I. America and the World

We meet here in the aftermath of the tragedy of Vietnam.

It will be years before it is possible to make a dispassionate analysis of a conflict which we entered so innocently a decade-and-a-half ago, which divided our country more than any event since our civil war, and which ended so swiftly and painfully.

But the consequences are with us today. Around the world people are asking what recent events mean about our strength, our wisdom, and our constancy. And Americans now ask questions which go to the very heart of our foreign policy: What are our interests in the world? What should be our commitments? Where do we go from here?

-2-

Let me begin by stating a profound conviction: The fact that we failed in one endeavor does not invalidate all others.

If in the aftermath of Vietnam we flee from responsibility as uncritically as we rushed into commitment a decade ago, we will surely soon find ourselves in a period of chaos and peril that will dwarf all previous experience. Global peace and America's security, global progress and America's prosperity, depend decisively on how we act in the months and years to come.

Americans have every reason to take pride in what their country has achieved in foreign policy. In the thirty years since World War II, the United States has done more to preserve peace and promote progress than any other nation in the world.

- 3 -

The recovery of Western Europe and Japan, the formation
and constant revitalization of our peacetime alliances, the
shaping and flourishing of the global trade and monetary
system, the economic advance of the newer and poorer
nations, the measures to control the nuclear arms race,
the development of a new agenda of global cooperation --
these are enduring achievements of American leadership.

We undertook these efforts not as charity but in our
enlightened self-interest. For a generation, we have under-
stood that without this country global peace could not be
maintained. For a generation, it has been clear that
American prosperity is inseparable from and dependant upon
a thriving world economy. Our international effort saved
American lives and preserved American jobs.

-4-

And these goals have been pursued by every Administration - Democrat or Republican - since the war. They have reflected a consensus of the public, the Congress and national leaders across the country, in and out of government.

This national unity was our most priceless resource. It was the foundation of our achievements. It must be restored.

If frustration, despair or a desire for novelty alter the American perception of our international responsibilities and cause us to dismantle our accomplishments, we will produce instability in the world and create untold dangers for our country.

The debate over our international commitment must be placed in this perspective. No doubt we must weigh carefully -- as we failed to do in the early Sixties -- the long-term consequences of *new* engagements. We must not over-extend

- 5 -

ourselves, promising what is not either in our interest
or within our capability. But we cannot shed our existing
responsibilities without straining the fabric of international
peace. When people speak of redefining our existing
commitments, which ones do they consider expendable?

To take just one example, have they considered how
abandonment of South Korea or the Philippines would
affect the future of Japan and therefore the future of the
entire Pacific area? Any ally that prefers alternative
arrangements will not find us insistent on the status quo.
But by the same token any ally that prefers existing
arrangements will not find us irresolute.

In any event, our obligations cannot be usefully debated
in the abstract. A nation's commitments do not derive simply

-6-

from legal documents or legislative undertakings. They
are not merely preferences to be altered at will. If properly
conceived, they rest on self-interest, based on the
necessities of geography and history and national values.
They are reflected in the sum total of a country's past
policies and actions, the expectations it has created, the
whole texture and record of its international conduct.

Thus we should not treat issues of prestige or
credibility too lightly or too ironically. A nation's
credibility--the value of its word--enables it to influence
events without having to turn every issue into a test of
strength. When a country's prestige declines, others will
be reluctant to stake their future on its assurances; it will
be increasingly tested by overt challenges. Given our central

- 7 -

role, a loss in our credibility invites international chaos.

There is no question that the trauma America has undergone
in the last decade -- from the assassination of one President
to the resignation of another -- has raised many doubts.

We must work hard to maintain our position.

And we shall.

The leadership role we have exercised for a generation
has never been more vital. The world of the 1970's is
less predictable, more fluid, than the world of ten
years ago. America's strength is less dominant,
our margins for error narrower, our choices more complex
and ambiguous. New centers of power and influence have
emerged and over a hundred new nations have come into being
since the Second World War. What we once considered a

- 8 -

monolithic Communist bloc has been fractured by profound
divisions. Our alliances have taken on new balance and
are adjusting to new conditions. Developing countries
are pressing their claims with fresh urgency and unity.

Economic interdependence has become a fact of life. While
the Cold War structure of international relations has come
apart a new stable international order has yet to be
formed.

- 9 -

A changing world places new demands on our leadership. Inevitably our policy must be more flexible, more complicated, more subtle and more imaginative than in the early post-war period. But the link between our international performance and our national destiny remains fundamental. It has become, if anything, more crucial:

-- Never before in history have the elements of national military power been so vast, so ready, so dangerous -- and so ill-suited to political objectives. An upsetting of the strategic equation could doom us; a spiralling arms race could produce a nuclear holocaust.

We must prevent both dangers from arising.

- 10 -

The contemporary world has many centers of power and initiative, and many other dimensions of international concern besides military threats to security. In military power, the world is still essentially bipolar. In economic power, there are several poles -- Western Europe, Japan, China, the producers of energy and key raw materials -- in addition to North America and the Soviet Union. Political, military and economic power are no longer necessarily commensurate with each other. Only the United States is strong in all categories.

Our responsibilities are therefore

- 11 -

inescapable. Our performance has profound
consequences whether we act or fail to act.

-- Regional and local conflicts still abound.

The absence of world war for a generation
has made the world too complacent about
local wars. But if not contained or resolved
through diplomacy, these wars pose grave dangers.

A war in the Middle East, for example,
carries with it profound risks of global economic
depression and confrontation among the
major powers. We must do our utmost
to prevent this.

- 12 -

-- The Indian nuclear explosion of a year ago raises anew the spectre of an era of plentiful nuclear weapons in which any local conflict risks exploding into a nuclear holocaust.

As nuclear weapons proliferate, nuclear catastrophe looms more plausible -- whether through design or miscalculation, accident, theft, or black mail. The withdrawal or weakening of the American security mantle would accelerate this process. It would give an additional incentive to many countries to seek their security in the development of nuclear weapons of their own.

- 13 -

-- The advanced industrial nations and the
developing nations are part of a single global
economic system whose stability and growth
is a vital American interest. The health of
the dollar, the expansion of our trade, the
free flow of investment, and the supply and
price of energy, food and other vital raw materials
are all essential for our own prosperity.

Whether we can accommodate the interests
of consumers and producers, rich and poor,
will determine whether our children inherit
a world of tranquillity or of constant conflict.

- 15 -

For Americans, our own destiny has always gone
beyond material or physical well-being. To be true to
ourselves, we have always been aware of what we
mean to others, not only technically but morally. Our
revolution was conceived as vindication of universal
truths and of the rights of man. Through the decades of
our involvement in international affairs, we have drawn
strength from the conviction that our goals of economic
and social advance and political freedom were the
goals of all peoples; the inspiration for our own achieve-
ments lay in the vision of progress we presented to all.

This conviction must continue to inspire us.

We cannot abandon values which are inseparable from

- 16 -

America. Though we are no longer predominant, we are inescapably a leader. Though we cannot impose our solutions, few solutions are possible without us. There is no other country so endowed to help build a better future.

If we sit back, there will be no hope for stability, no resistance to aggression, no effective mediation of disputes, no progress in the world economy. When force becomes the arbiter of conflicts, the standards of restraint in international conduct will erode sooner or later, instability and chaos will become the order of the day with inevitable and tragic consequences for us as well as for others. If there is no accommodation of conflicting economic interests among the industrial

- 17 -

nations, or between the industrial and the developing nations,
we will face increasing economic strife, of which
the oil price rise and embargo will be only the beginning.

So today we face these questions: Will the world
be consumed in anarchy -- in economic warfare,
proliferating weapons of destruction, and regional
conflagrations? Or will a new pattern of stable international
relations be established, bequeathing a prospect of
lasting peace to succeeding generations? Will Americans
be so discouraged that we pull away the essential pillar
of stability and progress that we have maintained for
thirty years? Or will we continue to recognize that
our contribution is essential to peace and progress?

- 18 -

We know too much depends on this country to allow us the luxury of retreat. If the United States responds to the challenge of building a peaceful and growing new world with imagination and perserverance, if we make clear to the world that we know where we are going and that we are on course, we have ahead of us a new era of great achievement for all of mankind. That is our deepest obligation and our most important commitment.

## II. The Design of Peace

In our effort to build a better and safer world, we start from the bedrock of our nation's physical strength -- the vitality of our economy, already beginning to recover from recession; our technological

- 19 -

supremacy; our military forces second to none. All of
these have been indispensable to our security and
progress. They remain so.

All foreign policy begins with security. No great
nation can afford to entrust its destiny to the whim of
others. Any stable international system therefore requires
a certain equilibrium of power. Our security and that of
our allies rest ultimately on deterrence of possible
challenges, on ensuring that others have no choice but to
exercise restraint.

Therefore it is our national and international duty to
maintain our military strength, in categories relevant to
the political dangers we face. An assault on our defense
budget would give a dangerous impression of the trend of

- 20 -

American policy, particularly at this moment. Of similar
importance is the economic health of this nation -- the
recovery of full employment, production and prosperity.

For this is the foundation of our strength and that of all
the industrial democracies.

But the more profound challenge is to anchor
stability not in the negative restraint of deterrence but
in the positive reconciliation of interests. The values and
intangibles that motivate men and nations have profound
weight in the international balance. A stable peace requires
a shared stake in its preservation; it must be considered just.

Power without purpose is sterile; strength without
direction leads to incoherence and inconsistency. To achieve
peace and progress, we must understand the contemporary
historical trends and have a design of our own to shape them.

- 21 -

The achievement of peace requires a vision of peace.

And this vision must be broadly based. Our people must understand the full complexity of our task; why we must maintain alliances even while striving to ease tensions with adversaries; why we need a design for cooperation between the rich and the poor nations even while many developing countries engage in the rhetoric and often the practice of confrontation. It must have scope to include both the new problems of interdependence and the persistent traditional issues of politics and security.

**Allies and Friends.** -- America's alliances, particularly with the industrial democracies of Western Europe, Canada and Japan have been the cornerstone of world stability and progress. We share common conceptions of the dignity of man, a common conviction of a linked destiny and a common interest in peace and prosperity. This truth has been reinforced not

- 22 -

weakened by changing global conditions. This is why this
Administration considers our allies and friends our first
priority. This is why the President will visit Western
Europe two weeks from now to reaffirm our solidarity at
a Summit meeting of the leaders of the North Atlantic
Alliance. This will be the theme of our conversations with
the Prime Minister of Japan in early August -- and with every
other ally.

We will stress that the cement of our relationship
should not be verbal reassurances but joint great enterprises.
We face a vast agenda: our alliances were formed when
the world was divided into two blocs and the United States
was preponderant in the West; today we must harmonize the
policies of strong independent states under conditions of

- 23 -

eased international tensions. Our alliances represented
initially a response to a military threat; today, we must
base our unity on shared efforts across a broad range of
human activity. A whole spectrum of challenges calls
the industrialized nations to joint action; the need for an
equitable and stable world trading and monetary system; the
imperative for cooperation in energy development and
conservation, and in dealing with the energy producers. We
are beckoned by the entire agenda of interdependence in food,
in raw materials and in giving meaning and significance to
life in modern industrialized societies.

Thus far from being gloomy about the prospect of
our alliance, we shall call our friends to joint enterprises
equally important and perhaps more exciting than the earlier

- 24 -

quest for security. None of us can deal with this agenda
alone. We are inseparably linked to each other -- by
interdependent economies and human aspirations, by
instant communications and nuclear peril. Whether our
alliances thrive today depends not on reiterating verbal
pledges but on our ability to make our collaboration equal
to our opportunity. It is with the conviction that our
greatest period of creativity is ahead of us that the President
will travel abroad in two weeks.

**Detente.** One of the legacies of a simpler period
of American history is the conviction that we can pursue
only one strand of policy at one time: either strength or
conciliation, either relations with our allies or improving
relations with our adversaries.

- 25 -

But the fact is that we do not have such a choice. In
a complicated world in transition it is important to recognize
that if we do not pursue all these strands, we shall not be
able to pursue any of them. Our people expect their govern-
ment to work for stability and peace, not to seek out
confrontation. If we are faced with a crisis, the American
people must know that it was forced upon us. Our alliances
can be vital only if they are sustained by the conviction that
their purpose is not to produce tension but to provide incentives
for an ultimate settlement.

It is in this context that we must judge the contrast
between the state of United States - Soviet relations today and
15 years ago. The world is no longer continually shaken by
direct and bitter confrontations. There is a general

- 26 -

understanding that tensions when they occur are not the
result of U. S. intransigence and this has enhanced our global
influence. It would be dangerous to take these achievements
for granted; undoubtedly a world neatly divided between black
and white was psychologically easier to handle but it was also
infinitely more dangerous.

We therefore should beware of the siren song that detente
is a trap, a one-way street of American unilateral concession.

In this Administration it will never be. In pursuing
detente we will be guided by the following principles:

-- We are not neutral in the struggle between freedom
and tyranny. We know that we are dealing with
countries of opposed ideology and values.

-- But we owe our people and mankind an untiring
effort to avoid nuclear holocaust. In the thermo

- 27 -

nuclear age, when the survival of civilization is at
stake we cannot defend peace by militant rhetoric.

-- We must outgrow the notion that every setback is
a Soviet gain or every problem is caused by Soviet
action. In Portugal, the Middle East, even in Indo
China, difficulties have resulted as much from local
conditions or inadequate U.S. responses as from
Soviet intervention.

-- We cannot use detente as a substitute for our own
effort and determination. Where a vacuum exists, it
will be exploited. We have not yet reached the stage
where vigilance can be relaxed.

These principles enable us to judge the state of our
relations with the Soviet Union. These relations occur on
many levels. The first order of business is the imperative
of avoiding thermonuclear war. Both superpowers face

- 28 -

a problem unprecedented in history; each possesses
armaments capable of destroying civilized life. Therefore,
however competitive we are and however ideologically opposed
neither can attempt to impose its will on the other without
an intolerable risk of mutual annihilation. A President has
no higher responsibility of sparing our people the dangers of
general nuclear war. He can have no greater goal than to
put a permanent end to a spiraling arms race which uncontrolled
can jeopardize the peace.

The agreement in principal reached last November at
Vladivostok between President Ford and General Secretary
Brezhnev on a long-term agreement limiting strategic
offensive weapons, is a major step in this direction. When
this negotiation is completed later this year a ceiling will
have been placed on the qualitative as well as quantitative

- 29 -

expansion of strategic forces for the first time in history.

The momentum of military deployments will have been slowed; military planning will no longer be driven by fear of the unknown; a baseline will have been established from which reductions can be negotiated soon thereafter.

Direct communication and consultation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and institutionalized cooperation in economic, scientific, and cultural fields constitutes the second level of our relationship. The extent of these links is now unprecedented. Naturally there are benefits for the Soviet Union or else the Soviet Union would not participate in them. But they also serve our interest or we would not conclude them. These agreements serve the additional purpose of engaging the Soviet Union at many

- 30 -

levels in contacts with the outside world so as to provide incentives for restraint. And they occur in an environment where failure to proceed on our part only opens the door to other industrialized countries perhaps less able than we to withstand the political use of economic relationships--as happened after the failure of our trade agreement with the Soviet Union.

A third level of US - Soviet relations involves the easing of tensions in areas where our vital interests impinge on each other. The Berlin Agreement of 1971 was both important and symbolic; it was a practical negotiated solution of a chronic dispute that on at least three occasions in twenty years had brought the world to the brink of war. The achievement of a stable political and military balance

- 31 -

in Europe has always been a vital American interest, which we have pursued by resisting pressures where necessary and by negotiations when possible. In this spirit we are now engaged in broader negotiations dealing with mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe and with an agreement regarding European security and cooperation.

These achievements of detente must be balanced against the record of the fourth level of US-Soviet relations; the quest for stability in areas peripheral to the vital interests of the two so-called superpowers. Here the progress achieved in other fields of our relations has not been equalled. The expansion of Soviet military power and its extension around the world is a serious concern to us. The willingness of the Soviet Union to exploit strategic

- 32 -

opportunities - even though some of these opportunities
presented themselves more or less spontaneously and not
as a result of Soviet action, constitutes a heavy mortgage on
detente. If detente turns into a formula for more selective
exploitation of opportunities, the new trends in US-Soviet
relations will be in jeopardy. If our contention in peripheral
areas persists, even more of it becomes exacerbated, the
progress achieved in other areas of detente will ultimately
be undermined. The United States is determined to maintain
the hopeful new trends in United States-Soviet relations on
the basis of realism and reciprocity. But it is equally
determined to resist pressures or the exploitation of local
conflict.

Our new relationship with the People's Republic of

- 33 -

China is another priority in the design of American policy.

Stability in Asia and the world requires our constructive
relations with one-quarter of the human race. We remain
committed to the goals of the Shanghai Communique.

President Ford will visit China later this year to reaffirm
these interests and goals and work for the continuing improve-
ment of our relations.

**The Developing World.** The five-fold oil price increase decided upon in 1973 by OPEC dramatized another dimension of American foreign policy--our relations with the developing world. For years it has been apparent that Asia, Africa, and Latin America have become major participants in the international system, and that a new range of issues was upon us--not those between East and

- 34 -

West but between North and South. Ideological and economic
differences have come to dominate international forums
such as the United Nations or the recent preparatory
conference in Paris between oil consumers and producers.

The American people have supported the aspirations
of developing countries since the postwar years of
decolonization. Their economic development has been an
objective of American policy for decades. Their genuine
nonalignment and interdependence remain an American
interest.

Without question, the new nations will have our
sympathy and our help as shaped by their own histories they
seek their own future. Our policy is based on the conviction
that our policies are essentially complementary and that

- 35 -

our destinies are shaped by interdependence. At the same
time all nations have a basic choice to make: They can
pursue confrontation or they can pursue solutions; they
can deal in rhetoric or they can deal with reality. They
cannot do both. A policy of confrontation will ultimately
work to the disadvantage of the weaker. The United States,
for its part, is prepared for cooperation in every area
of common concern, on the basis of mutual benefit and of
mutual respect. Therefore:

-- On energy, we will continue our efforts for solidarity among the consumers and we look forward to an early, constructive dialogue with the producers.

-- On the broader question of raw materials, we understand the interest of the producers in

Draft V

May 11, 1975

THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE

St. Louis, May 12, 1975

We meet here in the aftermath of the tragedy of Vietnam. It will be years before it is possible to make a dispassionate analysis of a conflict which we entered so innocently a decade-and-a-half ago, which then divided our country more than any event since our civil war, and which ended so swiftly and painfully.

But the consequences are with us today. Around the
world people are asking ~~what events in Indochina reveal~~ recent
about our strength, our wisdom, and our constancy. And in
~~now ask questions which~~ this country a debate has started ~~which goes~~ to the very heart
of our foreign policy: What are our interests in the world?
What should be our commitments? Where do we go from here?

Let me begin with a profound conviction: The fact that
we failed in one enterprise does not invalidate all others.

- 5 -

If frustration, despair or a device for novelty after radically altered American perception of its place in the responsibility world resulting from a fit of frustration or to meet demands we will produce for novelty for its own sake would compound instability in our country. the world and create untold dangers for America.

Against this background the current debate over our international commitment must be placed in perspective. No doubt we must weigh carefully -- as we did not in the early Sixties -- the long-term consequences of new engagements. We must not over-extend ourselves, promising either what is not in our interest or within our capability. But we cannot shed our existing responsibilities without straining the fabric of international peace. An America fleeing from its responsibilities can produce global panic. When people speak of redefining our existing commitments, which ones do they consider expendable? To take just one example, have they considered the impact of the collapse of a

-14-

So today we face these questions: will the world be consumed in anarchy -- in economic warfare, proliferating weapons of destruction, and regional conflagrations? Or will a new pattern of stable international relations be established, bequeathing a prospect of lasting peace to succeeding generations? Will we be so discouraged

progress that we have maintained for thirty years? We

know too much depends on this country.

We are determined to

defend our interests and to carry out our responsibility of leadership.

We are the strongest military and economic power in the world -- whether we like it or not. Our conduct will shape the nature of the emerging world order -- whether we like it or not. Therein resides our deepest obligation.

- 25 -

November at Vladivostok by the President and General

Secretary Brezhnev on the principal elements of a long-term
agreement limiting strategic offensive weapons. When
is a major step in this
situation.

this negotiation is completed later this year, for the first

time in history a ceiling will have been placed on the expansion

of strategic forces on both sides, in both quality and quantity.

unknown; a baseline will have been drawn from which to

negotiate reductions soon thereafter.

A second level of our relationship is our bilateral

exchanges - the direct communication and consultation between

us, and the institutionalized cooperation between us in economic,

scientific, and cultural fields. The extent of these relations links

is now unprecedented.

There are benefits for both sides. Naturally there are benefits for the Soviet Union or else the Soviet Union

or we would not conclude them. These agreements would not conclude them. For us they are not ends in themselves, but have

always been subordinated to the political objective of breaking down the wall of Soviet isolation from the rest of the world,

by engaging the Soviet system at many levels in contacts with the outside world to provide incentives for restraint. We will pursue these links on the basis of absolute reciprocity.

A third level of our relationship is the mitigation of tensions

conflict in areas where our vital interests impinge on each other. The Berlin Agreement of 1971 was both salutary and symbolic; it was a practical negotiated solution of one of the most significant and chronic disputes that on at least three occasions over a twenty year period had brought the world

- 28 -

this encroachment without hesitation, as we always have.

The Soviet Union must recognize that if our contention in peripheral areas persists and becomes exacerbated, the progress achieved in other areas of detente will be jeopardized and ultimately undermined. The United States is determined to maintain the hopeful new trends in United States-Soviet relations on the basis of realism and reciprocity. But it is equally determined to resist pressures on the exploitation of local conflict.

Our new relationship with the People's Republic of China is another priority in the design of American policy.

Stability in Asia and the world requires our constructive relations with one-quarter of the human race. Our relationship is now an enduring feature of the world scene; it rests

- 29 -

on long-term mutual interests. We remain committed to
the goals of the Shanghai Communique. President Ford will
visit China later this year to reaffirm these interests and
goals and work for the continuing improvement of our
relations.

**The Developing World.** -- The five-fold oil price increase decided upon in 1973 by OPEC dramatized another dimension of American foreign policy -- our relations with the developing world. For years it has been apparent that Asia, Africa, and Latin America have become major participants in the international system, and that a new range of issues was coming upon us, in international affairs -- not those between East and West but between North and South. Already ideological and economic issues have come to diffuse

- 30 -

to dominate international forums such as the United Nations
~~Organization~~ or the recent preparatory conference in Paris
between oil consumers and producers.

The issues of our ~~economic~~ relations are now of such
importance that the way they are resolved will, without ~~doubt~~
exaggeration, determine the political and economic future of
the international environment for the last quarter of this
century.

The American people have supported the aspirations
of developing countries since the postwar years of
decolonization. Their economic development has been an
objective of American policy for decades. Their genuine
nonalignment and interdependence are an American interest.
These interests continue. Now relations must develop
based on current realities.

- 33 -

of more than 16 million human beings, left millions more homeless and destitute, and virtually destroyed the institutional fabric of victor and vanquished alike. Had it not been for the *passionate* wise and generous involvement of the United States in the *democracy* aftermath of that struggle it is doubtful that Europe would yet *have returned to the standard of living it knew in 1938*.

Certainly *democracy* in Western Europe would never have *recovered*. But we did what no other nation had done before

But *we* gave mightily of our substance in the hope that the generations to come *after* would never again have to live through the agony and torment *that* tortured the world

in *that* struggle, from 1939 to 1945.

A later generation of Americans learned that *there* are limits to what even we can accomplish; that not every struggle anywhere in the world is necessarily one in which

- 34 -

the United States must involve itself; that not every injustice
man inflicts upon his neighbor is something that we, as a
nation, must or can seek to remedy.

There are lessons to be learned from both experiences.

The question is whether we will learn from both, or take our
most recent experience too much to heart and, in the process,
forget what so many millions of dead taught us but three short
unmistakably, forget
decades ago. If we do we will be engulfed by the failure to
deal with the agenda I have tried to sketch for you.

We came out of World War II a united people, secure in
our belief that our cause was just, our purposes benign.
We have come from Vietnam a divided nation, full of distrust --
something -- for our fellow countrymen, and lacking
and even hate -- for our fellow countrymen, and lacking
confidence in the goodness of our design.

It is time -- indeed it is more than time -- for us to put
a stop to this self-doubt and self-punishment.

- 35 -

It is time to remind ourselves that we still live in the greatest nation on the face of the earth; that no where in the world is there a people so free; that others throughout the world still look to us and depend upon us — by our example — and by our acts — to lead them out of the darkness to a better, freer and more secure life.

It is time that we recognized that we cannot exist apart from the world around us, no matter how much we may wish it. The facts of a world imperiled by nuclear weapons forbid it; the reality of an economically interdependent world renders it senseless and self-destructive. We cannot compensate for a cult of action for its own sake by indulging in a cult of withdrawal in any event; we must drawal for its own sake. Given us no invite, it will be an invitation to new burden.

And, perhaps most of all, it is time the American people demanded that the Executive and Legislative branches of their

- 38 -

We face no more urgent task than to conduct ourselves in
*we must demonstrate that we still are*
the months ahead in ways that will compel other nations to con-
*perform of our purposes*
*include that the United States remains the world's most powerful*
*strong country; that we remain a vibrant, talented, energetic and*
*continue to beUNITED STATES of America, that we remain dedicated to helping other nations*
*themselves; willing and able to help themselves because such assistance*
*contributes to a stable world order; that we remain faithful*
*are concerned with our future commitments; that we remain firmly committed to our treaty*
*future of the world because we know it will to meet our international responsibilities as we have always*
*determine our own future*
*met them; that we will meet the challenge of preserving peace and*
*building prosperity by helping to create a new international order.*

Let us never lose sight of the fact that in terms of inter-
national behavior, no great nation has more reason to be proud,
and less reason to be apologetic, than the United States. We
have maintained the general world order for thirty years, at

- 40 -

For our own sake and that of the rest of mankind let us now make sure that this lesson does not have to be learned again. And in that case we will usher in a period of progress for future generations, will be grateful, and peace of which our children will be proud.

DRAFT

May 6, 1975

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER VIETNAM

There comes a moment in the life of every country when it is tested, not by obvious crisis, but by the challenge of choosing its own future.

In the aftermath of Vietnam, the world is now watching to see how America responds. Because America is a global power, with global interests and responsibilities, the tragedy in Indochina cannot but have broader significance. It is universally read -- and misread -- as a major event in international affairs.

But the true consequences of Vietnam are yet to be determined.

The world is less affected by what happened three weeks ago in Saigon that by how America acts today.

Some in America say that we should not speak of Vietnam as a serious setback, that we only create a problem for American

-2-

prestige if we speak of it. But I believe we only delude ourselves
if we refuse to recognize the significance of this moment in our history.
We cannot found our foreign policy on ignoring reality.

And I am convinced the American people are strong enough
to confront their challenges and overcome them. If I did not believe
that, I would not be here today.

America can face the future with its head held high:

I do not believe it was ignoble for America to have sought to
help a brave people to preserve their independence.

I do not believe it was wrong for a President to have acted
to save 120,000 lives.

We can do little about the world's judgment of past events.

But we have it within our power to take charge of our future: If the
United States does its duty, if we respond to challenge with dignity,
if we make clear to the world that we know where we are going and we
are on course, then we have ahead of us a new era of accomplishment.

America's Role in the World

The American people have a right to ask of their government:
What are the basic purposes of American foreign policy today? What
are the reasons for our involvement in the world?

For 30 years since the end of World War II, the strength and
leadership of the United States were the bulwark of peace and the
engine of prosperity in the world. The recovery of Western Europe and
Japan, the formation of our peacetime alliances, the shaping and
flourishing of a global trading and monetary system -- these are enduring
achievements. They are the vindication of our effort.

In more recent years, we have taken historic new steps to
stabilize our relations with our major Communist adversaries, in the
interest of reducing international tensions and dangers. On the solid
foundation of our alliances and the military strength of the Western world,
we have negotiated solutions to chronic conflicts such as Berlin,

-4-

and we have negotiated major steps of strategic arms control, to
reduce the dangers of a spiraling arms race and global war. We
have ended a quarter-century of estrangement with the People's Republic
of China, one-quarter of the human race. We have launched an
unprecedented diplomatic process toward a just peace in the Middle
East, the most promising in 30 years. On a new agenda of global
problems -- energy, food, the environment, law of the sea -- the
United States has taken the major initiatives for mobilizing international
action.

We live in the 1970's in a new world, no longer stamped with the
Cold War division of the planet into blocs locked in military confrontation.
We live in a world of over 140 nations, of many other centers of power
and initiative, of many other dimensions of international concern
besides military threats to security. America is one country among
many -- but we are still the largest single factor in international affairs.

-5-

Our task as leader is not to predominate but to elicit the
effort and initiative and creativity of others. Our task is not to
mobilize blocs, but on the contrary, to facilitate cooperative solutions
to global problems. Our task as the strongest power in the West's
alliances is not to manage confrontation but to seek to mitigate tensions
by realistic political settlements. We are not the world's policeman.

The world of the 1970's is fluid and less predictable. As the Cold War
structure of international relations erodes, a new stable international
order has yet to take shape. This is the challenge to America: to realize
the positive possibilities of such a world; to act for good, as we always
have; to defend what we believe in; to help shape the future.

Thus, after Vietnam, the American role in the world continues
to be decisive. The design of our policies still stands. Our
responsibilities remain. There is every prospect for progress.
There is every reason for confidence.

-6-

I know it is not easy for a people disillusioned and beset by
economic difficulties to gear itself up for international effort. But
I also know that the American people care for the fate of their fellow
men. And they know that the fate of this country -- including its
economic health -- is inexorably bound up with the rest of the world.

For thirty years our prosperity has hinged upon a global
monetary and trading system whose stability is a vital American
interest. The interplay of political and economic forces touches our
own destiny; international events touch our security or those of our
allies. The 1973 Middle East war and the oil embargo and price
rise should have destroyed any illusion that our own well-being is
not affected by what happens elsewhere. The issues of energy, raw
materials, food, law of the sea are now major issues of diplomacy.

-7-

Freedom of the seas protects our shipping lanes. Regional crises in many parts of the world pose dangers of wider confrontations. The withdrawal of American strength and leadership from active involvement in the world would only lead to new instabilities, and to major shifts in political alignments in many parts of the world -- diminishing our influence over events that sooner or later affect our lives directly.

So we have no realistic choice. We must, for our own sake, play a major role in world affairs. We have the resources, the technological genius, the organizational skill, the enormous capacities of an industrious and gifted people, and the humane concern for our fellow men -- in short, we have the means, if we only have faith in ourselves.

## Agenda for the Present and Future

Let me describe for a moment how we see the agenda for the present and future.

-8-

The President, in the months since coming into office, has placed first priority on consolidating our relations with our friends and allies. He has met with several of the leaders of our major Western allies; he visited Japan and Korea. He visited Mexico. He consulted with the leaders of Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Indonesia, and will meet shortly with the Shah of Iran. Just this past week in Washington, I attended the annual General Assembly of the Organization of American States. We and our allies in Latin America are addressing the modern agenda of economic and political issues. And at the end of the month the President will visit Europe for the summit meeting with the leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance.

For we believe that the prospects for lessening tensions with potential adversaries, sometimes called detente, rests on the firm foundation of close bonds with our allies and our collective security.

-9-

In a new era, we and our allies see the links between us as enhancing, not preventing, the wider opportunities for better relations in the international arena.

The ability of our alliances to adapt to this new era of international affairs is itself one of the fundamental successes of the decade. Particularly with our principal allies, the industrial democracies of Western Europe, Canada, and Japan, our unity has proven itself dramatically on new issues such as energy cooperation, as well as on the basic tasks of collaboration in a new era of trade and monetary relations.

Worldwide, our friends and allies are the foundation of our foreign policy. At this moment of uncertainty in the world, these relationships take on a heightened importance. We will stand by our treaty commitments. We must give assurance to deter new challenges