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This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
(Pakistan)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT; AND HON. HENRY KISSINGER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,

7:15 P.M. Lahore Time

AUGUST 1, 1969

FRIDAY

(Lahore, West Pakistan)

MR. ZIEGLER: The meetings between the two Presidents today began at 2:30. At the same time there was a joint meeting between U.S. advisers and representatives from the Pakistan Government. Dr. Kissinger chaired the meeting from our side.

At 4:20 this group that was meeting joined the two Presidents. I will give you a rundown on the subjects that were discussed in the larger meeting and then Dr. Kissinger will follow from there.

Dr. Kissinger outlined and reviewed the Asian trip through this point; discussed our general policy toward Asia; discussed the Sino-Soviet relations.

Q Did you say Dr. Kissinger did this?

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger outlined the first point. In the meeting, Sino-Soviet relations were discussed. China, economic aid -- economic aid to Pakistan -- relationships of a Vietnam settlement to the general structure of American policy toward Asia, and arms policy, U.S. arms policy. Those were the subjects that were covered in the larger meeting.

Q Do you mean arms policy vis-a-vis the sub-continent?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, and also in relation to Pakistan.

Q Ron, this was the larger meeting of the advisers?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes.

Q Do you want to restate the ground rules?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, I will restate the ground rules.

As has been the practice in previous backgrounders, what Dr. Kissinger says is not directly attributed to Dr. Kissinger, but to White House sources and there will be no direct quotations.

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Q That is a change, is it not; no direct quotations?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. That has been the case since the
first briefing Dr. Kissinger gave.

Q Ask me to leave now.

Q What can you say, Dr. Kissinger, about the
Pakistan-Indian relations and what came up today about them?

DR. KISSINGER: As it happened, we had an opportunity
to talk about it at both Delhi and Lahore, and we received
not exactly coinciding points of view. The subject was dis-
cussed with us by both the Indian group in the morning and by
our Pakistan hosts this afternoon. It concerned the nature of
their bilateral relationships and the different perspectives
under dispute between the two countries.

A strong case was made by India against starting
the sale of arms, and a very strong case was made by Pakistan
in favor of it.

Q Who won?

DR. KISSINGER: We have the subject under review.
(Laughter)

Seriously, obviously it is a difficult subject, but
there is a problem about not only the different perspectives
of the two sides, but the different situation of the two sides.
One country has an armament industry; the other one does not.
Therefore, a prohibition of sales has a different significance
for one country than it does for the other.

We have made no decisions. We told both Delhi
and Pakistan in advance that no decisions would be made on
this trip. The subject is under review and we expect to
make a decision later this year.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you say that one country has an
arms industry and the other doesn't, so it has different
implications for them. The inference that I would draw is
that you favor arms to Pakistan. Is that true?

DR. KISSINGER: No. I would simply say that in a
normal situation in which both sides have the same capacity to
produce arms --

Q But they don't.

DR. KISSINGER: -- it is a simpler issue than it is
in this case. You should not conclude from what I said that
any decision has been reached, that any indication of a deci-
sion has been given to anybody. I simply wanted to point out
that the issue is more complicated than it would be if it weren't
for this other factor. You should conclude only that we
listened with understanding, but that we did not, as we had
said ahead of time we would not, make any decisions or any
promises.

Q Should one conclude that you are more sympathetic
to Pakistan than to India?

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DR. KISSINGER: The views of Thailand and India --
I am speaking now of impressions. I am not quoting anybody.
I am giving our impression of the general atmosphere, and
you should not ascribe this to particular conversations.

My impression is that Thailand and India believe that
there is a possibility, a strong possibility, of Chinese
pressure. In Thailand, the major fear is Chinese-instigated,
or as reported, subversion. India, There is that fear, plus
the belief that China might not stop even at military aggression.

Q. Might not stop at what?

DR. KISSINGER: Might not stop even at military
aggression. In other words, that it might be prepared to
engage in military aggression.

Q. Not stop at subversion but go beyond that?

DR. KISSINGER: It would go beyond subversion, to
military aggression.

At Harvard obtuseness is considered a sign of
profundity.

Q. Elsewhere it is considered a sign of obscurity.

DR. KISSINGER: Thank you. (laughter)

In Pakistan, the historical experience has been
somewhat different, and Pakistan has not been exposed to
Chinese Communist military pressure, and there is less
consciousness of the possibilities of Chinese subversion.
Therefore, our impression is that the danger from China is
considered less seriously in Pakistan than it is in India
and Thailand.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what do you think has been
accomplished on the Asian phase of this trip?

DR. KISSINGER: We came to Asia to put before the
countries we visited our general approach to Asian policy,
which I perhaps can sum up briefly as follows:

One, that we will honor all commitments which
we have made; two, that we will not undertake any new formal
commitments; three, that the best defense against the
insurrection is to prevent it from happening, by removing
the conditions that give rise to it. If insurrection reaches
the form, or if subversion reaches the form of insurrection,
the American role should be confined, essentially, to
technical and military assistance and not to the
supply of ground forces in those cases in which we feel
our interest is sufficiently involved to engage ourselves at
all.

Five, that peace in Asia is a pre-condition to
peace in the world, and that peace in Asia cannot result
primarily from American conceptions, but has to involve
Asian initiatives, and a structure developed by Asians.

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Therefore, we would look favorably upon regional and sub-regional arrangements that have an Asian origin, and we would be prepared to give our support, in especially the economic field, where it is asked for and where our view of the necessities coincides with that of the countries concerned.

I believe that while when we started out there was a fear in many of the countries that we visited that the United States might withdraw from Asia altogether, or might withdraw too precipitously from Vietnam, that there is an understanding that we are moving into a new phase, that we are looking for more permanent relationships and not the essentially emergency measures that were inevitable in the immediate post-war period.

I believe also that there is a general recognition that the way the war in Vietnam ends will affect the American posture towards international affairs and towards a role in Asia, and I think we have laid the basis for a relationship which, over a longer period of time, will be more viable than the existing one.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when you talk about insurrection and giving aid in the case of insurrection, does this mean that you are committing yourself to the present Governments of the countries you visited, or does it mean that the insurrection will have to be defined as Communist insurrection?

DR. KISSINGER: When I said that we would help in the case of insurrections, I should have made clear that I did not mean that there is an automatic American promise to support any Government in Asia against any insurrection that might arise.

I am talking about circumstances in which our view of our interests coincides with that of the country concerned. In those circumstances, and only in those circumstances, will we act in the manner that I indicated. But we did not give blanket assurances for all conceivable domestic insurrections.

Q Dr. Kissinger, it seems to me, listening to what has been said to us in the last week, since Guam, that the one point that has practically hardly been mentioned at all, except at this briefing, was the point number three, that the best defense against the insurrection is to block conditions giving rise to it. For instance, today we were told by the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Government of Pakistan that there was no discussion at all of when they were going to have elections in this country, which is ruled by a military government.

What has been done in the last week to tell these countries that we think it is in their interests that they should get their own houses in order in order to obviate a situation where we are just talking about more guns to shoot down people who are rioting or protesting?

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DR. KISSINGER: I don't believe that any of us who have spoken to you have said that we have talked about more guns to shoot down rioters who are protesting.

Q No, I didn't say you had.

DR. KISSINGER: Therefore, this is not a correct characterization of how we have described the American role. The President said at Guam, and I believe I said in a number of previous briefings, that it is our view that economic development and social reform is the best defense against insurrection, and obviously to remove the causes on which it thrives.

With respect to our discussions here, this particular point was made also. On the other hand, it would seem to me highly inappropriate that on a visit of the President we lay out in precise details what our view of the political evolution of every country ought to be. This is a matter to be discussed on other occasions. This particular proposal was not made by us.

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O Doctor, what do you judge to be the source of this so-called strained relations between Pakistan and the United States?

In other words, what is bothering them?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me simply analyze the source of it without attaching any value judgment to it one way or the other.

An alliance was formed between Pakistan and the United States in 1954 which was strongly supported by the American administration of that time. As a result of that, much of Pakistan's military supplies -- all of it -- came essentially from the United States.

In the subcontinent, the supply of arms always has to be seen not only in relationship to the threat to the subcontinent, but to the relative balance within the subcontinent. After 1962, when India came under attack, the United States started supplying some military equipment to India against the Chinese threat which, however, Pakistan was bound to interpret as a possible threat to itself.

After 1965, the United States stopped the supply of arms to both India and Pakistan, with the result that Pakistan's principal source of military supplies dried up.

O Dr. Kissinger, how bit ----

DR. KISSINGER: Wait a minute. The question to me was what is the source of the irritation. It was not whether every irritation is justified in the terms in which it was put forward. These are some of the major sources of irritation.

And the belief that the United States took, perhaps, a too even-handed view.

O Dr. Kissinger, in any of the discussions today, have you or have we brought up the fact that Pakistan does not seem any longer to be interested in either the SEATO or the CENTO pacts, and that we would like to see some revived interest, or is that just a dead letter now?

DR. KISSINGER: We have not, on this trip, attempted to induce countries to participate in alliances or to revitalize commitments that they have made. Our view with respect to security questions is that the security of countries must be at least in their interest as much as in ours, and we will not plead with any country that has an alliance relationship with us to maintain it.

We would make this as a general rule. We have indicated our readiness to continue our commitments, and to maintain our alliances, but we do not believe that it is our duty to attempt to urge countries that are mature and capable of assessing their own interest into the best form of their security.

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O Doctor, doesn't what you and President Nixon have said, both publicly and on the background, add up to a reduced American role in Asia, even though we are not withdrawing, in view of the fact that we will reduce military assistance and military advice while seeking to maintain a level of economic aid which even Congress is cutting?

DR. KISSINGER: The answer is that it indicates a different role in Asia, one that we believe is more viable in the long run, healthier for the long term relationship between Asia and the United States, and more consistent with the requirements of stability in Asia.

O Dr. Kissinger, would you expand just a little bit on what you said earlier, and the President also said in his message, about the regional development pacts? Do you have something in mind, for instance, where Pakistan and India could finally get together on a regional development pact, or do you have something else in mind?

DR. KISSINGER: If one could construct an international arrangement like a mathematical balance, one might say that the key to stability is to have India and Pakistan get together and then go from there to other arrangements.

I think even a brief visit to the subcontinent might indicate that India and Pakistan might not be the first two countries to get together, although let me emphasize that we would look on this with great favor.

Our general approach on this trip was to indicate that as far as we were concerned we welcomed the cooperation of Asian nations among each other, either on a regional or on a subregional basis, that we did not place any particular emphasis on whether this arrangement was economic, cultural, political or military, leaving this particular decision to the countries concerned.

We found considerable interest in this in every country that we visited, especially strong interest, I would think, in India and Indonesia, but considerable interest in every country.

O Doctor, to switch, if I may, from Asia to Europe, could you -- and this is a very important problem on the visit to Romania -- could you give us again a rundown, as you see it, of what the objectives are of this trip to Bucharest and what do you expect to achieve there?

DR. KISSINGER: We are going to Romania, obviously, for many reasons, which include our readiness to establish peaceful relations with any country, with any Communist country, that is prepared to have constructive relations with us. We are going there because we intend this to be an era of negotiations, and because we do not propose to base our foreign policy on the assumptions of intrinsic hostilities unless it is demonstrated by specific action.

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The problem of East-West relations is a central one for this Administration and we are dealing with it on many fronts in many ways. We are engaged in negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Middle East, and we hope, soon, on strategic arms limitations.

We have made some relatively symbolic moves towards other Communist countries. It seemed to us appropriate that we would talk to one country in Eastern Europe about its view of East-West relations.

Our intention is in no sense to challenge any country, specifically the Soviet Union. We do not believe that good relations with Romania are inconsistent with good relations with the Soviet Union, nor do we believe that Romania's relations with us would be inconsistent with its relationships with the Soviet Union.

We recognize that there are certain geographic and other realities, and we are not there to challenge those.

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Q Does that mean that in our talks with Romania the subject of general relations between Eastern Europe and the United States will be primary on the agenda?

DR. KISSINGER: We do not have a precise agenda in Romania any more than we had a precise agenda at every other stop. It seems to me, however, inevitable that in a review of the international situation there would be some discussion of the general context of East-West relations, including, of course, the relationships of Eastern Europe to the United States.

Q You have spoken several times on the Asian part of this tour about weighing U.S. national interests in terms of deciding whether to get involved to one degree or another. Would you define for us what this Administration's view is of the American national interest in Asian matters?

Q Could I add one thing to that question also?

DR. KISSINGER: It was not an excessively restrictive question to start with. Go ahead.

Q It used to be that we defined our national interest as stopping Communist aggression. This week we haven't heard a word about Communist aggression. I was wondering if you could give us some idea of just who we think the adversary is these days.

DR. KISSINGER: Let me take the last question first and then work around to yours, if I may, Chuck.

Our interest is in a peaceful world in which the aspirations of the people concerned can be fulfilled In other words, we do not equate peace with the status quo. Any consideration of this general goal makes it evident that the challenges to peace and progress are more complex than the earlier view that all dangers derive from the possibility of military aggression across recognized demarcation lines, or even the somewhat later view that all dangers arose from a centrally directed conspiracy that should make insurrections happen wherever they arose.

We recognize that there is a dynamic in the situation that may be independent of any central control or may not be due to any particular individual decision by necessarily even a major power. For this reason, we are trying to help construct or to encourage the emergence of a structure in Asia -- and this is a tall order -- which can encompass both change and peace, and this in countries in the grip of rather dramatic transformation.

If you ask me about the American interest in Asia, or in the world, it is very hard to give an answer that doesn't sound platitudinous in one or two sentences. But in general terms, I would say that our interest in Asia is to prevent the emergence of so much chaos that for the fourth time in the last 20 years we would be involved in a war that started in Asia, and the encouragement of a set of relationships in which the aspirations of this region can be fulfilled so that they don't seek an outlet in aggressive moves.

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Q I would like to ask you, Dr. Kissinger, if you would go back to the question which you will find in the transcript, when you were asked about the U.S. desire to carry out a role in the prevention of discord and tumult and conflict in Asia. Your answer was, "We would look favorably on regional arrangements that have an Asian origin and would be prepared to give them economic support."

DR. KISSINGER: If our interests coincided with theirs.

Q I beg your pardon?

DR. KISSINGER: Where our view of the situation coincides with theirs; yes.

Q I don't care whose coincides with whose. But are you ruling out military assistance? You see, the implication of your answer is economic.

DR. KISSINGER: I understand the question.

Q Could we have the answer?

DR. KISSINGER: As soon as you finish the question. Can everyone understand the question?

Q Yes. It is two to nothing right now.

MR. ZIEGLER: In favor of whom?

Q Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: Our view on military relationships is as follows: First, as I indicated, that we will honor our existing commitments. Secondly, where there is a military threat of a magnitude that threatens the international balance, we would have to consider our reaction, even though there is no formal commitment, although we would not necessarily specify this in advance.

If there were, for example, an attack by a major country -- a major attack by a major country -- this would have to be taken seriously. If there were a nuclear threat, this would have to be taken especially seriously. But these are only general principles which one would have to assess from case to case. But in terms of a general willingness to give assistance in the case to regional cooperation, we do not promise the military assistance except where there are existing commitments. We do indicate a willingness to extend economic assistance.

Q Dr. Kissinger, President Nixon's past political record has been strongly anti-Communist. Are we to judge from the burden of your remarks, particularly about the Romanian trip, that he is any less anti-Communist than he was, say, during the 1950's?

DR. KISSINGER: Gentlemen, you have to remember that I met President Nixon only on November 25, 1968, and I, therefore, would not wish to characterize President Nixon's views of the 1950's. I am in a position to characterize his views in 1969.

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This Administration is opposed to the Communist ideology. It recognizes, however, that the problem of peace is the paramount problem of our time. Therefore, we are willing to work on modes of coexistence with the Communist countries and to work out arrangements which will prevent the disagreements that exist between us and the Communist countries -- disagreements which we do not disavow -- from threatening the peace of the world.

We believe that the paramount problem of our time is the achievement of a stable peace in which different systems can coexist with each other.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could I ask a more down-to-earth question? The Indian press today reported that Mrs. Gandhi had brought up in her conversations with the President the idea of mutual guarantees between the Soviet and the United States for India. Could you confirm or clarify that for us? Could you further give us any indication of what the Indian and Pakistani Governments' reaction to the Brezhnev initiative for Asian collective security was?

DR. KISSINGER: I was not present at the meetings between Prime Minister Gandhi and the President. They met alone. In any event, I do not think it would be appropriate for me to go into this. I am not aware of such a request having been made, but I do not want flatly to reject it, because we haven't had a chance to go over the notes.

With respect to the Brezhnev doctrine, it isn't clear to us just exactly what it means. If it should mean a joint United States-Soviet military arrangement for the protection of Southeast Asia, we would not intend to participate in this and, therefore, we would not favor a joint U.S.-Soviet collective security system for Southeast Asia.

Our view is that this is a matter that the countries of Southeast Asia should work out for themselves, and that we do not favor something that will look or may look like a U.S.-Soviet military condominium in this area. But I am not saying that this is what the Soviets are proposing, because they have never really spelled it out. I am saying if that is what they are proposing, we would not cooperate with it.

Q Doctor, what is going on in Laos and how do we interpret it?

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DR. KISSINGER: What seems to be going on in Laos is an unusual degree of Communist pressure on especially the neutralists, a degree of pressure which has seriously impaired one of the three elements of the Laos arrangements of 1962. As many of the events of areas of Indochina, there are many interpretations and no conclusive answers.

Q Give us some of them.

DR. KISSINGER: One possible interpretation is an
attempt by Hanoi to add to its bargaining counters in Paris.
Another possible, more optimistic interpretation, is an attempt
by Hanoi to get into a position for an eventual withdrawal
from Vietnam, and therefore protecting its position in Laos.

A pessimistic interpretation is simply to accept
the settlement of 1962 as part of a long-range and fairly
generally avowed goal that the fate of this area has to
be settled jointly. I do not want on this occasion to
characterize the motivations.

I do want to repeat, however, the points I made
the other day. Events in Laos are bound to shake our
confidence in the constructive role that the Soviet Union
can play if, as Co-Chairman of the 1962 Conference, it makes
no effort to uphold it. Events in Laos, if they continue,
must also shake one's confidence in the good faith with
which any possible agreement in South Vietnam may be maintained,
and may therefore, if they continue, bring about an increase
in verification and guarantee requirements.

So one good way to begin the process of demonstrating
goodwill in Vietnam would be to adhere to an agreement that
was made in 1962.

Q Dr. Kissinger, a moment ago you were speaking
about relations between the United States and Romania,
good relations, would not be inconsistent with our policy
and neither would such good relations be inconsistent between
Romania and the Soviet Union. What is the effect of the
President's trip to Romania likely to have on our European
Western allies, and did the President discuss this possibility
of visiting such a country when he was there in Europe
this spring?

DR. KISSINGER: When we were in Europe this spring,
many European countries reminded us that of the pillars
of NATO, one was defense and the other one was to view NATO
as a political instrument to relax tension. So we view the
trip to Romania as certainly consistent with the advice which
we received from many European countries when we visited
there at the end of February.

Also, as you know, I am going to Brussels on Tuesday
morning to brief the Secretary General of NATO, and
either the Permanent Representatives or the Charges -- this
being vacation time -- on the results of our trip and especially
on the Romanian part of the trip.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, you said this was an era of negotiations, or the President stated that. You have raised many issues with which we should sit down and discuss with the Soviet Union. Will you ask Causescu to set up such a summit conference?

DR. KISSINGER: On the issues which the President raised at Guam, do you mean, or what I raised here?

Q What the President said at Guam.

DR. KISSINGER: What I said here was that we are engaged in negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Middle East; that we expect to engage in negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic arms talks. We had offered a date which now obviously will not be met; namely, today. But we still expect these talks will start within a month.

So there will be two major negotiations. Neither of these negotiations involves a summit conference. The President's criteria for a summit conference have been, I believe, clearly stated: That there must be sufficient progress at a lower level to indicate a high probability of success, lest the failure of a conference make it look as worsening the situation rather than improving it.

In any event, we do not believe that we need to ask Romania to set up a conference with the Soviet Union since our diplomatic channels to the Soviet Union are reasonably open.

Q One more question. Are there any moves afoot by us or anybody else to reconvene the 1962 Laos Conference?

DR. KISSINGER: There are no moves afoot by us to reconvene the 1962 Laos Conference.

Q Can you say why the Soviets have not responded to the August 1 bid for talks and why you think there will be one in a month?

DR. KISSINGER: Every indication we have from the Soviet Union is that the delay is entirely technical and that we will receive an answer within a very brief period. I wouldn't want to speculate why they haven't given us an answer yet. Maybe their bureaucracy is as cumbersome as ours.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

AT 8:00 P.M. Local Time

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

AT 9:50 A.M. EDT

SEPTEMBER 16, 1969

TUESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: You have the statement by the
President. Dr. Kissinger will provide you with background
information on the entire subject of South Vietnam. He
will respond to your questions.

What Dr. Kissinger says is attributed to the
White House or White House sources, whichever you prefer --
directly to the White House or White House sources. What
Dr. Kissinger says should not be reported with the use of
direct quotations.

DR. KISSINGER: I will answer any questions on
this or Vietnam or other subjects of foreign policy.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you give us a figure,
not in terms of strength ceiling, but in terms of actual
numbers of men going back to the time the President made
his announcement in Midway?

DR. KISSINGER: The Pentagon is going to have a
full detailed briefing, I think tomorrow, about units and
rotation schedules.

The difficulty about giving actual figures is
as follows: The number of forces in Vietnam is always
one or two percent below the authorized troop ceiling.
Therefore, for example, on June 30, which was the day before
the withdrawal started, the total figure was 539,500
actually in Vietnam, while the authorized ceiling was
549,500.

This is because the ceiling includes people on
leave, on rotation, on training, outside the country, while
the actual forces in Vietnam are counted as the name implies.
Therefore, we did not start drawing down from this ceiling
and we are going to draw below the ceiling we have announced
today.

In other words, when the ceiling is 484,000, the actual
number of forces in Vietnam is going to be one or two
percent below this.

The difficulty in giving you the figure down to
the last thousand is that it may fluctuate anywhere
between this one or two percent. In other words, there is

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an uncertainty in there of about 2,000. But the figure will
be several thousand, anywhere, conservatively, from 3,000
to 6,000 below 484,000 on December 15.

This is why we have said if you compare the figures
on June 30 with the figures that will exist on December 15,
they will be at least 60,000 below, but they may be higher.

In other words, the actual number withdrawn may be
1,000 or so higher. Now, if we wanted to play with numbers,
we could have taken the highest figure that had been reached
in Vietnam, which was 543,054 and added some 3,500 to the
withdrawal figure that way, and said that compared to the
highest figure that had been reached this year, 63,000
would have been withdrawn. We took the lowest figure that
we could be confident was actually going to be moved out
of the country from the date the withdrawal started to
December 15.

Henceforth, we will deal in troop ceilings, because
the troop ceilings we can guarantee down to the last man.
The figures actually in the country fluctuate. I have
been looking at them over the last few weeks. They go up
and down by several hundred and sometimes by more than a
few thousand by each day. Therefore, it becomes very
difficult to go on a day-by-day basis and deal with
the actual people in the country, to give you an absolutely
reliable figure.

But the figures we put out, we will stand behind,
and they represent the minimum that will be moved out of the
country. The troop ceiling, though, is what governs it.

Q That raises the question of why didn't you
use the troop ceilings this time?

DR. KISSINGER: You mean the first time?

Q No, this time. You said henceforth you will
use the troop ceilings to avoid this confusion about it.

DR. KISSINGER: That is right. The first time we
made the announcement we had not made clear from what figure
we were drawing down and the press had never been given a
full explanation about the difference between troop ceilings
and actual figures. If we had done it entirely in terms
of troop ceilings, there was a danger that it might appear
misleading and that we might claim a larger figure than
was actually being withdrawn.

So we are taking this occasion to straighten out the
bookkeeping and to make clear what the difference is and
what accounts for any discrepancies that may arise between
authorized strength and actual strength, and we feel that we
have now made it clear and we have given you the correct
figures in each case.

We are going to try to stick to the troop ceilings from
now on, because when you go to actual figures I cannot, in good
conscience, tell you today whether on December 15 we will have

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479,000, 478,500 or 480,823. No one can tell you this, but we can tell you that the actual strength is almost never less than one percent and usually one or two percent below the authorized strength.

Q What is the ceiling now?

DR. KISSINGER: The official troop ceiling now is 524,500 and it is being lowered to 484,000.

Q How many actual troops are there now?

DR. KISSINGER: You would have to get that from the Pentagon. The last figure was around 510,000.

Q Can't we just use orders of magnitude? If you say the difference is one or two percent, you took 25,000 men out before, is it now fair to say you are taking 35,000 men out, give or take a few men?

DR. KISSINGER: That is essentially right. We will have taken out 60,000-plus by December 15. So that is right.

Excuse me for being so pedantic, because we want to be precise. Actually, we have taken out a little more than 25,000, but if you say the first increment is 25,000, then the second is 35,000.

Q Are they all coming out of Vietnam or are they coming out of the pipeline?

DR. KISSINGER: The actual withdrawals come out of Vietnam.

Q Are they all combat troops in this?

DR. KISSINGER: The Pentagon will give you the units tomorrow.

Q Can we get something today, the kind of troops?

DR. KISSINGER: At least half of them will be combat troops, in my judgment.

Q Nowhere in the President's statement does he make mention of any of the three criteria that he has spoken so much of in the past. Can we assume that nonetheless this second troop announcement is related more to the criterion of Vietnamization of the war than the other two?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, but the three criteria, as general criteria, still govern.

Q Still govern future troop withdrawals?

DR. KISSINGER: Right.

Q To keep the bookkeeping straight, can you tell us how many troops were in South Vietnam when this Administration took office and at what point the 543,000, or high point, was reached?

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DR. KISSINGER: When we took office, I believe the figure -- I don't have it here -- was about 535,000.

Q Authorized?

DR. KISSINGER: No. The authorized ceiling, when we took office, was 549,500. On January 18, to the best of my knowledge, the figure was ---

Q It was 532,500.

DR. KISSINGER: You can get all of this from the Pentagon. It then rose to 543,500 on the basis of plans that had been made in the previous Administration. We did not add to the pipeline when we came in. It rose to 543,500, I think, around February 20. I think February 20 is the date.

Q The figure I got from the Pentagon was that it was 542,500 on the 22nd of February.

DR. KISSINGER: And it has been going down from that high point.

Q Dr. Kissinger, why was December 15 chosen, and does it mean that there could be another withdrawal either between now and December 15, or between December 15 and December 31?

DR. KISSINGER: We are not going to tie ourselves to any specific date for reviewing the situation. We have stated our general policy that we will attempt to replace American troops as rapidly as possible, consistent with the three principles which the President has announced. We will keep his program under constant review, and when we have an announcement to make, we will make it. But we will not, in advance, tie ourselves to a specific date for making this.

Q The President did express a hope of 100,000 by the end of the year. Does that hope still remain?

DR. KISSINGER: The President expressed the hope that he would be able to do this, and we will review the situation again. He has said nothing to me to indicate that he does not have this hope any more.

Q When is this second contingent going to start moving out?

DR. KISSINGER: Immediately.

Q From what you just said, does this mean that you do not project a goal for next year, or by the end of next year?

DR. KISSINGER: If the three criteria are going to mean anything, we cannot now state a rigid schedule. We will attempt to further this process, as I said, as quickly and as energetically as we can, consistent with the three principles. But we have not, at this point, established a fixed goal which we will meet no matter what the actions of the other side.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, is there any Navy involved in this? There was a story about a big Navy withdrawal.

DR. KISSINGER: The actual composition of the forces you can get more reliably from the Pentagon. I am best equipped to give you the gross figures.

Q Is that Navy amount included in these figures?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, to the best of my knowledge.

Q But not all?

DR. KISSINGER: No.

Q Can you bring us up to date on the three criteria, progress or no progress on them, Paris and enemy activity and training?

DR. KISSINGER: On progress in Paris, the negotiations up to now have been stalemated, especially during the summer. In effect, what Hanoi has asked is that we withdraw unconditionally and on the way out, overthrow the Thieu government and establish a coalition between the NLF and the non-organized, non-Communist groups in Vietnam.

The gist of Hanoi's proposal is that we should break the back of the organized non-Communist forces, after which they will have a coalition with the non-organized non-Communist forces.

Now, since the organized, non-Communist forces are having their problems, the possibility of the non-organized non-Communist forces representing a counter-weight is not very great. This is not a negotiating position. That is a demand for surrender.

Now, with respect to this negotiation, one must make this qualification: Until the end of May or early June, there was some -- not spectacular movement -- but some movement that could lead one to believe that Hanoi might be getting ready for a serious negotiation. They had not yet reached the point of serious negotiation, but it was getting there.

You may remember that the first reaction of the North Vietnamese negotiators to the President's May 14 speech was that there were several points in common.

Then about the middle of June or in June, Hanoi more or less shut down the negotiations. It has achieved the present deadlock. Now no one can be sure what the reasons were for this seeming change in tactics, but if one of the reasons was the illness of Ho, which coincided with it, then it is at least conceivable that the negotiations in Paris might go back to the position that they had reached at the end of May, or at any rate, that Hanoi is now in a position to move one way or the other in the negotiations.

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Now, I repeat, we are not saying that this is what is going to happen. We are saying that this is one of the things that we believe can happen, and that as we look at the future, we will be watching very carefully, and if Hanoi is prepared to talk seriously, they will find us ready to be flexible and serious.

As for the intensity of the war, there is no doubt that infiltration has declined substantially from the high point it had reached earlier this year. There is no question, also, that our casualties have declined from the high point they had reached earlier this year. The average casualties now are around 150 a week.

What is less clear and what we are again examining very carefully, is whether this is the result of a military decision to regroup, whether it is the result of the inability to do more, or whether it is the result of a political decision and a prelude to negotiations.

I might add that there is no dispute in this Administration over the figures. Everybody uses essentially the same figures. The differences arise, as you would have to expect, about the interpretation of these figures. Now, the view in this building is that this is not an issue to be settled in the abstract by declarations, that the actions at the conference table are going to make clear what the other side's intentions are.

We can talk about a lull this month as compared to, say, March, and it would be technically correct, if you take, as your index, the casualty figures. On the other hand, if the present casualties are maintained for a period of 12 months, then next summer no one will be talking about a lull. So lulls are relative.

Our objective is not to produce a lull, but to produce peace. We have to assess these figures in relation to the probability that they will lead to a peaceful settlement.

But again, one can find positive factors in this. One can also look at it from the point of view that Hanoi is getting itself into a position for a long-haul strategy and if it is a long-haul strategy, this is obviously not what we are trying to encourage.

On progress on Vietnamization, General Abrams, when he was here, told us that progress was being made; that Vietnamese units are improving. I can only repeat what I said at a previous backgrounder. The only way to find out the correctness of these assessments is to act on them.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what is the situation now regarding the B-52 strikes?

DR. KISSINGER: The B-52 strikes now are back on roughly the schedule they were prior to the cease fire. But there has been so much speculation about it, which we did not deliberately generate, that perhaps it might be useful if I explain our thinking to this group.

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Let me first of all say what that 36-hour halt
last week was not. No one expected, when we ordered
the 36-hour halt last week, that Hanoi would respond
on the battlefield to the fact that we had made a halt.
Clearly, 36 hours were not enough to do that.

There were two basic reasons; one which Ron
Ziegler has already given, and another which Murrey Marder
wrote about this weekend.

The military reason was this: We could not know,
although we had a pretty good idea, whether the cease fire
was simply an observance of Ho's death, or whether it
meant that Ho's death was being used as an excuse or as a
pretext for a general de-escalation. If it was used for
the latter, we wanted to be ready to indicate that we would
respond to some such move. We did not think this was
probable, but we wanted to be ready. That was one aspect.

The second, more fundamental aspect was, we
have been exchanging ideas with Hanoi at the conference
table now for many years. One of the problems is that words
tend to be, in many respects, the least useful means of
communication.

The second problem is that with the new leadership,
it may not be the best moment to make precise propositions
to which they then have to react immediately. But it is
better to make a suggestion in a way which they can think
about and pick up at the moment when their own internal
structure is in shape to make major decisions.

We, therefore, stood down the B-52's for 36 hours
in order to underline what the President has often said and
what our negotiators have repeatedly said, that everything
is negotiable except the self-determination of the people of
Vietnam, and to convey our determination and our willingness
to be flexible if the other side begins to talk to us
seriously.

Now, if you ladies and gentlemen remember, we
did not announce that standdown. We did not make anything
of this standdown. We have not claimed that we were betrayed
as a result of the standdown. We have not derived from it
the justification for other things. That particular
message could be delivered in 36 hours, as well as in
48 hours. It required no response then.

What perhaps was not sufficiently weighted was the
rapidity with which that standdown would be picked up and
force us into formal explanations. But this, frankly,
is the reasoning that was behind it and while it may not
have been correct, at least it was not confused.

Q A moment ago you said the figure was roughly
35,000. In answer to another question, you said you
thought that the navy reductions were part of this. The
story is 30,000 navy men are coming out. Does that mean
only 5,000 ground troops?

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EIC)

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DR. KISSINGER: No. I have not seen that precise report. The official position is that it is a speculative report. (Laughter.) My understanding, which I believe to be correct, is that these are the total figures of everything that is coming out, that this includes all the units. It is not heavily weighted towards the Navy. Most of them, to the best of my information, will be ground units in Vietnam, and again, to the best of my information, at least half of them will be combat troops. But I think you can get the exact figures, the precise designations, from the Pentagon.

Q Dr. Kissinger, at any time during this period when we were trying to get across the idea to the Communists that everything was negotiable, during this B-52 pause period, did we tell them or signal them in any other way through diplomatic sources in Paris, or anywhere else in the world, or did we just hope they would get the message through osmosis?

DR. KISSINGER: We take the position that we do not comment one way or the other on any contacts outside the plenary sessions, and therefore, I don't want to comment on it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could I just ask you to comment a little further on the first reason you gave for the stand-down? You suggested it was to see whether the 72-hour truce was simply an observance of Ho's death, or whether it suggested something more.

A lot of the criticism in the papers over the weekend suggested that it is impossible to judge Hanoi's activities on the field that quickly because their communications are so slow. Could you give us your comment on this?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me separate the two things. Let me distinguish it from bombing halts that occurred in the previous Administration. In the previous Administration there would be a bombing halt and then there would be the expectation of some reaction of the other side to the bombing halt, and then there was raised the whole set of questions of whether sufficient time had been given in view of the decision-making process of the other side, their method of communications with lower-echelon, and similar matters; whether sufficient time had been given.

The first reason we gave did not depend on this. The first reason we gave was: Assuming Hanoi had decided before announcing the cease fire in observance of Ho Chi Minh's death, that it would use Ho Chi Minh's death in order to stand down its operations, and assuming the order had already been given to its units to stand down operations and prolong the cease fire, we wanted to make sure that Hanoi would not be triggered into a misunderstanding by precipitated action on our part. In other words, it was not an attempt by us to elicit a response.

Either the order had been given or it had not been given. If the order had not been given, we recognized that we would not, through our action, bring the order about, all the more so as we believed that in this transitional period Hanoi might not be in a position to make such a fundamental order.

In other words, the first reason was primarily designed to be able to take advantage of an order that might have been given independent of our action.

Q Dr. Kissinger, was there any change in the war situation which persuaded the President that he was dealing with facts which enabled him to go ahead with this decision on troop withdrawal as contrasted with his earlier postponement of the decision?

DR. KISSINGER: The decision to delay was made, I believe, on August 23. At any rate, it was made within ten days of one of the so-called high points of North Vietnamese action in which our casualties for that week nearly doubled. We had not fully assessed, at that time, whether that was a cyclical pattern or indicated a new offensive.

Secondly, there was the stalemate in Paris for which there was no obvious explanation.

Thirdly, there was a degree of -- you cannot say confusion in Hanoi -- but there was at least the fact that Hanoi seemed to be marking time. All of this convinced the President that it was important for us to have a full review of the situation and not to have our withdrawals and replacements occur as the result of a mechanical inflexible schedule; unaffected by anything that the other side might do. He ordered that review.

Then the level of military activity returned, in the long term, to the intolerable level of 150 casualties, but still a level which is lower than the previous one.

Secondly, there was the fact that Ho's death gave us at least an explanation for why Hanoi might have been marking time, and therefore, another opportunity to test one of the three criteria.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how did they arrive at 35,000 and what is the rationale for this pull out? Is it de-escalation or is it now that the South Vietnamese can replace?

DR. KISSINGER: The one rationale is always that the South Vietnamese can replace. But the choice you gave me is not mutually exclusive. When you pull out 60,000 American forces, obviously it has to have an impact on the level of our operations, particularly when a fairly large slice of them are combat troops and when that slice again represents a higher percentage of the total combat troops than the total increment of the entire force. In other words, we have pulled out a greater percentage.

The first increment of 25,000, which was only five percent of the total force, was, I think, about nine percent of the combat force. I think that percentage has been kept fairly constant. We wanted to pull out a large enough number to make clear that we were serious about this replacement program and serious about the offer in the President's May 14 speech of withdrawing all our forces under conditions of an acceptable settlement.

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At the same time, we had to take into account
what could reasonably be replaced and we had to have
consultation to determine how to mix these criteria.
Obviously our problem is to withdraw a number large enough to
be politically and militarily significant, but not so
large as to undermine our entire position there.

I have to remind you, ladies and gentlemen, that
we get only one guess at this; that we cannot go back
to the drawing board if we make a mistake.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in the past, various Administra-
tion spokesmen have said on the record and for background
that the time has come for the other side to make a move and
that we, in effect, do not intend to offer, we have made
all the concessions that any responsible party could offer.
There were some people who were criticizing this as an inflexible
position at this moment.

What is our attitude right now in the wake of
Ho's death and in the wake of this latest withdrawal?

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DR. KISSINGER: If your patience holds out, I will be philosophical for a few minutes here. Let me state the problem as we see it.

It is easy to get a reputation for flexibility by submerging the other side in a constant flood of proposals. On the other hand, one ought to consider that if the other side knows that every deadlock will elicit a new proposal it will never have an incentive for making a settlement. If the test of one's flexibility is not the substantive merit of one's proposals, but only the criterion on whether it is new, one is on a slope in which there is no ending except to yield to the other side.

One of the obstacles, we believe, to a settlement is that Hanoi is not yet convinced that there is a floor below which America will not go. This doesn't mean that our proposals are the best that human ingenuity has ever devised. We believe, though, that they represent a reasonable and fair position.

We simply would like to be judged by the substance of the proposals and not by whether they are new or when they were most recently advanced.

Now, this is the first somewhat philosophical point.

Secondly, it is our judgment that the missing ingredient in the negotiations up to this moment, or at this moment, is not so much lack of ingenuity on our part in coming up with yet another formulation or yet another concession. The missing ingredient is the absence of a conviction on the part of Hanoi that a compromise settlement is indicated.

We have heard nothing from Hanoi to suggest anything other than that they insist on their maximum program and that they might consider giving us a fig leaf to obscure this. This is the big issue. If Hanoi came to us with a proposition which suggested a genuine desire for compromise, we would obviously respond flexibly and reasonably.

What we cannot do, what we see no sense in doing, is simply to accumulate concessions in a situation in which there has been no response to any of the many proposals that we have made since this Administration came into office and where every negotiation turns into an examination by the other side in the adequacy of our understanding of their ten points and the impression is created as if we were going to be given grades by them on how closely we approximate to the acceptance of the ten points.

This is the basic problem. If we ever reach a point where the other side indicates a clear willingness to compromise, then they will find us ready within the framework of the general propositions that we have advanced, to be understanding of their point of view. But we do not see that this present deadlock is caused by our failure to advance yet another proposal.

O Dr. Kissinger, were the troop figures which you explained here this morning explained to the South Vietnamese Government and if they were, in the light of the certain amount of public confusion which has arisen, can you suggest what Vice President Ky had in mind when he used the figure 40,500?

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DR. KISSINGER: I will tell you, I have trouble enough explaining what we have in mind. (Laughter.) I think what Vice President Ky was working from was the authorized troop ceiling. The authorized troop ceiling is now 524,500. It is being reduced to 484,000. He therefore assumed, and it is technically correct, the authorized ceiling was being reduced by 40,500 and this is the figure that he was using.

As I explained, the authorized ceiling, we have, as some of you pointed out, much fewer than 524,500 in Vietnam because we have actually pulled out somewhat more than 25,000.

But he was operating from the troop ceiling and not from the actual strength.

O Dr. Kissinger, along those lines, Vice President Ky also said that he anticipated that another 150,000 or 200,000 men would be withdrawn next year. Did he get those figures from us? What is our thinking about that?

DR. KISSINGER: No, he did not get those figures from us. Our thinking about this is not yet firm. We have a number of contingency plans, obviously. If he got these figures from any American they were not authorized figures.

O I mean he got them indirectly from us.

DR. KISSINGER: No. These are not figures which we have officially discussed with the South Vietnamese Government.

O There were reports last week of new discord between Washington and Saigon. Would you comment on that?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, I read these reports with astonishment. Obviously, a cease fire in observance of Ho Chi Minh's death presents a serious problem for Saigon. This is the leader who had sworn to overthrow this government, who refused in Paris to talk with this government and whose supporters are trying to undermine it by every conceivable means.

So naturally it is a serious emotional problem.

Secondly, after the offer of the cease fire the rocket attacks on South Vietnamese cities were stepped up and there were several hundred casualties in the interval between the announcement of the cease fire and the time the cease fire went into effect.

Obviously, the problem is a very emotional one for Saigon. We expressed our understanding of their point of view. There was no acrimony. We had an agreed statement of how we would react which was in effect that there would be no formal cease fire, but that we would gear our action to the level of action of the other side.

I do not agree that there was a disagreement of a fundamental nature or even of an important nature between Saigon and Washington last week.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have time for two more questions.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, given all the factors that went into this decision to withdraw another 35,000, half of whom are combat troops ---

DR. KISSINGER: Don't hold me to that.

Q Well, you also said that the rough percentage would hold, that nine percent of our combat effectiveness was reduced by that factor in the 25,000 and roughly the same this time. What signal is Hanoi supposed to get out of this? What will their planners think about this?

DR. KISSINGER: May I just comment on the figures? I don't want to create a credibility gap for ourselves. You have to get the correct figures from the Pentagon and make your own computations.

The first increment was roughly nine percent. I believe that this percentage will roughly hold. It may go down to eight or it may have risen to ten of the combat slice. But we did not levy a requirement on General Abrams that said, "Keep the percentages constant." I believe that this is roughly what is happening.

What Hanoi should get out of this is, first, the point that was made in response to a previous question. There is a great deal of debate on whether we are de-escalating or not or whether there should be de-escalation. When you try to write down how you would go about doing it in the abstract it is very difficult. But we are doing it in a very concrete way.

We therefore believe that if all forces of both sides were withdrawn this would be the easiest way for the people of South Vietnam to determine their own fate.

Secondly, we are trying to make clear that we have no permanent military interest in South Vietnam. If the South Vietnamese can take over from us, if the North Vietnamese withdraw, regardless of whether the South Vietnamese can take over from us, we are prepared to leave the future evolution of South Vietnam to the South Vietnamese.

One reason why we put such a heavy emphasis in the first withdrawal on combat forces -- even though we could have padded the figures by emphasizing support forces -- was because we wanted to do something real that could be translated into mutual action and that could be picked up by the other side without their necessarily using the phrase "mutual withdrawal" as the President said in his speech on May 14th.

MR. ZIEGLER: If you keep your questions short, Dr. Kissinger will keep his answers short and we can take a few more.

Q How about the domestic position on the war? Should we expect any action for reducing the draft?

DR. KISSINGER: I was pondering this pledge which Mr. Ziegler gave. (Laughter.) Would you repeat your question?

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Q What is being planned to combat domestic opposition to the draft within the Administration? We keep hearing about Executive Orders relating to the draft. Is this under serious consideration?

DR. KISSINGER: Any announcements about the draft will come from the Pentagon. I can say that with respect to this announcement, and I know I have sat in on all the meetings, the problem of the impact on any domestic opposition was not a factor.

MR. ZIEGLER: Gentlemen, some of you are on very tight deadlines. We will have one more question.

Q With the President going up to the U. N. on Thursday, are you able to say to what extent his speech or other action might have some impact on Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: We have stated our position in general terms, not that every last word of every proposal is sacrosanct, but we have laid out what we think to be a general program, which is negotiable to enable the people of South Vietnam to determine their own fate.

We have also indicated that we are willing to listen to other proposals that are capable of achieving this objective.

You therefore should not expect any spectacular new gimmick. Of course, it would be difficult for the President to speak at the United Nation without mentioning the subject of Vietnam. But you should not expect a major or new set of proposals.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 10:35 A.M. EDT)

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS;
CHARLES MEYER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS; AND
RON ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY TO
THE PRESIDENT

3:30 P.M. EST

OCTOBER 31, 1969

FRIDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: You have the text of the President's
address for this evening.

Dr. Kissinger is here, and also the Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Charles Meyer, to discuss it
with you.

Their remarks will be on a BACKGROUND basis and not
for direct quotations, as they will be discussing the
President's address with you.

Q Ron, is there any reason why we can't put this
on the record?

MR. ZIEGLER: The reason for not putting it on the
record is because it is on a BACKGROUND basis. It is not
for direct quotation.

Q What source should we attribute it to?

MR. ZIEGLER: I am sorry, I should have indicated
that.

White House sources are fine; White House and
State Department, or Administration officials, any one of them.

Q In other words, it is on the record except
for mentioning their names?

MR. ZIEGLER: Let's go over this once more. (Laughter.)

The groundrules for this briefing are as follows:

What Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Meyer
say is on BACKGROUND. It is not for direct quotation. They
are explaining and discussing the President's address for
this evening.

You can attribute it to White House sources or
Administration officials, if you prefer.

DR. KISSINGER: Is this on Vietnam?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, this is on Latin America.

Q Feel free, though. (Laughter.)

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[cc]

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DR. KISSINGER: We are going to do this in two bites.

I am going to explain briefly the general philosophy and approach to the Western Hemisphere policy and what the speech is attempting to do.

Secretary Meyer is going to discuss the specific proposals, which the President is making in this speech, and what they are attempting to accomplish.

To this Administration, the Western Hemisphere policy is an extremely important aspect of overall American foreign policy.

We went into this problem in two bites. We had an NSC meeting in July in which we tried to determine what general philosophy should guide our actions in the Western Hemisphere.

Specifically, at that time, we put five questions to the National Security Council: whether we should have a special relationship with Latin America; what the basic nature of this relationship ought to be; what it is that we want to accomplish in Latin America for a period or the term of this Administration and beyond; what the best approach would be; and indeed whether there can be such a thing as a uniform policy towards Latin America or in the Western Hemisphere or whether what we really should have is a different policy for each of the nations in the Western Hemisphere.

We came, in general, to these conclusions, which I hope you find reflected in that speech; and if they are not, it is unintentional.

There is a special relationship in the Western Hemisphere. It is the most consistent expression of American foreign policy. It is the area with which we are geographically closely linked. It is an area which is also of profound significance for a number of other reasons.

If it is true, as we believe it is, that the North-South problem -- that is, the relationship between the advanced and the less developed countries -- is one of the central problems of our period, it may be the deepest problem for the interests of long-term stability and peace and progress, then in this Hemisphere, where we are dealing with countries with similar or comparable traditions and backgrounds, sharing in many of the aspirations and, indeed, with the history which has had some of the same beliefs that what was done here in the Western Hemisphere was relevant to the rest of the world, then our ability to be effective in this context is crucial to our general relationship to less developed countries. Because if we can't create a constructive relationship under these conditions with the societies, with the nations with which we have been historically linked, then it is very difficult to see how we can do so in situations that are much more complicated and much less favorable.

But in pursuing this general objective of revitalizing the special relationship in the Western Hemisphere and of making the Western Hemisphere a kind of test case, and finally as one of the pillars of the general structure of peace, which must be the long-term goal of this Administration, we were also governed by some of the basic principles that this

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Administration is attempting to pursue everywhere in the
world which was reflected in the President's Guam statement,
for example, and the general policy announced on his Asian
trip.

And, it is this: In the past, this special relationship
has been characterized by a tendency for the United States
to take the primary responsibility for developing the
programs, executing the programs, furnishing the resources,
and, in short, dominating the relationship.

We believe, in the Western Hemisphere, as in other
parts of the world, that the United States can play a significant
role where its contribution makes a difference, but it cannot
assume the primary responsibility for developing all the
programs, furnishing all the resources, and implementing
all the programs that may be developed.

We, therefore, believe that the style of our policy
in the Western Hemisphere is almost as important as the
substance. In fact, it is inseparable from the substance.

What we are trying to create is a partnership which
creates the maximum incentives for each of the participants
to assume a principal responsibility and in which each of
them feel that it is their program and not something made
in the United States.

In this sense, I would like to stress that what we
do -- most of the time that I meet you, ladies and gentlemen,
we have talked about Vietnam. And, of course, Vietnam is the
immediate preoccupation of all of us. But what we hope
this Administration will be remembered for is to have begun
building and maybe make a significant step forward towards a
structure of peace, which, as most stable periods of peace,
is one in which the principal elements feel that they have
a share in it and that they have a stake in it.

We look at what we are trying to do in the Western
Hemisphere as a first step in this direction.

Two more quick observations and then I will let
Charley Meyer explain the specific policy.

We have deliberately stayed away, in this speech,
from announcing grandiose programs that had very little chance
of being fulfilled. We are not asking for any new expenditures
of money, partly because they won't be forthcoming, but partly
because what we are trying to do is to liberate the energies
of the other countries and to create the conditions for their
own initiative.

The measures that are being proposed are those that
we can take, that we consider major steps forward, but whose
effect will be to free local initiative rather than impose
American-manufactured programs.

There is only one part of these programs that I
want to talk about, which is the reorganization of the State
Department which we have recommended.

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One of the common complaints that Governor Rockefeller found on his trip has been that there has been lacking one focal point for the consideration of Western Hemisphere problems. And in order to underline the special importance that we attach to the Western Hemisphere, and in order to provide one focal point for the coordination of all activities within the Western Hemisphere, the President is proposing that the highest ranking State Department officer dealing with Western Hemisphere relationships be given the title of Under Secretary and that he be given the responsibility for coordinating, on a Government-wide basis, all the activities in the Americas dealing with all of the activities in the Americas of the United States Government, Canada not being a part of the system now.

With this as an introduction, why don't you, Charley, explain what some of the specific recommendations mean, what we are trying to do.

Let me just make one absolutely final point, which is: This speech is intended to be a general statement of principles. It will be followed in the middle of November by a meeting of the IA-ECOSOC group, before which we will put a large number of specific proposals that will implement these general principles. And this will be followed by a meeting of Ministers in December in Caracas. So that this speech should be considered a general statement of principle to begin a whole series of initiatives, which will continue over the period of this Administration.

And the reason it has been so long delayed is because we wanted to wait for the Rockefeller report, for the NSC considerations of basic principles and policy choices and for the consensus of Vina del Mar, which was delivered here at the end of June and to give us full opportunity to study it.

Now let me turn it over to Charley.

MR. MEYER: Thank you.

I don't know if there is anything symbolic about being between "The Crossing of the Delaware" and "The Attack on San Juan Hill." I have never been in this room before.

I think Henry Kissinger has explained perhaps all that needs being explained, in view of the fact that you have the speech and I presume you have read it.

But I would like to reemphasize perhaps something that is very, very close to our convictions.

In the nine months of this Administration, during which time many of us -- and I include all of us -- have said "Where is the policy? Where is the President's policy for Latin America? Where is the President's Latin American policy?", it has occurred to me that much of what the President will say tonight has been manifested by the United States' attitude toward events which have occurred in 1969 and that the philosophical doctrine and the tone of that doctrine, as indicated in your speech, in the speech before you, could very well have been, perhaps, defined.

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In short, we have been asked "Is there an evident intent of disengagement?" The obvious answer is no; that it is an evident intent of re-engaging.

"Is there an evident intent of economic neo-isolationism?" The obvious answer is no.

"Is there an evident intent to withdraw our economic assistance?" The evident answer is no.

What the President has outlined, without being overly specific -- and this, you all know better than I, is extraordinarily difficult, because everyone in the Department of State, certainly, has a facet in the total picture that he feels is important or so important that it should be headlined -- the President has not intended to be specific and should not.

He has established the atmosphere. He has drawn a blueprint without insisting that the details of every pertinent sub-structure in that blueprint be made in the USA.

Most specifically, and Henry has touched on the organizational philosophy, which I think you know has been around for a great many years he has reaffirmed the United States' determination to push for generalized preferences for the less developed nations. That is in direct response to our conviction and to Latin America's requests and the consensus of Vina del Mar.

He has followed the first step he took in June of abandoning additionality by untiring AID loans to Latin America to permit Latin America to spend some of its AID dollars to the degree that it is technically and economically feasible within Latin America -- not all within the USA.

He has recognized -- and this is important -- the fact that there is or will be world-wide a burden of debt that requires analysis as to source and solution.

He has taken the first step of any Administration toward multilaterality within this partnership. This will not be done overnight, self-evidently.

The multi-laterality is both in terms of economic development and is in terms of the Inter-American family partnership. Those are the key themes.

Dr. Kissinger referred to the upcoming Inter-American Economic and Social Council Meeting.

I would like to dispel to the greatest degree possible any feeling of "immediacy and urgency" to which, to my mind, is the one bad product the United States has sold since World War II, a cult of instant success. Everybody is looking for a plug-in messiah, 110 volt; put it in the wall, turn it on, and everything is all right.

The President has not promised miracles, and the United States never should, in particular reference to this unique Hemisphere to the South of us which is different in a great many ways and so closely tied to us for 400, 300, 200 or 100 years.

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The President has set a tone of mature interchange which should, and will, obviously, develop, not only in the IA-ECOSOC Conference in November, but in all Inter-American dialogue, certainly during this Administration.

If the foundation is as solid as I think it is, it will endure for the continued development of this Hemisphere.

I make that semi-philosophical on my part, but if you were to ask me questions, for example, as to specific Hemispheric development of more trade in something, I couldn't answer you. The trade concept is one that is responsive to, and dependent on, negotiation of CIAP with the other developed nations. And if all of you are familiar with the US Tariff schedule, you will notice that is tens of thousands of items.

Specific reference to untying aid, if you were to ask me what would that mean in dollars, I could say that applying the principle which the President has ennunciated to AID dollars currently in stream, if all of those dollars were properly expendible in Latin America rather than the United States there would be a difference of $168 million, if you were willing to export promotion into this country.

But that is an "if." There are a great many parts that Latin America needs that Latin America doesn't make.

If you were to ask me about the future dollar figure, I would only have to say that that depends on the future dollar programs approved by our Congress for present and future, because the fiscal year 1970 foreign assistance bill has not been written off or approved by the Appropriations Committees.

Q What is the request for fiscal '70?

MR. MEYER: For Latin America, it is $605 million.

Q Do you know what the House Committee figure is?

MR. MEYER: It is 437.

Q It was a cut of $100 million from the request?

MR. MEYER: It is 335, as I recall, for loans and 100 in grants. 435 I had in mind.

That still, as you know, has to go before the Appropriations Committee.

The President has said in his speech that we pledge ourselves to continued assistance, and we do. Please don't quantify that in dollars, because, one, we can't, and, two, I don't believe it is quite necessary. I don't believe that total dollars is an indication of success. How we spend them and what the Americas develop in this partnership is deeply important.

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Q Was the complete untying of AID considered at any point in your deliberations on this?

MR. MEYER: Yes, it was and I believe the speech says that there will be a continued re-examination of the total AID package in terms of untying.

Q Are you ready for questions now?

MR.MEYER: Yes.

Q At the bottom of page 3, "Finally, in world trade forums to press for a liberal system of generalized tariff preferences for all developing countries, including Latin America."

In what way does that change, if it does at all, the policy we have had all along: to press for all the developed countries of the world to help all the under-developed countries of the world? The word "press" is that a harder word?

MR. MEYER: Amongst my enormous variety of competencies, one is not that of being an absolute expert.

But the answer is yes, press is different.

Q But we always press and we always fail to get something for Latin America. That doesn't change anything. We are just going to continue to press; right?

MR.MEYER: We are going to continue to press.

MR. BERGSTEN: If I might add at that point, the United States has not heretofore made a firm statement that it intended to participate in a generalized preference system for the less developed countries. That is point one.

The next sentence, I think, also should be read in that context, what is meant by the US position on that subject. Details of that, as the Under Secretary said, will be carried out through negotiations later on. But that is also a very important step in explaining what it meant.

Q How would the Administration view preferential tariffs if they are going to affect domestic industries?

MR. MEYER: There is no question but that the total interchange and total continuing -- and I stress this -- continuing attention to preferential treatment for the less developed nations is a continuing process in relationship to a very real and ever-present economic and political change, pressures and lack of pressures, pluses and minuses within the United States. That is true all over the world.

Q So if a domestic industry was already under pressure from imports, how would this affect your attitude to preferential tariffs for those imports?

MR. MEYER: My attitude ---

Q I mean the Administration.

MR.MEYER: The Administration would have to self-
evidently balance, as is the case with all trade negotiations,
domestic and international interests.

Q Mr. Secretary, what was the $168 million, the
figure you gave us of all aid for purchases in Latin America
were untied? What does that represent? How is that arrived
at?

MR. MEYER: Carl, can I tell you that I would recommend,
before we get into this analysis which is a very complex
subject, that in terms of dollars and cents, as the untying
may -- and I say "may" -- be realized, would you talk at
any time after tonight to Jim Fowler?

Q All right.

May I ask you something about the Under Secretary.
Two questions: One, does this new structure now include
Canada as part of the area of responsibility of the Under
Secretary?

MR. MEYER: No.

Q Secondly, does it imply any need for Congressional
approval to make the change?

MR. MEYER: It does not include Canada and the
speech stipulates that the President will ask Congress for ---

Q Dr. Kissinger, you spoke earlier saying that
you deliberately stayed away from grandiose programs that
had very little chance of being fulfilled. And one of the
reasons you gave was that you want to liberate the initiative
of other countries. What gives the rise to the feeling that
the initiative of other countries would be released, given
their past performance, their social systems, the type of
representational government they have and all of that? Why
should we feel that it is any more valid now than it was
before even with a weak attempt of the Alliance?

DR. KISSINGER: One of the problems of the Alliance
was the principle specifically prescribed in the speech, but
one of the difficulties with the Alliance was that it seemed
too much manufactured in the United States and that it depended,
to a very large degree, on American resources.

What we are doing in this program, first of all, we
have the Consensus of Vina del Mar, which stated certain
requirements of the Latin American nations. We believe that
this program is responsive to these needs and to these
expressions.

Secondly, the Latin American nations have claimed
for a long period that the process, as many other nations do,
of development is retarded because of the special inhibitions
of entering the markets of industrialized nations.

MORR

So we can't guarantee that those nations will, in
fact, develop those initiatives. And we have stated as
a general policy with respect to other areas that we can't
supply the initiatives. We can create the framework in which
we believe these initiatives will flourish.

Thirdly, we are multi-lateralizing the development
assistance for the first time. And, therefore, we hope that
each of the participants will feel not that they are
executing a program which we recommend, but that they are
carrying out a program which they helped develop.

In short, we are attempting to go back to the
experience of the Marshall Plan in which this method of
multi-lateral distribution of assistance was used.

I have to say that this represents our best judgment
of what will liberate these initiatives. We do believe that
there is a firm belief in the Western Hemisphere that there
are these needs, there are these aspirations, that the
governments, even the non-representative governments, are
beginning to be increasingly influenced by these pressures
and, therefore, by creating a framework in which they have
a possibility to express their initiatives that, hopefully,
they will do so.

But I must tell you, in all candor, that we can't
supply the initiative. That is the one thing no US program
can do. In this sense, therefore, I am only explaining
why we believe this creates the best set of incentives.
Then we will have to see.

Q Henry, if I could compare that question in
just one other way, you said that the National Security
Council considered five questions last June, one of them
being what you hoped to accomplish during the tenure of
this Administration.

DR. KISSINGER: July.

Q To what extent did you consider in that
question whether or not the United States should help
stimulate social and political change in Latin America?
If you didn't consider that, why didn't you? If you did,
how is it reflected in this speech?

DR. KISSINGER: We did consider the question at the
time and we came to the conclusion that -- in fact, first of
all, in this speech we state our own preferences. We state
that we prefer democratic institutions; that we remain committed
to them; and that we hope that they will become the general
pattern in the Hemisphere and throughout the world.

Secondly, we also state in the speech that we believe
that we should deal with the governments that exist, though,
again emphasizing that we prefer democratic forms and that
we hope that even non-representative governments will evolve
in the direction of greater freedom and greater responsiveness
to the needs of their people.

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The general problem that is raised by your question is this: There is no disagreement. We believe in what seems to be implied in your question, the importance of social change, in the importance of representative government.

The question is, to what extent should the United States directly attempt to engage in the process of political change within other societies, some of which it may not understand very well.

The history of the last decade and a half should have taught us the limits of our ability of direct social engineering.

Therefore, we have concluded that our influence in bringing about this social change is best exercised by promoting a general system of evolution, by encouraging those programs which we believe will be most conducive to the welfare of the peoples concerned, but to de-emphasize the direct political intervention in the affairs of other societies.

The difference here is one as to method and not one as to objective.

The judgment is really one that applies not only to the Western Hemisphere, but to the general stance of the United States in the world at large and to the degree of responsibility the United States can or should assume for the direct re-making of governments and whether that attempt may not have counter-productive consequences.

But the question was seriously considered.

Q. Do you mean Haiti will be treated on a part with Chile?

DR. KISSINGER: No. You know, if you put the question this way -- first of all, you would have to explain what do you mean on a par with Chile? We don't advocate our judgment as to which government and which programs are conducive to produce the welfare of their people. And we will, therefore, continue to judge, but hopefully in partnership with our Latin American -- with the countries of the Western Hemisphere, what programs would be most consistent with these objectives.

For example, if AID becomes increasingly multi-lateralized, this question need not be addressed to the United States alone but can reflect a Hemisphere consensus.

Q. Mr. Meyer, you testified on the Hill not long ago that the Latin temperament needs grandiose schemes and impossible dreams in order to stimulate them to their best efforts. This program seems to be deliberately underplaying that angle. I wonder if you think it will be the stimulus to America and Canada which is required?

MR. MEYER: I think so, because this philosophy and tone is almost by independent genesis, but by happenstance, very close to the expression which the Latin American nations themselves arrived at in Chile. They have said, "We want" -- I use this in sort of shorthand -- "We want to do it ourselves."

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And the President has enunciated this partnership,
this new partnership, which is responsive. You have the
right to do it yourself.

Q Secretary Meyer, are you going to be this new
Under Secretary or will someone else new be brought in?

MR. MEYER: I knew I shouldn't be here. That
is up to the Secretary of State and the President.

Q Mr. Meyer, what is wrong with bold, dynamic
programs, and why are you so much against immediacy and
urgency? It seems to me that is what these people are crying
for down there. You are giving us a little more of the same.

MR. MEYER: No, I don't think so, ma'am. I am
convinced that there is a good deal of boldness and dynamism
in a philosophy which says in partnership "Let's plan
together."

I think we fall into the trap of boldness and
dynamism when we say, "This is our dream. You do it." And
I think that is the trap we have fallen into.

Q Is that the case, though? The Alliance for
Progress people, and the Latins, kept saying that they contri-
buted much more to the Alliance than the United States did,
and the whole theme here has been that the United States
has been directing things and has been overpowering in the
whole picture and directly denied by the Latins that you talk
to. Galo Plaza and others all produce figures showing what
the member countries have done in the Alliance.

MR. MEYER: This is a question, in my opinion, of
the difficulty of -- the interesting factor, if you will --
two clientelos. The Latin Americans have contributed an
enormous amount to the Alliance. I for one feel the
Alliance said that, too -- this I also said on Capitol Hill --
it is not a failure, it may have been a disappointment.

And the President's philosophy takes the next step
to the very valid doctrine of the Alliance for Progress.

Unfortunately, maybe even only at home in the
United States, over the period of the last three or four
years there has crept into the stream of consciousness a
distinct feeling that the United States has directed the
total show. That is the change that we advocate in our
seeking and that the President is enunciating.

Q Is the President directing himself to this
feeling in the United States rather than to the reality that
exists?

MR. MEYER: No.

Don't forget, this 'tenality and philosophy reflects
the 1969-1970, if you will, Latin dream.

Q May I ask a question on procedure and philosophy
and substance? It seems to me that at the Punta del Este
meetings and the various other meetings of the Alliance
for Progress, agreements were signed on philosophy and on
substance. Tonight, the President of the United States

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is presenting US modifications in the US viewpoint toward
certain philosophy and certain matters of substance. Is
it that we are going to submit to the other partners in the
partnership proposals for mutual change, or are we changing
it?

MR. MEYER: The submission, Carl, if it requires
a submission, in order for us to express a response to the
Latin requirement for a fuller partnership will be made
specifically at the IA-ECOSOC meeting.

Q Mr. Meyer, you haven't said anything in
this speech about the role of women and yet Mrs. Cammer
certainly worked as hard and talked to as many people as
Rockefeller did. Why don't you have anything in here
about that?

MR. MEYER: Miss Sarah, there is the difficulty
of getting it all in the speech.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, what is your answer to the argument that the United States is already directly and heavily intervening in Latin American countries by the weight of its industrial operations there and by the aid and support which is channeled through governments which want to keep themselves and their policies in power, and that the issue is not so much whether we intervene, but how we conduct the intervention, which the facts of the situation give us?

DR. KISSINGER: I agree with that and that was the thrust of my remarks before. The United States does play a major role.

The difference, really, is between how we aim at the general objectives, and whether we are deliberately attempting to do so by direct measures or by some other devices. But I agree with you, and it is our view, that the United States can't simply advocate the fact that it is a major factor in Latin American politics, that it has a responsibility for the evolution of the Western Hemisphere, and the conclusion that I mention to you had to do with our judgment as to how best to bring about the objective of the improvement in the political and social progress of the individuals which must remain the basic concern of American policy.

Q Dr. Kissinger, can you go into the extent to which security policy entered into the consideration of the formulation of this program?

DR. KISSINGER: Military security policy?

Q A greater tolerance for changes in South America, and dealing with them on a programatic basis, you say, and on the other hand, you refer to opposition to the export of revolution. Did this enter into the program at all?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, it is important to look at the facts of the situation. Most of the changes to which you refer occurred when we had an opposite declaratory policy. So that the mere fact that we are announcing something does not make it happen.

It is not that we are changing the events. We are attempting to state objectives that seem to be within our means, given the historical and political evolution of the Western Hemisphere.

Secondly, the military consideration plays an insignificant role in making this decision.

It isn't our custom to report the internal deliberations of the National Security Council in this room. But I can assure you that military considerations play a practically insignificant role, and I can say safely played no significant role.

Indeed, I would say it played no role at all in this particular issue that you have mentioned.

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Our concern was with our assessment of the political
evolution as we have seen it in Latin America over the past
decade, and what the United States could most responsibly
and effectively do, given the circumstances that have been
observed.

Q Is the Rockefeller Report going to be made public?

DR. KISSINGER: The Rockefeller Report will be made public within the next two weeks.

Q Along that line, could you tell us how much
of the Rockefeller Report was incorporated in here, or how
much will be a part of the program as is announced from
time to time?

DR. KISSINGER: The Rockefeller Report -- first of all, all of the recommendations in this speech, I think this is correct, have also been recommended in one form or another by Governor Rockefeller, not exactly the same.

For example, on the Under Secretary of Latin America he had a different organizational device to achieve the same objective. One is safe to say it is even more disturbing to existing bureaucratic structures -- enabled us to gain a reputation for moderation and mediation.
(Laughter)

All of the recommendations have been submitted to
the bureaucracy for full staffing and recommendations. I
think our recommendations before the IA-ECOSOC have been
influenced by the Rockefeller Report. And it is our belief
that the Rockefeller Report has been one of the most useful
such enterprises in terms of its impact on the United States
policy.

Q Could you tell us if under this policy now, number one, would the U.S. be favorably disposed toward giving economic aid to Haiti, and, two, whether land reform and tax reform will be at all considered pre-conditions for any aid programs?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me repeat what I have said
previously.

We would like to head for a situation in which the
objectives of the development in the Western Hemisphere
are set by the nations of the Western Hemisphere, and not
unilaterally by the United States.

I believe that the questions that have been asked
now on a number of occasions around the room are a good
illustration of what we are getting at. We don't want to be the
nation that alone announces what the political objectives for the
domestic structure of the various countries could be.

Haiti is an extreme case in which it is easy to get
a consensus. But when you come into borderline situations of
one-party governments, for example, where, however within the
governing party, you have a substantial democratic interplay,
do you treat this as an authoratarian regime, or do you treat
this as an essentially democratic form?

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I do not believe, and we don't believe, that this is
the sort of decision which will be handed down from Washington
to the Western Hemisphere nations, but rather one in which
the nations of the Western Hemisphere ought to define their own
definition of what they mean by political development and
social progress.

We are unambiguous for freedom, for individual
freedom and social progress, and in any multilateral forum,
you can be certain that the United States will remain true to
its principles.

When we say that we cannot insist on a particular
form of government, we are drawing from the lessons of, one,
what has happened in the Western Hemisphere in the last decade
under a completely different type of declaration; and, secondly,
from the experiences where the United States has attempted
to engage in social engineering, unilaterally, in many other parts
of the world.

So all we are saying is that it is our conviction
that the ideas for the political evolution of the countries of
the Western Hemisphere must emerge from the countries of the
Western Hemisphere, and you can be certain that we will play
a responsible role in this process.

Q Secretary Meyer, you say that this speech is
responsive to the consensus of Vina del Mar. This consensus
was a long list of very detailed, specific requirements and
aspirations on, in many cases, trade.

The speech itself, as you say, is couched in
very general terms. How is it, then, responsive to the
shopping list of Vina del Mar, and how do you think the
signatories of the consensus will receive it?

MR. MEYER: I think the signatories of the consensus
will receive it very well.

In terms of your generalities, don't overlook that
the specifics in this speech set the tones for further
specifics. In terms of Vina del Mar, this is
pinpointed in the upcoming IA-ECOSOC.

MR. ZIEGLER: Gentlemen, we have time for a couple
more questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you referred to applying the Marshall
Plan concept to Latin America, and as I recall, the OEEC
set priorities which then the United States supplied the
aid for.

Is that what you have in mind: now in CIAP and do
you envision bilateral aid in addition to that which
CIAP sets the priorities for?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the Marshall plan example
is -- what you have just described -- a correct model of what
we would like to move towards gradually. It cannot be done
from one year to the next, because the machinery doesn't
exist yet.

But this will be our general intention, and in the

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interim period, we would expect a combination of bilateral
and increasing multilateral -- is that correct?

MR. MEYER: I think there will always be some room
for some bilaterality.

Q After this lengthy look at Latin America,
have you determined what caused the anti-American resentment
during Governor Rockefeller's trip there, how widespread it is,
and is it growing or is this a passing thing that you think
might diminish?

DR. KISSINGER: I think we have to face the fact that
when a very -- first of all, the process of development is a
very painful one.

Many of the nations of Latin America now are going
through serious processes of social readjustment where
traditional lead(er)s are being replaced. Other traditional
lead(er)s are trying to find new roles for themselves by appealing
to nationalism.

The relationship between educational opportunity
and job opportunity, as in all developing countries, is not
yet fully established.

The historical phenomenon that Latin America,
starting from a similar phase, has lagged behind creates
a need for a scapegoat, and finally the fact that the United
States is physically so strong and they are relatively weak
in relation to us creates a situation where the temptation
of defining oneself in opposition to the United States is very
colorful.

It is important for us to understand that the success
of our policies should not be measured, and we will not intend
to measure it, by how much we are loved in this interim period.

The countries of the Western Hemisphere are undergoing
a very difficult process of adjustment. We must be mature
enough to realize that we are likely to be, perhaps, even
unfailing of some of these difficulties. We shouldn't oscillate
between masochism and resentment of wallowing in our
puishment, or on the other hand, self-righteously withdrawing
into isolation.

I can say that this Administration would like to
deal with countries of the Western Hemisphere with an under-
standing of their special problems. We hope that some
of them at least will develop some understanding of our
special problems, because the outside image of the overpowering
giant is not always what the seeming giant thinks of himself.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the concept of
the special relationship has dominated the comments that you
gentlemen have made, and also the President's speech,
and also the comments made at Vina del Mar when they talked
there about special relationship.

They gave very much weight to the access to the
United States market. When this is dealt with in the speech,
I wonder whether the way in which it is being dealt with here

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is not perhaps the antithesis of the special relationship,
because what you are calling for in this speech is access of
the underdeveloped nations in general, including Latin America,
to the markets of the industrialized countries in general,
including the United States.

Is this not moving away from a special relationship?

DR. KISSINGER: This is a question to which we have given some thought. (Laughter) But, you know, when I was a professor, the thing that would drive me up a wall would be a government official announcing that everything had been carefully considered, no alternative could possibly have any merit, and that by definition he was correct.

But this happens to be true in this case. (Laughter)

Our assessment of the Latin American view with
respect to this particular issue is that many of them have had
traditional ties, economic ties, with Western Europe, and that
they would prefer to take part in a generalized system.

The United States has never before committed itself
to a generalized system of preference. It has never
committed itself in this way, in this context, to seek the
elimination of preferences.

Without trying to force the hand of our negotiators,
I can tell you that, if this particular approach should not
give relief to the Latin American countries, and it is based
on our conviction that this is what they would prefer, that
we will then seriously look at the alternative methods,
including the method which your question implies.

THE PRESS: Thank you very much.

END

(AT 4:25 P.M. EST)