-3-

about withdrawal of forces, what about the question of the treaty between Washington and Taipei?

MR. CHOU—When you say us, you mean China and the United States?

MR. RESTON—Yes, the United States and China.

MR. CHOU—If Taiwan is to be returned, to the motherland, the U.S. forces must withdraw, because otherwise how can it be returned to the motherland? And since the United States is to withdraw all their troops and military installations from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait area, then as a matter of course the so-called U.S.-Chiang mutual defense treaty, which we had all along considered to be illegal, would become invalid.

## Preliminary Talks 'Possible'

MR. RESTON—I understand. It is clear, I think, since the differences over Rogers's statement, that there is a lot of underbrush to be cleared away before you and the President are to meet. I wondered what ideas you have about whether preliminary technical talks at a lower level should take place and where, between now and the President's arrival?

MR. CHOU—It is possible. But if these questions are to be solved, they can only be solved when the President himself comes. He expressed a desire to come and we have invited him to come.

MR. RESTON—Could I ask one final question about the U.N. and China? In your mind, is there a conflict between the basic principle of the U.N., namely, that all disputes between nations shall be resolved without the use of force or the threat of force, and the principle of revolution and support for national liberation movements in the world as espoused by your Government in the past? Is there a conflict between these two things?

MR. CHOU—No. Who has committed aggression against other countries? China hasn't. Over the 22 years of the history of our People's Republic, we only went abroad to assist Korea, but that was under certain conditions. We made it very clear to the so-called U.N. Command composed of 16 countries led by the U. S. We said to them that if they press toward the Yalu River, then we will not sit idly by, although at that time our Taiwan and Taiwan Strait area had already been occupied by the U.S. Seventh Fleet and the U.S. Air Force. It was the U.S. which first committed aggression against China, and not vice versa. It was only after the U.S. forces had reached the Yalu River that we sent our C.P.V. (Chinese People's Volunteers) to resist American aggression and aid Korea.

## Chinese People's Volunteers

As for our help to other countries of the world, that is in the case when they are subjected to aggression. And in the view of the U.N. itself, aggression is wrong and should be stopped.

So we are merely helping them to resist aggression. And in the view of the U.N. itself, they should be given support. And a striking instance is Vietnam.

As for Vietnam, we will continue to give them assistance to the end, until the complete withdrawal of the U.S. forces. At present the most urgent question is still Vietnam. You wondered very much why I said to the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars that it was our position that first of all the question of Vietnam and Indochina should be solved, and not the question of Taiwan or other questions.

Because the status quo of Taiwan has remained for 21 years. There is no war there. That is because of restraint on our part. But this is not the case with Vietnam. Not only did the U.S. send troops to commit aggression there, but the U.S. is expanding the war there. When President Nixon took office, he started withdrawing troops from Vietnam, that is anyhow changing the former situation. But in March last year, the peaceful rule of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia was subverted, and then the U.S. troops went in. Even your New York Times criticized that action.

MR. RESTON—Especially The New York Times.

MR. CHOU—And then this year there was the attack on Route 9. Isn't that an expansion of the war?

MR. RESTON—Yes, I think so.

## The Cost of the Vietnam War

MR. CHOU—And so that has brought even greater harm to the Vietnamese people and the Indochinese people as a whole. Such a small place as Indochina, with a small population. Yet such a huge sum has been spent. The American Government itself admitted that in 10 years' time it spent $120-billion and suffered such heavy casualties. And the American people are unhappy about the American casualties. We on our side feel they are needless casualties. But the Vietnamese people have suffered even greater casualties.

MR. RESTON—I agree.

MR. CHOU—Just take a look there and you can see that. Shouldn't we sympathize with them?

MR. RESTON—Absolutely. It's a tragedy.

MR. CHOU—So why shouldn't the United States. It's aggression?

MR. RESTON—Yes. Now what do you think we should do to stop it? I went straight there from Pamunjom in 1953, and I have been fighting against our involvement in that war ever since. As a matter of act, when I went to Saigon in 1953 I saw the British brigadier who was the observer there at that time and I asked, was there any way in which the West can possibly deal with the Vietnam, as they were then called. And he said, yes, there may be one way: If you would give foreign aid, military program to the Vietminh, especially tanks,

then you might be able to find them. That will be the only way, said he, the West will ever win a war in this part of the world.

MR. CHOU—You did some work, your New York Times, by making public some of the secret Pentagon papers.

MR. RESTON—Yes.

MR. CHOU—Indeed, back in the time of Truman, the U.S. Government started helping the French in their aggression and colonial war in Indochina. And after Dulles took over from Acheson, this further developed.

## Aid to Vietnamese Described

MR. RESTON—Are there some Peking papers on that period on the war that have not been published. If there are, then The New York Times would like to accommodate you and publish them.

MR. CHOU—We have no secret papers like that. But we did send some weapons to the Vietnamese people to help them in their resistance. The French Government is aware of that. Within less than half a year after the founding of our People's Republic, we recognized the DRVN [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] headed by President Ho Chi Minh. Actually the French Government was prepared to recognize the P.R.C. [People's Republic of China], but because of that matter, France put off the recognition until the time of General de Gaulle. So if you are interested in secret documents, this is a document but not a secret one.

MR. RESTON—Yes. Your commentor the other day made it quite clear that your Government is opposed to the Geneva conference for a settlement of the Indochina war. Now, do you see the Laotian and the Cambodian questions being settled separately from the Vietnam question?

MR. CHOU—This is a matter within the sovereignty of the Government of the DRVN, of the provisional revolutionary government of the Republic of SVN [South Vietnam], of the royal government of national union of Cambodia and of the Laotian Patriotic Front. It is within their sovereignty to decide whether the Indochina question is to be settled together or separately.

Judging from the present situation, negotiations are going on now only on Vietnam. And so maybe the Vietnam question will be first solved. As for Cambodia, the U.S. refuses to recognize Prince Sihanouk's Government, and Prince Sihanouk has clearly stated his just position in his message No. 24 to his compatriots. I haven't heard anyone say anything more on that score. As for Laos, they are planning to discuss among themselves. And there is correspondence between Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphanouvong, and the Laotian Patriotic Front has put forward a five-point proposal, one of which is cease-fire throughout Laos.

We support this five-point proposal of the Laotian Patriotic Front. As for the summit conference of the Indochinese peoples, the four sides of the three

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
James C. H. Shen, Ambassador of the Republic of China
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Mr. John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

DATE, TIME
July 27, 1971, 12:00 noon, Dr. Kissinger's Office

PLACE:

SUBJECT:
Dr. Kissinger's Discussions with Ambassador Shen
on the President's Visit to Peking

After a brief exchange with Ambassador Shen about the cuisine in Peking and the weight he had put on there, Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted Ambassador Shen to know that nothing in his tenure in the White House had been more painful to him than what had occurred (the secrecy over Dr. Kissinger's trip to Peking and the announcement of the President's visit). He was saying this not as a diplomat but as a genuine friend. There were no people who had deserved what had happened less than the ROC, because they were our loyal friends. What had happened had been brought into play by general necessities, and had nothing to do with Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that we were under no illusions as to what we were up against on the PRC side. He had told the President that in Moscow we were up against thugs, and that in Peking we were dealing with fanatical maniacs; of the two, it was hard to tell which was worse. Certainly we were not beginning an era of love, but we may have to go on a line which was not parallel to one followed by the ROC which would require some wisdom on the part of all of us. But we would not betray old friends, or turn anyone over to communism to ease our problems.

Dr. Kissinger noted that he was being attacked all over for being a hard liner, but if his record (and that of the President) were looked at closely, it could be seen that every effective military program with respect to Taiwan was done during this Administration. We would stand by our friends. With respect to recent developments, we simply had to respond to other problems not connected with Taiwan, and had to do what we did. This didn't ease Ambassador Shen's problems, but he, Dr. Kissinger, wanted the Ambassador to know his sentiments, and to feel some of the mood and feelings on our side. He hoped that Ambassador Shen would keep this in mind.

2

Ambassador Shen said that he appreciated what Dr. Kissinger had said. In addition, assurances from the President would be helpful. Dr. Kissinger declared that assurances were cheap and that he wanted to express his sentiments in terms which would be more valuable than formal assurances.

Ambassador Shen asked if Dr. Kissinger could speak about some of the things which he had discussed with the Chinese in Peking, for example the question of "two Chinas" and the U. S. position on China's Security Council seat. Dr. Kissinger informed Ambassador Shen that the PRC representatives had stated their full position on Taiwan's being a province of China, a position which Ambassador Shen must have known from the newspapers. We took the position which we had always taken, and had said that we would not oppose any peaceful solution which the ROC and the PRC worked out; we had also said that we had a Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC and hoped that they wouldn't use force against Taiwan.

Continuing, Dr. Kissinger said that with respect to the UN issue, we knew that they would oppose our position, and we had not gone into it because it was being handled separately. The question of the Security Council seat simply did not come up one way or another -- they simply wanted the whole thing, which we had said was not possible. There was no separate discussion about their getting the Security Council seat, and of the ROC staying in the General Assembly. So contrary to what Ambassador Shen would have read in the newspapers, there were no deals made about Formosa, and also contrary to what the newspapers had said, we didn't go to them for the meetings, that is, take the initiative. This was not a case of our going to them and having them say that we had to give up Taiwan and the Security Council seat. There were no conditions, and what Secretary Rogers had told Ambassador Shen about the talks in Peking was essentially what the situation had been.

Ambassador Shen noted that he had just had a session the previous day with Secretary Rogers, together with his colleague on the ROC UN delegation in New York, Ambassador Liu. This had been a very useful discussion. Dr. Kissinger said his judgment was that if we were to take the position Secretary Rogers had discussed with Ambassador Shen, the PRC would be violently opposed. They would stick for nothing less than their getting the entire China seat. The present formula which the Secretary had discussed with Ambassador Shen was never discussed in Peking, much less accepted by them. He again expressed the guess that the PRC would oppose our position.

3

**Ambassador Shen** asked, did the discussions in Peking therefore focus on the President's trip? **Dr. Kissinger** replied affirmatively, adding that things were in a very preliminary state. We had not reached any substantive points, and rather were exploring technical details. **Ambassador Shen** wondered if the date and the month for the visit had been set, to which **Dr. Kissinger** replied "no." He had told them that we might make a suggestion sometime in September. Of course they could make one of their own at any time. The visit itself, though, would probably be considerably later. **Dr. Kissinger** said that off the top of his head, the very earliest date was December, but he considered that it probably could not be as early as that. We did not want to sit in Peking and have them hold us up with a whole series of propositions; we wanted to know what they would want before going there.

**Ambassador Shen** asked, would the ROC be kept informed about these arrangements, as was the case for the Warsaw talks? Dr. Kissinger replied that we would certainly try to do so -- who would this information go to in the ROC? **Ambassador Shen** stated that only President Chiang and Chiang Ching-kuo would be informed. **Dr. Kissinger** declared that on that basis, we could do it. **Ambassador Shen** explained that he had a private channel to President Chiang and Chiang Ching-kuo via the Foreign Ministry: the Deputy Foreign Minister.

**Ambassador Shen** asked Dr. Kissinger for his impressions of how Chou En-lai had looked -- was he in good shape? **Dr. Kissinger** said that Chou En-lai had seemed to be in very good shape, and had impressed him as being very intelligent.

**Ambassador Shen** recalled that he had met Chou during the war years in Hankow and Chungking. He agreed that Chou was a very intelligent person. He went on to ask if Chou En-lai had appeared to be worried about the Soviets. **Dr. Kissinger** observed that he guessed relations with the Soviets had been on Chou's mind. Of course, the Chinese had not survived for three thousand years as an independent people by telling foreigners what they thought. This reminded Dr. Kissinger of a story concerning a Westerner who had been called to a police station for some reason in a provincial Chinese village. A Chinese bystander, seeing the Westerner, had wondered if he was a foreigner from the next province. Another villager had said, "no, he was a foreigner from the North." Finally, a third villager had said that the Westerner was a **foreign** foreigner. **Dr. Kissinger** asked Ambassador Shen where he was from. **Ambassador Shen** said that his home was Shanghai, on the coast.

4

Dr. Kissinger reverted to the subject of the Soviet Union, saying that Ambassador Shen must know that the question of the various great powers surrounding the PRC was no doubt of some concern to them. Ambassador Shen then wondered what, in Dr. Kissinger's opinion, Chou En-lai hoped to get out of the President's visit? Dr. Kissinger gave as his personal evaluation, since the Chinese hadn't told him this, that they basically believed the Taiwan problem was an historical one and not a military one which would settle itself over a period of years, and were more concerned over great power relationships, that is, over not being carved up. They were more interested in the US in this context than they were with respect to Taiwan and the US relationship with it. What did Ambassador Shen think?

Ambassador Shen remarked that he knew the people in the PRC were worried about the Soviets and Japanese, but not about the US. They saw that the US was withdrawing from the Far East, although they didn't know if this was partial or total. Dr. Kissinger assured Ambassador Shen that it was not going to be total. Continuing, Ambassador Shen said that those in Peking knew that the US had no designs against them. The US message had gotten through, and they knew that they had more serious problems with the Soviet Union and Japan. Dr. Kissinger commented that this was his analysis, too. Ambassador Shen surmised that the people in Peking also hoped to improve their position with respect to the Soviet Union via the US. Dr. Kissinger remarked that he did not know what they wanted vis-a-vis the Russians, but he personally believed that we should keep cool on this and see where we were going.

Referring again to the recent events, Ambassador Shen stated that the initial shock in Taiwan had been terrific. Dr. Kissinger should understand, though, that the official reaction had been quite restrained. Dr. Kissinger declared that this had been a tough thing for the ROC, but Ambassador Shen should believe that it had been tough for us, too. They hadn't had an American President before who liked Taiwan so much as our present President. As for himself, although he had never been to Taiwan, his friendships with senior officials there were very close.

Ambassador Shen expressed the view that the things discussed during the President's visit would raise more serious problems in Taiwan. Dr. Kissinger assumed that the President would restate the US position on Taiwan again, but the Ambassador could be assured that there would be no concessions. Ambassador Shen wondered if this, then would spoil the visit, to which Dr. Kissinger replied that he doubted it. Ambassador Shen thought that the Chinese in Peking felt that time would take care of the issue.

5

Dr. Kissinger said that time was not on their side -- we were not going to Peking to turn Taiwan over to them, and if they didn't understand this, then human language was not capable of containing it.

Ambassador Shen noted that Huang Hua, the new PRC Ambassador in Ottawa, had been four or five classes ahead of him in Yenching University in Peking. Was he the man with whom Dr. Kissinger would deal in arranging the visit? Dr. Kissinger replied that he didn't want to discuss this point. However, Ambassador Shen was Chinese enough to know that the most obvious place is not always the one picked.

Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Shen discussed briefly Chou En-lai's origin and educational background. Chou En-lai had been born in Anhui Province, but considered himself as being from Tientsin, where he has been educated. He was a graduate of Nankai University in Tientsin.

In conclusion, Dr. Kissinger observed that one thing had struck him while in Peking -- even 25 years of communism had not been able to destroy the elegant Chinese mannerisms. Perhaps these had been better before, but they were still good.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: July 26 Meeting with Chinese Ambassador in Paris

I established contact with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen, on the afternoon of Monday, July 26, after my other session. (You will recall that Chou designated him as our secret point of contact.) Although he was hospitable and friendly, it was clear that he has little latitude, operates narrowly within instructions, and will serve chiefly as a transmittal belt for messages between us and the PRC. He had just returned from Peking where he was called back after my trip there.

In our discussion the Ambassador relayed the following verbal points from the PRC.

- The Chinese government agrees to an interim visit by me in the latter part of October. (We had suggested late September or early October.)

- "Owing to understandable reasons, it would not be appropriate for Mr. Bruce to come to China."

- Our aircraft should go directly to Shanghai from Alaska. (Presumably they don't want an American plane crossing the bulk of their country.)

I pointed out that Chou had suggested an interim visit; that Bruce would be leaving the Paris talks next week; that you had total confidence in him; and I thus hoped Chou would review our conversations and make it possible for Bruce to maintain contact with the PRC in the future when I am unable to do so. (Comment: Chou expressly agreed to an interim visit by Bruce or me. The Chinese have now apparently decided that it would be too awkward for them to receive Bruce and me, given their troubles with Hanoi and the speculation about a U.S.-PRC deal on Indochina. Thus I did not press Bruce's acceptability for an interim visit but hope to get Peking to reconsider him for future assignments.)

2

I made a few other points to Ambassador Huang:

-- The Nationalist Chinese are stirring a campaign against my trip to Peking and your forthcoming visit. There is press speculation about my conversations with Chou which is designed to embarrass both the U.S. and the PRC. My backgrounder which I sent to the Chinese will remain the only U.S. Government commentary on these subjects and any speculation doesn't come from government sources.

-- We will continue to inform the PRC of any talks we have with other socialist countries which concern it.

-- We will show restraint with the press in our comments about the PRC in any event, but we would appreciate it if they would do the same. The best way for us to keep our right-wing opposition under control is to demonstrate that we are pursuing an independent policy; this is made easier if the PRC does not encourage left-wing spokesmen.

At the end of the meeting I told him that we would alert him whenever I was coming to Paris in case he had messages for me or it seemed worthwhile for us to meet. As for the technical details of my October visit, I said these could be passed through Walters and there was no particular urgency.