35

many people that the Europeans should either commit themselves to a
conventional defense of Europe or that if that cannot be achieved within a
reasonable time, that we redeploy some forces, not all forces, some forces
where they can provide a strategic reserve for engagements in areas
outside of Europe. My major point, however, is not my specific proposals.
My major point is that we face the fact that the conditions which existed
in 1950 no longer prevail. To simply continue the status quo is going to
lead to an explosion later on under much more difficult circumstances.
Also, another recommendation I made was that the Europeans assume the
direct responsibilites for those arms control negotiations which concern
weapons stationed from their territory, especially the nuclear missiles so
that they can no longer blame us for the failure of negotiations with
respect to weapons that are put there for their own defense. This was the
major thrust of my recommendations, but I would say--I would made a
distinction--between my analysis and my recommendations. I know my analy-
sis, I think my analysis is correct. On the specific recommendations
people can differ, but I believe we have to move in a direction where the
Europeans assume a greater responsibility and are deprived of the pos-
sibility of hiding behind our military shield while adopting quasi-
neutralist foreign policy.

Kalb: General Haig, do you agree with Dr. Kissinger's basic analysis and do you accept the recommendations he's put forward for solving the problems?

Haig: I do and, in the article, I felt the analysis was very astute and characteristic of my brilliant mentor's normal contribution. I would suggest, however, as I did in my opening remarks, that it is not simply a question of differences over security and burden-sharing. It involves a profoundly important issue, which Henry did not overlook, of a different

36

perception of detente, a different perception of responsibilities globally. I would make the point, not only do they not want us to fail--or should not want us to fail--but their ox is being gored with even greater potential danger to them in most of these developing world crises which they seem to want to keep hands off of. It's when you deal with the European question where, I suppose, I have been so close to it and Henry has not been in the sense of the administration's mistakes with our European friends, and believe me they've been profound. For example, the fact that Margaret Thatcher criticized the Grenada operation might be viewed somewhat differently by Mrs. Thatcher who was called up at eleven o'clock at night and told by an American President that our troops were going to land in Grenada, one of her Commonwealth states, the week before she had to go to her Commonwealth meeting and could very easily have been facing a major insurrection from these people. Style and tactics have a great deal to do with it. Secondly, it's been my experience with the Alliance, that you get more with honey that you do with vinegar. Henry's using vinegar and I think some of it is intentionally provocative to shake our European friends into reality and, for that, I'm not comfortable about it. My experience has been, however, that we Americans are sometimes a little short-sighted about what we get out of the Alliance with all its picadillo. I knew that if I had to go to war in Europe, I would get 90% of my ground forces from the Western Europeans, 80% of my naval forces and 75% of my air force. And, I know that when we make a calculation as Jim Schlesinger did some years ago, of what it would take for the United States to provide an equivalent security shield, on our own, unilaterally, we looked at figures three times the expenditure of our gross national product to get an equivalent defense capability. I also know that Mr.

37

Weinberger, in his correct concern about our global responsibilites, has done very little to strengthen our forces and capabilities in Western Europe, and I know we lived for a decade in Western Europe when the United States' allocation of resources declined by 11% during the '70s and the Western Europeans' contributions increased by 22%. Now, of course, we started from a profoundly different base of contribution. Finally, it's inconceivable to me that we Americans would want suggest that a European command the Alliance because we're talking the essential control of the nuclears. Can you imagine the paranoia in Western Europe if a West German were to be the Supreme Allied Commander? Well, I can tell you our Scandanavian, Belgium and Dutch friends would be off the reservation overnight, and I think the British would be equally concerned. Finally, I would leave you with this conclusion. Henry's criticism of the failure of flexible response in our strategy is correct, but why has it failed? It's failed because, jointly, the United States together with our western partners, have failed to provide the resources to ensure its credibility. We failed in the conventional area, not as grievously as I think some suggest, because NATO is not a toothless lion. The Germans have built up to twelve highly competent divisons. I saw them maneuver along side our own and they ran circles around some of our American divisions in Western Europe. They have twelve of them and they can reinforce by 500,000 men overnight without even referring the question to the Parliament. We're not totally devoid of a good conventional capability unless we want to talk ourselves into total weakness. Secondly, the theater nuclear area was the critical one and it was not created by the SS-20 but the failure of administration after administration starting in 1965 to deal with the theater nuclear threat facing us. Land based systems, S-4s, 5s, 6s---

LC

38

Frogs, Scuds, Scaleboards. That happened during the tenure of Robert McNamara, when he fired one of my predecessors, Larry Norstad, because Larry Norstad told him at that time, "You've got to deploy a countering system." Why? Because what is deterrent? Deterrence is the maintenance of credible capabilities at every level of potential threat. Every level. That's why we need a MX Missile because the Soviets have these heavy land base systems. That's why we must have these Pershings and cruises to counterbalance the SS-20s, the 4s and 5s and now soon to be deployed 21s, 22s and 23s. Where I would differ with Dr. Kissinger is, while I certainly am more than sympathetic with his urgent call for reassessing and getting on with the matters, is I would do it with sugar and honey. I would recognize that we Americans have a responsibility as well as our Europeans. I would not further aggravate the situation in the immediate sense in the security area after we have finally achieved the wonderful success against all the opposition of deploying systems in Western Europe. Don't think that didn't terrify the Soviets, that we finally began to correct that theater imbalance that has existed since '65. Above all, because in the near term if I were to describe for you what I think the greatest crises in trans-Atlantic relations are going to be, they're going to be economic. Agricultural differences, trade differences, monetary differences, and the emergence of economic protectionism, what Helmut Schmidt probably called your "beggaring-thy-neighbor" policies. If we let this situation fall into a secondary realm of concern while we start grappling with the security problems which are now in a somewhat better state of affairs, God help us. We are going to be off on the road to protectionism and this economic summit in London is going to be a very, very interesting meeting because the United States is going to go there and

39

stonewall and our Europeans friends are ready to go to the mat. If I were
Mr. Shultz or if I were President Reagan, I would recognize we'd better
get on this subject now and deal with the security issues as well.

Kalb:

Gentlemen, I'm going to shift location as we go into another area,
but you two just stand by.

We are now going to address some of the questions that come directly
from our audience. The first one here is to Dr. Kissinger and it relates
to the Middle East.

Now that the United States has pulled out of Lebanon, what should be
done, the questioner asks, to bring peace into the Middle East next if it
can be attained at all?

Kissinger:

I think we have to face the fact that the withdrawal from Lebanon was
a major setback for the United States. I was not in favor of putting
troops there to begin with because my basic strategic assessment was very
similar to that of General Haig's. Having put them there, however, to be
run out of the country by Druze and Shiite militias, not even by a major
opponent, is going to raise the most serious doubts in the minds of the
moderate Arabs and even eventually of the Israelis as to what we can do,
and what we are able to achieve. Now, I think a number of things are
necessary. First, we now have to let the situation settle down a little
bit and to bring the major players into direct confrontation with the
reality that has been created by our withdrawal. Secondly, before we make
another move in the Middle East, we better think through in the most care-
ful manner (a) what is possible to achieve, and (b) what price we are
prepared to achieve it. We cannot afford another demonstration of either
not appearing of knowing what we are doing or not being able to achieve
it.

LC

40

**Kalb:** Let me interrupt you. I have now covered you for a long time, and I have heard you say that, several times now; I've heard you say that in 1975 when we were beaten badly in Viet Nam or heard you say that, when you were not in office at the time, in Iran, I've heard you talk about Soviet interventionsim in Africa and each time you've expressed profound concern that if the United States demonstrates one more act of impotence, we're in desperate trouble. What we've demonstrated are several, including the pullout in Lebanon. . .

**Kissinger:** Yes, but the mere fact that we are a very powerful country and, therefore, can afford many setbacks, does not mean that the cumulative impact of these setbacks is not going to reach us sooner or later. Ten years ago we were talking about Viet Nam, seven years ago we were talking about Angola, now we are talking about Central America. And you asked me the question of what do we do in the Middle East. I tell you, that in the Middle East, before we do anything we'd better get clear what it is possible to achieve. Right now, there are radicals who have the upper hand. There's no way we are going to get the King of Jordan into a negotiation with Israel, which would my preferred solution to the West Bank problem, unless we can give him some assurance as to what will happen when his radical neighbors start bringing pressure on him, or perhaps invade him, as they did in 1970. There is no way we can get that negotiation generated unless we can define what the approximate line is at which the settlement on the West Bank is going to be achieved. Simply to say there should be a negotiation in the abstract is not enough. Secondly, we will have almost certainly within the next four years a major crisis in the Persian Gulf, produced by precisely what he mentioned before--the collapse of Iran in the late 1970s, then Iran has achieved its predominance over

41

Iraq which seems to me to be only a question of time. Then, the pressure
will start on Kuwait, the oil producers in Saudi Arabia and on the Gulf
states. A great deal will depend on what we are prepared to do. We can't
wait here until foreign forces are crossing the Rio Grande, for God's
sake.

Haig: I agree completely. I agree completely with what Dr. Kissinger said, but I would also add something else. The best thing we can do in the Middle East for now is to "cool it." Why? Because even American malfeasance--total incompetence of the kind we've just demonstrated for a prolonged period in that region--is not going to be the overwhelming reality of the future. That will come from the historic forces that are underway. As Dr. Kissinger said, if we could step back and let the nations and the region begin to understand what those forces are, I believe they are going to inevitably lead in a direction of a greater appreciation once again of the Arab world, that only the United States is really their hope for the future. Why? First, we already see the potential of disarray in Damascus where an ailing leader watches factions beginning to develop, his brother on the one hand; chief of the intelligence services on the other. Syria's appetite has always exceeded its international credibility and its competence as well as its power and they'll make the mistake. Secondly, we already see the alliance between the Druze and the Shiites beginning to fall into disarray in Lebanon as they try to distribute the spoils of their newly-won victory. Thirdly, most importantly of all, we have our friend, Mr. Qadhaifi, who never fails to remind the moderate Arab world, especially Egypt, by an air strike on the Sudan that perhaps this alliance of radical Arab states--Lybia, Syria, Iran--despite the contradictions and the manipulative Soviet Union in the

42

background, is after all the greatest danger they face. It's time we just step back. There isn't a thing we can do other than make it worse in the near term in my view. So, I agree completely with what Dr. Kissinger said.

Kalb:

General Haig, I would like to ask you a question which is a slight paraphrase of one of the questions presented to me by the audience, and that has to do with something that you called for when you were in office that is reflected in greater detail in your book and that concerns the general problems of Central America--that was going to the source, mainly going to Cuba. I'd like you to explain that to the audience. I'd like you to explain it within the context of whether, in fact, you feel the American people would have supported such a line had your recommendation to the President been accepted rather than rejected.

Haig:

Yes, I think it would, Marvin, but I think your perception of what I was recommending and what I recommended may differ a little bit because it's a rather blood-curdling to use that term "go to the source." Let me say this, Dr. Kissinger said it, far more correctly than perhaps I can, but Salvador, Nicaragua, Central America is first an in-country problem. I tried to describe this to our diplomatic representatives of the press two years ago and they bombed me right out of my seat. What I meant by that is that it is a struggle for social justice that needs American generosity and patience and urging towards democratic reform. But, it's a regional problem; it's the intervention of Castro/Cuba into the internal affairs of friendly neighbors; and it must be dealt with in a regional basis. That means in Havana--not in Salvador, not in Honduras and not in Nicaragua. And it's a global problem. A global problem because it is all orchestrated, supported, aided, abetted and directed by the greatest

[L.C]

43

catechist of all, the Soviet Union. Now, if we look at it in the other way as we did in Viet Nam where we tended, until Dr. Kissinger got into it and tried to work Soviet problems in the Viet Nam War, unfortunately too late for a host of reasons. Until we deal with it that way, realistically with our eyes open, we're facing potential incrementalism, self-delusion and the loss of the support of the American people for the President's policies because those policies are failing, or are not bringing results. Now, what am I saying? Did I mean load up the Marines and the 82nd Airborne and go into Havana? No. Let me tell you. Would anyone here explain to me how a nation of eleven million people, 90 miles from our shore, could conceive of a military confrontation with the United States of 230 million people with our vast political, economic and security assets? Our problem is we just haven't made it credible to Mr. Castro that he had better "butt-out" or we're going to do something that he won't like. Let me conclude with a word or two about the global problem. Please read my book--$17.95. We started this process--the problem was, and I tell you, gaps were beginning to develop between Moscow on the one hand and its willingness to risk detente with all their problems for Castro's concupiscence in this hemisphere. Mr. Castro was feeling increasing lonely. What we needed was the manifestation of American power and will in this Central American region, and not to float in and out because the Pentagon and Mr. Weinberger thought we had responsibilities elsewhere. Nothing is bigger than this Central American regime. We have an Atlantic fleet, a 6th fleet; that's where they should be today. I'm sorry. That's what I mean, Marvin, not going to war unless we're forced to it and I doubt that would ever happen; there isn't a pit of logic in it. But, we're not credible.

44

**Kalb:** Would you like to comment on that because I had a question to you, Dr. Kissinger, on a related issue? Is that okay?

**Kissinger:** Why don't you ask your question and then I'll ...

**Kalb:** Then you'll ignore the answer. He's been doing that to me for years. One of the questions...

**Kissinger:** There was a cartoon in the French newspaper about a DeGaulle press conference in which he allegedly began the press conference by saying, "Would someone like to ask a question to my answers?"

**Kalb:** Okay, you asked for it. How can the United States justify its support of anti-government forces in Nicaragua, the so-called "contras," while continuing our condemnation of Soviet and Cuban support of similar forces operating in El Salvador and other Central American nations?

**Kissinger:** Let's first of all define what the issue is and then I'll get to your question. We have in Nicaragua a government which pledged itself to the Organization of American States of introducing democratic, pluralistic institutions--a pledge it has totally broken. It then announced a revolution without frontiers which meant that they were going to intervene in all of the other Central American countries who imposed a Cuban style of dictatorship. They have provided the leadership, the structure, the organization, the discipline and many of the weapons for the Salvadorian effort. And, we also need to keep in mind that if all of Central America follows the route of Nicaragua, that threat to the Panama Canal and a threat to Mexico, no matter what the Mexican leaders may say, will be overwhelming, not just a military threat but a threat in terms of political structure. I do not happen to be involved in the policy-making process of the government and I say this only so that it is clear to the audience that what I support, I do as a private citizen and on my own and

LC

45

out of conviction and not because I am under any obligation to support.
It is very interesting—you didn't use this word, but the phrase that has
been assigned to the people who are fighting against the Nicaraguan
government is "contras," counter-revolutionaries, which is the name that
the Communists have given to them. If we call them "freedom fighters," if
we said that these are the people who felt betrayed by the revolution in
which they fought for democratic principles and who are now trying to
restore democratic principles in Nicaragua, we would have a totally
different mental image of them. Now, your question really answers itself.
Here are the Nicaraguans, avowedly supporting guerrilla wars in Salvador
and supporting revolutions everywhere. Would we have asked of them, one,
to leave their neighbors alone; secondly, to permit in their own country
the same pluralistic processess that our Congress imposes on all our
friends? Why should we demand less of our adversaries than we're demand-
ing of our friends? The only thing that we need to ask of Nicaragua is,
one, that they permit a political process in which those who had partici-
pated in the original revolution can participate as political parties win
or lose; secondly, that they stop interfering in the affairs of their
neighbors and in those circumstances we can leave—it's no reason for us
to support any other outside groups. The influx of foreign arms, foreign
advisors into Central America will sooner or later represent a threat to
our security. The Bi-Partisan Commission, which I headed, unanimously—
Democrats and Republicans—recommended that armed forces in Central
America be reduced and all foreign advisors be eliminated and that a
limit, a very low limit, be put on the influx of foreign arms. I must
tell you that if that is not achieved, we are just postponing the day of
reckoning and sooner or later, we're going to face. . . President DeGaulle

46

is supposed to have said once, "Central America is an incident on the road to Mexico," and then we will have a security problem which will never stop.

Kalb:

Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger.

Ladies and gentlemen and fellow panelists, we are very rapidly running out of time and I want to thank you for your patience as far as we have gone. We are now up to that concluding moment when you may disconnect your mikes because I'm going to ask you to come to this microphone to set forth, please in no more than five minutes, your concluding thoughts on this evening. Not so much answering questions again, but try to summarize and reach some higher level of philosophy, articulatness and brilliance than you have already achieved. I would like to start with General Haig.

Despite all the horrors that we've touched upon this evening, I would like to conclude with some more optimistic observations. You know, it's difficult as we deal with problem after problem and, perhaps some of our inadequacies, to recognize the great wave of history that is moving imperceptively at times, inevitably behind western democracy. I say that because we are dealing with a Soviet Union that is failing; its economic situation is in shambles; unable to feed its people, it's experiencing centrifugal pressure within and in the areas of the seas and Eastern Europe, suffering a transition of leadership problem. How important it is for us as Americans to recognize two things. One is that we are dependent on those who share our values around the world and we must move in concert with them. That requires from time to time the maturity and patience to scale down our unilateral aspirations in the interest of the common consensus of unity. We'll have to work at that more assiduously. It seems

47

to me we could do it with a great sense of self confidence and with the
clear recognition that, with every passing day, we've avoided the holo-
caust which concerns us all so much in the nuclear age; that history is on
our side and we're going to find ourselves armed with greater and
greater leverage to insist on responsible international conduct on the
part of the Soviet Union. I remain fundamentally optimistic that that is
the asset with which we work. Most importantly, I would like to make an
an observation about America's youth and their young people. In some of
the sophistries that emerged from America's confused decade of the '70s,
the so called "Club of Rhone" and its deliberations, the Jimmy Carter
"Study of the Year 2000," also which concluded and we conveyed to our
young that they were going to inherit an America that had run out of food,
that had run out of energy and, God forbid, was even going to run out of
bed space. What a specious malthusian and unjustified message we gave
America's youth. You know every assessment we've made at the Hudson
Institute which looks to the future and with which I've worked for the
last year and a half, reflects precisely the opposite. Modern technology,
biochemistry, robotics, computerizations, synthetics are going to open up
a vast new range of opportunities, economic improvement and growth,
investments streaming to our shores from abroad because we are and must
remain the leader in these fields. A quality of life that is unprece-
dented and how important it is today as we look at contemporary problems
that we keep this backdrop of fundamental optimism in a realistic framework
of unity of western peoples who share common values. I can assure you
that tomorrow will be a bright and wonderful thing for our young people
and I wish I could join them in the future world that they will face if

48

we, today, keep our heads clear, our objectives firm, our policies
consistent, reliable and predictable. Thank you.

Kissinger:

I want to pick up from the last point that Al Haig made. When one
discusses foreign policy problems, inevitably one is conscious of the
difficulties and one is aware of this or that shortcoming in our policy.
But, if one looks at the fundamental trends, and the fundamental resour-
ces, one has to come to the conclusion that we and our associates among
the free people are in a position to solve almost every problem that we
have described here, and to create a future that is compatible and reflec-
tive of our deepest aspirations. If you look at history, you will find
that every great achievement was a dream before it became a reality. One
of the saddest events of the last decade and a half in American debate was
to systematic self-denigration in which we have engaged. I am perhaps
particularly sensitive to this. You may think I speak with a Harvard
accent, but I, in fact, will tell you a secret. I was born in Europe and
I lived in a totalitarian state. I cannot tolerate the demonstrators and
the critics who use every American imperfection as an excuse for inaction.
Anybody who has lived in a totalitarian state knows the difference between
an imperfect democracy and a totalitarian oppression. And everybody who
has dealt with foreign countries knows that will all failings, there can
be no security without American commitment and no progress without Ameri-
can faith. The issue is not U.S.-Soviet. There are many problems in the
world that are not caused by the Soviets and many opportunities beyond
imagination of this little group of old men that are trying to cling to
power for a few more years in the Soviet Union. We have an opportunity to
create a new world. I have a friend, whom we all know, the Prime Minister
of Singapore, who claims that there is the following Chinese proverb--I

49

say claims because I sometimes suspect that the Chinese invent these proverbs in order to impress us barbarians as they consider us. Nevertheless, the proverb goes like this: "When there is turmoil under the heavens, little problems are dealt with as if they were big problems and big problems aren't dealt with at all. When there is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to little problems and little problems need not obsess us." My suggestion to you is that it is our generation and your generation which has the opportunity to bring about order under the heavens. Thank you very much.

Kalb:

Thank you. Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. I had prepared some concluding remarks, but I have a feeling we have heard two excellent summations and I want to say that it has been, for me personally, a distinct privilege to be on the same platform with two such highly experienced, articulate statesmen, both of whom have contributed very significantly to the evolution of recent American history and, I think in all respects in a positive way, so, it has been a privilege for me. My concluding thought which emerges out of what both Dr. Kissinger and General Haig said, and I make this comment, obviously, as a journalist, and I've been working at this craft for almost thirty years now. When I walk into a country that is not free, I can smell it. I can smell the minute I breathe the air when the plane doors open. I know when I arrive in Moscow. I know when I arrive in authoritarian society and not necessarily a totalitarian society and I know, also, when I arrive in a free country. One of the things that we have been, and I think I speak for both the panelists as well tonight, one of the great things that we are able to enjoy in this country is the opportunity to come together and discuss as adults serious problems that confront this country. Without a

50

sense of despair but in the recognition that as we discuss these problems
and understand them, particularly in a university environment and all of
the vibrations and echoes that come from the universities in this country,
we will all benefit from the increased knowledge that we picked up on an
evening such as this. I thank you on behalf of Dr. Kissinger and General
Haig for being with us here tonight. Thank you very much for having us.
God bless you all.