5-5-5

FROST: LATER ON, NIXON SAID 40,000.

KISSINGER: IT WAS...I DON'T KNOW WHEN NIXON SAID 40,000.

FROST: DECEMBER 10, 1970, HE SAID 40,000.

KISSINGER: WELL, OUR ESTIMATE WAS AROUND A HUNDRED THOUSAND, SOMETHING LIKE FOUR DIVISIONS...IT FLUCTUATED BECAUSE THEY WERE COMING BACK AND FORTH...

FROST: YES. LET ME SAY...I DON'T DEFEND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE VIOLATION OF CAMBIDIAN NEUTRALITY FOR FOUR YEARS. I DO THINK THAT TWO WRONGS DON'T MAKE A RIGHT AND THAT...ANALYSIS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN THAT IT WASN'T WORTH RISKING DESTROYING CAMBODIA TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE...

KISSINGER: YES, BUT FIRST OF ALL, IF YOU'LL LET ME ANSWER THE QUESTION AND THEN MAKE YOUR CASE, I THINK, WOULD BE BETTER. WE HAVE 40,000...WHETHER IT'S 40,000 OR A HUNDRED THOUSAND, IT'S VERY HARD TO DETERMINE BECAUSE THE SANCTUARY AREAS WERE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER AND THE TROOPS WERE MOVING BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THEM. SECONDLY, WE WERE BEGINNING TO WITHDRAW TROOPS WHICH THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT DONE. THIRD, THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION WAS BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM WHICH WE WERE NOT DOING DUR TO THE BOMBING HALT THAT HAD BEEN AGREED UPON. SO, WE FACED A TOTALLY NEW STRATEGIC PROBLEM. WITHIN THREE WEEKS OF COMING INTO OFFICE, THERE WAS A NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE, DESPITE THE BOMBING HALT, WHICH KILLED UP TO

6-6-6

FIVE HUNDRED AMERICANS A WEEK FOR FOUR WEEKS
BEFORE THERE WAS ANY REACTION BY THE UNITED
STATES. I CANNOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT
TWO WRONGS DO NOT MAKE A RIGHT WHEN THERE IS...
WHEN THERE ARE BASE AREAS, ESTABLISHED BY THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE, FROM WHICH ALL NORTH...FROM
WHICH ALL CAMBODIAN AUTHORITY HAD BEEN EXPELLED,
IN WHICH THE RULER OF CAMBODIA HAD ANNOUNCED
THAT HE NO LONGER KNEW WHAT WAS, WHAT WAS GOING
ON AND IN WHICH, IN SELF-DEFENSE, WE WERE
ATTEMPTING TO LIMIT THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE
OFFENSIVE WHICH WAS LAUNCHED AGAINST US IN AN
UNPROVOKED MANNER.

FROST: RIGHT. NOW, WELL, THERE'S THREE THINGS THAT...
ONE, YOU SAY IN YOUR BOOK THAT THIS WAS A
STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
ASSAULT AND...

KISSINGER: THAT'S RIGHT...

FROST: ...THAT YOU CONSIDERED BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM
AND NOT EMBROILING CAMBODIA. AND...

KISSINGER: BUT CAMBODIA WAS EMBROILED...IT IS AN ABSURDITY
TO SAY THAT A COUNTRY CAN OCCUPY A PART OF
ANOTHER COUNTRY, KILL YOUR PEOPLE AND THAT THEN
YOU ARE VIOLATING ITS NEUTRALITY WHEN YOU
RESPOND AGAINST THE FOREIGN TROOPS THAT ARE
ON THAT NEUTRAL TERRITORY. IT IS TOTAL HYPOCRACY..

FROST: I'VE ALREADY NOT MADE THAT POINT...DON'T GIVE
ME POINTS THAT I'M NOT MAKING. THE POINT IS

7-7-7

THAT, IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, SIHANOUK,...
TWO THINGS YOU SAID...CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES
WERE NO LONGER ACTIVE IN THIS AREA, HOWEVER,
YOU KNEW, PRESUMABLY FROM ALL THESE VOLUMINOUS
REPORTS FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THAT
INNOCENT CAMBODIAN PEASANTS WERE STILL IN
THESE AREAS. IN ONE CASE, MORE THAN A
THOUSAND, IN ONE CASE, A NUMBER MORE THAN
THAT, THAT THEY COULD...

KISSINGER:
NOW JUST A MINUTE...YOU ARE QUOTING A SOURCE THAT HAS HAD A VERY SELECTIVE LIST OF DOCUMENTATION. THE WHITE HOUSE CAN OPERATE ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE REPORT IT RECEIVES FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. IT CANNOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REPORT THAT SUBORDINATES SEND TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. THE REPORTS WE RECEIVED FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY BOTH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, WERE THAT THERE WERE NO CAMBODIANS LIVING IN THE TARGET AREAS. WHAT SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS MAY HAVE REPORTED TO OTHER SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS...

FROST: SO, WELL, YOU MEAN THAT..

KISSINGER: ...IS NOT IMPORTANT.

FROST: WELL, THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT BECAUSE THIS IS NEWS...YOU ASKED THE QUESTION: ARE THERE ANY CAMBODIAN PEASANTS AT ALL IN THIS AREA AND

8-8-8

YOU RECEIVED THE REPLY...

KISSINGER: NO...

FROST: ...THAT THESE REPORTS FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WERE RUBBISH.

KISSINGER: WE DIDN'T RECEIVE ANY REPORTS FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF THAT SAID THAT THERE WERE CIVILIANS LIVING IN THESE AREAS.

*FROST:*

BUT...SO, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SENT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SERIAL NUMBER JCM 207/69, A THING IN WHICH HE SPECIFICALLY SAID TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE... IT WASN'T SOME JUNIOR IN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF...SAID TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 198, 770 AND ALL OF THIS, THAT, DON'T LET'S BOMB 704 BECAUSE THERE ARE SO MANY CAMBODIANS.

KISSINGER: WELL, THEN, WE PROBABLY DIDN'T BOMB 704.

FROST: YES WE DID, WE BOMBED 704, IT BECAME SUPPER. AND 6,780 TONS WERE DROPPED ON IT. AND THAT WAS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE...IT WASN'T SOME TRIVIAL THING...WE KNEW WE WERE KILLING CAMBODIAN PEASANTS.

KISSINGER: THAT IS SIMPLY NOT CORRECT. AND YOU ARE SIMPLY REPEATING TENDENTIOUS...

FROST: WELL, IF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE...

KISSINGER: THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS...EVERY RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WAS RECEIVED IN THE WHITE HOUSE FROM EITHER THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OR FROM THE SECRETARY OF

*see attached William Shawcross letter.*

9-9-9

DEFENSE, INDICATED THAT THERE WAS NO DANGER
OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. THAT WAS A CRITERION
FOR TARGET SELECTION. SECONDLY, SIHANOUK
PUBLICLY STATES, WHEN HE WAS ASKED ABOUT
B-52 BOMBING IN THE SANCTUARY AREAS, WHICH WERE
FIVE MILES FROM THE FRONTIER...WE ARE NOT
TALKING HERE ABOUT BOMBING ALL OVER CAMBODIA...

FROST:

ABSOLUTELY...AT THIS POINT...ABSOLUTELY RIGHT...

KISSINGER:

WAIT A MINUTE. SIHANOUK PUBLICLY STATED THAT
NO CAMBODIANS WERE BEING KILLED, THAT IF THERE
WERE ANY CAMBODIAN CASUALTIES, IF THERE WERE
ONE CAMBODIAN BUFFALO INJURED, HE WOULD PROTEST.
BUT HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON IN
TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
IN WHICH THERE ARE NO CAMBODIANS LIVING, AND
IN WHICH THERE WERE NO CAMBODIAN CASUALTIES.
HE SAID THAT PUBLICLY.

FROST:

HE SAID THAT PUBLICLY AND HE SAID IT PUBLICLY
IN MAY, 1969. AND YOU QUOTE IT IN YOUR BOOK.
BUT ON MARCH THE 28TH, 1969, HE CALLED A
SPECIAL PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH YOU DON'T QUOTE
IN YOUR BOOK, TO COMMENT ON A U.P.I. REPORT
FROM SAIGON THAT ABRAMS HAD REQUESTED B-52
STRIKES IN CAMBODIA AND SIHANOUK LET IT BE
KNOWN THAT HE WOULD NOT OPPOSE THEM. THAT
THAT WAS THE RUMOR. THIS IS ONE OF THE EARLIEST
LEAKS ON THE BOMBING AND SIHANOUK SAID, AND I'M
NOT SUGGESTING HERE THAT SIHANOUK IS ANYBODY'S

10-10-10

WITNESS...I'M JUST SUGGESTING THAT HE'S NOT
YOURS...IN THE WAY YOU'RE PORTRAYING. HE SAID
QUOTE: NOBODY, NO CHIEF OF STATE IN THE WORLD,
PLACED IN THE SAME SITUATION AS I AM, WOULD
AGREE TO LET FOREIGN AIRCRAFT BOMB HIS OWN
COUNTRY. THEY'VE NEVER DARED TO SAY I WOULD
AUTHORIZE SUCH BOMBINGS BUT THEY HAVE SAID
I WOULDN'T OPPOSE THEM. WELL, I WILL OPPOSE
IT FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THEY'VE NEVER BEEN
ABLE TO KILL A SINGLE SOMMUNIST. THEY'VE ONLY
KILLED ORDINARY PEASANTS, MALE AND FEMALE.

I DON'T WANT TO RUN THE RISK, BECAUSE OF THEIR
BOMBING OF THE COMMUNISTS, OF SEEING THE
ESCALATION OF THE WAR EXTEND TO CAMBODIA.

THAT IS, I WILL, IN ALL CASES, OPPOSE ALL
BOMBINGS ON CAMBODIAN TERRITORY UNDER WHATEVER
PRETEXT. THE REAL INTENTION OF THE AMERICANS
IS TO WREAK DEATH EVERY DAY AMONG THE KHMER
PEOPLE SO AS TO GET THE LATTER TO THINK THAT
BECAUSE OF ME THERE CAN NEVER BE PEACE WITH
THE AMERICANS. THUS I WILL BE OBLIGED TO...
(THIS IS INCREDIBLY FARSIGHTED)...THUS I WILL
BE OBLIGED TO RESIGN, TO GIVE ROOM TO A MORE
RIGHTEST AND PRO-WESTERN AND MORE PRO-U.S.

REGIME. TWO THINGS WILL HAPPEN. FIRST, THE
SUFFERINGS SUSTAINED BY THE PEASANTS AND THE
INABILITY OF MY GOVERNMENT, OR SO THEY FEEL,
TO STOP THE U.S. BOMBINGS, AND SECONDLY THE
FRIGHT OF THE CITIZENS WHO POSSESS VILLAS,

11-11-11

THESE PEOPLE WILL BECOME FRIGHTENED. THAT WILL BE THE MOMENT THE TWO CONDITIONS, THE SUFFERINGS OF THE PEOPLE AND PEASANTS AND THE FRIGHT OF THE RICH WILL BE FULFILLED TO FORCE THE RIPE (NOT CLEAR) FRUIT FROM THE CAMBODIAN TREE. THAT IS THE WAY THINGS WILL GO, ACCORDING TO THE AMERICAN WISH, FOR THE AMERICANS KNOW VERY WELL THAT WILL NOT BE SO AS LONG AS I EXIST. I WILL DEFEND MYSELF WITH ALL MY MEANS, I WILL ALWAYS STAND NEUTRAL. THE AMERICANS WANT CAMBODIA TO BECOME ANOTHER SAIGON. (UNQUOTE) I'M NOT SUGGESTING THAT SIHANOUK WAS THE WORLD'S MOST CONSISTANT MAN, BUT I SUGGEST THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE QUOTED THAT PRESS CONFERENCE AS WELL AS THE MAY ONE.

KISSINGER:

THE FACT IS THAT THE MAY PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWED THIS PRESS CONFERENCE. THE FACT IS THAT AFTER THE MAY PRESS CONFERENCE, SIHANOUK REESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, HE INVITED PRESIDENT NIXON TO PHNOM PENH, THAT FOR THE WHOLE PERIOD WE WERE PREPARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE BOMBING, TO PAY DAMAGES IF SIHANOUK HAD PROTESTED. WE WANTED TO GIVE HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFINE THE NATURE OF THE PRESSURE THAT COULD BE PUT ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. OUR PROBLEM WAS THAT HUNDREDS OF AMERICANS WERE BEING KILLED PARTLY ON THESE BASES...

(lc)

12-12-12

FROST: ...FROM THESE BASES AND THAT WAS TERRIBLE...

KISSINGER: ...PARTLY FROM THESE BASIS, THAT SIHANOUK DID NOT PROTEST, THAT, THAT THE PRESS CONFERENCE THAT I QUOTED WAS AFTER THE BOMBING HAD TAKEN PLACE, AND...

FROST: SO WAS THIS...MARCH 28TH...

KISSINGER: THIS WAS AFTER ONE HAD TAKEN PLACE. AND...

FROST: BUT IN MAY...

KISSINGER: FRANKLY, I WASN'T AWARE OF THIS PRESS CONFERENCE, TO BE FRANK.

FROST: WELL, YOU COULDN'T HAVE QUOTED THAT THEN... BUT IN MAY VERY LITTLE BOMBING HAD TAKEN PLACE. THE BOMBING STEPPED UP AFTER THAT. IN MAY HE COULD BE CONFIDENT ABOUT THE BOMBING. YOU YOURSELF, IN YOUR LETTER TO "THE ECONOMIST" SAY THAT IT STEPPED UP LATER AND, I MEAN, AS YOU I'M SURE, KNOW...

KISSINGER: YES, BUT HE HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PROTEST.

FROST: CERTAINLY, BUT I MEAN THEY DID PROTEST...

KISSINGER: THEY DID NOT PROTEST...

FROST: ON THE 20TH OF NOVEMBER, '69, WHEELER SAYS WE'VE HAD A COMPLAINT FROM CAMBODIA ABOUT ELEVEN VILLAGERS KILLED IN A B-52 RAID. OKAY, HE DIDN'T DO A FORMAL PROTEST AND SIT ON THE STEPS OF THE WHITE HOUSE, BUT THEN...NOBODY SUGGESTS THAT...

KISSINGER: HE DIDN'T HAVE TO MAKE...HE DIDN'T HAVE TO SIT ON THE STEPS OF THE WHITE HOUSE. HE COULD HAVE

13-13-13

MADE A DIPLOMATIC...

FROST:
IT WAS AN INGLORIOUS COMPROMISE... NEUTRALITY
IS AN INGLORIOUS COMPROMISE... WE KNOW THAT...

KISSINGER:
NEUTRALITY WOULD HAVE BEEN GLADLY WELCOMED.
WHEN YOU HAVE A LARGE NUMBER OF ENEMY FORCES
ON YOUR TERRITORY, WHEN WE PICKED UP, DURING
THE INCURSIONS, TENS OF THOUSANDS OF TONS OF
SUPPLIES, THAT WERE ON THEIR TERRITORY, THEN
YOU'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT NEUTRALITY. YOU'RE
TALKING ABOUT THE INVASION OF THE NEUTRAL
COUNTRY BY THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE. THAT IS WHAT HAD HAPPENED FOR
FOUR YEARS PRIOR TO ANY AMERICAN REACTION.

FROST:
BUT ON A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS WE HAD LIVED
WITH THAT BECAUSE WE DIDN'T WANT TO DESTROY...

KISSINGER:
WE HAD LIVED WITH IT AT A TIME...

FROST:
A COUNTRY...

KISSINGER:
WE WEREN'T DESTROYING A COUNTRY WHEN WE
WERE...

FROST:
WE STARTED TO DESTROY A COUNTRY...

KISSINGER:
WE DID NOT START TO DESTROY A COUNTRY...

FROST:
FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW...

KISSINGER:
WE DID NOT START TO DESTROY A COUNTRY FROM
ANY...

FROST:
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE THERE FOR FOUR YEARS
BEFORE... I AGREE.

KISSINGER:
WE DID NOT START TO DESTROY A COUNTRY FROM
ANYBODY'S POINT OF VIEW WHEN WE WERE BOMBING
SEVEN ISOLATED NORTH VIETNAMESE BASE AREAS

14-14-14

WITHIN SOME FIVE MILES OF THE VIETNAMESE BORDER, FROM WHICH ATTACKS WERE BEING LAUNCHED INTO SOUTH VIETNAM.

FROST:

WELL, YOU QUOTE, YOUR PRESS CONFERENCES LATER... AND YOU QUOTE YOUR MEETING OF...THIS APRIL WITH SIHANOUK, ALSO IN YOUR BOOK AND, BUT, AND THEREFORE, ONE WANTED TO KNOW THE LATEST NEWS FROM SIHANOUK, SO WE GOT IN TOUCH WITH HIM LAST WEEK IN PYONYANG AND HE SAID THE AMERICAN BOMBING AND INVASION ARE NOW BOTH RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EXPANSION OF VIETNAMESE AND KHMER COMMUNISM IN CAMBODIA. DIRECT VERBATIM QUOTE FROM TELEX. SO THAT I MEAN, THAT'S THE LATEST QUOTE AND HE SAYS THAT. NOW, I'M NOT SAYING THAT HE IS UNFALLIBLE. BUT, I MEAN THAT'S WHAT HE SAYS.

KISSINGER:

THAT MAY BE...THAT IS NOT WHAT HE WAS SAYING AT THE TIME...THAT IS NOT THE PROBLEM AS IT PRESENTED ITSELF AT THE TIME. HE NOW HAS THE PROBLEM OF TRYING TO GET BACK INTO POWER, IF AT ALL, WITH THE TOLERATION OF HANOI, SO IT IS OBVIOUS THAT HE WILL NOT MAKE STATEMENTS TODAY THAT WOULD BE HIGHLY CRITICAL OF HANOI.

THE HISTORICAL FACT IS THAT HANOI INVADED CAMBODIA YEARS BEFORE THERE WAS ANY AMERICAN REACTION. THAT WE INHERITED A WAR THAT WE ATTEMPTED TO END ON HONORABLE TERMS, THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE STARTED AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST US WITHIN THREE WEEKS OF OUR COMING INTO

15-15-15

OFFICE. THAT THESE BASE AREAS WERE AN
IMPORTANT PART IN THAT, AND THAT THE BASIC
CAUSE FOR THE PROBLEM IN CAMBODIA WAS THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE INVASION, AND IT IS AN
ABSURDITY...

FROST: BUT IT WASN'T AN INVASION...

KISSINGER: WELL, WHAT WOULD YOU CALL IT?

FROST: I MEAN, AN UNWELCOME PRESENCE...IT WASN'T A
SUDDEN INVASION.

KISSINGER: WELL, I...

FROST: THE INVASION WAS OUR IN '70. BUT IT WAS AN
UNWELCOME PRESENCE.

KISSINGER: NOW, JUST A MINUTE...

FROST: IT WAS NOT A SUDDEN, A SUDDEN INVASION. YOU'RE
MAKING IT SOUND AS THOUGH IT WERE SUDDEN. IT
HAD BEEN THERE FOR FOUR YEARS AND, ROTTEN AS IT
WAS, WE HAD LIVED WITH IT.

KISSINGER: WE LIVED WITH IT UNDER CONDITIONS, WHEN WE
WERE BUILDING UP OUR FORCES. WHEN WE WERE
BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM. OUR PROBLEM WAS THAT
WE WERE WITHDRAWING FORCES, THAT WE WERE NO
LONGER BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM AND NEVERTHELESS
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE LAUNCHING MASSIVE
ATTACKS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AT A TIME WHEN WE COULD
NOT HAVE FORMULATED A POLICY YET, BECAUSE WE
WERE TOTALLY, BECAUSE WE WERE TOTALLY NEW IN
OFFICE. IF YOU, OF COURSE, DEFINE WHAT THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE DO AS AN UNWELCOME PRESENCE
WHILE IF WHAT WE DO IN RESPONSE IS AN INVASION,

16-16-16

THEN YOU ARE JUST COOKING YOUR QUESTIONS IN
SUCH A WAY THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ANSWER...

FROST:

...THAT IS NOT COOKING QUESTIONS AND I'M
NOT DOMESTIC ENOUGH TO DO COOKING. IT IS NOT
COOKING QUESTIONS TO SAY THAT PEOPLE HAVE BEEN
AROUND FOR FOUR YEARS AND TO CALL THAT A
SUDDEN...IMPLY THAT THAT'S A SUDDEN INVASION...
YOU DID THE COOKING, NOT ME.

KISSINGER:

IT MUST HAVE BEEN A SUDDEN...WHENEVER IT
STARTED...IT WAS...

FROST:

AND YOU WERE SAYING YOU WERE RESPONDING TO AN
INVASION. YOU WERE NOT RESPONDING TO AN
INVASION.THEY HAD BEEN THERE FOR FOUR YEARS.

KISSINGER:

OF COURSE THEY HAD. THEY HAD BEEN THERE FOR
FOUR YEARS UNDER THE CONDITIONS THAT I HAVE
DESCRIBED. OF COURSE THE RESPONSE THEN WOULD
HAVE A STARTING POINT AND THAT STARTING POINT
YOU CAN CALL SUDDEN...

FROST:

BUT I MEAN THE STARTING...THE STARTING POINT
YOU CALL SUDDEN AND IMPLIED IT WAS WHAT YOU
RESPONDED TO, WHEREAS IN THE BOOK YOU SAY YOU
WERE RESPONDING TO AN OVERALL MILITARY THREAT.
BUT THE INCIDENT OF THE...

KISSINGER:

OF COURSE WE WERE RESPONDING TO AN OVERALL
MILITARY THREAT IN WHICH THESE BASE AREAS
WERE AN INTEGRAL PART.

FROST:

AND YOU CHOSE THE SANCTUARIES RATHER THAN...
THAT YOU WERE RESPONDING TO A MILITARY THREAT
SOLELY FROM THE SANCTUARIES, BUT THE TARGET...

17-17-17

THERE'S TWO TARGETS. THE SECRECY OF THE BOMBING, BUT THE OTHER THING IS THAT IT STARTED THE PROCESS OF DESTABILIZING, YET FURTHER, CAMBODIA. IT DID PUSH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DEEPER INTO CAMBODIA. YOU SAY, IN YOUR BOOK, YOU DON'T THINK IT DID, YOU THINK THAT IF THEY MOVED ANYWHERE, THEY MOVED INTO SOUTH VIETNAM. BUT IF WE WERE ATTACKING THE SANCTUARIES... BECAUSE THIS WAS WHERE PEOPLE WERE HIDING, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE...

KISSINGER: NO, THEY WERE NOT...

FROST: HIDING FROM OUR TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

IT'S INSANE TO SAY: WHOOPEE, HERE'S A CHANCE TO GET INTO GREATER DANGER. I MEAN, THE LOGIC OF THE THING IS THAT THEY WOULD MOVE THE OTHER WAY.

KISSINGER: BUT IT IS NOT AT ALL INSANE. THEY HAD THEIR SUPPLY DEPOTS IN THE CAMBODIAN AREA. IT WASN'T JUST THAT THEY WERE HIDING THERE, THEIR SUPPLIES WERE THERE. THEIR SUPPLIES WERE AIMED AT SOUTH VIETNAM. IT IS ALSO...

IT DOESN'T MAKE MUCH SENSE TO SAY THEY WERE GOING TO MOVE THEIR SUPPLIES FURTHER AWAY FROM WHERE THEY WERE GOING TO USE IT. AFTER ALL, THEY ALSO HAD SUPPLY DEPOTS INSIDE SOUTH VIETNAM. I HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY MOVED THEM ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

18-18-18

FROST:
I THINK THE IMPLICATION OF YOUR BOOK, OR
THE IMPLICATION...

KISSINGER:
I SAID, IF THEY MOVE THEM, IT IS MORE LIKELY
THAT THEY MOVED THEM INTO SOUTH VIETNAM.

FROST:
WELL, AS YOU KNOW, GENERAL ABRAMS' SWORN
TESTIMONY TO THE SENATE IN '73, HE CONFIRMED
THAT THEY BOMBING QUOTE: MADE IT ALMOST
INEVITABLE THEY WOULD HAVE TO EXPAND THEIR
AREA OF CONTROL OR OPERATIONS, THUS BRINGING
THEM INTO INCREASING CONFLICT WITH THE
CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES (UNQUOTE). NOW AGAIN,
ABRAMS IS ONE VOICE, BUT HE'S A FAIRLY
AUTHORITATIVE...I WOULD CONSIDER HIM AN
AUTHORITATIVE VOICE.

KISSINGER:
WELL, I WOULD TAKE ABRAMS AUTHORITATIVE...
I WOULD CONSIDER HIM AN AUTHORITATIVE VOICE.

FROST:
AND SO, THEN WE MOVE ON TO THE NEXT STAGE IN
THE UNFOLDING TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIA...WHICH...

KISSINGER:
I WOULD ONLY SAY HE DIDN'T SAY THAT IN 1969
AND 1970, WHEN HE WAS RECOMMENDING IT.

FROST:
HE DID NOT SAY IT THEN AND THAT...FAIR POINT...
BUT IT...HE SAID IT WHEN HE RECONSIDERED. I
GUESS HE HAD SECOND THOUGHTS.

KISSINGER:
YES, BUT WE HAD TO ACT ON THE BASIS OF HIS
RECOMMENDATION IN '69, AND NOT ON THE BASIS
OF THE SECOND THOUGHTS IN '73.

FROST:
NO, SECOND THOUGHTS ARE THE LUXURY OF PEOPLE
WHO JUDGE EVENTS BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY
WILL BE THE JUDGMENT OF HISTORY...WILL BE

19-19-19

WHETHER PEOPLE WERE RIGHT OR WRONG AT THE TIME,
ADMITTING THAT IT'S NOT EASY TO BE RIGHT OR
EASY TO BE WRONG. BUT THE COMING ON TO THE
NEXT STEP...THE NEXT STEP YOU SAY IN THE BOOK,
THERE HAVE BEEN ALL SORTS OF ALLEGATIONS ABOUT
THE LON NOL COUP, BUT YOU SAY THAT IT TOOK US,
BOTH IN THE BOOK AND IN "THE ECONOMIST" YOU SAY
IT TOOK US COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE...THE LON
NOL...

KISSINGER: THIS IS CORRECT.

FROST: ...THE LON NOL COUP. AND THAT THE CIA REPORT THAT HAD BEEN CIRCULATING HAD NOT REACHED YOUR DESK AT THAT TIME. IN FACT...

KISSINGER: WELL, WHAT CIA REPORT THAT HAD BEEN CIRCULATING?

FROST: WELL, THERE WAS A REPORT THAT GENERALLY BECAME AVAILABLE ON THE DAY OF THE COUP AND, I MEAN THERE'S NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT IT WAS SEEN EARLIER. I MEAN, I ACCEPT THAT...

KISSINGER: THERE WAS A REPORT THAT BECAME AVAILABLE ON MARCH 18TH, OR THEREABOUTS, WHICH WAS DESCRIBING A GENERAL SITUATION THAT HAD ALREADY STARTED ON MARCH 11TH WITH RIOTS IN PHNOM PENH. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE OVERTHROW OF SIHANOUK WAS NOT WHAT HAPPENED ON MARCH 18TH BUT WHAT HAPPENED ON MARCH 11TH.

FROST: WELL, THE POINT THAT THIS REPORT WAS AVAILABLE ON THE 18TH, AS I SAID. THE POINT THAT I DON'T UNDERSTAND IS, AND I'M NOT SUBSCRIBING TO THE

20-20-20

AMERICAN COUP THEORY, BUT I DON'T UNDERSTAND
WHY IT WAS A SURPRISE AND THAT WE COULDN'T
HAVE BEEN BETTER PREPARED WHEN YOU...YOU
DIDN'T HAVE TO READ THE CIA REPORT, YOU ONLY
HAD TO READ "THE NEW YORK TIMES" OF MARCH THE
11TH, MARCH THE 12TH, MARCH THE 13TH, WHERE
THE PREDICTIONS WERE SPECIFIC, THE QUOTES
FROM SIHANOUK WERE SPECIFIC. NOW, I
KNOW YOUR OPINION OF "THE NEW YORK TIMES,"
BUT I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT IT WAS THE DUTY OF
SOMEBODY TO READ THE THING.

KISSINGER:
NOW, JUST A MINUTE. EVERYBODY KNEW, ON MARCH
11TH, THAT RIOTS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN PHNOM
PENH AND IN OTHER AREAS AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE.
THAT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ANYBODY'S REGARD
FOR "THE NEW YORK TIMES," EVEN WHEN I DISAGREE
WITH ITS EDITORIAL POLICY ON SPECIFIC, ON
SPECIFIC ISSUES. SO...

FROST:
WELL, PUT IT THIS WAS...IT WASN'T A FAVORITE
JOURNAL OF THE WHITE HOUSE.

KISSINGER:
THAT HAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH IT...
THERE WAS NO DISPUTE, THERE WAS NO...

FROST:
IT WASN'T JUST A REPORT...THE POINT IS IT WASN'T
JUST A REPORT OF RIOTING IN THE STREETS AND
SO ON, IT WAS A PREDICTION FROM SIHANOUK THAT
A COUP D'ETAT IS POSSIBLE OR LIKELY. HE RAISED
THE POSSIBILITY THAT GENERAL LON NOL, COMMANDER OF
THE ARMED FORCES, MIGHT LEAD THE COUP..I MEAN, ON
MARCH 13TH, THAT WAS. I MEAN TO SAY THAT ALL...I
MEAN IT SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN A SHOCK...

21-21-21

KISSINGER:

ON MARCH 11TH, THE RIOTS TOOK US BY SURPRISE. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO LON NOL'S SUCCESSION TO POWER TOOK US BY SURPRISE. THAT IS THE KEY ISSUE. AT FIRST I THOUGHT, AND I WROTE MEMORANDA TO THE PRESIDENT TO THAT EFFECT THAT THERE WAS EVEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT SIHANOUK HAD STAGED ALL OF THESE EVENTS BECAUSE HE HAD ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS GOING TO GO TO MOSCOW AND PEKING TO ASK THEM TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH HANOI TO REDUCE THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE IN HIS COUNTRY. THE RESULT, THEREFORE, AT THAT TIME, ALL THE MEETINGS WE HAD ABOUT THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA, CONCENTRATED MUCH MORE OF LAOS WHERE THERE WAS ALSO A NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE GOING ON THAN IN CAMBODIA. WE THOUGHT THAT THIS MIGHT BE ONE OF THOSE BYZANTINE GAMES THAT SIHANOUK WAS PLAYING EVEN AFTER MARCH 18TH, AFTER SIHANOUK WAS DEPOSED, PRESIDENT NIXON HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE, I FORGET NOW ON WHAT DAY, TWO OR THREE DAYS AFTERWARDS, AND EVEN THERE HE STILL KEPT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT SIHANOUK MIGHT, MIGHT RETURN. WE HAD ONLY SEVEN PERSONNEL IN OUR EMBASSY AT THE TIME. WE HAD NO CIA PERSONNEL, IN PHNOM PENH AND MAYBE OUR INFORMATION WAS INADEQUATE BUT THIS, THIS WAS OUR PERCEPTION AT THE TIME.

22-22-22

FROST: BUT, BUT I MEAN THE NEW YORK TIMES COULD'VE...
KISSINGER: THE NEW YORK TIMES COULD HAVE TOLD US NOTHING THAT WE DID NOT KNOW. WE KNEW THERE WERE RIOTS GOING ON. WE THOUGHT THAT SIHANOUK MIGHT GO BACK TO PHNOM PENH FROM PARIS AND LATER ON I LEARNED THAT HE WAS, IN FACT, SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING GOING BACK TO PHNOM PENH FROM PARIS. HE SUDDENLY WENT TO MOSCOW. THAT SURPRISED US AS WELL. WHILE IN MOSCOW, HE WAS DEPOSED. I CANNOT BELIEVE HE WOULD HAVE GONE TO MOSCOW IF HE HAD EXPECTED TO BE DEPOSED.

FROST: BUT THE POINT IS THAT WE CONTINUED OUR RECOGNITION OF LON NOL THE NEXT DAY AND...

KISSINGER: SO DID THE U.N. AND SO DID OVER A HUNDRED GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION.

FROST: THE NEXT...MORNING?

KISSINGER: WELL THE NEXT DAY, I DON'T KNOW.

FROST: I DON'T, I DON'T THINK IT WAS THAT QUICK...

KISSINGER: IT WAS WITHIN A WEEK OR SO. BY EARLY APRIL.

FROST: BUT WITH US IT WAS WITHIN A DAY. YOU HAD A MIDNIGHT MEETING AND IT WAS THE NEXT DAY.

KISSINGER: WHAT DO YOU MEAN WE HAD...WHAT MIDNIGHT MEETING?

FROST: WELL, THERE WAS A MIDNIGHT MEETING OR, OR A LATE NIGHT MEETING OR WHATEVER TO DISCUSS IT ON THE NIGHT...

KISSINGER: THERE WAS CERTAINLY NOT A MIDNIGHT MEETING AND I DON'T, THERE WAS NO LATE NIGHT MEETING. I DON'T KNOW WHEN THE MEETING...WHETHER THERE... I DON'T REMEMBER WHETHER THERE WAS A MEETING

(c)

23-23-23

OR NOT. I DON'T EVEN RECALL EXACTLY WHAT
DAY WE RECOGNIZED LON NOL.

FROST: NEXT...DAY...

KISSINGER: WELL, SO DID EVERY OTHER GOVERNMENT...OR PRACTICALLY EVERY OTHER GOVERNMENT.

FROST: I DON'T THINK THAT'S THE CASE. I THINK, AS YOU SAID EARLIER, IT WAS WITHIN A WEEK... BUT THE POINT IS...

KISSINGER: I'M NOT SAYING THEY DID IT WITHIN...THEY DID IT THE NEXT DAY. I AM SAYING, THAT THE UNITED NATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES, RECOGNIZED LON NOL WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

FROST: OF COURSE THE SOVIET UNION DID BECAUSE THEY WERE ANTI-CHINA, BUT, BUT THE...

KISSINGER: BUT AT THAT TIME IT WASN'T OBVIOUS WHETHER IT WAS PRO OR ANTI CHINA.

FROST: BUT I THINK THE BASIC POINT, DR. KISSINGER, IS THIS: THAT YOU SAY, AND WHAT YOU JUST SAID, THAT FOR TEN OR IN _THE ECONOMIST_ FOR TEN DAYS OR SO YOU THOUGHT THIS WAS ALL A SIHANOUK PLOT.

KISSINGER: THAT'S CORRECT.

FROST: IN THE BOOK YOU ALSO SAY THAT WITHIN THREE OR FOUR DAYS SIHANOUK HAD REMOVED YOUR ALTERNATIVE OF SUPPORTING HIM BY ALLYING HIMSELF WITH HOSTILE FORCES. BUT AS YOU SAID ON NBC, SIHANOUK WAS ALWAYS, AT ROOT, A CAMBODIAN AND THE THING IS, THAT IF WE HAD AND WHAT I AM SUGGESTING, IS, THAT SIHANOUK, AS WE'VE SEEN,

(c)

24-24-24

WAS MORE FLEXIBLE THAN YOU ANTICIPATED.
IN ONE CASE YOU THOUGHT FOR TEN DAYS HE
MIGHT BE BACK, IN ANOTHER CASE, FOUR DAYS
RUINED OUR ALTERNATIVES, THAT IN FACT WE
MADE THE SECOND BIG MISTAKE BY BACKING
LON NOL, RATHER THAN TRYING TO GET SIHANOUK
BACK BECAUSE IT LED INEVITABLY TO WHAT
HAPPENED A YEAR LATER, RATHER THAN THIS,
ADMITTED, I KNOW, I KNOW IT WAS FLAWED
NEUTRALITY. I KNOW SIHANOUK RULE WOULD
HAVE NOT BEEN RENAMED AND WOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN CLOSED TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND SO
ON...BUT HISTORY WILL SHOW THAT THIS WAS...
YOU WERE ON THE RECORD, I DON'T KNOW WHETHER
ON THE RECORD IS THE CORRECT REMARK FOR CON-
VERSATION WITH MANY MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF,
AS, AS, AS THINKING OF LON NOL AS AN INCOMPETENT...

KISSINGER: I HAD NO OPINION OF LON NOL...AT THAT TIME.

FROST: WELL, MANY PEOPLE HAVE QUOTED YOU AS SAYING
YOU REGARDED HIM VERY SOON, AS A JOKE.

KISSINGER: AT THAT TIME I HAD PRACTICALLY NO OPINION ABOUT
LON NOL BECAUSE I DIDN'T...I KNEW NEXT TO
NOTHING ABOUT HIM.

FROST: BUT LON NOL CAME TO POWER AND THEN IT JUST LEAD
A FEW WEEKS LATER, THE NEXT STEP WAS THE INVASION.
NOW IN YOUR BOOK.

25-25-25

KISSINGER: NOW JUST A MINUTE, I THINK WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, YOUR WHOLE LINE OF QUESTIONING IS MAKING A MOCKERY OF WHAT WAS GOING ON IN INDOCHINA. YOU ARE CONCENTRATING ON ONE COUNTRY. YOU ARE NOT DISCUSSING WHAT WAS GOING ON IN VIETNAM AT ALL. YOU ARE NOT DISCUSSING THE CONSTANT PEACE OVERTURES THAT WERE BEING MADE.

FROST: I'M PREPARED TO DISCUSS THOSE.

KISSINGER: YOU ARE ACCEPTING ONE PARTICULAR THEORY OF ONE PARTICULAR...OF A GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO ARE NOW CONCENTRATING ON CAMBODIA BECAUSE THE OUTCOME IN VIETNAM DID NOT FULFILL ALL OF THEIR PREDICATIONS. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WAS NOT AS YOU DESCRIBED IT. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WAS THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BROKE OUT OF THEIR SANCTUARIES AFTER LON NOL HAD OVERTHROWN SIHANOUK WITHOUT OUR HELP, WITHOUT OUR KNOWLEDGE, AND WITHOUT OUR ENCOURAGEMENT THAT FOR FIVE WEEKS WE DID NOTHING.

FROST: BUT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE DID A HELL OF A LOT WHICH YOU DON'T QUOTE IN YOUR BOOK. I MEAN THERE IS AN ENORMOUS LIST OF THINGS THEY DID.

KISSINGER: LIKE WHAT?

FROST: WELL I MEAN THE LIST GOES ON FOR TWO PAGES. I MEAN.

KISSINGER: YES, BUT THE QUESTION IS WHO PREPARED THE LIST?

FROST: PARDON?

(10)

26-26-26

KISSINGER: THE QUESTION IS WHO PREPARED THE LIST?

FROST: I DID. LIKE YOU PREPARED THE LIST IN YOUR BOOK. THE LIST IN YOUR BOOK OF THINGS THAT WENT ON BEFORE THE INVASION. A LOT OF THE THINGS, MOST OF THE THINGS NIXON COULDN'T QUOTE WHEN HE ANNOUNCED THE INVASION. HALF OF THEM HE COULDN'T QUOTE ON JUNE THE 30TH. AND...

KISSINGER: LIKE WHAT?

FROST: WELL, IF YOU GO THROUGH THE BOOK. AND I THINK THIS IS VERY DETAILED. BUT I MEAN ON JUNE THE 30TH HE DIDN'T MENTION HUNG LOI. HE DIDN'T MENTION THE TWO BRIDGES AT SVAY RIENG.

KISSINGER: I DON'T KNOW...

FROST: WELL, THEY'RE IN YOUR BOOK

HE DIDN'T MENTION THE SEVERAL CAMBODIAN POSTS NEAR SENMONOROM. HE DID NOT MENTION THE CAMBODIAN BATALLION ARMY BADLY MAULED IN THE WEST BANK OF THE MEKONG. HE DID NOT MENTION ENEMY FORCES UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTACKING SNUOL NOL KRATII PROVINCE. HE DIDN'T MENTION THE COMMUNIST FORCES STRIKING THE TOWN OF TAKEO.

I MEAN HE DIDN'T MENTION THE RAIL LINE LEADING SOUTH FROM PHNOM PENH WAS CUT AT SEVERAL POINTS IN TAKEO PROVINCE, AND SO ON.

WHAT I...

KISSINGER: IN OTHER WORDS YOU ARE SAYING THESE INCIDENTS WERE NOT TRUE.

27-27-27

FROST: NO, WHAT I AM SAYING IS IT WAS ONLY WHEN THE OUTRAGE OF THE WORLD ABOUT CAMBODIA CAME TO LIGHT THAT THESE EVENTS WERE RESEARCHED.

KISSINGER: NO THESE EVENTS

FROST: BECAUSE WE KNOW, I MEAN IT'S COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT THE BOOK OF THE MONTH CLUB WENT BESERK. THAT YOU HAD TO RE-WRITE THE SECTIONS, THE CAMBODIAN SECTIONS.

KISSINGER: THAT JUST ISN'T TRUE.

FROST: WELL THEY SAY THAT THEY HAD TO RESEARCH. IS THAT ABSOLUTELY NOT TRUE. THAT YOU DID NOT ESPECIALLY WRITE AND ADD TO REBUTT SHAWCROSS?

KISSINGER: I ADDED TO THE BOOK ITSELF ONE PARAGRAPH AND I ADDED ONE OR TWO FOOTNOTES. THE BASIC TEXT WHICH CAN EASILY BE RESEARCHED OF WHAT IS IN MY BOOK WAS COMPLETED 99 PER CENT BEFORE THE THERE WAS ANY...

FROST: YES, THE THESIS...

KISSINGER: THERE WAS NO... TO SPEAK OF AN OUTRAGE OF THE WORLD IS SIMPLY MAKING A MOCKERY OF WHAT HAS GONE ON IN CAMBODIA. EVERYTHING THAT I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO WRITE A BOOK THAT WILL STAND HISTORICAL SCRUTINY. I HAVE WRITTEN FROM THE DOCUMENTS THAT WERE AVAILABLE TO ME AT THE TIME AND ON THE BASIS OF WHICH WE ACTED. I HAVE NO INTEREST IN WRITING A HISTORICAL... A DEBATE WITH A JOURNALIST AND LOOKING FOR

28-28-28

DOCUMENTS AFTER...IN ORDER TO REBUT A
JOURNALIST. I HAVE WRITTEN FROM THE DOCUMENTS
ON THE BASIS OF WHICH WE ACTED, OF WHICH WE
WERE CONSCIOUS AT THE TIME AND WHICH WERE THE
REASONS FOR THE DECISIONS THAT WERE TAKEN.
WHETHER PRESIDENT NIXON IN A DOCUMENT LISTED
EVERY SINGLE EVENT OR NOT IS REALLY...THAT
WOULD HAVE GONE INTO A DEGREE OF DETAIL THAT
WAS AT THAT TIME NO NECESSARY.

FROST:

WHEN YOU SAY IN THE BOOK, YOU REFER TO THE
BOOK, THAT QUOTE: NIXON IN HIS APRIL THE
30TH INVASION SPEECH ADDED A SENTENCE THAT WAS
AS IRRELEVANT TO HIS CENTRAL THESIS AS IT WAS
UNTRUE. THAT WE HAD HERETOFORE NOT MOVED
AGAINST THE SANCTUARIES OVERLOOKING THE SECRET
BOMBING.

KISSINGER:

THAT STATEMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE.

FROST:

WHY DID HE MAKE IT?

KISSINGER:

BECAUSE HE WAS GIVEN TO HYPERBOLE.

FROST:

WHY DID YOU MAKE THE SAME STATEMENT IN YOUR
BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO THE PRESS ON THE SAME
DAY?

KISSINGER:

BECAUSE I SUPPOSE WE DID NOT HAVE...TO US THIS
BOMBING OF THE SANCTUARIES HAD BECOME SO MUCH PART
OF THE LANDSCAPE THAT WE DID NOT REALLY FOCUS
ON THAT BUT THAT WAS NOT A CORRECT STATEMENT.

29-29-29

FROST:

AND CAUSE IT ALSO NIXON SAID IT AGAIN ON
JUNE THE 30TH. THE IMMUNITY OF THE CAMBODIAN
SANCTUARY HAD BEEN A SERIOUS MILITARY HANDICAP
FOR US FOR MANY YEARS BUT WE HAD REFRAINED
FROM MOVING AGAINST THEM IN ORDER TO CONTAIN
THE CONFLICT AND HE WENT ON ABOUT PRESERVING...

KISSINGER:

THIS DOES NOT CHANGE THE BASIC

FROST:

AND THEN HE DID IT AGAIN IN THE STATE OF THE
WORLD MESSAGE WHICH I THINK YOU WERE INVOLVED
IN FEBRUARY 25, 1971.

KISSINGER:

IT DOES NOT CHANGE THE BASIC PROPOSITION THAT
I'M MAKING THAT IT WAS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
WHO FIRST ESTABLISHED THEMSELVES IN CAMBODIA.
THAT IT WAS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO BROKE
OUT OF THE SANCTUARIES IN 1970 AND CUT
COMMUNICATIONS ALL OVER THE COUNTRY AND TRIED
TO ISOLATE PHNOM PENH AND SO THAT IT WAS OUR
PERCEPTION THAT IT WOULD LEAD TO A COLLAPSE OF
THE GOVERNMENT THAT WAS AFTER ALL RECOGNIZED
BY THE UN BY MOST OF THE OTHERS TURNING ALL
OF CAMBODIA INTO ONE BIG BASE AREA AT A TIME
WHEN WE WERE WITHDRAWING HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS
OF TROOPS, FROM VIETNAM AND IT IS AFTER ALL
VIETNAM THAT HAS OCCUPIED CAMBODIA AFTER THERE
WERE NO AMERICANS THERE.

30-30-30

**FROST:** WELL, NO, THE THING IS THAT I MEAN THAT THE SECRECY OF THE BOMBING LEADING NIXON AND YOURSELF TO UNTRUE STATEMENTS IS AN EXAMPLE OF SOMETHING THAT STARTED IN A SMALL WAY AND OBVIOUSLY, OBVIOUSLY ESCALATED. AS WE KNOW YOUR STAFF COULDN'T PROVE THAT PHNOM PENH WAS REALLY IN DANGER PRIOR TO THE INVASION. BUT I SUPPOSE...

**KISSINGER:** WHAT DO YOU MEAN MY STAFF COULD NOT PROVE?

**FROST:** ALL OF YOUR STAFF THAT WE HAVE SPOKEN TO SAY THAT THEY COULD NOT FIND EVIDENCE TO BACK UP THE CALIM THAT PHNOM PENH WAS IN IMMINENT DANGER PRIOR TO THE INVASION.

**KISSINGER:** I DON'T KNOW THAT YOU MEAN BY ALL OF MY STAFF, BUT YOU MIGHT HAVE BEEN SPEAKING TO...

**FROST:** FOUR OR FIVE

**KISSINGER:** THE, WELL, YOU KNOW AS WELL AS I DO THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF MY STAFF MEMBERS WHO RESIGNED IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS AND HAVE CONSISTENTLY TAKEN CERTAIN POSITIONS SINCE THEN. THE EVENTS THAT I HAVE MENTIONED AND THE FACTS THAT I HAVE MENTIONED WERE THE FACTS ON THE BASIS ON WHICH WE ACTED. AND THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO ENABLE THE U.S. TO WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM UNDER CONDITIONS IN WHICH WE WOULD NOT BE FORCED TO OVERTHROW A GOVERNMENT AND TO TURN OVER TO COMMUNIST RULE PEOPLE WHO HAD RELIED ON US. AND COMMITMENTS MADE BY A PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION AND NOT BY OUR ADMINISTRATION, IT

31-31-31

WOULD HAVE BEEN AN EASY MATTER SIMPLY TO DUMP
EVERYTHING ON OUR PREDECESSORS.

THAT WAS THE KEY PROBLEM.

FROST:

LET ME TRY AND SUM UP THE SUBJECT. AFTER THE
INVASION THE HUGELY AMBITIOUS MILITARY PROGRAM
TOOK PLACE.

KISSINGER:

THAT IS ALSO NONSENSE.

FROST:

IN CAMBODIA, 35,000 TO 200,000 WAS PRETTY
AMBITIOUS.

KISSINGER:

PRETTY AMBITIOUS, BUT THE POINT IS...

FROST:

YOU SAID ORIGINALLY

KISSINGER:

THE CONGRESS LIMITED THE TOTAL AMERICAN AID
TO CAMBODIA TO SOMETHING LIKE $200 OR $250
MILLION WHICH WAS A SMALL FRACTION OF WHAT...

FROST:

WELL, THEY ARE NOT OUR TROOPS. I'M SAYING...

KISSINGER:

THE AMOUNT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE WE COULD GIVE
WITHIN THE CONGRESSIONAL LIMITS WAS RELATIVELY
FINITE AND IN ADDITION THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN
ADVISERS...WE WERE NOT PERMITTED TO HAVE ANY
ADVISERS THERE. SO THAT THE ABILITY TO EITHER
MONITOR THIS OR TO TRAIN THESE PEOPLE PROPERLY
ALSO DIDN'T EXIST.

FROST:

WELL BASICALLY THOUGHT THAT DOESN'T AFFECT THE
FACT THAT FROM 35,000 TO 200,000 IN CAMBODIA
LED TO HOPELESSLY INEXPERIENCED OFFICERS.

TWELVE YEAR OLD TROOPS DOCUMENTED BY THE
AUSTRALIANS, $750,000 A MONTH DOCUMENTED BY
THE GAO FOR NON-EXISTENT SO-CALLED PHANTOM
SOLDIERS, THE MASSIVE BOMBING CAMPAIGN ACCORDING

32-32-32

TO THE SENATE REFUGEE COMMITTEE LED THAT THE PEOPLE WHO FLED UP UNTIL 1974 CITED FIRST OF ALL THE AMERICAN BOMBING AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE BOMBING AND SO ON. WHAT I HAVE IS A PICTURE OF A POLICY OUT OF CONTROL, I AM NOT SUGGESTING FOR ONE SECOND, THAT YOU DID NOT HAVE A GREAT MANY OTHER IMPERATIVES. BUT I AM SUGGESTING THAT THE POLICY WAS OUT OF CONTROL.

KISSINGER: NO, WHAT YOU HAVE IS THE ONE-SIDED DOCUMENTATION OF PEOPLE WHO ARE NOW USING CAMBODIA AS AN ALIBI FOR A GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDOCHINA, WHAT YOU HAVE IS A TOTALLY ONE-SIDED AND MISLEADING PRESENTATION OF EVENTS.

FROST: OKAY, WELL, I THINK THAT'S NONSENSE. BUT LET ME QUOTE TWO QUOTES. LET'S NOT JUST STAY WITH, LET'S FIRST OF ALL QUOTE THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN ITS PUREST FORM. NIXON'S OWN QUOTE: THE BEST INVESTMENT THE U.S. HAS MADE IN MY LIFETIME THE CAMBODIANS ARE PEOPLE OF SEVEN MILLION ONLY NUTRALIST PREVIOUSLY UNtrained (NIGHTMARE WORD) UNtrained AT TYING DOWN 40,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE REGULARS UNQUOTE.

CERTAINLY WORTH TYING DOWN 40,000 REGULARS, IF TRUE, BUT TO SACRIFICE A NATION OF SEVEN MILLION, THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS IS QUESTIONABLE TO SAY THE LEAST.

33-33-33

KISSINGER:
WE HAD OFFERED TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE NEUTRALIZATION OF CAMBODIA. THAT HAD BEEN REJECTED. WE HAD OFFERED AN IMMEDIATE DEESCALATION OF THE WAR. THAT HAD BEEN REJECTED. WE HAD OFFERED CEASEFIRES ALL OVER INDOCHINA. THAT HAD BEEN REJECTED. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE CONDUCTING AND SUPPORTING THE OPERATIONS AND WERE SUPPORTING THE KHMER ROUGE, THE ALTERNATIVE WAS THE COMPLETE TAKEOVER OF CAMBODIA BY THE COMMUNISTS AND THE...

FROST: WHEN?

KISSINGER: '70, '71

FROST: NOT THE SAME COMMUNISTS, NOT THOSE GENOCIDAL, CRAZY, LUNATICS.

KISSINGER: THERE WERE NO OTHER COMMUNIST LEADERS AT THAT TIME.

FROST: THE KHMER ROUGE WAS 4,000. IT COULD NEVER HAVE TAKEN CAMBODIA, IN 1970.

KISSINGER: IT COULD HAVE TAKEN IT OVER WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE HELP.

FROST: THERE WAS NO COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO WE ARE TALKING ABOUT UNTIL THE INVASION. THE KHMER ROUGE WERE ALMOST PARIAHS IN '70. THAT'S WHAT I AM SAYING, THAT AMERICAN POLICY CREATED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE KHMER ROUGE TO SIEZE POWER.

34-34-34

KISSINGER:

NO, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, YOU ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT INDOCHINA. YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT CAMBODIA BECAUSE THIS HAPPENS TO BE THE MOST CONVENIENT ISSUE NOW ON WHICH TO HANG THE DEBATE. YOU ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACKS INTO CAMBODIA. YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT THE AMERICAN REACTIONS TO THESE ATTACKS. YOU ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT THE FACT THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE INSISTING THAT THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE IN PHNOM PENH HAD TO BE OVERTHROWN AS A CONDITION FOR ANY CONVERSATIONS IN CAMBODIA AS WAS THEIR CONDITION IN SOUTH VIETNAM. AGAIN, YOU ARE ONLY TALKING ABOUT THE AMERICAN ATTEMPT NOT TO TURN OVER A COUNTRY TO COMMUNIST RULE. WE DID NOT KNOW AT THE TIME,

FROST:

BUT

KISSINGER:

PLEASE LET ME FINISH. WE DID NOT KNOW AT THAT TIME THAT THE KHMER ROUGE WERE GENOCIDAL MURDERS. THIS WENT BEYOND OUR IMAGINATION.

FROST:

NOR DID THEY HAVE THE POWER, THANK GOD, IN 1970 TO BE GENOCIDAL MURDERS BECAUSE THERE WERE 4,000 OF THEM. THEY HAD THE POWER IN '75 WHEN BY A SERIES OF MISTAKES, I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT VILLAINY NOW, I'M MERELY TALKING ABOUT MISTAKES, BY A SERIES OF MISTAKES WE HAD ALLOWED A SITUATION TO EMERGE IN WHICH THESE BASTARDS, AND THAT WORD WILL DEFINITELY BE BLEEPED, COULD SIEZE POWER WHICH THEY COULD NOT HAVE DONE IN '70.

35-35-35

KISSINGER:
THEY HAD THE POWER IN 1975 BECAUSE AFTER 1970
THERE WAS A CONSISTENT ATTEMPT TO CUT OFF AND
TO LIMIT AID TO CAMBODIA AND THERE WAS AN
ACTUAL CUTOFF OF AID THEN IN 1975. THAT IS
WHY THEY HAD THE POWER TO DO SO.

FROST:
NO, THE REASON THEY HAD THE POWER TO DO SO WAS
AS SIHANOUK SAID LAST WEEK, THAT THEY COULD
HAVE BEEN PREVENTED, MAYBE, BY, IF THE USA
WITH WHICH I DECIDED TO HAVE A RECONCILIATION
IN '69. I WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PREVENT
BOTH VIETNAMESE AND KHMER ROUGE COMMUNISM.
WELL, MAYBE. BUT THE POINT IS THAT THE REASON
I AM DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT IS NOT BECAUSE
VIETNAM IS MORE DIFFICULT, BUT THAT VIETNAM...
AND I ABSOLUTELY SYMPATHIZE WITH YOU... WAS A
PROBLEM YOU INHERITED...

KISSINGER:
NO, BUT, WE HAVE NOW SPENT ALL OF OUR TIME
ON CAMBODIA. WE HAVE SPENT NO TIME ON THE
VARIOUS PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

FROST:
WELL, I'M HAPPY TO TALK ABOUT THOSE.

KISSINGER:
BUT WE HAVE TO DO THAT ON SOME OTHER DAY. WE
CANNOT DO THAT NOW.

FROST:
YES. THE LAST QUESTION ON CAMBODIA IS THIS ONE.
WHICH IS THAT WHAT I AM SAYING, LET ME UNDERLINE
AGAIN, I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT YOU WERE NOT
INHUMANLY BUSY, I'M NOT SUGGESTING THAT YOUR
MAIN CONCENTRATION... INDEED, I THINK IT WAS ONE
OF THE REASONS... WAS ON SOUTH VIETNAM.

KISSINGER:
MR. FROST...

36-36-36

FROST:

BUT, I'M MERELY SAYING...

KISSINGER:

MR. FROST...

FROST:

NOW, NOW, NOW, PLEASE LET ME FINISH. THE THING IS THAT WHEN THE CAMBODIAN SECTIONS OF YOUR BOOK ARE EXAMINED, PEOPLE WILL SAY THIS IS THE REVERSE OF THE FORSYTHE SAGE, IT'S THE HINDSIGHT SAGA, THAT IN FACT THE AMERICANS, NOT THROUGH VILLAINY BUT THROUGH NEGLIGENCE WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT HAPPENED--NOT SOLELY RESPONSIBLE--NOT SOLELY RESPONSIBLE-- FOR WHAT HAPPENED IN CAMBODIA, BECAUSE AND THIS IS WHY WE'RE DISCUSSING IT, AMERICA WAS NOT IN CAMBODIA UNTIL YOUR ADMINISTRATION. WELL, NIXON'S ADMINISTRATION. AND SINCE YOU CLAIM, TOTALLY FALSELY, THAT I AM QUOTING SOLELY FROM WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, WHEN I AM QUOTING FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND NIXON...LET ME QUOTE FROM EMERY SQANK, PUBLICLY, YOUR AMBASSADOR, WHO SAID, AS HE WAS LEAVING CAMBODIA, THAT THIS WAS AMERICA'S MOST POINTLESS, MOST USELESS WAR; HE ALSO SAID THAT LON NOL WAS INEPT, AND HE SAID IT WAS THE MOST POINTLESS AND USELESS WAR, IT HAD LOST ITS POINT, AND WHAT I AM SUGGESTING TO YOU IS THAT HISTORY'S JUDGMENT OF EVENTS IN CAMBODIA--AND WHAT WE SEE TODAY IS THE AFTERMATH-- BUT WILL BE THAT THE NIXON-KISISNGER REGIME WAS GUILTY, NOT OF GENOCIDE, BUT OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN THE DECISIONS THEY TOOK.

37-37-37

KISSINGER: WELL, I THINK THAT IS TOTALLY INCORRECT. I THINK WE INHERITED A TRAGEDY. WE ATTEMPTED TO, AND SUCCEEDED IN, EXTRICATING AMERICA WITH AMERICA WITH HONOR FROM THIS TRAGEDY, THAT WE FACED A DOMESTIC SITUATION IN WHICH THOSE WHO WANTED TO END THE WAR HONORABLY AND THOSE WHO IDENTIFIED HONOR WITH THE MOST RAPID TERMINATION OF THE WAR ON ALMOST ANY TERMS, MANAGED TO PARALYZE EACH OTHER; SO AS A RESULT NOTHING COULD BE CARRIED TO ITS CONCLUSION.

FROST: BUT WHAT ABOUT CAMBODIA?

KISSINGER: I'M TALKING ABOUT CAMBODIA.

FROST: YOU DIDN'T INHERIT A TRAGEDY. YOU INHERITED AN UNWELCOME SITUATION IN CAMBODIA. NOT A TRAGEDY.

KISSINGER: YOU ARE ASSUMING THAT THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA COULD BE TOTALLY ISOLATED FROM THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM. WE COULD NOT BOTH WITHDRAW, WITHSTAND NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVES, AND PERMIT THE COMMUNISTS TO ACT IN CAMBODIA WITH TOTAL IMPUNITY...WHICH THEY HAD OCCUPIED BEFORE WE DID ANYTHING.

FROST: BUT THE PREVIOUS REGIME HAD MANAGED, FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, TO ISOLATE CAMBODIA...

KISSINGER: THE PREVIOUS REGIME...

FROST: WE EMBROILED CAMBODIA...

KISSINGER: THE PREVIOUS...

FROST: WE ENGULFED CAMBODIA.

38-38-38

KISSINGER: THE PREVIOUS REGIME...NO, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ENGULFED CAMBODIA.

FROST: FOUR YEARS EARLIER.

KISSINGER: THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ENGULFED CAMBODIA...

FROST: THEY DIDN'T ENGULF IT. THEY DIDN'T BOMB THE HELL OUT OF IT.

KISSINGER: THEY ENGULFED IT IN 1965 AND '66 WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS. THEY ENGULFED IT IN 1970 BY BREAKING OUT OF THE SANCTUARIES AND CUTTING COMMUNICATIONS ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. AND THEY ENGULFED IT AFTER AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL BECAUSE A COMMUNIST...TO BE TRUE...TO BE SURE GENOCIDAL GOVERNMENT, HAD, THEY HAD TO BE INDEPENDENT OF THEM. THOSE WERE THE FACTS. BUT I THINK WE'VE REACHED THE END OF THIS.

FROST: WE CERTAINLY HAVE, AND I'M GLAD THAT WE DEBATED THIS SUBJECT...

-- END --

10 October, 1979.

Dear Nigel,

The conviction that Area 704 was "Supper" was based on the
White Paper submitted by Deputy Secretary of Defense
William P. Clements, Jnr., to the Senate Armed Services
Committee on September 9, 1973. It was reprinted in the
Committee's hearing record, "Bombing in Cambodia" p.481-
494. The original of the White Paper also describes "Supper"
as 704.

Following your request on Sunday, we checked with the
Pentagon to see if there could have been a mistake, since
Dr. Kissinger was certain that "Supper" was in fact 740.
The historians of the JCS eventually came back and said that
they had found no evidence to link 704 with "Supper". On
the contrary, the available documents showed 740 as "Supper".
They therefore believed there must have been a clerical
error in the original White Paper - one that remained
undiscovered until now. That also seems to us by far the
most likely conclusion.

As you know, David Frost and John Birt feel that, in these
circumstances, the exchange about Area 704 should not be
included. I agree with them.

Mr. Nigel Ryan,
N.B.C. News,
30 Rockefeller Plaza,
New York, NY 10020

10 October, 1979.

Dear Nigel,

C 18

TV & radio

10

# Shot in the arm for NBC's Kissinger

NBC probably isn't very happy with David Frost, now that he has demeaned the journalistic standards the network used in the special interview with Henry Kissinger tonight.

But really he did the network the biggest favor since Fred Silverman decided he was too big for just two networks. By sounding off about alleged unprofessional compromises with Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Frost stirred up more attention for this show than it ever could have gotten under normal circumstances.

How many viewers would be eager to hear Henry Kissinger expound upon the foreign policy initiatives of the Nixon years in the middle of the World Series? Or in the middle of the world kayak championships, for that matter?

But now maybe a few folks will be intrigued enough by the supposed controversy to tune in and hear what the good doctor has to say. The special is on Channel 11 at 10 tonight.

There are several interesting angles from which to examine this show, none of them having anything particular to do with its content.

First of all there's the totally unsurprising fact that the interview with Mr. Kissinger conveniently coincides with the publication of his memoirs. Mr. Kissinger is following the time-honored tradition of using a TV interview as free publicity to hawk his new book.

It's also mildly diverting to note that Mr. Kissinger happens to be under contract to NBC. He signed up with them shortly after he left public service. (Some say he's due back at any moment.) For a sizable six-figure-per-year retainer, Mr. Kissinger agreed to supply NBC with his foreign policy expertise on at least one special a year.

The agreement began in July, 1977. Since then, Mr. Kissinger's contributions to the network have been decidedly minimal. He has been interviewed on specials before; one will be remembered as one of the least-watched TV shows of all time.

DAVID FROST

## Bill Carter

That probably says more about the character of the nation than it does about the character of Henry Kissinger. But it's safe to say NBC hasn't exactly turned the Kissinger deal into a bonanza.

We could also consider the choice of Mr. Frost as the interviewer rather than one of the perfectly capable journalists already in the employ of NBC news. Why would the network pass over its own people?

Well, Mr. Frost did make quite a bit of hay for himself (even if not too many dollars) with his famous interviews of Richard Nixon in 1977. Could it be NBC thought Mr. Frost's name would give the show a little zip it might lack if someone like David Brinkley were doing the questioning?

Perhaps NBC's official explanation went like this:

"Frost's skill and expertise as an interviewer is [sic] well-documented. His history-making interviews with former President Nixon in 1977 demonstrated his grasp of complex matters and his ability to translate them effectively for television viewers."

Mr. Frost seems to have taken this praise seriously, to the point where he quit the show rather than agree to what he alleged was a sellout by NBC to Mr. Kissinger.

It seems that Mr. Frost and Mr. Kissinger really got into it over Mr. Kissinger's actions concerning Cambodia during the first of their two scheduled interview sessions. After the second session, NBC came to Mr. Frost and asked him to participate in a third interview segment.

At first he was willing, but then demurred, saying NBC had agreed to allow Mr. Kissinger to make a 15-minute statement defending himself. Mr. Frost said he didn't, this, and the fact that he would not be editing all the material by himself, would violate his journalistic principles.

NBC denied Mr. Frost's charges, saying it had never told Mr. Kissinger he could make a blanket statement free of cross-examination. It's gone back and forth like that the past week or so.

Meanwhile, the show is on tonight and NBC is going to preface it with a long statement explaining the network's position. It comes down to the fact that NBC says Mr. Frost is off base and Mr. Kissinger was never given any guarantees that would mean a compromise of the network's journalistic standards.

However, NBC did agree to Mr. Kissinger's request that a transcript of the entire first interview with Mr. Frost be released, so that nothing would be lost on TV in the editing process.

So what's it all come down to? Lots of publicity certainly, which should make most of the participants happy. Mr. Frost gets to be on the program as well as score some brownie points for his "journalistic integrity." Mr. Kissinger gets tons of publicity for his book, which won't hurt sales much.

The NBC network will probably get more viewers than it would have otherwise with what most viewers would regard as something more appropriate for public TV.

Only NBC news is likely to lose anything in the controversy. Despite the denials, Mr. Frost's critical comments hurt, especially when combined with the fact that NBC news wasn't exactly smelling like a rose for signing

Kissinger special

up Mr. Kissinger in the first place.

-0-

CBS still says it's not ready to pull the plug on its sick
shows, but it at least seems anxious to send them to the in-
tensive care unit.

The network already has announced that it will shelve
the two Wednesday night comedies, "Struck by Lightning"
and "The Last Resort," for at least the rest of this month.
Now it is working on a "game plan" to salvage some re-
spectability on Saturday night, which has been hell's
kitchen for CBS.

The network apparently will put three mega-losers,
"Working Stiffs," "Bad News Bears" and "Big Shamus,
Little Shamus," on the back burner and plug the gap with
movies, at least until it figures out something else to do.
That means another weak show, "Paris," may hold on at
10 Saturday nights for the time being.

For the Record

From the text of President Carter's remarks at the dedication of the John F. Kennedy Library.

On that November day almost 16 years ago a terrible moment was frozen in time. I remember that I climbed down from a tractor, unhooked a farm trailer and walked into my warehouse to weigh a load of grain, and was told by a group of farmers that the president had been shot. I went outside, knelt on the steps and began to pray. In a few minutes I learned that he had not lived. It was a grievous personal loss. My president. I wept openly, for the first time in more than 10 years—for the first time since the day my father died.

People wept in Boston and in Paris, in Atlanta and in Warsaw, in San Francisco and in New Delhi. More than anyone had realized before that day, the spirit of this young American president had taken hold of the hearts and imaginations of countless millions throughout the world.

During the years that followed—in civil rights, in medical care for the aged, in greater dignity for the poor—his vision was carried into reality with the help of a united Congress and people.

At the time, the tragedy in Dallas seemed an isolated convulsion of madness. But in retrospect it appears near the beginning of a time of darkness. From Vietnam to Cambodia, from Los Angeles to Memphis, from Kent State to Watergate, the American spirit suffered under one shock after another, and the confidence of our people was deeply shaken.

American people are good and they have undertaken a solemn commitment to heal those wounds, and at long last the darkness has begun to lift. I believe that America is now ready to meet the challenges of the 1980s with renewed confidence and a refreshed spirit.

(TV section)

Wait, There's More

A couple of notes on those NBC executives who chatted up representatives of the press in New York this past weekend...

NBC president Fred Silverman ... in response to a question about what one reporter called "sleazy promos" for some series (like maybe "BJ the Bear" or maybe "Sheriff Lobo"):

"As far as sexy promos... you'll be seeing less and less of them on the air and they will virtually disappear in the next couple of weeks"...

And NBC News president Bill Small ... talking about the recent controversial Henry Kissinger-David Frost interview:

"David Frost will never do another interview for the news division as long as I'm president...

"As for (Kissinger) ... I'd be surprised ... unless there are some very special reasons ... If we did a major Kissinger interview in the coming year"...

As you may recall... Frost stormed out after two days of taping the interview, charging that NBC News had given Kissinger permission to not only edit the show but also enjoy 10 minutes of rebuttal to be taped separately before the program went on the air...

Small last weekend blamed the controversy on Frost and said "we'd never use him again...

"Kissinger never asked to know what was in the broadcast ... he acted quite honorably"...

David Frost quits
Kissinger interview

New York (AP)—Television personality David Frost has quit as NBC's interviewer of former secretary of state Henry Kissinger in a dispute over editorial control.

William Small, president of NBC News, said Sunday that Mr. Frost notified the network he believed "fundamental journalistic ethics" were violated by certain NBC decisions about the interviews.

Mr. Kissinger, who last year signed a five-year contract worth $1 million to provide occasional services to the network, was interviewed by Mr. Frost for a television special to be aired Thursday. The program, which still is scheduled to appear, was to coincide with publication of Mr. Kissinger's memoirs, "White House Years."

In a letter to the network last week after completing two of three scheduled interviews for the program, Mr. Frost said he was quitting because NBC had agreed to let Mr. Kissinger retroactively edit and clarify statements he made during the interviews.

Mr. Frost wrote: "In effect, Dr. Kissinger is to be allowed a second opportunity to answer questions first put to him three days earlier, a clear breach of our understanding to each other and to the press that—in accordance with normal journalistic practice—we would not reveal questions to Dr. Kissinger in advance of the interview."

In a telephone interview at his Washington home, Mr. Small said Mr. Frost was wrong and that "at no time were NBC journalistic principles compromised."

Neither Mr. Frost nor Mr. Kissinger could be reached for comment on the matter.

A4

THE WASHINGTON STAR Friday, October 12, 1979

# Frost's Kissinger Interview Was Tough, But It Was Beside the Point

## Mary McGrory

In June 1974, Henry Kissinger staged a famous tantrum in Salzburg after a rough press conference in which reporters rudely failed to focus on his Mideast triumph and instead quizzed him about wiretapping.

The same thing apparently happened in an NBC studio last week. The offender this time was the English interviewer, David Frost, who was asking all sorts of penetrating questions about Cambodia — a subject as uncongenial to the former secretary of state as wiretapping.

When Kissinger blew up in Salzburg, the Senate fell to its knees and passed a resolution attesting to the purity of his character. After Kissinger stormed out of an NBC studio last Wednesday, Frost charges, the network went the way of the Senate.

The shoving match was aired last night and was prefaced by a statement that Kissinger had not been allowed to edit the tape.

They said that they had encouraged Frost to ask "tough, difficult

questions." But Kissinger reacted, by all accounts, as if a waiter at the Congress of Vienna had challenged Metternich, and NBC was mortified. They had hardly expected a Nobel Peace Prize winner to be grilled like a war criminal.

They greatly prize Kissinger. He is a part-time employee whom they are paying $1 million over a five-year period. They do not wish him to be upset. They regard him as he does himself, as a genius in exile who will surely return to formal power when the Republicans regain the White House.

Frost had been comparatively gentle with Kissinger's boss in their studio encounters. He obviously, found the former president a fascinatingly preposterous figure who could be coaxed into saying just about anything, which turned out to be the case. But he showed no relevance for Kissinger, who, he plainly thinks, knows better. Slightly overtrained for the bout, he interrupted, badgered, argued, jeered at sources.

He even got Kissinger to admit a lie, although, of course, it was not called that.

Nixon, in announcing the Cambodian invasion, declared that we had respected Cambodian neutrality, even though we had been bombing them from B-52s for more than a year.

Kissinger, who enjoys explaining Nixon's shortcomings, said he did it "because he was given to hyperbole."

Kissinger's explanation of why he himself had made the same statement in a background briefing was vintage:

"To us the bombing of the sanctuaries had become so much a part of the landscape that we did not really focus on that, but that was not a cor-

rect statement."

His problem in dealing with Frost was that he knows Frost is a surrogate for his real nemesis, a 32-year old English journalist named William Shawcross, who has written a meticulous and devastating account of the Cambodian tragedy called, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia. It has received serious, worldwide attention.

"Cambodia was not a mistake; it was a crime," Shawcross says in the last page of his indictment.

Shawcross was one of Frost's coaches for the debate.

Frost brusquely suggested that as a result of Shawcross' documentation, Kissinger had had to do some hasty rewriting of the Cambodian section of his memoirs. Kissinger,

much ruffled, said he had added only one paragraph and one or two footnotes.

"Yes, but the question is who prepared the list?" he asked, when Frost confronted him with a catalogue of omissions from his stately memoirs. He knew that Shawcross was behind the arras.

"You are accepting one particular theory of a group of people who are now concentrating on Cambodia because the outcome in Vietnam did not fulfill all of their predictions," he said in a typical attempt to generalize his way out of one predicament.

Actually, that group of people is concentrating on Cambodia because two million people — those who survived the slaughter by Pol Pot, the maniac who took over from Lon Nol, the man Nixon and Kissinger thought could beat the Vietnamese for them — are dying of hunger, there.

The fame was not mentioned.

Twice Kissinger accused Frost of

making a "mockery of what has gone on in Cambodia."

The mockery, of course, is the Kissinger is still defending policy that have led to the prostration of people who were getting along the right until he and Nixon decided the way to shorten the war was to wide-

it.
Maybe if he said he was sorry would be of some small interest. The best thing he could have done, which he was trying to fend off Frost, was to announce he will donate some his royalties — or better, his NBC salary — to Cambodian famine relief.

Shawcross' final paragraph about what Kissinger and Nixon did Cambodia applies equally to the situation today:

"In Cambodia, the imperatives of small and vulnerable people we consciously sacrificed to the intuits of strategic design."

That's what the debate should have been about. A couple of personalities shouting at each other about whose fault it was doesn't help.

The Washington Star

Founded in 1852

MURRAY J. GART, Editor

SIDNEY EPSTEIN, Executive Editor

WILLIAM F. McIlWAIN, Deputy Editor

EDWIN M. YODER JR., Editorial Page Editor

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1979

Cambodia and Dr. Kissinger

The publicity attending Thursday evening's David Frost stormy interview with Dr. Henry Kissinger made it sound, in prospect, a bit like a collision between prima donnas. To a degree, perhaps, it was:

But that doesn't obscure the light this interesting television dispute shed. — not so much on how history may judge the U.S. undertaking in Vietnam (historians will differ quite as sharply as participants and journalists) as on the current debate over it, recently sharpened by William Shawcross' book, *Sideshow*, subtitled "Nixon, Kissinger and the Destruction of Cambodia."

Mr. Shawcross' harsh indictment, which Mr. Frost echoes, is that through blunder and misjudgment the Nixon administration needlessly converted Cambodia from a neutral bystander in the Indochina conflict into its most pitifully mauled and hapless victim.

In the face of their prosecutorial brief, Dr. Kissinger seemed unusually disarmed and handled Mr. Frost's grilling with less than his usual aplomb. Yet no case so tendentious as the Shawcross-Frost case on Cambodia is unanswerable. And Dr. Kissinger did, after a fashion, effectively answer it.

In the initial stages, he claims, the "secret" U.S. bombing of North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia (which he elsewhere says was known in detail to "at least 25 members of the Congress") was necessitated by the changing U.S. strategy, which came to be known as Vietnamization. As American forces were drawn down, the North Vietnamese from their staging areas along the Cambodian border intensified their military pressure, killing 500 Americans a week in the process. Since President Johnson had stopped the bombing of North Vietnam during the 1968 campaign, bombing the Cambodian sanctuaries was seen as an alternative to the politically-explosive renewal of the bombing of the North.

The administration's premise, as Dr. Kissinger said, was that the U.S. could not accept a headlong rout and must end the war short of dishonorable acquiescence in the overthrow of a South Vietnamese regime that had, in good faith, linked its destiny with ours. That premise was controversial then, and remains so, although it seems valid to us.

There are all sorts of subordinate questions, too — whether or not the mercurial Prince Sihanouk accepted American bombing; how North Vietnamese forces in the border areas were redeployed after the bombing and, later, after the 21-day "incursion" by U.S. and South Vietnamese

forces in May of 1970, and the political effects of that redeployment in Pnom Penh; whether the U.S. encouraged or too quickly acquiesced in the ouster of Sihanouk, and the ensuing enlistment of Cambodia under the inept Lon Nol as an active combatant in the war; and finally the role of all these developments on the ultimate triumph of the murderous Khmer Rouge forces in the closing stages of U.S. withdrawal. It was a complex sequence of events, and no settled view is possible today as to precise cause and effect.

Dr. Kissinger might have strengthened his case by yielding a bit of tactical ground to the Shawcross-Frost case; for the U.S. military role in Cambodia was undeniably furtive and of dubious legality, and there was substantial risk all along that its side-effects would unsettle the delicate political balance in Cambodia. The best that can be said is that American policy was insufficiently attentive to political consequences, in Cambodia as at home.

Still, it remains nonsense — on this we believe Dr. Kissinger to be everlastingly right — to blame the entire ruin of Cambodia, ending in its virtual disintegration as a society, on limited U.S. intervention in the border areas.

Dr. Kissinger insists, correctly we think, that if any single military action was responsible for destroying the neutrality and peace of Cambodia it was North Vietnamese action. It was they who first carried the war into Cambodia, in violation of its neutrality. It was they who only last year imposed its most recent military outcome. As Mr. Shawcross himself observes, historic Vietnamese ambitions in Cambodia were probably only postponed, not altered, by U.S. intervention in Indochina.

And there is this question, finally: If it was ultimately beyond American capacity to determine or even greatly affect the political future of Vietnam itself, at a tolerable price, by what logic may it be insisted that American intervention preponderantly determined the outcome of the Cambodian "sideshow"?

Cambodia remains the last argument for the thesis, elsewhere confounded, that it was U.S. intervention that turned a placid and innocent land into a war ruin. American power greatly intensified and coarsened the conflict — there is no escaping that realization. But as for the political and military ambitions that primarily propelled the war, it would seem that Hanoi was determined from the outset to unite Indochina — including Cambodia — under its domination. As it has done.

Kissinger's Cambodian Ghost

Like the United States itself in the Indochina war, Henry Kissinger did not start the Cambodian invasion; but he and Richard Nixon escalated it beyond all justification. Somehow, the full dimensions of the Cambodian tragedy which resulted directly from the Nixon-Kissinger Indochina policies seem to be beyond the former secretary of state's comprehension. Like King Lear, Henry Kissinger can find no peace.

Provoked by the probing of interviewer David Frost on NBC network television, Mr. Kissinger's thin-skinned responses provided him little defense for carrying the war into Cambodia:

Kissinger—We weren't destroying a country when we were...

Frost—We started to destroy a country...

Kissinger—We did not start to destroy a country from anybody's point of view when we were bombing seven isolated North Vietnamese base areas within some five miles of the Vietnamese border, from which attacks were being launched into South Vietnam.

That, in effect continues to be Mr. Kissinger's line of

defense for expanding the war until it totally ungulfed Cambodia. In September issue of *The Economist*, Mr. Kissinger challenges author William Shawcross' assertion in his book, "Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia," that the United States ended Cambodia's neutrality by invading the country.

Mr. Shawcross, however, maintains that it was with just this invasion on March 18, 1969, which the former secretary of state engineered and President Nixon ordered, that Mr. Kissinger consolidated "his control over foreign policy."

Still, whatever the world might now think of Mr. Kissinger's defense that "we inherited a tragedy," it is unavoidably clear that the true tragedy today is the total destruction of the Cambodians through continuing warfare and starvation. Only a few days ago, thousands of starving Khmer Rouge civilians and soldiers resumed their flight into neighboring Thailand, straining already inadequate refugee facilities.

Whatever might have been Mr. Kissinger's role, this suffering is now a moral blot on mankind which cries out for greater international response.