34

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Absolutely not. That is definitely wrong. And short of some crisis that I now don't see, I don't believe that I will visit Israel and Syria.

MR. SCHECTER: Do you feel, on the basis of the debate over sending American technicians to the Sinai, that there's going to be a major reassessment of American commitment to Israel-- an American policy in the Middle East, when the aid appropriations are presented?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the aid discussions take on a very curious form. The impression has been created that the aid requests for Israel and Egypt are caused by the Sinai agreement. Indeed, I saw it in your paper that "kissinger promised them certain things." The fact of the matter is that before the agreement Israel asked for 2.6 billion dollars as part of the continuing relationship and was confident enough of getting it that they put it into their budget as a public figure. Seventy-six Senators urged us to meet that request.

Last year Israel received three billion dollars of total emergency and regular aid, and a substantial sum for

35

Israel has been in every budget for the last 15 years. Similarly, we had allocated a certain amount for Egypt prior to the agreement. And, indeed, aid levels were never discussed with Egypt during the agreement. We set the aid levels unilaterally after the agreement was completed.

Therefore, it will be a grave mistake to have the debate about aid hinge on the fact that the agreement made the aid necessary. We have permanent interests in our relation with Israel. We certainly have permanent interests in a country in the Middle East that is trying to find its own independent and moderate position, and that is totally independent of whether they agreed to the Sina agreement. And, therefore, if there is a debate, it should concern our long-term interests and should not be related to the Sinai agreement. And if it is related to our long-term interests, I think we will find that what we have -- what we are allocating for Israel -- will require austerity measures on the part of Israel and there is a minimal sum to enable Egypt to begin a process of economic development.

MR. SCHECTER: I was thinking of it though in

36

terms of a reassessment in terms of what our own domestic
priorities are -- given the problems in New York,
problems of the recession and unemployment.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You can't compare the
problem of New York to the problem of Israel. And I don't
think this is a fair choice because if you lose a major ally
abroad, it will have no immediate consequences; but the
long-term consequences, in terms of your international
position, are very severe. And we cannot -- we must
avoid the idea that when we deal with foreign governments
it is a favor that we do them that we can withdraw without
penalty to ourselves.

If we have a close relationship with a foreign
government, it must be because we believe that we have
permanent interests. If we don't have permanent interests,
then that country is in deep trouble. But if we do have
permanent interests, then we cannot choose between New
York and, say, Israel. That is a choice we cannot make.

MR. TALBOTT: Mr. Secretary, 200 Foreign Service
Officers have signed a letter to Chairman Otis Pike
supporting your refusal to release to the Pike Committee
documents that it wants. Clearly, they feel -- and you feel --

37

that great damage would be done to the conduct of
foreign policy and to the State Department --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. TALBOTT: -- if you were to comply with
those requests.

Could you explain exactly what damage would be
done?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, first of all, let's
make clear what my position is precisely. The Pike Committee
has asked for a so-called dissent memorandum. The dissent
channel exists in the State Department to enable
junior and middle officers to get their views to the
Secretary of State without being blocked by any intermediate
office. It's a way by which they can object to policy
or propose unorthodox new policies, and I read every dissent
channel personally. It is, therefore, in its essence, a
vehicle for personal opinion.

I do not believe that we can maintain the integrity
of the Foreign Service if the opinions of the officers
are subjected to scrutiny before Congressional Committees.
If the Committee wants to know what advice I rejected or
accepted, I'm prepared to summarize all the conflicting

38

advice and put that document before the Committee and testify to it. But what I'm not prepared to do is put the name of the officer next to the advice that was given. And I believe that if we once start inquiring into the views of the officers, they will then have to defend their personal opinion. They will write every memorandum, including the non-dissent. I would take a similar position on any recommendation that came from a middle level, even if it went through regular channels.

Right now the purpose may be to prove that I was derelict in some respects. If that's the purpose, I'm happy enough to supply to the Committee what views I rejected -- which is, after all, my job. But later on the same device can be used to inquire into the views of junior personnel. And some will then be criticized for the views they presented; others will be criticized for views they didn't present -- that is to say, either for dissenting or for not dissenting. And I think in a world in which so much depends on the free judgment of the permanent service, if I permit this to happen we are going to politicize the Foreign Service and memoranda here will be

39

written more from the point of view of how the
officer can defend them before a Congressional Committee
than what they contribute to the policy process.

I'm prepared to let them testify as to facts
within their knowledge. I'm prepared to have any
one of the policy-making personnel in the Department
testify as to recommendations they received or gave.
And there are 235 policy-making personnel in the Depart-
ment of State. I'm prepared to testify as to the
advice I received and to the advice I didn't accept.
But I do not believe that it is compatible with the
integrity and the professionalism and the non-
political nature of the Foreign Service to permit middle-
level officers to be questioned about their judgment
and their recommendations before Congressional Committees.

MR. TALBOTT: Do you share the fear of some of
your aides, as expressed publicly, that the Pike Committee
is coming close to a kind of neo-McCarthyism?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I don't think that the
Pike Committee itself is coming close to neo-McCarthyism.

This is not a reflection on the Committee. The

40

fact is that once I grant the premise of the Pike
Committee, which may be perfectly what the Pike
Committee is trying to do, as far as I can understand,
is to see whether policy advice that was available was
or was not used. That inquiry in itself I consider
appropriate and important. And I'm prepared to tell them
what advice was available to me and what advice was not
used.

My concern is that once you agree to the principle
that the opinions of middle-level personnel are subject
to Congressional scrutiny, you create the predicate for
a McCarthyite period of either the Left or the Right,
because once you've accepted the principle you cannot resist
it before future investigation.

So I'm fighting on the principle. I'm not making
a judgment on the Pike Committee.

MR. TALBOTT: Do you see possibilities for a
compromise?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I'm prepared to meet with the
Pike Committee. I believe that once they understand that
I'm not trying to withhold what they want from them, I believe
that this is a matter that should be worked out-- and can be

41

worked out.

-- -MR. TALBOTT: How much of your time and attention these days are-you devoting to Congressional affairs?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, at least 50 percent. And when one is told that one, you know, should get out of the trenches and do some long-term thinking (laughter), this is getting to be an increasing problem. I spent 82 hours with Congressmen in a three-week period where it was testimony, and private conversations -- 82 hours in a two-week period -- on the Sinai accord.

Now, that is a lot of time, and that is in addition to the normal Congressional contacts.

MR. TALBOTT: Is it possible to assess how much of the time and attention of your top aides these matters are taking?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, Mr. Hyland, the head of the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of State, I would say has spent 95 percent of his time in the last six weeks either preparing for or testifying before Congressional Committees. And that means that the Intelligence Bureau is not run by its Director at this point.

42

MR. SCHECTER: Mr. Secretary, to shift to another subject, there's been considerable questioning, concern and criticism about the --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If it's criticism, it was unfair. (Laughter.)

MR. SCHECTER: -- about the failure of the U. S. to take a stronger support for the traditional trial by jury and rights of the accused in the case of the summary execution Basques and Leftist terrorists in Spain. Why was that? On one hand, we refrain from criticism in Spain, whereas in Chile it's been reported that you've told the Chilean leaders that it won't be possible for there to be an OAS --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't have the impression that trial by jury is part of the Spanish tradition.

MR. SCHECTER: No, but it's part of the --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No -- but are we going to ask other governments to institute -- trial by jury isn't the case in France and Germany. It's not the case in any country that has the Napoleonic Code or the Roman Law. Trial by jury is an Anglo-Saxon concept that exists only

43

in countries within the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. And
I would make a distinction between countries where there
is some organized absence of where there's
the absence of organized due process -- where the government
and countries follow their own due process, whatever you
may think of that due process, as long as they don't
discriminate against them.

44

MR. SCHECTER: But you don't approve of the way they carried out the due process in the case of these executions, do you?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We did not take an official position on the legal proceedings that were carried out in Spain, and I don't think that was the objection of many of the Europeans. I think the objection there was that this was -- that it was a rallying point for a historical resentment of Franco Spain, which is rooted in experience of the Spanish civil war.

MR. SCHECTER: Well, do you see us playing a future role in Spain?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that the relationship between Spain and the West and to bring Spain back to the West is one of the critical problems of our foreign policy over the next five to ten years, and it must be seen in the context both of existing conditions and of conditions that could develop in that event.

In every step we take we have to keep in mind both the impact on the present situation and the relationship in the long term, but beyond that I don't really want to pursue this.

45

MR. SCHECTER: What do you consider as your top priority item now in foreign policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

Look, in foreign policy there are always periods of innovation and then there are periods of consolidation. We went through a period of innovation with respect to the communist countries between '71 and '73. We are now in the process of consolidating this. We then went through a period of innovation in our relations with Western Europe and Japan in the period of 1973 and '75. This is still in the process of going on. And actually, though it has not been, in my view, adequately noted, I think our relationship with the industrial democracies is better and more creative than it has been at any time since the late 1940's, and the summit that is taking place between the leaders of the industrial democracies is a good example of this. The things that were considered, if not revolutionary, very advanced in '73 when I put forward the Year of Europe are now a matter of course. At that time when we proposed that economic policies should be coordinated this was rejected. Today it is made as a demand.

46

(lc)

So this is a period I would put in the middle of
its creative phase.

Then we have the relationship with the new
countries in which we have just begun the process of
construction with the speech at the Seventh Special Session.

MR. SCHECTER: Right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Those are the three areas
which are in various states of evolution. Of course, then,
you have critical problems like the Middle East, which must,
in my view, in the next three to five years make a substantial
advance towards peace, or maybe towards peace -- or maybe
achieve peace.

You have the problem we've already discussed,
such as the limitation of strategic arms, with the Soviet
Union.

MR. SCHECTER: Right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But I'm talking about the
big issues of foreign policy.

One of the things we've often discussed is the
vitality of Western institutions in the period of change.
This is perhaps our deepest problem, to which a foreign
policy maker can contribute perhaps by performance but
not directly.

47

MR. SCHECTER: Do you see the wheat deal with the
Soviet Union going through?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would think so, yes.

MR. SCHECTER: And what about the oil grants?
You said that they are parallel, but obviously there are
different priorities for those two.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, there are different
problems as between the oil deal and the wheat deal. And
I think we can -- I am very confident about the wheat deal,
which has an associated maritime agreement, and I am fairly
optimistic about the oil deal, which, as I have pointed out
publicly, cannot be of huge proportions because of the
small Soviet supply, or relatively small Soviet supply.

MR. SCHECTER: Is price the key issue there?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that the stories
you referred to dealt with --

MR. SCHECTER: Fifteen percent.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I know, but they had a
vastly over-simplified version of what the real issue
there is. It isn't price in any direct sense, but it is --
there is a problem of how to make a Soviet oil purchase;
that is to say, a country with which we have no
traditional relationship with buying oil, where we will have
to buy it with new processes and new devices where there is

48

oil companies operating there, how to make that commercially
profitable and meaningful to us. It is not a question of a
straight discount.

MR. SCHECTER: I see.

MR. TALBOTT: Could I return to a question about
Iberia for just a second? Not Spain but Portugal. Last
week you met with the Portuguese Foreign Minister, and the
Administration has put forward to Congress the proposal for
$55 million of aid.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is on top of the
$30 million they already have, so the total package would
be $85 million.

MR. TALBOTT: Well, in the past it has been
generally known that you have been rather pessimistic
about the prospects of the survival of pluralist
democracy in Portugal. What are your feelings now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the greatest pastime
now is to put out my views -- to have others put out my
views so that they can position themselves.

MR. TALBOTT: That is how we make a living.

(Laughter)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My position has been that
without a systematic effort to encourage the pluralistic
forces in Portugal they would be defeated. For a while

49

there was a disagreement between us and the West Europeans, who thought that the forces of the government that was in office earlier this year would over a period of time produce pluralism. I was skeptical about this. At some time in this process during the summer the West Europeans came to the same conclusions we had earlier reached; namely, that pluralism had to be actively encouraged. And that has always been my position.

So now I think it is still a very precarious situation in Portugal, the outcome of which is not clear. But the outcome is of some importance to the future evolution of Western Europe.

MR. TALBOTT: Is it possible to assign either to the United States or to Western Europe the brunt of responsibility for encouraging pluralist democracy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would think that Western Europe has to be in the lead, but the United States can give strong support, and is giving support.

MR. SCHECTER: When you mentioned that you thought our --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: -- moral support -- political support.

50

MR. SCHECTER: When you mentioned that our relations now are better than they have ever been with the industrialized democracies --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. SCHECTER: -- do you include Japan there?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, definitely.

MR. SCHECTER: Right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Especially in many ways.

MR. TALBOTT: Are you going to go on from Japan?

MR. SCHECTER: Yes.

MR. TALBOTT: Are you stopping off in Japan on your way back from China?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. TALBOTT: Will you brief the Japanese leaders on your conversations there?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I'm seeing the Foreign Minister on the way to China, having breakfast with him Sunday. I'm seeing the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Finance Minister on the way back. So I'm seeing four of their leaders.

MR. TALBOTT: No shock news?

51

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, no, actually I think our relation with Japan is now on a more mature basis on both sides than it has ever been and that the process of the shocks about which I expressed regret publicly actually has had a healthy -- I don't want to say the shocks had a healthy effect, but that period.

MR. SCHECTER: But your self-reflection -- everybody's self-reflection had a healthy effect?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that's right. I think both sides understood it as a result of it how important the other one is to it.

MR. TALBOTT: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And in my recollection the relationship with Japan has not been easier and more matter of fact and more confidential.

MR. SCHECTER: The Korean situation remains as a potentially --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Are you going to give me the whole book?

(Laughter)

MR. SCHECTER: But in your UN speech you said that if North Korea and its allies would move to improve their relations with the Republic of Korea we would be prepared

52

to take similar reciprocal action.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's right.

MR. SCHECTER: What kind of improvement in relations do you see specifically as possible there? You suggested a conference between the concerned powers, and that has been rejected by the Chinese and the North Koreans.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but I'm not sure that is absolutely their last word on the subject. Or even if there is no formal conference, we can have exchanges of views. We are not opposed to North Korea as such. What we don't want to do is have bilateral talks with North Korea to the exclusion of South Korea. We don't want to have South Korea maneuvered into the position of an international pariah while we settle the future of North Korea in negotiations with other countries. So that as a general rule I can say that we would be prepared to participate in any negotiations or in any conference whose composition was reasonably balanced that included South Korea.

Similarly, if the Soviet Union or the People's Republic were prepared to recognize South Korea, we would be prepared to recognize North Korea. So there are many

53

ways possible in which the Korean problem can be
approached.

MR. SCHECTER: How concerned are you about
nuclear proliferation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Very much.

MR. SCHECTER: Do you feel that's going to be
a major problem and supply is --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I should have listed it,
in fact, among the big issues before us. You'd do me
a favor if you moved that up in that answer.

MR. SCHECTER: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the problem
of exploding technology, energy needs -- which makes
nuclear energy more profitable or relatively more
profitable -- will produce a situation where within
a number of very metrical period of years the problem
of nuclear proliferation will have become unmanageable.
And if you look at all the problems we have with the few
nuclear powers -- if you had very many nuclear powers, and
given some of the governments in the world today, we would
face a very grave problem.

MR. TALBOTT: Could you talk about areas of the

54

of the world where you see that danger particularly
rife? --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we have it already in
South Asia. It could happen in the Middle East.

MR. TALBOTT: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It could happen in Latin
America. And once there are enough nuclear powers,
nuclear weapons will be available for purchase.

MR. TALBOTT: Can we look forward to any
proposals from the Administration on how either the Non-
Proliferation Treaty might be made to work -- which many
people feel it hasn't -- or substituted with something
that will work?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we're at the moment
attempting to negotiate a nuclear suppliers agreement.
And if that works, this would have a major retarding effect
on the nuclear suppliers -- on nuclear proliferation.

I think we'd better do about three more
minutes.

MR. SCHECTER: All right.

You spoke as if the problems of coordination
and economic cooperation that are going to be discussed
at the conference in Europe are solved.

55

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, they're not solved. I think the fact that we're discussing them is a major step forward. We haven't begun to solve them -- we haven't begun to solve them.

MR. SCHECTER: What would you like to see emerge from that conference?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I don't expect necessarily that they'll be very precise -- the detailed ideas. The basic purpose of the conference, as I understood the French President when we were discussing it -- to which we agreed -- is to assert that the democratic governments can control their own destiny. They're not subject to blind economic forces that sweep across, that produce unemployment, that produce inflation -- and that we want to make a serious effort to bring our economic policies, our political policies, and our national purposes into some sort of cohesive pattern.

Now, that's going to be the beginning of the process. I would assume that in a predictable period, such a meeting would have to be repeated -- but that I see as the biggest significance, and no final decision has been made. But our advice is, to our colleagues, not to aim for a

56

long document -- or maybe for any document -- to come
out of this meeting, because any one who knows how these
meetings work -- if you have a document to work on,
you're going to spend half of your time drafting, or
part of your people are going to spend their time
drafting. And this meeting I don't think has that sort
of purpose.

MR. SCHECTER: One last question. In _A World Restored_, you wrote that "Statesmen often share the fate of prophets" -- that they're without honor in their own country -- that they always have a difficult task in legitimizing their programs domestically and that their greatness is usually apparent only in retrospect when their intuition has become experience."

How far along do you think your intuition has
become experienced in foreign policy? Do you feel that
you're suffering this fate?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think the lead time
for prophets has shortened (laughter) -- that the events
move so fast now that, let's say, the lead time is for
prophecy rather than for prophets. But I think there's some
attack on me, much less than one would imagine, from the

57

day-to-day way business is conducted here.

I think in the country there's a general
feeling that our foreign policy is reasonably effective. Much
of the criticism -- or some of the criticism, anyway -- is
the natural result of an election year. Some of it is the
inevitable result of having been in town for seven years,
in which you accumulate a lot of mortgages on yourself.
So I don't find that I'm under unmanageable attack
or, indeed, under -- I don't feel under any particular
strain, because when I meet with the Congressional
people the relationship is respectful and friendly.

MR. TALBOTT: On that there's just one follow-up.
Have your almost monthly trips out into what you call
the "Heartland," encouraged you that perhaps a prophet
might be vindicated while still in office?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think when you are
in office for an extended period, your policies tend to
be taken for granted -- your policies tend to be taken
for granted -- and, therefore, people think that they can have
all the benefits of what is being done, plus all the benefits
of an alternative course. So they now think they can have
peace, relaxation of tensions, and the satisfaction of pushing

58

the Soviets around.

MR. TALBOTT: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: So I think, inevitably, after one is out of office, one's achievements or lack of them will be seen in clearer perspective, because then the alternatives will have to be tried or rejected by somebody else.

But, on the whole, I believe that the criticism does not go to the central core of the policy and that, therefore, I believe the central core of the policy will be carried on after I leave office -- even if another Administration succeeds us.

MR. SCHECTER: It sounds like you'll stay, if the President's re-elected.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. Don't scare me like that. (Laughter.) I'd lose at least my dog, and probably my wife. (Laughter.)

[12:18 p.m.]

Draft VII Conf. v. 1

Oct. 14, 1975

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have given much thought to the Select
Committee's October 2 request that I provide it
with a copy of a dissent memorandum, on the
Cyprus crisis, sent me by a Foreign Service
Officer in August 1974. After careful considera-
tion I have decided that I cannot comply with that
request. I respectfully request the Committee to
work with me on alternate methods of putting before
it the information relevant to its inquiry.

The "Dissent Channel," through which this
memorandum was submitted, provides those officers

of the Department of State who disagree with
established policy, or have new policies to recommend,
a means for communicating their views to the highest
levels of the Department. "Dissent Channel"
messages and memoranda are forwarded to the
Secretary of State, and are normally given
restricted distribution within the Department.
They cannot be stopped by any intermediate office.

Mr. Chairman, I take the position I have
reluctantly, and only because I have concluded that
the circumstances are compelling. I am convinced
that I would be remiss in my duty as Secretary of

- 3 -

State were I to follow a different course.

The challenges that face our nation in the field
of foreign affairs have never been more difficult;
the pace of events ~~never so rapid; the revolutionary
character of the changes taking place around us has
been~~
seldom more pronounced. If we are to prosper -- indeed,
if we are to survive -- it will require the confidence
of the American people and of the ~~world's~~ nations in the
wisdom of our foreign policy and the effectiveness of
our foreign policy establishment. Basic to this sense
of confidence, of course, is the quality and
professionalism of the Department of State and the

- 4 -

Foreign Service. And the strength of those
institutions depends, to a critical degree, upon
the judgment and strength of purpose of the men
and women who serve in them. It is my view that
to turn over the dissent memorandum as requested —
would inevitably be destructive of the decision-making
process of the Department, and hence do great damage
to the conduct of our foreign relations and the
national security of the United States.

- 6 -

As the Cyprus crisis evolved, I received many recommendations for various courses of action from my subordinates. Their views were freely offered and fully considered in the policy making process. But the final choices of what policies to recommend to the President were mine, and they sometimes differed from the courses of action proposed to me by some of my associates. My decisions occasionally led to vigorous dissent, both during meetings with those of my colleagues who disagreed, and in written memoranda, as in the case presently before us.

The readiness to defend a point of view with

-7-

passion and courage is a quality always to be admired and
encouraged. But neither the passion nor the courage can
obscure the fact that arguments put forth by those not in
possession of all the facts, or aware of other policy considerations
that must weigh heavily in a final decision, are often incomplete.
Indeed, even those at middle and lower levels who argue most
vehemently would be astonished if their case were the only
one considered in the development of policy.

So it was during the Cyprus crisis. Should the
Select Committee so desire, I am prepared personally
to come before the Committee

- 8 -

to describe in detail the dissenting views put to
me, and my reasons for rejecting them.

Thus, my decision ~~not~~ to deliver the document
is not based on a desire to keep anything from the
Select Committee with regard to the Cyprus crisis or anything else.
On the contrary, the Department and I are both
prepared to cooperate with the Committee in the
pursuit of its legislatively established purposes.

The issue is not what information the Committee should
receive; we agree on that question. Rather, the issue is
from whom the information should be sought, and the form
in which it should be delivered. It is my strong

belief that the Committee should look to the policy
levels of the Department, and not to junior and
middle-level officers, for the policy information
they seek. It is my principal advisers and I who
are responsible for policy, and it is we who should
be held accountable before the Congress and the
American people for the manner in which we exercise
the authority and responsibility vested in us by the
President and Senate of the United States.

In keeping with this principle I am prepared

now, as I have been from the beginning, to do

the following:

- 10 -

-- Authorize any officer of the Department or the Foreign Service, regardless of rank, to testify before the Select Committee on all facts known by that officer about the collection and use of intelligence information in foreign relations crises.

-- Authorize any policy level officer of the Department or the Foreign Service to testify before the Select Committee on

- 11 -

recommendations received by him from his
subordinates, but without identification
of authorship, and any recommendations
he forwarded to his superiors.

-- Supply the Committee with a summary from
all sources, but without identification of
authorship, of views and recommendations
on the Cyprus crisis, and criticisms of our
handling of it.

-- Appear personally before the Committee
to testify as to the policy of the United
States with regard to the Cyprus crisis,

- 12 -

as well as the policy of this Department

with regard to the accountability of

junior and middle-level officers for

their views and recommendations.

The issue raised by the request for the dissent

memorandum runs to the fundamental question of

whether the Secretary of State should be asked to

disclose the advice, recommendations, or dissents

to policy that come to him from subordinate officers,

Since the founding of the Republic, every

- 13 -

Secretary of State has been regarded as the
principal adviser to the President in the
formulation of foreign policy and in the conduct
of foreign relations. If the Secretary of State is
to discharge his obligations and duties to the
President and the national interest, he must have
the benefit of the best available advice and
criticism from his subordinates; they in turn, if
they are to give their best, must enjoy a guarantee
that such advice or criticism, candidly given, will
remain privileged.

- 14 -

This concept has a special relevance and compelling character when applied to the delicate and critical area of national security and foreign affairs. As the Supreme Court has said: "the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decision-making process."

But, were I to agree to release the document requested, even on a classified

-15-

basis, I would be party to the destruction of the
privacy of communication on a matter of opinion which
the Secretary of State must have with his subordinates, ~~regarding~~ a
opinion.
Once the confidentiality of internal communications
had been breached, it would be but a short step
to ~~public~~ political exploitation of the subordinate's views. The
result would be to place Department officers in an
intolerable position -- at times praised, at times criticized for
their views; at times praised, at times criticized for dissenting;
at times praised, at times criticized for <u>not</u> dissenting.

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That the nation must have the most competent
and professional Foreign Service possible is surely
beyond question. It must be the repository for the
lessons learned over more than three decades of
world involvement; the institution to which each new
Administration looks for the wisdom garnered from
the past and the initiatives so necessary to cope with
the future. It must be loyal to the President, no
matter what his political persuasion; it must inspire
confidence in its judgment from the Congress, no matter
what party is in power there. The Foreign Service, in
a word, should be America's one sure guarantee of continuity
in the conduct of our foreign affairs.

We now have an outstanding, disciplined, and dedicated

Foreign Service -- perhaps the best in the world.

It is the continued strength and utility of this
institution that will be undermined by revealing
the opinions and judgments of junior and middle-
level officers.

While I know that the Select Committee has no
intention of embarrassing or exploiting junior and
middle-grade officers of the Department, there have
been other times and other committees -- and there
may be again -- where positions taken by Foreign
Service Officers were exposed to *ex post facto* public
examination and recrimination. The results are too
well known to need elaboration here: gross injustice

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to loyal public servants, a sapping of the morale
and abilities of the Foreign Service; and serious
damage to the ability of the Department and the
President to formulate and conduct the foreign affairs
of the nation. Mr. Chairman, I cannot, in good
conscience, by my own failure to raise the issue of
principle, be responsible for contributing to a
situation in which similar excesses could occur again.

The considerations I have outlined relate to
the broad question of testimony from, and documents
authored by junior and middle-level officers. The
request for a specific dissent memorandum raises

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a particular issue within that broader framework.

The "Dissent Channel," established by my predecessor, ✓ had its origin in the recommendations of special Task Forces made up of career professionals from the Department of State, the Foreign Service and other foreign affairs agencies. Two of these Task Forces recommended that improved means be found to transmit new ideas to the Department's decision-makers, to subject policy to the challenge of an adversary review, and to encourage the expression of dissenting views.

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The very purposes of the "Dissent Channel" --
to promote an atmosphere of openness in the
formulation of foreign policy, to stimulate fresh,
creative ideas, and to encourage a questioning of
established policies -- are ~~totally~~ inconsistent with
disclosure of such reports to an investigative
committee of the Congress, and perhaps ultimately to
the public. Dissent memoranda are, by their very
nature, statements of the author's opinions. ~~As such~~, ✓
if their confidentiality cannot be assured, if they are
to be held up to subsequent Congressional or public autopsy,
the whole purpose of the "Dissent Channel" will have

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been corrupted and the Channel itself will soon cease to be a viable instrument. Those whose legitimate purpose is to argue with a policy because they sincerely believe it to be ill-conceived, or because they have new but unorthodox ideas, will recognize the Channel for what it has become and cease to use it; those who care little about what the policy is, and even less about seeking to change that policy through the institutional processes open to them, will be encouraged to use the Channel as a tool for their own ends.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I cannot agree to the release of "issent Channel" messages --

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irrespective of their contents. I am, however,
ready to supply a summary of <u>all</u> contrary advice I
received on the Cyprus crisis, so long as it is not
necessary to disclose the source of this advice.

Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of State has an
obligation to serve the country to the best of his
ability. He can meet that obligation only if he is
assisted by senior advisers who accept the responsibility
for their decisions and the Secretary's delegation of
authority to them, and by lower ranking officers who
know they can pursue their duties free from fear of
recrimination or intimidation because of the substance
of their views.

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Every Secretary of State also has an
obligation to his country and to his successor
build to pass on a professional, effective, dedicated,
and disciplined Foreign Service. Were I to comply
with the request before me I would have failed
in that obligation. I would have been partly
responsible for a process that would almost
inevitably have politicized the Foreign Service,
discouraged courageous advice and the free
expression of dissenting opinion, and encouraged
timidity and caution. I would have taken a step
back toward another era -- an era that gravely

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damaged the Foreign Service, and in the process did
a vast disservice to the nation.

I stand ready to do what I can, on the basis of
the proposals contained in this letter, to cooperate
with the Committee's investigation. On another
occasion when the State Department was under investiga-
tion my great predecessor, Dean Acheson, wrote that
there is a right way and a wrong way to deal with the
Department of State. "The right way," he said, "met
the evil and preserved the institution; the wrong way
did not meet the evil and destroyed the institution.
More than that, it destroyed the faith of the country

- 25 -

in its Government, and of our allies in us."

I am prepared to work with the House Select Committee on Intelligence in a cooperative spirit so that, for the sake of our country, we may jointly find the "right" way to accommodate our mutual concerns. I am prepared to meet with the Committee at its convenience to search for a reasonable solution -- a solution which will meet the needs of the Committee, protect the integrity of the Department of State, and promote the effective conduct of the foreign relations of the United States.

Sincerely,

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 20, 1975

No. 534

PC 72

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
ELMENDORF AIR FORCE BASE
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA
OCTOBER 18, 1975

**QUESTION:** Can you give us your views on the 200 mile limit?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, as you know, we have been negotiating an international agreement on the 200 mile -- on the law of the seas which is one of the most complicated negotiations and potentially one of the most important that our nation is engaged in. I have great understanding and great sympathy for those who are advocating the unilateral legislation. I agree with them that fishing should be protected and therefore I substantially agree with their objective. However, it is my position that the fisheries can best be protected by having an internationally accepted agreement in which all nations apply an accepted standard and which preserves all the existing international agreements. The danger is that if one nation goes unilaterally all other nations are also going to go unilaterally and that the outcome of this is likely to be that not only fishing rights, but transit through straits and other interests we have on the oceans are going to be affected. On the other hand, if the law of the seas negotiations should not be concluded in a reasonable time, then I would support unilateral legislation so we are really talking now about giving us an opportunity to conclude the law of the seas negotiations.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, if the U. S. could become self-sufficient in energy, would it make sense to explore domestic oil and gas in order to perhaps undersell OPEC on the market?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, until the 1950's we were in a position really to set the world oil prices by selling our oil on the world market and therefore we could regulate the world price by setting our price at a certain level and, therefore, making sure that no one could go much above that. That condition disappeared when we needed all of our oil for ourselves and became even more acute when we had to import up to 30 percent of ours. If we should ever again get into a position where we can again export energy that would, of course, change the negotiating posture of all of the sides and it would be a highly desirable position. But that conditions will not exist until the middle '80s, if then.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you said on the fishing situation that if the international agreement could not be completed in a reasonable amount of time you would support unilateral action. What's a reasonable amount of time?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we are hopeful that we can arrange for a double session next year. There will be a session that starts in March in New York.

For further information contact:

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We are going to propose that in addition to that session there be another one in the fall. So we hope that at least the so-called economic zone can be negotiated next year, that is, the zone in which a country -- of 200 miles -- in which a country would have the right to exploit the resources including fisheries. And again our concern is that if one nation goes unilateral and then every other nation starts going unilateral if then these unilateral actions of these nations don't mesh and if some nations don't recognize it and abrogate their existing agreements that we are likely to have chaos and that we are likely to be hurt worse than we are now. But I again want to emphasize that I understand the concern of those who are supporting the unilateral legislation; and I have a great sympathy for the plight of the fishermen. We just believe we can protect it better by getting an international agreement and we hope that perhaps with some patience and analyzing the situation, that will be clear to other people.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, with whom will you be negotiating in China and what do you expect to happen as a result of the President's visit...how soon an Ambassador?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** How soon an Ambassador? Well, in the past my discussions on China -- my discussions have been either with the Prime Minister Chou En-lai, who is now ill; and therefore I would assume that they would be with the Vice Premier, Teng Hsio-ping. I will be able to give a better estimate of what is going to be achieved by the President's trip after I have concluded my negotiations or my visit there. I would not expect that we will achieve full normalization of relations this year. But we can make some progress. And of course as I said in the United Nations, we attach very great significance to our relations with the People's Republic of China, even at the present level of diplomatic contact.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, there have been recent reports out of the Far East of the China News Agency criticizing Soviet general foreign policy. Do you think that this renewed Sino-Soviet criticism of each other will have any affect upon the President's visit and or Soviet detente?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We conduct our relations with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China independent of their relations with each other. And, therefore, we have our own interests with relation to each of them, our one objective. And we leave their own relations to each other to them to work out.

**QUESTION:** So you don't see it as posing any kind of a problem?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think that whatever difficulties may exist in Sino-Soviet relations will not affect the President's trip.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, which, from the national security point of view, route for the gas line from Alaska would you consider safer? Down the coast with tankers or across Canada?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't really know whether that from a national security point of view, this is decisive. This is being largely considered from an economic point of view and from a technical point of view.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, on the subject of the 200 mile legislation, if the House has already passed it and it's up before the Senate now what happens if that bill is approved by the Senate? Are you going to urge President Ford to veto that legislation in order to get the time you need?

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I think the President knows the issues and I can only state my view with respect to the international implications. He will have to weigh it in relation to domestic considerations as well. We will spend our efforts in the next months trying to persuade a number of Senators that the course we are proposing is in the best interests of even the fishermen and in the best overall interests of the country. But I don't want to take a position as to what I would recommend in case that bill passes the Congress. And of course I can't speak for the President as to what he would do if it passes the Congress.

**QUESTION:** On the subject of oil, there have been recent reports that China may have substantial oil deposits. And will that come up in your discussions at all?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, you see, from our point of view -- I don't expect it to come up. But from our point of view if there is more oil on the market, if the world-wide supply of oil increases, the pressure on prices increases, too, even if it isn't sold to us, because the way the prices are being maintained is by the OPEC nations cutting production so that the production is in line with whatever level of prices are set. Obviously, the more supply there is, the more difficult it will be to regulate an agreed market.

**QUESTION:** As for Chou En-lai's health, how do you think that America's relationship with China would be affected if Chou En-lai died say within the next couple of months? Have you considered this?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It wouldn't be a tactful thing for me to say on the way to China --

**QUESTION:** But it is a consideration.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we're all mortal. But the relations between the People's Republic and the United States don't depend on personalities. They depend on the basic interests of both countries; and we would think that the main lines of both policies -- the policies of both countries would continue regardless of who is in office in either country. Though, of course, Chou En-lai is a man of outstanding abilities.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, it was reported today that negotiators in Moscow are close to a long-term grain agreement with Russia. Would you tell us exactly where the State Department stands? What are you looking for in a long-term agreement?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we have been trying to avoid a situation where we have to -- where supplies of grain to the Soviet Union are determined by the emergencies in the Soviet Union, so that when the Soviet Union bought massively it would lead to steep increases in prices in the United States. And since we didn't know from year to year what the Soviet needs would be, and indeed the Soviet Union didn't necessarily know from year to year what its needs would be, this introduced an element of great uncertainty into the calculations of the farmers and into the prices. So what we are attempting to do is to get a five-year agreement with an agreed minimum purchase and a maximum purchase. That way our farmers can plan their production and the Soviets can make their purchases without a major effect on the price of food for the consumer. And in effect, it means they are spreading their purchases over many years rather than to go into a peak buying period in which they oscillate from about 18 million tons in 1972 to a million tons a year or two later; and now this year they're going

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PR 534

up again and we are optimistic that we can achieve this agreement.

**QUESTION:** Do you consider this just a part of the overall detente policy --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, everything is part of the overall relationship. But we are not selling grain to the Soviet Union because of detente. We are selling it in the mutual interest. It's in the interest of our farmers. It's in the interest of the overall relationship and it's in our interest to have it on a long-term basis.

**QUESTION:** Since the crackdown in India by Indira Gandhi earlier this year, has the U. S. Government not taken any kind of stand. I was wondering, do you have any kind of proposals for taking a stand on that?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, that isn't exactly true. The President has expressed his views. But, as a basic problem for American foreign policy, we have to consider that we came into office at a time when it was generally accepted that the United States had overextended itself by getting involved in too many parts of the world. The United States cannot act both as a commentator on everybody's problems and assume responsibility for everybody's domestic evolution, and at the same time gear its commitments to its capabilities. So, as a general rule, we gear our foreign policy to the foreign actions of other countries and to those actions that affect us. We have made clear our preference for democratic institutions in other countries. And that applies also, of course, to India. But we cannot -- and as I pointed out, the President did express his views on the subject.

**QUESTION:** O. K., so then economically we have not made any steps to change our economic relationship?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, economically we really don't have -- we have no economic aid program to India at this moment, though one is under consideration. So this is not a case where we are in the position to change very much.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, if invited, would you remain as Secretary of State in the second Ford Administration?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't think that I should declare myself until the President is re-elected and has asked me.

**QUESTION:** A criticism of the Sinai accord is that it does not meet with a question of the Palestinians' rights or Golan. And do you think a Golan Heights agreement will resolve this problem?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the Sinai accord did not deal with a question of the Palestinians nor did it deal with some of the other questions. The reason we supported and helped negotiate the Sinai accord was our conviction that the attempt to deal with all issues simultaneously under the conditions that existed at the end of last year would have certainly led to a stalemate. And that a stalemate had a high probability of leading to an explosion which would have serious consequences, even for our country. So we took the largest bite that seemed to us possible at the time, which was the Sinai agreement between Egypt and Israel. And anyone who saw these negotiations will probably agree that even that negotiation strained the capability of the country's concern from a domestic point of view. It is our view that, having made this agreement, when things settle down and when the implementation gets into full swing, which is now the case, then other countries will begin to try to follow this example. But sooner or later we will have to make an overall settlement or contribute to an overall settlement;

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PR 534

and that will have to include a consideration of the Palestinians. We've
always said this, and that remains our position.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, it's been suggested recently that you're going to try and negotiate some kind of a settlement between Israel and Syria. I was wondering if you have made any specific plans yet for that type of diplomacy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we have indicated that we are prepared to do
for any of the adjoining states what we've done for Egypt. So we are pre-
pared to act as a mediator in the negotiations between Israel and Syria.
And Israel has indicated its readiness to negotiate with Syria without
preconditions. Syria, for a variety of reasons, has been reluctant to
begin these negotiations. And, therefore, we are waiting for an opportunity
to bring the two parties together. At this moment there is no negotiation
going on, or any immediate prospects.

**QUESTION:** Do the negotiations in this case involve as much money as it did with Egypt?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think it's important to understand that the negotiations between Egypt and Israel did not involve any significant amount of money, Israel had asked us for a sum of money *prior* to the agreement and independent of the agreement, which 76 Senators supported, and which is larger than the amount we are going to give -- recommend to the Congress for next year. Last year the Congress voted 3 billion dollars for Israel in a combination of emergency and continuing appropriations quite independent of these agreements. Similarly, we had already put into our planning budget a significant sum for Egypt, which we will increase only marginally because of the agreement and by marginally I mean a few hundred million dollars. We're not talking about ordinary sums. So in short, the aid to the Middle East is an investment in the American national interest which we have been continuing for over 15 years and which is essentially independent of the Sinai agreement.

**QUESTION:** Just what is the status of negotiations between the Canadian Government and the United States relative to gas lines?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The negotiations are continuing and we hope to bring them to a conclusion, but I can't estimate when that will be.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, in light of the negotiations, would the economic considerations be such that it might be better to go through Canada with the pipeline if negotiations were successful rather than go through Alaska?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Than the one we are building through Alaska?

**QUESTION:** The natural gas pipeline.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't know. I really haven't thought that one through.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, since recent attempts on the President's life, have you increased your security, like, are you wearing a bulletproof vest?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. No, I'm not wearing a bulletproof vest. I'm gaining weight so rapidly that that would be no problem. That's my best protection.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you were at the second game of the World Series. Would you tell me which team you were favoring in the Series?

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PR 534

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, as a Yankee fan I'm sort of an American League adherent.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, with the new shipment of arms to Turkey, just what is the future of our bases over there now?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, it's always difficult to restore a relationship once it has been damaged. The issue of our bases in Turkey has now become a domestic issue in Turkish politics. We hope and indeed we expect, that operations can be restored at our bases now that we have lifted at least the most irritating parts of the embargo. We also hope that progress can be made on negotiations on Cyprus. We are in close contact with the Turkish Government on both of those issues.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I know it's a terrible choice, but which do you prefer: newsmen listening in on your private conversations, or reading the garbage?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** They found less in the garbage than they did in the talk.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you had a few minutes with Senator Gravel before you came to talk with the press. What were you discussing with the Senator?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Senator Gravel has been very helpful to us in the law of the seas negotiations; and I got his latest views on the subject.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, in light of your earlier comment that the more oil that can go on the market it will bring pressure on the OPEC price set-up -- the Alaska oil has to be sold in the United States. Would it, perhaps in the future, be a good idea to change that legislation so that it could be --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, because the Alaska oil that is sold in the United States means that we have to import less oil. To the extent that we import less oil, that means that oil will then go on the international market. So it doesn't really make any difference where the total pool of available oil is sold. Just as long as the pool increases and that the countries that are not prepared to cut production in order to sustain the price get it on the market.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the Alaska press corps appreciates very much your stopping to chat with us.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Thank you very much.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[L.C]

October 20, 1975

No. 534

PC 72

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PR 534

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PR 534

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PR 534

**QUESTION:** Since the crackdown in India by Indira Gandhi earlier this year, has the U. S. Government has not taken any kind of stand. I was wondering, do you have any kind of proposals for taking a stand on that?

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PR 534

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think it's important to understand that the negotiations between Egypt and Israel did not involve any significant amount of money, Israel had asked us for a sum of money prior to the agreement and independent of the agreement, which 76 Senators supported, and which is larger than the amount we are going to give -- recommend to the Congress for next year. Last year the Congress voted 3 billion dollars for Israel in a combination of emergency and continuing appropriations quite independent of these agreements. Similarly, we had already put into our planning budget a significant sum for Egypt, which we will increase only marginally because of the agreement and by marginally I mean a few hundred million dollars. We're not talking about ordinary sums. So in short, the aid to the Middle East is an investment in the American national interest which we have been continuing for over 15 years and which is essentially independent of the Sinai agreement.

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PR 534

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

October 20, 1975

NO. 535

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS BETWEEN
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO KUAN-HUA
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
PEKING
OCTOBER 19, 1975

FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO:

Mr. Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger, Mr. Bush, Chief of U.S.L.O., and Mrs. Bush, American guests, Comrades,

I wish to express, in the name of my Chinese colleagues present, our welcome to the Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger and his party, who have come again to Peking to prepare for President Ford's visit to China later this year.

The current international situation is characterized by great disorder under heaven, and the situation is excellent. The basic contradictions in the world are sharpening. The factors for both revolution and war are increasing. The stark reality is not that detente has developed to a new stage, but that the danger of a new world war is mounting. We do not believe there is any lasting peace. Things develop according to objective laws independently of man's will. The only way to deal with hegemonism is to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against it. To base oneself on illusions, to mistake hopes or wishes for reality and act accordingly will only abet the ambitions of expansionism and lead to grave consequences. In this regard, the history of the Second World War provides a useful lesson. In the face of the growing danger of war, China's fundamental policy is to "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere and never seek hegemony," to persist in independence and self-reliance and make all necessary preparations. We are deeply convinced that, whatever zigzags and reverses there may be in the development of history, the general trend of the world is towards light and not darkness.

A new page was turned in the relations between China and the United States with President Nixon's visit to China and the issuance of the Shanghai Communique by our two sides in 1972. On the whole, Sino-U.S. relations have moved forward in the last few years. China and the United States have different social systems and there are essential differences between their policies. However, in the current turbulent world situation, our two sides have common points as well. This has been set forth clearly in the Shanghai Communique. So long as our two sides earnestly observe in actual practice the principles established in the Shanghai Communique, there is reason to believe that Sino-U.S. relations will continue to move ahead. This is the common desire of the Chinese and American peoples. On the Chinese side, we will do our part to promote Sino-U.S. relations in the spirit of the Shanghai Communique, as we have done all along.

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PR 535

Now I propose a toast to the friendship between the Chinese and American
peoples,

To the health of the Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger,
To the health of Mr. Bush, Chief of U.S.L.O and Mrs. Bush,
To the health of all American guests, and
To the health of the Chinese Comrades here!

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

Mr. Vice Premier, Mr. Foreign Minister, Chief of the Liaison Office in
Washington,

On this my eighth trip to China, I have finally found the courage to say
something in Chinese. I ask your indulgence to listen carefully while I
say it: Pan chiu jung yi, ch'ing k'o nan, which for those of you who
think I spoke Cantonese means:

It is easy to prepare a banquet, but it is hard to be a good host.

On each of my visits the table is always magnificently set. But it is the
warmth of the welcome that has made all of these evenings memorable.

I understand that today is the 40th anniversary of the end of the Long March.
This occasion therefore has profound meaning for the People's Republic of
China and those here tonight -- including the Vice Premier and Ambassador
Huang -- who made that epic march. That event was testimony to the world
as well of the courage and the vision of those who set out on a path
whose length and contours they could not know. Their success was a triumph
of spirit as much as exertion. And it demonstrates that faith is even more
important than material circumstances in achieving great things.

As I said in my speech to the United Nations, there is no relationship to
which the United States assigns greater significance than its ties with
the People's Republic of China.

The differences between us are apparent. Our task is not to intensify
those differences. Our task is to advance our relationship on the basis
of our mutual interests. Such a relationship would strengthen each of us.
It would threaten no one and it would contribute to the well-being of all
peoples. It is a relationship which we intend to be a durable feature
of the world scene.

Each country must pursue a policy suitable to its own circumstances. The
United States will resist hegemony as we have already stated in the Shanghai
Communique. But the United States will also make every effort to avoid
needless confrontations when it can do so without threatening the security
of third countries. In this policy we will be guided by actions and
realities and not rhetoric.

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PR 535

President Ford will soon be coming to China. He has visited you before, but now he comes as President with the intention of strengthening our relations on the basis of the Shanghai Communique and to give expression to the American interest in a China that is making progress in a peaceful and secure world.

During the next few days we will have the opportunity to exchange views on a wide range of matters of common interest. These regular consultations have become a valuable feature of our relationship. Once again, I look forward to my meetings with the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister.

And now, may I propose a toast,

* To the health of Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-Lai to whom we wish a rapid recovery,

* To the health of the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister,

* To the health of the Chief of the Liasion Office in Washington,

* To the health of all our friends here today; and

* To the friendship of the American people and Chinese peoples. Ganbei.

* * * * *

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 23, 1975

No. 540

INTERVIEW OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
WITH
DON OLIVER, NBC NEWS
BERNARD KALB, CBS NEWS
TED KOPPEL, ABC NEWS
TOKYO, JAPAN
OCTOBER 23, 1975

**MR. OLIVER:** Mr. Secretary, someone said that the meetings in Peking were in a rather chilly atmosphere with some criticism of the United States on the opening night's banquet and rather curt statements on the closing night. How would you characterize the meetings and what do you think they accomplished?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The Chinese described the meetings as friendly and wide ranging which I think is essentially correct. We had very full discussions. We covered the topics in about the manner in which we expected and we are satisfied with the visit. I think it laid the basis for the Presidential visit and maintained the relationship at the level which both sides want.

**MR. KALB:** Mr. Secretary, the Chinese made a point and have made the point of attacking various aspects of U. S. foreign policy that you personally are very much and prominently identified with. They have sharply attacked detente. They have sharply attacked, for example, the Helsinki Conference. Did you find in any way that on a personal level because of these policies the Chinese were a touch cool in your direction?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, personal relations are outstanding. This was my eighth visit to China in four years. These are all people I know well. We don't go to China to ask approval for our other policies. They don't ask approval for their policies. So we discuss matters of mutual interest and on the personal level the relationship is extremely good.

**MR. KOPPEL:** Mr. Secretary, you had an extraordinarily long meeting with Chairman Mao. Do you regard him on the basis of your meeting as still an active force in China today or does he have a largely honorific role?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I cannot determine the internal arrangements in China, but my impression was of a man of very powerful intelligence, very strong views and I see no reason to doubt that he is in charge of events in China.

**MR. KOPPEL:** I understand that you can't go into detail, but can you give us the sense of the mood. How did these meetings go when you went in to see Mao?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** They're in a rather sparse room and he likes to joke. I have learned that all of his remarks are rather carefully thought out. I think the discussions were well described as wide ranging, very acute.

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PR 540

**MR. KALB:** Mr. Secretary, do you have the feeling that the Chinese want, very much so, the United States to remain in Asia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have the impression that the Chinese, with all the things that may have been said at the banquets -- I think the Chinese basically understand our global policy -- and understand the necessity of our role in Asia -- and certainly have given no sign either to us or to any other country that they want us to end it.

**MR. KALB:** Are you suggesting the Chinese would like to see the United States remain in Asia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I think it is for them to say what they would like to do. I have heard no opposition to it nor to my knowledge have other Asian countries.

**MR. OLIVER:** With the possibility of a change in leadership in China with Mao ill, with Chou En-lai in the hospital, do you feel the Chinese are in any position right now to make any commitments toward progress in U.S.-Sino relationships?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It depends on what you mean by progress in U.S.-Sino relationships. On the issues of global international concern, we have many points of common views and we are pursuing those. On other issues of a purely bilateral nature having to deal with commercial relations and so forth, we are not advancing matters a great deal. But those are essentially of secondary importance. I don't know how much this is related to the leadership position. I think this is a calculated policy of the Chinese leadership.

**MR. KOPPEL:** Mr. Secretary, it's been almost a year since you were in China last and a great deal has happened worldwide since then and a great deal has happened internally in the United States. Do you have the feeling that China's perception of us has changed and if so in what direction?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** China's interest in the United States depends on their perception on how effectively we perform internationally and how able we are to carry out our policies or to get domestic support for our policies. I would guess that since I first went there in 1971, the series of upheavals we have gone through have not greatly strengthened that perception. But on the whole, I am satisfied with this trip. I think the relations between China and the United States are basically sound.

**MR. KOPPEL:** If I understand you correctly you seem to be saying that the Chinese feel we are a shade weaker than we were two or three years ago.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I'm not saying this is necessarily explicit, but this could be part of their perception.

**MR. KOPPEL:** But this is your sense?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It's probably true, but again I want to stress that the basic relationship was sound on this trip.

**MR. KALB:** Mr. Secretary, listening to some of the Chinese officials that we talked with, we got the feeling that in their attacks on detente there seemed to be a desire, a hope, on the part of the Chinese that the United States would go back to the Cold War days vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. How do you handle that one in your negotiations?

-3-

PR 540

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We do not make any attempt to encourage this split between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. We do not tell them how they should conduct their relations with the Soviet Union and we conduct our own relations with the Soviet Union. Similarly, we do not permit the Soviet Union to tell us how to conduct our relations with the People's Republic. The two great communist countries have a major disagreement of their own and it is up to them how to deal with it.

**MR. KALB:** Forgetting about what one side may tell the other, how do you handle the subject? How did both sides handle the subject, of the Soviet Union during the talks?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** When the occasion arises we state our perception of the problem and it's obvious they're stating their perception -- we should, however, not overlook the fact that both of us are opposed to expansionism. We may have different perceptions on how to resist it or whether it is possible to ease the conditions, but the United States has no illusions, that, if there is expansionism, we have many international obligations to resist it.

**MR. OLIVER:** Did the Chinese give you any indication that they feel that detente with the Soviet Union, from the American point of view, is a bar to better relations with China?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, no such point was made to us.

**MR. OLIVER:** Did the Chinese seem to be worried about the relationship?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Nor would we accept such a proposition from either the Soviet Union vis-a-vis China or from China vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

**MR. KOPPEL:** Wouldn't it be fair to say then, Mr. Secretary, that the Chinese are not happy with what they see as a softening of our relationship towards the Soviet Union. Don't they want to see us toughen it?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, since we opened our relations with China in 1971 -- and after all I was one of the principal architects of this -- at that time we were already engaged in improving our relations with the Soviet Union. We have pursued the improvement of relations with both sides simultaneously.

**MR. KOPPEL:** No, I understand that, but I'm asking you about the Chinese attitude. It seemed to us that they wanted the United States to get tough with the Soviet Union.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, but you have to distinguish between the formal position of the Chinese and what we may be talking about privately. In any event we do not consider that a basic subject of negotiations.

**NEWSMEN:** Thank you.

* * * *

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 25, 1975

No. 542

As prepared for Delivery

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY, SCHEDULED FOR 6:00 PM, EDT
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1975. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED,
QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY.

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
AT THE UN DAY CONCERT
THE KENNEDY CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.
OCTOBER 25, 1975

Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

This thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations cannot be simply an occasion for celebration; it must be a moment of rededication. Those of us who value this institution as indispensable must help it meet its challenges--as we have done successfully in the past.

The events of the last few years have taught the world many new lessons--the lessons that our economic fortunes are interdependent, that the problems of global peace and security are indivisible, that concerns for human rights transcend international boundaries. This recognition of the collective destiny of the human race could mark the beginnings of what dreamers have dreamt for ages--the emergence of a true global community. For the United Nations, this could perhaps be the era of its greatest achievements.

But recent history has also seen other trends--the formation of new blocs, attempts at economic warfare, and ideological intolerance. Sadly, we have seen these also reflected in the United Nations in practices and actions that threaten the UN's role as an instrument of conciliation. This bears no resemblance to the expectations of the American people when the Organization was founded; it cannot continue without a price being paid.

We in this hall are dedicated to seek to preserve this institution. We have not forgotten, in the face of all the frustrations and challenges that the Organization has confronted in thirty years, that the United Nations reflects--and indeed embodies all our hopes. If nations can learn to act in concert, and with responsibility, and in awareness of our common future, this too will be reflected in the United Nations.

[LC]

PR #542

-2-

Therefore, nothing is more welcome than this commitment of faith by those of you here. Nothing is more needed than this readiness to persevere to bring the goals of the United Nations to reality.

The great orchestra and great music we are about to hear should recall to us that man is not a creature of circumstance or of despair. Man is driven, and ennobled, by his dreams. Let us make the next thirty years of the United Nations the era of its fulfillment.

** ** -

This thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations cannot be simply an occasion for celebration; it must be a moment of rededication. Those of us who value this institution as indispensable must help it meet its challenges -- as we have done successfully in the past.

The events of the last few years have taught the world many new lessons -- the lessons that our economic fortunes are interdependent, that the problems of global peace and security are indivisible, that concerns for human rights transcend international boundaries. This recognition of the collective destiny of the human race could mark the beginnings of what dreamers have dreamt for ages -- the emergence of a true global community. For the United Nations, this could perhaps be the era of its greatest achievements.

-2-

But recent history has also seen other trends -- the formation of new blocs, attempts at economic warfare, and ideological intolerance. Sadly, we have seen these also reflected in the United Nations in practices and actions that threaten the UN's role as an instrument of conciliation. This bears no resemblance to the expectations of the American people when the Organization was founded; it cannot continue without a price being paid.

We in this hall are dedicated to seek to preserve this institution. We have not forgotten, in the face of all the frustrations and challenges that the Organization has confronted in thirty years, that the United Nations reflects -- and indeed embodies -- all our hopes. If nations can learn to act in concert, and with responsibility, and in awareness of our common future, this too

Excellencies, honored guests, and friends:

We are gathered here, as every year, in tribute to the
United Nations. We celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of its
existence.

But unlike every year, we meet now at a time of testing
for this vital institution.

The birth of the United Nations, at San Francisco
thirty years ago, was a moment of hope. It was a time when
men and women of good will and good sense, sickened by war,
depression and persecution, seized a precious moment of
international consensus and sketched out a vision of a better
future.

Statesmen had tried a quarter-century earlier to build
a new world order and a lasting peace; that first effort had

- 2 -

failed almost totally. Yet there could have been no better
tribute to the indomitable spirit of man than the effort of
a new generation of statesmen to embrace the same ideals
and to found a new world organization -- hoping this time
for a different outcome, convinced that no other course gave
any real hope to humanity.

Another generation now separates us from those events.
On this anniversary we may appropriately ask how much those
renewed hopes may be said to have succeeded.

The answer surely is that we have not done so badly.
After twenty years of the League of Nations, the whole of
the world was again at war. After thirty years of the United
Nations, we find ourselves at one of the rarest moments of
modern international history -- a moment when in all the

(tc)

- 3 -

world not one state is engaged in hostilities with another.

In this tragic century, such moments are precious indeed.

And it is not simply a peace of exhaustion. There
has been a genuine diminution of direct conflict among the
great powers; there have been solutions to chronic problems;
and there exist the elements for a balanced and secure
international structure. In thirty years there have been
wars, but no world war. There has been more than enough
economic disorder, but no world depression, and indeed
a long-term trend of growth, and strong institutions of
international cooperation.

It cannot be denied that the Organization we honor
tonight has played a central part in this positive evolution.
And such a past promises a hopeful future.

- 4 -

This promise was never more in evidence than at the
recent Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly,
which met in September to answer the global challenge of
economic development. The disparities of wealth and
well-being to which we addressed our concern were hardly
new; what was new was that the nations of the world, great
and small, escaped the pointless and destructive exercise
which had absorbed so much energy in international institutions
in years past. For once there was peace in the world, and
for once there was an appreciation of our common stake
in the advance of the global economy and of all its participants.

The unanimous agreement with which that Session closed, to
which the United States made a major contribution, may have

- 5 -

moved us a step closer toward the goals of economic progress
and economic justice.

This is a demonstration of the potential of the United
Nations. And it is those areas of international endeavor that
increasingly define what the modern age of international
relations is all about. For the United Nations, this could
perhaps be the era of its greatest achievement.

But if that promise is to be fulfilled, the same spirit
of mutual respect that marked that Session must govern the
conduct of states.

We have seen a disturbing contrary trend -- ideological
intolerance, procedural abuses, bloc majorities, one-sided
voting, resulting in a one-way morality that clearly undermines

- 6 -

the UN's role as an instrument of conciliation. The resolution
naming Zionism as a form of racism is an example; it under-
mines the UN's necessary and valuable compaign against
racial discrimination, and it threatens the UN's capacity as
mediator in the Middle East. We will work to defeat its
passage by the General Assembly; we call on all nations to
reconcile their vote with universal moral principles.

The UN Charter sets a standard for international
cooperation. Implicit in it are basic truths:

-- that diversity of principles and beliefs must be
respected;

-- that disputes are to be settled by fair and peaceful
means;

- 7 -

-- that international decisions must recognize the interests of all those involved, so that all will have a stake in their observance;

-- that practical agreements, not rhetoric, are the only way to lasting progress; and

-- that mutuality of benefit is essential to sustained cooperation.

This is the attitude of the United States.

As we Americans review our nation's past in this Bicentennial period, we are reminded anew that unity can be fashioned from the diversity of peoples and yet preserve it.

The divisions of history, interest and values which mark the international arena do not prevent cooperative action. Indeed, our times make it imperative. For in today's world military

- 8 -

conflict, on any scale, ultimately can endanger the survival
of all; economic warfare, for whatever cause, jeopardizes
the prosperity of all; injustice, wherever it occurs, diminishes
all humanity.

Ladies and gentlemen:

The American people want to see the United Nations
fulfill the vision and faith of its founders. After three decades
of challenge, it remains our opportunity for a better future.
Its success is the world's success; its failure is the world's
failure.

Let us build on what it has achieved and let us correct
its shortcomings.

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you, on behalf of the President,
to join me in a toast to the United Nations on its thirtieth anniversary.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 25, 1975

No. 543

As Prepared for Delivery

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY, SCHEDULED FOR 10:30 PM, EDT
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1975. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM,
OR USED IN ANY WAY.

TOAST BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
AT THE UN DAY DINNER
WASHINGTON HILTON HOTEL

OCTOBER 25, 1975

The birth of the United Nations, at San Francisco thirty years ago, was a moment of hope. It was a time when men and women of good will and good sense, sickened by war, depression and persecution, seized upon a precious moment of international consensus and sketched out a vision of a better future.

Statesmen had tried a quarter-century earlier to build a new world order and a lasting peace; that first effort had failed almost totally. Yet there could have been no better tribute to the indomitable spirit of man than the effort of a new generation of statesmen to embrace the same ideals and to found a new world organization -- hoping this time for a different outcome, convinced that no other course gave any real hope to humanity.

The answer surely is that we have not done so badly. After twenty years of the League of Nations, the whole of the world was again at war. After thirty years of the United Nations, we find ourselves at one of the rarest moments of modern international history -- a moment when in all the world not one state is engaged in hostilities with another. In this tragic century, such moments are precious indeed.

-2-

No. 543

This promise was never more in evidence than at the recent Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly, which met in September to answer the global challenge of economic development. The disparities of wealth and well-being to which we addressed our concern were hardly new; what was new was that the nations of the world, great and small, escaped the point-less and destructive exercise which had absorbed so much energy in international institutions in years past. For once there was peace in the world, and for once there was an appreciation of our common stake in the advance of the global economy and of all its participants. The unanimous agreement with which that Session closed, to which the United States made a major contribution, may have moved us a step closer toward the goals of economic progress and economic justice.

Just last week the Security Council made another important contribution to strengthening world peace by extending UNEF one year and by entrusting Secretary General Waldheim with the urgent task of promoting a settlement of the Spanish Sahara dispute.

These are demonstrations of the potential of the United Nations. And it is those areas of international endeavor that increasingly define what the modern age of international relations is all about. For the United Nations, this could perhaps be the era of its greatest achievement.

We have seen a disturbing contrary trend -- ideological intolerance, procedural abuses, bloc majorities, one-sided voting -- resulting in a one-way morality that clearly undermines the UN's role as an instrument of conciliation. The resolution naming Zionism as a form of racism is an example; it undermines the UN's necessary and valuable campaign against racial discrimination, and it threatens the UN's capacity as mediator in the Middle East. We will work to defeat its passage by the General Assembly; we call on all nations to reconcile their vote with universal moral principles.

-3-

No. 543

As we Americans review our nation's past in this Bicentennial period, we are reminded anew that unity can be fashioned from the diversity of peoples and yet preserve it. The divisions of history, interest and values which mark the international arena do not prevent cooperative action. Indeed, our times make it imperative. For in today's world military conflict on any scale, ultimately can endanger the survival of all; economic warfare, for whatever cause, jeopardizes the prosperity of all; injustice, wherever it occurs, diminishes all humanity.

Ladies and gentlemen:

** **

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 31, 1975

No. 551

As Prepared for
Delivery

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

October 31, 1975

I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before the Committee this morning. In letter of October 14 to the Chairman I stated that the State Department is prepared work with the House Select Committee on Intelligence in a cooperative spirit to find a way to accommodate our mutual interests. We understand the difficulties which confront your Committee in investigating matters as sensitive and complex as these, and are prepared to do all we can to assist you in your important work.

I would respectfully suggest, Mr. Chairman, that as this Committee and the Department of State pursue their common objectives in support of our national interests several important factors be kept in mind.

First, our nation today faces serious and unprecedented international challenges. We stand poised between a return to a nuclear arms race and a move forward to a new era of nuclear arms control; our allies and friends around the world continue to look to us for material and moral support to maintain their freedom and independence; our role is crucial in the relationship between developed and developing countries; and the growing problems of interdependence — food, energy, commodities policy, the reformation of international financial and economic institutions — all demand new, sometimes revolutionary approaches.

These goals can be achieved only if we preserve the confidence of other governments in us, and in our reliability. Foreign policy involves not only matters of great sensitivity to this country, but issues of equal sensitivity to others. Its raw material is actions and statements of American officials, as well as policies and attitudes of foreign leaders, at times conveyed to us in strictest confidence. All this gives a unique dimension to the substance of foreign affairs.

In the last quarter of the 20th Century is to be a time of prosperity and security for our nation, it will require the confidence of the nations of the world in the wisdom of our foreign policy and the effectiveness of our national security institutions. And confidence, once lost, cannot soon be regained.

PR #551

-2-

Mr. Chairman, I think we can all agree that the vitality and continuity of the insti-
tutions that formulate and implement foreign policy will be essential if we are to
meet the challenges that face our nation. We now have a Foreign Service and a
Department of State dedicated to the national interest and prepared to serve with
dedication under any Administration. We must make sure that this continues. The
Foreign Service must not be politicized or intimidated.

It is, of course, natural and proper for the Secretary of State and his senior advisers
to be called to account for their decisions before the Congress and the American
people. The conduct of an effective foreign policy requires the support of the
American people, who have the right to be informed about their government's actions
through their elected representatives.

These are the considerations I have sought to bear in mind in deciding how the
Department of State can most effectively cooperate with this Committee. They are
reflected in the proposals of my October 14 letter to the Chairman. The letter was
reviewed by the President before it was sent; the proposals were fully approved by
him. Let me review them briefly with you now.

First, I am prepared to authorize any officer of the Department or the Foreign
Service, regardless of rank, to testify before the Select Committee on all facts
known by that officer about the collection and use of intelligence information in
foreign relations crises.

Second, I will authorize any policy level officer of the Department or the Foreign
Service to testify before the Select Committee on recommendations received by him
from his subordinates, but without identification of authorship, and any recommenda-
tions he forwarded to his superiors.

And finally, I am prepared to supply the Committee with a summary from all sources,
but without identification of authorship, of views and recommendations on the Cyprus
crisis or any other issue within the Committee's jurisdiction and criticisms of our
handling of it.

In my view, Mr. Chairman, these proposals — offered in a spirit of cooperation and
compromise — will make it possible for the Committee to secure all the necessary
information as it goes forward with its investigation. There is nothing we seek
less than confrontation.

I ask the Committee to consider the special nature of foreign policy. Because of it
the national interest requires — and has long been recognized to require — a high
degree of confidentiality in the communications between the senior levels of the
Department and their subordinates.

As the Committee is aware, it is our view that junior and middle-level officers
should not be required to testify as to their recommendations to their superiors.
We are convinced that any other course would greatly damage the foreign policy
decision-making process and, as a consequence, greatly damage the foreign policy of
the United States.

PR #551

-3-

Mr. Chairman, in addition to the more general question of what testimony should be required from junior and middle-level officers, there is the immediate issue of the dissent memorandum which this committee has requested from the Department. If we were to accede to that request, we would risk grave and perhaps even irreparable harm to the very mechanism — the dissent channel — which has been established to encourage officers within the Department to give me and my successors the hard, blunt and critical comments we seek.

I recognize, Mr. Chairman, that these considerations complicate a Congressional inquiry — particularly when that inquiry is focused on information of a particularly sensitive nature. But I am confident that the procedures I outlined in my letter of October 14 — cooperatively implemented — will allow all the relevant evidence to come forward.

Mr. Chairman, I am here today so that I may personally assure the members of this Committee of my deep desire to accommodate the interests of the Legislative and Executive branches of government. I ask only that you recognize that as Secretary of State I have a number of additional obligations. On the one hand, I must do all I can to assure that Committees of the Congress receive the information they need to fulfill their responsibilities. But I must also assure that I and my successors are able to develop and give to the President the most comprehensive advice available as he carries out his constitutional duty to conduct the foreign relations of United States. And I must, as well, do my duty to my colleagues in the Department of State and the Foreign Service, so that they in turn may give our country their best.

Mr. Chairman, I have not come before this Committee to win an argument, but to bring about a cooperative solution. The separation of powers was not intended by the Founding Fathers to produce a restful relationship free of controversy. But our country has become great because our Executive and Legislative branches have generally managed to settle their disputes in a spirit of cooperation; we thrive as a country not on victories, but on reconciliations.

Thank you.

* * * * *

The Secretary
of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[LC]

Statement

October 31, 1975

Washington, D. C.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

CONFIDENTIALITY IN FOREIGN POLICY
DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

*The following is a statement by Secretary Kissinger before the House Select Committee on Intelligence on October 31, 1975.*

I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before the committee this morning. In my letter of October 14 to the chairman, I stated that the State Department is prepared to work with the House Select Committee on Intelligence in a cooperative spirit to find a way to accommodate our mutual interests. We understand the difficulties which confront your committee in investigating matters as sensitive and complex as these and are prepared to do all we can to assist you in your important work.

I would respectfully suggest, Mr. Chairman [Representative Otis G. Pike], that as this committee and the Department of State pursue their common objectives in support of our national interests several important factors be kept in mind.

First, our nation today faces serious and unprecedented international challenges. We stand poised between a return to a nuclear arms race and a move forward to a new era of nuclear arms control; our allies and friends around the world continue to look to us for material and moral support to maintain their freedom and independence; our role is crucial in the relationship between developed and developing countries; and the growing problems of interdependence—food, energy, commodities policy, the reformation of international financial and economic institutions—all demand new, sometimes revolutionary approaches.

These goals can be achieved only if we preserve the confidence of other governments in us and in our reliability. Foreign policy involves not only matters of great sensitivity to this country but issues of equal sensitivity to others. Its raw material is actions and statements of American officials, as well as policies and attitudes of foreign leaders, at times conveyed to us in strictest confidence. All this gives a unique dimension to the substance of foreign affairs.

If the last quarter of the 20th century is to be a time of prosperity and security for our nation, it will require the confidence of the nations of the world in the wisdom of our foreign policy and the effectiveness of our national security institutions. And confidence, once lost, cannot soon be regained.

Mr. Chairman, I think we can all agree that the vitality and continuity of the institutions that formulate and implement foreign policy will be essential if we are to meet the challenges that face our nation. We now have a Foreign Service and a Department of State dedicated to the national interest and prepared to serve with dedication under any Administration. We must make sure that this continues. The Foreign Service must not be politicized or intimidated.

It is of course natural and proper for the Secretary of State and his senior advisers to be called to account for their decisions before the Congress and the American people. The conduct of an effective foreign policy requires the support of the American people, who have the right to be

PR 551

These are the considerations I have sought to
bear in mind in deciding how the Department of
State can most effectively cooperate with this
committee. They are reflected in the proposals of
my October 14 letter to the chairman. The letter
was reviewed by the President before it was sent;
the proposals were fully approved by him. Let me
review them briefly with you now:

* First, I am prepared to authorize any officer of the Department or the Foreign Service, regardless of rank, to testify before the select committee on all facts known by that officer about the collection and use of intelligence information in foreign relations crises;

* Second, I will authorize any policy-level officer of the Department or the Foreign Service to testify before the select committee on recommendations received by him from his subordinates, but without identification of authorship, and any recommendations he forwarded to his superiors; and

* Finally, I am prepared to supply the committee with a summary from all sources, but without identification of authorship, of views and recommendations on the Cyprus crisis or any other issue within the committee's jurisdiction and criticisms of our handling of it.

In my view, Mr. Chairman, these proposals—offered in a spirit of cooperation and compromise—will make it possible for the committee to secure all the necessary information as it goes forward with its investigation. There is nothing we seek less than confrontation.

I ask the committee to consider the special nature of foreign policy. Because of it the national interest requires—and has long been recognized to require—a high degree of confidentiality in the communications between the senior levels of the Department and their subordinates.

As the committee is aware, it is our view that junior and middle-level officers should not be required to testify as to their recommendations to their superiors. We are convinced that any other course would greatly damage the foreign policy de-

cisionmaking process and, as a consequence, greatly damage the foreign policy of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, in addition to the more general question of what testimony should be required from junior and middle-level officers, there is the immediate issue of the dissent memorandum which this committee has requested from the Department. If we were to accede to that request, we would risk grave and perhaps even irreparable harm to the very mechanism—the dissent channel—which has been established to encourage officers within the Department to give me and my successors the hard, blunt, and critical comments we seek.

I recognize, Mr. Chairman, that these considerations complicate a congressional inquiry, particularly when that inquiry is focused on information of a particularly sensitive nature. But I am confident that the procedures I outlined in my letter of October 14—cooperatively implemented—will allow all the relevant evidence to come forward.

Mr. Chairman, I am here today so that I may personally assure the members of this committee of my deep desire to accommodate the interests of the legislative and executive branches of government. I ask only that you recognize that as Secretary of State I have a number of additional obligations. On the one hand, I must do all I can to assure that committees of the Congress receive the information they need to fulfill their responsibilities. But I must also assure that I and my successors are able to develop and give to the President the most comprehensive advice available as he carries out his constitutional duty to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. And I must, as well, do my duty to my colleagues in the Department of State and the Foreign Service so that they in turn may give our country their best.

Mr. Chairman, I have not come before this committee to win an argument, but to bring about a cooperative solution. The separation of powers was not intended by the Founding Fathers to produce a restful relationship free of controversy. But our country has become great because our executive and legislative branches have generally managed to settle their disputes in a spirit of cooperation; we thrive as a country not on victories, but on reconciliations.