TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger

March 13, 1974

6:38 PM

D: I got hold of Eban. 11:30 is fine and he will stay for lunch, on Friday.

K: Good.

D: Is it all right with you.

K: Does it have to be kosher?

D: No, it just has to be good, Mr. Secretary.

K: It will be up to the standards of his house.

D: You do not want to commit yourself even on culinary matters.

K: Right.

D: Mr. Secretary, do you think we should have a telephone talk with each other sometime before his meeting.

K: Absolutely.

D: What time will it be convenient for you.

K: Let me - sometime in the morning.

D: Sometime in the morning. OK.

K: Are you having, at any rate is we miss we can still have it at your house.

D: Except that he will be there.

K: Yes. We'll do it tomorrow sometime, probably in the morning.

D: You're asking if I'm going to have what, Mr. Secretary?

K: You remember you owe me a visitor next week.

D: Oh, you mean for the talks. I wanted to ask you how does it square with your change of schedule.

K: I want him on Thursday.

D: What date is it.

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

*

Dinitz - page 2

K: The 21st.

D: Oh, the 21st. And you will be going to Moscow afterwards?

K: Yes.

D: So, I'll let the government know the 21st is the date because I didn't know.

K: Yes, the 21st.

D: the 21st. OK, I will cable now maybe I'll have an answer by tomorrow.

K: Good. Terrific. And make it Dayan will you?

D: I am pressing for it.

K: It doesn't matter whether they send a clerk, the mere fact that you sent Dayan puts you in a stronger position.

D: Yes, I understand.

SANITIZED

K:

SANITIZED

There's

another thing which I'll tell you tomorrow.

D: Fine. OK, then I'm looking forward to talking to you tomorrow and then I'll see you in the evening.

K: Right.

END

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UNCLASSIFIED

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

March 13, 1974

7:43PM

K: Make sure that this thing get to the President, the question and answer.

S: Right.

K: And he cannot - it must be flagged - he cannot deviate much from it.

S: No, I understand.

K: OK

END

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TELCON

Secretary Schlesinger
Secretary Kissinger

3/14/74 9:10 a.m.'

S: Henry, how are you?

K: Okay, Jim.

S: So what do you want me to say to Hussein this morning?
Basically?

K: First, the President promised him something on the order of $100 - $70 million in grants and $30 million FMS credit

S: Okay

K: I just want you to be aware of that--

S: Do we have the fiscal latitude to do that?

K: No, he said we'll go to Congress on that. Now he wants $130 and even the President kept that open a little bit.

S: Right.

K: Now, I think you should tell him that we would prefer him to be the negotiator with the Israelis and that we are sympathetic to his disengagement ideas

S: What are they?

K: Well he wants to have the Israelis pull out of the Jordan valley four kilometers

S: hm huh

K: I wouldn't tie myself to his specific plan but just to the idea that there should be disengagement on his side too.

S: Okay, now on air defense, what do we do?

K: Did he ask for air defense?

S: He has asked for air defense. That seems to be the biggest thing on his mind. I'm not sure it is the best thing for Jordan, but that seems to be the thing he is stressing.

DECLASSIFIED
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K: I'd drag my feet a little bit on that.

S: Okay.
Very good. Now are you planning an announcement on the minesweeping operation?

K: No, but at any rate it should be done--why don't we ask the Egyptians whether they plan--don't let it come out of Defense

S: No, we won't -- Friedheim is working with Vest or somebody over in State--we assumed that you or State might make the announcement

K: Well I don't think we should do it unless the Egyptians do it jointly with us

S: Okay, well I think you ought to announce it -- first of all, it is bound to leak out, you can't take all of those C5A's out of the United States

K: Yeh, okay, I agree with you. I didn't know that was being done, but I just x hadn't thought of it.

S: If you can talk to your Egyptian associates and get out a joint announcement, I think it'd be damn good

K: Good

S: Now, there does seem to be some complaint of a division between you and me coming out of state still

K: Impossible

S: There was some coming out of the Pentagon--I did what I could to turn it off

K: A lot is coming out--I met yesterday with the editorial board of the POST

S: I met yesterday with the editorial board of the NYTimes

K: And I made a passionate defense of our relationship which happens to be true

S: Q Yeh. Scotty Reston indicated he was getting some of this stuff and I think most of his sources come from State

K: Well

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCORN
Congressman Wayne Hayes
Secretary Kissinger

9:29 a.m. 3/14/74

H: . . a copy of the agenda,

K: Yeh

H: And said if there was any specific thing you felt strongly about or wanted some input on to let me know, now I didn't know whether it would get up to you or not and knowing how those desk officers work I doubt if I would ever hear from it again, but I thought you ought to know about it--it is only a --4 items and it is one page, triple space so you can read it in--

K: For the meeting you have in Williamsburg

H: Yeh

K: Good, I'll take a look at it--

H If there is any specific thing you want expressed let me know and I'll see that it gets expressed.

K: Look I had another thought after you left yesterday, I was going to call you today; I understand you are on the standing committee of the NATO parlimentarians

H: That's right

K: And they were going to meet in Brussels this year

H: Yeh

K: I was wondering whether you thought it might be a good idea to bring them over here instead

H: Well, they were planning to come over here and because of financial problems they didn't, so they moved the standing committee meeting back to Brussels and the idea is now to bring the regular yearly committee meetings over here in May. And I'll push for that if you think it is a good idea

K: I think it is a good idea--does it have to be May--could it be early June?

H I don't see any reason why not

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K: Because the President may not be in town in May

H: Yeh, well I would prefer to have it in June myself because we are taking a delegation to France in May at the invitation of the French government and I'd prefer to have it third, 4th and 5th of June or something like that.

K: Yeh

H: So I'll see if I can't arrange that--we are going to meet over in Brussels on April 1 and 2

K: Well we believe that ah--we think it might be a good occasion for either the President or me to address a group and to revitalize some of the Atlantic ideas

H: Yeh, I think would be great if you want to do it

K:H: We have a financial problem in the organization

K: Well I may be able to help you from the Rockefellers

H: Well if you -- I'll tell you the biggest help we need is to get a plane to bring them over here

K: Yeh

H: If we could do that, I think it is definitely something that can be done

K: Let me take a look at it

H: We have done it before, but I haven't pushed for it lately
And if we could get a plane to bring them over, I think we'd be in the ballgame then

K: Well, let me take a look at that

H: Okay and we'll be together again later about then

K: Terrific. Good thank you.

TELCON
Tom Jarriell
Secretary Kissinger
10:08 a.m. 3/14/74

J: Good morning, Dr. Kissinger?

K: Yes.

J: Tom Jarriell, how are you sir?

K: Okay

J: I'm wondering about the Jerry Ford's comment this morning--he said he had talked to you about the oil embargo

K: We are talking on background

J: Yes, sir

K: He must have misunderstood because there--we have had no official word--frankly you know as much as we do, because all we have is news tickers -- if you draw exactly your own conclusions you are right up with our knowledge of the situation--

J: You have had nothing through diplomatic channels

K: No, and I think the Vice President must have misunderstood some remarks I made about the general trend

J: Right
But he wasn't speaking on direct communication from the Libyan Tripoli

K: Absolutely not and we will straighten that out with him

J: Would you have something on your schedule today where Ted or somebody can be talking with you or--or do you know if you have any appearances that you will be mentioning --

K: I don't think so--

J: Don't look for any today?

K: No, no we will not make an announcement on the oil embargo today--if that is the thrust of your question

J: That is what I am wondering.

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TELCORN
Secretary Kissinger
Hal Sonnenfeldt (Brussels)

3/14/74 10:25 a.m.

K: Hello, when are you coming back?

S: Saturday

K: About these letters we were discussing the other day--have you had
any second thoughts?

S: Yes, I'm just about to send you a notice--there have been some quite
welcomed developments in that general area although one can never
tell how well they sit and our judgment is that that particular
reflected in that letter will reinforce that. I can get you this message
in the next hour.

K: Can you do that because we have to decide whether to do that letter
tomorrow or MM to hold it to the middle of next week. What is your
judgment?

S: My judgment is that it ought to be done sooner rather than later,
because I think if you hold this particular matter open, the incentive
for these people to move or to continue moving in the direction that
we want them to move may subside.

K: Okay get me your message immediately

S: Right

K: Thank you.

S: Henry, have you been talking to the British over there?

K: No

S: I just asked Embassy London to send you a Daily Telegraph article
which is uncanny.

K: Why, is it critical?

S: No, no. It is analytical and hits the nail on the head in so many
respects, I just found it rather baffling.

K: I haven't talked to anybody.

By DECLASSIFIED
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Page 2

S: Well you look at it. I just asked Embassy London about 2-3 hours ago to send it full text to you.

K: I wouldn't talk without you Hal, you know that.

S: I know. You're a hero over here, by the way.

K: Where?

S: Here at NATO. The only thing they don't understand is why they are illegitimate.

K: Have you explained that to them?

S: I have tried to. But you haven't quite explained it to me.

K: I said this not in relation to--I said it in relation to the impact of nuclear war on a modern society

S: Oh hell.

K: And I said that nobody ever --will ever recover from that just as no European government that ended WWI ever recovered its legitimacy.

S: I see. I see. Okay. I should have read the transcript

K: It was never said in context with--of our struggle with the E--of our problem with the Europeans

S: I'll explain it. Let me get you this message right away.

K: Okay.

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Amb. McCloskey/HAK

3/14/74 - 10L36 a.m.

K: Bob.

M: Good morning.

K: Bob, I think that maybe I should step into the press room today for five minutes and sort of apologize in a light-hearted way about what I said about legitimacy. And just say now look gentlemen. Get it on the ground that when I'm with women my usual balance deserts and say I didn't know the press was there. It was said in a totally different context in so far as it could be misunderstood and it could be I regret....

M: That's what you need to say.

K: I regret having made that remark which does not reflect my view of the government. There is a basic problem. We've stated it and lets now get back to discussing this problem. But it is not a personality issue between me and the Europeans.

M: MMMM. I think that's called for and I think that will retrieve it a good deal.

K: Now, I can't get over there though much before 12:45. Can we hold the briefing as late as that.

M: Yes. Indeed.

K: Alright. Why don't you schedule it for 12:45.

M: I'll take care of it.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCORN

Barry Schweid/Secy Kissinger

10:40 a.m., March 14, 1974

K: ... If you read all the news reports, you know exactly what we know. In other words, there's nothing to it.

S: There's nothing to --

K: Well, we don't know.

S: We don't know in other words.

K: You know, he must have misunderstood some passing remark I made to him at dinner last night at the Jordanian Embassy.

S: I see. On a lower level of importance, there's some confusion whether it will be in Tripoli or in Vienna Sunday.

K: That's right. [Laughter] I'm in exactly the same position you are, Barry.

S: All right, sir.

K: I've seen both of these reports. But the official announcement though said Vienna, didn't it? Let me see -- [flips through papers] -- yeah, the official announcement said Vienna.

S: There's a Libyan report --

K: Yeah, I've seen that.

S: Course I don't know what to make of it. It has Algeria asking for a month lift.

K: Yeah, I've seen that. That's the only one of its kind I've seen. We have no official confirmation of anything. In fact, we have no official word.

S: I see. All right, sir. I appreciate it.

K: Okay. Bye.

By DECLASSIFIED
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TELCOM
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger

March 14, 1974

12:48 p.m.

S: He said he had just heard and everything is just fine and the way you want it; and the way you suggested and I said since the delay we probably ought to announce it on Saturday. And he said, well, I think Friday is a much better day, with the press. Besides you yesterday had indicated you'd be going on the 24th and we really ought to confirm it.

K: O.K. Fine. Well, why doesn't the President announce it then when he is out there.

S: They propose an 11:00 announcement -- simultaneously -- 6:00 there.

K: O.K. Then we had better announce it where? Can Ziegler announce it out there or you are going to have some Goddamned heart burn again.

S: I think Ziegler ought to announce it wherever he is. Don't you?

K: Yes.

S: Haig is with the President now.

K: Sonnenfeldt has already brief. Lunt so we have no choice, we've got to get it. But the French, I don't know -- there is a Cherokee cable you ought to look at. The French are becoming conciliatory on the NATO declaration and the Germans have said they will never again sign anything without full consultation with the US.

S: See. You've done it again. Somehow I just knew you would. You know...

K: Do you think I should make that statement in the light of these conditions?

S: I'm not sure you should now if this is what's happening. Let's just let it ride. I think it is a good statement and it wouldn't do any harm in any case but if they are running...

K: O.K. Well, let me see. Good.

S: Right.

END

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCON
Atherton/Sec. Kissinger

March 14, 1974

2:15 p.m.

K: I think we had better make an announcement on the mine clearing.
Everyone is straining at the leash.

A: I see no harm.

K: The point is we should do it together with the Egyptians.

A: Why don't we put in a telegram what we would propose saying and
have Herman...

K: Can you do that?

A: Yes, and we will check it out to see if they want a joint announcement
or prefer to do it or have us do it.

K: I wonder if Herman should go into see Fahmy on this story that they
will lift it (embargo) for two months.

A: I can't believe that we are not going to be getting some communications.

K: I think that Fahmy should understand this will make a Presidential
trip extremely difficult. We cannot go to the Middle East under
blackmail.

A: We have no real authoritative information.

K: How about just getting that to him saying we have read these reports.
We should explain that the President would be in the Middle East at the
same time that the decision on the embargo has to be made and that
might change the whole picture.

A: I see. See if we can smoke out what has been decided. We have had
no authoritative counsel from anyone. I thought we would be getting
messages from Fahmy and others.

K: I don't know what is happening. I think they decided to lift it but
not to announce it until Sunday and they had a 6 to 3 vote on that.

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TELCN
Amb. Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger

March 14, 1974

2:45 p.m.

D: Mr. Secretary.

K: Yes, Mr. Ambassador.

D: How are you?

K: Did I take you away from Marvin Kalb.

D: No, no., I am having lunch with the Foreign Min. We have already arrived at dessert so there is no...

K: At your home?

a day

D: No, at the Hotel here at the Hilton. Two meals at my house a day is too hard for Vivian. Mr. Sec. if I may I thought just briefly to suggest to you what I think will be the topic that would be raised. On the Jordanian situation he is familiar with the meeting of the Prime Minister.

K: Is he there now.

D: No, he is not with me. I am in a telephone booth. Although I don't think he knows all the details that were suggested but in general the question of the corridor he knows about and the question of the Palestinian exile government he knows about. I think it will be helpful if you will also tell us a little bit about the visit of the King and what next.

K: Yes. But how much can I tell him.

D: Well, unless the King has said things that he hasn't said to the Prime Minister you can tell him everything but if the King said something, as you indicated to me, something special.

K: The King hasn't said anything but the Egyptians have had an emissary here and I thought you should know about that.

D: On the Jordanian business.

K: A little bit on the Jordanian business.

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Dinitz - 2

D: I suggest the following then...

K: Which indicates that they may want to play with Hussein.

D: Let us do the following. Eban wants it too. At some point we will just remain the three of us. Because I am not only concerned about Eban but I am concerned about the staff you know -- maybe you tell him in general terms what the Egyptian wanted without any operative thing.

K: He will leak it.

D: Then don't say it at all then.

K: I will tell it to you.

D: Fine. Nevertheless he would want a few minutes alone.

K: We will see that the three of us, (are alone), About Syria, are you going to bring somebody over next week.

D: This is what I wanted to tell you. It is my--between you and me personally, Mr. Sec.--it has been my recommendation to have Dayan all the time. I got Eban to agree with this. Golda will go along with it. The big objection we have is from Dayan and the objection of Dayan is based on two elements: a) he says he doesn't believe anything can come out of it because only you can convince him to accept anything reasonable and therefore a second or third rate officer that will be sent here will not be able to do anything.

K: Look, will you tell that prima donna, that is perfectly true. I am trying to gain time. I don't give a good God damn. I am not even going to give that officer the real plan but I have got to gain time and I've got to be able to prove that I can produce Dayan.

D: Mr. Sec., this is exactly what I said, even if nothing will emerge out of this conversation it is important to indicate to the Egyptians that we are doing for the Syriars what we have done for ...

K: Exactly. I want Dayan over here then I am going off to Moscow. Then I want the Syrian. Dayan can be out of the country by then. Dayan has absolutely nothing to do with the Syrian. Then I am going to give the Syrian triple talk.

Dinitz - 3

D: I understand. I suggest that you mention to Eban this. Eban is with us on this. He agrees that Dayan should come and Golda I think will go along with it. The Government will decide on it Sunday. So Eban is impressed with the feeling that you want Dayan, he would be able to cable Golda that he found that it is a matter for you that would either make or break the future negotiations.

K: Secondly, Mr. Amb., I want you really to study some of these ideas carefully that you and I discussed. I know that they are terribly painful for you.

D: You mean on the Syrian situation. What do you think I have been doing. That is the second reason why Dayan doesn't want to come.

K: I know. That's the first reason -- not the second.

D: No, no, the second one because any govt now that will suggest anything beyond Oct. line would be dead duck tomorrow. But discuss it also with Eban. He is familiar with this idea.

K: I know but we are back at the old business. You have to consider it in terms of the other alternatives. We know now that the French and the Russians have made formal demarches in Syria not to settle with me.

D: Yes, that I also mentioned to you when I saw you because we knew the French were active in Damascus on this. But I think you are right in assuming that the Syrians had rather do business with you than with their other friend.

K: Yes, but they are under great pressure. Therefore, I have to have some action going.

D: We will discuss it. It is not a simple situation -- I don't want to go into now but we are also ...

K: Mr. Amb., I have learned one thing. The Israelis will do everything with bad grace but it will eventually be the right thing and it is better to do the right thing with bad grace than the wrong thing with good grace.

D: That is correct, but Mr. Sec., we also learned that things that you think are impossible can always be...

K: That is the wrong lesson you learned. That was the lesson you learned from the Egyptians. I said this to somebody. I said it this morning that the Israeli govt reminds me of a fellow who wins at roulette ten times in a row and now they think that is the normal event and they make their budget on that assumption.

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Dinitz - 4

D: Only if you are the croupier.

K: No, no. Really. Don't expect this. I give you my word. My
assessment is that the minimum you have to settle for is what I gave
you. I am really serious.

D: I know, and believe me I have passed this on. I just want you to know.

K: I have no indication that that will be accepted but if it will be
rejected at least we can split the Arabs on it.

D: If you can be 100 percent sure it will be rejected it will be easier
for me to sell it.

K: O.K. We will talk about it tomorrow.

D: The other subject he would want very much to talk to you about is the Russians. There is great concern in Israel over the role of the Russians and between you and me there has been some criticism that maybe you don't take to severely the Russian statements in Damascus, the Russian behavior vis-a-vis the whole Middle East development and he would want to hear from you how you evaluate the Russian role in the Middle East.

K: Very dangerous. What does he want me to do, be tougher publicly.

D: I don't know. He thinks that the Russians should be put in their
place in a more vigorous manner but let him explain his position.

K: That's childish but look I've got to go to the Foreign Relations Cmte.
What questions have you planted?

D: No, no. This time I let you off easily. But you said to the Jews that
unless I call you seven times a week I don't earn my salary.

K: No., I said unless you call me seven times a day.

D: No, weekly they said, and they have started a campaign to raise money
to supplement my salary now.

K: I told the Jewish leaders that you have a quota -- that you were a
stakhanovite.

TELECON
Vice President Ford/Secretary Kissinger

March 14, 1974

5:48 PM

F: Hi, Henry.

K: Hello, Mr. Vice President.

F: How are you, Henry?

K: OK. I just called you because I've been harrassed by both the President and the press all day long about what I may or may not have said to you.

F: When?

K: About the embargo. You know you said this morning you had heard from me that it was being lifted. All I want you to know if I had said to the press all day long what they asked me, then all I know about the embargo is what I read on the press tickers because we haven't had any official word. And that I must have given you the general sense of an expectation.

F: I guess that's right, but then I read the paper this morning and I was on that 7:30 TV program, Henry.

K: No, I just want you to know that I didn't mean to pull away from you.

F: Right.

K: But I had no choice because then to say that we haven't had any official word because if I said anything else Faisal would hit the ceiling.

F: Right, I understand. As I recall what I said, I said apparently it had been lifted and that a final notification would probably come in several days on Sunday and then they asked me, did I have any previous notice and I said well I fuzzed it a bit, forgotten exactly what I said and then - did I say I talked with you last night about it?

K: Well, that's what the news ticker brought, but you might well have - actually I don't remember that we talked about it.

F: I don't think so either and my best recollection is, Henry I didn't say I talked to you about it last night.

K: Well to tell you the truth, all I saw was the news ticker and they may well have run together two separate statements.

F: And put it on the basis that you and I were together last night.

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Ford - page 2

K: Well they didn't say I said it last night. They said you said - I said it would be lifted which I probably did say to you at some point.

F: That's right, but I suppose they made it more emphatic as a result of our being together last night.

K: Look, my concern now is not with what you said but so that when you see news reports that I said I had not given the clear impression that I didn't pull away from you.

F: Don't worry about that, Henry. I understand fully and you don't even have to call about those things.

K: I am determined to maintain some friendships in this town.

F: Well, it will be forever.

K: I know that.

F: OK, you're damn nice to call.

K: Thank you.

F: Don't worry about those little things, I understand what the damn press does.

K: Right.

F: Keep going.

K: Thank you.

F: Alright, Henry.

K: Bye.

F: Thanks for calling.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By CB NARA Date 6-8-84

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger

March 14, 1974

6:10 PM

K: Al.

H: Yes, Henry.

K: I just wanted to check, he has signed off on that letter?

H: Oh, Yes. I gave it to Brent when I called you.

K: OK, well, then we'll get it off by telegram.

H: Good.

K: That's right. He assumed you were sending it tonight.

K: Right. Now, I talked to Ford because I made too many statements disavowing him today.

H: Yes.

K: And he says it's ridiculous, he never even said this.

H: No, the questions said it.

K: He said we never even discussed it yesterday.

H: Right. I listen to the thing. It was, you've been close to Dr. Kissinger lately, something to that effect. What has happened on the embargo and he said well I understand, he informs me or something like that, that it's done.

K: Yes.

H: It was a very brief exchange. He sort of got led into it.

K: Yes.

H: His guy came over here, I said, look just don't worry about it. It's a minor problem Henry.

K: That's what I think.

H: Nobody's paying any god-damned attention to it.

K: I think it's not right to keep the Vice President from hosting that sort of a dinner. He changed all his travel plans. He didn't do any damage.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-84

TELECON

Assistant Secretary Sisco/Secretary Kissinger

March 14, 1974

7:30 PM

S: Hello.

K: Joe, you know, there has to be somebody in NEA when I'm in the building, it just can't be that I've got to run all over the place looking for people.

S: Yes.

K: And it really happens too often since you're not there any more. Now we've got a cable from Fahmy which we've got to answer tonight in which he asks what he should say to - first of all he wants to know what reactions we've had from Algeria and I think we should send Eilts some of these cables from Algiers.

S: Yes. You mean on the embargo?

K: Yes.

S: Yes.

K: And secondly, on the two months thing we ought to say that's a very difficult thing for us partly it's a question of dignity and secondly as a question of the end of those two months coinciding with the President's trip into the Middle East and we can hardly have the President go their looking as if he's opportuning for getting the thing extended.

S: Alright, why don't I - I'm getting into a clean tie - why don't I just come on back.

K: It's got to go tonight.

S: Yes. I'm just trying to figure out here - I can be a little late for this dinner. I'm just getting into a clean tie and I'll just go into the Department.

K: Well, wear a clean shirt while you're at it.

S: I think I ought to, don't you. May as well do both. Alright, I'll take care of it.

K: We'll get it out tonight?

S: What I'll do, I'll...

K: Isn't there a country director, these heros you talk about so much who can do it.

Sisco - page 2

S: Sure there is but (a) they're gone and (b) this has been one of the problems and that is we've kept them out of these things. And that's why we're so thin in that regard.

K: Atherton isn't here or I...

S: That's alright. What I'll do is come in right now, I'll get dressed here in about five minutes, and then I'll draft it and then bring a carbon right to the dinner and you can have a look at it.

K: OK, fine.

S: Good.

K: And you will indicate which of the Algeria cables - there were about two in which he said they were in favor of lifting the embargo.

S: I'll have to look them up and that may be a problem too, because I don't know whether - S/S is there in any event I can probably get them located.

K: One of them that's in my take now.

S: Yes.

K: But there were several during this week.

S: Yes, I'm aware of them, I read them all, but no where did I feel that we get a categoric response in those cables, of an affirmative character.

K: Well no, there was one where he said he was in favor of it now.

S: That was Humdhani (phonetic).

K: No, there's one today. You know this whole system in which I'm operating is...

S: I don't think you should have to worry about that. Just let me take that in hand and this can be gotten out tonight.

K: There is a cable today. Here we are. No that isn't the one. I saw something.

S: Just send that out to Dick Campbell and I'll...

K: No, it isn't in that bunch.

S: I'll stop by the office and see what we can do on it.

K: OK. END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By KARA Date 6-8-94

TELECON

General Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger

March 15, 1974

10:27 am

K: Hello Brent.

S: Good morning.

K: Brent, what do you think of this idea? I haven't seen my children in ages -- what would you think of my taking them to Russia with me? I know it is not very....

S: I think you would get bad press.

K: You do?

S: It probably would look as if you not as serious.

K: But I haven't seen them.

S: You should -- could you take them on vacation?

K: Well, when? I can't take them on my vacation, I'll never get a rest.

S: Well, that's true. Well, that's my quick answer -- that it might not look right.

K: Ok, is the President gone?

S: Yes, he is gone. He left last evening.

K: Let's see how it is going to be.

S: I think he is supposed to be on at 2:00.

K: Ok, thank you.

END

TELECON
The President/Sec. Kissinger

March 15, 1974

11:00

K: Mr. President

N: Henry, it is quite important, tell me in just a moment because I have some people waiting for me and I have to leave, but what should I say, as I will be asked about this embargo because of the Ford statement, your statement and then of course the leak out of Sadat about 2 months etcetera, etcetera, etcetera. What is your suggestion?

K: My suggestion is that the reports we have is that we have had no official report.

N: I know, I know, that is a duck you can take -- it is one I can't take. I can say simply that I am not going to comment on this because we have had no reports -- which of course isn't true, alright second point.

K: No, it isn't untrue, because we haven't had an official report, but you could say our impression is that they have decided to lift the embargo.

N: I should say that, that they have decided and then when they lift it for two months... suppose Henry, the more likely question will be, of course, is suppose, Mr. President, the report is true that they lift the embargo but only for two months with a condition -- what is your reaction. What do you say to that.

K: We have made a strong complaint to the Egyptians about this.

N: Privately, what do I say publicly, that's what I am asking.

K: I would say lifting it for two months really doesn't solve the basis problem very substantially. Or I would say this, however we move at the pace which is best suited to bring about a settlement regardless of the embargo and if they think they can affect us by it, that is not the right way of doing it. And I would handle it that way.

N: Ok.

K: But frankly....

N: We are not going to look at a gift horse in the mouth, we're going to take the two months at least and it will be awfully hard for them to impose it again.

-2-

K: If they have to reimpose it they'll never reimpose it. If it lapses after two months then it is a different problem and I haven't seen what it is they have actually decided. But if you show too much receptivity they'll vote it they might not do the two months thing.

N: ... show too much receptivity at all. That's what I am talking about. I am simply saying -- I am thinking of sort of kicking them about it -- about the two months.

K: I think the best way to say it is that we are moving at the pace that we think is most appropriate and that putting that pace will mean a deadline on the embargo won't affect our actions. Won't speed up our actions. And that will give some argument to those who want to lift it unconditionally.

N: Are there any that do, Henry.

K: Yes.

N: Still.

K: Definitely. We had definite word.

N: ... Has the decision been made that it is two months lifting, isn't that what we are talking about.

K: Yes, but we don't know whether that two months, Mr. President, means they'll review the situation after two months, which would be meaningless because they'll never agree on reimposing it; or whether they mean, it means that after two months, they have to take a new decision to lift it again. If it is just a review after two months, Mr. President, it would be a facesaving nothing.

N: That's right, I get your point. Fine. I got the word, don't bother with Buchanan's call when it comes, ok?

K: Right.

N: Fine, I am all set, anything else?

K: No, there is nothing else.

N: You got the letter off to Brandt.

I*

<table>
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    <td>EO 12/95/8</td>
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    <td>By</td>
    <td>CO NARA Date 6-8-94</td>
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K: Yes, he must have it by now.

N: Nothing..

K: Nothing in the paper -- that won't leak on their side.

N: Well, I'll cover that in answer to a question I think I am not going to make a big thing by announcing it.

K: No, I wouldn't do it.

N: I'll get a question on it so I'll low-key it.

K: Right, I would low-key it and keep it in that general framework.

N: Yes, not get into a position of announcing it in a big way -- well, we have cancelled our trip to Europe -- we have never had a trip to Europe.

K: Exactly, I wouldn't put it on the basis of cancel, I would just say...

N: We'll just say that we will take it when the situation is ready

K: And when the Declarations are ready.

N: They are not ready yet. The one on NATO is going along satisfactorily the one on the other is unsatisfactory because they have, the nine have taken a position at times that seems to be opposed to that of the United States. We, of course, do not .. it is a consultative process, you know what I mean.

K: Exactly, exactly the line and until we have that worked out there is nothing to sign.

N: And I am going to say too that this is all part of the same situation. The Europeans cannot expect cooperation on the security front where the American role is indispensable to their survival and confrontation with and at times even hostility on the economic front.

K: And political front. That I think would be excellent. And I think they are beginning to cave. We had word today that Brandt has given orders that there has to be full consultation with us no matter what the Nine do.

N: Right, right, Ok, Henry, I'll hit them even harder than you did --for the ladies.

K: Ok, all the best END

TELCON

McCloskey/Sec. Kissinger

March 15, 1974

11:05 a.m.

K: Bob, what do you think the public reactions would be if I took my
children to Moscow with me. I have not seen them in six months.

M: I don't see any particular reaction at all. I think it would be
perfectly understood and no problem.

K: You do?

M: I cannot imagine what the problem would be if any.

K: I literally have not seen them.

M: No. There are two?

K: Yes.

M: I see no reason not to do it. When are you leaving?

K: Saturday night.

M: I would go ahead and do it.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority E6 12/95</td></tr><tr><td>By CO NARA Date 6-8-94</td></tr></table>

March 15, 1974

4:14 PM

K: Brent, would you get a message to the President's plane to tell him I thought his performance was absolutely spectacular.

S: Yes.

K: I really think he was good.

S: I think he was good too. Is he in the air now?

K: Yes. He was a little rough on the Europeans then I would have liked him to be.

S: Well, that's alright.

K: But I tell you, we're winning. Have you seen the cables?

S: No, I haven't.

K: The Germans have now proposed to setting up a consultative group.

S: That follows Scheel's comments, never again would we go without consulting. That's good.

K: I tell you before the Europeans tackle us again they're going to think three times.

S: Your Congressional wives speech is going to turn into a great coo.

K: And they're all going to run to Jobert now and tell him, now shut up.

S: That's right.

K: You've now got the Americans so inflamed.

S: That's right. No question about it. I think it's just great. I think it's alright for the President to be a little tougher than you.

K: It's good for me, I don't know whether it's good - no but any sign of strength is good.

S: I agree, I certainly agree. I'll get word to him right away.

K: Yes, good. Thank you.

S: Right.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority E0 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By CO NARA Date 6-8-84</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger

March 15, 1974

7:58 PM

K: Jack, how are you.

J: OK. I wondered how you made out this morning with our two friends.

K: Well, first of all I told them I thought it was a good idea to have you participate and they said they would talk to you next week.

J: Right.

K: And, in fact, they said you had already called them too.

J: That's right. I told you that.

K: Yes. I'd forgotten that.

J: I told you I told them I want to see them.

K: I hadn't focused on that. Secondly, they talked about some pretty excessive numbers it seems to me. They want a hundred thousand. Ribicoff would, I think, settle for less. And some end of harrassment which we can handle if isn't taking two weeks, three four. I mean the demands. So, I didn't really argue because I don't think this is now the time. I have to see what I can get and then they have to see whether they're willing to take that.

J: Right. Well, the more I thought about the formulation, the better I like it.

K: What formulation?

J: I mean, the idea of some kind of short tether in return for commitments which are acceptable.

K: Yes.

J: So, I'll see them next week.

K: Good.

J: You're going to be around for a little bit.

K: I'll be around up until a week from tomorrow.

J: Good. By the way, how about that meeting yesterday. Did it go to your satisfaction?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By DE NARA Date 6-8-84

Javits - page 2

K: I thought it was very good. I was very pleased with it.

J: Good.

K: How about you.

J: I felt very good about it and they were obviously satisfied.

K: I think it's really a committee that can be very helpful.

J: Yes. I really think it is too. Of course, what happens to Fulbright is going to be a major gestion.

K: Yes.

J: Henry, one other thing I meant to ask about and omitted, that was your view on where Italy stands. The reason I ask is I'm very good friends with - you are you met her here with

K: Yes.

J: And she is very very deeply concerned and might even contemplate for office there if she knew more about what was going on.

K: Where Italy stands in what way?

J: She just wondered what we in the United States thought about it's present posture. My own opinion which I've given her was that for the moment this government would be let alone as more or less as a caretaker government. I didn't see any radical effort to unseat it or throw it out or create some new situation in Italy momentarily, probably not more than a matter of months.

K: You know in the issues that concern us in Atlantic relations they're sort of wishy washy, they want to get along with everybody, they don't have a very clearly defined policy.

J: They're probably very weak, that's their reason.

K: That's right. I'm not saying it critically.

J: So it really does count for too much at the moment.

K: No.

J: Do we see - do we think this government is likely to carry on for awhile?

K: It's probably the only one they can form under the present circumstances. This government is essentially the same as the preceding one.

By 08-16-84

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E0 12958

NARA Date 6-8-84

Javits - page 3

J: Right. If somebody thinks they can get something out of making a move they are very likely to just let it be.

K: That's my impression.

J: That was exactly mine. Henry, you did leave it with Wayne Hayes that he would come back to you with what he was going to do on these parliamentarians.

K: I left it with him that he would make an effort to do it and I had the impression he'd come back to me.

J: I see, ok, well I'll talk to him next week.

K: I think it would be a good idea.

J: Yes. Are you possibly be in town for perhaps a small brunch on Sunday.

K: This week?

J: Yes.

K: No.

J: Next week?

K: Next week, if I come into town I'd be in town only Friday and Saturday.

J: Only Friday and Saturday. Alright, well let me know and we'll see how you feel and what we might do.

K: I'd love to do it.

J: Alright.

K: Give my love to Marian and get some rest this weekend. For the first I've seen you look a little tired.

J: I will. I really will. I'll play a little tennis and I'll rest.

K: Good.

J: Fine, Henry, talk to you next week.

K: Thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-01

TELECON

Foreign Minister Rabassa/Secretary Kissinger

March 15, 1974

8:46 PM

R: Hello, Henry. Good evening.

K: How are you Emilio?

R: Fine and you?

K: OK.

R: I received your very nice letter in which you told me you wrote a letter
to the President saying that the organization was alright here.

K: It was superb it wasn't just alright.

R: Thank you. What have you thought of what I told you the other day.

K: For reasons, I find I can't discuss it on the telephone it would really have
a very bad reaction here with our President.

R: OK.

K: That doesn't mean I'd object to the principles, if it happens later on. As long
as it isn't announced here.

R: OK, Henry. I have to go to see this person anyhow for bilateral thing that
we have. What I'm going to tell him coming out of my own....

Conversation cut off.

R: We were cut off Henry.

K: Yes.

R: Look, I was telling you anyhow, not this weekend, but next weekend, I'm
going over there to speak to this man. We have some bilateral thing that I
want to arrange. I'm also going to tell him that I don't think or his foreign
minister or anyone when we have this meeting, brings anything in their favor
when they start speaking their mouth off. That this of course would be a way
in the future in Washington, that they would concur to our meeting. I repeat
I'm speaking just for myself and for my country.

K: You can certainly give your own impressions of my own views.

By DECLASSIFIED
 Authority EC 12958
 NARA Date 6-8-84

Rabasss - page 2

R: Exactly. I don't think the best way to arrange things by him or foreign ministers barking everytime there's an attempt for some admittance of them to the OES. In the other hand, in some near future can be utilized in another country for their admittance this we would discuss with you me. I think there's much good policy and diplomacy just then speaking their heads without any results.
This I am going to tell.

K: Right, and you can also tell them that anything you want to say -he wants to say to you, I'd be interested to hear.

R: Fine, that I will do Henry. Passing on another thing, of a bilateral nature I read in the paper here that an assistant to Jack Kubisch spoke about the possibility of money for the ______ must be paid.

K: Impossible.

R: Yes, I know. I want to explain. I had my Ambassador call him directly and he said that what happened is the executive branch, you, logically presents this as a bill apart and they put it with two other bills that are for domestic purposes. That was what he said and that the Foreign Senate Committee that he thought it more logical how the executives have presented it, which is right. The only thing that we have in mind, I don't want even to think of.

K: I will personally testify for it.

R: OK, thank you. Last thing Henry, my President, just give it a thought, ______ with a long time with our delegation, was thinking of sending a group of major investors in here so they can go and see all parts of the country, how they can ______ in the shares and explain that contrary to general commands or attacks, we do want foreign investment, but according to certain standards, that is to have it in a sporting mind. If you can arrange a group of that kind, would help us very much in many ways, Henry.

K: OK, I'll do my best. I'll see you - I'll be in Acapulco without fail on the 20th.

R: OK. Now the 30th.

K: Definite.

R: How long are you going to stay?

K: About ten days.

R: Fine, you deserve it.

K: Wonderful. I hope you come down to see me for a day or so.

R: OK. Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By CQ NARA Date 6-8-87

TELECON

Joseph Alsop/Secretary Kissinger

March 15, 1974

9:30 PM

A: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: OK, Joe. You called earlier this week, and I've been unbelievably tied up.

A: I know you were and I didn't bother you again. I'll see you on Tuesday. How are things looking?

K: They're fine.

A: I'm Jewish, I must say this castrated government of ours, as more direction and more authority than any other in the West.

K: That's right. You know the President today canceled his trip to Europe.

A: Oh, did he. Why was that.

K: Because of the European behavior.

A: Which European behavior?

K: Their approach to the Arabs.

A: Oh, yes.

K: No, they thought that he was so eager to come they could do anything.

A: Is this a new approach to the Arabs or just an old one.

K: No, the one we've been screaming at them about for the last ten days.

A: What did they do, Henry? I'm was in Arizona,

K: They have offered across the board economic, financial, technical, bilateral common market Arab deal culminating in a foreign ministers conference between all Arabs and all Europeans.

A: Did they go as far as t hat?

K: Yes.

A: Who is behind that, Jobert?

K: Yes.

Alsop - page 2

A: Who should I talk to about it.

K: When Sonnenfeldt comes back he's in Europe right now. He'll be back tomorrow.

A: He will?

K: yes.

A: I'll call him and say that you said for me to talk about it. I've written about gardens from my first return from vacation.

K: How was your vacation?

A: Well, it was awful, Henry. Because the doctor thought Stu ought to get away from this God-dmaned claustrophobia, we went out to Arizona. The blood separation was badly done and we were too far away and the dryness gave him nose bleeds anyway. We just had a gastly time.

K: How is he now, that he's back.

A: Well, he's so-so. I hope he'll be well enough. You may well see him on Tuesday night.

K: That would be good.

A: He's like a skelton and you keep thinking it's a long stage of a long saga. The wonderful consolation of it was Tish (phonetic) and he and I were together for a week under quite difficult circumstances and his boy's wife came for a couple of days. It was very cozy. We never had any arguments. It was very hard.

K: Nancy will be down this weekend.

A: She will.

K: You doing anything for dinner tomorrow night?

A: No. Not a damn thing. Oh yes I am, I'm going to Billy Graham's wedding dinner.

K: Billy Graham?

A: Yes. What are you doing for supper on Sunday?

K: You know, Nancy has to leave.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By OB NARA Date 6-8-64

TELECON

March 15, 1974

9:50 PM

S: Hi, this is Brent.

K: I'll be damned if a remember now why I've called you.

S: I'm sorry I took the afternoon off.

K: Oh, I got a note from Sie Weiss who is, of course, crazy. Saying that the Defense Department doesn't feel it's be ordered to do any mine clearing. In Egypt. That can't be right.

S: In the sense of having a piece of paper.

K: Will you make sure that they understand they are do to it though.

S: Sure. They may eventually insist on a piece of paper.

K: Then we'll get them a piece of paper.

S: We have to sort out who is going to pay for it, and all of that. It seems to me it's got to be Defense.

K: What did you think of our bloated curdling President? I thought it was good.

S: It was good. It was a little stronger than it had to be, but it was good.

K: It was better that he moved to the right of me.

S: I couldn't agree more.

K: It will clear the air in Europe because they now know it isn't a personal fight between me and Jobert.

S: Exactly.

K: And they're going to cave.

S: Oh, I think they will.

K: The only problem now is not to accept their first proposition.

S: No, that's right. I think we're in good shape and to do that now.

K: Yes.

S: What started out as maybe a disastrous week, turned into very good.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
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NUMBER ______ ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

By NARA Date 6-8-04

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)

UNCLASSIFIED

TELECON

Secretary Shultz/Sec. Kissinger

Marvh 16, 1974

11:38 pm

S: Hi Henry.

K: George, I understand you are not going to see Schmidt now?

S: As far as I know he is coming to the office at 11:00 on Monday.

K: On he is.

S: But the German Ambassador called this morning and he seems to be puzzled as to whether Schmidt is going to show up or not.

K: That's what I got because Schmidt was supposed to come and see me too.

S: Well, the German Ambassador is the one through whom the appointment was made and I have heard nothing to the contrary.

SANITIZED

S: Well, we have this offset negotiations.

K: But I would go to the absolute limit of what we can do plus ten percent.

S: Well, he has written a response to the letter that I wrote him in which we softened our position considerably. But his letter gives us no quarter, at least in our preliminary readings. Volcker and Casey are working on it this morning and I haven't heard their, how they come out; but I sort of read it and got a general reaction. At some point, I suppose we might have to say we'll alright, if this is what you can do we'll take it to the Congress, but the Congress may not buy it. I don't think the Congress would buy...

K: All I would urge you, George, I haven't looked at the details -- if you could go to the really absolute limit of what is conceivable.

S: Right, I will.

SANITIZED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Eo 12958
By Q-TARA Date 6-8-04

UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

S: Well, we will work on it and go over it with you.

K: Good.

S: So that you know where we are coming out.

K: Good.

S: Have you heard about the IDA, the opening of testimony again next week? On the 21st.

K: Yes.

S: Will you be able to make an appearance?

K: I don't know, but I'll send a letter.

S: I think if you could do that or if you could simply come to the hearings, make a brief statement and leave -- that would be helpful. Just to show the flag. I'll carry the testimony and I'll be there all morning.

K: Let me look at my schedule and see what I can do, but I'll certainly ask write a letter.

S: Ok.

K: Good, George.

S: Very good.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By C0 KARA Date 6.8.04

UNCLASSIFIED

TELECON

Mr. Colby/Secretary Kissinger

March 16, 1974

3:07 pm

K: Bill, I am talking to Jerry Schecter of Time which is doing a cover on me and he is under the impression that I ordered the abolishing of the National Estimate.....

C: Absolutely not.

K: Board and in any event, whether I ordered it or not, that my views were such that they produced the -- a tendency to give us...

C: Absolutely not.

K: I don't want you to talk to him while I am here, but could you talk to him at some point soon and tell him exactly what the hell happened, because my recollection is that I didn't even know it was being done until I read it in the papers.

C: I know it. It had nothing to do with you at all. I am going off to Europe tonight, unfortunately. If I could get him sometime me this afternoon.

K: Let me check with him -- he is here in my office (Aside: Colby is leaving for Europe tonight -- you want to talk to him at some point) Can he call you, say with another hour or so.

C: Sure.

K: Ok, he'll call you.

C: Alright, fine. Thanks very much.

K: Thanks, bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By CQ NARA Date 6-8-94

TELECON

General Haig/Sec. Kissinger

March 16, 1974

3:25 pm

H: Yes, Henry.

K: Do you want to hear something?

H: Yeah.

K: Fahmy, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, (this is from our Ambassador) asked to call on me at 11:00 today. He handed me the followi ng statement. "Information from most reliable source has reached us to the effect that the Secretary of State, in his briefing of the European Foreign Ministers, expressed the feeling that the utmost that could be achieved by the United States alone in the Middle East has been carried out and that henceforth we must bring the Soviet Union to participate in all future sets. This is what Dr. Kissinger intends to coordinate wi th the Soviets." Fahmy said this information had been passed to the Egyptians by a European state. He did not identify that state. Fahmy observed that if the statement is a correct reading of the Secretary's briefing to the Europeans Foreign Ministers, it is totally inconsistent wi th exchanges Egyptians have had wi th us and wi ll require a revision of Egyptian policy and so on and so forth. Isn't that revolting?

H: Yes. I should say it is. That is unbelievable.

K: You know t hat is what I am talking about.

H: Well, have you been in touch wi th them?

K: I am sending a flash, a rocket back. But I just wanted you to know what we are up against. You know I couldn't have said anything like this.

H: Of course not.

K: But that isn't w hat I am calling you about. I am calling you about something the President said this morning which rather disturbed me. He was in a rather sour mood again.

H: Yes, that is conceivable.

K: Why is that.

H: When did you talk to him.

K: About 11:00

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12958
By C8 NARA Date 6-8-84

-2-

H: Oh, he shouldn't have been too bad then. He got sour after I finished my noon to two session.

K: What was that about?

H: Well, you know you have to bite the boa here.

K: Well, he said after he is through with the Europeans, he is now going to go after the Israelis and he has been just waiting for an opportunity to lay into them. You know, he asked me how things were going and I said well, they are going on schedule but it will take some weeks to get the Israelis ready to do this. Now, I tell you if he goes publicly after the Israelis, he might as well start a war.

H: Henry, don't be concerned about that. He is just unwilling.

K: That's what the Syrians... we cannot, that is our policy, our strength consists in the fact that we are moving the Israelis.

H: Listen, I was told to get the football at 2:30.

K: What do you mean?

H: His black nuclear bag.

K: For what.

H: He is going to drop it on the Hill. What I am saying is don't take him too seriously.

K: Yes, but make sure he doesn't do it in Houston.

H: Oh, God no. No way.

K: I don't tell you, it would be a disaster. We are not doing bad, we are on schedule.

H: Yes, I think we are doing fine.

K: Well, what do you think of these fucking Europeans? In Brussels they are screaming, but I guarantee you they are all going to head in now.

H: Well, that is great.

K: We'll be alright after another week.

March 16, 1974

4:40

K: Brent, would you run past Vorontsov, this idea of taking my two
children to Russia. I just don't see why people should object.
I'm not getting anything out of it. I haven't seen them in six months.

S: Sure, I'll run it by him.

K: Tell him I am not sure yet that I want to do it, but I haven't seen them
and it is their vacation period.

S: Sure. I don't imagine that they'll say no. I can't conceive that they
would.

K: Well, see what they say. Also, can you find out from him whether
we meet in Sovidobo or in Moscow?

S: Sure.

K: That would be important to know.

S: I hadn't thought of that. If you are out in... You would either have to take
them to Sovidobo or there wouldn't be much point in their going.

K: Oh no, they have to be with me wherever I am. But you know they
have helicopters there, they could run into Moscow during the day and
come back. And they might enjoy a day there -- there is a swimming
pool and plenty of guards.

S: Sure.

K: You want to talk to Vorontsov about this. Tell him that if he can let me
know Monday I would appreciate it and tell him that it is a personal request.
I have been there and I haven't seen my kids.

S: Sure, you haven't seen them in a long time and it is their vacation
and you would like to get their reaction on a personal basis.

K: Right, ok.

END

Stabler - 3

S: He suggested we do it on the 14.

K: No, no. I guess he gets to the 14 in case the French don't cooperate.

S: What he is saying is that if we abandon the EC new nine declaration let us try to go ahead with the 15. The French might not be willing because if add this thing on consultation they won't like it. If that's the case then and Lunt has even suggested this perhaps we ought to do it on the basis of 14.

K: Let's not worry about that.

S: I think that is just a non-starter.

K: Well, that is not likely to happen.

S: I don't think it is either.

K: But you should say if we go the route of the NATO Declaration alone that then we would like additional paragraph on consultation.

S: Yes, that is in of course what you said to Von Staden so that should be in there.

K: Right.

S: I will send something up to you shortly on it.

K: Good. Thank you.

S: Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-87

TELCON
Stabler/Kissinger

March 16, 1974

4:58 p.m.

S: Yes., Mr. Secretary.

K: I have two contradictory concerns. One is I don't want this discussion to be sent in 10,000 copies all over the world.

S: No, what I had planned to do was to do a very brief resume of what at least some of the NATO -- at least our NATO capitals might know what happen.

K: What would you say?

S: I would simply say that he asked specifically these two questions and that you had indicated that there might be three options to consider; we had no further intention of making proposals. If they had something to say that was useful let them say it.

K: Right.

S: Just put it that way.

K: That gets me to my second point. I don't want our Embassies to encourage the Europeans into putting pressure on us to finish, especially the EEC declaration.

S: Oh, no. I think we would simply add in this thing -- that this is the way it was put -- if the matter was raised it could be simply put in exactly this form but that we weren't asking, or pressing or in any way suggesting that they make any proposals. It is entirely up to them.

K: O.K.

S: I think we ought to take the position that...

K: Do you agree with this incidentally. What is your personal view?

S: My personal view is that if they -- yes -- if they come up with a worthwhile proposal then we ought to be more than willing to at least meet them half-way on the thing, so they don't get any feeling that we are totally now deaf and completely deaf to any suggestions they may have to make.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By: NARA Date 6-8-94

Stabler - 2

K: Yes.

S: I think if we are completely deaf to it then this frankly plays back into the French hands who would say well they weren't really interested anyway.

K: Yes.

S: That we ought not to perhaps specifically or positively encourage but we certainly not at this stage of this game discourage.

K: Yes, but what I want to avoid is that come in next week some meaningless EC Nine paragraph and say now sign please.

S: I think that would be made clear in that you had said today very clearly and this would be the point that I would like our missions to have and that is it has got to be something that is not just meaningless words but a specific proposal.

K: And that we consider the EC Nine Declaration as it now stands to unbalanced for us to accept.

S: Yes.

K: That has to be made clear.

S: Yes. I will make that even clearer than what I have just written.

K: O.K. Fine.

S: One other thing while I have you. You've seen Don Rumsfeld's message. But it seems to me that is an absolutely non-starter. This idea that we go into a NATO Declaration of 14.

K: Well, if we go on that course of strengthening the NATO Declaration -- well he will get our cable.

S: He will get our cable.

K: Which will say the third option is that if we go on the NATO alone it must be strengthened.

S: Yes but it is quite clear that it has to be the fifteen.

K: That is clear.

TELCOM
Sonnenfeldt/Sec. Kissinger

March 16, 1974

5:05 p.m.

K: I have to pick up Nancy. I will call you later. Did you have a good trip?

S: Yes. I have to give you credit. I think you've got them on the run but I think we've got to hold still now.

K: That's what we are going to do. Look, the President wants to send a letter to Brezhnev on Monday. Will you draft one?

S: What does he want to tell them -- I mean what in general.

K: Just a quick review of our relations and that he means to continue on dtente and the usual crude and that he is sending me with a good you know -- but don't limit my freedom of action too much.

S: I would never do that.

K: I'll call you in about an hour.

S: You certainly had him programmed yesterday. He learned his lesson too well.

K: That's true. I didn't want him to go this far.

S: At least no one can say...

K: What I had him programmed to say was essentially what was in the letter to Brandt but he went far beyond that.

S: Did you cut out that one sentence for a purpose. Because the thrust of the letter still is to not scrap the thing at least to postpone it indefinitely -- the EC nine thing.

K: I took that out because it seemed to me to leave open that it might continue.

S: I thought you took it out because it was to definitive -- shut it off to definitively. Because I told the British to all intents and purposes we were holding it in abeyance.

K: That's correct. You took the correct line.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger/Joe Sisco
Sunday, March 17, 1974; 12:55 p.m.

K: Joe, I haven't got that cable yet and now I want to leave, and I don't want to be bothered at home.

S: Oh, for God's sakes.

K: It shouldn't take three hours to do a para...

S: Hell, I dictated it 15 minutes after you and I talked. Let me call the Ops Center.

K: Well, I am now leaving. It's too late. Where the hell could it be?

S: Well, let me call the Operations Center and see where it could be.

K: Okay.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By CO NARA Date 6.8.04