As far as the ultimate position in such an organization of the United States
follows independently the lead of the Latin Americas, or ignore the proposals,
United States - should it take the lead in developing these regional activities,
currency-credit system; these proposals create serious directions for the
proposals are being formulated for a hemispheric common market and common
five Central American republics have recently formed a common market and
still another economic problem is presented by the fact that this

family for doing so.

through it. A Regional Development Authority might well afford the oppor-

States could achieve more by working outside the United Nations thus

it would appear, therefore, that this was a situation where the United

has been promising are at variance with U.S. objectives in the region,

tion in influence and prestige. In some respects, the doctrine which it

Commission for Latin America stands for above any Latin American organi-

At present in the field of economics, the United Nations Economic

special relationship between Latin America and the United States.

It build on the traditions of cooperation which have existed and areas of

and thereby lessen the reasons for traditional nationalism. It would

which directly and indirectly would lessen the economic vulnerability of the

broader the economic development of the region would become a shared

it provides such aid for other regions, through the Authority. Under this ap-

economic aid, which it should provide for the region on the same basis at

standards of the International Bank. The United States could tunnel the

Draft of May 16, 1957
1 - Report

I - Report
Draft of May 18, 1957

- 43 -

is concerned, the question is not easy and deserves close study; but it
would seem that the United States should support these efforts on the part
of the Latin Americans and should seek to mould the evolving institutions
into forms in which the United States could participate.

Another difficult problem, which poses a serious threat to the
achievement of U. S. objectives in Latin America, is the appeal of com-
munism. This appeal arises from a number of factors. In the first place,
the successes of the U.S.S.R. in marshalling assets for rapid economic
development appeal to the imagination of those Latin Americans who
recognize the necessity for the rapid economic development of their region
and who are not satisfied with the economic, political and social results of
private enterprise as it operates in their vicinity. Furthermore, the wide
gap which separates the rich and the poor in many countries, the land-
hunger of a landless peasantry, the limited opportunities for a satisfying
career for educated or semi-educated persons who lack means or position,
all stimulate an interest in a system which in theory does not permit the
existence of any of these things. This psychological climate makes
possible the creation of strong communist movements, even without the
direct support of the U.S.S.R. Once in being these movements can be-
come serious threats to the objectives of the United States. One has only
to think of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala and the 600,000 members of the
official communist party in Brazil and consider the possibilities which have
been offered to the U.S.S.R. by analogous cases in Europe and Asia

been offered to the U.3.8.9. by analogous cases in Europe and Asia.

officiated communist party in Brazil and considered the possibilities which have

to think of the Uruguayan regime in Customers and the 600,000 members of the
come serious threats to the objectives of the United States. One has to

direct support of the U.3.8.9. Once in being these movements can be

existence of any of those things. This psychological climate makes

all stimulate an interest in a system which in theory does not permit the
career for educated or semi-educated persons who lack means or position

under a fandilean beauty, the limited opportunities for a satisfying

can which ascribes the rich and the poor in many countries, the rich-

private enterprises as it operates in their vicinity. Furthermore, the wife

recruit the necessity for the rapid economic development of their region

development aimed to the imagination of those Latin Americans who

the success of the U.3.8.9. in realizing assets for rapid economic

international. This aspect arises from a number of factors. In the first place,

importance of U.3. objectives in Latin America, is the absence of com-

interests in which the United States can participate,

of the Latin Americans and should see to would the evolving institutions

would seem that the United States should act in those interests on the part

in concerned, the question is not so easy and desirables close at hand; but it

Draft of May 18, 1953
I - Report

[Lc]

- 44 -

to recognize the reality of this threat.

This threat, however, involves a range of problems not easy to solve. The Latin American attitude toward intervention prohibits direct action by the United States alone to eliminate a communist regime once it is legally established there. The United States is thus compelled to work affirmatively to prevent such an event from occurring. Given the existing patterns of life, this is not an easy task; it cuts across questions of economic growth, democracy and human development. Our best hope is that an indirect approach to the problem, the partnership in economic and related human development, will undermine the bases of the appeal of communism.

In looking at the defense of Latin America against major military threats from outside the hemisphere, one cannot help concluding that, for the foreseeable future, defense must be provided by the United States and that the Latin American states cannot contribute effective force to this defense. This conclusion suggests that a defense community like NATO is not necessary and that consequently supporting military aid programs are not called for. Absent such a need, the adverse effects of this sort of military aid demand that it be reduced or eliminated. In practice today these adverse effects can be seen. Military aid strengthens the armed forces or a particular service within any given country and as a result relatively weakens other forces there. This imbalance may lead to the over-throw of democratic institutions there and the establishment of a military dictatorship. In addition, military aid programs are usually conducted with

dissolution. In addition, military aid programmes are usually conducted with
draw of democratic institutions there and the establishment of a military
team weakens other forces there. This imbalance may lead to the over-
force or a particular service within any given country and as a result
does adverse effects can be seen. Military aid attenuates the armed
military aid demand that it be reduced or eliminated. In practice today,
not called for. Absent such a need, the adverse effects of this sort of
not necessarily and that consequently supporting military aid programs are
detain. This conclusion attenuates that a defense community like NATO,
that the Latin American states cannot contribute effective force to this
the foreseeable future, defense must be provided by the United States and
forces from outside the hemispheres, one cannot help concluding thus,
for
In looking at the defense of Latin America against major military
development, will undermine the basis of the appeal of communism.
abroad to the problem, the paternistic in economic and related human
democracy and human development. Our bear hope is that an indirect
that it is not an easy task it cuts across questions of economic growth,
to prevent such an event from occurring. Given the existing patterns of life,
established there. The United States is thus compelled to work affirmatively
the United States alone to eliminate a committar regime once it is identified
The Latin American attitude toward intervention prohibits direct action by
this threat, however, involves risks of problems not easy to solve,
to recognize the reality of this threat.

Draft of May 18, 1987
I - Report

[LC]

- 45 -

military objectives in mind and consequently strengthen the dictatorships as much or more than the democracies which often refuse to enter into such programs. In addition, military aid, by injecting arms into a relatively unarmed area, may lead to an armaments race, thereby offering other forces outside the hemisphere to intervene. Therefore, military aid can contribute to military and political instability. In the absence of positive advantages, military aid to Latin America produces results contrary to our objectives for the area. The Organization of American States offers the basis for the international arrangements necessary to provide for the defense of the area against overt threats from outside the hemisphere.

It also offers the best means of maintaining the internal stability of the region. Within that framework, techniques of arbitration, mediation, conciliation and consultation have all but eliminated wars between Latin American countries in recent years. While population growth and economic rivalries may increase frictions in the future, the United States can probably rely on these arrangements for securing its objectives in the future. This reliance should not, however, be purely passive, but should include imaginative development of these arrangements toward meeting the changing problems.

Therefore, the following pattern of actions by the United States is called for in order to achieve its objectives in Latin America.

a. A reliance on the United States alone, working through the Organization of American States, for the defense of the Hemisphere against outside military threats.

[L]

- 46 -

b. A reliance on the traditions of consultation, arbitration and mediation and the Organization of American States for keeping the peace internally.

c. A combined effort through private enterprise and a Regional Development Authority, assisted by economic aid from the United States, for the economic development of the region. In both the private and public activities, the stress would be on partnership and cooperation, thereby building on the traditions of cooperation.

d. A reliance on cooperative economic development to lessen the vulnerability of the economy to outside forces and to contribute to the feeling that Latin Americans were sharing in the planning, the direction and the fruits of their development, thereby undermining the sources of extreme nationalism.

e. A similar reliance on economic growth in this framework to contribute to human dignity and thereby to destroy the appeal of indigenous economic movements.

f. A reliance on these developments to strengthen democratic forces in the region. This reliance would be supported by a reduction of the support of non-democratic forces now provided by military aid programs.

This program attempts to build on the historical forces in the region to achieve the United States objectives there and to blunt those forces which interfere with those objectives.

[LC]

- 17 -

# IV. WESTERN EUROPE

## A. The Present Situation

The selection of Western Europe only, rather than Europe, for treatment in this Chapter is a tragic fact but still a part of the present situation. The selection seems justified on the basis of the hard facts of Soviet control demonstrated in Hungary last fall. These facts make the translation of the national purpose into action in Western Europe as opposed to Eastern different tasks.

The dominant feature of the Western European scene today is the contrast between it and the scene in April, 1945 or even April, 1948. The task of reconstruction, material and spiritual, was immense and the obstacles in the way were many. Yet the political institutions and economy of Europe have been reconstituted, thanks partially to the Marshall Plan and other U.S. assistance, but the achievement also reflects the enduring vitality of the people and their devotion to free institutions and human dignity.

During the economic revival of Europe, a process continuing today, Europe's industrial plant has been rebuilt and modernized, its standards of management improved, its labor standards bettered. As a result, economic productivity has been increased and the distribution of economic benefits widened. In spite of these successes which contribute to the economic strengt. of the region and to the continued viability of its institutions, there still remain serious economic weaknesses and imbalances and deep fissures in

["remain actions economic weaknesses and imbalances and deep fissures in\nof the region and to the continued viability of its institutions, there still\nremained\". In spite of these advances which contribute to the economic atten-\nded\". In spite of these advances which contribute to the economic atten-\nd

- 48 -

the social structure of many states.

A second important feature of the present scene is the fact that important groups of Europeans are either opposed to U. S. objectives and methods, or mistrust them. The most notorious of these groups are the French and Italian communist parties which hold a significant fraction of the popular and parliamentary vote. In addition, in these countries and elsewhere a large portion of the non-communist Left questions the objectives and methods of the United States in varying degrees ranging from mild doubt to deep distrust. But there are other groups, perhaps more on the traditional Right, who find in the anti-colonial, the anti-monopoly and other policies of the United States a naked attempt to steal markets, opportunities and power.

The third important feature is the dependence of Western Europe on raw materials and especially fuel from outside the region to keep its economy running. It is obvious that these imports can be, and are being, interfered with. Important groups of Europeans can find no gap in the logic of the anti-colonial movements which draw on the political and philosophical heritage of the West to deny Europe the means of economic survival.

At the same time, Western Europe is unable to defend itself against the U.S.S.R. without the assistance of the United States; and even with that assistance, it can defend itself only at great cost. NATO provided a temporary sense of military security, but even that is now fading with an increased recognition by Europeans of their dependence on the nuclear weight of the U.S. air force.

U.S. air force.

recognition by Europeans of their dependence on the greatest weight of the
sense of military security, but even that is now fading with an increased
assurance, it can defend itself only at great cost. NATO provided a temporary
U.S. and U.K. without the assurance of the United States; and even with this
At the same time, Western Europe is unable to defend itself against
the West to deny Europe the means of economic survival.

colonial movements which draw on the political and philosophical heritage of
with. Important groups of Europeans can find no gap in the logic of the anti-
running. It is obvious that these imports can be, and are being, interrelated
raw materials and especially fuel from outside the region to keep its economy
The third important feature is the dependence of Western Europe on
a naked attempt to steal markets, opportunities and power.

the anti-colonial, the anti-monopoly, and other policies of the United States
But there are other groups, perhaps more on the traditional Right, who find in
of the United States in varying degrees ranging from mild doubt to deep distaste.
since portions of the non-communist Left continues the objectives and methods
proudly and parliamentary vote. In addition, in these countries and elsewhere
French and Italian communist parties which hold a significant fraction of the
methods, or whatsoever them. The most notorious of these groups are the
important groups of Europeans, either opposed to U. S. objectives and
A second important feature of the present scene is the fact that
the social structure of many states.

Draft of May 18, 1963
I - Report

[L]

- 49 -

This combination of factors cannot help but lead to a realization of the shrinking of Europe's economic and military power. This in turn leads large numbers of Europeans to believe that they have lost control over their own destiny, both militarily and economically, with the result that they can see no logical course of conduct open to them save a defeatist neutralism.

Aside from the threat of Soviet domination, direct or indirect, the major political problem confronting Europe is the question of the reunification of Germany. As long as Germany remains divided, the pressures for reunification in the Federal Republic will threaten the stability of NATO and the Western European community. Within the Federal Republic it will cause political differences. It will also cause tensions between the USSR and the West. Any terms of reunification now foreseeable threaten the unity of the Western European community and, according to some, the health of Europe.

The fifth important feature of the European scene is the growing tendency toward functional unification in Europe. The growth in types of activity has been marked. Beginning with the OEEC and the EPU, it has developed into the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and the Common Market. It has threatened to extend outside Europe, through, for example, plans for the joint European development of Africa.

## B. The Objectives of the United States in Western Europe

The general objectives of the United States in Western Europe are -
a) To maintain an environment within which our form of society can continue to develop in conformity with our humanistic principles.

principles.

can continue to develop in conformity with our humanistic
a) To maintain an environment within which our form of society
The general objectives of the United States in Western Europe are -

Joint European development of States
threatened to extend outside Europe, through, for example, signs for the
the Cost and Steel Community, Eusatom and the Common Market. It has
been marked. Beginning with the OEC and the EPU, it has developed into
toward functional unification in Europe. The growth in these of activity has
The fifth important feature of the European scene is the growing tendency
the Western European community and, according to some, the health of Europe.

West. Any terms of reunification now foreseeable threaten the unity of
political differences. It will also cause tension between the US and the
Western European community. Within the Federal Republic it will cause
unification in the Federal Republic will threaten the stability of NATO and the
of Germany. As long as Germany remains divided, the pressures for le-
water political problem controlling Europe is the question of the reunification

Aside from the threat of Soviet domination, direct or indirect, the
see no logical course of conduct open to them save a defeatist mentalism.
own destiny, both military and economically, with the result that they can
leave numbers of Europeans to believe that they have lost control over their
the shrinking of Europe's economic and military power. This in turn forces
This combination of factors cannot help but lead to a realization of

Draft of May 19, 1987
I - Report

[L.C.]

- 50 -

b) To maintain a strong and pervasive community of interest with Europe.

More specifically these objectives imply that -

a) The United States should assist in preventing the USSR from controlling Western Europe and, to that end, should re-vitalize NATO in accordance with the technical and strategic realities of today.

b) The United States should work for a greater awareness of the fundamental community of the Western world and for the maintenance of the free institutions of Europe, both as ends in themselves and as examples to the rest of the world.

c) The United States should assist in whatever way possible in the formation of effective political and economic unification of Western Europe as a source of internal strength for the region and of added power against the USSR.

d) The United States should assist in establishing more permanent and mutually profitable relationships between Western Europe and the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

### C. Considerations Affecting the Achievement of these Objectives

In determining how the forces working against the objectives of the United States can be sterilized and those favoring them can be strengthened,

United States can be stabilized and those revoking them can be attitudinalized.
In determining how the forces working against the objectives of the
C. Considerations Affecting the Achievement of these Objectives
AmERICA.

and the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa and Latin
and mutuality profitable relations between Western Europe
b. The United States should assist in establishing more permanent
and of added power against the U.S.S.R.

of Western Europe as a source of internal strength for the region
in the formation of effective political and economic unification
c. The United States should assist in whatever way possible
themselves and as examples to the rest of the world,
reignance of the free institutions of Europe, both as ends in
fundamental community of the Western world and for the main-
D. The United States should work for a greater awareness of the
realities of today.

utilize NATO in accordance with the technical and strategic
from controlling Western Europe and, to that end, should be-
a) The United States should assist in preventing the U.S.S.R.
More specifically these objectives imply that -
with Europe.

p) To maintain a strong and defensive community of interest
- 20 -

Draft of May 18, 1927
I - Report

[LC]

- 51 -

problems of the military defense of Europe will be examined first. The effectiveness of NATO today is central to this question. NATO was created during a period when nuclear weapons were relatively scarce, to coordinate the military forces of its members with the objective of deterring an invasion of Western Europe by the USSR with conventional forces and of strengthening Western Europe's will to resist. On the whole NATO has achieved a great success in these objectives. With respect to political and economic matters, the mission of NATO has been less clear and success less apparent.

Now, however, the basis of NATO has been much eroded. An era of nuclear plenty has succeeded the era of nuclear scarcity, and in the new era the USSR has great capacity for nuclear destruction. The character of the nuclear umbrella provided by the U.S. Strategic Air Command has therefore been much changed since the early days of NATO. Furthermore, recent events in Europe have undermined earlier assumptions about the character of the potential attack on Western Europe. Today it seems highly unlikely that any Eastern European satellite or combination of them could, or would, mount an affective attack on Western Europe or that the USSR would hazard an assault by conventional arms against Western Europe across the satellites. This change suggests that NATO as now conceived has no logical military function. This conclusion does not mean that no useful tasks exist for NATO, or that it can be abandoned. In fact the very opposite is true.

In the first place, NATO cannot be abandoned because such an abandonment would lead to exultation in the USSR and additional defeatism in Europe.

ment would lead to exultation in the USAR and additional defeatism in Europe.

In the first place, NATO cannot be abandoned because such an abandonment would lead to exultation in the USAR and additional defeatism in Europe.

NATO as a now conceived has no rational military function. This conclusion comes against Western Europe across the satellite. This change anguishes that in Western Europe or that the USAR would hazard an assault by conventional satellite or combination of them could, or would, mount an effective attack on Western Europe. Today it seems highly unlikely that any Eastern European have undermined earlier satellite operations about the character of the potential attack channelled since the early days of NATO. Furthermore, recent events in Europe complicate provided by the U.S. Strategic Air Command has therefore been much USAR has great capacity for nuclear destruction. The character of the nuclear bomb is a matter of course and in the new era the nuclear bomb has succeeded the era of nuclear scarcity, and in the new era the bomb, however, the date of NATO has been much studied. All etc of NATO has been less clear and success less apparent.

These objectives. With respect to tariff and economic matters, the mission of Europe is to treat. On the whole NATO has achieved a great success in Europe a will to treat. On the whole NATO has achieved a great success in Europe by the USAR with conventional forces and of attaining Western force of its members with the objective of deterring an invasion of Western period when nuclear weapons were relatively scarce, to coordinate the military uses of NATO today is central to this direction. NATO was created during a crisis of the military defense of Europe will be examined that. The effectiv-

- 21 -

Draft of May 19, 1987
1 - Report

[L]

- 52 -

Secondly, Western Europe must be capable, in some measure, of defending
itself and this capacity must be apparent for all to see, or the very situation
which existed in 1950 will be recreated. These premises call for a re-
ordination of NATO.

One of the difficulties with NATO at present is that while there is
broad agreement between the member countries as to their purpose in Europe,
all the members save the United States, lack the means to carry out that purpose.
The French Army is in Algeria, the German Army is non-existent, the British
Army is being dissolved; but the real difficulty is that only the United States
has nuclear weapons, and more particularly for this area, tactical nuclear
weapons. In order to revitalize NATO, to give the Western European countries
a sense of effective participation in the alliance and a feeling that they have
a measure of control over their own destiny, it is necessary for the United
States to share tactical nuclear weapons and doctrine concerning their use
with the NATO countries.

As the law now stands, such sharing is impossible, but the assumptions
on which the law was based have been undermined by the coming of nuclear
plenty. The basic interests of the United States demand that the law should be
changed.

This change would give new life to NATO and its members and it would
make Western Europe less vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. By giving these
countries the capacity to sting, this program would lessen their feelings of
helplessness and would weaken thereby the forces of defeatism and neutralism.

defilements and would weaken indirectly the forces of deterrence and neutralization of the capacity to act, that program would lessen their feelings of

plenty. The basic interest of the United States demands that the law should be on which the law was passed have been undermined by the command of nuclear

As the law now stands, such arising is improbable, but the assumption is with the NATO countries.

state to acquire tactical nuclear weapons and continue concerning their use as a measure of control over their own destiny. It is necessary for the United States to see effective participation in the alliance and a feeling that they have weapons. In order to revitalize NATO, to give the Western European countries a measure of control over their own destinies, it is necessary for the United States to be involved in the alliance.

ordination of NATO.

which existed in 1920 will be reëxisted. These premises call for a re-
tialist and this capacity must be apparent for all to see, or the very situation
Secondly, Western Europe must be capable, in some measure, of defending

Draft of May 18, 1923
1 - report

[L]

- 53 -

The possession of tactical nuclear weapons by our allies in Europe presents, however, serious problems in the organization and control of the armed forces of Europe. It raises questions of whether these weapons might be used to advance individual objectives of members of the alliance rather than for the common defense, and of how this use might be prevented. In the last analysis the degree of this danger depends upon the extent of common purpose within the alliance. As the leaders and the people of the Atlantic community are conscious of broad areas of common purpose, this danger will be small. If they cannot perceive a common purpose which overrides individual objectives, this danger looms large.

The future of Germany is central to the future of NATO. The attitude toward NATO, just expressed, assumes either that Germany will remain divided and the Federal Republic a cooperating member of NATO or that a reunified Germany will be a cooperating member of NATO. The second of these assumptions seems quite impossible; the USSR would not permit reunification on such terms. The first also presents serious difficulties because of the strong internal political pressures against such a policy. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine any sort of NATO with a united and neutralized Germany outside it. Germany thus presents a real dilemma.

In the field of economics, the major task is to assure Europe of the sources of energy which are needed. At present Europe must import more than one-fifth of its fuel and this dependence on imports is rising. The costs are large and the sources of supply insecure. There is no short and easy answer

["and the sources of authority. There is no short and easy answer to the question of its fuel and its dependence on imports. The costs are high, and the sources of energy which are needed. At present, there is not much room for imports. The costs are high, and the sources of energy which are needed. At present, there is not

[LC]

- 54 -

to this problem, although the development of nuclear power plants offers some
hope for the period ten to fifteen years ahead.

This problem must be attached as a whole for Europe and Europe must
take the initiative. Steps to be taken include more efficient use of energy
resources in Europe by research in fuel-saving and coal-mining techniques.
by improving fuel transportation facilities in Europe, by increasing the search
for oil there, and by increasing research, training and development in the field
of nuclear power. At the same time steps must be taken to reduce the
vulnerability of Europe to interruptions of the flow of oil from a single source.
These include larger storage and distribution facilities in Europe, the develop-
ment of alternate sources of supply and alternate means of transportation and,
most important, the creation of sound incentives to stimulate the flow of
fuel to Europe.

The United States should cooperate in these developments, perhaps
through the creation of an Atlantic Power Community in which Western Europe,
Canada, the United States and some of the Caribbean countries could cooperate
in planning and action toward these goals. This Community could become a
focus of relations between the North Atlantic community and the rest of the
world.

Such a focus would serve several purposes. It obviously demonstrates
the continuing interest of the United States in the welfare of Europe. Such a
demonstration is a useful blow in the cold war. Secondly, this focus is
constructive and peaceful, not defensive and military. These characteristics

constructive and positive, not defensive and military. These characteristics
demonstrate it is a useful blow in the cold war. Secondly, this focus is
in the continuing interest of the United States in the welfare of Europe. Such a
focus would serve several purposes. If continuously demonstrated
world.

In planning and action toward these goals, This Community could become a
Canada, the United States and some of the Caribbean countries could cooperate
through the creation of an Atlantic Power Community in which Western Europe,
The United States should cooperate in these developments, perhaps
fuel to Europe.

These include larger storage and distribution facilities in Europe, the development
of infrastructure of Europe to interruptions of the flow of oil from a single source,
of nuclear power. At the same time steps must be taken to reduce the
for oil there, and by increasing research, training and development in the field
by improving fuel transportation facilities in Europe, by increasing the action
reaction in Europe by research in fuel-earning and coal-mining techniques,
take the initiative. Steps to be taken include more efficient use of energy
This problem must be attached as a whole for Europe and Europe must
hope for the period ten to fifteen years ahead.

To this problem, although the development of nuclear power plants offers some

- 84 -

Draft of May 18, 1982
I -rieb

[LC]

- 55-

serve to weaken the mistrust of the methods and objectives of the United
States existing among important groups in Europe and elsewhere.

As a focus of relationships between the North Atlantic community and
the rest of the world, the Atlantic Power Community would seek to demonstrate
the fruitful possibilities of international exchange of goods and services.
It would not be solely concerned with getting oil for Europe, but with fruitful
exchange leading to the economic and social development of the areas from
which the oil comes. In these areas, there is a scarcity of skilled manpower,
proven techniques and capital goods needed to raise the productivity of
agriculture, commerce and industry. In Europe, on the other hand, there is a
reservoir of these things, and also the capacity and need to produce more
capital goods. These goods and services can be exchanged for oil with mutual
benefit. As the economies of the oil-producing areas become more developed
and the benefits of production more widespread in consequence of these
developments, the interest of the leaders and the peoples of these areas in
the continued flow of oil to Europe will increase. In general, a similar
approach could be taken in dealing with Europe's other needs for raw materials.

This approach has a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the
possibility of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity
of making a real contribution to the world. Both these should attack the
feeling of defeatism. This approach also offers to the United States an
opportunity of working out the conflict between its traditional policy of anti-
colonialism and its support of the Western European powers.

["colonialism and its support of the Western European powers, the\nopportunity of working out the conflict between its traditional policy of\nhostility to colonialism, and the support of the United States of America\nin making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor making a test contribution to the world. Both these around attack the\nbeauty of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity\nfor this approach to be a further advantage. It offers to Europe not only the\nopportunity

[LC]

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The United States has a real interest in the unification of Europe.
Not only are there political and economic benefits to be derived from it, but
aspirations toward it are an important part of European history and hope to
which the United States should not appear indifferent or opposed. In addition
these aspirations have an appeal for Eastern Europe and are a source of
behavior there which is probably not compatible with Soviet objectives in
that region.

However, there is not much the United States can do to further
European unification. The major steps will have to be taken by the Europeans
themselves and there is some doubt as to whether it is either possible or wise
for the United States to try to coerce them into taking any particular step
or series of steps. The appropriate role for the United States in this develop-
ment is that of the helpful midwife. In particular, it should be alert to
reverse any tendencies which would lead to the neutralization of a unified
Europe or which would make unification a threat to the underlying community
of interest in the Western world.

Within this framework the operational objectives of the United States
involve the creation of a partnership between Western Europe and the United
States. Basic to this partnership is the recognition that while Western Europe
has lost its position as hub of the universe, it still has important contributions
to make to the world in terms of politics, culture and economies.

The elements of this partnership include -

a) A strategic defense provided by the United States and a

a) A strategic defense provided by the United States and a
    the elements of this partnership include -

to make to the world in terms of building culture and economics,
has lost its position as part of the universe, it still has important contributions
 States. Basic to this partnership is the recognition that while Western Europe
involves the creation of a partnership between Western Europe and the United
 states of interest in the Western world.

Europe or which would make unifications a threat to the underlying community
resemble any tendencies which would lead to the neutralization of a unified
state that or the helpful midwife. In particular, it should be alert to
or series of steps. The appropriate role for the United States in this development
for the United States to try to coerce them into taking any particular step
themselves and there is some doubt as to whether it is either possible or wise
European unification. The major steps will have to be taken by the European
However, there is not much the United States can do to further
that region.

behavior there, which is broadly not compatible with Soviet objectives in
these situations have an abhor for Eastern Europe and she a source of
which the United States should not act as an obstacle. In addition
situations toward it are an important part of European policy and hope to
Not only are these political and economic benefits to be derived from it, but
the United States has a real interest in the unification of Europe.

Draft of May 19, 1983
I - Report

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Draft of May 18, 1957

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local defense provided by a revitalized NATO armed with
tactical nuclear weapons.

b) An Atlantic Power Community which will secure adequate
sources of energy for the European economy in exchange for the
application of European and American skills in the economic
development of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

c) An increasing development of intra-European institutions
carrying on various aspects of European economic and political
life across the traditional boundaries of the states of Europe.

Such a framework would make a major contribution to the realization of
the objectives of the United States, not only in Europe, but in the world
generally.

generally.

The objectives of the United States, not only in Europe, but in the world such a framework would make a major contribution to the realization of

life across the traditional frontlines of the states of Europe.

 carrying on various aspects of European economic and political
c) An increasing development of intra-European institutions
development of Iran, Iraq and Latin America.

subordination of European and American skills in the economic
sources of energy for the European economy in exchange for the
sources of nuclear weapons.

local defense provided by a revitalized NATO allied with

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Draft of May 13, 1947

I - Report

[L.C]

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# V. THE MIDDLE EAST

## A. The Present Situation

Unlike Latin America and Western Europe, the Middle East is today a region of crisis. It is in a revolutionary ferment where the old bases of life, social, political, economic and cultural, are undergoing revolutionary change. The overwhelming mass of the people are just awakening to the realization that it is no longer necessary for them to continue to live in poverty and misery. This realization is essentially an emotional reaction against nearly all they have ever experienced, but it has not yet advanced beyond this stage to the point of providing a new course of action. Unfortunately for us, much of this emotional reaction centers on the long and unsatisfactory historical relationship with the West and the servitudes imposed by the West on the region.

To complicate this picture, an unbelievable gap, material and spiritual, exists between the "haves" and the "have-nots" of the region and between urban and rural groups. An additional friction is provided by the existence of tribal and other groups whose aspirations are at variance with those of their so-called fellow countrymen and who may be excluded from avenues of political power. Typical of these are the Kurds in Azerbaijan, Iraq, Syria and Jordan, and, more recently, the Palestine Arabs in Jordan.

The new leaders of the Middle East are not secure enough in their position to impose rational and orderly procedures upon this revolution. As a rule, they are strong men who have emerged as leaders without previous

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training or experience in government or administration. Yet they are faced
with domestic problems which would tax those far better trained and far more
experienced than they and supported by established institutions. Following
the line of least resistance, these leaders are virtually compelled to con-
solidate their followings by exploiting emotional issues which arouse the
people. The most convenient of these are anti-Western issues and other ex-
ternal matters which distract the people from the pressing internal problems
which cannot be dealt with except through stability and orderly procedures.

This picture is subject to the qualification that wide differences exist
within the region, differences not so much in the basic elements which are
the product of a common history, religion, and culture but rather in the degree
to which any given state has evolved toward maturity as a nation. In some
areas considerable progress has been made, and leadership is evolving into
a government which is capable of carrying on the slow and difficult work needed
for achieving the unarticulated aspirations of the masses. But in others there
is turmoil, with no effective government and only a variety of leaders
struggling for power.

It is the fashion in the area to call for industrial development. The
leaders seek this industrial progress to consolidate their own power, to impress
the outside world, and in the sincere belief that such industrialization will
raise the level of their peoples. The region, however, is not prepared for
such development. It lacks the order, the administrative organization, the
skilled manpower and the countless elements that make up the foundation of
industrial strength. Such industrialization as has been attempted in the region

[L.C.]

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Draft of May 18, 1957

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has created stresses and imbalances which have often added to its instability.

The idea of Arab unity, the image of the Arab empire of the eighth century, exercises a great hold over much of the region. Its boldest image is of a federation of 90 million people extending from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. The idea offers a powerful tool for influencing behavior in the region, which can be used both by local leaders in furtherance of their own policies and position, as both Nasser and Saud have tried to do, and by outside powers who have the skill to do so. In some respects it is so powerful a force that it cannot be disregarded by local leaders even when from the practical point of view it is in their interest and that of their followers to do so. Saud finds himself in this position in many of his dealings with Nasser.

The area is not particularly well-endowed by nature in climate, terrain, or resources, so far as is now known, except for the fabulous supplies of oil, which have become so critical to other peoples of the world. Yet for the present, this oil has, save in a few cases, only a negative value for the leaders and peoples of the region. They have no use for it themselves; they see in it only a sweet to deny to others, not a key to unlock their own future. Added to this is the fact that oil is not allocated equally throughout the region; some states have it in abundance, others apparently not at all.

Working alone, each of these factors tends toward instability and disorder; together, they compound this effect. Thus, the present situation in the Middle East presents little to support the general objectives of the United States.

[L.C.]

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Draft of May 18, 1957

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## B. Objectives of the United States in the Middle East

The general objectives of the United States in the Middle East are -

a) To work for the establishment of order and stability in the area in order to eliminate the continual threat of disorder which jeopardizes the general order of the world and in order to develop a climate where the people of the region may have an opportunity for growth and human satisfactions.

b) To work for conditions whereby the oil of the region which is essential to Western Europe and other regions may be exchanged on a mutually profitable basis for goods and services which will contribute to the human and material development of the Middle East.

More specifically, these objectives imply that -

a) The United States should use whatever means are appropriate to strengthen the position of leaders, who are not clearly opposed to it and its objectives, so that they will be free to turn from emotional, external issues to the difficult tasks of organization and development at home. This requires us to build up the confidence of the peoples of the Middle East, not in us, but in their own leaders.

b) The United States should assist the leaders to develop constructive and attainable goals for the region which can replace the negative, emotional reactions of the people as a motivating force for life there.

c) The United States should work with its Western European allies so that the sale of oil to Europe would lead to a widely shared economic growth for the region and consequently an interest on the part of the people

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and the leaders of the region that the exchange should continue.

d) The United States with the help of its Western European allies should seek to maintain the internal peace of the region and to secure it against outside aggression.

### C. Considerations Affecting the Achievement of These Objectives

The most serious problem cutting across all these objectives lies in the emotional residues of anti-colonialism. Any intervention with military force in the area and even aspects of economic or technical assistance or the operations of the oil producers can and will be attacked as colonialism by potential leaders on the threshhold of power. If the attack touches the masses, the leader in power may have to adopt it or be swept away. Thus, some of the principal means for assisting in the development of stability contain in themselves threats to that stability in the short-run.

Yet this is a risk which the United States must take, for to do nothing is to court disaster. This is a clear case where "style" is important. The way in which the United States uses the various means at its disposal can either add to the strength of the appeal of the leader attacking these activities as a new colonialism, or make his appeal absurd.

The latent threat of anti-colonial feelings must always be kept in mind by the United States, but also by its Western European allies. Their position is even more difficult because among them are in fact the ex-colonial powers of the region who remain as colonial powers governing other peoples for whom the peoples of the Middle East feel an affinity by reason of race or

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religion. These facts suggest the desirability of avoiding unilateral action by any of the Western powers and of the use of multilateral devices such as the proposed Atlantic Power Community.

The position of Israel poses very difficult but similar problems. Away from the cities in most parts of the region there is little natural feeling of hostility against Israel. But it is a subject of high emotional impact in the cities and provides the leaders with the sort of external issue with which they can strengthen their position. On the one hand, it thus contributes to the instability of the region and on the other the best solution for the problem can be found only by increasing stability. For, as a leader feels himself secure in his position, he can abandon this issue and turn to more constructive tasks. As the constructive tasks catch the imagination of the people and give them hope, the people will be less influenced by the image of Israel as a scapegoat for all their misery.

The Middle East is thus the area where the type of analysis suggested in Chapter II applies very clearly. In this region, it must be recognized that the use of certain means will not necessarily produce the same result as use of the same means in the United States or Western Europe. For example, economic aid or technical projects such as irrigation often serve only to widen the gap between the rich and the poor instead of raising the general level.

Rapid industrialization may tear apart the fabric of society. Great care must be taken to ensure that all projects for the area do in fact support

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the operational objectives of the United States, the creation of an order in
the region which is not incompatible with the general objectives of the United
States in the world.

It is evident that the USSR has a strategic interest in the area as the
path to Africa and South Asia, quite apart from the question of oil. It is
probable, however, that it has no present plans to take over the region and
that its objectives for the time being can be realized by the continuation of
disorder there. It has numerous means at its disposal for doing so. One of
these is, of course, the inability of the United States and its allies to secure
a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Another is the Kurdish people
stretching from Azerbaijan S.R. through Iran, Iraq, Syria and Jordan. This
people, with national aspirations of its own, is largely out of power in the
Middle Eastern countries where it is located, and because the tribes extend
into the USSR, it has excellent opportunities for taking advantage of this
potentially explosive situation.

The USSR has, of course, other ways of influencing the region. The
impact of its program of military aid has already been felt. Although the appeal
of communism, both as a theory of reform and social justice and as a technique
for securing industrialization and rapid economic development, has not yet
had much influence in the region, potentially it could become a powerful force.
It is frequently said that such a development could not occur because
communism is incompatible with the Islamic faith. Unfortunately for the
United States this probably is not so. A grounding in Islam may be an

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excellent preparation for a strong belief in communism.

It is evident from the combination of all these considerations that there are many obstacles in the way of an easy achievement of our objectives in the Middle East. It is a region where the influence and behavior of people and nations outside the region are very important. This addition of another group of factors beyond the direct control of the United States makes our task more difficult. The Middle East, therefore, is a region which will call for patience, skill and forbearance on the part of the leaders and people of the United States.

It might add perspective to deal with our objectives and programs for a particular country. Iran might serve as a good example. At the close of the joint Soviet-U.S. occupation of Iran during World War II, the young Shah began an attempt to consolidate his authority for the purpose of bringing about reform and orderly development in his country, by winning the confidence of a majority of his people and a segment of influential leaders, including some of the old elite. In 1950, when he had made considerable progress in this direction, his position was threatened by the intransigence of the British oil companies which resulted in the suspension of the oil revenues on which his reform program depended. Before all was lost, he appealed to the United States for diplomatic support. This was denied him and our support went to the British.

These events created a situation in which Mossadeg could manoeuver the reactionaries, the fanatics, the nationalists, the disappointed and the

the rationables, the taxes, the nationalities, the dispositions and the

These events created a situation in which Measured could maneuver
the British.

States for diplomatic support. This was denied him and our support went to
the return program defended. Before all were lost, he appealed to the United
companies which resulted in the annihilation of the oil revenues on which
direction, his position was strengthened by the insurmountable pressure in this
of the old elite. In 1920, when he had made considerable progress in this
majority of the people and a segment of influential leaders, including some
religion and orderly development in the country, by winning the confidence of a
party in an attempt to consolidate the authority for the purpose of bringing about
the joint Soviet-U.S. occupation of Iran during World War II, the Young Shah
a particular country. Iran might serve as a good example. At the close of

it might add perspective to deal with our objectives and problems for

United States.

the balance, skill and tolerance on the part of the leaders and people of the
more difficult. The Middle East, therefore, is a region which will call for
a group of factors beyond the direct control of the United States, makes our task
and nations outside the region are very important. This edition of short
introduction to the region is very important. It is a region where the influence and behavior of people
are many objectives in the way of an easy achievement of our objectives in
the Middle East. It is a region where the influence and behavior of people
relate to the relations between the United States and the Middle East.

If it is evident from the combination of all these considerations that the
excellent preparation for a strong belief in communication

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subversives into a revolutionary movement which gave him control of the bankrupt country. In time rivalries among these groups and their leaders weakened their hold on the people and the situation dissolved into primitive disorder. After two years or so, the Shah was able to reestablish some confidence in himself as leader, work out a settlement of the oil dispute, thereby restoring his revenues, and begin again on his program.

An appraisal of the Shah's character and performance gives ground for the conclusion that our national objectives within his country, strategic, economic and political, will be served as long as he remains in power. As long as this conclusion is true, our first policy objective is to keep him in power. By looking at possible causes of his overthrow, we can define our operational objectives in terms of those actions which would remove or neutralize those causes. Among them are the behavior of the people, of other leaders in the country and foreign interests.

As for the people, their latent power to convulse Iran remains as strong as ever. Despite the Shah's apparent ascendancy, the divisive forces persist, based on history, tribal affinities and feuds, social and economic stratifications, religious fanaticism and the appeal of communism. These forces are ideological and there is little reason to believe that without outside support the Shah could survive an internal opposition that succeeded in activating them.

Among the people, however, there are powerful self-serving forces also at work some of which are actively opposed to the Shah's program and others

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which support it. This difference arises from the different view which these people take of this program -- some of the privileged see it as a threat to their present position; others see it as a source of what they seek in life. This latter group includes the growing "small business" interests in the community as well as progressive members of the older privileged groups and numbers of the traditionally underprivileged groups.

As far as the leaders are concerned, these do not appear to be any serious rivals to the Shah on a strictly political basis. Most of the opposing leaders represent ideological forces which the Shah is not in a particularly strong position to counter in their own terms. The problem here is to introduce self-serving interests which will cause the Shah to be supported by a significant fraction of existing leaders.

Of the foreign powers affecting the position of the Shah, the USSR is the most important. Although the expression of Soviet interest in the region will undoubtedly be ideological, the motivation of the Soviet leaders will be based on selfish economic and strategic interests in the region. This fact offers the opportunity of making the price of attaining their objectives so high that they will modify those objectives in their own interest.

The Soviet leaders have, however, an advantage in this struggle because of the nature of their objectives and their means. Because disorder in this region is a satisfactory objective from their point of view, they can work directly on the divisive forces existing among the people and are not limited to building order through leaders, as is the United States. Other

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advantages arise from the common boundary and the cultural and social similarities arising from this fact and from the fact that the economies of the two countries are complementary.

British interests in Iran are also self-serving, but on the whole are compatible with our objectives. Occasionally they conflict as when they result in pressing upon the Iranian economy undertakings which are more beneficial to British industry than it. But because they are self-serving, they can be dealt with.

Having, therefore, determined that our policy objective is to maintain the Shah in power, and having considered some of the principal threats to his position, we are now in a position to set forth our operational objectives and programs. These may be identified as follows:

a) To assist the Shah in protecting his government against internal violence, whether inspired from within or without the country. This would involve furnishing some material aid, training and advisory services.

b) To strengthen the Shah's support among the privileged groups by developing programs which reward those who support his program and induce those who oppose it or are neutral to it to become supporters. This will involve an agreement with the Shah on a technical assistance program which will provide such incentives.

c) To increase the capacity of the Shah's government to carry out its functions. This will involve arrangements with Shah whereby we shall

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provide specialists either to direct these functions or preferably to train
Iranians to do so.

d) To activate latent self-serving interests among the people which will support the Shah's program and thereby reduce his vulnerability to various latent ideological forces. This will involve agreement with the Shah on projects and programs which foster confidence in his program. One element is that the programs must be carried out through his government so that the benefits reach the people through him rather than through the United States. Another is to avoid projects which aggravate economic and social imbalances, and to encourage those which raise goals which appear desirable and attainable, but attainable only through responsible and orderly government.

e) To develop leadership at all levels, but with particular attention to the youth. Here the emphasis is to concentrate on the relatively small number of individuals to whom the masses look for guidance and to influence them in the direction of order and responsibility.

In working with all these operational objectives, it must be always borne in mind that they are not ends in themselves, but only means of achieving our policy objective in Iran, the maintenance of the Shah.

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VI. AFRICA

A. The Present Situation

Africa presents a different picture politically from most of the world.
As a political fact, colonialism is still prominent. Sixty-five per cent of the
people still live under colonial regimes and even the independent countries
still have close connections institutionally with Europe and the United States.
Of the eight independent countries, five have achieved their independence
since the end of World War II. The problem of anti-colonialism is, therefore,
somewhat different in Africa from elsewhere in the world.

Yet Africa has certainly begun to feel the revolutionary currents dis-
turbing other parts of the world. In some areas it has passed out of control
while others have been barely touched. The people are becoming more involved
in politics. Coupled with social and economic changes, this is altering the
relationship between the African territories and the colonial powers. This
change is accelerated by the fact that the African side of the relationship is
not the only one undergoing alteration. The decline in the global position of
the colonial powers and their ambivalent attitude toward the institution of
colonialism affects their relations with Africa.

Africa is characterized by wide variety in almost every aspect of life
and the factors affecting it. There are great contrasts in climate, terrain
and natural resources, and equally great ones in political, economic and
social development. Some of the more important areas can be identified.

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First there is North Africa, in history and culture a part of the Arab world but different from it in having a substantial minority of permanent European residents who, until recently have controlled most of the sources of political and economic power there. The relationships between the natives and the Europeans and between the area and the countries of Europe and the Middle East have not been worked out.

Then there are the negro regions of West Africa, virtually all still in a colonial status. Of the colonial powers, Britain is moving the most rapidly toward independence and Portugal the least. Within this region exist great varieties in culture and political and economic development and in native aspirations toward independence.

Then there are the regions of East, Central and South Africa where again there is a substantial minority of permanent European residents who control most of the sources of political and economic power. Within the region there are broad differences as to how and when the native majority will be given access to these sources, with solutions ranging from the South African apartheid to the common voters role in Southern Rhodesia. But no permanent relationship has been worked out among the Europeans, the natives, and the significant fraction of Asiatics who have settled there. In many respects this region has the most promising economic future and parts of it principally South Africa, have mature economies.

Thus, each region faces its own difficulties and opportunities and will have to make its response in terms of its own history and local conditions.

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Any generalization must be made with this variety in mind.

The introduction of Western agricultural technology into an economy which is still 90 percent agricultural is beginning to raise the standard of living above the level of mere subsistence for the first time. With this advance have come demands for a greater increase and for political independence and control over their own future.

This economic growth is breaking down the traditional tribal and communal organizations by replacing tribal and communal economies with a money and exchange economy. Frequently this results in a migration to urban areas where there is a labor market and money. New institutions have not yet been developed to provide the order furnished by the old. The economic growth has thus been a force for social disintegration, dissatisfaction, and instability.

In general, it appears that there are great obstacles to the maintenance of public stability in the region. In the multi-racial areas, the situation ranges from open rebellion as in Algeria to smoldering discontent as in the Union of South Africa. In these areas, there is a high level of integrity and competence in the administrative services and the administration is a going concern. But that is neither the solution nor the problem. The problem is working out a satisfactory relationship between the races, and though different approaches are being attempted in Tunisia, Rhodesia and South Africa, the situation is unstable.

In the black areas of West Africa, the problem is different. In the

In the black areas of West Africa, the problem is different. In the situation is unstable. The approaches are being attempted in Tanaïs, Rhodesia and South Africa, the working out a satisfactory relationship between the races, and through different concern, but that is neither the solution nor the problem. The problem is competence in the administrative services and the administration is a coming Union of South Africa. In these areas, there is a high level of integrity and tolerance from open rebellion as in Algeria to amending discontent as in the state of public stability in the region. In the multi-social areas, the situation

In general, it appears that there are great obstacles to the maintenance of order, and instability.

Economic growth has been a force for social disintegration, dissatisfaction, and instability. Not yet been developed to provide the order furnished by the old. The urban areas where there is a labor market and money, new institutions have money and exchange economy. Frequently this results in a migration to communal organizations by replacing tribal and communal economies with a tribal and control over their own future.

This economic growth is breaking down the traditional tribal and and control over their own future.

Economic growth has come demands for a greater increase and for political independence living above the level of mere subsistence for the first time. With this ad- which is still 90 percent agricultural is beginning to raise the standard of living above the level of mere subsistence for the first time. With this ad-

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emerging nations of this area, administration is not a going concern. There
is a shortage of qualified personnel, qualified not only technically but also
spiritually; for there exists no tradition of responsibility for the community
generally but only for oneself, one's family and one's tribe. These emerging
nations are facing enormous administrative problems brought about by the
political, economic and social revolutions through which they are passing.
The existence of such problems with the weakest of machinery with which to
handle them promises great instability.

Perhaps even more than the Middle East, Africa is a region where
forces outside it are vitally important. The UN has a special significance
for the region because seven of its eleven trust territories are located in
Africa. The Afro-Asian bloc, which appears to be dominated by Asian rather
than African states, is a concept which has much influence in the region.
India, with many of her people living in East and South Africa, eyes the region
with interest and seeks to exert an influence. The concept of Arab unity
includes North Africa, and at times Damascus and Beirut have been as
significant in supporting anti-French movements in North Africa as Cairo.
The mantle of Islam stretches even farther over Africa than the concept of Arab
unity. Then there is communism which is prepared to exploit nationalist
aspirations, racial bitterness, social disintegration, and hopes for economic
growth. Then there are the European nations which seek to protect the lives
and livelihood of their citizens who have made their homes there, and to secure
markets in which to buy and sell. Many of these interests and objectives

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conflict and thereby increase the tensions in the region.

## B. The Objectives of the United States in Africa

Generally speaking, our objective in Africa is to work for a healthy stability in the region through an orderly development of the necessary political, economic and social institutions. More specifically this means -

a) That we must cooperate with our Western European allies in helping the various peoples of the region work toward healthy independence.

b) That we must cooperate with our Western European allies in the economic development of Africa under conditions which are appropriate to the region and which avoid concepts of the exploiter and the exploited.

c) That we must seek to help in the development of patterns of racial partnership in the development of the region.

d) That we must seek to prevent the establishment of a hegemony over Africa, or a part of it, that is at odds with our views of the future of Africa or the world, be it communist, racist, totalitarian, or religious.

## C. Consideration Affecting the Achievement of Our Objectives

Working out solutions to what may be broadly described as the colonial problem must be the focus of our African policy. Yet to do so is extraordinarily difficult because, in the nature of things, the United States is on the sidelines. It is the needs, aspirations and behavior of Europeans and their governments and of Africans and theirs, which are central to the problem, and the most the United States can hope to do is to influence them in a constructive way.

Working out solutions to what may be properly described as the colonial problem must be the focus of our African policy. Yet to do so is extraordinarily difficult because, in the nature of things, the United States is on the sidelines. It is the needs, aspirations and behavior of Europeans and their governments that are the focus of our policy, and the most and of Africans and theirs, which are central to the problem, and the most and of the United States can hope to do so to influence them in a constructive way.

or the world, be it communist, socialist, totalitarian, or religious.

Africa, or a part of it, that is at odds with our views of the future of Africa. That we must seek to prevent the establishment of a hierarchy over partnership in the development of the region.

a) That we must seek to help in the development of patterns of racial to the region and which avoid concepts of the exploiter and the exploited, economic development of Africa under conditions which are appropriate

b) That we must cooperate with our Western European allies in the helping the various peoples of the region work toward healthily independent

a) That we must cooperate with our Western European allies in political, economic and social institutions. More specifically this means - stability in the region through an orderly development of the necessary

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The framework for that influence will be shaped in the first instance
by the preferences described in an earlier chapter, but a number of other
factors will enter into it. Among the most important of these will be a
continuous but unostentatious effort to persuade the colonial powers to work
for the development of local self-government and local leadership. Our private
foundations have much to offer in assisting in the training which is a pre-
requisite for any such development.

This effort must be always accompanied by a recognition that political
independence for every tribe and clan or even for potential nations who are
not ready for it is not in our interest, or in the interest of Africa. This
recognition must, therefore, curb our instinctive feelings of anti-colonialism.
We must be prepared to support our Western European allies against un-
reasonable demands for independence. The keynote of our approach thus
becomes the unostentatious encouragement of a balanced evolution toward a
viable national independence for the colonial areas. The concept of balanced
evolution includes training and practice in self-government and administration,
the development of economic and social institutions which will support the
new nation and the creation of attitudes of responsibility toward the state
and the local communities and of responsibility for the state in its relations
with the rest of the world. The concept of viable national independence rejects
the creation of states which are not viable politically or economically because
they are formed by lines arbitrarily drawn on the map.

In its attitude toward the multi-racial areas, the United States must

In its attitude toward the multi-racial areas, the United States must
they are formed by lines arbitrarily drawn on the map.

the creation of states which are not viable politically or economically because
with the rest of the world. The concept of viable national independence rejects
and the local communities and of reasonability for the state in its relations
new nation and the creation of attitudes of reasonability toward the state
the development of economic and social institutions which will support the
evolution includes training and practice in self-government and administration,
visable national independence for the colonial areas. The concept of balanced
becomes the unattentations encouragement of a balanced evolution toward a
reasonable demands for independence. The keynotes of our approach thus
We must be prepared to support our Western European allies against un-
recognition must, therefore, and our inoperative feelings of anti-colonialism,
not ready for it is not in our interest, or in the interest of Africa. This
independence for every tribe and class or even for beneficial nations who are
This effort must be always accompanied by a recognition that political
regulate for any such development.

foundations have much to offer in satisfying in the training which is a pre-
for the development of local self-government and local leadership. Our private
continuous put unattentations effort to behalf the colonial powers to work
factors will enter into it. Among the most important of these will be a
by the preferences described in an earlier chapter, but a number of other

The framework for that influence will be established in the first instance

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recognize that the colonial powers have a legitimate interest in the future of
the Europeans who have gone to settle in these areas. Americans can perhaps
get some insight into the difficulty of the problem in thinking of their own
history and their failure to work out any really satisfactory solution of what to
do with the Indians, just as the Indians did not know what to do with their
ancestors.

With respect to these areas, the United States must support the
concept of a constructive partnership between the races. Where there has
already been widespread violence between them, it will be very difficult
to develop this concept, but there are greater possibilities elsewhere. There
is one factor which offers some hope. In Africa far more than in many of
the countries of Asia, outside ideas, institutions and skills are needed if
it is to develop. The West can provide these. The danger is that if the West
cannot work out a relationship through which it can satisfy these needs, the
USSR may be called on to fill the gap.

Although the United States will thus be seeking to influence the
behavior and aspirations of both Africans and Europeans, it should avoid the
role of intermediary. In particular it should not seek to intervene directly
in questions of independence; to do so would be corrosive of our relations
with both. In the last resort, we must support our Western European allies,
but we should strive to prevent issues of this sort from arising.

With respect to economic development, it will be important to work out
a concept of mutually profitable exchange, like that suggested for the Middle

a concept of mutually profitable exchange, like that suggested for the Middle
With respect to economic development, it will be important to work out
but we should strive to prevent issues of this sort from arising.

with both. In the last resort, we must support our Western European allies,
in questions of independence, to do so would be corrective of our relations
role of intermediary. In particular it should not seek to intervene directly
behavior and aspirations of both Africans and Europeans, it should avoid the
Although the United States will thus be asking to influence the

USA may be called on to fill the gap.

cannot work out a relationship through which it can satisfy these needs, the
it is to develop. The West can provide these. The danger is that if the West
the countries of Asia, outside ideas, institutions and skills are needed if
is one factor which offers some hope. In Africa is far more than in many of
to develop this concept, but there are greater possibilities elsewhere. There
already been widespread violence between them, it will be very difficult
concept of a constructive partnership between the races. Where there has
With respect to these areas, the United States must support the
ancestors.

do with the Indians, just as the Indians did not know what to do with them,
inatory and their failure to work out any really satisfactory solution of what to
get some insight into the difficulty of the problem in thinking of their own
the Europeans who have done to settle in these areas. Americans can barbare
recognise that the colonial powers have a legitimate interest in the future of

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East in connection with the Atlantic Power Community. Because of differences of the economies of various regions, the relationships will vary but they will be based on the concept that Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States needs African raw materials, that Africa needs European goods for its life and further development, and that the exchange will benefit each. Suggestions for a beginning of such an exchange can be seen in the proposal for a Sahara Development Authority and in the inclusion of Algeria in the European Common Market. Such international projects should tend to reduce some of the contamination of emotional anti-colonialism.

Nevertheless, the United States in its policy toward Africa will be continually open to charges of being a colonial power or of supporting them. This tendency will be exaggerated to the extent the United States is unable happily to resolve its racial problems at home. Since the United States cannot be loved in all parts of the world all the time, this is an attitude it will have to accept. The attitude itself can be modified to the extent that the United States deals happily with its domestic problem and the style with which it handles its problems abroad.

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# VII. THE FAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

## A. The Present Situation

While there are clearly exceptions, this region is characterized by certain common features. It stands on the eastern and southern rim of Soviet Russia. It has an enormous population, non-white and over half of that in the world, which is rapidly growing. Primarily an agricultural economy, it is undergoing a series of economic, political and social revolutions which include the disappearance of colonial regimes and institutions, forced-draft industrialization, and the creation of new political and social institutions. In most parts of the region there is a great shortage of the skilled manpower, of the capital and of the institutions needed to carry out these changes. In many parts, there are even serious shortages of food.

## China

Red China is the newest of the great powers, but it derives strength from the fact that it has behind it a great imperial tradition. It stands thus in a unique position in Asia as the heir to the Chinese empires which have powerfully influenced the civilization and life of the Far East, and also as the Asiatic interpreter of the modern gospel of Marxism. In Asian eyes, there can be no question that Red China is the only China.

The Chinese communists have carefully consolidated their control of power in China and there exists no effective alternative to this control. With the help of the USSR, they have built up the Chinese Army into a power-

With the help of the U.S.S.R., they have built up the Chinese Army into a power-
of-power in China and there exists no effective alternative to this control.

The Chinese communists have carefully consolidated their control
can be no question that Red China is the only China.

Arithmetic interpreter of the modern gospel of Maoism. In Asian eyes, there
powerfully influenced the civilization and life of the Far East, and also as the
in a unique position in Asia as the link to the Chinese empires which have
from the fact that it has behind it a great imperial tradition. It stands thus
Red China is the new east of the great powers, but it delivers attend
the
Oriental

Oriental

include the disassistance of colonial regimes and institutions, forced-draft

that in the world, which is abnormally growing. Primarily an agricultural economy,

## V. The Present Situation

## VII. THE FAR EAST AND SOUTH PACIFIC

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ful and effective military force. They are embarking on programs of industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. Both programs are being carried on in a pragmatic, rather than doctrinaire, way. All these changes cannot be made without human suffering and sacrifice but these are hardly new features on the Chinese scene. The communists are, thus, increasing the effective strength of China and thereby increasing its influence in the rest of Asia.

Nevertheless, the regime faces a number of difficulties. Important among these is problem of population growth and its impact on limited resources of food and other things. This may result in the non-fulfillment of expectations. Another lies in the conflict between communist ideology and many traditional Chinese values. The leaders of Red China are committed to a complete ideological reorientation of the Chinese people and this will be difficult, if only because of the numbers involved. The same difficulty applies to their objective of creating a unified national state. The tasks of leadership and organization are very great.

The Sino-Soviet alliance appears to be a sound one. Although it is not yet an alliance of equals, the importance of the Chinese has increased, particularly since the death of Stalin. It is likely to continue, not only because it offers mutual advantages, but also because there is no plausible alternative at present for the Chinese, however much they may carp at the Russians.

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## Japan

Japan is in a unique position in the region for it has definitely passed through the first phases of the industrial revolution and has a broad and powerful industrial base. At present she is trying to diversify her industry further and to broaden her domestic market. Nevertheless, Japan has a major economic problem; she must trade or starve.

Japan also faces tremendous population pressure. This poses problems of internal stability in Japan and also of stability for the region. If Japan cannot find ways of meeting the expectations of its people for an adequate living standard, democratic institutions for which there is no indigenous tradition, would be likely to crumble and there might be a return to a policy of foreign adventure.

At present Japanese nationalism is defensive, resembling the nationalism of the early days of the Meiji restoration which sought unity and experimentation. In this climate, Japan will seek to act as a broker between the West and other Asian countries. It has much to offer in this role. It also has much to offer to Southeast Asia for the economic development of that region in terms of skilled manpower, and capital goods, although it lacks the finance capital to carry through such a program.

## India

India, with a population almost as large as China's and growing at a similar rate and with very similar social and economic problems, stands as the leader of the "in-between" world. For the United States, her position

as the leader of the "in-between" world. For the United States, her position
is a similar fate and with very similar social and economic problems, stands
India, with a population almost as large as China's and growing at
a rate of 1,000,000 a year.

India

to the extent of skilled manpower, and capital goods, although it lacks
reason in terms of skilled manpower, and capital goods, although it lacks
the much to offer to Southeast Asia for the economic development of that
West and other Asian countries. It has much to offer in this role, it also
mentation. In this climate, Japan will seek to act as a broker between the
law of the early days of the Mett restoration which sought unity and exalt-
ing the name of the Emperor to that of a god.

At present Japanese nationalism is defensive, resembling the national-

dignous tradition, would be likely to crumble and there might be a return
satisfactory living standard, democratic institutions for which there is no in-
Japan cannot find ways of meeting the expectations of its people for an
items of internal stability in Japan and also of stability for the region. It
Japan also faces tremendous population problems. This poses prob-

further and to broaden her domestic market. Nevertheless, Japan has a major
powerful industrial base. At present she is trying to diversify her industry
through the first phase of the industrial revolution and has a broad and
Japan is in a unique position in the region for it has definitely based

Japan

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is critical; if the Indian government is unable to fulfill the expectations of
the Indian people for more material and spiritual satisfactions than has been
their lot in the past, and if Red China scores an impressive success in
economic development, India will follow Red China's lead and so will the rest
of Asia, with the possible exception of Japan and the Philippines.

India has a policy of friendliness toward Red China. She is attracted
by China's progress toward industrialization and shares its resistance toward
Western colonialism and its belief that Asian problems must be settled by
Asians. She is united with China in agreement on the "Five Principles" and
has faith that they will be respected. Toward the United States' principal
Asian allies India is cool. Although willing to promote economic exchange
with Japan, she is not prepared to accept Japanese leadership in Asian affairs.
She considers the Philippines outside the Asian orbit.

In its internal development, India faces difficult problems. She has
embarked on an ambitious program of economic development which will
stretch to the limit the available resources of trained manpower and capital.
The program is being undertaken through new and relatively untried political
and economic institutions and within a framework based on the rule of law
and respect for the individual. It will be difficult to mobilize the massive
effort called for with the speed demanded by the needs of the growing popula-
tion without distorting this framework.

Southeast Asia

The primary characteristic of the region is instability, marked by a

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tendency toward rebellion, by weak governments, by strong anti-colonial
feelings and nationalism, and by a lack of progress in economic development.
In many cases, this is complicated by the existence of what appear to be
democratic institutions which are unable to operate as such because of the
lack of training and traditions which are a prerequisite to their successful
operation.

The influence of China is very powerful in this region. Historically
this has always been so. The influence is increased by the presence of
large and important colonies of Overseas Chinese scattered through the region.
These factors lead to a feeling among many of the leaders that somehow or
other they must find a way of living with China. This feeling has been
strengthened by China's recent policy of forebearance as expressed in the
"Five Principles" and the Sino-Indonesian treaty, which for the first time in
history recognized that Overseas Chinese did not owe their first loyalty to
China.

## The Phillipines

The United States has a special relationship and a special responsi-
bility for the Phillipines. Their political, economic and legal institutions are
largely copied from those of the United States. If the people are unable to
achieve a reasonable measure of peace, prosperity and satisfaction, the
example of the United States will be worth little in Asia. Unfortunately, the
opposite is not also true; if they do achieve these things, it will not neces-
sarily be a convincing example for the rest of Asia, of the superiority of

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United States methods and values, because at the very least, the rest of Asia considers the Philippines outside the main flow of Asian life.

Since it achieved its independence at the end of World War II, the Philippines has made notable progress toward mature nationhood. Particularly under the leadership of President Magsaysay, the image of what the Philippines might achieve in the way of widespread human dignity began to catch the imagination of the people. Since his death, there appears to be serious danger that the trends toward land reform, political reform, honesty in government, and economic development for all instead of for the few are being reversed.

## B. Objectives of the United States in the Far East and South Asia

The general objectives of the United States in the Far East and South Asia are somewhat hard to define because, although the region has many characteristics in common, the fact that part of it is within and part without the Soviet bloc makes a significant difference for the United States. Nevertheless, some general objectives can be found -

a) To work for the stability of the area to the end that there may be growth in material and spiritual satisfaction of the people of the area.

b) To assist them in working out collective security arrangements which offer some hope of being effective.

c) To keep open the markets and the channels of trade in the region so that we and our allies may engage in mutually profitable economic exchange with the peoples of the region.

d) To prevent all of the region from falling under the control of the Soviet bloc.

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More specifically these objectives imply -

a) That the United States make a significant effort to assist India in its planned economic development.

b) That the United States enter into a partnership, under which the United States will be a definitely junior partner, for the economic development of Southeast Asia.

c) That the United States explore the possibility of creating more normal relationships with Red China.

d) That the United States put its moral influence behind efforts to make the Philippines an example of the good life in Asia.

### C. Considerations Affecting the Achievement of United States Objectives

As has been previously pointed out, India's success or failure in her plans for economic development is crucial to the question of whether the Soviet bloc will easily expand over all of Asia. India's success is, thus, the key to a major United States objective. It seems clear that India lacks many things to carry out these plans; foreign exchange, capital, skilled manpower, to mention a few. It behooves the United States, not necessarily to supply these needs, but to see that India is supplied by someone, preferably not the USSR.

Both Western Europe and Japan have skilled manpower and capital goods which they can export, provided finance capital is available to support the transaction. Possibly some cooperative arrangement might be worked out whereby the United States could make a loan to a Development

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Authority to carry out such a program of assistance.

India may be concerned about too great a dependence on a single nation, because of a fear of a new colonialism. A cooperative arrangement, therefore, may be more appealing to her. For similar reasons, this assistance cannot be conditioned on a requirement that India follow our lead on matters of foreign relations. This assistance must be recognized by the American people for what it is - an effort to help India influence the behavior of the peoples of South Asia by example, and thereby prevent the spread of Soviet power and control. Conceivably some development from the Colombo Plan could be used.

Because the United States has only limited resources, our major effort in helping economic development in the region would have to be limited to India. But the United States should support other countries in the region in their plans for economic development by identifying itself with the general objectives and by supplying token support in the form of training key personnel. Perhaps Japan and Western Europe can both join in this effort and make a large proportional contribution. In this region as elsewhere the emphasis must be on mutually profitable exchange or the ghost of colonialism will damn the effort from the start.

By facing the problem of Red China, the United States will attempt to deal with the major threat to the stability of the region. In many ways the United States finds that its present China policy is a losing one. The sentiment for the admission of Red China to the U.N. is growing and it will soon be impossible for the United States to exclude Red China save by the veto with

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all the unfortunate consequences the use of the veto will have with our allies
and the uncommitted nations. If Red China is admitted to the U.N., she will
be recognized by virtually all the governments of the world. It will thus
be the United States and not Red China which is isolated on this issue.

Then, the question of trade with Red China creates friction between
us and our allies. This is particularly true of Japan. Although there is debate
within Japan on the extent to which trade with Red China will be profitable,
all Japanese are agreed on the desirability of experimenting in this direction.
To the extent that the United States remains adamant on this subject, it
creates political and economic problems for itself.

If the United States maintains its inflexible position that Nationalist
China is the true heir of the real China, it virtually compels Red China to
attack and destroy the Nationalist regime to demonstrate its own legitimacy.
Similarly if the United States categorically rejects the Five Principales
(1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
2. Non-aggression, 3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs
for any reason, 4. Equality and mutual benefit, and 5. Peaceful coexistence)
which are in accord with our basic purposes and the Charter of the United
Nations, the United States runs the risk of alienating India and other Asian
countries and of appearing insincere.

Thus, if the whole situation is examined with real American interests,
rather than emotions, in mind, there appear to be a number of sound reasons
for trying to normalize our relations with Red China. There also are a number

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of elements which could become items for negotiation. A first step toward any
such negotiation would be the working out of a satisfactory bipartisan basis for
it at home. The second step would be to establish a similar basis among our
allies.

Among the ingredients of the negotiation would be the U.N. seat. This,
however, involves more than a matter of credentials. When China was originally
placed in the Security Council, the concept was that China would be the
permanent representative of Asia in that body. This was appropriate in the
light of the situation and in the world at the time. But now with the emergence
of other great Asian nations, there is a real question whether Red China is
or should be the spokesman for Asia. This whole matter should be renegotiated.
(But caveat - what would be the implications of such a renegotiation for France?)

Other ingredients might include recognition of Red China by the United
States, reduction of the embargo against Red China and more normal trade
between our allies and Red China, surrender of the offshore islands to Red
China, aerial inspection of the Formosa Strait, the Yalu Valley and perhaps
other regions, reunification of Korea and Vietnam perhaps under some form of
trusteeship, renunciation of force between Red China and Taiwan, formal
guarantees to the small nations of the region, and a general acceptance of the
Five Principles as the standard of behavior for the United States and Red China.

A number of advantages could flow from this procedure. If the negotiations failed, the United States would gain credit throughout the region for having tried. If some sort of settlement could be worked out, it would contribute

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to the stability of the region. It might also contribute to independence of Red
China from the USSR.

The principal reliance of the United States for limiting communist
expansion becomes thus an effort to encourage the economic and human
development of the non-communist areas coupled with an effort to limit
Chinese expansion by recognizing Red China as a full member of the family of
nations. It will need also adequate forces physically to prevent another Korea
or Vietnam. It seems unlikely that for the foreseeable future these forces
will be provided by the countries in the region. Japan is rearming reluctantly
and at a very slow rate. Except for India, the other nations are too weak in
government and numbers to be able to provide effective force, and India,
concentrating on internal problems, is not interested in the task. The United
States has found that maintaining troops and bases in this area has been a
source of friction between it and the host country and has contributed to anti-
American and anti-colonial feelings with the result of interfering with general
objectives of the United States for the region. There seems to be no easy
solution for the problem. SEATO as it now exists is clearly not the answer,
but perhaps in time an effective regional security organization could be created.

The region presents the United States with many ambiguities and
difficulties. Because of contacts with the Far East which have endured over
the life of our republic, there exists an attachment, an emotional involve-
ment in the region, which has often exceeded our material interests and our
capacity effectively to pursue it. Now that the United States has a major

capacity effectively to bring about. Now that the United States have a major
ment in the region, which has already exceeded material interests and our
life of our Republic, there exists an attachment, an emotional involve-
diture, because of contractors with the East, which have induced over
the region representative United States with many communities and
but perhaps in time an effective regional security organization could be set up.

Solution for the problem, SEAFG 82. It now exists, is clearly not the answer, objectives of the United States for the region. There seems to be no easy American and anti-colonial telling with the result of infighting with general source of friction between it and the host country and has contributed to anti-state trouble that maintaining forces and bases in this area has been a constraining on internal problems, it is not interested in the task. The United government and numbers to be able to provide effective force, and India, and at a very slow rate. Except for India, the other nations are too weak in will be provided by the communities in the region. Unless it is returning relatively of Vietnam. It seems unlikely that for the foreseeable future these forces nations. It will need some effective force, structurally to prevent another Korea. Chinese expansion by reoccupying Korea as a full member of the family of development of the non-communist areas coupled with an effort to limit expansion becomes thus an effort to encourage the economic and human The principal reliance of the United States for limitingCommunist China from the USFK.

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responsibility for the stability of the world, it must be careful not to let this
sort of emotion trouble its analysis of its real interests in the region.

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# VIII. THE USSR AND THE SATELLITES

## A. The Present Situation in the USSR

The Soviet Union now stands as the chief rival of the United States. Convinced of the uniquely righteous character of its regime and of its unique capacity to predict the future course of history, the Soviet ruling elite stands consciously opposed to most of the objectives of the United States. Because of this willed opposition based on a different interpretation of the course of history and the political nature of man, the Soviet leaders and their regime present a somewhat different set of problems to the United States than most of the rest of the world except Red China.

This opposition would not be so important if it were not accompanied by power, but power the Soviet Union clearly has. A larger population than the United States living in a land more than twice as big has developed a powerful but unbalanced economy. This economy is growing at a rate in excess of ours, although the U. S. increment of growth added each year is larger than theirs. This economy, which stresses heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods, is capable of providing all the tools of modern war including thermonuclear weapons and modern delivery systems.

Soviet agriculture constitutes something of a problem for the regime. Agriculture uses a large labor force with low productivity. Soviet leaders appear to be still searching for an organization for agriculture which is appropriate from their point of view.

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The liberalizations which have occurred in the regimented society of the USSR since the death of Stalin will probably not be reversed. The regime which introduced them presumably believes that they will produce strength. Two major sectors of Soviet society are strongly committed to the regime. The elite, consisting of the top Party officials, the leading administrators and economic managers, the military elite, and the scientific and cultural leaders, have a vested interest in the status quo and the prerequisites which accompany it. The Soviet middle class, the group of officials and administrators just below the elite, forms a group which realizes that it has succeeded in lifting itself above the rank and file of Soviet citizens. Although it, as a group, may be less ideologically motivated than the first revolutionary generation and although there may be individuals among it who are cynical about official orthodoxies and who reach out for greater intellectual and political freedom, as a group it sees no alternative to support of the regime. The liberalizations thus do not foreshadow any radical alterations of the regime.

The Soviet Union has achieved a remarkable success in technical training and scientific education. It has produced a vast number of well-trained persons who find satisfaction in their calling and the rewards which it offers them. The consequences of this training are not clear; on the one hand it could be argued that a liberal training in science and techniques will develop a broad thirst for knowledge generally which will modify the

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attitudes of the elite and thereby of the regime, and on the others, that
having achieved a reasonable amount of freedom in their own field, these
persons will rest content with that.

The USSR will continue as a strong and dangerous opponent of the
United States. Naturally it is faced with some difficulties -- the agri-
cultural problems already referred to, a possible slowdown in its rate
of industrial growth arising out of a combination of political and economic
factors, political problems in its relations with its satellites and in its
own leadership. But for the present there is no indication that these will
seriously interfere with the effective power of the Soviet Union or of the
image which it holds out to the "in-between" world. Nevertheless it is
also clear that the USSR does not have unlimited freedom of action; it,
too, is bound in its own framework.

The general objectives of the United States are:

a) To contain Soviet imperialism within its present limits.

b) To strengthen the United States and the rest of the free world
in relation to the Soviet bloc.

c) To attempt to prevent general war from breaking out and to
force competition with the USSR into non-military channels.

These objectives imply:

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a) That we remain strong enough to carry out these tasks. This includes aid to the non-communist world so that it can resist force and subversion.

b) That we make clear to the Soviet leaders that the long-range threat to their regime does not arise from any design of the free world to attack their centers of power but rather from their own position on internal freedom and external peaceful coexistence. Therefore, we should attempt to negotiate with the USSR on any matters which can alleviate tension without decreasing our strength. We should also welcome any moves toward decency by the USSR instead of denouncing them as mere propaganda.

c) That we strengthen the forces working for liberty and human welfare in the uncommitted world so that the communist cannot capture it by default. We should seek to undermine, by repeated and practical demonstrations of what our system can do, the confidence of the communist elite in the uniquely righteous character of their regime. We should also constantly demonstrate to that elite that their personal welfare and that of their people would be enhanced by choosing courses of action which do not bring them into conflict with the free world.

d) That we greatly expand our program of cultural and informational activities to increase knowledge of the values, achievements and policies of the West among the leaders and peoples of the USSR.

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It is to be noted that with the exception of increasing the penetration
into the USSR of information about the West, the actions called for are
taken almost entirely in areas outside the USSR. Indeed they are in many
cases actions which we would take, without considering the USSR, in order
to further our objectives in these other regions, and our view of what the
world should be. It is less than fair to the United States, therefore, for
us to portray these actions in Congress and elsewhere as defensive reactions
to the communist threat. This excessive concentration with communism may
interfere with the realization of the objectives. It was with this thought in
mind that it was observed earlier in this paper that for many purposes our
best policy toward the USSR was to treat it as if it did not exist.

These objectives have been derived from our general objectives and
from a consideration of three possible developments in the USSR which
would be favorable to our interests and the courses of action we might take
to bring them about.

The first possibility might be a revolution in the USSR which would
replace the present regime with some sort of anti-communist regime. To
promote such a development the United States should:

a) Encourage the forces of dissatisfaction and dissent in the USSR
by means of radio and other means of communication.

b) Covertly assist groups inside and outside the USSR who oppose
the present leadership.

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c) Put a maximum competitive pressure on the Soviet economy by maintaining a high rate of military expenditure and foreign economic aid, thereby limiting Soviet concessions to the demands for increased standard of living. This pressure would generate tensions and dissatisfactions among the people. Such actions might, however, give the Soviet regime the opportunity to pose as the friend of peace and to blame the United States for barring a better standard of living for its people.

d) Provide direct military aid when and if a potentially successful uprising occurs.

For the present the possibility of such a revolution appears dim. Although there are signs of student unrest and other dissatisfactions, the present regime gives the impression of stability. Too many groups have a vested interest in its continuation and there is no sign of any effective organizational alternative inside the USSR which is capable of challenging the Communist leadership. Revolutionary movements may develop in time but if they develop, it will be largely for reasons which are independent of U.S. policy, for example, through the weakness or mistakes of the Soviet leadership.

As a second possibility, a favorable development would be a gradual evolution of the Soviet regime away from messianic militancy, becoming thereby a status quo power instead of an imperialist one, which would seek to adjust its differences with other powers within the framework of the

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system of nation-states. As an indication that any such evolution was
really occurring, we would expect the appearance of some of the following
supporting developments:

a) The disappearance of the messianic tone in Party dogma and
propaganda.

b) The transformation of the totalitarian single-party state into
a more traditional type of authoritarian regime which provided at least some
legal safeguards for the rights of individuals and groups and some means
for the orderly adjustment of the plural energies in Soviet society.

c) The appearance of government policies stressing welfare as
contrasted with international power -- butter, not guns.

d) The development of an educational system which stresses the
values common to all men rather than the gaps between Soviet society and
ours.

e) Freer traffic in ideas with the West.

a) Strengthen the Free World against communist aggression and
subversion, in an effort to contain militant communism and thereby to lead
to a reconsideration of Party dogma.

b) Show a willingness to accommodate basic Russian national
interests as opposed to messianic communism, thereby perhaps reinforcing
the elements inside the USSR which may be prepared to move in that direction.

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c) Continue in our search for a mutually acceptable disarmament plan in order to make our peaceful intentions clear and in order to support those groups inside the USSR which may be working in this direction.

d) Use and increase cultural exchange in order to stimulate the spread of Western ideas in the USSR.

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At present, the prospects for such an evolution are not very bright. The long term forces working for it appear to be approximately balanced by the forces opposing it. The forces in favor include -

a) Whatever success the West may achieve in its efforts to contain Soviet imperialism.

b) The concomitant decline of the messianic elements of communist dogma and the shift to nationalism and bourgeois incentives as the major cement in Soviet society.

c) The pressure of the new state middle class, looking for stability, seeking to widen its freedom of action and wishing a more normal and orderly society free of police characteristics.

d) The rising expectations of the masses for more food housing, consumer goods generally, and leisure.

e) The desire of the people for peace and for the decline of the crisis atmosphere.

f) The spread of education, with a consequent increase in the critical faculty and in the demand for a wider participation in the processes of decision-making. In parenthesis, it must be noted here that there are many who are convinced that the spread of technical education will not have this effect: that the increase in the critical faculty and the demand for wider participation in the making of decisions will be limited only to technical and and professional matters and will not extend broadly to matters of war and peace or the individual and society. They cite in evidence the experience

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of Germany with its extraordinary scientific and technical community being
involved nevertheless in two wars and a totalitarian regime.

Retarding factors against this evolution include -

a) Whatever defeats the West may suffer in its effort to contain
Soviet imperialism.

b) The consequent reinforcement of the messianic elements in com-
munist dogma and of the communist belief in their monopoly of the ability to
predict the future course of history.

c) The grip of the Party on the machinery of government, the instru-
ment of force, and the engines of indoctrination.

In summary, the retarding forces seem to be predominant for the next
ten years or so, but there is hope in the long run for the forces working for
such an evolution. The hope springs from our concept of the political con-
sequences of the nature of man.

A third alternative would be a Soviet regime which remains basically
a totalitarian one-party state, but one whose power declines relatively vis-a-
vis the Free World. In order to promote such a development the United States
should -

a) Seek to maintain a high rate of industrial growth and military and
scientific supremacy and to promote social progress, economic strength and
political unity in the Free World.

b) Encourage, by all means short of war, the disintegrating forces
within the Soviet orbit such as movements for internal independence and
national communism.

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Here again the factors within the Soviet bloc working for such a
development are more or less balanced by those opposing it. Recent events
in Eastern Europe have clearly demonstrated the existence of these forces
of disintegration and in fact have made the area an asset of doubtful value
for the USSR. In addition there are a number of internal pressures within
the USSR which may operate to impose some brakes of the rate of Soviet
industrial growth. But if Soviet leaders are able to persist in their present
plans, the rate of industrial growth and the scientific and technical achieve-
ments in the USSR will be great. Furthermore, the dynamic and flexible
approach to Asia and the Near East demonstrated in recent years poses a
severe threat to our interests in those areas. It seems, therefore, unlikely
that this third alternative will occur in the near future.

Two principal conclusions follow. The first is that there is little we
can do directly to change the nature or lessen the power of the Soviet Union.
The second is that we do not face difficult choices in selecting courses of
action for the actions to be taken in pursuit of each alternative are remarkably
similar.

These objectives and the actions taken in pursuit of them do, how-
ever, present some problems. For one thing, they require of the people of
the United States, the patience to suffer a long and trying period in inter-
national relations and the self-sacrifice to make the major effort needed. It
will be difficult to maintain the strength and resolution of the United States
and the rest of the free world and at the same time to work to reduce tensions.
Any gain with one tends to lessen the other.

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D. <u>The Present Situation in the Satellites</u>

The U.S.S.R. finds itself in difficulties in its European satellites.
Faced with resentment and unrest if it remains and with defeat if it departs,
the U.S.S.R. appears to be following a bankrupt policy. Although the causes
for difficulties vary somewhat from country to country, one of the most
important of them is a combination of nationalist and anti-Russian feelings,
shared widely through all strata of society. These feelings played an
important part in the October events in Poland and in the Hungarian revolt.
These feelings have been reinforced by the imposition of the methods of
the police-state and by the depressed standard of living.

For most of these people, the imposition of Soviet controls over
their economy has had unfortunate effects. The attempts at collectivisation
lowered agricultural production and caused waste, hardship and discomfort.
The dislocation of former patterns of trade and economic life, the one-sided
economic development and the actual exploitation of the economy by the
U.S.S.R. had similar effects. The general effect has been to lower the
standard of well-being.

On the other hand, some features of the economic scene, such as the
break-up of large land-holdings and the disappearance of the private owners
of industry, are more appealing to many Eastern Europeans than what they
knew before the Communist regimes were established. The vaunted "gains
of the working classes" thus therefore amount to more than mere words and
cannot be ignored in any analysis of the region.

of the working classes"; thus the therefore amount to more than were words and
known before the Communist regime were established. The amounted "sains
of liberty," are more appealing to many Eastern Europeans than what they
press-up of large land-holdings and the dissapberance of the private owners
On the other hand, some features of the economic scene, and so the
standard of well-being.

U.8.2.R. had stimulant effects. The general effect has been to lower the
economic development and the actual exploitation of the economy by the
The dislocation of former patterns of trade and economic life, the one-sided
lowered agricultural production and caused waste, hardship and discomfort.
their economy has had unfortunate effects. The attempts at collectivization
For most of these people, the imposition of Soviet controls over
the police-state and by the depressed standard of living.

These feelings have been reinforced by the imposition of the methods of
important but in the October events in Poland and in the Hungarian revolt.
caused widely through all strata of society. These feelings played an
important of them is a combination of nationalistic and anti-Germanic feelings,
for difficulties vary somewhat from country to country, one of the most
the U.8.2.R. appears to be following a particular policy. Without the cause
Issued with rearmament and unrest if it remains and with delect if it debarts,
The U.8.2.R. finds itself in difficulties in its European satellites.

D. The Present Situation in the Satellites

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Moreover, the economic situation is undergoing some change as a result of the events of last fall. The U.S.S.R. has decided to reduce its economic exploitation of the region. The government apparently intends to pay more attention to bettering the economic condition of their peoples than they have in the past. They are calling for help from both the U.S.S.R. and the West in this task. Because of the importance of trade between Eastern and Western Europe in the past and of the necessity for increasing it if these economic wants are to be met, it seems likely to anticipate that the present barriers to that trade will suffer erosion.

The region will probably see the continuation of the cautious policy of modest political and economic liberalization. With the lesson of Hungary before everyone's eyes, this liberalization will be carried on within the framework of communist controls and of the necessities of accommodation with the USSR. The example of Poland will be watched closely to see to what extent she can achieve the objectives of national autonomy and political and economic freedom without causing a violent reaction from the USSR.

The region believes that by history and culture it is a part of Europe and is strongly attracted by the European concept. It is eager to reestablish its contacts, cultural and economic, with the West, and is beginning to do so.

There exist for the United States greater opportunities, therefore, to exercise an influence in the satellites than in the USSR itself. But these opportunities are limited by the strong probability that Soviet leaders would counter by force either too rapid or too radical a change in the regimes of the

counter by force either too rapid or too radical a change in the regime of the
opportunity are limited by the strong propinquity that Soviet leaders would
exercise an influence in the satellites then in the U288 itself. But these

There exist for the United States greater opportunities, therefore, to
its contacts, cultural and economic, with the West, and is beginning to do so.
and is strongly attracted by the European concept. It is eager to reestablish
The region believes that by history and culture it is a part of Europe
and economic freedom without ceding a violent reaction from the U288.

What exist are the objectives of national autonomy and political
with the U288. This example of Poland will be watched closely to see to
the framework of communist controls and of the necessity of accommodation
Hungary before everyone's eye, this fertilization will be carried on within
of modest political and economic fertilization. With the exception of

The region will properly see the continuation of the sanctions policy
the present parrhes to that trade will underlie invasion.

If these economic wants are to be met, it seems likely to anticipate that
Estonia and Western Europe in the best and of the necessity for increasing
and the West in this task. Because of the importance of trade between
than they have in the East. They are calling for help from both the U. S. A. R.
result of the events of last fall. The U. S. A. R. has decided to reduce its

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[LC]

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Draft of May 18, 1957

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satellites or in their relationship with the Soviet Union. To the extent that
these changes are suggested or fostered by the West, the probability of Soviet
intervention is increased.

E. <u>Objectives of the United States</u>

The general objective of the United States for this region is to loosen
the bonds that bind the satellites to the USSR without causing a war or greater
oppression for these peoples. More specifically the United States should -

a) Encourage the communist rulers in the satellites to seek a reconciliation with their own peoples by meeting more of their basic demands and by permitting them gradually to reenter the international community.

b) Seek to reduce the military machines maintained in the satellite
countries by making it clear that they are not demanded by the national interests
of the country but that in fact they are imposed by the Soviet leaders in
furtherance of their expansionist ambitions.

c) Make it obvious to the Soviet leaders that a lessening of their control over the satellites will not mean that this region will become a base for aggression against the USSR.

d) Continue and expand cultural exchanges with the region and economic and technical assistance to it.

F. <u>Considerations Affecting Achievement of These Objectives</u>

The general objective of the United States with respect to these regions
derives from two bases. The first is a belief that a weakening of Soviet control

derived from two basic points. The first is a belief that a weakening of Soviet control

The general objective of the United States with respect to these regions

I. <u>Considerations Affecting Achievement of These Objectives</u>

economic and technical feasibility to it.

c) Continue and expand cultural exchanges with the region and
  aggression against the U.S.S.R.

control over the satellites will not mean that the region will become a base for
  (c) Make it obvious to the Soviet leaders that a reasoning of their
  furtherance of their expansionist ambitions.

of the country but that in fact they are imposed by the Soviet leaders in
  (d) Seek to reduce the military machine maintained in the satellite
  by permitting them gradually to reenter the international community.

c) Encourage the communists into the satellites to seek a recon-
  obsolescence for these peoples. More specifically the United States should -

the bonds that bind the satellites to the U.S.S.R. without causing a war or greater
  This general objective of the United States for this region is to loosen

intervention is increased.

these changes are suggested or fostered by the West, the probability of Soviet
satellites or in their relationship with the Soviet Union. To the extent that

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over the region results in a reduction of the totality of Soviet power. Although it can be argued that the satellites cost the USSR a great deal, it would seem that this belief is justified. The present state of affairs contributes to the USSR's general strategic position and adds to its voting strength in the UN and elsewhere; indeed, the retinue of the satellites has much to do with the image of the USSR as the leader of a bloc of world opinion.

The second of these bases is concern for the condition of the peoples of Eastern Europe under regimes imposed by the Soviet. This concern arises from our general interest in the dignity of man everywhere. This interest, however, has a special keenness as far as this region is concerned because of the existence in the United States of significant groups of people of Eastern European descent who have a special feeling for the plight of their kin.

There may be a conflict between the evolutionary and limited character of our objectives on the one hand and the views of these groups and the peoples of the region on the other. Both may feel that more drastic action is called for. This raises the question of what the United States should do if a new revolt breaks out in the satellites. East Germany presents the most difficult problem because of the fact that West Germany is our ally and that the United States has armed forces stationed in the Federal Republic. A revolt in East Germany, a repetition of the riots of 1953, therefore presents a situation in which the United States has an inclination and a modest capacity to act. Yet to intervene openly involves the most serious risk of a general war; to intervene covertly involves risks of failure and of adding to the anguish of the people;

certainly involve risks of failure and of adding to the anguish of the people;
to intervene openly involves the most serious risk of a general war; to intervene
which the United States has an inclination and a modest capacity to act. Yet
Germany, a repetition of the rise of 1923, therefore presents a situation in
which the United States has an inclination and a modest capacity to act. Yet
Germany, a repetition of the rise of 1923, therefore presents a situation in
States has armed forces stationed in the Federal Republic. A revolt in East
problem because of the fact that West Germany is our ally and that the United
revolt breaks out in the satellites. East Germany presents the most difficult
for. This raises the question of what the United States should do if a new
of the region on the other, both may feel that more drastic action is called
of our objectives on the one hand and the views of these groups and the people
There may be a conflict between the evolutionary and limited character
European descent who have a special feeling for the light of their kin.
existence in the United States of significant groups of people of Eastern
has a special keeness as far as this region is concerned because of the
our general interest in the dignity of man everywhere. This interest, however,
Eastern Europe under regimes imposed by the Soviet. This concern arises from
The second of these bases is to concern for the condition of the peoples of
of the U288 as the leader of a bloc of world opinion.
elementary; indeed, the return of the satellites free much to do with the image
U288's general stationary position and adds to its voting strength in the UN and
that this belief is justified. The present state of affairs contributes to the
it can be argued that the satellites cost the U288 a great deal, if would seem
over the region remains in a reduction of the totality of Soviet power. Although

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Dated: May 18, 1927
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and not to intervene leads to disillusionment and doubts about the cause of freedom in Eastern Europe and throughout the world.

Yet this gradual and limited program offers much. Cultural exchange and economic and technical assistance give the satellites not only a wider and more solid base on which to manoeuver in their struggle for autonomy but also provide the best means for a knowledge of Western values and objectives to become known first in the satellites and indirectly in the USSR itself. The spread of this knowledge could contribute directly to the realization of basic objectives of the United States with respect to the USSR itself.

objectives of the United States with respect to the U2E itself.

aware of this knowledge could contribute directly to the realization of pasto
become known that in the satellites and indirectly in the U2E itself. The
provide the best means for a knowledge of Western Asia and objectives to
and more solid base on which to maneuver in their attitude for autonomy but also
and economic and technical assistance give the satellites not only a wider
yet this gradual and limited program offers much. Cultural exchange
freedom in Eastern Europe and throughout the world,
and not to intervene leads to disintegration and doubts about the cause of

(This section: 6\3\21)
Draft of May 18, 1967
I - Report