NEWS MEDIA

Beirut's Thin
Green Line

Among the 50-odd foreign reporters covering the war in Lebanon, there is widespread agreement—even among the veterans—that combat reportage has never been so fraught with discomfort, difficulty and danger. From Beirut, NEWSWEEK'S William E. Schmidt filed this report on the press corps's daily nightmare:

The first few mortar rounds crashed with ear-splitting impact. Then one shell hit the apartment building across the street from the Commodore—the hotel that serves as headquarters and home for dozens of foreign correspondents. A spray of cement fragments and glass shards exploded through the open doors into the lobby. As they have done many times before, hotel deskmen broke out first-aid kits and fire extinguishers and herded a dozen newsmen from the bar into a makeshift shelter in the basement. The barrage lasted for 45 minutes, killing several persons in the street and once again knocking out the journalists' fragile telex communications system. "Even in Saigon," sighed one reporter, "it was never like this."

So far, twelve newsmen have been killed in Beirut—all but three of them Lebanese—and the threat of injury hangs thickly along the darkened streets patrolled by young and often undisciplined guerrillas. Communications are sporadic, information fragmented and unreliable, and movement between the Christian and Muslim sides of the city extremely dangerous. Outside of the Commodore, there is no electricity, little food and few of the amenities that made even Saigon a refuge in the days of that war: "It is much, much worse here," says Dean Brelis, a former NBC newsman who covered Vietnam and now reports for Time magazine. "There is a constant feeling that anything can happen to you at any moment."

**Gunmen:** Earlier this summer, New York Times correspondent Henry Tanner was driving with Beirut newspaper editor Edouard Saab across the green line separating the two rival factions. Suddenly, there was the crack of a sniper's rifle and Saab fell dead across the wheel with a bullet in his head. A shaken Tanner managed to steer the car to safety. NEWSWEEK'S Tony Clifton was recently tied up in his apartment by renegade gunmen who threatened to kill him. The most seriously injured American correspondent was The Chicago Tribune's Philip Caputo, who was turned back by gunmen on a Beirut sidewalk and then shot in the back and legs. One of Caputo's

heels was shattered by a bullet and he still has difficulty walking. Some casualties have been victims of vendettas. A young Christian boy who was a telex operator for UPI was kidnapped by leftists; when he was finally found, his throat had been slit, his eyes gouged out and his head split with an axe.

Movement about the city is complicated by a proliferation of passes issued by various factions, and woe to the reporter who shows the wrong one. NEWSWEEK'S Barry Came, who mistakenly flashed a pass from Saiga (a Palestinian guerrilla group) at a Palestine Liberation Organization checkpoint, was dragged from his car at gunpoint and held for nearly an hour in a windowless cell. One reaction to such dangers has been a recourse to modified pack journalism, in which reporters travel in clumps—even auto convoys—to cover the action. That has been a boon to Beirut's taxi drivers, who charge reporters up to $100 to take them near the action—a trip of usually less than 2 miles. Many newsmen have also purchased T shirts emblazoned with the Arabic script for journalist, sahafi, and the logo of their news organization.

The few telex and telephone facilities that exist lie in the Muslim sector, where most of the reporters are accordingly based. In order to get information from Christian sources, newsmen must risk not only a hazardous trip but the anger of rightists who suspect the correspondents of bias toward the other side. "It is not easy to write a balanced story," says The Washington Post's Tom Lippman, "simply because as the lines have become more rigidified, your access to both sides is all the more difficult."

The communications problems have proven especially dicey for the TV networks. With Beirut airport closed, film frequently must be driven from the city

to Amman via Damascus, a trip that can take up to twelve hours depending on battle and traffic conditions. Many major U.S. newspapers no longer staff the war on a full-time basis, but rather rotate reporters in and out on short-term assignments. Time has closed its Beirut bureau, splitting the coverage between its Cairo bureau and stringer Brelis, who is based in Athens. The AP has moved its operations to Cyprus, but UPI, Reuters, NEWSWEEK and The New York Times still maintain offices in Beirut.

**Escape:** "The major problem in Beirut is the question of personal security," notes Don Schanche, a Los Angeles Times reporter who periodically covers Lebanon. "In Korea, Southeast Asia, even the Middle East in 1958, you could always count on the people around you. In Beirut, there is the feeling they will turn on you at any moment." Reporters finishing their tours may literally have to escape from Lebanon. To get to Cyprus, Schanche was forced to charter a small boat that carried no radio, no charts, not even a flashlight.

Still, most reporters do cope. Copy does get out, sometimes not in time and occasionally via scratchy telephone dictation through Paris. The bar at the Commodore is crowded each night with reporters and Lebanese who have fled from shattered homes. Ice and cold beer come at a premium, but there is a press mascot—a lively green parrot which itself survived a sniper's shot recently while taking the sun by the seldom-used pool. And life improved last month when the Commodore's owner began showing TV tapes of films he had somehow brought in from the U.S. But the selection did little to revive the violence-weary correspondents. The first week's bill consisted of "The Godfather," "Bonnie and Clyde" and "Dirty Harry."

Catherine Leroy

NBC crew en route to the action: 'Saigon was never like this'

Newsweek, August 23, 1976

Vol: 88:63

Q. Since you are going to see black Rhodesian leaders on this trip, will you also see white Rhodesian leaders anywhere?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not plan to see white Rhodesian leaders on this trip.

I do not consider this trip to be the last word in our African policy. I expect it to be the basis from which an integrated African policy will be developed, and therefore we expect to be in contact with other leaders in both black African countries as well as in white southern African countries, or with southern African regimes, after I return to the United States.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

## Secretary Kissinger Discusses Situation in Lebanon

While en route to Africa, Secretary Kissinger met with Ambassador L. Dean Brown at London on April 23. Following are remarks to the press after their meeting.

Press release 195 dated April 24

Secretary Kissinger: Ambassador Brown and I have had a very good, very helpful talk.

As you know, Ambassador Brown was sent to Lebanon four weeks ago, taking leave from his position as president of the Middle East Institute, and left with something like 24 hours' notice. At that time, the situation in Lebanon was chaotic, and the danger of outside intervention was very great. In the interval, partly as a result of his extraordinary efforts, we can now talk about the beginning of a restoration of constitutional government in Lebanon.

We discussed such things as the creation of a security force and the danger of the situation in Lebanon escalating into a Middle East crisis has been reduced.

We've repeatedly pointed out that it remains a delicate process and that it could easily be upset by irresponsible actions of

individuals, actions of outside powers. And the U.S. view is that all of the factions, all of the interested outside powers should continue to exhibit the constructive attitude that has brought matters to this point.

Ambassador Brown is going to return to the United States to report to the President. He will then return to Lebanon for a few days, and then he will have completed his mission with great distinction and as a great service to peace in the area—a great service to the foreign policy of the United States.

Q. What do you mean by the "creation of a security force"?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, the security force in the country—the military forces and the police—disintegrated under the impact of the civil war, and when a new President is elected and the government is reconstituted, one of the obvious problems it will face is how to create a force that is responsive to the government and that can interpose itself between the various factions. And there are some ideas on this subject that are now being explored and with which Ambassador Brown has also been helpful.

Q. Will there be Lebanese forces or outside forces?

Secretary Kissinger: We are talking about Lebanese forces drawn perhaps from some of the factions or separately recruited. We don't want to go into any of the details, but we are specifically talking about Lebanese security forces to deal with Lebanese problems.

Q. Will there be indigenous Palestinians in that security force?

Secretary Kissinger: The composition of the security forces is one of the subjects that is under negotiation right now; and I don't think it is for us to speculate as to the elements, but obviously a security force to be effective must be acceptable to all of the parties there and all of the parties that feel threatened.

May 17, 1976

627

Q. What kind of time frame are you talking about?

Secretary Kissinger: We, of course, do not control the time frame. Again I must stress the situation is tenuous and delicate, and it has been brought to this point through the constructive attitude of all of the parties. On the assumption that that continues, we would think that the election of a new President could be completed within a two-week period and that the beginning of a return to more normal processes should start immediately after that.

Q. Has the danger of massive outside intervention been reduced?

Secretary Kissinger: It is my impression from Ambassador Brown's report that the danger of outside intervention has been reduced. But, of course, if the situation in Lebanon should blow up again, the danger could return.

Q. Are the Syrian troops still in there?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think there has been any significant change in troop deployment since I answered questions at a press conference yesterday.

Q. Would the United States play any role—perhaps as a guarantor in case security forces were to be established?

Secretary Kissinger: Our basic position has been to avoid intervention by outside powers or to give outside powers the right of intervention, and therefore we would believe that the best solution would be one in which the Lebanese factions agree among themselves as to the creation of the security force.

Q. What are the prospects for Syrians removing their troops from Lebanon?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this is a question that will have to be negotiated between the Lebanese and the Syrians, but it is our impression that they are there as part of the immediate situation and not a permanent feature of the Lebanese scene.

Q. What is the U.S. role in the creation of

the security force? Is Ambassador Brown trying to get factions to agree on the compositions or—

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think it is fair to say that Ambassador Brown has been one of the very few people who has been in touch with all of the factions—and I say very few, probably the only person in Lebanon—and therefore he has been in a position to carry the views of the various parties to the others. My judgment is that he's played a very useful, in fact, almost decisive role in this diplomatic process.

And we will do as we indicated when we sent Ambassador Brown—he will be ready to do what the parties ask him to do and to help them to move toward common objectives. And when he leaves—in about two weeks—Ambassador Meloy [Francis E. Meloy, Jr.] will replace him to perform again whatever functions—

Q. Ambassador Brown, did you have any direct or indirect contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization in your negotiations?

Ambassador Brown: I did not.

Q. Can I ask you something else, if I would, please? In Indianapolis early today, President Ford said there was no prospect the United States will extend diplomatic relations to North Viet-Nam. Some reporters out there sense a contradiction in what you said in the past. What are the prospects and is there any contradiction between your position and the President's?

Secretary Kissinger: President Ford and I meet practically every day, and it is traditional that the foreign policy of the Secretary of State coincides with the foreign policy of the President—a tradition which is not going to be interrupted this year.

As I understand the President's statement, and I have talked to General Scowcroft [Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs] in the interval, and I believe the President has spoken in this sense today as well, it was his assessment since—it was the President's

assessment that since we had not been given
a satisfactory answer to the missing in
action that he saw no prospect of normaliz-
ing relations. And therefore the policy of the
Administration is as the President expressed
it in Hawaii in December. As we've repeated
since, we're prepared to talk to North Viet-
Nam, but the absolute precondition before
considering any other move is an accounting
of the missing in action.

U.S. and Greece Initial Principles
for Future Defense Cooperation

Following is the text of a statement of
principles initialed at Washington on April
15 by Secretary Kissinger and Greek Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs Dimitri S. Bitsios,
together with the texts of a letter from For-
ign Minister Bitsios to Secretary Kissinger
dated April 7 and Secretary Kissinger's reply
dated April 10.

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE FUTURE
UNITED STATES-GREEK DEFENSE
COOPERATION

1. The Governments of the United States of America and Greece will complete as soon as possible a new defense cooperation agreement to replace the 1953 United States-Greek military facilities agreement and other related agreements. The United States Government will submit this Agreement to Congress for approval.

2. The new Agreement will be designed to modernize the United States-Greek defense relationship reflecting the traditionally close association between the United States and Greece and the mutuality of their defense interests in the North Atlantic Alliance.

3. This new Agreement will define the status and set forth the terms for operations of military installations in Greece where United States personnel are present. It will

be similar to the United States-Turkish
Agreement and will embody, inter alia, the
following principles:

(A) Each installation will be a Greek military installation under a Greek commander.

(B) The installations shall serve only purposes authorized by the Government of Greece. Their activities shall be carried out on the basis of mutually agreed programs.

(C) There shall be participation of Greek personnel up to 50% of the total strength required for agreed joint technical operations and related maintenance activities and services of the facilities and there shall be provisions for the training of such personnel for this purpose.

(D) All intelligence information including raw data produced by the installations shall be shared fully by the two Governments according to mutually agreed procedures. A joint use plan for the United States forces communications system in Greece shall be agreed upon.

(E) The Agreement shall remain in effect for four years and there shall be provisions for the termination thereof before its expiration, as well as for its renewal.

(F) Within this framework there shall be annexes to this Agreement covering each major installation (Nea Makri, Souda Bay, Iraklion), the United States element at the Hellenikon Greek Air Force Base, as well as annexes dealing with status of forces (SOFA), and command and control.

(G) The annex covering Souda Bay will be a revision of the 1959 Souda Bay Agreement. Meanwhile it is understood that United States operations at this airfield will be in accordance with the 1959 Agreement.

(H) It is understood that, pending the conclusion of the new Agreement within a reasonable time, United States operations now being conducted from facilities in Greece, which serve mutual defense interests, will be allowed to continue.

4. As an integral part of the new defense cooperation agreement, provision will be made for a four-year commitment to Greece of military assistance totaling 700 million

May 17, 1976

629

Global Peace, the Middle East, and the United States

Address by Secretary Kissinger¹

Ohio has been described as the heart of Middle America and the breeding ground of Presidents. So it is not surprising that we have here today such outstanding representatives of the people of the Midwest as Congressmen Clancy, Kindness, and Gradison and two Senators who have so distinguished themselves in public service as to merit mention as potential nominees for the highest position in the land.

It is a great honor to be here with Senator Taft, who in every respect brings credit and added distinction to his esteemed family and his beloved city.

John Glenn made a great contribution to his country and to mankind before he came to Washington and is destined for another distinguished career in the service of the nation.

And as for me, the privilege of talking to five Members of Congress who have no opportunity either to talk back or to question me makes the trip alone worthwhile. [Laugher and applause.]

As America enters its 200th year as a free nation, our role has grown central to the peace and progress of the world. We have become the engine of the global economy, the rock of security for those who share our values, the creative force in building international institutions, and the pioneer in science and technology.

Americans have carried the burdens of world leadership for a generation. They have done so with dedication and good will but, understandably, they ask when and if their labors can cease. They want to know what our purposes are in international affairs. They sense that the world needs us, but they ask: Do we need the world?

The past three decades have taught us that our commitment to global leadership is not an act of choice, but a recognition of reality. Awesome weapons can span continents in minutes. The international economic system thrives or declines as one. Conflict in faraway regions has vast political, security, and economic repercussions here at home. Communication makes us instantly aware of developments in every corner of the globe—of the travels of diplomats, the movement of troops, or the hunger of little children. World peace and American security, global well-being and American prosperity, have become virtually inseparable.

The past three decades have also taught us that our contribution is indispensable. We cannot solve every problem, but few solutions are possible without us. Other countries must do more, but we cannot ignore the responsibility that rests on us. If we do not help resist aggression, if we do not work for a dynamic world economy, if we do not promote liberty and justice, no other nation can—at least no other nation that shares our values.

Americans have a right to be proud of how they have met this challenge. Through five Administrations of both political parties we

Made on Sept. 16 at Cincinnati, Ohio, before a later meeting sponsored by the Greater Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce and 11 other area organizations, the text of the four introductory paragraphs from the release 482A; balance of address from press release 482).

October 6, 1975

493

led in assisting Europe and Japan recover from the devastation of the Second World War. We helped create a trading and monetary system that has spread prosperity in our own land and around the world. We forged alliances with the major democracies that have kept the global peace for a generation. We have mediated and helped resolve conflicts. We have fed the hungry, educated men and women from other lands, and welcomed those who fled oppression to our shores. With all humility we can say that no other nation in history has made comparable efforts on such a scale.

## The Design of Global Peace

But history has rewarded our exertions with new challenges. The world has been transformed over the 30 years since World War II partly because of the success of this nation's policies.

In the early years of the postwar period, we were militarily and economically the world's predominant power. Our allies were recovering; new nations were just coming into being; potential adversaries were restrained by our nuclear supremacy.

Today's world is radically different. The industrialized nations are strong and self-confident; our alliances are cooperative endeavors between equals. We have preserved the world balance of power—but in the process both superpowers have acquired the capacity to destroy civilized life in a matter of hours. The growth of the world's economic system has spread economic power more widely among the new nations; they seek a greater role in international affairs and a larger share of the world economy.

The United States remains the largest single factor in international affairs. But we must learn what most other nations in history have known: that one country can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. We can no longer overwhelm problems with our resources. We no longer have the luxury of simple choices.

Thus, beyond the issues that make daily headlines, we have sought to conduct a foreign policy that takes account of the fundamental changes in the international order.

We cannot afford oscillation between extremes of crusading and isolation. We must maintain a steady course which offers hope for long-term international stability and progress, a course which Americans can support, which gives courage to our allies and pause to our adversaries.

Our first priority is the vigor of our alliances with the great democracies of the Atlantic community and Japan. We formed these ties a generation ago to protect weaker friends against military danger. Today we work together as equals on issues going far beyond security. We have coordinated our efforts to ease tensions with the East; we have built new institutions of energy cooperation; we have developed common approaches to the developing countries. And we have begun to harmonize our economic policies to move together toward noninflationary economic recovery. The vitality of Western democracy and the solidarity of our alliances are an essential factor of global stability.

On the basis of allied cohesion and strength, we have also sought to place our relations with the Communist countries on a more stable and long-term basis. For 30 years, mankind's hopes for peace and its fear of war have turned on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Today strategic nuclear parity has transformed international politics. Your government—in any Administration—must manage a basic conflict of values and interests with the Soviet Union in the shadow of nuclear holocaust. Never before in history have the weapons of war been so devastating—and so ill suited to the pursuit of specific policy objectives. Therefore the United States has engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations on the limitation of strategic armaments. We have solved political disputes such as Berlin and restrained great-power conflict in the Middle East to give both sides a continuing stake in positive political relations. We have begun more normal contacts in trade and scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges. And we have regularized our consultations at the highest level.

The necessity of coexistence in the shadow

494

Department of State Bulletin

on between ex-
lation. We must
which offers hope
and stability and
Americans can sup-
to our allies and

rigor of our alli-
racies of the At-
ban. We formed
to protect weaker
warrior. Today we
issues going far
coordinated our
with the East; we
s of energy co-
oped common ap-
 countries. And we
ur economic poli-
d noninflationary
ality of Western
rity of our alli-
ciar of global sta-

ed cohesion and
also place our
nlist countries on
arm basis. For 30
or peace and its
the relationship
s and the Soviet

parity has trans-
ics. Your govern-
ation—must man-
ues and interests
the shadow of nu-
are in history have
so devastating—
pursuit of spe-
fore the United
iet Union in nego-
of strategic arma-
tical disputes such
a great-power con-
give both sides a
rative political rela-
the normal contacts
technical, and cul-
thave regularized
light level.
ension the shadow

of nuclear peril does not mean a coincidence
of moral purpose. This country knows the
moral difference between freedom and tyr-
anny. But we shall also never lose sight of
the fact that in the age of nuclear weapons,
peace, too, is a moral imperative. We shall
insist on reciprocity, but we believe that in-
centives for cooperation and penalties for
intransigence are more effective than rhe-
torical posturing. We shall keep our military
strength second to none; but we will not
succumb to the illusion that military power
offers the final answer to international prob-
lems.

On the basis of firmness and flexibility,
strength and willingness to negotiate, we
shall strive to moderate conflicts and to bring
a more secure world to future generations.

As we have maintained alliance cohesion
and begun to ease tensions with the Com-
munist powers, a new dimension has been
added to the spectrum of international issues
before us: the future of the relationship be-
tween developed and developing countries.
The vast and growing problems of energy,
food, raw materials, and economic develop-
ment now face us in all their complexity, as
the fundamental issues of the last quarter of
the 20th century.

These problems are not technical, or at
bottom even economic. They go to the heart
of the question of international order:
whether the world can accommodate the
needs of all nations, whether countries will
regulate their affairs by cooperation or by
confrontation, whether international rela-
tions will reflect the search for mutual bene-
fit and common progress or turn into tests
of strength. The United States is in a better
position than any other nation to go it alone
to face such a test of strength, but we
know that ultimately the whole world will
offer.

The United States has made its position
far. At the U.N. special session called to
ress these issues two weeks ago, I pledged
our country to a cooperative, understanding
approach. I said that we are prepared to work
with other nations to put the technological
economic genius of the modern age into
the service of all mankind. The United States
convinced that the developed and the

developing nations working together can
achieve through cooperation what neither
can extort through economic warfare or ideo-
logical pressure—economic advance for all
our peoples.

In this spirit, the United States presented
a comprehensive and detailed program for
economic and social cooperation to the spe-
cial session. These proposals and this atti-
tude will guide us in future discussions with
the less developed nations. The results at
the special session which just concluded to-
day were constructive. Discussions took place
in a conciliatory spirit, and the final docu-
ment produced considerable convergence be-
tween the developed and the developing
countries and the outlines of a consumer
program of action.

Cooperation must remain a two-way street.
If nations wield their special strengths as
weapons, the promise of global progress will
give way to the perils of global confronta-
tion.

The most critical immediate issue, of
course, is the question of the price of oil.
We and our partners in the International
Energy Agency have already taken major
steps to conserve oil and to establish finan-
cial structures that will help us cope with
the impact of rising oil prices. Much still
remains to be done; but the United States,
in cooperation with other industrial nations,
will make a determined effort to reverse the
conditions that have enabled oil prices to be
set unilaterally. The United States can not
and will not entrust its political and eco-
nomic destiny to decisions made elsewhere.

At the same time, we are ready to seek
a new relationship with the oil-producing na-
tions. We ought to be partners, not adver-
saries. Consumers must have reliable access
to oil supplies at reasonable prices. To invest
their new oil wealth, the producers must be-
come major importers of our products. We
are ready to cooperate with the oil producers
in linking our economies on equitable terms.

Next month the oil producers, developing
countries, and industrial countries will meet
to launch a dialogue on energy, raw mate-
rials, development, and finance first proposed
by President Giscard d'Estaing of France.
We have worked hard to make these meet-

State of State
of State

October 6, 1975

495