[Y]

- 6 -

"I admit the press was sometimes lied to in Saigon in the past, but that does not mean that lying has continued and that official word can never be taken at face value."

The stakes in Vietnam are too crucial for such frivolous treatment. The struggle to maintain the political and territorial integrity of the Republic of South Vietnam is of vital importance to the people of the United States and to free peoples everywhere. Our failure to defeat the Communist guerrilla movement in Vietnam will lead to the extension of Communism throughout all of Southeast Asia. Failure in Vietnam would convince all surrounding countries, and many others elsewhere, that Communists, indeed, are the wave of the future. It could, as well, convince our most trusted allies that our leadership is ineffective -- that we have neither the power nor the will to back up our word. All Americans have a special concern with the struggle in Vietnam because the lives of 15,000 American boys are imperiled daily in that country and 166 Americans have already died there. The American people are willing to make the sacrifices necessary to defeat Communist aggression. But they are entitled to be told the truth.

[Y]

- 7 -

### III. The Withdrawal of US Troops from South Vietnam

The same confusion exists in regard to our policy on
the withdrawal of American troops. Thus:

- On October 2nd the White House announced that 1,000 US military personnel would be withdrawn before the end of 1963 and most of the remainder before the end of 1965.

- On November 14, the White House reduced the figure of 1,000 troops for immediate withdrawal to "several hundred."

- On November 15, General Timmes, Chief of the United State Advisory Mission in Vietnam, spoke again of a plan to withdraw 1,000.

- On November 25th the policy statement of October 2nd was reaffirmed by President Johnson.

- On December 3rd, a troop withdrawal was begun and apparently 1,000 United States servicemen have been withdrawn from Vietnam, reducing the American contingent to 15,500 men.

- On December 20th, key US officials were reported as regarding the 1965 target date as unrealistic.

- On December 22nd, Secretary McNamara pointedly ignored our question about the 1965 deadline.

American people have a right to know how we could announce a troop withdrawal when, in fact the war is going badly. They are distressed to see it reported in the *New York Times* of December 20th that several key United States officials have expressed the feeling that the 1965 target date for the removal of American troops had been established merely for domestic political reasons.

- 8 -

The American people are also forced to wonder what the effect of the withdrawal of 1,000 American forces had been and will be on the morale of the anti-Communist Vietnamese -- at a time when visible evidence of American support must seem to be of utmost importance.

[Y]

- 9 -

## IV. Understanding the Nature of Guerrilla War.

In September and October of 1963, the Administration suddenly began to criticize the Diem regime publicly. It was suggested that the Diem government could not effectively prosecute the war. For example:

- On September 8th, an Administration official was quoted as saying: "We cannot go on supporting a dictatorial regime that is different from Communism only in name and in its international connections."

This attitude seemed strangely inconsistent with the uninterrupted exaltation of Diem by Secretary McNamara, who, for example, spoke as follows before the House Sub-committee on Foreign Operations on May 15th, 1963:

> "It is a near miracle, it seems to me, that Diem, one man, could have written the constitution, organized the new government of that country, and in a period of less than 10 years, moved that country out of near feudalism into the modern world, more than trebled the educational system of the country, initiated an army, and brought some order to the country.

> "Moreover, he has done this in the last few years under the severest form of subversive attack from the North Vietnamese and the Communists."

Nonetheless the new military junta was enthusiastically greeted with confidence that now the war effort would be stepped up. One US policymaker voiced the general Administration reaction: "These fellows are sure to be more efficient in running the war."

But within little over one month many of the comments made about the Diem regime reappeared in connection with the

[Y]

- 10 -

new military junta. For example:

-- On December 8th an American military advisor in Vietnam was quoted as saying: "The great unanswered question is whether the new government leaders are aware and are willing to accept the price it takes to win the war."

-- On December 14th, US officials in Saigon expressed concern to the press that the junta had failed to capitalize on its momentum from the coup, that there had been only minor reforms in the military effort, that there was a lack of a real effort to bring defectors into the Vietnamese government. (After the coup d'état, defections had apparently stopped completely, and then they had then returned only to the same rate as had been present under Diem; new military appointments of the junta were said to have disrupted the field forces;)

-- On December 23rd, we were told that the military junta had not shown the sense of urgency that some Western observers believed was required. One Washington official expressed his views toward the junta in these words: "We should have expected delays, but we cannot tolerate them very much longer. We need momentum. If we sit back, the situation may be lost."

Is it possible that the fundamental problems in Vietnam have never been faced by the Administration? Could we be making the Vietnamese government scapegoats for our own over-optimism?

All the criticism of the Diem regime and now of its successor may have obscured these basic facts:

-- The Vietcong guerrillas are trained and supported from outside the country. From such a privileged sanctuary, guerrilla action can be indefinitely maintained.

- 11 -

-- The guerrillas have a telling advantage over the government forces in that they need fight only where they are superior, whereas the government forces cannot be strong everywhere.

-- Many South Vietnamese, threatened by death by the guerrillas, are compelled to offer them support, whatever their real sympathies may be.

-- The morale and efficiency of the existing administration is one of the chief targets of any guerrilla movement; Through assassination or blackmail they eliminate or drive many of the most competent civil servants from office.

Unfortunately, these facts cannot be removed merely by a change of government.

- 12 -

V. The Future of Cambodia and the Rest of Southeast Asia.

Cambodia is a significant barometer of the estimate of Southeast Asian leaders about the probable trends in their area. The ruler of that small country, however temperamental by our standards, has seen his people through many troubles and kept Communism from his territory. At a time when Washington's claims of imminent victory in Vietnam were succeeding each other with great rapidity, the ruler of Cambodia pointed out that the war was going badly. He said that he would do his best to spare his people the fate of Vietnam.

Within days of the coup against Diem, Prince Sihanouk first demanded the withdrawal of American personnel from Cambodia and the end of all economic, cultural and military aid. On November 20, a request to this effect was formally made. Prince Sihanouk has also requested an international conference, similar to the conference which signed the neutralization of Laos at Geneva, in order to elaborate a similar status for his own country. The United States has agreed to such a conference.

Did we do the right thing to do it? Or should we do it differently? Or both, let's see.

The reasons for this state of affairs seem apparent. In 1962, the United States government sacrificed a pro-Western government in Vietnam to a military junta. The government of Cambodia must have wondered whether the effect of American aid would be similar in its own country. It also seems likely that the government of Cambodia concluded that the effort against the Communist Vietcong guerrillas

- 13 -

in South Vietnam was doomed to failure.

The attitude of Cambodia compounds the problem of Vietnam.
It opens up the last remaining frontier of Vietnam to Communist
infiltration. The *New York Times* of January 5th has reported that,
in fact, much of the heavy equipment for the Communist guerrillas
reaches Vietnam through Cambodia.

In these circumstances, what is the purpose of the
conference to neutralize Cambodia? Is it to legitimize that country
as a sanctuary for the war in Vietnam as was the case with Laos?
What is the sense of sitting down with the countries which daily
violate the neutrality of Laos to define the same status for Cambodia.

Of course, the ruler of Cambodia is free to conduct any
policy he chooses, including neutrality. The problem for the United
States is whether to participate in defining a special international
status for Cambodia.

If Cambodia is neutralized on the model of Laos, the
political and psychological pressures on Vietnam are bound to grow.
It will then be argued that the solution to the problems of South
Vietnam is "neutrality" -- which under the "Geneva formula" would
mean the take-over by Communism in a measurable time. It is no
accident that leaflets urging the neutralization of South Vietnam
have begun to appear in that country in increasing numbers. It is
high time that the United States clarified its policies on Southeast
Asia.

February 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROSWELL B. PERKINS

FROM: June Goldthwaite

SUBJECT: Position Paper on Africa
Letter from Mr. Zartman

A propos of the copy of your letter of February 4th to Mr. Zartman, I do not think that we should ask him to write a position paper on Africa covering the points you mention. My reasoning is:

1. Professor Zartman is relatively unheard of in his field, and if we are to ask for a paper on Africa from anyone, I believe that it should be some one of the caliber of James Coleman, or Gwendolyn Carter, both of whom have submitted excellent papers for us in the past, and who are generally conceded to be among the top people working in this field.

2. To ask Professor Zartman to submit to us as extensive a study as you have outlined would in my opinion be asking him to do something for which he should be payed. If we are not willing to pay someone for this type of project, it would seem to me apparent that we did not regard the end result as being very important.

3. I think it would be very unfortunate to have Professor Zartman informing his friends and relations that he is writing a position paper for the Governor.

On the third point I know that HAK would give me strong support, and I have checked this out with Doug.

HAK is out of town and I have not had time to consult him on the other two points.

February 19, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: Roswell B. Perkins

FROM: Douglas Bailey (Via Henry A. Kissinger)

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Section 4 of the Laird Declaration of Republican Principles and Policy

1. It may not be wise for the Republican Party to be labeled as the "war party" and therefore the concentration on the word "victory" is questionable, unless it is clear that victory here means moral and political victory rather than military victory. To this end the following wording might be included:

"Freedom can be enhanced by resolutely defending encroachments against it and by improving the vitality and the cohesion of the Western world."

2. There are obvious places in Section 4 which need badly to be updated. In particular, the section on "military power." Also paragraph 6 could be updated with the following:

"It was shown in Panama, in Vietnam, in Zanzibar. When a nation gains a reputation for indecision, as the United States has in the last years, its crises will multiply until its reputation to control events is re-established."

- 2 -

3. The two paragraphs on the United Nations might be replaced with something more general. In particular, the call for weighted voting seems inappropriate. Suggested wording might be:

"The United States must work to revitalize the United Nations. While we should not ask this organization to perform tasks which it is incapable of performing, and while our responsibility of free world leadership must not be abdicated, the United States must continue to help realize the United Nations' positive benefit to mankind."

4. Paragraph 6 under the section on "diplomacy" is unclear. We are not sure what this proposal means, although the Governor obviously would support any proposal for the free movement of people.

5. The section on "military power" needs substantial updating, and should include the following points:

(a) That the Administration's "phasing out" of the manned bomber program is unfortunate;

(b) That the Administration's troop withdrawal policy (from Europe, Japan and Vietnam) is also unfortunate, and distressingly reminiscent of the troop withdrawal from Korea in 1950 which invited Communist aggression.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

February 24, 1964

Mr. Roswell B. Perkins
Room 230
60 West 49th Street
New York 20, New York

Dear Rod:

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let me tell you precisely
what you can count on from me until the end of the New Hampshire cam-
paign.

a. I will respond to any request coming directly from the
Governor.

b. I will respond to any request coming from you, if I have some
assurance that some good will come from it.

c. I will review any other material bearing on foreign policy
prepared by any part of the Rockefeller Organization, if I
am requested to do so.

d. In case of a fast-breaking development, I will suggest a
position.

e. I will come to New York if there is a special need for it,
but not otherwise.

f. I will not prepare formal statements except when they are re-
quested by the Governor, because I no longer have any confi-
dence that my understanding of what is correct policy and
that of those who clear these statements coincides.

After the end of the New Hampshire campaign, we can all sit down
and discuss where we are going from here.

Best regards.

Henry V. Kieferger

Sincerely yours,

Best regards.

dence that my understanding of what is correct policy and
Preferred by the Governor, because I no longer have any conti-

t. I will not prepare formal statements except when they are re-

but not otherwise.

e. I will come to New York if there is a special need for it.

position.

f. In case of a fast-presiding development, I will attend a

am requested to go to.

p. I will reask to any request coming from you, if I have some

Governor.

a. I will reask to any request coming directly from the

begin.

what you can count on from us until the end of the New Hampshire cam-

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let me tell you briefly

Dear Rod:

New York 30, New York
60 West 46th Street
Room 330
Mr. Roswell B. Perkins

February 24, 1964

PERSONAL AND COMBINED

VIBRATE

32 | EVERETT ROAD
West Albany 5, N. Y. 12205

A VITAL ATTEMPT TO BRIDGE THE ERRORS
OF THE PAST
WITH THE VIBRANT NEW WORLD OF TODAY

Rockefeller for President
National Headquarters
521 Fifth Ave.
New York, N.Y. 10017

Gentlemen:

February 20, 1964

I realize that Mr. Rockefeller has no time to bother with anything that I may write, but I also realize that he must have some bright boys working for him who may possibly take the time to pick up any idea that might be worthwhile, or to develop any partial idea that may be presented. I am enclosing the germ of a couple of ideas for what they may be worth.

To pass any judgement on me I presume that you will want my background. I was with the St. Regis Paper Company for 35 years as Supt. of Shipping and then Production manager at the Norfolk mill in St. Lawrence County. During my life there I was on the school board and fire commission for one term each, was Past-Governor of the Loyal Order of Moose, having been an officer at two National Conventions, 1933 in Chicago, 1939 in Philadelphia. I was Vice President of the St. Lawrence County Historical Society, Vice Pres. of East St. Lawrence area Red Cross but as United Nations Chairman of my Lions Club I became interested in International Relations. I visited Lake Success and later many visits and Seminars at the present U.N.

The mill at Norfolk was sold and I moved to Albany nearly 12 years ago as I had married an Albanian and she wished to come back to her home. I sold myself on a job as Paper Inventory Control at Williams Press and retired last April 1st. In Albany I was a member of the American Heritage discussion group for several years, Council of Churches discussion groups, Problems of the Aged and for the past five or six years I have been a leader in "Great Decisions" discussion groups. I have been president of the Unitarian Laymen's League, a member of the World Affairs Council and interested in the wonderful International Center. I have also attended three Seminars at Star Island on "Religion in the Age of Science" where I made friends and received inspiration with Harlow Shapley the famous Astronomer. He feels that I have ideas that should be developed. I overlooked that while in Norfolk I was active in the Republican party but moved to Albany only a short time after I had been made Chairman.

My present activities are just nicely getting started. I plan a modest budget. My office is in two rooms in my wife's home for which I will pay her $50.00 a month, not because it is her home but for the reason that this is more convenient and far cheaper than an office downtown and it has the added value that it is a very nice place to entertain foreign visitors through my contacts at the International center. As soon as finances will allow and when I can find a very competent secretary, I will really get to work. I am to receive nothing myself but expenses as our home is paid for and I have just enough of an income to pay my normal expenses which are not high.

VIBRATE-a Grass Roots Peace Effort

By HOWARD LEWIS

NATIONS MUST reject the theory of 'My country — right or wrong,' if the world is ever going to achieve a peaceful and prosperous status, says a West Albany man who is spending his retirement years working for international goodwill.

Victor Tooley of 32 Everett Road isn't just going to talk about it. He created a non-profit organization known as "VIBRATE" to accomplish his aim.

"Slowly, we are getting to a point where the world's leaders can see that such nationalistic slogans are hypocritical and divisive," declared Mr. Tooley.

His own slogan for world cooperation is simple enough: "Permanent Prosperity Through Peace." . . . "Sounds trite," he concedes, "but it sure is true."

★ ★ ★
MR. TOOLEY'S organization, "VIBRATE," stands for Vision, Intelligence, Brotherhood, Research, Attainment, Teamwork and Education.

He first became interested in international relations in the days when the embryo United Nations was meeting at Lake Success.

"I looked forward to retiring at 65 so that I could devote more time to this work," said Mr. Tooley. He retired this spring from his job at Williams Press.

"I don't know so much," Mr. Tooley says frankly. "But I feel if I can stir others up — drop a hint and make them think twice — I am really accomplishing something."

HIS WIFE FEELS as strongly as he does.

Mrs. Tooley, better known in this area as Ruth Deitz Tooley, president of the Albany County Poetry Society, is proud that her husband has been invited to the United Nations Seminar on International Relations Oct. 15-17.

"But his primary concern right now is a briefing by the U. S. State Department to be held at Chancellor's Hall in Albany on Monday," Mrs. Tooley said.

McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to the President, will be the featured speaker. "I am certainly looking forward to this meeting," Mr. Tooley said with an eager smile.

"SOME FOLKS in Albany have questioned my motives in starting this thing," he remarked. "I tell them that six children and 16 grandchildren are motives enough for such a project."

He admits with an emphatic shrug that "VIBRATE" is not an answer to the world's tensions and crises.

"It will only be an agency, acting as a catalyst to stir up partially dormant thoughts of others and trying to coordinate the many ideas received.

"If we would bridge the errors of the past," concludes Mr. Tooley, "we must never close a door permanently, but constantly look for points of agreement.

"Every personal difference that is settled amicably, every strike averted, every dispute between nations negotiated brings us all closer to permanent peace and prosperity."

### $31,025 Bid Accepted on Filt

## Town Board A

Several contract awards were made by the Colonic Town Board at its meeting last night.

Albany Garage was t
cessful bidder to supply
for use bv the Latham

The Knickerbocker News **C**
Albany, Fri., Sept. 27, 1963 4B

Firemen

The Knickerbocker News Photo

BRIEFING AHEAD—Boning up on the history and operation of the United Nations in preparation for the U.N. Seminar on International Relations next month is Victor Tooley, West Albany man who has created an organization for international goodwill.

VIBRATE

32 EVERETT ROAD
WEST ALBANY, N.Y. 12205

PROJECT South America - Venezuela

TO Rockefeller for President National Headquarters

DATE Feb. 20, 1964

It would seem that South American is in a delicate situation but with great potential.

Some means should be used to show the land owners and others that their own selfish interest can be best served by some change in ideas. The continued lack of realization that they can easily lose all by a communist or otherwise inspired revolution is not good. I realize that they are a very touchy people and that whatever means are used must be used with good judgement.

I understand that the Governor has some interests in South America and no doubt has a better understanding of the situation. It could be a great move for better relations if he could have plans worked out whereby parallels are shown how wealth has actually increased in this country by putting the farmers and the laborers in a position to earn more and so spend more. It is just not in the cards for the present state of affairs to continue for long and I know of no person who is in a better position to do something or at least get some plan started to show that something can be done.

Any worthwhile ideas that can be started quietly and then brought forth just before the convention may turn the tide in his favor.

VIBRATE

PROJECT Unemployment

DATE Feb. 20, 1964

A three-pronged threat to employment must soon be met. Automation, the school dropouts and other unemployables, and finally, plans for a transfer to a non-war economy.

There was a time when a war economy meant more to employment than now. The cost of modern war materials is much higher in comparison with the number of people employed, therefore it is the responsibility, if not to the public, at least to themselves, for all companies with government contracts to find means of combating this eval. Home markets are fast fading out due to the diminishing number of buyers.

Every major company should start research in what I would call a "feeder system." An auxiliary manufacturing that has as its main purpose, the hiring of more people with emphasis on the unemployable types would serve a three-fold purpose, decrease the unemployed, make a greater market and take these people off the street where they become discouraged and become trouble makers.

Only a small amount of money would be needed for such research as compared with the amounts now being spent, altho well spent, on new advanced products.

It is possible that in working out many ideas, use could be made of Vibrate. It could be used for the purpose of trial balloons. The person, organization or company having an idea could write it up, furnish names and addresses to send it to and then I would send it out under the Vibrate heading. If it should prove to be successful, then the person or parties submitting the idea would be given full credit at the proper time, if a dud, no one would be hurt. Any idea that is compatible with any of the headings on the attached tentative magazine cover would be good and you will not that these topics allow plenty of leeway. I would be pleased to hear from you if you think that there is anything worthwhile in the trial balloon idea.

P.S. In the feeder system idea, government cooperation and leniency by unions should be sought.

VIBRATE

OFFICIAL
BULLETIN

VOL. 1, NO. 1

A non-profit organization dedicated to:
PERMANENT PROSPERITY THROUGH PEACE

In World Affairs - In Religion - In Business - In Personal Affairs

1. Never close a door permanently.

2. Constantly look for points of agreement.

3. "Every personal difference settled, every strike averted, every dispute between nations negotiated, brings us all closer to Permanent Prosperity.

VISION

Giving the world such a vision of the wonders yet to come that hope will overcome fear and greed.

INTELLIGENCE

Seeking intelligent people who realize the only way to keep the good life is through cooperation and Brotherhood.

BROTHERHOOD

Brotherhood - not through uniformity in mode of life - But by Unity of Purpose in seeking the better life.

RESEARCH

Into new types of Industry for a non-war economy plus Labor-Management-Government cooperative ventures.

ATTAINMENT

Of better International relations through Nations, Churches, Temples, Organizations, Industry, Labor and the Public.

TEAMWORK

Between every race and creed, every phase of society, worldwide. Between Management and Labor, Poets and Philosophers.

EDUCATION

In bringing all of the above and more to the world as a whole and making use of the knowledge, zest and vitality of our college students.

In this effort we realize the great value of our Communications system: Newspapers, Magazines, Radio and Television and will appreciate their cooperation and will make use of any good ideas they may present.

Edited at 32 Everett Road, West Albany 5, N.Y. 12205
Editor and Coordinator - Victor Tooley

*********************

Not for sale - By Donation only.

COORDINATE

March 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROSWELL B. PERKINS

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER OK

SUBJECT: The Use of Ambassador Farland in New Hampshire

When Bailey returned to Boston from New York on Tuesday afternoon, he noted at the airport that the Governor's Manchester, New Hampshire co-ordinator, Edward Bursk, was meeting former Ambassador to Panama, Joseph Farland, on the shuttle from Washington. Apparently Farland was on his way to New Hampshire to campaign for and publicly endorse the Governor.

While neither of us object to this turn of events, two comments are appropriate:

1. I was under the impression that the Governor was not enthusiastic about this idea at our breakfast meeting with him on February 27th.

2. If we had known in advance that Farland was on his way to Boston, we could have interviewed him up here on the Panama situation.

WASHINGTON REPORT

Washington, February 17, 1964

WR 64-7

FORMULA FOR VICTORY IN VIETNAM

We are rapidly approaching the moment of truth in Southeast Asia. The events of the coming year will, in all probability, decide whether freedom has any future in this strategically vital area, or whether the few free flags that still wave there will all be replaced by the hammer and sickle.

If we minimize the gravity of the situation, if we continue to engage in half-measures, if we permit the Communists to operate from privileged sanctuaries, if we again permit ourselves to become involved in plots against our allies, then Southeast Asia is doomed.

I believe Southeast Asia can be saved. But it can be saved only if we are prepared to face up to the facts in all their gravity and ugliness and act with the utmost resoluteness.

There are those who say that the United States is over-extended, that we cannot defend Asia as well as Europe, that we must reduce our commitments in Southeast Asia, even though this might result in a Communist takeover. I find this proposal as lacking in logic as it is in morality.

For better or for worse, our own fate is intertwined with that of Southeast Asia. Indeed, the Communist conquest of the area would produce so serious a shift in the world balance of power, that our very ability to survive would be called into question. Moreover, our prestige is so heavily committed in South Vietnam that if we accept defeat there, or if we accept defeat on the installment plan under the name of "neutralization," no nation could in the future place any confidence in America's commitment to its defense.

The gravity of the situation in Southeast Asia and the continuing downward spiral of our fortunes there simply do not jibe with the optimistic reassurances of the Department of State.

In Laos, the hard-pressed royalists, now supported by the neutralist forces of General Kong Le, have been forced back from one position after another by a series of limited but carefully calculated offensive actions, initiated by the Pathet Lao forces of Prince Souphannavong. The coalition government triumphantly put together by Mr. Harriman,

ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE NATION'S SECURITY

[c]

- 2 -

for all practical purposes does not exist. The Americans have withdrawn from Laos;
the North Vietnamese have not. The tripartite supervisory committee has been able
to operate in the non-Communist portions of the country; but it has not been able to
inspect those areas under Communist control, sometimes because of the obstruction
of the Polish member of the committee, more frequently simply because they have
been denied access by the Pathet Lao.

In Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, himself an anti-Communist, has sadly accept-
ed the inevitability of Communist rule throughout Asia, and has severed relations
with Britain and America and terminated their assistance programs. He has been
remarkably frank in stating that his only purpose in doing so is to buy a bit more
time for himself and his people. There is mounting evidence that the Viet Cong has
been using his territory for hit-and-run attacks on South Vietnam.

In Vietnam, the war has been going disastrously for our side ever since the overthrow of the Diem government last November 1. The military junta which overthrew President Diem has, in turn, been overthrown, and no one can tell where the damage done to the political stability of the country will end.

Internationally, our position has been undermined by the decision of President de Gaulle to recognize Red China. Perhaps the most single serious consequence of de Gaulle's action is that it may induce a weakening of US policy by emboldening these elements in the Department of State who have always believed that the way out of the Southeast Asia crisis lies via coalition governments and neutralization and disengagement. Already some of our pundits and editors are saying that if a brave and staunch anti-Communist like de Gaulle accepts the inevitability of the recognition of Red China and the neutralization of Southeast Asia, we might do well to heed his example. Almost without exception, these pundits are opposed to all those things de Gaulle has stood for in Europe. But they do not hesitate to invoke the authority of his name in pressing for appeasement in Southeast Asia.

We shall hear more such opinions and witness more such pressures over the coming months.

Against this otherwise bleak background, there is at least one faintly hopeful ray. The new government of General Khanh, although it has still not been able to repair the damage done to the apparatus of administration and command by the overthrow of Diem, appears to be a definite improvement over the first junta. General Khanh has a reputation as a resourceful and courageous commander, and as a careful planner; and it was impossible not to be impressed by the swiftness and smoothness with which he executed his coup. All the news indicates that he has taken power firmly into his own hands and that he is shaping up as the wise and benevolent strong man his country so desperately needs. General Khanh's reputation for personal loyalty should be a definite asset, in his relations with his fellow officers and in his relations with us.

He has shown his political astuteness in retaining the popular General Duong Van Minh as head of state. Although the generals guilty of plotting with the French have been imprisoned, there has been none of the wholesale dismissals and reshuffling of commands that characterized the military junta. And whereas the junta had been foolish enough to give all key posts to the so called "southerners", General Khanh,

- 3 -

himself a northerner, has wisely distributed his posts between people coming from
the North, South, and center.

To add to all this, Khanh seems to have the political instinct and gregariousness of
an American presidential candidate, and an ability to move from one point to another
on the fighting fronts that reminds one of the way Mayor La Guardia played the role
of inspector-general in New York. In short, everything about Khanh looks good. In
him Vietnam may well have found a man capable of unifying and leading its diverse
peoples. Let us hope that we will give him our unstinting support, that we will do
our utmost to help him develop the national image essential to the task of leader-
ship, that we will let it be known that we stand by this government, and that we will
use all our influence to discourage any new plots or coups. For the fact is that Viet-
nam cannot afford more coups. Another two or three coups and even the American
marines would not be able to save South Vietnam.

The firming up of the Khanh government is the first task in any formula for saving Southeast Asia. In helping to firm it up, I hope we will not insist on a dilution of authority, in the name of democracy, because no civil war can be successfully pro-secuted without a strong government.

Second, it is essential that we let the world know in unequivocal terms that we will not abandon Southeast Asia, that there will be no neutralization of Vietnam, and that we will have no part of a conference to neutralize Cambodia.

Third, by way of preparing the ground for a political and military counter-offensive, the government of South Vietnam should be encouraged to bring out a White Paper in-corporating all the massive evidence that the Viet Cong guerrilla war is not of indige-nous origin, but has been planned, armed, organized and led by the agents of Ho Chi Minh. Similarly, the anti-Communist elements in the Laotian coalition should be en-couraged to prepare a White Paper detailing the repeated violations of the cease-fire and of the terms of the Geneva Treaty by the Pathet Lao and the evidence of the con-tinuing presence of North Vietnamese forces in Laos.

Fourth, having given these facts to world opinion, we should then unleash the South Vietnamese and put an end to the one-sided set of rules under which the war in South Vietnam has heretofore been conducted. Up until now, the war has been fought entirely on the territory of South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese Army has had to spread its forces thin to protect bridges and railways and power plants and other installations against territory attacks. The North Vietnamese have operated under no such penalty. Not a week goes by without the murder of several hundred South Vietnamese village leaders and local officials by the Viet Cong. But the political commissars in the North have been able to carry out their work of political control and repression in absolute safety.

The situation in Vietnam, indeed, provides a classic example of our tacit acceptance of the Communist ground rule that the cold war and hot wars, both, must always be fought on the territory of the free world and never on the territory of the Communist world.

We must put an end to this imbalanced situation. Ho Chi Minh must be made to pay a penalty for his aggression in the South. Sustained guerrilla warfare may be diffi-

[L]

- 4 -

cult to conduct in a country under the iron control of the Communists. But North Vietnam, because of its long coastline, is exceedingly vulnerable to hit-and-run raids from the sea. The minute the South Vietnamese are given the green light to mount such raids, the minute they start blowing up bridges, and dams and generators and factories in the North and ambushing patrols and political commissars, it will have an immediate impact on the conduct of the war in the South.

Fifth, Ho Chi Minh conducts his activities in the South under the ostensible auspices of a Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, which maintains representatives in 15 countries. There are capable and determined men among the refugees and defectors from the North who would like nothing better than to be granted permission to set up a Front for the Liberation of North Vietnam from the tyranny of Communism. We must encourage, not inhibit the creation of such a front, committed to a program of liberation and social reform and we must provide it with the necessary propaganda facilities.

Sixth, it can be taken for granted that the Communists will again attack in Laos. We must respond to the next attack by announcing that we consider the Geneva agreement to be abrogated, by encouraging General Pheoumi and General Kong Le to counter-attack, and by giving them the necessary support. We should make it our strategic objective to assist the anti-Communist forces in securing at least the southern half of the country, including the Laotian panhandle through which the Ho Chi Minh is infiltrating men and supplies into South Vietnam. No measure we could take would do more to take the pressure off South Vietnam or would have greater psychological impact throughout Southeast Asia than the liberation of Tchepone, the chief Communist base in the panhandle.

SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD
Guest Editor

## EDITORIAL STAFF

<table><tr><td>Editor-in-Chief</td><td>John M. Fisher</td></tr><tr><td>International Politics Editor</td><td>Dr. James D. Atkinson</td></tr><tr><td>Intelligence Editor</td><td>Major General Garrison B. Coverdale, USA (Ret.)</td></tr><tr><td>Economics Editor</td><td>Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Editor</td><td>Frank J. Johnson</td></tr><tr><td>Internal Security Editor</td><td>Lee R. Pennington</td></tr><tr><td>International Law &amp; Space Editor</td><td>Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)</td></tr><tr><td>Strategy and Military Affairs Editor</td><td>Dr. Stefan T. Possony</td></tr><tr><td>Research Director</td><td>William K. Lambie, Jr.</td></tr><tr><td>Chief, Washington Bureau</td><td>Lee R. Pennington</td></tr></table>

## OFFICERS

<table><tr><td>President</td><td>John M. Fisher</td></tr><tr><td>Senior Vice President</td><td>Kenneth M. Piper</td></tr><tr><td>Vice President</td><td>Stephen L. Donchess</td></tr><tr><td>Vice President</td><td>John G. Sevcik</td></tr><tr><td>Vice President</td><td>Russell E. White</td></tr><tr><td>Secretary-Treasurer</td><td>Cyril W. Hooper</td></tr></table>

## NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE

<table><tr><td>Loyd Wright</td><td>Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret.)</td></tr><tr><td>Admiral Ben Moreell, USN (Ret.)</td><td>Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Robert Morris</td><td>Dr. Edward Teller</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Stefan T. Possony</td><td>Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)</td></tr><tr><td>Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)</td><td>General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)</td></tr></table>

## STRATEGY STAFF

<table><tr><td>Karl Baarslag</td><td>Dr. Anthony T. Bouscaren</td></tr><tr><td>Anthony Harrigan</td><td>Captain J. H. Morse, USN (Ret.)</td></tr><tr><td>Edgar Ansel Mowrer</td><td>Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. T. L. Shen</td><td>Duane Thorin</td></tr><tr><td>Stanley J. Tracy</td><td></td></tr></table>

## SENIOR ADVISORY BOARD

<table><tr><td>Bennett Archambault</td></tr><tr><td>Lloyd L. Austin</td></tr><tr><td>Charles S. Craigmile</td></tr><tr><td>Robert Donner</td></tr><tr><td>Henry Duque</td></tr><tr><td>Wade Fetzler, Jr.</td></tr><tr><td>Patrick J. Frawley, Jr.</td></tr><tr><td>Robert W. Galvin</td></tr><tr><td>Fred M. Gillies</td></tr><tr><td>Clifford F. Hood</td></tr><tr><td>Wayne A. Johnston</td></tr><tr><td>William H. Kendall</td></tr><tr><td>Ernest J. Loebbecke</td></tr><tr><td>Hughston M. McBain</td></tr><tr><td>A. B. McKee, Jr.</td></tr><tr><td>General Robert E. Wood</td></tr><tr><td>Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)</td></tr><tr><td>Howard I. Young</td></tr></table>

The American Security Council Washington Report is published four times monthly by the American Security Council. It reports on national and international developments affecting the nation's security for the information of the Council's over 3500 member companies and institutions. Annual subscription rate $12.00. Special subscription rates available to educators, students, clergy and members. Additional copies available at 25¢ each postpaid for non-members and 10¢ each postpaid for members.

Copyright © 1964 by American Security Council. All rights reserved except that permission is granted for reproduction in whole or in part if context is preserved, credit given and two copies are forwarded to the American Security Council Executive Offices.

AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

Executive Offices and Research Center: 123 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606

Washington Bureau: 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036

Western Office: 5931 West Slauson Avenue, Culver City, California 90232

February 28, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: John A. Wells

FROM: Roswell B. Perkins

SUBJECT: Interest Groups Concerned with Captive Nations

One of the areas in which interest groups are highly vocal, as you well know, is the area of captive nations in Europe.

I have asked a volunteer researcher, David Dulles, to help build up our files on the composition and platform of each of these groups, in order that we can separate the extremists from the responsible groups and deal with them more effectively.

I would appreciate the opportunity to chat with you or whoever on your staff is going to be concerned with these groups from a political viewpoint.

Incidentally, I am told one of the outstanding experts in this field is Horace E. Henderson, Chairman of the Republican Party in Virginia. He was formerly at the Free Europe Committee here in New York. Is Henderson a Rockefeller supporter? I would like very much to contact him and have him sit down with us.

cc: Douglas Bailey
Berent Friele
George L. Hinman
Henry A. Kissinger
Robert McManus
Hugh Morrow
William J. Ronan
Mike N. Scelsi