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December 22, 1957

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U.S. Capabilities

As compared with the U.S.S.R., the United States now has these
military advantages:

We have a superior industrial base and production know-how, which,
providing we use it properly, should enable us to assign high priority to a
greater variety of projects than the U.S.S.R.

We have superior operational experience in the use of long-range
manned airplanes and geography favors our system of advanced bases.

We have superior and more flexible naval power, especially surface
naval power.

We have more atomic weapons, and a greater variety of them.

However, some of these advantages must be qualified, and others
are only temporary. For example, our long-range bomber force is always in
competition with the improving defenses of our potential enemy. And our
advantage in training is transitory because missiles will increasingly take
over missions heretofore performed by manned planes. Moreover some U.S.
forward bases will continue to be exposed to the instability of the areas in
which they are located and all of our air bases are vulnerable to surprise
attack, particularly from Soviet missiles.

Nor can we afford to take for granted an indefinite continuation of
our present superiority at sea. The aircraft carrier, around which our naval
power is built, faces a problem of limited refueling facilities, particularly

power is built, faces a problem of limited refueling facilities, partially
our present abunent at sea. The aircraft carrier, around which our naval
power can afford to take for granted an indefinite continuation of
attack, particularly from Soviet airplanes.

which they are located and all of our air bases are vulnerable to surprise
forward bases will continue to be exposed to the inability of the area in
over airships heretofore performed by manned planes. Moreover some U.S.
avantage in training is transitory because airplanes will increasingly take
competition with the improving defenses of our potential enemy. And our
are only temporary. For example, our long-range bomber force is always in
however, some of these advantages must be qualified, and others
We have more strategic weapons, and a greater variety of them.

naval power.

We have superior and more flexible naval power, especially air force
manned planes and geography favor our system of advanced bases.

We have superior operational experience in the use of long-range
deeper variety of planes than the U.S. Air.

providing we use it properly, should enable us to secure high priority to a
We have a superior industrial base and production know-how, which
military advantages:

As compared with the U.S. Air, the United States now has these
U.S. Air Force

December 22, 1943
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December 22, 1957

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for its aircraft complement. The value of its freedom from the political
uncertainties of foreign bases is therefore a matter of degree. The unresolved
naval weakness is that our anti-submarine capability is not adequate to deal
with the growing Soviet underwater threat.

The third point of present U.S. military advantage is in the number
and variety of atomic weapons. But the U.S.S.R. is closing the gap and
because of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons numerical superiority
beyond a certain point may be meaningless.

Thus it appears that the U.S. is losing its lead over the U.S.S.R. in the military race. For a little while yet we possess the shield of a clear superiority in strategic striking power. But unless present trends are altered, the world balance of power will shift in favor of the Soviet bloc. If that should happen we would not be given another chance to remedy our failings. However, it is emphatically not too late if the American people and its leadership are prepared to make the big effort required now and in the years ahead.

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December 22, 1957

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IV - MISSIONS

The types of conflict by which we may be challenged pose particular problems because they tend to overleap the traditional boundaries between the military services. With modern weapons the distinction of land, sea and air warfare has lost a great deal of its validity. The criteria by which any future wars can be distinguished turn on the nature of the conflict, the issues in dispute, the geographical area of hostilities rather than on means of locomotion.

Among the possible challenges we may confront, three stand out most starkly: all-out war, limited war and a kind of war new to the twentieth century and highly developed by the communists -- the disguised or obscure, war concealed as internal take-over or as civil war.

All-Out War

Of the threats to our security, all-out war is the most overwhelming. It can be defined as an attack of such magnitude that our survival would be directly and immediately at stake. It is therefore the ultimate war, in which no inhibitions can be counted upon as regards the case of weapons.

With modern weapons such a war would involve catastrophic casualties. It is doubtful that civilized life as we know it could withstand the carnage. Even the nominal victor would have suffered losses which would shake its social fabric. This is particularly true for the side which concedes the first

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blow, if it be directed in large part against his population.

For this reason the purpose of our capability for all-out war is above
all to prevent war from breaking out; it is effective to the extent that it
deters a sudden onslaught. At the same time, our capability for all-out war
is the essential precondition for any more discriminating application of our
power. The capability to conduct all-out war does not protect all our
security interests. But it does preserve our ability to protect these interests
by means less drastic than all-out war. Limited war, for instance, can be
kept limited only if an opponent must consider expansion of the war highly
unattractive. An overwhelming readiness for all-out war must therefore be
the first charge on our military establishment.

The basic requirement for all-out war is a strategic striking force so
well protected and numerous that it can overcome any defense. Moreover,
the hard core of the striking force, whether based at home or overseas,
must be continuously alert, fully armed, and as secure as possible against
destruction or neutralization by surprise attack.

Thus the second requirement for all-out war is an active and passive
defense system capable of protecting the bulk of our striking force and of
blunting the effects of enemy attack against our centers of population and
industry. Dispersal, the hardening of bases and critical installations
against nuclear weapons through underground shelters and the increasing use
of ground, sea, and undersea missiles will all help to reduce vulnerability

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December 22, 1957

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to successful enemy attack. Early warning and air defense measures will reduce the likelihood that such attacks might be successful.

As attacking vehicles have become speedier and weapons ever more destructive, increasing attention will have to be paid to passive defense, often called civil defense, which seeks to blunt the enemy offense by reducing the damage as much as possible. This can be accomplished through shelters, dispersal of industries, and the stockpiling of critical supplies. A power which has succeeded in protecting its population at least to some degree is in a stronger psychological position than an opponent totally vulnerable to attack. In the age of the long-range missile, the known ability of a society to withstand attack through passive defense will become an increasingly important deterrent.

Readiness for all-out war therefore reflects a combination of three factors: (a) A retaliatory force sufficiently powerful and well-protected so that no matter what the scale of the enemy attack, the aggressor must have to contend with a return blow which will inflict an unacceptable amount of damage; (b) An active defense which can provide effective survival of the retaliatory force and which is able to reduce the enemy blow to the smallest possible proportions; (c) A passive defense which reduces the value of the enemy offense and the incentive for it.

The importance of defensive measures is that they force the enemy to increase his investment of resources in his offensive effort without

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adding to its strategic effectiveness. The necessity of a crushing retaliatory force is that it can deprive the aggressor of the fruits of a surprise attack. The task of strategy is to decide on the relative emphasis to be given to offensive and defensive capabilities and the "mix" which will provide the greatest degree of deterrence.

In looking at the strategic equation for all-out war there is reason for serious concern. Our strategic striking power, on which we have heretofore relied as the major element of our security, is imperiled by Soviet missile developments and the inadequate dispersal of our Strategic Air Command. Our active defense designed against manned planes will have to be redesigned for the missile age. Our civil defense program is completely inadequate. The effort to keep up our capability for all-out war will therefore require a substantially greater effort.

## Limited War

Unfortunately, readiness for all-out war does not exhaust our strategic problem. For no matter how vast our over-all strength, we face the dilemma that the magnitude of the total does not assure its sufficiency in any particular situation. Even if we are able to deter all-out war by the threat of total annihilation, our peril remains. Until the development of a Soviet nuclear stockpile and the means to deliver it, our retaliatory force could serve as the major deterrent to Soviet aggression. But as the Soviet capability to attack American cities increases, it will raise the threshold

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of provocation which would unleash our retaliatory force. And with the increasing horror of weapons technology this threshold is constantly rising. It is not that we will not fight if our national survival is threatened. It is simply that we shall interpret the requirements of our survival increasingly stringently if we must weigh all objectives against the destruction of New York or Washington or Chicago. If all-out war becomes our only riposte to aggression, the Soviet Union will be enabled to use its strategic striking force as a shield behind which to expand by more limited methods and to confront us with the alternative of acceding to what will seem a marginal Soviet gain or a world-wide holocaust.

As a result, though all-out war is a great danger, it does not represent the most likely threat. Thus we face the strategic problem of limited war, the form of conflict which overturns the balance of power by installments, any one of which does not seem to warrant a final showdown.

The distinctive feature of limited war is that its outcome does not involve or seem to involve national survival. It is for this precise reason that we have had such difficulty in coming to grips with it. For any peripheral Soviet move raises doubts whether this particular encroachment warrants a final showdown. Another difficulty has been caused by our lack of mobile forces capable of intervening rapidly and decisively and of restoring a local situation before matters get out of hand. Thus we may be forced into the position of choosing between Armageddon and defeat without

[x]

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war. In each crisis our inhibitions have tended to exceed those of the
Soviet Union.

To a certain extent, the forces designed to deter all-out war will
also be useful in preventing or stifling limited war. It would be dangerous,
however, to rely too heavily on our strategic striking force to fight limited
war. Since the chief sanction against the expansion of a limited war resides
in a crushing capability for retaliation, the deterrent force must be kept at
a state of the highest readiness particularly during periods of limited
conflict. An aggressor who could tempt us to use up our strategic striking
force in a limited war would gain an advantage however those particular
military operations ended. To consider our strategic striking force as a
dual-purpose force would weaken the deterrent precisely when it should be
strongest. The practical effect of a dual-purpose weapons system is to
withdraw it from the availability for limited war.

It is therefore imperative that we develop forces which can intervene
rapidly and which are able to make their power felt with discrimination. We
require much more airlift capacity. Our mobile forces must be tailored to
the gamut of possible limited wars which may range from a war involving
several allies to relatively minor police actions. At one end of the spectrum
limited war may require a highly complicated weapons system including
nuclear weapons. On the other end of the spectrum it may involve con-
ventional forces capable of assisting friendly governments resisting
border incursions.

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The effectiveness of our power thus depends on our unmistakable
ability and willingness to oppose force with force at whatever level of
intensity may be required. We do not now possess that capability. The
greatest point of concern about the U.S. strategic position is that our
distaste for limited risks may ultimately lead us into the ultimate risk at a
rate determined not by us but by Communist policy.

The Political Problem

We must not make the mistake of assuming that even a diversified
military establishment can protect us against the total range of our dangers.
To begin with, force by itself is useless without the resolution to use it
if need be. A great deal, therefore depends not only on our physical but
also on our psychological and political readiness. An effective policy must
not only find the means to resist transformations of the strategic balance,
it must also be able to determine what transformations to resist. As events
have proved, the latter may be our most difficult challenge and it depends
on the wisdom and courage of our political leadership.

For our security can be imperiled not only by overt aggression but
also by transformations which are made to appear, insofar as is possible,
to be no war at all. Those "concealed wars" may break out in the form of
internal revolution or civil war; they may be instigated by outside forces
or merely be exploited by them. Greece has furnished one example;

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Vietnam another; the Middle East still another. Whatever the degree of initial Soviet responsibility, one of the greatest threats to the security of the Free World is gradual Soviet infiltration and domination of vital areas through steps each of which is so small and seemingly so "legitimate" that it does not seem to justify overt intervention.

These conflicts raise issues with which in terms of our preconceptions and the structure of our forces we are least prepared to deal. A civil war has not traditionally been thought to justify foreign intervention however much its outcome may affect the international balance. The gradual subversion of a government is difficult to deal with from the outside, even though the fate of millions may depend on it.

As a result, unless we have a clear understanding of our national purpose we shall find ourselves paralyzed in the face of upheavals which may completely overturn the international equilibrium. We must also realize that it is the essence of these concealed conflicts that the issue they present is deliberately and intrinsically unclear. To ask for certainty in such situations is a prescription for inaction. Nor is it possible in advance to determine the nature of the conflict or every United States response. The problem in its deepest sense is not military but political and will therefore be treated more fully by Subpanel I. It should be our aim to prevent such situations from breaking into the open. When they do become acute we may have a choice only between evils. Our security and

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that of the rest of the non-Communist world will **then hinge importantly on our**
willingness to protect the international equilibrium in situations which fit
neither the soldier's classic concept of war nor the diplomat's traditional
concept of aggression.

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V - THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

One of the most troublesome strategic problems is the role to be
played by nuclear weapons in a future conflict. It is complicated by the
fact that except for two now obsolete weapons at the end of World War II
no nuclear weapons have ever been set off in wartime. The effect of the
introduction of nuclear weapons into military operations is therefore to some
extent a matter of conjecture. It is argued by some that the use of nuclear
weapons marks the dividing line between all-out and limited war. It is
feared by others that nuclear weapons would cause such widespread de-
struction that they would devastate at least the area which is being fought
over. Still others maintain that even if there should be an intention to keep
the war limited, neither side would accept defeat without resorting to every
weapon in its arsenal.

These arguments have great weight. It is important, however,
to distinguish between those which apply to limited war as such and
those which apply to limited nuclear war only. For example, if it is
argued that neither side will accept defeat short of having exhausted
every means at its disposal, it would not seem to make any difference
whether the war started as a conventional or as a nuclear war. A power
unwilling to accept defeat in a nuclear war is not likely to be more prepared
to accept defeat in a conventional war. This particular argument
therefore amounts to a rejection of any concept of limited war,

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nuclear or otherwise. It tends to run counter to every experience since
World War II. If we keep our retaliatory force in a high state of readiness,
it can be expected that both sides will look for excuses to limit, not to
expand the war. The possibility of limited war depends on making all-out
war or an expansion of hostilities an even more unattractive course.

In dealing with the issue of nuclear weapons, we come up against
the hard fact that the choice is no longer entirely up to us. Whatever we
may decide, the Soviet Union and in time other powers as well may choose
to conduct its aggressions with nuclear weapons. The introduction of
nuclear weapons by an opponent would immediately raise the question of
our reaction. Would we be prepared to respond with all-out war? And if
not, we would be forced into a limited nuclear war under the worst possible
circumstances: in the confusion of battle and unready.

It does not seem likely or wise that we would respond to *any* use of
nuclear weapons with all-out war. The decision to engage in a war that
stakes our survival and may lead to a basic transformation of our society
will depend to a much greater extent on the issues under dispute than on the
weapons used. To attempt to keep a limited war conventional by the threat
of all-out war would in fact involve all the dilemmas of massive retaliation.
It would enable an opponent by increasing the level of risk slightly to give
us the choice between all-out war and surrender. It would enable him to
achieve a decisive victory through the introduction of nuclear weapons against
conventional forces and to leave the next move up to us.

[Y]

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Thus against a nuclear power we must always be prepared to fight a
limited nuclear war. Even should we decide to use conventional weapons
in certain circumstances, we would not dare to do so without a nuclear
establishment ready at hand. And in a war in which the U.S.S.R. is a
war in which the U.S.S.R. is a direct participant, nuclear weapons will
have to be used almost by necessity. In their face the huge Soviet con-
ventional armament becomes obsolescent. In their absence the Soviet Union
will have the choice of seeking to prevail with its large ground army and
failing that could still introduce nuclear weapons at a moment of maximum
difficulty for us.

That the Soviet Union is well aware of this is shown by its persistent
"ban the bomb" propaganda. Even an equality in nuclear weapons will not
change the fact that nuclear weapons complicate the tasks of an aggressor
and reduce the blackmail value of Soviet World War II type forces.

No one can look at the prospects of nuclear war with equanimity.
It raises many issues from "fall-out" to bomb testing to its moral aspect.
We shall deal with the issue of bomb testing in a later chapter. The
argument for not renouncing the use of nuclear weapons is that it represents
our best chance to maintain the peace and of reducing the Soviet advantage
in conventional forces. It is the price of our liberty and of our values.

[Y]

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VI - DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

Because of the tremendous significance of the affairs which center
in the Department of Defense, all studies of the national security inevitably
concern themselves to some extent with the organization and methods of the
Pentagon. This concern is not new. It has been a preoccupation of successive
administrations since the creation of the original National Military Establishment
ten years ago. It has been the subject of numerous studies which have found
the organization of the Department of Defense inadequate to its task.

While detailed organizational recommendations lead quickly to arguments
outside the scope of this panel's undertaking, we have nevertheless sought to
identify the critical areas of weakness and to advance several broad principles
which should guide the development of specific organizational changes. It
seems to us that the major defects in the present organization are inherent and
organic, and will be further aggravated by the passage of time. These defects
are three in number:

1 - As now defined, the roles and missions assigned to the individual military services are competitive, rather than complementary; moreover, they are out of accord with both weapons technology and the principal military threats to our national safety;

2 - The present organization and responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff precludes the development of a comprehensive and coherent strategic doctrine for the United States;

Chiefs of Staff includes the development of a comprehensive

3 - The present organization and responsibilities of the joint

army national security;

militia technology and the principal military threats to
complementarily moreover, they are out of accord with both
individual military services are competitive, rather than

1 - As now defined, the roles and responsibilities assigned to the
army are three in number:

organizational, and will be further aggravated by the baseless of time. These defects
seems to me that the major defects in the present organization are inherent and
which should guide the development of specific organizational changes. It

identify the critical areas of weakness and to advance several broad principles
outside the scope of this panel's undertaking, we have nevertheless sought to

While detailed organizational recommendations lead quickly to arguments
the organization of the Department of Defense inadequate to its task.

ten years ago. It has been the subject of numerous studies which have found
administrations since the creation of the original National Military Establishment
Pentagon. This concern is not new. It has been a preoccupation of successive
concern themselves to some extent with the organization and methods of the
in the Department of Defense, all studies of the national security inevitably

VI - DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

December 23, 1927

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3 - The Secretary of Defense is so burdened with the negative tasks of arbitrating and controlling inter-service disputes that he cannot play his full part in the initiation and development of high military policy.

These points will be discussed in order.

## The Problem of Roles and Missions

The range and destructiveness of modern weapons have tended to overleap the traditional boundaries among the services. As a result, our effort to develop an adequate strategic plan has been beset by interservice rivalry. This rivalry is not due fundamentally to "parochialism" on the part of our military leaders; it is built into the present assignment of roles and missions.

Ten years ago, whatever else was hoped for in the new defense organization, one result was expected by the public: that through joint planning by the Chiefs of Staff, supplemented when necessary by the authority of the Secretary of Defense, we would develop in concert our potential in all three media of operations: land, sea, and air. Such has not occurred. With the advantage of hindsight, it is now clear that the organization itself doomed this important goal.

However one judges the wisdom of this initial assignment of roles and missions, one fact is self evident: the stage was set for rivalry. The only

measuring communications self-sufficiency + the structure and individuality...The only

Houkamans指出:the wisdom at this initial assignment of roles and
important goal.

advantage of blindfold, it is now clear that the organization itself does not
use media of operational land, air, and sea. Such has not occurred. With the
Secretary of Defense, we would develop in concert our potential in all three
by the Chiefs of Staff, subordinated when necessary by the authority of the
organization, one result was expected by the public that through joint planning
ten years ago, whatever else was hoped for in the new defense

misaons.

of our military leaders; it is built into the present assignment of roles and
rituals. This royalty is not due fundamentally to "parochialism" on the part
effort to develop an adequate strategic plan has been made by inter-service
overseas the traditional boundaries among the services. As a result, our
The range and destru ctiveness of modern weapons have tended to

demonstration and development of high military policy.

service disputes that he cannot play his full part in
negative tasks of arbitrating and controlling inter-

December 23, 1927
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question in this regard was whether the competition could be kept at a healthy level and prevented from becoming destructive of efficiency (cf. The "B-36 Hearings").

Then came the new capabilities inherent in guided missiles. The army, never content with the quantity on the organization of its tactical air support saw the possibility of again having its own tactical air power. It also saw its short range air defense missiles developing into replacements for manned interceptor aircraft, and capable further of destroying enemy ballistic missiles in flight. The navy saw the possibilities of missiles launched from ships and submarines enlarging its role in strategic air warfare. Needless to say, the air force saw in all of this an undermining of the integrity of its mission and the unity of air power which had supplied the very reason for its creation.

For More importantly, the assignment of roles and missions among the Army, Air Force and the Navy has become increasingly inconsistent with the new technology. Each of these services has had the mission of defeating its enemy counterpart: the Army has had primary responsibility for the land battle, the Navy for control of the seas and the Air Force for the control of the air. These missions were based, in effect, on means of locomotion with everything moving by water assigned to the Navy, everything moving by land assigned to the Army and everything moving through the air assigned to the Air Force.

Ten years ago this assignment of roles still represented distinguishable strategic tasks. Each service was, therefore, able to control exclusively the

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weapons considered essential for achieving its mission. In general it could
develop its own strategy without too much risk of duplicating the tasks of a
sister service, and without too much risk of conflict over the issue of what
constituted essential targets.

But the long-range airplane, the ballistic missile and the overwhelming
destructiveness of the new weapons have almost obliterated the traditional
boundaries among the services. Today, no service can achieve its primary
mission without either trespassing on the role of the other services or calling
on them for assistance. Some services, like the Navy, operate in all the media-
sea, land and air. Other missions are shared by two or more services, such as
tactical air support. Thus we have three services with airpower and two with
armies; the Air Force responsible for coordinating air defense but the Army
responsible for the air defense of specific targets.

As a result the division of functions which worked without fundamental
frictions until the end of World War II has become a source of bitter rivalry
in the nuclear age. Each new weapon has led to a wrangle as to which service
should control it. It is inherent in the philosophy and training of each service
that it should see in the developing enemy threat predominantly those elements
which its own particular organization seems best adapted to counter. And each
service by a natural rationalization, judges the proper balance of forces to be
that one which maximizes its own role.

Such a procedure is costly and inefficient. It leads to a duplication of

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weapons systems. It prevents us from drawing the full benefit from our military expenditures and in every crisis confronts our policy makers with needlessly conflicting advice. New weapons are pressed into the strait jacket of obsolescent missions instead of refashioning missions to conform to revolutionary departures in technology and to new military problems.

Conversely, where there is no competition or duplication of mission, and little glamor in the tasks, the present organization may neglect certain vital tasks. An example is the problem of airlift for the ground forces. Providing such facilities our airforce responsibility is very expensive. When budgets are tight, the airforce is not likely to favor this mission at the expense of its primary task of defeating the enemy in the air, especially against the background of growing Soviet strength in planes and missiles. On the other hand the *army* is prevented by our mechanistic assignment of functions from developing and operating the transport aircraft it must have to move its forces swiftly to the combat zone.

## The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Except for the Chairman, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the senior officers of the military services. Therefore, even with the best will in the world, they must be in considerable part advocates of a service point of view. Each has risen to his position through a lifetime of dedication to his service. He is primarily the product of its training schools, its problems, its environment. Maintaining the status and morale of his service can never be far

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from his mind. Thus under the present organization most of the decisive pressures on the JCS organization are imposed by the individual services, and it functions too often as a committee of partisan adversaries engaged in advancing service positions and compromising service differences. Too little in present arrangements permits the Chiefs of Staff time and opportunity to think spontaneously or comprehensively about overall strategic problems. The result is that our military plans for meeting foreseeable threats are a patchwork of compromise between conflicting strategic concepts or simply completely uncoordinated service war plans. The readiness of our forces for the time of dire emergency cannot be allowed to rest solely on committee action.

## The Role of the Secretary of Defense

The organization of the military establishment into three competing services, and the aggravation of this difficulty by obsolete roles & missions, have shaped the role of the Secretary of Defense in ways not foreseen when the office was created in 1947. To a great extent these conditions have confined him to the essentially negative functions of adjudication and discipline. He has become the referee in disputes over policy issues originating in the services or in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is the essence of a referee's position that disputes reach him only after positions have hardened. The Secretary of Defense has, in consequence, found it difficult to play the positive, creative role which befits the cabinet officer who is a full member, with the President and the Secretary of State, of the high policy triumvirate for foreign and military affairs.

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In order to exercise the functions of adjudication and discipline, the Secretary of Defense and his staff are overwhelmed with many housekeeping and management functions which, were it not for deep-seated interservice rivalry, could be better handled by the individual services. This condition is reflected in a proliferation of Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the elaborate organization of the Secretary's office as a vast business concern with heavy emphasis on financial controls. We certainly do not dispute the need for financial controls, nor for the nation's largest enterprise to be run in a business-like manner. Nevertheless a principal objective of any reorganization plan should be to create conditions in which the Secretary of Defense can play a larger, more positive role in the initiation and formulation of broad military policy, and can relegate to the substructures of the defense organization a substantial portion of his present administrative burden.

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## Proposed Remedies

The foregoing analysis indicates that the difficulties described are inherent in the present organization of the Defense Department, that they cannot be removed merely by adjustments of the present structure. The obstacles to correcting these deficiencies are formidable indeed, and no panacea is at hand. Yet the growing increase in technological complexity, the foreseeable rise in the cost of maintaining first-line weapons systems, and the interdependence of foreign policy and military capability make it clear to us that our future security -- which is to say, our survival as a nation -- will require a far more efficient system for military planning and military decisions than now exists.

To remedy the central weaknesses, we feel competent to put forward certain general proposals for consideration. In our judgment a plan for reorganization of the Defense Department should include the following elements:

a) The military services ~~should be removed from the channel of operational command.~~ They should cease to be individually responsible for carrying out particular combat missions. Their function should henceforth be to provide administrative support for the combined functional commands (to be described below) in matters of recruitment, training, research, procurement and supply. Freed from the responsibilities for operational commands, the service chiefs and their civilian superiors could concentrate on tasks of management and logistics.

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b) All of the operational military forces of the United States should be organized into functional commands to perform the missions which seem called for by our strategic requirements. No foreseeable conflict will fit the category of land, sea or air battle. As a result, unified commands are essential for the conduct of military operations as in fact they have been both in World War II and in the Korean War. Each such command should be composed of the appropriate elements from each military service brought together under a single commander. The units assigned to each functional commander should be organic to his command and not simply placed temporarily under his operational control. As units completed their training within the existing services they would be assigned to a functional command. Each command would be, in effect, a combined force with its own doctrine and trained to carry out distinctive tasks.

The composition and mission of these commands should not be frozen by legislation. They should be determined from time to time in the President's discretion, so that they remain congruent with technology and with the tasks an evolving strategy will require to be performed.

In such an organization officers would be brought more naturally to address themselves to strategic doctrine. To be sure, there will be rivalry between the functional commands; competition is a healthy concomitant of high morale. But with each functional area representing a distinguishable strategic option, the requirements of self-interest and of strategic doctrine would be much more in harmony than now.

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c) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be given a **stronger role, specifically by giving him control over the staff. He should also be designated Principal Military Advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the only member who can give his full-time attention to problems of overall strategic doctrine. It is therefore logical that he be the **Principal Military Advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense** instead of the Joint Chiefs collectively. At the same time he should be in a position to shape strategic planning. One major obstacle is the situation in which officers on inter-service committees are negotiators rather than planners and tend to represent the point of view of a service rather than the overall approach. A unified staff under the direct control of the Chairman would remove at least some of the service pressures on the members of the staff.

d) The chain of operational command should be from the **President through the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** Any modern war requires a rapid reaction time and this can be achieved only if there are a minimum number of organizational layers. Since the present division of functions among the military services often represents no distinguishable strategic option, the separate military departments should be relieved from responsibility for military operations. At the same time this proposal recognizes that the Secretary of Defense is the deputy commander-in-chief. His position in the line of command should thus **preserve safeguard** civilian control over the armed forces.

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e) The line of logistic command should be from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the existing military departments. This recommendation is an application to logistics and manpower of the previous recommendation.

f) All officers above the rank of Brigadier General or equivalent should be absorbed into a new and separate service (which might be called the Armed Service of the United States). For effective overall planning, it is essential that we develop a group of officers who throughout their careers have been encouraged to concern themselves with questions of strategic doctrine.

The procedure recommended here would retain the specialization necessary to command specific units and the morale which goes with membership in a service. At the higher levels, however, where the requirement is for an overall view there would exist a group of officers whose primary loyalties transcend service boundaries. Since entry into this group would be the goal of all officers throughout their careers, junior officers would have an incentive to take an overall view. Their future would depend on their ability to consider the whole, not as is so frequently the case today on the ability to defend the point of view of their service on interdepartmental committees. This proposal takes cognizance of the great impetus derived from service experience and motivation; but service experience will be most effective if it can be freed from the necessity of adhering to current instructions of individual services.

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g) The Secretary of Defense should be given authority to cancel
or transfer development and procurement programs among the services.
He should also be given a direct appropriation for the conduct of long-
range research and development programs not carried out by any of the
services. One of the outstanding characteristics of the present period is
the integral connection between strategy and technology. When technology
was relatively stable, the technical aspect of military planning usually
involved problems either of procurement or of engineering. But today with
technology developing at an explosive rate, the direction of its change is
itself a primary strategic concern. As a result, the next war may well be
won or lost in the laboratories and on the drawing boards. As long as the
Secretary of Defense cannot shape the direction of research and development,
his role will be the essentially passive one of arbitrating disputes formulated
elsewhere. Where so much depends on keeping up and staying ahead in the
technological race, it is essential that our weapons development reflects
a clear sense of direction and not a compromise.

Research and development poses another challenge to our military
establishment. In the fields of engineering and procurement where most of
its experience lies, goals are fixed and progress can be gauged by well under-
stood criteria. By contrast, it is the nature of basic research that its results
are uncertain and that together with its very discoveries it produces the
criteria for judging them. A bureaucratic approach to it can only stifle creativ-
ity. The mode of organization and the pattern of creativity therefore tend to

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clash and when they do bureaucratic norms should be subordinate. With
respect to our fundamental problem of regaining our technological supremacy,
it is the task of our military establishment -- as of the national government --
to bring about an environment conducive to real creativity. As our government
has grown, it has followed the familiar course into a system of rewards that
favor caution and mediocrity. Seldom is anyone punished for inaction, but
often for measures that were risky and failed. It is especially important that
this pattern be reversed in research where there is an inherent uncertainty
and where great achievement is particularly inseparable from great risk.

The Problem of Lead Times

Lead time -- the interval between conception and execution -- has
never been more crucial. The best plans will be fruitless if they cannot be
implemented sufficiently quickly. The best production apparatus will be
ineffective if it requires too long to produce the necessary implements of war.
A nation can score a basic advantage if it can either develop or produce
weapons more rapidly than its opponent.

One of the major weaknesses in our strategic posture has been our
inordinately long lead times. They have been produced in part by the cumber-
some machinery in the Department of Defense and the National Government.
In part they have been caused by a quest for perfection in development and its
corollary an overconcern with the avoidance of mistake. It is essential that

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December 23, 1957

we compress our lead times and the recommendations in this report should help in this direction. At the same time there has to be a greater willingness to run risks both in procurement and in development. *However, it is of greater importance than security.*

## Strategy and Psychology

One of the great *weaknesses* in the organization of our national government is the absence of a clear focus to assess the psychological impact of our actions. Whatever the wisdom of the decision not to engage in a race with the Soviets in the satellite field, it does not appear that the psychological impact of a Soviet breakthrough in this field had been sufficiently analyzed.

Yet *theoretically* the more revolutionary developments of technology, the more their significance depends on the interpretation placed on them. Since very few of the modern weapons have ever been used in wartime, *their impact on policy reflects a great deal* depends on *what people think with respect to them*. It is therefore essential that within our national government there exist a mechanism to assess the impact both at home and abroad of our actions in the military field as in others. This is a problem far transcending the organization of the Department of Defense. Is is mentioned here only because a section on organizational remedies would be incomplete without it.

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## Summary

If adopted together, the proposals in this chapter give promise of achieving the following objectives: (1) they would eliminate the root causes of interservice rivalry while fully utilizing the reservoir of leadership and special skills which each service represents; (2) through the device of functional combatant commands, the U.S. armed forces would be organized to carry out the distinguishable strategic and tactical tasks which correspond to the actual military threats which confront us; (3) through creation of a separate service for senior officers and provision for its administration by the Secretary of Defense, the motivation of the entire officer corps would be basically changed, for the goal of high rank and broad command could be reached only by transcending the boundaries of a particular service; (4) responsibility for strategic planning and for strategic direction of the armed forces would be clearly fixed in a high professional officer responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and supported by a strong staff drawn from all of the services. Achievement of these objectives would provide a unity and a coherence that are now absent from our Defense organization.

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December 22, 1957

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## VII - ALLIANCES AND THE ROLE OF FORCE

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has entered into a wide variety of military agreements with other states ranging from the sweeping multilateral defense arrangements of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Association to a large number of bilateral agreements with individual nations. Our Army, Navy and Air Forces overseas are a token of our determination to carry out these commitments.

### The Basis of the U.S. System of Alliances

Strategically, the U.S. system of alliances is invaluable in the overall world-balance of power. Overseas bases provide advanced observation and warning posts against Soviet aggression. They bring striking forces closer to enemy targets, thus complicating the opponent's defensive problem. The advant of missiles will not reduce the importance of alliances for the security of all their members. To be sure, missiles will increase the vulnerability of many of our allies, as well as of our overseas airbases. On the other hand, inter- mediate and short-range missiles can reach almost all of the U.S.S.R. from present free-world territory. The geographic relationship is such that inter- mediate range missiles in the hands or on the territory of our allies have the same strategic significance as intercontinental missiles in the hands of the U.S.S.R. And the shorter range the missile, the more mobile its launching site and, therefore, the more invulnerable to Soviet surprise attack.

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The significance of alliances has been further increased by the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile. As long as the United States possessed an atomic monopoly, the chief significance of alliances was in providing advance notice of American intentions. As long as the chief deterrent to Soviet aggression was thought to reside in U.S. superiority in strategic striking power, there was an understandable reluctance on the part of our allies to make a major military effort of their own. As long as it was believed that the issue of a war would be decided elsewhere, few of our allies saw much significance in a large military contribution of their own. The reliance on an all-out strategy tended to run counter to our desires for building _allied_ strength.

But with the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the means to deliver it, _all_ members of the alliance have an equal interest in removing any Soviet illusion that it might use its capability for all-out war as a shield behind which to expand by more limited means. They also share an interest to keep any war that does break out to the smallest proportions. This is possible only to the extent that local resistance is feasible. Alliance arrangements can provide local forces to deter or check limited aggression. They can strengthen local will to resist because they guarantee that a threatened country would not stand alone. The efficacy of our alliance policy may not only determine victory or defeat in limited war; it is a good insurance against such wars breaking out in the first place.

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Alliances and the United Nations

Nothing said about our alliance system should be taken as a derogation
of the United Nations. The United Nations remains the greatest symbol of
man's hope for peace. It has proved its ability to act in a number of situations
from Korea to Suez. It remains an indispensable forum for expressing the hopes
of humanity.

Still it would be idle to pretend that under present circumstances the
United Nations can replace our alliance policy. The Soviet veto in the Security
Council prevents effective action in all situations where Communist powers are
parties to the dispute. And these are precisely the cases which present the
gravest threat to the security of the world. Moreover, many other dangers may
see the United Nations paralyzed either by Communist intransigence or by
disputes among U. N. members extraneous to the issues actually at stake.
Thus while we should strive to transform resistance to aggression into the
widest possible expression of the police powers of humanity, we cannot permit
the world to be dominated by hostile states because these have been able to
hamstring the machinery of the United Nations. Failing United Nations action
we should try to act in concert with the widest grouping of states attainable --
a possibility foreseen in Articles 51 and 52 which has provided the juridical
basis of our system of alliances within the world organization. Our system of
alliances thus is not an alternative to the United Nations but its complement:
it can provide security where the processes of the United Nations may be too
slow or its action ineffective.

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Pressure on Our Alliance System

To assert that alliances are important does not imply that all is well with our alliance policy. Any evaluation must recognize three sets of forces tending to weaken our system of alliances: the fear of Communist military power, the ambiguity of communist tactics of aggression, and the lack of a defense concept offering to our allies reasonable prospects of security. Any alliance embracing a large number of nations over a considerable territory tends to diminish in effectiveness, especially in the face of a challenge that does not present a clear and present danger to the entire alliance. Our allies are faced with a situation in which, at one and the same time, the danger of war seems less imminent and the fear of the consequences of war grows greater.

In Europe and in Asia, the communist bloc is steadily improving its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Against the threat of nuclear attack, many of our allies have little defense of their own.

The fear that the use of even the smallest atomic weapon would involve enormous destruction -- a fear assiduously fostered by the U.S.S.R. -- has weakened the will to resist of many of our allies, in and out of NATO.

A correlative force contributing to the reluctance of many countries to make a substantial military effort is the growing cost and complexity of modern weapons. This imposes a fearful burden on frail economies as well as requiring skills and facilities which some of our allies do not have. The attainment of a capability to deter or to check local aggression is made much more difficult and in many cases such capabilities are actually decreasing, while the need for

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such local deterrents has become greater than ever. Aggravating the other pressures on our alliance arrangements is the concept of aggression which underlies them. Existing treaties essentially are concerned with open attack by armed regular troops, and do not cover a whole range of communist aggressive techniques, from civil war or economic strangulation to slow takeovers by communist-guided and communist-armed fifth columns.

As a result the communist bloc has learned that if it keeps its challenges sufficiently ambiguous, and below the level which the non-communist world considers to warrant major war, we and our allies may prove unable or unwilling to take effective action. Neither Korea nor Indochina, for example, seemed to some of our allies worth running major risks, and Suez found the shoe on the other foot. Confronted by an ambiguous threat, even a group of nations whose interests are very similar find it exceedingly difficult to achieve an effective concerted response.

## Alliance Strategy

One of the major problems faced by our alliance policy is to devise a military strategy equally meaningful to us and to our allies. In view of its manifold interests and commitments the United States has been understandably reluctant to commit itself specifically to defend allied territories, and has relied largely on its strategic striking power, supplemented by mobile sea and tactical air power, to deter aggression at all levels. While our allies have of necessity acquiesced in this concept, they have never abandoned their wish to see their own homelands protected from local invasion or devastation.

see their own homelands protected from local invasion or deprivation.

necessity enforced in this concept, they have never abandoned their wish to
sactical cit power, to deter aggression at all levels. While our allies have of
toiled largely on its strategic striking power, supplemented by mobile sea and
reluctant to commit itself specifically to defend allied territories, and has
unwieldy interests and commitments the United States has been underhandly
a military strategy equally meaningful to us and to our allies. In view of its

Alliance Strategy

concerned resource.

interests are very similar find it exceedingly difficult to achieve an effective
other foot. Contrasted by an ambitious threat, even a group of nations whose
some of our allies worth running major risks, and States found the shoe on the
to take effective action. Neither Korea nor Indochina, for example, seemed to
consider to warrant major war, we and our allies may prove unable or unwilling
sufficiently ambitious, and below the level which the non-communist world

As a result the commercial bloc has learned that if it keeps its challenge
communist-divided and communist-armed fifth column.

technique, from civil war or economic entanglement to slow takeovers by
by armed regular troops, and do not cover a whole range of communist aggressors
underneath them. Exerting pressure essentially are concerned with open attack
breaches on our alliance arrangements if the concept of aggression which
such local deterrents has become greater than ever. Aggravating the other

December 33, 1933
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This difference of concepts has meant that, with the partial exception
of NATO our security arrangements are not based on a military strategy equally
meaningful to all partners. This lack of an agreed strategy has resulted in
weaknesses, indecisions and contradictions at all levels of our security
arrangements. It has led to endless difficulties in formulating and implementing
U.S. base agreements and military aid programs. There have been disagreements
among the U.S. services concerning military requirements and programs. And
there has been a reluctance on the part of our allies to make or to meet specific
force commitments, partly because the function those forces would perform has
been so vague. Moreover our strategy is largely atomic, those of our allies
generally non-atomic, and their forces are designed accordingly. Thus as
nuclear weapons and delivery systems increase, present allied forces will
become less capable of making meaningful military contributions to other than
internal security missions.

The United States must therefore make a concerted effort, together with
its allies, to develop and obtain plans meeting the joint security requirements
of all partners. The act of consultation will be of itself of great significance
for one of the reasons for the sense of impotence of many of our allies is
ignorance about the nature of modern military technology and a sense of being
left out from decisions which affect their fate. If allied forces are to be capable
of acting in concert with U.S. forces, we will have to assist in their transformation and development. This does not mean we should equip all allied elements

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along the lines of comparable U.S. units. To the maximum degree possible both the types and levels of equipment provided allied forces should be tailored to the missions which suit their particular security requirements. And we should not set standards for our allies based on our own levels of technology. But we must establish a measure of harmony between the tactical doctrine of our allies and our own and equip the respective forces accordingly.

In effect, the free world is faced with a task of strengthening and re-equipping its forces at least comparable in magnitude to that which it faced in 1950, and at a time when both rapidly changing technology and, in many parts of the world, decreasing popular support for military programs combine to make the job even more costly and difficult. It is probable that the United States will have to provide -- either directly or indirectly -- much of the equipment needed by our allies, or else see their political stability decline along with their military strength. As a result, U.S. military aid programs will necessarily be costly.

Nor are the proposed military measures sufficient by themselves. They must be supplemented by positive programs for political cohesiveness, for economic and technical assistance, and by other measures discussed more fully by various groups of the overall study project of which this panel is but one part.

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The actions required to strengthen our system of alliances will be
neither easy nor cheap. And, despite our efforts, we can still expect to
be confronted with situations in which the choice may seem to lie between
acquiescence in communist aggression or acceptance of splits among our
allies. This much we can say concerning such decisions: we must act with
resolution or accept grave losses.

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December 22, 1957

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# VIII - THE SPECIAL CASE OF NATO

## Introduction

It is no derogation of the value of our alliances in other parts of the world to give special treatment in this report to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is militarily the most highly developed of our multiple alliances. It covers an area of great cultural and economic significance to both East and West. It embraces nations with whom we share a common spiritual and cultural heritage.

In order to appreciate the importance of NATO we need only to contemplate our situation if Western Europe were in Soviet hands. The Communist Bloc would have an industrial potential equal to our own. It would lie astride the world's main communications lines. It could flank and engulf the Middle East. It would be able to manipulate the man power, factories and cultural prestige of Europe to dominate Africa and infiltrate South America.

## The Weaknesses of NATO

The factors which make the NATO area essential to U.S. security also create difficulties and complications. For Western Europe is deeply affected by the revolutionary transformation going on in the world. European political and economic power has been weakened by the wholesale and continuing loss of colonial possessions in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. As the danger of Soviet aggression has come to seem less imminent, the sense of urgency on

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which NATO was founded has declined and a number of rivalries and irritations between NATO members have been revived. The dispute over Cyprus was permitted to fester to the detriment of NATO; France, against the wishes of some of her allies remains heavily embroiled in Algeria. Germany is offered the choice of unification on Soviet terms or continued membership in NATO and no unification. The Anglo-French adventure in Suez has not strengthened NATO ties while the recent British White Paper on Defense, whose issuance was surely hastened by the debacle at Suez, foreshadows sharp reductions of British military power in Germany.

Sentiment toward neutralism, or at least toward a more passive adherence to the alliance, has been growing in some NATO countries. Many factors contribute to this psychological retreat from nuclear reality including the relative weakness of our NATO partners as compared to the two super states and the frictions and antagonisms inherent in any alliance system. But perhaps the most pervasive reason is the fear of the consequences of nuclear warfare. This fear involves paradox and ambivalence: Europeans recoil from the damage and destruction they believe would result from the use of any sort of atomic weapons on their densely populated territories, but they are also beginning to be afraid that the growing Soviet nuclear stockpile will make the U.S. reluctant to risk devastation of the American mainland in order to protect Europe.

This does not mean that NATO is falling apart or has lost its importance. Whatever the disagreements within NATO, the U.S.S.R. has demonstrated the significance it attaches to NATO by its incessant efforts to disrupt it. But it

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does mean that NATO will have to be adapted to the new conditions created by an evolving technology. It will have to find new means of political and economic collaboration; it will have to find a new expression for its military strategy.

## NATO Strategy

However, before either of these objectives can be attained, attention will have to be paid to certain fundamental weaknesses in NATO strategy and military policy. Since 1954, all NATO planning has been based on the assumption that in any major war NATO forces would use nuclear weapons from the outset. Accordingly, NATO strategy calls for the maintenance of two components: a shield of local tactical forces and a sword of nuclear retaliatory force. The shield component of NATO has a double purpose: it provides sufficient tactical forces in Western Europe to discourage or contain local aggression, and its presence notifies the communists that a major aggression, with which these forces might not be able to cope, would trigger the second component of NATO strategy, the sword of strategic striking forces carrying nuclear weapons.

However, three factors have served to cast serious doubts upon this strategy. The first is the Soviet development of a large-scale air-atomic capability, which has led to fears that the "sword" of NATO -- the strategic air forces of the United States and the United Kingdom -- may not be unsheathed in the event of Soviet aggression.

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The second factor is that recent trends in U.S. military policy, and perhaps even more in British military policy, have done much to discredit the NATO doctrine, for both countries have emphasized the massive deterrent rather than the shield force. Thus the Europeans are placed in a position where they can no longer trust the strategic striking force to deter war, and yet see that force strengthened at the apparent expense of forces needed for their defense. Coupled with this is the fact that the strategic striking forces are not under NATO command, that of the tactical forces only the British and the Americans possess nuclear weapons, and that the opposing Soviet forces are daily increasing *their* capabilities to wage both strategic and tactical nuclear warfare. Under these circumstances many Europeans may well regard war as solely a choice between occupation and destruction.

A third factor making for instability is the reverse of the above: a tendency on the part of some NATO allies to seek to escape their dilemmas by a policy of disengagement. There is an understandable temptation to depend for deterrence on the military effort of a stronger power and, should aggression take place nevertheless, to rely for protection on a war fought elsewhere. Thus while the strategic striking forces in the exclusive possession of the United States and the United Kingdom tend to produce a sense of impotence, they also provide a feeling of security inhibiting a major effort.

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NATO Objectives

The problem of NATO is therefore one of will as much as of power.
All partners must realize that security can be enhanced only by a sharing of
risks. And they should all be placed into a position where they are able to
contribute, at least to some extent, to their own security.

The ultimate answers to the problems of NATO will be found not in
the realm of strategy but of policy. NATO to survive must generate a common
sense of political purpose. Many of the difficulties of NATO are aspects of
East-West relations in general; others are produced by situations outside of
NATO area proper. Subpanel I is dealing with the political problem at greater
length. Still, it would be idle to pretend that an alliance designed to provide
security against aggression can survive if it is not able to develop a common
military strategy in which all partners can play a role. If it cannot adapt itself
to new conditions, it must of necessity become sterile.

Fortunately there are two factors which seem to offer possibilities for
a viable common strategy. The first of these is the disaffection in the Soviet
bloc, so vividly illustrated in the cases of Hungary and Poland. This reduces
the combat value of satellite forces and makes even more precarious the already
tenuous line of communications between the Soviet forces in Central Europe and
their home base. The second, and more important, is the availability in quantity
of tactical nuclear weapons. The great advantage accruing to tactical defensive
forces, through preparation of positions, prior determination of target areas and

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December 22, 1957

stockpiling of both nuclear and conventional munitions, offers hope that even relatively small NATO forces could hurl back a local attack and blunt major aggression. It is perhaps too early to say that this is possible; it is crucial that we re-examine our present concept of the capabilities required to defend Western Europe in addition to the threat of strategic retaliation on the U.S.S.R.

Thus a prime element in the new strategy should be the strengthening of the NATO shield forces and backing them up with locally based missiles. The ability to resist local incursions will remove one temptation to aggression. The knowledge that an attack will meet with substantial local resistance provides an additional deterrent to Soviet aggression. The United States should approach with conviction this task of strengthening the shield forces, for it is equally in our interest to see that a conflict arising in Europe, either by design or by miscalculation, does not immediately result in all-out war.

A corollary of this central problem of establishing an adequate NATO shield is to provide within Europe -- controlled by Europeans -- an atomic capability that will substantially reduce Europe's dependence on U.S. strategic air power. This is necessary both to restore the declining power position of NATO vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. and to bolster the European sense of hope and of participation, which are basic ingredients of the will to resist. The development of European forces armed with nuclear weapons, and possessing their own delivery systems could create a kind of atomic stand-off between Europe and the U.S.S.R., similar to the broader strategic stand-off now existing between the United States and the Soviet Union.

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A strong NATO shield is all the more important because one of the purposes of the growing Soviet naval threat is undoubtedly to bring about a situation where the Soviet Union may be able to interrupt sea communications between us and our NATO allies by submarines and by mining European harbors.

In such a situation, the willingness to resist a simultaneous Soviet invasion will depend importantly on the forces available in Europe and under NATO control.

## The Role of the United States

As the strongest power in NATO, and the most influential in shaping its counsels, the United States has a major role to play in carrying out the policies recommended. First of all, this will require that we share with our allies scientific and technical information and that we assist in mobilizing the research and development capability of NATO both in the civilian and the military field. Second, we must strive for a true military interdependence which closely ties together the United States and the other NATO powers.

Thirdly, we must acknowledge the necessity for maintaining in Europe for an indefinite period a strong contribution to the shield forces. And finally, we must provide those of our allies which desire them with nuclear weapons and delivery systems, as well as with some of the other complex equipment of modern war.

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December 22, 1957

It will be unrealistic to say that such policies would be either cheap or without risk. There are always questions of cost to be considered and issues of security against espionage to be weighed. These are more than unbalanced however by the need to strengthen Europe militarily, in order for us to be effective politically. A strong, self-reliant Europe is a major American concern. Such a Europe, continuing along its present path toward greater unity, could become a great partner in the future evolution of free society.

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# IX - THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS AND ARMAMENTS

## Arms and the Prospects of Peace

The destructiveness of modern weapons have focussed the hopes of mankind as never before on the attainment of a stable peace. It is only natural that considerable attention has been paid to the effort of reducing tensions through the reduction and control of armaments.

This panel, as all Americans, considers the achievement of a peaceful world the primary challenge before mankind. The American people have demonstrated their dedication to this goal by their unilateral and drastic disarmament immediately after World War II, by their refusal to take advantage of the atomic monopoly, by their patience and moderation in the face of constant Soviet provocation. Even after the Greek civil war, the Berlin blockade, and the Korean War caused us to undertake a substantial rearmament program, we have responded to every seeming relaxation of tension by unilaterally reducing our military establishment sometimes even below the point of safety. In fact, many of the difficulties described in this report are due to this tendency.

The desirability of easing international tensions therefore does not require argument. It would be highly irresponsible, however, were a report to raise hopes which cannot be fulfilled or hold out prospects which on closer examination prove to increase our peril. However dangerous the

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multiplying armaments, the illusion of security brought about by a spurious
agreement to disarm would be a poor substitute for vigilance based on strength.

Genuine, enforceable, inspected disarmament will always be a U.S.
objective. Yet we must realize that of all the outstanding issues, disarmament
is the most difficult problem to settle directly. There are many other problems
the settlement of which would greatly ease tensions and almost automatically
bring about a reduction of arms, the unification of Germany for example or
Soviet attempts to stir up the Middle East. We will make greater progress
in disarmament negotiations if we face frankly their inherent difficulty and
if we are not seduced by Soviet slogans which in the past have used these
negotiations as a means to disarm their intended victims.

The nature of disarmament must be understood if peace and not
slavery is to result from efforts to attain it. It has several meanings, all
of which hide great complexities: the reduction of forces, the control of
arms, the prevention of surprise attack and the end of bomb testing. Each
will be considered in turn.

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The Reduction and Control of Arms

Reduction of forces is always a difficult matter to negotiate because it seeks to compare incommensurable quantities. What for example is the relation between the U.S. Strategic Air Command and the ability of Soviet ground forces to overrun adjacent countries? How does one compare an aircraft carrier to a Soviet armored division? If the United States disbanded its Strategic Air Command, it would take a decade at least to reconstitute. The Soviet Union can demobilize parts of its vast army and still retain the ability to reconstitute it from reserve components at a moment's notice.

Moreover, the Soviet Union is not likely to accept a reduction of forces which curtailed its ability to control the satellites or to play a major role in areas like the Middle East. But forces sufficient to accomplish this task are also sufficient to imperil all the powers around the Soviet periphery. A reduction of forces which leaves unimpaired the Soviet ability to overrun its neighbors will not diminish the basic security problem of the non-Soviet world.

Reduction of armaments is not meaningful unless there exist safeguards against violations of the agreement. But reduction of forces, always a difficult matter to control, have become more complicated by the increasingly rapid rate of technological change. Scientific research and development can decide the armament race. Hence no reduction in standing forces, however scrupulously

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carried out can protect a nation against a technological breakthrough --
a scientific discovery which drastically changes the strategic balance.
The fact that so much of the armaments race occurs in laboratories makes
control and inspection highly complicated. It is difficult to find something
when one does not know what it is one is looking for.

At the same time, technology has tended to change faster than the
pace of negotiations. Many schemes which would be meaningful if accepted
at the *beginning* of a certain technological development turn ineffective when
the technology is fully developed. Thus acceptance by the Soviet Union of
the U.S. Baruch-Lilienthal plan of 1946 which proposed the elimination of
nuclear stockpiles might have practically eliminated the possibility of nuclear
war. In the meantime so much fissionable material has been produced and it
is so easily hidden that no control scheme could guarantee against a violation.
And the spread of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will complicate the
problem even more because fissionable material is relatively easily diverted
from peaceful to military uses and because the dividing line between the two
is so narrow.

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The Problem of Surprise Attack

Because a controlled and verifiable reduction in forces has proved
so complicated, the major emphasis of disarmament efforts has turned to
the prevention of surprise attack. It is often argued that an inspection system
which reduced the danger of surprise attack would also remove some of the
urgent strains from international relationships.

There is no doubt that the danger of surprise attack contributes to the
tensions of the nuclear age. But with evolving technology it is doubtful whether
aerial inspection will significantly reduce the element of surprise. The high
state of readiness required of strategic striking forces means that they need no
noticeable mobilization to launch their blow. Thus it will be difficult to tell
whether a given flight of planes is on a training mission or is launching a
surprise attack until the early warning line is crossed.

As the speed of planes increases, warning times will be progressively
reduced. In the age of the Inter-continental Ballistic Missile, which is close
upon us, the maximum warning time afforded by even a perfect inspection
system will be half an hour, the period of time the missile will be in transit.
Under such circumstances, even a foolproof inspection system will tell largely
what is already known: that the opponent possesses the capability to launch a
devastating attack on very short notice and with a minimum of warning.

But if aerial inspection can no longer protect against surprise attack,
it can reveal an almost equally grave threat from hidden installations. Until
recently, there has been great hesitation in the free world to consider aerial

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surveillance without the permission of the country being observed. With the
development of earth satellites however, there exists an excellent means of
observation: in a relatively short time earth satellites can be equipped with
long-range cameras and radar. Accordingly, the U. S. should place at the
disposal of the U. N. as soon as practicable a reconnaissance satellite which
could apprise the world of relative military strengths. Even a partial inspection
system, operated by the U. N. might protect the world to a degree from hidden
military capabilities. But more than this is unlikely from aerial inspection.
Much as we would like to be more optimistic, we cannot see how present
vigilance could be reduced or insecurity be removed, by any inspection system
now in prospect.

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The Problem of War Limitation

Since all-out war could start not only by surprise attack, but also by
spreading of a small war, this study has considered various suggestions for
preventing the catastrophe of an all-out war caused by miscalculation or
through the spreading of small wars. It seems doubtful that ground rules
for the conduct of limited war could be established by mutual agreement, since
in order to undermine the will to resist, the Soviet Union has every interest
in painting the consequences of resistance in direct terms. Nevertheless,
it would seem wise for the U. S. to include on the agenda of disarmament
negotiations concrete proposals to limit such wars as may be forced on us
to the smallest necessary dimensions. Even should the Soviet Union reject
them, such proposals might serve to clarify our intentions and makes less
likely a war caused by miscalculation.

Accordingly, the United States should announce that if we are involved
again in fighting communist aggression we will use the forces and weapons
that seem best adapted to quick termination of open military operations but
that we will use them in a manner to reduce non-combattant casualties to a
minimum. Even a unilateral declaration which gave an indication of some of
the steps we propose to follow to insure this would give an opponent a strong
incentive to follow suit. At the very least, the United States could thus make
clear to the world that we will make every effort to limit the use of nuclear
weapons and to avoid the devastation of civilian populations.

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The value of unilateral declarations is proved by the experience of World War II. Neither the Soviet Union nor Japan had signed the Geneva convention of 1929 with respect to the treatment of war prisoners. Yet on ________ the U. S. S. R. informed Germany of its decision to adhere to the convention and on ________ Japan so notified its opponents. Clear United States declarations, firmly adhered to, might provide a similar framework for the mitigation of the worst consequences of modern war.

## The Issue of Testing

Despite the vital importance of nuclear weapons to our survival, it would be irresponsible to deny the hazards inherent in their use. An all-out exchange of nuclear stockpiles by the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. would bring about an extremely serious level of radiation on the entire planet.

The growth of nuclear stockpiles on both sides has been aptly described by Winston Churchill as the "balance of terror." It is a situation which some have incorrectly interpreted as a static, unchanging, nuclear "stalemate" or "standoff." Nothing could be further from the truth.

Nuclear deterrence is immensely complicated, since each new scientific advance, if applied by one side and not the other, is capable of overturning the strategic equation. In a dynamic situation, we must continually strive to improve our technological position lest an accumulation of advances by the other side faces us with overwhelming strength. It is this situation which makes a continuance of nuclear weapons testing so important.

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It has been proposed to start disarmament by agreeing to stop tests of nuclear weapons. It has been claimed that such a ban would be self-policing. Nuclear tests are said to be a hazard to the health of all people and of generations yet unborn; and they are believed to lead to ever more horrible weapons.

Unfortunately a nuclear test is easily monitored only if no serious attempt is made to keep it secret. If a nation wants to hide its tests, observation will become very complicated and uncertain. To be sure, secret tests require considerable effort. But the Soviet Union has never spared resources in order to secure a military advantage. On the other hand, our tradition and the structure of our society makes it certain that we shall not violate any international obligations to which we have agreed.

As to the medical danger, past tests have had a much smaller effect on public health than other biological effects to which mankind is constantly exposed. At higher altitudes the cosmic rays which bombard the earth have a greater intensity than the effects of weapons testing. The accumulated radiation from weapons test is only an insignificant fraction of the dosage to which most Americans are exposed from x-rays. A person moving from the seashore to Colorado exposes himself to considerably more radiation than the accumulated effect of all past weapon tests. To be sure, *any* additional radiation should be avoided. But weapons testing must be weighed against the consequences of ending tests not against the hazards inherent in it. If

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an end of weapons testing weakened the deterrent and made a war more likely,
we would have brought on what we most wished to avoid.

Thus the most important question is how will continued testing affect
a possible future war? Since the more powerful weapons have already been
tested further tests will enable us to use nuclear arms in a more discrimina-
ting manner. By reducing radioactive fall-out we will become increasingly
able to confine our military effort to our opponent's war machine. At the same
time continued testing will enable us to develop nuclear anti-aircraft or anti-
missile weapons to protect our population against enemy attack.

Thus, we are persuaded that a ban on weapon testing could not be
enforced, would make a future war more brutal, and would be beneficial only
to the side which would violate the ban by secret testing. Our strong desire
for peace and security should not induce us to buy the semblance of one at
the expense of the other.

The Prospect of Peace

This pessimistic assessment of the prospects of disarmament does not
mean that we welcome the current armaments race. Nothing would reflect the
deepest desires of American society more than a world from which the threat
of war has been removed. But peace cannot be attained by wishing for it. It
requires patience, understanding and determination. We must always stand
ready to negotiate on the issues that divide the world. But until the Soviet

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Union has shown a greater willingness to settle these disputes on terms other than her own, it would be dangerous for us not to be wary of a power that has brutally suppressed Hungarian freedom, fanned Middle Eastern flames by its sale of arms and constantly threatens the world with rocket and nuclear attacks. As soon as Soviet intransigence abides, our desire for peace and our willingness to devote our resources to constructive tasks will insure an eager American cooperation in any disarmament effort.

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December 22, 1957

X - CIVIL DEFENSE

There are few problems of the atomic age with which the United States
has had greater difficulty in coming to grips than civil defense. Our tradi-
tional invulnerability to direct military attack and our predilection for the of-
fensive over the defensive have combined to cause us to treat civil defense as
a mindor adjunct of our overall strategic posture both in terms of planning and
in the resources allocated to it.

The full civil defense problem is well beyond the scope of this report.
The technical possibilities of defending our cities and homes, the costs, the
impact on our national psychology and ways of working and living -- these
present a complex of considerations deserving detailed and separate examina-
tion. Nevertheless, the connection between civil defense and the other elements
of our national security requires a general evaluation of the possibilities.

If relations with the Soviet bloc ever reach the showdown stage, the
edge of difference which may be very fine, will depend on the strength of the
competing wills. This in turn may well reflect the relative vulnerabilities. It is
an oppressive thought that such circumstances might in fact occur, but it would
be feckless to suggest that they are impossible. Courage in crisis, if it is to
be effective and continuing, must rest on at least a modicum of hope.

Deterrence in short, depends on a combination of power and will. The
factor of power requires a retaliatory capability sufficient to overcome any
enemy defense, and as invulnerable as possible to surprise attack. The factor

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of will may hinge importantly on a reasonable combination of passive and active defense measures. An enemy who felt confident that he could disrupt and disorganize our society while preserving the substance of his own would be tempted to launch an all-out blow. Conversely the ability to protect our population at least to a degree may enable us to act with firmness and resolution in times of crisis. In the age of the ballistic missile the known capability of a society to withstand attack will become an increasingly important deterrent.

Civil defense will not be easy, and it can never be complete. Protecting against massively destructive weapons is an enormous problem.

A 20-megaton thermonuclear weapon, for example, with a radius of surface destruction by blast and heat of between five to eight miles will inevitably have devastating consequences.

Difficulty does not mean impotence, however. While it may be impossible to protect the population against the blast and heat of an atomic explosion, protection against radioactive fall-out and other contamination appears to be a great deal easier. Above all, it is essential that our people understand the dangers of modern weapons and the possibilities of mitigating their effects, so that we may respond with discipline and so that no enemy can assume that a sudden attack would disorganize our society.

While the whole field of civil defense requires, above all, the most careful study, it is possible to state a few general principles in relation to it:

1. Civil defense must be considered as part of the overall U.S. strategic posture. It must be faced forthrightly. It should be

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part of our defense planning and included in our overall strategic
plans. The expense involved should be treated as an addition to
existing military outlays.

2. The American people need to be told more clearly the dimensions of the problem of civil defense and what can be done to reduce them. Any effective civil defense program must have as a pre-requisite a program of public information supported by the Federal Government and carried through at all levels.

3. A civil defense program should be integrated with the construction program needed for the normal development of our expanding population and economy.

4. A cadre charged with supervising civil defense activities must be developed and trained immediately.

An effective civil defense program can be separated into three stages:

1. To provide warning, where possible and information about radiological levels. This requires an attack-proof radio-net to broadcast instructions during and after an attack. The cost of such a program would be reasonable.

2. Protection against fall-out. It has been estimated that half of the casualties of a large-scale atomic attack or between 25 - 30 million might result from radioactive fall-out. To prevent such a calamity, a fall-out shelter program is vital and it is essential that individuals in an area contaminated by radioactivity, chemicals,

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or biological agents behave with discipline and effectiveness.

A proportion of this program could be locally financed.

3. Protection against atomic blast and heat. This is a major problem particularly in our big urban concentrations. This panel has heard testimony that it is possible to construct shelters capable of resisting even a direct hit, located so that they can be reached within 15 to 30 minutes by the population they serve, and useful meanwhile for peacetime purposes, such as underground passages.

The subject is of such complexity, however, and the costs are so very large that this report cannot plausibly go further than to commend such a deep shelter program for careful study. If indeed it proves feasible it will add greatly to our security as a nation.

The major difficulty with civil defense has been our failure to treat it as an integral part of our defense planning. As a result, civil defense has been badly neglected and such steps as have been taken have been fitful and only inadequately related to our over-all strategic posture. The immediate task is to make a start in the direction of civil defense, both by including it directly in our defense planning and by mobilizing incentives for local support.

The purpose should be to protect as great a proportion of our population as possible and to permit a disciplined and efficient effort in case of an attack.

The immediate task is to construct an attack-proof radio-net to begin a program of fall-out shelters. The shelter program should be carried out

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with a maximum degree of cooperation with local and state authorities. Thus in addition to federal and state and local spending tax incentives might be created for all new construction which includes fall-out shelters, low interest federal loans to all private construction including fall-out shelters. A program of fall-out shelters might (in case of attack) reduce casualties by 25 - 30 million.

In addition to the protection of the population against fall-out, provision should be made for the post-attack period. It will be highly important to stockpile food supplies and industrial reserves in safe places to prevent famine and to enable the early resumption of economic activity. At the same time a continuation of organized activity will be aided by the greatest possible degree of dispersal of industry. It would be too costly to disperse existing industrial installations but tax incentives could be provided for the location of new facilities away from main concentrations.

The main feature to note with respect to civil defense is that time is running out. It does not make sense to engage in a major military effort without at the same time protecting our most important resource: our civilian population. The cost of launching even a gradual civil defense program, may well be high -- but the price of being without it may be national disintegration.

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XI - BUDGET FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Achievement of the objectives of our national security programs
in the years ahead hinges on the availability of financial resources and
the manner in which they are applied. There is grave reason for concern
with respect to recent levels of military appropriations as well as with respect
to the workings of the budgetary process.

The Budgetary Level

Programs of great importance to U. S. security now suffer from
insufficient funds, and at present budgetary levels our prospects are bleak.

Several reasons have brought about this state of affairs. When the
Korean war ended, it was natural that an effort be made to reduce military
expenditures. But the execution of these reductions, displaying less accuracy
than force, had serious consequences. These did not become evident for some
time because of a backlog of unspent appropriations. For example, the momen-
tum of the Air Force build-up continued until unspent appropriations from 1952 to
1953 ran out and, where major procurement is concerned, the Army has been
living off its pre-1954 appropriations.

The result has been a serious imbalance in our military posture.
Recent budgetary levels could be maintained only by a reduction of forces in all
services, a process which has been slowly going on for the past three years.
The budgetary squeeze has affected not only force levels, it has also produced

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a slowed down effort in certain fields such as missile research, where our
position vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. could have been maintained with a relatively
small additional effort.

Recent military expenditures are therefore inadequate to maintain
even our current force-levels at least with our present wasteful organization.

But events have made clear the inadequacy of our present force structure. And
remedies have to be sought against the background of an increasingly complex
technology which will inevitably multiply costs.

This panel does not possess the technical competence to determine
the budgetary level which could assure our security. It will therefore confine
itself to listing the major shortcomings in our strategic posture.

Strategic Forces

Deterrence

1. Unless aircraft procurement to modernize existing units is authorized into the 1960's, a gap in ready forces between the latest types of manned aircraft and the operational stage of ballistic missiles seems unavoidable. We cannot risk obsolescence of present weapons before new ones are ready.

2. The SAC base structure, long out of phase with other elements in its program, should be made less vulnerable to surprise attack through dispersion and other protective measures.

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3. Accelerated research and development support should be provided for such key programs as missiles and advance reconnaissance systems.

4. The SAC alert time should be reduced.

## Active Defense

Today, the U.S.S.R. can attack the U.S. with a strong bomber force and with submarine-launched missiles. In a few years it will be able to attack with a stronger bomber force, greatly improved submarine-launched missiles, and numerous ICBM's.

Accurately delivered on our biggest cities, only twenty-five nuclear weapons -- a small proportion of the total the U.S.S.R. can send against us -- could kill 25,000,000 persons, not counting those who might die from the effects of a radioactive fall-out carried many miles downwind.

Whichever side first achieves a strong defense will be in a strong psychological position. Should the Soviet Union achieve a really effective air defense ahead of us the balance of power will fall to her. She will then be able to blackmail the entire free world, because few nations will act vigorously if they know that they may be devastated with relative impunity.

Early warning and anti-missile defense systems therefore require greater attention.

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## Tactical Forces

To provide something more than the token mobile units presently in being, additional troop lift should be authorized in the form both of modern aircraft and modern ships.

The Army should be permitted to speed up the modernization of its division structure.

## Navy

Anti-submarine warfare requires additional funds. The program of equipping both surface and underwater ships with nuclear propulsion and missiles of various types should be accelerated. We require a larger number of modern, nuclear powered submarines.

## Personnel

With the complexity of modern weapons, the importance of a highly competent professional force has never been greater. But present pay scales are inadequate to retain the skilled officers and men necessary to an effective and economic military establishment. Neither are we attracting a sufficient number of the best of our youth to military careers.

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## Civil Defense

A start should be made on a program of fall-out shelters and related warning and communications equipment.

The above deficiencies in our strategic posture can be removed only by a substantially increased defense effort even allowing for a more efficient utilization of resources through the reorganization of the Department of Defense. The price of survival will not be low. On the other hand its effects will be cushioned by the expected growth of our Gross National Product. The impact of defense spending on our national economy will be discussed in detail by Subpanel IV. This much seems clear however to this panel: The valid measurement of defense is against security achieved and in the efficiency with which resources devoted to it are utilized. We can afford to survive.

## The Budgetary Process

An increased defense effort will not be fully effective however unless it is accompanied by the organizational changes outlined in Section VII. These in turn can be prompted by improvements of existing methods of presenting the budget.

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The budgetary process could be greatly improved if military budgets were prepared and presented in more meaningful terms. The present method of preparation does not give the President, the Secretary of Defense, Congress or the public a clear indication of what the funds requested will accomplish in terms of military missions or effective units. As a result, it is natural for Congress to make reductions by percentage cuts across-the-board, rather than by selective examinations of individual programs.

Complete budgetary reform may not be immediately feasible. However, a start can be made toward a system that corresponds more closely to the general strategic philosophy of this report. It should not be too difficult, for example, to restate the presentation of the Air Force budget, so that instead of the present categories of "aircraft and related procurement," "procurement other than aircraft," "operation and maintenance," "military personnel," etc., there would be a clear indication of how much goes to strategic air, to air defense, to tactical air, and to air transport. The present budget structures of the other services are equally far from indicating expenditures along mission lines.

Another highly desirable change is to transform the present one-year budget cycle to two years. Under present rules, the top personnel of the services spend the first six months of every year preparing, justifying and revising the budgetary requests of their departments. The next six months are consumed in testifying before congressional committees and otherwise defending the service budgets as approved by the President. If the budgetary process would extend

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over an entire congressional term, the energies of key personnel could be
directed toward strategic doctrine and overall management. At the same time
congressional control would be more meaningful because the examination of
requests could then be more careful.

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## XII - CONCLUSION

No aspect of America's problems presents a deeper challenge than the field of national security. It is not only because the technical problems are so complex, though an accelerating technology will test severely our wisdom and our ability to make choices. Nor is the economic challenge the most complicated one we face, though the price of security in the nuclear age is high and likely to increase. It is not even the field of strategic doctrine which presents our deepest problem though military strength is sterile without a doctrine for employing it.

Rather our chief difficulty resides in our whole approach to the problem of power and it reflects some of the most attractive qualities of American society. We like to believe that reasonable men can settle all disputes through good-will and compromise and that power should be invoked only as a last resort. We therefore tend to think of diplomacy and force as successive and separate phases of national policy. Unfortunately the position in which we find ourselves does not permit such absolute distinctions. In a revolutionary period the ability and willingness to use force may in itself provide a factor of stability. To a world threatened by aggression and infiltration, American strength and resolution are essential if there is to be a guarantee of security.

To be sure, this may not always be apparent in the public declarations of other nations. To countries primarily concerned with domestic development

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foreign aggression may seem unreal and the measures required to resist it may appear as irritating interruptions of more primary tasks. But while we should have full understanding for the psychology which produces these reactions, we would be wrong to gear our policy to it. Force will not solve the problems of this period but the willingness to use it may afford the breathing spell in which nations can work out their own destiny without foreign interference. We must not forget that the neutrality of many nations is possible only as long as we are strong, just as for a century and a half the British navy made possible our neutrality. Many of our most vocal critics would be deeply troubled were our military protection suddenly withdrawn.

Power is a fact whether it be ours of that of the Soviet Union. Its existence cannot be ignored. The dilemmas which it imposes cannot be wished away. Yet the power of modern weapons confronts us with a moral dilemma. The extensive and indiscriminate use of modern weapons in all-out war runs counter to our deepest sense of international morality. We should seek to limit such wars as may break out to the smallest area and to conduct them with the minimum loss of civilian life. Yet in the conflict between despotism and freedom, it would be immoral were we to shrink from the defense of the values for which we stand at whatever intensity which may be forced on us.

We are engaged in the phase of a global struggle which has come to be known as the cold war. In this report we have tried to set forth those measures which we feel it imperative to accept in the interest of national security. We consider them essential if we are to reduce the likelihood of war,

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and at the same time to make sure that if in spite of all our efforts such a grim disaster should prove unavoidable, we shall not be overwhelmed by it.

The cold war poses a two-fold dilemma: our desire for peace may make us overlook the importance of power in maintaining it. But once we have recognized the role of force we must beware that it does not become an end in itself. Power can only give us security against immediate dangers. In the long run, our security resides in the principles for which we stand and in the confidence which we inspire. These are facts which we must never forget in the middle of the cold war; they are indeed what gives it meaning.

We have not attempted to put a price-tag on any of the measures we advocate. For when the security of the United States and of the free world is at stake, cost cannot be the basic consideration. The cold war cannot be won and a "hot" war cannot be avoided without a major effort. This is clearly not time for complacency; it is just as clearly not a time for hysteria. What is required throughout the country is a mood of sustained determination. If this report makes a contribution to the emergence of such a mood it will have served its purpose.