a "rescue operation" of the MPLA by the Cubans developed into a broad offensive.

WIDE WORLD

**The U.S.S.R. and Civil War in Angola:** The collapse of the Portuguese dictatorship in April 1974 led to the decision of the new government to end 500 years of colonial rule in Southern Africa. Angola was to obtain independence on 11 November 1975, but the national liberation movement there, unlike those in the other Portuguese African territories, was fragmented, consisting of three competing sub-movements: the FNLA, or National Front for the Liberation of Angola; UNITA, or National Union for Total Liberation of Angola; and the MPLA, or Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

The collapse of the Portuguese empire brought changes in the behavior of many nations regarding developments in Angola. Several of these nations became actively involved in the arms race in that country, an arms race which originated as a competition between the U.S.S.R. and China. The Soviet Union, Cuba, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Guinea, and the People's Republic of the Congo actively supported the MPLA. China, the United States, South Africa, France, North Korea, Rumania, Zaire, and Zambia supported the FNLA and UNITA. Thus, the triangular struggle which evolved within Angola along ethnic, political, and ideological cleavage lines among liberation movements was also greatly complicated from without.

When fighting broke out between the rival liberation movements in March 1975, Soviet and East European ships began to sealift arms to the MPLA on

a massive scale. In the spring of that year, upon request of the MPLA, the Cuban leadership decided to send 230 advisors to Angola to train the MPLA military cadres. An additional 400 Cuban troops, led by a general, arrived in August. Meanwhile, the FNLA was receiving a small amount of military supplies from the United States and the People's Republic of China. In June, the MPLA, gaining momentum, drove both rival organizations out of the capital of Luanda, taking control of the city on 9 July and extending its authority to 12 of Angola's 15 provinces.

**External Involvement: August-September 1975:** From the Soviet point of view, the situation became dangerous in August. On 18 July, after urgings by Zaire and Zambia, the United States approved a $14 million paramilitary program for backing the FNLA and UNITA. In early August, the U. S. covert military aid began by war of the airport in Kinshasa, Zaire. The Chinese, alarmed by the MPLA offensive, in mid-July authorized Zaire to release Chinese military equipment held by the Zairian army. At about this time, President Mobuto Sé sé Séko of Zaire sent a few commando companies to Angola. By mid-August, Soviet reports began to indicate concern about intensified Chinese and U. S. military aid, and by early September about coordination of Chinese and U. S. covert assistance. The Chinese recalled their military personnel from FNLA bases in the summer but continued their political support.

Limited intervention by a few hundred South African advisors and increasing U. S. and South African military aid to the FNLA/UNITA coalition began to turn the tide in the civil war in late August-early September. Although for a while the vectors of the civil war moved from side to side, it was becoming

52

Proceedings / April 1980

clear that the presence of a few hundred Cubans was
insufficient to stop the U. S.-South African-
Zairian-backed counteroffensive of the FNLA-UNITA
coalition before 11 November, Independence Day. In
August, the Soviets resumed arms shipments to the
MPLA, and their reports began to describe the situa-
tion in Angola as extremely critical owing to "in-
ternal and external conspiracy." By early September,
the MPLA faced the possibility of defeat.

Soviet National Security Interests: Soviet leaders must have been aware of the strategic importance of the former Portuguese colonies, particularly Angola. One potential strategic benefit was the use of port facilities by Soviet naval vessels. The Soviet Navy, as repeatedly stressed by its Commander in Chief, Ad-miral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorsh-kov, emerged as "one of the most important instru-ments of state policy." It is aimed at supporting Soviet policy offshore and at countering American and other Western naval forces. It is also used to try to offset American and Chinese military and political presence in Third World regions. Besides the Navy, the KGB (state security) and the GRU (military intel-ligence) may have perceived an MPLA victory as es-sential to intelligence operations in southern Africa. There is evidence that the Soviet leaders were also aware of the economic potential of Angola's oil and minerals. Moreover, the Angolan crisis provided the Soviets with an opportunity to weaken the presence of their two main rivals—China and the United States—by checking the growth of Chinese influence in Africa and by preventing the victory of the Chinese- and U. S.-backed forces. Angola, because of its geostrategic position, mattered politically to the Soviets, who hoped to acquire a voice in southern African affairs. On the other hand, some reports sug-gest that elements in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defense opposed for some time the inter-vention because it would threaten détente and might prove to be expensive.

The risks of an intervention on behalf of the MPLA were undoubtedly an important consideration in Soviet decision-making. Judging from Soviet reports in the summer of 1975, Soviet U. S.-watchers were aware of the domestic constraints under which U. S. policymakers were operating after the collapse of South Vietnam in April 1975. The Soviets must have noticed that the U. S. program of covert paramilitary aid was, even in the summer of 1975, aimed primar-ily at balancing the power of the FNLA and UNITA in the face of MPLA advances during the summer offen-sive. A more extensive program of military aid, which might have brought victory to the FNLA-

UNITA coalition, would have required congressional
approval—a very unlikely possibility in the after-
math of Vietnam.

The Cuban "Connection:" The involvement of Cuban military personnel in Africa goes back to 1964 and 1965 when the Cubans began assisting Guinea, and to 1965 when they fought briefly in the ex-Belgian Congo (now Zaire) against the incumbent government supported by the United States. The African involvement was important to President Fidel Castro for reasons of ideology and racial heritage. It would be misleading, however, to view Castro's action in Angola solely in these terms. Castro had been a supporter of the MPLA and was a close friend of its leader, Agostinho Neto. Cuban support for the MPLA had been given since the mid-1960s without the ups and downs characteristic of Soviet support for the same organization. Moreover, Angola in 1975 provided Castro with an opportunity to refurbish his image as a revolutionary leader and to increase the prestige and influence of his regime in the Third World prior to the sixth conference of nonaligned nations, scheduled to take place in Havana in September 1979. It is possible, furthermore, that the Angolan situation gave him a chance to make adjustments in Soviet-Cuban economic relations. It should be noted that in the aftermath of the invasion, in April 1976, Cuba negotiated a highly favorable economic and scientific-technical agreement with the U.S.S.R. for the period 1976-1980. Since the intervention, the Cuban armed forces have received more sophisticated weapons from the Soviet Union.

In the spring and summer of 1975, and even in
the initial stage of the intervention in the fall, Cuba
appeared to have been more eager than the U.S.S.R.
to become vigorously involved on behalf of the
MPLA, ironically at the very time when the United
States seemed ready to normalize its relations with
Cuba. Thus, it would be misleading to view Cuban
policy with respect to Angola as subservient to Soviet
policy. The Cubans were not ordered into the war by
the Soviets. Still, it would be farfetched to think of
Cuba as the main actor, or as bringing the U.S.S.R.
into the Angolan conflict against its will. In the op-
eration the Cubans depended on the Soviets not only
for logistics but also for strategic cover and economic
and military assistance. Although Cuban willingness
to do the job was an important factor in Soviet
decision-making, Cuban and Soviet objectives in
Angola seem to have coincided entirely only in late
August-September 1975 onward, when the two
countries began to function as allies. The Soviets, if

Proceedings / April 1980

53

they decided to intervene, needed to deploy combat troops capable of handling sophisticated weapons for the MPLA. The Soviets were hesitant to be involved directly in the civil war. Direct Soviet intervention, which might have elicited a firm response from the United States, could have been detrimental to Soviet interests in détente. The willingness of Castro to offer Cuban combat troops provided a convenient, if not superior, alternative. The Cubans were familiar with the physical environment of Angola, which is similar to that of Cuba. The fact that they could offer a substantial number of black and mulatto soldiers meant a fortuitous racial as well as linguistic affinity with the MPLA soldiers.

*The Decision To Intervene:* Independence Day became for all parties (both internal and external) a kind of deadline in the decision-making game on Angola. On 11 November, the Portuguese armed forces would relinquish colonial rule in Angola to whatever national liberation movement or coalition thereof happened to be in control of the capital city of Luanda. In late August-September, the advocates of intervention within the Soviet leadership were able to convince their more hesitant colleagues that the massive deployment of Cuban troops was the only option left to the Politburo in preventing an MPLA defeat before 11 November. Reports from Cuban prisoners indicate that the decision to intervene and the subsequent dispatch of forces probably took place before the South Africans decided on *their* military intervention in Angola.

The Soviet-Cuban intervention began in late September when the first Cuban ship, *Vietnam Heroico*, delivered a few hundred uniformed, regular Cuban soldiers to Pointe-Noire. In early October, Cuban ships and aircraft began bringing in additional units. The Soviets and East Europeans resumed shipments of military hardware to the MPLA and the Cubans in August-September. Initial airlift and sealift, at least for a few weeks, were carried out primarily with Cuban civilian airliners (Britannias of Air Cubana) and by Cuban-flag merchant ships. The still-cautious Soviets seemingly worked to preserve the image of not breaching international law and the status quo before Independence Day. Yet only a few weeks later, in late October, Soviet Military Transport Aviation (VTA) launched an emergency airlift of military equipment by medium and heavy logistic transport aircraft (An-12s and An-22s). The Soviet-Cuban intervention came not a moment too soon for the MPLA, for on 23 October, *almost simultaneously* with the Soviet-Cuban invasion, a large intervention by South Africa took place.

The South African intervention rapidly changed the military situation in southern Angola. As Independence Day drew nearer, the Cuban-MPLA forces were holding only Luanda, Cabinda, and 3 of the 15 provinces—a narrow corridor stretching across north-central Angola. At this point Neto must have been desperately seeking speedy deployment of the Cuban reinforcements. Indeed, as Castro pointed out, Neto "did not hesitate" to ask for additional "assistance." It is clear that the hurried Soviet-Cuban airlift and sealift of additional Cuban regular units and Soviet advisers—essentially a rescue operation in its initial stage—saved the MPLA as well as the Cuban units around Luanda, which the South African invasion threatened to entrap, from almost certain defeat. At about the time of Independence Day, the second wave of Cuban troops and Soviet advisers was arriving. On 12 November, after a frightened MPLA leadership declared the establishment of the People's Republic of Angola, the FNLA army was halted by Cuban troops just short of Luanda. For a while South African and UNITA forces continued to advance, managing to score some temporary victories in late November and early December.

*Escalation of the Soviet-Cuban Intervention: The Role of the Soviet Navy:* In December and January, the Soviet-Cuban military intervention, which had originally appeared to be a rescue operation, developed into a broad offensive. An important factor in the escalation was undoubtedly a Soviet reassessment of the U. S. response. This reassessment was probably made during the period 9-25 December, when the Soviets briefly halted the deployment of Cuban troops. It is likely that the Soviet leadership was re-evaluating, at least momentarily, its policies in the light of U. S. public warnings that Soviet actions in Angola threatened U. S.-Soviet relations. The vote of the U. S. Senate on 19 December (the Tunney Amendment) to cut off covert aid to the FNLA and UNITA presumably convinced Soviet leaders that domestic constraints on U. S. policymakers were too strong to allow the United States any real options. Subsequently, the Soviets and Cubans resumed their operation in Angola. In December and January, the sealift and airlift were rapidly taken over by the Soviets from the Cubans and transformed into a massive operation during which both the Soviet Air Force and the Soviet Navy were operationally effective.

The Soviets had clearly learned from their experience in the early 1960s in the Congo (now Zaire). In that instance, poor coordination and shortages of sealift and airlift capabilities and experienced personnel had led to serious difficulties and ultimately to the

54

Proceedings / April 1980

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

In the battle of the bookstores that began with the end of the fighting, Cubans Che Guevara and Fidel Castro seem to have supplanted the tattered visage of Agostinho Neto, lower right, head of the Cuban-backed MPLA, who died in a Moscow hospital last year.

failure of Soviet operations. This time the operation was executed perfectly, with substantial airlift and naval cover in adjacent waters from late November. Soviet VTA aircraft carried military equipment from the Soviet Union through Algeria and Congo-Brazzaville to Angola, and Soviet merchant ships carried arms to the Congolese port of Pointe-Noire and then to Angolan ports. After Cuban aircraft (which could not fly to Africa without refueling) were denied landing rights in Barbados and the Azores, aircraft of the Soviet Aeroflot (IL-62s) assumed the role of transporting Cuban units from Cuba to Angola.

A significant role was played by the Soviet Navy. From late November 1975 to February 1976, the Soviets deployed a number of warships in West African and south-central Atlantic waters, including an amphibious landing ship manned with naval infantry and antitank and antiair missile-fitted vehicles on deck, a cruiser and a destroyer armed with guided missiles, an intelligence collector, several auxiliaries, and possibly submarines. The Soviets kept additional ships in reserve, near the Strait of Gibraltar. In effect, as pointed out by James McConnell and Bradford Dismukes, the Soviet Navy deployed at least one anticarrier warfare task force in the central Atlantic in January 1976. This bold move seems to have been aimed at countering an anticipated U. S. carrier task group that did not show up. The Soviet naval deployment was also supported, from January 1976, by long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft (Tu-95) deployments over the Atlantic Ocean from bases in Havana and Conakry, and also by electronic intelligence satellites.

The Soviet deployment appears to have had several purposes. First it provided physical and psychological support to the Cuban combat forces and the Soviet advisors. It played the role of what Admiral Gorshkov calls a "protector" of "progressive change"

offshore. In addition, at least in the initial stages (late November-early December), deployment of an amphibious landing ship served to protect the Soviet-Cuban staging area at Pointe-Noire against local threats—primarily, Zairian Navy small warships positioned in Angolan waters—and provided a convenient instrument, in case of an emergency, for evacuating Soviet military and diplomatic personnel. (As late as early December, the South Africans scored some victories over the Cubans and the MPLA.)

The Soviet Navy also played the role of what Gorshkov calls "... a deterrent to the aggressive aspirations of the imperialist states." From early January, the deployment of a large Soviet task force served as a strategic cover for established Soviet-Cuban sea and air communications, and as a deterrent against possible U. S. naval deployment. (It became obvious in late December, however, that the United States would not become involved militarily in Angola, and that the sending of a U. S. naval task force to Angolan waters was a very remote possibility indeed—although still a finite one, since a response would not require congressional approval.) The fact remains, as pointed out by Charles Peterson and William Durch, that "... Soviet naval units were deployed in a way that suggested an effort to *anticipate* naval movements by the U. S., an action completely unprecedented before Angola." [Emphasis added.]

The military balance began to swing rapidly in favor of the Cuban-MPLA forces. The rate of Cuban troop deployment, 400 per week in December,

Proceedings / April 1980

55

jumped to 1,000 per week in January, eventually
yielding a deployment total of 12,000 Cuban combat
troops. Overall, during the war the U.S.S.R.
supplied the MPLA with $400 million in arms and
military assistance, compared with an estimated $54
million spent over the previous 19 years. In early
February, the U. S. Government, bending to the
will of Congress (the Tunney Amendment passed the
House of Representatives on 27 January), dis-
continued its military aid to the FLNA and UNITA.
South Africa likewise discontinued its intervention.

*Lessons and Implications:* The Soviet-Cuban inter-
vention was an action marked by vigorously exploit-
ing opportunities and reducing risks. The interven-
tion showed the Soviet Navy in its most mature,
most assertive deployment. Although the outcome of
the war was decided mainly by the Cuban armed
forces and Soviet advisors, the Soviet Navy and Air
Force served as indispensable instruments in the ac-
tion. The intervention brought about important
strategic gains for the U.S.S.R.. In October 1976,
the Soviets concluded a Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation with Angola, which calls for "coopera-
tion in the military field." Since then, Soviet-
Angolan cooperation has been extended to cover a
wide range of activities in the military, security, and
economic areas. The Soviet Navy now reportedly
benefits from use of the strategic Angolan ports. In-
deed, the Soviet Navy may be trying to establish
permanent bases on the Angolan coast. The Soviets
have negotiated maritime and fishing agreements
with the Angolans, whose small but growing naval
force has become the beneficiary of hand-me-down
Soviet ships.

Obviously, the Soviet involvement in Angola
serves to further the U.S.S.R.'s national and
strategic interests. First, it enables the Soviets to
better protect their fishing fleet and maritime and
oceanographic activities in the South Atlantic. The
Soviet fishing fleet is the second largest in the world,
and fishing in the South Atlantic is very attractive,
particularly since the Soviets were forbidden to fish
off the coast of Latin America. Second, the deploy-
ment in Angola is an important step toward the de-
velopment of a Soviet military presence in Southern
Africa, protecting the shipping routes from Soviet
Europe to the Far East. (The alternative route to the
Soviet Far East in the Northern Sea is frozen two
thirds of the year.) Third, in strategic terms, de-
ployment in Angola can facilitate the Soviet Navy
mission to counter the U. S. nuclear deterrent and
the deployment of the Western naval forces in the
South Atlantic and movement toward closer naval

cooperation among South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina in this area.

At the present time, as pointed out by Robert
Legvold, the Soviet military involvement in Angola
is mainly of a defensive nature, bearing political con-
sequences primarily for the Southern African region.
One cannot ignore the consequences of the Soviet ef-
fort to exploit the strategic value of Angolan naval
facilities, where the Soviets are now flying antisub-
marine aircraft. From Luanda airport they are also
conducting reconnaissance flights over the South At-
lantic shipping lanes. Obviously, if this trend con-
tinues, the mobility and flexibility of Soviet naval
operations in the South Atlantic will be enhanced.
The Soviet naval facilities in Angola may give advan-
tage to the Soviet Navy because of their proximity to
the Cape route—one of the prime strategic and trade
sea-lanes in the world—furthering Soviet capability
to interrupt the flow of oil to North America and
Western Europe from the Persian Gulf. Although at
the present time one can envision such activities only
in an extreme case, such as war, the gaining of direct
strategic advantage in Angola might serve as a very
attractive example for the Soviets, to be followed in
other countries of the West Coast of Africa as well.
Such facilities in Namibia, for example, combined
with those in Angola and Guinea, and possibly in
Ethiopia and South Yemen, could enable the Soviet
Navy to effectively patrol most of the African littoral
and thereby pose a serious threat to U. S. naval ac-
tivities in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean as
well as to Western sea-lanes of commerce.

What are the lessons and implications of the inter-
vention in Angola for the future behavior of the
Soviet Union and Cuba in the Third World? The
Soviets and the Cubans will probably continue to ex-
ploit the opportunities available to them there, as
demonstrated by the military intervention in
Ethiopia where they responded even more vigorously
and boldly than in Angola. Since early 1978, an es-
timated 20,000 Cuban combat troops, 3,000 Soviet
advisors, and $2 billion worth of arms have been air-
lifted and sealifted to that country. The intervention
was managed on the ground by a group of Soviet and
Cuban generals.

Overall, as a result of these successful outcomes in
Angola and Ethiopia, Soviet and Cuban military in-
volvement in Africa has been greatly extended. The
U.S.S.R. now has strategic and political stakes in
several Third World countries. Its naval deployment
and security aid in this area are growing. Cuban in-
volvement in strategic areas is growing as well.
There are some 42,000-45,000 Cuban troops in Af-

56

Proceedings / April 1980

rica, stationed primarily in Angola and in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia), with additional contingents of military advisory personnel in another nine African countries and in the Middle East (South Yemen).

Finally, one of the salient lessons of Angola is that the Soviet leaders are acutely conscious of the risks entailed in decision-making vis-á-vis the Third World. It was their accurate assessment of the probable U. S. response that strengthened the arguments of those Soviet leaders advocating low-cost military escalation in Angola. The Soviets behaved with restraint during the 1978 invasion of the Shaba province of Zaire by the Congolese National Liberation Front (an MPLA ally) in the light of the U. S.-backed French-Belgian counterintervention. American inaction, retreat, or vacillation tends to encourage Soviet assertive behavior and Soviet attempts to exploit opportunities in the Third World.

This was demonstrated again in December 1979 in Afghanistan, where—as in Angola in 1975 and Ethiopia in 1978—the Soviets intervened militarily beyond their borders. In Afghanistan, however, the Soviets deployed thousands of combat troops on a large and unprecedented scale (80,000 to 100,000 as of January 1980). In all three cases, the overall objective of Soviet intervention was to further, by very assertive means, Soviet national and strategic interests, and this meant preventing anti-Communist forces from defeating pro-Soviet forces. In Afghanistan the Soviet military invasion was coupled with a political coup in which an inefficient pro-Soviet regime that had been unable to put down an insurrection of anti-Communist Moslem tribesmen was replaced by a more effective, Soviet-controlled regime.

Although it is too soon to draw any firm conclusions, it seems that the Soviet decision to escalate the military intervention was, among other factors, again influenced by U. S. signals of non-involvement: an earlier U. S. decision not to supply arms to the Moslem rebels and the almost total U. S. preoccupation with the Iranian crisis.

The United States, it is suggested, should by diplomatic and other means—ranging from economic development to security aid, and if necessary direct presence—aim at a more determined, activist role in the Third World, thereby deterring the U.S.S.R. and its allies from resolving a crisis situation such as the one in Angola by use of military power.

*A more detailed version of this article, complete with footnotes, will appear in a book entitled World Communism at the Crossroads: Military Ascendancy, Political Economy and Human Welfare, edited by Steven Rosefield. It is scheduled to be published later this year by Martinus Nijhoff.*

Dr. Valenta is assistant professor and coordinator of Soviet and East European studies in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He holds an advanced graduate degree from the Prague School of Economics (1968) and a Ph.D. from the School of Advanced International

Studies, Johns Hopkins University (1975). A former research fellow at the Brookings Institution, he is the author of *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979) and of numerous articles on Soviet foreign policy and national security. He is coeditor of two books on international security to be published this year by the Indiana University Press.

Proceedings / April 1980

57

Least Likely to Succeed

After 490 years of colonial rule, Portugal has pro-
claimed the "independence" of Angola and withdrawn
in haste—even ahead of deadline—leaving that huge
and potentially rich country of southwestern Africa torn
apart by an accelerating civil war with international
complications. Even Belgium's exit in 1960 from the
Congo (now Zaire), then seething with threats of civil
and tribal strife and secession, was accomplished with
greater smoothness.

Unable to transfer effective power to any of three
competing "liberation" movements, Portugal's high com-
missioner simply conferred independence and sovereignty
on "the Angolan people, who shall decide the forms of
its execution." In the capital of Luanda, this meant hand-
ing over power to the Marxist Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which is assured of
instant recognition by most of the Soviet bloc and other
Marxist governments.

Massively aided by Moscow, MPLA had been able earlier this year to drive the other two movements from Luanda and other strategic sites, including the ports, the oil-producing enclave of Cabinda and ten of twelve provincial capitals. In a power play reminiscent of Communist tactics in Portugal, MPLA sought to give the impression that its complete triumph was inevitable.

Any impression of inevitability has been badly tarnished, however, by renewed fighting for Cabinda, advances toward Luanda from the north by the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and recapture of the ports of Mossamedes, Benguela and Lobito in the south by a combination of FNLA and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). FNLA and UNITA have received support from Zaire and indirectly from the United States, and China has trained FNLA troops in Zaire.

White mercenaries, a feature for years of the strife
in the Congo, are again on the scene. MPLA blames its
recent defeats on mercenaries from South Africa and
elsewhere, allegedly funded by the C.I.A. UNITA says
it will publish shortly a list of Cuban soldiers captured
while fighting for MPLA. The opportunities for inter-
national mischief and wider war are enormous in a
tragedy that already may have claimed 1,200 lives this
year.

Secretary Kissinger told a press conference yesterday that Soviet and Cuban support of MPLA was a serious matter; and that Washington would not tolerate Soviet "hegemonial aspirations" in Angola. But Moscow is certain to reply by citing reports of American aid, funneled through Zaire, to FNLA and UNITA.

The Organization of African Unity will keep trying
to persuade the quarreling Angolans to put aside their
differences and form a national union government. The
great powers can best assist this effort by agreeing to
misengage completely from a situation even more dan-
gerous to international peace than that in the Congo
fifteen years ago.

PORTUGUESE AFRICA

guerrilla operations. Operating originally from bases in independent Guinea, it began incidents of sabotage to communications facilities and attacks in a number of areas where Portuguese control seemed least strong. By 1963, widened attacks on Portuguese army facilities and occasionally on towns became common. In those first years of insurgency, PAIGC efforts were directed from independent Guinea and were concentrated in the south.

The methods used to spark revolt were twofold. Small groups of men crossed the frontier from the south and summoned meetings in the bush, where they persuaded Guineans to join them in the fight against the Portuguese, sometimes on pain of having their villages burned. They recruited many of their supporters from the younger men of one tribe, the Balanta. Meanwhile, internal organizing was taking place on the village level. When the first attack was made, the Portuguese, with only two companies of infantry in the province, found themselves heavily outnumbered. There were barely enough troops to defend the main centers. For many months, the rebels were masters of a large tract of territory extending east and south of Bissau, the capital, to the frontier. To escape the danger of growing hosilities, about 50,000 Africans left their homes and took refuge either in the Republic of Guinea or in Senegal, but mostly in the latter.

The largest tribe, the Muslim Fula, and some smaller groups remained loyal to Portugal. Fula chieftains asked for arms to defend themselves against the guerrillas and were given 10,000 rifles by the Portuguese. Besides the addition of assistance, this gesture of arming the civilian population was an attempt to refute guerrilla claims to have all the population with them. African volunteers were recruited to defend their own villages, and a local militia was formed to act as auxiliaries. With the arrival of Portuguese reinforcements in 1963 and the later appointment of a new governor and commander-in-chief, General Arnaldo Schultz, who had been highly successful in Angola, the tide turned for a time against the guerrillas. Most administrative posts were reoccupied and garri-soned, and the large numbers of Africans who had fled from the attack, either into the bush or over the frontier, were encouraged to return to their villages, many of which, having been destroyed by the guerrillas, had to be rebuilt with the help of the Portuguese army.²⁹ By 1965, the situation had been stabilized: the insurgents held a strong military initiative and continued to operate much at will; all centers of population were in the hands of the Portuguese, who could also penetrate all parts of the territory with the exception of the island of Como, the rebel stronghold in the swampland south of the capital, where the PAIGC withstood a major Portuguese assault.

In the central district, east of Bissau, small bands of guerrillas, operating from hideouts in the bush, adopted tactics of mining roads and mounting ambushes. They also fired at Portuguese patrol boats from the banks of the rivers. Attempts to pursue them were made only when firm information could be acted on, which seldom resulted in contact with the rebels but occasionally led to the discovery of caches of arms. Portuguese defense had been restricted by the lack of roads in Guinea, although increasing numbers have been built in recent years. One of the first tasks of the army, after the arrival of reinforcements, was to build airstrips in all outlying districts.

CON

By establishing garris-
Portuguese aimed at sear-
independent Guinea. Th
another path, especially
main direction of infiltrat
first, and then to the n
defenses, the generalizati
gents could maneuver.

The other reason for p
the population and encou-
schools, essential goods
building new homes. As i
was to win the allegiance
that held out by the natí-
n

Under Governor Schu-
of fortified villages, a ty-
abandoned village and s
double fence of barbed-
tructing an inner defen-
underground shelters for
would be secured, some
food, clothes, medical att
ber steadily would increa

Occasional guerrilla at
Portuguese commander v
service. He would build
symbol of renewed con-
constructed, of mud br
school, and a hospital.

Such a village would
the village headman. So
much as a status symbol
guese garrisons, but the
that could send reinforce
actually beat off an attack

Besides providing secur-
countryside, such as bet-
ple, a district officer who
for some village would
commander, as well as t
been more material prog-
years before it.

In the first few years
The guerrillas shot from
and, in the ensuing exch
straying into the line of

416

CONFLICT IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA

By establishing garrisons at key points along the southeastern frontier, the Portuguese aimed at sealing off the routes by which the rebels infiltrated from independent Guinea. This was not possible, of course, since there is always another path, especially where the frontier runs through forest. However, the main direction of infiltration eventually shifted from the southeast to the east, first, and then to the north, showing the partial success of the Portuguese defenses, the generalization of the conflict, and the ease with which the insurgents could maneuver.

The other reason for posting troops near the frontier was to give protection to the population and encourage people to resettle, by providing medical services, schools, essential goods when these were lacking, and help with crops and in building new homes. As in Angola, the main object of this pacification campaign was to win the allegiance of the people by offering them a better way of life than that held out by the nationalists.

Under Governor Schultz, who became known for his advocacy of the creation of fortified villages, a typical procedure was for the Portuguese to enter an abandoned village and secure themselves from attack by erecting around it a double fence of barbed wire, equipped with an alarm system, and then constructing an inner defense line of earth and timber bulwarks, pillboxes, and underground shelters for protection against mortar fire. In theory, as the village would be secured, some of the inhabitants would start to drift back and receive food, clothes, medical attention, and tools. As life became organized, the number steadily would increase until the population was almost back to normal.

Occasional guerrilla attacks against the garrison were usually beaten off. The Portuguese commander was frequently a young lieutenant doing his compulsory service. He would build a new village outside the defensive perimeter as a symbol of renewed confidence in law and order. This would be more solidly constructed, of mud bricks baked in the sun, often including a mosque, a school, and a hospital.

Such a village would have a corps of African volunteers under command of the village headman. Some would take rifles when working in the fields, as much as a status symbol as for fear of attack. Not all such villages had Portuguese garrisons, but there was always a garrison within radio communication that could send reinforcements in the event of an alarm. Villages occasionally actually beat off an attack without asking for help.

Besides providing security, the presence of the army brought benefits to the countryside, such as better communications, housing, and services. For example, a district officer who previously had pleaded in vain for a new water supply for some village would find his request immediately answered by the local commander, as well as troops supplied to do the work. As in Angola, there has been more material progress since the emergency than had been seen for many years before it.

In the first few years of the conflict, attacks on fortified villages were rare. The guerrillas shot from the nearest cover, usually several hundred yards away, and, in the ensuing exchange of shots, the most likely casualties were livestock straying into the line of fire.

independent Guinea, it was and attacks in a number of towns became common. All groups of men crossed the bush, where they met the Portuguese, sometimes many of their supporters while, internal organizing and attack was made, the province, found themselves against the Portuguese. Besides the addition of tion was an attempt to them. African volunteers and their militia was formed to meet the threat in 1963 and the first general Arnaldo de Oliveira turned for a time the reoccupied and garri-oll from the attack, either return to their villages, or, had to be rebuilt with new villages had been stabilized: continued to operate much at the Portuguese, who could own of the island of Como, hospital, where the PAIGC

all groups of men crossed the bush, where they met the Portuguese, sometimes many of their supporters while, internal organizing and attack was made, the province, found themselves against the Portuguese. Besides the addition of tion was an attempt to them. African volunteers and their militia was formed to meet the threat in 1963 and the first general Arnaldo de Oliveira turned for a time the reoccupied and garri-oll from the attack, either return to their villages, or, had to be rebuilt with new villages had been stabilized: continued to operate much at the Portuguese, who could own of the island of Como, hospital, where the PAIGC

groups remained loyal to themselves against the Portuguese. Besides the addition of tion was an attempt to them. African volunteers and their militia was formed to meet the threat in 1963 and the first general Arnaldo de Oliveira turned for a time the reoccupied and garri-oll from the attack, either return to their villages, or, had to be rebuilt with new villages had been stabilized: continued to operate much at the Portuguese, who could own of the island of Como, hospital, where the PAIGC

guerrillas, operating from the banks of the rivers. Their formation could be acted upon occasionally led to the being restricted by the lack of a village to be built in recent

417

PORTUGUESE AFRICA

This system of defense, effective when it was attempted, was the Portuguese answer to the continuing claims made by Amilcar Cabral that his movement controlled between one-third and one-half of the territory. Most of this territory was either forest or marsh, with very little population, and the PAIGC guerrillas could move about freely in it without the risk of encountering any Portuguese.

The success of the Portuguese pacification campaign and the inconstancy of PAIGC's successes led the PAIGC to announce, in 1965, their own program of education and other social services for the area they controlled. The later execution of this program demonstrated the organizational capacity and following of the rebels.

During 1966, PAIGC advances continued, and the forces on both sides were increased. From an estimated several hundred in 1962, the number of guerrillas rose to 3,000 by 1964, at least twice that by 1966. They also contained a higher proportion of men trained abroad and were better led and better armed, with bazookas, mortars, and automatic weapons. In the same period reinforcements brought the Portuguese force to between 20,000 and 30,000 regular troops and six companies of local militia, apart from the civilian volunteers organized as "self-defense" groups in the villages.

The PAIGC forces received initial training at a base camp at Kindia, near Conakry, in the Republic of Guinea, which was staffed for a time by Russian instructors who were afterward replaced by Algerians. Here the guerrillas received their arms and supplies. The arms, including mortars, bazookas, and machine guns, were mostly from Eastern Europe with some new weapons from China. In 1965, the Algerians reportedly concluded an agreement with the U.S.S.R. by means of which any Algerian equipment sent southward for use in liberation movements would be replaced in kind by the Soviet Union. The three routes used to supply the rebels in Portuguese Guinea have been: (1) by sea, from Algeria via Conakry; (2) overland, from Algeria via Mali and thence to Conakry or Dakar; (3) by sea, from Cuba via Conakry.

By 1967, a modus vivendi had been established between PAIGC and Senegalese leaders. Most of the PAIGC incursions from Senegal were made across the northern frontier and came from a base camp at Kolda in Senegal, which appeared to have replaced the camp at Kindia in the Republic of Guinea as the principal training and supply center of PAIGC, although Cabral's own headquarters remained at Conakry.

Why the attack on the north had been expanded was not clear, but there could have been several reasons: failure to win over the southern tribes, better conditions in the north for living off the land, better conditions in Senegal for the majority of the refugees, or a more welcoming attitude on the part of the government of Senegal than previously. Another possibility was a change in the sources of PAIGC's foreign aid. The camp at Kolda allegedly included Cubans on the staff.

By the end of 1967, Cabral claimed to control half the territory, and several Western observers whom he had invited to visit the liberated zones accepted the claim. One of these, Basil Davidson, who spent two weeks with the guerrillas, described his experience when accompanying them on three sorties, one from a

landing on the coast
travelling about 80 m
"the Portuguese no lo
about half their coast
PAIGC claims to "pr
the villages and rura
guerrilla units in most
in on all but the bigg

Davidson witnessed
small jet bombers" a
ack-ack emplacement,
afterward visited the
in the extreme south
PAIGC claims to op
had 470 men and wo
electricians, agronom
training facilities we
Yugoslavia, and the C

Other press report
of nationalist success
Howe wrote:

Portugal concedes
out of its control.
centers. All but th
and bazooka shells
parts of Portugues

The propaganda suc
reply in kind. A vis
President Américo T
retain the nearly w
year guerrilla war th
tarily undefendable.
Bissau, the Presiden

Guinea does not
for we attach to it
territory. Within t
life, our decision
It is a part of the

In spite of this syn
may still have been
the area through th
Throughout the

418

CONFLICT IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA

landing on the coast and the other two across the northeast frontier.³⁰ After travelling about 80 miles inside the territory, mostly on foot, he reported that "the Portuguese no longer have any hold on four-fifths of their land frontiers or about half their coast line, now firmly in guerrilla hands." He also confirmed PAIGC claims to "practically undisputed possession of rather more than half the villages and rural areas," to be "operating successfully with mobile or guerrilla units in most of the rest of the country" and to be "beginning to close in on all but the biggest two or three towns."

Davidson witnessed "several air bombardments of villages and rice fields by small jet bombers" and was present when a napalm canister hit a nationalist ack-ack emplacement, incinerating one gunner and badly burning the other. He afterward visited the wounded man in a guerrilla hospital "not far from Cacine," in the extreme south of the territory. This was one of the two hospitals which PAIGC claims to operate in liberated zones. He was told by Cabral that PAIGC had 470 men and women in training in Europe as doctors, nurses, mechanics, electricians, agronomists, and the like, and that military supplies and civilian training facilities were provided chiefly by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the German Democratic Republic.

Other press reports appearing about the same time gave a similar impression of nationalist successes. Thus, in a dispatch from Conakry, Russell Warren Howe wrote:

> Portugal concedes that more than half of this maze of swamp and jungle is out of its control. Mr. Cabral concedes that he occupies none of the urban centers. All but three of these, however, have been hit by nationalist mortar and bazooka shells. . . . Recent visitors escorted by Mr. Cabral's forces around parts of Portuguese Guinea found African morale high.³¹

The propaganda success scored by the nationalists prompted the Portuguese to reply in kind. A visit to Portuguese Guinea in February, 1968, by Portuguese President Américo Tomas was meant as "evidence that Lisbon is determined to retain the nearly worthless tropical territory, despite the high cost of the five-year guerrilla war there" and despite the army assessment of the area as "militarily undefendable."³² To remove doubts of Lisbon's decision, on his arrival at Bissau, the President declared:

> Guinea does not stand in so-called Southern Africa but that does not matter, for we attach to it the same importance as to other sacred portions of national territory. Within the healthy principles that are the guidelines of our collective life, our decision to defend it against foreign attacks could not be any other. It is a part of the same body, which to function perfectly must be kept intact.³³

In spite of this symbol of continuing commitment, however, the Portuguese may still have been considering finding some way to extricate themselves from the area through the middle of 1968.

Throughout the summer, reports of PAIGC victories continued. Governor

419

as the Portuguese movement continued; this territory was also occupied by CEC guerrillas could Portuguese.

The inconstancy of our own program of controlled. The later capacity and follow-

on both sides were number of guerrillas contained a higher better armed, with better re-inforcements regular troops and officers organized as

up at Kindia, near time by Russian there the guerrillas were, bazookas, and new weapons from equipment with the Southward for use in Union. The three been: (1) by sea, and thence to

PAIGC and Senegal made across the border in Senegal, which of Guinea as the Cabral's own head-

clear, but there are other tribes, better than in Senegal for the part of the as a change in the included Cubans

itory, and several ones accepted the South with the guerrillas, parties, one from a

## PORTUGUESE AFRICA

Schultz's replacement was even forced to withdraw from several key centers in the northeast and south. At the time of the change of government in Portugal, there was some speculation that the opportunity would be taken to reduce their commitment in Guinea or to withdraw altogether. However, the announcement of the new Prime Minister, Marcello Caetano, promising that another 7,000 troops were to be sent to Guinea showed that there was no change of policy.³⁴

Portuguese forces still retained counterstrike capabilities, largely because of a squadron of twelve Fiat jets, which gave them the power to reach any part of Guinea in a few minutes. This to some extent offset the fact that the insurgents now had high-powered automatic rifles, heavy mortars, and modern antiaircraft guns and that their attacks on military camps and convoys were increasingly effective and daring. Undoubtedly the nationalists had help from many civilians, as a result both of spontaneous loyalty, signs of success, and threats.

By the same token, a major reason given by the Portuguese for holding on in Guinea was their moral obligation to protect the loyal section of the population. Even if it were true that the nationalists controlled half the territory, as they claimed, this was not the same as controlling half the inhabitants, a great number of whom, possibly the majority, were living in towns or fortified villages under Portuguese protection. Many of them feared that in the event of a national victory, they would be exposed to reprisals. Other important factors in the Portuguese determination include their own tradition in Africa, the economic interests of CUF, and a fear of consequences for Angola and Mozambique.

If the Portuguese were still in Guinea, it was not due entirely to superior force but also to the willingness of at least a part of the population to cooperate with the government, once they were sure that it had no intention of withdrawing, was resolved to remain indefinitely, and had the will and means to secure their protection. As a Portuguese officer observed to one of the authors of this chapter: "The Americans can never win in Vietnam, because everybody knows that sooner or later they will be leaving. Here we shall win because everybody knows we are staying."

## MOZAMBIQUE

In Mozambique, the Portuguese took precautions to avoid the surprises of Angola and Guinea.³⁵ They cleared a zone adjoining the northern frontier and obliged its population to move elsewhere. They also constructed airstrips and roads for the military. When the conflict began, they had a considerable force in the area. In making these preparations, steps were taken to clear rural areas and establish most of the population in fortified villages, where the inhabitants could work safely on the land by day and be protected from attack at night. As a result of the Portuguese actions, several thousand Makonde migrated to Tanzania.

The Makonde, who inhabit both sides of the Rovuma River, the border between Mozambique and Tanzania, resisted Portuguese attempts to assimilate them. The new migrants and others who had been living there for some years formed the first recruitment pool for anti-Portuguese activities. After the onset of insurgency, the numbers of migrants to Tanzania expanded.

The insurgency in Mozambique was centered in the northern frontier by a quarreled with FRELIM, were out hunting with their modern weapons, and were intercepted by Portuguese forces.

This premature action forced the Portuguese to launch its own战 crossed the Rovuma River, a Portuguese military force.

The first FRELIM training in Algeria. By the end of the year, the force had grown to 1,000 men if they were cooperating with some sanctuary on the coast. They pursued them, before launching their own ambushing convoys (in Portuguese parlance, "ambush groups"). Casualties were high, and the Portuguese were forced to plantations in the vicinities of Delgado, where they were taken prisoner.

The policy of establishing a Portuguese dominion in Mozambique was foiled by the resistance of the local inhabitants. The guerrillas also tried to get the Portuguese to give up the area. Delgado, where they were located, was the main resistance center. During the first half of 1968, the Mozambican forces, under the leadership of Nyasa, Nyama, and for a short time also Nyanga, Freeixo, and others, tried to push the Portuguese out of the area. They were met with resistance by the local inhabitants, and the Portuguese were forced to give up the area in early 1969.

During the first half of 1968, the Mozambican forces, under the leadership of Nyama, Nyanga, and for a short time also Nyamba, Freeixo, and others, tried to push the Portuguese out of the area. They were met with resistance by the local inhabitants, and the Portuguese were forced to give up the area in early 1969.

Like the Makonde, the Mozambican forces also tried to push the Portuguese out of the area. They were met with resistance by the local inhabitants, and the Portuguese were forced to give up the area in early 1969. As a result, most Nyamba and Nyanga inhabitants left the area, taking with them the last of the Portuguese forces. After being cleared from the area, the Mozambican forces concentrated in a fairly narrow band along the eastern shore of the Rovuma River, and railway terminates. A st

420

## CONFLICT IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA

The insurgency in Mozambique started in August, 1964, with a raid across its northern frontier by a small force headed by a former MANU leader who had quarreled with FRELIMO. After killing a Dutch priest and some Africans who were out hunting with him, the raiders withdrew toward Tanzania, but they were intercepted by Portuguese troops and a number, including the leader, were killed.

This premature action may have forced the hand of FRELIMO and obliged it to launch its own attack a month later. Several small bands of guerrillas had crossed the Rovuma River from Tanzania, and one of these struck first, against a Portuguese military outpost at Mueda on the Makonde plateau.

The first FRELIMO insurgents were led by men who had received their training in Algeria. By late in 1964, the force amounted to 250. They operated in small groups in the Makonde plateau, raiding villages and killing the headmen if they were cooperating with the Portuguese. They would then retire to some sanctuary on the edge of the plateau, where it was difficult for troops to pursue them, before launching another attack. Later they took to mining roads, ambushing convoys (in which mortars were sometimes used), sniping at Portuguese patrols, and occasionally making a night attack on some Portuguese garrison. Casualties were slight and little harm was done, except to some sisal plantations in the vicinity of Mocímboa da Praia, which the authorities closed down rather than taking the trouble of defending them.

The policy of establishing fortified villages was partially successful, but, between the defended positions, movement was unsafe and could be made only in convoy. This situation continued on the Makonde plateau with little change. The guerrillas also tried to infiltrate to the coast and thence southward, but they did not get further than the vicinity of Quissanga, 100 miles south of Cabo Delgado, where they were in the territory of the predominantly hostile Makua.

During the first half of 1965, the insurgency spread to the district of Niassa, further west, where Nyanja tribesmen, also based in Tanzania, engaged in the same kind of guerrilla warfare. This soon extended along the shore of Lake Nyasa, and for a short time threatened the Portuguese as far south as Nova Freixo, an important railhead.

Like the Makonde, the Nyanja have strong ties outside Mozambique. The majority of them live in Malawi and, of those who speak a European language, even in Mozambique, probably more speak English than Portuguese. This can be explained partly by the influence of Anglican missions, which, since the end of the nineteenth century, have been established on the island of Licoma³⁶ (which, although close to the eastern, and therefore Portuguese, side of the lake, belongs to Malawi) and at Massumba, in Niassa District of Mozambique. As a result, most Nyanja Christians are Protestants. Another reason for the prevalence of English was the fact that the Niassa Company, given a charter in 1891 to develop the district, was controlled by British finance capital.

After being cleared from the Nova Freixo region, guerrilla activity was concentrated in a fairly narrow zone running south from the Tanzanian border along the eastern shore of Lake Malawi to Vila Cabral and Catur, where the railway terminates. A start had been made to extend the line to Vila Cabral, but

several key centers in government in Portugal, taken to reduce their power, the announcement of that another 7,000 no change of policy.³⁴ It is, largely because of a need to reach any part of the country that the insurgents and modern antiaircraft toys were increasingly able to cross from many civilians, and threats.

Insurgents for holding on to section of the population half the territory, as the inhabitants, a great many or fortified villages sat in the event of a war important factors in the cause everybody knows in Africa, the economic-political and Mozambique. entirely to superior population to cooperate in the intention of withdrawing and means to secure the authors of this of cause everybody knows and because everybody

avoid the surprises of the northern frontier and the constructed airstrips and a considerable force in to clear rural areas and to settle the inhabitants could not work at night. As a result, the insurrection in Rovuma River, the border attempts to assimilate there for some years and a few cities. After the onset of

421

["PORTUGUESE AFRICA", "this was abandoned because of the continuing FRELIMO threat. The Portuguese have a naval base at Metangula, from which they patrol the lake and where there is a fortified village with several thousand inhabitants.", "In Niassa District, as in Cabo Delgado District, the system of concentrating the population in fortified villages proved very effective. In Niassa, moreover, the defense of many of the villages was left to local militia, usually, but not always, under command of a European NCO. As in Guinea, the villages were surrounded by barbed wire, usually with watchtowers, sometimes with an inner perimeter of bunkers and slit trenches. The villagers were free to go in or out but were expected to return at night, which they normally did. Nearly all contained schools provided by the government with African teachers, as well as dispensaries.", "Another area of insurgency was in the vicinity of Milange, close by the frontier with Malawi in Zambezia District. In the summer of 1965, two FRELIMO units, who had presumably come from Malawi, operated for a short time as far inland as Tacuane, the center of a tea-growing country, where they killed several headmen and some Portuguese before being rounded up or shot.", "Later there was some infiltration from Zambia, organized by COREMO from headquarters in Lusaka, but this was ineffective and was not taken very seriously by the Portuguese. Since at that time there were no known training camps for Mozambican guerrillas in Zambia, it was thought that the infiltrators' mission was political rather than military, in accordance with the COREMO plan for preparing the population for \"a massive uprising at a propitious time of COREMO's own choosing.\"37 Under this plan, small guerrilla units were to remain permanently in Mozambique, but, after making a few attacks in Tete District, the raiders usually retired across the frontier.", "By late in 1967, FRELIMO was faced with the fact that its activities were being contained in two relatively small areas, the northeastern corner of Cabo Delgado District, mainly the Makonde plateau, and the northwestern corner of Niassa District. Furthermore, within these areas at least 250,000 people, perhaps half the population, were living in fortified villages under Portuguese protection,38 and the number of such villages was constantly increasing. This situation led FRELIMO to search for another front. With the Cabora Bassa dam looming as a major project to cement the Portuguese position, FRELIMO sought to impede or harass those who were involved in the area. As a result, infiltration into Tete District began in mid-1968. As 1969 began, Eduardo Mondlane reported that his intention was \"to paralyze the work on the dam, or to make it more costly than the contractors had calculated.\"39 The Portuguese, for their part, reportedly with some South African assistance, began to fortify their defenses in that area.", "The failure of FRELIMO to make gains further south was due partly to the effectiveness of Portuguese counteraction, both military and administrative, but even more to tribal opposition. Although the FRELIMO hierarchy reflected no tribal emphasis, nevertheless, with their bases in Tanzania, they were obliged to recruit fighters from those who were already living there or just across the frontier, nearly all of whom were either Makonde or Nyanja. To the south of these two tribes lived other, more numerous and important tribes. When the", "guerrillas tried to progress blocked by cstrongholds they have already noted the being one of the two largest and most powerful tribal enities. To a city in the south and the Muslim Yao, and the Muslim Yao.", "Although there were some outside the areas of greatest influence of the big towns, Beira, the early days of PIDEAT keep a surveillance of the country, they remain.", "As in Angola, national and have helped to control their own. estimated their own. omitting casualties in deaths of injured soldiers. The PIDEAT seems likely that Portuguese divergent information. FRELIMO claimed to have published and the trial of the PIDEAT leaders. FRELIMO claimed to have years of the insurgent resistance. FRELIMO claimed to have varied greatly from the PIDEAT. Uria Simango, in an estimate, estimates are consid-", "Foreign Aid", "Eduardo Mondlane arms from the East, provided by the African Unity, with whom he is associated. He is a member of the African National Union (UAF), and of the Nationalist Party (P.N.P.). He is also a member of the National Assembly (1973-1978) and of the National Executive Council (1978-1980). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 1978, but was removed from office in 1980 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (1982-1985). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 1980, but was removed from office in 1985 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (1985-1988). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 1985, but was removed from office in 1988 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (1988-1992). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 1988, but was removed from office in 1992 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (1992-1996). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 1992, but was removed from office in 1996 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (1996-1999). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 1996, but was removed from office in 1999 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (1999-2003). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 1999, but was removed from office in 2003 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2003-2007). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2003, but was removed from office in 2007 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2007-2011). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2007, but was removed from office in 2011 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2011-2015). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2011, but was removed from office in 2015 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2015-2020). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2015, but was removed from office in 2020 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2020-2024). 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He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2056, but was removed from office in 2060 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2060-2064). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2060, but was removed from office in 2064 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2064-2068). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2064, but was removed from office in 2068 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2068-2072). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2068, but was removed from office in 2072 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2072-2076). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2072, but was removed from office in 2076 by Pres. Nyerere. 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He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2088, but was removed from office in 2088 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2088-2100). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2088, but was removed from office in 2088 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2088-2100). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2088, but was removed from office in 2088 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2088-2100). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2088, but was removed from office in 2088 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2088-2100). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2088, but was removed from office in 2088 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2088-2100). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2088, but was removed from office in 2088 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2088-2100). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2088, but was removed from office in 2088 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2088-2100). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2088, but was removed from office in 2088 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2088-2100). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2088, but was removed from office in 2088 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2088-2100). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2088, but was removed from office in 2088 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2088-2100). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2088, but was removed from office in 2088 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2088-2100). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique in 2088, but was removed from office in 2088 by Pres. Nyerere. He is now a member of the National Assembly (2088-2100). He was named as one of the six members of the Government of the Republic

guerrillas tried to penetrate beyond their own tribal territory, they found their progress blocked by either apathy or hostility from the African population. We have already noted the enmity between the Makonde and the Makua, the latter being one of the two largest ethnic groups in Mozambique. The Portuguese have recruited the Makua into defensive forces and have not hesitated to make use of tribal enmities. To a lesser extent, friction existed between the Christian Nyanja and the Muslim Yao.

Although there were, no doubt, nationalist supporters in other parts of the country, they remained inactive. There were practically no acts of sabotage outside the areas of guerrilla warfare. Such organization as FRELIMO had in the big towns, Beira and Lourenço Marques, seems to have been broken up in the early days of PIDE (the Portuguese security police), which has continued to keep a surveillance on suspected FRELIMO sympathizers.

As in Angola, nationalist claims of success have been consistently exaggerated and have helped to confuse the picture. Portuguese estimates have also underestimated their own casualties, since they only report those who die in battle, omitting casualties in accidents, which may include mine explosions and the deaths of injured soldiers. Nevertheless, Portuguese authorities must inform the next of kin of the dead and, if there were a wild discrepancy between the published and the true figures, the fact would become apparent. Therefore, it seems likely that Portuguese figures are fairly accurate. Many examples of the divergent information can be found. In one of these, during November, 1967, FRELIMO claimed that its forces had killed over fifty Portuguese, while the Portuguese admitted to only three.⁴⁰ Estimates of casualties for the first four years of the insurgency are likewise difficult to determine. By September, 1968, FRELIMO claimed to have killed 1,500 Portuguese troops.⁴¹ That estimate varied greatly from the figure of 5,000 claimed by FRELIMO's vice-president, Uria Simango, in a statement at Dar es Salaam early in 1968.⁴² Portuguese estimates are considerably below both numbers.

### Foreign Aid

Eduardo Mondlane boasted in 1965 that he received "money from the West and arms from the East," as much of both as he needed. Some of his funds were also provided by the African Liberation Committee (first referred to as the Committee of Nine and later of Eleven) which was set up in 1963 by the Organization of African Unity, with an office in Dar es Salaam. In March, 1967, however, he told an interviewer in Tunis that aid received from the OAU was being reduced month by month but that FRELIMO received substantial aid from the U.S.S.R., China, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria.⁴³ The reliance on Communist sources reflected an unwillingness of Western countries to provide assistance. The aid received from Western countries was "mostly from churches and humanitarian pro-African committees, and is designated for our educational, refugee, and other humanitarian programs."⁴⁴

The sites for the training and refugee camps were provided by the Tanzanian Government, and nearly all the arms and military equipment came from Communist countries, as shown from captured material. The principal training camp

423

threat. The Portuguese lake and its inhabitants.

In 1965, the Portuguese of concentrating Niassa, moreover, and, usually, but not always, the villages were able to go in or out times with an inner party of ten. Nearly all the teachers, as well as the pupils.

The Portuguese were close by the end of 1965, two further operated for a short time, where they rounded up or shot. The last by COREMO was not taken very seriously, but the known training that the infiltrators' with the COREMO group had propitious time of using their Portuguese units were to launch attacks in Tete.

Its activities were known later of Cabo Verde. The western corner of the island, with 10,000 people, per-under Portuguese rule, was increasing. This Cabora Bassa dam, FRELIMO's first, infiltration Mondlane reported, made it more costly than the other parts, reportedly inense in that area. Its due partly to the administrative, but arbitrary, policy reflected no reason why they were obliged to make it just across the border. To the south of the coast, as well as the tribes. When the

PORTUGUESE AFRICA

was installed at Kongwa, 100 miles west of Dar es Salaam. Financed by the OAU and one of the sites of a British groundnut (peanut) scheme that failed shortly after World War II, Kongwa was already partially equipped. Old buildings were rehabilitated and new ones constructed with a view to accommodating up to 12,000 people, mainly refugees and rebels from Rhodesia, South Africa, and the Portuguese territories. A smaller camp, to which recruits were sent for "boot training," was located at the small port of Bagamoyo, a short distance north of Dar es Salaam. Some of the leaders were given a course in guerrilla warfare at the Tlemcen base in Algeria. The operations were launched from bases in the south, in a chain from the Indian Ocean to the shore of Lake Nyasa: Lindi, Mtwara, Newala (where FRELIMO forces first gathered in the fall of 1964 in preparation for their entrance into Mozambique), Masasi, Tunduru, Songea, and Mbamba Bay. A road connected these bases, and the entire area was insulated from daily Tanzanian life by the Selous Game Reserve. While primarily designed to support operations in Mozambique, the bases were also used by rebels seeking to re-enter Zambia and Malawi.

The instructors were reported to include East Europeans, Algerians, Cubans, and Chinese. Captured weapons were the usual heterogeneous collection: the rifles of East European, West European, and American origin and the more sophisticated arms, such as mortars and bazookas, from China or Russia. Toward the end of 1967, new weapons made their appearance, notably the Kalashnikov AK47 automatic rifle and a new rocket launcher, both of Chinese manufacture.⁴⁵

## The Border Situation

Most manpower available for the continuing insurgency derives from among the Mozambicans who have migrated to Malawi, Kenya, Zambia, and Tanzania in the past two or three decades.⁴⁶ The liberation groups claimed that 7,000 refugees had entered Tanzania before September, 1964, when the first raids were launched across the frontier, but this was probably an overestimate. By 1968, the figure had risen to over 10,000 and, including families, possibly much higher. It would be a mistake to assume, however, that all refugees were involved in political activities. Many of them were simply escaping, after being caught in crossfire. Some became involved in refugee projects such as communal agricultural schemes in southern Tanzania making them less willing to join the ranks of the fighters. For this reason, such schemes did not find favor with the nationalists.⁴⁷

After the first few years, the Committee of Nine concluded that the nationalist political leaders and refugee groups did not make able and dedicated fighters. A possible alternative that was considered was the raising of an international brigade of mercenaries, officered by professionals and recruited from all races. However, such a force presented both practical difficulties of recruitment and organization and a potential challenge to the authority of the host government. That idea soon lost favor.

The Rovuma River line and the region immediately to the south comprise a natural defensive area for Mozambique. The banks of the Rovuma River and its valley are, for the most part, rugged and wild. Most of the migratory groups from Mozambique to Tanzania have not crossed the river directly but have

moved upstream in small miles, passing the 5-mile-guese tactical advantage alr air reconnaissance, using h strips were built at Umtanu to support reconnaissance aircraft. In addition, Mueguese have also constructed operations. Their main n rail to the new port at N Africa.

The central flank—bord vulnerability than the Tar waterway to support infiltr political tie between Ba Malawi has strategic inter Africa. (Malawi and Portug Africa in October, 1966.) two most important cities, to the east, south, and wes between Nova Freixo and Ma for Malawi. Because of the that the Portuguese had pl increase in infiltration fro tical situation in Malawi it forces across Lake Nyasa mented, since the southern more than 60 miles wide, c have completed a lake bas according to one observer, seal off the southern end of

The vulnerability of the Malawi-Lake Nyasa area, in Portuguese settlement. Po Zambian Government, as tions with Zambia continu independence (UDI). Zamb extent, Lourenço Marque played a delicate political demands and assuming a p tical support. Similarly, ho movements in the early ye commitment to what Kaun and more to make Lusak Africa. By 1967, he had a operations from Zambia.

424

CONFLICT IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA

moved upstream in small boats along the banks, a distance of more than 30 miles, passing the 5-mile-wide zone cleared by the Portuguese. The Portuguese tactical advantage along the entire river line has been vastly enhanced by air reconnaissance, using helicopters and light aircraft. During 1963, new air strips were built at Umtamba, Midumba, Ngamba, Mueda, and Palma in order to support reconnaissance efforts and to provide bases for fighters and transport aircraft. In addition, Mueda and Palma were joined by a new road. The Portuguese have also constructed a naval base at Porto Amélia, to assist in surveillance operations. Their main military headquarters is at Nampula, connected by rail to the new port at Nacala, one of the largest natural harbors in East Africa.

The central flank—bordering Malawi and Zambia—may be an area of greater vulnerability than the Tanzanian border. Lake Nyasa has already served as a waterway to support infiltration. However, there was always an extremely strong political tie between Banda's government and the Portuguese. Economically, Malawi has strategic interests which are closely tied to the southern part of Africa. (Malawi and Portugal alone opposed the U.N. resolution on South-West Africa in October, 1966.) Malawi is dependent upon Beira for transit, and its two most important cities, Zomba, the capital, and Blantyre-Limbe are flanked to the east, south, and west by Mozambique. When the projected railway between Nova Freixo and Malawi is completed, Nacala will become the chief outlet for Malawi. Because of the vulnerability of the Lake Nyasa area, it was believed that the Portuguese had plans to counter a number of contingencies, such as an increase in infiltration from Tanzania along the lake routes, or a changed political situation in Malawi itself. Reportedly, the plans included the movement of forces across Lake Nyasa and into Malawi and were capable of being implemented, since the southern portion of Malawi near the end of Lake Nyasa is no more than 60 miles wide, of which the lake constitutes 35 miles. The Portuguese have completed a lake base for marine commandos at Port Arroio, from which, according to one observer, "it would take no more than three or four hours to seal off the southern end of Lake Nyasa."⁴⁸

The vulnerability of the Zambian-Mozambique border is different from the Malawi-Lake Nyasa area, inasmuch as it is further removed from major areas of Portuguese settlement. Portuguese relations have never been as close with the Zambian Government, as with Malawi, yet Portuguese political and trade relations with Zambia continued even after the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). Zambia retains a dependency upon Beira, and, to a lesser extent, Lourenço Marques, for transit purposes. In the UDI crises, Kaunda played a delicate political game of realpolitik by making calculated public demands and assuming a posture aggressive enough to maintain internal political support. Similarly, he gave no more than token support to the liberation movements in the early years. However, geography and a deeply felt sense of commitment to what Kaunda has seen as an African necessity have tended more and more to make Lusaka a capital of revolution for the whole of southern Africa. By 1967, he had agreed to allow Angolan insurgents to expand their operations from Zambia. Subsequently, a training camp was also sanctioned

 financed by the ) scheme that failed equipped. Old build- low to accommodating desia, South Africa, recruits were sent for yo, a short distance to guerrilla war- launched from bases Lake Nyasa: Lindi, the fall of 1964 in Tunduru, Songea, the entire area was free. While primarily were also used by

Algerians, Cubans, bus collection: the begin and the more or Russia. Toward the Kalashnikov ese manufacture.⁴⁵

s from among the and Tanzania in at 7,000 refugees launched 1968, the figure higher. It would alved in political right in crossfire. cultural schemes of the fighters. lists.⁴⁷

at the national- dedicated fighters. international suited from all of recruitment the host govern-

th comprise a River and its gratory groups ectly but have

425

## PORTUGUESE AFRICA

first for Rhodesian and South Africa freedom fighters and later for Mozambicans. Zambian bases were used in mid-1968 by a group of guerrillas who attempted unsuccessfully to pass through Mozambique to South Africa. Portuguese defensive activities in the area began to worry the Zambian Government.

To sum up, so long as the conflict remains confined to the north, where the terrain and the wildness of the country favor the guerrillas, the military challenge to the Portuguese is limited, and there is no great danger to the rest of Mozambique. Furthermore, if the guerrillas succeed in advancing southward, the flat, open terrain would favor the Portuguese, and the nationalists might also be faced with the threat of action by Rhodesia and South Africa to remove the potential danger to their territories.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, between 40,000 and 60,000 Portuguese troops are necessary to carry on the present Portuguese policy. How much the defense effort can continue to expand is questionable.

## THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY

With the development of conflict in each of its territories on the African continent, the Portuguese have themselves witnessed a decade of change that affected their own military establishment.⁵⁰ In 1961, only a few thousand troops guarded an empire. By late in 1968, an estimated 120,000 to 150,000 troops fought a continuing struggle with an enemy whose numbers were increasing, whose tactics were maturing, and whose materiel was improving.

The immediate response to the 1961 uprising was to send troops to Angola. Later responses included the recruitment of more troops, the extension of military service obligations, modernization of equipment, and the expanded use of military officers in administrative positions formerly filled by civilians. What had been seen as military necessities have led to a greater reliance on the military and to a greater military presence, both in Portuguese Africa and within the government in Lisbon.

A major change in the decade was the growth of the Portuguese military establishment. The total strength of the armed forces in 1964 was about 80,000, about three-fourths of whom were in the army, with the rest divided almost evenly between the navy and the air force. By mid-1968, that figure had surpassed 180,000, the numbers were still increasing, and the emphasis (over 80 per cent) was clearly on the army.⁵¹ Although some of the troops were committed to the Portuguese participation in NATO, for the most part their purpose was to fight in Portuguese Africa. Though exact information was lacking, the general newspaper consensus suggested 40,000 to 60,000 in Angola, 40,000 to 60,000 in Mozambique, and 25,000 to 30,000 in Guinea. The requirements of a particular conflict often required more of one branch than another. Thus, there was a greater naval effort in Guinea than in the other territories.

The deepening of the Portuguese military commitment brought changes in national service requirements. Previously all youths had been required to serve for two years upon reaching age twenty-one. Those who wished at that age to continue their schooling could do so, since they would later be available as officers. The new manpower needs, however, forced a change of policy. In 1967,

military service was eighteen, the foreign total service obligation year tour of duty in Africa was difficult to determine.

Instructions in command of the Portuguese army in Malaya. Later, elite units of the metropolitan Portuguese military

Broadly speaking, ensure internal security has been suggested by the nor Arnaldo Schulte of that mission. The area to be overrun by PAIGC is least successful in FbK's Bakongo are now being overrun by PAIGC.

The Portuguese needs. Immediate national trust previous general trust previous guese troops. By 1961, resorting to African were "locally recruited" and were neither

Other than in the that frequently has other rural towns. The militiamen in wider which sometimes act (PIDE) are also part

An important ad insurgents is the commitment, including virtually all the most army material and air equipment. from using NATO however, has been helicopters from FbK.

The combination of being costly to Portugal, amount to slightly it was shown in C. expenses, the burde

426

military service was opened to women, the age of entrance was lowered to eighteen, the foreign travel of sixteen-year-olds was carefully limited, and the total service obligation was lengthened to four years, through a mandatory two-year tour of duty in Africa. Although these new laws also apply to Africans, it is difficult to determine how diligently they are applied.

Instructions in counterinsurgency tactics were being used in the training of the Portuguese army by 1962, following precedents developed by the British in Malaya. Later, elite commando units began to be trained in Angola as well as in metropolitan Portugal. These units were trained to embody the total mission of the Portuguese military.

Broadly speaking, that mission was threefold: to defend territorial borders, to ensure internal security, and to develop a program of psychosocial activity. As has been suggested before, a major tactic used by the Portuguese joined all parts of that mission. The principle of fortified villages, often associated with Governor Arnaldo Schultz of Guinea, has also been used in northern and eastern Angola and in northern Mozambique. Its success seems to have varied from area to area. It has been most successful in northern Angola, where repatriated Bakongo are now participants in a thriving, coffee-based rural economy, and least successful in Portuguese Guinea, where many of the hamlets have been overrun by PAIGC forces.

The Portuguese have traditionally relied on African allies to fill military needs. Immediate manpower needs after 1961 and a lack of confidence in the general trust previously given native Africans led to an over-reliance on Portuguese troops. By 1968, however, there were signs that the Portuguese were again resorting to African troops. An observer estimated that 19,000 troops in Angola were "locally recruited" and racially mixed.⁵² It remained clear that the Portuguese were neither unwilling nor unable to find Africans to fight for Portugal.

Other than in the official military units, Africans were also part of local militia that frequently handled the major defense burdens of the fortified villages and other rural towns. The Portuguese have armed these militia and occasionally use militiamen in wider combat. Civil defense units (Voluntários e Defesa Civil), which sometimes act as vigilantes, Public Security Police, and the secret police (PIDE) are also part of the defense effort.

An important advantage that the Portuguese maintain over the nationalist insurgents is the capacity to manufacture much of their own military equipment, including vital river-patrol craft. Nevertheless, though self-sufficient in most army material, Portugal has to rely on foreign sources for its major naval and air equipment.⁵³ Although Portugal is a member of NATO, it is restricted from using NATO equipment in African wars. A major asset to the Portuguese, however, has been the ability to acquire jet planes from West Germany and helicopters from France.

The combination of increased material needs and larger troop demands has been costly to Portugal. Defense expenditures have risen substantially until they amount to slightly less than half of current government expenditures. Although it was shown in Chapter XV that the Portuguese economy can tolerate these expenses, the burden has not passed unfelt.

and later for Mozambique of guerrillas who South Africa. Portuguese Government. the north, where the as, the military challenge to the rest ofADVANCING southward, the nationalists might with Africa to remove between 40,000 and present Portuguese be questionable. It is

In the African contin-
change that affected
and troops guarded
troops fought a con-
ning, whose tactics were

nd troops to Angola.
The extension of mili-
ty in the expanded use of
by civilians. What
terence on the
ese Africa and within

Portuguese military
1964 was about 80,000,
rest divided almost
that figure had sur-
e emphasis (over 80
the troops were com-
part their purpose
ion was lacking, the
n Angola, 40,000 to
the requirements of a
another. Thus, there
cories.

brought changes in
en required to serve
vished at that age to
later be available as
ge of policy. In 1967,

427

PORTUGUESE AFRICA

It is difficult to obtain an accurate figure for Portugal's annual military expen-
diture, because of the separation between what are considered "extraordinary"
defense expenditures and other allocations for military purposes that appear
elsewhere. Moreover, in order to present a balanced budget, estimated revenues
and expenditures are usually considerably lower than actually anticipated, and
the real situation can be known only after the accounts have been approved,
usually two years later.⁵⁴

Portugal's Budget Allocations for Extraordinary Overseas Forces
(in Millions of Dollars), 1961-68

<table><thead><tr><th>Years</th><th>Initial</th><th>Supplementary</th><th>Total</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1961</td><td>32.3</td><td>51</td><td>83.3</td></tr><tr><td>1962</td><td>51</td><td>61.1</td><td>112.1</td></tr><tr><td>1963</td><td>59.5</td><td>56.6</td><td>116.1</td></tr><tr><td>1964</td><td>59.5</td><td>62.9</td><td>122.4</td></tr><tr><td>1965</td><td>68</td><td>74.5*</td><td>142.5*</td></tr><tr><td>1966</td><td>85</td><td>63.6</td><td>148.6</td></tr><tr><td>1967</td><td>119</td><td>59.6</td><td>178.6</td></tr><tr><td>1968</td><td>136</td><td>—</td><td>—</td></tr></tbody></table>

* As revised in the 1967 budget.

Source: Portugal, *Diário do Governo* (Lisbon, 1961-67).

The Portuguese, of course, maintain other defense requirements, but since
1962, the Extraordinary Overseas Forces have absorbed an average of two-
thirds of total defense allocations.

Portugal's Military Budget (in Millions of Dollars), 1962-67

<table><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>Extraordinary<br>Overseas<br>Forces</th><th>Total<br>Defense<br>Allocations</th><th>Total<br>Ordinary<br>Budget</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1962</td><td>112.1</td><td>193.7†</td><td>280.1</td></tr><tr><td>1963</td><td>116.1</td><td>198.7†</td><td>307.2</td></tr><tr><td>1964</td><td>122.4</td><td>222.6†</td><td>326.3</td></tr><tr><td>1965</td><td>142.5</td><td>246.8†</td><td>364.1</td></tr><tr><td>1966</td><td>148.6</td><td>213.5</td><td>374.1</td></tr><tr><td>1967</td><td>178.6</td><td>267</td><td>428.6</td></tr><tr><td>1968</td><td>136*</td><td>280.9</td><td>575.1</td></tr></tbody></table>

* Initial allocation.

† Actual expenditure.

Sources: Figures for EOF and total ordinary budget allocations from Portugal, *Orçamento geral do estado* (Decree 48,164), in *Diário do governo* (Lisbon), I, 298 (December 26, 1967). Total defense allocations for 1962-65 from Portugal, *Projet de loi d'autorisation des recettes et des dépenses pour 1966* (Lisbon), p. 227, Table 14, and *ibid.*, 1967 (Lisbon), p. 243, Table 10. For 1966-67, Portugal, *Rapport sur le budget général de l'état pour 1967* (Lisbon), p. 75. For 1968, *Diário do governo* (Lisbon), Table XXXIII.

By late in 1968, the r
than seven years old
confined to limited ar
on much as usual, t
require an army of
national budget. Ev
two-year tour of dut
nation's resources for
increasingly on the r
of breaking the dead
line.

One possibility was
artillery, and armor.
example, has proven
operating as guerrilla
replacement, and sho
with a base, there is a
Massive retaliation w
strongest point has al
the population, and
bombing, would hav

Another possibility was
duction into the inst
which there was alro
training in the field l
Congo. However, ex
training would mak
come first been won over.

Another possibility
panied by the cessa
neither of these seem
and experience with
Portugal would be ef
first, the Portuguese
of Portugal, it wou
Salazar. But this di
successor was to con
movements, although
take up arms agains
the organizers much
occasional opportun
exile was made toler
ment. On the other
main suppliers of ar
champions of the "g

428

### CONCLUSION

By late in 1968, the nationalist challenge to Portuguese rule in Africa was more than seven years old and no end to it was in sight. While the disturbance was confined to limited areas of the three territories affected, and life elsewhere went on much as usual, the containment of the liberation movement continued to require an army of at least 120,000 men and to absorb 40 per cent of the national budget. Every Portuguese called up for national service had to face a two-year tour of duty in Africa; and the fact that this, and the drain on the nation's resources for defense expenditures, might continue indefinitely weighed increasingly on the national consciousness and pocketbook. Was there any way of breaking the deadlock, by one side or the other forcing a decision?

One possibility was a great increase in Portugal's use of military force, bombing, artillery, and armor. Apart from the expense involved, the use of bombers, for example, has proven relatively unsuccessful in other areas against insurgents operating as guerrillas. For every guerrilla killed or captured there is always a replacement, and short of occupying or destroying the country that provides him with a base, there is no means of preventing foreign supplies from reaching him. Massive retaliation would also not be in accord with Portuguese policy. Portugal's strongest point has always been the loyalty, or at least neutrality, of the majority of the population, and to increase repression, for example by large-scale napalm bombing, would have thrown this away.

Another possibility was an increase in rebel effectiveness through the introduction into the insurgent forces of more efficient equipment and weapons, of which there was already evidence by 1967, and the provision of badly needed training in the field by the attachment of foreign instructors, as was done in the Congo. However, experience suggested that neither better weapons nor better training would make a major difference, until the bulk of the population had first been won over.

Another possibility was that of firmer action by the United Nations, accompanied by the cessation of arms supplies to Portugal by NATO allies; but neither of these seemed very likely, at least while the war in Vietnam continued, and experience with Rhodesia did not hold out any hope that sanctions against Portugal would be effective. Finally, therefore, it boiled down to who would tire first, the Portuguese or their opponents. Were there any weakening on the part of Portugal, it would presumably have appeared after the retirement of Dr. Salazar. But this did not occur; on the contrary, one of the first acts of his successor was to confirm that the struggle would continue. As for the liberation movements, although some might tire, there would always be others willing to take up arms against the Portuguese and colonialism. After all, it did not cost the organizers much, since all the guerrillas asked for was their keep, a rifle, and occasional opportunities for battle spoils, while for the political leaders, their exile was made tolerably comfortable by the funds they received for the movement. On the other hand, the cost to the Communist countries, who were the main suppliers of arms and supplies, was a small price to pay for posing as the champions of the "oppressed" colonial peoples, thus enhancing their standing

annual military expended "extraordinary" purposes that appear to, estimated revenues actually anticipated, and have been approved,

## Overseas Forces

Total

83.3

112.1

116.1

122.4

142.5*

148.6

178.6

 retirements, but since an average of two-

1967

Total

Ordinary

Budget

280.1

307.2

326.3

364.1

374.1

428.6

575.1

tions from Portugal, Mo (Lisbon), I, 298 from Portugal, Projet p. 227, Table 14,ugal, Rapport sur le Diário do governo

429

PORTUGUESE AFRICA

in the United Nations and their influence in the world, especially with the
developing nations. Given the resolve of both sides, all signs pointed to a long
continuation of the conflict in Portuguese Africa.

NOTES

1. Galvão acted as a subordinate to General Humberto Delgado, who ran for the Portuguese presidency in 1958 and later became leader of the exile opposition, with headquarters in Brazil. This operation was conceived as having two phases: first, the seizure of the "Santa Maria" and attraction of world-wide support as conducted by rebels against the Salazar and Franco regimes; second, a surprise attack upon the Spanish-held island of Fernando Po, followed later by an operation to take control of Luanda, supposedly with the help of local rebel forces. Galvão's anticipation of the help of Angolan rebels, and, in fact, his attempt to gain the support of the Africans in the crew of the "Santa Maria," should not be interpreted as his support for the immediate liberation of the Portuguese territories. He asserted, in 1961, that the "immediate and absolute independence of Angola . . . in the situation found at present in the Portuguese colonies, after 30 years of Salazar's colonialism, can only lead Angola to the chaotic situation which exists in the Congo." He felt that the nationalist groups later formed did not represent "more than a minute minority of Angolans with a capacity for self-determination" and that, anyway, self-determination for Africa should occur only after "the return of the Portuguese nation to a regime of representative democracy." As for the revolution, which he personally hoped to foment in Portuguese Africa, he primarily looked to, in his words, "the white inhabitants of Angola and Mozambique shown by popular vote to be clearly anti-Salazar." The "Santa Maria" thus excited international attention, at a time when a change of government had taken place in Washington and was about to take place in Brazil. The ship surrendered at Recife on February 2, but not before there had been considerable speculation as to whether the seizure portended a wider rebel effort against the Portuguese Government. These events had led to an alert in Angola. (See Henrique Galvão, *Santa Maria: My Crusade for Portugal* (Cleveland, 1961), pp. 223-24 and 233.) Galvão had been high inspector of colonial administration from 1946 to 1949 and served in the National Assembly for Angola, where, in 1948, he delivered a critical report on native problems in Portuguese colonies. In 1952, he directed the presidential campaign of Admiral Quintão Meireles. The following year, he was tried and sent to prison, but he escaped in 1959. For a book that challenges Galvão's *Santa Maria: My Crusade for Portugal* and deflates most of his claims, see Beth Day, *Passage Perilous: The Stormy Saga of the Santa Maria* (New York, 1962).

2. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, XIII, 18070.

3. *Ibid*.

4. Ronald Waring, "The Case for Portugal," in *Angola: A Symposium, Views of a Revolt* (London, 1962), p. 31, adds that this "was the biggest slaughter of Europeans which has taken place in Africa in this century and it passed almost unnoticed in the world press."

5. Douglas Wheeler, "Reflections on Angola," *Africa Report*, November, 1967, p. 58.

6. A statement of the point of view of at least one of these Baptist missionaries

430

may be found in
Symposium: Views
of the uprisings in
 enemy's bullets in
p. 89.

7. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*,

8. A Kikongo word
enemy's bullets in

9. Hugh Kay, "A Contempt
p. 89.

10. Parsons (op. cit., F.
suffered appalling
of the uprising th
Parsons also de
and troops is far
sources have con
denials . . . Allow
who were dear to t
Africans all over t
were considered p

11. Kay, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

12. Pieter Lessing, *On
"Three Revolutions
400,000 in 1967.
... of South Africa*

13. One is tempted to
fact that both wars
similarity between
advantages not en
have been in Ango
Portuguese. Parso
presence has been
in school has crea
Congolese where
vernaculars." Ther
their own possess
aggression.

14. The Voice of Ango
January 17, 1965.

15. Belgrade Tanug Se
that a meeting betw
Cairo. The results o

16. The Junta de Inve
Políticos e Sociais,
analyzing the tacti
suitable for comba
Pinheiro, has show
by the subversives i
fear. "Natureza e F
subversão (Lisbon, 1

17. L'Alger Républicain
Information Bulletin
p. 49.

18. Marcum, op. cit., p.

world, especially with the
signs pointed to a long

Delgado, who ran for the
er of the exile opposition,
conceived as having two
attraction of world-wide
ar and Franco regimes;
island of Fernando Po,
nda, supposedly with the
help of Angolan rebels,
icans in the crew of the
port for the immediate
1961, that the "immedi-
tuation found at present
's colonialism, can only
the Congo." He felt that
"more than a minute
ation" and that, anyway,
the return of the Portu-
" As for the revolution,
ese Africa, he primarily
ngola and Mozambique
the "Santa Maria" thus
nge of government had
ace in Brazil. The ship
here still been consider-
ed a wider rebel effort
had led to an alert in
Crusade for Portugal
been high inspector of
the National Assembly
rt on native problems in
residential campaign of
was tried and sent to
ll Challenges Galvão's Santa
is claims, see Beth Day,
la (New York, 1962).

The *Symposium, Views of a*
the biggest slaughter of
ary and it passed almost

*Report, November, 1967,*

these Baptist missionaries

CONFLICT IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA

may be found in Clifford Parsons, "The Making of a Revolt," *Angola: A Symposium: Views of a Revolt*, p. 59.

7. Keesing's *Contemporary Archives*, XIII, 18071.

8. A Kikongo word for the magic that certain tribes believed would turn their enemy's bullets into water.

9. Hugh Kay, "A Catholic View," *Angola: A Symposium: Views of a Revolt*, p. 89.

10. Parsons (op. cit., p. 67) says: "During the first assaults many European settlers suffered appalling deaths with their families, a terrible and repugnant feature of the uprising that has been well-publicized by the Portuguese authorities." Parsons also declares that "the evidence of atrocities by Portuguese civilians and troops is far too formidable to be denied, and indeed even Portuguese sources have concentrated on making excuses rather than persisting in early denials. . . . Allowance must be made for those Portuguese who had lost those who were dear to them. . . . But it can never justify the measures taken against Africans all over the country who, because they were intelligent and educated, were considered potential leaders."

11. Kay, op. cit., p. 96.

12. Pieter Lessing, *Only Hyenas Laugh* (London, 1964), p. 125. John A. Marcum, "Three Revolutions," *Africa Report*, November, 1967, p. 16, lists a figure of 400,000 in 1967.

13. One is tempted to draw parallels with the war in Vietnam, but, apart from the fact that both wars are waged by guerrillas supplied from abroad, there is little similarity between them. The Portuguese have historical and linguistic advantages not enjoyed by American troops in Southeast Asia: the Portuguese have been in Angola for nearly 500 years, and much of the population speaks Portuguese. Parsons (op. cit., p. 78) makes this point: "The Portuguese presence has been a unifying factor. The use of Portuguese as a first language in school has created a medium of communication that was denied to the Congolese where primary education until quite recently was wholly in the vernaculars." Then again, the Portuguese are defending what they consider their own possessions, not merely assisting a foreign government to resist aggression.

14. The Voice of Angola, Congo (Brazzaville) broadcast in Portuguese to Angola, January 17, 1965.

15. Belgrade Tanug Service in English, September 20, 1965. Neto also mentioned that a meeting between the two warring factions was scheduled to take place at Cairo. The results of the meeting (if, indeed, it took place) are not known.

16. The Junta de Investigação do Ultramar, through its Centro de Estudos Políticos e Sociais, has published a series of papers by various authors, analyzing the tactics used in the revolts in Portuguese Africa and the methods suitable for combating them. One of the contributors, Joaquim Franco Pinheiro, has shown that terrorism is a very important tactic methodically used by the subversives in order to gain dominance over a native population through fear. "Natureza e Fundamentos da guerra subversiva," *Subversão e contra-subversão* (Lisbon, 1963), p. 36.

17. L'Alger Républicain, March 10, 1965, quoted in "Smashing Their Chains," *Information Bulletin of the Communist and Workers' Parties* (Prague), No. 12, p. 49.

18. Marcum, op. cit., p. 10.

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# Sunrise for Angola?

Portugal and the three Angolan liberation movements have charted an orderly and democratic path that promises to lead the rich African territory to independence on Nov. 11. If the three groups can keep to their agreement and then manage to compete peacefully within a democratic frame, their example would be certain to have profound impact on developments in Rhodesia and South Africa, the only remaining bastions of white minority rule on the continent.

It will not be easy. For years the Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) have fought each other as fiercely as they fought the Portuguese. Their differences are ethnic and regional as well as ideological; and the rivalry between MPLA and FNLA has some relationship to the Sino-Soviet cold war.

Yet, great progress in healing wounds has been made in recent weeks, with sensitive diplomatic efforts by Dr. Jonas Savimbi of UNITA and ministers of Portugal's revolutionary Government, aided by a timely boost from President Kenyatta of Kenya.

Angolan independence will signal the final liquidation of Portugal's once-mighty empire. For 500 years the Portuguese professed undying faith in their imperial mission. Yet, after an authoritarian regime was overthrown last April by army officers fed up with endless African wars, a new Government adjusted to the tides of change with astonishing speed.

When India's Army seized the Portuguese enclave of Goa in 1961, Portugal plunged into mourning. The windup

of an empire in November will be accompanied instead by manifestations of joy and relief as the end of the colonial era promises the beginning of peace.

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