*

TELCONE

Alex Johnson/Kissinger

9:56 a.m. - 1/26/73

K: Hello.

J: Good morning, Henry.

K: Yes, Alex.

J: I just wanted to do a double check with you now on this International
Conference thing. The Secretary will be seeing Pompidou tomorrow
morning at 8 o'clock, Paris time.

K: Yeh.

J: And he wants to spend, and I understand the President also - they
obviously want to tell him first that it's going to be whether we've
agreed to Paris. So this would mean that we should not see any of
the other participants until after he's seen Pompidou.

K: That is right.

J: But I would propose tomorrow morning to see the others during the
course of tomorrow morning.

K: Right.

J: Proposing both February 26 and Paris.

K: That is correct.

J: All right. And I will get something out - I presume the Secretary
will raise this or make mention of this to Lam as far as the GVN
is concerned.

K: Right. I think that Lam has already agreed to it to Sullivan.

J: Well, he has, all right.

K: I mean before he knew what our decision was.

J: Yeh. Yeh. Yeh. The Secretary should do it formally with him I think.

K: That's right.

AUGUST 5, 1978

Authority Eo. 12458
By: J.F. NARA Date: 6/15/78

2

*

J: Tomorrow and I'll send something off to the Secretary on that...
that we're assuming here that he will confirm this with Lam when
he sees Lam tomorrow.

K: Well, that is correct. Now one other thing. We don't want that
meeting with the four Foreign Ministers to turn into a buildup for
Madame Binh.

J: Yeh. Yeh. Yeh. Oh, you mean tomorrow?

K: Yes.

J: Oh. Oh. No, well

K: Will you make sure?

J: I don't know - what can we do? What can we do about it? Have you
talked to Sullivan or has anybody talked to Sullivan?

K: I haven't talked to Sullivan, but the President is concerned that we
don't turn it into a circus f:in:which Madame Binh emerges as a
Foreign Minister of equal status.

J: Yeh, I'm afraid this is going to - well, I'll tell

K: I'm not talking about the signing ceremony. I'm talking about the
meeting that the Secretary has scheduled with the four Foreign
Ministers for 15 minutes before.

J: Oh, before, yes.

K: Which I frankly think we could have done without but . . .

J: Yeh, I don't know how that came about.

K: Well, at any rate

J: I'll talk with Bill about that.

K: When I mentioned it to the President he's very goosy about it.

J: All right. I'll call Sullivan and talk to him about that. Now then tomorrow
I'll be seeing the - I'll get them in individually - the Soviets, the UK,
the Poles, Hungarians, Indonesians, Canadians and then I've got to check -
and then the Secretary General, the uh, well, I'll find out if the Secretary

KANBANBOARDSLY
Authority Eo 12458
BY: NARA Dake 6/15/69

3

already said something to him yesterday or just how to handle that.
I'll have to handle it through New York.

K: Right.

J: All we're doing is proposing this and asking for their reactions.

K: That's right and you can tell them that the DRV is doing the same thing.

J: That the DRV will be doing the same. Yeh. Will they be doing the same thing tomorrow then?

K: No, between now and February 1st.

J: I see. Well, I could put some of these over to Monday if I wanted to then?

K: Absolutely.

J: Why don't I put them over to Monday and let the Secretary do some of them here then?

K: That's up to you.

J: Yeh. I see. I don't have to do these tomorrow then.

K: Well I would start with some of them.

J: All right. OK, I'll start with some of them tomorrow.

K: OK.

J: OK, that's all I've got. Thanks very much on the SALT business and I'll send over a little list.

K: And you can announce that on Tuesday.

J: Do you want us to do it here?

K: Yeh, why not?

J: All right. OK.

K: Let me check with Ziegler.

AUGUST 25 1958
Authority E012458
By: J.R. MARS Date 6/15/64

*

TELCONE

Walter Stoessel/Kissinger

10:25 a.m. - 1/26/73

K: Hello.

S: Henry.

K: Yes, Walter.

S: On that MBFR business - I reflected on it, accounted with Hal also, and the way I come out is probably best to go for this restricted list.

K: OK, and then have them come back in their note with a restricted
list minus Hungary.

S: Yeh.

K: With the right then to invite others whose views should be heard.

S: That's right. Now they might want to say something to the effect
that Hungary has informed them that it does not wish to participate.
It'll be a bit transparent but that might help a bit.

K: OK.

S: Then we'll take a lot of flak from the flag countries but I think we
can handle it.

K: OK. Good.

S: And we'll try and set up ad hoc arrangements.

K: And this is what we would support.

S: Yeh. Yeh.

K: Thank you.

S: Ok.

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

10:27 a.m. - 1/26/73

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Good morning.

K: How are you?

D: How are you after missing yesterday's dinner?

K: What dinner?

D: Well it was Barbara Marx you intended to sit next to.

K: (Laughs) No, I wanted to give you a free hand.

D: Yes, once in a while otherwise you are so elated in the news. So no one could really approach this mound of publicity as of now. Except, and I quote, "nobody, but nobody-but Henry could do anything like this."

K: That goes up and down. I have no illusions.

D: I know. I am joking.

K: They will not rest now until they knock me off.

D: I know how it happens, Henry, but it's interesting, you draw one of the most, I shall say, critics of the Vietnam business and now they are trying to build a monument. I don't know what kind of model they need or not. But for the time being, they are doing these things.

K: Yes, it will last two weeks, then they'll find something else.

D: By this time you will be on television, Henry. So, I think you are still ahead.

K: The only way I can remain popular is to never to be in Washington.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
Date
By

TelCon

2

D: Well, this is one of the way, I should say, especially when you are going in one place and another place, now I think it will be quite a feat when you go to Hanoi. It will take a lot of publicity on this I'm sure. It will be no less than in the beginning and before, because it is now rather a special occasion. A person of your calibre when in Hanoi, it will be quite a study. Are you intend to take with you some newspaper men.

K: No.

D: I thought you would take the whole plane--

K: No, I'm yet sure whether they will put me on the schedule for the return of prisoners. They may not let me go until March 28.

D: (Laughter) I think in this case it better for them to send you than keep you until March 28.

K: Well, that's what I think.

D: It would keep you there. This is a possibility. At least you can brief them about how much money you will pay back.

K: They'll keep me for mine sweeping.

D: (Laughter) You will be promoted to rank of Admiral. You mention to me the other day that you have three stars already in Vietnam.

K: That's right.

D: My impression, they do not have at all an Admiral rank in their own Navy.

K: I don't think so.

D: That is my impression too. You will be the highest officer in this mining business.

K: I will make a great career in Vietnam.

D: Well, well, that you saw, Henry, you saw. So be careful Henry because otherwise they make you do too much in boat and this will make Le Duc Tho be angry with you. Because until now you give him a chance to comma nd.

K: Ah, Anatol, about what we discussed yesterday. If you in your reply propose that the membership that you suggested min;us the observews should meet in Italy.

D: Yeah.

K: And that they should then discuss whom else, how to get the views of other countries. That's the first item.

D: Yes.

K: We will agree to you.

D: But not until ______.

K: No, no, we are talking about your membership. We are talking about the membership you have suggested. Minus Hungary.

D: No, I mean at the beginning I understand what you are saying, but then they discuss how to reason, but of whom are not neutralist (?).

K: But I tell that informally that we will totally oppose the invitation to neutrals.

D: Yeah, but for the time being--

K: You don't have to say that in your reply.

us

D: Yeah, just simply saying, just to start/so to speak. And then let them discuss on a ______.

K: Exactly.

D: I have an announcement from Moscow around 7:00. Well I will cable right away, because you will be on way out.

K: Anatol, the way I get good service out of you is when there's a vacation coming in and you flash your cables back and forth.

D: (Laughter) Well I am impressed, the day for them is now look like I talk like Theodore ______ telling his, you know, add/gray letters it became volumes and volumes.

K: That is true.

D: They kept talking on your special committee and subcommittee. Because especially when you are talking, you have really a very quick sensibility to switch from one to another, it takes some time, I mean, especially a little bit more you more people involved.

K: That is true, but since they are all to anxious to get you back.

D: Well on this point, only my wife is so anxious to get me back. Nobody else.

K: Well, I want you back here at the end of February.

D: That is my impression because I understand if I do not live in then I will stay here.

K: After the 20th, I really don't plan any trips except to Moscow.

D: I understand. But you--are you going to Cairo.

K: I may take a vacation -- no, I'm not going to Cairo.

D: I think is rather really you mention this timing, by the end you will take some vacation, but by the end of February you will be prepared to deal with this measure.

K: That's right. We could meet, I might take a week's vacation, but we could have some work done and while you communicate with Moscow, I'm in ; Mexico.

D: Yes, I understand. Okay, Henry, good. Thank you very much.

K: Good, bye.

*

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

10:27 a. m. - 1/26/73

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Good morning.

K: How are you?

K: What dinner?

D: Yes, once in a while otherwise you are so elated in the news. So no one could really approach this mound of publicity as of now. Except, and I quote, "nobody, but nobody" but Henry could do anything like this."

D: I know. I am joking.

D: I know how it happens, Henry, but it's interesting, you draw one of the most, I shall say, critics of the Vietnam business and now they are trying to build a monument. I don't know what kind of model they may or not. But for the time being, they are doing these things.

TELEFONIKA

Authority
Eo 1295 8

BYAC
NAPRA Dne 6/15/94

*

2

TelCon

D: Well, this is one of the ways, I should say, especially when you are going in one place and another place, now I think it will be quite a feat when you go to Hanoi. It will take a lot of publicity on this I'm sure. It will be no less than in the beginning and before, because it is now rather a special occasion. A person of your calibre when in Hanoi, it will be quite a study. Are you intend to take with you some newspaper men.

K: No.

D: (Laughter) I think in this case it better for them to send you than keep you until March 29.

K: Well, that's what I think.

D: It would keep you thers. This is a possibility. At least you can brief them about how much money you will pay back.

K: That's right.

K: I don't think so.

K: Ah, Anatol, about what we discussed yesterday. If you in your reply propose that the membership that you suggested minus the observers should meet in Italy.

3

*

D: Yeah.

D: Yes.

K: We will agree to you.

D: But not until ______.

K: Exactly.

K: Anatol, the way I get good service out of you is when there's a vacation' coming in and you flash your cables back and forth.

D: (Laughter) Well I am impressed, the day for them is now look like orchid and I talk like Theodore ______ telling his, you know, add/gray letters it became volumes and volumes.

K: That is true.

D: They kept talking on your special committee and subcommittee. Because especially when you are talking, you have really a very quick sensibility to switch from one to another, it takes some time. I mean, especially a little bit more you more people involved.

4

D: I think it is rather really you mention this timing, by the end you will take some vacation, but by the end of February you will be prepared to deal with this measure.

K: That's right. We could meet, I might take a week's vacation, but we could have some work done and while you communicate with Moscow, I'm in Mexico.

K: Good, bye.

*

TELCOM

John Apple/Mr. Kissinger

4:53 1/26/73

JA: Congratulations on that television performance the other day--it was quite something.

HK: Thank you--are you over here as of now--

JA: I am assigned over there, but I am temporarily detached which is why I am bugging you.

HK: I can hardly wait to see the interplay of Johnny Apple and Ronald Ziegler

JA: Oh, we get along all right--I think it will be much more interesting to see the interplay of Johnny Apple and John Ehrlichman and Bob Haldeman

HK: (laughs) That is also true.

JA: I have been assigned to prepare and have been working for about 10 days upon the Times' definitive account of the peace negotiations.

HK: Ahhhh. Well Lewis was pretty good.

JA: I know she was but what they want is about 10,000 words. And my reaction was approximately the same as yours. But he wants one for a week or 10 days or two weeks from now, and obviously I have a number of nitty gritty questions that I would like to talk to you on background--can we do it?

HK: Next week not today.

JA: Oh, I know not today. When would be good for you next week?

HK: Can you call Monday morning and we'll set something up definitely.

JA: All right, very good. Why did you say Jesus Christ--because everybody's doing the same thing?

HK: Yea.

JA: That's one of the drags of the newspaper business.

HK: Yeh, but you do a better job.

JA: Yeh, I'll try--at least I'll have a head start on it--I'll call on Monday morning and maybe we can set something up for Wednesday--Take care of yourself

HK: Right.

*

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/Sec. Richardson

4:58 p.m. 1/26/73

SR: Hnery, thanks for call back. I've talked to Moorer about Haig and
he'll follow up with Abrams and I'll follow up with ISA and Dooland (?)

HK: Oh good.

SR: The reason I called you principally is that I neglected this morning to raise
with you one thing that seemed to me worthwhile and that is that it occurred
to me you would be probably be developing some new NSSM's--for proposing
studies of various things

HK: Right.

SR: I thought it would be helpful if I could--before they go into final form see
at least the ones that affect DOD from the point of view of what is being
levied on us but most especially in order to be able to react to the possibili-
ties that any given instance it might be as well for us in Defense to conduct
some study internally which we could then feed into an NSC process. I am
obviously going to have to initiate a review of quite a number of
fairly fundamental things over there and I'd like to have some sense at
least of what we do internally interfaces with what is done through the
NSC process.

HK: That's your privilege but every department always wants to do it alone.

SR: I wouldn't insist on doing it alone if you didn't agree that it was desirable
that we do and I am not sure whether there are any such ______ as a
matter of fact, but it would sort of be useful to have the opportunity to
discuss that with you.

HK: Okay, I'll I don't know precisely what specific thing you have reference
to.

SR: Well--

HK: My only interest--I don't care who does it --the whole purpose of the process is not to get exclusive jurisdiction for any department.

SR: I understand.

HK: That doesn't mean that those parts that are primarily defense can't be
chaired by Defense. And that the Defense input to them isn't totally in you
control.

~~K. Kissinger~~
 Authority E0-12958
By: NARA Date: 6/15/73

*

Page 2

SR: Yeh, Well of course I would try to assure that as least the best the ______ can produce. I--the point of going tnto specifics indeed I have only a preliminary listing of the things I think as high priority for us, but in general though I would say that--that this give you any sort of indication of what I have in mind--I think if we are to achieve a really persuasive posture in the defense of the budget requestin the upcoming Congress, we are going to have to do a hell of a lot better job in Defense in articulating what we are doing and why. And this means that you have to do more than develop in the front office in ISA or SA or some combination of these, what we think in the abstract makes intrinsic sense--in terms of a kind of internal process in the department that has as its ______ really engaging the military in this kind of thinking with a depth and involvement greater than it has lately. And that in turn means that I am trying to think both in terms of the issues that require analysis and but also in terms of the process of orchestration that will hopefully least in part pull the services out of a purely parochial approach to these questions. ·

HK: As far as the NSC is concerned the major difficulty has been that with this precise argument Defense has sabotaged any attempt to have an NSC process look at these things until they were so far down the road that no one could even catch up with them. And that's one of the things I mentioned to you when you were appointed that we should try to get a grip on.

SR: I think that's perfectly legitimate. I'm not sure to what extent there is a problem here and I don't want to be difficult, I just thought it would be--

HK: I have no objection to showing you NSSM's that concern Defense for your comments and I certainly favor having as much done by the departments as possible.

SR: If I hould see them, then if I felt that there was any area identified in which I really believed I could make a case on why we should do it and I am sure there would be I'll --we could talk about it and we usually have gotten along pretty well on that kind of --

HK: I don't think in tactics there will be any problem.

SR: There may be that problem won't arise.

HK: Now onearea in which there is a problem is that we have simply not had any acceptable presidential review of the defense budget because we'd be stonewalled until November and then we'd be thrown one set of figures and then we would start haggling over minor variations and that is totally unacceptable.

SR: I can see very clearly --

NATIONAL SECURITY
Authority E0.7258
By: CAPT. NARA Date: 6/15/69

*

Page 3

HK: That was done in the name of the integrity of the services but that has the President extremely restive.

SR: I am not going to make an argument based purely on the integrity of the services and I am in any event going to have to initiate a process--you call the references to the whole one-third, 1/3, 1/3, approach well now, the only way to get at that is by seeking to stimulate a process that engages the representatives of this service in a more comprehensive approach to issues of force systems structures and capabilities and hopefully out of this could come a new kind of consensus resting on a better appreciation of overall missions of forces and less on what is essentially an internal political process. I think Mel managed very well the internal political process.

HK: Yeh.

SR: But it suffered from the fact that that's what it was--McNamara tried to deal with this kind of thing by getting only token recognition to services involvement at all.

HK: That's right.

SR: My conclusion to date is that the only way to strike the right balance between the two is in effect to challenge the parochialism of the services by sucking them into a process which forces them to deal with issues transcending their own narrow perspectives. And this really is what I should do in any event and---the NSSM procedure and the preparation of the DOD input into this and they serve as well as any but at any rate it is that set of considerations that creates my interest at this point--

HK: I think on all of this we'll be on the same side.

SR: I think our perception of what we've got to do is certainly consonant consonant

HK: Okay.

SR: Good.

*

TELCORN

Amb. Bill Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

5:30 p.m., January 26, 1973

S: Hello, Henry. I just had about an hour and a half with our friend and he categorically denies that any list has been given to Cora Weiss and used the word "affirmed" this has not happened. So I don't know whether your information is --

K: Well, it came from the Board of Directors of the League.

S: Women's League -- the families.

K: Yeah.

S: Well, they're not the most reliable bunch, unless they've actually seen something. But he categorically denies it.

K: Okay.

S: And he also agrees that the list to be given tomorrow will not be publicized; that the publicity will be entirely up to us to undertake.

K: Okay.

S: The main purpose of the meeting was mine sweeping and I will give you a cable that reports what we're doing about trying to get that straightened out.

K: Right. And you told them that we had already ordered some ships in there?

S: No, but it's mainly a question of the people and the experts who are meeting sort of getting at loggerheads here and we're going to try to straighten it out.

K: Okay, fine.

S: I'll also give you a cable on the various other things that came in your last message to me.

K: Okay, good. That would be helpful.

S: No major problems but a number of nagging little things. Now on the question of the aircraft that are going to fly me to pick up the people.

K: Yeah.

S: You said whom should DOD get in contact with? Two people. One, their military representative here, Colonel Ryder (sp?) and two, General Woodward in Saigon.

NATIONALCABLE
Authority Eo.12458
BY:BT NAPA DATE:01/09/84

*

Amb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

5:30 p.m., January 26, 1973

- 2 -

K: Right. Now I better give those instructions then.

S: They should send the message to both those people because they'll both be in contact with these fellows.

K: Okay, good. That will be taken care of. Has your leader arrived yet?

S: Yes. All I was able to do was shake hands and then run off to this meeting and I haven't yet had a chance to talk with him.

K: Right.

S: I've just gotten back from it. But Mr. Schumann was at the airport to see him.

K: [Laughter]

S: Don't say it, it's an open line.

K: I know. I think it's very nice.

S: [Laughter]

K: I can express my admiration and affection. Just because you're anti-French, you're not going to stop me.

S: [Laughter] That's one way to leave it so that the listening public is thoroughly confused.

K: [Laughter] I look forward to seeing you.

S: All right. I won't take advantage of that.

K: I want to see you as soon as you get back.

S: Well, I get back Monday night so I'll see you Tuesday.

K: Good. Is your wife enjoying herself?

S: Well, I haven't seen much of her either but she's busy enjoying it, yeah.

K: Bye.

S: Bye, bye.

wgh

AUGUST 50, 1978
Authority E012958
By: [REDACTED] NARA File 615049

*

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Lew Gulick

7:20 p.m. 1/26/73

LG: I wanted to congratulate you.

HK: Aren't you nice.

LG: And I hope your health is holding up under this tremendous activity.

HK: Oh yes. It's fine.

LG: I wonder if you could help me a bit on the missing pieces on the Cambodia
Laos situation in view of the fact that the agreement doesn't specify any
time limit for the withdrawal of the foreign forces from Laos and Camboida.
As I understand it Lon Nol is having a unilateral ceasefire for three
days starting Sunday.

HK: Right.

LG: And then on the Laotian side they are looking toward a ceasefire that takes
place on February 11th.

HK: Around there yes.

LG: What's missing to me is the crossover between that situation and the
VN Agreement because the parties to the VN Agreement seems to me
would have to agree as to when they would implement the pullout from
Cambodia and Laos.

HK: The proposal of the Laotian communists has been that within 90 days of the
ceasefire all foreign forces would be removed.
That's a public proposal.

LG: Yes. Yes. So if that is accepted then that would take care of the imple-
mentation of that part of the VN Agreement really to Laos--foreign
forces.

HK: That's right.

LG: I see. Then what happens on the Cambodian side?

HK: I think the same pattern can be expected.

LG: Wouldn't you have to have a formal agreement.

HK: I have the impression that they will try to begin talking to each other.

*

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Cromer

1/26/73 8:10 p.m.

HK: Rollie I just wanted to tell you the President has agreed to come to the
lunch

AC: That is absolutely delightful and most unprecedented--

HK: Totally unprecedented

AC: And his lady or not?

HK: Frankly, let me raise one problem at a time--I will work on her starting
on Monday.

AC: That is very nice of you indeed--

HK: But that is easier than him.

AC: Surely--I appreciate you're letting me know.

HK: Good.

AC: Where are you--Key Biscayne?

HK: No, no, I am here.

AC: Fine--that's absolutely wonderful. Look forward to an interesting week.

HK: It should be a good week.

AC: Thank you so much.

Authority Eo 12458

By: A/VP, NARA Date: 6/15/89

*

TELCOM

Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

8:45 p.m., January 26, 1973

K: Tom, I cancelled that call actually. What we want is to send a plane up -- First of all, I want to tell you that the North Vietnamese have agreed to seaward approaches for prisoners.

M: Agreed to what?

K: To come in from the sea.

M: Oh, excellent. All right, okay.

K: And to go out from the sea -- by the sea.

M: Right. That would be better for us, yeah.

K: Right. Secondly, they want us, and we've agreed, to fly down the members of their military commission from Hanoi to Saigon.

M: Okay.

K: And we just wanted to make sure that you have a representative over in Paris and also that General Woodward are both instructed to do what is necessary.

M: To get their delegation down from Hanoi to Saigon.

K: Right, right.

M: When would they want to move?

K: Sunday.

M: Sunday. I'll take care of it.

K: Good, Tom.

M: Now the other things is -- You coming to work in the morning?

K: Yeah.

M: All right. Well, I want to talk to you about this other mining problem, just to be sure we're on the right track. I think it's going pretty well but they are demanding an excessive amount of information -

K: Well, I wouldn't give them intelligence information.

*

TELCOM

General Haig/Mr. Kissinger

8:50 p.m., January 26, 1973

H: Hello, Henry.

K: Yes, Al. I just wanted you to know I told Richardson to put you in charge of a Vietnam Task Force and he said he's already talked to Moorer about that.

H: Yeah, yeah. Well, Moorer's sort of goosey about it I guess. I got this late today. He mentioned it and he didn't know whether it had come from you or Richardson. And, you know, he did a lot of bitching about it.

K: Why should he be bitchy about it?

M: Well, he's worried about his authority I think and the chain of command and what have you. But, you know, that just happens to be the building problems.

K: Well, how they set it up -- Now, have you seen that paper of what he wants to pull out of there?

H: Oh, the Chairman?

K: Yeah.

H: No, but I told Richardson yesterday that he shouldn't pull a damn thing out.

K: Well, he wants to reduce the B-52s to 52 and the Tac Air Wings to 9.

H: I think that's very foolish, Henry.

K: Well, I won't hold still for it.

H: I think the B-52s should stay where they are, unless they change some models, that's all right. The Tac Air should stay where it is. And maybe we could take a carrier or two out because that's a real. -- You know, you could have some mutinys or something there.

K: Yeah. I don't mind them taking carriers out. I don't mind if after three months, they draw down a little bit.

H: No, that's right. Well, I told that to all of them. In fact, I told that to the Chairman. They're just pushing to see what they can get. We'll just have to stay tough on that.

K: No, there's no question about our staying tough. What I would like is a Defense Department that doesn't send such crap over here.

NATIONAL
Authority
E012458
By: J.R. Dake 01/25/86

*

General Haig/Mr. Kissinger

8:50 p.m., January 26, 1973

- 2 -

H: And they knew better cause I explained to them exactly. I said, we not only have the 60-day period, which is essential that we stay strong, but we have a period thereafter that is even more critical.

K: Yeah. Okay.

H: The only problem is in the Navy where they -- I think we probably will save ourself some difficulty if we go ahead and take a carrier or two away.

K: Oh, yeah. Well, I don't object to that.

H: Yeah.

K: Okay, good. Well, I think Richardson has every intention of making some runs at us.

H: Oh, I don't doubt that, Henry. I don't doubt it. Although he asked me to come over yesterday and he made some runs on personnel.

K: Like what?

H: Well, you know, on Jonathan. And I said: Well, I don't know. I knew Mr. Haldeman felt quite strongly about it and I thought the President did. So he said, well, if they just call me, I'll fold. But if they leave me hanging in the air, I'm just going to assume that I can bluff them out and that's the fact of it.

K: Yeah.

H: So I think Bob ought to call him up and say, hell, no. And that will close it out and then he can get -- I think he's having problems with his man. You see, Jonathan is holding him accountable.

K: Yeah.

H: But what he was concerned about and his discussion with me was his number two and how he could prevent the wrong kinds of stuff coming through. Well, you know, what *directorate* he was talking about.

K: Yeah.

H: Figures number two will be too tough. And then he said he wanted to do some contingency studies on rules of engagement for the whole settlement period. Well, that doesn't hurt if he's doing your work for you.

K: Oh, no, that's fine. Okay.

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Alex Johnson

9:15 a.m. 1/27/73

AJ: Henry, I understand you've got somebody there--I simply want to let you know, I'm turning over to you US Bill 2063 which says that there was a raucous demonstration by the Vietcong in front of the Majestic that the police made no effort to control it and the Secretary has protested to Schuman and Lam as withdrawn his agreement for Paris as a sight for the talks--for the conference and is going back for new instructions.

HK: Well, that's fair enough.

AJ: They behaved very badly and apparently Schumann (?) behaved you know in his usual fashion --

HK: How the hell did the Vietcong get get there?

AJ: No these apparently these are French--well local Vietnamese and French communists, see.

HK: Yeh. The French of course have a goddamn election --

AJ: Yeh. Yeh.

HK: Fine, we gave them a chance, we told them that if they could assure us a hospitable atmosphere

AJ: That's right. I wanted you to know. The Secretary's holding the thing open now then--I was calling these people in this morning--I still will go through with that, but I'll talk about the date and not--

HK: Just talk about the date and say--

AJ: And discuss and will be in touch with them later on the place--I wanted you to know right away, in case you got any calls or anything came up on it.

HK: I think the Secretary's right. Had he already told Pompidou that we were going along with--

AJL: Yes, he had previously told Pompidou. Now he has told Schumann that he's holding up any decision--he's made no announcement.

Page 2

HK: He's right.

AJ: He said they were yelling and chanting outside the windows all through the ceremony even.

HK: That is an outrage.

AJ: Yeh, it is it is. I wanted to let you know what I was doing so you don't --

HK: You are absolutely right and we completely agree with it.

AJ: Okay Henry.

HK: Right.

<table><tr><td> Authority: Eo. 12958 </td></tr><tr><td> By: [Signature] </td></tr></table>