Telecon
John McCloy

7/1/69 9:30 a.m.

McCloy said he was expecting a call from Laird and thought that
Laird was going to suggest that he (McC) become a member of the
Fitzhue Committee for procurement. McCloy said that in light of
what they discussed yesterday, he didn't feel he would have enough
time to handle both projects. HAK thought he should consider their
program of primary importance unless McCloy wanted to come on
full time which McCloy didn't want to do.

McCloy said he would tell Laird he had a previous commitment then.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958
By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Secretary Laird
9:31 a.m. 7/1/69

HAK wanted to tell Laird that he was planning on setting up an
Arms Control Advisory Panel under John McCloy to operate
like the FIAB and would report directly to the President. This
would give us a check on the proposals so Laird doesn't have
to carry the brunt of everything. The President hasn't been
happy with the briefings lately. Laird agreed that this would
be a good procedure.

Laird and HAK both agreed to get together next week to discuss
the verification think again.

HAK mentioned that he had Symington in to discuss the ABM
and had a hard time getting a word in edgewise. Symington
held most of the conversation. Laird said he was glad to see
HAK getting some of this.

DECLASSIFIED

TELCOM
Bob Haldeman

Mr Kissinger

7-1-69 9:40 AM

H said he has problem with Don Kendall because K will not return
his calls. H said Kendall's present problem concerns Osmena
from the Philippines who is running for President. Osmena has been
trying very hard to see the President. Kendall is having dinner
with Osmena tonight to keep him happy without his seeing President.
K said there are strong reasons why Pres should not see him. H said
Kendall recognizes that but asked if there is anything he can say to
Osmena - a message from the President? K said there is nothing he
could use in election campaign. K said he would get a reading on
Osmena - he does not know enough about his views. H said Kendall
thinks he may win.

K asked if Kendall is mad at him and H said yes, Kendall claims K is
harder to get than the President. H said he told Kendall that K did not
have the option of being able to answer phone calls because K is at call
of President, etc. H suggested that K call Kendall back re Osmena.
K said he would do so - Kendall is old friend of the President and K knows
he deserves better treatment than K has been giving him.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By DS

NARA Date

4/15/06

TELCOM

Donald Kendall
Mr. Kissinger

7-1-69

9:50 AM

K said that Kendall is still talking to him is a miracle. Kendall said K is getting impossible. K explained his schedule, saying he knows it is no excuse and that he would do better by Kendall from now on. K said the least he should do is have girl call to say he can't return the call.

Kendall mentioned Osmena and K said Bob had called him about it. Kendall said he told Osmena President could not see him because he is a candidate and because the President is going to the Philippines. Kendall said he is having dinner with Osmena tonight. K said anything Kendall can do to make Osmena feel good - high regard of President, etc. K said if he wants to come to Washington and see someone at the State Department that can be arranged but it would be mistake for Pres to see him. Kendall said he agreed. Kendall said he is prepared to give Osmena any message that K thinks he should, bearing in mind that a Philippine is apt to use it. K said we have nothing against him and would not be heartbroken if he won election - odds favor the other guy. Kendall said one thing that bothers Osmena is that Marcos will use the President's trip - K agreed. K said he gets nothing but good reports about Osmena which makes it tough but does not think Pres should see him. K said Kendall could ax tell him of our high regard but that this is delicate period for us. Kendall said he has convinced Osmena that meeting is impossible, but wondered if there was anything in particular that K could think of that K would like Kendall to tell him. K said only that we are interested in close relations with him and if he wins election he will find us very cooperative and forthcoming - we have no favorites and are strictly neutral.

Kendall said he was also concerned about South American thing - he is being bugged and should either tell them it is or it is not going to happen. K suggested they try to do it on the West Coast when his schedule will be less hectic and they agreed to aim for either August 16 or 23. K said they could meet any place near San Clemente that Kendall thinks appropriate - K said he would be glad to spend the day. Kendall said he would explore those dates.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCON
Secy Laird
Mr. Kidsinger
7-1-69 3:25 PM

L said he understood K has some names that L has on Defense Panel -
for example, John McCloy and Tom Dewey. L said he guesses he
better stay away from both of them. L said he talked with McCloy
and he said it was up to Laird to decide which is more important.
K and L agreed disarmament was more important. L said he would
also stay away from Dewey - he thinks they are the only two conflicts.
L said he would tell McCloy he thought disarmament was more important.

L said he would send over a copy of his memo to G Smith in which his
recommedations were included. K asked about questions and
answers. L said they will come to K this afternoon.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
6:05 p.m. 7/1/69

Rogers said he was thinking of having a press conference. He wanted to know what to say about the NATO people being mad. HAK said he didn't have a brilliant answer. They were notified two hours before.

Rogers said that on these trips, as soon as the President decides on a schedule, the operational phase should go through his office. HAK said they always would unless he is under the strictest orders not to. HAK assured Rogers that all cables had gone through State. Tito was informed through our Ambassador here and a simultaneous record sent to State. John Walsh would have the ma record. HAK said we didn't let the Soviets know and didn't feel it was a good idea to do so.

HAK said the President doesn't want to get trapped into opening of SALT on this trip -- like an invitation to come to Geneva. Rogers agreed.

On the Southern Rhodesia situation, Rogers said he will say we have the consular question under consideration. HAK said the President wasn't very eager to move into that one. Rogers said he was afraid we would have to get to it soon anyway and HAK agreed.

HAK said he mentioned the Malasian thing to the President and eh agrees that Rogers shouldn't go.

DECLASSIFIED

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
7/1/69, 6:40 p. m.

Laird said he had the questions and answers ready but that he
understood there were some questions and answers circulated by
ACDA. Laird said he wanted to go over his questions in view
of the questions circulated by ACDA. He said he was taking a
different position. He said he wouldn't comment on Gerry's
questions but there were several questions brought up by the
disarmament agency and he thought they should also be covered
in his list. He guaranteed to have the questions delivered to
K tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED

TELCORN

William Watts
Mr. Kissinger
7-2-69 9:40 AM

W said he has talked it over with Harriet and would like to come down.
K said he will talk to the President about it which he has not done yet/
K said he may not be able to do it this morning and will have to wait until
Monday. W said Harriet is anxious to get to Washington as fast
as she can about schooling, etc. K said in addition to checking with
Pres he will have to run quick SY check on W. K said another problem
is whether he can afford another enemy who is close to Fulbright in town.
W said he does not Moose but not well. W said whatever it is worth to
K, he has old friend on Fulbright's staff by name of Lowenstein
who resigned from FS when W did. They worked together professionally
and it might ask help to know there is someone on Fulbright's staff
who would look at W favorably. K said it is not that - Moose is constituent
of Fulbright - would not be directed at W.

W and K discussed salary - K said he thought it is around $36,000 - not
sure.

W said one other thing - he does have cousin (Phil Watts) who is known
to President, if that is worth anything.

K said he cannot add anything to the problems he already has described to W. W assured K he wanted to work with him and to help. W asked if if was too early for Harriet to come down on Monday to get some preliminary ideas about schools. K said it would be better to wait until he talks to W on Monday.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

TELCORN

Genl Cushman
Mr. Kissinger
7-2-69 10:15 AM

K said there are two papers due which President is very interested in and keeps asking him about. One is Haiphong paper - George Carver called K two weeks ago and asked what K's objections were. K said he did not want to be in position of telling Agency what to write. K said he does not think is is healthy position for him to tell C what he wants. C agreed and said he gave Carver some methods on presenting facts, etc. K said he thought C's last NIE in this respect presented the thing a lot better. K said he has his own personal doubts about that one theory but this is different problem. C said he discovered that there truly does seem to be a split.

K said second paper has to do with Cambodia - he got group together on this and was told he would have within two weeks a statement of requirements in order to settle the issue. K said there are differences of opinion between McVey(1) and C's agency. K said we really would like to get tentative conclusion before the trip. C said he would get right to work on this and hurry it up.

C asked about distribution of that last memo - NIE. C asked if it is o.k. to go ahead and make the distribution. K said yes - he will tell C privately his own analysis of the thing. K said he has no objection to way it was presented and to go ahead and distribute it. C said he would be back to K or his office on the other matter.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By

DSNARA Date 4/15/06

TELCON
Mr. Dirge

Mr. Kissinger

7-2-69 2:30 PM

K said he did not know where D was located and D said in Bloomington, Indiana. K said President wanted to do a poll on VN and have questions worked out between K and D and K asked how they could best do that. D asked if K had seen the one he did in May and K said no. D said it was delivered to Flanigan and Ehrlichman and D thought it might be useful for K to have a look at what he did then. K said Pres wants some specific questions on VN and K has no idea how to design a poll. D said they had one item on the poll taken between April 25 and May 2 on surrendering our interest or not and there was a scaler arrangement of that - also possibility of when the war would end. D said there are all sorts of ways to design or structure these things. D said he is certain from what K has said, the alternatives in that poll are not what K would want but he thinks K should get ahold of it. Also K should have in mind rather specifically the time frame, type of sample and type of interviewing wanted. K and D agreed to meet in K's office on Monday, July 7 at 12:00 Noon. In the meantime, K will get the May poll from Flanigan or Ehrlichman.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

7-2-69 2:40 PM

Kendall said he had fascinating meeting with Osmena last night. Osmena claims latest poll in Philippines has him leading four to one in the rural areas. K asked if Osmena was coming in to see K tomorrow - he asked for appointment and K set one up. Kendall said he did not mention it to him. Kendall said Osmena wanted to know if there is any way on trip to Philippines where there might be affairs at which Osmena would have a chance to say hello to the President. K said he are looking into that. Kendall said Osmena is anxious to assure Pres that he is not anti-American, etc. Kendall said he seemed completely sincere but knowing these people it is hard to tell what they mean. Kendall said he was very careful in anythin he said to Osmena and kept emphasizing what K had told him yesterday - if he wins we are looking forward to working with him, will watch election with great deal of interest, etc. K said that is exactly position we would take too. K said frankly we would like to see him when we are in the Philippines but do not want to break too much china. Kendall asked whether K had seen July issue of Fortune - good piece on the Philippines. K said he would get a copy of it. Kendall asked if K wanted to see Osmena tomorrow and K said if he wants to see him but K knows he wants it largely for publicity. K said he was not saying that critically and that he would be glad to see him if he wants to see K. Kendall said in other words, K was not particularly anxious? K said no but he is torn. In terms of his schedule, it is rough but in terms of national interest, K does not want to antagonize a man who may be President. K said if Kendall could turn him off without hurting his feelings it would be fine with K. Kendall said o.k. K said he would not go to any length on this, however, and Kendall said he would not bring it up if it does not seem appropriate.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

TELCOM

Gerard Smith
Mr. Kissinger
72-69 2:45 PM

S said he has communication from Laird about composition of SALT Delegation. K asked if he was objecting to it. S said no, but said K would recall S had Harold Brown as principal scientific adviser on basis of checking out with Packard and DuBridge who said President was enthusiastically in favor of Brown in that job. K said DuBridge is not the right person for S to check with. S said now Laird wants Rowland Herpst. S told Laird the history of this and Laird said he would not press this but S thinks K should be aware of this. K said he is - Laird has called K. K said he would back S up on this but in the future if S wants to be sure there is no objection he should talk to K. S said o.k. K said S did discuss Brown informally with K but never made a formal proposal - K said he did not discourage S then and would back him up.

S brought up General Allison - K said he did not understand what Laird is getting at. S said he did not either, but it must have to do with Defense Dept politics. K asked S if he cared and S said not necessarily but hoped we would not get Wheeler's nose out of joint at the start. S said he think he made an error when he sent it over because Laird says DOD will have chief military adviser and Allison will be on delegation or something like that. K said if Smith will tell him what he wants he will do his best to get it. S said he does not want Brown to get bumped - he thinks Mel is o.k. now after their talk. Mel is proposing as alternate to Nitze, Burt Marshall and that is o.k. with S but he hopes we do not get too many people. K said he will do his best on Brown and then said that President approved this morning S's delegation list.

S then brought up consulting papers to go to NATO. Directive is tell them China thing is non-negotiable. S said he is happy carrying out Commander in Chief's orders, but would flag point that this could leak out of Brussels and would prejudice President's position in the Senate. K said this was negotiation position and not necessarily for consulting. S said o.k.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

TELCORN

Secy Laird
Mr. Kissinger

7-2-69 5:10 PM

L said he wanted to talk to K a bit and asked if K had chance to talk to President last day or so re military operations in SEA. L said Bill Rogers was hit hard on this at press conference today. L said he understands that yesterday at VN Task Force they made it clear at State Department that our goal was 100,000 for this year. K asked who - L or State? L said State. K said they have no business making anything clear on that subject. L said he is concerned about doing planning for that if we do want to reach it. K said what Pres has in back of his mind is almost identical to what L discussed - doing something close to it. L mentioned another 28,000 in August and K said Pres might want to go higher and next time lower.
L said first he thinks we should look at military operation and withdrawals - XXX NVN forces and infiltration thing and new strategy.
L mentioned Genl Japps (?) speech of June 22 and K said it was fascinating speech. L said they also have clear budget guidelines too - do not have exemption for SEA figures they did last year.
L said he has been spending his mornings with the Chiefs and when he looks over speech by President this is merely a goal. K said that it clear - it is goal and not directive. KXX

L said we have to have this casualty thing looked at. K said Rogers told President that they were lowest ever. L said Rogers called him on that and he told him not to use it - L said he told him he was wrong. K said Pres called him and he said he could not believe never had been that low.

K asked if L would be around on July 4. L said he is making speech at Daytona Beach. K suggested they get together for half an hour.
L said it depends on when he gets back from Daytona - just going for speech and will call K when he returns.

L asked if K got copy of wire from Abrams that L sent over and K said yes, very interesting.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Ambassador Yost
2:30 a.m., 7/3/69

Yost was calling to reinforce telegram he sent about next round of
bilateral talks and to urge that our negotiators be authorized to
indicate that we are prepared to move on some of the points of primary
interest of the other side if they are ready to move on more of the
ones of interest to us. He thought we have carried on this sparring
as far as is profitable. There has been more movement on their side.
HAK said that is one point Dobrynin made.

Yost said the points on which we would move are points we have
already considered moving on anyway. For us to stand where we
have been he is convinced will produce no more movement on the
other side. Whenever there is a round where we continue not to move,
we get strong reactions such as with King Faisal.

HAK said a paper is now with the President including Yost's telegram
He will present this to the President as strongly as Yost presented it
to him. Actually, HAK said he would have no argument with him; they
were in agreement but would have to get word from the President as
to how he felt. Yost said if the situation were stable, we could afford
to spar but it is anything but stable and the Arabs are getting upset.

HAK said he would talk to Sisco and the Secretary about the Jeruselem
problem that has come up in the Security Council and get back to Yost
as soon as he could. Yost felt that this problem would be coming up
in the next day or so.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By DS

NARA Date

4/15/69

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
9:20 a.m. 7/3/69

HAK wanted to tell Rogers that he thought his press
conference went very well.

Rogers said he felt like the Secretary of Defense and HAK replied
that every question is a booby trap. The coverage was excellent.

HAK said if it was o.k., he would stop by to see Rogers at 12:30
today after Undersecretaries meeting. He would bring Life
photographer with him. Rogers said fine.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

DSNARA Date

Telecon
Donald Kendall
9:30 a.m. 7/3/69

HAK wanted to know if the meeting with Osmena was still on.
Kendall said no and he wasn't mad. After his Kendall found out
that Osmena had to go to california and couldn't make the appointment,
Kendall built up HAK's interest in seeing Osmena. O is sending
paper over.

Kendal thought that if anything was planned on the trip, Osmena
should be invited but he didn't think he would accept anything from
the President. HAK said we would try to have something and
would try to get him invited.

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon
James Killian
9:35 a.m. 7/3/69

Killiansaid he had to make a decision on whether to accept
Secretary Laird's invitation to be on the panel study at the
Defense Dept. He was also asked and supposedly confirmed
as a member on the Disarmament Advisory Panel. He wanted
HAK's opinion on which would be most important since he
couldn't possibly do both.

HAK said he didn't know too much about the Pentagon panel
and the the Disarmament Board would be very important.

Killian didn't want the WH to think he was trying to get out
of something. HAK said of course not, it wasunderstood that
he couldn't do both.

Killian said he would tell Laird that he is committed then
HAK said he would tell the President that Killian had called
to express his concern.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

I spoke to Dr. Killian at 9:05 p. m. on July 2, in response to his call to you earlier that day. He indicated that he wanted to speak to you on a personal basis reference discussion he had with John McCloy on the issue of his serving on the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel and on the Disarmament Advisory Council. I gather he wishes guidance as to the relationship between the two and the priority between the two. He stated that he wanted to keep this on a strictly personal basis and hoped that you could speak with him on July 3 since he is departing for Europe that evening.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCON
Mr. Ehrlichman
Mr. Kissinger
9:55 a. m., 7-3-69

HAK said I am calling you John, rather than bothering the President. E said that's fine. HAK said would you tell the President I am putting an embargo on any comment about Vietnamese withdrawals because there is a steamroller building up. I can already see the headlines that the war is over. HAK said a fair number of Vietnamese have been withdrawn but only in Cambodia. I think the President should announce anything like that. Would you tell the President I am doing this. If he disagrees, all he has to do is get you to call me and I will take the embargo off. HAK asked Ehrlichman to also tell Ziegler to say there are some movements but we just cannot judge whether there is some significance to them. And that we will just have to wait until we see what actions are over the next few weeks. E said I will tell them.

mlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Governor Harriman
11:00 a.m. 7/3/69

Harriman called to say that he was happy about the lull in the fighting.

HAK said he has ordered a full study of what orders one would give to implement this. The Chiefs of Staff aren't even aware of the study. Harriman said he was upset by McGovern's statement. He seems to draw Clifford, Vance andxx Harriman together on views and it is not true. Harriman is think if putting out public statement to that effect. HAK said that would help. It would make it look like Harriman wasn't opposed to everything.

Harriman said he didn't fully agree with Cliffords position. He said State and Lodge encouraged him to do this and HAK said he doubted that. McGovern told Lodge he was going and Lodge said o.k. but McG didn't tell anybody what he was going to say. Harriman said he didn't go along with Shaplen's article(?). It was too extreme.

HAK said he was anxious to see ghe Governor and get back to him to set something up.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By

DSNARA Date 4/15/66

Telecon
John Ehrlichman

2:15 p.m.

7/3/69

E said the president was concerned since the Ankeny index. Annenberg is a very vain fellow. He was afraid if it were indicated that the White House was aware, it would embarrass him and impair his effectiveness. He feels that we shouldn't do it and leave it to Dunkin's(?) discretion. E has a call in to him.

HAK said E might mention to the President that Hanoi has announced it will be releasing three American flyers today and that they will accept packages for the other prisoners.

HAK said what would I do without a war. E said if we don't have one, he would make sure. HAK said the President said he wished there was a major war on, just think what HAK could do for him.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By

DSNARA Date

4/15/06

Telecon
Governor Dewey
2:25 p.m. 7/3/69

Dewey wanted to know if HAK's friend gave him his greetings yesterday. HAK said yes and he asked me to discuss a matter that concerned him re strategic arms talks and our whole security situation. He feels he can get through his two administrations but didn't want his successor to wonder what he was doing. When you look at the facts, you have to see another 10 years of military deterioration isgoing to put us in a very difficult position diplomatically.

D said he made a speech to that effect but wasn't sure what he was talking about. HAK said we can slide through five or six years living off capital. So many interests have developed, it is hard to get objective views from the inside. We are being propelled into talks with Soviets. We are talking about blue chips. For all these reasons, we he(?) was wondering if we could create an informal group to meet from time to time to review where we stand and where we are going. He was think of Dewey and General Clay, Dean Achison and one or two others of this type. Dewey felt sure that Clay would accept. (Went on to discuss Clay's loyalty and past involvement).

As additional members of this group, Lovett was mentioned, and Prescott Bush. Dewey was going to approach Bush and call HAK back next Friday. Also suggested HAK call David Kennedy about possibility of getting someone from Chicago area. HAK said he would do this.

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon
Generral Wheeler

X 6:45 p.m. 7/3/69

HAK said he agreed with the note W sent over. He intends to
exercise that with some help from W. W said he would be glad
to. W was worried about the attitudes when the people get to
negotiation and HAK agreed. This is the hardest thing to
control. HAK suggested that Wheeler might want wne of his
people on the team to keep them in line -- if things start going
astray, we will know about it and can brigg them back in line.

Another matter which HAK wanted to bring up and one which he
hadn't even discussed with the President yet was the matter of
sending another set of orders to General Abrams. We are not
losing men in the search and destroy missions but when we sit
there and they attack us as Harriman suggests we do by the
lull in fighting.

Wheeler said he would do somethinking on this.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
William Sullivan

7:25 p.m.

7/3/69

Sullivan said he had a visit from Bieu Diem. In Diem's view, the pros outweigh the cons for the President to make a short stop in Vietnam. Sullivan told Diem that the current plans did not include a stop and thought that any speculation on Diems part would not be particularly useful. HAK said the President wanted to stay loose on this.

Sullivan said he had talked to Halperin about format for Sequoia meeting. He thought that a paper from George Carver(Garven?) might be useful and maybe an answer from Thieu about stop.

HAK said the President wanted these special meetings on VN to be ad hoc and to run on the lines of the NSC. Sullivan said that certainly met with the Secretary's needs.

Sullivan said he talked to Holdridge and hoped that he could still attend Sullivans sessions. HAK said by all means. Sullivan wants to use Holdridge as a liaison for clearances. HAK said fine but give him as much time as possible.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCORN

Mr. William Buckley
Mr. Kissinger
10:10 a.m., 7-4-69

B said are you calling to wish me a happy Fourth of July, Henry?
(Discussed what has been done at the University). B asked if HAK
had heard what he told them at Syracuse about him. B proceeded
to tell story. Also discussed students turning back on HAK at Brown
University.

HAK said, Bill, I was wondering whether you could come down next
week sometime. I have some things I would like to talk over with
you. B said, Henry my leader is sending me to Vienna and I am
leaving Tuesday. HAK asked when B would be back. HAK stated
it is not all that urgent but I would like to have a frank talk with you
about Vietnam. B said why don't I come down as soon as I come back.
Said the other alternative would be to come down before he left for
Vienna.

HAK said there are two things I want. I want to get your feel about
stands to take. Second, I want to ask whether there is anything you
could do in building a little fire on the right. It just can't go on like
this. Those are two things I wanted to talk with you about and also to
give you a position of where we stand.

HAK asked if B could come down about 8 or 8:30 Sunday nite and have
dinner or Monday morning. (HAK checked with Col Haig and advised
B that we would send a plane up to Westchester for him and take him
back and that Col Haig would advise him of plane number).

HAK and B agreed that B would be picked up at 6:30 p. m.

mlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By

DSNARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Elliot Richardson
1:15 p. m. 7/4/69

Richardson said he heard from Clyde Ferguson and was confused
about the paper he said he was preparing.

HAK explained that Meyer called him to say that Ferguson was
requesting to be cut loose from State and continue as special
President envoy with a few to springing settlement of relief
problem. Ferguson thinks he can lick the relief problem in
three or four days. HAK didn't think this could be done so
suggested that Ferguson write a paper stating just what his
plans would be on the relief problem. There was never any
mention that he should do something on a settlement. HAK's
instructions to Roger Morris were to state the paper was to
consider relif problems only.

Richardson said he had a meeting on this last week and they were
meeting again on Monday at 3:15 (Roger Morris was invited and
HAK told Morris). Richardson said that he was working through
Newsom and felt the chain should continue through him.

HAK said a request had come from the President today to look
at the relief problem and HAK was going to include Ferguson's
paper in that package.

They agreed that Ferguson could continue paper -- on relief
problem only --.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Lloyd Norman (Newsweek)
3:10 p.m. 7/4/69

Norman had questions on the statements made by Rogers and
the Pentagon regarding infiltration, specifically, is there a
dryup pipeline(?).

HAK said that this was the rainy season and there is always
low at this particular time. He didn't want to speculate any
further. He did not want to say there was no infiltration but
agreed that it was low at this time.

Norman asked about the withdrawal of 3 regiments near or
in the DMZ to x points further north. HAK said these
regiments are constantly going back and forth and is hard
to tell. He also didn't want to speculate on this point but said
that 6 weeks from now might show a bit more light.

Norman questioned the Pentagon's statement about reduction
in casualties if (something or other stopped) Their (Pentagon's)
estimate was 175 to 200 but Norman thought this was a bit
high. HAK said his estimate would be more like 75 to 100.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By DS

NARA Date

4/15/06

Telecon
Senator Javits

5:30 p.m.

7/7/69

Javits reminded HAK about their conversation at breakfast about
two things. (1) he was sending over a letter on (____?).

(2) Bringing in a lot of the leaders in the Jewish field to Washington for a luncheon. Max Fisher and Javits are prepared to do this and would like to schedule it for July 17 provided HAK's schedule will permit him to attend. HAK would make a short statement for 15 minutes and then answer questions. HAK said he agreed to do it in principle but would have to check with the President on whether he could or not. He said he would get back to Javits in the morning with an answer.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By

DSNARA Date 4/15/86

TELCORN
Secy Finch
Mr. Kissinger
7-7-69 6:05 PM

F said State says since he is not a Chief of State, it would be breaking
precedent. F said he leaves it to K about being raised with the President -
knowing how he reacts to State Dept recommendations. K asked
when decision has to be made and F said tonight. K said he is going with
President on boat and will be riding with him and will take it up with him,
saying F thinks it is good idea. F said there are some slight pluses
but not in terms of breaking any china, but it would be a plus in terms of
domestic politics. K said there are always ways of doing it if F wants
it done. F said they (State) said something about Mboya being too close
to US. K said he is dead now. F said he is not making a big issue of this.
K said he will take up with President this evening and let F know.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By DS

NARA Date

4/15/06

Telecon
Ambassador Yost
10:20 p. a.m. 7/8/69

K said he talked to Sisco about his trip and wanted Yost to know that his views had been represented, and hoped that he had been fairly represented. In answer to Yost's question on how things stood, K said the President did not want to authorize presentation of the fallback position. K said frankly, they had a hard time convincing the President that Sisco should go. K didn't feel he could go into the details of the President's thinking on the phone and would be glad to explain it to Yost at another time. Yost is very concerned about this. K said that the Secretary also agreed that we shouldn't do this. Yost mentioned a New York Times headline today stating that the whole thing is falling apart and the 2- and 4-powers meetings aren't doing their job. K said the President approved the other recommendations but agreed this wasn't much. K said the President's major concern is to see what the Russians are going to do, but Yost said in this exercise, the Russians have moved further than we have. K said he didn't think there was much chance of the President changing his mind on this and agreed to see Yost after they returned from the trip. K said he would be seeing the President today and would stress Yost's point again.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Secretary Laird
10:40 a.m. 7/8/69

K said the President is very eager to get for his own private use, a
particular study that K has already discussed with Capt. Robinson about.
This is to have no official status and will be just a Navy staff study. K
thought Laird would want to know about it, but Laird already knew and
assured K that there would be no official status of the study. K said he
would probably want to talk to Laird at some point as they did on the
Korean thing.

Laird thought the meeting on the Sequoia was very good; it helped him tremendously. K agreed. In discussing MX VN, K said for Laird's own use, the President has not excluded the possibility that he could take the option to the right in order to wind up the war quickly. Laird agreed that he had to be in that position. They discussed the numbers of troop withdrawals and the percentage of support to combat withdrawals. HAK said they shouldn't expect the same number all the time. Laird said he would explore the possibilities.

Laird mentioned SALT. He had been going over some of the cables that have gone to NATO and wanted to know how these were being coordinated. K said here. Laird said he didn't get much chance to see these things and would discuss this with Rogers. He felt when we give the impression that we are very confident of our verification process and then tell our NATO friends and then we don't make a point out of inspection, it takes our main position and waters it down. K said from CIA's point of view, we are playing down our verification too much. K asked Laird if he would do a memo to just K and the President noting what they had discussed the other day on this. Laird wasn't sure Ellsworth understood the problem. K promised to call Ellsworth and clear up the matter. K said he had lunch with Nitze and they discussed the Soviet strategy. All the facts indicated that the Soviet strategy was not the same as ours. Their view is toward military and ours is toward retaliation. The Government doesn't understand this. K said he would put it into the NSC And work at it from there. It would be more of an objective study rather than having it done in Defense. Laird agreed.

K thought Laird's Q&As were excellent and has given them to the President.
The President was also impressed with the six points Laird brought up at
the last NSC meeting. They were very important.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958
By DS NARA Date 4/15/69

Telecon
Dave Packard

Kissinger

7/8/69, 11:20 p. m.

K said re the announcement he was under a handicap that he had a direct unappealable order from the President that it has to be 10%. K said the President was positive about it more than anything else since he has worked with the President. K said the President wanted to make it 15%. K said President accepted combat forces in Vietnam; if he finds out we included Philippines and Okinawa, he will not go along with that.

Packard said 10,000 figure is on the conservative side. He said he thought it would be better to put it on the low side until they had more information.

K said we are not going to make the announcement until 11:00 a. m. He said he told the President, based on the BOB figures, that it would be closer to 24,000. K said we couldn't hold Packard to our misinformation.

P said a safer figure would be 15; JCS said they could only do about 8 and that's why we settled on 10,000.

K said frankly, this is one of those things the President feels very strongly about. At several stages he wanted 30% cuts. K said the President said if he couldn't get substantial cuts of 10% that he just had to order it.

P said he didn't want to come up with an unrealistic figure that we would have to "eat crow" on later. However, he said we can make it within reason with whatever the President wants.

K said he would see the President and explain P's problem -- you think 15% is an outside figure that you might realistically make? P said that depends on what the definitions are. Tell the President that I will bet on it the first thing in the morning.

K said he would tell the President that P knows he can make 10,000; 15,000 we may have to stretch definitions of related activities.

P said really to get a good fix on this you need time for analysis. He said it is hard to pull it out of a hat. P said tell the President that we picked the 10,000 figure as one that we were certain we could guarantee without stretch one way or the other. P said if the President thinks it would be helpful to his position to have the 15,000 figure we will have to stretch a little and that's all right and we can handle it on that basis.

P said we don't have a fix on the contract. K said we have excluded that from the announcement.

DECLASSIFIED

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger
Pete Vaky

7/8/69 -- 11:35 p. m.

K called to say that he was going over the talking points and he thought that they were very good. He said the only thing he was wondering was whether or not Vaky could now or tomorrow morning, before K goes to that meeting, do a few lines re. different interests, particularly on page 5 of the talking points. He said it was a good question. What did he think? Vaky said he would have them for K by 8:00 a. m. on Wednesday, 7/9.

K said that Vaky has been terrific. K said this is one of the best efforts we have had in the NSC. K said his major function vis-a-vis Vaky was to give him authority which he should have had as Under Secretary.

Vaky thanked him and then said he had a problem for K re Honduras and San Salvador. Vaky said that Tony had his memo on it. K looked over the memo and said that he understood it and that he would get to it the first thing in the morning. K said assume it will be approved and to work on a telegram to speed things up. Vaky said he would, but wouldn't have it until noon on Wednesday. K said that was good -- he would get it signed before lunch.

feg

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Governor Rockefeller
12:05 p. m. 7/9/69

R - I talked to Charlie Meyers who called me. He wanted support on a wire
re Congressional appropriations.

K.- The President has decided to put your report before the NSC. You know where your problem is going to be though. You will be getting calls saying that each of their views ought to be considered in your report.

R - It is a question of strategy as to how much it will help. Charlie is a decent sort. He wants a revolutionary change.

K - I would recommend that you listen but then present your views.

R - I will talk to George Woods.

You should

K - So/avoid any impression that you are putting public pressure on the
President. There is a systematic effort to warn about this.

R - In my statement I said I stand ready to support this in the executive and legislative branches of the Government where appropriate.

K - There are people here in town, that if given the chance, they will try to twist it.

R - I feel pretty clear as to how I will present this. My interest is for the country and the President. I will try to have an expurgated edition of the report.

K - The President has great confidence in you; you will have no problem with him.

R - The question is, how they can advise me when they don't know what is in my report.

K - We had an NSC meeting on Latin America today but any proposals have been deferred until after your report is submitted. He mentioned the Peru paper in which certain recommendations were made to the President wanted him to discuss with the Gov. before implementing them. The basic points were that we should not apply the Hickenlooper Amendment; we should continue the economic pressure so it doesn't show so they know we are watching things. The fishing convention is taking place on July 30.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By

DSNARA Date

4/15/69

- 2 -

Rockefeller was concerned about the Guinna ambassadorial post. His suggestion was that the present Ambassador be kept on until after their problems are settled. K said he didn't know if that could be done and didn't want to discuss it too much on the phone. R said if the President is spending the money and time and effort to send someone on a trip, he should listen to some of the recommendations. He felt that the President was letting the bureaucracy run over him on this and felt that the President should establish who is the boss. This is a little thing but if they win on this, they will continue to eat him up. K said the Gov didn't have to convince him. He would talk to the President about it again.

The Gov. said he was disappointed that there was no action on the Uruguaian situation. K said to his understanding action would be taken. The Gov. mentioned again that this man was in touble. If we refused him help, the Gov. said he could make a case in Congress and blow the whole lid off. This is a very simple, little thing and it only takes the President's pen to make it so. R said to tell the President "are we going to allow the bureaucracy and procedures to supersede the importance and realities and necessity of doing things that are curial to our foreign policy." If our house falls down there, you will have Communists in there. K asked the Gov. to send him a letter on this. The Gov. said he knew about these people. They are going to measure the President on this one. They will find where he is vulnerable. K said again that he would talk to the President on this. R said is he the boss or is he afraid and will let the bureaucracy run it. K said for the Gov. to write him a letter. This was a very delicate situation and one which he didn't want to discuss on the phone.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By

DSNARA Date

4/15/06

Telecon
Attorney General Mitchell

12:30 p.m.

7/9/69

Mitchell said after he received K's memo about the Sequoia meeting, he understood it much better. He was concerned about the point with the relationship on what they figure he(?) will do about withdrawals. He let them go too far with their position without calling their attention to his position and to more specifics because it was a general discussion. M thought he left it too open ended as to what the guidelines would be.

On the Latin American situation (discussed at NSC) it wasn't mentioned whether there is any intercountry p??? among revolutionaries. He thought this could be a very crucial if they ever got to the point of the Soviets being able to develop it. K said this ought to be included.

M wanted to know how Smith was coming along asx with approaches to the other side. They both agreed that he would have trouble with the point that you have to get there before you can decide on what to discuss.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
1:00 p. m. 7/9/69

R wanted to know if K was aware that Thieu was planning on giving
a statement the same day we were planning on having private
session. K was aware and agreed that the two shouldn't conflict.
The determined that Cabot Lodge should address his statement to
Tho without going into another room and speak it from the text not
read it. R said the private meeting should be afater Thieu's
speech. K said we should ask for Friday and R agreed.

On the statement again, K said it should be spoken the way the
President dictated it while the others are sitting around. If R
didn't hear from him before the end of the day, R should proceed
x on that basis.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By

DSNARA Date

4/15/06

Telecon
The President
3:25 p.m. 7/9/69

The President had discussed Thieu's statement with Rogers. It was his understanding that Thieu would give it tomorrow night with no morre changes. He was under the impression that Diem was not Thieu's man, therefore things get back to Thieu that we are trying to press. Whatever he says now, he should I should go ahead and hit it. The next day, possibly at 7:00 I'll go on TV. You have your shop draft a long statement that I can release, but will give only a 2 minute one on TV. K said we sent drafts of what he should say in the preceeding phase. Thats when we put the arm on him. Yesterday State tried to do a redraft. (President said Thieu's statement was a direct result of Midwa

On the personnel cut, the President didn't feel the figures were correct. The figures he has show that the total number of Americans abroad including Vietnam is 14,000 all over the world including Defense civilians. He thought that there were 21,000 Defense; 6,000 State; 4,000 AID, and 3,000 USIA. He said there were 4,000 people with USAI in India alone, and wanted to know where HK got his figures. K said from Bureau of Budget and each of the Undersecretaries. The President said you talk about taking a total on the civilian side of about 5,100, you realize that that is taking only about 1,000 people out of State, USIA, AID. That certainly wouldn't hurt us at all. Johnson - Congress - reduced by 10% 1/3. He wanted K to call Blachford at the Peace Corps and tell him to cut 1/3. That was the understanding when he was hired. This will help us with Congress.

On his statement again, the President said he didn't want Rogers' statement of backgrounder to get to TV before his.

On the trip, K said the Romanians were quite flexible but wanted to host a lunch at the Embassy. They were planning on a trip to the country and maybe they could extend that. The President said that would be fine, he could have a reception after the return from country. On England, K said when the Pres meets Wilson, Annenberg would probably want to be there. The President agreed and said to get the Mrs. there to to visit with Mrs. Nixon.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

The President thought it would have been a neat thing to visit the OAU if it had been planned earlier in the trip.

K said he was sending a copy of the London Economist up that had some favorable words about trip to Romania. The President thought that the second appraisals were about 75% in favor now. K said they think there is something more complex than meets the eye which there is. Its a pitty we can't make a Chinese move bef re we go.

The President said put it before me again on Friday morning. We
will take a look at the various things we are going to do. We might
do it befvore we come back. K said that would put a heavy load on
the Romanians; we should have a little time between. The President
said we might do it before we go then.

K said Sisco was off to Moscow and he told him to play it cool.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

DSNARA Date

4/15/06