April 29, 1955

Mr. Samuel P. Huntington
Kirkland House A-23
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Sam:

Thank you for your letter of April 24. I agree with you that my article in *Foreign Affairs* is a little more disciplined.

I am a little frightened of the reaction to my *Foreign Affairs* article, however. It has become required reading matter at the Air War College, at the Army War College, and the National War College; General Michaelis has distributed it to the Major Press Association, and General Gavin, the Deputy Chief of Staff, has made it required reading at the Pentagon. Be that as it may, I am too well aware of its genesis not to be a little bit concerned about how reputations are made in this country.

I had already seen your article, but I am delighted to have your reprint. I find it extremely interesting and right in line with something I shall be doing for the Council on Foreign Relations next year.

Would you let me know what you will be working on over the next few years of your social science research grant? We might perhaps fruitfully coordinate some of our activities.

Best regards.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

APR 17 1956

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT

LITTAUER CENTER M-2
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

April 14, 1956

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
The Harold Pratt House
58 East 68th Street
New York 21, N. Y.

Dear Henry:

I'm enclosing a copy of my
article on "Radicalism and Conservatism
in National Defense Policy."

Many congratulations on your
appointment at Chicago, although I am sorry
you will not be returning here. Harvard has
certainly denuded itself of capable people
in the foreign policy and defense areas.

Incidentally, would you have
a spare reprint of your current Foreign
Affairs piece? I have yet to read it as
all the newsstands here seem to be out of
it.

With many good wishes,

Columbia University
in the City of New York

NEW YORK 27, N. Y.

INSTITUTE OF WAR AND PEACE STUDIES
429 WEST 117TH STREET

August 17, 1960

Dear Henry,

Many thanks for your stimulating piece on "Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack". You herald, I think, the beginning of the third phase in the search for some sort of arms agreement. The first was concerned primarily with overall disarmament, the second primarily with inspection against tactical surprise. Now, as you indicate, the problem has taken new forms which can only be met by new solutions such as you propose. Your thinking has more than kept abreast of technological. I only wish the official thinking on both sides was as flexible.

With warmest wishes,

Samuel P. Huntington
Associate Director

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

September 7, 1960

Professor Samuel P. Huntington
Institute of War and Peace Studies
429 West 117th Street
New York 27, New York

Dear Sam:

I returned from a brief holiday
to find your letter of August 17th, and want
to tell you how much I appreciate your kind
words about my article. I'm now on my way
to Japan for a few weeks after finishing a
book which is being published in January and
which will contain an expansion of the article.

With warm regards.

NAUM KORZHAVIN: TWO TRANSLATIONS

by STANLEY KUNITZ

From foolishness or wiseness
We lived together laughing
And would not give our fondness
The name of love.

Though the war had scarcely ended
And everyone had troubles,
Spring taught us to move surely,
Light shimmered on the sea.

Yes, I know. Love is grievous,
Fugitive, exalted,
But I had what I wanted:
To live simply and to write.

Not to move mountains,
Not to dig to China,
But as Pushkin did it,
Easy and serene.

These poems will appear in an anthology of contemporary Russian writing, Pages From Tarusa, edited by Andrew Field, to be published by Little, Brown and Company in May. Copyright © 1964 by Little, Brown and Company. The work of a group of young writers, the book reflects a new current in Soviet literature, not "protest" writing but a return to the manner of the Russian classics. Naum Korzhavin, one of the young neoclassic poets, strives, says Mr. Field, "to achieve the 'lightness and lucidity' that is characteristic of Pushkin." Stanley Kunitz, a noted contemporary poet, teaches in the School of General Studies at Columbia.

THE THOUSAND YEAR SONG

"It's an old song / That is forever new."

HEINE

An old song
A thousand years old.
He worships her
But she is cold.

History flows
And fashions change;
Familiar customs
Yield to strange;

But still through this
Perpetual stir,
She loves him less
Than he loves her.

Horseman or poet
Though he be,
Her light is his
Necessity.

She seems perfection
In his eyes,
And must be so—
Since she agrees.

A thousand years
Like one unfold;
He worships her
But she is cold.

Who is this other
She finds fair?
No devil rides him,
He's Mister Square.

If such an ass
Can be preferred,
The point is plain:
She likes being bored.

Comfort instructs her,
"Never fret";
She does not choose
To be upset.

Maybe her suitor
Will cry: "Enough!
I'm sick of yearning!"
And shuffle off.

Maybe he'll turn,
Like his rival, fair;
Get rid of his devil,
Become Mr. Square;

Maybe she'll play him
Another tune.
How should I know?
The song lets me down.

To hell with the song!
My choice is not free;
Already both fates
Have happened to me.

And that's why my hurt
Is a thousand years old:
He worships her
But she is cold.

18

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY FORUM

"Monarchy . . . suits only wealthy nations; aristocracy, States of middling size and wealth; and democracy, States that are small and poor." Cities, said Jefferson, were "pestilential to the morals, the health, and the liberties of man." We now know, however, that affluence made democracy wealthier but not weaker: industrialization entrenched rather than undermined the political order. In all likelihood, the effects of affluence on Communism will be similar.

A new condition affecting the development of modern political systems is the unprecedented influence of international affairs coupled with rapid communication. The direct competition with the United States, especially in technology and economics, has had conflicting results. Peter Kapitsa, a Soviet nuclear physicist, has stated that many of Russia's successes in space would have been impossible if the views of the "philosophers" (i.e., ideologues) had prevailed. Soviet leadership increasingly concurs, and this had led it to accept scientific and scholarly exchanges with the West in the expectation of Soviet technical gain. At the same time, the exchanges have aroused the fears of some party leaders that Western humanists and philosophers, admitted in part as a necessary price for scientific exchange, will undermine the official ideology. The Soviet leaders have not resolved this issue, and during the past year an internal debate on the advantages and risks of the enterprise was in progress.

But the fact of Soviet international involvement also serves to justify internal mobilization. The new sense of Soviet nationalism is merged with the ideological interests of the ruling bureaucracy, and competition with America is the natural expression of both. Furthermore, since the Communist system was created as an institution of revolution and conflict, it is in some ways less threatened by international tensions than by protracted international harmony. To be sure, both America and Russia may "co-discover" each other as the balance of terror forces them to coexist. But this is not tantamount to their becoming more alike politically.

The theory of convergence thus ignores the probability that both the United States and the Soviet Union will evolve novel forms of government out of the present uneven balance of political and socio-economic determinants. In the

Soviet Union the sense of purpose and commitment of the professional party bureaucracy, its organizational efficiency, the availability of new means of social and economic control, and finally, the personal character of the leader—all these are likely to be more important to the Soviet future than the influence of experts, of common patterns of industrial culture, of affluence, and of limited contacts with other countries. Barring unforeseeable paralysis of the system during a struggle for succession, the Soviet pattern of political control and indoctrination will endure and may even be reinforced by a growing collectivist consensus.

The Soviet and the American political systems have both in their own ways been highly successful. Precisely because they have been successful, they are not likely to change in any fundamental way. For the two systems to converge, a fundamental alteration of course—in a historical sense, a revolutionary change in direction—would have to occur in one of them. Every healthy political system undergoes change, but when change is gradual it tends to be shaped in the context of both past and present. It is too simple to assume that the complexity of the human condition is reducible to a single socio-economic or political mold.

There is a further point worth reflecting upon, if only because much of the current emotional commitment to the convergence theory rests on the belief that in the long run convergence represents the only hope for peace. But history alone should suggest that socio-political uniformity and peace need not go hand in hand. A common Communist system has not prevented bitter hostility between China and Russia, and we ought not to forget that most European wars were fought by countries with very similar social and political structures. By now the Communists particularly should realize that a Communist America and a Communist Russia would be likely to engage in a competition even more intense than the relatively unequal struggle now being waged between Russia and China. Likewise, the West should not assume that a non-Communist Russia would be less likely to strive toward the political domination of the Eurasian continent than its Communist predecessor of today.

The evolution of the two systems—not their convergence—seems to be the undramatic pattern for the future.

WINTER 1964

17

control, will no longer be obstacles to rational re-
source allocation. That equally unattractive insti-
tution, the beehive state, will also be able to achieve
this end. The wasteful and arbitrary command
economy imposed by Stalin is no longer the only
kind possible.

Increasing economic complexity has, in fact,
freed the Soviet Union from Hobson's choice.
The party is no longer forced to choose between
the Marxist theory of value, which prevents
economic rationality, and the market economy,
which would threaten the ideological and po-
litical structure of the system. Indeed, it is the
advance in techniques of economic control and
coordination that makes possible for the first
time both further economic development and
the retention of Communist ideology.

Everything that the party leaders have said
and done recently suggests that they will con-
sciously strive to protect their ideology and their
power from erosion. They intend to keep scien-
tific and technical expertise compartmentalized
and the monopoly of social innovation in the
hands of the party. Multiplicity of expertise (an
aspect of any modern society) is not the same
thing as socio-political pluralism based on group
autonomy (an aspect of a particular form of de-
velopment), as recent events in the U.S.S.R.
show clearly. The attacks by party leaders on
the intellectuals and on the notion of ideological
coexistence advocated by some Soviet intellectu-
als indicate the bureaucrats realize the main
source of the threat to political stability lies in a
decline of the party's ideological and political
monopoly. Were the Soviet Union to open its
frontiers to foreign books, newspapers, and radio
broadcasts the effect could be political upheaval.
The party has been striving to combine economic
rationalization, which it does not fear per se,
with ideological revitalization by identifying the
party with technological innovation and a rising
standard of living. The Soviets' obvious goal is
to close the gap between doctrine and reality,
a gap that in the long run might erode their
ideology.

This brings us to the role of affluence in the
Soviet future. Affluence brought about in a mixed
economy and democratic political system pro-
motes social diversity and creates new loci of
power. The American pioneers were at first both
free and poor; subsequent affluence could at
worst diminish their freedom and at best con-
solidate it, but could not bring it about. Indeed,

one might argue (and many have) that afflu-
ence has produced far more conformity, inter-
dependence, and social malleability in contempo-
rary America than existed in the past. In the
Soviet Union, however, affluence is created by
means of political control wielded by an en-
trenched élite, a "New Class" as Djilas called it.
Soviet affluence is coming to a society that has
always been both poor and *unfree*. Furthermore,
to the extent that the Soviet Union even in the
future will remain *less* affluent than many other
nations, the pervading feeling of "relative non-
affluence" will remain a significant spur to
Soviet aspiration, and the political moderation
accompanying general well-being may be less
pronounced than elsewhere. Americans tend to
forget that since no country is richer than
theirs, there is no one "to overtake and surpass."

The few available hints as to the forms of
future Soviet affluence strongly suggest that the
political leadership is gravely concerned lest
rising standards of living lead to excessive in-
dividualism. Affluent collectivism is to be the
mode of Soviet affluence. Cars will be pooled, and
so will rest homes; people will live in "communal
palaces," each of which will house about 2,000
people; they will eat together, attend boarding
schools from early childhood, and enjoy free,
state-provided social facilities, such as transpor-
tation, housing, meals, social services, and even
clothing. These are serious projections, and
Soviet planners estimate that many of them will
be implemented between 1975 and 2000. The
political system may well be characterized by
greater rationality and less coercion and tension,
but it is unlikely that its monopoly of social con-
trol will be impaired. Greater reliance on social
self-control, collectivist affluence, and central-
ized managerial direction will evolve a society
as profoundly different from affluent Western
societies as from the earlier Stalinist model.

The current argument that Communism can-
not survive industrialization and affluence recalls
the 18th-century arguments about the fate of
democracy. Democracy, it was said, could sur-
vive only in a poor, egalitarian, rural environ-
ment. It would be corrupted and undermined by
affluence, urbanization, and industrialization.
The "less luxury there is in a republic," Montes-
quieu argued, "the more it is perfect. . . . Re-
publics end with luxury; monarchies with
poverty." In a similar vein, Rousseau held that

16

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY FORUM

more economically advanced East Germany and Czechoslovakia, both of which began large-scale industrial development many years ago and which, accordingly, should be politically more moderate.

One might suggest that the cases of Nazi Essen and democratic Detroit or moderate Poland and totalitarian East Germany do not refute the general theory because in each case specific historical elements were decisive in forming political structure. But if that is so, specific "historical" data are more important than an over-all theory. Should they not also be given their due in the cases of America and Russia?

In effect, we cannot be sure that a one-to-one correlation exists between economic change and political change. A political system is influenced and shaped by continuing cultural, social, historical, and traditional forces. Even more important, a political system has its own independent staying power and helps shape the course of economic development. Thus, a consideration of the influence of socio-economic processes on politics must take into account the means used to modernize the society, since the means affect the character of economic development. The liberalization of Western societies—and even their adoption of many socialist measures—was achieved because social and political pluralism preceded and accompanied economic change.

In analyzing the relationship between politics and economics in America and Russia, therefore, it is important to examine the character of the political system and the character of economic growth; if both are different, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the influence of economics on politics, and vice versa, is also likely to be quite different in the two societies. In the Soviet Union, a backward society was somewhat modernized (it is sometimes forgotten that the Soviet Union is still only quasi-developed) through total social revolution—a revolution implemented with an apparatus of terror wielded by a highly disciplined political élite that was by its very nature inimical to political pluralism. In broad terms, the Soviet Union underwent an extremely rapid industrialization that was politically directed and involved a drastic revision of the previous social structure. In America, industrialization was far more spon-

taneous, and national political coordination gradually emerged after social, economic, and political pluralism had already taken firm root.

These two patterns of development have resulted in a strikingly different relationship between society and politics in the two countries. The American Revolution freed a society from an irrelevant and restraining aristocratic order; the diversity, the pluralism, and the suspicion of central control that characterized the early settlers expressed themselves in a political and social system generally designed to protect diversity itself. The Soviet political system, on the other hand, came into being prior to the emergence of the Soviet society. Indeed, the political system was established to create a Soviet society and a power-motivated political élite was its *sine qua non*. Governing a continental society, changing drastically the way of life of 200,000,000 people, consciously shaping the future of an entire social order—all this is no mean task, and it is hardly surprising that a major preoccupation of Soviet leadership has been to develop techniques of government commensurate with the undertaking. Thus if American politics can best be understood in terms of American society, it is equally true that Soviet society can best be understood in terms of Soviet politics. In the former, economic power preceded political power; in the latter, political power preceded economic. It would be ironic indeed if the final intellectual victory of a fad- ing Marxism were to convince the West that economics shaped politics in the Soviet Union. Marxism cannot explain a Communist state.

Accordingly, ideology and a professional political élite play a greater role in determining the future in the Soviet Union than they do in the United States; conversely, economic change and the activity of interest groups have greater effect in the United States than in the Soviet Union. Changes in Soviet economic management need not challenge the ideological and power monopoly of the ruling party. Peter Wiles has convincingly argued that the introduction of computers, linear programing, and various modern techniques usually associated with "economic rationality and maturity" has increased the efficiency of central planning:

> . . . the so-called command economy can now be rationally conducted. Large enterprises, forced investment programs, equal incomes, even centralized

WINTER 1964

15

Secondly, it is said, an industrial society is necessarily a pluralistic society; hence ideological and political claims must be limited. Physical scientists, medical experts, pedagogues, military strategists, engineers, even economic planners must be free to apply their skills if society is to develop and operate efficiently. The laws of physics, of strategy, of engineering, and even of industrial management and economics are universally true and eventually must be so recognized by all modern societies. In addition, industrialization gives rise to a multiplicity of interest groups that make positive demands on the political process. In the early stages of industrialization, when few other industrial interest groups existed, the Communist party could pre-empt the scene; it articulated and imposed the demands for industrialization on an agricultural society. As a result of the party's success in industrializing the country, however, the vacuum has been filled, and in the future it will play a mediating, brokerage role comparable to that of governments and political parties in Western democracies.

Thirdly, industrialization creates affluence. Affluence undermines political discipline and ideological orthodoxy. If the historical function of the Communist party was to industrialize the Soviet Union, it could justify its monopoly of power only so long as sacrifice was required to achieve this end. As the balance of production shifts increasingly from producer goods to consumer goods, what place is there for revolutionary élan in a mass-consumption society? Ideological fervor is characteristic of only the early phases of industrialization; the age of ideology has already come to an end in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan; it will soon come to an end in the Soviet Union. With rare exceptions, affluent countries are also democratic ones. If Khrushchev does succeed in raising the Soviet standard of living above that of the United States, he will not achieve Communism; he will bury it.

The arguments that convergence will result from industrialization are often supplemented by an argument that convergence will arise from contact between nations. The Soviet Union and the United States, it is said, will enter into a phase of "mutual discovery," in which they will learn from each other. One important aspect of the 1950s was increased technological and cul-

tural exchange between Soviets and foreigners. With improved travel and communication, a machine, a technique, or even a form of social organization that works in one society will be imported into another. Since Soviet society has been more closed than Western ones, it will inevitably experience the greatest immediate change resulting from increased contact.

Is the case for convergence then incontestable? We think it is not. Undoubtedly there are certain traits inherent in the modern industrial and urban order, and surely they affect the style and values of contemporary mass culture. The Soviet leaders today are far more similar to their Western counterparts in clothing, in social behavior, even in aspiration than they were 25 years ago. The same is true of the average Soviet citizen. In that sense there has been, and there will continue to be, a steady convergence of the West and the East, including China. But the question is: Will it also reduce the political difference? That seems far less likely upon examination.

At the heart of the widely held view that modern industrialization imposes certain common social and political consequences is the assumption that there is a direct causal relationship between the stage of economic development and politics. Yet agrarian society, for example, was characterized by the economic similarity and by the political diversity of its institutions. Study of agrarian societies suggests at the very least that not every common economic pattern dictates a common political structure. Perhaps the more complex, technological, and socially impinging industrial economy does dictate political structure, but the causal relationship remains unproven.

In fact, there is much evidence to suggest that industrial complexity and maturity do not necessarily cause political uniformity and moderation. In an economic and technological sense, Essen under the Nazis was similar to Detroit, yet the similarity did not stop the Nazis from imposing an entirely different political system. Poland and Hungary today are in the disruptive "stage of transition" from agrarian to industrial society and according to the theory, one would expect them to be radically totalitarian. Yet they are more moderate, less doctrinaire, and more politically "mature" than the much

14

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY FORUM

sionally permitted writers, artists, and scientists; the encouragement of criticism and discussion on specific limited issues; the greater sensitivity of the regime to public opinion; and, above all, the pragmatic, freewheeling, open political style of Khrushchev: all these are indisputable facts. More than that: to the advocates of convergence they are but the first of even more fundamental changes in the Soviet political and social systems. "Liberalization" is seen not as a restricted phenomenon, nor as one phase in a cycle, but as a secular process that will develop as the inevitable concomitant of the industrialization of the Soviet Union and its new role in international politics.

The belief that industrialization will dissolve Communism in the Soviet Union is not limited to Western thinkers. It is also highly popular among intellectuals in the nonaligned states of Asia and Africa. The most prevalent view is that almost all the change is occurring within the Soviet Union. Implicit in the theory is the image of a static America and a dynamic Soviet Union. The United States is affluent and free; the Soviet Union is gradually moving toward these goals. The United States is comfortable and inflexible; the Soviet Union is flexible, developing, responsive to new needs. If Khrushchev has accomplished nothing else, he has publicized the Soviet Union as a highly dynamic, pragmatic society.

The idea of convergence serves many purposes, and belief in it raises many expectations. To Americans and West Europeans convergence may appear to be the only way out of a hopeless, endless conflict. Politicians of emergent countries can find in the theory historical sanction for their neutralism. Titoists invoke it to justify isolation from the rest of the Communist community. The Chinese Communists employ it to suggest that they, not the Soviets, remain the uncorrupted, orthodox Marxist-Leninists. The theory of convergence is not merely an abstract intellectual formulation; it is a source of optimism for many and of legitimation for all. Strikingly, the only apparent dissenters from the theory are the Soviets themselves. In June 1963, L. F. Ilyichev, the Secretary for ideological affairs of the Soviet Communist party, noted it among several "pernicious" clichés:

> Some time ago there appeared a theory, according to which socialism and capitalism, in spite of

their fundamental difference, are allegedly developing in the same direction—that the compulsory economic imperatives of total industrial development will gradually lead to a hybridization of the two systems, to their synthesis, to the formation of a single mixed society by means of the internal change of socialism and some modernization of capitalism. This is frank social demagogy. The imperialist ideologists . . . are not beyond adopting a few ideas of socialism in order to deceive the working people. . . . Like any reactionary concepts, the latest fancies of anti-Communism have no future at all.

Yet the Soviets themselves have their own long-run convergence thesis: "Your grandchildren," said Khrushchev, "will play under red flags." The world will converge, the Russians believe, to an essentially communist form of government. And in the West, we too support our own brand of convergence. We expect there will probably be more economic planning and social ownership in the West, but we see the Communist party and its monopoly on power as the real victims of the historical process: both will fade away. Thus, the Western and the Communist theories are essentially revolutionary: both foresee a revolutionary change in the character of one of the present systems of government. They assume not convergence, but submergence—of the opposite system. The Communists openly state the assumption. In the West, it is implicit in the prevalent belief in convergence. Let us examine the arguments on which the convergence view of the future rests.

The view that industrialization will produce increasing liberalization in the Soviet Union is not always explicitly formulated. In general, however, it is held that industrialization has three direct consequences that, with one supplementary factor, will stimulate convergence. First, industrialization and urbanization, it is said, give rise to a culture common to all modern societies. The industrial process imposes uniformities in equipment, skills, techniques, and organization. Managers and workers in such societies perform similar tasks and hence develop similar outlooks and similar ways of life. Industrial culture is the same in Sverdlovsk and Detroit. Eventually this culture will produce similar political institutions. This argument is, in effect, anti-Soviet Marxism: the forces of production will shape the social context of production, which in turn will determine the political superstructure.

WINTER 1964

13

# AMERICA AND RUSSIA
## CONVERGING NATIONS?

by ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
and SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

Industrial culture: Will it eventually produce political similarity in Sverdlovsk and Detroit?

Photograph by Henri Cartier-Bresson/Magnum

"You can't sit in the Kremlin and run that thing as you could 20 years ago. There's too much of it. It's too big. . . . And they are finding . . . what Western society found 200 years ago . . . that if you are going to have an industrial society, you have to have liberty, and Khrushchev, in a way, has been fumbling around with this . . . he wants more liberty. In fact, he knows he has to have it, and yet, he doesn't know how to do it. . . ."

"In a sense, then, the Russians are becoming more like us?"

"Yes, and less like the Chinese."

—Walter Lippmann, in a CBS interview with Charles Collingwood, May 1, 1963.

In this brief exchange, Walter Lippmann put succinctly an idea that has become increasingly popular in the past few years. It is called "the theory of convergence" —the idea that the Soviet and the American political systems are becoming more alike—and can be found in a variety of forms in the writings of leading Western intellectuals. George Kennan, for instance, has argued that Khrushchev's Communism represents "an essential alteration of the nature of the regime" and that a "new form of parliamentarianism" is developing in the Soviet Union. "In the main," he has said, "the goals and trends of Russian Communism lie along the same path as those of Western liberal-industrialism. . . . It is probable that the progress already made is in the direction of our own institutions." Similarly, Walt Rostow has described Communism as a "disease of the transition" to a highly industrialized society, and predicts that Communism is "likely to wither" when the Soviet Union reaches the stage of advanced mass consumption.

Wide acceptance of the convergence theory has been prompted by the events in the Soviet Union in the decade following the death of Stalin. The end of the atmosphere of terror; the closing of labor camps; the subordination of the secret police; the denunciation of the "crimes of the Stalinist era"; the greater freedom occa-

Zbigniew Brzezinski, director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs and professor of public law and government at the University, is the author of books and articles on the U.S.S.R. Samuel P. Huntington has also written extensively on Soviet politics. Formerly associate director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia, he is now professor of government at Harvard and a member of the Columbia University Seminar on The State. The present essay is adapted from Political Power: USA/USSR, a book on which the authors collaborated, to be published this spring by Viking Press.

12

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY FORUM

water into a blue sky. It was so calm and bright
that even when we were two miles away I could
see the little disturbance on the water where the
bird still struggled. I knew then what it is to
kill wantonly, and I still do. When the Ancient
Mariner says, so simply, "With my crossbow/I
shot the Albatross," I know exactly what he
means.

This little tale never failed to impress my
students. I flatter myself that it illuminates not
only the Mariner's fatal bow shot, but also the
act by which he lifts the ensuing curse from
himself and the souls of his shipmates. The two
acts are complementary. For only when he
sees the phosphorescent sea animals in the water
beneath the becalmed ship and blesses them
"unawares" for their unearthly beauty is the
curse broken. His blessing is as spontaneously
good as his killing of the Albatross is gratu-
itously evil.

My killing of the tropic bird seemed to be no
portent of misfortune during the war. We were
never becalmed, the crew stayed healthy, and
the ship was decommissioned, unharmed and, as
far as I know, unfired upon, in 1945.

I first found occasion to tell my story in a
prep school English class I taught in 1946, right
after my discharge from the service. I was a
nervous new teacher then, and felt not a little
pride when a student first asked that now famil-
iar question and I was able so precisely and
passionately to answer it.

In later years, though, pride changed to ap-
prehension. I date the change from a class about
ten years ago, when I was teaching at Columbia.
It was March, and a student had asked me the
inevitable question. I gave my answer, which
had by this time become one of those set pieces
of classroom performance that experienced
teachers so much enjoy. As I was about to turn
to Kubla Khan, a young man raised his hand.
"Sir," he asked, "do you find that every once in
a while you have an irresistible impulse to tell
this story?"

After the laughter died down, I congratulated
the student on his wit and said, "Yes, at least
once a year, depending on how many times I
have to teach *The Ancient Mariner*." Then we
did go on to Kubla Khan.

That was in the spring session. I was sched-
uled to teach the same survey course in the

following summer session. So, one hot day in
mid-July, I found myself standing in a class-
room, reading aloud, "It is an Ancient Mariner,
/ And he stoppeth one of three . . ." and looking
forward to my little set piece about the tropic
bird. But as I went through an explication of
the poem and asked the standard questions, I
began to have misgivings. I remembered that
student's sly question, and began to fight its im-
plications. Did I *have* to tell my story? Could I
get through the poem *without* telling it? Could
I *stop* myself from telling it? Nonsense, I said
to myself—there are generations of readers of
*The Ancient Mariner* who haven't wantonly shot
birds from the decks of ships at sea. Haven't they
understood the poem? But then, I thought, the
story is too good not to use. I really *know* what
it is to shoot the Albatross. Should I deprive my
students of my experience? My palms were
sweaty and my heart was pounding. This is ab-
surd, I said to myself. I'll simply skip it. There
are lots of other things in the poem to talk
about. But no, the whole voyage turns on that
moment. . . .

A student was asking me a question. "Sir,"
he said, "Something has always bothered me
about this poem. I read it in high school, and I
know I'll read it again many times. But it has
always seemed so artificial to me that this man
just shoots this Albatross for no reason at all.
What is the symbolism of this?"

Without premeditation, like a ribbon off a
spool, the answer came out of me: "Well," I
said, "it just so happens that I have an explana-
tion that I think will satisfy you." In 30 seconds
I was back in imagination on that calm Carib-
bean sea, shooting the tropic bird. So I told
them all about it, and I must say I felt better.

Until then, I had always told the story light-
heartedly, confidently. Afterwards, though, I
would try each March not to tell it. I'd find my-
self thinking, *I don't really have to tell it*; then
I'd think, *But it's such a good story. It explains
so much, and it's right out of my own exper-
ience. I owe it to the class*. And so, not without
struggle, I would always tell it.

Now that I have left Columbia and stopped
teaching, I no longer have my captive audience.
I miss that seasonal swing of English B2 into
Coleridge. In fact, this year I'm looking for an
audience. I know I'll find one, and when I do,
I'll tell my story. They cannot choose but hear.

WINTER 1964

11

April 29, 1964

Professor S. P. Huntington
Littauer M-26

Dear Sam:

Thank you for sending me a copy
of your article "American and Russia
Converging Nations?"

I have read it with great interest.

With kind regards.

-2-

Table of Contents

<table><tr><td>I. Introduction</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>II. Research Programs</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>A. Reform, Revolution, and Social Change</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>1. Internal Violence and Political Instability</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>2. External Influences on Revolution</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>3. Land Reform</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>4. Urbanization</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>5. Corruption</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>6. Social Mobilization and Political Development: the Arab World</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>B. Party Systems and Political Development</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>1. Communal Politics and Party Systems</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>2. Competitive Politics in Modernizing Societies</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>3. Evolution of Established One Party Systems</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>4. Political Institutionalization and Economic Development: Korea</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>C. International Integration and Political Development</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>D. Political Institutions and Social Change</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>III. Conferences and Seminars</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>IV. People</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>V. Publications and Other Writings</td><td>17</td></tr></table>

# I. INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1966 the Center for International Affairs launched a four-year research program on Political Institutionalization and Social Change. The principal source of support for this program was a grant of $250,000 which the Carnegie Corporation of New York made to the Center in February 1966. Additional support is contributed by the University from its own funds and from the Ford Foundation grant to Harvard for work in international affairs. The program constitutes one segment of the work going on at the Center on political development.

Political stability and social reform are highly desired goals in the modernizing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Yet the achievement of one often conflicts with the attainment of the other. The program on Political Institutionalization and Social Change was designed to focus upon the conditions under which and the methods by which these two goals could be reconciled. Building upon recent work in political development, this program was planned to stress neither abstract theory-building nor institutional description but rather the formulation of empirical generalizations about developmental processes and the testing of these generalizations through the comparative analysis of the experiences of a variety of countries, cultures, and eras. The general subjects in the program included reform, revolution, and political party development. Among the more specific topics to be covered in the research were: the social,

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political, and strategic factors which influence the outcome of revolu-
tions in modernizing countries; the politics of land reform and of tax
reform; the role of corruption in political development and moderniza-
tion; the effect of political institutions on racial and communal
conflict; the impact of social diversification on one-party systems;
the relation between electoral competition and social conflict; and
the effect of the concentration and dispersion of power on social
change.

This report is on the first fifteen months of the program,
from April 1, 1966 to June 30, 1967. Since the ongoing activities
of the program are so intimately related to each other, however, this
report also briefly describes under the appropriate headings work under
way during the academic year 1967-1968.

## II. RESEARCH PROGRAMS

In the spring of 1966 Martin C. Needler, now Director of
the Division of Inter-American Studies at the University of New Mexico,
completed a book-length study of the factors responsible for political
instability in Latin America. One portion of this manuscript was pub-
lished in the *American Political Science Review* in September 1966
and the entire study is due to be published late in 1967 under the
title, *Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence,
and Evolutionary Change*.

-5-

In the fall of 1966 Ergun Ozbudun, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Ankara, completed an analysis of "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," which the Center published as an occasional paper. In this analysis, Professor Ozbudun stresses the socially and economically progressive policies of the military government which came to power in 1960 and the tensions which resulted between the military and more conservative civilian groups.

During 1966-1967, David O. Wilkinson, Assistant Professor of Political Science at UCLA, was at the Center engaged in a study of the factors responsible for victory and defeat in revolutionary war. Drawing upon the historical experiences of the English, Mexican, Spanish, Russian, and several Chinese revolutions, he has attempted to develop a comparative causal explanation of the outcomes of such conflicts. A preliminary report on this research, "Victory and Defeat in Revolutionary Civil War: A Comparative Analysis," was presented at the American Political Science Association convention in September 1967. Professor Wilkinson expects to finish a book-length manuscript on this subject early in 1968.

In 1967-1968, Moshe Lissak, Lecturer in Sociology at Hebrew University, came to the Center to study the roles of the military in the politics and society of several Asian countries, including Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, and Israel.

## 2. External Influences on Revolution

Foreign influences often play a decisive role in stimulating

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revolutions and in suppressing them. In the current era the United
States is clearly the most significant external influence on revolu-
tions in other countries. During 1966-1967 two related efforts were
undertaken at the Center to explore this influence. One study, by
Steven R. Rivkin, a lawyer with considerable governmental experience,
analysed the intervention of the United States in five revolutionary
situations: the Philippines (1947-1952), Cuba (1957-1962), Vietnam
(1954-1967), the Dominican Republic (1961-1966), and Bolivia (1952-
1965). As a result of these researches, Mr. Rivkin has completed a
paper entitled "When Nations Intervene." A parallel and related effort
was the Center sponsorship of a faculty seminar on United States
policy in the Dominican Republic. The seminar was chaired by Ernest
R. May, Professor of History at Harvard, and its executive secretary
was Abraham F. Lowenthal, Ph.D. candidate in political science at
Harvard. Five scholars prepared papers for the seminar on aspects of
American involvement in Dominican political development as follows:
Howard J. Wiarda, "The Context of United States Policy Toward the
Dominican Republic: Background to the Revolution of 1965"; Abraham
F. Lowenthal, "The Dominican Intervention of 1965: A Study in U.S.
Policy"; José Moreno, "The Emergence of Leadership in a Revolutionary
Setting"; Jerome Slater, "The OAS and Political Change in the Dominican
Republic"; Larman Wilson, "United States Military Assistance to the
Dominican Republic, 1916-1967."

3. <u>Land Reform</u>

Successful revolutions in modernizing countries usually

-7-

require the active support and participation of the peasantry. If
the social and economic conditions producing revolution are to be
alleviated, some measure of land reform, particularly changes in
land tenure, is often necessary. While much has been written on the
economic aspects of land reform, relatively little has been done on
the politics of land reform. Hence this subject has a high priority
in the PI&SC program.

During 1966-67 Hung-chao Tai, Assistant Professor of
Political Science at the University of Detroit, undertook a compara-
tive analysis of the politics of land reform in eight countries:
Taiwan, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Mexico, and
Colombia. In his study he was concerned with both the political
processes through which land reform could be achieved and with the
political, economic, and social results of land reform. The first
result of his work was a 107-page paper entitled, "Land Reform in
the Developing Countries: Tenure Defects and Political Response,"
presented at the American Political Science Association convention
in September 1967. This paper will now be elaborated into a book-
length manuscript. In addition, Professor Tai produced an extensive
bibliography, "Land Reform in Colombia, India, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan,
Philippines, Taiwan, U.A.R." which has been issued under the auspices
of the Center for Rural Development.

In 1967-1968 the Center's interests in the politics of land
reform will be carried forward by two more detailed case studies of
Latin American experiences. John D. Powell, former Assistant Professor

-8-

of Political Science at the University of Southern California, has
come to the Center to complete a book-length manuscript on "The
Politics of Agrarian Reform in Venezuela: History, System, and
Process," and Robert R. Kaufman will be expanding and revising his
recent Harvard Ph.D. thesis on "Chilean Political Institutions and
Agrarian Reform: The Politics of Adjustment." Through comparative
analyses such as Professor Tai's and through detailed case studies
such as those by Drs. Powell and Kaufman, the Center hopes to throw
light on the conditions under which land reforms are a politically
feasible substitute for rural revolution.

4. Urbanization

Land reform involves conscious efforts by the political
elite to change social and economic structures. Urbanization, on
the other hand, is a form of social change which often proceeds
independently of conscious governmental policy but has important
implications for political institutions and political stability.
In 1966-67 Dr. Joan Nelson came to the Center from the Agency for
International Development to begin work on a major comparative analysis
of the economic and political implications of rapid urban growth in
modernizing countries. This study will involve some primary research
in Latin America, but more importantly, it will be an effort to
generalize from and to synthesize the vast literature dealing with
the problems of individual cities in modernizing countries. Dr.
Nelson is continuing her association with the Center in 1967-68 and

expects to have a book-length manuscript completed by the end of
that academic year.

## 5. Corruption

Studies of the role of corruption in political modernization often either voice puritanical moral indignation or, in a "revisionist" vein, overemphasize the contributions of corruption to modernization. In an effort to foster a more scientific approach to this problem, the Center has sponsored two studies. One, by Joseph Nye, Assistant Professor of Government at Harvard, was published in the 1967 *American Political Science Review* under the title, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost/Benefit Analysis." In addition the Center has supported Mr. Ramaswamy Mani of the Indian Administrative Service in a book-length comparative analysis of the role of corruption in Nigeria, Ghana, Pakistan, and India. From this analysis Mr. Mani intends to develop a general theory of the causes and functions of corruption in modernizing societies.

## 6. Social Mobilization and Political Development: the Arab World

Michael Hudson, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Brooklyn College, is undertaking a long-term comparative analysis of social mobilization and political modernization in Arab countries. Professor Hudson began this study in the summer of 1966 with a field trip to Lebanon and Syria during which he interviewed political leaders and collected substantial amounts of quantitative data on economic, demographic, and communications trends in those countries.

-10-

## B. Party Systems and Political Development

### 1. Communal Politics and Party Systems

During 1966 the Center sponsored work by Professor Hudson on the causes of the apparent political stability of Lebanon and the current trends of political development in that country. The basic issue with which his study was concerned is the extent to which the democratic and yet seemingly highly traditional system of confessional pluralism in Lebanon may be able to survive the increasing social and economic modernization of the society. Professor Hudson has written several papers and articles dealing with aspects of this subject, and his book, *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon* will be published in 1968.

In many countries race is also a crucial factor in politics. During 1966-67 Dr. Donald Horowitz completed a comparative analysis of race and politics in Guyana, Trinidad, and Jamaica. During 1967-68 the Center is helping to support the extension of this analysis to Malaya and Ceylon. Dr. Horowitz will be spending most of the year doing field research in these two countries and then will return to Cambridge to produce a general work on the interactions among racial conflict, party systems, and political institutions based on these five case studies.

### 2. Competitive Politics in Modernizing Societies

Chile is a notable exception to the instability which has plagued most Latin American countries. Yet the Chilean politics have also been a multi-party politics which is commonly supposed to be more

-11-

likely to produce political instability and military intervention than
one-party or two-party politics. Robert Kaufman is probing some
aspects of the stability and adaptability of the Chilean political
system in his study of the Chilean land reform mentioned above. In
addition, Robert Dix, Assistant Professor of Political Science at
Yale, joined the Center early in 1967 to complete a major analysis of
the interaction between social development and political change in
Chile, focusing on the evolution of Chilean political parties. Professor
Dix spent most of 1966 in Chile collecting material for his study, and
he expects to complete a book-length manuscript sometime in 1968.

In 1967-68, James Kurth, Instructor in Government at Harvard, will be working at the Center revising an earlier paper involving a comparative analysis of the development of the political party systems in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay and also initiating a somewhat parallel study of the evolution of political parties in Eastern Europe before World War II.

3. The Evolution of Established One-Party Systems

One of the most important and fascinating problems in con-
temporary world politics concerns the ability of one-party systems to
adapt to increasing economic affluence and social complexity in their
societies. In one form or another this problem has manifested itself
in Spain and Poland, Yugoslavia and Mexico, Communist China and
Nationalist China, as well as many other states both communist and non-
communist. In the winter of 1966-1967 the Center launched a broad
study of this subject under the direction of Samuel P. Huntington,

Professor of Government at Harvard, and Clement H. Moore, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California (Berkeley). Some 16 scholars have been enlisted in the project to prepare 18 papers dealing with various aspects of the problem. In the fall of 1967 initial drafts of three papers had been completed. One, "The Evolution of Established One-Party Systems: Statement of Purpose," by Professor Moore defined the general scope and approach of the project. Two others, presented at the American Political Science Association convention in September 1967, were by Andrew Janos, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California (Berkeley), "Single-Party Experiments in Eastern Europe" and by Jan Triska, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, "The Political Response of One-Party States to the Increasing Economic Affluence and Growing Complexity of Their Societies: Eastern Europe - A Preliminary Assessment." A conference to discuss all the project papers is planned for sometime early in 1968.

## 4. Political Institutionalization and Economic Development: Korea

In 1960 South Korea seemed mired in a stagnant economy and a chaotic political system. Six years later its economy was in the midst of a sustained boom and its political system had acquired a new stability with the elections of 1963 and 1967 producing authoritative and effect governments. Given its seemingly bleak prospects in 1960, the "Korean miracle" of 1967 needs some explaining. During 1967-68 the Center is sponsoring an effort to explain this phenomenon by two former AID administrators in Korea, Princeton Lyman, a political

scientist, and David Cole, an economist with the Center's Development
Advisory Service. Their study will focus directly on the relation-
ships between the stimulation of economic growth, on the one hand,
and the achievement of political stability, on the other.

C. <u>International Integration and Political Development</u>

Students of political development often focus on the
national level and neglect the development of international or
transnational political institutions. In its initial proposal to
the Carnegie Corporation the Center stressed the desirability of
bridging this gap. During 1966 and 1967 Joseph Nye has carried for-
ward his investigations of the politics of regional integration and
spent some time in Central America studying the Central American
Common Market. Initial results of this study were published under
the title "Central American Regional Integration," in International
Conciliation in March 1967. Professor Nye is planning to compare
the Central American experience with that which he previously studied
in East Africa.

One form which international integration assumes is that
of the relationship between a great power and its client or satellite
states. In 1967 Dr. James Kurth joined the Center to continue his
work on the theory of "hegemony" in international politics and his
comparative analysis of nine hegemonic systems. Professor Huntington
is also working on the relation between the rise and decline of
American hegemony in contemporary world politics and the development
of viable national political systems in modernizing countries.

-14-

## D. Political Institutions and Social Change

In the spring of 1967 Professor Huntington completed a book-length analysis of "Political Order in Changing Societies." This study is in part an elaboration of ideas published previously in *World Politics* and *Daedalus* and in part an outgrowth of the Stimson Lectures which he delivered at Yale early in 1966. Among the subjects covered are the relationship of social and economic change to political violence and disorder, historical patterns of political modernization in Europe and America, the nature of political change in traditional societies, the politics of praetorianism and military intervention, the impact of revolution on political modernization and political development, the relationship between reform and revolution, and the role of political parties in providing political stability.

## III. CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS

In September 1966 the Center joined with the Federal University of Minas Gerais in sponsoring an International Conference on Political Development which met in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. Participants in the conference included social scientists from the United States, Switzerland, Italy, Israel, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. The nine papers prepared for the conference dealt with various aspects of political development on a broadly comparative basis including revolution and modernization, democracy and reform, participation and development, political engineering and electoral systems, rationality and decision-making in traditional political systems, the

-15-

social-economic stimuli of radicalism, the development of national
consciousness, changing patterns of political leadership in modernizing
societies, and the planning of political development. It is hoped that
these essays will eventually be published in book form under the editor-
ship of Professor Huntington and Professor Julio Barbosa of the Univer-
sity of Minas Gerais.

During both 1966-67 and 1967-68 all those participants in
the program in PI&SC who were resident in Cambridge also participated
regularly in the Harvard - MIT Faculty Seminar on Political Development.
Meeting about ten times during the academic year, this seminar brought
together some thirty to forty scholars from Cambridge and elsewhere
on the Atlantic seaboard. In addition, a smaller group, consisting
primarily of scholars associated with the Center, met for lunch on
alternate Thursdays to discuss problems connected with research on
political development. These gatherings furnished an opportunity for
the more informal discussion of hypotheses and research methods.

IV. PEOPLE

During 1966-67 eleven scholars were intimately involved in
the work of the program on Political Institutionalization and Social
Change. The same number also participated in the program in 1967-68.
The total number of participants for the two years was nineteen. As
originally designed, the program was particularly geared to attract-
ing younger scholars. Its relative success in this is reflected in
the following breakdown of the ages of the nineteen participants as

-16-

of mid-1967:

40 1
35-39 3
30-34 9
25-29 6.

The nineteen most active participants in the program, with their former or current other organizational affiliations, are as follows:

Robert H. Dix. 1967-1968. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale University

Donald L. Horowitz. 1967-1968. National Science Foundation Fellow

Michael C. Hudson. 1966-1967. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York and Research Associate, Political Data Program, Yale University

Samuel P. Huntington. 1966-1968. Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government, Harvard University

Robert R. Kaufman. 1967-1968. Former Lecturer in General Education, Boston University

James R. Kurth. 1967-1968. Instructor in Government, Harvard University

Moshe A. Lissak. 1967-1968. Lecturer in Sociology, Hebrew University

Abraham F. Lowenthal. 1966-1967. Research Fellow, The Brookings Institution

Princeton N. Lyman. 1967-1968. Former Chief, Interdepartmental Planning Branch, U.S. Operations Mission, Seoul, Korea

Ramaswamy Mani. 1966-1967. Officer, Indian Administrative Service

Clement H. Moore. 1967-1968. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California (Berkeley)

Martin C. Needler. 1966-1967. Director, Division of Inter-American Studies, University of New Mexico

-17-

Joan M. Nelson. 1966-1968. Former Policy Planning Officer, Agency for International Development, Department of State

Joseph S. Nye. 1966-1968. Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University

Ergun Ozbudun. 1966-1967. Assistant Professor of Government, Ankara University

John D. Powell. 1967-1968. Director of Research, Center for Rural Development, Cambridge, Mass.

Steven R. Rivkin. 1966-1967. Attorney, Fisher, Sharlitt and Gelband, Washington, D.C.

Hung-chao Tai. 1966-1967. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Detroit

David O. Wilkinson. 1966-1967. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California (Los Angeles)

V. PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER WRITINGS

A. Publications: Actual and Forthcoming

Hudson, Michael C. "The Lebanese Republic: A Reassessment," Bustan (Hammer-Purgstall-Gesellschaft, Vienna), Heft 2/3-1966, pp. 3-9.

______. "The Electoral Process and Political Development in Lebanon." *Middle East Journal*, XX, 2 (Spring 1966), pp. 173-86.

______. The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon. Forthcoming, Random House, 1968.

Huntington, Samuel P. "Political Development and the Decline of the American System of World Order," *Daedalus*, 96 (Summer 1967) pp. 927-29.

______. Political Order in Changing Societies. Forthcoming, Yale University Press, 1968.

Needler, Martin C. "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," *American Political Science Review*, LX (Sept. 1966), pp. 616-626.

-18-

Needler, Martin C. Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change. Forthcoming, Random House, 1967.

Nye, Joseph S. "Central American Regional Integration," *International Conciliation*, No. 562 (March 1967), pp. 1-66.

______. "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost/Benefit Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (June 1967), pp. 417-427.

______. "Regional Integration and Political Development," *International Development*, IX (Sept. 1967), pp. 17-19.

Ozbudun, Ergun. *The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics*. Occasional Paper No. 14, Center for International Affairs, Cambridge, Mass. 1966. 54pp.

B. *Unpublished Papers and Theses*

Hudson, Michael. "Pluralism, Power, and Democracy in Lebanon," Revised Version, Center for International Affairs, 1966. 55pp.

Janos, Andrew. "Single-Party Experiments in Eastern Europe," Presented at Amer. Pol. Science Assoc., Annual Meeting, Sept. 1967. 23pp.

Kaufman, Robert R. "Chilean Political Institutions and Agrarian Reform: The Politics of Adjustment," Harvard University Ph.D. Thesis, 1967. 323pp.

Lowenthal, Abraham F. "The Dominican Intervention of 1965: A Study of U.S. Policy," Center for International Affairs, 1967. 92pp.

Mani, Ramaswamy. "Political Corruption and Political Change," Harvard University Ph.D. Thesis, 1967. 407pp.

Moore, Clement H. "The Evolution of Established One-Party Systems: Statement of Purpose," Center for International Affairs, 1967. 19pp.

Powell, John D. "The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Venezuela: History, System, and Process," Center for International Affairs, 1967. 280pp.

Rivkin, Steven R. "When Nations Intervene," Center for International Affairs, 1967. 35pp.

-19-

Tai, Hung-chao. "Land Reform in the Developing Countries: Tenure Defects and Political Response," Presented at Amer. Pol. Science Assoc., Annual Meeting, Sept. 1967. 107pp.

______. "Land Reform in Colombia, India, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan, U.A.R.: A Selected Bibliography," Center for Rural Development, Cambridge, Mass. 1967. 107pp.

Triska, Jan. "The Political Response of One-Party States to the Increasing Economic Affluence and Growing Complexity of Their Societies: Eastern Europe - A Preliminary Assessment," Presented at Amer. Pol. Science Assoc., Annual Meeting, Sept. 1967. 20pp.

Wilkinson, David O. "Victory and Defeat in Revolutionary Civil War: A Comparative Analysis," Presented at Amer. Pol. Science Assoc., Annual Meeting, Sept. 1967. 38pp.

April 11, 1968

#21 President's Building

April 8, 1968

Professor Samuel Huntington
Chairman, Department of Government
John F. Kennedy School
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Sam:

I am writing to you to sound out the possibilities of Harold C. Hinton spending a year as a Visiting Professor at Harvard, with the added possibility that he might have a sort of joint assignment primarily teaching in the Department of Government but attached additionally to Bob Bowie's Center for International Studies In order to make his necessary shift of a base for a year, since it would probably involve some sacrifice of the money he earns annually as a Member of the Institute for Defense Analysis, where he has been a very valuable research contributor for some years.

I think all of you who will receive this letter know something about Harold C. Hinton as a scholar since some of you also probably had him as a student. He did both his AB in History and an MA and Ph.D. in Far Eastern History and Politics, with emphasis on China, at Harvard. The Ph.D. was in 1951, but he got his AB in absentia during the war.

He taught for me very successfully in the Summer School. He has also worked for the Radio Corporation, USIA, and Department of State, as well as various other places (including Visiting Professor and Lecturer at Oxford University), and he had an Emerton Fellowship at Harvard. Indeed, he had some kind of prize scholarships for the entire time he was at Harvard, as far as I know.

I am suggesting him as a visiting lecturer because it seems to me that we get pretty well the one side of the Asian problem. I think a look at his book, *Communist China in World Politics* (Houghton Mifflin, 1966) will show that he tends to balance up considerably more than Fairbanks or Schwartz (and I now think I might include Ed Reischauer). He has also written *Major Governments in Asia* (Cornell University Press, 1958).

It seems to me that his extremely successful record as a lecturer, to which he is devoting considerable time with appearances at all the War Colleges here and in Canada, and radio and television performances at a high level, would recommend him as a teacher. I know from my son, Charles's association with him in the Political Science Faculty at George Washington how highly he is regarded for his work with students, in addition to his extraordinary gifts as a researcher.

I have not listed more of the contributions that he has made to books edited by others, for instance *Total War and Cold War* (Ohio State University Press, 1962) edited by Harry L. Coles. He has had lots of foreign