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KISSINGER INTERVIEW

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger interview conducted by Saumu Taniguchi and
Eyuji Nakazono.

Q: I'd like to ask you about your article with President Nixon. Why did you take this very unusual step of jointly writing the article? How serious are the divisions in the Western alliance over the proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles from Europe?

A: President Nixon and I took that decision which we recognize as extremely unusual because we are deeply concerned about the situation. One, because of the potential for divisions in the Western Alliance and secondly because of the substance of what is being negotiated. We thought that it would be more effective if we, who were intimately involved in East-West negotiations and who, moreover, are in favor of agreements with the Soviet Union, indicated our concerns jointly rather than separately.

Q: How do you assess the reaction?

A: It has certainly aroused a lot of attention. We were not trying to stop the agreement, but rather to put it in a framework that chieves western objectives.

From that effort has come one misinterpretation. Many people think that President Nixon and I want to hold up an agreement on Intermediate nuclear Forces [INF] until there is an agreement on conventional forces. That is not our view. Our view is: We are prepared to conclude the INF agreement now, but we think there should be a provision in the agreement requiring that negotiations on conventional forces be started. If there's an agreement on conventional forces within 3 1/2 years, the INF agreement will be carried to its completion. If there is no agreement on conventional forces, the last one-third of the INF withdrawal would be held up until there was such an agreement. But two thirds of the INF withdrawal would take place in either event.

Then of course, we think that the elimination of the hundred missiles in Asia should be made an integral part of the agreement on INF. There is no reason for the Soviets to have 100 warheads in Asia other than to give Japan, China and South Korea a special sense of vulnerability. They have some 19,000 other warheads so they don't need 00 in Asia. Keeping them would not only be a discriminatory step against Japan, China and Korea but also present major verification problems.

As to Afghanistan, we're not saying that should be part of the agreement. We are saying that at a summit it must be made part of the agenda.

Q: This proposal seem to require something more than limited agreement on INF.

A: All they have to do now is agree to the principle of conventional balance and start negotiating it immediately. Then they would have more than three years to come to a conclusion about it.

Q: And what was the initial reaction coming from the White House?

A: They have said publicly that they want to pursue the present strategy, but my impression is that they'll try to achieve our objective in the 100 warheads in Asia.

Q: General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev reportedly told Secretary of State George P. Schultz during their Moscow meeting that he'd like to reach agreement in the coming U.S.-Soviet summit on nuclear tests, peace weapons and strategic nuclear forces. Isn't that a repeat of what

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PAGE 2

that happened at the Reykjavik summit.

A: That's correct. They are now trying to sell us the Reykjavik summit at retail. At Reykjavik they tried to sell it wholesale and now they're selling it retail.

Q: Now should the United States react to this kind of proposal?

A: It would be very dangerous for the United States and for the industrial democracies to establish the principle that the desirable objective in these negotiations is to eliminate all nuclear weapons, category by category. First of all that objective is not achievable because you have the French, British, Indian, Chinese and Israeli nuclear programs and you would always have to account for those. Secondly, because in a territory as large as the Soviet Union some nuclear weapons can always be hidden, so we have to make allowances for that. Finally, you cannot eliminate knowledge from the minds of scientists, so the objective of zero is not achievable. There is some power limit that can be achieved, but in reaching it we have to be careful that we do not create a situation in which we demoralize all our allies.

Q: Yomiuri Shimbun recently interviewed with Mr. Zagladin, first deputy head of the international department of the Communist Party and in this interview he said that new Soviet proposals incorporate many points contained in earlier U.S. proposals.

A: Zagladin is correct. They have accepted many of our proposals but the point is that we should never have made those proposals. Many were made by governments in different circumstances and at times when the United States thought they would never be accepted. We do not have the luxury blaming the Soviets for our predicament. We put ourselves into it.

As to the short-range weapons, the Soviet Union can attack Europe from Soviet territory and if it doesn't use SS-20s it can use CBMs and long-range airplanes and medium-range airplanes and submarine-based missiles. So the danger to Europe is in no significant way reduced by these 1,300 missiles or warheads that an INF agreement could eliminate.

On the other hand if the United States withdraws its missiles to America, they are then in a different country an ocean away from Europe. For the Soviet Union a decision on using nuclear weapons against Europe or Japan is a national decision. For us, the defense of Europe and Japan is an allied decision and it can never be the same as decision made by one nation. Another problem is that the only nuclear saps that America would have left in Europe would be those that can reach only as far as German territory and you cannot expect an ally to free to a strategy in which it is designated as the only nuclear battlefield.

Q: That explains the concern expressed by West Germans?

A: You have only to ask yourself why those in Germany who in recent years have opposed every effort to strengthen NATO are supporting this proposal and those in Germany who have been friends of NATO for 40 years are worried about this policy. That in itself is a phenomenon that concerns me.

Q: How do you see the reactions of different western politicians and leaders?

A: All of them have a terrible problem, that they all have elections of one kind or another. They've all been put into the position where the

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United States has indicated that it considers the withdrawal of its missiles desirable and they have to ask us to keep them there when parts of the population rioted against their being put there in the first place.

So if you know Europe you must sense their great uneasiness. The act that they cannot express their uneasiness for domestic political reasons makes it even worse.

Q: What about the French position?

A: France also has elections next year. I think that Prime Minister Jacques Chirac is concerned, the government is concerned and the president is aloof because he enjoys the spectacle of a conservative French government being not in complete agreement with a conservative American administration. So I find a consensus in their concerns but I don't expect Europe to take a very strongly negative position. I expect this agreement to go through. But President Nixon and I thought it was important that some Americans understood the nature of the situation.

Q: What of the way support and opposition lines up in your own country?

A: In America you have people of the left and the right supporting the Administration negotiating position. The semi-radicals of the left and the isolationists of the right. There are many who support the position who really don't want any nuclear weapons in Europe. That's the traditional American policy.

Q: We think that U.S.-Japan relations are facing a crucial period. What steps should be taken by both nations to ease the current high tensions, especially over trade?

Kissinger: I start from the premise that it is imperative that the tensions be eased and that the United States and Japan work closely together. Neither country has an alternative and conflict between our two countries would be a disaster for both.

I've been convinced for a long time that the case-by-case approach is not working. We cannot go from computer chips to [a construction contract for] the Osaka Airport to whatever other issue there may be at any one moment. We must come to some comprehensive agreement. We should try to agree on a global deficit we are willing to accept and then we could make joint efforts to achieve it. Then we would not be asking the Japanese government to restrict automobile exports or something else we would study it, agree on some global deficit -- the trade can never be in balance -- and then coordinate policies so we do not have the constant pressures of constant negotiations. Secondly, we might agree to some global goals we share in the field of development. But we have to get off this constant discussion, this moving from crisis to crisis. It is an impossible situation for both governments.

For example, it was terrible for Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone to come over here in an absolutely no-win situation. We could not lift the sanctions for his domestic reasons. He needed us to lift the sanctions on the other sides could be right for all I know -- and it is not a dignified position for either government to be in.

Q: In an article on U.S. security interests in Asia, you touched on the famous 1% of the gross national product that Japan devotes to defense. You predicted that Japan would emerge as a major military power in the not-too-distant future and you wrote that the decision of

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Japan to breach its limit of 1% of the GNP on its defense expenditure would cause alarm among Japan's neighbors. You also said that such an increase was unnecessary to maintain global equilibrium. Could you elaborate further?

A: There are a number of separate problems here. First on the point of alarm among Japanese neighbors. That is a fact and the Chinese have expressed alarm. And Japan has expressed alarm. I simply stated a fact. That is not the point I was trying to make. It is that this was essentially a decision that Japan has to make for its own reasons. The United States should not press Japan one way or the other because this is a Japanese national decision. It is not a decision that we should take for our own reasons, especially not for economic reasons. I pointed out that many people in this country want Japan to rearm in order to reduce our trade deficit. That's ridiculous. Now in terms of the global equilibrium, I do not think it is imperative for Japan to rearm. In terms of the regional position it is a decision for Japan to make.

In my view Japan will emerge as an increasingly significant military power. That will happen even if it sticks to the 1% limit because the Japanese GNP is rising and Japanese technology is improving constantly. That is already maybe the best in the world -- so that 1% will become a larger and larger sum. Secondly, with a country with the traditions of Japan, I simply look at history. It is likely to want to play a larger role in its own self-defense. The major point of my article was addressed to Americans, not to Japanese. I was telling Americans not to press Japan beyond a point that Japan might reach on its own thinking.

Q: There is talk in Congress of proposing that Japan's defense spending increase at its economic growth rate plus 1 percent. That would mean a rate of 4 percent to 5 percent and that would really produce problems in Asia. It would also probably produce problems in Japan. It is that sort of argument that I was dealing with.

A: That's crazy. That would mean a rate of 4 percent to 5 percent and that would really produce problems in Asia. It would also probably produce problems in Japan. It is that sort of argument that I was dealing with.

Q: In the same article you also wrote that Japan could make a more significant contribution to global peace by increasing aid to developing nations than with a larger military program. Could you elaborate on this point, too?

A: Again, the proposal was aimed at the general proposition that exists in this country that Japan is economically so powerful because it is not spending enough on defense and that therefore the United States should put pressure on Japan to increase defense spending. I am trying to discourage that proposition by urging that if we bring pressure on Japan to increase its national expenditures it should be in the direction of global economic development.

Q: What kind of aid do you have in mind.

A: I would start with helping the third world with its debt problem. Don't have a complete proposal, but I think it cannot go on that every year there is a crisis with one country that is fixed temporarily and the next year there's a crisis with another country and that the crises always get resolved by the country's borrowing more money and thereby increasing its total debt burden. It is in the long term unwise for you to take any action that comes back to them right away in the form of interest payments.

A way has to be found to stimulate the economies of these countries. That also would ease some of the economic pressure on Japan because if

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We could export more to those countries, our total trade deficit couldn't be so large. Japan's recent new lending program will be very constructive and make a significant contribution if it is part of a global program, if it isn't tied to buying only in Japan and if it becomes part of a general effort to increase the economic growth of these countries.

Q: How do you view the recent turmoil in China where it appears that anti-Western sentiments may once again be gaining an upper hand?

A: Also anti-Japanese.

Q: That's right. How should the United States and Japan respond and should they respond separately?

A: They should respond together. But either separately or together, each of us has to have patience and understanding. To develop a country of a billion people with such a complex history as China is very difficult. After all China has never wanted to be like other nations, to the process of modernization creates two problems within one. It superficially looks to them as if they become less Chinese and have to give up some Communist ideas and that obviously creates some political uncertainty. The Chinese have decided that they cannot tolerate political turmoil and economic change together, so they're trying to keep the political situation calm while they go through economic reform. To what extent this is possible I cannot judge, but I don't think we should be impatient with the wait and I have every confidence that the leadership is genuinely dedicated to economic reform and modernization.

Q: Maybe you are up to here with this question, but what's your valuation of the so-called policy of (ital) glasnost? (unital)

A: Mr. Gorbachev is extremely intelligent and more flexible than previous Soviet leaders, and their tactics. I think the purpose of glasnost is to improve the efficiency of the Soviet economy and thereby liberate some creative energies. As far as the industrial democracies are concerned, they have to judge it by the foreign policy and not only by the domestic policy and in that respect we have to encourage equitable proposals. What bothers me about Gorbachev's foreign policy is that almost every proposal he makes has the objective result of destabilizing the western position.

Q: Then you can't find glasnost in his foreign policy?

A: I will give him this much credit. It is true he has accepted many of our proposals and it is not his fault that those proposals are not the best we could have offered. The industrial democracies must be more creative in our approach to Gorbachev. But so far I've seen no conclusive proof of glasnost in foreign policy to the extent that it appears in in domestic policy.

Q: Foreigners are amazed at the rapid development of events surrounding Gary Hart. You know the U.S. presidency well. What qualities are most important for a President in this country?

A: Character and courage are most important. I say this in general, but in relation to Gary Hart. Character and courage. You should, of course, require a minimum of intelligence but you can always hire intelligent people. You cannot hire character, nor can you hire courage. You need both of these qualities because when you're President, it's really difficult decisions could almost always go either way. That's why they come to you as President, because the easy decisions are all made at the lower level.

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[L.C.]

CAUTION: This material is strictly embargoed. Its use is authorized
only by subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column. With the exception
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ay published, in whole or in part. Precautions should be taken to
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## ENRY KISSINGER INTERVIEW

For release Sunday, May 17, 1987

(c) 1987, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

This interview with Henry A. Kissinger was conducted by senior
ditor Sumu Taniguchi and New York bureau chief Ryuji Nakazono of
omiuri.

Q: I'd like to ask you about your article with President Nixon. Why
id you take this very unusual step of jointly writing the article? How
erious are the divisions in the Western alliance over the proposal to
liminate medium-range missiles from Europe?

A: President Nixon and I took that decision which we both
ecognize was extremely unusual because we are deeply concerned about
the situation. First, because of the potential for divisions in the
eastern Alliance and, second, because of the substance of what is being
egotiated. We thought that it would be more effective if we, who were
ntimately involved in East-West negotiations and who, moreover, are in
avor of agreements with the Soviet Union, indicated our concerns
ointly rather than separately.

From that effort has come one misinterpretation. Many people think
that President Nixon and I want to hold up an agreement on intermediate
nuclear forces (INF) until there is an agreement on conventional
forces. That is not our view. Our view is: We are prepared to conclude
the INF agreement now, but we think there should be a provision in the
greement requiring that negotiations on conventional forces be
tarted. If there's an agreement on conventional forces within 3 1/2
ears, the INF agreement will be carried to its completion. If there is
o agreement on conventional forces, the last one-third of the INF
ithdrawal would be held up until there was such an agreement. But
wo-thirds of the INF withdrawal would take place in either event.

Then, of course, we think that the elimination of the hundred
issiles in Asia should be made an integral part of the agreement on
NF. There is no reason for the Soviets to have 100 warheads in Asia
ther than to give Japan, China and South Korea a special sense of
ulnerability. They have some 19,000 other warheads so they don't need
00 in Asia. Keeping them would not only be a discriminatory step
gainst Japan, China and Korea but also present major verification
roblems.

As to Afghanistan, we're not saying that should be part of the
greement. We are saying that at a summit it must be made part of the
genda.

Q: This proposal seems to require something more than limited

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Agreement on INF.

A: They have said publicly that they want to pursue the present strategy, but my impression is that they'll try to achieve the objective of the 100 warheads in Asia.

Q: General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev reportedly told Secretary State George P. Shultz during their Moscow meeting that he'd like to reach agreement in the coming U.S.-Soviet summit on nuclear tests, space weapons and strategic nuclear forces. Isn't that a repeat of what happened at the Reykjavik summit?

A: That's correct. They are now trying to sell us the Reykjavik formula at retail. At Reykjavik they tried to sell it wholesale and now they're selling it retail.

Q: How should the United States react to this kind of proposal?

A: It would be very dangerous for the United States and for the industrial democracies to establish the principle that the desirable objective in these negotiations is to eliminate all nuclear weapons, or at least to put an end to the category by category. First of all, that objective is not achievable because you have the French, British, Indian, Chinese and Israeli nuclear programs and you would always have to account for those. Second, because in a territory as large as the Soviet Union some nuclear weapons can always be hidden, so we would have to make allowances for that. Finally, you cannot eliminate knowledge from the minds of scientists, so the objective of zero is not achievable. There are some lower limits that can be achieved, but in reaching it we have to be careful that we do not create a situation in which we demoralize all our allies.

Q: Yomiuri Shimbun recently interviewed Vadim Zagladin, first deputy head of the international department of the Communist Party, and in this interview he said that new Soviet proposals incorporate many points contained in earlier U.S. proposals.

A: Zagladin is correct. They have accepted many of our proposals, but the point is that we should never have made those proposals. Many were made by governments in different circumstances and at times when the United States thought they would never be accepted. We do not have the luxury of blaming the Soviets for our predicament. We put ourselves to it.

As to the short-range weapons, the Soviet Union can attack Europe from Soviet territory and if it doesn't use SS-20s it can use ICBMs and long-range and medium-range airplanes and submarine-based missiles. So the danger to Europe is in no significant degree.