Now, it is quite true that our present unilateral military systems are just as difficult to understand, and blunders in our present systems could be just as hazardous to national security. But it is important to note that we are free to adjust our present system as our understanding of them evolves. For example, the United States Ballistic Missile Early Warning System was originally envisaged as the first stage of an active defense system; it is now largely viewed as a system to provide warning, and certain operating practices have been adjusted accordingly. I believe it will be important for any arms control arrangements to provide at least a reasonable degree of flexibility of this type, to accommodate changes that appear desirable as our understanding of the systems evolves.

If such flexibility is desirable to accommodate changes in unilateral understanding, it is even more desirable to accommodate changes in mutual understanding. This is because mutual understanding and perception is at the very heart of arms control. Arms control is not nearly so much a matter of capabilities and forces as it is of doctrine and common understanding.

The reason why doctrine is basically more important for arms control than are forces is that the most potent forces can be quite innocuous if the associated doctrine and understanding is, while a hostile and "trigger-happy" doctrine can be at most momentarily innocuous however much the military forces may be cut back or monitored. Even a state that has gone all the way to "general and complete" disarmament can always rearm, and will do so whenever its doctrine and its perception of the situation demands it. In this sense, doctrine and understanding clearly take precedence over forces and military capabilities as the important features of arms control.

This is by no means to suggest that doctrine and mutual understanding cannot themselves be influenced by capabilities and forces-in-being, quite the contrary, indeed. There is a problem of cause and effect here that, like the celebrated problem of the chicken and the egg, seems intrinsically unresolvable. But which-

ever comes first, a considerable degree of mutual understanding will be vital for the successful functioning of anything that might be called arms control. Such understanding may not be absolutely necessary; it is at least possible to conceive of an arms control arrangement working smoothly even though two or more of the participants have very different views of what the arrangement is all about. Such a situation, however, would not seem likely to be all stable. Arms control arrangements are likely to prove far more durable and successful if the participants have a shared understanding of what they are intended to accomplish, and how they should accomplish it. *

This brings us to the subject of communication. At the time of writing, the United States and the Soviet Union have virtually no mutual understanding of strategic doctrine, tactical doctrine, general and complete disarmament, the uses to which military force or military threats may be put, or limited arms control. There are some important exceptions--for example, the notion of a pre-emptive attack seems equally understood on both sides of the iron curtain--but this statement will serve as a simple characterization. However, it is not easy to see clearly why this should be so. It is certainly not entirely due to secrecy, and may not even be largely due to secrecy; there is a great deal of published literature in both the Soviet Union and the United States that displays the range of thinking to be found on both sides. In the United States, several published books, such as that of Diderstein,⁵ are devoted to Soviet strategy and doctrine; analogous treatments of United States views presumably exist in the Soviet Union. Perhaps one of the major sources of difficulty is that the range of views to be encountered is extremely wide. In the United States, virtually every strategic or tactical

* This point has been made by Schelling (among others), who has emphasized the role of tacit communication in developing such understanding.

-6-

or arms control doctrine of substance is a matter of considerable controversy, and there are indications that similar controversy exists in the Soviet Union. In terms of the discussion above, this means that the unilateral understanding of the relevant problems on each side is decidedly fuzzy.

But it seems to me that the major source of difficulty is that the relevant people on both sides have not been "talking to each other" in sufficiently meaningful ways. If American strategist A reads a paper by Soviet strategist B, he is likely to read the paper with an entirely different set of preconceptions than those on which B based his paper, and it is not always easy for A himself to discern this fact. This is equally true of political or military threats, or pronouncements concerning military policy or arms control, made by political leader C who is heard from a different point of view by political analyst D.

Two examples should serve to illustrate the problem. First, in the realm of military policy, there has been no mutual understanding of the possible role of nuclear weapons in a limited war. In the mid-1950's, the prevalent image in the United States was that nuclear weapons should and probably would be used, while the dominant Soviet view seems to have been that they should not be used and would not be first introduced by the Soviet Union. As of 1960, willingness to introduce nuclear weapons in any limited war is distinctly on the wane in the United States, but may well be on the increase in the Soviet Union. This course of events, which seems dangerous and intrinsically rather absurd, might well have been avoidable if appropriate people from both sides had been able to conduct relatively frank personal discussion of the basic issues involved.

Second, in the realm of arms control, most Soviet thinking seems to be nearly devoid of sophisticated technical, military, and political analysis, while Western students have perhaps tended to overemphasize considerations of military security.

-7-

I believe that the Western views on this matter are the more sound*, from the point of view of international as well as national security, but in any event there must be a higher degree of mutual understanding before any substantial cooperation will be possible.

There are obvious relationships among unilateral understanding, mutual understanding, and communication. There can be no mutual understanding of a problem unless there is first a high degree of unilateral understanding by each of the participants, and sufficient communication to establish a common view. Less obvious than this, however, is the fact that what we mean by "unilateral understanding" includes a very large component of what the other chap might do, how he will respond in a crisis, what threats he is serious about, what problems he is seriously worried about, and so on. Therefore, on many important problems, there cannot be a firmly established degree of unilateral understanding unless there has first been some "communication" (at least tacitly) among the participants. It is thus clear that the development of unilateral understanding as well as of mutual understanding is something of a circular and iterative process, in which the views and practices of one side, to the extent they are perceived by the other, act in shaping the views of the other side.

This process has operated very badly up to the present time. There are obviously many facts about weapons, forces, and doctrine that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union want to communicate to each other, and some political problems (such as China) about which communication is, at best, rather delicate. But this does not explain why communication has been very poor on matters concerning which there is (or should be) a large common interest. A prime example

* This is not to say that there have not been many Western spokesman who have emphasized military considerations to the exclusion of all others, or have not perceived that even the military hazards of arms control must properly be compared with the military hazards of our present policies, rather than compared to some mythical secure world.

-8-

of this type, emphasized by many writers on arms control, is the role of inventory
information in stabilizing the arms race. Yet, perhaps because they can read
about our own bomber forces in Congressional hearings and in the New York Times,
the Soviets seem never to have fully assimilated the importance of such information.
This suggests that new and better forms of communication are seriously needed.

In summary, what we need to develop is something like a common set of rules,
which should be equally well understood, and understood in the same way, by all
the participants; we shall probably need to change the rules occasionally as we
go along; and both the development of the rules and their subsequent adjustment
will require much better communication than has yet been achieved.

### III. Various Possible Mechanisms

There are many possible ways in which one could attempt to establish communication
channels, or use existing channels, for the purpose of improving mutual under-
standing of matters relating to arms control. Among those which might be used
singly or in combination are:

1) Formal negotiations;

2) Bilateral or international permanent study groups doing paper studies;

3) Bilateral or international research groups doing technical research relating
to arms control;

4) "Couriers" or other exchange mechanisms;

5) Periodic conferences of the "Pugwash" type;

6) Publication of joint East-West papers, or simultaneous publication of
separate but parallel papers, perhaps in an international journal devoted
to this purpose;

7) Correspondence.

[lc]

-9-

Any or all of these mechanisms can make useful contributions to the problem. The immediate question is, which of them should be explicitly pursued at the present time? My own view is that the establishment of item (2) should have high priority, supplemented as circumstances permit by items (4), (5), (6), and (7). Considerations bearing on this choice, in outline, are as follows.

1) **Formal Negotiations.** Apart from (5), this has been the only mechanism in use up to the present time. It has been completely inadequate to the task, and, by itself, it is unlikely to prove adequate in the future. This mechanism is not susceptible of being used except when formal negotiations are under way, and it is difficult to use this type of channel to explore any matters other than those under immediate negotiation. But perhaps the most severe shortcoming of this mechanism is that the official delegates at such conferences are not free to discuss their own views of such matters in an uninhibited fashion.

2) **Permanent Study Groups.** By this I mean study groups under non-governmental auspices, or at the very least, groups that are not under governmental direction. (Official study groups such as the Conferences of Experts at Geneva should properly be counted under Number 1 above.) It seems to me that this is the principal mechanism by which we can begin to develop some real insight and understanding of Soviets modes of thought concerning this subject, and provide channels by which the Soviets may begin to understand our thinking on this subject. The problem is one that requires full-time attention, which none of the other mechanisms are likely to provide. Of course, the efficacy of this mechanism would be critically dependent on the people participating in the group and on their relationships with people in official agencies in their countries. These considerations will be explored in more detail below, in connection with a specific tentative plan for such a group. An arrangement of this type was suggested by Dick Leghorn at the Lac Beauport "Pugwash" Conference of April 1958, but the suggestion was not implemented at that time.

-10-

3) **International Research Groups.** Several people have, at various times, suggested the formation of an International Research Group (or bilateral research group) to do physical and engineering research on problems related to arms control, such as seismic detection techniques and missile detection technology. Such research would be quite valuable and I do not wish to minimize its potential importance, but it seems to me to have much lower priority than the establishment of a study group doing purely paper studies of the political, military, legal, and other problems bearing more directly on relevant policy decisions. Among the reasons for this are: a) The investment in men and equipment required to advance the relevant technology significantly would be very large; b) the bulk of the people involved would presumably devote the bulk of their time to problems of physics and engineering that would not themselves provide much illumination on the basic problem of East-West communication, and in this sense, the operation would be inefficient; and c) the establishment of specific research programs with a good deal of internal momentum would make it difficult to shift the attention of the group from one problem to another as our understanding of the subject evolves, and it is to be hoped that our mutual understanding might evolve fairly rapidly within the next few years.

4) **Exchange Mechanisms.** One might, and probably should, attempt to contribute to the problem of understanding and communication simply by sending people back and forth to discuss problems with their opposite numbers. I believe this would be an enormously useful supplement to a permanent group, but as a mechanism by itself, it would seem to have several difficulties. These include: a) establishing a domestic mechanism for selecting people to do the required traveling; b) persuading the said people to leave their regular work for a period which, if short, is likely to be ineffectual, and if long, is likely to be disruptive of their regular work; c) identification of appropriate "opposite numbers" on the other side; d) the problem of matching availability and current interests of the said opposite numbers; and e) providing an arrangement for financing the travel involved. I do not suggest

-11-

that these problems could not be solved, but I believe they would be much easier
to solve if the exchange activity is carried on as a supplement to a permanent study
group. This point will be touched on again later.

5) **Periodic Conferences.** There is no question that the "Pugwash" Conferences have been of considerable value, and they should be continued. However, there is equally no question, at least in my own mind, that they are inadequate (as a sole mechanism) to this task. It is virtually impossible to get to a significant level of detail in a week-long conference; even a group of Americans is likely to spend several weeks getting past the level of generalities. Although the Pugwash Conferences do advance mutual understanding, it seems to me that this advance, at least at the recent Moscow Conference, is rather less than the change in understanding that has taken place on each side during the interval between conferences. This is a long-winded way of saying that these conferences have not even been keeping up with the problem, much less getting ahead of it.

6) **Publication of Joint Papers.** Again, while this activity by itself might be useful, it seems to me that it would be much more useful as a supplement to a permanent study group, and would be much easier to implement in such a context. Peter Kapitza suggested such joint publication at the Moscow Conference, and something of this type might well go forward, but the difficulties of achieving progress through this means, using only correspondence, are painfully obvious.

## IV. Soviet Reaction and a Tentative Specific Plan.

In the original written form of the paper from which Section II above was lifted, I had suggested the study group in the form of an international staff of an International Disarmament Agency, under or related to the UN, and of which the study group would be its most important component, at least in its early phases. However, by the time I presented the paper orally, well along in the Conference, it had become quite clear

-12-

that there was no point in discussing this rather elaborate arrangement if we were to accomplish something concrete within the next several months. I therefore concentrated on the International Staff alone, suggesting that it might be established under private auspices rather rapidly. Initial Soviet reaction at the Conference proper was rather nebulous. However, after subsequently clearing up some misunderstanding about the intent of the word "staff" (the Soviets read this in the sense of a purely military staff) in a very helpful seminar arranged by Louisohn, many of the Soviet participants and members of the Soviet staff of experts were not only receptive to the notion, but anxious to pursue it. I should digress at this point to explain that the Soviet participants at the Conference were backed up by a staff of nine or ten experts, who did not participate in the Conference proper although at least some of them were considerably better versed in the subject than some of the Soviet participants themselves. The Chief of this staff of experts was named George Zadorojny, and the Deputy Chief was named Michael Voslensky. There were several discussions with Zadorojny and Voslensky in the next day or two, concerning the nature and functioning of such a group, and Zadorojny suggested a list of topics that a group might begin with. (This list will appear below.) At the first day of the formal "private" meetings of December 6 and 7, I raised the question of proceeding explicitly with the formation of the study group. Federov responded to the effect that they were for it in principle and were ready to proceed, but he thought there should be a specific plan of some kind in sight to proceed from. The next morning, Zadorojny and Voslensky and I went off in a corner and put together an outline of a tentative plan, which, with subsequent modifications arranged with Federov, appears on the next page.

-13-

[c]

Tentative Plan

of U.S. - Soviet Permanent Scientific Study Group
for the Study of Disarmament

1. Location: Moscow, Boston

2. SU = US plus ultimately four to five others (e.g., Britain, France, UAR, Poland, E. Germany)

3. Under private auspices; Academies?

4. Number and type of participants: 2 or 3 year terms, perhaps renewable, 3 or 5 or 10 each US and SU, 1 each from 3 or 4 other countries

5. Topics:

1) Stable-Deterrent Systems

2) Danger of Unintended War and Means of Reducing It

3) First Stage Steps - e.g., Means of Delivery?

4) Inspection

5) General and Complete Disarmament

6. Forms of Work

Small (2, 3, or 4-man) study groups on specific problems, with reports; seminars; visits.

Direction of Group: 1 each Soviet and American

[1c]

-14-

The list of topics set forth on the preceding page is that originally suggested by Zadorojny. These were of course thought of as tentative initial topics for study, and it was explicitly recognized that topics could be changed at the discretion of the group. However, it is to my mind fairly impressive evidence of seriousness of purpose that stable-deterrent systems should appear first on a Soviet-proposed list of topics for study.

Both Zadorojny and Voslensky, and to some extent myself, wanted the group to be purely bilateral, i.e., involving the U. S. and Soviet Union only, but Federov was quite insistent that the group include others. Zadorojny finally arranged a compromise with Federov to the effect that initial organizational discussions could be purely bilateral, with participants from other countries brought in after the organizational arrangements are worked out in detail. I thought it might be a good idea to have the group associated in some way with the UN, and made overtures to this effect, but all the Soviets involved were quite firm in rejecting any association with the UN at the present time. We might reopen this question at some later time, but the establishment of the group should certainly not be made conditional on association with the UN.

I had several discussions with Zadorojny about this subject on December 8 and 9, i.e., after the main Conference and "private discussions" were over, and I can testify that Zadorojny at least has an image of the role and functioning of the group that coincides closely with our image. In particular, he remarked explicitly at one point that the group must not be used to wage propaganda. He also realized that in order for the group to be fully successful, their participants would have to develop some lines of informal communication with the relevant people in their Foreign Office and related quarters. (As matters stand, it appeared that their participants had rather less contact with the people in their official agencies than is the case with some of our participants in the United States.)

-15-

[LJ]

During a discussion at the residence of Ambassador Thompson on the evening of December 8, Fedorov indicated that the plan had the approval in principle of the Presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. I thought at that time he was referring to the specific plan evolved the preceding day, and I thought that his remark indicated very speedy action, but it has since occurred to me that this approval may stem from the suggestion Dick Leghorn advanced two and a half years previously. In any event, they are prepared to support such a group through the Soviet Academy if we can provide support from our side and develop mutually satisfactory organizational arrangements. Matters were left that they would await word from me as to whether and when we were prepared to proceed with specific organizational arrangements.

In this last regard, Leo Szilard suggested that the group should spend alternate six month periods in Boston and Moscow. While this kind of shuttling back and forth might in some respects be slightly painful to the participants, this arrangement would have numerous advantages that would more than offset the annoyance.

## V. Recommendations

Establishment of a group of this kind would not only be highly valuable in itself, it would also facilitate enormously the further exchange of visitors, as well as the publication of joint papers if this seems desirable. It seems to me that we should press for the establishment of such a group with, as the saying goes, all deliberate speed. This question has been discussed with many interested observers, both in official agencies and elsewhere, in the United States since mid-December, and there seems to be general agreement on this point. Perhaps the most basic problem is that of suitably qualified manpower. There seems to be fairly general agreement on the point that allocation of all suitably qualified manpower in the United States purely to domestic studies, with none allocated to the development of communication and mutual understanding, would represent a very poor allocation of resources, quite possibly

-16-

[L]

a self-defeating one. The immediate operational problem is one of scale. My own preference (and also that of Fedorov, Zadorojny and Voslensky) is for something like five participants each from the U. S. and S. U., not all of whom need be at the frontiers of the subject on the day they begin. Definitely limited terms, such as two years, would seem desirable for a number of reasons. As far as three participants each would still be highly useful, but I think that less than three would begin to degrade the efficacy of the operation very rapidly.

The immediate problems of the moment concern the establishment of suitable U. S. auspices to serve as a "parent" for our end of the operation, and the development of sources of financing. As to auspices, it seems to me very strongly that the group should have no official connection with the "Pugwash" Conference, though of course informal connections would be highly desirable. Perhaps a mechanism such as the joint Harvard-MIT Arms Control Seminar could play an important role in establishing suitable auspices. For five participants the required financing would be something like 250,000 dollars a year, in order to provide ample travel money for visitors and exchange arrangements.

Comments on any or all of these matters, from any or all of the recipients of this memorandum, would of course be most welcome.

REFERENCES

1. Herman Kahn. "The Arms Race and Some of its Hazards", in *Arms Control and National Security*, and in *Daedalus*, Fall 1960.

2. Jerome B. Wiesner. "Comprehensive Arms-Limitation Systems", in *Arms Control and National Security*, and in *Daedalus*, Fall 1960.

3. Herbert S. Dinerstein. *War and the Soviet Union*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.

4. Thomas C. Schelling. "Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War", *Conflict Resolution*, 1957, vol. 1, pp. 19-36.

5. Thomas C. Schelling. "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization", in *Arms Control and National Security*, and in *Daedalus*, Fall, 1960.

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW
HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
EDITOR

PHILIP W. QUIGG
MANAGING EDITOR

58 EAST SIXTY-EIGHTH STREET
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.
CABLE ADDRESS· FORAFFAIRS. NEW YORK

February 1, 1961

Mr. Donald G. Brennan
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Lincoln Laboratory
Lexington 73, Massachusetts

Dear Don:

I am sorry not to have written you earlier concerning
the manuscript on the Nuclear Test Ban. Up to this moment our hope
has been that space might be found for it in our April issue. But
now that appears quite impossible, partly because of the crowdedness
of our own schedule, partly because of the difficulty of cutting your
very long manuscript down to anything like manageable proportions.

You may be sure that a manuscript coming to us with the
warm recommendations of both Jerome Wiesner and Henry Kissinger re-
ceived very careful consideration. I am very glad that in any event
the manuscript will appear in print very soon.

I am delighted to have met you at Arden House. Please send
our thanks and regrets to Mort Halperin and, if you and or he have
another manuscript in mind one day, by all means keep FOREIGN AFFAIRS
in mind.

Philip W. Quigley

Sincerely yours,

in mind.

another manuscript in mind one day, by all means keep FOREIGN AFFAIRS
our thanks and regrets to Mort Halberin and, if you and or he have

Received very carefully consideration. I am very glad that in any event
I may be sure that a manuscript coming to me with the
very long manuscript down to anything like managespele proportions.

of our own schedule, partly because of the difficulty of cutting your
now that appears quite improbable, partly because of the crowdedness
has been that absence might be found for it in our April issue. But
the manuscript on the Nuclear Test Ban. Up to this moment our hope
I am sorry not to have written you earlier concerning

Dear Don:

Lexington 73, Massachusetts
Lincoln Laboratory
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Mr. Donald C. Brennan

February 1, 1961

CYNTE ADDRESS - LOYOLAIRY - NEW YORK

NEW YORK 51, N. Y.

28 EAST SIXTY-EIGHTH STREET

MANAGING EDITOR
PHILIP W. QUIGG

EDITOR
HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COPY

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
LINCOLN LABORATORY

TO: Henry Kissinger and Tom Schelling

FROM: D. G. Brennan

SUBJECT: Forthcoming Debate with Norman Thomas and Seymour Melman

February 8, 1961

I see by various posters, announcements and letters that you are going to have a debate with Norman Thomas and Seymour Melman on February 15. The circumstances and probable audience at this debate do not seem entirely propitious, but it may be a useful opportunity to impart some education to at least a few members of the audience.

To this end, it might be highly useful (for several reasons) to quote from pages 279 and 280 of Melman's inspection book. These pages contain a splendid statement of some of the major motivations for pursuing a so-called "stabilized deterrence" type of arms control arrangement. I mentioned this casually to Tom once before, I believe, but the passage involved may be worth more emphasis than my previous remark indicated.

DGB:jej

FOR LABORATORY USE ONLY

PRIVATE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL STUDIES OF ARMS CONTROL

Rough Minutes of First Meeting, Friday March 24, 1961, at Harvard Faculty Club

Present at the first meeting were R. S. Leghorn (Chairman), D. G. Brennan, D. H. Frisch, H. A. Kissinger, and L. B. Sohn. (P. M. Doty in London and Marshall Shulman on the West Coast.)

The meeting began with a review of possible sources of financial support. Leghorn reported talking to Shephard Stone of the Ford Foundation and of McCloy's office, who had expressed the view that Ford would like to see it financed jointly by Rockefeller and Ford, and who seemed reasonably optimistic that support could be secured. Leghorn also reported that McCloy and Wiesner were in favor of implementing the group.

There followed some review of the motives for implementing such a group and some of the possible objectives it might serve.

Concerning the length of time participants would be expected to serve, it was felt that one year should normally be the minimum term committed with the possibility of renewal. (Note: It was not decided if some participants could be invited for more than one year.) However, it was felt that a minimum commitment of six months might be possible for a very few outstanding participants who might otherwise be difficult to obtain.

The question of whether the group should alternate in location between Boston and Moscow, or should settle on a fixed location such as Vienna, was discussed at length. The group was strongly in favor of the alternation scheme, at least to begin with, and felt that three month cycles would be even better than six month cycles. The group might possibly decide to spend some three month intervals in other countries or other places. It was felt that we should try for a joint U.S.-Soviet directorship, with the U.S. director serving as administrative head when the group is in the United States, and the Soviet director serving as the administrative head when the group is in the Soviet Union.

Considerable time was devoted to discussing prospective participants. It was felt that we should try for six each from the United States and the Soviet Union. It was felt that any participants from other countries should generally be supported by sources from their own countries, but that we might possibly try to support an occasional participant who would be sufficiently valuable to the group to justify this as an unusual step. The Committee was able to agree on only four prospective participants to be approached at the present time, namely, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Lewis C. Bohn, Marshall Shulman, and David Cavers. Others suggested by one or more members of the Committee and who might be approached at some later time were: Max Singer, Hans Bethe, Charles Price, Frank Bothwell, Henry Roberts, Amrom Katz, Bernie Feld, Mathew Sands, Dan Ellsberg, Larry Martin, Thornton Read, Klaus Knorr, and Roger Fisher. (It is presumed that these names will not be discussed outside of the Committee.)

Leghorn agreed to explore with Topchiev the possibility of establishing a Soviet "Steering Committee," which would be the counterpart of our Committee.

The tentative target date for initial operation of the group was taken to be October 1, 1961.

Several matters concerning administration and budget matters were discussed that should be included in a draft proposal for establishing the group.

[Izvestiya, December 16, 1960]

# The Scientists and Disarmament

by E. Fedorov
Academician

The statement issued by the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Labor Parties directed to peoples of all countries contains an appeal to fight actively for averting war and for establishing secure and lasting peace among peoples.

The most urgent problem of our day - the problem of disarmament and international security - causes deep concern not only among the Soviet scientists but among men of science throughout the world.

In the past a certain detachment from practical life and an absence of interest in political problems was characteristic of many foreign scientists. Over the past few years the situation has changed. Science has been having an ever greater impact upon the life of society. Its achievements are capable of improving man's well-being considerably and insuring wide possibilities for his development. However, the same scientific achievements applied to military purposes will cost the lives of hundreds of millions.

Prominent scientists in Western countries can no longer remain indifferent to the application of their discoveries. The Pugwash movement is an expression of this concern that the scientists have for the fate of the world and primarily for the fate of their own countries. The initiators of this movement were the well-known philosopher Bertrand Russell, famous physicists Albert Einstein, Joliot Curie and other well-known scientists.

The sixth regular conference called by the Permanent International Pugwash Committee of Scientists has just ended in Moscow. This conference was devoted to the most urgent problem of our time, disarmament and international security. The largest delegation came from the USA; it included 26 prominent scientists. Men of science gathered from the United Kingdom, France, Holland, the German Federated Republic, Canada, Australia and Austria. Socialist countries were represented by a substantial group of scientists.

A heated discussion continued for seven days. In spite of great differences of political views, complete unanimity was achieved on many important questions.

The delegates noted that over the past two years tension in international relations has increased.

In the USA demands to resume nuclear weapons tests are becoming ever more insistent. There are even scientists who voice support of such demands. They are, for instance, the well-known Edward Teller, who dreams of creating cheap nuclear bombs; radiologist Harris, who claims (contrary to the conclusion of the Special UN Committee) that resumption of nuclear tests would not be harmful to human health, and others.

Under these circumstances the decision of the Moscow Conference to support the fundamental principles of the Vienna Declaration, adopted by the members of the Pugwash meeting of scientists in 1958, is of considerable significance.

-2-

This declaration had expressed the conviction that the development of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass annihilation calls for excluding not only such weapons but war itself from the life of human society.

What then needs to be done in order to avert war? Total and general disarmament carried out at a fast pace is in the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the delegates the fundamental means which can in a real way avert war and lead to stable and secure peace.

It should be noted that none of the scientists cited any arguments against this, although some American delegates expressed doubts that general and total disarmament could be achieved.

The necessity of achieving general and total disarmament is confirmed in the statement published by the conference.

The main arguments and a big discussion were raised over the question of ways and means of disarmament. Soviet delegates were in a favorable situation in this discussion. The plan for general and complete disarmament proposed by the head of the Soviet Government, N. S. Khrushchev, at the UN General Assembly Session is so clear and logical that the Soviet scientists were able successfully to explain and defend the provisions contained in it. Indeed, already the first phase of disarmament as proposed by the Soviet Government would provide for liquidating all means of delivery of mass annihilation weapons; all armed forces would have to be recalled to within the limits of national boundaries; military bases on foreign territory would have to be abolished, and conventional armed forces significantly reduced. This means a real reduction in the possibility of unleashing war and eliminates the danger of sudden attack.

The Soviet plan received the support of the scientists of all Socialist countries. Chinese delegates denounced in their speeches the slanderous reports which have appeared from time to time in the Western press, to the effect that the Chinese People's Republic allegedly does not strive for peaceful coexistence and does not want disarmament.

Some delegates who arrived from Western countries also supported the Soviet proposal in general terms.

It should be mentioned that the Western scientists here did not even attempt to counter this concrete plan by measures which now constitute the official proposals of the Western powers. As is well known, in the first phase they only provide for extensive control and primarily control over rockets. However, it would be difficult to find real disarmament measures in these proposals.

What then did the American scientists speak of? Their proposals in their various versions boiled down to calling for the need to reduce armaments, leaving, however, at the disposal of the USA and the Soviet Union such a number of nuclear bombs and appropriate means of delivery - rockets and planes - that would ensure for each country the capability of delivering a destructive counter-blow to the other side. American scientists considered that it was necessary to retain this weapon for many years to come. This, in their view, is allegedly necessary in order that in the course of disarmament the great powers would not be able to make use of some situations advantageous to themselves.

-3-

Naturally, it was exceedingly difficult for our American colleagues to defend such a point of view. The retention of weapons is contrary to the very idea of disarmament. Disarmament means that countries would not settle disputes by means of war. Having sincerely taken the position of disarmament, one cannot at the same time be concealing weapons up the sleeve.

The retention of planes, rockets, and other means of delivering nuclear bombs does not eliminate the danger of sudden attack, does not eliminate the danger of a war flaring up by accident. It was obvious to us that these proposals were one of the attempts to substitute the idea of disarmament by the idea of retaining the so-called "deterrent powers."

It is natural that the Moscow conference did not take any [some lines missing] on concrete ways of disarmament, [some lines missing] helped to reveal the nature of the different points of view.

The problem of trust considerably occupied the attention of the delegates. Development of trust among peoples and governments is a most important task. The reduction of suspicion and mutual misgivings is closely linked to the disarmament process. It should be noted that this connection is interpreted by some Western delegates as an argument in favor of the need first somehow to establish trust, and only then proceed with disarmament. However, the majority of scientists consider that disarmament is the most important and initial factor contributing to the elimination of suspicion and growth of trust.

The next big question discussed at the conference was the problem of cooperation among scientists. Numerous reports and speeches given by the delegates indicated that they all held the unanimous view that under present conditions it is necessary to expand cooperation among scientists both for developing peaceful science and for establishing greater trust among peoples.

The conference adopted a special resolution on the necessity of expanding the Pugwash movement with a view to establishing a world-wide social organization of scientists, which would contribute to the growth of international cooperation in science, study problems of disarmament and international security, assist in the solution of these problems by governments and in rapprochement and mutual understanding among peoples of different countries. The conference entrusted the Permanent International Pugwash Committee to develop and propose a concrete plan for creating such an organization.

In spite of some disagreements, the unity achieved on important questions is of great significance. We are certain that the conference has made a contribution to the reduction of international tension and to the improvement of mutual understanding among peoples. This is the opinion of our foreign guests as well.

The Head of the Soviet Government, N. S. Khrushchev, and wide segments of Soviet public opinion have welcomed warmly the Sixth Pugwash Conference.

"It is extremely gratifying," writes N. S. Khrushchev in his address, "that the problem of disarmament is being handled by the most prominent scientists of our time, whose voice in our age of wonderful scientific discoveries is being listened to throughout the world."

Soviet scientists have noted with surprise the unfavorable reaction to the conference on the part of certain circles in the United States of America. The article by Marguerite Higgins in the "New York Herald Tribune" of November 28 is indicative of this attitude. Confusing and distorting the facts, Higgins states that the conference of scientists is some sly maneuver of the Soviet Government. We consider that this is directed at thwarting friendly contacts among peoples. Apparently certain reactionary leaders are afraid of open and honest discussion of disputed questions of international relations. However, we understand that such phenomena do not reflect the opinion of the wide circles of intelligentsia in Western countries. We know that scientists in the West understand perfectly - just as we do here - their responsibility for consolidating peace among nations and for averting the horrors of a world war, and are doing a great deal towards achieving this objective.

[SOURCE: "PRAVDA," December 15, 1960]

THE PUGWASH CONFERENCE ---A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE - By Academician A. Topchiev, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Sixth Pugwash Conference.

The struggle against the danger of a new world war must be carried out without waiting for the time when atomic and hydrogen bombs begin to fall. This struggle must be conducted now, with ever increasing efforts from day to day. This appeal, contained in the Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of Communists! and Workers' Parties and in the Appeal to the Peoples of the Entire World, meets the aspirations of all peace-loving forces on earth.

One of the proofs that the ever-increasing active struggle of progressive scientists for peace is constantly growing was found in the Sixth International Pugwash Conference which took place in Moscow from November 27 to December 5, 1960. This conference derived its name from the small Canadian town of Pugwash where scientists of various countries first met to discuss the problems of the struggle for peace.

The Pugwash movement originated a few years ago and was initiated by such prominent world-famed scientists as A. Einstein, F. Joliot-Curie, B. Russell, and the most prominent scientists of many lands now take part in it.

The Sixth Pugwash Conference was dedicated to the problems of disarmament and guaranteeing international security. The necessity to discuss these very questions was dictated by the responsibility for the destinies of the world at the time when the Conference met and by the chief objective of the Pugwash movement among scientists. This movement arose and is growing under the banner of the struggle against the danger of nuclear war. It is natural that it is impossible to get rid of the danger of war without the destruction of armaments, without the elimination of means for mass.destruction of human lives.

It is clear to everyone that atomic and hydrogen bombs exist not for the purpose of growing two heads of wheat in place of one, not for the purpose of feeding the hungry or ridding people of disease. Their purpose is different---it is to sow death, disease, and destruction. Even when they are not used they take bread from the hungry, energy from industry, deprive people of shelter, steal light and culture, sow anxiety and hostility. People cannot be sure of their security while armaments are not destroyed on earth.

General and complete disarmament—that is what humanity needs. If heretofore such an appeal could remain a distant dream, now it has become the first cry of life, become a vital and urgent necessity. To this historical problem of the first magnitude the Sixth Pugwash Conference devoted its efforts. This is why it met with wide international response.

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Seventy-six scientists from 15 countries attended the Sixth Pugwash Conference. Among the participants in the Conference there were authoritative representatives of world science, including holders of the Nobel Prize who enjoy international fame, like S. Powell and Noel-Baker and also the scientists A. Haddow, B. Lockspizer, D. Rotblat (England), the well-known American scientists L. Scillard, D. Wisner, P. Doty, B. Glass, D. Inglis, P. Leghorn, E. Rabinovich, Professor Chow Pei Yuan (Chinese People's Republic), President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences I. Rusniak, Professor R. Brdichka (Czechoslovakia), prominent scientists of France, of the German Democratic Republic, of the Federal Republic of Germany, of The Netherlands, of Poland, Soviet Academicians A. Aleksandrov, A. Blagonravov, N. Bogolyubov, A. Vinogradov, M. Dubinin, P. Kapitsa, N. Semenov, D. Skobeltsyn, I. Tamm, A. Topchiev, A. Tupolev, E. Fedorov, corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR A. Arzumanyan, V. Yemeliyanov, I. Isakov, and others. The most numerous was the delegation of scientists of the USA.

At the Conference was also present C. Eaton, well-known American industrialist and public figure, and winner of the International Lenin Peace Prize through whose support the Pugwash movement was started.

On the opening day the Conference received greetings from N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Having emphasized that on the solution of the problem of disarmament and international security the future of the world depends, the head of the Soviet Government expressed his conviction that the participants in the Conference, in spite of differences in their political views, would express themselves unanimously in favor of general and complete disarmament. "We are ready to begin complete and general disarmament at once if the Western powers are ready," wrote N. S. Khrushchev.

Comrade N. S. Khrushchev called very gratifying the fact that the problem of disarmament is occupying the most important scientists of our time and to whose voice the whole world listens in our century of marvellous scientific discoveries. "Let the scientists, gathered at the Pugwash Conference," wrote Nikita Sergeyevich, "express their authoritative opinion on the urgent necessity to stop the present armament race and achieve complete and general disarmament."

The appeal of N. S. Khrushchev was warmly received by the participants in the Conference. The Conference addressed to the head of the Soviet Government a letter expressing its gratitude for his greeting.

The Sixth Pugwash Conference has done great work. It heard and discussed about 50 scientific papers on the following topics: general and complete disarmament, history and the dangers of the armament race, prohibition of tests of nuclear weapons, danger of surprise attack, measures for ensuring peace during and after disarmament, and the role and responsibility of scientists in averting war and in organizing international cooperation.

During the discussions which took place, an atmosphere of frankness and mutual understanding, the participants in the Conference exerted great efforts to find a constructive solution of the problems of disarmament and guaranteeing a lasting peace.

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(Y)

The Soviet scientists expressed the opinion that the most rational and effective methods of solving these problems is a stage-by-stage implementation of the plan for general and complete disarmament under international control corresponding to those measures for disarmament which would be implemented at each stage.

The vast popularity of the Soviet program of general and complete disarmament put forward by N. S. Khrushchev in 1959, found its clear reflection during the Pugwash Conference. The declaration of the Conference stressed the importance of the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, approved on the initiative of the Soviet Union, concerning the necessity of destroying all means of warfare. The Declaration stated: "In accordance with the aim of general and complete disarmament under effective control, we discussed the means by which it is possible to realize this objective. We have also considered in detail the nature and sequence of the stages in the plans of disarmament and the measures of international control after effective verification of their implementation, and we have reached a general understanding in regard to some of these important questions."

The unanimous acceptance by the participants in the Pugwash Conference of the principle of general and complete disarmament is a very important positive result of this international meeting of scientists.

A prominent place in the discussions of the Conference was occupied by the question of immediate discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons. The participants in the Conference unanimously declared their recognition of the urgent character of this problem, the necessity of putting an end to harmful experiments with nuclear weapons.

Along with the general problems of peace and disarmament, the Conference discussed technical details of the plan for disarmament and the creation of a system of control. In this connection especially valuable were the speeches of specialists in the fields of physics, chemistry, mathematics, military science, and the social sciences.

The Conference gave considerable attention to the problem of strengthening confidence and cooperation among scientists of various countries. It is known that certain circles of the West frequently formulate the question in this way: Disarmament is impossible as long as mistrust and suspicion exist on the international scene. From this they deliberately arrive at a baseless conclusion and allege that disarmament under existing conditions cannot be achieved. The advocates of such a point of view completely ignore the indisputable truth that armaments themselves are one of the most important causes of tension and suspicion in relations between countries and peoples. The achievement of the Sixth Pugwash Conference consists in the fact that it rightly called attention openly to this aspect of the cause by emphasizing in its declaration that "progress in the area of disarmament will of itself be the most important factor in changing the atmosphere of public opinion."

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The work of the Conference was characterized by the recognition of the fact that scientists of various countries can and must contribute in an important way toward overcoming mistrust and removal of suspicion in international relations.

The question of the role and responsibility of scientists in the existing situation was the subject of an animated discussion at the Conference. The scientists whose labors during past decades have been marked by the most important discoveries and inventions cannot be indifferent to the manner in which the achievements of science are utilized. It is their sacred duty to make sure that these achievements would never serve the aims of annihilation of people, that they would be directed exclusively to the good of the world and civilization. This thesis has received the approval of the participants in the Conference, who manifested a correct and deep understanding of the great problems which confront the scientists of the entire world at the present time.

This appeal of the progressive scientists is all the more important because the warmongers are not asleep and attract certain scientists into their ranks. In this respect a communication which arrived from New York on December 6 was very characteristic. Speaking before two thousand delegates of the 41st Annual Conference of the North American Radiological Society, a certain doctor, "a physician and a specialist in radiation," Dr. Paine Harris, urged the American physicians to tell the people that the resumption of nuclear tests would not do any harm. He declared: "The fear of radioactive fallout which induced the United States to agree voluntarily to discontinue nuclear tests, plunged the country to the bottom of the scientific well." It is noteworthy that Harris wanted to persuade physicians to speak in favor of continuation of tests just as energetically "as biochemist Dr. Poling [Pauling?] spoke against them." Thus some "humanists" offer their poisonous services in the struggle of warmongers against the advanced progressive scientist Dr. Lainus Poling, a Nobel prize winner and fearless fighter against nuclear tests, against the threat of a nuclear war.

Only persons who have lost their honor and conscience can urge the resumption of nuclear tests and multiplication of means for mass destruction of human beings and the kindling of the "cold" war in the face of the threat of thermonuclear catastrophe. Such persons are unworthy of the lofty calling and noble vocation of physician and scientist. All honest scientists and physicians will turn away with contempt from "Dr." Harris and other venal persons like him who conceal their business under the diploma of the scientist.

Scientists of various countries who hold divers views came to the Sixth Pugwash Conference and others that preceded it. Animated discussions took place at the Conference and divers points of view were expressed. As the Soviet scientists, only welcomed it, because arguments give birth to truth. Frank discussion carried out in the atmosphere of friendliness and cordiality contributed to improvement of mutual understanding among the participants in the Conference. The degree of unity of opinions achieved is characterized by the fact that not a single participant in the Conference voted against the statement adopted by the Conference in its conclusive declaration.

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Of course, the participants in the Pugwash movement still have
many unsolved problems. There will be discussions on these questions
between scientists of various countries. The participants in the
Conference adopted a resolution to submit their proposals to their
respective governments and to enlighten public opinion throughout the
world about measures necessary to ensure international security.

The subsequent conduct of the Pugwash Conference has also been
mapped out. In accordance with a proposal of American scientists the
next conference on the subject of "Disarmament and World Security"
must take place in 1961.

Valuable suggestions were introduced at the Conference concern-
ing an international forum of scientists on the question of discontinuance
of the "cold war," and concerning the creation of a world-wide public
organization of scientists for the study of problems of disarmament and
control. These proposals were approved and handed over to the Permanent
Committee of the Pugwash Conference for detailed study and elaboration.

We, the Soviet scientists, consider that this conference in Moscow
was an important stage in further development and broadening of the
Pugwash movement. We are convinced that the appeal of this conference
to the scientists of the entire world to assist in the study and
solution of the problem of achieving complete disarmament will not be
left unanswered.

On their part, the Soviet scientists will do everything in their
power in order to facilitate broadening and strengthening the Pugwash
movement, which puts forward as its aim the objective of con-
solidating peace and international security.

ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN SOVIET PUBLICATION
NEW TIMES, No. 1, JANUARY 1961

Disarmament, Control, Confidence

Professor Vasily Emelyanov

International security is a cardinal problem of the age. The future of mankind depends on whether or not we succeed in removing the menace of nuclear and missile war. That explains the universal demand for prohibition of nuclear weapons and their testing and for general and complete disarmament as safeguards of enduring peace.

The scientists are acutely conscious of the terrible danger confronting the world. For it was they who elaborated the scientific theories and technical processes on which the production of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is based.

This lends weight and objectivity to the voice of the scientist and to his suggestions of what should be done to eliminate the menace of war, which might be precipitated by the actions of some madman.

In September 1958, the Third Pugwash Conference declared in its unanimously adopted statement that "full-scale nuclear war would be a world-wide catastrophe of unprecedented magnitude."

The Sixth Pugwash Conference in Moscow (November 27-December 5, 1960) discussed disarmament and international security. It was attended by 76 eminent savants from 15 countries, the list being represented by more than 20 scientists working in different fields.

Some 50 scientific papers were read, all of them dealing with such pressing problems as cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, the danger implicit in the arms drive, general and complete disarmament, the menace of surprise attack, the role and responsibility of scientists in averting war and promoting international co-operation. Much attention was devoted to ways and means of fostering confidence and encouraging closer co-operation between men of science.

The most comprehensive and spirited debate was on disarmament. Some of the delegates used charts to bring home their points: one curve represented the declared level of armaments and the time necessary to disarm. At the end of a period agreed upon for complete disarmament, the armaments level would be reduced to zero.

"But what if a country has more armaments than it has declared?" some of the American delegates asked. In that event it could conceal some of its weapons, and there would be no way of detecting them.

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And if a country was able to conceal a certain quantity of nuclear weapons and missiles it would have an important advantage over countries that had destroyed all such weapons. There would always be the temptation to exploit this advantage and resort to arms whenever differences arose.

From this it was inferred that complete disarmament was dangerous, for it could not be effectively implemented. Perhaps it would be best, for the time being, to agree on partial disarmament and establish a missile-minimum? But how many missiles should a country be allowed to retain - 100, 200, 10? There was even a suggestion that a missile be kept in every national museum so that future generations might appreciate the wisdom of this one in banning missiles.

But why retain any missiles at all? This was the answer given by some delegates: if a country that conceals part of its weapons after complete disarmament is achieved attempts aggression, then other countries possessing missiles will be able to retaliation. The fear of retribution would deter the aggressor. But that raises the logical question: how many missiles must a nation possess for purposes of retaliation?

Apparently very many, for a retaliatory blow dealt with a few missiles will not stop the aggressor.

However, the retention of nuclear and missile weapons will not remove the danger of war, and in the end all the delegates agreed that the only possible solution was complete and general disarmament under effective international control.

But how should disarmament start? Opinions differed. The clearest and most comprehensive plan has been advanced by the U.S.S.R.: start with destruction of the means of delivering nuclear bombs - missiles, aircraft, submarines. For an A-bomb that cannot be delivered to its target ceases to be dangerous.

Nor should there be any difficulty in instituting international control of these means of delivery. Launching pads, airfields, and naval bases cannot be concealed. Acceptance of the Soviet plan would largely eliminate the danger of surprise attack.

But destruction of the means of delivery should be regarded only as a first step. Control of means of delivery will not of itself be an absolute guarantee against the sudden outbreak of war. An effective system of control can be created only with complete and universal disarmament.

And control of complete and universal disarmament is easier than control of partial disarmament. That should be obvious. Weapons production would continue under partial disarmament, and it would be difficult to establish how many weapons any given country produced. Besides, there would still exist the technical facilities needed to perfect the

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technology of arms manufacture. There would also be the technical
and skilled personnel to increase production. The experience of Germany's
partial disarmament after World War II should serve as a warning lesson.

Complete and general disarmament, on the other hand, would put
an end to the manufacture of weapons and of the special materials,
machines and instruments needed for their production. The whole complex
mechanism of weapons manufacture would fall apart. The training of
technical personnel for the war industry would be discontinued, existing
personnel would shift to other industries and gradually lose their
special skills.

There is also this important consideration: complete and general
disarmament would do much to strengthen international confidence. The
arms drive breeds international tension, suspicion and fear. Armaments
manufacturers are, of course, interested in expanding production and
in bigger government appropriations and orders. They are using every
propaganda medium to sow fear and distrust.

The Western press is full of appeals for war, discussing in detail
the plans of future aggression thought up by military and political
adventurers. All these plans centre around an attack on the Soviet
Union and the other socialist countries.

The Pugwash Conference dealt in detail with the role of the press
in promoting confidence in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. The Soviet delegates
cited numerous instances of America's newspapers printing patently
false stories about the Soviet Union. Some of the American delegates
maintained that the Soviet press at times gave a one-sided and biased
picture of the United States.

The important thing is to stop publishing appeals for war, stop
disseminating lies. It is difficult to draw a dividing line between
the objective and subjective, but it is not at all difficult to draw
a dividing line between truth and untruth.

In the Soviet Union appeals for war are a severe criminal offence;
in the West, press writers advocating war are generously paid.

It should be observed that the need to promote confidence was
stressed not by Soviet, but by Western delegates. Yet we in the Soviet
Union have much more reason not to trust the West. Never has a Russian
soldier trampled the soil of America or Britain, but British and American
troops invaded this country and caused us a good deal of trouble.

Capitalist society, founded as it is on injustice, engenders
suspicion, distrust, and fear. These play a big part in monopoly
rivalry. Deceit and fraud are weapons in this competitive struggle.
The question of confidence is one of the most acute in capitalist
society, plagued by many incurable ills.

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The question of confidence or distrust is the dividing line between
the two systems, a barrier that has to be removed.

When is the danger of sudden war greater - with complete and
general disarmament an accomplished fact, even though one or another
country manages to conceal part of its armaments, or with the arms
drive continuing and more nuclear and missile weapons being stockpiled?
The answer, obviously, is that the war danger is greater with the arms
drive continuing.

General and complete disarmament would greatly reduce the risk of
sudden war. Everyone agreed with that.

One of the American delegates related this incident. At the end
of World War I, after the cease-fire signal, an Austrian cavalry patrol
came face to face with a Russian patrol. The Austrian officer instinc-
tively reached for his revolver. The Russian officer did the same,
but drew his hand back and saluted. The Austrian officer followed suit.
Later he told brother officers: "I shall always regret that I did not
draw my hand back first."

Yes, the hand must be drawn back; we must get down to the practical
work of disarmament. Otherwise there will be the very real danger of
disarmament being drowned in an endless sea of technicalities. And
that danger is even more real because the arms-drive forces are employing
every means at their disposal to discredit the very idea of general and
complete disarmament. Their contention is that only after a detailed
plan is drawn up and the control system subjected to practical tests,
will the governments be able to negotiate on how to control - armaments!

The Pugwash Conference frankly dealt with the basic problems that
are agitating the world today. We are still not sufficiently clear on
how to solve some of them; concrete proposals have still to be worked out.

But one thing is perfectly clear to all of us: we must tackle the
chief problem without delay, get down to the work of general and complete
disarmament, so as to remove the danger of war for all time and set the
world on the only correct course - peaceful co-existence of states with
differing social systems.

(State-FD, Wash., D.C.)

NOTES ON COSWA VIII
STOWE, VERMONT--SEPTEMBER 9-16, 1961

D. G. Brennan

The following notes, which are intended for highly limited private distribution only, relate chiefly to various private or semi-private discussions in which I participated during the 8th COSWA. A note at the end by Miss Faith Wright reports an interesting fact from a conversation she had with Korneev at the American Academy reception in Brookline September 17. These notes are not intended to provide a complete record of the Conference, merely a supplement on some possibly interesting points for the use of people already familiar with the main outline and content of the Conference.

[The following block of material was largely dictated, in some cases from rough notes, on Wednesday, September 13, with a few additions made September 20.]

On Saturday, September 9, a meeting of the International Continuing Committee was held at the Brook House at The Lodge. (Though not a member of the Continuing Committee, I attended this meeting in connection with certain publication questions, the International Study Group proposal, and the agenda of the forthcoming conference.) During the course of the meeting, Topchiev explained (in connection with a problem that had arisen in plenary session of the 7th COSWA which finished that morning) that he had written his Chinese friends asking them to attend the Stowe Conference, but that they wrote back saying they didn't want to attend the Conference on U.S. soil. According to Topchiev, the Chinese actually refused to come, and it was not simply a matter of having the invitation lost between the cracks in Moscow, which some of our people had previously suspected.

On Tuesday, September 12, I spent the entire two-hour lunch period with Bogolyubov and Korneev, with others (such as Blagonravov and Pavlichenko) present for briefer periods during this span. I had initially wanted to have some purely private conversations with Bogolyubov, who speaks good English, but it proved impossible to

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get away from Korneev. Korneev does not speak English and is obviously a more political type than Bogolyubov, and it is not clear whether Bogolyubov did not respond to my desire to speak to him privately because he actually didn't understand it, or because he didn't think it appropriate to understand it, but in any event, we did not dodge Korneev. During the early part of the conversation, I had a strong sense that the Soviets present wanted to pump me on what was going on in disarmament, especially as to what plans were in the works and what views were prevailing on the subject.
I told them (quite accurately) that there had been some evolution in official plans since the Ten-Nation Conference and the U.S. proposal at the General Assembly last fall, and that evolution was still in progress in at least some sense, but that the outcome of this evolution could not be foreseen at this time because of the rather wide spectrum of views prevailing in official quarters concerned with the subject.
I also gave them some indication of the spectrum of views to be found in various American quarters concerning disarmament, without much indication of which views were to be found where or which were the most likely to prevail. This was all material that their official people have undoubtedly inferred some time ago. By spells, this part of the conversation was amusing; Bogolyubov can be quite sharp when he attends to what is going on, which isn't always.

The reason I had wished to speak privately with Bogolyubov was to explain that many of the American participants would be less angry with the Soviet discussions of the nuclear test ban breakdown if the Soviets would refrain from giving us alleged reasons for the resumption which we knew to be unmitigated nonsense, most especially the allegation that the French tests played some role. I had not expected any response from Bogolyubov on this point, but it seemed potentially useful to let them know that at least some of us thought they might well have some respectable reasons for resuming testing (notably the development of lightweight warheads for mobile missiles and perhaps also AICBM investigations), and if they did not know about or did not wish to tell us about the respectable military reasons for resuming, they could at

least diminish the aggravation by refraining from talking blatant nonsense. I suspect that the fact that Korneev was along may have eliminated any possibility of even a sympathetic response from Bogolyubov at that time. Korneev specifically insisted that the reasons given by the Soviet Government were complete and accurate, and that my conjectures about AICRM developments and mobile warheads were misplaced.

I asked them if they knew of the Soviet decision to resume testing when they left home to come to the Conference, and they both said they did not. I pointed out that this fact itself could indicate quite clearly that they did not know all the reasons the Soviet Government might have had for resuming, but Korneev shook his head at this, as if the statements of Khrushchev that they read reproduced in *The New York Times* contained the whole truth on the subject. This is to be contrasted with what Korneev had allegedly told Pierre Rosenstiehl two days previously, as reported below.

In the latter part of the morning session on Wednesday, Dubinin presented an offensive and inaccurate commentary on the test ban situation, which itself was later attacked by Panofsky. During the lunch period, I had Bogolyubov truly alone for a brief interval, and remarked that he had had another opportunity (via Panofsky) to observe our reaction to specious reasons for resuming testing. Bogolyubov then quietly inferred that the stated reasons didn't have much to do with it, and quickly passed on to talking about how much they were seriously concerned about the problem of German rearmament, mentioning their losses in World War II, etc. This latter seemed sincere enough, if not entirely plausible, but I did not have any sense that Bogolyubov knew what in fact was behind the resumption of testing.

My working day on Tuesday was spent with the working group on delivery systems, consisting of George Kistiakowsky as Chairman, with Bogolyubov, Blagonravov, Korneev, Trevor Gardner, Edward Bullard, Bob Bowie, and myself; Amrom Katz acted as rapporteur and Alex Korol (of the MIT Center for International Studies) served as our interpreter.

The day was not very fruitful, being spent chiefly in shadowboxing over the old question of inspection over armament versus inspection over disarmament, or equivalently,

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verification of the accuracy of inventory declarations. For whatever the information
may be worth, I raised at one point the question of whether, under the Soviet proposal
for a first stage (in which all normal military means of delivery are supposedly
abolished), it would be possible to retain substantial air defense systems as a way
of safeguarding against the military use of legitimately retained civilian aircraft.
Bogolyubov and Blagonravov asserted that this matter would be negotiable, and I think
that they had actually understood the nature of the question, after some considerable
discussion.

During the course of this discussion, the point emerged that the Soviet proposal
for a first stage included total elimination of all submarines. Sir Edward Bullard
pointed out that this proposal would yield a strategic advantage to the West, and
asked if the Soviets had realized this. (He was obviously thinking of the problem
of keeping the sea lanes open in the event of a European limited war, not the question
of POLARIS submarines.) The Soviets responded that they were aware of this, but
that if they had a commitment to "general and complete disarmament", they would be
less fussy about such matters during the transitional stages. However, the statements
of Blagonravov and Bogolyubov on this point could probably be taken as not particularly
informed or illuminating.

Another point from this session of potential interest: Blagonravov said (in
response to an inquiry) that the "special devices" mentioned in connection with the
Soviet proposal to prohibit special devices in orbit were those "capable of carrying
armament". Blagonravov had previously said that the Samos satellites (which he
called, or perhaps Korol translated as, "MIDAS") could be used for inspecting for
clandestine delivery systems. It was not clear if Blagonravov thought of cameras
as "armament". It was definitely clear that they did not envisage the prohibition
of all possible satellites. It would probably be a reasonable guess that Blagonravov
simply had not been briefed on how to respond to the question of what constituted

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"special devices", as any satellite whatever would clearly be capable of carrying
armament. However, Blagonravov had probably been briefed on, or otherwise knew
about, some questions to raise concerning the Samos system itself. At the beginning
of this discussion about reconnaissance satellites, Blagonravov said that he had
seen in the Western press that satellites at 500 kilometers' altitude would be able
to distinguish objects 30 centimeters in diameter. Several of us laughed at this
remark and said that it wasn't that good. Blagonravov's remark was in all likelihood
a fishing expedition, but it didn't net anything, not even as much as can be found
in published data in the *Space Handbook*, for example.

Korol, who was apparently quite sensitive to the moods and emotions of the Soviets,
was certain that Blagonravov had been briefed in considerable detail as to what
they should and should not say or discuss. He felt there were many points at which
Blagonravov would perhaps have liked to go in another direction or say something
different than he actually said. This was my own sense of the situation as well.

[The following material was largely dictated on Thursday, September 14, 1961.]

On Tuesday evening, September 12, a meeting was held of several people present at Stowe who were interested in the International Study Group proposal. The group included Henry Kissinger, Paul Doty, Louis Sohn, and myself from among the American participants (all four of these being members of the American Academy committee), and Topchiev, Talensky, Khvostov, Sissakian, Bogolyubov, and an interpreter (Felix Sviridov) from among the Russians, as well as Sir Solly Zuckerman from Great Britain. Wayland Young sat on the sidelines as an observer. We discussed tentative operating arrangements for the projected Study Group with the Russians, and they seemed to be agreeable to everything we had thought of. In particular, they were quite interested in the rotation arrangement (in which the Group would spend alternate periods of time in the U.S. and the S.U.), and expressed interest in a reciprocal support arrangement, in which the U.S. would be host to the Soviets when the entire group was in the U.S., and vice versa. The Soviets wanted the reciprocal support

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arrangement to extend to salaries as well, so that we should pay the salaries of
the Soviet participants when they were here and they would pay the salaries of our
participants over there (as special members of their Institutes, for example).
They said they would maintain the usual standards prevailing in the U.S. for our
participants*. The Soviets were agreeable to Moscow as a Russian terminus of the
operation, but they emphasized that the Crimea or any place else was agreeable to
them, and depended only on our wishes (or those of the Study Group). We indicated
that we had been thinking of Boston or Washington for the American terminus, and
they were agreeable to either possibility. They were also agreeable to the projected
number of participants (five each for the U.S. and S.U.), and to the joint director-
ship arrangement of having an American director and Soviet deputy director when the
Group was in the United States, and a Soviet director and an American deputy director
when the Group was in Russia, with no major decisions to be taken without the agree-
ment of both. They were also agreeable to furnishing two translators from each
side, if needed. Topchiev served as spokesman for the Soviets present, but I did
not have the sense that the others were sitting there as dummies merely.

There are probably two factors that account for the remarkable degree of agree-
ment and flexibility in this discussion. First, I think that the Soviets who were
present in this group want very much to have the Study Group go forward, and in
consequence were prepared to be quite flexible, so far as they were concerned, on
details. It of course remains to be seen if the other officials back home prove
equally flexible, though I should imagine that the proposal had been cleared through
very high levels before these people came here. Second, they had had ample opportunity
to go over the earlier draft of the proposal for the Study Group that had been left
with them at the Crimea meeting in May by Paul Doty and Louis Sohn. (This is not

* However, we shall have to arrange matters so that our participants do not actually become employees of the Soviet Academy of Sciences; this should be easy to arrange.

conjecture merely; Pavlichenko stated this to be the case.) They had therefore had
ample opportunity to review the main outlines of the operating arrangements we were
discussing in that draft. So far as I can recall at the moment of dictating, the
only new specific suggestion they came up with Tuesday evening that was not discussed
in our earlier (May) draft proposal was that the salaries of the participants should
be the responsibility of the host country, as part of the reciprocal support arrange-
ment. (We had not previously envisaged that the reciprocal support arrangement
would go beyond the provision of housing.)

[Note dictated Friday, September 15.]

The young French participant Pierre Rosenstiehl mentioned to me at dinner last
evening that Korneev speaks French like a native, and had told him last week end that
the French tests had nothing significant to do with the resumption of Soviet testing.
Rosenstiehl said that Korneev was quite free with him in such matters in private con-
versation. This contrasts very sharply of course with what Korneev had told me,
using Bogolyubov as an interpreter, two days later, on Tuesday, as noted above.
This may illustrate a general phenomenon, viz., that they are more likely to say
interesting things in a language that is easy for them to use than when they are
communicating through an interpreter or in a less familiar language.

[Note dictated September 20, 1961.]

An Editorial Board was appointed by the International Continuing Committee of
COSWA, and the first meeting of this Editorial Board was held in the Commander Hotel
in Cambridge at 10:30 a.m. on Sunday, September 17. The Soviet members of this
Board are Topchiev, Talensky, and Pavlichenko, though Topchiev was not present
at this meeting. We were discussing a projected international journal on arms
control, and discussing the possibility of having it appear in both Russian- and
English-language editions, with the Russian edition of course intended to circulate
freely in the Soviet Union. Talensky and Pavlichenko asserted that it was only

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an economic question of whether or not we could get the translations done and the separate edition published. I questioned this assertion, telling them explicitly that the question was off the record if they wished, and pointed out that in the case of other journals or magazines it was by no means purely an economic matter as to whether or not they were distributed in Russian editions within Russia.

Pavlichenko replied that this had something to do with the content of such magazines and that, in the present case, this would not be a problem, and he reaffirmed that it was purely an economic matter. This remains to be seen, of course; I shall personally be pleasantly surprised if we succeed in getting matters of the degree of delicacy involved in some of these questions, discussed in an openly circulated journal in Russian.

[The following note was prepared by F. Wright of the M.I.T. Lincoln Laboratory September 18.]

On Sunday, September 17, at the reception held at the House of the American Academy in Brookline, this exchange with S. G. Korneev took place during a conversation (carried on in French, which both of us spoke with considerable ease) which had already been going on for perhaps ten minutes. We had previously chatted mainly about the Stowe meeting and about some of the American participants present, in terms of their interests and activities in the arms control area. Korneev then made the unexpected remark that (roughly paraphrased) we in this country had certainly made great progress in arms control studies. I demurred at this, suggesting that in our view we had in fact made just a beginning, but that we were hopeful that significant progress might be made in connection, for example, with the proposed U.S. Disarmament Agency inside our own government and with the projected International Study Group. I observed that the latter looked promising since it could go beyond purely unilateral efforts to work at developing shared views, but that of course we had a great deal to study in our own internal efforts. I then remarked that I guessed they after all had some such internal effort going in their own government,

too, with people at work studying these questions. At this Korneev seemed to look
doubtful and to disagree, so that I reworded the remark, to be sure it was understood.
He then, clearly understanding my remark (and with no suggestion that he was commenting
on anything other than the existence of such an effort, e.g., on its being comparable
in size or organization to U.S.D.A.), asserted that no, he knew of no such effort
going on within the Soviet government. I was somewhat nonplused at this but he
volunteered no further comment, at which point others arrived and the conversation
was dropped.

PREAMBLE

+ It is a proper goal of mankind that the world should not remain armed to the teeth in perpetuity. The major Powers have an especial responsibility to avoid creating either the substance of the impression of continuing this state. It is in this sense that we understand the meaning of "general and complete disarmament", and subscribe to this as a goal. But it is worth stressing that even the achievement of this goal would not mean the complete elimination of all armed forces, still less of all forms of military power. For example, in the Soviet Memorandum on arms and nuclear tests submitted at the Vienna Conference of Heads of State on June 3 and 4, 1961, it is pointed out: "If ~~general and complete disarmament is effected, the States maintain only agreed, restricted contingencies of militia or police necessary for maintaining internal order and protecting the personal safety of citizens. . . . These contingencies can be used by the Security Council if some State, nevertheless, takes aggressive action." This indicates that military forces are likely to be present in at least some form for the indefinite future, and suggests that the objective of substantial reductions in national armed forces might better be described as "comprehensive" disarmament.

There are at least two conceivable frameworks in which to approach comprehensive disarmament. The first framework would be one in which international security arrangements capable of adjudicating differences and enforcing the peace against the major Powers, including specifically suitable arrangements for the control of an international/organization and an international security force, The achievement of this framework would require, from the method major Powers, agreement on at least the message and mechanisms of resolving a number of outstanding political disputes, including the division of Germany, the division of Korea, the status of Formosa, and the division of Vietnam, among others. It is clear that the achievement of this framework of world law and enforcement is not to be expected in the immediate future, but the probability possibilities and problems should be subjected to vigorous and exploration.

The second possible framework for the pursuit of comprehensive disarmament would be one without a decisive international security force capable of enforcing decisions against the major Powers or their Allies. Although this framework could not provide absolute guarantees against the renewal of armed conflict, and the residual national security forces would probably play much the same role in international politics as that of present military forces, we believe that it may be possible to use the disarmament

process in this framework to facilitate the development
of an international political and military climate in
which the outbreak of major war was less likely, and might
be less destructive if it did occur, and also to contribute
to the evolution of political settlements and the rule
of law. The process might contribute to this last ob-
jective by developing a body of successful experience with'
adjudication of arrangements of relatively modest scope
for partial disarmament measures.

Though not simple in an absolute sense, the intellectual
problems (concerning the political control of an in-
ternational disarmament organization and an international
force) associated with the first framework are considerably
simpler than those associated with the second, and the
framework of a world of law should be pursued as rapidly
as agreement may be achieved. However, in this view of the
manifest uncertainties concerning the achievement of this
framework, the second framework should also be pursued with
vigor, for the objectives identified above, in spite of
the complexities of this approach. When not accompanied by
a decisive international security force, many aspects of
extensive disarmament are not understood by either the U.S.
or the Soviet Union, or else seem to be understood in terms
that do not presently appear compatible. A major instance
in point concerns the U.S. desire for access to information

on the military force levels of possible adversaries,
to insure its security, and the desire of the Soviet
Union to preserve a high degree of secrecy, in order to
dévise
preserve its security. It is very difficult to divide pre-
liminary disarmament measures to satisfy these conflicting
requirements. There are many other problems of this type
that are not yet clearly understood, especially problems
concerning the relation of different kinds and amounts of
residual military forces to the likelihood and destructive-
ness of a war, and to the ability of the major Powers to
preserve their national security. In a recent major ef-
fort to develop a comprehensive disarmament program, the
U.S. assembled 10 Panels of experts to study and make
recommendations on various aspects of the subject. These
Panels produced many more problems requiring much further
study than they did solutions. (It would be desirable to
take a few relatively innocuous specimens out of the
actual Panel reports and insert them here as specific
examples.)

At the present time, the U.S. is in the process of
forming a new and substantially expanded agency for the
study of problems in this area and the evolution of detailed
specific programs. So far as can be discerned, other major
Powers have not yet begun the initiation of serious national

studies and the evolution of detailed proposed programs
of disarmament and associated controls. We believe it
would be highly valuable to all nations if all of the
major Powers would also undertake major studies.

These considerations suggested that at the present time, negotiations should concentrate on measures in two categories. In the first category are partial measures that are chiefly bilateral in character, devised to be useful and useable with minimal inspection, with ad hoc arrangements, with no international disarmament organization, and in some cases, temporary in character. In the second category, we propose exploratory negotiations on the composition and control mechanisms of an international disarmament organization, associated methods of adjudication, and means of organizing and controlling and international security force to maintain the peace. Any measures that may be separately implemented in the first category can subsequently be s&b&h subsumed under whatever comprehensive framework (if any) may be agreed to in the second category. We are prepared to negotiate in either or both of these categories at the present time.

Category I

I. Immediate Partial Measures:

1. Beginning July 1, 1962, or on such other date as may be agreed, the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped for a period of 5 years. Inspection of this measure shall be reciprocal, the U.S. and the U.K. inspecting plants and facilities set forth below in the territories of the Warsaw Pact Powers and the USSR inspecting plants and facilities in the territories of the US, the U.K. and Canada. Inspection shall be limited to x resident inspectors at diffusion plants, production reactors, metal processing plants, and on mines. The use of roving inspectors to search for clandestine production facilities is not envisioned. (This last provision is of course tied to the interim and experimental nature of proposal. The duration of this cutoff might perhaps be negotiable up to a maximum of 10m years, perhaps cancelable on notice after the first 5 years, but in no event should it be made permanent on this basis or contain provisions for automatic and indefinite renewal.)

2. Arrangements shall be made for x the advanced notification to all other Powers conducting space programs of launchings of missiles, space vehicles, or other devices intended rise above and agreed altitude, together with the location of the launching and the track of the vehicle.

No inspection for this measure is proposed.

3. Arrangements shall be made for advance notification to the other major Powers of such major military movements and maneuvers as might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale, and time span of the event.

4. Such zones of aerial and ground inspection as may be agreed shall be established.

5. Modest agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to the international atomic energy agency for peaceful uses by the smaller Powers.

6. The nations possessing nuclear weapons shall each make a declaration that they do not intend to transfer nuclear weapons, materials for production for nuclear weapons, or technology to produce nuclear weapons to nations not possessing such weapons. Nations not now possessing nuclear weapons shall, for their part, make a declaration that they do not intend to seek or receive such assistance.

7. All parties shall furnish to the United Nations organization complete information on the numbers of their strategic delivery vehicles by agreed categories. The inventory information shall include the numbers of vehicles and their location by defined areas, such as

countries, including sea and foreign-based units, but not
specific individual vehicle locations within areas.

8. Commencing July 1, 1962, or such date as may be agreed, the placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of military weapons shall be prohibited for a period of four years. Within the lifetime of this agreement, no inspection of this measure may be required. (The lifetime of this measure in should not be negotiable up to 10 years. In the event the Soviets counter propose the inclusion of all military devices, including reconnaissance satellites, we should first of all point out that a camera is not a weapon, but we might also consider accepting such a counter proposal conditioned on sufficient Soviet acceptance of the inventory declarations specified in para 7 above.)

(Additional remark: The elimination of the qualifying phrase "is capable of producing mass construction" is deliberate and is intended to bring orbital ACEM systems of the random Bombardment variety under the scope of the prohibition.)

9. Beginning July 1, 1962, or on such other date that might be agreed, the U.S. and the Soviet Union should shall each destroy, subject to reciprocal inspection, a total of 200 medium bombers (US B-47 and SU-LL-28) within a period of one year. (This is of course a purely symbolic gesture, not necessarily worthless as such, made possible by current programmed for the strategic forces.)

Category II

II. Evolution of an International Disarmament Organization and Machinery to Enforce the Peace

(There are several possibilities that could be included in this category and I have no strong preference on them among them. For example, this might include sections e, f, and g, Pages 7-10, of Stage I of the May 31 draft, sections d, e and f of Stage II, pages 12-13, and Stage 3 - pages 13 and 14, also of the May 31 Draft. Alternatively, and preferably, it might embody the "basic treaty" scheme set forth in the attachment in the memorandum of conversation with Canadian Govt representatives of May-25 May 24. In this case, however, it should probably consist primarily of the list of ten subjects set forth on Page 2 of the attachment; some of the details in the Canadian elaboration of these items appear defective.)

Henry V. Klaasen

Kind regards as always.

Group meetings very helpful.
the final plenary session. I found the working
Incidentally, much as I deplored

happily.
reason except to keep the Soviet delegation
blackmailed into statements for no other
I see no point in permitting myself to be
have scientific exchange it must be bilateral.
then, and it still seems to me, that it we
impressed by your behavior. It seemed to me
I told you at home: I was tremendously
Just a note to rebeat what

Dear Don:

Lexington, Massachusetts
244 Wood Street
Lincoln Laboratory
Dr. Donald G. Brennan

September 20, 1961

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA
GOLETA, CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

September 26, 1961

Professor Donald G. Brennan
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Boston, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Brennan:

Some of the Soviet and American participants in the Stowe
Conference were here yesterday and today at the Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions. While attending the meetings
here, I spoke with Professors Brown and Sands about the proposed
study groups which are to take up the problems of disarmament
and of a world without arms. They suggested that I contact you
for more information. The question of disarmament, as you know,
is one which interests me greatly, and I would like to know how
I might apply for membership in one of the two study groups,
particularly the disarmament group.

As a student at Moscow University I had to work to reconcile the
divergent approaches of my professors and myself to find some
mutual agreement on how to study disarmament. Not only with
these men but with Soviet professional men in the USSR and in
delegations to this country I have discussed disarmament and
other questions of world affairs. I have set up, led, and
interpreted for a number of tours of Soviet delegations here,
one tour lasting a month. The history of disarmament and liter-
ature on the subject is familiar to me as a result of research
on my dissertation (for which I researched the whole inter-war
period) and my bibliographical contribution to the project of
the American Council of Learned Societies. My wife has an M.A.
in history, has taught in two universities, and is now studying
Russian. I am currently working on several articles related to
disarmament. My wife and I are both interested in doing all we
can to contribute to the realistic analysis and hard thinking
necessary to the negotiation of a mutually acceptable disarmament
pact. We have a small baby but would be willing to travel and
to live some time in the Soviet Union.

Please let me know if I could make a more formal application.

I'd also appreciate learning whether you think there is any prospect
for a revised version of my dissertation to be published. Frederick
Praeger has indicated an interest, but says a subsidy would be needed.

Cc: Professor Harrison Brown and Matthew Sands

RECEIVED

OCT 2 1961

D. G. BRENNAN

LINCOLN LABORATORY
LEXINGTON 73, MASSACHUSETTS

Volunteer 2-3370

December 14, 1961

Dr. J. B. Wiesner
Science Adviser to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Jerry:

I understand that you were good enough to talk at some length to
Shep Stone last week about the Study Group proposal, after previously exploring
the views of Bill Foster. You probably know that Shep decided that the propos-
all should not be presented to the Ford Foundation trustees until we have clear-
er signs of appropriate support within the Government. From his point of view,
this is not an unreasonable position, though we could wish he had let us know
of the problems as he had them, as soon as he saw them. (The "we" in such con-
texts refers to the American Academy sponsoring committee, consisting of Doty,
Frisch, Kissinger, Leghorn, Shulman, Sohn, and myself.)

I had hoped that we might be able to implement the Study Group with-
out making any demands on your time and energy in the process. It now appears
that we shall not be able to do so. In addition to the help that you provided
last week, Shep Stone suggested strongly that we work with you to get the fur-
ther assurances requested by the Foundation. We would hope the problem could
be managed without using more than a total of two or three hours of your time,
with any luck. I hope very much you will find it possible to help; we should
surely not ask this of you if we believed the problem could be dealt with ef-
fectively by anyone else, or if we did not believe the Study Group a matter of
considerable importance and great potential value -- value to the Government
surely, and hopefully to the cause of world peace and security.

The most effective support we might hope to secure would be state-
ments from the President and/or the Secretary of State, to the effect that the
projected undertaking seems potentially valuable or at least worth a try for a
year or two. We might as well try to aim for this level of support and see if
we could get it, if this seems reasonable to you. These statements of support
need not (and preferably would not) be for publication, and it would be suffi-
cient for you to be able to report them, together with your own comments. They
would have to be quotable on a private basis to the Ford Foundation trustees.

You would surely be the better judge of tactics, but simply to pro-
vide a starting point for discussion, perhaps you might find it possible to
give a copy of our proposal to Mr. Rusk, and ask him to read it. We could then
arrange a meeting of Mr. Rusk with some of the members of the Committee, such
as Henry Kissinger and myself perhaps, to explain some of the matters it did
not seem diplomatic to include in the widely-distributed formal proposal (such
as the utilization of the Group to assess the kind and extent of Soviet efforts

Dr. J. B. Wiesner -- 2.

December 14, 1961

in arms control). Subsequent to this, perhaps you could take the proposal to the President if it seemed appropriate, and just explain the matter to him in outline, together with such reactions as might then be on hand from Bill Foster and from Secretary Rusk. (Both Walt Whitman and I suggested to Mr. Foster that he discuss the proposal with Mr. Rusk, but I do not know if he did so. We have talked to Walt Whitman two or three times about the Study Group, and he seems personally quite sympathetic, and should probably know if Secretary Rusk knows anything about the project.)

It may be worth mentioning that we have previously given Bill Foster assurances that the names of prospective U. S. participants for the Study Group would be reviewed with his office, and that the Committee would weight his views on this or other matters of substance related to the operation, very heavily. I had intended to review prospective participants with you as well, before the participants actually were committed. It would now be desirable that you should have some understanding of the kind of people we have been thinking of. Among the five participants envisaged for the U. S., the three who are presently uppermost in our thinking are Benjamin Cohen, Robert Oppenheimer, and Lewis Bohn, all of whom would be available for this purpose. No firm commitments have been made with any of them, however, and Oppenheimer specifically has said that he wished to do whatever he could that would assist the Study Group the most, meaning that he would be a participant if it would seem helpful on balance, and would not be a participant if it wouldn't. (This may depend in part on certain discussions now going forward that are not, I believe, known to Oppenheimer.) In any event, this should indicate that we can get the very best talent available for this purpose, most of which would not even be available to Foster, for one reason or another. I am sure you will appreciate that the remarks in this paragraph are especially private.

Could Walt Rostow help on this undertaking? I know John McNaughton is very sympathetic and may be able to muster some support in the Defense Department.

Rather than ask you to respond to this lengthy epistle by letter, it would perhaps be better to decide on next steps by phone, and I shall try to get in touch with you for this purpose on Wednesday or Thursday of next week. Nearest to say, I can come down to Washington (or climb telephone poles, or whatever) if anything constructive would be served by this.

DGB:fw
cc: Messrs. Doty,
    Frisch,
    Kissinger,
    Leghorn,
    Shulman,
    Sohn.