TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Rabin

11/3/72 12:16 p.m.

AR: Good morning. I passed to the Prime Minister what you had told me as a result of the leakage in Israel.

HK: Right.

AR: Now I was asked by the Prime Minister to convey to you first that she took the matter personally and second she realizes that there was a serious leakage. She is very sorry that it did happen and as a matter of fact she cannot even give to you any explanation of the situation.

HK: Right.

AR: She tries all the time to keep the secrecy of reports about the talks that we have held and she can only promise you that she will continue to do to find more effective ways that anything will be help only with her and she asked you not pass judgment about all the relations that I have been building--

HK: Our relations aren't affected, it's just the position in which I find myself as a result of this--I have total confidence in you and I have great confidence in her.

AR: Anyhow because you asked me to in addition to do what you said about the report itself--you asked for clarifications and assurances.

HK: Now I hope she understood that I wasn't making any demands for a proposal.

AR: No, no. At least I put it in the way and I think in the long run it's good that you put it this way.

HK: No, no, I stick by what I put to you. That was a formal request.

AR: Yeh I know, that's why I passed it as a formal request.

HK: That's what I wanted. You did it exactly correctly.

AR: And therefore what his explanations, he can't even be--because he doesn't know. You can't expect her to tell whom she suspects. I think she has taken precautions and she has expressed her regrets. She's has taken precautions--to prevent any repetition and after all this was only one case that really happened.

HK: That's right. Okay.

AR: I have been instructed to pass it to you as a message from her.

HK: I'll take it in that spirit and we'll conduct our relations based on that assurance.

AR: Okay. Fine. Bye.

RECLASSIFIED

Authority EO17258
By DAVID M. GLOSSER

TELCONE

Bill Hyland/Dr. Kissinger

9:10 a.m. - 11/4/72

K: Bill?

H: Yeah.

K: On that Berlin thing.

H: Yeah.

K: What is the situation, we did check it through out people, we
did tell the Russians it was ok.

H: Well, the problems are with the allies, the French and
British Ambassadors are behaving pretty wildly.

K: But why, what the hell difference does it make?

H: It doesn't, but you know they feel they're in a contest with
the Russians. Bar is also insisting that certain things get
in there because he can't get them from the East Germans
and he gets the support of the British and French and now
the Russians in Berlin have ended the subterfuge with
Hillenbrand and they are talking to him privately.

K: Now, then what can we do?

H: Well, I think it boils down to one simple phrase right now,
it's weird but there---

K: What is the phrase?

H: The question of four power rights.

K: What difference does it make?

H: Well, literally we're saying it doesn't affect the question of
and everybody, the allies would rather say it doesn't affect
the rights. And the second-----

K: It doesn't say it cannot raise the issue of the rights.

H: Well, the text that Marty's working from----

- 2 -

K: The question---

H: The question of.

K: Well why does that---what the Russians don't want to do is
reaffirm the rights again, they just want to keep it in the
status quo.

H: Yeah and the British, French and Germans are all disturbed
about the vagueness of the question of. That seems---they
all come back to that every damn time. If they could---if the
Russians could back away from that phrase it might unlock
it. But it may all come down to Bar. Bar has now thrown
in a real ringer by saying that if he can't get a reference
to Germany in his treaty or preamble then some reference
to Germany has to be in the four PEX power document.
And this morning they are going to press Bar to find out
whether that's really a demand of his or whether he's just
bargaining.

K: Couldn't I talk to Cromer and tell him------

H: That would be very helpful because the British damn near
walked out of the talks last night.

K: OK, I'll talk to Cromer.

H: But if Many could if they could have a little flexibility in
Berlin, sometimes this comes down to a word and Hillenbrand
is so damn scared to---but now that the Russians are talking
to him there are a couple of minor changes that would placate peo
that have no substance.

K: Right. Like what?

H: Well, for example there's a phrase "the four powers have
agreed to support". Now the Germans don't want this, they
say it's k condescending to their sovereignty and they would
like to say, "state that they will support". Now that's minor.
I'm sure the Russians would buy it.

K: OK.

H: Then there's another "that they will support such membership"

TELCOM

Amb. William Sullivan/Dr. Kissinger

9:55 a.m. - 11/4/72

K: Hello.

S: Yes Henry.

K: Bill, I understand that the Secretary is coming on ---going on Issues and Answers tomorrow.

S: One of those, Face, the Nation, Issues and Answers something of that sort, I don't know.

K: Are you going to be briefing him before?

S: He hasn't asked for any briefing. It's an anniversary, 25th anniversary program. He and George Shultz are on it. I don't know what they're going to get into.

K: Because what we would want is for him to hit you know McGovern's arguement that this is the same as his own proposal.

S: Sure, all right, I'll get that word to him.

K: And we thought it would come--that he'd take it more easily if you told him that if we tell him.

S: All right, ok I'll get in touch with him today.

K: I can tell him that and I'll tell him that you know the position very well and that you can take care of it.

S: If you to do that fine, that would give it a little more ah---

K: Yeah, I'll call him.

S: OK. Two things: I've got the Canadians coming in in about a little over an hour, about an hour and they're going to bring me some details. They other thing is that you may have seen what the Poles told our man in Warsaw.

K: Yes, I find that fascinating.

S: Yeah.

TELCORN

Secretary Rogers/Dr. Kissinger

10:00 a.m. - 11/4/72

K: Hello.

R: Henry.

K: Oh, Bill, sorry I didn't realize you were on the line. Two things: one I wanted to tell you, we will hear something, we're getting a message today from the North Vietnamese at 3:00 p.m. our time and we'll let you know what it says after we get it. And second, you're on on something tomorrow aren't you? The thinking here was that if you could had that one point where McGovern says it was his plan that was accepted. Sullivan knows all the positions. We would be glad to send something over but I think Sullivan---

R: I've got all that.

K: I'm sure you do.

R: What---I'm interested, did you have a briefing yesterday for foreign correspondents?

K: I had an off the record meeting which I have every two months or so--three months--with a group of foreign correspondents. It was off the record; it was not supposed to be used. And now the Washington Post is reporting it and reporting it incorrectly.

R: Yeah, Bill Alsop was questioned about the troops I mean what is---

K: Our position is on the troops has been that they should withdraw them prior to the agreement coming into effect. So it isn't part of the agreement. And then the no reinforcement provision would take care of it. But we've been very vague about acknowledging this.

R: Yeah. I haven't seen the Times. Did they play the story, too, the way the Post does?

K: I haven't seen the Times but, you know, somebody must have gone to one of these correspondents and got a cockeyed account because this was an off the record lunch. It was also incorrect.

DAILY NEWSPAPER

August 12, 1972

BOSTON GLOBE-BOSTON DAILY NEWSPAPER

- 2 -

R: I don't think there is any such thing as off the record any more on this subject.

K: That's true.

R: Well, I think probably the best thing to do is to try to duck it all together because if you start talking about troop withdrawals and so forth you open a can of worms.

K: I think that's right.

R: On the 3:00 p.m. thing we've gotten word that they'll let us know at 3:00?

K: They will have a message for us at 3:00.

R: What about Sout Vietnam? There's a ticker, we've got word now that Thieu has proposed something new. Do we have a copy of that yet?

K: Thieu hasn't proposed, but there's a news leak that Nha put out, his assistant, according to which we should make a separate arrangement with North Vietnam and then he'd negotiate separately with the rest of it. And he may drive us into that.

R: Yeah.

K: It is not a formal proposal and I don't think we should comment on it.

R: I like to just sort of see what the hell it is.

K: I haven't seen it.

R: We have it in the Department, at least we have reports of it. Maybe it's just a report. We don't have a direct communication from Bunker I don't think on it.

K: I have nothing from Bunker. This is something that I got from Bill Sullivan. Your information is better than mine. I have no independent information that Bill Sullivan doesn't have.

CLASSIFIED

AUG 27 1967 8:00AM
D. J. SMITH

- 3 -

R: Did you hear McGovern last night?

K: Oh that son-of-a-bitch. I didn't hear him but I've read
what he said.

R: He was pretty effective actually. I talked to the President
this morning. I didn't say it because I didn't want to
discourage him but I must say I thought it was one of his
better ones in terms of sounding as if he meant it.

K: Really.

R: It was rough, too, you know and dirty.

K: He is a filthy son-of-a-bitch. I mean for him to say that this
is his plan when he had---

R: Oh yeah, it is ridiculous, ridiculous. But it's tough. There
has been so much said on Vietnam for the average person to
follow--

K: Oh no, it can be effective.

R: Very effective. People are really fed up to the gills on the
God damn subject. And when he says it, Christ, in order
to negate it it takes you about two minutes to point out what
he proposed and where we stand in the agreement.

K: That's right.

R: But you know it is just absolutely false and the worst kind
of deception on his part.

K: That's right.

R: To pretend that what we have agreed to is what he proposed
all along. It's absolutely false. You know you've got to have
a lot of guts to lie that much in public.

K: I couldn't agree more. He will be all over the lot. You know
one minute he wants to overthrow Thieu and the next minute
Shriver bleeds about what we're doing to poor Thieu.

R: Yeah, well last week McGovern says we have an agreement
which he doesn't think much of he'd want to renegotiate it
and now he urges us to sign it.

CLASSIFIED
Autumn 1985-
B47
SANDIADAY 6/10/85

TELCOM

Bill Hyland/Dr. Kissinger

10:58 a.m. - 11/4/72

K: Hello, Bill?

H: Yes.

K: If they drop the phrase, "the question of" can we then guarantee that the God damn document will be accepted.

H: Yeah, I think---I think we have about a 90% chance of getting everybody on board if they make the semantic concession.

K: Now, I would like to be able to tell them that.

H: That's my guess, yes.

K: Can we then instruct Hillenbrand that he's got to get a _________

H: Yeah we can tell him---I can get on the---

K: I think I can get them to drop it. Where is Sonnenfeldt, is he playing tennis? Is he going to sulk for six weeks if I do this without him?

H: No, I talked to him this morning, he knows what's going on.

K: OK, let me talk to Cromer.

H: Look, the British are not as much of a problem as it seemed like when I talked to you this morning. Apparently this morning in Berlin they began to wobble.

K: OK.

H: But if we want to guarantee that if they drop "the question of" it would be good to have the British with us.

K: OK, let me talk to Cromer.

H: OK.

CLASSIFIED

August 27, 1972
Dated: October 1

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Cromer

11/4/72 11:15 a.m.

HK: We are having some problems on this Berlin thing. You have a tempermental ambassador there. If he would--

AC: We thought he was going better. I will go first and look at the text (four powers)

HK: I have a report on which I may have improvise. Are you familiar with the text?

AC: Not really.

HK: Me neither. The big issue is they got to be all cannon lawyers. The Russians had proposed "the question of four powers rights" are not effective. Your ambassador and the French say "the four powers rights are"--the Russians say if they drop the question of" will we support the test of it. I have to check with you and my instinct is we would like to support it.

AC: If this is the only--

HK: They have some other crazy things.

HK: I can say that because I don't know. But let me get back to you.

HK: How quickly?

AC: Very soon.

HK: If they drop "the question of: would you be willing to go along with it.

AC: I'll try to be back to you soon.

HK: Hillenbrandt can work it out with you--I sure don't want to get in on the rest of it.

AC: I am sure of that Henry--let me see.

LREASSFIELD)

Autograph, E212.958
B-EP MAR 10/03

*

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

11/4/72 11:25 a.m.

HK: If you drop "the question of" and keep in the word "practices"-- "Practices" is in our text anyway--then we will support it and I have talked to the British and they will also support it. They will take one more run at the specialized agencies and if you reject it they will break off on it. I am telling you this confidentially.

AD: Good. I will mention it. If we drop "the question of" then you will send a telegram and your ambassador will be in touch with ours.

HK: If you can say this--

AD: I will give the message to our ambassador and you to yours and then we'll use it together.

HK: We probably can get it introduced as a Western and let them work it out for whatever is best.

AD: Maybe Western and you and we together but you will stand together with us on this one. One other thing about the UN position in Vietnam. Waldheim--he makes too many speeches--

HK: Goddamn him! my colleagues call him the head waiter--he looks like one.

AD: (laughing) It depends on what kind of establishment you're talking about.

HK: Head waiter in a restaurant with private drawing rooms. The Secretary General is part of the conference--he can attend the conference--Otherwise he has no functions.

AD: He spoke of troops there.

HK: Total nonsense. Your allies don't want it and we didn't propose it. It is his own ambition.

AD: Goodbye and good luck Henry.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: N.W. St. Paul, Minn.

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Debrynin

11/4/72 11:25 a.m.

HK: If you drop "the question of" and keep in the word "practices"-- "Practices" is in our text anyway--then we will support it as I have talked to the British and they will also support it. They will take one more run at the specialized agencies and if you reject it they will break off on it. I am telling you this confidentially.

HK: If you can say this--

HK: Goddam him! Our colleagues call him the head waiter--he looks like one.

AD: He spoke of troops there.

TELCORN
Bill Hyland/Dr. Kissinger

11:35 a.m. - 11/4/72

K: Bill?

H: Yes.

K: Will you---they're willing to drop "the question of"

H: OK.

K: I have talked to Cromer and they're willing to go along.

H: OK.

K: Will you now get Hillenbrand in touch with the other fellow?

H: Yeah.

K: Let them work out the tactics.

H: And they will be instructed on this.

K: Well, we hope so, the British you mean?

H: No the other side.

K: The others, yes.

H: OK.

K: They'll be instructed but we are now pretty well committed to the rest of the thing's text.

H: Ok, the rest of the text minus "the question of"

K: Minus the question of.

H: And it's up to Marty and his counterpart to--

K: Right and he can count on British support. He called London. They want to take out the phrase"specialized agencies" but they won't fall on the specialized their sword.

H: Yeah, well that's not going to wash with the Russians.

CLASSIFIED

August 12, 1972

BOSTON DAILY GAZETTE, 11/1/72

TELCOM

Marquis Childs/Dr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m. - 11/4/72

K: Hello.

C: Good morning, Henry.

K: Marquis, how are you?

C: Well I'm pretty well, how about you?

K: I'm fine.

C: I couldn't help but think of our talk a week ago.

K: No, the essentials are unchanged.

C: They're unchanged.

K: The trouble is everybody calls two hours now to take our temperature. But what I said last week still stands and within weeks of another meeting I think we can get it done.

C: Within weeks of another meeting.

K: I have a feeling now that they will come to that meeting with the same attitude they had in October, if they want to stone-wall it then of course we won't get it.

C: How soon is that meeting, Henry?

K: I have no fixed date. I would think sometime soon after the election.

C: After the election?

K: That would be my instinct.

C: But this brouhaha is just what you expected?

K: More or less yes.

C: More or less. I remember you said especially the media would be going to cause you a great deal of trouble. I guess that's proved true. You still feel that it was the same as it was a week ago?

BROKEN PAGE

August 27 72 - Page 105

BROKEN PAGE

- 2 -

K: Essentially yes. In fact, yes. There's been no change in the situation except that everybody has to get----. Well look at it from Hanoi's point of view can they appear for a talk the day after they have demanded that we sign another agreement.

C: No.

K: They have to put some decent interval between those.

C: I see.

K: Do they want to talk in the last days of an election and give the President a shot in the arm. You know I'm looking at it from their point of view.

C: Surely, yes.

K: So I think that after Tuesday and after we have crushed you Democrats.

C: That's probably going to happen all right.

K: I don't know I have no way of knowing that. I mean after Tuesday when things can again be discussed calmly in this country.

C: Yes.

K: I cannot imagine as I said in my press conference that we could have come this far and that it should now break down over either the issue of procedure or over what now still remains to be done of substance.

C: How would you measure the substantiveness of what has to be done?

K: You know, when the huge things done then what remains looks big but I think compared to what has been done what remains to be done soluble to put in mildly.

C: Well I certainly hope so. I believe it, too, you see not knowing anything about it I believe it is irreversible.

K: That's what I think. If you read what they have said. What

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

256-2107

has Hanoi really said when you take out all the vituperation
and charges of double cross and so forth. What are they
saying? They say, what does Xuan Thuy say "there's no
sense in a private meeting unless they know we want to
agree to the accord" or something like. In other words
they want to make sure there'll be an agreement at the
end of it and not just a maneuver with us for a platform to
bomb them again. I'm looking at it now, I'm giving you the
Hanoi version.

C: Exactly.

K: I'm not saying they won't talk.

C: They're not saying that at all, are they?

K: NOT at all. Read their statements.

C: Yes, yes.

K: So essentially now we have to keep calm and remember that
you know this is not an electionthing this is something we
need to get done for the sake of the country.

C: Yeah. McGovern's dealing rather badly with it isn't he?

K: I think, you know speaking as a friend now, I really think
it's a shoddy thing.

C: Yeah.

K: To suggest that we, that Le Duc Tho and I put on a big
charade for several months and then that Hanoi would demand
that we sign an agreement also as part of that charade and
that then we refuse to sign it so that we can get through ten
days in a campaign where we are leading by 28 points.

C: Yeah, it's pretty bad.

K: I mean it's absurd.

C: It's pretty bad, I'll say it is.

K: I could put---if we put out the agreement you'd see it's a
God damn good agreement. We just don't put it out so
that there isn't a checklist so that afterwards people can't
say well Hanoi made you additional concessions.

DROPPED

August 22 1966

B4567890123456789

- 4 -

C: No. Is the version broadcast by Hanoi roughly correct?

K: Well, it is substantively correct but all the nuances are, of course, shaded in their favor.

C: Surely.

K: But I don't want to get into a debate with them at this stage.

C: No, or course not.

K: They and we have to settle in the next month or two at the outside.

C: Yes, yes.

K: Why the hell should we now start debating publicly and dig ourselves in where no one can retreat any more. But believe me the issues that remain to be settled are not fundamental issues of principle.

C: Not the fundamental issues of the agreement.

K: There not issues of principle. Of course, they have substantive aspects.

C: Yes.

K: But compared to the basic things that have been settled it is practically inconceivable to me that they won't get settled.

C: Well I'm glad to hear you say that. I've been a little bit shaken in the last day or two.

K: That's only because right now every little sliver is front page news.

C: I know. You know it's curiously like the war in Suez in 1956 right at the climax of the election and of course the Republicans thought they were going to lose to that but of course the Democrats, Sevenson knew better, he knew that that would cement Ike in if there had been any doubt at all which there wasn't

K: You know it's a rocky period to get this done. It's a war that's lasted for 15 years. You're dealing with maniacs on all sides. We're caught between Hanoi and Saigon but all of this will work out.

TELCOM

George Sherman/Dr. Kissinger

12:35 p.m. - 11/4/72

K: Hello.

S: Dr. Kissinger?

K: Yes.

S: Well, as I explained to your secretary I'm having a hell of a time with this story. I'm trying for Sunday to put something together with a sense of proportion on the diplomatic side as opposed to sort of the charges that are flying back and forth on the political side.

K: Well those charges are not worthy of comment.

S: Well, I'm sorry but this is some sort of flak I'm getting from my editorial side here. Now regarding the President's speech on Thursday night. I read that speech as the followon to some of the things that Ziegler had been saying on the record.

K: I'm amazed that anyone after all---you can bet your bottom dollar that I had something to do with drafting it.

S: Right.

K: I did not think there was anything new in there.

S: I agree with you. But you know the President---

K: With the President diassociating himself from what I said. This is off the record since I had a major hand in drafting that what he said, it's not very probable is it?

S: Well I think the basic impression that's given leaving aside the part that he's disassociating himself from you.

K: Leave that aside. Has anything fundamentally changed since my press conference, that's the important issue.

S: I think the impression that we all got in the Thursday press conference was that there were relatively insignificant issues.

K: I said compared to the issues that have already been settled.

S: What's happened in the week since is that the remaining differences have steadily emerged in the public mind as

OCTOBER 5, 1972

- 2 -

something more basic than insignificant.

K: I said they are ~~very~~ relatively minor compared to the issues that have already been settled.

S: Well would you say that that impression was left by the President's speech on Thursday night.

K: I don't want to comment on the President's speech. I want to say that we--stick by what I said that is that within the agreement the issues remaining to be settled can all be encompassed within the basic principles of the agreement. Then there are some corollated things which I don't want to talk about. But all of it is doable and has been known by the other side.

S: What's your assessment of how the other side's handling this?

K: The other side is in a very complex situation. The other side is trying to get us to commit ourselves to the other agreement

S: Right.

K: The other side doesn't want to enter a new negotiation which might reopen the entire agreement but they have never rejected the negotiations.

S: But you agree with this no new negotiation to reopen the whole agreement?

K: We have, after all, I have affirmed the essential provisions of the agreement publicly and we absolutely stick with that.

S: Right, ok.

K: So we're, talking therefore about nuances expansions. We're not talking about a new agreement and we're talking about a few associated actions. You know, anyone of those could be insoluble if you assume we are looking for a pretext to delay. I'm assuming a decision to settle.

S: Has already been made?

K: Yes.

CLASSIFIED

August 12 1988
B-84 FYD 8/10/88

- 3 -

S: You're not raising much hope that these talks will be before the election do you?

K: I think that's now less likely.

S: But you think, you're not very worried that they may do something in the next two or three days to try to influence the election real dramatically. I don't know what they could do, I mean---release the text of the President's letter

K: You know then if they do that we'll release a lot of other messages and a lot of records of meetings.

S: Which you could really set back the negotiations I suppose.

K: You know if we're going to play this game I have not said they were in bad faith. You know on the internal evidence since they said we changed the date three times already you would have to---the fact that these were hypothetical dates could not have escaped their notice.

S: Well you're actually firm on this---the President never categorically said on October whatever it was the 23rd that we would sign---

K: I am saying that in the context of the whole situation of all the things that were said at meetings of what they knew we were going through they should have known that there was a strong possibility that we might ask for further talks. But I'm not saying that in bad faith. They might release that text and then where the hell are they?

S: I'm rather puzzled by their tactics in terms of that interview Phan Van Dong gave to Arnold ________. That was given on the 18th the day after you arrived in Saigon for publication Monday.

K: No, that's the day on which I arrived in Saigon.

S: On the day. So had they already suspected that there were going to be problems with Saigon. How do you see this? Because that section was released at a time or given at a time that they had no idea whether there was going to be a delay did they?

- 4 -

K: No, at that time if there was a misunderstanding it occurred between---in a 36-hour period. On the 18th the had some reason to suppose that maybe there might be a delay.

S: Oh, I see. In other words we already contacted them.

K: Well I saw them on the 17th.

S: I see. You are saying by the time you arrived in Saigon they were aware that there probably would be a delay.

K: No, but that there was a possibility.

S: Oh.

K: With all respect I don't think this is the most important issue now. The most important thing is whether these--how we start these talks with sufficient assurance to them that you know, they won't get an entirely new ballgame. And I think it is a perfectly doable thing and then whether these issues are substance or nuances.

S: You believe that they have reason to know privately at least that you are not going to start a whole new ballgame.

K: They know exactly what we are going to discuss.

S: So in the long run you still haven't lost your basic confidence that the thing is doable in the next couple of weeks or so?

K: Well within weeks after we start talking provided we start talking in the way we talked last time we met.

S: OK, have a good time.

K:: Right, thanks.

TELECON
Rowland Evans

11/6/72 8:52 a.m.

E: For no attribution of any kind. Is this still on the track?

K: Listen, it is absolutely on the tracks and exactly the way we described it. I mean, you know, I'm talking to you as a friend now. I have never seen anything as filthily irresponsible as McGovern's behavior.

E: I agree.

K: I mean, just look at it from a practical point of view. Here is Hanoi asking us to sign on the 31st. So their question is how soon after the 31st can they sign, can they resume negotiations without looking totally ridiculous. There are we. The next time we start we want to finish it. Now wouldn't you think it makes a little sense not to get it all caught in the turmoil?

E: Absolutely.

K: You will see within the next two or three weeks that it is moving as I told you. But we had zero incentive for the sake of really public morality to stage a big spectacular on the last weekend of an election campaign.

E: Yeah, do they understand that in Hanoi?

K: There is no problem with Hanoi. And it isn't . . . it's a mutual thing. This thing is, you know, this is strictly for you Rowlie, but it is absolutely on track and you will see.

E: Well that was my feeling, but I wanted to double-check it with you.

K: And I must tell you that man may be a saintly man but I have yet to see the evidence of it.

E: Outrageous demagoguery.

K: I mean this is really filth, to suggest that the President of the United States in collusion with Hanoi would put on a tremendous hoax for which there is no substance whatever just so he can keep the war going for four more years.

E: No, I agree with that Henry; you'll have no quibble with me on that. I watched that speech and I thought it was outrageous. Let me ask you one point.

K: You know what I cannot tell you is whether when we meet there may be a hangup.

R. Evans, 11/6/7, 8:52 a.m., p. 2

E: What do you mean?

K: You know, when we meet with Hanoi.

E: What's your feeling there?

K: My feeling is that what I said in my press conference is going to happen. That is my near certainty.

E: I've been reading different figures about the size of the North Vietnam-ese regulars in South Vietnam. You told me about 110 but the figure that I read everywhere is 140 to 150. Could you clear that up for me?

K: Yeah, the figure is 145,000 in organized units but that includes the remnants of the VC divisions, not the guerrillas. You know there were three divisions that were VC and that are now about only a third VC, but there are still about 30,000 organized VC there.

E: Okay Henry, how long are you going to be out there?

K: I'll be back tomorrow evening.

E: You worried about Thieu? still worried about Thieu?

K: Well, I'm much more worried about him than I am about Hanoi.

E: He's got a lot of cards doesn't he?

K: Well he's got a lot of apparent cards. He's got no cards at all.

E: Except if he really threw down the gauntlet that the United States would do what would have to be done

K: Yeah but that's where he's wrong. Look I think we got a better deal than anybody thought possible. If you analyze even its military provisions if he can't live with those there is almost no way to improve them fundamentally by continuing the war.

E: Do you think Hanoi is upset at what we're trying to do in moving a lot of stuff in there?

K: No. I think we are on track there. That's really, that situation is under control.

E: Okay Henry, that's very helpful. What do you hear about California?

K: You mean the outcome?

Evans, 11/6/72 8:52 a.m., p. 3

K: I talked to Paul Ziffren yesterday; he thinks we'll carry it by about 600,000.

E: Take care of all those pretty girls will you.

K: What is your view about this?

E: Well I'd say there's been a substantial flaking off in the last four or five days. . . . . .

K: Why that's X.

E: I think it's a lot of blue-collar democrats coming home. I think McGovern made a point on the war issue although I'm not sure of that, I don't know. He may have lost. The blue-collar democrats back home, some of them, not by any means enough to threaten a landslide. I think he'll carry all the states but he might lose Wisconsin. They say now he might lose West Virginia. I don't believe it. I went down there and Nixon was way ahead. But he's not going to do much in Congress, if anything. Of course Eisenhower won in 1956 and lost in the . The Democrats there are a very strong party.

K: Yeah, but there isn't enough of a shift to affect the election in any significant way.

E: Oh hell no. I think it's been a lousey campaign Henry. It's been a parody of a serious .

K: Well it's been . . . what McGovern has done I really find unforgivable.

E: Have you ever talked to Paul Warncke?

K: Yes and Paul Warncke told us privately, he said this is what we dreamed about in 1968 and now you guys got it. He said I'll do my best to keep them quiet but I can't guarantee it.

E: I got a call in to him now. I want him to tell me that.

K: He won't tell you that but that's what he told Haig.

E: And you don't think there's a dangerous sticking point on this question of having North Vietnam pull out some of its troops.

K: Rowlie we have surmounted worse problems than that. If you read Xuan Thuy carefully in yesterday's Times he didn't sound like a man who was heading for an impasse, did he?

E: No he didn't, no.

Evans, 11/6/72 8:52 a.m., p. 4

K: And that's what you have to look at.

E: But when you say worse problems you're talking about

K: No, no we've surmounted much more difficult problems in our talking to the North Vietnamese. Look, Xuan Thuy is saying that the problems we raised have partly already been solved.

E: Say that again.

K: You know what Xuan Thuy was saying in the Times was that many of the problems we raised have already been solved. You know, that's a nice face-saver, you know.

E: All right.

K: Yeah, but we're in touch with them anyway, so we don't have to rely on what he says. No you can write with confidence that it's on track. Okay.

E: Thanks a lot.

K: Right.

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Jerry Schecter/Kissinger

9:36 a.m. - 11/6/72

K: Jerry.

S: Yes, sir, how are you?

K: OK. Jerry, I have a complaint which is when we've made a point - either Haig or I - of being so readily available, you really should check facts with us.

S: Yeh, what was

K: I mean for example, where do you get the fact that the agreement says the international board will get into place 30 days after?

S: Are you talking about this week's magazine?

K: Yeh, you say - it says: "Saigon and Washington want the machinery to supervise the ceasefire in-place when it is declared, not within 30 days as the hastily draft proposal now suggests." Well, that's just total crap. Even Xuan Thuy said the draft proposal says immediately. What we want is to spell out what immediately means.

S: Uh-huh, Well, that came from the other side, from the State Department and so

K: Yeh, but they just don't know. They're either mischievous or ignorant.

S: Well, I'm sorry about that.

K: Similarly, that national council is not supposed to set up elections. The elections - I mean I'm talking about facts now that are not matters of opinion. That the text of the agreement will make perfectly plain. Well, set up depends how you define it.

S: Yeh.

K: The elections are to be agreed upon by the Saigon and the NLF. After they are agreed upon, then the Committee organizes and supervises them.

S: I see.

2

K: But the Committee can't say it'd be nice to have an election and therefore we are now going to set one up. The way it works is they are handed an election, they'll say that Thieu and the NLF agree that there should be an election in 9 months, then they are told go to work. And of course, operating on the principle of unanimity they will do that with great efficiency.

S: Right. Well, the problem is that, you know, it's a real difficult situation because people all over are talking

K: Yeh, but I have never misled you.

S: I know, you haven't misled me but also you're not interpreting this thing for me, you're not spelling it out and so, you know, I don't like to come running around every 15 minutes or so asking you to - I figure that our relationship is such that if you're prepared to talk about something you're going to talk about it and if you're not then

K: No, no, but you'd have to assume that if I'm not prepared to talk nobody else knows.

S: (Laughs) That's wonderful, Henry.

K: Now you know there's another really that's at least opinion, I can't argue with it - that the President deliberately delayed this until after November 7.

S: Yeh, well

K: You know a little analysis of the situation makes clear... I mean if the North Vietnamese asked to sign on October 31st, how soon after October 31st can they start talking again without losing too much face. This thing is absolutely on track. It is exactly on the track I indicated.

S: Maybe I can pick up some pieces this week.

K: You know it doesn't hurt us any and no one except insiders gives a damn. Also it isn't really true that the members of that Conference were decided during this week. They were already agreed upon.

DREASCHED

AUG 21 1977 9:00AM

JOYCE JAS

S: Well, listen

K: You know these are little nuances that don't make any difference but they also

S: ... that really make a difference in the first place are questions raised about this whole thing that I'd like to ask you so that I can straighten this out, the whole timing of this thing. There are various ways and various things that appeared in the press here. We really ought to sit down and discuss this whole question of why it took so long and give a reasonable and satisfactory explanation that goes beyond simply saying how soon after October 31st can we start talking. An awful lot of people are wondering why this wasn't worked out.

K: Why it wasn't worked out when?

S: By that deadline. Here it says at one point that you were supposed to go to Hanoi and then

K: Well, you know there are a lot of stories around.

North

S: That was in what the/Vietnamese said. They outlined out the whole timetable.

K: Look, if we publish the whole record it will make clear that they knew goddamn well that every timetable was hypothetical. I mean they themselves said we changed it three times so the fact that we were changing timetables couldn't have been great news to them.

S: Well, I just don't ______ that frankly. Maybe it'll all come clear at some point.

K: You know what I find amazing. No one in the press thought one paragraph of the goddam thing had been drafted. For two years there was nothing but criticism about the talk. What conceivable motive could we have to do anything other than to get the best possible agreement and we're talking as I said in my press conference, about a matter of weeks. You know it's very easy then suddenly to start negotiating and to start looking for dark motives if they hadn't blown it, it would have gone like many other hurtles and would have finally been solved.