THE SUMMIT

LC

# The Dangers Ahead

The former secretary of state calls for ratification of the INF treaty, but warns against making deep cuts in our nuclear arsenal during the next round of arms talks

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

On the first day of the Gorbachev visit, I found myself at a Soviet Embassy reception for "public figures"—a term that seemed to cover everyone from rock stars and evangelists to professors and former cabinet officers. Circulating urbanly

through the ornate Victorian reception rooms, Gorbachev stopped to chat with me. It was necessary to change international relations, he said. Everybody would have to re-examine previous assumptions. He was counting on my contribution.

A little later, while addressing the entire assembly, Gorbachev again invited me to give him the benefit of my views about the future of international relations. With most of the audience in near rapture, I was reluctant to respond in the language of geopolitics. But had I done so, I would have said something like this: "Mr. General Secretary, the arms race is a symptom of tensions that go back at least 40 years and transcend personalities. I do not believe that peace is as easy to establish as a mood. A change of conduct is needed, an end to the tendency to exploit every dissatisfaction to weaken the existing structures. The United

States and the Soviet Union should see what kind of a world we want in the year 2000, and, if we agree, work back from there."

I was in Washington thanks to the courtesy of President and Mrs. Reagan, who invited me to all the public functions of the first day, including the state dinner. The mood of euphoria overwhelmed controversial subjects. The president did invoke human rights and regional conflicts, but one could not avoid the impression that these utterances were largely to placate restive right-wing critics. The old cold warrior was clearly preoccupied with nuclear disarmament. He also reflected a quintessential American dream: that history can be reversed by good will. As he told anecdotes deploring each society's ignorance of the other, he clearly yearned to show his guest the goodness of American life—and thereby alter the misconceptions that the president seems to believe cause Soviet intransigence. "A stranger is just a friend [you] have yet to meet," he said in his welcoming statement.

But Gorbachev is the representative of a system that prides itself on discerning "objective reality." He was in relentless pursuit of a strategic objective: to accelerate the loss of confidence in American strategic power, which throughout the postwar period has been the principal counterweight to Soviet conventional preponderance. His unvarying theme was that nuclear weapons must be abolished

in this century. Hence the INF agreement should be followed rapidly by a 50 percent reduction in strategic forces. And he advanced a very clever formula that would doom SDI by indirection, thus avoiding the need for formal approval by President Reagan.

I could sympathize with the near ecstasy of the American delegation as it culminated years of dedicated and able work. I had been there myself. And I recognized that President Reagan's persist

ence, both in strengthening America's defenses and in pushing SDI, had been instrumental in getting the Soviets to negotiate. But I could not shake a melancholy feeling as I watched the leaders of the country whose nuclear guarantee had protected free peoples for 40 years embrace Gorbachev's evocation of a nuclear-free world—a goal put forward, if with less pashache, by every Soviet leader since Stalin.

This most conservative of postwar presidents seemed bent on ending his term by dismantling the concepts and practices that have shaped Western strategy for four decades. During that time, American world leadership has been based on our ability to protect distant friends and to act as an engine of world economic growth. Now the summit was meeting at a time of economic crisis. And the end of the arms-control "process" being propa-

gated so enthusiastically at the summit may be to leave the United States with no meaningful nuclear option whatsoever.

I hope that the summit will not turn out to be "historic"—that overworked term—in that sense. But it might yet deserve that appellation if it becomes the occasion for the United States to cease evading its problems and to embrace the following agenda:

* The INF agreement, with all its failings, should be ratified. Failure to do so would wreck the Atlantic alliance.

* Any future reduction of strategic forces must be synchronized with a substantial reduction of Soviet conventional forces.

* Accepting the Soviet formula for SDI, or any variation of it, would doom the program of strategic defense.

* The Atlantic alliance must develop a realistic policy on both military strategy and arms control. This can no longer be accomplished by the United States alone. A "European identity" on defense matters should be encouraged.

* World peace requires urgent attention to regional conflicts—not simply those that have occurred already but those that will inevitably accompany the emerging transformation of the global balance of power.

* Foreign policy cannot be designed to "help" a foreign leader. Gorbachev has a right to insist on equitable agreements. But in the

Gorbachev greets Kissinger

BORIS YURCHENKO—AP

> **'We should see what kind of a world we want in the year 2000, and . . . work back from there'**

34 NEWSWEEK: DECEMBER 21, 1987

end relations must reflect mutual interests, not the fate of transitory personalities.

**INF and strategic forces:** I have repeatedly stated my concerns about the INF treaty. But it is pointless to dwell on objections to an accomplished fact. The very grave dangers of the accord would only be exacerbated by a refusal to ratify it. For now that the administration has declared the missiles dispensable, no European leader would permit them to remain simply because a Senate minority of more than a third refused to go along.

The Senate does, however, have a responsibility to generate a debate that brings out all the implications, strategic and political, of this accord and any further agreement. The nation must be obliged to face its real dilemma: the administration has not accompanied its buildup of U.S. military strength with a new strategic doctrine reflecting changed technological realities. It must not now dismantle what exists without putting something else in its place.

The administration is already suggesting that an agreement on reducing strategic warheads by 50 percent could be signed at a

Moscow summit in late spring. That would represent a fateful step. After the INF agreement, the nuclear defense of Europe rests almost entirely on nuclear weapons based in the continental United States or at sea. A 50 percent reduction would leave that strategy without military targets and hence reduce its credibility.

Numbers are boring but essential to understanding the danger. The advent of multiple-warhead missiles has brought about a situation in which, by definition, there are always more warheads than launchers. That disparity creates an inherent temptation for each side to attempt to destroy the other's arsenal before it can be launched.

As the accuracy of warheads increases, fixed land-based missiles become increasingly vulnerable. The Soviet Union has sought to reduce that vulnerability by making two of its new

missiles (the SS-24 and -25) mobile, while superhardening the sites of a third (the SS-18). Moreover, many Soviet land-based missiles have single warheads, which would allow them a larger number of launchers than we have under an overall ceiling. This is because under a START agreement we are likely to retire our 450 aged single-warhead Minuteman II missiles. All remaining American land-based missiles will have multiple warheads. And this vulnerability is magnified because they are all in fixed silos.

The proportion of warheads the Soviets can aim at each of these silos will, in fact, be increased from about 3 to 1 to at least 4 to 1. The United States would have a much less favorable ratio for attacking Soviet silos—something around 1 to 1, not nearly enough for a pre-emptive strike. The much advertised halving of Soviet heavy missiles is therefore irrelevant. The number of U.S. targets will shrink faster than the number of Soviet warheads or heavy missiles; the Soviet incentive to strike first will, if anything, increase.

The situation is even more worrisome with respect to submarine-launched missiles. At present, the United States has 36 missile-firing submarines, of which at least 25 are at sea at any moment. Under the projected agreement, the United States would possess 18 missile-carrying submarines. Of those, a maximum of 12 could be kept at sea at any one moment. Since fewer boats would be at sea, the

vulnerability of the submarine deterrent would be increased. The fact that the Soviet antisubmarine force will not be part of the agreement compounds the problem, especially if the Soviets achieve a technological breakthrough.

The projected agreement would leave civilian devastation as our only feasible deterrent strategy. This would either lack credibility, or in a crisis tempt a Soviet pre-emptive strike. What would be the operational significance of the nuclear guarantee to NATO under such circumstances?

The dilemma will become even more unmanageable if the administration persists in proclaiming a nuclear-free world as its final goal. The endless reiteration that the INF agreement is historic because it abolishes two entire categories of nuclear weapons is likely to backfire. Since these weapons represent only about 3 percent of the superpower arsenals, the "benefit" rests largely in setting a precedent for the abolition of all nuclear weapons.

Such a policy is as unachievable as it is undesirable. So many nuclear weapons have been produced by the superpowers, and their

territories are so vast, that the complete abolition of nuclear weapons would be utterly unverifiable. Each country would have to insist on retaining a number of weapons as a hedge against cheating and against the emergence of new nuclear powers. We would then be right back to all the existing dilemmas of nuclear deterrence, having in the process abandoned the conceptual underpinnings of the existing strategy.

Three conclusions follow:

* The 50 percent reduction in strategic forces must be synchronized with a major step in conventional disarmament. Abstract statements about proceeding with talks in that area will not do. The West must know before it weakens itself further in the nuclear field how the Soviets propose to deal with their conventional preponderance. If necessary, a provision could be inserted in the START agreement postponing its im-

plementation until there is specified progress toward conventional disarmament.

* A reduction in Soviet heavy missiles does not reduce the danger of a first strike. To contribute to strategic stability, a START agreement should eliminate the Soviet SS-18s altogether.

* The United States must step up deployment of the Midgetman single-warhead missile. Since it is also mobile, it would reduce the danger of surprise attack.

**The Strategic Defense Initiative:** The Reykjavik summit broke down because President Reagan refused to limit testing of SDI. He clearly has convinced the Soviet leadership that he is adamant on this subject. But they have come up with a formula brilliantly designed to achieve their objectives by indirection. They propose to extend the nonwithdrawal clause of the ABM agreement for 10 years. The United States has countered by offering seven years. A compromise is clearly in the cards. The Soviets also insist that the ABM treaty prohibits space testing of strategic defense components—an interpretation endorsed by a majority of the Senate. The combination of these propositions would doom SDI.

The summit communiqué defers the issue to later negotiations. But it is important that administration advocates of a negotiated testing regimen face facts. Either the United States is permitted to

Pershing missiles, West Germany

REGIS BOSSU—SYGMA

## Like ‘Goliath proposing to David an arms-control agreement to eliminate slingshots’

NEWSWEEK: DECEMBER 21, 1987 35

conduct tests during the moratorium that will enable it to develop deployable weapons at its end, or SDI is finished. The moratorium itself is a huge obstacle to SDI, since no moratorium has ever been abandoned by the United States. We are still observing both the SALT I and SALT II treaties. In a period of shrinking budgets, the military will surely lose its enthusiasm for a program that it can neither deploy nor test adequately. And there will be huge reluctance to risk the START reductions by abandoning SDI.

This is not the occasion to discuss the strategic merits of SDI. A serious debate has in fact never occurred. President Reagan weakened his case by presenting SDI as a means to achieve perfect defense against the entire Soviet arsenal. It was easy for opponents to punch holes in so extravagant a vision. In the process, a thoughtful examination has been neglected of some important intermediate options: defending ballistic-missile sites against major attack; defending the population against small-scale "terror attacks"; defending against third countries.

In drafting the START agreement, great care must be taken that

we do not slide by indirection into what the president has clearly refused explicitly. It would be a fateful decision to leave our population defenseless against a wide range of foreseeable dangers, while basing our strategy on the very weapons that produce this danger. The 50 percent reduction raises enough problems on its own. It must not be achieved at the cost of SDI.

**Conventional arms:** The Atlantic alliance must not, in the name of arms control, make the world safe for conventional war. Whenever a nuclear accord is in the offing, studies magically emerge "demonstrating" that conventional deterrence is feasible. But history is a more reliable guide than systems analysis. For millennia, conventional armies that on paper were evenly matched—and thus should have been deterred from fighting—went to war because their leaders drew different conclusions

from the same data. To be sure, NATO can do much more to improve its conventional defenses. But that is a far cry from relying on them for deterrence.

Yet reliance on conventional deterrence is exactly where advocates of a "nuclear-free zone" in Europe are seeking to take the alliance. In the aftermath of the INF agreement many influential Europeans, especially in West Germany, are calling for a third zero option—the removal of tactical missiles. Since the tactical weapons left in Germany are of a range able to reach only other German targets, such a reaction is understandable. For the alliance as a whole, however, it is bound to be disastrous. A nuclear-free zone logically implies the adoption of a "no first use" concept, because otherwise the zone would still be under nuclear threat from weapons outside. And once the alliance has proclaimed that it would not use nuclear weapons first, it is committed to accepting defeat with conventional weapons rather than escalating to nuclear war. The neutralization of Central Europe, the goal of Soviet policy for 40 years, will then be nearly complete.

The Soviet emphasis on nuclear disarmament is therefore understandable. What is less understandable is the West's acquiescence in a process that is equivalent to Goliath proposing an arms-control agreement to David that begins with the elimination of slingshots.

The Soviet leaders have thrown out vague hints of a readiness to explore "asymmetrical" reductions in the conventional field. But hints are not negotiating positions. A precise scheme is needed. When conventional-arms talks are at last joined, the West must keep in mind that the Soviets have two large advantages: a preponderance of force and shorter lines of communications. The former means that even unequal cuts may leave the Soviets with enough power to stretch NATO defensive forces to a point where a breakthrough becomes easier. (Rand Corporation studies indicate that reductions must be 5 to 1 in the West's favor to prevent this from happening.) Shorter lines of communication mean that any Soviet forces that are "withdrawn" could be pulled back a few hundred miles and be kept in a position to return rapidly. They would also be closer to other pressure points such as China or the Middle East. Therefore, any serious conventional-arms-control scheme would have to require the dismantling of those Soviet forces being reduced. And experience with German disarmament after World War I shows how complex designing an inspection system for that purpose can be.

**Arms-control doctrine:** When I was a young professor at Harvard in the '50s, a group of colleagues and I met almost every Saturday to analyze the implications of nuclear technology. Together with similar groups at other universities, we developed the new intellectual discipline of arms control. It was based on the premise that nuclear weapons were so destructive that for the first time in history, they made negotiated stability not only desirable but necessary.

Since then, arms control has developed a life of its own. It used to be argued that arms negotiations should be an essential complement to broader strategic and foreign policies. Today the tail comes close to wagging the dog. Now we are lucky if arms control leaves room for strategy and foreign policy.

The nature of the American domestic debate compounds the

problem. Philosophical opponents of arms control rarely state their real views—that the Soviets are inherently untrustworthy, or that détente saps the American will to resist. Instead, they emphasize buzzwords like "verification" or "reduction," without relating them to strategic theory or foreign policy.

Reagan's erstwhile paladins are being hoist with their own petard. For years they blocked arms control by invoking the need for real cuts and verification. Now they are being confronted with agreements that have these attributes but in the process erode the strategy of four decades.

Neither verification nor reduction are ends in themselves. Effective enforcement requires three elements: knowledge of a violation, a concept of how significant the violation is and some relevant preplanned counteraction. No doubt the inspection provisions for the INF treaty are intrusive—a significant and welcome precedent for future agreements. But they may also turn out to be irrelevant. Whatever Soviet violations they might uncover, the United States is in a poor position to respond. No European country—with the possible exception of Britain—would agree to a new deployment of American strategic missiles on its soil.

The situation is nearly as complex among the allies. For years too many European leaders have permitted President Reagan to be

With Britain's Margaret Thatcher

PRESS ASSOCIATION

> **'We have more to lose from European impotence than from a stronger European identity'**

36 NEWSWEEK: DECEMBER 21, 1987

pilloried as a bellicose cowboy—and themselves to be cast as
mediators between the superpowers. Now they cannot express
their uneasiness about the INF agreement without serious political
damage. In any event, they have no alternative theory.

The alliance as a whole has never had a coherent arms-control
policy. Whether Gorbachev planned it that way or fell into it as a
result of the vacuum in the West, the next steps in nuclear-arms
control are fraught with controversy at both ends of the nuclear
spectrum. The nuclear-free zone in Central Europe propagated
by some German leaders is opposed by us and most of our allies.
But the pressures in that direction will increase. At the same
time, after the 50 percent reduction is negotiated, a new presi-
dent will have nearly irresistible temptations to continue the
process. At that point, the Soviets are likely to insist that British
and French forces be counted as well. Whether we then choose to
take disproportionate cuts or press our allies to join the process,
arms control is in danger of turning into a Soviet weapon to split
the alliance rather than a tool to achieve stability.

**European identity:** A coherent strategy requires Europe to assume a greater responsibility for its own defense and foreign policy. For four decades U.S. "leadership" has been identified with prescriptions that originate in Washington and are later discussed with our allies. An elaborate consultative machinery has developed. But in the end, political decisions depend on the ability to assume operational responsibility. In the long run, it is demoralizing for a continent that has been looking after its own defense since the advent of the modern state system to abdicate this essential attribute of sovereignty. For the Europeans to contribute more seriously to defense and foreign-policy issues, they must establish a stronger identity in these matters. America has opposed such a development lest it encourage European separation from the United States. But in the end, alliances

are held together by shared interests, not by consultative
machinery.

I cannot imagine any security threat that would lead European leaders to conclude that they are better off without American support. Indeed, the defense field is precisely the area in which European and American interests are most congruent. Specifically, the United States should encourage attempts to revitalize the Western European Union as a forum for elaborating European defense and arms-control policies. We have more to lose from a sense of European impotence than from a stronger European identity.

**Regional conflicts:** Lip service continues to be paid to resolving regional conflicts, but there is no sense of urgency in this area. It has become ritualistic, like an opening prayer. Yet more tensions arise between the superpowers as a result of political conflicts where their interests intersect than as a result of weapons deployment. Almost all clashes in the postwar period have occurred at such points of intersection—Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, the Middle East. It is dangerous to emphasize symptoms while neglecting causes. And those conflicts of which we are aware are only the tip of the iceberg.

To look 15 years ahead is to see a radically different world. By

then, Japan will have considerably more military power. China will
be much stronger. India is likely to be the key country in South Asia,
and the Islamic world will have undergone a radical transforma-
tion. Some Latin American countries may have become world
powers. Europe may be either united or irrelevant.

These transformations cannot possibly occur without crises. And U.S.-Soviet relations will be a key element in maintaining the peace. There is no evidence that this incipient transformation in the global balance has received systematic attention within the U.S. government, let alone been discussed at a summit. Yet in the long run it will have more far-reaching implications than the technical issues that occupied the American and Soviet negotiating teams last week.

**Gorbachev's role:** The euphoria sweeping Washington was inspired less by Soviet policies than by Gorbachev's personality. He was greeted as though he were the *deus ex machina* to solve all the West's dilemmas—a communist leader who will bring peace and tranquillity without any real effort on the part of the free countries.

Business leaders and public fig-
ures were nearly abject in their
eagerness to celebrate a new
era, and reluctant even to imply
that grave issues remained to be
solved or that any relationship
might be established between
their investments and Soviet in-
ternational conduct.

But are these attitudes real-
istic? Do they in fact do justice
to the real choices facing the
Soviet leadership? Listening
to this obviously thoughtful,
seemingly open-minded gener-
al secretary, it is easy to forget
that he has emerged at the top
of what must be the toughest
competition in the world—one
in which nice guys finish last
and losers are rarely heard
from again. He has never wa-
vered from basic communist
doctrine. And how could he,
never having held any position
other than as a member of the
communist hierarchy?

Even assuming his inten-
tions are conciliatory, he can be

expected to go only so far by himself. Reality no doubt imposes at
least a respite on Soviet foreign adventurism, perhaps even an end
to it no matter who governs in Moscow. But Gorbachev, as any
prudent leader, is unlikely to court unnecessary domestic prob-
lems. He will not volunteer changes in political and strategic
arrangements that powerful factions within his bureaucracy
would find unpalatable. Obviously, he will push those programs
most advantageous to his own country. Nor can we blame him for
accepting proposals that should never have been made.

I do not know how Gorbachev would have reacted if approached in a less sentimental manner and presented with a comprehensive program that would reduce nuclear and conventional weapons simultaneously. Or how he would have responded to a serious attempt to discuss the U.S.-Soviet role in the world a decade or so ahead of us. I am convinced that he has the intelligence and imagination to make a significant and constructive response. And if he refused, we would at least understand the nature of the challenge better than we do now.

The failure to test Gorbachev seriously may be the great missed
opportunity of this summit. There is still time to restore a balance
to the East-West dialogue. But first we must recognize that Gorbac-
chev cannot save the West. We must do that ourselves.

Reagan and Gorbachev last week

WALLY MCNAMEE—NEWSWEEK

'The failure to test Gorbachev
may be the great missed
opportunity of the summit'

NEWSWEEK : DECEMBER 21, 1987

December 10, 1987

Due to the courtesy of President and Mrs. Reagan, I was enabled to participate in the first day's public functions of the Gorbachev visit to Washington from the arrival ceremony to the state dinner. And I was invited by the Soviet embassy to a reception by the General Secretary for what the Soviets call public figures which in the Soviet Union seems to embrace the gamut from rock stars to former cabinet members.

The mood of euphoria was overwhelming. It was moving to observe a President about to leave office in the twilight of his life seeking to fulfil the quintessentially American dream by way of a series of anecdotes: that history, whatever its record of Russian and Soviet expansionism, could be stopped by strenuous good will, that the principal obstacle to peace was the Soviet's ignorance of the goodness and quality of American life. "A stranger is a friend you have yet to meet" Reagan said in his welcoming statement.

One could not imagine Gorbachev, urbane, subtle, energetic

C Y J

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to utter such a thought. As much a product of his tradition that prides itself on seeing through "subjective" factors as personalities to the underlying "objective" reality, he was in obvious pursuit of a strategic objective: to accelerate the dismantling of the relevance of American strategic power. His principal theme was unvarying: nuclear weapons must be abolished in this century; the INF agreement to destroy medium and short range weapons must be followed in short order by a fifty percent reduction in strategic forces. He had also come prepared with an extremely clever formula whose practical consequence is to spell the end of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative without asking the President to sign its demise.

I could sympathize with the near ecstacy of the American delegation at the culmination of years of dedicated work. I had been there before. I was also very much impressed by Gorbachev -- so much more flexible in argument than the worn-out men who had preceded him. And yet, in the end, it is results which last. Moods are ephemeral.

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And in my day in Washington, I was seized by a melancholy
feeling that I might be watching the end of America's postwar
role in international affairs. The President, I am convinced,
will realize his goal to have made a difference in foreign
policy. This most conservative of all postwar Presidents will
have presided over a revolution in our strategic position and of
the concepts and practices that have shaped Western strategy and
alliance policy for four decades. For four decades it has been
assumed that nuclear weapons were needed to balance Soviet
conventional preponderence. That policy is in the process of
being abrogated whatever formal declarations to the contrary.
The Soviet strategy is clearly to complete most of that process
before reducing their conventional threat -- and conventional
arms control is in any event an intellectually difficult process
which has received inadequate conceptual discussion.

Whether that Reagan revolution can yet be turned into a
positive direction depends on whether America and its allies

are prepared to face the realities of the world they are in the
process of creating. These realities include:

a. The INF agreement has political and strategic implications which alter both political and military relationships within the alliance.

b. These difficulties cannot be cured by the failure of the Senate to ratify the treaty. Indeed non-ratification would compound American problems in Europe.

c. Remedies must be sought in developing urgently a new concept for both strategy and arms control policy for the Alliance as a whole.

d. In the absence of an agreed strategy, a fifty percent cut in America's strategic forces would compound the problems of the INF treaty. It must not be rushed in the last year of a lame duck administration.

e. The de facto abandonment of SDI is a decision of major magnitude requiring a national debate. A fifty percent cut

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in strategic forces is not an adequate quid pro quo.

f. Conventional disarmament must take place in tandem with nuclear disarmament or else the Soviets will lose all incentive for an equitable settlement. At a minimum, the West must see a concrete Soviet scheme so that it knows whether there is any reality to this prospect.

g. The United States must not forget that the world in the year 2000 will be radically different from today's. It must not be deflected from thinking about that future by becoming totally absorbed in the "bean counting" approach to foreign policy -- of balancing warheads and missiles while the political ground is shifting.

For the entire post war period, America provided world leadership because it offered military protection to distant countries with its military, largely nuclear might and economic growth with its dynamic industry. Both these pillars are in crisis simultaneously. Some of these changes.

were inevitable and American statesmanship should help guide this
change. But there is a difference between promoting evolution
and de facto abdication. An American abandonment of its historic
role -- albeit in new conditions -- would in time end all the
hopes so euphorically being celebrated in Washington this week.

## The INF Treaty

It is a largely symbolic gesture to satisfy those who believe that the reduction of nuclear arsenals is of such symbolic significance that it requires no analysis of its substance. The trouble is that the treaty's symbolism runs the wrong way. It does not reduce the nuclear threat for Europe because the Soviets will have a surfeit of nuclear weapons (even after a follow-on agreement) for that purpose. It does not reduce the nuclear threat against the United States because these weapons were always out of range of our country. It does eliminate the American capacity to retaliate against a Soviet attack on Europe from European soil.

EYD

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inform them in the end that a minority of the Senate (more than a third, but less than half) blocks implementation. It is certain that they would insist on the removal of the missiles the Administration has declared superfluous. We would then wind up with yet another agreement that is being implemented though not ratified, casting further doubt on America's seriousness in international affairs.

The Senate, then, must not undo the agreement. But it has a responsibility to engage in a debate that brings out all its implications, strategic and political. There is an overwhelming national need to face our real dilemma: the Administration did not accompany the important build-up of US military strength with insisting on the elaboration of a new strategic doctrine reflecting changed technological realities. It is now dismantling the only strategic doctrine that exists in the name of arms control. That process, if not arrested, will lead to disaster. The Senate should insist on an adequate

explanation of Western military strategy, not as a condition
of ratifying INF, but as a condition for proceeding with
follow on agreements.

The 50 percent Reduction of Strategic Forces. This is particularly important because the next phase of arms control has irrevocable consequences. Gorbachev and his skillful outsiders in Washington have skillfully managed to convey the idea that an agreement on reducing warheads by fifty percent is practically in the bag and they have dangled the prospect of a Moscow summit in early summer as its culmination. They have thrown in a clever formula for the de facto abolishing of the Strategic Defense Initiative. It is a fateful step that must not be rushed in the last year of a lame duck Administration. The INF agreement shifts the responsibility for the nuclear defense of Europe almost entirely to Washington and would require almost exclusively the use of nuclear weapons based in the continental United States or at sea. The projected fifty percent reduction -- unless drawn with an

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imagination beyond my comprehension -- help reduce the credibility
of our nuclear deterrent even further for any challenge short of
a direct nuclear attack on the United States.

Numbers are boring but essential to an understanding. The advent
of multiple warhead missiles has brought about a situation in which,
by definition, there are always more warheads than launchers.
Under such circumstances, there are always incentives for striking
first, destroying the enemies' arsenal before it can be launched
in retaliation. The potential victim seeks to overcome this
threat by mobility, hardening the target or -- perhaps -- by
strategic defense.

As the accuracy of warheads increases, fixed landbased
missiles become increasingly vulnerable. The Soviet Union has
sought to reduce this vulnerability by making two of its new
missiles (the SS24 and 25) mobile, while hardening the sites
of the third (the SS-18). One of these missiles -- the SS-25 --
has only a single warhead.

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For our part, all US landbased missiles are in fixed silos.
Hence a fifty percent reduction of warheads would not change the
disproportion in favor of the attacker. In fact, because all
<u>modern</u> US landbased missiles have multiple warheads, we are
certain to retire the 500 single-warhead Minuteman II missiles;
thereby reducing the number of aiming points the Soviets will
have to take <u>in</u> to account. Thus, the proportion of warheads the
Soviets can aim at our fixed missiles will be increased from about
three warheads per missile to about five warheads per missile.
But since so many Soviet landbased missiles are mobile and/or
single warhead (hence more numerous) the reverse equation does
not obtain. Indeed, the relevant proportion will be 1:1, not
nearly enough for a preemptive strike. The proposed reduction,
far from contributing to stability, would make the US landbased
missile force <u>more</u> vulnerable. This will be true even if the
Soviets reduce their heavy missiles by half; the US targets will

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shrink faster than Soviet warheads.

The situation is even more worrisome with respect to sub-
marine launched missiles. At present, the United States has
36 missile-firing submarines, of which at least 25 are at sea
at any moment. After an agreement, (depending on complicated
counting rules for warheads) the United States would possess
between 12-15 missile-carrying submarines, of which a maximum of ten
can be kept at sea at any one moment. Since the Soviet anti-sub-
marine force is not part of the agreement, the vulnerability of
the American submarine deterrent -- already increased because fewer
boats would be at sea -- could be further eroded in the event the Soviets
could achieve a technological breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare.

Depending on methods of calculation, these proportions might
be changed marginally, but not enough to alter the basic reality.

In summary, at the precise moment that the United States moves
the nuclear defense of the Atlantic Alliance substantially to
its own territory, it seems to be speeding an agreement that

[y]

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would leave civilian devastation as our only feasible deterrent strategy. This would be either incredible, or if believed, could tempt a Soviet preemptive attack for which their capability after arms control would far exceed ours. Whatever the euphoria that would greet such an outcome, a grave sobering up would inevitably follow. How would the United States defend Berlin in such circumstances? What is the operational significance of the nuclear guarantee to NATO? How will the Soviets interpret this state of affairs?

The dilemma will become unmanageable if the Administration and some of our allies persist in proclaiming the destruction of all nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal of their policy. The President, for example, never tires of emphasizing that the chief virtue of the INF agreement is that it abolishes two entire categories of nuclear weapons. But since these weapons represent only about three percent of the total, the "benefit" rests largely in setting a precedent for the eventual abolition of all nuclear

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weapons -- a goal often avowed by President Reagan and put into
concrete form by General Secretary Gorbachev. Such a declaratory
policy is inconsistent with the current strategy of the Western
Alliance; it also is as unachievable as it is undesirable. So
many nuclear weapons have been produced by the superpowers, and
their territories are so vast, that the complete abolition of
nuclear weapons would be utterly unverifiable. Each country
would have to insist on retaining a number of weapons as a hedge
against cheating and against the emergence of new nuclear powers.
We would then be right back to all the existing dilemmas of nuclear
deterrence.

The Strategic Defense Initiative

The treatment of the Strategic Defense Initiative compounds
the problem. The Reykjavik summit broke up because President Reagan
adamently refused to limit testing of his Strategic Defense
Initiative. He clearly has convinced the Soviet leadership that on
this subject he is adamant and that they will never get his

-15-

signature on an agreement to that effort. But they have come
up with a formula brilliantly designed to achieve their objective
by indirection. They propose to extend the non-withdrawal clause
of the existing ABM agreement for ten years. The United States
has countered by offering seven years. A compromise is clearly
in the cards, likely to be supplemented by another "compromise"
to the effect that the end of the moratorium period, another
negotiation would start about a new regimen for SDI.

These clauses have the practical consequences of killing
SDI -- or to put it kindly, postponing it indefinitely --
without requiring a Presidential signature to that effect.
Leaders owe it to their public to expose the implications of what
they are doing first to themselves, then to their publics.
They cannot afford to fool themselves and they will not retain
confidence if they fool their publics.

SDI cannot possibly survive these provisions. They require
a moratorium on deployment for two administrations and then it

-17-

SDI. A serious debate has in fact never occured. President Reagan who deserves enormous credit for putting forward the concept weakened his case by excessive claims. He presented SDI as a means to achieve perfect defense of the population against the total Soviet arsenal. It was easy for opponents to punch holes in so extravagant a vision -- especially as no new weapon in history would ever have been built had it been subjected to the test demanded by SDI opponents: demonstrating perfect feasibility before allocating further resources (at the same time proscribing testing) clearly a new weapons system cannot survive if it is prevented from evolutionary progress.

The absolution of the opposing camps has prevented a thoughtful examination of the real options: defense of ballistic missile sites against major attack; defense of the population against small scale "terror attacks"; defense of the population against third countries.

It is a fateful decision for a democratic society to proclaim that it will leave its population deliberately defenseless

-18-

against an entire range of foreseeable dangers while basing its
strategy on the very weapons that produce this danger. In
these conditions, pacificism and unilateral nuclear disarmament
sentiments seem nearly inevitable.

The behavior of our European allies towards SDI is nearly
incomprehensible. On the one hand they insist on the undiminished
importance of nuclear deterrence. Simultaneously, most of them
oppose SDI or urge the sort of "compromise" which will kill it.
For Britain and France, the reason may be to maintain the
deterrent threat of their small nuclear forces; for others the
principal motive may be to remove what Soviet diplomacy has
defined as "progress" towards arms control. Arms control and
strategy, in short, are on different, perhaps incompatible tracks.

## Strategic Controversies

The West is sliding into a situation where even what remains
of its nuclear capacity will become the subject of endless
controversy. It is clearly foreseeable that once the INF agreement
is ratified and as negotiations for major cuts in strategic

CJD

-19-

forces proceed the Atlantic Alliance will face major controversies
at both ends of the nuclear spectrum. Some German leaders --
in both government and opposition -- are already urging a third
zero option: the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from German
soil. Britain and the US -- for the moment at least -- are
adamently opposed, but there are French leaders who may prefer
to see Germany totally dependent on its allies in the nuclear
field. At any rate, as the implications of the INF decision
confining tactical nuclear war to German territory sink in,
pressures within Germany for the removal of those nuclear weapons
will multiply.

Should a fifty percent reduction be agreed upon during the
waning days of the Reagan Administration, a new US President will
be under great pressure to make another comparable step. At
that point, the Soviets will insist that British and French
forces be counted as well -- a maneuver that will either force
disproportionate American reductions in order to compensate

for British and French forces that remain untouched, or involve us in a bitter confrontation with our allies as we seek to force them to agree to reductions. The next step in arms control could, therefore, involve us in conflicts with each of our allies and of our allies with each other. And in the end, arms control would have brought neither political nor military stability.

## Conventional Disarmament

Is a purely conventional defense of Europe than the answer? The Atlantic Alliance should take great care not to make the world safe for conventional war. Whenever a nuclear accord is in the offing, studies appear magically "proving" that conventional deterrence is almost within sight. But history is a more reliable teacher than systems analysis. For millenia, conventional armies that on paper were evenly matched fought each other because the leaders of the warring parties drew difference conclusions from the same data. One lesson is

M

-21-

clear: numerical equality whether in men or equipment is not
enough for deterrence. All of history demonstrates that
victory in conventional conflict goes to him who best concentrates
his forces and most ably capitalizes on initial success derived
from that concentration. Mrs. Thatcher has understood the
dangers of the accord nearly agreed to at Rekjavik and now
being sold retail by a persistent and skillful Soviet diplomacy.
She insists on retaining a nuclear option, and on that point,
at least, she represents the consensus of the defenseminded in
Europe.

But with all her admirable leadership qualities, she will
face a daunting task until the Western alliance comes up with
some new and coherent concept. Those who advocate a nuclear-
free zone in Europe will be driven -- if they are not also
there -- to a no first use concept because otherwise weapons
from outside the area could be used to conduct a nuclear war
there. That no first use theory already has many impressive

-22-

backers. Its clear implication is however that the denuclearized
part of Europe will accept defeat with conventional weapons
rather than use nuclear weapons. The Finlandization of Central

Europe isn't an unjust term of art -- the goal of Soviet policy for
forty years will then be nearly complete.

It is therefore reckless to proceed with nuclear disarmament
beyond the INF treaty without first taking a step towards
conventional disarmament. Otherwise, we will find ourselves in
a process in which Goliath proposes an arms control agreement
to David which begins with the elimination of slingshots.

The Soviet leaders have thrown out vague hints of a
readiness to explore "asymmetrical" reductions in the conventional
field, hopefully a synonym for abandoning at least some of
their conventional preponderence. This must be reduced to a
precise scheme -- at least enough to give an indication of
their approach. Otherwise current negotiations will remain
inherently unequal because they focus on the weapons on which

C4J

(Newsweek, Dec. 11, 1987)

-23-

the West depends more than the Soviet Union.

## A Coherent Strategy

We must not make the mistake of ascribing all difficulties to a diabolic Soviet scheme. Most of our problems are in fact self-inflicted. The agreement reached and the negotiations in prospect largely grew out of Western proposals. It makes no sense to blame the Soviets for understanding Western political vulnerabilities better than we do. We will not overcome these problems until we develop a coherent strategy for both defense and arms control.

We have come to this pass because in too many Western countries arms control theory has developed a life of its own without an adequate relationship to security policy and domestic politics have taken precedence over the analysis of strategy.

When I was a young professor at Harvard in the Fifties, a group of colleagues and I met almost every Saturday to help

-24-

develop a concept to overcome the cataclysmic horrors of the
then new nuclear technology. Together with similar groups at
other universities we developed the new intellectual discipline
of arms control. It started from the premise that the nuclear
weapons were so destructive that they could not simply be
accumulated; that there was an upper limit of destructiveness
beyond which there could be no politically or humanly acceptable
military outcome. Hence, negotiated stability between adversaries
was for the first time in history, not only desirable, but
necessary. Arms control, we argued had to be built into the
strategy and foreign policy of especially adversaries.

Since then, arms control has developed a life of its
own. It used to be argued that it should be considered when
strategic and foreign policy decisions are made. Today,
it comes close to the tail wagging the dog. Arms control
has developed a life of its own. The United States is reluc-
tant to develop accurate large missiles and many oppose

-25-

strategic defense to maintain a concept of stability based on
the assumption that the permanent total vulnerability of civilian
populations is the principal obstacle to war.

My own view is that these theories are pushing valid
assumptions to extreme conclusions. But for present purposes,
it is enough to point out that they bear next to no relationship
to the strategy being enunciated or that they turn it into
mindlessness. Which political leader in the West will in the
end initiate civilian carnage for any foreseeable issue? How
do they propose to act militarily in East-West conflicts, not
to speak of Third World disputes with the military establishments
their arms controllers are so obsessively negotiating? Especially
since the solution of political conflicts is forever being
pushed into a distant future?

Arms control, in short, is in danger of turning into a
domestic political weapon. The slogan of the Fifties needs
reversal: It is to be hoped that arms control leaves room

-26-

for strategy and foreign policy. If they become too incom-
mensurable some disaster later on is inevitable. There are
no free lunches in foreign policy.

The nature of the American domestic debate compounds
the problem. Philosophical opponents of arms control rarely
state their real views which are often that agreements are
inherently untrustworthy or that detente saps the American
will to resist. Instead, they emphasized arcane arguments
on verification or slogans like verification.

These erstwhile friends of Reagan -- who tormented me
with their passion when I negotiated with the Soviets in the
70's -- are being hoist by their own petard. It would be
an occasion for my glee (what the Germans call Schadenfreude)
were the consequences not so potentially grave for the future
of the West. The conservatives' former paladin is delivering
to them what he promised: reductions and verification. But

-27-

since these slogans were rarely related to a strategic theory,
they lead to dangerous or irrelevant actions.

Dangerous, because as I have shown, reductions of nuclear
forces by themselves may increase the perils of free countries
-- especially if the Soviet conventional preponderence is not
dismantled.

And irrelevant because verification is not an end in itself.
Enforcement machinery for arms control requires three elements:
knowledge of the violation, a concept of the significance of
the violation and some preplanned counteraction relevant to
the violation. Knowledge of violation is not enough. The
Soviets have been building a radar the size of three football
fields at Kresnoyar, 800 miles from where it is permitted to be
under the ABM treaty. But the West has not reacted partly
because acolytes of the ABM treaty are reluctant to admit a
violation and therefore tend to dispute the significance of
the Soviet action. In any event, short of abrogating the
treaty, the United States has no effective countermeasure.

-28-

There is no sense in our building an equivalent radar because
the United States has abandoned voluntarily the one ABM site
permitted under the treaty; hence we would have nothing to
look into the radar.

The same dilemma exists with respect to verification of
the INF treaty. I have not studied them enough to judge their
intrinsic merit. But no doubt the inspection provisions are
unprecedentedly intrusive. And this is a significant precedent
for follow-on arms agreements. But the procedures may also turn
out to be beside the point. Whatever the verification scheme
discovers, the United States is in a poor position to respond.
No European country -- with the possible exception of Great
Britain -- would agree again to a new deployment of strategic
missiles on its soil whatever the Soviets do in violating the
agreement. They will not again risk the domestic uproar and
American changeability. I do not believe the Soviets will
violate the agreement but not because of the inspection
arrangements. The reason is that they no longer need the

-29-

SS-20 to intimidate Europe because the long-range SS-25 and other
strategic weapons suffice for that purpose.

In the absence of a strategic doctrine, arms control has become
a domestic football. For years, President Reagan was castigated
for being the first American President in thirty years not to
sign an agreement. Today, he is applauded by those who want
any agreement and castigated by those who oppose any. Rational
debate about American political and strategic goals is ground
down between these extremes.

The situation is at least as complex among allies. Many
leading figures all over Europe have expressed to me their
disquiet about current trends. But few articulate them publicly.
Friends of the United States do not want to express doubts
about the reliability of an American nuclear commitment that
worries them deeply in private. Neutralist opponents see in
the INF agreement an opportunity to regain public credibility
as a first step towards the complete denuclearization of Europe.

-30-

Even traditionally friendly leaders -- now in office in all key
European countries -- are the prisoners of their previous
attitudes. For years, too many have permitted President Reagan
to be pictured as a bellicose cowboy and themselves as mediators
with Moscow now suddenly to reverse course without grave domestic
damage. Moreover they are the heirs of the evasions of the 70's.
Then, it was much less controversial to justify the deployment of
American medium range missiles in Europe by the build-up of SS-20s
than by the growing fear that nuclear parity undermined the credibility
of the American nuclear guarantee. In fact, the U.S. medium range
missiles were never aimed at the SS-20s; their real function was
to establish an organic link between the strategic nuclear
defense of the US and of Europe. But given the basic justification
the so-called zero option -- trading SS-20s for American missiles --
made sense. Just as President Reagan's erstwhile American friends,
the European leaders are hoist by their own petard: the removal
of the SS-20s does not reduce the nuclear threat to Europe but the

-31-

removal of the American missiles weakens the strategic links
across the Atlantic -- a fact which no formal protestation to
the contrary can cure.

Their dilemma is heightened by the fright they took at
Reykjavik when the Soviet and American leaders came within a
hair of agreeing -- without any consultation -- to do away with
all strategic missiles, including the national nuclear forces.
Especially the leaders of France and Britain have been determined
to preserve their own national forces at all costs. The fate of
American missiles stationed largely on Germany soil seemed to
them far less central than to deflect discussions from their own
deterrent.

And all of these leaders faced even more dramatic pressures
from their own equivalent of the arms control lobby than
President Reagan.

In short, nowhere in the West has there been a coherent
analysis of the future of strategy or of arms control under

-32-

conditions when summits increase in frequency and Gorbachev is
on the verge of becoming a significant public figure in his own
right in most European countries.

But we have come to the end of relatively safe evasions in
the West. The price paid so far gets us to the edge of disaster.
Disaster can still be avoided and a promising era of international
relations arranged if we develop coherent strategies and arms
control policies. But we must become serious and stop confusing
foreign policy with psychiatry. A beneficient Gorbachev will
not save the free countries; they must do that for themselves.

Where Do We Go From Here?

a. The first priority must be a roadmap of where we are going. The foreign and defense policies of the West are in urgent need of reassessment. Specifically how does the West defend itself when its only nuclear strategy consists of the mass extermination of civilians? What will be the precise relationship between nuclear and conventional forces?

-33-

This must be expressed in precise force levels and not in
pious slogans. And one key question requiring an answer
is whether the West is willing to pay for the conventional
build-up its nuclear arms control policy implies. For even
if it is assumed that we can solve the problem via arms
control, no one who has ever negotiated with the Soviets
would believe that they will reduce their conventional
forces unless they are convinced that the alternative is
for the West to build up its own.

b. This reassessment is not possible unless Europe assumes
a greater responsibility for its own defense and foreign
policy. For four decades, Europe has been sheltered by
the American nuclear umbrella. In the defense field,
American "leadership" has been identified with prescriptions
originated in Washington which were subsequently discussed
with our allies. An elaborate consultative machinery de-
veloped. But in the end, political decisions depend on the

-34-

ability to assume operational responsibility. This has
been substantially lacking. All major decisions with
respect to INF were taken first in US-Soviet negotiations.

Our allies had an ample opportunity to object after the
event but only by assuming the responsibility towards
their publics for thwarting an agreement involving American
weapons American leaders had declared historic and had
already tentatively blessed with the Soviets. The situation
is even more one-sided with respect to strategic weapons.

It is in the long run demoralizing for a continent which
ever since the advent of the modern state system has been
looking after its own defense to abdicate this essential
attribute of sovereignty.

A serious European intellectual contribution to defense and
foreign policy issues requires the elaboration of a European
identity on these matters. America has been reluctant to see
this emerge for fear that it might encourage European separation

-35-

from the United States. And, let us be frank, hegemony is a
comfortable position. But in the end, alliances are held
together by shared interests, not consultative machinery. A
Europe assuming more responsibility for its own defense is
much more likely to contribute to a serious long-range set
of objectives than a junior partner in an essentially American
decision-making process which will in fact enhance its sense
of impotence. I cannot imagine any basic threat to the security
of Europe in which European leaders would conclude that they are
better off without American support. Indeed the defense field is
precisely the area in which European and American interests are
most congruent. If European neutralism were to become so virulent
as to neglect that reality, organizational devices could not
save the Alliance.

A continuation of existing procedures will encourage an
oscillating unilateralism on the American side and irresponsible
catering to the more radical elements of public opinion in Europe.

-36-

The United States should welcome the attempts of Europeans
to revitalize the West European Union as a forum for the elaboration
of European defense and arms control policies. We have more to
lose from a sense of European impotence than from the conclusions
such an entity would reach on matters affecting its survival.

Conventional Defense and Arms Control

Such a reexamination must come to grips on both sides
of the Atlantic with the problem of conventional defense. The
premises of nuclear deterrence are in the process of being
weakened, if not dismantled, by technology and by arms control
policies.

But there is no commensurate analysis of the conventional
aspect. Fatuous studies pretend to show that conventional
defense is feasible. Theoretically, this is undoubtedly correct
given the disparity in resources and even manpower between the
Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet bloc. In practice, there exists
neither a serious study of requirements nor a willingness to

-37-

mobilize necessary resources. A serious approach would recognize
that simply comparing numbers of divisions flies in the face of
all historic experience which shows that the capacity to
concentrate forces at the point of attack is usually decisive.

Then there is a whole host of practical questions requiring
resolution: For example, have the consumption rates of con-
ventional forces in the Atlantic Alliance been standardized?
How does the Alliance propose to handle supply in combat to
armies having five different types of tanks and an even greater
variety of artillery pieces? For how many days can combat be
sustained by the lowest critical item of supply?

Speaking of "progress" in these fields is an evasion of
responsibility. Narrow margins of superiority have in the
past sufficed for victory. It is pointless to play games
(for decades) with "progress" when adequacy is the only criterion;
all the more so as even adequacy is very difficult to define.
And none of this makes any sense unless there is a clear

willingness to bear in the present financial crisis the heavy
financial burden a serious build-up would require.

The situation with respect to conventional arms control
is even more *chaotic* The West must guard against the trap into
which it fell in INF: seemingly asymmetrical proposals which
nevertheless in fact weaken its strategic position. The
Soviets have two large advantages: a preponderance of force
and interior lines of communication: The former means that
even unequal *cuts* may help the attacker by stretching the
defensive forces to a point where a breakthrough is uncontrollable.
The interior lines of communication mean that Soviet forces
would withdraw only a few hundred miles; hence could be returned
rather rapidly. Also these forces would then be closer to other potential
crises points like Turkey, the Middle East and China, increasing
their peril. Therefore, any serious conventional arms control
scheme would have to require the dismantling of Soviet forces
being withdrawn. And experience with German disarmament under

-39-

international control after World War I shows the extreme
complexity of designing an inspection system for that purpose.

Nuclear Strategic Disarmament.

It would therefore be reckless to proceed with the fifty
percent reduction in strategic forces unless it is synchronized
and preferably preceded by a major step in conventional disarmament.

Abstract statements of a general readiness to proceed will not
do. The West must know before it weakens itself further in the
nuclear field the conceptual shape of a negotiation in conventional
arms.

Three other conclusions follow:

1. The Administration must generate a serious debate on the implications of a fifty percent reduction of strategic forces.

In the ratification, it cannot count once again on the argument that refusing to ratify an agreement is more costly than going along.

2. Numbers games must be avoided. A reduction in Soviet heavy

-40-

missiles of fifty percent does not reduce the danger of a
first strike if American missiles are reduced proportionately
(for technical counting reasons even more so). A fifty
percent reduction to contribute to strategic stability should
therefore eliminate the SS-18s altogether.

3. If the United States seriously intends to proceed with a fifty percent reduction of strategic forces it must urgently develop the Midget man single warhead missile which would enable us to increase the number of targets a Soviet first strike would have to cover thereby reducing the danger of surprise attack.

## Regional Conflicts

Lip service is being paid to the resolution of regional
conflicts but their treatment lacks any sense of urgency. And
yet international tensions are the result of political conflicts
where vital interests intersect. It is dangerous to emphasize
symptoms while neglecting causes.

-41-

Moreover, the regional conflicts which are being discussed almost exclusively deal with crises that have already broken out. But if we look fifteen years ahead, we see a world radically different from the current one. By then, Japan will be substantially armed, China will be much stronger, India will be the key country in South Asia, the Islamic world will have and radical transformation. Europe will be united or irrelevant; some of the countries of Latin America may have fulfilled their historic promise.

These transformations cannot possibly occur smoothly. Hence crises are inevitable. And US-Soviet relations will be a key factor in maintaining the peace. Arms control is nearly irrelevant to that process. Yet there is no evidence that this incipient revolution has received systematic attention either within the US government or by the summit participants.

After the transformation is completed there will emerge a radically changed world in which the present superpowers will

-42-

play a totally different role. There is no evidence that either
superpower has addressed this role individually much less
in its impact on each other. Yet it is certain that this
transformation of the world equilibrium will in the long
run be even more important than the technical issues that
occupied the summit these past few days.

## The Role of Gorbachev

The euphoria sweeping Washington can be explained primarily
then by the impact of the personality of Gorbachev. He has
emerged as the deus ex machina to solve all the West's dilemmas
-- a Communist leader who will bring peace and tranquillity
without any real effort on the part of the free countries.

But is that nostalgia realistic or even fair to Gorbachev?
Admittedly, listening to this obviously thoughtful seemingly
open-minded General Secretary, it is easy to forget that he has
emerged at the top of what must be the toughest competition
in the world in which nice guys finish last and losers are

-43-

rarely heard from again.

But even granting him good intentions, it is possible
that the West's near obsequiousness destroys the best oppor-
tunity for peace. I cannot judge whether Gorbachev is sincere
in his avowed desire for a new climate of international relations;
perhaps he does not know himself. The fact is the free countries
tendency to equate foreign policy with psychiatry deprives
us of the opportunity of ever knowing the answer. Reality no
doubt imposes at least a respite on Soviet foreign adventurism,
perhaps even an end to it. At the same time, Gorbachev, as
any prudent leader, is unlikely to court unnecessary domestic
problems. He will not volunteer changes in political and
strategic arrangements which parts of his bureaucracy would
find unpalatable. Obviously, he will push those programs
most advantageous to his own country. I do not know how
he would have reacted if presented with a comprehensive
program that linked the various elements of military power,

-44-

nuclear and conventional, or to a serious discussion on political
relationships in trouble spots around the world or to an attempt
to discuss the US-Soviet role in the world only a decade or so
ahead of us. I am convinced that he has the sort of intelligence
that could make a constructive contribution to such a dialogue
if he chose to do so. And if he refused, we would understand the
challenge we face better than we do now.

The failure to test Gorbachev seriously may cause the summit
to appear in the end as a missed opportunity. There is still
time to restore a balance to the East-West dialogue. But the
prerequisite is the recognition that Gorbachev cannot save the
democracies; they must do that themselves.

(Newsweek, Dec. 11, 1987)

-23-

## A Coherent Strategy

-24-

-25-

-26-

-27-

-29-

-30-

-31-

-32-

Where Do We Go From Here?

-33-

-34-

-35-

-36-

-37-

-38-

The situation with respect to conventional arms control
is even more *chaotic*.
The West must guard against the trap into
which it fell in INF: seemingly asymmetrical proposals which
nevertheless in fact weaken its strategic position. The
Soviets have two large advantages: a preponderance of force
and interior lines of communication: The former means that
even unequal *cuts* may help the attacker by stretching the
defensive forces to a point where a breakthrough is uncontrollable.
The interior lines of communication mean that Soviet forces
would withdraw only a few hundred miles; hence could be returned
rather rapidly. Also these forces would then be closer to other potential
crises points like Turkey, the Middle East and China, increasing
their peril. Therefore, any serious conventional arms control
scheme would have to require the dismantling of Soviet forces
being withdrawn. And experience with German disarmament under

-39-