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Jordan/HAK

J: Alright. I'll do it.

K: And tell him I've got to leave the next day because I've got some thing in California the evening of the 25th.

J: I have heard incidentally that he is under some pressure from one of the new ministers who has come in who is apparently cutting away at him.

K: For What.

J: Just sort of intervening with Echeverria with foreign policy ideas and so on. I think it's the new labor Minister or something. And I gather that Emilio is a little concerned about it and I think one reason that he is sort of anxious for you to come down is to sort of reinforce his position.

K: But what do I do at a Mexican fiesta where I don't speak a word of Spanish.

J: Oh they'll be plenty of people who will take care of that. Paullada and the Under Secretary of the Presidency are you know fluent in English and you know a lot of the people around him are fluent and Rabasa of course speaks English. I'll get the drill.

K: OK Bye.

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TELECON

Rowland Evans/Mr. Kissinger

10:04 a.m., August 15, 1973

E: Henry, have you got one second?

K: You wrote a great article today. It did me a lot of good.

E: Did it hurt you bad?

K: Well...

E: You're kidding me!

K: The villain in this isn't the original Watergate. It's the people who keep hacking away.

E: That's the base from which they can operate.

K: That's true, but does that give a license to everybody?

E: We have discussed how this looks anywhere.

K: A lot of people in this town remind me of the man who goes into a china shop, breaks everything in sight, and says 'look what you made me do!'

E: People here and there are saying please rally around. We don't write that kind of column. That is the only message that the President should get across -- 'Please let me govern.'

Henry, I'm very confused. I just talked to the UN guys on this vote. Between us, I get the word that all we want to do is abstain. I talked to Joe Sisco yesterday. He said the policy of the White House was to limit it to a simple condemnation. Is that the same policy this morning?

K: Yes. But if the non-aligned make it so tough it goes into automatic sanctions...

E: We would never vote for sanctions?

K: No. But condemnation we would vote for.

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Telcon
Bryce Harlow/HAK

August 15, 1973; 10:07 a.m.

K: Hello.

H: Henry.

K: Bryce, I understand you've made a great contribution on the speech and I wanted you to know that...

H: Yeah, I punctuated it for them. You know, substituted a number of semicolons for the commas.

K: Well, I want you to know that we are appreciative.

H: Well, you told me up there at that concentra..., I mean at that place, that there's a conceptual requirement that had to be met, and so I did that.

K: Have you seen it?

H: No, but I've been giving it concept, you might say, introspectively, ever since you said that.

K: It's an interesting process, isn't it?

H: Well, you know, I really am quite surprised at what the boss is doing. I don't understand it. Has he consulted you further?

K: No.

H: Well, if he hasn't talked to you, there's really only one that's broken the chastity belt.

K: But not much.

H: Well, I mean just that one time.

K: And after I said what they didn't want to hear, that took care of that little exercise.

H: Apparently, it's the damndest thing. I'm really puzzled and sort of fascinated by it. I'm not irritated in the least about it, because, Christ, he ought to talk to the ones he wants to. But, Mel has had no input whatever. I had none whatever, and you had a slight impact on it that was really more on what he ought to do next than what he was then doing. And that's it. But I am pleased that he took your

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advice on... I think Al was impressed by your argument on the concept thing because they did get Professor X.

K: Well they got at least the white paper redone.

H: Well, they got that redone and that was good, but they also had him redo the front part of the speech, and Al said it was much better.

K: Yes, but I haven't seen it.

H: No, I haven't either.

K: And that's the report I've had.

H: And I don't know who's working on it beyond...

K: The thing that bothers me, between you and me, is that there isn't anybody there who knows how to shape an intellectual product. __________ is a nice guy but, you know, he's a middle-level staffer.

H: That's correct.

K: I mean in terms of ability, I don't give a damn what title he's got. Haig is a terrific organizer, but he, I wouldn't think that shaping intellectual products is his forte.

H: No, I don't understand the process at all.

K: I mean there's only one professional - that's Wright - and he doesn't know anything about politics.

H: Well, I'm in an odd situation here. I came in at his insistence to help him personally - that's what he said - and I don't mind telling you - I don't broadcast it to Rollie Evans and people like that.

K: No, I'll do that for you.

H: But I want to arm you, the next discussion you have with Rollie, that six weeks now I've been here, at a cost of x thousands of dollars a month - which is not relevant, I realize, but that's a fact -- in order to be helpful to this guy. He said three times to me I had to do that. And do you know what I've done for him personally since I've been here?

-3-

I've talked to him twice on the phone. Once for three minutes about, and once for about 10 minutes.

K: Do you mean you haven't seen him alone?

H: No, not since I've been here. In six weeks. So, at any rate, I'm a helpin, boy! (laughter)

K: That's weird.

H: It is weird. I don't think that Mel has been alone with him either. He may have been. I haven't asked him about it.

K: I've been alone with him, but as I told you the other day, if I said Attila the Hun has just crossed the Vistula and we'd better cut him off at the Urals by dropping a 10-megatoner, he'd say, by God, that's the best idea I've heard all day. Order it.

H: (laughs) Well, I don't feel irritated about it in the least. I just feel immensely puzzled. I don't understand what's happening or why. I think you and I discussed that up in my office. I'm deeply worried about it for the country.

K: So am I, and it affects some other things that I have to think about.

H: Keep your hat on. Have you got that thing - your thing - on ice until this takes place.

K: Yes.

H: That's good. I really think that's good.

K: Listen, Bryce, the last thing you have to worry about is that other thing will be done with an excess of zeal.

H: I would think so. I would think so.

K: I haven't had any further discussion on it.

H: It has to happen this week, I understand.

K: Bryce, between you and me, I don't think it's going to happen this week.

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H: I was told sometime it was going to happen this week.

K: I was told sometime, too, but I would just as soon keep it on ice for a few weeks to see what happens.

H: Well, that press conference, of course, is much more important than what's happening today. That's the watershed on this ______ if he can bring himself to do it.

K: Well, he's got to. He's got no choice.

H: But if he stalls it much longer...

K: He's got no choice. He can delay it a week or two or three, but there's got to be a press conference.

H: Each day he delays it, of course, there's attrition.

K: And it's got to be well before Congress comes back.

H: Yeah, well, they're talking, I think, in terms of, the last I heard from what Al said that somewhere towards the end of the week of the 20th, maybe.

K: That's it. Next week.

H: Uh, huh. In other words, maybe all that effort that you put into it and Al says that he's put into it, and so on, maybe has moved him up a week.

K: Well, that would be progress.

H: Oh, yeah, that's what I say.

K: The President would at least lance that one boil.

H: Well, I think that will move him out of the danger zone, and back towards the high land.

K: He's got to get these Gallop polls going up a little bit, don't you think?

H: Yeah, because these professional politicians move right in on that kind of figure.

K: Yes, it's not something designed to overawe Congress.

-5-

H: This call I had here from George Bush I hate to return unless you want to tell me what's in the speech, because that's what he's going to ask me so he can position himself.

K: I haven't seen the speech.

H: Well, tell me what's in it. Make it up.

K: Bryce, the last draft I saw was the one after the one you saw, and it was worse than the one you saw. When I said that I've been excluded since then. I saw one draft in which he said he is against the deprivation of liberty to anybody whether it's done by Haldeman or whether it's done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they have the draft, and that's why he abolished the draft. (Harlow laughs) I'm not kidding you. That was in the speech.

H: You're really kinda kidding, aren't you?

K: You want to see the paragraph?

H: Why that's incredible. That's beautiful.

K: A half hour of screaming got it removed. It also got me excluded from any further discussions. (laughter) I said it was a national disgrace. Well, it was in just about like that.

H: Well, they've all seen it throughout the years, Al and Ron, as his counsel of state, and for some reason, and that's what he's got going, save your area where he uses you, but...

K: Where he turns it over to me, which is quite different.

H: Well, that's, uh...

K: Oh, no, that's a very important difference.

H: I understand it is, but, that's in your favor, really.

K: Well, not really. It is not in my favor because I have no authority. I can get away with this only until I am challenged.

H: Yeah, that's right, of course.

K: If you've got a working President behind you, you know you're backed.

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-6-

*

H: Didn't you tell me that starting with your recommendation on Bob and John that this <u>giving</u> chill set in?

K: On everything except my field.

H: Yeah, and suddenly, damn it, and then they go and ______ like that.
I really am deeply concerned, and not in the least personally, because
I don't mind if he doesn't want to use me at all, that's why he's
President, for Christ sake, but I'm still worried over what this
portends for the country.

K: That's what worries me.

H: Because you know, a lot of people are not going to take this kind of thing - they're gonna leave. George Shultz was not far away from that when I came in here.

K: Yeah.

H: And I had a long argument with him.

K: Oh, well, it can't be done now.

H: But if this goes on these people will say what the hell, and then this
whole operation will collapse, and then first thing you know he can get
run out of office just on the ground that he can't run the government.

K: Yeah.

H: And that's what I'm worrying about. I mean, you can't run the government through Ron and Al.

K: No.

H: And I'm not sure they have much choice about it themselves.

K: No, I'm not blaming them. I don't blame them at all. Without Al, we'd
be totally lost. I think Ron is just a sort of a court jester.

H:

H: And he's a security blanket.

K: He's the link to Haldeman.

H: Well, I think he's probably still talking to them.

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-7-

K: That would be an even worse disaster.

H: I'll bet he is though. I'll bet he's leaning still on Bob and John in some ways.

K: Yeah, but that would be a screaming disaster. And then we'd be better off bringing them back here where they can do day to day work. Their judgment wasn't any good when they saw all the papers. How the hell can their judgment be any good when they're sitting 3,000 miles away stewing in their own juice.

H: Well, I'll bet you he's doing it, though.

K: I'll bet you any amount.

H: I'll just bet you he's on the phone with Bob right along and Bob's guiding him, and that must gall the hell out of Al. Oh, well, I've got to find out what to say to George Bush. He's called me twice. He's the National Chairman; the networks are asking him for an appearance to comment and he doesn't know what to do. He wants me to tell him. I'm his contact with the White House, and in close with the President, and he wants me to tell him what's in his speech. (laughter) -- what could he say about it. He called me and said, Bryce, for God's sake be positioning us so I can know what to do here.

K: Well, I haven't seen it.

H: So if you won't tell me, I'm gonna find somebody who's seen it.

K: Okay, Bryce. Come and see me in a little while.

H: Okay, Henry. All right. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

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A4

TELCOM

August 15, 1973/10:30a.m.

Secretary Shultz/HAK

K: Hello

S: Hello Henry

K: George. How are you?

S: Alright thank you.

K: George. You won't be back until next week and I'll be on the West Coast and I wanted to raise one issue with you. Well, one of several. I talked to Simon yesterday. What is his first name incidentally?

S: Bill

K: Bill. I talked to him yesterday in connection with the oil and other things and raised a more tender problem. One of the major things we have to quiz and that other nations want from us is in the area of economics. And we have no ability now systematically to sell it politically and we have a tendency to sell it on technical economic grounds on its own merits. Now take for example the international monetary thing. I think you're making good progress. At least I don't know what you're doing but I'm assuming from the expressions of satisfaction of Schmit and d'Estaing that you are making good progress. That's isn't really what we need because their governments are behaving in a beastly way towards us on the Year of Europe. And if they get from you on technical economic grounds, you see what I mean, a degree of cooperation that don't show us elsewhere we are just not expressing our economic policy adequately. And I was wondering with this country... I mean take for example take another problem. Remember the agriculture discussion we had on the way to Reykjavik of Pompidou's idea of an agricultural pool. Now suddenly all our experts are talking to me about that. I'm not sure it's a good idea. I don't understand it. All I would like to bring about though is a situation where we can tell the France if we are going to some form of convertibility and some from of exchange rights that we are doing that if they behave elsewhere. Are you still there. And not to give it away as just part of a technical monetary discussion.

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Shultz/HAK

S: Well we have been... You know that we said that we would go along with convertability under certain conditions in the speeches that were made last September at the INS meetings.

K: And I strongly urged it at the time now what I'm wondering. Is it possible for you at Nairobi to hang tough cause the Europeans in the meantime have been bastards so that later on we can wrap Xup some concessions in the monetary field as part of more global negotiation.

S: That would be a pretty delicate proposition.

K: I know.

S: We have as much at stake as anybody in a monetary system that works.

K: I know it.

S: We have a meeting of the deputies.

K: But they have as much at stake as anybody in the security system that works and it doesn't seem to affect them.

S: Well I talked to Schmidt about the offset business which incidently is being very badly undercut by the Defense Department which thinks they want to offer cosmetic changes.

K: But I tell you the Defense Department right now. Schlesinger is in over his head in my opinion. I think...

S: In his favor... trying to think these things through on a comprehensive basis.

K: I know you are. I'm not saying these things critically I am asking, Bill Simon thought that this would be something that would in fact appeal to you.

S: Yeah. Well I.

K: Did he talk to you about it yesterday. He said he might.

- 2 -

Schultz/HAK

S: Yes he mentioned to me that he had this discussion with you.

K: Well what do you think.

S: Well, I think we should see what we can see about it. That is, we have
lots of prickly clicks in the negotiation. We won't finish in Nairobi

K: But I would like, I would like... You see what I would like to set up
is a situation where the President can give them something they
badly want. Or at least in which you make a dramatic move instead
of getting the thing sort trickled out. One technical item at a time.
You know when I talked to d'Estaing I said you know what you people
don't understand is if you made a political concession we could be
move generous in the economic field. He said like what? What
could you do that Shultz isn't already doing. Since I didn't know
exactly what you were already doing I had to start dancing around.
But d'Estaing was so pleased you know that I didn't feel that we had
much leverage there. And the reason I mention it George is because
we're going to head into a really prickly period with the Europeans in
September and October.

S: About what. Military side.

K: Everything. They have suddenly taken the position that they stared to take on the convertibility-- on the you know not the convertibility on the devaluation in March that they would make specific rules from which we are excluded and then informers of them and informers of them by an intermediary which they head of the foreign ministers conference which changes every six months who happens the Danish Foreign Minister in this period so you can imagine what kind of a negotiation we can have with them. So we are confronted with a block that makes... confronted with a series of fait accompli and a negotiator who has no authority. And that is totally unacceptable to us.

S: Well I think we've broken through that to some extent in the monetary area.

K: Yeah. But we've got to make it in the political area. And we above all
and the British have behaved unbelievably badly. We are not surfacing
it yet.

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Shultz/HAK

S: Really.

K: And I want to get your area sychronized with ours so that they can't claim a special relationship in one field and really put it to us in other fields. And this is another things. Are you doing anything for the British in the Treasury that you are not doing for others in the form of information.

S: Not that I know of. Of course we have this intelligence relationship

K: But that's not

S:q Which I think has to be questioned under the circumstance.

K: Well I'm cooling that but that's at CIA. You're not doing any of that.

S: No. But I have developed this little pattern with Schmidt, MXD'Estaing and Barber that has proven quite useful.

K: No I'm for that. Look basically you were right from the spirit of what we were trying to do but what the Europeans were trying to do is use our overtures to build their identity in confrontation with us and they are doing it by picking the areas where it is safe. And sucking us dry in the areas where it isn't and we've just got to put a stop to that.

S: Well, I'm quite ready to deal with that.

K: Can you give some thought to how you can get us some leverage in the monetary thing. I mean let that little group know that we are trilling it. You know I recognize it is delicate and I have no complete suggestion and I am not yet sure we want to do it but I wondered whether you could think about it.

K: Yeah?

S: Yeah. When are you going to leave for California.

K: Monday. When are you coming back.

S: Well I'll be back by Monday.

K: On Monday.

S: Yeah.

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Al

Shultz/HAK

K: When are you...

S: Another words I'll be in then Monday morning at the beginning of the day.

K: Well.

S: They have a pretty important meeting of the deputies of the committee of 20 in the first week of September.

K: Well, lets have breakfast on Monday at 8:00.

S: Why don't I come and see you. What time of day are you going to leave?

K: I'll bet you we'll leave at 9:00 or 9:30.

S: Really. Why in the hell go to Calif. What's going on around there Henry. I'm sort of totally out of touch. I just heard on the television the President is going to speak tonight.

K: George he is giving a speech that only Ron Ziegler and Haig have seen. Laird, Harlow and I have no idea of what's in it. I saw an early version and I was so outraged by it that they've been excluded everyone else. I understand this version is alot better.

S: Is the White Paper going to be issued?

K: Yes but that to was a disaster but I have seen a revision which is better. Again I haven't seen the latest draft.

S: Anymore information about the Vice President.

K: I have none. No. But they are not going to move along those lines until ---

S: I have my economic staff meeting at 8:00 is the only reason I'm reluctant about breakfast.

K: Oh I see. Otherwise it would be fine.

Telcon
Amb. Dinitz/Kissinger

August 15, 1973; 11:35 a.m.

D: Hello, Dr. Kissinger.

K: Yes, how are you?

D: Good morning. I have one good news and one bad news. The good news is that Eban has decided to fly directly back from Latin America, to shorten his visit, and fly back to Israel.

K: Oh, he isn't coming here?

D: No, he's not coming here, so you will have a free Friday morning. The bad news is what I feared yesterday. I talked to Sisco on the telephone this morning and we fixed a meeting for 12:30 because he told me he would be busy in the morning in the White House Conference.

K: He's a liar.

D: Well, that is not new. What he failed to tell me when he fixed the 12:30 meeting that he already issued instructions to Scali to endorse a very severe draft resolution and vote for it, not even abstain, but vote for it.

K: Now, just a minute. I was told that they took out the words "strong" and "condemnation."

D: Dr. Kissinger, I just explained it to Peter the text that was opposed by the State Department to vote for according to what Eban just told me on the telephone. This text includes condemnation of the Government of Israel, not of the acts, but of the government, and calls for solemn warning Israel that if such acts are repeated the Council will consider taking adequate steps and measures. These are sanctions. What the text tells me the big victory they succeeded to put the words "consider taking measures" instead of "taking measures," which to me is semantics because you can't take measures without considering them, obviously. So I mean that I want you to only to know because we have never had such a resolution endorsed by the United States. Not in the whole history of our UN trials and tribulations, and I understand, if I may say, I understand that there might be a difficulty of vetoing such a resolution but that such paragraphs would get the positive vote of the United States is not of enough substantiation. I mean that would -- that's really puzzling me. Maybe you tell me it shouldn't puzzle me.

K: No, but it's a difficult thing to discuss but I understand your point and I have made it forcefully.

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D: But I just, first, I want to be sure, Mr. Kissinger, that you know what we are going to vote for and that is the text now available to Peter and if you...

K: I'll take a look at it.

D: And especially if you look at the end of paragraph 4. I mean the last paragraph which definitely infers sanctions and if I'm not mistaken at one point you even told me, or told ______ that the President has never o.k.'d to go to sanctions without his previous approval. So, I mean they're telling us --

K: They're not committed to sanctions, only to consider them.

D: Yes, but you understand the difference is not material difference here. If you say, "solemnly warns Israel" ______ repeated to the Council we consider taking adequate steps and measures to enforce the thing, that is threatening sanction. When we argued there was never a solution that called for sanctions right away but always to consider sanctions. Never anything like this has passed. In any event, not with the U.S. approval. So maybe I could suggest that you vote for the resolution, but on that paragraph 4 ______ you abstain then you ______ at least by supporting some of the unjustified resolutions. But you don't take on ______ /

K: Can one vote paragraph by paragraph?

D: One can demand this. Yes, one can demand this, voting in paragraphs. For instance, maybe this itself is put to a vote and if the Council will not, as I am sure the Arabs would want, ______ then you can abstain and explain that you would have voted for the condemnation but not for sanctions. I mean that would be one way out.

K: Well, why don't you make a very strong case of this to Sisco.

D: I did to Atherton now, a very strong case. And I can't get to Sisco until 12:30. I have a meeting with him ----------tells me now the resolution can be voted any minute now.

K: I'll call Sisco.

D: Yes, thank you very much.

K: Good, thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
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Operative paragraphs of UN Security Council resolution
which Atherton says US is prepared to vote for:

1. Condemns the Government of Israel for violating Lebanese air space and sovereignty and for the forcible diversion and seizure by units of the Israel Air Force of a Lebanese airliner on lease to Iraqi Airways.

2. Considers that such actions by Israel constitute a violation of the Lebanon-Israel armistice agreement of 1949, the Security Council ceasefire resolutions of 1967, the provisions of the UN Charter, the international conventions on civil aviation, and the principles of international law and morality.

3. Calls on the ICAO to take into account this resolution when considering appropriate measures to safeguard international civil aviation against such acts.

4. Calls on Israel to desist from any and all acts which violate Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and endanger the safety of international civil aviation, and solemnly warns Israel that if such acts are repeated, the Council will consider taking adequate steps and measures to enforce its resolutions.

DECLASSIFIED
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AB

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TELCON

Henry Brandon - Mr. Kissinger

August 15, 1973

11:45 a. m.

B: Hello, Henry.

K: Hello, how are you.

B: I'm coming down after lunch and I was wondering if we could get together
before you leave for California.

K: Let me think about it. I'm not sure I want to make a public statement
right now. But, if you want to talk, well... Why don't you call me tomorrow
morning.

B: Are you doing anything in the evenings?

K: I don't know yet. I will know tomorrow.

B: Did you see my piece in the paper? I have a piece on the negotiations in Europe.

K: Is it negative? Who does it scold? Us or the Europeans.

B: Well, I simply said that it had peetered out.

K: That isn't quite true.

B: OH? That is what I had understood. That it had been left up to the Europeans.
If they can reach agreement among themselves.

K: O.K. Will you call me in the morning? Has Xandra got a hold of you? She
wants to use your pool. I'll let you two negotiate that.

B: All right. I will see you tomorrow morning.

K: Call me in the morning.

B: All right. Bye.

K: Bye.

Telcon
J. Sisco/Kissinger

August 15, 1973; 11:55 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Yes, Henry, good morning again.

K: Joe, I just talked to the President because I thought that this was not a matter that should happen without running it by him.

S: Sure.

K: Now his view, he is basically opposed to sanctions which I hadn't really focused on.

S: Well, then, we got away from that.

K: Well, but even consider taking sanctions.

S: Well, if the word "sanctions" is not used, that last paragraph commits us to nothing, Henry.

K: Well, what he would like, ideally, I want you to know what he wants. I don't know whether that's possible. If it is possible to vote on this thing by paragraphs, he would like us to vote for the condemnation and abstain on the sanctions.

S: Well, I'll talk to Scali to find out how far it's gone. I'm afraid it's gone beyond it but let me see what I can do right away Henry.

K: You know, he said I should work it out with you, but that's what he wants, and you know that wasn't my view this morning. But he just came back from Camp David and I thought I'd better run it by.

S: I can understand. Well, if it's possible, Henry, I'll just tell Scali what you've told me and I don't know whether it's possible.

K: But you see, you know, he --

S: But you know, Henry, it really isn't a sanction paragraph at all, it really isn't.

K: But you can see why he doesn't.

S: Oh, I know what the problem is. You've got to view this from a broader context.

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K: O.K.

S: By the way, Henry, if you get a chance to say to him there is absolutely no pressure from the Jewish community on this problem. The Jewish community is absolutely against the Israeli action.

K: Well, that I can't judge.

S: What I'm fearful of is, now let me just ask you this. I will tell Mr. Scali. What if it's gone beyond, because I'm sure Scali has said, understandably, "Look, we'll be able to support this resolution if you can make these changes."

K: Well, call me back after you've talked to Scali.

S: Alright. I'll get him right away.

K: Good. Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

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Telcon
J. Sisco/Kissinger

August 15, 1973; 1:00 p.m.

K: Hello.

S: Henry, I've not heard from Scali yet. I'll tell you what's happened. There has been a meeting of the non-aligned and the sponsors, and I'm waiting word. The moment I hear I will call you back. Where can I reach you over the lunch hour?

K: Call the White House. They'll get me.

S: Alright. And I've got the Israeli Ambassador in my office right now so that we're chatting about it.

K: You've had a chance to present the President's idea to Scali?

S: I have, and he wants to see where we are. I'll tell you what his preliminary reaction is, but don't take this as any... He feels that the thing has gone so far now that --- he feels that if he, and this is his tentative reaction, that if he were to move for a separate vote on that paragraph, he couldn't muster the necessary nine votes; and secondly, he would feel that this would go contrary to the way he has been moving in terms of the co-sponsors and he's still fearful of this opening up the door in terms of this other more severe proposal. But he said sit tight and, you know, he's going to see what the lay of the land is. So don't take this as any kind of a final judgment. Now what I said to him, Henry, was this, that if this were the case, how can we meet the President's concern that we make it very, very clear that we are not supporting sanctions. Well, one thing we can do, Henry, because I want to help you in terms of what you present to the President, one thing we can do is to have John make the strongest possible statement giving an explanation of the vote, which indicates that we're not supporting any specific sanctions, and that this is no different than what we voted in 1968, which was the very same paragraph and again we said we were not supporting any specific measure. But, Henry, I'm not ---

K: And also another thing that bothers him is, you know his view on hijacking.

S: Yes.

K: You know, that if you hijack by means of private persons you get away with it.

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S: Yes, well, of course, we realize this, but the other aspect of it is, we've been in the forefront through all these international organizations.

K: But could we, in our explanatory vote, say something condemnatory of hijacking in general?

S: Absolutely, and to say categorically we do not accept this decision. Why don't we do that, Henry?

K: O.K.

S: Good. Well then, look, you want me to get back at you ______ to give you the final answer. Cause, Henry, I am going to do everything I can to do as well as we can.

K: Good. Thank you, Joe.

S: I'll give you a final report, but I think this is basically the way it is going to come out and I hope that will meet the President at least part way.

K: Good.

S: Thanks, Henry.

K: Thank you.

TELCONE HAK--Marvin Kalb 2:40 p.m.

August 15, 1973

MK: I am sorry to trouble you. I have two things. One briefly, will there be any foreign policy in the President's speech tonight that we have to deal with?

HAK: I don't think I should comment on the speech.

MK: In reading the statement about Cambodia, the President says he would not act if there is an occasion of North Vietnamese aggression, without <u>talking</u> with Congress.

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HK: That is a proper assumption. I thought your thing about Cambodia was loaded. There were no four requests by Sihanouk about Cambodia.

MK: I apologize for the inaccuracy.

HAK: There was only one request, not four.

MK: I was given that on a stack of bibles.

HAK: By whom?

MK: By someone who was supposed to know.

HK: Someday I think we can document that this was well on the road when it started coming apart on June.

MK: How?

HAK: Now <u>you</u> are getting into deep background. I think because of Congress and Watergate.

MK: So when the President said the Communists were opposed, they were willing to talk in June?

HK: No question, after communication with Le Duc Tho and others. I told Congress this and I don't think I have ever misled them.

MK: I was talking to a Vietnamese at the Embassy to chat. He said the only thing is survival. He said he would define it as the survival of Cambodian cultural entity. It might have been an extreme statement.

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TELCONE HAK--Ken Fried

August 15, 1973 4:45 p.m.

F: I have a couple of questions about the President's statement today. The
most important part was the indication of relations with Congress rather than
with North Vietnam.

K: I think both.

F: I thought this <u>quarrel</u> was his order that he would go to Congress.

K: He has no choice.

F: What does it mean to take "appropriate action." What could be considerable?

K: I don't know what to speculate on that.

F: I would be to go to Congress? Is there any indication that the North Viet-
namese now intend to move as a result of the ban?

K: No, but there <u>has</u> been an attack in Laos, the first day.

F: Tie that to the end of the bombing.

Kissinger: There hasn't been an attack there in four months.

F: Congress willing?

F: In Copenhagen there has been reports of a draft proposal on the new Atlantic Charter?

K: We have been discussing some working papers with some of our allies.

F: From the AP speech?

K: All this is background and administration, not White House.

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TELCONE
Dan Rather - Mr. Kissinger

August 15, 1973

5:10 p. m.

R: Hello, how are you, Henry. This is Dan Rather.

K: Hello. I'm fine.

R: I have the responsibility toxx possibility tonight to go over the remarks given by Mr. Warren today and I was looking into Congress. In the event of a new military offensive, would this apply?

K: Do you mean an offensive anywhere?

R: I mean what's happened around Phnom Pheng. Do you consider this an offensive?

K: Right now it is permissible.

R: Well, I want to have it clear that if suddenly the pressure got heavy if it might seem to be an offensive.

K: I don't say that we would do it but it is a possibility.

R: Now this is the sort of thing he means in his speech.

K: Right.

R: You had added that there would be a negotiated settlement in Cambodia.

K: Before the vote.

R: Is it fair to assume that whatever chances there were before began to evaporate with the vote?

K: It is demonstrable. I mean insofar as you take it in perspective, as far as the negotiated balance of Sihanouk. It depends on an equilibrium--it depends on Phnom Pheng. There must be a certain ............ of its own. If the Khmer think they can win without Sihanouk, then he is just a figurehead. Then the role changes. If the Communists win on their own, this is a change of forces that also shifts. We didn't want to bomb on our own. That is the funny thing. We would have kept only enough to hope for a negotiated settlement. But that is all water under the bridge now. But your statement is basically correct. That chance vanished with the vote.