March 28, 1961

Hedley Bull, Esq.
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street, Aldwych
London W.2, England

Dear Mr. Bull:

This is just a note to thank you for
having sent me a copy of the Reporter issue
in which your article on British unilateralism
appeared. I found it most interesting and
informative.

With kind regards.

CHECKED IN TALKS DEPARTMENT WITH 'AS BROADCAST' SCRIPT

LIMITED WAR AND NUCLEAR WAR

by Hedley Bull

Producer: Anthony Moncrieff

Pre-Recorded: Monday, 7th January, 1963.

Tape No.: TLO 364 Duration: 19'40"

Transmission: Friday, 11th January, 1963: 8.00 - 8.20 p.m.

THIRD PROGRAMME

The doctrine that the conduct of war should be limited in relation to some criterion of prudence or justice has always been assessed from two different points of view. On the one hand there are those whose gaze is fixed upon a world in which war plays no part at all, and for whom the doctrine that war should be limited is objectionable because it represents a compromise with evil. On the other hand there are those for whom the alternative to a war moderated by some sense of prudence or justice is not the absence of war, but war fought without restraint of any kind. From this perspective the doctrine of limitations appears beneficent and civilising.

If we choose to embrace the doctrine of limited war, then it follows that we are granting a licence to engage in war. We are contributing to its continuation as an institution. Alternatively, if we choose to reject it, then there are other consequences equally inescapable. We are allying ourselves with those tendencies making against restraint in war. Grotius perceived this when he recognised the alliance that existed between the practice of uninhibited violence during the Thirty Years' War, and the pacifism of Erasmus - both of which were hostile to his own doctrine that a distinction must be drawn between just wars, and ways of conducting them, and unjust wars. "For both extremes," Grotius wrote, "For both extremes a remedy must be found, that men may not believe either that nothing is allowable or that anything is."

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The theory and practice of modern international relations have tended to move back and forth between one of the horns of this dilemma and the other. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the doctrine of limitations in war was a powerful one; but since the first world war it has receded into the background. In the theory of international relations, the idea of prudent and just conduct in war has given place to doctrines which aim at the prohibition of all war, or which concern themselves only with the justice of the cause for which the war is fought, and not with the manner in which it is carried on. While in the actual practice of war there has been a collapse of restraint, especially notable in the disappearance of respect for the cardinal distinction between combatants and non-combatants. The twentieth century has displayed that same alliance of extremes against which Grotius directed his remarks in the seventeenth.

In the discussion of war at the present time it has been almost universally assumed, until very recently, that a war involving an exchange of strategic nuclear weapons between the territories of the major powers would necessarily be one without limits. That is to say, it has been thought inconceivable that in such a way the parties should exercise restraint of any kind, whether with regard to the weapons they use, the theatres of operation they choose, or the targets they attack. It has, of course, long been thought that limitations may be observed in modern war so long as the major powers do not employ strategic nuclear weapons. It is widely believed that a conventional or non-nuclear, engagement involving the great powers may be kept limited. And it is also believed, though less widely, that restraint may be practised in a nuclear war if it is confined to the use of tactical nuclear weapons on a battlefield remote from the territories of the United States and the Soviet Union. But once a conflict has reached the level of strategic nuclear warfare, it has been assumed, no further possibility of limitation remains.

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In the United States in the last few years these assumptions have been increasingly criticised. And in official pronouncements of the United States government, the view that strategic nuclear war can only take the form of a blind fury of destruction unrelated to the political interests of the belligerents has now been definitely rejected. Nothing that has been said excludes the possibility that in such a war the United States will employ the means she possesses to destroy the cities and population of the Soviet Union. But it has been made clear that she hopes to place herself in a position in which this is no more than one of a number of courses of action from which she can choose, and in which throughout the conduct of operations she retains sufficient flexibility in her strategy and sufficient control of her own forces to ensure that the objectives of her foreign policy will at no stage be lost to sight. In his speech of 17th February last year, the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. McNamara, expressed this new doctrine as follows:

"Our new policy," he said, "gives us the flexibility to choose among several operational plans, but does not require that we make any advance commitments with respect to doctrine or targets. We shall be committed only to a system that gives us the ability to use our forces in a controlled and deliberate way, so as to pursue the interests of the United States, our allies, and the rest of the free world."

In a later speech, on 16th June, Mr. McNamara went beyond this doctrine of flexibility and control, to indicate actual preference for a strategy very different from that of a massive attack on cities. "The United States has come to the conclusion," he said, "that to the extent feasible basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives,

in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on
the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military
forces, not of his civilian population."

In assessing Mr. McNamara's doctrine of limitations we find
ourselves in the same dilemma by which the discussion of prudent
and just conduct in war has always been found. If we endorse the
idea that this kind of warfare may be employed as an instrument of
policy, we appear to be issuing an invitation to engage in it.
But, if we reject this idea, and the policies for which it seems
to call, if we insist that, whatever may be true of lesser forms
of violence, war in the strategic nuclear dimension can only take
the form of a meaningless orgy of destruction, we are helping to
ensure that if such a war does break out, it will, in fact, take
this form.

I do not believe that there is any way out of this dilemma.
We should recognise that there are dangers involved both in accepting
Mr. McNamara's view and in rejecting it. However, it is also my
impression that the balance of the argument rests in Mr. McNamara's
favour. I propose to explore the argument by considering three
objections that are commonly raised against his new doctrine.

The first objection is that even if limitations in strategic
nuclear war are possible and desirable, it is dangerous to speak
as if they are, because to do so is to make it more likely that
such a conflict will take place. In Britain this objection may be
heard both on the Right and on the Left. The Left wing is concerned
that talk of restraint will make a policy of resort to nuclear war
seem attractive to Western leaders. The Right wing, by contrast,
fears that the discussion will tempt Soviet leaders, and so undermine
the effectiveness of the Western deterrent.

This first objection is not a decisive one. The fear of a
general war, both in the Western world and in the Soviet Union,
is so great that it may be doubted whether the discussion of restraints

will noticeably diminish this fear. Moreover, whatever the risks involved in discussing these matters, there are also risks in failing to do so and allowing false doctrines to go unchallenged. Serious inquiry into strategic matters at the present time is constantly impeded by the argument that the myths and dogmas that surround the subject of nuclear war serve a useful purpose, and that we should let them well alone. But if we are to choose our opinions not according to their truth or falsity, but according to their possible effect on the future actions of ourselves or of others, our understanding of strategic questions will remain slight indeed.

The second objection is that once a strategic nuclear exchange has begun it is impossible to imagine that restraints will be observed. This view is very widely held, but it is, I believe, mistaken. The factors operating in favour of the limitation of war at lower levels, though they may be weaker, must also be present in a strategic nuclear conflict.

The arguments which are used in support of this objection are often the same ones which may be stated in order to show that limitations are not possible in any kind of war. Clausewitz paraphrased them as follows: "War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost extreme; as one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which logically must lead to an extreme." If this were the case, the mildest outbreak of hostilities between states must set in train an automatic process which leads inevitably to their use of every means of destruction at their command. It is clearly not the case as Clausewitz was aware.

What is there, then, about strategic nuclear conflict that exempts it from the operation of those factors that have sometimes brought about limitations in other kinds of war?

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It may be conceded at once that after the strategic nuclear threshold has been crossed, the danger of a collapse of all restraint must be very great indeed. It is also true that none of the boundaries or distinctions which might assist the limitations of this kind of war is as clear or as serviceable as those which should already have been crossed were it to have begun. The distinction between nuclear war and non-nuclear is easily recognised. So is that between war on the territories of the major powers and war elsewhere. Both these limitations were tested in the Korean war. If the powers are able to contain their violence within these lower limits, the chances of preventing the collapse of all restraint will be greater than if they do not. But it's dangerous in war or politics to assume that any course of action is impossible. It implies not merely that something cannot be done, but that this will continue to be the case irrespectively of what we think and do. Very often, this isn't so. It's not merely that there's some possibility of restraint in a strategic nuclear war, but how great this possibility is may largely depend on the strategic doctrines entertained by the belligerents, and the military arrangements made by them, at the moment of the outbreak of hostilities.

If, at this moment, the doctrine of limitations has never been seriously considered inside the governments of the belligerents, or if the opposing governments have never communicated to one another that they contemplated limitations, and what these were, the chances of restraint might be slim indeed. But if, on the other hand, at the opening of the war, the doctrine of limitations were to have become one of the orthodoxies of strategic opinion, familiar in the thought of both sides and forming part of the stock of ideas comprehensible to them both, the chances might be greater.

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A great deal will depend also upon the kinds of armaments and armed forces the belligerents have. If in the course of hostilities the governments are likely to lose control of what the military are doing, owing to an inadequate system of command and communication, the likelihood of limitation will be slight. If the only kinds of nuclear explosive at their disposal are of a kind that cause indiscriminate damage over a wide area, there will be a further obstacle. If the means they possess of delivering explosives on specified targets are inaccurate and unreliable, difficulties will result. If important military targets, such as strategic weapons, are located in or near centres of population, certain kinds of limitation, at least, cannot be observed. If the belligerents are committed by their war plans to the destruction of one another's seats of government, the kind of political intercourse which must persist during a war, if limitations are to be maintained, cannot take place. If there are all these difficulties in the way of the observance of restraint, it is also true that the military policies of the great powers can move in such a way as greatly to diminish them. Systems of command and control can be designed to withstand the disruption of general war. Explosives that are discriminating in their effects can be made available. The accuracy of missiles can be improved. Strategic weapons and other important military targets can in many cases be placed remote from centres of population. The desirability of allowing the political authority of the opposing country to escape attack, so as to preserve the possibility of negotiation, can be taken into account in the drawing up of war plans.

The third objection to Mr. McNamara's policy I wish to discuss is a somewhat sophisticated one which derives from an influential school of strategic thinkers. It's aimed not at the general conception of limitations in strategic nuclear war, but at the view expressed by the American Secretary of Defence, that these