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March 16, 1965

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Six Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Professor Kissinger:

I have just finished reading your article on de Gaulle and I thought I would write to thank you and HARPER'S for it. It was particularly interesting to me in view of our luncheon discussion where we touched on the idea of strong personal leadership (Bismarck) and its political meaning.

I was particularly struck by the title, "The Illusionist," because I had just finished reading the following passage on illusion in Koestler's REFLECTIONS ON HANGING, a polemic on capital punishment:

> "My scientific education tells me the outcome is predetermined by my past, and that what I experience as my 'free choice' is an illusion. . . but the point is, that even if it is an illusion, it is a useful and necessary illusion for the function of both the individual and society."

I thought there was great consistency in the article with your view of how you would approach your textbook. Great insight is shown in how leaders and evolving policy pull or push a country. A variety of theories certainly are manifested in your writing. You have provided analysis and raised questions--all without prejudging.

The times when I thought you were speaking very much for yourself were these: On page 73 you say, "Grandeur is not simply physical power, but strength reinforced by moral purpose." A question that has always puzzled me is, granted the force and meaning of personal morality, can there be such a thing as public or national morality? On page 77 you say, "Great men build truly only if they remember their achievement must be preserved by the less gifted individuals who are likely to follow them." Hans Kohn wrote a fine little book called THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Professor Henry A. Kissinger

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March 16, 1965

in which he traced what happened to great philosophical ideas when
sifted through the minds of less gifted men and put into action.
Your statement also raises two fundamental problems of responsible
leadership--continuity of leadership and delegation of authority.

In closing I am reminded of a comment made by a visiting French
student who was staying at our home. Naturally, we asked him what
he thought of de Gaulle. He said that to a man the students he
knew despised his ideas, laughed at his policy, but when he was in
view in a parade or public affair of any kind and they saw him,
they felt filled with all that was French in them.

I got a great deal from your article. I am curious to know how many
drafts were necessary for such a short, yet meaty piece of writing.

EDG:ccc
cc: C. Greene
    C. V. Pickering, Jr.
    R. Witty
    P. Martin
    F. Cushing

[LC]

The Library of Congress has requested Harper's Magazine to donate for its archives the original manuscripts or typescripts of material appearing in its pages, for the future use of students and historians.

We should like to hold the script recently purchased from you for a year or so after publication and then include it in the donation.

Would you please indicate on the attached postal card what your preference is, and return the card for our records?

Sincerely,
The Editors
HARPER'S MAGAZINE

[LC]

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION

A branch of the United Nations Student Association

President: Prof. Sir Denis Brogan Sen.Treasurer: E.Lauterpacht, M.A.

15 Bridge Street, Cambridge
Tel. 55259

February 6th 1965

Henry A.Kissinger
104 Fletcher Road
Beimont
Massachusetts
U.S.A.

Dear Sir,

CUUNA plans to edit a national magazine this year, which we hope
will prove a forum for international trends in political and cultural thought.
A circular is enclosed which sets out the lines on which the magazine is
being prepared in more detail.

We would be very interested in featuring an article by you in our
magazine. We have read with great interest your books on "Nuclear weapons
& foreign policy" and "The necessity for choice". We wondered whether you
could send us an article on the topic of nuclear policy and its relation-
ship to world peace. The article, which if possible, should not exceed
3,000 words, could be sent in by October.

Hoping to hear from you soon, we remain,

P.S. If you find no time to write something new, you may wish to send an
article which you have written or may presently write to a non-British
publication.

[L.C.]

A branch of the United Nations Student Association
President: Prof. Sir Denis Brogan Sen.Treasurer: E. Lauterpacht, M.A.

FENESTRA

The first issue of "FENESTRA" will appear next October. It is being produced by an international team of Cambridge undergraduates with the advice and support of those senior members of the University who form the Committee. This Committee now comprises Professor Sir Denis Brogan, Professor Edward Shils, Mr Peter Laslet, Mr Raymond Williams, and Dr. D. W. Bowett as Senior Treasurer.

We consider the aim of "FENESTRA" to be a vital one; one that is not fulfilled by any contemporary periodical. It will attempt to break down the insular attitudes which prevail in this country as regards international affairs.

The magazine's circulation will, of course, be in the United Kingdom. We are, however, establishing contacts with universities and organisations with the prospect of making its appeal more international.

To achieve this, "FENESTRA" will present informed intellectual opinion on a wide variety of political and cultural topics and will follow a completely independent line of thought. Its editorial policy is to maintain a consistently high standard of writing; this we hope will be apparent from its first few issues. Contributors on African politics and the emergence of an independent culture include Jahnheinz Jahn, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Aime Cesaire, Christopher Okigbo and J.P. Clark. This section will also include reproductions of African art. A section on Non-Violence will include contributions from Arne Naess, Martin Luther King, and Joseph Kasavubu. John Wain, Peter Weiss, Pierre Emmanuel, Chinua Achebe and others, will review their responsibility reflected in giving their work a political tendency, and Sven Stolpe and Rolf Hochhuth will discuss "Beware the Man whose God is in Heaven" with particular relevance to Dag Hammarskjöld, with extracts of his literary works. Further we hope to present articles by Romano Guardini, Lord Caradon, Raymond Aron, Zbigniew Brezezinski, Hans Magnus Ezenberger, Ralf Dahrendorf and Bernard Kops. Every issue will also contain book reviews, film and theatre criticism and a general comment. Articles and sections on China, Japan, peace research, world government, co-existence, the Iron Curtain countries and political satire are being prepared. Russian writers and thinkers will be presented; who they will be is largely a question of the cultural policies being carried out by their government at the time.

"FENESTRA", which is to be published by Cambridge University United Nations Association, will appear three times a year: October, January, and May; first time in October. It will be printed in 10,000 copies, 80 pages long, and sold in universities, schools and newsagents. It will cost approximately 3/6. A good relationship with the Congress for Cultural Freedom, Encounter, Forum Service and many political and cultural organisations, has been set up.

There is little doubt that "FENESTRA", if it fulfills its purposes, will play an important role in cultural and political fields. We hope the enthusiasm the project has so far been met with is an indication of its potential success on the market and with the critics.

Foreign Publications Service

ABBY BUILDING, NO. 3 N. PERRY STREET, ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 20850

Telephone: GArden 4-7766

Cable: FOREIGNPUB, Rockville, Maryland

MRS. MARJORIE E. TOBEY

Foreign Representatives of Kaigai Hyoron Sha, Tokyo, Japan

February 10, 1965

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I have received a letter from Kaigai Hyoron Sha, the Japanese firm which I represent in the United States and Europe, expressing great interest in your forthcoming article DE GAULLE'S TRAGIC VICTORY which is scheduled to appear soon in *Harper's*.

Kaigai Hyoron Sha feel that there would be a good opportunity of placing the translation rights to this article with a Japanese magazine and also have requested that permission be given to carry it in their Overseas Commentary Service, a description of which is enclosed. The Overseas Commentary Service, as you will notice, serves only the prefectural presses and does not encroach upon the metropolitan market of Tokyo. Their standard fee is $20.00 less the 15% Japanese tax, or a net of $17.00. We do hope you will be able to grant permission for the Overseas Commentary Service to carry your article, and also permission for Kaigai Hyoron Sha to place the translation rights with a prominent Japanese magazine if they find an interested publisher. We would, of course, consult you about the fee.

We are writing to Miss Verne Moberg of *Harper's* in this same mail to notify her of our interest in your article. Normally, *Harper's* buys only first North American rights and is therefore interested only in a proper acknowledgment to *Harper's*, and a reprint of the article as it appears in the foreign language.

We look forward to hearing from you and would like to inquire if there is any possibility of obtaining a copy of the manuscript for this article so that the interest of Japanese publishers would be enhanced

[IC]

Foreign Publications Service

Telephone: GAarden 4-7766

MRS. MARJORIE E. TOBEY

KAIGAI HYORON TSUSHIN
(Overseas Commentary Service)

The Overseas Commentary Service is a press service started by Kaigai Hyoron Sha in 1960. Its initial efforts were to attract the market comprised of the provincial presses of Japan. These newspapers, outside the metropolitan area of Tokyo, have no foreign correspondents or translation pools. Therefore, the conception of a press service carrying 5 articles each week, in Japanese, from prominent sources throughout the world, was designed to make available to the provincial presses material comparable to that carried by the large daily newspapers in Tokyo. Its success has been marked by the fact that its articles have attracted considerable attention throughout Japan and also in Korea and Okinawa.

In order to reach a sound financial basis as soon as possible, the Overseas Commentary Service is now accepting subscribers from the following areas:

1. Provincial presses of Japan

2. Private subscribers who may use the material for research and information but not for reprinting. (Some of these are National Diet Library, Japan Trade Union Congress, Japan Broadcasting Corporation, and the Foreign Affairs Research Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party.)

3. Hapdong News Agency in Korea which distributes the articles to its subscribers in Korea

4. Okinawa

5. Japan Times - (English-Language newspaper in Tokyo)

Kaigai Hyoron Sha has found that the news commentators on radio and TV stations have become interested in the Overseas Commentary Service and their reference to the articles and quotations from articles have helped to build up the subscriptions to the service.

Thus, with the expansion of the press service into the new areas listed above, plus the free advertising which comes about as the result of the interest of the news commentators, Kaigai Hyoron Tsushin (Overseas Commentary Service) has a bright future.

H.A.Kissinger

1/6/65

# The Illusionist: Reflections on de Gaulle

In recent years the Atlantic Alliance has been adjusting its internal arrangements through an increasingly acrimonious public debate. The chief protagonists have been France and the United States. French spokesmen have charged the United States with using high-sounding phrases such as Atlantic community to maintain its hegemony in the Alliance. Leading Americans have dismissed French policy as reflecting the illusion of grandeur of a bitter old man who cannot forget past slights, real or fancied.

The almost absurd caricature of each other's views reflects above all the different perspective from which the United States and France have had to view contemporary affairs. Historically aloof and geographically isolated, the United States has treated coalition diplomacy in terms of coordinating the efforts of many geographically remote countries. Roles are assigned on the basis of a division of labor. Allies are supposed to find fulfillment as part of a Grand Design.

France's problem is more complex. A society which has undergone severe shocks cannot find fulfillment in the Grand Design of others. Before it can decide what it wishes to become, it has to rediscover what it is. Far from being based on an excessive estimate of France's strength, de Gaulle's policy reflects, above all, a deep awareness of the suffering of his country over the span of more than a generation.

Few countries have experienced the travail of France since it lost much of its young generation in World War I. Victorious in 1918, France knew better than any of its allies how close to defeat it had been. Inchoately, the survivors of that catastrophe realized that France could

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not stand another trial like the one just surmounted. Deprived of its
youth, fearful of its defeated antagonist, feeling misunderstood by its
allies, France experienced the inter-war period as an almost uninterrupted
succession of frustrations. Domestically, the Third Republic witnessed
mounting governmental instability. In foreign policy France was torn
between its premonitions and its sense of impotence. Nothing could have
expressed France's feeling of insecurity better than the fact that France
began to build the Maginot Line at a moment when its army was the largest
in Europe and Germany's was limited by treaty to 100,000 men. What made
the action all the more poignant was that the Treaty of Versailles had
specifically prohibited Germany from stationing military forces in the
Rhineland--the territory which had to be crossed before an attack on France
could be launched. In other words, at the height of its victory France
felt so unsure of itself that it did not think itself able to prevent a
flagrant breach of the peace treaty by its disarmed enemy and constructed
a defensive line inside its borders for that contingency.

As if paralyzed by seeing her fears come true, France stood by
while Germany rearmed and proceeded to abrogate one after another of the
restrictions put on it by the Treaty of Versailles. The French collapse
of 1940 was as much moral as military. Even though France emerged among
the victors of World War II, its leaders were aware, despite all rhetoric
and perhaps because of it, that France had been saved largely through the
efforts of others.

Once more, peace brought no respite. Instead, the Fourth Republic
experienced the same governmental instability as the Third, and in addition
it had to go through the searing process of decolonization. Humiliated in

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1940, the French army had barely been reconstituted when it was obliged to
engage in nearly two decades of frustrating colonial wars each of which
ended in defeat.

This malaise must be understood as the essential background for
President de Gaulle's policy. A certain egocentricity on our part causes us to
see many of de Gaulle's actions as being primarily motivated by a desire to annoy
or to humiliate us. In fact, the central concern of de Gaulle is likely to be quite
different. For the greater part of his career, he has had to be an illusionist.
In the face of all evidence to the contrary, he has striven to restore France's
greatness by his passionate belief in it. At first he was the leader
of an insignificant faction of Frenchmen casting their lot with the Allies.
His primary task, as he saw it, was to re-establish the identity and the
integrity of France. Churchill and Roosevelt could concentrate on the
tangible goal of military victory. To De Gaulle, the war had an intangible
purpose. Victory was empty if it did not also restore the position, indeed the
soul, of France. Churchill and Roosevelt understandably considered this quest
peripheral to their central objective and treated De Gaulle's insistence as
an irritating interruption of more important problems.

The same conflict between the pragmatic and the intangible which
started during the war has continued to this day. The United States, blessed
with stable government, its sense of identity enhanced by its war experience,
could pursue single-mindedly whatever technical schemes its bureaucracy
thought up at any given moment. To de Gaulle, governing a country wracked
by a generation of conflict and decades of frustration, the mode of reaching
a goal has been as important as the objective itself. He judges the merit
of a policy not only by technical criteria but also by its contribution to

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Though de Gaulle often acts as if opposition to United States policy were a goal in itself, his deeper objective is pedagogical: to teach his people and perhaps his Continent attitudes of independence and self-reliance. The "folie de grandeur" of which de Gaulle is so often accused is a peculiar kind, for it is tied to a profound awareness of the suffering and disappointments of his country. In 1960 this caused him to speak as follows: "Once upon a time there was an old country all hemmed in by habits and circumspection. At one time the richest, the mightiest people among those in the center of the world stage, after great misfortunes it came, as it were, to withdraw within itself. While other people were growing around it, it remained immobile."

De Gaulle has chosen to revitalize France by an act of faith powerful enough to override a seemingly contrary reality. The effort to achieve greatness required that France regain--wherever possible--the right of independent decision. France could agree with the decisions of others: but it had to make clear that this represented a voluntary act and not the abdication of the impotent.

Consequently, the dispute between France and the United States centers, in part, around the philosophical issue of how nations cooperate. Washington, basing its policy on a division of labor, relies on consultation as the principal means for solving disagreements. In its view influence is proportionate to a nation's contribution to a common effort somewhat like share-owning in a stock company. Paris insists that influence depends not only on the existence of consultative machinery but also on what options are available in case of disagreement. In its view each ally must--at least theoretically--be able to act autonomously.

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Where United States spokesmen stress the concept of partnership, de Gaulle tends to emphasize the idea of equilibrium. Many United States officials assert that all disputes can be settled by talking things over in a "community spirit." To de Gaulle, sound relationships depend less on a personal attitude than on a balance of pressures and an understanding of historical trends. A great leader is not so much clever as lucid and clear-sighted. Grandeur is not simply physical power but strength reinforced by moral purpose. Nor does competition inevitably involve physical conflict.

On the contrary, a wise assessment of mutual interests should produce harmony: "Yes, international life, like life in general, is a battle.

The battle which our country is waging tends to unite and not to divide, to honor and not to debase, to liberate and not to dominate. Thus it is faithful to its mission, which always was and which remains human and universal."

## Historical Humility

De Gaulle's nationalism is in the tradition of Mazzini, who thought that nations which achieved their independence would respect the dignity of others. His diplomacy is in the style of Bismarck, who strove ruthlessly to achieve what he considered Prussia's rightful place but who then tried to preserve the new equilibrium through prudence, restraint and moderation. His policy clashes with ours because he is operating in a different time-frame.

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The United States as the leader of the Alliance inevitably concentrates on solving immediate problems. De Gaulle is more concerned with the period ten or fifteen years hence. Precisely because he is sure that the United States will protect Europe in the immediate future, he wants to use this respite to establish insurance for the far future. He is looking ahead to a time when present leaders will have disappeared and American attention may be focused on other continents.

Certainly, no one could have predicted at the beginning of any decade of this century what the world would look like at its end. De Gaulle need not be able to describe the circumstances which might arise when the convictions of existing leaders are no longer relevant in order to wish to reserve some measure of control over the destiny of his country or his continent. However arrogant his style, de Gaulle's approach to history is relatively humble. He is the leader of a country grown cautious by many enthusiasms shattered; turned sceptical from many dreams proved fragile; a country to which the unforeseen is the most elemental fact of history. American leaders while personally humble are much more confident that they can chart the future. What cannot be described concretely has little reality for them. Involved, ultimately, are differing conceptions of truth. The United States, with its technical, pragmatic approach, often has analytical truth on its side. De Gaulle, with his consciousness of the trials of France for the past generation, is frequently closer to the historical truth.

Though most American leaders tend to ascribe Allied tensions to the obstinancy of one man, present disputes are not reminiscent of the impatience some of our leaders felt with Churchill during World War II. Committed

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to assumptions about Soviet good faith and a world-wide system of collective security they were irked by Churchill's attempt to set up some physical safeguards for peace. Churchill's views were then treated with the condescension now reserved for de Gaulle. His interest in the post-war European balance of power were considered short-sighted and a symptom of old-fashioned nationalism. However, a subtler style, the prestige of Great Britain's heroic wartime effort and a common language prevented the conflict from being so explicit. Now as before, in our impatience to realize Grand Designs we are often reluctant to admit that a statesman must concern himself with the worst--and not only the best--foreseeable contingency.

Anonymous, Stateless Committees

Whatever the deeper reasons for the disagreements, de Gaulle's belief in the continued role of the nation-state was bound to come into conflict with the American conviction of its obsolescence. The problem is not that de Gaulle wishes to reactivate Europe's traditional national rivalries as so many of his American critics allege. On the contrary, he affirms the goal of unity for Europe as passionately as his detractors. But where the American/European "integrationists" insist that European unity requires that the role of the nation-state be diminished, de Gaulle argues that unity depends on the vitality of traditional Europe.

Thus de Gaulle's proposals for European unity invariably envisage a confederation of states rather than supranational institutions. In his press conference of September 5, 1960, he called for regular consultation between the European governments, for specialized subordinate agencies and

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for an assembly composed of delegates from the national parliaments. He urged a European referendum "so as to give this launching of Europe the character of popular support and initiative that is indispensable." He has opposed supranational institutions for Europe because as he told a press conference in 1963 such a Europe would be "governed in appearance by anonymous, technocratic, and stateless committees; in other words, a Europe without political reality, without economic drive, without a capacity for defense, and therefore doomed, in the face of the Soviet bloc, to being nothing more than a dependent of that great Western power, which itself had a policy, an economy, and a defense--the United States of America."

At the same time, de Gaulle wants Europe to be responsible for its own defense, whatever its internal organization. He therefore resists organic links between the United States and individual European countries which would tie the defense of Europe to American weapons or American conceptions. In his view, Europe should concert its own policy and then deal with the United States as a unit. This is why de Gaulle has opposed both the Nassau Agreement, which tied the British nuclear program to that of the United States, and the proposed NATO multilateral force. Both programs, in his view, make Europe completely dependent on the United States. Europeans would be lobbyists and not partners. De Gaulle considers such a role demeaning for a great power, and he is convinced that it will destroy the moral substance of the "integrated" partner.

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How to Annoy Your Allies

Few of de Gaulle's policies have so embroiled him with America as his insistence on an autonomous nuclear strike force. He explained his position in 1962 in these words: "The Americans, our allies and our friends, have for a long time, alone, possessed a nuclear arsenal. So long as they alone had such an arsenal and so long as they showed their will to use it immediately if Europe were attacked . . . an attack was beyond all probability . . . It is impossible to overestimate the extent of the service, most fortunately passive, that the Americans at that time, in that way, rendered to the freedom of the world.

Since then the Soviets have also acquired a nuclear arsenal, and that arsenal is powerful enough to endanger the very life of America . . . The new and gigantic fact is there.

Because of these views American spokesmen have lectured de Gaulle on his ignorance of nuclear strategy and ridiculed for excessive pretensions. Actually, de Gaulle's analysis of the situation does not differ radically from Secretary McNamara's. Both agree that the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal confronts the United States with an unprecedented challenge. Both insist that NATO strategy must be adapted to new realities.

They disagree less in their analysis than in the conclusions to be drawn from it. From the point of view of division of labor, the United States considers French resources better spent on conventional forces than on nuclear arms. From the perspective of vindicating France's identity, de Gaulle is not so concerned with the technical aspects of strategy as with the political problem of choice. The

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United States considers central control over nuclear weapons crucial for the contingency of general war; de Gaulle gives priority to France's impact on the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy. Secretary McNamara strives for strategic options; President de Gaulle seeks political ones.

Atlantic Policy and East-West Relations

Differences between France and the United States over the future of Europe have been compounded by disagreements over the scope of Atlantic policy. These date back to 1958 when de Gaulle proposed a global Directorate composed of the United States, Great Britain and France. The United States rejected this with the argument that it could not designate one of its European partners to speak for the others. No attempt was made to explore de Gaulle's reaction to the possibility of a wider forum.

In 1960, de Gaulle made yet another plea for a common Western world-wide policy particularly with respect to the Congo crisis.

When nothing came of these proposals, de Gaulle reverted to his usual, perhaps preferred, tactic of acting unilaterally and trying to force his partners' hand. After 1961, he stopped urging concerted Western action. Instead, he stressed that only a strong Europe would receive a respectful hearing from the United States or the U.S.S.R.

This is not to say that de Gaulle's policy was primarily a reaction to being rebuffed by the United States. Rather, two changes in the international situation caused him to consider American support less crucial and made independent action appear rewarding. When de Gaulle proposed the Directorate, a global showdown seemed possible. The Lebanese crisis had just occurred;

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Soviet intransigence was at its height. This impelled de Gaulle to try
to insure American support in case war proved unavoidable. Since 1961
the Soviet military threat has seemed to recede, and the need for concerted
action has diminished proportionately. Indeed, with the growth of American
involvements in Asia and Latin America, the shoe is now somewhat on the
other foot. It is the United States which presses its European allies
to share its global responsibilities and the Europeans who are reluctant
to assume world-wide risks.

The reduction in the Soviet threat has brought to the surface
sharply conflicting views of East-West relations. As in most other
controversies, each side has accused the other of the same offense: of
planning a settlement, if not at the expense, at least to the exclusion
of the other. In the United States, de Gaulle's comment that Europe extends
from the Atlantic to the Urals is often cited as proof of a thinly veiled
desire to negotiate directly with Moscow. In France, United States bilateral
dealings with the Soviet Union are taken as an indication that the United
States is seeking a separate accommodation with the U.S.S.R.

At times both sides seem primarily concerned with scoring debating
points. De Gaulle's statement that one day Europe would again extend from
the Atlantic to the Urals did not imply a deal with the Soviet Union:
he speaks of "a Europe, no longer split in two by ambitions and ideologies,"
that would again be the "heart of civilization." But the reorganization of
Europe to which he refers is to take place after Communist ideology no longer
dominates in the Soviet Union; that is, when Russia is once more a national,
and not an ideological, state pursuing a policy dictated by its national

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interests. This is the precise eventuality foreseen by four American postwar Administrations as the precondition for a final settlement.

In fact, French and American analyses of Soviet trends are not so different as the controversy sometimes suggests. Both are of the view that at some point the Soviet system will be transformed. Both believe that this transformation will mark the starting point for fruitful negotiations. They disagree not over the fact of evolution but its nature, not over the ultimate desirability of a diplomatic settlement but about who will be the spokesman for the West when it takes place. Above all, they differ about the nature of a stable international order and the role of personalities in relation to it.

The United States tends to believe that peace and stability is the "natural" condition. Crises must, therefore, be caused by personal ill-will rather than by objective conditions. As a result, United States policy toward the Soviet Union has oscillated between two opposite approaches: During periods of tension, the United States assumes that Soviet policy is conducted by highly purposeful, ideologically inspired men operating according to careful, long-range plans. During periods of détente, American leaders have often acted as if a settlement could be achieved by good personal relations with their Communist counterparts. Either approach leads to an avoidance of concreteness. When the Soviets are aggressive, negotiations are believed to be useless, and when they are conciliatory, there is a reluctance to disturb the favorable atmosphere. In either case, American policy statements envisage a world where all conflict has ended and nations live under "the rule of law."

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De Gaulle's view is more historical. Peace to him is not a final
settlement but a new, perhaps more stable, balance of forces. "Now, in
the last analysis and as always, it is only in equilibrium that the world
will find peace." An equilibrium can never be permanent but must be
adjusted in constant struggles. Tension, according to de Gaulle, is not
caused so much by the personal attitudes of individual Communist leaders
as by the dynamics of the system which they represent. To him, Soviet
aggressiveness reflects not a real grievance but internal instability.
"...there is in this uproar of imprecations and demands organized by
the Soviets something so arbitrary and so artificial that one is led to
attribute it either to the premeditated unleashing of frantic ambitions,
or to the desire of drawing attention away from great difficulties:
this second hypothesis seems ... the more plausible to me ..."

To yield to Soviet blackmail would not alleviate internal Soviet
stresses but only supply an incentive for further demands. Thus, during the
Berlin crisis de Gaulle spoke as follows: "... we do not allow ourselves
to be moved by all the tumult, all the flow of invective, of formal notifications,
of threats launched by certain countries against other lands and especially
against ours... We realize only too well that they indulge in virulent
utterances and sensational outbursts in order to lead people astray--within
their own country and outside."

De Gaulle in 1962 rejected the "exploratory" conversations on Berlin
urged by the United States and Britain because: "... so long as the Soviet
Union does not put a stop to its threats and its injunctions and bring about
an actual easing of the international situation, we believe that we have spared
out allies and ourselves the catastrophic retreat, dramatic rupture, or

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tragi-comical engulfment, in which the conference would obviously have ended." And he did not participate in the Geneva disarmament conference, predicting that it would do nothing except present irreconcilable plans.

De Gaulle differs, finally, about the significance of the Sino-Soviet split and about policy toward Communist China. The United States, convinced of the importance of intentions in the conduct of foreign policy, is tempted to back the Communist power which professes the most peaceful goals. De Gaulle, believing that an equilibrium is the only reliable basis for stability, is more concerned with weakening the stronger Communist partner. He is prepared, if necessary, to play off its weaker Communist opponent against it. With its global responsibilites, the United States sees in Communist China an objective threat to its interests. Leading a country primarily concerned with European affairs, de Gaulle, considers a Russia extending its power into the center of Europe as the principal threat. China to him is a distant state which could become useful in diverting Soviet energies. De Gaulle's analysis is far from unique in Europe, even if his methods of implementing it are.

In short, peace to de Gaulle results not from a personal reconciliation but from the establishment of a more stable equilibrium. France and Europe must contribute in bringing about this balance not as the objects of policy but as their author. De Gaulle is thus concerned not only with the fact of negotiations but also with France's role in them. He would object to any settlement which France did not help to formulate--regardless of his opinion of its substance. The major thrust of de Gaulle's policy is to make it impossible

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for the United States to deal with the Soviet Union over the heads of
France and Europe.

The Unassimilable Style

De Gaulle's thought is remarkably consistent. Convinced that
only those capable of assuming responsibility can form meaningful
associations, he can logically affirm his faith in the Atlantic Alliance
while insisting on the identity of Europe and the uniqueness of France.
To de Gaulle, the two notions are complementary--though this may seem
disingenuous or even cynical to many Americans.

President de Gaulle's brutal tactics sometimes give the impression
that a powerful, self-confident France has been a permanent feature of
the post-war landscape. It is almost forgotten that between 1958 and
1962 France was on the verge of civil war three times. So well has
de Gaulle succeeded in his *tour de force* that even his critics act as if
the only problem for Europe were to moderate excesses of French assertiveness.
This notion would have been inconceivable three years ago when it was
expected that freeing Algeria would keep France in turmoil for a decade or
more.

If his critics have shown little compassion for his special
circumstances, de Gaulle has often thwarted his own aims by his abrupt
tactics and his imperious style. Not comfortable with the give and take of
negotiations, he has moved through a series of *faits accomplis* to force his
allies to accept his objectives. A rationalist, he has acted as if his views
were certain to prevail by virtue of their logical necessity and that the

H.A.Kissinger

1/6/65

- 16 -

feelings of other statesmen were, therefore, irrelevant. A profound
believer in historical necessity, he has acted as if the logic of events
would always override the sensibilities of others.

No doubt, this is a heroic posture. But, man is not governed
by reason alone. History may appear inevitable in retrospect; but
it is made by men who cannot always distinguish their emotions from their
analysis. The paradox of de Gaulle's position is that although he claims
to speak for Europe, no substantial following outside of France sees him
as a European statesman. He has alienated many potential supporters by
his excessive rationalism, his unilateral tactics, and his wounding insistence
on intellectual submission to his maxims.

De Gaulle's methods suggest that he will cooperate only if others
accept his unilateral pronouncements. Although France and the United States
seem to agree on the principle of a strong and autonomous Europe, de Gaulle's
tactics give rise to the impression that he desires autonomy, not to enhance
the unity of the West but to be free to pursue policies contradictory, if
not hostile, to those of the United States.

Ironically, de Gaulle has become a symbol on both sides of the
Atlantic of principles contrary to his pronouncements and probably to his
intentions. He has enabled many in Europe not heretofore noted for their
devotion either to European unity or to Atlantic partnership to advocate
some ideal model of either relationship in order to thwart whatever progress
is possible now. By evoking so many memories of authoritarian rule, he has
made it next to impossible to come to grips with the substance of his thought.
A strong Europe was bound to present a challenge to American leadership. But

H.A.Kissinger

1/6/65

- 17 -

by couching this challenge so woundingly, de Gaulle has spurred American
self-righteousness rather than the objective reexamination of Atlantic
relationships which the situation demands.

History will probably demonstrate that de Gaulle's conceptions--
as distinct from his style--were greater than those of most of his critics.
But a statesman must work with the material at hand. If the sweep of his
conceptions exceeds the capacity of his environment to absorb them, he will
fail regardless of the validity of his insights. If his style makes him
unassimilable, it becomes irrelevant whether he is "right" or "wrong."

Though de Gaulle has performed enormous feats in lifting his
country's sights almost by an act of will, there are objective limits
which great and strong-willed statesmanship may extend but cannot change
altogether. De Gaulle's insistence that France and the United States are
equal is true in a moral sense but, if pushed too far, it must bring into the
open a permanent disparity of strength. In any collision the superiority of
American resources is likely to prevail regardless of the validity of the
competing views. By generating so much personal ill will among American
leaders, de Gaulle may rend the fabric of illusion on which his policy
depends. The irony of Franco-American rivalry is that de Gaulle has conceptions
greater than his strength, while United States power has been greater than
its conceptions.

In the meantime, there is something of a Greek tragedy about the
dispute between the United States and France. Each chief actor, following
the laws of his nature, is bringing about consequences quite different from
those intended. Either the "American" or the "French" concept of the Atlantic

H.A.Kissinger

1/6/65

- 18 -

relationship might have succeeded. Competing as they do--with no comprehension of the real intention of the other--they may bring on what each side professes to fear most: a divided, suspicious Europe absorbed once again in working out its ancient rivalries. Tragedy, to many Americans at least, is to find oneself thwarted in what is ardently desired. But there is another and perhaps more poignant tragedy, that of fulfilling one's desires and then finding them empty.

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Vol. 230
No. 1378

Harper's

March
1965

magazine

ARTICLES

51 Against Pornography George P. Elliott

61 The Man Who Put the Rhinestones on Miami
Martin Mayer *drawings by Morris Lapidus*

69 The Illusionist: Why We Misread de Gaulle
Henry A. Kissinger

78 A Brotherly Cruise on the Black Sea George Feifer
*drawings by Joseph Papin*

86 The Good Southern Universities Virginius Dabney

106 How to Help Your Wife Cope with a Hurricane
William R. Benedetto *drawing by Edward Frascino*

133 "Dear Stockholders: Everything Looks Rosy ..."
William H. Dinsmore *cartoon by Perry Barlow*

139 Eating Low on the Hog Alice B. Spalding

FICTION

96 The Watchers Florence Engel Randall *drawings by*
*Reese Brandt*

VERSE

77 Semblances Howard Moss

85 Poems, 1964 C. Day Lewis

DEPARTMENTS

6 Letters *drawing by N. M. Bodecker*

22 The Editor's Easy Chair: The Land of Charming
Anarchists John Fischer *drawings by Burmah Burris*

32 After Hours: Yale's New Treasure House
Alexander Winston *drawing by N. M. Bodecker*

40 Washington Insight: Johnson's Talent Hunt
Joseph Kraft

148 The New Books James M. Gavin, Paul Pickrel, Marion K. Sanders, Leo Steinberg, H. Montgomery Hyde *cartoon by Ed Fisher*

158 Books in Brief Katherine Gauss Jackson

162 Music in the Round Discus

164 Jazz Notes Eric Larrabee

Cover by Janet Halverson

# The Illusionist:
## Why We Misread de Gaulle

by Henry A. Kissinger

*And why his lofty schemes (which sometimes are better than the State Department admits) probably won't work out.*

In recent years the Atlantic Alliance has been adjusting its internal arrangements through an increasingly acrimonious public debate. The chief protagonists have been France and the United States. French spokesmen have charged the United States with using high-sounding phrases such as "Atlantic community" to maintain its hegemony in the Alliance. Leading Americans have dismissed French policy as reflecting the illusion of grandeur of a bitter old man who cannot forget past slights, real or fancied.

The almost absurd caricature of each other's views reflects above all the different positions from which the United States and France have had to view contemporary affairs. Historically aloof and geographically isolated, the United States has treated coalition diplomacy in terms of coordinating the efforts of many geographically remote countries. Roles are assigned on the basis of a division of labor. Allies are supposed to find fulfillment as part of a Grand Design.

Few countries have experienced the travail of France since it lost much of its young generation in World War I. Victorious in 1918, France knew better than any of its allies how close to defeat it had been. Inchoately, the survivors of that catastrophe realized that France could not stand another trial like the one just surmounted. Deprived of its youth, fearful of its defeated antagonist, feeling misunderstood by its allies, France experienced the interwar period as an almost uninterrupted succession of frustrations.

In domestic affairs, the Third Republic witnessed mounting governmental instability. In foreign policy, France was torn between its premonitions and its sense of impotence. Nothing could have expressed France's feeling of insecurity better than the fact that France began to build the Maginot Line at a moment when its army was the largest in Europe and Germany's was limited by treaty to 100,000 men. What made the action all the more poignant was that the Treaty of Versailles had specifically prohibited Germany from stationing military forces in the Rhineland—the territory which had to be crossed before an attack on France could be launched. In other words, at the height of its victory France felt so unsure of itself that it did not think it could prevent a flagrant breach of the peace treaty by its disarmed enemy.

70 WHY WE MISREAD DE GAULLE

Once more, peace brought no respite. Instead, the Fourth Republic experienced the same governmental instability as the Third, and in addition it had to go through the searing process of decolonization. Humiliated in 1940, the French army had barely been reconstituted when it was obliged to engage in nearly two decades of frustrating colonial wars each of which ended in defeat.

This malaise must be understood as the essential background for President de Gaulle's policy. A certain egocentricity on our part causes us to see many of de Gaulle's actions as being primarily motivated by a desire to annoy or to humiliate us. In fact, the central concern of de Gaulle is likely to be quite different. For the greater part of his career, he has had to be an illusionist. In the face of all evidence to the contrary, he has striven to restore France's greatness by his passionate belief in it. At first he was the leader of an insignificant faction of Frenchmen casting their lot with the Allies. His primary task, as he saw it, was to reestablish the identity and the integrity of France. Churchill and Roosevelt could concentrate on the tangible goal of military victory. To de Gaulle, the war had an intangible purpose. Victory was empty if it did not also restore the position, indeed the soul, of France. Churchill and Roosevelt understandably considered this quest peripheral to their central objective and treated de Gaulle's insistence as an irritating interruption of more important problems.

The conflict between the pragmatic and the intangible which started during the war has continued to this day. The United States, blessed with stable government, its sense of identity enhanced by its war experience, could pursue single-mindedly whatever technical schemes its

bureaucracy thought up at any given moment. To de Gaulle, governing a country racked by a generation of conflict and decades of frustration, the mode of reaching a goal has been as important as the objective itself. He judges the merit of a policy not only by technical criteria but also by its contribution to France's sense of identity. More important than any specific policy issue is the rediscovery of a specifically French sense of purpose.

Though de Gaulle often acts as if opposition to United States policy were a goal in itself, his deeper objective is pedagogical: to teach his people and perhaps his Continent attitudes of independence and self-reliance. The "folie de grand-eur" of which de Gaulle is so often accused is a peculiar kind, for it is tied to a profound awareness of the suffering and disappointments of his country. In 1960 this caused him to speak as follows: "Once upon a time there was an old country all hemmed in by habits and circumspection. At one time the richest, the mightiest people among those in the center of the world stage, after great misfortunes it came, as it were, to withdraw within itself. While other people were growing around it, it remained immobile."

De Gaulle has chosen to revitalize France by an act of faith powerful enough to override a seemingly contrary reality. The effort to achieve greatness required that France regain—wherever possible—the right of independent decision. France could agree with the decisions of others; but it had to make clear that this represented a voluntary act and not the abdication of the impotent.

Consequently, the dispute between France and the United States centers, in part, around the philosophical issue of how nations cooperate. Washington, basing its policy on a division of labor, relies on consultation as the principal means for solving disagreements. In its view influence is proportionate to a nation's contribution to a common effort somewhat like share-owning in a stock company. Paris insists that influence depends not only on the existence of consultative machinery but also on what options are available in case of disagreement. In its view each ally must—at least theoretically—be able to act autonomously.

Henry A. Kissinger, author of "The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy" and other books, is professor of government, and a faculty member of the Center for International Affairs, at Harvard. His next book, "The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance," will be published soon by McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations.

by Henry A. Kissinger 73

## Historical Humility

De Gaulle's nationalism is in the tradition of Mazzini, who thought that nations which achieved their independence would respect the dignity of others. His diplomacy is in the style of Bismarck, who strove ruthlessly to achieve what he considered Prussia's rightful place but who then tried to preserve the new equilibrium through prudence, restraint, and moderation. His policy clashes with ours because he is operating in a different time-frame.

The United States as the leader of the Alliance inevitably concentrates on solving immediate problems. De Gaulle is more concerned with the period ten or fifteen years hence. Precisely because he is sure that the United States will protect Europe in the immediate future, he wants to use this respite to establish insurance for the far future. He is looking ahead to a time when present leaders will have disappeared and American attention may possibly be focused on other continents.

Certainly, no one could have predicted at the beginning of any decade of this century what the world would look like at its end. De Gaulle need not be able to describe the circumstances which might arise when the convictions of existing leaders are no longer relevant, in order to wish to reserve some measure of control over the destiny of his country or his Continent. However arrogant his style, de Gaulle's approach to history is relatively humble. He is the leader of a country grown cautious by many enthusiasms shattered; turned skeptical from many dreams proved fragile; a country to which the unforeseen is the most elemental fact of history. American leaders while personally humble are much more confident that they can chart the future. What cannot be described concretely has little reality for them. Involved, ultimately, are differing conceptions of

Most American leaders tend to ascribe Allied tensions to the obstinacy of one man. It is interesting to note that present disputes are reminiscent of the impatience some of our leaders felt with Churchill during World War II. Committed to assumptions about Soviet good faith and a worldwide system of collective security they were irked by Churchill's attempt to set up some physical safeguards for peace. Churchill's interest in the postwar European balance of power was considered shortsighted and a symptom of old-fashioned nationalism. However, a subtler style, the prestige of Great Britain's heroic wartime effort, and a common language prevented the conflict from being so explicit. Now as before, in our impatience to realize Grand Designs we are often reluctant to admit that a statesman must concern himself with the worst—and not only the best—foreseeable contingency.

## Europe Governed by Committees

Whatever the deeper reasons for the disagreements, de Gaulle's belief in the continued role of the nation-state was bound to come into conflict with the American conviction of its obsolescence. The problem is not that de Gaulle wishes to reactivate Europe's traditional national rivalries as so many of his American critics allege. On the contrary, he affirms the goal of unity for Europe as passionately as his detractors. But where the American and European "integrationists" insist that European unity requires that the role of the nation-state be diminished, de Gaulle argues that unity depends on the vitality of traditional Europe.

Thus de Gaulle's proposals for European unity invariably envisage a confederation of states rather than supranational institutions. In his press conference of September 5, 1960, he called for regular consultation among the European governments, for specialized subordinate agencies and for an assembly composed of delegates from the national parliaments. He urged a European referendum "so as to give this launching of Europe the character of popular support and initiative that is indispensable." He has opposed supranational institutions for Europe because as he told a press conference in 1963 such a Europe would be "governed in appearance by anonymous

74 WHY WE MISREAD DE GAULLE

technocratic, and stateless committees; in other words, a Europe without political reality, without economic drive, without a capacity for defense, and therefore doomed, in the face of the Soviet bloc, to being nothing more than a dependent of that great Western power, which itself had a policy, an economy, and a defense—the United States of America."

At the same time, de Gaulle wants Europe, whatever its internal organization, to be responsible for its own defense. He therefore resists organic links between the United States and individual European countries which would tie the defense of Europe to American weapons or American conceptions. In his view, Europe should concert its own policy and then deal with the United States as a unit. This is why de Gaulle has opposed both the Nassau Agreement, which tied the British nuclear program to that of the United States, and the proposed NATO multilateral force. Both programs, in his view, make Europe completely dependent on the United States. Europeans would be lobbyists and not partners. De Gaulle considers such a role demeaning for a great power, and he is convinced that it will destroy the moral substance of the "integrated" partner.

## How to Annoy Your Allies

Few of de Gaulle's policies have so embroiled him with America as his insistence on an autonomous nuclear strike force. He explained his position in 1962 in these words: "The Americans, our allies and our friends, have for a long time, alone, possessed a nuclear arsenal. So long as they alone had such an arsenal and so long as they showed their will to use it immediately if Europe were attacked . . . an attack was beyond all probability. . . . It is impossible to overestimate the extent of the service, most fortunately passive, that the Americans at that time, in that way, rendered to the freedom of the world.

"Since then the Soviets have also acquired a nuclear arsenal, and that arsenal is powerful enough to endanger the very life of America. . . . The new and gigantic fact is there."

Because of these views American spokesmen have lectured de Gaulle on his ignorance of nuclear strategy and ridiculed him for excessive pretensions. Actually, de Gaulle's analysis of the situation does not differ radically from Secretary McNamara's. Both agree that the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal confronts the United States with an unprecedented challenge. Both insist that

NATO strategy must be adapted to new realities. They disagree less in their analysis than in the conclusions to be drawn from it. From the point of view of division of labor, the United States considers French resources better spent on conventional forces than on nuclear arms. From the perspective of vindicating France's identity, de Gaulle is not so concerned with the technical aspects of strategy as with the political problem of choice. The United States considers central control over nuclear weapons crucial for the contingency of general war; de Gaulle gives priority to France's impact on the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy. Secretary McNamara strives for strategic options; President de Gaulle seeks political ones.

## A Separate Deal with the Soviets?

Differences between France and the United States over the future of Europe have been compounded by disagreements over the scope of Atlantic policy. These date back to 1958 when de Gaulle proposed a global Directorate composed of the United States, Great Britain, and France. The United States rejected this with the argument that it could not designate one of its European partners to speak for the others. No attempt was made to explore de Gaulle's reaction to the possibility of a wider forum. In 1960, de Gaulle made yet another plea for a common Western worldwide policy particularly with respect to the Congo crisis.

When nothing came of these proposals, de Gaulle reverted to his usual, perhaps preferred, tactic of acting unilaterally and trying to force his partner's hand. After 1961, he stopped urging concerted Western action. Instead, he stressed that only a strong Europe would receive a respectful hearing from the United States or the U. S. S. R.

This is not to say that de Gaulle's policy was primarily a reaction to being rebuffed by the United States. Rather, two changes in the international situation caused him to consider American support less crucial and made independent action appear rewarding. When de Gaulle proposed the Directorate, a global showdown seemed possible. The Lebanese crisis had just occurred; Soviet intransigence was at its height. This impelled de Gaulle to try to insure American support in case war proved unavoidable. Since 1961 the Soviet military threat has seemed to recede, and the need for concerted action has diminished pro-

by Henry A. Kissinger

75

portionately. Indeed, with the growth of Ameri-
can involvements in Asia and Latin America, the
shoe is now somewhat on the other foot. It is the
United States which presses its European allies
to share its global responsibilities and the Euro-
peans who are reluctant to assume worldwide
risks.

The reduction in the Soviet threat has brought
to the surface sharply conflicting views of East-
West relations. As in most other controversies,
each side has accused the other of the same
offense: of planning a settlement, if not at the
expense, at least to the exclusion of the other. In
the United States, de Gaulle's comment that
Europe extends from the Atlantic to the Urals is
often cited as proof of a thinly veiled desire to
negotiate directly with Moscow. In France,
United States bilateral dealings with the Soviet
Union are taken as an indication that the United
States is seeking a separate accommodation with
the U. S. S. R.

At times both sides seem primarily concerned
with scoring debating points. De Gaulle's state-
ment that one day Europe would again extend
from the Atlantic to the Urals did not imply a
deal with the Soviet Union. He spoke of "a
Europe, no longer split in two by ambitions and
ideologies," that would again be the "heart of
civilization." But the reorganization of Europe to
which he referred is to take place *after* Commu-
nist ideology no longer dominates in the Soviet
Union; that is, when Russia is once more a na-
tional, and not an ideological, state pursuing a
policy dictated by its national interests. This is
the precise eventuality foreseen by four Ameri-
can postwar Administrations as the precondition
for a final settlement.

In fact, French and American analyses of
Soviet trends are not so different as the contro-
versy sometimes suggests. Both are of the view
that at some point the Soviet system will be trans-
formed. Both believe that this transformation will
mark the starting point for fruitful negotiations.
They disagree not over the fact of evolution but
its nature, not over the ultimate desirability of a
diplomatic settlement but about who will be the
spokesman for the West when it takes place.
Above all, they differ about the nature of a stable
international order and the role of personalities
in relation to it.

The United States tends to believe that peace
and stability are "natural." Crises must, there-
fore, be caused by personal ill-will rather than
by objective conditions. As a result, United States
policy toward the Soviet Union has oscillated be-
tween two opposite approaches: During periods

of tension, the United States assumes that Soviet
policy is conducted by highly purposeful, ideologi-
cally inspired men operating according to careful,
long-range plans. During periods of détente,
American leaders have often acted as if a settle-
ment could be achieved by good personal relations
with their Communist counterparts. Either ap-
proach leads to an avoidance of concreteness.
When the Soviets are aggressive, negotiations
are believed to be useless, and when they are
conciliatory, there is a reluctance to disturb the
favorable atmosphere. In either case, American
policy statements envisage a world where all con-
flict has ended and nations live under "the rule
of law."

De Gaulle's view is more historical. Peace to
him is not a final settlement but a new, perhaps
more stable, balance of forces. "Now, in the last
analysis and as always, it is only in equilibrium
that the world will find peace." An equilibrium
can never be permanent but must be adjusted in
constant struggles. Tension, according to de
Gaulle, is caused not so much by the personal
attitudes of individual Communist leaders as by
the dynamics of the system which they represent.
To him, Soviet aggressiveness reflects not a real
grievance but internal instability: "... there is in
this uproar of imprecations and demands or-
ganized by the Soviets something so arbitrary
and so artificial that one is led to attribute it
either to the premeditated unleashing of frantic
ambitions, or to the desire of drawing attention
away from great difficulties: this second hy-
pothesis seems . . . the more plausible to me."

To yield to Soviet blackmail would not alleviate
internal Soviet stresses but only supply an in-
centive for further demands. Thus, during the
Berlin crisis de Gaulle spoke as follows: "... we
do not allow ourselves to be moved by all the
tumult, all the flow of invective, of formal notifica-
tions, of threats launched by certain countries
against other lands and especially against ours.
... We realize only too well that they indulge in
virulent utterances and sensational outbursts in
order to lead people astray—within their own
country and outside. ..."

De Gaulle in 1962 rejected the "exploratory"
conversations on Berlin urged by the United States
and Britain because: "... so long as the Soviet
Union does not put a stop to its threats and its
injunctions and bring about an actual easing of
the international situation, we believe that we
have spared our allies and ourselves the cata-
strophic retreat, dramatic rupture, or tragi-
comical engulfment, in which the conference
would obviously have ended." And he did not

76 WHY WE MISREAD DE GAULLE

Views differ, finally, about the significance of the Sino-Soviet split and about policy toward Communist China. The United States, convinced of the importance of intentions in the conduct of foreign policy, is tempted to back the Communist power which professes the most peaceful goals. De Gaulle, believing that an equilibrium is the only reliable basis for stability, is more concerned with establishing a counterweight to the stronger Communist partner. He is prepared, if necessary, to play off its weaker Communist opponent against it. With its global responsibilities, the United States sees in Communist China an objective threat to its interests. Leading a country primarily concerned with European affairs, de Gaulle considers a Russia extending its power into the center of Europe as the principal threat. China to him is a distant state which could become useful in diverting Soviet energies. De Gaulle's analysis is far from unique in Europe, even if his methods of implementing it are.

In short, peace to de Gaulle results not from a personal reconciliation but from the establishment of a more stable equilibrium. France and Europe must contribute to bringing about this balance not as the objects of policy but as their author. De Gaulle is thus concerned not only with the fact of negotiations but also with France's role in them. He would object to any settlement which France did not help to formulate—regardless of his opinion of its substance. The major thrust of de Gaulle's policy is to make it impossible for the United States to deal with the Soviet Union over the heads of France and the rest of Europe.

The Unassimilable Style

De Gaulle's thought is remarkably consistent. Convinced that only those capable of assuming responsibility can form meaningful associations, he can logically affirm his faith in the Atlantic Alliance while insisting on the identity of Europe and the uniqueness of France. To de Gaulle, the two notions are complementary—though this may seem disingenuous or even cynical to many Americans.

De Gaulle's brutal tactics sometimes give the impression that a powerful, self-confident France has been a permanent feature of the postwar landscape. It is almost forgotten that between 1958 and 1962 France was on the verge of civil war

three times. So well has de Gaulle succeeded in his tour de force that even his critics act as if the only problem for Europe were to moderate excesses of French assertiveness. This notion would have been inconceivable three years ago when it was expected that freeing Algeria would keep France in turmoil for a decade or more. Difficult as the France of de Gaulle undoubtedly is, it is more in the interest of the West than a country torn by schisms or paralyzed by a sense of impotence.

If his critics have shown little compassion for his special circumstances, de Gaulle has often thwarted his own aims by his abrupt tactics and his imperious style. Not comfortable with the give and take of negotiations, he has moved through a series of faits accomplis to force his allies to accept his objectives. A rationalist, he has acted as if his views were certain to prevail by virtue of their logical necessity and as if the feelings of other statesmen were, therefore, irrelevant. A profound believer in historical necessity, he has acted as if the logic of events would always override the sensibilities of others.

No doubt, this is a heroic posture. But man is not governed by reason alone. History may appear inevitable in retrospect; but it is made by men who cannot always distinguish their emotions from their analysis. The paradox of de Gaulle's position is that although he claims to speak for Europe, no substantial following outside of France sees him as a European statesman. He has alienated many potential supporters by his excessive rationalism, his unilateral tactics, and his wounding insistence on intellectual submission to his maxims.