Personal and Confidential

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -21- November 18, 1960

by which to gauge whether your goals are being achieved. The
plan, once decided upon, should serve as a guideline to all
groups. The policy planning group should meet with you at least
once a month to determine progress.

(c) Each member of this group should have primary responsibility for one area of your activities. Nothing should be said substantively without full consideration and clearance by the man charged with this area and the same is true in the political field.

The importance of substantive preparation and political
organization cannot be overstressed. The former is important to
make certain that your public utterances are authoritative and to
give you a platform for which to contend. Organisation is required
for continuity, to bring pressure on the regular organization and to
enable you to contest primaries in 1964 with a maximum chance of
success.

(d) A reorganization of your political set-up is required.
Somebody should be appointed immediately who does for you what Farley
did for Roosevelt, Brownell for Dewey, Robert Kennedy for his brother:
create a national organization. This man should have no other
responsibilities. He should not be responsible for any state affairs.
He should get to know the leaders all over the country and work with
them.

I am no expert in this field. It seems to me, however, that

I am no expert in this field. It seems to me, however, that
them.

He should get to know the leaders all over the country and work with
reformist parties. He should not be representative for my state alone.
create a national organization. This man should have no other

did for Roosevelt, Brownell for Kennedy, Robert Kennedy for his protégé
somebody should be appointed immediately who does for him what he has
(q) A reorganization of your political set-up is required.

success.

ample how to conduct primaries in 1964 with a maximum chance of
tor continuity, to bring pressure on the regular organization and to
Give him a platform for which to contend. Organization is required
make certain that your public statements are authoritative and to
organization cannot be overstressed. The format is important to
The importance of apportioning preparation and political
charged with this area and the same is true in the political field.
apportionment without full consideration and clearance by the can-
pility for one area of your activities. Nothing should be said

(c) Each member of this group should have primarily respon-

Broome. The local planning group should meet with you at least
beyond once a month, should serve at a guideline to all
by which to gauge whether your business are being achieved. The

Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller - 31- November 13, 1960

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November 18, 1960

you have an enormous appeal to young people. A way must be found to mobilize the rank-and-file and, above all, to induce some of the younger people to take an interest in Republican politics. In this manner, you will be able by 1964 to create sufficient pressure on the traditional politicians, whom in my judgment you can never win over by direct appeals. Your task in this respect is similar to the one Kennedy faced within the Democratic Party.

At the same time, a determined effort should be made to reorganize the state political organization. I have little to suggest here. But the State Republican organization seems to me not nearly as effective an instrument as it should be.

(a) An immediate reorganization of your public relations set-up seems indicated. I know what is needed but not how to do it. I do know, however, that the image we are creating is not the intended one, much less does it reflect your real qualities.

## VII. Strategy Suggestions.

(a) It would be foolish to ignore the obstacles in the way of your national future. Still you have overcome worse obstacles. But it is important to recognize that there are several goals to be reached simultaneously, some of which are not going to be easy to reconcile:

1. The need to control the New York state machine.

reconcile:

reached simultaneously, some of which are not going to be easy to
But it is important to recognise that there are several goals to be
of your national future. Still you have overcome some obstacles.

(a) It would be useful to ignore the obstacles in the way
**AII. Strategy Suggestions.**

one, may less do so reflect your real difficulties.

I do know, however, that the image we are creating is not the intended
set-up some indicated. I know what is needed but not how to do it.

(b) An immediate reorganisation of your public relations
not nearly as effective an instrument as it should be.

suggest here. But the State Republican organization seems to me
reorganize the state political organization. I have little to
At the same time, a determined effort should be made to

the one Kennedy faced within the Democratic Party.
on over dy direct abbeles. Your task in this respect is similar to
the traditional politicians, when in my judgment you can never win
manner, you will be split by 1964 to create sufficient pressure on
bigger people to take an interest in Republican politics. In this
mobility the rank-and-file and, above all, to induce some of the
you have an enormous abbeles to buy people. A way must be found to

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November 19, 1960

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November 18, 1960

2. The need to win the 1962 election overwhelmingly.

3. The need to become firmly established as a national leader.

4. The need to maintain your position of competence in foreign policy and defense matter since the 1964 campaign is likely to turn on these.

(b) The primary goal must be to solidify yourself in New York state. This means that much more attention must be given to featuring state accomplishments and your record as Governor.

It is essential to maintain and extend your record of legislative accomplishments. It would seem to me very important to make sure before the legislative session starts which of your programs have a chance of being adopted and to concentrate on these. Too many defeats in the legislature weigh on your image and destroy the cohesiveness of the party.

(c) Pronouncements on national crises should be kept to a minimum over the next two years. However, you should make releases, preferably from Albany, on matters of crucial importance, particularly in the foreign policy field. Thus, if you feel that trends in disarmament conferences or on negotiations over Berlin are dangerous, a statement setting forth the major considerations should be issued.

be issued.

dangerous, a statement setting forth the major considerations should
tend to disarmament conferences or on negotiations over Berlin are
particularly in the foreign policy field. Thus, it has been that
releases, preferably from Vichy, on matters of crucial importance,
a minimum over the next two years. However, you should make

(c) pronouncements on national crises should be kept to
coercionless of the party.

Too much defeats in the legislature when your image and destruction the
program have a chance of being adopted and to concentrate on these,
to make sure before the legislative session starts which of your
legislative accomplishments. It would seem to me very important
It is essential to maintain and extend your record of
featuring state accomplishments and your record as Governor.

York state. This means that much more attention must be given to
(p) The primary goal must be to solidify yourself in New
farley to turn on these.

in foreign policy and defense matter since the 1964 campaign is
4. The need to maintain your position of coherence
leader.

Hiroakirason V. Rockettler November 18, 1960 -13-

## Personal and Confidential

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November 18, 1960

Despite the need for getting control of the state this
is essential to establish a record of having warned about the dangers
ahead. These statements should be reserved only for critical occurrences.
They should not be a commentary on <u>all</u> national issues. Rather you
should be in the position of speaking out only when the gravity of
the situation does not permit you to be silent. In my judgment you
could build up a really significant record in this manner by 1964.

(d) A systematic effort to keep up to date on major national issues is essential. It is impossible to improvise positions under the pressure of deadlines. This will require not only major effort by your research staff. The conclusions of your research group must be put before you at regular intervals in a manner that gives you a chance to comment, to criticize and to participate in the formulation of your positions.

It will also be necessary to develop, on an informal basis,
contacts and exchanges of views with individual leaders or groups on
the main issues involved. Finally, we should expand the informal
briefings started last year in your meetings with Teller, Gates, and
Foster.

(e) Early in the new Administration you should use the
opportunity of the February fund-raising dinners to lay out your
public philosophy. An alternative is to do so at the Godkin lectures

bundled philosophy. An alternative is to do so at the Godwin lectures
opportunity of the September impromptu meeting to lay out here

(c) Early in the new Administration he should use the
letter.

brieftage started last December your meetings with Teller, Gates, and
the main issues involved. Finally, we should expand the informal
contacts and exchanges of views with individual leaders or broome on
It will also be necessary to develop, on an informal basis,
of your positions.

chance to comment, to criticize and to participate in the consultation
be but before him at regular intervals in a manner that gives him a
py hour research staff. The conclusion of your research group must
the breather of deadlines. This will require not only major effort
at issues is essential. It is impossible to imitate your position under

(d) A systematic effort to keep up to date on major nation-
could build up a really significant record in this manner by 1964.
the situation does not permit him to be silent. In my judgment he
should be in the position of abetting out only when the gravity of
they should not be a commentary on all national issues. Rather how
speed. These statements should be reserved only for critical occasions.
is essential to establish a record of having warned about the dangers
Despite the need for setting control of the state title

November 18, 1960

Personal and Confidential

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Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -25- November 18, 1960

about which I spoke to you. My temptation would be to call them
a program for dynamic conservatism. You may be reluctant to call
yourself a Conservative. But as a Republican this seems to me
unavoidable and the attempt to escape the label will let Goldwater
monopolize the term.

Moreover, the bad connotation of Conservatism derives from
the manner in which it has been used by Hoover, Taft and Goldwater.
Their views in fact are Manchester Liberalism of the 19th century.
You have, it seems to me, a unique opportunity to explain how tradi-
tion can buttress progress rather than retard it and to develop a
philosophy for the future much as the British Conservatives became
the party of real progress.

The theme might be that we face two extremes: one, an
economic theory which believes that <u>all</u> problems are soluble by
purely economic means; the other, a form of welfare state in which
the bureaucracy becomes an end in itself. A dynamic conservatism
would oppose both tendencies of reducing man to a manipulable quality.
It would attempt to enhance the dignity of the individual against
the forces of both unbridled economics and stifling bureaucracy.

Whether or not you agree with this, you should develop
within the next twelve months a philosophical platform for the next
four years. Any criticism of Nixon or "I told you so," should be
avoided.

Personal and Confidential

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -26- November 18, 1960

(f) After the legislative session in 1961 you might consider a quick trip to Europe and perhaps Africa to keep yourself abreast of international issues and to maintain contacts with foreign leaders. In 1962 you cannot of course leave New York state. Starting in 1963 you should step up your pronouncements on foreign and defense policy. This will require that the interim be used to keep yourself informed.

VIII. Conclusion.

Much of what I have written has been perforce critical. I have done so because in the months ahead we can be most helpful by seeking to improve the organization and to remedy whatever weaknesses have become apparent over the past two years. What I said should not obscure the real assets: a dedicated, loyal and able staff which, properly organized, can become increasingly effective.

The purpose of this memorandum is to free you for the real challenge ahead: to inspire the nation, to maintain values in the face of an obsession with tactics and to liberate the idealism of America.

of America.

in the face of an operation with tactics and to liberate the idealism
real challenge ahead: to insulate the nation, to maintain values

The purpose of this memorandum is to free you for the
ost which, properly organized, can become increasingly effective.
should not occlude the real needs: a dedicated, loyal and able
success have become apparent over the past two years. What I said
by seeking to improve the organization and to remedy whatever work-
I have done so because in the months ahead we can be most helpful
Much of what I have written has been before critical.

## XIII. Conclusion.

be need to keep yourself informed.
on foreign and defense policy. This will reduce that the interests
state. Starting in 1963 you should step up your broomances
foreign leaders. In 1963 you cannot of course leave New York
apart of international issues and to maintain contracts with
super a duck trip to Europe and benabe Africa to keep yourself
(t) After the legislative session in 1961 you might con-

Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller - Sp.

Personal and Confidential

November 18, 1960

Personal and Confidential

Memorandum to the Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. Introductory Comments.

Now that the election is over, a point has clearly been reached where it becomes appropriate for all of us to chart your future course, to evaluate the organization at your disposal and to seek to define the goals towards which you should be directing your efforts. I shall set down my preliminary thoughts with absolute frankness in the hope of being helpful.

You know my devotion to you. You are aware, I am sure, that you can count on my support, even if you disagree with my advice. My analysis is designed solely to help you and to supply a perspective which in your position may not always be available.

This is a period when it is easy to be discouraged. The past few months have been an emotional travail even for those at the fringes of the campaign. I know what it must have meant to you. Still, if we compare the point at which you find yourself now with the time that you left Washington, your achievement has been remarkable.

the time that he felt Washington, how achievement has been remarkable.
Still, it is comparative the point at which he find himself now with
the trusses of the campaign. I know what it must have meant to him.
best ten months have been an emotional travail even for those at
Time is a period when it is easy to be discouraged. The
a herewithive which in your position may not always be available.
advice. My analysis is designed solely to help you and to ambly
that you can count on my subvert, even if you disagree with me.
You know my devotion to you. You are sure. I am sure,
solute firmness in the pose of being helpful.
Your efforts. I shall set down my preliminary thoughts with up-
to ask to define the goals towards which you should be directing
future course, to evaluate the organization at your diabolical and
reached where it becomes appropriate for all of us to part with
How that the election is over, a point has clearly been

I. Introductory Comments.

From: Henry V. Kieinger
Memorandum to the Honorary Nelson V. Rockefeller

Reconven and Confidential

November 13, 1980

Personal and Confidential

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -2- November 18, 1960

You have sparked a series of reports which focussed public attention on our peril and our opportunities. You have been elected Governor. Your record in this office has been outstanding. You have become a national figure. Almost single-handedly you moved the Republican Party to accept a platform which had it been maintained with conviction would surely have won the election.

Our present disappointment must not obscure the fact that events were largely out of your control. Though I shall offer suggestions for various changes in your organization and method of operation, these should not be taken as a judgment of the past, but as a means to help you shape your future.

The validity of everything that follows depends to a considerable extent on two factors: (a) My assessment of your role in our society and (b) the trends which I foresee, particularly in the international field.

## II. Your Role.

As for your role in our society, I have always believed that you were cast for greatness. Your idealism, sense of purpose, and conviction can inspire this society and may make it do the things of which it is capable. All of us who have had the privilege of being

Personal and Confidential

-3- November 18, 1960

associated with you have in the process discovered horizons which we had never known existed. It has always been my hope that some day you might do the same for the nation and indeed for the world.

Yet it is essential to realize that a price must be paid for greatness. The same qualities which will make you desperately needed in times of crisis will make you appear somewhat out of tune with your environment during periods of normalcy. If you are yourself, you will always make the regular organization man somewhat uncomfortable. Most organizations--and the Republican Party more than most--are run by a standard of average performance. Your vision and boldness, which may be desperately needed in times of crisis, are always likely to meet incomprehension in times of calm.

It is well to remember that the attributes which distinguish a great leader also doom him to a considerable degree of loneliness. Both Churchill and De Gaulle went through periods when they seemed politically doomed. Both were considered rash, or irresponsible, or simply irrelevant. Both prevailed in the end because history does not permit endless equivocation. Their opponents, who for a time seemed so clever and "balanced," were outstripped by events.

There is in the life of great men, then, an inherently tragic element. A people often learns only by experience; it knows only when it is too late to act. But a leader must act as if his

only when it is too late to act. But a leader must act as it finds
tragic elements. A people often learns only by experience; it knows
there is in the life of Great Men, then, an impermanently
events.

who for a time seemed so clever and "balanced," were unattributed by
because history does not permit endless elucidation. Their opponents,
troublesome, or simply irrelevant. Both prevailed in the end
they seemed politically correct. Both were considered red, or
illness. Both Churchill and De Gaulle went through periods when
Begun a Great leader also seemed him to a considerable degree of famous.

It is well to remember that the attributes which distinguish
critics are always likely to meet incompatibility in times of calm.
vital and positive, which may be deliberately needed in times of
than most--are run by a standard of average performance. You
uncomfortable. Most organizations--and the Republians partly more
self, you will always make the regular organization must adapt
with your environment during periods of normalcy. If you are born-
needed in times of crisis will make you appear somewhat out of tune
for peace. The same qualities which will make you deliberately
Yet it is essential to realize that a brute must be bad
that you might do the same for the nation and indeed for the world.
we had never known existed. It has always been a hope that some
associated with you have in the process discovered perhaps which

Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller -3- November 18, 1960

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aspirations were already reality. This is why great leaders often
share the fate of prophets in the sense that they are without honor
in their own country at least for a time. The more novel their in-
tuition, the more likely this is to be true.

There is, however, one consolation in our period. Often
the greatness of statesmen has been apparent only in retrospect when
experience has caught up with their vision. In our day, the lead-
time for prophets has been compressed, together with that of all
other lead-times. Vindication is certain within a decade--though
only an irresponsible person would predict that it must happen during
the four year period which must concern us most immediately.

I have spent so much time on the nature of greatness be-
cause it seems to me to bear importantly on one of the problems
connected with your public image over the past few years. There is
a quality to the actions of great men peculiarly their own. Honesty
compels me to say that I believe this to have been lacking in your
performance over the past two years. Of course, you have done
things no other person in public life would have dared to attempt:
the tax increase, the civil defense program, your stand on nuclear
testing. By any normal criteria, your actions have been outstanding.

You are not to be judged by normal criteria, however. My
concern is not that outstanding things have not been accomplished
but that the quality which has produced them has somehow failed to be

but that the quality which has produced them has someone failed to be
concern in not that outstanding things have not been accomplished

You are not to be judged by normal criteria, however. If
critical. By any normal criteria, your actions have been outstanding.
the tax increase, the civil defense program, your stand on nuclear
strife, no other person in public life would have dated to attempt:
performance over the past two years. Of course, your past done
thanks me to say that I believe this to have been lacking in your
quality to the actions of great men beautifully their own. Honestly
connected with your public image over the past ten years. There is
cause it seems to me to bear inappropriately on one of the problems
I have about so much time on the nature of greatness be-
the four year period which must concern me most immediately.
only an irrefutable person would predict that it must happen during
other less-time. Indirectly in certain ways a decade--though
time for biography has been compressed, together with that of all
experience has caught up with their vision. In our day, the lead-
the greatness of statements has been apparent only in retrospect upon
there is, however, one consolidation in our period. Often
tention, the more likely this is to be true.
in their own country at least for a time. The more novel their in-
where the late of biopducts in the same that they are without power
substitutions were already reality. This is why great leaders often

Honorable Melvin V. Rockefeller

November 10, 1960 -4-

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Personal and Confidential

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -5- November 13, 1960

conveyed. You still lack a clear profile in the public mind. Far too few people know you for what you are. Far too many see only the activity you generate but not the purpose which animates you.

Your speaking style seems to me too often to have contained a kind of rhetoric which tends to obscure rather than clarify. Above all, it simply does not sound like you. Your measures, even when individually correct, as they almost invariably are, too often seem to lack relationship to each other. You have not received full benefit of the courageous and profound steps you have taken. Actions which to your friends could only prove your greatness of spirit have not made the impact they should have, even on people well-disposed to you.

I am trying to make two points. First, the greatest contribution to our society you can make is to maintain the values and to advocate the programs which represent what you most deeply believe. This is also your greatest political asset. Thus, the crucial problem is what _you_ believe and what _you_ want--not what some group of advisors, however dedicated or able, thinks you should want.

The test of your role in our society is not tomorrow's editorial, but the one two or three or five years from now. You are the only public figure with the strength, the courage and the conviction to stand alone, if necessary. You are therefore the person who is the hope of the country to reverse the collapse of values and

who is the power of the country to reverse the collages of values and
viction to stand alone, it necessarily. You are therefore the person
the only bipie figure with the strength, the courage and the com-
editorial, put the one two or three or five here from now. You are
the text of your role in our society is not tomorrow's
Sword of advisors, however dedicated orpie, thinks you should want.
crucial problem is what you believe and what you want--not what some
believe. True is also your greatest political asset. True, the
and to advocate the program which rebuke what you most deeply
triumphant to our society you can make it to maintain the value
I am trying to make two points. First, the greatest con-
to you.

pave not made the impact they should have, even on people well-digested
which to your triangle could only prove your greatness of spirit
tit of the comtageons and broomstaps you have taken. Actions
to lack relationship to each other. You have not received full pass-
initially correctly, as they almost invariably are, too often seem
will, it simply does not sound like you. Your measures, even when
a kind of rhetoric which tends to opacize rather than clarify. Above
your abashing style seems to me too often to have contained
activity you generate but not the burrhoe which estimates you.

too ten people know you for what you are. But too many see only the
conceived. You still lack a clear broilile in the bipie mind. But

Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller -2- November 18, 1960

Bereavement and Confidential

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November 18, 1960

of thought which has characterized so much of our post-war policy.

Second: your role in our society transcends fluctuating
political fortune. Of course, all your friends must hope that you
will have the opportunity to inspire the nation as you do them.
But this depends on many factors, some of them out of our control.
Whatever your political fortunes, your special qualities will be
desperately needed. As long as you uphold your principles, you will
play a major role and you will always have a major forum.

Thus the challenge ahead is to clarify your program, to
maintain it regardless of short-term swings of public opinion,
and to emerge in this fashion as the conscience of the nation. In
that case, there seems to me every possibility that in four years
the country will be ready for you.

I would now like to turn to this problem.

the country will be ready for you.
that case, there seems to me every difficulty that in your hands
and to emerge in this fashion as the conscience of the nation. In
maintain it regardless of short-term swings of public opinion.
True the challenge ahead is to clarify your program, to
push a major role and you will always have a major form.
debatably needed. As long as you uphold your principles, you will
whatever your political fortunes, your special duties will be
but this depends on many factors, some of them out of our control.
will have the opportunity to inspire the nation as you do them.
political fortunes. Of course, all your friends must probe that your
Second: your role in our society transcends financing
at thought which has characterized so much of our host-country patch.

Honorable Nelson V. Zucksteiler

-c-

November 18, 1960

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### III. A Possible Projection of Future Trends.

Whenever conditions seem safe or non-critical or whenever it appears that an election can be won in the ordinary political way, the nominee will be a far more conventional type than you. It seems to me also that if there is "normalcy" Kennedy will be well night unbeatable. His social welfare program is going to win over many who now oppose him on religious grounds.
By 1964, a new generation will have grown up to whom the Eisenhower era will probably appear irrelevant.

Moreover, in many fields of policy the remedial measures are reasonably obvious. Any energetic man cannot fail to bring about dramatic movement. But for one fact, I would say that we are entering another Democratic era. This factor is my conviction that the international situation will almost certainly continue to deteriorate.

There are two reasons for this conviction. The first is outside Kennedy's control. I believe strongly that someone will have to pay the bill for the Eisenhower Administration. For eight years we have been living on capital--a process which can be quite pleasant as long as some capital remains. The net result, however, is inevitably

as long as some capital remains. The net result, however, is inevitably
pave been living on capital--a process which can be quite blemish-
ful the pill for the Eisenhower Administration. For eight years we
side Kennedy a control. I believe strongly that someone will pave to
there are two reasons for this conviction. The first is out-
continue to deteriorate.

tention that the international situation will result in certainly
are entering another Democratic era. This factor is an influ-
iant dramatic movement. But for one fact, I would say that we
are reasonably optimistic. And energetic men cannot fail to bring
Moreover, in many fields of policy the remedial measures
Eisenhower era will probably appear irrelevant.

By 1990, a new generation will pave grown up to whom the
going to win over many who now oppose pin on religious grounds.
will be well understood. His social welfare program is
an. It seems to me also that if there is 'new left,' Kennedy
tical way, the moment will be a far more conventional than
over it addresses that an election can be now in the ordinarily belt-
whenever conditions seem safe or non-critical or when-

### III. A Possible Protection of Future Trends.

November 18, 1960

-J-

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November 18, 1960

a storing up of trouble. We have reached the period when the bills are coming due and when we must face our challenges with our reserves depleted. A few years ago, only foresight was required to master events. For the 1960's lonely and harsh tasks are almost unavoidable. The spasm of crises of last May marked by the collapse of the summit, the cancellation of the President's visit to Japan, the Congo and Cuba are a foretaste of what seem to me inevitable at an ever-accelerating pace, regardless of what policies Kennedy follows.

For example, it seems likely to me that the next Administration will see more upheavals in Africa and probably in Latin America. Iran could collapse any day. Chinese pressure in South East Asia will intensify. Castroism may spread. There will be a showdown on Berlin. The Western Alliance is far from firm. The new Administration will have to preside over a major revision of our relations with Communist China, the best possible end result of which can only be a cutting of our losses and not any positive gain. The use by the Soviets of disarmament negotiations to demoralize the West is likely to continue.

As the phrase "without disarmament" there can be no peace" becomes established the Soviets will be in the driver's seat. For failure to achieve arms control will then convince many in the West that all is lost and that unilateral disarmament is preferable to a

that all its forces and that infinitesimal disentanglement is preferable to a
default to achieve some control will then convince many in the West
that the capitulation of the Soviet will be in the driver's seat. Not
we the brutes without disentanglement there can be no chance
demoralise the West is likely to continue.

five gain. The one by the Soviet of disentanglement negotiations to
suit of which can only be a cutting of our losses and not any beet-
work of our relations with Communist China, the best possible and re-
lieve the Administration will have to breathe over a major revolution
a slowdown on Berlin. The Western Alliance is far from him.
But We will intently. Cooperation may be sought. There will be
America. It can collude and do. Chinese brutes in South
attrition will see more opportunities in Asia and properly in Latin
for example, it seems likely to me that the next American
belligerent Kennedy follows.

to me invitable at an ever-accelerating pace, regardless of what
visit to Tokyo, theCG and China are a foretaste of what seem
by the collaboration of the summit, the cancellation of the President's
are almost unavoidable. The chain of events may be marked
during to master events. But the 1960's a lonely and pesky decade
our resources depleted. A few years ago, only foresight was re-
quired are coming due and when we must face our challenges with
a storing up of trouble. We have reached the period when the

Honorspie Nelson V. Rockefeller

November 18, 1960
-8-

Personnel and Confidential

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Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -9- November 18, 1960

continuation of the Cold War. Among intellectuals this kind of thinking is already alarmingly wide-spread. I would also expect the Soviets gradually to transform their disarmament proposals into demands, particularly vis-a-vis peripheral areas, and to seek to achieve domination over them in the name of arms control.

(Finally, I would not be surprised if sometime over the next decade, the Communists would set up their own United Nations-- both Khrushchev and Mao have hinted at it in speeches and it is our fault if we do not take them seriously.) Not all these things need happen of course. But an accelerated tempo of crises seems inevitable.

The second reason why I believe a deterioration of the international situation to be extremely probable is connected with the personality of Kennedy and, above all, with that of his intimate advisors. During the immobility of the Eisenhower Administration it has been overlooked that much of the criticism was as irrelevant as the policy itself. Many of the critics have assumed that the main failure of Eisenhower was in the field of budgetary restraints. They believe that all that is needed on the international scene is an increase in foreign aid appropriations and in the military budget. They reason that if the underfed, underdeveloped third of the world witnesses a dramatic rise in its economic well-being, it will look up to America for much as the deprived in the Depression looked up to the

to American men as the deprived in the Depression looked up to the
nesses a dramatic rise in the economic well-being, it will feel no
reason that it the unerited, underdeveloped third of the world wit-
nesses in foreign aid appropriations and in the military budget. They
believe that all that is needed on the international scene is an im-
tlement of Eiispower was in the field of propaganda restrictions. The
the benefit itself. Many of the critics have measured that the real
have been overlooked that much of the criticism was an irrelevant as
advantage. During the inappropriateness of the Eiispower Administration it
the horowability of Kennedy and, above all, with that of the increase
international situation to be extremely probable is connected with

The second reason why I believe a deterioration of the in-
pediment of course. But an accelerated tempo of critics seems inevitable.
that it we do not take them seriously. Not all these cringe next
beyond Kruschev and Mao have placed at it inhoopoe and it is our
next decade, the committes would act as their own United Nations--
timely. I would not be surprised if someone over the

ear to achieve domination over them in the same terms control.
into demand, particularly after a year or two of background area, and to
the Soviet Greyness to transform their classless brotherhood brood-
hood is already seemingly wide-above. I would also expect
continuation of the Cold War. Among intellectuals this kind of

Honorsapie Nelson V. Rocketteller -3- November 18, 1960

Bureaus and Confidential

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Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -10- November 18, 1960

New Deal. They identify "flexibility" with wooing the uncommitted and believe that these can somehow be brought to our side. They assume that we must strengthen Khrushchev--who is thought to be a liberal--against his domestic foes.

All these assumptions seem to me highly dubious. The New Deal was carried out in a society whose political framework was highly stable. The threat was social and economic discontent. By removing the disparity between aspiration and reality the underlying political unity could reassert itself.

But political structure is exactly what is lacking in the contemporary world. To bring it about is a slow task and until it comes into existence upheavals are extremely likely. Nor can it be achieved by purely economic means. Indeed, the most generous programs will be ineffective as long as it is believed that we have no other choice. In present circumstances even our most generous actions may be interpreted as weakness, our most moderate policies as imposed on us by events. Before economic measures can be effective we may have to undertake some difficult and lonely actions--and without them these programs cannot succeed. Kennedy, in so far as I can judge, is surrounded by people who grossly underestimate the gravity of our situation. In arms control, on European policy, in negotiations with the Soviets, they may undertake reckless experiments.

To repeat, in the best of circumstances the international

Personal and Confidential

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -11- November 18, 1960

situation is likely to deteriorate. But your role, it seems to me,
will be the same: to act as the conscience of the nation, to warn
even when it is unpopular; to be clear and forceful and unequivocal.
Of course, the trends I describe may not materialize in the first
term of a new Administration. But you should be available should
a crisis come and build up your moral credit for that eventuality.

In these conditions I can foresee two possibilities: your
nomination in 1964 or your appointment to a Cabinet of national unity
when the gravity of our situation becomes widely apparent.

IV. The Obstacles to Getting the Nomination.

It would be idle to deny the obstacles in the way of your
nomination. The election did not finish Nixon as a force in the
Republican Party. It did not bring about a clear mandate for a more
liberal Republican policy. It has done nothing to reduce the hostility
of the regular party organization to you--in fact, it may have magni-
fied it. Your own position in the state is still not solid. The
Republican organization of the state of New York does not seem to
me to be under firm control. The public does not fully understand
how outstanding your work as Governor has been. On the contrary,
there may be an impression of excessive absenteeism.

there may be an impression of excessive apportionment.

Plan outstanding your work as Governor has been done. On the contrary, me to be under firm control. The public does not fully understand Republican organization at the state of New York does not seem to tie it. Your own position in the state is still not solid. The of the regular party organization to you--in fact, it may prove most-favorable Republican policy. It has done nothing to reduce the possibility Republican party. It did not print about a clear mandate for a more nomination. The election did not limit Nixon as a force in the It would be idle to deny the obstacles in the way of him.

## IV. The Obstacles to Getting the Nomination

upon the gravity of our situation becomes widely apparent. Nomination in 1964 or your appointment to a Cabinet of national rank In these conditions I can foresee two possibilities: your a state come and build up your moral credit for that eventuality. Term of a new Administration. But you should be available should Of course, the trend I describe may not materialize in the future even upon it to be successful; to be clear and forceful and unambiguous. Will be the same: to act as the conscience of the nation, to work situation is likely to deteriorate. But your role, it seems to me,

Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller -11- November 13, 1960

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Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -12-- November 18, 1960

This is all the more extraordinary because the criti-
cisms made of you are absolutely contrary to the record. Your
record as Governor has been superb--the failure is not your achieve-
ment but the inability to communicate it. Your "absenteeism" need
never have become an issue if public relations had been more skill-
fully handled or if your top staff, personal or state, had "circulated"
more widely and acted more explicitly. You campaigned hard, but for
a combination of reasons you have not received the credit that you
deserve. In fact, I have heard violent criticism about your role
in the campaign even from people who wish you well.

The reason for this state of affairs seems to me a lack
of cohesion in your organization structure and the absence of a clear
sense of direction within your staff. I have been uneasy for many
months about what appears to me frantic activity concentrated on
very short-term objectives. Neither during your trips around the
country in 1959, nor in the interval afterwards, nor during the cam-
paign did I have the impression that there existed a clear plan or
concept according to which success or failure could be determined.
Tactics have predominated over strategy. Immediate impact has been
sought at the expense of long-term goals. The result has been a draining
of your energies and a considerable amount of lost motion. Above all,
there has emerged either a completely confused public image of you or

where he emerged either a completely bankrupt figure or of his own energies and a considerable amount of lost motion. Up to this time, caught at the expense of long-term goals. The result has been a continuing fluctuation have predominated over strategy. Immediately after he passed concept according to which success or failure could be determined. But he did have the impression that these existed a clear plan or country in 1929, nor in the interval attendance, nor during the early short-term objectives. Neither during his trip around the months apart was there any indication concentrated on sense of direction whatsoever. Still, I have been mostly for much of cooperation in your organization structure and the absence of a clear

The reason for this state of affairs seems to me a lack in the campaign even from people who know how well. reserve. In fact, I have heard violent criticism about how role a combination of reasons you have not received the credit that you more widely and acted more explicitly. You combined hard, put for fully handled or in your job staff, personnel or else, put "circumstanced reasons have become as issue in public relations put been more skill- must put the inability to communicate it. Your "encouragement need record as Governor has been under--the failure is not your responsibility made of you are especially contrary to the record. Your

Type is all the more extraordinarily because the exist-

-12--

November 18, 1929

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Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -13- November 18, 1960

one which is completely contrary to your real qualities.

I will now turn to this problem in greater detail.

## V. Problems of Organization.

For purposes of discussion, it may be useful to divide your organization into three general groups. These distinctions are to some extent arbitrary, but they may serve to illustrate some of the problems and also suggest measures of utilizing the special abilities of your staff to best advantage.

These three groups are: (a) Individuals who have been with your family for many years; (b) Individuals hired in the recent past as your public activities have expanded; (c) Individuals charged with primarily political tasks.

Since what follows may seem somewhat negative, I would like to say now that I have never seen a more dedicated group and that their ability is beyond dispute. The problems arise with the present mode of utilizing them given their varying backgrounds. With that qualification, let me now turn to the problems of each group:

(a) The people who have been with your family for many years are marvelous human beings. They are still the mainstays of your organization. With a few exceptions they find themselves, however, in a situation quite different from the one for which their experience had prepared them. Most of them had seen one of their

perception had broached thus. Most of them had seen one or the other, in a situation quite different from the one for which their entire organization. With a few exceptions they find themselves, perhaps are marvelling human beings. They are still the same as that identification, let us now turn to the problems of each group:

(a) The people who have been with them family for many years. (b) The people who have been with them family for many years. (c) The people who have been with them family for many years. (d) The people who have been with them family for many years. (e) The people who have been with them family for many years.

Since that follows we seem somewhat negative. I would

with primarily biological tasks.
but at their basic activities have expanded; (c) individuals charged with their family for many years; (d) individuals fixed in the recent years since groups are: (a) individuals who have been subject privileges of their staff to past advantages.

some of the problems and also affect measures of utilizing the same to some extent expirably, put them and serve to illustrate their organization into three general groups. These distributions for groups of discussions, it may be useful to divide

A. Problems of Organization.

I will now turn to some problems in greater detail.

one which is completely contrary to their real interests.

Honorable Nelson V. Rockeleifer -13- November 18, 1960

Personnel and Confidential

[Y]

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November 18, 1960

primary duties to be protective. Their habit is to prevent things
from happening. They have a tendency to be cautious and analytical.
Moreover, most of their expertise has been in fields other than the
political. Thus in the area which is now your primary concern they
lack the competence, the assurance and the imagination to make the
same contribution that they do to the affairs of your family. I
say this not as a criticism--only to indicate that the balance wheel
on which you have relied in the past is now only one part of the
whole and has lost some of its effectiveness.

(b) The second group of the staff is in many ways the most troublesome. They have not been exposed to the spirit and dedication of your family sufficiently long. They lack the discipline of the professional politicians. I do not doubt either their sincerity or their devotion. But by temperament or background they are more used to thinking in terms of tactical expedients than of over-all strategy; more to pushing their immediate views than relating them to an over-all program. Their style is not your style. They can be useful but unless strongly controlled they create a frenetic atmosphere and fail to bring about coherent actions.

(c) The professional politicians have the opposite problem.
To them quite clearly you are measured in terms of vote-getting abil-
ity. Their horizons are limited by the risks of a difficult profession.

ity. Their portrays are limited by the risks of a difficult profession.
To them duties clearly you are measured in terms of vote-getting electi-

(c) The professional politicians have the objective problem.

to bring spontaneous actions.
unless strongly controlled they create a treaetic atmosphere and fail
all program. Their style is not your style. They can be useful put
more to helping their immediate aims than relating them to an over-
to thinking in terms of tactical expedients than of overall strategy;
their devotion. But by temperament or background they are more need
professional politicians. I do not doubt either their sincerity or
of your family sufficiently high. They lack the discipline of the
troublesome. They have not been exposed to the spirit and dedication
(p) The second group of the staff is in many ways the most
amateur and has lost some of its effectiveness.
on which you have relied in the past is now only one part of the
only due not as a criticism--only to indicate that the balance when
some contribution that they do to the affairs of your family. I
lack the competence, the assurance and the imagination to make the
political. True in the area which is now your primary concern they
Moreover, most of their expertise has been in fields other than the
from programming. They have a tendency to be cautious and analytical,
primary duties to be protective. Their diet is to prevent things

November 18, 1960

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November 18, 1960

They have experienced too many upheavals to form permanent loyalties. They are experts at projecting familiar trends. They suffer from an excess of caution. They want you to prevail in the "normal" way--the only way they know and the one most inconsistent with your special qualities. They require discipline, organization, and someone to assume the responsibility for setting the goals. They are handicapped by the fact that few of them has had experience on the national scene. They are highly competent in a narrowly circumscribed area. Their effectiveness depends on how well they are related to other parts of your activities.

None of this is bad in itself. Indeed, if the over-all organization were more effective, the short-comings of each of these groups would cancel each other out and their assets could be mutually reinforcing. The real difficulty is posed by the fact that there exists no real focal point for coordination short of yourself.

This has several unfortunate consequences. I constantly hear complaints about your inaccessibility or about chaotic administrative arrangements when you travel. This was particularly true during your trips around the country last year. The merit of these complaints is not at issue. They would be less strident if there existed an individual or a group of them clearly entitled to speak for you and charged with coordinating technical arrangements.

Let me give another illustration. You are an extremely

Let me give another illustration. You are an extremely
fort you and charged with coordinating technical arrangements.

existed an individual or a group of them clearly entitled to them
complaints is not at issue. They would be less strict about it there
during your trip around the country last year. The merit of these
attitude arrangements when you travel. This was particularly true
near complaints about your inaccessibility or about chaotic admin-
istration has several unfortunate consequences. ICOMMUNICATE
entails no real local being for coordination apart of himself.

reinforcing. The real difficulty is based on the fact that there
bonds would cancel each other out and their assets could be mutually
organized were more effective, the shortcoming of each of these
none of this is bad in itself. Indeed, it the over-all
related to other bases of your activities.

described areas. Their effectiveness depends on how well they are
the national scene. They are highly competent in a narrow cir-
come to assume the responsibility for setting the tone. They
special duties. They require discipline, organization, and
way--the only way they know and the one most inconsistent with your
an excess of caution. They want you to prevail in the "normal"
They are experts at projecting familiar trends. They differ from
They have experienced too many upturns to form permanent loyalties.

Honorable Nelson V. Rockettler

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November 19, 1960

## Personal and Confidential

Y

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Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -16- November 18, 1960

strong personality. You therefore find it next to impossible to
get advice which is contrary to what your staff thinks you want.
Since the members of your staff are so deeply devoted to you, they
are of necessity desperately eager to gain your approbation. And
they tend to seek this in a rather short-term manner.

Tactics to enhance your immediate public reception are
accordingly overstressed. Momentum tends to be confused with pur-
pose. You, in turn, are put in an impossible position. For reasons
of morale you cannot reject every suggestion made to you and in the
absence of a planning staff or screening device, you lack an alter-
native proposal in any case. You are thereby often driven to accept
a part of the program suggested. This creates an optical illusion.
What may seem like moderation from the perspective of your office may
appear to outsiders quite differently.

Thus, during the period of your 'speaking out' last June,
a statement was issued almost as often as some of your advisors
could get to you. I agreed with the substance of these statements.
Yet their mass gave an impression of a frantic quest for headlines.
Two major pronouncements, sober in tone, solemn yet not sentimental
in content, would have been much more effective. But there was no
mechanism by which these considerations could be placed before you.

The recent campaign illustrates this also. You are undoubtedly
aware of the widespread criticism of your role, however unjust. I

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November 18, 1960

understand the difficulties posed for you by the kind of campaign
Nixon chose to wage. It clearly ran counter to your deepest con-
victions. It is also true that your speeches are generally more
effective with independents than with rabid Republicans.

The question remains whether the middle of a Presidential
campaign was the best time to make an issue. Was adequate consider-
ation given to the impact of the campaign on your posture after-
wards? Was a sufficient effort made to commit the Nixon people
to your campaign and thereby avoid the attacks now taking place--
particularly after it appeared likely that the Republicans would
not carry New York state? Above all, why has there been a failure
on the part of the public to understand that you in fact did work
yourself to the point of exhaustion?

Let me sum up the present shortcomings:

(a) There is no focus of authority below you. This forces
you into arbitrating <u>all</u> disputes between your advisors. On the one
hand, it makes it very difficult for you to adopt courses of action
different from those that come up to you. You can accept or reject
a given proposal. But you cannot insist on a sense of proportion or
force a sustained consideration of alternative courses.

Equally importantly, it imposes a physical and psychological
burden on you which no man can sustain indefinitely. The job to be
done is too big for one person. One man can inspire, encourage and
lead. He cannot in addition take the responsibility for seeing that

He cannot in addition take the responsibility for seeing that does it too pig for one hereon. One man can inure, encourage and purport on him which no man can sustain indefinitely. The loop to be exactly unbigotry, it induces a biobent and baphological force a sustained consideration of alternative courses.

a given brocade. But him cannot instat on a sense of prohibition or different from those that come up to him. You can accept or reject him, it makes it very difficult for him to accept course of action into arbitrating all diabetes between him advisors. On the one (a) there is no scope of authority below you. This forces let us am up the present positcomings:

yourself to the point of exsuation?
on the part of the people to understand that you in fact did work not carry New York state! Vpove all, why put there been a failure particularly after it abhorred likely that the Republicans would to your campaign and thereby avoid the attack now taking place--wants? We a sufficient effort made to commit the Nixon beadle action given to the effect of the campaign on your beadle after-campaign was the past time to make an issue. We adequate consider-
The decision remains whether the middle of a Presidential effective with independence than with rapid Republicans.

It is also true that your abodes are generally more Nixon chose to wage. It clearly ran counter to your greatest con-
understand the difficulties based for how he put the mind of campaign

Honorable Nelson V. Bochelleff

November 18, 1960

Reasons and Confidentiel

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November 18, 1960

his inspiration, courage and vitality seep down to the roots of
the organization where it is essential. By trying to do too much,
all of your greatest qualities tend to be watered down.

(b) There exists no mechanism for developing long-range coherent plans with respect to either substance or to procedure. During your trips around the country in 1959 it was hard to obtain a description of the sequence of events which might lead to your nomination. During your subsequent period of withdrawal many of your advisors said that all was not yet lost. But never, despite many attempts, could I obtain a satisfactory explanation of just what this phrase meant and how you might do something else than simply wait for something to turn up. During the period of your speaking out there was poor advance preparation for your statements and a totally inadequate follow-up. During the campaign the opposite of what you intended was achieved.

Throughout one has a feeling of activities unrelated to plan or concept. I recall last June that the same group of advisors who on a Tuesday morning urged you to announce your candidacy were pressing you on Sunday afternoon to state on 'Meet the Press' that you were not a candidate under any circumstances. These fluctuations indicate an absence of long-range thinking.

Similar comments can be made about substance. My experience with you has been that you have been masterful whenever you were in full control of your subject. On government organization, civil defense, social programs, no one can listen to you without failing to be moved by your conviction and your authority.

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November 18, 1960

In other areas, however, the same assurance has been lacking. Though I agree strongly with the Confederation proposal, you would have been even more effective had it been based on the same kind of advance work as your civil defense program or, for that matter, as the Confederation scheme has since received. I am partly responsible for this and I mention it only to indicate that strengthening the substance of your program must be one of our major goals.

(c) There exists no adequate administrative coordination. Each separate group carries out its functions with only a minimum of awareness of what the other groups are doing. They are brought together usually only under the pressure of a deadline when sober consideration has grown next to impossible. At the same time, there seems to me to be lacking a mechanism for following up on decisions taken to make sure they are phased into each other.

(d) Your public relations set-up, for all its size, is deficient. The image of absenteeism seems to me to have been wholly avoidable. The inadequate awareness of your record as Governor seems to me unnecessary. The lack of public understanding of your effort in the campaign should have been prevented.

There are other problems but I want to keep this memorandum within bounds.

Tremendous within pounds.

There are other problems put I want to read these memos-
in the campaign ahead. Pave been prevented.

To me unnecessary. The lack of haptic understanding of your effort
available. The inadequate awareness of your record to the Governor seems
delicious. The image of upstanding aspect to me to have been wholly

(d) Your haptic relations east-north, for all its size, is
decalsate taken to make sure they are placed into each other.

There seems to me to be lacking a mechanism for following up on
consideration past from north to south. At the same time,
together usually only under the pressure of a deadline again to put
of awareness of what the other Groome are doing. They are brought
up to separate Groome carries out its functions with only a minimum

(c) There exists no adequate substitutive coordination.

Our major goal.

That strengthening of the awareness of your program must be one of
an entirely responsible effort and I want it only to indicate
that matter, as the Confederation scope has already received. I
know kind of advance work at your civil defense program or, for
you would have been even more effective had it been passed on the
facking. Though I agree strongly with the Confederation program,
In outer areas, however, the same assurance per person

Honorable Wilson V. Heekelley

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November 18, 1960

Personnel and Contributions!

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November 18, 1960

VI. Organizational Suggestions.

If the above analysis is correct, a major reorganization
of your staff seems necessary. Accordingly, I recommend:

(a) The immediate appointment of an administrative offi-
cer who acts as your Chief of Staff. He should be responsible for
following up decisions that are taken. He should screen requests
that come to you. He should relieve you of the burden of rejecting
proposals which are clearly not meritorious.

(b) The creation of a group of intimate advisors who would act as a kind of policy planning staff. This group should have one man largely responsible for your political relationships in the nation, a man responsible for your substantive positions, a public relations advisor, the administrative officer described under (a) above, and perhaps somebody responsible for political organization in the state. (George Hinman?)

This group should immediately set about charting your
course for the next four years. Specifically they should formulate
concepts regarding the public functions that your appointment
officer should encourage, the relationship between state and
national activities and the theme of your pronouncements. This
plan should include a rather concrete scheme for getting the nomi-
nation in 1964. Things may work out differently, of course. But
each key member of your organization ought to have some yardsticks,

[Y]

Personal and Confidential

I am no expert in this field. It seems to me, however, that
civil

He should get to know the leaders still over the country and work with
the Labor parties. He should not be responsible for any strike or
create a national organization. This man should have no other

die for Roosevelt, Roosevelt for DeWald, Robert Kennedy for Die Procter:
Somebody should be appointed immediately who does for him what he does.
(c) A reorganization of labor political act-m is required.

success.

ample how to contact fundamentals in 1964 with a maximum chance of
tor continuity, to print pressure on the relevant organization and to
give him a platform for which to contend. Organization is required
make certain that labor持久attitudes are authoritative and to
organization cannot be overestimated. The former is important to
The importance of authoritative preparation and political
charged with this area and the same is true in the political field.
superannuation without trial consideration and clearance by the union
politics for one area of labor activities. Nothing should be said

(c) Each member of this group should have primarily respondent-
once a month to determine progress.

Broome. The local planning group should meet with him at least
once a month to decide how, should serve as a guideline to all
by which to gauge appreciation of how goals are being achieved. The

Honorable Melvin V. Rockeeller - 31- November 18, 1960

Personnel and Contingents

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November 18, 1960

## VII. Strategy Suggestions.

I. The need to control the New York state machine.

recourse to:

recruiting simultaneously, some of which are not going to be easy to
but it is important to recognize that these are several goals to be
of your national future. Still you have overcome worse obstacles.

(a) It would be useful to figure out the obstacles in the way

## VII. Strategy Considerations.

(b) When immediate reorganization of your public relations
not nearly as effective an instrument as it should be.

unaffected here. But the State Republican organization seems to me
reorganize the state political organization. I have little to

At the same time, a determined effort should be made to
the one Kennedy tied within the Democratic party.

over his direct competitors. Your task is this: reach out to
the traditional politicians, whom in my judgment you can never win
manner. You will be able in 1964 to create sufficient pressure on
batterer people to take an interest in Republican politics. In this
mobilize the rank-and-file, above all, to induce some of the
you have an enormous abhor to harm people. You must be found to

Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller -33- November 19, 1960

November 19, 1960

## Letters and Correspondence

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November 18, 1960

It is essential to maintain and extend your record of legislative accomplishments. It would seem to me very important to make sure before the legislative session starts which of your programs have a chance of being adopted and to concentrate on these. Too many defeats in the legislature weaken your image and destroy the cohesiveness of the party.

be taken.

c) dangerous, a statement setting forth the major considerations should trends in distant conferences or on negotiations over Berlin and particularly in the foreign policy field. Thus, it has been stated that the foreign policy field of the United States, in general, is a field of discussion, preferably from Vichy, on matters of crucial importance, a minimum over the next two years. However, he should make

(c) pronouncements on national issues should be kept to a minimum.

To one who understands the legislative means both trade and treaty programs have a chance of being achieved and to concentrate on these, to make sure before the legislative session starts which of their legislative accomplishments. It would seem to me very important that it is essential to maintain and extend his record of featuring state accomplishments and hour record as Governor.

Your state. This means that much more attention must be given to (p) the primary goal must be to solidify himself in New York state on these.

4. The need to maintain his position of competence in foreign policy and defense must be of prime importance to the leadership of a national leader.

Hobsonville Nelson V. Boeckeler - 33- November 18, 1960

## Personal and Confidential

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November 18, 1960

Despite the need for getting control of the state this
is essential to establish a record of having warned about the dangers
ahead. These statements should be reserved only for critical occurrences.
They should not be a commentary on all national issues. Rather you
should be in the position of speaking out only when the gravity of
the situation does not permit you to be silent. In my judgment you
could build up a really significant record in this manner by 1964.

["Baptic philosophy. As alternative to do so at the Godwin features\nobliquity of the previously un-related ditties to fall out here.", "(c) Early in the new Administration you should use the\nblogger.", "Pretending started last year in your message with 'Blogger' Cates' and\nthe main issue involved. It turns out we should expand the informal\ncontract and encroach on views with individual leavers or Groome on\nIt will also be necessary to develop' on an informal basis,\nof your blogions.", "Enjoine to comment, to criticise and to participate in the termination\nbe but before you at regular intervals in a manner that gives you a\nby your research staff. The conclusions of your research from most\nthe measure of deadliness. This will reduce not only major effort\nat issues is essential. It is advisable to improve blogions under", "(d) A systematic effort to keep up to date on major nation-\ncould build up a result significant record in this manner by 1964.\nthe situation does not permit you to be strict. In my judgment you\nshould be in the position of checking out only when the gravity of\nthat should not be a commentary on all national issues. Further, how\nshould not be a commentary on

Personal and Confidential

about which I spoke to you. My temptation would be to call them
a program for dynamic conservation. You may be reluctant to call
yourself a Conservative. But as a Republican this seems to me
unavoidable and the attempt to escape the label will let Goldwater
monopolize the term.

The theme might be that we face two extremes: one, an
economic theory which believes that _all_ problems are soluble by
purely economic means; the other, a form of welfare state in which
the bureaucracy becomes an end in itself. A dynamic conservatism
would oppose both tendencies of reducing man to a manipulable quality.
It would attempt to enhance the dignity of the individual against
the forces of both unbridled economics and stifling bureaucracy.

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November 18, 1960

VIII. Conclusion.

of America.

in the face of an operation with tactics and to librate the idealism
real challenge speech: to inspire the nation, to maintain value

The purpose of this memorandum is to free you for the
act which, properly organized, can become increasingly effective.
should not occlude the real assets: a dedicated, loyal and able
process have become apparent over the past two years. What I said
by seeking to improve the organization and to remedy whatever was
I have done so because in the months ahead we can be most helpful
Much of what I have written has been background critical.

VIII. Conclusion.

be need to keep yourself informed.
on foreign and defense policy. This will require that the interim
state. Starting in 1963 you should get up your brochures
foreign leaders. In 1962 you cannot get out of course leave New York
apart of international issues and to maintain contacts with
older a quick trip to Europe and perhaps Austria to keep yourself
(c) Write the legislative statement in 1961 you might con-

November 18, 1960

- 36 -

Personal and Confidential

I. U Thant's philosophy of foreign policy

U Thant was elected Secretary General of the United Nations because, as a "neutral" he represented the only type of candidate who would not be opposed by either the West or the Communist bloc powers. In the time that he has been in office U Thant has demonstrated, in both his actions and his public statements, that "neutralism" in the United Nations does not always represent what the West would consider to be genuinely "neutral."

U Thant showed his form of neutralism in his handling of both the Dutch-Indonesian dispute in New Guinea, and his recent trip to Havana to arrange for international inspection to verify the removal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba. More recently he made a major speech at Johns Hopkins in early December where he stated quite fully and frankly his views of the world affairs. His statement there is an indication as to what may have led him to act as he did in the earlier situations.

A. U Thant's speech at Johns Hopkins, December 2, 1962

1. East-West relations

At the heart of U Thant's speech is a highly controversial analysis of East-West relations.

a. He deliberately evades allocating responsibility for the Cold War and considers its only as a "fact";

- By inference he groups both the U.S. and the Soviet Union as equally responsible for world tension; "there are two Great Powers, neither wanting war, but each so apprehensive of the other that they must possess greater military might. Hence the frantic nuclear arms race."

b. He believes that the advent of Khrushchev has brought about a change of political climate in the Soviet Union, and that the West does not seem to appreciate the full significance of this "obvious change." "We have very good reasons to believe that (Khrushchev) does not want war."

c. He believes that some of the outstanding Cold War issues may now be solved on the basis of compromise and the principle of give-and-take on both sides, the spirit which, he states, characterized the discussion between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the case of Cuba.

[y]

- 4 -

General use his good offices (1) to exhort Indonesia to refrain from aggressive action, and (2) to send observers to the territory.

U Thant rejected both requests, on the ground that to grant them would "imply that I was taking sides in the controversy." He could not send observers, he said, unless "both governments" requested it. Later, it might be "appropriate" to appeal to both to "refrain from all aggression."

Thus the Dutch and Indonesians were bracketed as aggressors, and U Thant refused on legalistic grounds to arrange for U.N. observers to determine the facts of the situation without the consent of both parties, including the aggressor. (Krock, NYT, 12/6/62).

- 6 -

and withdrawal of Belgian technicians, and culminating
in a boycott of Katanga's copper, cobalt and other
minerals by UN members. If these measures did not lead
to Tshombe's agreement, governments were to "consult
with each other and with the UN on other measures that
could be taken."

B. The US has strongly supported both parts of U Thant's plan; however Britain, France, and Belgium served notice that they would not comply with a boycott. This complicated the situation because, without their support, a boycott would be almost powerless.

- France is the second largest purchaser of Katangese copper;

- Belgium is the largest buyer of all minerals;

- Although Britain buys very little, British holdings in Katanga's Union Minière are so large that British participation is essential if the boycott is to work.

US representatives made many visits to the three countries trying to persuade their governments to agree to a boycott. In the fall, Belgium relented and agreed to join the US and West Germany on two conditions: (1) if it could be established that the deadlock was Tshombe's fault and (2) if there were reasons to believe that the boycott would work despite the non-participation of Britain and France, who still held their original positions.

- 7 -

C. Pressure on Tshombe.

U Thant had not originally submitted the plan as an ultima-
tum; however, on November 7, 1962, when still no progress
had been made, he warned Tshombe that he had until November
15 to start implementing the plan before economic pressure
was brought to bear on Katanga. Since Tshombe did not act,
U Thant, in the beginning of December, initiated the following
measures, none of which appear to have been implemented thus
far:

1. He asked Belgium to freeze all foreign exchange earnings of the Union Minière, Katanga's largest, mining concern.

2. He called upon South Africa, Angola and British Rhodesia to refuse to "bootleg" Katanga minerals (i.e. ore on which customs duties have not been paid to the central government).

3. He asked 17 countries which are major customers of Katangese copper and cobalt to stop buying these minerals unless customs duties have been paid.

D. The U.S. Position

The US illustrated its support of the UN efforts in the
Congo in its announcement of additional military equipment
for the US force. The announcement was made after a talk
between Ambassador Stevenson and U Thant on December 18, 1962.

The US is sending a military mission to survey the needs of
the Congo force.

December 28, 1962

MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNOR

From: Henry A. Kissinger

Subject: Meeting with General Lauris Norstad

General Norstad is going to be returning to this
country in January. I have reason to believe that he is extremely
displeased with our NATO policy. It would seem to me a good idea
for you to invite him for luncheon or dinner simply to review the
situation. He might be a valuable supporter later on.

I know General Norstad well and would be glad to
act as an intermediary if you wish, since I will be seeing him
in any case on other matters.

MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNOR

December 28, 1963

From: Henry V. Kieinger

Subject: Meeting with General Lauris Moratad

General Moratad is going to be returning to the country in January. I have reason to believe that he is extremely displeased with our NATO policy. It would seem to me a good idea

I know General Moratad well and would be glad to act as an intermediary if you wish, since I will be seeing him situation. He might be a valuable subporter later on.

in any case on other matters.

December 28, 1962

MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNOR

From: Henry A. Kissinger

Subject: Meeting with Max Ascoli

Max Ascoli, whom you know, is a good friend of mine.

He is extremely disenchanted with the President and has on a number of occasions expressed a great desire to have a chat with you.

I think he might support you later on if he is
handled properly. Would you consider inviting him for luncheon
some time?

December 28, 1962

MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNOR

From: Henry A. Kissinger

Subject: Meeting with Frank Meyer

Frank Meyer, the Vice Chairman of the Conservative Party of New York and a contributing editor of *The National Review*, has been in general antagonistic to you. I know him well, and have been arguing with him about this. He agrees that foreign policy is one of the key issues before the country and has said that he would change his attitude towards you if you could ever convince him of your views. I believe that he basically agrees with your foreign policy views and simply does not know them well enough.

While the support of the Conservative Party does not mean much, Frank Meyer has a devoted following in *The National Review*, precisely among the conservative elements in the country. You might consider having him in for a half hour discussion at some point.