If any nation might be considered. As far as
demonstrative potential of the unions
from duncunatively in terms of the
require a small capability nation
numerosing those nations that might
be viewed qualitatively in terms of e-
cause the problem has been
enacted has been to be exemplar-
The strategic importance of brief-
IV. CONCLUSION
undertakenable.

Should geostrategic areas seem
role of unknown defined in future
a minimum. That those on whom the
at the beneficial loss be paid to
of others, if some reasonable in-
booted to accept losses in permit
their defense. It a nation is ex-
acting ready to intervene in
states to accept a low casualty
unanimously to agree the United
one who rely on U.S. protection aim-
ing wholly consistent for de-
universally available. Nor does
protective measure of a the not
to the United States to benefit
ere, if does not seem unreasonable
from the cooperation in permit of of-
relying upon measures retaliation and
black powder of a moreform defined,
Soutenirerax\Noufes\31

[A]

Schlesinger/Nuclear/ 32

as we can see into the future, the strategic environment will continue to be dominated by the preponderant military power of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is possible that the spread of weapons will result in greater inhibition on the use of power by the United States or the Soviet Union in regions of less than vital concern.

The degree of % inhibition depends, upon the risks that we (or the Soviets) are willing to run. However, if we desire to accept the risks, we could, because of our preponderant power, continue to intervene in unsettled areas to diminish the risk of small-scale nuclear war.

With the spread of weapons there would be a greater likelihood of use of misuse, but the risk of use or misuse will be concentrated primarily in the third areas of the world. Given the current and prospective stable military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, it is difficult to envisage % conflicts in third areas escalating into exchanges between the ZIs of the two major powers.

The aim of the two major powers, consisting into exchange between
envoyage & conflicts in third areas
Soviet Union, it is difficult to
tween the United States and the
British & military balance be-
worth given the current and pre-
dominantly in the third areas of the
use on balance will be concentrated
use of balance, but the risk of
some failure, but the risk of
not being a greater idealistic of
risk of自我-scale maximum war.
in unattacked areas to gain the
eraent power, continue to intervene
we could, because of our bracken-
tot we desire to accept the risks,
totals are willing to run, however,
upon the risk that we (or the war-
the degree of % Induction required,
tions of force than after concern.
States on the Soviet Union in reg-
on the use of power by the United
will result in greater irritation
because that the share of someone
steers and the Soviet Union. If it
and military power of the United
& to be dominated by the bracken-
strategic environment will continue
as we can see into the future, the
Soviet Union/Morozov 35

Schlesinger/Nuclear/33

This implies, of course, that pro-
liferation would impose enlarged
risks primarily on other nations.
The superpowers will continue to be
relatively immune; the threat to t-
hem will continue to come primarily
from each other. In all analyses
of proliferation this asymmetrical
distribution of the risks should
be stressed because of its possible
impact on the incentives of aspir-
ing nuclear powers.

A substantial diminution of the
strategic gap between the superpow-
ers and others is simply not in the
cffing. The only way in which re-
duction of the gap could be influ-
ential is if it undermines the cre-
dibility of intervention by a super-
power to stabilize conditions in
third areas being subjected to nuc-
lear threat. This is not necessari-
ly beneficial, and it is doubtful
whether those in threatened areas
an
would desire such an outcome, if
they think seriously about the pro-
blem. What may be desirable is to
make crystal clear that despite
nuclear spread the major powers
will retain the ability to inter-

["will retain the aptness to itself—\nnucleate around the mutual powers\nmake crystal clean that cab能力\ndesire. What may be desirable to it\ndoes think autonomously about the pro-\nwould centre upon its outcome, it\nwould centre upon its outcome, it\nan\nwhat may be desirable to it\nwhat may be desirable to it\nan\nwhat may be desirable to it\nwhat may be

Schlesinger/Nuclear/34

vene to deter nuclear threats or
to punish nuclear irresponsibility
without risking substantial damage
to themselves. This does not nec-
essarily mean that the major powers
will be forced to deploy all those
systems, like ABM, which hold some
promise in this regard, it does mean
that they shall be forced to work
diligently so as continually to up-
grade their ability to detect, det-
er, disarm, or punish the national
source of nuclear irresponsibility.

While nuclear spread is basically
destabilizing, its strategic conse-
quences need not be too severe.

Simple nuclear capabilities cannot
play the role of "equalizers" in
international conflict. The strat-
egic position that the United Stat-
es and the Soviet Union currently
enjoy is so unassailable that even
continuing action by third parties
is unlikely to upset the central s-
trategic balance for the next twen-
ty years. Properly exploited, this
central strategic balance could
continue to provide some stability
in regional conflict--even in the
face of nuclear spread.

##

The role of nuclearभूत्तर
in regional conflict--even in the
continue to provide some capability
central strategic balance could
fly away. Properly exploited, this
strategic balance for the next ten-
tyury to meet the consensus a-
continuing action by third parties
entails it be unassailable that even
so and the Soviet Union currently
olate position that the United States
-justifies the interventionist
brink the role of "enabler" in
simple nuclear capabilities cannot
decide need not be too severe.

**Dissipating its strategic concern**
while nuclearभूत्तर is practical
source of nuclear逾
on, 'dramatic' or baneful the national
grace, spatial specificity to detect, des-
familiarity so as continuously to un-
dertake itself be forced to work
broader in this regard, it does mean
that it itself be forced to work
exactly, like VEN, which hold some
will be forced to deploy all forces
assurably mean that the materiel here
is dissimilar. This does not nec-
sitate making substantial damage
to baneful nuclear逾
some to detect nuclear threats or
Series/Infernal/34

Schlesinger/nuclear/ 35

Any views expressed in this paper
are those of the author. They should
not be interpreted as reflecting the
views of The RAND Corporation or
the official opinion or policy of
any of its governmental or private
research sponsors. Papers are repr-
oduced by The RAND Corporation as
a courtesy to members of its staff.

This paper was developed from the
author's panel comments recorded at
the Third International A_yms Contr-
ol Symposium held in Philadelphia,
April 1-3, 1966.

###

WWW

July 1-3, 1969.
of 2600meters near in Pittsburgh.
the U.S. International Vane Contr-
sort's a base comments recorded at
this paper was developed from the
a context to members of its staff.
based on the NMD Corporation an
research samples. Lived as the reac-
and at its Government or private
the official document or brief of
items of the NMD Corporation or
not be interpreted as reflecting the
the those of the author. They should
not be construed in this paper.

September84\unless\ 32

[A]

OCT 21. 1966

THE REPORTER

660 Madison Avenue
New York City 21
TE 2-8800

Max Ascoli

October 18, 1966

Dear Bernard:

Thank you for your two letters, one about your book, the other on Bailey's piece, which we are rushing to press. I am very glad to have it, for too many crackpots have their say in our Correspondence columns; for once, we can publish a letter from a man of your distinction and wisdom.

Of course, I will be delighted if you would send me a follow-up to the Bailey story. And, please, don't start playing that modest tune: your background in political and military affairs lets you outrank with ease any one of my staff who deals with similar matters. Let me know when I can have the article.

As to the book, what kind of review can you expect from the New York Times, especially one written by Amitai Etzioni? I would like to bring out a review, but Henry is away somewhere, maybe Vietnam. Anyway, I have not heard from him. One thing, however, is certain: I would not give your book to him. You two are good friends of mine, and I would hate to have in The Reporter anything that could even remotely be called a back-scratching club. I am now looking for a reviewer. Any suggestion you can give me, other than Henry, would be welcome.

All the best,

Affectionately,

Dr. Bernard Brodie
Social Sciences Building
University of California
Los Angeles, California 90024

cc: Dr. Henry Kissinger

THE REPORTER

Max Ascoli

December 22, 1966

Dear Henry:

Here is the article I told you about by
this man named Frank (alas, you were right:
a moment after having denied that it was in
favor of an IBM system built in the expecta-
tion of China, it occurred to me that this
was one of the points of the article). The
other one, as I told you, is an outline that
makes some sense until the final paragraphs.
But the author seems to be susceptible to
persuasion.

My feeling of guilt for sending you such
trifling material is somewhat relieved by the
knowledge that you read very fast, and some-
times you don't need to read at all to find
the weak spots.

Happy Christmas, again, and I'll talk to
you Sunday.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
419 Beacon Street
Boston, Mass. 02115