NYHT - 12/30/48

Forrestal first annual report -

No. 1 priority - serious defense contribution in military aid to Western
Allies.

(no indication of plans for aid outside Western Europe)

Other top priority items for legislative program:

1) Medical, dental services - forces

2) Housing

3) Revision of pay and allowances

4) Establishment of "radar" fence" land based air warning and control installations

5) Organize for national planning and civil defense

6) Improve reserves

7) Revise military justice

8) Reorganization of Army

9) Wind Tunnel facilities

10) Authority to conduct research to keep pace with developments.

11) Authority to charter vessels

12) Fixing powers of AF Department.

Need for stockpiling.

Need for stockpiling.

13) Fixing powers of VE Department.

II) Authority to charter vessels

3) Wind Tunnel facilities

8) Reorganization of Army

7) Revises military justice

3) Improve reserves

2) Organize for national planning and civil defense
installations

3) Revision of bay and allowance

2) Housing

Villages.

No. 1 priority - serious defense contribution in military aid to Western
Forces that annual report -

NYHT - 15\30\48

NYHT - 2/26/49

Collins -

In reply to McArthur demand for greater troop strength "in view of the
Chinese Communist victories and general tension in Asia" -

Collins - purpose of U.S. troops in Japan

"to carry out the terms of the peace"

they would fight "if Japan were attacked".

Royal - concurs with Collins "(don't think Russia will attack or war is imminent"

4 combat divisions of 18,000 planned for Mac Arthur - only one for Clay.

Five - U.S. in Far East 88% of total strength in tactical units only 72% in Europe.

in Europe.

Five - U.S. in Far East 88% of total strength in tactical units only 72%
4 combat divisions of 18,000 planned for Mac Arthur - only one for Clay.
imminent.

Royal - confronts with Collins "(don't think Russians will attack or war is
they would fight "it Japan were attached".

"to carry out the terms of the peace".

Collins - purpose of U.S. troops in Japan
Chinese Communist victories and general tension in Asia".

In reply to McCarthy demand for greater troop strength "in view of the
Collins -

NYHT - 5/26/49

NYT - 3/5/49

Truman refused today to set up permanent office of civil defense - gave
task to N.S.R.B.

"Under present conditions the essential need of Federal Government
in the area of civil defense is peacetime planning and preparation
for civil defense in the event of war rather than opening of a
full-scale civil defense program. I see no need to establish
a permanent organization ------"

full-scale civil defense program. I see no need to establish
for civil defense in the event of war rather than opening of a
in the area of civil defense is besettime planning and preparation

"Under present conditions the essential need of Federal Government
task to N.A.A.

Human returned today to set up permanent office of civil defense - same

NYT - 3/2/49

NYT - 3/17/49

Strategy of Alaska

Baldwin

Needs better radar screen

"portable testing units for planes, 95% of anti-aircraft "quads"
out of action due to inexperience in the cold weather operations -
AA fire control is visual, not electronic

Eisenhower 2/24/47 address in Stl Louis -

I decry loose and sometime s gloating talk about the degree of security implicit in a weapon that might destroy millions over night.... Those who measure security solely in terms of offensive capacity distort its meaning and mislead those who pay them heed. No modern nation has ever equaled prior to the outbreak of war the crushing offensive power attained by the German war machine in 1939. No modern nation was ever broken and smashed as was Germany 6 years later."

NYHT - 5/1/50

# Strategy of American Defense

## Statement of Harvard MIT group

1) U.S. strategy ill equipped to deal with problems of limited aggression - danger of "revolts:, guerilla war - no U.S. answer in marginal areas.

2) Predominant reliance on atomic warfare may weaken morale and confidence of our European allies. (Insufficient tactical air cover - reduces will to resist)

3) Reliance on bomb indicates that U.S. accepts principle of mass destruction.

4) Due to increased U.S. reliance, agreement limiting bomb lessened - while our vulnerability is exceptional. Total vulnerability of allies like Britain.

5) In war both sides might hesitate. But no hope if either side is dependent on bomb as main instrument.

on pomp as main instrument.

2) In war pomp aids might realize. But no hope it either side is dependent
Britain.

3) Due to increased U.S. reliance, agreement limiting pomp feared -
destruction.

4) R reliance on pomp indicates that U.S. accepts principle of usps
will toreats)

confidence of our European allies. (Insufficient tactical air cover - reduces
prevalence of atomic warfare may weaken morale and
gender of "rejoice" anerille war - no U.S. answer in marginal areas.

1) U.S. strategy ill equipped to deal with problems of limited seaplane -
statement of Harvard MIT group
Strategy of American Defense

NYHT - 2/1/20

NYHT - 3/20/53

Alsops (Project Lincoln)

Walter Millis.

AF strategy if of nuclear devastation is nightmare - not strategy -
Especially as AF discussion recently: As SAC becomes more truly inter-
continental Modem America - character and move of our first line striking
forces are based - continental N. America (the more) the U.S. will be
slated for the first attack.

alated for the first attack.

forces are passed - continental U. America (the more) the U.S. will be
continental Macsmaniac - character and move of our first line attrition
especially as VB discussion recently: As SAC becomes more truly inter-
VL strategy of nuclear devastation is nightmare - not strategy -
Walter Millila.

WVLeba (project Lincoln)
NYHT - 3/20/23

NYHT - 3/20/23

NYT - 11/13/53

Baldwin-

Debate starts on whether new weapons can supplant infantry and usual
guns. - incalculable risk

1) all strategical and tactical eggs in one basket.

2) Will quantitative superiority in atomic weapons compensate for conventional inferiority?

vontional inferiority?

3) Will desubstantive superiority in atomic weapons combine for con-

1) all strategic and tactical edges in one packet.

dune. - incalculable risk

Debate starts on whether new weapons can subplant intensity and neural

Baldwin -

NYT - 11/13/23

NYHT - 1/19/54

## Millis -

Down to Korean crisis in 1950 we relied almost wholly on a policy of strategic atomic warfare. When Korea exposed its weakness, we undertook a tremendous effort of conventional re-armament and remodelled our policy on conventional warfare. Now that the crisis has been met and the costs of conventional warfare are becoming onerous, we are returning to the strategic atomic concept. But it is being done under cover of the unfounded idea that nuclear weapons can now be substituted for men in conventional military organs and that therefore we are not returning to the strategic concept at all.

the strategic concept at all.

conventional military organs and that therefore we are not returning to
unbounded ideas that nuclear weapons can now be substituted for men in
to the strategic atomic concept. But it is being done under cover of the
the costs of conventional warfare are becomingFERrous, we are returning
our policy on conventional warfare. Now that the criteria has been met and
understood a tremendous effort of conventional re-annexment and remodelling
of strategic atomic warfare. When Korea exposed its weakness, we
down to Korean criteria in 1920 we relied almost wholly on a policy
Militia -

MYHT - 1/19/24

MYHT - 1/19/24

U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings
Vol. 80 #3, March 1954

Commander Ralph E. Williams Jr.

"We must recognize that the only purpose our atomic capability can have is to obtain the conditions which effectively enjoin an enemy from using his. It can never be used as an instrument of policy either military or diplomatic and because of this fact our requirement for the more conventional types of weapons remains as insistent as ever.

We must stop boggling at the spectre of atomic warfare as if it were the only possibility that confronts us.

..... We must stop podding at the apectre of atomic warlike as it
tronsal types of weapons remains as insistent as ever.

or diplomatic and because of this fact our recruitment for the more conven-
ous. It can never be used as an instrument of policy either military
is to obtain the conditions which effectively enjoin an enemy from using
"We must recognize that the only purpose our atomic capability can have
Commander Ralph E. Williams Jr.

Vol. 80 #3, March 1964
Proceedings

U.S. Naval Institute

Vol. 81 #10 October 1955

Making Atomic Strategy - by Lt. Cmdr. R. G. Alexander

.... maintaining peace thru determent power is dependent upon a number of conditions. One condition is the possession of a military advantage that would clearly be decisive - war. Atomic strategic air power may give us that advantage at this time, but when a condition of parity is reached --- the advantage disappears. If when parity occurs we still persist in considering our atomic strategic air power as a decisive advantage, we will be doing a very foolish thing. We will in effect be wagering our physical and institutional structure against the enemy's.

the enemy's.

in effect be waging our physical and institutional structure against
as a decisive advantage, we will be doing a very foolish thing. We will
occurs we still persist in considering our atomic strategic air power
of parity is reached --- the advantage disappears. It when parity
power may give us that advantage at this time, but when a condition
advantage that would clearly be decisive - was. Atomic strategic air
number of conditions. One condition is the possession of a military
.... maintaining peace thru deterrent power is dependent upon a

Vol. 81 #10 October 1952

NYT - 6/29/56

Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin - testimony revealed.

Secret testimony declassified - re: hundreds of millions of casualties
in wake of all-out SAC attach. - "officials, etc. shocked for it was
feared it would alienate friendly or neutralist countries.

Also critical: C.E. Wilson 6/30/56 - "possible effect on U.S. allies."

Viao critical: C.E. Wilson 6/30/86 - "possible effect on U.S. allies."
tested it would alienate friendly or neutral states.

in wake of all-out SAC attaché. - "officials, etc. shocked for it was

NYT - 6/28/86

NYHT - 8/24/53

Jos. Alsop -

Taxes and H-Bomb -

Since Eisenhower administration began, 3 committees submitted reports on Continental Air Defense. (

(While U.S. atomic lead is pre-eminent) "according to American Govt's official estimates the Kremlin is now able to cripple this country by air atomic attack. According to the same estimates the Kremlin will gain the ability to devastate this country - to strike a knock-out blow that will force our surrender to the enemy - within 18 to 24 months.

The recent Soviet bomb test plainly suggest that these American Govt estimates have erred, if at all, on the side of caution. When the Kremlin has the airpower and bombs to destroy this country, it will be a very poor consolation to know that we have more bombs. ... The Kremlin is rapidly building an air defense worthy of the name against our air defense while we have no air defense worthy of the name and are unlikely to buy one.

(When he entered White House, Eisenhower found .../w/ a warning of grave danger and an ambitious American air defense program to ward the danger off. Initially the President seems to have been much impressed. But the air defense program was going to cost a lot of money...As a result, the National Security Council has been walking up to and backing away from this vital problem for 8 long months. The vast accumulation of data left behind by the Truman administration has now been supplemented by no less than 3 major committee reports. (con't)

(cont)

1) Kelly Committee (of Dr. Mervin Kelly of Bell Telephone Laboratories.

2) Edwards Committee (of Lt. Gen. Idwal Edwards)

3) Bull Committee (President's wartime G-3, Maj. Gen. Harold Bull)

Kelly Committee composed of leading scientists and industrialists
recommended a strong air defense program,

The Edwards Committee named to assess Soviet air atomic capa-
bilities sharply underscored the extent of the danger. The Bull Committee
chosen by the Eisenhower National Security Council to get a "report from
our own people" recommended an even stronger program than the Kelly
committee - ... if you don't like the last Committee's report, get a
new committee. (Those who fear foxes more than H-bombs were still
displeased).

discontinued).

new committee. (Those who fear taxes more than H-pomps were still committee - ... if you don't like the last Committee's report, get a copy of our own people" recommended an even stronger program than the Kelly chosen by the Eisenhower National Security Council to get a "report from ptilities sharply underscored the extent of the danger." The Bull Committee The Edwards Committee named to assess Soviet air atomic caps-recommended a strong air defense program,

Kelly Committee (President, a war time G-3, Mac. Gen. Harold Bull)

3) Bull Committee (President, a war time G-3, Mac. Gen. Harold Bull)

3) Edwards Committee (of Lt. Gen. Idwal Edwards)

1) Kelly Committee (of Dr. Marvin Kelly of Bell Telephone Laboratories.
(con't)

[A]

NYT - 6/25/49

Hanson Baldwin in

Current article in Saturday Post -

An Admiral Talks Back to the Airmen:

> "..."sensational publicity campaign (being conducted) that all we need now is an A.F. and the only instruments needed for peace "will be the B-36 and the A-bomb."

5 objections to blitz plan for world peace:

1) leaves our friends in Europe out on a limb.

2) makes war look too easy and painless.

3) provides only for weapons of mass destruction and therefore commits us to a war against a population rather than against the military forces of a dictatorship.

4) H. gambles the future of the U.S. on the big bomber by discarding the Army and Navy.

5) H calls for a form of war which insures losing the peace even if we win the war.

we win the war.

2) H calls for a form of war which inanes losing the peace even it Army and Navy.

4) H samples the future of the U.S. on the pig bomber by discussing the military forces of a dictatorship.

3) provides only for weapons of mass destruction and therefore commit us to a war against a population rather than against the

3) makes war look too easy and painless.

1) leaves our friends in Europe out on a limp.

2) omissions to hit plan for world peace:

B-36 and the A-pomp.

now is an A.T. and the only instruments needed for peace "will be the
... "sentational publicity campaign (being conducted) that all we need

An Admiral Talk's Back to the Warmen;

Hanson Baldwin in

NYT - 6/22/49

NYT - 10/10/49

Rep. John F. Kennedy

Calls on Truman "that U.S. was laying itself open to atomic Pearl Harbor"
by

- indifference to civilian defense planning. He was "shocked"
to find only one govt official working full time on such prckx plans
despite announcement of Soviet atomic explosion.

Sen. B. McMahon said that he was convinced Americans would never take the
drastic precautions necessary to attain relative security from atomic
bombardment.

pompardment.

Sen. B. McMahan said that he was convinced Americans would never take the
despite announcement of Soviet atomic explosion.

to find only one Soviet official working full time on such key plans
- inditference to civilian defense planning. He was "shocked"

py

Calla on Truman "that U.S. was laying itself open to atomic besti Harbor."

Rep. John E. Kennedy

NYT - 10/10/49

NYHT - 10/10/49

Alsops

The Grain Among Chaff -

SAC - only moderately expensive - but main reason for this immense
gamble is probably most obvious one.

In the past 4 years only 3 leaders of the Administration have really believed
in re-arming in earnest. Robert A. Lovett - now in N.Y., Averell Harriman
in Paris, James V. Forrestal in Arlington Cemetary. They alone asked:
What needs to be done? The question nowadays is: What can be done?
Without ambitious Johnson tempted by false economies, John Snyder's
business as usual, the Bureau of Budget, we should perhaps thank God
that at least we possess the determent of the B-36's and the atomic stockpile.

that at least we possess the determination of the B-36's and the atomic stockpile.

in Paris, James V. Forrestal in Arlington Cemetery. They stoke asked:

in re-arming in earnest. Robert A. Lovett - now in N.Y., Average Harriman

In the past 4 years only 3 leaders of the Administration have really believed
damper is properly most opales one.

SVC - only moderately expensive - put main reason for this immense

The Grain Amount Chaff -

Vlaopa

NYHT - 10/10/49

NYT Sunday mag 8/17/52

Baldwin - attacks Fortress America.

1) Would bring defense to our shores

2) Would alienate allies

3) Would sacrifice advance retaliatory bases.

4) Loss of raw materials.

(No emphasis on Soviet retaliatory power vs. our nuclear)

5) Only reference - We no longer have an atomic monopoly. X A-bombs
dropped on Russia means A-bombs dropped on Western Europe and the U.S.

6) Poor weapon vs. infiltration, revolt, guerilla war, etc.

6) Poor weapon vs. infiltration, revolt, guerrilla war, etc.,
gropped on Russia means A-pomps dropped on Western Europe and the U.S.

2) Only reference - We no longer have an atomic monopoly. X A-pomps
(No emphasis on Soviet retaliatory power vs. our nuclear)

4) Loss of raw materials.

3) Would isolate allies

1) Would bring defense to our shores
Baldwin - attacks Fortress America.

NYT Sunday mag 8/17/83

Baldwin -

Harvard Business Review

July 1953

Improved strength position since 1950

Tho - Soviet atomic production and delivery gaining, 3 - 4 years leeway,
Soviet AF (tactical) ahead, anyway already very strong - dark period while
Europe defense catches up.

[y]

Millis

NYHT - 9/28/53

The AF itself has acquired a more vivid realization of the fact one
cannot continue to brandish a super-power effusive weapon without
making reasonable provision for defending our own people and bases
against its use by an enemy.

- comes down to real issue of "proper proportioning and combination
of several elements - air defense, strategic air, conventional arms -
which we now have.

which we now have.

of several elements - air defense, strategic air, conventional arms -
- comes down to real issue of "proper two portioning and compensation
against its use by an enemy.

making reasonable provision for defending our own people and passers
cannot continue to prandial a super-power equivalent weapon without
The AP itself has acquired a more vivid realization of the fact one

Millis

NYHT - 9/28/23

Strategy of Restraint or Chaos Unlimited

Baldwin - Combat Forces July. Jan. '54

C nnot build strategy on ideological crusade of unlimited means to
achieve unlimited destruction - needed a strategy of reason with
fixed, attainable objectives.

Alternatives - not really open: isolation, world brotherhood, preventive
war. Need for atomic, weapons restraints not crusade.

war. Need for atomic, mequne restraints not crusade.

Alternatives - not really open: isolation, world brotherhood, preventive
fixed, attainable objectives.

achieve unlimited destruction - needed a strategy of reason with
G cannot build strategy on ideological crusade of unlimited means to
Baldwin - Combat Forces July. Jan. '54

Stratagy of Restraint or Chaos Unlimited

A

Ned Russell

NYHT - 1/8/54

Eisenhower State of the Union
(shift to atomic defense)

1) Permit reduction in armed forces manpower

2) Give armed forces maximum mobility and enable them to be deployed for swift resistance to any sudden attack on this country or its allies.

3) Give U.S. a massive capability to strike back with atomic weapons in the event of new aggression.

4) Strengthen the U.S.'s position in any negotiations with Russia aimed at lessening or resolving the East-West struggle.

aimed at lessening or reining in the East-West struggle.

4. Strengthen the U.S.'s position in any negotiations with Russia in the event of new aggression.

3. Give U.S. a massive capability to strike back with atomic weapons for any resistance to anyaden attack on this country or its allies.

2. Give armed forces maximum mobility and enable them to be deployed
   1. Permit reduction in armed forces manpower
      (shift to atomic defense)

Eisenhower State of the Union

Ned Russell

NYHT - 1/3/84

NYHT - 1/8/54

"Candid explanation" in 6 categories:

1) Increased reliance on A and H weapons and consequent need to build up AF and Navy to deliver them (Will ask Congress for authority to share with allies "certain knowledge of the tactical use of nuclear weapons.

2) Need to develop centrally located, swiftly deployed strategic reserves.

3) Stronger "professional corps" of trained fighting men. (Build morale)

4) Plans to improve ability of nation from partial to full mobilization.

5) Plans to spend $1,000,000,000 more on military and non-military continental defense.

6) Complete cooperation among all authorities concerned - civil defense.

6) Complete cooperation among all authorities concerned - civil defense, tinental defense.

2) Plans to spend $1,000,000,000 more on military and non-military cou-

3) Stronger "proteasional corps" of trained fighting men. (Build morale)

3) Need to develop centrally located, efficiently deployed strategic reserves, megeboua.

share with allies "certain knowledge of the tactical use of uncler
ub V and Navy to deliver them (Will ask Congress for authority to
1) Increased reliance on V and H megeboua and consequence need to build
"Candidate explanation" in 6 categories:

MYHT - 1/8/24

[y]

New Republic

1/11/54

Apparently U.S. has decided that the war of the future a war of
annihilation.

- follows from Administration intent to make nuclear weapons the center of military plans

- no debate while it shapes our lives

- perils allies

- presumably results in Soviet counter preparation yet no adequate defense.

- closes door to further negotiations

NYHT - 1/10/54

Reliance on "our great and growing number of nuclear weapons" - a
reasonable calculation, but involves disadvantages.

It means binding our hands, --- to peculiarly dangerous, disruptive and
relatively ineffective means of response.

Also illogical ¤ re - mobilization base? for what?

[Y]

NYT - 6/21/54 at Quantico.

U.S. lead in weapons stays at 2 - 3 years.

Quarles: "On balance our technical position vis-a-vis the Soviet is less favorable than it was a year ago.

Wilson - "I don't know that the gap is narrowing exactly. I would say we have a better understanding of what the gap is."

"I still feel we are 2 or 3 years ahead"

"who not in every field."

"who not in every field."

"I still feel we are 5 or 3 years ahead."

"we have a better understanding of what the gap is."

Wilson - "I don't know that the gap is narrowing exactly. I would say it's less favorable than it was a year ago."

Charles: "On balance our technical position vis-a-vis the Soviet is U.S. led in mesobone stays at 5 - 3 years.

NYT - 6/31/24 at 0700.

NYHT - 8/1/54

U.S. defense

Aug '54 - Feb '56

Defense Plans worry Scientists - Walter Kerr.

Whether U.S. is approaching problems of modern warfare in the most
effective manner.

Defense Dept believes things are going as well as could be expected
given the amount of funds that have been appropriated for the purpose.

Many of top scientists disagree, causing considerable uneasiness
in Congress. Scientists troubled by Deep Defense Dept's whole handling
of research and development.

James R. Killian Jr. - (Pres. MIT) - before House sub-committee on
military operations - (Committee report:

"It was disconcerting to subcommittee to find that scientists have
not been called in by JCS. Dr. Killian was asked whether the JC requested
his counsel. His reply was that they had not done so and that as far as
he knew few if any scientists had been called upon. It was his feeling
that there was a tendency to feel that civilians and research people or
staff people should not come in above a certain level. It was his general
impression that the JC have not found it desirable to call upon this
kind of counsel."

Vanever Bush felt quite strongly for many years that the defense esta-
blishment was not organized for good vigorous planning with respect to
Research and Development at the top levels.

(continued)

(continued from preceding page)

Trevor Gardner, Special Assistant for Research and Development to
Sec'y of Air Force. "You might be interested to know that we are
prevented by law from a complete exchange (of information) on the part of
our contractors."

Dr. Berliner thinks military incapable of conducting an imaginative
approach to radical new weapons and new weapon systems....Under no
circumstances should strategic Research and Development be under the
control of the JCS or any military organ.

control of the ICB or any military organ.

circumstances should be strategic Research and Development be under the
approach to radical new weapons and new weapon systems....Under no
Dr. Berliner thinks military incapable of conducting an imaginative
out contractors."

prevented by law from a complete exchange (of information) on the part of
Sec'y of War Force. "You might be interested to know that we are
Trevor Gardner, Special Assistant for Research and Development to
(continued from preceding page)

Reston

NYT - 8/19/54

A more moderate foreign policy is to prevail:

1) 4 more divisions announced today to be withdrawn from Korea.

2) NSC rejects guarantee of Formosa

3) Economic blockade softened vs. China

4) Refused air and naval aid, in Dienbienphuh acquiesced in partition

Militarily this means a regrouping of grand forces in mobile commandoes

at strategic (unexposed bases)

Military this means a regrouping of grand forces in mobile commands

4) Relieved air and naval aid, in Dienteupung addressed in partition

2) MAC rejects guarantee of formless

A more moderate foreign policy is to prevail!

Reason

NYT - 8/19/24

1.8 billion manifest.

1.6 billion for research and 200 million for misc.

$4,763 billion - of that $2,963 billion for production
Total Appropriations since 1920

Wilson - new look at robot missiles projects

NYHT - 10/10/24

[Y]

NYT - 11/25/54

# Montgomery on use of A-weapons at SHAPE

(H. Baldwin on Ridgway)

"we at Shape are basing all our operational plannings on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our defense". "With us it is no longer:

"They may probably be used". It is very definitely "They will be used if we are attacked."

(Lecture to Royal United Service Institution)

(Resume to Royal United Service Institution)

we are attacked."

"They may properly be used." It is very definitely "They will be used if they are used." With us it is no longer a thermiteless bomb in our defense."

"We at shape are passing all our operational planning on using atomic and
(H. Baldwin on Broadway)

Montgomery on use of V-missiles at SHABE

NYT - 11/22/24

Dulles release -

12/21/54

Strategic concept

"The present policies will gradually involve the use of atomic weapons as conventional weapons for tactical purposes. If that occurs and there is a replacement of what is now known as conventional weapons by a different type of weapon they will of course be used.

There is of course a great difference between the tactical use of weapons and the strategic use of weapons."

Asked if it were possible to reduce the over-all strength of U.S. military forces without reducing either the forces carrying out the worldwide commitments or the centrally placed strategic reserve, Mr. D replied: "Well, the cuts to which you refer are primarily a reduction in the strength of the land forces in being at the moment. It doesn't apply to reserve forces and the like. Now it is deemed entirely consistent with the U.S. commitments and U.S. policies to make these reductions. If it were not the case they would not be made, I can assure you." (No present intention to take out troops from Europe).

Wilson disagrees - (Baldwin 12/23/54)

Wilson disagrees - (Belgian 15/23/24)

With the U.S. commitments and U.S. policies to make these reductions, to reserve forces and the like. Now it is deemed entirely consistent the strength of the land forces in being at the moment. It cannot apply replied: "Well, the cause to which you refer are primarily a reduction in wide commitments or the centrally placed strategic reserve, Mr. D. military forces without reducing either the forces carrying out the world-

Vaked it it were possible to reduce the over-all strength of U.S. weapons and the strategic use of weapons."

There is of course a great difference between the tactical use of different types of weapon they will of course be used.

It is a replacement of what is now known as a conventional weapons by a
as conventional weapons for tactical purposes. It first occurs and there
"The present policies will gradually involve the use of atomic weapons

Strategic concept

Duties release -

15/21/24

NYT - 7/3/56

Symington Committee, Wilson testimony

Sen. Jackson: "Don't you feel that your statement, which is an excellent statement of what we have been doing, doesn't mean much unless you place it in relation to the building up of the Soviet Union?

Wilson: Well, I think I have said that we are ahead of the Russians and we expect to keep that way.

Q - Ahead in what"

A - In our general military strength, in our ability to underwrite the security of our country to the degree that it can be done.

    ground

Q - Are we ahead in ground forces ?

A - Not ... the numbers of men.

Q - Quote ... unbelievable

W - I would also like to say ... the B-36 is comparable with the Bear (compares advantageously)

Q. Symington - Why are we then scrapping B 36's? ... (fairly heavily - ?)

W - We only made the last of them 2 years ago

S - I am not talking of what we did, (but) ... what we are doing... Why should we scrap a good airplane?

W - I think we are retiring them somewhat in the order of which they were built ... It takes a crew of 15 or 16 to operate them.

S - I understand all that

(continued)

(continue)

2 - I understand all that

built.... It takes a crew of 12 or 16 to operate them.

M - I think we are retiring them somewhat in the order of which they were
we should: scrap a good airplane?

2 - I am not talking of what we did, but... what we are doing... Why should
W - We only made the last of them 2 years ago

Q - Wilmington - Why are we then scrapping B 30.a? ... (stupidly heavily - ?)
(compares advantageously)

W - I would also like to ask... the B-36 is comparable with the B-37

Q - Quotes unbeliavable

V - Not ... the numbers of men.

Q - Are we behind inxygenation?
down

V - In our general military strength, in our ability to underwrite the security
Q - Ahead in what.

we expect to keep that way.

Wilson: Well, I think I have said that we are ahead of the Russians and
it in relation to the building up of the Soviet Union?

statement of what we have been doing, doesn't mean much unless you place
Ben. Jackson: "Don't you feel that your statement, which is an excellent

Birmingham Committee, Wilson testimony

NYT - 7/3/29

W - The maintenance is high

S - I just wondered why we are scrapping them.

W - But nevertheless they are an effective weapon.

S - If they are comparable to the new Bears?

W - They have military value if you don't have anything that is better or just as good and more efficient to operate -

[y]

NYT - 7/15/56

Army General Staff paper

"U.S. and Allied Objectives in War"

may
'The bringing of mass destruction weapons into the art of war/require a
more limited or circumscribed application of military force in pursuit of
national goals. In order to attain an honorable state of peace within
the context of equal nuclear weapons capability by all adversaries the
U.S. and its allies may be required to pursue limited military and political
objectives as primary course of action if for no other reason than that
attainment of limited objectives offers a better alternative than mutual
destruction. If by the realization that full use of nuclear weapons would
fail to satisfy the purposes for which such weapons are used but instead
would bring about utter world devastation, concentration on the pursuit
of limited objectives may become intense by all adversaries in war.

It is therefore conceivable that the ultimate manifestation of war "total
war" may be abandoned in favor of the prosecution of lesser actions, such
as the peripheral wars or police actions as primary courses of action."