Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Fulbright
3/18/74; 9:41 a.m.

K: Hello.

F: Good morning.

K: Mr. Chairman, how are you?

F: Mr. Secretary. Fine, how are you?

K: I just called you primarily to tell you I was thinking of you and wishing you well.

F: Well, thank you very much. I guess you know I ______ the Governor.

K: Yep. I saw it with unhappiness if I may say so.

F: Yes, it's got to be tough I'm afraid. He's down to the point of general unhappiness with Washington. The same old thing.

K: Yes.

F: It's not easy.

K: I bet.
suddenly

F: If/confronted we all have all kinds of problems with getting headquarters and raising money and all that goes with it. You know.

K: Oh, really.

F: Oh, sure. You know that is a major problem. And so, there it goes.

K: Well, I want you to know that as far as -- I will ______ as close to a partisan position as I dare.

F: Well, I know you have to be very careful in your own statements.

K: But I am telling all the newsmen what I think of this -- for whatever good that does.

F: Well, it all adds up, you know.

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K: I have been telling a group of newsmen the other day that I genuinely felt that it was in the national interest that you return here. So I just want you to know that I really think that it is important.

F: Well, I appreciate that very much and I think these things are very subtle but I think they mean something to thoughtful people. So I think that is a very, very good way to do it.

K: Now I don't know, Mr. Chairman, how you want to be kept informed. I haven't bothered you because of your preoccupations. But, are you coming to Washington at any point -- or how should we do it?

F: Well, I -- we are so preoccupied now with trying to get people together -- organization and find ways and means to raise enough money to open the headquarters and employ some of the people that need to be employed in this kind of a campaign right away but I do want to come back -- I need to come back for various personal and public reasons. I instructed the staff before left to negotiate with your staff about the possibility of few days hearings on that matter we talked about the last time.

K: Yes. You still want that?

F: Well, I think it would be useful to you and I ought to come back -- it would give me a reason to come back for various things -- you know.

K: Well, if you think it is useful, I will do it.

F: There is a question of . . .

K: My schedule is absolutely murderous from now on.

F: What?

K: My schedule is absolutely murderous because I am going to the Soviet Union.

F: When?

K: On Monday -- on Saturday.

F: Oh, how long will you be there, and then I was planning to go on vacation.

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3

K: And then I was planning to go on vacation.

F: Oh, I see. Well, I told Holt to talk to Eagleburger.

K: Look, if you want it we will find some time to do it in April.

F: That's all right. I just thought when ever was convenient for you and
you remember what it was about.

K: Oh, very well.

F: And it's only a day or two -- certainly one day with you, I guess and
then a day or two with somebody else.

K: Well, we will do our best. It might be better to do it after my return.

F: That's right. Oh, I think so. I wasn't thinking of it before. After
you return -- you know this is on this general problem -- program of
detente and I thought it would serve both your purposes and I think it
would be wise to call attention to it from my point of view, too.

K: Well, we will do it. You can count on it.

F: That would probably be the middle of April.

K: Right.

F: Well, how are things going? What is your estimate of what is going
to happen on the oil problem.

two

K: I think it is going to be lifted within the next/weeks -- maybe today
maybe next week at the meeting of the Foreing Ministers.

F: Yeah. This is just for my information -- I won't quote you at all --
does that mean there is a possibility of a settling down, of oil reaching a
more economic level?

K: My guess is that it would lead to a decline in prices.

F: It ought too.

K: If they lift the embargo and if they increase production.

F: Yeah.

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K: Both of which is likely to happen that's almost certain to depress the prices.

F: Uh-huh.

K: The other day they had an auction in Kuwait even at present levels and they couldn't get more than nine dollars a barrel.

F: Uh-huh. That's coming back to some reasonable level.

K: So we think it is likely to come down to about seven.

F: That sounds good to me.

K: Now on the Syrian thing, Mr. Chairman, we are moving rather slowly deliberately because we wanted it to be -- there has got to be a lot of work done in the Syrian domestic structure and a hell of a lot of work on the Israelis.

F: Uh-huh. Well, so long as it is moving and in the right direction that's what...

K: No, it is definitely moving.

F: Are you feeling all right?

K: I feel fine.

F: Is Congress doing all right? Is the Committee acting all right?

K: We had a very good session with the Committee last week. Unfortunately we missed you but it was Sparkman -- he conducted it unobtrusively and it worked very well. I think it is one of the best things -- the relationship between the Committee and the Executive and you have had a tremendous role in shaping that.

F: Well, I think it would be very helpful to have those -- I would hope they are good meetings. I know they always are when you are there and I will look forward to it. I ought to get back for a little refresher anyway.

K: Good and look, when you come back why don't we have some visible appearances together if you think that would do any good.

F: All right. That would be fine.

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K: If you thought -- you know I leave it entirely up to you.

F: Okay. Have you ever heard anything more about the matter we talked about from the community . . .

K: I've used my influence and I have even talked to Javits about it. And he told me he had talked to a few people.

F: Uh-huh.

K: But I don't think they are all out to get you but I may be wrong.

F: We keep hearing diverse views, you know, some of it not stemming from New York but from Memphis but anyway that is a matter that you won't be getting involved in. I just thought if you heard it by the way.

K: Oh, from Memphis?

F: Yeah. But you don't . . .

K: I haven't heard that.

F: I am not suggesting you do anything about it.

K: I am in no position to . . .

F: Just in the course of conversation.

K: Well, if I hear anything I will call you.

F: Good. Thank you very much for calling.

K: Warmest regards to Betty.

F: Betty is sitting here and says to give you her best.

K: Thank you.

F: Take care.

K: Same to you and I will be rooting for you.

F: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

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TELCONE

Amb. Zahedi/Secy Kissinger

10:00 a.m., March 18, 1974

K: Hello.

Z: Good.morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: Mr. Ambassador, how are you?

Z: How are you? I hope you have a lovely day in the beginning of the week.

K: How was Brasilia?

Z: Marvelous. It couldn't have been better.

K: Good.

Z: The weather was very nice. And Mrs. Nixon actually took the show. It was a very, very good idea. I think everybody was ______ her, not only the Brazilian people but also different Delegates. They were very happy to see her.

K: Good.

Z: She did a beautiful job.

K: Always does.

Z: She does really indeed. Now since I have been allowed to call you for a ______ again, I got a printed message from him through my sister.

K: Yes.

Z: He is wondering whether the time which they've been insisting that he would have you as his guest -- His Majesty -- in that first island --

K: That unfortunately will not work out.

Z: It would not?

K: No. I am very touched and I would have loved to do it but I will come at the end of April without fail.

Z: At the end of April?

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Zahedi/Kissinger

K: Yes.

Z: Because the reason he wanted to know -- I think ______ had already told that you go to see him so if you can't go, then he'll arrange for him to go to the island.

K: Right. I will visit him at the end of April wherever he is -- probably in Tehran.

Z: I think by that time he will be in Tehran but anyway I will bring it to your attention close to that time where he would be . . .

K: Well, tell him I really look forward very much to seeing him.

Z: All right, I shall do that. Did you about that message?

K: Yes, that's coming this week.

Z: It's going this week?

K: Yes.

Z: Thank you very much. Well, I'm very grateful to you. When I come to New York, I will be in touch with you.

K: When you come to where?

Z: I'm now in New York.

K: Oh, you're in New York.

Z: Yes, I arrived last night from Brazil and I have to be here for the ______ students tonight. They have about 2800 of them. I have to talk with them.

K: All of them revolutionaries.

Z: Oh, no [laughter] . . . and one of your students is here in New York -- he's coming with me to Washington. ______ who is my brother-in-law (he's the owner of the paper), so if you would be here in the beginning of April and if you give us the honor, we'll have a little dinner. And also if you have time, I think he would be very grateful if you would receive him for a few minutes. One of our biggest papers in Tehran.

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TELCON
Strausz-Hupe/HAK

3/18/74 - 10:10 a.m.

K: Hello. How are you?

SH: How are you Henry? I have now gotten Eleanor to agree that we can go to Stockholm.

K: Oh marvelous.

SH: Stockholm is possible. She is prepared to follow me there.

K: Terrific.

SH: I hope that will expand. I therefore accept your assignment.

K: Many thanks.

SZH: I do so principally because I wish to serve you and the President.

K: I know that and I know you are a dedicated man and we will proceed and I will also keep in mind the other matter that you and I discussed.

SH: That of course has weighed very heavily on my decision because I do hope and it is tentative of my hope Henry, to serve on in a mission. Especially the one we discussed. Of course it has weighed very heavily on my decision and I hope that I would not serve in the next assignment too long. It's what I hope and that in the not too far future it is possible for me to assume this other mission. Or at least one of them. Furthermore, I ask you to consider the following. Since I wish Eleanor to proceed from here by the most comfortable and shortest means possible, I would like her to remain in Brussels residence until after I've taken charge in Stockholm. Do you think that is possible Henry?

K: Let me see what I can do.

SH: I would appreciate it because I think it would be a great hardship. If that could possibly be arranged, I would be very grateful.

K: Right. And I will let you know about that.

SH: Well Henry, I hope that this is agreeable to you.

K: I am delighted and it is a patriotic decision as is in character with you.

SH: I thank you very much Henry. I deeply appreciate what you just said.

K: And we'll stay in close touch.

SH: Many thanks.

K: Bye Robert.

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TELCOM
The President/Sec. Kissinger

March 18, 1974

12:55 p.m.

K: Mr. President

N: Hi, Henry.

K: I just want you to know we've had a message from Sadat saying that he has advance information that they are going to lift the embargo with a review scheduled in June. That doesn't mean a thing, Mr. President.

N: That's fine.

K: Because if it is just a review...

N: We will have -- by that time we will have made some progress and that will also leave it open for me to make that trip before then.

K: Exactly.

N: I hope this is true. When will we know it.

K: We have had another report that we might know it by the end of the day today and that is also what Sadat indicated -- by the end of the day in Europe and this might well be by 3:00 here.

N: O.K. You give me a ring. Good luck.

K: I will give you a ring immediately.

END

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TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger

March 18, 1974

1:10 p.m.

K: Mr. President. We have just had a flash news ticker item that the embargo has been lifted. We have not had it confirmed yet.

N: That's good.

K: Apparently, without conditions. We will say nothing here.

N: You keep the lid on totally. If and when anything is said I will say it in Houston. Gives me a day to think about it.
tomorrow

K: The news will come out today.

N: I don't care about the news coming out but I mean as/what it means to us ; what we now do, rationing and that crap.

K: We will say nothing here. I thought you might like to hear it.

N: Good. Great.

K: Right Mr. President.

END

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger

March 18, 1974

4:18

S: I talked to Jerry Warren. He had already called this guy in. He says that doesn't even remotely resemble what he said and he said he hopes he has gotten him all turned around on it.

K: yes, but can we now shut-up?

S: That's what I told him. We now shut-up.

K: I don't want him to say anymore.

K: That's what I told him. Let's just let it ride now, we have said everything there is to say on the subject.

K: That's right.

S: But he said that is not at all...

K: But, tomorrow, just say no matter what... we have had our statement now and we will not continue the public discussion.

S: Exactly, right.

K: Ok, good.

END

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-2-

K: Scoop, my assessment was that you gave me this figure to toughen me up and that it was not your absolute last word. You don't have to comment on it. I had no possible interest to get that figure out. I didn't want to nail you to a figure.

J: No, I understand. But, I haven't called back to Marilyn Berger - I am going to do it now. But I am just going to no comment

K: Look, from our side, I will say that a lot of figures have been discussed and we just are not going to comment on anything. And you can absolutely count on it -- on our not confirming it.

J: Right, right.

K: And I will have George Vest say tomorrow, explicitly at the press briefing that we discussed a lot of things and any figure -- there was no final figure.

J: Right. Well, there are two main concerns which I have said publicly and that relates to numbers and harrassment.

K: That's right.

J: Those are the two key things.

K: Scoop, I thought I understood you very well the other day. And I have two objectives -- one to come up with something that you can support and secondly to let you take the leadership in it when it comes out.

J: Well, ..

K: I don't want to set up a scorecard on who got what.

J: The important thing is to accomplish something. I want to be cooperative.

K: Scoop, I have no complaint about our relationship on this and it is totally against my interest to put that figure out because it locks you in and as you know I consider it unrealistic. I have no reason at all to put it out.

J: Right. I wonder how in the world those two guys, Fisher and Dinitz -- well, anyway, I wanted to check with you before I called....

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TELECON

Mr. Vest/Sec. Kissinger

March 18, 1974

5:03 pm

K: Jackson is climbing the walls because somebody put out the figure of a 100,000 that he asked for.

V: Ooops.

K: And, absolutely not to confirm it, just say we have no comment on these purely speculative stories.

V: Ok.

K: I will you make sure we stick to that.

V: I will and I will call right away to make sure we do.

K: Good, thank you.

END

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TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger

March 18, 1974

5:13 pm

K: How are you?

D: I am fine. I would like to see you tomorrow.

K: How about Wednesday for lunch?

D: That is alright, 1:00?

K: 1:00.

D: Ok. As for children, they are welcome in Moscow.

K: I haven't decided to do it. You see the trouble is, it is their vacation.

D: That is alright because Brezhnev asked me to tell you that your children are welcome in Moscow. So all the attention will be taken and we will take care to show them what is worthwhile to see. So it is no trouble at all.

K: They will probably come back as Communists.

D: Well, we will try to do our best.

K: Are we going to meet in Zavidovo or in Moscow.

D: As of now it stands in Zavidovo.

K: Good.

D: This is, he thinks it is better to be quiet there, as you know.

K: No, I like it.

D: Unless there is last minute change, which I don't think. It will be Zavidovo.

K: Do you think it is time enough to meet on Wednesday. It is the first time I have really a good stretch of time available, lunch on Wednesday.

D: Ok, it is quite alright, if you don't have anything tomorrow -- if tomorrow you are busy.

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K: Let me look at my calendar again.

D: And then you'll call back.

K: I'll call back.

D: You know, just to see you to discuss where we stand in connection with the meeting.

K: Tomorrow, you mean.

D: Yes.

K: Well, we'll try for a half hour tomorrow and we have lunch anyway on Wednesday.

D: Lunch day after tomorrow.

K: So we will try, ... how are you, you seem to have a cold.

D: No, quite alright. Simply, I just arrived today so it is rather busy after it was a long way to go.

K: Are you coming back with me on my plane?

D: Yes, if you don't mine.

K: No, because that way if your anti-aircraft shoots us down they get you too.

D: (Laughter) No, no. Thank you very much, I will come with you. Brezhnev set aside all this week for thinking. he is preparing to meet with you.

K: Good, I think it is an important meeting.

D: Right, he decided to go to Zavidovo to look in a quiet way for himself

K: Well, I look forward to it.

D: So, please let me know about tomorrow and we fix on 1:00 Wednesday.

K: Teriffic. No we will definitely find a brief period tomorrow.

D: And on Wednesday we will have a quiet discussion, Ok? How do you feel Henry?

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger

March 18, 1974

6:28 PM

K: Mr. President.

N: Hello, Henry.

K: We finally got the official text. What happened is basically it is lifted unconditionally by the majority. With the previsal that they would discuss it again on June 1. Which doesn't mean it goes back on June 1, it just means they will discuss it again on June 1.

N: Right.

K: The Algerians may say they agree to lift it only until June 1, so they make it conditional.

N: We don't care, we don't get any from them anyway.

K: That's right. I got a message from Sadat and he said he will help me get the thing concluded by the end of April, which is also my plan. The Syrian disengagement, so then there won't be any problem, anyway.

N: Well, of course, there must follow not only the disengagement, as you know, but....

K: Mr. President, with all respect, we don't have to linger to any permanent settlement at this point. The major thing we need now is the disengagement. If we talk too much about permanent settlement, when I was there the last time I talked to Sadat, he isn't ready to discuss that. That will get us back into Geneva. We should be very careful in making promises on that.

N: This is one thing we're going to do though, Henry. That's understand that. There is going to be a permanent settlement.

K: Of course, Mr. President. If we get into a forum where all of these issues get discussed together, we'll get killed.

N: I agree, but we don't want to leave any illusions here with our friends here that this is it, you know, and the Israelis think that they can just dig in and this is it.

K: No, no...

N: Because then this same thing will come up to haunt us next Fall.

K: No, the strategy that I see now, but which we shouldn't announce publicly, is that after the Syrian disengagement we should get a settlement between

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Nixon - page 2

Egypt and Israel and then we've broken the back of it. Then we can work on....

N: I agree. Palestine and Jerusalem last.

K: It's one step at a time. That's our advantage over the Russians. The Russians are trying.....

N: What about the note to Brezhnev, did we decide?

K: That's coming - that should be waiting for you.

N: It's still a good idea.

K: It's an excellent idea, Mr. President. I made just general review by you of the issues for the summit.

N: Good. And you have incidentally made it clear to everybody in the Department that there is to be no comment on this thing.

K: Absolutely.

N: And Simon should just really be ...

K: Haig and I called Simon.

N: Don't say a word, I'll say something tomorrow night. I must say it categorically but I won't go too far. I can't do it in a half-assed way. You see what I mean.

K: We both called Simon, Mr. President.

N: We'll the advantage out of this and if later on it would be a disadvantage we'll take it. It's fine. It's good news. Good news to get it done this far.

K: On the other one, I - there's no question that after the Syrian disengagement we have to go to a permanent settlement.

N: Yes. Looking at the trip thing now, that's the other thing I want to raise with you.

K: My recommendation would be for you - the Egyptians are recommending that around May 20 would be best for them. We can announce it early in April. We can have a few others ahead of the Egyptians. I would recommend that you start in Egypt.

N: Put Egypt first.

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K: Yes. Because you'd get a tremendous reception. He could smooth the way for you and go to Morocco last. That way you'll have two tremendous receptions. You could go to Morocco first.

N: Morocco will be good. It should be Egypt first, they're the hard one.

K: If you go to Egypt first, you'll get a tremendous reception. You'll get a good one in Sudan and Saudi Arabia. You'll get a great one in Amman. What you get in Damascus, only the devil knows.

N: That's right.

K: Then Israel you'll get a good reception.

N: Maybe.

K: No, you'll get an excellent reception.

N: The point that I make is that - I might be asked about that - I doubt it, but if I am, I'll say we have a number of invitations we have under consideration.

K: And now that the embargo lifted, we can explore them more fully.

N: We're looking at them, right. On the European thing, you want to stay about where we are.

K: Mr. President, it is going so well, the French Ambassador today made a public statement praising you, but you should stay tough. We've put the steam in the kettle and we're going to get everything. I think you should say you've made your comments. The Atlantic relationship is of course, the corner stone and now it is up to the Europeans. We have for a year expressed our views and when the Europeans have reacted, we will meet them more than halfway. If they ask you about a trip to Europe I think you should say let's wait how the discussions go. They will be on their knees begging you to come before too much time is over and when you come now you'll come as the strong man.

N: What I was going to ask though was on the trip to Europe, we put in terms that having laid down what we did, can we say the matters are now under discussion.

K: On the trip to Europe...

N: No, no, not the trip. The matters of issue.

K: The issues are now being under discussion.

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TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

March 18, 1974

8:00 PM

K: On the way to Moscow, instead of stopping in Copenhagen, stop in Bonn and see Scheel at the airport. It will drive the French right up the wall.

S: It would.

K: I think we have the Germans so scared now and we want them on our side.

S: I think you're right. That would mean you would have to stop in the Benelux.

K: I have to stop somewhere for refueling.

S: I don't see anything wrong with it.

K: Can you find out what this does to the schedule?

S: Yes. We would have to let the Russians know so they can get their escort there.

K: And how much it would delay it?

S: Sure. I'll find out.

K: OK, and if necessary we leave an hour earlier. Second problem is, since I'll be in New York this weekend, do you think I have to come back or do you think they can pick me up there. Give me your frank opinion, I don't mind coming back.

S: No, I think honestly it would be slightly better coming back, because there would be a lot of press.

K: OK.

S: I think it can be done the other way, but it will highlight your being in New York and that sort of thing. There will be a lot of press interest in this.

K: OK, well then I'll come back. I think I can use military transportation, now that the thing is lifted.

S: Oh, I think you have to. Yes, I definitely would. As I understand, that's all it takes - they were going to lift that as soon as the embargo was lifted anyway. I would use military. I definitely would.

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K: Yes.

S: It's just not safe for you to be doing anything else anyway.

K: Right.

S: Are you going to have Dick set that one up for you? Or you want me to.

K: No, you - I have not talked to Dick about it.

S: OK. When do you want to go.

K: Friday afternoon. And come back Saturday night. I could bring my children down with me then.

S: Sure.

K: Look into the transportation situation. We have, in any event, stop for refueling somewhere.

S: No, that's right.

K: I guess Copenhagen is a little easier.

S: It's a little easier. It's the shortest way.

K: How much time can it add to it?

S: I think the only thing it adds is a slight loop from B to B back up to the Baltic Sea, that's all. I doubt if it's a half hour.

K: Will you try to get the President for April 17.

S: I've already approached him on that.

K: What do they say?

S: Parker, he think it's just a great idea. He's all excited about it.

K: OK, fine.

S: I'll let you know in the morning on the B to B thing.

K: Then I'll discuss it with Sonnenfeldt and see what he thinks.

S: OK. Good.

K: Good.

END

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

Telcon

Secretary Kissinger:Stephen Graubard

Sunday, March 18, 1974; a.m.

G: Hello.

K: Hello, Steve.

G: Hi, Henry, how are you?

K: OK.

G: Good, any chance?

K: No, I don't think so.

G: Really. You're just too busy.

K: Yeah.

G: Okay. Are you likely to be here next weekend, Henry.

K: Well, that's what I have my doubts about. I might go to New York for a day, and then I'm going to the Soviet Union.

G: Are you? And then you're there for a week - or longer?

K: For about a week. And then I'm planning to go on vacation.

G: You are? Well that I'm pleased by. For a week or two?

K: For about ten days.

G: Good. Somewhere warm?

K: Yes, to Mexico.

G: How nice. Do you have a few minutes to talk?

K: Yeah, a few minutes.

G: Well, how are you reacting to life?

K: Well, you know, the Europeans have managed now to turn it into an uproar.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By CQ-TARA Date 6.8.04

-2-

G: Were you unhappy about the remarks made the other day by the President. Would you rather he hadn't said what he did?

K: Yes.

G: I felt that it was unnecessary. I mean, it serves no purpose.

K: It's sort of unfortunate, because what I said wasn't planned. And it gave the Europeans an opportunity to totally confuse the issue.

G: Yeah, it was very unfortunate.

K: I mean I spoke to a group of wives in an informal way and those morons in the State Department had the press in there without telling me.

G: Well what actually, I mean, I never could get it out what you in fact said to them. What did he mean by.....

K: I said nothing of any consequence, but by the time they got through distorting it, it was hopeless. I wasn't even talking about Europe. I was talking about a nuclear war, and I said, let's not kid ourselves, no government is going to survive the catastrophe of a nuclear war. No European government that ended World War I ever recovered its legitimacy. That's absolutely true.

G: Yeah, fantastic. Well that's interesting. I read the thing and I couldn't imagine what you had said.

K: What I had talked about was the impact of a huge catastrophe caused by governments on its population. It had nothing to do with the current crisis. It wasn't set in that context.

G: Of course. Well, again, when it comes out of context it's a meaningless phrase. I mean, it just doesn't mean anything. And nobody has understood it.

K: And in that context it's one hundred percent right.

G: Yeah, well, Henry, what exactly, what do you see. I mean, is it just [illegible] leave things alone there?

K: We're not going to make another move.

G: Well, this is what I feel very strongly. Has Bruce been going around importuning people?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By 09 NARA Date 6-8-04

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-94

K: No.

G: That never took off.

K: No, we canceled that.

G: I see. Is it because there was just no point.

K: There was no point. We knew what the facts were. I mean, everyone knows what it is.

G: Yeah, and is the severance in the British government at all helpful or even more problematical?

K: Well, in the short term it's helpful. In the long term it will be more problematical.

G: Yeah. And the Germans are just continuing to say, we don't know what the argument is about.

K: That's right. They're waffling all over the place.

G: Yeah. And why essentially? Just too worried about the French, or just a feeling let's not rock this boat as well as so many others?

K: I think that and the emotional need of the French. The French are beyond my understanding. DeGaulle I understood.

G: Yeah. Well the other day at the West European Studies this man Bahr who used to be the head of the French Delegation to the Common Market was there. He began to talk about the difference in generations and about the fact that the new generation doesn't understand things. So, when it came to questions, I mean the whole thing was an unbelievable performance. For example, among other things, he lashed out at the Dutch in response to a question. I think the question either from Kimmelberger or Leonchev. In a fashion, you cannot imagine the ______ "[speaks in French.]" On and on this way. But then I asked him, I mean, he went on and on talking about difference in generations. I said you sound positively ______. I said after all, this is all that he's talking about. But what would you have to do if you were an American to prove that the object is not simply to dominate you.

G: He said you would have to behave differently than you are now behaving.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By 09 NARA Date 6-8-94

K: Like what?

G: This is the next question. This is all in French. I said, "[French]", and again talking about the oil thing in terms of no planning. You know, I reminded him of all the things... Some day, Henry, I must show you however this Bill Bundy letter, and I'm sure you've heard from Nancy the end of that thing, where he said the crisis is over, as I told you, and France is now -- you know, that's how the whole thing ended.

K: Yes, that's what he told me too.

G: Unbelievable.

K: He wanted to get me to say that he shouldn't print it. And I said, no, I thought this was just putting a bandaid over a cancer.

G: Now what is his game here, Henry? Is he anxious not to have anything in there that would upset the Europeans? Is he anxious not to have anything in there...

K: He is anxious not to have anything in there that supports the Administration.

G: That's right. That is what I... I mean this is what Dan Bell and Irving Kristol and others said. But someday I must show you a letter from him that is theoretically a letter of criticism. I mean, this is not the last one. In the end he simply said, it's all over, as I told you, I mean, there is no problem anymore.

K: Yeah. What are you going to do with his article.

G: Well, this is the thing, Henry. There's nothing to do. I made a change in the beginning and sent it to the *Times*. The *Times* felt that their *Laquer*(? ) piece is rather like it, which in a sense it is. But what I now feel, and this is one of the many things I want to talk to you about, I really feel that what I have in this article is the basis for a very important longer article. Where do you public it in this country. What is a serious journal? Again, you don't have the time to read this foreign policy, but it's just unbelievable crud.

K: You know I would have to say we are practically being...you know, we had a good foreign policy going and they are now killing it.

G: Yeah. But what can be done?

K: They are moving to the right of us on detente.

G: Absolutely. This is the thing.

-4-

-5-

K: I mean the very people who were accusing us of being warmongers, insensitive, immoral, and 5 thousand other things, now think we are not tough enough on the Russians.

G: Absolutely, but this is what it's all about.

K: The people who thought we were too tough on the North Vietnamese say we are too soft on the Russians.

G: That's right. But, Henry, how do you get anywhere in this country - how do you get any of these things said?

K: I think we are heading into a third republic state. We are going to become ungovernable. The press is going to be our parliament.

G: What can be done?

K: I don't know.

G: But this is it.

torn

K: You know, they're not going to rest until they've taken me down.

G: Well, again, and you know some people imagine that I write this way because of a personal relation with you. It has nothing to do with you.

K: I know a clash with Europe won't do it because the Europeans are going to collapse on us before it's done. They haven't got the nerve to continue it.

G: Again, who is going to collapse first there?

K: The Germans, the Dutch. You know, we're going to kill the Davignon committee and nobody's going to make a decision anymore without checking with us.

G: Yeah, but the bigger thing, Henry, is that there is one kind of theme that is coming through from the left all the way over to the right. I mean not all the way over to the right, whatever the right is, but it is one kind of opinion and you cannot get another thing said. And again one thinks of trying to start something new, but what do you do - you can't start a new newspaper, you can't start a new journal. It would take years to build it up. But there is simply no outlet for a certain kind of opinion. What you just said about whether it's Third Republic or not, that's another matter.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority to 12/95
By 09 NARA Date 6-8-94

By CB NARA DATE 6-8-04

K: Well, and they're moving with amazing uniformity. You know, last year the Democrats were hitting us for a $60 billion Defense budget. This year $95 billion isn't enough. Last year if you explained high manpower costs they'd sneer at you. This year I had Cy Vance and MacBundy in the other day and *they* said and I said, look, our budget is higher in detente. Oh, but that doesn't mean anything. Manpower is such a big slice of it and inflation.

C: Yeah.

K: Which is true, but they wouldn't have said that last year.

G: Yeah. You know it really was, Henry, and not for just one policy or something else...

K: But then you know, the suicidal...[end of tape]. ...but they systematically go after me.

G: But their illusion is this is why you have to look at least at this Brzyzinski thing. Because after all what Brzyzinski is telling you is, in a sense what it really is, it is a kind of...

K: SANITIZED

G: Yes, but you see the only thing that I think can save this. May I just give you this to reflect on - you've probably reflected. I keep going around with these people and saying one thing. If you think there are going to be Democrats in the White House in '77, you are really mistaken. You aren't gonna make it. Not one of you are gonna be there. And, incidentally, I said it to someone yesterday, here in Washington, and, you know, I could almost see the man blanch. They have just taken it for granted that they're gonna be heirs to all this - it's simply a matter of waiting the thing out. It is by no means certain, Henry.

K: No, no, I think that Gerry Ford could probably beat anyone except Jackson.

G: I think he could beat Jackson. Incidentally, I don't think Jackson can get it without suffering such a struggle, including the killing-off of Chappaquidic, which isn't gonna be all that easy, because Chappaquidic is gonna stay in long enough for him to ruin the chances of a fair number of other people. What I am really worried about is that there is the illusion. I mean what you have in Brzyzinski is the illusion that in '77 he'll come back because he is the head of a trilateral commission that believes in a thing called Western Europe and also believes in a thing called Japan and these bad relations will be restored.

-7-

K: Well, first, our relations with Japan aren't bad. Secondly, if last year proved anything it's precisely the attempt to restore bad -- whatever I tried to do other than what the trilateral commission says it is trying to do. That's exactly the mistake we made. But when you listen to the establishment we always go wrong. That's right, if we hadn't lifted a finger with Europe nothing would have happened.

G: Yeah.

K: How is he going to establish good relations with Europe, precisely how? What country is he going to? concrete steps would he take? I don't think he's gonna get into office, but supposing he did. How would he do it?

G: I have no idea. He has no idea. But it is a new kind of nostalgia, a nostalgia for something which again never existed.

K: Look, Kennedy tried it, Johnson tried it, Nixon tried it. Isn't it probable that there's something organic he re?

G: Yeah, yeah, but also, Henry, what has got to be seen is these people still think that it is if they had any sympathy for us, which they lack, it is in respect to a recalcitrant France. It is France that is impossible. And the failure to see that it is a much deeper thing - that it is Europe in the terms - I continue to feel that what I wrote in that article is essentially right. You cannot understand it unless you understand a place called England, a place called Germany.

K: That's right.

G: You cannot understand this phenomenon.

K: Well, I think we'll let them stew in their own juice now. I'm sorry frankly that it reached these public proportions. I think if last week hadn't happened and we had just slowly disengaged from Europe and let them stew in their own juice it would have brought them back better than this public brawling. I wouldn't have had the President say what he said.

G: I didn't feel you did. I just knew you hadn't.

K: And you know I wouldn't have said publicly what I said. Although what I said wasn't so bad, if you read it.

G: Well, but this is it, you see, I only read it out of context.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By CD NARA Date 6-8-94

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By C9 NARA Date 6-8-94

K: What I said, two things that were taken deadly out of context. I said the big problem in this world is to create a cooperative world structure. There is a paradox that we know how to regulate relations with our enemies but we have not managed yet to create a cooperative structure with our friends - which happens to be true. That was one quote they played with. The other one was the legitimacy one which I put in a totally different section and which dealt with a different subject.

G: Yeah, well, Henry, again I don't want to quote my own article, but I think the thing really is to let the thing simply be. I think there should be no more talk about any visit.

K: No, no, that's out.

G: I think there's no need for it. And I think just play the whole thing down and see what happens. But what I still worry about is what is going on in this country, which again, nobody is writing about.

K: No I think the better strategy would have been just to let it die without an uproar.

G: Yeah, but now that the uproar has happened, Henry, do you still not think that one should just forget it?

K: I think one should just forget it, but you know now the trouble is the Europeans are gonna make an overture and that's gonna keep it up and up and up. They're gonna try to rescue these declarations now.

G: Really?

K: Yeah.

still

G: Because they/think that that's what the issue is about.

K: That's right.

G: Who is there there, Henry, that you really do feel understands? Does Giscard not understand what's going on?

K: That I can't tell.

G: I mean they speak with one voice, with the master's voice.

K: Well, I don't know who's doing the speaking. You see, what makes us think they're nuts is whenever I see Jobert alone he tells me he disagrees with Pompidou.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By CD NARA Date 6-8-94

G: Yeah. But it certainly doesn't sound that way.

K: No, but it isn't true that we have ever had any controversy. That's French pu blicity.

G: Yeah, very interesting. Well I am going over for about - I'm leaving a week Friday - for various things in connection with a book of essays that I've edited that is coming out in Italy, and things, and I really frankly to answer your question about what I want to do with the article, I would like to make it into something better, but I frankly don't know - you know, better in the sense of not fleshing it out and dealing much more with the real difficulties of some of these x mysteries(?) But once you did, I have no idea in this country at this moment where to put it. I have no idea who to offer it to.

K: Yeah, I agree. Harper and so forth wouldn't do it?

G: Who reads Harper?

K: Yeah.

G: Who reads The Atlantic?

K: Well, that's true.

G: I mean, The Atlantic wouldn't do it. Harper's might, but who reads it? So this is really, I think this is the most serious matter that exists, that there is this kind of nostalgia for moments when we were able to get on with our allies and when we were fairly tough with the Russians. Again, what you say about detente is absolutely true.

K: But look, they're not going to maintain their toughness. Do you think that Hinster(?) would be tough with the Russians for two years once he got into office?

G: But, Henry, he's never going to get in. I feel this so intensely and so certainly ... that would mess things up.

K: Yeah, well that I'm sure of too. Besides he couldn't stay in even if he got it.

G: It's never gonna happen. But it is the creation of a myth that is going to survive until the 1976 election.

K: I know.

G: And I think this myth - we're aware of that this myth has to be taken apart. And when his doctors say, look, I mean again the Europeans are constantly talking about detente. Who in God's name pushed detente with real ardor if not the Europeans. And the British seemed the ______ ones among them.

K: Okay, Steve - I know, I know, when Heath came into it all over here and the minute he detente ended the Europeans would be in Moscow. Okay, I've got to run.

G: Henry, bless you, and you don't think you'll be here at all next weekend.

K: I'm not sure yet.

G: Well, I'll just try to get to you from time to time, but this is not the man to do it through. Can I call Eagleburger?

K: Call Eagleburger.

G: And just say that you told me to.

K: Yes.

G: Okay, thanks. Goodbye, Henry.

K: Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EC 12958

By 09 NARA Date 6-8-94

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger

George Vest
3/19/74; 10:44 a.m.

K: George.

V: Yes, sir.

K: Did you see that the London Sunday Times has a long quote from a briefing I gave on the plane on a background basis which they must have gotten from one of those tapes.

V: Yep.

K: What do you mean yep, what are you doing about it?

V: I've got that and ASP has the tape -- has some of the quotes from your tape as well. Which means that really the tapes are not private and they are not being respected. And it raises the question whether you want to go on with tapes because they are not being controlled by the owners.

K: Yes. We can't go on with tapes.

V: I have already gone to the record of the New York Times and it means that Bernie Gwertzman's tapes are picked up by other New York Times writers and they begin to quote from them. We had that with David Binder and I raised that with him. So I think the real answer is, sir, if we have tapes they are not going to be properly controlled. They are not controlling them well.

K: Well, we won't permit it anymore.

V: I think that is the answer. If you want control -- when we go back in your office they can hear what you are saying in the plane but tapes are used and misused and there is no question about it. I have a whole documentary practically episode on that.

K: Now again, I, of course, don't know what I said in that briefing.

V: Well, I have both records in tape, sir, throughout each time I sat in with you.

K: Is that briefing bad if it gets to the French. I mean it has gotten to the French.

V: It's gotten to the French because the briefing was the last briefing on your way back from overseas in which you commented on the French rather heavily and that tape and the comments had reached me, I found out has since reached AP and deSegonzac. DeSegonzac has treated it rather well.

K: Can I see that tape.

V: I'll get that sir.

K: Good. Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-64

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Sec. Kissinger

March 19, 1974

12:07 pm

K: What do you think of stopping in Bonn rather than in Copenhagen on the way to Moscow and see whether Scheel wants to meet me at the airport for an hour?

S: Well, it can't hurt. I think we ought to clear up whatever misunderstandings there are, at least on the facts. Although they have a full diet now of our position if you clear this most recent telegram that should be up there on the guidance we talked about yesterday.

K: That should have gone out last night, Hal. That's when I wanted it out. I am not running a god damn bureaucratic fudge factory.

S: I forwarded it to you just as quickly as I got it.

K: Which was when.

S: This morning and I had to redo part of it. You've got it there now.

K: yes, but now that means today is lost.

S: In any event, I am sorry about that. I didn't write it, so I moved it as quickly as I got it. In any event, I don't think it can hurt to offer to keep communications open. You do have to get your Russian friends there, then.

K: Or does it look too eager?

S: Of course, it could also depend on what they say to us in the meantime.

K: Well, we haven't got much time. If we do it we should do it this weekend, we should offer it now.

S: Well, the more I think about it, really, the more I think maybe not. I think maybe enough has been said.

K: Ask Hartman and call me back in about fifteen minutes, will you.

END

By CO NARA Date 6-8-84

TELCONE
Sen. Cranston/Sec. Kissinger

March 19, 1974

2:15 p.m.

K: How are you?

C: Very good, How are you?

K: O.K.

C: I appreciate your calling. I am one of the sponsors of the Jackson
Amendment. I have been troubled by it all the time. I know it has given
you some problems. I see you have been negotiating with the people who are
the toughest to negotiate with.

K: That is the truth.

C: I would be delighted if you are interested to chat with you about what
compromise might be acceptable and see if I could be of help.

K: That is very nice of you. Should we do it after I have been in the
Soviet Union.

C: That is probably the best.

K: I will be in a better position to know what is obtainable.

C: I would like it to be a private meeting with you because it is somewhat
risky for me but I want to do it because I know it is important.

K: That is real generous of you and I guarantee you we will have a drink
here quietly and no one will know about it.

C: I am quietly exploring the waters up here and I think it is possible
to figure out something and I will devote every effort.

K: I appreciate that very much and I will call you when I get back from the
Soviet Union.

C: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

end

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By C.P. NARA Date 6-8-94

TELECON
Secretary Shultz/Secretary Kissinger

March 19, 1974

5:28 PM

S: Helmut and I worked out an agreement in principle.

K: Don't give me that Helmut business, you've sold us out again.

S: Well, I was just doing it on your account. You told me to.

K: (laughter).

S: But I think it's something we can sell. Casey agrees on it and he will follow up and try to....

K: What are the major...

S: There is one sticking point that Helmut said he would have to check with Brent on but from the way he described that, I don't think he'll have any trouble. The tricks of the matter was the loan and the amount of money per year that the concessionary aspects of the loan would generate. Basically what we've got is about $150 million per year. Which is quite a lot.

K: Yes.

S: The problem was jockeying around these numbers and getting them fixed so that he can describe them in a way that fits his political circumstances and we can describe them in another way which fits ours and we both understand that and arranging these terms so that they will yield us the money that we need. I put in this call while he was still here so he could speak to you but he had to go, but he sends you his regards and says he appreciates the chance to talk with you today.

K: That sounds terrific, it really sounds very good.

S: He continues to be anxious to have a meeting of our little group in Bonn.

K: I'm for it. I strongly urge him to do it.

S: I gave him what dates I can although it would stretch me a lot to do it.

K: Now George, as long as I've got you on the phone. You mentioned the other day you might stay until July 1. I don't know what these characters are thinking of a replacement for you. Do you know?

S: I think they expect the name Bill Simon, but I don't know.

Secretary Shultz - page 2

K: I personally believe that given all the domestic uproar we're going to have, it would be better if you could stay until July 1.

S: Well, I'm not particularly anxious to, there is the only rationale for it really is the fact that there is this Russian meeting and there is the C-20.

K: Exactly.

S: Meeting to finish off. If Helmut said - he inferred to me that you and he had talked about that. He has pressured me some to stay. Why don't you take it up with the President or Haig or somebody.

K: OK. I just didn't want to do it without having talked to you.

S: I think we're in business with this offset thing, and I think Schmidt will again be able to present himself as a person who knows how to work things out.

K: Terrific.

S: OK.

K: Thank you. Congratulations.

END

TELECON
Paul Ziffren/Secretary Kissinger

March 19, 1974

6:23 PM

Z: I wanted to call and tell you that was quite a copy?

K: What?

Z: The embargo being lifted.

K: Aren't you nice.

Z: I don't know how you pull these thing out of the hat.

K: You're a great friend.

Z: I understand you had a meeting or two with Jackson. The thing is beginning to show some movement. I talked to a number of other Senators including Adlai Stevenson and to Jack Harvey, who is close to Stevenson. The Los Angeles Times had an editorial on Jackson.

K: I don't have it.

Z: I'll send it to you.

K: I would appreciate it.

Z: I'm trying to get them to publish Schullman's speech.

K: I caught your fine hand on a number of them. Guido (?) called me the other day.

Z: Wherever I can, I've been trying to gain some movement on the other thing. It's beginning to have some effect.

K: I have to see what I can come back with from the Soviet Union.

Z: In any event, I just wanted you to know I'm doing what I can and we're all proud of you.

K: If you keep up this work, we'll be proud of you.

Z: I'll keep us with whatever I can, you can be sure of that.

K: Well, you've been marvelous. How's Mickey?

Z: Mickey is wonderful and sends her love.

K: Hope to see you all soon.

END

TELECON
Senator Hugh Scott/Secretary Kissinger

March 19, 1974

6:40 PM

K: Hugh, how are you?

S: Fine. Thank you for being available. We had an interesting little coffee
session for the last hour with Eban. I thought it would be useful for you to
know the sort of going attitude which was expressed to him unanimously by
Symington, Humphrey, Sparkman and myself, all of us vest the feeling that
Jackson was being intransigent. The word was used several times.

K: Terrific.

S: And it was worrying us and in one way or another, each in his own way,
they developed the thought that - well Humphrey said, we've got to get
something, more from the Russians then we're getting. Everybody hoped
that you would gain two things. A progression above the 30 to 36 thousand
which was Eban's argument rather than a lowering and some assurances of
an end of harrassment in special cases involved. It should be conditioned
on a reformulation of the Jackson amendment, in such form as you could work
with it. And the word reformulation was used a lot. The point is that all
four of these, the people, three of them Democrat said that they were'
becoming increasingly uneasy for fear that the failure of the trade agreement
would be hung on them, the Senators. Of course they met on the people who
pushed the Jackson agreement. I told them of the possibility of defection
from the signatories. I said there are not many but I overheard some talking
about that. Eban interposed no objection except that he's bargaining for those
two points.

K: Yes.

S: There was an agreement that they hoped very much you could get it but
there was also an understanding that it should be conditioned on - you could
accept it be conditioned on a reformulation. Some of them thought, the
Democrats, that they ought to have private talks with Scoop and ask him not
to make it impossible for them to work something out.

K: That sounds very good. I'm very grateful to you.

S: I thought you'd need the information.

K: Oh, I need it very much.

S: You know that now Symington, Humphrey and Sparkman approached
properly when you get back, we'll all be willing to work on a reformulation

TELCON
Joe Sisco/Kissinger
3/20/74 - 11:22 a.m.

S: They're inviting you to come to Norway in June and asking you whether you would want to deliver a Nobel lecture, and since it was that personal, I thought you were in the building, he really wanted to see you by himself. I was just really going to ask whether you had permitted for me to take him into your office, but I gather you are at the White House.

K: No, I'll be over, so you can bring him in.

S: Will you be coming over....

K: In about 15 minutes.

S: That's great.

K: Now would you stop bugging me on that one year or six months business. I don't think it's worth it.

S: No, I'm not bugging them at all. The difficulty is that we've gotten two signals. We don't really care one way or another.

K: That's my point.

S: Sure. We're not really bugging them. We're just trying to be sure which position it is and we'll buy whatever it is. Six months or a year.

K: O.K. Will you make that clear?

S: Sure.

K: Good. Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By NARA Date 6-8-84

March 20, 1974

4:06 PM

K: On this paper to the President - what is the paper that goes to the President, so he understands what they're talking about.

S: It's Tab B.

K: There is nothing in there that explains to him what the issues are. He's going to be flying absolutely blind.

S: Do you want a lot of details for him?

K: He needs enough to know what the players are saying and that he should come out with a very firm position.

S: OK. So we should describe enough about what DOD may be doing and so he knows what to do.

K: That's right. His own statement should be a lot tougher than what's in there.

S: Alright. I'll get right on it.

K: OK.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 5012958
By NARA Date 6-8-64

TELECON
Ron Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger

March 20, 1974

4:27 PM

Z: Henry.

K: Hi, Ron.

Z: Well we're back.

K: Good. Still advising the President on my views?

Z: What do you mean?

K: I'm pulling your leg.

Z: I let you know where I was last night. The reason I'm calling, did you see the UPI wire.

K: No.

Z: On the Europe thing.

K: No.

Z: I think it plays fine.

K: You have to take my word for it, the French have already put on their
radio, it's a two page thing that the President pulled back. That he was
forced by public opinion to pull back, that he's corroborated the French point
of view. That we need the weapons. That we need our troop there and
therefore - you see the Europeans don't mind our yelling at them as long
as we don't pull our troops out.

Z: Right. I wasn't aware of the French thing.

K: No, no. It was great until he got into Mansfield.

Z: Yes. You might want to take a look at the UPI thing. I just read it on the
airplane when I got back and it's says, President Nixon warned the Western
Europe last night that they are contributing to a new sense of isolation in U.S.
and risking there own defense readiness, by refusing to co-operate in the
political and economic field.

K: I have seen nothing American that was in any sense bothersome.

Z: I understand. I was in a little bit awkward position last night.

K: I thought you behaved well.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 60 12958
By NARA Date 6.8.87

SANITIZED

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER ______ ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By NARA Date 6.8.04

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

March 20, 1974

4:30 PM

S: First on the subject of MFN, I'm more or less aware of what you've been doing and it sounds very constructive to me. I have the feeling that it is a pretty urgent issue.

K: I've talked to.....

S: Subject you could bring up on this Russian trip.

K: I've already raised it.

S: You have.

K: With Dobrynin.

S: OK, very good. Second, do you have any thoughts on how to handle this Cuban question. As I gather the President is taking a hard line on it. What do we do, start putting people in jail. The Canadians have just gone ahead. They're furious of course. Or shall we just wait a little bit.

K: I wouldn't take any action yet. He's got to yield on the Argentine case.

S: He's got both these cases and they're both tough.

K: He approved the Argentine case and he disapproved the Canadian case. That doesn't make any sense. So I've sent the Argentine case back into him.

S: OK, we'll wait in hopes that maybe he'll change his mind on that. Third, and this is sort of on a personal level. John Dunlap has a friend who is the head of the Central Planning Office in Saudi Arabia.

K: Oh yes, Nazir.

S: Hisham Nazir.

K: I know him.

S: Dunlap has worked with Nazir over the years.

K: SANITIZED

S: Well, alright.

SANITIZED

By 09 NARA Date 6-8-74

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958

Shultz - page 3

S: Why don't you put him down on the list of people that meets on that subject and then he can come on some things. I would also suggest to you that you put Eberle down on that.

K: Alright.

S: There are a lot of things involving our trade relationships around the world for which this has implications.

K: Right. I can tell you there's nothing I don't think that Dunlap is qualified for.

S: Dunlap is extraordinarily talented. He's also totally reliable.

K: And unselfish.

S: And unselfish. He's a very very good man.

K: Frankly, in my mind he would be a good possibility to replace you. I don't know how much he knows about financial things.

S: He knows plenty. He learns, he understands things. Anyway, I think it would be good to involve him in this effort. Next item, and I'm sort of on two sides of this issue. Yesterday Schmidt, after we got through with our negotiations, made a comment about the energy conference along the lines that he hoped we wouldn't let it drop because he felt some momentum was gotten up and he said if you have problems like the Foreign Ministers taking that initiative. He said I was distressed by that and he said if I had known ahead of time that they were going to do that I could have headed it off, and would have. At the same time he says he hopes that we don't drop the initiative because then it will set him back and others because it will just be described as a gimick of some kind that we used for either domestic purposes or some other purpose, but it wasn't really something to be taken seriously.

K: We won't drop it.

S: I think as I know you agree, he's worth paying attention to.

K: He's our key man.

S: I think that we need to think that over and in that connection it seems to me we need to have some way of making it public, that we are having these discussions with the Saudis and the Iranians, or we will. So that they don't seem to be an act of bad faith, assuming we're carrying on in the energy conference. That is to set it properly. That's not easy to do, I know, but it seems.....

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95/8
By C8 NARA Date 6-8-97

Schultz - page 4

K: When they are scheduled we can do it, but so far we don't really have a formal agreement yet.

S: Right. I think it is important to give attention to how that information is put forward so it doesn't seem contradictory to other things.

K: Exactly.

S: Finally on my list, there is a subject that's been under discussion for some time on international investment flows in the OECD. Casey has been handling it in the State Department. The subject has been, and I guess mainly because the State Department seems to be our representative in the OECD. Right now the subject is in danger of sort of falling between the stools. It's something we have felt, was of course, to discuss and with Casey gone, his thrust disappears and anyway I think there is probably more expertise on this subject in a fellow like Denham (phonetic) than you find over there. I would like to suggest to you that you consider having some different form of representation in the OECD and perhaps let Denham handle it or somebody else handle it.

K: In principle I'm in favor of that, but these things, they always bleed so much over here. Let me raise that here.

S: You've got to do something about it because there is a meeting scheduled that may get postponed or we may have to ask for a postponement because we're not really ready with a strong person to put forward there.

K: Right. I'll try to get to it tomorrow.

S: OK, now finally I have a suggestion for you for your Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

K: Who?

S: The name is Alan Greenspan (phonetic).

K: Oh yes. I know him.

S: You know him?

K: Yes.

S: I think he's a very talented fellow. I don't know whether he could be gotten to do it, but he's smart as he can be. He fits your description of wanting somebody who is analytically able and is experienced and savvy. He's more of an analyst then he is an operator but he has enough of the operational, not to be sort of brittle. He is a very good analyst and knowledgeable fellow.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By KARA Date 6-8-94

TELECON

General Haig/Secretary Kissinger

March 20, 1974

6:10 PM

H: Henry.

K: Hello Al.

H: How are you doing?

K: OK.

H: Good. I'm returning your call.

K: Oh, you're returning my call. That wasn't all that important. The French
of course picked up exactly what I was afraid they would. They're putting it all
over their radio and television.

H: Sure they did.

K: Have you seen it?

H: No, but I knew it was inevitable.

K: They say, one, he was very friendly to France, so there is no problem with France. Two, he confirmed what they've always said that we've no alternative but to keep our troops there. Third, so what's all the screaming about.

H: The way to handle that is, is that's not what he said.

K: Exactly. That's the line we're taking. I'm stopping in Bomm on the way to Russia, just for an hour.

H: You're not going to kiss and make up are you.

K: Al, I don't know what you guys think. I want to isolate the French, I'm going to be brutal.

H: Good.

K: It took me two months to get this show down started, I'm not going to pull off.

H: I'm only kidding you. You're losing you're sense of humor.

K: Well, you sound like Ziegler. He's been giving me strategic advice.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By C0 NARA Date 6-8-87

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-87

Haig - page 2

H: Listen, I had some long-haired guy come in here today. He was the creepiest looking fellow I've even seen. He's doing a piece on you.

K: What's his name?

H: Berlin.

K: Oh, yes.

H: My God, the questions he asked.

K: Like what?

H: I don't know whether he's out to screw you or not.

K: I'm sure he is. He's NY Post. Like what?

H: You were using devious methods in the bureaucracy. You were paranoiac. Whether you had scars of your youth. He just went on and on and on. I think I handled him alright.

K: What did you say, no I have scars of my adulthood.

H: I told him you once told me acute paranoia in Washington would be diagnosed as excess complacency. I said I agreed with that.

K: So, he'll say we were both paranoid.

H: Yes.

K: That's all you're going to achieve with that sort of a smark alecky remark.

H: I think I went through your organizational stuff. He wanted me to say you are an organizational disastor. I said that's anything but true. I said it precisely the opposite. I said he doesn't like to deal those things. He'd rather deal with substance. But when he wants to do it and has to do it, he does it very well. I said I don't know anybody who does it any better.

K: After all, you know, we've kep the foreign policy and defense policy going for five years in a disastrous situation.

H: That's right.

K: I don't know what the test is.

H: He apparently talked to everyone of our ever defective staff group over there. The earlier boys.

Haig - page 3

K: Yes.

H: I always say people who haven't been really close or have responsibilities or
carried them out successfully have a lot of ____ of things that they'll say about
Henry or me or the President or anybody. I didn't know whether you knew this
guy was doing this.

K: I know he's doing it. He's trying to get to see me. Maybe I ought to see him.

H: I think you should. He's not dumb.

K: How is our leader doing.

H: He's fine. He's dead tired. I just went over there, he was crawling.

K: He's got to crack that NSC group because Schlesinger is playing is usual
game.

H: Let's be damn sure that we have a paper in there for him that isn't too long
and too complex.

K: I'm going to be over in the morning and I can go over some of this with him.
OK, Al.

H: Alright, Henry.

END

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger

March 20, 1974

6:40 PM

K: Are you going to get me an answer tomorrow morning on this.

S: Yes indeed. I've just finished it.

K: What's your view?

S: It's interesting there are several permutations and combinations that you can go with this thing. Some of them would be quite defensible and not bad from our stand point. I think the main thing for us is to hold ours to our present level of deployment because obviously the higher we want to go the higher they'll want to go.

K: No, but I told them something like 5 to 3.

S: There are all kinds of funny combinations which don't make the throw away thing look too bad you wouldn't put them in those terms. For example, we would have 50% and they would have 20% of there - 50% of our light(?) missiles and they would have 20 of their medium. That would also make it possible...

K: But can we express it in numbers? Rather than in percentages.

S: We're going to give you several...

K: I don't want it in percentages.

S: I want to give you several ways of expressing it, there will be verification problems if we're not careful. We have to do it by fields or we have to do it by what we already know has been converted to be compatible with SS-19's and SS-18's. We've got to keep that in mind and...

K: That is not at all...all we need is a number for now. Then we can get into the verification problem.

S: I'm sure I'll be giving you more than you want, but I want you to have the whole problem when you talk.

K: I don't want to talk, he wants a paper I can give him because Brezhnev has the whole gang of them in Zavidovo.

S: Then I'll give you two things. I'll give you a paper also.

K: He didn't think it would be good for him to send the paper back I gave him.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By NARA Date 6-8-74

Sonnenfeldt - page 2

S: OK, that was another question I meant to ask you. But you gave it to him anyway. I'll give you a piece of paper that has fixed numbers in it, but I'll also give you an analytical memo that tells you how we got there.

K: Right. Well what are the numbers. Can you share them with me.

S: 240 is one of them.

K: Look 240 and ... 240 19's?

S: That's right.

K: They'll never accept that.

S: Another set of numbers is 64 18's which is what they've already got converted and 120 or maybe 180 19's. That takes you way out of wack on throw weight.

K: How far does it throw you out of wack on throw weight.

S: Well, 2.1 to 1.5 or something like that.

K: They say that the throw weight penalizes them for their backward technology.

S: Yes. To try and do it on the basis of war heads gets to be extremely difficult.

K: Because each of their war heads is bigger.

S: Megatonage in any case is way out of wack because of the size of their missiles. I guess the conclusions is you really have to do it in tubes.

K: What do you mean?

S: You have to do it on launchers rather than war heads. We'll give you what the war head figures so that you know. But I don't think you can express it in terms of war heads.

K: We would have more warheads if it's 1500 to 240...

S: In that time frame we would have more merve(?) war heads on any variation you can think of.

K: They'll never accept any of this. OK.

S: At least we have an opening.

K: Right, thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority CO 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-01

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger

March 20, 1974

6:55 PM

K: Find out how we're going on the Saudi business.

S: Saqqaf is scheduled to arrive on the 21st.

K: I think we're moving along badly.

S: We've been asked to present....

K: I understand all that. When are the Europeans coming?

S: That is one of the subject he's going to ask you about.

K: We have to get some sort of how we're going to answer it.

S: What I'm putting up to you tomorrow. We've got a ____ the European aspect of this thing. When it becomes known that we're persuing this matter. We don't want to put ourselves into a position of where the Europeans are going to accuse us of going around end. What I want to put up to you are two or three possibilities to how to handle the consultation process and whatever we say.

K: But not until the mission is clear.

S: No, but I think you have to do it really in the context of the mission hopefully.

K: Yes. OK.

S: How's Gina?

K: She's great.

S: I thought I was your friend and here I've never met this girl.

K: I don't want to get you too excited.

S: I probably get excited, even though it's seven o'clock and it's been a long day already. OK, thanks very much.

K: Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By C9-NARA Date 6-8-74

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

3/21/74: 9:12 a.m.

K: Hal.

S: Yes, sir.

K: Shultz tells me that the State Department has instructed Casey that after there is a favorable ruling to say that these are the -- we approved the loans that had already been done and to say that this is all until there is a clarification of Congressional intent. I don't know who is setting State Department policy, but this is not State Department policy.

S: Of course it is not. I'll find out immediately because Casey was . . .

K: Casey is to say that there is no change. We will approve the loans that have already been . . .

S: I don't know that he needs to say anything, other than we are going to resume business as before.

K: Exactly.

S: I'll find out who told him that. I'll call Casey anyhow and make sure that . . .

K: Well find out who told him that and I want that fellow <u>reubuk</u> rebuked.

S: Okay. You have a paper on SALT.

K: Yeah, now, that is not possible because Dobrynin told me not to raise the issue of fields which they have never heard of and now I am not in this business for Lodal's concept. The numbers -- you can give them the numbers without the fields. You can then -- when they accept the numbers, work it out in fields.

S: All right. You understand that the business of the fields is not just an idle concept. It is the cleanest way to get at the verification problems.

K: Hal, I cannot stand constant, stupid harassment. I know it is the cleanest way to get at the verification problem. I know all that bullshit. I wasn't born yesterday. I am saying that the first time the Soviets are introduced to the idea, the first thing that they have to agree to is the numbers.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-84

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
3/21/74; 9:12 a.m.

- 2 -

S: Now would you like to put in then a sentence that says, of course this
has to be done in a way to permit verification by national means . . .

K: You can put in the fields as an illustration but it cannot be done -- you
have to give them a ratio. Now what the -- what Dobrynin says they can
probably live with -- at any rate when I said yesterday the ratio has to
be five to three 1/10, you know . . .

S: We tried to come as close to that as possible.

K: Dobrynin said they can apparently live with a ratio. I don't know what
that ratio is. Secondly, a set ceiling for large missiles that no more than
X or __ could be the largest missiles and finally that the number of warheads
could -- had to be -- could not be unbalanced.

S: This makes them relatively equal at the launching.

K: That's right but there are a number of their schemes which you showed
me that actually by giving equal warheads they would have to cut down their
numbers.

S: That's right.

K: There is a number of them that where the equal warheads thing works
in our favor towards lower numbers.

S: Yeah.

K: Now can you redo it in that sense?

S: Well, I will give you another one in the next couple of hours.

K: Okay.

S: All right.

Telcon

Secretary Kissinger/Robert McCloskey

Thursday, March 21, 1974; 9:17 a.m.

K: Hello.

McC: Good morning, Mr. Secretary. You'll find in that briefing book a somewhat long proposed voluntary statement on Indochina. Re-writing it.

K: Yes.

McC: This is the result of a meeting the other day with Ken Rush and others on the need for having something on the record, particularly by you...

K: Yes, but I'm not sure this is the place to do it.

McC: I see.

K: I'll take a look at it, but this may just trigger a Vietnam debate which I am not sure is in our interest right now.

McC: Okay. I'll go ahead and re-do it and we can talk about it when you get back.

K: Yeah. You think we should have it?

McC: I thought we should. I agreed to it and I agreed to recommend it to you.

K: Yeah, but you know, there is the basic sentence in the Department, "when in trouble make it a Secretary's statement whether it makes sense or not." You know, I know it would be good on the record, but do we really want a debate on Vietnam right now?

McC: Well, I pointed out there is a risk that you will now focus a lot more attention on Indochina than there has been. It's kind of been a benign subject, at least until Graham Martin's unfortunate telegram.

K: Yeah.

McC: But the point is that they need something to go after to get the money with.

K: Well, I'll be glad to write letters. I just don't think a public debate is desirable right now.

DOLLAR DOLLAR
Authority
By: C.B. NARA Date: 3-8-84

-2-

McC: I agree with that, and I said on the first bounce you'd probably get some adverse criticism.

K: I mean why shouldn't I use my influence with Senators by either calling them or writing them.

McC: Well, fir st, I suppose people thought that you may not have the time to do as much individually as would have to be done and that having a little anchor out in the wind in the form of a statement would give other people the wherewithal to make points with individual Congressmen.

K: Well, let me think about it.

McC: Yes, sir. Anything else you need?

K: No, I'll be over in about an hour, I hope, if the President lets me go.

McC: Yes sir.

K: Good.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By CQ NARA Date 6-8-84

March 21, 1974

12:15PM

(Missed first part)

K: But now on can it be...

S: Yes it can.

K: Has the time changed?

S: Not yet.

K: Are they still in there?

S: Yes. He has a meeting at 2:30 with Butz, so I think we can get it slipped easily enough. There needs to be time for you to discuss it. I think you were very good.

K: Oh, did you hear it?

S: Yes.

K: I didn't know they had it over there.

S: They piped it through. I think it was very good balance.

K: Well, I hope it had taken some of the steam out of what he said the other day.

S: No, I think so. It's not strident but firm.

K: But it remained strong, I hope.

S: Oh, yes. No, in fact, you came out just right on two things-- the troop thing and the factual relationship--were very good.

K: O.K. Thank you.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority EO 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By C.P. KARA Date 6-8-74</td></tr></table>

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March 21, 1974

12:35PM

Z: Hi Henry.

K: Ron, how are you.

Z: How did it go?

K: I think it went well.

Z: I guess you called me beforehand, and I am returning your call.

K: Oh, what the hell did I want? I did want something and now I have forgotten it.

Z: Did you want me to give your press conference for you?

K: No. What the hell did I want? No, that isn't, it will come to me later. But I want to make sure Ron that you don't start weaseling on the troup question. The President really hurt us by what he said--oh he hurt himself. Just leave it where it is. Just don't pull away; don't reassure the Europeans about the troop issue any further.

Z: All right.

K: Just say we have nothing to add to what the President has said.

Z: I understand that.

K: I today have said all these statements are perfectly consistent--
that he was describing reality. OK.

Z: Good, OK.

K: Thank you.

Z: OK Henry.

TELECON
General Scowcroft/ Secretary Kissinger

12:55 PM,

March 21, 1974

K: Have we changed the date yet?

S: He is still over there.

K: How will I know now?

S: I'll get some way to pass on a note to Haig, and get an answer right away. If you have gone, I will get word to you at lunch.

K: Fine:

K: (Inaudible--something about private channel).

K: Those new talking points are still not what I want.

S: Is there something else I can do?

K: No, because there is just no explanation. There is no distinction between land based and sea based MIRV.

S: No there is not, but did you want to get into that?

K: No, because if you take the land based one the disparity will be unbelievable.

S: This is still focussed of course on the throw away thing. I don't see how you can do that in a meeting.

K: Well, OK. Let me know where we'll be, will you?

S: All Right.

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

12:57 PM March 21, 1973

D: Hello

K: Anatoliy.

D: Oh, hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

D: Thank you. You have just been in press conference?

K: Yes.

D: I have not had chance to read it, but I hope to read it after dinner.

K: Well, I hope it was friendly. I understand they have moved the talks to Moscow.

D: Yes, I just received this on the receiver in this morning. I have two questions. One is about Pompidou from Brezhnev. Second, he asked me if it would be more convenient location to have meeting in Moscow. With the understanding that you and your children will be in a separate house. You will be there and some of your main aides. As for others they will be put in hotels. You remember the residence.

K: Yes.

K: You put all of them in the hotels.

D: No, no. Only in the hotels will be the secondary. Your main aides and you and your children are in the residence which you used in Moscow before.

K: O.K.

D: Brezhnev asked to tell you personally if you would like to go to river one of the evenings.

K: Oh, he and I.

D: To talk, and have expedition of hunting. If you like, he will accompany you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By: NARA Date 6.8.04

-2-

K: I leave this entirely up to him. That will be very pleasant.
I am delighted of course.

D: He said for me to tell you. He would accompany you and go
there for an evening. He would like to if you would. Have a talk
and for hunting. Is that all right?

K: Of course.

D: With the children now it is easier. You don't need to put them
in the Embassy. They will stay with you and all of the problems are
taken care of. As to when I will see you. Maybe tomorrow if you
have time. I will talk to you about Pompidou. It is not urgent.

K: I have letter for you from President to Brezhnev. A fairly long one.

D: Maybe I drop in for 10 or 15 min to talk about your ideas on SALT.

K: I will give that to you too. Why don't we aim for 5:30.

D: Today.

K: Yes.

D: In your office.

K: Yes, at the State Department.

D: Thank you very much Henry.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-84

TELECON
Atherton/Secretary Kissinger

March 21, 1974

1:04 PM

K: I have that cable here from Eilts about the UN. One, this is the
sort of issue in which the State Dept. specializes, but I think it is
just a waste of time for us to have made so much fuss over it.

A: I'm not sure I know which one it is.

K: Cairo 1454. Well I have seen two or three Sisco cables as if my
life depended on that gd thing. About the one year extension.

A: Yes. I'll have to look at this one. I don't think I have seen it.

K: Look will you get across to Eilts that I discussed it with Sadat
and he had agreed. But I am not going to make a huge issue of it.
All we want is their reaction.

A: All right

K: Good

A: Thank you.

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Sisco - page 2

K: Aren't you nice.

S: No, really. It was a first-rate job. You don't need it from an amateur.
It really ought to have a tremendous impact.

K: I appreciate this.

S: I almost called you a little earlier, but you tied up on other things.

K: Now, if Akens is out of there, well whom are you thinking of sending?

S: Well, I don't know whether we'll send anybody, but the number two man
is a very very good man. A very bright fellow by the name of Horan. But let
me think this over because we've just gotten word today and I'll have some kind
of recommendation on this thing tomorrow.

K: But can we take it easy now on overloading that system.

S: Yes, we certainly will. In fact there hasn't been a discussion with the Saudis
ever since that first batch, which is about ten days ago, because Akens has held
off waiting for Saqqaf's return. Therefore we're in a position to fully control it.

K: Good.

S: Yes. OK.

K: Right.

S: Thank you.

END

March 21, 1974

6:36 PM

K: Joe.

S: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: I'm seeing Dobrynin, is there anything you have figured out we could do?

S: I send you a memo and what's in it is this.

K: Where would the God-damned memo be, would you think?

S: I think it's probably - why don't I just get Dick to send it right into the room rather than I - let me say just thing as to how I feel you ought to handle the Moscow thing generally. You know, Henry, I think you've got to talk very straight to them. They may be unhappy but from their point of view this is a situation which is not very bad and I think you've got to say to them, look, we're not going out of our way not to cooperate with you in the Middle East. But the reality is that you're unacceptable to one side and we're going to try and find ways in which we and you will keep together. We're not going out of our way to exclude you here and we will touch base with you, not concretely what I've suggested to you or little nuggets. One, I think you could commit yourself to a Geneva ceremonial exercise to put the stamp of approval on both the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement as well as the Syrian one.

K: Once they're done.

S: Yes, once they're done. Secondly, at that Geneva conference you could also commit yourself that you are willing to talk generally at that conference in terms of where you go from here. In other words, kind of a non-committal sort of general discussion at that particular reconvening of the Geneva conference. Third, you could make a commitment that you will consult informally with them at least once more substantively before any Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement is achieved. And fourth, that if there is an opportunity where you feel that their direct intervention, particularly with the Syrians, would be helpful. That you would bear this in mind. These are all mouses that I've come up with. Henry, I don't think you need to give very much to the Russians on this, regardless of how delicate it is. I think they might be irritated, but from their point of view they could live with this situation.

K: OK, good.

S: It's in a piece of paper.

K: Thank you.

END

TELECON
Mr. Casey/Secretary Kissinger

March 21, 1974

7:02 PM

K: How does it feel to be President of something?

C: Not bad.

K: Good.

C: I had a good day Tuesday and cleaned up the off set agreement.

K: I wanted to congratulate you on it, you did very well.

C: We got about 85% of the troop stationing costs and we got enough to meet the tax and 100% of the loans are OK.

K: The only trouble is, I appreciated you too late.

C: I thought it might be useful to have a ten minute chat about this East/West trade business. I'm going to have to testify on the authorization bill probably the week after next and I got an opinion from the Attorney General authorizing the - supporting our practices.

K: Yes, I saw that.

C: I intend to announce it tomorrow.

K: You should return to the old practices.

C: I intend to announce tomorrow that we'll approve the trade center and the other loans and resume the old practice, open up the doors. We'll have an East/West Trade Commission meeting on Monday. We'll probably talk about the fertilizer and the ______. My own view is that we should not rock the boat with those deals until the thing got settled fundamentally. Try to push those a month or two forward and run the risk the magnitude will make the Congress say we're trying to jam them through before they close the door down. I think is too much of a risk and sowing the atmosphere....

K: You should proceed at the regular rate.

C: Yes. That's right. That's what we intend to do.

K: That's what I think you should do.

C: Yes.

March 21, 1974

9:35 PM

S: Yes sir.

K: Brent, did we ever pass on the message to Sadat about his brother?

S: Yes.

K: Did we ever get a response?

S: No, nothing. I passed it on Sunday to Eilts.

K: Why don't you query Eilts about what Sadat's reaction was.

S: OK, I will.

K: OK.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>EO 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>CB</td><td>NARA Date</td><td>6.8.04</td></tr></table>

TELECON

George Vest/Secretary Kissinger

March 21, 1974

10:15 PM

V: Yes sir.

K: You called me.

V: I got word already from Dick Campbell that you said to check the White House on this ABC interview tomorrow with you and the President.

K: You stay out of it. ABC is to do it. You stay out of it.

V: That is exactly what I passed on to ABC.

K: Yes.

V: And they are doing that themselves.

K: OK, good.

V: That's the way I left it.

K: Good. Not an interview is it?

V: No, sir. Just to photograph the two of you.

K: OK.

V: And I have passed that on to Ted Kopel and he is doing it with the people over there.

K: Good, fine.

END