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CHAPTER III

THE BERLIN CRISIS AND THE NASSAU AGREEMENT:

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND GREAT BRITAIN UNTIL JANUARY 1963

A. The Problem of Germany: Events Leading Up to the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship

Arrangements in Germany have been the key to the stability of Europe for at least three centuries. In the twentieth century the peace of Europe has been violated twice by a powerful and unified Germany. But prior to 1871, when Germany was composed of a group of competing states, it was the arena of conflict for other European powers which sought to perpetuate its divisions, thwart its national aspirations and prevent one another from gaining a preponderant influence.

Considering this history it was inevitable that Germany, when it was finally unified in 1871, should identify security with sufficient strength to defend itself against all of its neighbors simultaneously. But this effort, however understandable, proved fatal to the stability of Europe. Germany's strength, coupled with its central position, produced a vicious circle. A country powerful enough to defend itself against all its neighbors simultaneously would also be strong enough to defeat each of them singly. Moreover, the effort to develop such strength required a mobilization of resources and an exaltation of national feelings certain to disquiet all other European countries. Bismarck, the last great German statesman before Adenauer, spoke of "the nightmare of hostile coalitions." It was Germany's tragedy that the effort to prevent these coalitions made them inevitable. Germany has been either too weak or too powerful for the peace of Europe.

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Ideally, Germany should be strong enough to defend itself but not to attack; it should be united so that its frustrations do not erupt into conflict and its divisions do not encourage the rivalries of other countries, but not so nationalistic that it disquiets its neighbors. To bring about such a Germany has been a major goal of Western policy since the end of World War II.

The effort to define a new role for Germany faces major psychological problems. Every German above fifty has lived through three revolutions. He has known four different regimes, each claiming to be morally antithetical to its predecessor. He has seen Germany lose two world wars and has experienced two catastrophic inflations. Every German above thirty-five has witnessed the trauma of the Nazi period, of World War II and of the post-war collapse. The Nazi experience has been so completely suppressed in public consciousness or has been sublimated into a vague feeling of generalized guilt that it is no longer a problem as such. But the rootlessness produced by blotting out twelve years of history is relevant. Germany has suffered too many breaks in historical continuity and too many shocks. Great national prosperity has developed at the same time that national, political and territorial integrity has been lost. The incongruity of this situation contributes to the insecurity of German leadership groups, the stridency and legalism of whose disputes often hide a lack of inner assurance.

Chancellor Adenauer's great achievement--just as De Gaulle's--was that he understood the psychological needs of his country. He was aided by wise and far-sighted American statesmen, who helped reintroduce Germany into the community of nations. In order to prevent the latent nihilism in Germany from again menacing the peace, Adenauer sought to give the Federal

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Republic a stake in something larger than itself. The so-called rigidity
decried by many of his critics was in fact the reverse side of his attempt
to teach his people habits of reliability in international affairs. He
realized that Germany was too exposed geographically and too vulnerable
psychologically and politically to be able to sustain a very active policy.
He understood that a divided and rootless country, viewed with suspicion
and fear, would be excessively tempted by either nationalism or neutralism,
or both, if forced to undertake an autonomous foreign policy. The fabric
of German political life might not withstand the pressures inherent in such
a course.

Adenauer, therefore, sought to submerge narrowly German interests
in a wider community. First he developed intimate ties with the United
States which earned him the epithet of the opposition parties
that he was the Chancellor of the Allies. Later, when United States policy
on Berlin seemed to threaten vital German interests, he renewed his always
strong tendency for close association with France. This culminated in the
Franco-German Treaty of Friendship of January 1963. In both cases his
major concern was to assure for the Federal Republic the moral and physical
backing of a senior partner. In the case of the treaty with France, diplomatic
advantage was reinforced by psychological need. For the first time in its
history as a nation, Germany had a friendly country as a neighbor to the West.
Perhaps Chancellor Adenauer's most notable achievement was to bring about
the optical illusion that conditions in the Federal Republic were as firm
and stable as his own policy.

This is not the case, however. For the first twenty years after
the collapse of the Third Reich, German energies were absorbed in

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reconstruction, and German politics were dominated by a man whose formative
experience was in the last century. But Germany's uncertain sense of
identity could take surprising forms. This is all the more true because
since 1961 the German situation has become more fluid under the impact
of four events: (a) the Berlin Crisis and Anglo-American negotiating tactics
until the end of 1962; (b) the Berlin Wall; (c) De Gaulle's European policy
and the United States reaction to it; and (d) United States pressures for
diplomatic flexibility.

The Berlin crisis was crucial because it emphasized a serious
potential for tension within the Alliance: the difference between the
German quest for national unity and the equally understandable concern of
the rest of the allies for stability. Of course, no alliance can perfectly
reconcile the objectives of all of its members. But the minimum condition
for effectiveness is that the requirements of the alliance should not clash
with the deepest aspirations of one or more of the partners.

The Berlin issue has proved sensitive not so much because the city
is physically vulnerable, but because all of Germany is psychologically
vulnerable. Not all of Germany's allies accept the division of Germany,
and some might prefer a unified Germany; but none makes reunification a
major goal. Thus during the Berlin crises of 1959-60 and 1961-62, many in
the West argued that the logical solution was to negotiate new procedures
for access to Berlin in return for accepting the "fact" of a divided Germany.
To many influential Americans and Britishers, the continuation of a status
quo which had persisted for a decade and a half appeared a small price to
pay for a promise of stability.

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However, acceptance by the West of the division of Germany as
permanent would upset the domestic equilibrium of the Federal Republic;
this is one of the reasons that the Soviets are so eager to secure Western
recognition of the status quo in Germany. The division of Germany may be
unavoidable; but the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance requires that there
is no ambiguity about the reason for it. If the West tacitly or explicitly
abandoned the principle of German national unity--collaborating with the
Soviets in keeping Germany divided--Germans would consider it a sacrifice
of their basic interests. No German political leader can accept as permanent
the subjugation of seventeen million of his compatriots--all German political
parties are agreed on this point. His minimum goal must be to ameliorate
conditions in East Germany--a goal which he will be under increasing
pressure to pursue independently if his allies prove indifferent to it.

This is why the building of the Wall in Berlin and the hesitant
Western response to it gave such a shock to German political life. Many
in the West considered the Wall primarily as another unilateral abrogation
of a treaty obligation by the Soviets and as an act of inhumanity to the
people of Berlin. In Germany the Wall shattered the previous hopes for
unification. For better or worse, the policy of the Federal Republic had
been based on the premise that there was no inconsistency between Germany's
national aspirations and its Western orientation. In fact, the Western
Alliance had been sold to the German public with the argument that it
represented the best method to achieve these aspirations.

The partition of Berlin marked the end of the belief that German
unification would more or less automatically follow the strengthening of
the Atlantic Alliance. Since then, the Federal Republic has groped for

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a new approach to the question of German unity and to the alleviation of conditions in East Germany. Some have begun to argue that these objectives must be sought by unilateral initiatives if necessary. Others advocate a policy of relaxation. Still others favor maximum pressure. The challenge to Western policy is to prevent the Alliance from seeming an obstacle to legitimate German aspirations, while being careful to keep German national aspirations from transcending all other imperatives.

To strike this balance would be difficult even in a cohesive alliance. It has proved impossible in the face of a Franco-American rivalry. President Kennedy had been in office less than six months when Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum confronted his Administration with a direct challenge. The Kennedy Administration thereupon coupled a drastic build-up of American military strength with a diplomacy based on the unexceptionable proposition that a show-down could not be faced until all honorable means of compromise had been exhausted. It was widely assumed that the primary Soviet goal was to stabilize conditions in Central Europe. The United States was, therefore, inclined to seek some way to deal with the immediate irritant --the problem of <u>...</u> Berlin--by making concessions which might enhance the status of the East German authorities without impairing the physical means of access to Berlin. American policymakers assumed that progress on the national question would be achieved by increasing technical contacts between East and West Germany. In these contacts, it was supposed, the superior moral strength of West Germany could not fail to make itself felt.

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All of these elements were contained in the United States plan which the Germans leaked to the press in April 1962 in order to torpedo it. It provided for an International Access Authority in which East Germany would enjoy the same status as the Federal Republic; a number of East-West German commissions to deal with technical problems; a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; and an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.

These initiatives produced conflicting emotions on the part of the leaders of the Federal Republic. Conscious of the danger of being accused of bellicosity, they accepted the need for negotiations. But Chancellor Adenauer and his associates were extremely uneasy about the way the issue had been posed. They held that Soviet "salami tactics" had already curtailed West Berlin's margin of safety so sharply that any further concessions were likely to undermine its viability. They were torn between the desire for progress on the German question and a fear that any negotiation would conclude with further concessions on Berlin. They remembered that at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva in 1959 the Western powers first coupled a proposal on German unification with some concessions on Berlin. When the Soviets refused even to discuss unification, the West refrained from pushing the German plan, but still allowed possible modifications of Berlin's status to remain on the agenda.

The German government, having based its entire post-war policy on close ties with the West and especially with the United States, chose not to make public the full extent of its disquiet. Similarly, the United States preferred to stress German agreement to specific formulas in order

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to maintain the appearance of allied unity. However, nominal German agreement frequently depended on Chancellor Adenauer's knowledge that President de Gaulle would exercise his veto in allied councils.

One result was that much of the polemic between Washington and Bonn was conducted by means of inspired leaks to the press. During the summer and fall of 1961, many American newspapers pointed out that Germany's bills for World War II would be coming due. The United States was said to be delaying proposals until after the German elections scheduled for that fall so that a new government would be able to bear the brunt of the unpleasant decisions which were required. There were demands for "initiatives" and "imagination" from the Germans. According to a prevalent theory, it was safe to press the Germans for concessions because, as the saying went, "where are the Germans going to go?"

On the German side, the suspicion was frequently voiced that sooner or later the United States would confront Germany with a *fait accompli*. Planted stories expressed doubt about the validity of the United States nuclear guarantee. The frequent demand that the Germans undertake "initiatives," it was said, really was a euphemism for an American desire that they should offer unpalatable concessions which we were reluctant to make ourselves.

A more important result of this atmosphere of distrust between Bonn and Washington was the emergence of France as guardian of the Federal Republic's interests--thus answering the rhetorical question of where Germany might go. This, in turn, laid the basis for the close Franco-German cooperation which existed during the remainder of Chancellor Adenauer's term in office and which gave France the psychological support it needed for the exclusion of Britain from the Common Market.

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France's role has not been without its own ambivalence. French leaders are not likely to have transcended their historical reflexes so thoroughly as to have become believers in a united, powerful and self-confident Germany for its own sake. But President de Gaulle has understood that the most dangerous kind of Germany is one that feels foresaken by its allies and is thrown back on a purely national policy. This is why has from the beginning of his tenure De Gaulle sought to demonstrate that the Federal Republic would not stand alone. When rejecting--sometimes brutally --the American efforts to devise negotiating formulas, De Gaulle came to express the true convictions of the German government better than it dared to do itself.

The conflicting policies of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic created a diplomacy which combined the disadvantage of Allied disunity with the inability to gain any real benefit from negotiations with the Soviets. France refused to negotiate. The Federal Republic approved diplomatic contacts with the Soviets only with great misgivings. The "exploratory talks" were first conducted by Secretary Rusk and later by Ambassador Thompson with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Thus, the Federal Republic, on an issue affecting it most immediately, stood on the sidelines, in a position to criticize the unfavorable features of specific proposals without having to weigh them against alternative courses. By assuming the role of chief negotiator, the United States played into the hands of President de Gaulle and disquieted the Germans, and all without being able to bring about a settlement. Since we could not commit the West as a whole, the Soviets were in a position to treat our offers as fishing expeditions or to engage in fishing expeditions of their own. If they

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considered allied discord a feint, this gave them an incentive to be rigid.
If they took it seriously, they could, in effect, bank every concession
and use it as the starting point for the next round of talks.

The longer negotiations were conducted in this matter, the more
relations between Bonn and Washington suffered. The mere fact of bilateral
negotiations raised the specter of a U.S.-Soviet accommodation at the
expense of our allies. Our tactics thus encouraged the Franco-German entente.
The French inclination to create a Third Force would probably have been
pursued in any case; but it was given impetus and opportunity by German
uneasiness about Anglo-American negotiating tactics.

This was the situation when Chancellor Adenauer finally put an end
to the "exploratory talks" by publicly expressing his dissatisfaction with
them. Throughout 1962, American-German relations remained wary, while
the Federal Republic moved ever closer to an intimate association with France.

Thus, by the end of 1962, while NATO was still going through the
liturgy of unity, serious fissures had appeared. France had formulated
an explicit challenge to American pre-eminence within NATO. The Federal
Republic was torn between disquiet over American policy and the knowledge
that its military security required American support. Great Britain's
application for membership in the Common Market was stalled. Matters were
brought to a head by De Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963,
excluding Britain from the Common Market. This was followed within two
weeks by the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship.

The first United States reaction was stunned outrage at what was
seen as an embryo European organization based on De Gaulle's conceptions.
This was followed by a deliberate policy of wooing the Federal Republic

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away from its French ties. The focus of America's European policy shifted
more and more toward Germany. In the military, diplomatic and economic
fields strenuous efforts were made to forge new United States-German links.
Their practical consequence--whatever the intention--was to reduce the
German commitment to the French alliance. Where the previous policy ran
the risk of a German estrangement from the Alliance, the current policy,
by giving the impression of a special United States-German relationship,
is in danger of eventually producing an estrangement of the other allies.
Before dealing with this problem, it is important to examine the role of
Great Britain, the ally which has prided itself on its special relationship
to the United States during the entire post-war period.

B. Great Britain and Europe: The Nassau Agreement

Great Britain's relations to the Continent in the post-war period
have been extraordinarily ambivalent. In the years immediately following
the war, the countries of the Continent were on the verge of chaos. The
quest for a modicum of stability overrode all other considerations. Great
Britain alone seemed to possess a structure capable of sustaining a long-range,
orderly policy. During this period, Britain could have had the leadership
of Europe for the asking. It would have seemed inconceivable that Europe
might exclude Britain from its community--assuming that it would ever be
able to form one.

Yet it was precisely the memory of its recent isolation that prevented
Britain from seizing its opportunity. Throughout Britain's history, the
threats to its security had come from the Continent, which in Britain
significantly is called Europe. Britain's historic policy had been to prevent
the emergence of a powerful and united Continent. To promote the unity of

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Europe, to submerge Britain in such a structure and to substitute European for American and Commonwealth connections, all this has represented a wrench with tradition which few in Britain have been prepared to make.

The memory of the war reinforced this hesitation. The countries of the Continent had **surrendered** and forced Britain to fight alone. In the late Forties, these countries were still wracked by internal dissension. Britain might be located close to Europe geographically, but its emotional ties were to its recent ally across the sea and to the Commonwealth. The special relationship with the United States was not only an act of policy but also a psychological necessity. Long before anyone on the Continent could even imagine excluding Britain from whatever structure might be formed, Britain had made a tentative choice against the Continent.

The more the war receded, the more apparent it became that total defeat may be more conducive to making a new start than partial victory. For Great Britain, the tremendous exertions of the war did not lead to a well-deserved respite. On the contrary, Britain was obliged to undertake another major effort to adjust **it** to a loss of international influence--a task which was made even more difficult by the memory of the recent heroic effort. While defeat enabled the Continent to free itself from the shackles of traditional nostalgia, Britain's policy, courageous and steadfast during two difficult decades, now began to turn stagnant. Its exertions had consumed so much energy that Britain never seemed able to decide which option to pursue: close relations with the United States, a new concept of Commonwealth or an unreserved entry into Europe. By trying to combine all three, Britain ran the risk of losing each. The roots of Britain's exclusion from the Continent go deeper than an individual's arbitrary decision.

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This ambivalence has been described by some as Britain's search for identity. But the real problem is not that Britain has lacked an identity. Rather it is that its sense of identity has been incompatible with an unreserved entry into Europe. Britain's coolness toward Europe has been a consistent feature of the post-war period. She refused to join the Schumann Plan. She was not part of the abortive European Defense Community. She opposed the Common Market and applied for membership only after it was a going concern. Britain has strongly opposed the possibility of eventually transforming the proposed NATO multilateral force into a European force--one of her motives for entering it is indeed to obtain a veto over such a development. ¹

Throughout, Britain's views on the organization of Europe have been quite different from those of the European integrationists who so passionately championed her cause. They have in fact not been easy to distinguish from those of President de Gaulle except that they have been stated in a more accommodating fashion. Britain has been no more prepared than De Gaulle to join an "integrated," "supranational" Europe. Thus, in proposing that Britain enter the Common Market, Prime Minister Macmillan told the House of Commons:

> A number of years have passed since the movement began which culminated in the Treaty of Rome and I am bound to say that I do not see any signs of the members of the Community losing their national identity because they have delegated a measure of their sovereignty. This problem of sovereignty, to which we must, of course, attach the highest importance is, in the end, perhaps a matter of degree. I fully accept that there are some forces in Europe which would like a genuine federalist system. ... They would like Europe to turn itself into a sort

1

See below Chapter V

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of United States, but I believe this to be a completely
false analogy.

...The alternative concept, the only practical concept, would be a confederation, a commonwealth if hon. Members would like to call it that--what I think General de Gaulle has called Europe des patries--which would retain the great traditions and the pride of individual nations while working together in clearly defined spheres for their common interest. This seems to me a concept more in tune with the national traditions of European countries and, in particular, of our own.²

The same thought was expressed by Reginald Maudlirg, then President

of the Board of Trade:

...we have seen in the last year or two the development of
the European patrie of General de Gaulle and it is clear,
I should have thought, that the Governments of the Six are
not supporters of the conception of a political federation.
Therefore, it is fair to say that neither by the terms of
the Treaty itself nor by the expressed views of the Governments
concerned in the Community would our membership commit ourselves
in any way to ultimate political federation.³

To be sure, Britain's attitude toward European integration was less
theoretical than De Gaulle's. It advanced no general maxims about the
relationship between national identity and cooperative efforts. It
insisted simply that supranationalism violated, not universal rules, but
the lessons of British history.

Resistance to supranationalism has had an emotional basis as well.

Britain had always considered itself primarily a world power and nqt a
European power. Its sense of identity was bound up with relations across

2
Hansard, Fifth Series-Vol. 645, Commons, (July 24-August 4, 1961),
Col. 1490-91.

3
Hansard, ibid., Col. 1598.

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the sea, not across the channel. Its emotional ties were less with Europe
than with the "special relationship" with the United States.

This relationship is difficult to define, and there is no doubt
that President de Gaulle sees it as more formal than it really is.
Unquestionably the enormous prestige gained by Britain during the war has
played a major role. Unique ties of language and culture encourage many
Anglo-American
informal connections. United States-British relations would therefore be
"special" whatever the formal agreements.

British diplomacy has skillfully exploited these assets. De Gaulle's
tactics consist of submitting a proposal pre-emptorily and with a minimum
of explanation. If the proposal is rejected, De Gaulle then proceeds to
implement it unilaterally in order to create a *fait accompli* to which his
allies must adjust. British tactics have been more subtle. Britain never
contests an abstract or theoretical point. It almost never disagrees openly
with fundamental American policies. Instead, British policy usually concedes
us the liturgy while seeking to shape its implementation through intensive
formal and informal consultation. Where De Gaulle has often been difficult
to insure that he cannot be overlooked, Britain has been so conciliatory
that it has seemed natural to solicit Britain's views before major action
is taken. Whatever the "real" status of the "special relationship," Britain
has tried hard to give the impression to the outside world that American
policy is strongly influenced, if not guided, by London.

In the Sixties, this policy became less effective for a number of
reasons. For one thing, the "special relationship" has never had the same
psychological significance for the United States. The memory of Britain's
wartime effort, enormous as the prestige gained by it was, has diminished

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with time. As the post-war period progressed, many influential Americans have come to believe that Britain has been claiming influence out of proportion to its power. Consequently they have pressed Britain to substitute close association with Europe for the special ties across the Atlantic. This school of thought has objected to giving Britain a preferential voice or even the appearance of it. They believe that Britain should be treated as simply one other European country which should seek its fulfillment in Europe.

The two events which underlined the decline of Britain's influence in Washington most vividly were the Suez crisis and the cancellation of the Skybolt missile. The former demonstrated the end of Britain's capacity for major independent diplomatic action; the latter showed the hollowness of Britain's aspiration to military autonomy. In both instances, the wounds were to some extent self-inflicted--more in the case of Suez than in the case of Skybolt. In both instances, brutal and unfeeling American actions aggravated an already difficult situation. After Suez much of the previous assurance disappeared from British diplomacy.⁴ Britain increasingly tended to substitute maneuver for commitment and tried to add to Britain's influence while reducing its responsibilities--a combination impossible to sustain in the long run.

But the "special relationship" lasted long enough to bring about a number of illusions in Allied relationships. Where Britain tended to

4

It is interesting to compare the reaction of Britain and France to Suez. Britain, having based its entire policy on close association with the United States, suffered a severe psychological blow. France, having fewer illusions about its determining role in Washington, decided to accelerate its autonomy. The French nuclear program was much more the result of Suez than of the British example.

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exaggerate its special influence in Washington, the United States may have overestimated the extent of Britain's pliability. It came to be an axiom of United States policy that Britain's entry into a supranational Europe would be a guarantee of Atlantic partnership. This is why Washington championed Britain's entry into the Common Market so ardently and why it was so outraged when this policy was thwarted.

It is possible, however, that the American view was overoptimistic. To be sure, Britain's political maturity would weigh heavily in Europe's councils. With Britain playing a leading role, the policy of a united Europe would be more subtle, more skillful and, at least in form, less demanding. Nevertheless, the Conservative government's arguments on behalf of Britain's entry into Europe always emphasized that only as part of a united Europe would Britain carry weight with the United States, that basically the United States only respected strength. One ironic result of Britain's entry into Europe might well have been that Europe would henceforth have conducted De Gaulle's policies with British methods.

By 1962 the chief remaining symbol of the special Anglo-American relationship was in the nuclear field. An amendment to the United States Atomic Energy Act in 1954 permitted United States assistance to the British nuclear program. This corrected an inequity in the original law which, despite close war-time collaboration in research between Britain and the United States, prohibited the sharing of nuclear information with foreign countries. American technology was also made available for the development of delivery vehicles for the British retaliatory force. No such assistance has been extended to any other ally.

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The "independent" British deterrent has been composed of about 175 V-bombers which are threatened with obsolescence. Accordingly, in 1957, Britain began to develop a missile called the Blue Streak--similar to first-generation American liquid-fuel missiles such as Jupiter or Thor. Because this development was extremely expensive--as is true of all first-generation weapons--it was scrapped in February 1960 in favor of an air-to-surface weapon then under development in the United States, the ill-fated Skybolt.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1960, the Conservative government was under constant attack by Labor on two grounds: (a) by relying on a weapon to be developed by a foreign country, Britain admitted that an "independent" British deterrent was impossible and (b) if there really was a need for an independent deterrent, it was dangerous to rely on Skybolt since the weapons did not yet exist and since, as George Brown, then Labor's spokesman on defense matters, said, "the Americans have not bought it."

The Conservative government countered by referring to an "agreement" by the United States to supply Skybolt. This was never contradicted by either the Eisenhower or the Kennedy Administration.

This debate became more intense after the Kennedy Administration took office. President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara publicly deprecated the utility of independent nuclear forces. They were supported in this stand by the British Opposition. In 1962, Harold Wilson, then foreign affairs spokesman for the Labor Party, insisted after a visit to Washington that the United States did not consider the British retaliatory force a strategic weapon significant and that the British defense effort would make a greater contribution if channeled in other directions. This was denied by the Conservative government. Labor then challenged the Conservative

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government to produce a single official American statement affirming that
the United States valued the British deterrent. This the Conservative
government was unable to do.

Thus, when the Skybolt program was cancelled in December 1962,
conditions were not conducive to calm deliberation. The uproar which the
cancellation produced had little to do with the technical merits of Skybolt
in any event. No one was concerned over a possible deterrent gap in the
interval between the time the V-bombers became obsolete and a new weapons
system could be developed to replace Skybolt. What was at stake was a fiction
on which Britain's post-war policy had been based and for which successive
British governments had expended ten billion dollars. British independence
in the field of strategy--whatever its "real" significance--was literally
a matter of life and death for the Conservative government. And governments
are notoriously slow to appreciate the technical merits of arguments which
threaten their existence. As a result, a conference between President
Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, which had been scheduled originally
to review the world situation after the Cuban missile crisis, was transformed
into a redefinition of nuclear relationships. The Nassau Agreement was
the result.

The Nassau Agreement is a document of extraordinary ambiguity
reflecting as it does an attempt to reconcile the American quest for the
integration of all the nuclear forces of the Alliance with the British
desire to maintain a measure of independence. The United States agreed to
supply Polaris missiles to Great Britain. Britain was to construct the
submarines and to provide the warheads. The British Polaris submarines,
armed with American missiles and British warheads, were then to be subscribed

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to a NATO "multilateral" force which the United States and Great Britain pledged themselves to establish. It was to include the British Bomber Command, some United States Polaris forces and other tactical forces in Europe. Another paragraph stated that the purpose of the two Governments was "the development of a NATO multilateral force in the closest consultation with other NATO allies." Great Britain committed itself to use its nuclear forces "for the purpose of the international defense of the Western Alliance" except "where the supreme national interest was at stake." The same qualification appeared in the provision that both governments agreed that Western defense "is indivisible and ... in all ordinary circumstances of crisis or danger /Emphasis added./ it is this very unity which is the best protection of the West." Finally Great Britain and the United States agreed that NATO in addition to having a nuclear "shield" should have a non-nuclear "sword," thus reversing the traditional NATO strategic concept.

5

This agreement was transmitted to President de Gaulle after it was published. In an accompanying memorandum, the United States offered to sell Polaris missiles to France on the same terms as to Great Britain.

The Nassau Agreement attempted a *tour de force*. It tried to reconcile integration with independence, the American belief in the need for an indivisible nuclear strategy with a British desire for autonomy.

But the price was high, and in practice the various clauses of the Nassau Agreement tended to cancel each other out. For example, what

5

Text, Joint Communique and Attached Statement on nuclear defense systems issued on December 21, by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, DOSB, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1229 (January 14, 1963), pp. 44-5.

See also Chapter IV.

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was the significance of subscribing the British retaliatory force to NATO
while at the same time reserving the right of independent action when the
supreme national interest was at stake? As President Kennedy pointed out
shortly after the Nassau Agreement was signed, the supreme national interest is
automatically involved when a country considers the use of nuclear weapons.
Similarly, what was the meaning of the phrase that a unified strategy was
the best protection in "ordinary" circumstances? To what "extraordinary"
contingencies did the escape clause refer? Moreover, it was not clear whether
the multilateral force described in paragraph six was the same as that in
paragraph seven. In other words, did the commitment imply only that national
contingents be assigned to NATO or did it involve also an undertaking to
establish a mixed-manned fleet (the MLF). Britain was to urge the first
interpretation; the United States defended the latter one. Finally what was the
meaning of the reversal of the traditional notions of "shield" and "sword" in NATO
strategy. Did it imply that the United States and Great Britain were
proposing to resist a conventional attack in Europe primarily with conventional
means?

Thus even an individual less inclined to exploit Allied discord than
President de Gaulle was likely to view the Nassau Agreement with suspicion.
Indeed, reaction to the Nassau Agreement all over Europe ranged from cool
to hostile. In Germany, the grouping of NATO's nuclear forces into a
special nuclear command revived fears of a possible nuclear disengagement.

6

See below Chapter V.

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The Labor Party interpreted the Nassau Agreement as proving the validity
of their previous contention that British nuclear independence was a sham.
The Agreement did not satisfy those in the United States who had been
pressing for an integrated strategy. And it was, of course, rejected out
of hand by President de Gaulle.

The Nassau Agreement could not have been timed more disastrously
for Britain's application for membership in the Common Market. If Britain
overestimated its special ties with the United States, De Gaulle took them
at face value. He has never forgotten Churchill's statement that if Britain

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were forced to choose between Europe and the open sea, it would unhesitatingly opt for the latter.⁷ The tenacity with which Britain argued about the economic conditions of its entry into Europe, while settling its nuclear future in a three day conference with the United States seemed to indicate to De Gaulle the real nature of Britain's priorities. Britain's special relation with the United States in the nuclear field could have two meanings: It was either a challenge to De Gaulle's contention that a united Europe required its own defense; or else it seemed designed to assure Britain a pre-eminent place in a united Europe. Neither contingency was attractive to De Gaulle.

Moreover, if the integration envisaged by the Nassau Agreement did not go far enough for some Americans, it was much too sweeping for President de Gaulle. President de Gaulle was likely to object to the term "assignment" whatever its actual significance. He said that the proposed assignment of nuclear forces to NATO involved:

> ...a web of liaisons, transmissions and interferences within itself ... such that, if an integral part were suddenly snatched from it, there would be a strong risk of paralyzing it just at the moment, perhaps, when it should act.⁸

And he asked how in practice integration could be reconciled with independent disposition, putting his finger on the key evasion of the Nassau Agreement. At the same time, he agreed that cooperation between

7 Charles de Gaulle, *The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, Unity, 1942-1944*, translated by Richard Howard (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), p. 253.

8 *Major Addresses, op. cit.*, Press Conference on January 14, 1963, p. 219.

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the national nuclear forces within NATO was both possible and desirable. It is symptomatic that, while arguing the relative merits of integration and coordination, neither side has yet defined what concrete meaning these phrases would have in practical terms or what common action might be possible under one label that was not possible under the other.

The way the Nassau Agreement was negotiated created as many problems as its content and timing. Given De Gaulle's wartime experiences and his view of France's role in the world, it was against all probability that he would accept a proposal negotiated privately by the "Anglo-Saxons" and revealed to Paris only after it had been released to the press. It should have come as no surprise that De Gaulle acidly commented at the press conference where he rejected French participation: "Of course, I am only speaking of this proposal and agreement because they have been published and because their content is known." 9

Moreover, the actual terms of the agreement seemed to De Gaulle to perpetuate the discriminatory treatment which he had opposed throughout his public career. France possessed neither submarines nor warheads for the Polaris missiles. Thus, the Nassau Agreement could bring benefits to France only after many years. Britain's experience with the Skybolt program reduced the already small incentive of France to make itself dependent on the promise of future delivery of United States missiles--even less so as France was not offered the information about the construction of nuclear warheads without which these missiles would be useless.

9

Ibid., p. 218.

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There have been endless debates whether the Nassau Agreement precipitated De Gaulle's decision to veto British membership in the Common Market, whether it was a pretext or--as is most likely--whether it was simply a contributory cause. It is not necessary to decide this question to realize that the Nassau Agreement exacerbated an already difficult situation and placed the issue of British membership in Europe in the most adverse light imaginable. Britain's application for membership in the Common Market was bound to raise the issue whether it was consistent with the aspirations of a united Europe for one of its members to have an exclusive relationship with the United States on so vital a subject as nuclear strategy or whether it should share its nuclear knowledge with its new partners.

The Nassau Agreement brought this issue to a premature head. Britain had received an abrupt rebuff on the Skybolt issue. Yet it never seems seriously to have considered that it might use this opportunity for closer cooperation with its European partners in the military field. Instead, it concluded an agreement with the United States without even consulting France, the other European nuclear power, and it developed a nuclear plan for NATO without the participation of its prospective partners in the Common Market. It agreed to reverse the traditional significance of "sword" and "shield" in NATO doctrine without consulting any other NATO ally. Perhaps President de Gaulle had decided in any event on a veto. But if he still hesitated, the Nassau Agreement was likely to tip the scales.

In retrospect, the failure of Britain to consult with France and its other European allies before committing itself to the Nassau Agreement seems a historic missed opportunity. It will never be known what the reaction would have been if Britain had made such an overture before the

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the Bahamas meeting. Even had it failed, it would have placed the subsequent debate in a far better context.

As it was, De Gaulle, in his press conference of January 14, 1963, abruptly and brutally vetoed British membership in the Common Market and rejected the Nassau offer. The date marks an important watershed in Atlantic relations. De Gaulle's action exploded the premises on which much of previous thinking had been based. The belief in an automatic progression from economic to political integration suddenly stood in need of re-examination. The concept of an Atlantic partnership between the United States and a united Europe, including Great Britain, was seriously challenged. It was now clear that conflicting approaches to Atlantic relationships were confronting each other.

The debate was confused by the way the lines were drawn, which made it dangerous to take either criticism or support of United States positions at face value. France's claim that it spoke for Europe was belied by the fact that on economic issues Germany and the Netherlands tended to side with Great Britain and in the field of strategy the Federal Republic leaned toward the United States. Many in Europe were disquieted by De Gaulle's tactics even when they basically agreed with his policies--as in the case of the recognition of Communist China and his proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia.

At the same time, opposition to De Gaulle does not guarantee support of United States policies. British policy often differs from that of De Gaulle only in the greater subtlety of British methods. Much domestic French criticism is due to the frustration of the divided Opposition which sees its policies carried out by the incumbent. All over Europe left-wing

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groups violently oppose De Gaulle's imperious style, seeing in him a direct
descendant of the dictators of the Thirties. But this does not mean that
they object to Third Force policies as such or that their long-term
alternative is close association with the United States. The Federal
Republic maneuvers uneasily between relying on the military protection of
the United States and the diplomatic cover of France.

The press conference of January 14, 1963, ushered in a period of frantic diplomatic activity in which the United States strove hard to vindicate its previous conception, and France aloofly pursued her own course. What started out as a dispute about the internal structure of Europe and its role runs the risk of fragmenting Europe or of shifting the balance within Europe in unexpected directions. The result is a stalemate the most obvious manifestation of which occurs in the field of strategy.

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# CHAPTER III
## THE BERLIN CRISIS AND THE NASSAU AGREEMENT:
### THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND GREAT BRITAIN UNTIL JANUARY 1963

#### A. The Problem of Germany: Events Leading Up to the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship

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Adenauer, therefore, sought to submerge narrowly German interests
in a wider community. First he developed intimate ties with the United
States which earned him the epithet of the *Social Democratic opposition parties* that he was the Chancellor of the Allies. Later, when United States policy
on Berlin seemed to threaten vital German interests, he renewed his always
strong tendency for close association with France. This culminated in the
Franco-German Treaty of Friendship of January 1963. In both cases his
major concern was to assure for the Federal Republic the moral and physical
backing of a senior partner. In the case of the treaty with France, diplomatic
advantage was reinforced by psychological need. For the first time in its
history as a nation, Germany had a friendly major country as a neighbor to the west.
Perhaps Chancellor Adenauer's most notable achievement was to bring about
the optical illusion that conditions in the Federal Republic were as firm
and stable as his own policy.

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The Berlin crisis was crucial because it emphasized a serious
t potential for tension within the Alliance: the difference between the
German quest for national unity and the equally understandable concern of
the rest of the allies for stability. Of course, no alliance can perfectly
reconcile the objectives of all of its members. But the minimum condition
for effectiveness is that the requirements of the alliance should not clash
with the deepest aspirations of one or more of the partners.

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III-6

a new approach to the question of German unity and to the alleviation of conditions in East Germany. Some have begun to argue that these objectives must be sought by unilateral initiatives if necessary. Others advocate a policy of relaxation. Still others favor maximum pressure. <u>Though no clear policy has yet emerged, the West cannot delay much longer in deciding whether the future of Germany is to be the concern of the Alliance as a whole or primarily of Germany as a separate national policy.</u> The challenge to Western policy is to prevent the Alliance from seeming an obstacle to legitimate German aspirations, while being careful to keep German national aspirations from transcending all other imperatives.

To strike this balance would be difficult even in a cohesive alliance. It has proved impossible in the face of a Franco-American rivalry. President Kennedy had been in office less than six months when Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum confronted his Administration with a direct challenge. The Kennedy Administration thereupon coupled a drastic build-up of American military strength with a diplomacy based on the unexceptionable proposition that a show-down could not be faced until all honorable means of compromise had been exhausted. It was widely assumed that the primary Soviet goal was to stabilize conditions in Central Europe. The United States was, therefore, inclined to seek some way to deal with the immediate irritant --the problem of <u>isolated</u> Berlin--by making concessions which might enhance the status of the East German authorities without impairing the physical means of access to Berlin. American policymakers assumed that progress on the national question would be achieved by increasing technical contacts between East and West Germany. In these contacts, it was supposed, the superior moral strength of West Germany could <u>not</u> fail to make itself felt.

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These initiatives produced conflicting motives on the part of emotions
the leaders of the Federal Republic. Conscious of the danger of being
accused of bellicosity, they accepted the need for negotiations. But
Chancellor Adenauer and his associates were extremely uneasy about the way
the issue had been posed. They held that Soviet "salami tactics" had already
curtailed West Berlin's margin of safety so sharply that any further
concessions were likely to undermine its viability. They were torn between
the desire for progress on the German question and a fear that any negotiation
would conclude with further concessions on Berlin. They remembered that
at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva in 1959 the Western powers
first coupled a proposal on German unification with some concessions on
Berlin. When the Soviets refused even to discuss unification, the West
refrained from pushing the German plan, but still allowed possible modifications
of Berlin's status to remain on the agenda.

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France's role has not been without its own ambivalence. French leaders are not likely to have transcended their historical reflexes so thoroughly as to have become believers in a united, powerful and self-confident Germany for its own sake. But President de Gaulle has understood that the most dangerous kind of Germany is one that feels foresaken by its allies and is thrown back on a purely national policy. This is why from the beginning of his tenure De Gaulle sought to demonstrate that the A has Federal Republic would not stand alone. When rejecting--sometimes brutally --the American efforts to devise negotiating formulas, De Gaulle came to express the true convictions of the German government better than it dared to do itself.

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III-12

The memory of the war reinforced this hesitation. The countries of the Continent had *surrendered* and forced Britain to fight alone. In the late Forties, these countries were still wracked by internal dissension. Britain might be located close to Europe geographically, but its emotional ties were to its recent ally across the sea and to the Commonwealth. The special relationship with the United States was not only an act of policy but also a psychological necessity. Long before anyone on the Continent could even imagine excluding Britain from whatever structure might be formed, Britain had made a tentative choice against the Continent.

The more the war receded, the more apparent it became that total defeat may be more conducive to making a new start than partial victory. For Great Britain, the tremendous exertions of the war did not lead to a well-deserved respite. On the contrary, Britain was obliged to undertake another major effort to adjust *to* a loss of international influence--a task which was made even more difficult by the memory of the recent heroic effort. While defeat enabled the Continent to free itself from the shackles of traditional nostalgia, Britain's policy, courageous and steadfast during two difficult decades, now began to turn stagnant. Its exertions had consumed so much energy that Britain never seemed able to decide which option to pursue: close relations with the United States, a new concept of Commonwealth or an unreserved entry into Europe. By trying to combine all three, Britain ran the risk of losing each. The roots of Britain's exclusion from the Continent go deeper than an individual's arbitrary decision.

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See below Chapter V

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The same thought was expressed by Reginald Maudling, then President
of the Board of Trade:

3
Hansard, ibid., Col. 1598f.

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This relationship is difficult to define, and there is no doubt
that President de Gaulle sees it as more formal than it really is.
Unquestionably the enormous prestige gained by Britain during the war has
played a major role. Unique ties of language and culture encourage many
informal connections. Anglo-American and American British relations would therefore be
"special" whatever the formal agreements.

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4

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It is possible, however, that the American view was overoptimistic.
To be sure, Britain's political maturity would weigh heavily in Europe's
councils. With Britain playing a leading role, the policy of a united
Europe would be more subtle, more skillful and, at least in form, less
demanding. Nevertheless, the Conservative government's arguments on behalf
of Britain's entry into Europe always emphasized that only as part of a
united Europe would Britain carry weight in the United States, that basically
the United States only respected strength. One ironic result of Britain's
entry into Europe might well have been that Europe would henceforth have
conducted De Gaulle's policies with British methods.

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This debate became more intense after the Kennedy Administration took office. President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara publicly deprecated the utility of independent nuclear forces. They were supported in this stand by the British Opposition. In 1962, Harold Wilson, then foreign affairs spokesman for the Labor Party, insisted after a visit to Washington that the United States did not consider the British retaliatory force to be strategically significant and that the British defense effort would make a greater contribution if channeled in other directions. This was denied by the Conservative government. Labor then challenged the Conservative

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5

5

See also Chapter IV.