CHAPTER X

Diplomacy and the Limitation of Armaments

It may seem like a paradox to ask diplomacy that it rescue mankind from the horrors of a thermo-nuclear holocaust by devising a framework of war limitation. Is not the situation revolutionary precisely because the Soviet bloc considers the gulf between different social systems as irreconcilable? How can there be an agreement on the limitation of war when all negotiations with the Soviets have proved that the two sides have rarely been able to agree even on what constituted a reasonable demand?

Diplomacy has never faced a more fearful challenge. For almost everything conspires against the subtle negotiation, the artful compromise, the ability to formulate without opening unnecessary wounds of classical diplomacy. Diplomacy the art of settling dispute by negotiation rather than through force, presupposes that all the major powers accept a framework which establishes a balance between the requirement of change and the imperative of continued harmony. Negotiations are made necessary by the dissatisfaction of some Power with the status quo, for were all Powers perfectly satisfied there would be nothing to negotiate about. But negotiations can lead to a conclusion only if the parties to the dispute [accept some common standard transcending] the dispute: They must either agree that the continued maintenance of the international system is more important than any dispute within it; or else there must be a general understanding that the

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consequences of not making concessions will be more serious than those of doing so. Historically settlements have come about through a combination of the advantage of continued harmony combined with a fear of the consequences of proving obdurate. [The spontaneity of international relations has depended on which of the two factors, harmony or fear, has been emphasized.] The smaller the interest in harmony, the greater has been the requirement of fear produced by force or the threat of force. The greater the interest of the major Powers in continued good relations, the less necessary has been the recourse to force.

The result has been that diplomacy has proved most efficacious in periods when the conception of the various Powers of their vital interests were most in accord. Diplomacy has been least able to settle disputes when there was a conflict in the notions of "vital" interests. For there is a limiting condition to all diplomatic negotiations: that no nation can negotiate about its own survival and that no nation will give up what it considers its "vital" interests for the sake of continued harmony. An international order that does not protect a Power's conception of its vital interests will not seem worth preserving to this Power: its relations with the remainder of the international community will therefore be revolutionary. "Whenever there appears a revolutionary Power or group of Powers the emphasis of the conduct of international relations changes. Because a revolutionary Power is distinguished precisely by its attack on the existing order the requirement of continued harmony will no longer supply

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an impetus for the settlement of disputes. Because vital interests
in such a situation seem constantly in conflict, negotiations be-
come increasingly futile. Henceforth, disagreements tend to be
pushed to their logical extreme and relations based on force or
the threat of force.

The contemporary revolution is taking place in an unprecedented manner, however. Rarely has there been less common ground among the major powers, but never has recourse to force been more inhibited. This brings about a dual frustration with respect to power and with respect to diplomacy. Were weapons technology stable, an equilibrium might be established between the antagonism of a revolutionary period [and the fear of a nuclear war]. But weapons systems are changing at an ever-accelerating rate so that every major Power is living with the consciousness that its survival is at the mercy of a technological breakthrough by its opponent. The inhibitions with respect to the use of force therefore do not abolish the revolutionary contest; they transform it into an armament race and into a struggle for the allegiance of those areas of the world as yet uncommitted. And because of the reluctance of the non-Soviet world to resort to force, the Soviet bloc is able to exacerbate all tensions among the secondary Powers. Encouraged to give vent to all their resentments many of the newly independent states are tempted to play an international role out of proportion to their strength and to their willingness to assume responsibilities. The sense of impotence of formerly powerful states and the aspirations to greatness of still weak and often

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immature Powers have contributed to the demoralization of the
international system.

On the other hand, the more absolute the sanctions of
modern war, the more absolute have been the demands made on dip-
lomacy. The fear of total war has had as its counterpart the
call for total diplomacy. Diplomacy is asked to solve by nego-
tiations two major concurrent revolutions, that of the Soviet
bloc and that of the newly independent states, and at a moment
when many of the pressures traditionally available to it, even
in "legitimate" international orders, have lost their potency.
As a result, in a situation which has never been more tense,
diplomacy has never had fewer tools at its disposal. It is said
that force having abdicated, diplomacy must take over. But dip-
lomacy may be handicapped in taking over precisely because force
has abdicated. To the extent that the Soviet bloc becomes convin-
ced that it can initiate negotiations with impunity and break
them off without penalty, conferences become a tool of Soviet
propaganda. The incommensurability between the tensions produced
by the revolutionary international situation and the pressures
available to diplomacy may be inherent in the present state of
weapons technology. If so, it will not make for stability; rather
it will depreciate the seriousness of diplomatic intercourse.

It is therefore asking too much of diplomacy that it should
resolve present-day conflicts. It can provide a forum for the
settlement of disputes which have become unprofitable for both
side. It can keep open channels for information. Most importantly

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it can enable each side to convey its intentions to the other.

The task of leaving no doubt about a Power's intentions is perhaps the most important function of diplomacy in the nuclear age. For the primary bridge between the two sides at present is a common fear. They may not agree on any positive goals, but both the Soviet bloc and the Free World have at least one interest in common: that neither side can be interested in an all-out war. In the past, the greater the revolutionary schism, the more protracted and violent the resulting war as is demonstrated both by the Thirty Year's War and the wars of the French Revolution. Wars have almost inevitably accompanied revolutionary periods because either the revolutionary Power hoped that it might reshape reality to accord with its notions of justice or else the Powers which represented legitimacy and the status quo thought that they might put an end to the prevailing insecurity once and for all. Wars occured in a sense because of faulty intelligence, because with conventional technology it was never possible to calculate the relation of forces precisely, and because both sides could expect that the victor could retain sufficient resources to impose his will.

But in the face of the horrors of nuclear warfare, it does not require special precision of calculation to determine the consequences of all-out war. Despite the strenuous Soviet efforts to define their risks as smaller than those of their opponents, it would take an extraordinary degree of fanaticism to believe that all-out war could be used to achieve any positive

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goals. For an aggressor can hope to break the resistance of
his opponent by a sudden onslaught only in very special circum-
stances. Unless a surprise attack eliminates the retaliatory
force itself, it will not be able to prevent a devastating coun-
terblow even if it should inflict catastrophic losses on the
enemy society. For a well-organized retaliatory force should be
able to launch its counter-attack mechanically and before the
demoralizing effect of a surprise attack can make itself felt.

All-out war therefore ceases to be a rational instrument
of policy. It would be likely only if one side felt strong
enough to eliminate the other's retaliatory force -- to prevent
this contingency can be avoided only by a wise military policy
and not by diplomacy. Or else all-out war could break out be-
cause a miscalculation or a misunderstanding. A miscalculation
could be produced by the belief of the Soviets that they were
free to conduct operations of limited objectives with impunity.
And a misunderstanding because the Soviets may mistake what is
an American decision to resist locally as a prelude to all-out
war and react accordingly. These are the only kinds of all-out
war it is in the power of our diplomacy to avoid by conveying
our intentions to the Soviets as unambiguously as possible, and
by making clear what we understand by limited war.

To state the task is easier than to accomplish it. To be
sure, as long as our retaliatory force is adequate, both sides
have every interest in avoiding all-out war. But the same fac-
tors which make it difficult to settle disputes will also inhibit