FOREWORD

In the spring of 1960, a plan for a Summer Study on Arms Control was
developed under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
With the financial support of the Twentieth Century Fund, the group was
organized in mid-June under the general direction of Bernard T. Feld
of the Department of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
It continued in session until mid-September, with a nucleus of regular
participants and a number of part-time contributors and visitors. Some
50 persons were associated with the study in some capacity, from uni-
versities and research organizations across the country. Of these,
typically 20 or 25 were present at any one time. The group met at
M.I.T.'s Endicott House estate near Boston.

The group was under the general guidance of a steering committee composed of B. T. Feld, Chairman; D. G. Brennan, M.I.T.; P. M. Doty, Harvard; D. H. Frisch, M.I.T.; M. F. Millikan, M.I.T.; T. C. Schelling, Harvard; V. F. Weisskopf, M.I.T.; and J. B. Wiesner, M.I.T. After mid-September, several of the activities initiated during the summer were coordinated by D. G. Brennan. The project was terminated in January, 1961.

Among the immediate results of the study are four principal documents:
(1) a conceptual analysis of arms controls, with primary emphasis on
the military-policy aspects, by T. C. Schelling and M. H. Halperin;
(2) a discussion of specific plans and important components of arms
controls for the 1960's, edited by D. H. Frisch; (3) a volume of
collected seminar notes, working papers, and "exercises" produced
during the study; and (4) a short collection of papers relating to
non-physical inspection techniques ("psychological inspection"). (The
actual writing of item (1) was largely supported by the Harvard Center
for International Affairs.) Items (1) and (2) are intended for wide-
spread general distribution via the Twentieth Century Fund, while items
(3) and (4) have been reproduced in limited quantities for distribution
only to those professionally concerned with the subject. An independent
book by Arthur Hadley, based partly on his association with the Summer
Study, is scheduled to be published by Viking Press in 1961.

The general objectives of the study were to advance some aspects of the
intellectual state of the art in arms control and to provide some concrete
data on a few technical and strategic problems of potential importance.
We believe the several reports will demonstrate that these objectives
have been reasonably accomplished, though they leave untouched many wide
areas. The study group did not arrive at a consensus on recommended
policies for governmental action, but much of the material in the reports
will unquestionably be of considerable value in the further evolution of
national policy relating to arms control.

We appreciate the foresight of the Trustees of the Twentieth Century Fund in providing the financial support for a study that has enabled the production of useful material at the beginning of a period that seems likely to be both critical for and highly active in the further development of the subject.

Steering Committee of the Summer Study
Cambridge, Massachusetts

January, 1961

PREFATORY NOTE TO THE COLLECTED PAPERS

This volume of the work of the Summer Study consists of various documents produced in connection with, or made available to, the Study. The papers were largely organized and (in a few cases) edited by Garry Quinn, whose introduction below will explain the volume in more detail.

It should be stated here that many of these papers, especially the seminar notes, were not originally intended for publication or distribution in any form. They have been collected in this volume only because many students of these matters, including some who are exceptionally qualified, have found them useful in illuminating various aspects of the subject in spite of their very rough state. But the volume is definitely not intended for the general reader, and it must be emphasized that statements in the seminar notes and working papers are *not for quotation or attribution without explicit permission of the author concerned*. It is probable that there are many errors of fact in these papers, and it is certain that they are of highly variable quality.

Virtually all of the administrative work in connection with the production of this volume, and much of the editorial work, was performed by Miss Karin Plaskett, with the able assistance of Miss Virginia Furrate. The timely appearance of this volume is due in no small measure to their cheerful per-severance with wayward authors and study directors. The utility of the vol-ume has been increased by the presence of an index, prepared by Roberts Coward.

Requests for additional copies of this volume should be directed to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 280 Newton Street, Brook-line Station, Boston 46, Massachusetts, stating in detail the nature of the need for the volume.

D. G. Brennan

Cambridge, Massachusetts

January 1961

# INTRODUCTION TO THE COLLECTED PAPERS

The papers in this volume have been collected primarily for specialists in arms control and national security policy. Because of the nature of the Summer Study, we believe that the documents contain many provocative ideas not available elsewhere. For the same reason, they are not as organized or uniform as are the published volumes of Summer Study work.

If thought and discussion were the raw material of the Summer Study, these papers represent the refined ore. They are of two basic types -- records of seminars, and working papers.

Daily seminars were the dominant feature of the first weeks of the study. Their purpose was to supply common background, survey the "state of the art", air preconceived notions, and stimulate new thought on the complex questions they covered. Additional seminars were held later in the Summer.

The seminars were deliberately kept informal in order to stimulate the flow of ideas. (There really couldn't have been any other way to go about things, as wholly-formed concepts are few and far between at this stage of the study of arms control.) This is mentioned to emphasize that none of the participants should be held to account for statements attributed to him in the seminar records, whether or not the ubiquitous "perhaps" was captured by the secretariat. As a matter of fact, the seminar records were prepared from informal notes, uncleared by the speakers, and were intended not to pin anyone down, but almost the contrary -- to stimulate elaboration and dissection of all the ideas brought up.

The working papers form a heterogeneous group, having been turned out when their authors felt moved by the proper spirit. It turns out that most of them have served a useful purpose -- some to summarize a phase of the Study, or one man's impressions thereof; others to introduce a new phase; some to bring into sharper focus ideas which had become stock-in-trade without thorough examination; and not a few to provide some tangible or specific facts as inputs to the group's theorizing.

The two categories just described intersect in the form of certain working group papers. These are the product of informal and ever-varying groups of the Summer Study personnel who chose to draw apart in the later weeks to pursue particular topics of interest. In such a group the "200-missile" system was studied. Another such group delved into the field of psychological inspection. While this volume contains portions of these groups' output, more important parts are to be found in the appropriate published volumes.

The appropriate words of introduction, then, are that this volume samples many of the various aspects of the subject.

You will find in the Summer Study a generous helping of the "systems" approach to arms control. That is to say, the group was concerned primarily with the building and operation of arms control arrangements, small and grand. Their attention to component aspects of the system was guided by this interest. Among these components, attention tended to center on strategic and military affects of arms control, and also on technical problems, with lesser attention to socio-political effects and little indeed to economics. (For a balanced discussion of arms control from virtually all angles, see *Arms Control and National Security*, D. G. Brennan, Ed., Harcourt Brace, New York, to appear in 1961; based on the Fall 1960 issue of *Daedalus*.)

An attempt has been made to organize the following papers under reasonably logical sequence of headings. This effort falls short of complete success, for the simple reason that the original work was not neatly compartmentalized. Particularly in the case of the seminars, a wide variety of subjects is likely to creep into any given paper. No excuse is made for this; as already indicated, the group welcomed ideas whenever and whenever they arrived. For what it is worth, however, the following is a brief rundown on this volume.

We start off with four papers examining what we (the United States) are after in pursuing arms control, with important side glances at the aims of the Soviet Union. These papers are framed as questions more than as answers.

The next, and perhaps dominant, section revolves about the concept of stabilized deterrence. There is no denying that stabilization of the strategic balance was a major concern of the group. Most of the members see stabilized deterrence as the only feasible initial course in arms control. Accordingly, the group spent much of its early time in a general exploration of what stabilized deterrence might be, how it might be reached, and how things would be once we got there. The second part of this section, serving as a backup to the first, contains evaluations of technical factors contributing to stability (or instability), and should be of significant interest to military operations analysts.

Third, we have some studies of specific arms control systems. A subgroup of the Summer Study tried out a stabilized deterrence system which had met the superficial tests with a more searching examination. Another subgroup later played out several "war games" centering on various different systems, in the hope of bringing the Summer's work one step closer to the real world.

A section on steps beyond stabilized deterrence show that the latter was not the concern of the study. In fact, to represent the aspirations of the participants, this section would have to be many times longer. These later steps are seen more dimly, but it was felt important by many members to have a sense of ultimate direction at this date. This section also contains arguments showing why we should have minimum satisfaction with our first steps in arms control, and press beyond with utmost urgency.

We come now to a series of sections on making arms control work, specific arms control agreements, etc. This part of the outline is, however, spotty in emphasis. These sections in particular should be viewed as supplements to the other volumes of the reports. Duplication has been minimized.

Near the end, as if to return to Barber's question which opens the volume -- "Are we talking to ourselves?" -- we have another look at the men and nations whom we must face across the table in arms control negotiations. The look reveals vacua in our knowledge, and is useful primarily for this revalation.

Bringing up the rear is a bibliography on arms control and related subjects. It tries to be moderately complete, not critical.

Garry L. Quinn

CONTENTS

OBJECTIVES, EAST AND WEST

<table><tr><td>"Arms Control: A Search for Policy", Arthur Barber</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>"Are We Talking to Ourselves", Arthur Barber.</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>"NATO - A Reappraisal", Arthur Barber</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>Seminar, June 22: "Limited vs. Comprehensive Arms Control"</td><td>43</td></tr></table>

THE CALCULUS OF DETERRENCE

Toward Stabilized Deterrence

<table><tr><td>Seminar, June 20: "Deterrent Force Composition"</td><td>49</td></tr><tr><td>Seminar, June 29: "Deterrent Force Composition"</td><td>57</td></tr><tr><td>Seminar, July 11: "Security, Arms Control and Deterrence"</td><td>65</td></tr><tr><td>"Considerations on the Optimum Size for Deterrent Forces for the Case of Deterrence of Big Wars", Marvin Kalkstein</td><td>77</td></tr><tr><td>Seminar, June 21: "Deterrence".</td><td>81</td></tr><tr><td>"Psychological Factors in Deterrence", Thomas Milburn.</td><td>93</td></tr><tr><td>Seminar, August 19: "The Psychology of Deterrence".</td><td>97</td></tr><tr><td>Seminar, July 7: "Informal Discussions with Professor Hans Bethe"</td><td>103</td></tr><tr><td>Seminar, September 13: "A Second Informal Discussion with H. A. Bethe"</td><td>109</td></tr><tr><td>"Steps to a Stable and Effective Defense", Frank Bothwell.</td><td>113</td></tr></table>

Data on Vulnerability and Stability

<table><tr><td>"A Technique for Estimating the Vulnerability of Land-Mobile Missiles", John Phelps, et.al.</td><td>115</td></tr><tr><td>"Some Data for Use in Estimating the Vulnerability of Missile-Launching Submarines", John Phelps, et.al.</td><td>125</td></tr><tr><td>"The Destabilizing Effect of Changes in Missile Performance Parameters", John Phelps, et.al.</td><td>131</td></tr><tr><td>"Nuclear Exchange Ratios", John Mullen</td><td>137</td></tr><tr><td>"Some Probabilistic Factors in Deterrence Models", John Phelps and Winthrop Smith.</td><td>143</td></tr></table>

Exercises in Stabilized Deterrence

<table><tr><td>Seminar, July 11: "Some Implications of a 200-Missile Stabilized Deterrence Agreement - Part 1, Strategic Problems", John Phelps, Morton Halperin, Arthur Barber, Thomas Milburn.</td><td>151</td></tr><tr><td>Synopsis of Exercise on Possible Modes of Outbreak of War, Max Singer</td><td>165</td></tr></table>

BEYOND DETERRENCE

<table><tr><td>"Shortcomings of a Stabilized Nuclear Deterrent", Jay Orear</td><td>.183</td></tr><tr><td>Seminar, July 18-29: "Stabilized Deterrence as One Stage of a General and Complete Disarmament Program"</td><td>.187</td></tr><tr><td>Seminar, June 23: "The Case for and against General and Complete Disarmament"</td><td>.195</td></tr></table>

MAKING ARMS CONTROL WORK

Inspection Techniques

<table><tr><td>Seminar, July 12: "Some Implications of a 200-Missile Stabilized Deterrence Agreement - Part 2, Problems of Inspection", Thomas Schelling, H. Roberts Coward, Bernard Feld, Winthrop Smith, Marvin Gewirtz, Arthur Hadley</td><td>.201</td></tr><tr><td>Seminar, August 17-18: "The Role of Psychological and Personnel Inspection".</td><td>.227</td></tr><tr><td>Seminar, September 1: Dr. Joseph Kubis</td><td>.245</td></tr></table>

Role of Inspection and Intelligence

<table><tr><td>"The Role of Inspection in Arms Control".</td><td>.247</td></tr><tr><td>"Information and Arms Control", John Phelps</td><td>.253</td></tr></table>

Phasing into Arms Control

<table><tr><td>"A Suggestion for Phased, Proportional Disarmament", Joseph Salerno</td><td>.261</td></tr><tr><td>"Phasing of Arms Controls: The Territorial Method", Louis Sohn</td><td>.265</td></tr></table>

NEGOTIATION AND AGREEMENT

<table><tr><td>Seminar, June 27: "Role of International Agencies; Legal Problems"</td><td>.271</td></tr><tr><td>"Constructing Rules That Affect Governments", Roger Fisher</td><td>.275</td></tr><tr><td>"Unilateral Restraints vs. International Agreements", Louis Sohn.</td><td>.289</td></tr><tr><td>"The Peacemaking Process", Louis Sohn.</td><td>.293</td></tr></table>

SPECIFIC AGREEMENT AREAS

Nuclear Weapons

<table><tr><td>Seminar, July 1: "Stockpile Problem"</td><td>.297</td></tr></table>

Missiles and Space

<table><tr><td>Seminar, July 1: "Outer Space"</td><td>.303</td></tr><tr><td>"Cost of a Radar Network for a Missile Test Ban", Joseph Salerno.</td><td>.311</td></tr><tr><td>"Some Problems of Missile Production Inspection", John Phelps</td><td>.315</td></tr></table>

["\"A Physical Device for Moderating Nuclear War\", Jay Orear .331", "Surprise Attack", "Seminar, June 24: \"Surprise Attack Agreements\" . . . . . . .333", "Test Ban", "Seminar, June 28: \"The Test Ban\" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .339", "R and D Constraints", "Seminar, June 30: \"Research and Development Constraints\" .345", "KNOWING THE OTHER SIDE", "Seminar, August 22: \"The Problem of China\". . . . . . . . . . . . .353", "\"Chinese Military Policy\", Morton Halperin . . . . . . . . . . . . .361", "\"The USSR and Arms Control\", George Fischer. . . . . . . . . . . .375", "\"Communism and Coexistence: The Key to Peace?, H. Roberts", "Coward. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .383", "\"A Short History of Disarmament\", Louis Sohn . . . . . . . . . . . .401", "PERSPECTIVES", "\"Arms Control: Some Perspectives and Priorities\", John Phelps .435", "BIBLIOGRAPHY", "\"Bibliography on Arms Control and Related Problems\", H. Roberts Coward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ARMS CONTROL: A SEARCH FOR POLICY

Arthur Barber

On the Promenade des Bastions in Geneva stands a statue of John Calvin, a leader of the Protestant reformation, who believed the future was predesigned by God. Recently other men have come to Geneva who also see their destiny in a predetermined future. They speak of peaceful coexistence in a disarmed world. Paradoxically, the Western alliance, custodians of the Christian tradition, seem confused by the challenge of peace. Weeks after the departure of the Soviet representatives, the Western delegation continues to remain, attempting to find a policy in the villas along Lake Geneva. Their search is doomed to failure for a new disarmament policy can only be found in Washington.

Despite Mr. Eaton's claims to the contrary, the collapse of the summit and the Geneva disarmament conference have dashed any hopes of the present administration for possible Soviet-American agreement. Any new policy will be formulated by a new administration in 1961.

Before a new disarmament policy can be formulated, a reappraisal must be made of our military posture and its relationship to our national objectives. To date our response to the challenge of peaceful coexistence has been confused and ineffective, not because of any fault on the part of our negotiators, but because our policy has been confused. After our Army was reduced to 114 divisions because of budget limitations, Mr. Khrushchev announced reduction in the Soviet Army as a step toward peaceful coexistence. On February 3, the President said that he favored arming our NATO allies with nuclear weapons; when the Kremlin protested, we announced that we had no intention of distributing nuclear weapons to NATO. This despite General Norstadt's request for 300 land mobile Polarises.

As a result of Soviet initiative, we have drifted into a policy of arms limitations on nuclear weapons testing and distribution without any safeguards. Our policy has lacked initiative, held fixed by equal and opposite pressure from two vocal groups: the supporters of the status quo, who believe any arms control agreement will undermine our national security, and the disarmers, who believe that somehow by removing weapons we will eliminate the tensions which have led to their creation. Unfortunately, statements from leading scientists and public petitioners can not make up for careful deliberation upon the issues at stake. We will make little progress until we cease thinking of arms control in terms of a peace treaty and view it for what it may become, a new dynamic and perhaps more rational phase of the Soviet-American conflict. The concept that a nation's military posture should be an instrument of national posture is not a new idea. Yet until recently, despite sharp limitations upon the application of military power in Korea, Lebanon, and Formosa, we have been unwilling to seriously consider the negotiation of mutual arms limitations.

At present although only a handful of governmental personnel are working on arms control problems, they suffer from no shortage of advice. Intellectuals and arm chair strategists across the nation stand poised and ready to advise the government. From Harvard yard to the shores of Muscle Beach, scholars prepare arms control programs or dissertations on dis-

11

armament problems. Some suggest lie detector tests for Premier Khrushchev while others propose joint Soviet-American expeditions to the moon. In Washington, couriers shuttle between the Pentagon and the new State Department building, carrying numerous disarmament proposals. Yet behind all this activity there is frighteningly little substance.

The current maze of interdepartmental committees and advisory groups in Washington effectively stifles any new creative proposals. Indeed one of the major problems of our negotiating team appears to be the winning of Defense Department and Atomic Energy Commission approval to any substantive proposal. One of the first steps to achieve a more effective arms control program must be the establishment of a permanent arms control organization capable of analyzing the complex problems of controlling armaments in a world of shifting political alliances.

Detailed studies by such an agency should leave us in a better position to negotiate than we have been in the past. During the nuclear test ban negotiations, we prepared an agreement in considerable detail over a period of many months only to find that the technical basis for our negotiations had changed. In view of the weapons revolution of the past decade, this is not surprising. What is surprising is our attempt to negotiate on the basis of a static technology. Although we must negotiate the initial conditions for any arms control agreement, it is equally important that we establish a joint Soviet-American organization to adapt the spirit of the agreement to changing circumstances. In a very fundamental sense, we do not know what future inspectors will wish to inspect.

Our strategy in a period of arms control can only be viable and useful if it truly reflects the power relationships between this nation and the rest of the world. Thus, the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament within four years with a Control Authority under the Security Council, subject to a Soviet veto, cannot be taken seriously. We could have no assurance that, if general and complete disarmament were achieved on Sunday, a new arms race would not break out on Monday. Indeed, it seems certain that a totally disarmed world would be even less stable than the tenuous balance of terror that exists today. One need look no further than the Congo to see the result of a suddenly disarmed society.

Inasmuch as neither we nor the Soviets are likely at the present time to surrender national sovereignty to a U.N. or other force which could enforce compliance, any Soviet infraction of an agreement could not be punished except by some American response. The possibility that World III might start over some unenforceable disarmament agreement, however ironic, nonetheless exists. We cannot wait until a period of crisis to determine our response to a Soviet violation of an arms control agreement.

The conception of a violation itself is confusing. Some legalists apparently believe that we would have to "prove" a violation to the U.N., the international court, or some other administrative body. In the absence of any enforcement agency, the question of proof can at best be a minor issue. Clearly, both we and the Soviets would make our own determinations of any infringement on the basis, not only of inspection teams, but intelligence agencies and whatever other information is available to us. No one seriously

12

believes that we would maintain the present nuclear test ban if we had reliable information of Soviet violations.

The cliches of the cold war hide the fact that our interests coincide with Soviet interests in certain vital areas. First is the reduction in vulnerability of our strategic forces. Whether we wish it or not, our weapons are powerful silent spokesmen which reflect our national strengths and weaknesses. However secure and powerful the Titan missiles currently being installed in hardened sites in New Mexico, they are far less provocative than the vulnerable intermediate range ballistic missiles planned for installation in Europe. Because of their vulnerability, soft ballistic missiles on the continent could only be counted upon if the United States planned to strike first. Further installation of such weapons on the continent can lead our friends as well as the Soviets to question our intent or our wisdom. As long as we and the Soviets have soft or vulnerable offensive forces, the great advantages of striking first may lead to a war which neither desires. If both sides have enough confidence in the invulnerability of their deterrent power to wait until one or more bombs go off, we may well have averted a war triggered by erroneous signals from our Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radar or the Midas Satellite.

Another area of mutual interest is each nation's responsibility to maintain tight control over its atomic forces. Both the Soviets and we can sleep better if we are assured that there is no chance that a garbled message or a communication failure would lead to an attack by our airborne alert forces, the Polaris submarine, or our soft ballistic missiles. We wish to be sure that no Soviet and American weapons will fire if some component fails. We want our weapons to fail "safe". We must take care, however, to insure that our weapons are not so "safe" that they cannot fire, for then our deterrent posture will be a hollow facade.

Even when our forces are hardened, the danger of an accidental missile firing or bomb detonation, however unlikely, will still remain. In a period of tension, an accident along the borders of the Soviet Union such as the recent Bomarc explosion could trigger a chain of events leading to war if it were not immediately recognized as an accident. We therefore have an interest now to establish procedures, formal or informal, to make arrangements for accidents. Although present emphasis upon warning is important in a period of tension, to provide the Soviet definite information that we are not attacking is equally important.

The development of less vulnerable weapons, and a more reliable, and hence a more responsible, system to control these weapons can be carried out on a national basis. Any agreement to limit the number and distribution of weapons must be negotiated. While Khrushchev's proposal for complete disarmament is unacceptable, it is equally clear that an unlimited arms race with concurrent world-wide distribution of nuclear weapons is equally unacceptable. Recently, General Medaris testified before Congress that our atomic weapon stockpile was at least thirty thousand megatons. This is equal to ten tons of explosives for every man, woman, and child on the face of the earth. To change the present arms race to an arms control environment, we must first limit the areas where nuclear arms are located.

13

Last December we signed the first area agreement treaty. During the Geneva negotiations we proposed a ban on nuclear arms in outer space. The Eden and Rapocki proposal for removing nuclear weapons from Central Europe and the Soviet proposal for a nuclear free zone in Asia are other area limitations proposals.

Having limited the extension of the arms race, the next step will be the determination where we may then stabilize the arms race consistent with the requirements of national security. To do so, we must determine the number of strategic weapons required to provide an adequate deterrent. This question is exceedingly complex and depends not only upon the performance and vulnerability of our forces but upon the quantity and quality of Soviet strategic forces. At the heart of the matter is the question of how many megatons delivered on the Soviet Union constitute an adequate deterrent. General Power has said:

> If anybody tells you they know what the minimum deterrent is, tell them for me they are liars. The closest to one man who would know what the minimum deterrent is would be Mr. Khrushchev, and frankly, I don't think he knows from one week to another.

While we can never be sure that any level of destruction will deter aggression, we can calculate the number of megatons delivered on the Soviet Union to accomplish different levels of destruction. Everett and Pugh of the Weapon Systems Evaluation Group have recently published a paper which shows that 500 megatons delivered on the Soviet Union would cause 40 million deaths, a figure comparable to Soviet losses in World War II. Certainly, a military posture which could guarantee such a response after attack would cool the ardor of Mr. Khrushchev, if he were planning an attack.

In any case, a new administration must determine the level of deterrence required for national security to provide the basis for any arms control agreement. In theory, then, we should build an "adequate" deterrent which is "invulnerable". Unfortunately, there are no invulnerable weapons systems. While hardened ballistic missile sites may require three to ten weapons to destroy, they can be destroyed. If the Soviets were to develop long range air defense aircraft such as the Navy Missileer, they could attack airborne alert aircraft in this country. While the Polaris submarines are hidden, it is no secret that their limited range requires them to take stations close to the Soviet borders. Any attacks upon them will be similarly hidden and the possibility exists that at some time in the future, as Soviet anti-submarine weapons improve, we may begin to lose Polaris submarines to "unknown" causes. Any attempt to protect the submarines with destroyers or other ships would reveal the submarine's position and compromise its effectiveness.

While inspection can no longer provide warning against surprise attack, it is absolutely essential to determine the Soviet strategic posture and thus maintain confidence in the invulnerability of our deterrent force. An inspection system need not be perfect to be useful. If we were to stabilize at a level of 500 hardened missiles, an uncertainty of 50 missiles in the Soviet force would not be critical. However, if we had agreed on a stable level of 50 missiles, the secret construction of

14

another 50 could be disastrous. Indeed, our willingness to reduce forces
as inspection systems are improved may provide a means to motivate the
Soviet to permit tighter inspection.

Over a decade ago, Winston Churchill said, "We arm to parley." In 1961,
negotiations will resume with the Soviet Union. A new administration must
formulate an arms control strategy which reflects our national objectives.
For if we fail to speak for ourselves, our weapons will speak for us, in
one way or another.

15

ACS-W3

8/17/60

SUMMER STUDY ON ARMS CONTROL
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Brookline Station, Massachusetts

ARE WE TALKING TO OURSELVES?

Art Barber

I

There are many military scholars who believe that the rise of modern
liberal democracy brought an end to the use of military forces as an
instrument of national policy. The need for popular and extremist
slogans, such as "Unconditional Surrender", are necessary to arouse
the passions of the electorate to sacrifice the blood, sweat, and tears,
or dollars necessary for victory.

While modern scholarship has made clear the questionable results of acts
such as the atom bombing of Japan, which resulted from an inflexible war
policy, we continue to maintain the mythological division between
"military questions" and foreign policy questions. General MacArthur
clearly stated this:

> The general definition which for many decades has been
> accepted was that war was the ultimate process of politics;
> that when all other political means failed, you then go
> to force; and that when you do that, the balance of control
> . . . the minute you reach the killing stage, is the control
> of the military. A theater commander, in any campaign, is not
> merely limited to a handling of his troops; he commands that
> whole area politically, economically, and militarily. You have
> got to trust at the stage of the game when politics fail, and
> the military take over, you must trust the military . . . I

Clausewitze's thesis that military force is an instrument of policy is completely foreign to those who believe the objective is to "win" any battle or negotiation. When issues are presented in such clear terms that they arouse popular support among Congress and the electorate, a rational analysis of policy problems is difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, our defense policy since 1945 has, in large measure, been determined by our emotions rather than our national objectives. Having "won" in 1945, we unilaterally disarmed. By September, 1949, the explosion of the first Soviet A-bomb brought fear of atomic war into our personal lives, and within a month we rushed off to build the SAGE air defense system; in 1956, the Soviets flew a few jet bombers and, faced with an airplane gap,

Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on
Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1951), p. 45.

we built over 1,000 B-52s. As Soviet intercontinental power grew, we began to fear limited aggression. The concept of limited atomic war, however illusory, was adopted to assuage our fears. The successful tests of Soviet ICBMs in September 1957, followed by Sputnik in 1957, created a missile gap in our minds, which can be resolved only by the vast building program of Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, and Polaris. Similarly, our atomic weapons stockpile appears to be one or two orders of magnitude greater than any possible national requirement. In short, our policy has been based more upon fears and emotional needs than upon our national objectives.

There can be no doubt that the present emphasis upon bomb tests and disarma-
ments has resulted primarily from misinformation about fall-out and the fears
of genetic mutation. We have been heading in the right direction for the wrong
reasons. While the fears of the electorate are a powerful political tool, they
are potentially extremely dangerous. The American people today have strongly
ambivalent feelings on atomic weapons. Their implied destructiveness makes them
distasteful and yet because of our fear of the Soviet Union we need them to feel
secure. Even though the relieving of these anxieties is worthwhile, it is not
sufficient. We must establish positive rather than negative objectives. A suc-
cessful arms-control policy must be motivated by a desire to do great deeds
rather than by a fear of dying.

The conclusion is that we should first determine this nation's political objec-
tives. Second, we should examine our military posture to determine whether this
position supports these objectives. Through unilateral action or negotiations
we must use our weapons (not in war) to achieve our objectives. Probably the
most important aspect of arms control is to establish the principle that arms
have no raison d'etre beyond the support of clearly defined national objectives
(for national objectives see Appendix A).

II.

Assuming that the participants of this study support a national policy of arms control or disarmament, it is interesting to note the discrepancies in organizational location that various individuals recommend. Some recommend location in the State Department, some in the Executive Office of the President, while others recommend a separate agency. If the thesis that we must restore armaments to its classic role as an instrument of policy is correct, then I think the concept of a separate agency or an establishment in the Executive Office of the President would be politically disastrous. The Civil Defense Program OCDM has been ineffective over the past decade despite the fact or because of the fact that it is located in the Office of the President.

New programs require three things:

1) New people who can promote their careers by effective participation

2) Political support at the Executive level

3) The information upon which to base a sound policy

One and Two are not enough; a sound policy must be based on facts. Note the AEC and State Department rationale for continued testing based on "military require-

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ments". No argument other than close analysis can judge these "military requirements". At present and for some time in the future this will be impossible outside the Defense Department. Professor Bowie, formerly head of policy planning in the State Department, has said he found it impossible to get certain information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Defense Department.

Conclusion: Arms-Control policy must be formulated within the Defense and State Departments at the Undersecretary level and then brought to the Secretaries and the President for approval. When approved, the Chief Executive and the Secretaries must exercise authority to see that their subordinates support the program. It may require some resignations before the strong hand of the Executive is felt, but that may be necessary to make the point.

### III.

The current national shopping list which we seem to have made up has numerous items, but for simplicity's sake they can be reduced to:

1) Stable Deterrent

2) Open Societies

3) Open Skies and Inspections

4) Reduce and Control Nuclear Warhead Supplies

In short, we want a stable deterrent in an arms-control environment. Unfortunately (or fortunately), this is not what the Soviets have been proposing. They want disarmament. We have absolutely no reason to believe the Soviets will agree to the types of inspection systems proposed without disarmament. If we want to negotiate successfully, we must determine what we are willing to give as well as what we want to get. Despite the newspaper scares to the contrary, the Soviets are negotiating from a position of military and material weakness when compared to the United States. What they do have is a growing economy supported by a nation dedicated to a vision of national destiny which makes them willing to sacrifice for the future. When Premier Khrushchev said our grandchildren would be socialists, this was not mere propaganda; he believed it.

Faced by such a challenge from a closed and mysterious society, one cannot predict our national response over the next decade. Indeed, it is quite possible that the Soviets may well scare us into irrational acts which will isolate us from our allies, e.g., if we pressure our allies to adopt tactical nuclear weapons.

In short, I believe the Soviets to have done a masterful job of pursuing their aims from a position of military weakness. Furthermore, this weakness by no means motivates them towards arms control. They didn't accept the Baruch Plan for atomic control after World War II when they had no bombs. Furthermore, this weakness makes inspection and widespread knowledge of their posture much less attractive than such inspection would be if they were equal or superior to us.

Conclusion: We appear to have developed a sound understanding of what we want. We should now spend some time determining what Soviet desires we should be prepared to grant to achieve these objects.

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ACS-W17

11/17/60

NATO - A REAPPRAISAL
Arthur Barber

I
Arms Control and the NATO Alliance

In December 1949, the NATO military committees reached agreement on a strategic plan for the defense of Europe. Despite the existence of American atomic weapons and the recent testing of Soviet atomic weapons, the plan provided for the raising of a large standing army on the continent, a naval force to keep the sea lanes open, and tactical aircraft to support ground forces. Today, over a decade later, the NATO military forces still reflect these strategic decisions. NATO military strategy has yet to come to grips with the realities of an atomic war. The basic NATO weakness is the ambiguity of its strategy. It has atomic weapons but is not equipped to use them effectively. The NATO armies, while capable, are small in number. As the collapse of the summit has recently demonstrated, the unity of the NATO nations against communist attack has perhaps never been greater; yet, the political objectives of NATO have never been less clear. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that NATO military strategy is confused. The result has been a force of questionable effectiveness developed at a very great cost.

Before any sound NATO strategy can be developed, the United States must clarify its position within the NATO community. When the NATO alliance was formed, Europe was struggling to regain its strength following World War II. There was no question that the economic and military strength of the alliance lay in the United States. Furthermore, the United States was invulnerable to Soviet attack. Today, this situation has changed. Europe has made an amazing economic recovery and is now well equipped to support the military forces required for its defense. Soviet ballistic missiles can strike targets anywhere in the United States. Faced with this situation, American policy today faces three alternatives: the development of independent European community capable of providing its own military forces and pursuing its own political objectives, the continuation of the present trend toward independent national forces, or a reformation of NATO based upon closer political, economic and military cooperation. In 1957, in his speech to the NATO council, President Eisenhower said, "We have all been guilty of faulty military planning." If Europe is to achieve security with freedom, then major changes must be made in NATO's military and diplomatic policies. Then, and only then, will NATO be in a position to enter serious disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union.

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Before a closer alliance can be formed, we must attempt to resolve certain outstanding political questions which, unresolved, continue to create friction within the NATO community. Our policy toward Germany represents perhaps the major policy problem. Our stated objective of unifying Germany within the framework of the NATO alliance is a demonstrable failure. Our policy of liberating the satellites died with the crushing of the Hungarian rebellion. While we may, with justice, condemn the Soviet Union for crushing the Hungarian bid for independence, we must recognize the hypocrisy of a policy which preached revolution and yet ignored the pleas for help from the Hungarian freedom fighters.

We must bring our policies and our capabilities into closer alignment. Russia will not relax her grip on the satellites as long as powerful military forces such as the German army stand on the borders of Western Europe. If we are not prepared to take the military initiative to obtain our objectives by force, we must face the fact that any improvement in the status of the satellites and Germany must be achieved through negotiations with the Soviet Union.

While we profess a desire to create greater freedom in the satellites, it can be argued that our military policies are doing quite the opposite. The recent rapid growth of the West German Army and Air Force can only serve to drive Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other satellites closer to Russia. The Rapocki plan and other proposals for an atom-free zone in Europe testify to Polish and satellite fears of the distribution of atomic weapons on the continent of Europe. Any attempt to accede to the recent demand of the German army for atomic weapons can only provide a strengthening of the Warsaw pact. Widespread distribution of atomic weapons in Europe is feared, not only by Russia and the satellites, but by many of our NATO allies including Britain, Turkey, Italy and Canada. An American policy supporting widespread distribution of nuclear weapons will divide rather than unite the alliance. Although we have supported such a policy since 1955, we have not carried it out. At the present time, our vacillation on this question has irritated both our allies and our enemies.

On February 3rd, at his press conference, the President said that he favored the distribution of atomic weapons to NATO. Shortly thereafter, following a Moscow protest, an announcement was made that we would not distribute atomic weapons to NATO allies. Despite this stated policy, it is clear that General Norstad and Mr. Paul Henri Spaak are planning weapon systems for NATO which will be useless unless atomic warheads are available. While Mr. Spaak, and European analysts such as Pierre Gallois support the use of tactical nuclear weapons for the defense of NATO, it is by no means clear that this desire is widespread. In England, there have been protest marches about the Thor IRBM sites and mass meetings attended by over 200,000 people in Trafalgar Square. Despite opposition from Mr. Gaitskell, the British Labor Party recently approved a resolution which, if adopted, would mean British abandonment of the concept of nuclear deterrence. In Germany, a group of German scientists, including Heisenberg and Von Laue, prepared a protest against German atomic weapons. Certainly

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an American policy to distribute nuclear weapons throughout NATO may
divide rather than unite the alliance.

The failure to formulate a coherent NATO strategy has resulted in increased nationalism at the expense of NATO unity. Premier DeGaulle's recent demand for a veto over the use of nuclear weapons by any member of the western alliance and his continued refusal to permit, in France, atomic weapons which are not under the control of France, has created a major gap in NATO strategic planning. In a time requiring closer international cooperation, DeGaulle has resurrected the concept of French nationalism of the late 19th century. Independent national armed forces, such as France proposes to develop, have little military relevance to the challenge of Soviet ballistic missiles in the middle of the 20th century.

It would, however, be a mistake to believe that France's development of an independent atomic capability is primarily motivated by a desire to build a deterrent posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Rather it is an essential part of DeGaulle's program to establish France as the leader of western Europe. It was only after DeGaulle had failed to obtain Washington approval for a Franco-British triumvirate to guide NATO strategy that he began the development of an independent atomic force. Concurrently, it has been reported that DeGaulle believes that the United States will eventually withdraw from the continent of Europe. Consequently, he believes that France must prepare now to undertake the role of leader of the European community now nominally held by the United States.

DeGaulle's dreams of atomic weapon diplomacy extend beyond Europe to Africa. In July, Premier Debre, speaking before the French national assembly, said, "(France must have weapons) because our allies do not always share our conceptions, notably concerning Africa."

The revolutionary guerilla war which has dragged out inconclusively in Algeria has had profound effects upon NATO. Originally, France was to contribute 20 divisions to NATO; today, with a large part of the French army in Algeria, there are only two French divisions serving in NATO. France has been under increasing pressure to bring an end to the war which has dragged on inconclusively for six years. In the last general assembly of the United Nations, the United States, refusing to support France's claim that the Algeria war was an internal affair, abstained from the vote on a resolution which would have put the matter before the General Assembly. Russia has recently granted de facto recognition to the rebel "government" and has indicated it will provide support to the revolutionary government. French sensitivity on the Algerian question has not only had profound effects upon NATO strategy, but has also affected operations such as the Congo airlift. The French government persuaded the United States government to cancel a press briefing on the Congo airlift carried out by Air Force units based at Chateroux.

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II

NATO Strategy: New Wine in Old Bottles

"The true reasons for the deal are political, the first from which almost all the other followed, was the absence of policy; from the beginning to the end, our leaders never knew what they wanted . . . They didn't know how to engage the nation in war or how to make peace . . . They only knew how to take from day to day bastard measures always out-stripped by events."

(General Henri Novarre, a former NATO officer who led French troops to defeat in Indo-China)

NATO strategy, like Gaul, can be divided into three parts. From its inception in 1949 until 1954, NATO strategy was directed toward large-scale high-explosive operations similar to those of World War II. With the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States in 1954, NATO strategy could best be described as World War II plus atomic weapons -- the application of new weapons to old strategic concepts. By 1957, it had become clear that, in the event of atomic war, NATO was more symbol than substance. Since that time, NATO strategy has been torn between the realities of atomic warfare and a desire to maintain a capability for conventional military operations.

The earliest NATO short-term plan, formulated in 1949, was elementary. Its purpose was to save as many troops as possible in case of war. Provisions were made for evacuations through the channel ports and retreat over the Pyrenees to Spain. According to an oft-quoted tale of the time, when asked what the Russian army needed to reach the channel, a NATO staff officer replied, "Shoes". The twelve divisions then stationed on the continent were deployed for occupation duty rather than the defense of Western Europe. The long-range plans of the time provided for the raising of a force of 100 divisions to defend Central Europe. Despite the availability of atomic weapons, the strategic concepts were only slightly different than those of World War II.

Shortly after assuming office, the Eisenhower administration issued National Security Council Paper 162-2, establishing the policy that the armed services could plan on using nuclear weapons wherever needed. This was rapidly implemented by the transfer of atomic weapons to Europe. As early as October, 1954, Field Marshal Montgomery, Vice Deputy Allied Supreme Commander in Europe said:

"In fact, we have reached the point of no return as regards the use of thermo-nuclear weapons in the hot war."

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Montgomery's statement was confirmed two months later when the North Atlantic Council granted permission to the NATO military staff to base its plans on the use of atomic weapons. Strangely enough, the Council explicitly reserved the right to withhold permission to use the weapons but, nevertheless, permitted the planning of a force which would be relatively useless without them.

Operation Carté Blanche and similiar NATO atomic war exercises in the mid-50's demonstrated the weakness of NATO nuclear strategy. While fighter bombers and the 280 mm atomic cannon could destroy attacking enemy armies, the prompt destruction of the fighter bases and the atomic cannon were assured as soon as a modest number of weapons were available to the Soviet forces. Furthermore, there were clear indications that Soviet troops had tactical atomic weapons as early as 1954.

Winston Churchill, a political realist, early recognized that the defenses of NATO depended not upon NATO forces on the continent, but upon the United States Strategic Air Command. When the Royal Air Force suggested that a public statement be issued to this effect, Churchill refused for fear that the United States would never retain its troops on the continent solely as a symbol without strategic purpose in a general war. The British defense statement of 1954, which Churchill was reported to have prepared, states:

> "The government will continue to regard it as a defense measure of the first importance to maintain the strength and efficiency of the British forces on the continent assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The primary deterrent, however, remains the atomic bomb and the ability of the highly organized and trained United States strategic airpower to use it."

By 1957 it had become clear that in an atomic war the NATO shield was, in fact, a plate glass covering on a fire alarm: although the shield could be shattered readily, supposedly it would bring the Strategic Air Command to the rescue. General Norsted said:

> "The aggressor knows that the start of war would invite his own destruction...and here lies the value of the shield force. If this critical line which the 15 NATO nations have vowed to defend is held with reasonable force, then force must be used to breach it. The decision to apply that force would be terrible in its implications. It must consider not only the stout shield in immediate defense but the sharp sword of our strategic retaliation."

One month earlier, November 1957, General Gruenther in his farewell speech to NATO had been more specific:

> "Any military encroachment of the Soviet Union in Western Europe will lead to instant destruction of the Soviet Union by the American Air Force...Even the elimination of African or European SAC bases by Soviet rockets cannot prevent the retaliatory attack."

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Exactly two weeks later, eight B-52's completed non-stop trips from 14,000 to 17,000 miles, a clear demonstration of this capability. Today, the rapid growth of Soviet thermonuclear weapons has left NATO dependent upon the Strategic Air Command for its defense. As a result, NATO strategy can best be described as confused.

The German rearmament program is an example of NATO strategic confusion. In 1945, President Roosevelt said:

> "It is clear to us that if Germany and Italy and Japan...or any one of them...remain armed at the end of this war or are permitted to rearm, they will again, and inevitably, embark on an ambitious career of world conquest." - Roosevelt Message to Congress, 7 Jan. 1945

Yet only five years later in September 1950, at the North Atlantic Council Meeting, Dean Acheson proposed the rearming of Germany. The change in American policy had been brought about only a few days before. As a result of the invasion of Korea in July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were under pressure to commit troops to the continent of Europe. They finally agreed on condition that the United States would support German rearmament.

Despite the council agreement, progress was extremely slow. It was not until March 1954 that the German Parliament passed a constitutional law permitting the government to have responsibility for defense. It wasn't until the London conference of 1956 that Germany joined NATO. There were many reasons for this delay. Not the least was the confusion concerning NATO's strategy and Germany's role within that strategy. Indeed, it is fair to say that NATO "forward strategy" was adopted largely to allay German fears of a NATO retreat behind the Rhine rather than by any critical military analysis.

Confusion concerning the use of atomic weapons has further confounded German defense preparations. As late as August 1956, Chancellor Adenauer said:

> "After the debate on conventional and nuclear weapons started by the Americans, I would like to stress distinctly that, for the time being, I consider it unsuitable to shift the center of gravity to atomic weapons. I am of the opinion that it is of special importance to localize small conflicts that may occur, and for this we need divisions with conventional weapons."

The debate in the German Parliament on the military service bill in July 1956 provides an interesting indication of German policy. A critic of the bill said:

> The strategy of NATO leaves no room for doubt that an armed conflict in Europe...will not remain conventional conflict...The NATO plans are based upon immediate and direct employment of atomic weapons in the event of conflict in Europe.

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The supporting government spokesmen defended the bill as essential in order that atomic weapons would not be required, and said that the army was necessary "to the end of avoiding the use of the most horrible of all means of destruction, if the worst comes to the worst". The military service bill finally was passed. It provided for a continued build-up of German armed forces in accordance with NATO strategy until such time as general and controlled disarmament could be achieved. German plans at that time provided for a conventional force of 500,000 men.

In the Fall of 1956, following discussions with Assistant Secretary of Defense, Donald Quarles, there was a sharp change in German policy toward the adoption of atomic weapons. In October, Theodore Blank, the German Defense Minister, who had supported the concept of conventional weapons for the German armed forces, was replaced by Joseph Strauss, an advocate of nuclear weapons.

Later, in a discussion of the question, Adenauer said:

> "If the Federal Republic refused to make use of progress in armament techniques, should the strategic planning of NATO demand it, the Federal Republic would find itself excluded from NATO."

Early in 1957, under pressure from the United States and Defense Minister Strauss, the German government said it would be willing to have the German army equipped with atomic weapons. In a very real sense this policy resulted from the "new look" defense policy of the Eisenhower administration, which proposed to substitute atomic weapons for manpower. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in announcing the policy of massive retaliation, said we would:

> "retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing... As a result, it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at less cost."

This is a policy which Secretary of Defense Wilson described more succinctly as "a bigger bang for a buck".

Thus, Adenauer was under pressure, not only from the United States and NATO, but also from internal political pressure, to adopt "modern" weapons, and thus permit force reductions similiar to those being carried out by other NATO nations. In the Fall of 1956, for example, an article in the New York Times on the subject of the reduction of American troops led to German reduction of service for conscripts from 18 months to 12 months, and subsequently reduced the planned strength of the German army from 500,000 men to 315,000 men.

On 26 February 1958, General Norsted said that atomic weapons for the German army were "absolutely indispensable". At the meeting, in April 1958, of the NATO Defense Ministers, the five-year plan for the defense of Europe was

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approved and confirmed the earlier decision to base NATO strategy on the use of tactical nuclear weapons. On 19 August of this year, the Fuehrungstaf of the Bundeswehr, the German General Staff, issued a memorandum, approved by Defense Minister Strauss, which said, in part:

> "The soldiers of the Bundeswehr have the right to the weapons that are at least equal to those of the opponent. The responsibility to the soldiers put into their trust requires Bundeswehr leaders to demand nuclear armament, which has become indispensable to the shield forces."

Although the demand had repercussions throughout Europe, the dilemma of the German Fuehrungstaf is apparent. They have supported the United States-NATO policy of atomic strategy only to find that atomic weapons are not available.

Despite Germany's announced intention to support NATO atomic strategy, her aircraft program shows so such indication. In 1956, at the London conference, Defense Minister Strauss stated that Bonn was willing to continue organization of the Luftwaffe to the extent that aircraft were donated by other NATO nations. He told the NATO authorities that Germany would refuse to invest billions of marks "in preparations to fight the last war". He argued that Germany's prime advantage was that it was not encumbered by an obsolete military establishment. Approximately two years later it was announced that Germany had come to an agreement with the American government and Lockheed Aircraft Company to build approximately 1,200 F104 aircraft. (Similiar agreements have been, or shortly will be, negotiated with the Belgian, Dutch, and Canadian governments to build F104 aircraft for NATO use.) The Germans have also recently announced the purchase of Mace missiles, a winged jet-powered missile, which was originally supplied to United States Air Force units in 1954. If we can assume that the German air force will not strike first, it is difficult to consider such a large investment in aircraft and missiles for the continent a sound investment for atomic war.

Of all the NATO nations, Britain has, perhaps, been most realistic in her weapons program. Recently, Britain reluctantly abandoned the development of the Blue Streak IRBM even though they had invested $200 million in it; and with it they abandoned any hope of developing an independent deterrent. Despite the fact that the missile was designed to be operated from hardened launching sites, the British realized that the missile would be obsolete before it could be completed.

As a result, Britain has reached agreement with the United States to obtain Sky Bolt air-to-surface missiles and has initiated discussion on the procurement of Polaris missiles. Although the nature of these agreements has not been announced, it is probable that, unless Britain can supply the advanced warheads required for such weapons, the weapons will be under "joint" control. In such circumstances, Britain will have no power of initiative; but will merely retain a veto over weapons operated from British bases.

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Whereas Britain has had the courage to face the stern realities of ballistic missile warfare, France either can not, or will not, recognize the futility of her present atomic weapons program. De Gaulle, the soldier of vision in the 30's, appears to be blind to the military realities of the 60's. The 2.3 billion dollar atomic weapons program which France recently initiated is to include the development of an unknown quantity of 1,500-mile Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, the Sol-Sol Balistique-Strategique, a force of 50 Mystere supersonic bombers, and three rocket-launching naval cruisers. All are extremely vulnerable to atomic attack. Yet even though De Gaulle's strategy concepts clearly are obsolete; United States leadership in the formulation of NATO strategy leaves much to be desired.

The vulnerability of NATO forces has long been recognized. During his defense inquiry in 1956, Senator Symington said:

> "Secretary Quarles stated last February that it would make no material difference in the European situation if the Communists got the 1,500-mile IREB...On investigation we found the reason it was felt this was true, was because if the Communists wanted to destroy Europe with their preponderance of jet planes...they could do it anyway."

Despite the vulnerability of fixed target systems on the continent, we are continuing to install Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles throughout the NATO complex. As these missiles are "soft" and their locations are known to the Soviet Union, it is difficult to imagine their use in response to a Soviet surprise attack. In March, Secretary of Defense Gates proposed that NATO attempt to develop an invulnerable deterrent of land-mobile ballistic missiles such as the Polaris. As mobility and hardening are contradictions in terms, mobile Polarises can remain invulnerable only as long as their location is unknown. Although the Polaris is smaller than current ICBM's it would, nevertheless, be difficult to hide on the railroads or autobahns of Europe. As position-reports could be transmitted readily to Eastern Europe, it is difficult to believe that mobile Polarises on the continent will, in fact, be invulnerable. If this is true, mobile Polarises will have increased NATO's defense costs without significantly reducing the vulnerability of her nuclear force.

If atomic weapons were distributed to our NATO allies, to be used in invulnerable weapons systems, the advisability of independent NATO or national forces would still remain questionable. The development of independent atomic weapons in a vulnerable posture close to overwhelming Soviet thermonuclear capability can not serve any NATO or United States objective.

Since the introduction of atomic weapons, NATO strategic planning has been confused by the concept of limited nuclear war. The advocates of widespread nuclear atomic weapons in Europe, generally, support the concept of limited atomic war in which a battle upon the continent would be fought with "clean" tactical atomic weapons. If the concept of limited nuclear war is to provide a sound foundation for NATO strategy, it must be technically and tactically sound, and we must have some hope that the Russians would respond in kind. The concept of limited nuclear war in Europe can meet none of these criteria.

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Today, the limited distribution of atomic weapons and the vulnerability of our forces to sudden attack makes such a war impossible. More important, none of the exponents of tactical limited nuclear warfare have even begun to indicate the weapons, logistic, and communications concepts necessary to support such strategy. One thing is clear: missiles and aircraft cannot survive atomic attack in a known location. Hiding an operational missile or fighter aircraft for any period of time is extremely difficult, if not impossible, if for no other reason than the logistic and communications requirements. A modern fighter bomber requires from 8,000 to 12,000 pounds of fuel per mission. In the campaign in France, Patton's army required 2,500 tons of supplies per day during the break-through campaign.

How are these support requirements to be met in a limited nuclear war? No truck convoy, such as the Red Ball Express which supported Patton's break-through in France, is remotely feasible. At present, fuel for NATO fighter aircraft is provided through a large pipeline, the location of which is well-known to the Soviets. Air logistic support, even by vertical take-off and landing aircraft, cannot remain hidden. Although nuclear war has reduced weapons requirements; aircraft, trucks, and tanks still consume equal or greater volumes of gasoline, and humans continue to consume comparable volumes of food. In fact, continuous "improvements" in vehicles, such as the jeep, have made them more and more complicated while increasing fuel consumption over the "old-fashioned" jeeps of World War II.

The theoretical concepts of limited nuclear war have so facilitated the United States Army that it has continued its attempt to provide nuclear weapons in ever increasing quantity to its troops in the field. The Army recently announced a request for 6247 Davy Crockett missiles, "a man and jeep portable system, designed to give infantry and armored troops a low yield nuclear capability for use at close range". If such weapons are to be of any value they must be distributed to forward units in peacetime. If only a fraction of these weapons are distributed, the chance of accidental atomic explosion will have increased tremendously. Even though considerable attention has been paid to the nth-country problem, we have failed to recognize the dangers inherent in the nth-private problem.

Even if we could be sure that every private obeyed orders and was not accident prone, it is not clear how such weapons could be used in a nuclear war. How are we to control such a force? The flexibility required by fire teams equipped with nuclear weapons also implies great danger of firing at our troops, allies, or civilian targets. If radio communications are used to control the force, elementary direction-finders can locate the transmitter, which can then be destroyed easily. The large-scale use of nuclear weapons which is implied in the Army request for Davy Crockettts is an example of the development of weapons and strategy without any concept of political purpose.

At present, we do not have the weapons, communications or logistic support which makes nuclear limited war even remotely feasible. Furthermore, we do not have the plans to develop such a capability.

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Even if we could develop the equipment to support such a concept, the concept does not appear to be sound tactically. The advocates of nuclear limited war assume that nuclear weapons provide an advantage for the defense, and, therefore, can permit NATO to defend itself against larger forces. This assumption can not bear close examination. Dispersal is a prerequisite for nuclear war; however, both offense and defense must disperse. The more dispersed the defense, the less the attacker need concentrate to penetrate a defense line. Such dispersion makes flanking operations and attacks in the rear much easier. Thus, even though nuclear weapons will make large troop concentrations impossible, they create a situation in which superior forces may not be required. According to Lidell Hart:

> "It may even enable him to breakthrough without any numerical superiority...Even the potential advantages of the small yield type which appear so good at first sight, tend to fade in the light of closer examination."

Finally, a nuclear limited war can never occur unless both sides are willing, and able, to participate in such a sophisticated strategy. There is little evidence that the Soviet Union is willing, or able to engage in nuclear limited war. In fact, there is considerable evidence to the contrary. Recently, General Nikolai Talensky, one of the foremost theoreticians on the Soviet General Staff, wrote in the official Soviet foreign affairs magazine, *Mexhduna-rodnaya Zhizn*, that it would be impossible to keep local nuclear wars from spreading; they would be "nothing but a prelude to universal nuclear rocket war". Advocates of nuclear limited warfare often point to the Soviet short-range atomic rockets which regularly are paraded in Red Square as indications of Soviet capability for nuclear limited war. These weapons would be no more effective than our 280 mm atomic cannon. They merely indicate that some Soviet weapons are developed, as some American ones are, as the result of habit rather than rational analysis.

The concept of a nuclear limited war fought from within the battle area (which is difficult to imagine in our current posture), thus, becomes even more incredible in the future. If the large-scale use of nuclear weapons were to occur in any local area, the result would be the rapid destruction of any organized resistance within the battle zone, and would create a stalemate unless utilities are resumed in another area. Needless to say, such widespread destruction to no significant military purpose leaves the statesmen of NATO less than enthusiastic about the establishment of tactical nuclear weapons upon the continent.

If we were to place tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO, or independent national forces, could such weapons be controlled as a valid instrument of policy? Could a political framework be created within which a decision to commit nuclear weapons could be made? Can our political and technical skills be blended into a control system for NATO atomic weapons which can, on one hand, provide high confidence that no weapons will be fired by mistake and, on the other hand, provide equal confidence that we can respond reliably following a Soviet attack? The problem of controlling atomic forces in NATO is a critical problem which has been discussed only recently.

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Any valid NATO deterrent posture must allow sufficient time for the political decision to commit nuclear weapons. It is difficult to imagine the President of the United States or the Secretary General of NATO making a decision to engage in thermonuclear war in less than an hour. Yet, as Prime Minister, Gomulka of Poland recently observed in his speech to the United Nations, our decision-makers have, at present, only a few minutes to make such a decision. If our weapons can not survive for a period consistent with rational decision-making, they are of questionable value. Recently, our friends in NATO have been shocked by the pictures of the control board of the Thor missile, on which there is a switch marked war or peace. A recent article explaining the control mechanism said:

> "To be effective in the age of ballistic missiles and nuclear destruction, the Thors must be capable of nearly instant action ... If war threatened, Britain's Prime Minister and the United States President would presumably have been in consultation over a matter of days or weeks. When and if the Russians actually launched an attack, the President and Prime Minister would be in instant touch. Jointly, they would agree to issue the order: 'Turn the key'."

Of course, it would be very desirable to have a long consultation period between the President and the Prime Minister over many weeks; but, unfortunately, we can not plan on such an occurance. Certainly, it is inconsistent to speak of our fear of surprise attack at the same time that we instal weapons which are useless against such attacks.

There can be little doubt that the Soviets have the capability for a surprise attack. Soviet ballistic missiles can reach our missile sites in Europe in 10 to 15 minutes. Unless we receive some strategic warning from intelligence sources, the Thors and Jupiters will be useless.

Anyone who places confidence in strategic warning from intelligence sources is a poor student of history. Responsible people in the United States had good intelligence of Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor. However, there were similiar reports of Japanese attacks on Singapore, on the Phillipines, and on other locations. Our evaluation of the intelligence was colored by our expectations. In fact, when the officers at Pearl Harbor were warned to prepare for a Japanese attack, they lined all of the aircraft neatly in the middle of the field and placed them under twenty four-hour guard as protection against an attack from Japanese saboteurs. Similiarly, there were valid intelligence indications concerning the Chinese interventions in Korea; but, again, these were masked by other reports which indicated contradictory expectations. Although strategic intelligence is usually available; it is rarely believed. Certainly, the security of NATO should not depend upon the receipt of strategic warning.

If a NATO control system upon the continent must be consistent with Soviet capability for surprise attack; we find ourselves in a fundamental dilemma. On the political level, we are unwilling to delegate firing authority to the officers on duty at the missile launch facilities; yet our weapons may be destroyed before normal decision-making can take effect.

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Let us suppose that a nuclear weapon explodes upon a base on the continent. It is very doubtful that the base would report the occurrence; in which case, some unpredictable observer, such as an officer in a nearby radar facility, might report it. If communications were available, he would not report to the President, but would report to his squadron commander who, in turn, would report to his wing commander who, in turn, would report to the chief of the Army or Air Force unit who would report to the Commander SACEUR, General Norstad who, in turn, would report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who might, then, call the President. Even though the President has communications facilities with him at all times, it would take some time to inform him of the situation. If discussions were then required with the British Prime Minister, and General de Gaulle, and the NATO Council, further time would be required. At this point, you may say, this is ridiculous! Modern warfare demands instantaneous decision. But do we really want it otherwise? Do we want instantaneous decision? Do we want widespread distribution of firing authority? If nuclear weapons upon the continent are to be valid instruments of policy, they must survive long enough to permit rational decision-making. Soft ballistic missiles and aircraft on the ground can not meet this requirement.

Although our plans for controlling strategic weapons under thermonuclear attack is hopelessly antiquated, and the development of invulnerable weapons a necessary condition; this development is not sufficient to solve the control problem. The problem of political responsibility will remain. In discussing this problem, Pierre Gallois has said:

> "To avoid unnecessary risks, the nuclear weapons so distributed would be placed under dual control...The circumstances under which these weapons would be used would be set forth in an agreement between the United States and the recipient nations. If those expressly defined conditions were to materialize, the United States government would hand over to its ally the 'key' held by its own representative."

Although it is not obvious, there are two fundamental fallacies in this plan. First, it is not clear that there are any conceivable circumstances in which the United States would be unwilling to fire its own weapons, yet would be willing to release its weapons to be fired by someone else. Certainly, any threat not to fire weapons could apply, equally well, to the release of atomic weapons to be fired by our allies. Gallois says that the latter threat could never be made because: "The Soviet Union would not consider it worthwhile to risk exchange in ballistic missiles with the United States just for the sake of subjugating Denmark". This, certainly, is true. Indeed, it is the heart of NATO strategy, today.

To this my knowledgeable military friends will say, "Ah, but our NATO allies could seize control of the weapon and this possibility would deter the Soviet Union". True. The United States government will never "hand over a key". The United States government will be represented by one or two officers who are powerless to protect the sovereignty of United States nuclear warheads except in a peaceful environment.

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It has been suggested by some critics that this problem can be solved by
developing an independent NATO force which would provide NATO with a capa-
bility for controlling its own forces. This concept also is an illusion.
First, there is little doubt that some NATO nations would not assume any
responsibility for either national or NATO atomic weapons. Any attempt to
adopt such a position would only tend to push Norway, Denmark, Greece, and
possibly Turkey toward a policy of neutrality.

If a NATO deterrent were adopted by some NATO nations, how would they control it? If the Prime Ministers of all the NATO nations waited in constant attention upon General Norstad or the Secretary General, the decision to launch nuclear weapons would be no less awesome. Not only de Gaulle, but every NATO nation would insist upon a veto. Yet if any nation could cast a veto, could Germany feel that Berlin was safe? In fact, would the United States provide Polaris missiles and nuclear warheads to an independent NATO force without retaining a veto? The myth of an independent NATO force is an attempt to seek control without responsibility. If possible, consultation with the members of NATO would be desirable. Ultimately, however, such a decision must rest with one individual.

A recent study sponsored by the State Department has recommended an independent NATO force which would include "Polaris-missile submarines that could roam the seas with international crews". If NATO could agree to give the Secretary General of NATO authority to develop and control such a Polaris force, could it be controlled in a crisis? If the Secretary General ordered Polaris weapons fired in defense of Berlin, would the international crews of the submarines obey? Couldn't one crewman sabotage the attack? We could never be sure. Finally, it has been suggested that international crews are required because this would permit a German to fire a missile in case of an attack on Germany, a Turk in case of an attack on Turkey, and somehow, the remaining nations of NATO could disclaim responsibility. Somehow, I do not see how a nation under attack would know or care about the citizenship of the man who pressed the button.

Ultimately, our policy reduces to simple terms. We must either distribute nu-
clear weapons to our allies or to the Secretary General of NATO to use as they
determine, or we must retain them under our own control. There is no middle way.
If we plan to fail to support our commitments, there is no easy way to hide the
fact. Our objective should not be to distribute the responsibility for the con-
trol of nuclear weapons but rather to focus it in responsible hands and then
take every possible precaution to insure that it is not misused.

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III

A NATO Military Program for the Future

"We are superior to our enemies...our city is open to the world ...we live freely, and yet we face the same dangers as readily as they...those men surely should be deemed bravest who know most clearly what danger is and what pleasure is and are not made thereby to flinch".

- Pericles -

The NATO alliance, born in the crisis of the Berlin blockade and funded by the fears created by the Korean War, has preserved the freedom of Western Europe for the past decade. If NATO is to continue to be an effective force for freedom in the North Atlantic community, a major reappraisal of goals and strategy is required. The rapid advance of Soviet thermonuclear missile power has raised doubts among many of our NATO allies about both our capabilities and our intent.

The launching of Sputnik, the much-discussed missile gap, and the admitted vulnerability of United States Strategic Air Command bases have raised legitimate fears as to our capability to defend NATO. No one seriously believes that NATO forces on the continent could defend themselves against a surprise attack with thermonuclear weapons. Announcements that two nuclear submarines, each equipped with 16 Polaris missiles, would be operational this year and that SAC has placed a portion of its force on airborne alert, has made it clear that we have and will continue to have a capability to respond to a sudden thermonuclear attack.

Our capabilities have improved, but the crisis of confidence remains. Even though we have the capability to respond to thermonuclear attack, there are grave doubts that we will. Secretary of State, Christian Herter, in testimony before Congress, said:

"I cannot conceive of any President involving us in an all-out nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly that we are in danger of all-out devastation ourselves or that actual moves had been made toward devastating ourselves."

Thus, we have confirmed the fears of many Europeans that the American commitment to Europe would disappear with the growth of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. President Eisenhower's recent letter to Chancellor Adenauer, in which he said the United States would "reconsider" the continued support of United States troops in Europe, lends further support to European fears. The NATO alliance, which united has withstood numerous Soviet threats, finds its most severe test in the Soviet proposals for peace backed

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by the threat of ballistic missile attack. The cause of peace will not be advanced by United States withdrawal in the face of force. If the NATO alliance is to continue to provide an effective defense for Western Europe, the new administration must reaffirm the United States' commitment to the defense of Europe.

Ultimately, the freedom of Western Europe can be found only in a disarmed society in which military power is retained, solely, to support international law. Soviet and Polish proposals for a European detente indicate a willingness to negotiate. Such proposals may or may not be sincere. In either case, they cannot be ignored. If the United States and its NATO allies are to enter serious disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union, they must first formulate a sound strategic policy for the defense of NATO as a basis for negotiation. The following five-point program is essential if we are to negotiate arms reductions in Europe without wreaking the NATO alliance.

## 1. Plan NATO's Continental Defense on the Basis of Conventional Weapons

The NATO adoption of a strategy based upon nuclear weapons will remain one of the most serious strategic blunders of modern times. In 1954, when General Montgomery said, "The reason for this action (adopting nuclear weapons) is that we cannot match the strength that could be brought against us unless we use nuclear weapons", he was voicing the fundamental assumptions underlying NATO's atomic strategy, a strategy which is wrong in both its major and minor premises.

The major premise, which Montgomery and other NATO leaders have supported, is the thesis that nuclear weapons will aid the defense more than the offense. There is no question that NATO atomic weapons could destroy any large-scale troop concentration or could destroy the major cities of Eastern Europe. The objective of NATO, however, is to defend Western Europe, not to destroy Eastern Europe. The widespread dispersal of NATO troops required in nuclear warfare will make the defense of any static front impossible. The vulnerability of existing weapons is such that at no time, either in the past, present, or future has NATO been capable of carrying out sustained atomic combat operations. NATO's weapons, logistics, and communications are inconsistent with the destructiveness of atomic war.

Second, the statement that NATO cannot match the Soviet bloc in conventional armament, simply, is not true. The NATO countries of Europe have a population of 230 million. Russia's population is approximately 208 million. There is no question that NATO could match Soviet conventional preparations, if there was a will to do so. Unfortunately, the leaders of NATO have been reluctant to attempt to match the Soviet capability for conventional armament. The illusion that atomic weapons could provide inexpensive security, however ill-founded, has been politically popular. As a result, the current NATO budget of 10 million dollars per year does not provide adequate defense either against conventional or atomic attack.

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If NATO were to drop all the complex and costly equipment that has been conceived for nuclear war, she could significantly increase the conventional-war capability of her existing forces. Advances in conventional weapons, notably in accurate-fire control and large-scale use of artillery create advantages for a skillful and well-equipped defense. In Korea, divisions held 25,000-yard fronts; although in World War II, 5,000 yards was considered extremely unusual. If the present NATO forces, supported by the new German divisions now coming into operation, were to be trained and equipped for conventional combat, there is every indication they could hold the present Russian forces.

A study of combat operations in World War II shows time and again the advantages of a sound defense. Lidell Hart has said, "Even on such a wide front as Russia, it became evident that a well-conducted defense could be maintained indefinitely unless the attacking side had an over-all superiority considerably exceeding three-to-one." On this basis, the present NATO forces should be able to hold their own on the defensive when outnumbered two-to-one. Certainly, a ratio of three-to-two should provide a safe margin for the defense. Hart notes further: "In the Normandy campaign, an analysis shows that allied attacks hardly ever succeeded unless the attacking troops had a superiority of more than five-to-one in fighting strength even though they were greatly helped by complete domination of the air (which at least doubles the value of the ground forces and, in some staff calculations, it has been reckoned as trebling it). In some cases, the attacks have failed with odds of nearly ten-to-one in their favor." There is every reason to believe that present NATO forces could hold existing Soviet forces in a war fought with conventional weapons. Certainly NATO could be defended with conventional weapons if agreement were achieved to establish a parity of conventional forces in Europe.

## 2. NATO Must Have an Invulnerable Deterrent of Ballistic-Missile Submarines or Aircraft on Airborne Alert.

In a world of atomic plenty, NATO strategy cannot ignore the existence of atomic weapons. However, if atomic weapons are to be used as valid instruments of policy, they must be invulnerable. We cannot continue the installation of atomic weapons which are provocative in peace and useless in war.

As a result of the advances in weapons technology, it is no longer essential to place weapons in the areas which they are to protect. Indeed, with the destructiveness of thermonuclear weapons, it is desirable to separate thermonuclear weapons from the centers of civil population centers. In the absence of any arms control agreement, it would be desirable to place NATO's strategic deterrent either in the air on airborne alert or at sea in Polaris submarines.

## 3. The United States Must Provide the Atomic Deterrent for NATO. The United States Must Persuade its Allies to Abandon Nuclear Weapons.

The present NATO crisis has been caused by a lack of confidence in American leadership. There is broad agreement that NATO forces must include an improved conventional capability and invulnerable atomic forces. The disagree-

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ment arises over the question of the control of the nuclear forces. Today, NATO's atomic deterrent is provided by the United States Strategic Air Command. There is no question that this force or other invulnerable weapons assigned to a United States commander in Europe could provide a NATO deterrent if the Soviet Union and our NATO allies were persuaded that the United States had the will to use these weapons in the defense of NATO. Furthermore, it is clear that widespread distribution of nuclear weapons in Europe cannot serve NATO objectives. An American policy of restraint is necessary if not sufficient to assure the success of any plan for limiting the distribution of atomic weapons.

A close examination of the record will show that the United States probably could persuade Germany, Britain, and France to abandon nuclear weapons if we chose to do so. Chancellor Adenauer and the German government have shown no deep desire for atomic weapons and have accepted them only under pressure from the United States Department of Defense. Defense Minister Strauss said as recently as two years ago:

> "We do not wish to equip the German army with tactical weapons ...(but it is necessary)...We are prepared to accept any prohibition of atomic weapons on the basis of control and balance of strength in the sphere of conventional weapons. Our allies are completely free to make such declarations on behalf of Germany."

In the face of the possible growth of German and French atomic arsenals on the continent, and vocal political forces within Britain; it is likely that Britain would abandon nuclear weapons if the United States asked her to do so. It is becoming increasingly clear that other nations can not maintain an independent deterrent. The Western alliance can not afford their distribution for political prestige.

The greatest obstacle to a proposal for limiting nuclear weapons is Premier Charles de Gaulle and his concept of an independent French deterrent. It is important to remember that de Gaulle initiated the development of his atomic force only after the United States rejected his proposals for a triumvirate of Britain, France, and the United States to provide the leadership for NATO. In a very real sense, the purpose of France's independent force is to increase French prestige in Europe and, in particular, to gain support for her African policies. The United States and her NATO allies must persuade de Gaulle to reappraise his dreams and base his plans upon a firmer foundation. Vulnerable French nuclear weapons can not serve an independent French policy outside of the NATO community. French atomic weapons can not change votes on Algeria in the United Nations Assembly. At the same time, we should make it clear that the United States will not withdraw from Europe and that steps will be taken to provide a more effective means for consultation among the NATO nations in the formulation of a total political, economic, and military strategy for the Western alliance.

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If Britain and Germany can be persuaded to relinquish atomic weapons, France no longer will need such weapons to assuage her pride. The United States must make it clear that, although we will always welcome France as a respected friend and ally, she can not control United States policy toward Algeria, or obtain a veto over United States strategic forces, no matter how many atomic weapons she fires in the Sahara.

### 4. The United States Must Reaffirm its Commitment to the Defense of Europe.

The withdrawl of nuclear weapons from the continent of Europe and reliance upon the United States' atomic weapons will be strategically and politically sound if, and only if, the Soviet Union and our allies are persuaded that, if necessary, these weapons will be used in the defense of Europe.

In the recent past, the growth of Soviet thermonuclear weapons has led the United States to attempt to limit its commitment to the defense of NATO -- first, by a concept of nuclear limited war, and, now, by a concept of an "independent NATO deterrent". Both are attempts to defend NATO without risking attacks upon the United States. Even though the fallacies of nuclear limited war have been recognized, now; the concept of an independent deterrent is so new and so nebulous, that its faults go undetected. According to this concept, if the United States were faced by attacks on its homeland, it would not come to the defense of its NATO allies. If this is true, what reason do we have to expect that other members of the alliance would defend one another? Why should Britain, if faced by attacks on her homeland, come to the aid of Turkey or Greece? If the United States withdraws or limits its commitment to the defense of NATO, the inevitable result will be the development of independent national forces which pursue their own narrow objectives. Such a development can not possibly be termed a sound policy for an international alliance.

The NATO alliance can not survive either the withdrawl of the United States nor the widespread distribution of atomic weapons. It can survive only if the United States has the courage to reaffirm its commitment to the defense of Europe and, then, to take steps to make it credible. If the commitment is real, in our own minds, then we would be wise to discuss steps to demonstrate our commitment with our NATO allies. An obvious indication of our feelings would be assignment of more United States forces to the continent. Such an increase would make negotiations on mutual reduction of armed forces difficult, if not impossible. Obviously, such a commitment would be inequitable with the growing economic wealth in Europe, unless European troops assumed positions currently maintained by United States forces throughout the world. This does not seem impossible. It is not inconceivable that, if American troops were stationed in defense of the Rhine, German troops might man NIKE batteries in the United States; that if American troops relieved the British army on the Rhine, the British battalions might replace American units in Hawaii. If we are to have serious negotiations with the Soviet Union on troop reductions in Europe, we must begin to think of NATO deployment in terms of a total world-wide strategy, and not merely as a facet of American military strategy.

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5. NATO, Led by the United States, Must Resume Negotiations Toward Agreement on an Atom-Free Zone and Troop Limitations on the Continent of Europe.

As a major reappraisal of military plans is in order, NATO offers an excellent opportunity for an initial area disarmament agreement. Inspection techniques and, more important, the sincerity of both parties could be tested without major effects upon the overall strategic balance.

As recently as 8 December 1957, the Russians proposed to the German government a version of the Rapocki plan for a nuclear free zone. Chancellor Adenauer indicated that he was receptive to such a proposal at the December meeting of the NATO council. Later, however, he was reported to have stated that the adoption of such a proposal would destroy NATO. It certainly need not. NATO accepts the responsibility for defending Denmark and Norway, although they represent nuclear free zones with very few troops. There is no reason to believe that West Germany could not remain within NATO and yet be defended on the same basis. We do not believe that the defense of our cities demands that ballistic missiles be located in their midst. Similarly, there is no need to locate weapons in certain areas of Europe if we have the will to come to their defense.

As Clausewitz wrote, the important things are all simple and the simple things are most difficult. Our chances for successful disarmament negotiations will be greatest if we reaffirm our commitment to the defense of Western Europe.

* * * * *

Recently, a group of travellers from Western Europe observed that the New York subway system had numerous air raid shelter signs and very few maps of the subway system. The New York subway system and American policy toward NATO both can be criticized for seeking security which can not be achieved until objectives have been clarified. In a world of thermonuclear weapons, we can not escape risks. We must clarify our objectives so that they may justify the risks which we must face. We must let our dreams rather than our fears determine NATO policies and strategy.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION * NOT FOR QUOTATION

Attributed remarks, based on notes taken at
an informal seminar, have not been approved
by participants and are not to be considered
authoritative statements of their positions.

ACS-3

6/22/60

SEMINAR: Limited *versus* Comprehensive Arms Control Measures

SPEAKERS: Jerome B. Wiesner, Donald G. Brennan and Thomas C. Schelling

Remarks by J. Wiesner

While the distinction between limited and comprehensive measures is
difficult to make, it is suggested that a comprehensive arms control agree-
ment would attempt to control and limit all the important arms systems and
weapons which could be used in attacking either armed forces or a civilian
population. This would include the control of such matters as research and
development, espionage, etc. Any such system would substantially increase
the security of the nations involved, although it is difficult to delineate
and to anticipate all elements.

There have been a variety of limited measures proposed. These range from
measures designed to provide protection against specific threats, such as
measures against surprise attack or missile or nuclear weapons test ban to
such area agreements as the Rapacki Plan.

While limited agreements may appear to be more easily negotiated, this is
not necessarily the case. Such plans may involve proportionately a much
greater degree of inspection than a more comprehensive program. It is also
unlikely that meaningful limited measures could long survive if not soon
followed up by more comprehensive nuclear measures.

For example, the expensive monitoring system required for a nuclear
test ban would soon be junked as more meaningful and comprehensive measures
were instituted. It is also possible that we would be willing to take a
more considerable risk over a short period in order to institute a compre-
hensive long-term program, than to take similar risks for only partial
measures.

Remarks by D. Brennan

It is necessary to think of any system which is eventually arrived at
as a dynamic one. It must adapt to changing technology, changing postures,
etc., and its ability to do so must be built into such treaties as may be
involved.

A possibly useful way of thinking of "comprehensive" systems was to
define a comprehensive system as one that was "optimum", or, equivalently,
one that maximized net security of the participants, and was designed as
a synthesis problem subject to the various political, legal, social, and
technological "boundary conditions" (such as existing weapons and stock-
piles). This is only a semantic matter since one could not in any event
know what an "optimum" system was.

The use of the "versus" in our heading "Limited versus Comprehensive
Measures" is important since it would seem that anything which could be done
would seem desirable. The problem is quite complex, however, and political
as opposed to technical assessments may lead to different conclusions. The

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allocation of study and research resources, and, more importantly, the choice
of courses and policies for negotiation, is governed by decisions concerning
the most fruitful avenues of approach. This is especially true with regard
to the problem of including China in any comprehensive control measures,
which may well dominate the question of "limited" versus "comprehensive"
measures.

Wiesner clarified his definition of comprehensive control measures by
noting that even though such measures might decide not to place limitations
on any given weapon system, all weapon systems must be taken into account in
the formulation of the control scheme.

Rowen noted that a possible approach to the problem might be through a
modern "Congress of Vienna". By settling the major political problems of the
world, the need for arms control measures might to a large degree be obviated.

Feld prefers to think of comprehensive disarmament as involving a large
cutback in the general arms level, especially in nuclear armaments; while
limited measures would be any short of this. This raises the possibility of
a so-called "balanced reduction" on the part of both sides.

Remarks by Tom Schelling

Another way of looking at comprehensive versus limited would be to think
of a comprehensive agreement as one completely written out as opposed to a
limited agreement reached by tacit understanding.

There are some basic philosophical differences between the approaches
being made to the problem. One important difference would seem to be in the
ends toward which we would work. One type of comprehensive measure advocate
would work toward total reduction of armaments, as opposed to those who feel
that there is no need to be immediately concerned with such an end point.
There is also the difference between those who would see any such agreement
formalized on paper and institutionalized with inspection, etc., and the
opposite, who would see tacit, unarticulated, perhaps even outwardly denied,
agreements.

An important need is having procedures to end a war should it have
started. This may seem a very limited scheme and is not the pre-war type
of measure usually thought of as arms control. However, it may have very
comprehensive effects if put into action and may require very comprehensive
measures in order to implement it.

It is necessary to look at both the total disarmament end of the scale
and its opposite; that of a complete standoff deterrent. We must recognize
that a balanced, graduated reduction may not be technically possible, since
there may be no continuous safe path down the scale.

Another difference in approach is between those who would attempt to
keep things from getting worse and those who would attempt to make things
better. The former may be led toward not violating any of the tacit agree-
ments which we do have with our enemy which are, in fact if not in law, a
system of arms control. In characterizing these tacit agreements, it is
not necessary to have a list of them. What is important is in being able
to recognize them as such. These are the unarticulated decisions and ac-
tions of policy-makers on both sides and involve such things as not engag-
ing in a comprehensive civil defense program, not over-flying, etc.

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Wiesner noted that such agreements may involve allowing the enemy to get away with such activities as submarine spying because it is considered more important that we be allowed to do similar things.

An important factor in these agreements is the element of "yet". Thus the Soviet Union had not yet protested our over-flights until the recent U-2 incident.

The fact that these tacit understandings are unwritten is also important. They thus do not include the fine print that must be arrived at in the situation of bargaining for a written agreement. By almost inadvertently backing into such agreements as the test moratorium, the number of options can be reduced to a minimum. This may be particularly useful in the case of technical agreements where the time lag in bargaining may outdate the agreement by the time it is completed. We should perhaps attach more respectability to these agreements than has hitherto been done.

An element of the self-imposed restraints is that they are made conspicuously evident. For example, the traffic pattern followed by our bombers is well known by the Soviet Union and carefully adhered to by our pilots.

These tacit agreements may have their place in the world of today, noted Wiesner, but this does not mean that we should not study the problems of more comprehensive and carefully delineated measures. While it seems unlikely to him that we can agree upon any such scheme, it is more than likely that the tacit agreements will not prove adequate to the job of maintaining the peace. It would seem very likely that an accidental war would occur within the next two decades.

The "limited" approach is an optimistic one, noted Feld, in that it assumes that such measures have a good chance of averting a war. Even though it would seem most likely that disarmament measures will proceed out of the next war, every effort should be made to minimize the effect of this war through such measures as provision of a way to get out.

Schelling noted that a problem posed to our government is in choosing between the several possible approaches in disarmament negotiations. One government will find it very difficult to pursue them both. In comparing the speeches of the Secretary of State in February and in March, one would seem to find that he has adopted both approaches to the problem.

Arthur Smithies attempted to clarify the apparent difference between the Schelling and Wiesner points of view. As he sees it, Schelling's viewpoint is that we must live with the arms race and it will not necessarily kill us, although efforts must be made to keep it from getting worse. In this case, the hope of reduction of armaments would stem from the eventual recognition of the futility of the race and the desire to apply the effort elsewhere. The Wiesner viewpoint would seem to be that we must press for a reduction in armaments, if we are to survive.

Wiesner agreed with this and said he realized that the argument could be made that we have survived for 15 years without a nuclear war, during which period statesmen have indeed exercised unprecedented restraint. Nevertheless, the thing to fear is an accident-triggered war because of the inherent instability of the system without arms control.

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Schelling said that he felt that unilateral measures remained still the most important. Such measures might be, for example, the choice of Polaris weapons over ICBM's, thus increasing the possible time period allowed for decision.

Pool said that he failed to see how any international system could exist without both tacit and explicit agreements. He could think of no international agreement which was an even tit-for-tat exchange by both parties. One of the reasons for this no doubt, was that as the two sides get closer to agreement, it pays less to make the last few concessions. In order to make these last few concessions of value, there must be some third force or threat hanging over both sides. The result in the post-war world seems to be that the two sides agree upon continuing activities. Examples of such activities are the Lend-Lease negotiations and the Security Council. It would seem that these are likely to continue, or to grow in importance.

Continuing the discussion generated by Schelling's mention of tacit agreements, Brennan felt that it was unlikely that we would achieve any optimum agreement without some constraints (e.g. on nuclear) imposed by treaties. He feels it more important to reduce the chance of war than to reduce the economic burden of armaments. Kalkstein then made the comment that most of the tacit types of agreement drive toward not making things worse. He felt that perhaps we needed written agreements in order to achieve a significant improvement in our disarmament posture. Barber then noted that there is a distinct difference between the concept of a solid, manifestly effective deterrent and one which would be accident prone. To him the threat that we might get into a war by accident seems more serious than the threat that China might lead us into one. (Schelling dissented from this view.)

Wiesner noted a lack of appreciation of the real economic incentive to end the arms race in Russia. Russia would like to earmark a larger fraction of its national income for raising the domestic standard of living and to free manpower from the military establishment. This economic incentive does not seem to be one of our primary motivations. Among our own motivations one might include the fear of war, dissatisfaction with our warlike posture in the eyes of the world, and a number of other things.

Rowen enumerated three types of arms control: in the first type defense is steered toward the employment of weapons which allow a longer response time, like the Polaris. These must also be relatively invulnerable to a first strike. The second type is Schelling's "tacit agreements", unilateral measures, which can be taken in such a way that you can watch the enemy's response and continue or discontinue this type of measure according to the enemy's response. The third method would be an explicit agreement or treaty limiting weapons or providing inspection.

Schelling expressed the view that agreement is much easier to obtain if you do not actually need to limit the number of weapons. This is particularly true of an "invulnerable." mobile type of weapon like the Polaris. The hope was expressed that when a sufficient number of weapons were available to both sides (we might even want to give Polaris to the Russians for this purpose), a kind of tolerable equilibrium situation would be reached such that both sides had an adequate deterrent and there would be very little incentive to go on stockpiling weapons beyond this point. David Cavers, however, felt

46

that before we could operate on this type of an arms control basis we would need to answer the question as to how we can be sure that the Russians have the same set of assumptions here as we have. Wiesner raised two further difficulties, namely that tacit stabilization in research and development (a significant factor in the arms control picture) are impossible. The Nth-country problem is another difficulty.

Milburn asked Wiesner if, in his dealings with the Russians, he had formed any impressions as to their assumptions about arms control. Wiesner replied that in these matters he felt that the Russians have a totally different frame of reference from ours. They are not particularly concerned about systems of inspecting the United States, perhaps because they feel that we are not capable of clandestine activities and that they can find out all they need to know without inspection and without being inspected themselves. Also, the Russians have fewer mutual security agreements than we do; we might have to renege on some of ours if we disarmed. Some of them also seem to feel that they would stand to gain if world disarmament were achieved since "popular" revolutions might be easier to foster in a disarmed world. The major Russian fear, he felt, was of the rearmament of Germany. Wiesner could find no serious indications of arms control effort in Russia except on the part of a handful of people. (Reference was given to the writings of Talienski as some of the best on Soviet military strategy.)

Feld brought up a point with regard to improving the stability of arms control systems. This was related to some of Schelling's remarks about the importance of building into an arms system measures for insuring the quick damping-out of a conflict once it starts. Feld believes that the amount of weapons material ready at the commencement of a conflict should be kept small. In this case there would be a time for reconsideration and a time for the intervention of third powers (or the U.N.) with the aim of stopping the conflict before the megatons begin raining down. If megatons are available on short notice, the system may be so unstable that it is virtually impossible to keep the war small. This is an argument for a comprehensive agreement.

Pool said that he thought people were discussing the arms control situation in terms which are too static, i.e. in terms of definite end points. He believes the Russians may adopt measures which maximize their immediate advantage without any specific long range goals, or that it is possible these goals may change too rapidly for us to be able to base a policy upon them. So far, no allowance has been made for this type of approach in these discussions. Barber pointed out that it is possible to have long range goals and yet to remain flexible. He feels that by unilateral action, such as the observance of traffic rules by our bombers on patrol, we can set limits for the Russians. We can then decide what we will do if they exceed these limits and then make sure that they are made aware, even if informally, of our ground rules. No explicit agreement is needed. One source of worry, however, is that when the first nuclear weapon goes off by accident, there is a strong possibility that the response may not be rational and may be completely unpredictable, so that advance planning cannot take care of all contingencies.

Rowen expressed the view that, desirable as a comprehensive agreement might be, it might have to wait for some kind of political settlement in Asia because of Red China's aggressiveness. Both we and the Russians might be reluctant to give up our weapons while the threat of Chinese militarism

47

still remains. Alexander did not feel that a political settlement was necessary. He said that any situation of graduated arms reduction must at some point deprive one side or another of its dominant aspirations. The implication here seemed to be that, for example, the United States and Russia could share the responsibility for controlling China, with each having a level of armaments insufficient to permit domination of the other. Pool mentioned, but did not advocate, an alternative to bilateral reduction of armaments. This was essentially that the U. S. and the Soviet could each improve their defense posture at the expense of a third party (e.g. China or Europe). Thus it is conceivable that the U. S. and Russia could divide up the world between them, increasing stability without disarming.

Barber hoped that this conference might put some numbers into this whole question and estimate the size of our nuclear arsenal at which we lose stability relative to Russia and also the minimum size at which we lost stability with respect to third powers. Schelling then noted that it is at least conceivable that we may already have too much arms control for stability because of present budgetary limitations. Some remarks were made on accidents as a cause of war. In the first place Schelling noted that it is impossible to define in advance what contingencies we will have to deal with -- we can only get a sampling (See Schelling's paper on Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization prepared for the Arms Control issue of DAEDALUS.) His second point was that it is not an accident as such which would cause war, but prior or subsequent decisions about how to respond to an accident. Thus, we want to look for systems which will provide very little advantage in making quick decisions and which will give us time to investigate the extent of an enemy's attack, to negotiate with the enemy, etc. Preemptive attack may result as usually thought, not only when one side or the other receives intelligence that the other is about to attack, but also in a state of tension and frustration when leaders on one side or another conclude, quite aside from any intelligence confirmation, that war is inevitable and that he who strikes first will fare best.

Participants:

S. Alexander

A. Barber

D. Brennan

D. Cavers

R. Coward

B. Feld

M. Gewirtz

M. Kalkstein

R. Luce

T. Milburn

J. Phelps

I. Pool

H. Rowen

T. Schelling

T. Smith

A. Smithies

J. Wiesner

V. Weisskopf

48

(w) ACS-2

6/20/60

SEMINAR: Deterrent Force Composition

SPEAKERS: Donald G. Brennan, Arthur Barber

I. Deterrent Force Composition - D. G. Brennan

Mr. Brennan posed originally three problems: (1) What constitutes an adequate deterrent? (2) Given the answer to (1), what do you need to get this deterrent capability? (3) How many people are at risk? In mentioning General Medaris's recent figure of 30,000 megatons (30 KMT) as our present first-strike capability, Mr. Brennan generated a discussion of definitions and numbers in the constitution of a deterrent. Mr. Brennan defined what was being deterred as a direct attack upon the United States. Mr. Wiesner made the point that there is no necessary relationship between an adequate deterrent and our first-strike capability.

It was pointed out that the megaton figure is not the only factor entering into a deterrent force, other factors being the types of vehicles involved, the attrition during a first-strike attack, targets involved, etc.

Discussion on numbers evolved an agreement that a significant unit by which to measure the size of the deterrent was the "beach", Brennan asserting that, as an extreme example, a deterrent force of 500 KMT, roughly one-half of a beach, must be rejected even if feasible. One criterion of adequacy is whether the force could be delivered within a reasonably short period of time with a reasonably small number of men in the chain of command. Schelling suggested that, because of lack of agreement on the specific figures, the conference should compile a working estimate of the numbers involved before the end of the summer.

In discussing how many people are at risk, Brennan contended that no deterrent force should be designed which would put more than one-tenth of the world population at risk. Long-term genetic, as well as short-term, effects must be included.

Kalkstein noted that effects of the last Russian test series in the Arctic might be extrapolated to show that 500 KMT would give a dose of the order of 400 R to one-half of the world's population as fall-out within one-half year.

Discussion turned to the calculation of minimizing the expected people at risk, Brennan proposing the graph in Figure 1 as an example. The argument asserted was that, while the curve for the 500 KMT deterrent force had a higher peak at zero number of people killed, the extension of the tail of this curve out into the area of a considerable fraction of the world's population made it unacceptable. On the other hand, the curve for a lower deterrent, perhaps 10 KMT, while having a higher probability of being used, does not have the unacceptable tail. Brennan believes that no analysis is ever going to be adequate for the description of the tail of the curve of a deterrent on the order of 500 KMT.

Rowen noted that the calculations of allowable tonnage would be affected by the recent tendency to use smaller warheads. Discussion turned back

49

Figure 1

to the question of how much of a deterrent force would remain after an attack. Brennan cast his vote in favor of reducing the deterrent force, as calculated, rather than taking a chance on exceeding the ceiling through the failure of the enemy to destroy as much as your calculations had estimated.

Brennan and Milburn agreed that the size of a deterrent force was not just a technical matter, but a problem of influencing the Soviet policymakers in their decisions.

## II. Deterrent Force Composition: Specific Weapon Possibilities -
A. Barber.

It was noted that our weapons planning was not as systematic as might be desired. The weapons may be roughly divided into two categories: the ZI based and the overseas weapons.

### A. ZI Based Weapons

#### 1. B-52

The backbone of our defense is the B-52 which is presently on air-borne alert over northern Canada. The problems of this air-borne alert are considerable and very complex, including the changing of targets as the fuel supply is exhausted by the planes in the air. The B-52 has undergone considerable evolution since its original design, reflecting the change in the missions of manned aircraft from going in and dropping bombs to standing outside of the nation and sending in air-to-surface missiles (ASM's).

The present air-to-surface missile is the Hounddog, with the Skybolt, a ballistic air-to-surface missile, due to be operational by the mid-sixties. Hounddog is carried under the B-52 wings and can carry a warhead of some fraction of a megaton. The same plane can also drop bombs, giving rise to the roll-back theory. In this, the missiles are used as a penetration aid to disrupt the air defense system, thus permitting the "safe" entrance by the planes to drop bombs.

With continued emphasis upon air-borne alert and air-to-surface missiles, it has been proposed that an aircraft designed for long air-borne operation as a missile launch platform should be developed. A few years ago, the

5

nuclear-powered aircraft was considered for this role. However, the extremely high cost of the nuclear-powered aircraft has led recent preliminary design personnel to propose a rather large transport aircraft, equipped with turboprop engines, which could maintain air-borne alert for 80 to 120 hours and carry a suitable number of ASM's. This aircraft would be of conventional design and fly at speeds of from 200 to 300 knots at altitudes of 10,000 to 20,000 feet. This is the "Dromedary" concept.

## 2. B-70

The B-70 bomber, the program for which has been recently cut back, is a steel aircraft, a fact which indicates that it is designed to fly above Mach 2.5. Barber estimated the cost of the plane as about $100 million. The design of the plane would make an air-borne alert prodigiously expensive and the problem of hardening would also be difficult, especially in comparison to the cost of the missiles which could knock out the plane.

## 3. Atlas and Titan

The two big ICBM's, Atlas and Titan, were compared. At the moment, only the Atlas is operational. One difficulty is that these weapons cannot be kept ready for rapid fire indefinitely. Both of these missiles can be "hardened". The degree of hardening of a missile system can be expressed quantitatively in pounds per square inch (psi); i.e., the pressure which the missile system can withstand from an atomic blast and still be subsequently fired. The Atlas and Titan ICBM's can carry significantly larger warheads than the Minuteman. (Some discussion ensued in which it was mentioned that the AEC has released figures to the effect that the largest warheads available are of the order of 10 to 30 megatons.)

## 4. Minuteman

Minuteman is a solid fuel missile, designed to be fired from a hardened base, presently under development and probably available by the mid-sixties. While smaller than the other two missiles, its design and hardening will provide the lower maintenance cost and easier firing on a ready basis. One possibility, to be tested this summer, is to fire the missile from trains roving about the country. While this would provide a large number of launch sites about the country, the number would be finite, and the train is not designed to be hidden. As the missile train is "soft", i.e. vulnerable to blast, the element of security is in the cycle of time between an enemy agent being able to pinpoint the train and his communications of this information to an enemy missile base.

It was pointed out that the train would be operating in a large part in areas under automatic signal and switching control. The railroad employees controlling these operations would be union men and not be subject to security clearance. Hence, the appeal of the roving missile base is not without its limitations.

Another possibility is to design an ICBM rocket on a smaller basis. These smaller missiles could be designed to carry a warhead on the order of 20 KT or so.

5

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## 5. Polaris

The Polaris missile, scheduled to be operational in late 1960, is designed to be fired from submarines. Recent press reports state that the present program calls for nine submarines, with three more under consideration as part of a recent arms budget increase. Warhead size and accuracy is comparable to those of the Minuteman; the accuracy, however, is dependent upon precise location of the firing vessel. While the Polaris missile is also under consideration for placement on surface ships, there is no serious consideration of attempting to hide mobile missiles with the exception of the underwater firing of Polaris.

## 6. Dyna-Soar (Orbital Bomb)

A possibility for the future which may evolve from the Air Force Dyna-Soar project would be an orbital bomber. The Dyna-Soar project is presently occupied with getting a man into space. However, the vehicle conceivably could be designed to carry a bomb to be dropped from an orbital position. One of the key problems in this weapon is whether it should be manned or unmanned. If it is to be manned, special problems concerning the survival of the pilot, time period which he can remain up, the radiation belts, etc., are involved. Present knowledge indicates that the period allowable for any one pilot would be quite short, and hopes for 30 to 45 days in orbit are probably over-optimistic. Since the cost of orbiting such a weapon would be substantial, the necessity of frequently-repeated launchings would probably make the program economically unfeasible.

While the accuracy of even an unmanned orbital bomb would be roughly that of a ballistic missile, the unmanned bomb also presents a number of important problems. In particular, there is the problem of reliability. There is the question of how long an orbital bomber would remain operational through the hazards of launching, space, and so forth, as well as the determination whether some portion of the device had failed. Furthermore, if a fail-safe mechanism is incorporated in the bomb, we become engaged in games of control in which an enemy would attempt to abort the mechanism while we were presented with the necessity of countering this action. Generally speaking, the problems involved in an orbital bomb make the project one of questionable feasibility at this point.

## B. Overseas Weapons

### 1. F-100, F-105 and MACE

Located around the periphery of the Soviet Union in the individual theaters we have the F-100's and the F-105's, fighter-bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and the MACE missiles. The latter is not recallable. It is no particular secret that these weapons are on five to fifteen minute alert around the Soviet Union. They have little range and, therefore, must go directly for their targets, unlike SAC which may be placed on air-borne alert or may delay in the delivery of its bombs. As our world-wide attack forces are located on less than 70 bases, all of which are soft, they could be destroyed with relatively few nuclear weapons. Thus, the personnel involved in these weapon systems are under considerable tension and are one of the primary possible sources of a war stemming from errors. Despite this precarious position, the theater personnel hold on to the use of nuclear weapons to maintain their positions as sort of "junior" SAC men.

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Of particular significance in the matter of timing is that the cycle time to report and destroy our mobile forces must of needs be much shorter in Europe than in the United States.

There is some sentiment to alter this pattern by giving the theater personnel tactical ballistic missiles mounted in trucks and removing such weapons as the F-100's and the MACE.

## 2. STOL

Another of the theater weapons is the short take-off aircraft (STOL) which has evolved out of the vertical take-off aircraft (VTOL). The latter have been proven to be of little use, due to the large amount of weight which is required for engines and fuel to permit vertical take-off. As a result, the size of bombload, communications equipment, and so forth is very small. While the VTOL and current fighter-bombers lack sufficient range to make a two-way trip to Russia, they make more sense in terms of limited warfare potential. As mentioned, the primary problem with these tactical weapons is in the time necessary for communication between the TAC commander and Washington in order to strike. With a short cycle time, it is questionable whether this could be done.

## C. Priorities in Weapon Development

Mr. Barber suggested that two sets of priorities might be set up, distinguishing between the situation of an uncontrolled arms race or in an arms control situation. The priorities for the situation of an uncontrolled arms race should be as follows: (1) the Polaris, (2) the Dromedary concept, and (3) the Minuteman missile. The proposed priorities for an arms control situation would probably be the reverse. With the Minuteman missile, it was suggested that we might allow the Russians to place observers on bases since, within the present limits of accuracy, the bases were designed to withstand a nuclear attack while retaining their retaliatory ability. In this line, it would probably be an excellent strategy for the Soviet Union to seek to eliminate the Polaris-type missile as a deterrent force in disarmament negotiations, since this is the system which creates the maximum amount of insecurity.

From our own point of view, the hardness plus visibility of the Minuteman offers a considerable advantage. There exists always the possibility that a Polaris force might begin to disappear through limited war means on the part of an enemy. If this were to occur, it would prove difficult for us to ascertain the reasons for the disappearance. This reverse in priorities is due to the fact that, with any given Minuteman force, a force of ($E_x$)$N$, where ($E_x$) is the exchange ratio (2-10), could destroy the force. However, no matter how large a Soviet missile force, they could not insure the destruction of Polaris submarines. In the presence of arms control, stability can be found with Minuteman and a Soviet equivalent where both forces are within the exchange ratio limits.

In sum, there is a basic need to reexamine the requirement of atomic weapons in the field. Theater weapons are losing their importance in a general war, and modern weapons development make it unnecessary to have the weapons near the area which is to be defended.

In a discussion period following Barber's talk, a number of points were brought up. They may be summarized as follows:

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If it is desired to hedge bets in an arms control situation, one must hedge against many factors. Thus, Polaris missiles might be needed to counter a break-through in the guidance field which would nullify Minutemen, and so forth. The result is that a one weapon system, as suggested by Barber, is a dangerous one for this type of situation.

It is possible that the Soviet Union is reluctant to allow over-flights due to the fact that its missile bases are not hardened. If this is true, it might be possible to exchange hardening for the right of over-flights in a bargaining process.

The importance of accuracy in the survival of a deterrent system was brought up. Barber stated that it is not necessarily true that bombers are more accurate than missiles. He expects that in the next decade ICBM accuracy will approach one-third of a nautical mile. A significant increase in accuracy would have important implications in the effectiveness of such a deterrent system as the hardened-based Minuteman. Such an increase in accuracy might make it necessary to develop an automatic system which would begin firing after a certain number of enemy bombs had been dropped on our territory. This would be necessary to avoid the complete destruction of our deterrent force. It nevertheless raises the question of against whom the retaliation is to take place.

Barber's point about different priorities for weapons depending upon whether there was arms control or not received some attention in the discussion. It was noted that an arms control situation is a bargaining situation. Hence, we must take into consideration what is to be allowed to the other side. The Minuteman has some advantages in this sort of a situation, since it is an easily inspected system which depends more upon its hardening than upon secrecy for its security. With regard to this, a distinction was made between two functions of inspectors: (1) to give warning, and (2) to see that a previously agreed upon number of weapons in the field is not exceeded, or that important alterations in the system are not being made. Feld made the point that when a very versatile or invulnerable deterrent system has been attained, the importance of the problem of surprise attack is reduced. In this sort of a situation, the purpose of arms control should be to preserve the stability of the system and prevent miscalculations.

As our long-range missiles become more important, the value of our overseas missile bases in a general was would appear to diminish, although they might remain important in a limited war. Barber and Feld agreed that this might be a fruitful point upon which to negotiate with the Russians. Nevertheless, Rowen and others pointed out that, in spite of these considerations, our bases around the borders of Russia are certainly not yet valueless. Furthermore, their value may extend into the future. For one thing, the enemy would have to strike bases in both the United States and Europe simultaneously in order to knock out the entire retaliatory capacity, thus spreading out his attack. The Soviet Union would also be much surer of these missiles being fired in the event of a limited attack upon Europe. This is reinforced by the presence of United States forces and their families in Europe.

Concerning the disparity between the amount of time needed to fire one of these missiles and the amount of warning probable, it was noted that our choice would seem to be either to harden these missiles or get out. An example of this vulnerability is the stationing of a Jupiter rocket in

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Turkey on the Black Sea. This rocket would require nearly two hours for the authorization and fueling operations to take place before it could be fired. Meanwhile, the Soviets might easily destroy it with planes taking only fifteen minutes to reach its base. Smithies noted that a deterrent to European aggression might be more credible if in the hands of Europeans, which is not presently the case.

Tom Schelling made a number of points. One of these was that we must carefully consider methods by which war, should it arise, could be terminated. In particular, there should be a plan for allowing the enemy to surrender, should it wish to do so, before all of our striking capability has been launched. This surrender might take the form of a demonstrated destruction of the carriers of warheads at a specified spot. Any war must terminate with some form of disarmament, whether unilaterally imposed by the victor or through some other arrangement.

We must also recognize that the enemy may, in fact, wish to spare the people in the launching of its attack. If it is to be allowed to do so, then we must locate our missile bases far from centers of population.

A problem posed by the development of modern weapon systems is the question of what constitutes an overt act of aggression with any given weapon system. While the destruction of an American vessel at sea might easily be considered an accident, similar destruction of one missile base or an orbiting bomber is far more likely to turn out to be a casus belli. Location of weapons outside the United States, despite its advantages, makes it harder to define such acts.

Schelling also noted that there was considerable safety in diversification of weapons, especially for second strike. This is also true where very small schemes, such as a few missiles on a railroad train, will require an unduly large effort by an enemy for counteraction. In the case of the trains, their saturation of the entire railroad system would be required in order to guarantee the nullification of this weapon system.

It will be important in the implementation of any arms control plan to have certain safeguards against the reversal of the program by an enemy. Such a reversal and change to a program of rearmament might give an enemy the power of nuclear blackmail.

A further problem in imposing an arms control program is in the proper place for controls on any given weapon system. For example, in the case of submarine-fired missiles, are the controls best imposed directly upon the submarines and the rockets, or would the effort be more fruitfully invested in anti-submarine work?

Mr. Hadley suggested the jamming of our radar network as one of the possible modern acts of war.

The discussion then turned to problems of controlling modern warfare. Barber suggested that problems of control might be thought of in terms of degrees, with central control above a certain level of attack being impossible. If this were true, the choice of a weapons system should be based in part on the ease of maintaining centralized command. In any future war, it would be necessary to have central control and communications set up and planned in order to let either side out of the war when they wanted to surrender.

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Mr. Barber closed off the seminar by mentioning several points. First, he pointed out that there was perhaps too much emphasis on the problem of a guaranteed deterrent or guaranteed arms control. In this sort of a bargaining situation, we must look at the problem both from a Western point of view and from a Soviet point of view, being prepared to run at least some minimal risks in order to get an agreement. Concerning the problem of control, he noted that, to the man in the field, the difference between the absence of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff due to their destruction in a nuclear attack, and only the absence of communication channels between the field and these sources of command, is, for all practical purposes, impossible to discern. Thus, the planning must include the sort of option which the field commander is given in this type of situation. Finally, Barber noted that it would be nearly impossible to put controls upon research. He cited a recent example of unclassified research which may eventually have very important implications in military technology.

Further considerations of the problems of deterrence will be made in a later seminar, scheduled for next Wednesday morning.

Participants:

A. Barber
D. G. Brennan
G. Brewer
D. Cavers
R. Coward
B. Feld
M. Gewirtz
A. Hadley
M. Kalkstein
T. Milburn
K. Mather
R. Luce
J. Phelps
H. Rowen
W. Smith
T. Schelling
A. Smithies
T. O'Sullivan
J. Wiesner

RC, WS

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(cc) ACS-9

6/29/60

SPEAKERS: T. Schelling, J. Phelps and M. Halperin

## Remarks by Schelling

It is necessary to consider the relevance of deterrent force composition to arms control, and we may pose two initial questions:

1. Should arms control be mainly concerned with stabilizing deterrence?

2. Need one still have to envision a world maintained by deterrence even with arms control which would go down to the point of a comprehensively disarmed world?

Regarding the first question, I tend toward an affirmative answer, but this is a matter of emphasis. I add the qualification that weapons most needed for deterring general war may not be the optimal weapons system we would need in the case of general war. Two main functions of arms control that emerge from our discussions are (a) to improve and stabilize deterrence before the war breaks out and (b) to reduce destruction in case of war. Speaking to the second question, in any kind of disarmed world, deterrence is going to be one of the most important concepts of military and foreign policy. For example, the deterrent function of an international army would be very important to consider.

There is a real difference between deterrence and resistance. Deterrence discourages an action rather than meeting it when it comes. Resistance seems less reliable than it was formerly because of (1) the considerable destruction that ensues after an attack and (2) the fact that there is no longer any way in which resistance can be put up against a full-scale attack.

There are four principles to keep in mind regarding deterrence. (1) If you have the ability to resist successfully and wish to deter, the enemy should know your ability to do so. In contrast, for resistance per se, you might want to keep your ability to resist secret from the enemy. (2) Under the pure deterrence principle, what you threaten need not be in proportion to the size of the potential attack on you. This goes on the assumption that you can make the enemy believe that you would actually carry out what you threaten to do. (3) Extending the last point is the concept of credibility: Since most threats are exceedingly costly to carry out, there is the problem of demonstrating that you actually will carry it out, if necessary, and (L) the pure deterrent threat probably involves actions that you would not want to do. The tendency, therefore, would be to give it to someone who would want to do it if the threat failed. For example, to put atomic weapons in the hands of West Germany or Chiang Kai-Shek, in order to "really" show the Chinese and Russians that we intend to use them, is a device intended to meet the credibility problem. The "trip-wire" concept is another variant of this. Dulles' strategy of

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massive retaliation was an attempt at deterrence, but it was not very successful because he could not make it very credible.

(A general discussion of the definition of the terms ensued. The general consensus of opinion was finally that deterrence is making the enemy unwilling to do anything. Resistance is opposing his ability to do anything.)

Orear commented that we must keep in mind that what is deterrence for the Russians may not be deterrence for the Chinese. Barber quoted General Powers as saying that deterrence is a state of mind and cannot be given a quantitative value. Feld said that, short of murder and suicide, there is no real deterrence, and even then it may not work because of the possibility of paranoia. Brennan commented that the main motivation of arms control is not only to stabilize deterrence, but also to make sure we will be all right if deterrence fails. We don't have to fight over the precise boundary of where deterrence ends and resistance begins. The aim of arms control is in part in improving deterrence.

## Remarks by John Phelps

The force levels involved in stabilized deterrence are also a necessary consideration. Complete disarmament might yield a situation over which we would have little control. On the other hand, a natural stabilizing of deterrent forces in a continuing arms race is not to be depended upon, although there may be a kind of transitory stability for a time. The more promising approach lies in stabilized deterrence through arms control. Suppose that $N$ is the number of weapons we and the enemy would be permitted to have. $\Delta N$ refers to the number of weapons which might be concealed beyond this permitted level. Any inspection system would leave some uncertainty. Therefore, $\Delta N/N$ (or its reciprocal) might be called a figure of merit for the inspection system.

The "stabilized" deterrent forces should (1) assure a second-strike capability, and (2) have punitive, not suicidal, capability. We would ask how much damage do you want to do to the enemy's population. The dividing line between "punitive" and "suicidal" retaliation can arbitrarily be set at around 15% of the enemy population. Figure 1 shows approximate fatalities as a function of delivered yield. Thus, assuming two MT warheads and 50% destruction of the retaliatory force and a $N$ of about 150 missiles, we could conclude that 250 to 400 missiles would be sufficient to assure knocking out in retaliation something like 15% of the enemy population. Thus, $\Delta N/N \approx 0.5$

Brennan commented that ten surviving missiles constitutes a sufficient retaliatory force to deter a coldly-calculated surprise attack. He would assume that we could take out ten Soviet cities with these missiles which would de-house at least, if not kill, 20 to 25 million people, and eliminate one-third of their industrial capacity. On the other hand, the aggressor needs at least 1400 and probably more missiles, if we had 200 hardened to 1,000 p.s.i.* Therefore, $\Delta N/N$ could be as high as seven or more. This would roughly be sufficient to deter.

*See Figure 2*

## Discussion

Orear commented that all you need under a deterrent system is to have a

58

bluff called, and that's all. This did not seem to be stable to any degree.

Brennan said that no one would use severely-restricted force levels for
blackmail. The probability of blackmail, therefore, goes down as force
levels go down, but this also would be dependent on the size of △N.

Smithies said that he doesn't feel that deterrence could be stabilized at the level which was described and that either the arms level will go further down or, if critical tensions increase, it will go up. Brennan commented that 200 weapons is a very small number. Even these might wither away as countries become more open. As to the question of whether the arms race starts up again, this depends upon what stability could be built into the program. In any case, it would certainly be much more stable than the one we have now. Cavers asked whether this setup involved an arms control program that would include other weapons. Brennan replied that it would involve steps to improve world security. Whether or not this would involve reductions of conventional forces is hard to say. Orear asked, if we can get down to a level of 200 missiles, whether or not the governments would be ready to destroy their current military capability to that extent. Phelps replied that it is not a question of getting down. It is a question of not building. He noted that we did have a chance for stabilizing our deterrent force at the point where we were completely dependent on SAC bombers and before we started building missiles, but this point is now past. The next point for any chance of stability is when we get solid fuel missiles. If we can get an agreement at this point, we may be much better off.

Schelling remarked that, if each side is developing a preemptive capability, the "arms race" may be unlimited, but if each side is developing a retaliatory force, the arms race may level off. Therefore, we should not just look at the question of what would be an ideal arms-control scale of weapons on both sides, but rather ask if we can even agree that the goal is to damp down the race and to understand each other's programs. If we can have sufficient communication with the enemy on this, we might manage to guess what level of weapons could be expected on both sides, but when you get down to negotiating on force levels, you would run into considerable difficulty in finding exchange rates which would actually make inventories commensurable on both sides. You may have such a complicated analysis that the heads of the governments and the negotiators would not understand it. Therefore, it may be better to try to communicate with the enemy and to let each side find its own level. Had we thought in the past ten years of having only stable retaliation, we might have moved down to extremely low levels compared to what the Air Force likes to think of as deliverable megatonnage in the period of 1965-70.

Orear was of the opinion that, in obtaining a 200-missile level, there might be such an era of good feeling that the force level would keep going down. Barber warned that, even though we and Russia might be "in each other's laps", where it would level out would be dependent on what is needed vis-à-vis China. Schelling commented that much of this is dependent on the degree of sophistication on the part of the heads of government. If we can't look forward to developing some unilateral action policy, we could less look forward to arms control.

## Remarks by M. Halperin

In considering arms control as a means of stabilizing deterrence, one must distinguish between the effort to stabilize the strategic balance and the

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effort to stabilize the deterrence of limited war. The capabilities for
deterring total and limited war are likely to be different and, in some
cases, conflicting. For limited war, a first-strike counterforce is
necessary to make the threat of massive retaliation credible, while to
stabilize the strategic deterrent, a second-strike, counter-population
force is necessary. For limited war, it is advisable to have a strategic
force which needs to strike quickly, again to make the threat of massive
retaliation more credible, while for a stable strategic deterrent, a
hardened, well-dispersed force is necessary.

Civil defense might be needed in addition, as Herman Kahn has argued, to
make the threat of massive retaliation more credible, while civil defense
might serve to upset the strategic balance.

In devising arms control measures, there is again likely to be a conflict
between the desire to stabilize the strategic balance and desire to prevent
limited wars. For example, missile site inspection or other arms control
agreements which reduce the likelihood of a nuclear exchange might limit it
both by reducing the threat of massive retaliation and by making it less
likely that a limited war spirals into total war. A disengagement agree-
ment or an agreement on base withdrawals might, on the one hand, make the
strategic situation more stable by convincing the enemy of our peaceful
intentions, while, on the other hand, making limited war more likely by
giving the enemy the feeling that we are less committed to defend peri-
pheral areas.

The question arises of whether an effort should be made to increase the
size of conventional armies to be better able to deal with limited wars
which have become more likely after an arms control agreement. If so, it
may be that the chief value of the arms control agreement would be wiped
out by the larger effort in conventional weapons. The possibilities of
arms control at the limited war level has not been fully explored.
Limited war itself is a form of arms control, and there are a number of
agreements that might be made. An example might be in eliminating
middle-range nuclear weapons, which might serve to keep limited wars
stable and prevent them from becoming total wars.

Discussion

Brennan noted that a number of persons would disagree with the assertion
that the "Massive Retaliation" speech had had a considerable effect upon
the Chinese Communists. The analysis of one of the brothers Barnett
indicates that the Chinese take very little account of nuclear weapons.
A recent article appearing in *Life Magazine* indicates that the North
Koreans and Chinese never considered the possibility of the introduction
of atomic weapons into the Korean War. It also did not seem likely to
him that an increase in conventional forces would much increase world
tension.

Halperin cited the research of Miss Hsia of the Rand Corporation which
indicated that the Chinese had at least talked about "massive retaliation"
at the time of Quemoy. It is this research which indicates that the
Chinese took the concept seriously.

In response to a question by Brennan, Halperin suggested that the numbers

60

of conventional forces in an arms control situation should probably be about the same as now. They should, however, be placed in a more prepared state. The real problem in this sort of a situation will be keeping China under control. Phelps said that recent military history has shown that a very large number of troops are required to make a break-through. In order to do so, a force must have a superiority on the order of three to one. Thus, there is an element of stability in a situation where two fairly well-led armies face one another, even though one may outnumber the other. There are, however, too many imponderables involved to allow counting heavily upon this.

Cavers said that, with the possible exception of Korea, there are no limited wars in Asia which we could hope to win, especially without the assistance of nuclear weapons. Brennan felt that this was untrue even now, but if something were to give resolution to the American people, a sufficient increase in the numbers of our forces and in the effectiveness of their leadership and training might be brought about to make this emphatically untrue in the future.

The importance of conventional artillery, even when fired indiscriminately, was recalled by Barber. The Korean War demonstrated that much could be done to offset the outnumbering of forces by hard and heavy use of artillery.

Schelling doubted very much that we could muster the necessary resources for conducting a large-scale limited war, while maintaining an attitude which would submit to arms control restraints. Any limited war would seriously endanger an arms control agreement.

The distinction between limited and total war is a facile one, said Smithies. In fact, there is a large grey area between the two. Strategic weapons may be used in a limited war, or they may be used to a limited degree. There is also the possibility of limited blackmail in which the point at issue is not of major significance. Halperin pointed out that blackmail of the type practiced by Khrushchev in the U-2 incident had been examined by Morton Kaplan, calling it "limited retaliation". The limited retaliation theory which Kaplan set out was followed very closely by Khrushchev in successively forcing the United States to give up the U-2 flights. Orear questioned what American policy should have been if we were determined to continue the flights. Halperin indicated that Kaplan's answer would be that we should have declared to the Russians that the flights were part of the status-quo and should have threatened retaliation in kind. That is, if the Russians took out a base, we should have threatened to take out a base of theirs, and hope that they will then see that we are serious and will back down.

Luce asked what our policy should have been, under this strategy, if we had decided to back down. Halperin indicated that our policy should have been to indicate that the Russians, by making a threat, had shown how serious they considered the violation of their sovereignty of the over-flight, and, therefore, indicated that it was respecting the Russian commitment and withdrawing the flights. Smithies observed that, while this strategy might work in theory, it would be very tricky in practice and very dangerous.

If our primary aim was the maintenance of the status-quo, Feld said, we

0

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might approach the problem of arms control from this point of view. However, it is doubtful that we are presently agreed upon the status-quo, and, even if we were agreed, changes over time may make the present status-quo quite intolerable. It is also possible that an arms control agreement would cause major readjustments in strategic considerations. Areas which are highly important at the present time might lose their strategic significance, further easing tensions and solving some of the problems which we are considering.

Halperin noted that the threat to break up the arms agreement might be an effective check against the Russians starting a limited war, but might not work against the Chinese. The Chinese might be uninterested in the disarmament agreement or might be positively interested in breaking it, and having the Soviet Union and the United States break the agreement. This might encourage them to start a limited war, rather than serving as a check on their starting such a war.

We must make a distinction, noted Schelling, between the political conditions which an arms control system would require and those which it would create. If it requires impossible changes in the present situation as a prerequisite, an arms control system cannot be. If it is unable to create the changes necessary for its survival after being instituted, it will not work. Even though we might hope that the necessary considerations might be created vis-a-vis the Russians, it seems much less likely that this can be done with respect to the Chinese.

Feld wondered whether it was hopeless to think that there was no possible change in political conditions in the Far East which might lead China to take a less belligerant attitude. It seem unlikely in the near future, said Cavers, since there seems to be an advantage in this for the Chinese now.

An attempt to clarify what sort of an arms agreement we were thinking about led to a discussion of the directions in which the study program might go. It was agreed that we need more consensus than has hitherto been exhibited on terminology, goals, and so forth. There are a number of possible directions which the program might take, and it was suggested that the members give considerable thought to this problem in the immediate future.

Participants:

<table><tr><td>A. Barber</td><td>R. Luce</td></tr><tr><td>D. Brennan</td><td>J. Orear</td></tr><tr><td>R. Coward</td><td>J. Phelps</td></tr><tr><td>B. Feld</td><td>T. Schelling</td></tr><tr><td>M. Gewirtz</td><td>W. Smith</td></tr><tr><td>A. Hadley</td><td>I. Pool</td></tr><tr><td>M. Halperin</td><td>A. Smithies</td></tr><tr><td>N. Hoepli</td><td></td></tr></table>

RC, MG, MH

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The proposals provided that an International Control Commission be established, within the framework of the Security Council, and that it shall be provided with its own machinery of inspection. They also contained the following provisions:

"5...(d) The International Control Commission shall periodically carry out inspection of facilities for the mining of atomic raw materials and for the production of atomic materials and atomic energy.

"6. In carrying out the inspection of atomic energy facilities, the International Control Commission shall undertake the following measures:

"(a) Investigate the activities of facilities for mining atomic raw materials and for the production of atomic materials and atomic energy, and check their accounts;

"(b) Check existing stocks of atomic raw materials, atomic materials, and unfinished products;

"(c) Study production operations to the extent necessary for the control of the use of atomic materials and atomic energy;

"(d) Observe the fulfilment of the rules of technical exploitation of the facilities prescribed by the convention on control, and work out and prescribe the rules of technological control of such facilities;

"(e) Collect and analyze data on the mining of atomic raw materials and on the production of atomic materials and atomic energy;

"(f) Carry out special investigations in cases when suspicion of violations of the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons arises;

"(g) Make recommendations to Governments on questions relating to the production, stockpiling, and use of atomic materials and atomic energy;

"(h) Make recommendations to the Security Council on measures for prevention and suppression with regard to violators of the conventions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and on the control of atomic energy.

"7. For the fulfilment of the tasks of control and inspection entrusted to the International Control Commission, the latter shall have the right of:

"(a) Access to any facilities for mining, production, and stockpiling of atomic raw materials and atomic materials, as well

418

as to the facilities for the exploitation of atomic energy;

"(b) Acquaintance with the production operations of the atomic energy facilities, to the extent necessary for the control of the use of atomic materials and atomic energy;

"(c) Carrying out weighing, measurements, and various analyses of atomic raw materials, atomic materials, and unfinished products;

"(d) Requesting from the Government of any nation, and checking, various data and reports on the activities of atomic energy facilities;

"(e) Requesting various explanations on the questions relating to the activities of atomic energy facilities;

"(f) Making recommendations and presenting suggestions to Governments on matters concerning the production and use of atomic energy.

"(g) Submitting recommendations for the consideration of the Security Council on measures in regard to violators of the conventions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and on the control of atomic energy....

Though many of these proposals constituted a delayed acceptance of the conclusions of the majority, they seemed to contain many dangerous loopholes and the majority decided that they "do not provide an adequate basis" for an international agreement on the subject. AECOR, II, Spec. Supp., pp. 95-96; AECOR, III, Spec. Supp., pp. 29-39. The Commission continued its work regardless of the deepening conflict between the majority and the Soviet minority, but in its third report it was forced to admit that "it has reached an impasse;" it recommended, therefore, that its work be suspended. Idem, pp. 1,5.

A draft resolution, approving the findings of the Commission and the specific proposals in its second report, was defeated in the Security Council by a negative vote of the USSR (SCOR, III, No. 88, pp. 11-12)... The matter was then taken up in the General Assembly, which, by 40 votes to 6, with 4 abstentions, approved the Commission's findings and proposals "as constituting the necessary basis for establishing an effective system of international control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons," and asked the Commission to make such further studies "as it considers to be practicable and useful." Resolution 191 (III), 4 Nov. 1948; GAOR, III.1, Resolutions (A/810), pp. 16-17.

When the Atomic Energy Commission reconvened in February 1949, the Soviet Union brought up again its proposals for simultaneous

419

conventions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and on the control of atomic energy. AECOR, IV, No. 2, p. 8. The Commission considered that these proposals "do not provide an adequate basis for the effective international control of atomic energy," and concluded that "no useful purpose can be served by further discussions" on the subject. In another resolution, also adopted on 29 July 1949, the majority of the Commission criticized the Soviet proposals "for national ownership, operation and management of dangerous atomic facilities"; it expressed the opinion that these proposals "would not remove causes for suspicion, fear and distrust among nations, would render ineffective the prohibition of atomic weapons, and would continue dangerous national rivalries in the field of atomic energy." It concluded that "the impasse as analyzed in the third report of the Atomic Energy Commission still exists; that these differences are irreconcilable at the Commission level, and that further discussion in the Atomic Energy Commission would tend to harden these differences and would serve no practicable or useful purpose until such time as the sponsoring Powers have reported that there exists a basis for agreement." AEC/42 and 43 and S/1377; SCOR, IV, Supp. for Sept.-Dec. 1949, pp. 8-10. In the Security Council, a Soviet proposal that the Council request the Commission "to continue its work" was rejected on 16 September 1949; the Council instead adopted a Canadian proposal to transmit all the documents to the General Assembly. SCOR, IV, No. 43, pp. 19, 24, 28. The six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission also presented to the General Assembly reports on their consultations. GAOR, IV, Supp. 15, pp. 3-37.

The General Assembly, by Resolution 299 (IV), called upon all Governments "to do everything in their power to make possible, by the acceptance of effective international control, the effective prohibition and elimination of atomic weapons"; recommended "that all nations, in the use of their rights of sovereignty, join in mutual agreement to limit the individual exercise of those rights in the control of atomic energy to the extent required, in the light of the foregoing considerations, for the promotion of world security and peace, and ... that all nations agree to exercise such rights jointly"; and requested the six permanent members of the AEC to continue their consultations. GAOR, IV, Resolutions (A/1251), p. 22. These consultations continued for a while, but were suspended when the Soviet delegate refused to participate as long as the representative of the "Kuomintang" continued to represent China. GAOR, V, Supp. 1 (A/1287), pp. 26-27.

11. **Commission on Conventional Armaments.** In December 1946, the General Assembly recommended that "the Security Council give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and to assure that such regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces will be generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally by only some of the participants."

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Resolution 41 (I); GAOR, I.2, Resolutions (A/64/Add.1), p. 65.

Accordingly the Security Council established a Commission for
Conventional Armaments on 13 February 1947. The Commission was
to be composed of representatives of the members of the Security
Council and to prepare proposals "for the general regulation and
reduction of armaments and armed forces"; and "for practical and
effective safeguards in connection with the general regulation
and reduction of armaments." Matters which fell within the
competence of the Atomic Energy Commission were excluded from the
jurisdiction of the Commission for Conventional Armaments.
S/268/Rev.1; SCOR, II, Supp. No. 5, pp. 58-59.

At its third session, the General Assembly noted that "no
agreement is attainable on any proposal for the reduction of
conventional armaments and armed forces so long as each State
lacks exact and authenticated information concerning the
conventional armaments and armed forces of other States, so long
as no convention has been concluded regarding the types of
military forces to which such reduction would apply, and so long
as no organ of control has been established"; and asked the
Commission for Conventional Armaments to "devote its first
attention to formulating proposals for the receipt, checking and
publication, by an international organ of control within the
framework of the Security Council, of full information to be
supplied by Member States with regard to their effects and
their conventional armaments." Resolution 192 (III); GAOR, III.1,
Resolutions (A/810), pp. 17-18. At the same time, the General
Assembly rejected a Soviet proposal that all existing land, naval
and air forces of the five great powers be reduced by one third
during one year as a first step in reduction of armaments and
armed forces. A/C.1/310; GAOR, III.1, First C., Annexes, p. 19,
and Plenary, pp. 468-69. In February, 1949, the Security Council
adopted a U.S. proposal to transmit the resolution of the General
Assembly to the Commission for Conventional Armaments. It
rejected, at the same time, two Soviet proposals which would have
called for the reduction by one-third of the armed forces of the
permanent members of the Security Council, and for the establish-
ment of a single international control organ for supervision and
control of the implementation of the measures for the reduction
of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic
weapons. GAOR, IV, Supp. 2 (A/945), pp. 73-75.

In October 1949, the Security Council had before it the
following basic resolutions adopted by the Commission on 12 August
1948 (S/C.3/32):

"I. The Commission for Conventional Armaments resolves to
advice the Security Council:

"I. that it considers that all armaments and armed forces,
except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction, fall within

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its jurisdiction and that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.

"2. that it proposes to proceed with its work on the basis of the above definition.

"II. The Commission for Conventional Armaments recommends that the following principles should govern the formulation of practical proposals for the establishment of a system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces:

"1. A system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should provide for the adherence of all States. Initially it must include at least all States having substantial military resources.

"2. A system of regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces can only be put into effect in an atmosphere of international confidence and security. Measures for the regulation and reduction of armaments which would follow the establishment of the necessary degree of confidence might in turn be expected to increase confidence and so justify further measures of regulation and reduction.

"3. Examples of conditions essential to such confidence and security are:

"(a) The establishment of an adequate system of agreements under Article 43 of the Charter. Until the agreed forces are pledged to the Security Council an essential step in establishing a system of collective security will not have been taken.

"(b) The establishment of international control of atomic energy. It is a basic assumption of the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments that the Atomic Energy Commission will make specific proposals for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

"(c) The conclusion of the peace settlements with Germany and Japan. Conditions of international peace and security will not be fully established until measures have been agreed upon which will prevent these States from undertaking aggressive action in the future.

"4. A system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, in order to make possible the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources pursuant to Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, must limit armaments and armed forces to those which are consistent

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with and indispensable to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such armaments and armed forces should not exceed those necessary for the implementation of members' obligations and the protection of their rights under the Charter of the United Nations.

"5. A system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces must include an adequate system of safeguards, which by including an agreed system of international supervision will ensure the observance of the provisions of the treaty or convention by all parties thereto. A system of safeguards cannot be adequate unless it possesses the following characteristics:

"(a) it is technically feasible and practical;

"(b) it is capable of detecting promptly the occurrence of violations;

"(c) it causes the minimum interference with, and imposes the minimum burdens on, any aspect of the life of individual nations.

"6. Provision must be made for effective enforcement action in the event of violations.

A draft resolution, approving these proposals, was vetoed in the Security Council on 11 October 1949. SCOR, IV, No. 46, p. 14. The Council then proceeded to discuss a plan for census and verification of armed forces and armaments of Member States, prepared by the Commission on the basis of a French proposal. It provided for a "central control authority" empowered to investigate and verify the census and take decisions by a simple majority. S/1372; SCOR, IV, Supp. for Sept. - Dec. 1949, pp. 2-7. However, the Ukrainian SSR and USSR representatives were opposed to the French plan on the grounds that it imposed preliminary conditions on the reduction of armaments, and that without prior agreements on reduction of armaments, any census would be meaningless. The proposals were vetoed in the Security Council on 18 October 1949. SCOR, IV, No. 48, pp. 21-22.

The Assembly approved the proposals formulated by the Commission for Conventional Armaments, but noted that the unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council, which was essential for their implementation, had not yet been achieved, and recommended further study by the Commission. Resolution 300 (IV); GAOR, IV, Resolutions (A/1251), p. 22.

On 27 April 1950, the USSR representative stated that his delegation would not take part in the work of the Commission so long as the "representative of the Kuomintang group" was permitted to be present, and withdrew. GAOR, V, Supp. 2 (A/1361), pp. 41-42.

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On 22 June 1950 the U.S. made public a detailed outline for the operation of a conventional armaments administration and two additional working papers were presented on 13 July. A report containing these and other proposals on items subject to census and industrial safeguards (S/1690) was transmitted to the Security Council, which took no action on it.

12. Committee of Twelve. On 13 December 1950 the General Assembly established a committee of twelve, consisting of the representatives of the members of the Security Council, together with Canada, "to consider and report ... on means whereby the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments may be co-ordinated and on the advisability of their functions being merged and placed under a new and consolidated disarmament commission." Resolution 496(V); GAOR, V, Supp. 20 (A/1775), p. 80.

The Committee of Twelve recommended the establishment of a single new commission to carry forward the work (A/1922; GAOR, VI, Annexes, Agenda Items 66 and 16, pp. 2-3). On the basis of this report, the General Assembly established the Disarmament Commission and dissolved the Atomic Energy Commission. Resolution 502 (VI), 11 Jan. 1952; GAOR, VI, Supp. 20 (A/2119); p. 1-2. The Security Council dissolved the Commission on Conventional Armaments on 30 January 1952.

13. Disarmament Commission. Despite repeated meetings in 1952, the Commission did not succeed in carrying out any part of the tasks assigned in Resolution 502(VI). The first report of the Disarmament Commission (DC/11; DCOR, Supp. for April-June 1952, pp. 5-8) was submitted on 29 May; it referred to several working papers presented by the members of the Commission, such as a U.S. proposal for "progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments", and a joint proposal by France, UK and US for "fixing numerical limitation of all armed forces." DC/C.2/1, DCOR, op. cit., pp. 9-18; DC/10, DCOR, op. cit., pp. 1-5.

The second report of the Commission of 1 October 1952 contained a detailed account of the proceedings, but no attempt was made to reach an agreement on the substance of the problem. DC/20; DCOR, Spec. Supp. 1, pp. 1-163. The General Assembly took note of this report and asked the Commission to prepare co-ordinate plans for "(a) the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments; (b) the elimination and prohibition of all major weapons, including bacteriological, adaptable to mass destruction; (c) the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only; the whole programme to be carried out under effective international control in such a way that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered." Resolution 704 (VII);

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CAOR, VII, Supp. 20A (A/2361/Add.1), p.3. The third report of
the Commission reported in August 1953 that no meetings of the
Commission were held since the adoption of that resolution.
DC/32; DCOR, Supp. for July-Sept. 1953, p.1.

In November 1953 the Assembly suggested that the Commission
study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee to "seek
in private an acceptable solution." Resolution 715 (VIII);
GAOR, VIII, Supp. 17 (A/2630), pp. 3-4. Accordingly, the
Disarmament Commission established in April 1954 a sub-committee
composed of the representatives of Canada, France, USSR, UK and
US, recommending that it "should arrange its own meetings and
method of work." DC/49; DCOR, Supp. for April-June 1954, p.5.

During the course of the Sub-Committee's discussions, held
in London between 13 May and 22 June 1954, various memoranda
and working papers were submitted, including a detailed paper by
the U.S. on "the establishment of international control organs
with appropriate rights, powers and functions." DC/53, Annex 4;
DCOR, Supp. for April-June 1954, pp. 9-14. The USSR Draft
Resolution of 1 June 1954 took the position that the Disarmament
Commission should declare "it essential that, as an important
step towards achieving complete elimination from the armaments
of all States of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of
mass destruction, together with the simultaneous establishment of
strict international control securing the observance of an
agreement to prohibit the use of atomic energy for military
purposes, the States concerned should assume a solemn and
unconditional obligation not to employ atomic, hydrogen or other
weapons of mass destruction." DC/53, Annex 6; DCOR, op. cit.,
p. 15. A British-French memorandum of 11 June 1954 provided for a
prohibition of the use of atomic weapons "except in defense
against aggression"; and for the carrying out of the disarmament
process in careful stages. DC/53, Annex 9; DCOR, op. cit., pp.21-22

At its ninth session, the General Assembly considered the
fourth report of the Disarmament Commission (DC/55; DCOR, Supp.
for July-Sept. 1954, pp. 1-3). After the Soviet delegation
accepted the British-French proposals as the basis of further
discussions (A/2742/Add.1 and A/C.1/750; GAOR, IX, Agenda
Items 20 and 68, pp. 2-3), the First Committee adopted unanimously
a draft resolution co-sponsored by the five nations memebers of
the Sub-Committee on disarmament. On 4 November 1954 the General
Assembly adopted the main draft resolution unanimously; it concluded
that "a further effort should be made to reach agreement on
comprehensive and co-ordinated proposals to be embodied in a draft
international disarmament convention providing for:

"(a) The regulation, limitation and major reduction of all
armed forces and all conventional armaments;

"(b) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type,

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together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons
to peaceful purposes;

"(c) The establishment of effective international control, through a control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed reductions of all armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

"The whole programme to be such that no State would have
cause to fear that its security was endangered." Resolution
808 (IX); IX, Supp. 21 (A/2890), p. 3.

Pursuant to this resolution, the Disarmament Commission
requested the Sub-Committee to reconvene and resume its work
during 1955. The Canadian, French, British and American
delegations presented several joint draft resolutions concerning
the manner in which the disarmament programme should be carried
out, the principles of control and nuclear disarmament. DC/71,
Annexes 4, 6, 10-12 and 14; DCOR, Supp. for April-Dec. 1955,
pp. 5-8, 13-17. There were serious and fundamental differences
in the Sub-Committee on the specific means of attaining the
agreed general objectives of full disclosure, inspection, control
and safeguards.

Once again the USSR objected to the four-power formulations
of plans for balanced reduction of armed forces and achievement
of international control before unconditional prohibition of atomic
weapons. However, on 10 May 1955, the USSR representative
presented a plan which for the first time used ideas and language
similar to views put forward by the Western powers. DC/71,
Annex 15; DCOR, op. cit., pp. 17-25.

At the Geneva Conference, held in July 1955, President
Eisenhower presented a plan for mutual aerial inspection
designed to prevent surprise attack. (DC/71, Annex 17; DCOR,
op. cit., pp. 31-33); the French Government presented proposals
for financial supervision of disarmament (DC/71, Annex 16,
DCOR, op. cit., pp. 25-31); the British Government proposed
"a system of joint inspection of the forces now confronting each
other in Europe" (DC/71, Annex 19; DCOR, op. cit., pp. 35-37);
and the Soviet Government suggested the establishment of control
posts in large ports, at railroad junctions and at airfields.

A U.S. plan to implement the Eisenhower proposal was presented
to the Disarmament Sub-Committee on 30 August 1955. DC/71,
Annex 20; DCOR, op. cit., pp. 37-39. On 19 September 1955,
Marshall Bulganin presented the Soviet comments on this proposal.
33 Dep't. of State Bull. (1955), pp. 644-647. In reply to that
comment, President Eisenhower presented, on 1 March 1956, a new
proposal for cessation of nuclear production for military purposes.

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34 Dep't. of State Bull. (1956), pp. 514-515.

Pursuant to Resolution 914 (X) of the General Assembly, adopted on 16 December 1955 (GAOR, X, Supp. 19 [A/3116], p. 5), the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission held another series of meetings in 1956 to explore the Geneva proposals. France and the United Kingdom presented a synthesis of the various plans, outlining carefully the various stages and the procedure for passing from one stage to another, together with a set of working papers on control. DC/83, Annexes 2 and 8. United States made proposals for technical exchange missions, small demonstration test areas and a detailed proposal for steps to be taken during the first phase of disarmament. DC/83, Annexes 3, 4 and 6. The Soviet Union presented to the Sub-Committee: (a) a revised version of its previous proposals, embodying the main features of the Western drafts and a description of the functions of the control organ which was much clearer than in previous Soviet proposals; and (b) a special proposal for a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments in Europe, "including the territory of both parts of Germany and of States adjacent to them." DC/83, Annex 5. On 17 November 1956, the Soviet Union agreed, in addition, to aerial inspection over an area extending 800 kilometers east and west of the demarcation line between NATO and Soviet forces. A/3366.

At the next series of meetings of the Sub-committee in London, March-August 1957, a serious attempt was made to close the gap between the two sets of proposals and to reach a comprehensive agreement on disarmament. The United States proposals put an emphasis on five points:

1. All future production of fissionable materials shall be used exclusively for "non-weapons purposes," and existing stockpiles shall be reduced through transfers to "internationally supervised national or international use for non-weapons purposes."

2. Limitation, and ultimately elimination, of nuclear explosions.

3. Reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to 2.5 million for the USSR and the United States, and 750,000 for France and the United Kingdom. Reductions beyond this stage would depend upon the settlement of major political issues dividing the world.

4. The first step toward assuring the use of outer space for peaceful and scientific purposes only should be to bring the testing of objects propelled through outer space "under international inspection and participation."

6

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5. Progressive installation of inspection systems which will provide against the possibility of great surprise attack; such systems should include "open skies, open ports, open centres." A/C.1/783.

Soviet proposals of 30 April 1957 accepted the levels proposed by the United States for the first stage and suggested a level of 2.5 million also for China, but conditioned these proposals upon prior agreement on second-stage reductions to 1.5 million for the USSR, the United States and China, and to 650,000 for the United Kingdom and France. In reply to a United States suggestion for a 10 per cent cut in conventional armaments and military budget, the Soviet Union proposed a 15 per cent cut. With respect to controls, the Soviet Union pointed out that in the first stage controls should be limited to control posts "in the western border regions of the Soviet Union, in the territories of France, the United Kingdom and other signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Treaty, and the eastern part of the United States." Control posts at the airfields should be established only in the second stage (after reduction of forces to 1.5 million). Instead of asking for complete elimination of foreign bases, the Soviet Union proposed an initial agreement on a list of bases which "can be abolished within one or two years." As to aerial inspection, the Soviet Union countered the United States proposal to establish a wedge-shaped area of inspection extending from the North Pole to Marseilles at one corner and Odessa at the other corner, by a proposal for a rectangular area bounded roughly by London, Riga, Athens and Madrid, and including only a small area of Soviet territory. In the Far East, the Soviet proposal suggested the creation of areas of aerial inspection of equal size in Siberia and Western United States. DC/112, Annex 7.

On 29 August 1957, in the light of informal discussions with the Soviet Union and after prolonged discussions with their NATO allies, the Western Powers presented an integrated set of proposals "for partial measures of disarmament." They included proposals for: suspension of tests of nuclear weapons for 24 months, cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, unconditional reduction of armed forces in the second stage to 2.1 million and in the third stage to 1.7 million (leaving only further reductions subject to progress toward the solution of political issues), and acceptance of an obligation "not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defense." With respect to safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack through aerial inspection and ground control posts, the Western Powers presented to the Soviet Union the following alternatives:

(1) All the territory of the continental United States, Alaska and Canada, on the one side, and all the territory of the Soviet Union, on the other side, or

428

(2) all the territory north of the Artic Circle of NATO countries and the Soviet Union, together with all the territory of Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union west of 140 degrees west longitude, east of 160 degrees east longitude and north of 50 degrees north latitude, and the remainder of Alaska and Kamchatka as well as all the Aleutian and Kurile Islands -- should be subject to inspection, provided that the Soviet Union agrees also to accept inspection either in:

(3) a zone of Europe extending in the south to 40 degrees north latitude, in the west to 10 degrees west longitude and in the east to 60 degrees east longitude (i.e., including, on the one hand, all Europe, except southern Spain and Portugal, southern tip of Italy and Sicily and southern two-thirds of Greece and Turkey, and, on the other hand, all European Russia west of the Urals), or in

(4) a more limited zone including " a significant part of the territory of the Soviet Union, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe." DC/113, Annex 5.

Just two days before the official presentation of the Western proposals, the Soviet delegate to the Subcommittee reversed his prior cooperative attitude and made a strong attack on Western slowness. After he rejected the new proposals as entirely unacceptable, the Subcommittee recessed on 6 September 1957. Nevertheless, the Soviet memorandum of 20 September 1957, on partial measures in the field of disarmament, accepted several Western proposals (e.g., those relating to the reductions of armed forces in the first three stages), proposed the acceptance of the obligation not to use nuclear weapons during an initial period of five years, and suggested that no atomic military units should be stationed beyond national frontiers and that no atomic weapons should be placed at the disposal of States which do not have them. A/C.1/793.

At the twelfth session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union complained about the unrepresentative composition of the Disarmament Commission and of its Subcommittee, and proposed the establishment of a new commission composed of all Members of the United Nations. The Western Powers agreed to the enlargement of the Commission from 11 members to 25, also adding, besides some NATO and Latin American countries, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Poland, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. Resolution 1150 (XII); GAOR, XII, Supp. 18 (A/3805), p. 4. They refused, however, to accept the Albanian proposal for the addition of seven more members, i.e., Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Finland, Indonesia, Rumania and the Sudan. Consequently, the Soviet Union refused to participate in the work of the enlarged Disarmament Commission in 1958.

In his letter of 10 December 1957, Mr. Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, endorsed a Polish suggestion (the Rapacki plan) that no nuclear weapons be stationed or

429

produced within the two parts of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
38 Dep't. of State Bull. (1958), pp. 127-130. In his reply of
12 January 1958, President Eisenhower suggested: that outer
space should be used only for peaceful purposes; that newly
produced fissionable materials should not be used for weapons
purposes and that existing nuclear weapons stocks should be
reduced by transfers to peaceful purposes; that testing of nuclear
weapons be stopped indefinitely; and that measures be taken to
guarantee against the possibility of surprise attack. Ibid.,
pp. 122-127. On 8 January 1958, Premier Bulganin proposed a
reduction in foreign troops stationed in the two parts of Germany,
and agreed to two measures against surprise attacks: establishment
of control stations at large ports and at railroad and highway
centers; and repeated the previous proposal for the creation of
an 800-kilometer zone for aerial photography on both lines
dividing the opposing military groupings in Europe. N. Y. Times,
10 Jan. 1958, p. 6. On 15 March 1958, the Soviet Union accepted
the proposal to ban the use of cosmic space for military
purposes, subject, however, to a simultaneous elimination of
foreign military bases. A/3818.

In the spring of 1958, the Governments of the United States
and the USSR agreed to convene a conference of technical experts
to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible
agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. This conference
was held at Geneva, from 1 July to 21 August 1958, and reached
the conclusion that it is technically feasible to set up "a
workable and effective control system for the detection of
violations of an agreement on the worldwide cessation of nuclear
weapons tests." A/3897.

Another conference of experts from five Western and five
communist States was held at Geneva, from 10 November to 18
December 1958, to study possible measures which might be helpful
in preventing surprise attack, but no joint report was agreed
upon. The Western experts presented to the conference detailed
papers on: technical aspects of possible instruments of
surprise attack (missiles, long-range aircraft, etc.); techniques
which would be effective in the observation and inspection of the
instruments of surprise attack (aerial and satellite photography,
radar, etc.); illustrative outlines of possible systems for
observation and inspection of long-range aircraft, ballistic
missiles and ground forces; and planning an integrated observation
system for reducing the possibility of surprise attack. A/4078,
Annexes 5-7, 10, 11 and 13. In its introductory proposal, the
Soviet Government agreed to 28 ground control posts in the
territory of countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty, including
6 posts in the western frontier zones of the USSR, provided that
there be established 54 posts on the territory of countries
parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Baghdad Pact,
including 6 posts along the east coast of the United States.
As far as aerial photography was concerned, the Soviet Government

430

repeated the suggestion with respect to an 800-kilometer zone to
the east and the west of the line of division between NATO and
Warsaw Treaty forces, but added to the zone the territories of
Greece, Turkey and Iran; it suggested also an aerial photography
zone including the Far Eastern Territory of the USSR to the east of
108° east longitude and the territory of the United States west of
90° west longitude as well as all of Japan including Okinawa. The
Soviet Government coupled these proposals with a simultaneous
reduction of foreign forces in Europe by one third and on agreement
not to keep nuclear weapons and rockets on the territory of Germany.
During the conference, the Soviet experts presented a proposal to
prohibit flights of aircraft with nuclear weapons over the
territories of foreign States and over open seas, and detailed
proposals regarding the tasks and functions of ground control posts
and aerial inspection. Ibid., Annexes 4, 8, 9 and 12. The
Western experts refused to discuss several issues presented by the
Soviet experts on the ground that they were political, while the
Soviet experts insisted on the consideration by the conference of
all the issues raised by them. Ibid., Annexes 14 and 15. In view
of this basic disagreement, only limited consideration was given
by the conference to the substance of the proposals.

The General Assembly, on 4 November 1958, accepted the Soviet
proposal to change the membership of the Disarmament Commission and
decided that it should be composed of all the Members of the
United Nations. Resolution 1252 D (XIII); GAOR, XIII, Supp. 18
(A/4090), p. 4. As no discussions were held in that Commission
during 1959, the Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Geneva
in August 1959 decided to establish a new committee of ten
nations to consider disarmament matters DC/144.

At the fourteenth session of the General Assembly,
Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
introduced new Soviet proposals on disarmament, which were
followed by a declaration of the Soviet Government on general and
complete disarmament. This declaration envisaged the disbanding
of all armed forces and the destruction of all forms of armaments,
leaving only strictly limited contingents of police (militia),
equipped with small arms, for the maintenance of internal order
and the protection of the personal security of citizens. This
programme of disarmament was to be carried out in three stages,
within a period of four years. A/4219. One day before the
announcement of the Soviet proposal, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, British
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presented a declaration on
comprehensive disarmament down to "levels which will rule out the
possibility of aggressive war." This proposal provided also for
three stages, with a balance in each stage between disarmament in
the nuclear and conventional fields. A/C.1/820. Later, Mr. Jules
Moch presented a French proposal to give high priority to measures
prohibiting first the development and then the manufacture and
possession of all vehicles for the delivery of nuclear devices
(satellites, rockets, aircraft, submarines, etc.). A/C.1/821.
The General Assembly endorsed "the goal of general and complete
disarmament under effective international control," and

431

referred all proposals to the Disarmament Commission and the ten-
nation disarmament committee. Resolution 1378 (XIV), 20 November
1959; GAOR, XIV, Supp. 16 (A/4354), p. 3.

On 18 February 1960, Mr. Herter, the Secretary of State of the United States outlined two major goals for the disarmament negotiations: creating "a more stable military environment, which will curtail the risk of war and permit reductions in national armed forces and armaments"; and, subsequently, "to cut national armed forces and armaments further and to build up international peacekeeping machinery, to the point where aggression will be deterred by international rather than national force." In the second stage it would be necessary "to create certain universally accepted rules of law which, if followed, would prevent all nations from attacking other nations," and to back up such rules by a world court and an international armed force. 42 Dep't. of State Bull. (1960), pp. 354-358.

The proposals presented by the Western nations at the Ten-
Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva on 14 March 1960
constituted an elaboration of the British proposals of September
1959 for a three-stage disarmament plan. They envisaged: the
creation of an International Disarmament Organization; reduction
of national forces and armaments by progressive safeguarded steps
to "levels required by internal security and fulfillment of
obligations under the United Nations Charter to the end that no
single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose enforce-
ment of international law"; and establishment of an international
organization, to be an organ of, or linked to, the United Nations,
to preserve world peace as national armaments are reduced.
Ibid., pp. 511-513. The introductory statement by Mr. Eaton,
U.S. Representative to the Conference, emphasized the importance
not only of "carefully measured first steps" which will bring
increased security to each nation, but also of the final measures
necessary to attain the ultimate goal of a "world of peace under
law." In this connection, he pointed out the need for:
strengthening international arrangements for settling difficulties
among nations; establishing universally accepted rules of
international law, backed by a universally recognized international
court; and building up an international force to insure that
weaker nations would not be threatened by more powerful ones.
Ibid., pp. 513-515.

On 2 June 1960, the Soviet Government made new proposals con-
cerning the basic clauses of a treaty on general and complete
disarmament. In particular, it accepted the French proposal of
October 1959 that in the first stage all means of delivering
nuclear weapons to their targets be abolished, and suggested that
all military bases in foreign territories be simultaneously
liquidated. It also spelled out in greater detail than in the
past the measures of control to be introduced in the three stages,
and proposed that measures to maintain peace and security under
conditions of general and complete disarmament should include the

432

placing at the disposal of the Security Council of "units from the contingents of the police (militia) remaining at their disposal."
A/4374/Rev.1.

On 27 June 1960, the Communist delegations withdrew from the Ten-Nation Conference on the ground that the Western delegations failed to participate in a substantive discussion of disarmament problems. On the same day, the United States delegation presented its new "program for general and complete disarmament under effective international control." The new American proposals put in the forefront the goal of "a secure and peaceful world of free and open societies in which there shall be general and complete disarmament under effective international control and agreed procedures for the settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. They defined general and complete disarmament as disbanding of all armed forces, "except for those contingents of agreed size required for the purpose of maintaining internal order and ensuring the personal security of citizens and for agreed contingents for the international peace force." Disarmament was to be carried out in three stages "containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures with each measure being carried out in an agreed and strictly defined period of time, under the supervision of an International Disarmament Control Organization." Transition from one stage to the next would depend on a finding by the Security Council that "all measures in the preceding stage have been fully implemented" and verified and that "any additional verification arrangements and procedures required for measures in the next stage have been established and are ready to operate effectively." The international peace force was to be established progressively and to possess such personnel strength and armaments as would be "sufficient to preserve world peace when general and complete disarmament is achieved." With respect to nuclear delivery systems, the American plan envisaged early technical studies of "measures necessary to verify control over, reduction and elimination of agreed categories" of such systems, and the establishment of "on-site inspection at mutually agreed operational air bases, missile launching pads, submarine and naval bases in order to establish a basis for controls over nuclear delivery systems in subsequent stages." 43 Dep't, of State Bull. (1960), pp. 90-92.

Despite the fact that the new Soviet and United States proposals contained many common features and were not too far apart, the Communist delegations did not return to the Ten-Nation Conference and the question of disarmament was resubmitted to the United Nations in the second half of 1960.

433

ARMS CONTROL: SOME PERSPECTIVES AND PRIORITIES

-- John B. Phelps

The passage of a few weeks since the end of the main part of the Summer Study provides a chance to look back and collect a few miscellaneous thoughts on the status and direction of arms control research. In this period the election campaign has been, on balance, a probably salutary influence because it reminds one forcefully of the lack of public understanding of some arms control problems and so makes for a realistic perspective.

My aim in this little paper is not to suggest specific programs or policies, but to pick out what seem to me to be the more important constraints of the present situation, as far as arms control research is concerned, and to suggest some guidelines for further work. I think there are now three dominant circumstances which control and inhibit our pursuit of effective arms controls. One circumstance is the great lack of urgency about arms controls which exists in the minds of most influential people. Another is the acceptance in most of our thinking of the prevailing state of bilateral suspicion and the limitation this imposes. A third circumstance is our great relative ignorance, on which all the Summer Study participants seemed to agree, of the nature and scope of the problems we are trying to come to grips with when we talk about arms controls. I will briefly discuss each of these circumstances as I see it.

1. When we stop to think about it we all realize that our sense of urgency about arms controls is not shared by very many people. It is shared, in a kind of unspecific and unfortunately probably not very useful way, by the so-called "peace groups." But it is not shared by the overwhelming majority of Americans, even the most influential and presumably thoughtful Americans. Politicians in campaigns certainly don't mean everything they say, but it is safe to say that their statements are largely aimed to coincide as nearly as possible with the thinking and the needs of their audiences. It is for this latter reason that the recent campaign is discouraging. Disarmament as an issue has been pushed rather far into the background. In the Kennedy camp at least there was tacit recognition early in the campaign that this would be necessary for the sake of winning the election. I have no information on the Nixon camp, but my guess is that little need was felt to come to grips with disarmament as an issue; it was just largely omitted.

435

The idea of course is that peace is an overriding issue and that we must work toward it in all possible ways. But, with the occasional exception of very particular things like the nuclear test ban situation, the pursuit of peace and disarmament makes a very unspecific kind of issue. When we understand that the dedicated U.S. efforts are consistently blocked by Soviet intransigence and that, until we can be sure the Communists are not cheating in a disarmament agreement, security is attainable only by military means, we have about covered the disarmament issue. What is almost never asserted in public is the notion that, with the passage of time, military means offer less true security and that it is necessary to begin to compromise maximum traditional military security in the hope of getting more security in other ways.

Almost equally disturbing is most military thinking, at least so far as it is revealed in public statements and Congressional hearings. Military planning going on into the 1970's has about it still the same obsolescent words and concepts. The Air Force is still pushing the B-70 bomber. There is no hint that Polaris will not be deployed to within a few miles of Communist coastlines. We are in favor of "one last try" on the nuclear test ban negotiations. The Polaris program is planned up to a few hundred missiles. Something like 300 ICBM's are contemplated, and the SAC bomber force is holding to at least its present level. Except on rare and isolated occasions, no one of any consequence has yet said anything in public about stabilized deterrence with arms controls.

What is most fundamentally missing is a real sense of urgency about disarmament. The prevailing view is that disarmament is a desirable and, as most people will concede, an essential goal in the long run, but until we have it with all sorts of rigid safeguards we must not slow up our pursuit of traditional military security by as much as one percent. I believe that, until there is some willingness to sacrifice at least a small part of our traditional military security for the sake of disarmament, we will have no disarmament (or arms controls, if you prefer). The sacrifices need not be very great. They may involve, as a starter, small reductions in force levels in the interest of a stable deterrent balance; they may involve certain information exchanges, and so on.

The sense of urgency that would get us out of the present unfortunate situation would come about very rapidly, I think, if it were clearly and forcefully demonstrated that the security that is achievable by military means declines sharply with time and the dangers rise steadily as we progress through the 1960's. We have already learned, or at least we should have learned by now, that a sense of urgency about arms controls cannot be instilled by painting frightening pictures of nuclear war. These pictures have been painted adequately, sometimes brilliantly. They frighten a

436

very few people and they provide ammunition for the peace groups. But they tell us nothing about how best to avoid the horrors they portray. It may be that arms controls or disarmament can be accomplished by a fortuitous combination of events -- by unexpected drops in international tension, or by technological breakthroughs. But I doubt it. People will have to be more motivated, in a quite specific way, to seek arms controls. Clear, obviously unrefutable answers must be prepared to the polished and publicized cliche that, as a practical matter, our best hope for security is to continue to deter the Communists by the threat of force.

This kind of realignment of prevailing thinking will certainly take a long time, but the sooner we get started on it the more chance we have. This means that what we may need to do, at least as much as devising new arms control concepts and trying to increase our intellectual comprehension of the field, is to figure out ways of creating more of a directed sense of urgency in the minds of more people. What we seem to need most are clear demonstrations that arms controls are immediately necessary and that they may require now a few adjustments in military policy.

2. A second dominant circumstance of the present situation is the assumption of bilateral suspicion which characterizes our efforts toward arms controls. Present U.S. positions and most of the significant thought (including that of our Summer Study) start with the assumption that arms controls must include very tight safeguards against cheating. This is a severe constraint on our thinking. It is true that efforts to achieve trust have been very discouraging and the Communist record gives cause for suspicion. But we have worked ourselves into a situation in which not only the prevailing popular and official mood, but also the thinking of (relatively) enlightened groups such as ours, starts with the assumption of mutual distrust and looks for safeguards and inspection techniques founded largely on technical ingenuity.

This assumption of distrust has a constricting effect on the range of possible arms control ideas. It tends to reduce the pursuit of peace to a sort of an exercise in technical ingenuity and game theory, or an interesting new branch of military strategy in which some new rules are set on the strategic game. We need all the technical ingenuity we can find and we would be very naive to trust the Communists completely. But we have, probably without being completely aware of it, narrowed our position so greatly that we have largely excluded the possibility of trying to develop trust.

Trust is an ephemeral thing. In late 1945, when we certainly trusted the Russians more than now, we would probably have settled for much less stringent arms control safeguards. History shows that distrust, and also trust, among nations can crystallize fairly

437

rapidly. The belligerency shown toward Russia by the statements of U.S. leaders and our arms budgets fluctuate markedly with the intensity of the Cold War.

All this leads one to conclude that some small gains in trust, some small demonstrations that neither side is committed to maximum hostility, could have a very significant influence on the attitudes which largely determine our progress toward arms controls. Consideration of the technical problems of inspection shows that a very small amount of trust can replace a vast technical apparatus. It can of course be argued that with trust -- a trust that many, in the light of our experiences, would consider naive -- we sacrifice safeguards and so risk our security. But the risks are great anyway and we can carefully control the extent to which we substitute trust for safeguards. The main problem is to get arms controls started somehow, and the point is that in our fascination with largely technical approaches we may be overlooking some elementary and valuable ideas which come largely under the heading of trust.

3) The third dominant circumstance of the present arms control situation is one we all recognize and talk about -- our very limited understanding of the problems we are trying to come to grips with. Probably little elaboration is needed on this point. The contrast between the intellectual effort which has gone into analyzing essentially military problems and that which has gone into arms controls and disarmament in the postwar years is sharp enough. Anyone can make a long list of things we don't know or understand about arms controls: how much inspection is needed for what purposes, to what extent inspection might be replaced or supplemented by other sources of information, what can be accomplished by unilateral actions and which actions are most reasonable, what is the role of stabilized deterrence, and so on.

For any progress that is ultimately made toward disarmament, arms controls, world security, or whatever we call the goals, an extensive study of the fairly conventional problems of arms controls as we have just begun to organize and understand them will be vastly worthwhile. Even though I have expressed reservations about the emphases in our arms control research so far, it is clear that any understandings we can get at this point, however limited, will be valuable. So more research along the present lines is obviously one task we must set ourselves.

I have the impression that the largely strategic questions of stabilized deterrence have been analyzed somewhat out of proportion to our understanding of other aspects of the problem. This may be because many workers start with a background in military operations analysis, and because most stable deterrence models have an appealing (for many, including me) analytical neatness about them.

438

But it seems that much more study of the precise role of stabi-
lized deterrence and the means of moving toward it would be
helpful now. The whole idea of unilateral actions and tacit
agreements as a means of supplementing formal negotiations is
relatively new and unexplored. I am personally intrigued with the
importance of information in relation to arms controls and believe
that some quite useful ideas may eventually emerge in this area.
A large and very important subproblem along this line is the role
of inspection, with which D. G. Brennan has recently been concerned.

10 November 1960

439

August 8, 1960

BIBLIOGRAPHY ON ARMS CONTROL AND RELATED PROBLEMS

H. Roberts Coward

The following is designed to be a comprehensive bibliography on the subject of arms control and the related political, strategic, psychological, economic, and technical problems related thereto. It has been subdivided into a number of topics for the purposes of reference to it, with a special section on U. S. government and other agency documents. Naturally, some divisions required an arbitrary decision on the part of the author, and it is hoped that these will cause no inconvenience to the user. The vast spectrum of material on the subject might be subdivided almost indefinitely.

If any significant omissions are noted, the author would appreciate having them brought to his attention.

Bibliography

I. International Politics and Military Strategy

A. General Theory

Aron, Raymond, *On War*. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959).

Backus, P. H., "Finite Deterrence, Controlled Retaliation", *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXXXV, 1959.

Blackett, P. M. S., "Nuclear Weapons and Defense: Comments on Kissinger, Kennan, and King-Hall", *International Affairs*, October, 1958, pp. 421-34.

Brodie, Bernard, "The Anatomy of Deterrence", *World Politics*, January, 1959, pp. 173-91.

______, *Strategy in the Missile Age*. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959).

Burns, Arthur Lee, "From Balance to Deterrence", *World Politics*, July, 1957, pp. 494,529.

______, "A Graphical Approach to Some Problems of the Arms Race", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. III, No. 4, December, 1959.

______, "The International Consequences of Expecting Surprise", *World Politics*, July, 1958.

______, *The Rationale of Catalytic War*, (Princeton University, Center of International Studies, April 2, 1959). Research Monograph No. 3.

441

Buzzard, A., et al., "The H-Bomb: Massive Retaliation or Graduated Deterrence?", International Affairs, April, 1956.

Halle, Louis J., Choice for Survival. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1958).

Aderz, John H., International Politics in the Atomic Age. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959)

Huntington, Samuel P., "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results", in the publication, Public Policy, Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University, 1958.

Kahn, Herman, The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence. U. S. Senate document No. 101, May, 1960.

______, Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense, RAND Corporation Study, July 1, 1958, Report R-322-RC.

Kaplan, Morton A., "The Calculus of Nuclear Deterrence", World Politics, October, 1958.

______, The Strategy of Limited Retaliation, (Princeton University: Center of International Studies, April 9, 1959), Policy Memorandum No. 19.

Kaufmann, William W., Ed., Military Policy and National Security. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956).

Kecskemeti, Paul, Strategic Surrender. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1958).

King-Hall, Stephen, Defense in the Nuclear Age. (Nyack, N.Y.: Fellowship Publications, 1959).

Kissinger, Henry A., Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).

Knorr, Klaus, The War Potential of Nations. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956).

Kybal, Dalimil, Deterrence and Rational Behavior, September, 1959.

McClelland, Charles A., Ed., Nuclear Weapons, Missiles, and Future War: Problem for the Sixties. (San Francisco, Calif.: Howard Chandler, 1960).

Miksche, F. O., The Failure of Atomic Strategy. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958).

442

Milburn, T. W., *Brief Report on the Inyokern Meeting: Some First Steps Toward a Theory of Deterrence*.

______, "What Constitutes Effective Deterrence?", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume III, No. 2, June, 1959.

Mills, C. Wright, "The Balance of Blame", *The Nation*, June 18, 1960.

______, *The Causes of World War III*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958).

*National Security in the Nuclear Age*, Proceedings of a Conference held at the University of Minnesota, February 17, 18, & 21, 1958.

Niebuhr, Reinhold, *The Structure of Nations and Empires*. (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1959).

Nitze, Paul H., "Atoms, Strategy and Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIV, 1956.

Osgood, Robert Endicott, *Limited War*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

Peeters, Paul, *Massive Retaliation*. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959).

Schelling, Thomas C., "Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. I, No. 1, March, 1957.

______, *The Strategy of Conflict*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).

Singer, J. David, "Surprise Attack: Fear Could Pull the Trigger", *The Nation*, January 30, 1959.

______, "Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, March, 1958.

Slessor, John, *The Great Deterrent*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957)

*Stanford Research Institute Journal*, Fourth Quarter, 1959. (Delegated to "The Spectrum of Conflict").

Strausz-Hupe, Robert, William R. Kintner, et al., *Protracted Conflict*. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1959)

Wohlstetter, Albert, "The Delicate Balance of Terror", *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1959.

443

B. Special Problems

Baldwin, Hanson W., *The Great Arms Race*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958)

Blackett, P.M.S., *Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations*. (Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1956)

______, *Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy*. (London: Turnstile Press, 1948)

Buchan, Alastair, *NATO in the 1960's*. (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson for The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1960)

Deutsch, Karl W., "The Impact of Science and Technology on International Politics", *Daedalus*, Fall, 1959.

Dinerstein, H.S., *War and the Soviet Union*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959)

Eliot, George Fielding, *Victory without War, 1958-1961*. (Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute, 1958)

Federation of American Scientists, Committee on Public Information, *Problems of the Nuclear Arms Race: A Portfolio of Background Information*.

Finletter, Thomas K., *Power and Policy*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1954).

Garthoff, Raymond L., *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958)

Gavin, James M., *War and Peace in the Space Age*. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958)

Huntington, Samuel P., "To Choose Peace or War", *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, April, 1957, pp. 359-369.

Kennan, George C., *Russia, the Atom, and the West*. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958)

Killian, Dr. James R. Jr., *Science and Public Policy, Speech Made to the American Association for the Advancement of Science*, Washington, D.C., December 29, 1958.

Knorr, Klaus, Ed., *NATO and American Security*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959)

______, "Nuclear Weapons: 'Haves' and 'Have-Nots'", *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1957.

444

McAllister, Gilbert, Ed., *The Bomb -- Challenge and Answer*.
(London: B. T. Batsford, Ltd., 1955).

Millis, Walter, *Arms and the State*. (New York: The Twentieth
Century Fund, 1958).

Morgenstern, Oskar, *The Question of National Defense*. (New York:
Random House, 1959).

Pokrovsky, G. I., *Science and Technology in Contemporary War*.
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959).

Quigg, Philip W., "Open Skies and Open Space", *Foreign Affairs*,
October, 1958.

Reinhardt, George C., *American Strategy in the Atomic Age*.
(Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955).

Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc., *International Security: The
Military Aspect*. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc. 1958)

Schwarzenberger, Georg, *The Legality of Nuclear Weapons*.
(London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1958).

Slessor, John, *Strategy for the West*. (New York: William
Morrow and Co., 1954).

Smyth, Henry D., *Atomic Energy for Military Purposes*.
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1945).

Speier, Hans, *German Rearmament and Atomic War*.
(White Plains, N.Y.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1957).

Stillson, Albert C., "The Military Control of Outer Space",
*The Journal of International Affairs*, Winter, 1959.

Taylor, Maxwell D., *The Uncertain Trumpet*. (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1959).

Teller, Edward, and Albert L. Latter, *Our Nuclear Future*.
(New York: Criterion Books, 1958).

Wright, Christopher, "Scientific Progress and the Government of
Outer Space", *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter, 1959.

Yamelyanov, V.S., "Atomic Energy for Peace", *Foreign Affairs*,
April, 1960.

445

## II. Arms Control

### A. General

Adam, Gen. Sir Ronald, and Charles Judd, *Assault at Arms*.
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960).

Bernard, Stephan, "Some Political and Technical Implications
of Disarmament", *World Politics*, October, 1955.

Bolte, Charles G., *The Price of Peace*. (Boston: The Beacon
Press, 1956).

Bull, Hedley, "Disarmament and the International System",
*Australian Journal of Politics and History*, May, 1959.

______, "The Arms Race and the Banning of Nuclear Tests",
*Political Quarterly*, October - December, 1959.

Burns, Arthur Lee, "Disarmament or the Balance of Terror",
*World Politics*, October, 1959.

Cavers, David F., "The Challenge of Planning Arms Controls",
*Foreign Affairs*, October, 1955.

Collart, Yves, *Disarmament: A Study Guide and Bibliography
on the Efforts of the United Nations*.
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1958).

Eliot, George Fielding, "The X-Factor in Disarmament", *Orbis*.
Fall, 1958.

Freeman, Harrop A., and Stanley Yaker, "Disarmament and Atomic
Control: Legal and Non-Legal Problems", *Cornell Law Quarterly*.
XLIII, No. 2, Winter, 1958.

Frye, William R., *Disarmament: Atoms into Plowshares? Headline
Series, Foreign Policy Association*, No. 113, Sept. - Oct., 1955.

Henkin, Louis, *Arms Control and Inspection in American Law*.
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1958).

*Intercom*, Vol. 1, No. 9, November, 1959. "Special: Focus on
Problems of Disarmament".

*International Review Service*, A. G. Mezerik, Ed., "Disarmament;
Postwar Through 1957", "The Arms Race: Satellites, Missiles,
Nuclear", 1957 and "New Proposals for Disarmament", 1957 and
1959, resp.

Jacob, Philip E., "The Disarmament Consensus", *International
Organization*, Spring, 1960.

Jessup, Philip C., and Taubenfeld, Howard J., *Controls for
Outer Space*.
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

446

Kaplan, Morton A., "The Fantasy of Disarmament", New Leader, March 2, 1959.

Kennan, George F., "Disengagement Revisited", Foreign Affairs, January, 1959.

Kissinger, Henry A., "Arms Control, Inspections, and Surprise attack", Foreign Affairs, July, 1960.

______, "Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace", Foreign Affairs, October, 1958.

Lilienthal, David E., Chairman, A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy by a Board of Consultants. (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1946).

Martin, Paul, "Recent Developments in Disarmament", International Journal.

Matteson, Robert E., "The Disarmament Dilemma", Orbis, Fall, 1958.

Millis, Walter, "Essential Conditions of Disarmament", Social Science, October, 1958.

Moch, Jules, "Towards a Disarmed Peace", International Journal, Spring, 1956.

Mooney, Melvin, Total Disarmament by Territorial Divisions, February, 1960, Mountain Lakes, N. J.

Mumford, Lewis, In the Name of Sanity. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954).

National Planning Association. The 4th Country Problem and Arms Control, Planning Pamphlet No. 108. (Washington; National Planning Association, 1960).

______, Special Project Committee on Security Through Arms Control, 1970 Without Arms Control, Planning Pamphlet 104. (Washington: N.P.A., 1958).

Noel-Baker, Philip, The Arms Race: A Programme for World Disarmament. (New York: Oceana, 1958).

Nogee, Joseph, "Diplomacy of Disarmament", International Conciliation, January, 1960, No. 526.

Nutting, Anthony, Disarmament: An Outline of the Negotiations. (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).

447

Pauling, Linus, <u>No More War!</u> (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1958).

Rostow, W.W., and Millikan, Max F., <u>Statements before Special Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament</u>. (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1956)

Russell, Bertrand, <u>Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare</u>. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959)

Schwarcz, Ernst, <u>Paths to Freedom Through Nonviolence</u>, (Vienna: Sensen-Verlag, 1959)

Schweitzer, Albert, <u>Peace or Atomic War?</u> (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958)

Singer, J. David, <u>Disarmament and National Security</u>, June 20, 1959

Slick, Tom, <u>Permanent Peace: A Check and Balance Plan</u>, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958)

Sohn, Louis B., <u>A Short History of Disarmament</u>

<u>Survival</u>, A periodical published by the Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Szilard, Leo, "How to Live with the Bomb and Survive--", <u>BAS</u>, February, 1960.

<u>The Voice of the Dolphins</u>, Working paper for September, 1960 Pugwash Conference, July 23, 1960.

Toynbee, Philip, Ed., <u>Fearful Choice: A Debate on Nuclear Policy</u>. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1959).

White, E.B., "Letter from the West", <u>The New Yorker</u>, June 18, 1960.

White House Disarmament Staff, <u>Disarmament Background Series</u>. "Reference Documents on Disarmament Matters".

Woodbury, David O., <u>Atoms for Peace</u>. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1955)

Young, Weyland, <u>Strategy for Survival</u>, (London: Penguin Books, 1959)

448

B. Technical Problems, Inspection, and Weapons

Berkner, Lloyd, Chmn., *The Need for Fundamental Research in Seismology*, Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement. March 6, 1959

______, "The President's Page" and following summary of the "Berkner Report" on recent developments in seismology and their relation to detection of nuclear tests. *Transactions: American Geophysical Union*, September, 1959.

Bethe, H.A., *Decoupling Theory*, and A.L. Latter, *Size of the Decoupling Cavity*, Papers presented at Geneva, November, 1959.

Bohn, Lewis C., *Psychological Inspection, P-1917* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, Feb., 1960).

______, *The Research Approach to Disarmament*, Lecture, May-June, 1960.

Brennan, D.G., *The Detection of High-Altitude Missile Tests, II*, Prepared for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Brookline, Mass., Sept., 1958.

Burgess, Eric, *Guided Weapons*. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1957)

Clarke, Arthur C., *The Making of a Moon*. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957)

Cory, Robert H., Jr., "International Inspection: From Proposals to Realization", *International Organization*, Autumn, 1959, pp. 495-504.

Cox, Donald, and Michael Stoiko, *Spacepower*. (Philadelphia, Pa.: John C. Winston Company, 1958)

*Daedalus*, Issue on Arms Control, To appear Fall, 1960.

Davis, Clive E., *The Book of Missiles*, (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1959)

Dyson, Freeman J., "The Future Development of Nuclear Weapons". *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1960.

Everett, Hugh, III, and George E. Pugh, "The Distribution and Effects of Fallout in Large Nuclear Weapon Campaigns", *Operations Research*, March-April, 1959.

Feld, Bernard T., et al., *The Technical Problems of Arms Control*. (New York: Institute for International Order, 1960)

449

Fowler, John M., ed., *Fallout: A Study of Superbombs, Strontium 90, and Survival*. (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

Haskell, Norman, *The Detection of Nuclear Explosions by Seismic Means*.

Institute for International Order, *Factory Inspection and Armaments Control*.

Latter, A.L., R.E. LeLevier, E.A. Martinelli, and W. G. McMillan, *A Method of Concealing Underground Nuclear Explosions*, March 30, 1959. (Declassified October 20, 1959), The RAND Corporation, R-348.

Melman, Seymour, Ed., *Inspection for Disarmament*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958).

______, "The Political Implications of Inspection for Disarmament", *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter, 1959.

Mershon National Security Program, (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University); RP-1, Phelps, Foye, Howland, "Some Calculations on Counterforce Strategies in a General Nuclear War"; RP-2, Foye, Phelps, "Counterforce Calculations: Attack and Retaliation with Mixed Weapons Systems"; RP-3, Rosow, Phelps, "Measures of Destruction: Some Observations on Damage Levels in a General Nuclear War"; RP-4, Phelps, "Strategy and Arms Controls"; RP-5, Phelps, Foye, "A Technique for Fallout Casualty Calculations"; RP-6, Cummins, et al, "Accidental war: Some Dangers in the 1960's".

Moore, Patrick, *Earth Satellites*. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1956).

Murphy, Charles J. V., "Nuclear Inspection: A Near Miss", and "The Case for Resuming Nuclear Tests", *Fortune*, March, 1959 and April, 1960, resp.

Murray, Thomas E., *Nuclear Policy for War and Peace*. (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Company, 1960).

National Academy of Sciences, *The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation*, "A Report to the Public", and "Summary Reports". (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, 1956).

National Planning Association, *Committee on Security Through Arms Control, Continuation of Nuclear Test Suspension*, November 8, 1959.

______, Special Project Committee on Security through Arms Control, *Establishing International Control of Nuclear Testing*, Special Report No. 50. (Washington: N. P. A., 1958).

450

National Planning Association, *Strengthening the Government for Arms Control*, Report of the Special Project Committee on Security through Arms Control. July, 1960.

Piel, Gerard, "The Economics of Disarmament", a talk given at the Case Institute of Technology, Cleveland, Ohio, November 12, 1959.

Rockefeller Report on Fallout, *Survival in a Nuclear Attack*, February 15, 1960, State of New York, Committee on Fallout Protection.

Schalling, T. C., *Surprise Attack and Disarmament*, P-1574 (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, December, 1958).

Simons, Howard, "World-Wide Capabilities for Production and Control of Nuclear Weapons", *Daedalus*, Summer, 1959.

U. S. News and World Report, "A Ban That Could Cost U. S. the Arms Race", July 11, 1960.

### III. International Law and Organization

Biorklund, Elis, *International Atomic Policy During a Decade*. (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956).

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Relationship to the United Nations of Organizations for the Control of Armaments*, June 13, 1960.

Cavers, David, "Arms Control in the United Nations: A Decade of Disagreement", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April, 1956.

Clark, Grenville, and Sohn, Louis B., *World Peace Through World Law*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).

Glaude, Inis L., Jr., *Swords into Plowshares*, (New York: Random House, 1956).

Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Arthur N. Holcombe, Chmn. *Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age*. (New York: New York University Press, 1959).

Frye, William R., *A United Nations Peace Force*. (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1957).

Goodrich, Leland M., and Simons, Anne P., *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1955).

Jenks, C. Wilfred, *The Common Law of Mankind*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958).

451

Mehran, Robert B. von, "The International Atomic Energy Agency in World Politics", *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter, 1959.

Wilcox, Francis O., and Marcy, Carl M., *Proposals for Changes in the United Nations*. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1955).

World Rule of Law Center, Duke Law School, *Design for Research on International Rule of Law*.

## IV. Government and Other Documents

United Nations, *International Control of Atomic Energy*, Documents under discussion by the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations, June - September, 1947.

______, *International Control of Atomic Energy*, Second Report of the U. N. Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, September 11, 1947. U. N. Doc. No. S/557.

______, *Atomic Energy Committee, Report on the Scientific and Technical Aspects of the Problem of Control*, September, 1946.

______, "Report of the Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures which Might be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack and for the Preparation of a Report Thereon to Governments", U. N. Doc. No's A/4078 & S/4145, January 5, 1959.

______, *Disarmament Commission, Official Records, Supplement for January to December, 1957*. See especially DC/112 and DC/113.

______, *General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space*, A/4141, July 14, 1959.

U. S. Congress, *Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban*, May, 1960.

______, *Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 86th Congress, 2nd session, Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban*, Hearings: Part 1: April 19-22, 1960; Part 2: Appendices.

______, *Joint Economic Committee, National Security and the American Economy in the 1960's*, by Henry Rowen, January 30, 1960.

U. S. Department of Defense, *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons*, Samuel Glasstone, Editor. Published by the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, June, 1957.

U. S. Department of State, *Background: Highlights of Foreign Policy Developments, 1958*, April, 1959; *Background: Highlights of Foreign Policy Developments, 1959*, May, 1960.

452

U. S. Department of State, *Disarmament, the Intensified Effort: 1955 - 1958*. Department of State Publication 6676, July, 1958.

*The International Atomic Energy Agency: ... The First Year*, Department of State Publication No. 6696, August, 1958.

*International Control of Atomic Energy*, "Growth of a Policy" and "Policy at the Crossroads", 1946 and 1948, resp.

*Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council*, Numbers 1 and 3, 1946 and 1948, resp.

*The Search for Disarmament*, by Francis O. Wilcox, Department of State Publication 6398, November, 1956.

*A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy* (The Acheson-Lilienthal Report) March, 1946. Department of State Publication 2498.

*Text of the Twelve Nation Antarctic Pact*, *U. S. State Department Bulletin*, December 21, 1959.

U. S. House of Representatives, *Research in Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare*, Report No. 815, August 10, 1959.

*Committee on Government Operations, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Civil Defense*. Hearings: Part I: Shelter Policy, Part II: Post-Attack Planning, Part III: Relation to Missile Programs, March, 1960.

*Civil Defense Shelter Policy and Post-Attack Recovery Planning*, July 1, 1960.

*Committee on Appropriations, 86th Congress, 2nd session, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961*. Hearings: Part I: Monday, February 1 - Thursday, March 10, 1960; Part II: Monday, March 21 - Thursday, May 26, 1960.

*Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Congress, 2nd session*. *Events Incident to the Summit Conference*, Hearings, May 27, June 1, 2, 1960. *Background Documents on Events Incident to the Summit Conference*, May 27, 1960. *Events Relating to the Summit Conference*, Report, June 28, 1960.

*Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy: Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy*. A Study prepared by The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, The Johns Hopkins University, No. 8., 1959.

453

U. S. Senate, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Control and Reduction of Armaments*, March 12&25, 1958, Part 16; April 16 & 17, 1958, Part 17.

______, Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Control and Reduction of Armaments*, 1958.

______, Prepared for the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations by the Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service, *Controlling the Further Development of Nuclear Weapons*, October 14, 1958.

______, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Disarmament and Foreign Policy*, Parts 1 & 2, January, February, 1959.

______, Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents*, 1919 - 55. 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956.

______, Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Disarmament Developments: Spring, 1960*. Hearing, June 10, 1960.

______, Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Geneva Test Ban Negotiations*, Hearing, March 25, 1959.

______, Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Handbook on Arms Control and Related Problems in Europe*, May, 1959.

______, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Technical Problems and the Geneva Test Ban Negotiations*, February 4, 1960.

______, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Testimony of John A. McCone on Geneva Test Ban Negotiations*, June 24, 1959.

______, Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *United Nations Action on Disarmament*, 1960.

______, Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, *Space Law: A Symposium*, 1958.

______, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery (Jackson Committee) of the Committee on Government Operations, 86th Congress; *Organizing for National Security*, Hearings, Parts I - IV; *National Policy Machinery in Communist China*, 1959; *National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union*, 1960; *Organizing for National Security: A Bibliography, 1959, Selected Materials, 1960, Interim Report*, January 18, 1960.

454

V. Miscellaneous

Aiken, F. B., "Abraham '59 - A Nuclear Fantasy", Dissent, VI, 1959.

Brody, Richard A., Deterrence Strategies: An Annotated Bibliography,
Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Winter, 1960.

Bryant, Peter, Red Alert (New York: Ace Books, Inc., 1958).

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, most issues.

Current Thought on Peace and War, Winter, 1960.

Fisher, H. H., ed., American Research on Russia. (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1959).

Goudsmit, Samuel A., ALSOS. (New York: Henry Schuman, Inc., 1947).

James, F. Cyril, On Understanding Russia. (University of Toronto
Press, Canada: 1959).

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XIII, No. 1, 1959.

Pugwash Conference, Proceedings: 2nd conference, April, 1958; 3rd
conference, September, 1958; 4th conference, July, 1959; Conference
of International Scientists on Biological and Chemical Warfare,
August, 1959.

The RAND Corporation, Index of Publications, November, 1959, Santa
Monica, California.

Schelling, T. C., Miscellaneous Papers; "Arms Control: Proposal for a
Special Surveillance Force", "Meteors, Mischief, and War", "Remarks
on the Military Use of Outer Space, With Particular Reference to
Bombardment Satellites", "Sitting Ducks or Decoys: The High Cost
of SAC Dispersal to Large-City Airfields", "The Threat that Leaves
Something to Chance", "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization".

Shute, Nevil, On the Beach. (London: Heineman, 1957).

Walder, Francis, The Negotiators. (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1959).

455

Sept. 19, 1960 (c)

ADDENDA

H. Roberts Coward

A. General Theory

Baldwin, Hanson W., "Limited War", *The Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1959.

Brodie, Bernard (ed.), *The Absolute Weapon*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946).

Cottrell, Alvin J. and James E. Dougherty, "Nuclear Weapons and Strategy", *Orbis*, Summer, 1957.

Halperin, Morton H., *Nuclear Weapons and Limited War*, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, July, 1960.

Kaufmann, William W., "The Crisis in Military Affairs", *World Politics*, July, 1958.

Liddell Hart, B. H., *Deterrent or Defense?*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960).

Richardson, Lewis F., *Arms and Insecurity*. (Chicago, Ill: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1960).

*Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*. (Chicago, Ill: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1960).

Seton-Watson, Hugh, *Neither War Nor Peace*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960).

Snyder, Glenn H., *Deterrence by Denial and Punishment*.

Research Monograph No. 1. (Princeton: Center of International Studies, January 2, 1959).

Turner, Gordon B. and Richard D. Challener (ed.), *National Security in the Nuclear Age*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960).

B. Special Problems

Finletter, Thomas K., *Foreign Policy: The Next Phase: The 1960's*. (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1960).

Garthoff, Raymond L., *The Soviet Image of Future War*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959).

457

Hitch, Charles J. and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).

Kingston-McCloughry, E. J., *Defense: Policy and Strategy*. (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1960).

Medaris, John B., *Countdown for Decision*. (New York: Putnam, 1960).

Rabi, I. I., "The Cost of Secrecy", *The Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1960.

Reinhardt, George C. and William R. Kintner, *The Haphazard Years*. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1960).

Strausz-Hupe, Robert and William R. Kintner, "A Forward Strategy Beyond Survival", *Orbis*, Summer, 1960.

## II. Arms Control

### A. General

Barnet, Richard J., *Who Wants Disarmament?*. (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1960).

Bethe, Hans, "The Case for Ending Nuclear Tests", *The Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1960.

Gardner, Trevor, "Organizing for Peace", *BAS*, Sept., 1960.

Hinterhoff, Eugene, *Disengagement*. (London: Stevens, 1959).

Ikle, F. C., "Nth Countries"and Disarmament, The RAND Corporation, April 1, 1960, P-1956.

Moch, Jules, *Human Folly: To Disarm or Perish*. (London: Gollancz, 1955).

Wolfe, Thomas W., "Khrushchev's Disarmament Strategy", *Orbis*, Spring, 1960.

### B. Technical Problems, Inspection, and Weapons

Hydeman, Lee M. and William H. Berman, *International Control of Nuclear Maritime Activities*. (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Law School, 1960).

Institute for International Order, *Economic Factors Bearing Upon the Maintenance of Peace, Part 2: Economic Adjustments to Disarmament* by Emile Benoit. (New York: Institute for International Order, 1960).

458

Kramish, Arnold, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union*. (Stanford University Press, California, 1960).

Modelski, G. A., *Atomic Energy in the Communist Bloc*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959).

Bloomfield, Lincoln P., *The United Nations and U. S. Foreign Policy*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960).

Cavers, David F., "Legal Planning Against the Risk of Atomic War", *Columbia Law Review*, February, 1955.

Sohn, Louis B., "The Role of International Institutions as Conflict-Adjusting Agencies", Conference on World Tensions, The University of Chicago and World Brotherhood, Inc.

### IV. Government Documents

United States Department of State, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, 2 volumes, Dept. of State Publication #7008, August, 1960.

U. S. Senate, Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Chemical-Biological-Radiological (CBR) Warfare and Its Disarmament Aspects*, August 29, 1960.

### V. Miscellaneous

Campaigne, Jamison G., *American Might and Soviet Myth*. (Chicago, Ill.: Henry Regnery & Company, 1960).

Crankshaw, Edward, *Khrushchev's Russia*. (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1959).

Dennett, Raymond and Joseph E. Johnson, (ed.), *Negotiating With the Russians*. (Boston, Mass.: World Peace Foundation, 1951).

Deutscher, Isaac, *The Great Contest*. (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1960).

Kirst, Hans Hellmut, *The Seventh Day*. (New York: Ace Books Inc., 1960).

Moseley, Philip E., *The Kremlin and World Politics: Studies in Soviet Policy and Action*. (New York: Vintage Books, 1960).

TEMPO Reports, Technical Military Planning Operation, General Electric Company, Santa Barbara, California.

459

PARTICIPANTS

SUMMER STUDY ON ARMS CONTROL

Sidney S. Alexander
Professor of Industrial Management, M.I.T.
Participant

Arthur Barber
Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories
Bedford, Massachusetts
Participant

Hans A. Bethe
Professor of Physics, Cornell Univ.
Participant

Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Assoc. Professor of Economics, M.I.T.
Participant

George F. Bing
Lawrence Radiation Laboratories
Livermore, California
Participant

Lewis C. Bohn
Systems Research Center
Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
Participant

Frank E. Bothwell
Director, Laboratories for Applied Sciences
Univ. of Chicago
Participant

Donald G. Brennan
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Steering Committee; Acting Director

George F. Brewer
Asst. Executive Officer, American Academy
of Arts and Sciences
Executive Director

Thomas Brewer
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Secretariat

David F. Cavers
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
Participant

H. Roberts Coward
Political Science Section, M.I.T.
Secretariat/Participant

Paul M. Doty
Professor of Chemistry, Harvard
Steering Committee

John T. Edsall
Professor of Biology, Harvard
Participant

Bernard T. Feld
Professor of Physics, M.I.T.
Director

George Fischer
Professor of Political Science,
Brandeis Univ.
Participant

Roger Fisher
Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law
School
Participant

Raymond Foye
Mershon National Security Program
Ohio State University
Participant

David H. Frisch
Professor of Physics, M.I.T.
Steering Committee; Assoc. Director

Marvin H. Gewirtz
New York University
Secretariat/Participant

Milton Greenblatt
Massachusetts Mental Health Center
Boston, Massachusetts
Participant

Arthur T. Hadley
Author
New York City
Participant

Morton H. Halperin
Center for International Affairs,
Harvard
Secretariat/Participant

461

Roland Herbst
Lawrence Radiation Laboratories
Livermore, California
Participant

Nancy Hoepli
Research Associate of Arthur Hadley
New York City
Participant

Marvin I. Kalkstein
Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories
Bedford, Massachusetts
Participant

E. L. Katzenbach
Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories
Bedford, Massachusetts
Participant

Dalmil Kybal
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
Sunnyvale, California
Participant

Ralph Lapp
Consultant
Alexandria, Virginia
Participant

Leon Lederman
Department of Physics, Columbia Univ.
Participant

Herbert Liederman
Massachusetts Mental Health Center
Boston, Massachusetts
Participant

R. Duncan Luce
Professor of Psychology, Univ. of Pennsylvania
Participant

Seymour Melman
Professor of Engineering, Columbia Univ.
Participant

Donald N. Michael
The Brookings Institution
Washington, D. C.
Participant

Thomas W. Milburn
USNOTS
China Lake, California
Participant

Max F. Millikan
Professor of Economics, M.I.T.
Steering Committee

John Mullen
Air Force Cambridge Research
Laboratories
Bedford, Massachusetts
Participant

Philip Noel-Baker
M. P., House of Commons
Participant

Jay Orear
Professor of Physics, Cornell Univ.
Participant

Thomas O'Sullivan
ITEK Corporation
Participant

John B. Phelps
Department of Physics; Mershon
National Security Program, Ohio
State Univ.
Participant

Ithiel D. Pool
Professor of Economics, M.I.T.
Participant

Garry L. Quinn
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C.
Participant

Harry Rowen
Center for International Affairs,
Harvard
Participant

Joseph Salerno
Lincoln Laboratory, M.I.T.
Participant

Edward Salpeter
Professor of Physics, Cornell Univ.
Participant

Miriam Salpeter
Cornell Univ.
Participant

462

Thomas C. Schelling
Center for International Affairs,
Harvard
Steering Committee; Participant

Max Singer
RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California
Participant

Winthrop W. Smith
Research Asst., M.I.T.
Secretariat/Participant

Arthur Smithies
Professor of Economics, Harvard
Participant

Louis D. Smullin
Assoc. Professor of Elec. Engineering,
M.I.T.
Participant

Louis B. Sohn
Professor of International Law,
Harvard Law School
Participant

Victor F. Weisskopf
Professor of Physics, M.I.T.
Steering Committee

Jerome B. Wiesner
Professor of Elec. Engineering; Director,
Research Laboratory of Electronics, M.I.T.
Steering Committee

463

INDEX

Area agreements, 14, 192, 265-69, 363,
427

Accidental war, 13, 47, 48, 55, 83, 137,
153, 167, 192, 336

Accuracy of missiles, 54, 82, 104, 105,
106, 117-18, 131-33, 137ff, 143-50passim,
273, 350

Agreement in principal, 274

Anti-submarine warfare (asw), 109, 125ff

Bargaining, 212, 271, 289, 291, 337

"Beach", 49, 77

Bibliography, (China) 365-74, (Soviet Union)
375-81passim, (General) 441-59.

Blackmail, 158, 299, 346

CBR warfare, 173-74, 196, 333, 348

China, 46, 47, 60, 62, 87, 94, 105, 152,
156, 158, 161, 162, 172ff, 183, 188,
190, 199, 220, 286, 340, 353-60,
361-74, 383-400passim

Civil defense, 18, 60, 82, 83, 154,
178, 272, 284

Coexistence, 383, 390ff

Communications, 13, 55, 56, 68, 225,
257, 259, 308, 309, 335, 337, 348,
358, 381-82

Confidence levels, 143ff

"Containment", 392, 399

Conventional weapons and forces, 11, 37,
60, 61, 84, 102, 110, 111, 112, 114,
162, 187ff, 190, 195, 343, 419-22,
426-33passim

Counterforce, 58, 60, 67, 77-80, 82,
83, 109, 143, 154ff

Counterpopulation, 55, 58, 60, 65-76,
82, 83, 101, 106, 109, 154ff, 336,
348

Decision-makers, 191, 354

Delivery systems, 196, 299, 301, 315,
346, 347, 431

Deterrence, 33 (NATO)ff, 57-63, 65-76,
77-80, 81-91, 93-95, 97-102, 103-108,
143, 333, 359, 398

Deterrence, psychology of, 50, 58,
65-76, 77-80, 83ff, 93, 97

Deterrent, credibility, 93ff, 101

Deterrent force 14, 26, 27, 49, 57-63,
93passim, 97passim

Deterrent force, mobile, 51, 106, 109ff,
115ff, 125ff, 152, 190, 213, 214, 307

Deterrent size, 14, 48, 49-56, 57-59, 84,
93ff, 100-02, 206, 255, 342, 436

Deterrent, stabilized, 19, 57, 63,
65-76passim, 81, 84, 97, 99, 100,
103ff, 109ff, 115, 125ff, 131-36,

147-48, 151-64, 171ff, 183-85, 187-93,
202-25, 256, 322, 327, 353, 359, 397ff,
438-39

Diplomacy, 212, 293-96, 358, 377

Disarmament, General, 43, 187-93,
195-200passim, 206, 265, 269

Disarmament, history of, 401-33

Disarmament, phasing, 187-93, 265-69

Disengagement, 266, 334, 428

Dynasoar, 52, 306, 346, 349, 350

Economic implications, 162-63, 191

Escalation, 188, 336

Europe, 22, 273 (Common Market), 397

Evasion, 55, 58, 192, 204, 209, 210,
211, 214, 215, 216, 224, 225, 229,
238, 239, 240, 250, 251, 256, 286,
298, 322, 343, 350

Exchange ratios, 53, 63, 82ff, 131-36,
137-42, 143-50, 154ff, 207

Executive agreements, 344

First strike, 60, 94, 137, 178, 346,
359

Fissionable materials, 297-301passim

Force levels, 247-48, 261ff

France, 21passim

Game theory, 280ff

Gaming, 165-82

Germany, 21passim, 198, 266, 340, 358

Government, organization, 11, 12, 18, 19

Graduated arms reduction, 48, 191,
261-63, 265

Guidance systems, 303ff, 346, 347-48

"Hard" missiles, 13, 53, 54, 58, 103ff,
137ff, 152, 190

Hardening, 107, 137ff, 347

Ideological debate (Communist), 355-56,
383-400

Information, 253ff

Inspection, 14, 43, 53, 54, 60, 104,
106ff, 111, 112, 114, 157, 161, 165,
174, 179, 187, 191, 192, 197, 202-25,
247, 252, 253-60, 261ff, 265ff, 301,
315-29, 334, 336, 339, 343, 345, 351,
353, 438

Inspection, psychological & personnel,
104, 218, 222-23, 227-46, 297, 298,
315, 344

Inspection, records, 211, 218, 224-25,
227, 238, 297, 317ff, 323, 326, 327,
328

465

Inspection, seismic, 249, 343

Inspectorate, 202, 214, 221, 222, 223-25,
232-33, 237-38, 239, 241, 252, 317, 325

Intelligence, 167, 173, 174, 211, 214, 219,
224, 237, 240, 247ff, 253, 257ff, 261,
266, 334, 336

International forces & controls, 190, 192,
193, 195, 197, 199, 214, 221, 223-25, 256,
267, 271-74, 294, 344, 349, 377, 430

International law, 242, 271-74, 276, 294,
307, 377

Khrushchev, Nikita, 354, 356, 380, 383-97
passim

League of Nations, 403ff

Lie detectors (polygraph), 230, 232, 234,
235, 236, 245, 246

Limited measures, 43passim

Limited retaliation, 61, 81, 107, 169-70,
184

Limited war, 25, 32, 60, 61, 106, 107, 110,
114, 152-53, 156ff, 161, 162, 178, 183,
187ff, 336, 340, 343, 344, 362-63

Mao, Tse-Tung, 354-55

Massive retaliation, 28, 58, 60, 184

NATO, 11, 21-41, 158, 160, 203, 340

Negotiations, 160-61, 163, 253, 271ff,
286, 289ff, 339, 344, 377, 379, 380,
381, 439

"Noise", 214, 215, 240 (spoofing), 300

"Nth" powers, 81, 82, 87, 100, 101, 183,
300, 307-08, 339ff, 344, 346, 385

Nuclear rockets, 303, 305

Nuclear weapons, effects of, 49, 63, 82ff,
104, 106, 115ff, 126-29, 131-36, 137-42,
143-50, 298-99, 339, 380, 390, 391, 393,
397ff

Nuclear weapons, use of, 189, 190, 191,
195, 363

Objectives, 18

Open/closed society, 19, 192, 220, 230,
236, 239, 253ff, 334, 341, 348, 425

Overseas bases, 54, 103, 109, 160, 189,
193, 290

Polaris, 52, 113, 207, 213, 214, 217, 222,
334, 342, 436

Political climate/environment, 184, 191,
199, 228, 230, 231, 251-52, 253, 272,
275, 321, 322, 337, 343, 384, 397ff,
437-38

Political considerations, 62, 165passim,
191

Preemption, 48, 59, 81, 107, 178,
190

Propaganda, 274

Public opinion, 168, 172, 188, 195,
228, 231, 237, 238, 239, 274, 277,
279, 339, 378, 392, 396, 435ff

Radar network, 311-13

Reactors, 298, 349

Reconnaissance satellites, 306

Reentry, 304-05, 308

Research and development, 56, 68, 104,
153, 163, 164, 196, 205, 208, 211,
213, 215, 216, 217-18, 220-22,
227-28, 247, 273, 303-09passim,
345-51, 398, 437

Retaliation, 24

Satellites, satellite weapons, 52,
160, 164, 190, 219-20, 250, 272,
334

Second strike, 58, 60, 94, 152ff, 178,
183ff, 190, 345, 346

Security, 18, 67, 294, 396

Small powers, 88, 105, 197, 276, 348
"Soft" missiles, 13, 306

Soviet Union objectives, 19, 46, 47,
94, 95, 99, 100, 109, 188, 192, 196,
197, 198, 200, 232, 247ff, 258,
350, 357, 375-82passim, 383-400
passim, 437-38

Soviet Union proposals, 12, 19, 110,
185, 195, 196, 199, 253, 266,
375-82passim, 407ff, 425-33passim

Soviet Union, relations with China,
358, 359, 363, 383-400passim

Soviet Union, Stalinists, 357, 384,
393

Space, 215, 219, 220, 303-09, 311-13,
347

Stability, 14, 19, 46, 47, 59, 65-76,
77-78, 81-91passim, 98, 113, 125,
131ff, 147-48, 159, 164, 183, 189,
187, 191, 218, 222, 228, 255, 306,
336, 341, 345, 346, 347, 348, 351,
385, 388, 400, 430

Stockpile, 13, 18, 48, 104, 106, 111,
196, 216, 218, 222, 297-301

Surprise attack, 43, 153, 208, 225,
254, 333-37, 346, 350, 425, 429

Tacit agreements, 44, 45, 46

Tactical forces, 21-41passim

Tactical nuclear weapons, 22, 106ff,
110, 152, 156, 187, 189, 300, 340,
341, 343, 344

Termination of war, 44, 47, 55, 107,
337

466

Test ban, 43, 106, 113, 197, 249,
(missile) 311-13, 339-44, 350, 358,
359, 428ff

Treaty, 11, 103, 109ff, 113-14, 160, 161,
178ff, 205, 237, 243, 260, 271, 273-74,
274-87, 289-92

Tritium, 298, 300

Unilateral action, 18, 100, 102, 103, 109ff,
113, 160, 190, 198, 206, 219, 260, 271ff,
282ff, 289-92, 334, 439

United Nations, 168, 195, 219, 221, 224, 241,
274, 283, 293ff, 306, 379, 380, 410ff,
(Atomic Energy Commission) 410-19.

United States policy, 18, 21 (NATO), 21passim
(NATO), 199, 202, 247ff, 294, 296

"Unwarning", 336-37

Vulnerability, 13, 14, 30ff, 54, 65passim,
100, 102, 103ff, 109ff, 113, 115ff, 125ff,
147ff, 163-64, 167, 183, 336

War, control of, 55, 57, 331-32

War, probability of, 153, 156, 165, 183ff,
187, 200, 354, 385ff

Warheads, 103, 107, 152, 175, 207, 213, 216,
218, 221, 299, 300

Warning time, 54, 334-35, 336

Weapons, aircraft, 50, 51, 52, 53, 111, 160,
190, 202-03, 247, 337, 342, 436

Weapons, air-to-surface missiles, 50, 190,
221, 347

Weapons, ballistic missiles, 51, 52, 54,
103ff, 109ff, 113, 115ff, 131-33, 151-64,
190, 202-25passim, 299, 303ff, 315-29,
331-32, 333ff, 345-46

Western military strategy, 21ff, 195, 253

Western policy, 11, 110, 266, 274,
419-33passim

World War I, 353-54, 386

World War II, 196-97, 355, 396-97

Yield per weight ratio, 342

467