TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Maw

9:15 a.m.

6/27/73

CM: Hello, Henry, how are you.

HK: Carl, how are you.

CM Fine.

HK I wanted to ask you as a general rule, I am getting some awards now for distinguished public service, some of which have money attached to them, what is my position with respect to that.

CM: I think you could accept provided there are no strings, if it is just an
an award.

HK: No, no it is an award.
There are two that I am getting.

CM: What are we talking about?

HK: One is--I don't know what it is called--just being founded, but it is a very prestigious group. I know Jackie Kennedy is the Vice Chairman, it's a bipartisan group of very senior people. I can get you a list, but Terry Sanford, I think from each state--one or two from each state and they are giving their first awards July 4.

CM: And it would be a public award of merit accomplishment

HK: That's right.
And that has I think $5,000. And then there is another one for which
Mrs. Longworth is going to give to me that is in honor of her father,
that is given annually--I think that has $1,500 attached to it.

CM: I think that is quite all right. But let me just check it out and come back to you in a couple of hours.

HK: Can you do that--not just on the legality, which I assume it has to be
legal, but on the ethics of it. You know, I can do three things, I can
accept it and keep it, I can accept it and turn it over to charity, or I
can accept the award and not take the money.

CM: That's right. I'll come back to you later--where are you now, in
Washington?

HK: I'm in San Clemente but you can reach me through Washington or you can reach me at 714 492 0011.

CM: I'll be back with you this afternoon.

Page 2

HK: Just been watching Mr. Dean on television. I don't think you'd hire him for your law firm, would you?

CM: I should say not, I started to look at it last night, got bored sick. There is something awful funny.

HK: I never knew him, thank God

CM: Did you ever meet him at all?

HK: The amazing thing is I would get memos--legal memos from his office and then I'd see this young guy run around the halls and I never put the name and the face together. I always thought that the Counsel to the President had to be a senior guy. So I never thought that this young guy could be the John Dean who was sending me memos.

CM Extraordinary.

HK: So I don't recall any meeting I have had with him.

HK:

KM: He may have sat in large meetings where he didn't say anything. But if I had to testify I would have to say I never talked to him. I have no recollection of any conversation with him.

CM: That's good. He is not one to have dealings with.

HK: Well he mentioned me once. He claimed that J Edgar Hoover had told Rockefeller who had told me who had told the President who had told him that J. Edgar Hoover objected to the wire tapping of four newsmen. Rockefeller has already denied talking to Hoover or to me. And I have to deny that I talked to either Rockefeller or ex to the President, on this matter. But he just slipped that ex in -- it was just--it was directed at me.

CM: Okay, Henry, I'll be back at you this afternoon.

HK: Good.

DELEGATED
Authority E012858

Dated: 10/2/88
NARRATED 9/2/88

TELCONE

Lou Wasserman/Mr. Kissinger

9:30 a.m. 6/27/73

LW: Hi, Henry, I won't ask how you are doing down there.

HK: There must be some shit in the country that we didn't hire on our staff. Somebody said to me yesterday he must be in Kuwan tapping somebody else's telephone.

LW: That's right.

HK: Lou I'm giving a dinner Friday night for the French FonMin and I wondered whether you and your wife would like to come

LW: Sure I would love to.

HK: Good, then let me let you know where it is going to be.

LW: Sure, we'd be happy to come.

HK: Good, I'll let you know, it is informal I'll let you know the--

LW: I'll look forward to seeing you and cheering you up if I can.

HK: You're great. They haven't gotten to the K's in the testimony yet so I am pretty safe.

LW: I heard something about the K's from our friend Herb

HK: Isn't that awful. You know the tragedy of so many well-meaning, dedicated men who got themselves destroyed.

LW: Wiped out for no reason.

HK: For petty baloney. Good Lou, see you Friday night.

LW: See you Friday night.

CLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT
Authority: EO 12958

DATE: 6/27/73
NARRATOR'S NAME:

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Taft Schreiber

11:20 a.m. 6/27/73

HK: Taft, I'm giving a dinner this Friday for the French FonMin and the following Friday for the Chinese Amb. here and I've asked Lou Wasserman for this Friday and I thought if you could come the following Friday for the Chinese.

TS: I'd love to but--but we're leaving Sat morn for Europe.

HK: Then do you want to come this Friday?

TS: I'd love to, but I have to check my house-- Where are you going to do that?

HK: I wanted to ask your advice on that or the Bistro

TS: I would suggest either Chassons--depending on the number of people

HK: I'll have about 20-22

TS: I think either place would do and if you want help from us in arranging like photographer and celebrities--I'll make calls for you.

HK: We can do the inviting if--what would be a big help to me is if somebody from your office--they did such a beautiful job in getting the room set up--

TS: I can get Herb to do it--for about 20 people--

HK: The one for the Chinese may be a bit bigger

TS: Whatever you want--I'll have Herb call you back--

HK: Can he call Mrs. Andrews in my office? And will you let me know whether you can come.

TS: Yes, well call you right back--who would you ask--Lou for the following Friday

HK: No, I'll have you both--

TS: Because he's leaving on Sat or Sun for Europe--we have a board meeting

HK: I see. Can have two executives from Universal considering that I'm going to be your leading man.

TS: Your buttering both sides of the bread.

DECEMBER
Authority E012958
P. O. BOX 61204
NAPLES

TELCON

Richard Valeriani/Mr. Kissinger

6/27/73 2:20 p.m.

DV: I wanted to check in terms of the veto message--about the ongoing diplomatic efforts to get a settlement in Cambodia. Have they progressed any since last you talked to them.

HK: I can't give daily progress reports

DV: In terms of this development--are we talking about something in a few months a away?

HK: No, I have said we are talking about something that we hope to conclude during this summer.

DV: And ah

HK: This is on deep background

DV: Right. Is there any recent development or do you have any imminent that you will participate in to speed this along.

HK: I can't go into that except to say that we have--I think to cut this thing off now would be a calamity. Without giving us an opportunity to bring the effort in which we are engaged to a conclusion.

DV: Is there something--

HK: It is not a question of whether to give a day-to-day progress report --it is obvious for example that certain things have to wait till Sihounok returns to Peking which won't be for another few days. But I can't go any more deeply into it. And you ought to remember these--this is now being played like a rerun of all the Vietnam debates of recent years. But the Vietnam war is over. We have negotiated a settlement. What conceivable reason--no flyers are being lost--no prisoners are being taken. We are trying to wind up the last phase in the --consistent with the other settlement. That is all this is about. This is not a Indochina war thing.

DV: If the Senate says okay look if this is still going by October 1 or Nov. 1

HK: It would be very understandable then--the difficulty with that is this--we can do that as a gentleman's understanding with the Senate--it would be somewhat counterproductive to make it legislation--see what I mean.

DV: I understand why you can't have a fixed deadline to negotiate again--

DELEGATED
Authority E.O. 12958
Dated NARAD 6/20/73

TELCONE

Page 2

HK: But in terms if the leaders of the SEnate came to us and said October 1 we would think this is a reasonable proposition.
But we would like it as a gentleman's agreement. But speculate on that on your own, will you?

DV: Okay.

HK: You can ascribe that to sources, but to give you some feeling for what we are thinking.

DV: That's what I'm looking for--

HK: We would not think that someone is asking anything unreasonable of us if that were the way it went.

DV: Okay fine, thank you very much.

HK: Good.

DELEGATEE

Authority E012958

I*

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Cong. Holifield/Mr. Kissinger

10:34 a.m. 6/28/73

HK: ...with respect to Cambodia

H: yes.

HK: I know it's coming up today and I really feel very strongly that we -- now partly as a result of our discussions here, partly as a result of other things, that we have an opportunity to wind this thing up and if the Senate version were adopted it might really totally destroy this and I was wondering if I could appeal to you to help us support the House version.

CH: Well I have pretty well gone along with the President's program all the way but I'm in doubt on this particular thing, Dr. Kissinger, I want to listen to the debate today on it before I make my decision, but frankly I am leaning toward voting for the Eagleton amendment. I wouldn't <u>absence</u> you. I'm not committed on it yet to anyone, but I can see very little reason for continued bombing. I stayed with the President all through the Vietnam situation right up until the last, but it looks a little different to me now and I'm --frankly I'm leaning toward the Eagleton amendment.

HK: Well, ah, you see, our view is (1) we can reduce the bombing considerably and I can tell you now that if we don't succeed except when it is made public it doesn't help us, by September we'll be prepared to go along with this.

CH: Ah huh.

HK: But we are so close to getting this negotiation under way, that we'd just like to have an opportunity to see it develop without being stopped in the very last weeks of what would then be a successful disengagement, by the Congress quite frankly--I mean you aren't here voting for an open ended commitment and this I want to assure you of

CH: I'll consider it very carefully Dr. Kissinger and I see that the bells have just rung for a vote--don't know whether it is on this or or something else so I will have to go the floor and I appreciate your calling.

HK: Right, nice to talk to you.

DELEGATES
Authority E.O. 12958
DAILY WRAPS DUE 6/29/73

TELCONE (San Clemente)
Mr. Kissinger/Cong. Morgan

10:45 a.m. 6/28/73

HK: Hello, Mr. Chairman?

M: Yes, Henry.

HK: How are you?

M: Pretty good.

HK: I don't normally call congressman about congressional--about votes, in fact I've never done it, but I think that vote on Cambodia today is really so important that I wanted you to have our view which is that the House version is one we can live with, but the Eagleton amendment would be really very serious.

M: Ah huh.

HK: And I can tell you personally we don't intend to carry this beyond the summer but we have such a good chance we think of getting it wound up that we--that a negative vote now would really have a rather serious consequences.

M: Well a vote is going on now and the previous question is already--I voted but I'll take your views into consideration on this final vote. You know. Do you think it is really important.

HK: I think it is really very important, and I don't think I have ever called you before.

M: No sir.
Okay, Henry, but it'll cause me some real difficulty back in my area.

HK: Well I think though you'd be vindicated without a future. I think by the end of the summer.

M: Yeh, okay thanks for calling Henry.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated 6/29/73
P.O. Box 1467

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Mr. Kissinger/Taft Schreiber

11:35 a.m.

6/28/73

HK: Hello

TS: Henry, Taft.

HK: Taft, I still can't take that job.

TS: Ah huh. Listen you better do it while you've got all these things going on. You know bringing the Premier here, the next thing you are going to do is bring Mao here and then Chou and this is the hot period. So we have to get your picture on the screen while you are always on the front page newspaper.

HK: I'll consider it. Depends on the leading lady.

TS: All right. We'll give you your pick.

HK: It was good to see you.

TS: It was wonderful seeing you Henry and I can imagine how busy you've been and it was a very trying time for everyone. But I'm sure it will all be fine. I have every reason to believe that everything will be great. There probably going to be some people that are hurt, but it won't be our President.

HK: No.

is

TS: The reason I called you/that Sunday after the line was over and Henry Salvitore said to me, let's ask the President if we can go with a special group from this group here to Russia to see if we can't do something about helping the business relationships between our two countries, he said here is Dave Packard, head of the largest electronic company, Tex Thornton, Litton Industries, O Miller, Chairman of Standard Oil, you (Taft) from the movie industry and said--he--his company by the way is the largest exploration company for gas and oil--the greatest scientists in oil and gas and mineral explorations.

HK: Right.

pulled

TS: So I said fine, let's go ask him, so I pulled him to walk over as he said how can you do this, I said I just am a man that asks. So I did--the President--the line had been over and the President was listening in on a conversation between Brezhnev and Reagan and I walked up and he turned to me and I told him what had happened and he said the interpreter picked this up--the kind of pushed me in--the interpreter told Brezhnev and Brezhnev said well if the trip is sponsored by the President, I'm sure it would be

DECE ASSIGNED
Authority E012958
P. H. NARAN Dated 6/29/73

Page 2

fine, but I think there are many things we have to do --why don't you talk to Dobrynin and the President and when the interpreter--the President said of course, he said, these are wonderful men and great friends of yours and our country and they could--I think it would be fine. And he said there are a lot of details to be worked out--Brezhnev was saying this in Russian--and then we said look we're patient, we will do everything we are asked to do and with that he stuck his hand out in Russian, you're invited. So the President said you've got your deal now; I understood so walked away. Well Henry was in the state of shock. I talked to Al Hiag for a minute and told him about it and he said fine. He said fine--oh yeh Brezhnev said be sure be in touch with Dobrynin about this--Now I talked--oh I mentioned to the President that Firestone who is there had told me coming down they had been thinking of building a plant there now, so I told this to Al and he said this was fine, let me know what--how you want to further this. Well in talking to Henry Salvatore this morning he said you know I don't know whether we should ask our wives or should go it alone and I think business is all business and we'd like to be of help and we're a special group and I think it ought to go to the mission and I said let me talk to Henry Kissinger because I think if we are not going to have wives this should be indicated rather than coming from you and I because we'll have nothing but trouble but what Henry Salvatore is talking about is our engaging and we know it'll cost a lot of dough but hiring a large private jet and going there and trying to visit several cities and meeting people and maybe breaking in special groups where I can talk to motion picture people--this is not to open up a trade between us but maybe tell some of their people that we'd be happy to make a picture or two there and maybe bring some of their technicians over to see what we do and generally trying to further if it is useful--

HK: Look if you want to do the thing realistically write me a letter of what you want and let me take it up with Dobrynin.

TF: All right. Now I will do that but I want to find out from you really is advice if you say Taft I don't think you ought to do it--I don't think it would be constructive, I don't--I think you put the President on a spot--

HK: Let me see the letter. I think it could be useful. I think basically we'd be for it.

TF: All right. That's the purpose and when you talk to the President you might tell him that we had this conversation so that it is only going to be done if it's useful and helpful.

HK: Absolutely no question.

TF: No. 2, Wasserman called and said how was the affair and so forth I said great and he said you talk to Henry again, I said no I saw him for a minute

DECE 24 ASGRED

Authority E0 12958

Dated NARAD 6/2/89

Page 3

he was with a beautiful girl--who the hell wants to talk business so he
said anymore been said and I said I think we are on a time schedule--
and he would get back to us--so he said to me then I hear he is making
a deal with an oil group--and I said I don't know--I don't think there is
any glamour in that. Just wanted to tell you he bugs me all the time

HK: No, no I'm not talking to anybody else because of this watergate thing, I didn't think I could resign right now.

TS: Well you shouldn't Henry. It would be a terribly terribly bad thing. I think it may delay your schedules a little bit but at the same time I think you're so necessary in these relationships that are being put together that your country is more important than anything else right now.

HK: I thought that I should wait until this thing has quieted down before I go back to my original scheme.

TS: All right. Let me just say again that (a) that it should quiet down in due course and (b) the appetite is greater. I have had a couple--I know Lou hasn't talked to anybody you see, but said wouldn't he be great--

HK: Actually Mike Frankiewicz mentioned it to me the other day and I just --just as an idea and I had lunch with him--I just acted as if--I brushed if off.

TS: You should because I know Lou hasn't told anybody--I think it would take a pretty stupid man not to figure out that this wouldn't be a -- the fact is that it could be almost a difference between everything in the future and so we're being patient they're just--if I keep mentioning it to you it's not because I'm bugging you, because I'm fine.

HK: Well I appreciate this very much.

TS: Okay, Henry if there is anything that I can do--please let me know. We're going to get to England for 5-6 days--I've got a board meeting and then play golf and I'll be in NY about 15th of July. However, I'll get this off sometime today--are you staying here or going back to Washington?

HK: I'll stay until about the 8th or 9th.

TS: Then I'll get this off to you right away. If you need anything let me know will you?

HK: Thank you.

TS: All right. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Date 6/29/89
Title NARA Ref. 6/29/89

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Sec. Clements/Kissinger

1:57 p.m. - 6/28/73

K: Hello.

C: Henry.

K: Yes, how are you?

C: I'm just fine. Hope I didn't interrupt too much out there for you.

K: No, that's all right.

C: Henry, I have a problem here that we've got to decide today or tomorrow that just came to my attention because of the contract program that has to do with SCAD. Now very quickly and briefly you can jot some of this down, it won't take but just about 3 minutes to get the high points. We now have a program on SCAD that will give us 25% armed decoys and the other 75% will not be armed. We've spent $60 million to date on R & D and we have a total to go of $315 million R & D and after we complete that, if we do successfully, production is going to be approximately $1 billion for 864 of the missiles.

K: Right.

C: So in effect they're about $1 million a piece. Now that's funded, Henry on a program of $72 million in FY '74; $134 million for FY '75 and $75 million for FY '76. What's happening here is that our group and I have to concur in this - I don't have to, I do concur - our group, the DSART Group and everybody is saying we don't really think that this program has this kind of merit and this is the lowest priority item on the list and therefore we feel that we can't support it and we should stop it before we get this kind of money in it. I'm thinking, first of all, Henry, NSC may want this program for cosmetic reasons with the SALT talks being where they are.

K: That's right.

C: And furthermore we might be able to go ahead and accomplish two purposes, we might be able to drop this program on Saturday as such and then renegotiate it in a different form at a different spending level - and I'm talking about now

K: Well, we wouldn't be happy about your dropping the program.

DSC
Authority E012958
DATE N/A
NARRATIVE 6/29/73

2

C: What I'm trying to do, Henry, is to reduce the level of the spending and retain the technology because we have some $60 million in the R & D now and the technology fits the so-called cruise missile. It's the same technology

K: When do you have to have our answer?

C: The damn program is going to run out on Saturday.

K: How is it that we learn about it so late?

C: Well, Henry, the question that you asked is the same question I asked and the answer is that they just didn't come to call with the thing and didn't bring it in here for discussion until about 15 minutes ago. I don't mean 15 minutes, it's 30 minutes, but I've been talking about it for 30 minutes and I know what the program is. Now what we ought to do here is retain the technology, keep the technology going forward, concentrate on the cruise missile aspects of it . . .

K: Well, what decision are you asking me to make then?

C: What I'm asking you to do is to give me your best thoughts on how much importance you put to this insofar as the cosmetics for SALT, that's all I'm asking you.

K: Well, we would like to keep the maximum amount of the program going?

C: Maximum amount?

K: That's right.

C: Hell, that's $50 million worth. It's funded right now into the present program and under the existing contract for $72 million in 1974 and I don't think that Congress is going to sit still for it.

K: Well, the maximum possible amount then. What would they hold still for?

C: I think that we could go for about half that and concentrate on the cruise missile aspects and use that technology on something that you and I both have a helluva high interest in.

K: I must tell you honestly, Bill, I'm getting very restive about the way these things are being handled. We are operating on thinner and thinner margins. Every service is getting so god damned selfish - I mean we just can't operate this way. You know that

DELEGATED
Authority ED 12958
DATE 6/2/87
Dkt. 6194

3

C: Now look Henry don't tell me about something like this because I've got a lot of complaints too. And we're doing the best we can, I think.

K: We told you months ago that the standoff missiles are the things the Soviets are worried about.

C: That's right and that's the thing I want to concentrate on, not this damn thing.

K: I frankly don't know all that much about it.

C: OK, you and I, Henry, and I'm sure we're saying the same damn thing because the standoff cruise missile is important to you, it's important to me, the Russians are worried about it, we need that technology. What I want to do is keep the technology and move to the standoff missile and move away from this thing that is primarily an adjunct to upgrade the B-52. That's all it is.

K: Yeh, but then the end result will be to play into the hands of those who want to abolish the B-52's faster. You know it's awfully hard for me to make a quick judgment. I'd like to get my systems analyzt guy to at least give me his view.

C: OH yeh. To go through that kind of a process which is really the thing that our group has been doing for the last 3 or 4 days.

K: Yeh, but then let me have a paper. You know, you hit me with this without any advance warning, without giving me a chance to think about it. I can't make a reasonable judgment.

C: Well, that's probably right.

K: Can I call you tomorrow?

C: Oh sure.

K: I'll call you tomorrow.

C: All right, that'll be good, I'll wait until I hear from you tomorrow.

K: Good.

C: OK, Henry, thank you.

DEG ASHED

Authority E01258

D# MARA DRE 6/2/04

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Flanigan/Kissinger

2'25 p.m. - 6/28/73

K: Hello.

F: Hello, Henry.

K: Hello, Pete.

F: You will recall the two things we wanted to discuss. One prior to your
Jobert meeting.

K: Yeh, I've got yourmemo and I'll take all these issues up.

F: The only one that you have to initiate and it is very important, is 24-6.
And in that issue they alone stood against us.

K: I understand.

F: Right. With regard to the mandate, the Irish were the ones who were
most, I regeret to say, most obstreperous with regard to agricul ture,
but they were doing it at the behalf, we believe, and I talked to
d'Avignon who happened to be here and who is head of the drafting
committee at the behest of the French. I don't know that - the mandate
is not an impossible document. We can live with it though it's a little
difficult, but the 24-6 Henry, we do have an opportunity to do something
about this week. We can change it. If we get no progress it's going to
make our trade bill which in the last couple of days has gone downhill
even more difficult.

K: OK, I will stress this.

F: Good. The second issue is most favored nation. We are now in the
markup period with Ways and Means and expect shortly, though it
may not now be until the 9th to get to the MFN section. You will recall
that I gave you some language, both that we had already given to the
Committee

K: Yes, I remember it very well.

F: And some more stringent language that we hope we can get okayed by
the Soviets so we'd have a little fallback position. You'll further recall

K: Yeh, what's the question?

F: Do the Soviets agree?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

Dated NARA ID 6/29/73

2

K: Well, they take the position that they don't want to comment on our uh... The second one I didn't particularly like. That was a little stringent.

F: All right.

K: Now what was the essence again of both of them?

F: The essence was that

K: Both of them left the determination to the President.

F: Both left the determination to the President but both put the onus on the direction to the President that if they reinstituted any discrimination by virtue of education, race, color or creed or country of destination that he would at that point withdraw MFN. So he could go ahead now and as long as they didn't start collecting the tax again that there would be no withdrawal. But if they were to reinstitute the tax, then he would be obliged to remove MFN.

K: Yeh.

F: Incidentally as I told you then, in another meeting I tried the approach on Alkimof and he seemed to think that he didn't want to give it any kind of Russian blessing, but he seemed to say they don't like any of the problem, but they didn't find this

K: Why don't you run it past Dobrynin this afternoon.

F: I will run it past Dobrynin.

K: Call him up and tell him I asked you to call and I will call him from here.

F: Before I call or after. You want to call now?

K: I'll call now.

F: I'll call him in a half an hour. Thank you Henry.

K: Thank you.

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Dobrynin/Kissinger

2:35 p. m. - 6/28/73

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol, how are you?

D: As you know I am missing you here.

K: I bet.

D: (Laughs) For two days I can't really speak with you and I feel a little bit uneasy. Today I don't know whether Colonel Kennedy mentioned to you, I called him and he will call you or just have a chance to discuss with you, our ______ promised your interview with his ______.

K: Oh, good.

D: So it's a good interview.

K: Good. I'm delighted. Anatol, I told Peter Flanigan - he has two amendments to the MFN legislation and I asked him to check them with you - you know you can't give your - but just to see whether they're something you could live with. And he will call you within half an hour. I mean the practical consequence is to give us the right to extend MFN.

D: Yeh, I understand. OK, he will call me.

K: He will call you.

D: When you will be back Henry?

K: Oh, another 10 days.

D: Oh, come on, it's too long.

K: (Laughs)

D: Really - ok. Have a little bit rest. I see that now the French Minister is there. I thought that they don't know what about our agreement. Now he will be with you, he will spill everything.'

K: What agreement?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By MWBrauer 06/30/73

2

D: You remember when our two bosses

K: Yeh, we never got your - Brezhnev was going to let me know within
24 hours.

D: Last time it was 28 hours.

K: I never got it, did I?

D: It's now 48 hours. It arrived only yesterday.

K: Oh, I see.

D: Because he was in France. I am counting 28 hours because it was 24 and then during the last night it was agreed on 48. So I am counting by the end of tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. This is I am sure of. He will be today or tomorrow.

K: Tomorrow.

D: So you have to tell me then he because you will have first knowledge already.

K: I will keep in touch with you.

D: OK. What I receive, I'm sure I will receive. Maybe I will call you then from Kennedy's place. Do they have a direct line.

K: Yes, we have a direct line. Come over to Kennedy's place.

D: I could come over there and then talk with you whenever I receive, all right

K: Exactly.

D: I think it will be better.

K: Much better.

D: OK, Henry. Nice to talk with you.

K: Nice to talk to you. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By: MW Arap 5-30-94

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Dobrynin/Kissinger

2:35 p. m. - 6/28/73

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol, how are you?

K: I bet.

D: (Laugs) For two days I can't really speak with you and I feel a little bit uneasy. Today I don't know whether Colonel Kennedy mentioned to you, I called him and he will call you or just have a chance to discuss with you, our ________ promised your interview with his ________.

K: Oh, good.

D: So it's a good interview.

K: He will call you.

K: Oh, another 10 days.

K: (Laugs)

D: Really - ok. Have a little bit rest. I see that now the French Minister is there. I thought that they don't know what about our agreement. Now he will be with you, he will spill everything.¹

K: What agreement?

2

D: Last time it was 28 hours.

K: I never got it, did I?

K: Oh, I see.

K: Tomorrow.

K: Exactly.

D: I think it will be better.

K: Much better.

K: Nice to talk to you. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01258
Dated 6/2/94
P# 144444

TELCORN

General Haig/Mr. Kissinger

Jody 5.25p97k

June 28, 1973 8:30 p.m.

GH: Henry, I haven't talked to Timmons, so I got the latest word on this thing--the House Committee came out with the second supplemental with an agreed position ex that it would have 15 August

HK: Yeh, I talked to Laird and he thinks we shouldn't yield anymore.

GH: Okay, that's about what I think too and if they can get the second supplemental pre-report tomorrow then they may take the lead from that. It is a weak bill, you know, in that it says that there won't be any money in this bill for Cambodia. Although there isn't any in it anyhow. It's just phoney.

HK: Okay, I'll go along with that and I'll call Javits and tell him no deals.

GH: Right.

HK: Okay, thank you Al.

GH: Bye.

DELEGATES

Authority EO 12958

D. H. NARAD, Jr. 6/2/87

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Senator Javits

June 28, 1973 8:40 p.m.

HK: Hello, Jack. Jack we really can't go beyond, in good conscience, the Mahon amendment and I just think that the Senate will --we just cannot go beyond it--

J: The August 15 ban to Cambodia

HK: That's right.

J: I see.

HK: And you will should consider what is being done to the whole foreign policy by this, it is not-Indochina--is really a very subsidiary issue.

J: Henry, I'm up now and I keep --you know we keep working over the papers and so one and I assure you--

HK: If the Chinese come to the cond usion that we have become irrelevant, they'll turn sharp left. To try to get the Communists parties around world away from the Russians. This then frees the Russians in Europe and the middle East and we really--in fact when I come back I'd like to talk to you about how--what we can do to get some support for our foreign policy in a way that we haven't been successful before.

J: You mean when you come back from San Clemente.

HK: Yeh.

J: Henry, I'm leaving for Europe tomorrow night after this meeting. I'll be gone only a day--incidentally that Evalyn Rothchull is getting married--yeh Evalyn is marrying in NY -- the daughter is a very good friend of ours. So I'm going to be back Sunday for the Wedding.

HK: No, I didn't know. Isn't that nice. I'll be coming back about the 8th, of July. Will you be in Washington?

J: I'll be back here on the 9th and 10th.

K: Let's have breakfast shortly afterwards--I'd really like your counsel on what can be done.

J: You're very kind and I will be more than glad to do it and in the meantime I assure you I'll think this over most carefully.

DECS. ASSIGNED

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Laird/Kissinger

6/28/73 - Evening from his Residence

K: Hello.

L: Hello, Henry.

K: Mel, how are you? Going to screw things up here now.

L: What happened?

K: I needed your advice, Mel.

L: Yeh.

K: Jack Javits - I called Javits at the request of Timmons about that Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Now he says what they're considering is a cutoff of everything on August 15th. Not just Cambodia.

L: Well hell, they already passed it out of the Senate cutting out everything immediately - out of the Senate Appropriations Committee today.

K: He says what they're willing to take is a cutoff that names Cambodia if we give them oral assurances that we won't do anything else, but you know they'll leak that immediately.

L: Well, I wouldn't - you don't want to do that. I think we can save the House vote. You know what the vote was on August 1, don't you?

K: August 1 is no good to us.

L: Yeh, but you don't know what the vote was in Committee?

K: No.

L: 17 - 14.>Maine defeated the August 1 - 17 - 14. Then they went on and voted 17 - 14 for the Rhoades Amendment which was the 15th of August.

K: How about September 1st?

L: They did not have the votes on that.

K: You know, it's almost beyond my comprehension Mel, they're going to throw everything down the drain for nothing. If somebody can explain to me what this argument is about, I could understand last year's arguments better than this year's.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Dated NARADATE 6/29/73

2

14

L: I could too, Henry. But they really are - you know actually I wish you would - it's just amazing up there now, Henry.

K: Look, you know how much confidence I have in your judgment, Mel, I'm not questioning it.

L: You know Jerry - I got two phone calls on this airplane from Jerry Ford on the way out here.

K: Really.

L: Wanting me to come back immediately. Now maybe I should go back. Now he's setting up a meeting where I'm going to talk to the House Republicans at 8 o'clock tomorrow morning.

K: How can you do it? Oh, from here.

L: By phone in a conference call where they can ask me questions on it. He says he can't pass August 15 if I don't do this.

K: But that's August 15th only for Cambodia?

L: Right. And that's the way it should go to the Senate and the House will stand firm on that Henry.

K: OK, then I'll tell Javits we can't make any deals.

L: Yeh, I think that you should stay with the House language. Don't give up anymore. I think we've gone as far as we can.

K: Mel we've gone further than we can afford.

L: And the President has to say that he may come back to the Congress asking for a further authority when he signs this.

K: Can't he let it become law without his signature?

L: I'm not sure what it is with the recess.

K: Yeh.

L: They're going to put this on the Continuing Resolution too, I think.

K: I'd rather not have him sign it at all.

L: I think he may have to, I haven't looked at the legal.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Dated NARA Doc 6/2/84

3

K: We'll have to look at it, but you know this is one of the most vindictive, cheap actions that I've seen the Congress take. And it's not just in Cambodia, it's going to hurt us murderously with the Chinese because if they think that the Congress can do these things to us in Cambodia, what are they going to do to us elsewhere.

L: The only problem is now, Henry, right now we've got no authority. We've got to get some authority.

K: That's right. Yeh. (Laugs) A few more memos out of the White House and we won't have any left.

L: God, I wish people would keep cool on that thing for a while.

K: Well, did you know that they were sending out that memo?

L: I knew that they were told to start attacking.

K: Oh, it's just too god damn stupid. You don't attack when Dean is on the stand.

L: I understand that, Henry. Christ, I told that to Al, I said "Al, you're making a mistake. Keep cool."

K: That's right. I would have left this week to him. We shouldn't attack until all this testimony is out.

L: Right and then you can have a press conference and do something but wait 'til you're through with this thing.

K: That's what I think. That just gives some ammunition to hit us.

L: Boy, I tell you this is kind of a - we got to get together once in a while, Henry. This gets to be kind of a weird operation as far as I'm concerned.

K: Look, Mel, you and Al and I when we're in the same town must get together. This is absurd. It's absurd if we let them play this game again we're going to have the same bloody nightmares as before. As I understand it, Haig refused it and then he went through Ziegler - that cannot be. I mean I agree with you, Mel, when I look at this from the point of view of foreign policy, you know and I know that we're living off fat.

L: Yeh, I understand.

K: And as soon as other countries recognize how little authority there is left here we are just going to be in murderous difficulty. And we can't afford these stupid mistakes anymore.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
DATE MAR 16 1994

4

L: I called Haig, you know, about this. I guess I should have called the President, but I understood that he was the one that was very much concerned and wanted something done.

K: Haig?

L: The President.

K: The President always wants something done and we got into this mess because people reacted.

L: You can't overact all the time though, Henry.

K: I couldn't agree more.

L: OK.

K: OK, Mel, look I will tell Javits then that we cannot go further than August 15th on Cambodia.

L: Yeh, tell him that we've gone along with the so-called Mayheim position and you just can't back away from it now. All we said there is that we wouldn't veto it and that the President would have to make a statement that he might have to come back to the Congress for more authority.

K: Is this what Bill said on the Hill or did he go further?

L: No, that's what he told them. He said that it wouldn't be vetoed, but if it was signed the President would have to say that he may have to come back to ask for further authority.

K: Because he certainly didn't sound very tough on television tonight.

L: Well, I don't know about that - oh, you mean Bill Rogers. I was thinking of Bill Timmons.

K: No, Bill Rogers.

L: Oh, Christ, did he say something on this tonight?

K: Yeh, he said that Congress has it's view and we have our view and we'll find a compromise inbetween.

DEC 15 1968
 Authority EO 12958
 DEPT. NARRATED 6/20/68

DECLASSIFIED

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger - William Buckley

June 29, 1973

9:10 a.m

K: Hello.

B: Hi, Doc.

K: Hi, Bill.

B: How are you my friend?

K: OK, Bill.

B: I'm imagine you're suffering a little bit. I'm sorry for you.

K: Well, it's not one of the more glorious moments in American history.

B: No, no, it sure isn't. From a hundred points of view.

K: But, I think the reaction of the opponents is even more revolting than
the tawdry behavior of my ex-colleagues.

B: Yeah, I wish it were easier for you to externalize that point.

K: You know, to dismantle the country.... because of what was a collection
of petty crimes, unworthy, and everything else, but still this is a dramatic
dismantling of our foreign policy, of our Indochina policy.... they know damn
well we are in the process of negotiating the end of Cambodia.

B: That to me is truly shameful. And the remarkable thing is the total
collapse of the Senate. It is absolutely corrupt. And...

K: And if this thing comes apart now we're going to have the Chinese move
far left to steal the Communist parties. We'll have a belicose Soviet policy
and no public opinion to deal with it.

B: Yeah, yeah, yeah. I wish certain things which aren't easy to say over
the phone.... but I wish the guy in charge had a better means of communicating
~~that~~ this kind of thing to the Amer. people but unfortunately there is
in our recent history a self-serving communication that make it kind of
difficult for people to feel that this is not an aggression.

TELCONE

K: I know. But you know, history is going to have a hell of a time explaining
how it all happened.

B: Yeah, I know.

K: And, for what. What I called you about yesterday was a relatively
minor thing which just shows you how attentively I read the National Review.
Mentioning Halperin, it said that he is suing me for illegal wire tapping him
and that he can stand to gain 75 thousand dollars ...

B: I was surprised by that.

K: First of all, the wiretapping was perfectly legal when it was done and
it was authorized by the Attorney General, recommended by the Director
of the FBI and approved by the President. And in the fourth month in a
law and order Administration it wouldn't occur to anyone that this could
be illegal.

B: Well, did you lawyers tell you that you can get the case thrown out of
court?

K: Yes.

B: I will call down and find out what in the hell George will...

K: But they printed it as if the illegality was a fact, that he is suing me for
illegally wiretapping him what he is suing me for, but process was declared
illegal only in 1972....

B: After the fact.

K: Yeah, even then it wasn't applied to National Security things.

B: Yeah, right.

K: Secondly, I can prove that what your people didn't know was that I didn't
order the wiretapping of HaPERIN--that this was done on his own by J. Edgar
Hoover because he had evidence that the man was a security risk.

B: Well, have you answered yet?

K: No, I will not answer.

B: But you have to in the court.

K: Well, the Justice Dept. believes it can get it dismissed on motion.

B: Oh, I see, as a matter of law.

K: Yeah, before it even gets to court.

B: I'll get that straightened out, Doc.

K: OK. It isn't one of the most major problems.

B: No, No, but I will straighten it out. I was not on duty last week and was rather surprised when I read it myself. Tell me this......I was terribly sorry to miss your 50th birthday party.

K: Well, I would have loved to have seen you.

B: But, I was not present for different reasons other than those of Joe Kraft. When will I see you again? Soon, I hope.

K: I'll be back in about 10 days. I'd love to see you. Maybe you could come down that week.

B: Good, I'll be down there and hold your hand.

K: Well, we ought to discuss what to do about the country.

B: You're god damn right. It couldn't have happened to a nicer country.

K: You know, really, when you think of the reserves of dedication in this country.....it's really cruel.

B: Yeah, I know.

K: OK.

B: Thanks, Henry.

K: Bye.

DECE ASSIGNED
Authority ED 12958

Dated NARA Ref. 6/2/07

Hart

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger - General Haig

June 29, 1973

9:17 a.m.

K: Hello?

H: Yeah, Henry. Rogers is on the golf course so he hasn't done any mischief yet but I got Elliott and I told him that this has got to be turned off. And he will be back in touch with us. It goes counter to discussions held with the Soviets and would like complicity in double dealings to launch something now before we have their comments on ....

K: Of course this will just trigger him into a talkless Gromyko. Well, he's got to go. No matter what else happens.

H: Yeah, well, anyway, he got the message and he will turn it off.

K: Yeah. OK, fine.

H: Bye.

DECEMBER

Authority EO 12958

NARRATOR 6/2/91 9:07

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger - Len Garment

June 29, 1973

9:18 a.m.

K: Hello?

G: Henry, how are you?

K: OK.

G: Two things. Dinitz called last night and wanted... he had be receiving a number of representations from the community here and from back home and wondered whether it would be desirable to sit down with you. He will not be here the week that you are back. I told him I would speak with you.

K: Does he want to come out here?

G: Well, he wants to talk about the specific issues. Of the...

K: Yeah, but where can he sit down with me?

G: The question is whether it is necessary at this point. I think.... I said I would chat with you and perhaps I could, in the interim, before you returned, sit down with a couple of the leaders, or in any event, or at least give an assurance when you are back here that you will chat with them, informally.

K: Right, that's correct.

G: Why don't I tell him that and say that he should go away comfortable in the assurance that the matter is .... that it is being dealt with in a realistic and sensible fashion. And is not being ignored. Is that a fair statement?

K: That's a correct statement.

G: And that I can tell him and Jack Steim that when you are back that I will arrange a private meeting for three or four of them and yourself.

K: Right. But I would like to have a chance to talk to Dobrynin first.

G: All right.

K: I mean, don't do it the first day back.

G: But, sometime within the first few days that you are back. And I'll tell Dinitz that that will be done and that when he's back from Nassau that the two of you can sit down then.

K: OK.

2

G: Secondly, I assume....well, that's the only question I had. How are we doing out there? We're not doing too well back here.

K: Well, we're not doing too well out here either in terms of Cambodia and so forth which is doing us unbelievable damage. This is going to wreck us with the Chinese.

G: The atmosphere is very bad on Watergate.

K: It is?

G: And I don't know....

K: Well, why did we put out that statement the other day?

G: It's a long and complicated story. One of those things that happen when there is not good working morale and no real line of command.

K: It wasn't a very well thought thing....anyway to put it out while the guy is one the stand is nuts.

G: It wasn't put out. It was delivered in a rather haphazard fashion by Fred Bazartit without appropriate....

K: But, knowing these guys...

G: Well, I was not..this has become an exercise in super-secrecy and it is very complicated. I'll talk to you about this when we are together. There is no point in burdening you with it.

K: No, No.

G: More problems of the same. People who are being secretive when they don't need to be. And so there are bungles....And the soviets have to be handled with the most enormous sophistication so far as public opinion is concerned and it is not available. And we're having more of the Colson madness so that the atmosphere is getting rancid once again. It can be very hurtful. That plus all the other head-knocking. On the more conventional features.

K: You think we're going to make it?

G: Well, I think we could if there were better communication among ourselves. It's going to be a very difficult time. When are you all coming back?

K: It depends on the Cambodia thing.

G: You may come back sooner?

DELEGATED
Authority E012858
Dated NARA DTD 6/2/84

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Taft Schreiber/Kissinger

3:17 p.m. - 6/29/73

K: Hello.

S: Henry, Taft.

K: A, how are you? I have still got that Foreign Minister here with me. He's not in the room now but I've invited Danny Kaye now.

S: He's been prompted.

K: Oh, he has.

S: He's been told what we need, you understand. As the host it's not easy and also Herb told him we needed him for next Friday and he's happy to do it. And then he said look, do you think Dr. Kissinger would think it would be smart if I threw a cookout for them at my house. I said, well, when you see Henry Friday you discuss it with him. Now the other reason I wanted to call you was to be sure that if you wanted any studio red carpet stuff - you wanted to send him here to get him off your back for a couple days - or the French - all you have to do is to tell Herb. And Herb will give it the same treatment we gave Dobrynin. You don't have to be here.

K: But you can't do it on Saturday, can you?

S: Yeh, absolutely.

K: You can do it on Saturday.

S: Yeh, we don't have the stages open but we have enough action going on that seeing the studio will be just as exciting.

K: Oh, good. Well, let me check with them.

S: That's right. So I didn't want to bother you because I'm leaving, but I just felt that you ought to know, that you could say "Look, I'll take care of everything." And the Chinese may like it and how much hand holding can you do?

K: Now, tell me, do I have to have Danny Kaye. I've broken it up into 3 tables. It just didn't seem to me safe enough to have one - you know you need the right chemical combination for that. But do I have Danny at the same table as the Foreign Minister?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01208
Dated N/A

Date 6/29/73

2

S: I don't think so. I don't think so. I think you should put those that you think are the most important...I'll tell you if you're trying to make the Foreign Minister have fun and enjoy himself, I'd put him at the table 'cause he'll have everybody laughing.

K: Yeh, I'll have him there.

S: Because he's really the Chinese guy

K: Oh, I'm crazy about Danny.

S: And we told him that diplomatic affairs are very difficult for you and that you especially needed help. Then if he feels he's doing a diplomatic mission he'll go overboard.

K: Good.

S: So you decide and Steinberg is available for whatever you want. He'll be by tonight sometime to just look in and see everything is all right. And everything is all set.

K: Well, you're terrific, Taft. I'm sorry you can't be there.

S: I am too, Henry, but have a wonderful time. One thing I am concerned about - I heard more testimony today and I feel so badly for the President for the things - the hearsay - the kind of things that they're saying and

K: It's unbelievable!

S: It's unbelievable and I just wish he'd - I hope he keeps his courage up because the Democrats are having a field day. They're setting the stage for an attempt to impeach.

K: That's one of the filthiest things that I've ever seen.

S: Yeh, it's immoral. It's immoral and I wanted you to know that we call you know 20 of us everyday - and we sense how devious this is, how unfair to a great man, to a great Administration.

K: Do you think Kalmbach will be all right?

S: Well, I'm worried about it but although yesterday Dean started to crack. He finally admitted. You see he had all along said that the money was given for silence; that Herb knew it; he told him. Yesterday under hard examination by Gurney he admitted that maybe silence was never mentioned. Now if silence was mentioned and Herb raised the money for that, that's a felony. If it was not mentioned it was just for bail and for sustenance, that's not a felony.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01298

D#1 NAGADZE 9/20/91

3

K: Yeh.

S: So but Herb did tell me the story - as he related it there was never any silence because I asked him. I said, "Herb was silence or they were to shut up or anything ever mentioned." He said, "They couldn't. Dean couldn't say that to me. I'd have kicked him in the head. That's a felony."

K: And Kalmbach is after all an experienced guy.

S: Yes a very experienced guy. And I think he has a credibility and I think when he gets on this. Also has already said the President, as far as he knew, never knew about this. But this looks like a little man who is trying to glory in the spotlight.

K: That's right.

S: And I'm just saying this so if the President wonders what his friends are thinking, we haven't been convinced of a damn thing except that he is being unfairly attacked.

K: You're great.

S: OK, Henry, I'll talk to you when I get back from Europe.

K: When will that be.

S: I'll be in New York on the 14th and 15th and 16th of July.

K: Give me a call.

S: I'll call you from there.

K: Terrific. And many thanks for everything.

S: OK.

DECEMBER 9, 1958

Authority E.O. 12858

2

K: Yes.

S: It says Pen Nute (sp.?) is going to go to Phnom Penh. Is that in accord with anything you know?

K: That I do know about. That seems unlikely to me.

S: And also it's pointed out that Sihanouk is in Rumania, isn't he?

K: He's on the way back soon I know.

S: I mean wouldn't it be rather unusual for this thing to surface while he's away from the area, or not? I mean people I talk to are reading a lot of sinister things into this thing since Hanoi and the insurgents went over to get this thing out before Sihanouk gets back.

K: I do not know that Pen Nute is going to Phnom Penh and I don't believe that.

S: Well, can you give me any idea where we stand on this thing. I want to write something for Sunday on it.

K: It's essentially what I told you last Monday. We think we have the makings of a negotiation. I don't want to give you all the components but I gave you the basic factors.

S: I gathered from what you said and also what you said in the briefing that these major components are Moscow, Peking and Washington.

K: And Hanoi.

S: And Hanoi. Well, now the other thing is I gathered from coming home on the radio that all the major airports - the four major airports in China have been closed. Do you know anything about that?

K: No, that I haven't heard.

S: I hadn't heard it either and it was on Lowell Thomas.

K: Does that make it true?

S: (Laughs) But anyway you hadn't heard anything about it?

K: No.

S: Maybe they're closing them because they heard you're going to come.

K: They heard I was going to come from you. I mean you people misunderstood

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Dated NARA Doc 6/2/09

what I said. There is no present plan for me to come. The only thing is I can't deny that as categorically as the Chou visit just based on my record. There is no current date fixed.

S: Right, but I was told by someone last night in contact with the Chinese that it was likely to be in early August rather than July. Now do you mean you haven't discussed dates with them at all?

K: We don't have any precise discussions.

S: But would it be fair to assume your trip to Peking would be tied in with this Cambodian thing if you went.

K: Well, it's a topic we have always discussed.

S: How'd the thing with the French go today?

K: How can anyone resist when they meet me - personally agree to anything. No, really George, it went the way they planned. You know I'm getting boring on the subject. What we have to do now is to get an understanding in principle on some details on substance with the French and we had apreliminary very substantive talk.

S: You figure the French are really the whole - I mean if you can get something worked out with the French the rest will just fall in line?

K: Well, the rest seem to agree substantially. But I'm seeing the NATO Council tomorrow?

S: Is the President going to see them as well?

K: Yes.

S: Ok, then just one other thing on this Cambodian thing, Henry. I talked to the Ambassador here and he seemed to be suggesting that you're rapidly reaching a point where the insurgents say that they will negotiate but they won't stand for Lon Nol.

K: Who said that?

S: The Ambassador.

K: Which Ambassador?

S: Cambodian Ambassador here in Washington. That you see it appears that their side, the insurgents or Sihanouk anyway, are saying we are willing to negotiate a coalition government but we won't stand still to have Lon Nol in the thing. Whereas Phnom Penh is saying that we

DELEGATED

Authority E.O.12958
DATE NARAD Date 6/26/87

4

won't have anything to do with Sihanouk. Is that the trend of the negotiation?

K: I can't go into the details.

S: But I mean would that be a fair statement of the positions at the moment? Just simply put.

K: I think that's - that has some of the elements but I really don't want to go into it.

S: In other words, it's a question of trying to neutralize personalities.

K: Right.

S: OK. Good. I hope you're having a good time.

K: I'm having a good time. I Tell you some of your friends are missing you.

S: I would love to have heard the words that flew around.

K: Among your friends?

S: Right.

K: I mean the Hollywood contingent. I'm going to bring them to my press conferences at the White House from now on. You, I've seen you polite one time out of ten, but I've never seen Lisagor polite.

S: You know Peter has his moments.

K: Never with White House officials.

S: You know all you have to do is call him cynical and it sets him back for three days.

K: Actually in all seriousness I admire him. He has great integrity and that sort of cynicism no one can object to and it's never personal.

S: I agree with you. I have tremendous admiration for him because insofar as what the press should stand for - I think he stands for.

K: There's no question. He's sometimes painful but he isn't there to please us. He's never unfair.

S: OK. Good talking to you.

DECEMBER 1988

DECEMBER 1988

MAR 19 1990

TELCONE

Amb. Khan/Mr. Kissinger

6/30/73 1:30 p. m.

HK: How are you?

AK: Fine, how are you?

HK: Okay.

AK: There are two things that I wanted you to look into please.
In connection with the visit of President Bhutto here,
I received a request from President Bhutto day before yesterday
saying that the time provided for the talks between the two
President is only on the day of the arrival for about 1 and 1/2
hour and President Bhutto felt that there would be quite a lot
left over which may not be covered in this and he requested that
some time also be set aside on the next day of the visit.

HK: We'll do our best. I'll have to check with the President but I'm
pretty sure we can do it.

AK: Thank you very much and the other thing was that when the program
was being discussed I had made a request on behalf of my President
for President Nixon to accept a return invitation for dinner, but I
was told that this was not possible, in the meantime I have again
received a reminder if this matter could be reviewed.

HK: I think that's going to be very difficult because if we do it, then he'd
have to do it all the time.

AK: Well could you have a second look at it.

H: Yes.

AK: Then are you expected back here about the 9th?

HK: Yes, I'm back on the 8th, why don't you and I meet on the 9th and
review the whole thing.

AK: I would be very grateful if you could give me time on the 9th

HK: Good let's do that.

AK: And would you kindly look at the setting of additional time for talks
on the next day?

HK: Right, you can count on it.

CLASSIFIED

Authority E012858

Dated: NARAD, 6/2/84