GRADUATED DETERRENCE IN BRITAIN.

As early as 1947 Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, the distinguished British military commentator, foresaw that the limitless destruction of the Atom bomb would form its own practical limitation. It seemed to him, since statesmen would shrink from using such a weapon for anything except vital issues, it would prove ineffective as a method of dealing with the lesser forms of aggression. Some sort of limited action would be essential.

When the strategy of atomic warfare was being evolved during the next few years, the idea of limited action and limited wars was given little prominence. Indeed, official defence policy at the start of the atomic era seemed to move more in the opposite direction, despite the experience of Korea. And when the West's atomic strategy was first displayed publicly, it took the form of Massive Retaliation, as announced by Mr. Dulles in January, 1954.

Mr. Dulles' pronouncement was followed closely by the British White Paper "Statement on Defence - 1954", published in February of that year. This, it is true, gave first priority to the cold war, which included such commitments as Korea, but the emphasis was on the atomic deterrent against global war, and little or nothing was said of the important problem of limiting and localising war. There being no mention of tactical use of atomic weapons, it appeared that no alternative was envisaged between the use of conventional weapons and total atomic warfare.

In the subsequent Defence Debate in the House of Commons in April, 1954, the Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, in addition to stressing the need for the atomic deterrent, declared the basis of Western policy to be "We arm to parley". This clearly showed that he saw the need for defence preparations not only as a deterrent to war, but also to provide the strength necessary to help in negotiating with the Communists on disarmament and the many outstanding issues.

In the same month Dr. Kurt Hahn, former German schoolmaster who had become a British subject after quarrelling with Hitler, drew attention, in "The Times", of London, to the fact that to initiate atomic warfare contravened the spirit, if not the letter of the 1925 Geneva Convention which banned the use of poisonous gases. This Convention had been ratified by Britain and other countries, but not, it seems, by the United States.

Dr. Hahn, who had won for himself a high reputation as an educationist and moralist in Britain, implored the West to work for agreement with the Communists to prohibit atomic warfare, but meanwhile to develop atomic weapons in order to defend itself from the Communists by the threat of reprisals.

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In the summer of 1954 articles in various newspapers by Captain Liddell Hart expressed doubts on the Western defence policy. The essence of his criticism was that the policy was too suicidal and 'all-or-nothing'. At this stage Captain Liddell Hart was inconclusive as to the alternative solution to the problem, but he was hinting at the tactical use of atomic weapons as at least a possibility. He felt that the West had not really thought the problem through and pleaded that its Governments should do so.

Meanwhile, in the late summer of 1954, a book by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor called "Strategy for the West" was published. Its general theme was that the great atomic deterrent had abolished all but minor wars, so long as the West remained resolved never to hesitate to use it.

This was very much akin to Mr. Dulles' policy of 'Massive Retaliation', and it was reported that during 1952-3, when Sir John was British Chief of Air Staff, he had 'sold' that idea to Washington.

Sir John's book was reviewed anonymously in "The Economist" by Rear-Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, who had just retired from the Royal Navy and who thus became associated for the first time, outside official circles, with the question of limiting atomic war. He pointed out that the weakness of our 'Great Deterrent' was the fact that clearly we might shrink from using it in any but the most vital issues. He therefore stressed the desirability of limiting atomic war. Sir Anthony was subsequently to become one of the leading advocates of 'Graduated Deterrence' in Britain.

By the beginning of 1955 Sir Anthony was circulating in Whitehall and other circles a memorandum emphasising, as Captain Liddell Hart had done, the terrible dangers and shortcomings of the existing policy of 'Massive Retaliation'. He pleaded for the establishment of a distinction between using atomic weapons against armed forces and using them against cities, in order that the West might renounce the 'nuclear' bombing of cities, and the use of the 'H' bomb altogether, unless the enemy resorted to such methods.

This theme was pursued in the early months of 1955 by Sir Anthony in an article in a private naval journal and in anonymous letters in the "Daily Telegraph" and the "Christian Science Monitor" of Boston, U.S.A. (Sir Anthony was writing anonymously at this time because he had only recently vacated the post of Director of Naval Intelligence)

At this stage the only British newspaper which supported this theme actively was the "Manchester Guardian", a highly respected Liberal newspaper. This support was largely due to the efforts of the paper's Foreign Affairs and Defence Editor, Mr. Alistair Hetherington. Subsequently the "Manchester Guardian" has become one of the foremost and most consistent advocates of 'Graduated

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Deterrence' as it has developed.

In the British Government's 1955 White paper on Defence the full implications of the 'H' bomb were thrust upon the British public for the first time. It was also announced in the White Paper that Britain would make the 'H' bomb. It recorded, too, the N.A.T.O. decision of December 1954 that henceforward N.A.T.O. defence planning would be based on the use of nuclear weapons. But once again there was no mention of tactical atomic weapons or of the possibility of limiting the use of nuclear weapons.

In the Defence debate in the House of Lords or upper chamber of Parliament the Archbishop of York, Dr. Garbett, gave a significant lead to public thinking by stating that there was moral justification for Britain to develop the 'H' bomb, but he gave no guidance on the baffling problem of the circumstances in which its use might be justified.

In the House of Commons Defence debate the issue of whether Britain should produce the 'H' bomb was high-lighted by the resignation of a Labour member, Sir Richard Acland. This had a considerable but by no means decisive or lasting effect.

On the question of N.A.T.O. initiating the use of nuclear weapons there was considerable controversy. A number of M.P.'s, led by left-wing socialist Aneurin Bevan, were opposed to such initiation. But throughout the entire debate in the Commons only one member suggested that nuclear weapons should be limited to tactical use. This was the Labour member Denis Healey, one of the ablest younger M.P.'s in matters concerning foreign affairs and defence.

The Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, whose retirement followed soon after the Defence debate, used all his famous eloquence to persuade Parliament and the country to support the development of the 'H' bomb, and to add it to the 'Great Deterrent' in a generally unchanged policy of 'Massive Retaliation'.

Nevertheless, there was a growing feeling among political observers that in the acceptance of this policy there was something unreal and irrational; and, by the early summer, there was no doubt that the seeds of the idea of distinctions and limitations in the use of nuclear weapons had been sown in some minds, including a few in influential quarters.

Encouragement for this view had been coming from the United States in a treatise by Colonel Richard S. Leghorn, published by U.S.News and World Report, entitled "No Need to Bomb Cities to Win War". Later came further encouragement on the probable future trend of wars toward limitations from Canada's Minister of External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, in the "Stafford Little Lecture" delivered at Princeton University in April 1955.

Much encouragement had also come from articles by Mr. Kaufmann and Mr. Kissinger which had recently appeared in certain United States journals.

In June 1955 personal contact with American exponents of limited atomic warfare was established when Colonel Leghorn and Senator Flanders visited the United Kingdom. This resulted in a meeting between them and Britain's Captain Liddell Hart, Denis Healey and Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard. It was then that the title 'Graduated Deterrence' was decided upon. A joint brief on the subject was drawn up by Colonel Leghorn and Sir Anthony Buzzard, and thereafter a regular trans-Atlantic exchange of ideas and papers on 'Graduated Deterrence' was established with much advantage to both teams.

In July 1955 Lord Bertrand Russell, well-known British philosopher, issued a statement signed by a group of international scientists, imploring mankind to live together without war, since the only alternative, he said, was for all to die together now that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. both possessed the 'H' bomb.

This 'all-or-nothing' appeal appeared to the advocates of 'Graduated Deterrence', though worthy enough as an ultimate ideal, to be of little practical value, since the prospects of abolishing all fighting at one stroke were negligible. The idea appealed to the pacifists and near-pacifists, but probably did more harm than good to the cause of 'Graduated Deterrence'.

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1955, a number of articles and letters appeared in various British newspapers and journals by the United Kingdom advocates of 'Graduated Deterrence', and some lectures were given. The subject was also debated at several private conferences, including one international one of considerable importance.

It was at this international meeting that Denis Healey and Sir Anthony Buzzard came to the important conclusion that it was impractical at present to persuade the Western Governments to consider making any promises in advance not to use the 'H' bomb. Emphasis should therefore be placed on merely establishing distinctions between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, and between tactical and strategic targets. Any suggestion of promising in advance not to be the first to use the 'H' bomb should be mentioned only as a possible further step to be taken in the future.

An important debate, following talks by Sir John Slessor and Sir Anthony Buzzard, also took place in November at the Institute for International Affairs, at Chatham House, London. At this it was concluded that there seemed to be general support for establishing the distinctions referred to above.

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'Graduated Deterrence' was at this time attracting increas-
ing attention in a number of British newspapers. The "Observer"
began to support it from October onwards. The "Economist" in
November and "The Times" in December both analysed the plan, but
tended to oppose it. In March of 1956 the "Spectator" joined in
supporting the 'Graduated Deterrence' theme.

Meanwhile, great encouragement came from Mr. Dulles' speech of December 8th, 1955, in which he strongly advocated a policy of 'Selective Retaliation' including the limited use of tactical atomic weapons in appropriate circumstances.

In February, 1956, the British Government White Paper
"Statement on Defence - 1956" was published and showed an advance
on that of 1955 in that it accepted "limited war" as a possibility
in addition to "cold" and "global" war. It also admitted that
in limited wars "the possible use of nuclear weapons cannot be
excluded". But there was no mention of tactical atomic weapons
nor of any distinction between the limited and unlimited use of
nuclear weapons.

However, in the Defence debate in March, in both Houses of
Parliament the Ministers responsible for defence spoke at some
length on 'Graduated Deterrence', clearly referring to the
specific proposals which the advocates of the plan had been
pressing for so long. But these proposals were misrepresented
in several respects. In particular, it was mistakenly stated
that 'Graduated Deterrence' involved the West in committing it-
self in advance as to the circumstances in which each grade of
action should be used.

Nevertheless, in the House of Lords, the Government chief
spokesman, Lord Carrington, concluded by conceding that three
types of situation were envisaged - (1) Those to be dealt with
by conventional forces - (2) those needing the use of atomic
weapons for tactical purposes - and (3) those requiring the full
force of nuclear weapons.

Most unfortunately, the Minister of Defence, Sir Walter
Monckton, in the House of Commons, inadvertently implied that he
agreed with his opposite number in Moscow, Marshal Zhukov, who
had recently declared at the Communist party congress that any
tactical atomic warfare would mean global war.

Throughout the Defence debate in both Houses of Parliament
the crucial problem of how to establish distinctions between
tactical atomic and total warfare was virtually untouched by
Ministers and back-benchers alike.

In January Dr. George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, had entered
the lists in support of 'Graduated Deterrence' in a potent article
on "The Moral Issues" in a National Peace Council pamphlet en-

titled "Nuclear War and Peace". In this he concluded that it was impossible to justify morally any use of such indiscriminate weapons as 'H' bombs or the use of atomic bombs against centres of population. But he conceded that in the last resort the use of atomic weapons tactically against armed forces might be justified.

This view was also given some support in an analysis of "The Morality of Nuclear War" appearing in a Roman Catholic journal "Blackfriars" in March, 1956.

This general thesis on the moral aspect of nuclear war received further support in a powerful article by Dr. Kurt Hahn appearing in the Liberal newspaper "News Chronicle", January 23rd, 1956.

Further articles and letters to the press arguing the case for 'Graduated Deterrence' generally, and the establishment of distinctions in particular, were published throughout the spring and summer of 1956, notably by Denis Healey, Sir Anthony Buzzard and Captain Liddell Hart. The subject was also given support, in a lecture at Cambridge University, by Professor P. Blackett, Professor of Physics at the Imperial Institute and now newly appointed President of the British Association. It is understood that a book about to be published by Professor Blackett will also give some backing to 'Graduated Deterrence'.

A fairly full study of the policy of 'Graduated Deterrence', including the desirability and practicability of publicly establishing distinctions between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and tactical and strategic targets, has been carried out this summer by a team consisting of Denis Healey, Professor Blackett, Sir Anthony Buzzard and a well-known British journalist, Richard Goold-Adams. This study is expected to be published by Chatham House in pamphlet form in November.

To sum up, it seems that both in America and Britain the general policy of 'Graduated Deterrence' has been accepted by responsible Ministers, though with what degree of support from Government and Service departments is far from clear. Certainly it appears that in neither country have the public yet become really aware of this, or begun to appreciate the issues involved in the crucial problem of distinguishing between tactical atomic and total warfare.

In the view of the British 'Graduated Deterrence' team the real point is that it will not be possible to put the accepted principle of 'Graduated Deterrence' into practice without publishing these distinctions well in advance of a crisis arising. For distinctions are so difficult to define in practice, that unless

they are known and thoroughly understood by all concerned for
months or years beforehand, the West's tactical atomic deterrent
against local aggression will not be convincing, and the limita-
tions involved in tactical atomic warfare will not hold good if
such a war should break out.

Either, therefore, distinctions must be publicly established
and thus made practicable, or the West must consider them impract-
icable and give up its policy of, and preparations for tactical
atomic warfare. Otherwise, to adhere to a policy which envisages
the possibility of tactical atomic warfare will prove to be not
only a great waste of money but also extremely dangerous.

This point has not yet struck home in official Whitehall
minds, which, with the Suez crisis, have been even more distracted
than usual by issues of a more immediate nature. Nor does this
point yet seem to have been really emphasised in the recent writ-
ings of the advocates of 'Graduated Deterrence' in the U.S.A.,
despite the most excellent and compelling articles in support of
the general policy, by Henry Kissinger, Paul Nitze, Thomas Murray,
Senator Flanders and Colonel Leghorn.

Only by concerted efforts on both sides of the Atlantic is
this vital problem likely to be faced and dealt with by officialdom
in London and Washington. The longer it is neglected the more
difficult will it become to resolve. Meanwhile, we do not only
risk the failure of our deterrence policy with the disasters which
that might bring, but we hold up the one major practical step, in
the realm of defence, which, without having to wait upon Communist
agreement, would lead towards our goal of disarmament and effective
negotiations.

23rd September, 1956.