Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Under Secretary Johnson

6/7/71 8:20 a.m.

J: I understand from Al that you heard from your friend David.

K: Yeah, I have some cables you can look at; they're not clear to me.

J: The Post is carrying a story this morning that he reached an agreement.

K: On Taiwan.

J: Does he say that?

K: No, that he doesn't say. One is about shoes . . .

J: About shoes? !

K: Yeah. The other explains why he was tougher than his instructions about the P-3 thing. And the third has to do with his objection to the return of the _______________ Islands.

J: His objection?

K: Well, he tends to go along with it. Why don't I send them over with a messenger and you read them and give them back?

J: Okay. These were to you?

K: One was to me; the others to Peterson. But I am going to insist that I be sent a copy of everything that goes to Peterson; this is an impossible way to do business. Why don't I send them over; it's not worth a trip . . .

J: Yes, send them over and I'll send them right back.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOU-1258
By CNARA Date El01

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger
9:35 a.m. 6/7/71

D: I was in NY Sat. so it was a pleasant weekend.

K: About dinner tomorrow. The boat is not available because of wedding parties but I had the following idea. You have never been to Camp David. I thought you might go up there. We could helicopter up.

D: It would be an interesting experience for me.

K: I would like to suggest the following. You might want to stay overnight and come back first thing in the morning. We could leave earlier and take a walk and then we have dinner there and they have movies and we can see it if you want to. What movies do you like?

D: What do they have?

K: They can get anything.

D: Historical movie.

K: Let me see what they have got. Come here about 6:00 and bring things to stay overnight. We will be there at 6:45 and take a walk and have dinner and then after dinner if we can decide whether we want a movie.

D: 6:00 in the Map Room?

K: We will have to helicopter back at 8:00 Wed. morning. I know you lead a softer life than I.

D: No problem. We will find out.

K: 6:00 tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:35 a.m.

6/7/71

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

D: I was in NY Sat, so it was a pleasant weekend.

K: About dinner tomorrow. The boat is not available because of wedding part but I had the following idea. You have never been to Camp David. I thought you might go up there. We could helicopter up.

D: What do they have?

K: They can get anything.

D: Historical movies.

D: 6:00 in the Map Room?

K: 6:00 tomorrow.

By KHLNARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELCONE
Bryce Harlow/Kissinger

10:25 a.m.

6/7/71

H: It's the first time in my life you walked out on me to speak with the President.

K: Give you relevant importance. The President wants you to know whether he will be considered for the ticket next year but I don't think you have the stature.

H: Which place?

K: Do you know there's no Constitutional prohibition for foreign born becoming Vice President so I am considering getting to the top by that route.

H: If you want a campaign manager I will be happy to help on the side if the pay is good.

K: The President wanted me to ask if you could go to Korea. He would like that.

H: I don't understand it.

K: I can't explain on the telephone what's in mind but it's more complicated than what's meeting the eye.

H: I need to know what I am doing. Can I see you?

K: Yeah. It will take 5 mins. when you are in the building.

H: You are never available unless it's planned several weeks in advance. How about 11:00?

K: That's fine.

H: Will you clear me?

K: They don't know you at the gate?

H: That's why they won't clear me.

By: KH V NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON
The President

6/7/71 10:25 a.m.

P: My memory is infallible; this Laotian thing started under Kennedy.

K: But the bigger buildup...

P: I know the bigger buildup, but just say the Kennedy-Harriman buildup. Is that clear.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCON
Johnson/Kissinger

10:30 a.m. 6/7/71

K: About those G__ damn islands, where do we stand?

J: It's frozen in concrete.

K: When?

J: Over a period of several months. I would have to go back on the history of it. The GRC dialogue is 6-7 months. I would have to run it down.

K: Could I ask you?

J: It's frozen in the text of the agreement with Japan. The principle is we received them from Japan and returning them to Japan without prejudice to rights. Just returning them with same rights. No change in rights. They were included in islands in 1945.

K: I know our position. When was it frozen? Before or after he talked with Chou?

J: Before that. Well before that.

K: That's what I think.

J: It's hard -- I will run it down. It's hard to give a date because there's a continuing dialogue between us and GRC. Between us and Japanese there's no question. I will get you a chronology on the thing.

K: Could you do that? It's bound to come up with the President.

J: Sure thing.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Vice President/Kissinger
10:50 a.m. 6/7/71

VP: One thing I wanted to say to you when I asked Albert about going to Korea he said the President asked him to go to the bicentennial thing. So he should go there.

K: I don't know where it is.

VP: I don't either but I want to say to him that the President wants you to go where he said. Let him designate Morgan instead. I wanted you to know.

K: That's fine.

VP: Albert can't make up his mind about anything. The President asked him to do that other thing.

K: Say the President didn't have the dates exactly clear in his mind.

VP: Did you get to Bryce?

K: Yes.

VP: It looks how?

K: Good and he is coming in at 11:00.

VP: The departure date looks like the 26th from L. A.

K: You will be there on the 27th?

VP: Out there the evening of the 29th. There's a date loss.

K: OK.

VP: You will get back on the other thing?

K: By then end of the day.

VP: Art had a call into you but not necessary.

K: He cancelled it. I am looking into the other matter.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Finch/Kissinger

11:24 p.x a.m. 6/7/71

F: Apparently McCloy is having a meeting of his group tomorrow.
McCone says he was talked to about joining the group. McCone wants to take his name from consideration.

K: Why?

F: Because he got challenged from State. He said Henry Kissinger --

K: That's the reason we want him on the committee. That's the reason.

F: He thought also something must have gone awry because he was talking with
and you had to leave and you didn't call back, so he thought you were trying to talk to him nicely.

K: Tell him we want him on the committee and I am just too irresponsible to have
so much responsibility.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

12:22 p.m. 6/7/71

Kx

L: You know I have been raising hell because I didn't want it tied to withdrawal. We should have gotten a look at the letter before it went to Kennedy. I haven't seen it and Doolin never did. Kennedy released it this morning. It's not tied to Northern Laos.

K: Of course not. Haig is calling Elliot because the President is raising can.
Do you think I made the point?

L: I hope so.

K: You and I are on the same side.

By KHLU

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Mr. Bray

6/7/71 12:30 p.m.

(following conference call)

B: Our fast research came back showing this started in 1964, so I have to stick with President Johnson.

K: So you say, in 1964, if that is correct.

B: It is.

K: Can you check with Helms to see where he got the idea that it was under Kennedy? We have to be correct, of course.

B: Of course.

K: But let's make it clear that this was not a program we started. I will rely on you to check with Helms.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Alexis Johnson/Mr. Kissinger

3:05 p.m., June 7, 1971

K: Alex, Kennedy is running amok on these islands and it is now being presented to the President -- I shouldn't be telling you this -- as the only thing that can make the textiles go. He has the textiles people lined up. I am going in to see the President shortly. What is the legal position of these islands.

J: In the 1951 treaty with Japan, the territory that we kept out (the Ryukyus) was defined to include these islands.

K: Is it correct that they were until then administered as part of China.

J: No. You would have to go back to when Formosa went under Japanese rule. I have people working on what position the Chinese took in 1951 at the time of the treaty. I want to find out if they made a reclama at that time or that they signed the treaty at that time.

K: Find out as quickly as possible.

J: I will call them.

K: Get the information to my office and they will get it in to me at the meeting. To raise an issue on that would blow the whole thing up?

J: No question.

K: They would not yield on textiles?

J: It would blow the whole thing up. Jim Shen was in to see Marshall on Saturday. The suggestion was to talk to the Japanese. There are two points: (1) There is not the slightest question about this blowing up the Okinawa negotiations with the Japanese; and (2) I think one thing we can do is get the Japanese (since the Chinese have refused to take the initiative in talking to the Japanese) to take the initiative in talking to the Chinese and explain our problem.

K: Could we say this issue should go to the World Court?

J: It is not ours to say. It is not our territory. We have no sovereignty. It is a territorial dispute under our present administration of Okinawa. We just administer it -- it is a Japanese-Chinese question.

By KLW

NARA, Dalo

5/12/04

Alexis Johnson/Mr. Kiss

3:05 p.m., June 7, 1971

K: So the issue is -- in 1951 when we accepted Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa, we put those islands in as part of the Okinawa territory.

J: Let me confirm this.

K: If that is true and it passed unchallenged...

J: We would have to turn back the same territory as we turned...

K: That could settle the issue. Call me when you get the information

J: All right.

lds

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCON
Freeman/Kissinger
3:08 p.m. 6/7/71

K: You dropped me from my completely from view here.

F: I was thinking yesterday of writing you.

K: You have had a difficult period.

F: And working hard.

K: I might be in England the 24th-26th of June.

F: I shall be at your service.

K: I would like to see you.

F: I can make myself available on any of those days. The 26th is my daughter's birthday so I would prefer the 24th or 25th.

K: I haven't gotten the specific suggestions from you govt.

F: Who should I talk with?

K: Burt Trend has ideas. Dinner or lunch.

F: I shall be available the whole time. I want to see you and have a number of things to tell and say to you.

K: You will be in touch with Trend and when I know my schedule I will call you. Give Trend another day because we just talked with Cromer a couple of hours ago.

F: Do plan to take 2-3 hours when you are here. I shall plant to hear from you. My number is 01-485-9630.

K: Your home number?

F: My private number.

K: You can always call through the embassy.

F: It's been quite a lot even in the last few days. I thought you be over sometime this summer.

K: You will have to tell me through which thought process.

F: I shall look forward to seeing you.

By KHL

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCOM

Amb. Cromer/Kissinger

5:16 p.m.

6/7/71

C: Just thought you would like to know. I have a telegram in and the PM hopes you will be having lunch on the 24th. I have a list of things to discuss. Everythings under control. One aspect -- anyone in London that they can get in touch with on your movements?

K: No.

C: What I was thinking of doing --

K: I will get you a name tomorrow. It will be someone over there

C: A name tomorrow and how he can be contacted.

K: I will have it tomorrow.

C: He will get in touch on a private basis with our chap. Someo operations in the AF.

K: I will call you about it before the end of the day. Thank you very much

C: Thanks for the lunch.

K: It's a generous man. The food is awful.

By KCLW

NARA, Dato

5/12/84

TELCOM
President/Kissinger
afternoon 6/7/71

P: What position are we involved in? I am going over there in a minute. Does it involve the big thing?

K: Blow up negotiations with Japan. Both Chinese prefer it part of Taiwan. They figure they could get it if they get Taiwan.

P: We have a very important point to make here to try to do some on the textile-thing.

K: This would be a hell of a price to pay with the Japanese. The treaty is to be signed in about a week. Kennedy thinks we should raise it.

P: Have you talked with Peterson and gotten him around?

K: He is acting as Kennedy's agent. He's all right.

P: I will see you in 5 mins.

By: K.L. V

NAHA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCOM

Alex Johnson/Kissinger

10:45 a.m. 6/8/71

J: I have to get something off on Okinawa for the Secretary's talk with Aichi.

K: I have stopped that.

J: It's no reason why the Secy. can't sign on this June 17?

K: You have a disaffected Secy. at-Large and I have a furious economics asst. h

J: I think it's going well. I had Byrd here who has been a problem and he thinks the two should be kept separate.

K: We will not raise the islands.

J: Peterson called me last night and raised them again.

K: He was ordered by the President to shut up.

J: He said someone I said from textile issues how did he expect to get anything from the Japanese. He hadn't thought about it. He thought we would have to go the mi equipment route.

K: He has been told we don't do that.

J: He said rather than the Senkakos. I just wanted to let you know.

K: G__ damn it!

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Freeman Gosden/Kissinger

11:02 a.m.

June 8/71

Gosden suggested lunch on Sat. and HAK agreed. They decided on the Sans Souci with the Gosdens coming first to HAK's office. After some discussion on the time (due to Mrs. Gosden's hair appt.) it was decided that they would arrive at the WH between 12:30 and 1:00 and then go to the Sans Souci. HAK told him to come to the Penn. Ave. entrance. The Gosdens are staying at the Madison. (They are also attending Tricia's wedding and have been told they should arrive about 3:15.)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KML NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELCON

Peterson/Kissinger

11:40 a.m. 6/8/71

K: I had a call from Alex Johnson this morning saying that he was confused that I talked with him last night on the islands.

P: I wanted the status so when I talked with David. He is doing something with Bill Rogers -- did you know -- to agree that Japan will agree to discuss issues with Taiwan. I wanted to know the latest status.

K: He said you are trying to get him to change his mind. He said you mentioned military assistance to Taiwan. He doesn't know all that's going on.

P: He was a smart aleck about me -- what do I know about negotiations and the Far East and so forth. In the Cabinet Room once he said that we could get these countries to do what we wanted and hadn't asked them. I took this opportunity to say it's going to take a lot more then friendly persuasion. So he said it might take something on the military side.

K: He said you were trying to push him to expand the military thing.

P: Bull shit! I said nothing about the trip in August or anything.

K: OK.

P: You can see what I am saying.

K: I took out a sub-phrase that referred to other considerations. Except for that

P: OK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KLW NAHA, Date 5/13/04

TELCORN

McGregor/Kissinger

noon-ish

6/8/71

M: We have an emergency that will take me to the Hill. Can Timmons sit in with you?

K: Then I think it's better to meet with him alone.

M: Timmons could greet him and that's all.

K: Fine. This x Allott amendment --

M: That's one I'm working on.

K: Stennis wants me to call Senators.

M: If you could call those on the list from Lehman.

K: (reads list). Who?

M: Scott and Griffin and x tell them that once we make a break on a major element like this there will be other breaks and we hope they can hold the line. It's not your bag but it will harm other major security proposals down the line.

Reproduced from the original files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHLW

NAHA, Dato

5/12/04

TELECON
Senator Griffin

6/8/71 12:05 p.m.

K: I am calling about this Allott amendment coming up this afternoon.

G: Problem there.

K: Yes. You know our view. I wanted you to know that we feel strongly. It seems to be our occupational disease. It would throw the defense budget out of whack. I hope you'll be able to support us.

G: I'll be with you; the problem is if we can count enough. Some other names: Baker, Dominick, Hiram Fong and Lynn Jordan may go the other way.

K: How about Taft?

G: He is going to support Allott. I don't think you can get that one. He gave a speech supporting it.

K: I see. Should I call any of the others?

G: Shre. Do you want some others?

K: No, I'm not in the lobbying business. I'll call Dominick.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC

NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCONE
Kraslow/Kissinger

12:11 p.m.

6/8/71

HAK: I am impressed to see how quickly the Los Angeles Times corrects its errors.

K: I had a conversation with Sieverts and offered a rebuttal if they would ? ? ?

HAK: It was my name that was villified.

K: Al~~k~~ox must have gotten him on me. The other matter. This is not for
release until ~~x~~ tonight. Clifford will make a speech tonight on the McGovern th
and has a proposal that he will make. "Concise workable plan ? ? ? ? . Reas
believe in private negotiations with NLF nad Hanoi? ? ? ? . U.S. agree to wit
draw al~~k~~ox military personnel? ? ? all ground, air and ______ personnel.
? ? ? ? ? ? ?" He goes on to say that he is of the strong opinion that it will ac
agreement between North and South Vietnam and end the war. Story needs an
administration reaction. Whether this has any merit or what objection would be

HAK: I prefer not to comment. This is a variation of what he said before. I don't know why he has reason to believe and I won't debate that.

K: Would it read too much that from the President's press conferences that Br
has tried to explore this matter privately ? ? ? in turn for _______?

HAK: I don't want to get into our private negotiations and if there are any. You
best to just ride it out. I cannot get into a debate with Clifford. His information
doesn't square with ours. When its over then let the record speak for itself.

K: May I ask again what the harm is in going at these people privately?

HAK: Because if I tell you privately it's no longer private. I don't want to disc
an issue that's going on privately.

K: Could we say it doesn't address giving SVN a chance to survive.

HAK: That's true but frankly it's teue and the position the President has taken
but I will let Clifford speak for himself and we will speak for ourselves when we
have something to say. For guidance, it's silly to say we are missing great
opportunities because of stubbornness.

K: Then the WH wouldn't comment after Clifford thing is announced?

HAK: That's probably.

will

K: You ~~will~~ here more of it. It's being circulated around town.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KLC NAHA, Dalo 5/13/04

Kraslow/Kissinger

12:11 p.m. 6/8/71

-2-

HAK: I just don't know whether the President will decide on a reply but ? ? ?

K: I will play with it. On the other matter, I told Sieverts that the State Dept. wants to pull all the stuff together on POWs and give me chrono on paper --

HAK: One is charge it came out of this office on face of knowledge it wouldn't work. This has nothing to do with other and it's nothing true and nothing to pro that. When you put something on your front page charging something you should correct it when you find it's untrue.

K: If the WH will say something on the record then we will print it.

HAK: You will say we deny it and that's it. You should have checked it.

K: I agree but there's nothing I can do. The system failed on this. We are supposed to be notified. I am going with the Clifford thing and if later in the day

HAK: If I have more thoughts I will call you.

By KL V NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Jay Lovestone

12:23 p.m., June 8, 1971

L: Henry, I'm sorry we can't see you today. The situation is
Teddy got tied up in New York. New York is in a mess.

K: The problem I have is we would like to get a reading on his attitude.

L: He is going to make a special trip tomorrow into Washington if it's okay with you.

K: I'll be happy to see you. But we are pretty well committed to doing it on Thursday. It is harder for him to have an impact tomorrow than today.

L: He is in the shambles of New York today.

K: Have you talked to him?

L: Just before I talked to you.

K: What is your reading of his mood?

L: It's a tit-for-tat proposition. He wants something -- but not for himself.

K: That would be easy. It's easier to deal with corruptible people. What does he want?

L: Could the Peking crowd issue a public statement or make an appeal, or be helpful in releasing war prisoners with Hanoi.

K: I get the gist of it. I think he and I can have a talk.

L: I will be with him tomorrow. I go back to New York tomorrow afternoon. Should I come with him?

K: I would just as soon have you sit in.

L: What time?

K: Let's say 2:30.

L: We will be at your place then. Get us both cleared.

K: It's going to be hard to do, but we will do it. Come in on Pennsyl Avenue gate.

By KHLN NARA, Dalo 5/13/04

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Senator Dominick
12:35 p. m., 6/8/71

K: I am calling you about that vote on the Allott Amendment. I wanted you to know that if that passes it will throw the whole Defense package out of whack.

D: I was sure you were calling on that but I told Gordon yesterday that I would support him. And I don't think I can go back on it. If we are getting into a volunteer Army, this will give more of a boost to it than under the original version.

K: But the budgetary problems; it will come out of our overall Defense posture. It is not just for one year. It is for the indefinite future so I really hope and I know the President does, that you can search your conscious once more.

D: I am trying to stick with you on these things but I told Gordon I would go with him and I don't feel that I can go back on my word. I apologize Henry.

K: Alright.

mlh

By KMLN NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

1:15 p.m., June 8, 1971

L: Hi, Henry. That Laos thing went pretty well yesterday. They are probably going to have an amendment next week.

K: Can you handle it?

L: One way or the other. We can get it knocked out in conference.

K: We are determined that this thing go on -- if we have to make you break the law.

L: I am breaking it now. Did you happen to get the paper I sent over on Laos?

K: I haven't seen it yet. What did it say?

L: It goes through the mechanism we can use to carry on in the next year. I think it's a pretty good paper. It doesn't come down one way or the other as to the overall strategy.

K: We do not want to lose the possibility.

L: We won't -- we will keep it. But we have to keep everybody together on it.

K: We will keep them together -- keep their KONG feet to the fire. If you keep it going, we will see that you don't get outflanked.

L: If we could get the bill moved along, and now we are going through the Hughes amendment all over again. Allott is making it a Republican issue. They are favoring $2 billion added. I just talked to him. I talked to Stennis and KONG Margaret Chase Smith. We are now very close simply because of our friends like Goldwater and Dominick going along.

K: I called Dominick -- it was useless.

L: Tower gave me a commitment he will vote against it on the floor. One other thing -- the little plan we had on faulty ammunition is going forward.

K: What ammunition. I don't know about it.

By KL V NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

L: Remember the problem in Germany on those shells.

K: What are you doing about it?

L: Moving. But I shouldn't talk on this phone.

K: I'll call you on the secure phone in about an hour.

L: Did you check that Army thing for me?

K: XX The BeLieu thing? I talked to Haldeman about it yesterday. I think if you can make a firm commitment on the other thing it might be saleable.

L: There's no problem on that.

K: You mean springing Froehlke? Let me get that done today.

L: They had to slip the hearing last week.

K: XXX There's no problem I am familiar with. I talked about it at a meeting last night. They all consider it helpful.

L: I can do something for BeLieu.

K: I will talk to Haldeman this afternoon.

L: Okay.

lds

By KML V NAFA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Wm. Buckley/Kissinger

2:18 p.m. 6/8/71

K: I appreciated the column about Carter Burton.

B: I hope it had effect. It was an outrageous position.

K: If you started advocating the gas chambers for Jews and said you believe in freedom of press, you will see how fast they come down.

B: It was a fantastic position. Some day I hope you will write your memoirs.

K: How is that relevant?

B: You must be frustrated and this would be a good footnote.

K: I don't think I can do it and no one except me can give an account of foreign policy of this period. I wonder if we can get together sometime for a general review.

B: Good.

K: I have seen in the National Review your understanding of SALT as being ABM agreement only and it's a misunderstanding.

B: President was unclear.

K: It was intentional. We got our position in return for face saving formula. We wouldn't have made an announcement -- Moorer thinks that the understanding goes beyond his fondest hopes. All the pressures in town were for ABM only and might have cut our funds. What we have is an understanding on offensive weapons but we have MIRV and forward based aircraft which we don't want considered.

B: This is off the record?

K: We want you to know. There will be concurrent and ? ? negotiations.

B: So ambiguity was for tranquility over there.

K: One concession we made was there may be greater formality to ABM -- one a treaty and one an effective agreement. Soviets don't care about the legal position but the power reality.

B: What time is the fram is the document?

K: This year.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By K.L. NARA, Dale

5/12/04

Buckley/Kissinger

2:18 p.m. 6/8/71

-2-

B: You said a month ago that this year was your deadline.

K: I care less about what you write but what I care for is that you don't feel we have gone soft in the head.

B: We spent an interesting day at the Hudson Institute last week with Don Brennan. His formula for live Americans instead of dead Russians is interesting.

K: The scientific community is unbelievable. I have a group I meet with and they are beyond belief. Their theory the more Ameridans that are vulnerable to better it is. 4 years ago they had 4 sites. 6 months ago they suggested 4 fields against Moscow and it's tremendous. Now with the agreement with Soviets they suggest one large interceptor and low powered radar and all missiles in one field. That's scientific advice.

B: Incredible. How is the morale there?

K: Uneven. We have a number of things going in foreign affairs ~~we~~ will have a field if we had a bare modicum of support we could end the war but with this country why shouldn't the Vietnamese wait?

B: Anything to look forward to in the immediate future to animate your friend? Detente in sight?

K: A number of things are kicking that would be spectacular. After this month we could have an extraordinary summer and that's not said lightly. Also I though might like to know that Dr. Teller is on the FIAB. We have yet to do the paper.

B: We are writing a piece on the Mao-Mao of Dr. Teller. Calling him in the middle of the night and the whole bit.

K: Will you come down sometime?

B: I will make it a point.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCORN

Sen. Scott/Kissinger
2:30 p.m. 6/8/71

S: Sorry I couldn't call before.

K: Some of the people here thought you might want to hear from me that the WH
is opposed to the Allot Amendment.

S: I read the Packard letter and sited the Joint Chiefs and Saxbe made a longer
speech against it and Allott spoke for it and was supported by Bell and Stevens a
Baker and Goldwater. How they can support Gates when they don't support the
is hard to see it. It's about 45-45 with some doubtful. Timmons and McGregor
and Belieu are up here and trying on Goldwater and Baker. Dominick will prob
go with Allot. But we dont think his heart is in it.

K: I've just talked with him. It's not.

B: We are seeing what we can do. A call to Goldwater wouldn't be a bad idea.
He usually votes for pay increases.

K: He is probably mad at me.

This

S: ~~Xxx~~ would be a good thing to get him un-mad. Most are saying we voted for
a two year extension but you have to make so attractive so that ultimately you
won't need the draft.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHLW

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCORN

Sen. Goldwater/Kissinger

2:32 p. m.

6/8/71

K: I am calling you about the Allot Amendment coming up this afternoon.

G: I am not going to vote. I talked with Mel about this. My position has been a
along -- the Allot amendment is substantially my bill. I told the chairman that I
push nothing. You put me in a peculiar position because if I vote against it today
it will be opposite to what I voted the other day.

K: Well, if you can at least refrain from voting for it.

G: I will.

By KHW NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/John McCloy

3:05 p.m., June 8, 1971

K: John, how are you?

M: I got a call this morning from McCone. Apparently he has some kind of contretemps about his availability or about whether we wanted him.

K: We want him. He was in the office the other day. He kept talking away; he delayed his departure. He was apparently wanting me to ask him to join the Committee. I thought it had been settled so I never raised it.

M: He was looking for something from the White House.

K: He will get it.

M: He called me today.

K: There's no problem; we want him.

M: He felt there was something in the State Department was throwing a block. I have not been able to reach our other friend -- Jim Douglas -- yet, but I don't worry a great deal about that.

K: It's not a major thing.

M: Are we clear on other possibilities? We have a lot of names. Is there anybody else I should be or you should be approaching?

K: You should approach them first.

M: On the basis, "Would you be willing?" Let me make a couple of suggestions. One from Dean Rusk -- Carl Sanders, former Governor of Georgia. I know him slightly; he has some substance but is not particularly knowledgeable in this area but he's a pretty sound man. Scranton suggested Stanley Resor.

K: That won't ever be accepted.

M: I'm relieved on that. Have you ever thought about Milton
Eisenhower?

K: Let me check both Sanders and Eisenhower with the President.

M: How about Reischauer and Robert Ellsworth.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHLW

NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Mr. Kissinger/John McC

3:05 p.m., June 8, 1971

K: Let me check those names.

M: There is a Mrs. Harris -- a Negro member of the Board of IBM and former Ambassador to Luxembourg. But she has no background in foreign affairs.

K: All right. I will check them.

lds

By KL V NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

McGeorge Bundy/Mr. Kissinger

4:32 p.m., June 8, 1971

B: I have had extremely interesting conversations on this paper. I am calling to ask you when it would be most useful to have it in the mail.

K: If I could have it by the weekend, I could put it in a folder for Saturday.

B: I will put it in the mail by close of business tomorrow. I got an extremely resonant answer from Humphrey -- and some extremely interesting tactical advice as to how the fine print should be handled from Vance -- also some reactions from him reflecting the other side of the coin on his October 7 experience. But I will put that in a side memo. I am also sitting down to talk to other fellows -- old friends of yours and mine.

K: What does Vance think his October 7 experience was?

B: He thinks the stand-fast ceasefire never was pressed in Paris as he thought it should be and hoped; it would be. He thinks it probable that it wasn't as likely to work as he then hoped. I told him I thought he was feeling the other way and that a lot of people urged that these things be tried. They were tried, but the Administration didn't get any credit. He was not ill-tempered.

K: I understand. Good -- if you could send it.

B: I will send it and you tell me whatever else I can do. Another subject -- You had a word with my man Staples on Pakistan. We went over our papers again and have had a running conversation with the boys in AID (MacDonald). Their information is more horrendous than ours. The young man who watches these things is coming home and if you want to see him or want him to see somebody else, we will arrange it.

K: I would like him to see Saunders. If I can spare 10-15 minutes, I will see him.

B: I think he should talk to XX Hal.

K: It would be good to get a first-hand impression.

B: It's a horrible situation -- incredible.

K: It would be very helpful to get it first-hand!

B: We will have him come down.

By KHU NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

June 8, 1971 4:55pm

Mr. Haldeman

H: We are going to hold up Froehlke until we get agreement on BeLieu. He lied to me about the BeLieu thing. My intention is to go to the mat with him on it.

K: He says he'll give BeLieu the Navy thing.

H: He doesn't want that. And we need a guy worse in the Army than the Navy. First he says Beall isn't leaving; then he says . . . My question is why can't ______ have the Navy thing?

K: I don't understand why BeLieu wants it more than the others.

H: Because he is an Army man and knows where the problems are.

K: How do you mean going to the mat?

H: Saying that we won't send Froehlke up till he agrees on BeLieu.

K: You'll have the bloodiest fight ever on your hands.

H: It might be interesting. He screwed us on Froehlke to begin with.

K: He has screwed us on so many things . . .

By: KHLN NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
President/Kissinger
6:03 p.m. 6/8/71

P: I understand you got your friend Clifford to come out for a Dec. 31 deadline.

K: He claims he has information and I thought of asking him to come over but it builds him up too much so Sullivan is seeing him.

P: Is it McGovern/Hatfield?

K: If it's authentic then we know they are moving towards our position. It's the way they played the bombing halt. They are trying to force us with public opinion a Dec. 31 deadline. Treat it with contempt.

P: Except on prisoners thing.

K: We shouldn't give the impression that if they offered Dec. 31 -- Zeigler hand it well.

P: He is a cool customer.

K: I am seeing Dobrynin and I will lay it into him. Tell their little yellow frien stop these games. We are not going down quietly.

P: Take him to the new cabins and up the mountain top

K: I will call you if anything important occurs.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Max Frankel

6/8/71 6:10pm

K: I was told by Bob Sample to call you.

F: Have you talked to Terry Smith?

K: No.

F: He is doing a story on Clark Clifford's speech tonight; Bob is trying to get to you to find out if you know what it's all about. If you could talk to him or Terry or me . . .

K: Let me talk to you; I'm going off. He has talked to no one in the Administration: he hasn't talked to me or anyone in State. I don't know what his certain information is. Secondly, our problem is this: We would like to negotiate with Hanoi, not Clark Clifford. I like Clark; in fact, I adr him, so I don't want to get into a personal dispute. But we don't want to fritter away our last chance by getting into a debate with Clark Clifford. We don't want Hanoi to get the idea that they can use Americans to float ideas. This is why people say ________ about this date. All our studies say that if we gave a date he wants it would collapse the whole effort. Whether any date is right, we would like to discuss in another forum.

F: You know who xxx he is dealing with?

K: No, I haven't the foggiest. We are asking him to come in to tell us.

F: What can we say about this?

K: You can give the substance of what I said. We would rather negotiate with Hanoi than with Clark Clifford. Hanoi must talk to us, not Clark Clifford. They know what channels are open.

F: You want to talk about the substance of his idea?

K: No.

F: What is wrong with it?

K: The date that he proposes would collapse the whole enterprise.

F: Okay, thank you.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Henry Brandon/Kissinger

morning

6/8/71

K: The 24th is not possible because Heath wants lunch that day but the 25th is.

B: I will check with London.

K: If not, perhaps another occasion.

B: Evans would organize the same thing but I don't know if Thompson would --

K: I don't think he is intellectually essential.

B: No problem. What would be the best number?

K: 20 or 15?

B: 20 might be fine. It will give a broader audience --

K: I am trying to get a feel for what they think. You people won't vote in the next election.

B: Say it's a give and take and that you are interested in what goes on here and Washington. They will be quite forth coming.

K: Can I get a list of the people? Giles will be there automatically.

B: That will be easily arranged.

K: I appreciate that. They collected those documents before you photographed them all?

B: Only half of them photographed.

K: You cannot make a judgment except province by province.

B: It was fascinating but I would like to talk with you about the thinking and what happened on the basis of analysis on that. It's a fascinating paper and what really happens when you try to draw the right conclusions.

K: It does indicate we are not ______ our own analysis.

B: From that point of view it's a progress.

K: But doesn't guarantee right answers.

Represented from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

By K.L. NARA, Dalo 5/13/04

Henry Brandon/Kissinger
morning 6/8/71

-2-

K: Who hasn't?

B: Hethinksan agreement with Congress is politically --

K: Mac always wants to be fashionable and it will keep him from being a great man. What does an agreement with Congress mean? This year with 8 candidate in Congress? Could any proposal we make survive and generate debate we have

B: The only advantage would be that you would share responsibility.

K: If you could get it voted up and down. If getting up and give up completely on negoationa. It's not as simple as Mac makes it. Voting is an alternative and I ask why. How many dates can a man vote no.

B: Whether there's a possibility of making a gesture without expecting to proceed

K: That's a fix different problem. You are not making partners but diffusing the It's not the same. But ? ? ? ? AND IT'S written in prose and pseudo-profundi It's a spectacular piece.

B: I'm not that impressed. I think it leaves a lot to be desired. Full of holes.

K: My comments are between you and me.

B: Of course. It's interesting that Mac is so tortured that he is trying to find ways out for himself and others.

K: If he doesn't become a great man he only has himself to blame. Don't you agree?

B: He has brilliance but not wisdom. It's sometimes disaffection for him it's what I feel.

K: Let me know as soon as possible.

B: Anytime you feel like a swim just call.

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCORN

Bafbara Walters/Kissinger

10:40 a.m. 6/9/71

W: Your social life is interfering with my business. I went to Mollie Parnis' la
night and she said she is giving a dinner party for you on Thurs. (I would love to
go but I have to be in on Friday and she suggested that if you were going back
perennis I could ride with you.)

K: I am flying back at 11:30 but I don't know if I can take you in a government plane.

W: I am not positive because I am covering the wedding on Sat. and I have a
meeting on Thurs. I would stay if you are flying back. I have to be back Friday
for a taping in Washington. She has lots of interesting friends and it would be
a good party.

K: I will inquire if I can take you on the plane. If there's no problem, I'll be
glad to. I will call you this afternoon/

W: I will be out but back at 6:00. Call after that?

K: It would be nice to see you again. You sneak in and out of Washington.

W: You sneak in and out of NY.

K: Fair enough.

W: I hear you were at the Galan.

K: I didn't see you.

W: I didn't see you. I heard you were there but I was talking with Ted Kennedy
couldn't get away.

K: I understand your priorities.

W: Some day you might be President -- you can't be. I am having lunch with
Barbara Howar on Friday. At the Sans Souci. Would you like to join us?

K: I'm lunching with the Under Secretary of State. I think you would be too muc
for him.

W: We thought we would come to the Sans Souci for a get together.

K: I will join you if I can get away. And I will let you know about the other.

By KML

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCON
Amb. Cromer/Kissinger
10:45 a.m. 6/9/71

C: I just wanted to come back on one thing. Your overt visit to my home town, who at the embassy dealing with that part?

K: I don't know.

C: Can they talk with the embassy about it?

K: Yes, indeed.

C: through normal channels?

K: We have notified Annenberg.

C: Wanted to wait until you are ready.

K: Make a formal proposal to me for the 26th. So it will be on my schedule. The technical side I will wait for ____.

C: So it's not a blank in the program. I will take it up with London on a secret line.

K: Have a good trip.

C: I will be in touch before I leave. Or Jeffrey Ling.

K: See you when you get back.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Irwin/Kissinger

10:47 a.m. 6/9/71

I: I called on the question -- you talked to Marshall on Clifford.

K: We want to keep it at the lowest level possible.

I: Someone xxshould be in touch with him.

K: Sullivan or Marshall.

I: Make sure no one in Defense is thinking of it.

K: I will get on top of it. I will be sure no one else gets into it.

I: I will wait your call.

By KM U

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCORN
Peterson/Kissinger

11:13 a.m.

6/9/71

P: I have a couple of problems -- have you seen the wire from Kennedy?

K: We can't hold up for a month.

P: On China but what about the first thing? We have a morale problem over th
and David is discouraged and whatever we can do to help.

K: Right.

P: On China, would you let me know where it stands because we have requests
to brief farm media and I don't know what you will say tomorrow.

K: I will send it over in an hour but no briefings until this afternoon.

P: I understand. One group is agriculture. What on that?

K: Lifting 50% and freeing up general export.

P: Fine.

K: What about the letter to Kamorov?

P: I checked on that. State and Commerce recommended it. My guys said wh
kind of letter and they sent a draft letter. My guy doesn't like the letter and
had talked with Ernest Johnson.

K: In the meantime Beam has read it to Dobrynin. They talked with State.

P: Those SOBs. It was a draft.

K: It was read as a draft. State and Commerce always have games like this.
We want to deal with Dobrynin and not Kamorov and let Kamorov think it's a pol
deal and that there are no non-political channels open to him. I had dinner wi
Dobrynin and I stepped out to call you. He wasn't pleased about the letter to Kam
because he was saying the quid pro quo I wanted wasn't tied to the stop. I said
there was no letter and he said the letter was read to him by Beam.

P: State recommended a letter and Hinton said what kind of letter and they
drafted it --

K: The letter said looking at it in a constructive way. Did it?

P: I haven't seen the letter. Hinton said it's a poor letter. It was a draft. I

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Peterson/Kissinger

11:13 a.m.

6/9/71

-2-

K: It's a letter from you to Kamorov.

P: What could we do about this?

K: Terrorize them more. Say it will be hard to sell and we will get back to you. If you give any encouragement they will run with it and claim the credit. Now you should say you cannot send the letter. That will fix them.

P: You and I should have lunch soon. I have a major couple of things to discuss.

K: We are hanging by our fingernails with the Russians.

P: It's impossible to read a letter to Dobrynin I have never seen and say it's from me and my guy doesn't like it.

K: It's not surprising.

P: You will send me a list on China. Politically, on the briefing when the foreign policy aspect is not enough --

K: I am not doing a briefing.

P: I will play the role of what it means in terms of jobs and --

K: We want to play it low key. We don't want the Chinese to think it's a tremendous economic boom to us. Rather not have it in newspapers that it will create jobs.

P: Colson and Klein --

K: I will stop them. For 3 headlines they will kill something we have worked two years on.

P: I am partly the culprit. I know the pressures on the President from the farmers.

K: Tell them we are doing it but quietly.

P: Not how important it is to us. On China, you asked how it could be broken categories. I will send something to you from Hinton on how to break it down.

K: Let's lunch in the next week.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCORN

Dobrynin/Kissinger

11:31 a.m.

6/9/71

K: One, I have told our bureaucracy that you and I had breakfast and I took you for a helicopter x ride around the city. You don't have to say anything but just don't say the opposite. Secondly, on that issue on your presence in W. Berlin, I have now received other communications from Rush and to fix it will move in the direct I talked with you about.

D: What you hinted before. It will be this way when I will be back. Confirmation of what you mentioned. Thank you.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

telcon
Chester Cooper/Kissinger

12:35 p.m.

6/9/71

C: Just came back from VN. I am talking with Irwin. I am seeing Smyser tomo
I don't intend to see any potential candidates or press but I do have views on the
politics of the establishment there. I will pass them to Smyser or take 10 mins.
your time.

K: I will set it up in the next 3-4 days. What is your quick impression?

C: It's interesting to me because I have not been there for 3-4 years. Superficia
one gets the sense of greater security. ? ? ? ? that's the kind of question that
______ and worked the hell out of me. It's good but on the other hand I met a wid
of a VN general and she asked me to her farm 20 mins. away from Saigon. The
problem was that some VC tax collectors were there the night before. But the
security to me seems better. The election thing I find very troublesome. I do th
and I have talked with a large number of VN politicians that Thieu could win an
election and we would have trouble justifying it and why he won't settle for one ab
approach even given the problems of an Asian country. I talked with Bunker abou
the Administration protecting itself by saying we have made the right ______ pri
to the election. Say we have talked 6 times perviously with Thieu and ? ? ? sayi
keep hands off and that's not good enough and for that reason it would be good to s
over the past several months it's been obvious.

K: I have to run. I will try to set a date in the next week.

["Reproduced from the open files\nof the Nixon Presidential\nMaterials Staff", "DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04", "telcon\nZeigler/Kissinger\n3:31 p.m. 6/9/71", "''", "Z: Anybody there?", "K: Al Haig.", "Z: Did he tell you what I said this morning? I took <u>Chiggo</u> Clifford on.", "K: Good.", "Z: "? ? ? ? ? ? hopes they will be released.", "K: No. Good.", "Z: See you/"]

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By KHLU

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
G. Smith/Kissinger

5:55 p.m.

6/9/71

S: We are about to send over our final report on the Vienna session and I want to read the section on your part to be sure no sensibilities will be effected. Report going to President. Under final phase of _________ "your initiative in Jan. 19' looking to breaking deadlock lead to WH eschages with Soviet leadership ? ? ? during which the leadership recommened modification of Soviet position. ? ? ? the Soviet side would negotiate on ? ? ? ? ?. On May 10 Smith returned to Washington for scheduled consultations and then ? ? ? ? which reads as follows

K: How widely circulated?

S: It's up to you. You know who it was last time.

K: If you could throw in one more sentence about the President's role. If it the leaks out he will fell better. What you have said is fair.

S: I just want to do what you say.

K: I will think about it. I had breakfast with Dobrynin. He says he has found that Semonov will not be able to come over. I am writing it and sending it to you. Secondly, I said look, I hope we will approach it in a constructive spirit and not hang on every sentence but approach it that we will settle. He said it was his and Gromyko's attitude. Said I was sorry SALT had become text case because it is out of foreign minister's hands and also Brezhnev because _________ coming with briefings and our military no one contradicted. They have no right to pass political/military judgment.

E: No information.

K: He got Brezhnev's permission to circulate among the Party Congress and how better briefed then any other Soviet.

S: I think that's right.

K: Not pessimistic. Just giving me inside. Otherwise nothing in substance.

S: The fact that the politburo is involved orgres well.

K: Brezschnev has only 3 assistents that _________ to him and when _________ one in he has no one in front of him.

S: Maybe you should lend him your people.

K: It will get the support of lots of people in this town.

S: You will suggest language.

By KML

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Dan Rather

6/9/71 6:05 p.m.

R:K Thank you for returning my call. Have you seen Clark Clifford lately?

K: No. I saw him at the big dinner once, but not in a business sense and he has not communicated this to anyone here.

R: I wondered whether you had an indication.

K: No, nor does anyone else in the Administration.

R: Is it fair to say at no time was anyone around the President suggested a final withdrawal date earlier than 1972.

K: Don't ascribe it to anyone, but everyone agrees that this sort of withdrawal date is really a way of collapsing everything there. None of our studies indicated this is a feasible date.

R: Thank you. I am aware of the basis on which we are speaking but "this sort of date." What does that mean?

K: I mean December, 1971. The thing we are trying to avoid is negotiating with ourselves. You have been to most of my backgrounders and know how hipped we are on thing. We have a very delicate problem and want to negotiate with Hanoi and not Clark Clifford.

R: That's a good point.

K: If we reply to Clifford and say what is acceptable then we are not negotiating with Hanoi anymore; he becomes their stalking horse. We are not just casually rejecting this; we want to talk to Hanoi.

R: I understand; there's no sense getting into some patter with him. Thank you for returning my call.

By KHC

NARA, Dato

TELCORN

A. Johnson/Kissinger

6:06 p.m.

6/9/71

K: Two things. Ted Eliot probably -- Haig called in the morning. I had breakfast with Dobrynin and I promised him a helicopter ride over Washington if we got to a agreement.

J: I must say, I couldn't have been more surprised.

K: So that was --

J: He got his ride.

K: I told him the next time he I get him on an airplane to Baltimore.

J: I gave a couple of people a ride the other day in working out of summer camp for his kids.

K: He told me about the camp.

J: We went all out on this. Navy ran down 15 locations including military installa and took his people riding around on Sat.

K: He was pleased. I didn't say I knew about it. He said they found a place in the country. I have another backchannel from Kennedy. He told the Chinese we couldn't do anything on Senkakos with Ching Kao. He then requested that the U.S. at the time of the signing state categorically that we are returning sovereignty to the GO but still in dispute and should be settled by the parties involved and the U will do what it can to facilitate a settlement.

J: All right.

K: If anything like that could be done.

J: The Secy. talked to Aichi. He hit Aichi hard on this. The way it's left is Aichi has agreed they will talk with Chinese on this. He suggested we needed Japanese help on this. An hour ago I asked my boys to work on this to see what we could say. What we can say is that our returning it to the Japanese changes nothing. This neither adds to or detracts from claims. We can say something about those lines. We have them working on that. I am prepared to consider something. We can say it in a note to the Chinese.

K: If you could let me have something like that.

J: The reason I heard about this is I called Peterson. Where is Kennedy going and does he know the plan because I have a telegram from Taipei on a long statement

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/12/04

A. Johnson/Kissinger
6:06 p.m. 6/9/71

J: (cont) them to arrange for Kennedy and some 20-odd to stay at Kyoto from the 9th - 12ht. And keep it secret and not say anything to the Japanese govt. Tokyo said it was difficult to get a military plane to land at Kyoto airport with a crowd and not say anything. Pete said he was going to Koreanext. Let me say simply when he asked Pete he mentioned the Senkakoes.

K: Before David goes outagain he will be brought under control from here. We might do something out of here but not without knowing what the bureaucracy this

J: At least we should know what's he doing. Okinawa, I couldn't find out from what he told the Japanese.

K: I will talk to take it up with the President after the wedding.

J: I will get something together on the Senbakoes and bow (?) to them.

K: All I want is if you could give me a chance to say it's what you did before he beaten on the head because Kennedy was in there screaming they will be being blocked and not getting a textile agreement.

J: I already had the Secy. talk to Aichi.

K: A sentence that you are planning to do, I will take it to the President.

J: What's the timing?

K: You could tell Chin.

J: Kennedy not there.

K: Then it would go into regular channels. Or let McConaughy do it in regular channels and tell Chin here.

J: I will get something to you tomorrow.

By KHLU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Taft Schreiber/Kissinger

6:27 p.m.

6/9/71

K: I talked with Dobrynin last night about the idea of art exchange and said what a good friend and he says you should call him.

S: That's nice.

K: He will get you in touch with the cultural counsellor. He wanted to know what paintings. He said Russian easier then impressionistic ones. They figure the impressionists don't do much for Russia -- representation. He will support you

S: Today in the mail I sent you another request for not of the same order but of the same kind. We are making a series of museums called "Museums Without Wall" so I wanted our photographer to photograph impressionists in the Hermitage. I don't use heavy light because we (went into a technical discussion of technique) used to do it in such a way so you could say it was another request.

K: Why don't you wait until I see your letter. The traffic won't bear too many requests.

S: I would meet with cultural people and do what's easier for them and fotograph is probably easier. That's a face saver because Carter Brown knows what we are trying and he says we are fooling ourselves because for what our govt sent to Russia because it's so hard. They may not realize the value and may let it happen. In any event what are you doing about coming out here?

K: Probably there Sat. night or Sun.

S: I will see you Sunday night.

K: Which of the performances are you going to?

S: The first.

K: I am joining the VP and so shuttling back and forth.

S: They consider this quite a coup.

K: What?

S: You and the VP both coming.

K: Really?

S: In fact Marrish --

By KML

NARA, Dalo

5/12/04

Schreiber/Kissinger
6:27 p.m. 6/9/71

-2-

K: I told Marlo Thomas I am starting a series called "That Man."

S: Rabin is coming here and I am having a small dinner.

K: You talk with him alone.

S: I had an understanding from my friends that the Premier wanted him back a
an offset to Dayan and I am worried who will fill his shoes here.

K: It's almost impossible. In dealing with the WH impossible.

S: I can imagine. Did the other thing to me go with Len Garment.

K: Yeah.

S: I am sure that somehow they will have to send someone who has a conscience
and simplicity that this man has to make things work smoothly. It would be a
shame to jar tranquilities and I wonder if you can tell me anything. I would like
to emphasize something.

K: I will give it some thought.

S: I will see you here.

K: I will tell Rabin to be frank with you.

S: I have my chin out 20 miles on this.

K: You have been a great soldier. I will see you at the Pavillion.

S: I will be playing golf Sunday morning but if you want lunch I could arrange to meet you.

K: I don't know how yet, I may not come until Sunday morning. The Hill Crest or home? I will call you at one or the other.

S: Where are you staying? Beverley Hills?

K: Yes and leave your numbers there.

S: Thank you so much for your help on these other things.

K: You have been a terrific friend for me.

S: I want to do something that you can do that...

By KHL

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Ronald Grierson/Kissinger

10:47 a.m.

6/11/71

G: A little bird tells me you might be carrying out your plan of visiting here.

K: I know you are the secret head of the British intelligence.

G: And I hear it might be around the 24th.

K: Where am I staying?

G: The Connaught or Clarigges. Pretty good, huh? If you would like to
a lunch here at my house I would like to do it.

K: Could I wait until next week when I know my schedule better?

G: I will be in Italy until Monday.

K: I will call you Tuesday.

G: And arrange a lunch or dinner.

K: Or drinks.

G: Whatever suits you. Heather would love to see you too.

K: I would like to see you both. Good of you to call.

G: I heard me yesterday from someone who will not allow to have himself disclosed. I am glad you admire my sources of information. It will be great to see you and London is spring-like.

K: It's the time of year for the one month of good weather you have.

G: We will try to keep it that way for you. I will hear from you on Tuesday.

By KCL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Freeman Gosden

6/11/71 10:50 a.m.

G: Frank called last night; he asked when we were coming back. I said Sunday and he said why don't you come with Henry. So we'll do that if it's okay.

K: Pretty presumptuous. You doing this to get out of lunch?

G: No, lunch is still great.

K: Can I bring someone?

G: Sure. I am calling Washington about the car and chauffeur. You want to ride with us over?

K: I'll probably stay at the White House.

G: Not going to have lunch?

K: No, we're going to have lunch at a restaurant within walking distance of the White House. The car should pick you up at the restaurant, Sans Souci.

G: At 2:30 or 2:15?

K: Yes. I may go with the Vice President on Saturday.

G: But he was sending the plane just for you.

K: That's right.

G: So you may not use it?

K: No, in all probability I will.

G: Okay, but if you have the chance to use the other I would.

K: I am going to make up my mind on that/.

G: Okay, think it out real well. . . . . . . I will call you tomorrow morning and let you know whether Jane can make it at 12:30 or 1:00.

K: Okay, come to my office about half an hour or 15 minutes before we are to have lunch.

By KCLW

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCOM
President/Kissinger
11:10 a.m. 6/11/71

P: On Connally, maybe because of therapy xinx, you and he and I and Flanigan could whack a little on this. I hate to overrule him.

K: That's fine. He is not being overruled.

P: It x says on the chart he is opposed to it.

K: He was opposed to the Ex-Im Bank.

P: I can do it at 2:00 for half an hour. His imput on these things -- we need to know Treasury's position on these loans. 2:00 or 4:00.

K: At 4:00 I have a meeting. 2:00 is fine for me.

P: (Set it up then).

By: KH. NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

John Scali
Mr. Kissinger
12:25 pm, 6/11/71

S: Two things. I assume you are not interested in having anyone provide assistance to Bob Toth on your relationship with Dobrynin.

K: Certainly not. What do you think?

S: Very bad. I will tell him. Number two -- I am growing increasingly concerned on distortions coming out on the POWs.

K: I agree. I think we should shut up.

S: I have something I want to suggest to you. Do you think you would consider a backgrounder?

K: Absolutely not. I think it would call more attention to it.

S: I am getting a lot of words that you have been bawled out by the Vietnamese, why won't you talk to them, etc. I am just talking now about this particular problem.

K: They will say if they give you a deadline - they will say what will you do? We will be glad to talk to Hanoi - not with the press. I think they will run out of steam.

S: I think you should think about it.

K: I will think about it. We will insist that if Hanoi wants to talk we will talk.

S: I understand that. I think you should consider that the newspaper men will be speculating and also other people. I think you should be thinking about what you could say, to keep them off your back.

about

K: What I am thinking is meeting with senior newsmen and talk about negotiating.

By KML

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
The Vice President
Mr. Kissinger
1:20 pm, 6/11/71

VP: I just had a call from Gerry Ford who made a request of me. Apparently the President has asked Congressman Kemp to act as a counter to McCloskey and go to Vietnam on the drug problem. Ford asked me if we could include him on the South Korean thing: I told him I did not know but would check with you.

K: And then he would peal off from you?

VP: Yes.

K: Let me think about it. I would think we would just as soon not have him do it.

VP: Well, with Gerry, I don't want to alienate him.

K: I will call him and in that case you are out of it completely.

VP: Okay, fine.

K: I may come out with you on the plane tomorrow.

VP: Good Henry.

mlh

TELECON

Kissinger/Mosbacher

6/11/71 - 1:30 pm

By KHL

NARA, Date 5/12/04

M: I go away for a few days and my wife is compromised all over the place.

K: Well, you are lucky it wasn't worse.

M: Yes, it might have been Kissinger instead of Sinatra.

K: Yes.

M: It's terrible what you have done. She had a good time and she is now spoiled for me.

K: I enjoyed having her with us. She had such a good time in White Plains.

M: Incidentally, that's why I called you, Henry. We were thinking about going up after the wedding and I wanted to know if you wanted to go up?

K: I don't think I can do it this weekend, but maybe next weekend. You really have a peaceful, lovely place there and ...

M: Yes, somebody said to me so long ago, "What the hell are you doing down here?"

K: Frankly, that's what I thought.

M: Pat likes it. ...

K: You hold on there. If there is a second term we have some other things in mind.

M: That's a long way off. . . . We have a lot of bright, good young people. We might use the fellow ...

K: They are sending him off to Central America.

M: What happened?

K: I don't know. No, I think you should hang onto this job until some time next year until you can see what's happening.

OCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KCL- NARA, Date 5/12/04

M: I thought you were a friend.

K: I am a friend; not only a friend, but an admirer.

M: I am told that there is only one thing worse than working for me and that is to work for Kissinger.

K: As long as you realize that you are right.

M: I had an interesting trip.

K: I didn't know you were going as a delegate. It was a good thing to do.

M: I think it was. I think particularly so because it was an opportunity to have a little broader experience and I am glad I had it. I can imagine that some of these moves in and out can get a bit wearing on your . . .

K: Yes

M: You are inviting her (Mrs. Mosbacher) to a party on the 29th. Does that mean I am invited, too?

K: Of course, are you coming?

M: Yes . . .

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger
1:45 p. m. 6/11/71

H: What's the 2:00 meeting with the President?

K: Flanigan, Connally, and me. I have nothing to discuss. Loans.

H: He thinks there's a meeting. You have set it up?

K: Yeah.

H: You didn't tell anyone in the scheduling office. It might be nice to know what's happening.

K: That was a slip-up. Sorry.

H: He doesn't want Flanigan there. Whoever called to say he should be there, should tell him there's some difficulty and he shouldn't come.

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM
Frank Sinatra/Kissinger

5:05 p.m.

6/11/71

S: The Gosdens are staying at the Madison. Coming back to L. A. on Sunday. thought you might be able to take them. Coming Sunday?

K: I won't know until the morning.

S: I will be here until 8:00 my time and then the Beverley Hills. No. 213/278- You call them and make arrangements.

K: I will call you one place or the other. I don't want to bug you.

S: You're not bugging me. It will be done quicker if we deal together. Just give me a holler.

K: I am having lunch with Freeman tomorrow. How long is the trip from here to L. A.?

S: 4 hours and 40 mins.

K: Then I can set the departure time.

S: Tell him you will pick him up or go to Haines Air.

K: I will probably come out Sunday morning. The VP can duck out from the wedding easier then I. I will take another reading in the morning and decide.

S: One final point. How many will come with you to the theater?

K: I'll be alone.

S: Two security men?

K: Right.

S: We have 10 seats for the security people -- yours and VP's. Malatesta will contact you and pick you up on the way downtown.

K: Fine. I will go for half an hour to the other show and then walk across and come in at that entrance and stay for the second show.

S: I will arrange for the envelope with the 3 tickets for the second performance to be left at your hotel.

K: At the Beverley Hills hotel. That's great.

By KHC

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Secretary Laird
6/11/71 5:07 p.m.

L: One or two things that I thought I ought to check with you. At the insista of some of our colleagues in the public affairs arena while I was gove they urged this POW visit -- the chairman of the committee is General Hughes.

K: What visit?

L: To make visits all over the United States to these POWs. I send a memo over saying that it was a mistake, but they indicated that the President wanted it done.

K: Can't you delay it a bit?

L: They have sent out the word. It's Herb Klein's operation along with Hughes. All the relatives will come in to see them. I don't think it's a big winner at this time for us.

K: I know it. Don't you ever call me with any good news?

L: Sometimes I do Henry. Another thing, on the command structure change I sent over a memo. I don't want to beed or die on SOUTHCOM. I don't think we should wait on the SOUTHCOM thing.

K: Okay.

L: Another thing, I think we have got to have a good man in NATO.

K: I agree. It's essential. The President, for your information, was thinking of Packard for that if he is determined to leave.

L: Well, he has agreed to stay for a few more months.

K: We want him to stay; don't misunderstand.

LK: I think you have got to have someone who is sympathetic to the Adminis all the way. Our Ambassador in Germany is doing an outstanding job.

K: Superb. Do you think we should move him to NATO?

L: I think we should give some thought to it.

K: Isn't he worth more in Germany. We can't let him go till Berlin is settled.

L: I agree. Then we've got Farland.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Secretary Laird

6/11/71 5:07 p.m. page 2

K: He is good and he's our man.

L: You bet he is.

K: Another good one is Nitze.

L: Yes but he should stay with the SALT thing. Smith needs Paul. Some of the lower guys are leaking about the two-side Safeguard plan. That shouldn't get out on the Hill.

K: Jesus no.

L: I think guys like Rush and Farland shouldn't be overlooked.

K: Farland the President could be sold on. Rush I would like if we can get Berlin moving.

L: Rush is great. Even Bob Hill is strong.

K: But he doesn't want it. He wants to leave Spain for personal reasons.

L: I know it.

K: What do you think of Rumsfeld?

L: I like him. I think he is a hell of a good guy. We'd have to work with him hasn't been around the Hill. But I think he could do it. He's a fine guy. He wants to go; wants to do something else. I don't know what the problem is but he wants to do something else.

K: I want to go too but does anyone care about that?

L: You can't go now.

K: I am joking; you and I will go togger.

L: I think in these jobs it's better to get new people in after three or four yea

K: One thing, the President wants to turn off the Taiwan visit.

L: How can we do that? State has made all the arrangements.

K: Shall we do it for you?

TELECON
Secretary Laird

6/11/71 5:07 p.m. page 3

By: KML

NARA, Date: 5/12/04

L: My problem is the invitation was accepted about six months ago.

K: We don't object to your going later. Let me talk to you about some
of what the problem is -- I can't do it over the phone.

L: Maybe we ought to ask the Ambassador how he suggests turning it off.

K: Right.

L: Can we ask him? ... Korean Defense Ministers meeting.

K: Let me discuss that with Marshall Green first.

L: They'd make a big thing out of the fact that we cancelled this. Find out
how the tone can be set. They'll think it is a kick in the face. I was going to
look at the new storage facilities for our weapons. The Defense Minister was
over half a year ago and this was to be an exchange, and I said I'd drop by
when I came to the Korean Defense Ministers meeting.

K: Let me talk to Marshall Green and I'll call you back.

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Bryce Harlow

6/11/71 5:30 p.m.

H: You are nice to keep calling me back.

K: It's always a privilege to deal with a man of stature, small stature but stature nevertheless.

H: I would like to borrow about eight minutes of your time.

K: When?

H: Whenever you can spare it.

K: Tomorrow morning?

H: Okay. I would like to talk more about this trip to you. I have to make a decision on it and I think I had better talk with you. And it is the most important thing you have to think about.

K: That is true. Okay. 9:45?

H: 9:45 tomorrow. I'll be there, happily there and very proudly there to see you.

K: But don't leak it to the newspapers.

By KHC

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

5:35 p.m.

6/11/71

K: Meglomaniac that I am we don't want you on the phone first. I keep trying to teach my girls.

L: Don't ever worry about that.

K: I will have a recommendation for you on Taiwan in a day or so.

L: I think the Ambassador should handle that quietly. Chiang Kai-shek has seen me in the country.

K: It's not a good time right now.

L: Don't commit me to do it. I don't want to go to China in ____.

K: You are going to be in Face the Nation on Sunday. The President is very goosy about and of combat given any more of a fillip. If you could dodge that question. He has something particular in mind on that that I will talk with you about next week.

L: I was going to say it's not in the Defense report and we are not going into it.

K: When we have something to announce, we will. Itx At the end of phase one and no guessing game. They will please the President.

L: It will be on the POW thing.

K: That's the second thing. We don't want a position with the POWs against a deadline. I think we should take the position that we are not negotiating publicly with Clifford and we will not get into a reasonable deadline. They know how to talk with us.

L: I want to take Clifford on.

K: Oh, sure.

L: I have some quotes of his when he was here that I would like to throw back at him.

K: I saw LBJ last night at a dinner. ____ asked if we weren't hard on Clifflc and he said hard? He went out to Burning Tree after his statement and the President had to clean up the mess. They know how to talk with us. On what grounds will you take him on?

By KML

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger

5:35 p.m. 6/11/71

-2-

L: The fact that he held job for 11 months with no plan and when President can
in he had a plan. The plan is going forward. He had an opportunity to make
recommendations and provide a program and compliment (?) negotiations and di

K: And in foreign affairs I remember things he didn't do.

L: He also said maintain airpower in VN for an indefinite period of time.

K: Just so you don't get into withdrawal.

L: These stories about Bunker coming here to talk about withdrawals. I am
seeing him Tues.

K: We all are.

L: But I don't plan to talk on withdrawals. I have never put a target date on withdrawals. And I won't Sunday.

K: Tyat will be good. I will be watching it with interest.