Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
1/18/73; 9:40 a.m.

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry, are you in the Situation Room or something?

K: No, I was -- I had Eliot in my office.

P: Oh, fine.

K: Elliot Richardson. And I wanted to get rid of him before I spoke to you.

P: No, I just didn't want to bother you when you were in something else.

K: No, no, I am ...

P: Ron is all on salvo for everything today?

K: Yes, he is all on ...

P: What is the answer in the event they raise the question about the objections that -- Thieu's objections in the protocols and all that sort of thing? What does he say. Frankly, I think this is the key question I think a press man will put. Or suppose they don't go along. What are you going to do, Mr. Ziegler?

K: I think he should say we are discussing with them the outline of what we consider ...

P: We are not going to comment on what -- on that at this point.

K: No, no, we don't comment on the hypothetical situation.

P: On a hypoethetical question you don't comment -- I will prepare him for that.

K: I think that is better.

P: Well, that'w what I intended but I just want him to be sure. That's the kind of question that he is likely to get and I don't want him to get in any muddy ground on that sort. Just say that while our discussions are underway we are just not going to comment on the progress of negotiations.

*

-2-

K: Exactly.

P: We are just making an announcement with regard to the fact that Dr. Kisinger will return to meet with Le Duc Tho for the purpose of completing the text of the agreement. Period.

K: Exactly.

P: And beyond that I have nothing further to say.

K: Exactly.

P: As to hypothetical questions, I am not going to comment on them.

K: On the other hand, Mr. President, when you talk about newspapers, Washington Post has a big headline going across the front page saying Thieu ready to accept ceasefire.

P: Yep. You understand I don't pay any attention to, Henry, -- the only thing I see here is the Herald Times this morning. It doesn't bother me any. I just want to be sure that we don't get trapped on one of those questions of that sort so that -- and therefore, egg Thieu out in the open before the 20th or before the 23rd for that matter.

K: As I said yesterday, I think it is highly unlikely because it is never to his advantage to be at an open break with us.

P: Yeah, yeah, I agree, I agree.

K: I mean.

P: You know, I am just thinking that what people do when they are not rational and history is rather full of instances when they are not. Right?

K: That right.

P: Don't we know? (Laughter)

K: We certainly have got plenty of experience . . .

P: Right.

*

3

K: Haig had a good talk with Lon Nol who -- he's the guy with respect to whom the agreement is least satisfactory because it's a series of indirect understandings.

P: Right.

K: And, nevertheless he's the man, I mean, he's absolutely en-
theusiastic, he says the North Vietnamese have suffered a
shattering defeat and he thinks he can live with it, a great improve-
ment of the situation, and so on and so forth.

P:q Good, good.

K: And I know we know what Suuvanna thinks.

P: Yes, he's told us he won't change that.

K: He won't change that, and this new agreement is better.

P: And about the Thais--

K: Well he's going there tomorrow, there'll be no problem with the Thais.

P: No problem, but they are the ones you want to put the arm on Thieu.

K: Absolutely.

P: All right.

K: And we sent the letter off to Thieu, we haven't had a report from Bunker yet.

P: Well, he may not get it, isn't that correct, did you say he's only going to deliver it and walk out, then maybe Thieu will give it to Haig when he arrives. But that's not our trouble, as I said I'm only getting the contingencies ready and getting on with things-- you know, at least they don't turn out that way. And we'll just be prepared to go out on the contingency plan if necessary.

K: Exactly.

P: But we might be ready to go on that, that may make it unnecessary to use it. But in the meantime, I'm like you, I cannot see under the circumstances how he could run away from this. Also it's interesting to note the story that is carried here in the papers this morning, that they go on that version, and he says that the agreement is all right but it is the protocols that worry him.

*

4

K: But that's what we expected.

P: Yeah, I know you said that, but nevertheless that is a rather
significant step from what it was before. Isn't that true?

K: Oh, yes. And again when you speak about--

P: And the letter that we sent off to him answers some of that stuff
on protocol.

K: Yes. That's just a delaying action. Now, he, moreover he had
2-1/2 months on the protocols. All last week we were pleading
with him for comments and they wouldn't give them to us.

P: Yeah.

K: But the protocols, Mr. President, will in fact turn out to be one
of our strong points, because everybody--Rowland Evans I don't
know who talked to him, but it is somebody who has access to the
agreement because he has a column today that's very accurate,
very favorable to you.

P: Is that right?

K: Sure, oh yes, saying that your cold blooded decision improved
the agreement tremendously, and then he tries the reverse
from some paragraphs of the agreement. Specifically the protocols.

P: That's good. Would it be useful, the only thing I wonder, would it
be useful to have Goldwater take a little--say look, come along boy.

K: I think that might do some good.

P: Well, then, you give Goldwater a call and tell him that, huh.

K: Right. I had a good talk with Colson yesterday too.

P: Right. Good.

K: Of course, he's enthusiastic.

S

P: Yeah. What I meant is if--you remember I raised this before--
as to whether we wanted some of our hawks and, and you said
yesterday you didn't think any breaks from the right would do any
good.

K: Well, Goldwater might do us some good.

P: OK. He just ought to say, I think if Goldwater could

5

*

just come out and say it's time to quit this nonsense, stop all
this jabbering and this and that and--

K: And say that the major concern is now to close ranks. That is
more important.

P: This or that clause and the interpretation of the agreement that we
done and it's time to go forward. You give Colson a call and tell
him to--understand, the only one it'll help with--I don't want
one of the left to do it, but somebody like Goldwater from the right,
should say it.

K: Exactly.

P: And maybe Stennis will say it if he won't. Stennis should be another
good one.

K: Right.

P: But I only suggest it, I just have a feeling it might have some effect
on people out there.

K: I think you are right.

P: The only other one that could help would be, in terms of the
newspaper types, is somebody like Buckley. But--

K: Buckely has already said it.

P: His lead time is so long--

K: And also he's already said it.

P: Yeah, I know. I'm just thinking of saying it now at a time that is
more timely. But let me say, let Goldwater take a pop at it. Now
the only risk there is that we pop them and they got to answer, but
I don't think they are going to answer.

K: No, no, they won't answer Goldwater, certainly not.

P: But my point is that when they were here they saw the likes of
the doves, which is good, Javits and the rest scared them to death
as to what would happen, and here's Goldwater, their staunch man,
and the other one is Hebert--Goldwater, Hebert and Stennis are the
three best names I can think of.

K: Let me talk to Colson. Should he make the calls to them or should I?

*

6

P: No, no, no I think Colson, well. In this instance I think you could. Talk to him about it, I just, I think actually it would be better--

K: None of them would say they had talked to me, they keep their--

P: Yeah, well you can tell them that's it's very important that this not appear to come from the White House.

K: Right.

P: But that you feel it would be helpful if they could just say that, that we think they are going to come along, but it would be helpful if they could say that. The only reason I suggest the--working with Colson is that with these fellows you've damn near got to write it out for them and take it down, or they--you see what I mean.

K: Well what I should do is talk to Colson and then work with him on what should be said

P: Right.

K: My instinct as to Stennis--

P: I take it you think better of him, I know. And Goldwater will too, they all will. I would try all three though. I would try Goldwater and Stennis, in other words let's have two people get that thing out there two different ways.

K: And keep Hebert in reserve.

P: Well Hebert is in the House, so it isn't going to make that much difference over there. I think you might just let the three of them, you know, and maybe only one of the three will hit. But the point is by having three out there, one of the three damn well will hit.

K: Right.

P: I have a feeling, just a hunch, that that sort of thing coming from here could shake these people a little bit.

K: I think today is the right day for it. Yesterday would have been premature.

P: Yeah, today--the announcement is at 12:00 Noon, right?

K: Right, he should make it a little earlier because the --

P: Oh sure, 11:00 briefing, of course, 11:30.

*

7

K: Right.

P: And we'll be prepared. I'm going forward myself, I think we've got--you know you've got to take some gamble--I'm going forward on positive upbeat without going all the way of course, upbeat in the inaugural line in the inaugural.

K: Right.

P: Because failing to do that would be immediately interpreted as a lack of confidence in what was going to happen.

K: I would do it, Mr. President.

P: And I feel, first I think it's going to come out, but second, even if it comes out with Thieu dragging his feet, it's still a peace, right?

K: It's got to end now, Mr. President, and it will one way or the other.

P: It's over, huh.

K: The only thing I would perhaps mention is, but that's more for your speech on the 23rd than for your inaugural, I don't know whether I would nail myself so much to the word lasting peace or guaranteed peace because this thing is almost certain to blow up sooner or later.

P: Well I think rather than lasting and guaranteed in relation to this in the inaugural I'm not going to speak of this specifically, I'm going speak of this in conjunction with our whole policy as being a structure of peace in the world, see my point.

K: No, no, the inaugural is fine. I was thinking more of the 23rd.

P: No, I wouldn't guarantee that this was a lasting peace, I'd, as a matter of fact we've got to say that this will depend upon the intention of all parties to keep this. The fact that we sign an agreement does not mean that peace can be lasting.

K: But one thing the agreement will do is to put Indochina into the perspective of a world wide structure for peace.

P: Yeah, yeah. I agree with you. But you work on that, I will not bother my mind with it. I will not need that, incidentally, I don't want to even see it until about 7:00 Sunday night. See I will have inaugural affairs all day long, so by 10:00 pm Monday night I want to see the draft of whatever you think we ought to say Tuesday, see

*

8

K: Right, I'll have it.

P: And then--when do you have to take off?

K: Monday morning.

P: Monday morning, oh God. Oh, well, that's all right. I know what to say in that and it's going to be so brief and serious and everything that--

K: Will you send me any draft text. We have a very secure channel.

P: Oh, sure, sure. I will have to do my major modifications of whatever I get in and get it in my own language. I'll do it all day Monday, so I will send you a text Monday night.

K: That would be fine. And then I could get you my comments. On the rhetoric I won't really say I have a great deal to contribute.

P: I don't believe we should actually make a lot of rhetoric. I think it should be more like China. I don't think we should stand up there and say, God isn't this great and so forth, I think it's going to speak for itself.

K: That is my very strong view.

P: I do feel that we should say -- to call on all people to adhere and the North, the South, and thank our own people for going through this long and difficult experience.

K: I was very interested--David Bruce whom I saw yesterday--

P: I'm glad you saw him.

K: You acted like a great man. Anyone else would have said let's rush it through by the 20th. You are obviously moving at a measured pace, you don't get rattled toward peace, you don't get rattled in military actions.

P: Yeah. What was his reaction about the whole thing, Henry, did --how did he feel.

K: He says it is the greatest diplomatic feat in American history. I mean, that's a little ------

P: He overstates a bit.

K: Well, why did you ask --

9

*

P: Why does he -- because of the--

K: He says because you have two maniacal Vietnamese bodies-- you have 12 major communist countries at each other's throat whom we got to bring influence to bare, we negotiated a--

P: Also we got a--enormous opposition in this country. Part of which don't want us to succeed.

K: That's right. And he's after all dealt with these people for a year. He said when he reads the newspapers -- he sat across the table with these men for a year--they are meanest, toughest bastards he's ever dealt with in his long career. He is Ecstatic.

P: What does he feel, to go in with him Henry, about the--if Thieu doesn't go along.

K: He says we then better go alone.

P: Uh huh. Well my view is yours. The signs still indicate that they are preparing to go along.

K: Oh, yes.

P: If anything happens, I--

K: Quite different. Anytime we said something positive, they said that's a lie. The first time now, their foreign minister said yesterday peace is very near. Their radio said yesterday every war must end, this one too cannot; escape this law.

P: Fine.

K: I think step by step they are entering into it.

P: Yes, but I suppose Henry, the thing we are going to have to roll them on is the inevitable request for delay to work the protocols and I understand it Haig has already told them that my letter clearly says there will be no delay, correct?

K: And so did your first letter and the second one does it even more strongly.

P: Good, good. The second letter put in a little sugar by saying I look forward to hopefully we will get together--

K: And then put in that you'll meet with him in--

P: In March.

10

*

K: Yes. That will be weeks after the signing.

P: Well I hope your morale is all right.

K: My morale couldn't--

P: You've been through a lot haven't you.

K: Well we've all been through a lot, but I think--

P: Well that's my job, I mean, You're just a paid hand, you know.

K: Now, Mr. President.

P: I'm the guy that gets all the glory.

K: No, Mr. President, you get--no President has taken such a beating, on the contrary, whenever you do something great, the press is looking for some way to take away the glory from you.

P: Yes, that's right, I know.

K: You haven't suffered from an excess of--

P: Did you ever get that book?

K: Yes, I have it.

P: Well, be sure to read chapters 11, 12 and 13, just those three.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: And, I'd be very interested in your comments. Okay, Henry, I'll tell Ziegler to go forward and to say nothing about the South Vietnamese attitude.

K: Exactly.

P: All right.

*

TELECON
General Haig
(calling from Saigon, Secure Voice)

1/18/73 8:50 a.m.

H: I just returned from the Palace and have a letter which was handed to me sealed which Thieu did not want me to open in his quarters.
There is a very peremptory critique of the agreement and the protocols all written in the language that not final in Our intelligence suggests he is making one more try to get improvements and but that he will succumb if we stay tough.

K: Right.

H: I am going to flash this to you and suggest a very cool but rejecting reply.

K: Right.

H: which tells Thieu that we are going to proceed as outlined in the
President's letter and authorizing me to stay over at the completion
of my stops in other countries to Saturday to get his absolutely
last answer.

K: I understand and I agree.

H: All right Henry. I'll send this.

K: But you go on to your other stops in the meantime?

H: I will go to Phnom Penh and Laos tomorrow, Bangkok Friday.

K: Right, I will have the letter delivered by Bunker.

H: Right. You should get the answer to him I think very quickly.

K: He will have the answer by opening of business tomorrow Saigon time.

H: Very good.

K: And it will be exactly as you suggest.

H: Right Henry.

K: And you believe he will accept?

H: I think he is just covering his tail and so that he can
at the last minute.

K: Right. Did you see him?

*

TELCONE

The Vice President/Mr. Kissinger

10:35 a.m., January 18, 1973

K: Mr. Vice President.

VP: Henry, do you have any time at all that -- in the foreseeable near future that we can get together a few minutes?

K: Sure. Could we do it early this afternoon? Or any time.

VP: Well, here's my trouble. I've got that darn reception tonight, you know, and I've got to get out of here fairly early. Is there any possibility we could do it now? Or a possibility we could do it at Noon time.

K: Let's do it shortly after Noon. Say about 12:15.

VP: I've got a luncheon at 12:30 with Arthur Burns.

K: All right, I'll come over at Noon.

VP: Noon would be better if you could.

K: Okay.

VP: All right, thank you.

wgh

*

TelCon

Ron Ziegler / Mr. Kissinger

10:44 am, January 18, 1973

K: Hello.

Z: Hi.

K: Ron, you have to drop the phrase at the end of that announcement an agreement to end the war in Vietnam. Just say an agreement period.

Z: Okay, are they going to drop that?

K: They have not described that got it in their text, I just found.

Z: Okay, that's fine. Can I say for the press, completing the text of an agreement on Vietnam.

K: The text of an agreement period. And then what sort of an agreement. Well obviously the agreement is to restore peace in Vietnam.

Z: Restore peace in Vietnam.

K: And the war in Vietnam.

Z: What?

K: You can say the purpose is to bring about a -- the agreement we've all been talking about.

Z: Restore peace and bring about an end to the war.

K: Yeah. Right.

Z: Okay. I just talked to the President, told him we had a long conversation, he's very comfortable with it. He buys your point so obviously about Hanoi and Saigon and the whole thing.

K: Good.

Z: Now, he wanted me to cover just one other question with you. How do we handle the question of: 'Ron, are the issues unresolved'.

K: I'm not commenting on the content of the negotiations.

Z: Right. That's what we both thought you'd say.

K: You see, because if you say Yes, we will trigger Saigon and Hanoi. If you say No, you'll please Hanoi and Saigon will go up the wall.

2

*

Z: Right. Okay.

K: Now, just for your information, Laird called and said he's outraged
that Evans is getting more information than he is, which is true.

Z: Well, I don't blame him. Do you.

K: Well, I think it came partly out of--you know, I briefed Rogers
Tuesday night, and I'm beginning to think the son of a bitch leaked
it to prove that he's in on things.

Z: May have been. Henry, I'll be asked to read this for radio you
know, and TV, if I do that do you mind if I say the purpose of
continuing the text of an agreement to restore peace in Vietnam.

K: No, say, look when are you going to hand out the official statement?

Z: Yes, sir.

K: And that will not have it in it.

Z: That's correct.

K: What will move on the wires will not be that.

Z: That's correct.

K: Then you can say to restore peace in V---
When

Z: When I'm doing is for film just when I'm there recapping the
briefing, then I can say it, right?

K: Right. As long as the official text doesn't have it.

Z: Yes, sir.

K: Good.

Z: Okay.

K: Bye.

Z: Bye.

*

TelCon

Rowland Evans/Mr. Kissinger

10:45 am, Jan. 18, 1973

K: Listen, Evans, I play hard to get to avoid the sort of column you wrote this morning.

E: I didn't write that.

K: Well, it's a disaster in terms of our dealings with the North Vietnamese.

E: Why?

K: Because we have an understanding not to let out--not to talk about these negotiations.

E: Well, you didn't talk about it, I did. You don't control what I write.

K: No, some son of a bitch must have talked to you.

E: I just had a little dream--

K: Oh, don't give me that baloney, Evans.

E: You assuming that--

K: I know. If you'll tell me whom you talked to--

E: Oh, come on, Henry, for Christ sakes, you know me better than that. I really want to see you. I've been trying to call you--well you know--

K: I called the other evening and--

E: You are kidding! I never got the message.

K: And some Spanish speaking creature answered.

E: What night.

K: Monday night.

E: For Christ sakes. I was right there.

K: No, they said you wouldn't be back until 11:30.

E: Oh, for Christ sakes. I was out to dinner but I left a number, she's so God damned--God that makes me mad.

*

2

K: Seriously, I called you Monday night.

E: Off the record, how long are you going to be in town.

K: Oh, I'll be here the rest of this week.

E: You intend on coming Friday night.

K: No.

E: About 10 minutes, Henry.

K: No, I really have taken the position that I'm not seeing anybody and if I am seen being seeing you--one thing though I would to urge you Rolly, don't fall for any of this crap that I had one line and the President made me shift it to another. That's total unadulterated b----s----.

E: I didn't hear about that.

K: Yeah, but you say I negotiated a <u>PERIOD</u> decent interval--

E: No, no, I didn't say that.

K: And, then he made me go to---

E: No, No, I said you and Nixon. You and Nixon. I did not say that.

K: Because when the whole story comes out, it will be seen first that we were totally together at every stage.

E: I have never doubted that--

K: And secondly, that the evolution of this position--the difference between Octover and--I just can't go into it, but we were play ing-- you see what most analysts, I mean you haven't fallen into this trap-- never understand is, and it's not pleasant, not pretty maybe, but it's a very cold blooded game.

E: I used that word in my--

K: You used it, I mean, every time something is done out of this building that the establishment doesn't like, what is the theory? But -- the President is impulsive, he didn't follow constitutional processes, he's crazy like -- loves bombing. The never analyze whatever action a man might have in mind, and then attack us.

E: Sure.

3

*

K: Now in this case, we had a very deliberate strategy at the end of August/Sept. October. What happened at the end of October was foreseen as one of the contingencies. When the second contingency arose, we shifted into it without any consultation with the President because I knew before I left what we would do.

E: Yeah.

K: Look, I've got to talk to Ron Ziegler. I'll call you right back.

E: Will you?

K: Yes.

E: I'll be waiting.

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E012958</td></tr><tr><td>DATE: 6/1/87</td></tr><tr><td>Box: 64</td></tr></table>

*

TELCORN

Senator Goldwater/Mr. Kissinger

11:13 a.m., January 18, 1973

K: I like what you said.

G: Well, we've had very good reaction to that, Henry.

K: Good, very good.

G: I was in New York yesterday and was really surprised to get the reaction to that in the New York Times piece they printed of mine.

K: Well, I like that too.

G: Well, we're going to keep banging away at them; I think we'll making headway.

K: Because what you said about the split between the President and me, it's you know -- it's exactly right -- that's what our opponents are trying to do in order to reduce my effectiveness.

G: That's right. Well, they're not getting very far with it.

K: Because Jesus, you know, everything -- Well, you know the facts; there's no sense talking -- Barry, what I called you about is this - I was wondering whether you would consider making a statement today in effect saying to Thieu, 'what's important now isn't this or that comma or word or clause; what's important now is to maintain the unity between us.

G: This is directed to President Thieu.

K: That's right. Because we are at a point now where if they keep nitpicking around in Saigon on these abstruse theological points. They are going to get so much opposition to themselves triggered here.

G: Yes.

K: The difference is between them and us. I mean, we shouldn't say that but just for your information -- cannot be explained to the American people.

G: No, that's for sure.

K: I mean, they are abstruse points -- you take -- when the agreement is published, you'll see, for example, that we've got the word sovereignty in there in three or four places.

G: Yes.

K: But we can't make them sign it in blood in a separate sentence, you see what I mean?

*

- 2 -

TELCONE

11:13 a.m., January 18, 1973

G: Yes.

K: So they have to show a little subtlety. But basically what will make this agreement go isn't legal clauses.

G: Yes, that's right.

K: What will make this agreement go is the willingness of the American people and the American President to back them.

G: That's right.

K: And that willingness they are going to jeopardize if they are going to get such a debate started here about themselves that we will be on the defensive right away.

G: Well, let me get something together, Henry.

K: Because it would really be a great help. They take you seriously and we've gotten practically everything we went after.

G: All right. Let me get it together and I'll get it right out.

K: Thank you, Barry.

G: Okay, Henry.

wgh

*

TELCOM

11:17 a.m., January 18, 1973

K: Hello.

G: Yes, Henry.

K: Barry, the only thing I wanted to add is you won't say that you and I talked.

G: Oh, hell, no. No, it's all on me.

K: Good.

G: We'll have it for you in just a minute.

K: As long as I've got you on the phone, I wanted to tell you that we're going to announce today at Noon that I'm going over there to meet with them on the 23rd to complete the agreement.

G: Oh, wonderful. Glad to hear it. I know we're going to get some place.

K: Well, I think we've got a better agreement than it seemed possible sometime ago.

G: Well, thanks to you.

K: Well, thanks to supporters like you.

G: Well, we'll keep it up.

K: Thank you, Barry.

G: Okay, Henry.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
Author: EO 12958
Date: 1/14/73
D. Nakazato

TELCONE

Gov. Nelson Rockefeller/Mr. Kissinger

11:20 a.m., January 18, 1973

K: Hello, Nelson.

R: Henry, listen, I had to bother you to check a detail on the dinner.

K: Right.

R: I got a call from Bunny Lasker saying he was having a candlelight dinner at the Lincoln Center tomorrow night; it was the biggest thing down there and so forth.

K: Yeah, that's where we're all going.

R: Well, that's what I wanted to be sure.

K: You want him to sit at our table? I can control that.

R: You can?

K: Yeah.

R: Now, wait till I check with Ann. [Ann, Henry said he could have him sit at his table.] Ann likes that idea.

K: Okay. I'll get Bunny Lasker put at our table.

R: [Laughter] You're marvelous!

K: Well, I'm supposed to be a host for a group of 10.

R: Marvelous, that's a great thing.

K: It's the same thing.

R: You're fantastic.

K: We'll arrange that.

R: Great! Well, I just wanted to check because you hadn't mentioned candles

K: [Laughter] Well, I thought you were so little used to that, Nelson, I didn't want to floor you.

R: Don't you love it.

K: [Laughter]

TELCOM

11:20 a.m., January 18, 1973

- 2 -

R: He said, this is the big ...

K: All in colonial costumes -- the waiters.

R: Colonial costumes for the waiters; up from Williamsburg I trust.

K: [Laughter]

R: What a life! Listen, how do you like your new colleague down there
settling the Long Island strike? Keith Bennett.

K: Oh, he's great.

R: Isn't he terrific?

K: He is marvelous. I'm counting on him.

R: Well, you've got a real friend there. Now, one other thing, are you set
for lunch tomorrow?

K: Well, I was going to call you, Nelson.
afternoon.

SANITIZED

R: Ah, beautiful.

K: SANITIZED

R: Right.

K: Do you mind if I keep it open?

R: Oh, no; let's pick another time so if you can't do it lunch, I do want to
see you.

K: Oh, I must see you! If we can't do it at lunch, shall we say -- well, you
give me the time -- 3:00?

R: 3:00 if you can't do it for lunch.

K: Or in the morning.

R: Makes no difference to me, I'm going to be wandering around seeing
people see. I'm down there doing business.

TELCONE

11:20 a.m., January 18, 1973

- 3 -

K: Well, let's say either lunch or 3:00.

R: Either lunch or at 3:00, marvelous.

K: SANITIZED

R: Well, it makes no difference to me; I just want to see you and whether I
see you eating or see you without eating is immaterial. Not that I'm just
trying to get food. But I'm going on a diet. I..... this morning to Happy.

K: You know, ____ Hughes wrote an article saying I corrupted Stewart
Alsop by feeding him lunch every month. And Stewart said he resented the
idea that he could be brought -- but the thought to be bought by the lunches
I serve is an outrage.

R: Yeah, I go along with that. I go along with that. Oh, brother.
Well, this is great, Henry.

K: Nelson, we're announcing today -- in about an hour -- that I'm going
back to Paris to meet with them on the 23rd to complete the agreement.

R: To complete the agreement! That is marvelous, the 23rd.

K: Right, next Tuesday.

R: Great. Marvelous, Henry. Well, this is the most fabulous thing that's
ever happened. Steve Kevin (?) called me last night when he settled it.
He said I just want you to know that the Rockefeller men in Washington are
really doing things.

K: [Laughter] That's the truth, that is the truth, Nelson.

R: Henry, take care. You're great and I will hear from your secretary
sometime between now and lunch tomorrow. I'll be out at the --

K: My parents are coming in at 2:00 and as soon as I've seen them, I'll
call you. What time are you going to come in? I'll call you by 3:00 or
3:30.

R: Makes no difference. Just tell your secretary to leave word.

K: Good. Marvelous.

R: Great. Okay.

K: See you tomorrow in any event.

R: Wonderful. K: Bve. bve.

t

*

Telcon
Senator Stennis/Dr. Kissinger
1-18-73 - 11:30 a.m.

S: Hello.

K: Mr. Chairman. How are you.
Mr. Chairman, I was wondering whether I could make a suggestion to you.

S: Yes sir, always,

K: Wethink given your long-term commitment to Defense and so forth, that if you made a statement saying that you thought that this would be - that this was now the time for Thieu and us to close ranks and that there shouldn't be legal quibbles that to restore the unity between our two governments, or something like that that puts a little pressure on Thieu, so that he doesn't think that the conservative element in this country is behind him.

S: Yes, sure.

K: Today would be a good day to do it.

S: I heartedly agree, matter of fact I issued a little statement you know when you had that other thing going.

K: Right.

S: Well you want as a guideline - would you want to send something up here?

K: Okay, I'll get something over to you.

S: Alright, you do it and I'll be working on it in the meantime, but go ahead and give me any detailed points you want. I think this would be very good indeed. I am more willing to do it.

K: It would be helpful to the country. He is leaning towards coming along and just a little shove might help him.

S: Well, of course, this is the way the President sees it too.

K: Oh yes.

S: To make a statement.

K: No, no, the President and I discussed it and I am calling you at the suggestion of the President. He would consider it very helpful. He doesn't want you to indicate that you talked to us.

*

2

He would prefer it if you would not indicate.

S: Oh of course that's right I won't do that.

K: But you can be sure that this reflects the President.

S: Alright well that's what I wanted to know.

K: You can count on that.

S: Okay well that's fine enough. It is almost time to convene
I - you could get that up here rather soon?

K: Within the hour.

S: Alright - just send it to my office is 205 and I'll have someone there to bring it on to me.

K: Terrific.

S: Thank you so much.

K: Many thanks, Mr. Chairman.

S: I'm proud of what you have been able to do.

K: Well, you have been a tremendous support.

RECLASSIFIED

Author: E O 12/25/8
Date: 6/24/8

D. A. Chairman

*

Telcon
Ron Ziegler/Dr. Kissinger
1-18-73/11:30 a.m.

Z: Henry?

K: Yes.

Z: I am getting ready to go out in a second and I just wanted to check one thing with you. It won't spook the other side will it if I say an Agreement is not completed until text is completed and finalized.

K: You have to remember these guys think that they are going to get screwed again. In what context is that going to come out?

Z: Well if I am asked, Ron, is an agreement reached? An agreement in principle and all that remains in the text to be worked out.

K: I would just say, Gentlemen, as you know discussions are still continuing, there are still exchanges between Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. There is still another meeting scheduled between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho and an agreement cannot be considered completed until . .

Z: Mr. Kissinger is going for substantive discussions.

K: That's right. I dance around the thing if you possibly can.

Z: An agreement cannot be considered completed until the text is finalized. Right?

K: Well, if you can avoid that particular phrase. You can say, look gentlemen.

Z: How about putting the text must be completed before the agreement then.

K: How about avoiding such a huge phrase and just saying look Gentlemen, technical discussions are still going on. Kissinger is going over for substantive discussions and the announcement obviously makes it clear that there is not yet an agreed - that you know there's still things to be done.

K: You see what I mean?

*

2

Z: Yeah. The announcement makes clear that there are still things to be done. If pressed then we will go to the other.

K: Well I don't like it basically because we have told them it is completed.

Z: Okay. Sir, I just wanted to check that with you.

K: Well, you are meticulous Ron, but I think the overwhelming thrust of everything is very positive, don't you ?

Z: Oh sure, absolutely. Okay, good Henry.

K: Good Ron.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E012958</td></tr><tr><td>Art. No.: C14/1</td></tr><tr><td>Date:</td></tr></table>

*

Telcon
Chuck Colson/Dr. Kissinger
1-18-73/11:35 a.m.

K: Hello.

C: Yes, Henry.

K: Chuck, Goldwater and Stennis are both making statements, Goldwater is doing his own and I am drafting one for Stennis.

C: Excellent - are they going to do it on the floor right after the Senate goes in.

K: Well, I didn't ask them that.

C: I'll get three or four over to you within the next 40 minutes or so and then we'll get some people to sign in with them.

K: Terrific. We are making the announcement within the next 10 minutes.

C: Excellent. Good, sounds great.

<table><tr><td>RECLAMATION</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E012958</td></tr><tr><td>Date: 6/1/87</td></tr></table>

*

Telcon
Taft Schreiber/Dr. Kissinger
1-18-73/11:45 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Good morning, how are you?

K: Taft, how are you?

S: Very good, sir.

K: Have you got a role for me finally?

S: Yeah, I finally got it all worked out. Anything you do - you can write your own - we have got to get only profiles of you and for me to decide - the front view you looked a little stout we had to take too much weight off. Profiles you are beautiful.

K: Okay. I just want to be able to ______ the leading lady.

S: I figured by this time you would be tired.

K: No, no.

S: You never tire of that.

K: No.

S: What's your schedule going to look like? You never know, I assume. We are kind of booked all around the place except for Sunday, we are leaving at 3:30. I don't know what your plans are for lunch or -

K: I have so much family here that I am not absolutely sure - but can we keep it tentatively open.

S: Yeah, I'll leave it open and I imagine that there is so much going on you don't know what is going on. But I could come over tomorrow afternoon late. We've got that darn trustees meeting but that ought to be over - I should have some time in between.

K: About what time.

S: Well, the way it is scheduled and planned is that we're - it's called for around

K: How about this afternoon?

RECEIVED

Autograph
Date 12/1/73
Dated
AM/12/73

*

TelCon

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

12:45 pm, Jan. 18, 1973

K: Hello. How are you?

Z: Good. I'm fine.

K: Did it attract any attention?

Z: A little bit. I was asked whether or not a ceasefire would come before a final agreement. I said, I've seen that speculation I won't comment whether it's right or whether it's wrong, I'll just tell you that the President suggested we mean to end the fighting and restore the peace by means of a negotiated settlement and that Henry is going back to complete--you know.

K: That implies that there will not be one.

Z: That implies --

K: Which is good; which is right. There will not be one for your information.

Z: Good, the speculation continues to run.

K: It is wrong.

Z: It means we are not going to announce something --

K: Absolutely not, not a chance.

Z: Okay, good.

K: Good. It went well otherwise.

Z: In good shape. I read it and they are moving it on the wires, a joint announcement, an agreed to text.

K: The same exact wording, Henry.

K: That's what the agreement says.

Z: Okay, no problem Henry.

K: Right.

Z: See you later.

*

TelCon

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

12:53, January 18, 1973

K: Hello.

Z: Henry?

K: Yes.

Z: Richard Valeriani just came in and said the North Vietn;amese press says that you and Le Duc Tho are going to meet on the 23rd for the purpose of completing an agreement, and left text out.

K: Well--

Z: Well, it's not that big of a problem. I'm just going to say that they both mean the same thing.

K: Yes, that's the intention.

Z: Then they found out what we were struggling around with.

K: That's what we wanted. Their note to us says states.

Z: Yeah. Do you think they might have us tapped?

K: (Laughter)

Z: In response to that ques--they put out the text we wanted to and we put out the text we thought they wanted.

K: That's right.

Z: Okay, it's not that big a problem.

K: I don't think it's any problem, do you? The statements means the same

Z: No. It means the same thing. Because Valeriani said, well we speculating that an agreement has been reached and you are just working out the words. Well that's what we clearly would speculate on. Right.

K: Yeah.

Z: I said, well they both mean the same thing.

K: Exactly.

TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger

1:07 pm, January 18, 1973

K: Mr. President.

P: In regard to my suggestion on the Goldwater thing, another possible approach which you could use would be to have Goldwater and Stennis write a joint letter which you could send to Bunker to be delivered to Thieu.

K: I think they've already delivered statements.

P: Oh good, fine.

K: I talked to Goldwater. He was 100% aboard, enthusiastically in back of you; talked to Stennis and we actually drafted the statement.

P: What in essence did you have him say?

K: We had him say that as somebody who has always supported the freedom of South Vietnam, he hopes that President Thieu will weight the fact that we have a peace with honor before us and that what is important now is to continue this close cooperation and that he should not--that if he becomes the obstacle of the peace the Congress will find it very difficult to--

P: Good, very good. There's no problem with that. As a matter of fact, it ought to get the message across and it will look as if they did it on their own. Also that lays the foundation here at home too.

K: We have Bunker's cable now about his having brought the letter to Thieu, and he's now quite convinced--and we also have a-- where Bunker --where Thieu called in his Corps Commanders and military commanders and said he would accept the ceasefire. So I think---

P: Well Bunker said he was shaking, but my goodness Henry, we've shaken him before you remember.

K: I would say now, Mr. President, the chances are now four out of five.

P: That isn't good enough. It has to be five out of five. We'll hope for the best. Bunker says he was shaking--what the hell is new that shook him in this letter that wasn't in the other.

K: Oh, you know, that you just didn't give an inch.

2

*

P: Oh, you mean about delay and that sort of thing.

K: Yeah.

P: Did Bunker stay there while he read it?

K: Yes, and he made a few nitpicking replies. But the nitpicks are diminishing too.

P: Yeah. The other point that occurred to me was to when Haig sees him again, he ought to really urge him on a very personal basis to get a message to the President before his inauguration, what the President has gone through and suffered for him. Not a bad idea. Well, any way, it may not work but--

K: Well, his daughter is getting married tomorrow and he's in seclusion.

P: Oh well, I see.

K: It is a real bunch. He was going through religious rights all day long.

P: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, that's all right. We'll go right ahead and say we got an announcement to be out, right.

K: Right. And I understand it went very well.

P: Right. And at least Goldwater and Stennis are certainly are fellows to present aboard, huh.

K: It couldn't be more.

P: How did they sound.

K: They sounded enthusiastic, Mr. President.

P: It was very good, incidentally, that you talked to both of those, that will get around, and the fellows will realize you are going to talk to them. Which is damn good from my standpoint, cause it helps enormously with the people we have to depend upon now to back us up.

K: It couldn't have been more--really--I'm

P: What did Goldwater say, for example.

K: He said the President is 100% right, I'm fully behind him, and congratulations to the President, we've got to wrap this thing up now.

3

*

P: Right. And Stennis the same.

K: He said--

P: Of course, neither one of them are corresponding about the bombing.
Scott, that was a miserable statement of his, wasn't it.

K: Scott is always dancing all over the--
will see it through.

P: That's all right. We'll see. Okay, Henry, fine. Unless I hear otherwise from you I'll see you on Saturday. I'm sorta toning my inaugural.

K: I think you should.

P: I'm going to play it, not with any idea that everything is easy and all that, but that--as a positive fact. In fact, I'm going to have to for another reason. This announcement today, as you can realize, is going to hot foot this thing like the devil.

K: I think, Mr. President, this thing is done. We can't resume bombing now.

P: Oh I know, but God knows there's no way. I know that. The question is not whether we resume bombing, but whether we quit doing the rest, see what I mean. It's the peace that I'm talking about, it isn't any resumption of bombing.

K: Therefore, we've got to get it wound up now.

P: That's right. That ought to have some effect on him but--

K: Oh, no, he knows this week you've taken some irrevocable steps.

P: Yeah. That's the way to do. It was done beautifully too.

K: It was beautifully done. Calmly, deliberately, everyday turning the screw a little more.

P: We really felt that this was quite a diplomatic feat knowing how--

K: He says it's the greatest diplomatic feat that is in American history.

P: Well, we'll see how long it works. Okay, thanks, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President.

*

TelCon

Secy. Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

1:10 pm, January 18, 1973

R: George Aldrich and Sullivan and they'll be available when you want them.

K: Right. Well, that won't be will it?

R: No, I'll try to work it out so nobody over hear knows it.

K: Right.

R: But you know, there isn't much secret to the fact that things seem to be going pretty well and we just want to be sure we don't get it going too fast. What is the--

K: Actually, if he goes over on Tuesday morning, that's time enough.

R: When do you get there?

K: I'll get there Monday night, and there's no conceivable way that he could be needed until Tuesday night.

R: All right. Why don't I have him go sometime Monday then. I mean Tuesday.

K: I think the later we can tell him the better it will be.

R: All right. Well, I'll find out where he is and have him stand by, and just be sure he's here so he can get there on Tuesday.

K: Right.

R: What about--anything on Al's conversations that Braden is still--

K: Fishtailing around, but all the collateral intelligence indicates he's coming. He said he'd give him his final answer on the 20th.

R: I see. Well that's--

K: I mean, he hasn't turned it down, and his objections are much less vehement in all the tone of their public discussions seems to indicate that they are resigned to it.

R: Yeah. One thing that I told you about, and he hasn't called back, there's no urgency, the--you asked about whether we ought to have Congress act and I indicated I didn't think so. But on reflection, it seems to me that if after the President makes the announcement and you do the briefing,

2

*

if the leaders, I'm thinking now particularly of Scott and Mansfield and
of course Fordham and Albert, but particularly Scott and Mansfield,
if they took the lead themselves without any communications so it didn't
appear to be any administration approach and they had some simple
resolution saying they reported the President. That might be helpful.

K: That might be helpful.

R: In other words, if it is one of those things where he's got to go up and
have a long, lot of testimony and all that, that would be wrong and it
would be harmful, I think, dangerous.

K: Dangerous.

R: On the other hand, if they just went ahead and did what they've done on
other occasions, say in effect, we applaud what the President has done
and we support him, that would be very helpful.

K: That would be very good.

R: So, maybe we could do that. When the time comes, I get along very
well with Mansfield, and God maybe I can encourage him to do it.

K: Well, the President will be back tomorrow. Let's take that up with
him.

R: Okay. But it would have to be done in a way that it was not our initiative,
because we don't want to be rebuffed.

K: Exactly.

R: I don't think they will. I think would love to do it. My own judgment is
that they would be so happy about and Mansfield I think would be静态
and would be very happy to introduce some such resolution.

K: I think that might work.

R: Okay, let's see if there is anything else we ought--

K: On Bevans's I'd just be a little careful --

R: Well, I won't even talk to him until Monday. I'll just find out where he is.
Won't say anything to him until Monday.

K: Good. That would be good.

R: And then you could--if there is any reason to drag your feet at it, just
send me a message and--

CLASSIFIED AD

DECE 8 1958
Author: E 01
Date: 6/24/58
Title: ANGUS

3

K: I don't think so. I think on Monday you can send him.

R: Okay. Well we'll go ahead and do all the things we can do within the limitations we have to get ready without letting anybody know that we are getting ready. I'm speaking about the ones who went to the WSAG meeting. They already know.

K: Right. But if we can--you might consider putting the Canadians and Indonesians--have them in tomorrow and see whether they'd consider going on three day's standby.

R: All right.

K: I mentioned that to Alex yesterday.

R: Yeah. Well Alex of course, lately he's--I'm perfectly happy to do it but--

K: Then what I would do--not before Monday--

R: Okay. Let's let it go until Monday.

K: That's better.

R: Okay, the thing of course seems to be going well. I went to a big meeting last night in Ndw York. With all the Jewish leaders, and it was interesting that everyone was relaxed and no one asked questions about it, and I just said well, the President is acting on the basis of the progress that has been made, everyone is working very hard, everybody seems to be satisfied.

K: Good. The press didn't ask any questions.

R: The press didn't ask any questions or anything.

K: No, I think the fact that we are moving at this deliberate pace is impressing people.

R: I do too. Okay, Henry, good, bye.

K: Bye.

8/2/61
TUESDAY
THURSDAY
FRIDAY
SATURDAY
SUNDAY
ANNUAL DATE

*

TelCon
Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

2:40, Jan. 18, 1973

K: Hello.

Z: Yeah, Henry.

K: You called me.

Z: Out of Paris, apparently the North Vietnamese announced and said 'one agreement', I said "an agreement".

K: Well, just tell them our english is a little better than their's.

Z: Well, here's the point. Have you seen the AP piece?

K: No.

Z: There is in Paris a North Vietnamese delegation announced the resumption of the Kissinger/Tho talks. In noticeable different terms than those used by the Florida White House.

K: You know what I think happened. They published our preference and we published their preference.

Z: I think so.

K: Well, what's the difference, to complete the agreement.

Z: Well, here's point they are making. There was a difference in communist terminology between an and the agreement. Hanoi has demanded for almost three months that the U.S. sign without any---

K: Total nonsense. Tell them not--you know, anyone who calls you, just tout them off as much as you can.

Z: Okay, but as a quote I'm going to say the intent of both announcements are the same.

K: And there is no substantive difference.

Z: No substantive difference.

K: Did we announce that this is--when there are so many communications exchanged, there is no difference as to the purpose of the meeting.

2

*

Z: The intention is the same but there is no substantive difference.

K: About the intention of the meeting.

Z: The intention that both statements were the same and there is no substantive difference, right.

K: Right. And really tout them off it. It is just ridiculous.

Z: Okay.

K: Now, wait a minute Ron, are you making arrangements for who's to travel with me on Monday.

Z: Yeah, I didn't want to do that before today.

K: No, I know, but I do not have to worry about that.

Z: I'll get that wrapped up with Kennedy tomorrow.

K: Okay, good, but I will not do anything, you will take care of it?

Z: Yes, sir.

K: Good.

Z: Well, do we still want to release this film and stuff tomorrow?

K: Yes.

Z: Will do.

K: If I could delete two of the pictures--one in which I'm pulling my nose and the other in which I'm laughing.

Z: All right, we'll look at them all before we release them.

K: Good.

Z: Okay.

*

TelCon

Dr. Kraemer/Mr. Kissinger

3!10 pm, January 18, 1973

K: Hello.

Kr.: Henry?

K: How are you?

Kr: Hi.

K: I just wanted to call you because I haven't had a chance since
I came back to be in touch with you.

Kr: I thought that it would be difficult.

K: Things have been just extremely hectic.

Kr: That is probably a mild word.

K: But I just wanted to tell you that on the--I can't of course say
a great deal on the telephone--but on the agreement itself, we
do have the DMZ now in a very satisfactory--

Kr: I was just instructed that it will go on the radio tomorrow night, Mr. Cordry, I said from all indications, I'm only reading the newspapers, I'm convinced we have that back and the man asked me. Shall I say over the radio tomorrow--

K: No, you should not.

Kr: with it, I said yes you can say it was with the bombing because
that alone would be a very important thing.

K: And we have the word "administrative structure" removed. That
means the three countries of Vietnam.

Kr: And is of course absolutely decisive.

K: And we have in there in a way which you as a lawyer will under-
stand, but I don't want anyone to say until it's published. There
are four different references to the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

Kr: My gosh, that's more than I expected, I must tell--

K: They are in clauses.

Kr: I understand. They're somewhere where--

2

K: In other words, A and B will be done in--consistent with the
sovereignty of South Vietnam. Or they will pursue a policy
based on the sovereignty--you see what I mean.

Kr: Yes, I understand.

K: But I think from the legal point of view the effect is the same,
but we don't want to crow about that until the agreement is
effective.

Kr: Remember from my writing, I would have already considered
it a remarkable thing, if one had merely gotten the demarcation
line back and then I felt if you have recognition of things around
the garden? that cannot be crossed legally except in a certain
way. Then it is so important to say to whom the garden belongs.

K: Well, in fact, we got even better because we have first the
recognition of the fence. And then we have another sentence
in another part which says -- it discusses what North and South
Vietnam will do after the war. It says North and South Vietnam
will discuss the modalities of civilian crossing of the DMZ. In
other words, military crossing is completely barred.

Kr: That's what a lawyer would call an ultimatum-econtrario.

K: Exactly. And I thought this was rather a neat way of stopping
the argument, you know, can they agree among each other.
Madam Binh controls the southern part of it.

Kr: Now, in other words, you feel--

K: And on the international control commission, we did
really well.

Kr: What about numbers there? Will it be about 5, will it be 3,
will it be 4--

K: It will be--numbers are not--it will be 1200 international and
then 3000 Vietnamese of various kinds.

Kr: Vietnamese?

K: Well, in various mixed commissions.

Kr: There arises of course enormous problem because--

K: We put those away from centers of population.

Kr: I see. Well I would of course be--

3

*

K: In fact, those Vietnamese will be--it's a very complex thing--
there are 3000 in a Four-Party commission which will then be
reduced to a two-party one which is about the same size of the
international one. But the two-party one can only act by
unanimity.

Kr: Not act at all.

K: Exactly. But the international one, it's reports are unanimous,
but in the absence of unanimous reports, individual reports #can
be submitted.

Kr: I see.

K: In other words--

Kr: But why the reduction in manpower; these people cannot be
everywhere.

K: Well, we have it actually scattered--we have 27 Posts, we have
14 border posts including 4 at the DMZ.

Kr: But those are by foreigners--

K: It's all international.

Kr: Very good. I would love to see one day the actual documents.
Now, I do hope there will be no signing before the 20th.

K: No.

Kr: For--

K: No, no I can assure you. You haven't seen the announcement.
We announced today that I am going over on the 23rd to complete
the negotiations.

Kr: Only/I said we'll probably next week, and I concluded it.

K: No, no, we've officially announced it.

Kr: Very good. I had not seen that yet. By the way, were you
able to read the note that I--

K: Oh, yes, with the greatest attention.

*

4

Kr: It is very amusing to see that in the meantime people who are distinctly against the President of the United States' policies say, let's look at the facts as they are, whatever Congress may say, he cannot really stay disarmed. And that comes suddenly from Com-Weeker and Preston and his people. But it took them quite some time to understand this legal fact.

K: Yeah, but the problem here is (garbled).

Kr: You know, that's why I carefully wrote, I well imagine that at this time, somebody might think he simply has to - that was meant to convey to you the idea that I understood that. Was the other side in this time, as we both had thought more realistic and --

K: Well, you see, I had certain advance information from their north ally which gave me more courage. What these people do to each other is most amusing.

Kr: They are hard, but at this time they didn't play the scholastic games.

K: But the first day was very, very tough, and then I said I'd leave on Wednesday night, and after that they were very businesslike.

Kr: Good. Why did one send our young friend who is now essentially in this building, quickly over there. I thought that psychologically one could well wait three days in order not to make us look over eager.

K: Well, that had always been planned that way.

Kr: But you see, this is one of the things that the over-eagerness which seems or indicated sometimes by certain actions, that will always make the think that we are under very great time pressure. By the way, did you see this one very interesting thing about the Cubans, I asked that it be given to you.

K: Well, tell me what it is, I've seen a number of--

Kr: All right. One single paragraph: As of January 1st, all Cuban foreign legions were asked to determine through their local contacts whether the Americans are willing to make further concessions with Vietnam or whether on the contrary they are going to stand firm until Hanoi is making concessions". Now this to me was unbelievably enlightening because in view of Hanoi and Havanna's contact, I thought Havanna used its entire apparatus to find out the answer to this $64 question, that meant the other side had to stand firm, regardless of our doubts about that we might stand very firm.

5

K: Yeah.

Kr: I had asked that this particular thing - only one single paragraph - be sent to you, I don't know, but you would remember if you had seen it.

K: No, I haven't seen that. All right, I just wanted to call you.

Kr: That is very kind, especially since you got me just a minute before I'm leaving. I have to get out tomorrow, give a lecture somewhere, and be out of time. I would go a happier man now. When do you leave--

K: I leave on the 22nd. And when I come back, I will sit down with you.

Kr: Very good. Now, any question Henry/on something where you feel that if really by arguing about it, it would be a help, you know I am at your disposal. Thank you very much for this phone call, I know it means a lot any time.

K: I'll see you soon.

Kr: Thank you. Bye.

K: Bye.

*

TELCONE

Bernard Laskar/Kissinger

4:32 p.m. - 1/18/73

K: Hello.

L: Henry, I just got called by the woman who's in charge of arrange-
ments for the dinner and she tells me that the television and the press
are coming in mainly to get you tomorrow and they'll be there from
6:30 to 7:10. Then at 7:10 we sit down and that'll be very, very
difficult for them to operate so that if you possibly could be there,
they've got everybody there because they read that you were coming.

K: OK, Bunnie.

L: This is everything.

K: Now is somebody going to take care of me when I come in so that I know where to go.

L: Yes, I am.

K: OK.

L: Right, you've got no problem. And I called Nelson. Nelson's on
his way to Washington, I left word with Ann Whitman that he should
please try to be there early but that was before I just got this call.

K: OK, I'll get it across to him.

L: OK, Great. Don't worry we'll all be waiting for you.

K: Good. Marvelous.

L: Great.

*

TELCOM

Adm. Murphy/Kissinger

5:05 p.m. - 1/18/73

K: Hello. Dan.

M: Yes, sir. This is unusual for me to be calling you.

K: That's all right.

M: This is a personal thing. We have tried to get the Medal of Freedom for the Secretary of Defense.

K: Absolutely, I know what you're talking about. And what, has it been turned down?

M: It's been flatly turned down.

K: God damn these horses asses.

M: And Brent Scowcroft tried when he was down at the other end and he's been turned off. I'm kind of desperate I don't know what to do.

K: Dan, let me raise it. I will talk to the President personally.

M: All right, I'd appreciate that, Sir. Thank you very much.

K: That sort of thing you can always call me about.

M: All right. I appreciate it.

K: I admire your boss. He's a great patriot.

M: I think he's - I know he's crossed some wires over there.

K: Not mine.

M: Not yours, I know. I know that.

K: Never mine.

M: All right, thank you very much, sir.

K: Thank you for calling.

*

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Bunny Lasker
1/18/73; 6:40 p.m.

L: Henry, Bunny.

K: Bunny, how are you.

L: Good. Yourself?

K: Okay. I understand we have joined forces.

L: Oh, boy, it sounds great.

K: Good.

L: And I just wanted to say as dinner chairman we will be at table numeral uno.

K: Good. You are the chairman, I am just ...

L: I am the chairman you are the honored guest. Nelson is coming, as you know, and Billy Graham. It's going to be great.

K: Yes, I know. Who are the Berlingers? That I don't know.

L: Very close friends -- good friends of the Governor and Happy. The Governor asked him to for nothing for him which he has done, investigating welfare for New York State and he's done a magnificent job over the last year or two.

K: Is he a lawyer?

L: No, he is just a retired businessman. And a good friend of mine and good friend of the Governor's. A wonderful fellow. He has become famous for the work he has done for the Governor in exposing welfare lackets in the city first and now the State and he has been called all over the Nation to do this work which he is doing for nothing because Nelson asked him to do it. He's a great guy.

K: Good, I just wanted to know just so I didn't ask him anything embarrassing.

L: Right, right. No, he is a friend of all of ours.

K: Good. It will be great to see you Bunny.

*

-2-

L: It will be wonderful. What time do you think you will be able to make it.

K: About 7:30.

L: Well, that's the reason I wanted to speak to you. If -- the cocktails start at 6:00 and we will hope . . .

K: Oh, I thought it started at 7:00.

L: No, the dinner is 7:00 and the concert is 9:00 so we will probably sit down at 7:15 at the worst 7:30 for dinner but this is the #1 and the only sane social event of the whole Inauguration. This is by far the best event of everything. If you can possibly make it in the next neighborhood of a quarter of 7:00.

K: Okay. I was going to be -- I had promised Henry Ford I would come by at a cocktail party he is . . .

L: Well, I think Henry would do a hell of a lot better if you brought him over to our party.

K: Is he coming to this, too?

L: I don't know. I will check. But if he is not, tell him he is invited and I'll do the rest.

K: Okay, now you have a talk with Nelson -- you get Nelson to be there at a quarter to 7:00 and I will be there, too.

L: All right.

K: And I will be there, too.

L: Well, I just spoke to Ann Whitman so I will recall here.

K: Just tell her -- have you told her we have joined forces?

L: Yes. The Governor knows all about it.

K: Good. You get her behind you on the quarter to 7:00 and it will work.

L: Good and if you can bring Henry over and we will take good care of Henry. He really should be here because this is really the one and only event of the whole

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

SANITIZED

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 1 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012058

By: WW. AP 5304

-2-

K: Therefore Exactly.

D: There is not really any particular threat for them but it is better not to... Do you think it will be probably now as you understand it

K: I don't think so. I mean if we do it in a low-key way and say we've done it by mutual agreement...

D: Yeah. When are you leaving?

K: On Monday morning.

D: Oh Monday. If you have a chance to give it. I know that you are now much more important things, but.

K: No, I'll look at it today.

D:

K: I'll look at it today.

D: The Vice President is going to Saigon too?

K: It's a god-damned made to us.

D: Oh.

K: And we may do it, but this is of no great significance.

D: I understand Henry.

K: You know, this will be part of the price for the signature.

D: But now finally the agreement...

K: Well not completely yet. But I think it's moving in that direction.

D: I think it will not spoil all the things we already have done, in this case I hope.

K: Well, we will not tolerate... I mean we will then have to proceed bilaterally, if they don't...

D:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MWB, P. O. Box 304

-3-

K: Oh, one other suggestion I had for your consideration about that conference, the MBFR preliminary agenda conference. I was wondering, you have accepted the list of participants we have, but you said we should also invite all the others.

D: Well, there was...

K: I understand. Let me make this compromise suggestion to you. Supposing we stick, we have the original conference that will be composed of the countries that we've proposed. And that then we will agree at the conference to invite anybody else who wants to be heard.

D: In this way original conference will be invited

K: They will say any other European country which wants to express its views should come to that meeting.

D: No, no I would like to understand. Because now

K: That were in our original letter.

D: Yes and when they come in after some deliberations

K: Well, we could decide that. For example, after they come to Vienna they could do it.

D: After they come to Vienna. And then proceed organ of conference which will handle it.

K: That's right.

D: So the idea is you want us from the very beginning make it clear who is really in charge.

K: Right, and also we will have a difficult time now with our allies if we change the original basis for invitations.

D: Original committee of parties we will call a permanent body or . Otherwise is the same.

K: That's right.

D: The only difference is between...

K: The original group and the working group.

*

TELECON

Amb. D

1/19/73 9:22 a.m.

K: Hello.

D: Hello Henry.

K: Anatole, how are you.

D: How are you. I called you yesterday twice, but you had disappeared.

K: Yeah, what I called you about was the SALT talks at the end of February.
I was wondering whether it mightn't be a good idea to postpone them by two
weeks.

D: Do you think it's worthwhile?

K: Say to March 19.

D: To March 19. What is the advantage?

K: Well the advantage is we have a new negotiator. We will all be
occupied now with the post-Vietnam thing. We don't insist on it. Or
March 12 even.

D: March 12?

K: Yes.

D: I think it will be better not to make it go too far.

K: All right, then let's make it March 12, that would be two weeks.

D: Two weeks, yeah. Just to give Johnson and so on.

K: Just to give Johnson a chance, and also, I think it would be helpful
for you and me to exchange some . . .

D: Yes, to have it more clear.

K: That's right.

D: All right, I send to Moscow.

K: We don't insist on it.

D: No I will send it. It is . . . after all you could easily hold on to it
during

*

-2-

K: Therefore Exactly.

K: On Monday morning.

K: No, I'll look at it today.

D:

K: I'll look at it today.

D: Oh.

D: I understand Henry.

D:

*

-3-

D: Well, there was...

K: I understand. Let me make this compromise suggestion to you. Supposing we stick, we have the original conference that will be composed of the countries that we've proposed. And that then we will agree at the conference to invite anybody ~~xx~~ else who wants to be heard.

K: That's right.

K: That's right.

*

-4-

D: So the only real difference between your proposal and our proposal is that at the very beginning whether it should be invited all who want to participate but when they arrive then there will be a committee which will handle all the things. Your other proposal begins with . . .

K: Who will then invite other countries.

D: Okay, you make it as preliminary remarks.

K: Right, and on Vienna as a site, I can tell you informally we are quite favorable, but we don't want to spend an enormous amount of capital with our allies to force them to do it.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: But frankly, I mean this is between you and me, the British have been especially difficult and we have now told them that they should be a little more quiet. This is strictly between you and me.

D: My feeling is this proposal you mentioned, this is now so to speak in our confidential channel . . .

K: That's right, but we haven't told the State Department yet.

D: No, I understand. But this is Moscow that I talked to you . . . because I will mention to

K: We'll support that.

D: So in this case we still have now a proposal.

K: That's correct.

D: Then I will mention this proposal for them to know.

K: Okay.

D: Today I have a lunch? for lunch. To what extent I could discuss with him, I do not have any special purposes. It is a social lunch.

K: Well I would confine it to social Anatol because he doesn't know about our channel yet.

D: He doesn't know.

K: No, I'll tell him after he's been confirmed. But we still want to keep the principal channel in the White House and not with him.

D: No, no, I understand. Only social lunch but we will discuss what is the situation in Europe and Germany

TELECON

Kitty Hart

1/19/73 9:37 a.m.

K: How nice to hear from you.

H: Well my love, I saw you this morning on the TODAY Show looking absolutely marvelous.

K: On the TODAY Show?

H: Yeah, you were going to some kind of an Inaugural celebration.

K: Oh yes, yes, yes.

H: Well you look great.

K: Did I?

H: How do you feel?

K: I feel fine.

H: Good, I'm so happy. You must be very pleased.

K: Well, I, you know, when you deal with the Vietnamese it's like training rattlesnakes.

H: Oh my God.

K: It's tough enough to train one of them -- it's never been done -- but to train two simultaneously is almost . . .

Oh my darling, it must be unbelievable! Well I read what you said about the language problem. I thought this is obviously so terribly difficult, something really so hard to deal with, it's just like talking to people who've been living on the moon.

K: They are unbelievable. They are a really tricky bunch.

H: Are you going back on Tuesday?

K: I am going to be, . . . I am leaving on Monday; I'll be there on Tuesday.

H: I see. Well, I wanted to ask you to dinner, but I thought maybe you might be able to come to dinner on the 7th of February if you're around.

K: 7th of February. What day in the . . .

*

-2-

H: It's a Wednesday.

K: I... oh yeah, I ought to be back by then.

H: I hope so.

K: I've got to be back by then.

H: That's right.

K: If I'm not back I'll be heading east and look for asylum somewhere.

H: Oh darling, look, I'll hide you under my bed. They'd never look for you there.

K: Under your bed!

H: They'd never look for you there, never.

K: No woman has ever proposed to keep me under her bed.

H: Henry, I'm afraid I'm too old to offer anything else. This is just a real legitimate proposal, to hide you. Why don't you put it down with a question mark.

K: Good, I'll put it down and at this moment it looks fine. Cause I'll certainly be back from Paris by the 7th.

H: Right, say do you live in a different place every time you go?

K: Where, in Paris?

H: Yeah.

K: No, I live at the Embassy.

H: Oh, you live at the Embassy. Cause I thought wandering from house to house must be very tough.

K: We meet in a different place; we alternate the meeting places. But I live in the Embassy which is no hardship. I don't know whether you're seen the new one. It's on Rue Faubourg st. Honore.

H: No, I've never seen it.

K: It's right next to the Elysee Palace and it's very handsome.

*

TELECON
The Vice President
1/19/73, 10:00 a.m.

K: How are you?

A: All right, I'm still alive after that bash last night.

K: That was nice. It was a nice party, little bit haphazard show but quite amusing.

A: Yeah.

K: Mr. Vice President I called because the Saigon radio has announced or at least there are rumors out of Saigon that you are going out there. And I just want you to know that when we were talking to Thieu about this, about his coming along with the agreement, we told him that we would be prepared to send you out there, or to ask you to go out there, to discuss the post-war situation along the lines of our discussion yesterday. But we haven't had a firm reply from him yet. But this is what this is about.

A: Well what is this? Is there any validity to it?

K: Well, uh, oh yes, that's what we intend to do if you are agreeable.

A: When?

K: Well, whenever the damned thing is signed.

A: You predicted a couple of weeks.

K: In a couple of weeks, yeah.

A: All right, you'll let me know . . .

K: I'll let you know. I just didn't want you to hear your name mentioned on the radio.

A: It's a strange way to get news from Saigon.

K: Right, well I gave you as much of the correct information as I had yesterday.

A: Yeah, well the thing that surprised me, I had asked not only you but I asked the President directly whether there was any possibility that I might go and he said "no." So, all right, I'm prepared to go.

K: That's between you and him.

A: I'm prepared to go.

K: Good, thank you. Bye, Mr. Vice Pres.

*

TELCONE

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

10:58 a.m., January 19, 1973

Z: ... high level people can wait three more minutes can't they?

K: Yeah, I'll come --

Z: Come and look at this film with Win, will you?

K: Yeah, but I've just got to give Win something to do first. I'll look at it.

Z: Okay, you come and look at it.

K: But give me three minutes.

Z: Okay, fine.

wgh

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 pm, January 19, 1973

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Oh, yes, Henry. I have two points. One in connection with your proposal I would like to clarify one point about this MFB business. In your original -- I mean, official -- it was delivered note, you were speaking about situation when there is a number of countries and the countries which are really mentioned in our apply, which I told to you.

K: Yeah.

D: They are exactly the same minus Hungary.

K: Right.

D: But at the same time, you propose at that time that representatives of Denmark, Norway, Italy and Turkey should be present at these talks on an invitation basis.

K: Right.

D: Well, in our proposal they have nothing to do to do with this. And really in yours, this is going to be invitations. I just would like another clarification because as I understood it another way. It should be only those bodies we discussed because all this ...

K: Yeah, well, you see --

D: Otherwise ... they couldn't be really present at these invitations. I mean, only those bodies which we discussed.

K: That's right except that that body could then issue invitations to anybody else and that would include them.

D: Yes, this is exactly. I clarify ......... so they will be only those who will be invited to come and make their point.

K: Exactly.

D: Yes, this is clearer. So really what you want -- as we already discussed -- that particular body which is exactly yours and ours minus Hungary. I mean, we'll invite also by Austrian Government and then they will invite others, yes

K: Right.

DECLASSIFIED

authority E012058

By M.W. Riehl Date 00/01/04

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MW B. Lee
Date: Jan 19, 1973

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., January 19, 1973

- 2 -

D: Okay. So this is I would like to check. Second, I really would like to have one regarding Vietnam business. If I am not mistaken, it was Article 19. It is written there, as it was long before, that it should be an International Conference.

K: Right.

D: And there is a composition and so on. It seems to me I would like to ask you in a very informal way -- I say you, I mean you personally or some of your staff or maybe it was discussed in some way with maybe Le Duc Tho -- because I just don't know exactly at this point. This particular point because according -- as it is written in your agreement, it could be it was in such a way.

K: Right.

D: 27 of February.

K: Right.

D: And it was quite a Conference, as you could guess.

K: [Laughter] Oh, it's going to be a beauty. I can hardly wait.

D: I know that you are impatient because you will be number one picker there.

K: I have no intention of going there.

D: Why? It's a nice thing. You went through all this trouble and then you will be just sitting in Washington and smile and who is going to do the things? State Department?

K: The Secretary of State, that's what we got him for.

D: Yeah. Oh, but there is nothing said, it is on the level of the Secretary.

K: No, no; no, no. I don't know -- You know how the State Department runs foreign policy, we'll send them there.

D: I understand. But did you have any additional observation connected with this Conference because it directly involves us too. I mean, do you have any preliminary ideas about how it could be handled and so on?

K: Frankly, we haven't thought about it but we'd be prepared to exchange preliminary ideas with you on it.

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p. m., January 19, 1973

- 4 -

K: Shall we tell Le Duc Tho we've chosen a neutral place like Moscow?

D: Well, you might put it in this light, we have a new for instance - Minsk. You know, where Pompidou was.

K: Yeah.

D: So he likes Pompidou and Le Duc Tho likes Pompidou, so maybe they will on this basis. And Minsk is really a neutral place.

k: ...

D: It's between Paris and Moscow. [Laughter] So you see, it's quite a compromise. Um-humm.

K: How about Stockholm?

D: Oh, Stockholm, I'm not so sure we could accept it. [Laughter]

K: We like it.

D: Yes, exactly. [Laughter]

K: We thought we would go there.

D: That's why I'm really trying to save you trouble. so we will not object, you know, but we try to have it to say okay. Rather, we don't like this place.

K: Now, what do I do? You will have left when I get back?

D: I really don't know because I have not a reply. So you will be leaving when? On Monday?

K: I will leave Monday and you know when I'll be back but no one else does.

D: Yeah, I know. But you will not stay there until this business on Rogers?

K: No.

D: You will be present?

K: I will not be present.

D: Oh, come on. You mean, giving this nice ceremony and you will be not.

K: No.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F-012058
By: MWPA 530-00304