U.S. Insists on Hanoi
Pullback From South

Continued from First Page
Hanoi.

Confidence remains
high, nonetheless, that an
agreement will emerge.
The Administration has
received signals that Han-
oi will not break off talks,
the sources reiterated, this
reinforces the more gener-
al conviction that neither
Hanoi, by its curious Oct.
31 deadline for signing,
nor the Administration
through a possible misun-
derstanding with North
Vietnam, will allow any-
thing to scuttle the effort
now.

The settlement terms as
outlined call for a cease-
fire in place with total
U.S. withdrawal and re-
turn of American POWs in
60 days, followed by Viet-
namese-only negotiations
on the political future of
the south.

These details were pub-
lished first by Hanoi, then
by Washington, after Han-
oi had accused the United
States of failing to live up
to a promise to sign the
agreement by Oct. 31. Kis-
singer said that this might
be blamed on misunder-
standing.

Authoritative sources
said the crossed signals
came during a two-day pe-
riod a weekend ago, be-
tween late Oct. 20 and ear-
ly Oct. 22. Mr. Nixon on
Oct. 20 sent Hanoi a mes-
sage welcoming its accep-
tance to the U.S. position
on two significant issues,

U.S. sources said. Accord-
ing to Hanoi, Mr. Nixon
also agreed then to Oct. 31
for the settlement to be
signed in Paris.

But on Oct. 22, Mr. Nix-
on sent another message
to Hanoi raising the six or
seven issues still to be
worked out, which North
Vietnam saw as reneging
on the deal.

The precise reason for
these differing messages
could not be learned.
However, Kissinger was
still in Saigon during the
period. The presumption
must be that Thieu's ob-
jections to the settlement
were given to him be-
tween Oct. 20 and Oct. 22,
and were thus reflected in
the second but not the
first presidential dispatch.

It is quite possible, giv-
en, this chronology, that
Thieu gave Kissinger a go-
ahead Friday and changed
his mind Saturday.

The five outstanding
issues mentioned by Kis-
singer Thursday: the tim-
ing and staging of the
cease-fire in South Viet-
nam; the cease-fire in Laos
and Cambodia as related
to that in Vietnam; the in-
tended role of the post-
truce National Council of
Reconciliation; the clauses
in the 1954 Geneva accord
on Indochina to be cited in
this settlement; who will
sign the settlement.

Thieu is now insisting
that he sign, although Kis-
singer said Thursday that

ACTIVIST HAYDEN SAYS
HE WILL GO TO HANOI

Antiwar activist Tom Hayden said Monday he will be one of five to seven Americans to leave for North Vietnam Wednesday "to try to clear up lies laid on the American people" about the proposed cease-fire settlement.

He said the delegation will leave from New York City and that the other delegates from the peace movement will be announced at that time.

"If the United States signs the peace agreement today as demanded by North Vietnam, this delegation will be able to expedite the return of all prisoners of war by the new year," Hayden said at a press conference in San Diego.

the signators would be al-
most certainly not at the
presidential level. Author-
itative sources Monday
dismissed Thieu's demand
by saying that if he is un-
movable, he will be the
only head of government
present at the signing.

Kissinger's comments
Thursday, when he avoid-
ed mention of the future
of North Vietnamese
troops in the south, caused
the widespread presump-
tion that Hanoi's forces
could remain as the U.S.
Saigon concession.

But Hanoi's withdrawal
was left out of the agree-
ment, formally at least, to
be officially resolved in
the all-Vietnamese negoti-
ations to follow the cease-
fire.

Coalition Government

Thieu's demand for a
Hanoi pullback may now
be viewed as insistence on
something long agreed to
in principle by Hanoi.
When implemented, he
could claim credit for os-
tensibly succeeding in a
hard-line position.

In much the same way,
Thieu insisted he would
never accept a tripartite
coalition government with
the Communists. Imple-
ment, he suggested that
Washington was trying to
force this on him. Actual-
ly, the United States never
contemplated that Hanoi

solution, let alone asking
Thieu to accept it, as the
settlement details now re-
vealed have shown.

Authoritative sources
Monday recalled that Kis-
singer last week repeated-
ly expressed his "convic-
tion" and confidence that
Thieu will accept a cease-
fire. The inference was
that Thieu knows Hanoi
had agreed to withdraw
and is again positioning
himself to claim he stood
fast against American as
well as Communist pres-
sure when the settlement
is finally signed.

In broader terms, the
Administration recognizes
that Thieu holds an ulti-
mate veto — "suicide," as
one official put it.

Should he refuse to
agree in the end to the set-
tlement, the United States
might settle with Hanoi
and withdraw, precipitat-
ing a Thieu resignation
and the chaotic collapse of
the Saigon regime. The
end effect might not be
much different from the
"imposed" government
Mr. Nixon has pledged to
prevent.

NOVEMBER 11, 1972

The Nixon Watch

Kissinger's Course

It has been Richard Nixon's war since 1969 and it will be his settlement if Henry Kissinger turns out to have been right when he said in the White House press room on October 26, in a voice charged with pride and emotion, that "peace is at hand." The official accounts of the preliminaries to the settlement predicted by Kissinger make it evident that it has been the President, not his assistant for national security affairs, who has decided what to concede and what to hold out for at every step of the current approach to a condition that may pass, at least for awhile, as peace in Indo-china. But the attitudes and the world view of Henry Kissinger, meshing as they have in unique accord with the President's equivalent attitudes and view, have contributed immensely to American policy in Indo-china and Vietnam during the Nixon time. Here, derived from the incomplete public and private record, is a brief review of Kissinger's contribution to the course that may in some part be called his course.

There are indications that Kissinger misread the minds of both President Thieu in Saigon and President Nixon in Washington during the critical private negotiations in Paris from October 8 through October 11. Kissinger spoke later of "the risks that were involved" when, in order to seize the promise of a settlement that might slip away, he accepted Hanoi's revised proposals as the working basis for "at least the outline of an agreement" and, as he tacitly acknowledged, gave his North Vietnamese friend and antagonist in secret negotiation since 1969, Le Duc Tho, reason to believe that the draft completed on October 11 was in effect a final agreement that the US and North Vietnamese governments were pledged to sign before or by October 31. The risk that President Thieu would balk at the provisions for a cease-fire and a political settlement proved to be more thoroughly justified than Kissinger anticipated. A further impression that Kissinger also and knowingly risked exceeding the bounds of concession that President Nixon would tolerate is supported by the Hanoi assertion that the President in a message to Premier Pham Van Dong "raised a number of complex points" that would have to be cleared up while Kissinger and Tho were still working out the agreement. It was then, I suspect, that Kissinger learned for keeps that, as he later said in reference both to the October draft and to the changes he soon found to be required, "we would have to discuss anything that was negotiated (in Paris) first in Washington and then in Saigon." It appears, in short, that the difficulties that infuriated Hanoi and frustrated the intention to sign by October 31 were not due solely to President Thieu.

Kissinger said on the 26th that his announcement of

imminent peace and his discussion of the October draft had no connection with the November 7 presidential election. He insisted that "we were prepared to keep this whole agreement secret until it was consummated" and that he would not have been discussing it "had Hanoi not revealed . . . the substance of the agreement." Kissinger's known though unstated theory that Hanoi expected Richard Nixon to be reelected and figured it could get more concessions before the election than it might get afterward is probably sound. His claim that he was discussing the October agreement and explaining the delay only because and after Hanoi had revealed the gist of the draft elides the facts. Hanoi broadcast its summary of the October draft at 1 am on the 26th, Washington time. *The New York Times* of the 26th was out by 10 pm of the previous evening with an authoritative and substantially accurate summary of the draft. The White House story is that the *Times'* information "came from Paris." Some of it did. Some of it came from various Washington sources. Some of it, including the basis for the language that gave the *Times* account its authoritative tone, came from Kissinger.

Hanoi's account of the October negotiations suggests that Kissinger might have popped up in Hanoi if all had gone as he hoped. Kissinger understood all along that Secretary of State William P. Rogers would have the ceremonial honor of signing a final agreement. A more important act is the initialing of an agreement, signifying that it has been concluded and accepted by the parties to it. The North Vietnamese account said it was agreed that "the two parties would initial the text of the agreement in Hanoi" and sign it later in Paris. There could be no more fitting reward to Henry Kissinger for his efforts over nearly four years to frame negotiable terms than the assignment to initial the result of his endeavors in Hanoi.

Hanoi claimed, and Kissinger gladly granted the truth of the claim, that the North Vietnamese proposal submitted to him on October 8 broke the long deadlock and made "at least the outline of an agreement" possible. But the key elements of the Hanoi proposal and of the agreed draft that resulted from it are fore shadowed in the proposals that President Nixon has been making since May 14, 1969, and in Kissinger's explanations and justifications of them. In June of 1969, for example, Kissinger discussed "mixed commissions" as possible alternatives to the kind of "imposed" government that Mr. Nixon has said he would never foist upon South Vietnam. The three-party Council of National Reconciliation proposed by Hanoi and agreed to by the US is such a body. Although Kissinger says now that this council would have no sovereign powers, he made a great point in 1969 of the prospect that the supervision of national elections, one of the duties assigned to the proposed council, would require a substantial transfer of power from the in-

13

14

THE NEW REPUBLIC

cumbent government to the supervisory body.

Kissinger never wavered from his assertions of belief, first made in 1969, that "sooner or later this war is going to be settled through negotiations." He thought then that productive negotiation and a settlement would come in that year or in 1970 at the latest. Proven wrong then, he has maintained ever since that it would come eventually and very suddenly, after a fierce display of force such as the Tet attacks in 1968 or the North Vietnamese offensive last spring. "I've always believed," he said in 1969, "that Hanoi would maintain an implacable ferocity until just before they agreed to a settlement."

As any person of his sophistication must, Kissinger has understood throughout the Nixon period but has never said that the President's repeated commitment to accept and live with *any* result of national elections in South Vietnam removed the original excuse for US intervention there. The excuse was that a Communist rule of South Vietnam would endanger US security and therefore must be prevented. In 1969, soon after Mr. Nixon first made the pledge, Kissinger was asked whether he and the President were saying that the US would accept the outcome of an election won by the South Vietnamese Communists. "Yes," he answered, "we have said that and we are committed to it." When he was confronted with the general impression that any negotiated election would be rigged against the Communists, he answered that "we make no assumption that the Saigon government is bound to win this election and that the Communists are bound to be a

minority." But he has always evaded invitations to spell out the logical conclusion. When he was asked in 1970 whether the administration then considered the preservation of a non-Communist government in Saigon to be essential to US security, he repeated the Nixon-Kissinger cliché to the effect that "this administration will abide by the political decisions of the South Vietnamese people."

One of the intriguing indications that Kissinger's private views do not invariably conform to the official view he usually expresses is his frequent description of the Vietnam war as "a civil war." The official view since the late 1950s has been that it is not a civil war but a war between two sovereign and separate nations, the one an invader and the other invaded. When a reporter called his attention to this unorthodox contradiction in 1970, he hastily said that it was a civil war "with support from the outside." Afterward, in informal discussions, he resumed his references to "a civil war."

Kissinger's readiness to accept all the hazards and complexities of the kind of "cease-fire in place" now proposed for South Vietnam, and the fact that it amounts to fragmentary partition, dates back to 1969. He said then that some such arrangement didn't strike him as "a preposterous idea" and he has been working toward it ever since.

*Note:* The 1969-70 transcripts of Kissinger "background" sessions quoted in this piece are liberally cited and quoted by David Landau in his current *Kissinger* (Houghton Mifflin; $5.95).

John Osborne

The Gray Area

Politics and the FBI

by Walter Pincus

J. Edgar Hoover was petty, irascible and occasionally irrational, but given the Watergate bugging, allegations of Republican campaign sabotage and political manipulation of the FBI, the country would be better off if the old man were alive. For there would be no doubt who was in charge, and had been for 48 years.

His first loyalty was not to the White House but to the

choice of L. Patrick Gray III, an old political friend of Mr. Nixon's, as necessary to guard the famous FBI files until November 7, after which the President, his mandate renewed, would find a more competent director.

That defense missed the central point: a national police with the power and prestige of the FBI should not, even temporarily, be or seem to be available for par-

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN 30 OCTOBER 1972 P8 (31)

# Sen. Mathias Airs Views On Peace

By JERRY ADLER

U. S. Sen. Charles Mathias thinks there is a good chance of rice in Indochina before the Presidential election but permanent peace may be a long way off.

Maryland's senior senator invited the press to his Charles Center office to discuss accomplishments of the just-ended, 92d Congress but he found primary interest in the Vietnam situation.

Mathias said he attended a private dinner Thursday evening for Prince Souvanna Phouma of Laos, and spoke with presidential adviser, Dr. Henry Kissinger at the affair.

Based on that discussion, Mathias said Indochina peace is "close" but "there are very real obstacles and it takes more prescience than mine to make a guess about the day and hour it will happen."

OBSTACLES TO peace: Mathias said, are not only President Thieu, but such "powerful forces as the Pathet Lao, who have no allegiance to Hanoi and won't be bound by an agreement."

He said he feels President Thieu "can be brought into the framework of a larger plan for Indochina, including North and South Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia."

Mathias said he "hopes and prays" it can be done quickly.

He said permanent peace in Indochina is dependent on it being guaranteed by "all parties, such as Russia, China, England, France, and perhaps India."

RECONSTRUCTION in Indochina, he said, ought to be a "multi-national effort in the areas of financing and creative ideas."

He hopes America "never again has to engage in a conflict like Vietnam" and he expects a new committee, on which he will serve in the 93d Congress, to recommend "an overhaul of government machinery on presidential emergency powers."

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 31 OCTOBER 1972 P4

# McGovern Calls on Nixon
To Sign Vietnam Truce Today

From Our Wire Services

HARTFORD, Conn. — Sen. George McGovern on Monday urged President Nixon to sign the nine-point settlement of the Vietnam war with the Hanoi government by Tuesday — the deadline set by North Vietnam.

"I hope the agreement will be signed tomorrow," McGovern told a mass rally at Constitution Plaza as thousands cheered his record of opposition to American involvement in the war.

"I hope at long last Mr. Nixon will quit letting Gen. Thieu dictate policy to us."

THE NIXON Administration earlier ruled out the possibility of signing the agreement by the Tuesday deadline unless it is changed to meet objections by the South Vietnamese government.

"We can only hope and pray that these last minute efforts at peace are successful," McGovern said, adding that "It does appear at long last that Nixon has begun to take those steps to end the killing and dying in Southeast Asia."

Mathias said Congress is still operating under an emergency proclaimed by former President Truman during the Korean War.

"If the President can order troops into combat and make commitments that Congress reads about it in the newspapers, then we have lost our grip as a policy-making body," Mathias asserted.

HE SAID when the Tonkin Gulf resolution was passed "we were hoodwinked because we didn't have all the facts."

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
31 OCTOBER 1972 P3

# Saigon Calls Pact
'Quite Possible'

By DONALD KIRK
Far East Correspondent

Chicago Tribune Press Service

SAIGON, Viet Nam, Oct. 30 —The government of President Nguyen Van Thieu may be edging toward compromise in its opposition to the peace formula negotiated by United States Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger.

Foreign Minister Tan Van Lam today indicated some softening in the position of his government by remarking that it was "quite possible" that all sides would agree to a settlement.

Lam earlier termed the peace plan as "Unacceptable." However, he refused to commit his government to any time schedule for the signing.

"We are ready to sign if the other side accepts our point of view," said Lam, when asked if he saw any chance for concluding an agreement by tomorrow, the date by which North Viet Nam claimed the

United States had agreed to sign the nine-point peace plan.

"I do not think the signing of the agreement is linked with the election in the United States," Lam said in response to the question of whether he saw any chance of concluding an agreement by election day, November 7.

Lam chatted with newsmen after a joint session of the National Assembly.

Lam denied there was any basic difference between the outlook of the Saigon government and that of the U. S. as reflected in Kissingers news conference four days ago.

"We are convinced the United States understands our position," said Lam. "Dr. Kissinger says he needs another meeting with Hanoi to make it very clear. He said a few days ago that more discussions were needed to explain and clarify some points."

NEW YORK NEWS

31 OCTOBER 1972 P24

# PWs Are Moved to Hanoi

Saigon, Oct. 20 (Special)—North Vietnam was reported today to be setting the stage for the repatriation of U.S. prisoners of war by assembling in Hanoi captive airmen held in outlying areas.

Reliable sources who discolied the shift said it was one of several moves indicating that North Vietnam has begun preliminary processing of about 400 American PWs who would be released as part of the pending U.S.-North Vietnamese peace agreement.

To minimize the risk of commando raids like the unsuccessful November 1970 Son Tay operation, the PWs were scattered in small detention centers. Now, the North Vietnamese are reported closing down those centers and consolidating the PWs in central processing centers around Hanoi.
—Joseph Fried

BALTIMORE SUN
31 OCTOBER 1972 P2

# Saigon chastises U.S., says Hanoi uses votes-lure

Saigon — The official Saigon radio assailed the United States last night for its role in peace negotiations with North Vietnam and said Hanoi was trying to lure President Nixon into a quick settlement "in return for a few ballots."

In the sharpest official attack on the United States yet, a Saigon radio commentary declared that "whatever our ally's doings," President Nguyen Van Thieu "will not sanction mass suicide by the people of South Vietnam."

The broadcast sarcastically referred to the United States as an "ally who plays the role

of negotiator." It said Mr. Thieu had stood up to it by rejecting a proposed draft agreement worked out by the United States and North Vietnam in secret talks in Paris.

The radio indicated that the Communists would wait for an opportune time after all American forces are withdrawn, then strike again militarily.

"To meet with this Communist scheme," the radio said, "we have initiated a diplomatic counterattack and our emissaries are traveling to explain our position to all friends and allies in this part of the world."

5

EDITORIALS

Nuclear Proliferation for Europe

LOS ANGELES TIMES
31 OCTOBER 1972

If there is one fundamental of U.S. foreign policy with which practically everybody agrees, it is that the proliferation of atomic weapons should be resisted. The reason is that the greater the number of nuclear powers, the greater the danger that somebody will push the red button.

However, a recent speech by Lord Carrington, the British defense minister, points up the fact that, increasingly in the next few years, the ideal of nonproliferation may conflict with our NATO allies' perception of their best interests.

Lord Carrington observed that while both Britain and France have small nuclear forces of their own, he saw the need for a collective effort within the framework of the Common Market. In his words, "I foresee one day that the evolution of European defense must include some kind of European nuclear force."

The Guardian, a liberal British newspaper, recalled that Prime Minister Edward Heath had spoken in similar terms, as had a French member of the European Economic Commission.

Fortunately, there are serious obstacles in the way of a separate European nuclear force.

Memories of World War II are too fresh for Europeans, be they Russians or Frenchmen, to relish the idea of German access to nuclear weapons. The West Germans, sensitive to such feelings, express no interest in a European nuclear force.

Beyond that, neither France nor Britain has the advanced delivery systems and warhead technology required to provide true deterrence at this time. And there is no way they could get them without massively greater defense outlays, or help from the United States.

This country, correctly committed to nonproliferation, is not interested in giving such help.

Given the domestic pressure for a substantial reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, and the resulting European nervousness about the reliability of the American nuclear shield, the idea of an independent nuclear force is unlikely to go away.

A lot depends upon the degree to which Washington keeps European interests in mind in U.S.-Soviet negotiations on arms control and reduction of forces in Europe.

Before this decade is over, unless U.S. negotiators are very careful, this country may face the unhoppy choice of helping its NATO allies build their own nuclear force or watching a nervous Europe drift toward a play-it-soil posture of accommodation to the realities of Soviet power.

MILWAUKEE JOURNAL 26 OCTOBER 1972 (31)

France Defies Nuclear Test Ban

It is disturbing to learn that France is planning nuclear tests in the atmosphere again next year. Reports indicate that the tests in the Pacific will be bigger than the ones held this year. The French claim that these tests are necessary in order to put hydrogen warheads on submarine launched missiles by 1976. Supposedly, underground sites are not far enough developed to meet that deadline.

The only gray in this dark picture of continued French resistance to acknowledging the hazards of atmospheric testing is that they at least are talking about underground testing. Also, world opinion against the French

action is growing more acute. During last summer's tests, France was subjected to heavy pressure from South American countries, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Peru threatened to break diplomatic relations. The tests were delayed because a Canadian yacht, manned by protesters, sailed into the test zone.

These nations assuredly will protest again. Sixteen Pacific countries already have drawn up a resolution to be put before the United Nations urging a ban on all atmospheric testing and condemning the French tests. World opinion may yet push France, a nuclear holdout with China, into adhering to the limited test ban treaty.

MILWAUKEE JOURNAL 27 OCTOBER 1972 (31)

Peace Not Won Quite Yet

Presidential adviser Kissinger, in confirming a general agreement with North Vietnam on a settlement of the war, said that peace was at hand. The heady public reaction to being so near an end of this long, expensive and devastating war must be tempered. Final accord is still to be reached. The war still continues. The final effort must still be made to insure that peace this time is really won.

The main points agreed to by Hanoi and the US appear to be a sound basis for settlement. The North Vietnamese are assured of a military presence and an influence in the political future of South Vietnam. Short of a military victory in the south, which Hanoi has not been able to achieve, it cannot expect to get much more. The ruinous bombing of the north will stop.

The US will win release of its prisoners held in the north, and arrangements by which it can withdraw gracefully. This latter

point has been a primary consideration of the Nixon administration all along.

For President Thieu, there is a fighting chance that he can survive politically. He is not being forced to step down. Saigon will continue to get US military and economic aid. The ceasefire will have international guarantees by the great powers as he desired. Thieu, at least initially, will have controlling influence over the great majority of the South Vietnamese population. He will have to stand or fall on that.

There seems to be no reason, except for minor details, why agreement cannot be reached shortly. Kissinger has said as much. Unless the North Vietnamese are playing games, they must also agree. It would appear that President Thieu has no choice but to go along. The US, however, should in no way let Thieu's obstinacy ruin this opportunity. Acceptable terms are available. This bloody war has gone on too long.

ST LOUIS POST-DISPATCH 10/25/72 (31)

Unneeded Umbrella

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to resume the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks on Nov. 21 in Geneva and the second round of these negotiations will be devoted to reaching a permanent treaty on offensive nuclear weapons. Even before they begin, the talks have been complicated by the Jackson amendment to the current interim offensive missile agreement under which the Senate directed the American team not to settle for anything less than numerical and payload equality with the Russians. An interesting if not exactly compelling case for such an arrangement has now been put forward by Edward N. Luttwak, a

defense strategist, in the Washington Post

Mr. Luttwak argues that the perceived sense of superiority or equality is critically important, and to the eyes of the world the U.S. no longer enjoys such a position due to the quantitative (not qualitative) inferiority embodied in the SALT I agreement. While the U.S. has more than enough power to deter any Soviet attack, other nations, says Mr. Luttwak, may well conclude that it may no longer have the ability to furnish a credible nuclear umbrella for it; allies. As a result, "nuclear proliferation will occur and, he concludes, "we always did know that the road to nuclear perdition would be paved with small power nuclear forces."

What this line of analysis seems to neglect, in our opinion, is the fact that any actual reduction in nuclear forces of both the U.S. and the USSR is bound to have its effect in reduced tensions between the two powers and also in the world. It also will form a second stepping stone (the first was the defensive missile treaty from SALT 1) on the road toward even further arms reductions. In a situation in which the two superpowers have agreed to limit their nuclear arsenals, other nations will have before them a powerful incentive not to acquire their own atomic forces. In short, umbrellas are scarcely needed when there is no chance of rain.

NEW YORK NEWS 31 OCTOBER 1972

By JERRY GREENE

Washington, Oct. 30 — The one man who above all others has had experience in dealing with Communists in Indochina slipped through here the other day almost unnoticed amidst the uproar over possible peace, and it is a pity more people didn't listen to him harder. For he has some rather precise data on the difficulties to be expected with Hanoi after the ceasefire agreement is signed.

If very recent history can offer any guidelines, and if the U.S. sticks with some of the peace pact provisions, then the final disengagement and withdrawal, and the settlement of the future of Southeast Asia, is well likely to be bumpy and troublesome, not quick, clean, and easy.

## A Coalition?
Ask the Man
Who Knows

The quiekie visitor who knows of these things was Prince Souvanna Phouma of Laos, definitely a key figure in establishment of any lasting peace in Indochina. Phouma did confer with President Nixon and with Secretary of State William Rogers during what was designated as a "private" visit. He expressed hope that the U.S.-Hanoi agreement on cessation of hostilities would be followed promptly by an end to the fighting in his own country.

Phouma is possessed of unusual knowledge and experience because his half-brother, Prince Souvannoung, is about as close to being a Communist as one can get without carrying the Hammer and Sickle in either hand, who has been doing business closely with Hanoi for many years.

Additionally, Phouma is the head of one of these "coalition" governments so dear to the hearts of the anti-Saigon personages in this country, and which until Oct. 8 topped the list of peace demands being made by Hanoi in negotiations with the U.S.

Phouma could tell one and all that his own government in Laos, consisting more or less of rightists, leftists, and neutralists in its original makeup, ceased being much of a coalition because the Communists walked out when they found they couldn't seize control altogether.

But Phouma has been a cagey politician—he would have

to be to have served as premier of his nation five times—and he carefully and properly kept the door wide open. This is the sort of thing that could happen only in Laos, which by all odds is a never-never land all its own in a troubled world.

For catch-up purposes, it should be recalled that landlocked Laos is a constitutional monarchy, a one-time French protectorate which became an independent sovereign state in 1949. But internal affairs didn't work out very well, with neutralists, Communists, and conservatives jockeying for power; chaos developed and continued after France pulled out of all Indochina in 1954 after the defeat by Ho Chi Minh.

Open warfare reached the point where in 1962 the big powers decided it must be halted before the conflict spread. Ambassador Averill Harriman represented the U.S.; and in another Geneva Conference, a coalition government for Laos was ordained. Phouma was named Premier—he was the favorite of the Russians.

With installation of the troika government in Vientiane, the 300 or 400 American military advisers packed up in ceremonies style and pulled out of Laos just as the Geneva Agreement stipulated.

It is recorded that a few North Vietnamese departed, not many of the thousands of troops out in the jungles, intermingled with the Pathet Lao down to the squad level. The "Pathet Lao" backed off a few miles—but not so far as to permit establishment of a strong protective line to secure the Ho Chi Minh Trail running down from North Vietnam along the eastern border of Laos and into South Vietnam.

## An Armed Platoon in Midst of Vientiane

There was, to be sure, an International Control Commission, just like one of those to be created in the impending peace accord between the U.S. and Hanoi. But nobody ever paid much attention other than to use its services for courier purposes into Hanoi.

Premier Phouma has literally reserved the four chairs for the Communist members of his cabinet in the Government Palace's Conference Room. The "Pathet Lao" has kept a headquarters in Vientiane, an old French house surrounded by barbed wire and housing an armed infantry platoon.

But the shooting never stopped between the Communists and the Lao government forces; and eventually, when Hanoi began sending down more troops, Phouma asked the U.S. for help and got it. He approved air strikes against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in his own country.

Now there are about 60,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos, Phouma told officials here last week, most of them working on, or defending, the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

The Premier noted with pleasure by Henry Kissinger in his press briefing on the peace activities, where the President's foreign policy adviser said the pending agreement contained a section pledging recognition of the independence and sovereignty of both Laos and Cambodia. Further, Kissinger said, "There is an agreement that foreign countries will withdraw their forces from Laos and Cambodia."

Souvanna Phouma liked that, particularly. He had liked it when 14 world powers signed an agreement with the same stipulation back in 1962. The daftish prime has seen it, all come and go, pledges, internationat commissions, and peace vigils. He's hoping that this time Hanoi means it, and he knows peace won't come easily."

WASHINGTON POST
31 OCTOBER 1972
Grenade Kills Thai

Reuter

BANGKOK, Oct. 30—A Thai soldier dropped a handgrenade he was playing with at a dinner party, fell on it to shield his friends and died in the explosion, police said today. The soldier had been playing with the grenade after a meal given by his friends in Lop Buri Province in central Thailand last Saturday, Police said.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 31 OCTOBER 1972

# Red giants
press peace
on Hanoi

By Charlotte Saikowski

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

As the world anxiously awaits the next move in the critical Vietnam peace negotiations, China and the Soviet Union continue to maintain a restrained public stance toward the United States.

Ironically, the world's two Communist giants and bitter rivals — both trying to improve their relations with Washington — find themselves on the same side of the fence, quietly pressing Hanoi to move down the path of negotiation.

Hanoi, for its part, at this writing has not responded publicly to the administration position that it will not sign the peace accord Oct. 31. The North Vietnamese have continued to insist that something — a signing or an

initialling of the accord — take place but they have not burned their bridges behind them by threatening to refuse further negotiations.

Despite the hassle over signing of the peace agreement, Peking's mood has remained moderate. According to the Associated Press, China on Oct. 30 advised Britain that it is ready to consider participation in an international peace conference on Vietnam, although it will decide only when it knows the details of the peace talks.

In an exchange of views, said the AP report, Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Pengfei and British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home stressed that both nations want to see an end of the war and establishment of a lasting peace.

The same day the People's Daily, the Chinese Communist Party newspaper ran a major commentary supporting Hanoi's Oct. 26 statement that a signing date had been agreed upon and that it is up to Washington to bring South Vietnamese President Thieu in line and to meet that deadline.

"The U.S. Government must keep its word and bear the responsibility for correcting the truculent and unreasonable attitude of the Nguyen Van Thieu government and sign the agreement at the scheduled time," the newspaper declared.

By Chinese standards, however, the

lengthy commentary is not viewed by U.S. officials as vituperative or inflammatory. Fairly restrained where the United States is concerned, it concentrates its attack on the South Vietnamese leader and even then refrains from assailing him in vicious personal terms.

## Position restrained

Meanwhile, Moscow has avoided treating the Oct. 31 signing date as a real deadline which, if ignored, could lead to a collapse of the negotiations. Its public position has been circumventive and restrained, when one considers that in 1971 President Podgorny was saying in Hanoi that the moment of victory was near.

Now the Soviet line is that a settlement should reflect the existing situation, namely that there are two governments and two armed forces in South Vietnam.

On balance, the Russians seem to want a political settlement even if it falls short of Hanoi's maximum objectives. They, of course, have been supporting North Vietnam with military aid and have said they will continue to do this until the withdrawal of American forces.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

6-F

Learning from Mao

Hanoi will fight on
after U. S. is gone

By ROBERT S. ELEGANT
Special to The Inquirer
And Los Angeles Times

SAIGON.—The war in Vietnam will end shortly, but the struggle will continue—the struggle to unite all Vietnam under a totalitarian regime, the struggle the Communists have waged for 27 years.

Hanoi has just reaffirmed its determi-
nation to fight in its comments on the
secret talks that led to the North Vietna-
mese-American draft agreement.

The Communists have invariably used
"united front" or "coalition" govern-
ments as the first, decisive step towards
seizing all power. No less an authority
on revolutionary strategy than Chairman
Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party
of China laid down the tactics in one of
his most widely read works, "On Coali-
tion Government."

The United States is withdrawing from direct involvement in Vietnam. The decision is wise from the American point of view—and probably unavoidable.

If America has not attained every last
one of its national objectives, it has
equally not acceded to Hanoi's long-
standing demand that America make it-
self responsible for delivering South
Vietnam to harsh, authoritarian rule.
But America would be unwise if it de-
luded itself that the draft agreement ac-
complishes more than ending American
intervention with relative grace, while
starting a new phase in the unrelenting
military and political battle for control
of the South's 17.5 million people.

Last week Hanoi declared its intention of "accelerating the struggle on the military, political, and diplomatic fronts until the lofty objectives—liberating the South, protecting and building the socialist North, and advancing towards peacefully uniting the country—are achieved."

In Hanoi's lexicon, liberation means im-
posing its own rule, after destroying "de-
cadent, bourgeois democracy." Clearly,
the objective has not changed, only the
means.

A "coalition government," excluding the present Saigon regime, will not be created simultaneously with the cease-fire. Instead, Saigon will rule its areas and the Vietcong theirs, while a "Council on National Reconciliation and Concord" plans elections to choose a new government. The tripartite council will represent Saigon, the Vietcong and the amorphous "neutralist" faction.

The term, "coalition government," anathema to Saigon, did not appear. Nonetheless, Mao's "On Coalition Government," a report to the seventh congress of the Chinese Communist Party in April, 1945, is the surest guide to Hanoi's strategy and objectives. Despite differences between Peking and Hanoi, Mao's revolutionary manuals are read avidly in North Vietnam.

The political conditions Hanoi faces in 1972 closely resemble the conditions Mao faced in 1945. Besides, the negotiating tactics and even the language Hanoi now employs are almost identical with Chinese tactics and language 27 years ago.

As the war in the Pacific was ending, Mao faced the challenge of winning political victory in China. The Nationalist government ruled much larger territories and commanded much more powerful armies than did the Communists. Mao's solution was a coalition government—which would shortly become a Communist government.

As the big war in Vietnam draws to a close, Hanoi must win political victory over a regime that controls 90 percent of the population and deploys troops out-numbering the Communists several times. The North Vietnamese have chosen the same solution.

In 1945, Mao made almost the same proposal Hanoi has now advanced. The Nationalist government was to join a tripartite, united-front alliance that would prepare for a coalition government.

Mao's proposal was not accepted. In-
stead, he fought almost five years longer
to win military victory.

Mao's first act after victory was to es-
tablish a "coalition government" com-
posed of the Communist party, the Demo-
cratic League, the National Revolu-
tionary League, and other splinter
groups.

The non-Communist "democratic parties and personalities" were powerless from the beginning. After six years, Peking purged those "democratic elements"—and razed the flimsy facade of coalition government.

Contending for supreme power under less advantageous conditions, the Vietnamese Communists might try to shorten the process. But there can be no doubt that, in Mao's words, their "future or maximum objective is socialism and Communism"—which, to Hanoi, means a sternly authoritarian and vengeful regime.

RED GIANTS, ... CONTINUED

But news media reporting of the Vietnam
peace negotiations bears out that they would
prefer an agreement to a continuation of the
conflict. These reports have been factual,
brief, and without extended commentary.

Pravda makes appeal

President Thieu is portrayed as "isolated"
both at home and abroad, implying that the
United States is not supporting him. On Oct.
29 Pravda dismissed the notion that Mr.
Thieu could block a peace settlement and
appeal to the United States not to let the
chance of ending the war slip by.

In reporting presidential adviser Henry A.
Kissinger's recent press conference the So-
viet media chose to single out his character-
ization of Hanoi as negotiating "seriously"
and his expressed belief that peace is at hand.

When Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin
met with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
envoys in Moscow last week, the North
Vietnamese were reported to have accused
Washington of dragging out a settlement.
But, as the Soviet news agency Tass reported,
the meeting, the Soviet leader did not respond
but merely called for a continuation of the
talks.

Thus, the Kremlin leadership publicly has
opted to portray the negotiations in a
positive light and to refrain from any
statements that could complicate the situ-
ation at this critical juncture.

7-F

TIME MAGAZINE
6 NOVEMBER 1972 (31 OCT)

The Frisbee Fiasco

No one at the Pentagon is talking about who originated the idea. But somehow, back in 1968, the Navy began experimenting with those saucer-shaped toys called Frisbees, ostensibly to find a better way to keep flares aloft. Last week, after spending $375,000 on the Frisbee project, the Navy admitted that it was a flop.

On the face of it, the scheme was not all that farfetched. Flares are usually fired from the ground high into the air or dropped from a plane to light up a target at night. To extend the time of illumination, parachutes are used to slow the flares' descent. Trouble is the chutes are bulky and heavy. Thus, the light little Frisbee, which is stabilized by its gyroscope-like spin as it sails through the air, seemed like a possible alternative. Properly launched, the Navy researchers reasoned, Frisbees might well serve as a steady descending platform for flares and perhaps other payloads. Some Pentagon sources have suggested that the Navy hoped to load Frisbee-like disks with anti-personnel explosives, which would be scattered in whatever directions as the disk spun above a target area.

Whatever the real objective, the Navy did test the concept both in wind tunnels and off 1,000-ft-high Hurricane Mesa in Utah. As expected, the Navy's

WALL STREET JOURNAL
31 OCTOBER 1972

A PEACE SIGNING is expected by Saturday or Sunday, diplomatic sources said.

The sources, in Washington, said the private
talks between White House aide Henry Kissin-
ger and North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc
Tho will resume this week. Signing of the pact
is likely on Saturday or Sunday, they said, and
probably will be in Paris. It also was learned
that agreement had been reached on having In-
donesia, Hungary, Poland and Canada super-
vise the cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign
forces from South Vietnam. Earlier, the Viet-
cong had said it would hold the U.S. responsi-
ble for "sabotaging peace" by not signing the
pact today. But it also indicated that neither
the proposed cease-fire nor further peace talks
would be scrapped.

WALL ST JOURNAL 31 OCT 1972

China is pushing nuclear programs to gain bargaining power with the Soviet Union in border disputes, the latest edition of "Jane's Weapons Systems" asserts. The British reference work adds; however, that the Chinese still are technologically weak and will need U.S. and Japanese help. "This weakness is probably one of the reasons for China's new readiness to have dealings with the U.S. and Japan," it said.

flying saucers always soared beautifully
—when they were unloaded. But when
they had to carry any significant extra
weight they fell flat on their faces. Con-
clusion: the Frisbee's lift-to-drag ratio
was insufficient for the vehicle to sup-
port a working flare. Back to the draw-
ing board.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 6 NOVEMBER 1972 (31 OCT)

# WHY HANOI CAME TO REALIZE IT "COULD NOT HOPE TO WIN"

## Interview With a British Authority on Vietnam

What was behind the big change of heart in Hanoi? Military failure? A split at the top?

All that—and more—says Patrick J. Honey in this interview conducted by Joseph Fromm, the magazine's senior European editor.

At LONDON

Q Mr. Honey, what brought about the change in Hanoi's attitude toward peace?

A There are a number of factors:

First, President Nixon is almost certainly going to defeat George McGovern, and the Vietnam war is no longer politically disadvantageous to the President. This is very important.

Second, Mr. Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow aroused in the minds of all North Vietnamese leaders the fears that they were once more going to be sold down the river by their Soviet and Chinese allies as they were at Geneva in 1954.

Third, their military invasion of South Vietnam earlier this year—from which they had hoped great things—has, in fact, failed to achieve any of its primary targets. They have had more than 100,000 killed in this invasion, and these losses are difficult to replace.

They also have lost several hundred tanks and heaven knows how much equipment.

Finally, there was the disruption of communications inside North Vietnam due to the bombing, and the effect of the mining of the ports that has reduced severely the flow of supplies.

All of these things produced a cumulative effect. I think that it was borne in on the North Vietnamese leaders more and more that they could not hope to win a military victory. They were being forced to accept some sort of negotiated settlement on the best terms that they could secure from [presidential aide] Henry Kissinger.

Q Has there been tangible evidence that Hanoi was contemplating a settlement?

A Yes. I have seen a number of Communist documents and debriefing reports on interrogation of defectors and prisoners that are quite clear on this score.

The Communists were telling their people in the South that there might be a cease-fire. They advised them that, if there was a cease-fire, the infrastructure cadres in the South must "surface"—come into the open—to establish effective control over the people in the local areas where they operate.

The aim is to guarantee that when an election comes, the Communist cadres will be in a position to tell the people what to do, how to vote. I don't think that the North Vietnamese leaders would do this unless the possibility of a cease-fire were under very serious consideration in Hanoi.

## BOMBING: "VITAL FACTOR" IN TALKS—

Q How important was the bombing of the North in pressuring Hanoi toward a negotiated settlement?

A The heavy bombing of North Vietnam was perhaps the vital factor which kept pressures on North Vietnam and maintained their interest in continuing the negotiations with Dr. Kissinger. In 1968, on the advice of Clark Clifford [former Secretary of Defense], the bombing was stopped. This removed any sense of urgency on the Communist side. As a result, the negotiations got nowhere. But now the North Vietnamese leaders knew that the bombing would continue. Therefore, they had an incentive to settle as soon as possible because the bombing hurt.

Patrick J. Honey, ranked among the outstanding Western authorities on North Vietnam affairs, has extensive first-hand knowledge of the country and fluency in the language. For the past 24 years he has been in charge of North Vietnamese studies at London University.

Q Do you think Moscow and Peking were pressuring the North Vietnamese to end the war?

A The North Vietnamese were coming under pressure insofar as Moscow and Peking both advised them to end the war. But neither the Russians nor the Chinese dared to exert pressure by cutting off aid for fear of recrimination from the other.

So the Communist leaders in Hanoi continued to get aid—but at the same time they were getting insistent advice that it is against the interests of the North Vietnamese to continue the war. They were being advised insistently by Moscow and Peking that they would do very much better to settle on the best terms that they could get at the moment.

There are two reasons for the Chinese and Russian attitudes:

First, this war has been going on a long time—since 1959. North Vietnam has lost something in the region of a million men. The Soviets and the Chinese have lost billions of dollars in military aid. And all they've got to show for it is that the North Vietnamese control less territory now than they did in 1960. North Vietnam was smashed up. And they were no nearer victory.

Second, both the Soviets and Chinese are hoping to get things out of the United States. The Soviets need American grain and trade. The Chinese are after Taiwan and all sorts of foreign-policy requirements. It's quite difficult for them to deal with the U. S. with this war going on. Both, for national reasons of their own, have wanted out.

The fact is, under pressure, the North Vietnamese made some concessions. For example, they have conceded that none of the three factions in the coalition government they envisage for South Vietnam will be able to assert its authority over the others. More recently, they dropped their insistence on the removal of President Thieu from the Saigon Government.

The North Vietnamese leadership has been undergoing the painful experience of preparing itself to settle on terms fairly close to the offer that President Nixon made on May 8. This would hold out the prospect that a non-Communist South would survive—at least for the foreseeable future.

## HOW HANOI'S LEADERS HAVE SPLIT—

Q Is there really a division inside Hanoi's Politburo between so-called hawks and doves?

A There is plenty of evidence to support the view that the Politburo is divided. There is unanimity in the leadership on the final objective—namely, the imposition of a Communist regime in South Vietnam. The division has arisen over the means of implementing this objective.

Q Has there recently been a power struggle, with a war faction losing to a peace faction?

A I think it is probably wrong to talk about a war faction and peace faction. Both factions maintain the necessity for struggle in one form or another.

One faction, led by Truong Chinh [Chairman of the National Assembly], argues that the stability of North Vietnam is being endangered by overemphasis of the military aspect

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

11-F

TIME 6 NOVEMBER 1972 (31 OCTOBER)

## The Uses of Vietspeak

Q: When is a war not a war? A: The fighting in Viet Nam is referred to as an "international armed conflict," according to the Judge Advocate General's Office.

—Army Digest, April 1968

EVERY war makes its peculiar contributions to the language. There was still a sense of heroes in the neologisms of World War I: over the top into no man's land. World War II created a new terminology of mass death: fission, fire storm, and the final solution. From Korea, the first confrontation with Asian Communism, we acquired the widespread use of gooks and brainwashing.

The most vividly iconoclastic new words generally come from the G.I.s, and so, in Viet Nam, the grunts spoke of slants and slopes, of Charley (Viet Cong) and Yards (Mong-tagnard tribesmen) and White Mice (white-uniformed local police). Where they were "the boonies of Nam"; everything else was "the world." Officials spoke windily of "winning hearts and minds," but the G.I.s shortened that to WHAM. To the airmen, the jungle was Indian Country, where you might end up either in the Hanoi Hilton (prison camp) or Buying the Farm (dead).

Killing was the reality for which the G.I. invented the largest number of euphemisms: zapping, fragging, offing, greasing, waxing, hosing down a village (or using a Zippo Squad to set it afire). When Lieut. William Calley testified that he had been ordered to attack My Lai, he did not say that he had been told to kill but to "waste" everyone in sight.

In devising such brusque euphemisms, however, the G.I.s hardly matched the ornate creations of their superiors at headquarters. Specimens:

* Air raid—Limited duration protective reaction strike

* Artillery fire—H & I (harassment and interdiction)

* Murder of an enemy spy—Termination with extreme prejudice

* Defoliation—Resources control program

* Refugee camp—New life hamlet

"War does things to the language," New York Times Columnist Russell Baker once wrote, "and the language in revenge refuses to cooperate in helping us to understand what we are talking about." In Viet Nam, it was all too unpleasant to "understand what we are talking about," so even when the U.S. finally decided to start withdrawing its troops it created a new word to disguise reality one last time. It called the process Vietnamization.

## WHY HANOI CAME TO REALIZE IT "COULD NOT HOPE TO WIN"... CONTINUED

of the war and by subordination of everything to the prosecution of the war. They contend that priority No. 1 ought to be the consolidation of socialism in the rear base, which is North Vietnam.

The other faction, which is led by Le Duan [First Secretary of the Communist Party], maintains that priority No. 1 must be winning the war in South Vietnam. Le Duan argues that once they have disposed of the enemy in the South they can go on with the consolidation of socialism throughout the whole of Vietnam at their leisure.

In short, Truong Chinh emphasizes political struggle while Le Duan emphasizes military struggle.

Q Which faction is winning out?

A I think that there has not yet been a showdown to force a change of policy.

Q Where does the Army—and especially Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap—stand in the division within the North Vietnamese leadership?

A They stand firmly inside Le Duan's faction. Defense Minister Giap has always wanted to win military victory.

No doubt he sincerely believes that this would best serve North Vietnam's interests. But I can't avoid the conclusion that he also is thinking of his personal reputation and his place in the history books. If he could win a military victory, he would go down as a great general. Otherwise, there would be a question mark over his place in the history books. He has suffered two failures—in the Tet offensive of 1968 and again in this year's invasion of the South. He probably has argued for a third offensive.

## KEEPING A LID ON DISSENT—

Q Are Hanoi's present leaders firmly in control of the North?

A They're in control as firmly as any Communist administration is in control in its own territory. They have very powerful security forces.

There is no public opinion because nobody dares to voice a contrary opinion. It's very difficult for any disaffected North Vietnamese to start any dissident movement which would threaten the regime.

Q Is there any sign of an effective anti-Government underground in North Vietnam?

A No. The only evidence of any dissilience whatever involves a number of wounded veterans who were allowed to be repatriated to North Vietnam several months ago.

Some have come back so embittered that they have beaten up the managers of co-operative farms whom they have accused of failing to look after their families while they were in South Vietnam.

Quite a number have been going around telling people very bluntly that they should not allow their sons to go to South Vietnam because they will die of starvation or disease or be killed by the South Vietnamese.

There have been several instances in which these returned veterans have clashed with security forces in North Vietnam. They actually have killed members of the security forces, and nobody has attempted to stop them. But these wounded veterans are too scattered and too few to form any sort of effective anti-Government movement.

Q Do the North Vietnamese still widely support their Government?

A I don't think they either support or oppose the Government, but rather accept it. There's nothing to be done

about it. So they've got to manage with it and make the best of what they've got. This, for my money, is about the state of mind of the North Vietnamese people.

## WHERE THE NORTH FEELS THE STRAIN—

Q Have civilians borne up well under bombing and privation?

A As we discovered here in Britain in World War II, heavy bombing induces a spirit of camaraderie and mutual self-help. But, equally, the bombing in North Vietnam damaged severely the communications system. It reduced imports. The mining of the ports in particular cut down imports by sea. This in turn required the requisitioning of vast numbers of North Vietnamese to carry goods by coolie labor and to repair the communications, roads and railroads. North Vietnam just doesn't have the manpower to meet all these demands. Also, families were split up, as coolie labor had to go to the Chinese frontier or elsewhere. Socially, I think, the bombing and mining of the ports had a tremendous effect on civilians.

Q In view of that situation, did morale sag seriously?

A No. Morale has been fairly high. The people believed the propaganda that told them that they were winning victories in the South. I think that morale was reasonably high for the simple reason that the truth was not getting through.

Q Has there been plenty of food, fuel and other necessities?

A It's very difficult to generalize. The North Vietnamese were getting all of the petroleum products they required through plastic pipelines that run from China. It was almost impossible for bombers to cut them. Delivery of foodstuffs, however, was curtailed, since priority on the damaged communications system went to military supplies. There has been greater reliance on growing more food at home. Fertilizer was no longer being imported. Inevitably that will affect crops. Other things have been cut off, too, but they were mostly goods that the North Vietnamese leaders believed they could do without in the short term.

Q Were the bombing and the blockage of ports hurting Hanoi's military forces badly?

A I'm sure they were being hurt very badly. Remember that virtually every division in the North Vietnamese Army has been deployed outside North Vietnam's frontiers. Supplies must be carried from the Chinese border through North Vietnam to the battlefields of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos—and this at a time of disrupted communications and power shortages. Resupply is greatly reduced.

## AS REDS' STRENGTH WANES—

Q Were enough supplies getting through to keep the war going?

A They were probably getting enough through to the front line to keep the war ticking over for the next few months on a reduced scale. But the sort of military action that we saw in April, May and June this year was quite impossible.

With the present blockading of supplies and disruption of communication, I don't think that the North Vietnamese could really hope to achieve more than rocket and mortar attacks, sabotage, or local operations against towns and villages. I don't think they could achieve any real military victories of great significance.

12-F

TUESDAY MORNING - 31 OCTOBER 1972

WASHINGTON POST

31 OCT 72 P-05

Seminars Set
For Generals
On Race Ties

By Eric Sharp

PATRICK AIR FORCE
BASE, Fla., Oct. 30 (AP)—In
January, all admirals and gen-
erals will begin attending De-
fense Department race rela-
tions seminars conceived in re-
sponse to racial brawls and
deaths on bases and ships in
the United States and abroad.
A spokesman for the De-
fense Race Relations Institute
(DRRI) at this base 30 miles
south of Cape Kennedy said
today the first class of lieuten-
ant colonels and commanders,
for instructing the high-rank-
ing officers had arrived to
begin training.
The DRRI trains the field

Instructors who run race rela-
tions seminars, now mand-
tory for all ranks from buck
private to colonel, at U.S. mil-
itary installations throughout
the world.

> The institute has trained 574 field instructors and is beginning a crash program to meet Defense Department requests for 1,400 instructors in the field by next summer.

> The institute opened in Oc-
tober, 1971, as part of the De-
fense Department effort to
ease racial tension at several
military installations abroad.

A Defense Department spokesman in Washington said all generals and flag-rank officers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on down would take part in the program and would attend two days of race relations seminars each year.

As of last May, there were
1,114 generals and 317 admi-
rals in the services.

Asked if the program was
mandatory for the military's
top brass, the spokesman said,
"No, it isn't mandatory-but I
think you can say they'll all do
it."

WASHINGTON POST 31 OCT 1972 P-12

Draft Dodgers Held
Cool to Amnesty Bid

TORONTO, Oct. 30 (AP)--
Spokesman for war resistance
groups say that most United
States Army deserters and
draft dodgers living here
would remain in Canada even
if U.S. authorities offered
them amnesty.

Dan Zimmerman, 23-year-old
draft dodger working for a
group called the Toronto
Anti-Draft Program, said in a
weekend interview that about
90 per cent of draft dodgers
and 50 per cent of deserters
would remain in Canada, am-
nesty or not.

Dee Charles Knight, manag-
ing editor of Amex-Canada, a
bimonthly magazine for war
resisters, predicted public pres-
sure eventually would bring
amnesty. But he said in an in-
terview that amnesty would be
a while in coming because the

WASHINGTON POST

31 OCT 1972 P-15

Big Four Talks

BERLIN—Ambassadors of the United States, Britain France and the Soviet Union held a fourth round of talks on their rights as World War II victors in the whole of Germany after the two Germans join the United Nations.

The meetings coincided
with East-West German ne-
gotiations on a treaty estab-
lishing relations between
the two states of the divided
nation.

United States still needs a
draft to maintain a standing
army and would make scape-
goats of draft dodgers in the
early postwar period.

034A

By UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

THE UNITED STATES REFUSED MONDAY TO MEET HANOI'S DEADLINE FOR SIGNING A VIETNAM SETTLEMENT TODAY IN PARIS. THE VIET CONG SAID THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION HAD BROKEN ITS WORD AND ACCUSED WASHINGTON OF "SABOTAGING PEACE."

WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY RONALD ZIEGLER SAID PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER HENRY A. KISSINGER, WHO WORKED OUT THE PEACE PACT IN PRIVATE TALKS WITH HANOI, WAS "QUITE CLEAR" WHEN HE SAID LAST WEEK THAT AT LEAST ONE MORE MEETING WAS NEEDED TO CLEAR UP REMAINING ISSUES.
KISSINGER SAID THE UNITED STATES HAD AGREED TO WORK TOWARD A SIGNING TODAY BUT HAD MADE NO OUTRIGHT COMMITMENT TO DO SO.

BUT MADAME NGUYEN THI BINH, THE VIET CONG FOREIGN MINISTER, SAID MONDAY IN PARIS "IT WAS THE UNITED STATES THAT PROPOSED THE (OCT. 31) DATE" AND ADDED: "WE MUST STRESS THAT THIS IS A MANEUVER BY THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND A PRETEXT WITH THE OBVIOUS INTENTION OF PROLONGING THE WAR, KEEPING THE (PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN) THIEU REGIME IN POWER IN SAIGON AND SABOTAGING PEACE."

ZEIGLER SAID "WE'RE STILL HOPEFUL" A VIETNAM PEACE SETTLEMENT
WOULD BE SIGNED SOON AND THERE APPEARED TO BE NO PESSIMISM AROUND THE
WHITE HOUSE THE ACCORD WOULD BE LOST BECAUSE OF THE U.S. DEMAND FOR
ANOTHER MEETING. BUT WHEN THAT MEETING WOULD COME WAS NOT DISCLOSED.

THERE WAS STILL NO INDICATION OF IF OR WHEN KISSINGER WOULD MEET
AGAIN WITH HANOI NEGOTIATORS. ZIEGLER SAID KISSINGER WAS STILL IN THE
WHITE HOUSE MONDAY BUT REFUSED TO GIVE ANY HINT OF HIS TRAVEL PLANS.
HE SAID THE WHITE HOUSE WOULD CONTINUE TO DISCLOSE KISSINGER'S
MEETINGS IN PARIS ONLY AFTER THEY WERE UNDER WAY.

THE COMMUNIST DELEGATION IN PARIS REFUSED TO SAY WHETHER THE U.S.
REFUSAL TO SIGN TODAY MEANT THE PEACE AGREEMENT WOULD BE SCUTTLED.
MRS. BINH DECLINED TO STATE OUTRIGHT WHETHER THE VIETNAMESE
COMMUNISTS WOULD SCRAP THE ACCORD BUT WAS CAREFUL TO AVOID TALK OF AN
OPEN BREAK AND SAID THE COMMUNISTS WOULD ATTEND THURSDAY'S REGULARLY
SCHEDULED WEEKLY PEACE TALKS IN PARIS.

028A

BOGGS 10-31

ANCHORAGE, ALASKA (UPI)--SNOW AND FOG MONDAY PREVENTED AIR FORCE PLANES FROM CONTINUING THE 15-DAY SEARCH FOR HOUSE MAJORITY LEADER HALE BOGGS AND THREE OTHER MEN WHO DISAPPEARED IN A LIGHT PLANE.

"WE ARE STANDING BY," MAJ. CHARLES SHELLEY SAID AT THE ELEMENT OF
AIR FORCE BASE SEARCH CENTER, NOTING THE PLANES WOULD RESUME THE
SEARCH WHEN THE SKIES CLEARED.

THE TWIN-ENGINE CESSNA DISAPPEARED OCT. 16 ON A FLIGHT FROM
ANCHORAGE TO JUNEAU WHERE BOGGS, A VETERAN LOUISIANA CONGRESSMAN, WAS
TO SPEAK AT A DEMOCRATIC FUND-RAISING EVENT. ALSO ABOARD WERE REP.
NICK PEGICH, D-ALASKA, HIS AIDE, RUSSELL BROWN, AND PILOT DON E.
JONZ.

AIP FORCE OFFICIALS CONCEDED THAT THE CHANCE OF THE FOUR MEN SURVIVING WAS GROWING SLIM. THEY DID NOT INDICATE WHEN THE SEARCH--ALREADY THE LONGEST IN ALASKA HISTORY--WOULD BE DISCONTINUED. THE COAST GUARD LAST WEEK REDUCED ITS EFFORTS.

6