DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Ambassador Cromer/Mr. Kissinger

12:49 p.m., November 19, 1971

C: Henry?

K: Rowley, how are you? I wanted to tell you two things. The President is delighted by not only the content but the tone of the communication. I think we will have that well back on the track.

C: That's very good news.

K: Secondly, we would prefer now -- to prove that even I with all my humility can be wrong sometime -- to make the announcement on the 24th. It remains to be cleared up that he wanted to talk to the Portuguese about the X Azores.

C: But you have in mind to make the announcement on the 24th.

K: Yes. Could your people make whatever preparations they have to but keep it secret until then?

C: Yes, certainly. I will get a signal off to them right away.

K: Thank you.

lds

TELECON

Dobrynin

11/19/71 4:45 p.m.

D: I have to go in 15 minutes. But two points: one is the question, rather three. About my residence,

K: Yes.

D: Today on a low lever we were told without explanation that the State Department couldn't approve it.

K: Give me the address of it.

D: 1101 Crest Lane, McLean, Virginia

K: Until yesterday, I didn't know you were looking at a residence.

D: It was a dealer recommended by State Department. I would like on a personal basis for you to look at it if possible. I would like to ask it as a personal favor. Second, anything new from

K: No.

D: Even now?

K: Not today.

D: I have a telegram, signed not by a man who deals with American affairs, said it looks like they are preparing some kind of report to give you. This was just for my own information. So there is nothing.

K: No.

D: So I will urge Moscow to recheck.

K: And if they make public a reply to a private communication, that will be the end of any negotiations with them.

D: Nothing is clear in the gelegram.

K: We informed them today that I wouldn't come to meet with their subordinates.

D: Why now have their subordinates come here to meet with you?

K: I would be delighted, but I doubt that they are willing to come. If they can I will arrange a plane and total secrecy.

D: It was just a question.

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 12958
Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin

11/19/71 4:45pm

p. 2

K: We have had no communication since they told us Le Duc Tho was not coming.

D: I understand. And last, personal communication to you from Gromyko. He asked if you could spare a half hour to look at our proposal at the UN about the moon.

K: What about it?

D: A certain treaty.

K: You can assure him I will take personal look at it.

D: No specific objections, but your delegation is saying . . . I don't know why he is so interested in this treaty . . .

K: Maybe he bought some land on the moon. I'll look into it.

D: Then just let your other people there know.

K: Why don't I send you a message through Vorontsov on what I find. I take it is you want us to support you?

D: Yes, but Vorontsov could tell you.

K: Why doesn't Vorontsov send over to me what you want. And I promise you I will look into it and by the middle of next week tell you.

D: Okay, I will tell Gromyko.

K: Good. Any request of his will receive my personal attention. We'll look into it and tell you before I leave for the West Coast.

D: And look into the matter about my house?

K: I will. If it is a bureaucratic boondoggle I will take care of it.

D: Okay.

K: You want me to let you know through Vorontsov about that?

D: Definitely . . . in Moscow asking them for about a million dollars. Expecting to make oral presentation.

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 12558

By NARA Date 6/1/71

TELECON

The President

11/19/71 6:00 p.m.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

P: Did your pretty little secretary tell you that I said it's the first time I've ever seen Dr. Kissinger give you some time off.

K: No.

P: I told her to tell you that.

K: I understand it was a tremendous success.

P: Well it wasn't exactly that. But I think it was an asset. I praised them on their defense of our Cambodia and Vietnam policy and then took off after them.

K: I think in terms of Presidential leadership it was a plus.

P: It may have some good effects, but it had to be done. You can't let
or any special interest group get away with this.

K: And the people like to see their President stand up for principles, and
I wouldn't be surprised if labor felt that way too.

P: A lot of them do. A lot of them don't like this old man, and they don't like having him calling the head of the price board a dolt and the Secretary of Labor a ribbon clerk. So I took him on to China and K. Russia. I said a lot of these are looked on as election-year junkets. I said these trips are not about the next election; they are about the next generation.

K: Good.

P: It's an old line.

K: But it's true.

P: I said we have got our differences. But we are not going to achieve anything by fighting about them.

K: I think that is very strong.

P: I'm still of the same view but you can't.

K: No, you can't now. Pompidou has accepted for the 13th and 14th.

P: And Rogers is pleased?

K: Oh yes. He thinks it's great. I gave him the picture and sent Haig over to go over details.

TELECON
The President

11/19/71 6:00 p.m. p. 2

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

P: And on the Latin trip, I've shoved that into the first three days of February.

K: The mm later the better.

P: But I didn't want to get it too close to China because I need that time to study. I have 10 days clear before China.

K: But no less. One reason you couldn't do it over the weekend is because
Pham Van Dong is leaving.

P: And we can't do it while he's there.

K: No, it's not possible.

P: There will be another target.

K: There are plenty in the Penhandle. My recommendation is two weeks from
today, if we haven't heard from them. Actually I consider this trip very interesting;
first that the Chinese gave us warning on it. In effect they gave us a four-day advance
warning. I am sending a message to Chou (?) similar to the one I gave the Russians
yesterday. We had a reaction from Dobrynin -- I laid it to him last night. This morning
I said the President said "it's not enough that there will be no offensive action."
At 5:00 Dobbrynin called me; he had heard from Moscow informing him the North
Vietnamese were preparing a reply to our proposition. If they do it publicly,
we can go public, and they can't possible go as far as we have.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Dr. Judd/Kissinger

6:25 p.m.

11/19/71

J: I wondered if he was off base. If he can say I am authorized --

K: Where can I reach you next week?

J: In Washington.

K: Will you call me Tues.?

J: I will call you from Rochester.

K: This has been a rough time for you. It is not a source of joy here either.
No one deserves it less than the Taiwanese.

J: They are victims of other forces.

K: And disarray (?). We had to have maneuvering room.

J: There's a stampede away from them.

K: After we have been in Peking and they say nothing happening.

J: Taiwan we have to take domestic action and Equador breaks relations.

I thought this would be useful with a minimum of risk and maximum of ____.

I will call you.

TELCOM

Ambassador Rabin/Mr. Kissinger

7:55 p.m., November 19, 1971

R: I will get the answer for each one of the two options tomorrow.

K: Right.

R: It seems that the first reaction is not in favor of the third.

K: That's okay. I haven't cleared it with the President yet but it
seems possible.

R: I see.

K: There is a slight chance there will be a problem but I don't expect it.

R: I sent a cable and said these are the two options. I got an answer that not for the time being for the third and favor the 11th.

K: That would be good.

R: And means consideration would be ______ before the meeting.

K: What are you going to do at the meeting, attack us?

R: Which one?

K: On the 11th.

R: I don't believe under any circumstances the President would be attacked.

K: It is okay. I understand.

R: Anyhow I hope there will be no reason for it.

K: Good.

R: Then I will be in contact with you about 10:00 in the morning.

K: I will be here until 11:30.

R: I have been promised an answer by 9:00 here which is 4:00 there.

K: All right. I will here from you then?

R: Right. Thank you very much.

DECLASSIFIED

MJD E0 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/1/04

By.

NARA, Date

TELCORN

Rabin/Kissinger

afternoon 11/19/71

K: We are having this problem that the Secy. of State is leaving town on the 4th for Europe. Therefore, this means that the President -- and he is insistent that he must be in town when the President meets your Prime Minister. That means he is not fighting it. One is Dec. 15 and 16 which is perferable or Dec. 2 and 3.

R: The meeting is on the 11th.

K: Since you give us a chance -- I see, then she spends 5 days here.

R: Not advisable for her to appear publicly before seeing the President.

K: Why not? You offered the correct way. We could do the 15th and 16th.

R: She will come before the 11th.

K: We will be on the West Coast through the 1st so the meeting should be on the 3rd. Only that way can he see her. I am tied up the evening of the second.

R: Any problem if she appears at the meeting on the 11th and then sees President.

K: We will let the press know that we have scheduled her meeting with the President after her public appearance so she can meet with the Secy. of State.

R: He wants to meet before with her.

K: Not necessary but will want to be at the meeting.

R: Could she come at the 8th and see the President and even to wait one day until the Secy. comes back.

K: To see him?

R: Yeah. Or don't you think it would be advisable?

K: It isn't if any decisions are taken that are contrary to the existing line.

R: Then it puts a position that she will appear publicly first.

K: We could do it the 3rd. If we have to.

R: Then she could not be here the 11th. Then I would have to figure out something

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Rabin/Kissinger

afternoon 11/19/71

-2-

K: But he is strongly opposed to that.

R: Who.

K: Rogers because he says it's time of UN debate but I don't think that's the decisive point. Why so bad if she speaks first?

R: I think it's not polite.

K: We would make clear that we forced you.

R: You asked me that it would be put a private visit for a plausivel reason. The only one I can find so it doesn't look like a (contrived?) meetings is the 11th.

K: Why not then the 15th or 16th?

R: It's better the 15th. 16th is a Friday. And Friday means that another -- 15th is a Wed.

K: I don't know 16th is Thurs. We can do it on the 15th but I think the 16th is better but it's not decisive.

R: It's a real problem. Because it was planned. The 3rd you don't want.

K: We can do it but can she stay until the 11th?

R: No, there's no reason purpose.

K: Why?

R: 11 days.

K: Yeah.

R: I will try to find out another. It is a pity we didn't check because in the meantime --

K: I didn't realize he would be gone.

R: I have to check with her.

K: And let me know. We can decide Monday. We are holding these dates.

R: I will let you know tomorrow.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TelCon)9:25-11/20/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Hugh Sidey

K: How are you.

S: Good.

K: I am calling you actually against everyone's advice here who knows about these things. I understand that Life is doing a story on my social life. Is it possible to talk to you about that not getting in the papers. There is a girl on the West Coast - Amanda __________(?). She called me last night and said she was being bothered by reports and photographers. I was out with her about eight months ago and I haven't seen her since. Why should she be in life as a great romancer of mine. I have seen her once. And I feel that Maxine Cheshire, what she wrote about is really a rewarding crime. I do date some girls but God damn it I am not a play boy. It is rough on my children and embarrassing to me, and I don't know what you get out of it.

S: I understand. I know nothing about this - but let me find out about it.

K: I would like to have this whole thing dropped.

S: I will talk to Healey(? )and see.

K: It's alright to joke about it, but it is not the principal activity in which I am engaged.

S: Let me find out about it. This is the first I have found out about it. They maybe just trying to get a story together and that is all.

K: Thanks. That is good.

S: How was Cincinnati?

K: Nice. They are not as sophisticated as the group at the luncheon but they are so . . . It went well and they were interesting. I enjoyed it very much.

S: Yes, I think they appreciate it.

K: Yes, they do and I going to try and do it more often.

S: Well, I think will find out about this and get back to you.

K: Good. Thanks and I appreciate it.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TelCon:11:20-11/20/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Ambassador Watson

W: Hello Henry.

K: How are you. Did you get my message?

W: No, I didn't get it that is why I called.

K: We had planned to go ahead with making all three announcements on the 24th. This is still our strong preference. However, we have this suggestion if you can't sell it.

W: I tried but he is adamant about it.

K: We have gone ahead with the 310(? ) meeting on November 30. Now if we make just the announcement of seeing him before the 30th, it will look like we are trying to tear this apart. Our suggestion is the French on the 24th, the British on the 26th and the Germans on the 28th or 30th. We have to because one, it might leak . . . . . . for the French if all the cards are on the table.

W: OK that is terrific.

K: If they agree with that we can proceed. On the other points, the schedule for the first and second days are fine . . . . . . to the Portuguese. We will send you a rough agenda this weekend. We would like to bring Rogers and Connally for obvious reasons.

W: I think they are (?) cases.

K: In one case it is essential substantively and the other emotionally. The President will meet with Pompidou separately.

W: Henry, we better speak in a little more code. Yes, fine I got you.

K: In other words we want the maximum head-to-head meetings. The others will meet with their counterparts.

W: OK. Very good, I will do my best. The man I talked to this morning, his boss is out of town but I am sure I can get in touch with him.

K: OK.

W: I will get your message very soon.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Amb. Bogdan/Kissinger

10:20 a.m.

11/22/71

B: I am in NY.

K: You are coming back to see --

B: ______ at 3:00.

K: The President asked me to call you to give you detail on what Allen wants to see you about and to tell you that we have decided to extend ExIm Bank facilities to Romania and make MFN availabe for Romania if we can work out the bond issue. You said you would do that.

B: Yes.

K: Don't tell Allen I told you this when you meet him. The President asked me to convey to you that this is to confirm to your president the bond between our people.

B: I don't have to meet with you?

K: No. You will see Allen.

B: I am grateful for this communication and the President will be delighted.

K: Convey to your President that this is a sign of the contact of the two Presidents.

B: I haven't received word from State.

K: It's unbelievable. I know we are backing Jacobsen. I will get you an answer in 48 hours.

B: thank you very much.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Amb. Raza

11/22/71 12:00 noon

R: On Sunday I tried to get you but you were out. On Saturday I was out racing.

K: Racing? !

R: I had gone to the race course.

K: I wanted to tell you on behalf of the President that we think the Xh Chinese statement on F ______ was something in which we had a little suggestion to make and we are in touch with the Chinese on your problems.

R: Good.

K: I have just seen a report from Karachi ______ announcement Indian full-scale attack. That can't be true.

R: ________________. This is from the BBC. Then Secretary Connally's press conference was interrupted to announce that war had broken out between India and Pakistan. They said there would be details after the press conference.

K: Is that true?

R: I don't know. This is all I have heard. ______ just telephoned me to ask if there was anything going on. ______ in the UN and they wanted to know about it.

K: Will you let me know as soon as possible if you hear anything from Pakistan because if it is true we'll call you take a tough line on it.

R: I am now busy trying to get the news. If I hear any more I will keep you informed.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Rogers/Kissinger

12:27 p. m. 11/22/71

R: I want to talk cryptically but any progress on that --

K: I should have called Friday. I didn't go because the guy supposedly got ill and they wanted the other guy and the President thought no point in doing that. We have some intelligence reports from Hanoi that the guy is ill but whether genuine or not we told them it is upen and when he recovers they should keep in touch.

R: I got wind of it. Al said something about your being here.

K: I meant to call you.

R: That's all right. Al suggested it on the phone. 1

K: That's what I thought.

R: On India/Pakistan thing we haven't dot the direct word. I thought the editorial in Times was good saying the bee is on the UN and if we could keep it in that framwork it is better.

K: I have called a WSAG for the facts. No decision will be made at the meeting and if any decision is contemplated we will get you and Laird over here.

R: How are his spirits?

K: Poor Sat. morning but he helped himself with this.

R: He doesn't like this. For the President to be mistreated so.

K: He is in good shape today.

R: These visits are good. Strenuous but good.

K: He is planning to take you and Connally on allof them. He thinks it's good for Connally to see what political impact of moves is.

R: I had a good lunch meeting with Connally. You learn from quietly meeting rather than pushing.

K: A negotiation has to be (alone on conviction?). On textile ? ? ? ? ? .
Even there I don't know if the price was worth it. But on this they will just
wait for an opportunity to get even.

TELECON
The President

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

11/22/71 12:45 p.m.

P: What's happening in India-Pakistan?

K: The Indians have now denied it, and said they are confusing...

P: What do the Paks say?

K: Their communication is bad. There is no doubt there is a large encroachment taking place and it is heavily backed by the Indians.

P: They are probably trying to do it without getting cut off. I want you to lay it out hard that I have made a determination that all aid to both sides stops. Cut it to both India and Pakistan.

K: We haven't completely cut it to Pakistan yet. That might put them over the brink.

P: But won't it hurt the Indians more?

K: That's a determination I can make for you.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Amb. Watson/Kissinger

2:17 p.m. 11/22/71

W: I am sorry to bother you. This is Dick again. I have a problem and has
nothing to do with our previous conversation. Are you aware of the Delaware
Drug case in NewarH?

K: In the roughest way.

W: I have just gotten an AP bulletin.

K: Where we accuse someone?

W: This quotes Sterns letter to the examining judge in Paris and on
Nov. 5 the Deputy assured Stern that the ? ? ? ? was Fornier. Stern
released this letter to the press. It's the most damaging on the part of
Stern. Since the meetinb between Stern and the Deputy was arranged by me
at the Residence and is a priviliged matter this is a breach of faith and
the Deputy Director says he will sue Stern.

K: Let me see what we can do.

W: Shall I call John Mitchell?

K: I will talk with him. There is nothing you x can add.

W: I made the point of getting Sterns over here so he can get information
and tell the French what he knew x and now he is irresponsible and I have
tried to lett the judicial authorities handle this. And with everything we have
going this makes me sick. Maybe a letter from John to Marshland.

K: Call Mitchell and I will get after it.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM

Atty. G en/Kissinger

2:28 p.m.

11/22/71

AG: I just had a call from Dick Watson.

K: He called me and since I don't understand the case I told him to call you.

AG: He mentioned backchannel wire.

K: We are meeting Pompidou on the 15th and 16th.

AG: Over there?

K: In the Azores and don't want to rock the boat.

A: That's the substance?

K: Right.

AG: I will turn this character off and get in touch with Marcellon (?) and put oil on the water.

K: Good. We have Golda Meir tied down.

AG: Going ahead with the request?

K: In a complicated way.

AG: The State Dept. won't screw it up?

K: I don't think so. You mentioned a meeting in Los Angeles. You will let me know?

AG: I will structure it and let you know through Haldeman because he will be out there.

K: Just let me know ahead of time.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
Amb. Raza/Kissinger
3:23 p.m. 11/22/71

R: We have received no telegram from the Foreign Office yet but the High Commissioner in London got in touch and following each one. The

has started in the ______ area about 3:00 yesterday. 9th division and second
tank regiment and ______ in front of them. Mig aircraft xxxxxx
over Chittagong, ______, ______. India withdrawn two divisions from
China border and Nagaya. For the moment ______ divisions are pointing after
Pakistan. Also not to move Security Council until they have received their
telegram because ______ on the telephone things go wrong. A little more.
According to India the ______ are advancing in East Pakistan.

K: If at all possible I would appreciate it if you would hold off going to the Security Council until Wed. I am meeting -- but strictly for you -- the Chinese secretly tomorrow. No one knows this. I would like to see what they intend to do.

R: Could I tell this to my permanent representative?

K: No.

R: All right. I have it. I will say try to postpone until Wed. if possible.

K: If not, go ahead because nothing will happen first today.

R: Shall I inform my government?

K: I will inform through my channel. But I am counting on you. This is secret.

R: No one will know. Now no one can say that we are preparing to attack them.

K: Do you know that Indian troops have crossed the border?

R: I think they have. When the telegram comes I will call you.

K: Have a memo of the pertinent facts and send it over.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
11/22/71 3:30 p.m.

K: I wanted to tell you we had a message proceeding recent events from XINX on the Pakistan situation which I sent to you. In effect it says the same thing they said publicly on Friday. It may be a nuance more sharply. I think it has to affect whatever strategy we pursue at the UN.

R: I will get on it right away. I have to get rid of a few people and then I will get back to you.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Amb. Bush/Kissinger

3:47 p.m. 11/22/71

K: You have anyone on this phone?

B: Would you rather me call you on the green one?

K: I don't know what it is.

B: It's a secure phone.

K: The appointment we discussed is set for tomorrow evening at 10:00. I would
like to see you before that.

B: We could have you come over. Let me see what's lowest profile.

K: I would like to get a feel from you what issues require urgent discussion.
But I hate to do it 5 minutes before I see them.

B: The French Ambassador just left this office and he had two hour talk with
them and the main thing they discussed was disarmament.

K: We have an India-Pakistan problem.

B: You know them on that. The Secy. General was one and on the M.E. they
said they would not want to get involved on that.

K: What business before the UN that even if they don't want to get involved will
involve them?

B: Pakistan-India. Finance. Not so important but important to other UN --

K: The President is calling.

********

K: Question is when we can get together. Are you free tonight?

B: I will be here. I have a touch of the bxxx flu. I cancelled a trip to Boston.
I can meet you up here if you want.

Kxxx bxxx Kxxx

K: You couldn't come down?

B: I am very weak. We have a Security Council in the afternoon and the
first time they have come to that so I should be there. A reception by them
after.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

Bush/Kissinger

3:47 p. m. 11/22/71

-2-

K: If we cannot meet there is no sense in you going along.

B: We can meet but case of whether 7:00 or 8:00 or so is all right.

K: I have to go to the President now. I will call you in the morning.

By. NARA, Dato 5/20

TELCONE

Sisco/Kissinger

5:47 p.m. 11/22/71

S: I want to explain something about the messages so you will know what I have done. We are in the box. We don't want to get into a creditibility gap. Obviously ______ but pattern of the last several days but no assumption of what is or is not the case.

K: The President wants to make -- they have a catalogue of what we have proposed and then we say it's unfortunate that it's unfortunate that as we haven't let it be played out --

S: I didn't get that. It's not in this message at all.

K: The thing I find so hard to understand why we don't get the basic tilt of President straight which isn't to ______ to Pakistan.

S: We have the straight but these meetings we are having -- you don't understand how intimidating you sound. You don't have to threaten us or intimidate us. We are trying to do the job. You will scare the hell out of so many people in this building that no one will give you the information you should hear. Not me. I am not one of these but I am telling you. You are a good professor and teacher but don't cut off your sources of information.

K: My job is to get the President's wants.

S: You are getting through. We have a responsibility also to say to you this is the way we read it. We know what the President wants. To make us feel that we are not doing what the President wants done -- it's developing in that room. And you should be aware of it. Let me catch the telegram.

K: That's the whole point of the telegrma.

S: This paragraph will improve it. It's a good telegram but this will improve it.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
11/22/71 6:25 p.m.

R: I have looked at this <u>eg</u> telegram the President wants to send. They will be over shortly. I think we ought to delay sending it till we have got a confirmation. So if we have only Pak radio reports . . .

K: Okay. Why don't we wait until tomorrow morning.

R: I think that's better. I think we'll find there is confirmation, but so far we haven't. We ought to be able to say we have independent confirmation.

K: If we can have them over here and ready to go in the morning.

R: Okay. I feel sure we'll have some confirmation. It's amazing that it's held this long.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Connally
11/22/71 6:30 p.m.

K: I saw you on TV and I share my friends' views.

C: What are they?

K: They have say you took on George Meany and they were still wiping him off the floor with him when they cut to another.

C: I thought it was good. Understand he was furious. God damn him. Any time he insults the President like he did I will do it again.

K: And we would be better off if this were the general posture of the Administration

C: Let me tell you something. We can't settle trade issues and burden sharing in the next 30 or 60 days. Why don't we revise our position. .r. . . . . .

K: That might be better.

C: It's better politically for us.

K: My judgment is that the Germans will not go above 6 percent revaluation. So in the next round you'll still be faced with this. You could still make a proposal you are thinking of and as a compromise come back with another.

C: We are going to start negotiating here at the end of the month.

K: In my view it's politically easier for these ministers. . . . . . . .

C: . . . . . . . . . . This is where the domestic political payoff is.

K: My instinct is it is easier to sell to the French and would avoid the German problem. But we still have a tactical problem . . . and both sides . . . anyway. Either way as an outcome it's more plausible than the one we talked about and may be better for us.

C: What we need domestically at least for the mid-west if we could crack agricultuar and help get the mid-west which the President will have to carry xxixx it would be a tremendous help it seems to me.

K: And would give us a better negotiating position.

C: I think so too.

By.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Chancellor Brandt/Mr. Kissinger

9:51 a.m., November 23, 1971

K: Mr. Chancellor.

B: Yes. The reason why I am calling is we have the Foreign Minister of Pakistan here and also an announcement of a new message from his President. We are worried about what is going on in that region. I want to ask before I give him any advice what is the U.S. position on the UN and the Security Council.

K: We have just had, Mr. Chancellor, a meeting on the subject. Strictly for your information, we are asking our Embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad what they think the reaction would be in those two countries of a Security Council meeting, and we would also like to take some soundings with other countries. If it goes to the Security Council, we will recommend that all parties should stop military operations and should also work for the possibility of the return of refugees -- which is a delicate way of talking about a political settlement. That would be our approach. We will wait for another 24 hours to see what the Chinese will say at the Security Council today at their first meeting.

B: This is good to hear. I hope it will not develop into a serious crisis.

K: We will do our best to keep the situation from becoming more inflamed. It might not hurt if some of our friends would tell the Indians... we are telling them that while we have enormous sympathy for the refugee problem, a resort to military force would not be understood in this country.

B: We might tell them something along the same MX lines.

K: That would be very helpful.

B: Thank you very much. Give my regards to your President.

K: At the moment he can't be reached. Otherwise, he would have been eager to talk to you. We look forward very much to seeing you at the end of December.

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Peterson/Kissinger

10:22 a. m.

11/23/71

P: I have missed you. How's everything?

K: OK.

P: Let me tell you what I am calling about. I am going to Europe the first week in December. Briefing ambassadors and foreign governments. I am planning to talk to economic people in each government. The economic minister and finance minister. I know ______ in France. Do you know Jean, the press chief? You probably know. He has raised my seeing Pompidou. Al seemed reluctant. The same thing has come up in Germany. They say the PM would like to talk about the economic situation.

K: When are you going?

P: I don't want to screw you up. The first week in December.

K: The President is planning to meet with them the first of next month and I don't think he wants someone else talking or not. You might also have trouble with Connally on this. It doesn't bother me.

P: Can you check it out? He is planning it now.

K: Who?

P: A guy on my staff setting up appointments.

K: Shall I ask the President?

P: If you could. I didn't raise it. On each case they say don't you want to see the PM.

K: Say no, you hate being bored.

P: I wanted to check with you.

K: Tell them after you have seen Kissinger, PMs are a letdown.

P: SOB! Will you mention this to the President?

K: I will mention it to the President to see how in the complex relationship with Connally they will feel.

P: Can you tell me about the meeting with Connally? Did you just meet with him?

K: I was invited and then disinvited. He is now meeting alone with him. Let's

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Peterson/Kissinger

10:22 a.m.

11/23/71

you and I have a rump meeting and have a vote.

P: An equal vote?

K: The President can't vote because he is the Chairman.

P: You and I think alike on this. Can you let me know about this today?

K: I will try.

P: In each case they brought it up. We didn't.

K: It shows what a big name you are.

P: I know. I agree.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Rogers/Kissinger

10:55 a.m. 11/23/71

K: I just wanted to tell you we had a call here from Brandt to the President which we thought concerned the meeting. But the President doesn't want to talk because doesn't want to get involved in scheduling of announcements. But it was about India/Pakistan. He asked what the attitude would be. I will send you a memo. I said we will ask for restraint. He asked about the UN and I said if it went to the UN we would urge end of military operations and opportunity for refugees to return. Drawn from the cable.

R: Can't beat that. What is he going to do?

K: He agreed with that. I said it wouldn't hurt that people who are friendly with India that military action would be hard to understand and he said he would and that they would urge restraint on Pakistan.

R: If it continues to build and I think it will then exhortations will not help and the UN is the only way out.

K: Let's not get ourselves -- that means Pakistan will get raped.

R: They will if the fighting doesn't stop.

K: India is outrageous.

R: I think in the UN Pakistan will come out better than India and Pakistan has no other way out.

K: I am in favor of going to the UN if it continues another day.

R: We don't do it.

K: No someone else.

R: I think we have been positioned ourselves well. We have asked restraint on both sides and humanitarian assistance. Yahya's position is more tenable than Mrs. Gandhi. She doesn't want UN or observers or a representative group. Yahya does. So he has quite an advantage and I see no way out for him but that.

K: It's part of the Soviet strategy to humiliate the country that helped the UN and China.

R: And it looks like they will succeed.

K: I think we should cut off military pipe line.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

Rogers/Kissinger

10:55 a.m. 11/23/71

-2-

R: It's not substantial. The principle reason it continues is the intelligence
facilities we thought it was important. ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? over a period of time.
If we decide it's of no consequence we will break ties with India. No
military significance. If we do it it will get attention. On ammunition and
such we should but our radar equipment I think we should wait.

K: I don't have a staff paper. Could we get recommendations?

R: It's so small it doesn't have significance except symbolic. I think we should
be sure to stay out of it. Get someone else to stop fighting and its going on in
3 places now and fairly substantial. Brandt going to talk with the President?

K: No. I think he did it as a grandstand play. But I wasn't prepared for this
subject. I thought he would bitch about the separate announcement.

R: Have you talked with the German Ambassador?

K: No.

R: Maybe I should call him in and say Brzndt called the President and touch
base with him.

K: I think there's a shade of difference between State's and the President's
view. He would like to tilt towards Pakistan and not India and your people
go the other way.

R: I don't see that. I don't think it's right. Does he think that?

K: No because I didn't go into it with him. He wants tough cables to go out.
I haven't gone into that because it's not my job to make difficulties. But he
told them in a WAG meeting 3 months ago what he thought.

K: We all favor Peking but we have to be realistic and Pakistan will be
leaked unless big powers go in.

K: Question all along -- we are lax if we tell India we will give anything
which ______ or if we give humanitarian or they want military things.

R: They don't rely on us for military things.

K: No but ?? ?? ?.

R: Is that what the President wants?

K: No, not for a couple of days.

Rogers/Kissinger

10:55 a.m.

11/23/71

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

R: I don't think it serves the President well. I don't think we should say the President wants us to kick India.

K: If one is asked what to do then one says release Mujib. That's what India wants.

R: Who said that? Did we?

K: I don't want to go into it. It's a speech that was made yesterday.

R: It's not what we have urged.

K: I thought this morning we were together. No disagreement this morning.

R: I think we should talk with the President about it. If there's any difference of opinion then he should know about it but I don't think so.

K: I think we are substantially in accord. It's a question of nuance and if ... ?
its demanding telling India to go ahead.

R: I don't think we should try to settle the politically or militarily. We can cut off economic assistance to India but at the moment I don't think so. Perhaps next week.

K: It shouldn't be done until after the extent of fighting is known.

R: I think perhaps we should ge together with the President so he knows what my position is. I will call the President.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Dr. Judd/Kissinger

4:42 p.m.

11/23/71

J: I wondered how you came out on that matter.

K: I have a call in to Robert Anderson who I have not been able to reach yet.

J: It's Robt. E, who used to be in Treasury.

K: Oh, I have the wrong one. I will call him now.

J: He is willing if someone else --

K: I also asked if he objected to the Vice President and he said no.

J: I put in a call to him. I talked with Mr. Damguard over there. He said the schedule is full. I thought he should be sure everything is satisfactory all around.

K: That's where we stand.

J: If the V. P. can't do it could I ask Geo. Bush to do it? I asked him earlier about the dinner but not about asking him to speak.

K: Human courtesies are inimportant in this situation.

J: It means a lot to the people who got such a blow. Help morale and see that stories that the U.S. didn't want to keep their membership are not true.

K: Absolutely.

J: If the VP is there it wouldn't be just a friendship but a policy of support for them.

K: I hope to see you sometime. It's painful that for those who thought of me as a xxx supporter find me doing things that they don't like. What you do is important.

J: I think so. I made my peace in the UN and if it was anotherxxx decision, I went along. But I have an intellectual feeling that the positive will outweigh the negative of this.

K: Expulsion of Taiwan. The problem is the Peking trip. What we face there. Sometime I will talk about it. The media is dominated by liberals.

J: Peking radio has broadcast the nature of the struggle going on there. Twice they are saying the President coming to surrender. People are afraid that its true. Make concessions or come home empty handed and that's not good for the country. They don't hestate as their man said that nothing can help our liberating

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Dr. Judd/Kissiner

4:42 p.m.

11/23/71

Taiwan. They would respect us more if we were forthright in saying we will not do this at expense of our friends.

K: In my meetings with them and in the President's forthcoming meetings they will be under no misapprehension.

J: They are smart and if they feel as Edgar Snow said in Life that presents have been brought to them before but never before the leader of the biggest country has visited there. They will have effect on our leadership. The President is strong in a box and we need to support him. In citizens groups I am trying to support him. It strengthens his hand to say that there is pressure in this country not to concede. They say I am working against the Administration.

K: We need opponents like you. Rather you then some of our friends.

J: Because they will not be on your side no matter what.

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Herb Schlosser

11/23/71 4:50pm

S: Your whole department . . . the kind of young people you have; I was
very impressed. Do you have any evening free here for dinner?

K: Let me see. Can I call you Thursday morning?

S: Sure. My home phone is SANITIZED office, 213/845-7000 and they
always know where I am.

K: I might be able to Monday or Tuesday night. I know I can't do it
before then because I will have my children with me.

S: Well either way. I would like to invite Joyce and Doug . . .

K: Good. I love them.

S: Henry, I am convinced that piece of film you showed me will have some
historic importance. You should have a duplicate. You could have it transferred
to electric tape with little loss of clarity, or have a duplicate of the print made.
You should have that done though. The Signal Corps could probably do it,
or we could do it.

K: If you did it, could it be kept secret?

S: There is always the danger that the people who did the actual recording
would see it and might make a copy of it for themselves. I have to tell you that.
You don't want to release it at this point?

K: I would like to check on it.

S: I think any network would love to have it. It shows a historic moment
add it has a style and quality to it. Maybe we can talk about it. But I think it
should be preserved.

K: I would like to get it done. Let me find out if the Signal Corps can
do it and if not I'll give it to you. I'll call you Thursday morning.

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
11/23/71 5:17 p.m.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

K: I just talked to the President for two minutes between meetings. He is wondering whether we three can meet at noon tomorrow. I don't think there's any difference on this but if the three of us could get together it would be good.

R: That's what I suggested to Bull.

K: Well he's taking credit now; do you mind?

R: No, give him all the credit he can get. The poor devil; he deserves it.

K: All right; we'll meet at noon tomorrow.

R: Good.

TELECON
Ambassador Raza
11/23/71 5:40 p.m.

By NARA, Date 5/26

R: Is it possible for me to see you some time.

K: I am not available tonight. How about tomorrow?

R: Any time to suit you.

K: I will have to call you in the morning. I am going away but I will see you before I go.

R: I am free any time except I have to go out at 9:00 tonight.

K: Where?

R: Where?!

K: Oh no, I didn't mean that. It's none of my business where. I will talk to you tomorrow; let's aim for 2:30.

R: Okay, and I will now tell you what I am doing: I am seeing the press.

K: I would focus on Indian military aggression and Pakistani reasonableness.

RX