- 3 -

[lc]

PR #469

After the fighting began we, in concert with the Soviet Union, helped bring an end to the hostilities by sponsoring a number of resolutions in the Security Council. The Six-Point Agreement of November 11 consolidated the ceasefire. It helped create the minimal conditions necessary for carrying forward our efforts here. All these resolutions and agreements must be strictly implemented.

But regardless of these steps, we recognize that the ceasefire remains fragile and tentative. The United States is concerned over the evidence of increased military preparedness in recent days. A renewal of hostilities would be both foolhardy and dangerous. We urge all concerned to refrain from the use of force, and to give our efforts here the chance they deserve.

Second, we must understand what can realistically be accomplished at any given moment.

The separation of military forces is certainly the most immediate problem. Disengagement of military forces would help to reduce the danger of a new military outbreak; it would begin the process of building confidence between the two sides.

Based on intensive consultations with the leaders of the Middle East, including many in this room today, I believe that the first work of this conference should be to achieve early agreement on the separation of military forces, and that such an agreement is possible.

Serious discussions have already taken place between the military representatives of Egypt and Israel at kilometer 101. It is important to build promptly on the progress achieved there. And on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts a comparable base for the lessening of tensions and the negotiation of further steps toward peace must be found. Progress towards peace should include all the parties concerned.

Third, the disengagement of forces is an essential first step -- a consolidation of the ceasefire and a bridge to the "peaceful and accepted settlement" called for in Security Council Resolution 242. Our final objective is the implementation in all its parts of Resolution 242. This goal has the full support of the United States.

Peace must bring a new relationship among the nations of the Middle East -- a relationship that will not only put an end to the state of war which has persisted for the last quarter of a century, but will also permit the peoples of the Middle East to live together in harmony and safety. It must replace the reality of mistrust with a new reality of promise and hope. It must include concrete measures that make war less likely.

A peace agreement must include these elements, among others: withdrawals, recognized frontiers, security arrangements, guarantees, a settlement of the legitimate interests of the Palestinians and a recognition that Jerusalem contains places considered holy by three great religions.

Peace will require that we relate the imperative of withdrawals to the necessities of security, the requirement of guarantees to the sovereignty of the parties, the hopes of the displaced to the realities now existing.

- 4 -

PR #469

[lc]

Fourth, we believe there must be realistic negotiations between the parties. Resolution 338 provides just such a process. It is on the parties that the primary responsibility rests. The United States intends to help facilitate these talks in very feasible ways, to encourage moderation and the spirit of accommodation. We are prepared to make concrete suggestions to either side if this will help promote practical progress. But we must always remember that while a Middle East settlement is in the interest of us all, it is the people of the area that must live with the results. It must in the final analysis, be acceptable to them.

Peace, in short, cannot last unless it rests on the consent of the parties concerned. The wisest of realists are those who understand the power of a moral consensus. There is a measure of safety in power to prevent aggression, but there is greater security still in arrangements considered so just that no one wishes to overthrow them.

As we open this conference we take a momentous step. We are challenging a history of missed opportunities, of mutual fear and bottomless distrust. Our backdrop is a war that had brought anguish and pain, death and destruction, a war that has been costly on both sides, that has brought neither victory nor defeat, that reflected the failure of all our past efforts at peaceful solutions.

Mr. Secretary General, fellow delegates, President Nixon has sent me here with the purpose of affirming America's commitment to a just and lasting peace.

We do not embark on this task with false expectations. We do not pretend that there are easy answers. A problem that has defied solution for a generation does not yield to simple remedies.

In all efforts for peace the overriding problem is to relate the sense of individual justice to the common good. The great tragedies of history occur not when right confronts wrong, but when two rights face each other.

The problems of the Middle East today have such a character. There is justice on all sides, but there is a greater justice still in finding a truth which merges all aspirations in the realization of a common humanity. It was a Jewish sage, who speaking for all mankind, expressed this problem well: "If I am not for myself who is for me, but if I am for myself alone who am I?"

Fellow delegates, in the months ahead we will examine many problems. We will discuss many expedients. We will know success -- and I dare say we shall experience deadlock and despair.

But let us always keep in mind our final goal: We can exhaust ourselves in maneuvers or we can remember that this is the first real chance for peace the Middle East has had in three decades.

We can concentrate on our resentments or we can be motivated by the consciousness that this opportunity, once past will not return.

We can emphasize the very real causes of distrust, or we can remember that if we succeed our children will thank us for what they have been spared.

- 5 -

PR #469

[LC]

We can make propaganda or we can try to make progress.

The American attitude is clear. We know we are starting on a journey whose outcome is uncertain and whose progress will be painful. We are conscious that we need wisdom and patience and good will. But we know, too, that the agony of three decades must be overcome and that somehow we have to muster the insight and courage to put an end to the conflict between peoples who have so often ennobled mankind.

So we are here to spare no effort in the quest of a lasting peace in the Middle East, a task which is as worthy as it may be agonizing. In the words of the poet:

"Pain that cannot forget
falls drop by drop
upon the heart
until in our despair
there comes wisdom
through the awful
grace of God."

Bassin

UNITED STATES MISSION

U.S. INFORMATION SERVICE

80, RUE DE LAUSANNE
1211 GENEVA 21 - TEL. 32 70 20

PRESS RELEASE

OFFICIAL TEXT OF
ADDRESS BY SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER
BEFORE THE
OPENING SESSION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

December 21, 1973

Mr. Secretary General, distinguished Foreign Ministers,
Delegates.

As one of the Co-Chairmen of this Conference, let me
express my gratitude to the United Nations and to you
personally for providing such excellent facilities for
the Conference, for convening it, and for doing us all the
honor of presiding at this historic moment.

We are convened here at a moment of historic opportunity for the cause of peace in the Middle East, and for the cause of peace in the world. For the first time in a generation the peoples of the Middle East are sitting together to turn their talents to the challenge of a lasting peace.

All of us must have the wisdom to grasp this moment--
to break the shackles of the past, and to create at last a
new hope for the future.

Two months ago what we now refer to as the fourth
Arab-Israeli war was coming to an end. Today, there is the
respite of an imperfect ceasefire, but the shadow of war still
hangs over the Middle East. Either we begin today the process
of correcting the conditions which produced that conflict,
or we doom untold tens of thousands to travail, sorrow and
further inconclusive bloodshed.

When the history of our era is written, it will speak
not of a series of Arab-Israeli wars, but of one war broken
by periods of uneasy armistices and temporary ceasefires.
That war has already lasted twenty-five years. Whether future
histories will call this the era of the twenty-five year Arab-
Israeli war, or the thirty-year war, or the fifty-year war,
rests in large measure in our hands. And above all, it rests
in the hands of the Israeli and Arab governments, not only
those whose distinguished representatives are seated around
this table, but also those who are absent and who we all hope
will join us soon.

We are challenged by emotions so deeply felt--by causes
so passionately believed and pursued--that the tragic march
from cataclysm to cataclysm, each more costly and indecisive
than the last, sometimes seems preordained. Yet our presence
here today--in itself a momentous accomplishment--is a symbol
of rejection of this fatalistic view. Respect for the forces
of history does not mean blind submission to those forces.

-2-

There is an Arab saying, Eli Fat Mat, which means that the past is dead. Let us resolve here today that we will overcome the legacy of hatred and suffering. Let us overcome old myths with new hope. Let us make the Middle East worthy of the messages of hope and reconciliation that have been carried forward from its stark soil by three great religions.

Today there is hope for the future, for the conflict is no longer looked upon entirely in terms of irreconcilable absolutes. The passionate ideologies of the past have, in part at least, been replaced by a recognition that all the peoples concerned have earned, by their sacrifice, a long period of peace.

From two recent trips through the Middle East I have the impression that people on both sides have had enough of bloodshed. No further proof of heroism is necessary; no military point remains to be made. The Middle East--so often the source of mankind's inspiration--is challenged to another act of hope and reconciliation--significant not only for its own peoples but for all mankind.

What does each side seek? Both answer with a single word: peace. But peace has of course a concrete meaning for each. One side seeks the recovery of sovereignty and the redress of grievances suffered by a displaced people. The other seeks security and recognition of its legitimacy as a nation. The common goal of peace must surely be broad enough to embrace all these aspirations.

For the United States, our objective is such a peace.

I cannot promise success, but I can promise dedication. I cannot guarantee a smooth journey towards our goal. I can assure you of an unswerving quest for justice.

The United States will make a determined and unflagging effort.

President Nixon has sent me here because for five years he has endeavored to build a new structure of international peace in which ties with old friends are strengthened, and new and constructive relationships replace distrust and confrontation with adversaries.

But world peace remains tenuous and incomplete so long as the Middle East is in perpetual crisis. Its turmoil is a threat to the hopes of all of us in this room.

It is time to end it.

The question is not whether there must be peace. The question is how do we achieve it. What can we do here to launch new beginnings?

First, this Conference must speak with a clear and unequivocal voice: the ceasefire called for by the Security Council must be scrupulously adhered to by all concerned.

-3-

Prior to last October the United States did all it could to prevent a new outbreak of fighting. But we failed because frustration could no longer be contained.

After the fighting began we, in concert with the Soviet Union, helped bring an end to the hostilities by sponsoring a number of resolutions in the Security Council. The six-point agreement of November 11 consolidated the ceasefire. It helped create the minimal conditions necessary for carrying forward our efforts here. All these resolutions and agreements must be strictly implemented.

Based on intensive consultations with the leaders of the Middle East, including many in this room today, I believe that the first work of this Conference should be to achieve early agreement on the separation of military forces, and that such an agreement is possible.

Serious discussions have already taken place between the military representatives of Egypt and Israel at Kilometer 101. It is important to build promptly on the progress achieved there. And on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts a comparable base for the lessening of tensions and the negotiation of further steps toward peace must be found. Progress towards peace should include all the parties concerned.

Third, the disengagement of forces is an essential first step—a consolidation of the ceasefire and a bridge to the "peaceful and accepted settlement" called for in Security Council Resolution 242. Our final objective is the implementation in all its parts of Resolution 242. This goal has the full support of the United States.

Peace must bring a new relationship among the nations of the Middle East—a relationship that will not only put an end to the state of war which has persisted for the last quarter of a century, but will also permit the peoples of the Middle East to live together in harmony and safety. It must replace the reality of mistrust with a new reality of promise and hope. It must include concrete measures that make war less likely.

-4-

Fourth, we believe there must be realistic negotiations between the parties. Resolution 338 provides just such a process. It is on the parties that the primary responsibility rests. The United States intends to help facilitate these talks in every feasible way, to encourage moderation and the spirit of accommodation. We are prepared to make concrete suggestions to either side if this will help promote practical progress. But we must always remember that while a Middle East settlement is in the interest of us all, it is the people of the area that must live with the results. It must in the final analysis, be acceptable to them.

As we open this Conference we take a momentous step. We are challenging a history of missed opportunities, of mutual fear and bottomless distrust. Our backdrop is a war that has brought anguish and pain, death and destruction a war that has been costly to both sides, that has brought neither victory nor defeat, that reflected the failure of all our past efforts at peaceful solutions.

-5-

The Problems of the Middle East today have such a
character. There is justice on all sides, but there is a
greater justice still in finding a truth which merges all
aspirations in the realization of a common humanity. It
was a Jewish sage, who speaking for all mankind, expressed
this problem well: "If I am not for myself who is for me,
but if I am for myself alone who am I?"

Fellow delegates, in the months ahead we will examine
many problems. We will discuss many expedients. We will
know success--and I dare say we shall experience deadlock
and despair.

We can concentrate on our resentments or we can be
motivated by the consciousness that this opportunity, once
past, will not return.

* * * * *

PCME/PV.1
page 3

The SECRETARY-GENERAL of the UNITED NATIONS: It is a great honour for me to open this historic Conference and to welcome the representatives of the participating Governments. It is also a source of gratification to me that this unique event is taking place under the auspices of the United Nations. The Palais des Nations has housed many historic meetings, but none have been of more potential importance, both to the Governments concerned and to the international community as a whole, than this Conference on peace in the Middle East.

I am certain that I am speaking on behalf of all the participants in the Conference when I also take this opportunity to thank sincerely the Federal and Cantonal authorities of Switzerland for their valuable assistance. We are indeed most grateful for their unfailing and generous co-operation in making the necessary arrangements possible.

There is no need to remind the distinguished representatives of the Governments here assembled of the concern of the international community for the success of our deliberations. This concern was emphasized most recently by the Security Council when it expressed the hope that the Conference would make speedy progress towards the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The United Nations has been seized of the various aspects of the Middle East conflict for more than a quarter of a century and has devoted an immense amount of time and effort both to keeping the peace and to the search for a just and lasting settlement.

On 11 October of this year, five days after bitter fighting had broken out once again in the Middle East, I appealed to the Governments concerned to look urgently to the possibility of turning the tragic conflict into a starting point for a new effort at a real settlement. Similar appeals were made by numerous Governments. Now, two months later, this new effort is taking shape here in Geneva. None of us, I know, underestimates the difficulties of the task ahead, but the very fact of this Conference, and the willingness of the Governments concerned to respond to this new effort to find a just and lasting settlement, is a source of encouragement and hope for all mankind.

The basis for this meeting was laid down in Security Council resolution 338 of 22 October 1973. That resolution called upon the parties for an immediate cessation of all firing and a termination of all military activity. It called upon the parties to start immediately the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 in all its parts, and it decided that negotiations should begin at once between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

In subsequent resolutions on 23 and 25 October, the Council confirmed its decisions on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action, called for United Nations observation of the cease-fire and decided to set up a United Nations Emergency Force. The United Nations Military Observers and the Force were immediately put into the field, and they continue to exert their best efforts to keep the peace.

On 11 November the representatives of Egypt and Israel, under the auspices of the Commander of UNEP, met at Kilometre Marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road and signed the six-point agreement which had been communicated to the Secretary-General on 9 November by the Secretary of State of the United States. In subsequent meetings the

PCME/PV.1

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modalities for the implementation of five of the six points were agreed upon by the parties and were put into effect with the assistance of UNEF and the International Committee for the Red Cross. It is gratifying that in this way the humanitarian aspects of the six-point agreement have been largely fulfilled.

I am aware of the outstanding humanitarian problems relating to the Middle East question as a whole. The Commander of UNEF, in close co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, is making persistent efforts to find solutions to some of these problems, and I myself have taken initiatives in an effort to resolve others. It is my earnest hope that through such efforts and through the proceedings of this Conference rapid progress may be made in this regard.

On the implementation of one point of the agreement, namely the question of the return to the October 22 position in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the United Nations, the parties have not so far reached accord, although detailed exploratory discussions have been held. I hope that through its deliberations this Conference may make progress on this important matter, as well as embarking on the next step envisaged in resolution 338, namely the negotiations aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

The presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations here today reflects the deep concern of the international community in the Middle East question. It also symbolizes the willingness of the Organization to be of assistance whenever the parties require it. I want to assure all of the parties here present that in that spirit I and my staff, both at United Nations Headquarters and in the Middle East, stand ready to be of assistance in any way that may seem useful to them. We have, I believe, amply demonstrated this readiness to act promptly in the critical events of recent months.

Before concluding, may I express appreciation to all the Governments which, by their spirit of co-operation and their desire to make progress on this most complex and crucial question, have made possible the convening of this Conference today. The Conference has a unique opportunity to come to grips with a most difficult, dangerous and complex international problem. If this opportunity is not seized, the world will inevitably be confronted once again with a dangerous and highly explosive situation in the Middle East. Unless progress can be made, the cease-fire and the United Nations peace-keeping arrangements already in operation in the area will remain fragile, and there will be an ever-present danger that fighting will break out again.

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This Conference presents a historic challenge to its participants not only because the eyes of the world are upon it, but because the situation in the Middle East, with all its manifold implications, urgently demands the statesmanship, courage, patience and vision of each and all of the participants. I know that these qualities are not lacking in this room. I am sure that all the participants share a sense of urgency and will not fail to seize the opportunity to build a lasting structure of peace in the area. It is an opportuntiy which may not recur for a very long time. I wish this Conference all success in its noble task.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL of the UNITED NATIONS: I call upon the representative of the USSR, Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Secretary-General, distinguished colleagues. It is with a deep feeling of satisfaction that the Soviet Union welcomes the convening of this conference. A first, but important, step has been taken on the road to the political solution of one of the most acute international problems. For a quarter of a century now it has been a constant source of tension, not only in the Middle East but also far beyond its boundaries.

From time to time, and we are all witnesses to that, the tension in this area turns into open armed conflict. Every time that happens, the fate of the whole world is in jeopardy. That was so six years ago, as it was quite recently in October this year, when the military activities, although they did not last long, were marked by extreme violence.

There can hardly be any doubt that further sanguinary military clashes in the Middle East will take place in the future as well unless we eradicate the main tensions prevailing there. Anyone must inevitably come to that conclusion who has even a slight knowledge of the actual situation and approaches the question objectively.

The intolerable situation in the Middle East created because of the policy of Israel cannot continue. We should like to hope that the participants in the Conference will recognize this, that they came here with the firm intention of laying the foundation for a just settlement.

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There is no alternative to such a settlement which would be acceptable to the peoples of the area, to the peoples of the world as a whole. This is irrefutably demonstrated by the whole course of events, including those which have happened recently. It is now quite clear to all that the Arab States will never reconcile themselves to the loss of the territories which were taken away from them in 1967. The Soviet Union has full understanding of their position, and supports it. The Arab countries have the support of the overwhelming majority of the States of the world in their righteous struggle. They have on their side the strengthening solidarity of the Arab world.

It is hopeless to think that the occupied territories can be kept by force. The need for another, a realistic approach to the problems of war and peace in the Middle East, of which the Soviet Union has always spoken, cannot be deferred.

The overwhelming majority of the States of the world have very definitely shown, in one form or another, that they will not tolerate the perpetuation of a source of tension in the Middle East. Not to take this into account would be to go against the expressed will of the peoples.

Also conducive to a lasting settlement of the situation in the Middle East are the positive movements towards détente in the world as a whole that have been achieved in recent years. In many parts of the world a number of important international problems have been solved, including some which had seemed unapproachable. It is sufficient to recall the termination of the war in Viet-Nam, the settlement of acute and important post-war problems in Europe, and the important turn towards normalization and the improvement of relations among States with different social structures on the basis of peaceful co-existence through the conclusion of international treaties and agreements.

A real indicator of the positive changes that have taken place in the Middle East, too, was the initiative taken by the Soviet Union and the United States, which found its expression in the well-known decisions of the United Nations Security Council. In the light of all this, the continuing Middle East conflict, even though the military activities have stopped; seems an inadmissible anomaly.

We do not wish to say again whose responsibility it is. We know whose it is and we believe we are not the only ones who do. Now that the question of a

PCME/PV.1
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settlement is no longer deadlocked, something else is more important: to determine
what must be done in order to establish such a peace in the Middle East as would
be lasting and just to all States and peoples in the area.

In the first place, it is the Soviet Union's firm conviction that a fundamental
principle of international life must be unswervingly applied - the principle of the
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by means of war.

That is the key to the whole problem. If the participants in the conference
really wish to rid the Middle East area of the threat of new conflicts, it is
necessary to remove the initial cause of the crisis - the occupation of Arab
territories which has been continuing now for more than six years. These
territories must be returned in full to their lawful owners. It is our conviction
that, so long as Israeli forces are in these territories, there will be no peace in
the Middle East.

Any document adopted by this conference must contain precise and clear
obligations concerning the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories occupied
in 1967.

Without the achievement of an agreement by the parties on this question of
principle, we do not see how it would be possible to ensure a settlement which
would satisfy the interests of the Arab States and Israel, and the interests of
international security. On the other hand, if agreement was reached on this
basis, the solution of many other aspects of the settlement would undoubtedly be
greatly simplified.

At the same time it is necessary to ensure respect for and recognition of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all the States of
the Middle East, and of their right to live in peace. This also refers to Israel.
Our position is clear and consistent from start to finish - peace and security for
all the peoples of the area. This implies, of course, that justice will be ensured
as regards the Arab people of Palestine. Their legitimate rights must be protected.
It goes without saying that the Palestinian problem cannot be considered and decided
without the participation of representatives of the Arab people of Palestine.

PCME/PV.1

It is, of course, one thing to recognize resolutions in the world, but another to carry them out in deeds. If this had been done, the problem of a Middle East settlement would long since have been removed from the agenda. However, even as I speak, the smell of gunpowder and burning still hangs over Sinai and the Golan Heights and the pain of bloody wounds still wrings the hearts of thousands of Arabs as well as of Israelis.

The practical task of this Conference is to work out a concrete, realistic programme for implementing the above-mentioned Security Council resolution in all its parts. Such action is also required by the decisions which were taken by the Security Council during the recent military operations and in which a cease fire in the Middle East was linked with the start of immediate negotiations with a view to a sound solution of the Middle East problem.

As we see it, the agreements on such a settlement that are reached between the parties concerned will be embodied in the appropriate documents at the Conference. It is important that these should be substantial documents and should be binding on all the parties that subscribe to them. In other words, they must have the force of law.

In this way a firm foundation would be laid for peaceful co-existence and good-neighbourly relations between all States and peoples of the Middle East.

Obligations assumed by the parties under international law would be the best guarantee of their mutual security, which can be ensured only through trust and co-operation between States, through strict fulfilment of the treaties and agreements they have concluded, and not through seizure of the territories of others.

If it proves necessary to lend additional weight to such agreements, the Soviet Union, taking into account the wishes of the interested parties, is ready, together with appropriate other Powers, to assume the responsibilities involved. The Security Council of the United Nations can also make an important contribution in this connexion. What is vital is that the political settlement in the Middle East should be a truly solid one.

Other measures to achieve the same effect are also possible. I have in mind, in particular, the question of establishing demilitarized zones in certain sectors on a basis of reciprocity and the temporary deployment of international personnel in particular areas. All these matters would, of course, have to be the subject of separate negotiations and, what is most important, would have to be settled on terms which are mutually acceptable to the parties concerned.

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One can only imagine the extent to which the entire international atmosphere would become more healthy and progress would be made towards the relaxation of tension as a result of the elimination of the Middle East conflict. This would have a most beneficial effect on the situation throughout the whole Mediterranean basin, in Europe, Asia and indeed throughout the whole world.

The peoples of the Middle East and indeed of the whole world expect practical measures aimed at ensuring a stable peaceful settlement in this area. The Soviet Union will do everything in its power to ensure that the work of the Conference proceeds in this direction and that it is businesslike and constructive.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL of the UNITED NATIONS: I thank the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States of America, Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger.

Mr. KISSINGER (United States of America): Mr. Secretary General, distinguished Foreign Ministers, delegates.

Mr. Secretary-General, as one of the Co-Chairmen of this Conference, let me express my gratitude to the United Nations and to you personally for providing such excellent facilities for the Conference, for convening it, and for doing us all the honour of presiding at this historic moment.

All of us must have the wisdom to grasp this moment - to break the shackles of the past, and to create at last a new hope for the future.

Two months ago what we now refer to as the fourth Arab-Israeli war was coming to an end. Today, there is the respite of an imperfect cease fire, but the shadow of war still hangs over the Middle East. Either we begin today the process of correcting the conditions which produced that conflict, or we doom untold tens of thousands to travail, sorrow and further inconclusive bloodshed.

When the history of our era is written, it will speak not of a series of Arab-Israeli wars, but of one war broken by periods of uneasy armistices and temporary cease fires. That war has already lasted twenty-five years. Whether future histories will call this the era of the twenty-five year Arab-Israeli war, or the thirty year war, or the fifty year war, rests in large measure in our hands. And above all, it rests in the hands of the Israeli and Arab Governments, not only those whose distinguished representatives are seated around this table, but also those who are absent and who we all hope will join us soon.

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We are challenged by emotions so deeply felt - by causes so passionately believed and pursued - that the tragic march from cataclysm to cataclysm, each more costly and indecisive than the last, sometimes seems pre-ordained. Yet our presence here today - in itself a momentous accomplishment - is a symbol of rejection of this fatalistic view. Respect for the forces of history does not mean blind submission to those forces.

From two recent trips through the Middle East I have the impression that people on both sides have had enough of bloodshed. No further proof of heroism is necessary; no military point remains to be made. The Middle East - so often the source of mankind's inspiration - is challenged to another act of hope and reconciliation - significant not only for its own peoples but for all mankind.

What does each side seek? Both answer with a single word: peace. But peace has of course a concrete meaning for each. One side seeks the recovery of sovereignty and the redress of grievances suffered by a displaced people. The other seeks security and recognition of its legitimacy as a nation. The common goal of peace must be broad enough to embrace all these aspirations.

We cannot promise success, but we can promise dedication. We cannot guarantee a smooth journey towards our goal, but we can assure you of an unswerving quest for justice.

President Nixon has sent me here because for five years he has endeavoured to build a new structure of international peace in which ties with old friends are strengthened, and new and constructive relationships replace distrust and confrontation with adversaries.

It is time to end this turmoil.

(lc)

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A peace agreement must include these elements among others: withdrawals, recognized frontiers, security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, guarantees, a settlement of the legitimate interests of the Palestinians and a recognition that Jerusalem contains places considered holy by three great religions.

As we open this Conference we take a momentous step. We are challenging a history of missed opportunities, of mutual fear and bottomless distrust. Our backdrop is a war that has brought anguish and pain, a war that has been costly to both sides, that has brought neither victory nor defeat, that reflected the failure of all our past efforts at peaceful solutions.

Mr. Secretary-General, fellow delegates, President Nixon has sent me here with the purpose of affirming America's commitment to a just and lasting peace.

The problems of the Middle East today have such a character. There is justice on all sides, but there is a greater justice still in finding a truth which merges all aspirations in the realization of a common humanity. It was a Jewish sage, who speaking for all mankind, expressed this problem well: "If I am not for myself, who is for me, but if I am for myself alone, who am I?"

PCME/PV.1

page 15

Fellow delegates, in the months ahead we will examine many problems. We will discuss many expedients. We will know success - and I dare say we shall experience deadlock and perhaps occasionally despair.

We can exhaust ourselves in manoeuvres or we can remember that this is the first real chance for peace the Middle East has had in three decades.

So we in the American delegation are here to spare no effort in the quest of a lasting peace in the Middle East, a task which is as worthy as it may be agonizing. If I may quote the words of a poet: "Pain that cannot forget falls drop by drop upon the heart until in our despair there comes wisdom through the awful grace of God."

**The SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS:** I thank the distinguished Secretary of State of the United States.

I have been informed that the distinguished representative of Egypt wishes to speak now. If so, I give the floor to the distinguished Foreign Minister of Egypt, Mr. Ismail Fahmy.

**Mr. FAHMY (Egypt):** Mr. Secretary-General, we are meeting today under the auspices of the United Nations and we are indeed pleased to meet under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Your presence symbolizes the interest of the Organization in the question of the Middle East, which has been the concern of the United Nations since its inception. We would wish to thank you and all your colleagues, and we are sure that the United Nations will follow with keen interest our deliberations. I would appreciate it, if and when our work departs - and heaven forbid that it should - from the principles enshrined in the Charter, if you and the United Nations would fulfil your duty and put us back on the path prescribed by the Charter.

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(c)

Gentlemen, throughout history countries and nations have shown a stubborn
resistance when faced with wrongs perpetrated against them. Legitimate grievances
never fail to generate increasing resolve to do away with injustice. We in Egypt
have had to face along the centuries many kinds of wrongs inflicted upon us. Each
time we have resisted and suppressed them and have emerged in the end triumphant.
No sacrifices were too great and no sufferings unbearable when nations pursuing such
a noble cause worked with determination for justice and genuine peace. Such are the
teachings of history. This we must remember when all of us look ahead and delve
into the future.

When applying these lessons to the Middle East, one hardly needs to point out
the tragic events that have taken place since the Palestinians were denied their
national rights over their country and driven by force from their own land, a land
to which they and we eternally belong. This area has **since then** continuously
suffered from the militaristic and expansionist policy of Israel and from its
unrelenting efforts to conquer and annex ever more territory, thus seriously
endangering the independence, and infringing upon the territorial integrity, of the
countries in the area.

The conflict in the Middle East is not and never has been a struggle that arose
because its peoples hold different beliefs. For centuries these peoples, irrespective
of their creed or religion, lived peacefully side by side. They could have continued
living in peace, enjoying the immense opportunities which God and nature have
bestowed on this good earth, had it not been for the wedge that was driven by force
and in the alleged name of religion into their midst for the sake of domination,
exploitation and racist practices. I do not wish, however, to dwell on this
well-known matter, but merely want to say that only when warlike acts and aggression
cease to be the maxim of Israel, which is trying to convince the world that its
very existence can be built on military rashness and supremacy, only then can a just
peace at last be envisaged for the region.

As a result of the events which took place on the 6 October, the Israelis must,
we hope, have decided to relinquish this maxim and to change their course towards
real peace, durable peace and just peace. So far as Egypt is concerned, my presence
here symbolizes our deep desire to restore to our ravaged and embattled region
a durable and just peace. This Conference is an historic event on which all the

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(iv) the infringement of the sovereignty of States and the violation of their territorial integrity;

(v) the denial of the inalienable rights of the Palestinians to self-determination and to live in peace.

As for us, Mr. Secretary-General, we are sincerely and hopefully looking forward to achieving a durable and just peace. To our minds, nothing less should emerge from this historic gathering; otherwise we would produce a most unusual document which public opinion in our countries and in the world at large would never accept, but rather oppose and reject. Such a peace would be as vulnerable and fragile as the present cease fire and as shaky and dangerous as were the conditions which, for the last 25 years or so, have persisted in the Middle East as a result of the failure to implement the many relevant resolutions adopted by the different organs of the United Nations.

Mr. Chairman, my presence here is a true and faithful continuation and implementation of the policies and the strategy laid down by President Sadat. In fact, as you may recall, he proposed on 14 February 1971 a programme for achieving peace based on the full implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Again, on 16 October of this year, he proposed that a peace conference be convened at the United Nations: such a conference was to lay down the modalities and establish the guarantees for building peace in the area based on respect for the legitimate rights of the peoples living therein.

Egypt's determination to work for peace equals its resolve to see that, in one way or another, its land; the Arab lands and those of our neighbours are liberated, and that the Palestinians enjoy their legitimate right to live in peace and dignity. This, in fact, represents what Egypt has been endeavouring to achieve since 5 June 1967, and up to 6 October 1973. Indeed, Egypt worked unremittingly for peace. These efforts were recognized and welcomed by all the countries of the world, whether in Africa, Asia or Europe, by the Soviet Union and even by the United States. My President, and with him the Egyptian people, are on record as declaring that they have done their best to attain a durable and just peace by peaceful means. Alas, all these efforts were met by a persistent cry and determination to retain Arab territories unlawfully and by the use of force. Then the hour of 6 October 1973 struck, as a result of which we hope that the Israeli Government has now realized that Israeli security does not lie in retaining geographical trophies or in achieving military supremacy, but that it would best be safeguarded if it undertakes to live in

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peace with its neighbours. We hope, furthermore, that Israel now also understands that Egypt and, for that matter, all the Arab countries cannot be conquered by force or allow their lands to remain occupied. Nor will the Arab world accept the continued inhumane treatment of the Palestinians or agree that Jerusalem, the city of peace, should remain under the banner of the conqueror. Territories are the heritage most jealously guarded and defended by a people. They are handed from generation to generation. They are part of its history and prompt a profound sense of pride and thus of nationhood. Loss of territory deeply affects them and provokes a strong resolve to regain by all possible means what is theirs by right. Peoples do not bargain or barter over their territories, and the Arab nation is no exception. To expect the Arabs to give up part of their lands is tragically to misread their determination to the contrary. To insist that this be done would wreck all hopes for this Peace Conference to achieve what it has set out to do.

For all of us, coming to this Conference is a major step on the road to peace. We realize that this Conference would never have materialized if it were not for the multiple efforts of all countries of the world and their resolve to see to it that peace is at last restored to the region. Egypt is attending this Conference with the full determination to do its best in a businesslike manner to achieve a just and lasting peace. In doing so, however, we will never overlook the following basic essentials for peace in our area:

(1) the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967;

(2) the liberation of the Arab city of Jerusalem and non-acceptance of any situation which may be injurious to the complete Arab sovereignty over the holy city;

(3) the exercise by the Palestinians of the right to self-determination and to live in peace and dignity;

(4) the right of every State in the area to enjoy territorial inviolability and political independence;

(5) that there be international guarantees by the major Powers or the United Nations or both, as an added safeguard to international peace and security in the area.

These essentials for peace are in conformity with and fully reflect the decisions taken at the recent Arab summit in Algiers. Egypt, for its part, is fully prepared to honour all its other obligations emanating from Security Council resolution 242(1967) both in letter and in spirit.

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Second, international boundaries of the States of the area must be recognized and respected, as well as the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of these States.

Third, wherever there are no international boundaries between an Arab State and Israel, such boundaries are to be established by agreement and on the basis of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.

Fourth, the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force, must be pledged and guaranteed.

Fifth, the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine must be fulfilled in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations, and the Palestinian refugees must exercise their right of repatriation and/or compensation in accordance with law and justice.

Sixth, Arab Jerusalem is an inseparable part of Arab occupied territory. Therefore, Israel is to relinquish its authority over it. Arab sovereignty must be restored in the Arab sector of the city. The Holy Places of all the three divine religions must be preserved, protected and respected, and free access for all the followers of these three religions must be secured and maintained.

Mr. Chairman, when Israel was established by the United Nations in 1947 and was admitted to the membership of the United Nations in 1948, it made a declaration that it "unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day it becomes a Member of the United Nations".

With such an undertaking, Mr. Chairman, Israel failed to honour its first obligation of membership under the Charter of the United Nations, which stipulates that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State".

For the last six and a half years, Israel has been violating the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of three Arab States, namely Egypt, Jordan and Syria, and has, for the last twenty-five years, been violating the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

Today, we come, as directly involved parties and most concerned with the problem, to try to arrive at a settlement through peace.

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**Mr. EBAN (Israel):** If there is a chance of addressing the Conference this afternoon I would like to study the addresses that have been made and to speak at the next session. If it could be this afternoon I would prefer it, but I leave that, Sir, to the Chair.

**The SECRETARY-GENERAL of the UNITED NATIONS:** Is there any objection to having a meeting this afternoon? Originally I had intended to hold the next meeting tomorrow morning at 10.30 and to leave the afternoon free for private consultations, but of course I am in the hands of the Conference, of the distinguished members of this Conference, and therefore I wish to consult you as to whether you prefer a meeting tomorrow morning or this afternoon. May I ask the distinguished representative of Israel whether he would agree to speak tomorrow morning?

**Mr. EBAN (Israel):** If there is no reason for not having a meeting this afternoon, Mr. Chairman, I would like to address the Conference this afternoon. But I would at any rate like to address it at the next meeting.

**The SECRETARY-GENERAL of the UNITED NATIONS:** Do the delegates agree to hold a meeting this afternoon? I see no objection. I assume therefore that you agree to hold our next meeting this afternoon at, may I suggest, 3.30? I take it then that we agree to hold the next meeting this afternoon at 3.30. It is so decided. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

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These are acts of Governments - responsible people, if they are responsible at all - but he thinks that we don't know. We know, but he thinks that the other people do not know. Everybody around this table, everybody outside this table know the facts, and I hope that for the future if he would like to work in a serious way he should not use this rostrum for propaganda. He spoke about Syria. He spoke about Syria because Syria is absent. I am ready to keep you here for three hours and tell you how the Israelis act and react, what kind of atrocities they do, what their armies are doing either on the cease-fire or around the cease-fire or during the battle itself. Even Mr. Eban cannot deny that his planes dropped booby-traps on villages in my country - to kill what? Farmers and children. And now he speaks about security. What kind of security? Security through agreement. What does he mean? He means annexed territories. He means by "agreement" that the Arab countries must agree to what? To give him Arab land for the sake of his security. And he forgot - I doubt it, that he forgot - that in 1947 it was the Zionists who engaged with Palestine: 1956 he remembers, and I think he participated in that collusion against my country. In 1967 they invaded my country and all the Arab countries. And he speaks about 1973, the sixth of October. He admitted in his statement that now - and this is the lesson he should learn - that now, after 1973, he knows very well that not only the Israelis can use weapons, modern and sophisticated weapons. He is trying here to present himself as the lamp of the whole world - the most peaceful legend in history.

He referred to the Algiers decision of the Arab Summit, and he is very angry that we did not mention the name of Israel. We will mention the name of Israel when Israel behaves, when Israel would like to live in peace in this country, not to annex territory under any pretext whatsoever, not to try to confuse and mislead people under this fallacy of so-called security. Security of whom, Mr. Eban? You threaten the security of all the Arab countries as long as you are using these militaristic maxims of yours. But in his speech today, while he was pleading for peace, he never uttered once the words "withdrawal from Arab territories" - not a single time - and this is how he would like to plead for peace here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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The SECRETARY-GENERAL of the UNITED NATIONS: I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt. Does any other delegation wish to speak? Apparently this is not the case. May I then propose that we adjourn this meeting and that we hold a closed meeting tomorrow morning at 11 o'clock? The purpose of that meeting would be to discuss the organization of the future work of this Conference.

I call on the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union

Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Tomorrow we shall have to discuss the question you have raised, but if anybody has any considerations to put forward on the substance of the problem, then of course he will be free to express those considerations as well at tomorrow's meeting. I take it that this stands to reason.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL of the UNITED NATIONS: I think that there is certainly no objection to this interpretation; I think the Conference agrees that, if any delegation wants to discuss substance, it is accepted. Are there any other comments? If not, I adjourn this meeting until tomorrow at 11 a.m.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

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NEWS
RELEASE

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Department of State
Office of Media Services

Press Conference

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S
1973 YEAR-END REVIEW

December 27, 1973

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Press conference by Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger, December 27, 1973,
in the International Conference Room
of the Department of State, Washington, D.C.

SECRETARY KISSINGER Ladies and Gentlemen, I thought the way to give this conference some focus is for me to make a brief summary of the highlights of this year's foreign policy as we see it and some attempt of projecting it into the future.

First, let me begin with the event that started the year which was, of course, the peace in Viet-Nam, and then let me go from there to the general design of the foreign policy and how the various pieces -- how we attempted to fit the various pieces together.

The year began with ending the most divisive, the most difficult, the most agonizing war in American history, certainly the most divisive and agonizing foreign war in American history.

Throughout the four years of President Nixon's first term, the basic debate had been on the terms by which the war should be ended. And the fundamental condition that the United States had set was that we should not end the war by overthrowing the government with which we had been allied, but that we were prepared to withdraw our forces and to leave the evolution of events in Indochina to the Indochinese.

At the beginning of January, last year, we achieved a settlement which permitted the disengagement of American forces, which left the political resolution of the political future of Viet-Nam to be decided by negotiation among the Vietnamese parties, and which returned the American prisoners. It did not settle all the issues that had produced the conflict in the first place, a war that was partly a foreign invasion from the outside and partly civil war; an area that had been rent by conflict for thirty years could not possibly go from war to peace immediately or painlessly or perhaps at all.

We had defined the American role as permitting an evolution that left the destiny of the area in the hands of the people concerned. We had hoped -- if you remember the speech of the President and my press conference -- we had hoped that the end of the war in Viet-Nam would permit also the beginning of an era of national reconciliation in this country. And much of

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the agony of the previous years had been assumed to be overcome by the fact
that both those who had opposed the manner of conducting the war and those
who had wanted to bring it to a conclusion along the lines that was achieved,
could agree now that there was a need to turn to more positive tasks.

For a variety of reasons, other issues arose that did not make this
entirely possible. But the war in Viet-Nam is no longer -- and the war in
Indochina -- is no longer a divisive national issue, and as far as the Admini-
stration is concerned, it will, as I have pointed out in my last press conference,
heed the expressions of the Congress and stay true to the principles that it
has consistently pursued.

In any event, with the war in Viet-Nam ended, the major focus of our
foreign policy attention could turn to the design of the structure of peace
that has been the President's principal goal since he came into office.

In its first phase, this meant that the United States had to reduce many
of its over-extended commitments, and that the United States had to disengage
gradually from any foreign involvement, and above all that the United States
should evoke a sense of responsibility for their own sake in many areas of
the world. This was the so-called "Nixon Doctrine" which characterized the
first two or three years of the President's first term.

It was the prelude to the initiatives towards China and the detente with
the Soviet Union that was to lay the basis for a fundamental re-alignment of
the post-war period which had been based on a rigid division between opposing
hostile blocs.

So, by the time the second term of the President started, we faced an
international situation in which the basic assumptions of the immediate post-
war period had been substantially altered. The rigid hostility between the
communist world and the non-communist world had been altered first by the
divisions within the communist world itself and by the amelioration of
relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as the
People's Republic of China and the United States.

Europe and Japan had gained strength and political self-confidence. The
economic system that had been created in the immediate post-war period had
become fluid and was in need of redesigning. So the great task before this
administration, as it will be before its successors, has been to construct
an international system based on a sense of justice so that its participants
would have a stake in maintaining it; with a sufficient balance of power so
that no nation or group of nations would be dependent entirely on the good
will of its neighbors, and based on a sense of participation so that all
nations could share in the positive aspirations.

This has been the basic architectural design that cannot possibly be
completed in any one administration, and the work which must continue in
future administrations. And when we speak of institutionalizing foreign
policy, we do not mean that designated committees would carry out specific
taks, but that the basic goals of the long term are accepted by a sufficient
consensus in America so that the future security of this country does not
depend entirely on the vagaries of the political process.

Now, let me be more specific, and let me talk in various categories.
Let me begin first with East-West relations. Our policy towards both the
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China has been characterized as a
policy of detente. And it is the characteristic of policies that become more
or less accepted, that its benefits are taken for granted, and that some of
the difficulties that were overlooked in the beginning become more and more
apparent.

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Let me explain what we understand by detente. We do not say that detente is based on the compatibility of domestic systems. We recognize that the values and ideology of both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are opposed and sometimes hostile to ours. We do not say that there are no conflicting national interests. We do say that there is a fundamental change in the international environment compared to any other previous period, a change which was expressed by President Eisenhower more than 20 years ago when he said "There is no longer any alternative to peace." Under conditions of nuclear plenty, the decision to engage in general war involves consequences of such magnitude that no responsible statesman can base his policy on the constant threat of such a holocaust, and every leader with a responsibility for these weapons must set himself the task of bringing about conditions which reduces the possibility of such a war to a minimum and, indeed, over any extended period of time reduce this possibility to zero.

So, we do not say that we approve of the domestic evolution of the Soviet Union, or of other communist countries, with which we are attempting to coexist. Nor do we accept that detente can be used for military expansion or for threatening weaker countries, or for undermining our traditional friendships. But we do make a conscious effort to set up rules of conduct and to establish a certain interconnection of interests, and above all to establish communications between the top leaders and between officials at every level, that makes it possible in times of crisis to reduce the danger of accident or miscalculation.

This has been our policy with the Soviet Union and it is the policy we have pursued as well with the People's Republic of China.

With respect to the Soviet Union, it has led us into a series of negotiations on the limitations of strategic arms, on mutual and balanced force reductions on European security, on such measures as the Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War -- into extended exchanges between the President and General Secretary Brezhnev designed to lay the basis for a more civil discourse.

This does not preclude that this relationship can break down.

Ideology, long established relations, as well as the internal logic of certain areas, such as the Middle East, can produce tensions, and indeed, can produce explosions, that whether or not they are fostered by the two superpowers, may bring them into conflict with each other.

Nor is it foreordained that the behavior of the two protagonists necessarily lives up to the principles that they declare. In those cases, as happened at one phase during the Middle East crisis, the United States will maintain its commitments and will defend its international position and the position of its friends.

But we will not be easily deflected from the course of seeking a relaxation of tension -- a course which proved itself even in tension periods, and a course which modern technology will impose on any administration even if we should be prevented from carrying out all the measures by different opinions about what should be the purpose of detente -- such as the degree to which we should attempt to use our foreign policy to affect the domestic structure of other countries.

With respect to the People's Republic of China, we have established liason offices in each other's capitals that are performing many of the functions that are normally carried out by embassies. We have had two visits by myself to Peking, and also a substantial expansion of economic and other exchanges.

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So we believe that with respect to the two great communist countries, we are on a course which is in the interests of all of mankind and which is essential for the long term prospects of peace.

In our relations with our friends in Europe, the year has been disappointing. It had been our intention, in what we called perhaps too rashly "the Year of Europe," to affirm that the important measures in foreign policy were not confined to relations with adversaries but that traditional friends could also seize the opportunities of the future. We intended in our various initiatives to lay to rest concerns about the possibilities of a condominium between the United States and, particularly, the Soviet Union. We attempted to emphasize that the very successes of the Atlantic Alliance had created a new situation which required a new act of vision, and we invited Europe and Japan to participate with us in this task of construction.

Now there have been many debates about whether the tactics by which this objective was pursued were always ideal and there were many comments about this or that initiative. And obviously, any senior official pursuing the policies of his government, will always be convinced that the measures his administration took are correct, because otherwise he would not have taken them. But I do not believe that this is the key problem. There is one principal problem in our relations with, especially, Europe at this moment, that only the Europeans can answer. --all the other criticisms can be relatively easily taken care of -- and that question is: What is to be the shape of the emerging unified Europe? Is this Europe to be organized on a basis which seeks its identity in exclusivity to our position -- or at least in distance from the United States? Or is it prepared, while affirming its identity, to recognize that the opportunities of the future require Atlantic cooperation?

As far as the United States is concerned, we have given our answer. All of our proposals, however they were advanced, from the proposal of the Atlantic Charter to the proposal of the common approach to energy, had one fundamental goal: To create a dialogue between ourselves and the Europeans in terms of the challenges that lay ahead of us and in terms of the common problems that needed to be solved.

That offer is still open. We believe that some progress was made in our recent talks in Europe and we will continue both the work on the declarations with the European Community and with our NATO partners, as well as the work on the Energy Action Group.

But the United States is not concerned with developing some legal formula or with a document that responds to a single initiative. The problem before us is whether the nations of the Atlantic area, as well as Japan, faced with self-evident problems that affect them all can develop a common approach or whether they will consume themselves in the sort of rivalry that has destroyed other civilizations. I will have a word to say about that when I discuss the energy problem.

As far as Japan is concerned, we believed that we were well underway to developing a new and mature partnership when the energy crisis diverted energies, diverted concerns, and when it created many temporary obstacles. But we believe that Japan should be an integral part of the relationship we are also attempting to develop with Europe, and that Japan's importance and its growing strength and its political maturity entitle it to full consideration as an equal partner of the United States.

The most dramatic event of the year, of course, was the crisis in the Middle East. It is -- it came upon us unexpectedly. We were not warned by any foreign government that there were any specific plans for an attack. The only warnings we received were general descriptions that the Middle East conflict -- or that the tensions in the Middle East might not be contained. And I have already described the kind of intelligence information that was available and which illustrated that facts are not self-explanatory, that one's preconceptions determine very importantly what interpretation is given to these facts.

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5

The war in the Middle East faced the United States with a number of profound issues.

There was the commitment the United States has had through all post war administrations to the security of Israel. It was our concern that another superpower not exploit the tensions in the area for its own advantage. There was our interest in maintaining a balanced relationship with the Arab countries. And there came to be, increasingly, the problem of the energy crisis.

Our policy had to go through several phases.

The first, during the military phase, was to bring -- to contribute to a situation in which the post war evolution would not be determined by military success primarily, especially by military success growing out of a surprise attack and achieved with Soviet arms.

And secondly, to conduct ourselves in such a manner that in the diplomacy that would follow the war, we would be able to talk to all of the parties involved -- Arab as well as Israeli.

And thirdly, we had to conduct ourselves in such a way that the Middle East would not play the role of the Balkans in 1914, in which local rivalries produced a catastrophe from which Europe never recovered, and in which under contemporary conditions, if a general war occurred the world would never recover.

The result of these efforts was first, the ceasefire of October 22nd;

Then, the Six Point Agreement that was signed in early November.

And the Geneva Peace Conference which started last week.

We are at the very beginning of what will be a slow and agonizing effort to reconcile objectives that in many respects seem contradictory. But as I have said repeatedly, and as the President has emphasized -- the United States is committed to making a major effort to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, that recognizes the security of all the countries in the Middle East -- as well as the legitimate aspirations of all of the peoples in the area.

We believe that the conference is well launched and we hope that some progress can be made in the disengagement talks that are now going on between Egypt and Israel-- and that could go on between Israel and the other Arab countries.

The Middle East -- the war in the Middle East also brought to a head the energy crisis on a global basis. It brought it to a head, but it did not cause it.

The basic cause of the energy crisis is that demand for energy has been growing exponentially while the incentives for supply have not kept pace -- and in these conditions, sooner or later, the energy-consuming countries would have come up against the situation where their demand far outstripped the possibilities of supply.

And therefore, it is the United States' view that the long term problem in the field of energy makes it essential that a world-wide cooperative effort between consumers and between consumers and producers, be started so that we can deal with the challenges on a long term basis and not have to improvise responses with every year.

In this respect, the energy crisis may be only a forerunner of similar difficulties in other areas -- and this is why the United States supported the World Food Conference that has now been called for 1974.

These are some of the highlights of last year, and if one is to look ahead, one can see that the major task of building this international system remains to be done.

In East-West relations, in negotiations with the Soviet Union, we have before us the problem of SALT and as I have pointed out repeatedly, no task is more urgent than to master the rapid technological change in which weapons may outstrip the capacity of political control.

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And therefore, the United States will make a determined effort to fulfill the promise that President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev made to each other, to try to have an agreement on SALT in 1974. It is a difficult assignment, because the first SALT agreement dealt with quantitative change; the present negotiations deal with the problem of qualitative change, which is both technically and conceptually much more difficult.

And we will continue to pursue the negotiations on mutual force reductions and European security.

In relations with the People's Republic of China, we will continue the policy of normalization that was started and seek to accelerate it.

Our relations with Europe -- the offer that we made in April and December, still remain on the table, and we are prepared to discuss with our European allies those aspects of our consultative processes that they find difficult. We believe that the problem of fears of condominium cannot be settled by abstract declarations, but only by a confident cooperation in trying to devise a future that we can all believe in.

In the Middle East, we will strive for peace -- based on justice and accepted by all of the parties. And we hope that the peace that has been so painfully achieved in Indochina, can be preserved.

These are the major tasks that we have set ourselves together with an initiative toward Latin America which will culminate in a Foreign Ministers Meeting at the end of February in Mexico City, in which the Latin American Foreign Ministers have responded to an initiative by the United States last October, that we should define, together, a new Western Hemisphere relationship.

But I would like to stress again, that the basic conviction of the Administration is that the task that we have set ourselves cannot be completed in one administration, or in one decade, because the international system that has grown up over many decades is fundamentally altered, and the new international system will take many years to construct -- but its ultimate objective must be to contribute to the peace and to the well being of all mankind.

Now I'll be glad to answer your questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, early on in your lecture you said that the great task before this Administration is to create an international situation based on a structure so that its participants will have a stake in maintaining it, which is, I suppose, about the same as the late Secretary Dulles used to say when he said the Russians will keep any agreements that is to their benefit to keep.

With that background of continuity in mind, I would like to ask you whether you can tell us at all what stake the Soviet Union has in maintaining the agreements that you have made so far in the Middle East, and if so, where their position is now. I am thinking of the various meetings that you have had with Mr. Dobrynin and others.

A There are two schools of thought about Soviet objectives in the Middle East. One school of thought is that the Soviet Union has an interest in maintaining the tension because that will guarantee permanent Arab hostility to the United States, and enhances the possibilities of Soviet influence. The other school of thought is that while this may have started out to be the Soviet policy in the 1950's, there have been since then three wars which have consumed a great deal of Soviet resources and whose outcome has been inconclusive. It has been demonstrated that the conflict in the Middle East can bring the superpowers into positions of potential confrontation. And it is therefore at least possible that the Soviet Union now has an interest in contributing to the stabilization of the situation in an area which neither superpower can really control by itself.

As far as the United States is concerned, we will deal with the Soviet Union as long as its actions are consistent with the second interpretation. That is to say, if the Soviet Union makes a responsible contribution to peace in the Middle East, we will be prepared to cooperate -- not at the expense of our traditional

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friends nor by imposing a settlement made together with the Soviet Union. We are in direct contact with all of the parties in the Middle East. But we are prepared to deal with the Soviet Union on an equitable basis as long as its motives, or as long as its actions are consistent with a responsible course.

At Geneva, the Soviet Union contributed to a positive atmosphere. As you know, Foreign Minister Gromyko met with Foreign Minister Eban.

The Soviet Union cooperated also in focusing the discussions on the first issue of disengagement which seemed more manageable than some of the more difficult ones that will come along further down the road.

So as of now, judging the Soviet Union by its actions, we are willing to cooperate. Should Soviet behavior change, we can always re-examine our policy.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the institutionalizing of foreign policy again today. Perhaps you can comment on that in light of increasing published stories that you have displayed an increasing penchant for secrecy and instead of institutionalizing it, you have been personalizing it and making it entirely dependent on your own role.

A Of course the final judgment on foreign policy is the substance and not the procedure. The institutionalization of foreign policy is in my view the development of a set of principles of foreign policy, and of a sufficient support among those who have to carry it out, so that continuity within the limits of the changes of the political process is assured.

Now, I have read many of these stories. And of course I do not propose to engage in a public debate with the various sources of these stories.

I believe that I am working closely with the appropriate Assistant Secretaries who are responsible for the areas with which we are dealing, and I believe that anyone who has a real knowledge of how policy is being made in the State Department today knows that there is a close sense of participation by all of those who have responsibility for regional areas or for those functional areas that can most contribute to policy. How this filters down below the Assistant Secretary level is primarily the responsibility of the Assistant Secretaries. But I believe that after a period of six to nine months, it will be quite obvious what has been done.

Q Mr. Secretary, now that the Arab states have lifted their oil embargo against Europe and Japan and have restored some of the production cutbacks, when do you expect them to start supplying the United States with oil again?

A I don't want to speculate on when the Arab countries will restore -- will lift the boycott against the United States. As I have pointed out at several previous press conferences, the United States could understand certain actions by Arab countries at a time when the United States seemed to be -- was supplying military equipment to one of the sides in a war. Now that the United States has publicly declared its commitment to bring about a just settlement, now that much of the progress that has been made towards a settlement can be traced to American actions, discriminatory measures against the United States become increasingly difficult to understand.

Q Mr. Secretary, how much knowledge did you have, either before you left Washington or after you left Saudi Arabia, that the Arab nations were about to make a change in their oil export policy to take Europe and Japan off the hook?

A Well, I had no knowledge of this before I left Washington. And I had no precise knowledge of specific measures when I left Saudi Arabia, except that I knew that certain measures were under consideration.

Now, in analyzing the supply of oil, one has to consider that there are two problems involved. One is the problem of the embargo; the second is the problem of production. Lifting the embargo without increasing the production does not help a great deal, because it means that more nations would compete for an inadequate supply. So both of these measures have to go hand in hand. And on the whole we consider it a positive step that production has been increased.

Q Mr. Secretary, you seem to be expressing an increasing sense of irritation with the fact that Saudi Arabia, principally, has not lifted the oil embargo against the United States, though it has taken these other actions towards Europe and Japan. Was there some action that you expected to happen by now from the Saudi Arabians that did not? Do you link a possible action to the disengagement talks in Geneva?

[Lc]

-11-

A My understanding is that there is a plan to extradite these terrorists to the so-called Palestinian Liberation Organization, which has promised to punish them severely.

Now, our interest is that this terrorism be ended; and the United States has made
strong representation to that effect.

With respect to other measures, they will have to await the actions of the Kuwaiti
Government on other fronts; but we have not yet seen any reason to terminate them.

Q Well, in connection with his promise to punish them severely, I seem to recall your predecessor -- Secretary Rogers -- asked for the death penalty of those Palestinians that murdered Ambassador Noel last March. I checked with your Sudan Desk this week and find that these terrorists have not even been brought to trial.

Now, in consideration of that, and reports that a group similar to this -- or
possibly the same group -- planned to assassinate you, what is the next Administration prepared
to do about this, other than regret it or plead for aviation security -- usually in vain?

A Well, the Administration has taken a very strong stand against any attacks on me --

(Laughter.)

-- but our position on terrorism is clear. We believe that it is a worldwide problem that must be stamped out. We will renew our efforts to achieve a multilateral agreement which puts teeth into the enforcement of anti-terrorist activity. But I do not want to comment on every individual action of every government concerned.

Q Mr. Secretary, the answer may be in your responses here; but the thing that I am still uncertain about is that you will recall, in that saloon in the basement of the National Hotel in Moscow, when you briefed us on the SALT Agreement, there was a certain amount of optimism about the future with respect to offensive nuclear weapons. I acknowledge it was qualified optimism.

Now, who is responsible for the fact that things have not gone quite as well as you thought at the time?

Now, if the premise of my question is wrong, why, the answer is inoperative -- I don't know.

(Laughter.)

A Well, I think one would have to look again at the transcript of that press conference in order to be able to determine what is meant by the phrase "It has not gone as well as one hoped."

The Agreement that was made in Moscow in 1972 was supposed to last for only five years. And it was to permit the negotiation of a more permanent agreement.

It was recognized at the time that the problem of the multiple warheads would soon come to the fore. If the strategic problem had remained what it was in 1972 -- that is to say, individual weapons with individual warheads -- the situation would have been essentially stabilized by that Agreement.

The new element in the equation is the rapid evolution of technology, coupled with improvements in accuracy that have -- even within the limits of that Agreement -- produced vulnerabilities, perhaps a year or two more rapidly than one expected at the time.

When I was a Professor, I used to study the issue of arms control. All of the theoretical thinking was concentrated on the problem of quantity -- how to get control of quantitative change. How to master technology really has no good theoretical base. When we started the first SALT negotiations, there was a vast literature on which one could draw for an understanding of the problem of numbers.

So if things have not gone as well -- which I wouldn't quite concede -- if we are now facing new problems, it is not because anyone has done anything wrong. It is simply because technology has been accelerating at a rate that threatens to outstrip the capacity to control it.