Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
The President
10/17/73; 8:44 a.m.

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: What's new on the diplomatic and military front this morning.

K: On the military front it looks still like a stalemate. On the diplomatic front -- all the intelligence analysts who don't know what is going on are now analyzing that something is going on simply because of the Russian visit, the low-key comments from Arab countries, and so forth. I don't think anything will go off until Kosygin has left Cairo.

P: Yeah, yeah.

K: And that's the big . . .

P: The question is whether -- what he is there for -- whether to gin it up or cool it down.

K: It's inconceivable -- well, either way, Mr. President, we are not slowing anything down just because he is there. We are pouring in arms at a rate about 30% greater than they do. Our total tonnage today should start exceeding theirs. We are not -- as I said -- we are not slowing anything down but it's inconceivable to me that he is going to gin it up.

P: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

K: And there is still . . .

P: You haven't received any message from him?

K: We won't until he gets back, I am sure. But their press is still mute and I think they are trying to work something out. Now whether that is possible with the Egyptians, I don't know. All the information we have is that the Egyptians have been taking a tougher line than they have.

P: This Israeli raid was not that big, huh?

K: Apparently not.

P: I gathered that.

K: There is a tank battle going on now in the Sinai and we don't have any report of its outcome yet. Now, with these four Foreign Ministers, Mr. President, I . . .

2

P: I have read the talking points.

K: You have?

P: Yeah.

K: The major point, remember, is that meeting was set before we did anything. They are not coming here to protest.

P: Yes.

K: And I would not float any particular idea on them because they are not the ones that are going to be able negotiate it and the particular ideas are already before the Egyptians and Russians.

P: Yeah. Well, when they come down to say Israel must withdraw to the '67 border, what do you say.

K: You say that should be negotiated after a ceasefire.

P: Well, to be negotiated -- does it mean -- do we agree to that goal?

K: Well, I think it is unattainable, Mr. President, and in my conversations I have always fudged it and said that is an issue that should be addressed within the context of the Security Council Resolution 242 and the major point to make to these people is to separate the ceasefire from the post-ceasefire and the argument that I found very effective is -- they want America to engage itself in the diplomacy afterwards -- that you promised to do. But that means also now that the war has to be brought to an end under conditions which enable us to be in touch with all of the parties. And secondly that if we now try to settle it at the result of the war it will be an endless negotiations with the war going on.

P: That's right. Well if we aren't there to work on the settlement, it leaves them with no other option -- just beat the hell out of the Israelis.

K: To have an endless war to push them back.

P: We are the only ones who can influence the Israelis.

K: And that is a point to make. Another point to make is that the military situation has already changed as a result of the war.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Annex</td></tr><tr><td>By: AHRA. Date 10/17/73</td></tr></table>

3

P: Oh, it's changed. How do you mean?

K: Well, they will say how do we know that after a ceasefire there
won't be a stalemate. And one point to make to them is that the situation
has changed strategically. That no country now can claim supremacy in
the area anymore and therefore they have to rely on . . .

P: In other words, basically, that Israel can no longer claim supremacy.

K: Right. I wouldn't phrase it that way because . . .

P: I understand. All right, I've got the word.

K: I talked to the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia yesterday extending
your invitation to the King and he was very pleased. In fact, you can
hold him back for a few minutes when the others leave.

P: Yeah.

very moderate and

K: And do two things -- thank him for the constructive role he has played
all week and secondly saying you hope to see the King as soon as a
ceasefire is achieved as can be mutually arranged. I would tie it to the
ceasefire, Mr. President, because otherwise they'll have another reason
for delay.

P: Yeah.

K: And we don't want him -- it's not in his interest to be in the forefront
of the diplomacy because he will be stuck with all the problems.

P: After the ceasefire . . .

K: After a ceasefire -- they may want to get him over here before.

P: We don't want that.

K: No. That would not be advantageous.

P: We don't want anybody.

K: I think by tomorrow this thing is going to break one way or the other.
It may break unfavorably but then Kosygin goes back to Moscow . . .

4

Have you seen the New York Times blasting the Nobel Prize?

P: Why have the blasted it?

K: B_e cause they can't bear the thought the war in Vietnam has ended.

P: That's amusing.

K: They should call it the war prize. All the liberals all screaming their heads off.

P: Really?

K: George Ball.

P: Why is he screaming?

K: He just made a snide comment.

P: What -- that the war is not over -- or what?

K: That the Nobel Prize Commitee has a sense of humor.

P: Uh-huh.

K: They can't bear the thought -- you know, Mr. President, when they said the detente didn't work. They never say the detente enabled us to settle the Vietnam war because that is the thing they cannot bear -- with honor.

P: Yeah, that's right. When we stick to the honor -- that's the last straw.

K: Yeah.

P: All right.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Rush
10/17/73; 9:21 a.m.

K: Ken.

R: Yes, Henry.

K: Ken, we have been diddling around for two days now with this
Supplemental.

R: Right.

K: Everyone here agrees that it must go up today.

R: Right.

K: It is nuts for us to waste this time in a sort of what I am sure is
insane bureaucratic squabbling that is now going on.

R: Well, Henry, I will get into it.

K: Let's put in a figure today and find the rationale for it later.

R: Right. Right. I will get into it. I told them to get the thing in today.
I will check it and be sure that it gets in today.

K: Good. Many thanks.

R: Okay, Henry.

KL Bye.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Kaul (India)
10/17/73; 9:28 a.m.

K: Hello.

Kaul: Good morning.

K: Hello, Mr. Ambassador, how are you?

Kaul: I am very well, thank you. How are you?

K: I am fine. Mr. Ambassador, I am afraid it won't be possible for
me to see your Ambassador.

Kaul: He has left, actually. He had to go back but he gave me the low
down. If you think it is of interest to you I could come over. Otherwise.

K: I can't do it this morning. Let me call you -- uh. Maybe we can
do it for about 15 minutes at the State Department around 2:30.

Kaul. Yes, that will be all right.

K: Good. 2:30. See you then. Bye.

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>CLASSIFIED</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>DATE 10/17/73</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>TO H. Kissinger</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>FROM J. Kaul</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>RECEIVED</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

TELCONE

Ambassacor Scali/HAK

October 17, 1973/9:30 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Henry, John.

K: Yes John, how are you?

S: Pretty good. I have a quick question before I go up to the Hill to talk about Puerto Rico. Is there any chance of my sitting in with you and the President on that 11:00 meeting. For 2 reasons. (1) I will not participate (2) it would be sort of an indication that we haven't given up on the U.N.

K: The President just never has anybody in on these meetings.

S: Alright. I just didn't know what the prospects were. I just wanted to get an additional feel. Can I sit in on your geographic thing.

K: Absolutely. 12:15.

S: Thank you. Bye.

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Originately 6-23-73</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>By AHARA, Date 6-16-73</td>
  </tr>
</table>

TELCON

Sec. Clements/HAK

October 17, 1973/9:35 a.m.

K: Hello.

C: Hi Henry.

K: How are you?

C: Fine.

K: Bill, we feel very strongly, I'm at the White House now, that we should get that supplemental up today and to stop diddling around with exact figures. Let's just get a figure.

C: We're ready Henry. I looked at the draft last night.

K: Good. What is it? 31/2.

C: No Henry, its 2.9. The reason its 2.9 is because we found on investigation that the 1.7 that you heard me talk about in the meeting yesterday which is the credit to date, that cannot be cross-referenced to this supplemental. There's no way. So that 2.9 that we're coming up with is in fact a net increase greater than the other number.

K: Good. But you're putting in something for others.

C: Absolutely. There is 500 million dollars in there plus Cambodia.

K: Good.

C: That's the whole thing now. I can get a draft of this, I mean I can get you a copy of this draft over there immediately but I think that Bill Timmons has already got it.

K: We all feel that it is essential to get it in today in case the diplomacy breaks.

C: Fine.

K: Can you do that.

C: Yes we can Henry. I was going to bring this up for review at the WASG this afternoon and I feel like you ought to look at this thing and be fully aware of what we do before we drop it in that hopper. Would you like for some of us to come over there and brief you about 15 minutes on it or something.

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

10/17/73 9:42 a.m.

K: Hello

D: How are you?

K: Okay.

D: Three things, first this is a--Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko asked me to congratulate you heartily with the Nobel Prize.

K: Thank you, I appreciate that.

D: And they would really like to congratulate you. Second, I have instructions to tell you on a very strictly confidential basis for you and for President Nixon, I am to mention to him and you that we are now having consultations with Arab Leaders.

K: Yes, and Kosygin is in Cairo.

D: Yeh, this is exactly what they asked me to tell you. But you already know.

K: No, no we know a Soviet VIP is in Cairo, we've told the Israelis to stay away from Cairo and the Cairo airport.

D: This is Kosygin.

K: We didn't have it confirmed.

D: But they specifically asked to tell you and to the President --

K: I hope you have noticed that we have tried to keep things very quiet here.

D: No, I know. I noticed that it is on low key under the circumstances. But this is really for your information.

K: You know we cannot help if there is speculation because

D: No, no, I understand

K: Frankly, we know a Soviet VIP plane is there. And therefore a lot of people know something.

D: No, I understnad.

K: But you can be sure that we will not confirm it in any official way or leak it.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012057
By: N.M. Spada 00404

D: Yeh, I understand.
This is just they asked me specifically to tell --he is there in connection
with this consultation and including a consult with the about ___ formula
issue proposal--

K: Anatol, you should understand because I don't want to mislead you, the ceasefire formula--the one on Saturday, we had discussed with the Israelis--this formula, we have not yet discussed with the Israelis.

D: About the 242?

K: Yes.

D: 242.

K: Yes. But we think they will accept it, but we didn't want frankly our press to be agitated against us.

D: Yeh, no, no.

K: So there may be 24 hours after if you come back with something.

D: Yes, I understand.

K: I just -- don't want you people to be misled =

D: Yes,

K: You can be sure that what we said to you we will stand by.

D: Hm huh. And the last one, Henry, here is some oral ___ considerations
by Mr. Brezhnev to the President. It is not immediate in the sense
of proposals, but so to speak of our relations in really good terms, I should
say in a quiet way, it is on four pages--probably--it's oral however, maybe
I will send it to you--nothing really

K: Can you send it over within the next hour.

D: I could send it right away.

K: Send it over, just for our records.

D: Just for your own. And if you have some comments or other, please let me know.

K: Okay.

D: I could come to you anytime--or by telephone.

Page 3

K: You know our policy as I have told you, is to try to really to the utmost to not only keep the detente going, but to strengthen it.

D: Yeh, this is really what--this too--this oral consideration--by Brezhnev. I think it is rather helpful, just for the whole background--there is nothing immediate or specifically new, but in general how it is presented, I think you will find it interesting.

K: Good.

D: Okay. Nothing else for the time being, no?

K: No, we are waiting for you.

D: I understand. This foreign minister not yet--in your office. The foreign ministers of ________

K: No, they are coming in at 11:30, but we don't think we should give them this formula do you?

D: No--well it's up to you, but I don't know I doubt very much if their reaction will ________ but you may have better indications that we have, but this is my impression, because they are under the pressure from ________

K: No, no we will wait for you before we make an open initiative.

D: Okay. Be in touch.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

E012055

Authority
BY: W.N.ande

0030

TELCONE
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

10/17/73 9:42 a.m.

K: Hello

D: How are you?

K: Okay.

D: This is Kosygin.

D: No, no, I understand

D: No, I understand.

Page 2

D: Yeh, I understand.
This is just they asked me specifically to tell --he is there in connection
with this consultation and including a consult with the about formula
issue proposal--

D: About the 242?

K: Yes.

D: 242.

D: Yeh, no, no.

D: Yes, I understand.

D: Yes,

D: Hm huh. And the last one, Henry, here is some oral considerations
by Mr. Brezhnev to the President. It is not immediate in the sense
of proposals, but so to speak of our relations in really good terms, I should
say in a quiet way, it is on four pages--probably--it's oral however, maybe
I will send it to you--nothing really

K: Okay.

Page 3

K: Good.

D: Okay. Be in touch.

K: Bye.

TELCORN

Mr. William Randolph Hearst
Secretary Kissinger

10/17/73 10:02 a.m.

H: Thank you for getting on the phone. Congratulations--and that's twice
within a week or so, I must say you are deserving of that big job.

K: Thank you

H: You deserve the peace prize, but I must say that other son-of-a-bitch
didn't deserve to share it with you. I swear to God, isn't it amazing
when you have to bomb them to the table and then they give him a prize
--he didn't live up to a damn thing he promised, has he?

K: I couldn't agree more.

H: Listen, Henry, honest to goodness, I appreciate also the fact that
there's going to be a Hearst writer on--I'm going to put Johnny Wallich
on the airplane.

K: Okay.

H: He's the --a capable member of our group you know of the two of us.
And he's fine--do you like him a lot.

K: I like him very much--he's a fine man.

H: Yeh, he's a good boy. Now Henry, look something very, very crucial,
I'm going to be in Tokyo anyway for reasons that I'm not going to bother
boring you with--it's a personal reason and so, if somebody falls off the
airplane or something like--you can let me know in Tokyo--I'll be in touch
with you and Jack in Tokyo. I'm going to try to have a visa, so I can
just go in and out. I don't want to report, but I'd love to make the trip
if I could. I'll be in Tokyo and that's all.

K: Right.

H: And I'm not going to be a pest.

K: No you couldn't be a pest.

H: Well anyway, I think a hell of a lot of you and I'm not complimenting you to get on a airplane either, but I'll see you in Tokyo--but you may put if off a day or two,

K: Yeh, I may.

TELCON
The President - Secretary Kissinger

October 17, 1973

1:40 p. m.

K: I wanted to let you know, these Arabs are floating on air, they say you are a great man and that you spoke to them with a sincerity they knew you would, then we went into a lot of detail on how to do it, assurances they would do it. I think we are going to get it, a cease fire within three or four days.

N: Main thing is Sadat said, the press, here's the guy who could cut off the oil for all of the world...very constructive.

K: I also talked to Joe Sisco. He also said when traveling with Rogers, he never knew what he was talking about...with you you always know what you're talking about.

N: Well... I thought it went well.

K: Thought it was spectacular.

N: That's good.

K: Just saw telegram from El-Zayyat, got the Arabs, quite important. Had a big argument with the Algerians, how can we be sure we can believe the President. I told him, look here, for years I told him the President was harassed. They wanted to know were we willing to bring pressure on Thieu. Let the other side make a proposal and we will see whether we will bring pressure. I am not drawing a parallel, but you can figure out for yourself.

N: Well, I left a lot of things... but I said I wanted to visit their countries, loved all of them, which was true,

K: Mr. President, I think it was a most successful morning. What's more important, they were happy ... very successful morning.

N: Now, on to the Russians. When do you expect to hear from Kosygin.

K: We've got long message from Brezhnev, now in itself doesn't say anything, he skirts the issue ... matters have not reached the point of no return and in detente... we will hear from them be tomorrow.

N: Meantime, you might pickup Senator Mansfield's brilliant suggestion.

K: Mr. President, when have they not failed us.

N: Really something.