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The World

PRESSURE ON THIEU?—Presidential ad-
visor Henry Kissinger left for Saigon amid re-
ports in diplomatic circles that he would try to
persuade President Thieu to step down. Page 3.
In the war, South Vietnamese marines drove off
100 enemy commandos attacking near Quang
Tri City. Page 11.

The Nation

POW DEBATE—Rita Hauser, co-chairman of the Committee to Reelect the President, and Ramsey Clark, recently returned from a tour of North Vietnam, exchange sharp words on the prisoner of war issue. Clark said that he had pleaded for humane treatment of U.S. prisoners of war and suggested that Miss Hauser inspect prison camps in North Vietnam herself. Page 3.

SPY CHARGES DROPPED—Without prior announcement or explanation, the government moved for dismissal of spy charges against a Soviet UN translator caught receiving F-14 secrets. The case against Valeriy Markelov was dropped, according to the assistant U.S. attorney, "after consultation between the State Department and Department of Justice." Page 7.

PIPELINE DECISION—A U.S. District judge in Washington lifted an injunction blocking construction of the projected $3 billion, trans-Alaska oil pipeline, but he predicted appeals to the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs—three environmentalist groups—said the appeal papers would be filed by Monday. Page 9.

FROM MOUTH TO EAR—Cattle growers prohibited from adding DES to their stocks' feed can get around the ban by implanting pellets of the growth-inducing hormone in the animals' ears. If the government stops that, a court case— and better-tasting meat—may result. Page 86A.

New York

BAD NEWS—A medical researcher in New Jersey said that the lead-based ink used in newspapers and magazines presents a health hazard,

AP Photo

Convention Scene

While robed Quakers protested the
Vietnam war in Miami Beach, GOP re-
formers on a rules subcommittee meet-
ing nearby rejected an administration-
backed delegate-apportionment plan in
favor of one that would give more
representation to the eight most popu-
lous states. Page 5.

especially to children who might chew on the
paper. New York-area manufacturers of printing
ink denied the researcher's claim. Page 9.

MOB FIGURE ARRAIGNED—Alphonse
(Allie Boy) Persico, described by federal au-
thorities as the intended target of an underworld
assassin who mistakenly killed two kosher-meat
wholesalers, pleaded innocent in U.S. District
Court, Manhattan, to a charge that he was in
illegal possession of firearms. Page 17.

Long Island

TO SAVE FIRE ISLAND?—The Islip Town Board declared a one-year moratorium on zoning variances for unincorporated Fire Island property within its jurisdiction. The move was made after vehement complaints from island residents about “hog-wild” development. The town zoning board of appeals is expected to contest the ban. Page 6.

CHANGE OF PACE—Ever since he got the idea for a mobile voter-registration unit in the 1950s, Nassau's Republican Elections Commissioner William D. Meisser has been committed to getting people to register. In 1972, when most younger voters are registering Democratic, he seems to have a slightly different attitude. Page 6.

MONA'S METEOR—"A flaming mass fell out of the sky!" Mona Sarfaty reported, after rushing to investigate the hissing sound outside her Wantagh home. A physics summer student at Nassau Community College, she naturally decided to test "the thing" that had shattered and melted a neighbor's car windshield to see if it was a meteor. Page 7.

DOG SHOW—Breeders, owners and even dog wardens at a public hearing complained about the proposed state dog law on grounds ranging from financial to esthetic to constitutional. The most criticized part was the requirement that all dogs be tattooed with a permanent identification number. Page 21.

HEALTH PLAN—When Willie Wright called the Brentwood Health Center, all he wanted was physical examinations for himself and his wife. The Wrights got their physicals, but they also got a family doctor who wants to take care of all the family's health problems. The treatment is part of a new program in the area. Page 23.

COURT RESTRUCTURING — Voters of New York State will decide this November on a constitutional amendment that would create a separate judicial department made up solely of Nassau and Suffolk Counties. The plan has bipartisan support on Long Island but is opposed by Bronx and Manhattan leaders and several organizations. Page 19.

OTHER FEATURES

Sports

Mets 5, Braves 0

Home runs by Ed Kranepool and Tommy Agee and the combined pitching of Jim McAndrew and Tug McGraw helped the Mets open a home stand with a shutout. McAndrew is now 9-3.

Royals 7, Yankees 6

The Yankees, who had overcome a 4-0 deficit to go ahead, 6-4, lost out in a wild ninth inning when Steve Hovley tied the game with a two-run single and scored on Lou Finiella's two-out single. The loss dropped the Yankees to two full games behind idle Baltimore.

Chess Board

Boris Spassky let a winning chance slip away yesterday and was forced to accept a draw with Bobby Fischer in the 14th game of their world chess match. The draw lessened Spassky's chance of retaining his championship and he now trails Fischer in points, 8½ to 5½. Page 85.

Weather

Sunny today, high in the low 70s. Low tonight in the low 50s. Fair tomorrow, high near 80. Sun sets 7:53, rises 7:08. (Tide tables in Sports Section.)

Special Report

STAY TUNED—Grinning like the Cheshire cat, Lawrence O'Brien hardly could conceal that he was very thoughtfully trying to keep the public interested, at least until November, in the case of the break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters. He is strategically stringing out the juicy developments, like episodes in a Flash Gordon serial. Page 4.

Point of View

JIMMY BRESLIN—"The other day, with two customers in the shop, they cut the power from Mr. Toney's place . . . [he] looked at the electric hair dryers. Then he looked out the window at the sun. 'It's good, it's a new Danish method,' Tony said. He walked around to the front of the store got into his car and drove away into the hot day, and behind him, two women sat and talked in the sun and another Long Island beauty parlor closed 'this one due to bad habits.' Page 47.

$4,000 Jackpot

This week's $4,000 Bonus Jackpot in the Newsday TV Book Lucky Number Game is still unclaimed. Tomorrow at 5 PM is the deadline for claiming the jackpot and the remaining $6,040 in prizes. Details on Page 31.

Here's an index to all the features:

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Altshul</td>
      <td>46</td>
      <td>In Review</td>
      <td>7A-9A</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Alvarez</td>
      <td>19A</td>
      <td>Kittichai</td>
      <td>83A</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Bombeck</td>
      <td>46</td>
      <td>Landers</td>
      <td>43A</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Bridge</td>
      <td>44A</td>
      <td>Letters</td>
      <td>49</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Ereslin</td>
      <td>47</td>
      <td>LI Diary</td>
      <td>16</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Change</td>
      <td>13A</td>
      <td>Media</td>
      <td>15A</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Classified</td>
      <td>56-73</td>
      <td>Money</td>
      <td>84A-88A</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Comics</td>
      <td>43A-45A</td>
      <td>Movie Timetable</td>
      <td>80A</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Crossword</td>
      <td>45A</td>
      <td>News Calendar</td>
      <td>70A</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Cryptoquote</td>
      <td>45A</td>
      <td>Obituaries</td>
      <td>33</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Darcy</td>
      <td>44</td>
      <td>People</td>
      <td>7</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Editorials</td>
      <td>44</td>
      <td>Problem Line</td>
      <td>2A</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Entertainment</td>
      <td>11A</td>
      <td>Radio Listings</td>
      <td>83A</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Food</td>
      <td>17A</td>
      <td>Sports</td>
      <td>75-88</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Fritchey</td>
      <td>47</td>
      <td>TV Listings</td>
      <td>82A</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Hroscope</td>
      <td>44A</td>
      <td>Viewpoints</td>
      <td>44-49</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

Total Pages Today—208

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2

Wednesday, August 16, 1972

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 23 AUGUST 1972 P14

Kissinger's visit to Tokyo:
Did it concern Taiwan?

By Elizabeth Pond

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Tokyo

The reason for Henry A. Kissinger's hasty one-day visit here over the weekend remains as much a mystery after the fact as before.

Apart from prescribed generalities, Washington has imposed on American diplomats a strict rule of silence concerning the visit. It has likewise imposed strict silence on a hot issue between Tokyo and Washington — the "Taiwan clause."

The Japanese side also has agreed not to leak information about Dr. Kissinger's visit. Indirect comments from Japanese sources, however, suggest that the United States may be pressing for an explicit Japanese guarantee that U.S. forces stationed in Japan may be used to defend Taiwan in an emergency. Further, these sources state flatly that Japan will not give the U.S. such a guarantee.

In the past, Taiwan has fallen under the definition of the "Far East," where Japanese-based U.S. forces may be sent under the terms of the Japanese-U.S. security treaty. The importance of Taiwan's security to Japan's security was likewise repeated in the 1969 "Taiwan clause" agreed on by then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Nixon when Mr. Nixon promised to return Okinawa to Japan.

Japan's position, stated publicly by the Sato government and confirmed in private by sources in the new government of Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, has been that the Taiwan clause did not have the binding force of a treaty and in effect disappeared with American-Chinese detente and Mr. Nixon's visit to Peking last February.

Japan intended, according to government sources, to bridge the gap in Washington's and Tokyo's positions by saying as little as possible about the issue. This would have left Japan and the U.S. to their own interpretations — and their differences presumably would never be tested, as China supposedly would not use force against Taiwan in the new era of detente.

Dr. Kissinger's sudden visit here suggests that the U.S. is not satisfied with Japanese ambiguity on the issue, however. Unless Dr. Kissinger were consulting with Japan on some secret Vietnam arrangement — and he has shown no propensity to do so in the past — the only issue of international strategy urgent enough to attract him to Tokyo would appear to be Taiwan security.

The existence of Japanese-American differences on the issue is certainly confirmed by Japanese Government sources and, in more guarded terms, by American diplomats. Washington has made it clear to Tokyo, informed sources say, that it wants the Japanese to promise nothing to the Chinese that would prejudice the U.S.-Japanese security treaty and its applicability to Taiwan. In explaining to reporters that the Japanese couldn't possibly be reneging on the Taiwan clause, some Americans even point out that such a move would call the whole security treaty into question.

Publicly, prior to Dr. Kissinger's surprise visit, the Japanese had not gone beyond saying vaguely that their rapprochement with China would not hurt American interests. Their private diplomatic exchanges with the U.S., too, showed a "marked absence of specifics, a great deal of not raising issues, not discussing legality in writing," according to an American source.

WASHINGTON POST

23 AUGUST 1972 P26

Opposed Nixon Before '68

A Public Mea Culpa
From Mr. Kissinger

By Chalmers M. Roberts

MIAMI BEACH—If you were watching the televised Republican Convention on Tuesday evening and were not thrown off the German-accented English, you heard a remarkable public mea culpa by Henry Kissinger. It is worth recording for the history books and not just because it was the first time in political history that a President's White House national security adviser has taken part in a purely political film endorsement of a candidate.

"I, like most of my colleagues," said Kissinger, "had always been opposed to him"—Richard Nixon—"and had formed certain images about him and I found that he was really, was totally different from the image the intellectuals have of him. He's very analytical but quite gentle in his manner, and I always had a quite different view."

This low key confession fit perfectly a central strategy of the Nixon re-election campaign, a strategy that says to millions of voters: we know you may not have voted for him because of what he has accomplished (with heavy emphasis on foreign policy, Kissinger's specialty).

I remember standing beside Kissinger in the San Francisco Cow Place in July, 1964, when the Republicans roared approval of Barry Goldwater's "extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice!" Kissinger then was 41 years old and the foreign and defense policy adviser to New York's Gov. Nelson Rockefeller. Kissinger then had been at odds with the GOP platform committee, headed by Rep. Melvin Laird, and he felt that Goldwater's extreme Cold War philosophy was disastrous for both the party and the nation. He spoke of something approaching a sort of American fascism in the proceedings in his talks with me and my colleagues.

FOUR 'YEARS later here in Miami Beach, Kissinger again was on hand in the Rockefeller entourage as the governor hopelessly attempted to prevent the nomination of Richard Nixon. He made no bones to me and others about his unhappiness over the selection. He has been quoted as saying at the time that "Richard Nixon is the most dangerous, of all the men running, to have as President."

Kissinger evidently was not at the 1960 Republican convention in Chicago but his presence was felt nonetheless. In 1966-58 he had headed the special studies project for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund; its report called for $3 billion a year more for defense than the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration then was spending "for the next several fiscal years." Vice President Nixon flew to New

York to compromise the issue with Rockefeller. The governor won his point but Mr. Nixon won the nomination.

In 1957 Kissinger came to general public attention for the first time with the publication of his "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy." The book's heavy emphasis was that the government lacked a doctrinal approach to foreign policy, one that "will enable us to act purposefully in the face of the challenges which will inevitably confront us." Nixon as Vice President told me he had read and admired the book. Perhaps that was the genesis of his selection, more than a decade later, of Kissinger as his national security advisor.

Kissinger's extraordinary relationship with Mr. Nixon springs from the parallel ways in which their minds work and from their mutual conception both of American foreign policy aims and of the politico-military techniques required to achieve those aims.

"There's a certain, you know it's a big word, but it's a certain heroic quality, about how he conducts his business," said Kissinger in the television film you saw last night, And: "I believe that his impact on foreign policy will be historic no matter what happens. He has provided one of the big waterfalls in American international history."

Considering what Kissinger said in his mea culpa and what obviously was Mr. Nixon's knowledge of Kissinger's long relationship with Rockefeller, it is something of a tribute to Mr. Nixon that Kissinger was picked for the White House post. Most others so definitely marked as members of opposition camps never got into the Nixon entourage. Kissinger, however, limited his public criticisms and remarks to what he thought was Mr. Nixon's policy and style of doing business. His mea culpa says he was wrong on those counts.

Today Henry Kissinger, still only 49, is probably better known around the world than any other figure in the Nixon Administration save the President himself. He has become Secretary of State in fact if not in name. His sweep of interest and power overshadows Defense Secretary Laird. He alone with the President went to call on Mao Tse-tung in China. He is the central conductor of the negotiations with Hanoi and Saigon, Moscow and Peking, in trying to find a way out of the Indochina morass.

WITH Mr. Nixon about to be re-nominated Kissinger is at the height of his power and influence. Many think that he would accept the Secretaryship of State if Mr. Nixon professed the job but that the President more likely will want to keep him closer at hand in the White House. In one post or another, however, he is likely to continue to be the number one foreign policy adviser for the next four years, assuming the President's re-election. If Sen. McGovern should win, Kissinger would be out, as McGovern already has made clear.

Here in Miami, Rockefeller is nominating Mr. Nixon. Goldwater, if not disavowing what so pained Kissinger, is approving the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy at least in general terms. Laird long ago came aboard.

Kissinger also said in the TV film that what the President "is trying to do is pretty well what he's done, is to revitalize our alliances, to get into a new relationship with the Soviets, to begin to feel our way toward the Chinese and to end the war in Vietnam." In the show biz of this convention, Mao and Chou En-lai and Leonid Brezhnev have become supporting cast for the Nixon campaign. Important things have been done. Yet, maybe in the end a great part of the verdict on Henry Kissinger will turn on how it all ends in Vietnam.

Change in situation claimed

Japanese Government sources reached following Dr. Kissinger's visit did not comment on the substance of the Kissinger talks with Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira. But they still spoke of differences between the U.S. and

Japan on the Taiwan issue. They said flatly that the two sides would not confirm the 1969 Taiwan clause at the Honolulu summit meeting. They pointed out once again that the Far East situation had changed with President Nixon's visit to China. They stressed that the Taiwan problem must be solved "realistically."

5-F

THE ECONOMIST AUGUST 19, 1972

# It is a real issue

Henry Kissinger, flying from Le Duc Tho to President Thieu, is one man who doesn't think the Indochina war is pointless

It has happened often enough before with Vietnam, and it is happening again now: the argument is all about means, and hardly anybody is talking about ends. It is right that the methods used to fight the war should always be kept under inspection; that applies particularly at the moment to the American bombing of North Vietnam. But in a week that has seen the withdrawal of the American army's last combat unit from South Vietnam, and the more or less simultaneous arrival on the battlefield of units from what may be North Vietnam's last previously uncommitted fighting division, there is something eerily unreal about much of the present American debate. It is no use talking about methods and ignoring causes. How matters; why matters even more.

## The numbers are wrong

The argument about means has come back to the question of whether the United States is systematically trying to destroy the network of likes that protects the Red river delta. On the evidence that has been produced so far, by anyone with any claim to objectivity, it is almost certainly not. Mr Ramsey Clark, the former American attorney-general, is reported to have said on his return from North Vietnam on Monday that in a tour of more than 600 miles he had seen "at least three" bombed dikes. As it happens, that is the number this paper was able to identify on the map it published on July 29th; they may or may not be the same three. The Americans themselves say they have hit at least 12 dikes, 10 of which had roads or anti-aircraft guns on them or were close to other legitimate targets. None of this constitutes a deliberate attack on the dike system. Even the North Vietnamese claim reported by one of Mr Clark's fellow-tourists—that dikes have been damaged in 58 places in four months—has to be measured against the fact that there are about 2,500 miles of dikes, some of them 40 or 50 yards wide at the base, and that there have been 200 to 300 American planes a day over North Vietnam during most of that four months. It is worth remembering that at this time last year, without any bombing at all, the dikes were already being swamped by the flood-waters that inundated much of the delta. So far this year's rains have not been as heavy; but if there is another flood the cause could be the damage nature did last year, more than the bombing now.

Of course, it is clear that American bombs have been hitting a good many other non-military targets in addition to some dikes: there is sufficient evidence of that, from the scrupulous Joseph Kraft as well as from other recipients of visas to Hanoi. It is not enough to say that these are the inevitable accidents involved in the still rather imprecise business of delivering high explosive over long distances, whether the means of delivery is an American bomber or the rockets and artillery the North Vietnamese are using in the south. The pilots have to be reminded to be accurate, even if it means they are likelier to get killed; the search for technological precision has to be continued, by laser beams and television-guided bombs and whatever the next device is; the men who select the targets have to be as careful as the airmen are expected to be. It is possible that within a few weeks the Americans will have come to the end of their list of legitimate targets. From then on they may be able to reduce the number of planes they send out each day,

and concentrate on keeping out of action the two railway lines and the emergency oil pipeline from China to Hanoi, and the roads and storage areas south of Hanoi that supply the army beyond the borders.

## The issue is what the South Vietnamese prefer

But none of this relieves the American opponents of the war from the responsibility they have too. It is a fair criticism of the way they have been conducting their argument that they have talked almost exclusively about the means by which the war is fought, and even then almost entirely about the American and South Vietnamese side of it. Mr McGovern has said very little so far this year about the issues behind the war except to repeat the phrase that South Vietnam is a "corrupt military dictatorship." There is some truth, if not a decisive amount, in each of those words; it would, be odd if there were not, in a poor country fighting a long war. But to try to dismiss the causes of the war in that single phrase, like a man irritably hitting out at a wasp, makes Mr McGovern seem either naive or contemptuous about the problems of south-east Asia, and perhaps both.

The advantage that Mr Nixon has over Mr McGovern at the moment—the reason why the American opinion polls are still on his side over Vietnam—is the fact that this year's attack by the North Vietnamese army has made a good many people re-examine their ideas about the nature of the war. In the past Mr Nixon, like Mr Johnson before him, had managed to make life remarkably difficult for himself in explaining what he was trying to achieve in Vietnam. He did this by erecting a whole superstructure of other reasons and justifications for the war, on top of the basic argument about self-determination for the South Vietnamese. There were those tottering dominoes in the rest of south-east Asia; there was the credibility of America's promises to its friends in Europe and Israel; there was even the curious proposition that the United States was just not going to lose a war, full stop.

All of these reasons, except the last one, had something to be said for them, but they did not make it easy to offer a simple explanation to baffled and war-weary Americans. Anyway, none of these other arguments would justify the war unless it could be shown that a policy of resisting the communists in South Vietnam was something the South Vietnamese themselves were willing to fight for too. Events have now simplified Mr Nixon's task. The North Vietnamese invasion, and South Vietnam's resistance to it, have made this conflict look less like a civil war within the south, and more like a war between two separate states, than ever before.

The most obvious thing about south-east Asia today is that North Vietnam has, virtually its entire army outside its own frontiers, fighting in three different countries. In South Vietnam and Cambodia, the local communists and their supporters would certainly be unable to keep the war going without North Vietnamese help; in Laos, the most the Pathet Lao could hold on to by themselves would probably be the hill-country in the north and the east. In all three countries the local armies go on fighting the North Vietnamese, and getting the recruits to replace the losses of each successive campaign, even though they seem condemned to a permanent defensive war. They do not fight brilliantly, and quite

32

possibly they would be defeated without the help American air power gives them; but that is because they are up against the most efficient army in their part of the world, and nobody who has read any history believes that there is much connection between the efficiency of an army and the acceptability of the political ideas it serves. There is no evidence from the movement of refugees in Indochina that a majority of people in the areas occupied by the North Vietnamese army have welcomed the sort of government it has brought with it. It is true that most of the refugees want to get out of the fighting zone as much because they are afraid of the bombing the government's counter-attack will bring as because of what the communists do when they arrive; but they always move away from the North Vietnamese, not deeper into their territory.

### Ask Lenin's question

Lenin said that if you want to see your way through a difficult problem you should ask who is doing what to whom. It is a test that should be applied to the four countries of Indochina. Whose army is where?

This is the basic difficulty in the private talks between Mr Kissinger and Mr Le Duc Tho, which went into their 16th session on Monday, after which Mr Kissinger flew off to talk to President Thied in Saigon. The North Vietnamese are saying that their army will keep on fighting until the Americans agree to remove Mr Thieu from power and put the communists into a new government in Saigon. The Americans are saying that who next governs South Vietnam should be decided by an election. They recognise that an election held after such

a war will be something less than a perfect expression of people's wishes, but they have suggested a number of ways of making it as free as possible. It is the difference between those who believe that power comes from the barrel of a gun, and those who think that power should be referred, even if imperfectly, to the people who have to live under it. There is no real compromise between such points of view, and those who want to make even more concessions to the North Vietnamese in the name of peace should recognise what it is they are proposing. They are proposing to subordinate politics to violence.

There is a curious similarity between those who advocate this sort of "peace" in Indochina, and those who advocate peace on similar terms in Britain's present industrial crisis. The militants among Britain's dockers have been using violence to insist that they should be given jobs in companies outside the docks, irrespective of the wishes of those companies and ultimately at the expense of the men who at present work in them. The North Vietnamese are using their army to insist that their friends should be put into the governments of South Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos, irrespective of any attempt to test the wishes of the population of those countries. And there are many people who would greet giving both of them what they want as a feat of peace-making, who in fact demand such a peace, and who deplore a policy of resistance because, they say, it will only lead to more trouble. The comparison is worth dwelling on. It is strange how many people will put up with injustice, for others, in the name of a temporary suspension of trouble for themselves.

had long been his personal friends; even personal notes from them were not delivered to him. In Algiers, an American journalist finally managed to get an interview — but only after he had threatened to write a nasty story if he was not allowed to meet with the Prince. A depressed and weary Sihanouk confided to him that he was allowed to retain the title "Head of State" only because "they" thought he was still useful to them. Leading his visitor to the door at the end of the conversation, Sihanouk asked: "Nixon told the Chinese that the CIA was not involved in the Cambodian coup against me. What do you think?" At this point, Cambodians who were with him during the conversation interrupted and asked the journalist to leave.

That Sihanouk later cancelled a scheduled visit to Conakry was something of a mystery. The visit was called off at the last moment; that day, Sihanouk remained in his residence, seeing no visitors. It was the Chinese who stopped him from going to Conakry and they did so for security reasons. Was it possible that the Cambodians surrounding Sihanouk had some drastic plans up their sleeves?

Edith Lenart adds: There are reliable indications in Paris that contacts across the ideological dividing line are taking place among political activists in Cambodia. The idea, broadly, is to establish

taking place among these various groups in isolated parts of the country and, occasionally, in Phnom Penh itself. A joint effort is being made to work out a policy of survival for Cambodia and to seek support for it from Cambodians everywhere, including those in Peking.

An interesting aspect of the thinking behind these contacts is that the initiators of the move believe a neutral Cambodia must necessarily be part of a neutral Southeast Asia. In their view, if Indochina alone were neutralised and Southeast Asia as a whole left out of the process, it would lead to a gradual Vietnamese takeover of the peninsula — leaving Cambodia where it is now and where it was around 1860 when the

### NEW YORK TIMES

25 August 1972

## Saigon's Toll in Offensive Exceeds 10% of Entire War

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Aug. 24 (AP) — South Vietnamese combat deaths reported by Saigon in the 20 weeks of the North Vietnamese offensive exceed 10 per cent of the acknowledged toll for more than a decade of the Indochina war.

The Saigon command reported today that 617 Government soldiers were killed in action last week and 2,311 were wounded, bringing the 20-week tolls to 15,610 dead and 50,909 wounded. Saigon's toll for the war is 153,423 killed and 398,616 wounded.

Cambodians seem to suspect that it is the former.

China's position is equally clouded. By all outward appearances it is playing up to Sihanouk in Peking, honouring him at every turn. But the Chinese leadership is fully aware of the Prince's tenuous position with Cambodian communists. While feting Sihanouk at intervals, China appears to be standing by in terms of realpolitik and letting events evolve without direct interference. Perhaps, hoping that the future will depend on how North Vietnam settles down to post-war Indochina, they are concentrating on Hanoi rather than on the Cambodians.

But authoritative American sources have estimated the actual death toll in the offensive to be at least 3,000 higher than the official figures. In addition, thousands of civilians have been killed or wounded.

Three Americans were reported to have been killed in action last week, along with 21 wounded, 8 missing and 11 dead from noncombatant action, the United States command announced.

It was the lowest American combat death total in eight weeks, but delays in the reporting system prevent the weekly summary from accurately reflecting any single calendar week's casualties. The weekly average in the offensive is more than 8 Americans killed in action and more than 26 wounded.

34

JAPANESE PRESS ΕΝΝΥΕΚΚΕΣ COVERAGE OF KISSINGER VISIT

August 19, 1972

All papers (Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri, Nihon Keizai, Sankei and Tokyo Shimbun) frontpaged Special Assistant KISSINGER's arrival in Japan last night, with photographs. The captions read: "Special Assistant KISSINGER ARRIVES IN JAPAN" (Asahi); "Special Assistant KISSINGER ARRIVES IN JAPAN; TO HAVE TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER TANAKA TODAY" (Mainichi); "Special Assistant KISSINGER ARRIVES IN JAPAN; TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER TANAKA TODAY" (Yomiuri); "Special Assistant KISSINGER ARRIVES IN JAPAN; TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY" (Nihon Keizai); "FOR DISSOLVING ECONOMIC FRICISION; "JAPAN-CHINA'S" ALSO TO BE TAKEN UP; SPECIAL ASSISTANT KISSINGER ARRIVES IN JAPAN; TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING" (Sankei); "Special Assistant KISSINGER ARRIVES IN JAPAN; TALKS TODAY WITH PRIME MINISTER TANAKA AND OTHERS" (Tokyo Shimbun).

The Sankei report stated as follows:

U.S. Presidential Special Assistant KISSINGER arrived in Japan by a U.S. Presidential special plane, landing at Haneda on the night of the 18th. The Special Assistant will have talks with Prime Minister MX TANAKA in Karuizawa, from 9:30 a.m. on the 19th, and with Foreign Minister OHIRA from 3:00 p.m. of the same day, at the Foreign Ministry.

It is thought that, at these talks, probing exchange of views will take place on the international situation in general, with an eye to the U.S.-Japan summit talks, to be held in Hawaii on September 1 and 2. At the same time, it is also thought that frank talks will be held on U.S.-Japan trade relations, in which a big imbalance has arisen, and on the Government's policy toward China, aiming at normalization of Japan-China

Government's policy toward China, aiming at normalization of Japan-China
Japan trade relations, in which a pig impulsion has arisen, and on the
the same time, it is also thought that frank talks will be held on U.2.-
U.2.-Japan summit talks, to be held in Hawaii on September 1 and 2. At
talks place on the international situation in general, with an eye to the
It is thought that, at these talks,roping exchange of views will
from 3:00 p.m. of the same day, at the Foreign Ministry.

in Kamikawa, from 8:30 a.m. on the 16th, and with Foreign Minister OHIRA
18th. The Specialist Assistant will have talks with Prime Minister MX TANAKA
U.2. Presidental specialist brane, landing at Haneda on the night of the
U.2. Presidental Specialist Assistant KIIZINGER arrived in Japan by a
The Sankei report stated as follows:

(Tokyo Shimpuu).

Arrives in Japan; Tsuka Today with Prime Minister TANAKA and Others"
with Prime Minister This Morning" (Sankei); "Specialist Assistant KIIZINGER
to be taken up; Specialist Assistant Kix KIIZINGER Arrives in Japan; Tsuka
(Mihon Keisai); "For Disabling Economic Friction; "Japan-China VAO
Arrives in Japan; Tsuka with Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Today"
with Prime Minister TANAKA Today"(Yomiji); "Specialist Assistant KIIZINGER
Today" (Mainichi); "Specialist Assistant KIIZINGER Arrives in Japan; Tsuka
KIIZINGER Arrives in Japan; To have Tsuka with Prime Minister TANAKA
Vasatant KIIZINGER KIX Arrives in Japan" (Yasui); "Specialist Assistant
Today night, with photographs. The captions read: "Specialist KIIZINGER
Shimpuu) frontpaged Specialist Assistant KIIZINGER's arrival in Japan

All papers (Yasui, Mainichi, Yomiuri, Uihon Keisai, Sankei and Tokyo

August 19, 1952

JAPANESE PRESS KIIZIMIKKI COVERAGE OF KIIZINGER A121

relations. Especially in regard to economic questions, Prime Minister TANAKA will present concrete measures clearly, including emergency imports from the U.S., and in this way, dissolve friction between the two nations in their economic relations.

Special Assistant KISSINGER, who arrived in Haneda by a special plane, at 10:30 p.m. on the 18th, immediately spent the night at Hotel Okura, and on the morning of the 19th, will fly to Karuizawa by a U.S. military helicopter. He will have talks with Prime Minister TANAKA from 9:30 a.m. at Manpei Hotel.

At the talks, Prime Minister TANAKA is expected to explain the Japanese side's views, concerning the question of normalizing Japan-China relations, which is moving forward at a rapid pace recently, and in this connection, its views toward the question of the "scope of the Far East," in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty structure, and on the "Taiwan Clause" contained in the U.S.-Japan Joint Communique of 1969, in response to Special Assistant KISSINGER's request.

It is also thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is attaching very strong expectations. The Japanese side does not want to introduce economic questions into the Hawaii talks, and for this reason, it will probably present concrete plans for emergency imports, amounting to about one billion dollars, and seek the U.S. side's understanding.

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister OHIRA will have talks with Special Assistant KISSINGER in the afternoon, awaiting his return to Tokyo by helicopter. The focal point at the talks is expected to be the question of normalizing Japan-China relations, which is moving forward at a fast pace recently. The Foreign Minister will explain Japan's policy

- 2 -

["- 5 -", "pace recently. The foreign Minister will explain Japan's foreign policy of normalizing Japan-China relations, which is moving forward at a fast helicopter. The focal point at the talks is expected to be the question of normalizing Japan's return to Tokyo by the U.S. and the U.K. and the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is attaching very strong expectations. The Japanese side is not going to spout one billion dollars, and seek the U.S. side's understanding. It will properly present concrete plans for emergency imports, assuring to introduce economic questions into the Hawaii talks, and for this reason, the Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is attaching very strong expectations. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. 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The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. 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The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. 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The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. 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The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S. and the U.K. will have talks with the Japanese. The Japanese side does not want the rectification of U.S.-Japan economic relations, on which the U.S. side is afo thought that considerable time will be given to discussing the U.S.

toward China, especially its views regarding the handling of the Taiwan question. He is also expected to emphasize, in connection with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, that "Japan-China and Japan-U.S. relations can co-exist together."

In the light of these circumstances, it is thought that the talks with Prime Minister TANAKA and Foreign Minister OHIRA will be entirely different in nature from his "secret diplomacy" to date, and will have the nature of preliminary talks in preparation for the Hawaii talks, and that therefore, "substantial" talks, touching upon central questions will be held. (Full translation)

In main contents, the other papers' reports were generally similar, but the Tokyo Shimbun report added as follows: "The Japanese leaders' attitude toward the talks with Special Assistant KISSINGER has not yet been firmly decided, and therefore, a Government source observed that it will be difficult to settle the various pending issues at the talks on the 19th, and that they will probably be carried over to the Hawaii talks. The talks this time ~~WHERE~~ are being held at the U.S. side's strong request, and it is very unusual for an American Government leader to call on Japan's Prime Minister, even by visiting him at a vacation place.
All the more for this reason, the view prevails strongly that KISSINGER's ~~WINTER~~ visit to Japan this time is an indication of the U.S. side's entertaining serious uneasiness ~~AMID~~ about the rapid moves for the normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations, recently, and it is thought that the talking will be done mainly by KISSINGER at the talks."

All papers also carried a brief UPI report ~~on the frontpage,~~
~~AMERICAN~~ reporting that Special ~~ASSISTANT~~ Assistant KISSINGER is ~~planning~~ to have secret talks with Taiwanese leaders during his stay in Japan.

- 3 -

- 3 -

**KINZIMINGER** reporting that **Special Assistant KI22INGER** is **ask** basing
**&** VII papers also carried a brief UBI report on the frontpage,
thought that the talking will be done mainly by KI22INGER at the talks."

normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations, recently, and it is
entertaining serious messiness. **KINZIMINGER** spout the rapid moves for the
**KINZIMINGER** visit to Japan this time is an indication of the U.2. side's
All the more for this reason, the view prevails strongly that KI22INGER's
on Japan's Prime Minister, even by visiting him at a vacation place.
redouble, and it is very unusual for an American Government leader to call
talks. The talks this time **KINZIMINGER** are being held at the U.2. side's strong
on the part, and that they will properly be carried over to the Hawaii
it will be difficult to settle the various pending issues at the talks
been timely decided, and therefore, a Government announcement observed that
attitude toward the talks with **Special Assistant KI22INGER** has not yet
put the Tokyo Shimbun report added as follows: "The Japanese leaders,
In main contents, the other papers' reports were generally similar,
be held. (Full translation)

(Full translation)

that therefore, "amateurial" talks, touching upon central questions will
the nature of preliminary talks in preparation for the Hawaii talks, and
different in nature from his "secret diplomacy" to date, and will have
with **&** Prime Minister TANAKA and Foreign Minister OHIRA will be entirely
In the light of these circumstances, it is thought that the talks
can co-exist together."

U.2.-Japan Security Treaty, that "Japan-China and Japan-U.2. relations
discussion. He is also expected to emphasize, in connection with the
toward China, especially its views regarding the handling of the Taiwan

The Yomiuri and Sankei carried editorials on the KISSINGER visit to
Japan. In gist, the Yomiuri editorial noted as follows: "There is no
doubt that the focal point at the talks with the Japanese leaders will be
the Taiwan question, in connection with the Japan-China diplomatic relations
normalization question. It is not strange that the U.S. is feeling uneasi-
ness about the possibility of Japan's going ahead alone in the Japan-China
question, which has grave meaning for U.S.-Japan relations, too. It
is clear, however, that in the light of the circumstances between Japan
and China, diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan must be
severed, when diplomatic relations are established between Japan and China.
Today, when the U.S. itself has changed its course greatly, from confronta-
tion to dialogue with China, it is only natural for Japan to normalize
its relations with China. Furthermore, with the "danger in the Taiwan
Straits" becoming only nominal, with the NIXON visit to China, it can
be said that normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations will further
ease tension in the area, and this in the meaning that the Far East
Clause of the Security Treaty was established for the ensuring of peace and
security in this area, we consider that normalization of Japan-China
relations will further solidify peace in this area, and that therefore,
it is completely compatible with the purposes of the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty."

The Sankei editorial expressed the hope that the talks with KISSINGER
this time will lay the foundation for true partnership, through frank
exchange of views, and make full preparations so that the Hawaii summit
talks will be truly useful. The paper also hoped that the U.S. will
understand that what Japan is desiring is "reciprocal and equal relations
between Japan and China," and that it has no intention of upsetting the
balance of power in Asia or any nation sacrificing third nations. The paper

- ٤ -

— 11 —

balance of power in Vais or *kōmei* sacrificing third nations. The baber between Japan and China," and that it has no intention of abetting the underdog and that what Japan is desiring is "reciprocal and edict relations talks will be truly *kōmei* fruitful." The baber also hoped that the U.2. will exchange of views, and make full preparations so that the Hawaii summit this time will lay the foundation for true partnership, through frank

The Sankai editorist expressed the hope that the talks with KISSINGER Tresdy."

it is completely compatible with the bnrboas of the U.2.-Japan Security relations will further solidify peace in this area, and that therefore, security in this area, we consider that normalization of Japan-China Cisna of the Security Treaty was established for the enmity of peace and ease tension in the area, and *kōmei* in the meaning that the Far East be said that normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations will further *straitex* becoming only nominal, with the NIXON visit to China, it can its relations with China. Furthermore, with the "danger in the Taiwan tion to dialogue with China, it is only natural for Japan to normalize Today" when the U.2. itself has changed its course greatly, from confronts- sevened, when diplomatic relations are established between Japan and China, and China's diplomatic relations between Japan and *kōmei* Taiwan what be is clear, however, that in the light of the circumstances between Japan dneation, which has grave meaning for U.2.-Japan relations, too. It means that the possibility of Japan's going ahead alone in the Japan-China normalization dneation. It is not strange that the U.2. is feeling mesai- the Taiwan dneation, in connection with the Japan-China diplomatic relations donpt that the focal point at the talks with the Japanese fesder will be Japan. In fact, the Yomiji editorist noted as follows: "There is no

The Yomiji and Sankai carried editorials on the KISSINGER visit to

warned that the United States' trying to put a brake on these Japanese
moves will not be good for friendly relations between Japan and the U.S.
In their regard to economic questions, too, the paper pointed out that the
two sides should explore long-term measures for rectifying the imbalance
in trade, rather than temporary elimination of deficits. The important
question, the paper pointed out, is for the two nations to explore
common strategy for Asian peace, organically combining their
respective diplomatic and economic policies. The paper concluded that
this is the only way to make the U.S.-Japan summit talks truly fruitful.

- 5 -

triumphant...

this is the only way to make the U.S.-Japan summit take truly important
diplomatic and economic policies. The paper concluded that
common strategy for Asian peace, especially organically combining their
discussion, the paper pointed out, is for the two nations to explore
in trade, rather than temporary elimination of deficits. The important
two sides should explore long-term measures for rectifying the imbalance
in trade regard to economic questions, too, the paper pointed out that the
moves will not be good for friendly relations between Japan and the U.S.
warned that the United States, trying to put a brake on these Japanese

- 2 -

ADVANCE COPY

YOMIURI (Full)

Eve., August 18, 1972

"Japan-China" As Already Decided; Government Policy on Visit to Japan
by Special Assistant KISSINGER; Consideration to Be Given toward "Bases"
and "Economy"; To Avoid Friction at Hawaii

U.S. Presidential Special Assistant KISSINGER, after completing his
talks with South Vietnamese President THIEU and others, will arrive in
Japan by a special plane, arriving in Haneda on the night of the 18th,
and will have talks with Prime Minister TANAKA, who is resting in
Karuizawa, from 9:30 a.m. on the 19th. On the afternoon of the same
day, he will have talks with Foreign Minister OHIRA at the Foreign
Ministry. At the talks with the Prime Minister, probing exchange of
views will be held on the international situation in general. According
to a clarification made by a Government source on the 18th, the talks
will also be attended by Administrative Foreign Vice Minister HOGEN and
U.S. Ambassador to Japan INGERSOLL. It is thought that, with the Hawaii
talks, slated to be held from the 31st of this month, near at hand, it
will probably become full-scale political talks.

The Government is earnestly tackling the "consolidation of the
environment," for the talks, such as the hastening of the disposition
of the problem of the transporting of U.S. military tanks, the problem
of the North Fuji Maneuver Grounds, and the problem of the correcting of
the trade imbalance between Japan and the U.S., in advance of the talks
with Special Assistant KISSINGER.

The TANAKA-KISSINGER talks will have the nature of being the pre-
liminary talks for the U.S.-Japan summit conference, but it is thought
that the focal questions at the talks will be the question of Japan-China
normalization of relations, which is developing at a very fast pace
recently, and the question of Asian security after the normalization,
including the Taiwan Clause of 1969, and the question of the scope of
the Far East in Article 6 of the Security Treaty, in this connection.
The U.S. side is also showing very strong interest in the rectification
of its imbalance in trade with Japan, with the approach of the U.S.
Presidential election. Therefore, the outlook is that it will not be
possible to side-step this question at the Hawaii talks, and for this
reason, it is thought that preliminary talks on this point will also be
held with Special Assistant KISSINGER.

As for the Japan-China question, the Japanese side is planning to
make utmost efforts to secure the understanding of the U.S. side,
explaining fully the Government's basic policy for the early restoration
of Japan-China diplomatic relations. However, the U.S. side has not yet
discarded its doubts about the Japanese side's posture toward Asian
security, including its relations with Taiwan, saying, for example, that
in normalizing relations, "consideration should be given so that the
positions of allied nations will not be impaired."

For this reason, the Government has solidified its judgment that
it will be necessary to give "proof" that it will maintain the U.S.-
Japan Security Treaty firmly. Its formulation of the policy of recogniz-
ing special exceptions on the same level as for the SDF in regard to the
question of the shipment of U.S. military tanks, and its preparing a
compromise plan for the concluding of a three-month provisional contract
in connection with the problem of the North Fuji Maneuver Grounds, all 1
stem from the political aim of endeavoring to avoid trouble between Japan
and the U.S.; with an eye to the summit conference. Moreover, JDA Director
General MASUHARA's already bringing up the plan for the "formulation of a
fifth defense plan," at the Lower House Cabinet Committee meeting on the
17th, is also taken as aiming at impressing the U.S. side with the Japanese
side's defense efforts, and with this, "consolidate the environment" for
the Hawaii talks.

- 8 -

It is observed that Vice Minister HOGEN and U.S. Ambassador INGERSOLL are to be present at the talks for the purpose of showing that this is not a "secret envoy" diplomacy by Special Assistant KISSINGER, and that the talks will have the nature of being preliminary talks between the Governments of Japan and the U.S., in preparation for the Hawaii talks. For this reason, it is thought that the talks will be considerably probing discussions, touching on central questions.

KH

ASAHI (Full)

Eve., August 18, 1972

### Importance to Be Attached to Economic Questions, Too?; Prime Minister-Special Assistant KISSINGER Talks Tomorrow

The talks between Prime Minister TANAKA and U.S. Presidential Special Assistant KISSINGER will be held on the morning of the 19th, in Karuizawa, where the Prime Minister is resting. The talks will also be attended by Administrative Foreign Vice Minister HOGEN, from the Japanese side, and by U.S. Ambassador to Japan INGERSOLL from the U.S. side, according to an announcement made on the 18th.

It is observed that the central questions at the talks will be the moves for the normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations and economic questions between Japan and the U.S., centering on the imbalance in trade. The Government does not want to introduce the confrontation of views between Japan and the U.S. on economic questions, into the U.S.-Japan summit conference to be held in Hawaii on September 1 and 2 (Japan time), and it is desirous of indicating to some extent the Japanese side's concrete plans for the correction of the imbalance in the trade accounts between Japan and the U.S. at the talks to be held between Prime Minister TANAKA and Special Assistant KISSINGER. For this reason, it is expected that considerably probing exchange of views will take place on economic questions at the talks in Karuizawa, and it is observed that it was for this reason that the participation of Vice Minister HOGEN and Ambassador INGERSOLL was decided.

KH

SANKEI (Full)

Eve., August 18, 1972

### Vice Minister HOGEN and U.S. Ambassador Also to Be Present at TANAKA-KISSINGER Talks in Karuizawa

According to a clarification made by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary YAMASHITA at a press conference on the 18th, U.S. Ambassador to Japan INGERSOLL and Administrative Foreign Vice Minister HOGEN will also be present at the Karuizawa talks between Prime Minister TANAKA and U.S. Presidential Special Assistant KISSINGER, who is arriving in Japan to make adjustments in advance, for the U.S.-Japan Hawaii talks.

Special Assistant KISSINGER, who will arrive in Japan late on the night of the 18th, by a Presidential special plane, will stay that night in Tokyo, and he is scheduled to proceed to Karuizawa by helicopter, on the morning of the 19th.

KH

EDITORIALS

NEW YORK TIMES

20 August 1972 (21)

Vietnam Review

Henry Kissinger's consultations in Saigon and the return to Hanoi of North Vietnam's chief Paris negotiator, Le Duc Tho, suggest that a moment of truth is approaching in the long quest for peace in Indochina. After three secret Kissinger-Tho meetings in six weeks, both sides are reviewing the bidding in preparation, for the final round of settlement talks before the American election.

Both Washington and Hanoi are under maximum pressure to reach some agreement by October. President Nixon would welcome a cease-fire before American voters go to the polls. Hanoi knows that, if he stays in the White House, American peace terms and military action are more likely to stiffen than ease after Election Day. Meanwhile, the two sides are compelled to continue talking—both to avoid missing the opportunity October may bring and to be able to blame the other if the outcome is failure. But the fact of talks is less important than whether Washington and Hanoi are talking to the point.

The point is political—Vietnamese politics, not American. President Nixon's May 8 proposals for a military settlement—withdrawal of all American troops in return for release of prisoners of war and an all-Indochina cease-fire—have been rejected by the Communists. They insist that an agreement without a "political element" is unacceptable. While that insistence is not likely to change, it is also wholly improbable that the complex political solution proposed by Hanoi could be negotiated in the few weeks before November, even if Washington were prepared to go that route. Unless a simpler first step can be devised, agreement in October already is out the window.

In the past the Communists have insisted that a cease-fire and release of prisoners must wait until a three-party coalition government is formed, made up of elements of the Saigon Government, the Vietcong and neutralist groups. They now say they would negotiate the compo-

sition of such a coalition with a new Saigon Government rather than the United States, and that Washington's political responsibility could end once President Thieu resigned and was replaced by a regime more congenial to Hanoi.

It is unclear, however, whether this new two-stage proposal means that American prisoners of war would be released and a cease-fire declared prior to negotiation of a coalition government. Nor have the Communists, up to the last Kissinger-Tho meeting at least, been willing to indicate whom in Saigon they would consider acceptable as negotiating partners.

If these questions could be answered reasonably, a formula for an October agreement is conceivable. At a minimum, the political element would have to comprise a broadening of the Saigon Government, the opening of talks with the Vietcong and third groups on a coalition and a pledge by President Thieu to resign when agreement is reached, rather than five months later. The military element then could be an immediate cease-fire, which would halt the bombing of North Vietnam, and the release of American prisoners in parallel with the withdrawal of all remaining American troops.

With flexibility in Hanoi and Saigon, such a formula to transfer the struggle in Vietnam from the battlefield to the conference table by November is clearly feasible. Moscow and Peking, which have made their peace with President Nixon, undoubtedly favor it. But Hanoi remains a cipher. And in Saigon, President Thieu has called publicly for the bombing to go on—a position fortified perhaps by President Nixon's February pledge that "any future proposals we make will be joint proposals of the Government of South Vietnam and the Government of the United States."

As long as that implied veto is left in President Thieu's hands, chances for a negotiated settlement either in October or later will remain small. Another discouraging, but we hope not totally prohibitive impediment to Mr. Kissinger's efforts to reach an accommodation is the hard line on Communist participation in a new Saigon Government that is set forth in the White House-drafted Republican platform.

NEW YORK NEWS

21 August 1972 P8

BALTIMORE SUN 20 August 1972 (21)

Pressure on the Two Vietnams

Henry A. Kissinger's presence in Saigon was the occasion for a huge American air attack against North Vietnam and a tough reminder from the Hanoi leadership of its intransigent mood. Both these developments, in their separate ways, underscored once again how difficult it is for outside forces to settle, or extricate themselves from the bitter, bloody morass in Vietnam. We do not know what Mr. Kissinger told Saigon's President Thieu about the status of the Paris peace talks, but we do know that the U.S. air strikes were in accordance with Mr. Thieu's call for "relentless bombing as the way to peace." We do not know what Le Duc Tho, the chief Hanoi envoy in Paris, was advising Moscow officials while he was on a route home for consultations, but we do know what his

government was telling the world. It was asserting through its party newspaper, Nhan Dan, that the "Communists must persist in revolution and should not compromise."

It is intriguing that North Vietnam obliquely but unmistakably took the opportunity to rebuke China and the Soviet Union for playing along with the "Machiavellian" compromise tactics of the "perfidious imperialists." This would serve to buttress speculation that Peking and Moscow have indeed been trying to nudge Hanoi toward a settlement just as the United States, for its part, has been seeking more flexibility in the South Vietnamese position.

So far, if spillage of blood and production of rubble are any criteria, these efforts by the big powers have not been very successful. Zealots in Hanoi and generals

in Saigon still talk of seemingly endless war—a war lamentably made more fearsome by American bombs, Soviet air defense missiles and Chinese grenades. Yet for all the belligerence of the two Vietnams, it is to be hoped that they are not completely free agents. The warfare of the last five months has demonstrated that the South Vietnamese Army remains utterly dependent on American air support. North Vietnam's willingness to negotiate with Mr. Kissinger, despite evidence that this helps President Nixon's re-election campaign, shows that Hanoi feels it necessary to make some show of a readiness for a peace settlement. Perhaps this is the time for greater pressures by the three big powers on the two Vietnams, even if a touch of Machiavellian is required.

Are Russians Coming?

Washington, Aug. 20 (UPI)—As the next step in relaxing Soviet-American tensions, the ad-

ministration hopes to welcome Russian warships to United States ports for the first time since World War II. Navy Secretary John W. Warner outlined the idea in an interview in Seapower, a monthly magazine published by the Navy League. Warner said such ship visits would be reciprocal and he hoped to be aboard the first American vessel to call at a Soviet port. He gave no indication whether the proposal had been raised with the Russians. Warner became Navy secretary two months ago. As undersecretary, he negotiated an agreement with the Soviet Union to end harassment of naval ships and planes.

Warner

1-E

OMAHA WORLD HERALD
15 August 1972 (21)

CHICAGO SUN TIMES 16 August 1972 (21)

Consider the Source

"I'm an American," said Ramsey Clark. "I was born in America and I'm going to die in America, and I want to make my report on American soil."

He was announcing his intention to hold a press conference in San Francisco on his return from Hanoi.

He said he wanted to digest the information he had gathered in North Vietnam, and give the Nixon administration a chance to give him its perspective, before publicly detailing his conclusions.

Well, that sounds fair enough. A former U.S. attorney general who is the son of a former Supreme Court justice should, after all, know better than most that it's reasonable to weigh the evidence before rendering a verdict, and choose a propitious time and place to announce his conclusions on a sensitive issue.

The trouble is, Clark arrived at his judicious approach a little late.

***

By the time he left Hanoi his judgment on the U.S. bombing had already been rendered, loudly and in prime time and on Page One around the world.

He had been quoted by Hanoi radio, and in fact had been heard broadcasting in person. He didn't wait to get back to American soil, or to hear the administration's point of view, before allowing the North Vietnamese to make utmost use of his righteous pronouncements as to the dikes, the schools and hospitals, the nonjustification of the U.S. air effort, etc.

So his statements about holding off a formal statement until his arrival home sounded inconsistent at best and hypocritical at worst.

To keep the matter in perspective, the source of all this tiresomeness should be considered.

Ramsey Clark is one of the last public figures in America who could be regarded as an objective or reliable observer of events connected with the war, for he has been deeply imbued with the New Left view of things for time. It could have been predicted within a semicolon or two what he'd say from the vantage point of Hanoi.

***

Some people in this country are trembling about investigations and reason and what not, both in Clark's case and with regard to the pilgrimage made by that expert on strategy and diplomacy, Jane Fonda.

This kind of reaction attaches too much import to the unimportant. The credibility of these two travelers is of the sort that should lend no more weight to their words than to the opinion of any other self-appointed "observer" who gets the red-carpet treatment in Hanoi.

The administration, in a heavy-handed wav, may have missed the point

Clark plays politics with PWs

Former Atty. Gen. Ramsey Clark played the lowest kind of irresponsible politics in trumpeting that election of Sen. George McGovern in November would result in the freeing of Vietnam prisoners of war when McGovern took office in January. An appeal for votes using war prisoners as campaign material is such a miserable ploy it ought to be disowned by McGovern.

Clark obviously has been used by the North Vietnamese in an attempt to put pressure on the White House while the President's representative, Henry Kissinger, is holding secret talks aimed at ending the war.

Former U.S. Atty. Gen. John Mitchell was being charitable when he dubbed Clark "a naive American" who was "unwittingly duped into playing Hanoi's wretched game."

Clark spent two weeks in North Vietnam as part of a peace group invited by Hanoi. What he saw and what he was told obviously were well-controlled. He at first said he had been told prisoners of war would be released "when we stop this senseless bombing." Later he said he misspoke or was misquoted. He also denied that he had spoken on Radio Hanoi as actress Jane Fonda did. But Clark acknowledged his comments while in Hanoi may have been tape recorded and broadcast by his hosts. In other words, he was "used."

Specifically, Clark said Hanoi's foreign minister "guaranteed" him that the American PWs would be released immediately after a war-ending treaty was implemented by the United States. And, of course, on Hanoi's conditions. That is hardly sensational news. It is customary for PWs to be released at war's end. We assume Kissinger has received such assurance.

Clark has served as a transmission belt for Hanoi to make its arguments

directly to the American people. He quoted the conditions which Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh set for PW release: The United States must "stop its war of aggression" and cease maintaining "the Saigon stooge administration." And that, again, is hardly sensational news. It's merely a restatement of Hanoi's shibboleths for ending the war, which are well known.

President Nixon would end the war by an agreed-on cease-fire, with each side holding the territory it now has. Hanoi and Saigon would then work out their own political settlement. Hanoi demands a political settlement first, starting with the removal of South Vietnamese President Thieu. McGovern would simply pull out all American forces, end aid to Thieu and let the Vietnamese, North and South, continue to fight it out or make what peace they could. Hanoi obviously would prefer McGovern's election, but no American, be he for McGovern or not, should permit Hanoi to influence an American election.

It is not clear whether activities such as Clark's and Jane Fonda's violate the Logan Act of 1799 which forbids any U.S. citizen, without authority of the United States, from "any intercourse with any foreign government or any officer thereof, with intent... to defeat the measures of the United States."

Clark's irresponsible ambiguities are hardly intended to strengthen the measures the United States is taking to end the war and bring peace to Vietnam. If the people prefer McGovern's approach, they can so signify Nov. 7. But as long as Mr. Nixon is President we believe he should be able to pursue his own means to that end without undercutting from political opposition parroting Hanoi's line.

WALL STREET JOURNAL

21 August 1972

Funds for an ABM site for the nation's capital and for a high-accuracy nuclear warhead were deleted by Senate-House conferees from a compromise $20.9 billion weapons bill.

of this when it wheeled out its criticism of Clark. It should have occurred to the people in the White House that a person like Clark may suffer more from dispassionate news reporting than from official criticism.

Sen. McGovern seems to have missed something, too, when he came so vehemently to Clark's defense. A candidate more sensitive to public mood and the appearances of propriety would have been less indiscreet about embracing a negligible politician just returned from public wallowing in enemy propaganda.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISP. 8/9/72 (21)

Egress Recap

Since the Nixon Administration's approach to the prisoner-of-war problem has been in the nature of a public relations exercise, it is not surprising that the Administration has quietly drawn up a program called Operation Egress Recap for the return and rehabilitation of the more than 500 Americans believed held captive in Indochina. The idea is to prepare a warm welcome for the men when, as and if they are set free, and no one would argue with that objective. It would seem, however, that the first effort ought to be made at getting the men back. That means an end-the-war agreement, which the U.S. could readily have if it would bargain in earnest with North Vietnam. We should think that the POWs would be a little cynical if, despite the loving kindness of their welcome on returning from imprisonment, their ordeal had been prolonged while the Administration used them for its own political ends.

2-E

Africa

WASHINGTON POST

17 August 1972

# Britain Asks Others to Take Some Uganda Refugees

By Robert Mott

Special to The Washington Post

LONDON, Aug. 16—Geoffery Rippon, Britain's special envoy dealing with Uganda's scheduled expulsion of British Asians, said today that the British government expects other countries, especially India and other members of the Commonwealth, to help find homes for those evicted from the East African nation.

"A great international effort may be needed," Rippon said at a news conference after returning from a trip to Uganda during which he conferred with President Idi Amin. "I envisage now a period of intense diplomatic activity among the various countries involved."

Amin has ruled that Asians holding British passports, whose numbers are estimated at between 50,000 and 80,000, must leave Uganda by Nov. 5.

Amin expelled the Asians because he said they had a stranglehold on business in the country and this was hurting its economy.

Rippon said he had talked informally with the Indian high commissioner (ambassador) in London, adding that "there is room for a great deal of discussion" about India's role as a temporary or permanent home for some of the refugees.

Rippon reiterated Britain's "legal duty and moral responsibility," to Asians holding British passports. Most of the Asians involved are from India or Pakistan.

Rippon's remarks, and those of other official sources, made it clear that the British government is trying to avoid creating the impression that Amin's expulsion decree is being quietly accepted here and that the only remaining order of business is to resettle the Asians.

The British government is apparently still hopeful that the Ugandan leader can be persuaded to extend the three-month deadline he set for the Asians' departure.

The tangled question of the citizenship of many Asians liv-

ing in Uganda also remains to be settled.

Many Asians who chose to take Ugandan citizenship at the time of independence in 1962 now contend that official documents have been destroyed and that they, too, face expulsion. Speeches by Amin and other Ugandan leaders during the past week would appear to support these fears, although Amin has de-

nied that any records were destroyed.

Rippon repeatedly sidestepped questions about contingency plans the government may be making to absorb a large inflow of immigrants should Amin stick to his deadline.

The envoy said Amin had assured him the Asians would be paid full prices for their businesses However, the Ugan-

dan president, has threatened to "reduce drastically" the $7,000 each emigrant is now allowed to take out of Uganda, a move aimed at protecting the country's already low foreign exchange balance.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

16 August 1972

# South Africa to improve black settlement camps

By Paul Dold

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Cape Town

The South African Government has launched a six-point program to improve conditions in black resettlement camps in the Ciskei — where more than 100 black children have died during the past year.

The blacks in the camps are mainly those who have been sent out of towns and cities in white South Africa, under apartheid policy. They include pensioners, unemployed blacks, and others who have lost their right to stay in white South Africa.

The main camp, Dimbaza, is in the Ciskei — one of the Bantustans (black homelands) being readied for self-rule. Dimbaza is near King William's Town, and the others, Sada and Ilinge, are outside Queenstown in the eastern Cape.

## Steps to help blacks

In a six-page reply to a questionnaire, South Africa's Department of Bantu Administration revealed the following steps being taken to help blacks in the camps:

- Free medicine and medical treatment for indigent people.

- Free milk powder for babies.

- Free protein-enriched soup daily for schoolchildren.

- Social welfare workers to be stationed in all camps.

- A health educator to visit the camps.

- Film shows, other entertainment, and sporting facilities to be provided.

Pensioners in the camps are paid a monthly allowance of Rands 5 ($6.65) and women in the townships receive a maintenance grant of R 2.5 ($3.33) or rations worth about the same.

## Mortality rate soars

The mortality rate in the camps has been soaring, churchmen say, due to malnutrition.

An Anglican clergyman, the Rev. David Russell, has been fighting for the past year to improve conditions in the camps. Last May he fasted for four days and nights on the steps of St. George's Cathedral in Cape Town, drawing attention to the blacks' plight.

For the past three and a half months, Rev. Russell has been living on grants and rations normally paid to blacks and writing a monthly open letter to the Department of Bantu Affairs telling the government how it feels to live on the daily allotment.

Mr. Russell said nine babies died at Dimbaza in 12 days in May. "There are 286 children's graves, 38 have died in two months this year, 68 graves have already been dug and wait there in expectation."

In its July 25 reply to this correspondent, the Bantu administration said 115 black children died from June, 1971, to May this year.

"It is not understood on what grounds it can be stated deaths were due to malnutrition. There is simply no earthly reason why a child who receives rations should die from malnutrition," the administration contended.

## Protein content too low?

The rations given to needy blacks had been compiled in collaboration with the Department of Health, but the department revealed it has now decided to add powdered milk to the ration scale for children under 12.

Churchmen say one of the main drawbacks of the camps is their location — far from towns providing work for blacks. They say assurances of factories being set up in the camps have largely been forgotten.

The department announced in its reply that work already has been provided for 550 blacks. Projects planned and extended will offer work to another 1,050 blacks. There are 2,615 blacks unemployed, but many cannot be placed on the open labor market.

27

NOTING THAT HUSAK HIMSELF WAS VICTIM OF THE STALINIST
RULE OF THE 1950S, MAINICHI SAID, "AS A FORMER PRISONER OF THE
TERROR, IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT HE WOULD RESORT TO THE
SAME METHODS HIMSELF.

"HOWEVER, THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION HAS

PAGE 3 RUADLEA 0476 UNCLAS

NOT RPT NOT BEEN STABILIZED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. IN POLAND AND
EAST GERMANY WHERE THE LEADERSHIPS HAVE CHANGED, THE SITUATION IS
NORMAL AND THE PEOPLE'S LIVING CONDITIONS HAVE IMPROVED. IF
THE HUSAK LEADERSHIP WERE TO CONTINUE ITS POLICY OF TIGHTENING
POLITICAL AND THOUGHT CONTROLS, THIS WOULD HAVE A SUBTLE
EFFECT ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS."

"THE SOVIET INVASION," IT CONCLUDED, "GREATLY DAMAGED THE
IMAGE OF SOCIALISM; THE RECENT SERIES OF TRIALS IN PRAGUE
MAKE THE PICTURE EVEN DARKER. THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY,
VERY FAITHFUL TO THE KREMLIN, EVEN HAD TO EXPRESS DOUBT
ABOUT WHETHER "FREEDOM OF THOUGHT" EXISTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA."
ITEM USIS TOKYO

BT
#0476

NNNN

... Western Europe, p. 2 Asia, p. 10 Communist Countries, p. 12

KISSINGER TRIP TO SAIGON - II

Summary

Foreign media speculation on Henry Kissinger's trip to Saigon, hampered by lack of details of his talks there, ranged from early expectations of a peace "breakthrough" to late conclusions that nothing new had emerged this week in Saigon or Paris.

Scattered discussion relied instead on correspondent reports:

--The Washington correspondent of the London *Daily Telegraph* reported speculation "that a breakthrough may be at hand" and "strong suspicion" among Democrats that Mr. Kissinger's mission was a "political" show of efforts toward peace.

--West German TV's Washington correspondent said that among his tasks was explaining to President Thieu that the latter's suggestion of increased air warfare "does not fit in" with the idea that Vietnam will not be a U.S. election issue--"November is approaching and impatience in the White House is growing."

--Rome TV's New York correspondent declared that "Kissinger's consultations in Saigon are more difficult than expected... but the hope for a breakthrough is still strong."

Early comment on Pierre Salinger's trip to Paris to talk to North Vietnamese representatives about POWs was limited to British papers.

The *Guardian* of Manchester and London said the story had emerged "in a series of confusing statements and counter-statements which appeared unnecessarily to impugn Senator McGovern's credibility."

The *Times* of London said "the White House reaction... again revealed the extreme sensibility within the Administration to Mr. McGovern's attempts to provoke a debate on Vietnam."

Nhan Dan indirectly criticized the leaders of the socialist camp by attacking the "policy of reconciliation toward a number of big powers..."

* * *

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London: "Peace Breakthrough or Political Trip?"

British papers yesterday and today played stories of Mr. Kissinger's activities in Saigon and speculation about a "breakthrough" toward peace.

Yesterday's conservative London *Daily Telegraph*, which supports U.S. Vietnam policy, reported that Mr. Kissinger's presence in Saigon "has inevitably aroused speculation in Washington that a breakthrough may be at hand in the Paris peace talks. But there was also a strong suspicion among opposition Democrats that his mission's main purpose was political--to demonstrate that the Administration is doing everything it can to reach a settlement."

In the same issue, the paper's Saigon correspondent wrote that "should any new Washington blueprint for peace involve either relaxation of American military pressure on North Vietnam or a partial Indochina ceasefire, Dr. Kissinger is likely to encounter strong resistance from President Thieu."

"Showdown in Saigon?"

The liberal *Guardian* of Manchester and London, a critic of U. S. policies, said today in a Saigon-datelined story that "Vietnamese and foreign analysts... suggested that if Dr. Kissinger's mission was in fact to force a showdown, even the tight-lipped Mr. Thieu would not be able to prevent word from leaking out. Any far-reaching American pressures--though likely to concern a standstill cease-fire and the future sharing of political power with the National Liberation Front--would have to be communicated to army commanders and leading ministers."

The correspondent added that some Vietnamese sources were convinced that the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho meetings "had produced a workable compromise about sharing political power in Saigon."

In the same vein, the paper reported yesterday from Saigon that "any major U.S. policy change now would run counter to the reasoning of those analysts who are convinced that unquestioned American support for Thieu so far meant that the Nixon Administration desired at least the appearance, if not the reality, of calm here until after November."

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# "Confusing Reports on Salinger Mission"

This morning the paper said the news of Pierre Salinger's mission to Paris "emerged yesterday in a series of confusing statements and counter-statements which appeared unnecessarily to impugn Senator McGovern's credibility."

# "Salinger Stirs Sensibilities"

The independent *Times* of London today judged that "the White House reaction" to Mr. Salinger's move "again revealed the extreme sensibility within the Administration to Mr. McGovern's attempts to provoke a debate on Vietnam.

"Indeed, in deciding to make a major issue of the incident, the White House risked losing the advantage given to it by Mr. McGovern's conflicting statements....

"Mr. McGovern can little afford...ridicule... The incident has again raised questions both of judgment and of control of his staff in handling delicate matters of policy."

# "Trip Suggests Eagerness for Peace"

The independent weekly *Spectator*, out today, remarked that "poisoning trees is, of course, better than poisoning people. But the style of thinking is the same....

"The suspicion grows that the U.S. has deliberately bombed North Vietnam's dikes, and it has experimented with pilotless aircraft. In its conduct of the Vietnam war, the Pentagon has not demonstrated any particular squeamishness....

"President Nixon's determination to end the Vietnam war may not be popular in the Pentagon, or, indeed, in those think-tanks where calculations concerning suffering and personal responsibility do not enter. enter.

"But Mr. Kissinger's visit to Vietnam suggests that the President is eager to seek peace, and that he is quite prepared for 'the abandonment of the nation's role in helping to maintain peace' by pursuing war.

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"It would do no harm for President Nixon to inform his Defense Secretary that American policy is to withdraw from Vietnam; and, when that has sunk in, the President could do worse than inquire what the men in the think-tanks think they are doing, and whether they might not be better employed doing something else, or nothing."

## "No Evidence of Intent to Destroy Dikes"

The independent weekly London Economist, also out today, stated that "the argument about means" in Vietnam has returned to the question "whether the U.S. is systematically trying to destroy the network of dikes that protects the Red River delta." It declared:

"On the evidence that has been produced so far, by anyone with any claim to objectivity, it is almost certainly not...."

The periodical considered it "fair criticism" of the argumentation by critics of the war that "they have talked almost exclusively about the means..." and declared that "Mr. McGovern has said very little so far this year about the issues behind the war...." It then asserted the Senator is "either naive or contemptuous about the problems of Southeast Asia, and perhaps both." It continued:

"The most obvious thing about Southeast Asia today is that North Vietnam has virtually its entire army outside its own frontiers.... There is no evidence from the movement of refugees in Indochina that a majority of people in the areas occupied by the North Vietnamese army have welcomed the sort of government it has brought with it."

## West German TV: "U.S. Getting Impatient"

The Washington correspondent of West Germany's second TV network Wednesday night said that Mr. Kissinger "could scarcely order" President Thieu to resign but still would have to explain to Mr. Thieu that his suggestion of increased air warfare "does not fit in with the concept" that Vietnam will not be a U.S. election issue. He declared:

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8/18/72

"Every compromise which would give the U. S. its POWs and a ceasefire will contribute to the end of the Thieu regime. The models discussed again feature a further division of Vietnam.... Only one thing is certain--November is approaching and impatience in the White House is growing."

## "Settlement Implies Thieu Resignation"

Independent *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* of Munich yesterday ran its Washington correspondent's report that troop withdrawal "has failed to defuse" the war as an election issue and that Administration sensitivity to the POWs issue "is indicated by its vilification campaign against Senator McGovern's friend, Ramsey Clark." The correspondent concluded:

"By countless assertions that he would not impose on Saigon anything that the Communists failed to win by military action, the President has barred the way to a negotiated settlement. But no settlement can be achieved without imposing on Thieu something that might imply his resignation."

## "Saigon Fear of Compromise"

The Washington correspondent of pro-Christian Democratic *Frankfurter Neue Presse* agreed that Mr. Nixon's "freedom of action is narrowed" by earlier "promises." He speculated that President Thieu's "arrogance" in keeping Mr. Kissinger waiting before their meeting indicated fear in Saigon that "cooler" relations with America could result in a compromise reached "over South Vietnam's head." He concluded:

"The U. S. has tried to quash speculation on Kissinger's travels... But experience shows that with these wandering spirits of secret diplomacy anything is possible."

Independent-right *Frankfurter Allgemeine* wrote that the Vietnam situation is "shrouded in a fog of vague information and speculation...

"The charges by the American opposition that Nixon missed an opportunity to end the war are as confusing as the North Vietnamese denial that a solution is now in sight."

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# "U.S. Public Doubts About Air War"

The Washington correspondent of West Germany's second television network last night reported Mr. Clark's testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees. It observed:

> "The Government's embarrassment is obvious. As a lawyer and politician, Clark has an impeccable reputation because his arguments are strictly moral and because for many millions in this country, the doubts about justification of the air war are growing."

## Rome TV: "Cold Shoulder in Saigon"

Italian media which yesterday reflected hope for a "breakthrough" today were more cautious about prospects.

For example, state-run television earlier reported "a feeling that something big is afoot." By last night, however, it noted that Thieu's postponement of a meeting with Mr. Kissinger was "considered a cold shoulder for the U.S. envoy."

Independent left-center La Stampa of Turin yesterday reviewed the Time magazine story of a new peace plan and judged, "the Vietnam war may be about to end." It said the "new plan... once again shows Kissinger's inexhaustible imagination."

Today it ran an assessment by its New York correspondent that "Kissinger's consultations in Saigon are more difficult than expected... but the hope for a breakthrough is still strong."

Socialist Avanti of Rome discussed the visit in critical terms. Yesterday it asserted that the White House was "playing up the Kissinger mission to make an impression" and was saying that nothing in particular was expected from it "as if to prepare public opinion for merely propaganda news." Today it headlined: "Four Hundred U.S. Air Strikes While Kissinger in Saigon. Is This His Calling Card for a Negotiated Solution?"

## Paris: Peace Hopes and Doubts

French media yesterday expressed considerable hope that decisive meetings were being held. Today, however, they reported lack of apparent progress in Paris or Saigon.

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"End Is Rather Near"

Wednesday afternoon's independent _Le Monde_ carried an assessment by its American affairs specialist, Alain Clement, stressing that now was the time to reach a settlement.

Yesterday morning, commercial Europe One radio stated, "There is every reason to believe that the end is rather near," and financial _Les Echos_ of Paris concluded yesterday that what it called the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho "diplomatic ballet... appears to confirm that the Vietnam negotiations have entered a crucial phase."

By last night, however, the state-run French radio was reporting "no developments" at yesterday's Paris peace talks, and television noted stepped-up air sorties "coinciding with Dr. Kissinger's conversations in Saigon."

"Bloody Months Ahead"

Meanwhile, a Saigon correspondent wrote in _Le Monde_ that "everyone agrees that the next two months are likely to be particularly bloody" and that the U.S. would not move to unseat Thieu. He wrote:

"According to a reliable source, President Nixon has furnished President Thieu a triple guarantee: he will not decree a unilateral ceasefire; he will not negotiate a ceasefire between Americans and Communists; and he will not decide to stop the bombing of the North for electoral reasons.

"Furthermore, Mr. Kissinger's visit to Saigon seems to constitute an additional and personal guarantee for the South Vietnamese chief of state, in the immediate future at least...."

The correspondent reasoned that in the pre-electoral period, Mr. Nixon "needs order in Saigon.

"Dropping Thieu in such a period, after having done everything to keep him in power, would awkwardly recall the precedent of 1963, when President Diem, although brought to power with American backing, was the victim of a coup fomented by generals acting in complicity with the United States."

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## "There Has Been No Genocide"

Raymond Aron, writing in yesterday's moderately conservative *Le Figaro*, judged it wrong to "join in the chorus of those accusing the U.S. of war crimes" in Vietnam "without getting into the question of war crimes by the other side." In the Indochina conflict, he pointed out, "war crimes have undoubtedly been committed, if that is the name given to attacks against the civilian population... But there has been no genocide: however horrible, the bombing of North Vietnam has nothing in common with the systematic killing of the Armenians during World War I or of the Jews during World War II...."

"As for the dikes, I admit that some of them were deliberately attacked. But I do not think that President Nixon intends to destroy the system of dikes, for a very simple reason: No one will make me believe that he if he were bent on doing so he could not, considering the air force he has launched into battle."

## Vienna: "Trip to Provide Progress"

Socialist *Arbeiter-Zeitung* of Vienna wrote yesterday "there is real reason" to believe that the U. S. now has a more flexible attitude on the Vietnam war and that Mr. Kissinger's trip to Saigon is to provide "some tangible progress" for the Administration as election day approaches "because the American election day is also a deadline for Vietnam."

## "Clark's Burlesque"

Semi-official *Wiener Zeitung* asserted today that Mr. Clark's activities belonged to the "realm of jokes or burlesque," and derided his "discovery" that the U. S. was killing people in the war in Vietnam. It concluded:

"It is too bad that Mr. Clark did not continue his trail-blazing research.... He could have found out, with very little trouble, that the North Vietnamese occasionally flirt with the idea of killing off a few South Vietnamese. But that would have completely shaken Mr. Clark's view of the world. And neither would it have suited his lord and master, McGovern, who loves to pose as the nation's savior from the horror of the Vietnam war."

No. 100

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