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FOR NBC

PROGRAM The Today Show

STATION WRC-TV
NBC Network

DATE January 10, 1979 7:00 AM CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Interview with Henry Kissinger

TOM BROKAW: Dr. Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, is with us this morning to take a look at some international developments that have captured all of our attention in the past several days: Cambodia and Iran, specifically.

First of all, were you surprised at the ease with which Vietnam was able to take control of Cambodia?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER: I wasn't surprised by that; I was surprised by the willingness of Vietnam simply to occupy all of Cambodia. I thought they would keep it to a border conflict.

BROKAW: Some State Department analysts say that Vietnam will now more than have its hands full in Cambodia, because of the nature of the Cambodians, even those who are not necessarily loyal to Pol Pot, the man who was toppled, that they have never been happy with the Vietnamese and that they'll be fighting the Vietnamese internally.

DR. KISSINGER: I think that the Cambodians hate the Vietnamese, but I think that the Vietnamese are specialists in suppressing people, and they're going to keep it under control.

BROKAW: What about the United States' response to what has been going on there? Do you think that the Carter Administration has responded sufficiently?

DR. KISSINGER: I think what we have to get clear in our mind is that, on the one hand, it's, of course, a Southeast Asian conflict; on the other hand, it is yet another

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example, after Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, of
a Russian-sponsored invasion of a neighboring country without
even the pretext of legality.

The sin of Cambodia was that it was in -- wanted to
be independent, though Communist; and that it was a friend of
China, rather than of Russia.

Now, I have no use for the government that they over-
threw. It was a group of genocidal murderers. But neverthe-
less, this doesn't -- and that isn't why the Vietnamese attacked
them; and the Vietnamese aren't much better.

BROKAW: Is that a long way of saying that the Carter
Administration should have been tougher in its condemnation of
the Soviet role in this invasion?

DR. KISSINGER: I'm saying that the statements -- that
what we have to avoid is the intervention of both Communist
countries puts them on an even level. And in respect to this,
the Soviets supplied the arms and the Soviets made a friendship
treaty with Vietnam a month ago, a month before the invasion,
which was -- in which the two sides promised each support, not
only against attack from another country, but against the threat
of an attack, clearly intended to intimidate China.

BROKAW: How will this affect, do you think, if at all,
the United States' normalization of relations with China itself,
in terms of the public image of it? Does it take away from the
triumph of those normalizations?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, leaving aside the question of
triumph, I think it will accelerate the normalization because
the Chinese in an increasingly precarious situation and have a
strong interest in improving their ties with the United States.

And I favor close ties between the United States and
China under these circumstances, leaving aside the particulars
of normalization.

BROKAW: Moving on to Iran. You said in a Time maga-
zine interview this week that the Soviets have a direct or in-
direct role in the turmoil that is going on there. But as far
as the United States is concerned, isn't a large part of our
problem, doesn't it date back many years, through your tenure
as Secretary of State, to our inability to read the situation
correctly, and to support the Shah at a time when he did not
have the depth and breadth of support in his own country that
we were led to believe that he had?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, it's not easy to deter-
mine what you mean by "support the Shah."

Secondly, the Shah's funda -- one of the Shah's funda-
mental problems was due to the fact that he attempted to modernize
his country with extraordinary rapidity. As a result, he was
bound to lose support. He expropriated the landowners and dis-
tributed the land. He brought about literacy in a very short
period of time. He sent over 50,000 students out of the country.

The process of modernization in every country where
it has ever happened...

BROKAW: But there was an enormous amount of corruption,
apparently, going on at the time, at the same time that we were
not made aware of.

DR. KISSINGER: This is what always -- what often happens in a period of rapid change.

Undoubtedly, there were factors that were indigenous
to Iran that helped produce unrest; and, undoubtedly, there were
many things that were wrong with the government of the Shah. But
it has to be compared with the governments in the Middle East,
not with governments -- not with governments in Western Europe.

And I think that what is happening in Iran is a substantial setback for the United States, whosever fault it is.

BROKAW: Now, the Carter Administration has been saying
the Shah should leave. Do you think that that's a wise move on
the part of the Carter Administration?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that having pledged unswerving
support to the Shah less than three weeks ago, I think the decent
thing for us to do is the Shah can stay. But for the United
States to be perceived in pushing him out under circumstances
where all the surrounding countries are watching what we do with
people who've been friends of ours for 38 years -- and again,
whatever -- there was corruption in Iran, but what has happened
in Iran would not have taken this acute form without the radical
encouragement that has been generated, in part, by the Soviet
Union, and without the geopolitical assault.

BROKAW: You characterized the Carter Administration
foreign policy this week as inconsistent and oscillating, and
those were the characterizations, I think it is fair to say.
You have seemed to a lot of people to be stepping up your crit-
ticism. There are persistent rumors that you're preparing to
run for office yourself. Are you getting ready to run for the
United States Senate?

DR. KISSINGER: I'm not getting ready to run for office.
When you look at what has happened, from Ethiopia to South Yemen
to Afghanistan to Cambodia, where now nations are simply gobbled

up by their neighbors, you have to be concerned, as an American
citizen, about the erosion of all international restraints,
which sooner or later are going to trigger us into a confron-
tation if this keeps up.

This has absolutely no political basis. As somebody
who's conducted foreign policy, I know how tough it is, and I
have great sympathy for the people who are -- who are conducting
it. On the other hand, I'm also concerned about the drift of
events.

BROKAW: Dr. Henry Kissinger.

**Report To:** DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

**Program/Date:** THE TODAY SHOW/January 10, 1979 7:00 AM
**Station:** WRC-TV
NBC Network
Washington, D.C.

**Subject:** Discussion With Henry Kissinger on Cambodia and Iran

TOM BROKAW: Dr. Henry Kissinger is here with us this morning to take a look at some international developments that have captured all of our attention in the past several days. Cambodia and Iran, specifically.

BROKAW: Some State Department analysts believe that Vietnam now will more than have its hands full in Cambodia because of the nature of the Cambodians, even those who are not necessarily loyal to Pol Pot--the man who was toppled, that they've never been happy with the Vietnamese and that they'll be fighting the Vietnamese internally.

KISSINGER: I think that the Cambodians hate the Vietnamese. But I think the Vietnamese are specialists in suppressing people and they're going to keep it under control.

BROKAW: What about the United States' response to what has been going on there? Do you think the Carter Administration has responded sufficiently?

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KISSINGER: I think what we have to get clear in our mind is that on the one hand it's, of course, a Southeast Asian country; on the other hand, it is yet another example, after Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, of a Russian-sponsored invasion of a neighboring country without even the pretext of legality. The sin of Cambodia was that it was...wanted to be independent of communism, and that it was a friend of China rather than of Russia. I have no use for the government that they overthrew; it was a group of genocidal murderers. But nevertheless, that isn't why the Vietnamese attacked them and the Vietnamese aren't much better.

KISSINGER: I think that the statements...what we have to avoid is the intervention of both communist countries puts them on an even level and in respect to this, the Soviets supplied the arms and the Soviets made a friendship treaty with Vietnam a month ago---à month before the invasion--in which the two sides promised each other support not only against attack from another country, but against the threat of an attack--clearly intended to intimidate China.

BROKAW: How will this affect, do you think, if at all, the United States normalization relations with China, itself, in terms of the public image? Does it take it away from the triumph of those normalizations?

KISSINGER: Leaving aside the question of triumph, I think it will accelerate the normalization because the Chinese are in an increasingly precarious situation and have a strong interest in improving their ties with the United States. And I favor close ties between the United States and China under these circumstances, leaving aside the particulars of normalization.

BROKAW: Moving on to Iran. You said in a Time Magazine interview

3

TR-084

this week that the Soviets have a direct or indirect role in the turmoil
that is going on there. But as far as the United States is concerned, isn't
a large part of our problem, doesn't it date back many years--through your
tenure as Secretary of State--to our inability to read the situation correctly?
To support the Shah at a time when he did not have the depth and breadth of
support in his own country we were led to believe that he had?

KISSINGER: First of all, it's not easy to determine what you mean by support the Shah. Secondly, one of the Shah's fundamental problems was due to the fact that he attempted to modernize his country with extraordinary rapidity. As a result, he was bound to lose support. He expropriated the land of opponents and distributed the land. He brought about literacy in a very short period of time. He send over 50,000 students out of the country. All of the processes of modernization in every country where it has ever happened...

BROKAW: But there was an enormous amount of corruption apparently going on at the time, at the same time that we were not made aware of....

KISSINGER: This is what often happens in a period of rapid change. Undoubtedly there were factors that were indigenous to Iran which helped produce unrest and undoubtedly there were many things that were wrong with the government of the Shah. But it has to be compared with the governments in the Middle East; not with governments in Western Europe. And I think that what is happening in Iran is a substantial setback for the United States, whosever fault it is.

BROKAW: Now the Carter Administration has been saying that the Shah should leave. Do you think that's a wise move on the part of the Carter Administration?

KISSINGER: I think that having pledged unswerving support for the

4

TR-084

Shah less than three weeks ago, I think the decent thing for us to do is to keep quiet. I'm not saying that the Shah can stay. But for the United States to be perceived in pushing him out and under circumstances where all these other countries are watching what we do with people who've been friends of ours for 38 years; and again, there was corruption in Iran but what has happened in Iran would not have taken this acute form without the radical encouragement that has been generated, in part, by the Soviet Union, and without the geo-political assault.

BROKAW: You characterized the Carter Administration foreign policy this week as inconsistent and oscillating. Those were the characterizations. I think that it's fair to say you have seemed, to a lot of people, to be stepping up your criticism. There are persistent rumors that you're preparing to run for office yourself. Are you getting ready to run for the United States Senate?

KISSINGER: I'm not getting ready to run for office. When you look at what has happened from Ethiopia to South Yemen to Afghanistan to Cambodia where now nations are simply gobbled up by their neighbors, you have to be concerned, as an American citizen, about the erosion of all international restraint which, sooner or later, is going to trigger us into a confrontation if this keeps up. This has absolutely no political basis. As somebody who's conducted foreign policy, I know how tough it is and I have great sympathy for the people who are conducting it. On the other hand, I'm also concerned about the drift of events.

BROKAW: Dr. Henry Kissinger.