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R 0810392 OCT 87

FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1276

UNCLASS SECTION 01 OF 07 BEIJING 28358

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, CH, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY)

SUBJECT: DR. KISSINGER'S SEPTEMBER 3 SPEECH

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SPEECH GIVEN BY DR. KISSINGER AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE ON SEPTEMBER 3. WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL REQUESTS FOR TEXTS OF THE SPEECH, BUT WE WOULD LIKE DR. KISSINGER'S APPROVAL OF THE TEXT BEFORE WE RELEASE IT. WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF EAP/CM COULD PASS THE SPEECH TO DR. KISSINGER FOR HIS COMMENTS/CLEARANCE PRIOR TO RELEASE. PLEASE NOTIFY US OF ANY CHANGES THAT HE MAKES IN THE TEXT. FYI - THE SPEECH TEXT WAS TRANSCRIBED FROM A TAPE OF POOR QUALITY PROVIDED BY THE CHINESE HOST, AND THIS SHOULD BE EXPLAINED TO DR. KISSINGER.

2. BEGIN TEXT: IT IS A GREAT HONOR FOR ME TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK IN THE HALL. SOME FIFTEEN YEARS AGO, ON A VISIT TO CHINA, I WAS INVITED TO ATTEND A PERFORMANCE OF THE OPERA HERE IN THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE ON ONE OF MY VERY EARLY VISITS. I BELIEVE IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT A CHINESE AUDIENCE WOULD SEEN AN AMERICAN SINCE THE INTERRUPTION OF OUR RELATIONSHIP AND IT CERTAINLY WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT I HAD SEEN A CHINESE AUDIENCE, AND IT WAS A VERY MOVING OCCASION.

3. FOR THE EMOTIONAL BALANCE OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AND THE MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY WHO ARE HERE, I WOULD LIKE TO TELL OUR CHINESE FRIENDS THAT I SPEAK HERE A PRIVATE CITIZEN AND NOT AS AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES. THERE MAY, THEREFORE, BE OCCASIONAL NUANCES OF DIFFERENCE, BUT OF COURSE I SUPPORT THE MAIN LINES OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

4. I WILL SPEAK TO YOU FOR SOME PERIOD ABOUT TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AS I SEE THEM, AND THEN I WOULD BE GLAD TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS. I WANT TO TALK TO YOU PRIMARILY ABOUT THREE TOPICS: THE BASIC PROBLEMS CONFRONTING AMERICAN POLICYMAKERS AND SOME REFERENCE TO THE SITUATION AT THIS MOMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF; SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AS I SEE THEM; AND SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS AT THIS MOMENT.

5. FIRST, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. WHEN I TRAVEL AROUND THE WORLD, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IS USUALLY ANALYZED IN TERMS OF VERY LONG-RANGE CONSIDERATIONS, VERY COMPLICATED DESIGNS AND VERY PRECISE PURPOSES.

BEIJIN 28358 01 OF 07 081107Z

AND THAT IS CERTAINLY THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BEIJING UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF MY OLD FRIEND WINSTON LORD. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND, ESPECIALLY IN A COUNTRY WITH A HISTORY OF OVER 2,000 YEARS, THAT AMERICA IS A VERY YOUNG COUNTRY. THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IS SHORTER THAN THE HISTORY OF MOST INDIVIDUAL CHINESE DYNASTIES. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IS EVEN SHORTER THAN THAT. THE UNITED STATES DID NOT REALLY BECOME INVOLVED IN WORLD AFFAIRS UNTIL THE END OF WORLD WAR II. AND AFTER THAT, THE UNITED STATES DID NOT HAVE TO CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICY IN ANY NORMAL WAY FOR

ANOTHER TWENTY YEARS. IN 1949, WHEN THE UNITED STATES FIRST COMMITTED ITSELF TO A PERMANENT ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE UNITED STATES HAD 52 PERCENT OF THE WORLD'S GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT. WE PRODUCED MORE OF ALL THE GOODS AND SERVICES THAN ALL THE REST OF THE WORLD COMBINED. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, FOREIGN POLICY BECAME A PROBLEM OF ALLOCATING RESOURCES TO PROBLEMS THAT WERE RECOGNIZED AS PROBLEMS.

6. IT WAS NOT FOR TWENTY MORE YEARS THAT THE UNITED STATES CAME UP AGAINST THE REALITY THAT IS CHARACTERISTIC OF ALL OTHER NATIONS, NAMELY THAT YOU HAVE TO MAKE FOREIGN POLICY ON THE BASIS OF ASSESSMENTS THAT YOU CANNOT PROVE TRUE WHEN YOU MAKE THEM. YOU HAVE TO FORM A PERCEPTION ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND THE LIKELY COURSE OF EVENTS THAT ONLY LATER EXPERIENCE CAN PROVE CORRECT OR INCORRECT. I MUST SAY ONE OF THE REASONS THAT I HAVE ALWAYS ENJOYED CONVERSATIONS WITH CHINESE LEADERS IS BECAUSE IN THE THOUSANDS OF YEARS OF CHINESE HISTORY, THIS UNDERSTANDING HAS BECOME SECOND NATURE. THE MOST SOPHISTICATED ANALYSES OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS THAT I HAVE HEARD ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD, I HAVE HEARD IN

5626 EAP0911

HK Finally
shayed distri-
bution on this.
She'd go in
pub. Statements.
Make dupe for
DC files.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1277

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 07 BEIJING 28358

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM

.0. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, CH, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY)
SUBJECT: DR. KISSINGER'S SEPTEMBER 3 SPEECH

BEIJING FROM MY CHINESE COUNTERPARTS. THAT IS NOT THE NATURAL CONDITION IN THE UNITED STATES. FOR THE UNITED STATES THE POST-WAR PERIOD HAS BEEN A LEARNING PROCESS. MOST AMERICANS BELIEVED AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD WITHDRAW FROM INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS INTO ISOLATION. MOST AMERICANS HOPED THAT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. THE IDEA THAT THE UNITED STATES IS LOOKING FOR INVOLVEMENT AROUND THE WORLD IS TOTALLY CONTRARY TO THE AMERICAN REALITY. THE TRUTH IS THAT IN THE AMERICAN PERCEPTION, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, IT WAS THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF THE SOVIET UNION THAT TRIGGERED US INTO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND THE NOSTALGIA OF AMERICANS IS THAT A MOMENT MIGHT COME IN WHICH WE CAN AGAIN WITHDRAW FROM WORLD AFFAIRS. THOSE OF YOU WHO FOLLOW THE AMERICAN DOMESTIC DEBATE WILL KNOW THAT MUCH OF THE ANALYSIS IS IN TERMS OF COMPARING RELATIONS AMONG NATIONS TO RELATIONS AMONG PEOPLE. THERE IS ALWAYS THE EXPECTATION THAT PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED BY CONVERSION, THAT IS TO SAY THAT OUR OPPONENTS WILL SUDDENLY CHANGE THEIR MINDS AND THE NEED FOR CONTINUAL EFFORT DISAPPEARS.

7. THE HARDEST PROBLEM FOR AMERICAN LEADERS IN EVERY ADMINISTRATION IS FIRST TO LEARN THEMSELVES AND THEN TO EDUCATE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO THE PROPOSITION THAT THERE ARE FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, DOMESTIC STRUCTURE, NATIONAL VALUE CREATE A FRAMEWORK WHICH DOES NOT GIVE AN UNLIMITED SCOPE TO THE DESIRES OF INDIVIDUAL LEADERS. IT IS FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW, INCIDENTALLY -- AND I WILL RETURN TO IT -- THAT SINO-UNITED STATES RELATIONS ARE SO INTERESTING AND IMPORTANT AND SO HOPEFUL.

8. I HAD THE GREAT PRIVILEGE, IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT NIXON, TO BE THE FIRST AMERICAN DIPLOMAT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE CHINESE LEADERS. BUT SINO-U.S. RELATIONS ARE NOT BASED ON INDIVIDUAL ACHIEVEMENTS. FOUR PRESIDENTS OF TWO DIFFERENT PARTIES, INCLUDING PRESIDENTS WHOSE ORIGINAL ENTHUSIASM FOR CHINA WAS VERY SEVERELY LIMITED, LIKE PRESIDENT REAGAN -- EVERY ONE OF THEM HAS COME TO THE SAME CONCLUSION: THAT U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS ARE A KEY ELEMENT IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

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9. THAT IS HIGHLY UNUSUAL IN AMERICA. IN AMERICA THERE IS A TEMPTATION TO BELIEVE THAT EVERY FOUR YEARS WHEN WE CHANGE OUR PRESIDENT -- OR EIGHT YEARS, DEPENDING ON THE SITUATION -- YOU CAN HAVE A TOTAL REASSESSMENT OF EVERY ASPECT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. IT IS A VERY INTERESTING PHENOMENON THAT NEXT YEAR WHEN WE HAVE THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN THERE IS EVERY HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE NO DEBATE OF OUR SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. BUT THE FACT IS THAT IN THE UNITED STATES THERE IS A FREQUENT OSCILLATION BETWEEN EXCESSES OF FRIENDLINESS TO CERTAIN COUNTRIES AND EXCESSES OF HOSTILITY. THERE IS TOO MUCH OF THE BELIEF THAT THE BALANCE OF POWER DOES NOT APPLY TO THE UNITED STATES, THAT WE CAN CONDUCT OUR RELATIONS ON A DIFFERENT AND MORE ELEVATED LEVEL. AND SO THE DEBATE ON FOREIGN POLICY IS ENDLESS. WHAT AMERICA WAS TO LEARN - WHAT AMERICA IS IN THE PROCESS OF LEARNING - IS THAT THERE ARE PERMANENT REALITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SUCH AS MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWER AND THE NEED TO ACT BEFORE A DANGER IS OVERWHELMING. IT IS A DIFFICULT PROCESS.

10. I MENTION IT BECAUSE WITH ALL THE CRITICISMS THAT ARE OFTEN MADE OF THE UNITED STATES ONE HAS TO REMEMBER THAT IF, AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II AND FOR FORTY YEARS AFTERWARDS, THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT ENGAGED ITSELF AROUND THE WORLD, WHAT WAS CALLED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE "THE HEGEMONY OF MORE PROGRESSIVE COUNTRIES" WOULD SURELY HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. AND IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT WITHOUT AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN THE WORLD WOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN SLOWER THAN IT HAS IN FACT BEEN.

11. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT ALL THE PROBLEMS ARE EVEN CLOSE TO BEING SOLVED. BUT I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THREAD. NOW IN THIS CONTEXT LET ME MAKE A FEW OBSERVATIONS

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UNCLASS SECTION 03 OF 07 BEIJING 28358

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12356: N/A

ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

12. IN THE PERSIAN GULF WE FACE TWO REALITIES. THE FIRST REALITY IS THAT FOR CENTURIES THERE HAS BEEN RUSSIAN EXPANSIONISM INTO THAT AREA UNDER BOTH CZARS AND COMMISSARS. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BROUGHT PRESSURE ON THE ADJOINING COUNTRIES, FIRST ABSORBING THE MOSLEM PRINCIPALITIES IN CENTRAL ASIA, AND THEN AIMING PRIMARILY FOR AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO REACH WARM WATER PORTS. THAT IS ONE REALITY. AND HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR GREAT BRITAIN'S COUNTERPOINT, IRAN WOULD PROBABLY HAVE GONE THE WAY THE OF OTHER ASIAN PRINCIPALITIES IN THE LAST CENTURY.

13. THE SECOND REALITY IS THE CONFLICT WITHIN THE MOSLEM WORLD BETWEEN THE MODERATE SECULAR AND THE FUNDAMENTALIST RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS. AT THIS MOMENT IRAN IS GOVERNED BY A FUNDAMENTALIST RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. IT'S STRATEGY IS TO UNDERMINE ALL OF THE REGIMES OF A MODERATE NATURE IN THAT AREA AND TO SEEK TO BRING ABOUT AN UPHEAVAL THAT WOULD HAVE PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES, NOT ONLY FOR THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE BUT ALSO FOR THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD. IT WOULD TRULY BRING ABOUT A RAPID RISE IN OIL PRICES WHICH, THE LAST "ME I OCCURRED, BROUGHT ABOUT A WORLD ECONOMIC RECESSION. IT WOULD AFFECT EVERY COUNTRY, INCLUDING THOSE FAR AWAY, AND ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO ARE INTERESTED IN RAPID DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION.

14. SO WE ACE A PARADOX IN THE PERSIAN GULF. FROM THE SHORT RANGE POINT OF VIEW, IT IS AGAINST EVERYBODY'S INTEREST THAT IRAN WIN THE WAR. FROM THE LONG RANGE POINT OF VIEW IT IS AGAINST EVERYBODY'S INTEREST THAT IRAN SHOULD BE SO WEAKENED THAT IT BECOMES A VICTIM OF ITS HISTORICAL ADVERSARY. IT IS A SEEMING CONTRADICTION. IN THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, IT IS MY VIEW THAT IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF WORLD PEACE THAT NEITHER SIDE WINS. IF EITHER COUNTRY EMERGES AS THE VICTOR, IT WILL SEEK TO BRING ABOUT AN UPHEAVAL IN THE AREA. THE BEST OUTCOME WOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE, AND THIS IS WHAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ATTEMPTED TO DO AND IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION, DO NOT DIFFER WITH THAT ASSESSMENT EVEN IF THEY DIFFER WITH THE METHODS BY WHICH IT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED.

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15. AT THE SAME TIME I HAVE GREAT SYMPATHY WITH EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN INFLUENCE IN IRAN. IRAN IS THE STRONGEST COUNTRY IN THE AREA. IT IS HISTORICALLY AND GEOPOLITICALLY AT THE JUNCTURE WHERE HISTORIC RUSSIAN EXPANSIONISM HAS OPERATED, AND I DO NOT THINK IT IS AGAINST THE INTEREST OF WORLD PEACE FOR OTHER COUNTRIES TO MAINTAIN SOME INFLUENCE IN IRAN. INDEED, I BELIEVE IT IS IN THE AMERICAN INTEREST AT SOME POINT TO ESTABLISH BETTER RELATIONS WITH IRAN, EVEN THOUGH THE METHODS THAT WERE CHOSEN TWO YEARS AGO TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WERE NOT THE IDEAL ONES. AND I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

16. NOW AT THIS MOMENT THE UNITED STATES IS ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT OF ESCORTING SHIPS IN THE PERSIAN GULF. SINCE THIS IS A GROUP THAT IS STUDYING INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND SINCE MY VANITY DOES NOT PERMIT ME TO ADMIT THAT NOBODY HERE HAS READ MY ARTICLES, I ASSUME THAT THERE MAY BE TWO OR THREE PEOPLE IN THIS ROOM WHO KNOW THAT I HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE VISION OF THAT POLICY. HOWEVER, NOW THAT THAT POLICY HAS BEEN ADOPTED, IT WOULD BE A VERY DANGEROUS MISTAKE FOR IT TO FAIL. AND NOW THAT WE ARE ENGAGED IN THIS PROCESS IT CANNOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF ANY COUNTRY TO MAKE THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES MORE DIFFICULT. AT THIS POINT THE BEST WAY OUT OF THIS SITUATION IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

AND SPECIAL CARE MUST BE TAKEN THAT ARMS OF FRIENDLY NATIONS NOT BE USED IN WHAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WILL PERCEIVE AS BEING AIMED AT AMERICANS.

17. FUNDAMENTALLY, IN THE GOVERNMENT WE MUST NOT LET LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES BE CONFUSED. IN THE SHORT TERM WE WANT NEITHER SIDE TO WIN. IN THE

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R 081039Z OCT 87 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1279

UNCLASS SECTION 04 OF 07 BEIJING 28358

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM

CORRECTED COPY FOR PARA 17 AND 18

E.O. 12356: N/A

LONG TERM WE MUST ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE BY METHODS THAT WOULD NOT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE SOME INFLUENCE IN WHAT IS, IN TERMS OF POPULATION AND RESOURCES, A KEY COUNTRY IN THE AREA - NAMELY, IRAN. WE CANNOT PAY THE PRICE OF LETTING THE MODERATE GOVERNMENTS BE DESTROYED. AND IRAN MUST ALSO KNOW THAT ONCE IT IS WILLING TO LIVE WITHIN ITS HISTORIC BORDERS, THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH IT AND OTHER COUNTRIES WILL HELP IN THIS PROCESS. AND FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW, I BELIEVE FROM THE LONG-RANGE POINT OF VIEW, THAT CHINA IS A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE TO PLAY.

18. NOW LET ME TURN TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES POINT. FOR THE UNITED STATES TO DEAL WITH A MAJOR COUNTRY LIKE THE SOVIET UNION, OF A DIFFERENT IDEOLOGY, ON A PERMANENT BASIS IS AN ABSOLUTELY UNPRECEDENTED EXPERIENCE. THE UNITED STATES NEVER IN ITS HISTORY HAD FELT THREATENED FROM ANOTHER COUNTRY. THE UNITED STATES HAD NEVER HAD TO DEAL PERMANENTLY WITH AN IDEOLOGICAL ADVERSARY. AND THEREFORE THE UNITED STATES HAS OSCILLATED BETWEEN ASSUMING THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS BECOME OUR DEFINITION OF NOTION, WHICH MEANS LIKE ALL OTHER COUNTRIES THAT WE KNEW, OR AS IF IT HAD BEEN - AS IF IT WERE - THE INCARNATION OF EVIL. TIME AND AGAIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS HAVE BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD ESTABLISH A PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SOVIET LEADERS THAT WOULD CHANGE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. THEY DID THIS IN THE 40'S, DURING WORLD WAR II. THEY DID THIS IN THE 50'S WHEN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER MET KRUSHCHEV AND BULGANIN. THEY DID IT IN EVERY DECADE, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF PRESIDENT NIXON. AND I READ IN THE NEWSPAPERS THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS GREAT HOPES THAT HE CAN SHOW MR. GORBACHEV THE SWIMMING POOLS THAT AMERICAN WORKERS HAVE IN ORDER TO CHANGE HIS ATTITUDE. IN MY VIEW, THE RELATION IS MUCH MORE COMPLICATED.

19. FIRST, IF YOU LOOK AT RUSSIAN HISTORY, THE FACT IS THAT FOR 400 YEARS RUSSIA HAS EXPANDED INTO EVERY DIRECTION. THAT HAS BEEN A FACT OF LIFE FOR WHICH THERE CAN BE MANY EXPLANATIONS, NONE OF WHICH CHANGED THE REALITY.

20. SECONDLY, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM AND THE

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SOVIET IDEOLOGY IS ONE THAT IS QUITE CONTRARY TO THAT OF THE UNITED STATES. AND THE LAST THING A SOVIET LEADER CAN DO IS TO SEEK TO CONVINCE THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO THAT BECAUSE HE HAS MET A VERY CHARMING PRESIDENT, THEY SHOULD MAKE CONCESSIONS THAT OTHERWISE HAD NOT BEEN CONSIDERED. IF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ARE TO BE IMPROVED, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE CAUSES OF THE TENSIONS BE DEALT WITH AND NOT THE PERSONALITIES OF THE INDIVIDUALS THAT LEAD THE SOVIET UNION.

21. NOW AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT THERE IS A GREAT OF DISCUSSION ABOUT "GLASNOST" AND ABOUT WHETHER THE SOVIET SYSTEM IS CHANGING. I WOULD RAISE MORE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS. ASSUMING THE SOVIET SYSTEM CHANGES, DOES THAT BY ITSELF BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICY AND DOES IT BY ITSELF INDICATE A BEGINNING OF A MORE PEACEFUL PERIOD? IS IT THE DOMESTIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION THAT CONCERNS US OR ITS FOREIGN POLICY? GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV HAS, WITHOUT ANY QUESTION, ANALYZED IN A VERY SUBSTANTIAL MANNER THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM: THE STAGNATION OF ITS GOVERNMENTAL APPARATUS, THE RIGIDITY OF ITS ECONOMY, ITS TECHNOLOGICAL BACKWARDNESS. HE HAS PROPOSED A NUMBER OF REMEDIAL MEASURES. IN THIS COUNTRY YOU KNOW HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO CHANGE THE EMPHASIS FROM CENTRAL PLANNING TO MORE DIFFERENTIATED METHODS OF ECONOMIC PLANNING. I BELIEVE THE PROBLEM IN THE SOVIET UNION IS INFINITELY MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT IS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

22. IN THE SOVIET UNION YOU HAVE HUGE BUREAUCRACIES WITH A VESTED INTEREST IN CENTRAL PLANNING AND THESE HUGE BUREAUCRACIES ARE INTIMATELY TIED TO A GOVERNMENTAL BODY THAT SEES ITS PRIMARY ROLE IN THE SUPERVISION OF ECONOMIC PLANNING. IT WILL THEREFORE BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO CHANGE.

23. SECONDLY, CHINA IS A CULTURALLY HOMOGENEOUS

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1280

UNCLASS SECTION 05 OF 07 BEIJING 28358

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12356: N/A

COUNTRY. THE SOVIET UNION IS AN EMPIRE COMPOSED OF
MANY NATIONALITIES AND THEREFORE DECENTRALIZATION CAN
HAVE MANY UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES.

24. THIRD, IN THE SOVIET UNION THE MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT PLAYS AN EXTRAORDINARY ROCE AND IT IS
VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW ITS PRIORITIES CAN EASILY
BE CHANGED, ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY ARE NEEDED TO
SUPPORT THE LEADERSHIP IN ITS DOMESTIC STRUGGLE
AGAINST THE CENTRAL PLANNING METHODS. SO I DO NOT
KNOW WHETHER GLASNOST WILL SUCCEED. BUT THAT IS NOT
MY PROBLEM. THAT IS MR. GORBACHEV'S PROBLEM.

25. I WANT TO RAISE A MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION. FOR THE UNITED STATES, THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM IS NOT WHAT HAPPENS IN THE SOVIET UNION INTERNALLY, BUT WHAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES IN THE CONDUCT OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY. IT IS NOT THE DUTY OF THE UNITED STATE TO BRING ABOUT DOMESTIC REFORM ALL OVER THE WORLD, SINCE WE HAVE TROUBLE ENOUGH HANDLING OUR OWN DOMESTIC SITUATION. IT IS THE DUTY OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF ITS POWER, TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND STABILITY.

26. A FEW WEEKS AGO I SPOKE, AFTER A TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION, AT THE NEW YORK COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. AND I SAID, "THERE ARE 'NO DANGERS IN THE GORBACHEV PROGRAM. DANGER ONE IS THAT IT SUCCEEDS AND DANGER TWO IS THAT IT FAILS." IF IT SUCCEEDS, THE SOVIET UNION WILL BECOME STRONGER. AND A STRONG SOVIET UNION IS NOT, TO ME, SELF-EVIDENTLY AN UNALLOYED BLESSING UNLESS IT CHANGES IT'S FOREIGN POLICY.

27. BUT IF IT FAILS, THERE WILL BE A GREAT IMPATIENCE TO USE THE BLUNT BRANCH OF ACTIVITY IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN UNDOUBTEDLY SUCCESSFUL - NAMELY, THE MILITARY THEATER - TO IMPROVE ITS SECURITY SITUATION IN SOME DIRECTION BEFORE IT'S ECONOMY BECOMES HOPELESSLY OUTCLASSED. NOW, WHETHER THAT EFFORT WILL BE MADE IN THE WEST, OR IN THE EAST, OR IN THE SOUTH IS SOMETHING THAT I HAVE ENDLESSLY DISCUSSED WITH FOREIGN FRIENDS, INCLUDING CHINA, AND I WOULD NOT CHOOSE TO MAKE A PREDICTION. ALL I'M SAYING IS THAT THAT PROBLEM EXISTS. FROM THIS I DRAW THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS.

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28. FIRST, WE CANNOT, IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION, RELY ON THE PERSONAL ATTITUDES OF INDIVIDUAL LEADERS OR ENGAGE IN INTERNAL POLITICS IN WHICH WE SAY WE WANT TO STRENGTHEN ONE GROUP AGAINST ANOTHER.

29. SECONDLY, THE CAUSES OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION ARE VERY CONCRETE. I HAVE GREAT SYMPATHY FOR THE WAY THE CHINESE SIDE HAS PUT FORWARD ITS VIEWS. THEY HAVE STATED THAT THERE ARE THREE OBSTACLES: KAMPUCHEA, AFGHANISTAN AND SOVIET TROOPS ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER. AS AN AMERICAN, I WOULD HAVE MY REASONS, WHICH INCLUDES THE POINTS THAT THE CHINESE HAVE RAISED. IF THERE IS TO BE A PERMANENT IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS, SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS MUST BE SOLVED. AND I WOULD SAY THAT IF THEY ARE NOT SOLVED NOW, WHEN ARE WE GOING TO SOLVE THEM? IF THEY CANNOT BE NEGOTIATED WHEN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS FACING A HUGE DOMESTIC CRISIS, WHEN CAN THEY BE NEGOTIABLE?

30. THIRD, THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF DISCUSSION ABOUT ARMS CONTROL. THAT IS A SUBJECT THAT HAS BECOME SO ABSTRACT AND SO ESOTERIC THAT THE FEWEST PEOPLE UNDERSTAND IT. IN THE 19TH CENTURY THERE WAS AN ISSUE CALLED THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN CRISIS, ABOUT WHICH THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY LORD PALMERSTON SAID, "ONLY THREE PEOPLE HAVE EVER UNDERSTOOD IT." ONE WAS DEAD, THE SECOND WAS IN A LUNATIC ASYLUM, AND HE WAS THE THIRD AND HE HAD FORGOTTEN. ARMS CONTROL IS RUNNING THE RISK OF BECOMING A RELIGION, NOT A POLICY. IT, IF WE ARE NOT CAREFUL, CAN BE USED TO UNDERMINE THE DOMESTIC STRUCTURE OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. IT IS MY PERSONAL VIEW THAT MANY OF THE PRESENT SOVIET PROPOSALS ARE DESIGNED TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, AND ESPECIALLY TO RADICALIZE THE FOREIGN POLITICS OF THE FREDERUL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. SO I SUPPORT THE NEED

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R 081039Z OCT 87
FM AMBASSAY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WACHDC 1281

UNCLASS SECTION 06 OF 07 BEIJING 28358

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12356: N/A

TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BUT IT
MUST BE DONE IN RELATIONSHIPS TO POLITICAL PROBLEMS.
AND WITH RESPECT TO ARMAMENTS ISSUES WE MUST BE ABLE
TO ANSWER THE QUESTION, "IN WHAT CONCRETE WAY DOES IT
EASE THE DANGER OF WHAT SPECIFIC THREAT?" -IT CANNOT
BE DONE SIMPLY BY THROWING NUMBERS AROUND. IT SHOULD
NOT BECOME A SLOGAN. IT SHOULD NOT BECOME AN ISSUE.
BUT THOSE ARE THE PROBLEMS THAT MUST BE DISCUSSED
WITH GREAT COMPLETENESS.

31. I BELIEVE THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, PRODUCED BY ITS INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES, BUT ONLY IF WE ARE PREPARED TO BE CONCRETE AND ONLY IF WE SOLVE THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE IN FACT PRODUCED THE TENSION.

32. NOW LET ME SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. FIRST OF ALL LET ME TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK THE ORGANIZERS HERE AND ALL MY CHINESE HOSTS FOR THE EXTRAORDINARILY WARM RECEPTION THAT I HAVE RECEIVED HERE. I HAVE BEEN COMING HERE NOW FOR 16 YEARS. THIS IS MY FOURTEENTH VISIT. AND, AS I SAID THE LAST TIME I WAS HERE, WHILE I ALWAYS LECTURE THAT THE RELATIONS AMONG NATIONS SHOULD BE BASED ON A COOL ASSESSMENT, I MAKE AN EXCEPTION IN THIS CASE, PRIMARILY ON SENTIMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS.

33. I HAVE RECENTLY ASSUMED THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE CHINA-AMERICA SOCIETY, DEDICATED TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. ON ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS IS EVERY FORMER PRESIDENT, EVERY FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, ALL EXCEPT ONE FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, AND PROBABLY THE MOST DISTINGUISHED GROUP OF LEADING AMERICANS THAT HAS BEEN ASSEMBLED FOR ANY GROUP. THIS IS A TRIBUTE TO THE FACT THAT FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAS BECOME ACTIVE IN THE CONVICTION OF LEADING AMERICANS. THAT FRIENDSHIP IS BASED ON THE FACT THAT FOR THE UNITED STATES, A STRONG AND INDEPENDENT AND MODERNIZING CHINA IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. IT IS BOUND TO CONTRIBUTE TO GLOBAL STABILITY BY DISCOURAGING ADVERTURISM AND BY PERHAPS PROVIDING A MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO PROGRESS.

34. FOR CHINA, A UNITED STATES COMMITTED TO PRESERVING THE GLOBAL EQUILIBRIUM IS CRUCIAL FOR ITS

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OWN SECURITY BECAUSE WITHOUT SUCH A UNITED STATES THE TASK OF MAINTAINING CHINESE INDEPENDENCE, ESPECIALLY IN THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD, WOULD BE POSSIBLE BUT MUCH MORE COMPLICATED.

35. IN ADDITION, OUR TWO NATIONS CAN PERFORM MANY JOINT TASKS. AND THEREFORE, IN EVERY AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION THE RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED. NOW, IT WOULD BE IDLE TO DENY THAT THERE ARE DIFFERENCES. A COUNTRY WITH THE HISTORY OF CHINA, AND WITH THE CULTURAL PRIDE AND SENSE OF IDENTITY AS CHINA, IS BOUND TO LOOK AT THE WORLD FROM A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE IN MANY RESPECTS. AND WE SHOULD NOT PRETEND THAT WE AGREE ON EVERYTHING. AT THE SAME TIME, GIVEN OUR UNDERLYING PARALLELS OF INTEREST, IT IS POSSIBLE TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE CATEGORIES OF PROBLEMS. THERE ARE PROBLEMS IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA HAVE CONVERGING INTERESTS AND CAN CONCERT OUR POLICIES. FOR EXAMPLE, AFGHANISTAN OR INDOCHINA.

36. THERE ARE COUNTRIES OR REGIONS WHERE WE HAVE DIVERGENT POLICIES SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, KOREA, BUT WHERE WE BOTH HAVE AN INTEREST IN EITHER PREVENTING THE EMERGENCE OF THE DOMINATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES OR WHERE WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN PREVENTING A CONFLICT FROM BREAKING OUT.

37. THERE ARE OTHER AREAS WHERE WE HAVE CLEARLY DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS. IN SOME RESPECT IN THE MIDDLE EAST; IN SOME RESPECTS IN AFRICA. AND THERE THE CHALLENGE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY ON BOTH SIDES MUST BE TO MAKE SURE THAT THESE DIFFERENCES ARE CONTAINED WITHIN A FRAMEWORK OF UNDERSTANDING THE OVERRIDING COMMON INTEREST. THE OVERRIDING COMMON INTEREST IS THAT EACH, FOR OUR DIFFERENT REASONS, WANT TO PREVENT THE WORLD IN WHICH HEGEMONIAL ASPIRATIONS CAN BE

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R 081039Z OCT 87

FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 12&2

UNCLASS SECTION 07 OF 07 BEIJING 28358

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12356: N/A

REALIZED. WE EACH WANT A WORLD IN WHICH NATIONS CAN
DEVELOP THEIR IDENTITY FREE OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

38. FOR SOMEBODY WHO HAS COME TO CHINA NOW FOR 16
YEARS, IT IS MOVING TO SEE THE ENORMOUS PROGRESS THAT
A BILLION PEOPLE MOVING FORWARD ARE MAKING, UNEVEN AS
IT INEVITABLY MUST BE. THE EXPERIMENT IN WHICH
CHINA

IS NOW ENGAGED OF FINDING A FORM OF SOCIALISM ADAPTED
TO CHINESE CONDITIONS AND MODIFYING NINETEENTH
CENTURY THEORIES TO FIT TWENTIETH CENTURY REALITIES
IS ONE OF THE GREAT ADVENTURES OF THE CONTEMPORARY
PERIOD. AND HAVING WAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH
YOUR LEADERS, I MUST SAY THAT IT IS DEEPLY MOVING TO
SEE THEIR COURAGE AND THEIR FAITH IN A BETTER FUTURE.

39. SO FOR ALL OF THIS WE NEED PEACE. BUT PEACE
CANNOT BE DEFINED ONLY AS THE ABSENCE OF WAR OR WE
WILL TURN THE WORLD OVER TO THE MOST RUTHLESS. THERE
HAS TO BE SOME POSITIVE NOTION OF WHAT THE PRECISE
DANGERS ARE AND HOW THEY CAN BE REBUKED. THE UNITED
STATES, WITH ITS ENTHUSIASM AND IDEALISM, AND CHINA,
WITH ITS EXPERIENCE AND ANCIENT WISDOM, CAN BOTH MAKE
INDIVIDUAL AND JOINT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS EFFORT. I
HAVE A CHINESE FRIEND WHO ALLEGES THAT THERE EXISTS
THE FOLLOWING CHINESE PROVERB. I SAY "ALLEGES"
BECAUSE I SOMETIMES WONDER WHETHER THERE ARE AS MANY
CHINESE PROVERBS AS YOU TELL US WESTERNERS TO ENHANCE
OUR NATURAL SENSE OF INFERIORITY. BUT LET ME TELL IT
TO YOU AND MAYBE IN THE QUESTION PERIOD YOU CAN TELL
ME WHETHER THAT PROVERB REALLY EXISTS.

40. HE SAYS IT GOES LIKE THIS: WHEN THERE IS
TURMOIL UNDER THE HEAVENS, LITTLE PROBLEMS ARE DEALT
WITH AS IF THEY WERE BIG PROBLEMS AND BIG PROBLEMS
ARE NOT DEALT WITH AT ALL. WHEN THERE IS ORDER UNDER
THE HEAVENS, BIG PROBLEMS ARE REDUCED TO LITTLE
PROBLEMS AND THE LITTLE PROBLEMS SHOULD NOT PREOCCUPY
US.

41. IF IT ISN'T A CHINESE PROVERB, IT SHOULD BE.
AND I WOULD SAY THAT BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA
HAVE A COMMON RESPONSIBILITY - SOMETIMES TOGETHER AND
SOMETIMES SEPARATELY - TO CONTRIBUTE TO MAKING BIG
PROBLEMS INTO SMALL PROBLEMS AND THEREBY CONTRIBUTE
TO ORDER UNDER THE HEAVENS.

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42. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. END TEXT. LORD

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