The "prophetic" and "political" approaches can be distinguished
by the relative importance attributed to Morality and Interest.
The champions of one pay tribute to the importance of the other,
but the test is which one gives way in the case of a conflict.
Naturally, it is common to try to reconcile Morality and Interest.
Theories of Historical Progress, for example, are attempts to
blend "what is" and "what ought to be" via "what really has been"
or "what will be." But a view of History may serve as a means
of redefining Morality and Interest, or of describing the relation
between them.

Thus it is still possible to classify various writers according
to the "prophetic" and "political" categories, although a
spectrum, rather than a simple dichotomy, does more justice to
their sophistication and complexity. The "prophetic" approach
is connected with the preeminence given to Moral Values, and
with the view that History has one set of solutions. The
"political" approach is associated with historical and moral
relativism. The attitudes toward the nation-state, domestic
structure, and the role of personal leadership reflect the
overall approach of each writer. The "analytical" category seems
appropriate for those writers, here especially Toynbee, who see
human affairs as an historical process, but who do not apply
themselves to the problems of politics and policy.

*Views of History.*-- These range from a view of unilinear
progress to a sense of permanence and regularity in human affairs.

progresses to a sense of permanence and regularity in human affairs.

### *Views of History.*--- These range from a view of multinear

human affairs as an historical process, but who do not apply
appropriate for those writers, here especially Tocqueville, who see
overall approach of each writer. The "analytical" category aeems
attracture, and the role of personal leadership reflect the
relativism. The attitude toward the nation-state, domestic
"political" approach is associated with historical and moral
with the view that History has one set of solutions. The
is connected with the preeminence given to Moral Values, and
their sophistication and complexity. The "prophetic" approach
spectrum, rather than a simple dichotomy, does more justice to
to the "prophetic" and "political" categories, although a

Thus it is at still possible to classically various writers according
between them.

of redeeming Morality and Interest, or of describing the relation
or "what will be." But a view of History may serve as a means
plend "what is" and "what ought to be" via "what really has been"
Theories of Historical Progress, for example, are attempts to
Naturally, it is common to try to reconcile Morality and Interest.
but the test is which one gives way in the case of a conflict.
The champions of one bay tribute to the importance of the other,
by the relative importance attributed to Morality and Interest.

-2-

The former is evident, in increasing order of emphasis, in
Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Marx. The latter is evident in
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Burke. There are variations
among the former group: Rousseau points out historical evolution
and human perfectibility, but these are something less than
Kant's "Hidden Plan of Nature." For both Rousseau and Kant,
historical progress is much less central to their moral and
political philosophies than it is for Hegel, who makes it a
framework for everything he says about morals and politics.

Yet Hegel admits that the course of History is intelligible only
in retrospect. Marx borrows Hegel's dialectical theory of
progress but is less modest: _He_ knows where History is moving.

Thucydides et al. see recurrence and regularity in History,
but with a sense of the permanence of human nature and human
problems. Spengler and Toynbee are harder to classify: Both
reject unilinear progress and emphasize the multiplicity of
civilizations. But they see lines of progress (and decline)
within each civilization. In Spengler, especially, each
civilization-cycle is charted along Hegelian lines. Toynbee
takes the relativism much further, and thus has some affinity with
the "Politicians," Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Burke.
But because of the "nonpolitical" nature of his approach, he is
probably best classified as "analytical."

_Views of Human Nature._-- Here the writers range from the
Idealist Kant to the apologists for Interest, Machiavelli and
Hobbes. But these polar extremes are not so rigid. Kant argues

Hoppea. But these polar extremes are not so rigid. Kant argues
idealiat Kant to the apologist for interest, Machiavelli and
*Views of Human Nature*.— Here the writers range from the
propably best classified as "analytical."

But because of the "nonsocial" nature of his approach, he is
the "politician," "Thucydides," Machiavelli, Hoppea, and Burke.
takes the relativism much further, and thus has some affinity with
civilization-cycle is charted along Hegelian lines. Toynbee
within each civilization. In Spengler, especially, each
civilizationa. But they see lines of progress (and decline)
reject unilinear progress and emphasize the multiplicity of
problems. Spengler and Toynbee are harder to classify: Both
put with a sense of the permanence of human nature and human
Thucydides et al. see recurrence and regularity in History,
progress put in less modest: He knows where History is moving.

in perspective. Marx borrows Hegel's dialectical theory of
Yet Hegel admits that the course of History is intelligible only
framework for everything he says about morals and politics.
political philosophies than it is for Hegel, who makes it a
historical progress is much less central to their moral and
Kant's "Hedgen Plan of Nature." For both Ronaean and Kant,
and human perfectibility, put these are something less than
among the former group: Ronaean points out historical evolution
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hoppea, and Burke. There are variations
Ronaean, Kant, Hegel, and Marx. The latter is evident in
The former is evident, in increasing order of emphasis, in

-5-

-3-

that Morality is actually practical, and Machiavelli and Hobbes
see power and interest as having some moral purpose or justification.
Rousseau (always a hard man to classify) tries to straddle the
fence: he sees two kinds of self-interest, one egoistic and
aggressive, the other innocent and beneficial. But he is clearly
closer to Kant than to Hobbes. The "Historians" -- Hegel, Marx,
and Spengler -- see History as the embodiment of Morality.
Whatever is Historically appropriate is moral. A great leader
is he who, wittingly or not, leads in the direction of History.
The significant entity moving or moved in History is for Hegel
and Spengler, the political state, for Marx the economic class,
and for Toynbee the "society" or culture. History endows the
interests of these entities with moral validity. The same is
true in a different sense for the "Politicians", Thucydides,
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Burke, who see self-interestedness as
historically permanent and necessary.

<u>Summary.</u>-- Thus the "political" category would include
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Burke. The "prophetic"
category would include Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Spengler.
Toynbee would be in the "analytical" category. The text will
consider them in the order foregoing.

<u>Note on the text:</u> Quotations which run over two pages in
the original (e.g. "pp.6-7") will include a slash(/) to indicate
where the change of page occurs, in case you wish to use only
part of the quotation.

part of the quotation.

where the change of page occurs, in case you wish to make only
the original (e.g. "pp. 1-7") will include a "page(1)" to indicate
*Note on the text: Quotations which run over two pages in
consider them in the order foregoing.*

Toynbee would be in the "analytical" category. The text will
category would include Ronaasen, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Spengler.
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hoppea, and Burke. The "prophetic
*Summary*... Thus the "political" category would include
historically permanent and necessary.

Machiavelli, Hoppea, and Burke, who see self-interestedness as
true in a different sense for the "Politicians", Thucydides,
interests of these entities with moral validity. The same is
and for Toynbee the "society" or culture. History endows the
and Spengler, the political state, for Marx the economic class.
The significant entity moving or moved in History is for Hegel
is he who, wittingly or not, leads in the direction of History.
Whatever is Historically appropriate is moral. A great leader
and Spengler -- see History as the embodiment of Morality.
closer to Kant than to Hoppea. The "Historians" -- Hegel, Marx,
aggressive, the other innocent and beneficial. But he is clearly
fence: he sees two kinds of self-interest, one egotistic and
Ronrasen (always a hard man to classify) tries to straddle the
see power and interest as having some moral purpose or justification.
that Morality is actually practical, and Machiavelli and Hoppea

-3-

-4-

THUCYDIDES: Text from *The Complete Writings of Thucydides:*
*The Peloponnesian War*, Crawley translation, Modern Library College
Edition, Modern Library, New York (1951).

Thucydides sees History as a guide to the present and future,
with human nature and problems more or less constant:

> The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract
> somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those
> inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid
> to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of
> human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall
> be content. In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay
> which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession
> for all time. (I 22, p.14)

The war was caused by the threat to the equilibrium of powers:

> The real cause of the war I consider to be the one which was
> formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of
> Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made
> war inevitable. (I 24, p.15)

He thus accepts as decisive the considerations expressed in the
following passages from the *Corinthians' speech to the Spartans*:

> "For the true author of the subjugation of a people is not so
> much the immediate agent, as the power which permits it having
> the means to prevent it; particularly if that power aspires
> to the glory of being the liberator of Hellas; . . . . We
> ought not to be still inquiring into the fact of our wrongs,
> but into the means of our defence. For the aggressors with
> matured plans to oppose our indecision have cast threats aside
> and betaken themselves to action. And we know what are the
> paths by which Athenian aggression travels, and how insidious
> is its progress. A degree of confidence she may feel from the
> idea that your bluntness of perception prevents your noticing
> her; but it is nothing to the impulse which her advance will
> receive from the knowledge that you see, but do not care to
> interfere. You, Lacedaemonians, of all the Hellenes are alone
> inactive, and defend youselves not by doing anything but by
> looking as if you would do something; you alone wait till the
> power of an enemy is becoming twice its original size, instead
> of crushing it in its infancy." (III, p.39)

and:

> "... it has always been the law that the weaker should be

-5-

subject to the stronger. Besides, we believed ourselves to
be worthy of our position, and so you thought us till now,
when calculations of interest have made you take up the cry
of justice -- a consideration which no-one ever yet brought
forward to hinder his ambition when he had a chance of gain-
ing anything by might. And praise is due all who, if not so
superior to human nature as to refuse dominion, yet respect
justice more than their position compels them to do.

"We imagine that our moderation would be best demonstrated
by the conduct of others who should be placed in our position."
(III, p.44)

Thus the Spartans were swayed by balance-of-power considerations:

The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty the 30 years truce
had been broken and that war must be declared, not so much
because they were persuaded by the arguments of the allies,
as because they feared the growth of the power of the Athenians,
seeing most of Hellas already subject to them. (III 88, p.50)

In fact it looks as if they were thinking along the same lines as
their allies. Meanwhile, on the other side, Pericles was
warning the Athenians about the requirements of deterrence:

"I hope that you will none of you think that we shall be
going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara
decree. . . . Why this trifle contains the whole/seal and
trial of your resolution. If you give way, you will
instantly have to meet some greater demand, as having been
frightened into obedience in the first instance; while a
firm refusal will make them clearly understand that they must
treat you more as equals." (V 139, pp.70-71)

In Chapter I, in a long historical survey, Thucydides suggested
something about spheres of influence, pointing out that alliances
are made according to interests, not affection:

And so the power of the descendants of Pelops came to be
greater than that of the descendants of Perseus. To all this
Agamemnon succeeded. He also had a navy far stronger than his
contemporaries, so that, in my opinion, fear was quite as
strong an element as love in the formation of the confederate
expedition. (I 9, p.7)

Also, domestic structure was an important factor determining the
strength of the city-states:

-6-

But at last came a time when the tyrants of Athens and the far older tyrannies of the rest of Hellas were, with the exception of those in Sicily, once and for all put down by Lacedaemon; for this city, though after the settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants, it suffered from factions for an unparalleled length of time, still at a very early period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from tyrants which was unbroken; it has possessed the same form of government for more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the late war, and has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs of other states. (I, p.12)

## NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, The Prince and the Discourses, Modern Library College Edition, Modern Library, N.Y. (1950).

In Machiavelli's view, History (or Fortune) provides opportunities, not directions. In _The Prince_ he offers a guidebook for leadership, in the manner of a Renaissance Richard Neustadt.

Discussing the great Law-givers Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus, he points out:

> And in examining their life and deeds it will be seen that they owed nothing to fortune but the opportunity which gave them matter to be shaped into what form they thought fit; and without that opportunity their powers would have been wasted, and without their powers the opportunity would have come in vain.
> 
> (Prince, Chapter VI, pp.20-21)

For:

> Nevertheless, that our free will may not be altogether extinguished, I think it may be true that fortune is the ruler of half our actions, but that she allows the other half or thereabouts to be governed by us. (Prince, XXV, p.91)

Two passages in the Discourses point out that History shows things to stay pretty much the same:

> Thus the majority of those who read it [history] take pleasure only in the variety of events which history relates, without ever thinking of imitating the noble actions, deeming that

ever thinking of imitating the noble actions, Geomeing\ that
only in the variety of events which History relates, without
Thus the majority of those who read it \History\ take bessame
to say pretty much the same:

Two passages in the Diacronæa point out that History shows things
or thereabout to be governed by na. (Prince, XXA, b.2r)
under of half our actions, but that she allows the other half
extinguished. I think it may be true that fortune is the
Nevertheless, that our free will may not be altogether

For:

(Prince, Chapter VI, bp.50-Sf)
without their powers the opportunity would have come in vain.
without that opportunity their powers would have been wasted,\ and
them matter to be shaped into what form they thought fit; and
they then owed nothing to fortune but the opportunity which gave
and in examining their life and deeds it will be seen that

Treasurer, he points out:

Diacronæa, the great Law-Giver, Mosæa, Carna, Romina, and
for Leadership, in the manner of a Renaissance Richard Menatadt.
obstacles, not directions. In The Prince he offers a guidebook
In Machiavell's view, History (or Fortune) provides

Diacronæa, Modern Library College Edition, Modern Library, N.Y. (1920).

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, The Prince and the

(I, b.1s)
thus been in a position to arrange the affairs of other states.
hundred years, reckoning to the end of the late war, and has
possessed the same form of government for more than four
and enjoyed a freedom from tyrants which was unbroken; it has
length of time, still at very early period obtained good laws,
present inhabitants, it entered from factions for an unbarrelled
for this city, though after the settlement of the Doriana, its
of those in Sicily once and for all but down by Lacedaemon;
other tyrannies of the rest of Hellas were, with the exception
but at last came a time when the tyrants of Athens and the far

-c-

-7-

not only difficult but impossible, as though heaven, the sun,
the elements, and men had changed the order of their motions
and power, and were different from what they were in ancient
times. (Discourses, Book I, Introduction, pp.104-105)

And:

Reflecting now upon the course of human affairs, I think that,
as a whole, the world remains very much in the same condition,
and the good in it always balances the evil; but the good
and evil change from one country to another, as we learn from
the history of those ancient kingdoms that differed from each
other in manners, whilst the world at large remained the same.
(Discourses, Book II, Introduction, p.272)

Machiavelli does not endorse the quest for power without moral
purpose:

> It cannot be called virtue to kill one's fellow-citizens,
> betray one's friends, be without faith, without pity, and
> without religion; by these methods one may indeed gain
> power, but not glory. (Prince, VIII, p.32)

But necessity rules that self-interest must often take precedence
as a means:

> . . . for how we live is so far removed from how we ought to
> live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be
> done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his
> preservation. A man who wishes to make a profession of
> goodness in everything must necessarily come to grief among
> so many who are not good. Therefore it is necessary for a
> prince, who wishes to maintain himself, to learn how not to
> be good, and to use this knowledge and not use it, according
> to the necessity of the case. (Prince, XV, p.56)

This is elaborated in two famous passages:

> From this arises the question whether it is better to be
> loved more than feared, or feared more than loved. The reply
> is, that one ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is
> difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer to be
> feared than loved, if one of the two has to be wanting. For
> it may be said of men in general that they are ungrateful,
> voluble, disemblers, anxious to avoid danger, and covetous
> of gain. . . . And men have less scruple in offending one
> who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared;
> for love is held by a chain of obligation which, men being
> selfish, is broken whenever it serves their purpose; but
> fear is maintained by a dread of punishment which never fails.
> (Prince, XVII, p.61)

-8-

And, on keeping faith:

Therefore, a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so
doing it would be against his interest, and when the reasons
which made him bind himself no longer exist. If men were all
good, this precept would not be a good one; but as they are
bad, and would not observe their faith with you, so you are
not bound to keep faith with them. (Prince, XVIII, p.64)

In The Discourses, he shows a preference for democratic republics,
for domestic structure affects the strength of states and the
wisdom of their policy.:

> ... it is not individual prosperity, but the general good,
> that makes cities great; and certainly the general good is
> regarded nowhere but in republics, because whatever they do
> is for the common benefit. (Discourses, II, p.282)

Bok-II, ch.II

And:

> But as regards prudence and stability, I say that the people
> are more prudent and stable, and have better judgment than a
> prince; and it is not without good reason that it is said,
> "The voice of the people is the voice of God." (Discourses, Bk.I,
> ch.LVIII, p.263)

Republics are less careful about their own interests, but there
may be a hint of the author's approval in this:

> Alliances are broken from considerations of interest; and
> in this respect republics are much more careful in the
> observance of treaties than princes. It would be easy to
> cite instances where princes for the smallest advantage have
> broken their faith, and where the greatest advantages have
> failed to induce republics to disregard theirs. (Discourses, Bk.I,
> ch. LIX, p.268)

Certain values may be in a country's interest, especially in
regard to domestic structure and behavior:

> It was the valor of her [Rome's] armies that achieved those
> conquests, but it was the wisdom of her conduct and the
> nature of her institutions, as established by her first
> legislator, that enabled her to preserve these acquisitions.
> (Discourses, Book.II, ch.I, p.277)

-9-

Anarchy in the world of states breeds insecurity:

... it is impossible for a republic to remain long in the quiet enjoyment of her freedom within her limited confines; for even if she does not molest others, others will molest her, and from being thus molested will spring the desire and necessity of conquests, and even if she has no foreign foes, she will find domestic enemies among her own citizens, for such seems to be the inevitable fate of all large cities.
(Discourses, BookII, Ch.XIX, p.345.)

Finally, a ringing endorsement of the national interest:

For where the safety of the country depends upon the resolution to be taken, no considerations of justice or injustice, humanity or cruelty, nor of glory or of shame, should be allowed to prevail. But putting all other considerations aside the only question should be, What course will save the life and liberty of the country?
(Discourses, Bk. III, Ch. XLI, p.528)

THOMAS HOBBES, *Leviathan*, Everyman's Library, New York: E.P.Dutton and Company, Inc., and London: J.M.Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1950.

Hobbes has no explicit Theory of History as such, but in his view, man's condition is governed by immutable Laws of Nature. His basic theme is the supremacy of self-interest as the motive of human behavior. He is a bit cynical, as when he speaks of Honor:

> Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,) be just or unjust: for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power. (Part I, ch.X, p.75)

Man is a creature of appetite, and power is the means of self-preservation:

For there is no such *Finis ultimus*, (utmost ayme,) nor *Summum Bonum*, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. . . . Felicity is a continuall

old Morsell Bibliophiles. . . Felicity is a continuous
Boum, (greatest good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the
For there is no anch. Finie finite, (not so fine.) nor infinite

breastwork

Man is a creature of appetite, and power is the means of self-
in the opinion of power. (Part I, ch. X, p. 12)

much power,) be that or what: for Honor consists in only
(so it be great and difficult, and consequently a fame of
nor does it after the case of Honor, whether an action
of human凸) He is a pit chucker, sa when he abducts of Honor:

His basic theme is the ambivalence of self-interest as the motive
view, man's condition is governed by immutable laws of Nature.

Hoppes has no explicit Theory of History as such, put in life

TOGO.

E.B.Dutton and Company, Inc., and London: J.M.Dent and Sons, Ltd.

THOMAS HOBBS, Levithan, Everyman, a Library, New York:

(Diacourea, BK. III, CH. XII, p. 258)

Diacourea will save the life and liberty of the country?
considerations aside the only question should be, What
should be allowed to breathe. But cutting all other
injustice, humanity or cruelty, nor of glory or of fame,
reconciliation to be taken, no considerations of justice or
For where the safety of the country depends upon the

Finley, a ringing encomium of the national interest:

(Diacourea, Book II, ch. XIX, p. 342.)

such seems to be the inevitable fate of all large cities.
they will find domestic enemies among her own citizens, for
necessity of necessity, and even if she has no foreign foes,
per, and from being thus molested will arise the desire and
for even if she does not moleat others, others will moleat
quiet enjoyment of her freedom within her limited confines;
... it is impossible for a republic to remain long in the

घন্ডা in the world of states precludes inactivity:

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-10-

progresse of the desire, from one object to another; the
attaining of the former, being still but the way to the latter.
the cause whereof is, That the object of man's desire, is not
to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to
assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore
the voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not
only to the procurement, but also to the assuring of a
contented life. ...

So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination
of all mankind, a perpetual and restlesse desire of Power after
power, that ceaseth onely in Death. (Part I, ch.XI, p.79)

Men in the state of nature are roughly equal in their power:

> Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body and
> mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes
> manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then _sic_
> another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference
> between man, and man, is not so considerable. (Part I, XIII, p.101)

The state of nature is a state of war, in the famous passage:

> Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without
> a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that
> condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of
> every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in
> Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time,
> wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known:
> and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the
> nature of Warre. ... All other time is PEACE.

> Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, / where
> every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to
> the time, wherein men live without other security, than what
> their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them
> withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry;
> because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no
> Culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor use of the commodities
> that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no
> Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much
> force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of
> Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of
> all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the
> life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
> (Part I, ch.XIII, pp.103-104)

Most important for our purposes is the statement that this state
of nature describes _international relations_:

-11-

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns, upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men. (Part I, ch. XIII, p.105)

Individuals therefore have a natural right to protect themselves:

> And because the condition of Man . . . is a condition of Warre of every one against everyone; in which case every one is governed by his own reason; . . . It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to everything; even to one anothers body. . . . And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre. The first branch of which Rule, containeth the first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, to seek Peace, and follow it. The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, By all means we can, to defend our selves. (Part I, ch. XIV, p.107)

Only the existence of a Common Power makes moral behavior in one's interest; and therefore obligatory:

> If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe presently, but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of Warre of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable Suspicion, it is Voyd: But if there be a common Power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compell performance; it is not Voyd. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feare of some coercive Power; which in the condition of meer Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. (Part I, ch.XIV, p.113)

The purpose of establishing the Leviathan or Commonwealth is self-protection, nothing more and nothing less:

manner in which they influenced the old; and the revolution, have most commonly influenced the new governments in the same those forms, the stationary interests of the nation concerned the government might be with respect to these bodies and neighboring states have had little or no concern. Whatever of countries, both as to bodies and forms, in which the There have been many internal revolutions in the Government interests of nations, according to "principles merely political;"

ideology disrupts a world making policy according to the permanent

(Thoughts on French Affairs, 12th, Works, Vol. VII, p. 15) (Original) adopt for the internal government of our own country, measure also now the system which we may think it right to depend) now merely external relations; but in a great our connexion or parallel with other states has for some time ought to dictate to Great Britain, will not depend (as hitherto in the politics of Europe. The conduct, which brings principles, (and which pleases itself to be) is an essential criteria This declaration of a new species of government, on new of all other states;

Europe because it called into question the internal legitimacy

B. Burke saw the French Revolution as a menace to the peace of
Rivington, 1856.

EDWARD BURKE

<u>Works</u>, London, Printed for C.&L.

which more. (Part II, ch. XX, b. 1c9)

is perhbestall warre of every man against his neighbor, are

consequences, let the consequences of the want of it, which

And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy may evill

Because of the alternative:

Obedience is Protection. (Part II, ch. XXI, p. 181)

them, can be no Government be reformed. . . . The end of

Nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect

which he is able to protect them. For the right men have p

to last so long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by

The Obligation of Subjects to the Sovereign, is under stood

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turning on a matter of local grievance, or of local
accommodation, did not extend beyond its territory.

The present Revolution in France seems to me to be quite
of another character and description; and to bear little
resemblance or analogy to any of those which have been
brought about in Europe, upon principles merely political.
It is a revolution of doctrine and theoretick dogma. It has
a / much greater resemblance to those changes which have been
made upon religious grounds, in which a spirit of proselytism
makes an essential part. (Ibid., pp.13-14) (Emphasis in original)

Such things are recurrent phenomena in history, he indicates,
referring to the conflicts between the Guelfs and Ghibellines, and
between the aristocratic Spartans and the democratic Athenians:

> In the modern world, before this time, there has been no
> instance of this spirit of general political faction, separated
> from religion, pervading several countries, and forming a
> principle of union between the partisans in each. But the
> thing is not less in human nature. (Ibid., p.16)

The Revolution threatens to upset the balance of power in Central,
and thereby in all, Europe:

> A great revolution is preparing in Germany; and a revolution,
> in my opinion, likely to be more decisive upon the general
> fate of nations than that of France itself; other than as
> in France is to be found the first source of all the principles
> which are in any way likely to distinguish the troubles and
> convulsions of our age. If Europe does not conceive the
> independence, and the equilibrium of the empire to be in the
> very essence of the system of balanced powers in Europe, and
> if the scheme of publick law, or mass of laws, upon which that
> independence and equilibrium are founded, be of no leading
> consequence as they are preserved or destroyed, all the
> politicks of Europe for more than two centuries have been
> miserably erroneous. (Ibid., pp.27-28)

Again, the Revolution undermines the old code of behavior; and
thereby weakens the old and stable system:

> France, the author of the treaty of Westphalia, is the
> natural guardian of the independence and balance of Germany.
> Great Britain . . . has a serious interest in preserving it;
> but, except through the power of France, acting upon the
> common old principles of state policy, in the case we have
> supposed, she has no sort of means of supporting that
> interest. (Ibid., p.30) (Emphasis in original)

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The "new principle of alliances" introduces confusion into
the system:

In this state of things, a new principle of alliances and
wars is opened. The treaty of Westphalia is, with France,
an antiquated fable. The rights and liberties she was bound
to maintain are now a system of wrong and tyranny which she
is bound to destroy. . . . So that . . . her whole scheme
has been, and is, to throw the empire into confusion: and
those statesmen, who follow the old routine of politicks,
may see, in this general confusion, and in the danger of
the lesser princes, an occasion, as protectors or enemies, of
connecting their territories to one or other of the two great
German powers. They do not take into consideration that the
means which they encourage as leading to the event they
desire, will with certainty not only ravage and destroy the
empire, but, if they should for a moment seem to aggrandize
the two great houses, will also establish principles, and
confirm tempers amongst the people, which will preclude the
two sovereigns from the possibility of holding what they
acquire, or even the dominions which they have inherited.
(Ibid., pp.31-32)

The general insecurity means insecurity in France, too:

> . . . as long as it [the present system] exists in France, it
> will be the interest of the managers there, and it is in the
> very essence of their plan, to disturb and distract all other
> governments, and their endless succession of restless
> politicians will continually stimulate them to new attempts.
> (Ibid., p.56)

Elsewhere, Burke states concisely his view of France:

> My ideas and my principles led me, in this contest, to
> encounter France, not as a state, but as a faction.
> (Three Letters addressed to a Member of the present Parlia-
ment, on the proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory
of France, Letter II: On the Genius and Character of the
French Revolution as it regards other nations, 1796, Works,
Vol. VIII, p.213)

Not merely the conduct, but the existence of France, is a menace:

> As to me, I was always steadily of the opinion, that this
> disorder was not in its nature intermittent. I conceived that
> the contest, once begun, could not be laid down again, to be
> resumed at our discretion; but that our first struggle with

first law is to provide for his own preservation, his first
This common liberty results from the nature of man. His

Man's primary motive is self-preservation.

(Introduction, b.3)

Utility may in no case be divided. (Social Contract, Book I, what is prescribed by interest, in order that justice and shall endeavour always to make what right sanctions with as they are and laws as they might be. In this industry I am sure and legitimate rule of administration, men being taken I mean to induire it, in the civil order, there can be any

Morsity and Interest:

Ronaean would like to reconcile the prescriptions of
Uttall, with introduction by G. Powes Dickson, London, 1957.
Ronaean, *A Project of Perpetual Peace*, translated by Edith M.
J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1950. The other work quoted from is
Everyman's Library, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., London:
*and Disconrasa*, Translated with an Introduction by G.D.H. Cole,
*Inequality*, 1925, are contained in Ronaean, *The Social Contract
Principles of Political Right*, 1925, and the *Disconrasa on
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU*. The Social Contract, or

independent can co-exist. (Ibid., pp.526-527)
Europe. . . . \ In one word, with this repugnance nothing
art: that it must be destroyed, or that it will destroy all
system of robbery in France cannot be rendered safe by any
From all this, what is my inference? It is, that this new

Coexistence with it is impossible:

were the same. (Ibid., pp.514-515)

ita existence; convinced that its existence and its hostility
the matter, we were at \ war not with its conduct, but with
with the system itself that we were at war. As I under stood
of an object we banished in rivalry with each other, put
make peace with the system; because it was not for the sake
this evil would afo be our last. I never thought we could

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cares are those which he owes to himself; and as soon as he reaches years of discretion, he is the sole judge of the proper means of preserving himself, and consequently becomes his own master. (Social Contract, Book I, Ch. II, p.4)

The foregoing sounds like Hobbes. But, for Rousseau, self-interest is not enough for Morality; morality must be something more than an act of necessity:

> Force is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral effect it can have. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will -- at the most, an act of prudence. In what sense can it be a duty? (Social Contract, Bk. I, Ch. III, pp. 5-6)

Another difference from Hobbes is that Rousseau's state of nature cannot be characterized as a state of war:

> Men from the mere fact that, while they are living in their primitive independence, they have no mutual relations stable enough to constitute either the state of peace or the state of war, cannot be naturally enemies. (Social Contract, Bk. I, Ch. IV, p.9)

And:

> War then is a relation, not between man and man, but between state and state, and individuals are enemies only accidently (sic), not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers. (Ibid., p.10)

Morality comes with civil society:

> The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked. (Social Contract, Bk. I, Ch. VIII, p.18)

Obligation to the state is the source of freedom (cf. Hobbes and Hegel):

> What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses. ...

> We might, over and above all this, add to what man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty. (Social Contract, Bk. I, Ch. VIII, p.19)

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N.B. Hobbes had written: "For in the act of our *Submission*, consisteth both our *Obligation*, and our *Liberty*; . . ." (Leviathan, Part II, Ch.XXI, p.183).

In the *Discourse on Inequality*, Rousseau suggests that there is something fundamental in man's nature and something which changes with historical circumstances:

> For how shall we know the source of inequality between men, if we do not begin by knowing mankind? And how shall man hope to see himself as nature made him, across all the changes which the succession of place and time must have produced in his original constitution? How can he distinguish what is fundamental in his nature from the changes and additions which his circumstances and the advances he has made have introduced to modify his primitive condition? (Discourse, Preface, p.189)

Man has the capacity for improvement (perfectibility):

> . . . there is another very specific quality which distinguishes them /men and brutes/, and which will admit of no dispute. This is the faculty of self-improvement, which, by the help of circumstances, gradually develops all the rest of our faculties, and is inherent in the species as in the individual. (Discourse, pp.208-209)

Human nature is more complicated than Hobbes thought, because man has a natural compassion as well as a natural selfishness:

> Throwing aside, therefore, all those scientific books, which teach us only to see men such as they have made themselves, and contemplating the first and most simple operations of the human soul, I think I can perceive in it two principles prior to reason, one of them deeply interesting us in our own welfare and preservation, and the other exciting a natural repugnance at seeing any other sensible being, and particularly any of our own species, suffer pain or death. (Ibid., p.193)

> There are two kinds of selfishness, *amour propre* and *amour de soi*; the first is defensive, and natural, while the second is the source of aggressiveness, and the product of man's situation in society:

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Egoism must not be confused with self-respect: for they differ both in themselves and in their effects. Self-respect is a natural feeling, which leads every animal to look to its own preservation, and which, guided in man by reason and modified by compassion, creates humanity and virtue. Egoism is a purely relative and factitious feeling, which arises in the state of society, leads each individual to make more of himself than of any other, causes all the mutual damage men inflict one on another, and is the real source of the "sense of honour." This being understood, I maintain that, in our primitive condition, in the true state of nature, egoism did not exist; for as each man regarded himself as the only observer of his actions, the only being in the universe who took any interest in him, and the sole judge of his deserts, no feeling arising from comparisons he could not be led to make could take root in his soul; ... (Discourse, p.223n.)

Natural compassion and innocent self-interest produce a standard of natural goodness:

> ... it is this _/compassion_ which, instead of inculcating that sublime maxim of rational justice, / Do to others as you would have them do unto you, inspires all men with that other maxim of natural goodness, much less perfect indeed, but perhaps more useful; Do good to yourself with as little evil as possible to others. (Discourse, pp.226-227)

On Man's goodness, he concludes:

> That men are actually wicked, a sad and continual experience of them proves beyond doubt: but, all the same, I think I have shown that man is naturally good. (Discourse, Appendix, p.273)

Man's behavior in the state of nature is illustrated in the famous story of the deer and the rabbit. Men are preoccupied with their immediate self-interest because they are "strangers to foresight." But Kenneth Waltz (Man, The State, and War, pp.167ff.) draws the additional inference that this preoccupation is rational, since in a condition of anarchy, no man can trust the others:

> In this manner, men may have insensibly acquired some gross ideas of mutual undertakings, and of the advantages of fulfilling them: that is, just so far as their present and

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apparent interest was concerned: for they were perfect
strangers to foresight, and were so far from troubling
themselves about the distant future, that they hardly
thought of the morrow. If a deer was to be taken, every
one saw that, in order to succeed, he must abide faithfully
by his post: but if a hare happened to come within the reach
of any one of them, it is not to be doubted that he pursued
it without scruple, and, having seized his prey, cared very
little, if by doing so he caused his companions to miss theirs.
(Discourse, p.238)

Waltz's conclusion may not be in this particular story, but the
idea is explicit in a passage in _A Project of Perpetual Peace_:
In a world of anarchy and insecurity, self-interest is rational:

> . . . although it would be better for all to be always at
> peace, the common lack of security in this respect brings it
> out that each one, not being able to be sure of avoiding war,
> tries at least to begin it to his own advantage when opportunity
> favours him, and to forestall a neighbour who would not
> hesitate to forestall him in opposite circumstances, so that
> many wars, even offensive ones, are unjust precautions to
> safeguard one's own possessions rather than means of seizing
> what belongs to others. However salutary in general the
> principles of public welfare may be, it is certain if one
> considers nothing but the object that he has in view in
> politics, and often even in morals, these principles become
> harmful to him who persists in practising / them towards
> everyone when no one will practise them towards him.
> (Perpetual Peace, pp.73-75; N.B. the even-numbered pages
> in this edition contain the French original)

In this book Rousseau points out that _the world of states_
_resembles the state of nature_, but he _still_ hopes for the federation
_of Europe_:

> If the social order were, as is pretended, the work of reason
> rather than of the passions, should we have been so long in
> seeing that either too much or too little has been done for
> our happiness; that, as we are each of us in the civil state
> with our fellow-citizens, and in the state of nature with the
> rest of the world, we have prevented private feuds only to
> fan the flames of public wars which are a thousand times more
> terrible; in short mankind, by gathering itself into groups,
> has become its own enemy?

> If there is any means of getting rid of these dangerous
> contradictions, it can be only by a confederative form of

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government, which, uniting nations by bonds similar to
those which unite individuals, submits them all equally
to the authority of the laws. (Perpetual Peace, pp.5-7)

Rousseau is aware of the difficulties of achieving this in a world
of self-interested nations. But he argues that there is a stable
balance of power in Europe, which should make union feasible and
in everyone's interest:

> In addition to these public confederations, others less
> apparent but none the less real, may be tacitly formed by
> some union of interests, by the acceptance of a common policy,
> by conformity of customs, or by other circumstances which create
> a common bond between nations otherwise separate. Thus it is
> that all the European Powers form among themselves a sort of
> system which unites them by the same religion, the same
> international law, by customs, literature, commerce, and by
> a kind of balance, a necessary consequence of all of this
> which, without anyone's studying actually to preserve it,
> would nevertheless not be quite easy to disturb as many
> believe. (Ibid., p.9)

Some common power is needed to make this equilibrium stable:

> Everyone sees that all societies are moulded by common
> interests; that all divisions spring from opposing interests;
> that a thousand accidental occurrences can change and modify
> both these factors, once society is called into being;
> therefore there must necessarily be some power with sanctions
> to regulate and organize the movements of its members, in
> order to give to common interests and mutual engagements that
> degree of solidity which they could not assume by themselves.
> (Ibid., p.25)

Thus the European system is stable enough to make further union
feasible, but so unstable as to make it urgently necessary! He
argues for what we would call a collective-security system.

Here he points out that a general equilibrium is required for
the system to work:

> If I have insisted on the equal distribution of force
> which is the result in Europe of the present constitution,
> it was in order to deduce a conclusion of importance for the
> project for establishing a general league; for, to form a

project for establishing a general league; for, to form a
which is the result in Europe of the present constitution.
If I have initiated on the equal distribution of force

the system to work:

Here he points out that a general equilibrium is required for
argues for what we would call a collective-security system.

feasible, but so unstable as to make it ungenerally necessary! He
Thus the European system is stable enough to make further union

(Ibid., p.52)

degrees of solidity which they could not assume by themselves.
order to give to common interests and mutual engagements that
to regulate and organize the movements of its members, in
therefore there what necessarily be some power with sanctions
both these factors, once society is called into being;

that a thousand accidental occurrences can change and modify
interests; that all divisions spring from opposing interests;
Everyone sees that all societies are moulded by common

believe. (Ibid., p.6)

would nevertheless not be quite necessary to diaturn so many
which, without anyone's studying actually to preserve it,
a kind of balance, a necessary consequence of all of this
international law, by cnatoms, literature, commerce, and by
ayatem which unites them by the same religion, the same
that all the European Powers form among themselves a sort of
a common pond between nations otherwise separate. Thus it is
by conformity of cnatoms, or by other circumstances which create
some union of interests, by the acceptance of a common policy,
apparent but none the less real, may be tacitly formed by
In addition to these public confederations, others less

in everyone's interest:

balance of power in Europe, which should make union feasible and
of self-interested nations. But he argues that there is a stable
Rosaea is aware of the difficulties of achieving this in a world

to the authority of the laws. (Perpetual peace, pp.2-7)
those which unite individuals, unites them all equally
government, which, uniting nations by ponds similar to

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solid and durable confederation, all its members must be placed in such a mutual state of dependence that not one of them alone may be in a position to resist all of the others, and that minor associations which would have the power to injure the general body may meet with sufficient hindrances to prevent their formation. . . . (Ibid., p.39)

Domestic structure affects the degree to which a state is able to perceive, and act for, the general good:

> All the business of kings or of those to whom they delegate their duties, is concerned with two / objects alone; to extend their rule abroad or to make it more absolute at home. Any other view is either subservient to one of these objects, or a mere pretext for obtaining them such are the "public good," "the welfare of the people," or the "glory of the nation"; words always banished from the king's closet. . . .

(Ibid., pp.101-103)

Rousseau's answer to the skeptics is to argue that there are two kinds of self-interest, a higher and a lower. (The distinction is like that of Kant between practical morality and expediency):

> In politics, therefore, as in morals, let us distinguish real from apparent interests. The first would be found in Perpetual Peace; that is shown by the project. The second is to be found in the state of absolute independence. . . .

(Ibid., p.101)

These two levels of self-interest might be taken to correspond to the two levels of selfishness -- *amour de soi* and *amour propre*. The difference between "real" and "apparent" interests is that between an innocent selfishness compatible with that of others and an egoistic obsession. But if Waltz's interpretation of the deer-story is Rousseau's meaning (I'm not so sure), then the idea of an innocent self-interest might be taken as a justification of national interest. One might argue that the national interest, being defensive, and necessary in an anarchic world, is "real" and

being delenaiue, and necessary in an anarochic world, is "real" and
national interest. One might argue that the national interest,
of an innocent self-interest might be taken as a quantification of
qeen-atory is Ronaean's meaning (I'm not so amuse), then the idea
and an egoistic opesation. But if Waits'a interpretation of the
between an innocent selfiameas compatible with that of others
The difference between "real" and "abparent" interests is that
to the two levels of selfiameas -- *swom* *de* *sot* and *swom* *probre*.
These two levels of self-interest might be taken to correspond

(Ibid., b.10f)

is to be found in the state of indefinite independence . . .
perpetual peace; that is shown by the project. The second
real from apparent interests. The first would be found in
In politica, therefore, as in morala, let us distinguish

like that of Kant between practical morality and expropriety;

kings of self-interest, a higher and a lower. (The distinction is
Ronaean's answer to the skepticism is to argue that there are two

(Ibid., bb.10f-103)

worda always punished from the king's closet. . . .
"the welfare of the people," or the "glory of the nation;"
s a mere pretext for obtaining them and are the "public good,"
other view is either impernient to one of these objects, or
their rule abroad or to make it more indefinite at home. Any
All theTaiiness of kings or of those to whom they delegate
berceive, and act for, the general good:

to prevent their formation. . . . (Ibid., b.36)

injure the general body may meet with sufficient influence
and that minor associations which would have the power to
be alone may be in a position to resist all of the others,
placed in such a mutual state of dependence that not one of them
solid and homogeneous confederation, all its members must be

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legitimate, rather than "apparent" and dangerous. All told,
I think Rousseau himself is closer to Kant than to Hobbes.

IMMANUEL KANT: The Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings, edited, with an Introduction, by Carl J. Friedrich, The Modern Library, New York (1949).

Where Rousseau had a vague notion of the perfectibility of
man, Kant turns this into a Natural Law of Human Progress:

No matter what conception one may form of the freedom of
the will in metaphysics, the phenomenal appearances of the
will, i.e., human actions, are determined by general laws of
nature like any other event of nature. History is concerned
with telling about these events. History allows one to hope
that when history considers in the large the play of the
freedom of human will, it will be possible to discover the
regular progressions thereof. Thus (it is to be hoped) that
what appears to be complicated and accidental in individuals,
may yet be understood as a steady, progressive, though slow,
evolution of the original endowments of the entire species.
Thus marriages, the consequent births and deaths, since the
free will seems to have such a great influence on them, do
not seem to be subject to any law according to which one
could calculate their number beforehand. Yet the annual
(statistical) tables about them in the major countries show
that they occur according to stable natural laws.

Individual human beings, each pursuing his own ends
according to his inclination and often one against another
(and even one entire people against another) rarely
unintentionally promote, as if it were their guide, an end
of nature which is unknown to them. They thus work to promote
that which they would care little for if they knew about it.
(Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent, 1784,
pp.116-117)

Kant's idea of the "asocial sociability" of man resembles Rousseau's
picture of man in the state of nature. From this state man
evolves socially and morally through history:

Fourth Principle: The means which nature employs to
accomplish the development of all faculties is the antagonism
of men in society, since this antagonism becomes, in the end,

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the cause of a lawful order of this society. I mean by
antagonism the asocial sociability of man, i.e., the
propensity of men to enter into a society, which propensity
is, however, linked to a constant mutual resistance which
threatens to dissolve this society. This propensity apparently
is innate in man. Man has an inclination to associate himself,
because in such a state he feels himself more like a man
capable of developing his natural faculties. Man has also
a marked propensity to isolate himself, because he finds in
himself the asocial quality to want to arrange everything
according to his own ideas. He therefore expects resistance
everywhere, just as he knows of himself that he is inclined
to resist others. This resistance awakens all the latent
forces in man which drive him to overcome his propensity to
be lazy, . . . All man's talents are gradually unfolded,
taste is developed. Through continuous enlightenment the
basis is laid for a frame of mind which, in the course of
time, transforms the raw natural faculty of moral discrimina-
tion into definite practical principles. Thus a pathologically
enforced coordination of society finally transforms it into
a moral whole. (Ibid., p.120)

Nature uses wars to lay the basis for eventual unity:

Nature has again used quarrelsomeness, in this case that of
great societies and states, as a means for discovering a
condition of quiet and security through the very antagonism
inevitable among them. That is to say, wars, the excessive
and never-ending preparation for wars, and the want which
every state even in the midst of peace must feel -- all these
are means by which, after many devastations, reversals and a
very general exhaustion of the states' resources, may
accomplish what reason could have suggested to them without
so much sad experience, namely; to leave the lawless state of
savages and to enter into a union of nations wherein each,
even the smallest state, could expect to derive its security
and rights -- not from its own power or its own legal judg-
ment -- but only from this great union of nations . . . and
from united power and decisions according to the united will
of them all. (Ibid., p.124)

History reveals the "Hidden Plan of Nature":

Eighth Principle: The history of mankind could be viewed on the whole as the realization of a hidden plan of nature in order to bring about an internally -- and for this purpose also externally -- perfect constitution; since this is the only state in which nature can develop all faculties of mankind. (Ibid., p.127)

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In his 1795 essay on Eternal Peace, Kant elaborates on the theme of "Nature's Guarantee":

> On the Guarantee of Eternal Peace: No one less than the great artist *nature* (*natura daedala rerum*) offers such a guarantee. Nature's mechanical course evidently reveals a teleology: to produce harmony from the very disharmony of men even against their will. (p.448)

And:

> Nature's provisional arrangement consists in the following: (1) she has seen to it that human beings can live in all the regions where they are settled; (2) she has by war driven them everywhere, even in the most inhospitable regions, in order to populate them; (3) she has forced them by war to enter into more or less legal relationships. (p.449)

Not only war, but commerce, leads men to nature's end:

> It is the *spirit of commerce* which cannot coexist with war, and which sooner or later takes hold of every nation. ... 
> 
> -- In this way nature guarantees lasting peace by the mechanism of human inclinations, however the certainty /that this will come to pass/ is not sufficient to *predict* such a future (theoretically). But for practical purposes the certainty suffices and makes it one's duty to work toward this (not simply chimerical) state. (p.455; phrase in brackets is inserted by Friedrich)

How?

Domestic structure affects the *morality* of the state. (This is like Rousseau, but unlike Machiavelli, who was concerned with domestic structure as a determinant of a state's *strength*):

> ... the republican constitution does offer the prospect of the desired purpose, that is to say, eternal peace, and the reason is as follows: If, as is necessarily the case under the constitution, the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide whether there should be war or not, nothing is more natural than that those who would have to decide to undergo all the deprivations of war will very much hesitate to start such an evil game. ... By contrast, under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen and which is therefore not republican, it is the easiest thing in the world to start a war. (p.438)

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Kant believes that moral obligation is _practical_, and that self-interested expediency is a negation of morals:

Morals, when conceived of as the totality of absolutely binding laws according to which we _ought_ to act, is in itself practice in an objective sense. It is therefore an apparent paradox to say that one _cannot_ do _what one ought to do_ once the authoritativeness of this concept of _duty_ is acknowledged. For in that case this concept _of duty_ would be eliminated from morals since _ultra posse nemo obligatur_. Hence there can be no conflict between theory and practice, unless theory were taken to mean a general _doctrine of expediency_ _[Klugheitslehre]_, that is to say a theory of the maxims as to how to choose the most appropriate means for the realization of self-interested purposes; in other words, altogether to deny that morals exist. (p.457; phrases in brackets are Friedrich's)

Morality should rule:

_Fiat justitia, pereat mundus_ is a proverbial saying which sounds a bit pompous, yet it is true, and it means in simple language, "Justice shall prevail, even though all the rascals in the world should perish as a result." This is a sound principle of right and law which cuts off all the brooked paths of cunning and violence. . . .

This sentence really does not intend to say anything more than that political maxims must not proceed from considering the welfare and happiness to be expected from their being followed, that is to say they must not proceed from the end which / each of these maxims makes its object, nor from the will as the highest (but empirical) principle of political prudence. Rather such maxims must be derived from the pure principle of duty under natural law (from the Ought the principle of which is given a _priori_ by pure reason) regardless of what might be the physical consequences thereof. The world will not perish because there are fewer bad men. (pp.467-468)

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL: The Philosophy of Hegel, Edited, with an Introduction, by Carl J. Friedrich, The Modern Library, New York (1954). The works quoted from are Philosophy of History, (1822) and Philosophy of Right and Law.

-26-

or *Natural Law and Political Science Outlined, 1821*).

World history is the evolution of the *self-conscious* Spirit:

Our subject, world history, occurs in the field of the
spirit. The world comprises both physical and psychic nature.
The physical nature affects world history ... but the spirit
and the course of its development is its substance. ...

In the light of this discussion it can be said of world
history that it is the description of the spirit as it works
out the knowledge of that which is in itself. (Phil. of History,
Introduction, p.11)

History moves men towards ends they may not be aware of (cf. Kant):

What is involved here is that in world history something
else results from the actions of men than what they intend
and achieve, something else than they know or want. They
accomplish their interest; but something else is accomplished,
which was implied in it, but which was not in the conscious/
ness and in the intention of the actors. (Ibid., pp.16-17)

Great men (e.g. Caesar) are those who happen to be leading in the
direction of history:

Such are the great men in history whose own particular
purposes contain the substantial task which is the will of
the world spirit. This substance is their true power and
strength, for it is at work in the general, un-conscious
instinct of their contemporaries. (Ibid., pp.17-18)

Elsewhere Hegel says on the same theme:

> He who says and accomplishes what his time wants and desires
> is the great man of that time. (Phil. of Right and Law,
> Para.318, supplement), p.293)

History presents the evolution of the idea of freedom:

World history presents therefore the stages in the
development of the principle whose meaning (*Gehalt*) is the
consciousness of freedom. (Phil. of History, Introduction,
p.23; *German words + phrases in this other passage* are put in by Friedrich)

Historical morality, which characterizes great men, is not
the same as individual morality for ordinary men:

For world history moves upon a higher plane than that upon
which morality has its particular place; for morality is the
private conviction of the individuals, their particular will

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and mode of action: these have their value, their reward and punishment. But what the final end of the spirit requires and accomplishes -- this end being in and by itself -- what providence does, all that lies beyond the obligations, cannot be imputed to nor expected of individuals in regard to their ethics. . . . The deeds of the great men who are world historical individuals thus appear justified not only in their inner (and to them unknown) meaning, but also from the world standpoint. From this standpoint moral circles ought not to object to world historical deeds and to those who accomplish them. . . . (Phil. of History, Introduction, p. 31)

Philosophy deals with things actual, not things other-worldly:

Philosophy is, because it is the exploration of the rational, by that very fact the prehension of the present and the actual (Wirklichen), and not the construction of something other-worldly that might be God knows where . . . . (Phil. of Right and Law, Preface, p.224)

The state is to be regarded as one of these things actual:

> Therefore, this treatise in so far as it contains political science is intended to be nothing else but an attempt to understand the state as something rational in itself and so to describe it. As a philosophical study it ought to be furthest from constructing a state as it ought to be. . . .

(Ibid., pp.225-226)

Prediction and prescription are impossible, because philosophical understanding comes too late for that:

> To say one more word about preaching what the world ought to be like, philosophy arrives always too late for that. As thought of the world it appears at a time when actuality has completed its developmental process and is finished. What the conception teaches, history also shows as necessary, namely, that only in a maturing actuality the ideal appears and confronts the real. It is then that the ideal rebuilds for itself this same world in the shape of an intellectual realm, comprehending this world in its substance. When philosophy paints its gray in gray, a form of life has become old, and this gray in gray cannot rejuvenate it, only understand it. The owl of Minerva begins its flight when dusk is falling.

(Ibid., p.227)

Obligation is liberating, because it puts the individual in tune on the objective (historical) path:

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Obligatory duty can appear as a *limitation*, only to
undetermined subjectivity or abstract freedom. . . . But
the individual has in duty rather his *liberation*, on the
one hand, from the dependence imposed upon him when under the
influence of natural desires alone, as well as from the
oppression which he suffers as subjective particularity in
the moral reflection as to what ought and what may be done;
and, on the other hand, from the undetermined subjectivity
which does not express itself/ and thus attain the objective
characteristic of action, but remains *in itself* as a non-
actuality. In duty the individual shakes off subjective
fetters and attains substantial freedom. (Phil. of Right
and Law, Para. 149, pp.263-264)

The state is the embodiment of the ethical idea:

The state is the actual reality of the ethical idea; it is
the ethical spirit as the *manifest* (*offenbare*) substantial
will that is fully self-cognizant (*sich selbst deutlich*), and
that thinks and knows itself and realizes what it knows and
in so far as it knows. The state has its immediate existence
in the ethical habits (*Sitte*) and in the self-consciousness
of the individual; in his knowing and doing the state has
its mediated existence, just as the individual has his
*substantial freedom* in the state as in his own essence, his
end and the product of his activity. (Phil. of Right and
Law, Para. 257, p.280)

The state represents the realization of the idea of freedom:

The state in-and-for-itself is the ethical whole, the
actualization of freedom. It is the absolute end of
reason / that freedom be actual. The state is the spirit
which dwells in the world and *consciously* realizes itself
in the world, whereas in nature it actualizes itself only
... as a dormant spirit. (Para. 258, supplement, pp.282-
283)

As such, the state has a progress of its own:

> The state is the world which the spirit has created for
> itself: therefore the state has a definite progress of its
> own. (Para.272, supplement, p.293)

International relations heighten the state's consciousness of
its sovereign independence:

> The individuality, as an exclusive being-in-itself, manifests
> (*erscheint*) itself in the *relation* to *other states*, each of

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which is autonomous toward the others. Since the being-in-
itself of the actual spirit has its reality (Dasein) in this
autonomy, this autonomy is the first freedom and the highest
honor of a nation.

Those who talk of the desires of such a totality which
constitutes a more or less autonomous state and has its own
center, for losing this center and autonomy in order to
constitute together with another people another whole, know
little of the nature of such a totality and of the pride
which a people takes in its independence. . . . (Para.322,
p.320)

States are in a state of nature with each other; interests
therefore usually overrule treaty obligations; and Kant's idea
of an eternal peace is a dream:

But because the relation between such states rests upon
their sovereignty, they are in a state of nature, so to
speak, toward each other and their rights have their
actuality not in any general [power] constituted / over
them, but in their own free will. The general norm [that
treaties are to be observed] remains an [ought] and the actual
situation varies in accordance with what is appropriate to
their relation, in accordance with treaties that may be
suspended.

There is no praetor, at most arbiters and mediators,
between states and these latter only in accordance with a
particular decision, that is, accidentally. The conception
of Kant of an eternal peace based upon a federation of states
which would arbitrate every conflict and would compose, as a
power recognized by the individual state, each trouble, and
thus would make a decision by war impossible, presupposes
the agreement of the states which would rest upon moral,
religious or other grounds and considerations, which would
altogether always rest upon the particular sovereign wills
and therefore would remain subject to contingency.

334. A conflict between states can therefore when the
particular wills do not find any agreement be decided only
by war. . . .

335. Moreover, a state as a spiritual being cannot stop
at regarding merely the actual violation; it must also
consider the anticipation (Vorstellung: literally imagination)
of such a violation as a danger which threatens it from
another state, and that means the calculation of changing
probabilities, the suspicion of motives, etc., must be added
as causes of conflict. (Paras.333-335, pp.326-327;
phrases in brackets, and translations of words, are Friedrich's)

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In other words, a precautionary foreign policy is inevitable. In the world of states, moreover, legality and morality have to be merely normative:

> States are not private persons, but completely autonomous totalities in themselves, and hence their relationship is different from a merely moral and legal one. It has often been tried to interpret them thus as legal and moral, but private persons have a court over them which realizes what is law. The relationship between states ought also to be lawful in itself, but in this world that which is in itself must also have power to actualize it. Since there exists no power which can decide against a state what is law (Recht) in itself and which might enforce such a decision, the relationship must remain a normative one. (Para. 330, p.325)

War enhances the ethical nature of the state:

> In what has been said is implied the ethical aspect of war. . . . War as the state in which the vanity of all earthly goods and things which is often no more than a pious phrase, becomes a deadly serious matter, is therefore the aspect of the state wherein the ideality of the particular receives what is its right (Recht) and becomes actuality. War has its higher meaning that through it, as I have said elsewhere, the ethical health of nations is maintained, since such health does not require the stabilizing of finite arrangements; just as the motion of the winds keeps the sea from the foulness which a constant calm would produce -- so war prevents a corruption of nations which a perpetual, let alone an eternal peace would produce. (Para. 324, pp.321-322)

For:

> Nations do not only emerge from wars stronger, but nations which are quarrelsome within themselves gain by wars some peace within. (Para. 324, supplement, p.322)

Elsewhere he considers war as a test of the cohesiveness of a state, and of how much it can demand of its citizens:

> The health of the state manifests itself generally not in the quietness of peace but in the commotion of war. Peace is a state of enjoyment and activity in isolation, when the government is a wise paternalism, which demands from the subjects only what is customary. In war, the strength of the cohesion of all the whole is demonstrated, how much the state can demand of them and how much that is worth which

-31-

all may be willing to do for it out of their own initiative
and sentiment. (*The Constitution of Germany*, 1802, p.327)

Finally, the interplay of international relations is the medium
through which the world spirit evolves:

> The relation of states toward each other, as particular
> states, includes the highly animated interplay of their
> particular passions, interests, purposes, talents and
> virtues, of force, injustice and vices -- their inner life --
> with the external contingency appearing in its largest dimen-
> sions. This interplay exposes the ethical whole itself, the
> autonomy of the state, to contingency. The principles of
> the *national spirits* are, because they are particular *existing*
> individuals having their objective actuality and self-
> consciousness, altogether limited. Their destinies and
> actions are in their relation to each other the phenomenal
> dialectics of the finiteness of these spirits. From this
> finiteness, the *universal spirit*, the *spirit of the world*
> which is unlimited creates itself; it is this world spirit
> which exercises its right over them -- and this right is
> the highest -- in world history as the world court. (Phil.
> of Right and Law, para.340, p.329)

KARL MARX: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* in two volumes, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958.

In the words of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, 1848:
> "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of
class struggles." (Manifesto, *Works*, vol.I, p.34). History
unfolds itself in the struggle of classes:

> Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however,/
> this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class
> antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting
> up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes
> directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.
> (Ibid., pp.34-35)

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Man's ideas are materialistically based:

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?

What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class. (Ibid., p.52)

A long passage in his "Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," 1859, expresses his view of the materialist foundation of consciousness and political institutions, the causes of social revolution, and the objective, scientific nature of his study:

> In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or -- what is but a legal expression for the same thing -- with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic -- in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and

forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and
religion, seamy or fabriodic -- in short, ideological
brietion of natural science, and the legal, political,
conditions of production, which can be determined with the
be made between the material transformation of the economic
considering such transformatioa a distinction should always
aneratructure ia more or less rabidly transformed. In
With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense
their letters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution.
development of the productive forces these relations turn into
within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of
expression for the same thing -- with the property relations
existing relations of production, or -- what is put a legal
productive forces of society come in conflict with the
naas. At a certain stage of their development, the material
contrary, their social being that determines their consacra-
conacianaae of men that determines their being, put, on the
and intellectual life process in general. It is not the
of production of material life conditions the social, political
correspond definite forms of social conacianaae. The mode
riases a legal and political aneratructure and to which
economic atnructure of society, the real foundation, on which
aum total of these relations of production conatitutes the
stage of development of their material productive forces. The
will, relations of production which correspond to a definite
infinite relations that are indiabenable and independent of their
in the social production of their life, men enter into self

nature of life study:

cases of social revolution, and the objective, scientific
foundation of conacianaae and political institutions, the
of Political Economy," 1826, expresses his view of the materialist
A long passage in his "Preface to A Contribution to the Critique

(Ipiq., b.25)

each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class.
as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of
intellectual production changes its character in proportion
What else does the history of ideas prove, then that
social life?

material existence, in his social relations, and in his
ness, changes with every change in the conditions of his
ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's conacian-
Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's

Man's ideas are materially passed:

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-33-

fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not
based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of
such a period of transformation by its own consciousness;
on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather
from the contradictions of material life, from the existing
conflict between the social productive forces and the relations
of production. (Vol. I, pp.362-363)

The last stage of human prehistory is at hand:

In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern
bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive
epochs in the economic formation of society. The bourgeois
relations of production are / the last antagonistic form of
the social process of production -- antagonistic not in the
sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from the
social conditions of life of the individuals; at the same
time the productive forces developing in the womb of bour-
geois society create the material conditions for the solution
of that antagonism. This social formation brings, therefore,
the prehistory of human society to a close. (Ibid., pp.363-
364)

Individuals are less important than social forces:

I paint the capitalist and the landlord in no sense couleur
de rose. But here individuals are dealt with only in so far
as they are the personifications of economic categories,
embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests.
My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic
formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history,
can less than any other make the individual responsible for
relations whose creature he socially remains, however much
he may subjectively raise himself above them. ("Preface to
the First German Edition of the First Volume of Capital,"
1867, Selected Works, Vol. I, p.451)

Hegel had the right idea about History, but his idealist attitude
made the thing upside down:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian,
but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the
human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the
name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an independent
subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real
world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea."
With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the
material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into
forms of thought.

... The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's

-34-

hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to
present its general form of working in a comprehensive and
conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head.
It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover
the rational kernel within the mystical shell. ("From the
Afterword to the Second German Edition of the First Volume
of *Capital*," Selected Works, Vol. I, p.456)

1873

The modern political state is a superstructure based on modern
bourgeois society:

Nevertheless, the different states of the different
civilized countries, in spite of their manifold diversity
of form, all have this in common, that they are based on
modern bourgeois society, only one more or less capitalistically
developed. They have, therefore, also certain essential
features in common. In this sense it is possible to speak of
the "present-day state," in contrast with the future, in
which the present root, bourgeois society, will have died off.
("Marginal Notes to the Programme of the German Workers'
Party" /Critique of the Gotha Programme/, 1875, Selected
Works, Vol. II, p.32)

In a letter summing up his own contribution to social theory,
Marx mentions his economic analysis and his theory of historical
evolution:

... And now as to myself, no credit is due to me for
discovering the existence of classes in modern society, nor
yet the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois
historians had described the historical development of this
struggle of the classes, and bourgeois economists the
economic anatomy of the classes. What I did that was new was
to prove: 1) that the *existence of classes* is only bound up
with *particular historical phases in the development of
production*; 2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to
the *dictatorship of the proletariat*; 3) that this dictator-
ship itself only constitutes the transition to the *abolition
of all classes* and to a *classless society*.

(Letter to J. Weydemeyer, London, March 5, 1852; Selected
Works, Vol. II, p.452)

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OSWALD SPENGLER, The Decline of the West, Authorized
translation with notes by Charles Francis Atkinson, London, George
Allen & Unwin Lyd., One-volume edition (1932).

World history is characterized by periodicity and repetition:

The means whereby to identify dead forms is Mathematical Law.
The means whereby to identify living forms is Analogy. By
these means we are enabled to distinguish polarity and period-
icity in the world.

It is, and has always been, a matter of knowledge that the
expression-forms of world-history are limited in number, and
that eras, epochs, situations, persons are ever repeating
themselves true to type. Napoleon has hardly ever been
discussed without a side-glance at Caesar and Alexander. . .
while Napoleon himself conceived of his situation as akin to
Charlemagne's. The French Revolutionary Convention spoke of
Ca'thage when it meant England, and the Jacobins styled
themselves Romans.

Still, all this was only fragmentary and arbitrary, and
usually implied rather a momentary inclination to poetical
or ingenious expressions than a really deep sense of histori-
cal forms. (Volume I, Introduction, section 2, p.4)

There is no rectilinear progress in History:

Thanks to the subdivision of history into "Ancient,"
"Medieval," and "Modern" -- an incredibly jejune and meaningful
scheme, which has, however, entirely dominated our
historical thinking -- we have failed to see the true position
in the general history of higher mankind, of the little part-
world which has developed on West-European soil from the time
of the German-Roman Empire, to judge of its relative importance
and above all to estimate its direction. The Cultures that
are to come will find it difficult to believe that the validity
of such a scheme with its simple rectilinear progression and
its meaningless proportions, becoming more and more preposterous
with each century, incapable of bringing into itself new fields
of history as they successively come into the light of our
knowledge, was, in spite of all, never whole-heartedly
attacked. (Ibid., p.16)

The idea of unilinear progress is absurd and arrogant, for there
is actually a great multiplicity of cultures, each living and
dying out:

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We know it to be true of every organism that the rhythm,
form, and duration of its life, and all the expression-
details of that life as well, are determined by the _properties_
_of its_ species. . . . In the case of higher human history,
on the contrary, we take our ideas as to the course of the
future from an unbridled optimism that sets at naught all
historical, i.e., _organic_, experience, and everyone therefore
sets himself to discover in the accidental present terms
that he can expand into some striking progression-series, the
existence of which rests not on scientific proof but on
predilection. He works upon unlimited possibilities -- never
a natural end -- and from the momentary top-course of his
bricks plans artlessly the continuation of his structure.

"Mankind," however, has no aim, no idea, no plan, any more
than the family of butterflies or orchids. "Mankind" is a
zoological expression, or an empty word. But conjure away
the phantom, break the magic circle, and at once there
emerges an astonishing wealth of _actual_ forms -- the Living
with all its immense fullness, depth and movement -- hitherto
veiled by a catchword, a dryasdust scheme, and a set of
personal "ideals." I see, in place of that empty figment of
one linear history which can only be kept up by shutting one's
eyes to the overwhelming multitude of the facts, the drama
of a _number_ of mighty Cultures, each springing with primitive
strength from the soil of a mother-region to which it remains
firmly bound throughout its whole life-cycle; each stamping
its material, its mankind, in _its own_ image; each having _its_
Own idea, _its own_ passions, _its own_ life, will and feeling,
 _its own_ death. Here indeed are colours, lights, movements,
that no intellectual eye has yet discovered. Here the
Cultures, peoples, languages, truths, gods, landscapes bloom
and age as the oaks and the stone-pines, the blossoms, twigs
and leaves -- but there is no ageing "Mankind." Each Culture
has its own new possibilities of self-expression which arise,
ripen, decay, and never return. (Vol. I, Introduction,
section 7, p.21)

In place of this "egocentric" theory of history, he urges a

"Copernican" re-interpretation:

In opposition to all these arbitrary and narrow schemes,
derived from tradition or personal choice, into which history
is forced, I put forward the natural, the "Copernican," form
of the historical process which lies deep in the essence of
that process and reveals itself only to an eye perfectly free
from prepossessions. (Section 9, p.25)

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From this perspective, he can foresee the Decline of the West:

> . . . the "Decline of the West" comprises nothing less than the problem of Civilization. We have before us one of the fundamental questions of all higher history, What is Civilization, understood as the organic-logical sequel, fulfilment and finale of a culture?

> For every Culture has its own Civilization. In this work, for the first time the two words, hitherto used to express an indefinite, more or less ethical, distinction, are used in a periodic sense, to express a strict and necessary organic succession. (Section XII, p.31)

This is shown by the example of "available precedents":

> . . . as our own time represents a transitional phase which occurs with certainty under particular conditions, there are perfectly well-defined states (such as have occurred more than once in the history of the past) later than the present-day state of West Europe, and therefore . . .

> The future of the West is not a limitless tending upwards and onwards for all time towards our present ideals, but a single phenomenon of history, strictly limited and defined as to form and duration, which covers a few centuries and can be viewed and, in essentials, calculated from available precedents. (Section XIII, p.39)

But at the moment of writing, the forces governing the life-cycle of the West are pointing to Imperialism; Cecil Rhodes is the Great Man of the age, in a Hegelian sense:

> Imperialism is Civilization unadulterated. In this phenomenal form the destiny of the West is now irrevocably set. The energy of culture-man is directed inwards, that of civilization-man outwards. And thus I see in Cecil Rhodes the first man of a new age. He stands for the political style of a far-ranging, Western, Teutonic and especially German future. . . . It is not a matter of choice -- it is not the conscious will of individuals, or even that of whole classes or peoples that decides. The expansive tendency is a doom, something daemonic and immense, which grips, forces into service, and uses up the late mankind of the world-city stage, willy-nilly, aware or unaware. (Section XIII, pp.36-37)

The following passages are taken from Volume II, ChapterXII, on "The State: (c) Philosophy of Politics." Here he emphasizes the

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primacy of politics:

The being-streams of humanity are called History when we regard them as movements, and family, estate, people, nation, when we regard them as the / object moved. Politics is the way in which this fluent Being maintains itself, grows, triumphs over other life-streams. All living is politics, in every trait of instinct, in the inmost marrow.
(Vol.II, Ch.XII, pp.439-440)

The great statesman is he who leads in the direction of history
(cf. Hegel):

How is politics done? The born statesman is above all a valuer -- a valuer of men, situations, and things. He has the "eye" which unhesitatingly and inflexibly embraces the round of possibilities. . . . To do the correct thing without "knowing" it, to have the hands that imperceptibly tighten or ease the bit -- his talent is the very opposite to that of the man of theory. The secret pulse of all being is one and the same in him and in the things of history. . . . He has convictions, certainly, that are dear to him, but he has them as a private person; no real politician ever felt himself tied to them when in action. "The doer is always conscienceless; no-one has a conscience except the spectator," said Goethe, and it is equally true of Sulla and Robespierre as it is of Bismarck and Pitt. (Ibid., p.442)

He elaborates the point that the standards of ordinary private morals are not really relevant to the statesman:

The influence that a statesman -- even one in an exceptionally strong position -- possesses over the methods of politics is very small, and it is one of the characteristics of the high-grade statesman that he does not deceive himself on this matter. His task is to work in and with the historical form that he finds in existence; it is only the theorist, who enthusiastically searches for more /ideal forms.
(Ibid., pp.446-447)

As for Hegel, domestic affairs are subordinate to the state's power and capacity to play an historical role in the international sphere:

Politics, lastly, is the form in which is accomplished the history of a nation within a plurality of nations. The great art is to maintain one's own nation inwardly "in form" for events outside; this is the natural relation of home and

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foreign politics. . . . And, as between the two, the first
exists exclusively for the second and not vice versa. . . .
But the value of all this /domestic reform/ depends upon its
relation to this basic fact of history -- that a people is
not / alone in the world, and that its future will be decided
by its force-relationships towards other peoples and powers
and not by its mere internal ordering. (Ibid., pp.447-448)

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A Study of History, Volume I,
Oxford University Press (London, New York, Toronto), 2nd ed., 1935.

Spengler thought of history as a natural science; Toynbee is
skeptical of this analogy:

> . . . the course of our argument . . . has been leading us
> up to the point of calling into question the analogy between
> historical thought and industrial production altogether. In
> the world of action we know that it is disastrous to treat
> animals or human beings as though they were stocks and stones.
> Why should we suppose this treatment to be any less mistaken
> in the world of ideas? Why should we suppose that the
> scientific method of thought -- a method which has been
> devised for thinking about Inanimate Nature -- should be
> applicable to historical thought, which is a study of living
> creatures and indeed of human beings? . . / . . We are
> sufficiently on our guard against the so-called 'Pathetic
> Fallacy' of imaginatively endowing inanimate objects with
> life. We now fall victims to the inverse 'Apathetic Fallacy'
> of treating living creatures as though they were inanimate.
> (Part I: Introduction, Section A; pp.7-8)

Spengler thought of the nation-state as the historically signifi-
cant entity; Toynbee thinks of the state as a recurrent but
passing phase:

> Here again, an institution dominating a particular age of a
> particular society has influenced the outlook and activity of
> historians who happen to have been brought up under its
> shadow. The spirit of Nationality is a sour ferment of the
> new wine of Democracy in the old bottles of Tribalism. (Ibid., p.9)

new wine of Democracy in the old bottles of Tripolitania. (Ibid., p.6)

The spirit of Nationality is a strong ferment of the

basing base:

cant entity; Toynbee thinks of the state as a recurrent put

Shengler thought of the nation-state as the historically effi-
cient entity; Toynbee thinks of the state as a recurrent put

(Part I: *Introduction*, Section A: pp.1-8)

of treating living creatures as though they were inanimate.
life. We now fall victims to the inverse 'Abathetic Fallacy,
Fallacy, of imaginatively endowing inanimate objects with
unefficiently on our own against the so-called 'Pathetic
creatures and indeed of human beings? ... We are
applicable to historical thought, which is a study of living
deviated from thinking about Inanimate Nature -- should be
scientific method of thought -- a method which has been
in the world of ideas? Why should we impose that the
Why should we impose this treatment to be any less mistaken
animals or human beings as though they were at once and at once,
the world of action we know that it is dissimilar to treat
historical thought and industrial production altogether. In
up to the point of calling into question the analogy between
... the course of our argument ... has been leading us
skeptical of this analogy:

Shengler thought of history as a natural science; Toynbee is

Oxford University Press (London, New York, Toronto), 1932.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. *A Study of History*. Volume I,

and not by its mere internal ordering. (Ibid., pp.447-448)
by its force—relationship towards other peoples and powers
not alone in the world, and that its future will be decided
relation to this basic fact of history — that a people is
but the cause of all this domestic reform, depends upon its
exists exclusively for the second and not vice versa. ...
foreign politics. . . . And, as between the two, the first

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Toynbee's approach is thus characterized by a high degree of relativism. But there is still some "constant and absolute" subject for historical study:

> So far, we have simply found that in the foreground of historical thought there is a shimmer of relativity, and it is not impossible that the ascertaining of this fact may prove to be the first step towards ascertaining the presence of some constant and absolute object of historical thought in the background. (Ibid., p.16)

History operates through general forces much bigger than the nation:

> The forces in action are not national but proceed from wider causes, which operate upon all the parts simultaneously and which are not intelligible in their partial operation unless a comprehensive view is taken of their operation throughout the society. At the same time, different parts are differently affected by an identical general cause, because they each react, and each contribute, in a different way to the forces which that same cause sets in motion. (Ibid., p.22)

Thus the field of historical study must be extended in space (pp.26ff.) and in time (pp.36ff.). Thus he isolates the phenomenon of "The West" or "the Western Society" or "the Western World" (p.34), which is but one representative of the species. The idea of "the continuity of history" is a myth:

> 'The continuity of history' is the most attractive of all the conceptions which have been framed on the analogy of the 'classical' Western Physical Science by Western historians; yet, in view of its suspect origin, we must harden our hearts and criticize it in the light of the foregoing investigation. What, precisely, did the inventors of the term mean to imply? If they simply meant that 'the continuity of history' was a particular instance of the continuity of Life, then their formula is an unimpeachable but not very illuminating truism. Between all the manifestations of Life some kind of continuity is certainly discernible -- between the amoeba and the vertebrate, between the ape and the human being, between parents and offspring in a family -- but this continuity is so abstract that the apprehension of it only brings us to the threshold of understanding what Life is. We hardly begin to learn anything about the nature of Life until we

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succeed in distinguishing the points of relative discontinuity
in the ever-rolling stream -- the bends which intervene
between the straight reaches, the rapids which isolate from
one another the quiet navigable stretches, the crests and
troughs of the waves which arise when the waters are troubled,
the seracs and crevasses which are fashioned by age-long
pressure into a myriad forms when the waters are frozen into
a glacier. In other words, the concept of continuity is only
significant as a symbolic mental background on which we can
plot out our perceptions of discontinuity in all their
actual variety and complexity. Let us apply this general
observation concerning the study of Life to the study of
History. Does the term 'continuity of history,' as used by
modern Western historians, tacitly imply that the mass,
momentum, volume, velocity, and direction of the social
stream of human life are constant, or, short of being
literally constant, vary within such narrow limits that the
variations have no historical significance? If the term
carries any such implication as this, then however attractive
it may seem at first sight it is seriously misleading. . . .
(Part I: Introduction, Section B, p.43)

There is a certain rhythm of thought, alternating between fact-gathering and interpretation, neither phase of which can ever be complete. There are certain "universal conditions of scholarship -- criticism, transitoriness, and succession," which are "ineluctable," (p.48):

> They are conditions that arise from the nature of scholarship
> itself, which makes its progress by a rhythmic alternation
> between two activities -- the collection of materials and their
> arrangement, the finding of facts and their interpretation --
> just as a physical organism lives and grows by an alternation
> between eating and digestion. . . . No collection of facts
> is ever complete, because the Universe is without bounds. And
> no synthesis or interpretation is ever final because there
> are always fresh facts to be found after the first collection
> has been provisionally arranged. (Ibid., p.49)

Again, "societies" are the relevant data of historical study:

> In the preceding investigation we have established the
> existence of societies which (unlike their articulations
> called states) are independent entities in the sense that
> each of them constitutes by itself an 'intelligible field of

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historical study,' but which at the same time are all
representatives of a single species. (Ibid., p.51)

He discovers twenty-one societies, past and present (Part I, Section C, I, II), which are all comparable, or "philosophically contemporaneous and equivalent" (I C, III). The twenty-one are actually a particular type, called "civilizations":

... societies which are 'intelligible fields of historical study' are a genus within which our twenty-one representatives constitute one particular species. Societies of this species are commonly called 'civilizations' in order to distinguish them from 'primitive societies,' which are likewise 'intelligible fields of historical study'. . . . (I, C, III; p.147)

The idea of the present supremacy of Western civilization as the culmination of the historical process is a gross error, partly due to the mistake of focussing on the political and economic, rather than cultural, plane:

> This thesis that the present unification of the world on a Western basis is the consummation of a single continuous process which accounts for the whole of human history requires a violent distortion of historical facts and a drastic limitation of the historian's field of vision.

> In the first place, his vision of the contemporary world must be confined to the economic and political planes of social life and must be inhibited from penetrating to the cultural plane, which is not only deeper but is fundamental. While the economic and political maps of the world have now been 'Westernized' out of recognition, the cultural map remains today substantially what it was before our Western Society ever started on its career of economic and political conquest. (Ibid., p.151).

So economics and politics are a kind of superstructure imposed on, but not always related to, the basic, or cultural, essence. The idea of unilinear progress is founded on an egocentric and optimistic illusion:

optimistic illusion:

idea of nonlinear progress is founded on an eccentric and
but not always related to, the basic, or cultural, essence. The
so economics and politics are a kind of superstructure imposed on,
condense. (Ibid., p.12).

Society ever started on its career of economic and political
remains today apathetically what it was before our Western
been 'Westernised', out of recognition, the cultural was
while the economic and political rules of the world have now
cultural plane, which is not only deeper put in fundamental.
social life and what be impelled from penetrating to the
what be confined to the economic and political plane of
In the first place, his vision of the contemporary world
tion of the historian's field of vision.
a violent distortion of historical facts and a drastic limita-
process which accords for the whole of human history requires
a Western point of view the consummation of a single continuous
This theory that the present manifestation of the world on
rather than cultural, plane:

due to the mistake of focusing on the political and economic,
fulmination of the historical process is a gross error, partly
The idea of the present awareness of Western civilization as the
fields of historical study. . . . (I. C. III; p.147)

them from 'primitive societies', which are likewise 'intelligible
are commonly called 'civilizations', in order to qualifying
constitute one barterjar species. Societies of this species
atnd, are a genus within which our twenty-one representative
... societies which are 'intelligible fields of historical

actually ▼●● barterjar plane, called "civilizations":

exemplary of a
contemporaneous and adjacent" (I C, III). The twenty-one are
Section C, I, II), which are all comparable, on "philosophically
He discovers twenty-one societies, beat and present (part I,
representatives of a single species. (Ibid., p.12)

historical study, put which at the same time are all

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At bottom, the misconception is founded on an egocentric illusion which is always and everywhere ingrained in human minds.

Of course it is possible that the omnipresent illusion may accidentally coincide with reality in any given case. At any moment in the history of any civilization, so long as the society remains alive, its members may be right in believing that their own local / and temporary movement is in the main line of evolution -- that it is on the point of vindicating its claim to be the consummation of human history by accomplishing the transformation of Sub-Man through Man into Super-Man. Yet the chances in favour of this coincidence cannot ever be very great. We know of twenty-one cases in which the enterprise of civilization has been attempted hitherto. We know of no case in which the goal of human endeavours has been attained yet, while on the other hand we know of fourteen cases in which attempts to attain the goal are proved to have failed irretrievably by the fact that the societies which made them have become extinct. . . . The goal of human endeavours may be attained, perhaps thousands or hundreds of thousands of years hence, by some society as yet unborn; or the Human Race itself may become extinct without the goal ever having been attained at all. (Ibid., pp.158-159)

The illusion, again, is partly due to "equating politics with life":

> By ignoring the cultural plane and by equating politics with Life, Western observers arrive at an opinion about non-Western histories which exposes the confusion of their thought as much as it ministers to their self-esteem. (Ibid., p.165)

Spengler, of course, equated politics with life, but was not a victim of the egocentric illusion. Toynbee's notion of the "philosophic⁸ contemporaneity" and "philosophical equivalence" of all representatives of the species (pp.172ff. and pp.175ff., respectively) is evident in Spengler, too. So is Toynbee's notion of regularity and recurrence:

> A priori, the implied abnormality of civilizations appears improbable. Moreover, if we make an empirical investigation into the facts of human life as manifested in civilizations, we actually come across an element of regularity and recurrence, that is to say an aspect to which the comparative method of study can be applied. (Ibid., p.180)

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The major difference between Spengler and Toynbee is reflected
in their attitudes toward politics and the state. Spengler's views
of the historical role of the state and the statesman, and of the
sort of "higher morality" which history ascribes to these, are
distinctly Hegelian. Toynbee de-emphasizes the state, and is not
interested in the question of political morality at all. Therefore
I put Spengler in with Hegel in the "prophetic" class, and Toynbee
in the "analytical" group.

You might want to classify Spengler and Toynbee differently. My
feeling was that they could not be classed as "political," even
though they both speak of multiplicity and recurrence in human
affairs. Their cyclical notions of history are very much unlike
the history-repeats-itself attitude of Thucydides, Machiavelli, et al.
The latter do not try to fit history into any rigid pattern, whether
of unilinear progress or multiple cycles; they merely show a sense
of the permanence of the human condition. For them, history
provides a record of examples, not the blueprint of a process.

I'm not sure of the distinction you mean to make between the
"analytical" and "prophetic" approaches. Your provisional out-
line speaks of "politics as a historical process" vs. "politics as
a messianic vision," respectively. The former can easily blend
with, or become, the latter. Hegel, Spengler, and Marx are all in
the neighborhood of this blurry line. I saw all three as more
messianic than analytical, in the usual senses of the terms.

measlesic than analytical, in the sense of the term.
the neighborhood of this poor line. I saw all three as more
with, or become, the latter. Hegel, Spengler, and Marx are all in
a measlesic vision," respectively. The former can easily blend
fine aspects of "politics as a historical process" vs. "politics as
"analytical" and "prophetic" approaches. Your provisional out-
I'm not sure of the distinction you mean to make between the
provides a record of examples, not the blueprint of a process.

of the permanence of the human condition. For them, history
of millennial progress or multiple cycles; they merely show a sense
The latter do not try to fit history into any rigid pattern, whether
the history-repeats-itself attitude of Thucydides, Machiavelli, et al.
attains. Their cyclical notions of history are very much unlike
though they both lack of multiplicity and recurrence in human
feeling was that they could not be classed as "political," even
You might want to classify Spengler and Toynbee differently. My
in the "analytical" group.

I but Spengler in with Hegel in the "prophetic" class, and Toynbee
interested in the creation of political morality at all. Therefore
distinctly Hegelian. Toynbee de-embarrasses the state, and is not
of the historical role of the state and the statesman, and of the
in their attitudes toward politics and the state. Spengler's views
The major difference between Spengler and Toynbee is reflected

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