Both Generals Powell and Swee-
ney made available top members
of their staffs for full time duty,
while Gen. Paul Adams of the
Strike Command (STRICOM) con-
tributed other needed personnel.
In addition, the joint staff of Task
Force 122 was absorbed-includ-
ing the Force's immediate past
commander, Admiral Taylor. By
utilizing Admiral Taylor's fleet
familiarity, Admiral Beakley was
freed to run the staff and "joint
war room" side by side with Gen-
eral Truman.

The entire joint staff was pre-
pared to go to sea on a moment's
notice if world tensions indicated
its advisability. A tender was con-
stantly available within a five-
minute drive. From this, the staff
could shift to a command ship
at sea.

Dispatch traffic that Sunday had
already increased. At times dur-
ing the next few days it would
jump to more than three times the
approximately 1,000 messages that
make up a normal day's traffic.

The Amphib Force Role

Admiral Beakley summarized
the operation of the joint com-
mand this way:

"We had, of course, consider-
able experience before, but now
we understand the refinements
of thorough and immediate staff
work. This one taught us a lot.
The President wanted fast action,
and he got it."

MONDAY, OCTOBER 22. Vice
Admiral Horacio Rivero, Com-
mander Atlantic Fleet Amphibious
Force, had a problem.

Five days before he had picked
up a Marine brigade from Camp
Lejeune and headed south for the
Phibriglex landing on Vieques. A
rendezvous had been scheduled
with Amphibious Squadron 8 (the
six ships on "ready" duty in the
Caribbean), but on Sunday he had
received orders to send them to
GTMO.

Moreover, the attack carrier
USS INDEPENDENCE had been
cut from the exercise, and a dress
rehearsal-scheduled for Monday
-had been cancelled.

Even a less experienced Naval

Marines with bayoneted rifles man a sandbagged gun position on high ground overlooking Cuban territory.

officer could have read these as
clear indications of the rising ten-
sion in Cuba. And the normal
thing would have been to move in
that direction.

The Question for Rivero

However, if he committed his
forces toward GTMO—in the op-
posite direction from Vieques—it
would mean that the exercise
would be missed if it remained on
the books.

It was a thorny problem for an
admiral who had worn his third
star only one week—the first na-
tive-born Puerto Rican to achieve
this rank.

The manner in which Admiral
Rivero resolved it is representa-
tive of the manner in which com-
mand judgment was exercised
throughout those early days. Many
commanders were not to know pre-
cisely what had precipitated the
crisis, or the President's response
to it, until the speech Monday
night. Yet no one was caught
napping.

In the Rivero force were two
LPHs, carrier-type ships whose de-
sign was based on the concept of
"vertical envelopment" — sending
Marines behind enemy lines, via
helicopter. They had one quality
not generally associated with am-
phibious-type vessels-speed.

The Rivero Decision

So Admiral Rivero detached
USS THETIS BAY and USS OKI-
NAWA and sent them steaming
down Mona Passage between the
western end of Puerto Rico and
the eastern end of the Dominican

Republic. At the bottom of the
passage they turned right and
moved to a point beneath the
island. There they remained—
ready to dash for either GTMO
or Vieques.

The Admiral himself steamed
down the passage. He listened
to the President's speech piped
over the USS MOUNT McKIN-
LEY's loud speaker system. With
the THETIS BAY and the OKI-
NAWA already on the way, they

THEY GOT THE
CUBAN PICTURES

Commander William B. Ecker, USN, of
Omaha, Nebr., Commander of Light
Photographic Squadron SIXTY-TWO;
and Captain John I. Hudson, USMC,
of Fern Creek, Ky., a member of Cdr.
Ecker's squadron, received the Dis-
tinguished Flying Cross for low-level
reconnaissance flights during the
Cuban crisis.

10

Two Marines service their machine gun on Suicide Ridge facing Castro's Cuba on the perimeter of the Guantanamo Naval Base.

A United States Marine mans a lonely outpost a few feet from Cuban territory on a hill at Guantanamo. That's a high-powered binocular in the center foreground, a listening device at right.

were able to arrive off GTMO in short order to take up stations and await any call for help. When the call didn't come, Admiral Rivero summoned them to join his force now cruising between the quarantine line and the Bahama Islands.

Throughout the crisis, the force remained poised there. It was one side of a double-headed hammer, ready to smash down on Cuba at an instant's notice.

The other side of the hammer was to be known as Task Force 135.

## Loading the Big One

The ENTERPRISE had left Norfolk after the Naval Supply Center, sweating blood, had loaded 10 hours of provisions and supplies in 120 minutes.

Embarked on ENTERPRISE was Rear Admiral John T. Hayward, Commander Carrier Division 2. On Monday morning he rendezvoused with the INDEPENDENCE north of the Bahamas, above Windward Passage. INDEPENDENCE carried Rear Admiral Robert J. Stroh, Commander Carrier Division 6.

The INDEPENDENCE and her destroyers had already been joined by Capt. Otis R. Cole, Jr., Commander Service Squadron 4, embarked in the fleet oiler, USS TRUCKEE.

## An Extra Weapon

The next day Task Force 135, under command of Admiral Stroh, steamed toward Windward Passage lying between the eastern tip of Cuba and the western tip of

Haiti. The INDEPENDENCE had 85 planes aboard, the ENTERPRISE, more than 100.

It is significant that ENTERPRISE, on her way to the rendezvous, had picked up an extra Marine squadron of A4D attack bombers from Cherry Point—the type of aircraft that would be called on if a decision was made to knock out the Russian missile bases.

The Task Force passed ships carrying the 2,800 evacuees from GTMO. The ships identified themselves but would say only that they were traveling under secret orders.

Near Jamaica, they took up ready stations, sometimes cruising above the island, sometimes below, depending on unidentified submarine contacts. Admiral Hayward, senior to Admiral Stroh, relieved him of command of the Task Force, and on November 9, Admiral Stroh flew back to the States.

The two flattops remained within easy striking range of Cuba throughout the operation.

## The Latins Help, Too

Another Task Force entered the scene a short time later. While small in size, its political weight was considerable, for this one was the Combined Quarantine Force containing units of South American navies.

On October 23, Rear Admiral J. A. Tyree, Jr., Commander South Atlantic Forces, was headed up the west coast of South America aboard the destroyer USS MULLINNIX. Since mid-August, the

MULLINNIX had been engaged in the annual ASW exercise UNITAS with South American destroyers.

A message arrived ordering Admiral Tyree to fly to Trinidad to establish Task Force 137. MULLINNIX steamed at flank speed to the nearest airport (Lima) then began its long run up the coast and through the canal.

Another run was underway at the same time. The Argentine ROSALES and ESPORA raced 4,500 miles at flank speed to join up.

"Those boys came to fight," said the MULLINNIX skipper, Comdr. W. H. Shaw. "They were real disappointed when we didn't move in."

On the arrival of the ZULIA and NUEVA ESPARTA from Venezuela, the force was deployed in the passages of the Lesser Antilles, which guard the eastern approaches of the Caribbean.

What else was happening on that momentous Monday?

At Atlantic Command headquarters, a series of high level briefings went on throughout the morning. The largest in point of attendance was held by Admiral Dennison. Most of the approximately 30 flags in the Norfolk area were present.

A short time later, Admiral Ward met with unit commanders and commanders of Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 4.

## The Problem of Leave

"None of the 14 officers demurred at the order to get under way on short notice," Admiral

*Continued on Page 28*

11

DETERRENT STRATEGY AND THE

By GEORGE E. LOWE
Contributing Writer

FOR good or evil, East-West nu-
clear "sufficiency" and a re-
sulting thermonuclear stalemate
have arrived, bringing with them
the Age of Deterrence. In a deter-
rent-dominated world total war is
abolished as an instrument of na-
tional policy because nation states
can no longer guarantee meaning-
ful victory to their citizens.

Unlike the aftermaths of World
War I and World War II, victors
and vanquished will not be found
after World War III, at least not
among the belligerents participat-
ing in the thermonuclear exchange
nor any people living in the Tem-
perate Zone, for prevailing wester-
lies will carry the deadly fallout to
the most "civilized" nations of the
world. Victors, if there are any,
will be found only among under-
developed nations. As Walter Lipp-
mann has observed:

"A war of that kind (total nu-
clear exchange) would not be fol-
lowed by reconstruction; it would
not be followed by a Marshall Plan
and by a new NATO. It would be
followed by a savage struggle for
existence as the survivors crawled
out of their cellars, and all the de-
mocracies would have to be con-
verted into military dictatorships
in order to keep some semblance
of order among the desperate
survivors."

Total War "Obsolete"

In the next two decades, barring
a highly unlikely unilateral tech-
nological breakthrough, both sides
in the cold war will have the un-
challengeable ability to destroy the
most important industrial com-
plexes of the other. This very abil-
ity insures that general war, if it
comes, will be "obsolete" total war.
Paradoxically, this vast destruc-
tive power that would be mutually

inflicted rules out the total victory
type of settlement usually asso-
ciated with total wars of the past.

A future war "to make the world
safe for democracy" might con-
ceivably eliminate the physical
structure of world communism,
but it could hardly eradicate the
idea. Such a war probably would
doom the very institutions and
ideals that we wish to preserve.

Mutual existence of 100-mega-
ton bombs or their equivalent

relegates World War II concepts,
like unconditional surrender and
strategic air warfare, to a pre-
hydrogen bomb age when total
wars were winnable.

Korean War-generated slogans,
like "there is no substitute for vic-
tory," are valid only if the broadest
possible interpretation is given to
the word "victory." We of the Open
Society devoutly believe that our
institutions eventually will triumph
and that there can be no compro-

12

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Harold E. Wirth, National Vice President, presents the District of Columbia Council's Theodore Roosevelt Citizenship Award for 1962 to Commander John F. Finneran, Jr., USN, of the Naval Research Laboratory, at the Navy Day Dinner in Washington. At the right is the Commandant of the Potomac River Naval Command, Rear Admiral Laurence H. Frost, USN.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

Vice Admiral H. T. Deutermann, USN, then Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, chats with Howard W. Taylor, Jr. and Rear Admiral Robert W. Cavenagh, USN, Commandant, Fourth Naval District, prior to the Navy Day Luncheon.

Paul B. Hartenstein, Harold A. Waterworth, Pennsylvania State President and Howard W. Taylor, Jr., Council President watch Mayor H. J. Tate, of the City of Philadelphia, sign the Navy Day Proclamation.

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

Governor A. S. Harrison of Virginia signs the proclamation designating October 27th as Navy Day throughout the State. Looking on are Jacob M. Viener, State President; Commander William F. Shea, Commanding Officer, Naval Reserve Training Center, Richmond; Judge Moscoe Huntley and Council President Richard A. Velz.

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

Rear Admiral G. C. Towner, USN, Commandant Thirteenth Naval District, presents the Navy Department's Meritorious Public Service Citation to Washington State President J. Darrel Taylor, during a Navy Day luncheon in Seattle, in recognition of his contributions to the Navy in the fields of public information and community relations.

# THE NAVY AND CUBA

*Continued from Page 11*

Ward recalls, "even though they were forbidden to send telegrams or make long distance phone calls to missing crewmen."

The problem of crewmen on leave and liberty had already been felt. The preceding Saturday, a decision was made to add the ammunition ship USS WRANGELL to the Caribbean force. Normally, she would proceed unescorted, but this was considered a good opportunity to get a couple of destroyers down there.

USS STICKELL and USS CHARLES P. CECIL were tapped for the job.

On any given weekend, approximately half of the crew of any ship in port will be out on liberty or leave. Married personnel can generally be contacted, but others are scattered to the winds.

When the two destroyers took a nose count, they came up approximately 100 short. This included two crewmen from the STICKELL who were scheduled for discharge but, sniffing something big afoot, demanded to be taken along. They had to be ordered off the ship.

The missing rates were peremptorily siphoned from sister destroyers, and the two departed—the STICKELL at 8 p.m., Saturday, the CECIL at 2 a.m., Sunday.

## A Destroyer to the Rescue

The personnel problem snowballed during the next few days. Returning sailors stared aghast at empty piers, then went aboard the tender USS SHENANDOAH to plaintively ask what had happened to their "homes."

The reserve destroyer USS BEARSS finally solved part of the problem by eagerly responding to an offer to play sea-going taxi and deliver to the quarantine force 212 officers and men who had missed their ships.

A personnel problem of a somewhat different nature was posed by the upcoming operation. Each quarantine ship had to have a Russian-speaking officer aboard. It was imperative to a successful

boarding. But how to find them on such short notice?

"I think they must have punched an IBM machine in Washington and come up with the name of every Russian-speaking Naval officer east of the Mississippi," Admiral Ward said later with a grin.

"The officer we received was stationed in Washington. He said he was called at 3 a.m., Monday and told to report aboard the NEWPORT NEWS no later than 2 p.m. that same day."

## Coast Guard Lends a Hand

In addition to interpreters, the blockading force also took along five Coast Guardsmen who were experienced in boarding and search procedures.

Getting the ships to sea and on station in time to meet the 10 a.m. Wednesday deadline was no small task. Admiral Dennison said during a subsequent press conference that "the blockade . . . demonstrated the need for more destroyer types than I have in the Atlantic Fleet."

While warships normally keep both fuel and ammo at 90 per cent, others in a "repair availability" status do not.

DesRon 22 had just settled down to six weeks of overhaul and repair, yet all its ships were at sea in less than five days. In fact, 28 ships had sailed by Friday. Tenders worked around the clock.

Thanks to some fast and thoughtful work by Captain Frank L. Pinney, Commander of the Yorktown Naval Weapons Station, the ammo loading operation was greatly facilitated.

## The Ammo Gets Aboard

Captain Pinney sent ammo barges down to Hampton Roads where they were anchored. Outbound ships could thus load en-route and save a full day's time. At least three destroyers — USS DUPONT, USS HAYNSWORTH and USS HENLEY—were nudged out of their nests and to the barges by tugs.

Admiral Ward dined with his wife at home that night. She had

fixed steak. Then he settled in front of his television set to listen to Mr. Kennedy's speech. The President's sober words were still hanging in the air when he said goodbye and walked out the door to a car waiting to take him to the Naval Station.

At 9 p.m., the NEWPORT NEWS backed slowly from her berth and headed out into the dark night.

**TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23.** Admiral Dennison held briefings at 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. The buildup in Florida and Georgia by the Army and Air Force continued apace.

Sixteen destroyers and 2 cruisers of Task Force 136 headed at 27 knots for a thin pencil line on a chart.

**WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24.** At 10 a.m., the hour of implementation, the NEWPORT NEWS was moving east past the blockade line. Days before, photographs taken of the Russian freighter POLTAVA indicated that she was of such size and configuration as to permit concealment of missiles in her holds. She was kept under almost continual air surveillance. Washington picked her as the first ship to board, and the NEWPORT NEWS was headed for an intercept.

But at 10 a.m., according to aircraft reports, a strange thing happened. The POLTAVA went dead in the water. For the next 12 hours she sat there. Then slowly she turned and headed back east.

There can be little doubt that this was the turning point in the entire Cuban operation. As Admiral Ward later put it:

"I think Mr. K. made up his mind pretty early."

This did not mean that the operation was over. Far from it. A total of 435 sightings of inbound ships were made, 33 were intercepted and one boarded. Then there were the follow-up operations of intercepting and photographing outbound missiles and IL-28 bombers. Somehow, though, there then was the feeling of anticlimax.

During the days that followed the POLTAVA intercept, the "Walnut Line," as the original quarantine

28

LC

2

1

3

4

6

5

1. Soviet ship FIZIK KURCHATOV at sea showing six canvas covered missile transporters with missiles on deck. Ship departed Cuba 7 Nov. 1962.

2. The Russian freighter ANOSOV rides the South Atlantic early on November 10, 1962 with the USS BARRY, a destroyer, at a point of interception. The freighter was homeward bound with a military cargo, presumably including ballistic missiles from Cuban bases. Photo was made from a Navy patrol plane.

3. The Soviet ship ANOSOV with eight missile transporters with canvas-covered missiles. Departed Cuba 6 Nov. 1962.

4. The USS DAHLGREN trails the Soviet freighter LENINSKY KOMSOMOL as the Russian vessel heads from Cuba through the Windward Passage. The ship, loaded with canvas-covered missile-like objects, later was intercepted by the USS NORFOLK.

5. The Soviet ship VOLGOLES with one partially uncovered missile on the foredeck, with skin-tight protective casing clearly visible, and other canvas-covered missiles on the afterdeck. The U.S. Navy radar picket ship VAGOLA (DDR-878) has come alongside.

6. The Soviet ship KASIMOV is under way at sea with fifteen IL-28 bombers on board. Fuselage crates on the KASIMOV were voluntarily opened by the Soviet crew for U.S. air inspection.

tine line was called ("because the
walnut is a tough nut to crack,"
according to one naval officer),
was pulled in tighter and set up
as the "Chestnut Line" along the
top of the Bahama Island chain.

During daylight hours, the ships
would steam eastward, then turn
west at nightfall. This gave assur-
ance that all intercepts would be
made during the day.

The Chestnut Line was longer
than Walnut, but it cut down the
number of required ships—thanks
to the relatively few passages
through the Bahama chain—and
permitted hard-pressed destroyers
to rotate into port for upkeep, or
to perform other required duties
—such as patrolling the Windward
Passage, the Yucatan Channel and
the Straits of Florida to protect
shipping.

Destroyers weren't the only ships
to do yeoman duty during the
blockade. Vice Admiral Frank
O'Bierne, Commander of the At-
lantic Fleet Naval Air Force, said
later:

"Give those Service Force boys
credit. Without them, we couldn't
have stayed out there."

It was a simple statement of
fact.

183 Ships Involved

Replenishing ships at sea is not
a very romantic job. Rear Admiral
Denys Knoll, SERVLANT com-
mander, says:

"We like to think of ourselves
as the linemen in a football game.
We don't make many headlines,
but it would be hard to win with-
out us."

For the Service Force, the Cuban
operation meant supplying logis-
tic support to 85,000 men in 183
ships deployed over a 2,100-mile
front.

During the operation, the oiler,
USS ELOKOMIN refuelled the de-
royer CECIL in the middle of the
night while the latter was tailing a
Russian sub!

In 31 days, SERVLANT transfer-
red 63 million gallons of petroleum
products at sea, carried 2,500 long
tons of food, 1,500 long tons of

This photograph of one of the launch positions at this site, shows how Soviets have completely removed all Medium Range Ballistic Missile launch equipment, including the missile ready tents, and have completely destroyed the former launch position in lower center of photograph.

floating freight, and 800 tons of
small items.

It had the additional duty of
providing two big morale boosters
to the Fleet—mail and movies.

While some ships were slow in
receiving mail due to their move-
ments, the only large delay in-
volved 22 Pacific Fleet amphibious
ships that moved through the
Panama Canal to the Caribbean.
Some mail clerk in Chicago kept
returning mail to the West Coast,
since he knew those ships were
based out there!

Captain Joseph F. Dalton, Com-
mander of ServRon 2, devised a
system of three "filling stations"
set up behind the line so that
regular scheduling could be
established.

Even so, three HUK groups
(ASW Hunter-Killer groups) oper-
ating seaward of the line placed
a strain on the oilers as the groups
moved in and out in response to
sub contacts.

The Shore Support

Admiral Knoll says that his
force's ability to meet their com-
mitments should be credited in
large part to the "fantastic support
we got from all shore establish-
ments."

The biggest single shore estab-
lishment was the Norfolk Naval
Supply Center. Rear Admiral
Hugh C. Haynsworth, the center's
commander, told a reporter later
that 10 days before the imposition
of the blockade high priority de-
mands climbed steadily from their
normal 6 per cent to 25 per cent,
while general requisitions soared
from an average 17,000 daily to
30,000.

Admiral Haynsworth managed

to accomplish this with his regu-
lar staff (except for stevedores)
by beefing up the 2nd and 3rd
shifts.

"This meant that some mothers
were getting home at midnight,"
he said, "but morale here was
never higher. People were proud
of what they were doing. And
they damned well should have
been. This whole thing was a mar-
velous test of nearly every aspect
of the Navy's operation."

After the "Ball" Is Over

During the interview, Admiral
Haynsworth and a visitor moved
to the picture window of his sixth
floor office. The window over-
looked Hampton Roads and the
piers of the world's largest naval
complex. It was late afternoon,
and a mid-December snow swirled
through the descending dusk to
crimp the corners of a grey horizon.

At Pier 12, filling the northern
end of the scene, was the blurred
outline of the ENTERPRISE, and
beyond her the INDEPENDENCE.
Down the line was the NEWPORT
NEWS, the MOUNT MCKINLEY,
and the bulky grey shapes of the
Service Force ships.

In the street below, a sailor
scraped ice from a windshield,
while another ran to catch a lib-
erty bus.

It was the fleet at rest, a fleet
that had stopped the vaunted
might of Soviet Russia.

As President Kennedy was to
put it later:

"It was the first time that the
military forces of the Soviet Union
and the United States had faced
each other with the possibility of
conflict."

And the Reds had backed away.

30

February 18, 1963

To: Diane Van Wie

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I am enclosing several draft replies to letters
the Governor has received on his testing statement, and
also the one from Mr. Richardson about taping an interview.

also the one from Mr. Richardson about talking an interview.

From: Henry A. Klaasen

To: Diane Van Wie

February 18, 1963

DRAFT

Miss Bernice A. Stein
335 McClellan Avenue
Mt. Vernon, New York

Dear Miss Stein:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of January 29. All concerned Americans must take seriously the dangers of nuclear war. The question at each stage is whether a particular step increases or decreases these dangers.

While I favor an adequately inspected test ban, it is my conviction that the absence of adequate safeguards might bring on the very dangers we are trying to avoid. A judgment on this difficult issue is, I assure you, not a partisan matter.

Sincerely yours,

D R A F T

Miss Bernice V. Stein
332 McClellan Avenue
Mt. Vernon, New York

Dear Miss Stein:

While I favor an adequately inspected test pan, particular step increases or decreases these dangers. of nuclear war. The question at each stage is whether a 20'. All concerned Americans must take seriously the dangers Thank you for your thoughtful letter of January

Sincerely yours,

DRAFT

Mrs. Gordon Webber
Kirby Lane
Rye, New York

Dear Mrs. Webber:

Thank you for your letter of January 30. The issue of a nuclear test ban is one of the most difficult and complicated before the country, involving many complex judgments and deep emotions. No one is in favor of radioactive fallout. I would favor an end to all testing that produces fallout immediately.

The only issue is the one that concerns the range of testing where adequate inspection methods have not yet been devised. There, it is important to determine the risks of violation of an agreement. If it is possible to upset the strategic balance by secret underground testing, the world may face the danger of a nuclear war, which will induce far more fallout than any that has resulted from nuclear testing.

These judgments, on which serious people have differed, are not, I assure you, a partisan matter.

Sincerely yours,

D R A F T

Dear Mrs. Webber:

The only issue is the one that concerns the range
produces fallout immediately.

active fallout. I would favor an end to all testing that
judgments and deep emotions. No one is in favor of radio-
and complicated before the country, involving many complex
issues of a nuclear test pan is one of the most difficult

of testing where adequate inspection methods have not yet
been devised. There, it is important to determine the risks
of violation of an agreement. If it is possible to upset
the strategic balance by secret underground testing, the world
may face the danger of a nuclear war, which will incite
far more fallout than any that has resulted from nuclear

These judgments, on which serious people have
test[ing].

Sincerely yours,

D R A F T

Mr. John Love
228 South Third Street
Brooklyn 11, New York

Dear Mr. Love:

Thank you for your letter of January 29. I believe
that if you review the Soviet positions since July of 1958,
it would not be easy to substantiate your statement that they
have taken a more flexible position on inspection recently
than in the past.

The fact is that in March, 1961, the Soviet Union
withdrew most of the agreements already reached previously
with respect to inspection. It has now come part of the
way back to the point we had reached early in 1961.

Sincerely yours,

D R A F T

Mr. John Love
Brooklyn 11, New York
228 South Third Street

Dear Mr. Love:

that if you review the Soviet positions since July of 1928, it would not be easy to substantiate your statement that they have taken a more flexible position on inspection recently

than in the past.

Sincerely yours,

D R A F T

Mrs. Martin Harris
190 Stokes Avenue
Freeport, New York

Dear Mrs. Harris:

Thank you for your letter of February 1st. Of
course, every responsible American must take seriously the
risks of radiation. The problem one faces in each situation
is to determine whether the risks involved in any particular
step outweigh the promised benefits. I would like an immediate
cessation of all testing that produces fallout. This type
of testing is easy to monitor.

However, my difference with the Administration con-
cerns underground testing, in which the detection methods are
much less reliable, and which does not produce fallout.

Sincerely yours,

D R A F T

Mrs. Martin Harris
Freeport, New York

Dear Mrs. Harris:

Much less reliable, and which does not produce fallout.
came underground testing, in which the detection methods are
However, my difference with the Administration con-
of testing is easy to monitor.
caution of all testing that produces fallout. This type
step outweigh the promised benefits. I would like an immediate
is to determine whether the risks involved in any particular
risks of radiation. The problem one faces in each situation
course, every reasonable American must take seriously the
Thank you for your letter of February last. Of

Sincerely yours,

DRAFT

Miss Virginia L. Snitow
81 Walworth Avenue
Scarsdale, New York

Dear Miss Snitow:

Thank you for your letter of February 1. I would agree with C.P. Snow's statement. It does not, however, tell us where the risk is and where the certainty is. Also, I can assure you that no mathematician would agree with his proposition that if there is a ten per cent risk of something occurring in one year, there is a hundred per cent risk of this happening at the end of ten years.

In any given issue, it is important to determine whether the risks involved outweigh the benefits. Until adequate safeguards can be devised to detect clandestine underground testing, I believe that the dangers of nuclear war may be increased, rather than decreased, by ignoring the "unimportant technicalities" you mention.

Sincerely yours,

D R A F T

Mies Virginia L. Suitow
Scarsdale, New York
81 Walworth Avenue

Dear Mies Suitow:

Thank you for your letter of February 1. I would
agree with C.P. Snow's statement. It does not, however, tell
me where the risk is and where the certainty is. Also, I
assure you that no mathematician would agree with his
proposition that if there is a ten per cent risk of something
occurring in one year, there is a hundred per cent risk of
this happening at the end of ten years.

In any given issue, it is important to determine
whether the risks involved outweigh the benefits. Until
adequate safeguards can be devised to detect contamination
war may be increased, rather than decreased, by ignoring the
underground testing. I believe that the dangers of nuclear

Sincerely yours,

DRAFT

Mr. John Richardson, Jr.
Free Europe Committee, Inc.
Two Park Avenue
New York 16, New York

Dear Mr. Richardson:

Thank you for your nice letter of February 5.

In principle, I would be glad to tape an interview
with you. However, the pressure of state business over the
next few months will make it impossible for me. Perhaps you
could get in touch with me again in May or June.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely yours,

DRAFT

Mrs. Harold K. Harvey
Box 199
Aspen, Colorado

Dear Mrs. Harvey:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of January 30. My concern about the test ban as now conceived derives not only from the very small number of inspections agreed upon, but also from the change in the nature of the inspection stations from manned to unmanned. It is generally agreed that the proposed system would leave a range of underground explosions that present seismographic equipment cannot detect.

The question each thoughtful citizen has to decide is whether a given step reduces the dangers of the arms race and nuclear war or increases them.

With kind regards.

Sincerely yours,

DRAFT

Mrs. Harold K. Harvey
Vасен, Colorado
Box 166

Dear Mrs. Harvey:

30. My concern about the test pan as now conceived derives
not only from the very small number of inspections agreed
upon, but also from the change in the nature of the inspection
that the proposed system would leave a range of underground
stations from manned to unmanned. It is generally agreed
explosions that present seismographic equipment cannot
detect.

The question each thoughtful citizen has to decide
is whether a given step reduces the dangers of the arms race
and unclear war or increases them.

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards.

DRAFT

Mrs. Helene Hayward
123 Eagle Avenue
New Milford, New Jersey

Dear Mrs. Hayward:

Thank you for your very thoughtful letter of
January 31. I agree with you that Christian principles must
animate our policies. I also agree that the United States
confronts no more important task than to help build a lasting
peace.

On the issue of nuclear testing, the problem we
face is to determine whether a given proposal increases or
decreases the dangers of war. It is my conviction that an
inadequately inspected test ban would enhance these dangers.

With kind regards.

Sincerely yours,

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards.

inadequately inspected test pan would enhance these dangers.
decreases the dangers of war. It is my conviction that an
face is to determine whether a given proposal increases or
On the issue of nuclear testing, the problem we
peace.

confronts no more important task than to help build a lasting
animate our policies. I also agree that the United States
January 31. I agree with you that Christian principles must
Thank you for your very thoughtful letter of

Dear Mrs. Hayward:

New Milford, New Jersey
133 Eagle Avenue
Mrs. Helene Hayward

DRAFT

Mrs. George V. H. Moseley, III
2703 Yates Avenue
Bronx 69, New York

Dear Mrs. Moseley:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of January 29. The issue of nuclear testing is one of the most painful and difficult about which to form a judgment. As I said in my statement, I would approve an adequately inspected test ban. My concern is whether the safeguards that have been proposed are adequate.

In agreeing to a small number of on-site inspections, the Soviets have not come "at least half way in meeting our demands." When the negotiations started in 1958, it was assumed that the right of inspection of suspicious occurrences was unlimited. In 1960, the Soviets agreed to a quota of inspections. In March, 1961, the Soviets withdrew their agreement. Their recent "concession" thus brings them back to the position they held in March, 1961, in return for which we are asked to give up the concept of manned inspection posts, which were still considered basic in 1961, and to reduce the number of unmanned posts from twenty-one to three.

I appreciate your thoughtfulness in writing to me and I want to assure you that I share your concern about the dangers of nuclear war. The judgment one has to make in each situation is whether a given step increases or decreases these dangers.

Sincerely yours,

Sincerely yours,

is whether a given step increases or decreases these dangers.
of nuclear war. The judgment one has to make in each situation
I want to assure you that I share your concern about the dangers
I appreciate your thoughtfulness in writing to me and
the number of unmanned boats from twenty-one to three.

boats, which were still considered basic in 1961, and to reduce
which we are asked to give up the concept of manned inspection
back to the position they held in March, 1961, in return for
agreement. Their recent "concession" thus brings them
sactions. In March, 1961, the Soviets withdrew their
unlimited. In 1960, the Soviets agreed to a dota of in-
that the right of inspection of الانبطيات occurred was
demands." When the negotiations started in 1928, it was assumed
the Soviets have not come "at least half way in meeting our

In agreeing to a small number of on-site inspections,
proposed are addeutate.

pan. My concern is whether the safeguards that have been
my statement, I would approve an adequately inspected test
and difficult apart which to form a judgment. As I said in
29. The issue of nuclear testing is one of the most painful
Thank you for your thoughtful letter of January

Dear Mrs. Moseley:

Bromx 69, New York
2703 Yates Avenue
Mrs. George V. H. Moseley, III

D E A F T

STATE OF NEW YORK

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

EXECUTIVE CHAMBER

ALBANY

COPY

February 26, 1963

Dear Miss Stein:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of January twenty-ninth. All concerned Americans must take seriously the dangers of nuclear war. The question at each stage is whether a particular step increases or decreases these dangers.

With the thought that you may be interested in the full text of my statement, I am enclosing a copy herewith.

Enclosure

cc: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger w/photo of incoming correspondence

4-9-62-5M (1B1-326)

COPY

February 26, 1963

Dear Mrs. Webber:

Thank you for your letter of January thirtieth. The issue of a nuclear test ban is one of the most difficult and complicated before the country, involving many complex judgments and deep emotions. No one is in favor of radioactive fallout. I would favor a ban on all testing that produces fallout immediately.

The only issue is the one that concerns the range of testing where adequate inspection methods have not yet been devised. There, it is important to determine the risks of violation of an agreement. If it is possible to upset the strategic balance by secret underground testing, the world may face the danger of a nuclear war, which will introduce far more fallout than any that has resulted from nuclear testing.

Enclosure

cc: Dr. Kissinger w/photo of incoming correspondence

4-9-62-5M (1B1-326)

STATE OF NEW YORK

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

EXECUTIVE CHAMBER

ALBANY

COPY

February 26, 1963

Dear Mr. Love:

Thank you for your letter of January twenty-ninth. I believe that if you review the Soviet positions since July of 1958, it would not be easy to substantiate your statement that they have taken a more flexible position on inspection recently than in the past.

Enclosure

cc: ✓Dr. Kissinger w/photo of incoming correspondence

4-9-62-5M (1B1-326)

COPY

February 26, 1963

Dear Miss Snitow:

Thank you for your letter of February first. I would agree with C. P. Snow's statement. It does not, however, tell us where the risk is and where the certainty is. Also, I can assure you that no mathematician would agree with his proposition that if there is a ten per cent risk of something occurring in one year, there is a hundred per cent risk of this happening at the end of ten years.

Enclosure

✓ cc: Dr. Kissinger w/photo of incoming correspondence

4-9-62-5M (1B1-326)

4-9-83-2M (1B1-320)

cc: Dr. Kraefinger w
d photo of incoming correabouqence

Enclosure

Bennegate, New York
81 Wainwright Avenue
Miss Virginia P. Sutton

✓\N\efson T. Rockefeller

Blercerly,

mention.

than decreased, by ignoring the "unimportant technicalities," how
I believe that the dangers of unclear was may be increased, rather
guards can be devised to detect claudine underground testing,
the risks involved outweigh the benefits. Until adequate sales-

In any given case, it is important to determine whether
the end of ten years.
one year, there is aRED her cent risk of this happening at
that it there is a ten per cent risk of something occurring in
some how that no mathematician would agree with his proposition
we where the risk is and where the certainty is. "Viao" I can
agree with C. P. Snow's a statement. It does not, however, tell
Thank you for your letter of February that I would

Dear Miss Sutton:

February 50, 1983

COPY

ALBANY
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF NEW YORK

STATE OF NEW YORK

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

EXECUTIVE CHAMBER

ALBANY

COPY

February 26, 1963

Dear Mrs. Harvey:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of January thirtieth. My concern about the test ban as now conceived derives not only from the very small number of inspections agreed upon, but also from the change in the nature of the inspection stations from manned to unmanned. It is generally agreed that the proposed system would leave a range of underground explosions that present seismographic equipment cannot detect.

With kind regards,

Enclosure

4-9-62-5M (1B1-326)

4-6-85-2M (1B1-250)

cc: Dr. Klaasinger w\photo of incoming correspondence

Enclosure

Vabern, Colorado
Box 133
Mrs. Harold K. Harvey

/s/ Nelson W. Rocketteler

Sincerely,

With kind regards,

With the thought that you may be interested in the tru

whether a given step reduces the dangers of the arms race and
The question each thoughtful citizen has to decide is

aidsographic equipment cannot detect.

aids would leave a range of underground explosions that present
manned to unmanned. It is generally agreed that the proposed
from the change in the nature of the inspection stations from
from the very small number of inspections agreed upon, but also
MY concern about the test plan as now conceived derives not only
Thank you for your thoughtful letter of January thirtieth.

Dear Mrs. Harvey:

February 50, 1963

COPY

COPY

February 26, 1963

Dear Mrs. Hayward:

Thank you for your very thoughtful letter of January thirty-first. I agree with you that Christian principles must animate our policies. I also agree that the United States confronts no more important task than to help build a lasting peace.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Nelson A. Rockefeller

Mrs. J. Hayward
123 Eagle Avenue
New Milford, New Jersey

Enclosure

✓cc: Dr. Kissinger w/photo of incoming correspondence

4-9-62-5M (1B1-326)

STATE OF NEW YORK

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

EXECUTIVE CHAMBER

ALBANY

COPY

February 26, 1963

Dear Mrs. Moseley:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of January twenty-ninth. The issue of nuclear testing is one of the most painful and difficult about which to form a judgment. As I said in my statement, I favor an adequately inspected test ban. My concern is whether the safeguards that have been proposed are adequate.

Enclosure

cc: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Harvard University w/photo of incoming correspondence

4-9-62-5M (1B1-326)