REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION

DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM, 1957 - 1958

HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table><tr><td>I.</td><td>INTRODUCTION: MILITARY POLICY AS A FIELD OF STUDY</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>II.</td><td>STAFF</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>III.</td><td>CURRICULUM</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>A. Defense Policy and Administration in the United States</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>B. Comparative Defense Policy and Administration</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>IV.</td><td>RESEARCH, TEACHING AND WRITING BY THE STAFF<br>(Includes List of Publications)</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>V.</td><td>WORKING LIBRARY AND SPECIAL COLLECTIONS</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>VI.</td><td>OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>VII.</td><td>TOWARD THE FUTURE</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>VIII.</td><td>AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION CITATION</td><td>32</td></tr><tr><td>IX.</td><td>APPENDICES</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Appendix I. Recipients of Defense Policy Seminar Materials to 1 July 1958.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Appendix II. Defense Policy and Administration in the United States, 1957-1958.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Appendix III. List of Mimeographed Materials Prepared for Student Use -- Serials.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Appendix IV. Comparative Defense Policy and Administration in the United States -- Bibliography.</td><td></td></tr></table>

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# I. INTRODUCTION: MILITARY POLICY AS A FIELD OF STUDY.

> I think it is not going too far to say that given the nature of modern arms and modern warfare, the major institutional aspect of the whole problem of democratic foreign policy has come to be that of the relations between the civilian and military components of government.*

Three years ago when the Harvard Defense Studies Program was founded, warfare was still generally considered within the prerogative of the military, requiring at once a particular background and a security clearance. In the teaching of history it was the fashion to bracket wars as irrelevant parentheses in time with causes at the beginning and results at the end. The study of political thought was still divorced from its concomitant, military thought, and amongst political scientists, military policy was treated as a minor aspect of foreign policy. Thus in a sense military policy has been excluded from serious consideration because of its semi-inclusion in other fields. Before military affairs could be fully appreciated the intellectual content had to be developed on its own in an atmosphere of full freedom and unlimited scope. This was the challenge which the Ford Foundation Grant presented.

Certainly it cannot yet be contended that the study of military affairs is given the serious academic consideration which the concept of civilian control, the large responsibilities of Congress, the persistence of certain Constitutional debates, and the perennial problem of the

*Max Beloff, *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process*, Baltimore, 1955, pp. 84-85.

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budget both as to size and allocation would all suggest.* It is, for example, discouraging to note that in the image of the American Political Science Association, as this is delineated in convention programs, defense policy is not yet an annually recurring subject for discussion. In 1957 it was not discussed at all. In 1958 it will be a subject on only one panel. However, on the brighter side of the academic ledger, there is now a permanently established and enthusiastically supported Program at Harvard, as well as at a number of other institutions. Military Policy is becoming an area in which civilian scholarship is beginning to have an effect on national thinking. Indeed, the response to the need which brought the Defense Studies Program into existence has been greater than any of us imagined possible. After three years of development it is encouraging to report that new approaches to the subject are being tried elsewhere and the richness and variety of present thinking show great promise for the future.

Perhaps, as Colonel George A. Lincoln of the United States Military Academy suggests, the academic community shouldered their responsibilities "a generation too late", but there is every indication that they have now been shouldered permanently. In the future, given the quality

*It seems only proper, however, to cite the opinion of a respected scholar to the contrary who states: "A symptom of the barrenness of our collective attention to diplomacy has been the existence of nearly a dozen generously endowed research centers preoccupied with military problems and national security, while only a pitiful handful of our scholars have grappled with diplomatic problems." The opinion, however, we find inexplicable. See Kenneth W. Thompson, "The Kennan-Acheson Debate," *The Commonweal*, April 4, 1958.

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of those who are teaching and writing on military affairs and the interest of students in the field, there will doubtless be a more general sharing of the burden in the academic community.

There are, however, several very real problems which must be met before the full potentiality of the field can be developed. Basically, these can be solved only through the expenditure of sums which, usual in the physical sciences, are larger than customary in the established fields of the social sciences.

For example, since the field is a new one it is difficult to bring together adequate raw materials for research and student readings. Also there is immediate need for a society for the study of defense policy, teaching and graduate fellowships, and a magazine devoted to defense studies.

From a number of points of view the study of military affairs can be conceived as a reasonably stable body of data susceptible to academic analysis. The impact of the military on the social structure of the United States offers one approach; the relationship between military technology and the organization of government for making various kinds of decisions offers another.

Organizational patterns change however, new weapons bring up new problems; and as some particular needs arise, the relevance of others withers away. Thus there is an alternative as to whether one should teach in terms of the immediate problems of the day, or give exclusive attention to the more permanent aspects of the subject, given the undeniable fact that students will not be policy makers during the period when most current problems are still pending.

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At the beginning of the Program it was decided to make every effort to keep it as up-to-the-moment as possible. The reasoning which lay behind this decision was a firm conviction on our part that this would tend to emphasize what we considered the most important aspect in the making of defense policy -- namely minimizing lead-time in terms of both changes in weapons systems and modifications in policies which these necessitate. As a policy decision this seems with the perspective of time to have been sound. A remarkable number of the policy issues which appeared to be serious in 1955-56 are equally as serious now. The pressing problems of a reserve program, of retention of men in the Services, of military transport -- were then, and are now, very much with us. Our initial contention, therefore, that keeping a seminar contemporary does not bring about a lessening of the intellectual content, seems justified by experience. But it must be remembered that staying abreast of contemporary affairs is a relatively expensive process.

As it was originally conceived, the seminar in "Defense Policy and Administration in the United States" was to consider chiefly aspects of national policy which crossed the desks of civilians in the Pentagon. This concept has been broadened, for military policy is made in the Office of Defense Mobilization with respect to civil defense, to stockpiling etc., and is presently part and parcel of any number of other programs which are not controlled in the Pentagon. War must be conceived broadly to include, among others, measures to be taken for passive defense and foreign economic policy. For example, the Director of the Defense Studies Program, if not all his colleagues, has been of the opinion that military assistance programs should be examined far more closely than they have been in the past. He feels that in the future the problem of

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arms control should be given greater attention, and that the effects of
an intensified war on the international economic front must be studied
with utmost care. If the Seminar in "Defense Policy and Administration
in the United States" is to have this breadth, it is clear that Research
Associates and Research Assistants with different training and interests
must be brought into the Program for periods of a year or more to keep
the permanent staff abreast of new problems in international conflict.

The question of defining the most important aspects in the field
of Defense Studies must also be raised. After three years of study we have
determined what we believe should be the subject matter considered in a
course in U. S. Defense Policy and Administration.* We also believe that
we now understand at least one suggestive and enlightening approach to
the study of comparative defense policy.** Finally, we have experimented
with an undergraduate course in the history of Modern U.S. Military
Policy. The results of this experiment were recounted in last year's re-
port to the Ford Foundation.

Our experiments in teaching have convinced us that what is peculiar
about the study of military affairs is that it cannot be confined within
the context of any single academic discipline. The field submits to
independent study by the economist, the sociologist, the political scien-
tist and others, each from his own viewpoint. No single academic dis-
cipline is broad enough to contain military policy, just as none is
broad enough to satisfy the needs of a study in foreign policy. What

*See Appendix II.

**See page 12.

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differentiates military policy from other academic pursuits is that it devotes itself to study of the methodology of violence. Because of its interdisciplinary character, the Defense Studies Program should find a compatible atmosphere within Harvard's new Center for International Affairs.

who served as Associate Director in 1955-58 and as Director for the past two years; Harry H. Kissom, Research Associate in 1955-58; and Harry D. Feld, Research Assistant in 1955-58 and Research Associate for the past two years.

In addition, a number of others have been associated on a full-time or part-time basis with the Defense Studies Program for limited periods over the past three years. They have included as Research Associate and Lecturer, William R. Emerson (on leave, 1956-57, from Yale University); as Research Associate, William Wiseley, as Teaching Fellow; Franklin G. Ball, John A. Ballard, Robert W. Berry, Harvard K. Gordon, Donald B. Reesing, Lawrence Levine, Dudley F. Mason, Peter R. O'Conlin, and Timothy W. Stanley. Though not formal members of the staff, others who have been closely associated with the program at various periods at Harvard have included Arthur Smithies, Professor of Economics; Samuel P. Huntington, Assistant Professor of Government; Colonel Trevor N. Denny, formerly Professor of Military Science and Tactics; and Robert Dorfman, Professor of Economics.

Indispensable administrative and secretarial assistance over the past three years have been given by Helen Sorrentino (1955-58), Helen Brooks (1958-59),

*Professor Leuchten conducted an experimental Defense Policy Seminar in 1955-56 on his non initiative and without outside financing. The success of this venture was the basis for a successful application to the Ford Foundation for a three-year grant to continue the experiment with an expanded full-time staff and more adequate facilities.

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## II. THE STAFF.

Four members of the staff have been continuously associated with the Defense Studies Program during the past three years. These are: W. Barton Leach, Story Professor of Law, founder* and first Director (1955-56) of the Defense Studies Program; Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., who served as Associate Director in 1955-56 and as Director for the past two years; Harry H. Ransom, Research Associate in 1955-58; and Maury D. Feld, Research Assistant in 1955-56 and Research Associate for the past two years.

In addition, a number of others have been associated on a full-time or part-time basis with the Defense Studies Program for limited periods over the past three years. These have included as Research Associate and Lecturer, William R. Emerson (on leave, 1956-57, from Yale University); as Research Associate, William Wiseley; as teaching fellows: Franklin G. Balch, John A. Ballard, Robert W. Berry, Bernard K. Gordon, Donald B. Keesing, Laurence Levine, Bayley F. Mason, Peter K. Ogloblin, and Timothy W. Stanley. Though not formal members of the staff, others who have been closely associated with the program at various periods at Harvard have included Arthur Smithies, Professor of Economics; Samuel P. Huntington, Assistant Professor of Government; Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, formerly Professor of Military Science and Tactics; and Robert Dorfman, Professor of Economics.

Indispensable administrative and secretarial assistance over the past three years have been given by Helen Sorrentino (1955-58), Helen Brooks (1955-57), Rena Themistocles (1955-58), and Deirdre Henderson (1957-58).

*Professor Leach conducted an experimental Defense Policy Seminar in 1954-55 on his own initiative and without outside financing. The success of this venture was the basis for a successful application to the Ford Foundation for a three-year grant to continue the experiment with an expanded full-time staff and more adequate facilities.

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### III. CURRICULUM.

#### A. DEFENSE POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

First priority over the past three years has been given the Seminar in "Defense Policy and Administration in the United States" by the Defense Studies Program staff. The Seminar, running the full academic year, has been a composite group of graduate students from Law, Business, Public Administration, and a few students from other schools. This year the student enrollment was 39.* During the past three years, 124 students have been enrolled in the Defense Policy Seminar.** Of these, approximately half have been officers of the armed services assigned to Harvard, enrolled mostly in the Business School. The other half of the total were civilians, largely from the Law School.

A pattern for instruction in the Seminar has been established. Elements of this pattern are as follows: (a) lectures, often by outside experts, on topics selected (b) student presentations on selected topics (c) discussion of lectures (d) extensive required readings (e) a long research paper and book review required of each student.

Lecturers have represented a wide range of backgrounds, interests and skills.*** The trend over the past three years has been to rely less

* **Breakdown of Students: 1957-58**

<table><tr><td>Business School</td><td>18</td><td>Civilian</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>Law School</td><td>13</td><td>Military</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>GSPA</td><td>6</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>GSAS</td><td>2</td><td>Total</td><td>39</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>39</td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>

**Additionally some 60 students were enrolled in a Military History Course in 1957 and 27 students have taken the Advanced Seminar of the Defense Studies Program. For a detailed report on "History 138b" see the Report to the Ford Foundation for 1956-57, pp. 13-21.

***See Appendix II; also Ford Report 1955-56, pp. 8-11; Ford Report 1956-57, Appendix III.

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upon outside guest lecturers and more upon the Defense Studies staff and
the wealth of resources from the immediate academic community. Neverthe-
less, it is expected that, given the range of topics covered in the
Seminar, guest lecturers with widely different skills will always be use-
ful.

The normal pattern for the Seminar in its weekly meetings has been
a one-hour lecture and a one-hour question and discussion period. In
keeping with a precedent early established, subgroups have been assigned
responsibility for particular sessions. At such sessions, designated
groups have been expected to do intensive preparation on the chosen sub-
ject and to take the lead in raising questions in the general discussion
during one session. Because of the size of the Seminar, this method has
made possible a more active sense of participation by members of the
Seminar than might have been possible had the entire group attempted
to play a role in the question and discussion period. In addition to the
committee or subgroup method, each of the four subgroups of the Seminar
during 1957-58 met bi-weekly with a member of the Defense Studies staff
for an hour's discussion. In this way, each member of the Seminar has
been given an opportunity to participate in a discussion. This has
proved to be a most satisfactory way of meeting the problems resulting
from the Seminar's unusually large size.

In planning the Seminar for its first year of operation under the
Ford Foundation grant, staff members faced a perplexing problem of provid-
ing students with adequate reading material on topics chosen for discus-
sion.

Since the Seminar began its operations in the fall of 1955, a steady
volume of writing on defense policy has been published. The problem of

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1958 in this regard is not the same as in 1955. In the intervening years the Defense Studies Program has issued some 129 serials designed to fill the gaps in reading matter for students enrolled in the Seminar, and for other universities undertaking to teach similar courses. These serials have been widely used, both in university courses elsewhere and in governmental agencies.* Much of the energy of the Defense Studies staff has been devoted over the past three years to the production of these readings. These have, of course, been supplemented by the increasing volume of published material on topics dealt with in the Seminar. The increasing number of very useful published materials more recently has somewhat freed the Defense Studies staff from the heavy burden of producing weekly serials. This, in turn, has allowed staff members more time to pursue their own research interests. In the three-year period, the Defense Studies staff has expended much effort in providing its own basic textbook material, and this task is far from completed.

A basic requirement of all students enrolled in the Seminar has been a research paper. The model for such requirement was a paper suitable for publication in an appropriate journal. Some have met this goal.

The staff of the Defense Studies Program is satisfied with the general format of the Seminar. The instructional techniques which have been developed over the past three years now seem well suited to the situation here. The teaching materials can, of course, stand improvement. Yet most encouraging of all is the fact that many students of the Seminar have put their study to good use. Some have seen to it that our methods

*See Appendix I.

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and teaching materials were instituted in other academic institutions, others have gone into positions in the Pentagon where they have found that their instruction here has been invaluable to them. Still others write on defense policy. The measure of continued enthusiasm of former students has been, together with helping spread defense studies, a deep satisfaction.

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B. COMPARATIVE DEFENSE POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

Each nation's defense policy is a reflection of the social values, the prejudices and aspirations which history, geography and wealth have molded. The second seminar of the Defense Studies Program, offered to a small group of selected students, dealt with this problem on a comparative basis. The defense policies of Great Britain, France, Germany, the USSR and China were studied. The strategic concepts, organizational concepts, tactics, officer recruitment and service training of these nations were compared in order to obtain some realization of the factors which go into the creation of over-all military doctrines.

It is only when there is broad understanding of the terms in which military doctrine is acceptable to a society that more reasoned thought leading to more rational courses of action will be possible. The image of the future for which preparations have to be made can never be foretold with statistical accuracy. Probabilities, however, can be more accurately outlined if the thinking of other nations on their defense problems comes to be a matter of common understanding, and the full range of their theoretical approaches to defense problems is laid out. Thinking on war has been in terms of opportunities lost or exploited rather than in terms of the breakdown of logical doctrine.

This year the Seminar was broken down into five sections. The first had to do with the selection of weapons systems and the effect of weapons systems on policy planning and strategic thought. Here we dealt with the motivation which goes into the selection of such weapons within a framework of military doctrine. Likewise, we considered in the same context the pattern of weapons rejection. We also discussed the influence of weapons on national planning in the field of foreign policy. The fact that the French Army

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thought of the tank in primarily defensive terms while the German Army saw it as basically an offensive weapon had a great effect on the kinds of policy planning on which each nation insisted. A number of other such examples were discussed.

A second section of the Seminar dealt with the relationship between political, economic and military thought. The fact that differing social values create opposite military ideologies was considered. For instance, the industrial state thinks of war essentially in terms of blockade, strategic bombing, and cutting lines of communication; the agricultural state thinks in terms of manpower attrition. We attempted to trace the influence on military strategy of revolution, of laissez-faire liberalism, and of doctrinaire national socialism, facets which have not to our knowledge been given much scholarly attention.

A third section of the Seminar dealt with the general topic of the meaning of civilian control as defined in various types of governments. Considering the frequency with which this topic is discussed, and the convictions which it arouses, singularly little seems to be known about the attitudes toward civilian control in other nations. To illustrate: in the United States all Secretaries must be civilian. In France this need not be so. In the United States it is an almost sacred right of Congress to probe into each of the provisions of the military budget. In Great Britain the legislative body does not consider this delving within its prerogative. Again the point is that a comparative study illuminates the darkness of one's own preconceptions in a way in which no other approach can.

A fourth area of study has been comparative organization. This has been very broadly conceived to include concepts of leadership. Again the weaknesses, the vagaries, and the strengths of a variety of organi-

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zational patterns were studied, both with a view to discovering the limi-
tations with which organization may shackle leadership on the one hand,
and help develop it on the other. We also became much interested in the
ways in which organizational patterns reflect the many mutually exclusive
objectives which an organization is designed to attain.

The fifth section of the Seminar was given by the students them-
selves. This consisted of student presentations of the topics on which
their papers were written.

The format of the Seminar this year proved most satisfactory. How-
ever, it attempted to cover too much ground. Perhaps this is necessary
in so undeveloped a field. Suffice it to say, in summary, that for those
on the staff who taught this subject for two years, the experience and
achievement was most worthwhile. It should be continued when possible.

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IV. RESEARCH, TEACHING AND WRITING BY THE STAFF.

As mentioned above, the production of teaching materials has been a major function of the Defense Studies Program. In the issuance of some 129 serials over the three-year period -- the mimeograph form ranging from a few pages to as many as 80 pages -- the Defense Studies Program has attempted to fulfill its principal mandate, to stimulate teaching in this field. Some of the material appearing originally as Defense Studies serials has been developed into books or published as articles. In this category are Timothy W. Stanley's *American Defense and National Security*, Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1956; Harry Howe Ransom's *Central Intelligence and National Security*, Harvard University Press, 1958 (forthcoming); and W. Barton Leach's "The Job of the American Service Secretary," *Revue Militaire Générale*, Paris, March 1958. Likewise published articles have been made into serials, such as Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr.'s "Should Our Military Leaders Speak Up?" The New York *Times Magazine*, April 15, 1956, and "The Military Lessons of Suez," *The Reporter*, November 29, 1956.

Although the Program has been primarily oriented to teaching, the production of reading materials, and experimentation in teaching methods, it has also been possible for members of the staff to engage in writing and research in the defense field. Such activity has, of course, been highly interrelated with the primary teaching objective of the Program.

A list of some of the publications of members of the Defense Studies staff over the past three years indicates the areas in which interest has developed.

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## BOOKS

Feld, M.D.; Huntington, S.P.; Katzenbach, E.L.; Ransom, H.H.; Wrinch, P.N.,
(contributors)

Essays in Comparative Defense Policy, published as Part I of *Public Policy*, 1958, Friedrich, C.J.; Harris, S.; Eds., (These essays were gathered at the request of the Director of the Defense Studies Program).

Ransom, Harry H.

*Central Intelligence and National Security*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1958 (forthcoming).

Stanley, Timothy W.

*American Defense and National Security*, (foreword by Robert Cutler), Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1956.

## MAGAZINE ARTICLES

Berry, Robert W.

"Bombers and Aircraft Carriers -- Secretaries and Senators," *Air Force*, July 1956.

Feld, Maury D.

"Policy and Persuasion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, March 1958.

"Typology of Military Organization," *Public Policy*, 1958.

"Study of Military History," *Military Affairs*, Spring 1958.

Katzenbach, Edward L., Jr.

"The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung," *Political Science Quarterly*, September 1955. (Written with Gene Z. Hanrahan).

"Astigmatism and Geopolitics," *Naval War College Review*, December 1955.

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"Do We Need Strong and Global Defenses?" <u>Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association</u>, January-February 1956.

"Should Our Military Leaders Speak Up?" The New York <u>Times Magazine</u>, April 15, 1956.

"The French Army," <u>Yale Review</u>, Summer 1956.

"Military Policy as a National Issue," <u>Current History</u>, October 1956.

"Time, Space and Will: The Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung," <u>Marine Corps Gazette</u>, October 1956.

"The Military Lessons of Suez," <u>The Reporter</u>, November 1956.

"Some Thoughts on DOD Organization," <u>Naval War College Review</u>, December 1956.

"The U.S. Missile Muddle," <u>The Reporter</u>, October 3, 1957.

"Deterrence and Limited War," <u>The New Leader</u>, February 10, 1958.

"Do We Pay More or Less for Defense?" <u>The New Republic</u>, April 28, 1958.

"The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century: A Study in Policy Response," in <u>Public Policy</u>, 1958. (Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, Eds.)

"The Pentagon's Reorganization Muddle," <u>The Reporter</u>, May 15, 1958.

"The Soldier and the Scholar," <u>New England Association Review</u>, Spring 1958.

"Unpreparedness for Disarmament," <u>The Reporter</u>, July 2, 1958.

## Leach, W. Barton

"Obstacles to Development of American Airpower," <u>The Annals</u>, May 1955. Reprinted in <u>Air Force Magazine</u>, August 1955.

"Pentagon Prep School," <u>Air Force Magazine</u>, August 1955.

"Nine Reasons Why Our Airpower Is Lagging," <u>Air Force Magazine</u>, September 1955.

"The Seminar in Defense Policy and Administration," <u>Harvard Law School Bulletin</u>, October 1955.

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"How to Tell Who is Ahead in Air Strength," U.S. News and World Report, May 18, 1956.

"Midway," a Chapter in Public Policy, 1956.

"Higher Defense Organization: Some British Viewpoints," Air University Quarterly Review, Winter 1956-57.

"To the Next Secretary of Defense -- A Respectful Memorandum," Air Force Magazine, January 1957.

"American Problems of Forces and Organization," Royal United Service Institution Journal, February 1957. Reprinted in 1958 by National War College as required reading.

"The Central Blue," Air Force Magazine, February 1957.

"National Need Versus Personal Wish," Air Force Magazine, September 1957.

"American Deficiencies in Military Research," The Listener, October 1957 (London).

"The Job of an American Service Secretary" with French and German summaries, Revue Militaire Generale, March 1958 (Paris).

Ransom, Harry H.

"Establish an Administrative Vice-President in the Executive Branch?" a statement appearing in Hearings, "Administrative Vice President," United States Senate, Subcommittee on Reorganization, Committee on Government Operations, January 1956, pp. 33-34.

"The Continuing Debate," Military Review, April 1956.

"Lord Trenchard, Architect of Air Power," Air University Quarterly Review, Summer 1956.

"Scientific Manpower and National Security," Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers, November 1956.

"The Harvard Seminar in Defense Policy and Administration," Journal of Legal Education (Association of American Law Schools), 1957.

"The Politics of Air Power -- A Comparative Analysis," Public Policy, 1957.

"NATO Strategy in Transition," Journal of International Affairs, May 1958.

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REVIEWS

Feld, Maury D.

Review appearing in American Sociological Review, August 1958,
(forthcoming) of: G.N. Clark, War and Society in the Seventeenth
Century.

Katzenbach, Edward L., Jr.

Review of B.H. Liddell Hart, *The Red Army: The Red Army 1918 to 1945, The Soviet Army 1946 to the Present*; *Political Science Quarterly*, January 1957.

Review of Preston, Werner and Wise, *Men in Arms*; Walter Millis, *Arms and Men*; and F.F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China*; *The Yale Review*, Winter 1957.

Review of Timothy W. Stanley, *American Defense and National Security*; *The American Political Science Review*, September 1957.

Ransom, Harry H.

Review of Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*; *Harvard Law Record*, October 17, 1957.

Leach, W. Barton

Review of Sir John C. Slessor, *The Central Blue*; *Air Force Magazine*, February 1957.

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

Leach, W. Barton

Series of letters to Editor, *Boston Herald* (Example, see page 58,
Serial No. 57, "Reading Assignment for the Air Force Budget for FY
1957").

Katzenbach, Edward L., Jr.

"How to Bring Peace to the Pentagon," *The Boston Sunday Globe*,
January 1958.

"Why That Mass Flight from Armed Services?" *The Boston Sunday Globe*, March 1958.

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## V. WORKING LIBRARY AND COLLECTIONS.

During the past three years the Defense Studies Program has accumulated a small and unique working library which may be listed as a major accomplishment of the Program. It comprises documents, pamphlets, reports, hearings by Congressional committees, and miscellaneous material relating to defense policy.

The library also has a systematically organized file of periodical and newspaper clippings dating from July 1955. It includes also several score reference books and reserve copies of recent books on national defense. The pamphlet-clipfile and miscellaneous document collection, and the nucleus of an extensive defense policy bibliography, constitute the collection's most useful features.

The working library which has evolved with the Defense Studies Program has, then, two characteristics: one, a rare collection of fugitive materials essential for effective teaching and research in defense policy; and two, a limited number of standard volumes and reference books acquired as convenient working tools. The collection has also been widely used by Harvard students enrolled in other courses in the University. The groundwork has been laid for the worthwhile long-range goal of a consolidated bibliography in American defense policy, a badly needed aid to the development of the field.

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## VI. OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM.

> ... Competence to handle military and security problems in their relation to foreign policy and other aspects of public policy must be introduced effectively into the processes of public opinion formation ... Without it, we are as vulnerable in the policy-making sphere, as the lack of an essential weapons system might make us in the military sphere.*

One of the tasks which the Defense Studies Program has felt to be important is that of maintaining working relations with the government in various ways as consultants, lecturers and conference participants. This gives the staff of the Defense Studies Program an opportunity to aid the government as do other Harvard groups in the area of their specialty and at the same time to gain those intimate insights into Defense Department thinking which only personal contact can bring. Likewise because of the alarming lack of information and interest on the part of the general public on matters of national defense, the staff have felt a strong sense of obligation to make themselves available for public discussion of current issues. This is time consuming, but it is felt to be part of our academic responsibility. Presentation of lectures, talks and participation in radio and television programs, lectures at colleges and universities, at the service and war colleges, as well as to local civic groups have all been considered part of the Program's contribution to the better understanding of defense policy issues.

The following selected list of activities during this past year will indicate the kind of topics which members of the staff have been asked to speak on:

*Gabriel Almond, "Public Opinion and National Security Policy," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer 1956, p. 378.

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## VII. TOWARD THE FUTURE.

In all that we do whether in the struggle or after it, it is necessary that we should constantly have in our eye, the nature and character of the enemy we have to contend with . . . What have they then to supply their numerous defects, and to make them terrible even to the firmest minds? *One* thing and *one* thing only . . . they have energy . . . . We must meet a vicious and dis-tempered energy with a manly and rational vigour. As virtue is limited in its resources — we are doubly bound to use all that, in the circle drawn about us by our morals, we are able to command.*

The final section of this report is being written on June 16. The headlines of the newspapers are, if anything, slightly more grim than usual: "Tito Says Peiping Counts on War to Rule Asia"; "Greeks Cut Military Links to Turks in Cyprus Dispute"; "Army Tanks Fire in Beirut Strife"; "Moscow's Economic Drive Held Chief Danger by U.S."; "Jakarta Forces Land in Celebes for Attack Upon Rebel Capital". The significance of these headlines is that they indicate no foreseeable point of termination. The study of defense policy would seem, therefore, to stand very little chance of slipping away into history.

U.S. history has, of course, its fair share of fighting slogans, from "Give me liberty or give me death" to "Remember Pearl Harbor". But despite the fact that so many of our slogans begin with the word "Remember", the first thing U.S. citizens have done is to forget the very existence of war once vengeance, or what passes for it, has been reaped. There are, of course, many contributing factors. Laissez-faire capitalism has been strongly anti-military, and the United States has been the refuge of strong waves of anti-

*Edmund Burke, *Remarks on the Policy of the Allies with Respect to France*, Collected Works, vol. VII, J. Rivington, 1808, p. 166.

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militarist factions. Also the United States has had a frontier to develop and two great moats on either side to protect her from the great powers. All these factors have contributed to the national belief that war is a terminal social aberration. Now that the ocean barriers have lost their effectiveness and new weapons have been developed, the United States has moved into the very front of military crisis. It is the task of the universities to adapt teaching and research to this situation. Despite the growth of interest in the study of defense policy over the past several years, much remains to be done if a century and a half of neglect is to be overcome.

There is always the danger that writing or study on war will become second rate. Interest in matters of war, particularly in times of continuing crisis, creates a market for superficially sophisticated writing on the part of those willing to cater to the demands of an uneducated and hungry public. There are always opportunists who will take advantage of the lack of public information to present sensational information rather than scholarly and critical analysis. The advent of new weapons invites rash and irresponsible conjecture unless the public is sufficiently enlightened to reject it as false. Hence one of the roles of defense studies programs is to provide intellectual discipline in order to prevent an illogical public response to new technical developments and new techniques in the art of war.

Much has been written and said in recent months, since the unexpected departure of Sputnik I for outer space, about developments in Soviet education and the strength of the Soviet economy. Very little has been said about Soviet understanding of the ways of war. Yet were it not for the sophistication of the Communist image of war, both the Communist economic acceleration and educational developments would be interesting rather than serious. It would seem obvious that, if this country is to compete successfully as it must with the Soviet Union, the competition must be effective

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not only in weaponry and industrial resources but in our understanding of
the policies through which these are used. Ideas must be tied to weapons
if the latter are to be effective.

The future of war, its prevention, its forms, its possibilities will
grow in complexity. As the balance of terror between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. becomes more infinitely adjusted, the problems not only of main-
taining the peace from inadvertent war, but of judging the validity of
threat and counter-threat will become more difficult.

To revert to the headlines mentioned above, military aid to forces
in the Far and Middle East, the dimensions of the threat of economic war-
fare vis-a-vis military warfare, questions of readjustment of plans when
allies fall out among themselves, -- all of these curiously complicated
factors force one to the conclusion that the future of military policy
presents an intellectual challenge even beyond that which exists today.
As to the necessity of future study, there can be no doubt whatsoever.

One would hope that the academic approach to the analysis of military
affairs would grow in breadth and imaginativeness. While the progress of
the Harvard seminars in both "Defense Policy and Administration in the
United States" and "Comparative Defense Policy and Administration" is gen-
erally satisfactory to the members of the Defense Studies Program, this
does not mean that anything approaching perfection has been achieved or
that the methods will not change over the years. Diversity of approach is
a hopeful sign -- almost as hopeful as the increased interest.

There are two pitfalls into which a defense studies program could con-
ceivably fall. The first is that defense policy may be conceived in such
narrow terms as not to seem worth the expenditure of adequate time and
human effort. The danger here lies in accepting for purposes of scholarly
research the definition of war as a clash of military hardware. The other

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danger lies in defining the area of the program so broadly that it be-
comes no more than a study in power politics. The future of this Program
should be defined in terms of a study of the methodology of conflict. This
leaves the way open for multiple approaches within a common framework.

Whatever the approach, however, defense studies groups must be perform-
ing two tasks. They must be providing long range thinking about long range
defense problems; and they must be creating an awareness that these problems
must be met by an understanding public which is prepared and able to make
an intelligent political response. The first task is necessitated by the
constant personnel changes which the military are always making, changes
which mean that no one group has the opportunity to study a given problem
for any length of time. The second task, that of educating the public, is
necessary because one of the burdens of a democratic form of government is
a public reluctance in following unfamiliar courses.

The fulfillment of the first task must be met by making available,
within the academic community at large, research facilities, research
assistance, and research time. Furthermore, these three are inseparable;
no one is of use without the others. Note also that despite the many gov-
ernment research organizations which combine many skills and attract men
of outstanding ability, these organizations cannot prepare the way for
necessary changes in policy along the broad front which is necessary in
a democracy. Useful as these government research agencies are, they are
no substitute for the free research of the academic community. They cannot
place their findings before students or, through publications, before their
own profession and the public at large. This is why independent university
study is so necessary. Parenthetically it must be said in this connection
that the experience of the past three years has shown that the restrictions

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on the flow of information is not a serious drawback to this kind of re-
search group. Security classification has rarely closed off a profitable
avenue of research.

The task of creating an awareness of current defense issues has been
our primary task. We have devoted most of our attention to developing the
field so that others could join with us in its intellectual cultivation.
We have done everything in our power to interest other academic institu-
tions through lecturing, through publication and through making teaching
materials available. Likewise, we have made an effort to contact segments
of the public directly. We are of the opinion that in the future every
effort must be made to continue this endeavor; for the public does decide,
both indirectly and directly, the strategy to be pursued, the kind of tac-
tics which may be employed, and the risks which may be run in training.

There is just enough truth in De Tocqueville's contention that
democracies cannot prepare for war in peace, so that the members of the
Defense Studies staff have felt a sense of urgency about creating that
degree of understanding which makes necessary sacrifices politically pos-
sible. To date we as a nation have responded only to obvious challenges —
a Korea, a Berlin Blockade, a Sputnik. The reason defense must be studied,
taught and made a topic of popular discussion is to assure that policy may
find its basis in a sustained initiative rather than occasional response
to crisis.

[L]

# Appendix II.

## Defense Policy and Administration in the United States

1957 - 1958

<table><thead><tr><td>Lecturer</td><td>Topic</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>25 September 1957<br>Defense Studies Program Staff.</td><td>Preview of Defense Policy Issues.</td></tr><tr><td>2 October 1957<br>Major General H. H. C. Sugden, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., Engineer-in-Chief to the British Forces.</td><td>British Defense Policy.</td></tr><tr><td>9 October 1957<br>Henry A. Kissinger, Associate Director, Center for International Affairs, Harvard; Director of Special Studies, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund; Studies Director on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations.</td><td>Limited War in the Nuclear Age.</td></tr><tr><td>16 October 1957<br>Robert R. Bowie, Director, Center for International Affairs, Harvard; Former Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning.</td><td>Integrating Foreign Policy & Military Programs.</td></tr><tr><td>23 October 1957<br>W. Barton Leach, Story Professor of Law, Harvard; Brig. Gen., USAFR; Consultant to Air Force.</td><td>Military Forces and Strategy.</td></tr><tr><td>30 October 1957<br>Bayley F. Mason, Harbridge House; and Student Committee.</td><td>The Korean War-Genesis of the Conflict.</td></tr><tr><td>6 November 1957<br>Bayley F. Mason; and Student Committee.</td><td>The Korean War-Pursuit of Objectives.</td></tr><tr><td>13 November 1957<br>Captain Henry L. Miller, U.S.N., Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and Commander Edward H. Winslow.</td><td>The U.S. Navy-A Briefing.</td></tr></tbody></table>

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20 November 1957

Peter K. Ogloblin, Research Fellow; and Student Committee.

**Military Air Transport** - A Problem in Defense Administration.

27 November 1957

Arthur Smithies, Professor of Economics, Harvard.

**Budgetary Reform** - Some Proposals.

4 December 1957

Maj. Gen. Frank. A. Bogart, Director of the Budget, United States Air Force.

**The Budgetary Process** - How Budgets Are Made.

11 December 1957

James S. Dusenberry, Professor of Economics, Harvard.

**The Economics of National Defense** - The Burden of Security on the Economy.

18 December 1957

The Honorable Leverett Saltonstall, United States Senate, Ranking Republican member of the Armed Services Committee; member of the Appropriations Committee.

**Congress and Defense Policy as Viewed from the Hill.**

8 January 1958

Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., Director, Defense Studies Program.

**Congress and Defense Policy** - An Overall View.

15 January 1958

William T. R. Fox, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University.

**Concepts of Civilian-Military Relations.**

29 January 1958

Student Committee.

**Government Secrecy and National Security.**

5 February 1958

Robert Amory, Jr., Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

**Intelligence.**

12 February 1958

W. Barton Leach, Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., H.H. Ransom, Col. D.P. Armstrong - Moderator; Col. T. N. Dupuy, Office of Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

**Department of Defense Organization** - The Unification Problem.

19 February 1958

W. Barton Leach, with commentary by Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., and H.H. Ransom.

**Department of Defense Organization.**

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26 February 1958

Paul H. Nitze, Director,
Foreign Service Educational
Foundation; former Director,
Policy Planning Staff, Depart-
ment of State.

New Concepts of Department
of Defense Organization.

5 March 1958

Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr.,
Bernard K. Gordon, Research
Fellow, and Student Members
of the Seminar.

Alliances and Distribution
of Weapons.

12 March 1958

H. Lee White of Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft, New York;
member of the Cordiner Commit-
tee; former Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force.

Manpower -- The Recruitment
and Retention of Qualified
Personnel.

17 March 1958

Sir John Slessor, G.C.B., D.S.O.,
M.C., Marshal of the Royal Air
Force.

Disengagement and the Western
Alliance.

26 March 1958

Lt. Colonel Amos A. Jordan,
Associate Professor, United
States Military Academy.

The Military Assistance
Program.

9 April 1958

Robert M. Pennoyer, Special
Assistant to the Under Secretary
of Defense for International
Security Affairs; formerly asso-
ciated with the Office of the
General Counsel, Department of
Defense.

Relations Between the Defense
and State Departments with
Respect to the Administration
of Mutual Security.

23 April 1958

George S. Pettee, Assistant
Director, Operations Research
Office, The Johns Hopkins
University.

Decision-Making Problems of
The Army - Technical Aspects.

30 April 1958

David F. Cavers, Associate Dean
Harvard Law School, with com-
mentary by Richard Leghorn, President
ITEK Corp., and Louis Osborne, De-
partment of Physics, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.

Disarmament.

7 May 1958

Defense Studies Staff.

Retrospect and Prospect.

Appendix III.

HARVARD DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM

List of Mimeographed Materials Prepared for Student Use (Serials)

1955 - 1958*

<table><thead><tr><td>Title</td><td>Serial No.</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Reading Assignment for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Levine)</td><td>32</td></tr><tr><td>Field Marshal Montgomery and World War III (Dupuy)</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>Preparation for session of 3 November 1955, on Budgeting Procedures in the Government</td><td>34</td></tr><tr><td>Preparation for session of 15 November 1955, on Command and Control for Global War</td><td>35</td></tr><tr><td>Commentary on Robert Amory, Jr.'s Seminar session of 25 October 1955 on Intelligence (Leach)</td><td>36</td></tr><tr><td>Assignment to Students: Discussion of Item from WASHINGTON POST &amp; TIMES HERALD</td><td>37</td></tr><tr><td>Preparation for session of 10 November 1955, on NATO and International Military Affairs</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>Science, Technology and Modern War (Ransom)</td><td>39</td></tr><tr><td>The Structure and Role of Command, Recent British Comment</td><td>40</td></tr><tr><td>General Ridgway's Farewell Letter and Related Documents -- A Study of the Debate over Military Forces (Ransom)</td><td>41</td></tr><tr><td>Technology Change and the Development of Modern Warfare (Emerson)</td><td>42</td></tr><tr><td>Organization for War in Modern Times (Field Marshal Montgomery)</td><td>43</td></tr><tr><td>The Constitutional Framework of Civilian Control and Military Policy (Huntington)</td><td>44</td></tr></tbody></table>

*Serials Nos. 1-31 were issued prior to July 1, 1955. Mostly they have been superseded by later Serials. The two following items may be of general interest: Memorandum to Students No. 1A, Serial No. 2; Memorandum to Students No. 4, Serial No. 14.

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<table><thead><tr><td>Title</td><td>Serial No.</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Preparation for session of 8 December 1955, on the Concept of Civilian Control</td><td>45</td></tr><tr><td>Preparation for session of 1 December 1955, on Planning of Force Levels</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td>Reading Assignment on The Hoover Commission Recommendations for the Department of Defense, 1955 (Stanley)</td><td>47</td></tr><tr><td>Congress and Defense: Defense Appropriations: Investigations; and Relations with the Pentagon (Katzenbach)</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>The Role of Congress in Defense Policy-Making, Preparation for session of 15 December 1956</td><td>49</td></tr><tr><td>The Press and the Pentagon (Berry)</td><td>50</td></tr><tr><td>Military Policy and Civilian Control (Ransom)</td><td>51</td></tr><tr><td>Preparation for session of 12 January 1956 on The Hoover Commission Reports</td><td>52</td></tr><tr><td>Preparation for session of 5 January 1956 on The Press and The Pentagon</td><td>53</td></tr><tr><td>The Organization for National Security (Stanley)</td><td>54</td></tr><tr><td>Second Semester Schedule 1956</td><td>55</td></tr><tr><td>Preparation for session of 9 February 1956 on National Security Council</td><td>56</td></tr><tr><td>Reading Assignment for the Air Force Budget for FY 1957 (Leach)</td><td>57</td></tr><tr><td>Sample of Defense Studies Program Distributions, 1955-56</td><td>58</td></tr><tr><td>Planning for a Peripheral War (Berry)</td><td>59</td></tr><tr><td>Preparation for session of 1 March 1956 on Planning for a Peripheral War</td><td>60</td></tr><tr><td>Lecture Outline - AF Budget for FY 1957 (Leach)</td><td>61</td></tr><tr><td>Preparation for session of 11 March 1956 on Strategy and Forces for the Free World (Levine)</td><td>62</td></tr></tbody></table>

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<table><thead><tr><td>Title</td><td>Serial No.</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Seminar Outline - Civilian Control Revisited</td><td>63</td></tr><tr><td>Preparation for session of 11 March 1956 (Sir John Slessor)</td><td>64</td></tr><tr><td>Fact-Finding and Analytical Facilities Available to Policy Makers in the Defense Establishment (Leach et al.)</td><td>65</td></tr><tr><td>Preparation for session of 22 March 1956 on Fact-Finding and Analytical Facilities Available to Policy Makers in the Defense Establishment</td><td>66</td></tr><tr><td>Defense as a Partisan and an Election Issue</td><td>67</td></tr><tr><td>Preparation for session of 12 March 1956, on The Crossroads of Defense and Foreign Policy</td><td>68</td></tr><tr><td>Atoms, Strategy and Policy, by Paul H. Nitze (reprinted from Foreign Affairs, January 1956), preparation for session of 12 April 1956</td><td>68A</td></tr><tr><td>Preparation for session of 3 May 1956, on Current Senate Investigation of Air Power, Missiles and Research and Development</td><td>69</td></tr><tr><td>Statements before the Special Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations</td><td>70</td></tr><tr><td>Memorandum - Final Seminar Session, 10 May 1956</td><td>71</td></tr><tr><td>Seminar Outline, Session of 10 May 1956: Final Session</td><td>72</td></tr><tr><td>Agenda: Session of 3 May 1956: The Symington Committee Investigation</td><td>73</td></tr><tr><td>A Complete List of Subjects and Lectures, 1955-56</td><td>74</td></tr><tr><td>Summer Readings (Katzenbach, Leach and Feld)</td><td>75</td></tr><tr><td>Commentary on Command in War (Leach)</td><td>76</td></tr><tr><td>Memo to Students No. 17, Research Topics for Seminar Research Papers (Ransom)</td><td>77</td></tr><tr><td>The Composition and Role of the Navy (Mason)</td><td>78</td></tr><tr><td>Reading Assignment No. 20, Forces for Limited or Total War — The Continuing Debate (Ransom)</td><td>79</td></tr></tbody></table>

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<table><thead><tr><td>Title</td><td>Serial No.</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Readings for First Session 26 September 1956, Party Platforms for the 1956 Political Campaign (Leach)</td><td>80</td></tr><tr><td>The Continuing Debate (Ransom)</td><td>81</td></tr><tr><td>The Forces of the Communist Bloc (Feld and Keesing)</td><td>82</td></tr><tr><td>Readings on: Higher Organization of Defense (British View) (Leach)</td><td>83</td></tr><tr><td>Defense Policy Seminar Committees -- 1956-57</td><td>84</td></tr><tr><td>The War in Korea; A Case Study in the Problems of Limited War</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Part I The Genesis of the Conflict</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Part II The Establishment and Pursuit of the Objectives (Mason)</td><td>85</td></tr><tr><td>Military Air Transport: A Specific Problem in the Determination of Force Requirements (Wiseley)</td><td>86</td></tr><tr><td>Readings on: American Problems of Forces and Organization (Leach)</td><td>87</td></tr><tr><td>A Viewpoint of the Testing of Nuclear Weapons (Leland Allen)</td><td>88</td></tr><tr><td>Unification of the Armed Forces (Ransom)</td><td>89</td></tr><tr><td>Readings on the Theory and Concept of Civilian Control</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Part I "Civilian Control and the Constitution" (Huntington)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Part II "The High Level Conduct and Direction of World War II" (Lt. Gen. Sir Ian Jacob)</td><td>90</td></tr><tr><td>Another Viewpoint of Testing of Thermonuclear Weapons (Anon.)</td><td>91</td></tr><tr><td>Military Doctrine: Some Opinions and Comments</td><td>92</td></tr><tr><td>The Job-Concept of the Civilian Secretary (Ballard)</td><td>93</td></tr><tr><td>Extension of Thoughts Re Unification of the Armed Forces, Memorandum from Rawlings S. Poole</td><td>94</td></tr><tr><td>The Air Force and the Budget: How to Question the Adequacy of a Budget (Leach)</td><td>95</td></tr><tr><td>Problems in the Budgetary Process (Keesing)</td><td>96</td></tr><tr><td>Some Concrete Suggestions for a Program Budget (Keesing)</td><td>97</td></tr></tbody></table>

[LC]

<table><thead><tr><th>Title</th><th>Serial No.</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Pentagon and the Hill (Katzenbach)</td><td>98</td></tr><tr><td>Defense Policy and Public Information (Ransom)</td><td>100</td></tr><tr><td>Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (Ransom)</td><td>101</td></tr><tr><td>Strategic Intelligence and Defense Policy (Ransom and Mason)</td><td>102</td></tr><tr><td>Central Intelligence -- The 1947 Views of Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, 1953</td><td>102A</td></tr><tr><td>Relations Between Congress and the Central Intelligence Agency -- Exchange of Letters, Senator Mike Mansfield and Director, CIA</td><td>102B</td></tr><tr><td>Revising National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of Soviet Airpower</td><td>102C</td></tr><tr><td>The Job of a Service Secretary (Leach)</td><td>103</td></tr><tr><td>The National Security Council (Stanley and Ransom)</td><td>104</td></tr><tr><td>U.S. Military Research and Development - Organization and Mission (Ransom)</td><td>105</td></tr><tr><td>Fact-Finding and Analytical Facilities Available to Policy Makers in the Defense Establishment (Leach et al.)</td><td>106</td></tr><tr><td>Total or Limited War? (Sir John Slessor)</td><td>107</td></tr><tr><td>Strategy for the West: A 1957 Reappraisal (Sir John Slessor)</td><td>108</td></tr><tr><td>Legal/Military Subjects for Student Papers (Leach)</td><td>109</td></tr><tr><td>Current Developments in Defense Studies at University of London (Wiseley)</td><td>110</td></tr><tr><td>Economic Warfare and National Strategy (Keesing)</td><td>111</td></tr><tr><td>Readings for NATO Symposium of 23 March 1957</td><td>112</td></tr><tr><td>Coalitions -- The Historical Experience (Emerson and Wiseley)</td><td>113</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Military Assistance and National Policy: Some Background Materials (Ransom)</td><td>114</td></tr></tbody></table>

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<table><thead><tr><td>Title</td><td>Serial No.</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>British White Paper on Defence, 1957 (Cmnd. 124) (Leach)</td><td>115</td></tr><tr><td>U.S. Defense Policy Administration: A Proposed Syllabus (Ransom)</td><td>116</td></tr><tr><td>The Military Lessons of Suez (Katzenbach)</td><td>117</td></tr><tr><td>Congressional Problems: Appropriations and Information (Katzenbach)</td><td>118</td></tr><tr><td>Vershinin Comments on Military Strategy (Translated by Ogloblin)</td><td>119</td></tr><tr><td>The Integration of National Policy (Admiral Burke)</td><td>120</td></tr><tr><td>Can We Survive Technology? (John von Neumann)</td><td>121</td></tr><tr><td>The Budgetary Process and Defense Policy (Wood, Leach, Ransom)</td><td>122</td></tr><tr><td>Government Secrecy and National Security: an Analysis (Ransom)</td><td>123</td></tr><tr><td>Observations on Defense Organization (Leach)</td><td>124</td></tr><tr><td>Readings on Soviet Military Preparedness</td><td>125</td></tr><tr><td>Perspectives on Disarmament (Katzenbach, Gordon)</td><td>126</td></tr><tr><td>Alliances and Weapons — An Organizational Analysis (Balch and Gordon)</td><td>127</td></tr><tr><td>Preventing an Accidental War (Sir John Slessor)</td><td>128</td></tr><tr><td>Military Air Transport (Ogloblin)</td><td>129</td></tr></tbody></table>

[Lc]

Appendix IV.

Comparative Defense Policy and Administration -- Bibliography

Bagehot, Walter, *Physics and Politics*, New York, 1948.

Berman, H. and Kerner, M., *Soviet Military Law and Administration*, Cambridge, Mass., 1955.

Bryant, Arthur, *The Turn of the Tide*, New York, 1957.

Bury, J.P.T., *Gambetta and the National Defense, 1870-71*, London, 1948.

Callender, G.A.R., *The Naval Side of British History*, London, 1952.

Carlson, E. F., *The Chinese Army*, New York, 1940.

Challener, Richard D., *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms*, New York, 1953.

Chauvineau, Narcisse, *Une Invasion: Est-elle Encore Possible?*, Paris, 1938.

Clarkson, J. D. and Cochrane, T. C., *War as a Social Institution*, New York, 1941.

Clausewitz, Karl von, *On War*, Harrisburg, Pa., 1950.

Corbett, Sir Julian S., *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, London, 1911.

Craig, G. A., *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*, Oxford, 1955.

Demarest, S., *La Défence Nationale 1870-71*, Paris, 1949.

Deutscher, Isaac, *The Prophet Armed*, Oxford, 1954.

Deutscher, Isaac, "The New Soviet Strategy," *The Reporter*, October 3, 1957.

Earle, E. M. (Ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Princeton University Press, 1948.

Fairman, Charles, "Government Under Law in Time of Crisis," *John Marshall Bicentenary Lectures, Cambridge, Mass.*, 1955.

Feld, M. D.; Huntington, S. P.; Katzenbach, E. L.; Ransom, H. H., contributors to *Public Policy*, 1958, Friedrich, C. J. and Harris, S. (Eds.).

Galbraith, J. K., "Germany Was Run Badly," *Fortune*, December 1945.

Gallay, N., "The Problem of Quantity and Quality," *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*, October 1956.

Garthoff, Raymond L., *Soviet Military Doctrine*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1953.

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De Gaulle, Charles, *Vers L'Armée de Métier*, Paris, 1934.

Girardet, Raoul, *La Société Militaire*, Paris, 1953.

Guderian, Heinz, *Panzer Leader*, New York, 1952.

Hanrahan, G. Z., "Guerrilla Warfare," *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 1956.

Hittle, J. D., *The Military Staff*, Harrisburg, Pa., 1949.

Huntington, Samuel P., *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, Mass., 1957.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, *Report: "Engineering and Scientific Manpower in the United States, Western Europe and Soviet Russia,"* Washington, March 1956.

Katzenbach, E. L., Jr., "The French Army," *Yale Review*, Summer 1956.

Katzenbach, E. L., Jr., "Political Parties and the French Army Since Liberation" in *Modern France*, E. M. Earle (Ed.), Princeton, 1951.

Katzenbach, E. L., Jr. and Hanrahan, G. Z, "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-tung," *Political Science Quarterly*, September 1955.

Kautsky, John, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India*, Cambridge, Mass., 1956.

Kissinger, Henry, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1957.

Knorr, Klaus, *The War Potential of Nations*, Princeton, 1956.

Leighton, R. M. and Coakley, R. W., *Global Logistics and Strategy*, Washington, 1955.

Liddell-Hart, B. H., *The British Way in Warfare*, London, 1932.

Liddell-Hart, B. H. (Ed.), *The Red Army 1918-1945*, New York, 1956.

Liu, F. F., *A Military History of Modern China*, Princeton, 1956.

Louis, Andre, *Michel le Tellier et l'Organisation de l'Armée Monarchique*, Paris, 1906.

Macridis, Roy C., *The Study of Comparative Government*, New York, 1955.

Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, New York, 1954.

Martiensson, Anthony, *Hitler and His Admirals*, London, 1948.

Matloff, Maurice and Snell, E. M., *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1947*, Washington, 1953.

Millis, Walter, *Arms and Men*, New York, 1956.

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Montross, Lynn, *War Through the Ages*, New York, 1946.

Mumford, Lewis, *Technics and Civilization*, New York, 1935.

Nelson, O. L., *National Security and the General Staff*, Washington, 1946.

Nickerson, Hoffman, *The Armed Horde, 1793-1939*, New York, 1940.

O'Brien, T. H., *Civil Defence*, London, 1955.

Osgood, Robert, *Limited War*, Chicago, 1957.

Phillips, Thomas R., *Roots of Strategy*, Harrisburg, Pa., 1940.

Pye, Lucian W., *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya*, Princeton, 1956.

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