The New York Times

TIMES SQUARE NEW YORK NY 10036

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The account of your visit to Fuerth, published in this
morning's paper, brought to mind a possibly apocryphal story
that used to make the rounds in my native Germany in the
late 1920's.

A highlight of the annual festival of choral societies
held in Fuerth was the formal parade. And one of the
songs rendered during the parade included the following
lines:

Doch das allerschoenst Gewuerz,

Das sind uns die Maenner Fuerth's.

With all best wishes,

FIRST IN 1932 — FIRST TODAY

The National Call

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October 28, 1974.

Respected Mr. Kissinger,

The 'National Call' and the Indian Nation welcome
you to India as the spirit of Rossevelt-Nehru Era of
Friendship, Liberty and Goodwill for all which you have
helped to revive.

You are one of the greatest man the world has
produced. We dedicate this Special Supplement of our
newspaper to Mrs. Nancy Kissinger and to you and add
our GOOD WISHES.

Long Live INDOUS Friendship,

Dr.Henry Kissinger
U.S. Secretary of State
Stati oned at New Delhi.

India & U.S.A. To Build New Bonds

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New Delhi, October 27—Dr. Kissinger was given a warm welcome in Delhi. The old spirit of Indo-U.S. Amity was in evidence. The American and Indian officials.

Men and Women were greeting each other at Palam Airport with genuine sense of pleasure on the arrival of the great American who had helped to reshape the world in a big way and has the distinction of having served one President of the United States after the other, showing that his nation—the richest and the most powerful democracy in the world—has unbounded faith in him. India and United States are now engaged “to remove all misunderstandings and build a new, mature and realistic relationship between the two greatest democracies of the world.” This is a great tentative to his genius.

The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Y. B. Chavan, and U. S. Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, expressed their desire for ...eager for new ties promoting co-operation between the two countries in various fields, including trade, science, technology, education and culture.

Mr. Chavan and Dr. Kissinger were speaking at a dinner given in honour of the visiting Secretary of State Mr. Chavan said that

he was confident their discussions would enable
them not only to remove "past misunderstandings"
but also generate momentum for
a better, more mature and realistic relationship
in the months and years ahead.

Dr. Kissinger, in his reply, stressed that he accepted the invitation to visit India "to renew the long-standing friendship, to remove old misunderstandings and to build a new mature relationship." Dr. Kissinger assured Mr Chavan that he had come to India with the goodwill to contribute to the building up of a strong relationship between the two great democracies sharing many similar ideas, the two democracies which, whatever their occasional differences on particular issues might be, had a common interest in a peaceful world, a developing and co-operative world.

Mr. Kissinger
...pragmatic
and friendly.

Mr. Chavan in his speech has particularly referred to the "far-reaching changes" that had taken place in this region since Dr. Kissinger's last visit to India. Out of the agony of the subcontinent, a new nation was born, underlining a historical truth that popular aspirations cannot be long suppressed", he said. He also told Dr. Kissinger that India had been trying to build a new structure of peace, friendship and co-operation in the region on the basis of the realities of the situation. Dr. Kissinger emphatically declared that his country "strongly supports the Simla agreement" He said the U.S. felt that development of peace in the sub-continent without external interference and on the basis of equality and negotiations was "an essential precondition to peace in the world." Dr. Kissinger said that his visit to India, was designed to "renew long standing friendship, remove old misunderstandings and to build a new and mature relationship." Dr. Kissinger reaffirmed his own and President Ford's conviction of "the importance we attach to close ties with India."

Y.B. Chavan

...eager for new ties

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T. N. KAUL (EAST) & T. N. KAUL (WEST)

T. N. Kaul has the rare distinction of being Indian's Ambassador to Soviet Russia and now Ambassador in the United States of America. Kaul's role in the TWO-WORLDS OF EAST and WEST has been most interesting. There is, however, on incompatibility in the T. N. Kaul (East) and T. N. Kaul (West), because he has sought to project and build up India's image abroad faithfully and with great ability. Kaul tried to analyse the Indo-US love-hate relationship from his unique vantage point, showing of the fund of goodwill that exists between the people of both countries in a special TV interview in New Delhi recently. He did it with great ability and convincingly.

## Food Without Strings

Delhi television interview, Mr. Kaul was asked if the question of food-grain supply was likely to be discussed with the US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger during his visit to India. Mr. T. N. Kaul replied, "I do not think that food is the most important thing." Mr. Kaul said bulk purchases had already been made through commercial channels and all that was needed was to build up reserves Dr. Kissinger's visit, Mr. Kaul said, was a goodwill one, normal along friendly nations. This would help exchange of views on bilateral relations and international issues. Mr. Kaul said the proposal for a joint Indo-US Commission at Government level was likely to take shape during Dr. Kissinger's visit. Asked why the idea of an Indo-US Joint Commission on Education was rejected in 1967, Mr. Kaul said it was to be financed by a foreign country and India had basic objections to that. To a question about the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Kaul replied that Dr. Kissinger had publicly assured and informed the US Senate Foreign Affairs Committee that any person indulging inversive activities in India would be withdrawn within 24 to 48 hours.

However, "we have to be vigilant and careful," he said. Mr. Kaul declined to comment on the reported cable of the Ambassador, Mr. Daniel Moynihan, expressing India's concern at CIA activities. Mr. Kaul said the US had "rectified" its policy of tilt towards Pakistan, which, it realised, was incompatible with existing realities in the sub-continent. Mr. Kaul felt that the so-called tilt was a temporary phase. He said the Americans had shown great sympathy for the hopes and aspirations of the people of Bangladesh. US recognition of Bangladesh and its appreciation of the Simla and Delhi

T. N. Kaul

...an able Envoy

## Brahm Perkash to Launch Movement for Economic & Political Revolution

NEW DELHI,—Mr. Brahm Perkash recently announced his decision to return to active politics in support of the movement being conducted by Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan.

Ch. B. Perkash

...again active

Lt. Governor, the DDA. All these institutions seemed to be fighting each other. Mr. Perkash said he stood for a full-fledged statehood for Delhi which alone could solve its chronic problems.

"I do not intend to join any political party or form a new one. I will join JP to support his movement," he declared at a Press conference.

He said he was planning to form an association of activists who would look after constructive work, political education and mass contract "It will not be a political party to fight election."

When asked if he intended to start a movement in Delhi, the former Chief Minister of Delhi said he would decide after his return from Bihar. He strongly felt that the persent set-up in Delhi was in a mess. There was no cohesion between the Executive Councillors, the Delhi Administration, Municipal Corporation

Mr. Perkash said he wanted a total revolution, economic and political. It alone could stem the rot in all sections of society. It was necessary that economic and political power be widely distributed and properly controlled to safeguard against it concentration at one point.

Agreement amounted to an acceptance of the new situation Mr. Kaul said the "major irritants" created by issues like Vietnam, Pakistan and Bangladesh and the US stand on Kashmir were "on the way out."

## Kaul For US Cooperation

He said there was "no conflict on the basic national interests" that of striving for the peace and stability of the region and resolving disputes bilaterally without third party interference. There was no reason why the US should not follow the path of friendship and co-operation with India. "India wants it." he said. Asked to comment on Mr. William Barners' assessment that US interest in South Asia was on the decline and countries like India had ceased to concern it, Mr. Kaul said he would welcome a decrease in the kind of interest the US had shown in the past. "Interest of a progressive nature was welcome." Interference in the internal affairs of any nation or dominating a place was "unwelcome". Mr. Kaul said India's relations with the US and other great Powers were guided by aid rather than mutual interest, respect and understanding. Aid he said, made one more dependent. Co-operation was a better word. No country could be fully self-sufficient. But at the same time, every country must work for self-reliance.

## US Tilt Towards Pak Over, Says Envoy

An Indo-US Joint Commission is likely to be set up soon, India's Ambassador to the U.S. Mr. T. N. Kaul said letter.

He said a decision to set up the commission was expected to be taken during the fortcoming visit of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

Speaking on Indo-US relations at the Post-Graduate Institute of Medical Education an Research Mr. Kaul said once the commission was formed, it would open the doors for further Indo-US collaboration in trade and commerce, science and technology and education and culture. At present, India had set up such commissions with 30 countries. He hoped that with the passage of a trade Bill in the US Congress, US trade with India would be doubled. The US imports from India accounted for only 0.7 percent of its total imports.

Mr. Kaul said there was improvement in the United States attitude towards India and the period of "tilt" towards Pakistan was over.

He said if the present favourable trend continued, India and the US could develop friendly relations for their mutual benefit in future. But this would not be aimed against any other country he said.

He told another questioner he would not join the Sangharsh Samiti. "I have not decided what my future plans would be but I can say definitely that I am against status quo and communal politics. I am, for radical reforms." When asked if he would give a call to his followers in the Congress to come out and join him, Mr. Perkash said for the present he had no intention of doing it. That will depend on my future programme." "My sympathies are Still with the Congress and I have not lost faith in the Prime Minister. She is capable of taking bold and unorthodox steps. So the case with Mr. Gokhale." He urged both to take step to solve the Bihar tangle as the movement there could not be suppressed. When asked if JP was willing to talk to the PM and if he could play the role of mediator. Mr. Perkash said he did not think JP would be unwilling to talk as he has not lost faith in her. Mr. Brahm Perkash retired from active politics on January 13, 1970 after the Bombay Session of the Congress.

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Commentary

The United States in Opposition

Daniel P. Moynihan

"WE ARE far from living in a single world community," writes Edward Shils, "but the rudiments of a world society do exist." Among those rudiments, perhaps the most conspicuous, if least remarked, are the emerging views as to what kind of society it is. A measure of self-awareness has appeared, much as it did for smaller polities in earlier times. These assessments tend at the international level to be as diverse as those commonly encountered concerning national societies, or local ones. Some will think the society is good and getting better; others will see it as bad and getting worse. Some want change; some fear it. Where one sees justice, another sees wrong.

The notion of a world society is nothing new to Americans. It dominated the rhetoric of World War II, of the founding of the United Nations, of much of the cold war. It is now a received idea, and its impress may be measured by the success with which advocates have found audiences for issues defined in international terms: the world environmental problem; the world population problem; the world food problem. Not a generation ago, these were national issues at most.

Much of this internationalist rhetoric is based on things real enough. There is a world ecology; there is a world economy; and some measures important to individual countries can only be obtained through international accord. Thus the concept of interdependence has become perhaps the main element of the new consciousness of a world society. This is a valid basis on which to posit the existence of a society; it is almost a precondition of a society's coming into being.

Yet societies rarely stop at the acknowledgment of the need for cooperation which is implied by the term interdependence. The image of a society as a family is a common one, and with reason, for in both cases the idea of cooperation is frequently supplemented or even, supplanted by the idea of

obligation. What does one member *owe* another? This is something new in international pronouncements. If one were to characterize the discomfiture and distress with which Americans responded to the events of the 29th General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, some measure would have to be attributed to the discovery that a vast majority of the nations of the world feel there are claims which can be made on the wealth of individual nations that are both considerable and threatening—in any event threatening to countries such as the United States which regularly finds itself in a minority (often a minority of one or two or at most a half-dozen) in an assembly of 138 members.

The tyranny of the UN's "new majority" has accordingly been deplored, and there has been much comment that whereas opposition to the United Nations was once a position of "conservatives" in the United States, it is increasingly one of "liberals" also. Yet while there have been some calls to boycott the General Assembly, or not to vote in it, there have been but few calls for withdrawal from the United Nations. It is almost as if American opinion now acknowledged that there was no escaping involvement in the emergent world society. All the more reason, then, for seeking to understand what has been going on.

I

Now, of course, a lot is going on, and no single element dominates. Yet it may be argued that what happened in the early 1970's is that for the first time the world felt the impact of what for lack of a better term I shall call the British revolution. That is the revolution which began in 1947 with the granting by socialist Britain of independence to socialist India. In slow, then rapid, order the great empires of the world—with the single major exception of the Czarist empire—broke up into independent states; the original membership of the United Nations of 51 grew to 138. These new nations naturally varied in terms of size, population, and resources. But in one respect they hardly varied at all. To a quite astonishing degree they were ideologically uniform, having fashioned their polities in terms derived from the general corpus of British socialist opinion as it developed in the period roughly

DANIEL P. MOYNihan has just returned to Harvard after two years as the United States Ambassador to India. Among the many other positions he has held in government service, he was a member of the United States delegation to the 26th United Nations General Assembly. Mr. Moynihan's books include *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income, Coping, and* (with Nathan Glazer) *Beyond the Melting Pot.*

31

32/COMMENTARY MARCH 1975

1890-1950. The Englishmen and Irishmen, Scots-men and Welsh, who created this body of doctrine and espoused it with such enterprise—nay, genius—thought they were making a social revolution in Britain. And they were. But the spread of their ideology to the furthest reaches of the globe, with its ascent to dominance in the highest national councils everywhere, gives to the British revolution the kind of worldwide significance which the American and French, and then the Russian, revolutions possessed in earlier times.*

From the perspective of their impact on others, the American and French revolutions can be treated as a single event. They were not of course identical in themselves, and profoundly important distinctions can be made between them. But these distinctions were little noted in the political rhetoric of the century that followed, or in the forms of government fashioned in the likeness of this rhetoric, or in the goals of governments so fashioned. Men sought a constitutional regime which disestablished ancient privilege, guaranteed liberties, and promoted the general welfare through what came to be known as liberal social policies. Liberalism was at first characterized by the opposition to state intervention in economic affairs, and later by the advocacy of such intervention, but the intervention in question was a fairly mild business, it being no liberal's view that the state was an especially trustworthy servant of the citizen. The citizen, as liberals viewed the world, was a very important person, especially perhaps if he tended to clean linen.

The Russian revolution of 1917 brought into existence a regime even more dramatically different from its predecessors than had the liberal regimes of a century earlier been from theirs. Everything, it was understood, had changed. Those who would change everything, or who believed that, like it or not, everything was going to change, rallied to this rhetoric. As for the rest of the world, it came soon enough to know that a wholly extraordinary event had occurred, even

that the future had occurred. For three decades, culminating in the triumph of Communist arms in China in 1948, this was quite the most vivid, and the most attended to, movement in the world.

The British revolution of the second quarter of the 20th century attracted no such attention. Everyone certainly recognized that new states were coming into existence out of former European, and indeed mostly British, colonies, but the tendency was to see them as candidates for incorporation into one or the other of the older revolutionary traditions then dominant elsewhere in the world. It was not generally perceived that they were in a sense already spoken for—that they came to independence with a preexisting, coherent, and surprisingly stable ideological base which, while related to both the earlier traditions, was distinct from both. This most likely accounts for the almost incurious initial reaction in what would soon be known as the First and Second Worlds. In the Republic of India the United States could see democracy; the Soviets could see socialism. In truth, a certain Hegelian synthesis had occurred. On the one hand, the Minimal State of the American revolution; in response, the Total State of the Russian revolution; in synthesis, the Welfare State of the British revolution.

SAMUEL H. BEER describes the doctrine of British socialism as follows:

> ... it is especially the socialist's commitment to "fellowship" that fundamentally distinguishes his approach. . . . For private ownership he would substitute public ownership; for production for profit, production for use; for competition, cooperation. A cultural and ethical revolution would also take place, and motives that had aimed at individual benefit would now aim at common benefits. Industry, which had been governed by individual decisions within the competitive system, would be subject to collective and democratic control. . . . Government would consist in comprehensive and continuous planning and administration.

* The term British revolution is open to objection as seeming to exclude the influence of continental socialism on the new nations, and indeed a good case could be made for calling the phenomenon I am trying to describe the revolution of the Second International. But the term British can be justified by the fact that of the 87 states to have joined the UN since its founding, more than half—47—had been part of the British empire. Even apart from the empire, British culture was in the first half of this century incomparably the most influential in the world, and that culture was increasingly suffused with socialist ideas and attitudes. I anticipate and hope for a rigorous critique of the arguments of this paper, but I also hope it will not be too much distracted by the difficulties of finding a concise term to describe what was on the whole a concise phenomenon; the development of socialist doctrine and the formation of socialist parties in Western Europe at this time. I should also note that the political ideology in the new states of the Third World of which I will be speaking was best described by the late George Lichtheim as "national socialism." This term has, of course, acquired an altogether unacceptable connotation.

* Two general points may be made about this British doctrine. First, it contained a suspicion of, almost a bias against, economic development which carried over into those parts of the world where British culture held sway. The fundamental assertion of the age of the Diamond Jubilee was that there was plenty of wealth to go 'round if only it were fairly distributed. No matter what more thoughtful socialist analysts might urge, redistribution, not production, remained central to the ethos of British socialism. Profit became synonymous with exploitation. That profit might be something conceptually elegant—least-cost production—made scarcely any impress. "Production for profit" became a formulation for all that was wrong in the old ways, and Tories half-agreed. (For it was the Liberals and the Radicals who

THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION/33

were being repudiated by such doctrine, and it was the Liberal party that went under.) This, too, was passed on. When Sir Arthur Lewis in 1974 gave the Tata lectures in India and found himself pleading, as a socialist and as a man of the Third World, but also as an economist, that profit was not a concept public-sector enterprise could afford to ignore, no less a personage than the head of the Indian Planning Commission felt called upon to rebut him.

To be sure, much of this redistributionist bias was simply innocent. British socialists, for example, proved in office to know almost nothing about how actually to redistribute income, and British income has not been significantly redistributed. Coming to power just after World War II, the socialists appeared to think they had abolished wealth by imposing a top income-tax rate of nineteen shillings six pence in the twenty-shilling pound, which is to say confiscating the rich man's pay envelope. Few seemed to note that capital gains remained exempt from income tax altogether, so that in large measure thereafter only those with property could acquire property: the very antithesis of the social condition socialism sought. (This detail perhaps did not escape the well-to-do of the developing nations when the prospect of socialism on the British model first appeared there.)

THE second general point about socialist doctrine as it developed in Britain was that it was anti-American. More anti-American, surely, than it was ever anti-Soviet. The reasons for this are not that obscure. The British were not overmuch admiring of Americans in that era, nor we of them. In part their attitude began as aristocratical disdain. (An intimate of Pandit Nehru's describes once asking India's first Prime Minister why he was so anti-American. This was in 1961. Nehru's first reaction was a rather huffy denial of any such predisposition, but he then became reflective and after a moment admitted that, yes, it was true, and that probably it all dated back to his days at Harrow. There was one American boy there at the time: filthy rich, and much too pushy.) But more importantly, of course, America was seen as quintessentially capitalist.

With the Russian revolution, and then especially with the world depression of the 1930's and the onset of popular-front movements in Europe, a considerable number of British socialists, despite their party's fundamental and central attachment to democratic processes, became supporters of the Soviet regime. Russia was the future. America was the past. With the coming of the cold war this attitude became institutionalized and almost compulsory on the British Left. The New Statesman, a journal which tended to follow Asian and African graduates after they had left Britain and returned home, became near

Stalinist in its attachment to Soviet ways with the world and its pervasive antagonism to things American.

And yet the New Statesman was never Communist, and neither, save in small proportion, were its readers. They were British socialists, part of a movement of opinion which spread in the course of the first half of the 20th century to the whole of the British empire, a domain which covered one-quarter of the earth's surface, and which an inspired cartographic convention had long ago decreed be colored pink. It was British civil servants who took the doctrine to the colonies. (How curious, in retrospect, are the agonizations of Harold Laski and others as to whether the civil service would carry out the policies of a socialist government. What more congenial task for persons whose status comes from the power and prestige of government? But in the Britain of that era it could be thought that class origin would somehow overcome occupational interest.)

What the civil service began, British education completed. Has there ever been a conversion as complete as that of the Malay, the Ibo, the Gujarati, the Jamaican, the Australian, the Cypriot, the Guyanan, the Yemenite, the Yoruban, the sabra, the felaheen to this distant creed? The London School of Economics, Shils notes, was often said to be the most important institution of higher education in Asia and Africa. In her autobiography, Beatrice Webb wrote that she and her husband felt "assured that with the School [LSE] as the teaching body, the Fabian Society as a propagandist organization, the LCC [London County Council] as object lesson in electoral success, our books as the only elaborate original work in economic fact and theory, no young man or woman who is anxious to study or to work in public affairs can fail to come under our influence." For reasons that are understandable, this was true most particularly for young men and women coming from abroad in that long and incongruously optimistic intellectual age that began amid late Victorian plumpness and ended with the austerity of postwar Britain. In 1950 the conservative Michael Oakeshott succeeded to the Fabian Harold Laski's chair in political theory at LSE and in a sense that party was over. But by then not Communists but Fabians could claim that the largest portion of the world's population lived in regimes of their fashioning. Before very long, the arithmetical majority and the ideological coherence of those new nations brought them to dominance in the United Nations and, indeed, in any world forum characterized by universal membership.

BUT if the new nations absorbed ideas about others from the doctrines of British socialism, they also absorbed ideas about themselves. The master concept, of course, is that they had the right to independence. This idea

34/COMMENTARY MARCH 1975

goes back to the American revolution, and even beyond to the Glorious Revolution in 17th-century Britain, but British socialism readily incorporated and even appropriated it. As the 20th century wore on and the issue of independence arose with respect to these specific peoples and places, it was most often the socialists who became the principal political sponsors of independence. It was a Labour government which in 1947 granted independence to India and formally commenced the vast, peaceful revolution that followed. The Indian Congress party had been founded in 1883 by a British civil servant, Alan Octavian Hume, whose politics were essentially Liberal. But by the time of independence, it was a matter to be taken for granted that the Congress was socialist and that its leaders, Gandhi and then Nehru, were socialists too.

Two further concepts triangulate and fix the imported political culture of these new nations. The first is the belief—often, of course, justified—that they have been subject to economic exploitation, exactly as the working class is said in socialist theory to have been exploited under capitalism. The second is the belief—also, of course, often justified—that they have been subject to ethnic discrimination corresponding to class distinctions in industrial society. As with the belief in the right to independence, these concepts, which now seem wholly natural, rarely occur in nature. They are learned ideas, and they were learned by the new nations mostly where they mostly originated, in the intellectual and political circles of Britain of the late 19th and early 20th century. Gandhi greatly elucidated the moral dimensions of exploitation and discrimination, but he did so in the context of a worldwide political movement that was more than receptive to his ideas, a political movement of which he was a part. At root, the ideas of exploitation and discrimination represent a transfer to colonial populations of the fundamental socialist assertions with respect to the condition of the European working class, just as the idea of independence parallels the demand that the working class break out of bondage and rise to power.

Now it is possible to imagine a country, or collection of countries, with a background similar to that of the British colonies, attaining independence and then letting bygones be bygones. The Americans did that: our political culture did not suggest any alternative. International life was thought to operate in Wordsworth's terms:

> The good old rule.

> ... The simple plan

> That they should take, who have the power.
> And they should keep who can.

So in their own terms might Marxists judge the aftermath of Marxist triumph: history was working its ineluctable way; there would be no point, no logic, in holding the past to account. Not so

the heirs of the British revolution. British socialism is, was, and remains a highly moral creed. It is not a politics of revenge; it is too civil for that. But reparations? Yes: reparations. This idea was fundamental to the social hope of a movement which, it must ever be recalled, rested on the assumption that there existed vast stores of unethically accumulated wealth. On the edges of the movement there were those who saw the future not just in terms of redistribution, but of something ominously close to looting. In any event, the past was by no means to be judged over and done with. There were scores to be settled. Internally and internationally.

A final distinctive character of the British revolution concerns procedure. Wrongs are to be righted by legislation. The movement was fundamentally parliamentarian. The Labour party came to power through the ballot, and proceeded to change society by statute. This was dramatically so with respect to the empire. For the first time in the history of mankind a vast empire dismantled itself, piece by piece, of its own systematic accord. A third of the nations of the world today owe their existence to a statute of Westminster. What more profound experience could there be of the potency of parliamentary majorities in distant places, and of their enactments?

Plainly, not all the new nations of the postwar world were formerly British. There were French colonies. Belgian. Dutch. Portuguese. Political traditions in each case were different from the British. But only slightly different: viewed from Mars, London, Paris, and The Hague are not widely separated or disparate places. By the time of the granting of independence, all were democratic with a socialist intelligentsia and often as not a socialist government. With the exception of Algeria—which is marked by the exception—the former French and Dutch colonies came into being in very much the manner the British had laid down. For a prolonged initial period the former British possessions had pride of place in the ex-colonial world—they speak English at the UN, not American—and pretty much set the style of politics which has become steadily more conspicuous in international affairs.

Not everyone has noticed this. Indeed, there is scarcely yet a vocabulary in which to describe it. In part, this is because the event is recent; but also because it was incomplete. As with the liberal revolution which came out of America, and the Communist revolution which came out of Russia, this socialist revolution coming mainly out of Britain carried only so much of the world in its initial period of expansion. The liberal revolution of America was not exactly a spent force by the mid-20th century, but (pace the Mekong Delta Development Plan) there was never any great prospect of its expanding to new

THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION/35

territories. On the other hand, the heirs of the
Russian revolution did capture China, the great-
est of all the prizes, in 1918, and at least part of
Indochina a bit later. But in the main the Com-
munist revolution stopped right there, and the
two older revolutions now hold sway within fairly
well-defined boundaries. Since 1950 it has been
not they but the heirs of the British revolution
who have been expanding.

Almost the first international political act of
the new states was to form the nonaligned
blocl, distinguishing themselves—partially—from
the two blocl into which the immediate postwar
world had formed. From politics the emphasis
shifted to economic affairs. In 1968 these coun-
tries, meeting at Algiers, formed the Group of 77
as a formal economic bloc. Their Joint Statement
described the group as "comprising the vast ma-
jority of the human race"—and indeed it did. The
B's in the list of members gave a sense of the
range of nations and peoples involved: Bahrain,
Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Burma, Burundi. And yet there was—now some-
what hidden—unity to the list. Of these eight
countries, five were formerly British-governed or
British-directed. At its second Ministerial Meet-
ing in Lima in 1971, the group (now numbering
96) drew up an Action Program which stated,
inter alia, that developing countries should

encourage and promote appropriate commodity
action and, particularly, the protection of the
interests of primary producers of the region
through intensive consultations among producer
countries in order to encourage appropriate
policies, leading to the establishment of pro-
ducers' associations and understandings. . . .

This was represented in the press as a major gain
for the black African states who carried the point
over objections from Latin Americans accus-
tomed to working out raw-material and commod-
ity arrangements with the United States. But the
idea was fundamentally a heritage of the British
revolution, and if the black Africans took the
lead in proclaiming it, there is no reason to think
it was any less familiar to Arabs. They had all
gone to the same schools. Was it not right for
those who have only their labor to sell, or only
the products of their soil, to organize to confront
capital? Had they not been exploited?

II

How has the United States dealt with
these new nations and their distinc-
tive ideology? Clearly we have not dealt very suc-
cessfully. This past year, in the 29th General
Assembly, we were frequently reduced to a voting
blocl which, with variations, consisted of ourselves,
Chile, and the Dominican Republic. As this "his-
toric session" closed, the Permanent Representa-
tive of India to the United Nations declared:

"The activities of the Soviet delegation at the
session showed once again that the Soviet Union
deeply understands and shares the aspirations of
the Third World." This was not Krishna Menon,
but a balanced and considerate Asian diplomat.
If no equivalent pronouncement on China comes
immediately to hand, this may be because the
Chinese feel free to identify themselves as mem-
bers of the Third World. As such, at the end of
1974 they declared that the new majority had
written a "brilliant chapter" during the twelve
months previous, that it was "sweeping ahead
full sail as the boat of imperialism [the United
States] and hegemonism [the Soviet Union]
founders." "These days," the Chinese statement
continued, "the United Nations often takes on
the appearance of an international court with the
Third World pressing the charges and conduct-
ing the trial." A statement to which many could
subscribe. But no such statement could come
from an American statesman, no such praise
would be accorded American policy. Clearly at
some level—we all but started the United Nations
—there has been a massive failure of American
diplomacy.

But why? Why has the United States dealt so
unsuccessfully with these nations and their dis-
tinct ideology? A first thought is that we have not
seen the ideology as distinctive. Not recognizing
it, we have made no sustained effort to relate our-
selves to it. The totalitarian states, from their
point of view, did. They recognize ideologies. By
1971 it was clear enough that the Third World—
a few exceptions here and there—was not going
Communist. But it was nevertheless possible to
encourage it in directions that veered very con-
siderably from any tendency the bloc might have
to establish fruitful relations with the West; and
this was done. It was done, moreover, with the
blind acquiescence and even agreement of the
United States which kept endorsing principles
for whose logical outcome it was wholly unpre-
pared and with which it could never actually
go along.

A RELATIVELY small but revealing ex-
ample of this process may be seen in
the development of the World Social Report,
a document of the Economic and Social Council.
The first volume, covering the year 1963, was
directed almost exclusively to problems of the
developing countries, and the United States took
its advent as a promising event. The 1965 report,
concentrating on "practical methods of promot-
ing social change," might have caused some to
take note, but American officials were entirely
unwary: this was, after all, a report designed to
help the developing world. In actual fact, it was
becoming a document based on the veritably
totalitarian idea that social justice means social
stability and that social stability means the absence
of social protest. Thus by 1970, the Soviet Union—

36/COMMENTARY MARCH 1975

not much social protest there!—emerges as the very embodiment of the just state, while the United States is a nation in near turmoil from the injustices it wreaks upon the poor and the protests these injustices have provoked. And Western Europe hardly comes off any better.

What happened here was that a "Finlandized" Secretariat (the official in charge of preparing the document was indeed a Finn) found that the developing countries and the Communist countries had an easy common interest in portraying their own progress, justifying the effective suppression of dissent, and in the process deprecating and indicting the seeming progress of Western societies. It is easy enough to see that this would be in the interest of the Soviet bloc. (The Chinese did not participate in the debate.) But why the developing world? First, the developing nations could ally with the totalitarians in depicting social reality in this way, in part because so many, having edged toward authoritarian regimes, faced the same problems the Communists would have encountered with a liberal analysis of civil liberties. Secondly, the developing nations had an interest in deprecating the economic achievements of capitalism, since almost none of their own managed economies was doing well. To deplore, to deride, the social effects of affluence in the United States is scarcely a recent invention. For a generation the British Left has held the patent. Further, there is an almost automatic interest on the Left in delegitimating wealth—prior to redistributing it—much as the opposite interest exists on the Right.

Small wonder that officials could describe the Social Report as the most popular document in the UN series, a statement intended to be more than faint praise. Yet it has been more representative than otherwise. There are hundreds like it, suffused with a neo-totalitarian, anti-American bias.

American protests at the 26th General Assembly have evidently influenced the most recent Social Report, submitted to the 29th, but here the significant fact is that this protest—entered at the very last moment, when the document was being presented for pro-forma approval—was the first of its kind, or one of the first. In fact the United States until then did not protest. To the contrary, the United States actively participated in preparing this sustained assault on American institutions. The 1970 Social Report had been three years in the making. During those three years it made its way through layers of bureaucracies, all manner of meetings. Americans were always present, and Americans always approved. This was, after all, a Third World document; it was to be treated with tolerance and understanding. Complacency of this order could only arise from the failure to perceive that a distinctive ideology was at work, and that skill and intelligence were required to deal with it successfully.

THE blindness of American diplomacy to the process persists. Two large events occurred in 1971, and a series of smaller ones were set in motion. China entered the United Nations, an event the Third World representatives saw as a decisive shift of power to their camp. In that same year the Lima conference established the nonaligned as an economic bloc intent on producer cartels. Less noticed, but perhaps no less important in its implications, a distinctive radicalization began in what might as well be termed world social policy.

This radicalization was first clearly evidenced at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held at Stockholm in 1972, or more precisely at the 26th General Assembly, which was finally to authorize the conference. The conference was in considerable measure an American initiative, and while American negotiators were primarily concerned with ways to get the Russians to join (which in the end they did not), the Brazilians suddenly stormed onto the scene to denounce the whole enterprise as a conspiracy of the haves to keep the have-nots down and out. The argument was that the rich had got rich by polluting their environments and now proposed to stay that way by preventing anyone else from polluting theirs. This, among other things, would insure that the rich would continue their monopoly on the use of the raw materials of the poor. Thus was it asserted that matters originally put forward as soluble in the context of existing economic and political relations were nothing of the sort. To the contrary, they were symptomatic of economic and political exploitation and injustice which could only be resolved by the most profound transformation: to expropriate the expropriators.

At Stockholm itself, this quickly became the dominant theme—espoused by a dominant majority. "Are not poverty and need the greatest politicians?" Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India asked. "There are grave misgivings," she continued, "that the discussion of ecology may be designed to distract attention from the problems of war and poverty." She was wrong in this. They were not so designed. But at Stockholm the nations who feared they might be took control of the agenda. The conference declared as its first principle:

> Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality, and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality which permits a life of dignity and well being, and bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations. In this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domination stand condemned and must be eliminated.

The American delegates routinely voted for this

THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION/37

resolution. It was, after all, language the new
countries wanted. What wholly unwelcome mean-
ings might be attached to "other forms of oppres-
sion and foreign domination" which stood "con-
demned" and had to be "eliminated" was a
thought scarcely in keeping with the spirit of the
occasion.

THE Stockholm Conference had been turbulent. The United Nations World Population Conference, held nearly two years later, in August 1971, had an air of insurrection. This conference too was largely an American initiative, the culmination of years of State Department effort to put population on the agenda of world social policy. The Secretary General of the United Nations proclaimed the gathering would be "a turning point in the history of mankind." The centerpiece was a Draft World Population Plan of Action, which in essence set 1985 as the year crude birth rates in developing countries would be reduced to 30 per thousand (as against an anticipated 34) and when "the necessary information and education about family planning and means to practice family planning" would be available "to all persons who so desire. ..." There can be no doubt of the social change implicit in such a conference's even meeting: in most industrialized countries, family planning has only just achieved the status of an accepted social value deserving of public support. Yet neither should there be any doubt that a disaster overtook the American position in the course of the conference, and that this disaster was wholly predictable.

To begin with, the conference was thought up by Americans to deal with a problem we consider that other people have. (In fairness, not long ago the United States itself was thought to have a problem of population size, while the provision of family-planning services is an issue of social equity as well as of population growth.) Specifically, it was considered a problem of the developing countries: countries, that is, of the British revolution who are animated by the liveliest sense that their troubles originate in capitalist and imperialist systems of which the United States all but offered itself as an exemplar. Further, the conference met in Bucharest, capital of a Communist country. At one level no great imagination would have been required to anticipate the outcome. President Nicolae Ceausescu opened the conference by declaring that "The division of the world into developed and underdeveloped countries is a result of historical evolution, and is a direct consequence of the imperialist, colonialist, and neo-colonialist policies of exploitation of many peoples." He called for "a new international economic order" and condemned "a pessimistic outlook" on population growth.

But if this was to be expected, few could have
anticipated the wild energy of the Chinese assault

on the Western position. China has the strictest of all population-control programs. Yet the Chinese arrived in Rumania to assail with unprecedented fury and devastating zeal the very idea of population control as fundamentally subversive of the future of the Third World. The future, the Chinese proclaimed, is infinitely bright. Only the imperialists and the hegemonists could spoil it, and population control was to be their wrecking device. A theory of "consumerism" emerged: it was excessive consumption in the developed economies which was the true source of the problems of the underdeveloped nations and not the size of the latter's population. None dared oppose the thesis. The Indians, who are thought to have a population problem, went to the conference rather disposed to endorse a Plan of Action. But they did nothing of the sort. Instead, the Maratha of Jammu and Kashmir, who headed the Indian delegation, found himself denouncing "colonial denudation" of the East, and the "vulgar affluence" of the West. The scene grew orgiastic.

In the end, a doctrine emerged which is almost certainly more true than otherwise, namely that social and economic change is the fundamental determinant of fertility change, compared with which family planning as such has at most a residual role. There need be no difficulty with this assertion. The difficulty comes with the conclusion said to follow: that economic growth in the West should cease and the wealth of the world be redistributed. We are back to Keir Hardie, expropriating the expropriators. Not to produce wealth, but to redistribute it. As with the environment conference, the population conference turned into another occasion for reminding the West of its alleged crimes and unresolved obligations.

THE tone attained to manic proportions in Population Tribune, an official, American-financed parallel conference of a form that first appeared in Stockholm. Ritual recantation became the order of the day as one notable after another confessed to a class-bound past which had blinded him to the infinitely bright future. Most of the recanters were American, but it was Professor René Dumont of France who epitomized the argument in a statement, "Population and Cannibals," which was subsequently given the full front page of *Development Forum*, an official, five-language, UN publication. Professor Dumont-blaming the "Plunderers of the Third World" for world conditions—"They ... 'under-pay' for the rare raw materials of the Third World and then squander them"—put the case with some vivacity.

*Eating little children.* I have already had occasion to show that the rich white man, with his overconsumption of meat and his lack of generosity toward poor populations, acts like a true cannibal, albeit indirect. Last year, in over-

38/COMMENTARY MARCH 1975

consuming meat which wasted the cereals which could have saved them, we ate the little children of the Sahel, of Ethiopia, and of Bangladesh. And this year, we are continuing to do the same thing, with the same appetite.

Dr. Han Suyin, a sympathetic commentator on Chinese Communist affairs, summed up for others:

> You cannot cut off any talk about population, about people, from economics and politics. You cannot put in a vacuum any talk about population and world resources without relation to the present as it exists. I admire people who can talk about a noble future where there will be an equal society and where resources will be controlled by all. But, forgive me for saying so, if this is to be done, then we have to, begin by sharing now everything and that would mean that a lot of people who have a lot of private property, for instance, should divest themselves immediately of it in favor of the poor. It means that at this very moment we should start to implement a very simple thing—something which we heard . . . at the United Nations at the sixth special session of the United Nations where the voice of the Third World—the majority of the world—at last formulated their demand for more equitable terms of trade, and for an end to exploitation, for an end to the real cause of poverty and backwardness, which is not population, but which is injustice and exploitation. The Third World has a word for it, it calls it imperialism and hegemony.

And the American delegation? The official view, flashed to diplomatic posts around the world, was as uncomplicated at the end as it had been at the outset: "ALL BASIC U.S. OBJECTIVES WERE ACHIEVED AND U.S. ACCOMPLISHMENTS WERE MANY. . . . U.S. DELEGATION UNANIMOUSLY PLEASED WITH FINAL RESULT."

THE World Food Conference which followed in Rome in November was even more explicitly an American initiative. Yet as the American delegation somewhat sadly noted, the plenary forum was used to the fullest by LDC's (Less Developed Countries) to excoriate the United States and other developed nations as responsible for the current food crisis and the generally depressed state of their part of the world, calling for "radical adjustment in the current economic order and, in effect, reparations from developed countries" to the less developed. Such negotiations as took place were somewhat more sober since something immediately of value —wheat—was at stake and obviously only the United States and a few such countries were prepared to part with any. Even so, by the time the conference was concluded, one of the great, and truly liberal, innovations of world social policy—the American-led assertion that the hungry of the world should be fed by transfers of resources—had been utterly deprecated. Thus the Indian Food Minister's statement with respect to the needs of the developing countries:

> It is obvious that the developed nations can be held responsible for their [the developing nations'] present plight. Developed nations, therefore, have a duty to help them. Whatever help is rendered to them now should not be regarded as charity but deferred compensation for what has been done to them in the past by the developed countries.

The UN General Assembly pursued this theme with notable persistence throughout 1974, commencing with a special session in the spring which dealt with the economic crises of the underdeveloped in just such terms. Occasioned as much as anything by the devastating impact of oil price increases, the special session dwelt on every conceivable abuse of economic power save that one. At the end of the regular autumn session, the General Assembly solemnly adopted a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States which accords to each state the right freely to exercise full permanent sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources, to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments, and to nationalize, expropriate, or transfer ownership of foreign property pretty much at will. The vote was 120 to 6—the United States, Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom. What was being asserted was a radical discontinuity with the original, essentially liberal vision of the United Nations as a regime of international law and practice which acknowledges all manner of claims, but claims that move in all directions. Now they moved in one direction only.

In general a rhetoric of expropriation became routine. At year's end, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, opening the 56th Conference of the International Law Association meeting in New Delhi, declared:

> Laws designed to protect the political or economic power of a few against the rights of the many, must . . . yield place to laws which enlarge the area of equality, and . . . law itself should be an ally and instrument of change.

She spoke a now-common language of resentment over population issues:

> Is it not a new form of arrogance for affluent nations to regard the poorer nations as an im provident species whose numbers are a threat to their own standard of living?

She suggested a reversal of roles had taken place as between the new nations and the old:

> An obligation rests on the haves to generate confidence among the have-nots. . . . A new approach to foreign investments is indicated, in which investments abroad are regarded more as a service to the recipient community than as an enterprise where profits and their repatriation must be secured at all cost.

Now there is nothing unfamiliar in this language:

THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION/39

only the setting is new. It is the language of Brit-
ish socialism applied to the international scene.
American diplomacy has yet to recognize this fact
and, failing to recognize it, has failed even to
begin dealing intelligently with it.

III

BUT if the beginning of wisdom in dealing with the nations of the Third World is to recognize their essential ideological coherence, the next step is to recognize that there is every reason to welcome this ideology, and to welcome the coherence also. Because of the British revolution and its heritage, the prospect now is that the world will not go totalitarian. In the Christian sense, has there been such political "good news" in our time? But there is bad news also. The great darkness could yet consume us. The potential for absorption of these states into the totalitarian camp is there and will continue to be there. This is perhaps especially true where one-party states have been established, but even where multi-party democracy flourishes the tug of the "socialist countries," to use the UN term, persists.

The outcome will almost certainly turn on whether or not these nations, individually and in groups, succeed in establishing sufficiently productive economies. If they do not, if instead they become permanently dependent on outside assistance, that assistance is likely more and more to come from the totalitarian nations, and with it the price of internal political influence from the totalitarian camp through the local pro-Moscow, or pro-Peking, Communist party. For everywhere there are such parties. They appear able to go on indefinitely in a dormant state, and can be awakened pretty much at will. India, with a population equal to that of the whole of Africa and South America combined, is the best current example. Parliamentary democracy is vigorous enough there, but economic incompetence on its part and diplomatic blunders on ours have led to an increasing dependence on Soviet support, which in the space of three years has brought about an open electoral alliance between the Congress party and the Moscow-oriented Communists, an alliance we would have thought worth fighting a war to prevent two decades ago, but which we scarcely notice today.

This alliance would not have come about save
for the failure of the Indian economy to prosper
and the success-typical-of the argument that the
cure for the damage done by leftist policies is
even more leftist policies, which in practice trans-
lates into dependence on the Soviets and alli-
ances with their internal allies. And here is the
nub of the bad news: for all the attractions of this
variety of socialist politics, it has proved, in almost
all its versions, almost the world over, to be a
distinctly poor means of producing wealth. Shar-

ing wealth—perhaps. But not producing wealth.
Who, having read British political journals over
the past quarter-century, would be surprised to
find that during this period (1950-73) the United
Kingdom's share of the "Planetary Product" has
been reduced from 5.8 to 3.1 per cent? Why then
be surprised that those who have made British
socialism their model have trouble taking off in
the opposite direction? Yet even so, one must be
surprised at the decline of economies such as those
of Burma and Sri Lanka: immensely productive
places not a generation ago. Sri Lanka, for ex-
ample, having first got to the point where it was
importing potatoes from Poland, has now got to
the further point where it can no longer afford to
do so. A recent survey of the Ceylonese economy
in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* was entitled:
"Conspiracy or Catastrophe?" For what else could
explain such failure?

What else, that is, to those experiencing it (with
all that implies for political instability)? The out-
sider can indulge a more relaxed view. The fault
lies in ideas, not persons. Americans—Westerners
—do not have any claim to superior wisdom on
the subject of these economies. Starting in the
1950’s a large number of first-rate economists
began working on theories of economic growth
designed to get the LDC’s on a path of self-
sustained growth. “To be perfectly brutal about
it,” Jesse Burkhead recently stated, “it hasn’t
worked.” And yet there is no need to stand mute.
Two assertions may be reasonably put forth, of
which the first is that to say these economies
haven’t worked as well as hoped is not to say that
none has worked at all. There *has* been growth.
In the main, things are better than they were. For
every Argentina—that “miracle” of economic non-
growth—there is a Brazil. For Ghana, Nigeria. For
Calcutta, Singapore. The second assertion is that
relative failure is particularly to be encountered
in economies most heavily influenced by that ver-
sion of late Fabian economics which compounded
the Edwardian view that there was plenty to go
around if justly distributed with the 1930’s view
that capitalism could never produce enough to go
around regardless of distributive principles.*

S TILL, there are gains in the relative loss
of income associated with the man-
aged economies of the Third World which need to
be appreciated. An Asian economist has said of
his own country, plaintively yet not without a cer-
tain defiance: "We are socialists, so we do not

* This latter idea is very much alive. On leaving my post as United States Ambassador to India, I gave a press conference in which *inter alia* I touched upon the failure of India to achieve a productive economy. The *National Herald*, the Nehru family newspaper, commented in an editorial: "Mr. Moynihan may be justified in some of his criticism of the state of the Indian economy, but what he is trying to sell is the capitalist system which can only impoverish India's millions further."

40/COMMENTARY MARCH 1975

believe in capitalism. We are democrats, so we do not believe in terror. What, then, is our alter native save one per cent a year?" There is a welfare state of sorts; there is protection of indus trial labor; and in some countries, at least, there is freedom to protest.

But the most distinctive gain and the least noted is that in the course of its outward journey, the managed economy was transmuted from an instrument of economic rationality to an instru ment of political rationality. It is sometimes diffi cult to recall, but early socialist theory expounded the greater efficiency of production for use rather than for capital, and put much stress on capitalist wastefulness. In practice, however, the real at traction of the managed economy has been the means it provides to collect enough political power at the center to maintain national unity— almost everywhere a chancy thing in these gen erally multi-ethnic states.

One must still conclude, however, that these political gains are purchased at the expense of even more conspicuous economic losses. India will serve for a final example. In the year of its inde pendence, 1947, India produced 1.2 million tons of steel and Japan only 900,000 tons. A quarter century later, in 1972, India produced 6.8 million tons and Japan 106.8. These outcomes are the result of decisions made by the ruling party of each nation, and only an innocent could continue to accept Indian protestations that the results were unexpected. The break in Indian growth came precisely in 1962 when the United States, which had been about to finance its largest aid project ever, a steel complex at Bokharo in East ern India, insisted that it be managed privately. India insisted on a public-sector plant, for which read a plant that would do what the Prime Min ister of India wanted done. In the manner of the Aswan Dam (and with as much political impact), the Russians stepped in to finance the public-sector plant. By 1974 this plant had yet to produce sheet steel. For the period 1962-72 Indian steel produc tion grew by a bare 1.8 per cent, while Japanese grew 13.4 per cent.

There is no serious way to deny that India has in a very real sense desired this outcome, just as there is no way to deny that high living standards in the modern world are associated with rela tively free market economies and with liberalist international trade policies. Granted that much economic policy does not have high living stan dards as its true objective, but is rather concerned with political stability, and granted that such a concern may be wholly legitimate in a new nation —in any event it is not anyone else's business—it nevertheless remains the case that the relative economic failure accompanying political success in regimes such as that of India sooner or later begins to undermine that very success. Promises are made and political stability, especially in the more democratic regimes, requires some measure

of performance. When it is not forthcoming, re gimes change. They become less democratic. They become less independent.

Neither of these developments can be wel comed by the United States. The United States in the past may have cared about the course of political events in these nations, but only in the most abstract terms. (Consider the casualness with which we armed Pakistan and incurred the bitter and enduring hostility of India, the second most populous nation in the world.) But India has now exploded a nuclear device. That may well prove the most important event of the tur bulent year 1974. Other Third World nations are likely to follow. Hence political stability in the Third World acquires a meaning it simply has never in the past had for American strategic think ing, as well as our general view of world politics.

IV

W HAT then is to be done? We are witnessing the emergence of a world order dominated arithmetically by the countries of the Third World. This order is al ready much too developed for the United States or any other nation to think of opting out. It can't be done. One may become a delinquent in this nascent world society. An outcast in it. But one remains "in" it. There is no escape from a definition of nationhood which derives primarily from the new international reality. Nor does this reality respond much to the kind of painfully impotent threats which are sometimes heard of America's "pulling out." Anyone who doubts that Dubai can pay for UNESCO, knows little of UNESCO, less of what the United States pays, and nothing whatever of Dubai.

In any event, matters of this sort aside, world society and world organization have evolved to the point where palpable interests are disposed in international forums to a degree without prec edent. Witness, as an instance, the decisions of the World Court allocating the oil fields of the North Sea among the various littoral states in dis tinctly weighted (but no doubt proper) manner. Witness the current negotiations at the Law of the Sea Conference. Two-thirds of the world is covered by the sea, and the United Nations claims the seabed. That seabed, especially in the region around Hawaii, is rich in so-called "manganese nodules"—concentrations of ore which American technology is now able to exploit, or will be sooner than anyone else. At this moment we have, argu ably, complete and perfect freedom to commence industrial use of the high seas. This freedom is being challenged, however, and almost certainly some form of international regime is about to be established. It can be a regime that permits Amer ican technology to go forward on some kind of license-and-royalties basis. Or it can assert ex clusive "internationalized" rights to exploitation

THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION/41

in an international public corporation. The stakes are considerable. They are enormous.

And then, of course, there remains the overriding interest, a true international interest, in arms control, and here true international government has emerged in a most impressive manner. If we were to ask who is the most important international official, a persuasive case could be made for choosing the Inspector General of the International Atomic Energy Authority, the man who supervises the safeguard agreements of the world's atomic reactors. Few would know the name of this unobtrusive Swiss chemist; few, perhaps, need to. But more than a few do need to know that the post is there and that its viability derives ultimately from the international system of which it is a part. For the moment, American security derives primarily from our own armaments, and our strategic agreements with the Soviet Union and a few other powers. But the international regime of arms control is already important and certain to become more so.

If, that is, it does not-go down in the general wreckage of the world system embodied now in the United Nations. But assuming that the new majority will not destroy the regime through actions that drive nations like the United States away, is it not reasonable to anticipate a quasi-parliamentary situation at the international level—the General Assembly and a dozen such forums—in which a nominally radical majority sets about legislating its presumed advantage in a world which has just come into its hands? The qualification “quasi-parliamentary” is necessary, for in fact the pronouncements of these assemblies have but limited force. So did the pronouncements of the Continental Congress. They are not on that ground to be ignored. What then does the United States do?

The United States goes into opposition. This is our circumstance. We are a minority. We are outvoted. This is neither an unprecedented nor an intolerable situation. The question is what do we make of it. So far we have made little—nothing—of what is in fact an opportunity. We go about dazed that the world has changed. We toy with the idea of stopping it and getting off. We rebound with the thought that if only we are more reasonable perhaps “they” will be. (Almost to the end, dominant opinion in the U.S. Mission to the United Nations was that the United States could not vote against the “have-nots” by opposing the Charter on the Rights and Duties of States—all rights for the Group of 77 and no duties.) But “they” do not grow reasonable. Instead, we grow unreasonable. A sterile enterprise which awaits total redefinition.

Going into opposition requires first of all that we recognize that there is a distinctive ideology at work in the Third World, and that it has a distinctive history and logic. To repeat the

point once again, we have not done this, tending to see these new political cultures in our own image, or in that of the totalitarians, with a steady shift in the general perception from the former to the latter. But once we perceive the coherence in the majority, we will be in a position to reach for a certain coherence of opposition.

Three central issues commend themselves as points of systematic attack: first, the condition of international liberalism; second, the world economy; third, the state of political and civil liberties and of the general welfare. The rudiments of these arguments need only be sketched.

It is the peculiar function of “radical” political demands, such as those most recently heard in the international forums, that they bring about an exceptional depreciation of the achievements of liberal processes. Even when the radicalism is ultimately rejected, this is rarely from a sense that established processes do better and promise more. American liberalism experienced this depreciation in the 1960’s; international liberalism is undergoing it in the 1970’s. But the truth is that international liberalism and its processes have enormous recent achievements to their credit. It is time for the United States to start saying so.

One example is the multinational corporation which, combining modern management with liberal trade policies, is arguably the most creative international institution of the 20th century. A less controversial example is the World Health Organization. In 1966 it set out to abolish smallpox, and by the time this article is read, the job will more than likely have been successfully completed—in very significant measure with the techniques and participation of American epidemiologists. While not many Americans have been getting smallpox of late, the United States has been spending $140 million a year to keep it that way. Savings in that proportion and more will immediately follow. Here, as in a very long list, a liberal world policy has made national sense.

We should resist the temptation to designate agreeable policies as liberal merely on grounds of agreeableness. There are harder criteria. Liberal policies are limited in their undertakings, concrete in their means, representative in their mode of adoption, and definable in terms of results. These are surely the techniques appropriate to a still tentative, still emergent world society. It is time for the United States, as the new society's loyal opposition, to say this directly, loudly, forcefully.

THE economic argument—which will appear inconsistent only to those who have never been much in politics—is that the world economy is not nearly bad enough to justify the measures proposed by the majority, and yet is much worse than it would otherwise be in consequence of measures the majority has al-

42/COMMENTARY MARCH 1975

ready taken. The first half of this formulation
will require a considerable shift in the govern-
ment mind, and possibly even some movement in
American elite opinion also, for we have become
great producers and distributors of crisis. The
world environment crisis, the world population
crisis, the world food crisis are in the main Amer-
ican discoveries-or inventions, opinions differ.
Yet the simple and direct fact is that any crisis
the United States takes to an international forum
in the foreseeable future will be decided to the
disadvantage of the United States. (Let us hope
arms control is an exception.) Ergo: skepticism,
challenge.

The world economy is the most inviting case for skepticism, although it will be difficult to persuade many Americans of this during an American recession, and although the rise in oil prices is now creating a crisis in the Third World which is neither of American contrivance nor of American discovery nor of American invention. But until the dislocations caused by OPEC, things were simply not as bad as they were typically portrayed. *Things were better than they had been.* Almost everywhere. In many places things were very good indeed. Sir Arthur Lewis summed up the evidence admirably:

> We have now had nearly three decades of rapid economic growth. . . . Output per head has been growing in the developed world twice as fast as at any time within the preceding century. In the LDC world, output per head is not growing as fast as in the developed world, but is growing faster than the developed world used to grow.

The data can be quite startling. In 1973, as Sir Arthur was speaking, the "Planetary Product," as estimated by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, grew at a real rate of 6.8 per cent, an astonishing figure. The Third World product expanded by 5.75 per cent, no less astonishing.

Simultaneously it is to be asserted that these
economies do less well than they ought: that the
difference is of their own making and no one
else's, and no claim on anyone else arises in con-
sequence. This will be hard for us to do, but it is
time we did it. It is time we commenced citing
men such as Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Professor of
Economics at MIT, an Indian by birth, who stated
in the Lal Bahadur Shastri lectures in India in
1978:

In the 1950's our economic programs were con-
sidered by the progressive and democratic
opinion abroad to be a model of what other de-
veloping countries might aspire to and emulate.
Today, many of us spend our time trying
desperately to convince others that somehow
all the success stories elsewhere are special
cases and that our performance is not as un-
satisfactory as it appears. And yet, we must con-
front the fact that, in the ultimate analysis,

despite our socialist patter and our planning
efforts, we have managed to show neither rapid
growth nor significant reduction of income in-
equality and poverty.

It is time we asserted, with Sir Arthur-a socialist,
a man of the Third World-that economic growth
is governed not by Western or American conspir-
acies, but by its own laws and that it "is not an
egalitarian process. It is bound to be more vig-
orous in some professions, or sectors, or geograph-
ical regions than in others, and even to cause
some impoverishment."

A commentator in *The Statesman*, Calcutta's
century-old and most prestigious journal, recent-
ly warned:

> It would be unwise for policy planners in the
developing world to dismiss too easily . . . the
basic premise of a society that worships success:
if you are poor, you have only yourself to
blame. Development is a matter of hard work
and discipline. So if you are not developing
fast, it is not because the rules of the game are
stacked against you or that structural changes
are never easy to bring about, but because you
are lazy and indisciplined. The general dis-
enchantment with economic aid flows from this.
It is difficult for Americans to understand why
such substantial flows of food and money have
made so little impact.

Well, the time may have come when it is neces-
sary for Americans to say, "Yes, it is difficult to
understand that." Not least because some Third
World economies have done so very well. For if
Calcutta has the lowest urban standard of living
in the world, Singapore has in some ways the high-
est. It is time we asserted that inequalities in the
world may be not so much a matter of condition
as of performance. The Brazilians do well. The
Israelis. The Nigerians. The Taiwanese. It is a
good argument. Far better, surely, than the re-
peated plea of *nolo contendere* which we have en-
tered, standing accused and abased before the
Tribune of the People.

CATALOGUING the economic failings of
other countries is something to be
done out of necessity, not choice. But speaking
for political and civil liberty, and doing so in
detail and in concrete particulars, is something
that can surely be undertaken by Americans with
enthusiasm and zeal. Surely it is not beyond us,
when the next Social Report comes along, to ask
about conditions and events in many countries
of the Third World of which almost everyone
knows, but few have thought it politic to speak.
The AFL-CIO does it. Freedom House does it.
Amnesty International does it. *American social-
ists* do it. The time has come for the spokesmen
of the United States to do it too.

It is time, that is, that the American spokes-
man came to be feared in international forums
for the truths he might tell. Mexico, which has

THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION/43

grown increasingly competitive in Third World affairs, which took the lead in the Declaration of the Economic Rights and Duties, preaches international equity. Yet it preaches domestic equity also. It could not without some cost expose itself to a repeated inquiry as to the extent of equity within its own borders. Nor would a good many other Third World countries welcome a sustained comparison between the liberties they provide their own peoples with those which are common and taken for granted in the United States.

For the United States to go into opposition in this manner not only requires a recognition of the ideology of the Third World, but a reversal of roles for American spokesmen as well. As if to compensate for its aggressiveness about what might be termed Security Council affairs, the United States has chosen at the UN to be extraordinarily passive, even compliant, about the endless goings-on in the Commissions and Divisions and Centers and suchlike elusive enterprises associated with the Economic and Social Council. Men and women were assigned to these missions, but have rarely been given much support, or even much scrutiny. Rather, the scrutiny has been of just the wrong kind, ever alert to deviation from the formula platitudes of UN debate, and hopelessly insensitive to the history of political struggles of the 20th century.

In Washington, three decades of habit and incentive have created patterns of appeasement so profound as to seem wholly normal. Delegations to international conferences return from devastating defeats proclaiming victory. In truth, these have never been thought especially important. Taking seriously a Third World speech about, say, the right of commodity producers to market their products in concert and to raise their prices in the process, would have been the mark of the quixotic or the failed. To consider the intellectual antecedents of such propositions would not have occurred to anyone, for they were not thought to have any.

And yet how interesting the results might be. The results, say, of observing the occasion of an Algerian's assuming the Presidency of the General Assembly with an informed tribute to the career of the liberator Ben Bella, still presumably rotting in an Algerian prison cell. The results of a discourse on the disparities between the (1973) per-capita GNP in Abu Dhabi of $43,000 and that of its neighbor, the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen, with one-thousandth that. Again, this need not be a uniformly scornful exercise; anything but. The Third World has more than its share of attractive regimes, and some attractive indeed—Costa Rica, Gambia, Malaysia, to name but three. Half the people in the world who live under a regime of civil liberties live in India. The point is to differentiate, and to turn their own standards against regimes for the moment too much preoccupied with causing diffi-

culties for others, mainly the United States. If this has been in order for some time, the oil price increase—devastating to the development hopes of half-a-hundred Asian and African and Latin American countries—makes it urgent and opportunity in a way it has never been.

Such a reversal of roles would be painful to American spokesmen, but it could be liberating also. It is past time we ceased to apologize for an imperfect democracy. Find its equal. It is time we grew out of our initial—not a little condescending—supersensitivity about the feelings of new nations. It is time we commenced to treat them as equals, a respect to which they are entitled.

The case is formidable that there is nothing the Third World needs less—especially now that the United States has so much withdrawn—than to lapse into a kind of cargo cult designed to bring about our return through imprecation and threat rather than the usual invocations. The Third World has achieved independence, and it needs to assert it in a genuine manner. The condition of the developing countries is in significant measure an imported condition. In the main a distinctive body of European ideas has taken hold, not everywhere in the same measure. Sri Lanka will be more cerebrate in its socialism than will, say, Iraq, Brazil more given to actual economic expansion than Syria or Egypt, Algeria considerably less libertarian than Nigeria. Still, there is a recognizable pattern to the economic and political postures of these countries, of which the central reality is that their anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist ideologies are in fact themselves the last stage of colonialism. These are imported ideas every bit as much as the capitalist and imperialist ideas to which they are opposed. The sooner they are succeeded by truly indigenous ideas, the better off all the former colonies will be, the United States included.

The Third World must feed itself, for example, and this will not be done by suggesting that Americans eat too much. It is one thing to stress what is consumed in the West, another to note what is produced there. In 1973, 17.8 per cent of the world's population produced 64.3 per cent of its product—and not just from taking advantage of cheap raw materials.

In the same way, the Third World has almost everywhere a constitutional heritage of individual liberty, and it needs to be as jealous of that heritage as of the heritage of national independence. It should be a source of renown that India, for one, has done that, and of infamy that so many others have not.

Not long ago, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, speaking of the case of a Soviet dissident who had been detained in a mental hospital, asked whether world opinion would ever permit South Africa to detain a black African leader in this fashion.

44/COMMENTARY MARCH 1975

Answering his own question, he said, "The storm of worldwide rage would have long ago swept the roof from that prison!" His point is very like the one Stephen Spender came to in the course of the Spanish Civil War. Visiting Spain, he encountered atrocities of the Right, and atrocities of the Left. But only those of the Right were being written about, and it came to him, as he later put it, that if one did not care about every murdered child indiscriminately, one did not really care about children being murdered at all. Very well. But nothing we finally know about the countries of the Third World (only in part the object of the Solzhenitsyn charge) warrants the conclusion that they will be concerned only for wrongdoing that directly affects them. Ethnic solidarity is not the automatic enemy of civil liberties. It has been the foundation of many. If there are any who can blow off the roof of any such prison—then all credit to them. If you can be against the wrongful imprisonment of a person anywhere, then you can be against wrongful imprisonment everywhere.

It is in precisely such terms that we can seek common cause with the new nations: granted that they, no more than we, are likely ever wholly to live up to either of our protestations. Yet there exists the strongest possibility of an accommodating relationship at the level of principle—a possibility that does not exist at all with the totalitarian powers as they are now constituted. To contemplate an oppositional role to the Soviet bloc, or the Chinese, in, say, the General Assembly. would be self-deceptive. One may negotiate there as between separate political communities, but to participate as in a single community—even in opposition—would simply not be possible. We

can, however, have such a relation with most Third World nations. And we can do so while speaking for and in the name of political and civil liberty.

AND equality, what of it? Here an act of historical faith is required: what is the record? The record was stated most succinctly by an Israeli socialist who told William F. Buckley, Jr. that those nations which have put liberty ahead of equality have ended up doing better by equality than those with the reverse priority. This is so, and being so, it is something to be shouted to the heavens in the years now upon us. This is our case. We are of the liberty party, and it might surprise us what energies might be released were we to unfurl those banners.

In the spring of 1973, in his first address as director-designate of the London School of Economics—where Harold Laski once molded the minds of so many future leaders of the “new majority”—Ralf Dahrendorf sounded this theme. The equality party, he said, has had its day. The liberty party’s time has come once more. It is a time to be shared with the new nations, and those not so new, shaped from the old European empires, and especially the British—and is the United States not one such?—whose heritage this is also. To have halted the great totalitarian advance only to be undone by the politics of resentment and the economics of envy would be a poor outcome to the promise of a world society. At the level of world affairs we have learned to deal with Communism. Our task is now to learn to deal with socialism. It will not be less difficult a task. It ought to be a profoundly more pleasant one.

PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY BRUNCH

September 20, 1975

9:15 a.m.

SPECIAL PARKING PASS

Please present this pass to parking attendant
for entrance to the campus and parking instructions
for the Brunch.

CASPER--ROVING UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR AT WORK IN NEW ZEALAND

Billy Casper, veteran PGA star and the second golfer in history to earn over a million on the pro tour, just returned home after playing in the Otago Golf Classic in Dunedin, New Zealand over thanksgiving holidays. Pretty good duty, eh? Before you smile knowingly about the beautiful life led by American golfing stars, consider the realities. Sure he was paid handsomely for his appearances and he won a little money with his fourth place finish (among a field of over 150 professionals), finishing the final 36 holes on Sunday with a 68 and a 66, but:

> Billy missed Thanksgiving at home, as usual, and Thanksgiving is a big day at the Casper home with nine children (6 adopted). At least Shirley didn't have to serve buffalo or elk.

In Auckland, he was met by representatives of the Murray Halberg Trust for Crippled Children, being informed that he was the featured speaker in New Zealand's gala sports affair--the annual "sportsman of the year" award dinner in Christchurch. There was barely enough time to be fitted with tux, let alone time to collect thoughts to entertain and inspire the appreciative audience. It was evident that Casper is as well-known in New Zealand as in the United States. Scratched was the practice round in Dunedin Casper had counted on.

Then, with most of the Otago gallery following him, Casper played the usual 18 holes of golf in the pro-am preceding the four day tournament in Dunedin. Not really in competition, Casper entertained his playing amateurs and gallery with constant chatter all the way.

Television, radio, and newspaper interviews, all interested in the United States and its golf tour, continued before and after play each day.

As is usually the case with Billy, who converted to the "Mormon" religion several years ago, local Church elders found Billy and arranged several "fireside chats" with local church members and friends during the evening hours.

After the tournament there were more appearances, special rounds of golf with local enthusiasts in Invercargill and Levin.

With Billy most of the time, I left him to relax a couple of days in Tahiti, and join him on the long flight home on New Zealand Airlines. Not too surprisingly, Casper was in a coma-like sleep following his second all night flight in ten days. Sometimes he sleeps around the clock when he gets to his farm in Mapelton, Utah. And whenever possible, the golf clubs stay in the garage a few days.

Few Americans are as welcome in the world as Billy Casper. Before his New Zealand tour, he completed tournaments in France, Italy, Spain and Morocco, winning two and finishing third in the other two. It all sounds glamorous, but perhaps we'd better ask Kissinger. And by the way, maybe Henry could get Casper confirmed as ambassador-at-large. Not many of us have the common language of golf or the world reputation enjoyed by Billy Casper.

John K. Carmack, representing
Uni-Managers International in
New Zealand

Picture with Billy and Mrs. Patterson, Dunedin Amateur in the Otago Golf Classic, Nov. 27, 1974

DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEAR DR. KISSINGER:

HOPE YOUR SCHEDULE WILL PERMIT YOUR COMING TO HARTFORD OCTOBER 27

TO ADDRESS WORLD AFFAIRS CENTERS 1976 EXECUTIVE FORUM -- A VERY

IMPORTANT GROUP OF CENTRAL CONNECTICUT THOUGHT LEADERS.

SINCERELY,

MR. WALLACE BARNES
ADVISORY BOARD - 1976 EXECUTIVE FORUM
PRESIDENT - BARNES GROUP INC.
13 MAIN STREET
BRISTOL, CONNECTICUT 06010

TWX

7134540190

BARNES GP BRIS

NNNN

LIONEL BARNETT,
painter of this
beautiful collection
of WILDLIFE
PRINTS is a native
of Africa, who has
exploited his re-
markable talent as
a painter to make
the world aware,
not only of the

majesty, but the plight of these wonderful animals. His brush "strokes" these "people", as he fondly refers to them, with tenderness and strong devotion. The accuracy of his colors and detail is proof of his perception of the spirit of nature and the beauty of it.

Now resident in Richmond, Virginia, he intends to promote, through his paintings a better understanding of one of Nature's greatest gifts to man—our wildlife.

[LC]

BORN FREE

P.O.BOX 7421, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, 23221

Mrs. Bonnie Andrews
Office of the Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

July 24, 1974

Dear Mrs. Andrews,

I was delighted to hear, through our Congressman, Mr. David Satterfield III, that Dr. Henry Kissinger would be pleased to accept Portfolio No. 1 of my collection of Wildlife Lithographs. Only 500 copies of this portfolio have been produced and each one comes signed and numbered. The collection comprises six prints which have been beautifully lithographed by one of Virginias oldest printing companies. It is my intention to promote, through my paintings and prints, a better understanding of the plight of these "endangered species."

As a recent emigrant to the United States of America, I have been able to follow Dr. Kissinger's many triumphs with great admiration and pride.

I would be honored if Dr. Kissinger would accept my collection of lithographs as a token of my high regard for his contribution to THE OTHER ENDANGERED SPECIE---MAN!

Please advice me regarding a suitable time and place in which to make the presentation to Dr. Kissinger.

Thanking you in anticipation

cc: Congressman David Satterfield, III

LB:jb

HELP PROTECT OUR ENDANGERED SPECIES

[LC]

RECEPTION

With the gracious cooperation of Dr. Joshua C. Taylor and his staff at the National Collection of Fine Arts, the Board of Trustees of Ford's Theatre Society will host a buffet reception in the Lincoln Gallery of the National Collection, immediately following "GIVE 'EM HELL, HARRY." The National Collection is located at 8th and G Streets NW (within walking distance of the theatre).

Housed in the historic Old Patent Office Building since 1968, the museum's third floor was the site of Abraham Lincoln's second inaugural ball. Guests promenaded in what is now the Lincoln Gallery and, today, the room's magnificent proportions provide a superb setting for a representative selection of the museum's permanent collection of art and sculpture of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries.

An admit card for the reception will be enclosed with your theatre tickets. For your convenience, tickets will be available to pick up at the Ford's Theatre box office at 10:00 a.m. on April 17th. To avoid long box office lines, please pick up your tickets before 7:00 p.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1975

On behalf of President and Mrs. Ford I would like to invite
you and your spouse to a reception at the White House honoring the
members of the National Commission on the Observance of International
Women's Year. The reception will be held on Monday, April 14th at
6:00 p.m.

Please respond by telegram or telephone to Pat Lindh (202-456-2715 or 2663) at the White House whether or not you will be able to attend. At the same time that you accept, please give your date of birth, place of birth, and social security number. Since time is short, we ask your immediate reply.

It is requested that you enter the White House by the Southwest Gate and have a form of identification with you. Dress for the reception is informal. We look forward to seeing you on April 14th.

November 1, 1973

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I know you are an extremely busy man, but perhaps you can
take a moment to read this letter.

My father, William I. Baruch formerly of Nurnberg, who is
a great admirer of yours, will be 95 years old on Dec. 19
1973. He is in good physical and mental health.

It would be the highlight of his life if you would find
it possible to drop him a line of congratulations.

His name and address: William I. Baruch
117-01 Park Lane South
Kew Gardens, N.Y. 11418

Thank you so much. However, if we do not hear from you
we will understand.

November 10, 1975

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

My father, William I. Baruch formerly of Nurnberg, who is a great admirer of yours, will be 97 years old on December 19, 1975. He is in good physical and mental health.

It would be the highlight of his life if you would find it possible, despite your busy schedule, to drop him a note of congratulations.