Helmut Schmidt
(Hamburg)

Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages

Prof. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
Littauer Center
Cambridge 30, Massachusetts USA

Dear Prof. Kissinger !

Haben Sie sehr herzlichen Dank für die Übersendung von zwei
Artikeln, die ich mit Interesse gelesen habe. Ich benutze die
Gelegenheit, um Ihnen zu sagen, wie außerordentlich mich unsere
Unterhaltung im Hamburger Rathaus interessiert hat.

Mit besten Wünschen

Bonn, den 13. April 1959

Bundeshaus
Fernruf 206

2282

Sch/Wm.

Die Wahl dieser Rufnummer vermittelt den
gewünschten Hausanschluß

Kommt ein Anschluß nicht zustande, bitte
Nr. 2061 (Bundeshaus-Vermittlung) anrufen.

January 6, 1960

Mr. Helmut Schmidt
Zickzackweg 6B
Hamburg-Othmarschen, Germany

My dear Mr. Schmidt:

I remember with great pleasure
our meeting in Hamburg last year. I will
be there again on Monday and Tuesday, January
25th and 26th, and I would like very much
to see you again, and perhaps some of your
colleagues to get their views.

I am staying at the Europaischer
Hof, but it would be most helpful if you could
write to me here before my departure on January
20th so that I could arrange my appointments.

I am looking forward to renewing our
acquaintance.

Kind regards.

Helmut Schmidt
(Hamburg)

Bonn, den 14. Januar 1960
Sch/Wm.

Fernruf 206 2282

Die Wahl dieser Rufnummer vermittelt
den gewünschten Hausanschluß.

Herrn
Prof. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts
USA

Dear Prof. Kissinger!

Haben Sie besten Dank für Ihr freundliches Schreiben vom 6. Januar. Ich stehe Ihnen am Montag, den 25. Januar gern in Hamburg zur Verfügung, leider mit Ausschluß des Abends, an dem ich bereits besetzt bin und nachts nach Bonn fahren muß. Meine Parteifreunde, Prof. Dr. Karl Schiller und Bundestagsabgeordneter Berkhan wären gleichfalls an dem Gespräch interessiert. Ich darf vorschlagen, dass wir uns vielleicht am Montagnachmittag gegen 16 Uhr in meiner Wohnung in Hamburg-Othmarschen, Zickzackweg 6 b treffen. Bitte lassen Sie mich wissen, ob Ihnen dieser Vorschlag genehm ist (meine Hamburger Telefonnummer: 89 20 12).

Mit vorzüglicher Hochachtung
Ihr sehr ergebener

February 3, 1960

Dear Mr. Schmidt:

It was a pleasure as always to see you. I particularly appreciated the opportunity to learn your views in greater detail than I had been able on my previous visit. I do not think that on the theory and on the goals we would differ very much. I must say, however, that having spent a few days in France and having been exposed to some of the situation there, I am not so optimistic about either the possibility or the wisdom of stationing the entire Western military establishment in Europe in that country.

I hope you will send me your speeches on this and other topics.

I do not have the address of your friend Bergman whom I liked very much, and I would be grateful if you would ask him to make sure to contact me before he comes to America. It will be a pleasure to see him again.

With all good wishes.

NEWS FROM GERMANY

RE-DEPLOYMENT

Vol. 14

January, 1960

No. 1

Lest We Forget ...

Once again antisemitic outbursts have caused the searchlights of international public opinion to focus on the Federal Republic of Germany. We feel small consolation in the fact that our bulletin has consistently tried to draw attention to such a development. Exactly one year ago we began to publish a column under the heading "Lest we forget". At that time the editor explained the reasons for instituting such a column as follows:

"Under this title the January issue of NEWS FROM GERMANY for the first time published a few reports about nationalist and antisemitic occurrences in West Germany. We have limited ourselves to reporting and have deliberately refrained from commenting, because the facts speak for themselves.

For a long time we hesitated whether it was the function of a bulletin of this kind, intended to give English-speaking countries a background in German affairs, to publish a collection of facts which tend to embarrass the prestige of the Federal Republic. The fact that we have nevertheless decided to do so stems from our conviction that these facts throw light on a political tendency which causes us concern.

The causes which have given rise to these nationalist tendencies are not here and now to be investigated. They are not, however, the sole concern of Germans."

Many newspapers in Germany have dealt with antisemitic and antidemocratic activities, yet far too often with tongue in cheek. It is high time to drop this reserve and to stop mincing words.

We know, of course, that antisemitism has never been and is not now a purely German phenomenon. It is part and parcel of an antidemocratic and nationalist attitude, both political and social. We also know that there are a number of sociological factors contributing in our present society to the rise of such occurrences. But when all this is said and duly analysed, no comfort can be felt about scientific and sophisticated explanations because antisemitic and nationalist deeds must carry a special flavour when they occur in Germany. Nobody can make undone the atrocities committed by the Nazi Regime against millions of Jewish citizens for no other reason than their being Jewish. There can, therefore, be no feeling of "relief", that in the world at large non-German hooligans, because of contamination, conviction or immaturity, likewise smear swastikas and antisemitic slogans on house-walls.

CONTENTS

Lest We Forget

Contribution to Disarmament

STRONG REACTION IN PRESS

The German press, certainly representing the sentiments of the great majority of the German population, has reacted in a way appropriate to democratic institutions. This should be little cause for praise, for in a democratic society it should be a matter of course to react as it did. Far too often, however, there is an underlying tone, even more strongly noticeable in some government declarations, that these outrages result in a loss of prestige for the Federal Republic outside our own borders. It seems to us that this purely opportunistic attitude is just as shameless as the attempt of many of the highest circles of our State authorities to divert the attention from the right-wing hooligans and blame others, for instance the Communists. No doubt, Communists and other antidemocratic forces will rejoice that such happenings take place in Western Germany. But this is too cheap an argument and in fact raises a number of questions, for instance that of guilty conscience, if such attempts are further being pursued.

In spite of all strong declarations, so far nobody knows whether the recent smearings are part of a campaign, organized or not, whether from Germany or elsewhere. In all probability, we shall never be certain about the answer to these questions and, in fact, they are really immaterial. We shall probably find many motives for the present campaign, which may be partly an organized effort and partly mere imitation by international Fascists or by youngsters who want to catch the public's eye. It is disturbing enough that 15 years after the defeat of the barbarious Nazi Regime, racial discrimination is rearing its ugly head again. Apologists may and will point to bad examples in foreign countries. This may be as it is, we have to deal with the German causes for such happenings in our own country under our responsibility. For 10 years Social Democrats and others have pointed to the dangers of a policy which has led to an appeasement of former Nazis. A personnel policy which led to the appointment of Mini-

NEWS FROM GERMANY, January 1960

It is quite clear that in view of this demand for equivalence a zone of limited armaments in Europe is out of question so long as it would include only the two parts of Germany, since there would be no equivalence of territory on both sides. The equivalence would also not be given if the zone ran from the Atlantic coast to the Western border of Russia. These are only two examples of zones that fail to come up to the demand for equivalence.

You know, that we Social Democrats have always proposed a zone of completely different dimensions, with the Federal Republic on one side, and East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary on the other side. By the way, allow me to mention here that it was one of the most interesting points in the Rapacki-Plan that it implicitly recognised that only East Germany plus Poland plus Czechoslovakia would form a counter-balance to West Germany. This should be remembered at future negotiations.

## A First Step

We Social Democrats do not expect you to take steps now and here which would imply a radical change of your position in this difficult hour — difficult because the international situation is so impenetrable. We do not intend to question West German membership in NATO here and today.

Nor do we intend to question — even less — here and today the ties to the West in all other treaties. Nor do we expect you to give up the goals which you are pursuing through the build-up of the Bundeswehr. These are not the issues. The problems are much too difficult than to be susceptible to such over-simplifications.

What we suggest to the Federal Government at the present time is to take a first small step, to make a proposal, or even to talk about proposals which have been made elsewhere, in order to achieve the creation of a zone of controlled limitations on armaments in Central Europe that fulfills all these demands for equivalence, of which the Defence Minister has spoken.

How would it look? A first requisite would be international and reciprocal controls on the ground, and these should be stationary as well as mobile, also in seaports and in airports. There would have to be reciprocal air inspection; then a limit would have to be established on the number of foreign troops in the zone, a limitation or ceiling on the number of foreign troops so that they will not grow any more.

There also has to be a ceiling on the troop strength of those forces which remain in the zone after the foreign troops will have been pulled out step by step.

Let us assume that the Bundeswehr will have 300,000 soldiers. Then it could be imagined that the ratio of the Bundeswehr to the Polish Army would be 3 to 2, the ratio of West German troops to East German troops would be 3 to 1, the ratio to Czechoslovakia also 3 to 1, and perhaps the same to Hungary.

If this is added then we arrive at a ratio of 3 to 5 for West German troops compared to Satellite troops inside the zone. This would include — I must recall this — a definite restriction to conventional armaments for these troops.

Besides that the controls would have to include the para-military organisations which exist in different states.

In the next stage it would be necessary for both systems of alliances to set up advanced radar stations at the opposite edge of the zone, i. e. for the Warsaw pact perhaps on the Rhine and for NATO perhaps on the Narew. It may also be considered whether it will be necessary to control even these radar stations so that they cannot be transformed into electronic stations for the guidance of missiles.

Once this has been installed, it would come to a step by step — not everything at once, so that nothing can happen — reduction of foreign troops in the zone under reciprocal controls, and I add, perhaps down to small symbolic forces, let us say the size of brigades, which could stay on the line of demarcation. Of course, the stationing of symbolic troops in Berlin would also have to be maintained.

To prevent this idea from constantly being misunderstood, I must add, that a zone of limited armaments which is structured in the described manner does not presuppose that the Federal Republic leaves NATO or that the three staytes leave the Warsaw Pact. On the contrary, this question only arises once a collective security system is to be created, which we hope will go beyond this zone of limited armaments. It does arise when a political solution of the German problems is discussed, but not at present. I cannot understand why some people constantly repeat that we intend to take the Federal Republic unilaterally out of her alliance without regard for what is happening in the rest of Europe, which in truth we do not do at all.

All these proposals came under various criticisms in recent months. But most of the criticisms were dressed up in military clothes, that is, criticism from political motivations — insofar as it was serious criticism — was always presented in the form of a military argument. Our parliamentary party deems it necessary to scrutinize these military arguments against a zone of limited armaments more closely.

At first it must be pointed out that in terms of territory there would be 250,000 square kilometres of West German territory inside this zone, compared to 310,000 square kilometres of Poland, 110,000 square kilometres of East Germany, 130,000 square kilometres of Czechoslovakia, a total of 550,000 square kilometres plus Hungary. This means that the ratio of territory on both sides of the line of demarcation is about one to two. The width of the area would be between 300 and 400 kilometres on our side and between 800 and 1,000 kilometres on the other side. I must add, that I am not overlooking the fact that on the Northern and Southern corners of the Eastern side of this zone the section of East Prussia which is under Russian occupation and Hungary, if it were not to be part of this zone, cut into it and reduce the distance to about 600 kilometres to the line of demarcation.

What is the relationship in terms of population? There are 52 million people on our side and 58 million on the other side, to which must be added the population of Hungary. (28 million people in Poland, 17 or 18 million in East Germany, and 13 million in

Czechoslovakia). So it would be roughly a one to one relationship.

Now thirdly, and very important, the economic power. The productive power of the Western part of this limitation zone, namely that of the Federal Republic, would be considerably greater than that of the four Eastern states combined, in the forseeable future.

## Where to put the Rockets

The objections with which I would like to deal here all go — and this is typical — in one definite direction. According to one objection there would not remain enough room for NATO to allocate strategic nuclear weapons in Western Europe and keep a sufficient protective forefield for these strategic nuclear weapons.

In answer to this it can be said that strategic nuclear weapons, especially IRBM's — and these were the subject of discussions in recent years — are not stationed in the Federal Republic today and will apparently not be stationed here in the future. This is the declared intention of all those who have a say in these matters in NATO.

These rockets are stationed outside of Germany even today, insofar as they are stationed in Europe at all, and they can unfortunately be reached by Soviet medium range rockets in their present sites in the case of war or by Soviet bombers. This would not change, to the better or worse, by having a zone of limited armaments in the middle. This also applies to the bombers of the British Bomber Command.

If the vulnerability from which the IRBM's of NATO are now suffering were to be removed, they should not be put on solid land bases but on moving ships.

In connection with this territorial argument it is often said that NATO could not do without the 300 or 400 kilometres of West Germany. Today the Red Army stands only 120 kilometres from Frankfurt, 50 kilometres from Hamburg and 100 kilometres from the Kiel Canal. If the zone of limited armaments were established the Soviet Tank Armies would not only stand behind the Elbe river, but also behind the Oder, behind the Vistula and behind the Bug.

This would mean, for instance, with regard to the exits of the Baltic, a problem that has been much discussed by NATO politicians and strategists in the past twelve months, that these exits would no longer be exposed to an immediate attack by Soviet land forces and that the bases of naval forces, which might want to conquer the exit from the Baltic would be much further eastward than they are today.

## Open Flanks are to be Avoided

In comparison with this the forces of NATO would have to be pulled back only 300 kilometres, and they would not have to cross three major European streams in the case of war, but only one: the Rhine.

It should be pointed out that the efficiency of modern tactical air forces is suited excellently to interrupting just such mass crossings of streams. Soviet armies would have to reckon with the danger

of "interdiction" by Western air forces at three rivers. The West would have to reckon with this danger at only one river, the Rhine.

In this connection the problem of so-called open flanks is often mentioned, which would result for NATO in Scandinavia on the one hand, and in Southern Europe on the other. This objection starts from the vacuum theory, according to which Central Europe without considerable military forces would act as an attracting vacuum, which the Soviets could penetrate and attack the flanks from there.

To this it can be replied that before Soviet troops would be able to penetrate to the centre of this zone from behind the Bug, NATO troops from beyond the Rhine could reach their present positions far earlier. But above all, the forces of the Federal Republic will stand in the centre of Europe.

The vacuum-objection includes also a second problem, which in international discussions is called the problem of "re-entry", and pertains to the supposed return of the Soviets to their former positions. The answer: The present forward-strategy of NATO is really an euphemism. In reality it means that NATO will try to start its containing action, which is calculated to gain time, directly at the Iron Curtain but fixed lines of defence will not be reached before the Rhine. That is the present conception.

## The problem of Soviet Re-entry

If the Soviets tried to re-enter this zone in the future, NATO would have much more time to alarm its forces and deploy them eastwards from the German Western frontiers. These forces would also be able to reach their present positions in Germany much more easily than the Soviets would be able to reach theirs in East Germany, particularly since traffic conditions in Poland are not so good as they are in West Germany.

Another objection constantly being heard is that NATO would be considerably weakened if it could not have tactical nuclear weapons on its front line on the territory of the Federal Republic.

In reply it must be said that it has been the task of tactical nuclear weapons to balance Russian superiority in the field of conventional armed manpower. Once these Russian troops have been pulled back eastwards out of this zone of limited armaments, it will no longer be necessary to have tactical nuclear weapons to balance the conventional superiority of Russia at the Elbe since the Russians will no longer stand at the Elbe. If at any moment they should decide to re-enter, the tactical nuclear weapons of NATO could be brought back into the territory of the Federal Republic from the West. At the same time the West would preserve a territorial and therefore also an advantage of time for possible similar moves of the East, as I have mentioned above.

It must also be pointed out that the most important tactical nuclear weapons of the West, namely the fighter bomber squadrons in the Eifel and Hunsrück, would have to be moved back only a few kilometres to the West, whereas the fighter bomber

squadrons of the Soviets would suffer greater eastward transpositions.

In the next place the objection is at times voiced that a so-called small war could come about inside this zone of limitations, a war between states inside the zone. The answer:

The forces of the Federal Republic will always be able to defend her own borders against the forces of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia if all these forces will remain limited to numbers I mentioned earlier. The West German army will always be able to stop what the Defence Minister, Herr Strauß, likes to call "Salami-tactics" or what the British call "piece-meal".

Besides that — I want to say this to those who may think that this military argumentation is somewhat unusual in parliament; but I think it is neccessary to speak about all this once — I should like to point out that NATO's superiority in tactical nuclear weapons will unfortunately diminish in the course of the next two or four years.

It is also said that it would be possible to shoot into this zone with nuclear weapons from outside, and that therefore in the case of a serious conflict all guarantees would be useless.

In answer to this I would like to say that a power, most likely a major power, which would shoot into the zone of limited armaments with tactical or even strategic nuclear weapons, would thereby challenge retaliation from the opposite major power which is allied to the injured state. She also has weapons of great range, so that whoever shoots first would also have to worry about eliminating the nuclear weapons of the one who might retaliate at the same time. This means that by shooting into the zone with nuclear weapons, a nuclear conflict in Europe would be sparked, and that the military starting position of the West in such a case would be neither better nor worse in a controlled zone of limited armaments than it is today.

## From all Sides...

It is not impossible that someone will shoot into this zone from the outside with nuclear weapons — I admit this — even if there are no nuclear weapons in the zone, with the consequences I mentioned, of course. But if we have nuclear weapons inside of this zone, then it is almost certain that in the case of war nuclear weapons will be used here from all sides.

It is also objected that ammunition of the so-called two-purpose-weapons — to which belong fighter bombers, which are capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional bombs, and also certain missiles — can easily be hidden. This objection is not incorrect in principle, and it will require special care in settling up the machinery of controls. But I should like to point out that this specific problem is not a special problem of a European limited armaments zone, but a general problem of any limitation measures with respect to nuclear weapons all over the world. This problem makes itself felt everywhere, it is therefore not restricted to Europe.

There is one last objection, which is constantly heard, namely that a zone of limited armaments

would place the Federal Republic into a special position vis-à-vis the other NATO-partners, and that this special position is not politically or psychologically tolerable. To this it must be replied that there are already countries with a special status in NATO, if not de jure then a least in practice. I only point to Denmark and Norway and in an opposite sense to France, which will doubtless be in quite a different position than the Federal Republic for instance, once she has her own bomb. Even today the Federal Republic is in a special position in NATO through the West European Union (WEU) and its arms restrictions, without endangering the coherence and unity of NATO. This special status should certainly not be a cause for worry in the Federal Republic, when on the other side East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary will have a similar special status within the Warsaw Pact.

It was important to us to present these military arguments here and state our views about them, so that those people in this house who usually discard our military proposals as unrealistic might have the opportunity of thinking about concrete military conceptions.

## Allied Military Leaders Agree

In conclusion let me quote a few military authorities who have reached similar conclusions in these questions.

Field Marshal Montgomery was quoted earlier today. I would like to recall what Montgomery really said, who it must be remembered was Deputy Commander in Chief of NATO in Europe until very recently. He held this position for ten years, and therefore does not speak like a blind man about colour, but was forced to think about these problems professionally for many years. Montgomery writes: (Reprinted in the West German newspaper *Die Welt*, April 4th, 1958):

> "I fail to understand those Americans who say they would leave Europe if their troops left Germany... When conditions call for it a United States Corps of — let us say — two divisions will be transferred to France, and the same applies to a British Corps... And if Russia demands that the same number of Russian troops be stationed in Poland or some other Satellite state then no one can object to this in my opinion... and then we can start to live next to each other peacefully in Europe." (Re-translated from German text)

I shall quote another Englishman, also a man who until recently held a very important military command, the former Chief of Staff of the Royal Air Force, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor. In several articles (New York Herald Tribune, Jan.—Febr. 1958) — and on other occasions — he has argued again and again that in the first place, the shield task inside of a zone of limited armaments against limited actions from the East, here on German territory, can without much trouble be assumed by the divisions of the Bundeswehr and that the Bundeswehr needs no nuclear arms for this. He has always said that he would welcome if after the withdrawal of foreign troops

symbolic brigades of the two major powers would remain here in a so-called trip-wire-function. He has repeatedly demanded that radar stations of both major powers should be moved to the borders of the zones, something that is of great military importance to both, although it has often been overlooked in political discussions up to now.

What interests me particularly in these statements by military authorities — which I could easily supplement further — are less the details than the fact that they are voiced by high-ranking and experienced military commanders only at a time when these soldiers are no longer responsible to the political line of a government.

Lord Montgomery did not say this when he was still in the service of NATO, nor did Sir John Slessor say this when he was still serving in the Royal Air Force. I am personally very much interested in knowing what General Lauris Norstad will say about these problems when he becomes a free man, and what General Adolf Heusinger will say.

It only happened once — recently in Germany — that a General in active service said something of this sort. This was the Commander in Chief of the United States Army in Europe, General Eddleman, who said in Bonn (on May 7, 1959 before the Foreign Press Association): „NATO can fulfill its tasks in Europe even from positions west of the Rhine.“ But since he is still in active service, a denial from his superiors was quick to follow.

Two weeks ago, I should like to mention this to the Defence Minister, his chief witness, the American Professor Henry Kissinger, even said on German television (Frankfurter Allgemeine, October 22, 1959) a regional disarmament in Europe was quite imaginable.

And very recently an outstanding German military thinker gave his views about this problem. He said: "We Germans do not want to appear to be in the way of disarmament. We also consider disarmament an essential point on the way to an easing of tensions. It would, of course, be dishonest to say, 'Let them control and inspect in the world, but not with us'. On the contrary, we must give a good example and be prepared to make the Federal Republic a part of a control- and inspection zone, whether completely or only in part."

He continued:

"This does not mean the control- and inspection zone has to be identical with the geographic borders of the Federal Republic, it means that the Federal Republic, either completely or in part, should become a part of the control zone on which the major powers can agree. If the major powers do not agree then a German proposal would not be of decisive importance in the world all by itself. If the major powers do agree, however, then we should not be in the way of an agreement with any special wishes."

You may have noticed in the meantime, whom I have quoted here. It was the Federal Defence Minister, Herr Strauss, who said this, and the next part of the quote I would like to address to Herr von Eckardt (Chief Government spokesman), who said

two days ago that the Federal Government was only in favour of such a zone if it went up to the Urals.

For Herr Strauss continues verbatim — I have the original record of his press conference here before me — it would be vain to say this disarmament zone should go all the way to the Urals, if the Soviet Union did not agree. The expansion of the inspection zone might be the first phase of a continuing disarmament, with the expansion going as far to the East as the Soviets are willing to allow with an equivalent expansion westwards. The speaker, who is the Commander in Chief of the West German Armed Forces, also made it clear that he would not like to see the zone as the final stage of disarmament, but just as we, would accept it only as the beginning phase of world-wide disarmament, if the major powers should so decide.

I have no personal interest in imputing anything to Herr Strauss, nor do I want to bring him into opposition to anything that has been said on this subject here today. But I should like to point out with a certain amount of satisfaction that this military thinker seems no longer opposed to the idea of a zone of limited armaments in Central Europe, if a balance of power is maintained. I must add in all fairness that Herr Strauss said in the same interview he would oppose the creation of such a zone, if it had not previously been agreed that further disarmament steps should follow. It is clear that we differ on this point. We do not think it is adequate to erect new conditions now that the old conditions have been dropped.

## Shield Function of NATO unchanged

May I conclude: If it is the purpose of NATO to defend Europe then in the case of our proposal this capacity will be maintained in the event of a major war. The main task of NATO to act as a shield against an attack in order to gain time for nuclear retaliation will even be made easier. The gain in time will be considerably increased if both sides must at first cross the zone before getting in touch, whereas now they stand face to face at the Thuringian Forest and the Elbe River. It would also be a great psychological and political advantage for the West, no longer to be forced to maintain the incredible threat that it will retaliate with nuclear weapons in any event, which is the present strategy of NATO, and at the same time has made its political position so difficult.

Outside of the Zone there will arise, of course, certain military and political consequences which we are not overlooking. Not, as it is often said, that the Americans could not bear it if their remaining symbolic troops were not equipped with nuclear arms. They can bear this fairly well. The Americans in Berlin have borne not being equipped with tactical nuclear arms, for the past ten years, as well. We are only dealing with symbolic forces inside the zone. The American forces outside of this zone would of course be able to dispose over any weapons they like. Especially the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, one of the most decisive levers, would not be affected at all. The British Bomber Command would not be affected and the medium range missile bases in Britain or elsewhere in Europe would not be affected. It is hard to imagine in what sense the

Americans should feel discriminated. The Humphrey Report (Final Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Washington September 3, 1958) and the statements of Senator Fulbright and many others also rule this out.

## Transfer of Troops

It will, however, be necessary to find room for the greater part of the foreign troops now stationed in West Germany — there are about four American divisions at present and a total of two British, Canadian, and Belgian — elsewhere in Europe, behind the Western borders of Germany. This transfer requires considerable financial expenditures. It requires the building of new airports, new depots, and troop-quarters etc.

But these difficulties are much greater on the other side, however, due to the transfer of at least 22 Soviet divisions from East Germany alone. Besides, there is enough room between the Western borders of Germany and the Atlantic coast to accomodate the relatively small troop contingents stationed in West Germany, today. As a matter of fact, the territory between the German Western borders and the Atlantic coast is virtually clear of any combat forces. If this is compared to the number of troops which this territory should have absorbed if the NATO-decisions of Lisbon had ever been carried out, there would have been much greater numbers than under the present plan.

The actual difficulties are not military in our opinion. The military objections must be taken seriously, and they must be studied. Perhaps conclusions will be reached which agree with those presented here today. The real difficulties and actual motives, which have always led to the political rejection of a zone of limited armaments in Central Europe, are in fact political and psychological.

They are to be found for instance in the disinclination of Western countries to take only a few more American soldiers than they already have. This is true in France, in Holland, and in other countries. It is not the generals therefore and their staffs, who reach the conclusion to disagree to a zone of limitations from military considerations, but it is the politicians who reject it, using the generals who must furnish them with arguments.

In the next few years there will be a change of roles of the European NATO countries and a reevaluation of the present situation of NATO. This new distribution of roles is already discussed under the key-word "re-deployment". Look for instance at what France has done or rather left undone with respect to NATO in the past 12 months. This also applies to the desire of the non-nuclear partners of NATO, not to be presented with a *fait accompli* some day, when NATO decides to use nuclear weapons in the event of a serious threat.

## Time gained for ultimate decision

Against the background of this last question the controlled zone of limited armaments has this important political advantage: Today when troops are facing each other immediately across the River Elbe, NATO is forced to employ nuclear weapons within a very short time in the event of a conflict. Once a control zone exists it will have much more time carefully to explain this decision. It could present the opponent with an ultimatum to stop his actions and would still be left with time to push the release-button.

There is one final objection which is often used after having stressed the disadvantages for NATO, namely that the Russians would not accept this zone. This argument is a paradox. If our proposal has disadvantages for NATO, then why should not the Russians accept it? Of course, it cannot be claimed here today that these proposals will be accepted by the East. We can only say that we do not know. We know that a step by step withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany and other states in the East would doubtless have and is expected to have political consequences. We are therefore not too optimistic about the acceptance of such proposals.

In the last speech of the Soviet Prime Minister, however, he again spoke of a European Inspection Zone and a Central European zone free of nuclear weapons. We therefore do not believe that such a proposal if it came from our American ally would be rejected straight-out by the Eastern side. In any case, a proposal of this kind would show the world once and for all that the West and West Germany in particular are serious about wanting peace and disarmament.

It is to be regretted that strategic and political problems are so closely linked today. The danger from the East is not so much a military threat, I think, and a major war is not very probable in Europe. The danger will be reduced even further through the establishment of a zone of limited armaments.

The real danger from the East lies in competition in the fields of science, technology, production and living standard during the next decade. The danger is essentially in the spiritual and intellectual challenge the East has posed for Europe. If we pretend that it will be enough to maintain the military balance of power or the Western lead in productivity, and trust in the pseudo-ideology of "psychological defence" for the rest, then we shall have a terrible awakening some day.

Of course, the West needs soldiers, of course it needs a flourishing and efficient economy, of course it needs the sense of living in a state of social justice. But above all it needs the deep conviction of the moral superiority of the free spirit and a democratic order in which people respect each other.

Published by the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, International Department, Bonn, Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 170.

Obtainable abroad: F. Segall, 182 Goldhurst Terrace, London NW 6,
and Gerhard G. Gerechter, 1693 Nelson Ave, Apt. 22, New York 53, USA

Edited by H. Putzrath, Bonn • Printed by DRUCKHAUS DEUTZ, KÖLN

March 10, 1960

Herr Helmut Schmidt
Zickzackweg 6B
Hamburg/Othmarchen, Germany

My dear Herr Schmidt:

I have read with great interest
excerpts from your speech, "Is a Regional
Limitation of Armaments in Central Europe
Possible?" which you gave in November,
and want to thank you very much for sending
it.

I hope we will get the chance to
meet again on my next trip to Germany.

With kind regards.

Helmut Schmidt
(Hamburg)

Bonn, den 8. Juli 1960 [ihr]
Fernruf 206 2282 Sch/Wm.

Herrn
Prof. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center of International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass. - USA

Dear Professor Kissinger !

Sie haben mir im Laufe der letzten Monate mehrfach Aufsätze zu-
gehen lassen, die ich stets mit großem Interesse gelesen habe.
Ebenso denke ich gern an unsere beiden interessanten Gespräche
in Hamburg zurück. Die Erinnerung daran ermutigt mich zu der
nachstehend ausgesprochenen Bitte.

Ich bin zur Zeit dabei, ein etwa 150 Druckseiten umfassendes
Buch zu schreiben, das sich mit den Wandlungen der strategischen
Lage in Europa beschäftigen soll. Mein Zweck ist dabei folgender:

Nachdem bisher die öffentliche Diskussion strategischer und wehr-
politischer Fragen in der Bundesrepublik stark unter der Belastung
durch Voroteile, ideologische Fixierungen und Gefühlsmomente ge-
litten hat, ist es dringend notwendig, zumindest dem Meinungsbil-
denden in unserer Gesellschaft, vor allem aber Politikern und
Journalisten die Möglichkeit zur objektiven Unterrichtung über
die Tatsachen zu geben. In Amerika erscheinen jedes Jahr eine
Reihe von wissenschaftlich hervorragend qualifizierten Werken
zu strategischen Problemen bzw. zu den ineinander verwobenen
Fragen der Strategie und Außenpolitik. Diese ganze umfangreiche
Literatur der letzten fünf Jahre, ebenso wie die auch etwas spär-
lichere englische und sowjetische Literatur, ist hierzulande fast
völlig unbekannt geblieben - mit Ausnahme Ihres Buches. Mir käme
es darauf an, in militärisch und wissenschaftlich einwandfreier
Weise eine trotzdem auch für den Laien lesbare und anziehende
Darstellung der Tatsachen zu geben und durch einen ausführlichen
Literaturanhang weitere Informationsmöglichkeiten

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aufzuzeigen. Selbstverständlich will ich bei der Darstellung
mein eigenes Urteil keineswegs unterdrücken.

Meine Hoffnung ist, nicht nur bei den der Sozialdemokratie an-
hängenden Lesern mehr Verständnis für militärische Realitäten
zu wecken, als auch insbesondere bei den übrigen Lesern Ver-
ständnis zu erwecken für den militärischen Realismus sozial-
demokratischer Vorstellungen. Zweifellos wird aber vieles
in dem Buch sthen, das auch für meine sozialdemokratischen Freunde
im Bundestag überraschend sein mag.

Ich würde sehr gern meine Gedanken in einem Gespräch mit Ihnen
überprüfen (wie auch vielleicht später mit dem mir ebenfalls
bekannten Prof. Wolfers in Washington). Zu diesem Zweck ließe
sich in der Zeit vom 29.8. bis 16.9.1960 ein Besuch in Harvard
ermöglichen. Bitte lassen Sie mich wissen, ob Sie in diesem
Zeitraum in Harvard sein werden und ob Sie Zeit für ein solches
Gespräch erübrigen könnten,

Mit freundlichen Grüssen
stets Ihr ergebener

Helmut Schmidt

Bonn, den 29. 7. 1960

[d]

Fernruf 206

Hamburg-Othmarschen
Zickzackweg 6b

Dear Professor Kissinger,

Thank you very much for your kind letter from Athens. Very unfortunately I can arrive in the United States not earlier than on August 28th, and I will have to go to Chicago first. But I do hope that there will be a chance to meet you in Japan. I will arrive in Tokio on September 20th and do hope very much that you will still be there. In any case I will immediately call on the American Embassy in Tokio hoping that they might know about your whereabouts.

In the meantime I would be very grateful if you could see any possibility to introduce me to one of your military expert collegues at Harvard. I will arrive at Boston on September 12th staying for two days. I will stay in Chicago until September 3rd or 4th, in New York from September 8th to September 12th and in Washington at September 6th and 7th.

I do hate to cause you a lot of trouble, but nevertheless would be very glad to get your introduction to one or the other military expert (especially on NATO-problems) or high-ranking officer.

Hoping to meet you either in Tokio or sometimes later at your next trip to Europe

August 26, 1960

Senator Stuart Blyington
United States Senate

Dear Senator:

 schedule.
any time you can give him from your push
with him. I will be very grateful for
he would brought a great deal from speaking
I believe will go very far, and I know
He is an extremely bright young man who
and a specialist in military affairs.
in the German Social Democratic Party
who is one of the most influential men
of introducing to you Mr. Heimat Schmidt,
I would like to take the liberty

With kind regards.

August 26, 1960

Major General C. H. Bonesteel
Secretary of the General Staff
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Tick:

I'm sorry to keep bothering you, but I would like to introduce Mr. Helmut Schmidt, who is one of the most influential men in the German Social Democratic Party, and a specialist in military affairs. He is a very bright young man who I believe is destined to go far, and I think it is important to give him some exposure to Army thinking. I would be very grateful if you could see him.

All the best, and many thanks for your patience.

August 29, 1960

Dr. Helmut Schmidt
Member of the Bundestag
c/o German Embassy
1742 R Street NW
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Schmidt

Thank you very much for your letter of July 27th, which I found on my desk upon my return to this country a few days ago. Unhappily, I am leaving for Tokyo at the end of this week, and will not be here when you come to visit in September. However, my office will be glad to arrange some meetings for you with some of my colleagues if you will get in touch with them when you arrive. I will be very sorry to miss seeing you.

I am enclosing two letters of introduction to Senators Symington and General Bonesteel, which I hope will be helpful. Neither of these people has been informed that you will be visiting them, so that if you do not have time to see them no harm will be done.

I hope you enjoy your visit here, and that we will have an opportunity to see one another soon.

With kind regards.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

February 28, 1961

Mr. Helmut Schmidt
Zickzack weg 6B
Hamburg/Othmarchen, Germany

Dear Mr. Schmidt:

It was good to see you at the recent German-American
Conference in Washington, and I am sorry that we did not have
more time for conversation.

I am sorry also that the Conference did not seem more
fruitful. Many of our German friends were no doubt disappointed
by the kind of Americans who participated and by the lack of real
information they conveyed. Of course the two problems are
closely connected.

I believe that the difficulty was that the conference was
held in Washington, where everyone who has any governmental
connection finds it almost impossible not to combine his visit
with some other duties. I am convinced, for example, that our
Congressional delegation would have attended much more regularly
had the meeting been held in Miami or some other place which
presented no opportunity for their regular pursuits.

Another problem is that during the Eisenhower Administration
our first team was out of office and consequently highly available
for conferences. At present our first team is in office and therefore
somewhat busy. If I were a German, however, I would be more reassured
to have people like Acheson or McCloy too busy to attend a conference
than otherwise.

Finally, as someone who has some acquaintance with the
thinking of the new Administration, I am confident about our firm-
ness with respect to Berlin. We will all be facing a difficult time
this year, but I am sure we will face it together, and also that this
is not only my private opinion.

With kind regards.

FOLD SIDES OVER AND THEN FOLD BOTTOM UP
MOISTEN, FLAP WELL AND APPLY PRESSURE TO SEAL

Conclusions on NATO-Strategy
==============================

Extracted from the last chapter of Helmut Schmidts book
"Verteidigung oder Vergeltung" *)

1. Deterrence is a traditional factor in defensive strategy. Deterrence is not identical with retaliation; it means generally threatening a potential aggressor with an intolerable risk. The principle of deterrence can fail if the aggressor holds that the threatened risk is acceptable, whether by error or by correct appraisal; or when the aggressor is not convinced that the opponent has the will or the capability to carry out his threat; or when no other course of action remains open to the aggressor; or when the aggressor does not make his decision as the result of a rational evaluation of the situation. The principle of deterrence can also fail if the defender is mistaken over the degree to which the threatened risk is unbearable to the aggressor. Protection of the allied nations of Europe from the outbreak of a war can be achieved if a potential attacker is deterred by the creation of risks which would in his judgment outweigh the benefits to be gained by his attack.

2. In the long run, the threat of weapons is effective only if there is no doubt on either side that they will in fact be used for defence if necessary. Therefore military strategies drawn up in peacetime for their deterrent effect, and threatened as such, must be completely congruent with strategies to be used in an

*) published by Seewald-Verlag Stuttgart 1961, 290 p;
Translation of the title: Defence or Retaliation

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actual defence operation. Any gap between the damage which is
merely threatenend, and that which is actually to be carried
out, can induce a potential aggressor to act.

3. The deterring factor which until now has been the most im-
portant, the threat of massive retaliation by the US Strategic
Air Command, inevitably loses significance with the approach of
a stable nuclear balance between the world powers. The threat of
thermo-nuklear destruction against a world power of strategic
nuclear capacity is not an effective deterrent against any aggres-
sion except a total one, because of the risk to the defender's
mere existence which is bound up with realisation of the threat.
The actual use of thermo-nuclear retaliation in reply to limited
or even non-nuklear aggression proves itself to be irresponsible;
the threat of it therefore loses credibility and leads to self-
deeption by the defender as to his own security against such
aggression. Retaliatory nuclear destruction with strategic weapons
can in the future be inflicted on another nuclear power with stra-
tegic capability only when the latter commits aggression with such
weapons. Only against a power with such intentions can the threat
of nuclear retaliation have lasting credibility and deterrent
effect. Therefore the West needs a strategic nuclear force which
is largely immune to damage (that is, hard), solely to deter
aggression of this type. The era of unlimited effectiveness is
rapidly approaching its end as far as the nuclear retaliation
threat in other cases is concerned. As the time draws nearer when
the Western strategic force will be confined to the above mentioned
single purpose, the probability of a total nuclear war between
East and West decreases; at the same time, however, the deterrent

[10]

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effect which was previously gained by the threat of nuclear destruction against smaller-scale aggression will be reduced.

4. Continued maintenance of the _general_ conception of strategic nuclear retaliation is foolish. Anyone who fails to understand that the threat of nuclear destruction is a deterrent against certain definite forms of aggression only, lays Europe open to subjection or destruction. The theory of the inevitability of nuclear defence is fatally wrong.

5. It is highly probable that a conflict could increase and accelerate in intensity, ending in the use of the most powerful weapons and the related risk of the defender's own thermo-nuclear destruction. Therefore the threat to use limited, or tactical, nuclear weapons against a nuclear-armed world power is no longer entirely credible in so far as it is meant to deter the latter from committing non-nuclear, or conventional, aggression. Defence with limited use of nuclear weapons will in the end serve as a serious threat only against aggression in which a similar use of weapons is intended. For the sole purpose of deterring aggression of this type, Nato therefore needs in Europe an adequate number of tactical nuclear weapons.

6. Defence against a non-nuclear aggression in Europe with the aid of tactical nuclear weapons, even in the unlikely event of both sides keeping within bounds avoiding the upward acceleration of weapons, would most probably mean extensive destruction in Europe, and would in any event mean extensive destruction in Germany.

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7. In the interest of maintaining the substance of Europe and particularly of Germany, Nato must therefore have troops and weapons on a scale adequate enough to make non-nuclear aggression appear hopeless, and sufficient in an emergency to force on of two courses on the aggressor - to halt or to extend the conflict.

8. Conventional defence of Europe against non-nuclear aggression, and therefore a conventional deterrent, is possible. Setting up the necessary deterrent and defence structure of Nato requires penetrating analysis by participating governments, by Nato and by the military staffs of both; it requires political decisions with their corresponding financial and legislative consequences as well as corresponding directives to military staffs. The change-over to the necessary defence structure will take several years, and this period will be accompanied by risks in foreign policy. But if because of these risks the change is not made, we can be certain that towards the end of the sixties Europe will not be able to defend itself against non-nuclear aggression at all. So those who think that it is not possible or not worth while to limit military conflicts to conventional weapons must not be allowed to exercise any influence on the strategy of Nato.

9. In the present circumstances, to defend Europe in a conflict with conventional weapons, Nato needs:

a) some 30 divisions with exclusively conventional weapons for the central European sector;

b) small, highly manoeuvrable groups (or "fire brigade"); conventional action

c) preparation for larger reserves;

d) modernised arms and equipment of considerably better quality;

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e) joint planning of development, production, supply and logistics;

f) integration of air defence.

10. Conventional forces which are intended to defend Europe against non-nuclear aggression or as a deterrent against such aggression must in future be kept strictly apart from nuclear forces intended to combat or deter nuclear aggression. Any possibility of a conventional conflict turning into a nuclear one only because of Nato's structure and strategy must be carefully excluded by means of appropriate provisions in political and military planning.

11. The overall defence structure of the West must in future be adequate enough to present an intolerable risk to a potential aggressor in all types of conflict. Conventional forces on land, on sea and in the air make the first encounter; they must be capable of operating without nuclear support. A special force armed with tactical nuclear weapons, the "second encounter" is needed for defence with limited nuclear firepower, and it must be capable of working together operationally with "first encounter" units if nuclear defence is needed.

12. Far-reaching division of labour is necessary among the European members of Nato for the sake of higher efficiency and to shorten the period of transition. The task of perfecting and maintaining an effective strategic nuclear force should be left to the United States. The task of releasing troops armed with tactical nuclear weapons from the existing "shield" forces and their formation into a separately organised tactical nuclear force should

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be entrusted to those states which have already made considerable
investments in this field and have created such units.

13. The creation of new independent nuclear (tactical as well as strategical) forces in the control of individual Nato countries would endanger the consistency and the cohesion of the alliance. The distribution of control over nuclear weapons among additional governments increases the probability of a nuclear catastrophe with mathematical certainty. In present-day conditions, transferring control over nuclear weapons to the German government would contribute considerably to fears which already exist. Nato must make every conceivable effort to oppose the spreading process. If contrary views on the part of individual member states cannot be changed in any other way, joint and integrated participation by other member states in strategic and tactical nuclear forces would appear to be the lesser evil. And yet Nato does not by any means need extra nuclear weapons to defend Europe - it needs more soldiers, tanks and conventional weapons in general.

14. Any strategic nuclear forces, as well as a special tactical nuclear force of Nato, would require special political leadership and control. So far there are no convincing suggestions for solving this problem; it is however a problem of extreme urgency and greatest significance, that must be analysed much more thoroughly than has been done in Europe until now, so that the Nato council can come to a well-founded political decision. It might be appropriate if the political leadership and control of both were placed under the command of the American President and - in an emergency - of a joint command subordinate to him.

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15. The supreme aim of all efforts made by Nato and its members in the military sphere must be the achievement of a stable balance of power. Arms control and limitation as well as inspection are suitable means of achieving greater stability. Agreed limitation of arms presumes an approach towards balance at all levels of weapons and troops on both sides. So long as Nato has to rely largely on nuclear weapons, while the Soviet led military block has great numerical superiority in conventional forces, it is not very probably that for-reaching agreements will be achieved.

16. However, there is intense interest in both world powers and all over the rest of the world in a speedy and final ban on nuclear tests. Such an agreement could prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other governments. An agreed halt to tests does not presume a general balance at all levels. It is therefore more pressing than other disarmament problems. If it is not brought about, with the participation of all countries concerned, a considerable deterioration in the strategic nuclear situation of the world will probably set in within a few years; such a deterioration could force new and unwanted decisions on Nato and its member states.

17. In the western world the problems of armament limitation and control, and inspection as a safeguard against surprise attack, have been so far scientifically investigated less than have the problems of deterrence and defence; results of analyses which have so far been made on disarmament and arms control have been kept more secret than those on defence. But deterrence and defence on the one hand and disarmament and control on the other are only different aspects of the same complex set of questions; the two

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sides of the coin. If better results are to be obtained, much more
comprehensive information and greater use of scientific research
methods are indispensable. The federal republic has also to con-
tribute to this.

18. The federal republic has in particular an urgent interest in careful examination of any such possibility of limited regional disarmament, control or inspection, which would offer a prospect of easing the political situation in central Europe without endan- gering the military balance of forces and its stabilising.

19. In the present state of the world and of Europe, there is hardly anybody who depends more on Nato's protection than Berlin and with it the federal republic of Germany. For this reason Germany should be the last to pursue political or military inten- tions which could impair the power to deter and defend of the alliance; on the contrary, she must oppose such intentions. In this connection Germany has to realise that many of her allies still do not place full or finally established confidence in her, and that many regards legitimate German claims arising from the partition of the country as a threat to peace. So the federal republic must neither give the impression that she will in her defence prepara- tions go farther than the Nato Council's decisions, nor must she give rise to any suspicion that she is toying with the thought of a policy that would make her independent of Nato. Political forces in the federal republic must not endanger confidence in the coun- try's loyalty to Nato, either by setting exaggerated armament aims or by demanding a reduction in Germany's commitments to the alliance. The size, equipment and training of the West German armed forces

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must fit the needs of Nato.

20. Closing of the missile gap by the United States and the reform of Nato's defence structure which has been demanded above will take two or three years. It is probable that the Soviet leadership will exploit this period with new foreign policy offensives. The greatest possible unanimity is therefore to be desired in Nato, and enough solidarity to ensure a national existence is to be demanded from all political forces within the federal republic.

Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung

- Pressereferat -

To
Havard University
Center for International Affairs
Professor Henry A. Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38
Massachusetts U. S. A.

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Thank you very much for your letter of September 19. I also like to remember our former conversations. Gladly, I agree to your proposal of meeting Mr. Quigg here in Bonn and to introduce him to some representatives of our military commands, e.g. the Chief of the Armed Forces Staff, the heads of the sections technology and defense economy, and some officers of the operations-staff.

I shall get in touch with Mr. Quigg by phone in the next few days in order to arrange the details of the meeting and possibly to hear special questions of Mr. Quigg.

Also I wish to thank you for your letter to the Minister of Defense. He is spending his holidays and will be back in Bonn on October 16. Therefore it will not be possible for him, to speak with Mr. Quigg.

With kind regards,

53 Bonn, den 25. September 1962

Ermekeilstraße 27 - Postschließfach

Fernsprecher 20161

Fernschreiber 0886575, 0886576

November 24, 1964

Senator Helmut Schmidt
Hamburg 1
Johanniswall 4
Germany

Dear Helmut:

Upon my return to the United States, I would like to tell you how much I enjoyed our conversations in Berlin both with respect to German re-unification and the future of NATO.

I thought that the questions you asked at one of our plenary sessions were much better than the answers you received. I think your questions will have to be answered if NATO is to prosper.

I look forward to hearing from you about our discussions with respect to the disarmament study group.

With high regard.

Henry A. Klausinger

Sincerely yours,

With high regard.

disarmament study group.
about our discussions with respect to the
I look forward to hearing from you

answered it NATO is to broader.
I think your questions will pave to be
much better than the answers you received.
asked at one of our plenary sessions were
I thought that the questions you

the future of NATO.
with respect to German re-unification and
joked our conversations in Berlin both
I would like to tell you how much I en-
Upon my return to the United States,

Dear Helmut:

Germany
Johann Wolfgang 4
Hamburg 1
Senator Helmut Schmidt

November 24, 1964

HELMUT SCHMIDT
Senator

2000 HAMBURG 1
Johanniswall 4
Tel. 24825800

den 18. Januar 1965

Herrn
Professor Henry A. Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

USA

Dear Henry !

Coming back to your letter from December 16th about the
Harvard University International Seminar of 1965 I would
like to come back to my recommendation of Oberregierungsrat
Herbert Rieck which I gave you last year. I do think that
the papers concerning Herr Rieck are still in your file.

I look forward to meet you at Harvard at the end of February
and hope that in the meantime you have got a letter from
Fritz Erler concerning the question of having a short meeting
in Germany. I have talked to Professor Weizsäcker in the
way you asked me to do.

JUL 30 1968

HELMUT SCHMIDT

Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages
Vorsitzender
der Sozialdemokratischen
Bundestagsfraktion

53 Bonn, Bundeshaus

July 26, 1968

Professor Henry A. KISSINGER
c/o. Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue,
Boston, Mass. - USA

Dear Henry,

A friend of mine, Manfred SCHULTE, Member of the Bundestag and whip of the social-democratic parliamentary group, will be visiting Washington and New York between August 7 - 15. He is particularly interested to spend one or two days with the headquarters or the entourage of Governor Rockefeller.

Please, be so kind as to give me a hint whom Herr Schulte should approach. Of course a letter of introduction might be very helpful.

Thanks a lot.

RÖMERTURM - KLANGHART