July 14, 1982

CYPRUS MEMORIES - 1974

(from Bob Oakley who was then head of NSC Middle East Office
and participated in the Sisco mission on Cyprus crisis)

I. An important theme: Intelligence Failure

1 - Failure to perceive and try to prevent Greek coup against Makarios.

--background of emotional controversy and partisan polarization over issue of U.S.G. support for Greek colonels clouded the analysis and the reaction to analysis at the policy level.

--CIA role was too operationally engaged in support of colonels/anti-Communists to allow objective reporting/analysis (Ionnides assure Station Chief - his only contact in Embassy -- several days before the coup that it would not happen), and the Embassy (under a terrible Ambassador) was engaged and weak.

--fears of a coup were discounted and not backed by solid intelligence; HAK had a bias and was distracted by Watergate; USG made no serious effort to prevent a coup (might not have succeeded anyway).

2 - Failure to foresee early on the Turkish reaction, i.e. invasion.

--US military resources in Turkey were widespread

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but never mobilized to collect obvious intel-
ligence on troop movements and other preparations
(landing craft, etc) -- ditto CIA.

--Embassy not strong.

--Analysts in Washington took tack that since they
had no specific reports of impending invasion,
there would be none - rather than using common sense
and history of Turkish-Greek relations to conclude
that invsion was likely.

3 - Failure to believe UK intelligence report of 2nd Turkish attack in August 1974 when they moved out of bridgehead during 2nd session of Geneva talks under UK auspices (with UN assisting officially & US behind the scenes).

--Callaghan came to US with a specific report,
including the date, and asked for US support in
moving a squadron of UK F-4s to Cyprus to deter
the Turks - we rejected the proposal and opposed the
move (which never took place) on the grounds that the
intelligence community had no such report and there-
fore disbelieved it.

--Art Hartman had sent a series of messages from
Nicosia, Ankara and Athens the week preceeding
the 2nd Geneva talks predicting that the Turks would

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move unilaterally if, as seemed certain, the talks
failed to move rapidly.

--Hartman called Eagleburger by phone to urge him
to force HAK to read the reports and reconsider
the UK request before it was too late and the Turks
attacked, but HAK was literally on his knees in the
Oval Office praying with Nixon and could not think
about the Turks.

--also, HAK had a bias for Ecevit, his former pupil
at Harvard, and thought Ecevit would not betray the
"strategic understanding" and support from the US.
(HAK had no previous history of dealing with the
Turks and Greeks, two tough cookies and especially
unreasonable when dealing with each other.)

II. Effective 1st-phase diplomacy, given Greek decision to
pull a coup; and Turkish decision to attack:

1 - Sisco Mission:

--sent off to try and stop Turkish attack.

--made a good-faith effort in talks with UK,
Greece and Turkey.

--Ecevit finally told Sisco (at 0430 am) that the
Turkish NSC had just taken final decision (at
0400 am) to invade Cyprus pursuant to the original

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treating creating Cyprus (UK-Greece-Turkey).

Ecevit: "Since before the USG came to Turkey in Cyprus crisis (1st, LBJ; 2nd, Vance) and told us you would take care of the problem by political means - we agreed - as soon as crisis was over, you forgot Turkey and needs of Turkish Cypriots; situation now is intolerable and we are going to do it the Turkish way, not the US way!" (Sisco and company fled to airport and took off just as airspace closed.)

--USG proposed ceasefire and HAK ordered Sisco to make clear to Greeks and Turks that USG insisted upon ceasefire.

--with lots of pressure on Greeks, the junta decided to disappear and call Karamanlis back from Paris to placate the US and appease the Turks and declare a ceasefire (expecting that the military could later return to power at expense of civilians who "surrendered" to Turks).

--in order to get someone on Greek side to agree to ceasefire, Sisco backed down an Admiral (C-in-Chief of Navy), only member of junta willing to meet Sisco -- he agreed to sign ceasefire in name of the junta (almost disappeared) if he could talk to HAK. Sisco got HAK on the phone (HAK and Nancy and the

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Lords were at dinner at the Empress Restaurant, 8:30-9:00 pm in Washington, 3:30 am in Ankara). HAK talked to the Admiral and the latter signed the ceasefire.

--then Sisco flew to Ankara, despite not getting Turkish air clearance, and forced Ecevit to see him. Sisco had instructions from HAK over an open phone line to tell the Turks we would cut off all aid -- including food -- if they did not honor their earlier agreement and sign the ceasefire (which they did not want to do since the Turkish army was way behind schedule and held only 1/4 of planned territory) - though eventually agreed.

--we then (Buffum) worked at Geneva with the UK and UN to get a basic framework - which later broke down under refusal of Greeks to accept Turkish confederation/cantonal plan (with US input) and pressure of Turkish army to move ahead.

--thus the deadlock at the 2nd Geneva meeting led to a 2nd Turkish attack, and the Turkish attack caused US and Western European opinion to swing back behind Greece (and Karamanlis) from its brief pro-Turkish or neutral position -- this led to the arms embargo action by Congress which took 5 years to remove.

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III. Strategic approach by HAK vs. Conventional/Liberal approach.

1. HAK was dedicated to preserving US strategic interests - thus he did not respond to demands to cut off the Greek junta - despite the opposition from within State (e.g. Boyatt and others at the Office Desk level who leaked constantly to NYTimes and Congress) and from the press and Congress.

2. When anti-Makarios coup broke, HAK tried to establish a close relationship with Turkey for strategic reasons (also because of the fallacious assumption that his former pupil Ecevit would be cooperative).

3. After the 2nd Turkish attack, the mood of Congress became nasty, pro Greek (and anti'HAK!) - the Greek lobby went to work, supported by the press. (HAK told Sisco in my presence early on that Congress would be no problem, he would handle them -). The State Department Legal Advisor did a memo (which HAK never read) saying that the law required an arms embargo - and it was leaked to the Hill. When HAK was asked about this, he made a mistake and quipped that the"national interest was more important than the law" - that touched off a furor and created a long-term, major problem.