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5. The Problem of Conjecture of Foreign Policy

a. When decision can be most decisive policymaker cannot be certain of the significance of events. By the time he is certain the scope for decision will be substantially reduced.

## II. The Impact of Domestic Structure

It determines:

a. The type of person who achieves eminence

b. The style of policy

c. How actions of other states are interpreted

d. How policy is decided
These aspects will be discussed in turn.

### III. Type of Leadership

Discussion of the qualities of leadership in Western, Socialist and New Countries (recognizing intermediary gradations.)

Conservative, Bureaucratic and revolutionary leaders--impact of their interaction on international stability specifically:

a. What experiences form them?

b. What criteria of reasonableness do they apply?
--internally-externally

c. What defines their legitimacy? Internally-externally.

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[y]

#### IV. The Style of Policy

Prophetic and political foreign policies: inspiration versus organization; concern with insight or with equilibrium.

Examples of prophetic foreign policies

Examples of foreign policies geared towards equilibrium.

#### V. How Actions of Other States are Interpreted?

Defensive and precautionary foreign policy reconsidered. What defines a threat? Extreme notions of defensive policy grew indistinguishable from aggressive policies.

The problem of "Absolute" Security.

— Stoknitz: Polity

The problem of the need for a permanent enemy--the conception of threat as a means of achieving identity.

#### VI. How is the Decision Arrived at?

Relationship of the internal structure of government to the problem with which it is supposed to deal.

Does the structure bring the leaders to think naturally about problems of greatest concern? Or is the structure an obstacle, that is, are the problems it generates irrelevant? (Examples)

Capacity for taking a range of decisions.

Capacity and scope of improvisation.

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Cyj

## VII. Factors Shaping Domestic Structure (in no order of priority)

1. Environment

2. Values

3. History

These factors are not clearly distinguishable because at some point in a society's development they begin to interact.

Separation here is for analytic purposes.

1. **Environment** - Pressures of environment can be so great as to subsume all other considerations: Sparta, Prussia, Israel.

But for most societies the range of choice is wider. Which option is selected depends importantly on society's values.

2. **Values** - Domestic Legitimacy determines amount of resources devoted to national effort.

Divine right of kings

Democracy

Totalitarianism

Charismatic Leadership

Determine also the extent to which a Society wishes to change its environment to make it consistent with its values.

Relationship between legitimacy, security and equilibrium.

III - 4

a respectful hearing. But what exactly does a "greater voice" entail?
A veto over all our foreign policy? A veto over SAC plans? What happens
when views differ or if interests do not coincide? These questions involve
both a technical and a political component.

On the technical level, the effectiveness of consultation depends
on the competence of the participating parties. Though in our own
bureaucracy, many departments have the right to offer their views, a
much smaller number carry actual weight. Since the weight given to advice
is proportionate to the competence it reflects, we may well ask whether in
the long run our allies could consult effectively while we possess virtually
all the technical knowledge and physical control of nuclear weapons. One
suspects that if the alliance is to remain politically vital, its require-
ments will be much broader than a technical consideration of strategy.

It is likely that the concerns expressed about the absence of joint
strategic planning are the symptom and not the cause of many allied tensions.
If the alliance cannot develop procedures for a common diplomacy or at
least agree upon a prescribed range of divergence, it would seem contradictory
to insist on unitary strategic control. It should not shock us to see countries
reluctant to entrust their survival to an ally, when NATO has not even managed
to develop a common trade policy toward Communist-bloc countries. Harsh
disagreements over such issues as Suez, the Congo, negotiating tactics over
Berlin, or the defense of South Arabia demonstrate that differences in the
Alliance are neither strange nor new. At present we see the United States in

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the curious position of staking great prestige on the NATO Multilateral Force and a system of unitary strategic control, while matters so critical as East-West negotiations or the war in Southeast Asia are dealt with more or less unilaterally.

A reexamination of priorities seems in order. More emphasis should be given to common policies in those areas where interests coincide and less to essentially to technical remedies as magic cure-alls. In this process, it may be important to ask how much centralization is in fact desirable in a system of strategy and diplomacy. Is it more vital in the long run to construct a unitary Atlantic system or one that permits some autonomy? The value of united action on many issues--particularly East-West relations--is evident. In other cases, some degree of flexibility may be desirable. If over the next decades the United States finds itself increasingly engaged in the Far East and in Latin America, our European allies may not perceive their vital interest to be at stake in these areas. Even if President de Gaulle's methods of diplomacy have been original, his views on this subject are far from unique in Europe.

Atlantic policy, if centralized, might tend to be reduced to the lowest common denominator and permit the Soviets to use our global involvements to blackmail Europe. Given the European lack of interest in some of these world wide issues, this could strain the alliance beyond the breaking point.

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But, on the other hand, if Europe retains some capacity for independent
action in the military and political sphere, this could reduce the
temptation for Soviet adventures even if it gave us no greater support
from the Alliance in non-European areas. To state the proposition more
positively, a structure which allowed us to coordinate a variety of approaches
towards the new nations could reinvigorate Western policies, the self-
confidence of our allies and the long-term vitality of the alliance.
Paradoxically, the unity of the Atlantic area can be encouraged by a
structure which, in granting reasonable autonomy, reduces the desire for
it.

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[y]

(a) Safety indicators - Powers with lower boiling point and more sophisticated assessment of equilibrium

- "World War II - Danzig - World War I - Belgium
DEFENSIVE OF
Precautionary policy - Essence is precisely to prevent

threat from becoming unambiguous.

Similar toester structures

(b) "Normalcy" of Peace reflected legitimate order, i.e.
order in which maintenance of system seemed more
important than any disputes within it.

But we live in a revolutionary period.

1. International upheaval - emergence of Germany in 1870; Emergence of many new states after 1945. Not only intrinsic problem, but also difficulty of obtaining agreed interpretation of significance.

The wider the international system, the more irrelevant
tensions in part of it may become to the whole - but also
the harder they may be to resolve on a general basis.

2. Technological upheavals - speed and destructiveness of weapons.

Increments of destructiveness

Industrial Potential

3. Geography: different importance of time and distance.
Shift of balance through developments within territory of
sovereign state - conquest no longer so essential.

4. Population pressures

We are living through a period where all the environmental
factors are changing simultaneously.

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[y]

a. International relations - world wide;
   Classical History; medieval history, etc.

b. Rapidity of transmitting ideas.

c. Tremendous destructiveness of weapons

d. Foreign policy no longer task of elite

e. Speed of making decisions - When diplomatic notes were in transit for weeks, etc.

f. Change in values (or expectations) of major areas.

When reality clashes with our expectation of it ambivalence is inevitable consequence.

United States torn between applying its attitude for peaceful relations or its remedy for aggression. Has oscillated between con-ciliation and intransigeance, between negotiating as if all problems were soluble and could be resolved by process of negotiation independent of any of the pressures brought to bear and insisting that negotiations were inherently futile.

Have had difficulty in balancing capability vs. intention
Great Britain's thermonuclear capability.

When we have relied on negotiations we have had tendency to
Soviet
interpret intentions most favorably. As if we could not
negotiate with Soviets against background of recognized hostility.
This is a symptom of our desire to believe in stability.

Plethora of statements of basic change in Soviet
policy and society

Been vulnerable to peaceful coexistence

11.

Alliance protects against capability

Soviets conduct policy on basis of capability. Absolute security for one side means absolute insecurity for all others.

Statesman can always escape his dilemmas by lowering his sights. Temptation to consider intentions as *fixed* -- unaffected by our actions.

Appearances always seem reasonable to their contemporaries.

French alliances

British Labour Party in the 30's

United States ambivalent

Torn between applying remedy for peace and remedy for aggression.

Negotiation

When fact of negotiation becomes end in itself diplomatic process becomes sterile.

Sliding now into conference where insistence on agenda and preparation is considered act of intransigeance.

Flexibility, elasticity shibboleths.

Consequences of failure: Disengagement, weapons test.

In foreign policy good intentions are no guarantee of success.

Two kinds of diplomacy

Legitimate to formulate
to perpetuate
to persuade

Therefore pattern of action appropriate to legitimate period may no longer apply.

Legitimate period tends to take protestations at face value.

Consider revolutionary misunderstood legitimacy.

The more stable the society, the more difficulty it will have in understanding revolutionary challenge. Consider it caused by specific grievance or particular issue.

Seek to integrate it into what has come to seem familiar.

Difficulty of knowing that the revolutionary is in fact revolutionary.

12.

Revolutionary period:

Negotiable -- Programmatic

Maximum -- Minimum

Substantive -- Symbolic

But whatever the mode of diplomacy, its ultimate success
depends on the nature of statesmanship.

Scholarship of social determinism has given rise to the notion
of "automatic" nature of statesmanship.

But all reliance on automatic nature of statesmanship does is
to produce inflexibility and often mediocrity.

Task of statesman

1. Assessment of relation of force

If each statesman assessed similarly policy could be
conducted by IBM machines. Intangible qualities of
will and resolution and subtlety.

2. Devise means for attaining them.

One has only to see different interpretations of force
within _each_ governmental machine to see the complexity
of this.

3. Find formula to get agreement of other powers

4. Get domestic agreement.

bureaucracy.

risks -- opportunities

Great conceptions -- great men always opposed by
"expert." What is an "expert?"

people -- prophet