of the Strategic Debate" (the title itself recalls Aron's
recent *Le Grand Débat*, translated as *The Great Debate*) really
has much to all to do with the strictly military side of
the problem. It is an excellent chapter, and it is sufficient.

The book is about the Atlantic Alliance, or NATO, and
what troubles this "troubled partnership" are for the most part
not questions of strategy at all, though many of them can
hide too easily behind the pretense of being so. Incidentally,
of those same three chapters supposed to be on strategic
issues, Chapter Five deals with the proposed multilateral
force (MLF), which is from beginning to end a political and
not a strategic issue. I should add that Kissinger's chapter
on the MLF is in my opinion far and away the best summary
and statement of the complicated issues in this fantastic
story that I have yet read. In view of the large volume of
literature that this particular debate has churned up, this
too is saying a great deal.

Of the total of eight chapters in the book, there is
only one concerning which I feel any substantial reservations.
This is Chapter Two, which is on the subject of Franco-American
relations, particularly with respect to President de Gaulle's
role in them. I have considerable sympathy with most of

LA

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Kissinger's views and insights even in this chapter, finding
myself much oftener in agreement than not, but his apologia
for de Gaulle does seem to me to go a bit too far. Kissinger
might have a point in his insistence that de Gaulle's attacks
on the United States are more motivated by his interest in
bucking up French morale after the long years of defeat than
by other considerations, but we have plenty of evidence ~~(underlined by the work of Nathan Leites and others) that~~
the French population, as distinct from a very few nationalist
personages, are not only in no need of such bucking up but
really do not respond to it. They are interested in other
things, mostly their prosperity; and while it no doubt gives
most of them more pleasure than pain to see their president
periodically kicking Uncle Sam, there are plenty of reservations
in France even about that. (In a recent article in
*Paris-Match*,
curiously enough, Raymond Cartier refers to what he calls
Kissinger's "psychoanalytic" defense of the General, but he
seems to be shaking his head sadly in disagreement.)

On the subject of the *problems of* Germany, however, and of
the other members of the Alliance, and especially of their
dissatisfaction with the Alliance as it now stands, Kissinger
is superb. No doubt something is owing to his background,

which in the first place assists him in achieving appropriate
intellectual detachment and also makes him entirely at home
in the German tongue. With these goes a reputation in
Europe, especially as one closest to the highest councils
of the United States and yet detached from and critical of
their views, that undoubtedly gives him access under conditions
of candor to all the important personages of Europe.

Others, however, may enjoy a comparable access and even
linguistic skill, but few others have the remaining necessary
equipment. There is simply no substitute for insight,
perception, sensitivity, and what simply has to be called
a "political sense." These Kissinger has in abundance, and
in this field the combination is rare. It is really hard to
understand why they should be so rare. So many articulate
people study international politics; so few of them grasp
so well its essence -- especially where issues of military
significance are involved. The latter is indeed a most
complicating factor, and Kissinger no doubt owes something to
pure luck that he happened at the beginning of his academic
career to turn his attention seriously and deeply to military
problems. With his knowledge of military affairs goes,
however, an even rarer thing, a sense for the implications
of the realities of

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power -- its potentialities and its limitations. He can
speak of military force and its use without inducing a
reviewer to remark, as one British reviewer once did in
reviewing, on the whole favorably, Herman Kahn's *Thinking
about the Unthinkable*: "One sometimes wonders what has happened
to Mr. Kahn's sense of anguish."

The number of quotable passages in this book is legion.
I refrain from quoting more of them for several reasons, but
mostly because the choice among them would be too difficult
and their insertion would add considerably to the bulk of
this review. Anyway, let the reader of this review read the
book for himself. It will be worth his while.

However, I may perhaps be excused for quoting only
the following, because it reflects Kissinger's talent for
observation and for getting around. It is not the kind of
insight one picks up merely in reading:

"Faced with a ravaged Europe, the United States came
to deal with its Allies paternalistically. This has
involved a certain self-righteousness and impatience
with criticism. American policymakers often act as
if disagreement with their views is due to ignorance
which must be overcome by extensive briefings and
insistent reiteration. They are less inclined to
inquire whether there may be some merit in an opposing
view than in overwhelming it with floods of emissaries,
official and semi-official. As a result, the United
States and Europe have too often conducted their
dialogue over the technical implementation of a blueprint
manufactured in America."

(continued)

Finally I should like to say that in this book Kissinger
has achieved a clarity and a terseness of style that he has not
possessed in the past. He has always been capable of turning
a very good phrase now and then, but with it went a lot of
plain turgid writing. The latter he has now sloughed off,
and he emerges as no mean stylist, certainly as one of the
most readable as well as insightful of the American commentators
on the international scene.