## Chapter 1

*

August 1, 1961

### Inspection

By Leo Szilard

The difficulties of the problem of "inspection" appear to be almost insurmountable only because this problem is approached in the wrong way. People have become accustomed to think in terms of a foolproof treaty which would spell out in detail the measures of inspection that would be imposed on the United States, the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China, as well as the other nations involved.

Most of those who adopt this approach fail to realize that even if it were possible to draft such a treaty, it would take many years to do so. I personally do not believe, however, that it is possible no to draft such a treaty, for /treaty which might be drafted could make provisions for every secret evasion which is at present foreseeable and new ways of evading such a treaty might be developed as time goes on.

One may be led to a constructive approach to the problem of "inspection" by recognizing that no treaty providing for disarmament could remain in force if either America, Russia or China would cease to want to keep it in force, and/any one of these three nations would be able to sabotage the operation of the treaty, without having to resort to open violations of the treaty. Any one of these three nations can withdraw from such a treaty if it wishes to do so.

## Inspection

-2-

It follows that if Russia, China and America enter into a treaty providing for far-reaching disarmament which they wish to keep in force, on account of the great benefits which they derive from disarmament, then it will be necessary for them to convince each other that they are not secretly violating the treaty, /unless all three nations can be convinced of this, one or the other of them may withdraw from the treaty.

As far as these three nations are concerned, the treaty need not say anything specific about measures of inspection that may be imposed upon them. Instead, the treaty needs/to recognize that any one of these three nations can halt or reverse the disarmament process if it cannot be convinced that the others don't secretly evade the agreement.

Naturally, it would serve no useful purpose for America, Russia and the Peoples' Republic of China to enter into such a treaty, unless they first reach a meeting of the minds on the means that may be available to them for convincing each other of the absence of secret evasions. But the means that, say, America may choose in order to convince the Russians and the Chinese that she does not secretly evade the agreement need not be the same as the means that, say, the Soviet Union may choose to convince the Americans and the Chinese.

That a certain amount of inspection would be needed is, of

## Inspection

course, a foregone conclusion. I do not believe, however, that
inspection is the answer to all of our problems. In particular,
I do not believe that foreign inspectors, even if admitted to
Russian territory in virtually unlimited numbers, would be able
to find bombs and rockets if the Soviet Government wanted to hide
such bombs and rockets.

In a discussion which I had with N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman
of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., on October 5, 1960,
the question came up whether the Soviet Union would be willing to
create conditions in which America could rely on Soviet citizens
in general, and Soviet scientists and engineers, in particular, to
report secret violations to an International Control Commission. On
the basis of that discussion and extended private conversations
which I had on this subject during December of last year in Moscow,
I am now convinced that the Soviet Union would be willing to give
serious consideration to this possibility.

I should make it clear at this point, however, that we are
dealing here with two questions:

a.) Would the Government of the Soviet Union be willing to create such conditions?

b.) Assuming that the Government of the Soviet Union is willing to create such conditions, would she be able to do so?

I made a considerable effort to clarify in my own mind, this

## Inspection

second point, but I cannot say that I have reached a final conclusion. Still, I have reached the stage where I can say that by exploring this point further, a final and favorable conclusion could probably be reached.

We may envisage that after a treaty providing for general disarmament is concluded and goes into effect disarmament will progress step-by-step. Presumably there will be a First Period during which left there still may be military secrets/that would need to be safeguarded,

But we may assume here that this would no longer be necessary after the end of the First Period and that from that point on all-out inspection would be acceptable to all nations. Presumably a disarmament agreement would set a limit to the number of bombs which each nation may retain at the end of the First Period, when all-out inspection goes into effect,

How could America, from that point on, reassure Russia and the other powers of the world that she has not illegally retained, and hidden in secret, bombs in substantial numbers?

One way of accomplishing this would be for the President of the United States to address the American people over television, radio and through the newspapers. He would explain why the American Government had entered into this agreement, and why it wished to keep it indefinitely in force. He would make it clear that any secret violations of the agreement might lead to an abrogation of

Inspection

-5-

the agreement by the Russians or the Chinese, and that the American
Government would not condone such violations. The President would
admit that violations might occur, and state that if they did occur,
they would have to be regarded as the work of over-zealous subordin-
ate governmental agencies, whose comprehension of America's true
interests and purposes were rather limited. The President would
make it clear that, in these circumstances, it would be the patriotic
duty of American citizens in general, and of American scientists
and engineers in particular, to try to discover such secret viola-
tions of the agreement, and to report them to the International
Control Commission. In addition to having the satisfaction of ful-
filling a patriotic duty, the informant who discloses a major
violation of the agreement would receive an award of one million
dollars from the President's Contingency Fund. The President would
announce that no income tax would be levied on such an award, and
that the recipient of such an award, who wished to enjoy his wealth
by living a life of leisure and luxury abroad and would want to
leave America with his family, would not be hampered by currency
restrictions in transferring the award abroad.

This system ought to work well in America. It has the draw-
back, however, that if no bombs were hidden, it would be frustrating
for people to keep looking for bombs and to never find any. Vigil-
ance might soon cease, in such circumstances.

## Inspection

Moreover, the system would probably not set an example that could be blindly followed, say, by the Soviet Union. If the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union were simply to follow the example of the President of the United States and say that bombs might have been secretly hidden in the Soviet Union by over-zealous subordinate agencies, acting against the orders of the Soviet Government, people in the Soviet Union might not know what to make of this. They might find it difficult to believe that any subordinate agency would act against the orders of the Soviet Government.

In view of all this, it might be better for America to choose a somewhat different system for the purpose of assuring other nations that no bombs or rockets were illegally hidden. Such a system may be represented by a "game" of the following kind: America would hide, during the First Period, a certain number of bombs and rockets. For this purpose, the Government could appoint small committees composed of three to seven men and each such committee could be assigned the task of hiding a bomb or rocket. These committees would be permitted to lie, to cheat and to threaten, and to do whatever is within their power to keep the location of the hidden bombs or rockets secret. They would be free to tell gullible citizens that it was necessary to keep such rockets or bombs hidden because the Government had received secret information that bombs and rockets are

## Inspection

-7-

being illegally hidden in substantial numbers by other governments.
As an incentive for doing a good job the members of these committees
would receive, each year, a bonus equal to their regular salaries,
and they would continue to receive these bonuses as long as the
bomb or rocket which they had hidden, remain hidden.

Whenever a bomb or rocket was hidden by one of the committees
appointed for the purpose, the committee would prepare a protocol
describing the circumstances under which the bomb or rocket was
hidden, and the measures adopted for keeping it hidden. The Govern-
ment would place each such protocol in a sealed envelope, carrying
a code number, and would deposit it with the International Control
Commission. In addition, the Government would deposit with the

Control Commission a number of similar envelopes, each
bearing a code number, but containing merely an empty sheet of paper.

From time to time, the President of the United States would
appeal to the American people to participate in the "game", and
thus to help convince other nations that no bombs or rockets were
illegally hidden in America. He would point out that it was the
patriotic duty of all citizens to try to discover the bombs or
rockets, which have been hidden. A substantial reward would be paid
to those who report to the International Control Commission the loca-
tion of a hidden bomb or rocket.

Each time the Control Commission receives such a report, the

[Lc]

## Inspection -8-

U. S. Government would give the Control Commission the code number of the envelope which contains the protocol that describes the hiding of that particular bomb or rocket. As long as no bombs or rockets were hidden -- except as a part of the "game" -- each bomb or rocket discovered would be covered by a protocol describing how that particular bomb or rocket had been hidden.

Other nations could, from time to time, check on how effective the American citizenry was in reporting bombs and rockets that were hidden in America, by selecting at random, say fifty envelopes deposited by the American Government with the International Control Commission, and, determining what fraction of the envelopes contained a protocol relating to a hidden bomb or rocket, rather than an empty sheet. On the basis of checks of this type performed from time to time, it should be possible to estimate how long a bomb or rocket be hidden in America may be expected to remain hidden.

If the American Government wanted to hide bombs and rockets outside of the "game", it would not deposit with the International Control Commission protocols with respect to these bombs or rockets. The probability of discovering bombs and rockets that were hidden outside of the "game" would, however, be just as great as the probability of discovering rockets and bombs which were hidden as part of the "game". Thus, if the American Government intended to violate the agreement by secretly hiding bombs and rockets outside

Inspection

-9-

of the "game", it could do no better than it was
doing within the framework of the "game".

If the "game" showed that bombs and rockets might remain hidden for one or two years, but rarely any longer, then the nations need not fear that some governmental agency would risk hiding bombs or rockets outside of the "game".

In a state of virtually complete disarmament, the United States would have no military secrets left that need to be safeguarded. In these circumstances, America might choose to permit other nations to employ American citizens as plainclothes inspectors whose identities are not known. The task of these plainclothes inspectors would be to move about unobstrusively in American territory and try to discover secret violations of the agreement that might have escaped the notice of the citizen at large. Such inspectors would carry a badge and it would be understood that they would be immune from arrest.

One may perhaps ask: What is the difference between a plain-
clothes inspector whose identity is not known to the Government and
a spy? Today a foreign agent operating in America as a spy,
serves the interest of a foreign government, as well as his own
interest; he does not serve the interests of America. But, in the
conditions which we envisage here, a plainclothes inspector,
operating on behalf of a foreign government on American territory,

Inspection

-10-

would serve the interests of America, as well as the interests of the foreign government. He would be part of the means chosen by America for the purpose of convincing foreign governments that there are no secret evasions of the disarmament treaty on America territory.

If there is any apprehension that such plainclothes inspectors might be foreign agents, engaged in trying to subvert America rather than trying to discover secret violations of the disarmament agreement, America could obtain assurance on this point in the following manner: The plainclothes inspectors, in the employ of foreign governments, might be required to register with the International Control Commission and the International Control Commission in turn might be required to disclose each year the identity of a small number of such inspectors, selected at random. These inspectors could then be placed under surveillance by the FBI for the purpose of determining whether any of them were engaged in subversion, instead of persuing their legitimate "spying" activities.

It is my belief that even though a few bombs and rockets might be hidden by one nation or another it would be impossible for any nation to maintain under a reasonable system of inspection-a bomb delivery system in operation that could endanger any of the great powers.

Bombs could be delivered, from one continent to another, by almost any commercial aircraft capable of crossing the Atlantic or the Pacific. But if any nation were to fear that this might be done,

## Inspection

-11-

such fears could be alleviated by assigning a team of, say, three inspectors to any such aircraft and such a team could be carried on board every flight. The expense involved in the subjecting of all aircraft to this type of inspection would be negligible.

It has been proposed that America, Russia and perhaps some other nation might want to retain a small number of bombs, as an insurance against being attacked by means of bombs that other nations may have retained in secret. It is my contention that once a reasonable inspection system has been in operation for a few years, the number of bombs that nations would need to retain, as an insurance, could be set very low.

## Chapter 2

*

August 5, 1961

### The Securing of the Peace

By Leo Szilard

We may assume that virtually complete disarmament would mean the elimination from the national armament of all atomic weapons, all other heavy mobile weapons such as heavy tanks, guns, etc., as well as the dissolution of all standing armies, navies, and air forces, etc.

In such a virtually disarmed world machine guns would presumably still be available in essentially unlimited quantities and might be freely transported legally, or illegally, across national boundaries. Thus armies equipped with machine guns could spring up, so to speak, overnight.

The security of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Peoples' Republic of China would not be directly threatened by such improvised armies, for the forces maintained in these countries for purposes of internal security, even though they may not be equipped with anything heavier than machine guns (and perhaps light tanks), could be bolstered by militia, and should be capable of repelling an attack by an improvised army equipped with machine guns.

These three nations would presumably also remain strong enough to extend military protection to their neighbors. But it would no longer be possible for America to extend military protection against Russia to nations located in the geographical proximity of Russia,

The Securing of the Peace -2-

or for Russia to extend such protection to countries located
close to America, etc.

Since today America is committed to the defense of countries
lying in the geographical proximity of Russia and China, she can
accept general and complete disarmament only if she can extricate
herself from her existing commitments. In order to make it possible
for America to do this, it might be necessary to devise political
settlements which she could accept without loss of prestige and
without doing serious damage to the vital interests of the other
countries involved.

Before dealing with the question to what extent and in what
sense small countries located in the geographical proximity of
America, Russia or China, might remain secure from military in-
tervention on the part of their powerful neighbor, we shall first
address ourselves to a series of other issues.

If the world were disarmed today down to machine guns, we would
have a rather unstable situation in a number of disturbed areas of
the world where political tensions are acute. Armies equipped with
machine guns could be improvised in such disturbed areas and if a
nation were attacked by its neighbor it might appeal to America or
to Russia for help. In such circumstances America and Russia might
be tempted to rearm and to intervene on opposite sides. Clearly it
is necessary to devise means for securing the peace in the disturbed

The Securing of the Peace

Rather, it would be necessary for the powers to enter into negotiations with each other, at an early date, in order to discover as soon as possible whether they would be able to select different slates of nations for the different regional commissions, without seriously risking a veto when the slates came up for approval before the Security Council or the High Council of the Disarmament Administration.

As a first step, America and Russia might explore in informal discussions whether they could select slates for all the disturbed regions of the world and agree that neither of them would veto these particular slates. Obviously, there is room for *quid pro quo* in a negotiation of this sort. Even if Russia did not particularly like a slate favored by the United States for the region of Central America, she might agree not to veto that slate provided America would not veto some slate which Russia favors, say the slate for the region of the Middle East.

That a region might become a sphere of influence for one or the other of the great powers cannot be excluded with absolute certainty, but this danger could be minimized by prudent selection of the slates of nations for the various regions. Thus, for instance, if the slate for the region of Central America were to consist of Canada, Australia, Uruguay, Denmark and Austria, this would not mean that Central America would be within the sphere of

The Securing of the Peace

influence of the United States, but it would mean that Central
America would not be within the sphere of influence of the Soviet
Union.

As far as the great powers are concerned, an agreement among
them on the selection of the commissions which control the various
regional police forces would be tantamount to a political settlement,
with respect to these regions.

The commissions in charge of the various regions would be un-
doubtedly pledged to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs
of any nation of the region, but the possibility that they might in-
tervene could not be excluded with certainty. If, in the course of
fulfilling their proper and legitimate function, a regional force
were impelled to arrest the leading members of the government of an
offending nation, then the regional commission might be forced to
take over the government of that nation, for a shorter or longer
period of time. I do not believe that it would be possible to
devise a workable system which could exclude under such cir-
cumstances any abuse of power on the part of the commission of the
region. But it may be possible to devise various means through
which such an abuse of power could be discouraged.

Thus for instance, a regional peace-court may sit in per-
manence in each region where a regional police force operates and
habeas corpus proceedings might then be instituted on behalf of

The Securing of the Peace

-7-

any individual before such a court. The fact that such a court
could not itself enforce its rulings would set a limit to the pro-
tection that it may be able to extend to the citizens of the nations,
located in the region.

We may envisage that the operations of the
regional police forces would be financed through dues, paid by all
nations who participate in the disarmament agreement, to the region-
al commissions. We may further envisage that there would be provided
financial inducements for an individual citizen to pay his dues di-
rectly to one or the other of the regional commissions, rather than
indirectly (through paying a special tax to his own government). The
individual citizens, as well as the national government, may be left
free to shift, within certain limits, their dues from one regional
commission to another.

Each regional commission may under such a system receive a
financial contribution towards the operating cost of the regional
force, in an amount that would lie, say, between 80 percent and
120 percent of that cost. If a given regional commission, and the
corresponding regional police force, operates to the satisfaction
of the governments of most nations, as well as their citizens, it
should be able to count on receiving 120 percent of the operating
expenses, i.e., the commission should be able to count on making
a profit, in the amount of 20 percent of the operating expenses.

The Securing of the Peace

-8-

In contrast to this, if the governments of many nations or their citizens were to hold that the commission of a given region abuses the power with which it is invested, they might divert their dues to other regions and the dues received by the "offending" commission could fall to 80 percent of the operating expenses of the regional force. Thus if many people were to hold that the commission in charge of a given region abuses the power with which it is invested, that commission would suffer a financial loss.

Under the system described above, the financial loss would be limited to 20 percent of the operating costs of the regional police and it would not be possible to cut off completely the financial support of the regional police force, even if a substantial majority of nations, and their citizens, were to disapprove of the conduct of that regional force.

Any regional commission could of course always be replaced, provided it were possible to select another slate of nations which could command a majority vote in the High Council with the concurring votes of the permanent members. Accordingly, if a commission for a region were to abuse its power, it might or might not be possible to replace it, depending on whether the permanent members were to act in concert to this end or were to disagree with each other.

The system of control of the regional police forces outlined above is aimed at securing peace with justice, but it takes into

The Securing of the Peace

-9-

account that peace with justice might not be obtainable in every case and that we may have to choose between peace and justice. The system of control outlined above favors peace over justice, in cases where these two goals cannot be reconciled.

Prior to Second World War, it would have been possible to argue, when faced with such a choice, in favor of justice rather than peace. But these days, a strong argument can be made in favor of the opposite choice, particularly if it is doubtful whether justice would be attainable either without or with war.

It would not be practicable to maintain a regional police force in Europe, strong enough to restrain the national security forces of say Germany or France from protecting individuals against being arrested by the regional police.

It is probably true that in order to secure the peace in Europe it would be necessary to have political settlements that would leave no nation in Europe strongly motivated by its vital national interests to resort to force. If there is an adequate political settlement in Europe, even though it might not fully satisfy all major national aspirations, the nations in Europe might be restrained from resorting to force, if they greatly benefit from disarmament because if there were a resort to force, this would put an end to disarmament.

The problem posed by the nations of Europe is posed even more

[14]

The Securing of the Peace -11-

big power, such as the Soviet Union, the United States or China?

One may first of all ask in what sense would -- in the absence of such machinery -- the countries lying in the geographical proximity of the Soviet Union, China, or the United States be secure from a military intervention, on the part of their big neighbors? Knowing that they cannot look for military protection to any geographically distant nation, it is likely that the countries located adjacent to one of these three giants would readjust their behavior and would try and lessen the incentives for a military intervention by their neighbor. Clearly, Finland is in no danger of a military intervention from Russia today, nor is Mexico in danger of a military intervention from the United States, but this is so only because Finland and Mexico refrain from any actions that might provoke such a military intervention. Because disarmament, once it is established, would prove to be of very great benefit to them, America, Russia and China might refrain from resorting to force -- even when confronted with a certain degree of provocation -- for fear that this would bring disarmament to an end.

Would this be enough of a restraint or would it be necessary to go further? And how much further would it be possible to go?

In discussing the securing of peace in a disarmed world one hears frequently the demand that there shall be set up an International Security Force of sufficient military power to overcome

The Securing of the Peace -12-

any nation, or group of nations, which attempts to use military
force against any other nation.

I believe the time has come to grab this bull by the horns
and look it in the eyes:

It is my contention that it would be physically, economically,
and politically impossible to create and maintain a force that would
have such military power except if that force were equipped with
atomic bombs. It is further my contention that if such a force were
equipped with nuclear weapons, then there would be no politically
acceptable solution to the issue of how that force should be con-
trolled.

Is there, then, any way in which nations like America, Russia
or China could be restrained in a disarmed world from resorting to
force?

It is my contention that if these great powers were willing
to be restrained it would be possible to set up a system that would
exert a measure of restraint that might be sufficient in a con-
flict in which a minor or perhaps even a substantial national
interest is involved. But even if America, Russia and China were
willing to go very far in this direction, it might still be impossi-
ble to devise a practicable system that would effectively restrain
any one of them in a conflict involving a very major national
interest, or the very existence of the nation.

Accepting this limitation, we may now examine what kind of

The Securing of the Peace

-13-

restraints might be possible, assuming that America, China and
Russia would be willing to institutionalize such restraints.

After the Second World War an abortive attempt was made to
define "crimes against peace" and to hold individual Germans and
Japanese who committed such crimes responsible for their actions.

A system in which only such individuals can be brought to justice
whose nation is defeated in war would hardly exert much restraining
influence, for no nation starts a war if it considers it likely to
lose that war. But let us suppose now, for the sake of argument,
that the nations, including America, Russia and China, were to set
up a World Peace Court by treaty and were to define by treaty a set
of laws -- restricted to crimes against peace -- broad enough to
cover the advocating of a war or invasion, in violation of the United
Nations Charter, or the provisions of the disarmament agreement.

To what extent, and in what sense could such laws, applicable
to individuals, exercise restraint, say, on American citizens, if
the United States were, for instance, tempted to improvise an army
equipped with machine guns, and to invade Mexico, in order to unseat
a legally elected Communist government?

Presumably the possibility of such an invasion would be publicly
debated in the American newspapers, with some editorial writers in
favor of such an action and others opposed to it. Presumably the
issue would also be debated in the high councils of the Government,
with occasional leaks to the press, disclosing the stand that the

[Lc]

The Securing of the Peace

-14-

Secretary of State and various advisors to the President were
taking on the issue. Could the Peace Court step in at this point
and summon into its presence some of the individuals involved where
they would stand accused of a Crime against Peace?

The Court would be in no position to arrest Americans who may
be summoned to appear in Court and who may refuse to appear, if
such individuals enjoy the protection of the American police (or
other American security forces) and were America seriously to contem-
plate invading Mexico, such protection would be likely to be forth-
coming.

It is my contention that the only way to make the Court effec-
tive in such a contingency is to empower the Court to impose the
death penalty for failure to appear in Court, when summoned. Such
a death penalty imposed by the Court might not be meaningless even
if there were considerable doubt whether it could ever be executed.

In the Middle Ages, when the Catholic Church had no power to
execute a death sentence, it still could and did pronounce death
sentences by outlawing certain individuals. Anyone could kill such
an outlaw and be absolved by the Church.

The Court passing the death sentence, for non-appearance in
court, on American citizens in general, or officials of the Govern-
ment in particular, might not be in a position to execute the sen-
tence but it would remove the moral inhibition that normally pro-
tects the lives of all individuals.

Chapter 3

August 11, 1961

# Political Settlement in Europe

If one of the nations of Europe, Germany for instance, were strongly motivated to resort to force in a generally disarmed world, the means for the securing of peace, discussed above, would be wholly inadequate for restraining her.

As long as there are two completely unrelated German States in Europe, the unification of Germany is likely to emerge sooner or later as a rather explosive issue, because it represents a political objective on which all Germans may unite.

It has been repeatedly proposed that the two German states be united on the basis of free elections, that Germany renounce the recovery of the territories lost to Poland, and that all the great powers join in guaranteeing the Oder-Neisse Line.

The unification of Germany in the near future on the basis of free elections may not be politically acceptable. Moreover, it is open to doubt that the unification of Germany on this basis would offer a substantial guarantee of stability in Europe.

If Germany were thus united, it might not take long until the recovery of the territories lost to Poland would emerge as an explosive issue because it would represent a political objective on which all Germans may unite. The majority of Germans might be rather

## Political Settlement in Europe -2-

indifferent to this issue, but a minority who have strong feelings on the issue would be likely to become the politically controlling factor. Presumably there would be two major political parties contending for the majority in parliament and they would be impelled to compete for the vote of this minority.

Guaranty of the Oder-Neisse Line by America would be meaningless, since in a generally disarmed world America would be in no position to render military assistance to Poland, even if she were inclined to do so. In the absence of far-reaching political integration of Western Europe, the other Western European nations would be in no position politically to restrain Germany. Nor would they be likely to render military assistance to Poland against Germany, even in contingencies where they might be legally obliged to do so.

In these circumstances I do not believe that recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line by the powers either now, or at the time when Germany might be unified, would really settle the issue of the territories that Germany lost to Poland.

These days one frequently hears in Germany that the recovery of the territories lost to Poland is a major political objective, but that it must not be accomplished by the use of force. This, of course, is a meaningless statement, as long as there is no way of accomplishing the return of these territories, except through the use of force.

## Political Settlement in Europe -3-

The situation would be different if it were politically possible to create a united Germany and if it were politically possible to give such a united Germany, an option to recover from Poland step-by-step strips of territory -- by paying a compensation of, say, $20,000 to each Polish family that would have to be relocated. Even if the compensation were set considerably higher, it would be cheaper for Germany to pay such compensation than to resort to force. If the compensation were set high enough, Germany might not take up the option, because the political party in office would have to weigh the popularity it would gain by purchasing territories from Poland, against the popularity it would lose by financing such purchases through increased taxation. Thus, if the compensation were set high enough, the Germans might not take up the option, but whether they did or did not, the option might still eliminate the issue of the recovery of territories lost to Poland, as a major element of political instability, from the European scene.

The unification of Germany on the basis of free election does not appear to be a political acceptable solution in the near future. In a generally disarmed world, there would not arise the issue of whether such a united Germany would be militarily in the Western camp, but there would still remain the issue of whether state ownership of all means of production would be preserved in East Germany if Germany were united.

## Political Settlement in Europe -6-

I propose to assume here, for the sake of argument, that within the predictable future the crisis in France will be resolved in favor of a return to parliamentary control and that Western Europe will continue to move towards economic integration. On this basis, I propose to examine what the chances might be for a far-reaching political integration of Western Europe.

It is usually assumed that such a political integration could be achieved through the creation of super-national agencies and the step-by-step delegation to such agencies of sovereign rights of the individual nations.

I venture to predict that there will be no substantial progress along this line, in the predictable future, towards political integration of Western Europe. Western Europe might conceivably move, however, towards political integration through an entirely different route.

There could be a limited representation in the parliament of each Western European nation of the other Western European nations. In each case "foreign representation" in the parliament could start very low, say, at a few percent of the seats and increase step-by-step until it reaches perhaps 20% or 25% of the seats.

Such a limited "foreign representation" in each of these parliaments would correspond to the actually existing interdependence among the nations of Western Europe. It would not affect the voting strength of the extreme left parties in the parliaments of Europe.

It would, however, decrease the influence of the extreme right wing parties, because the representatives of these parties of two neighboring nations would be likely to vote on the opposite side of the explosive controversial issues.

Only if political integration goes along with economic integration would the nations in Western Europe be able politically to restrain each other from pursuing their individual nationalistic aspirations which might endanger the peace.

At the time of this writing, the so-called Berlin crisis occupies much public attention. If we assume that the goal is to maintain stability in Europe, in a disarmed world, then it becomes possible to put forward reasoned argument in favor of one or another "solution" of the problem posed by Berlin.

A "Letter to the Editor", which is attached, illustrates how such reasoned arguments might be applied to this problem.

* * *

Appendix

## Political Settlement in Europe -9-

their people to flee to West Germany. Even so, there would probably be some migration to West Germany, at least initially, because the standard of living there is higher. In the case of a major economic recession in West Germany, however, migration would probably be reversed.

If we accept the thesis -- as I believe we should -- that, at some future time, such a federal council may be set up as a first step toward unifying Germany, then it would appear reasonable to propose that we resolve the current Berlin crisis along the following lines.

Let East Germany shift its capital from East Berlin to Dresden, and West Germany shift its capital from Bonn to Munich. Let us then set up East Berlin and West Berlin, each as a free city with a government of its own and, in addition, establish a council of Berlin, in which half of the delegates would represent East Berlin and the other half, West Berlin.

If such an arrangement were adopted, we would have made a constructive use of the current Berlin crisis, because the arrangement would enable us to find out how this type of federation would actually work, and Berlin might set the pattern for a subsequent federation of the East German State and the West German State.

About 2 years ago, I spent several months in West Berlin. There was no telephone communication between East Berlin and West Berlin at that time. People could freely cross over from one half of the city to the other, but taxicabs could not cross the dividing line. There was good theater both in East Berlin and West Berlin, and people crossed

Chapter 4

*

August 4, 1961

# *Treaty Providing for Far-Reaching Disarmament*

By Leo Szilard

While disarmament would have to be carried out step-by-step, it is not possible to reach an agreement on disarmament step-by-step. Prior to the drafting of a treaty on disarmament the nations involved would have to reach a meeting of the minds

a.) on the issue of how peace would be secured in a disarmed world;

b.) on the means that would be available to them for convincing each other that the disarmament provisions of the treaty are not secretly violated;

c.) on the political settlements which would have to go into effect when the arms level falls to the point where the nations would no longer be able to live up to their pre-existing commitments militarily to protect areas which are geographically remote from their own territory.

Disarmament will not reach a stable point until it goes far enough to give the nations a very substantial economic benefit, so that they would want to keep the treaty in force in order not to lose those benefits. Therefore, America, Russia and China would be ill-advised to enter into a treaty, providing for disarmament, unless they had reasonable assurance that such a stable point would be reached within a very few years.

Treaty Providing for Far-
Reaching Disarmament

-8-

At the outset of the First Period America and Russia shall, as a first step, dismantle a certain number of bombs and the fissionable material (and other bomb ingredients) contained in these bombs shall be placed in depots that are under appropriate international supervision (or in the custody of the International Disarmament Administration). The dismantling of each bomb shall take place in the presence of international inspectors and the materials shall be transported to the appropriate depots under the surveillance of such inspectors. All materials derived from the Soviet Union shall be kept in depots located on her territory and similarly all materials derived from America shall be kept in depots located on American territory.

The number of bombs dismantled in the first step by a nation shall be larger than one-third of the difference between the number of bombs possessed by that nation and the number of bombs which that nation is permitted to retain at the end of the First Period -- within the framework of the Intermediate Nuclear Force Level set by the agreement.

America and Russia would not need to disclose at this point how many bombs they possess and thus it might not be possible immediately to check whether the number of bombs which are dismantled in the first step, (in the presence of inspectors) is, in fact, larger than one-third of the above-defined difference. If, at this point, either

-11-

to retain at the end of each stage shall be specified in the
disarmament agreement.

During the Second Period there shall also be a stage-by-stage
reduction in conventional arms and the level of the conventional
forces that each nation is permitted to retain in each
stage is to be specified in the disarmament agreement.

The stages relating to the number of legitimately retained
bombs (and the corresponding means of delivery) -- which shall be
referred to as N-stages/need not coincide with (and may go into
effect quite independently of) the stages which relate to the con-
ventional force level -- which shall be referred to as C-stages.

The rate at which the world may pass on from one N-stage to
the next N-stage, i.e., the rate at which nuclear bombs will be
eliminated, shall be determined solely by the guiding principle
that the number of bombs America and Russia is to be permitted to
retain in any given stage, shall be commensurate to the number of
bombs that may have been illegally retained and may have remained
up to then undetected. Accordingly, the rate at which bombs would
be eliminated during the Second Period would depend solely upon
the ability of the Atomic Powers to convince each other that no
bombs have been retained by them in secret.

While the agreement would specify the Intermediate Conventional

-12-

Force Level which would be retained at the end of the Second
Period, it would not set the nuclear force level that may remain
in existence at the end of the Second Period.

During the Third Period there would be a further stage-by-stage reduction of the nuclear force level and as time goes on bombs and means for their delivery might be completely eliminated from the nations' arsenals.

During the Third Period there would also be a stage-by-stage
reduction in the Conventional Force Level towards the final Minimal
Conventional Force Level, set by the Agreement, that would limit the
conventional forces of each nation to that necessary for maintain-
ing internal security.

It is envisaged that disarmament will be carried out under
the control of an International Disarmament Administration which
either operates under the Security Council of the United Nations,
or a similar Council of its own -- referred to as the High Council
of the International Disarmament Administration. It is envisaged
that the Soviet Union, the United States and the Peoples' Republic
of China (and presumably also certain other nations such as, for
instance, Britain and France) may have permanent seats on the High
Council, while the other seats may rotate among the other nations

-13-

which are a party to the Disarmament Agreement.

If the United States, the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China conclude a Disarmament Agreement, they will presumably have a strong desire to keep the agreement in force,

In fact, the agreement could not remain in force if either of these nations should cease to wish to keep it in force. It is therefore envisaged that these three nations (and perhaps also the other permanent members of the High Council) would have certain Special Rights which may be as follows:

1. During the Second Period the progression from one N-stage to the next N-stage or from one C-stage to the next C-stage shall require a majority vote of the High Council of the Disarmament Administration with the concurring votes of the United States, the Peoples' Republic of China, and the Soviet Union (and perhaps with the concurring vote(s) of the other permanent members of the High Council also).

2. If either the Soviet Union or the United States or the Peoples' Republic of China (and perhaps also any one of the permanent members of the High Council), or the majority of the High Council, remains unconvinced that there are no major violations of the disarmament agreement then each of these individual nations, as well as the majority of the High Council, shall have the right -- upon giving due notice -- to demand that the disarmament process be reversed and they shall then be free to revert from the prevailing

-14-

N-stage to a preceding N-stage. All other nations shall then also be free to revert to the same preceding N-stage.

It is envisaged that secret evasions or open violations of the disarmament agreement by one of the powers who possess the Special Rights listed under (2), would lead to a reversal of the disarmament process and the step-by-step moving back from the pre-vailing N-stage to preceding N-stages. This "sanction" would go into effect at the demand of at least one power who possesses the Special Rights listed under (2), or at the demand of a majority of the High Council.

In case of a secret evasion or open violation of the Disarmament Agreement by a nation, which does not possess the Special Rights listed under (2), there shall be applied such sanctions as may be specified in the Disarmament Agreement.

* * *

Appendix

August 4, 1961

Living With the Bomb

By Leo Szilard

Until such time as it may become possible to negotiate an agreement providing for far-reaching disarmament, both America and the Soviet Union are likely to retain large stockpiles of bombs. It is conceivable that within the next few years America and her allies may accept an earlier Soviet proposal and that the atomic powers will pledge not to resort to the use of the bomb except in retaliation, if they are attacked with such bombs.

In the meantime, however, the bomb is going to be retained as a "deterent". Threats which could not be carried out without leading to all-out destruction of both America and Russia will not have a substantial deterrent effect, because the threat of "murder and suicide" is not a believable threat -- particularly if it is made by either America or Russia -- in a conflict where no basic issue is involved that would threaten the very existence of the nation. In these circumstances, the Departments of Defense, of both America and the Soviet Union, are bound to devise plans for strategic uses of the bomb which could be carried out without leading to all-out destruction.

The public does not know what these plans may be because both governments keep their plans secret. Secrecy in this instance is likely to be self-defeating, however. A strategy of this type might be unilaterally decided upon by either America or Russia, but it may not attain its objective of avoiding all-out destruction.

Living With the Bomb

-2-

unless both the governments fully understand the nature and intent of the strategy -- ahead of time. Accordingly, there ought to be arranged informal discussions on a governmental level between America and the Soviet Union on plans for the strategic uses of the bomb which might avoid all-out destruction.

There are only a limited number of strategies to choose from.
I have described one of these strategies on various occasions,

*/ Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Oct. 1959; Feb. 1960. The Voice of the Dolphins, Simon & Schuster, N. Y., 1961.

which represents one end of a rather wide spectrum of strategies. It is a strategy for replacing war -- in the usual sense of the term -- inasmuch as it replaces the killing of men by the destruction of property.

This particular strategy could be unilaterally adopted either by the United States or the Soviet Union, but it could not attain its objective of avoiding all-out destruction, unless it was fully understood by the governments of both of these nations. Moreover, it might take some sort of an understanding between America and Russia ... to avoid a dangerous controversy over the question which American city may be regarded as equivalent to which Russian city.

The text which follows (taken from "The Voice of the Dolphins") describes the strategy I have singled out for the purpose of this discussion. It describes the strategy in the form of a recital of a sequence of events as viewed in retrospect by a future historian:

[LC]

Living With the Bomb

-3-

"Between 1962 and 1965 the world passed through an agonizing transitional phase in the so-called atomic stalemate. At the beginning of this period America had still to rely mostly on bombers, based on airfields located in the proximity of Russia. Because of the possibility of a surprise attack which could have knocked out America's ability to strike a counter-blow, in times of crisis America felt impelled to keep one-third of her bombers in the air, on an around-the-clock basis. Russia, on the other hand, had no foreign bases, nor was she in need of any, since she possessed an adequate stockpile of long-range rockets which could be launched from bases inside of Russia and were capable of carrying hydrogen bombs large enough to demolish a city. By 1965 America had an adequate stockpile of such long-range rockets also and thereafter she was no longer in need of having foreign bases either.

"By 1965 America and Russia were capable of destroying each other to any desired degree. Their long-range rockets could be launched from submarines, trucks or railroad cars that were kept constantly on the move and thus it would have been impossible for either Russia or America to destroy, by one single sudden blow, the power of the other to strike/devastating counter-blow. With the fear of a surprise attack thus eliminated, the atomic stalemate began to gain a stability which it did not formerly possess.

At a time when America and Russia could have destroyed each other to any desired degree, the threat of massive retaliation would have been tantamount to a threat of murder and suicide.

Living With the Bomb

Such a threat might be believable if made in a conflict by a nation whose very existence was at stake, but it would not be believable if made by America in a conflict in which American interests were at stake, but not America's existence, as a nation. In these circumstances America concluded that for the defense of her national interests she could no longer rely on long-range rockets, carrying a large bomb, and that she ought to maintain highly mobile forces which could be rapidly transported to almost any part of the globe. It was assumed that, in the case of an armed conflict, America would send troops to the area involved and resist by using small atomic bombs against troops in combat, within the contested area.

In time, Americans came to understand well enough that the "real aim" of such a limited war could not be victory, which clearly might not be obtainable in every case, but rather the exacting of a "price" from the "enemy". If America were able to exact a price higher than the price which the "enemy" would be prepared to pay, then America's capability of fighting a limited atomic war, anywhere on the globe, would effectively deter the "enemy" from attempting to change the map by force. It was recognized of course that, in order to freeze the map, America might have to be prepared to pay a price as high as she proposed to exact, both in money and in lives-- the lives of the young men who would die in the fighting.

"It was generally taken for granted that the large bombs and the long-range rockets would play no role in any of the foreseeable

Living With the Bomb

-6-

force of arms, an American intervention in the Middle East, but would rather seek to deter America by setting a high price. The price would not be set, however, in terms of human life but in terms of property. The Russian Note listed twelve American cities by name. Russia stated that if American troops crossed over into Iraq she would single out one of these twelve cities, give that city four weeks of warning to permit its orderly evacuation--as well as to allow time to make arrangements for the feeding and housing of refugees--and thereafter the city would be demolished with one single long-range rocket.

"The American reply indicated that for each city that Russia would demolish in America, America might demolish two cities in Russia.

"To this, Russia replied in a second Note -- a Note of unprecedented length -- that if America were to demolish two cities in Russia for each city that Russia may have demolished in America, and if Russia were to demolish two cities in America for each city that America may have demolished in Russia, then the destruction of one city would trigger a chain of events which would step by step lead to the destruction of all American cities as well as Russian cities. Since clearly America could not possibly want this result, she may not make such a threat of "two for one" and expect it to be believed. Russia, on her part, would tolerate that America demolish one Russian city, in return for Russia having demolished one American city. But for each additional city that America might demolish, Russia would demolish one and just one additional city in America.

Living With the Bomb

-10-

then from here on Russia would be in a position to get her way on any issue; she would be in a position to change the map at will, simply by threatening to demolish a limited number of American cities, in case America should try locally to resist, by force of arms.

"Fortunately, these prophecies proved to be incorrect. For the time being at least, Russia appeared to be quite satisfied with the map as it stood."

It is conceivable that the above-described strategy is being considered either by the United States Department of Defense or by the Government of the U.S.S.R., or by both. Therefore I take the liberty to propose that if either America or Russia were to invoke the above-discussed strategy, then in applying the principle of one to one they regard cities as equivalent which have -- according to the attached list -- the same population.

The United States and the Soviet Union may, of course, agree at any time on a more up to date list for the number of inhabitants or alternatively they might at any time reach a meeting of the minds in favor of some principle, other than "size of population", for determining the equivalence of cities.

-13-

USSR Cities - Continued

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Thousands</th><th></th><th>Thousands</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Tambov</td><td>150</td><td>Namangan</td><td>104</td></tr><tr><td>Kopeysk</td><td>149</td><td>Leninakan</td><td>103</td></tr><tr><td>Dzerzhinsk</td><td>147</td><td>Babushkin</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Gomel'</td><td>144</td><td>(Moskovskaya Oblast')</td><td>103</td></tr><tr><td>Zlatoust</td><td>143</td><td>Serpukhov</td><td>102</td></tr><tr><td>Ashkabad</td><td>142</td><td>Armavir</td><td>102</td></tr><tr><td>Chernovtsy</td><td>142</td><td>Voroshilov</td><td>101</td></tr><tr><td>Ryazan'</td><td>136</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Semipalatinsk</td><td>136</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Kherson</td><td>134</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Sevastopol'</td><td>133</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Perovo</td><td>132</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Smolensk</td><td>131</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Chimkent</td><td>130</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Poltava</td><td>129</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Vitebsk</td><td>128</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Orel</td><td>128</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Vologda</td><td>127</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Tyumen'</td><td>125</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Cheremkhovo</td><td>124</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Lipetsk</td><td>123</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Stavropol'</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>(Stavropol'skiy Kray)</td><td>123</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Kamensk-Ural'skiy</td><td>122</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Kaluga</td><td>122</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Bladimir</td><td>121</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Leninsk-Kuznetskiy</td><td>119</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Petropavlovsk</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>(Severo-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast')</td><td>118</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Petrozavodsk</td><td>118</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Kramatorsk</td><td>117</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Kiselevsk</td><td>116</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Anzhero-Sudzhensk</td><td>116</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Kirovograd</td><td>115</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Andizhan</td><td>115</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Kutaisi</td><td>114</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Polol'sk</td><td>113</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Biysk</td><td>112</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Kuntsevo</td><td>111</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Bryansk</td><td>111</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Kirovabad (Azerbaydzhan SSR)</td><td>111</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Stalinogorsk</td><td>109</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Orekhobo-Zuyevo</td><td>109</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Makhachkala</td><td>106</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Mogilev</td><td>106</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Kurgan</td><td>106</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Vinnitsa</td><td>105</td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

Working Group 5

Eighth Conference on Science
and World Affairs

September 11-16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont

WORKING GROUP 5

DRAFT STATEMENT 1

(Unanimously Approved)

International confidence, necessary for progress in the field of disarmament which in turn will facilitate the development of international confidence, would be strengthened by the reduction of unnecessary secrecy. We recommend to governments that they encourage the expansion of scientific, cultural, touristic, and other contacts, as well as of the exchange information, and that they take steps to remove obstacles in the way of such an expansion.

DRAFT STATEMENT 2 (Unanimous)

The problems of disarmament are sufficiently complex that careful examination of them on a national basis and informal discussions on an international basis, are essential, in most cases, as an adequate preparation for the negotiation of agreements. Failure to take these steps may result in premature firm positions, and in frustrations. We urge that nations provide for extensive and continuing study of the problems of disarmament. The joint study group proposed elsewhere in this conference under the aegis of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences should also be very useful. We urge further that preparations for negotiations should be

WG-5

-2-

include extensive use of informal discussions, these discussions
and any conclusions reached in them being protected from use for any
purposes of propaganda. Summarize the attachment of附件

DRAFT STATEMENT 3

(Unanimously Approved)

The Conference considers that the United Nations must play an
important role in the solution of the problem of general and complete
disarmament with effective control, including all those steps
leading toward the achievement of this goal which require the parti-
cipation of all nations.

The Conference urges the United Nations to make the necessary
efforts to insure representation in the U.N. of all the peoples of
the world, and to insure that the U.N. serve as a forum for discussion
between nations, as well as an organization for the peaceful settle-
ment of international problems.

Reprinted for private circulation from
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

Vol. XIV, No. 9, November 1958

Copyright 1958 by the Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc.

PRINTED IN U.S.A.

# Vienna Declaration

Statement of the conference on "The Dangers of the Atomic Age and What Scientists Can Do About Them" (Third Pugwash Conference), held at Kitzbühel, Austria on September 14–19, and at Vienna on September 20, 1958.

## 1. Necessity to End Wars

We meet in Kitzbühel and in Vienna at a time when it has become evident that the development of nuclear weapons makes it possible for man to destroy civilization and, indeed, himself; the means of destruction are being made ever more efficient. The scientists attending our meetings have long been concerned with this development, and they are unanimous in the opinion that a full-scale nuclear war would be a world-wide catastrophe of unprecedented magnitude.

In our opinion defense against nuclear attack is very difficult. Unfounded faith in defensive measures may even contribute to an outbreak of war.

Although the nations may agree to eliminate nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of the world, the knowledge of how to produce such weapons can never be destroyed. They remain for all time a potential threat for mankind. In any future major war, each belligerent state will feel not only free but compelled to undertake immediate production of nuclear weapons; for no state, when at war, can be sure that such steps are not being taken by the enemy. We believe that, in such a situation, a major industrial power would require less than one year to begin accumulating atomic weapons. From then on, the only restraint against their employment in war would be agreements not to use them, which were concluded in times of peace. The decisive power of nuclear weapons, however, would make the temptation to use them almost irresistible, particularly to leaders who are facing defeat. It appears, therefore, that atomic weapons are likely to be employed in any future major war, with all their terrible consequences.

It is sometimes suggested that localized wars, with limited objective, might still be fought without catastrophic consequences. History shows,

however, that the risk of local conflicts growing into major wars is too great to be acceptable in the age of weapons of mass destruction. Mankind must therefore set itself the task of eliminating all wars, including local wars.

## 2. Requirements for Ending the Arms Race

The armaments race is the result of distrust between states; it also contributes to this distrust. Any step that mitigates the arms race, and leads to even small reductions in armaments and armed forces, on an equitable basis and subject to necessary control, is therefore desirable. We welcome all steps in this direction and, in particular, the recent agreement in Geneva between representatives of East and West about the feasibility of detecting test-explosions. As scientists, we take particular pleasure in the fact that this unanimous agreement, the first after a long series of unsuccessful international disarmament negotiations, was made possible by mutual understanding and a common objective approach by scientists from different countries. We note with satisfaction that the governments of the USA, USSR, and U.K. have approved the statements and the conclusion contained in the report of the technical experts. This is a significant success; we most earnestly hope that this approval will soon be followed by an international agreement leading to the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and an effective system of control. This would be a first step toward the relaxation of international tension and the end of the arms race.

It is generally agreed that any agreement on disarmament, and in particular nuclear disarmament, requires measures of control to protect every party from possible evasion. Through their technical competence, scientists are well aware that effective control

will in some cases be relatively easy, while it is very difficult in others. For example, the conference of experts in Geneva has agreed that the cessation of bomb tests could be monitored by a suitable network of detecting stations. On the other hand, it will be a technical problem of great difficulty to account fully for existing stocks of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction. An agreement to cease production of nuclear weapons presents a problem of intermediate technical difficulty between these two extreme examples.

We recognize that the accumulation of large stocks of nuclear weapons has made a completely reliable system of controls for far-reaching nuclear disarmament extremely difficult, perhaps impossible. For this disarmament to become possible, nations may have to depend, in addition to a practical degree of technical verification, on a combination of political agreements, of successful international security arrangements, and of experience of successful cooperation in various areas. Together, these can create the climate of mutual trust, which does not now exist, and an assurance that nations recognize the mutual political advantages of avoiding suspicion.

Recognizing the difficulties of the technological situation, scientists feel an obligation to impress on their peoples and on their governments the need for policies which will encourage international trust and reduce mutual apprehension. Mutual apprehensions cannot be reduced by assertions of good will; their reduction will require political ad-

341

justment and the establishment of ac-
tive cooperation.

3. What War Would Mean

Our conclusions about the possible
consequences of war have been sup-
ported by reports and papers submitted
to our Conference. These documents in-
dicate that if, in a future war, a sub-
stantial proportion of the nuclear weap-
ons already manufactured were deliv-
ered against urban targets, most centers
of civilization in the belligerent coun-
tries would be totally destroyed, and
most of their populations killed. This
would be true whether the bombs used
derived most of their power from fusion
reactions (so-called "clean" bombs) or
principally from fission reactions (so-
called "dirty" bombs). In addition to
destroying major centers of population
and industry, such bombs would also
wreck the economy of the country at-
tacked, through the destruction of vi-
tal means of distribution and communi-
cation.

Major states have already accumu-
lated large stocks of "dirty" nuclear
weapons; it appears that they are con-
tinuing to do so. From a strictly mili-
tary point of view, dirty bombs have
advantages in some situations; this
makes likely their use in a major war.

The local fall-out resulting from ex-
tensive use of "dirty" bombs would
cause the death of a large part of the
population in the country attacked. Fol-
lowing their explosion in large num-
bers (each explosion equivalent to that
of millions of tons of ordinary chemical
explosive), radioactive fall-out would
be distributed, not only over the terri-
tory to which they were delivered but,
in varying intensity, over the rest of the
earth's surface. Many millions of deaths
would thus be produced, not only in
belligerent but also in nonbelligerent
countries, by the acute effects of radia-
tion.

There would be, further, substantial
long-term radiation damage, to human
and other organisms everywhere, from
somatic effects such as leukemia, bone
cancer, and shortening of the lifespan;
and from genetic damage affecting the
hereditary traits transmitted to the
progeny.

Knowledge of human genetics is not
yet sufficient to allow precise predic-
tions of consequences likely to arise
from the considerable increase in the
rate of mutation which would ensue
from unrestricted nuclear war. How-
ever, geneticists believe that they may
well be serious for the future of a sur-
viving world population.

It is sometimes suggested that in a

future war, the use of nuclear weapons
might be restricted to objectives such
as military bases, troop concentrations,
airfields, and other communication cen-
ters; and that attacks on large centers
of population could thus be avoided.

Even tactical weapons now have a
large radius of action; cities and towns
are commonly closely associated with
centers of supply and transportation.
We, therefore, believe that even a "re-
stricted" war would lead, despite at-
tempted limitation of targets, to wide-
spread devastation of the territory in
which it took place, and to the destruc-
tion of much of its population. Further,
an agreement not to use cities for mili-
tary purposes, entered into in order to
justify their immunity from attack is
unlikely to be maintained to the end of
a war, particularly by the losing side.
The latter would also be strongly tem-
ted to use nuclear bombs against the
population centers of the enemy, in
the hope of breaking his will to contin-
ue the war.

4. Hazards of Bomb Tests

At our first conference it had been
agreed that while the biological hazards
of bomb tests may be small compared
with similar hazards to which mankind
is exposed from other sources, hazards
from tests exist and should receive close
and continued study. Since then, an ex-
tensive investigation by the United Na-
tions Scientific Committee on the Ef-
fects of Atomic Radiation has been car-
ried out and its authoritative conclu-
sions published.¹ In this case, too, sci-
entists from many different countries
have been able to arrive at a unanimous
agreement. Their conclusions confirm
that the bomb tests produce a definite
hazard and that they will claim a signif-
icant number of victims in present and
following generations. Though the
magnitude of the genetic damage ap-
pears to be relatively small compared
with that produced by natural causes,
the incidence of leukemia and bone
cancer due to the radioactivity from
test explosions may, in the estimate of
the U.N. committee, add significantly
to the natural incidence of these dis-
eases. This conclusion depends on the
assumption (not shared by all authori-
ties in the field) that these effects can
be produced even by the smallest
amount of radiation. This uncertainty
calls for extensive study and, in the
meantime, for a prudent acceptance of
the most pessimistic assumption. It
lends emphasis to the generally agreed

¹ For a report on this investigation, see
p. 388 of this issue.—Ed.

conclusion that all unnecessary expo-
sure of mankind to radiation is unde-
sirable and should be avoided.

It goes without saying that the bi-
logical damage from a war, in which
many nuclear bombs would be used,
would be incomparably larger than
that from tests; the main immediate
problem before mankind is thus the es-
tablishment of conditions that would
eliminate war.

5. Science and International Co-operation

We believe that, as scientists, we
have an important contribution to make
toward establishing trust and coopera-
tion among nations. Science is, by long
tradition, an international undertaking.
Scientists with different national alle-
giances easily find a common basis of
understanding: they use the same con-
cepts and the same methods; they work
toward common intellectual goals, de-
spite differences in philosophical, eco-
nomic, or political views. The rapidly
growing importance of science in the
affairs of mankind increases the impor-
tance of the community of understand-
ing.

The ability of scientists all over the
world to understand one another, and
to work together, is an excellent instru-
ment for bridging the gap between na-
tions and for uniting them around com-
mon aims. We believe that working to-
gether in every field where internation-
al cooperation proves possible makes
an important contribution toward es-
tablishing an appreciation of the com-
munity of nations. It can contribute to
the development of the climate of mu-
tual trust, which is necessary for the
resolution of political conflicts between
nations, and which is an essential back-
ground to effective disarmament. We
hope scientists everywhere will recog-
nize their responsibility, to mankind
and to their own nations, to contribute
thought, time, and energy to the fur-
thering of international cooperation.

Several international scientific under-
takings have already had considerable
success. We mention only the century-
old, world-wide cooperation in weather
science, the two International Polar
Years which preceded (by seventy-five
and twenty-five years respectively) the
present International Geophysical
Year, and the Atoms-for-Peace Confer-
ences. We earnestly hope that efforts
will be made to initiate similar collab-
oration in other fields of study. Certain-
ly they will have the enthusiastic sup-
port of scientists all over the world.

We call for an increase in the unre-

[L.L.C.]

342

stricted flow of scientific information among nations, and for a wide exchange of scientists. We believe that nations which build their national security on secrecy of scientific developments sacrifice the interests of peace, and of the progress of science, for temporary advantages.

It is our belief that science can best serve mankind, if it is free from inter-

ference by any dogma imposed from the outside, and if it exercises its right to question all postulates, including its own.

## 6. Technology in the Service of Peace

In our time, pure and applied science have become increasingly interdepend-

ent. The achievements of fundamental, experimental, and theoretical science are more and more rapidly transformed into new technological developments. This accelerated trend is manifest, alike in the creation of weapons of increased destructiveness, and in the development of means for the increased wealth and well-being of mankind. We believe that the tradition of mutual understanding and of international cooperation, which have long existed in fundamental science, can and should be extended to many fields of technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency, for example, aims not merely at cooperation for establishing facts about atomic energy, but also at helping the nations of the world to develop a new source of energy as a basis for the improvement of their material welfare. We believe that international cooperation in this and other fields, such as economic development and the promotion of health, should be greatly strengthened.

The extremely low level of living in the industrially underdeveloped countries of the world is and will remain a source of international tension. We see an urgent need to forward studies and programs for the effective industrialization of these countries. This would not only improve the level of living of the majority of the population of the world; it would also help reduce the sources of conflict between the highly industrialized powers. Such studies would offer fruitful scope for cooperative efforts between scientists of all nations.

The great increase in the ease and speed of communications, and our increasing understanding of how the forces of nature influence the living conditions of nations in different parts of the world, show us, in a way not previously possible, the extent to which the prosperity of individual nations is connected with, and dependent upon, that of mankind as a whole; and how rapidly it could be increased by common international effort. We believe that through such common effort, the coexistence between nations of different social and economic structure can become not merely peaceful and competitive, but to an increasing degree cooperative, and therefore more stable.

As scientists, we are deeply aware of the great change in the condition of mankind which has been brought about by the modern development and application of science. Given peace, mankind stands at the beginning of a great scientific age. Science can provide mankind with an ever increasing understanding of the forces of nature, and the means of harnessing them. This will

## Participants in Third Pugwash Conference of Scientists

**Australia**
M. L. E. OLIPHANT

**Austria**
HANS THIRRING

**Canada**
BROCK CHISHOLM
ROBERT WATSON-WATT

**Czechoslovakia**
VIKTOR KNAPP
J. KOŽESNÍK

**Denmark**
MOGENS PIHL

**France**
DANIEL DUBARLE
BERNARD GREGORY
J. GUÉRON
ANTOINE LACASSAGNE

**German Democratic Republic**
GÜNTHER RIENÄCKER

**Federal Republic of Germany**
MAX BORN
G. BURKHARDT
HELMUT HOHL
WERNER KLIEFOTH
HANFRIED LENZ

**Great Britain**
JOHN BOYD-ORR
KATHLEEN LONSDALE
C. F. POWELL
M. H. L. PRYCE
J. ROTBLAT
BERTRAND RUSSELL
GEORGE THOMSON

**Hungary**
LAJOS JANOSSY

**India**
H. J. BHABHA
K. S. KRISHNAN
P. C. MAHALANOBIS

**Italy**
E. AMALDI
E. BOERI

**Japan**
IWAO OGAWA
S. TOMONAGA
YASUO MIYAKE
SCHOICHI SAKATA
HIDEKI YUKAWA

**Netherlands**
B. R. A. NIJBOER

**Norway**
GUNNAR RANDERS

**Poland**
LEOPOLD INFELD

**U.S.A.**
HARRISON BROWN
DAVID CAVERS
CHARLES CORYELL
WILLIAM DAVIDON
BERNARD FELD
BENTLEY GLASS
MORTON GRODZINS
DAVID HILL
MARTIN KAPLAN
H. J. MULLER
JAY OREAR
HARRY PALEVSKY
LINUS PAULING
EUGENE RABINOWITCH
FREDERICK SEITZ
WALTER SELOVE
LEO SZILARD
ALVIN WEINBERG
VICTOR WEISSKOPF
EUGENE WIGNER

**U.S.S.R.**
N. N. BOGOLUBOV
N. A. DOBROTTIN
E. K. FEDOROV
E. A. KOROVIN
A.M. KUZIN
V. P. PAVLICHENKO
D. V. SKOBELTZYN
A. V. TOPCHIEV
V. S. VAVILOV
A. P. VINOGRADOV

**Yugoslavia**
PAUL SAVIĆ

343

bring about a great increase in the
well-being, health, and prosperity of
all men.

7. The Responsibility of Scientists

We believe it to be a responsibility
of scientists in all countries to contrib-
ute to the education of the peoples by
spreading among them a wide under-
standing of the dangers and potentiali-
ties offered by the unprecedented
growth of science. We appeal to our
colleagues everywhere to contribute to
this effort, both through enlightenment
of adult populations, and through edu-
cation of the coming generations. In
particular, education should stress im-
provement of all forms of human rela-
tions and should eliminate any glorifi-
cation of war and violence.

Scientists are, because of their spe-
cial knowledge, well equipped for early
awareness of the danger and the prom-
ise arising from scientific discoveries.
Hence, they have a special competence
and a special responsibility in relation
to the most pressing problems of our
times.

In the present conditions of distrust
between nations, and of the race for
military supremacy which arises from
it, all branches of science-physics,
chemistry, biology, psychology-have
become increasingly involved in mili-
tary developments. In the eyes of the
people of many countries, science has
become associated with the develop-
ment of weapons. Scientists are either
admired for their contribution to na-
tional security, or damned for having
brought mankind into jeopardy by their
invention of weapons of mass destruc-
tion. The increasing material support
which science now enjoys in many
countries is mainly due to its impor-
tance, direct or indirect, to the military
strength of the nation and to its degree
of success in the arms race. This diverts
science from its true purpose, which is
to increase human knowledge, and to
promote man's mastery over the forces
of nature for the benefit of all.

We deplore the conditions which
lead to this situation, and appeal to all
peoples and their governments to estab-
lish conditions of lasting and stable
peace.

September 19, 1958

On the last day of the meeting, the
conference expressed its confidence
in the continuing committee (Powell,
Rabinowitch, Rotblat, Russell, and
Skobeltzyn) and instructed it to in-
crease its strength by cooping five new
members, to be chosen in such a way
as to preserve the balance of the com-
mittee. The following recommenda-
tions were also made to the enlarged
committee:

The most important function of meet-
ings of the Pugwash type is to provide
the means whereby scientists from
many nations can meet, attempt to
understand each other, and exchange
frankly their views concerning the seri-
ous problems which now confront the
world. In view of this, we suggest that
the meetings are as important as the
subjects of the meetings.

We urge the committee to call fur-
ther conferences of this general type,
but we believe that smaller meetings
than that held in Kitzbühel are prefer-
able. This should, however, be left to
the discretion of the committee. In gen-
eral, conferences should be held to dis-
cuss specific concrete problems. We
urge that the gatherings be kept un-
official and informal.

There are many topics which should
be discussed at future meetings. In
view of the fact that the choice of topic
might well depend upon the state of
international relations at the time, we
suggest that the continuing committee

use its own discretion in selecting sub-
jects for discussion. We believe that
the committee should concentrate its
efforts, however, on topics which are
directly related to the easing of inter-
national tensions, the establishment of
systems of mutual security, the elimi-
nation of war as an instrument of na-
tional policy, nuclear control and dis-
armament, and the role of the scientist
in creating a peaceful and abundant
world. Related to these broad subjects,
we urge discussions of the potential
contributions of science and technology
to the development of the underde-
veloped nations, and to the interna-
tional exchange of scientists on a scale
far greater than that which now pre-
vails.

In pursuing these discussions, the
continuing committee might wish to
consider the advisability of establish-
ing small groups for the purpose of
studying specific topics which are re-
lated to these general aims. These
groups would report their findings at
subsequent meetings and their findings,
together with reports and papers of
individuals, which should be distrib-
uted in condensed form well in ad-
vance, could form the basis for dis-
cussion.

We also urge that attempts be made
to diversify the composition of the
meetings and, whenever possible, to
include competent representations from
the social sciences and humanities.

"Over the past three years the planning and carrying out of the Inter-
national Geophysical Year has demonstrated the ability of scientists from
the Soviet and Western worlds to work together....

"The IGY, which ends in December, has been so successful that per-
manent scientific committees have been set up to continue cooperative
planning of research, both in the Antarctic and on the oceans.

"This was followed by universal acceptance of a proposal by President
Eisenhower to discuss freezing political claims in Antarctica so that co-
operative research there might continue.

"Despite the political overtones of the fall-out controversy, general
agreement was also reached in this area. The United Nations Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation issued in August a unani-
mous report concluding that fall-out was a hazard to the health of
humanity....

"In the same month scientists from East and West, meeting in Geneva, agreed on the nature of a detection system needed to enforce a ban on nuclear weapons tests."

—WALTER SULLIVAN

The New York Times, October 2, 1958

344

9/15/61

DRAFT STATEMENT
WORKING GROUP 3

EIGHTH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE
AND WORLD AFFAIRS

September 11 - 16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont

SELECTED NEXT STEPS IN ARMS REDUCTION

Chairman: P.M.S. Blackett

The Morning discussion on September 14 was devoted to the study of the first step of a disarmament plan as part of a comprehensive plan for general and complete disarmament. The group had before them the detailed proposals of the USA and the USSR to the Committee of Ten in June 1960 and noted their marked differences in approach. A long discussion took place on possible ways in which a substantial degree of disarmament and increased security could be achieved while maintaining a strategic balance between the two blocs. The essential problem has long been recognized as that of finding a suitable phasing of the various steps in disarmament, inspection and control. Following the argument at the Moscow Conference it was held that the degree and completion of the inspection system should increase as the disarmament proceeds.

Clearly there are many possible solutions, and several were discussed. However, out of the discussion emerged one which seemed worthy of further detailed consideration. So a small committee of the group prepared a draft statement for submission to the afternoon meeting which was held in conjunction with Group 4. After various alterations had been suggested, the final drafting was left to me. So I now submit to the plenary session of this conference the Draft Statement.

Statement.

Submit to the plenary session of this conference the Draft
argued, the final drafting was left to me. So I now
conclusion with Group 4. After various attentions had been
to submission to the plenary meeting which was held in
So a small committee of the Group prepared a draft statement
one which seemed worky of further detailed consideration.
several were discussed, however, out of the discussion emerged
Clearly there are many possible solutions, and
injunction should should increase as the disarmament proceeds.

Conference it was held that the degree and completion of the
inspection and control. Following the argument at the Moscow
finding a separate phasing of the various steps in disarmament.
The essential problem has long been recognized so that of
while maintaining a strategic balance between the two places,
disarmament and increased security could be achieved
place on possible ways in which a substantial degree of
their marked differences in approach. A long discussion took
the Group had before them the detailed proposals of the
UKR and the UNGA to the Committee of Ten in June 1960 and noted
The Group had before them the detailed proposals of the
or, a comprehensive plan for General and complete disarmament.
to the study of the final step of a disarmament plan as part
of the morning discussion on September 14 was devoted

Chairman: P.M.J. Blomberg

The morning discussion on September 14 was devoted

REVIEW NEXT STEP IN AREA DISCUSSION

WORKING GROUP 3
DRAFT STATEMENT
8/12/61

Group 3, Amsterdam
September 11 - 12, 1961
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
FIFTH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. We have considered the first steps in a disarmament agreement in the framework of general and complete disarmament.

2. The first stage in such an agreement must involve arms reduction measures large enough to lead to a radical diminution of the chances of a nuclear war.

3. At all times during the stages of such an agreement, all parties must be convinced that the strategic balance is not upset.

4. The reduction of armaments must at all times be accompanied by sufficient effective controls to assure both sides against violation of the agreement.

5. The achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and the attainment of a substantial first-stage of disarmament would contribute very substantially to the solution of outstanding political problems.

6. We urge that further detailed studies of a first stage, the outline of which is given below, are urgently needed and we strongly ... endorse the recommendation of Working Group 4 for an international study group.

*******************************

In accordance with these principles the first stage of an agreement on general and complete disarmament should include!

1. Limitations on conventional forces according to a formula similar to those suggested by both sides in previous proposals.

2. A complete published inventory of military manpower, weapons, delivery systems, means of production of weapons and weapons materials, to be submitted by both sides to an international control commission at the beginning of the agreement.

Beginning of the agreement.

2. A complete published inventory of military weapons, weapons, to those suggested by both sides in previous proposals.

1. Limitations on conventional forces according to a formula similar to General and complete disarmament should include:

In consequence with these principles, the first stage of an agreement:

Group.

congratulate the recommendation of Working Group 4 for an international treaty of which it is given below, are marginally needed and we accordingly

6. We agree that further detailed studies of a first stage, the output and outputivity to the solution of outstanding political problems.

7. The achievement of an agreement on General and complete disarmament agreement.

8. The reduction of armaments must at all times be accompanied by
enlighten effective controls to ensure both sides against a violation of the
must be convinced that the strategic balance is not upset.

9. At all times during the stages of such an agreement, all parties
be non-concurrent.

10. The first stage in such an agreement must involve some reduction
the framework of General and complete disarmament.

11. We have considered the first stage in a disarmament agreement in
GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

9/15/61

page 3

3. Rapid reduction of stockpiles of delivery systems and weapons materials by a substantial percentage of the declared inventory; the corresponding destruction of delivery systems, and diversion to peaceful uses of fissile materials to be verified by the control commission.

4. The prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and of further production of weapons material and delivery systems with the institution of the required staged controls as outlined in the reports of other working groups (inspection at declared production plants).

5. Upon the completion of the above measures, the institution of a limited system of inspection using suitable forms of sampling aimed at the verification of the temporarily remaining declared stockpiles and of the test ban. From this point on, the completeness of inspection would bear a direct relation to the degree of reduction achieved. Simultaneous with the institution of this inspection, a continued reduction of delivery systems and stockpiles to agreed levels consistent with strategic requirements of both sides for a minimum deterrent force.

6. The last stage of the disarmament process should comprise complete inspection simultaneous with final reduction of delivery systems and nuclear stockpiles to the zero level.

9/15/61

September 11 - 16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont

Chairman: P.M.S. Blackett

The Morning discussion on September 14 was devoted to the study of the first step of a disarmament plan as part of a comprehensive plan for general and complete disarmament. The group had before them the detailed proposals of the USA and the USSA to the Committee of Ten in June 1960 and noted their marked differences in approach. A long discussion took place on possible ways in which a substantial degree of disarmament and increased security could be achieved while maintaining a strategic balance between the two blocs. The essential problem has long been recognized as that of finding a suitable phasing of the various steps in disarmament, inspection and control. Following the argument at the Moscow Conference it was held that the degree and completion of the inspection system should increase as the disarmament proceeds.