[L]

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nuclear matters. To Soviet and European critics, the MLF has
been advocated as decreasing, if anything, the role of its
members in the decision to go to nuclear war. Thus Gerard
C. Smith, then Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for
the MLF, said on April 22, 1964:

Any wartime decision to fire the missiles would be by multi-
lateral agreement, rather than by bilateral agreement as in 'the case
of these earlier strategic missiles. The MLF will thus increase the
number of states with fingers on the safety catch, rather than on
the nuclear trigger. [emphasis added.]

There would be no increase of risk of compromise of weapons
design data under MLF. Multilateral custodial procedures would
assure that individual countries had no greater access to informa-
tion about how to design and manufacture weapons than at pres-
ent under the NATO atomic stockpile.¹⁹

¹⁹ Gerard C. Smith, "The Nuclear Defense of NATO," speech on April 22, 1964, DOSB, Vol. L, No. 1299 (May 18, 1964), p. 785.

The dilemma of how to reconcile the requirement of cen-
tral control over nuclear weapons with the sovereignty of our
Allies is real. But for the long-term vitality of the Alliance it
would have been better to face this issue head-on than to
present different versions of the control problem to different
audiences. If there *is* a German demand for nuclear weapons
—as the advocates of the MLF have alleged—it is unlikely to
be satisfied by “increasing the number of states with fingers on
the safety catch, rather than on the nuclear trigger.” If other
countries do wish to enter the nuclear field, they are not
likely to be put off by a device which creates the illusion of
participation while giving “no greater access to information
about how to design and manufacture weapons than at pres-
ent.” The MLF cannot at one and the same time satisfy de-
mands for nuclear sharing and assuage concerns about nu-
clear proliferation.

Originated to fulfill SACEUR's military requirement, pressed as a counter to a French challenge, the MLF stands in danger of compounding every problem it was supposed to solve. It has prevented a reconsideration of the strategic missions that gave rise to the military requirement. Rather than heal the rift in the Alliance, the MLF is likely to multiply divisions. There is something absurd about trying to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by bringing the non-nuclear countries of NATO into the nuclear field, often with only their reluctant assent. It makes no sense to attempt to revitalize NATO with a project which, because of the opposition of France and other Allies, will have to be set up outside of NATO. It is contradictory to advocate European political unity while urging a scheme which is certain to produce a rift between France and the Federal Republic.

To be sure, France cannot be given a veto over every
measure to strengthen the Alliance. But before embarking on
a collision course, we should be sure that a disputed scheme
commands wide support and that it will in fact bring about a
structure which enhances the long-term vitality of the
Alliance.

There is reason to doubt that the MLF meets either of
these requirements. Though the proponents of the MLF have
tended to blame all objections on the manipulations of short-

Alliance.

There is reason to doubt that the MLF meets either of these requirements. Though the proponents of the MLF have tended to blame all objections on the manipulations of shortsighted men, the opposition of France, Belgium and the Secretary General of NATO, the indifference of most other NATO Allies and the split within the Federal Republic cannot be simply shrugged off. Outside the Federal Republic there is not one country whose agreement to the MLF represents anything more than acquiescence in American pressure.

Proponents of the MLF often compare their project to the Schuman Plan, which, despite heavy initial criticism, laid the basis for European economic integration. However, while many constructive innovations have had to withstand criticism when first proposed, not everything that is criticized is necessarily constructive. The Schuman Plan promoted Franco-German cooperation in areas where long-term interests were parallel. The longer the Coal and Steel Community lasted, the more obvious were the benefits of common action.

The opposite is likely to be the case with the MLF. Once established, the conflicting motives of the participants will become increasingly apparent. There is a latent difference of opinion between the Federal Republic and the United States and Great Britain about the size of the force as well as about its composition, specifically about whether land-based missiles should supplement the sea-based MLF. It is likely that the Federal Republic regards the MLF as the first installment in meeting SACEUR's requirement for medium-range missiles while the United States and Britain consider it a final satisfaction of existing needs. Though this will not become apparent in the early stages of the project, it is bound to lead to difficulties later on.

Another potential dispute derives from the fact that the Federal Republic favors the Multilateral Force partly to increase its share of nuclear control. Most other countries—especially Great Britain—participate in order to prevent an increase of German control. This difference can be obscured in the early stages of the MLF; it, too, will become more and more acute as time goes on.

Finally, an extremely divisive debate in the Federal Republic can be avoided only if the MLF treaty contains a "European" clause providing for the possibility of transforming the MLF into a European nuclear force once European political integration is further advanced. The Italian government (whose parliamentary support for the MLF is dubious in any event) has taken a similar position. Great Britain, on the other hand, will not agree to such a prospect; indeed, its participation in any new nuclear arrangement is conditional on a British veto over any structural changes. It is one thing to create an institution whose evolution is likely to strengthen common objectives; it is quite another to stake so much on a device where conflicting interests have been kept latent only by avoiding consideration of the key issues.

The MLF may therefore strengthen the very tendencies it seeks to combat. In its advocacy of the MLF, the United States

LJG

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has granted almost all of the propositions of its European critics. It has agreed that possession of nuclear weapons is a criterion of equality. It has granted that ownership of some strategic forces is essential for participation in strategic planning and political decisions. It has admitted that influence in the Alliance somehow depends on access to a strategic nuclear arsenal. It has differed only about the nature of ownership and the way control should be exercised. But since the control procedures of the MLF patently favor United States hegemony, they can be used by the nationalists and extremists as a proof of American bad faith. If the Federal Republic finds itself at odds with the United States about control, or with its other allies about the evolution of the force, a serious backlash could develop.

The MLF may backfire even with respect to its primary objective of preventing Franco-German nuclear collaboration. Having made access to nuclear weapons the test of equality, we have given an incentive to the Federal Republic to seek alternative arrangements if the MLF fails or if its control arrangements prove unsatisfactory. Disappointment could then justify a Franco-German nuclear collaboration for which prior to the MLF no significant support existed within the Federal Republic.

It was to render a poor service to the Federal Republic to seek to restore Allied cohesion by a scheme which involved access by Germany to nuclear weapons. If the MLF succeeds, the Federal Republic will be embroiled with France. If it fails, leaders who have staked a great deal on following the American lead will be discredited. Participation by Germany in a nuclear fleet has resurrected instinctive fears all over Europe. Within Germany, pro-American and pro-French factions have rent the governing party, the Christian Democratic Union. The MLF thus threatens internal German stability and creates the danger that the Federal Republic will become isolated internationally.

Advocates of the MLF often argue that it is easy to pick holes in any existing nuclear control plan but much harder to offer a constructive alternative. To be sure, if the issue of nuclear control is, in fact, the cause of Allied tensions, the MLF proponents have a point. However, the issue of nuclear control is a symptom, not a cause, of NATO's difficulties. There exists no neat solution for it so long as NATO is composed of sovereign states. Nor does the MLF "solve" it. The basic problem in the Alliance is political and not strategic. There is something incongruous about NATO's absorption in technicalities of mixed-manning while it lacks a common policy toward the Communist world, flounders dividedly in the former colonial areas and has yet to concert a strategic doctrine. To devote so much energy to the problem of who pushes the button in the remote contingency of nuclear war while neglecting the issues which confront the Alliance daily comes close to being escapism. Insofar as the German conversion to the MLF was not the result of American missionary zeal, it reflected above all a desire to establish a claim not to be excluded from further East-West negotiations and to create

close to being escapism. Insofar as the German conversion to
the MLF was not the result of American missionary zeal,
it reflected above all a desire to establish a claim not to be
excluded from further East-West negotiations and to create
another organic link between the United States and Europe.

The MLF is at best a circuitous way to achieve these goals. In fact, it reverses the correct priorities. Political unity must *precede*, it cannot follow, nuclear integration. To pursue nuclear multilateralism while foreign policy remains national must emphasize divergent interests. The imagination and dedication expended on the MLF would, therefore, have been better spent in strengthening political cohesion. Our allies are not likely to be convinced that their interests will be taken seriously during the improbable eventuality of general nuclear war when no consensus exists for the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy and for crisis situations. Rather than take the detour through the MLF, it would have been wiser to aim directly for coordination of policy by setting up a body to develop common policies for many unsolved problems of the Alliance in East-West relations, strategic doctrine, trade policy, arms control or relations with the emerging nations. If France had refused to participate, the disruptive intent would have been obvious. France would have stood apart from an effort which commanded a real consensus. Moreover, a future French government could participate in such a group more easily than in the MLF, in which French membership could well be precluded by financial considerations alone. If a political steering body for the Alliance had then decided to include the Federal Republic in the ownership of strategic weapons, the political context would have been entirely different. It would have represented the common view of all Allies rather than the pressure of one. Regardless of the ultimate fate of the MLF, a political body to coordinate Alliance policy and to manage crises remains essential.²⁰ If it

²⁰ For an elaboration of such a policymaking body, see Chapter 8. should be argued that the Atlantic Alliance will never be able to develop a common political program, the emptiness of nuclear multilateralism becomes apparent. Nations that cannot develop common negotiating positions are not likely to be able to concert a common strategy for an apocalypse.

Even in our bilateral relations with the Federal Republic, the strengthening of political consultation should have had priority. If we had created institutions to give the Federal Republic access to our strategic and disarmament planning and the conduct of East-West negotiations in general, these could have been used as a brake on eventual Franco-German nuclear collaboration much as the Franco-German Treaty turned out to be one of the factors thwarting the MLF. By reversing the process, we brought on what we feared most. We whetted German nuclear appetites without giving satisfaction to the political concerns. It is questionable whether it is in our interest to discourage Franco-German intimacy, but at least it should not be based on disillusionment with the United States.

The MLF, as originally conceived, is not likely to be realized. So much opposition exists that even the most passionate

50

advocates will have to modify the scheme. It may be useful,
however, to inquire what lessons can be drawn from the
experience.

The most important one is not to try to solve political
problems with technical expedients. Confronted with a po-
litical and philosophical challenge in De Gaulle's exclusion
of Britain from the Common Market, American policy-
makers reacted by staking everything on a scheme of nuclear
control which they had previously treated with indifference.
They then spent two years negotiating its mechanical aspects.
In the process, the deeper causes of NATO's disarray were neg-
lected. The ends and means became confused. At its best,
the MLF was irrelevant to the fundamental problems of NATO.
It would have repeated within its framework many of the
disputes which it was supposed to overcome.

In Washington, this was obscured because one group in
the government had become so deeply committed to the MLF
that it acted as a lobby rather than an organ for calmly
weighing alternatives. In the words of one acute observer,
engaged in "a public relations campaign to gain official, po-
litical and academic support, of an energy and ruthlessness
unknown since Harriet Beecher Stowe . . ."²¹ This has made

²¹ Alastair Buchan, "Is This NATO Crisis Necessary?" *The New Republic*, Vol. 151, Nos. 6-7 (August 8, 1964), pp. 19-21.

it difficult to determine whether what appeared in Washing-
ton as the European opinion did not really reflect European
acquiescence in the passionate advocacy of one segment of
our bureaucracy. The result was a whole series of misjudg-
ments. European support for the MLF has been grossly over-
estimated. Despite the repeated criticisms of the MLF by
British Labor leaders when in opposition, it was expected
that the new British government would agree to a treaty set-
ting up the MLF within two months of coming into office.
The divisive impact of the threat of a German-American nu-
clear partnership was misjudged. The capacity of the German
political structure to withstand strain was completely miscon-
ceived. Throughout, some American officials acted as if get-
ting agreement to the MLF was an end in itself. By using
whatever argument was convenient to this purpose, a num-
ber of partially contradictory promissory notes were handed
out.

The pressure of a relatively small group of officials in the
State Department gave our Allies a misleading impression of
American unanimity and commitment. The Pentagon had
accepted the MLF only on the assumption that ultimate
American control would remain unimpaired. The group in
the State Department that originated the MLF proposal and
pressed it on our Allies was much more sympathetic to the
ultimate emergence of a separate European nuclear force.
Indeed, it occasionally urged the MLF as a means to this end.
Although the cohesiveness of our society depends on under-
stating conflicting views, it is dangerous to engage in major
international innovations unless we are clear about our ulti-
mate direction.

All this suggests the need for a re-examination of some
governmental procedures. We need a planning focus less
geared to immediate crises and more capable of developing
concepts responsive to fundamental trends. There should be

inate direction.

All this suggests the need for a re-examination of some governmental procedures. We need a planning focus less geared to immediate crises and more capable of developing concepts responsive to fundamental trends. There should be less reliance on the accidents of bureaucratic pressures. Our own aims must be clear before we commit our prestige. We should not use the process of negotiations to make up our own minds. Not to reveal what we intend to do is a question of tactics; not to know is to mortgage the future.

Fortunately, partly because of the initiative of the new British government, partly because of President Johnson's removal of previous time limits, an opportunity exists to take a new approach to the issue of nuclear control. The wise, if abrupt, decision of President Johnson to reduce the pressures for the original MLF project and Britain's initiative have smoothed the way for a new study of the entire problem. This should enable us to determine the real wishes of our Allies before irrevocable decisions are taken. In any reassessment, we must, of course, keep in mind that in many countries, notably in the Federal Republic, leaders have staked their careers on our previous proposals. Though another approach to the issue of nuclear control would have been preferable, future policy must consider that simply to abandon the MLF now would have a different significance than earlier. Moreover, some of the objectives that the MLF has sought to realize are important. For example, the goal of political equality for all members of the Alliance is crucial. Means must be found to achieve those objectives of the MLF project essential to Allied cohesion. The controversy about the MLF will have served some useful purpose if it permits the Alliance to return to fundamentals: the definition of common purposes and an answer to the question of what the members of the Alliance really want in the nuclear field.

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## CHAPTER SIX

### The Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here?

#### STRATEGIC WEAPONS

The nuclear problem in the Alliance has four components: (1) The United States would like to establish central control over the nuclear weapons in the Alliance. The ideal solution from the point of view of the Pentagon is to deprive all Allies of the physical capacity to act autonomously in the nuclear field. (2) Two of our Allies, Great Britain and France, have national nuclear weapons programs. (3) It is desirable to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons within the Alliance and elsewhere.

The MLF negotiations have established or confirmed (depending on the point of view) the claims of non-nuclear Allies to participate in nuclear control and, perhaps, to some form of ownership of nuclear weapons.

No program could perfectly reconcile all these objectives, partly because each Ally has two somewhat contradictory aims with respect to nuclear policy, partly because there is an inherent inconsistency between the attempt to establish central control over nuclear weapons and the jealousy with which each major Ally, including the United States, has here-tofore guarded its sovereignty.

The two contradictory aims of the Allies sometimes tend to cancel each other out: Each Ally wants to avoid being forced into nuclear war against its will, and it wants to be certain of nuclear support when its existence is at stake.

What our Allies understand by nuclear support is less clear. They want the *appearance* of nuclear support so that the Soviets never challenge their vital interests. Whether they are actually prepared to face the consequences of nuclear war is ambiguous. Their tendency to base NATO's military policy entirely on deterrence suggests that many of them may be above all concerned with their veto if nuclear war seemed imminent. They may be more interested in not being forced into nuclear war against their will than in being able to force us into a nuclear war against our will.

The ambivalence of our Allies underlines the incompatibility between central control over nuclear weapons and undiluted sovereignty. If no conflict of interest among the Allies were conceivable, the concern with either veto or triggering

The ambivalence of our Allies underlines the incompatibility between central control over nuclear weapons and undiluted sovereignty. If no conflict of interest among the Allies were conceivable, the concern with either veto or triggering ability would not exist. But as a sovereign state is the final judge of its interests, absolute reassurance is unobtainable. No one can predict with certainty how hard-pressed leaders will react under the unprecedented stresses of imminent nuclear war—not only with respect to the decision to use nuclear weapons but also with respect to the many nuances of bargaining during crises. The single-mindedness with which the United States has always guarded its freedom of decision is as significant a symptom of this dilemma as France's excessive claims to independence.

American proposals—including the MLF—have largely avoided this problem. The United States, starting from the technically unexceptionable premise that the conduct of nuclear war should be centrally controlled, has tried hard to create a structure in NATO which deprives our Allies of the physical capacity to act independently. We have been less ready to face the inevitable corollary: Those nations which are being asked to entrust their nuclear defense to the United States will urge, in return, a commensurate surrender of American sovereignty in the political field. To insist on centralized strategy while diplomacy remains national guarantees the perpetuation of all disputes.

France, on the other hand, has expressed the implications of sovereignty clearly and correctly, but it has neglected the technical requirements of nuclear strategy. In the face of the risks of a nuclear holocaust, no country can have complete freedom of decision—least of all a nation with a nuclear force strong enough to start a nuclear war but far too weak to finish it. While the United States has overemphasized the technical aspects of central command and control, France and those Europeans agreeing with her have pushed the legal implications of sovereignty to a point where they clash with the technical realities of the nuclear age.

We react bitterly when Europeans suggest that no one can foresee how even the most solemn commitments will be interpreted in the stark circumstances of a nuclear showdown. But when we argue *against* the nuclear forces of Britain and France, we seem to understand the problems produced by sovereignty very well. Then we tend to reverse the field and use the arguments which our nuclear European Allies invoke against us and thereby generate suspicions where none had been articulated before. Thus J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, explained why even a joint Franco-British nuclear force which shared command and control responsibilities with other European countries would still not meet the need as he saw it:

> [An agreed European control mechanism] would still not answer the basic question of these non-nuclear countries: In the moment of crisis would the nuclear powers of the arrangement—the

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powers which owned and operated the nuclear forces—in fact
consult and collaborate on an equal basis with their associate
members?¹

¹ J. Robert Schaetzel, "The Nuclear Problem and Atlantic Interdependence," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1963-63), pp. 565-566.

Carrying Schaetzel's argument one step further, it may be
relevant to ask why, if our European Allies cannot rely upon
formal commitments among themselves, they should have ab-
solute trust in the United States, which is 3,000 miles away
and has a recent history of isolation.

The nuclear issue thus turns in part on how crucial it is
for the United States to obtain physical control over all the
nuclear weapons within the Alliance. Heretofore we have
considered the objective so important that we have been
prepared to bring the non-nuclear countries of NATO into the
nuclear business—as long as they accepted an American veto
—in the hope that this might thwart the efforts of our nuclear
Allies. We have been less concerned about the proliferation
of nuclear know-how which the MLF is bound to bring than
about the already existing centers of nuclear decision within
the Alliance. We have preferred establishing yet another nu-
clear force—provided it was subject to an American veto—
rather than concede in theory the autonomy which France
and Britain already possess in practice.

The debate engendered by this policy has been more con-
ductive to self-righteousness than to sober thought. By plac-
ing so much stress on the actual conduct of nuclear opera-
tions, we have forced our Allies into inherently misleading
justifications of their nuclear programs. They have projected
the remote nightmare of the failure of the Alliance into the
present; we in turn have confused their fears with their
preferences.

But the real concern behind pressure for European
autonomy goes deeper. Europeans live on a continent cov-
ered with ruins testifying to the fallibility of human fore-
sight. They have had too much experience with nuances of
interpretation which can all but nullify formal commit-
ments; indeed, at some point, all of them have felt obliged to
leave some ally to his fate. The concern for a European role
in nuclear affairs expresses above all a desire to obtain a
measure of insurance against the unforeseeable events of
which European history is so full.

Some argue that the British and French nuclear programs
jeopardize our own security because they may force us into a
nuclear war against our will. But this is carrying logical ex-
trapolations to extremes. France and Great Britain must
know at least as well as we—though we can hardly expect
them to advertise this fact—that using their nuclear forces
independently against the Soviet Union would be a desperate
last resort. The French and British nuclear programs are not
a strategic preference but an attempt to provide insurance
against a disastrous contingency within Europe and against
nuclear developments in other parts of the world. Taking out
fire insurance does not indicate a liking for fires. On the
contrary, it may prevent a remote possibility from turning
into an obsession and thus free energies for more constructive
tasks.

For their limited objectives, the British and French nu-
clear forces are not so ineffective as we sometimes insist. The

In contrary, it may prevent a復讐政变
taking into an obsession and thus free energies for more constructive
tasks.

For their limited objectives, the British and French nu-
clear forces are not so ineffective as we sometimes insist. The
ratio of the combined British and French forces to those of
the Soviet Union is more favorable than was that of the So-
viet Union vis-à-vis the United States in the fifties. Despite
the overwhelming strategic superiority of the United States,
no one would maintain that the Soviet strategic force had no
deterrent value. And certainly in relation to any threats from
new nuclear powers, the British and French forces would be
formidable.

Of course, the Soviets could launch a pre-emptive blow at
the bases of European nuclear forces. However, such a course
would be extraordinarily risky. As long as the NATO treaty is
operative at all, it would be extremely foolhardy for the So-
viet s to undertake a nuclear attack on Europe without taking
into account the near certainty of American involvement.
The nuclear forces of our Allies should not be viewed as an
alternative to United States strategic power, but as a comple-
ment. The fear of some American officials that the French
nuclear force of less than a hundred delivery vehicles could
be seriously considered as possible replacement for our
arsenal of thousands is to give little credit to the ability of
our Allies to perceive their own interests. Close coordination
between Europe and the United States in the nuclear field is
dictated by self-interest; and Europeans have more to gain
from it than the United States.

In short, the real choice before the United States is
whether to try to build NATO nuclear policy on the existing
programs of our nuclear Allies or whether to seek to counter-
act these programs by creating yet another nuclear force—the
MLF. The former alternative seems far preferable, especially if
the non-nuclear countries are given equal status in political
and strategic planning.

Basing NATO nuclear policy on the existing nuclear forces
rather than the MLF is also more consistent with the eventual
evolution of a European nuclear force. In the long term,
nuclear proliferation in Europe can be reliably arrested only
by the development of an Atlantic political community in-
volving a real sharing of sovereignty or by European political
unity. Of these developments the latter seems more attaina-
ble. If Europe could organize itself politically, it would re-
duce the number of nuclear powers. A European nuclear
force would then replace the British and French nuclear pro-
grams, and other countries in Europe could be related to it
through whatever European political mechanisms emerge.
Such a framework would avoid what must in the long run be
a highly demoralizing relationship in which the United
States is alone responsible for the nuclear defense of the en-
tire non-Communist world.

On both sides of the Atlantic serious individuals fear that
a European nuclear force would lead to a reckless European

53

policy and to an eventual withdrawal of the United States from Europe. But it is likely that nuclear autonomy is the least divisive form of European unity. In the economic field, competition between Europe and the United States involves, at best, indirect risks. In the political area, the temptations for independent action are great and the penalties small. In military matters—and particularly in the nuclear field—the closest association between Europe and the United States is in the self-interest of both sides. Whatever their formal autonomy, it is inconceivable that our Allies would *prefer* to go to war with the relatively small nuclear forces available or in prospect for them and *without* the support of our necessarily preponderant arsenal.

Finally, we cannot withdraw from Europe even if we do not obtain our preferred strategic arrangements. To threaten to do so is both dangerous and empty. It is dangerous because it indicates that our commitment is conditional; and it is empty because we can no more withdraw from Europe than from Hawaii.

Of course there is a very real concern with arresting the spread of nuclear weapons. But when nuclear weapons have already been acquired by Communist China and may soon be in the possession of other anti-Western countries, it is not clear that nuclear proliferation is best arrested by wrecking the nuclear programs of our closest allies. Would it not be wiser to concentrate on eliminating the programs of those countries which in fact threaten our security?

This is not to say that the United States should promote a European nuclear force. On the contrary, the United States should show more restraint in seeking to influence internal European arrangements and exert its influence in shaping Atlantic relationships. It does mean, however, that we should not seek to destroy those elements from which a European force could emerge by pressing for an alternative—the MLF—which will in time cause much greater difficulties. No final solution is possible so long as the Alliance remains composed of sovereign states. Any interim arrangement should therefore be consistent with the most constructive evolution of European and Atlantic relationships.

Until either Atlantic or European political cohesion progresses further, the nuclear policy of the Alliance should be three-pronged: (1) There is need for a political mechanism to plan long-term policy, to manage crises and to control the nuclear weapons of the Alliance. This may require the establishment of an Executive Committee of the NATO Council composed of the United States, Britain, France, the Federal Republic, Italy and a rotating representative of the smaller countries.² (2) The military advice to this Committee

² The functions of this Committee are described in Chapter 8.

should come from a group of senior officers from the United States, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. It might be useful to charge the NATO Standing Group with this task. In that case it would have to be expanded to include the Federal Republic, and its seat would have to be transferred from Washington to Paris. (3) An Allied Nuclear Force should be constituted from the strategic forces of the United States, Great Britain and France and from the long-range weapons in Europe under the double-

have to be transferred from Washington to Paris. (3) An Allied Nuclear Force should be constituted from the strategic forces of the United States, Great Britain and France and from the long-range weapons in Europe under the double-veto system. The proposals made by the British government seem to move in this direction.

Will an attempt to base NATO nuclear strategy on the existing nuclear forces, with the Federal Republic sharing equally in political and strategic planning, meet German desires? This is difficult to answer because it is doubtful whether, after two years of being told by American policymakers what their ultimate wishes might be, German leaders know what their actual desires with respect to nuclear control are. Not the least useful aspect of changing the framework of negotiations is that it gives all partners an opportunity to become clear about their actual priorities. For example, if the main interest of the Federal Republic in the MLF is to obtain a voice in eventual East-West negotiations, it should be possible to achieve this objective by less divisive and more direct methods than the MLF. If the real German aim is to participate in joint strategic planning, an effort should be made to determine whether a major German role in the targeting and deployment of existing nuclear forces might not fill the need.

But, one might ask, is not discrimination inherent in the continued existence of national nuclear forces—even if they are assigned “irrevocably” to NATO—as Britain has proposed? Would this not place the Federal Republic in the position of a second-class ally? It has been argued, for example, that unless Germany obtains exactly the same status in the nuclear field as Britain and France, its loyalty to the Alliance might be shaken. But is this really true? Is it wise to encourage even the implication that the German commitment to the Alliance depends on access to nuclear weapons? Some argue that an Allied Nuclear Force composed of national contingents contains no assurance that these forces will not be withdrawn in a crisis. The British government has sought to get around this problem by offering to assign its strategic forces “irrevocably” to NATO. But it seems futile to devote energies to quibbling over such phrases as “assignment” and “irrevocable.” It is not healthy for the Alliance to waste energies in terminological exercises which obscure reality. No sovereign government is going to be forced into war against its will—no matter what the arrangement of nuclear forces and whatever the label under which they are grouped. Should Britain be prepared to wreck NATO, it could also break the additional commitment inherent in “irrevocable assignment.” In other words, the Allied Nuclear Force is no protection against situations in which the Alliance has already collapsed. But neither is the MLF, which could be even more easily paralyzed by a single veto. There is no technical or legal expedient which can serve as a substitute for political unity or which could protect the Alliance against failure to achieve it.

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Almost all responsible people in the Federal Republic understand that the Alliance could probably not survive German national ownership of strategic nuclear weapons. The real test of equality for the Federal Republic must be in the political field and in strategic planning. In the long term, the solution to the nuclear problem requires the fostering of European political unity and Atlantic cooperation. The former would diminish the role of the nation-state; the latter would make the Federal Republic part of a structure capable of assuring its security. The most dangerous course is one which in the name of integrated strategic planning magnifies the divisions within Europe.

Even in the present framework, care must be taken to assure full political equality to the Federal Republic. Participation in vital negotiations should not depend on the possession of a national nuclear arsenal. The Federal Republic must have a real opportunity to contribute to the formulation of positions in such fields as disarmament while they are still fluid. In other words, political unity must precede nuclear integration. To seek to reverse the process is to sow the seeds of unending disputes.

What would be the mission of an Allied Nuclear Force drawn from national contingents? It would appear that its most useful role would be deep interdiction, say, from a distance of some 300 miles behind the combat zone. It would be important to recognize, however, that effective counterforce operations against several hundred MRBM's are unlikely. Whatever its targets, the Allied Nuclear Force should be designed so that it is able to conduct discriminating nuclear operations according to the principles of "flexible response."

All the weapons suitable for its mission should become part of the Allied Nuclear Force. It should include major portions of the British and French national forces and a comparable contingent of American strategic weapons, probably in the form of Polaris submarines. The longer-range nuclear weapons now in Europe, such as the Pershing missiles and the F-104 airplanes, which are now under the double-veto system should also be assigned to this force.

With respect to the MLF, the best course would be to admit frankly that it was a mistake and to satisfy German desires by improving the process of political consultation and by giving the Federal Republic an equal role in the control of the proposed Allied Nuclear Force. But if it appears that the German desire for access to nuclear weapons has been so stimulated as to be irreversible, we are honor-bound to proceed with a mixed-manned element as a part of the Allied Nuclear Force. However, in that case, the purpose and size of the MLF should be redefined.

In the context of an Allied Nuclear Force, the previous extravagant claims for the MLF could be abandoned. It should no longer be the central focus of United States nuclear policy. There would be no need for American (or German) pressure on reluctant Allies to join. The decision would not be a test of friendship for the United States, but an individual judgment of the various governments. The size of

clear policy. There would be no need for American (or German) pressure on reluctant Allies to join. The decision would not be a test of friendship for the United States, but an individual judgment of the various governments. The size of the element should not be determined by the political objective of dwarfing the British and French nuclear programs but by the military goals of the Allied Nuclear Force.

The Allied Nuclear Force could be placed under SACEUR. However, it seems wiser to have SACEUR concentrate on the land battle and to create a distinct NATO Strategic Command. To symbolize a greater European influence in strategic matters, the command could be headed by a senior European officer and should be located in Europe. The purpose would be to place in one command all the weapons—European and American—relevant to deep penetration of hostile territory. Tactical nuclear weapons of ranges up to 300 miles would remain under SACEUR.

In bringing such a force into being the United States has obvious interests in insuring that its European components meet certain criteria. The following seem most important:
(1) European forces should be well protected so that they do not invite pre-emptive attack or have to be used precipitately because of their vulnerability. (2) These forces should possess an effective command and control system so that they are at all times responsive to political direction.
(3) They should be a part of a strategy that includes the possibility of flexible response. (4) They should be coordinated as part of a common NATO strategy.

Some European Allies will undoubtedly object to the creation of a separate NATO Nuclear Strategic Command. They will see such a command as the first step toward nuclear disengagement. These Allies seem to feel that, since SACEUR is located in Europe, he will be more sensitive to European needs than the President in Washington. But such attitudes are not healthy in the long run.

SACEUR's primary responsibility should be the land battle; he should not be burdened with military or political missions irrelevant to that important and complicated task. From a military point of view, operations that involve large sections of Soviet territory cannot be conducted as an adjunct to ground operations in Europe. SACEUR does not have sufficient information about the over-all strategic context; he will be too preoccupied with conditions within the European theater of operations. Deep penetrations of Soviet territory should be carried out only as part of an over-all plan for general nuclear war. The location of a NATO Strategic Command in Europe could allay concerns that Europe's interests would be neglected; in fact, by giving it the mission to conduct the portion of general nuclear war directly relevant to Europe, a forum for fulfilling Allied needs in the strategic field would be created.

The notion that unfavorable arms control measures can best be prevented by freezing the existing NATO command structure underlines the need for a focal point within the Alliance to develop common political objectives. The issue of arms control in Central Europe has been before the Alliance for many years. It has been evaded because some Allies have

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been reluctant to express their fears and others have been
loathe to voice their hopes. The absence of a consensus guar-ntees that the issue will always arise at a moment of
maximum embarrassment. Decisions will be taken by subter-
fuge and under stress. Distrust will grow. A military com-
mander cannot possibly be used to paper over this problem
indefinitely. Its solution must be sought by developing a po-
litical program for the Alliance as a whole.

Within the framework of a newly created NATO Strategic Command and a corresponding political control body, the Alliance could finally address itself to the tasks which must be undertaken rather than spend energy on legalistic debates about who has a right to do what in circumstances that no one can describe. With some insurance available for the improbable contingency that the United States might interpret its interest differently from those of Europe, our Allies are likely to come to conclusions very similar to ours about the desirability of a strategy which provides multiple options.

Such a system would be more flexible than the MLF. It would give the existing strategic forces a clearly defined mission. It would create a structure that France could ultimately join, if not under its present government, certainly under its successor. As compared to the MLF, the United States would sacrifice some measure of physical control, but the Alliance as a whole would gain in political cohesion. This arrangement would differ from previous assignments of nuclear forces because it would include a political mechanism for managing crises for the Alliance as a whole and because it would create an explicit Allied doctrine for strategic war.

Such an arrangement provides the greatest flexibility with
respect to the future. If European political integration pro-
gresses, the European contingents in the Allied Nuclear
Force can merge into a European nuclear force. If desired by
the European members, the Western European Union could
be given official status in the Allied Nuclear Force from the
beginning. If integration proceeds more slowly the major
Allies can contribute individually to the planning of the
Allied Nuclear Force. In either case, the United States will
remain closely linked to Europe through a structure in which
the Europeans can develop under their own initiative. An
Allied Nuclear Force in which an American contingent is an
integral part and which controlled all the weapons relevant
to its mission would be a better symbol of the indivisibility of
Atlantic interests than an MLF whose strategic role would be,
at best, marginal.

For this to be achieved a change in attitude on both sides
of the Atlantic is needed. The United States would have to
abandon its futile insistence on maintaining physical control
of all the nuclear weapons in the Alliance. Some of our Allies
would have to stop extolling the theoretical virtues of au-
tonomy and begin dealing with the problem of how autono-
mous nuclear forces can achieve a coordinated strategy. We
have often been dogmatic in defending the theoretical vir-
tues of "integration." But our Allies—especially the French—
bear a heavy responsibility for the current state of affairs
because they have never spelled out concretely what they
mean by their alternative of coordination. If abstract and

have often been dogmatic in defending the theoretical vi-
tues of “integration.” But our Allies—especially the French—
bear a heavy responsibility for the current state of affairs
because they have never spelled out concretely what they
mean by their alternative of coordination. If abstract and
doctrinaire attitudes are avoided, the solution of current dis-
putes is far from hopeless. Arguments about the right of in-
dependent action in the nuclear field are acute only when
they are theoretical. Any crisis serious enough to cause the
Allies to consider the use of nuclear weapons is also likely to
reveal the underlying community of interest. It is this com-
munity rather than American physical control which is the
best guarantee of the cohesion of the Alliance. A wise United
States policy will not invest American prestige in forcing our
Allies into a structure which makes autonomous action physi-
cally impossible. Rather it will create a structure which
grants autonomy while reducing the desire for it.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

One of the consequences of the obsession with the MLF has
been that many issues requiring urgent attention have been
swept under the rug in order to maintain the momentum
behind the Multilateral Force. One of these problems con-
cerns the role and control of tactical nuclear weapons.

Tactical nuclear weapons have had a checkered history in NATO strategy. They were first introduced into the NATO arsenal in the middle fifties to offset what was then believed to be a permanent numerical superiority of Soviet manpower. As a result, thousands of nuclear weapons were shipped into Europe. They included almost everything from artillery pieces with ranges of about fifteen miles to Pershing missiles with ranges up to 700 miles (in the improved versions). The term tactical was defined to include all weapons placed under the authority of SACEUR even though some of the longer-range weapons would be indistinguishable from those controlled by SAC. From its beginning, the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent raised formidable problems of coordination that remained dormant only because the dominant American strategic doctrine predicted that any nuclear war was likely to be massive and all-out.

The advent of the Kennedy Administraton in 1961
changed this. Committed to a strategy of flexible response,
the new administration began to evaluate the suitability of
the nuclear establishment on the Continent for discriminat-
ing military operations. Its conclusions were skeptical: Early
in the Kennedy Administration, the then Deputy Secretary
of Defense Gilpatric rejected the notion of tactical nuclear
war with the argument that it was impossible to build any
limit into a nuclear war.³ Deputy Assistant Secretary of De-
fense Alain Enthoven insisted that once the dividing line
between conventional and nuclear weapons is crossed, no
obvious "fire-break" exists short of large scale thermonuclear
war.⁴ Secretary McNamara spoke deprecatingly of a limited

⁴ Alain Enthoven, "American Deterrent Policy," *Survival*, Vol. V, No. 3 (May–June 1963), p. 96.

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nuclear war below some "ill-defined threshold of strategic
exchange."⁵ These views were given urgency by the problem

⁵ Robert S. McNamara, "Major National Security Problems Confronting the United States," speech made before the Economics Club of New York, New York City, November 18, 1963, DOSB, Vol. XLIX, No. 1277 (December 16, 1963), p. 917.

of exercising political control over the nuclear weapons sta-
tioned on the Continent. Controlling a few hundred strategic
weapons during military operations is difficult but soluble.
Controlling thousands of weapons of many different ranges
and characteristics in the confusion of combat is another
matter.

At the same time, while skeptical about the utility of
much of the tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe, both the
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations have muted their
doubts in order not to complicate further the disputes over
the role of the conventional weapons and the MLF. Indeed,
tactical nuclear weapons have been used as a means to
reassure the Europeans about the continued validity of our
nuclear guarantee and to insure German support for the
MLF. As a result, the tactical nuclear establishment on the
Continent has been substantially increased since 1961-by
some 60 per cent according to Secretary McNamara's an-
nouncements. The thousands of nuclear weapons on the
Continent thus exist in a shadow land. To many of our
Allies, they have become a touchstone of the American com-
mitment, while American planners regard them with ex-
traordinary ambivalence. To build up the tactical nuclear
establishment without clarifying its mission would seem to
emphasize the worst features of all available options.

The question whether so much reliance should have been
placed on tactical nuclear weapons ten years ago must not
obscure the need to deal with the current situation, which is
dominated by the following facts: (1) On the Continent
there exists a large and growing arsenal of tactical nuclear
weapons without a clearly defined mission. (2) The United
States is solemnly committed to maintain this arsenal in Eu-
rope. (3) The Soviet army is equipped with tactical nuclear
weapons; therefore, the decision to use nuclear weapons is no
longer entirely up to the West. (4) NATO ground forces are
inadequate to withstand a full-scale Soviet onslaught. Even
the proposed build-up of NATO ground forces to thirty divi-
sions would leave the West numerically inferior to a fully
mobilized Soviet army—and this does not take into account
the inevitable disadvantage of a coalition when confronting a
single state. (5) The tactical nuclear estabhshment in Eu-
rope is extremely vulnerable. Because strategic weapons are
relatively secure, fears that they will tempt a disarming, pre-
emptive blow are usually exaggerated. But the classic pre-
emptive situation does exist with respect to the tactical nu-
clear arsenal in Europe. As now deployed it is capable of
inflicting severe damage; it is, in turn, highly vulnerable to a
first strike. This may well add to deterrence; at the same
time, it increases the probability of escalation should war
occur.

There exists yet another inconsistency between NATO's
military deployment and our strategic doctrine: Pentagon
officials have indicated a clear preference for resisting even a
major Soviet attack by conventional weapons. At the same

There exists yet another inconsistency between NATO's military deployment and our strategic doctrine: Pentagon officials have indicated a clear preference for resisting even a major Soviet attack by conventional weapons. At the same time, they have announced repeatedly that if a conventional defeat were imminent, we would resort to tactical nuclear weapons. Considering the extreme vulnerability of the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent and the fact that the Soviets would not attack without expecting to win, these two propositions tend to cancel each other out. If there is large-scale aggression—an admittedly improbable contingency—the Soviets have every incentive to seek to neutralize NATO's tactical nuclear arsenal by launching an attack against it.

All this suggests that it is imperative to reconsider the mission and deployment of the tactical nuclear arsenal on the Continent. Some argue that all nuclear missions—including the so-called tactical ones—can be performed by the strategic forces, which are more easily controlled and more suitable for discriminating operations. They maintain that any use of nuclear weapons would bring about so much confusion that the situation in the combat zone would appear relatively unimportant. Finally, some officials have implied that the nuclear arsenal in Europe is militarily unnecessary. Secretary McNamara has on occasion seemed to share this view.

The notion that all tactical missions can be performed by strategic forces must be assessed in terms of three problems: (1) the probability of uncontrolled escalation if battlefield weapons are used, (2) the suitability of strategic forces for tactical operations and (3) the feasibility of conducting nuclear operations confined to a battlefield.

The problem of escalation has two aspects: escalation within the theater of operations and escalation into general war. As long as NATO's tactical nuclear establishment is so vulnerable, the danger of escalation of any military operations within Europe is enormous even if they begin with conventional weapons. The precondition of any effective use of tactical nuclear weapons—as of strategic weapons—is to enhance their invulnerability.

The probability of escalation to general war depends on the vulnerability of the opposing retaliatory forces. If the strategic forces are extremely vulnerable, any use of nuclear weapons is likely to expand very rapidly. In that case, any large-scale military operation—even a conventional one—in an area as vital as Europe would involve risks out of proportion to any conceivable gain. In short, the doctrine of massive retaliation will remain valid.

When retaliatory forces grow increasingly vulnerable, as Secretary McNamara has postulated, the pressures against rapid escalation would probably be great. There may be no logical stopping place once nuclear weapons are being used. There is, however, a very crucial psychological obstacle to automatic escalation. When mutual invulnerability guarantees catastrophic destruction and offers no prospect of great

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military advantage, neither side can be very eager to let escalation proceed automatically. Both sides are likely to look for excuses to limit, not expand, military operations.

This is not to say that in case of a full-scale Soviet attack on Europe our responses should be confined to battlefield weapons. On the contrary, there are important reasons for making sure that the Soviets are under no misapprehension that a full-scale attack on Europe could be confined to Europe. If the Soviets have shown a willingness to conquer Europe, the war is by definition no longer local. It cannot end with the *status quo ante*. If the Soviets come to believe that their territory would be spared but we would devastate Europe by confining the use of nuclear weapons to the combat zone, they may have an incentive for aggression. Such a strategy, even if it succeeded in stopping the attack, would eliminate Europe as a factor in international politics; it would guarantee that any other threatened area would surrender.

Nevertheless, even though a full-scale attack on Europe would inevitably bring the strategic forces into play, there is a problem of relating their action to local operations. Strategic forces are not designed to affect a local situation *directly*. Whether used demonstratively, punitively or in discriminating counterforce operations, their purpose is to force the aggressor into ordering an end to his local attacks, not to blunt the attacks themselves.

But is it wise to neglect the local outcome? It is at least possible that once strategic weapons are used, however discriminately, all other considerations could become submerged in the desire to end a spiral toward ever greater devastation. If the aggressor has made major advances, the ensuing confusion and panic may well enable him to consolidate his gains.

This suggests that, together with an agreed doctrine for the use of strategic forces, the Alliance requires a nuclear capability to deny an aggressor a significant territorial advance. Tactical weapons used early in the face of a full-scale attack could perform this role. If a standstill in military operations can be forced, a major objective of the defense will have been achieved. Aggression would have no object if it were certain to result in a stalemate.

Thus the nuclear components of NATO must have two aims: (1) they should be able to force a standstill of the initial onslaught and (2) they should be able to inflict sufficient punishment on the aggressor so that he is forced into negotiations. The aggressor must not believe that our response will shift all the risks of nuclear devastation to the victims of aggression. But there must also be a local response capable of preventing a *fait accompli* and an attempt to negotiate on the basis of it.

To achieve these objectives, the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent must be adapted along the following lines: (1) its mission must be redefined, (2) its vulnerability must be reduced and (3) its deployment must be changed.

The current number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe suggests an intention to conduct a self-contained tactical nuclear war with battlefield weapons used as a more efficient

changed.

The current number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe suggests an intention to conduct a self-contained tactical nuclear war with battlefield weapons used as a more efficient explosive to defeat the opposing forces. But a prolonged use of battlefield weapons according to purely military criteria would surely obliterate the combat zone, and this cannot be in the interest of any threatened country. Thus the mission of the tactical nuclear weapons should not be considered in isolation from the other, primarily strategic, operations which will be taking place. This makes it necessary to redefine some traditional military missions. For example, given the range of modern weapons, air superiority can be obtained —if at all—only by deep penetration of hostile territory on a scale indistinguishable from general nuclear war. Such operations should not be conducted by a theater commander fully occupied with the land battle. This is why all weapons above a certain range (say 300 miles) should be put under the Allied Nuclear Force described earlier.

As for the nuclear weapons that remain under SACEUR's command, a careful study should determine which of them can combine the requirement of relative invulnerability with suitability for discriminating battlefield use. At the same time major efforts should be made to enhance the invulnerability of the tactical nuclear weapons on the Continent and to improve their command and control procedures. Tactical nuclear weapons present particular difficulties of command and control. The strategic arsenal can be fitted with electronic devices which make it possible to subject each weapon to political control. But individual control, even if technically feasible, presents different problems when close to 10,000 weapons of very different ranges and characteristics are involved. No communications system could withstand such a strain.

During the Presidential campaign of 1964, it was proposed that one way of solving this problem would be to delegate authority to a military commander, specifically to SACEUR. This was justified with the argument that communications between Washington and Paris might be interrupted. But such a scheme would create more problems than it solves. For one thing, no other member of the Alliance would be prepared to make such a delegation of authority. Also, SACEUR would be extremely ill-advised to resort to nuclear weapons without making sure that SAC is alerted. If communications are adequate for that purpose, they should also be adequate for political control to be exercised. Moreover, the real communications bottleneck is not between Washington and Paris, but between NATO headquarters and the field commanders. But if authority to initiate the use of nuclear weapons were delegated to field commanders, this would mean that nuclear war could be started by officers least familiar with the strategic context and most subject to immediate pressures which may or may not be symptomatic of the overall situation. Field commanders do not have access to strategy.

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gic intelligence about the Soviet Union or to plans for gen-
eral war. Thus the initial decision to use tactical nuclear
weapons will have to be made by Washington (or by the
Executive Committee of the NATO Council described below).
Once the decision is taken, they will have to be released by
category of range, yield and, above all, geographic location.
This underlines the urgent need for an agreed NATO strategic
doctrine.

Another subject requiring careful reexamination is NATO
deployment. Currently it is an uneasy compromise between
the desire to retain a conventional option and the reality that
nuclear weapons have become an integral part of the equip-
ment of all military units. This reflects a real dilemma. To
fight a conventional war, military units must concentrate; to
be effective during nuclear operations, they must disperse.
Units deployed for conventional operations present tempting
targets for nuclear attack and may thus invite it. Units de-
ployed for nuclear war are too dispersed to resist an attack
with conventional weapons. In all likelihood, it will be im-
possible to shift from one mode of deployment to another
during military operations, particularly if the opponent has
introduced nuclear weapons first. But current NATO deploy-
ment involves precisely this danger. Units are concentrated as
if the likely attack would be conventional. At the same time,
even their forward echelons are equipped with nuclear weap-
ons. This concentration coupled with the ambiguity of NATO
doctrine and the vulnerability of tactical nuclear weapons
gives an aggressor a high incentive to use nuclear weapons
first.

It has become increasingly clear that NATO will not raise
sufficient troops for a purely conventional defense of Europe
—all trends, in fact, are in the opposite direction. It is there-
fore crucial that deployment on the Continent take into ac-
count the realities of NATO in the next decade. NATO's con-
ventional forces are suitable for two major roles: (1) to act
as a screening force to determine that a full-scale attack is, in
fact, taking place and thus to discourage sudden seizures of
NATO territory and (2) to furnish a reserve to resist aggres-
sion on the flanks of NATO or in areas outside of Europe
where the Alliance might agree on joint action.

NATO deployment should reflect this. There should be a
screen of conventional forces deployed forward and organized
for purely conventional combat. The size of this screen
would depend on the total NATO forces available and on a
military estimate of what is required to force a major Soviet
concentration before aggression can have any chance of suc-
cess. The remainder of NATO's divisions—deployed behind
this screen—should be equipped and organized for nuclear
war. With such a deployment, it would be obvious to any
aggressor that once operations reached a certain magnitude
nuclear war would be inevitable. At the same time, NATO
deployment and weapons design would reduce the incentives
for pre-emption. Within these "nuclear" units the responsi-
bility for operations should not be assigned to any level
of war-making. Weapons should be released to these com-

nuclear war would be inevitable. At the same time, NATO deployment and weapons design would reduce the incentives for pre-emption. Within these "nuclear" units the responsibility for operations should not be assigned to any level lower than corps. Weapons should be released to these commanders only by an appropriate political authority (preferably the Executive Committee of the NATO Council described below).⁶

⁶ See Chapter 8.

In addition, there should be a strategic reserve capable of conducting either conventional or tactical nuclear war and organized to intervene rapidly either in a land battle in Europe or in distant theaters.

## CONCLUSION—THE MILITARY

### ORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIANCE

The military organization of the Alliance would then appear as follows:

1. There would be an Allied Nuclear Force. It would be constituted from existing NATO weapons above a range of, say, 30 miles, from major units from Great Britain and the United States, together with long-range delivery vehicles now on the Continent, and an eventual French contribution. If the MLF survives the reexamination of NATO strategy, a small mixed-manned element could be included. The mission of the Allied Nuclear Force would be deep interdiction. It would have a separate commander and be under the control of a political body in which the Federal Republic has a voice equal to that of the countries contributing nuclear weapons. This body should be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council and should have responsibility for developing common political programs and an agreed strategic doctrine.⁷

⁷ See Chapter 8.

2. SACEUR would retain tactical nuclear weapons up to a range of, say, 300 miles. However, their deployment would be altered in order to create real conventional and nuclear options. Their number would be related to the existing missions.

3. The deployment of conventional forces would clearly reflect their primary mission of acting as a screening force and furnishing a strategic reserve.

However, no arrangement of military forces will, of itself, solve the problems of the Alliance. The ultimate challenge lies in the political field. It is whether NATO can develop common purposes and whether it can devise a political structure that combines community with flexibility.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

East-West Relations and the Future of Germany

There is a curious disproportion between the energy de-
voted to nuclear control and that spent on the issue of the
future of Germany. This is no accident. Nuclear control, for
all its complexity, has the advantage of seeming concrete.
Solutions permit technical analysis. Absorption in this prob-
lem can therefore serve as an escape from issues that are in-
tangible and much less amenable to mechanical remedies.
Yet it is probable that over the next decade the cohesiveness
of the Alliance will be tested more severely by the problem of
German unity than by the issue of who presses the button for
nuclear war.

Basic to any policy regarding the future of Germany is a
common conception of East-West relations.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

East-West relations have been a cause of disagreement
within the Alliance at least since the death of Stalin. In the
early years of NATO our European Allies feared above all that
we might return to our traditional isolationism. They, there-
fore, suppressed whatever doubts they might have had about
the American understanding of the Communist threat. If
anything, they had an interest in exaggerating the extent of
the immediate danger. Stalinist intransigence did the rest.
America's commitment to the defense of Europe grew abso-
lute. In American thinking, the danger of Communist ag-
gression became as ominous as our nostalgia for our historic
aloofness from international affairs was great.

After the death of Stalin, the previous Allied unanimity
about the nature of the Communist threat evaporated.¹

¹Throughout, there had been significant opposition groups in each country which maintained that the threat was exaggerated or even that NATO was provocative.

Under the impact of periodic Soviet peace offensives and the
schisms within the Communist world, differences in the
Allies' approach to the Communist challenge became appar-
ent. Great Britain, Italy and the Scandinavian countries

Under the impact of periodic Soviet peace offensives and the schisms within the Communist world, differences in the Allies' approach to the Communist challenge became apparent. Great Britain, Italy and the Scandinavian countries tended to treat every Soviet peace offensive as the beginning of a new era of international cooperation. Each sign of Communist moderation was hailed as a basic change in the Soviet system. In these countries the predominant view was that Soviet ideology had become transformed into a Marxist form of moderate nationalism.

In the Federal Republic and in France after the advent of De Gaulle, the attitude has been quite different. The Federal Republic, divided by Communist intransigence and repeatedly subjected to Communist pressures, has seen in Soviet peace offensives merely a variation of tactics, not a major shift in objectives. Supported by France, the Federal Republic has been uneasy about East-West negotiations and fearful that any settlement would legitimize, at least indirectly, the division of Germany. In 1962, Paris and Bonn disagreed with the United States about the utility of the exploratory talks regarding Berlin. They have been uneasy about most of the schemes advanced at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. France rejected—as the Federal Republic would have liked to do but did not dare—the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

United States policy has oscillated between these conflicting views. American pronouncements include many of the phrases about Soviet intransigence characteristic of the early days of NATO. Our actual policy has tended toward bilateral dealings with the Soviets. Seeking to straddle the conflicting views of its Allies but not reconciling them, the United States has retained the liturgy of the Cold War while adopting a good deal of the practice of those urging a policy of relaxation of tensions.

As a result, much of the Allied debate about East-West relations has concerned not the content of a program for negotiation but the nature of the Soviet system. Those who assume that there has been a change in Soviet policy tend to stress the impact of modernization on Soviet purposes. To them a great deal depends on establishing good personal relations with Soviet leaders and on bringing about a general atmosphere of goodwill. Those who insist on the unchangeable nature of Soviet hostility postulate a Soviet society immune to the erosion of time—an achievement which would be unprecedented in human history.

But the desirability of easing tensions should never be in dispute. The only sensible debate can concern the question of how peace can be achieved and then made secure. The issue is not whether tensions should be artificially maintained, but what their cause is and how they can best be ended. Is the Cold War the result of personal malice or does it have deeper causes? Is lasting detente reached by improving the atmosphere first and moving from there to specific settlements? Or is a relaxation of tensions reliable only if it is tied from the very beginning to a settlement of outstanding issues? Above all, what exactly is to be understood by a settlement? These are the questions which the Alliance must an-

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swer for itself if it is to determine whether a given peace
offensive represents a change of tactics or a change of policy.

Peace offensives, of course, are not new in Soviet history.
Peaceful co-existence has been avowed since the advent of
Communism in Russia. It was stressed particularly between
1924-1939; between 1941-1946; at the time of the Geneva
Summit Conference of 1955; again on the occasion of Khru-
shev's visit to the United States in 1959; and following the
Cuban missile crisis in 1962. On each occasion the reason for
the detente was some internal or external strain on the Soviet
system. In 1924, it was the struggle between Stalin and
Trotsky, which was followed by the forced collectivization of
agriculture and the purges; in 1941-1946 it was the German
invasion; in 1955 it was the succession struggle after the
death of Stalin; in 1959 it was part of a Soviet attempt to
push the Allies out of Berlin; since 1962 it has been caused
by the shock of the defeat in Cuba and the internal strains on
the Soviet system.

On each occasion the period of relaxation ended when an
opportunity for expanding Communism presented itself.
The period of tranquillity after 1924 was followed by the
annexation of Bessarabia, the Baltic States and one third of
Poland, as well as an attack on Finland. World War II led to
the creation of the satellite orbit in Eastern Europe. The
spirit of Geneva gave way to an attempted penetration of
the Middle East and a crisis over Berlin. And, the spirit of Camp
David was succeeded by another Berlin crisis which did not
end until the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

During each previous Soviet peace offensive, many in the
West—including some who thought of themselves as
staunchly, sometimes almost religiously, anti-Communist—
hailed a fundamental change in Soviet attitude. This demon-
strates the extent of the American consensus that conflict is
usually the result of individual malice rather than of struc-
tural causes. The corollary is that East-West tensions can be
ended by a simple change of heart on the part of Communist
leaders. In 1933 a noted historian wrote:

> The former crusaders of world revolution at any cost have
> exchanged their swords for machine tools and now rely more on
> the results of their labor than on direct action to achieve the
> ultimate triumph of the proletariat.²

²Michael T. Florinsky, *World Revolution and the USSR* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), p. 216.

When Stalin abolished the Comintern in 1943, the late Sen-
ator Tom Connally from Texas commented: "Russians for
years have been changing their economy and approaching the
abandonment of communism and the whole Western world
will be gratified at the happy climax of their efforts." ³ In

³*New York Times*, May 23, 1943.

1956 Secretary Dulles was impelled by the spirit of Geneva to say: "The Soviet leaders are scrapping thirty years of policy based on violence and intolerance." ⁴ This is matched by

⁴U.S. Department of State Press Release, No. 92, February 25, 1956. Secretary Rusk's statement early in 1964: "They [the Communists] appear to have begun to realize that there is an irresolvable contradiction between the demands to promote world Communism by force and the needs of the Soviet state and people." ⁵

⁵Secretary Rusk. "Why We Treat Different Communist Countries Dif-

millions) appear to have begun to realize that there is an irresolvable contradiction between the demands to promote world Communism by force and the needs of the Soviet state and people."⁵

⁵Secretary Rusk. "Why We Treat Different Communist Countries Differently," address to the Full Citizenship and World Affairs Conference of the International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers at Washington, D. C. on February 25, 1964, *DOSB*, Vol. L, No. 1290 (March 16, 1964), p. 393.

Each of these assessments turned out to be mistaken—except Secretary Rusk's, which it is too early to judge. The reason is not obscure. Any system has its own dynamism that shapes its leaders and affects what is considered reasonable in internal discussions. There is need for an assessment of those factors in the Soviet system that produce belligerence and those that encourage accommodation. These are delicately balanced. It should be the goal of Western policy to give a maximum spur to the peaceful trends.

Two factors encourage intransigence in the Communist world: the qualities of the men who rise to leadership positions and the ideology on which the Communist system is built.

Any comparison of the composition of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of any decade with its membership at the end of that decade illustrates the precariousness of high office in the Soviet system.⁶

⁶The fate of the first groups of post-Stalin leaders has been described as follows by Severyn Bialer in "Twenty-four Men Who Rule Russia," *New York Times Magazine*, November 1, 1964, p. 27:

Two (Beria and Bagirov) were shot. Six (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Saburov and Pervukhin) were denounced and expelled from leadership and have disappeared from public life. One (Voroshilov) was publicly denounced, expelled from the leadership but admitted to Khrushchev's banquet circuit. Two (Ignatiev and Melnikov) gradually disappeared from public life following censure.

Three are no longer in positions of leadership but are still members of the Central Committee and occupy positions of secondary importance. These are Aristov, the Ambassador to Poland; Mikailov, the Ambassador to Indonesia, and Pospelov, the director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. One (Ponomarenko) was removed from the Central Committee without censure and occupies a fourth-rate post. Only two (Mikoyan and Suslov) outlasted Khrushchev and are now in the front ranks of the post-Khrushchev leadership.

Turnover is rapid; the penalties for failure in the inevitable leadership struggle are drastic. Loss of position involves public disgrace, usually for the former leader's family as well, and complete separation from all erstwhile colleagues or from any public activity.

Even more poignant than the fate of the top leadership is that of the middle and lower echelons. The top leaders at least have the consolation that the enormous risks they run are on behalf of their own ambitions; those on the lower levels may find themselves submerged as a result of events totally out of their control. Loyalty may turn into a source of personal danger; subordinate officials will often share the fate of the leader even though they may have had no real alternative.

All this creates an atmosphere of suspicion—even of conspiracy—in the Communist leadership groups. There is no legitimate succession. Power goes to those skillful and ruth-

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less enough to seize and hold it. It becomes its own justification because it brings control of the only source of legitimacy: the Communist Party apparatus. In the past, no attempt at collective leadership has lasted. One leader has eliminated all rivals and has not felt restrained by ties of loyalty or by past obligations. Stalin had all the individuals who helped him into power executed. Khrushchev disgraced Kaganovich, whose protégé he had been, and turned on Marshal Zhukov six months after being saved by him from a conspiracy of his own colleagues. Brezhnev and Kosygin owed their careers to Khrushchev; they nevertheless overthrew him and started a campaign of calumny against him within twenty-four hours of his dismissal.

Only an enormous desire for power can impel a man to enter such a career. Anyone succeeding in Communist leadership struggles must be single-minded, unemotional, unsentimental and dedicated. Nothing in the experience of Soviet leaders would lead them to prize peace as an end or to accept protestations of personal goodwill at face value. Their own career—indeed their survival—has been advanced by the ability to dissemble. Khrushchev's success, as Brezhnev's after him, depended on his ability to hide his ambition until it was too late for his rivals to organize against him. Suspiciousness is therefore inherent in the domestic position of Soviet leaders. It is unlikely that their attitude toward the outside world is more benign. There is no reason for them to treat foreign statesmen more gently than their own colleagues or to expect more consideration from them.

The Soviet system tends to produce leaders who identify their survival with the elimination of all possible rivals. Domestically this means that the power of potential competitors must be broken. Internationally it implies that opponents must be neutralized if at all possible. The motives of Soviet leaders may well be defensive. The problem is that they feel secure only when all conceivable rivals have been reduced to impotence. Wary of even his closest colleagues, the type of man who rises to a position of leadership in the Soviet Union will identify security less with goodwill than with a balance of forces and will be tempted to engage in constant probes designed to reduce the power and influence of countries whose size or structure makes them possible competitors of the U.S.S.R. This does not make crises inevitable or settlements impossible; Soviet leaders, whatever their experience, are cautious and patient. But if peace were to depend on their pronouncements alone, it would not be very secure.

Soviet tendencies to exert maximum pressure and to emphasize the importance of a balance of forces are reinforced by Communist ideology. To be sure, Communist leaders do not follow the teachings of Marx or Lenin literally; they could not, even if they wished, because these writings are too contradictory and too dependent on tactical considerations. However, if ideology does not guide the day-to-day actions, its basic categories shape the Communist sense of reality. It is considered to be the guarantee of the ultimate victory that will make all sacrifices worthwhile. It is the means for establishing discipline within the world Communist movement by providing criteria of legitimacy for the settlement of disputes.
While the growing gap between ideology and reality is one of

considered to be the guarantee of the ultimate
will make all sacrifices worthwhile. It is the means for estab-
lishing discipline within the world Communist movement by
providing criteria of legitimacy for the settlement of disputes.
While the growing gap between ideology and reality is one of
the latent weaknesses of any Communist system, in the im-
mediate future ideology continues as one of the prime obsta-
cles to a basic accommodation.

Communists believe that Marxism-Leninism supplies an invaluable tool in understanding historical trends and the relation of forces existing at any particular moment. According to it, "subjective" factors, such as the personal convictions of statesmen, matter less than the "objective" factors they reflect. These objective factors include the social and economic conditions of society, the nature of the economic process and, above all, the class struggle. Communists consider that Marxism-Leninism enables them to distinguish between appearance and reality, to avoid the "subjectivism" inherent in an excessive reliance on personality and the "adventurism" that risks a historical movement on one throw of the dice.

Belief in the predominance of "objective" factors explains why Soviet leaders, whenever they have had to make a choice between Western goodwill and a territorial or political gain, have unhesitatingly chosen the latter. The friendship of the West built up during the heroic efforts of World War II was ruthlessly sacrificed to the possibility of establishing Communist-controlled governments in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva did not survive the temptations offered by the prospect of penetrating the Middle East. The spirit of Camp David ended with another ultimatum on Berlin. The many overtures of the Kennedy Administration were rebuffed until the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that the balance of forces was not in fact favorable.

The Soviet reliance on "objective" factors is one of the reasons that negotiations with the Soviets have often been so frustrating. Communist negotiators cannot admit that they could be swayed by the arguments of opponents whose understanding of the basic laws of historical development is, by definition, inferior to their own. They cannot reciprocate "concessions" because they believe that concessions are made to reality, not to individuals. They may change their position, but they will go to great lengths to demonstrate that they did so of their own volition and at their own pace. For them a great deal depends on avoiding what seems basic to most Western negotiators: the give-and-take of a bargaining process. Their attitude toward Western negotiators is very similar to that of Western psychiatrists toward their patients: no matter what is said, they think that they understand their Western counterpart better than he understands himself. This is one of the reasons that exercises in personal diplomacy—even at the highest level—have been so futile. No Soviet leader could make an agreement based on the proposition that he has been impressed by the personal qualities of a

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capitalist statesman. Settlements are possible; but to be
meaningful in Soviet eyes they must reflect "objective" con-
ditions and not a personal relationship.

The ritualistic belief in the importance of the class strug-
gle causes Soviet leaders to adopt a posture of irreconcilable
philosophical hostility toward the non-Communist world.
Even while advocating political co-existence, the Communist
Party of the U.S.S.R. declared:

The C.P.S.U. [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] resolutely opposes peaceful coexistence in the province of ideology. These are elementary truhs, and it is time for everyone who considers himself a Marxist-Leninist to master them.⁷

⁷ "The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," open letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as it appeared in *Pravda*, July 14, 1963, pp. 1-4; *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter referred to as CDSP), Vol. XV, No. 28 (August 7, 1963), p. 23.

Thus peaceful co-existence is never advocated for its own
the West at minimum risk. In replying to Chinese charges
sake. It is justified primarily as a tactical device to overthrow
that it was abandoning world revolution, the Communist
Party of the U.S.S.R. proposed the following test for the
policy of "peaceful co-existence":

Does the policy of peace and peaceful co-existence favor the
development of the revolutionary class struggle in the capi'talist
countries, the upsurge of national liberation movements?⁸

⁸ "Another Statement Answering Chinese on Test Ban," statement of the Soviet Government as it appeared in *Pravda*, September 21, 1963, pp. 1-2, and September 22, 1963, pp. 1-2; *Izvestia*, pp. 1-2 and 1-3; CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 38 (October 16, 1963), p. 12.

In yet another reply to their Chinese tormentors, the Soviet
Communist Party affirmed:

We fully support the destruction of imperialism and capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable death of capitalism, but are doing everything possible for it to be accomplished through class struggle as quickly as possible.⁹

⁹ "The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," op cit., CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 28 (August 7, 1963), p. 20.

Moreover, "peaceful co-existence" is advanced by Soviet lead-
ers not as a new insight, but as the continuation of Leninist
tradition. This proposition has elicited the following ex-
asperated comment from George F. Kennan:

... people in Moscow are not likely to strengthen belief outside Russia in... their attachment to liberal and tolerant principles of international life... by pleading that such an attachment flows inevitably from the nature of the social and political system prevailing in the Soviet Union. It is possible to conceive that the Soviet attitude in such questions may have changed; it is not possible to accept the proposition that it did not need to change in order to meet the requirements of peaceful co-existence...¹⁰

¹⁰ George F. Kennan. "Peaceful Co-existence: A Western View," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (January 1960), p. 174.

These factors, which almost overnight could produce
again an expansionist Communist foreign policy, must be
balanced against restraints that, over a period of time, may
become dominant. First, there is the power of modern weap-
ons. Ideological hostility comes up against the stark risks of
nuclear warfare. Soviet leaders must be acutely aware that, if
they press intransigence beyond a certain point, they run the
risk of hazarding what they have built up at so much sacrifice
over four decades. Whatever the strategic theory of the West

nuclear warfare. Soviet leaders must be acutely aware that, if they press intransigence beyond a certain point, they run the risk of hazarding what they have built up at so much sacrifice over four decades. Whatever the strategic theory of the West—even if it is not an ideal one—Soviet planners will not be easily convinced that the danger of escalation in any direct confrontation is not enormous. The West would have to behave extraordinarily foolishly before the Soviets risk an overt military challenge. To be sure, in some circumstances aggression does not need to take the form of direct military action, and this accounts for the persistence of the so-called "wars of national liberation." However, if the West conducts itself with reasonable prudence, the traditional methods of military pressure can be made increasingly unattractive. Then agreements may be possible to implement one interest which the two great nuclear powers must have in common: to prevent a nuclear holocaust. It is significant that one of the principal arguments advanced by Soviet leaders on behalf of peaceful co-existence is that nuclear war is too dangerous. It is in the West's interest to see to it that it remain so.

Another factor which acts as a restraint on Soviet foreign policy is the instability of the leadership group. A great deal of the energy of Soviet leaders is absorbed in internal maneuvering. It is a symptom of weakness that, over forty years after seizing power, the Soviet Union has not solved the problem of legitimate succession. Each ruler has felt secure only by villifying his predecessor.

In almost half a century of Soviet rule, the reputation of only the first leader (Lenin) has outlived his tenure in office. In the short term, the patience and capacity for endurance of the Russian people may support such a style of government. At some point, however, cynicism and demoralization are likely to set in. Sooner or later, the Communist leaders will be asked by the younger generation how a system which constantly invokes the universality of its maxims can produce leaders who, by the account of their successors, are so fallible and so corrupt; how an ideology which prides itself on its mastery of "objective" forces could have as its pervasive aberration—again by its own account—the "cult of personality."

The difficulty of settling domestic disputes is closely related to the inability of Communist countries to deal with each other. Communist ideology does not admit the possibility of conflict among Communist states. Since national rivalries are thought to be the result of class conflict, they are expected to disappear wherever Socialism has triumphed. In the absence of any provision for the settlement of disputes, Communist leaders try to deal with disputes among Communist states as they conduct their own internal struggles: by seeking first to ostracize and then to destroy their opponents. But among sovereign states, such tactics cause disputes to harden into irremediable schisms. Each schism, in turn, demonstrates that a supposedly universal orthodoxy can be interpreted in various ways. This must, in time, erode confidence

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in the universality of Communist ideology as well as the discipline of the world Communist movement.

Thus, events of the past decade have had a profoundly disruptive impact on the unity of the world Communist movement. The enormous tactical flexibility of Communist parties in the past has been due to two factors: belief in the scientific truth of Communist ideology and the existence of Moscow as the center of Marxist infallibility. Belief in scientific truth supplied the inward assurance; the pre-eminence of Moscow provided the discipline without which tactical flexibility easily degenerates into opportunism.

The unity produced by these factors has been undermined by three developments: de-Stalinization, the Sino-Soviet split and the manner in which Khrushchev has been overthrown. De-Stalinization raised the question of the relationship between the scientific truth of the dominant ideology and the murderous cult of personality of Stalin. How could a system that was supposed to end forever man's oppression produce an even more pervasive tyranny than the one it replaced? How could belief in scientific truth be reconciled with slave labor camps and a police state? Even if the Russian people did not ask such questions, Communist cadres must have been assailed by doubts which must have been reinforced when Khrushchev was overthrown in his turn and denounced for "hare-brained schemes."

The Sino-Soviet split was the catalyst for the overt fragmentation of the Communist world. The causes of this rift are many and complex. There is the rivalry of two empires along the most extended land frontier of the world. Competition for a dominant role in the underdeveloped countries plays a part. But what makes the dispute insoluble is the conflict over the leadership of the world Communist movement. While the actual manifestations of the rift may be patched up from time to time, its underlying cause seems beyond repair. A movement that claims to represent a universal truth cannot tolerate two centers of orthodoxy. As long as Peiping rejects the doctrinal pre-eminence of Moscow, the most important reason for discord will persist—whatever temporary adjustments may be made.

The mere assertion of Peiping's independence on doctrinal matters was bound to alter the nature of Communism. Once the Soviet Union's doctrinal infallibility was challenged, the pattern of relationships within the Communist world changed irretrievably. The East European governments, beset by economic difficulties, saw an opportunity to solidify their sometimes tenuous hold by appealing to the national feelings of their populations. The Soviet Union was no longer in a position to command their loyalty but had to complete for it. In the face of Albanian and then Rumanian defiance, the previous monolithic unity of the Communist world has been eroded. Convinced Communists must be moralized by the disarray; technicians see in the Sino-Soviet split an opportunity for striking the maximum bargain for their country.

Khrushchev's fall had also had unfortunate consequences for the cohesiveness of the Communist world. Communist leaders, whatever their attitudes toward Khrushchev, must have realized that they were jeopardizing their own position

their country.

Khrushchev's fall had also had unfortunate consequences for the cohesiveness of the Communist world. Communist leaders, whatever their attitudes toward Khrushchev, must have realized that they were jeopardizing their own position by tying themselves too closely to whoever might be in power in Moscow. Since foreign Communist leaders share many of the characteristics of their Soviet colleagues—including a highly developed sense for personal power—the instability of the Kremlin hierarchy impels them to protect themselves by a measure of autonomy. They must try to protect their position against possible future upheavals in Moscow. The initial hesitation of the Communist parties around the world in endorsing Khrushchev's ouster can be partly explained by this.

Personal ambition thus reinforces the dominant trends in East European countries. A decade and a half of Communist rule have, if anything, intensified traditional nationalism. Communism has been able to gain a measure of popular acceptance only where its leaders emphasize national and not Communist concerns. The autarchic organization of Communist economies compounds these tendencies. It encapsulates each state in a system of total planning, which complicates relations even with Communist neighbors. A particularly virulent form of nationalism results.

All of this suggests that the current period of relaxation of tension has been initiated by the Soviets not because a few individuals have overcome the opposition of some unnamed Stalinists, but because conditions require it. To the West the challenge presented by this detente can be defined as follows: When the Communist world faces internal difficulties, should we bask in the relative calm of the Communist tone, or should we use the opportunity to press for the settlement of issues that produced the tension in the first place?

Domestic considerations impel many Western leaders to present themselves to their electorate as the architects of a lasting peace. The temptation is, therefore, strong to treat a more conciliatory Communist tone as a permanent conversion to a peaceful course and to gear everything to personal diplomacy.

Such attitudes will cause the West to squander its opportunities, as has happened so often in the past. The prospects for peace are not served by leaving the Soviet leadership with the impression that any action, no matter how belligerent, can always be reversed by a change of tone. Negotiations will prove empty if they are confined to vague protestations of goodwill. If a detente is not to be part of another cycle leading to renewed tensions, it is essential that negotiations be concrete and programs specific.

Above all, the West must conduct its policy without illusions. The same pressures that have produced a relaxation of tensions can also tempt Soviet leaders to enter upon another period of hostility. There is always the danger that the Kremlin will try to restore the unity of Eastern Europe by fostering a crisis centered on Germany. Even as it is, the East European governments almost invariably support Soviet foreign

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give up the hope of a Communist Germany. The East Euro-
pean governments would have to change their policy of
acquiescing in what seems most expedient to their senior
partner. The Western Allies would have to overcome inertia
and place the problem of Germany high on their agenda.

But the rewards would be great. Such a program would
end a situation that is bound to become more dangerous the
longer it lasts. It would allow a more objective analysis of
arms control in Europe. The construction of Europe could
be placed on a sounder basis. Even were such a program
rejected initially by the Soviets, it would change the frame-
work of negotiations. Rather than begin with enhancing the
status of the East German regime, as is the case with current
schemes, the new program would focus attention on its op-
pressiveness as the principal obstacle to unification. By taking
a stand on the issue of self-determination, the West would
have a platform most likely to command international sup-
port. By separating self-determination from unification, an
interim period for adjustments and a framework for meeting
legitimate security concerns of Germany's neighbors are
provided.

Nevertheless, it is improbable that any negotiating
formula will advance German unity. Even the most reasona-
ble program is likely to be rejected by the East. The long-
term hope for German unity therefore resides in the unity of
Europe. As nations lose their former significance, the fear of
any one state will diminish. A united Western Europe more-
over will be a powerful magnet for the countries of Eastern
Europe. If an all-embracing European structure ever comes
to pass, the existing dividing lines may seem less crucial.

This is why the existing rift in the West is so unfortunate.
The practical result of the Franco-American rivalry is that
each ally is tempted to add the Federal Republic to its side by
holding out vague hopes and grandiose schemes for the
achievement of Germany's maximum objectives. German
leaders will be torn by the conflicting demands of their allies
and their own national aspirations. The West, which has so
often been rent by internal struggles, stands in danger of
repeating its historic folly. Paris may have thought that by
committing the Federal Republic to a treaty of special
friendship, it was braking temptations of nationalism and
providing for the construction of Europe. Washington's atti-
tude toward the Treaty of Collaboration was motivated by a
desire to combat Third Force tendencies. These competing
efforts stand in danger of producing what they seek to pre-
vent; the attempt to use Germany as a balance wheel will
complete the fragmentation of the Atlantic Alliance.

The best hope to prevent a latent nihilism in Germany
from again menacing the West is to give the Federal Repub-
lic a stake in something larger than itself. The future of the
Federal Republic depends on two related policies by the
West: (1) recognition of the psychological and political
dilemmas of a divided country and (2) the ability to make
the Federal Republic part of a larger community. These
policies are interdependent; to pursue one without the other
is to defeat both. It is to the construction of this larger com-
munity that we must now turn.

the Federal Republic part of a larger community. These policies are interdependent; to pursue one without the other is to defeat both. It is to the construction of this larger community that we must now turn.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### What Kind of Atlantic Partnership?

Two solutions are usually offered for enhancing Allied cohesion: (1) an improvement in the process of consultation and (2) the development of a united Europe with federal, supranational institutions as the precondition for an Atlantic partnership.

## THE PROBLEM OF CONSULTATION

The inherently difficult problem of coalition diplomacy is magnified under present conditions by three factors:

1. The firm commitment of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to the existing balance of power provides their allies with increasing scope for purely national actions.

2. The internal workings of modern government are so complex that they create a variety of obstacles to meaningful consultation. Nations sometimes find it so difficult to achieve a domestic consensus that they are reluctant to jeopardize it afterward in international forums. The American tendency to confine consultation to an elaboration of its own blueprints often reflects a desire to avoid complicating still further our own increasingly complex decision-making process.

3. As governments have found in their own domestic experience, access to the same technical data does not guarantee unanimity. In an alliance of states very unequal in size and strength, differences are almost certain to arise. And they are likely to be intensified because the histories of the states vary widely and because of a technology of unprecedented destructiveness and novelty.

The American historical experience causes our policymakers to be reluctant to admit that the process of consultation may have objective limits. United States society, with its

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large area of consensus, encourages the belief that all problems are soluble through goodwill and a willingness to compromise. A rationalistic streak produces a conviction that there are single, universally valid answers to most problems and that agreement is sure to emerge if the interested parties gather around a table. This creates a temptation to conduct Alliance diplomacy as if it were analogous to the domestic policy of stable societies.

However, the most difficult issues of coalition diplomacy are more complicated. Differences in history, geography and domestic structure become relevant. The analogy to domestic policy breaks down.

In stable societies, domestic decisions tend to be accepted because there is a consensus on legitimacy. Those who are overruled generally consider maintenance of domestic order more important than any particular grievance; if they do not, domestic policy acquires some of the characteristics and sanctions of foreign policy and, in extreme cases, leads to civil war. In stable societies those who are overruled retain the hope of winning another round later or of influencing the implementation of the decision. In democracies, there exists the possibility of changing the government with the next election.

In a coalition of sovereign states, these safety valves are not available. Legitimacy resides in the individual governments. Decisions require their consent—this is the essence of sovereignty. Even when they agree to be bound by majority vote—a rare occurrence in coalitions and not the case with NATO—their sovereignty implies the right to renounce the treaty. In short, those who dissent and are prepared to insist on their sovereignty cannot be bound indefinitely.

If fundamental differences among sovereign allies persist, the partners are torn between the desire to maintain the appearance of unity and the attempt to vindicate their views. The need to present a facade of harmony has at least three consequences: (1) It puts a limit on the sanctions that can be applied to a recalcitrant ally. (2) One of the few pressures available is to mobilize domestic pressures against an obstructive partner, thus multiplying resentments. (3) Because misgivings are sometimes subordinated to an appearance of amity, the real views of the governments cannot always be deduced from their formal statements. Simultaneously—and somewhat contradictorily—a premium is placed on intransigence. Ruthless allies can use their partners' desire for harmony to impose a desired course. But if this happens too frequently, there is a dangerous build-up of frustration that cannot be smothered indefinitely by declarations of friendship. This has been happening in the Atlantic Alliance.

Consultation, therefore, is far from a panacea. It is least effective when it is most needed: when there exist basic differences of assessment or of interest. It works best in *implementing* a consensus rather than in *creating* it. Nevertheless, an improvement in the consultative process should be one of the primary objectives of the Alliance.

Many American schemes for strengthening NATO have

implementing a consensus rather than in *creating* it. Nevertheless, an improvement in the consultative process should be one of the primary objectives of the Alliance.

Many American schemes for strengthening NATO have taken the form of making our predominant position psychologically more acceptable; we try to create a structure which physically prevents any Ally (except the United States) from acting autonomously. This tends to turn our Allies into advisors in an American decision-making process. It then becomes relevant to inquire whether such a system serves the long-term political vitality of the Alliance.

The effectiveness of any process of consultation is tested by the answers to the following questions: Who has a right to be consulted? Whose voice carries weight? Who has technical competence? These three questions do not necessarily have identical answers. Many agencies in our own government have a right to be heard, but not all have the same influence. When some Europeans ask for a greater voice in our decisions in return for giving up some of their military autonomy, the issue they raise is: compared to whose voice *within* the United States government? That of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency? Or the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Or the State Department? Or the Commerce Department? In our interdepartmental disputes, the outcome is clearly affected by the constituency that the agency or department represents. The weight given to advice is related to the competence that it reflects and this in turn depends on how seriously a given department takes its role.

These considerations apply even more strongly in an alliance of sovereign states. The challenge is not only to provide a forum for the expression of a point of view—important as this is—but also to bring about a framework which encourages the emergence of responsible attitudes. Setting up lines of communication without paying corresponding attention to what flows through them is to evade the key problem. If the United States insists on retaining a dominant position and complete freedom of action—if integration becomes in practice an exegesis of American schemes—we will probably find that the political will of Europe will eventually be broken. Before a government makes a major effort to acquire the competence necessary for developing a serious point of view, it must be convinced that its views matter not only by the grace of a senior ally but also because of structural necessities.

American policy has not always been sensitive to the psychological prerequisites for effective consultation. It generally holds that influence in the Alliance is apportioned as in a stock company: the partner with the largest number of shares in a common enterprise is supposed to have the greatest influence.

Influence is, of course, an intangible quality. However, to measure it entirely in terms of contribution to a common effort is much too mechanical. President de Gaulle, with his disconcerting habit of cutting through slogans to the underlying reality, has put his finger on the fact that as long as NATO is an alliance of sovereign states, a too literal conception of “integration” can easily lead to an evasion of responsi-

[L]

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bility. Difficult decisions can be avoided, and failure can be blamed on other allies. Even a major effort may not result in a corresponding increase in influence. In an alliance of sovereign states, a country's influence requires that its effort be considered essential and that its partners do not take it for granted. In determining an ally's real—as opposed to his formal—role, one can do worse than inquire what its choices are in case of disagreement. To combine technical integration with insistence on sovereignty can in time erode the moral basis of joint action.

Heretofore, American policy has assumed that the chief obstacle to close United States-European cooperation on a global scale is that the resources of the European nation-state are inadequate for the requirements of the modern age. According to this school of thought, the political integration of Europe will solve the problem of Allied consultation. A united Europe will be prepared to share world-wide burdens which a Europe of national states is reluctant to assume. Under Secretary of State Ball has expressed the American view as follows:

> The problem will never be fully solved until Europe gets on further with the achievement of its own unity—until it organizes itself on a scale commensurate with the requirements of the age.

> There are quite obvious reasons for this. The undertaking of world responsibility requires a world view. The discharge of such responsibility under post-colonial conditions must be based on the command of vast resources for defense and foreign aid—and on the will to use them. Western Europe collectively has more than enough resources, but a fragmented Europe cannot efficiently mobilize them in support of a common effort and a common view.¹

¹ George W. Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1964), p. 216.

The nature of world responsibility is rarely defined; it is assumed to be self-evident. Thus, United States Ambassador to Germany, George McGhee, spoke as follows:

> This [Atlantic partnership] entails increasing contributions in formerly remote areas like Vietnam and Central Africa from countries which, like Germany, have only recently acquired the ability to contribute.²

² George C. McGhee, "Some American Thoughts on Current Issues," speech on July 16, 1964, DOSB, Vol. LI, No. 1510 (August 3, 1964), p. 138.

American policy seems to consider that its goals in these areas are in the common interest and, therefore, beyond challenge; what it desires is a sharing of the cost.

But is it really true that willingness to assume global responsibilities is related to availability of resources? The American national experience would seem to contradict this assumption. Through the greatest part of its history, the United States possessed the resources but not the inclination to play a global role. Conversely many European states maintained overseas commitments when their resources were much smaller than they are today.

For many European countries, the combination of de-colonization and two World Wars has been traumatic. Having been forced to relinquish their overseas possessions, they no longer consider that their security is *directly* affected by what happens in, for example, Southeast Asia. Rather than run the risk of nuclear destruction on behalf of a distant area from which they have been recently ejected, they prefer to

ing been forced to relinquish their overseas possessions, they
no longer consider that their security is *directly* affected by
what happens in, for example, Southeast Asia. Rather than
run the risk of nuclear destruction on behalf of a distant area
from which they have been recently ejected, they prefer to
shift the risks and the burdens to us. They are reasonably
sure that long before upheavals in other continents threaten
the safety of Europe, the United States will have entered the
fray. In other words, they treat America's extra-European
concerns in much the same way that the United States looked
at Europe's quarrels until 1941.

This problem is not eliminated by drawing distinctions—
often moralistic in tone—between “responsibility” and “in-
terest.” Under Secretary Ball, echoing similar statements by
Secretary Rusk, has argued that:

We Americans have few national interests—in the narrow sense
—outside our own territory but we have assumed vast world re-
sponsibility. . . . The willingness to accept world responsibility—
as distinct from the preservation of national interests—is, in our
observation and experience, not universal among the NATO mem-
ship.³

³ Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," *op. cit.*, p. 215.

Aside from the fact that our European Allies are likely to
consider a "disinterested" foreign policy as both mercurial
and unsteady, the distinction misses the central point. The
chief reason for the reluctance of most of our Allies to assume
world responsibility is precisely that in the past decade they
have been obliged to give up their global interests. Sharing
our burdens would give impetus to Atlantic cooperation only
if our Allies have the same view as we of what is at stake
outside of Europe and if they believe that the United States
would curtail its commitments but for their assistance.
Neither condition is met today. The very commitment of the
United States to a global role—our often-invoked sense of
world responsibility—reduces the incentive of our Allies to
share in it, much as the commitment of Britain and France to
the European balance of power permitted the United States
to evade the problems of security in the period before 1941.

Thus, European unity is not a major cure-all for Atlantic
disagreements. In many respects it may magnify rather than
reduce differences. As Europe gains structure, it will be in a
better position to assert divergent perspectives whose ulti-
mate cause is structural rather than personal. Phrases like
"indivisible interest" are correct when applied to the defense
of Europe or East-West relations; they come close to being
platitudes in other parts of the world. A wise Alliance policy
will not gear everything to the expectation that common
positions can be developed on a global basis; it will also take
account of the fact that the interests of Europe and America
are not identical everywhere.

This fact is relevant to any assessment of the degree of
centralization of Atlantic policy which it is in our interest to
promote. Over the next decades the United States is likely to
find itself increasingly engaged in the Far East, in Southeast
Asia and in Latin America. Our European Allies will almost

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certainly consider that their vital interests are not at stake in
these areas. If Atlantic policy is completely centralized, it
may grow stagnant. The Alliance will be able to agree only
on doing nothing. Or else, it will engage in a series of pre-
tenses. The behavior of our Allies toward American requests
for assistance in Vietnam is a good example. The Soviets may
use our involvements in other continents as a pretext to
blackmail Europe. This, combined with the lack of interest
among Europeans in the issues involved, may strain the Alli-nce beyond the breaking point.

Looking beyond the immediate future, it is not difficult
to visualize an increasingly powerful China fomenting the
already strong tendencies toward turmoil in other parts of
the world. If we insist on remaining the sole trustee of global
policy, the strain on our resources and ingenuity may well be
too great. The day will come when we will consider a meas-
ure of autonomy in Europe a blessing rather than an irritant.
In this century no one could have foreseen at the beginning
of any decade what the world would look like at its end.
Things have not grown less complicated or more predictable.
Those centers of initiative which still exist should not be
discouraged. It is not always the least-responsible allies that
wish to reserve some measure of control over their destiny.

If we face the fact that the interests of Europe and the
United States are not identical everywhere, it may be possi-
ble to agree on a permissible range of divergence. Each part-
ner will regain a measure of flexibility. The temptation for
Soviet adventures might be reduced. Europe could assume
greater responsibility for its defense and its future. Put posi-
tively, the Atlantic Alliance will have to decide whether to
emphasize immediate convenience or long-term political
vitality. At any given point of time, centralization of deci-
sions guarantees the greatest degree of coordination. Critics
of such schemes can always be put on the defensive by being
accused of fomenting distrust. In the long term, however,
excessive concentration of decision-making in the hands of
the senior partner may deprive out Allies of the incentive to
be responsible and it may create profound fissures when a
conflict of interest becomes apparent.

This suggests that the vitality of the Alliance would be
served by an Allied structure which makes possible a variety
of coordinated approaches on some issues. For responsible
attitudes to emerge, participants in a consultative process
must do more than simply advise. Influencing another coun-
try's actions—however benevolent that dominant partner may
be—will be demoralizing in the long run. If coalition diplo-
macy becomes largely an exercise in affecting essentially
American decisions, most of our Allies will lose the incentive
to make responsible judgments. The type of leader comforta-
ble with such a relationship may be only too ready to shift
the burden of difficult choices to our shoulders; this very
quality may make him unreliable when he is most needed in
times of crisis. For decisions to be meaningful, our Allies
must consider them their own, not ours.

Paradoxically, some autonomy in political decision for

Paradoxically, some autonomy in political decision for
Europe is psychologically important for the cohesion of the
Alliance. Though this proposition will be granted by most
American policymakers in the abstract, they tend to resist
independence when it takes the form of challenging our
judgments. A decade and a half of hegemony have accu-
tomed us to believing that our views represent the general
interest. The difficulty with which decisions are reached in
our government produces temptations to turn Allied consul-
tation into an attempt to implement essentially American
conceptions.

Nevertheless, the future well-being of the Alliance de-
pends on our willingness to adjust the pattern of relation-
ships which grew up after the war. Though historically we
are the children of Europe, with respect to the postwar evolu-
tion, we are somewhat in the position of a father toward a
grown-up son. He can always take the attitude that, since
their interests are identical, he will continue to control all
the resources. He can challenge the son to name circum-
stances in which their interests might differ. He can tell him
that no legitimate request will ever go unheeded. Such an
attitude will either drive the son to open rebellion or, if
accepted, will break his spirit.

Since the war Europe has been first nurtured and then
protected by us. Now we require wisdom and delicacy in
handling the transition from tutelage to equality. Grandiose
schemes of great technical complexity may magnify inward
insecurities. What is needed is a recognition that it is in the
long-term interest of the United States to share responsibili-
ties even more than burdens. This will involve a painful loss
of some of our former pre-eminence—a process to which no
nation has ever adjusted easily. The assertions of European
self-will which we find so irritating today can be the growing
pains of a new and healthier relationship which ultimately is
important for us as well.

In too much of the current dialogue we offer our good
intentions as a guarantee of the validity of our actions. But
the nature of our intentions is not at issue. It is important for
us to realize that our style and our commitment which have
been responsible for so many constructive measures can also
dissolve the identity of others. Our optimism makes us press
for final answers to any problem. These often take the form
of abstract models in which other nations are considered
interchangeable entities. Our pragmatism produces a willing-
ness to try everything once and a restless quest for ever "new"
remedies. Thus, sudden changes in our policy are not
uncommon—witness the checkered career of the MLF. Deci-
sions within our government are influenced by a combina-
tion of bureaucratic pressures in which the immediate often
predominates over the long-term.

All of this can make our impact undermine the sense of
responsibility of even close allies. Most societies lack the co-
hesiveness for the restless quest for novelty which seems
natural to us. The constant adjustment of policies to differ-

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ing pressures can be demoralizing for countries whose margin
for maneuver is more limited. What appears as open-
mindedness to us may be seen as unsteadiness by others. The
fluctuations in our German policy from impatient aloofness
in 1961 to ardent wooing in 1963 to a more distant policy in
1965; the changes in the MLF from indifference to passionate
advocacy to aloof goodwill in the space of three years; the
frequent alterations of our strategic doctrine; the tendency of
our bureaucracy to conduct their internal battles by lining
up support in foreign capitals—all suggest that it is necessary
even for the stability of our own policy to have self-confident
partners with a strongly developed sense of identity. Reluc-
tant as we may be to admit it, we could benefit from a
counterweight to discipline our occasional impetuosity and
to supply historical perspective to our penchant for abstract
and “final” solutions. The real case for European autonomy
is not burden-sharing but the establishing of a psychological
balance between us and Europe.

For centuries one of the most difficult problems of West-
ern political thought has been how to reconcile unity with
respect for diversity. Overemphasis on either unity or di-
versity destroys the delicate balance of creativity. Excessive
stress on unity leads to a deadening conformism; exalting
diversity as an end produces a relativism hostile to great con-
ceptions and, on the political level, an overconcern with na-
tional peculiarities. To strike this balance is the big unsolved
problem before the Western Alliance.

THE GRAND DESIGN AND EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION

Since the war and with increasing emphasis since 1961,
the United States has argued that the most effective structure
for Atlantic cooperation is a partnership between the United
States and a united, supranational Europe. "When one part-
ner possesses over 50 per cent of the resources of an enterprise
and the balance is distributed among sixteen or seventeen
others, the relationship is unlikely to work very well." ⁴ Real

⁴George W. Ball. "Toward an Atlantic Partnership." speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, February 6, 1962, DOSB, Vol. XLVI, No. 1184 (March 5, 1962), p. 366.

partnership, according to American spokesmen, is possible
only among equals.

As a result, American pronouncements have often as-
sumed that before Europe could be an effective partner of
the United States it would have to unify. This concept of
Atlantic partnership, strongly urged also by such wise Euro-
peans as Jean Monnet, has been described by the image of
"twin pillars" or "dumbbell." Former Secretary of State
Herter has written:

I believe the present Administration [the Kennedy Administra-
tion]... holds the ... view, which has come to be termed the
"dumbbell" concept—meaning that an economic and political
alliance is stronger if it has been agreed to by partners of equal
weight on both sides.⁵

⁵Christian Herter, "Atlantica," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1963), p. 301.

The European side of this partnership is to be a United
States of Europe organized on federal lines with suprana-

weight on both sides.

² Christian Herter, "Atlantica," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1963), p. 301.

The European side of this partnership is to be a United States of Europe organized on federal lines with supranational institutions.

There is no doubt that the dumbbell concept represents one form of Atlantic partnership. But an excessive, almost doctrinaire commitment to it runs the risk of treating a symbol as the only possible reality. This may cause us to beg the key questions by the very terms in which we state them.

The single-mindedness with which the dumbbell concept has been pursued obscures three questions: Is it true that partnership is possible only among equals? What has been the real progress toward European political integration? To what extent is it in the American interest to promote one form of European unity to the exclusion of other possible plans?

Given the nature of America's relations with the rest of the world, it seems strange that partnership should be said to be possible only among equals. The assertion that we can deal effectively only with countries of equal strength is not conducive to inspiring confidence among the great majority of the nations of the world which are weak. Moreover, the proposition is open to doubt. History would seem to indicate that the most difficult and rigid partnerships are those among equals—witness, for example, the alliance between Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire prior to World War I. In Atlantic relationships we should recognize that an improvement in Europe's bargaining position toward us is inseparable from an increase in European strength and cohesion; we should be prepared to pay this price for European unity, but we must realize that there is a price to be paid.

Granting that a strong and united Europe is on balance in our best interest, we must nevertheless inquire whether it is wise—either from the point of view of Europe or of the United States—to insist that there is only one reliable method of bringing about that unity: that of federal, supranational institutions. In the aftermath of De Gaulle's abrupt rejection of Britain's membership in the Common Market, it has become almost a commonplace that the willful act of a single individual interrupted what would otherwise have been a smooth advance toward political integration. According to this view, once Britain would have entered the Common Market, an "outward-looking" Europe would have emerged. Progress toward supranational political institutions would have been continuous. In the opinion of the "integrationists" in Europe and in the State Department, European unity would have been promoted by a "community spirit," which in turn was to be fostered by supranational commissions. Expert judgment unaffected by considerations of national interest was to move European political integration forward, step-by-step, toward a final culmination in which the supranational authorities would be dominant. All this is said to have been destroyed by De Gaulle's abrupt exclusion of Britain from the Common Market.

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However, no man could have single-handedly brought about the consequences ascribed to De Gaulle. Significant underlying factors must have been operating to obstruct the idealized progression envisaged by the European integrationists on both sides of the Atlantic. It was always somewhat unrealistic to imagine that the methods by which economic integration had been achieved could be applied automatically to the political arena. The "community" approach—which equates method and purpose—works best when the objective is clear. It answers the question of how a common objective can be realized. It is much less useful in *defining* this objective.

In the aftermath of World War II, this was obscured because Europe had been so shattered by the war that immediate needs were overwhelming. Leaders did not think that their problem was to choose among different objectives; on the contrary, the task of meeting minimum necessities absorbed all their energies. Most countries on the Continent had governments so weak or were so eager to overcome a past—or both—that an abdication of some of their sovereignty seemed a respite from overwhelming uncertainties. For many in Europe, economic activity became a means to avoid facing nearly insoluble moral or political issues. And the economic imperatives were so urgent that the governments were only too glad to turn them over to supranational experts.⁶

⁶ For a splendid discussion of the problem of Europe's identity see Stanley Hoffmann, "Europe's Identity Crisis: Between the Past and America," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 4 (Fall 1964).

As Europe recovered economically, political confidence returned as well. Inevitably this strengthened the national state, the traditional repository of European loyalties. This process took place with varying intensity in each country. Germany and Italy, partly to escape their past, were more ready to submerge themselves in a federal Europe than Britain and France. Smaller countries accustomed to the protection of some major power had less difficulty with the supranational concept that those that had been major powers themselves. France and Great Britain—with the longest history as national states—have consistently aimed for a confederal, rather than a federal, solution; that is, a structure that preserves the identity of the states and in which decisions will be made, at least initially, on the basis of agreement among governments. Four years before De Gaulle came to power, the abortive European Defense Community demonstrated the obstacles faced by a supranational approach to political integration.

But if De Gaulle cannot fairly be charged with being the sole obstacle to European integration on the federal model, he is responsible for confusing the debate about the future of Europe in at least two ways: (1) The controversy between the federalists and the confederalists has become a test of attitudes toward De Gaulle. The line-up is not a reliable guide to the real views of the participants because many who strongly oppose De Gaulle's style and domestic policy are in agreement with him about the organization of Europe. (2) Some of the most ardent advocates of Britain's entry into the Common Market are also dedicated proponents of a federal Europe, which is as unacceptable in London as in Paris. Thus opponents of European integration have often combined forces with dedicated advocates of it to advance

into the Common Market are also dedicated proponents of a federal Europe, which is as unacceptable in London as in Paris. Thus opponents of European integration have often combined forces with dedicated advocates of it to advance sweeping schemes certain to be vetoed by the French President.

This confusion has been magnified by the role of the United States. Our strong support of supranational, federal institutions has contributed to the stalemate in European discussions. While not sufficient to bring about our preferred solution, our influence is strong enough to block approaches with which we disagree. Moreover, despite our ardent support for European unity, our impact has often been the contrary of what was intended. While affirming the need for European integration, we have unintentionally tended to undermine a European sense of identity.

During the long period of American predominance, a group of experts comfortable with the existing relationship has grown up on both sides of the Atlantic. Having worked well together for many years, they tend to see problems from the same perspective. Though they generally favor European integration, they consider the quest for European autonomy inherently divisive. According to them, if United States policy is wise, European autonomy will be unnecessary. If United States policy is mistaken, an independent European policy would only magnify the problem. Thus, both in Europe and the United States, many who urge European integration balk at the prospect of an autonomous European policy—which is one of the likely results of European integration.

This attitude is particularly noticeable in the field of defense. Were Europe thrown on itself, it would probably unite sufficiently to assure its security. It clearly has the potential to do so. But, having been sheltered by American power for nearly two decades, many Europeans are concerned that the emergence of an autonomous Europe in the area of defense will undermine the American guarantee and force them into assuming direct responsibilities. American pronouncements sometimes encourage this concern. The threat to withdraw American forces has been used to obtain European support for American strategic preferences. Proposals such as the MLF have the practical consequence of preventing the emergence of a European point of view on nuclear matters. These American attitudes have inhibited a European quest for autonomy; they have also caused some advocates of European identity in the defense field to give their case an anti-American cast.

These tendencies are reinforced by the fact that some Europeans prefer an Atlantic structure based on the existing NATO states to a united Europe. The smaller countries in particular fear that European integration will result in the hegemony of powerful neighbors. They see no advantage in European autonomy. Since they must follow the lead of a

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dominant country in any event, they prefer the hegemony of an ally 3,000 miles away and with a tradition of using its power with restraint. Consequently, these countries are a ready-made constituency for schemes to perpetuate the relationship between Europe and the United States that developed after the war.

In short, American policy has been extremely ambivalent: it has urged European unity while recoiling before its probable consequences. We have sought to combine a supra-national Europe with a closely integrated Atlantic Community under American leadership. These objectives are likely to prove incompatible. Indeed, the United States will have to reconcile itself to the fact that no matter what structure emerges in Europe, a difference in perspective with the United States is probable, particularly about policies outside of Europe. A wise policy will try to mitigate the impact of this difference; it will not be able to remove it.

This latent difference could well be accentuated by the manner in which European unity is achieved. History teaches that the more abrupt the political transitions, the more drastic have to be the efforts to reestablish some sort of cohesion. A Europe that grows out of the collapse of all traditional loyalties must have as its primary problem the discovery of some specific purpose for its existence. Too doctrinaire an approach to European unity could produce either a collapse of political will or, more likely, a new and virulent form of nationalism, perhaps even more intense than the nationalism of *patries*. A Europe constructed largely on theoretical models might be forced into an anti-American mold because its only sense of identity could be what distinguished it from America.

It is hard to understand why many European federalists believe that a European parliament would mitigate this danger. The decline in the role of the European national parliaments has been apparent for decades. In no European country—not even Great Britain—does parliament exercise an effective control over the formulation or the conduct of foreign policy. Party discipline has become so pervasive that in European parliaments the majority almost always ratifies the decisions of the cabinet. And where the party system is ineffective—either because the parties are weak or because there are too many of them—the result is paralysis of government rather than parliamentary control.

These conditions are likely to be magnified by all-European elections. The need to establish a consensus comprising Schleswig-Holstein and Sicily, Scotland and Bavaria will surely tempt demagogic appeals. A parliament emerging from such a process of direct elections may be completely unrelated to the calm deliberative body envisaged by so many European federalists.

This suggests the need to reexamine American priorities. The mechanical notion that one particular form of European integration automatically will solve the problem of Atlantic partnership should be abandoned. The United States should leave the internal evolution of a united Europe to the Europeans and use its ingenuity and influence in devising new forms of *Atlantic* cooperation. The passionate commitment of so many American policymakers to a single formula of

leave the internal evolution of a united Europe to the Europeans and use its ingenuity and influence in devising new forms of *Atlantic* cooperation. The passionate commitment of so many American policymakers to a single formula of European integration, that of supranationality, confuses form and substance. It could in fact bring about results quite contrary to those intended. Many European federalists have been devoted adherents of Atlantic partnership; Jean Monnet, their most significant figure, has been a staunch and remarkable friend of the United States. By contrast, President de Gaulle's career is filled with examples of abrupt and uni-lateral tactics designed to exalt the status of France, occasionally at our expense. It would be one of history's frequent ironies if the structure for Europe proposed by Monnet would generate the greatest pressures for the kind of policy generally described as Gaullist, while the structure advocated by De Gaulle turned out to be best suited for flexible Atlantic arrangements. Our bent for structural remedies sometimes blinds us to the fact that institutions produce their own momentum, which cannot necessarily be foreseen from the intentions of their founders.

While the United States should welcome any unified Europe that reflects the desires of Europeans, it is doubtful that either our national or Atlantic interests require our passionate commitment to a supranational structure for Europe. A very schematic and rigid conception of Atlantic partnership can easily fail to do justice to the richness and variety of relationships possible within the Atlantic context. Is each European country always inherently closer to its European neighbors than to the United States? If we separate the question into political, military or economic components, is the answer always uniform and does it always point in the same direction? Would it not be wiser to retain some flexibility?

There may be various roads to European unity. The one traced by the Fouchet Plan—calling for institutionalized meetings of foreign ministers and subcabinet officials—is not the least plausible, and indeed it is the one most consistent with British participation. It has the advantage that it would produce some immediate progress without foreclosing the future and thus would put an end to the process of demanding the desirable in order to defeat the attainable. It would also permit a more flexible arrangement of Atlantic relations than the “twin pillar” concept now in vogue. A confederal Europe would enable the United States to maintain an influence at many centers of decision rather than be forced to stake everything on affecting the views of a single, supranational body.

Every European state was formed through some process of integration during the past four centuries, and Germany and Italy achieved unity less than 100 years ago. European history suggests that there is more than one way to build unity. In Italy, it came by way of plebiscite and annexation abolishing the individual states. In Germany, unification occurred under the aegis of one state but as the act of sovereign governments which remained in existence after unity was

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achieved. The resulting structure clearly did not lack cohesiveness. History is rarely so linear and simple a process as some of the enthusiasts for a particular form of European integration suggest.

European history demonstrates also that stability in Europe is unattainable except through the cooperation of Britain, France and Germany. Care should be taken not to resurgent old national rivalries in the name of Atlanticism. The United States should not single out one ally as its special partner. The attempt to force allies to choose between us and France—a tendency which, despite all disavowals, is real—must magnify the European nationalism that French policy has already done so much to foster.

Our concern thus returns to the somewhat out-of-scale figure of President de Gaulle. Conceivably he is as petty and as animated by remembered slights as some of our commentators suggest. It is also possible that a man so conscious of his historic role has larger purposes. In a period of detente with the Soviet Union, it should not be impossible to conduct a serious conversation with a traditional ally. President de Gaulle has repeatedly expressed his willingness to coordinate strategy rather than to integrate it. It is a welcome sign of progress that, at the NATO meeting of December 1964, Secretary McNamara and French Defense Minister Messmer agreed on a procedure to begin exploring what this means with respect to strategic nuclear forces.

But a more fundamental dialogue is needed. Irritation with De Gaulle's tactics does not change the fact that in his proposal of 1958 for a Directorate he pointed out what has remained the key problem of NATO: If the Atlantic Alliance is to retain any vitality, it requires a common foreign policy—or at least an agreed range of divergence. In its absence, the attempt to devise a common military strategy is likely to prove futile. As long as the Alliance cannot agree even on a common trade policy toward the East, it will be impossible to convince the Allies to relinquish their freedom of action over decisions affecting their very survival. Lord Avon and Dean Acheson have come to the same conclusion. The time seems ripe to create a political body at the highest level for concerting the policies of the nations bordering the North Atlantic.

Organizational devices should never be confused with substantive solutions. Nevertheless the following outline could serve as an illustration of a desirable direction if not as a detailed blueprint for action. The political body could be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council. It could be composed of six members: five permanent members (the United States, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic and Italy) and one rotating member representing the smaller NATO countries. The rotating member could be elected by a vote of the NATO Council from which the permanent members are excluded, thus protecting the rights of the smaller countries. The Allies would agree to accept a two-thirds vote as binding with escape clauses to be described.

The Executive Committee should formulate common Atlantic purposes and define the limits of autonomous action where interests diverge. It should give political guidance for

The Executive Committee should formulate common Atlantic purposes and define the limits of autonomous action where interests diverge. It should give political guidance for the military arrangements described in the previous chapters. It should be the political authority for the proposed Allied Nuclear Force. It should be charged with developing a common strategic doctrine.

As long as the Alliance is composed of sovereign states, the delegation of authority will clearly have to be limited. Each Ally, whether or not a member of the Executive Committee, would have to be given the right to appeal its decisions to the NATO Council, where a two-thirds majority would carry. Each Ally should have the right, for an interim period at least, to refuse to be bound by such a vote. However, it should be required to make a formal declaration to that effect within a given time. A negative vote either in the Executive Committee or in the NATO Council would not be taken as an indication of non-compliance. Instead, a formal notification that a country refuses to carry out the common decision would be required. The purpose of separating the two stages would be to enable the Allies to record their disagreement and yet to carry out the majority's decision for the sake of unity.

Within this framework, the European countries could, if they wished, form a closer association. For example, the Western European Union might well be given responsibility for the European component of the Allied Nuclear Force and, indeed, the European contribution to joint NATO plans. As Europe gains structure, the Executive Committee could draw nearer to the "twin pillars" concept. But Atlantic partnership, in this approach, could become operative even if European unity were delayed. Atlantic partnership and increased European cohesion thus could be pursued simultaneously, with no advance commitment to giving priority to either course. An Atlantic Community could thus develop on a two-pronged basis.

Conceivably such a policy could end the sterile debate over the relative benefits of integration and coordination. It might heal a rift that, if continued, is bound to hazard everything that has been painfully built up over fifteen years. It would leave the internal evolution of Europe to the European countries and concentrate our efforts where we can be most constructive: in the elaboration of Atlantic relationships.

This requires that we become clear about the notion of Europe as a Third Force which is used so often in a pejorative sense in our discussions. In the sense of being powerful Europe is bound to be a Third Force, partly because we ourselves have made it so. Whether Europe will use its strength for a narrow or a wider conception depends in large part on the ability of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to develop common purposes and a structure to give them effect. We can best counteract Third Force tendencies based on a form of neutrality by conducting ourselves so that most of our Allies will always consider the advantages of an At-

[L]

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lantic partnership greater than those which could be gained
by a more parochial approach.

For this purpose steadiness and reliability are more im-
portant assets than an erratic quest for ever-more refined
formulae. Confidence presupposes that the leaders of other
countries can gear their actions to ours over a period of time.
The United States should use its ingenuity to forge a variety
of Atlantic institutions not only in the political realm but also
in the spheres of economics, scholarship and the arts.

But institutions based on present concepts of national
sovereignty are not enough. The West requires a larger goal:
the constitution of an Atlantic Commonwealth in which all
the peoples bordering the North Atlantic can fulfill their aspi-
rations. Clearly, it will not come quickly; many intermediate
stages must be traversed before it can be reached. It is not too-
early, however, to prepare ourselves now for this step beyond
the nation-state.

A FINAL WORD

When the Atlantic Alliance was founded in 1949, no one
would have thought it possible that within fifteen years its
pervasive problem would turn out to be the growing strength-
and self-confidence of Europe. In the face of what was be-
lieved to be the imminent threat of Soviet aggression, it
would have seemed absurd to predict that fissures would
open because the fear of Communist invasion had largely
vanished. When Europe dreaded the return of America's
traditional isolationism, it would have been incredible that
some day our Allies would feel so confident of our support
that they would consider it safe to disagree with our policies
or even to oppose them.

In a way, then, many of the difficulties in the Atlantic
Alliance could be a source of pride for the United States.
They are the result of the success of policies ushered in by the
Marshall Plan and consistently pursued through four postwar
administrations. The West today is less imperiled by outside
pressures than by a tendency to consume its own substance.

Yet it is easy to draw too much comfort from this. History
is the tale of civilizations that sought their future in their
past. There are no plateaus in international affairs; what is
not a stepping stone soon becomes the beginning of a decline.
Succeeding generations will not be able to draw comfort
from the fact that an unmet challenge was produced by great
achievement.

In the life of societies and international systems there
comes a time when the question arises whether all the possi-
bilities of innovation inherent in a given structure have been
exhausted. At this point, symptoms are taken for causes; im-
mediate problems absorb the attention that should be de-
voted to determining their significance. Events are not
shaped by a concept of the future; the present becomes all-
intrusive. However impressive such a structure may still ap-
pear to outsiders, it has passed its zenith. It will grow ever
more rigid and, in time, irrelevant.

The West today confronts such a challenge. It has had
centuries of great achievements punctuated by catastrophic

intrusive. However impressive each a single
pear to outsiders, it has passed its zenith. It will grow ever
more rigid and, in time, irrelevant.

The West today confronts such a challenge. It has had
centuries of great achievements punctuated by catastrophic
upheaval. Its propensity for disaster has been high; but here-
tofore each tragedy was followed by a new burst of creativity.
Are the stresses of today a sign of consolidation or the first
symptoms of decay? Will they lead to renewal or to disinte-
gration?

For a while longer the West can continue along familiar
routes. The traditional machinery of the Atlantic Alliance is
well designed to produce the appearance of amity. But if the
Alliance continues to confuse form and substance, energy
will increasingly have to be spent in reconciling illusion with
reality. Each nation will be thrown on its own resources and
will emphasize policies that magnify divisions. At each previ-
ous critical juncture the West—though with much travail—
found political forms adequate for its needs. It made the
transition from feudalism to the nation-state. Its challenge
now is whether it can move from the nation-state to a larger
community and draw from this effort the strength for another
period of innovation.

Its ability to master this problem will largely determine
whether the West can remain relevant to the rest of the world.
Confronted by turmoil and hatred in the former colonial
areas, the West desperately searches for means to demonstrate
its good faith to its erstwhile subjects. But every satisfied de-
mand spawns new pressures. The inward insecurity produced
by centuries of subordination is not allayed by dealing with
its manifestations any more than a tidal wave is understood
by studying the surface of the ocean. In many of the new
nations, popularity is unattainable partly because of the
memory of colonial rule, partly because these nations often
do not know what they really want. Their greatest need is a
sense of purpose. But this can be conveyed only by example,
not by preachments or by efforts to ingratiate that compound
the new nations' sense of insecurity with our own.

What the West can mean to others depends therefore in
great part on what it means to itself. In the heyday of coloni-
alism. Western political forms were widely imitated. The
leaders of independence movements fought their oppressors
in the name of principles they had acquired from them. The
reason was that for all the wrongs it committed, the West
appeared dynamic, creative and vital. If the West is still to
contribute to the rest of the world, it will have to begin by
demonstrating in its internal relationships that its well-
springs of creativity have not run dry.

The opportunity is great. The dynamic periods of West-
ern history occurred when unity was forged from diversity.
This is the task once again. The struggles for prestige and
influence can be salutary if at some point they lead to a
heightened sense of community. Conversely, fifty years from
now no one will care who was "right" with respect to the
issues that form the headlines of the day if in the process the
West has torn itself to pieces.

[L]

79

Troubled-Kissinger—9731

The challenge is whether the difference in perspective be-
tween the two sides of the Atlantic, which is at the heart of
many disagreements, can be turned into a source of strength.
Our idealism and impetuosity would gain depth if leavened
by the European sense of tragedy. And the European con-
sciousness of history could recover dynamism if bolstered by
our hopefulness.

The deepest question before the West may thus be what
kind of vision it has of its future. With the growth of bu-
reaucracy and expertise on both sides of the Atlantic, there is
a danger of becoming mired by the prudent, the tactical or
the expedient. Problems that are recognized are treated with
considerable adeptness. But many problems are not recog-
nized. The solution of immediate issues has priority over the
shaping of the future. The expert has a vested interest in the
existing framework; doing the familiar very well has, after
all, made him an expert. His weakness is that he may confuse
creativity with a projection of the present into the future. He
respects "facts" and considers them something to be adjusted
to, perhaps to be manipulated, but not to be transcended.

In the decades ahead, the West will have to lift its sights.
When technique becomes exalted over purpose, men become
the victims of their complexities. They forget that every great
achievement in every field was a vision before it became a
reality. Both sides of the Atlantic would do well to keep in
mind that there are two kinds of realists: those who use facts
and those who create them. The West requires nothing so
much as men able to create their own reality.

It has become fashionable to compare the disagreements
of the West with rifts in the Communist world. But this
comparison fails to do justice to the possibilities of the Atlan-
tic area. In the Communist world schisms are inevitable and
unbridgeable. Western societies have been more fortunate.
Their evolution has been richer because at their best they
have managed to relate diversity to community. Free from
the shackles of a doctrine of historical inevitability, the na-
tions of the West can render a great service by demonstrating
that whatever meaning history has is derived from the con-
victions and purpose of the generation which shapes it.

DUPLICATE SET

DO NOT
RETURN
THIS LOT

152

than heat the rift in the Alliance. There is something to multiregional divisions. There is something to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons into the non-nuclear countries of NATO into the nuclear field, often with only their relevant assent. It makes no sense to attempt to revitalize NATO with a project which, because of the opposition of France and other Allies, will have to be set up outside of NATO. It is contradictory to advocate European political unity while urging a scheme which is certain to produce a rift between France and the Federal Republic.

To be sure, France cannot be given a veto over every measure to strengthen the Alliance. But a direct clash is justified only when a disputed scheme commands wide support and will in fact bring about a structure which enhances the long-term vitality of the Alliance.

There is reason to doubt that the MLF meets either of these requirements. Though the proponents of the MLF have tended to blame all objections on the manipulations of shortsighted men, the opposition of France, the indifference of most other NATO Allies and the split within the Federal Republic cannot be simply shrugged off. Outside the Federal Republic there is not one country whose agreement to the MLF represents anything more than acquiescence in American pressure.

Issue of Nuclear Control—The Multilateral Force

153

152 The Strategic Issues

than heal the rift in the Alliance, the MLF is likely to multi-
ply divisions. There is something absurd about trying to pre-
vent the spread of nuclear weapons by bringing the non-
nuclear countries of NATO into the nuclear field, often with
only their reluctant assent. It makes no sense to attempt to
revitalize NATO with a project which, because of the opposi-
tion of France and other Allies, will have to be set up outside
of NATO. It is contradictory to advocate European political
unity while urging a scheme which is certain to produce a rift
between France and the Federal Republic.

To be sure, France cannot be given a veto over every
measure to strengthen the Alliance. But a direct clash is justi-
fied only when a disputed scheme commands wide support
and will in fact bring about a structure which enhances the
long-term vitality of the Alliance.

There is reason to doubt that the MLF meets either of
these requirements. Though the proponents of the MLF have
tended to blame all objections on the manipulations of short-
sighted men, the opposition of France, the indifference of most
other NATO Allies and the split within the Federal Republic
cannot be simply shrugged off. Outside the Federal Republic
there is not one country whose agreement to the MLF repre-
sents anything more than acquiescence in American pressure.

Proponents of the MLF often compare their project to the
Schuman Plan, which, despite heavy initial criticism, laid the
basis for European economic integration. However, while
many constructive innovations have had to withstand criti-
cism when first proposed, not everything that is criticized is
necessarily constructive. The Schuman Plan promoted
Franco-German cooperation in areas where long-term inter-
ests were parallel. The longer the Coal and Steel Community
lasted, the more obvious were the benefits of common action.

153

153

Another potential dispute derives from the fact that the Federal Republic favors the Multilateral Force partly to increase its share of nuclear control. Most other countries—especially Great Britain—will participate, if at all, in order to prevent an increase of German control. This difference can be obscured in the early stages of the MLF; it, too, will become more and more acute as time goes on.

The MLF may therefore strengthen the very tendencies it seeks to combat. In its advocacy of the MLF, the United States has granted almost all of the propositions of its European critics. It has agreed that possession of nuclear weapons is a criterion of equality. It has granted that ownership of some strategic forces is essential for participation in strategic plan-

154 The Strategic Issues

ning and political decisions. It has admitted that influence in
the Alliance somehow depends on access to a strategic nuclear
arsenal. It has differed only about the nature of ownership
and the way control should be exercised. But since the con-
trol procedures of the MLF patently favor United States he-
gemony, they can be used by the nationalists and extremists as
a proof of American bad faith. If the Federal Republic finds
itself at odds with the United States about control, or with its
other allies about the evolution of the force, a serious back-
lash could develop.

The MLF may backfire even with respect to its primary
objective of preventing Franco-German nuclear collabora-
tion. Having made access to nuclear weapons the test of
equality, we have given an incentive to the Federal Republic
to seek alternative arrangements if the MLF fails or if its con-
trol arrangements prove unsatisfactory. Disappointment
could then justify a Franco-German nuclear collaboration for
which prior to the MLF no significant support existed within
the Federal Republic.

It was to render a poor service to the Federal Republic to
seek to restore Allied cohesion by a scheme which involved
access by Germany to nuclear weapons. If the MLF succeeds,
the Federal Republic will be embroiled with France. If it
fails, leaders who have staked a great deal on following the
American lead will be discredited. Participation by Germany
in a nuclear fleet has resurrected instinctive fears all over
Europe. Within Germany, pro-American and pro-French fac-
tions have rent the governing party, the Christian Demo-
cratic Union. The MLF thus threatens internal German sta-
bility and creates the danger that the Federal Republic will
become isolated internationally.

Issue of Nuclear Control—The Multilateral Force 155
control is a symptom, not a cause, of NATO's difficulties. There

155

control is a symptom, not a cause, of NATO's difficulties. There exists no neat solution for it so long as NATO is composed of sovereign states. Nor does the MLF "solve" it. The basic problem in the Alliance is political and not strategic. There is something incongruous about NATO's absorption in technicalities of mixed-manning while it lacks a common policy toward the Communist world, flounders dividedly in the former colonial areas and has yet to concert a strategic doctrine. To devote so much energy to the problem of who pushes the button in the remote contingency of nuclear war while neglecting the issues which confront the Alliance daily comes close to being escapism. Insofar as the German conversion to the MLF was not the result of American missionary zeal, it reflected above all a desire to establish a claim not to be excluded from further East-West negotiations and to create another organic link between the United States and Europe.

The MLF is at best a circuitous way to achieve these goals. In fact, it reverses the correct priorities. Political unity must precede, it cannot follow, nuclear integration. To pursue nuclear multilateralism while foreign policy remains national must emphasize divergent interests. The imagination and dedication expended on the MLF would, therefore, have been better spent in strengthening political cohesion. Our allies are not likely to be convinced that their interests will be taken seriously during the improbable eventuality of general nuclear war when no consensus exists for the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy and for crisis situations. Rather than take the detour through the MLF, it would have been wiser to aim directly for coordination of policy by setting up a body to develop common policies for many unsolved problems of the Alliance in East-West relations, strategic doctrine, trade policy, arms control or relations with the emerging nations. If France had refused to participate, the disruptive intent would have been obvious. France would have stood apart from an effort which commanded a real consensus. Moreover, a future French government could participate in such a

156 *The Strategic Issues*

group more easily than in the MLF, in which French mem-
bership could well be precluded by financial considerations
alone. If a political steering body for the Alliance had then
decided to include the Federal Republic in the ownership of
strategic weapons, the political context would have been en-
tirely different. It would have represented the common view
of all Allies rather than the pressure of one. Regardless of the
ultimate fate of the MLF, a political body to coordinate Alli-
ance policy and to manage crises remains essential.²⁰ If it
should be argued that the Atlantic Alliance will never be
able to develop a common political program, the emptiness
of nuclear multilateralism becomes apparent. Nations that
cannot agree on common negotiating positions are not likely
to be able to concert a common strategy for an apocalypse.

Even in our bilateral relations with the Federal Republic,
the strengthening of political consultation should have had
priority. If we had created institutions to give the Federal
Republic access to our strategic and disarmament planning
and the conduct of East-West negotiations in general, these
could have been used as a brake on eventual Franco-German
nuclear collaboration much as the Franco-German Treaty
turned out to be one of the factors thwarting the MLF. By
reversing the process, we brought on what we feared most.
We whetted German nuclear appetites without giving satis-
faction to the political concerns. It is questionable whether it
is in our interest to discourage Franco-German intimacy, but
at least it should not be based on disillusionment with the
United States.

The MLF, as originally conceived, is not likely to be real-
ized. So much opposition exists that even the most passionate
advocates will have to modify the scheme. It may be useful,
however, to inquire what lessons can be drawn from the
experience.

Issue of Nuclear Control—The Multilateral Force 157

litical and philosophical challenge in De Gaulle's exclusion of Britain from the Common Market, American policymakers reacted by staking everything on a scheme of nuclear control which they had previously treated with indifference. They then spent two years negotiating its mechanical aspects. In the process, the deeper causes of NATO's disarray were neglected. The ends and means became confused. At its best, the MLF was irrelevant to the fundamental problems of NATO. It would have repeated within its framework many of the disputes which it was supposed to overcome.

In Washington, this was obscured because one small group in the government had become so deeply committed to the MLF that it acted as a lobby rather than an organ for calmly weighing alternatives. In the words of one acute observer, the MLF proponents engaged in "a public relations campaign to gain official, political and academic support, of an energy and ruthlessness unknown since Harriet Beecher Stowe...."²¹ This has made it difficult to determine whether what appeared in Washington as European opinion did not really reflect European acquiescence in the passionate advocacy of one segment of our bureaucracy. The result was a whole series of misjudgments. European support for the MLF was grossly overestimated. Despite the repeated criticisms of the MLF by British Labor leaders when in opposition, it was expected that the new British government would agree to a treaty setting up the MLF within two months of coming into office. The divisive impact of the threat of a German-American nuclear partnership was misjudged. The capacity of the German political structure to withstand strain was completely misconceived. Throughout, some American officials acted as if getting agreement to the MLF was an end in itself. By using whatever argument was convenient to this purpose, a number of partially contradictory promissory notes were handed out.

158 The Strategic Issues

The pressure of a relatively small group of officials in the State Department gave our Allies a misleading impression of American unanimity and commitment. The Pentagon had accepted the MLF only on the assumption that ultimate American control would remain unimpaired. The group in the State Department that originated the MLF proposal and pressed it on our Allies was much more sympathetic to the ultimate emergence of a separate European nuclear force. Indeed, it occasionally urged the MLF as a means to this end. Although the cohesiveness of our society depends on understating conflicting views, it is dangerous to engage in major international innovations unless we are clear about our ultimate direction.

All this suggests the need for a reexamination of some governmental procedures. We need a planning focus less geared to immediate crises and more capable of developing concepts responsive to fundamental trends. There should be less reliance on the accidents of bureaucratic pressures. Our own aims must be clear before we commit our prestige. We should not use the process of negotiations to make up our own minds. Not to reveal what we intend to do is a question of tactics; not to know is to mortgage the future.

Issue of Nuclear Control—The Multilateral Force 159
the MLF now would have a different significance than earlier.

162 The Strategic Issues

163

163

American proposals—including the MLF—have largely avoided this problem. The United States, starting from the technically unexceptionable premise that the conduct of nuclear war should be centrally controlled, has tried hard to create a structure in NATO which deprives our Allies of the physical capacity to act independently. We have been less ready to face the inevitable corollary: Those nations which are being asked to entrust their nuclear defense to the United States will urge, in return, a commensurate surrender of American sovereignty in the political field. To insist on centralized strategy while diplomacy remains national guarantees mounting disputes.

164 The Strategic Issues

[An agreed European control mechanism] would still not answer the basic question of these non-nuclear countries: In the moment of crisis would the nuclear powers of the arrangement—the powers which owned and operated the nuclear forces—in fact consult and collaborate on an equal basis with their associate members?¹

Carrying Schaetzel's argument one step further, it may be relevant to ask, why, if our European Allies cannot rely upon formal commitments among themselves, they should have absolute trust in the United States, which is 3,000 miles away and has a recent history of isolation.

The nuclear issue thus turns in part on how crucial it is for the United States to obtain physical control over all the nuclear weapons within the Alliance. Heretofore we have considered the objective so important that we have been prepared to bring the non-nuclear countries of NATO into the nuclear business—as long as they accepted an American veto—in the hope that this might thwart the efforts of our nuclear Allies. We have been less concerned about the proliferation of nuclear know-how which the MEF is bound to bring about eliminating the already existing centers of nuclear decision within the Alliance. We have preferred establishing yet another nuclear force—provided it was subject to an American veto—rather than concede in theory the autonomy which France and Britain already possess in practice.

The debate engendered by this policy has been more conducive to self-righteousness than to sober thought. By placing so much stress on the actual conduct of nuclear operations, we have forced our Allies into inherently misleading justifications of their nuclear programs. They have projected the remote nightmare of the failure of the Alliance into the present; we in turn have confused their fears with their preferences.

¹ J. Robert Schaetzel, "The Nuclear Problem and Atlantic Interdependence," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1963-64), pp. 565-566.

Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here? 165

165

autonomy goes deeper. Europeans live on a continent covered with ruins testifying to the fallibility of human foresight. They have had too much experience with nuances of interpretation which can all but nullify formal commitments; indeed, at some point, all of them have felt obliged to leave some ally to his fate. The concern for a European role in nuclear affairs expresses above all a desire to obtain a measure of insurance against the unforeseeable events of which European history is so full.

Some argue that the British and French nuclear programs jeopardize our own security because they may force us into a nuclear war against our will. But this is carrying logical extrapolations to extremes. France and Great Britain must know at least as well as we—though we can hardly expect them to advertise this fact—that using their nuclear forces independently against the Soviet Union would be a desperate last resort. The French and British nuclear programs are not a strategic preference but an attempt to provide insurance against a disastrous contingency within Europe and against nuclear developments in other parts of the world. Taking out fire insurance does not indicate a liking for fires. On the contrary, it may prevent a remote possibility from turning into an obsession and thus free energies for more constructive tasks.

For their limited objectives, the British and French nuclear forces are not so ineffective as we sometimes insist. The ratio of the combined British and French forces to those of the Soviet Union is more favorable than was that of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the United States in the fifties. Despite the overwhelming strategic superiority of the United States, no one would maintain that the Soviet strategic force had no deterrent value. And certainly in relation to any threats from new nuclear powers, the British and French forces would be formidable.

166 *The Strategic Issues*

would be extraordinarily risky. As long as the NATO treaty is
operative at all, it would be extremely foolhardy for the So-
viets to undertake a nuclear attack on Europe without taking
into account the near certainty of American involvement.
The nuclear forces of our Allies should not be viewed as an
alternative to United States strategic power, but as a comple-
ment. The fear of some American officials that the French-
nuclear force of less than a hundred delivery vehicles could
be seriously considered as possible replacement for our
arsenal of thousands is to give little credit to the ability of
our Allies to perceive their own interests. Close coordination
between Europe and the United States in the nuclear field is
dictated by self-interest; and Europeans have more to gain
from it than the United States.

In short, the United States has three broad choices in pur-
suing an Atlantic nuclear policy: (1) It can seek to suppress
other nuclear forces in the Alliance and insist that nuclear
defense is an American responsibility with our allies playing
an advisory role. This is the course preferred by the Pentagon.
(2) It can try to eliminate the existing nuclear forces by bring-
ing the non-nuclear Allies into the nuclear field as part of a
structure in which the United States retains a veto. To reduce
the significance of national forces, the new nuclear force
would have to be of sufficient size to dwarf the British and
French nuclear programs. This, in effect, is the road of the
MLF. (3) It can base its nuclear policy on the existing nuclear
programs and seek to coordinate them by strengthening the
process of political consultation.

Of these options, the first is precluded by the refusal of
France and, for all practical purposes, of Great Britain simply
to abolish their nuclear forces. The second course has the dis-
advantages described in the previous chapter. Thus the most
constructive avenue for Atlantic cooperation would be to
build on the existing nuclear programs rather than bring a
new force into being.

Such a policy is also more consistent with the eventual

[LJ]

Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here? 167

emergence of a European nuclear force. In the long term, nu-
uclear proliferation in Europe can be reliably arrested only by

167

emergence of a European nuclear force. In the long term, nu-
clear proliferation in Europe can be reliably arrested only by
the development of an Atlantic political community involving
a real sharing of sovereignty or by European political unity.
Of these developments the latter seems more attainable. If
Europe could organize itself politically, it would reduce the
number of nuclear powers. A European nuclear force would
then replace the British and French nuclear programs, and
other countries in Europe could be related to it through what-
ever European political mechanisms emerge.

United States policy has been extremely ambivalent about the prospect of a European nuclear force. From the technical point of view, central command and control is complicated by a united European force as much as by the existing national forces. This is why the Pentagon has been cool to the idea of a European nuclear force. It has refrained from making its opposition explicit only because the kind of political unity postulated by the State Department as the condition of American acquiescence is extremely remote. State Department views— and occasionally those of the President—appear more forthcoming. Official statements assert that once Europe creates a central political authority capable of speaking with a single voice, the United States would recognize that a new situation exists. What conclusions we would draw from this “new situation” is rarely spelled out, though the implication has been strong that we might then accept a European nuclear force. At the same time, there have been thinly veiled threats that a redeployment of American forces will be inevitable if European national forces persist.

However, to state a condition which according to the most optimistic advocates of European unity cannot be realized for decades, is to confuse the present debate. The immediate issue is whether a European force should develop—if at all—out of the existing European nuclear programs or whether it should grow out of a new structure, such as the MLF. To be sure, the MLF may well wreck any prospect of a European nu-

168 *The Strategic Issues*

clear identity because of the divisions within Europe which it
will inevitably produce and also because countries having
once left the nuclear field are not likely to re-enter via the
supranational route. But if it *should* lead to a European nu-
clear force—as some of its proponents urge—the MLF will
have shifted the nuclear balance within Europe toward pres-
ently non-nuclear countries, which are much more vulnerable
to pressures than Britain and France. Thus the MLF is either a
poor starting point for a European force or it will bring into
being the kind of European nuclear force which would create
the greatest long-term difficulties.

On both sides of the Atlantic serious individuals oppose a
European nuclear force because they fear that it would lead
to a reckless European policy and to an eventual withdrawal
of the United States from Europe. But what exactly is the dan-
ger posed by European autonomy in the nuclear field? Is the
problem the essentially technical one of coordinating legally
autonomous forces in a common strategy? Or is the concern
deeper? Are we really worried lest, for whatever reason, Eu-
rope may feel so desperate or behave so irresponsibly that it
would be prepared to go to nuclear war against our wishes and
in the full knowledge that this would mean the end of its exist-
ence as a functioning society? If divisions in the Atlantic area
ever reach this point, the Alliance will have come to an end
whether or not a European nuclear force exists. If our Allies
should feel this forsaken, they would sooner or later re-enter
the nuclear field or else withdraw into sullen neutralism. A
wise United States policy will not invest American prestige
in forcing our Allies into a structure which makes autonomous
action *physically* impossible. Rather it will create a structure
which grants autonomy while reducing the desire for it.

With such an attitude, the coordination of technically au-
tonomous nuclear forces should not prove an insuperable
problem. Indeed it is likely that nuclear autonomy is the least
divisive form of European unity. In the economic field, com-
petition between Europe and the United States involves, at

169

best, indirect risks. In the political area, the temptations for
independent action are great and the penalties small. In mili-

169

Finally, it is high time to end the threat that our commitment to the defense of Europe is conditional on one particular organization of nuclear forces. The fact is that we cannot withdraw from Europe even if we do not obtain our preferred strategic arrangements. To threaten to do so is both dangerous and empty. It is dangerous because it indicates that our commitment is conditional; and it is empty because we can no more withdraw from Europe than from Hawaii.

Of course there is a very real concern with arresting the spread of nuclear weapons. But there is no evidence that the nuclear program of Communist China was in the slightest influenced by the example of Great Britain or that its willingness to end its nuclear efforts depends in any sense on the actions of our European allies. The same is true of the possible nuclear programs of India, Israel or Egypt. If anything, were Britain to leave the nuclear field, this might provide an additional incentive for India to enter it. When the real danger of nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of anti-Western countries, it is not clear that the first remedial step should be the elimination of the nuclear programs of our closest allies. Would it not be wiser to concentrate our anti-proliferation policy, which is important, on countries which may join the nuclear club in the future?

170 *The Strategic Issues*

Atlantic relationships. It does mean, however, that we should not seek to destroy those elements from which a European force could emerge by pressing for an alternative—the MLF—which will in time cause much greater difficulties and which involves a much greater degree of nuclear proliferation. No final solution is possible so long as the Alliance remains composed of sovereign states. Any interim arrangement should therefore be consistent with the most constructive evolution of European and Atlantic relationships.

Until either Atlantic or European political cohesion progresses further, the nuclear policy of the Alliance should be three-pronged: (1) There is need for a political mechanism to plan long-term policy, to manage crises and to control the nuclear weapons of the Alliance. This may require the establishment of an Executive Committee of the NATO Council composed of the United States, Britain, France, the Federal Republic, Italy and a rotating representative of the smaller countries.² (2) The military advice to this Committee should come from a group of senior officers from the United States, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. It might be useful to charge the NATO Standing Group with this task. In that case it would have to be expanded to include the Federal Republic, and its seat would have to be transferred from Washington to Paris. (3) An Allied Nuclear Force should be constituted from the strategic forces of the United States, Great Britain and France and from the long-range weapons in Europe under the double-veto system. The proposals made by the British government seem to move in this direction.

²The functions of this Committee are described in Chapter 8,

Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here? 171

171

But, one might ask, is not discrimination inherent in the
continued existence of national nuclear forces—even if they
are assigned “irrevocably” to NATO—as Britain has proposed?
Would this not place the Federal Republic in the position of
a second-class ally? It has been argued, for example, that un-
less Germany obtains exactly the same status in the nuclear
field as Britain and France, its loyalty to the Alliance might
be shaken. But is this really true? Is it wise to encourage even
the implication that the German commitment to the Alliance
depends on access to nuclear weapons? Some argue that an
Allied Nuclear Force composed of national contingents con-
tains no assurance that these forces will not be withdrawn in
a crisis. The British government has sought to get around this
problem by offering to assign its strategic forces “irrevocably”
to NATO. But it seems futile to devote energies to quibbling
over such phrases as “assignment” and “irrevocable.” It is
not healthy for the Alliance to waste energies in termino-
logical exercises which obscure reality. No sovereign govern-
ment is going to be forced into war against its will—no mat-
ter what the arrangement of nuclear forces and whatever the
label under which they are grouped. Should Britain be pre-
pared to wreck NATO, it could also break the additional com-
mitment inherent in “irrevocable assignment.” In other
words, the Allied Nuclear Force is no protection against

172: The Strategic Issues:

Responsible people in the Federal Republic understand that the Alliance could probably not survive German national ownership of strategic nuclear weapons. The real test of equality for the Federal Republic must be in the political field and in strategic planning. In the long term, the solution to the nuclear problem requires the fostering of European political unity and Atlantic cooperation. The most dangerous course is one which in the name of integrated strategic planning magnifies the divisions within Europe.

Even in the present framework, care must be taken to
assure full political equality to the Federal Republic. Partici-
pation in vital negotiations should not depend on the posses-
sion of a national nuclear arsenal. The Federal Republic
must have a real opportunity to contribute to the formula-
tion of positions in such fields as disarmament while they are
still fluid. In other words, political unity must precede nu-
clear integration. To seek to reverse the process is to sow the
seeds of unending disputes.

All the weapons suitable for its mission should become
part of the Allied Nuclear Force. It should include major
portions of the British and French national forces and a com-
parable contingent of American strategic weapons, probably

173

173

in the form of Polaris submarines. The longer-range nuclear weapons now in Europe, such as the Pershing missiles and the F-104 airplanes, which are under the double-veto system should also be assigned to this force.

With respect to the MLF, the best course would be to admit frankly that it was a mistake and to satisfy German desires by improving the process of political consultation and by giving the Federal Republic an equal role in the control of the proposed Allied Nuclear Force. But if it appears that the German desire for access to nuclear weapons has been so stimulated as to be irreversible, we may be honor-bound to proceed with a mixed-manned element as a part of the Allied Nuclear Force. However, in that case, the purpose and size of the MLF should be redefined.

In the context of an Allied Nuclear Force, the previous extravagant claims for the MLF could be abandoned. It should no longer be the central focus of United States nuclear policy. There would be no need for American (or German) pressure on reluctant Allies to join. The decision would not be a test of friendship for the United States, but an individual judgment of the various governments. The size of the mixed-manned element should not be determined by the political objective of dwarfing the British and French nuclear programs but by the military goals of the Allied Nuclear Force.

The Allied Nuclear Force could be placed under SACEUR. However, it seems wiser to have SACEUR concentrate on the land battle and to create a distinct NATO Strategic Command. To symbolize a greater European influence in strategic matters, the command could in time be headed by a senior European officer and should be located in Europe. The purpose would be to place in one command all the weapons—European and American—relevant to deep penetration of hostile territory. Tactical nuclear weapons of ranges up to 300 miles would remain under SACEUR.

174 *The Strategic Issues*

175

175

Alliance to develop common political objectives. The issue of arms control in Central Europe has been before the Alliance for many years. It has been evaded because some Allies have been reluctant to express their fears and others have been loathe to voice their hopes. The absence of a consensus guarantees that the issue will always arise at a moment of maximum embarrassment. Decisions will be taken by subterfuge and under stress. Distrust will grow. A military commander cannot possibly be used to paper over this problem indefinitely. Its solution must be sought by developing a political program for the Alliance as a whole.

Such an arrangement provides the greatest flexibility with respect to the future. If European political integration progresses, the European contingents in the Allied Nuclear Force can merge into a European nuclear force. If desired by

176 *The Strategic Issues*

For this to be achieved a change in attitude on both sides
of the Atlantic is needed. The United States would have to
abandon its futile insistence on maintaining physical control
of all the nuclear weapons in the Alliance. Some of our Allies
would have to stop extolling the theoretical virtues of au-
tonomy and begin dealing with the problem of how autono-
mous nuclear forces can achieve a coordinated strategy. We
have often been dogmatic in defending the theoretical vir-
tues of "integration." But our Allies—especially the French—
bear a heavy responsibility for the current state of affairs
because they have never spelled out concretely what they
mean by their alternative of coordination. If abstract and
doctrinaire attitudes are avoided, the solution of current dis-
putes is far from hopeless. Arguments about the right of in-
dependent action in the nuclear field are acute only when
they are theoretical. Any crisis serious enough to cause the
Allies to consider the use of nuclear weapons is also likely to
reveal the underlying community of interest. It is this com-
munity rather than American physical control which is the
best guarantee of the cohesion of the Alliance.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here? 177

swept under the rug in order to maintain the momentum behind the Multilateral Force. One of these problems concerns the role and control of tactical nuclear weapons.

The advent of the Kennedy Administraton in 1961 changed this. Committed to a strategy of flexible response, the new administration began to evaluate the suitability of the nuclear establishment on the Continent for discriminating military operations. Its conclusions were skeptical: Early in the Kennedy Administration, the then Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric rejected the notion of tactical nuclear war with the argument that it was impossible to build any limit into a nuclear war.³ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain Enthoven insisted that once the dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons is crossed, no obvious "fire-break" exists short of large scale thermonuclear war.⁴ Secretary McNamara spoke deprecatingly of a limited nuclear war below some "ill-defined threshold of strategic

³Roswell L. Gilpatric, Press Conference on June 6, 1961, *New York Times*, June 7, 1961.

⁴Alain Enthoven, "American Deterrent Policy," *Survival*, Vol. V, No. 3 (May–June 1963), p. 96.

178: The Strategic Issues

exchange.”⁵ These views were given urgency by the problem of exercising political control over the nuclear weapons stationed on the Continent. Controlling a few hundred strategic weapons during military operations is difficult but soluble. Controlling thousands of weapons of many different ranges and characteristics in the confusion of combat is another matter.

At the same time, while skeptical about the utility of much of the tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe, both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations have muted their doubts in order not to complicate further the disputes over the role of the conventional weapons and the MLF. Indeed, tactical nuclear weapons have been used as a means to reassure the Europeans about the continued validity of our nuclear guarantee and to insure German support for the MLF. As a result, the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent has been substantially increased since 1961—by some 60 per cent according to Secretary McNamara's announcements. The thousands of nuclear weapons on the Continent thus exist in a shadow land. To many of our Allies, they have become a touchstone of the American commitment, while American planners regard them with extraordinary ambivalence. To build up the tactical nuclear establishment without clarifying its mission would seem to emphasize the worst features of all available options.

179

Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here? 179

rope. (3) The Soviet army is equipped with tactical nuclear weapons; therefore, the decision to use nuclear weapons is no longer entirely up to the West. (4) NATO ground forces are inadequate to withstand a full-scale Soviet onslaught. Even the proposed build-up of NATO ground forces to thirty divisions would leave the West numerically inferior to a fully mobilized Soviet army—and this does not take into account the inevitable disadvantage of a coalition when confronting a single state. (5) The tactical nuclear establishment in Europe is extremely vulnerable. Because strategic weapons are relatively secure, fears that they will tempt a disarming, preemptive blow are usually exaggerated. But the classic preemptive situation does exist with respect to the tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe. As now deployed it is capable of inflicting severe damage; it is, in turn, highly vulnerable to a first strike. This may well add to deterrence; at the same time, it increases the probability of escalation should war occur.

180 The Strategic Issues

The probability of escalation to general war depends on the vulnerability of the opposing retaliatory forces. If the strategic forces are extremely vulnerable, any use of nuclear weapons is likely to expand very rapidly. In that case, any large-scale military operation—even a conventional one—in an area as vital as Europe would involve risks out of proportion to any conceivable gain. The doctrine of massive retaliation will remain valid.

When retaliatory forces grow increasingly invulnerable, as Secretary McNamara has postulated, the pressures against rapid escalation would probably be great. There may be no logical stopping place once nuclear weapons are being used. There is, however, a very crucial psychological obstacle to automatic escalation. When mutual invulnerability guarantees catastrophic destruction and offers no prospect of great

Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here? 181

But is it wise to neglect the local outcome? It is at least possible that once strategic weapons are used, however discriminatingly, all other considerations could become submerged in the desire to end a spiral toward ever greater devastation. If the aggressor has made major advances, the ensuing confusion and panic may well enable him to consolidate his gains.

This suggests that, together with an agreed doctrine for the use of strategic forces, the Alliance requires a nuclear capability to deny an aggressor a significant territorial ad-

LA

182 *The Strategic Issues*

Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here? 183

a certain range (say 300 miles) should be put under the
NATO Strategic Command described earlier.

As for the nuclear weapons that remain under SACEUR's command, a careful study should determine which of them can combine the requirement of relative invulnerability with suitability for discriminating battlefield use. At the same time major efforts should be made to enhance the invulnerability of the tactical nuclear weapons remaining on the Continent and to improve their command and control procedures. Tactical nuclear weapons present particular difficulties of command and control. The strategic arsenal can be fitted with electronic devices which make it possible to subject each weapon to political control. But individual control, even if technically feasible, presents different problems when thousands of weapons of very different ranges and characteristics are involved. No communications system could withstand such a strain.

184 The Strategic Issues

pressures which may or may not be symptomatic of the over-
all situation. Field commanders do not have access to strate-
gic intelligence about the Soviet Union or to plans for gen-
eral war. Thus the initial decision to use tactical nuclear
weapons will have to be made by Washington (or by the
Executive Committee of the NATO Council described below).
Once the decision is taken, they will have to be released by
category of range, yield and geographic location. This under-
lines the urgent need for an agreed NATO strategic doctrine.

Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here? 185

185

as a screening force to determine that a full-scale attack is, in fact, taking place and thus to discourage sudden seizures of NATO territory and (2) to furnish a reserve to resist aggression on the flanks of NATO or in areas outside of Europe where the Alliance might agree on joint action.

NATO deployment should reflect this. There should be a screen of conventional forces deployed forward and organized for purely conventional combat. The size of this screen would depend on the total NATO forces available and on a military estimate of what is required to force a major Soviet concentration before aggression can have any chance of success. The remainder of NATO's divisions—deployed behind this screen—should be equipped and organized for nuclear war. With such a deployment, it would be obvious to any aggressor that once operations reached a certain magnitude nuclear war would be inevitable. At the same time, NATO deployment and weapons design would reduce the incentives for pre-emption. Within these "nuclear" units the responsibility for operations should not be assigned to any level lower than corps. Weapons should be released to these commanders only by an appropriate political authority (preferably the Executive Committee of the NATO Council described below).⁶

## CONCLUSION—THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIANCE

⁶ See Chapter 8.

186. *The Strategic Issues*

300 miles, from major units from Great Britain and the United States, together with long-range delivery vehicles now on the Continent, and an eventual French contribution. If the MLF survives the reexamination of NATO strategy, a small mixed-manned element could be included. The mission of the Allied Nuclear Force would be deep interdiction. It would have a separate commander and be under the control of a political body in which the Federal Republic has a voice equal to that of the countries contributing nuclear weapons. This body should be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council and should have responsibility for developing common political programs and an agreed strategic doctrine.⁷

⁷ See Chapter 8.

CHAPTER SEVEN

188 The Strategic Issues-

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

East-West relations have been a cause of disagreement within the Alliance at least since the death of Stalin. In the early years of NATO our European Allies feared above all that we might return to our traditional isolationism. They, therefore, suppressed whatever doubts they might have had about the American understanding of the Communist threat. If anything, they had an interest in exaggerating the extent of the immediate danger. Stalinist intransigence did the rest. America's commitment to the defense of Europe grew absolute. In American thinking, the danger of Communist aggression became as ominous as our nostalgia for our historic aloofness from international affairs was great.

After the death of Stalin, the previous Allied unanimity about the nature of the Communist threat evaporated.¹ Under the impact of periodic Soviet peace offensives and the schisms within the Communist world, differences in the Allies' approach to the Communist challenge became apparent. Great Britain, Italy and the Scandinavian countries tended to treat every Soviet peace offensive as the beginning of a new era of international cooperation. Each sign of Communist moderation was hailed as a basic change in the Soviet system. In these countries the predominant view was that Soviet ideology had become transformed into a Marxist form of moderate nationalism.

In the Federal Republic and in France after the advent of De Gaulle, the attitude has been quite different. The Federal Republic, divided by Communist intransigence and repeatedly subjected to Communist pressures, has seen in Soviet peace offensives merely a variation of tactics, not a major shift in objectives. Supported by France, the Federal Repub-

189

189

lic has been uneasy about East-West negotiations and fearful
that any settlement would legitimize, at least indirectly, the
division of Germany. In 1962, Paris and Bonn disagreed with
the United States about the utility of the exploratory talks
regarding Berlin. They have been unhappy about most of the
schemes advanced at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.
France rejected—as the Federal Republic would have liked to
do but did not dare—the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

United States policy has oscillated between these conflict-
ing views. American pronouncements include many of the
phrases about Soviet intransigence characteristic of the early
days of NATO. Our actual policy has tended toward bilateral
dealings with the Soviets. Seeking to straddle the conflicting
views of its Allies but not reconciling them, the United States
has retained the liturgy of the Cold War while adopting a
good deal of the practice of those urging a policy of relaxa-
tion of tensions.

As a result, much of the Allied debate about East-West
relations has concerned not the content of a program for
negotiation but the nature of the Soviet system. Those who
assume that there has been a change in Soviet policy tend to
stress the impact of modernization on Soviet purposes. To
them a great deal depends on establishing good personal rela-
tions with Soviet leaders and on bringing about a general
atmosphere of goodwill. Those who insist on the unchangea-
ble nature of Soviet hostility postulate a Soviet society im-
mune to the erosion of time—an achievement which would
be unprecedented in human history.

But the desirability of easing tensions should never be in
dispute. The only sensible debate can concern the question
of how peace can be achieved and then made secure. The
issue is not whether tensions should be artificially maintained,
but what their cause is and how they can best be ended. Is
the Cold War the result of personal malice or does it have
deeper causes? Is a lasting detente reached by improving the
atmosphere first and moving from there to specific settle-

190 The Strategic Issues

ments? Or is a relaxation of tensions reliable only if it is tied
from the very beginning to a settlement of outstanding
issues? Above all, what exactly is to be understood by a settle-
ment? These are the questions which the Alliance must an-
swer for itself if it is to determine whether a given peace
offensive represents a change of tactics or a change of policy.

Peace offensives, of course, are not new in Soviet history.
Peaceful co-existence has been avowed since the advent of
Communism in Russia. It was stressed particularly between
1924-1939; between 1941-1946; at the time of the Geneva
Summit Conference of 1955; again on the occasion of Khru-
shchev's visit to the United States in 1959; and following the
Cuban missile crisis in 1962. On each occasion the reason for
the detente was some internal or external strain on the Soviet
system. In 1924, it was the struggle between Stalin and
Trotsky, which was followed by the forced collectivization of
agriculture and the purges; in 1941-1946 it was the German
invasion; in 1955 it was the succession struggle after the
death of Stalin; in 1959 it was part of a Soviet attempt to
push the Allies out of Berlin; since 1962 it has been caused
by the shock of the defeat in Cuba and the internal strains on
the Soviet system.

East-West Relations and the Future of Germany 191

East-West Relations and the Future of Germany 1933-1945

strates the extent of the American consensus that conflict is usually the result of individual malice rather than of structural causes. The corollary is that East-West tensions can be ended by a simple change of heart on the part of Communist leaders. In 1933 a noted historian wrote:

> The former crusaders of world revolution at any cost have exchanged their swords for machine tools and now rely more on the results of their labor than on direct action to achieve the ultimate triumph of the proletariat.²

> When Stalin abolished the Comintern in 1943, the late Senator Tom Connally from Texas commented: "Russians for years have been changing their economy and approaching the abandonment of communism and the whole Western world will be gratified at the happy climax of their efforts." ³ In 1956 Secretary Dulles was impelled by the spirit of Geneva to say: "The Soviet leaders are scrapping thirty years of policy based on violence and intolerance." ⁴ This is matched by Secretary Rusk's statement early in 1964: "They [the Communists] appear to have begun to realize that there is an irresolvable contradiction between the demands to promote world Communism by force and the needs of the Soviet state and people." ⁵

Each of these assessments turned out to be mistaken—except Secretary Rusk’s, which it is too early to judge. The reason is not obscure. Any system has its own dynamism that shapes its leaders and affects what is considered reasonable in internal discussions. There is need for an assessment of those factors in the Soviet system that produce belligerence and those that encourage accommodation. These are deli-

² Michael T. Florinsky, *World Revolution and the USSR* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), p. 216.

³ *New York Times*, May 23, 1943.

⁴ U.S. Department of State Press Release, No. 92, February 25, 1956.

⁵ Secretary Rusk, "Why We Treat Different Communist Countries Differently," address to the Full Citizenship and World Affairs Conference of the International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers at Washington, D. C., on February 25, 1964, *DOSB*, Vol. L, No. 1290 (March 16, 1964), p. 393.

192 The Strategic Issues

Two factors encourage intransigence in the Communist
world: the qualities of the men who rise to leadership posi-
tions and the ideology on which the Communist system is
built.

Any comparison of the composition of the Presidium of
the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of any
decade with its membership at the end of that decade illus-
trates the precariousness of high office in the Soviet system.®
Turnover is rapid; the penalties for failure in the inevitable
leadership struggle are drastic. Loss of position involves pub-
lic disgrace, usually for the former leader's family as well, and
complete separation from all erstwhile colleagues or from any
public activity.

“The fate of the first groups of post-Stalin leaders has been described as follows by Severyn Bialer in "Twenty-four Men Who Rule Russia," New York Times Magazine, November 1, 1964, p. 27:

Three are no longer in positions of leadership but are still mem-
bers of the Central Committee and occupy positions of secondary
importance. These are Aristov, the Ambassador to Poland; Mikhailov,
the Ambassador to Indonesia, and Pospelov, the director of the
Institute of Marxism-Leninism. One (Ponomarenko) was removed
from the Central Committee without censure and occupies a fourth-
rate post. Only two (Mikovan and Suslov) outlasted Khrushchev
and are now in the front ranks of the post-Khrushchev leadership,

All this creates an atmosphere of suspicion—even of conspiracy—in the Communist leadership groups. There is no legitimate succession. Power goes to those skillful and ruthless enough to seize and hold it. It becomes its own justification because it brings control of the only source of legitimacy: the Communist Party apparatus. In the past, no attempt at collective leadership has lasted. One leader has eliminated all rivals and has not felt restrained by ties of loyalty or by past obligations. Stalin had all the individuals who helped him into power executed. Khrushchev disgraced Kaganovich, whose protégé he had been, and turned on Marshal Zhukov six months after being saved by him from a conspiracy of his own colleagues. Brezhnev and Kosygin owed their careers to Khrushchev; they nevertheless overthrew him and started a campaign of calumny against him within twenty-four hours of his dismissal.

194 The Strategic Issues

Soviet tendencies to exert maximum pressure and to emphasize the importance of a balance of forces are reinforced by Communist ideology. To be sure, Communist leaders do not follow the teachings of Marx or Lenin literally; they could not, even if they wished, because these writings are too contradictory and too dependent on tactical considerations. However, if ideology does not guide the day-to-day actions, its basic categories shape the Communist sense of reality. It is considered to be the guarantee of the ultimate victory that will make all sacrifices worthwhile. It is the means for establishing discipline within the world Communist movement by providing criteria of legitimacy for the settlement of disputes. While the growing gap between ideology and reality is one of the latent weaknesses of any Communist system, in the immediate future ideology continues as one of the prime obstacles to a basic accommodation.

195

East-West Relations and the Future of Germany 195

economic conditions of society, the nature of the economic
process and, above all, the class struggle. Communists con-
sider that Marxism-Leninism enables them to distinguish be-
tween appearance and reality, to avoid the "subjectivism"
inherent in an excessive reliance on personality and the "ad-
venturism" that risks a historical movement on one throw of
the dice.

Belief in the predominance of "objective" factors ex-
plains why Soviet leaders, whenever they have had to make a
choice between Western goodwill and a territorial or politi-
cal gain, have unhesitatingly chosen the latter. The friend-
ship of the West built up during the heroic efforts of World
War II was ruthlessly sacrificed to the possibility of establish-
ing Communist-controlled governments in Eastern Europe.
The spirit of Geneva did not survive the temptations offered
by the prospect of penetrating the Middle East. The spirit of
Camp David ended with another ultimatum on Berlin. The
many overtures of the Kennedy Administration were re-
buffed until the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that the
balance of forces was not in fact favorable.

The Soviet reliance on "objective" factors is one of the
reasons that negotiations with the Soviets have often been so
frustrating. Communist negotiators cannot admit that they
could be swayed by the arguments of opponents whose un-
derstanding of the basic laws of historical development is, by
definition, inferior to their own. They cannot reciprocate
"concessions" because they believe that concessions are made
to reality, not to individuals. They may change their posi-
tion, but they will go to great lengths to demonstrate that
they did so of their own volition and at their own pace. For
them a great deal depends on avoiding what seems basic to
most Western negotiators: the give-and-take of a bargaining
process. Their attitude toward Western negotiators is very
similar to that of Western psychiatrists toward their patients:
no matter what is said, they think that they understand their
Western counterpart better than he understands himself.

[L]

196 The Strategic Issues

This is one of the reasons that exercises in personal
diplomacy—even at the highest level—have been so futile. No
Soviet leader could make an agreement based on the proposi-
tion that he has been impressed by the personal qualities of a
capitalist statesman. Settlements are possible, but to be
meaningful in Soviet eyes they must reflect “objective” con-
ditions and not a personal relationship.

The C.P.S.U. [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] resolutely opposes peaceful coexistence in the province of ideology. These are elementary truths, and it is time for everyone who considers himself a Marxist-Leninist to master them.⁷

Thus peaceful co-existence is never advocated for its own sake. It is justified primarily as a tactical device to overthrow the West at minimum risk. In replying to Chinese charges that it was abandoning world revolution, the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. proposed the following test for the policy of "peaceful co-existence":

Does the policy of peace and peaceful co-existence favor the
development of the revolutionary class struggle in the capitalist
countries, the upsurge of national liberation movements? ⁸

⁷ "The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," open letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as it appeared in *Pravda*, July 14, 1963, pp. 1-4; *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter referred to as *CDSP*), Vol. XV, No. 28 (August 7, 1963), p. 23.

⁸ "Another Statement Answering Chinese on Test Ban," statement of the Soviet Government as it appeared in *Pravda*, September 21, 1963, pp. 1-2, and September 22, 1963, pp. 1-2; *Izvestia*, pp. 1-2 and 1-3; *CDSP*, Vol. XV, No. 38 (October 16, 1963), p. 12.

East-West Relations and the Future of Germany 197

Moreover, "peaceful co-existence" is advanced by Soviet leaders not as a new insight, but as the continuation of Leninist tradition. This proposition has elicited the following exasperated comment from George F. Kennan:

> ... people in Moscow are not likely to strengthen belief outside Russia in ... their attachment to liberal and tolerant principles of international life ... by pleading that such an attachment flows inevitably from the nature of the social and political system prevailing in the Soviet Union. It is possible to conceive that the Soviet attitude in such questions may have changed; it is not possible to accept the proposition that it did not need to change in order to meet the requirements of peaceful co-existence. ...¹⁰

These factors, which almost overnight could produce again an expansionist Communist foreign policy, must be balanced against restraints that, over a period of time, may become dominant. First, there is the power of modern weapons. Ideological hostility comes up against the stark risks of nuclear warfare. Soviet leaders must be acutely aware that, if they press intransigence beyond a certain point, they run the risk of hazarding what they have built up at so much sacrifice over four decades. Whatever the strategic theory of the West —even if it is not an ideal one—Soviet planners will not be easily convinced that the danger of escalation in any direct confrontation is not enormous. The West would have to behave extraordinarily foolishly before the Soviets risk an overt military challenge. To be sure, in some circumstances aggression does not need to take the form of direct military action, and this accounts for the persistence of the so-called "wars of

⁹ "The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," *op cit.*, CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 28 (August 7, 1963), p. 20.

¹⁰ George F. Kennan, "Peaceful Co-existence: A Western View," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (January 1960), p. 174.

198 The Strategic Issues

East-West Relations and the Future of Germany 199

Communist leaders try to deal with disputes among Commu-
nist states as they conduct their own internal struggles: by
seeking first to ostracize and then to destroy their opponents.
But among sovereign states, such tactics cause disputes to
harden into irremediable schisms. Each schism, in turn, dem-
onstrates that a supposedly universal orthodoxy can be inter-
preted in various ways. This must, in time, erode confidence
in the universality of Communist ideology as well as the dis-
cipline of the world Communist movement.

The unity produced by these factors has been under-
mined by three developments: de-Stalinization, the Sino-
Soviet split and the manner in which Khrushchev has been
overthrown. De-Stalinization raised the question of the rela-
tionship between the scientific truth of the dominant ide-
ology and the murderous cult of personality of Stalin. How
could a system that was supposed to end forever man's op-
pression produce an even more pervasive tyranny than the
one it replaced? How could belief in scientific truth be recon-
ciled with slave labor camps and a police state? Even if the
Russian people did not ask such questions, Communist cadres
must have been assailed by doubts which must have been
reinforced when Khrushchev was overthrown in his turn and
denounced for "hare-brained schemes."

The Sino-Soviet split was the catalyst for the overt frag-
mentation of the Communist world. The causes of this rift
are many and complex. There is the rivalry of two empires
along the most extended land frontier of the world. Competi-

200 The Strategic Issues

The mere assertion of Peiping's independence on doctrinal matters was bound to alter the nature of Communism. Once the Soviet Union's doctrinal infallibility was challenged, the pattern of relationships within the Communist world changed irretrievably. The East European governments, beset by economic difficulties, saw an opportunity to solidify their sometimes tenuous hold by appealing to the national feelings of their populations. The Soviet Union was no longer in a position to command their loyalty but had to compete for it. In the face of Albanian and then Rumanian defiance, the previous monolithic unity of the Communist world has been eroded. Convinced Communists must be moralized by the disarray; technicians see in the Sino-Soviet split an opportunity for striking the maximum bargain for their country.

Khrushchev's fall had also had unfortunate consequences for the cohesiveness of the Communist world. Communist leaders, whatever their attitudes toward Khrushchev, must have realized that they were jeopardizing their own position by tying themselves too closely to whoever might be in power in Moscow. Since foreign Communist leaders share many of the characteristics of their Soviet colleagues—including a highly developed sense for personal power—the instability of the Kremlin hierarchy impels them to protect themselves by a measure of autonomy. They must try to safeguard their position against possible future upheavals in Moscow. The initial

201

201

hesitation of the Communist parties around the world in en-
dorsing Khrushchev's ouster can be partly explained by this.

202 The Strategic Issues

Above all, the West must conduct its policy without illu-
sions. The same pressures that have produced a relaxation of
tensions can also tempt Soviet leaders to enter upon another
period of hostility. There is always the danger that the Krem-
lin will try to restore the unity of Eastern Europe by foster-
ing a crisis centered on Germany. Even as it is, the East Euro-
pean governments almost invariably support Soviet foreign
policy, particularly in the underdeveloped world. Events in
other continents can have a backlash in Europe. The Soviets
could be drawn into an intransigent course as a result of
situations over which they have no direct control. The weak-
ening of central authority in the Soviet Union may enable
various bureaucracies to operate relatively autonomously, in-
cluding those with a vested interest in fomenting upheavals.
The spiritual malaise of Communism could be reversed if an
unchecked collapse of Western influence and power around
the world seems to demonstrate the validity of the basic
tenets of Leninism.

Even the split between the largest Communist countries
represents danger as well as opportunity. It means that
henceforth the West will confront not alternating periods of
hostility and conciliation but both at the same time. It can
also happen that the two Communist giants may try to outbid
each other in giving so-called liberation movements an anti-
Western cast—Soviet actions in the Congo are a good
example.

Moreover, to the degree that the Soviet Union is certified
as the more conciliatory Communist country, a "respectable"
form of Communism begins to intrude in the domestic situa-
tion of several of our Allies. One of the major achievements
of the postwar period in Europe has been the isolation of the
Communist parties. Under the impact of many factors, this
isolation is beginning to break down. In Italy, for example,
the "opening to the Left" has resulted in new-found strength
for the Communist Party. In France, the demoralization of
the traditional parties by De Gaulle and the change in tactics

203

by the Communist Party has opened up prospects of a Popu-
lar Front for the first time in thirty years.