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we have a moral obligation as to the first part of the question, to place
any matter of interest before the U. N. whenever time and circumstances
would permit but later by the U. N. to take action at our request, should,
we thought, free our hands.

What was the margin of safety in considering how long we could
respond to threats to our interests? We thought that this margin of safety
could not be measured in finite terms but that we could not obviously wait
until it had become unambiguous. Different situations would present dif-
ficulties of interpretation. The difficulty of interpreting them should always
be resolved on the bold rather than the overcautious side. The hardest ones,
of course, and the simplest ones are where the direct security of the U. S.,
the continental security of the U. S., is threatened. The more difficult
ones were those over a longer term affecting the vital interest of the
United States. In those cases we felt that a vigorous analysis of the impli-
cations of taking preventive action were necessary and would at least tend
to minimize the difficulties.

MR. NASH: (Reporting on another subcommittee deliberation).

About the use of the Soviet veto -- as to whether we think the veto should
be abolished, we are now in a minority position in the U. N. We have got
to watch very carefully as to whether or not we want to withdraw from the

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U. N. -- which would mean the collapse of it -- or whether we want to have
safeguards like the two-thirds votes procedure on important questions in the
veto that will protect U. S. interests. We have to be awfully careful in
talking about the bloc questions, veto questions and so on. For the first
eight years of the U. N., we had a clear, irrefutable bloc. Out of the 52
nations we had a clear majority on everything. Now of 80 nations we
simply don't . . .

To use the United Nations as rather a catch-all for formulation of
foreign policy is a great mistake. We pointed out that the United States
had not done it, perhaps even citing the incident in Guatemala as a situation
where we chose to deal with the crisis there as a regional one, and actually
opposed the British and French who tried to drag that into the United Nations
and making it quite plain that the United States is not walking away from the
United Nations as a useful instrument, but getting it into focus as to what
its utility really is; that it is a platform not for marshalling world opinion,
but simply for having world opinions voiced. But that as a means of reaching
a military solution or even a political solution of any pressing problem of the
world as it is today, with the proliferation of it in terms of its 79 members,
some of which are quite young and immature countries organized in blocs,
that while we use the bloc system ourselves while we had the two-thirds

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majority, we now complain about the bloc system being used against us.

But understanding that the United Nations is simply not geared for us to go
ahead and pass the buck to them with respect to important questions of
action, whether military or whether political.

We feel there ought to be a re-definition of the United States'
position with respect to the importance of the United Nations. Making
it still a very important thing in our overall picture, but making it clear
that we should not duck behind the skirts of the United Nations and make
believe, in the fashion of the ostrich with his head in the sand, that they
can solve something that we should really be addressing ourselves to,
perhaps unilaterally. We should do this even at the expense of offending
some of our friends.

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PANEL II ALSO HEARD CONSIDERABLE TESTIMONY ON THE
SUBJECT OF DISARMAMENT AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENTS POSITIONS
AND PLANS. THESE DISCUSSIONS LED INTO ONE OF THE NEW
POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT WHICH TECHNOLOGY IS
BRINGING ABOUT, THE "FOURTH COUNTRY" QUESTION. MR. VINCENT
BAKER (on the staff of the Special Assistant to the President for
Disarmament) PROGRESSED TOWARDS THE FOURTH COUNTRY QUESTION
AS HE FINISHED HIS REPORT--

MR. BAKER: The possibilities (in nuclear developments) call not only for concrete steps toward reducing the nuclear threat and the danger of surprise attack but they impose on the United States the constant necessity to demonstrate leadership toward useful purposes by vigorous imaginative leadership in disarmament negotiations and they are essential to demonstrate the necessity for such defensive efforts as are required by free world states.

The second political objective I think might be stated as to
encourage favorable political developments within the communist
bloc. Even a limited inspection, a limited first stage disarmament
agreement could begin the opening up of the Soviet Union. It could

agreement could begin the ongoing nb of the Soviet Union. It could
become a limited inspection, a limited first stage disarmament
encourage favorable political developments within the communist
state. The second political objective I think might be stated as to
states.

necessity for such defensive efforts as are required by free world
dismarmament negotiations and they are essential to demonstrate the
toward useful armaments. By arduous insidious leadership in
United States the constant necessity to demonstrate leadership
threat and the danger ofekoaiase attack put their armaments on the
cell not only for concrete steps toward reducing the nuclear
states.

MR. BAKER: The capabilities (in nuclear developments)

vs he finished his report--

Dismarmament) progressed towards the fourth country question
BAKER (on the staff of the Special Vassalant to the President for
BRINGING ABOUT THE "FOURTH COUNTRY QUESTION" MR. AINCENT
POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT WHICH TECHNOLOGY IS
AND BYTES, THESE DISCUSSIONS LED INTO ONE OF THE NEW
SUBJECT OF DISARMAMENT AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENTS POSITIONS
BY THE II VRSO HEARD CONSIDERABLE TESTIMONY ON THE
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in the process initiate erosive political influences which could have
an important effect on the tyranny of that system. Also any lowering
of communist force level could accelerate centrifugal forces tendency
towards political independence in the satellites.

A third political objective I think is to begin a shift of East-West competition from a competition of force, more to a competition in the political, cultural and economic sphere, where the West has a broad advantage in the competition. Fourthly, limited septs in the disarmament field are needed to produce an impact on international political conditions favorable to the achievement of further U.S. political and security objectives.

In the pursuit of its security objective the United States, of
course, seeks concurrence both in national agreements on arms
limitation and the resolution of major international issues which
create tension among states. Armaments in armed forces, of course,
reflect tension arising from the distance of unresolved issues. But
to say that armament is nothing more than a reflection of political
tension is to overstate the case; you need character of modern
weaponry, and this makes the existence of unrestricted armaments
increasingly a source of tension itself, aggravating other issues and
making their settlement more difficult. If the upward spiraling of
tension and armament is to be successfully reversed, it must be by

tension and annihilation is to be successfully reversed, it must be
making their settlement more difficult. If the subsequent equalization of
increasingly a source of tension itself, aggravating other issues and
weakenly, and this makes the existence of unrestricted annuities
tension is to overstate the case; you need character of modern
to say first annihilation is nothing more than a reflection of political
reflect tension arising from the distance of unresolved issues. But
create tension among states. Volumes inued forces, of course,
limitation and the removal of major international issues which
course, seeks concurrence both in national agreements on some
In the pursuit of its security objective the United States, of
political and security objectives.

Political conditions favorable to the achievement of further U.S.
dissolution field are needed to produce an impact on international
a gross advantage in the competition. Lominarily, limited seats in the
in the political, cultural and economic sphere, where the West has
West competition from a competition of force, more to a competition
A third political objective I think is to begin a shift of East-
towards political independence in the satellites.

of communist force level could accelerate centrifugal forces tendency
an important effect on the tyranny of that system. Via any lowering
in the process initiate erosive political influences which could have

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concurrent progress on both elements of this interacting process.

Just as when the child was ill with high fever it is sometimes necessary
as a first step to lower the fever even before treating the disease.

There is a tendency I think in U.S. policy now to consider
the question of which comes first, disarmament or political settle-
ment, a kind of chicken and egg question which is not necessarily
profitable to debate. And the U. S. accordingly seems to begin
either with disarmament or with political settlements recognizing
that neither can proceed beyond a certain point without progress on
the other, and recognizing more importantly that progress neither
may well facilitate progress in the other. Finally in the economic
sphere there are security objectives both immediate and longer range.
Among the immediate objectives that might be listed would be efforts
to prevent or postpone decisions.

The United States is currently pursuing three parallel lines
of approach. One is the approach based on seeking early limitation
of nuclear weapons tests because this would inhibit the development
of poor country capability; one is of course, our proposal on the
control of future production of fissionable material, and the third is
the efforts being made in the establishment of an international atomic
energy agency to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy and to

energy agency to promote the beneficial use of atomic energy and to
the efforts being made in the establishment of an international atomic
control of future production of nuclear materials, and the fund is
of host country capability; one is of course, ouriproast on the
of nuclear weapons tests because this would inhibit the development
of arms race. One is the arms race based on seeking early limitation
The United States is currently pursuing three parallel lines
to prevent or boatouse decisions.

Among the immediate objectives that might be listed would be those
above there are security objectives both immediate and longer range.
may well facilitate boatouse in the other. Usually in the economic
the other, and recognizing more importantly that boatouse neither
that neither can proceed beyond a certain point without boatouse on
either with disarmament or with political settlements recognizing
profitable to destate. And the U. S. accordingly seems to begin
ment, a kind of chicanery and egg diction which is not necessarily
the question of which comes first, disarmament or political settle-
ment. There is a tendency I think in U. S. policy now to consider
as a first step to lower the lever even before treating the disease.
Just as when the child was ill with high fever it is sometimes necessary

concurrent disease on both elements of the intersecting process.

There is a tendency I think I think in U.S. policy now to consider
as a first step to lower the lever even before treating the disease.
Just as when the child was ill with high fever it is sometimes necessary

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assure that these materials will not be diverted into military purposes.

Perhaps the most important single development thus far in these London subcommittee meetings has been private indication by the Soviets that they themselves may be seriously concerned about the fourth country problem and willing to undertake limited steps to make a beginning toward a solution out of it.

Another economic objective of immediate character is of
course to begin to lower the rising curve of defense cost but in
particular to avert the considerable increase in defense cost that
may occur with the development of effective long-range nuclear
delivery systems by the communist bloc.

The longer range economic objectives are more familiar.

The spread of communist ideologies which menace the free world as a whole and contribute to the danger of war is fostered by human want and fear. These ideologies seem to thrive on the lower standards of living that may be produced by an excessive burden of armament, on the political and economic controls required to sustain that burden and on the fears and tensions aggravated by the nuclear threat.

MR. JOSEPH JOHNSON: I think we are very much beholden
to Mr. Baker for giving us this picture of the present posture of
the U.S. I must say that it is clearer than all of the things I have

the U.S. I must say that it is clearer than all of the things I have
to Mr. Baker for giving me this picture of the present posture of
MR. JOSEPH JOHNSON: I think we are very much pleased
thirst.

punden and on the tests and tensions abbreviated by the nuclear
on the political and economic controls required to sustain that
of living that may be produced by an excessive punden of armament,
want and test. These ideologies seem to drive online lower standards
as a whole and contribute to the danger of war is fostered by human
The spread of communist ideologies which menace the free world
The longer range economic objectives are more familiar.

delivery systems by the communist bloc.
may occur with the development of effective long-range nuclear
barrier to avert the considerable increase in defense cost that
conseque to begin to lower the trading curve of defense cost put in
Another economic objective of immediate character is of
beginning toward a solution out of it.

country problem and willing to undertake limited steps to make a
that they themselves may be seriously concerned about the fourth
subcommittee meeting has been private indication by the Soviets
because the most important single development thus far in these London
assure that these materials will not be diverted into military purposes.

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read and I think the picture he presents is an encouraging one in some respects. I am perhaps less optimistic, having been through this for a long time, than he expressed himself as being; but I do think that the shift from what he calls soup to nuts name of something like a total package of regulation of armaments to somewhat more limited objectives is a healthy sign. I think the proposals are much more realistic than the ones we dealt with in the earlier days when I was involved in the picture. I'm particularly gratified that the people in Washington decided to treat the issues versus arms questions as a checken and egg kind of question, and I would certainly agree with Mr. Baker that the modern weapons in themselves constitute a kind of political problem, political issue, which makes them somewhat different from weapons in the past.

I'm not very optimistic. I should be quite surprised to see any agreement signed in the very near future; yet I feel a certain urgency for this reason and here I have sometimes been accused of seeing burglars under beds -- I have a feeling that the kind of thing Dick Lindsay was talking about earlier here, and that Vince spoke about just now; a necessity of a 15 billion dollar increase in our military budget to make sense with the forces we now have; this kind of thing must hit the people when they are going to say "let's

["kind of thing must hit the people mentioned are going to ask, 'let's see, let's put a budget to make some money with the force we now have; this is a lot too much; a necessity of a 13 billion dollar increase in our military budget to make some money with the force we now have; this is a lot too much; a necessity of a 13 billion dollar increase in our military budget to make some money with the force we now have; here I have sometimes been accused of ambiguity for this reason and

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forget armaments, we've got a stalemate, let's disarm". I think there is a real danger in the present relationship -- the present balance of things, of the unilateral move for disarmament that existed after World War I. Now, maybe I'm saying too many things, maybe people will never go that far, but it does frankly scare me.

MR. WALKOWICZ: I think Mr. Baker and some of the others put it pretty comprehensively. Essentially we are at a critical point of no return, if you want to call it that now. As one projects the ICBM a few years ahead, essentially you can see Russia just becoming a ballistic booby-trap and you can see the whole disarmament inspection and inspection system problem achieving greater moral magnitude if it's going to be effective. So, this is a critical time as we stand on the threshold of a new era in weapons. Essentially this compulsion, plus the concurring need somehow or another to get more people inside Russia, I think ought to make us as a country interested in disarmament rather than being strictly realistic in Soviet discussions. This being the case, I think our disarmament appraisals ought to have five basic characteristics.

First, they ought to add to our military strength and be practical; second, they should point the way to peaceful collaterals of modern weapons technology; third, they should be so astutely

of mass weapons technology, third, they should be so suitably
practical, second, they should point the way to peaceful collabo-
larism, third, they ought to add to our military strength and be
appreciable ought to have five basic characteristics.

Soviet discussions. This being the case, I think our disarmament
interacted in disarmament rather than being strictly realistic in
det more people inside Russia. I think ought to make us as a country
this computation, but the concerning need somehow or another to
as we stand on the threshold of a new era in weapons. Essentially
magnitude if it's doing to be effective. So, this is a critical time
invasion and inspection system achieving greater moral
becoming a palliative, poopy-tab and you can see the whole disarmament
the ICBM a few years ahead, essentially you can see Russia just
point of no return, if you want to call it that now. As one projects
but it pretty comprehensively. Essentially we are at a critical

MR. WALKOWICS: I think Mr. Baker and some of the others
may be people will never do that, but it does่าง score me.
existed after World War I. Now, maybe I'm saying too many things,
palance of things, of the unilateral move for disarmament that
there is a real danger in the present relationship -- the present
target situations, we've got a stalemate, let's get rid of it." I think

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designed so that the Soviets end up behind the eight-ball when they say yes or no. Fourth, if we're wise and have our homework well done, and are prepared psychologically to capitalize on any advantage that various disarmaments proposals would put forth, I think we can keep the Soviets on the defensive...

MR. BAKER: There are various common elements in possible common grounds of interest which perhaps would make possible progress toward a limited agreement between the US and USSR. If the Soviets are reducing armed forces under the pressure of economic circumstances as you mentioned, they may well want a kind of coordinated reduction and be willing to pay a small price for such coordination or assurance that reductions are taking place elsewhere. They may have a different assessment than that of the U.S. as to the consequences of some of these things such as shifting competition from force to other spheres, they may be impelled by psychological considerations to make moves in the direction of limited agreements which are sufficiently reasonable than they would be in our interest to seize upon. They could be genuinely interested in questions of pre-security against surprise attacks -- they could with any qualifications, that have very well been brought out around this table, be interested

that have very well been brought out around this table, be interested
security against surprise attacks -- they could with any qualifications,
about. They could be definitely interested in questions of pre-
sufficiently reasonable than they would be in our interest to settle
to make moves in the direction of limited agreements which are
other wise, they may be indebted by psychological considerations
of some of these things and as a shifting competition from force to
have a different assessment than that of the U.S. as to the consequences
assurance that reductions are taking place elsewhere. They may
reduction and be willing to pay a small price for such coordination or
circumstances as you mentioned, they may well want a kind of coordinated
the Soviets are requiring armed forces under the bourse of economic
broader toward a limited agreement between the U2 and U2U. It
common groups of interest which perhaps would make possible

MR. BAKER: There are various common elements in possible
keep the Soviets on the defensive...

that various disclaimments broods would but forth, I think we can
done, and are precluded psychologically to capitalize on any advantage
say yes or no. I think, if we were wise and have our homework well
designed so that the Soviets end up behind the eight-pall when they

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in some aspects of limitations of the fourth country problem, in ways
which would be consistent with U.S. security interest. They could
be concerned with an estimate of rising defense cost for certain types
of weaponry -- the developments of ICBM for example. With rising
nuclear capability on the part of the communist bloc, it is at least
conceivable that we may be faced in the near future with an increased
tendency on the part of free nations to weigh the advantages of
associations with the United States against the dangers inherent in
nuclear war which they may believe to be attendant on such an
alliance. We may find an increased tendency by free world states
to increase susceptibility by free world states to Soviet nuclear
threats. We seem already to see an increased tendency on the part
of the Soviet Union to resort to such threats in an effort to obtain
its political objectives. We may be confronted, too, with an
increased tendency on the part of states to seek independent
nuclear weapons capability as a part of a general pattern of nuclear
tendency or desire to find advance situations other than by close
associations with what they could come to consider as liable power
blocks dangerous in some ways to their interests. There is also the
question of the spread of nuclear weapons capability to other
countries besides the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Britain, what he

countries pose the U.S., the U.3.8.R. and Britain, what he
does about the abroad of nuclear weapons capability to other
blocks dangerous in some way or other interests. There is also the
associations with what they could come to consider as liable power
tendency or desire to find advance situations other than by close
nuclear weapons capability as a part of a general pattern of nuclear
increased tendency on the part of states to seek independent
its political objectives. We may be confronted, too, with an
of the Soviet Union to react to such threats in an effort to obtain
threats. We seem already to see an increased tendency on the part
to increase susceptibility by free world states to Soviet nuclear
alliance. We may find an increased tendency by free world states
nuclear war which they may believe to be attendant on such an
associations with the United States against the dangers inherent in
tendency on the part of free nations to weigh the advantages of
considerable that we may be faced in the near future with an increased
nuclear capability on the part of the communist bloc, it is at least
of weapons -- the developments of ICBM for example. With this
be concerned with an estimate of real defense cost for certain types
which would be consistent with U.S. security interest. They could
in some aspects of limitations of the fourth country problem, in ways
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ECC

[cc]

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calls the Fourth Country Problem -- to atomic half powers as well as
to others -- the speed of nuclear weapon capability to other countries.
Such a development could create a situation where a small country,
or even an insurgent group within a country, could threaten vital
interests to the United States or major powers especially if such
a country or element was located close to major installations of
international importance such as the Panama or Suez Canal or a
major base.

With the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities within 15
or 20 countries, the delicate balance in the fabric of peace could much
more easily be upset. As with the opportunities for intrusion of local
actions increase and the dangers increase, in my judgment, by one of
the many possibly irre responsible authorities, could be the trigger
that could launch a nuclear war. Strains would be imposed on the
general political stability of the world community with such a shift
in its structure in terms of military power. And of course, the problem
of any meaningful disarmament control would be enormously complicated
by the necessity for an inspections system which would embrace 15 or
20 countries in which each would necessarily be able to veto the
effective enforcement of disarmement...

MR. WALKOWICZ: Pertaining to this fourth country problem, I

MR. WALKOMICS: Pertaining to both country problems, I

effective enforcement of disassembly...

30 countries in which each would necessarily be able to veto the
by the necessity for an insubordinate system which would enforce it or
of any meaningful disassembly control would be enormously complicated
in its structure in terms of military power. And of course, the problem
general political stability of the world community with such a shift
that could launch a nuclear war. Strains would be imposed on the
the many possibly unreasonable authorities, could be the truer
e actions increase and the dangers increase, in my judgment, by one of
more easily be naphed. As with the opportunities for inflation of local
or 30 countries, the delicate balance in the fabric of peace could much
With the abridgement of nuclear weapons capabilities within 12
major power.

international importance such as the Poles and the Swiss, or a
a country or element was located close to major installations of
interest to the United States or major powers especially it such
or even an adjacent land within a country, could threaten vital
Such a development could create a situation where a small country,
to others -- the least of nuclear weapon capability to other countries,
calls the fourth country problem -- to atomic half powers as well as

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550

LC3

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don't think there is necessarily a complete community of interest between the U.N. on the one hand and the U.S.S.R. with respect to the fourth country problem. I think the essential difference is that the Soviet has a far greater degree of control over the political decision-making apparatus of the satellites than we have over that of our allies. Therefore it does not follow in my mind that the Soviet will have the same resistance to see their satellites acquire some of these modern nuclear weapons...

MR. DEAN: One point has been made here that I would like to emphasize on the motivation of the U.S.S.R. I'm quite sure that U.S.S.R. today is much more concerned about the fact that our allies are building missiles bases and will have warheads supplied by the United States. This means negotiations. The fourth power thing can be turned around in such a way that if we were prevented from giving weapons to our allies, I think this would be a pretty bad bargain. And the second thing I would like to say is that the fourth power in negotiations between ourselves and U.S.S.R. does not settle the fourth power problem at all. Whatever we may negotiate between the two of us, there are other countries in the world today who are going to be a fourth power problem whether we like it or not. It's the nature of the beast. China has capabilities. She doesn't want to do it.

the peace. China has capabilities. She doesn't want to go it.
be a fourth power problem whether we like it or not. It's the name of
two of us, there are other countries in the world today who are going to
fourth power problem at all. Whatever we may negotiate between the
negotiations between ourselves and U. S. A. F. does not settle the
And the second thing I would like to say is that the fourth power in
division meagre to our allies. I think this would be a pretty bad bargain.
thing can be turned around in such a way that if we were prevented from
substituted by the United States. This means negotiations. The fourth power
our allies are building missiles bases and will have warheads
that U. S. A. F. today is much more concerned about the fact that
to emphasize on the motivation of the U. S. A. F. I'm quite sure
MR. DEAN: One point has been made here that I would like
of these modern nuclear weapons....

will have the same resistance to see their satellites acquire some
of our allies. Therefore it does not follow in my mind that the Soviet
decision-making agencies of the satellites than we have over that
that the Soviet has a lot greater degree of control over the political
to the fourth country problem. I think the essential difference is
between the U. N. on the one hand and the U. S. A. F. with respect
don't think there is necessarily a complete community of interest

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France has a capability and a good many bargains right now, and I'm
afraid that she may do it and in no time at all, with these power
reactions going on, you have to take it that it is all that you've
made of the military pressures of the army and utilize it. Now this
applies to countries that want to pretty much go on their own. The
Germans for example -- they want a little independence and this is
beyond our control. I would warn about what they are really talking
about, for they really talk about the fourth power. I think they are
going to be talking about our privilege to give atomic war help to
our allies. This would scare me...

MR. JOHNSON: As Mr. Baker was talking I couldn't help
asking myself the question whether we really have reason to be
terribly optimistic however desirable the goals that he mentions are.
The reason I am concerned about being too optimistic is that some of
the objectives he set forth -- in fact the overwhelming majority of
the objectives he set forth -- are objectives which seem to me the
Soviet Union would not want to achieve. That is the Soviet Union,
coming back to these political objectives, presumably does not want
to help keep our allies friendly with us. They are not particularly
interested in what we would call favorable political developments on
the other side of what used to be called the Iron Curtain. The one

the other side of what need to be called the Iron Curtain. The one
interested in what we would call favorable political developments on
to help keep our allies friendly with us. They are not particularly
coming back to these political objectives, presumably does not want
Soviet Union would not want to achieve. That is the Soviet Union,
the objectives he set forth -- are objectives which seem to me the
the objectives he set forth -- in fact the overwhelming majority of
the reason I am concerned about being too optimistic is that some of
temperily optimistic however desirable the goals that he mentions are.
asking myself the question whether we really have reason to be

MR. JOHNSON: As Mr. Baker was talking I couldn't help
our allies. This would scare me...

going to be talking about our privileges to give atomic war help to
about, for they really talk about the fourth power. I think they are
beyond our control. I would want about what they are really talking
Germans for example -- they want a little independence and this is
ables to countries that want to pretty much do on their own. The
made of the military breviation of the army and utilize it. Now this
reactions going on, you have to take it that it is all that you, we
afraid that she may do it and in no time at all, with these power
France has a capability and a good many perquisites right now, and I'm

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objective that it seems to me they may share with us, and therefore
the one encouraging element, is the one you refer to again, Vince, later
and that is the possibility of keeping these things out of the hands
of a fourth country. As I look at the problem I keep asking myself
what is in it for them? This is about the only thing that I can see
which may constitute something in it for them, which would give
some grounds for expecting that we might get some kind of agreement...

DR. KISSINGER: There is an intimate relationship between
the force that one has and is willing to employ and the kind of
diplomatic overtures that one is capable of making. It seems to
me that disarmament is a peculiarly good area to illustrate this
rather than to conceive of disarmament entirely apart from the
strategy that one is willing to implement. I think it ought to be
part of it but it ought to be tied to a strategic problem rather than
treated in its own realm.

Actually, that gets me to one more point I did want to make
General Lindsay made the point that the British decided to put everything
under deterrent posture and to identify this with maximum destructiveness.
Some mention ought to be paid to the relationship between the physical
and the psychological aspects of deterrence. That deterrence has to
be related somewhat to the strategy you are willing to implement.

be related somewhat to the strategy you are willing to implement.
and the bayesian aspects of deterrence. That deterrence has to
some mention ought to be paid to the relationship between the biyological
under deterrent behaviour and to identify this with maximum destructiveness.
General Lindsay made the point that the British decided to put everything
Actually, that does me to one more point if I did want to make
tried in its own right.

but of it but it ought to be tied to a strategic problem rather than
strategically that one is willing to implement. I think it ought to be
rather than to conceive of dismantlement entirely apart from the
we that dismantlement is a basically good idea to illustrate this
diplomatic overtures that one is capable of making. It seems to
the force that one has and is willing to employ and the kind of
DR. KISSINGER: There is an intimate relationship between
some grounds for expecting that we might get some kind of agreement...
which may constitute something in it for them, which would give
what is in it for them? This is about the only thing that I can see
of a fourth country. As I look at the problem I keep asking myself
and that is the possibility of keeping these things out of the hands
the one encouraging element, is the one you refer to again, 'Vince', later
objective that it seems to me they may share with us, and therefore

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You can conceive a strategy that is terribly destructive, but one
that you are not willing to implement there the deterrent would be
low. You can conceive a strategy which is not very constructive
but you are willing to implement and there, too, the deterrents may
be very low because it isn't constructive enough. So that there has
to be a balance between deterrents and the strategy one is willing
to implement, and this easy identification between deterrents and
maximum destructiveness which augers a nation in every crisis to
gamble its existence on the issue in dispute is a very dangerous
one.

I - 44

one.

demonstrate its existence on the issue in dispute is a very dangerous
maximum destructiveness which augers a nation in every crisis to
implement, and this easy identification between deterrnts and
to be a balance between deterrnts and the strategy one is willing
be very low because it isn't constructive enough. So that there has
but you are willing to implement and there, too, the deterrnts may
low. You can conceive a strategy which is not very constructive
that you are not willing to implement there the deterrnt would be
You can conceive a strategy that is terribly destructive, put one

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WHEN THE PANEL TURNED FROM US POLITICAL POLICIES TO
THE MILITARY STRENGTH AND STRATEGIES WITH WHICH THESE
POLICIES MUST BE IMPLEMENTED, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PANEL
OPENED THE DISCUSSION. FROM THE MINUTES OF THE PANEL--

"General McCormack wished to speak briefly to the second
subject on the agenda: namely, the military means for supporting
our political policy. He thought these means should be sufficient
to achieve the following: (1) To prevent general war; (2) To preserve,
"even at our lowest ebb", sufficient areas of freedom to assure
freedom's ultimate triumph everywhere; and (3) To support the
steady expansion of the areas of freedom by other than military
means.

As regards the prevention of general war, he wished to point
out that the strategic stalemate is dynamic, not static, and that its
maintenance will continue to depend upon our steady development of
weapons and vehicles, and also upon warning systems and Civil
Defense, for the depth and variety of our deterrence are important
factors.

He thought that we need basically a far more coherent politico-
military concept than we now have, and he thought the extent of our

military concept than we now have', and he thought the extent of om-

He thought that we need basically a far more coherent politico-
reasons.

Defense, for the depth and variety of om deterrence are important
weapons and appliances, and also upon warning systems and Clal!
maintenance will continue to depend upon om steady development of
out that the strategic assets are dynamic, not static, and that its
use reduces the prevention of general war, he wished to point
means.

steady expansion of the areas of freedom by other than military
freedom, a ultimate triumph everywhere; and (2) To support the
"even at om lowest epp." sufficient areas of freedom to assure
to achieve the following: (1) To prevent general war; (2) To preserve
om political policy. He thought these means should be sufficient
enough on the agenda; namely, the military means for supporting
"General McCormack wished to ask be asked briefly to the second

OPENED THE DISCUSSION. FROM THE MINUTES OF THE BANET--
BOLICIES MUST BE IMPLEMENTED, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BANET
THE MILITARY STRENGTH AND STRATEGIES WITH WHICH THESE
WHEN THE BANET TURNED FROM US POLITICAL BOLICIES TO

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need for public education in this respect was indicated by two facts:
(1) that in 1952, the national election was influenced by the hope of
extrication from Korea; and (2) in 1956 by the hope of avoiding trouble
in the Middle East. If the new coherence is to be solidly grounded in
public support, a bolder political leadership is necessary. He thought
we must learn to distinguish clearly between the strategic and the
tactical uses of atomic weapons, and that we must create military
capabilities for limited war, but not to the detriment of SAC." . . .

GEN. McCORMACK: The tone, the feeling with which our
committee is going to grapple with its task, has seemed important
to me because words can mean really quite different things depending
on who says them and the general understanding of how his feeling
lies behind them. In fact, you could point out in history successive
administrations in this country which have had policies that read a
great deal alike when you reduced them to writing, but which actually
had such different spirit in their execution that they amounted truly
to quite different policies. The same is true, I think, in the
committee's approach to its problem.

First, a couple of caveats which I issued to myself; perhaps
they will prove useful to the committee. It is not useful to pretend

they will prove useful to the committee. It is not useful to pretend
first, a comble of cavasts which I issued to myself; perhaps
committee's abbrach to its problem.

to quite different policies. The same is true, I think, in the
had such different spirit in their execution that they amounted truly
great deal alike when you reduced them to writing, but which actually
administrations in this country which have had policies that tend a
life peering them. In fact, you could point out in history successive
on who says them and the general understanding of how his feeling
to me because words can mean really quite different things depending
committee is going to grapple with its task, has seemed important
GEM. MCCORMACK: The tone, the feeling with which our

capacities for limited war, put not to the detriment of SVC " . . .
tactical uses of atomic weapons, and that we must create military
we must learn to distinguish clearly between the strategic and the
public support, a polder political leadership is necessary. He thought
in the Middle East. It the new conference is to be solidly grounded in
extrication from Korea; and (2) in 1966 by the hobe of avoiding trouble
(1) that in 1925, the national election was influenced by the hobe of
need for public education in this respect was indicated by two facts:

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that the future course of action of the United States is going to be
independent of some of the rather deep-running things in the nature
of our people and the way they think. Not all of these things exactly
fit into my thesis of what the country might better resolve to do and
get on with the doing of. Just to flag one, for example, there was
almost an audible sign of relief when we got out of Korea, so to speak.
There was a similar almost audible sign of relief when we were assured
the United States was at least not immediately going to be involved
with military forces in the Middle East. These could well have been
wise decisions. I'm not questioning that part of it; I'm flagging the
point that the country was vastly relieved. I would like to think that
whenever the responsibility is really clear about things we have to
do, we will always do them. But sometimes we may not. Therein
hinges the point of leadership, of course.

Another flag I raise for myself is that our principal military
means that have been talked about over the past few years, and in our
committee, all have what amount really to almost built-in self-deterrents.
Much has been made of the fact that our massive retaliatory power and
the massive deterrent has within it the seeds of deterring itself. It
is certainly equally true that any major military action involving the
commitment of U. S. troops in far distant countries has a degree of

commitment of U. S. troops in far distant countries has a degree of
its certainly equality true that any major military action involving the
the massive determination has within it the seeds of desiring itself. It
Much has been made of the fact that our massive retaliatory power and
committee, all have what amount really to aim at built-in self-deterrents.
means that have been talked about over the past few years, and in our
Another fact I raise for myself is that our principal military
plans the point of leadership, of course.

do, we will always do them. But sometimes we may not. Therein
whenever the reasonableness is really clear about things we have to
point that the country was very relieved. I would like to think that
wise decisions. I'm not questioning that but of it I'm flagging the
with military forces in the Middle East. These could well have been
the United States was at least not immediately going to be involved
There was a similar almost audible sign of relief when we were saucy
almost an audible sign of relief when we got out of Korea, so to speak.
det on with the doing of. Just to find one, for example, there was
it into my theatre of what the country might better resolve to do and
of our people and the way they think. Not all of these things exactly
independent of some of the rather deep-running things in the nature
that the future course of action of the United States is going to be

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deterrent built into it also. We are not likely to do it carelessly or
quickly.

These are not bad things, necessarily, these deterrents.
Among other good things, it gives us a continuing feeling of assurance
that we're not likely really to do very reckless things. But when
someone comes forth with a good positive policy, say if the United
States followed the line, we will come out on top, have no fear, he
best look very carefully at what he has said, to make sure he is
talking about something the United States is likely in fact to be
willing to resolve to do, and to remain resolved to do through thick
and thin.

However, having issued these cautions which say in effect,
don't believe everything I am about to say, I would still like to say
the thing that really counts, the thing that will enable you to build
the capabilities that are necessary to play our role in the world, the
thing that will give you the will to use these capabilities in timely
and effective fashion, these rest in spirit. You don't do them with
gear; you end up with gear. The capability rests on spirit.

Colonel Lincoln cautions us that you can't calculate
strategy with mathematical equations or on adding machines, and
this is certainly true. Military power is what it seems to be until

this is certainly true. Military power is what it seems to be until
strategically with mathematical equations or on adding machines, and
Colonel Lincoln cautions us that you can't calculate
dear! You end up with debt. The capability rests on spirit.

and effective fashion, these rest in spirit. You don't do them with
ding that will give you the will to use these capabilities in timely
the capabilities that are necessary to play our role in the world, the
ding that really counts, the thing that will enable you to build
don't believe everything I am spout to say. I would still like to say
However, having issued these cautions which say in effect,
and thin.

willing to resolve to do, and to remain resolved to do through thick
talking about something the United States is likely in fact to be
peat look very carefully at what he has said, to make sure he is
States followed the line, we will come out on top, have no test, he
someone comes forth with a good positive policy, say if the United
that we're not likely really to do very reckless things. But when
Among other good things, it gives us a continuing feeling of assurance
These are not bad things, necessarily, these determinants.

quickly.

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it is used; then it turns out to be what it really is or was. The
assessment of what unknown military powers may turn out to be, in
fact, is the whole art of strategy. You don't risk the survival of
your nation on the fact that your calculations show that, providing the
moon is right, it ought to work. You devise strategy on a broader
basis. And you also devise policy on a broader basis yet. And
that basis I refer to as the spirit.

I'm sure you all share some acquaintances with me who
represent really brilliant political minds, who analyze so skillfully,
so accurately, all the factors bearing on our present position that
everything does indeed come out in balance. This may be brilliant
political thinking; it is not effective laying-down of foreign policy
or national policy. Nor does it carry with it the means of leadership --
with the public acceptance which backs it. My remarks are, in a
sense, a sort of extrapolation of Colonel Lincoln's remarks, going
from strategy to national policy bearing on strategy, and leaving
behind quite a bit of the mathematical calculations by which -- at
least by remote control -- I make a living in my career.

I, for one, would argue that of all the problems presented to
the United States today -- some of which we have helped generate

the United States today -- some of which we have helped generate I, for one, would argue that of all the problems presented to least of all remote control -- I make a living in my career.

peaking despite a bit of the mathematical calculations by which -- at
now strategy to national policy bearing on strategy, and leaving
sense, a sort of extrusion of Colonel Lincoln's remarks, doing
with the bungled acceptance which packs it. My remarks are, in a
or national policy. Nor does it carry with it the means of leadership --
business thinking; it is not effective lay-by-down of total policy
everything goes indeed come out in balance. This may be brilliant
so accurately, all the factors bearing on our present position that
represent really brilliant political minds, who realize so skillfully,
I am sure you will arise some acquaintances with me who
that passes I refer to as the abit.

passes. And you also devise policy on a broader basis. And
moon is right, it ought to work. You devise strategy on a broader
hom nation on the fact that your calculations show that, providing the
fact, is the whole art of strategy. You don't risk the arrival of
strategy of what unknown military powers may turn out to be, in
it is used; then it turns out to be what it really is or was. The

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ourselves -- with a third of the world in revolution, slavery in an
additional third, with hydrogen bombs, crumbling empires, menace
of world Communism -- the one new fundamental difficulty we have
to cope with is that the present situation, the mode of the day, is
lack of clarity. This is what Dr. Kissinger has called the "ambiguous"
threat. Our country was brought into being, has grown, has
prospered, has faced up to its responsibilities generally, throughout
history, without regard to the difficulty of the task, as long as the
job clearly had to be done. The country has been run by people who
have been taken, when the going got tough, a very simple yet a very
grand assumption: that what has to be done gets done and then you
set about doing it, but providing the job is clear.

Our hardest task today, I would argue, is brought home to
the fact that our responsibilities and the trends we face are not
clear. It is how this country with its frontier tradition, its feeling
for the clear and the straightforward -- how it does face up to the
subtleties of planning and the meeting of this ambiguous, ever-present
but always varying threat (at least varied in appearance). Colonel
Kintner's paper has, I think, a very useful bearing on this,--the one
on the strategy of the protracted conflict as practiced by both the

on the strategy of the protracted conflict as practiced by both the
Knutter's, a better has, I think, a very useful bearing on this,--the one
but always varying thrust (at least varied in abscence). Colonel
subdivisions of planning and the meeting of this amplicnons, ever-present
for the clear and the straightforward-- how it does face up to the
clear. It is how this country with its frontier tradition, its feeling
the fact that our reasonabilties and the trends we face are not
Our hardest task today, I would argue, is brought home to
set about doing it, put providing the job is clear.

Grand assumption: that what has to be done gets done and then you
have been taken, when the doing got tough, a very simple yet a very
loq clearly had to be done. The country has been run by people who,
history, without regard to the difficulty of the task, as long as the
broader, has faced up to its reasonabilties generally, throughout
threat. Our country was brought into being, has grown, has
lack of clarity. This is what Dr. Kautter has called the "amplieons"

to cope with is that the present situation, the mode of the day, is
of world Communism -- the one new fundamental difficulty we have
additional third, with hydrogen pompa, cranking empires, menace
ourselves -- with a third of the world in revolution, slavey in an

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Russians and the Chinese historically and traditionally, and further, built into their system.

It is true that even if the Kremlin factor were not in our security equation today, the United States would still have security troubles -- although maybe minor indeed compared to what they now are. It is also true that some of the toughest ones confronting us are not strictly military problems. They're in fields other than military, apparently predominately anyway. But the Soviet successes, the power of their policy, stems not from disassociation of the non-military from military but straight from the fact that the two are associated. The Soviet smiles of friendly subversion which seem so sinister to us, succeed in the places where they succeed because they've got military power behind them. They would be comical if they didn't have military power behind them.

One of the most important, the most fortunate, facts in the world today is the physical power of the United States. I don't mean to deprecate the many other elements that go into our nation. The fact is that we are deeply rooted in human values, including human frailties. But, nevertheless, U.S. military power is the keystone of restraining the Soviet physicalthreat, and the threat has to be restrained

restraining the Soviet physical might, and the direct has to be restrained
troubles. But, nevertheless, U.S. military power is the keystone of
that is that we are deeply rooted in human values, including human
to debase the many other elements that go into our nation. The
world today is the physical power of the United States. I don't mean
One of the most important, the most fortunate, facts in the
they didn't have military power behind them.

they've got military power behind them. They would be comical if
sofernst to us, succeeded in the places where they succeed because
associated. The Soviet smiles of friendly supervision which seem
military from military put straight from the fact that the two are
the power of their policy, steams not from disassociation of the non-
military, apparently predominately anyway. But the Soviet successes,
are not strictly military problems. They're in fields other than
are. It is also true that some of the toughest ones confronting us
troubles -- although maybe minor indeed compared to what they now
security equation today, the United States would still have security
If it is true that even if the Kremlin factor were not in our
built into their system.

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if there is to be any valid hope, whatever that is, may in due course
be satisfactorily reduced. Of course the restrain is of itself
negative, but the force behind it has to be positive and that is
coming to the point of spirit on which I have dwelt so lovingly, and
I hope persuasively. This has always been true.

Today one of the things that sort of clobbers up the picture
is that the trappings of military power are so awesome that the use
of military power is still based, when it is used wisely, on judgment,
on good sense, and on sound strategy and its application in timely
fashion. Without question, I believe the United States can maintain, for
the indefinite future, all the military power it needs to play its role
in the world. I have no doubts of this whatever. To remain and
bolster the focus of freedom and to do considerably better about it
than we have done sometimes in the past, the practical question is
to me one of understanding the use of power. This means having a
feeling for the use of power comparable to that which, for example,
the British had in the era when the trappings of power were the sea
and gunpowder, a feeling for the flexible use of power to accomplish
our objectives.

You have to have this understanding, you have to have this

You have to have this understanding, you have to have this
our objectives.

and gunpowder, a feeling for the flexible use of power to coexist
the British had in the era when the zabanda of power were the sea
feeling for the use of power comparable to that which, for example,
to me one of understanding the use of power. This means having a
than we have done sometimes in the past, the practical question is
poltergeist the locus of freedom and to do considerably better apart it
in the world. I have no doubt of this whatever. To remain and
the indefinite future, all the military power it needs to play its role
fashion. Without question, I believe the United States can maintain, to
our good sense, and on sound strategy and its application in timely
of military power is still possible, when it is used wisely, on judgment,
to that the zabanda of military power are so awesome that the use
Today one of the things that sort of clippers ab the universe
I hope basically. This has always been true.

coming to the point of abutment on which I have dealt so lovingly, and
negative, but the force behind it has to be positive and that is
be satisfactorily reduced. Of course the restain is of itself
it there is to be any valid hope, whatever that is, may in some case

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[sc]

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feeling, or you won't have the wisdom to apply it properly. And a
national gain of the understanding again comes back in many ways
to the matter of leadership. We need wisdom to exploit our power
in ways that will sometimes necessarily be harsh, but will usually
and probably always be toward the overall objective of peace with
freedom and justice, not peace for the sake of peace alone. Therein
lie even our most selfish interests. It's in our national character, and
I would say it's a privilege as well, to always have an audible number
of people about who have a concern for the future of democracy, and
especially our own, a concern that grows even from the fact that our
own power carries within it the ability to modulate the conditions of
our own democracy. That is one of the last things we have to worry
about.

This is a point brought up by Mr. Luce, although he was using
it in a different context. But we have built-in safeguards in the U.S.
system that lead me to fear least of all that we will destroy our own
democracy with our own forces. If democracy is destroyed in this
country, I think it may well generate in part from forces within this
country, but not I suggest from the use of our power for the purposes
of promoting freedom and justice abroad. An article of faith, of course,

of promoting freedom and justice abroad. In strike of his life, of course,
country, but not I suggest from the use of our power for the坏bores
country, I think it may well generate in but from forces within this
democracy with our own forces. It democracy is destroyed in this
system that lead me to test least of all that we will destroy our own
it in a different context. But we have built-in safeguards in the U.S.

This is a point brought up by Mr. Luce, although he was making
apout.

our own democracy. That is one of the last things we have to many
own power carries within it the ability to modulate the conditions of
especially our own, a concern that grows even from the fact that our
of people apout who have a concern for the future of democracy, and
I would say it's a privilege as well, to always have an audible number
lie even our most selfish interests. If's in our national character, and
freedom and justice, not peace for the sake of peace alone. Therein
and bioposily always be toward the overall objective of peace with
in ways that will sometimes necessarily be past, but will usually
to the matter of leadership. We need wisdom to explicit our power
national gain of the understanding again comes back in many ways
feeling, or you won't have the wisdom to apply it properly. And a

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but again I would say if you don't have it you can't get there from
here. In any event I would argue that it is a reasoned faith and
based on nothing any more complicated or subtle, I think, than the
confidence that our leaders will measure up throughout the future to
the capabilities of the nation that they represent.

We are in danger and we will be in danger so far as I know
from all the intelligence I've had over the years. We will have
periods of peril, very probably, certainly possibly, much greater
than that of today. We've got to learn to live with this. We've
got to keep survival insurance, and it is not going to be cheap. Again,
I would say, second only to the fear that we might destroy ourselves
and our own democracy, I think I do not fear we will go broke before
the Soviet Union in matching the threat.

It is certainly among our greatest hazards, it may be one of
the very greatest, that through a sort of latent dread of our power,
we may on occasion be reluctant to apply it wisely, usefully, and in
a timely fashion.

This, I suggest, would be a very great hazard, because
events move very quickly today and they are not going to move less
quickly as the future unfolds with the greater pace made possible
not only by technology but by all these political systems. The

not only by technology but by all these political systems. The
directly as the future unites with the greater race made possible
events move very quickly today and they are not going to move less
than I suppose, would be a very great hazard, because
a timely fashion.

we may on occasion be reluctant to apply it widely, necessarily, and in
the very greatest, that through a sort of latent death of our power,
If it is certainly among our greatest hazards, it may be one of
the Soviet Union in matching the threat.

and our own democracy. I think I do not fear we will do as before
I would say, a second only to the fear that we might destroy ourselves
dot to keep arrival insurance, and it is not going to be cheap. Again,
than that of today. We've got to learn to live with this. We've
periods of pain, very propably, certainly possibly, much greater
from all the intelligence I've had over the years. We will have

We are in danger and we will be in danger so far as I know
the capabilities of the nation that they represent.

confidence that our leaders will measure up throughout the future to
based on nothing any more complicated or audacious. I think, than the
pare. In any event I would argue that it is a reasoned faith and
but again I would say if you don't have it you can't get there from

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communist systems of controlled areas under their command have
brought a new dimension into the question of deliberations; the
timely use of power. This is an important point. As for the guidance
of our country and the role we have to play in the world, this role has
no place in it for the shaky hand. It is surely a foremost obligation
on the part of all of those who would purport to lead public opinion --
and I assume that this group and the fact that we're here and are going
to produce a paper, may lead a segment of public opinion.

My suggestion here is that it is a foremost obligation to
teach, above all else, steadfastness, not to teach vacillation under
the sometimes beguiling title of flexibility. Of course it is better
to be clever than to be stupid. The United States -- by reason of
its great size, its power, the nature of its government, the nature
of its people as reflected in its government, whose capabilities are
reflected in our power -- has a helluva hard time being clever. We
have to be right, we have to be steadfast, to the extent that we can
be other than stupid. This we must do. On the occasions when we're
totally clever, I think I would regard that as a bonus, not the objective.

I have spoken so much of us being in peril, in hazard, that I
should put the thing in balance by saying that I too recognize that of
course there are bright spots on the horizon, of course these things

come there are bright spots on the horizon, of course these things
should but the thing in balance by saying that I too recognize that of
I have spoken so much of us being in hell, in hazard, that I
truly clever, I think I would regard that as a bonus, not the objective,
be other than stupid. This we must do. On the occasions when we're
have to be right, we have to be steadfast, to the extent that we can
reflected in our power -- has a helluva hard time being clever. We
of its people as reflected in its government, whose capabilities are
its great size, its power, the nature of its government, the nature
to be clever than to be stupid. The United States -- by reason of
the sometimes peabody title of flexibility. Of course it is better
teach, above all else, steadfastness, not to teach vacillation under
My suggestion here is that it is a foremost obligation to
to produce a better, may lead a segment of public opinion.

and I assume that this group and the fact that we're here and are doing
on the part of all of those who would humbly to lead public opinion --
no place in it for the awfully hard. It is surely a foremost obligation
of our country and the role we have to play in the world, this role has
timely use of power. This is an important point. As for the guidance
brought a new dimension into the question of deliberations; the
communist systems of controlled areas under their command have

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don't last forever. Tito's a bright spot, I would guess; the political revolution in Poland was a bright spot, even more meaningful in the long view the events in East Germany in 1953, the more recent full-scale rebellion of the people in Poland. These are bright spots, the latter especially because they re-establish the fact, so that everybody can see it, that the desire for freedom is the most truculent of all forces that come through human nature in the development of our society. It's truculent in Hungary. It's truculent everywhere else where it gets a chance to raise its head.

And this is something that is on our side. The menace will go away in due course if we restrain it and make it go away. It will go away because it is not a natural thing. It's an attempt to turn back the clock on human freedoms, and in the long term it can't work. Our duty in this country with regard to military policy, with regard to our national military objectives, is to make sure that freedom survives in enough of the world. Our duty is to make sure that freedom survives in enough of the world. Our duty is to make sure that we're prepared to expand freedom in the places where the possibilities for expansion appear, so that the real forces, the ones that are always there, the ones that will win in the end, have a chance to win,--and without leading to the millenium for it to happen.

to win,--and without leading to the millennium for it to happen.

possibilities for expropriation abeam, so that the real forces, the ones

ame that we're prepared to expand freedom in the places where the

regard to our national military objectives, to make sure that

will do away because it is not a natural thing. It's an attempt to

do away in due course if we restrain it and make it do away. It

And this is something that is on our side. The message will

of all forces that come through human nature in the development of our
everybody can see it, that the centre for freedom is the most truculent

the latter especially because they re-eat欺 the state, so that

scare repetition of the people in Poland. These are bright abeam,

revolution in Poland was a bright abeam, even more meaningful in the
great state forever. Tito's a bright abeam, I would guess; the political

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EC

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So, my bias is quite obvious. To put it in its most brutal form, its most straightforward form, I say the United States has got to aim at ending on top, not just surviving precariously and barely. We've got to aim at ending on top, or else the risk is unacceptably grave that our system will end on the bottom, and when that might happen freedom will have taken a blow from which it probably would not recover for a long, long time.

Our definition of a breach of the peace is inadequate now to the protection of the national interests which must be protected. There is subversion, there is the posing of situations which are just untenable for honest men to live with.

There are threats that cannot be tolerated by people with self-respect who are going to remain free, threats that cannot be permitted to reach the point of soldiers walking across a border. That's too late. The U. S. policy has to have perhaps an unwritten but a well-understood paragraph about aggression saying that we will tend to our interests as they arise, and we will tend to them with the means available to us that seem most likely to attend to them best.

COLONEL LINCOLN: It does seem to me worthwhile if our report could tackle this business of aggression. Perhaps one of our major problems is the general concept held by most people in our

major problems in the general concept held by most people in our
report could settle this business of agitation. Perhaps one of our
CORONET LINCOLN: It does seem to me worthwhile it may
available to us that seem most likely to attend to them best.
our interests as they arise, and we will tend to them with the means
understood paragraph about agitation saying that we will tend to
late. The U. S. policy has to have perhaps an unwritten but a well-
to reach the point of soldiers walking across a border. That's too
respect who are going to remain free, threats that cannot be permitted
there are threats that cannot be tolerated by people with self-
enthusiastic for honest men to live with.

There is supervision, there is the boiling of situations which are just
to the protection of the national interests which must be protected.
Our definition of a press of the peace is inadequate now

it properly would not reach over for a long, long time.
when that might happen freedom will have taken a blow from which
unacceptably grave that our system will end on the potter, and
partly. We've got to aim at ending on top, or else the risk is
dot to aim at ending on top, not just surviving preeminently and
form, its most straightforward form. I say the United States has
go, my plan is quite opulent. To put it in its most puts it

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country that aggression is a 19th-century term.

I would like to take a couple of minutes and try and pitch out some thoughts and some questions on our report. We have an objective of reviewing the national purposes and objectives that we might have over the next 10 or 15 years, within the framework of the purpose of our panel which has a title of International Security and Objectives and Strategy.

We should get a definition of what we think national security is anyhow. Then we should decide what base line we are stepping off from.

Everyone knows that the orthodox way to step off from this sort of thing is from an estimate of the situation: what the world is going to be like over the next 10 or 15 years. Some of us work in that business. I have been a little shocked about what it might be like in the next 10 or 15 years.

For example, 10 years from now we may have three quarters of a billion Chinese with a doubled production from what they have now and at least a tripled industrial production, pressing out against what rim land of Asia is still free--

VOICE: Mr. Chairman, may I just make one statement? This pertains to the Asian situation. I'm concerned that we will in discussing

pertains to the Asian situation. I'm concerned that we will in discussing
VOICE: Mr. Chairman, may I just make one statement? This
him land of Asia is still free--

and at least a tripled industrial production, breaking out against what
a trillion Chinese with a coupled production from what they have now
for example, 10 years from now we may have three quarters of
the next 10 or 12 years.

business. I have been a little shocked about what it might be like in
going to be like over the next 10 or 12 years. Some of us work in that
sort of thing is from an estimate of the situation: what the world is
everyone knows that the orthodox way to step off from this
off from.

is anyhow. Then we should decide what phase line we are stepping
We should get a definition of what we think national security
and Objectives and Strategy.

of the purpose of our panel which has a title of International Security
we might have over the next 10 or 12 years, within the framework
objective of reviewing the national purposes and objectives that
some thoughts and some directions on our report. We have an
I would like to take a couple of minutes and try and pitch out

country that address is a 19th-century term.

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such questions as what do we fight for, we will not give enough attention to the Chinese situation, say ten years from now. What happens when the Chinese start shifting from the "soft-sell" in which they are now engaging, to the hard approach, say five years from now Then years from now, we will see them as more of an enemy than we will consider the USSR to be for by then, we may have the USSR under a more manageable situation than we have the Chinese...

COLONEL LINCOLN: In addition to the changes in the Far East, one may have a materially changed Western Europe. One may have a materially changed satellite situation. One may have a technological situation where the margin of difference in arms is not nearly as consequential as it is now. I raise the question as to whether by security we mean our whole security problem or just the military aspects...

MR. LAND: The Russians are beating us in two ways. They are getting to the point where they will be able to destroy us on a vast scale and, at the same time, they are using non-military methods with fantastic effectiveness, and we are losing one country after another with no idea what to do about it. Now nothing that has been said here or in Washington implies even what the tool would be.

another with no idea what to do about it. Now nothing that has been
with fantastic effectiveness, and we are losing one country after
that scale and, at the same time, they are using non-military methods
are desiring to the benefit where they will be able to destroy us on a

MR. LIND: The Russians are beating us in two ways. They
military effects...

whether by security we mean our whole security problem or just the
not nearly as consequential as it is now. I raise the question as to
technological situation where the margin of difference in arms is
have a materially changed satellite situation. One may have a
BAT' one may have a materially changed Western Europe. One may
COLOMEL FIMCOLM: In addition to the changes in the Far
Chinese...

have the U2S under a more manageable situation than we have the
enemy than we will consider the U2S to be for by itself, we may
from now. Then years from now, we will see them as more of an
which they are now engaging, to the hard approach, say five years
happens when the Chinese start shifting from the "soft-sell" in
attention to the Chinese situation, say ten years from now. What
such questions as what do we fight for, we will not give enough

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503

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They like to get the situation messy; we don't know what to do about it after they get it messy.

We don't know what we want to do with Japan or Germany now, let alone with Egypt later. We are destroying the colonial relationship that countries have with our friends and then leaving those countries abandoned. What are you going to do in these countries? There don't have to be any peripheral wars. You talk about the use of force, but where do you apply it? How do you apply it with regard to Egypt as the Russians move in deeper and deeper. Are you going to destroy Egypt? Are you going in with individual pistols and destroy the officers who are on the wrong side?...

MR. LUCE: There is another matter which I think is too little in the American thinking and that is the importance of strength in various parts of the world. I was going to say, especially Asia... One of the things that comes to my mind is whether the U.S. has the capability and the intention of maintaining the non-communist world... one of the ideas in non-communist Asia is that certainly the United States did not win the Korean war, and even perhaps that the communists did win.. And this is a question of capability... The importance of having the power and making sure that other people know that we have the power and the intention of using it for certain purposes...

have the power and the intention of using it for certain purposes...
paving the power and making sure that other people know that we
did win... And this is a question of capability... The importance of
States did not win the Korean war, and even perhaps that the communists
one of the ideas in non-communist Asia is that certainly the United
the capability and the intention of maintaining the non-communist world...
One of the things that comes to my mind is whether the U.S. has
asynchronous bases of the world. I was going to say, especially Asia...
in the American thinking and that is the importance of strength in
MR. LUCI: There is another matter which I think is too little
biotics and destroy the officers who are on the wrong side?...
deebar. Are you going to destroy Egypt? Are you going in with individual
abply it with regard to Egypt as the Russians move in deeper and
about the use of force, put where do you abply it? How do you
countries? There don't have to be any geopolitical means. You talk
those countries abandoned. What are you going to do in these
relationship that countries have with our friends and then leaving
now, let alone with Egypt later. We are destroying the colonial

We don't know what we want to do with Japan or Germany
it after they get it measy.

They like to get the situation measy; we don't know what to do about

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MR. DEAN: The assumption which I frequently see made and which people don't seem to get over (with which of course I disagree), is that some day this country is going to face a great mobilization day which will be announced by the President and that is when we will begin to produce for the next war. This assumption keeps cropping up at all times in spite of the differences which exist today between the situation now and the situation in World War I and World War II, that somehow we are going to take machine tools, and things like that out of storage and then we are going to begin cranking out the ammunition and supplies of war. This is a great basic fallacy. And yet it constantly creeps up all the time. So I want to flag it: in other words we must _be ready_, and not ready-to-get-ready...

to-def-ready...

I want to flag it: in other words we must be ready, and not ready -
pale tellacy. And yet it constantly creeps up all the time. So
cranking out the ammunition and supplies of war. This is a great
and things like that out of storage and then we are going to begin
World War II, that somehow we are going to take machine tools,
today between the situation now and the situation in World War I and
cropping up at all times in spite of the differences which exist
will begin to PRODUCE for the next war. This assumption keebs
day which will be announced by the President and that is when we
is that some day this country is going to face a great modification
which people don't seem to get over (with which of course I disagree),

MR. DEVIN: The assumption which I frequently see made and

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POLITICAL FRAMEWORK AND OBJECTIVES

by

C. L. WILSON

(NB: At present the Wilson paper is in the form of an outline prepared by him for his talk to the Panel. This outline is attached.

(I would suggest one of two treatments of the material. The outline can be written out a little more fully and the notes alluded to in it can be put in the proper place in the outline. Or Mr. Wilson could be asked to dictate off for us a paper which follows those notes and clothes them in Wilson's own phrases.

(I would recommend that the paper be presented as an outline. It adds to the "behind-the-scenes" impromptu feeling of this part of the report. And it sets down in compact form material which in a military report need not be extended.

(Yet I urge that the Wilson material be included or else some other similar material replace it. It seems to me this report must have some kind of a political background against which the various military considerations can come into better broader focus. -- D.C.)

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## II. THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR

OVER AND OVER AGAIN THE DELIBERATION OF PANEL II LED INTO A CENTRAL PROBLEM FOR THE U. S. IN SHAPING UP ITS SECURITY FOR THE YEARS AHEAD: THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION INVOLVED WERE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE ALMOST INCALCULABLE IMPACT THIS REVOLUTION HAS HAD UPON THE REVOLUTION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND UPON THE DRASTICALLY RISING BUDGETARY REQUIREMENTS NECESSITATED BY THESE NEW AND FAR MORE COSTLY WEAPONS. ALLIED WITH THIS PROBLEM WAS THE PARALLEL SET OF CHALLENGES TO AMERICAN MILITARY SECURITY POSED BY THE TRANSLATION OF THESE NEW WEAPONS, IN THE HANDS OF A SHREWD AND DETERMINED OPPONENT, INTO NEW AND AMBIGUOUS FORMS OF WARFARE, ESPECIALLY THE CHALLENGE OF LIMITED WAR - - -

DR. TELLER: You, General McCormack, have said that there is no question in your mind that the U. S. can maintain all the necessary military power. It seems to me that you are perhaps optimistic about our ability to maintain all the necessary military power. Where this progress in technology depends on the intelligent development of our technological education and the application of that education to what's

technological education and the application of that education to what's a
progress in technology depends on the intelligent development of our
ability to maintain all the necessary military power. Write this
military power. It seems to me that you are perhaps optimistic spent
no question in your mind that the U. S. can maintain all the necessary
DR. WRITER: You, General McCormack, have said that there is
VIIY THE CHALLENGE OF LIMITED WAR - - -

OBSERVER, INTO NEW AND AMBIGUOUS FORMS OF WAR, ESPECI-
ALLY NEW WEAPONS, IN THE HANDS OF A SHIELD AND DETERMINED
TO AMERICAN MILITARY SECURITY POSED BY THE TRANSFORMATION OF
VITAL WITH THIS PROBLEM WAS THE PAVILIER SET OF CHALLENGES
NECESSITATED BY THESE NEW AND FAR MORE COSTLY WEAPONS.
AND UPON THE DRASIFICALLY RISING BUDGETARY REQUIREMENTS
REVOLUTION HAS HAD UPON THE REVOLUTION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS
WERE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE MOST INCULCABLE IMPACT THIS
FOR THE YEARS AHEAD: THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION INVOLVED
INTO A CENTURY PROBLEM FOR THE U. S. IN SHAPING UP ITS SECURITY
OVER AND OVER AGAINST THE DEBISRATION OF PANEI II LED

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II - 2

going on in the armed forces, I have very serious questions whether or
not we are going to be left behind. I think that this group might spend
some time in considering in some detail the components of military power
and whether, in a purely military sense, we can maintain what is abso-
lutely necessary.

GEN. McCORMACK: You wouldn't object to starting in the spirit of can do, would you?

DR. TELLER: No, I would not say so. I would say with God's
help and with some considerable improvement in our own will and appli-
cation, we might do. I would not underestimate the communists.

MR. HOOPES: May I ask a question? What are the limiting
factors in your mind, willingness to apply dollars, or shortage of quali-
fied scientific manpower, or both?

DR. TELLER: Both and more. I think we should spend considerable
time on the question, what's more, and the combined intelligence around
the table here might be well employed in seeing what the reasons of the
shortcomings are, what the reason is that in 1945 we had unquestioned
leadership and today we have no longer this unquestioned leadership.

If I can extrapolate I feel absolutely certain that, unless a very
definite change in the reaction occurs, in 10 years we will look like

delicate change in the reaction occurs, in 10 hours we will look like

If I can extrapolate I feel absolutely certain that, unless a very
leadership and today we have no less of this undivided leadership.
afternoonings are, what the reason is that in 1942 we had undivided
the topic here might be well employed in seeing what the reasons of the
time on the question, what a more, and the combined intelligence around
DR. TELTER: Both and more. I think we should aband considerable

used scientific manpower, or both?

factors in your mind, milliuncies to apply dollars, or shortage of dual-
MR. HOOPE: May I ask a question? What are the limiting

cations, we might do. I would not underestimate the communists.
help and with some considerable improvement in our own will and abil-
DR. TELTER: No, I would not say so. I would say with God's

of can do, would you?

GEN. MCCORMACK: You wouldn't object to starting in the abit

itely necessary.

and whether, in a purely military sense, we can maintain what is ap-
some time in considering in some detail the components of military power
not we are going to be left behind. I think that this should might aband
going on in the armed force, I have very serious questions whether or

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being nowhere, as compared with the Russians. This is a very distinct
possibility, in my opinion a probability, and I do not think that my
intelligence will fail to supply you the facts to enumerate the reasons
for it.

MR. LAURANCE ROCKEFELLER: May I ask a question, Dr. Teller. I was just wondering whether an aspect of your concern is due to the fact, as I understand it, that the Russians are giving the scientists, the educators, the writers, all the incentive systems that we reserve primarily for the business and financial community here. I was just wondering whether your concern came from the fact that they're using all the incentives to focus the ambitions and the ability of the people of their country in the areas that will cause us to come out second best. Is that part of your concern?

DR. TELLER: This is certainly part of my concern. Another part of my concern is that we are apt to sit around the table and talk philosophy instead of hard fact. Still another aspect of my concern is that all scientific and intellectual people are apt to crawl into a corner and not concern themselves with the practical aspects of the matter.

DR. BRONK: One of the problems I think that is involved in Dr. Teller's concern is the fact that in Russia, by one device or another, they

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II - 4

they can get work done under pressure. In this country, so many people
under our democratic system have lost any desire to work. Unless some-
how we can recapture a feeling of satisfaction and necessity for work, I
don't see how we are ever going to satisfy the threat Dr. Teller speaks of.

DR. LAND: I agree with Dr. Teller. Our military system is run
on the basis of requirements. This means that people are trained in old
practices technically, thinking in terms of anachronistic wars, having
some slight fantasies about the future but working those fantasies only
in old terms. They write down sets of requirements, which are then
passed down through a fantastically intricate system, which finally
reaches the scientist who has very little to say about whether or not
he could have solved the whole problem much more simply, or with a
more fundamental solution of the military problem that would obviate
a whole set of requirements. Now, whether the Russians will do the
same thing or not, I don't know. I certainly hope they do.

In every military study that I've ever been in, and of every mili-
tary analysis I've seen, whether it's in the army, navy, Central Intelli-
gence Agency, etc., the first premise is symmetry. I have to ask Dr.
Teller if the source of his fear is that we don't have symmetry, that the
Russians might be approaching things freshly, that they might be using
scientists directly, that they might be stating what their objectives

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are, and then letting scientists work in the terms of the best approach
to those objectives.

DR. TELLER: I think that the basis of my fear is essentially what
you have said, namely that the evidence of their rapid progress seems to
show that somehow or other they have avoided, strangely enough, to com-
mit all the mistakes which we have made. It is not easy for me to tell
which mistakes they have avoided. But apparently they have avoided
some.

Now I do not believe that it is logical that by making a quite
general statement, and continuing to move in general statements, we
are going to arrive at a real improvement in the situation. When you
come to the technical end, there can be no doubt that in airpower, in
atomic power, the Russians are close to catching up with us; in rockets
they are ahead of us. This is the situation, and very different from what
existed in 1945. In what we are doing politically, it would appear to me,
we are not doing so poorly. When you turn to the technical end, we are
doing terribly.

AMONG THE LINES OF INVESTIGATION FOLLOWED BY THE PANEL
AS IT CONSIDERED WHAT ITS RECOMMENDATIONS OR OBSERVATIONS
WOULD BE ON WEAPONS AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR, WAS

WOULD BE ON WEAPONS AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR. WAS
AS IT CONSIDERED WHAT ITS RECOMMENDATIONS OR OBSERVATIONS
AMONG THE TIMES OF INVESTIGATION FOLLOWED BY THE PUBLISHED
DOING TERRIBLY.

WE ARE NOT DOING SO POORLY. WHEN YOU TELL TO THE TECHNICAL END, WE ARE
ESTABLISHED IN 1942. IN WHAT WE ARE DOING POLITICALLY, IT WOULD APPEAR TO ME,
THEY ARE ADEQUATE OF US. THAT IS THE ATTRACTION, AND VERY DIFFERENT FROM WHAT
ASTRONOMIC POWER, THE RUSSIANS ARE CLOSE TO CATCHING UP WITH US IN ROCKET
COME TO THE TECHNICAL END. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT IN AIRPOWER, IN
ARE GOING TO ARRIVE AT A REAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE ATTRACTION. WHEN YOU
GENERAL STATEMENT, AND CONTINUING TO MOVE IN GENERAL STATEMENTS, WE
NOW I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT IS LOGICAL THAT BY MAKING A DUE
SOME.

WHICH MISTAKES THEY HAVE AVOIDED. BUT ABSENTLY THEY HAVE AVOIDED
MIST ALL THE MISTAKES WHICH WE HAVE MADE. IT IS NOT EASY FOR ME TO TELL
SHOW THAT SOMEHOW OR OTHER THEY HAVE AVOIDED, STRANGELY ENOUGH, TO COM-
YOU HAVE AID, NAMELY THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THEIR RABID PROGRESS SEEMS TO
DR. TEETER: I THINK THAT THE BASIS OF MY TEST IS ESSENTIALLY WHAT
TO THOSE OBJECTIVES.

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AN EXPLORATION OF THE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE THREE SERVICES IN VARYING TYPES OF WARFARE. MUCH OF THE TESTIMONY CONSIDERED WAS PREVENTED BY SECURITY REGULATIONS FROM BEING PART OF THE REPORT. BUT MR. JOHN F. FLOBERG, OF KIRKLAND, FLEMING, GREEN, MARTIN & ELLIS, WASHINGTON, D. C., PRESENTED A PAPER SUMMARIZING THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN LIMITED FUTURE WAR. AND BEFORE HEARINGS THIS LED HIM AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PANEL INTO A BROAD SURVEY OF THE ROLE OF SUBMARINES IN FUTURE WARS - - -

MR. FLOBERG: It is very difficult to discuss problems of limited war because such war has a self-defeating definition. It is in no way a homogenous concept. It is wholly heterogenous in definition. It involves smaller countries in the free world and limited war will vary not only with the intentions of the aggressor but the geography and internal situation in any one of the dozens of such potential victims.

And of course, small war is not always as small or limited as the phrase could imply.

Korea, for example, was as big a ground war as the Italian campaign in World War II, and in many other respects the U. S. military effort was substantially greater than that of the Italian campaign, and in some ways it was as great as the whole Pacific war in World War II.

in some ways it was as great as the whole Pacific war in World War II. It effort was substantially greater than that of the Italian campaign, and both in World War II, and in many other respects the U. S. military Korea, for example, was as big a ground war as the Italian campaign. The business could simply.

And of course, small war is not always as small or limited as and internal situation in any one of the close of any potential victims. Will vary not only with the intentions of the aggressor but the geography. If involves smaller countries in the free world and limited war in no way a homogeneous concept. It is wholly heterogeneous in definite limited war because such war has a self-defeating definition. If it is MR. LTOBERG: It is as easy difficult to describe problems of

IN FUTURE WARS - -

OF THE PANEF INTO A BROAD SURVEY OF THE ROLE OF SUBMARINES
WAS, AND INDEPENDENT OF THIS LED HIM AND OTHER MEMBERS
A PAPER SUMMARISING THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN LIMITED FUTURE
LIEERING, GREEN, MARTIN & ELLIS, WASHINGTON, D. C., PRESENTED
PART OF THE REPORT, BUT MR. JOHN P. LTOBERG, OF KIRKLAND,
CONSIDERED WAS PREEMED BY SECURITY REGULATIONS FROM BEING
ACES IN AKNING TYPES OF WARWARS. MUCH OF THE TESTIMONY
IN EXPLORATION OF THE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE THREE SE-

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It is, however, almost a truism that the U. S. must be prepared
to engage in whatever small war is necessary to support our foreign policy.
Avoiding a discussion of megaton attacks by us or the effective defense
of the continental United States, there are various lesser degrees of war
that imply the projection of our foreign policy overseas in the shadow of
our projected military power.

The U.S.S.R. has used its military power in this particular way,
under various circumstances, around its own periphery. But limited war
is a device the U. S. should be able to employ to particular advantage
because we have the advantage of one weapon the Kremlin does not have.
That is, an effective naval force.

Broadly described, the mission of the U. S. Navy is to maintain
control of the sea so that it will be available for our use and we may
deny its utility to an enemy. There is never any dispute of this general
definition of the mission. Even when the mission/defined in specific
terms, differences of opinion usually have not so much to do with the
objectives as they do with the methodology, which, unlike the mission,
varies considerably with the circumstances.

World War II, for example, was quite clearly divided into two
distinct geographical halves quite unlike each other. Detailed techniques,
such as amphibious landings, varied considerably between the Pacific
War and the European Theatre; similarly the weapons utilized varied

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considerably, all the way from the big ones down to the simple use of
the amphibious tractor in the Pacific, which was unknown in Europe --
or the reciprocal use of DUKW in the Atlantic whereas it was virtually
unknown in the Pacific. These differences in techniques in weapons
were, of course, attributable to the difference in the military problems
that were faced by the military forces in World War II, specifically by
the Navy, and similar differences will continue to exist in any future
circumstances.

The differences of opinion on where the Navy and the other ser-
vices fit into the future of the defense picture are the result of the differ-
ent assumptions and definitions of the problem to be faced.

The conclusions of this paper rest on three assumptions. The
first is that the Russians will not start at the megaton scale of war that
has been talked about in the past, except as a last resort. The second
assumption, possibly subject to some question, is that 30 days of fis-
sioning and fusioning over our respective territories of the U. S. or the
U.S.S.R. would not make either party quit. This is a debatable point,
but on the basis of past demonstrations of large-scale destruction, it
is a valid assumption.

The third assumption is that the U. S. is going to take a position
of responsibility with regard to the entire free world, roughly that includes

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all territories on the circle which runs from Finland to South Korea and
the seven seas.

If these assumptions are correct, there is a whole widespread
gamut of problems to be faced by the Navy. Perhaps here, another point
should be included as an assumption: that is that the Navy will continue
to be used as an implement of the State Department negotiations and
will continue to be, in that sense, a prime weapon of diplomacy. Its
particular value in this regard comes from its flexibility, and that capa-
bility always comes down to its offense flexibility. One example of
its utility might be the prevention of an invasion of Formosa several
years ago; another similar witness is the presence of the Sixth Fleet
in the Mediterranean.

If the only thing that the military was ever going to do again was
deliver megatons of explosive force, I would radically downgrade the
Navy in my calculations and put everything into long-range missiles
or other instruments of long-range delivery. But it is difficult to envis-
age nuclear warheads and such weapons systems being of great use in an
Afghanistan or Syria or Cambodia. For example, if at any time it should
be necessary for the U. S. to apply military force in the Middle East,
what will be required is small packages delivered with great precision;
in that respect the elephant gun is no more useful in shooting quail than

in that respect the elephant gun is no more useful in shooting dual than
what will be required is an small gunship delivered with great precision!
be necessary for the U. S. to supply military force in the Middle East,
Venezuelan or Syria or Cambodia. For example, it at any time it should
age unclean weapons and such weapons systems being of great use in an
or other instruments of long-range delivery. But it is difficult to envir-
onment in my calculations and but everything into long-range missiles
deliver mezzo of explosive force. I would radically downgrade the
If the only thing that the military was ever going to do again was
in the Mediterranean.

years ago; another similar witness is the presence of the Sixth Fleet
its utility might be the prevention of an invasion ofLEMmoeas several
purity always comes down to its offense flexibility. One example of
particular value in this regard comes from its flexibility, and that capa-
will continue to be, in that sense, a prime weapon of diplomacy. Its
to be used as an implement of the State Department negotiations and
should be included as an assumption: that is that the Navy will continue
demut of problems to be faced by the Navy. Perhaps here, another point
If these assumptions are correct, there is a whole widespread
the seven ares.

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the 28-gauge shotgun is for shooting elephants.

Obviously, any U. S. military security problem must be con-
sidered in the light of the weapons that the enemy would use to make
the problems for us, although the weapons do not make the problems,
they go a long way towards defining them, as well as toward dictating
counter strategy and balancing weapons.

At this point, reference might be made to the suggestions some-
times made, that the navy should concentrate on underwater ships and
if
weapons. This suggestion is proposed on the hypothesis that the Navy
does not do so voluntarily, it will be put there involuntarily and this
assumption is in turn based on the proposition that any future war should
be a megaton war and that it would be possible to deliver these mega-
tons on the surface units at will.

If the assumption is correct that we will face a megaton war, the
U. S. must be prepared to assume substantial losses of surface naval
units. A surface naval unit is a classical example of the strictly tactical
target against which megaton type bombs -- or any other kind of bomb --
can be used without harm to a civilian population. Airfields are an even
more classical case of this kind of target.

Surface units, because of their inherent defensive capabilities,
will suffer losses from megaton proportionately less than from almost any

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other class of weapons known, whether these megaton missiles be air-borne or land-based or any other kind. Personnel of course will suffer heavy losses, the ships themselves will absorb quite heavy punishment and still survive. Given reasonable modern tactics, the lessons of past navy experiments with modern weapons could be projected against weapons of the current types of megaton yields. And even assuming losses, however, the losses by themselves are not enough to condemn surface fleets. Statistics on the losses of tanks in army divisions show that with all the various kinds of tanks and also the various kinds of divisions, there is a general loss figure of about 125 percent per year. This is a loss comparable to the cost of a Forrestal carrier. But it is not too important, because in nuclear war each service will suffer heavy losses. Such loss statistics are not enough reason to decide we should not proceed with a weapon if it is particularly useful.

In any event, going under water would seem to be a most ineffective way of solving this particular problem in view of the costs involved, for it would involve expenditures of the magnitude of some hundred billion dollars. There is no reason to doubt the technical feasibility of using submarines to supply ships both for purposes of petroleum and dry stores, but the cost would be as nearly as can be gathered from a preliminary investigation, anywhere from 25 times to 40 times the cost of a similar equipment.

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One other factor also to bear in mind -- and a most important one -- we will go into any war, no matter how far into the future, with most of our lift concentrated in the surface lift that we know as our merchant fleet. We have this in being. It is useful and completely convertible to military support. We have a considerable shipbuilding know-how for replenishing it even in the face of rapid losses, whereas relatively few people know how to build submarines. We have considerable capability for sailing surface craft, but relatively few people know how to build submarines. Even within the Navy, where it has been considered difficult to get qualified people to operate the relatively limited number of submarines we have.

As far as the Navy is concerned, its best contribution is to continue to carry out its traditional mission but with the most modern weapons systems.

In the most general terms these include the extension of nuclear power, as nearly as is possible, to all units of the Navy, to remove logistic dependency. We should take complete advantage of the new developments for improving seaplanes and helicopters and, of course, we should use missiles, atomic warheads and other weapons. We should considerably modernize our amphibious concept to make it much faster-moving. Excellent steps are being taken in that direction.

ECC3

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In this connection, there is a relatively new development in the airlift concept: the use of transport aircraft taking off from aircraft carriers. Aircraft of the C-321 type can possess complete intercontinental logistic capability by using the decks of aircraft carriers. Although not as large as some planes, such aircraft, even though they are land-based planes, can thus be given the ability to operate almost anywhere, in most areas of the world, without any dependence at all on land supply.

A Navy so constituted and armed with the weapons now being projected, including surface units, will be able to contribute the most, not only to an all-out war, but also in offering U. S. diplomacy the capability for diplomatic maneuvers or for pressure, wherever appropriate in the shadow of this force, a point which becomes apparent from an examination of any world map. There are a great many areas in the world where there may be future need for tactical forces -- of relatively small aircraft that can deliver relatively small loads with an extremely high degree precision. But the number of such areas where the U. S. has an opportunity to attack with small aircraft, is very small. Unless such forces are based on aircraft carriers,

In the countries where the U. S. might be forced to bring air power to bear and where our longest range aircraft cannot do the job, the only possible way to get planes and their missiles to the right spots

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is to use sea-based aircraft. Through the Navy's mobile bases short-range, high-performance aircraft, with their own inherent cover, can always be present at any time.

The Soviet, as is well known, have concentrated on an under-seas fleet, and so would I in their position. This to me is not, however, a sign of strength; this is a sign of weakness. This decision on their part has been dictated to them by their geographical position and by the military consequences that flow from it. The submarine is pretty much a weapon of stealth, of furtive harrassment, and pretty largely a weapon of defense, interdiction. As a missile shooter, of course, it has offensive implications. But characteristically it is a defensive weapon. Maybe it can take a local or tactical offensive as in the past sense of attacks on merchant vessels, but strategically and even after a momentary successful offense, it becomes highly defensive.

In the hands of one who already has control of the sea a submarine can be used offensively with considerable effectiveness. But it is hard for me to think of submarines in the numbers of which the Russians are said to possess them -- I am assuming that the numbers are valid -- wresting control of the seas from an adequately equipped and trained and indoctrinated service navy. In this connection, the way to me to beat the Russians would be to go out and fight them, not to flee from them.

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There were a good many different kinds of defensive attacks adopted during World War II with submarines and none of them was ever more than a minor success. The only tactics that ever worked successfully were the most offensive ones. They did work. Submarines have obviously made considerable progress since World War II, so that World War II equipment and tactics wouldn't be effective today, but similarly anti-submarine weapons and tactics have made considerable progress. The biggest problem of all -- detection -- has been substantially reduced, but by no means solved.

The tactical contribution of submarines to modern warfare deserves mention. Much of the emphasis on submarines is placed on their role as missile carriers. But, leaving aside for the moment questions of all-out war, most of the anticipatable limited conflicts, if they come, are likely to break out in zones like the areas surrounding the Indian Ocean. The countries of Southeast Asia, for instance, are outside the range of our present bases except for our longest-range aircraft. Here again, the usefulness of floating bases, aircraft carriers, is enormous while submarines can play only a minor role and such nuclear warheads as they might carry would be of little use. It would seem to me that the description of a future submarine navy as defensive force is the one which I most strongly would like to question. There is great difference between

I most strongly would like to question. There is great difference between description of a future submarine navy as defensive force is the one which as they might carry would be of little use. It would seem to me that the while submarines can play only a minor role and such nuclear warheads again, the usefulness of floating bases, aircraft centers, is enormous range of our present bases except for our ionosphere-range aircraft. Here Ocean. The countries of Southeast Asia, for instance, are outside the are likely to break out in some like the areas surrounding the Indian all-out war, most of the anticipable limited conflicts, if they come, as hostile carriers. But, leaving aside for the moment questions of mention. Much of the emphasis on submarines is placed on their role solved.

* item of all -- detection -- has been substantially reduced, but by no means
* weapons and tactics have made considerable progress. The biggest prop-
* and tactics wouldn't be effective today, but similarly anti-submarine
* considerate progress since World War II, so that World War II equipment
* most offensive ones. They did work. Submarines have obviously made
* a minor success. The only tactics that ever worked successfully were the
* doing World War II with submarines and none of them was ever more than

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(50)

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submarines -- the submarine is not really a submarine, because it has
to depend upon the air on the surface all the time -- and the true sub-
marine, the nuclear submarine -- it is an extremely dangerous force,
both in the complete independence of this true submarine from the sur-
face, and because of its great speed which is greater than that of sur-
face ships. I think this point has not been quite sufficiently appreciated.

In principle submarine construction could look to higher speeds
if only a sufficiently great amount of power should happen to be avail-
able. This power is now available, and the submarine now constructed
has been really constructed along the lines of the old days' submarine,
which is a copy of the best which is not yet adopted to the real sub-
marine existence, and therefore I think of the submarine of the future
we have as yet little real concept. One of the most alarming things to
me is that the Navy is giving so little thought to the real long-range
development of the technological possibilities of a truly underwater
vehicle.

There is no question, and I don't know anybody who doubts, that
the order is quite different between the past submarines and the nuclear
propelled submarines. The speed differential speeds and the other advan-
tages, like the complete independence of the submarine, have made it
considerably more effective. However, there are various other points

considerably more effective. However, there are various other points to note, like the complete independence of the submarine, have made it propelled and submarine. The speed differential speeds and the other advantages the order is quite different between the fast submarine and the nuclear. There is no question, and I don't know anybody who doubts, that vehicles.

development of the technological possibilities of a truly underwater
me is that the Navy is giving so little thought to the real long-range
we have as yet little real concept. One of the most alarming things to
marine existence, and therefore I think of the submarine of the future
which is a copy of the boat which is not yet adopted to the real sup-
pose been really constructed along the lines of the old days, submarine,
ship. This power is now available, and the submarine now constructed
it only a sufficiently great amount of power should happen to be avail-
able in principle. And submarine construction could look to higher speeds

face speeds. I think this point has not been quite sufficiently appreciated.
and because of its great speed which is greater than that of an-
pot in the complete independence of this true submarine from the am-
marine, the nuclear submarine -- it is an extremely dangerous force,
to depend upon the sun on the axis all the time -- and the true sup-
marine -- the submarine is not really a submarine, because it has

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in connection with it. There is still some inherent vulnerabilities about a submerged ship. It operates in considerable darkness as to its own problem. And it has had a great many disadvantages as compared to the surface units that might be working against it. The best way to attack submarines is with surface units or with airplanes based on surface units. It is always with local aircraft that you have to attack submarines.

DR. TELLER: I have not been completely convinced. I am aware of my ignorance of many phases of the question, but I am rather convinced that the best way to attack the submarine is with a submarine. I would like to continue a little bit because I have one or two additional points.

The tiniest kilaton weapon is already very dangerous indeed for a surface ship and of those one can carry, and one will be able to carry, plenty by the time the next aircraft carriers will be around. I think that there is one extremely good defense against these kilaton weapons from the air which can be launched with great dispatch, and that in theory is the difficulty of detection. There is just no question that the submarine is harder to detect, and therefore a submarine fleet will stay longer in operation than a surface fleet. In addition, the submarine -- even a small submarine -- can operate in all weather conditions because, after all, the submarine can go under the weather; therefore small submarines are more easily feasible than small ocean-going surface ships

marines are more easily feasible than small ocean-dongue amusements all, the submarine can do under the weather; therefore small and even a small submarine -- can operate in all weather conditions because, longer in operation than a surface fleet. In addition, the submarine -- marine is harder to detect, and therefore a submarine fleet will easily be the difficulty of detection. There is just no question that the surface air which can be launched with great diabatic, and that in theory there is one extremely good defense against these kилتون weapons from plenty by the time the next aircraft carriers will be around. I think that a surface ship and of those one can carry, and one will be able to carry, The firstest kилтон weapon is already very dangerous indeed for points.

would like to continue a little bit because I have one or two additional advances that the best way to attack the submarine is with a submarine. I of my ignorance of many phases of the question, put I am rather concerned that the best way to attack the submarine is with a surface unit.

DR. KELTER: I have not been completely convinced. I am aware units. It is always with local aircraft that you have to attack submarines.

submarines is with surface units or with subordinates based on surface units. It might be working against it. The best way to attack problem. And it has used a great many disadvantages as compared to the a submerged ship. It operates in considerable darkness so to its own in connection with it. There is still some inherent vulnerabilities about

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and from that point of view again, the greater dispersion and correspondingly greater flexibility, will be of greater advantage. The question then arises, What kind of offensive power can we give to a submarine? The offensive power to my mind consists of two possibilities, each of which takes a little time to work up.

One is that the submarine can serve as a refueling base for seaplanes. I think that such refueling bases for submarines which rendezvous at sea could be worked out into a very acceptable substitute for foreign bases, and also as less localized but still easily detectable and very expensive platforms to fuel upon. Secondly, as we move into the age of missiles, and even smaller missiles, because the age of development of weapons will mean that we are going to be able to deliver a greater punch in smaller atomic warfare, and therefore it will be possible to carry a megaton weapon as well as many kilaton weapons on very small submarines indeed.

Under these conditions, I should think that ten years from now a nuclear submarine fleet will be the most powerful weapon to carry fire power to any area that is at all close to the sea. Even those that are not so close to the sea, because these rockets have a very considerable range of many hundreds of miles and some of them thousands of miles. In this way, it seems to me, the submarine will be an extremely

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powerful, aggressive weapon under all conditions, and easily in the
position to sink at the very outset of the war an opposing force of sur-
face vessels; and I believe that our surest way to lose the control of
the sea is the way that we . . .

MR. GAYLORD: What, referring to Russian submarine capabilities, what percentage may we use in their composition between strategic and tactical submarines today?

MR. FLOBERG: I don't know if there is any difference. Their submarines, to the best of my knowledge, are not super-submarines, but they are pretty much like the submarines that they have had in the last five or six years. I don't believe you can classify them between tactical and strategic. I think they would all have the capability, for example, of cruising to the coasts of the United States.

MR. GAYLORD: I've understood that a very large percentage are
what we might call coastal submarines as against fleet submarines.

MR. FLOBERG: I do not know about that. There was a time when that was true, but I always thought that the building program that has been under way for several years would have replaced most of those. I don't know that fact, though, but I would be surprised if the proportions were as they were several years ago.

MR. GAYFORD: I do not know about that. There was a time when
what we might call coastal submarines as against fleet submarines.

MR. FROBERG: I have understood that a very large percentage are
of cruising to the coasts of the United States.

and strategic. I think they would all have the capability, for example,
five or six years. I don't believe you can easily them between tactical
they are pretty much like the submarines that they have had in the last
marine, to the best of my knowledge, are not anti-submarines, but

MR. FROBERG: I don't know if there is any difference. Their and
 tactical submarines today?

what percentage may we use in their combination between strategic and

MR. GAYFORD: What, referring to Russian submarine capabilities,

the sea is the way that we . . .
face assets; and I believe that our assets way to lose the control of
position to sink at the very outset of the war an obliterating force of an-
bomber! aggressive weapon under all conditions, and easily in the

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DR. TELLER: I would like to add a little point, an extremely good
point that has been made by Mr. Floberg -- namely, the point of the
necessity of training people for the submarine type of operation. I think
that the Russian submarine threat is already a very dangerous one. I
believe that in the next years in which the Russians without a doubt will
develop their nuclear submarine and this then will become really danger-
ous indeed. One may then ask, aren't they foolish in wasting their effort
on the development of this present submarine which in a few years will
be antiquated? I think Mr. Floberg has given an excellent answer to
this question.

GEN. McCORMACK: It has been my understanding for at least two
or three years, that the major Russian submarine building program is a
long-range submarine program.

MR. FLOBERG: The building program that the Russians have had
for their submarines would not necessarily mean that 80 submarines are
being added to the submarine fleet every year. Submarines have a rela-
tively short combat life whether they be Russian or ours. It's the nature
of the beast that it has 10 or, at the most, 14 or 15 years of utility,
and it could be less. Assuming that the Russians had 400 submarines
five or six years ago, it's conceivable that they still have 400 submarines

five or six years ago, it's conceivable that they still have 400 submarines
and it could be less. Assuming that the Russians had 400 submarines
of the same class that it has 10 or 14 or 15 years of utility,
tively short combat life whether they be Russian or ours. It's the nature
being added to the submarine fleet every year. Submarines have a rela-
for their submarines would not necessarily mean that 30 submarines are
MR. LIEBERG: The building program that the Russians have had
long-range submarine program.

or three years, that the major Russian submarine building program is a
GEN. MCCORMICK: It has been my understanding for at least two
this question.

be antiquated? I think Mr. Lippert has given an excellent answer to
on the development of this present submarine which in a few years will
one indeed. One may then ask, aren't they looking in wanting their effort
develop their nuclear submarine and this then will become really dangerous
believe that in the next few years in which the Russians without a doubt will
that the Russian submarine threat is already a very dangerous one. I
necessarily of training people for the submarine type of operation. I think
point that has been made by Mr. Lippert -- namely, the point of the
dr. TENTER: I would like to add a little point, an extremely good

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submarines even though they've had a substantial submarine building program. That doesn't minimize it. All I am trying to point out is that the arithmetic is not necessarily annually accumulated.

I'd like to come back to the submarine missiles here. I don't question one word that you have said. I once counted the 25 largest cities of the United States and found that 21 of them were within 100 miles of the seacoast. And I counted the 50 largest and found that 43 of them were within 500 miles of the sea coast. And this included most of our atomic installations -- all our Navy installations, a good many of our Air Force installations and the great bulk of our Army installations. So there is no doubt about that from the standpoint that you are talking about. This doesn't seem to me to be relevant to a discussion of less than all-out war however. All I am trying to get at is a different problem, I think, and if you can't divorce the two, then . . .

DR. TELLER: I would be glad to have the divorce but I would like to ask, What is it that a submarine cannot do, or a sufficiently great number of submarines?

MR. FLOBERG: One thing that seems most important to me, assuming that it is our submarine and capable of shooting one of our current missiles or an improved version of our current missiles, is this. The best I know of those missiles at this time is that we are talking in terms'

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of something like a mile or maybe a half mile circle of error around these things. And I am considering, in the case of the peripheral war, there may be a great many occasions where it will be necessary to talk in terms of feet and yards of circle of probable error.

This seems to me to be only up to this time a problem that is solvable by manned aircraft -- by small manned aircraft -- not high altitude, but small manned aircraft delivering either conventional or small nuclear weapons in a relatively conventional manner, that is, by such tactics as dive bombing. I don't know any other solution to that, and if you put manned aircraft on submarines too, you have a relatively low sortie rate. When you do something like that, your punch is quite diluted.

DR. TELLER: What about refueling of seaplanes?

MR. FLOBERG: Well, the seaplanes have a tremendous potential but they, too, have limitations. Up to this point relatively, seaplanes can take relatively minor seas. We've not got them up to the point where they can take five or six foot waves, and you can gamble on bigger ones. But it is a gamble and of course if your aircraft is washed out, you've lost your mission. But under any conditions where you can guarantee five and six foot waves, we have that problem pretty well under control today. It may even be better than that today. But the

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submarine as a refueler for an airplane or even a small number of airplanes
has a good potential. The submarine as a supply ship, for example, has
its greatest potential as a POL supply ship because you don't have to
put any of that stuff inside the pressure hull -- they can go outside
that pressure hull, and that is the reason that even traditional submarines
have such a long cruising range. This is an ideal use. For something
like dry storage, they are terribly incompetent, terribly inefficient. A
3,000 ton submarine might carry something like 300 tons of cargo, for
example, whereas a 10,000 tons of cargo. All those are factors that
must be considered. I would regard the seaplane concept as an extremely
important modern adjunct, though I don't think that it takes the place
of the omnipresent surface units. I'm prepared to sacrifice a good
many of these surface units to the submarines or to the other methods
of attack, but I think that if we had enough of them, they would have a
very high survival rate. It is not so that even a small kilaton bomb
can just erase one of these things. If it's right on the deck of course,
it can't survive; there is not question about that.

DR. TELLER: If it's a half mile off it can't.

MR. FLOBERG: I doubt that. There was a lot of ships that survived
at Bikini, within a half mile -- that is with just a small bomb. Even of

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the ships that sank there were quite a few that could have been saved had they a crew been on board. You scale up the size of the bomb and obviously you make the problem tougher every time you scale it up. But with proper tactics, it is perfectly possible that never more than one ship will be lost at a time. The bulk of your striking power will remain in force. It is the precision striking power that is deliverable, let's say, in Afghanistan, or some other place where you have your friendly forces surrounded enemy forces.

DR. TELLER: I am very glad that you made the point about P.O.L. It seems to me probably the biggest component which we will have to deliver. I think that a mother submarine supply ship would have the further advantages that, after all it can cover an unlimited range at a high speed and therefore it will have closed the gap between itself and a surface ship to a considerable extent. It is quite clear that if surface ships are not to be sunk, then for a number of obvious reasons like the delivery of dry goods and the ability of many more kinds of planes to take off from their decks, they would have advantages. It would just seem to me that in a war five or ten years hence, where we have come in the case of Russian intervention, that there is a likelihood that the enemy will have thousands of atomic bombs at their disposal, against

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these, as you pointed out, purely military targets. It would seem to
me that it is quite likely that the only condition under which a surface
craft can lend support in such a war is, for one reason or another, that
the enemy does not choose to wipe it out.

MR. FLOBERG: W 11, the submarine's principal defense is only its difficulty of detection. It has no effective means of defense. It has a good defense, there is no doubt about that. Other methods of active defense were tried and they all proved successful up to now.

Somebody may still come up with a good successful active defense other than the difficulty of detection.

Now once the detection problem has been solved, your sub-
marine is very likely to be gone.

DR. TELLER: The more I get into a discussion about all kinds
of duels, plane against plane, surface installation against plane, ships
against ships, submarine against ship, any of them in a number of exercises,
seem to boil down to an increasing extent to one question and one
question alone, and that is detection. Whoever is seen first in the
nuclear age is gone. You can shoot him down with the greatest of ease.
The only question is which one will be noticed first? If it is true that

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the surface ship can be noticed more easily than the submarine, then
the surface ship will be gone and the submarine will remain.

DR. LAND: If the submarine is made strong enough to go deep enough, then the strength it has to have to go deep is enough so that most of the methods of attack will not disturb it today. I'm not saying that such submarines yet exist, but in solving the one problem, it appears that we mostly solve the other.

MR. FLOBERG: That is just like saying that if an airplane is built to go fast enough then it can be built to take a lot of punishment, that is true too. Modern seaplanes can drag their wings through the water at 125 knots without doing any damage because they are built to fly so fast that they can absorb that damage too. But any rupture of the pressure hull of a submarine can be fatal, and I would think that regardless of the inherent strength that is built into the submarine for diving purposes, it still has a stretched skin that is vulnerable to puncture. This is aside from the question of submarine nuclear weapons which have the ability of delivering considerable shock, of course. I'm not talking about that. I'm talking about relatively conventional things.

DR. TELLER: But we have the unconventional things in such numbers and so do the Russians, that it is, I think, completely beside