Re: Kissinger's phone call to
the President of the Republic
of Vietnam

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KHLW

NASA Date:

5/13/72

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Ivan Head

3:25 5/18/72

HAK: Hello, how are you

IV: I am well, how are you.

HAK: I am well, I have had my hands full since our visit.

IV: I bet, I have been reluctant to---

HAK: No, no I owed you a phone call. I also thought that given our impending changes, it might be better to wait until it was consummated. What we discussed is still on, as far as we are concerned. My strong advice is that we wait until we are back from Moscow and as soon as the change is completed we will get Shultz to start the negotiations.

IV: That sounds very good to me. One of the reasons I wanted to get through to you was the pressures we felt were coming in from the flanks on us --one in particular of the Assistant Secretary's in that department had been making some speeches which were quite inflammatory here, and that coupled with the pressures that we're under are not overtly supporting your Vietnam policy, but certainly indicating that we are sticking with you and loyal to you because we are in trouble has given some cabinet ministers some cause to squeal --they thought well what kind of response are we getting from Washington where we need a little help when we are in political trouble because of helping them.

HAK: I chose the unheroic course of not fighting a tough battle when three weeks from now it will be relevant anyway. If you would explain that to the Prime Minister, we will proceed along the lines of our discussions.

IV: There seems to be an increasing amount of pressure in Canade building up among labor unions and intellectuals that is spilling out a lot more broadly than we have ever had before. I do want to reassure you that the PM and Mr. Charb will stick to the guns they have taken on this up until now. None of us anymore than you I am sure are committed

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

Re: [insert phone number here]
the phone number of a mutual
Neppe's Macs?

by: KMLW NARA, Data 5/12/04

TELCONE

Page 2

to the absolute wisdom of what is happening there. But we recognize entirely the toughness of your situation and we are not going to allow the Canadian government to be employed as a means of bringing pressure against you.

HAK: That is very--that means a lot.

IV: I am not sure that that means a lot--but it is the other way around --it would be an intolerable situation for you. I am off to a meeting right now with the PM -- he may be announcing to a few of us his decision about an election--I don't know. He will be very pleased to know..

HAK: You told me that if he hadn't announced it by the end of April it wouldn't take place in June.

IV: There is now a great deal of speculation that he may be choosing July 17th and if that is the case, he has to do it by tomorrow. Whether he will, I don't know. I wish you well in your trip to Moscow. This as important to us as it is to you.

HAK: Well it didn't look so evident 10 days ago that we would go.

IV: I read with considerable anguish your press conference. I could see between the lines the pressures that have been brought to bear--it must have been a very difficult decision to reach.

HAK: It was very tough. But I think it was the right one.

IV: Well, I think events are certainly proving out and I had to go out on a limb in preparing what the PM was going to say in response to the immediate crash that we came under at that time and hopefully events will prove--I have got great faith in you.

HAK: Well, we appreciated very much what he said.

IV: Godsped on your trip.

HAK: We'll talk to you as soon as I come back--

IV: Good, I will wait to hear from you. I know you will be very busy for the first few days after you get back--I can assure the PM that we are in contact.

Hypothetical Title of the open file
in the files of the Office of the General Counsel
of the Department of Defense

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

6/21/64

NASA Date 5/12/64

TELCONE
Page 3

HAK: You can assure him that we are on the course which we discussed in Ottawa and that the only reason for delay is that I didn't want to mislead you and I didn't think it was wise to start what was coming.

IV: No I think in the event I agree with you entirely. I wanted to say too just before hanging up that the word is out here that no one is to make any comment whatever either of relief exuberance or anything else on the change--

HAK: Oh god

IV: We know full well that this man may be back--it is stupid for anyone here to show huh

HAK: And you are his special pigeons

IV: Okay, have a good trip.

Husqville, France, the 19th of April

The State of Washington

U.S. Department of Defense

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12939, Sect. 3.5

By: KMLW HAFIA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Ron Ziegler

3:56 R 5/18/72

RZ: Henry, about the Dobrynin meeting, I said that he conferred for an hour--that is what you wanted me to say--I said with the President. But shall I say that the two of you went up by helicopter last night?

HAK: Well, yeh, around midnight.

RZ: Yes, and met with him this morning. And came back at 1:30

HAK: Right. But Dobrynin stayed alone and I met and conferred with the President the rest of the time

RZ: In other words don't put you conferring with Dobrynin the whole time

HAK: Right.

RZ: You were with the President

HAK: Say D and I met with the President for an hour and then I stayed on alone with the President for a while and then we came back--

RZ: And D simply relaxed at the camp.

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.5

By: K.L.S. NAFU, Date: 5/13/64

TELCOM

Sec. Rogers/Henry Kissinger

4:05 5/18/72

BR: I am going to see Mobrynin today--what happened today?

HAK: He had a personal message from Brezhnev--nothing substantive just to tell him he wanted him to know that in spite obvious differences between our countries in certain areas that the Soviet leaders are approaching this in a positive spirit, that he would be very welcome, that any wishes he had was entirely--and those items which we couldn't agree in substance if we could perhaps indicate the directions of perspective--what we visualize--and housekeeping things--what Mrs. Nixon wanted--it was basically in my judgment their way of telling them that it would be a very warm visit and there was no substantive discussion at any time.

BR: What did you do--fly him up?

HAK: Actually what happened was he called up last night to say that he had this personal message which he had to deliver to the President he had just come back from New York where he had seen his wife off --I was going up at midnight--and I called the President who said to bring him up and then the President had him for breakfast--then we put him into a cabin and he stayed there while I talked to the President and then we came back. But the talk with the President was 99-1/9% chit chat and in fact I would say 100%.

BR: HAK: I wish they were as nice to our Ambassador. Anything else. He wanted to see me too, he called yesterday and asked

HAK: Well, he told the President that he was going to have a
with you just in general terms and I said anything particular?
He said he might ask you whether you had any ideas on the Middle East.
And I said that is one in which I have no ideas at all.

BR: What about SALT--did he talk about that at all?

HAK: no, except he thought that there would be an agreement, xik but
there was no specific issue raised on SALT.

BR: Okay fine Henry, thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

The President of the Republic of Vietnam

By: K.H. V. NASHA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM
President/Mr. Kissinger

5/18/72 4:50

President: Did the balance of your meeting go alright?

HAK: Very well, very well. We have got the communique now in the
place that anoth another day in Moscow is going to get it--on the Middle
East, I think for the first time told us to make a counterproposal
that might make things possible, but I don't think we will get the
breakthrough there, but I think the major thing is to keep it going
the way you have proposed something to dangle after them, after
the Vietnam settlement.

RN: Good, and we are set for the meeting--the first meeting--
which will be more of a get acquainted meeting.

HAK: That is what I think. And just a general discussion of how to
handle the plenary. I also talked to Bill about the visit up there--he
is in good faith

RN: What did you say--that he just wanted to--how did you put it?

HAK: I said he had a personal message for you from Brezhnev which
discussed most all personal stuff of Brezhnev welcoming and assuring
him that he would be received in a positive spirit--and he is seeing
Bill at 4:00

RN: You understand on Vietnam, it is not my intention to go in there
with the assumption that they shouldn't do something --I am going to
give it to them hard you know, but not in the way that we are begging
them. They have to understand that we ---we will just have to see what
they want. The only thing that is going to get them going on Vietnam
is not their <u>RECEPTION</u> concern to do something for us, but their
fear that if they don't do something that it is going to be a very unpleasant
consequence for them.

HAK: I think that was very well put.

RN: How was the party last night--did it go well. I called Stewart
in the late afternoon.

HAK: Oh, it wasn't that nice. It is probably going to be his last
birthday.

RN: The stuff is getting worse, huh?

H

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

The President's Office in Washington, D.C.
the White House and the Executive Office Building
U.S. Department of Defense

By: KHLW NASHA, D.C. 5/13/04

TELCOM
Page 2

HAK: And it is beginning to show.

RN: Was Connally there?

HAK: Connally was there and they were pumping him on the political situation and he was really laying it into them. He said that you are going to start a new era in politics in American, that the Republicans are going to be the majority party after you get through with them, the only thing that is important now is that lift some of the restraints on yourself and stop being a statesman and act like politician during the campaign. He said the only danger you have is if you run as an encumbent--you should run as--I am sure he has told you this

RN: He wants to hang it on them. You have three theories, you have his and you have the Ray Price theory--be a statesman, but I am not sure we are in the position to do that anymore. As much as we attempt not to--like your university presidents, I am not going to give any ______, I am going to tear their hides off.

HAK: It makes a very persuasive case, that anyone who gets identified with the status quo is automatically in trouble and therefore he says you should run as if you wanted to change things. And he said that he doesn't really mean so much that you need to tear the people necessarily to pieces, but you should indicate that you are the one who is trying to change things and they *also* have slaughtered you at every turn.

RN: Yes, but we have to attack the old establishment. That is the point that he makes. There has been this establishment for years, it is sort of called the turns here and it is now failed. --failed the country, and by God, they have to be taken out. And we are going to take them out. They will know they have been in the ______ anyway. Anything new in Vietnam today?

HAK: No the military situation--our side is on the initiative, almost in all regions.

RN: Tomorrow we expect the pop

HAK: I don't believe that--that would be tonight.

RN: I mean I would know before I leave in other words. Abrams has been warning this, you know all this time--Haig has been telling me this.

H. E. M. T. of Vietnam
in the North, South, and Central
Provinces of Vietnam

6/11/04 WAPDA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Page 3

HAK: I just don't think they work that way. They have never geared themselves to that sort of a date. And we have not got the first message from the North Vietnamese, and while it is sort of a veiled suggestion, you see I had sent him an extract from my press conference in which I said that we are always ready in principle to talk to him, but without comment and then he sent me an extract from his--saying we estimate that the means for a peaceful solution for the Vietnamese problem is through negotiation and we have goodwill and a serious attitude; I as a negotiator am still in Paris--that is a sign of goodwill and is indicative of our efforts. They asked for As far as knowing that we can or cannot engage in negotiations depends on the attitude of Mr. Nixon, so in other words, ..... and then they asked for a meeting but I think we should see what they say to the Russians.

RN: As I understand it the Russians are going to suggest that we have a meeting.

HAK: They have already suggested to them this week, that there would be a private meeting in Paris this Sunday. And Dobrynin said that they really put it to him hard and again I see no reason why they should lie to me, because if they don't have it, it just gives us the advantage by saying look we have accepted everything. My instinct tells me they won't accept it, but right now we can bleed them another few weeks now, I think we can ask for a private meeting after---

RN: We are not all that interested, Henry, in their private, and particularly we are not interested, you see the difficulty with the plenary because if you have it all the damn doves would say why are we bombing so hard and I don't want any restraint right now, because they won't exercise any restraint, don't you agree?

HAK: Exactly, I think we should bleed them for a few more weeks

RN: Let him continue to have it, because if this momentum starts and we get it started at all, they can be in a hell of a lot worse shape than we realize, I don't know, they could be, and you old theory the two runners as they reach the wire-----

HAK: Mr. President, I have no question, the only thing now that is keeping them going is the prospect of our election

RN: Towsen made the very good point at the outset of this election--he said this is a mistake from their part, it is too early for the election

Report of the report to
the President of the Council
of State and of Government

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KMLW NAVAQ Date: 5/13/04

TELCOM

Page 4

and too late because of the weather--in other words they can't win now
because the weather is going to calm down and it is too early--

HAK: Well, they could win if they could smash those three divisions
around Hue, but I don't think they could do it

RN: The reason I don't think they could do is that our air now will be
released gradually from An Loc area will it not?

HAK: I think so, yes.

RN: After all if the weather gets bad there, they ought to be able
to hold. And then you move more and more of the air into that area.
Just lambast the hell of them and they have never had this kind of
punishment before, have they?

HAK: No never this way and there was never a scientific air attack
on them in the north before.

RN: I would think that their planners now would begin to look at the
resupply--they are careful people, they have to wonder where in the
hell are they getting it, three months from now.

HAK: People are talking that when they have three months supply,
the fight for three months, but when they have 3 months supply they
also know they are running out in 3 months

RN: Then they will be on their knees.

HAK: The only hope they now have is to play for our election. Dobrynin
said to me that he thought that that was the thing that was keeping them
going. They were overestimating the domestic opposition to you.

RN: We ought to get those damn polls over there around too. Have
you sent those polls to---send the polls to Porter.

HAK: We have brought him back here, we'll give them to him.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E1268
By CNARA Date 6/2/68

TELCOM

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissing er

May 18, 1972 - 5:27 p.m.

K: ... answer from Vorontsov in the meantime about the hunting rifles.

D: What was about?

K: Or whether they wanted shotguns or hunting -- you know, high-powered rifles but Vorontsov explained it.

D: Yeah. That's right.

K: And on the car, unfortunately, the damage is already done in the sense that they have a black interior for it.

D: Well, it's all right. I think it will ..... I mean, if they could do it in a nice way, it's --

K: Oh, it's very nicely done. I'm sure it's beautifully done. They know it's -- and it's going to be picked up -- they made a special job so that we could get it so it's hard to change now.

D: Oh, I see.

K: ... are bringing it up tomorrow or the day after.

D: Oh, it's very nice, huh? So you really got it to bring there?

K: Yes.

D: Oh, I think that's very nice. Okay, Henry.

K: Good, those were really -- did I have any other? There was one other problem they wanted me to -- Oh, yes, yes; I know there was another problem. When we fly on your airplane, they say that messages to the President on the airplane have to come through a Russian radio operator --

D: Yes.

K: Our people think we should have an American radio operator there only for messages to the President.

D: Just to be there on the plane?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FOLKSTON
By Cb MARA Date 06/18/72

TELCORN
Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

May 18, 1972 -- 5:27 p.m.

K: On your plane.

D: I think it could be arranged.

K: I mean, you know, you of course handle the communications and everything else; just if there's a message to the President.

D: Yes, but he would be on the same plane?

K: Yes.

D: Okay; I think there is no problem.

K: Can you arrange that?

K: Good.

D: He would just be on our plane for radio.

K: Now, our people say, having seen your plane that the President will be so furious at his own plane.

D: (laughter)

K: That he will ask to have it rebuilt.

D: No, I think we have a very nice [U-62?] really. Not noisy and quite quiet.

K: Well, I'm told that it's a better plane than ours.

D: Inside I could guess it is because it's really -- I don't know about how the interior how they make it now but --

K: No; I'm told the interior is also extremely nice.

D: ... probably they make it really. But in the air it is much better really; much more quiet and much more stable in the air. But in this case, I am sure he will enjoy and you too.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01250
By CHNARA Date 05/01

*

TELCON

May 18, 1972 -- 5:27 p.m.

- 3 -

K: Okay, well, I probably --

D: And I will be [hostage/hostess], all right?

K: Good. I'll be only on the key airplane.

D: Oh, I understand, yeah. Well, we'll arrange something for the
______ trip when they will be there.

K: Good.

D: Okay?

K: Good.

D: So for once again, I thank you very much.

K: No; we enjoyed having you and it was good that we could have this
review.

D: Yes; it definitely was very helpful. And I'm looking forward to
another year of cooperation.

K: Excellent! And if we make as much progress in that year as in
the last year, I think we will have really done something together.

D: It is my impression too, Henry.

K: Good, Anatol.

D: Okay, thank you very much. I see you in Moscow.

K: Right; look forward. Have a good trip.

D: Yes; thank you very much.

K: Bye.

["H. E. S. H. E. S. H. E. S. H. E

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012358
By CHIRA Date Elstol

TELCOM
Minister Vorontsov/Mr. Kissinger

11:41 a.m., May 19, 1972

V: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay, Yuly, how are you?

V: Fine and I'm not calling to you because of any crisis, even a mini one.

K: Goddammit, there's no sense talking to you unless there's a crisis.

V: No, Henry, but there is some concern. I got a cable from Gromyko. He asked me to talk to you on the following. He says that in Moscow they are worried about the state of affairs in [Hildengen ?].

K: Oh, Jesus, yeah.

V: And the cable is dated today so it must be -- not entirely after Anatol's talk yesterday with you and the President but maybe they just meet each other; that cable and our cable. But their worries are rather serious because they say that Ambassador Smith is suggesting on many cases something which does not correspond entirely to your talks in Moscow and to what the President confirmed here. As one example, Gromyko wants me to mention to you that on the exchange letter Smith suggests various formulations which do not correspond to the talks you had in Moscow. For example, he says Smith challenges the number 48. You remember what it is?

K: Yeah, well, 48 wasn't mentioned in Moscow.

V: Yeah, but it has been mentioned here and it is mentioned in the exchange letter you suggest -- at least you haven't raised any objections to that one.

K: Yeah, but that I wouldn't -- that I was just passing on to -- all right the 48 I was just -- didn't express any opinion on.

V: I see. That means that you have some misgivings about that figure too?

K: Let me think -- No, I think we can live with it.

V: And then he mentions, Gromyko, something else. He says they are not proceeding with full speed on some other matters which are not yet agreed upon. For example, the mobile landing surface launchers and the heavy missiles and the other things and there are

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012357
By LINDA Date 9/10/71

TELCOM

11:41 a.m., May 19, 1972

- 2 -

rather

V: (cont'd) some not agreed matters on ABM which needs/speedy solutions there at the talks. So the general tenor of Gromyko's cable is that we are worried that they will not be able to finish the whole job by the time the President is in Moscow.

K: Well, then they have to finish it when he is in Moscow. Well, you tell Mr. Gromyko that I am going to get our negotiators in Helsinki to move with all speed.

V: Right.

K: On the ~~item~~ of 48, that we had not agreed to in Moscow as a base figure but I think we can handle it probably.

V: Um-humm.

K: I have not heard here that there was any insuperable objection to it.

V: I see.

K: If there is, I'll call you this afternoon.

V: Uh-huh. I see.

K: What is the other issue?

V: And the other issue, as you mentioned just as an example, the mobile surface launchers and the heavy missiles which need some kind of formulation to be made. The American Delegation, he says, is not showing any inclination to find compromise solution or any acceptable solution to that side. Then the same goes with the ABM -- some missiles on ABM, especially the regions which will be covered by the ABM rockets in the vicinity of ICBM ____ sites. But generally he says it's only examples and generally says that we think that in Helsinki they should do their utmost now and we send our instructions to our delegation to do that. And as the basis of agreement, he suggests, Gromyko, should be the talks you had in Moscow.

K: Well, that I agree with. The agreements in Moscow will be treated as the basis and you can assure Gromyko of that. And the number 48, that's a subsidiary issue because that's a working number by which you determine the base.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOLSSX
By CNARA Date Stated

TELCOM

11:41 a.m., May 19, 1972

V: Yeah, I know.

K: By which you reach 62.

V: Yeah.

K: There's no problem about the 62.

V: Yes, so there shouldn't --

K: So I have generally taken the position that I will not get into working level arguments until there is a total impasse but if there is I will move into it.

V: Yeah. And then generally Gromyko expects that you will give some urgent instructions.

K: You can tell Mr. Gromyko I will give urgent instructions today.

V: Good.

K: To have our people speed up their deliberations.

V: Good. That's exactly what he wants. I understand.

K: Good.

V: Fine.

K: Now, Mr. Vorontsov, I have one thing as long as I've got you on phone; I wasn't going to do it. A friend of mine, you probably know him, the singer Frank Sinatra --

V: Oh, sure.

K: Wants to visit the Soviet Union in July and he's going to call you today to ask for a visa. I'm not recommending a visa or against it; you will make that judgment --

V: Oh, no, no; there will be no problem.

K: As you see fit.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01258
By CNAR Date 05/20/82

TELCOM

11:41 a.m., May 19, 1972

- 4 -

V: He is well-known in our country.

K: He isn't used to being held on the telephone too long so you talk to him when he calls or whoever and steer him to the right person.

V: Sure.

K: But I want you to know it's not a White House request.

V: Oh, no; I understand. Fine. There will be no problem about him.

K: Okay.

V: Okay.

K: Bye, bye.

HARRIS'S NOTE TO THE MEETING IS IN
THE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL
PUBLISHED AND DATED

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.5

By: K.L. W. HASLA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Mrs. Harriman

5/19/72 5:50 p.m.

Ms.H: Oh Henry, I went out to collect Winston, he just arrived, and he is going on the 4th in Missouri to make a speech at the Westminister College--you know, the blind curtain speech and I wondered whether tomorrow you would have 5 minutes he could say hello tomorrow.

HAK: Can I call him or you in the morning. Does he want to drop by here

MsH: He would love to come by and see you for five minutes--

HAK: Generally five minutes?

MsH: Yes generally

HAK: If you come along I would make it 10.

MsH: Okay Henry, will you call me in the morning? How are things?

HAK: I think they are falling into place.

MsH: I wish you all the luck.

It is possible to send a message to a person who is not present but is known to the sender. For example, if you want to call a person who is not in the room with you, you can use the telephone to call that person's room number.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.H.Y. NASA Date: 5/12/72

TELECON

Peter Malatesta/Mr. Kissinger

6:15 p.m., May 18, 1972

M: Henry, How are you today?

K: Okay.

M: I know you are busy as ever. Frank called a while ago and said he had the missed the plane he had hoped to get and he is taking a 6:00 plane out and will be at the hotel about 7:15 or 7:30. He said you had mentioned something about going some place prior to dinner -- to some cocktail thing or something.

K: Maybe I'll go there and then pick him up afterwards.

M: All right. Yeah, cause I'm going to one myself. Where are you going to eat, cause he said you would eat later and he didn't say where?

K: I was going ... I'm bringing somebody along. The Jockey Club?

M: Okay. Caust Tina's in, you know that.

K: Yeah.

M: We had somebody pick her up and I will touch base with her. What are you going to do -- meet at the Jockey Club later?

K: Yeah, we could do that. What do you think?

M: What time is your affair now?

K: Well, that's supposed to be from 6:30 to 9:30. We could just drop by there at 8:00 and then go to the Jockey Club later.

XXXXXXXX

M: You know what I'd like to suggest. Do you want Frank to go to that prior affair with you?

K: It's entirely up to him. It's a birthday thing for Senator Javits and he'd be delighted.

M: He's going to be at the hotel at 7:30 if the shuttle is on time today.

K: What do you recommend -- makes no great difference to me.

M: I think I would recommend. What time are you leaving?

K: 7:00 or 7:30 for 30-45 minutes. The trouble is that it is a buffet and if we stay too long, we will get trapped.

A question about the paper is not
sufficient to support a conclusion.
Please read it again!

By: K.H. W. NASHA, Date: 5/13/04

M: Well I would say this -- cause he probably won't get there until 7:30 and I don't know whether he is ready for the evening or not yet -- but I will call him as soon as he gets in, or he will call me.

K: I could pick him up around 8:00.
him

M: And tell you are going to swing by there about 7:30 if he wants to go. If he doesn't you can go on without him and then we'll see you at the Jockey Club later.

K: Okay.

M: All right?

K: About 8:30.

M: About 8:30. Did you already make a reservation?

K: Yes. I made it for four, so if you are going to be along. I didn't know you were going to be along.

M: He had just said it to me. I don't think he's coming to dinner; in fact, I'm sure he's not. So if it's for four, they can make five out of it.

K: Oh, that's fine. Good.

M: I understand we are not going to have the pleasure of your...

K: Well, because we are leaving the next day.

M: I know -- be a little bit too much for you, I guess.

K: What time does it start?

M: It's an early thing. It starts at 8:15 and it's over at 10:15.

K: Can I still change my mind?

M: Oh, of course. You know that.

K: It's in Baltimore?

M: Yes, it's in Baltimore. X: OK, K: OK

K: You know, that's an hour and 15 minutes driving.

December 13, 1968, 1:00 p.m.

Re: Peter Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger

Subject: PRC-001

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3-6

By: K.M.Y. NASA Date: 5/13/64

TELCORN

Peter Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger
6:30 p.m. 5/18/72

PF: I have a draft position paper which I think adequately maximizes the salvating of these people. I would like to discuss it with you.

HAK: Oh Peter, that makes you number 658.

PF: Alright--then forget it, we will send it in the way it is

HAK: Why do we have to get him to make a decision--I have told you what I know he wants.

PF: What you told me he wanted was an agreement that makes them Salvate to the maximum degree and doesn't give them anything between the end of the year.

HAK: What we really need is rather than a decision paper

PF: It isn't a decision paper--it is talking points

HAK: Oh I am sorry--I thought you were asking him for a decision.

PF: No, I made a proposal--I drafted a paper for his book--

HAK: Oh wonderful-- could you send it down and let me read it

PF: Yes, of course. Sonnenfeldt said it was contrary to what you had already decided you were going to do over there.

HAK: If I survive Sonnenfeldt on this trip, it will not be anybody's fault but due to my inward strength and my basically good nature

PF: ...and extraordinary good patience.

HAK: Let me just summarize what I believe we have agreed on--a commercial commission will be created; we agree in principle to extend credit, we agree in principle to settle the land-lease issue. We agree in principle to consider asking for most favored nations. All of this will be implemented by the commercial commission. The one thing we would like to conclude there is the agricultural agreement. Now Sonnenfeldt tells me that you do not want to do that.

HAK: I have been told by Dobrynin today on a personal basis that he has recommended a three-year agreement and that they will be ready to do that next week.

By: J.H. V. NASH, O.B.

5/13/64

TELCOM

Page 2

PF: now that isn't true.

PF: Henry, my paper says, here is the most and the least you can do. The most will make them salivate more. What I say is that you can do these things and instead of just talking more you can just agree to them, instead of agreeing in principle. If you want to back off from that a little bit, fine.

HAK: But Peter. We are going to deal with a man under enormous pressure. Let's tell him what you recommend.

PF: Let me send you this paper and we can rewrite it in a way that you...

HAK: Am I correct in our understanding that the minimum is that we agree in principle, but we may be able to go further and just do it.

PF: That is correct.

HAK: So where do you and I differ?

PF: We don't -- just Sonnenfeldt and I differ.

HAK: What does Sonnenfeldt want? --except your job together with mine.

PF: He said you wouldn't want to do anything more than that--you just want to do the commercial commission and agree to talk further on the other things.

HAK: Nonsense, we want the agricultural agreement if at all possible. Agree?

PF: Yes. I haven't written one of these for your books--maybe the style is wrong. It is quite short--just tell me if you like it or not and I'll redo it.

HAK: Excellent

Husqville Three the open in
the Sea of the Pacific
Papua New Guinea

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

By: K.L. W. HASLA, Date: 5/13/84

TELCOM
President/Mr. Kissinger
6:50 p.m. 5/19/72

RN: I had an idea that I think is very important--why not get Haig and Moorer and Rush together and tell them that I think that their priority assignment will be between now and the time we get back is to talk to the hawks.

HAK: Right, I have already talked to Hig about that--

RN: Why don't you bring Rush in on that--he is a terrific salesman and he can do it and do it piece of piece so we don't have the blowups

HAK: We have a few snags in that SALT agreement and I think that has to be on the first agenda item on Tuesday. So we have to wait till we get it.

RN: The point is, apart from the fact we are not going to--let's just start preparing people of the fact that it is going to be a hell of an agreement however, it turns out, you know. Because it is. You and I know

HAK: I think Mr. President that Jacksonis generally frustrated by his fate this year--I took him into the office and he lowered his opposition by 80% right there. And I got Stennis--

RN: The main thing is we don't have to wait for you to do it. Haig is very impressive in this sort of thing. Haig, Moorer and Rush

HAK: On the submarines we ought to get Zumwalt on it--

RN: Yes, he is a good salesman. Tell that is an order, they're to carry it out.

HAK: I think that went well with the press.

RN: They can't complain, they got a nice little story and as you may have noticed, I limited it to a three-item

HAK: One suggestion, Brezhnev isn't that quite pre-eminent in that in the Soviet Union and he will get into trouble if we give him quite that much--as if he could decide things--he is the first but not the only one. It may weaken his position at home--that is the only

RN: I wouldn't

Hanoi, Vietnam
Date: May 19, 1972

Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

U.S. Navy/Retired

TELCOM (Secure Phone)
Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

8:05 p.m., May 19, 1972

NASA Data

M: Henry, I think you ought to get this to the President whenever you can. I just talked to Johnny Vogt and called the Fleet Commander. They've got all the authorities that they can handle, their morale is high, they are knocking the hell out of them. They're glad to have this support. The Wing Commander said his people think this is terrific. .... restraints that the President is putting on people out there. I don't know where this is coming from. I've talked to Guam, Saigon, Hawaii and out to the Fleet; morale is high. Johnny Vogt says we are really accomplishing something. I just don't know where this is coming from. They have adequate authorities; they've got more than they can handle anyway.

K: I've checked with the Vice President's people; I think he exaggerated what he was told.

M: He must have. Johnny Vogt said things have never looked better. And you did see Abrams' report on the situation in Hue? He thinks we can hold Komtum, An Loc has eased off and Hue has been enforced up to full strength. They believe they can inflict defeat on the enemy.

K: Just hold things together while we're gone. But, Tom, we have got to move some B-52s out there. I have a memo here that would curdle your blood --

M: We are looking at it now.

K: I am getting hell for not transmitting all the orders I am getting.

M: We'll get some out there. We can't get a hundred but --

K: 100 is probably too much.

M: We will get some.

K: Right. After tonight, you are not dropping any leaflets.

M: No leaflets anywhere?

K: You can do them in the Panhandle.

M: But none in Hanoi.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F01287
By CNAR Date StatoL

TELCON

8:10 p.m., May 19, 1972

V: Hello. Good evening, Henry.

K: Yuly, how are you? Any trouble anywhere in the world?

V: Oh, no. You're just checking, Henry, every hour on the hour.

K: Exactly.

V: No, everything's fine. Only one question, Henry, I have. As I understand the agreement on incidents at sea, it will be signed by your Secretary of the Navy. Is this true, because I've got the request --

K: Yeah. Warner.

V: To issue the visa.

K: That's right. That's what Anatol and I agreed on.

V: Right, right. So I just wanted to get the confirmation.

K: Now, we have only one other problem.

V: Yes.

K: That concerns the SALT thing, you know, I can tell you unofficially we would be prepared to give on this issue of the mobile missiles but if Anatol will consult his notes, our hang-up -- we have no problem with the 950 missiles and the 62 boats.

V: Yeah.

K: The reason we are having trouble with the 48 boats, which is your figure not ours, is this -- I had told Anatol that we wanted the G&H class submarines, which represent a total of 90 missiles hounded into the replacement. In other words, to be replaced by modern boats.

V: Yeah.

K: So those 90 missiles is what's at issue for us.

V: I see, yes. Not the number of the boats?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E12582
By CNARA Date 6/2/82
GLot

TELCON
Minister Vorontsov/Mr. Kissinger
8:10 p.m., May 19, 1972

K: Not the ultimate number of the boats but we think that those 90 missiles should be replaced.

V: I see. But the figure, you can leave with this figure?

K: We can leave the figure of 950 and 62. I'm herewith confirming to you again --

V: Not 48?

K: Well, the 48 is really a -- if you can find a way -- the figure 48 is really a working figure from which you count the replacements.

V: Yeah.

K: What we want is to somehow find a way of getting rid of the G&H class submarines as part of this process.

V: Yeah.

K: Because we will have a massive problem with our Congressional opponents. I met this afternoon with some of our Congressional opponents and I can assure you that we will have an unbelievable job selling this agreement.

V: I see.

K: Now, if it's the issue and this is what I had told Anatol to begin with.

V: Yes, I know that; he mentioned it to me.

K: So that is what -- why we are hanging up on the 48. The end result for you will still be 950 modern missiles.

V: Yeah, 950 and 62 is okay.

K: That's no problem.

V: Um-humm. Shall I report this, that the 48 you'd like to get out and just to --

K: Well, what we want to get -- if your people -- the best way of handling it would be to get rid of the 48 and to say that the C&H class submarines would be counted in this replacement. Then I think we would have all problems solved.

TELCONE

8:10 p.m., May 19, 1972

Page 3

V: 48 out and meaning that these -- yeah.

K: The 90 missiles on the C&H class submarines would be counted in the replacement.

V: I see. What action will Mr. Smith do now in Helsinki? He will insist that 48 should go out, I mean, the figure?

K: Yeah, for the time -- that's his present position.

V: I see.

K: But I wanted to explain to you what our concern is. And also explain to you, Yuly, that this is not a new position for us; that is what I told Anatol to begin with.

V: Yeah, well, I understand but --

K: The difference arose from the fact that we thought you had 40 submarines under construction and whatever and therefore we counted those 90 missiles -- we gave you 90 more missiles when I gave you 62.

V: Um-humm.

K: By assuming you would replace the C&H class submarines.

V: Which was accepted actually?

K: That's right.

V: In the last wording of ours?

K: Oh, yes.

V: Well, I don't think Gromyko will be happy with all this because .... in his words and his cable, he suggests that 48 was the figure didn't get any trouble far as you are concerned. When it was first mentioned, it was okay; you didn't raise any objection.

K: Well, no, you see when Anatol handed me these various papers, I just said these in reading quickly; I'm thinking out loud here and I said the rest of the answers you'll get from Smith.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E10282
By CHNAR Date 6/20/72

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Folio.558

By: CNRA Date: 5/18/72

TELCON

8:10 p.m., May 19, 1972

V: Uh-huh.

K: I had not considered these as conclusive answers.

V: I see.

K: Which may have been a misunderstanding on my part.

V: I see.

K: Because I just gave him very quick reactions.

V: I see.

K: That is the problem here. Now we can leave it for Moscow and
see whether the President and Brezhnev can come up as a compromise.

V: Yeah, if they don't have enough time in Helsinki, that will be the
only solution I suppose.

K: Yeah.

V: But you think it would be good for me now just to relay to Moscow
what you said to me?

K: Yes, I think so.

V: I'll do that immediately.

K: Okay, good.

V: Okay.

K: Thank you, Yuly.

V: Yeah, bye.

K: You can reach me -- Haig will be able to reach me within 10 minutes.

V: Yes, I understand that. I suppose if something on this or the other
matter of 21 --

K: Yeah, well, the other one is going to be a little tough to arrange now
on short notice.

The president of the department is the dean, and the vice-dean is the assistant dean.

By: K.H. V. NASH, Date: 5/13/72

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Dr. Jerome Weiser

8:25 5/19/72

JW: I have an interesting question. I got a phone call--I didn't
take it, my secretary did. from TASS. I don't know if this is a
generalized thing or if you heard about it from anyone else asking
whether I would make a statement about the future of Soviet/American
relations. Do you see any booby traps?

HAK: No, I would make a very positive statement. I think that
would be very--in terms of potential, I wouldn't claim it yet.

JW: Do you have any idea whether they will get insulted if I talked
about intellectual freedom?

HAK: Probably yes. No I wouldn't do it. I would talk about bilateral
--you know chances for peace and things like that.

JW: Then it doesn't embarrass you

HAK: No, not at all. Good Jerry, well how are you?

JW: I am exhausted. I am not young enough to run with the students

HAK: Are you having trouble?

JW: Well, we had an ROTC occupation last weekend, we remained
faithful to the ROTC only our faculty define. So we spent one of the
weekends like that. Then we had one of the kids who declared persona
non grata --he was in court today and got 60 days, and that upset a
number of other students, so it just sort of bubbles on like that.
How about you?

HAK: I have got my hands full. But I hope we are going to bring some
things to a conclusion next week.

JW: I am going to sit down with David on Monday--

HAK: Well he will bring you up to date on SALT I guess.

The President's Office report to
the Vice President for Academic Affairs

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.M.L. NASA Date: 5/12/84

TELCOM

Page 2

JW: Is that making good progress?

HAK: We hope so.

JW: I remember back this time in Moscow days 1968 how hopeful we were.

HAK: Well, you set us on the right course. So let's hope we can add another peg.

JW: But you are really optimistic about that?

HAK: Yes, quite. Nice to talk to you again.

Hussein el-Kasabani
The Secretary-General
of the United Nations
P.O. Box 266

By: KML V HAFIA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco
8:45 p.m. 5/19/72

JS: Hi Henry do you have a minute?

HAK: Yes.

JS: I just if you don't mind have a couple of reminders on the
Middle East before you take off and want to wish you a successful
bon voyage. They are going to play it fairly hard in my opinion.
And I hope there will be no disposition to concede.

HAK: Concede what?

JS: Well, that is the point. There are two possibilities, and I want
to be very precise. One of the things they are very apt to float is to
say to you well our so called modified Russian peace plan of 1969 as
modified in 1970 is reconcilable with the so-called Rogers plan. I
don't know whether they tried that out on you while you were there
or not, but that is one basic approach.

HAK: Why is it not reconcilable?

JS: It is not reconcilable for the reasons following. We cannot produce
today Israel on the Rogers plan let alone produce the Soviets on the
so called Soviet plan--I say that as a generality first. In substance,
what is it in the Soviet plan which we cannot accept? On the Egyptian
side, the Israeli position is the only way to bring about security in the
Sharm El Sheik area is a physical Israeli presence. The Soviet answer
is the United Nations. Secondly, in terms of the Sinai, the Israeli position
is and ours total demilitarization of the Sinai--no introduction of armed
forces of any kind, the Russian Arab position has never deviated, there
is a timing buffer zone on both sides of the border -- on the UN policing
that particular border, also unacceptable to the Israelis. Third, the
whole Gaza strip should go back to the Arab world, sovereignty and
security. The Egyptians have never particularly insisted that they take
it back, but at least ______ to the Arab world. The Israeli position is
that this is a very important area strategically and must remain in
Israeli hands.

HAK: Oh really?

Oh, yes.

JS: So, Henry, that is the substance. Now may I say a word about

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.5

Re: [HAK] W. L. Warneke's (W.) Warneke
Re: [HAK] S. S. S. Sadat
Re: [HAK] P. Kissinger's (P.) Kissinger

By: [HAK] L. S. Kissinger
NARA. File: 5/12/64

Page 2

the procedure which is even much more beguiling. And this is why I think you are going to have to play this tactically in a very shrewd way. [W]arneke (?) will make or can make any one of the following procedural proposals. One, let's resume bi-lateral American/Soviet talks because these plans are reconcilable. Two, alternatively, or as a complementary matter, let's resume the four power talks, or three, let's support the idea of a conference in which the principal parties in the area and the major powers participate. Now, what is wrong with all of these procedures. What is wrong is that fundamentally if anything is ever going to get done it is going to be done on the basis of negotiations by the parties and not these kinds of procedures that that are intended to give Sadat the opportunity to have the major powers to do the job for them. If we were to accept any of these procedures, either formally or in the communique, there will be a major Donnybrook with the Israelis, the major Donnybrook with the Jewish community and for no reason--if it was worthwhile and it would help achieve something, I am sure the President would even chance it in a election year.

HAK: What if they offered to pull out their forces?

JS: If they offer to pull their forces out how?

HAK: In case we agree to one of these procedures and it leads to a resolve.

JS: My answer would be that we have always felt as part of any overall settlement, that the question of your presence and our presence--that the question of arms limitations goes well beyond the question of what arms we send to the area and you send to the area. You are physically present in materiel as well as manpower.

HAK: What if they offer to pull their manpower out? I'm just trying to think of their making an attractive offer.

I can't conceive of it but

JS: If they do, obviously we look at this, but I don't see this coming. But the two points I want to leave you with Henry are: no major power involvement as a matter of procedure or reconciliation of substantive plans.....

HAK: Do you have the Secretary lined up on this.

JS: No, this is why I am telling you.

The President's Office of the Vice-Chairman
and the Chairman of the Board of Directors
Publicity Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELCOM

Joseph Sisco (State)/Mr. Kissinger

8:45 p.m., May 19, 1972

Page 3

HAK: What's he going to be up to?

S: I don't know what he's going to do. Let me just say to you that I have great faith and confidence in you and I felt that I must tell you this.

HAK: Well, he said to the leaders today that Dobrynin was much more forthcoming --

S: Well, that's what he told me. He told me that today and boy, this worried me; I turned gray today when he told me this. Because I don't really know what's going to happen in Moscow when Mr. Gromyko really begins to give him the smooth talk.

HAK: Yeah.

S: Another thing is emphasize negotiations between the parties. Henry, if you have any trouble negotiating the Communique as a matter of substance, if they don't want to endorse --

HAK: Listen, nothing goes into the Communique that I don't get back to Haig and have him check with you.

S: Right.

HAK: I mean, so let me give you that flat assurance. On the Middle East, any word in it -- every word of it will be tracked with you.

S: Well, let me give you this reminder, if you have differences on substance, The Security Council Resolutions, procedures or anything else, remember that from our point of view, Henry, the best possible sentence in the Communique on the Middle East is merely, "The Middle East was discussed." Period, Henry. If that came out, that would be the best possible thing because it's a signal to Sadat that he has no alternative; that he can't look to the Soviet Union to pull his chestnuts out of the fire; that if he's going to get anything done on a so-called partial settlement, that the Israeli strategy has been to close all options except the option of talking about an interim agreement, you see. And any little communique that merely says the Russians and the Americans have talked about this and says nothing on the substance is perfectly all right with us. From our point of view, if they want to endorse the ceasefire, that's great but the way they're going to play it with you is -- "All right, we're willing to endorse the ceasefire; it's in our mutual interest ...."

By: K.L.Y. NAVA Date: 5/13/04

TELCONE

Mr. Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

8:45 p.m., May 19, 1972

HAK: How about endorsing the Jarring efforts?

S: Well, even that we shouldn't -- Henry, if you had to, okay but even endorsing the Jarring Mission as opposed to other things or giving primacy to the Jarring Mission, that gives encouragement to Sadat of the kind which in my judgment is bad. Now, if you have to buy it eventually, it's something that we could swallow and we can finesse in the post-summit --

HAK: Joe, all I can tell you as an old friend, I have set in on a lot of these meetings and by the time the Secretary and the President and all these characters get through --

S: Right.

HAK: Doh't over-estimate my bloody influence.

S: Gee, Henry, you worry me when you say that because --

HAK: Well, I don't know what's going to happen.

S: I don't either and I'll tell you very, very frankly, I'm very concerned. I got concerned after I heard the Secretary say to me, "Well, you know, I must say Mr. Dobrynin was very thoughtful about the Middle East yesterday." Oh, I said, did you discuss the Middle East with him? "Oh," he says, "Yes, he raised it. He was very thoughtful." And then he said to me, "Well, you know, what if they proposed a the conference at which the major powers and the participants are involved, can't we buy that?" I said that will call a major explosion with the Israelis because this will smack as far as they are concerned with an imposed settlement and I said why cause this difficulty for the President between now and November because the Israelis are going to say to us, "Go to Hell." You will have alienated the Jewish Community in this country for no reason at all. Now this is what I told him today.

HAK: Yeah. Well, I had the definite impression when he talked to the Leaders that he's got something on his mind.

S: Oh, boy; Oh, boy. Well, Henry, I've got to leave to you, my friend.

HAK: Well, I'll do my best.