PAPER NO. G-1

by: M. Tracy

May 26, 1960

# SUMMARY

## MIDDLE EAST

Charles Issawi
549 West 123d Street
New York 27, New York

Date of Paper: April 1960

This paper is a general study of the Middle East with emphasis on trends. Policy recommendations contain few specifics.

### I. BACKGROUND

#### A. Unity and Diversity of the Middle East

In his definition of the Middle East, the author includes several British non-self-governing territories and 11 states: Sudan, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, Turkey, Iran. (Note: first 8 are Arab states, but author excludes other Arab League states - Libya, Tunisia, Morocco.)

The Middle East consists of four segments which differ considerably in physical characteristics: the Nile Valley, the Arabian peninsula, the Fertile Crescent, and the Anatolian and Iranian plateaus and mountain system.

Besides physical diversity, the region shows national and religious heterogeneity. On the basis of language, 55 million (half the population) speak Arabic; 30 million Turkish; 15 million Persian; 5-6 million Kurdish; 2 million Hebrew. Religious diversity is less marked, with 90 per cent Muslim, but strong Muslim minorities.

The outstanding physical characteristic of the Middle East is its extreme aridity. Agriculture is confined to the few fertile areas, nomadism is prevalent, and the existence of large empty spaces has impeded the formation of large stable states.

#### B. Political and Economic Characteristics

The Middle East is a region of great strategic importance lying at a low level of development and displaying very uneven possibilities of growth. Moreover, it is passing through a series of revolutionary changes.

through a series of revolutionary changes, very uneven habsalities of growth. Moreover, it is bearing
portance lying at a low level of development and displaying
The Middle East is a region of great strategic im-
portance.

The outstanding physical characteristic of the Middle
states.
large empty areas had imbeded the formation of large stable
new fertile areas. Nomadism is prevalent, and the existence of
East is its extreme aridity. Agriculture is confined to the
but strong Muslim minorities.
Religious diversity is less marked, with 30 per cent Muslim,
12 million Persian; 2-6 million Kurdish; 1.8 million Syriac,
mishron (millions of population) speak Arabic; 30 million Turkmen;
and religious heterogeneity. On the basis of language, 33
Bulgars physical diversity, the region above national
Iranian Plateaus and mountain system.
Arabian peninsular, the Fertile Crescent, and the Anatolian and
considerably in physical characteristics: the Wile Valley, the
The Middle East consists of four segments which differ
Arabian Peninsula, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Israel,
and the Levant.

I. BACKGROUND

specifics...
with empires on trends. Policy recommendations contain few
This paper is a general study of the Middle East.

Date of paper: April 1960
New York St., New York
240 West 123d Street
Charles Isad.

SUMMARY
MIDDLE EAST

May 26, 1960
BY: M. Tracy
DAILY NO. C-1

PAPER NO. G-1

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1. Its strategic importance is due to its location and its extensive deposits of oil. Not only does the area contain 62 per cent of the world reserves; it also has the lowest cost of production (less than half as much as in Venezuela; 1/6 as much as in the U. S.)

2. Its level of development is above that of Asia but below that of Southern Europe and most of Latin America. It displays characteristics typical of backward areas: low life expectancy, low income, maldistribution of income; low level of manufacturing (except in Israel); high dependence on foreign trade but a concentration on a narrow range of exports, thus extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices.

### C. <u>Potentialities for Development</u>

Some countries, notably Iran and Iraq, have considerable reserves of both oil and cultivable land. The Arabian peninsula states have oil but no land. Most of the rest have neither oil nor land, and they must seek development in other fields.

The uneven distribution of land and human resources means that regional cooperation is needed if potentialities of growth are to be smoothly achieved. However, existing political tensions severely limit the scope of such cooperation.

## II. <u>TRENDS</u>

The Middle East is undergoing a whole series of revolutions whose intensity varies from country to country and within each.

### A. <u>Demographic Revolution.</u>

Population growth ranges from 2-2.5 per cent in most countries (in Turkey it is almost 3 per cent; in Israel 3.74 per cent). Not yet at its peak, the growth rate is expected to rise to 3-3.5 per cent before the birth rate declines. Just to match this explosion may necessitate the investment of 10 per cent or more of the GNP.

### B. <u>Urban Explosion.</u>
The rapid expansion of cities (Cairo tripled in the last 30 years, Teheran quintupled) raises serious social and political problems. In the past, all significant political movements have been confined to the towns. The accelerating urbanization has greatly increased the number of participants; moreover, it has introduced a significant revolutionary element - the mob.

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C. **Agricultural Revolution.** Essentially, this consists in the breakdown of the traditional subsistence agriculture based on common ownership of the land. New cash crops and improved methods have resulted in a growth of agricultural production. These advances have brought about new evils: absentee creditors, fragmentation of land, and landless peasants, all of which weaken Middle Eastern societies and expose them to political dangers.

D. **Industrial Revolution.** Though still a minor part of the economy, manufacturing and mining have grown tremendously, especially in the Mediterranean area. Output is presently growing at a rate of 7-8 per cent per year.

Industrialization is important psychologically as a symbol of status, as an agent of social change, and as a hope of conquering poverty. Because of these factors, industry is receiving much government aid and should continue to grow in spite of obstacles.

The industrial revolution will bring about social and political changes. It will give rise to a growing industrial working class which may show radical leanings; this will probably not be matched by a corresponding increase in the power of the middle class, since much of the industrialization is being carried out by the government. The rapid growth of technological and scientific knowledge may change the traditional world outlook of the region. Industrialization may profoundly modify traditional family patterns.

E. **Transport and Communications Revolution.** Since the war, the emphasis on roads has brought many villages into contact with the market and opened them to urban influences. The growth in the mass media of communications, especially radios, makes the country more receptive to political movements arising in the cities.

F. **Social Transformations** include the growth of education, with an emphasis on science; the decline of religion; and the emancipation of women. The New emphasis on science may weaken one of the most important links with the West, for this knowledge is more easily obtainable from the Soviet bloc.

G. **Political Trends**

1. **Liquidation of Western influence.** Western influence has sunk to an unprecedentedly low level. The West is no longer regarded as a model of progress. Secondly, there has been a sharp deterioration in its military power in the region. Almost all the Western bases in the Middle East have been abandoned. The change in the relative power of Western and local force was evidenced

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by Britain and France hesitating during the Suez campaign. (Although the Egyptian army itself could not defeat the British and French, the Arabs nevertheless had the support of a significant sector of world opinion and thus could turn their military defeat into a victory.) Finally, the proximity of the U.S.S.R. reduces the value of the vast military power of the West.

Finally, there has been a decline in the economic power of the West. Formerly 90% of Middle Eastern trade was with the West. Now the U.S.S.R. has replaced the West as a market and a source of supply. Egypt, Syria, Iran, Turkey and now Iraq have 25-40% of their trade with the Soviet bloc.

As a result of these developments, the political power of the West has been reduced and more Middle Eastern states have achieved a position where they can act independently of the West.

2. **Breakdown of parliamentary government.** The trend to military dictatorships results from several factors: a lack of historical traditions of self-government; the pressure of outside forces; national character of extreme individualism; and more important, the lack of the economic and social basis on which democracy arose in the West and without which it cannot survive.

Author expects parliamentary governments to survive in Israel, Lebanon and Turkey, where the economic and social basis is fairly favorable. In other countries, parliamentary government is likely to breakdown; since the army is the one cohesive and organized group in these countries, it is probable that military dictatorships will result.

3. **National consolidation.** National consciousness is still at an immature stage, but nationalism is today the strongest in the Middle East. The author expects internal cohesion of the Middle Eastern governments to grow and foresees increasing freedom of action for them. (Note: Author does not make a distinction between national consolidation and Arab nationalism, a separate and distinct phenomenon.)

4. **Growth of socialist forces.**

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**B. Intraregional Problems.** The Arab-Israeli conflict is the most serious. The Arabs cannot forget the loss of Palestine; they have 800,000 refugees; and they fear Israeli expansionism backed by World Zionism. The Israelis fear Arab revanche backed by Soviet arms.

A second problem is the struggle between Egypt and Iraq for leadership of the Arab world. Neither conflict can be expected to be resolved for a long time. (Overthrow of Kassem would not solve inter-Arab problems. Egypt's dynamic policy is resented by the ruling circles of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms and at a broader level, by Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan. It is likely that the dissidents would find a new champion for their grievances.)

Other difficulties result from border disputes, but author feels these are likely to develop only if encouraged by outside powers.

**C. Problems Involving Extra-Regional Powers.** Several Arab countries are involved in the Algerian struggle. In the Arabian sheikhdoms, local uprisings backed by Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. are putting pressure on the British.

## IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Since 1945, U. S. policy has failed in its main objective of keeping the U.S.S.R. out of the area.

The failure is due partly to the inherent difficulties of the situation:

1. The Middle East belongs to a different culture, with a long history of conflict with Western Christian civilization.

2. As a Western power, the U. S. is identified with the evils of Western imperialism. (Note: Although this is one of the inherent difficulties of the situation, the U. S. can take propaganda measures to counteract the impression. We can stress the imperialistic aspects of the U.S.S.R. (and to this appeal the Arabs are more responsive than ever before); we can point up the good record of the U. S., and finally, we can point out that the former imperialists have lost most of their empires.)

3. The U. S. entered the area at the moment when nationalism was approaching its boiling point.

4. The U. S. is not well-placed to deal with revolutionary changes. Its economic and political interest will be jeopardized by upheavals. Since it must operate within the

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existing social and political framework, it has a tendency to identify itself with whatever groups are in power.

**5. The U. S. is at a disadvantage economically.** Except for Saudi Arabian oil, Turkish tobacco and chromium, and some Israeli products, it is not an important market for the Middle East. Some of its exports, especially cotton (the main export item in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, and important in Turkey and Iran), are in competition with Middle Eastern exports.

The U.S.S.R., by contrast, seems to have a boundless market and offers no competition.

To a great extent, Middle Easterners have accepted the Leninist picture of the U. S. as a monopolistic capitalist, and they view all U. S. gestures suspiciously.

**6. After the war, Europe's expanding economy came to rely to a dangerous degree on Middle East oil.**

**Postwar Policy:** Granted these handicaps, U. S. policy cannot be absolved of major errors: the illusion of plenipotence and underestimation of the strength of local forces; the quest for military pacts; insufficient expenditure of effort and money to win over some of the peoples. (Note: The author does not explain the last point.)

**Turkey.** U. S. policy has had success because it built on a firm foundation of nationalist tradition and stability.

**Iran.** By pushing Iran into an activist policy, the U. S. has undone much good. Most Iranians would prefer a neutralist alignment. By urging Iran to join defensive pacts, we have not increased our military power significantly, and it is doubtful that Iran can make more of a contribution as an ally than it could as a neutral.

**Arabs.** U. S. policy proceeded on the erroneous assumption that if it exerted enough political and economic pressure, it could make Arab governments do things to which their peoples were opposed.

Our light-hearted support of Israel was based on the miscalculation of its effect on Arab opinion.

The Baghdad Pact was a paper treaty between countries whose military power was negligible and whose public opinion was hostile. U. S. assumed that Arab Nationalism would soon

PAPER NO. G-1

be reconciled to U. S. policy.

**Denying arms to Nasser (1955) and withdrawal of the Aswan Dam offer (1956) were based on the assumption that the U. S. retained a monopoly of power in the area.**

**Border Incidents (1955, 1957).** The attempt to use incidents between Turkey and Syria to pressure Syria backfired, with the result that pro-Soviet elements in Syria were strengthened and the U.S.S.R. appeared as the protector of the Arabs.

**Recommendations:**

In the past year, the U. S. seems to have realized the necessity of confining its aims to the safeguarding of its most essential interests: keeping the Middle East from Soviet domination and ensuring that oil flows to Europe on reasonable terms. (Author does not explain.)

A. **Soviet domination** may be achieved by military invasion (unlikely) or by subversion; thus the attitude of the people is crucial. Nationalism is the only force against Communism. We should not oppose it in pursuit of unessential aims. (Note: An unessential aim would be a defense pact such as the Baghdad Treaty. In its anxiety to secure maximum security, the U. S. pushed Iraq into an alliance to which its people were strongly opposed.)

B. **Securing Oil.** The situation is more favorable today with a glut of supplies, overabundant tankers, and a surplus of coal. There is less temptation for one country to shut off the flow of oil.

Middle Eastern governments will continue to press for a larger share of the profits. This should be considered sympathetically before matters come to a head. (The vital interest of the West is not in the amount of profits, but to keep oil flowing at a reasonable price.) Efforts to build alternative sources of energy supply and transport routes should continue. (Note: The danger of Iraq nationalizing its oil is minimized by the author. The memory of the Iranian fiasco is still fresh in the minds of the Arabs. Morevoer, Iraq produces only crude oil; she does not even have a trump card in the giant refinery at Abadan. Too, such a step would not have popular support in Iraq.)

Even if oil were nationalized, author feels we could do without that source of supply, for we would still have the fields in Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Sahara. Thus the West is in a position where it could exert pressure on the Iraqis.)

PAPER NO. G-1

C. **Economic Aid and Cultural Exchange.** Financial aid is one of the few instruments of policy available to the U. S.; it should make fuller use of it. (Note: no details given.)

Cultural exchange should be expanded: by sale of books at prices that Middle Easterners can afford; by an increase in scholarships; by an exchange of scholars, artists, and especially scientists and technicians.

## Positions:

**Internal changes.** Revolutions can be expected in Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. U. S. aid may remove some of the pressures, but it is unlikely that the trend can be halted.

The problem is how to cooperate with existing governments and influence them in the direction of reform and to make it clear that their successors would be acceptable providing they are not pro-Communist. (Note: no solution offered.)

U. S. intervention in 1958 was probably necessary and the results were, on the whole, favorable, but it is hoped that there will be no repetition.

A. **Lebanon.** U. S. should continue its policy of benevolent and generous support without demanding in return that Lebanon identify itself too openly with the West, since that may threaten another civil war.

B. **Kurds.** U. S. should continue to oppose Kurdish national aspirations. A Kurdish state could be formed only at the expense of our ally Turkey, and of Iran and Iraq.

C. **Arab-Israeli.** No satisfactory position can be recommended since neither side is at present willing to meet conditions set by the other, and since neither is amenable to pressure. The best hope is to gain time. Israel is getting stronger economically and may be able to live without foreign aid (Note: no proof is given) and the Arabs are becoming involved with other problems. Author doubts the crisis will flare up to the point of war because each side realizes it cannot win.

U. S. should continue to support the Palestine refugees and to aid the growth of both Arabs and Israelis. (Note: Author does not discuss the arms race. He also makes no mention of the U. S. role in the dispute.)

## Inter-Arab Relations

A. **Pan-Arabism** should be accepted as normal. U. S. should abide by the principle that the degree or form of unity

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is to be decided by the Arabs alone. U. S. should not choose sides because this is the surest way of discrediting any government.

B. Oil Wealth. U. S. can pursue a positive policy of aiding in a more equitable distribution of oil wealth. The Inter-Arab bank is a first step. The U. S. should encourage the oil companies to cooperate in this or other regional schemes. (Note: the rivalries between the Haves and Havemots are a fact of the Middle Eastern situation. Author's plan seems too generalized.)

C. Algeria. The U. S. should use all its influence to persuade the French to make the necessary concessions to the Algerian nationalists. The Author sees acceptance of Algerian separationism by the French and the Algerian colonists as a distant prospect. He cannot suggest specific steps to speed settlement of the crisis. Settlement is hampered because the Algerians are being cagey about the minimum they want, and de Gaulle has been equally vague about peace terms. Author foresees a long-run acceptance of a separate Algeria by the French and says the U. S. should encourage development of natural self-determination for the Algerians.

D. Arabian Peninsula. The British may be expected to find their own gradual solution. The U. S. can help by assuring their oil supply and foreign exchange position in case of crisis.

PAPER NO. H-2

by: E. Hobbing

# SUMMARY

## DEFENSE

### A U. S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

Author Unattributed

Date of Paper: December 1959

## I. DEFINITION

National strategy consists of "the plans and procedures designed - to reach the nation's objectives."

## II. PAST AND PRESENT COMMUNIST STRATEGY

Communism intends to establish control over all important parts of the world.

There are several important aspects of Communist strategy:

A. After World War II, the Communists first obscured the moral issue of the conflict between freedom and Communism by claiming that the conflict was merely a power struggle. When this propaganda line succeeded, the Communists pressed on - as Khrushchev's tactics have shown - to claim that they were the pillars of morality while the free world was decadent and immoral.

1. Communism championed the backward nations, disarmament and "peace." All these espousals have been and will remain cynical.

2. In attacking the morality of the U. S., the Communists have called us war mongers, economic imperialists and devotees of "massive retaliation." They have managed to instill considerable doubt about American morality in the minds of many peoples.

B. The Communists try to represent themselves as "the wave of the future." Their successes and rapid economic growth powerfully support this contention.

C. The Communists use massive and widely varied military power to support all phases of their strategy.