L01

MEMORANDUM

TO: G.S. Pettee

FROM: J.D Montgomery

SUBJECT: Attached Critique of the Litchfield Report

This report was disappointing as a list of research projects, although it displays a broad view of military government and has some good projects listed, particularly under the heading of "Occupation Management."

I fear that it will not provide an adequate statement of the areas for research and would hesitate to publish it as a technical memorandum.

Probably the source of many difficulties is the rather loose organization. This has resulted in confusion, and the project descriptions often fail to isolate a subject which is at once researchable and useful.

My critique is perhaps rather offhand because of limitations of time, but it pretty well covers my own criticisms and suggestions. Please use it in any way you like, in view of Litchfield's letter to you inviting criticism of his draft report.

MEMORANDUM

Critique of GAI Report (August, 1951 version.)

In general, it seems to me that this blocks out a very comprehensive and
thought-provoking picture of major research areas in military government adminis-
tration and policy. My criticisms are intended not to discount its value but to
serve as a basis for improving the general approach and clarifying the specific
research problems in terms of LEGATE's mission.

In summing up my first impression of this report I would conjure up about
five major propositions which I think the Litchfield report has emphasized in-
sufficiently:

(1) Military government is a combat responsibility as well as a post-combat operation. Here I am not speaking of any so-called "combat phase," as I consider the popular distinction between "phases" superficial and misleading. I here refer to the need for evaluating military government as a staff and operating adjunct to other military missions: combat victory, military security, and support for future military operations. These are parallel in importance to the political objectives of military government.

(2) Military government responsibilities also include a variety of "civil affairs" operations, wherein the Army is charged with the responsibility for stationing troops in friendly countries in preparation for, or in support of, combat. The range of operations extends from Iceland, England, and the Near East in World War II to Japan and Greece in post-war years.

(3) There is a real need for studying the function of troops used in support of a military occupation. A special garrison situation is created when troops are released from combat operations and held in reserve in a foreign country to represent a "force in being" as a means of preserving public order. A thorough

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analysis of this problem might conceivably revolutionize current theories of American troop disposition overseas.

(4) The Army is now charged with a "running" responsibility which is largely overlooked in this report. Here I refer to pressing need for improving the selection and training of military government officers by the application of existing psychological techniques. There are also other current problems of supply, policing, etc., which are in the most urgent need of study.

(5) In general, plans for research in occupation administration should devote considerably more attention to the methodology of the research. This report should make a greater effort at preliminary evaluation of the kinds of results which may be anticipated from each project, together with its usefulness in reaching command decisions.

These general conclusions can be more precisely spelled out if there are any questions about them. As a starter I should like to discuss specifically some of the items detailed in the Litchfield report.

# I. Introduction

## Paragraph 5, page 2.

This list of assumptions does not seem to me to have much relevance to research in military government. The conduct of research of World War II experiences certainly requires no such assumptions as these. The kind of assumptions which the Army must make in the formation of future policy cannot be stated adequately by an organization which has no access to JCS directives, and should therefore not become a limiting factor in stating the problem.

## Paragraph 6 (b), page 2.

Political and psychological situations are not a limit on "researchability," but rather on the usefulness of the conclusions drawn in terms of their parallel to anticipated situations.

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### Paragraph 2 (a), page 5.

"Political purification" may be an area problem as well as one of administration. The actual means of discovering implicated elements is a parallel function to that of regenerating leadership, (Paragraph 3, page 31.) The present statement assumes that Communism as such will be our enemy rather than Russian imperialism, which may be questionable in view of our present support of Tito. The problem for research seems to be not how we identified "impure" elements in an occupied society but how effectively we dealt with them.

### Paragraph 2 (c), page 5.

This description probably places the project outside primary Army responsibility.

### Paragraphs 3 and 4, pages 6 and 7.

This is stated too vaguely. There are important anthropological questions raised about cultural reform which are fundamental to theories of culture change itself. I am not at all sure that the methodology available would provide answers of operating significance to the Army, especially since the situation after World War III may be quite different from that of World War II.

It is not clear to me how the problems stated in Paragraphs 3 and 4 are to be distinguished. Note especially the confusion that arises from the statement in Paragraph 4 (b), page 7, where ideological reform is apparently identified with institutional reform. (Of Paragraph 10, page 32.)

### Paragraph 5, page 7.

I am not sure that this is really a researchable topic as stated here. What is "self-government"? Is this an objective of military government or does military government merely seek to increase native administrative responsibilities in order to accomplish other objectives in the occupation? If the latter, we have a problem of administration rather than of re-establishing self-government.

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The phrase "evaluation of the inadequacy" is a pre-judgment which I think is irrelevant to the statement of the research problem.

### Paragraph 5 (b), page 8.

This is an example of an assumption regarding the nature of a future occupation situation which does not appear in Paragraph 5, page 2, and which in any case in questionable in view of the tactical and strategic possibilities for a future occupation, (cf. Newsweek, 20 August 1951, page 20.)

### Paragraph 5 (c), page 8.

The allocation of staff is probably too great. I would feel more comfortable about these estimates if the methodology of the research problems were more clearly defined.

### Paragraph 6, page 8.

Not parallel because not an occupation policy. I doubt if this kind of problem can be solved by comparative studies, as an "evaluation of legitimacy" would not be implied simply by studying what we did in Germany and Japan. In any case, since this decision was not an Army one, a better formulation might be to evaluate its effects on the actual administration of military government.

### Paragraph 7, page 9.

This is probably less important than other basic economic objectives in an occupation, and should be studied only in connection with them (cf. Paragraph 12, page 12.) This is especially true if the Japanese peace treaty represents a real change in international policy.

### Paragraph 9, page 10.

Why include this topic if you do not recommend that it be "researched"? Hundreds of other topics of equal importance have already been excluded from this paper on the grounds given in Paragraph 3, page 1 and Paragraph 6 (a), page 2.

6.

### Paragraph 10, page 10.

This is not a parallel title because it does not represent an occupation objective. If the problem is one of "refugee control" or "management of DP's" this should be stated. Clarification of this is more than a problem of rhetoric because it points up the need for closer analysis of the relationship between Sections II, III and IV. Compare comment to Paragraph 6, page 8.

### Paragraph 11, page 11.

This is a mixture of the public safety function and the public health function. These are administratively separated by the Army and are substantively distinct as well.

### Paragraph 13, page 12.

An important question of policy which needs study by political scientists, but not a military responsibility or subject to operations research except perhaps as a device in psychological warfare.

### Paragraph 13 (b), page 12.

Assumption is highly questionable.

### Paragraph 15, page 13.

Should be considered in connection with Paragraph 5, page 7; Paragraph 10, page 10, and Paragraph 8, page 31.

### Paragraph 16, page 11.

The Army usually includes this as a function of public safety. I am not sure that there is any basis for separating physical security from public safety. If the problem is only one of civil censorship then I concur upon restatement.

### Paragraph 17, page 15.

Finance is here confused with other functional aspects of military government (such as Labor.) In any case, occupational cost accounting and the administration of the finances in an occupied area are not the same problem and should not be

tion of the finance in an occupied area are not the case problems and should not be
ment (and so on). In any case, combinations of cost accounting and the administrative
liabilities in here concerned with other administrative subjects of which Treasury

It is proposed to award one of the claims concerned then I consider that reasonable

some that there is no place for administrative facilities from which help is needed.

The VRAH similarly provides that as a function of help is needed. I am not

### Paragraph 12, b, bte 11.

bete 10, and Paragraph 8, bte 11.

Should be considered in connection with Paragraph 2, bte 1, Paragraph 10,

### Paragraph 12, b, bte 13.

Vasandhou is strictly discretionary.

### Paragraph 13 (p), bte 15.

as a device in behaviourist literature.

but not a written relationship or aspect to observations research except perhaps
in order to determine the effect which needs to be studied in detail.

### Paragraph 13, bte 15.

direct as well.

These are administrative subordinated to the VRAH and are absolutely
necessary as well.

### Paragraph 11, bte 11.

and 1A. Combines comment to Paragraph 2, bte 8.

If done so the need for closer scrutiny of the relationship between Sections 11, 111 and 12 should be satisfied. Certification of this is more than a problem of reporting because objective. It is the problem is one of 

### Paragraph 10, bte 10.

p.

lumped into a single study.

### Paragraph 18, page 16.

This problem as stated has little to do with occupational administration, although as a separate problem of international relations and strategy it is important.

If the intent here is to discuss international occupational administration and to compare the "zonal" method with that of joint administration, the topic should be restated.

This topic also suggests another study: psychological warfare pronouncements as sources of embarrassment to later military government administrators.

Another separate subject suggested here is the problem of "customs frontiers." These are part of international trade administration, not boundary policies, and deserve careful study as such.

Federal and administrative subdivision of an occupied country is not a matter of "boundary policy."

## III. Occupational Management.

### Paragraph 2, page 17.

Very well stated. I would tentatively suggest that the local and operating functions of military government may not be adequately described in Paragraph (5) as "military government teams." The whole relationship of the local administration of military government to the staff of the local military units merits close examination. Here is one of the major gaps between military government policy and performance. Also note that sub-Paragraph (7) duplicates the most important part of Paragraph 18, page 16, which is not otherwise a real military government function. Sub-Paragraph (3) displays perhaps too much emphasis on organizational relationships to the exclusion of problems of assistance, techniques and "informal" relationships. The response of indigenous governmental units to the occupational administration

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are often conditioned by these apparently secondary factors.

### Paragraph 4, page 21.

Needs to be clarified to become a project which could give rise to administrative decisions.

### Paragraph 6 (b), page 23.

Statement might arouse antagonism because of its implied criticism. This is an important area, and one which should be defined as objectively as possible.

### Paragraph 7, page 23.

The question of selecting "high quality professional staffs" may depend on an analysis of the personal qualifications necessary for military government officers. Perhaps a study of this problem could produce results similar to those now employed by the Air Force in selecting pilots. Questions of training should also be subjected to analysis to determine means for evaluating the progress. (Cf. my memorandum "Evaluating the Military Government Training Program.")

### Paragraph 8, page 25.

Should be broadened to include all problems of supporting services rendered to troops on occupation duty. Vagueness of the topic is reflected in the title, which seems to me inappropriate in any case.

## IV. Occupation Methods and Techniques.

(This section is not sufficiently distinguished in content from III. A general introduction like that of the other sections should be supplied, describing the scope of its projects and distinguishing it from the foregoing parts.

### Paragraph 1, page 26.

Not sufficiently distinguished from Paragraph 2 a(8), page 18.

### Paragraph 2 (b), page 27.

Statement is too positive. I do not think this subject should be studied or listed in a description of research. If we should emerge with conclusions relative

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to this it will be as a result of other studies. As now stated, Army military government planners would probably dismiss it as impractical.

### Paragraph 4, page 28.

The facetious description of the impact of an occupation is perhaps responsible for the serious underestimation of time needed to assess this problem (Paragraph 4 (c)). Reference is made to my "Administration of Occupied Japan", _Human Organization_, Summer, 1949, for a hint of the types of problems encountered and their implications for the successful outcome of an occupation. Of Paragraph 13, page 34, and especially Paragraph 11, page 33. This general subject has implications for Paragraphs 5 and 6, page 29; and 7, 8, and 9, page 31. The reason why there is so much overlap is that the problems of cultural change as a product of occupation have been treated in fragmentary terms. This could be corrected by a more adequate consideration of anthropology as a tool for studying occupation administration (of Paragraph 5(b), page 2.) This problem has been discussed in my memorandum, "Scientific Resources for Military Government Research."

### Paragraph 6, page 29.

Should be broadened to include methods of indoctrinating troops in occupation, and establishment of standards of discipline and behavior. The title is unnecessarily abstract; the problem is primarily one of troop discipline once the standards of desired behavior are established. The estimates of staff and time requirements here are probably excessive.

### Paragraph 9, page 31.

Too vague: Not distinguished from Paragraph 7 or 8 above. Discussion of researchability of this whole general topic is inadequate, as a vast literature and methodology exists in the fields of social psychology and cultural anthropology. The dimensions of the problem may be miscalculated because of the fragmentation described above.

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### Paragraph 10, page 32.

Probably important in future operations but presently stated as a problem in political theory rather than occupational administration.

### Paragraph 11, page 33.

Should be omitted or included in Paragraph 6, page 29.

### Paragraph 13, page 34.

As stated, this study constitutes the basic research necessary to Paragraph 8, page 31, and other related problems. I doubt if we should consider it as a separate problem in occupation methods and techniques.

### Paragraph 14, page 34.

Might be broadened to include other military organizations than the official military government, such as CIO, etc., etc.

### Paragraph 16, page 36.

I am not sure this study would produce much more than a record of instances where cultural monuments were sacrificed needlessly. The functions of "fine arts, monuments and archives" is not more important than the other military government functions (labor, procurement, etc.) which have been omitted from this paper, but the study of which could easily produce results of far greater importance to occupation management.

### Paragraph 17, page 36.

Not a project of primary interest to LEGATE.

### Paragraph 18, page 37.

An over-all statement which is too vague to be considered as a problem in occupation management (cf. Paragraph 2, page 27.). Costing studies have already been suggested in Paragraph 9, page 26, and the evaluation of goal fulfillment as required here is a far greater task than could be performed in one and one-half man-years. Assessment of our "physical, financial and intellectual competence" is too great an operation to be subsumed here. Problems of our capacity to undertake

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specific programs of training, security control, economic reconstruction, etc.

should be considered as an important parameter of each of these functions, not as

a general essay on "depth of effort." I think this paragraph should be omitted.