- 80 -

[LC]

X

Conclusion

What will be the structure of future German society in the fields surveyed in this essay? The situation is sufficiently fluid to make confidend predictions difficult, but certain trends seem likely to continue. The break with Germany's pre-1945 predominantly romantic and idealistic tradition is likely to prove permanent: the skepticism, pragmatism, and materialism of the "disillusioned generation" will in all likelihood prove self-perpetuating, though probably not with the same defiant intensity characteristic of those who reacted personally against the Nazi debacle. The contrast between the ideals of 1947 and the reality of 1965 -- today still a major complaint of the literary, political, religious, and educational elite of the Federal Republic -- is certain to remain an objective fact, but may very will diminish as a subjective grievance. The further consolidation of the status quo through sheer passage of time will soon make the vision of 1947 a mere historic reminiscence. The complaints about a "restoration" will probably diminish as a new generation attains positions of power. What exists in the way of a Nazi (or, more accurately, ex-Nazi) domination of the economy, bureaucracy, and judiciary will become eliminated within another fifteen years through the automatic processes of retirement and death. Then there will no longer be any compelling reason for influential people to take an apologetic attitude towards Nazism or the forerunners in pre-1933 German history.

The trend towards the modernization of patterns of living, material welfare, and mass culture is certain to continue, and will probably be increasingly accepted as typical of a common "North Atlantic civilization" rather than an limitation of America. The political and cultural ties to Western Europe and the United States will

- 81 -

[LC]

probably be strengthened still further, and a relapse into any kind of self-centered
nationalism is most improbable. The partition of Germany will continue to be deeply
resented but is unlikely to have any decisive impact upon the West German temper. No
single fact illustrates more dramatically the broad change wrought in the national
character during the last twenty years. The so-called territorial "mutilation" of
1919 -- with the loss of the primarily non-German areas of Alsace-Lorraine, the Polish
Corridor, and part of Upper Silesia -- caused far more political trouble and
emotional excitement during the Weimar years than the infinitely more grievous
national losses of 1945 have caused to the Bonn Republic. If Germans were still
the nationalist, romantic, and idealist people of earlier German history they would
react in a violent, adventurist, and irresponsible manner to the intolerable fact of
Germany's partition; they can today be expected, on the contrary, to continue to
react with the prudence and self-restraint they have shown since the "two Germanies"
were created.

It is improbable that literature will play a great role in Germany's foreseeable
future, or that great literature will be produced. Too many conditions of modern
life militate against its development: the solution of many serious -- but in
scope manageable-- problems, such as class conflict which aroused literary protest
in the past; the decline of an aesthetic tradition with firm standards enforced by
an educated reading public with a common culture; the general chaos of modern life
and the collapse of recognized values, developments which deprive authors of any firm
point d'appui for commenting upon the *comédie humaine*, and the combination of material
opulence (making for complacency) and existentialist despair (which makes obsolete
many literary genres, including the epic and tragedy, which *assume* that the author
knows the meaning of life). There is also the demoralizing external fact that
literature is forced to compete today with many other media -- notably the film,

[Lc]

- 82 -

radio and TV -- for the instruction and entertainment of the masses, and that authors are easily tempted by the material rewards offered by these media.

German society has not yet firmly "jelled," but it is clearly on the road of doing so into a pattern very similar to that of contemporary America. It is still embarrassed by the Nazi past, which poisons everything from dinner table conversation to international relations; but this factor will be eliminated in another half generation. It is troubled, and will continue to be troubled for the foreseeable future by the tragedy of national partition; but this fact has, as we have seen, remarkably little impact upon the contemporary West German outlook. Its problems are increasingly those typical of any modern, secularized, "mass civilization." Can freedom and democracy be maintained in an age of mechanization and manipulation? The chances appear good in West Germany, where the memory of Nazism will long dictate special vigilance in the face of any challenges to freedom (as was shown, for example, in the *Spiegel* affair). Can scientific advance and technological innovation keep pace with modern needs and the competing achievements of other nations? The prospects appear uncertain because of the many anachronistic features of the German university system, the chaotic organization of cultural affairs, and the persistent refusal to plan intelligently for the future. Can man live a satisfactory life in a world marked by security and prosperity, but also skepticism, the absence of any absolute faith (whether transcendental or secular) and the threat of the atomic bomb? The majority of Germans seem to have adjusted very well to the "abnormal" phenomenon of "normalcy," with political messianism being dead and religious experience confined to a small elite. One must expect -- is it occasion to rejoice or despair? -- that the German future will not be marked by political experimentation -- despite the unsolved problem of partition -- nor a bold tackling

- 83 -

of the problem of threatening economic backwardness -- though Germany's future
world position depends upon its solution. There is little chance of cultural
ferment, much danger of complacency and provincialism. The greatest danger which
confronts Germany is -- in the opinion of this writer -- the decline into dullness
and mediocrity. When could the same be said during the last two hundred turbulent
years of German history?

[Lc]

-84-

## Notes

### I. The Break in Historic Continuity

1. There is no single book which treats the "break in historic continuity" adequately. My discussion is based upon personal impressions gathered during three long visits to Germany in 1955-56, 1959-60, and 1962-63, and study of the relevant historical background. For the younger generation there are two important books: the analytical study by Helmut Schelsky, _Die skeptische Generation--eine Soziologie der deutscher Jugend_ (Düsseldorf, 1958) and the collection of voices: _Zwanzigjährige haben das Wort_ (Munich, 1959).

### III. The Fear of Restoration

1. A good summary of the wide prevalence of Socialist ideas after 1945 can be found in Wolfgang Abendroth, "Bilanz der sozialistischen Idee in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," _Bestandsaufnahme_ (ed. H. W. Richter), 233-63 (Munich, 1962). Henceforth cited as _Bestandsaufnahme_. The great shift in the position of the Left since 1947 is indicated in the symposium edited by Horst Krüger, _Was ist heute links? Thesen und Theorien zu einer politischen Position_ (Munich, 1963). One of the contributors named Reinhard Baumgart sums up the thought of many in his statement that Leftism in 1963 is no longer primarily a protest against human misery and degradation, but rather against the "spreading mutilation of consciousness" (_um sich greifende Verelendung des Bewusstseins_), p. 65.

### IV. The Confrontation with Nazism

1. Peter Kleist, _Auch Du warst dabei_ (Bonn, 1951) is perhaps the best example of this species of literature. Kleist had been on the staff of Ribbentrop, Hitler's Foreign Minister, during the Nazi period.

[LC]

-85-

2. The important book by Fritz Tobias, *Der Reichstagsbrand* (1962), Engl. translation under the title *The Reichstag Fire* (New York, 1964), was certainly not neo-Nazi in intention, but its main thesis--that the Reichstag fire was set by the Dutch Communist Van der Lubbe without Nazi help--was in fact hailed by neo-Nazi sections of German public opinion.

3. For a brilliant literary treatment of the theme that "everybody is equally guilty" see Ernst von Salomon, *Der Fragebogen* (Hamburg, 1951), a takeoff on the pedantic and inquisitorial questionnaire which American Military Government required Germans to fill out.

4. Thus Professor Hans Rothfels, in his presidential address at the German Historians' Convention held at Duisburg in 1962, singled out Hoggan's book for criticism.

5. The author of this article can attest the broad influence exercised by David Hoggan. While on various lecture tours throughout Germany in 1962-63 he found that someone invariably raised the Hoggan topic during every question period (regardless of whether or not the Hoggan theme was pertinent to the lecture). Contemptuous dismissal of Hoggan invariably provoked a spate of indignant letters to local newspapers. The Hoggan thesis has been widely popularized by a series of articles in the unreconstructed *Deutsche Nationalzeitung und Soldatenzeitung*. Hoggan's book has not yet found an American publisher; the German edition was prepared and published by a notorious neo-Nazi named Grabert, whose political past led to a termination of his academic career in 1945.

6. For a one-sidedly hostile account of how Nazi history is treated in German schools, see Mark Krug, "Teaching of History at the Center of the Cold War: History Textbooks in East and West Germany," *School Review*, LXIX (Winter, 1961), 461-87. In fact, the *Internationales Schulbuch-Institut* in Braunschweig, directed by Georg Eckert and Otto-Ernst Schüddekopf, has done an admirable job of purging German schoolbooks of Nazi residues.

[LC]

-86-

7. For a profound statement of the problem involved in "digesting" Germany's recent past see an important speech delivered by Theodor Adorno before a conference of German educators at Wiesbaden in November, 1959: "What Does 'Digesting the Past' Mean?", Eng. translation in W. Stahl, ed., *Education for Democracy in West Germany* (New York, 1961), 88-101. The classic statement of this view was made by Karl Jaspers already in 1947. *The Question of German Guilt*, Eng. translation by E. B. Ashton (New York, 1947).

8. See for example, Gerhard Ritter, "The Historical Foundations of the Rise of National Socialism" in *The Third Reich*, ed. by M. Baumont, J. Fried, and E. Vermeil (New York, 1955), 381-416.

9. Immanuel Geiss, *Der polnische Grenzstreifen 1914-18* (Lübeck, 1960).

10. Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-18* (Düsseldorf, 1961).

11. Kurt Sontheimer, *Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik* (Munich, 1962).

## V. The Literary Scene

1. For a sharp critique of German reviewing habits, see Franz Schonauer, "Literaturkritik und Restauration," *Bestandsaufnahme*, 477-93.

2. For this and the following paragraphs, see Hans Werner Richter, ed., *Almanach der Gruppe 47* (Hamburg, 1962). The book consists of a delightfully self-conscious self-analysis of the group in Part I: "Die Gruppe 47, ein literarisch-publizistisches Kuriosum unserer Zeit," and a selection from pieces read in the years 1947-1961 in Part II. Part II provides *Marginalien*, Part V gives valuable bibliographies. The name was given to the group by Hans Georg Brenner, a Hamburg author best known as the German translator of J. P. Sartre. He was thinking of the Spanish "generation of 1898" (Unanumo, Ortega, etc.) as a prototype.

[Lc]

-87-

3. Quoted in *ibid.*, 22-23. Other notable critics have been the Catholic author Rudolf Kramer-Badoni and the rather old-fashioned Friedrich Sieburg, literary critic of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

4. Martin Walser, ed., *Die Alternative--oder brauchen wir eine neue Regierung?* (Hamburg, 1961).

5. H. M. Enzensberger, "Die Clique," in *Almanach*, 22.

6. Full title of this important publication: Hans Werner Richter, *Bestandsaufnahme. Eine deutsche Bilanz 1962. Sechsunddreissig Beiträge, deutscher Wissenschaftler, Schchriststeller und Publizisten* (Verlag Kurt Desch, Munich, 1962).
I have frequently cited individual contributions in the course of this essay.

7. Useful surveys of post-1945 German literature are Albert Soergel and Curt Hohoff, *Dichtung und Dichter der Zeit* (Düsseldorf, 1963), Vol. II, 815-78 (encyclopedic and magisterial); and two rather essayistic treatments: K. A. Horst, *Die deutsche Literatur der Gegenwart* (Munich, 1957) and Walter Jens, *Deutsche Literatur der Gegenwart: Themen, Stile, Tendenzen* (Munich, 1961).

8. Johannes Gaitanides, "A Word on the Impotence of German Literature," originally published in *Der Monat* (June, 1960). I have followed, with some revision, the English translation in Walter Stahl, ed., *Education for Democracy in West Germany*, 345-51.

9. *Ibid.*, 349-50.

10. The best critical study of Gottfried Benn is, perhaps, Dieter Wellershoff, *Gottfried Benn. Phänotyp dieser Stunde. Eine Studie über den Problemgehalt seines Werkes* (Cologne, 1958).

11. See his *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, published in Frankfurt in 1962, probably the greatest philosophical work published in Germany since the war.

-88-

VI. Religious Questions

1. The German word has an odious flavor because it is most frequently used in connection with the Nazi seizure of power in 1933.

2. For a good statement of the case of the Protestant Left, see Heinz Zahrnt, "Versäumte Chancen der Kirche? Eine Bilanz des Protestantismus," *Bestandsaufnahme*, 178-96.

3. On the "Church Struggle" in the East Zone see the excellent work by Richard Solberg, *God and Caesar in East Germany* (New York, 1962).

4. Carl Amery, *Die Kapitulation oder deutscher Katholizismus heute* (Hamburg, 1963). Amery's indictment has recently received powerful support from two American scholars: Gordon Zahn, *German Catholics and Hitler's Wars: A Study in Social Control* (New York, 1962) and Günter Lewy, *The Roman Catholic Church and the Third Reich* (New York, 1964). In Germany, the main Catholic critic of the Catholic accommodation to Nazism is E. W. Böckenförde, whose article, "Der deutsche Katholizismus im Jahr 1933," *Hochland* (February, 1961), provoked a vigorous reply by Hans Buchheim, "Der deutsche Katholizismus im Jahre 1933. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit E. W. Böckenförde," *ibid*. (August, 1961).

5. Hans Kung, *Rechfertigung. Die Lehre Karl Barths und eine katholische Besinnung* (Einseideln, 1957). Barth appeared pleased by Kung's interpretation of his views but doubted that it would prove acceptable to the main body of Catholics.

6. Carl Amery, "Yoghis und Kommissare. Der westdeutsche Katholizismus 1945-1962," *Bestandsaufnahme*, 157-77.

7. The Deputy is now available in an excellent English translation by Richard and Clara Winston (New York, 1964). The controversy provoked in Germany can be followed in the collection of voices edited by Fritz J. Raddatz, *Summa iniuria oder Durfte der Papst schweigen?* (Hamburg, 1963).

[10]

-89-

## VII. The Situation of the Universities.

1. See the valuable article by Hans Peter Schwarz, "Zweiteilung des Studiums," *Christ und Welt*, Sondernummer (May, 1963) with title, *Neue Gedanken zur Hochschulreform*, 3-4. The German title of the essay contest sponsored by *Christ und Welt* was: "Wie sollen sich neu zu grundende Universitaten von den bisherigen unterscheiden?"

2. This entire problem is admirably discussed by Leonard Forster, "Die deutsche Universität von aussen geschen," in *Hochschulführer*, ed. by P. Kipphoff, T. von Randow, D. Zimmer (Hamburg, 1964), 37-39.

## VIII. Organizational Problems of German Cultural Life.

1. On scientific backwardness, see the excellent article by the Munich physicist Walter Gerlach, "Eine Bilanz der Naturwissenschaften. Aufgaben und Gefahren," *Bestandsaufnahme*, 360-72.

2. A recent favorite, often referred to in private conversation and even party conclaves, is Dieter Friede, *Das russische Perpetuum Mobile* (Würzburg, 1959), an incredibly primitive analysis of the Russian problem.

3. Much of the information in this paragraph is from an article by Hans Schwab-Felisch, "Kultur ohne Partner: Eine Bilanz der Aera Adenauer," *Die Welt*, February 15, 1964.

4. It should be noted that the Chancellor's indifference to professorial opinions is not without its attractive side in a country where deference to professors is still something of a fetish; what is deplorable is that it was obviously part of a contempt for culture *per se*.

5. "die sich der staats-und gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Lehre auf christlich-humanistischer Grundlage widman."

-90-

6. The entire section on German foundations is based upon an article by Hellmuth Becker, "Stiftungen in Deutschland. Widerpart der geistigen Burokratisierung," *Die Zeit*, February 21, 1964. Mr. Becker is the director of the new *Institut für Bildungsforschung der Max Planck Gesellschaft*.

## IX. Some Aspects of Popular Culture.

1. This section is indebted to the mordant analysis of Heinz von Gramer, "Wer zahlt--darf tanzen. Versuch einer kritischen Biographie des deutschen Films," *Bestandsaufnahme*, 517-42. Much solid information is contained in the encyclopedic work *Regierung Adenauer* (Bonn, 1963), 912-17.

2. The observations on radio and TV owe much to the just cited work, *Regierung Adenauer*, 917-24.

3. For an excellent discussion of the German theatre see Christian Ferber, "Das Theater. Moralische Anstalt zum Vergnügen der Einwohner," *Bestandsaufnahme*, 506-16.

4. The observations on music are much indebted to Joachim Kaiser, "Atonaler Lichtblick," *Bestandsaufnahme*, 543-46.