"A Conversation With the Secretary of State"—January 1972

Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rogers by Howard K. Smith
and Ted Koppel of ABC News which was
videotaped January 4 for ABC network
broadcasts beginning January 5.

Press release 2 dated January 5

Mr. Smith: Mr. Secretary, we hope to elicit
from you a kind of turn-of-the-year commen-
tary on the state of foreign relations, and I
would like to begin by asking you something
which has impressed me very much in 1971.
That is, the Nixon doctrine has gone into ef-
fect; we are lowering our profile very much
in Viet-Nam, a great degree in Korea; we
are going to leave Okinawa; in Europe there
is pressure from Congress to cut back our
troops; NATO bases in Malta and in Iceland
are in question. But while we are lowering
our profile, Russia has raised her profile quite
obviously—a new big fleet in the North At-
lantic operating out of Murmansk, a fleet
almost equal to ours in the Mediterranean
in size, one in the Indian Ocean bigger than
what we have, new friendship pacts with
Egypt and with India, which indicate a
spreading influence. Does this contrast in
our lowering and their raising profiles bother
you?

Secretary Rogers: Well, it is a matter that we are very concerned about, naturally, and the President has this uppermost in his mind. We cannot proceed on the initiative that we have taken toward peace without maintaining a very strong military posture, and that is something that the President is conscious about. He is going to make certain that we do. And you will notice in the coming year that we will make some moves in that direction. We have a very strong military position in the world, and I don't think the reductions that we are making in the Pacific, for example,

in the long run are going to weaken our
position. We were overcommitted in the Pa-
cific. We have reduced our troops in Korea,
in the Philippines and Japan, Thailand, and
of course in South Viet-Nam, by about
450,000. But in the process we have a strong
military establishment and we are going to
maintain that, because in order to work for
peace in the world, in order to have an effec-
tive diplomacy, it is essential that we remain
strong militarily.

Mr. Koppel: Mr. Secretary, the other eve-
ning President Nixon suggested that the
United States might eliminate its military
profile altogether in Viet-Nam if Hanoi
would give us a quid pro quo by releasing all
American POW's. The next day the White
House added another condition for U.S. with-
drawal and said the government in Saigon
would have to be able to defend itself, to be
able to stand on its own feet. Was the Presi-
dent's omission merely an oversight, and if
so, would you be prepared now to reassure
the Saigon government that we will not pull
all of our troops out of Viet-Nam until they
are really in fact ready to stand on their own
feet?

Secretary Rogers: Yes, Mr. Koppel, I think
the President made it clear. Certainly if you
take his comments generally, they have all
made it clear that our purpose is to provide
the opportunity for South Viet-Nam to con-
tinue to determine its own future. Now, we
also are very concerned about the welfare
of the American prisoners of war. Now, we
have made a commitment that we will with-
draw our troops from Viet-Nam eventually,
but we are not going to withdraw our troops
until we feel we have done everything that
we can to provide an opportunity for the
other side to release the prisoners of war. In

January 24, 1972

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other words we are going to insist that our troops remain there, at least to some degree, until we have made every possible effort to get the prisoners of war back. In the process we want South Viet-Nam to determine its own future. They are quite strong now. They have a million men in their armed forces, and we think they have the capability of defending themselves as we withdraw. So we are committed to total withdrawal eventually, and we are committed to maximum effort to achieve the release of prisoners of war.

**Mr. Koppel:** Who will make that ultimate decision, though, as to whether Saigon is ready to stand on its own feet? The President?

**Secretary Rogers:** The President of the United States.

**Mr. Koppel:** The President of the United States. To what extent will we take into consideration the views of the government in Saigon?

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, we will consult very closely with them about it, because we have made a tremendous effort in Viet-Nam. We have lost 45,000 Americans killed in action, we have had 250,000 Americans wounded, we have contributed a great deal in terms of our resources, and it would be folly to move out of there until we did it in an orderly way and in a way that gave South Viet-Nam the right to determine its own future.

Now, our program is working. It is successful. And the President is going to continue to withdraw those troops, but he is going to leave a residual force there in order to provide an opportunity to get our prisoners of war back when our troops are gone.

**Mr. Koppel:** Is it possible, Mr. Secretary, that the President of the United States could be saying, "We think that Saigon is able to stand on its own two feet," and that the administration in Saigon says, "Now, hold on, we are not ready for you to leave"?

**Secretary Rogers:** No, I don't think that is true. We have worked very closely with them.

I think they are able to withstand the attack of the enemy. They have proved that. The war in Viet-Nam has deescalated, and I think South Viet-Nam can provide for its own security. Now, we will have to continue to help them economically. We have indicated that we will continue to provide air cover, air support, for them. But the American ground forces are getting out of Viet-Nam, and I think that is the great success of the President's program in 1971. He has deescalated that war so that the American forces are going to be out of there, for all practical purposes, in 1972.

**Mr. Smith:** You are not worried by the fact that the North Vietnamese continue to show fight—they are developing an air force, obviously—and that we may be just delaying the time when we leave and then the Communists march in and take over?

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, of course, Mr. Smith, we have to take that into account and we are concerned about it to some extent, but we have always anticipated that that would be the case. We forget, I think, when we make that analysis, that the South Vietnamese also have an air force and they have a million men, a good deal more strength on the ground than North Viet-Nam. So we think that they can defend themselves.

## President Nixon's Trip to Peking

**Mr. Smith:** Mr. Secretary, the President said the other night on television that you shouldn't have a summit meeting until the ground has been laid for some kind of agreement, and he mentioned in the case of his visit to Moscow the Berlin agreement. Now, what kind of agreement can you hope from the Chinese summit meeting? If you could have the maximum you wanted from it, what would you like to have—just a trade agreement or an agreement to neutralize Southeast Asia, or what?

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, I don't think there is any point in speculating on what we would like to achieve. I think we have to consider what we think is possible to achieve. And I

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think the President made it clear that he
differentiates between the trip to Peking and
the trip to Moscow. Because no American
has ever visited Communist China—no
American President. And for that reason
the mere fact of the visit itself will be
of tremendous importance to the world and
importance to our relations with Communist
China. We would hope that we can set up a
system that will provide for continuing con-
tacts, greater communication with the PRC,
exchanges of persons, scholars—

Mr. Smith: With the People's Republic of
China.

Secretary Rogers: That is right, Commu-
nist China. And some trade, although I think
the possibilities of trade are less than they
might appear at first. I think they are mini-
mal to begin with.

Mr. Koppel: Mr. Secretary, when the
United States began its latest round of bomb-
ing over North Viet-Nam there was an obvi-
ous danger that China might react somewhat
violently, at least in terms of possibly can-
celing President Nixon's proposed trip to
Peking. Was there any prior consultation
with Peking before we began our bombing?

Secretary Rogers: No, there was not, Mr.
Koppel, but we have not suggested to the
Chinese that we were going to change our
foreign policy. There was no agreement made
with the People's Republic of China in order
to work out the arrangements for the visit.
So we have indicated to them that we are
going to continue our foreign policy, and
they have indicated to us that they are going
to continue their foreign policy. We have
very serious differences, obviously, and they
will continue. But we think the fact that we
are going to make this visit and will have
the opportunity to talk with them, to discuss
common problems, will be helpful in achiev-
ing peace in the future.

Mr. Koppel: Were you not concerned
though, when the discussions were held to
resume the bombing of North Viet-Nam, that
this might somehow adversely affect the
President's plans?

Secretary Rogers: We didn't think so. We
didn't think so.

Mr. Smith: Mr. Secretary, in connection
with that trip to China, you and the admin-
istration have been criticized for not at least
letting Premier Sato know ahead of time
because (a) it offended him and (b) Japan,
as Dr. [Edwin O.] Reischauer said, is po-
tentially the strongest nation in Asia, not
China. Was it not a diplomatic fault not to
have given him previous notice?

Secretary Rogers: Mr. Smith, I think it
would have been a good thing to do for the
reasons that you mention. Japan is a very
important ally of ours, and we have to con-
tinue to have excellent relations with Japan.
We have worked very hard for the last 25
years to establish good relations with Japan.
And they are essential to the future and for
peace in the area. Now, the reason we didn't
is quite a simple reason: We made an agree-
ment with the People's Republic of China
that we would not disclose the fact the Presi-
dent was going to visit Peking except on an
agreed date. We knew that if we told others
that this was happening that it would leak,
and Japan—we have had some experience
with Japan, and they are frank to admit that
they do have problems with leaks.

Mr. Smith: Do they publish Pentagon
papers, too?

Secretary Rogers: Yes, they do, and they
also have a problem within the government.
It is a free system, and they have a very
active press, and we felt any possibility of a
leak would endanger the whole trip, and
we thought that was too high a price to pay.
And I think the Japanese understand that
now. And we have made it clear in every
possible way that there is no agreement that
was made with Peking and that if we had
had the opportunity—in the first place, if
we had talked to Prime Minister Sato about
it, we would have had to talk to our other
allies about it, and the probability of a leak
would have been very great.

Mr. Koppel: Mr. Secretary, since the Pres-
ident first announced his trip, preparations

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89

seem to have proceeded with scarcely a rip-
ple, and yet we know now that there has
been some considerable political turmoil
inside China. How can you be sure, how can
the President be sure, that when you go to
Peking you will actually be talking to the
people who are in control of the Chinese
Government?

Secretary Rogers: We don't really have much doubt about that. I think the facts speak for themselves. I mean we have had, now, two groups of Americans who have gone there to make arrangements for the visit. There is no doubt about the fact that the people we are dealing with are the government, so we have no fears along that line.

Mr. Koppel: Do you have any more than just surface assurances? I mean you have admitted in the past that we haven't really known what has been going on in a political sense inside China. Are you confident now that we are aware of what is going on inside China?

Secretary Rogers: Well, no, we haven't made any great effort to find out about these internal problems that they have. We are completely satisfied that the government that we are dealing with is in complete control, and we have every reason to think, and we have no doubt about it at all, that the visit is going to take place on schedule.

I don't think it would be wise for us to start attempting to find out what happened politically in the People's Republic of China. The important thing is that we are dealing with the leadership that is governing that nation.

Mr. Koppel: Is it wise to go without knowing what is happening inside China?

Secretary Rogers: Sure, I think so.

Mr. Smith: Mr. Secretary, I am going to make us jump again, all the way to the Middle East. The most promising initiative, actually closely identified with you, was the initiative for peace in the Middle East, and at the end of 1971 and the beginning of '72

it doesn't look as promising as it used to.
Do you have any ways to revive that initia-
tive that you can tell us about, to give it new
life?

Developments in the Middle East

Secretary Rogers: Yes. I think, Mr. Smith, you should start out on this premise: that the cease-fire that was brought about in the Middle East as a result of the initiative President Nixon took is still in effect. We have had no fighting there for about 18 months, so that in itself is an encouraging fact. Now, we hope that we are able to get negotiations started. We are not too concerned about whether they are negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring at the United Nations or whether we take an active role in those negotiations in trying to get an interim agreement. We are working in both ways. We are seeking to encourage both sides to start negotiations, or to resume negotiations, under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. We also are encouraging both sides to engage in discussions in what we say is close proximity, with us—the United States —as a mediator, in looking toward an opening of the Suez Canal.

We think there are some possibilities that might happen. It is a slow process, a very discouraging process, but the conditions in the area are much more stable now than they were a year ago, or 2 years ago, and a cease-fire is still in effect. In fact, it is one of the encouraging developments that it has lasted as long as it has, and we are going to do everything we can as a nation to take the lead diplomatically to continue the cease-fire and to see if we can't get some progress going, started, in looking toward a final agreement.

Mr. Smith: How about the prospect of the United States actually offering a guarantee of any borders the two sides will agree on? Is that a possibility?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't think that the United States individually as a nation

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would undertake that. I think that the United
States will consider possibilities of some kind
of United Nations guarantee—

Mr. Smith: *The Israelis don't have much faith in the U.N. guarantees.*

Secretary Rogers: Well, you can understand why that is, Mr. Smith, because it didn't work before; but that doesn't mean we can't set up a new system that might work, and if there was a veto power so the Secretary General himself couldn't change the rules we might be able to work out a guarantee that would be meaningful.

Mr. Smith: *How about a Russian-American guarantee? I am thinking of the way they occupied Vienna after World War II. American and Russian and French and British soldiers all went around in the same jeep and policed the streets.*

Secretary Rogers: Well, as you know, the Soviet Union has indicated a willingness for the first time to take part in a peacekeeping effort. Now, whether that is a realistic possibility or not, I don't know. In the first place, we have to find out whether the parties can agree on something first before we find out how we can guarantee the agreement.

Mr. Koppel: *Mr. Secretary, the President said, again the other evening, that the United States was now ready, in principle, to start resupplying the Israelis with Phantom jets. Now, without questioning Washington's principles, what, precisely, does that mean?*

Secretary Rogers: Well, we have followed the policy for some time of attempting to maintain a military balance in the Middle East. By that we mean that we will provide arms to Israel in order to make sure that they can defend themselves. If that were not the case it would be destabilizing. It would be incentive for the other side to start a conflict. We want that to be avoided. On the other hand, we do not want our support to Israel to appear to be encouraging Israel itself to start hostilities.

We talk about a military balance in those

terms: to provide sufficient arms to Israel to maintain its independence, its sovereignty, without causing the Arabs to feel that we are supporting them to the point where we are encouraging the initiation of hostilities.

As far as what kind of arms we supply and when we make those shipments, and so forth, we are not going to discuss that publicly. We are going to maintain a policy of keeping an arms balance in the area, hopefully to keep the cease-fire in effect.

Mr. Koppel: *Well, can we deduce from the President's statement of the other evening that the United States now feels that balance is in danger of shifting in favor of the Egyptians?*

Secretary Rogers: No, I don't think you could come to that conclusion, but he pointed out that the Soviet Union is continuing to supply Egypt with arms, and in those circumstances we expect to continue to supply arms to Israel to be sure that the balance doesn't shift.

Mr. Koppel: *You could say, then, it has not yet reached the point where the balance has shifted so far in the Egyptians' favor?*

Secretary Rogers: No, and we don't intend to let the balance shift.

Mr. Smith: *Sir, you said something about the situation growing more stable in the Middle East, but one of the factors which many people thought was a stabilizing factor was the bringing under control of the guerrillas by King Hussein, which he did in 1971. Now we see persistent reports that the Russians are taking those defeated Palestinian guerrillas and training them and equipping them to go back. Do you know whether that is true? If so, are you concerned about it?*

Secretary Rogers: Well, we would be concerned about the renewal of the strength of the guerrillas, but we are encouraged by the fact that King Hussein does have control of his country, as distinguished from the condition that existed 2 years ago. Obviously, if the fedayeen movement gained in strength

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we would be concerned. At the present time we do not think that is the case. We think that the King has control of his country and is in complete command.

## Situation in South Asia

Mr. Koppel: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if I could move this over now from the Middle East to South Asia. I believe that for quite some period of time India was our biggest foreign aid client, and yet when it came to the crunch during these past few months, that foreign aid didn't seem to give us very much clout with the Indians. Do you think perhaps the administration, or we as a people, have oversold ourselves on the effectiveness of foreign aid in terms of the influence that it gives us?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't think we feel that foreign aid should be given with the thought that when we want another nation to do something, that they have to toe the mark. We provide foreign aid because we have humanitarian instincts. We want to help other people. So, I think the question is not properly phrased.

We were disappointed that India resorted to armed means to resolve a political controversy. We recognized that the trouble in Pakistan which caused the refugees to move into India had created a problem for India. We strongly opposed the use of armed forces to solve that problem, and we were disappointed that India used those means to resolve it, and that is why we went to the United Nations and asked for cease-fire and withdrawal.

I think we have to, in considering foreign aid, we have to consider in the future how much we want to contribute to other nations compared to the needs here at home. And I think that in the case of India we contributed about, oh, I think it is $10 billion since the independence of India.

Mr. Smith: A tremendous sum.

Secretary Rogers: And I think we have to

take a good hard look at whether that kind of contribution, that magnitude, is wise or not, or whether we shouldn't spend a good deal more of it here at home to help our own people. Now, that is what President Nixon is doing. He is taking a good hard look at foreign aid, and I might say in this connection, Mr. Koppel, that I have been pleased that the Prime Minister of India has said now since—in the last couple of weeks—that they are going to do more in terms of self-sufficiency. They are going to try to rely on themselves more, and I think that is a very good development indeed.

Mr. Koppel: Without wanting to become argumentative on the subject, you say that foreign aid was not meant to be used as a club to bring about American influence over other countries—and yet did we not use the threat of cutting foreign aid in an effort to influence India?

Secretary Rogers: In this instance?

Mr. Koppel: Yes.

Secretary Rogers: Well, we did cut military aid.

Mr. Koppel: Then there was also the implied threat that we might at some time in the future cut economic aid.

Secretary Rogers: Yes, in this case particularly, Mr. Koppel, because if we are going to provide very substantial amounts of foreign aid and then nations are going to get involved in warfare so that it all goes down the drain, then it seems to us we have to ask ourselves is that a wise investment of our money, and that is what we did. In this case we have stopped foreign aid, for the moment, and we are going to take a good hard look before we renew it.

Mr. Smith: Mr. Secretary, even after all this time and after so many words have been stated, I am puzzled as to why we morally took the side of Pakistan when actually we had much more in common institutionally with India, and we took the side also of a

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power that was bound to lose the conflict that was emerging. They say in power politics: "Try and be moral, but if you can't be moral, be successful." Well, we took both the side that was opposed to democracy and the side that was bound to lose. Wasn't that a mistake?

**Secretary Rogers:** No, I don't think so. I think that the idea that we have to always side with the winner, the more powerful of two nations, is fallacious. I don't think it serves our national interest. I think we have to stand on principle. Now, in this case the President took the position that a nation like India should not invade East Pakistan, even though there were a lot of political reasons.

**Mr. Smith:** Powerful social reasons. Ten million refugees—

**Secretary Rogers:** Yes. Well, we felt sure that if we had continued to negotiate on the political track, diplomatically, we would have brought about a successful outcome without resorting to war. Now, if every time there is a political problem and the stronger nation decides to resort to war, we say, "Fine, it is more powerful, it is going to win, let's support them," then the whole idea of the United Nations falls. The idea of the United Nations is: Don't solve political problems by war, try to resolve them by diplomatic means —and that is what the President tried to do.

**Mr. Smith:** Let me be argumentative just to make one point. Eight months had passed. Yahya Khan had not begun talks with the other side, and the other side was his prisoner so there was no problem about it. What reason was there for India to believe that he was ever going to stop stalling?

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, we had a discussion with Mrs. Gandhi when she was here, and I talked to the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador of India, saying that Yahya had agreed to negotiate with a representative designated by Mujib, and we felt that if those negotiations started and Mujib designated someone to represent him and they succeeded,

that you could have solved it by political, diplomatic means. I think there was a good probability that that might have occurred. At least we felt it was worth a try. We felt if another 2 or 3 weeks had elapsed, you could have started those negotiations to see what would have happened.

**Mr. Smith:** Now, while Mrs. Gandhi was telling you that, presumably, across the street at the White House, at Blair House she saw some of us for breakfast and said, "The refugee situation in Bengal is about to blow." She said, "They are so poor they will work for anything, and they are undercutting the wages of our own people so much there is going to be trouble. We just can't wait much longer."

**Secretary Rogers:** Yes, that is right. That was her position. But I don't think that justifies the use of armed forces, and we said so in the United Nations and we made our position clear, and we think in the long run that position will be fully justified.

If every political problem that is created in the world justifies the use of armed forces, then there is no end to war. And what the President is working for and what I am working for is to try to bring about peaceful conditions in the world. The world is a much more peaceful place now than it was when President Nixon took office, and he is working very diligently to bring about conditions that will lead to peace in the future.

**Mr. Koppel:** Mr. Secretary, President Bhutto has now indicated that he will release Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and it is widely anticipated that Sheikh Mujib will then become President of Bangladesh. Would anything then stand in the way of U.S. recognition of Bangladesh?

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, I don't want to answer that hypothetically, Mr. Koppel. I would be interested to see what happens. Of course, we haven't yet found out for sure whether Mujib has been released or not. We would hope very much that arrangements

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can be worked out between Bhutto and Mujib, or any other political leaders in that part of the world, so that they can live in peace. And if so, we will consider what our relations with the resulting entities are, what they should be.

*Mr. Koppel: So we are waiting for them to put their own house in order before we make a decision?*

*Secretary Rogers: Yes. We can't make a decision until we know.*

*Mr. Smith: Mr. Secretary, we only have a few minutes left. I would like to ask you a few odd questions.*

*The Pentagon papers came out. People said, "This is going to make foreign leaders timid about speaking frankly with us." Now, we have had a lot of months to see whether that is so or not. Is it so?*

*Secretary Rogers: Well, I think it did create a problem, and I think the problem still exists. We are having discussions with foreign leaders, and we are being very careful to try to keep those discussions out of the newspapers.*

I think, Mr. Smith, that I can say that the leaders of the world now—and they all recognize the President's leadership in the world, and that is why they are interested in having meetings with him—I think they feel that we have a very comprehensive policy looking toward peace. I think they have been very impressed with the initiatives President Nixon has taken for peace, and I think they feel that it is possible that his hope for a generation of peace may come to pass. It is just possible that the conditions exist in the world for peace, for a generation of peace, and that is the hope of the President; that is the hope of all Americans, I am sure.

*Mr. Smith: Well, Secretary of State Rogers, Jules Verne gave his hero 80 days to go around the world. We have given you only 30 minutes, but I am afraid the 30 minutes are up, and on that upbeat note you have just sounded, I want to thank you, very much, for appearing here with us.*

## 139th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris

Following are remarks made by Ambassador William J. Porter, head of the U.S. delegation, at the 139th plenary session of the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on January 6.

Press release 5 dated January 6

### OPENING REMARKS

Ladies and gentlemen: I have listened carefully to your statements about our protective reaction airstrikes against selected military installations and supply-buildup areas in North Viet-Nam. However, you are aware that our policies have been clearly stated with respect to the protection of U.S. forces as they withdraw from South Viet-Nam. You are also aware of the understandings reached in 1968, particularly as regards unarmed reconnaissance aircraft.

More to the point is the fact that the means to eliminate the events you described have long been available. Let me remind you briefly of one or two of them and urge you once again to give them consideration and join us in ending this conflict.

In October 1970, President Nixon with the support of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam proposed a general cease-fire, which, if you had felt able to accept it, would have spared thousands of lives. This proposal has never been withdrawn. Its acceptance would bring the immediate benefits of a suitable climate for discussion of our affairs here, as well as a cessation of the activities you described.

Second, you have been offered direct talks without preconditions by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and participation in internationally supervised elections which would determine the political status of the NLF along with that of other political groupings in South Viet-Nam. In other words, the people of the South would have the opportunity to state their views under international supervision. For you to enter into discussions with the Government of the Re-

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