[L]

242 The Strategic Issues

and thus would put an end to the process of demanding the
desirable in order to defeat the attainable. It would also
permit a more flexible arrangement of Atlantic relations than
the "twin pillar" concept now in vogue. A confederal Europe
would enable the United States to maintain an influence at
many centers of decision rather than be forced to stake every-
thing on affecting the views of a single, supranational body.

Every European state was formed through some process of integration during the past four centuries, and Germany and Italy achieved unity less than 100 years ago. European history suggests that there is more than one way to build unity. In Italy, it came by way of plebiscite and annexation abolishing the individual states. In Germany, unification occurred under the aegis of one state but as the act of sovereign governments which remained in existence after unity was achieved. The resulting structure clearly did not lack cohesiveness. History is rarely so linear and simple a process as some of the enthusiasts for a particular form of European integration suggest.

European history demonstrates also that stability in Eu-
rope is unattainable except through the cooperation of Brit-
ain, France and Germany. Care should be taken not to resur-
rect old national rivalries in the name of Atlanticism. The
United States should not single out one ally as its special
partner. The attempt to force allies to choose between us and
France—a tendency which, despite all disavowals, is real—
must magnify the European nationalism that French policy
has already done so much to foster.

Our concern thus returns to the somewhat out-of-scale
figure of President de Gaulle. Conceivably he is as petty and
as animated by remembered slights as some of our com-
mentators suggest. It is also possible that a man so conscious
of his historic role has larger purposes. In a period of detente
with the Soviet Union, it should not be impossible to conduct
a serious conversation with a traditional ally. President de

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 243

Gaulle has repeatedly expressed his willingness to coordinate
strategy rather than to integrate it. It is a welcome sign of
progress that, at the NATO meeting of December 1964, Sec-

Gaulle has repeatedly expressed his willingness to coordinate strategy rather than to integrate it. It is a welcome sign of progress that, at the NATO meeting of December 1964, Secretary McNamara and French Defense Minister Messmer agreed on a procedure to begin exploring what this means with respect to strategic nuclear forces.

But a more fundamental dialogue is needed. Irritation with De Gaulle's tactics does not change the fact that in his proposal of 1958 for a Directorate, he pointed out what has remained the key problem of NATO. If the Atlantic Alliance is to retain any vitality, it requires a common foreign policy—or at least an agreed range of divergence. In its absence, the attempt to devise a common military strategy is likely to prove futile. As long as the Alliance cannot agree even on a common trade policy toward the East, it will be impossible to convince the Allies to relinquish their freedom of action over decisions affecting their very survival. Lord Avon and Dean Acheson have come to the same conclusion. The time seems ripe to create a political body at the highest level for concerting the policies of the nations bordering the North Atlantic.

Organizational devices should never be confused with substantive solutions. Nevertheless the following outlining could serve as an illustration of a desirable direction if not as a detailed blueprint for action. The political body could be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council. It could be composed of six members: five permanent members (the United States, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Italy) and one rotating member representing the smaller NATO countries. The rotating member could be elected by a vote of the NATO Council from which the permanent members are excluded, thus protecting the rights of the smaller countries. The Allies would agree to accept a two-thirds vote as binding with escape clauses to be described. In order to give this Executive Committee appropriate status, membership should be no lower than Deputy

hesion. A Europe that grows out of the collapse of all traditional loyalties must have as its primary problem the discovery of some specific purpose for its existence. Too doctrinaire an approach to European unity could produce either a collapse of political will or, more likely, a new and virulent form of nationalism, perhaps even more intense than the nationalism of *partries*. A Europe constructed largely on theoretical models might be forced into an anti-American mold because its only sense of identity could be what distinguished it from America.

It is hard to understand why many European federalists believe that a European parliament would mitigate this danger. The decline in the role of the European national parliaments has been apparent for decades. In no European country—not even Great Britain—does parliament exercise an effective control over the formulation or the conduct of foreign policy. Party discipline has become so pervasive that in European parliaments the majority almost always ratifies the decisions of the cabinet. And where the party system is ineffective—either because the parties are weak or because there are too many of them—the result is paralysis of government rather than parliamentary control.

These conditions are likely to be magnified by all-European elections. The need to establish a consensus comprising Schleswig-Holstein and Sicily, Scotland and Bavaria will surely tempt demagogic appeals. A parliament emerging from such a process of direct elections may be completely unrelated to the calm deliberative body envisaged by so many European federalists.

This suggests the need to reexamine American priorities. The mechanical notion that one particular form of European integration automatically will solve the problem of Atlantic partnership should be abandoned. The United States should leave the internal evolution of a united Europe to the Europeans and use its ingenuity and influence in devising new forms of *Atlantic* cooperation. The passionate commitment

24

13

of so many American policymakers to a single formula of European integration, that of supranationality, confuses form

247

/3

of so many American policymakers to a single formula of European integration, that of supranationality, confuses form and substance. It could in fact bring about results quite contrary to those intended. Many European federalists have been devoted adherents of Atlantic partnership: Jean Monnet, their most significant figure, has been a staunch and remarkable friend of the United States. By contrast, President de Gaulle's career is filled with examples of abrupt and uni-lateral tactics designed to exalt the status of France, occasion-ally at our expense. It would be one of history's frequent ironies if the structure for Europe proposed by Monnet would generate the greatest pressures for the kind of policy generally described as Gaullist, while the structure advocated by De Gaulle turned out to be best suited for flexible At-lantic arrangements. Our bent for structural remedies some-times blinds us to the fact that institutions produce their own momentum, which cannot necessarily be foreseen from the intentions of their founders.

While the United States should welcome any unified Europe that reflects the desires of Europeans, it is doubtful that either our national or Atlantic interests require our passionate commitment to a supranational structure for Europe. A very schematic and rigid conception of Atlantic partnership can easily fail to do justice to the richness and variety of relationships possible within the Atlantic context. Is each European country always inherently closer to its European neighbors than to the United States? If we separate the question into political, military or economic components, is the answer always uniform and does it always point in the same direction? Would it not be wiser to retain some flexibility?

There may be various roads to European unity. The one traced by the Fouchet Plan—calling for institutionalized meetings of foreign ministers and subcabinet officials—is not the least plausible, and indeed it is the one most consistent with British participation. It has the advantage that it would produce some immediate progress without foreclosing the future

and thus would put an end to the process of demanding the desirable in order to defeat the attainable. It would also permit a more flexible arrangement of Atlantic relations than the "twin pillar" concept now in vogue. A confederal Europe would enable the United States to maintain an influence at many centers of decision rather than be forced to stake everything on affecting the views of a single, supranational body.

European history demonstrates also that stability in Europe is unattainable except through the cooperation of Britain, France and Germany. Care should be taken not to resurrect old national rivalries in the name of Atlanticism. The United States should not single out one ally as its special partner. The attempt to force allies to choose between us and France—a tendency which, despite all disavowals, is real—must magnify the European nationalism that French policy has already done so much to foster.

Our concern thus returns to the somewhat out-of-scale figure of President de Gaulle. Conceivably he is as petty and as animated by remembered slights as some of our commentators suggest. It is also possible that a man so conscious of his historic role has larger purposes. In a period of detente with the Soviet Union, it should not be impossible to conduct a serious conversation with a traditional ally. President de

24

248

But a more fundamental dialogue is needed. Irritation with De Gaulle's tactics does not change the fact that in his proposal of 1958 for a Directorate he pointed out what has remained the key problem of NATO: If the Atlantic Alliance is to retain any vitality, it requires a common foreign policy—or at least an agreed range of divergence. In its absence, the attempt to devise a common military strategy is likely to prove futile. As long as the Alliance cannot agree even on a common trade policy toward the East, it will be impossible to convince the Allies to relinquish their freedom of action over decisions affecting their very survival. Lord Avon and Dean Acheson have come to the same conclusion. The time seems ripe to create a political body at the highest level for concerting the policies of the nations bordering the North Atlantic.

Organizational devices should never be confused with substantive solutions. Nevertheless the following outline could serve as an illustration of a desirable direction if not as a detailed blueprint for action. The political body could be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council. It could be composed of six members: five permanent members (the United States, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic and Italy) and one rotating member representing the smaller NATO countries. The rotating member could be elected by a vote of the NATO Council from which the permanent members are excluded, thus protecting the rights of the smaller countries. The Allies would agree to accept a two-thirds vote as binding with escape clauses to be described. In order to give this Executive Committee appropriate status, membership should be no lower than Deputy

246 Political Prospects

244 The Strategic Issues

Foreign Ministers meeting at least bi-monthly. In the inter-
val between meetings, the NATO ambassadors could act as
departments.

The Executive Committee should formulate common At-
lantic purposes and define the limits of autonomous action
where interests diverge. It should give political guidance for
the military arrangements described in the previous chapters.
It should be the political authority for the proposed Allied
Nuclear Force. It should be charged with developing a com-
mon strategic doctrine.

As long as the Alliance is composed of sovereign states,
the delegation of authority will clearly have to be limited.
Each Ally, whether or not a member of the Executive Com-
mittee, would have to be given the right to appeal its deci-
sions to the NATO Council, where a two-thirds majority would
carry. Each Ally should have the right, for an interim period
at least, to refuse to be bound by such a vote. However, it
should be required to make a formal declaration to that effect
within a given time. A negative vote either in the Executive
Committee or in the NATO Council would not be taken as an
indication of non-compliance. Instead, a formal notification
that a country refuses to carry out the common decision
would be required. The purpose of separating the two stages
would be to enable the Allies to record their disagreement
and yet to carry out the majority's decision for the sake of
unity.

Within this framework, the European countries could, if
they wished, form a closer association. For example, the
Western European Union might well be given responsibility
for the European component of the Allied Nuclear Force
and, indeed, the European contribution to joint NATO
plans. As Europe gains structure, the Executive Committee
could draw nearer to the "twin pillars" concept. But Atlantic
partnership, in this approach, could become operative even if
European unity were delayed. Atlantic partnership and in-
creased European cohesion thus could be pursued simultane-

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245

17

ously, with no advance commitment to giving priority to
either course. An Atlantic Community could thus develop on

245

/7

ously, with no advance commitment to giving priority to
either course. An Atlantic Community could thus develop on
a two-pronged basis.

Conceivably such a policy could end the sterile debate over
the relative benefits of integration and coordination. It might
heal a rift that, if continued, is bound to hazard everything
that has been painfully built up over fifteen years. It would
leave the internal evolution of Europe to the European
countries and concentrate our efforts where we can be most
constructive: in the elaboration of Atlantic relationships.

This requires that we become clear about the notion of
Europe as a Third Force which is used so often in a pejora-
tive sense in our discussions. In the sense of being powerful
Europe is bound to be a Third Force, partly because
we ourselves have made it so. Whether Europe will use
its strength for a narrow or a wider conception depends in
large part on the ability of leaders on both sides of the Atlan-
tic to develop common purposes and a structure to give them
effect. We can best counteract Third Force tendencies based
on a form of neutrality by conducting ourselves so that most
of our Allies will always consider the advantages of an At-
lantic partnership greater than those which could be gained
by a more parochial approach.

For this purpose steadiness and reliability are more im-
portant assets than an erratic quest for ever-more refined
formulated. Confidence presupposes that the leaders of other
countries can gear their actions to ours over a period of time.
The United States should use its ingenuity to forge a variety
of Atlantic institutions not only in the political realm but also
in the spheres of economics, scholarship and the arts.

But institutions based on present concepts of national
sovereignty are not enough. The West requires a larger goal:
the constitution of an Atlantic Commonwealth in which all
the peoples bordering the North Atlantic can fulfill their aspi-
rations. Clearly, it will not come quickly; many intermediate
stages must be traversed before it can be reached. It is not too

248

political Prospects

246

The Strategic Issues

early, however, to prepare ourselves now for this step beyond
the nation-state.

A FINAL WORD

When the Atlantic Alliance was founded in 1949, no one would have thought it possible that within fifteen years its pervasive problem would turn out to be the growing strength and self-confidence of Europe. In the face of what was believed to be the imminent threat of Soviet aggression, it would have seemed absurd to predict that fissures would open because the fear of Communist invasion had largely vanished. When Europe dreaded the return of America's traditional isolationism, it would have been incredible that some day our Allies would feel so confident of our support that they would consider it safe to disagree with our policies or even to oppose them.

In a way, then, many of the difficulties in the Atlantic Alliance could be a source of pride for the United States. They are the result of the success of policies ushered in by the Marshall Plan and consistently pursued through four postwar administrations. The West today is less imperiled by outside pressures than by a tendency to consume its own substance.

Yet it is easy to draw too much comfort from this. History is the tale of civilizations that sought their future in their past. There are no plateaus in international affairs; what is not a stepping stone soon becomes the beginning of a decline. Succeeding generations will not be able to draw comfort from the fact that an unmet challenge was produced by great achievement.

In the life of societies and international systems there comes a time when the question arises whether all the possibilities of innovation inherent in a given structure have been exhausted. At this point, symptoms are taken for causes; immediate problems absorb the attention that should be devoted to determining their significance. Events are not

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247

shaped by a concept of the future; the present becomes all-
intrusive. However impressive such a structure may still ap-
pear to outsiders, it has passed its zenith. It will grow ever
more rigid and, in time, irrelevant.

The West today confronts such a challenge. It has had
centuries of great achievements punctuated by catastrophic
upheaval. Its propensity for disaster has been high; but here-
tofore each tragedy was followed by a new burst of creativity.
Are the stresses of today a sign of consolidation or the first
symptoms of decay? Will they lead to renewal or to disinte-
gration?

For a while longer the West can continue along familiar
routes. The traditional machinery of the Atlantic Alliance is
well designed to produce the appearance of amity. But if the
Alliance continues to confuse form and substance, energy
will increasingly have to be spent in reconciling illusion with
reality. Each nation will be thrown on its own resources and
will emphasize policies that magnify divisions. At each previ-
ous critical juncture the West—though with much travail—
found political forms adequate for its needs. It made the
transition from feudalism to the nation-state. Its challenge
now is whether it can move from the nation-state to a larger
community and draw from this effort the strength for another
period of innovation.

Its ability to master this problem will largely determine
whether the West can remain relevant to the rest of the world.
Confronted by turmoil and hatred in the former colonial
areas, the West desperately searches for means to demonstrate
its good faith to its erstwhile subjects. But every satisfied de-
mand spawns new pressures. The inward insecurity produced
by centuries of subordination is not allayed by dealing with
its manifestations any more than a tidal wave is understood
by studying the surface of the ocean. In many of the new
nations, popularity is unattainable partly because of the
memory of colonial rule, partly because these nations often
do not know what they really want. Their greatest need is a

248 The Strategic Issues

sense of purpose. But this can be conveyed only by example, not by preachments or by efforts to ingratiate that compound the new nations' sense of insecurity with our own.

What the West can mean to others depends therefore in great part on what it means to itself. In the heyday of colonialism, Western political forms were widely imitated. The leaders of independence movements fought their oppressors in the name of principles they had acquired from them. The reason was that for all the wrongs it committed, the West appeared dynamic, creative and vital. If the West is still to contribute to the rest of the world, it will have to begin by demonstrating in its internal relationships that its wellsprings of creativity have not run dry.

The opportunity is great. The dynamic periods of Western history occurred when unity was forged from diversity. This is the task once again. The struggles for prestige and influence can be salutary if at some point they lead to a heightened sense of community. Conversely, fifty years from now no one will care who was "right" with respect to the issues that form the headlines of the day if in the process the West has torn itself to pieces.

The challenge is whether the difference in perspective between the two sides of the Atlantic, which is at the heart of many disagreements, can be turned into a source of strength. Our idealism and impetuosity would gain depth if leavened by the European sense of tragedy. And the European consciousness of history could recover dynamism if bolstered by our hopefulness.

The deepest question before the West may thus be what kind of vision it has of its future. With the growth of bureaucracy and expertise on both sides of the Atlantic, there is a danger of becoming mired by the prudent, the tactical or the expedient. Problems that are recognized are treated with considerable adeptness. But many problems are not recognized. The solution of immediate issues has priority over the shaping of the future. The expert has a vested interest in the

existing framework; doing the familiar very well has, after all, made him an expert. His weakness is that he may confuse creativity with a projection of the present into the future. He

[10]

existing framework; doing the familiar very well has, after all, made him an expert. His weakness is that he may confuse creativity with a projection of the present into the future. He respects "facts" and considers them something to be adjusted to, perhaps to be manipulated, but not to be transcended.

In the decades ahead, the West will have to lift its sights. When technique becomes exalted over purpose, men become the victims of their complexities. They forget that every great achievement in every field was a vision before it became a reality. Both sides of the Atlantic would do well to keep in mind that there are two kinds of realists: those who use facts and those who create them. The West requires nothing so much as men able to create their own reality.

It has become fashionable to compare the disagreements of the West with rifts in the Communist world. But this comparison fails to do justice to the possibilities of the Atlantic area. In the Communist world schisms are inevitable and unbridgeable. Western societies have been more fortunate. Their evolution has been richer because at their best they have managed to relate diversity to community. Free from the shackles of a doctrine of historical inevitability, the nations of the West can render a great service by demonstrating that whatever meaning history has is derived from the convictions and purpose of the generation which shapes it.

[LC]

[LC]

Index to Volume I, 7-10

Bmc. 293-297

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Troubled waters

•••

Index

•••••

•

•

•

•

•••••

•

•

•

•

•••••

•

•

9

•

Acheson, Dean. 243

Action Committee for a United Europe,
198-149

Adenauer, Chancellor Konrad, 67-68, 70-
74, 142, 205

Africa, 4, 203

Air-defense system, 20, 182

Alaska, 22

Algeria, 200

Algiers, 45, 53, 61

Alliances, 11-18, 42

changes in nature of, 11-18

effect of nuclear weapons on. 13-14
reasons for joining, 15-18

(See also Atlantic Alliance)

Allied Nuclear Force, 170-176, 244
criteria, 174

European influence, 176

military organization, 185-186

nuclear control, 174-175

role of Federal Republic, 171-173, 186

under SACEUR, 173

strategic weapons, 172-173

U.S. influence, 176

Allies, distinction between neutrals, 16-18

Arms control, 220-221

Arms race, 204

Asia, 4, 9, 56

Assignment of nuclear weapons, 122-124

De Gaulle on, 84-85

Atlantic Alliance, 3-28, 246

Berlin Crisis, 68-74

changed nature of relationships, 5-11

conflict of interest, 21-23

consultation, 225-234

current disputes, 4-5

De Gaulle's views, 44-60

differences in historical perspective, 23-28

formation, 91

future trends, 246-249

need for political unity, 155-156, 159-175-176

nuclear problems, 161-186

policy on German reunification, 208-210, 214-215

political control, 147

role of United States, 3-28, 246

role of West Germany, 141-142, 206

strategic debate, 91-125

to strengthen Allied cohesion, 139, 232-253

structural problems, 3-28

threat of Soviet agression, 9-10, 93

Atlantic Commonwealth, 245

253

Index

Acheson, Dean, 245

138, 140

74, 142, 205

Africa, 4, 203

Air-defense system, 20, 182

Alaska, 22

Albania, 200

Algiers, 45, 53, 61

Alliances, 11-18, 42

changes in nature of, 11-18

effect of nuclear weapons on, 13-14

reasons for joining, 15-18

(See also Atlantic Alliance)

criteria, 174

European influence, 176

nuclear control, 174-175

under SACEUR, 175

strategic weapons, 172-173

U.S. influence, 176

Arms control, 220-221

Arms race, 204

Asia, 4, 9, 56

De Gaulle on, 84-85

Atlantic Alliance, 3-28, 246

Berlin Crisis, 68-74

conflict of interest, 21-23

consultation, 225-234

current disputes, 4-5

De Gaulle's views, 44-60

differences in historical perspective, 25-28

formation, 91

future trends, 246-249

need for political unity, 155-156, 159.

175-176

nuclear problems, 161-186

210, 214-215

political control, 147

strategic debate, 91-125

233

structural problems, 2-28

threat of Soviet aggression, 9-10, 93

Atlantic Commonwealth, 245

253

262

basic questions about the future of America's Atlantic relations.

The studies are policy-oriented, seeking not only to describe and forecast but also to prescribe. Each of the twelve studies is the responsibility of its author, but will consider its special problems in the light of the general aim of the program as a whole. The program is under the guidance of a Steering Committee, of which Carles M. Spofford is the chairman.

The Atlantic Policy Studies are divided into four broad categories, dealing respectively with the external environment of the West; with problems of military strength and organization; with economic relations among the Atlantic countries and between them and less developed countries; and with Atlantic political relations.

Two studies of the Atlantic world's external environment have been commissioned and will be published as part of the series. One, by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski of Columbia University, considers the relations between the West, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A second, by Theodore Geiger of the National Planning Association, examines the nature of the great transformation now going on throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America, and its implications for the future of relations with the Western world. A book by Hedley Bull of London University will examine further the military-political problems of the alliance in the areas of nuclear weapons, arms control, and strategic doctrine.

Economic problems both within the Atlantic area and between the Atlantic nations and the rest of the world are examined in four separate studies. One, by John O. Coppock of Stanford University, considers the principal problems of agricultural policy and trade within the Atlantic area. A second by Richard N. Cooper of Yale University examines international financial arrangements and monetary institutions among the Atlantic nations, and prescribes policies for the future in this area. Trade arrangements and economic in-

263

tegration within the Atlantic Community are the subject of a third economic study, by Bela Balassa of Yale University, in collaboration with a group of economists from the United States, Europe, Canada and Japan. John Pincus of the RAND Corporation has undertaken a study of economic relations, trade and aid, between the industrial nations and the less developed countries.

Political relations among the Atlantic nations are the subject of four studies. Miriam Camps of Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations is preparing a volume on

[LC]

developed countries.

Political relations among the Atlantic nations are the subject of four studies. Miriam Camps of Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations is preparing a volume on the future of European unity. Hans Speier of the RAND Corporation and the Council on Foreign Relations has undertaken a study of the implications of German foreign policy for the United States. Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University will give a series of lectures at the Council in the spring of 1965, which will review the principal constraints, particularly the domestic constraints, on United States action in Atlantic affairs. His lectures will be published as a volume in the Atlantic Policy Series. A fourth political volume, by the Director of the Atlantic Policy Studies, will be addressed to the question of the future shape of political relations among the Atlantic countries.

Harold van B. Cleveland

Director, Atlantic Policy Studies

Council on Foreign Relations

[L]

COUNCIL PUBLICATIONS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (quarterly), edited by Hamilton Fish
Armstrong.

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS (annual). Volumes for 1931, 1932 and 1933, by Walter Lippman and William O. Scroggs; for 1934-35, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1940, by Whitney H. Shepardson and William O. Scroggs; for 1945-47, 1947-1948 and 1948-1949, by John C. Campbell; for 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, and 1954 by Richard P. Stebbins; for 1955, by Hollis W. Barber; for 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963, by Richard P. Stebbins.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (annual). Volume for 1952 edited by Clarence W. Baier and Richard P. Stebbins; for 1953, and 1954, edited by Peter V. Curl; for 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, edited by Paul E. Zinner; for 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963 edited by Richard P. Stebbins.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD (annual), edited by Walter H. Mallory.

REMNANTS OF EMPIRE: The United Nations and the
End of Colonialism, by David W. Wainhouse.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND WORLD TRADE,
by Randall Hinshaw.

THE FOURTH DIMENSION OF FOREIGN POLICY:
Educational and Cultural Affairs, by Philip H. Coombs.

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD TRADE,
by Warren S. Hunsberger.

AMERICAN AGENCIES INTERESTED IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Fifth Edition), compiled by Donald Wasson.

265

FOREIGN AFFAIRS BIBLIOGRAPHY 1952-1962, by
Henry L. Roberts.

265

THE DOLLAR IN WORLD AFFAIRS: An Essay in In-
ternational Financial Policy, by Henry G. Aubrey.

ON DEALING WITH THE COMMUNIST WORLD, by
George F. Kennan.

FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY, by Edward S.
Mason.

THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION AND WORLD POL-
ITICS, by Caryl P. Haskins.

AFRICA: A Foreign Affairs Reader, edited by Phillip W.
Quigg.

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES:
Problems of Partnership, by George E. Taylor.

SOUTHEAST ASIA IN UNITED STATES POLICY,
by Russell H. Fifield.

UNESCO: Assessment and Promise, by George N. Shuster.

THE PEACEFUL ATOM IN FOREIGN POLICY, by
Arnold Kramish.

THE ARABS AND THE WORLD: Nasser's Arab Nation-
alist Policy, by Charles D. Cremeans.

TOWARD AN ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, by Christian
A. Herter.

THE SOVIET UNION, 1922-1962: A Foreign Affairs
Reader, edited by Philip E. Mosely.

THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID: American Experi-
ence in Southeast Asia, by John D. Montgomery.

SPEARHEADS OF DEMOCRACY: Labor in the Devel-
oping Countries, by George C. Lodge.

LATIN AMERICA: Diplomacy and Reality, by Adolf A.
Berle.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND
THE HEMISPHERE CRISIS, by John C. Dreier.

THE UNITED NATIONS: Structure for Peace, by Ernest
A. Gross.

[L]

266

THE LONG POLAR WATCH: Canada and the Defense of North America, by Melvin Conant.

ARMS AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA (Revised Edition), by Edwin Lieuwen.

THE FUTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES: Political Implications of Economic Development (Revised Edition), by Eugene Staley.

SPAIN AND THE DEFENSE OF THE WEST: Ally and Liability, by Arthur P. Whitaker.

SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA TODAY: Its Implications for United States Policy, by Richard N. Adams, John P. Gillin, Allan R. Holmberg, Oscar Lewis, Richard W. Patch, and Charles W. Wagley.

FOREIGN POLICY: The Next Phase: The 1960s (Revised Edition), by Thomas K. Finletter.

DEFENSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST: Problems of American Policy (Revised Edition), by John C. Campbell.

COMMUNIST CHINA AND ASIA: Challenge to American Policy, by A. Doak Barnett.

FRANCE, TROUBLED ALLY: De Gaulle's Heritage and Prospects, by Edgar S. Furniss, Jr.

Index, pp. 253-268, 260 bl.
Bachmann 201-206 encr.

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Index

Troubled Kissingers

Acheson, Dean, 243

Action Committee for a United Europe,
138, 140

Africa, 4, 203

Air-defense system, 20, 182

Alaska, 22

Albania, 200

Algiers, 45, 53, 61

Alliances, 11-18, 42

reasons for joining, 15-18

(See also Atlantic Alliance)

European influence, 176

nuclear control, 174-175

under SACEUR, 173

strategic weapons, 172-173

U.S. influence, 176

Arms control, 220-221

Arms race, 204

Asia, 4, 9, 56

Atlantic Alliance, 3-28, 246

Berlin Crisis, 68-74

consultation, 225-234

current disputes, 4-5

De Gaulle's views, 44-60

formation, 91

future trends, 246-249

need for political unity, 155-156, 159,
175-176

nuclear problems, 161-186

political control, 147

strategic debate, 91-125

structural problems, 3-28

Atlantic Commonwealth, 245

253

Index

Acheson, Dean, 243

Adenauer, Chancellor Konrad, 67-68, 70-74, 142, 205

Africa, 4, 203

Air-defense system, 20, 182

Alaska, 22

Albania, 200

Algiers, 45, 53, 61

Alliances, 11-18, 42

changes in nature of, 11-18

reasons for joining, 15-18

(See also Atlantic Alliance)

criteria, 174

European influence, 176

nuclear control, 174-175

under SACEUR, 173

strategic weapons, 172-173

U.S. influence, 176

Arms control, 220-221

Arms race, 204

Asia, 4, 9, 56

De Gaulle on, 84-85

Atlantic Alliance, 3-28, 246

Berlin Crisis, 68-74

conflict of interest, 21-23

consultation, 225-234

current disputes, 4-5

De Gaulle's views, 44-60

formation, 91

future trends, 246-249

need for political unity, 153-156, 159-175-176

nuclear problems, 161-186

political control, 147

strategic debate, 91-125

to strengthen Allied cohesion, 139, 232-233

structural problems, 3-28

Atlantic Commonwealth, 245

253

Index 255

effect on MLF, 138

view of Atlantic partnership, 40-64
on Western world-wide policies, 54-55
Germany fleet from NATO, 55

Detente, 17, 207

Deterrence, 14-15, 19, 106, 162, 179

Diplomacy, 18-20, 23

coalition, 223-224, 231
of De Gaulle, 46-47

effect of nuclear war, 18-19

Directorate proposed by De Gaulle, 55-56, 142, 243

Dulles, John Foster, 33, 191

"Earmarking" of missiles, 122

East European countries, 37, 209, 212, 215-217, 220

Communist rule, 190, 195, 199-204

trade missions to, 216

East Germany (see Germany, East)

East-West relations, 56, 155-156, 188-204
bilateral approaches, 56, 203-204

Communist threat, 9-10, 39-40, 56, 58-60, 93, 188

conflicting Allied views, 188-189
future of Germany and, 204-222

long-term policy, 204

negotiations, 144, 195-196, 201, 204

peaceful co-existence, 190, 196-198

relaxation of tensions, 189-191, 201-202
role of Federal Republic, 171

Sino-Soviet split, 60, 196, 199-200

Soviet leadership, 191-194, 198, 200-201

Soviet peace offensives, 188, 190

trade policy, 204

Egyptian nuclear program, 169

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 81, 96, 128

Enthoven, Alain C., 102-104, 177

Equilibrium, 27, 58, 60

(See also Balance of power)

Erhard, Chancellor Ludwig, 133, 306

Escalation, 18, 179-181, 187

EURATOM, 4

Europe, economic recovery, 7-8, 25, 39, 94

integration, 4, 7, 11, 33-38, 76-77

Atlantic partnership and, 234-246

British view, 76-77

community approach, 236

confederal, 237, 242

De Gaulle's view, 76, 52-53, 76-77, 84

federal, 235-237

MLF and, 137-138, 148-149

opponents, 52-53, 238

political, 235-236

role of U.S., 238-242

supranationality, 236-241

need for unity, 27, 221

policy of influencing American decisions, 6-7

political dynamism, 7

political unity, 32-39, 172

Soviet threat, 9-10, 39-40, 56, 58-60, 93, 188

stability, 27, 65-66

supranational, 76-77, 236-241

suspicion of U.S., 7

unification, 27, 32-36, 39-40, 51

De Gaulle's views, 49-51

U.S. troops stationed in, 107, 116

European autonomy, 234, 238-239

nuclear control, 164-165

European Defense Community, 33, 76, 237

European nuclear force, 139, 149, 153,

158, 167-168, 175

opposition to, 168-169

U.S. policy, 167

Expertise, 21, 23, 248-249

F-104 airplanes, 173

Federal Republic (see Germany, West)

Federalists, European, 241

Finland, 190

Finletter, Thomas K., 133

"Fire-break," 177

Flexible response doctrine, 98-101, 106, 111, 117, 119, 121, 136, 147, 172, 174, 177

Foreign aid programs, 3

Florinsky, Michael T., 1917

Foreign policy, European, 38-39

Fouchet Plan, 50, 241

France, 24-25, 38, 163, 202, 237

and the Common Market, 8

De Gaulle's policy, 44-64

foreign policy, 41-64

Fourth Republic, 43

interwar period, 94

nuclear program, 798, 101, 118, 137, 143-144, 163, 165-167

opposition to MLF, 134-136, 138, 155-158

relations with Soviet Union, 56-59, 189

relations with U.S., 46-64

relations with West Germany, 67, 72-73, 128, 189

Third Republic, 42-43

World War I, 16, 42

Franco-German nuclear collaboration, 156

Euro-German Treaty of Collaboration, 67, 74, 135-134, 204-205, 207, 221-222

Gallois, General Pierre M., 13-14, 110

Geneva Disarmament Conference, 59, 189

Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference (1959), 71

Geneva Summit Conference (1955), 190

Germany, 24-25, 27, 65-74, 87, 242

division of, 68-69, 207

future of, 204-222

Nazism, 66

post World War I, 42-43

psychological needs, 66-67

re-unification, 208-214

Atlantic Alliance policies, 208-210, 214-215

issue of frontiers, 217, 219

objectives, 214-215

proposed plan, 219-221

self-determination, 218-219

and stability of Europe, 65-66

unification, 65-66

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### Harold van B. Cleveland

Council on Foreign Relations

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THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS (annual). Volumes for 1931, 1932 and 1933, by Walter Lippman and William O. Scroggs; for 1934-35, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1940, by Whitney H. Shepardson and William O. Scroggs; for 1945-47, 1947-48 and 1948-1949, by John C. Campbell; for 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, and 1954 by Richard P. Stebbins; for 1955, by Hollis W. Barber; for 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963, by Richard P. Stebbins.

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THE DOLLAR IN WORLD AFFAIRS: An Essay in International Financial Policy, by Henry G. Aubrey.

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**THE LONG POLAR WATCH:** Canada and the Defense of North America, by Melvin Conant.

**ARMS AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA (Revised Edition),** by Edwin Lieuwen.

**THE FUTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES:** Political Implications of Economic Development (Revised Edition), by Eugene Staley.

**SPAIN AND THE DEFENSE OF THE WEST:** Ally and Liability, by Arthur P. Whitaker.

**SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA TODAY:** Its Implications for United States Policy, by Richard N. Adams, John P. Gillin, Allan R. Holmberg, Oscar Lewis, Richard W. Patch, and Charles W. Wagley.

**FOREIGN POLICY:** The Next Phase: The 1960s (Revised Edition), by Thomas K. Finletter.

**DEFENSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST:** Problems of American Policy (Revised Edition), by John C. Campbell.

**COMMUNIST CHINA AND ASIA:** Challenge to American Policy, by A. Doak Barnett.

**FRANCE, TROUBLED ALLY:** De Gaulle's Heritage and Prospects, by Edgar S. Furniss, Jr.

A&A ACADEMICS • NEW YORK • 1976