# Test-Ban Treaty: Let's Wait Awhile

By

John Deutch, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft

Wednesday, October 6, 1999

The Washington Post

The Senate is scheduled to vote Oct. 12 on whether to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The treaty has many strong supporters and equally vociferous opponents who are committed to its defeat next week. We believe, however, that the treaty's supporters and opponents are both wrong.

While we are no fans of the CTBT, our purpose here is not to argue its merits and defects. Our point is more straightforward. The simple fact is that it is premature for the Senate to vote on the CTBT -- at least during the life of the present Congress -- because the treaty is not coming into force any time soon, whether or not the United States ratifies it. This means that few if any of the benefits envisaged by the treaty's advocates could be realized by such action. But if we act now, there could be real costs and risks to our security interests, including our non-proliferation objectives.

Supporters of the CTBT claim that it will make a major contribution to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. But even the treaty's advocates concede that for this objective to be achieved, at least the key countries that are of proliferation concern must agree to accede to the treaty. Indeed, the treaty wisely requires that each of 44 specific countries sign and ratify the document before it enters into force.

But only 23 of those countries have done so thus far. For example, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Syria have not yet acted. Many of these countries may never join the CTBT regime, and U.S. Senate ratification, early or late, is unlikely to have any significant impact on their decisions. For example, no serious person should believe that rogue nations such as Iran or Iraq will give up their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons if only the United States ratifies the CTBT.

The United States should take advantage of this situation to delay a vote on ratification, without prejudice to eventual action on the treaty. This would provide the opportunity to learn more about such issues as movement on the ratification process by the required 44 countries, technical progress in the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program, the political consequences of the India/Pakistan detonations, changing Russian doctrine toward greater reliance on nuclear weapons, and continued Chinese development of a nuclear arsenal.

We do not minimize the threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, U.S. efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction not only deserve but are receiving the highest national security priority. It is clear to any fair-minded observer that the United States has substantially reduced its reliance on nuclear

weapons. The United States has also made or committed to dramatic reductions in the level of deployed nuclear force.

Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the United States must continue to rely on nuclear weapons to help deter certain kinds of attacks on this country and its friends and allies. In addition, several countries depend on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for their security. Their lack of confidence in that deterrent might lead to the further spread of weapons of mass destruction by increasing incentives for them to acquire their own nuclear or other weapons-of-mass-destruction capabilities.

As a consequence, the United States must continue to be certain that its nuclear weapons remain safe, secure and reliable. But the fact is that the scientific case simply has not been made that over the long term the United States can ensure the nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. The

United States is seeking to do so by means of an ambitious effort called the Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program attempts to maintain adequate knowledge of nuclear weapons physics indirectly by computer modeling, simulation and other experiments. We support the kind of scientific and analytical effort that is reflected in the Stockpile Stewardship Program. At this point, however, success is far from ensured.

In light of the uncertainty, and in the absence of any compelling reasons for early ratification, it is unwise to take actions now that constrain this or future presidents' choices about how best to pursue our non-proliferation and other national security goals while maintaining the effectiveness and credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Accordingly, we urge the Senate leadership to reach an understanding with the president to suspend action on the CTBT, at least for the duration of the 106th Congress.

John Deutch was undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, deputy secretary of defense and Director of Central Intelligence in the first Clinton administration. Henry Kissinger was secretary of state to Presidents Nixon and Ford. Brent Scowcroft was national security adviser to Presidents Ford and Bush.

© Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company

HENRY A. KISSINGER

October 13, 1999

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, I--together with former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and former CIA Director and Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch--had recommended in a letter dated October 5th to Senators Lott and Daschle and in an op-ed in the October 6th *Washington Post* that a vote on ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty be postponed to permit a further discussion and clarification of the issues now too controversial. This having proved unachievable, I am obliged to state my position.

As a former Secretary of State, I find the prospect that a major treaty might fail to be ratified extremely painful. But the subject of this treaty concerns the future security of the United States and involves risks that make it impossible for me to recommend voting for the treaty as it now stands.

My concerns are as follows.

### Importance of Nuclear Weapons

For the entire postwar period, the American nuclear arsenal has been America's ultimate shield and that of our allies. Though we no longer face the same massive threat that we did during the Cold War, new dangers have arisen. Our nuclear arsenal is our principal deterrent to the possible use of biological and chemical warfare against America, our military, and our allies.

### Verification

Almost all experts agree that nuclear tests below some yield threshold remain unverifiable and that this threshold

Page 2/

can be raised by technical means. It seems to me highly
dangerous to leave such a vacuum regarding a matter
fundamentally affecting the security of the United States.
And the fact that this treaty is of indefinite duration
compounds the problem. The CIA's concerns about recent
ambiguous activities by Russia, as reported in the media,
illustrate difficulties that will only be compounded by the
passage of time.

Supporters of the treaty argue that, because of their small
yield, these tests cannot be significant and that the
treaty would therefore "lock in" our advantages vis-à-vis
other nuclear powers and aspirants. I do not know how they
can be so sure of this in an age of rapidly exploding
technology and whether, on the contrary, this may not work
to the advantage of nations seeking to close this gap.
After all, victory in the Cold War was achieved in part
because we kept increasing, and not freezing, our
technological edge.

## Nuclear Stockpile

I am not a technical expert on such issues as proof
testing, aging of nuclear material, and reworking existing
warheads. But I find it impossible to ignore the concern
about the treaty expressed by six former Secretaries of
Defense and several former CIA Directors and National
Security Advisers. I am aware that experts from the
weapons laboratories have argued that there are ingenious
ways to mitigate these concerns. On the other hand, there
is a difference between the opinion of experts from
laboratories and policymakers' confidence in the
reliability of these weapons as our existing stockpile
ages. When national security is involved, one should not
proceed in the face of such doubts.

## Sanctions

Another fundamental problem is the weakness of the
enforcement mechanism. In theory, we have a right to
abrogate the treaty when the "supreme national survival"
is involved. But this option is more theoretical than

practical. In a bilateral treaty, the reluctance to resort
to abrogation is powerful enough; in a multilateral treaty
of indefinite duration, this reluctance would be even more
acute. It is not clear how we would respond to a set of
violations by an individual country or, indeed, what
response would be meaningful or whether, say, an Iranian
test could be said to threaten the supreme national
survival.

Non-proliferation

I am not persuaded that the proposed treaty would inhibit
nuclear proliferation. Restraint by the major powers has
never been a significant factor in the decisions of other
nuclear aspirants, which are driven by local rivalries and
security needs. Nor is the behavior of rogue states such
as Iraq, Iran, or North Korea likely to be affected by this
treaty. They either will not sign or, if they sign, will
cheat. And countries relying on our nuclear umbrella might
be induced by declining confidence in our arsenal--and the
general impression of denuclearization--to accelerate their
own efforts.

For all these reasons, I cannot recommend a vote for a
comprehensive test ban of unlimited duration.

I hope this is helpful.

The Honorable
Jesse Helms
Chairman
Foreign Relations Committee
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

HENRY A. KISSINGER

October 13, 1999

Dear Mr. Chairman:

My concerns are as follows.

### Verification

Nuclear Stockpile

Sanctions

Page 3/

Non-proliferation

I hope this is helpful.

Sincerely,

Henry A. Kissinger

HENRY A. KISSINGER

October 11, 1999

Dear Mr. Chairman:

My concerns are as follows.

### Verification

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR • 350 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 • (212) 759-7919

HENRY A. KISSINGER

October 11, 1999

Dear Mr. Chairman:

My concerns are as follows.

### Verification

Final version to
Sen. Warner never
sent (SASC did not
call to request)

Page 2/

## Nuclear Stockpile

## Sanctions

09/10 '99 SAM 00:39 FAX 0143163180

HOTEL RITZ

002

Page 3/

## Non-proliferation

I hope this is helpful.

The Honorable
John Warner
Chairman
Armed Services Committee
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Page 3/

Non-proliferation

I hope this is helpful.

Non-proliferation

I hope this is helpful.

Page 3/

Non-proliferation

For all these reasons, I cannot recommend a vote for a
comprehensive test ban of unlimited duration. I could
support a threshold test ban at verifiable limits for a
fixed term, say ten years. I realize, however, that this
option is not before you.

I hope this is helpful.

OLD VERSIONS
(for your reference)

(change made to p. 3
dnly)

October 11, 1999

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, I--together with former National Security
Adviser Brent Scowcroft and former CIA Director and Deputy
Secretary of Defense John Deutch--had recommended in a
letter dated October 5th to Senators Lott and Daschle and in
an op-ed in the October 6th Washington Post that a vote on
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
be postponed to permit a further discussion and
clarification of the issues now too controversial. This
having proved unachievable, I am obliged to state my
position.

My concerns are as follows.

## Importance of Nuclear Weapons

## Verification

Almost all experts agree that nuclear tests below some
yield threshold remain unverifiable and that this threshold
can be raised by technical means. It seems to me highly
dangerous to leave such a vacuum regarding a matter

[Y]

[Y]

3

[Y]

Nuclear Stockpile

4

[Y]

## Sanctions

## Non-proliferation

5

I hope this is helpful.

Sincerely,

6

[Y]

Importance of Nuclear Weapons

*its* military, and our allies.

Verification

nuclear

Almost all experts agree that tests below some

Yield (Tresold)

magnitude remain unverifiable and that this *limit* can be

*increased* by technical means. It seems to me highly

And the fact that *the* treaty is of indefinite duration

2

[Y]

ambiguous activities by Russia, as reported in the media, only illustrate difficulties that will be compounded by the passage of time.

Supporters of the treaty argue that, because of their small yield, these tests cannot be significant and that the treaty would therefore "lock in" our advantages vis-à-vis other nuclear powers. I do not know how they can be so sure of this in an age of rapidly exploding technology and whether, on the contrary, this may not work to the advantage of nations seeking to close this gap. After all, victory in the war was achieved because we kept secrecy + not freeing our technological edge. Nuclear Stockpile in part

10/7/99

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, I had recommended that a vote on ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty be put off to permit a further discussion of the issues. This having proved unachievable, I am obliged to state my position.

My concerns are as follows.

[Y]

For the entire postwar period, the American nuclear arsenal has been America's ultimate shield and that of our allies. Though we no longer face the same massive threat that we did during the Cold War, new dangers have arisen. Our nuclear arsenal is our principal deterrent to the possible use of biological and chemical warfare against America, its military, and our allies.

## Verification

Almost all experts agree that tests below some magnitude remain unverifiable and that this limit can be increased by technical means. It seems to me highly dangerous to leave such a vacuum regarding a matter fundamentally affecting the security of the United States. And the fact that the treaty is of indefinite duration compounds the problem. The CIA's concerns about recent

2

[Y]

ambiguous activities by Russia, as reported in the media,
illustrate difficulties that will be compounded by the
passage of time.

Supporters of the treaty argue that, because of their
small yield, these tests cannot be significant and that the
treaty would therefore "lock in" our advantages vis-à-vis
nuclear powers. I do not know how they can be so sure of
this in an age of rapidly exploding technology and whether,
on the contrary, this may not work to the advantage of
nations seeking to close this gap.

## Nuclear Stockpile

3

[Y]

## Sanctions

The sanctions available for violating the treaty cause
grave concern. In a bilateral treaty, the reluctance to
resort to abrogation is powerful enough. In a multilateral
treaty of indefinite duration, this reluctance would be
even more acute. It is not clear how we would respond to a
set of violations by an individual country or, indeed, what
response would be meaningful.

4

[Y]

Non-proliferation

I am not persuaded that the proposed treaty would inhibit nuclear proliferation. Restraint by the major powers has never been a significant factor in the decisions of other nuclear aspirants, which are driven by local concerns. Rogue states such as Iraq, Iran, or North Korea, moreover, will not be affected by this treaty. They either will not sign or, if they sign, will cheat. And countries relying on our nuclear umbrella might be induced by declining confidence in our arsenal to accelerate their own efforts.

5

10/7/99

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, I had recommended that a vote on
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban ~~be put~~ *Treaty*
off to permit a further discussion of the issues. This
having proved unachievable, I am obliged to state my
position.

As a former Secretary of State, I find the prospect
*majer* ~~to be ratified if~~ *is approved?*
that a treaty might fail if ~~ratification [WORD MISSING]~~
extremely painful. But the subject of this treaty concerns
the future security of the United States and involves risks
that make it impossible for me to recommend voting for the
treaty as it now stands.

My concerns are as follows.

OCT-06-1999 20:46

P.03/06

Importance of Nuclear Weapons

Verification

Almost all experts agree that tests below some
magnitude remain unverifiable and that this limit can be
increased by technical means. It seems to me highly
dangerous to leave such a vacuum regarding a matter
fundamentally affecting the security of the United States.
And the fact that the treaty is of indefinite duration
compounds my concern.

10-06-99 19:40 TO:

FROM:

10/6/99

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, I had recommended that a vote on ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban be put off to permit a further discussion of the issues. This having proved unachievable, I am obliged to state my position.

As a former Secretary of State, I find the prospect that a treaty might fail if ratification [WORD MISSING] extremely painful. But the subject of this treaty concerns the future security of the United States and involves risks that make it impossible for me to recommend voting for the treaty as it now stands.

My concerns are as follows.

[Y]

## Verification

2

[Y]

The problem is exemplified by the CIA's concerns about
recent ambiguous activities by Russia, as reported in the
media.

Supporters of the treaty argue that these tests cannot
be significant and that the treaty would "lock in" our
advantages vis-à-vis nuclear powers. I do not know how
they can be so sure of this in an age of rapidly exploding
technology and whether, on the contrary, this may not work
to the advantage of nations seeking to close this gap.

## Nuclear Stockpile

I am not a technical expert on such issues as proof
testing, aging of nuclear material, and reworking existing
warheads. But I find it impossible to ignore the nearly
unanimous concern about the treaty expressed by almost all
former Secretaries of Defense. I am aware that experts
from the weapons laboratories have argued that there are

3

## Sanctions

The sanctions available for violating the treaty cause grave concern. In a bilateral treaty, the reluctance to resort to it is powerful. In a multilateral treaty of indefinite duration, it is not even clear how we would respond to a set of violations by an individual country or, indeed, what response would be meaningful.

## Non-proliferation

Nor am I persuaded that such a treaty would inhibit nuclear proliferation. Restraint by the major powers has never been a significant factor in the decisions of other

[M]

[Y]

Rogue states, moreover, will not be affected by this
treaty. They either will not sign or, if they sign, will
cheat. And countries relying on our nuclear umbrella might
be induced by declining confidence in our arsenal to
accelerate their own efforts.

I hope this is helpful.

5

10.1-04-1999 11:55AM

KISSINGER ASSOCIATES

212 759 0041

10/4/99

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, on which Senate action is
imminent.

You will remember that in testifying before your
Committee on missile defense, I answered a question on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as follows: "In my day it
was always believed that you could not go below a certain
threshold with safety. And all the analysis that I was
familiar with when I was conducting these negotiations was
[based on] the belief (A) that you could not test below a
certain threshold, and (B) that you needed it for the
confidence in your own weapons. But this is knowledge that
I have not updated."

10/4/99

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on which Senate action is
imminent.

Given the short time available before the Senate vote, I have not been able to prepare myself as I would have preferred. However, if I were asked to recommend a vote today, I could not do so on the basis of the evidence before me. My concerns are as follows:

## Verifiability

From my experience in government when the Administration in which I served negotiated a test ban with a threshold, I know that there is a level below which nuclear underground explosions are unverifiable. This threshold has undoubtedly been lowered since the 1970s. But there seems to be a consensus that tests below a certain magnitude are unverifiable and that this limit can be increased by technical means called uncoupling. It seems to me highly dangerous to leave such a vacuum regarding a matter fundamentally affecting the security of

[Y]

## Integrity of our Nuclear Arsenal

For the entire postwar period, the American nuclear
arsenal has been America's ultimate shield and that of our
allies. Though we no longer face the same massive threat
that we did during the Cold War, new dangers have arisen.
One principal deterrent to biological and chemical warfare
is our nuclear arsenal.

I am not a technical expert on such issues as proof
testing, aging of nuclear material, reworking existing
warheads and similar issues. I find it impossible to
ignore the nearly unanimous concern regarding the treaty of
former Secretaries of Defense. I find especially
persuasive the argument of former Secretary of Defense and

[Y]

former Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on __________.

I am aware of the fact that experts from the weapons
laboratories have argued that there are ingenious ways to
mitigate these concerns. But there is a difference between
experts from laboratories and confidence to use these
weapons as our existing stockpile ages.

It also seems to me dangerous to forego all options of
modernization in a period of revolutionary technological
change.

## Sanctions

I am also concerned about the sanctions available for
violating the treaty. In a bilateral treaty, abrogation is
difficult enough--although, even there, the reluctance to
resort to it would be very powerful. But in a multilateral
treaty of indefinite duration, it is not clear how we would

4

[Y]

Nonproliferation

I am aware of the argument that such a treaty would
inhibit nuclear proliferation. But a case can also be made
for the proposition that countries relying on our nuclear
umbrella might be induced by declining confidence in our
arsenal to accelerate their efforts.

For all these reasons, I cannot recommend a vote for a
complete test ban of unlimited duration. I could support a
threshold test ban at verifiable limits for a fixed term,
say ten years.

5

Page from your 5/26 SFRC (FYI)
<u>testimony</u>

CYJ

43

Dr. Kissinger: I really am not adequately prepared on
all the nuances of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I am
not ducking it. I will be glad to come back. I have not
addressed that issue.

In my day it was always believed that you could not go
below a certain threshold with safety. And all the analysis
that I was familiar with when I was conducting these
negotiations was the belief that you needed to test below

(A) that you could not test below a certain threshold, and
(B) to have? secondly, that you needed it for the confidence in your own weapons. But this is knowledge that I have not updated.

Senator Hagel: Thank you.

The general theme of the hearing this morning is
obviously on nuclear weapons, national security, ABM Treaty as
the core of the hearing. But I think this panel would be very
interested in getting your sense or whatever you would like to
offer in regard to what you know about the intelligence breach
that has provided China with apparently considerable nuclear
knowledge of our capacity.

Dr. Kissinger: I only know what I read in the
Sources?
unclassified -- I have not been briefed by the administration
on what they know and what their side of it is. I have talked
to Congressman Cox, and I have no reason to disbelieve his
report. In fact, I accept his report.

The worrisome aspect to me in the report is not that the

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SUITE 400

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

(202) 289-2260

(800) FOR DEPO

OCT. 1.1999 12:58PM

SENATOR JON KYL

NO. 366 P. 2/4

DRAFT

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senators Lott and Daschle:

As the Senate weighs whether to approve the Compr
we believe Senators will be obliged to focus on one domina
ratified: over the decades ahead, confidence in the reliability
would inevitably decline, thereby reducing the credibility of
previous efforts at a CTBT, this Treaty is intended to be of 1
yield," meaning that all nuclear tests, even of the lowest yiel
Treaty.

The nuclear weapons in our nation's arsenal are sophisticated devices, whose numerous
components must function together with split-second timing and scant margin for error. A
nuclear weapon contains radioactive material, which in itself decays, and also changes the
properties of other materials within the weapon. Over time, the components of our weapons
corrode and deteriorate, and we lack experience predicting the effects of such aging on the safety
and reliability of the weapons. The shelf life of U.S. nuclear weapons was expected to be some
20 years. In the past, the constant process of replacement and testing of new designs gave some
assurance that weapons in the arsenal would be both new and reliable. But under the CTBT, we
would be vulnerable to the effects of aging because we could neither test "fixes" of problems
with existing warheads nor test new weapon designs.

Remanufacturing components of existing weapons that have deteriorated also poses
significant problems. Manufacturers go out of business, materials and production processes
change, certain chemicals previously used in production may now be forbidden under new
environmental regulations, and so on. It is a certainty that new processes and materials --
untested -- will be used. Even more important, ultimately the nuclear "pits" will need to be
replaced -- and we will not be able to test those replacements. The upshot is that new defects
may be introduced into the stockpile through remanufacture, and without testing we can never be
certain that these replacement components will work as their predecessors did.

Another implication of a CTBT of unlimited duration is that over time we would
gradually lose our pool of knowledgeable people with experience in nuclear weapons design and
testing. Consider what would occur if the United States halted nuclear testing for 30 years. We
would then be dependent on the judgement of personnel with no personal experience either in
designing or testing nuclear weapons. In place of a learning curve, we would experience an
extended unlearning curve.

OCT. 1.1999 12:58PM

SENATOR JON KYL

NO. 366 P. 2/4

DRAFT

As the Senate weighs whether to approve the Compris
we believe Senators will be obliged to focus on one dominar-
ratified: over the decades ahead, confidence in the reliability
would inevitably decline, thereby reducing the credibility of
previous efforts at a CTBT, this Treaty is intended to be of u-
yield," meaning that all nuclear tests, even of the lowest yield
Treaty.

OCT. 1.1999 12:58PM

SENATOR JON KYL

NO. 366 P. 2/4

DRAFT

The Honorable Tom Daschle
Democratic Leader
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

As the Senate weighs whether to approve the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), we believe Senators will be obliged to focus on one dominant, inescapable result were it to be ratified: over the decades ahead, confidence in the reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile would inevitably decline, thereby reducing the credibility of America's nuclear deterrent. Unlike previous efforts at a CTBT, this Treaty is intended to be of unlimited duration and is "zero-yield," meaning that all nuclear tests, even of the lowest yield, are permanently prohibited by the Treaty.

OCT. 1. 1999 12:59PM

SENATOR JON KYL

NO. 366 P. 3/4

Furthermore, major gaps exist in our scientific understanding of nuclear explosives. As President Bush noted in a report to Congress in January 1993, "Of all U.S. nuclear weapons designs fielded since 1958, approximately one-third have required nuclear testing to resolve problems arising after deployment." We were discovering defects in our arsenal up until the moment when the current moratorium on U.S. testing was imposed in 1992. Is our subsequent record of non-discovery of similar defects since 1992 a reflection of the perfection of our arsenal, or simply the absence of testing? What defects we might have discovered over the last seven years will forever remain unknown.

Indeed, the history of maintaining complex military hardware without testing demonstrates the pitfalls of such an approach. Prior to World War II, the Navy's torpedoes had not been adequately tested because of insufficient funds. It took nearly two years of war before we fully solved the problems that caused our torpedoes to routinely pass harmlessly under the target or to fail to explode on contact. For example, at the Battle of Midway, the U.S. launched 47 torpedo aircraft, without damaging a single Japanese ship. If not for our dive bombers, the U.S. would have lost the crucial naval battle of the Pacific war.

The Department of Energy has crafted a program of experiments and computer simulations called the Stockpile Stewardship Program, that it hopes will allow our weapons to be maintained without testing. This program, which will not be mature for at least 10 years, will improve our scientific understanding of nuclear weapons and would likely mitigate the decline in our confidence in the safety and reliability of our arsenal. Mitigation is, of course, not the same as prevention. Over the decades, the erosion of confidence inevitably would be substantial.

The decline in confidence in our nuclear deterrent is particularly troublesome in light of the unique geopolitical role of the United States. The U.S. has a far-reaching foreign policy agenda and our forces are stationed around the globe. In addition, we have pledged to hold a nuclear umbrella over our NATO allies and Japan. Though we have abandoned chemical and biological weapons, we have threatened to retaliate with nuclear weapons to such an attack. In the Gulf War, such a threat was apparently sufficient to deter Iraq from using chemical weapons against American troops.

We also do not believe the CTBT will do much to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The motivation of rogue nations like North Korea and Iraq to acquire nuclear weapons will not be affected by whether the U.S. tests. Similarly, the possession of nuclear weapons by nations like India, Pakistan, and Israel depends on the security environment in their region, not by whether or not the U.S. tests. If confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent were to decline, countries that have relied on our protection could well feel compelled to seek nuclear capabilities of their own. Thus, ironically, the CTBT might cause additional nations to seek nuclear weapons.

Finally, it is impossible to verify a ban that extends to very low yields. The likelihood of cheating is high. "Trust but verify" should remain our guide. Tests with yields below 1 kiloton can both go undetected and be militarily useful to the testing state. Furthermore, a significantly larger explosion can go undetected -- or be mistaken for a conventional explosion used for

DONALD RUMSFELD

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October 18, 1999

Dear Henry:

Attached is a copy of the final letter that we all signed.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
26th Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Attachment

DR/nsp
101899.24

October 6, 1999

As the Senate weighs whether to approve the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), we believe Senators will be obliged to focus on one dominant, inescapable result were it to be ratified: over the decades ahead, confidence in the reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile would inevitably decline, thereby reducing the credibility of America's nuclear deterrent. Unlike previous efforts at a CTBT, this Treaty is intended to be of unlimited duration, and though "nuclear weapon test explosion" is undefined in the Treaty, by America's unilateral declaration the accord is "zero-yield," meaning that all nuclear tests, even of the lowest yield, are permanently prohibited.

The nuclear weapons in our nation's arsenal are sophisticated devices, whose thousands of components must function together with split-second timing and scant margin for error. A nuclear weapon contains radioactive material, which in itself decays, and also changes the properties of other materials within the weapon. Over time, the components of our weapons corrode and deteriorate, and we lack experience predicting the effects of such aging on the safety and reliability of the weapons. The shelf life of U.S. nuclear weapons was expected to be some 20 years. In the past, the constant process of replacement and testing of new designs gave some assurance that weapons in the arsenal would be both new and reliable. But under the CTBT, we would be vulnerable to the effects of aging because we could not test "fixes" of problems with existing warheads.

Remanufacturing components of existing weapons that have deteriorated also poses significant problems. Manufacturers go out of business, materials and production processes change, certain chemicals previously used in production are now forbidden under new environmental regulations, and so on. It is a certainty that new processes and materials — untested — will be used. Even more important, ultimately the nuclear "pits" will need to be replaced — and we will not be able to test those replacements. The upshot is that new defects may be introduced into the stockpile through remanufacture, and without testing we can never be certain that these replacement components will work as their predecessors did.

problems arising after deployment." We were discovering defects in our arsenal up until the moment when the current moratorium on U.S. testing was imposed in 1992. While we have uncovered similar defects since 1992, which in the past would have led to testing, in the absence of testing, we are not able to test whether the "fixes" indeed work.

The Department of Energy has structured a program of experiments and computer simulations called the Stockpile Stewardship Program, that it hopes will allow our weapons to be maintained without testing. This program, which will not be mature for at least 10 years, will improve our scientific understanding of nuclear weapons and would likely mitigate the decline in our confidence in the safety and reliability of our arsenal. We will never know whether we should trust Stockpile Stewardship if we cannot conduct nuclear tests to calibrate the unproven new techniques. Mitigation is, of course, not the same as prevention. Over the decades, the erosion of confidence inevitably would be substantial.

Finally, it is impossible to verify a ban that extends to very low yields. The likelihood of cheating is high. "Trust but verify" should remain our guide. Tests with yields below 1 kiloton can both go undetected and be militarily useful to the testing state. Furthermore, a significantly larger explosion can go undetected – or be mistaken for a conventional explosion used for mining or an earthquake – if the test is "decoupled." Decoupling involves conducting the test in a large underground cavity and has been shown to dampen an explosion's seismic signature by a factor of up to 70. The U.S. demonstrated this capability in 1966 in two tests conducted in salt domes at Chilton, Mississippi.