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people, with national aspirations of its own, is largely out of power in the
Middle Eastern countries where it is located, and because the tribes extend
into the USSR, it has excellent opportunities for taking advantage of this
potentially explosive situation.

The USSR has, of course, other ways of influencing the region. The
impact of its program of military aid has already been felt. Although the appeal
of communism, both as a theory of reform and social justice and as a technique
for securing industrialization and rapid economic development, has not yet
had much influence in the region, potentially it could become a powerful force.
It is frequently said that such a development could not occur because com-
munism is incompatible with the Islamic faith. Unfortunately for the United
States this probably is not so. A grounding in Islam may be an excellent
preparation for a strong belief in communism. Among the elements contributing
to such a preparation are the facts that Islam is a revealed religion which has
not recognized toleration or rationalism, that it counts heavily on indoctrina-
tion and authority in its concept of a Muslim theocratic society and that it
postulates the supremacy of the believer over the non-believer. None of these
elements are incompatible with communism.

It is evident from the combination of all these considerations that there
are many obstacles in the way of an easy achievement of our objectives in the
Middle East. It is a region where the influence and behavior of people and
nations outside the region are very important. This addition of another group

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of factors beyond the direct control of the United States makes our task more
difficult. The Middle East, therefore, is a region which will call for patience,
skill and for bearance on the part of the leaders and people of the United
States.

But there are some elements in the Middle East which are favorable to
the objectives of the United States. Perhaps the most important of these is
the progress which has been made in a few places in raising the standard of
living. In Turkey, Iraq and Iran economic and social development have advanced
enough to give hope to many of the local people that their lot can really be
improved and improved within a foreseeable time. Although Turkey's finances
are in a precarious condition and although she is a victim of the desire for
too rapid industrialization which is common in the region, the image of what
might be achieved has in a significant degree caught the imagination of all
classes. The economic and social development of Turkey is, therefore, a
meaningful objective for them and something for which they are willing to work.

Iran and Iraq have not advanced so far, but because of the oil revenues
they both have great opportunities. These developments afford the United
States an opportunity to work with those in these countries who are also seeking
order and human and economic development. As these countries and their
people are strengthened, they can contribute to these ends within the region by
example and deed.

In helping these people, it must be recognized that the use of a particu-

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lar means in the Middle East will not necessarily produce the same result
as use of the same means in the United States or Western Europe. For
example, economic aid or technical assistance projects, such as irrigation,
often serve only to widen the gap between rich and poor instead of raising
the general level of the economy. Rapid industrialization may tear apart
the fabric of society, destroying old values, weakening the economy and
thereby causing disorder and instability. Consequently great care must be
taken that U.S. assistance does in fact support the operational objectives
of the United States in the region.

Another element favorable to the United States is that not everyone in
the region accepts the Egyptian version of Arab unity. This version which is
clearly opposed to Western interests gives Egypt the leadership of the move-
ment and in fact makes the movement merely an extension of Egyptian foreign
policy. The oil-rich countries are reluctant to accept this, but there is no
competing version in existence. If one should emerge which was more
compatible with U.S. objectives, the United States should support it by all
means available. Meanwhile it should support those forces in the region
resisting Egyptian hegemony.

D. Conclusions

In the Middle East, the Soviet Union appears to be using the revolution
occurring there to exclude Western influence from the region, to deny to
Western Europe the oil which it needs for economic survival and growth, and
to create disorder which will prevent the establishment of a world environment

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in which the United States would like to live and grow, and a disorder which
may eventually permit Soviet domination. The United States should undertake
the following pattern of action to deal with the Soviet threat and to induce the
revolution into more fruitful channels.

a) By means of the Atlantic Development Community, it should seek
to demonstrate to the peoples of the Middle East the creative possibilities of
international exchange of goods and services and the essential dignity of
such exchanges.

b) It should persuade Israel to take some affirmative steps toward easing the tensions of Arab-Israeli conflict. This should be done not only for the sake of easing the tensions and helping the refugees as ends in themselves, but also to demonstrate to the Arabs that it is not only the USSR that has their interests at heart.

c) It should support and assist those forces and countries which are concentrating on constructive tasks of economic and human development and which are thereby laying sound foundations for the future of the region.

It should be noted that although all these actions are intended to
counter Soviet actions, none are military and all would be undertaken if the
Soviet threat did not exist.

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# VI. AFRICA

## A. The Present Situation

Africa presents a different picture politically from most of the world. As a political fact, colonialism is still prominent. Sixty-five per cent of the people still live under colonial regimes and even the independent countries still have close connections institutionally with Europe and the United States. Of the eight independent countries, five have achieved their independence since the end of World War II. The problem of anti-colonialism is, therefore, somewhat different in Africa from elsewhere in the world.

Yet Africa has certainly begun to feel the revolutionary currents disturbing other parts of the world. In some areas it has passed out of control while others have been barely touched. The people are becoming more involved in politics. Coupled with social and economic changes, this is altering the relationship between the African territories and the colonial powers. This change is accelerated by the fact that the African side of the relationship is not the only one undergoing alteration. The decline in the global position of the colonial powers and their ambivalent attitude toward the institution of colonialism affects their relations with Africa.

Africa is characterized by wide variety in almost every aspect of life and the factors affecting it. There are great contrasts in climate, terrain and natural resources, and equally great ones in political, economic and

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social development. Some of the more important areas can be identified.
First there is North Africa, in history and culture a part of the Arab world but
different from it in having a substantial minority of permanent European resi-
dents who, until recently have controlled most of the sources of political and
economic power there. The relationships between the natives and the Europeans
and between the area and the countries of Europe and the Middle East have not
been worked out.

Then there are the negro regions of West Africa, virtually all still in
a colonial status. Of the colonial powers, Britain is moving the most rapidly
toward independence and Portugal the least. France has taken some steps
and Belgium has concentrated on economic rather than political development
for the region. Within this region exist great varieties in culture and political
and economic development and in native aspirations toward independence.

Then there are the regions of East, Central and South Africa where
again there is a substantial minority of permanent European residents who
control most of the sources of political and economic power. Within the
region there are broad differences as to how and when the native majority
will be given access to these sources, with solutions ranging from the South
African apartheid to the common voters role in Southern Rhodesia. But no
permanent relationship has been worked out among the Europeans, the natives,
and the significant fraction of Asiatics who have settled there. In many
respects this region has the most promising economic future and parts of it
principally South Africa, have mature economies.

Portuguese South Africa, have separate economies.

In 1950 South Africa was the most prominent economic power and one of the significant factors in relation of Africa who have settled there. In many permanent relationships has been worked out among the European states, the native African shareholder to the common vector role in South Africa. But no will be given access to these sectors, with solutions ranging from the South African economy, as to how and when the native majority control most of the source of political and economic power. Within the again there is a substantial minority of permanent European residents who then are the residents of South, Central and South Africa where and economic development and in native aspirations toward independence.

Within this region exist great varieties in culture and political and Belgium has concentrated an economic rather than political development toward independence and Portugal the least. France has taken some shape a colonial status. Of the colonial powers, Britain in moving the most rapidly. Then there are the sections of West Africa, virtually all still to be worked out, and between the area and the countries of Europe and the Middle East have not economic power there. The relationships between the natives and the European are quite as well known as between the source of political and social development, some of the more important areas can be identified.

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Thus, each region faces its own difficulties and opportunities and
will have to make its response in terms of its own history and local conditions.
Any generalization must be made with this variety in mind.

The introduction of Western agricultural technology into an economy
which is still 90 per cent agricultural is beginning to raise the standard of
living above the level of mere subsistence for the first time. With this ad-
vance have come demands for a greater increase and for political independence
and control over their own future.

This economic growth is breaking down the traditional tribal and
communal organizations by replacing tribal and communal economies with a
money and exchange economy. Frequently it results in a migration to
urban areas where there is a labor market and money. New institutions have
not yet been developed to provide the order furnished by the old. The
economic growth has thus been a force for social disintegration, dissatis-
faction, and instability.

In general, it appears that there are great obstacles to the maintenance
of public stability in the region. In the multi-racial areas, the situation
ranges from open rebellion as in Algeria to smoldering discontent as in the
Union of South Africa. In these areas, there is a high level of integrity and
competence in the administrative services and the administration is a going
concern. But that is neither the solution nor the problem. The problem is
working out a satisfactory relationship between the races, and though different
approaches are being attempted in Tunisia, Rhodesia and South Africa, the
situation is unstable.

affection is unstable.

The approaches are being implemented in的各项事业,如音乐和体育运动,在工作上是发展战略性 relationship between the states, and through different agencies, such as that of the administration, the administrative services and the administrative staff. The problem is that it is rather the solution not the problem. The problem is the administration in the administrative services and the administration is a doing union of human beings. In these areas, there is a high level of integrity and intelligence from often repetition as in Vitellis to smelting discount as in the public stability in the region. In the multi-national areas, the situation in general, it abounds that there are great obstacles to the maintenance of stability, and integrity.

Economic growth has thus been a force for social disintegration,徒劳
for yet been developed to provide the other fulfilled by the old. The
urban areas where there is a depot market and money. New institutions have
money and exchange economy. Frequently it results in a migration to
COMMUNAL organizations by relocating depot and communal economies with a
strong economic growth is bringing down the traditional inputs and
control over their own time.

The introduction of Western agricultural technology into an economy
Any generalization must be made with this variety in mind.

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In the black areas of West Africa, the problem is different. In the emerging nations of this area, administration is not a going concern. There is a shortage of qualified personnel, qualified not only technically but also spiritually; for there exists no tradition of responsibility for the community generally, but only for oneself, one's family and one's tribe. These emerging nations are facing enormous administrative problems brought about by the political, economic and social revolutions through which they are passing. The existence of such problems with the weakest of machinery with which to handle them promises great instability.

Perhaps even more than the Middle East, Africa is a region where forces outside it are vitally important. The UN has a special significance for the region because seven of its eleven trust territories are located in Africa. The Afro-Asian bloc, which appears to be dominated by Asian rather than African states, is a concept which has much influence in the region. India, with many of her people living in East and South Africa, eyes the region with interest and seeks to exert an influence. The concept of Arab unity includes North Africa, and at times Damascus and Beirut have been as significant in supporting anti-French movements in North Africa as Cairo. The mantle of Islam stretches even farther over Africa than the concept of Arab unity. Then there is communism which is prepared to exploit nationalist aspirations, racial bitterness, social disintegration, and hopes for economic growth. Then there are the European nations which seek to protect the lives and livelihood of their citizens who have made their homes there, and to secure

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markets in which to buy and sell. Many of these interests and objectives
conflict and thereby increase the tensions in the region.

B. <u>The Objectives of the United States in Africa</u>

In contrast with the Middle East, the world revolution in Africa has
not yet reached the crisis stage. The situation, therefore, offers greater
opportunity for constructive work toward the creation of an environment in which
the United States can thrive. Generally speaking, our objective in Africa is
to work for a healthy stability in the region through an orderly development of
the political, economic and social institutions which are the prerequisites
to human development. More specifically this means -

a) That we must cooperate with our Western European allies in
helping the various peoples of the region work toward healthy independence and
in the economic development of Africa under conditions which are appropriate
to the region and which avoid concepts of the exploiter and the exploited.

b) That we must seek to prevent the establishment of a hegemony over Africa, or any part of it, that is at odds with our views of the future of Africa or the world, be it communist, racist, totalitarian, or religious.

c) That we must seek to help in the development of patterns of racial partnership in the development of the region.

C. <ins>Consideration Affecting the Achievement of Our Objectives</ins>

Working out solutions to what may be broadly described as the colonial
problem must be the focus of our African policy. Yet to do so is extraordinarily

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difficult because, in the nature of things, the United States is on the sidelines. It is the needs, aspirations and behavior of Europeans and their governments and of Africans and theirs, which are central to the problem, and the most the United States can hope to do is to influence them in a constructive way.

The framework for that influence will be shaped in the first instance by the preferences described in Chapter II, preferences for orderly change, for nations sharing our basic objectives, for nations evolving toward government under law, for nations cooperating with the broad purposes of the UN Charter, but a number of other factors will enter into it. Among the most important of these will be a continuous but unostentatious effort to persuade the colonial powers to work for the development of local self-government and local leadership. Our private foundations have much to offer in assisting in the training which is a prerequisite for any such development.

This effort must be always accompanied by a recognition that political independence for every tribe and clan or even for potential nations who are not ready for it is not in our interest, or in the interest of Africa. This recognition must, therefore, curb our instinctive feelings of anti-colonialism. We must be prepared to support our Western European allies against unreasonable demands for independence. The keynote of our approach thus becomes the unostentatious encouragement of a balanced evolution toward a viable national independence for the colonial areas. The concept of balanced evolution includes training and practice in self-government and administration, the development of economic and social institutions which will support the

The development of economic and social institutions which will support the evolution includes training and education in self-government and administration, while national independence for the colonial areas. The concept of balanced development the momentous embodiment of a balanced evolution toward a reasonable demand for independence. The keynote of our approach thus is that we must be prepared to support our Western European allies against mm-recognition must, therefore, comp our interactive feelings of anti-colonialism, not ready for it is not in our interest, or in the interest of Africa. This independence for every tribe and all or even for potential nations who are

This effort must be always accomplished by a recognition that political training which is a prerequisite for any such development.

Our private foundations have much to offer in assisting in
the colonial powers to work for the development of local self-government and
important of these will be a continuous put momentous effort to neutralize
Chqueret, but a number of other factors will enter into it. Among the most
important under law, for nations cooperating with the broad purposes of the UN
for nations sharing our basic objectives, for nations evolving toward dovn-
by the preferences described in Chapter II, preferences for orderly change.

The framework for that influence will be shaped in the first instance
by the United States can hope to do so to influence them in a constructive way,
and of Africa and their, which are central to the problem, and the most
it is the needs, aspirations and behavior of European and their governments
in the nature of things, the United States is on the eve of

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new nation, and the creation of attitudes of responsibility toward the state
and the local communities and of responsibility for the state in its relations
with the rest of the world. The concept of viable national independence rejects
the creation of states which are not viable politically or economically because
they are formed by lines arbitrarily drawn on the map.

In its attitude toward the multi-racial areas, the United States must
recognize that the colonial powers have a legitimate interest in the future of
the Europeans who have gone to settle in these areas. Americans can perhaps
get some insight into the difficulty of the problem in thinking of their own
history and their failure to work out any really satisfactory solution of what to
do with the Indians, just as the Indians did not know what to do with their
ancestors.

With respect to these areas, the United States must support the
concept of a constructive partnership between the races. Where there has
already been widespread violence between them, it will be very difficult
to develop this concept, but there are greater possibilities elsewhere. This
may be another sector where private rather than public action by the United
States may be more fruitful. For example, American companies in the
copperbelt region of Rhodesia have permitted Africans, where qualified, to take
positions requiring technical skill, which had hitherto been the monopoly of
Europeans. There is one factor which offers some hope. In Africa far more
than in many of the countries of Asia, outside ideas, institutions and skills
are needed if it is to develop. The West can provide these. The danger is

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that if the West cannot work out a relationship through which it can satisfy
these needs, the USSR may be called on to fill the gap.

Although the United States will thus be seeking to influence the
behavior and aspirations of both Africans and Europeans, it should avoid the
role of intermediary. In particular it should not seek to intervene directly
in questions of independence; to do so would be corrosive of our relations
with both. In the last resort, we must support our Western European allies
as long as they are working for human development, but we should strive
to prevent issues of this sort from arising.

With respect to economic development, it will be important to work out
a concept of mutually profitable exchange, like that suggested for the Middle
East in connection with the Atlantic Development Community. Because of
differences of the economies of various regions, the relationships will vary
but they will be based on the concept that Europe and, to a lesser extent, the
United States needs African raw materials, that Africa needs European goods
for its life and further development, and that the exchange will benefit each.
Suggestions for a beginning of such an exchange can be seen in the proposal
for a Sahara Development Authority and in the inclusion of Algeria in the
European Common Market. Such international projects should tend to reduce
some of the contamination of emotional anti-colonialism.

In working out projects for the economic development, many of the
same considerations apply to Africa as to the Middle East. There is a need
for simple projects which do not radically change existing patterns of life

for simple protects which do not radiately enhance existing benefits of the
same considerations apply to Africa as to the Middle East. There is a need
in working out protects for the economic development, mainly of the
some of the contamination of emotional and colonialism.

European Common Market. Such international protects should tend to reduce
for a sales Development Authority and to the institution of Alberts in the
Sagductions for a beginning of such an exchange, can be seen in the proposal
for its life and further development, and that the exchange will benefit each,
United States needs African raw materials, that Africa needs European goods
but they will be based on the concept that Europe and, to a lesser extent, the
differences of the economies of various regions, the relations will vary
East in connection with the Atlantic Development Community. Because of
a concept of mutually profitable exchange, like that suggested for the Middle
With respect to economic development, it will be important to work on
such a long as they are working for human development, but we should strive
in questions of independence to do so which would be compatible with our relations
role of intermittency. In partition it should not seek to intervene directly
behaviour and regulations of both Africans and Europeans, it should avoid the
Although the United States will not be seeking to influence the
these needs, the USA may be called on to fill the gap.

that in the West cannot work out a relationship through which it can actually

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but which give opportunities for raising the standard of living and for training
in new skills and responsibilities. Many of the areas are crying for impressive
large-scale developments, such as the proposed Volta Dam, but the region as
a whole lacks as yet the social and economic foundations needed to support
them. As a result, such projects will cause disorder and instability and will
in fact retard human development. Opposition to such projects, however,
will bring charges that the United States and the West are seeking to preserve
the colonial status of Africa, for industrialization and heavy industry form
a major part of the popular image of mature nationhood. To be truly successful,
therefore, our projects of economic development should be capable in demon-
strating in themselves the essential dignity of agriculture as well as other
forms of productive activity.

Nevertheless, the United States in its policy toward Africa will be
continually open to charges of being a colonial power or of supporting them.
This tendency will be exaggerated to the extent the United States is unable
happily to resolve its racial problems at home. Since the United States cannot
be loved in all parts of the world all the time, this is an attitude it will have
to accept. The attitude itself can be modified to the extent that the United
States deals happily with its domestic problem and the style with which it
handles its problems abroad.

## D. Conclusions

Unlike in the Middle East, the Soviet Union has not yet made a major
effort to use the revolution occurring in Africa to isolate and defeat the West.

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The West, therefore, has the opportunity of acting first to make it more difficult for the Soviet Union to do so. The United States has not yet assumed any direct responsibilities in Africa and so must work through the West European powers which have such responsibilities, at least so far as its public activities are concerned. The following pattern of actions thus emerges.

a) A continuous but unostentatious pressure on the colonial powers to work for the development of local self-government as a prerequisite to independence and human development.

b) A recognition that premature independence before the development of appropriate institutions and leadership leads to instability and retards human development.

c) An attempt to assist in working out a constructive partnership between the races in the multi-racial areas based on the concept that members of both races are entitled to human dignity.

d) An effort to assist in the economic development of Africa by means of creative exchanges of goods and services, largely through the Atlantic Development Authority, and by useful projects of technical assistance which are geared directly to the needs of the region and to human development.

This pattern of action is aimed at producing the following results, which further our national objectives.

a) Raising the level of human dignity in Africa by economic, political and social means.

b) Inducing the world revolution into constructive channels.

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By blunting the conflict over colonialism in these ways, we strengthen
the West and lessen the opportunity for the Soviet bloc to expand its power
and influence.

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# VII THE FAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

## A. The Present Situation

While there are clearly exceptions, this region is characterized by certain common features. It stands on the eastern and southern rim of Soviet Russia. It has an enormous population, non-white and over half of that in the world, which is rapidly growing. Primarily an agricultural economy, it is undergoing a series of economic, political and social revolutions which include the disappearance of colonial regimes and institutions, forced-draft industrialization, and the creation of new political and social institutions. In most parts of the region there is a great shortage of the skilled manpower, of the capital and of the institutions needed to carry out these changes. In many parts, there are even serious shortages of food.

## China

Red China is the newest of the great powers, but it derives strength from the fact that it has behind it a great imperial tradition. It stands thus in a unique position in Asia as the heir to the Chinese empires which for centuries have powerfully influenced the civilization and life of the Far East and the countries of Southeast Asia. It is also the Asiatic interpreter of the modern gospel of Marxism which to many Asians appears as an effective and

modern leader of Marxism which to many Marxists appears as an effective and
and the countries of Southeast Asia. It is also the Vaticano interpreter of the
centuries have powerfully influenced the civilization and life of the Far East
in a unique position in Asia as the heart to the Chinese empire which for
from the fact that it has behind it a great imperial tradition. It stands thus
Red China is the newest of the great powers, but it derives strength
from China.

of food.
carry out these changes. In many parts, there are even serious shortages
of the skilled manpower, of the capital and of the institutions needed to
social institutions. In most parts of the region there is a great shortage
tions, forced-draft industrialization, and the creation of new political and
institutions which include the disappearance of colonial regimes and institu-
tions, it is undergoing a series of economic, political and social reac-
economy, of that in the world, which is rapidly growing. Primarily an agricultural
Soviet Russia. It has an enormous population, non-white and over half
certain common features. It stands on the eastern and southern rim of
White there are clearly exceptions, this region is characterized by

A. The Present Situation
---
VII. THE FAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

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palatable antidote to colonialism. In Asian eyes, there can be no question that Red China is the only China, and also the most powerful political and military force in the East.

The Chinese communists have carefully consolidated their control in China and there exists no effective alternative. With the help of the USSR, they have built up the Chinese Army into a powerful and effective military force. They are embarking on programs of industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. Both programs are being carried on in a pragmatic, rather than doctrinaire, way. All these changes cannot be made without human suffering and sacrifice, but these are hardly new features on the Chinese scene. The communists are, thus, increasing the effective strength of China and thereby their influence in the rest of Asia.

Nevertheless, the regime faces formidable difficulties. Important among these is the rapid growth of population and its impact on limited resources of food and other necessities. This may result in the non-fulfillment of many expectations. Another difficulty lies in the conflict between communist ideology and many traditional Chinese values. The leaders of Red China are committed to a complete ideological reorientation of the Chinese people and this will be difficult, if only because of the numbers involved. The same difficulty applies to their objective of creating a unified national state. The tasks of leadership and organization are very great.

The same difficulty applies to their objective of creating a unified national people and thus will be difficult. It only becomes of the numbers involved.

Red China are committed to a complete ideological reorientation of the Chinese communist ideology and many traditional Chinese values. The leaders of ment of many expectations. Another difficulty lies in the conflict between resources of food and other necessities. This may result in the non-fulfillment of these is the rapid growth of population and its impact on limited resources.

Nevertheless, the regime faces formidable difficulties. Improbable strength of China and thereby their influence in the rest of Asia.

The Chinese scene. The communists are, thus, increasing the effective
without human suffering and sacrifice, but these are hardly new features on
broadcast, rather than concrete, way. All these changes cannot be made
collectivization of agriculture. Both programs are being carried on in a
military force. They are embarking on programs of industrialization and
USA, they have built up the Chinese Army into a powerful and effective
in China and there exists no effective alternative. With the help of the

The Chinese communists have carefully consolidated their control
military force in the East.

that Red China is the only China, and also the most powerful political and
belatedly attribute to colonialism. In Asian eyes, there can be no question

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The Sino-Soviet alliance appears to be a sound one. Although it is not yet an alliance of equals, the importance and prestige of the Chinese have increased, particularly since the death of Stalin. It is likely to continue, not only because it offers mutual advantages, but also because there is no plausible alternative at present for the Chinese, however much they may carp at the Russians.

## Japan

Japan is in a unique position in the region for it has definitely passed through the first phases of the industrial revolution and has a broad and powerful industrial base. At present she is trying to diversify her industry further and to broaden her domestic market. Nevertheless, Japan has a major economic problem; she must trade or starve.

Japan also faces tremendous population pressure. This poses problems of internal stability in Japan and also of stability for the region. If Japan cannot find ways of meeting the expectations of its people for an adequate living standard, democratic institutions for which there is no indigenous tradition, and which many Japanese consider unsuitable to Japan and its problems, would be likely to crumble and there might be a return to a policy of foreign adventure.

At present Japanese nationalism is defensive, resembling the nationalism of the early days of the Meiji restoration which sought unity and experimentation. In this climate, Japan will seek to act as a broker between

experimentation. In this climate, Japan will seek to act as a broker between
the early days of the Meiji restoration which sought mainly and
the climate of the early days of the Meiji restoration which sought mainly and

At present Japanese nationalism is defensive, reëmbting the national-
return to a policy of foreign adventure.

Japan and its problems, would be likely to crumble and there might be a
no indigenous tradition, and which many Japanese considers unaffordable to
for an adequate living standard, democratic institutions for which there is
reality. If Japan cannot find ways of meeting the expectations of its people
these problems of internal stability in Japan and also of stability for the
Japan also faces tremendous population pressure. This

Japan has a major economic problem; she must trade or arrive
industrially further and to produce her domestic market. Nevertheless,
and powerful industrial base. At present she is trying to diversify her
based through the first phases of the industrial revolution and has a broad
Japan is in a unique position in the region for it has definitely

Japan

at the Russians.

plausible alternative at present for the Chinese, however much they may car
not only because it offers mutual advantages, but also because there is no
increased, particularly since the death of Stalin. It is likely to continue,
an alliance of equals, the importance and brevity of the Chinese have
the Sino-Soviet alliance appears to be a sound one. Although it is not yet

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the West and other Asian countries. Although it has little political influence among Asian countries, it has much to offer in the field of economics and technology, particularly to Southeast Asia for the economic development of that region in terms of skilled manpower, and capital goods.

## India

India, with a population two-thirds as large as China's and growing at a similar rate and with equally difficult social and economic problems, stands as the leader of the "in-between" world. For the United States, her position is critical; if the Indian government is unable to fulfill the expectations of the Indian people for more material and spiritual satisfactions than has been their lot in the past, and if Red China scores an impressive success in economic development, India may follow Red China's lead with important consequences for the rest of Asia, with the possible exception of Japan and the Philippines.

India has a policy of friendliness toward Red China. She is attracted by China's progress, her strength, her resistance toward Western colonialism, and her belief that Asian problems must be settled by Asians. She is united with China in agreement on the "Five Principles" and appears to believe that they will be respected. Toward the United States' principal Asian allies India is cool. Although willing to promote economic exchange with Japan, she is not prepared to accept Japanese leadership in Asian affairs. She considers the Philippines outside the Asian orbit.

It is not prepared to accept Japanese leadership in Asian affairs. She considers India is cool. Although willing to promote economic exchange with Japan, she would like to see Japan follow the five principles and adhere to the believe that with China in agreement on the "live principles" and abides to believe that and her belief that Asian problems must be settled by Asia. She is united by China's progress, her strength, her reference toward Western civilization, India has a policy of friendliness toward Red China. She is attracted to the Philippines.

consequences for the rest of Asia, with the possible exception of Japan and economic development, India may follow Red China's lead with important their lot in the past, and if Red China scores an impressive success in the Indian people for more material and spiritual satisfactions than has been its critical; if the Indian government is unable to fulfill the expectations of as the leader of the "in-between" world. For the United States, her position a similar rate and with equally difficult social and economic problems, stands India's, with a population two-times as large as China's and growing at

that region in terms of skilled manpower, and capital goods.
technology, particularly to Southeast Asia for the economic development of
among Asian countries, it has much to offer in the field of economics and
the West and other Asian countries. Although it has little political influence

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In its internal development, India faces difficult problems. By itself, the caste system creates many obstacles. In addition, she has embarked on an ambitious program of economic development which will stretch to the limit the available resources of trained manpower and capital. The program is being undertaken through new and relatively untried political and economic institutions and within a framework based on the rule of law and respect for the individual. It will be difficult to mobilize the massive effort called for with the speed demanded by the needs of the growing population without distorting this framework.

## Southeast Asia

The dominant forces in Southeast Asia today are nationalism and anti-colonialism. They strongly influence not only the foreign relations of these nations, but also their internal administration, their economic plans and their social philosophy. In their present form, they lead to instability, a tendency toward rebellion, weak governments, and a lack of progress in economic development. In many cases, the instability is complicated by the existence of what appear to be democratic institutions which are unable to operate as such because of the lack of training and traditions which are a prerequisite to their successful operation.

The influence of China is a very powerful in this region. Historically this has always been so. The influence is increased by the presence of large and important colonies of Overseas Chinese scattered through the region.

and important colonies of Overseas Chinese scattered through the region. The influence of China is very powerful in this region. Historically it has always been so. The influence is increased by the presence of large

to operate as such because of the lack of training and traditions which are the existence of what appear to be democratic institutions which are unable to be stable. In many cases, the instability is complicated by a tendency toward rebellion, weak governments, and a lack of progress in and their social philosophy. In their present form, they lead to instability, these nations, but also their internal administration, their economic plans and their colonialism. They strongly influence not only the foreign relations of the dominant forces in Southeast Asia today, are nationalism and

Southeast Asia

growing population without distorting this framework. The negative effort called for with the speed demanded by the needs of the rule of law and respect for the individual. It will be difficult to modify political and economic institutions and within a framework based on the capital. The problem is being undertaken through new and relatively untutored efforts to limit the available resources of united manpower and compared on an ambitious program of economic development which will itself, the state system create many obstacles. In addition, she has in its internal development, India faces difficult problems. By

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These factors lead to a feeling among many of the leaders that somehow or other they must find a way of living with China. This feeling has been strengthened by China's recent policy of forebearance as expressed in the "Five Principles" and the Sino-Indonesian treaty, which for the first time in history recognized that Overseas Chinese did not owe their first loyalty to China.

## The Philippines

The United States has a special relationship and a special responsibility for the Philippines. Their political, economic and legal institutions are largely copied from those of the United States. If these people are unable to achieve a reasonable measure of peace, prosperity and satisfaction, the example of the United States will be worth little in Asia. Unfortunately, the opposite is not also true; if they do achieve these things, it will not necessarily be a convincing example for the rest of Asia, of the superiority of United States methods and values, because there is a tendency for the rest of Asia to consider the Philippines outside the main flow of Asian life.

Since it achieved its independence at the end of World War II, the Philippines has made notable progress toward mature nationhood. Particularly under the leadership of President Magsaysay, the image of what the Philippines might achieve in the way of widespread human dignity began to catch the imagination of the people. Since his death, there appears to be serious danger that the trends toward land reform, political reform, honesty in

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government, and economic development for all instead of for the few may be reversed, at least temporarily.

## B. Objectives of the United States in the Far East and South Asia

The general objectives of the United States in the Far East and South Asia are somewhat hard to define because, although the region has many characteristics in common, the fact that part of it is within and part without the Soviet bloc makes a significant difference for the United States. It represents a case of dealing with a direct threat of further communist expansion, either by aggression or by using the forces of the world revolution, and at the same time trying to induce that revolution into constructive channels. Because of the size of the area, the large number of people involved and the difficulty of the problems facing them, the United States will have to make choices as to where to apply its effort. In looking for appropriate points to apply our influence, the following objectives appear important:

a) To limit the further expansion of Red China in the region

b) To work for the general stability of the region and for the economic, political and social development of the free nations of the region to the end that the peoples may enjoy spiritual and material growth and satisfaction.

c) To keep open the markets and the channels of trade in the region so that we and our allies may engage in mutually profitable economic exchange with the peoples of the region.

so that we and our allies may engage in mutually profitable economic exchange.

c) To keep open the markets and the channels of trade in the region that the peoples may enjoy spiritual and material growth and satisfaction.

b) To work for the general stability of the region and for the economic, political and social expansion of Red China in the region.

important:

for appropriate points to attack our influence, the following objectives appear in the following points to attack our influence. In looking for appropriate channels, because of the size of the area, the large number of world revolution and at the same time trying to induce that revolution into communist expansion, either by subtraction or by raising the force of the states. It represents a case of dealing with a direct threat of further attack without the Soviet bloc makes a significant difference for the United States. The fact that part of it is within and has many characteristics in common, the fact that part of it is without and the peoples of the region are somewhat hard to define because, although the region

8. Objectives of the United States in the Far East and South Asia.

Government, and economic development for all instead of for the few may

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More specifically these objectives imply --

a) That the United States make a significant effort to assist India in its planned economic development.

b) That the United States enter into a partnership with Japan and Western Europe for the economic development of Southeast Asia.

c) That the United States explore the possibility of creating more normal relationships with Red China.

d) That the United States enter into a partnership with the Philippines to make that Republic an example of the good life in Asia.

C. Considerations Affecting the Achievement of United States Objectives

As has been previously suggested, India's success or failure in her plans for economic development has an important bearing on the question of the expansion of the Soviet bloc in Asia and Africa. India's success thus becomes a major United States objective. It seems clear that India lacks many things to carry out these plans; foreign exchange, capital, skilled manpower, to mention a few. It behooves the United States, not necessarily to supply these needs, but to see that India is supplied by someone, preferably not the USSR.

Both Western Europe and Japan have skilled manpower and capital goods which they can export, provided finance capital is available to support the transaction. A cooperative arrangement should be worked out whereby the United States could make a loan to a Development Authority to carry out such

the United States could make a loan to a Development Authority to carry out such the transaction. A cooperative arrangement should be worked out whereby goods which they can export, provided finance capital is available to support both Western Europe and Japan have skilled manpower and capital not the UAR.

preferably to supply these needs, but to see that India is supplied by someone, preferably manpower, to mention a few. It behoves the United States, not necessarily many things to carry out these plans; foreign exchange, capital, skilled becomes a major United States objective. It seems clear that India lacks the expansion of the Soviet bloc in Asia and Africa. India's success thus plans for economic development has an important bearing on the direction of Asia has been previously underscored. India's success or failure in her

### Considerations Affecting the Achievement of United States Objectives

d) That the United States enter into a partnership with the Philippines normal relationship with Red China.

c) That the United States explore the possibility of creating more Western Europe for the economic development of Southeast Asia.

b) That the United States enter into a partnership with Japan and in its planned economic development.

a) That the United States make a significant effort to start India. India specifically these objectives imply...

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a program of assistance.

India may be concerned about too great a dependence on a single
nation, because of a fear of a new colonialism. A cooperative arrangement,
therefore, may be more appealing to her. For similar reasons, this assistance
cannot be conditioned on a requirement that India follow our lead on matters
of foreign relations. This assistance must be recognized by the American
people for what it is -- an effort to help India influence the behavior of the
peoples of underdeveloped areas everywhere by the example of a broad program
of economic and social development undertaken within a democratic framework
and with the objective of human development rather than that of increasing
the power of the state, and thereby prevent the spread of Soviet power and
control. Conceivably some development from the Colombo Plan could be used.

Because the United States has only limited resources, our major
effort in helping economic development in the region would have to be limited
to India. But the United States should support other countries in the region
in their plans for economic development by identifying itself with the general
objectives and by supplying token support in the form of training key personnel.
Perhaps Japan and Western Europe can both join in this effort and make a
large proportional contribution. In this region as elsewhere the emphasis
must be on mutually profitable exchange and on autonomous international
authorities or the ghost of colonialism will damn the effort from the start.

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By facing the problem of Red China, the United States will attempt to deal with the major threat to the stability of the region. In many ways the United States finds that its present China policy is a losing one. The sentiment for the admission of Red China to the U.N. is growing and it will soon be impossible for the United States to exclude Red China save by the veto with all the unfortunate consequences the use of the veto will have with our allies and the uncommitted nations. If Red China is admitted to the U.N., she will be recognized by virtually all the governments of the world. It will thus be the United States and not Red China which is isolated on this issue.

In addition, the question of trade with Red China creates friction between us and our allies. This is particularly true of Japan. Although there is debate within Japan on the extent to which trade with Red China will be profitable, all Japanese are agreed on the desirability of experimenting in this direction. Recent events have shown that this applies also to our European allies. To the extent that the United States remain adamant on this subject, it creates political and economic problems for itself.

If the United States maintains its inflexible position that Nationalist China is the true heir of the real China, it virtually compels Red China to attack and destroy the Nationalist regime to demonstrate its own legitimacy. Simarly if the United States categorically rejects the "Five Principles" -- 1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,

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2. Non-aggression, 3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs for any reason, 4. Equality and mutual benefit, and 5. Peaceful coexistence) which are in accord with our basic purposes and the Charter of the United Nations, the United States runs the risk of alienating India and other Asian countries and of appearing insincere. Instead of negatively questioning the sincerity of Red China with respect to the Five Principles, the United States should affirmatively seek to hold Red China to their observance.

Thus, if the whole situation is examined with real American interests, rather than emotions, in mind, there appear to be a number of sound reasons for trying to normalize our relations with Red China. There also are a number of elements which could become items for negotiation. A first step toward any such negotiation would be the working out of a satisfactory bipartisan basis for it at home. The second step would be to establish a similar basis among our allies.

Among the ingredients of the negotiation would be the U.N. seat. This, however, involves more than a matter of credentials. When China was originally placed in the Security Council, the concept was that China would be the permanent representative of Asia in that body. This was appropriate in the light of the situation and in the world at the time. But now with the emergence of other great Asian nations, there is a real question whether Red China is or should be the spokesman for Asia. This whole matter should be renegotiated. (But caveat -- what would be the implications

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of such a renegotiation for say France?)

Other ingredients might include recognition of Red China by the United States, reduction of the embargo against Red China and more normal trade between our allies and Red China, surrender of the offshore islands to Red China, aerial inspection of the Formosa Strait, the Yalu Valley and perhaps other regions, reunification of Korea and Vietnam perhaps under some form of trusteeship, renunciation of force between Red China and Taiwan, formal guarantees to the small nations of the region, and a general acceptance of the Five Principles as the standard of behavior for the United States and Red China.

A number of advantages could flow from this procedure. If the negotiations failed, the United States would gain credit throughout the region for having tried. If some sort of settlement could be worked out, it would contribute to the stability of the region. It might also contribute to independence of Red China from the USSR.

The principal reliance of the United States for limiting communist expansion by other means than military aggression becomes thus an effort to encourage the economic and human development of the non-communist areas. Physical force will also be needed to prevent another Korea or Vietnam. It seems unlikely that for the foreseeable future these forces will be provided by the countries in the region. Japan is rearming reluctantly and at a very slow rate. Except for India, the other nations are too weak

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in government and numbers to be able to provide effective force, and India, concentrating on internal problems, is not interested in the task. The United States has found that maintaining troops and bases in this area has been a source of friction between it and the host country and has contributed to anti-American and anti-colonial feelings which interfere with general objectives of the United States for the region. There seems to be no easy solution for the problem. SEATO as it now exists is clearly unacceptable to a majority of the countries in the region, but perhaps in time an effective regional security organization could be created. During the interim, the major responsibility is left to the long-range nuclear deterrents of the United States, a solution which is not really flexible enough for the purpose.

The region presents the United States with many ambiguities and difficulties. Because of contacts with the Far East which have endured over the life of our republic, there exists an attachment, an emotional involvement in the region, which has often exceeded our material interests and our capacity effectively to pursue it. Now that the United States has a major responsibility for the stability of the world, it must be careful not to let this sort of emotion trouble its analysis of its real interests in the region.

D. Conclusions

In seeking to achieve its national purposes in the Far East and Southeast Asia, the United States finds a complex and uneven pattern. In

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parts of the region, it would seem that our basic objectives of human betterment in a stable world are widely shared. In other parts, this sharing is not perceived, and in Red China the attitude of the government, which for the time being is what counts, is squarely opposed. Our pattern of action in furtherance of these objectives is:

a) To work most closely with those countries which share our objectives in an effort to promote social and economic well-being there in the hope that this will provide a check to communist expansion and an example to others in the region.

b) To normalize our relations with Red China to avoid being isolated on this issue and to lessen its appeal as the major supporter of Asian values.

c) To rely on the military power of the United States to prevent direct military aggression.

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# VIII. THE USSR AND THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES

## A. The Present Situation in the USSR

The Soviet Union now stands as the chief opponent of the United States. Convinced of the uniquely righteous character of its regime and of its unique capacity to predict the future course of history, the Soviet ruling elite stands consciously opposed to most of the objectives of the United States. Because of this willed opposition based on a different interpretation of the course of history and the political nature of man, the Soviet leaders and their regime present a different set of problems to the United States from most of the rest of the world except Red China.

This opposition would not be so important if it were not accompanied by power, but power the Soviet Union clearly has. A larger population than that of the United States living in a land more than twice as big has developed a powerful but unbalanced economy. This economy is growing at a rate in excess of ours, although the U. S. increment of growth added each year is larger than theirs. This economy, which stresses heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods, is capable of providing all the tools of modern war including thermonuclear weapons and modern delivery systems.

Soviet agriculture constitutes something of a problem for the regime. Agriculture uses a large labor force with low productivity. Soviet leaders appear to be still searching for an organization for agriculture which is appropriate from their point of view.

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The liberalizations which have occurred in the regimented society of the USSR since the death of Stalin such as somewhat greater freedom of expression, a reduced role for the secret police, some decentralization, less control over science and other intellectual activities, will probably not be reversed. The regime which introduced them presumably believes that they will produce strength. Two major sectors of Soviet society are strongly committed to the regime. The elite, consisting of the top Party officials, the leading administrators and economic manages, the military elite, and the scientific and cultural leaders, have a vested interest in the status quo and the prerequisites which accompany it. The Soviet middle class, the group of officials and administrators just below the elite, forms a group which realizes that it has succeeded in lifting itself above the rank and file of Soviet citizens. Although it, as a group, may be less ideologically motivated than the first revolutionary generation and although there may be individuals among it who are cynical about official orthodoxies and who reach out for greater intellectual and political freedom, as a group it sees no alternative to support of the regime. The liberalizations thus do not foreshadow any radical alterations of the regime.

The Soviet Union has achieved a remarkable success in technical training and scientific education. It has produced a vast number of well-trained persons who apparently find satisfaction in their calling and the rewards which it offers them. The consequences of this training are not clear;

where which it offers them. The consequences of this training are not clean. trained persons who abnormally find satisfaction in their ceiling and the retaining and scientific education. If he produced a vast number of well

operations of the regime. The liberalizations thus do not foreclose any radical alterations of the regime. The officials and officials and administrators that below the elite, forms a group which realizes the prerogatives which accompany it. The Soviet middle class, the group of scientific and cultural leaders, have a vested interest in the status quo and feeding administrators and economic mandates, the military elite, and the mitted to the regime. The elite, controlling of the top Party officials, the will produce strength. Two major actors of Soviet society are strongly coherent. The regime which introduced them presumably believes that the control over science and other intellectual activities, will probably increase breather, a reduced role for the secret police, some decentralization, less the USAF since the death of Stalin, such a somewhat greater freedom of ex-

The liberalizations which have occurred in the reformed society of

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on the one hand it could be argued that a liberal training in science and tech-
niques will develop a broad thirst for knowledge generally which will modify
the attitudes of the elite and thereby of the regime, and on the other, that
having achieved a reasonable amount of freedom in their own field, these per-
sons will rest content with that.

The U.S.S.R. will continue as a strong and dangerous opponent of the United States. Naturally it is faced with some difficulties -- the agricultural problems already referred to, a possible slowdown in its rate of industrial growth arising out of a combination of political and economic factors, political problems in its relations with its satellites and in its own leadership. But for the present there is no indication that these will seriously interfere with the effective power of the Soviet Union or of the image which it holds out to the "in-between" world. Nevertheless it is also clear that the U.S.S.R. does not have unlimited freedom of action; it, too, is bound in its own framework.

B. <u>Objectives of the United States</u>

The general objectives of the United States are:

a) To contain Soviet imperialism within its present limits.

b) To strengthen the United States and the rest of the free world in relation to the Soviet bloc.

c) To attempt to prevent general war from breaking out and to force competition with the U.S.S.R. into non-military channels.

competition with the U.3.3.R. into non-military channels.

c) To attempt to prevent general war from breaking out and to force
relation to the Soviet Union.

d) To arrest the development of the free world in
a) To contain Soviet imperium within its present limits.

3. Objectives of the United States

have unlimited freedom of action; it, too, is bound in its own framework,
in-between "world". Nevertheless it is also clear that the U.3.3.R. does not
effective power of the Soviet Union or of the Union which it holds out to the
the present there is no indication that these will seriously interfere with the
problems in its relations with the satellite and in its own leadership. But for
growth arising out of a combination of political and economic factors, political
problems already referred to, a possible slowdown in the rate of industrial


The U.3.3.R. will continue as a strong and dangerous opponent of the
come will rest content with that,
having achieved a reasonable amount of freedom in their own field, these per-
the attitudes of the elite and thereby of the regime, and on the other, that
nances will develop a broad threat for knowledge generally which will modify
on the one hand it could be assumed that a liberal training in science and con-

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These objectives imply:

a) That we remain strong enough to carry out these tasks. This includes the creation in the non-communist world of an environment which will in itself resist communist force and subversion.

b) That we make clear to the Soviet leaders that the long-range threat to their regime does not arise from any design of the free world to attack their centers of power but rather from their own position on internal freedom and external peaceful coexistence. Therefore, we should attempt to negotiate with the U.S.S.R. on any matters which can alleviate tension without decreasing our strength. We should also welcome any moves toward decency by the U.S.S.R. and seek to hold the U.S.S.R. to that standard instead of denouncing them as mere propaganda.

c) That we strengthen the forces working for liberty and human welfare in the uncommitted world so that the communist cannot capture it by default. We should seek to undermine, by repeated and practical demonstrations of what our system can do, the confidence of the communist elite in the uniquely righteous character of their regime. We should also constantly demonstrate to that elite that their personal welfare and that of their people would be enhanced by choosing courses of action which do not bring them into conflict with the free world.

d) That we greatly expand our program of cultural and informational activities to increase knowledge of the values, achievements and policies of the

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West among the leaders and peoples of the U.S.S.R. and to increase their con-
tact with the creative forces of the rest of the world.

C. Considerations Affecting the Achievement of these Objectives

It is to be noted that with the exception of increasing the penetration
into the U.S.S.R. of information about the West, the actions called for are
taken almost entirely in areas outside the U.S.S.R. Indeed they are in many
cases actions which we would take, without considering the U.S.S.R. in order
to further our objectives in these other regions, and our view of what the world
should be. It is less than fair to the United States, therefore, for us to por-
tray these actions in Congress and elsewhere as defensive reactions to the
communist threat. This excessive concentration with communism may inter-
fere with the realization of the objectives. In many respects therefore it may
be best to treat the U.S.S.R. as if it did not exist.

These objectives have been derived from our general objectives and
from a consideration of three possible developments in the U.S.S.R. which
would be favorable to our interests and the courses of action we might take to
bring them about.

The first possibility might be a revolution in the U.S.S.R. which would
replace the present regime with a regime based on concepts of freedom and
respect for human dignity. To promote such a development the United States
should:

should be

respect for human dignity. To promote such a development the United States
replace the present regime with a regime based on concepts of freedom and

The first possibility might be a revolution in the U.2.8.R. which would
bring them about.

would be favorable to our interests and the course of action we might take to
from a consideration of three possible developments in the U.2.8.R. which
These objectives have been derived from our general objectives and

be best to treat the U.2.8.R. as if it did not exist.

date with the realization of the objectives. In many respects therefore it may
communist threat. This excessive concentration with communism may inter-
act these actions in Congress and elsewhere as defensive reactions to the
should be. If it is less than fair to the United States, therefore, for us to por-
to further our objectives in these other regions, and our view of what the world
cases actions which we would take, without considering the U.2.8.R. in order
taken almost entirely in areas outside the U.2.8.R. Indeed they are in many
into the U.2.8.R. of information about the West, the actions called for are
It is to be noted that with the exception of increasing the penetration

test with the creative forces of the rest of the world.

West among the leaders and peoples of the U.2.8.R. and to increase their con-

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a) Encourage the forces of dissatisfaction and dissent in the U.S.S.R. by means of radio and other means of communication.

b) Covertly assist groups inside and outside the U.S.S.R. who oppose the present leadership.

c) Put a maximum competitive pressure on the Soviet economy by maintaining a high rate of military expenditure and foreign economic aid, thereby limiting Soviet concessions to the demands for increased standard of living.

This pressure would generate tensions and dissatisfactions among the people.

Such actions might, however, give the Soviet regime the opportunity to pose as the friend of peace and to blame the United States for barring a better standard of living for its people.

d) Provide direct military aid when and if a potentially successful uprising occurs.

For the present the possibility of such a revolution appears dim.

Although there are signs of student unrest and other dissatisfactions, the present regime gives the impression of stability. Too many groups have a vested interest in its continuation and there is no sign of any effective organizational alternative inside the U.S.S.R. which is capable of challenging the Communist leadership. Revolutionary movements may develop in time but if they develop, it will be largely for reasons which are independent of U.S. policy, for example, through the weakness or mistakes of the Soviet leadership.

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As a second possibility, a favorable development would be a gradual evolution of the Soviet regime away from messianic militancy, becoming thereby a status quo power instead of an imperialist one, which would seek to adjust its differences with other powers within the framework of the system of nation-states. As an indication that any such evolution was really occurring, we would expect the appearance of some of the following supporting developments:

a) The disappearance of the messianic tone in Party dogma and propaganda.

b) The transformation of the totalitarian single-party state into a more traditional type of authoritarian regime which provided at least some legal safeguards for the rights of individuals and groups and some means for the orderly adjustment of the plural energies in Soviet society.

c) The appearance of government policies stressing welfare as contrasted with international power -- butter, not guns.

d) The development of an educational system which stresses the values common to all men rather than the gaps between Soviet society and ours.

e) Freer traffic in ideas with the West.

a) Strengthen the Free World against communist aggression and subversion, in an effort to contain militant communism and thereby to lead to a reconsideration of Party dogma.

reconsideration of party dogma.

version, in an effort to contain militant Communists and thereby to lead to a

a) Strengthen the Free World against communist aggression and anti-

e) Promote traffic in ideas with the West.

c) The development of an educational system which stresses the values treated with international power -- butter, not arms.

c) The appearance of government policies stressing welfare as an adjustment of the plural energies in Soviet society.

gives for the rights of individuals and groups and some means for the orderly traditional type of authoritarian regime which provided at least some federal aut-

d) The transformation of the totalitarian single-party state into a more democratic state.

c) The disappearance of the megalistic tone in party dogma and troops would expect the disappearance of some of the following supporting developments:

a) An indication that any such evolution was really accounting for its differences with other powers within the framework of the system of nation-

evolution of the Soviet regime away from megalistic military, becoming thereby a second possibility, a favorable development would be agreed upon.

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b) Show a willingness to accommodate basic Russian national interests as opposed to messianic communism, thereby perhaps reinforcing the elements inside the U.S.S.R. which may be prepared to move in that direction.

c) Continue in our search for a mutually acceptable disarmament plan in order to make our peaceful intentions clear and in order to support those groups inside the U.S.S.R. which may be working in this direction.

d) Use and increase cultural exchange in order to stimulate the spread of Western ideas in the U.S.S.R.

At present, the prospects for such an evolution are not very bright. The long term forces working for it appear to be approximately balanced by the forces opposing it. The forces in favor include --

a) Whatever success the West may achieve in its efforts to contain Soviet imperialism.

b) The concomitant decline of the messianic elements of communist dogma and the shift to nationalism and bourgeois incentives as the major cement in Soviet society.

c) The pressure of the new state middle class, looking for stability, seeking to widen its freedom of action and wishing a more normal and orderly society free of police characteristics.

d) The rising expectations of the masses for more food, housing, consumer goods generally, and lesirue.

e) The desire of the people for peace and for the decline of the crisis atmosphere.

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f) The spread of education, with a consequent increase in the critical faculty and in the demand for a wider participation in the processes of decision-making. In parenthesis, it must be noted here that there are many who are convinced that the spread of technical education will not have this effect: that the increase in the critical faculty and the demand for wider participation in the making of decisions will be limited only to technical and professional matters and will not extend broadly to matters of war and peace or the individual and society. They cite in evidence the experience of Germany with its extraordinary scientific and technical community being involved nevertheless in two wars and a totalitarin regime.

Retarding factors against this evolution include --

a) Whatever defeats the West may suffer in its effort to contain Soviet imperialism.

b) The consequent reinforcement of the messianic elements in communist dogma and of the communist belief in their monopoly of the ability to predict the future course of history.

c) The grip of the Party on the machinery of government, the instrument of force, and the engines of indoctrination.

In summary, the retarding forces seem to be predominant for the next ten years or so, but there is hope in the long run for the forces working for such an evolution. The hope springs from our concept of the political consequences of the nature of man.

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A third alternative would be a Soviet regime which remains basically a totalitarian one-party state, but one whose power declines relatively vis-a-vis the Free World. In order to promote such a development the United States should --

a) Seek to maintain a high rate of industrial growth and military and scientific supremacy and to promote social progress, economic strength and political unity in the Free World.

b) Encourage, by all means short of war, the disintegrating forces within the Soviet orbit such as movements for internal independence and national communism.

Here again the factors within the Soviet bloc working for such a development are more or less balanced by those opposing it. Recent events in Eastern Europe have clearly demonstrated the existence of these forces of disintegration and in fact have made the area an asset of doubtful value for the U.S.S.R. In addition there are a number of internal pressures within the U.S.S.R. which may operate to impose some brakes of the rate of Soviet industrial growth. But if Soviet leaders are able to persist in their present plans, the rate of industrial growth and the scientific and technical achievements in the U.S.S.R. will be great. Furthermore, the dynamic and flexible approach to Asia and the Near East demonstrated in recent years poses a severe threat to our interests in those areas. It seems, therefore, unlikely that this third alternative will occur in the near future.

It seems, therefore, unlikely that this third alternative will work in the near
demonstrated in recent years. Boesel's severe threat to our interests in those areas,
however, the dynamism of the approach to Ares and the West. But
growth and the scientific development in the U. S. S. R. will be
Soviet leaders are able to better understand the nature of industrial
opposition there are a number of internal pressures within the U. S. S. R. which may
and in fact have made the areas an asset of doubtful value for the U. S. S. R. In
Europe have clearly demonstrated the existence of these forces of integration
are more or less balanced by those opposing it. Recent events in Eastern
Europe have more or less influenced the course of the war.

Here again the factors within the Soviet bloc working for such a development.

the Soviet Union and all movements for internal independence and national
communism.

p) Encourage, if all means short of war, the distribution of forces within
political unity in the Free World.

q) Seek to maintain a high rate of industrial growth and military strength.

r) ... should be

In order to promote such a development the United States
a) should maintain one-party state, but one whose power declines relatively visit.
A third alternative would be a Soviet regime which remains possible.

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## D. Conclusions

Two principal conclusions follow. The first is that there is little we can do directly to change the nature or lessen the power of the Soviet Union. The second is that we do not face difficult choices in selecting courses of action for the actions to be taken in pursuit of each alternative are remarkably similar. The principal creative effort of the United States will thus be undertaken outside the Soviet bloc. Here the United States will work to create conditions favorable to human dignity generally and for economic, political and social development.

These objectives and the actions taken in pursuit of them do, however, present some problems. For one thing, they require of the people of the United States, the patience to suffer a long and trying period in international relations and the self-sacrifice to make the major effort needed. It will be difficult to maintain the strength and resolution of the United States and the rest of the free world and at the same time to work to reduce tensions. Any gain with one tends to lessen the other.

## E. The Present Situation in the Satellites

The U.S.S.R. finds itself in difficulties in its European satellites. Faced with resentment and unrest if it remains and with defeat if it departs, the U.S.S.R. appears to be following a bankrupt policy. Although the causes for difficulties vary somewhat from country to country, one of the most important of them is a combination of nationalist and anti-Russian feelings, shared widely through all strata of society. These feelings played an

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important part in the October events in Poland and in the Hungarian revolt.
These feelings have been reinforced by the imposition of the methods of the
police-state and by the depressed standard of living.

For most of these people, the imposition of Soviet controls over their
economy has had unfortunate effects. The attempts at collectivization
lowered agricultural production and caused waste, hardship and discomfort.
The dislocation of former patterns of trade and economic life, the one-sided
economic development and the actual exploitation of the economy by the
U.S.S.R. had similar effects. The general effect has been to lower the
standard of well-being.

On the other hand, some features of the economic scene, such as the
break-up of large land-holdings and the disappearance of the private owners
of industry, are more appealing to many Eastern Europeans than what they
knew before the Communist regimes were established. The vaunted "gains
of the working classes" therefore amount to more than mere words and
cannot be ignored in any analysis of the region.

Moreover, the economic situation is undergoing some change as a
result of the events of last fall. The U.S.S.R. has decided to reduce its
economic exploitation of the region. The governments apparently intend
to pay more attention to bettering the economic condition of their peoples
than they have in the past. They are calling for help from both the U.S.S.R.
and the West in this task. Because of the importance of trade between
Eastern and Western Europe in the past and of the necessity for increasing
it if these economic wants are to be met, it seems likely to anticipate that

if it were an economic want, it would be met, if it were likely to contribute that
Western and Western Europe in the best and of the necessity for increasing
and the West in this task. Because of the importance of trade between
them they have in the past. They are calling for help from both the U. S. A. R.,
to pay more attention to bettering the economic condition of their peoples
economic exploitation of the region. The governments abnegably intend
to result of the events of last fall. The U. S. A. R. has decided to reduce its

Moreover, the economic situation is undergoing some change as a
cannot be ignored in any analysis of the region.

of the working classes"; therefore amount to more than mere words and
knew before the Communist regime were established. The numbered "dign
of industry," are more appealing to many Eastern Europeans than what they
break-up of trade, land-holdings and the disappearance of the private owners

On the other hand, some features of the economic scene, such as the
standard of well-being,

U. S. A. R. had similar effects. The general effect has been to lower the
economic development and the actual exploitation of the economy by the
The dislocation of former patterns of trade and economic life, the one-based
lowered agricultural production and caused waste, unemployment and discomfort.
economy has had unfortunate effects. The attempts at collectivization

for most of these people, the imposition of Soviet controls over their
police-state and by the depressed standard of living.

These feelings have been reinforced by the imposition of the methods of the
important but in the October events in Poland and in the Hungarian revolution.

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the present barriers to that trade will suffer erosion.

The region will probably see the continuation of the cautious policy of modest political and economic liberalization. With the lesson of Hungary before everyone's eyes, this liberalization will be carried on within the framework of communist controls and of the necessities of accommodation with the U.S.S.R. The example of Poland will be watched closely to see to what extent she can achieve the objectives of national autonomy and political and economic freedom without causing a violent reaction from the U.S.S.R.

The region believes that by history and culture it is a part of Europe and is strongly attracted by the European concept. It is eager to reestablish its contacts, cultural and economic, with the West, and is beginning to do so.

There exist for the United States greater opportunities, therefore, to exercise an influence in the satellites than in the U.S.S.R. itself. But these opportunities are limited by the strong probability that Soviet leaders would counter by force either too rapid or too radical a change in the regimes of the satellites or in their relationship with the Soviet Union. To the extent that these changes are suggested or fostered by the West, the probability of Soviet intervention is increased.

## F. Objectives of the United States

The general objective of the United States in accordance with its efforts toward human dignity is to loosen the bonds that bind the satellites to the U.S.S.R. without causing a war or greater oppression for these peoples.

More specifically, the United States should -

Materiologically, the United States should -

to the U. S. B. R. without causing a war or greater opposition for these peoples, efforts toward human dignity is to loose the forces that bind the satellites

T. Objectives of the United States

intervention is increased.

these changes are accompanied or opposed by the West, the probability of Soviet satellites or in their relationship with the Soviet Union. To the extent that counter by force either too rapid or too radical a change in the regime of the opportunities are limited by the strong probability that Soviet leaders would exercise an influence in the satellites than in the U. S. B. R. itself, but these

there exist for the United States greater opportunities, therefore, to its contacts, cultural and economic, with the West, and is beginning to do so, and is strongly structured by the European concept. It is eager to reestablish

The region believes that by history and culture it is a part of Europe freedom without causing a violent reaction from the U. S. B. R.

she can achieve the objectives of national autonomy and political and economic U. S. B. R. The example of Poland will be watched closely to see to what extent work of communist controls and of the necessities of accommodation with the before everyone's eye, this liberalization will be carried on within the frame- or modest political and economic liberalization. With the reason of Humility The region will probably see the continuation of the cautious policy

the present barriers to that trade will be lifted.

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a) Encourage the communist rulers in the satellites to seek a reconciliation with their own peoples by meeting more of their basic demands and by permitting them gradually to reenter the international community.

b) Seek to reduce the military machines maintained in the satellite countries by making it clear that they are not demanded by the national interests of the country but that in fact they are imposed by the Soviet leaders in furtherance of their expansionist ambitions.

c) Make it obvious to the Soviet leaders that a lessening of their control over the satellites will not mean that this region will become a base for aggression against the U.S.S.R.

d) Continue and expand cultural exchanges with the region and economic and technical assistance to it.

G. Considerations Affecting Achievement of These Objectives

The general objective of the United States with respect to these regions derives from two bases. The first is a belief that a weakening of Soviet control over the region results in a reduction of the totality of Soviet power. Although it can be argued that the satellites cost the U.S.S.R. a great deal, it would seem that this belief is justified. The present state of affairs contributes to the U.S.S.R.'s general strategic position and adds to its voting strength in the UN and elsewhere; indeed, the retinue of the satellites has much to do with the image of the U.S.S.R. as the leader of a bloc of world opinion.

The second of these bases is concern for the condition of the peoples

The second of these passes is concerned for the condition of the peoples
world opinion.

use much to do with the issue of the U.3.8.1. as the leader of a bloc of
voting strength in the UN and elsewhere; indeed, the returns of the satellites
contribute to the U.3.8.1. a general strategic position and adds to its
it would seem that this belief is justified. The present state of affairs
Although it can be argued that the satellites cost the U.3.8.1. a great deal,
control over the region results in a reduction of the totality of Soviet power,
divided from two bases. The latter is a belief that a weakening of Soviet
the general objective of the United States with respect to these regions.

(b) Continue and expand cultural exchanges with the region and for agriculture against the U.3.8.1.

control over the satellites will not mean that this region will become a pass
control over the satellites will not mean that this region will become a pass

of the country but that in fact they are imposed by the Soviet leaders in
countries by making it clear that they are not demanded by the national interests
p) Seek to reduce the military machines maintained in the satellite
by permitting them ad libitum to reenter the international community.

c) Encourage the communist parties in the satellites to seek a recon-
ciliation with their own people by meeting more of their basic demands and

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of Eastern Europe under regimes imposed by the Soviet. This concern arises
from our general interest in the dignity of man everywhere. This interest,
however, has a special keenness as far as this region is concerned because
of the existence in the United States of significant groups of people of Eastern
European descent who have a special feeling for the plight of their kin.

There may be a conflict between the evolutionary and limited character
of our objectives on the one hand and the views of these groups and the
peoples of the region on the other. Both may feel that more drastic action
is called for. This raises the question of what the United States should do
if a new revolt breaks out in the satellites. East Germany presents the most
difficult problem because of the fact that West Germany is our ally and that
the United States has armed forces stationed in the Federal Republic. A
revolt in East Germany, a repetition of the riots of 1953, therefore presents
a situation in which the United States has an inclination and a modest capacity
to act. Yet to intervene openly involves the most serious risk of a general
war; to intervene covertly involves risks of failure and of adding to the anguish
of the people; and not to intervene to disillusionment and doubts about the
cause of freedom in Eastern Europe and throughout the world.

Yet this gradual and limited program offers much. Cultural exchange
and economic and technical assistance give the satellites not only a wider
and more solid base on which to manoeuver in their struggle for autonomy
but also provide the best means for a knowledge of Western values and
objectives to become known first in the satellites and indirectly in the U.S.S.

objectives to become known that in the satellites and indirectly in the U.3.8., but also provide the best means for a knowledge of Western states and more solid base on which to maneuver in their struggle for autonomy and economic and technical assistance give the satellites not only a wider but this gradual and limited program offers much. Cultural exchange cause of freedom in Eastern Europe and throughout the world.

war; to intervene cooly involves risks of failure and of adding to the annual cost. Yet to intervene openly involves the most serious risk of a general situation in which the United States has an inclination and a modest casuistry revolt in East Germany, a repetition of the risks of 1963, therefore presents the United States has armed forces stationed in the Federal Republic. A difficult problem because of the fact that West Germany is ally and that it is a new revolt breaks out in the satellites. East Germany presents the notes to be called for. This raises the question of what the United States should do about the region on the other. Both may test that more drastic action of our objectives on the one hand and the views of these groups and the there may be a conflict between the evolutionary and limited character of Eastern Europe who have a special feeling for the right of their kind.

The United States of America and the other Western countries should do their best to prevent the evolution of the question of what the United States should do about the region on the other. Both may test that more drastic action of our objectives on the one hand and the views of these groups and the there may be a conflict between the evolutionary and limited character of Eastern Europe under conditions imposed by the Soviet. This concern lies in the United States of America and the other Western countries.

Europeans descent who have a special feeling for the right of their kind, of the existence in the United States of significant groups of people of Eastern Europe, and the other Western countries, as far as this region is concerned because from our general interest in the dignity of man everywhere. This interest, of Eastern Europe under conditions imposed by the Soviet. This concern lies in the United States of America and the other Western countries.

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itself. The spread of this knowledge could contribute directly to the
realization of basic objectives of the United States with respect to the U.S.S.R.
itself.

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IX International Organization

In the beginning chapters of this paper, reference has been made to
the numerous forces, military, economic, political, and social, which require
international resolution. The regional analysis which followed emphasized
and particularized their existence. Unfortunately the mere existence of such
forces does not automatically bring into being institutions appropriate to deal
with them. The United States is now a member of variety of international
arrangements which have been created to cope with some of the problems which
are apparent.

Of these, the most important is obviously the United Nations. Almost
twelve years old, it has taken remarkable strides toward the realization of
many of the objectives stated in its preamble. It and its specialized agencies
have done much "to promote social progress and better standards of life in
larger freedom". They have assisted many of the newly independent nations
in their transition to a new political and economic basis. They have done much
in matters of health, food and technical assistance and it is interesting to note
that even nations, such as the USSR, which stood aloof from these cooperative
efforts for a while have joined in.

Even in the more difficult field of world order, the United Nations has
achieved qualified successes - the conclusions of the Azerbaijan dispute, the
Arab-Israeli armistice, and the Korean War. But the general picture in this
field is not a happy one and the prospects of improving it within the framework

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of the UN do not appear particularly promising. Yet it is quite true that the Charter was accepted by the peoples of the world largely on the assumption that some sort of international organization was necessary "to maintain international peace and security" and in the hope that the Charter would provide a better instrument than the Covenant of the League of Nations. Present indications are that the assumption was correct, but there are doubts about the hope.

This political position of the United States in the United Nations is growing more insecure. With the increasing importance of the general assembly in contrast with the Security Council, the size and strength of the United States count for less. The principle, one nation, one vote, does not work in its favor. As more and more states become members, the United States is at the hazard of combinations between smaller states. For example, if the Latin American nations or substantial number of them should join with the Afro-Asian bloc on any issue, the United States and its Western European associates can be easily outvoted.

It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to have its general objectives and its policy objectives clearly formulated and to have lined up political support for them among other member states before participating in any session of the General Assembly. If it hopes to formulate its objectives during the course of the session, it will be hopelessly left behind. This analysis suggests the necessity for a regional approach if only to build up the

Amendment suggests the necessity for a regional approach if only to build up the
underlying the course of the season, it will be hopelessly left behind. This
any season of the General Assembly. If it happens to formulate the objectives
political support for them ahead of other states before participating in
objectives and its policy objectives clearly formulated and to have lined up
If so, therefore, necessarily for the United States to have its general
can be easily outdone.

Vernon� on any issue, the United States and its Western European associated
American nations or substantial number of them should join with the Aro-
the hazard of combinations between smaller states. For example, if the Latin
its favor. As more and more states become members, the United States is at
states count for less. The principle, one nation, one vote, does not work in
pity in contrast with the Security Council, the state and strength of the United
growing more insecure. With the increasing importance of the general states-

This political position of the United States in the United Nations is
just

dpositions are that the assumption was correct, but there are doubts about the
clearer instrument than the Covenant of the Reade of Nations. Present in
the national peace and security, and in the hope that the Charter would provide
that some sort of international organization was necessary to maintain inter-
Charter was accepted by the peoples of the world largely on the assumption
of the UN do not abrogate particularly promising. Yet it is quite true that the


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voting strength of this United States in the United Nations.

The Charter is, of course, subject to amendment, and the original draftsmen provided a somewhat easier process after the Charter's tenth anniversary by placing the question of Charter revision automatically on the agenda of the General Assembly. In the present state of world affairs any attempt at general revision of the Charter would be fraught with danger and frustrations. As it now stands, despite its flows, the Charter is a force for order in the world and attempts at revision would seem likely to bring disorder. This view is apparently shared by many for the General Assembly has so far voted to postpone the calling of a conference for revision.

As has been pointed out the United Nations and the principles on which it is based are fundamental to the international objectives of the United States. Nevertheless the United Nations itself may not always provide the best means of carrying them out. Among the choices facing the United States in translating its objectives into action is the possibility that the objectives can be sought, and the means for achieving them can be used, unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally. Choice between these alternatives will turn on the following factors. A bilateral or multilateral arrangement is not something of value in itself; it is valuable only to the extent to which it enables the United States to achieve its objectives. For it to work in this way, there must be a common purpose among the participants, and this common purpose should form a significant part of the national purpose of the participants.

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Secondly, this common purpose must be aimed at achieving objectives which the participants could not achieve alone and toward which the multilateral or bilateral arrangement is capable of contributing. Absent such conditions, the United States can achieve more acting unilaterally because it thereby avoids the limitations on its freedom of action imposed by the existence of the arrangement and the interests of the other participants. Since the articulation of common purpose is easier to achieve among peoples who have a common history and common values, it would appear that it would be easier for the United States to work out satisfactory bilateral and multilateral arrangements with European nations or those of Latin America than any others. The regional analyses have supported this assumption.

The regional analyses have in fact suggested a variety of regional groupings as the best means for realizing the objectives of the United States. These include the Organization of American States, the various European economic agreements, the proposed Latin American Regional Development Authority, the proposed Atlantic Development Authority NATO and others. They have different tasks but they have in common the fact that they are organizations for carrying out a perceived common purpose which is important for the region. Such regional organizations can contribute much to the realization of the objectives of the United States. Through them the United States can work for human development in an orderly world.

the objectives of the United States; through them the United States can work
region. Such regional organization can contribute much to the realization of
dreams for carrying out a perceived common Agenda which is important for the
have different takes but they have in common the fact that they are organized
Authority, the Proposed Atlantic Development Authority (MIA) and others. They
economic agreements, the proposed Latin American Regional Development
These include the Organization of American States, the Union of European
countries as the best means for realizing the objectives of the United States.

The regional analyses have in fact suggested a variety of regional
analyses have supported this assumption.

with European nations or those of Latin America than any others. The regional
United States to work out antitributary bilaterals and multilaterals arrangements
to and common values, it would appear that it would be easier for the
common purpose is easier to achieve among peoples who have a common his-
ment and the interests of the other participants. Since the articulation of
the limitations on its freedom of action imposed by the existence of the arrange-
ments in the United States can achieve more acting unilaterally because it thereby avoids
bilateral arrangement is capable of contributing. Apart from conditions, the
the participants could not achieve alone and toward which the multilateral or
Secondly, this common purpose must be aimed at achieving objectives which

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