01-04-1997 11:15

DFB-PRESSE

+49 69 6788204

S.01

DEUTSCHER
FUSSBALL-BUND

EGIDIUS BRAUN · PRÄSIDENT

TELEFAX

No.: 001 - 212 - 759 0042

Dr. Henry Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
New York City, NY 10022-6022
USA

APR 0 1 1997

01st April, 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

we all know that you are not only a great fan of the German national team, but also a long-standing football lover and connoisseur. (Or should I have said: Despite being a football lover and connoisseur, you are a great fan of....)

But, joking apart, I was truly happy to witness your steadfast support for "our" team when we last met in London during EURO 96. I was very glad and proud to receive your signs of friendship and personal affection, not least in your letter of congratulation after the event.

You may have heard that the DFB will host, on behalf of UEFA, this year's Champions League final in the Munich "Olympiastadion" on 28th May, 1997. As an expression of the great esteem in which you are held here, may I formally invite you and your wife, also on behalf of UEFA-President Lennart Johansson, to come to the Bavarian capital.

We have planned the following programme:

**Sunday, 25-05-1997, 19h00**
I wish to invite a small circle of friends to a
typically "Bavarian night", with beer, sausages,
music and inspiring conversation

**Monday, 26-05-1997**
Lunch at the invitation of the Lord Mayor of
Munich, in the Munich Rathaus.

**Tuesday, 27-05-1997**
At 17h30, the DFB will hold a reception in the
newly renovated *Prinzregententheater* to officially
introduce and present its bid for the 2006 FIFA
World Cup to the international media.

WELTMEISTER 1954 · 1974 · 1990

TELEFON 0 69 - 67 88 0 · TELEFAX 0 69 - 6 78 82 66 · HERMANN-NEUBERGER-HAUS · OTTO-FLECK-SCHNEISE 6 · 60528 FRANKFURT / MAIN

01-04-1997 11:16

DFB-PRESSE

+49 69 6788204

5.02

DEUTSCHER
FUSSBALL-BUND

- 2 -

At approx. 20h00, the DFB invites UEFA, the two competing clubs' representatives, as well as additional guests of honour, to dinner in the *Münchner Residenz*.

Wednesday, 28-05-1997

Traditionally, UEFA will invite the two clubs and guests to the official luncheon; at 20h00, the match will be kicked off.

I am sure that everybody concerned will make your and your wife's stay in Munich an unforgettable occasion.

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I am afraid that's not all: May I ask you a very special favour?

Concerning the media presentation of the DFB's bid, we intend to prepare a supporting brochure that summarises the key aspects. Our very concrete question to you is, would you be ready and willing to contribute an article featuring some of the arguments that speak for the 2006 World Cup in a reunited Germany?

You know this country, you are fully conversant with German football, you know Germany's standing in the world, and you are aware of the immensely positive echo that such an event produces. In short: I consider you the ideal person to come forward with such a statement.

I am eagerly looking forward to hearing from you in the near future, and remain

GESAMT S.02

HENRY A. KISSINGER

April 14, 1997

Dear Mr. Braun:

You don't know how tempted I have been by your invitation to the Champions League final in May, not only by the certainty of an exciting match but also by the promise of my favorite Bavarian food. But, sadly, I can see no way to clear my calendar of some long-standing commitments here in New York at that time. Unfortunately, duty must prevail over soccer and sausages, though I wish it were not so!

I'll be glad to write a short statement supporting Germany's bid for World Cup 1996. If you can let me know what you consider the most important points to stress and when it needs to be in your hands, it would be very helpful.

Again, my thanks to you and to UEFA President Johansson for an invitation I would have loved to be able to accept.

Mr. Egidius Braun
President
Deutscher Fussball-Bund
Hermann-Neuberger-Haus
Otto-Fleck-Schneise 6
60528 Frankfurt/Main
Germany

HENRY A. KISSINGER

July 23, 1997

Dear Mr. Braun:

I received your letter this morning
following a very good visit with
President Herzog and much appreciated
your sending along the T-shirt--which
will indeed be worn often--and the
impressive promotional brochure.
Many thanks.

With respect to Mr. Johansson's
situation, I would be happy to discuss
this with you at a convenient time and
look forward to your being in touch.

Mr. Egidius Braun
Deutscher Fussball-Bund
Hermann-Neuberger-Haus
Otto-Fleck-Schneise 6
60528 Frankfurt/Main
Germany

SUITE 1021 • 1800 K STREET, N. W. • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 • (202) 872-0300
TELEFAX (212) 753-7248

DEUTSCHER
FUSSBALL-BUND

EGIDIUS BRAUN · PRÄSIDENT

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
26th Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

USA

JUL 23 1997

16th July, 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

we have been informed that you will soon meet with the German Federal
President, Professor Dr. Roman Herzog, on the occasion of his 2nd state visit to
the United States of America. May I seize this opportunity to send you the DFB's
2006 World Cup promotional brochure and a limited-edition T-shirt for which you
will surely have good use. I would like to thank you again for your spontaneous
willingness to contribute a personal statement for our presentation. It has been
vital in lending weight to the credibility of our country's 2006 World Cup bid.

I am happy to have in you such a wonderful companion for the cause of German
football. This emboldens me, so to speak, to raise the issue of your support in the
matter of my friend Lennart Johansson's election to the FIFA Presidency. I would
be greatly honoured if you were to assist me in this crucial issue, and I am looking
forward to seeing you in the near future.

Until then, may I wish you pleasant and fruitful talks with the Federal President,
Professor Dr. Roman Herzog, who - as you will be aware - is held in high esteem
indeed for his social commitment.

Very sincerely yours

Encls.

DFB World Cup promotional brochure

Official T-shirt

TELEFON 0 69 - 67 88 0 · TELEFAX 0 69 - 6 78 82 66 · HERMANN-NEUBERGER-HAUS · OTTO-FLECK-SCHNEISE 6 · 60528 FRANKFURT/MAIN

29-SEP-1997 14:59

DFB

+49 69 6788266

S.001/002

DEUTSCHER
FUSSBALL-BUND

EGIDIUS BRAUN PRÄSIDENT

per Fax
001-212-753 72 48

USA

SEP 29 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

29.09.97

I am writing to you today in my capacity as a member of the „Support Committee“ for the election of our President Lennart Johansson as President of FIFA.

The „Support Committee“ is preparing an election brochure to be published in October of this year, which will give explanations as to why we think Mr. Johansson should be elected President of FIFA at the FIFA Congress in Paris next July.

This election brochure will be sent out to all the confederations and FIFA member associations. The publication will present Lennart Johansson as a person, showing his beliefs, his achievements and the programme which he proposes for FIFA in the next millennium if he is elected president.

It is of considerable importance that we tell national associations throughout the world of the achievements in Europe which have benefitted the entire football movement under the presidency of Lennart Johansson, given that many such associations are not in close touch with developments within European Football.

With this proven record, the credibility of his agenda for the future will be very high, and it is for this reason that I am writing to you to ask if you would agree to sign as a „character witness“ in the election brochure of our president. We have pre-selected 25 personalities from football, business and politics to give an individual quote on Mr. Johansson as a person, and who will pay tribute to his personal qualities, his beliefs and his achievements.

TELEFON 0 69 - 67 88 0 · TELEFAX 0 69 - 6 78 82 66 · HERMANN-NEUBERGER-HAUS · OTTO-FLECK-SCHNOISE 6 · 60528 FRANKFURT /MAIN

The British-American Chamber of Commerce presents
**The Transatlantic Business Awards Dinner**

Thursday, October 30, 1997

The Pierre, New York

September 24, 1997

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10021

Dear Henry:

I am delighted to announce that The British-American Chamber of Commerce's Transatlantic Business Awards Dinner to be held on October 30, 1997 is already well on its way to being a great success.

My Co-Chairmen and I have received a tremendously enthusiastic response from leaders of the business community on both sides of the Atlantic. This demonstrates not only the business community's support for this event, but also its recognition that our Honorees, William C. Steere, Jr. of Pfizer and Sir Iain Vallance of British Telecommunications, are richly deserving of this honor for their many contributions to the strong business partnership between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Joining these Honorees will be Sir Colin Marshall, Chairman of British Airways, who will receive a special "Lifetime Service Award" in recognition of the unique role that he has played in the promotion of transatlantic commerce. In addition, James S. Gleason of Gleason Corporation and John Simpson of The Mayflower Corporation will be our two Entrepreneurial Award winners.

I hope that you will join the many other business leaders who will be participating in this event. If so, please return the reservation portion of the enclosed invitation to us at your earliest convenience, as tables in The Pierre Grand Ballroom are filling rapidly. Please note that Underwriters, for a contribution of $25,000, are entitled to an excellent table, the privilege of bringing all of their guests to a private pre-dinner reception with our honorees and other dignitaries, a full page advertisement in our event journal and other special marks of recognition. You will also find that Patrons and Sponsors are entitled to certain special marks of recognition for their contribution to the success of the evening.

My Co-Chairmen and I hope to receive your reservation or, if you cannot attend, your generous contribution. This gratitude will be shared by William Steere, Sir Iain Vallance, Sir Colin Marshall and all of us concerned with reinforcing and expanding the bridges between the United States and the United Kingdom, both of which enjoy a long tradition of mutually beneficial economic, political and cultural ties.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Crandall

SEP 26 1997

**Guests of Honor**

William C. Steere, Jr.
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Pfizer Inc

Sir Iain Vallance
Chairman
British Telecommunications plc

**Entrepreneurial Awards Honoring**

James S. Gleason
Chairman and President
Gleason Corporation

John Simpson
Deputy Chairman and Group Chief Executive
The Mayflower Corporation plc

**Lifetime Service Award**

Sir Colin Marshall
Chairman
British Airways

International Advisory Board Chairman
The British-American Business Council
Master of Ceremonies

The Honorable Raymond G.H. Seitz
Vice Chairman
Lehman Brothers International (Europe)

**Dinner Co-Chairmen**

Sir Dominic Cadbury
Chairman
Cadbury Schweppes plc

Robert L. Crandall
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
AMR Corporation/American Airlines

Harry P. Kamen
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

Thomas G. Labrecque
President and Chief Operating Officer
The Chase Manhattan Corporation

Deryck C. Maughan
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Salomon Brothers Inc

Lucio A. Noto
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
Mobil Corporation

Dean R. O'Hare
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
The Chubb Corporation

Bert C. Roberts, Jr.
Chairman
MCI Communications Corporation

**Honorary Co-Chairmen**

William M. Castell
Chief Executive
Amersham International plc

Alex Trotman
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
Ford Motor Company

John F. Welch, Jr.
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
General Electric Company

**The British-American Chamber of Commerce**

Marshall H. Millsap
Chairman

David K. Diebold
Deputy Chairman

Richard Fursland
Managing Director

**Dinner Committee**

145 West 45th Street, Suite 300
New York, NY 10036
(212) 997-0100
Fax: (212) 997-0188

BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL

The Honorable Dr. Henry Kissinger
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW #S-1021
Washington, DC 20006

APR 1 7 1997

16 April 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

Please find enclosed a draft revised version of NATO's current Strategic Concept. Also enclosed is a summary of the principal policy changes BASIC recommends.

BASIC is asking for your comments and suggestions to this draft. In addition, we ask you to consider endorsing this document.

BASIC proposes that NATO should fulfill its promise of transformation and adopt this revised concept during their Summit in Madrid in July.

NATO's current "New Strategic Concept" was agreed in 1991 when the Soviet Union was still in existence. Since then, there have been fundamental improvements in European security. NATO has initiated a process of internal adaptation to bring about changes which will reflect the new security environment. However, the Alliance has not decided to revise this document. The British government stated in the House of Commons that updating the Strategic Concept "is under consideration within NATO".

Please let me know whether you agree that the Alliance needs a revised Strategic Concept and whether you agree with the overall content of the proposed revision, although not necessarily with every detail. Individuals who are prepared to lend their support will receive an advanced copy of this document prior to its formal publication. This will allow them to reconsider if they wish.

BASIC would like to publicize support for this document in April, prior to key NATO and EU meetings in May. I would, therefore, appreciate a prompt reply.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Daniel T. Plesch
Director

**Washington**
1900 L Street, NW
Suite 401
Washington, DC 20036
USA
Telephone (+1 202) 785 1266
Facsimile (+1 202) 387 6298
E-mail: basicusa@igc.apc.org

**London**
Carrara House
20 Embankment Place
London WC2N 6NN
ENGLAND
Telephone (+44 171) 925 0862
Facsimile (+44 171) 925 0861
E-mail: basic@gn.apc.org

**Director** Daniel T. Plesch • **Council** • Nicole Ball • Frank Blackaby • Morris Brodie
Martin Butcher • Patricia Chilton • Lord Healey (Hon. President) • Richard Healey
Lord Jenkins of Putney • Ambassador James Leonard • Rep. Cynthia McKinney
(Hon. Vice-President) • Daniel N. Nelson • James O'Connell • Lord Elis Thomas
Joe Volk • Sheryl L. Walter • Ambassador Paul Warnke (President) • Derek
Wellman • **Advisors** • Robert Aldridge • Richard Barnet • Ambassador Jonathan
Dean • Nancy Donaldson • Scilla Elworthy • Michael Ferber • Randall Forsberg
Isabel Guy • Sima Osdoby • Kathryn Schultz

Internet: http://www.igc.apc.org/basic/

UK Registered Charity No. 1001081. US Non-profit Organization 501(c)(3).

# A new Strategic Concept for NATO from BASIC

## DRAFT 1. March 1997

Note to the reader:

Plain text is NATO's current Strategic Concept agreed in 1991. Struck-out text has been deleted because it has been overtaken by events or a policy change is being proposed. **Bolded text** is modernising language and is **double underlined** where the most important changes in Alliance policy are recommended.

## THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991 Madrid on 7-8 July 1997.

1. At their meetings in London July 1990 and Rome in November 1991, NATO's Heads of State and Government agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe. While reaffirming the basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception, they recognised that the developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in future. The Strategic Concept agreed by the Alliance in November 1991 has been kept under review in light of the continually improving political context in Europe. These changes have allowed the Alliance to further revise its Strategic Concept.

## PART I -- THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

### The New Strategic Environment

2. Since 1989, profound political changes have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe which have radically improved the security environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to achieve its objectives. The USSR no longer exists. The USSR's former satellites have fully recovered their sovereignty. The former Soviet Union and its Republics have become independent sovereign states and together with are undergoing the nations of Central and Eastern Europe they continue to develop their democratic societies. radical change. The three Baltic Republics have regained their independence.

1

Former Soviet forces have left Hungary and Czechoslovakia and are due to have now completed their withdrawal from Poland and Germany by 1994. All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West. Many of these countries have expressed a strong desire to become members of the Alliance. They have, in varying degrees, embraced and begun to be implementing policies which have aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and a market economy. The political division of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation of the Cold War period has thus been overcome and will not be reestablished. NATO now meets with almost all the nations of Europe through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace programmes whose existence has produced an even greater warning time of any threat to the Alliance or its Partners. The newly established Atlantic Partnership Council which is a mark of the mature cooperative relations between all European states will further intensify contacts and promote security and stability throughout Europe.

The Alliance recognises the inherent dangers of the process of opening to the East and in particular takes note of the OSCE stated objective of creating a common security space in Europe, free of dividing lines. The Alliance, therefore, perceives no need to enlarge.

Alternatively, [At the 1994 Brussels Summit the Alliance made its historic decision to enlarge, a decision which is likely to shape the future of the European security landscape. By 1999, the Alliance's 50th anniversary, a number of States from Central and Eastern Europe will become members of the Alliance. The Alliance recognises the inherent dangers of the process of opening to the East and in particular takes note of the OSCE stated objective of creating a common security space in Europe, free of dividing lines. The Alliance will therefore remain open to possible new members and declares that no country in Europe is excluded from membership. The Russian Federation and Ukraine are strongly encouraged to apply and join the new Alliance.]

3. In the West, there have also been significant changes. Germany has been united and remains a full member of the Alliance and of European institutions. The European Community has become the European Union. The fact that the countries of the European Community Union are working towards the goal of political and monetary union, including the development of a European security identity; and the enhancement of the role of the WEU, are important factors for European security. The strengthening of the security dimension in the process of European integration, and the enhancement of the role and responsibilities of European members of the Alliance are positive and mutually reinforcing. The development of a European security identity and defence role which is separable but not separate from NATO through the

2

Combined Joint Task Force concept, reflects in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.

4. Substantial progress in arms control has already enhanced stability and security by lowering arms levels and increasing military transparency and mutual confidence (including through the Stockholm CDE agreement of 1986, the INF Treaty of 1987 and the CSCE agreements and confidence and security-building measures of 1990) (including the Chemical Weapons Convention, the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, the indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the accession of Belarus and Ukraine to the Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the entry into force of START I, the implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the removal of the vast majority of non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe). The Alliance looks forward to the entry into force of the CWC, the CTBT and START II at the earliest possible time. The consolidation of existing agreements and the development of new agreements restricting weapons of mass destruction is of the utmost international importance.

Implementation of the 1991 START Treaty-1992 START II Treaty will lead to increased stability through substantial and balanced reductions in the field of strategic nuclear arms. Further far-reaching changes and reductions in the nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union will be **Russian Federation** have been pursued following President Bush's September 1991 President Clinton's initiative to take nuclear weapons off alert. The agreed framework for START III will further reduce the nuclear danger by bringing the number of deployed strategic warheads to a total of 2000-2500 in phase A and to 1,000 in phase B. The Alliance welcomes the political declaration of France and the United Kingdom not to increase their nuclear forces and looks forward to unanimity amongst the five nuclear weapons states to enable the implementation of START III B.

Also of great importance is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed at the 1990 Paris Summit; its modernisation implementation will remove the Alliance's numerical insuperiority in key all conventional weapon systems and provide for effective verification procedures and restriction on the introduction of new weapon types and technologies. All these developments will have also resulted in an unprecedented and increasing degree of military transparency, prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional and nuclear forces, and for the achievement of the ultimate goal of a global ban on chemical nuclear weapons, as well as restricting de-stabilising arms exports through the enforceable Codes of Conduct on the Arms Trade and the proliferation of certain weapons technologies.

3

[LQ]

Despite this, a destabilising concentration of military forces exist in certain parts of Europe, and particularly, in its south-east corner. The Alliance will intensify its efforts to convince its members and partners alike that reductions in military holdings are essential for reducing the real or residual threats to peace. Allies and partners alike will implement an appropriate mix of unilateral and multilateral steps to achieve this goal.

5. The OSCE process, which began, formerly the CSCE, in Helsinki in 1975, has already contributed significantly to overcoming the division of Europe. As a result of the Paris, Helsinki and Budapest Paris-Summits, it now has become an organisation in its own right. The OSCE includes new institutional arrangements and provides a contractual framework for consultation and cooperation that can play a constructive role, complementary to that of NATO, the EU, the WEU and the Council of Europe and the process of European integration, in preserving peace. The OSCE's "Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century", agreed in Lisbon in December 1996, provides the framework for the future of European Security. As agreed in Lisbon, the Alliance recognises that the OSCE plays a central role in achieving the goal of a common security space in Europe. A security space free of dividing lines in which all States are equal partners.

6. The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the fulfilment of a number of objectives set out in the Harmel Report, have significantly improved the overall security of the Allies. The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared. On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain.

7. The new Strategic Concept of 1991 looked forward to a security environment in which the positive changes of 1986-1991 referred to above have come to fruition. In particular, it assumed both the completion of the planned withdrawal of former Soviet military forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the full implementation by all parties of the 1990 CFE Treaty. These changes have occurred. In addition the dissolution of the USSR and its replacement by the Confederation of Independent States, the introduction of the PFP and the conclusion of the several treaties controlling weapons of mass destruction has resulted in a further dramatic improvement in the security environment, unanticipated in 1991. The implementation of the Strategic Concept will thus be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment and in particular progress in fulfilling these assumptions. Further adaptation will be made to the extent necessary.

4

Security Challenges and Risks

8. The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, The risk of a surprise attack no longer exists has been substantially reduced, and minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly enormously.

8. Since 1991 new challenges have emerged in Europe resulting from the collapse of multi-ethnic states in Central and Eastern Europe. The wars in former Yugoslavia, Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh have demonstrated the fragility of the post-Cold War stability in parts of Europe. Nationalist forces are on the ascendancy and although they pose no military threat to Allied security they nevertheless constitute a risk to the new European security architecture. Other acute problems include the continuous violations of human rights, the lack of full democratisation, threats to independent media, electoral fraud, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism.

The new Alliance, as demonstrated by the success of the NATO-led mission to former Yugoslavia, is prepared to make its resources available to meet these challenges where appropriate. In Berlin in June 1996 Alliance's Ministers have taken a major step forward in shaping the new NATO, a NATO taking on new missions such as IFOR and SFOR. The on-going adaptation of the Alliance structures will make the Alliance able to more effectively carry out the full range of its missions, including future IFOR-type operations.

However, the predominantly non-military nature of the new challenges in Europe means that there are profound limitations on what the Alliance can contribute. The OSCE, the EU, the UN and the Council of Europe have an important role to play in meeting the new security challenges in Europe and in most cases they are better equipped than the Alliance to do so. There is a clear requirement to develop concepts for the rapid introduction of packages of non-military measures by these organisations.

9. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved. In 1991 the Alliance assessed that these risks could arise in various ways. These assessed risks have been largely contained and reduced in the last seven years.

10. Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from

5

institutions of European security in ensuring that this risk has
not materialised over the last seven years.

Despite the availability of this technology, the Alliance
recognises that the threats of WMD's and BM's cannot be mainly
addressed by counterproliferation. Therefore, the Alliance
supports efforts that will address security issues along its
southern flank, including the Mediterranean forum, CSCM, and
bilateral and multilateral talks.

The Alliance has initiated a discussion in the Partnership for
Peace on a multi-lateral moratorium on transfers of weapons
within the CFE TLE categories to all nations in the Middle East
and through the CFE modernisation talks to restrict the
introduction of new weapons systems amongst CFE signatories.

13. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from
whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the
Washington Treaty, which places the right of self-defence within
the authority of the UN Charter and the Security Council.
However, Alliance security must also take account of the global
context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other
risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and
actions of terrorism and sabotage. Arrangements exist within the
Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the
Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of their
efforts including their responses to such risks. However, the
Allies agree that a military alliance is the institution of last
resort and non-military institutions must play the leading role
in conflict prevention. Therefore, NATO actively supports
collective security organisations, including the OSCE and the UN
in addressing these risks to European and global security. The
Alliance notes the success of this strategy in achieving the
permanent NPT, the CTBT, the CWC and the ANWFZ.

14. From the point of view of Alliance strategy, these
different risks have to be seen in different ways. In 1991 the
Alliance based its strategy on the need to maintain the strategic
balance in Europe. Even in a The non-adversarial and cooperative
relationship, which has since been established with the Russian
Federation - Soviet military capability and build-up potential,
including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most
significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in
maintaining the strategic balance in Europe. The end of
East-West confrontation has, however, greatly reduced requires
to abandon the need to maintain strategic balance in
Europe. Russia's military capability and build-up potential has
declined to the point where it should not be considered a serious
threat to the rest of Europe. the risk of major conflict in
Europe. On the other hand, there is a greater risk of different
crises arising, which could develop quickly and would require a

7

[LQ]

rapid response, but they are likely to be of a lesser magnitude.

15. Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. The first is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity encourages non-military organisations to address the new risks to security. The second, on the other hand, is that the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security by strengthening the non-military aspects of NATO.

# PART II -- ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY FUNCTIONS

## The Purpose of the Alliance

16. NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged. **The Alliance intends to exercise its responsibilities with respect to its aforementioned values by inviting presentations and recommendations from the relevant bodies of the OSCE, the UN and the Council of Europe to the North Atlantic Council and Cooperation Council and the Atlantic Partnership Council.** The Alliance welcomes the work conducted at the OSCE toward "A Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century" and is committed in assisting its conclusion. The Alliance intends to discuss the observation of standards for its values along with those it continues to set for military matters in order to play its full part in the prevention of the security risks from economic, social, political, ethnic and territorial factors.

## The Nature of the Alliance

17. NATO embodies the transatlantic **politico-military** link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. Alliance members recognize that the transatlantic link shouldn't rest solely on the military aspect, and recognise the importance of the OECD, the G7, the Atlantic Partnership Council and the OSCE as the means with which to strengthen transatlantic relations. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in

8

LQ

support of their common interests.

18. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO's daily work in both the political and military spheres, ensures that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to enhance their ability to realise their essential national security objectives. Membership in the Alliance enables states to rely on far smaller forces for their defence than were they standing alone. Conversely, the Alliance recognises that it possesses a major numerical supremacy to any non-Allied state

19. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other, contributes to overall stability within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions conducive to increased cooperation both among Alliance members and with others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance, together with other nations, are able to pursue the development of cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free.

## The Fundamental Tasks of the Alliance

20. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defence; an overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts favouring dialogue with other nations and the active search for a cooperative approach to European security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

21. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

9

II. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

IV. To serve as a forum for cooperation between Allies and Partners.

22. Other European institutions such as the EC EU, WEU and OSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four core security functions. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

23. In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above, member states confirm that the scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged.

# PART III -- A BROAD APPROACH TO SECURITY

## Protecting Peace in a New Europe

24. The Alliance has always sought to achieve its objectives of safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its members, and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, through both political and military means. This comprehensive approach remains the basis of the Alliance's security policy.

25. But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges facing the

10

LQ

Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy; dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.

26. The Alliance's active pursuit of dialogue and cooperation, underpinned by its commitment to an effective collective defence capability, seeks to reduce the risks of conflict arising out of misunderstanding or design; to build increased mutual understanding and confidence among all European states; to help manage crises affecting the security of the Allies; and to expand the opportunities for a genuine partnership among all European countries in dealing with common security problems.

27. In this regard, the Alliance's arms control and disarmament policy contributes both to dialogue and to cooperation with other nations, and thus will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Allies seek, through arms control and disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. Thus, the Alliance will continue to ensure that defence and arms control and disarmament objectives remain in harmony.

28. In fulfilling its fundamental objectives and core security functions, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. In this respect, it recognises the valuable contribution being made by other organizations such as the European Community Union and the OSCE Alliance, and that the roles of these institutions and of the Alliance are complementary.

## Dialogue

29. The new situation in Europe has multiplied the opportunities for dialogue on the part of the Alliance with the **Former** Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance has established regular diplomatic liaison and military contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as provided for in the London Declaration. **Since 1991** the Alliance **will have** further promoted dialogue **through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council**, the **Partnership for Peace agreements** and the **Atlantic Partnership Council**. **Regular diplomatic liaison**, including an **intensified exchange of views** and **information on security policy issues**. Through such means the Allies, individually and collectively, will seek to make full use of the unprecedented opportunities afforded by the growth of

11

freedom and democracy throughout Europe and encourage greater mutual understanding of respective security concerns, to increase transparency and predictability in security affairs, and thus to reinforce stability. The military can help to overcome the divisions of the past, not least through intensified military contacts and greater military transparency. The Alliance's pursuit of dialogue will provide a foundation for greater cooperation throughout Europe and the ability to resolve differences and conflicts by peaceful means.

## Cooperation

30. The Allies are also committed to pursue cooperation with all states in Europe on the basis of the principles set out in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. They will seek to develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all relevant fields of European security, with the aim, inter alia, of preventing crises or, should they arise, ensuring their effective management. Such partnership between the members of the Alliance and other nations in dealing with specific problems will be an essential factor in moving beyond past divisions towards one Europe whole and free. This policy of cooperation is the expression of the inseparability of security among European states. It is built upon a common recognition among Alliance members that the persistence of new political, economic or social divisions across the continent could lead to future instability, and such divisions must thus be diminished.

## COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

31. The political approach to security *will thus have* become—increasingly important **the primary focus of the Alliance's security policy.** Nonetheless, the military dimension remains essential. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain **central essential** to the Alliance's security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, is required in order to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance, **however unlikely this may be,** can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success. It is equally indispensable so that dialogue and co-operation can be undertaken with confidence and achieve their desired results.

## MANAGEMENT OF CRISIS AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

32. In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance's policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management

12

of crises affecting the security of its members. The Alliance is one of the instruments available for conflict prevention and resolution. The OSCE and the EU have developed mechanisms which are more suited in tackling risks to European security. At their meeting in Lisbon in December 1996, Heads of State and Government from OSCE participating states, reaffirmed the Organisation's key role in fostering security and stability, and they decided to further enhance its efficiency as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation capabilities. In 1992, the Alliance offered to support OSCE peacekeeping activities by making available its resources on a case by case basis. The Alliance reaffirms its willingness to contribute its resources as required and will jointly explore and develop with the OSCE the necessary modalities.

Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely and would be preceded by significant warning time. Though on a much smaller scale, the range and variety of other potential risks facing the Alliance Europe are less predictable than before.

33. In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an early stage. The OSCE and the European Union are the main instruments for the prevention of crises in Europe. The Alliance will lend its assistance by providing expertise and resources as required. The success of Alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the Alliance's political authorities choosing and co-ordinating appropriate crisis management measures, in consultation with the OSCE and the EU, as required from a range of political and other measures, including those in the military field. Close control by the political authorities of the Alliance will be applied from the outset and at all stages. Appropriate consultation and decision making procedures are essential to this end.

34. The potential of dialogue and co-operation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts since the Allies' security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. To this end, the Allies will support the role of the OSCE process OSCE and its institutions. The OSCE can develop into a primary instrument for conflict prevention and resolution in Europe. Other bodies including the European Community Union, Western European Union and United Nations may will also have an important role to play.

# PART IV - GUIDELINES FOR DEFENCE

## PRINCIPLES OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY

13

35. The diversity of challenges now facing the Alliance Europe thus requires a broad approach to security. The transformed political and strategic environment enables the Alliance to **make further changes to** a number of important features of its military strategy and to set out new guidelines, while reaffirming proven fundamental principles. At the London Summit, it was therefore agreed to prepare a new military strategy and a revised force posture responding to the changed circumstances.

36. Alliance strategy will continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles. The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence, and it does not consider itself to be anyone's adversary. **Furthermore the Alliance will never use its weapons first.** The Allies will further reduce their military strength to remove the strategic imbalance in key categories of conventional weaponry in its favour resulting from the reduction in the forces of the CIS states. **The Alliance will maintain military strength capability** adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and effective action by all of them and that the risks involved in initiating conflict would outweigh any foreseeable gains. The forces of the Allies must therefore be able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. The role of the Alliance's military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe.

37. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliance solidarity and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of the Alliance's objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of **North American US conventional and US nuclear forces** in Europe remains **vital important** to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. As the process of developing a European security identity and defence role progresses, and is reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, the European members of the Alliance will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the defence of Europe.

38. The collective nature of Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective

14

move away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defence
towards a reduced forward presence, and to modify the principle
of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear
weapons. The changes stemming from the new strategic environment
and the altered risks now facing the Alliance Europe enable
significant further modifications to be made in the missions of
the Allies' military forces and in their posture.

The Missions of Alliance Military Forces

41. The 1991 New Strategic Concept affirmed that the Alliance's military forces' is to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states, remains unchanged. This role, remains important, but this role must but it does not take account of the new strategic environment, in which a single massive and global threat does not exist has given way to diverse and multi-directional risks. The Alliance will concentrate instead on developing its ability to carry out new roles and missions relating to conflict prevention and crisis management. The success of the NATO-led mission in former Yugoslavia has demonstrated that the Allied military forces can become an important instrument for peace enforcement, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation in Europe. The Alliance will utilise military forces from non-Allied European countries by developing the operational modalities of the Combined Joint Task Forces. Alliance forces have different functions to perform in peace, crisis and war.

42. In peace, the role of Allied military forces is to guard against risks to the security of Alliance members; to contribute towards the maintenance of stability and balance in Europe; and to ensure that peace is preserved. They can contribute to dialogue and co-operation throughout Europe by their participation in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements. Through the Partnership for Peace programme Allied military forces have made a significant contribution towards improving confidence and understanding between Allied and non-Allied military forces. The Alliance is committed to enhance the PfP programme and its military forces will continue to support its activities. Allies could, further, be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions.

43. In the event of crises which might lead to a military threat to the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces can complement and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security, and thereby contribute to the management of such crises and their peaceful resolution. This requires that these forces have a capability for measured and

16

[L]

timely responses in such circumstances; the capability to deter action against any Ally and, in the event that aggression takes place, to respond to and repel it as well as to reestablish the territorial integrity of member states.

44. While in the new security environment a general war in Europe has become highly unlikely, it cannot finally be ruled out. The Alliance's military forces, which have as their fundamental mission to protect peace, have to provide the essential insurance against potential risks at the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and, should aggression occur, to restore peace. Hence the need for the capabilities and the appropriate mix of forces already described.

## Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture

45. To implement its security objectives and strategic principles in the new environment, the organization of the Allies' forces must be adapted to provide capabilities that can contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that affect the security of Alliance members, and preventing war, while retaining at all times the means to defend, if necessary, all Allied territory and to restore peace. The posture of Allies' forces will conform to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.

46. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's military forces will continue to reflect its strictly defensive nature and will be adapted accordingly to the new strategic environment including arms control agreements. This means in particular:

a. that the overall size of the Allies' forces, and in many cases their readiness, will be significantly reduced. The Alliance is prepared to take steps to this effect and will abide by this commitment irrespective of the number of new members that may join the Alliance in the future.

b. that the maintenance of a comprehensive in-place linear defensive posture in the central region will no longer be required. The peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including where necessary forward deployment of appropriate forces. Major forward deployment in the northern, southern and central regions is no longer required. Regional considerations and, in particular, geostrategic differences within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, including the shorter warning times to which the northern and southern regions will be subject compared with the central region and, in the southern region, the potential for instability and the military capabilities in the adjacent areas.

17

[LQ]

47. To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies' forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary. For these reasons:

a. Available forces will include, in a limited but militarily significant proportion, ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable. They will be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to deter a limited attack and, if required, to defend the territory of the Allies against attacks, particularly those launched without long warning time.

b. The forces of the Allies will be structured so as to permit their military capability to be built up when necessary. This ability to build up by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces, must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including the possibility - albeit unlikely, but one that prudence dictates should not be ruled out - of a major conflict. Consequently, capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within Europe and from North America will be of critical importance.

c. Appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and discriminately, will be developed to permit measured, flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime.

d. In the event of use of forces, including the deployment of reaction and other available reinforcing forces as an instrument of crisis management, the Alliance's political authorities will, as before, exercise close control over their employment at all stages. Existing procedures will be reviewed in the light of the new missions and posture of Alliance forces.

## Characteristics of Conventional Forces

48. It is essential that the Allies' military forces have a credible ability to fulfil their functions in peace, crisis and war in a way appropriate to the new security environment. This will be reflected in force and equipment levels; readiness and availability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up capabilities, all of which will be adjusted accordingly. The conventional forces of the Allies will include, in addition to immediate and rapid reaction forces, main

18

defence forces, which will provide the bulk of forces needed to
ensure the Alliance's territorial integrity and the unimpeded use
of their lines of communication; and augmentation forces, which
will provide a means of reinforcing existing forces in a
particular region. Main defence and augmentation forces will
comprise both active and mobilisable elements. **Major reductions**
**will be implemented in main defence forces.**

49. Ground, maritime and air forces will have to co-operate closely and combine and assist each other in operations aimed at achieving agreed objectives. These forces will consist of the following:

a. Ground forces, which are essential to hold or regain territory. The majority will normally be at lower states of readiness and, overall, there will be a greater reliance on mobilization and reserves. All categories of ground forces will require demonstrable combat effectiveness together with an appropriately enhanced capability for flexible deployment.

b. Maritime forces, which because of their inherent mobility, flexibility and endurance, make an important contribution to the Alliance's crisis response options. Their essential missions are to ensure sea control in order to safeguard the Allies' sea lines of communication, to support land and amphibious operations, and to protect the deployment of the Alliance's sea-based nuclear deterrent.

c. Air forces, whose ability to fulfil their fundamental roles in both independent air and combined operations - counter-air, air interdiction and offensive air support - as well as to contribute to surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warfare operations, is essential to the overall effectiveness of the Allies' military forces. Their role in supporting operations, on land and at sea, will require appropriate long-distance airlift and air refuelling capabilities. Air defence forces, including modern air command and control systems, are required to ensure a secure air defence environment.

50. In light of the potential risks it poses, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction should be given special consideration. Solution of this problem will require complementary approaches including, for example, export control and missile defences. non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament measures.

51. Alliance strategy is not dependent on a chemical warfare capability. The Allies remain committed to the earliest possible achievement of a global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable ban on all chemical weapons. But, even after implementation of a global ban, precautions of a purely defensive

19

nature will need to be maintained.

52. In the new security environment and given the reduced overall force levels in future, the ability to work closely together, which will facilitate the cost effective use of Alliance resources, will be particularly important for the achievement of the missions of the Allies' forces. The Alliance's collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure, including multinational forces, plays the key role, will be essential in this regard. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence. Allies' efforts to achieve maximum co-operation will be based on the common guidelines for defence defined above. Practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary mutual transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity and the Alliance. The development of the CJTF concept is an important development which will enhance the ability of the Alliance to perform its functions.

53. In order to be able to respond flexibly to a wide range of possible contingencies, the Allies concerned will require effective surveillance and intelligence, flexible command and control, mobility within and between regions, and appropriate logistics capabilities, including transport capacities. Logistic stocks must be sufficient to sustain all types of forces in order to permit effective defence until resupply is available. The capability of the Allies concerned to build-up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level appropriate to any risk to Alliance security, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This capability will include the ability to reinforce any area at risk within the territory of the Allies and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Elements of all three force categories will be capable of being employed flexibly as part of both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. Proper use of these capabilities will require control of the necessary lines of communication as well as appropriate support and exercise arrangements. Civil resources will be of increasing relevance in this context.

54. For the Allies concerned, collective defence arrangements will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO. Multinational forces demonstrate the Alliance's resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the European pillar. Multinational forces, and in particular reaction forces, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying

20

more capable formations than might be available purely
nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce
defence resources. This may include a highly integrated,
multinational approach to specific tasks and functions.

Characteristics of Nuclear Forces

55. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option.

Nuclear deterrence is not an infallible system and is particularly unsuited to the real world environment of irrational actors at the leadership level and simple human and technical error. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies from nuclear attack will be the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies but also to the global instability brought about by the existence of these weapons. In an environment of no-political threat and vastly reduced military threats it is the existence of the weapons themselves that presents the greatest threat.

56. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue **no longer** require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. These military structures were not needed in the first twenty years of the Alliance. They were largely created and implemented after 1967 and are not needed in the new security environment. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.

57. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including conventional force levels in Europe maintained in relative balance and increased reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through

21

diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount
a successful conventional defence will significantly improve.
The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have
to be contemplated by them are therefore even more remote. They
can therefore eliminate their remaining significantly reduce
their sub-strategic nuclear forces. They will maintain adequate
sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an
essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the
trans-Atlantic link. These will consist solely of dual-capable
aircraft which could, if necessary, be supplemented by offshore
systems. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be
deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack
submarines. There is no requirement for nuclear artillery or
ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles and they will be
eliminated.

PART V - CONCLUSION

58. This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance's security policy is based on dialogue; co-operation; and effective collective defence as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use of the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order.

59. The Allies will continue to pursue vigorously further progress in arms control and confidence-building measures with the objective of enhancing security and stability. They will also play an active part in promoting dialogue and co-operation between states on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Paris Charter.

60. NATO's strategy will retain the flexibility to reflect further developments in the politico-military environment, including progress in the moves towards a European security identity, and in any changes in the risks to Alliance security. For the Allies concerned, the Strategic Concept will form the basis for the further development of the Alliance's defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence planning arrangements.

22