**BONN:** Met with Ambassador Lodge, Foreign Minister Brandt, and Parliamentary State Secretary of Defense Adorno.

West Germany is deeply concerned over the nuclear non-proliferation treaty insofar as this would prevent acquisition of purely defensive nuclear weapons either by West Germany or, especially, by any future confederation of Western European countries. They have reservations over the ability of Euratom to do an adequate job of inspection. Needless to say, the Czechoslovakian incident has confirmed their fears and suspicions over previous U. S. talk about a detente between the East and the West, and as proof that the Soviet's signature on the non-proliferation treaty would be meaningless.

**LEBANON:** Met with Ambassador Porter and Foreign Minister Haj Hussein Oweini (who is also Minister of Defense).

Of the Arab states, Lebanon is undoubtedly the most temperate with respect to the crisis in the Middle East. This is partly due to the fact that its population is approximately evenly divided between Muslim and Christian, with both represented in the government and both working together amiably; partly due to the fact that its influence in finance and trade among the Arab states is very great, and its leaders realize how disastrous a war can be to the economies of these states; and partly due to the fact that its leaders are strong enough to wield power without having to resort to belligerant talk. At the same time, the Muslims are sympathetic with the plight of the Arab refugees, concerned over the future of Jerusalem, and very much opposed to what they term "Zionist expansionism" in the form of holding territory acquired during the 6-day war. To the extent that Israel can persuade them that she is not going to be under the influence of "expansionists", good relations with Lebanon are not only possible, but probable.

Israel: Met with Ambassador Barbour, Prime Minister Eshkol, and Foreign Minister Eban.

As with any country, the number one concern is security. The leadership is not "expansionist", and any territory seized during the 6-day war will only be held to the extent and for as long as deemed essential for security. Because of the pull-out of United Nations peacekeeping forces from Gaza before the 6-day war, which Israel feels represented capitulation to Egyptian threats, the security of Israel will not be entrusted to the United Nations. Demilitarization of all, or most of, the West Bank of the Jordan River is seen as a real, short-range possibility -- especially in view of King Hussein's reported views expressing a willingness to consider neutralization of this area. But the real problem is Egypt, and there will not be any pull-back from the Sinai peninsula until Israel is assured of use of the Suez canal and has a peace commitment from Egypt. Even then, I would guess that she will require sufficient military hardware to provide a deterrent against a future Egyptian attack -- certainly as long as the Soviet Union continues to build up Egyptian strength and Nasser persists in making belligerent statements. The situation is dangerous, but we would make a mistake by thinking it is so critical as to cause Israel to lay herself open to being thrown into the sea.

India: Met with Ambassador Bowles, Agriculture Director for AID Olson, Agricultural Attache Boulware, and GOI Deputy Secretary for Agriculture Mathur and Agriculture Member of Planning Commission Venkatappiah.

Compared to food grain production of 75 million tons in fiscal 1967, the estimated production of around 100 million for fiscal 1968 and 97 million for fiscal 1969 demonstrates the dramatic progress India is making. My estimate of two years ago that India would become self-sufficient in food grains by the early 1970s is being borne out. Nevertheless, continued shipments of Food for Peace grain are indicated -- though in steadily reducing amounts -- to enable the central government to maintain buffer stocks needed for price stability and for reserve against monsoon deficiencies.

Pakistan: Met with Ambassador Oehlert, West Pakistan Secretary of Agriculture Khan, Foreign Secretary Yusuf, and members of central government planning commission.

Pakistan is moving towards self-sufficiency even faster than India. In fact, for fiscal 1969 they expect to have a small surplus in wheat in West Pakistan, though some deficiency in East Pakistan, with a net deficiency of around 400 million tons needed from us under Food for Peace. They may well need no wheat from us next year. However, it appears there may be a deficiency in East Pakistan of 500,000 tons of rice, which would be requested under Food for Peace.

Australia: Met with Ambassador Crook, Minister for Primary Industries Anthony, Interior Minister Nixon, and members of Australian Meat Board.

Although one abbatoir was decertified several months ago, they are not having any problem meeting our standards. They recognize that we have a meat import problem, and they naturally do not wish to have their exports to the United States reduced. But their main concern is that their percentage of whatever market is available not be reduced in favor of other countries. They feel that with the United States enjoying a favorable balance of trade and with their military commitment to South Vietnam, they are in a strong position to request this consideration.

New Zealand: Met with Ambassador Henning, Prime Minister Holyoake, Deputy PM Marshall (who is also Minister for Overseas Trade), Under-Secretary of Agriculture Carter, and members of the New Zealand Meat Board.

They are having a little more of a problem meeting our standards, but moving along satisfactorily. They feel like Australia on the meat export to the United States situation. Additionally, they believe they should have a larger share of any dairy import market into the United States because they are the only country not subsidizing their dairy exports -- although they understand that we have a dairy import problem. The point is that they are also sharing some of the burden in Vietnam and not using non-tariff barriers and should be given some preferential treatment.

Korea: Met with their Minister of Defense and top U. S. and Korean military leaders,

They are absolutely no indication on the part of North Korea to change its policy of communizing South Korea -- either by direct military attack, by guerilla operations, or both. Just before I was there, some fifty guerillas were reported to have landed along the eastern coast, and the last report indicated that most of them had been eliminated or captured. It appears likely that these incursions will increase, and, if they do, it will become increasingly difficult to persuade the South Koreans to refrain from retaliation with a view to persuading North Korea to leave their country alone.¹

Thailand: Met with Ambassador Unger, all of our Air Force base commanders, and several of our military advisers,

The Thais have over 7,000 troops in South Vietnam now, and they are very strong allies. They are deeply disturbed by the halt in our bombing of North Vietnam, especially in view of what they regard as North Vietnam's continued policy of military aggression -- both in South Vietnam and through occasional guerilla raids in Thailand. When and if there is a settlement of the war in South Vietnam, they believe Laos and Thailand should be included to make sure that North Vietnamese military activity is not thereupon re-directed towards them.

South Vietnam: Met with all of our major Air Force commanders, General Abrams, Ambassador Bunker, and AID Director McDonald.

I am satisfied that, with the authority given General Abrams, there is no undue jeopardy to the security of our troops and those of our allies as a result of the bombing halt. The long-range implications are serious, because interdiction of the supply routes through North Vietnam, which was becoming increasingly effective, has been stopped. However, it has become increasingly evident that the diplomatic side of the bombing halt was not satisfactorily worked out. Apparently our policy was to stop the bombing because North Vietnam "understood" our position that there was to be a "your side - our side" arrangement for the Paris negotiations; also that we were continuing air reconnaissance over North Vietnam. But, because of what can, at best, be termed overeagerness to get the Paris negotiations underway, our leadership failed to appreciate that an "understanding" of our position by the Communist leaders of North Vietnam is not the same as an "agreement." The resulting game of musical chairs in Paris, while frustrating, should not be blamed on South Vietnam, which is steadfastly maintaining the very position we have always maintained, namely, that the NLF is not a bona fide civil war organization, but merely a political and military arm of Hanoi.

Some of you will recall my press release of October 25 in which I warned that the Administration may be falling into a trap which would undercut the legality of our presence in South Vietnam. This followed from a press report that President Thieu had rejected the idea of official representation of the NLF at any peace negotiations. I pointed out then the danger of giving recognition to the claim that this is a civil war, for under no interpretation of the SEATO Treaty can the U. S. intervene in a civil war.

Under these circumstances I believe it would be most shortsighted for the U. S. to seek to bring pressure on the leaders of South Vietnam to move away from the very policy we, ourselves, have so long maintained. And to bring this pressure into the open by reckless public statements only causes greater consternation -- not only among the South Vietnamese, but among our other allies -- and increasing boldness and optimism on the part of Hanoi.

I might add that all of this is not lost on many of our men who are fighting in South Vietnam, who are pessimistic over the strategy being employed to end the war soon -- on an honorable basis.