the emphasis is too much on fighting guerrillas, on counter-guerrilla action. We need a lot of new thinking on this subject. We are unfortunate y handicapped by the unfavorable connotations, mostly moral, of such terms as "guerrilla war" and "irregular" or "unconventional" operations. Perhaps this is another heritage of the War Between the States.

The fact is that whereas it takes something like twenty regular soldiers to fight one guerrilla, if the experience of Korea, the Philippines, and Malaya is a sound guide, no guerrilla action has ever prospered that did not enjoy substantial local popular support. Guerrilla warfare then, is preeminently political. Guerrilla warfare is possible only if the political regime within a country is so unstable or so disliked as to have alienated a large part of the population. Therefore, in combating guerrilla actions against us, our aim should be primarily at the population, and only secondarily at the guerrillas, as Magsaysay so brilliantly demonstrated in the Philippines. But there is another great unexplored possibility. It not uncommonly happens that the population is favorable to us and hostile to Communist overlords. We should think, then, of guerrilla operations as a positive device, probably the least risky, though perhaps the most uncongenial to our temper, of all the ways of conducting limited war.

At the other extreme, it is sometimes stated with magisterial authority that limited war between the US and the USSR is impossible. As the Secretary of Defense said last summer, "I do not think there is going to be any little war with the Russians. I think if the Russians and the Americans are ever in war in any small place, it is going to expand very rapidly into a terrible war". Possibly it would. I feel myself that this is just about the last ditch for both sides. And just for that reason I think it is a rather unlikely contingency. The Russians have demonstrated their facility for camouflaging their participation; I should suggest that we think of doing the same. But though the risks inherent in such a conflict are very high indeed, it need not follow that they are risks we cannot run under any circumstances. If we allow that to become the case we merely encourage the Russians to participate openly; we encourage their initiative in the most flagrant cases of aggression. I think we should let it be known that we have explored the implications of war limitation; that we are convinced that war can be limited; and that if necessary to the defense of our position we will fight such wars against any and all comers.

There is entirely too much talk these days about what is going to happen, and much too little about what we are going to let happen. Because nuclear weapons have changed our premises it does not follow that our intellect and our will are paralyzed. We must seek to understand what is possible, and then work at controlling events. The craven attitude that all is predestined leads to fatalism or to an equally fatuous optimism. Some say that nuclear weapons are going to be used -- without limit -- solely

because they exist, and that we might as well be prepared to sell our
existence dear. Others argue that nuclear weapons will be used because
they exist but that their employment will somehow be automatically
limited because unlimited employment would be unthinkable. Still others
adopt the unbelievable view that wars will just not happen, because
nuclear weapons have made the prospect too horrible. I hope I have said
enough to persuade you, if you needed persuading, that none of these is
a necessary or intelligent response of the human spirit to the greatest
challenge it has ever faced.

Another extreme case I shall touch on very lightly. It concerns
the larger limited wars. It has been said that we shall never again
become involved in a war as big as the Korean War without using our "best
weapons". If this means that whatever limitation we accept on such a war
must include the use of nuclear weapons I have already presented my
objections. If it appears that the use of nuclear weapons can and will
be limited and if their employment is appropriate to the immediate circum-
stance, the argument is not incompatible with the requirements of limita-
tion. But if it means that we shall never again fight another war as big
as the Korean without going into it to win a MacArthurian "victory", I take
my leave. Compared to what general war in the age of nuclear plenty
promises to cost, the Korean war was dirt cheap, in lives and treasure.
To take our chances of survival under a rain of thermuclear bombs and
missile warheads rather than expend the effort necessary to achieve a
limited settlement in any way, no matter how big, would be insanity.

One final question, and then I am done: WHAT FREQUENCY OF LIMITED
WAR DO WE NEED TO PREPARE FOR?

You wouldn't expect me to answer this one, but I should like to
correct a possible false impression. What I have been saying may have
given the impression that I think there will be a limited war of one kind
or another annually from here on out and that we shall be in most of them.
That is not my intention. I feel that the risks inherent in general war,
and the risk of general war in any war, no matter how limited, may well
make war itself less frequent. Moreover, I do not mean to assert that we
must participate every time there is an exchange of small arms fire any-
where in the world. But limited war is a real problem, the requirements
of which are exacting and still somewhat unfamiliar. To meet them we need
to be prepared, emotionally, philosophically, politically, and militarily.
I think it is reasonable to assume that the better prepared we are the less
likely we are to be called on.

Our defense problem in the age of nuclear plenty, then, is two-fold.
We must maintain our strategic power -- enough of it so that any prospective
enemy must believe that he cannot survive a war in which it is employed.
In other words, we must maintain the "mutual deterrence" to prevent general

12

In other morgue, we must maintain the "initial deference," to prevent General
enquiry, whether that be caused by a war in which it is employed.
We must maintain our strategy here --- enough of it so that we may broach
to our defense broom in the age of moles, bluen, then, is done right.

Firstly, we are to be called on.

I think it is reasonable to assume that the better broken we are the less
to be broken, emotionally, biologically, and militarily.
Of course we are executing and still somewhat unutilitarian. To meet them we need
more in the morgue. But limited war is a real problem, the difficulties
must be overcome every time there is an expense of effort same the ad-
justed war itself less tremendous. Moreover, I do not mean to assert that we
send the risk of General war in small war, no matter how limited, will
win it not at all. In conclusion, I feel that the risks inherent in General war,
on another, annually from here on out and that we shall be in meat of them.
Given the impression that I think there will be a limited war of one kind
and kind of a broom else imbrication. But I have been astute and well
know that military expeot me to answer quite one, put I should like to
ask you do we need to preserve them?

One final direction, and then I am done: WHAT FREQUENCY OF LIMITED

limited settlement in each war, no matter how big, should be pursued.

Whataille marauder, rapier, then expond the effort necessarily to serve a
To take our ounces of annals, number a sum of fermionic force and
broadsides to cost, the Korean war was quite cheap, in like and like sense.
My leave. Compared to what General war in due time of moles, bluen,
as the Korean without found into it to win a McPherson "Aloft," I take
for granted. But it means that we shall never again light another war at all
since, the argument is not inconsiderable with the reductions of time
and space, and their employment is appropriate to the immediate circum-
options. If it abhors that the use of moles, mebome can and will
not increase the use of moles, mebome I have already presented my
mebome." It gives me cause to regret limitation we accept on and on a war
become involved in a war so big as it is the Korean war without need on "our
the larger limited war." If we can avoid that we shall never again
wonder extreme case I shall touch on again briefly. If possible

effort, if we ever used.

a necessarily or intelligent reason of the manner shrift to the respect
enough to behave like an, if you need be behaving, that none of these is
moles, mebome have made the broom too narrow. I hope I have said
enough the unpeopled area, again, will not happen, because
limited because unlimited employment would be unprofitable. Still other
will exist but that their employment will somehow be automatically
eliminated because limited employment would be unprofitable. Still other
exist, exist, exist, and that we might be well be bioteered to sell our
because they exist, exist, exist.

Opportunities are the that moles, mebome will be needed because
existence here. Opportunities are the that moles, mebome will be needed because
because they exist, exist, exist.

Because they exist, exist, exist.

war. But equally, we must be prepared to exert our force in limited
conflicts. The two requirements are parallel. Neither is prior in any
true sense. We must have both. We face destruction if we let ourselves
become incapable of an annihilating stroke. But we can just as surely be
destroyed piece by piece if we cannot handle the "little" threats. It
might take longer, but probably not much. I cannot see us sitting idle
while our foundations are chiseled away.

Advances in transportation and communication have made a smaller
world, into which the tremendous destructiveness of nuclear weapons must
be crowded. Someone has suggested that the US and the USSR are like two
deadly enemies locked in a small room, each armed with a handgrenade.
The problem we have been exploring suggests that the analogy should be
refined. In his right hand our enemy holds a knife; if we do not provide
ourselves with a weapon to parry his strokes we can be cut to ribbons,
with no defense that is not also suicide. If we do provide ourselves with
such a weapon, and use it well, not only shall we have a defense against
indignity and eventual disaster, but also we may yet find a way out of the
room.

room.

In truth and actual distance, put also we will find a way out of the
and a meadow, and see it well, not only a wall we have a defense against
with no defense that is not also strong. If we do provide ourself with
ourselves with a weapon to bear by the attack we can be out of the way,
returned. In the right hand our enemy holds a knife; if we do not provide
the problem we have been exploring and satisfied the enemy should be
goodly enemies locked in a small room, each armed with a pikegane.
be crowded. Someone has illustrated that the US and the U2E are like two
worlds, into which the greatest destructions of nuclear weapons must
advance in transportation and communication have made a smeller
white our foundations are created away.

might be longer, put properly not more. I cannot see me sitting idle
destroyed piece by piece if we cannot handle the "little" threats. If
become impossible of an annihilating stroke. But we can get that we need pe
tire sense. We must have power. We face destruction if we let ourselves
conflict. The two requirements are barrierless. Mother is prior in small
war. But easily, we must be prepared to exert our force in limited

May 23, 1957

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter of May 9th and the transcript
of your talk to the Industrial College. Believe it or not, I
have still not received a transcript of my talk to the Air War
College but I have written today asking for it.

I thought very well of your talk to the Industrial
College. As you know we are in almost complete agreement
except on the point of the wisdom of using nuclear weapons
in limited war. Your argument on Page 12 is a particularly
telling one which, as you undoubtedly realize, works both
ways. You could argue that it does not make sense to assert
that a nation will resort to all-out war to avoid losing a limited
war. Or if it does make sense, it would apply to a conventional
war as well. The question of limited nuclear war therefore is
a question of practicality and of the wisdom of it in certain
situations. On this point there are many considerations,
some of which I would like to discuss with you at your
leisure sometime.

Warm regards,

Mr. James E. King, Jr.
Operations Research Office
The Johns Hopkins University
7100 Connecticut Avenue
Chevy Chase, Maryland

10700 Weymouth Street
Garrett Park, Maryland
August Sixth

Dear Henry:

Your letter of July thirteenth came while I was on leave. Ellis
J. ordered me up to Maine to deliver two lectures (I understand you
turned down such an opportunity), one on the British White Paper,
the other entitled, "Can Graduated Deterrence Prevent War Indefinitely."
I spent a week there, attending the conferences and committees in
addition to delivering my two papers.

The Maine exile is a somewhat madcap idea, not unlike others
that Ellis has had in that respect. After toying first with the
idea of taking "strategists," then "strategists" and hardware people,
he finally decided to take mainly hardware people, so he could have
an almost equal number of military, and bringing the strategists in
as visiting "experts." Not surprisingly, I found everybody debating
strategy. One group was haring off on a trail that assumed one and
one only iron limitation--no thermonuclear bombs (nobody wants an
intercontinental exchange of TM bombs; use of TM bombs anywhere
would risk such an exchange; ergo, no use of TM bombs). This was
supposed to give firm indication of the Army's future role and the
kinds of weapons required. At the same time another minority was
fighting for the idea that the only possible limitation would
eliminate any and all nuclear employment. These are of course
early indications only--I don't know what the conference will come
up with. I thought they were asking _some_ of the right questions.

I certainly agree that we cannot rely on the threat of nuclear
war for purposes of deterrence and then expect to fight conventionally
when deterrence fails. That, in fact, is the burden of my attack upon
the so-called theory of deterrence, as you must have noted if you've
had the patience to read my diatribes against it. Deterrence, with a
capital "D", rests upon an assumption that there exists a formula for
military forces and political actions such that "aggression" can be
prevented. To me this is plain nonsense. What I find in it everytime
I examine it is a hidden premise--namely, that we possess a decisive
military advantage that will overawe any possible aggressor. And that
advantage _has_ to be nuclear, in the light of our actions. But obvi-
ously we _don't_ have such an advantage even now, as applied to all the
conceivable cases of conflict, and almost certainly won't have it in
any conceivable case in the future, and once that little fact is
recognized "Deterrence" comes down like the proverbial house of cards.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

Page 2

6 August 1957

I'm modestly proud of one of the concluding paragraphs of my
lecture, to wit:

> As an action policy Deterrence falls short because it is out of phase with the rationality of men and the predictability of events. At the one extreme the Grand Deterrent underestimates both. It is defeated by its transparent illogic, by a practical calculus in which real values and predictable risks do not lead to the desired result. Graduated Deterrence, at the other end, exaggerates both, making no allowance for areas of national conflict in which risks, though they cannot be predicted accurately, may reasonably be assumed to lie within an acceptable range--nor for the moral and emotional forces that determine which side, in a particular conflict, will more closely approach the holo-caust.

With the commonsense belief that military preparation, intelligently undertaken, will have a deterrent (small "d") effect, I of course have no quarrel.

I think I may have persuaded some Orons, who were not already persuaded (as quite a number are) that the problem is not Deterrence (the absolute formula) but Limitation, the conditions and requirements of.

I do not quarrel with the examination of the possibility of limiting nuclear war, quite the contrary, but only with your proposal that we commit ourselves to nuclear war in certain critical contingencies before the examination has been made. I would commit us only to the proposition that war can be limited as it must be, and then start with the maximum (most restrictive) limitations rather than with the minimum (least restrictive), as the point for exploration and application. Admittedly the danger of slippage exists, but if you are right about the rationale of limited war--and I think you are--then it is unlikely that anything will be proved by a conflict just-short-of annihilating that would not equally be proved by a considerably less destructive conflict.

Apparently we are going to have the opportunity to discuss these questions at whatever length we wish to. I suppose you know that I'm moving to the School of Advanced International Study the first

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

6 August 1957

of September, and that I'm to be in the Research Center with Arnold Wolfers and Paul Nitze. I understand you are also a part-time participant. I'm to run the program of conferences for business executives that the School puts on in the other half of my time. I hope your multifarious activities aren't going to prevent you from participating. Someone told me you were also going to be on the Harvard faculty. What's the story on that?

Congratulations on your other book. As a member of the History Book Club I got the announcement last night, and for once I did tear up the card. I'm looking forward to Metternich and Castlereagh à la Kissinger.

P.S. Please use my home address.

August 17, 1957

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter of August sixth. I was amused
by your description of Ellis' Maine enterprise and I liked very
much the concluding paragraph of your lecture.

I think we have gone about as far in our private discussion
as we can by correspondence and I look forward to an early oppor-
tunity to discuss these problems with you personally. I fear,
however, that you are under a misapprehension with respect to
my association with Nitze.

As you have heard, I have accepted the position as
Associate Director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs.
Between that and my New York activities, a Washington commitment
is out of the question.

Best regards.

Mr. James E. King, Jr.
10700 Weymouth Street
Garrett Park, Maryland

THE WASHINGTON CENTER OF FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH

1906 FLORIDA AVENUE, N. W. WASHINGTON 9. D. C. ADAMS 4-6623

AFFILIATED WITH THE
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

July 29, 1958

Dear Henry,

Having seen you on TV twice in as many days, not to mention practically daily references to you in the press and even more permanent publications, I'm become convinced that Kissinger is an institution and not just a vogue. Incidentally, it takes quite a lot of gall to "face the nation", but you acquitted yourself very well indeed.

My real reasons for writing are two. First, I want to say how much I enjoyed seeing and talking to you during my recent visit to Cambridge, and particularly that it was a pleasure and a privilege to meet Ann. Second, assuming that you are too busy to read anything you don't have forced upon you these days, I want to call your attention to Father Murray's essay in Foreign Policy and the Free Society, published for the Fund for the Republic by Oceana Publications. Mike Wallace asked you about a statement by Walter Millis in the latter's contribution to the same booklet. You rightly disagreed with Millis, I think. But Murray, without meaning to, makes a monkey out of Millis. I never thought I'd see the day when I could agree so fully with a Jesuit on Communism and US foreign policy. Of course I'm enough of an egghead to have some reservations. I am also impressed to the point of enthusiasm. If you should have a moment, let me know how the essay strikes you.

October 1, 1958

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Litauer Center
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Henry,

I want to thank you for recommending me as your substitute at the
Democratic forum in Trenton. Minor's office called, but I had to turn
them down because of a previous commitment for that day. I'm not surprised
you have run out of time, and I appreciate the vote of confidence in my scruples
as a critic.

Rather to my surprise, I was quite favorably impressed with your article
in the current issue of Foreign Affairs. I say to my surprise, because for
some reason the title aroused my suspicions. Actually, I thought you did a fine
job of presenting your case. I do think there are other "cases" that can be
made though.

My book is beginning to shape up nicely, though with some definite holes
remaining to be filled. But it is all in my head so far, and there is definitely
going to be a problem of finding time to get it down on paper. The first
priority is a contribution (possibly two) to Arnold Wolfer's symposium, which
is to be published this time in book form--by the Johns Hopkins Press.
Subject (provisionally): Going It with Others, which is to say, the American
systems of alliances, pro and con.

August 19, 1959

Dear Henry,

I am going to make the NATO circuit this fall, leaving September thirtieth and starting with the Oxford conference that Alastair Buchan is organizing. The State Department and the Pentagon will give me the usual blessings, so I do not anticipate difficulty in making contact with the appropriate Americans. The natives, however, are somewhat more of a problem. I wonder if you, from your large and recent experience, might be able to offer some suggestions, particularly as regards Germany. I should like of course to see both the official and the nonofficial strategists. I doubt if letters of introduction are required in most cases, but if you know of someone in Bonn or elsewhere who would be particularly valuable to me and to whom a letter is indicated your writing one would be vastly appreciated.

Princeton Press has sent me Bernard Brodie's new book and I note with egocentric interest that my sole entry is as your reviewer. This satellite fame will doubtless pursue me until I get something of my own out between hard covers, and probably even after that. In fact, I'm writing a book now -- for the Fulbright Committee -- but the effort will obviously be wasted as regards any possibility of my ultimately giving off on my own. Meantime, I liked your latest in *Foreign Affairs*.

1906 Florida Avenue, N.W., Washington 9, D. C.—AD 4-6623

September 14, 1959

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Henry,

Thanks immensely for the letters, both
are to men I should not like to miss.

I understand you are openly expressing your
preference for non-nuclear local defense these
days. Cheers! Meantime, I have been trying to
work it out so that both nuclear and non-nuclear
local defenses can been accommodated in the same
analysis. Cannot say I've solved it yet, but I
have made enough progress so that there's talk of
a book in the wind around here. Wish me luck.

Best regards, and, again, thanks.

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

International Studies Division

1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington 9, D.C., Telephone 234-9350 (Area Code 202)

July eleventh

Dear Henry:

Is the summerschool meeting honoring Bill Elliott
still on? I haven't heard anything about it since I
received the invitation to participate back in April.

In my reply to Tom Crooks I asked for further
clarification on what was expected of me, information
that did not emerge very clearly from his statement
that I was invited "to present with Mr. Kissinger your
notions about the interplay of philosophy and practice
in the conduct of national security programs." I
assume that you are either planning to read a prepared
paper, or at least to make some kind of address you
have planned in advance. Is my role to be that of
discussant or some alternative? Am I to be given a few
minutes to make a statement, or am I expected to
participate spontaneously as a panel member? In either
ease, could I have in advance some indication of the
subject you plan to tackle, and how you plan to approach
it?

I have been following your debate with the
New Frontiersmen with great interest, and more admiration
and sympathy than you may have expected.

All the best,

Professor Henry Kissinger
Center of International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Mass.

July 16, 1963

Mr. James King
Institute for Defense Analyses
1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington 9, D. C.

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter of July 11th. To tell you the truth I do not know any more about the conference than you do. I know I am supposed to lead off but just what the relationship between your comments and mine is I have no idea.

I do not really believe that you are supposed to comment on my views unless you want to. The idea, as far as I understand it, is for each of the speakers to present his own ideas. I wish I could send you some advance information about what I am going to say but unhappily I have not yet addressed myself to the subject.

I appreciated your kind words about my debate with the New Frontiersmen. It may be that my megalomania is going out of control but I had always thought of you as somewhat of an ally.

Warm regards.

Henry V. Kießinger

Warm regards.

 somewhat of an ally.

Going out of control but I had always thought of you as
the New Frontiersmen. It may be that my megatons is
I appreciated your kind words about my debates with

have not yet addressed me yet to the subject.

formation about what I am going to say but unnebly I
have my ideas. I may I could send you some advance in-
so I understand it, is for each of the sheekees to present
comment on my views unless you want to. The ideas, as far
I do not refly believe that you are abhored to

I have no ideas.

what the relationship between your comments and mine is
than you do. I know I am abhored to lead off but just
you the truth I do not know and more about the conference
Thank you for your letter of July 11th. To tell

Dear Tim:

Washington G. D. C.
166 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Institute for Defense Analysis
Mr. James King

July 10, 1963

400 Army-Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202, Telephone (703) 558-1000

July 18, 1966

JUL 20 1966

Professor Henry Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

I procured a copy of your prepared testimony before the Reporter article had time to appear--thanks to a more enterprising IDA staff member who got it from the Committee. Sorry to have bothered you. If you really are interested in my opinion, here it is.

I am with you--on de Gaulle, MLF, better relations between the Federal Republic and Eastern Europe, etc., etc.--until you come to the issue of unification and relations between West and East Germany. There we part company and I join Schelling. I find nothing in your arguments to convince me that I should change what I wrote two years ago and published in *Changing East-West Relations and the Unity of the West* (edited by Wolfers and published by The Johns Hopkins Press). You would describe it, no doubt, as the policy of "little steps" but I arrived at it independently, not by borrowing it from Willy Brandt. I'd now go farther. I'd insist as firmly as I did then that the allies (especially the United States!) ought not to push the Federal Republic into anything. But the West Germans themselves should be seriously exploring recognition as the alternative most likely to produce movement towards reunification. The recognition could be "formal," even grudging; but I can see no other way of improving the situation, which clearly depends upon achieving some status for East Germany other than that of a Soviet occupation. The short-run objective, it seems to me, is to get self-determination in East Germany. The "Austrian solution" might do it. Frankly, most of the alarm with which you view the recognition of East Germany just doesn't make sense to me. You say the "most promising" policy is to isolate the GDR, when fifteen years of doing just that has got us where we are. You worry about the dangers of two Germany's in competition, as if that isn't the situation already. You warn that once East Germany has "established its international status" its weakness will give it the strength to "undermine the Federal Republic." You talk about a "popular Front of a particularly virulent kind because the partner would be not a party but a sovereign state" --a characterization I find incomprehensible. And in your *Troubled Partnership* you try to pin it all down by a one-paragraph reference to Italy that is simply grotesque! (And incidentally I consider that book your best yet--at least since *A World Restored*.)

cr]

Professor Henry A. Kissinger

-2-

July 18, 1966

Of course I agree that all the horrible outcomes you depict are possible. But they are only possible, which means that much more favorable outcomes are possible too--and what is the alternative? I am all for increasing trade and relations between the Federal Republic and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. But I see no reason why the Federal Republic and its allies should continue to cooperate with the Soviet Union to maintain East Germany in *statu quo*. The Ulbricht regime is isolated already, and it will continue to be isolated, so long as it depends upon Soviet Divisions for its survival, far beyond our poor power to add or detract. It is in fact almost as isolated from its partners in the Warsaw Pact as it is from its "enemies" in NATO. I see little hope of changing that situation while Ulbricht remains on the scene, but he is not immortal and sooner or later there must be movement, if the West and the Russians will permit it.

Is it utterly hopeless to expect that an East German regime that wanted it could gain the kind of acceptance the Hungarian regime has gained from its people? Is it unimaginable that such a regime would then evolve roughly along the paths the Jugoslavs, Roumanians, etc. are following? I agree that it is a problem there is no East German nationalism. But there is such a thing as German patriotism, which is not just equated with acceptance of the Basic Law and NATO. There is also a German form of Communism that might eventually assert itself.

Anyway, I see no possibility of a genuine reconciliation between West Germany and Poland and Czechoslovakia while the FRG insists upon reunification, and without such a reconciliation I see little prospect of useful progress in Europe.

Incidentally, I am writing my account of the development of the "new strategy" (relating it to the parallel development of strategic doctrine by the U.S. Government) and I find myself using your evolving ideas as a connecting thread. Once I get it into reasonably satisfactory shape, by early fall according to my present schedule, I hope you will find time to read it for me--not only because I don't wish to do you an injustice but also because I should value your critique immensely.

All the best,

James E. King, Jr.

Professor Klaaijder
Secretary to

Sincerely yours,

at that time.
I will bring your letter to his attention
office the first week in August and
He is expected to return to the
acknowledge your letter of July 18th,
on a trip abroad. I am writing to
In Professor Klaaijder's absence

Dear Mr. King:

Arlington, Virginia 23208
400 Army-Navy Drive
Institute for Defense Analyses
Mr. James E. King, Jr.

July 30, 1966

August 12, 1968

Mr. James E. King, Jr.
Institute for Defense Analyses
400 Army-Navy Drive
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter of July 18th which reached my office
while I was in Vietnam. Let me reply on my first day back at the
office.

I appreciated your thoughtful analysis very much. You ascribe
views to me which I expressed in my book but which I did not repeat
before the Committee in quite the force you seemed to think. Still
this is only a technical problem.

I quite agree with you that the outcomes I predict are only possibilities. It seems to me to be the essence of foreign policy that one has to make one's judgments on the basis of assessments which cannot be proved true. I think the difference between us boils down to a different assessment of the stability of the West German situation. I do not believe that the West Germans will be able to conduct themselves with wisdom and subtlety in the situation you envisage. I could conceive of a unified Europe or a Franco-American partnership doing many of the things you have in mind. The Federal Republic alone will tear itself to pieces if it pursues that course but as I said this is a question of judgment which cannot be proved.

I will be very interested to see you account of the development of
the "new strategy." Better still, I would love a chance to see you
personally.

Warm regards.

Henry V. Krausdorfer

Sincerely yours,

Warm regards,

personally.

the "new atmosphere." Better still, I would love a chance to see you
I will be very interested to see your account of the development of
proved.

that course but so I said it is a question of judgment which cannot be
minded. The Federal Republic stone will test itself to pieces if it buries
France-Americas partnership good many of the things you have in
the situation you envisage. I could conceive of a united Europe or a
Germany will be able to conduct themselves with wisdom and aptitude
the ability of the West German situation. I do not believe that the West
I think the difference between na polio down to a different assessment of
one's judgments on the basis of assessments which cannot be proved true.
It seems to me to be the essence of foreign policy that one has to make
I quite agree with you that the outcomes I predict are only possibilities.
this is only a technical problem.

before the Committee in due course the force you seemed to think. Still
views to me which I expressed in my book but which I did not repeat
I appreciated your thoughtful analysis very much. You subscribe
to office.

while I was in Vietnam. Let me reply on my first day pack at the
Thank you for your letter of July 18th which reached my office

Dear Jim:

Arlington, Virginia 22203
400 Army-Usavy Drive
Institute for Defense Analysis
Mr. James E. King, Jr.

August 12, 1968

August 15, 1966

AUG 17 1966

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Henry:

I appreciate your prompt response to my letter. It makes clear what I
probably should have read between the lines of your testimony (and your book).

Of course I respect your grasp of German political realities. On the
other hand, I don't regard myself as a Pollyanna where West German stability
is concerned. Isn't it really a question of the most likely source of the greater
pressures on that stability? What bothers me is that I foresee the Germans coming
to think of themselves as (a) the victims of a conspiracy among the West European
states and, at the same time, (b) instruments of U.S. policy towards the Soviet
Union. That, too, could cause the Federal Republic to "tear itself to pieces."
As you say, we are both judging possibilities.

I'd very much like to have a talk with you too. In fact, I feel the need to
because your writings bulk rather large in my study and I'd like to be sure I have
captured their drift accurately. There's a possibility I shall be coming to
Cambridge during the week of September 19 to help my daughter, who will be a
senior at Brandeis next term, get established in her Cambridge apartment. I've
written Schelling that I'd appreciate a chance to talk with him during that visit;
perhaps you could extend the same privilege. I'd be happy to extend my visit for a
day or two to suit your convenience. If you could let me know how your availability
during that week looks I should be able to make a precise date with you very soon.

August 18, 1966

Dear Jim:

I would love to see you. Unhappily,
I am not likely to be back in Cambridge
from a European trip much before
September 23rd. If you could stay until
the 24th I could certainly see you. If
not, why don't I make a point of seeing
you on one of my visits to Washington.

With kind regards.

Henry V. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards.

you on one of my visits to Washington.
not' why don't I make a point of seeing
the 34th I could certainly see you. It
September 33rd. If you could stay until
from a European trip much before
I am not likely to be back in Cambridge
I would love to see you. Unwillingly.

Dear Jim:

Arlington, Virginia 22203
400 Army-Navy Drive
Institute for Defense Analysis
Mr. James E. King, Jr.

August 18, 1966

2 February 1967

Professor Henry Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

I have recently had called to my attention Raymond Aron's article, "Can War in the Atomic Age be Limited," which you published in *Confluence* in July 1956 and which, I am ashamed to say, I had completely forgotten. Re-reading this piece with all the advantages of a decade of hindsight persuades me that it was a remarkable production. Not only did he make the case for preserving the tactical nuclear option (which you were to make in your book the next year and which I assume you were working on at the time) but he also argued for the "no-cities" strategy in general war and said that limited wars of the future were more likely to be guerrilla wars than "limited war between regular armies."

Now, I should like to know how much of this Aron derived from his talks with Americans and how much of it was original. As I recall, he was in Cambridge about that time in your summer group. Is that correct? Was he there when he wrote the article or had he been there? Do you recall any other circumstances that might explain the ideas he incorporated? Also, what can you tell me about how they were received?

I am willing to assume that Herman Kahn and possibly some others were already talking about the "no-cities" or hostage principle in connection with their researches at RAND. But this was actually before Kahn started his briefings from which *On Thermonuclear War* emerged and I am not aware that Aron had encountered Herman at the time. I suppose though that he might have gotten the no-cities idea from Dick Leghorn's article ("No Need to Bomb Cities to Win Wars") which was published in January 1955. I am also familiar with your long chapter on "The Strategy of Ambiguity" but I do not find in it an explicit statement of Aron's prophecy about future limited conflicts. I am an old admirer of Aron's capacity for absorbing and sorting out the ideas of American writers on strategy, contrasting them with the European perspective on the

FEB 6 1967

same problems and interpreting them for both American and European readers. For
these reasons I have a very high regard for his book, *The Great Debate*. This 1956
article, however, may indicate that he was actually more creative in the field than I
had thought he was. If that is the case, naturally I should like to give him credit for
it and that is the reason I am asking for your help. I am writing him about it too, but
the questions I am asking you are not ones he can very well answer about himself.

We never have had our talk but I still have hopes for it. I am rushing to get my
study (I am thinking of calling it *The New Strategy*--maybe "and its critics.") completed
and when I have it in reasonable shape I shall want you to read it. Also, I have no doubt
you will want me to read it because you figure prominently in much of it! I am going to
try sending the draft around to all whose ideas I have quoted. From some quarters I
anticipate only trouble for my pains, but not from you I think.

FEB 14 1968

February 12, 1968

Dear Henry:

I wonder if you would try to answer a question about yourself for me. It is one of the questions I would ask you if I were to have that long-delayed session we have talked about. It is perhaps not of decisive moment, but it is a matter of some interest to me.

Here is the question: Where did you receive your indoctrination in international power politics? I have put it bluntly, probably more bluntly than you like, but that is to make the import of my question clear.

I have been very much struck by the fact that of the "political" strategists (as opposed to the "scientists" in Aron's classification) all the more notable ones were leaders in the post World War II reaction against Wilsonian internationalism. You are included in the group, even though as a proponent of balance-of-power thinking you were, and are, certainly among the more moderate, historical, and "legitimist" ones.

In addition, I have been much struck by the extent to which, in my survey of strategic thinking in the fifties all roads lead to New Haven. I should be willing to suggest, as a tentative hypothesis in intellectual history, that it was a melding of historical military strategy as represented by Bernard Brodie and the power-politics thinking of Spykman and Wolfers that -- more than any one other influence -- determined the point of departure for American strategic theory in the nuclear era. Don't forget that Brodie went from New Haven to Santa Monica where he obviously influenced Wohlstetter and his group (and where he must have been instrumental in arousing Herman Kahn's interest in international politics). In other words, what I call "the new strategy", which was very largely a RAND creation, seems to me to have issued from an alliance (possibly a misalliance) of the Machtpolitik school at the Yale University Center of International Studies and the systems analysts, most of whom (aside from Wohlstetter, Kahn, and Ed Paxon) were economists. What makes this a plausible hypothesis is of course the role of Brodie as catalyst. Where else did the Wohlstetters, Rowens, etc. get their "criteria" in the broadest sense? There is nothing in systems analysis or in economic analysis per se that tells anything about international politics. I should

[L]

-2-

add that I am deliberately relating this development to the new arrivals from Europe: Wolfers, Spykman, Klaus Knorr, etc. -- rather than to the native schools of power politicians -- Lippmann, Schumann, Niebuhr, Kennan, Ken Thompson etc. -- because the latter are all moralists in a sense that the Europeans are not. Morganthau does not quite fit the pattern: he did not pass through New Haven and he is a moralist a la Niebuhr. And neither do you in a number of ways(which probably helps explain why you have found yourself at odds with the RAND group at various times).

But you are sufficiently close to the New Haven pattern for me to be intrigued. I know you did not get that perspective from Bill Elliott. I doubt if you got it from Carl Friedrich. Did you get it from Mac Bundy? Bob Osgood (also no New Havenite) certainly did -- though I doubt he would acknowledge it. In fact it was when I discovered that Bundy was Osgood's thesis supervisor that I was first struck by this pervasive influence of New Haven.

Now maybe you think your appreciation of international politics was simply self-generated. It would be understandable if you did, and it might even be true, but it would be most unusual if you had no intellectual affiliations, as even you must admit. In other words, what I am asking is that you stir your memory and ask yourself when and if possible where you first became aware of the "errors" of Wilsonian collective-security thinking -- or of American "moralism and legalism" in international politics, if you prefer the Kennan formula.

By the by, my son David has signed up for your introduction to international politics. I have urged him to speak to you and he may do so. He does not look very much like me but just in case you see someone before you whom you think does it might help you to know that he is wearing a mustache and long hair! If he remembers anything much from that formidable reading list you use he will know as much about the subject as I do!

Sincerely,

James B. King

February 20, 1968

Mr. James E. King
Institute for Defense Analyses
400 Army-Navy Drive
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Dear Jim:

Your thoughtful letter of February 12 requires a fuller reply than I have
time for. It is always difficult to talk about intellectual antecedents.
No doubt one is influenced about many things of which one is not aware.
As for Brodie, unbelievable as this may sound, I did not even know his
name when I started working on international affairs. I came across
him for the first time after I had already agreed to work for the Council
on Foreign Relations on nuclear weapons and foreign policy. The
influence of which I am most conscious is that of Bill Elliott and Fritz
Kraemer. Mac Bundy had very little, if any, influence on me. As you
know, he is much better at thinking about administrative problems than
basic philosophical issues.

I doubt that this is of much help to you.

Henry A. Kissinger