[Y]

1985

Henry A. Kissinger

Draft

# Psychological Aspects of Negotiations with the USSR

## A. The Problem

The series of negotiations which started with the Geneva summit conference are forcing the U.S. to examine again its whole diplomatic and psychological posture, to assess the nature of the process in which we are engaged and to determine the means to deal with its pitfalls.

Perhaps the best way to approach an understanding of current negotiations is to compare them with their counterpart during the heyday of "secret diplomacy" in the nineteenth century. At that time negotiations played a determinate role: to delimit the area of attainable agreement and to find formulas to reconcile divergent points of view. Because no power considered the existence of another as a threat to its own survival the penalty of diplomatic defeat was the loss of a tactical position and not national catastrophe. And because the risks were smaller, no power felt it necessary to maintain force levels of a magnitude which required intensive preparations of public opinion, either domestic or allied. The flexibility of diplomacy was, therefore, much greater than in an era of imminent nuclear destruction; in framing his proposals the diplomat was more independent of domestic support and for reasons which can be summarized in these propositions: (1) no government attacked the domestic structure of any other state (2) the demands on the population either in peace or in war were relative negligible.

Nothing could be more different from the situation today. We are confronted by a power which for over a generation has claimed both

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exclusiveness and universality for its nation of social justice; which
has based its domestic control apparatus on the myth of a permanently
hostile outside world and which is building a nuclear capacity to
inflict catastrophic blows on the U.S. In these circumstances the
whole pattern of international relations is transformed. In the face
of subversion by the Cominform the freedom of action of many govern-
ments is being circumscribed; in the face of the demands of the tech-
nological race the U.S. Government must fight a war on three fronts:
domestically to generate enough support to build the force-levels
without which we cannot negotiate; toward our allies in order not to
trade whatever freedom of action remains to their governments; and
toward the Soviet Bloc to prevent its splitting the U.S. system of
alliances or to expand its sphere even further. In this manner,
"normal" diplomatic relations have changed their meaning: what is
at issue is no longer the adjustment of local disputes between pro-
taganists agreed on a basic framework, but the basic framework itself.
Diplomatic conferences become sounding boards which attempt to harmonize
conflicting considerations: the possibility of continuing a domestic
consensus and the relationship of the U.S. to its allies while determining
the area of possible agreement with the USSR.

All this is another way of saying that the predominant aspect of
the new diplomacy is its psychological dimension. If the U.S. in the
process of attempting to establish a better atmosphere lulls its own
people into a false sense of security it may paralyze itself in the
next round of negotiations. If in order to hold allies in line the
U.S. appeals to their most defeatist elements, it may gain a propaganda

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victory but erode the basis for any decisive action that may prove
necessary. If a detente is achieved in Europe it may remove the only
incentive of our European allies to support us in case of a crisis in
Asia. The more the Soviets succeed in giving the impression that there
exists a "third alternative" in the context between the U.S. and the
USSR the more difficult our coalition effort becomes.

And the psychological element is no less true vis-a-vis the USSR.
Let us assume one of two motives behind recent Soviet maneuvers:
(a) that the USSR sincerely desires an accommodation with the U.S. or
(b) that it is simply playing for time until its nuclear capacity is
more nearly commensurable with that of the U.S. and until the con-
stellation of forces in the non-Communist world becomes more favorable.
It is true that in case of eventuality [symbol] an intransigent U.S. attitude
may lead in turn to a hardening of the Soviet stand. (This is so only
within limits as will be discussed below.) But it is no less true that
a too rapid surrender to Soviet blandishments may give the USSR all the
advantages of course (a) and still retain the capabilities of course
(b), i.e., it will still give the Soviets the option of executing
an about-face when it serves their purpose. Everything therefore de-
pends on projecting to the Soviet leaders a correct picture of U.S.
determination: if they are sincere in order not to mislead them into
believing that a real accommodation can be purchased by a change of tone
Alone, and if they are playing for time, in order not to allow them to
buy [symbol] cheaply. In short, it is to the U.S. interest to strengthen those
forces in the USSR not willing to risk everything for the sake of
expansion but to do so in a manner which does not disintegrate the
domestic U.S. support for a firm policy nor undermine allied relationships.

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The real difficulty with the above observations arises from applying them to concrete situations, particularly if one inquires into the psychological potential available to achieve American objectives. There is no doubt that the desire for peace is the predominant trend in the public opinion of all the countries of the world including the Soviet Bloc; it is the attitude which must be used to legitimize any U.S. policy. The USSR has so far been most skillful in utilizing it in two ways: (a) By talking about peace in general it has given the impression that the outstanding disputes are minor and that the achievement of peace depends largely on a change of tone (b) By focussing on security problems such as German rearament the USSR has placed itself in the position of being threatened and has put the onus for reassuring it on the West.

Both tactics are eminently to the Soviet advantage. While the concept of peace is identified with the ease of international intercourse it will be relatively simple for the USSR to play for time and to prolong negotiations as long as it suits its purpose to negotiate. The more the Soviet Bloc is permitted to capitalize on gestures which cost it nothing, such as visits of Soviet farm delegations or releasing illegally imprisoned U.S. citizens, the more difficult it will prove to get popular support for the level of armament expenditure which brought the USSR to the conference table in the first place. The more prolonged the discussions about threats to Soviet security, the more difficult will it prove to return to the real security problem: the disproportion in conventional military strength and the presence of Soviet troops in the center of the European continent. In the process unless the U.S. is vigilant it may be forgotten that no peace is permanent which does not take into account the nature of power relationships. Stability is not achieved only by conciliatory words--

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at least no statesman can gamble the survival of his charge on words
alone particularly under conditions of modern nuclear capabilities.
This is all the more true when confronted by a power priding itself on
its assessment of "objective" factors to which professions of good
faith unrelated to power factors will seem caused either by hypocracy
or stupidity.

If this is true, the U.S. has the following tasks in the forthcoming
negotiations: (a) to maintain within the U.S. the domestic support for
a continuation of a firm policy; (b) to reduce the Soviet peace offensive
to concrete terms as quickly as possible; (c) to announce a program
which captures the *universal desire* for peace while leaving no doubt
that peace can only be achieved through a series of concrete adjust-
ments; (d) to announce a program which appeals to the general desire
for economic advancement in the underdeveloped countries; (e) not
to permit the coming negotiations to be conducted solely on a plane
where the U.S. will be placed in the position of reassuring the USSR.
In other words, the presence of Soviet troops in the center of the
continent and the Soviet satellite orbit must be stressed as one of
the causes of the present tension; (f) to generate symbols which will
create pressures which the Soviets must include in their calculus of
risks.

## B. The Implications of the Geneva Summit Conference

Against the background it may prove useful to reassess the Geneva
conference. There is no doubt that it yielded some gains for the U.S.:

a. It demonstrated that U.S. relationships with its allies can be
conducted only as an aspect of U.S.-Soviet relationships. No amount
of patient discussion with our allies had the electrifying effect of
the U.S. disarmament proposal to the USSR.

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b. In limited fields and for the time being the U.S. has gained the diplomatic initiative.

c. For the time being the wind has been taken out of the sails of the neutralists.

d. If the USSR is really interested in an accommodation, Geneva has supplied the atmosphere in which it may occur.

e. It may have launched the USSR on a process it may find difficult to reverse. In the present atmosphere a return to a "hard" line may have deleterious effects on the USSR both domestically and abroad.

Many of the above gains are problematical, however; others are useful only for a limited time. It is not at all clear for example whether the USSR cannot reverse its present course at a moment's notice as it has so often in the past. On the contrary it may well be that if the USSR should decide to adopt a more intransigent policy that it would derive considerable benefit from its present line since the Soviet people at least would probably be convinced that only provocation on the part of the outside world could have led to the new reversal. Nor is our new-found popularity in the neutralist press likely to outlast our first attempt to implement our alliances for something else than generalities. Above all Geneva has confronted us with the following dangers:

a. Domestically the "spirit of Geneva" may make it more difficult to obtain appropriations for defense or to continue a firm policy. The same problem may be faced by most of our allies.

b. Within NATO we may have played into the hand of all the forces making for inaction. Public support for coalition policy concerned with anything but a direct threat to the survival of our European allies may be reduced.

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c. To the extent that tension has been lowered in Europe we may have isolated ourselves in Asia for the only incentive for the support of our European allies in Asia is their fear of being left alone in Europe.

d. We may have given the USSR an atmosphere in which to gain time to catch up in its development of nuclear weapons and thereby shift the strategic balance against us.

e. We have strengthened all the forces who advocate a third course both in Europe and in Asia.

f. The policy of the Bonn government has become more vulnerable domestically.

## 6. Outline of a Future Strategy

Whether Geneva was a success or failure therefore depends on the use we make of it. We have gained a measure of freedom of action but it will be of little avail if we do not exploit it. But what is meant by the term "action" in the context of a detente or at least a series of negotiations leading to a detente? What measures can utilize the psychological potential of a peace offensive while at the same time bringing pressure on the USSR? How can we keep the USSR from gaining time and disrupting our system of alliances without appearing bellicose? What pressures, in short, are available to the U.S. to bring the negotiations which started at Geneva to an issue favorable to us? The answer to these questions depends on an analysis of what brought the USSR to the conference table in the first place.

As already noted two interpretations are possible: (a) that the USSR is simply playing for time until the constellation of forces in the outside world is more nearly favorable to it and until it develops

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its nuclear capability more fully, (b) that the USSR has found its
previous course too risky and that it sincerely desires an accommoda-
tion with the U.S. It must be stressed at the outset that these
motivations are not mutually exclusive. In the short term, they
can coincide or at least it is in the U.S. interest to make them co-
incide: i.e., the U.S. should not permit the USSR to gain time except
on terms which the U.S. considers the basis for a real accommodation.
Conversely, even if the USSR sincerely desires a settlement it will
undoubtedly seek to buy it as cheaply as possible. Thus a period of
relaxation of tension which is permitted to remain largely formal may
have the paradoxical result of tempting the Soviets, whatever their
present intentions, into a more intransigent attitude later on if
they get through this period with their power unimpaired.

To be sure, the U.S. should do everything in its power to strengthen
the peaceful elements within the USSR by giving demonstrations of
limited objectives and by meeting legitimate Soviet concerns for their
security. But the U.S. cannot gamble its existence on the assumption
of continued Soviet good faith; nor is a "better atmosphere" an end
in itself only a condition in which U.S. objectives can be realized.
In short, the U.S. while keeping the door open to a real accommodation
must frame its policy on the assumption of the worst contingency, that
is, that the Soviets are really playing for time. The most signal
achievement of Geneva has been the emergence of the President as the
most dominant figure on the world scene and the explosion of the myth
of U.S. intransigence. This is the platform from which the U.S.
must move in charting its future strategy.

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How then can pressure be brought on the USSR in the form of a peace offensive? If the USSR is interested in gaining time, then "time" itself is negotiable, then the U.S. must sell time as dearly as possible. This means that we must overcome the static concept of negotiations which looks at a conference as an isolated phenomenon the failure of which merely defines the subject for a future negotiation. Such an attitude is tailor-made for the Soviet strategy to confuse the issues while prolonging the semblance of harmony. If on the other hand we realize that the failure of negotiation can be used as the basis for increasing the pressures on the Soviet Bloc and if no doubt is left that this will be the result of a failure, we will have created a motive for Soviet conciliation. For even if the Soviets are willing to make concessions, they will find it impossible for domestic reasons except insofar as the U.S. poses a calculus of risks that will make yielding appear as the lesser of two evils.

But how can time be negotiable? It can be used as a means of pressure if the U.S. announces objectives whose very existence will generate pressure on the USSR (i.e., the disarmament proposal.) Although our tone should always be conciliatory, it should be made clear that unless the forthcoming negotiations show some progress toward these objectives the U.S. will see no further point in conferences and will await the time when discussions promise to be more fruitful. The announcement of these objectives would in itself force the Soviet hand in case they should wish a long-range settlement and it will make clear that peace is not equivalent to general statements of good will. and by relating these objectives to definite timstable we shall make clear that negotiations cannot be an end in themselves.

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The U.S. therefore faces a three-fold task: (a) to become clear about its own objectives: specifically what extent of the Soviet sphere is compatible with U.S. security and what U.S. policy can prevent further Soviet gains in the uncommitted areas. It is all the more necessary that the U.S. be clear about its objectives lest the USSR score psychological gains by means of concessions which do not affect the strategic balance (it will therefore be necessary to develop policies on the colonial issue, Southeast Asia and the Formosa Strait). (b) to make these objectives clear to the American people so that there will exist public support for a long-range program - (c) to make clear to the Soviet leadership that the failure of negotiation entails a penalty, at a minimum the refusal to continue to negotiate, at a maximum a stepped-up defense effort. These goals can be achieved by the following steps:

(a) A fireside chat by the President explaining that while Geneva has created a better atmosphere it will still be necessary to test Soviet intentions by concrete measures, that while the U.S. is willing to negotiate as long as there exists a hope for concrete results, it will not be a party to misleading the people of the world if the negotiations should merely mask continued Soviet intransigeance. As a first test of the new atmosphere the President should propose that the Soviet leaders associate themselves with him in a declaration that the Big Four oppose the settlement of disputes by force and that they will refuse to support materially or otherwise any effort to settle disputes by force. As far as the U.S. is concerned such a declaration would merely formalize what has long been announced U.S. policy (see i.e., the U.S. attitude toward South Korean threats to advance north)

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and it would further strengthen the image of the President as a man of peace. As for the USSR, such a declaration is fraught with the danger of a split with China and it would in any case make more difficult the strategy of using the detente in Europe to obtain freedom of action in Asia. If the USSR refuses this proposal we would have an unassailable basis to refuse further negotiations.

(b) About three weeks before the Geneva conference of foreign ministers the President should make clear that Germany is the touchstone of Soviet intentions in Europe and outline the U.S. program for Germany. The program should meet the criteria developed in Draft Paper 17. A failure to approach these objectives should be declared as making further negotiations difficult.

(c) The U.S. should announce a dynamic program for the underdeveloped areas to convince the USSR that time is not on its side and to demonstrate the superior viability of the Free World. This may involve an international Point IV agency or similar cooperative ventures

(d) The U.S. must maintain its present force levels and if possible increase them, for to the degree that the strategic balance shifts in the Soviet favor their readiness to make concessions will diminish.

(e) The U.S. should continue to push the Geneva inspection plan but announce at least partial realization of it as the condition for further negotiation.

(f) The U.S. should propose a conference to discuss concrete measures to lift the Iron Curtain, perhaps beginning with a proposal for free travel within Germany.

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All these proposals should be designed (1) to create by their very existence pressure on the USSR (2) to make Soviet concessions acceptable domestically within the USSR; they should not be calls for surrender but at the same time they should make clear the penalties of rejection (3) to attempt to restore fluidity to the diplomatic situation by starting a process the Soviets may find it difficult to control (4) to make clear to the U.S. public and the rest of the Free World its dangers as well as its opportunities (5) above all conciliation should stand at the end not at the beginning of this process; it is the price we can pay the Soviets for concrete concessions. We can learn from Tito in this respect: he replied to every Soviet blandishment with a demand for deeds and not words, until Khrushchev appeared in Belgrade.

### D. Notes on the Arms Race

A special word must be said in conclusion about the arms race. There can be little doubt that the existence of the arms race can in itself furnish a pressure on the Soviet Bloc. To be sure, the Soviets can hold their own in some fields but to the extent that they do so, they may impose a measure of stagnation on the Soviet economy and retard Soviet efforts to industrialize China. On the other hand, Soviet resources freed by disarmament may well emerge in a competitive effort in the underdeveloped areas. Finally in stressing disarmament plans based largely on the number of troops under arms, the USSR is seeking to shift the strategic balance in its favor: (a) because of its superiority in conventional weapons (b) because even if it should accept a limitation on the production of new weapons its stockpile of conventional weapons is presumably far superior to that of the Free World.

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All these considerations will be dealt with in detail in other papers. It may be useful, however, to stress here the psychological aspect of the arms race which has two facets: (1) its impact on the USSR (2) its impact on our allies. Looking at the world through Soviet eyes the continuation of a high level of U.S. defense expenditures, however conciliatory our professions, will be a source of concern and therefore an effective means of pressure. The U.S. defense effort can therefore under no circumstances be relaxed until we have obtained a transformation of the strategic situation. It may be argued that a continued high level of defense expenditure coupled with a resolute to negotiate unless the USSR makes concessions may lure the Soviets into an anticipatory strike. But it is more than doubtful that the USSR will launch a "preventive war" unless it considers its chances better than even, a situation which our force levels should always be adequate to prevent. In any case reassuring of the USSR in the task of our diplomacy, not of our military policy.

The impact of the armaments race on our allies is more subtle: no matter how disquieted they may profess to be by American military preparations, they will be made infinitely more nervous by a relaxation of this effort. Their leaders have no illusion, even if their public has, that U.S. strength is the only obstacle to the immediate occupation of their country by Soviet troops. But while the size of the U.S. military establishment represents the condition for our diplomacy; the distribution of its force levels and the strategic concept behind them supply the condition for its flexibility. The strategic concept must be adequate to deal with any form of Soviet aggression for our ability to act will be largely determined by our planning before action becomes necessary; and our force levels must be able to implement

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this strategic concept. (It is significant that there has been in-
creasing debate in the German press about the meaningfulness of
German rearmament). The real significance of thermomuclear weapons
may well be that they place a premium on a strategy which shifts the risk of
their use to the other side by means of an alternative weapons system.
If we stake everything on an all-or-nothing military policy one of two
consequences become inevitable: either our allies will feel that
peace is preferable to war almost at any price; or they reduce their
military expenditures on the assumption that events cannot be affected
by their action. In short in order to obtain indigenous support for
local defense, we must make local defense meaningful.

This even the armaments race has a psychological component and
one we can ignore only at our peril. The period ahead holds many
opportunities for the U.S. but they will be no greater than our strength
and if we fail to grasp them they will merely define the dangers which
are inevitable if the USSR gets through this period without a major
adjustment.