Husqville, France
Date: 05-06-1972
Time: 14:00
Volume: 3
Page-footer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.5

TelCon:5:05-6/10/72
Mr. Kissinger
Mrs. Braden

By: KML NASLA Date: 5/12/04

By: MW NARA Date: 05/28/04

K: Joannie, I just wanted to tell you how nice it was of you to come for luncheon at such

B: Oh, I had such a good time. You know I like your brother so much.

K: Well, I wish I could say that.

B: How have you been.

K: Oh, he is OK, but I have nothing to talk to him about.

B: Then you think lunch was OK.

K: Sure, because of you.

B: You know, I thought we had some time.

K: Because you and I had

B: I do have a good time with you Henry. There is no question.

K: Well, I look forward - I am off to Japan but I wanted to tell you and I look forward

B: That is nice of you. Hurry home.

K: Thank you. See you next week.

B: OK.

K: Goodbye.

["A. M. E. T. R. R. E. G. O. S. E. C. A. R. E. G. O. S. E. C. A

TELCOM

John Andrews /Mr. Kissinger

11:21 a.m., June 13, 1972

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Fc 12/58

By [W]NARA Date 05/28/72

K: John, I have rewritten my testimony on -- you know, we haven't decided yet whether to do it. I didn't know whether you were involved -- some of it seemed to have the Andrews touch.

A: Sir, I was involved. About 1/3 of it was probably mine and the rest is silent.

K: Right. Well, could I get that over to you and have you put it into English.

A: Yes, sir. Fine. Would you like for me to come over and get it?

K: Yeah, can you?

A: I will right now.

K: Good.

A: Thanks.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01-2352
By LJB NARA Date 06-01-72

TELCONE

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:53 p.m., June 13, 1972

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol, two things.

D: Yes.

K: One, on that trip -- I mean, not mine but yours.

D: Yeah.

K: We have put on the restriction I mentioned to you this morning.

D: Until --

K: And we will maintain it until he leaves if it is within a reasonable time.

D: Yeah, I understand. Okay, thank you.

K: Yes, but it is important that you tell me as soon as you can once you know the time is.

D: I will check with them but I am sure nobody could answer me right now because it will depend -- he probably already arrived today or if he doesn't arrive but how many days, I just tell you reasonably it probably take around four days but nobody could tell as of now. Particularly, because it is not just a quick visit in a sense, that is, a visit from this till this one. He will just have a informal discussion with them but it will not be long, I am sure about this.

K: Well, if you could let me know, then I will not put an arbitrary restriction on.

D: Yeah, I understand. May I put it this way, I will say to -- by Saturday or what you say, or you don't want really -- better not to mention, of course, specifically but --

K: Well, we have now put it on through Saturday their time.

D: I see.

K: But if your leader should stay an extra day, could you let me know?

D: Okay.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F01287
By CNAR Date 06/13/72

TELCORN

4:53 p.m., June 13, 1972

K: And we will not do anything while he's there.

D: Yeah, I understand. Okay, I think it's fair enough. Saturday, yes, their time.

K: As it is now, the orders are to go through Saturday.

D: Yes, understand.

K: But if you let me know before, say Friday, or let Haig know that he's staying, say through Sunday.

D: Yeah.

K: We will not do anything while he's in the country.

D: I understand. It involved that ______ you mentioned?

K: Exactly.

D: Okay, thank you.

K: Secondly, I have on this issue of how we present the treaties.

D: Yes.

K: We have found a formula which I think you might find interesting. We will invite the two foreign relations committees and the two armed services committees --

D: The whole committees.

K: The whole committees. And the Joint Atomic Energy Committee to the White House together with the press --

D: Huh?

K: The press pool.

D: I see.

K: And I will present them. The President will introduce me and I will introduce me and I will present it.

D: Um-humm. It's quite a performance (laughter).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01256

By CHARA Date Statement

TELCORN

4:53 p.m., June 13, 1972

K: So it will not be on television but it will be a very full press coverage.

D: I see. You'll be in the White House?

K: And it will be in the White House.

D: Is it any timetable or you cannot say?

K: We haven't told the press so it's strictly for you.

D: I understand.

K: Thursday morning at 9:00.

D: Oh, Thursday morning. So it's really before you go?

K: Yes.

D: I see. I think it's a very good idea.

K: It will not make my reception much warmer when I say friendly things about you.

D: (laughter) So I see you are not really exhausted by your trip to the Orient. Still there are some ideas following.

K: Okay.

D: Okay, thank you. So we will -- somebody will be in touch with you.

K: Good.

D: You are leaving on the end of Thursday or Friday?

K: I'm leaving either at the end of Thursday or Friday morning.

D: Just for my own information.

K: But you will let Haig know?

D: Yeah. He knows?

K: Yes, he's fully informed.

D: Yeah. Okay about this one. And we will have this warm line I hope.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01252
By CHNARA Date 06/13/72

TELCORN

4:53 p.m., June 13, 1972

K: Oh, that will be established within the shortest time.

D: Yes, I understand that today. Have you had a chance to speak with
Pete, not yet?

K: Oh, yes, I had lunch with Peterson and I think you will find his approach
very constructive and positive.

D: Oh, I think it sounds very positive . . . . . . . .

[End of tape]

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Ed 12/58

By MW SARA Date 05/28/94

TELECON
Ambassador Debrynja/Mr. Kissinger
4:53 p. m., June 13, 1972

D: I understand.

K: Thursday morning at 9:00.

K: Yes.

K: Okay.

K: Good.

K: But you will let me know?

D: Yeah, He knows?

K: Yes, he's fully informed.

Receptionist's Note: the secretary has left.
Mr. Sato's office.
President's Office.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

By: KHLW NAAA, Date: 5/13/74

TELCON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., June 24, 1972

K: Oh, yes; any of them. Yeah, absolutely.

P: What about the Canadian? No, I don't think so.

K: No, we have to worry about not leaking it back.

P: Right. All right, fine.

K: And Brandt we can give a little palaver too.

P: Yeah. And I'd like to pick three or four smaller countries.

K: Right.

P: I notice one other thing that would interest -- Tanaka they say now has a good chance. I thought Fukuda was going to get it. What's your evaluation?

K: I think Tanaka has an excellent chance. I'm not so worried about him because he's a pretty tough guy.

P: Well, he incidentally --

K: He'll turn out to be more nationalistic

P: On a personal basis, he's very friendly to me. His daughter was our supporter in '68. He told me so.

K: Oh, really. I didn't know.

P: When she was in school here. Oh, yeah.

K: No, no; I think you'll be all right with Tanaka. I had a long talk with him.

P: Well, that's good, that's good. You think he's pretty tough?

K: Oh, yeah.

[Break in tapes - Start Tape #3]

P: ....... He couldn't make it this morning but at this point, the only thing keeping this war going is McGovern. That's got to be made by somebody sometime.

H. G. W. Bush, the 42nd President of the United States

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., June 24, 1972

By: K.H. W. NASA Date: 5/13/74

K: Yeah, but I think we should give it a little more -- In fact, I'm wondering about the following, Mr. President, as a tactical device. I'm wondering whether I shouldn't call McGovern and give him just enough of a feel for the negotiations so that we can say afterwards knowing what we're doing, the son-of-a-bitch is coming us anyway.

P: Uh-huh.

K: And asking him to lay off for a while.

P: If you could do it discreetly, I'd do it.

K: Well, even if it leaks.

P: All right, fine.

K: I mean, I'd call him and say look, I want you to know what's going on.

P: I'd do it also with Humphrey and Muskie.

K: Right.

P: We should do it with the three of them.

K: Together?

P: No, not together. But I'd be sure that I'd covered all three so that McGovern's opponents will not -- because some of Humphrey's supporters will desert McGovern. I don't want them to think that we just started to play McGovern.

K: Right.

P: Cover Humphrey; cover Muskie.

K: Right. But I think it has the advantage that we can then say, he knew and he went ahead anyway.

P: That's right, that's right. Good.

K: Good.

P: Well, get a little rest.

K: Right, Thank you, Mr. President.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOL2582

By CNARA Date 05/14/72

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

8:20 a.m. - 6/14/72

(Came in late)

K: ... at Calcutta and they're talking about bad weather in Hanoi and some of you people are talking that he may have to turn around. Do you know anything about that?

D: No, nothing. I know that while in Moscow there was a ... I was with him at that moment when he made up his own route and then there was ... there to go through China but back to go through India because he wants to see Prime Minister Nehru. But really at this time I didn't have any messages but I thought rather doubt that he would go around from Calcutta where - with this other way.

K: I know I didn't understand it. That's why I wondered whether you had any ...

D: NO, I didn't. If I had I would have given you a call but really.

K: Please don't think it has any significance.

D: Not at all. On this I am positive.

K: At any rate we are proceeding with the instructions.

D: Yes, I understand. There was no announcement as you know. ... I have permission two days ago just for my own or for you, if you like.

K: But now apparently it is announced.

D: No it wasn't. ... it was simply. ...

K: That he was supposed to stop for an hour and then he decided to stay over night.

D: That's probably ... If there is something I will be in touch with you.

K: OK. Good.

It's just a three word report card
of the kind, one of three commandments
and one of three commandments!

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KML NAFU Date: 5/12/84

By: MW NAFU Date: 05/28/84

TELCONE

Tom Braden/Kissinger

12:27 p.m. - 6/14/72

K: Hello.

B: Henry.

K: Listen you have written more anti-Kissinger articles than any three other guys combined.

B: Oh, bullshit. I have to keep my objectivity with my publishers. They all think - they all accuse me of leaning over backwards in favor of Kissinger.

K: I don't know - that Japanese one.

B: Well, you know.

K: OK. I'm not going to debate it with you.

B: When are you leaving?

K: For China?

B: Um-hmmm.

K: Tomorrow night or Friday morning. I haven't decided yet. I want to get a little rest in Hawaii.

B: You're not taking anybody with you?

K: No.

B: No reporters.

K: No, just some girls but that doesn't concern you.

B: Girls, yeh. That's fine. Peterson's not going?

K: No. He's going to Moscow in July.

B: Who is?

K: Peterson.

B: Is he?

Re: [insert telephone number here]

is the name of a mutual

Paperspace

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12953, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L. W.

NARA. Date: 5/13/64

January 12, 1964

By: MW NARA Date: 05/28/64

K: Yeh.

B: Well I wanted to ask one word of advice before you got away when I knew that you were going. And I know you're pressed, but just one word of advice. I was asked by I guess what amounts to the Japanese government or some front there for them to come to Japan for two weeks.

K: I think it's a damn good idea.

B: Do you?

K: Yeh.

B: Well, when you get back, could we talk. . .

K: And I'll open some doors for you.

B: About who to see and what to do?

K: Yeh. You know I really think. . . .

B: You would advise me to do it - I have to tell them today and that's why I bother you.

K: You tell them you accept because I am convinced that we have to get closer ties with them and give them a sense that they're not left alone and I think any senior journalist who gives them that sense of American interest - if you don't go around lacerating us afterwards.

B: Yeh, all right. I'll tell them I'll go.

K: And if you go around lacerating us you'll do some . . . . . . Treat them well.

B: That's right. I get your point. It's just too bad that you have to knock Kissinger on the way but what the hell he's expendable.

K: That's right. OK. you won't get any more caviar out of me.

B: I didn't get any.

K: Well, I'm supposing that she's going to share it with you.

The following statements are made without any intention ofional
omission or understatement

By KHLW NAFU, DIO 5/12/04
January 10, 1964
By MW NAFU Date 05/28/04

B: Oh, no, boy, I'm telling you anything that's Kissinger's is held in reserve.

K: Is that it?

B: Ah-ha!!! (Laughter)

K: Oh, how is Stewart? I called on Monday night just as soon as I came back.

B: Yeh. Well, he went in and got this virus and it set his temperature at 104 which is what they wanted to do.

K: Is he home or is he in the hospital?

B: Well both, I guess. In and out, but not working. He's feeling lousy.

K: He's supposed to feel lousy.

B: Yeh, he's supposed to feel lousy. And he is so communication has been broken off for the last couple days.

K: Well, I'm in the same shape.

B: Well, all right. I wish you luck on your venture - whatever it is and I'll call you when you get back.

K: You're not going to out on . . . you don't have your home anymore do you.

B: In California? No, we sold it. Why, are you going out there as soon as you get back.

K: A week after.

B: A week after. Maybe I can see you after you get back.

K: I'll be here for a week. Yes, I'll make every effort to see you.

B: All right.

K: Good, Tom. Bye.

The telephone call is the most important thing in the world.
More than money or anything else.
Make the call often.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.5

By: K.L. V. NAVA Date: 5/13/84

TELCOM

Sec. Peterson/Kissinger

12:32 p.m. - 6/14/72

K: Hello.

P: Hi, Henry.

K: I'm glad they put you on first because after all...

P: Henry . . . . . we used to call it a sentence completion test in clinical psychology.

(Laughter)

P: I met with him for a couple of hours. It was a reasonably good discussion. I can give you a quick rundown. One, we're talking about starting July 17. You wanted to know how long we were talking - 10 days, two weeks - something like that.

K: I'd make it on the shorter side.

P: You would?

K: Yes. They will use the whole time anyway. You know whatever will be done will be done in the last three or four days and I think it will make you look more important not to be able to spare two weeks.

P: Yeh, all right.

K: In fact, I would do it on the shorter side even of ten days. I don't care from my point of view.

P: Yes, all right. Now lend-lease I agree with you this is a very cool customer we are dealing with here, but when he starts discussing lend-lease the whole discussion gets an emotional political aspect to it. You know, of the millions that were killed over there and how can we be arguing about interest rates and that sort of thing. The same thing you reported yesterday, Henry. Now what I'm doing is I've got two guys working on three or four ways of restructuring this interest issue. For example, even one possibility which might be our low, low possibility of having them figure whatever the interest should have been for the last 20 years - even though they haven't paid it - and then consider the possibility of saying from that day forward you pay what the other people do. But we're going to have

The President's Office in Washington, D.C.

Publicity File

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 1295A, Sept. 3.6

By: KMLV
NASA Date: 5/13/04

P: (cont) to come up with a new formulation of that problem. I'm now convinced of it. And all I can tell you is I got three guys working on it.

On the credit issue which is also very important, there is no question that the big deals are what are on their minds. He keeps throwing the word around billions and how Brezhnev said billions and you know the President set a new era and so forth. I think the thing I talked to you about yesterday, Henry, the whole business of getting these top financiers, you know, really thinking in much larger terms than we've ever thought before is really what we have to do. Now I've already talked with Rocke- feller and I've got six guys I want to talk to today, but by the time I leave I would hope we could have something sufficiently structured so we can titillate the hell out of them on the real big deal because that's what I think's going to move them much more than almost anything else we're talking about.

K: On that I agree.

P: On business facilities. I brought that up. I think it may have assumed more importance in his mind than it did in mine. I just told him I wanted to know where they stood on this facility. For your informa- tion, Henry, we get an enormous amount of grousing by business people who can't have telephones - there's a whole bunch of crap here that's identified with it. He showed much more flexibility on this than Patolichev. He said my impression is that if we make a deal on the other stuff this will fall in line and he didn't seem too bothered by the concept perhaps of the hotel, you know, that we discussed or something of that sort. As long as it doesn't look like it's only for Americans. Now did you know that Vichiani has been in touch with Dr. Schriver on this?

K: No, I do not.

P: Henry, you're going to have to learn how to circulate among a broader spectrum of people. You've been spending too much time over there with Haldeman and those people. Vichiani has been talking with Schriver and I'm talking with Sarge again today.

K: About what?

P: The possibility of something close to what I was talking to you about - some kind of a compound that includes a hotel. And I kind of like the idea Henry because I think if we can come up with a joint venture

The President of the Republic of the United States of America

By: KMH/ WASH. D.C. 5/13/64

3

P:(cont.) in the hotel arena that has facilities it will kind of symbolize this new era. You know, in a way that will capture a little imagination around the country. So we're still working on the report to you on that but I just wanted you to know the subject came up of business facilities.

The subject of whose on the Commission, he seemed a little touchy about how many foreign policy people we're going to have. I told him that my ____ view was that we ought to have what's his name from State - Armstrong - because you and I've got to talk about how we're going to get lend-lease into this negotiation and my preliminary view was the first step to that is to get Armstrong on the Commission and have him there and then I'm taking Jim Lynn, or at least this is my plan, with me. And I thought Jim who is infinitely brighter than Armstrong or anybody else I've seen around here, I was going to give him the problem of working with Armstrong on lend-lease.

K: But my philosophy of course with State is never let them in on anything until it's done.

P: Well, on the other hand all the announcements have stated that it will be carried on in parallel and that sort of business.

K: I don't give a damn.

P: But I thought we could save their face even if I was handling the negotiations and they didn't even know about it with having them in Moscow if they weren't in Moscow.

K: That's up to you. I myself, you know, I would do it differently but then I'm a son-of-a-bitch.

P: You mean not having them even there at all.

K: I might have them there but not let them in on meetings.

P: Well, this is what I'm saying - on the lend-lease thing I think what's finally going to happen on lend-lease is it's so emotional that at some point I'm going to have to sit down with Patolichev and perhaps Kosygin and as you suggested get together a very private, complex package.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Ed 12/5/6

By MW SARA Date 05/28/94

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Kraft

6/14/72 12:56 p.m.

JK: All you best jokes are being put into other people's mouths.

HAK: On the SS 9--Yes I noticed that.

JK: I wondered if under the circumstances I could set it straight.

HAK: That's okay with me. In fact it would be a little helpful.

JK: Okay, this would be for the New Yorker. Now I guess I better get it exactly right. That you mentioned this to Breshnev

HAK: No, no, to Grechko and Menov--the way to solve both problems would be to put the SS 9's on T-Class submarines--so that

JK: So that every time they would fire them, the sub would sink.

HAK: That's right.

JK: And they laughed?

HAK: Menov laughed the first time--Grechko didn't know whether I was a nut or what--but when I saw Grechko the second time he came up and hit me on the shoulder and made a joke about it--he said he had studied it and had come to the conclusion that it was an original but not feasible idea. But if you could do this--not that I was revealing great secrets to you, but just because---

JK: No, I think they will be pleased--they made me take out the piece about the classic piece of diplomatic history that will go down for years, but otherwise you will see--they made me take out that classic piece of diplomatic--and they have a point, but otherwise it is going to be all right. Is there anything else that you have to say--do you have any other things to say to me about Lavell's case. Is this something that you people feel you should have monitored.

HAK: You can't monitor what he did or what happened to him after he did it.

JK: But take the first part--do your command and control system should have worked better than it did.

HAK: Well, we are looking into that--but it is awfully hard when your top commander in the field falsifies his report.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Fc 12758
By: [W]NARA Date: 05/28/94

TELCON

XXX

HAK: Incidentally, I don't think these were major raids--I am getting a list put together--I think what he did was where he was authorized to fire on these radars when they locked on them, he fired on the radars before they had been engaged--I think that is what he did--That's my impression, I have to check it.

JK: Because there have been other people--that colonel who falsified the bombing Russian ____ in Haiphong--you know destroyed the pictures and got buste____ by Hal ____.

HAK: When was that?

JK: I think '68. Hal ____ I know was secretary at the time, and they hit a Russian ship and these guy destroyed the pictures and when the Russians complained, the investigation was made and what happened this guy was buste____ out of the service. I mean it is not something that is unknown and my impressions of my conversations with Brown was that he was particularly sensitive to this; I don't have that impression of the civilian air force people now. Are they outside the loop.

HAK: No, I guarantee they are sensitive to it now.

JK: You know the penalty seems like a slap on the wrist if it is just a one man operation.

HAK: Well, I am at the moment frankly studying it more fully because even when the change was made, I wasn't fully clear what had happened. And the extent what has now come out

JK: I see. How was Japan?

HAK: Actually I thought in so far as one--you know there are people peculiarly inaccessible to conversation, and I said that even though if I quoted everything that was said, it was an enormous success, you see what I mean, but I don't believe they make their decisions on the basis of rational calculations, but on the basis of--not on conceptual conversations, but they make their decisions on their calculations of pressures, social--I think your articles were really the best thing that has been written.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Fd

1256

By MW SARA Date 05/28/94

Page 3

JK: Do you think Fukuda is going to make it? Your presence must have been an enormous help to them.

HAK: Well, I gave equal time to Tanaka.

JK: Yeh, but you sort of allayed the fears that were fears of what would have happened if Fukuda would come in and you gave a lot of time to Sato.

HAK: Yeh.

JK: I think it is perfectly appropriate--and I am for Fukuda.

HAK: I think the numbers favor Tanaka, but Japanese tradition favors Fukuda.

JK: Do you think it matters much?

HAK: No, and I am not at all sure whether Fukuda would be better for us than Tanaka.

JK: I mean it sounds like it was an interesting trip--you got right into the guts of it.

HAK: It was a very good trip--I learned a lot. Insofar as you can make things stick that *were* primarily conceptual and intellecutal, it was satisfactory.

JK: Yes, that is difficult for them. Podgorny's thing I see happened You did know that that was going to happen?

HAK: Yes.

JK: Because you were very, very glad when I mentioned it.

HAK: Yeh, but that is because I knew about it.

JK: Usually I can tell, but you really faked me out on that one. I wasn't sure. I said I hear there is a high-level meeting and you did nothing and I said higher than Kavased' and you said to be higher than Kavased is very high, I said Podgorny is higher and you said just something like, yes, he's higher, but completely noncommittal.

HAK: Yeh, but I can't do my job if I start talking around this way.

TELCORN

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Authority</td>
    <td>Fe/2156</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>By</td>
    <td>MW</td>
    <td>NARA Date</td>
    <td>05/28/69</td>
  </tr>
</table>

JK: I am not reproaching you. I am reproaching myself. But you
have a positive feeling about it?

HAK: Potentially, yes.

JK: What is your sense of timing--it is still a ways off.

HAK: You'll see something within the next month.

JK: Yeh. Do you have a good sense of what is going on in Hanoi?

HAK: No, but something is clearly going on. Didn't you make
the point if Toni Lewis was there a month without seeing anyone of
consequence.... and I don't get the sense from what Le Duc Tho has
told you and Murray that isn't anything other than a sort of confused
holding pattern. Isn't that your view?

JK: But a holding pattern that has at least a quarter of the day engaged
them.

HAK: Oh yeh, no question. But I mean they are not yet fully clear
what they are going to say when they have us engaged.
And that is what we are waiting for.

JK: Yes. They pace it very slow.

HAK: Because they have a hell of a decision to make.

JK: And did you expect it to be this long before Podgorny went. Must
have been some arranging to do. And I notice he doesn't go through
China. Do you have adequate information on the Lavell incident,
because Pac is an old friend of mine, I am going to be seeing him

HAK: No I would be grateful for anything you gave. Do you know
incidentally that I am going to China next week?

JK: I didn't know that. But I think that is a very appropriate thing to
do. Are you taking press.

HAK: No.

JK: Good thing to do. I will see you.

TELCONE

Laird/Kissinger

1:17 p.m. - 6/14/72

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Ed 1 2/15/8

By MWSARA Date 05/28/84

L: Henry, how are you?

K: Good, Mel, how are you?

L: Two things. First I got your memorandum of the 13th asking that all of the requests for the 1973 budget for strategic forces be submitted over there. I have already done that.

K: Well, only if they're different from the ones you've done.

L: I sent over there a statement back on the 7th and then I sent the full list over on the 10th of June. They're there in your office. I'll send you a little memorandum. . . .

K: That will meet it then.

L: And the only things (?) that are involved here are a little bit more in the satellite program on verification so that we can have a couple of standby satellites and the other has to do with the resubmission of those research and development items that did not get approved in '72.

K: Right and is that the $100 million item?

L: The $100 million item is made up by the satellite program, some intelligence stuff and the items that had not been approved that were submitted in '72.

K: Stennis was in here yesterday and mentioned that. He was in on the war powers issue and now on the Mansfield thing and I frankly didn't know what he was talking about and I said I'd take it up with you. Do you feel you have to have. . .

L: That's over there now.

K: No, but do you feel - could you do without that one item?

L: Which one?

K: The $100 million.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Fc 12758

By MWNARA Date 05/28/94

L: The $100 million is made up of the breakout out of your _______. It's made up of items that are really being resubmitted except for the acceleration of the bomber basing and so we will deploy our bombers and disperse them within the United States when they return. But that's all laid out in that thing and then that counterforce thing which I talked to you about, that's only about $20 million.

K: No, there's no question about that.

L: That's all laid out on page 3 of the statement I sent over to you. Then in my testimony that I sent over in advance, - I'll lay that out in a memorandum.

K: OK, Mel.

L: The problem here is we don't - what we need now is really action and not delay because they're marking up these bills and . . .

K: We're not holding you up.

L: Yes, but you won't get some of this money - not in the strategic field but in the Southeast Asia thing. I'm going to be unable to fund these programs. I've had to open these new ammunition lines and I'm using a deficiency authority from the Civil War. Did you realize that?

K: (Laughter) No, I didn't.

L: I found this law which carries over from the Civil War which allows the Secretary to feed - it's for fod and feeder for the troops and I'm using that authority.

K: Listen I expect any day now you're going to resurrect that Civil War law about how Secretaries of Defense can be replaced only with the advice of the Congress.

L: Of course, this goddamn thing has to do with feeding horses, Henry. I'll show you what I'm using now. I've got every governor in the United States I'm pulling these tanks away from and I've had to take a few and tell them. They're upset that we're taking all the national guard equipment now.

K: Yes, OK, Mel.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

Fd 12156

By

MSARA Date

05/28/94

L: But I'll send you a memo on that. The second thing is you know on this stuff that went up to the Hill, I am in a little disagreement with the interpretations that have been place on certain sections of the - that are contrary really to the testimony I've given already particularly on the G-submarines.

K: In what way?

L: Well, I'll send you a little note on that but they've gone back to the original ACDA position.

K: Which is what? We worked that out in the Verification Panel.

L: I know but the things that went to the Hill are just the opposite.

K: Well it can't be.

L: It is Henry though.

K: On the G-class submarines if they put modern missiles they are counted in the 950.

L: I'll send you a little memo on this Henry.

K: There's no - I mean the G-class aren't free.

L: I understand but of course if you look at that interpretation that's put on in here and then there are about 4 places here that I think there is some disagreement between your position and ACDA's position.

K: Well if there's disagreement between my position and ACDA's I'm going to prevail.

L: But you didn't in the transmission to the Congress.

K: Well, you know - can you let me have that this afternoon? I will have to straighten that out when I meet with the Committees tomorrow morning.

L: All right, I'll send you a little memo on it today.

K: There can't be any disagreement because I negotiated the goddamn thing.

Re: What time will the report be ready?
Let's see. I'm not sure if we have time for it.
Please wait a minute.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.L. V.

NARA Date: 5/13/64

By: W. NARA Date:

05/28/64

TELCOM

Barbara Walters/Henry Kissinger

6/14/72 1:55 p.m.

BW: What a nice surprise. I have been so absolutely exhausted.

HAK: I am getting there.

BW: Tomorrow you leave

HAK: No tonight--I am not sure. What are you doing?

BW: Last week I was in California, where we were covering the primary

HAK: Yeh, I saw you. Somebody told me you were on vacation.

BW: I was, I took a few days off after that and went to the Beverly Hills pool

HAK: So now you are back?

BW: I am back in NY. As a matter of fact we were just talking about you last night because I was with Danny Kaye and he said, "What I have to do is cook Chinese food for Henry Kissinger". And I said I am sure that is just what he is waiting for when he comes home.

HAK: Is he going to be on the West Coast?

BW: He was here and is going back today.

HAK: I'll be out there the first week of July. and the second.

BW: I'll be out there the third week of July--a week after the Democratic convention.

HAK: I'll be back.

BW: I'm going out to do a special and would go out there immediately following the convention.

HAK: If I am still out there early that week, which I might be, will you try to find me.

OCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

It's possible there is a error in the open co
of the bed, or some kind of mistake.
Please check it

By: KH V NASA Date: 5/13/94

By: MW NARA Date: 05/28/94

TELCOM
Walters/Kissinger

Page 2

BW: I will be at the Beverly Hills Hotel. I will definitely be there

HAK: Call the Western White House. Barbara, I wanted your advice on something having to do with television. Don't know whether I ever told you about the nightmarish girl

BW: I hear the book goes on sale on Monday. I thought that's what you were calling about--I had her cancelled. When I went off to California, Jean Salid (?) gave me an advance paperback, and I thought it was just the worst piece of crap I've ever read.

HAK: It is totally outrageous

BW: I read it and I thought, you didn't kiss her, you didn't touch her--you were as nice to her as you are to me or any reporter

HAK: I am a hell of a lot nicer --I like you.

BW: If anyone reads the book they will realize how absurd and ridiculous it is. What troubles me about it is that a lot of people are going to bother to read and will get all this kind of publicity. But we cancelled out totally.

HAK: I am wondering what you recommend I do because this--you know if you wrote a book like this, it would have 50 times the reasons than she did. You I genuinely like. Her, after the first meeting--you know she is intelligent--she just turned into a nightmare.

BW: Our show which has more dignity--essentially the book came last night--it's in paperback as you know, so I knew she was going to be on, so I called Stuart ______ today and said listen, if you put her on am I supposed to be interviewing her--he said yes. I said I can't interview her without saying that this is the worst piece of foolish trash and it is obvious, even from her book that after the first meeting you didn't answer calls--you know I'd either say this on the air or there is no reason to have her around. He said well could we talk to her about what Henry Kissinger is like. I just called Stuart back and said we have cancelled her out indefinitely. But I am sure they will put her on Carson and Cavett and so forth.

Reporters Without a Press Pass
in the City of New York
November 1963
Volume 3, Issue 3

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12953, Sept. 3.5

By K.L. W.

NASA Date 5/13/64

By M.W. NASA Date 05/28/64

Walters/Kissinger
Page 3

HAK: Can you image that I would said to anybody, I am your slave --that I wouldn't do for somebody I liked.

BW: I am just trying to think as we talk--my first direction is always ignore it

HAK: That's is what I have done up to now.

BW: But I just wonder in some things like this, whether you shouldn't make a short and rather humorous and sad statement--not the way you would talk about the glorious ______ when you do it humorously, but kind of like she is kind of a nut

HAK: The Clifford Irving of Henry Kissinger

BW: I wouldn't do that--anything you do on that score makes the book more seem interesting --any kind of statement you give out gives credence to Kissinger's denial of whatever--I almost think the kind of thing you should say is I feel very sorry for Ms. Humlabelle --I am sad that what was one of the many interviews should have produced such an emotional experience in her. I would be flattered if I were not so disturbed for this poor, sick lady--in that vein-- making her pathetic rather than interesting. There are various ways we could do it--one thing we could do if you wanted--when I was talking to Stuart this morning I said the only thing that I did feel that I would do on this book is a sort of by-line piece because it reminds me of the fan magazine stories on Jackie Kennedy which I was reading in the beauty parlor--but on this headline it says "Divorce, divorce Onassis divorce, Jackie swears to go to court and tell the truth" and it turns out to be Onassis' daughter is getting divorced--seems to be the same thing

HAK: You don't find a response from me anywhere in there.

BW: If you wanted, I could do this kind of a thing and say that we --various reporters have talked with you about and your feeling is one mostly pity for Ms. Humlabelle, you feel embarrassed by it--what you feel mostly is sadness that a routine interview should have produced such a senatic response.

HAK: It is up to you; that might not be bad. That isn't why I called you.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1295A, Sec. 3.6

H. E. L. STUART

By: K.J. W.

NARA Date: 5/12/64

By: M. W. NARA Date:

05/28/64

Walters/Kissinger

Page 4

BW: I know that's not why you called me and it is something that I had thought of doing anything, and also if you had called me for that I would call you if I needed a favor.

HAK: Barbara, I asked you for your advice. I didn't ask you to do anything.

BW: Let me do it that way--if anyone does call you about it who seems important, I would say I hardly know her, and am said that this lady seems to make so much of it, I've read the book and you can see that there is nothing to it--but I feel very sorry for her--I would treat it that way--and make no statement. If someone directly asks you. Do it serious, not humorously. I am sad that she has blown it up to such an emotional experience and I offer her my regrets. It is too bad you have to be plagued with it--it is a terrible piece of crap.

HAK: I haven't read the English version yet.

BW: All she talks about is what a wonderful person she is, how tough it was to film this movie with her one little camera and how you avoided her at every turn--

HAK: You know I am not exactly attracted by women, but I found her physically repulsive--she was so persistent.

BW: She looks sort of unattractive in the picture with you and Nixon.

HAK: She is aggressive and I had to change my phone number.

BW: I said to Stuart this morning that what she is so upset about is that you came to Paris and took a very nice girl from CBS and for this she about committed suicide. It's just gossip, I said to Stuart and I won't do the interview for the book.

HAK: I have never taken her out.

BW: That is also clear in the book--that you never took her out, that you never answered letters, that you never returned phone calls, however, if she goes on the shows like Carson and Cavett--they haven't read the book--my advice not to say anything and if asked treat her as you would a sick child.

HARRIS'S
LOVE STORIES
IN TWO VOLUMES
E.D. 1929-30, Sec. 3.5
PUBLISHED 1930-31

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 1929-30, Sec. 3.5

By K.L.Y. NARA Date 5/12/64

January 1-6, 1964

By MW NARA Date 05/29/64

Walters/Kissinger

Page 5

HAK: She will certainly go on Carson and Cavett

BW: I can find out for you. But also I am not terribly sure other shows won't turn her down as ours did. Realistically, she will probably be doing a lot of it--she came over here just to do it. You can also have one line, "of course, you can sympathize for her, because you know she is going to make a great deal of money," inferring that it is a way of hooking into the reputation.

HAK: Barbara, can I take you to lunch or dinner sometime?

BW: I'd love to see you.

HAK: Are you coming down.

BW: I have been terribly proud of you to hear and see what things you have done. Where do you go from here?

HAK: Back to Harvard.

BW: No, you'll never go back to Harvard.

HAK: But I don't know what I am going to do.

BW: You going to be in charge of a large company.

HAK: No, I'm really only good at doing things I believe in. I drive everyone around me crazy, but I get it done.

BW: How is Nancy?

HAK: She is fine.

BW: This time at least, I don't have to wrry about your shopping do I. Charlotte told me she told you that story. She was really cute about it. After this was over--this tiny group of ladies, and I arrived late, but when I finished, a woman came up to me and said Barbara my name is Ann Cox and I want to thank you for what you said about opening the door to peace or some such thing, and I said nothing about the Nixon's at all, and I went home and went to bed that night and woke up, and said Oh my God, Ann Cox and realized who it was--do you know who it is.

OCLASSIFICO
E.O 12958, Secl. 3.6

Walters/Kissinger

Page 6
HAK: No

BW: Tricia's mother-in-law.
HAK: And she's such an awful woman.

BW: She was a nice grey-haired looking lady and she was sitting
next to Gab Talley-- I had talked about really light things--shopping
in the stores--nothing that was important.

HAK: We missed you in Moscow.

BW: I missed being there--except in a way it was good I wasn't there.
The week after I was asked to come and speak at Harvard and
John Fairbank was there, and it was exciting for me.
Don't be concerned about this, we'll do something next week--just
treat it as though she is making a lot of money off you because that
is exactly what it is. I'll come down and have lunch one day when
you return.

HAK: Would you do that?

Re: [insert telephone number]
the name of the recipient
Re: [insert telephone number]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KML

NARA. Data: 5/12/04

By: MW NARA Data: 05/28/04

TELCOM
President/Mr. Kissinger

6/14/72 3:00 p.m.

RN:....(tape came on late) on the release of AnLoc.

HAK: I am not absolutely sure how relieved it is; but I think:
a message from you to Thieu in general would be....

RN: The only problem that I was thinking, when you read of these
various things, maybe you don't want to do it, I think a message
to him--I wasn't really thinking of it for a way of encouraging him,
because I would think he would be damned encouraged anyway, maybe
we shouldn't....

HAK: I wouldn't hang myself on the relief on AnLoc, they may
come back and take it.

RN: I suppose they could.

HAK: I just don't trust that situation enough. They would have suffered
crippling loses there.

RN: Okay maybe we won't bother.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Fc 12/5/8

By: M/W NARA Date: 05/28/89

TELCON

Senator Mathias/Mr. Kissinger

6/14/72 3:12 p.m.

SM: I can't tell you how grateful I am

HAK: Not at all, it was a pleasure.

SM: You were extremely generous and at the same time creditable.
not

HAK: I tell you the Vice President is/in complete agreement with me. He thinks I should have done it for him some time.

SM: [laughter]. I was simply great. And it really laid a tremendous
difference in mood and spirit and I think the President will be much
better for it and I know I will

HAK: I enjoyed it--I'm glad you gave me a chance to do it, and it
reflected my real feelings.

SM: When do you leave for China?

HAK: Tonight or tomorrow morning.

SM: If this Mansfield thing comes on while you are away--the
Mansfield/Vietnam not the Mansfield/NATO, who in your office
is available to do a little talking--

HAK: General Haig

SM: I have a feeling, and this doesn't relate directly to you appearance in Baltimore, but I just have a feeling that the situation now is a totally different situation than it was than in previous time in this whole cycle.

HAK: That's what I think.

SM: I just think it ought to make a difference in the way some of us
who have consistently supported those resolutions feel--and I'll get
in touch with General Haig.

HAK: I really think, Mac, there is somey things going on now that
no good can come out of these resolutions and only damage.

TELCON
Mathias/Kissinger

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Ed 2/15/8

By: MW SARA Date: 05/28/89

SM: This is sort of the gut feeling I have--that heretofore it might have encouraged negotiations, now they become a blockage, I think

HAK: That's my feeling. I wasn't going to approach you on this,

SM: Plus the fact that I think the big power situation has changed.

HAK: Look, you have a situation where we have reason to believe that Moscow and maybe Peking are encouraging Hanoi to negotiate. Let's not give Hanoi the counter argument of saying they really got us domestically, if they can just hold another four months.

SM: What is the chance of some--and we can't talk about very satisfactorily now, but some let up in the acts of force that are now under way.

HAK: We hope..

SM: We don't have to go into it, but it seems to me

HAK: they're not excluded.

SM: Well, that would be a helpful thing. And I'll talk to General Haig, I'm still up in Boston.

HAK: That's what I gathered. Well, Mac, I appreciate your raising this.

SM: As I say, it is not related directly to your visit, but I do think the time shift changed and you have to be pretty obtuse to see it and I'll talk to him and have a good trip--and that was a great outpouring the other night which I think ought to make you feel--they turned down as many people as were there.

HAK: I really like the people I met. So you are not excatly the most unpopular man there. If I ever run for anything in Maryland, I'm going to ask for your support.

SM: There were some awfully good people there of all descriptions. I will also be grateful.

HAK: It was a privilege--I have admired you and I was glad you gave me the time.

SM: We'll see you when we get back.

Re: Question Three: did the open letter to the State Department Personnel Staff get to Kissinger?

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12938, Secr. 3.6

TelCon: 4:02-6/14/72

Mr. Kissinger/
Ambassador Rabin

NARA Date 5/12/04

By W/NARA Date 05/28/74

K: Hello.

R: Hello.

K: Mr. Ambassador.

R: I am the most undiplomatic diplomat in Washington.

K: You are doing fine.

R: You know I have _got_ some problems. Hello?

K: Yes.

leader

R: Have you _seen the_ in the Washington Post.

K: Yes.

R: _If you can_ advise there that no one said any words whatsoever especially not to the Post of you.

K: Yes. We will keep quiet. XXXXX

ant

R: That is the most important part.

K: No, you can be sure we will keep quiet.

R: That is what I am interested in the present because the Prime Minister will come up _there not_ too bad.

K: I promise you we will say nothing.

R: That is fine.

K: OK.

R: Thank you very much.

K: All the best.

R: All the best.

K: Good bye.

The Times, Sunday, October 15, 1972
Page 1 of 2
London, United Kingdom

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.5

By KHL W NASA Date 5/12/72

By MW NARA Date 05/28/72

TELCOM

Ron Zeigler/Mr. Kissinger

6/14/72 4:40

HAK: Ron, are you with Dianne

RJ: Now, I am with Tim Gannon of the Wall Street Journal.

HAK: Isn't that impressive. What is your thinking about my statement tomorrow, can we hold it until after I am through reading it, or do we have to hand it out before I give it--I much prefer giving it out afterwards.

RJ: Yeh, and then that could be the first thing that would move--let's do it that way.

HAK: Then we can take a short break.

RJ: Let's do it that way.

HAK: Otherwise people will be sitting there shuffling the paper

RJ: Good that's the way we'll do it Henry.

HAK: Good, Henry.

TelCon:5:02-6/14/72

Mr. Kissinger/
Stu Alsop

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Ed 12/56

By: MW NARA Date: 05/28/74

A: Hello Henry.

K: Stewart, you are harder to keep up with than I am.

A: Well, that is saying a great deal. I thought you had already left on one of your global missions.

K: I am leaving tonight and I just wanted to pick(?) up on the most difficult columnist in town.

A: Well I am still - they make me ______ three times a week and then I come back and feel OK. So I am now feeling OK. They shove this stuff into me and I quiver like a ______ and get a temperature of 104 and then suppose to pick up my defense. Well, we will see what happens.

K: Has it done anything yet?

A: The ______ has come back rather nicely but what has worried everybody is - the damn white cells and they are still (right in the cellar?) but we have got our fingers crossed. But I have(?) got your work cut out for you Henry.

K: Yes.

A: When will you come back?

K: A week from Friday and let's have lunch after that.

A: I would love to do that. I should be out of this hospital certainly by then I hope.

K: I have the willowy Miss Maginnes coming that weekend and if you promise not to make any passes I may bring her by to say hello.

A: Well you ______ wouldn't be able to come out to the country with the willowy Miss Maginnes would you?
(Mrs.)

K: Mes. she isn't yet.

A: I mean Miss. I correct myself.

K: Can I keep that open - because I don't know

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Fc 12/58

By [W]NARA Date 05/28/58

A: Keep it open, we might get the Bradons and you and Miss Maginnes - it would be a lot of fun. We have a nice place out in the country you know.

K: Stuart, I would come for you even if it weren't absolutely nice.

A: Well, you know it is comfortable.

K: Right. Well maybe - how long does it take to get there?

A: About an hour.

K: Well maybe Saturday afternoon. It would be fun if you could.

A: I would love to see her and I promise not to make a pass.

K: But we - give me your telephone number in the country.

A: 334-7557 (on cardex on Irene's desk it reads 834-7557 - but sounds like Mr. Alsop is saying 334-7557)

K: And area code?

A: 301. It is not far from Camp David, but it is closer than that.

K: OK

A: That will be fine.

K: And I may do that and then I may see you that weekend. If that not I'll see you soon the week after.

A: Have we got a little light at the end of the tunnel Henry?

K: Listen these guys are human. ______ but not for your column but I think we have got them pretty well isolated diplomatically and we have beaten their brains in militarily so - if it weren't for our election I think - I think we can confidently say that within six months of the election that war will be over one way or the other.

A: Sounds good. It could be over now if it weren't for the damn election.

K: If it weren't for the election, really they have got no place to go. That really is now true.

A: I have one hope left. Mr. [McGovern?])

K: That is right. They have no other hope - because literally they got in

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Fc 12958
By MW NARA Date 05/28/94

the position militarily(?) where they are throwing good money after bad.

A: Sure they are.

K: And - we are in the position where we are actually hoping for them to attack so we can use up more of their forces.

A: Did Joe tell you about John Paul Vann's letter? I think he will publish it next tomorrow.

K: Yes, he told me about it.

A: I thought it was very impressive.

K: And you have to remember that is the case in Kontum where they were up against the lousiest division - but above all it is the tremendous toll they have taken.

A: Yes. Unfortunately, they seem to be incapable of pronouncing the word 'uncle.'

K: Well in their way - you know they are making more noises than they ever have.

A: Yes, that is true.

K: But of course when you have George McGovern offering them more than they are asking for - it is a terrific temptation.

A: (Laughing) Yes, __________ a chance.

K: That's right. That is their only hope right now.

A: Absolutely.

K: And in fact it is not their only hope right now - they have got no possibility of improving their position.

A: You are not worried about Hue anymore?

K: Well Hue is the one place where they could still score theoretically a victory but I say to myself if we can't hold them with a 180 B-52s, 800 F-4s

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Ed 12/15
By: MW SARA Date: 05/28/19

and what we have got there, then you know they are unstoppable.

A: Yes, then throw in your cards.

K: But I think we are going to be able to put somewhat ______ higher on them there. We have never had this fire power there before. And they are up against the three best South Vietnamese divisions. (end of tape)

(new tape) and if they don't take it they may not have a God damn thing left.

luck

A: That is right. Well, good luck to you, Henry and I will see you I hope when you get back and I hope that that time My ______ will be roaring away.

K: We all pray for it.

A: And I pray for your mission.

K: Thank you Stewart. All the best to you. I will be thinking of you.
Good bye.

H. J. Kissinger, the press, and the press conference?

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: K.L. V NASA Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Henry Kissinger/Secretary Rogers

6/14/72 5:30 p.m.

BR: Say, I don't want to heckle you on this, but want to check with you on this to be sure that if you want to exclude Jerry Smith, I gather the press will be there tomorrow too, huh?

HAK: I don't know what the rules are.

BR: I really feel if the press is going to be there, you ought to have Jerry there.

HAK: Doing what?

BR: At least to be there, I mean if they have all those members of Congress and press there and you don't even have ______ there

HAK: Yeh, I was talking to the President and Haldeman and they weren't too eager, but let me raise it again.

BR: And there may be some question of something that happened ______ and he could answer one of them--it just seems to be an unnecessary shuffle when the chief negotiator is excluded, and he is going to have to testify anyway--I didn't feel so strongly about it until I heard the press is going to be there.

HAK: I have to check--I don't doubt if if that's the case.

BR: I gather there is going to be a po

HAK: I didn't think there could be enough room for the press--

BR: No, just a po, I think it will look as if the president----I don't think I have to be there, because I have to testify and I can be busy on other things--we don't want to create the impression that Jerry's nose is out of joint or that the President doesn't have confidence in him.

HAK: Yeh.

BR: We're too far down the road to do that, it seems to me and the idea some how or other that he is not enthusiastic about this--what you said today may be completely right

The President's Office
The White House
The President's Desk
Transcript of Speech

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.5

By: KMLY NASA Date: 5/12/64

Rogers/Kissinger

Page 2

HAK: No, I am sure he is enthusiastic. I think the President has two concerns about him. One is that he is a lousy briefer and two loads it too much on the dark side.

BR: I think the President must have gotten that from what people told him, because I doubt it if he read it--you know some people think is great--I talked to some people in Moscow and they thought that Jerry did a fine job--Bob said he hadn't done a good job; some congressmen think he is great, some Senators think he is fine--just a different style.

HAK: Let me raise it again.

BR: I think it is unnecessary trouble, I think you can go right ahead with this thing--there may be some times when something will come up about what happened and they'll think--

HAK: I'll raise it again.

BR: I wish you would, good, thank you.

Huygk is�m deeln kie
op de Nooit van ondern.
Regering Sint Ann.
Huygk is�m deeln kie
op de Nooit van ondern.

OECIASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

6/14/72

NASA Date 5/12/04

TELCONE

Shultz/Kissinger

6/14/72 5:30

AS: Did the gisha girls treat you improperly?

HAK: They never unfortunately treat anyone improperly.

AS: Were the Ingersolls pleasant?

HAK: Very good and I took him along on everything except Sato
who insisted on being totally alone, but I think he was very happy.

AS: Good

HAK: And I was very pleased with him. Y

AS: You mentioned that we ought to have a discussion about the
Canadian trade problems.

HAK: Yeh, but I don't know whether or not you know I am going
off to China again.

AS: Yes, you told me, when are you leaving?

HAK: Tomorrow night.

AS: I see, when do you get back?

HAK: The end of the following week. Let's wait till then.

AS: All right, very fine. Anything new or different?

HAK: No; Podgorny is in Hanoi, as I told you.

AS: You regard that as good, don't you.

HAK: Oh yeh, that was programmed.

AS: Okay, have a good trip.

The President of the Republic of China

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12939, Sec. 3.5

6/14/72

NASA Date 5/12/72

TELCONE
President/Mr. Kissinger

5:55 6/14/72

RN: How did you get along with the Wall Street Journal today? "

HAK: Oh, I did very well with them.

RN: Good I'm glad you did

HAK: I think they will be all right--I gave them a real strong pitch.

RN: Good, it gave you a little warm up for tomorrow

HAK: Not just on that--but on how you are trying to save the national
morality, and to give the country some confidence.

RN: Oh, you went into Vietnam too, then. I see. That's good, Henry
I'm glad you're taking off tomorrow. Good decision, Don't waver
from it, because believe me I'll handle Echeverria.

HAK: Oh no, that's not my problem. My problem is how he would
consider it.

RN: He'll consider it fine, because I will also say that after you return
some time this fall, you'll come down and see him again.

HAK: That would be good, fine.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

U. S. Air Force
U. S. Air Force
U. S. Air Force
U. S. Air Force
U. S. Air Force
U. S. Air Force
U. S. Air Force
U. S. Air Force
U. S. Air Force
U. S. Air Force

6:16 p.m. 6/14/72
By: K.H. V. NASA Date: 5/12/72

TELCOM

Ambassador Rabin, Mr. Kissinger

6:16 p.m. 6/14/72

HAK: Mr. Ambassador. One thing, your favorite Senator from New York is driving me crazy--he's coming to Israel and he has some hot plans for a settlement of the Jordon thing.

AR: Well, I had a long talk with him

HAK: Which he wants me --I just want you to know what my view is. I would like to have him think that I have done something for him, but I don't want you to think that he represents us.

AR: Well, I had a long talk with him--I tried very politely to explain that as I see the situation nothing can come out of it and unless there is any need to take a decision, there will be no decision in Israel, but then he stressed why I would like to go etc, etc. I could not say that he is welcome. But no one has any intention really to discuss it with him.

HAK: Now I have a dual problem--one is to make sure since he is on the foreign Relations Committee and his ego is not exactly underdeveloped, if you could over there let him know that I put in some --you know I got in touch with you to treat him well.

AR: Oh that's good.

HAK: You see what I mean, and if you could flatter him a bit, because I have asked, you'd listen to him, whatever. I'm not asking you to do anything.

AR: I know, because he said to me about two or three months ago that he would like to talk to me but he first had to refer to you and since I didn't ______ very much he said to me only about three weeks ago.

HAK: When I have something to tell you, I tell you... directly.

AR: I know, I know.

HAK: And I do want to talk to you about this problem, some time during the summer simply to plan a general strategy at some point, but there

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 92958, Sec. 3.5

Re: [ ] Phone line open to Rabin, Kissinger
Re: [x] Phone line open to Rabin, Kissinger

6/14/94
NASA Date 5/12/94

TELCONE

Rabin, Kissinger

is no hurry about it at all.

AR: Yeh, I don't see a need.

HAK: And since you won't get under any pressure from us. The
situation is exactly as we left it and I will keep tracking it along.

AR: I really believe at the end of the month or the beginning of
July it would be advisable that...

HAK: I will be back from China on the 23rd and during the following
week, you and I should have a long talk.

AR: Well, I will be in Mexico until the 29th.

HAK: Well, I'm leaving on the 30th. Could you come back a day
earlier.

AR: I will try. If it will be on the 29th, I can arrange maybe to
come on the 28th.

HAK: Yeh, I can meet you on the 29th.

AR: All right.

HAK: Because I will be leaving for the west coast on the 30th and it
might be good if you and I had a talk. But if you could take care of
Javits in a way that satisfies his ego but doesn't get you people
confused that he is representing us.

AR: He will be there on the 6th, 7th, and 5th. Just to give you
an example, he came with a proposal that he meet with the Prime
Minister and a group of ministers together--the PM was almost
perplexed to him. We'll take care of it.

HAK: Give him the feeling that you are doing something for him because
the WH asked you to, that you wouldn't have done otherwise. But as far as
substance you won't get into any problem with us. We have not fixed view
on that and no need pressure.

AR: All right.

HAK: Good

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.5

Re: phone tree from the open line
in the State of New York
Public Records Unit

By: K.L. L.

NASA Date: 5/13/04

TelCon: 6:22-6/14

Mr. Kissinger
Mr. Flanigan

Tape

(Did not start at beginning of conversation)

F: It is a mammoth one. I don't know whether you think you can do anything about it or not.

K: What is it?

F: There is a vote on minor loan $12 million to Iraq and State feels very strongly that we are jeopardizing our position with regard to other Arab countries if we vote against it. Treasury feels that in line with the President's expropriation policy we must vote against it. I must say I agree with Treasury.

K: I agree with Treasury.

F: On the other hand we are going to lose because the French and the British are going to vote for it. The French indicate that they think as we think that the loan should be delayed. Let's see whether the Iraqies are honestly

K: Well, can't we get that done?

F: McNamara won't delay the vote.

K: Alright, I will ask him. When is it?

F: Tomorrow.

K: Alright, I will try.

F: Will you try. Now the British may be against the delay but we had a cable from the French saying they are for a delay according to Julius Katz at the State Department who read me the cable and it sounds

K: OK, I will call McNamara.

F: Thank you.

K: Goodbye.

F: Goodbye.

Re: John Henry the open man
in his suit at the court
McNamara's office

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 1295B, Sept. 3.5

TelCon-6:25-6/14/72

Mr. Kissinger
Mr. McNamara

By: K.H. W. NASHA, Date: 5/13/04

K: Hello

M: Hi, Henry - what are you trying to do - follow John Connally's example. My God, off to Peking again. I can't keep up with you.

K: I tell you, I love that Chinese food. I'll tell you another thing. I am getting more and more to your state of mind about this god damn military.

M: Say, I don't know how you put up with it. I had no idea that <u>this</u> <u>E</u> Lavelle case was what it was.

K: Well,

M: It is unbelievable. I only read between the lines but I must have really screwed you up.

K: Well, the Lavelle case - I didn't know it until it was already over of course.

M: But don't you think this had some effect on some of these other actions you were planning?

K: Marginally, but certainly in March he will be out on the one hand <u>XMEX</u> turning down the <u>E</u> Joint Chiefs and that maniac - you know then it wasn't even effective. You know, if we had to prove the recommendation at least we would have gotten ________

M: Why of course. That is just a few pin pricks at the God damn thing.

K: And of

M: What is your latest problem?

K: Oh God, you know the way they fly around near the Chinese border - it is just not to be believed.

M: Yes. That is very dangerous Henry. They can slip over there without intention you know - the navigation just isn't that ________

K: I have news for you. They have done it. Four successive days.

M: (laughing)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.5

- 2 -

K: So now we are back to the old buffer zone.

M: Well Henry I lived through the same thing.

K: That is why I say I am thinking of you now. Unreasonable restraints, you give them no restraints and they uncap your whole policy.

M: Yes, well I know.

K: What I am calling you about is a loan to Iraq - that you are passing on tomorrow.

M: Yes.

K: And we are here embroiled in a God damnest fight between State and Treasury and State tells us that France would be willing to delay the vote if you were willing to delay the vote.

M: I don't think that is right Henry. I just checked this morning - and I am told. Now I haven't myself talked to the ______ I have been busy today but I checked on it and I am told that they are strongly in favor of. That isn't frankly *why* I am proceeding but it is a factor that I

K: Flanigan just called me. I haven't checked into the facts. He claims that Julius Katz at State claims to know that the French side would be glad to delay.

M: Well, I will look into it. I doubt it. I don't think it *really* like hell and I had lunch with Charles Walker today at Treasury and I was talking to him about it. And he said the U.S. was going to vote no. And I said well I am not going to get into this discussion again, but I just want to draw your attention to what I understand to be the facts. That the French, the British and the Dutch who are primary parties at interest here will all vote yes. And assuming for a minute that the U.S. is right on substance - that the banks shouldn't go ahead and the deal should not be passed. Assume that for the minute. I think the U.S. is insane Henry in fighting a losing battle.

K: That is what they are pretty good at though.

M: Yes, but it doesn't make a *K*KKK God damn bit of sense to me and as I said that isn't frankly the reason I am going forward. I have got to follow a consistent policy here and I have got to be able to explain to people why I do certain things and we think in the Bank we

A. M. E. T. S. T. F. R. S. C. S. U. C. S. U. S. A.

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHLW
NASA Date: 5/12/04

- 5 -

all follow that consistent policy. Now our conclusion is supported by action of France, Britain and the Netherlands. And the U.S. - it seems to me - ought to be asking itself are we right actually in substances in taking this position and are we right indeed technically. How the hell are we going to vote and incur all the amity(?) of the XX Arabs and lose. So, I will check right now frankly.

K: I frankly don't know the facts of the case. I haven't looked into it and let me so if this the situation that can at least xx sustain.

M: Well, it is much better.

K: I mean I am not clear why - if the British and the French are being expropriated

M: And the Dutch.

K: And the Dutch, if they vote for it why we have to vote against it.

M: This is exactly what I xx said to Charles Walker. I wasn't trying to argue this case but

K: XX If it were our money(?) I would have no hesitation.

M: I was using this as an illustration Henry, what I think is just stupidity on the part of the U.S. Another illustration for example was Dayan(?) The same damn case. Aly Kahn(?) was about to be ______ I don't think actually had been at the date of the loan but it was about to be - everybody knew it was going to happen so for all practical purposes I had to face the fact that it had been nationalized. But Guyana was a primary concern to the Canadian government. Now the U.S. also had an interest in it. I understand that but the primary party of interest was Canada. Canada came to me and said we think you ought to go ahead. I thought we ought to go ahead to but Canada came to me and said after consultation at the highest levels of the Canadian Government they thought the Bank ought to go ahead for two reasons. (A) They felt this was the best way to get compensation for Guyana by going ahead and not spitting in the face of Bernam(?) down there. But they were just scared to death, but if they opposed Bernam(?) on this thing and jerked the rug out from under them they would end up with a Communist government in Guyana. So we went ahead, the U.S. voted no and ultimately we got a reasonable settlement out of the deal and the Communist didn't take over. Now I told the U.S. ahead of time you are going to lose on this. I have got the votes. And they went ahead and laughed. But I just think that is

Re: Kissinger's call to the French

Date: 6/14/72

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12938, Sect. 3.6

By: K.J. W. NASHA, Date: 5/13/04

TelCon: 6:36-6/14/72
Mr. Kissinger/
Mc. McNamara

K: Hello.

M: Henry, the French Director, a man named Marq ______ (?) who is also a director of the Fund and he is also a Minister in the French Embassy, I can't find him in his Fund office, the Bank office or the Embassy, and I tried him at home and he isn't there either. But by an odd coincidence I am going to have dinner tonight with the French Ambassador. I will talk to him and it is very possible that this French Director will be present as well.

K: Good.

M: In any case I will talk to the Ambassador or

K: And I'll see whether I can get our people to sustain.

M: I think that is much the best thing Henry. And if by any chance you know - the French are anxious to avoid this tomorrow or willing to avoid it I will try to avoid it. My problem is that I have to have a consistent policy that I can stand up before 117 countries and defend. And I can't appear to be favoring the U.S. or favoring the ______

K: I understand and that is the only way you can do it.

M: Yes, but also I will look into it tonight.

K: Thank you.

M: Thank you good bye.