DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

TELCOM

Pete Vaky
Mr. Kissinger
4/5/69 10:05 a.m.

HAK told Vaky the Pres had called him from Biscayne asking what you are doing about Peru, and HAK told him 'you are sawing it off and floating it in the Pacific.'

Vaky said they had that talk with IPC, and it looks as though the better procedure would be the administrative process route, or maybe a mixture of that and negotiations. IPC is a little reluctant to proceed. They will talk with the Chairman of the Board and let us know in the morning. They will block out the terms which will be washable. The question is are we going to be able to defend it publicly. We haven't made a decision on that.

HAK: But you're not going to make a decision without letting him get a crack at it. (Vaky said he wasn't.) Then HAK said, he doesn't want to have a crack at it, but you can't apply Hickenlooper without letting him know about it.

HAK: If the answer is positive, if you decide it's a credible fig leaf, then anything you can construct is OK with him. If you come to a decision that Hickenlooper has to be applied, that it has to be done, whom do I go to? President wants to be sure that State understands that he wants the fig leaf applied if applied from a posture of confrontation; he doesn't want the thing to peter out then.

V: Our proposal is we're deferring it so pressure maintains itself. And we may well have to apply it later down the road. He wants maximum pressure in the interval. Irwin says we must be prepared to apply it later if you spin out the fig leaf--that you will just have to apply it then. This I understand is your view too. If we agree we can credibly put on the fig leaf and defer, this the President agrees, and we do not particularly have to go back to him.

HAK: That's right; he wants you to be tough then.

V: That's the premise of our deferring. We'll apply pressure, and so on. We'll increase uncertainty on Velasco.

HAK: Will Velasco let you do it?

V: He may stick his finger in our eye. If he does that we will have better grounds.

HAK: I think you are doing the right thing.

DECLASSIFIED

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By MW NARA Date 081004

TELCON
John Irwin

Mr. Kissinger

4/5/69 10 25 am (Saturday)

HAK told Irwin that he had been kibitzing with the President on Irwin's problem, and he thinks the track Irwin is on is the right one -- and the President feels that way, too. HAK said P would like it understood that we put some sort of terminal date on the process, and that we move in our attitude toward a posture of confrontation -- don't just let the thing peter out -- let's really put the screws on them.

Irwin said he feels strongly on that too -- that if we go by the 9th we go by the 9th with the conviction that we will apply the Hickenlooper Amendment and sanctions at a later date unless compensation is paid -- and even though political circumstances change adversely, we still go ahead with the conviction that this is what we do. Amb. Jones concurs.

HAK said that was the major thing. Pres. wanted to be sure to convey to Irwin also, appreciation for what he has done there. It has been very skilfully done.

Irwin said it is quite critical, from point of view down there, that Irwin stop by Key Biscayne -- he feels it is essential that it be seen that he goes in and out. HAK said the Pres was reluctant to do that and hadn't mentioned it to him; as of that moment, the P wasn't expecting to see Irwin. Irwin said Secy was going to try to arrange such a meeting and he would speak to him again. HAK said maybe such a meeting could be synchronized so Irwin could meet the Pres at the airport when he is leaving. Irwin said he could stop anytime Sunday. HAK said OK, if the Secy can arrange it-- although it hadn't been arranged as of Saturday morning.

Mr Meyer got on and talked to HAK about a loan of 12-1/2 million in the private sector for a housing project in Peru. In the event the Hickenlooper Amendment is deferred, he believes we should approve this loan. He had mentioned it to Richardson, who thought it was interesting. Meyer recognizes desirability of indirect sanctions -- this is a loan made to a savings and loan bank and only drawn down if some private guy wants to go down and build houses. HAK said you will have a problem with the Pres if you don't show him some squeeze you are putting on. Meyer replied that whatever we do, the squeeze is on. HAK said before he does it, let's have a word on it so it doesn't hit the Pres unexpectedly. He asked Meyer to get over a piece of paper on the way these indirect pressures could work -- so we can show how the over thing really supports it. Meyer thought HAK and he and Richardson might get together on this early week of April 7.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958
By MW NARA Date 080608

TELCON

Amb. Ellsworth Bunker
Mr. Kissinger

4/7/69 10 10 am

HAK said to Bunker "You are getting into a great negotiating position-- they are all giving away Vietnam in the newspapers." Bunker wished people wouldn't talk so much. He referred to Evans and Novak, Max Frankel--that isn't going to be very helpful. He also referred to Laird's remarks, and wished Laird didn't feel he had to talk about coalition. HAK asked if all this will hurt us in Vietnam and Bunker said Yes.

Bunker asked when the President might see him; and although, HAK said, there was total confusion upstairs at the moment, he would get back to Bunker later this morning. Bunker planned to get off first thing tomorrow morning but of course it is important for him to see the President. He wouldn't need much more than a half hour. Bunker added he would like to have his wife come in to say hello to the President, and HAK said of course.

HAK will be back in touch with Bunker by the end of this morning.

192 x3852

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958
By MW NARA Date 08/06/08

TE LCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4-7-69 2:30 PM

R said he was afraid he could not make the NSC meeting tomorrow and asked if it would be an extensive meeting. R said he hated to miss it. K asked about Elliot Richardson. R said he could come but would not be involved in NATO. K said he could bring Marty Hillenbrand along too. R said o.k. - the thinks that is the thing to do. R asked if there would be another one later in the week - K said on Wednesday and subject would be trade policy. K said the NATO meeting tomorrow will not go into fundamentals - it is just a preliminary discussion. R said thing that concerns him is what we say about force levels - it can be touch because of Canada and our own position with Congress.

K asked how R's press conference went. R said you can never be sure but he does not believe he put his foot into it - he skirted the tough ones. People at State thought it went well and a lot of correspondents were very nice on the way out.

jm

(Moose's office advised about Hillenbrand's attendance at NSC)

Joseph Kraft

Laird, Kissinger Approaches
Affect President's Peace Plan

PRESIDENT Nixon's peace plan depends on a delicate balance between two different approaches to the Vietnam problem. There is the Laird approach, which emphasizes winding down the American military commitment; and there is the Kissinger approach, which emphasizes a negotiated political settlement.

So far, the Laird approach has generated almost all the action. But failure to distinguish between the two approaches has built the illusion of far more progress towards settlement than has actually been made.

The Laird approach is, of course, named after Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. The idea here is to set in motion a withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam in the next few months. The withdrawal would be completed in stages over the next couple of years.

The place of the American troops in South Vietnam would be taken by two forces now being regenerated. First, there would be a much stronger South Vietnamese army, retrained and re-equipped. Second, there would be a much stronger South Vietnamese government, built around the army but broadened to engage the whole country in a large-scale political movement.

THE LAIRD approach has potent appeal inside the Administration. It is attractive to Republican politicians as a quick and highly visible way to meet public pressure for an early end to high American casualties.

Additionally, the Laird approach is the perfect apologetica for all the ex-hawks who still hold high positions in the Saigon Embassy, the State Department and the military services. For the Laird approach makes it

seem that Vietnam policy between 1964 and 1968 was just dandy—a natural principle to leaving South Vietnam in control of a strong army and government.

Because of this potent appeal, the Laird approach has been steadily building up a big head of steam. South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu has announced plans to build a national political party, and to beef up his army. Over last weekend, in Washington, word spread that a first American withdrawal of from 40,000 to 100,000 men would be made soon.

As it happens however, the Laird approach has some obvious flaws. There is little reason to think that the South Vietnamese forces can be soon rebuilt to the point of being able to withstand insurgent pressure aided. There is less reason to think that Gen. Thieu can put together a broad gauged party.

AT THIS POINT there comes in the Kissinger approach—which is named after Dr. Henry Kissinger, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. It is designed to meet the obvious flaws in the Laird approach.

The emphasis is on a political settlement worked out between the Saigon authorities and the Vietcong insurgents. American troop withdrawals are undertaken primarily in a context of bargaining with the other side.

In recent weeks, the Kissinger approach has not been without a certain success. In particular, there was the announcement two weeks ago by President Thieu that he was prepared without prior conditions to enter into secret talks with the Vietcong for a political settlement.

But plainly the Kissinger approach depends for its success on having secret talks on substantive matters. And all signs suggest that such talks have not gotten under way. On the contrary, the impression perists that the secret phase of the Paris talks has to do more with procedural rather than substantive issues. And according to some reliable accounts, the United States is leaving the initiative for secret talks up to the other side.

IN THE MEANTIME, the Kissinger approach is obviously losing momentum. Thus last week, Secretary Laird—over the objections of Dr. Kissinger and the Budget Bureau—was able to put into effect, ostensibly as a financial move, a unilateral decision to cut back B-52 aorties in Vietnam. And at his press conference yesterday, Secretary of State William Rogers had to check the speculation that the United States would begin withdrawing troops without some negotiating quid pro quo from the other side.

The Laird approach and the Kissinger approach, in other words, seem not to be moving in harmony. The military withdrawal, which is easy but dangerous, seems to be far advanced over the political settlement, which is hard but safe.

While the Administration has got things moving on Vietnam all right, they are not necessarily moving in the direction of settlement. And unless some vitality and momentum is imparted to the Paris peace talks, the Nixon Administration may find itself borne ineluctably towards a bogus Vietnam settlement that looks safe but is in fact filled with peril.

© 1969 Publishers-Hall Syndicate

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958
By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

DECLASSIFIED

TELCON

Secy Laird
Mr. Kissinger

4-8-69 9:00 AM

K said he was calling about Kraft article and wondered who had been talking to him. L asked if he was at that meeting on Friday (Overseas Press Club). K said no and nothing was said at that meeting that would even vaguely suggest this. L said he thinks we should talk to Kraft. L said he notices that some of the people are playing Dan Rogers' press conference as unilateral withdrawal in the future. L said he has tried to stay away from that in his public appearances.

L said he would like to find out who is feeding Kraft this stuff - this is second one. K said he has not talked to him for three or four weeks. He talked to him when he came back from Europe re the NVN stories. L said maybe he should call Kraft but then decided not to. L said most serious problem is that they (columnists) try to develop feeling that there is great division.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Joseph Kraft

Washington Post

April 8, 1969

# Laird, Kissinger Approaches Affect President's Peace Plan

seem that Vietnam policy between 1964 and 1968 was just dandy—a natural prejudice to leaving South Vietnam in control of a strong army and government.

As it happens however, the Laird approach has some obvious flaws. There is little reason to think that the South Vietnamese forces can be soon rebuilt to the point of being able to withstand insurgent pressure aided. There is less reason to think that Gen. Thieu can put together a broad-gauged party.

But plainly the Kissinger approach depends for its success on having secret talks on substantive matters. And all signs suggest that such talks have not gotten under way (On the contrary, the impression persists that the secret phase of the Paris talks has to do more with procedural rather than substantive issues. And according to some reliable accounts, the United States is leaving the initiative for secret talks up to the other side.

While the Administration has got things moving on Vietnam all right, they are not necessarily moving in the direction of settlement. And unless some vitality and momentum is imparted to the Paris peace talks, the Nixon Administration may find itself borne ineluctably towards a bogus Vietnam settlement that looks safe but is in fact filled with perils.

DECLASSIFIED

TELCOM

Harlan Cleveland
Mr. Kissinger
4/8/69 10:15 a.m.

HAK told Amb. Cleveland we would be delighted to have him attend the meeting this afternoon at 3 o'clock. HAK pointed out that the Pres feels that State is always over-represented at these meetings and then tries to take time over, and that creates great restiveness on his part. Cleveland said "I don't work for the State Dept, I work for him." HAK pointed out he says this to everybody who is not a regular attendee. At any rate, the Pres will be delighted to have Cleveland come.

Cleveland had seen the paper and noted it's on short-term questions. HAK said the longer-term would be taken up in another review. But there will be initial discussion of ministerial meeting.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958
By MW NARA Date 08/06/68

TELCORN
Ambassador Lucet
Mr. Kissinger
4/8/69 6:45 pm

Lucet called about what he termed "a question of protocol." He
wondered if it would be possible for HAK to come to the French
Embassy to meet Mr. Debre. But if he could go to the White House
and have a chance to see the President say, for 5 minutes, and have
a long talk with HAK...

HAK said that's what he had wanted to see if he could do, but can't
let Lucet know until tomorrow. HAK has no feelings on these
"protocol" matters. But he does have a very heavy schedule.

What HAK was doing to try to do was to take Debre up on an informal basis--
if it can be done-- but it won't do him any good because he won't be able
to say it was on the President's schedule.

HAK further stated he would come to the French Embassy--but he would
have to change the time a bit. Lucet said they have an appointment with
the Secy of State at 3:30.

HAK said he would do what he could--but that he would certainly come
to the French Embassy; it's not a question of protocol with him; he will
do what he can; he will call I Lucet tomorrow.

Lucet said, "You understand my point; he wants to have a long talk with you."

HAK ended the conversation by saying he would work it out the
other and would call Lucet tomorrow morning.

TELCORN

Thomas Vail - Publisher of Cleveland Plain Dealer
Mr. Kissinger

4-9-69

9:20 AM

V said he wanted to talk with K completely off the record. V had
marvelous talk with President and among many other things,
President brought up Ambassadorial situation and asked V about
Germany and Japan. V said he had not given this much thought -
he has done a few things for the Government and some day would
want to do anything he could for the country. V said he would not
be interested in anything ceremonial, etc., but if there is a real
job to do be done, that might be something else. V said he asked
the President if he could think about it a bit. V said he would like
to get K's opinion. K said he thought the two most interesting
Ambassadorial posts now are Germany and Japan - the Ambassador
to these two places makes a lot of difference; he is not just a messenger.

V said of the two areas, he supposes he is more oriented to
Germany than to Japan in terms of knowledge and a feel for it.
V said Germany seems a little more interesting to him than Japan.
K said in Germany a lot depends on personal relations established
and degree of confidence President has in you, etc. K said you
deal basically with the State Department but there would be a
personal relationship with the President and we would like to have
some Ambassadors we trust and know. V speculated about whether
he could do as much for his country in this post as in his present
position.

V said he would still like to think about it and suggested that K might
discuss this with the President. K said he would.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958
By MW NARA Date 080619

TELCOM

Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger

4-9-69 12:38 PM

shortly

R said he was going to see the King of Jordan and wanted to give him
this word about planes - (F 104s) in principle. R said he wanted
to be sure the President is o.k. on it. K said he has not looked
at it yet but K's own view is that we should go ahead with it and
asked if that was R's view. R said yes and also Lairds.

(I had to get off telephone to answer intercom and when I got back
on subject had shifted to Vail)

K said Vail had called him this morning about Ambassadorships
to Japan and Germany. K asked the President to and the President
asked K to check with R to see what he thinks about it. K said he
has no view. R said he thinks it would be very bad - Vail is
a lightweight. K said the President told him that he did not think
Vail was interested. R said they have been talking about Gates
for Germany and Armin Meyer for Japan. K said he makes no
personnel recommendations unless he is asked. K said whether or not
the President has told Vail he would like him to consider
being Ambassador to one of these two countries, the operational
problem is the same because Vail thinks the President said this to
him.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon

Denis Healey

3:45 April 9

HAK said he thought Healey would like to know -- for his information
only -- that the subject which they had talked about re Europe will
be a part of the President's speech tomorrow and thought that it
would fill Healey's needs. Healey was pleased.

Healey mentioned a speech he had made and will send over a
copy to HAK.

Healey mentioned his discussion with Laird and thought that it went
very well. He found Laird a very nice chap and thought they would
get along fine.

TELCORN

Joe Sisco
Mr. Kissinger
4-9-69 7:55 p. m.

S said I am still negotiating communique.

HAK said "I did not realize we were going to get into that business.

S said I would like to have back that sentence you struck out, "the
way to conquest." This man will need this before he gets his
head chopped off. I am not too worried about the Israeli reaction.
This would go no further than the statement the Secretary has made
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

HAK said "I did not chop it out. Can you put in something like "
those that favor Israel like free water access, etc.

S said, let me try that as a next step. We need to fall back to
that sentence because this is a pretty delicate situation.

HAK said, "how did we get into that situation?

S said the Secretary asked how can we help and he asked about this
particular statement and they (the Jordanians) liked the idea.

HAK said they will give us a sob story anyway.

S said they have given us one already.

HAK asked, "are they happy with the arms part.

S said I believe they are. I am trying to arrange that there is
nothing else said on this tomorrow morning. I will give you a
memorandum on this.

HAK said, if you can put in some general reference.

S said, I will do my best.

mlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

TELCON
Stu Loory
Mr. Kissinger
4-9-69 8:10 p. m.

L said the problem is that we have dug up nothing on withdrawal.
Everyone else is digging up stories about troop withdrawals.
Obviously, someone in town is talking.

HAK said, "as soon as you find out, call me."

L said, is the Administration mad about this?

HAK said the people that are saying these things are not talking for
the Administration.

L said the UPI State Department correspondent has a story on it
tonight quoting official sources.

HAK asked what does official sources mean? I can tell you flatly
there is no such policy. I can tell you flatly it is not Administration
policy that there be talks about withdrawals. These leaks are not
authorized.

L said that is all I need. This is something we have to settle in
our minds.

HAK said these are not authorized leaks and it is not part of any
great scheme. I repeat, I am not saying there will never be
troop withdrawals. I don't want you to think I am a liar. For
this moment and for the immediate future, this is the situation and
for any time period these stories are not authorized leaks. HAK
said I am saying only that we will keep only what is necessary. If
we come to some determination that we can withdraw, we will.
HAK said you must protect me on this.

L said, OK I understand.

mlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958

By MW NARA Date 081068

TELCON
Herb Klein
Mr. Kissinger
4-9-69 8:20 p. m.

K said I received a call from (missed name) stating that Greek Foreign Minister had apparently had an appointment with you and Greek Ambassador had cancelled it because Elliott Richardson was available for Foreign Minister to see and Ambassador thought he (Foreign Minister) would want to do it that way. K said Foreign Minister would very much like to see HAK and could HAK do it Saturday.

HAK said I cannot see him on Saturday because I have an all-day meeting with a group of intellectuals.

K said Foreign Minister is very unhappy with Ambassador for having cancelled and, therefore, has lost all confidence in his Ambassador.

HAK said tell him I try to see him on Friday, but I cannot promise.

K said OK.

mlh

TELCOM
Chalmers Roberts
Mr. Kissinger

9-69 8:45 p. m.

R said I want to see you and wondered if I could get you out Saturday or Sunday to have a swim in our heated pool.

HAK said I would love to do it but Saturday I have an all day meeting and Sunday I hope to get up to New York.

R asked what is your situation next week?

HAK said why don't you call me Monday. I would love to see you.

R said, alright I will call you Monday but if you change your mind and are here Sunday, will you give me a call.

HAK said he would.

mlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

TELCON

Joe Sisco
Mr. Kissinger

4/10/69 8:55 a.m.

Sisco said the suggestion HAK made last night will work out. (referring to text) The U.S. called to the attention of the Government of Jordan and reaffirmed the statement Sect. Rogers made on this and other points before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Sisco said in the document Jordanians sent back there is a sentence new to him about "His Majesty's extending an invitation to the President and the invitation's being accepted."

HAK said he would say that in much more general terms. He extended an invitation and the President said he hoped to be able to visit the Middle East before the end of his term.

Sisco repeated "and the President said he hoped to be able to visit the Middle East before the end at some appropriate point." Sisco corrected that--he said we have to operate on the assumption of 8-year-term, not 4.

HAK said in earlier part of the communique there was a statement which implied we agreed that Israeli conquests were cause of the tension.

Sisco: "His Majesty the King explained the explosive nature of the situation in the Middle East which is caused by the continued occupation of Jordan and other Arab territories."

HAK: We ought to say "His Majesty explained that the tense situation in the Middle East is caused....." so it is clear it is his language.

Sisco: We have not bought that.

HAK: I would recommend "explained that the explosive nature of the Middle East is caused by...." in that case it is perfectly plain that it is his view and not ours. Sisco agreed that was a good point. He'll have a clean copy of this after his last conversation this morning. He wants President, and His Majesty, to look at it in final form.

mz

TELCON
Professor Neustadt
Mr. Kissinger

4-10-69

11:45 AM

N and K discussed the problems with the students at Cambridge last night.

K said the thought Doty was coming to Washington tomorrow and asked if Neustadt would be able to come to Neustadt could come too - it would be for lunch.
N said he would check his schedule, which he thought was probably bad - he said he would let K know.

N said he thought K was in good shape personally and the President was in surprisingly good shape until Laird and Packard got to work - mentioned York and Panowsky. K said this is stupidity more than anything else. N said the guys around there were inclined to think he has been badly served - they are around here all the time but aroused all anti-Pentagon sentiments. K said he thinks the President thinks he can win if he goes right. N said K should quiz Paul on system - rhetoric is good, but system is technically lousy. Gore can get a lot more technical testimony in next few weeks. N said what he hears up there is there will be great big row about it and it will be close vote.

K mentioned a dinner he had gone to at Javits house with a group of Senators.

K asked N to try to come down to tomorrow and he said he would try.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCOM
Joseph Sisco
Mr. Kissinger
4-10-69 12:00 N

S said he understood K was considering seeing Yost about 12:30 and wanted to give him a little background. S said they had a long discussion in terms of four power approach and there are two additional alternatives: (1) situation where four powers are pressing us and isolating us to the point where we would be expected to take positions and come out with four-power pronouncement at end of line which would isolate us and Israel; (2) the other alternative would be in trying to bring the parties along in the four-power discussion, but if we find we are not achieving common ground, it would be not be because of fact that Israel is culprit but four powers themselves that are not able to achieve sufficient common ground.

K said we should use second alternative. S thought said right and asked K to give it to Yost in this regard. Yost is taking the line that the President has crossed this bridge and S said President has not crossed this bridge. K agreed and said that is the type of thing that infuriates the President.

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Paul Doty
Mr. Kissinger

4-10-69 12:15 PM

D and K stxx discussed student problem at Harvard.

D said he would be down for lunch tomorrow. K said he might ask Neustadt to come too.

K said he needs a replacement for Spurgeon Keeny and asked if
D had any suggestions. D said he would think about it.

jm

By: KLC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
4/10/69 12:25 pm

P: Be sure that some work has been done on these two proposals with regard to the Deputy Ministers and the challenges of modern life. Have these been run by people like Brosio and two or three others? Get some people to speak up for it.

HAK: Bill is going to speak up right afterwards. We haven't run it past anyone because we didn't want to leak it.

P: I would assume this doesn't run counter to anything we're doing. I would hope that State have a plan. Cleveland of course should be working on this--and Ellsworth--whoever else is around.

HAK: I'll talk to them immediately.

P: Be sure a few people speak up and say it's a good idea.

###

mz

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Telecon

Harland Cleveland

12:35 4/10/69

HAK wanted to know if Cleveland has seen the three proposals in the speech the President was going to make. Cleveland said yes and mentioned the one about changing the name of the committee. HAK said all of Cleveland's suggestions had been considered.

## Cleveland's attention please

HAK mentioned the frequency of the Deputy Foreign Minister's meetings also.

HAK was wondering if Cleveland could do anything about getting some support from some of the Foreign Ministers on these proposals. He thought that some of the FM could make some friendly comments since the President would welcome this. Cleveland said this would be no problem. They would probably make some comments during the private discussions and then as a backgrounder afterwards it could be made public.

HAK said then he could tell the President this would be done.
Cleveland said yes.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin
Mr. Kissinger
4/10/69 12:55 pm

Dobrynin ventured the guess that HAK must be very busy these days
and HAK said this is a hectic period.

HAK said last time they met they talked about getting together next
week and asked what his schedule was -- Dobrynin said "give me a
time and I'll tell you."

They agreed on Monday, April 14, at 8:30 p.m. at HAK's house on
2527 Waterside Drive. HAK will send Dobrynin a note with a map
showing location of above address.

(HAK mentioned that he lives alone so can't offer Dobrynin dinner.
Later in conversation Dobrynin said he would be delighted to see how
bachelors live.)

By: KHC NARA, Dalo 5/13/04

TELCON

Gerard Smith
Mr. Kissinger

4-10-69 5:25 PM

S said he has a letter from McCloy and he would definitely want to talk with the President about the General Advisory Committee of ACDA before coming to any decision. S said we should prepare something for the President to read in advance. Both agreed McCloy will be a headache. S said he feels he has made a commitment to him. K said he will put to the President. K said he takes it that if the appointment gets delayed a bit, S will not be heartbroken. S said he will get up a piece of paper explaining how committee has worked in the past and how McCloy would like it to work in the future. Both agreed they had to request an appointment for McCloy.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

John J. McCloy
Mr. Kissinger

4/10/69 5:45 p. m.

John McCloy said he is here today and tomorrow -- he is going to the dinner tomorrow night. HAK started to explain that with all these NATO Ministers, and the President's going to a meeting... and ascertained that McCloy was coming back next week.

McCloy said they can have a few words at the dinner. HAK told him he was most anxious to have a good wx talk with McCloy, and the latter said he will plan on it and will give HAK a ring before he comes down next week.

##

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHL NARA, Dato:

5/12/04

TELCON
Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger
4/10/69 a.m.

Laird called while he was at State. He said Schlesinger had
talked to the Comptroller this morning and gave him orders to
cut out Hexagon and MOL. HAK said "certainly not to cut out MOL."
Laird said this was stirring up the Air Force in his shop -- they
slipped in the President's office yesterday without warning. HAK
said "you should have full right of appeal."

HAK said the President did say that they should talk to Laird in this
sense, but not beyond the right of appeal.

Laird doesn't like the idea of Schlesinger's runover and telling them
"the President ordered this." Laird said he and HAK and Helms should
talk about this.

HAK said we ought to have a discussion of the degree to which Budget
can get into the substantive defense business. If one man there can
tell you which weapons system is good and which is not, you are
wasting a lot of manpower. HAK doesn't know what Hexagon is, but
he kept them from cancelling MOL. HAK said we ought to have a
paper on what the things will do. He also said he'd tell the President
Laird wants to discuss this with Helms and himself.

Laird said "I'll show you exactly what it does."

mz

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
By MW NARA Date 08/06/68

Telecon

John Irwin

4/10/69

Irwin said there was one thing he was concerned about and that was the IDB housing loan. HAK said he was willing to go along with it and wanted to know what was required from him.

Irwin said if we turn this request down, it would give the Peruvians a handle to have something to work一起 unite the people against the U.S. which they now don't have. They might call back their team.

Irwin said someone from State of Treasury had sent a memo over with the background. HAK said he hadn't seen it yet and would Irwin check on it.

HAK said when he saw the paper he would make his recommendation to the President.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird

11:25 a.m., April 11, 1969

K - Said he was calling concerning the modified Navy study of the mining feint of Haiphong Harbor, which the Secy had transmitted to K with a note that he had serious reservations about it. For the record, K said he wasn't working directly with Navy on this. He doesn't operate that way, certainly not without informing Secy L about it.

L -- They told me you had worked on it with them; I can't remember how I dictated the covering note.

K -- Asked L where he would be on Saturday; he would like to discuss this further with him.

L -- Said he would be in his office all day -- he was expecting all the Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers to be there all day. The problem as L saw it was that he didn't see where the plan leads. Unless you are willing to go all the way....

K -- We are not going anywhere beyond the point mentioned. The whole thing should be very closely held. The point is to underline something to indicate we are thinking of certain things, and it will not go any farther than this. This is it!

L -- What is going on right now with regard to the shellings today is not significant from the standpoint of what they are doing. They haven't done any damage.

K -- I am talking about the Navy.

L -- We will talk about it further tomorrow -- but not on the phone.

K -- I will call you in your office tomorrow. The President was anxious to get something started on this. I will call to see if I can come over for 15 minutes.

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCORN

Secy Laird (called from State)
Mr. Kissinger
4/11/69 3:40 p. m.

HAK asked Laird if he remembered the Navy thing they discussed the other day. It wasn't exactly what the President had had in mind. Laird said he talked to Col Haig about that. HAK said we have a Navy Captain who is here as liaison from the JC. They are coming up with something through Laird's office. We would like to keep that in Navy channels, for reasons HAK will explain when he talks with Laird. HAK emphasized we don't want it to go through the whole machinery. HAK said it will come to Laird this afternoon. If Laird approves it, he should send it over here. It phases into something the President is thinking of doing, and it's important that we get it.

Laird said he was looking at "this other matter right now -- as far as the B52 operation we talked about...." Wx They'll get that over this afternoon. On the other matter, it was HAK's understanding that they will get it to Laird this afternoon.

mz

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHU NARA, Date 5/13/64

Telecon

Prof. Jerome Weisner

5:20 April 11, 1969

W said he had been doing some writing on the ABM thing for Kennedy. The more people write about this the more absurd the present deployment looks to him. This has turned into a confrontation between the Kennedy supporters and Nixon people, even though the Senate coalition is x bilateral. W thought that the President should have another chance to review his Safeguard program. W had worked out some charts and thought that this side of the subject had never been brought to the President's attention. HAK said he would see if the President would see him but doubted it very much. HAK thought it would be impossible for the President to reverse his decision at this point. and wondered if it would even be desirable. HAK thought it was destructive to have a fight on something like this. W said he was not asking for an appointment with the President but went on to describe his findings in the charts. HAK asked KW why he thought the Russians were building their ABMs. W thought for the same reasons we were and since they had them, why not make them modern and up to date.

HAK said he appreciate W calling him on this.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato.

5/12/04

TELCORN

Gerard Smith

Mr. Kissinger

4-12-69 11:15 AM

S said he had read with interest the President's remarks about SALT in his NATO speech and asked if, in the future, he could have clearance on anything having to do with arms control. President is very jumpy about showing draft speeches around K said. S said he assumes the Secretary of State must have had clearance at it. S said it seems to him that on arms control things, they should have a chance to look at it. K asked if he had any fix difficulty with what was said. S said the language was fine but not too clear about codification. K said this was just to institutionalize it. S said he has his doubts about flattening out curve unless there were some qualitative controls. K said in effect this will institutionalize some sort of parody. S said sometime when they have a few minutes, he would like K to go over a draft he has done on parody - he would like to talk to K about it. S said perhaps he could come over one day next week - Kx K said o.k. and S said he would call him on Monday.

jm

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Bob Haldeman
Mr. Kissinger
4-12-69 5:10 PM

K said one of his professor friends had just told him that Dubridge told Long the only way he could get job was if he made a public endorsement of the ABM. H said Long is withdrawing. K asked if it was put that way and H said no. K said it will be an academic scandal. K asked H if he thought this was o.k. H said he does not think anything can be done about it. K said he is sorry if he got H into trouble. K said his friend said Dubridge said he had been ordered to tell him he had to endorse the ABM. H said he would not worry about it. H said it is already done, Long has withdrawn so it is settled. K said in any event it is the right outcome.

jm

By KLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE

Gerard Smith
Mr. Kissinger

4-12-69 5:20 PM

S said he wanted to get some feel if we could some how or other
get Harold Brown to go to work in some capacity in SALT talks.
K said he would check with the President. K's personal view
(strictly personal) is that he thinks very highly of him and it would
be a good appointment but there may be some sensitivity in view of his
previous position. S said he had in mind the following - he sounded
him out in general terms so there would be no embarrassment
if it did not pan out. He was thinking in terms of having Brown
as principal scientific adviser and Brown could give six weeks to
two months, starting this summer (like first of July).

K said the fact that he thinks well of Brown is proved by his being
here today. S said Kexpax K probably knows that Brown had been
chosen by previous Administration to be one of deputies if
negotiations started so he is completely briefed. K said Brown
is open minded with a lot of government experience and K thinks
it is appropriate to put the matter before the President. K said
he would sound out the President and if he gets any storm signals,
he will let S know.

S mentioned fact that he had sent GAC stuff to K rather than to
Personnel people and asked about static. K said he had done exactly
the right thing and K has already talked to Personnel about it.
K said S had been first class in all these things and K hopes we
will do equally well by him.

jm

*

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE

Franklin Ford
Mr. Kissinger

4-12-69 7:00 PM

K said he wanted F to know that some of his faculty on leave thought
he had acted correctly. F said he was sorry K's trip to VN became
the cause celebre, but on the other hand he is sort of glad because
it disclosed foolishness of whole thing and some of the students
are already talking about it in those terms. K said it does not bother
him - K did not know about it until late this afternoon. K said he
was not in Hanoi, however. F said he knew that and it had gotten
garbled. K said he just wanted to let F know that if he had been able
to be there he would have given full support to F's actions. K said he
read F's statement and thought it was very good. K said he was
disheartened that some of his friends could not see moral issue - F
agreed. F said he does not believe that any of those who criticized
action taken would have supported the administration if it had not
been taken. F thanked K for calling.

F said he would be in Washington in May and they agreed to have
lunch or dinner.

jm

By KMLU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

April 14, 10:00

John McCone

McCone mentioned his long personal relationship with the King of Greece and mentioned that Constantine wanted to see him while McCone was in Greece. They had set up a meeting and then the King came to the States for Eisenhower's funeral. Upon his return, he still wanted to see McCone. They met and the King reviewd his views on his situation in Greece. He was very hurt that the President didn't see him. HAK said it was impossible since the Deputy Prime Minister was here as the official representative of the Greek Government. HAK said the Greek Government had said they didn't want us to recognize the King or treat him as the Head of State. The King was trying to use the administration to reestablish his position in Greece. In the conclusion of the conversation between McCone and the King, the King said he was going to return to the U.S. at a more relaxed time and mentioned that in a discussion with HAK, HAK told him to do this. HAK said his only reference was the fact that if he came on a private visit the situation might be easier since the President couldn't recognize him in any official capacity. McCone was taken back and surprised and thought that a visit by the King to the U.S. might create more problems, and would receive more publicity than if the President had seen him during the funeral. The King was going to have his Ambassador contact HAK to make arrangements for an appointment and asked McCone to do what he could to promote this. McCone said he would respond to the request. HAK said that it would not be wise to generate this visit and HAK and McCone agreed that if the visit was strictly private with no publicity, there might be a chance the President would see the King since the President does like him. They agreed that it would be difficult to avoid any publicity. HAK said it wasn't really in the King's interest to push our Government since, if asked, we would be forced to back the present Government of Greece with whom we have formal diplomatic relations. HAK said if McCone could use his influence to turn the King off it would be in the best interest of everyone. McCone said he would do his best to dissuade him from coming at all but at the same time would express the President's highest regard for him (the King). HAK said again that in his conversation with the King, all he said was that if the King had been here privately, it might have been different. McCone said he would direct his point in that direction to the King. McCone said we was sending a report to Dick Helms on this and has informed Alexis.

By: KHLU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Secy Packard
Mr. Kissinger
4-14-69 12:30 PM

25

P said he wanted to find out about situation with respect to Hexagon and MOL. K said Laird told him he was going to send something over so K could re-raise it. P asked what decision has been made and what does President want to do. K said he was called into a meeting with Mayo and tax the President - Mayo carried on about these two. K said his problem is that he knows nothing about Hexagon and not much about MOL so he could not take a position to say MOL is sex essential. K said President said stretch out MOL. K said both could be reopened if he could get a piece of paper explaining why. P said the best course to him would be to kill MOL altogether. P said there is a good deal of development work on camera for MOL and if we cancel, we should kill the whole thing. P said we could go back and restructure the camera work so that it might be used in Hexagon. P said he does not know what this would cost but if President really wants to do something, this looks like the best. K said he wants to do it but is willing to listen to reason on it. P said that is all he needs to know except for timing - when does K want recommendation. K said fairly soon and P said he would get it over today or tomorrow.

jm

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger

4x4x4 4-14-69 12:35 PM

Both agreed OAS speech had been a good one.

K said he was calling about two minor things. First, the President feels that John Lodge is going to Argentina or nothing. R said o.k. R asked K if he had seen that story and K said yes - R said Lodge gave it out himself. K said, secondly, the President is beginning to think of Cleveland for OAS. K said he just wanted to warn R of this. R asked what about Italy - that is really what he wants and he speaks Italian. K said if R wanted him to raise it with the President and R said yes. K said that is not a bad idea, he would be wasted at OAS in a way.

K asked whether R had seen the story in the latest Newsweek re divisions in the Administration on foreign policy. R said no. K said he has a call in to Kay Graham - one point they make is that R talked to Dobrynin and then within 24 hours K called him and said the opposite. K said he has never talked to Dobrynin about SEA, which is what they say. K said Dobrynin came in last week to drop off Budapest thing and he saw him four weeks ago at the Czech Ambassador's luncheon. K said story also says K has made contemptuous comments about R and Laird and that is outrageous. K said he says what he believes and he has always spoken in the highest terms about R - K said Kay Graham knows this better than anyone. R said he would be interested in what Kay says. K said he never comments to the press about Cabinet Officers. The only thing he has ever said about R is that they have a good working relationship and he has a high personal regard for R. K said he does not think it is possible to find a newsman who has ever heard him say anything else. R said he has never heard anything derogatory. K said it can't be true because he does not feel it. K said he really wants Kay to track it down. Re: K said Laird, K said the only thing he said was policy on secret talks is President's policy. R said to let him know what Kay says. K asked R if he had ever heard that story about his talking to Dobrynin within 24 hours and R said no.

jm

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

April 14, 2:40 p.m.

Kay Graham

HAK said he would like to register a couple of complaints. He was referring to two statements appearing in the current issue of Newsweek.

"Rogers was assuring him that the U.S. was determined to get out of Vietnam as soon as possible; 24 hours later, national-security adviser Kissinger was warning him that the U.S. has long-term interests in Southeast Asia which it is bound to protect."

HAK said the sequence of time here was totally untrue in the first place and that Rogers wouldn't say something like that. HAK said these statements were inconsistent. It is possible that Rogers would want to get out of Vietnam but HAK doesn't think he would say something like that to Dobrynin (if that is where the writer puts his source. HAK said he didn't recall any time frame relevant to such a statement any meetings he would have had with Dobrynin.

The second quote in Newsweek was "...the strategist with an eye largely fastened on long-range global concepts and an ear largely deaf to propolitical clamor surrounding them, is more than slightly contemptuous of what he considers amateurish dabblings by his colleagues." HAK said he defies anyone to find the time or place in which he expressed this attitude. He said he has always had a high regard for Rogers and Laird and would never say a thing like that even if he thought it, and that Kay Graham now he was genuine in his feelings toward both of them.

Graham said she would see what she could find out but it would be difficult for the writer to give up their source. She agreed that this could be damaging.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Richard Helms
Mr. Kissinger
4-14-69 4:00 PM

H said he would like to ask K to take a matter up for him with the President. H said he has been asked to make a talk to Business Council next month at the Nixon Hot Springs on Vietnam. H said he would plan to cover the background and where it stands but would not get into controversial aspects of peace talks etc. H said he did this once before in a slightly different context and it was off the record. H said this would be off the record as well, but you can't stop people from saying a word here and there. H wants to be sure he has President's permission and he will submit text to K beforehand. K said he would raise it with the President.

K said he would like to see H for about fifteen minutes today or tomorrow. They agreed to meet at 9:45 in the morning (April 15) before the 303 Committee.

jm

By KHL NARA, Date 5/13/04

Telecon

Secretary Rogers

April 14, 5:25 p.m.

HAK said he had talked to Kay Graham about the two statements appearing in Newsweek. She didn't know anything but was supposed to call HAK back. The first statement was untrue and besides the two statements were not consistent. On the second statement, she knows from her mark own experience, and she confirmed that, that it was totally contrary.

Rogers said he was going to make a speech tomorrow on ( ???) He said he would make a remark about how the press has written up the news differences between State and the WH. Rogers said "When he was Attorney General it was suggested by the press that he was working for J. Edgar Hoover and now it is suggested that he is working for HAK. He is pretty happy to share the blame. with everybody" He wanted to know if HAK objected to this. HAK said no.

Rogers said if we don't take them seriously and keep it on a personal humerous base, it would be better for all.

HAK said he hadn't had a chance to talk to the President about the
Cleveland thing but thought it was a good idea anyway.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCON
Pete Vaky
Mr. Kissinger
4-14-69 6:15 PM

V said he imagines Larry has told K that he will still be at State this
week. V said with K's permission, he would like a few days to
recharge and will be on deck on the 28th. K said o.k.

K asked V if he was putting the squeeze on Rockefeller because of
Guatemala. K asked if V was urging him to do it. V said he thinks
a Secret Service judgment should be obtained - it is difficult if he
cancels now. V said the only thing would be to ask all central American
countries to meet in one place. K asked whether there were not two or
three places where they have organizations. K said he does not see
any reason why Rockefeller should run risk of getting himself bumped
off - neither does the President. V said he thought Rockefeller should
get Secret Service judgment on this - the only other thing
would be for all five countries to meet in Salvador. K said o.k. he
would talk to Rockefeller.

jm

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Professor Graubard
Mr. Kissinger
4-14-69 6:20 PM

G said the Council on Foreign Relations is trying to bring together a Franco-American something. G said he wondered if there was any chance of K being able to attend - it is at Endicott House June 12-15. K said he could not predict that and asked G to write him a letter. G said it is on a week end - K said he might be able to come up on a Saturday afternoon. K asked whether G was managing it and G said yes, the American side. G said group is made up of kind of people K would approve - Dillon, Brademas, etc. K said he would love to do it but he cannot commit himself now to a fixed date. G said he would send invitation. If K does not come, it might be useful to have someone from K's staff - K said he would try to arrange that. G said, of course, he would rather have K than someone like Bergsten or someone else from the staff - if K can come for 2/3 or 1/2 it would be wonderful. K said he would try his best.

K said he would love to see G. G said he would like to tell K about a trip he took to Europe. K said he is getting honorary degree at Brown and hopes G will be there - in June.

K and G discussed Harvard student problem

jm

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCON
Dr. Nathan Pusey
Mr. Kissinger
4-14-69 7:05 PM

K said he just wanted P to know that he would have strongly supported his actions. P said he thinks he has 48 percent with him and if he can build up to 60 percent they will do something important. K said when 300 students can destroy 300 years of tradition we have really reached a sorry state. P said he had decided it was time to fight - of all the presidents he is in the best position to do it; if Harvard can't do it then we are really in bad shape. K said he was upset by the moral blindness of some of his colleagues. P said K may have heard that he is in the press again again because the kids got into the files. K said he was actually never in NVT. K said he was not bothered by it. P said it would be disastrous if they got into the personal lives of our people. P said it is outrageous that files can be stolen and published. P said the students and faculty think the administration is on trial and particularly P - but with the alumni and governing boards it is 90 percent the other way. P said the faculty is really on trial and that will show up in next few days. P said he thinks it has national significance - K agreed and P said he was glad K recognized it. P said he was going to fight this thing thru.

K said privately the President was shaken by this and sees it the way P does. President asked if it would help if he pulled the ROTC out of there. P said to tell him not to say or do anything. P said he would let K know when and if the time comes when he thinks it would be helpful for President to get involved.

jm

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

TELECON

Dr. Kissinger to
Dick Sneider

8:16 p. m., April 14, 1969

K -- Sorry I didn't get back to you but I was going over your peace plan in case I had to see the President. I think it's on the right track and very much along the lines of my own thinking. Would you put the whole thing to the Russians?

S -- XXXXX Only the first element of it; not the details. Wouldn't go into the phases of it because they tend to essentially spell it out. The big thing with them is to understand we would be willing to go on both tracks together. One different element is Mort's idea -- in effect, to give a kind of assurance.

K -- Could you and Mort work out something more in a speech format that takes your idea and some of his.

S -- How far would you go on this: the stage between engagements and getting out of the country.

K -- You got this from the Rockefeller plan. I would like something I can show the President -- this is too detailed for the President to use in a public speech. Envision in two or three weeks his saying, 'these are our negotiating efforts' publicly. Then we could give them a slightly more generous detailed version. The public version should be less forthcoming.