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K: We are not going to do it until about 2:00 or 3:00 this afternoon for a meeting 5:00 or 6:00 this afternoon. And all we will do is ask for a cease-fire and we ask for a return to the cease-fire lines. The British are prepared to say they think the Arabs started this.

S: I think it is quite clear. The U.N. observers have also reported that from both fronts.

K: To all practical purposes there is no question.
[...]

GENERAL HAIG-KISSINGER

Saturday, October 6, 1973

12:45 P.M.

...

H: We are returning to Washington.

K: What is he going to do?

H: It is conceivable we will have an announcement about the Vice President. That is the first thing.

K: That is a slightly different problem.

H: You bet it is and what I am telling you is the two are going to be linked together. He cannot be sitting down here in the sun with what is going on in the VP thing. It is not firm yet but we will know very shortly.

K: If that other thing is happening then I can see a reason for coming back from the point of view of diplomacy. I would keep his return for later. Supposing the Soviets get tough and if he then returns that would be a good move. If he returns early it looks like an hysterical move. I am giving you my honest opinion. If the Soviets took a position of having kicked us in the teeth that would be a signal that [the President's] return is a signal that things are getting serious. We will not have heard by 3:00. We probably won't know until the first thing in the morning.

H: All right. I will try to hold this down here.

K: I would hold him until the first thing in the morning.

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H: Okay.

K: We have put him into the involvement with all morning phone
calls. Ron [Ziegler] can put that out too.

H: Right. Okay.

K: But don't you agree, speaking personally?

H: I know, except I know about the other problem.

K: You are a better judge of that. The problem I am handling in my judgment is if we played this as a crisis—say nothing, act tough, without stirring up the atmosphere.

H: Right. I will be in touch. I will go back to him on this thing.

K: Thank you.

SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM-KISSINGER

Saturday, October 6, 1973

1:20 P.M.

W: I want to keep you informed of the developments here. Zayyat came to see the President [of the General Assembly] and saw him in my presence. He asked him to convene an urgent meeting of the General Assembly. I mentioned this to you, that he had already suggested that to me. . . . The President reacted as I did. He said it was not technically possible— He cannot do it so quickly. After a lengthy conversation el-Zayyat agreed to send him a letter which he had prepared and signed in the office of the President and instead of having a special meeting of the General Assembly he asked to circulate this letter. It is a two-page letter which accuses the Israelis to have started the aggression and that they had to react and they accused the Israelis for having launched this aggressing along the Egyptian-Syrian border and continues the Israelis' policy of occupation of the Arab territory and the increasing of the utilization of the Arab territories.

K: I guess we will see it eventually.

W: It is an accusation [against] Israel for not having accepted the U.N. resolution [242], etc. This is the situation and this letter

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thinking is we'll call the Security Council. We will propose without condemnation of either side a cease-fire and a return to the cease-fire line.

D: That is it.

K: I will send over to you a draft resolution.

...

MINISTER SHALEV-KISSINGER

Saturday, October 6, 1973

4:00 P.M.

K: How are you?

S: Hungry [because Yom Kippur is a day of fasting].

K: Well, that I can appreciate. Can't you get dispensation to eat in a crisis?

S: I have passed it on and they are preparing something.

K: What about the pilots? I hope they are eating.

S: Don't you worry. Special rations for things of this sort.

K: Do you have anything more for me?

S: I hope I'll have it at some later point. I just have some information based on some phone conversations.

K: Since we talked?

S: Yes—they are slowly pulling them out—two bridgeheads—we are able to establish. I think the number of planes we downed is about twenty on the Egyptian side and half of that on the Syrian side.

K: Okay. In terms of strategy, please pass this on to Mrs. Meir—
doesn't go any further, not the whole Cabinet.

S: It will—nobody here.

K: You know that the Egyptians have asked for a special meeting of the General Assembly. It will go into a debate on Monday. Our judgment is the General Assembly is a bad forum for you—extremely bad. ... In order to make [our strategy] effective, we must call a Security Council meeting.

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GENERAL HAIG-KISSINGER

Saturday, October 6, 1973

7:10 P.M.

H: Just talked to the President. He feels that we possibly should not wait too much longer for the Soviet answer before moving with the resolution [for a cease-fire and return to the status quo ante].

K: Exactly right. First, though, a Soviet answer is coming in now. Second, my recommendation is to move tonight; whatever is the answer, we move into the Security Council as soon— We will put forward a call for a cease-fire and return to the status quo ante before the fighting started. . . . [Otherwise] we will be rewarding the attacker— Once the Israelis start beating up on the Arabs—Israelis grab Arab territory—I feel we must recommend a cease-fire and return to status quo ante [even] if it gets voted down—best position with the Chinese. Can’t have precedents set in which—can grab territory and then call for a ceasefire.

H: Henry, what do you think about our announcing here, first on that thing?

K: That's fine. Just say that the President has instructed Dr. Kissinger to move immediately— Wait for the Soviet answer. It's coming in now, but I will let you make the announcement down there. I'll call you as soon as I have got the answer.

Immediately thereafter, I reviewed the state of play with Dobrynin, pointing out the threat to U.S.-Soviet relations. The strategy was to induce Soviet restraint to create conditions for an outcome that would, in the end, reduce Soviet influence.

AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN-KISSINGER

Saturday, October 6, 1973

7:20 P.M.

K: Here is what we will do. In deference to the message which you have sent us we will not go to the Security Council tonight,

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[Y]

by creating Arab
doubts about
Soviet consistency

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it/

though [our intention] originally was to go at six o'clock. We will wait for a decision on how to proceed until 9:00 tomorrow.

D: In the morning?

K: Yes. Give you a chance to go to church. If you could get me an answer from Moscow which is a little more specific than this: A

D: On what?

K: What exactly are your intentions? My impression is—I understand you don't want to get into a public disassociation.

D: I will put it quite friendly. We are rather in a difficult position publicly.

K: If you can give us some indication what you are doing privately. You and I have handled these things [in] private. We are interested in the results. We want a cease-fire and status quo ante. I repeat: by Tuesday you will be asking us. It is not a question in which we are asking for a favor. We are trying to prevent an exacerbation of our relationship—a situation where in this country and the Congress [we] will have very serious consequences. If you tell us you are working with the Egyptians and the Syrians and by Monday morning this will be over and no further debate is necessary.

If you will tell us that you believe that by Monday morning there will be in effect a cease-fire and return to the status quo ante We don't want this to become a public affair. Tell us something we can understand. It will be kept confidential, as everything has been kept between us. I am not asking for you to agree for concerted public action. I am asking you tomorrow morning for a concerted practical action, [one] that will lead to the result we want. I genuinely believe and you will tell Gromyko and Brezhnev by Tuesday at the latest the situation will be a different show. Right? No?

D: I understand.

K: Our reading of the situation is that the Arab attack has been totally contained, that now they are going to be pushed back, and this process will accelerate as the mobilization is completed,

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which will be no later than Monday morning, and after that we
will see what we have seen before. This is our military reading of
the situation. We think the matter could be wound up tomorrow.
The Arabs have proved their point. They have attacked across
the Canal. They can withdraw on their own and return to the
status quo. We can both enjoy a good Security Council debate.

D: I don't understand in a political sense what do you think? What do you want from our point of view, our position—which is a principle from the beginning of '67 [return of Israel to 1967 borders].

K: I know your position.

D: It is not a public debate that I am telling you. For us to tell the Arabs is very difficult. I had rather hear from Moscow but as I understand our position the difficulties we are now facing is that the Arabs are trying to regain the lands occupied by Israel. They have been using that argument to us, and for us to tell them you cannot free your land, it is ridiculous.

K: I recognize the situation. I am not saying it is all easy. We have a different situation. There have not been any raids on Damascus and Cairo, but I would not bet anything on tomorrow.

D: I understand.

K: Is it possible for the Politburo to imagine a complete course of action which we agree on privately?

D: What course of action do you propose besides Security Council?

K: A de facto return to the status quo ante, a de facto return of the cease-fire. I have already told the Egyptians that I would make an effort after the Israeli election. I have told Gromyko I would talk to him in January. None of this we will do if these pressures continue—

D: I understand.

K: We have a framework out of which we could crystallize [progress]. The Arabs have now proved their point.

D: Henry, how could they?

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K: You see they are going to lose. It is not a case where we are asking....

D: I understand. The military point of view. I cannot argue with you. You know the situation better. I am trying to understand the situation better politically.

K: They have next to nothing [territorial gains].

D: What is the question—asking them to return somewhere if they have nothing?

K: We have two choices: we can let this war continue until the exact calibrated moment when the Israelis have pushed [the Arabs] out of every territory but before they start heading for Damascus. If we are lucky and hit that moment exactly right we can hit the cease-fire then. Probability is that the Arabs can hold on another twenty-four hours and [are] then going to retreat to their capitals and wait for winter.

D: I understand what the situation really is. But for us to go to the Arabs and say, look here, I don't know how many you have—one or two miles but you have to go back. They say you invite us to give back territory that belongs to us?

K: Can you not say that it was your understanding that an effort was going to be made for negotiations? They have proved their point, of the urgency in which they see this, and this is a good psychological moment for them to make a generous gesture, rather than wait until the outcome of these hostilities. By Monday evening they will be thrown out of there anyway.

D: I understand.

K: This is a new strategy—of using the threat of one's own defeat.

D: I know. There are many [things] that could be said. The question is, from the practical way. From a practical point of view because they put on us all the cats and dogs. On the Russians because we asked them to give back land which we have already said—

K: I understand your dilemma.

D: They will say you are in collusion with the U.S. and Israel.

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K: Who will be the first?

D: Cairo. From a man you met [means Zayyat]. The Russians were in collusion with the U.S. and [unclear].

K: If you and we could find a way of settling this now, then it would be an overwhelming argument in all of the things we have been going through [regarding détente] as to what the practical consequences have been of our relationship.

D: I understand.

K: I think it would overwhelm in one blow all of these things we have been facing. If it goes the other way, and Monday you and we are going to be up at the rostrum calling each other names, it will be a disaster.

D: I can assure you we will not be calling the U.S. names. I am not sure what the Israelis will be calling.

K: You know some of the local people cannot always distinguish those two.

D: We will try to put them out of the country on this particular American line. You understand?

K: I understand.

D: This we could take care of.

K: It still would not change the objective condition. The various people who are harassing you will be more inflamed.

D: I know. That is why I keep returning to the practical thing. You understand?

K: I understand it.

D: They would say you have spoken of liberating [after the 1967 cease-fire]. It is impossible for us.

K: Anatol, with all due respect, we will face this problem somewhere in the next forty-eight hours. Suppose you do nothing and we do nothing. By Tuesday, or Wednesday at the latest, the Arabs will be defeated unless our estimates are wrong. At that point what are we going to do?

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D: Did you approach once more the Egyptians?

K: No. You think I should?

D: I think you should. Tell them your estimate. Otherwise it would be such an invitation. You are [unclear] and we their friends are saying, go back from your own land.

K: I will approach them tonight and I will call you after I have talked to them.

D: I think it would be much better. From us, it would look like we are trying to sell them out.

K: We have to leave it at this. We will not go to the Security Council tonight—to give ourselves a chance to think. You think and we will think. Try to get me an expression from Moscow by 9:00 in the morning.

D: Ask for 9:00? That is 5:00A

K: Tell them they will have to go to early mass.

D: They would find it strange to have these kinds of discussions going on over the weekend.

K: I can imagine what kind of discussion is going on there. I understand the [unclear]—are very happy today.

D: This is a basic problem. I also understand your ingenuity.

K: If I have any ideas I will call you.

D: Not at night. I go to sleep quite early.

K: You are not going to bed now, are you?

D: No.

K: What you have to understand is, if it turns into a propaganda battle on Monday in the General Assembly, then our only protection is to **be extremely tough** and to teach the facts of life to people who like to make great speeches and we will see what is more important—a speech or reality. **I will be very brutal.** That will be our strategy. **We want to get it settled before then, at least with an understanding.**

...

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the General Assembly, we had decided to call for a formal Security Council meeting toward evening, to postpone the debate until the next day, and to aim for a vote by Tuesday or Wednesday. By then, if our intelligence estimates were to be believed, Israel would have restored at least the original lines. Everyone might then be prepared to accept a cease-fire in place.

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GENERAL HAIG-KISSINGER

Sunday, October 7, 1973

9:35 A.M.

K: Where are you?

H: In my room, about to go to see the boss.

K: We haven't heard from the Soviets. I think around noon [press secretary Ron] Ziegler ought to say we are going to the Security Council. Before it's done, check again. We have next to no support. On the other hand, the Arabs are doing better than anyone thought possible. I have just talked to the Israelis. They will need until Wednesday or Thursday. They are not all that eager for a Security Council meeting. In fact, nobody is—the Israelis, the Soviets, the Egyptians, the British. On the other hand, I think we can have a low-key meeting. For the Security Council to do nothing while fighting goes on is absolutely intolerable and I think we have to go ahead. We should seek return to the status quo ante.

H: Yes.

K: If we go, we must ask for return [to the status quo ante]—the Israelis will never forgive us for a straight cease-fire, and they'd never observe it anyway.

H: It's going to be tough if we are all alone.

K: On the other hand, a simple cease-fire request would make it seem that we have turned against the Israelis and this would have incalculable domestic consequences—and international ones too, and we would have changed our position of yesterday.

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H: Are the Israelis panicking?

K: They are almost. They are anxious to get some equipment which has been approved and which some SOB in Defense held up, which I didn't know about. I think, myself, we should release some of it.

H: I think so too.

K: I think if the Arabs win, they will be impossible and there will be no negotiations. A change would be ascribed to our own domestic crisis [Watergate].

H: Right, I agree. I think we have got to stand by principle. We'll have to provide the stuff we have been committed to unless they can stabilize this thing quickly—two or three days.

K: That's what they think. If we don't move today somebody will move with a simple cease-fire resolution.

H: Anything else the boss should know, Henry?

K: No, those are the main things.

H: Interesting report. The Israelis are shocked by the confidence of the Arabs.

K: Yes, that's right.

H: This might make easier negotiations.

K: Depends on how we conduct ourselves. We must be on their [the Israeli] side now so that they have something to lose afterwards. Therefore I think we have to give the equipment.

H: What are we talking about, ammunition and spares?

K: Let me see, I have it here. [Reads from list.] What we can do is send those which have already been approved.

H: Do we airlift them?

K: We don't have to do anything. They are sending a plane over and we could do it on the ground—that they were picking up things they had already ordered. My profound conviction is that if we play this the hard way, it's the last time they [the Israelis] are going to listen. If we kick them in the teeth, they have nothing to

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lose. Later if we support them they would be willing to help with Jewish emigration or MFN [Most Favored Nation] or other stuff. [Most Favored Nation status for Soviet trade was being blocked by an amendment put forward by Senator Henry Jackson (D.-Wash.) and Representative Charles Vanik (D.-Ohio), making it conditional on Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.]

H: Will be in touch before noon.

K: Have Ziegler read the announcement to me.

FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN-KISSINGER

Sunday, October 7, 1973
10:00 A.M.

E: I have two things to add to what Shalev told you. You will be getting a military roundup very soon. I have had some telephone talks—the night was not particularly good. More forces were sent over.

K: You're talking about Sinai?

E: I'm talking about Sinai but even in the north there was further penetration there, in the Harmon area. Our garrison fell at Mount Harmon. We're not at full capability because of the special circumstances of yesterday. You'll get the military reports and I think they will reinforce the conclusions in the message.

K: I have just discussed it with my colleagues—not the message but the general strategy.

E: I understand you're asking for a special Security Council meeting tonight to preempt—

K: Yes, to preempt somebody else introducing a straight cease-fire resolution.

E: You could ask for a meeting and table a resolution tonight. Then ask for discussion tomorrow.

K: Well, if that can be done. Our judgment is that we need a platform on which to stand.

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E: I have just been given a radio report that Britain had received in-
structions to call for a meeting. Perhaps you can have a word
with them telling them not to hurry. If you could ask your Am-
bassador to be in touch, we could go over it.

K: We haven't given him instructions. Let me check with the British about whether they are going to proceed. I can't believe they are going to proceed without checking with us.

E: You could make two points: (a) you will ask for a meeting, (b) it's your opinion that is all it requires. That will have [a] preemptive effect and gain time. The full military report will reach you and will reinforce the conclusions in the message. The Ambassador will return this afternoon and will want to see you.

K: I will see him as soon as he arrives and we will check with the British.

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page

THE PRESIDENT—KISSINGER

Sunday, October 7, 1973

10:18 A.M.

K: I just wanted to tell you we have had a call from Dobrynin that a message from Brezhnev to you is coming through in the next two hours, so I think we should hold this thing up until we get this message. I know this might be impatient-making—

N: It what?

K: I know that these delays are difficult, but the problem is we may end up with no support at all.

N: We can't do that.

K: I think we should make a record that we have been very active before we go to the Security Council and not get totally isolated. It is best to know where the cards lie. I think we can wait, even if we take some flak. If we can see this through, we have a major platform.

N: We'll have to do that. With Brezhnev I don't think we will learn anything.

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K: —Somebody on the Arab side will put in a simple cease-fire resolution. . . . We're going to be in a hell of a position in vetoing or voting against a simple cease-fire. We had a message saying they will have their equipment by Wednesday or Thursday, but they will not accept a cease-fire before they have thrown them out. My view is that if we cannot break ranks during this crisis, we can really do it afterwards because then they will have something to lose.

N: One thing that we have to have in the back of our minds is, we don't want to be so pro-Israel that the oil states—the Arabs that are not involved in the fighting—will break ranks.

K: So far we haven't done anything.

N: You are keeping Scali informed?

K: Yes.

N: PR is terribly important. Even if we don't do anything— Let Scali go out—he can do a lot and prattle and cause no problem.

K: We held a meeting of four perm reps and some others to—

N: You keep one step removed—we can use you for the power punch.

K: I recommend that you announce that you have asked for a meeting of the Security Council as soon as we have the Soviet message. I have told Dobrynin that we are not hell-bent on a Security Council meeting—that if the Soviets made a proposal where we could settle outside the Security Council, we would consider it. I called the Egyptian Foreign Minister last night. Some of our oil people in this country are [end of transcript].

GENERAL HAIG—KISSINGER

Sunday, October 7, 1973

12:35 P.M.

K: Let me tell you where matters now stand. The Egyptians have told the British—he [they] didn't want a Security Council meeting but if one were held we will be totally alone—My suggestion

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bank. Now whatever happens in negotiations, if the Arabs come
out ahead, they will be totally unmanageable. This way, if we
don't help them, they won't come out ahead and we will wind up
with nothing.

H: I've discussed it with the President and he is in full agreement.

AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN-KISSINGER

Sunday, October 7, 1973

3:25 P.M.

D: Received the text. I could read it to you but then I could give to you oral, however you like.

K: What's the essence?

D: This say[s]—it is a letter from boss to boss [Brezhnev to Nixon]—it is saying about that recollection how [the] question was discussed between them, minister to minister, saying we are always in favor here to do something but nothing [was] done. We regret very much it bothers you. And then after—these things, then it goes like this. It would be possible to say a lot more to this but the main thing now is to take urgent effective measures to get rid of the cause of the conflict. With the situation in the Middle East—will continue to remain a source of constant danger. It would be very important if there came on the part of the Israelis a statement of its readiness to negotiate. Keeping in mind at the same time the security of the Israelis and other countries, so that area would be guaranteed—what is acceptable for Israel, to the interest of the Israeli people themselves. And if at all possible, to seek security of states in a seizure of foreign territories. As you know, Mr. President, we have always exercised restraint.

In effect the effectiveness of such a guarantee for the Israelis
ensures turning point in the dangerous situation in the Middle
East, could be the beginning of the process of settlement on the
basis of U.N. decisions [Security Council Resolution 242]. We

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great achievement. One of the greatest achievements of all. People in this country would think—really tough.

[...]

K: It's a little premature. One usually smells a point when one can say they see it come together. Wednesday or Thursday perhaps. I've been calling a lot of senators in your behalf, after you decided to go to the U.N.

N: I will be in the morning. Will you be at the White House tomorrow?

K: I'll be in around 8:00, 8:30.

N: Good. Why don't you come over and we'll have a talk, publicize it.

The reference to a letter from Egypt's National Security Adviser, Hafiz Ismail, on behalf of Sadat—which Zayyat had also mentioned earlier in the day—was one reason we believed we were in a position to control the pace of diplomacy. On the first day of the war, Sadat had taken the extraordinary step of contacting us. In a message addressed to me through intelligence channels, Ismail informed us of Egypt's terms for ending the war. The terms were not acceptable, requiring the withdrawal of Israel to the 1967 borders. But they were clearly an opening position. Communicating with us was risky enough. Sadat could not compound the risk of alienating Syria and perhaps the Soviet Union—whose support was essential for the conduct of the war—by immediately offering concessions that might drive Syria to abandon the common struggle or the Soviet Union to reduce its supplies.

What was significant was the fact of the message, not its content. Sadat was inviting the United States to take charge of the peace process, despite the fact that at the United Nations we were advocating that he give up territory that his armies had just captured. The message included an avowal that showed Sadat knew very well the limits of what was attainable: "We do not intend to deepen the en-

This was *Ic* earlier on, as in "Sadat's security adviser". Okay as it is here in caps?

[Y]

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duce that resolution. I told the Russians we were not introducing
a resolution—have consultations.

N: No message from Brezhnev?

K: Oh, yes. We heard from him.

N: What did he say?

K: It was a friendly message, but it didn't say anything. One thing it did say was that the Russians pulled out all their advisers against the wishes of the Arab governments, and we have confirmed that through our sources. Also they have withdrawn their fleet in the Mediterranean.

N: Where's our fleet?

K: Well, actually our two fleets are very close together. Ours went east and theirs went west. They have moved back and we have moved up— Military situation sufficiently clear. Everybody wants a settlement. Also arrangement for Israelis to stick to—if they go beyond the [previous lines]. If you appeal to them to return, they must return. I have checked this with Mrs. Meir and she agrees.

N: I see. With regard to the report I was reading coming up on the plane, possibly out-of-date by now, but the doggoned Syrians surprised me. They're doing better than I ever thought.

K: The Israelis haven't thrown in the reserves yet. They're doing damned well. They've taken [unclear], penetrated two points and that mountain. You must have seen it when you were there.

N: Yes, I remember.

K: They have done pretty well. Implantation won't be complete until tomorrow. Then Ismail [Sadat's security adviser] sent me a message suggesting [a] possible framework for negotiations. Not yet adequate. It's where North Vietnam was four months before the breakthrough. The same message was sent through the Shah [of Iran], but it's not yet adequate and it's not quite time to do [it]. We have to get the war stopped first. Then—diplomacy.

N: The thing to do now is to get the war stopped. That would be [a]

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AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN-KISSINGER

Saturday, October 13, 1973
4:25 P.M.

K: Anatoly, I just talked to the President and he asked me to tell you that under these circumstances he can no longer observe any restrictions that I gave you yesterday on flying American planes.

D: Under what circumstances?

K: The plan we worked out is not being implemented because we didn't know the Egyptians' real feelings. We are prepared to stop when you are.

D: What?

K: We are prepared to stop our aerial supplies when you are willing to stop.

D: I will send that right now.

K: So what I told you yesterday as of an hour from now will not be accurate.

D: You don't want to wait even an hour?

K: We can always stop it. It will not be that massive that quickly.

Lord CROMER-KISSINGER

Saturday, October 13, 1973
4:35 P.M.

C: Henry, I still haven't heard anything.

K: I talked to Alec and your people won't do it. They have talked to the Egyptians and they say they are violently opposed to it.

C: They won't give any—? Maybe the Egyptians have changed their minds in the delusion that they may win.

K: At any rate, I have just talked to the President, who is taking it extremely ill. When we look over the crises of the last three years we just don't seem to be able to get together.

C: Our clients are quite different, but our objectives are the same.

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Messages in this vein were also sent to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia
and the Shah of Iran.

Nixon was between domestic crises. The issue of Agnew's resignation had been resolved by the appointment of Gerald Ford as Vice President. The crisis over release of the Watergate tapes and the start of impeachment proceedings was but a few days away.

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THE PRESIDENT—KISSINGER

Sunday, October 14, 1973

9:04 A.M.

N: Hi, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay.

N: Anything new this morning?

K: Yes, the Egyptians have launched a big offensive and it's hard to know exactly what is going on in an early stage of an offensive.

N: Of course.

K: The Israelis have claimed that they've knocked out 150 tanks and that they've lost about fifteen of their own. But that in itself would not prove anything—it depends where they [the Egyptians] get to. The last information we have that is not absolutely firm is that they may have reached close to the Mitla Pass, which is about thirty kilometers from the Canal, and which would be the key Israeli defensive position—it's about one third of the way into Sinai and it would be a rather—

[...]

K: ... The Israelis—there are two possibilities, one that the Israelis are trying to draw them beyond the SAM belt in order to knock out a lot of their forces and, in that case, the battle could be fairly decisive. The other is that the Israelis are really in trouble and we should know that by tonight in any event. I think that makes clear why that peace move wouldn't work yesterday. I don't think the Egyptians were ready until they launched an attack.

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N: That's right. And basically they told—the Russians might have wanted—we haven't heard anything more from the Russians?

K: No, but that's a little early. I'm certain we will before the end of the day.

N: What then? We have in effect told the Russians to—

K: The issue now is this, Mr. President. As of yesterday, we started out with the idea of a cease-fire and a return to the pre-hostilities lines. Incidentally, should the Israelis clobber the Egyptians that will turn out to be a pretty good position. Then we moved to a simple cease-fire. The Egyptians may have been ready to accept that before the Israelis got into Syria. The Egyptians are demanding a return to '67 borders; now that's absolutely out of the question, short of a huge [Israeli] defeat as a result of the war. That has to come as a result of the subsequent negotiations that follow the war. So now what we are trying to do is—I've talked to Dobrynin about that last night after you and I talked—is to see whether we can find a formula that links the cease-fire to the peace settlement.

N: I think we've got to get some way. Look we've got to face this—that as far as the Russians are concerned, they have a pretty good beef insofar as everything we have offered on the Mideast, you know what I mean, that meeting in San Clemente, we were stringing them along and they know it. We've got to come off with something on the diplomatic front, because if we go the cease-fire [route], they'll figure that we get the cease-fire and then the Israelis will dig in and we'll back them, as we always have. That's putting it quite bluntly, but it's quite true, Henry, isn't it?

K: There's a lot in that.

N: They can't be in that position, so we have got to be in a position to offer something.

K: Well I—

N: Because we've got to squeeze the Israelis when this is over and

between
Brezhnev
and Nixon
in June
1973-74

V

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the Russians have got to know it. We've got to squeeze them goddamn hard. And that's the way it is going to be done. But I don't know how we can get across now; we told them before we'd squeeze them and we didn't.

K: Well we were going to squeeze them; we were going to start a diplomacy in November right after the Israeli—

N: I know we were, but—

K: And we have made all the preparations for that but that's now water over the dam. I think what we need now—if we can find a resolution that doesn't flatly say the '67 borders, but leaves it open—something that invokes the Security Council Resolution 242 that speaks of withdrawals and that's something everybody has already agreed to once. Plus a conference or something like that. Then perhaps by tomorrow we can move it to a vote in the Security Council.

N: Yeah, yeah. Certainly a conference would be fine.

K: And I know the British are working on something like that and I'm going to be meeting with Cromer later.

N: The British, then, are not just standing aside—that'd be terrible.

K: There are two things, Mr. President. The British basic attitude is lousy because they are trying—I put it to Cromer yesterday. I said what have you got to lose in Egypt that's compared to what you will lose in Saudi Arabia if this thing gets worse and worse. On the immediate specific issue, where the British are behaving badly, they are just passively sitting there picking up the pieces; they are not shaping anything. But on the very immediate one, Sadat did take a negative attitude, but they made no attempt to persuade him, nor did they want to run any risks. We might have done what you suggested yesterday, offering a cease-fire, if we could have gotten Britain and France to go along with it. But to go into the Security Council with a resolution that has only two members supporting it, one other member possibly supporting it, is suicidal.

N: Yeah, I understand.

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K: But by the end of the day, this thing will become a lot clearer because the battle now in Sinai, whatever happens in Syria and Sinai, the battles just cannot be extremely protracted because supplies from both sides have to come a fairly long distance.

N: Desert battles are not protracted, we know that—that they move quickly. The other point I was going to make—what are we doing on the supply side?

K: If I could call you in an hour; I have a meeting which is going to start now.

N: All right.

K: In which I can give you an accurate report. Basically what we are trying to do is stop the military planes after today and put commercial charters in.

N: Yes, yes. As I say though, it's got to be the works. What I meant is—we are going to get blamed just as much for three planes as for three hundred—not going to let the Russians come in there for—with a free hand. On the other hand, this is a deadly course, I know, but what I meant is, Henry, I have no patience with the view that we send in a couple of planes, even though they carry sixty some—

N: My point is if—when we are going to make a move, it's going to cost us, in terms of our—out there. I don't think it's going to cost us a damn bit more to send in more and—I have to emphasize to you that I think the way it's been handled in terms of our things—I want in any future statements out of McCloskey—we are sending supplies, but only for the purpose of maintaining the balance, so that we can create the conditions that will lead to an equitable settlement. The point is, if you don't say it that way, it looks as though we are sending in supplies to have the war go on indefinitely, and that is not a tenable position.

K: Right. Right. If it hasn't been said before, we'll say it certainly today.

N: The thought is basically: the purpose of supplies is not simply to

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THE PRESIDENT—KISSINGER

Tuesday, October 16, 1973
11:46 A.M.

N: I wanted to congratulate you.

K: I know who deserves it.

N: Yes. Yes. I was going to make two suggestions. It occurred to me that you should make a little statement.

K: I have told everyone that I wanted to say that I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity and, above all, for the leadership that created the conditions.

N: Fine. Fine. I was going to suggest that it might be well for you to drop over here and have a picture taken with me congratulating you. How about 12:30?

K: Absolutely.

N: That will give us some time. Come after you make your statement.

K: I will be there at 12:30.

N: Make your statement before you come, so they will not ask you to do it here.

...

SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER (R.-ARIZ.)—KISSINGER

Tuesday, October 16, 1973
3:57 P.M.

G: I hate to bother you with this. When the Shah of Iran was here, he asked Peggy [Senator Goldwater's wife] and me if we would come over. We are looking at December 1, but in view of the situation—

K: You mean in the Middle East, it will be all over before then unless we screw it up in the next few days.

G: I am sure glad to hear that. Are we working with the Soviets? No, you don't have to answer over the phone.

K: We are working with the Soviets and also with the Egyptians. It's a tough situation and could blow up.

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K: Thank you. I am calling on behalf of the President to tell you that after the end of hostilities, the President would be very pleased if His Majesty would accept an invitation to visit the United States.

S: Can we discuss this tomorrow?

K: There will be others present. Perhaps you and I can discuss it.

S: Is there a time for this?

K: We can find a time mutually convenient as soon as possible.

S: Thank you very much. See you tomorrow.

Skip to p. 273
(next pg.)

THE PRESIDENT—KISSINGER

Tuesday, October 16, 1973

End of day

K: Mr. President.

N: Any other developments on the diplomatic front?

K: I saw the Sudanese Foreign Minister.

N: Good.

K: And he has the impression things may be breaking. He's close to the other Arabs, you know.

N: I wouldn't include him in tomorrow—

K: No, they selected themselves— Let them go.

N: Think we have Sadat's position: we are not going to get a resolution of this thing until we get some kind of diplomatic offer they can save face with. The one you made was pretty good—

K: Wouldn't float that with those three [actually four—the Foreign Ministers from Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Kuwait, and Algeria] tomorrow, though—

N: No, no. I don't intend to float anything tomorrow.

K: I don't think we will get anything until Kosygin has returned from Cairo.

N: What tell him—?

K: He's got the offer.

N: What if he returns and says they won't do it?

K: I think there's a good chance they will do it.

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N: Or some variation of it. Do you think he will return tomorrow.
Kosygin visit, how long will it be?

K: I'll bet he will be back by tomorrow night. Or he may stay until
Thursday.

N: You see Mansfield's [Mike Mansfield, Senate Majority Leader] brilliant suggestion—urging summit conference with the British, French, Japanese, U.S., and Russians? What in the name of heaven would be decided?—

K: Mr. President, it would kill us. It would be the Israelis and—us
against six other nations. Insane.

N: It's just as it was in Vietnam, our friends on the Democratic side
are petrified it will end, and they want to be out there suggesting
and urging.

K: Makes no difference—unless somebody loses his cool.

N: Could happen.

K: Don't think it will, though.

N: Hope we've got that airstrip in Tel Aviv damned well protected.

K: They're not going to attack it.

N: Why not?

K: Because they're afraid we'll start attacking the Soviet airlift.
Chances are two out of three—now moving towards resolution.
Last week was too easy, done too much with mirrors—better so-
lution this week, when we have shown our muscle.

N: If the airlift continues— How many—fifty planes? They'll have
more planes in the end than at the beginning.

K: Well, they're going in at a rate of six a day, depends now on when
it ends, is settled.

N: Well, the Israelis ought to be awfully grateful after this. . . .

K: There have been statements on Senate floor; Javits made one
today— Diplomatically, it helps us that you are not way out in
front until we get it done.

N: I understand, but we will—it ought to happen when we get
through.

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K. Around 8:00 or 9:00.

...

AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN-KISSINGER

Friday, October 19, 1973
1:35 P.M.

...

K: Anatoly, about that letter. The President agrees that I should go to Moscow. You understand this will present us with enormous domestic difficulties.

D: Well—

K: Oh, never mind. I think it's important that we say publicly, it was done at the invitation of the Soviet government.

D: I see no difficulty in that.

K: In our interests to announce it about 1:00 this morning our time.

D: 1:00 A.M.?

K: Yes, I think we should leave about 12:30.

D: This is acceptable.

K: Then we should say it is [at] the invitation of the Soviet government. I am going on urgent consultations. Of course, we will be delighted to have you come with us and—we are assuming that no unilateral actions will be taken while I am in transit.

D: What do you mean?

K: No military threats. And I am assuming both of us will keep the situation calm—I don't believe while I am there I will be able to negotiate a final settlement. I will be able to negotiate a cease-fire.

D: A cease-fire?

K: But we can't expect to settle it in one day.

D: Okay.

...

The visit to Moscow could not have taken place at a more complicated time from the point of view of our domestic situation. Nixon

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was negotiating the agreement on the release of his tapes with Sena-
tor Stennis, the refusal of which led to the resignation of Attorney
General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney General and Acting
FBI Director William Ruckelshaus and the firing of Special Prosecu-
tor Archibald Cox on October 20. Two days later, the House of Rep-
resentatives started impeachment proceedings against Nixon.

GENERAL HAIG-KISSINGER

Friday, October 19, 1973
3:20 P.M.

H: On this thing we are working on. The President wants to go out tonight and announce your trip.

K: Impossible.

H: Why?

K: First of all, we have now told the Soviets we would do it at 2:00 in the morning and secondly, I will be at a Chinese dinner that the Chinese are giving me. When does he want to do it?

H: Whenever we put this other mess [the Stennis compromise] to-
gether, which could be anywhere from 6:00 to 8:00. He would
assemble the press in the Press Room and with cameras.

K: And say what?

H: Say in consultation with Chairman Brezhnev and that he has been in communication with him.

K: Say at the invitation.

H: He wants you to prepare the statement that he should say. Very brief.

K: Why should he do it?

H: There are a couple of reasons. One is he feels it for the reason of what he is going to announce after that.

K: He is going to make them both at the same time?

H: Yes.

K: A disaster.

H: Why?

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K: My honest opinion is that it is a cheap stunt. It looks as if he is using foreign policy to cover a domestic thing.

H: The domestic thing is not controversial [the Stennis compromise]. A very good one. A very good settlement. It would also look very weird for him to make a major announcement on Watergate and ignore the fact you are going to Moscow when everyone wants to know what is going on in the Middle East. I don't see it as a contrived phony. I think you have two very important things happening.

K: He is not firing Cox?

H: As of now, no. Just giving him a desist order, which will probably result in his resignation.

K: I would not link foreign policy with Watergate. You will regret it for the rest of your life. I don't think he has to do either of them himself.

H: He has Ervin [Sam Ervin (D.-N.C.), Chairman of the Senate Watergate Committee], Baker [Howard Baker (R.-Tenn.), member of Senate Watergate Committee], and Stennis [John Stennis (D.-Miss.), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee]. We are doing a hell of a thing here. He has to do it.

K: But if he gets that mixed up with foreign policy, Al, then he has to do this with the Jewish community. It will forever after be said he did this to cover Watergate. I really would plead with you. If he wants to make it as an announcement separate from the other.

H: He wants to do that. That is his idea.

K: No, no, no. He is going to make both announcements together.

H: You meant at the same time.

K: Right. I would be opposed if he even wanted to make an announcement. Now, the Soviets have asked us—by his stepping out there it becomes high-profile.

H: You are the best judge of that.

K: That does not bother me nearly so much. I think that is poor tac-

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tics. Also, we would have to get back to the Soviets. This will be
a situation where the President has put his prestige on the line.
Right now the Soviets have asked us to come. We should do it as
a reasonable, low-key thing—simultaneous announcement. We
call some newsmen in the middle of the night. It is still a big
thing, but not the President's going before TV announcing it.

H: Okay.

K: I tell you, it will do him more good that way. It will be a second story that will override the first. I really mean it.

H: I know you do.

K: If he is insisting, we will do it, but I think he will regret it.

H: Okay. I will see what I can do.

GENERAL HAIG-KISSINGER

Friday, October 19, 1973
3:35 P.M.

H: I have an answer to your problem. He says okay, but he wants an announcement of your trip to come from the White House.

K: Yes. Ziegler should make it. One other question: must you do it tonight?

H: Absolutely, no way out of it. We have a midnight deadline to file.

K: All right. You will explain that?

H: How do you mean explain it?

K: It is my problem, quite honestly. It is no joy to be in Moscow under these conditions, as it is. Anything the President says makes it tougher.

H: This will strengthen it dramatically.

K: You think so?

H: No question. All the press knows we have until midnight to file.

K: Actually that is a good cover for me to get out of town. I had already explained that Ziegler should call a few selected press people about 2:00 in the morning. Tomorrow morning he could give a briefing at the White House. It would be all White House. Not

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State Department. Moreover, when I come back, whatever
comes out of it, then he should step forward.

H: I understand you and you are right.

K: Thank you.

AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN-KISSINGER

Friday, October 19, 1973

4:30 P.M.

D: —Could I tell them it will be a commercial flight?

K: Tell them I am coming on a B-52.

D: Laughter.

K: As it turns out I have to stop in Copenhagen.

D: And then they will go along route of commercial.

K: Let's say yes.

D: I think it would be safer. I will tell them you will stop in Copenhagen and you will use [the] route used by your Pan American.

K: Yes. You have to tell us what altitude.

D: All right.

K: Is the announcement all right?

D: I will be in touch with you.

AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN-KISSINGER

Friday, October 19, 1973

4:30 P.M.

D: —A short telegram from Brezhnev. He thanks the President and you for your positive answer on his proposal. He says no objection for your public statement concerning your visit to Moscow and I was told you may come without any of our men on your aircraft.

K: Try to understand. We are discussing in the framework you and I have been discussing—not a final settlement.

D: No need for me to tell them that.

K: I just don't want them to be disappointed.

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K: And say the same thing—We are willing to accept this and make it a joint resolution if you will.

V: Good, yes.

K: In the second paragraph—Using for this purpose—personnel in Middle East—and personnel on Cairo. Now, between you and me, I would not hold up deliberations on that.

V: Not understand.

K: It should be included in—I think it is a reasonable proposal, don't you?

V: I do too. I will talk to Malik and I will confirm.

K: It is better to argue about where the line is—the principle of withdrawal. We would slow that debate.

V: Let them argue but just not fight—

K: Secondly, we attach great importance to the understanding between the Secretary General and me about the exchange of [prisoners]—

V: I repeat this to Moscow.

K: Emphasize it again. Let me know.

V: I need five minutes.

K: We will make it a joint resolution.

V: A joint resolution. Malik has insisted to make it separate.

K: Tell Malik not to. If you can accept my language—

V: Exactly, exactly. We can accept. I then need five minutes.

AMBASSADOR SCALI-KISSINGER

Tuesday, October 23, 1973
1:36 P.M.

S: Malik is acting like a goddamn idiot.

K: You tell Malik to calm down. We are in the process of working it out.

S: Tell him right now?

K: Yes. Tell him right now. Vorontsov is now in the process of getting instructions from Moscow.

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S: He claims that he has talked to Vorontsov and has gotten—

K: I have just talked to Vorontsov and given him our proposal. You tell Malik to hold his water or I will send him to Siberia. I know Brezhnev better than he does. Ask him if he has ever been kissed on the mouth by Brezhnev, as I have. Tell him to go to Vorontsov. We have made a new proposal and we think we will—

S: Okay, I'll tell him.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION VORONTSOV—KISSINGER

Tuesday, October 23, 1973

1:40 P.M.

V: We accept the changes you wanted in the first case and second. So we are accepting it together.

K: Give me ten minutes to let those maniacs in New York know.

V: I have contacted Malik and he has told Scali, so Scali knows.

K: Good.

We thought we had given Israel the maximum flexibility to bargain. But it wanted what we could not grant: a free hand to destroy the Egyptian Third Army.

That Tuesday afternoon, October 23, we received a blistering communication from Golda Meir, which Dinitz read to us. She chose to construe the proposed new Security Council resolution as an Egyptian-Soviet imposition growing out of an Egyptian violation of the cease-fire: "It is impossible for Israel to accept that time and again it must face Russian and Egyptian ultimatums which will subsequently be assented to by the United States." It was, of course, hardly an ultimatum to ask Israel and Egypt to cease firing and to negotiate a return to a line we had carefully not specified and while the U.S. airlift was still going full blast. But all the frustrations of the three difficult weeks found expression in Israel's reaction. Golda informed us that Israel would not comply with the proposed resolution or even talk about it. Israel seemed determined to end the war with a

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to fifty people, he received two hundred more and they are
camping outside of the gate. This was their own decision. We
have no objections if he wants to enter the city, but we will not
help him to do this because we do not want to be responsible for
the people.

K: Good.

D: 2) We took note of the statement of Zayyat on the Egyptian con-
sent that drivers will be U.N. drivers, not Egyptian. We will in-
form this to General Siilasvuo.

K: Good.

D: 3) We took note that Egypt will issue new orders for observation of the cease-fire. We appreciate your intervention. We passed this message on to our chief of staff.

K: Good.

D: The situation itself is quiet and we hope it will remain that way. This is passed on as sort of humorous. The Prime Minister sends you her greetings and felicitations. She wants to meet with Sadat at 3:30 this evening on Kilometer 111¼. If you receive a positive answer from Sadat— She understands your impossible task of getting the real truth when you get him to answer.

K: I am glad she still has a sense of humor.

D: Yes, I was beginning to lose mine myself.

K: We have navigated another difficult problem.

D: I am sure it will be all right.

K: We are over the worst today.

D: I said to my wife this morning when I got home, "You know, this is the first night I am going to sleep quietly because I am beginning to see the ray of light." Then I woke up to this. I think we have it worked out now.

K: Yes.

Finally, at 1:30 A.M. local time on Sunday, October 28, an hour
and a half behind the new schedule, Israeli and Egyptian military