10

AMERICAN SCIENTIST

energy conversion. These concepts lead inevitably to a more fundamental curriculum for all fields of engineering, with specialization deferred to the last two years of the undergraduate program and even reduced in these two years in favor of pushing real specialization into the graduate years or into the in-service training programs given by industry itself. Notable new programs representing some of these points of view are now being tried at a number of institutions. Industry, acutely aware of its needs for engineers of more depth, power, and versatility, is encouraging these efforts. Together these new goals seem to presage an increasing number of institutions dedicated to programs that are less vocational and specialized at the undergraduate level and fundamental enough in their basic science and advanced enough in their mathematics and humanities to educate a new breed of engineer more adaptable to our changing technology—the kind of engineer we are really desperately short of today.

As I sense educational trends at present, we are to witness further efforts to exploit the vertical organization of education whereby the professional and the general are carried along in parallel with fewer discontinuities between the freshman year and the graduate and professional degree. New programs are under way in other professional fields, which may hold useful lessons for the education of scientists and engineers. The new medical school program at Western Reserve is a striking example, with its organization along functional lines rather than traditional departmental lines.

It is heartening to hear so much stimulating discussion about new approaches to professional education, and I think it bodes well for the future quality of our technology that some of the new ideas are originating in the engineering schools. A superb opportunity exists to provide a new type of liberal education polarized about science, unified by professional requirements, and relevant to the needs of our technological society. In our institutes and schools of technology there is a vision of a new kind of university, a modern university built around science and social technology rather than classical studies, but embracing the arts, the social sciences, and the humanities as essential and equal partners in its corporate aims and culture.

Whether one agrees or not about these particular concepts of engineering education, the fact that they reflect is important to the urgent task of maintaining and augmenting the quality of our science and technology and of educating professional engineers with a reach and grasp equal to the performance expected by our society.

In concluding these observations about engineering education, I wish to stress the importance of more variety, differentiation, and innovation in our system. We need more graduate study in engineering but we also need more technical institutes and junior colleges. We

THE SHORTAGE RE-EXAMINED

11

need more stress on science in the liberal arts colleges but we also need
the kind of undergraduate program represented by our engineering
schools, where a sound general education is achieved in the environment
of a professional school.

In undergraduate education of all kinds we need a differentiated
system, with institutions specializing in accord not so much with sub-
ject matter but with the standards and intellectual performance ex-
pected of their students. Whether undergraduate education is obtained
in a liberal arts college or in an engineering school, it should be funda-
mental and never narrow. All these goals and concepts are important
in attracting enough top talent into science and engineering and in
achieving the quality of professional achievement these great profes-
sions must have.

I venture to express two hopes. I hope we keep in mind the possi-
bility that a drop in business activity or in the volume of defense de-
velopment or production could reduce the demand for run-of-the-mill
engineers and scientists. Jobs temporarily might be hard to come by.
Such adjustments, however, would not, except temporarily, reduce the
demand for superior men; excellence will never be in oversupply for
very long.

Second, I hope we do not set as our goal an academic numbers race
with the Russians. The Russian educational system serves the state,
ours the individual. They are highly specialized in their scientific and
engineering education and we are trending toward more fundamental
generalized education, especially at the undergraduate level. Our
objectives and our trends are more likely to serve our nation well, and
to give us the scientific and technological strength which will be in-
digenous and therefore in accord with our special qualities and ideals.
Our goal should be to meet our own indigenous needs superbly well and
not to engage in a numbers race.

And now having reviewed some of the ways whereby education must
respond to our manpower needs, I come finally to the consideration of
those attitudes and values now current in America which complicate
our efforts to increase our ranks of scientists and engineers. In these
attitudes may be found some of the underlying and less obvious causes
for our failure to increase the numbers in these fields in proportion to the
increase in national demand.

We note today evidence of a surprising amount of fear of science and
of a misreading of what science really is.

Some of this adverse reaction arises from anti-intellectualism, from
the disdain and distrust toward the learned man and the realm of reason
which defaces the surface of our mid-century period like the tropical
fungus which blemishes the polished surface of optical glass. Some of

12

AMERICAN SCIENTIST

the aversion has grown out of the part which science has been called upon to play in the development of weapons.

Antagonism towards science and engineering has also been engen-
dered by a feeling that they are wholly materialistic and anti-humanistic.
Even in this age of science we have residual legacies from the conflicts
which swirled about great innovators like Roger Bacon, Galileo, and
Darwin, and other discoverers. In fact, there is some evidence that
we are in a period of fresh reaction against science. Underlying this
reaction is one of our great educational failures, the failure to find
effective ways of communicating the meaning, the method, and the spirit
of science to the non-scientist—a failure for which responsibility must
be shared by both the humanist and the scientist. Valiant efforts to
take the non-scientist into the arcana of science have been made, such
as Conant's program at Harvard and Hilderbrand's at Berkeley, but
the problem is still unsolved and is still receiving inadequate attention
and creative effort.

Thus the condition of intellectual separatism remains as a deep fault
marring our terrain of scholarship. Robert Oppenheimer, in an ad-
dress in 1953 (The Scientist in Society) gave a superb report of this
condition. "I have a great anxiety," he noted, "that our educational
directions, far from making us a part of the world we live in. . . may
be even moving in the opposite direction. . . . We live in the world very
much affected by science, and even our thinking caps, and our ideas
and the terms in which we tend to talk about things, the notion of prog-
ress, the notion of a fraternity of scholars and scientists which is so
familiar to a Christian life and which has a new twist because of the
spread of science—all of these we can see originally at a time when
science was understood by men of affairs, by artists, by poets. We
live today in a world in which poets and historians and men of affairs
are proud that they wouldn't even begin to consider thinking about
learning anything of science, regarding it as the far end of a tunnel too
long for any wise man to put his head into. We therefore have, insofar
as we have at all, a philosophy that is quite anachronistic and, I am
convinced, quite inadequate to our times. . . . Far more subtle recog-
nition of the nature of man's knowledge and of his relations to the uni-
verse is certainly long overdue, if we are to do justice to the wisdom
which our tradition has in it and to the brilliant and ever-changing
flower of discovery which is modern science."¹

This attitude toward science is described more bluntly in academic
circles by well-worn observations. One of these notes that the scientist
knows nothing of the liberal arts and regrets it while the humanist knows

¹ J. Robert Oppenheimer, *The Open Mind*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955, pp. 128-129.

THE SHORTAGE RE-EXAMINED

13

nothing of science and is proud of it. The other reports an incident in a liberal arts faculty meeting. When a student named Cicero was reported as having flunked Latin, everybody laughed, but when a student named Gauss was named as having failed mathematics, only the science professors laughed.

This drawing away from science is related to an attitude of antagonism and fear with respect to scientists. The old cliché about the expert is applied to the scientist. The scientist, it is repeatedly said, should be on tap but not on top. He thus is considered to be merely one of the hired men who has no business doing anything but what he is told to do in the field of his specialty. I have heard no statement that the lawyer or banker or economist or production specialist should be on tap but not on top. I do not imply that the scientist has any right or unique qualifications to be on top. I am disturbed by the attitude that because a man is a scientist, he is disqualified for public and private administrative responsibility even though he may have the qualifications.

This attitude reflects something wrong in the relationship of the scientist to society and in society's current estimate of the scientist.

I think that the scientist and engineer are themselves partly to blame for the manner in which their function in public affairs has been derogated. They have tended too much to professional parochialism. They have been preoccupied with their own trade secrets, too little concerned to communicate these secrets except to each other so that the public misunderstandings about science and technology can be diminished by facts and not aggravated by mystery.

But I also feel that the humanist has a responsibility for this hurtful condition. There is still too much of the separatist spirit among the lower reaches of the humanists, too much facile criticism of science as materialistic, too much envy of the scientist for his intellectual achievements, too much protesting that only in the liberal arts can the true gospel of man be found. There has been a tendency to make the scientist the scapegoat for the ills of the modern world.

Our colleges and universities must share a heavy responsibility for this separatism, for they have too easily acquiesced in protective tariffs for intellectual vested interests. Is it not true that a spirit of snobbery on the part of both scientists and humanists, each derogating the other, is one of the most virulent forms of anti-humanism? I feel so. It is the great humanistic responsibility of our colleges and universities to stress the kinship, indeed the unity, of all knowledge, and to ease the vested interests and snobberies which sometimes appear among learned men. Objectivity, for example, is not the exclusive monopoly of science, nor humanism the tight monopoly of the liberal arts. In these parlous times we need to remind ourselves of this and to seek to develop more sensi-

14

AMERICAN SCIENTIST

tive couplings interconnecting the sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities. We need to remember how the great humanists of Greece, of the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance helped to create an intellectual and spiritual environment and attitude benign to the development of modern science. As Crane Brinton observes in *Ideas and Men*, "Science needed not merely an interest in material things; it needed the intellectual apparatus to devise the incredibly complex ordering of things we call science; it needed above all the long training in the use of reason afforded by the Greek and medieval philosophy and theology our invidious logical positivists like to deprecate."

Humanism is no less important today as an ally of science in the great coalition of learning we seek. The humanist is one of the principal architects and custodians of the benign environment which science requires for its success. The beauty the great humanist creates or makes us aware of, the perspectives of history he reveals, the "vision of greatness" he sets before us, his search for the first-rate in living, the eternal questions he asks—all these activities help to create the great society and the great men which science requires to flourish.

We need also to reiterate how the great scientists have broken shackles of ignorance and superstition, given new leads in the social sciences, profoundly influenced and enriched the philosophy and the understanding of men and thereby given a new depth and reach to humanism. As George R. Harrison has eloquently written: "There is no evil, no inhumanity, in the primary task of science, to forward man's love and desire for truth. An increased awareness of truth has often made men uncomfortable, but seldom has it made them less human. Science increases the areas of spiritual contact between man and nature, and between man and other men." When I hear our schools of science condemned as citadels of materialism and our liberal arts schools held up in contrast as the sole custodians of the liberal spirit, or when I hear that our schools of science have the only sound approach to education, I cannot but feel that the true spirit of liberalism and science is forgotten and the symbiotic relationship between the great fields of learning ignored.

The liberal arts of our time cannot be liberal if they reject or disdain science and technology. Thus science and technology cannot fulfill their responsibilities if our scientists and engineers lack the humanistic quality which has been ascribed to the Athenians—the art of making gentle the life of mankind. In our schools of science and engineering we must seek to cultivate this quality.

If American science is to continue to prosper, if it is to attract to it its proper complement of creative and gifted minds, we must combat the notions that science and engineering are incompatible with the great humanities disciplines, and that they are narrowly materialistic

THE SHORTAGE RE-EXAMINED

15

and destructive of human values. In the face of the practical responsi-
bilities which rest in science and engineering for our security and our
material welfare, it is all too easy for people to conclude that science is
inimical to the spiritual ends of life and for them to fail to understand
that in reality it is one of man's most powerful and noble means for
searching out truth and for augmenting man's dignity by augmenting
his understanding. Scientists have an obligation to make this true
character of science better understood, not by an arrogant advocacy of
science and technology as the only objective means to increase our under-
standing and well-being, but by the balanced and tolerant presentation
of science as one of the powerful means by which man can increase his
knowledge and understanding and still remain humble and ennobled
before the wonder and the majesty of what he does not understand.
When thus perceived and practiced, and when not misused for ignoble
ends, science and engineering are a major means for "making gentle
the life of mankind." If science can thus appear in its true colors and
thus be recognized, we will have accomplished a major requirement for
attracting enough first-rate minds into science and for maintaining a
vigorous and advancing technology.

President Truman, State of the Union message, January 1953:

"There is something I would say to Stalin: You claim belief in Lenin's prophecy that one stage in the development of Communist society would be war between your world and ours. But Lenin was a pre-atomic man, who viewed society and history with pre-atomic eyes. Something profound has happened since he wrote. War has changed its shape and its dimension. It cannot now be a "stage" in the development of anything save ruin for your regime and your homeland."

* * * * * * * * *

Mahan, Naval Strategy, 1911:

"In war, the defensive exists mainly that the offensive may act more freely."

And, in Retrospect and Prospect, 1902:

"Offense therefore dominates, but it does not exclude. The necessity for defense remains obligatory, though subordinate. The two are complementary. It is only in the reversal of <u>roles</u>, by which priority of importance is assigned to the defensive, that ultimate defeat is involved."

* * * * * * * * *

Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Affairs, April 1955:

"As to the third world war, the war which might break out tomorrow, we must all be fully aware that it would see the use of atomic weapons. It may seem exaggerated to say that humanity would be entirely destroyed, but there can be no doubt that the cataclysm would be immense and the losses incalculable. Even if the aggressor makes a surprise attack he will not be safe from reprisals, since he could not obtain control over all the reserves of his enemy at one blow. War long accepted as cruel, is today stupid also. There is no reason and no excuse for anyone to make one. The number and efficiency of modern weapons may not make war completely inconceivable since the possibility that fools or desperadoes may head governments cannot be ruled out, but at least it becomes more and more unlikely.

"It is for these reasons that I say, contrary to the opinion of many and also at some risk of being misunderstood, that in the present state of affairs I would hesitate to forbid the construction of atomic bombs. I believe that the terrible fear weighing on the world on this account is one of the most effective guarantees."

* * * * * * * * *

- 2 -

[Lc]

General Bradley, Department of State Bulletin, 16 March 1953:

"Military policy and its included strategic planning is not separate and distinct from our foreign policy. The two of them are part and parcel of our overall policy for the safety and security of our nation."

"Perhaps some people might feel that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should stand up and resolutely and strongly recommend a national policy which we would prefer, but to date I have not been convinced that this is the proper role of the military leader. I do not believe that military strategists should choose the course of Government action."

* * * * * *

Admiral Radford, U.S. News & World Report, 25 February 1955:

"There is real strength (in a coalition), provided we continue to generate true unity of purpose, firm resolution, and a willingness to make sacrifices, commit resources, and incur risks for the common good."

"There is often no clear line of demarcation between foreign and military policy in the formulation of national policy. Instead, there is overlap. There are military implications in foreign policy and, conversely, political implications in military policy."

* * * * * *

Admiral Mahan, in an essay c. 1910:

"Relations between states are primarily the concern of the statesman, a matter of international policies; but they are also among the data which the strategist has to consider. I cannot too entirely repudiate any casual word of mine, reflecting the tone which was once so traditional in the Navy that it might be called professional, -- that 'political questions belong rather to the statesman than to the military man'. I find these words in my old lectures, but I very soon learned better, and I believe that no printed book of mine endorses the opinion that external politics are of no concern to the military man."

* * * * * *

McCormack, notes written in 1955:

The reconciliation of the classic Mahan and the modern Truman, Spaak, Bradley and Radford lies in the fact that we are now at war in a very

- 3 -

[L]

real sense. Korea and Indo-China -- and others? -- are the surface manifestations, but let us not be deceived that they are the essence even though they may *look* like the familiar war. The real war today is the war of position and maneuver by which Soviet Communism hopes to achieve world domination -- a war in which the tempo of battle exceeds that of past shooting wars, and mistakes are as costly as ever they were in a shooting war.

It has been called a war for men's minds -- and that is a part of it.

It is said by some that the main Soviet objective is to harrass us in all ways to the point that our economy falls apart-- and such may be a part of the Kremlin's hopes.

It is a war of many tactics: internal subversion in free countries, calculated preying on the aspirations of colonial peoples, dividing allies, playing (contemptuously we may be sure) with those who would find peace (and maybe prominence) through neutralism. In particular, the Kremlin seeks targets among those who would pretend for one reason or another that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are equal menaces to world peace.

However, the most frightening military point is not one of Soviet tactics -- it is the central theme. That is the race for supremacy in the technology of air atomic warfare. The public can be reminded constantly, if it wishes, that the Soviet Bloc has more soldiers, or more fighter aircraft, or more tanks, or more something than the forces of freedom. This is not a comfortable situation, of course, but dread the day they may move out in front of us with a genuine, massive technological surprise in the field of air atomic power, especially if it be of a long-range nature such as an intercontinental ballistic missile when we may have none and no defenses against it.

* * * * * * *

Arthur Schlessinger, The Reporter, August 4, 1953:

"The strategic air power theory commits us to maximum force or nothing. It gives us the choice between making faces at the enemy and blowing up the world. It offers no solution to the typical technique of Soviet aggression, which is not all-out war but a succession of frontier wars."

* * * * * * *

["- 4 -", "[Lc]", "McCormack, on reading the above:", "\"Soviet policy is to push everywhere and always as far as the leaders in the Kremlin feel is safe and profitable. Being practical men, they move where they think the odds are good and the potential rewards satisfactory. It is extremely important to control frontier wars but a luxury, Mr. Schlessinger, to be able to talk hopefully about them. It is a luxury that would disappear if the Soviets had strategic air power supremacy. U. S. strategic air power is: the preventive of the big war; assurance against little wars spreading; and the force that precludes blackmail. Do we decry the force that provides the background against which other objectives may be formulated and attained, and without which they can not?", "\"Why does Mr. Schlessinger think the U. S. S. R. is producing jet bombers having range, speed and altitude comparable with our best? Why are they developing atomic weapons as vigorously as they can, including thermonuclear weapons? Why did they ten years ago seize and hold all of the German V-2 experts they could lay hands on?", "\"For Dien Bien Phu?\"", "* * * * * * *", "From John Donne:", "\"No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.\"", "* * * * * * *", "Finletter, Atlantic, September 1953:", "\"There are those who believe that the Russians will keep away from a general war as long as possible; that they are doing so well in the Cold War that there is no point in their starting a hot one. This may be. But even the most convinced believer that the Russians will not make general war would not want to put us in the position of being in jeopardy of a Russian decision.\"", "* * * * * * *", "Killian and Hill, Atlantic, November 1953:", "\"Those who have a deep philosophical conviction that a stronger air defense is essential ... see the leadership of the United States strengthened by the world knowledge that we are prepared to defend as well as to invade.\"", "• • • • • • • • • • • •

- 5 -

[Lc]

"An adequate defense can also add something to our bargaining powers at the international table. A better air defense for North America can mean a better defense for Europe."

"The fact should be made clear that it was the Air Force three years ago that induced a group of scientists to tackle the problem of air defense, a responsibility they were reluctant to undertake until urged by Secretary Finletter to do so. It was General Vandenburg himself who wrote the letter which set in motion a substantial research undertaking by civilian scientists in the field of air defense."

* * * * * *

Scattered notes, McCormack, 1953-55.

It is frequently said that we are already at war, that the present scattered struggle is only a continuation of World War II, that we are in fact already in World War III. It can be said with some truth that the present struggle began at least as long ago as Yalta. Certainly the rape of Czechoslovakia made clear that the war was on and the Berlin blockade made clear that the simple presence of U. S. and allied forces per se were not going to stop the Soviet advance.

In this regard, Admiral Mahan remarked (The Interest of America in Sea Power, 1897): "Military positions, fortified posts, by land or by sea, however strong or admirably situated, do not confer control by themselves alone. People often say that such an island or harbor will give control of such a body of water. It is an utter, deplorable, ruinous mistake. Napoleon, who knew better, once talked this way. 'The Islands of San Pietro, Corfu, and Malta', he wrote, 'will make us masters of the whole Mediterranean.' Vain boast! Within one year Corfu, in two years Malta, were rent away from the state that could not support them by its ships." It would be interesting to hear Admiral Mahan's comments on the show of force by the United States in ordering the Pacific Fleet to station at Pearl Harbor in 1940, to make sure that the Japanese understood that we meant business. As it turned out, we did, in due course, but the Japanese meant more business sooner.

* * * * * * * *

There is sometimes heard the contention that the United States needs more tactical air power, for one purpose and another, and less strategic. Occasionally one hears the opposite contention. Actually the question is not one of formally nominated forces or weapons. The design of air forces begins with a definition of objectives. Then the process moves

- 6 -

[LC]

on to a definition of missions and targets, then one studies the best way of accomplishing the multitude of tasks. The end result is a balanced air force, with manned and unmanned vehicles of various ranges, weapons, base structure, personnel and logistics appropriate to the need.

The defense of the NATO area is extremely important. The U.S. has many overseas defense responsibilities which come and go. The defense of the United States is vital, and the responsibility is eternally our own.

I recently read a troubled little treatise on the influence of the military during recent years in U. S. foreign policy, dealing with their expanded role in not only the execution of national policy abroad but also in its formulation at home. The authors, who are university types, are worried mainly that military types are likely by the narrowness of their upbringing to miss the big picture, yet still have great influence in the national and international scene because their limitations are not recognized. Often they may prevail because of the force of their conviction in the presentation of their views, and occasionally because of the glamour of the presentor. In rare instances these views might be persuasive in part because of their logic and correspondence with the clear national interest.

I find the thesis both depressing and reassuring.

Depressing, because the authors miss the point that the really important military and foreign affairs problems of today are neither separable nor transitory. They will be with us for a long time, and whether we solve them all satisfactorily may be touch and go. Surely they require the closest and most effective application of the best brains, experience, and executive capabilities of all of us -- the military not least among the participants.

Reassuring, because it is healthy that such thoughts are being circulated -- and from the bibliography of this treatise, there is quite a lot of such material in circulation. Our country is almost alone among those whose governmental leaders do not wear uniforms while inspecting the troops. We have as many vocal military experts out of uniform as in. But it remains vital to protect against the billeting of rude soldiery on the hapless householder.

* * * * * *

THE PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLANNING

WEAPONS AND MISSIONS

Introduction

It is a fair assumption that anyone embarking on a commentary
such as the following enters into the affair with certain preconceptions.
The invitation to set forth some thoughts on the subject indicates that the
 invitee has done some thinking about it. And having done some thinking
about it he must have reached at least some tentative conclusions.

These comments fit within such an assumption. The main purpose
of the paper is to furnish an outline for discussion, and it will have served
its purpose if it supplies a good reminder list of reasonably discrete sub-
divisions of the overall subject, the total of which is so complex in its
many aspects that some sort of subdivision is necessary for discussion to
be meaningful or even manageable. But it is important also that the bias
be indicated, and that is the purpose of this Introduction.

It is true that even if the Kremlin factor were not in the U. S.
security equation the United States would still have its military problems.
It is true also that some of the toughest problems confronting the United
States today stem from Soviet actions in other than military fields. But
Soviet non-military successes result not from dissociation of these efforts
from the military potentials and requirements but, at least in part, exactly
because the pattern is consciously interlocked. The growth of Soviet
industry is given urgent attention in the Kremlin; a priority reason is the

DRAFT

DRAFT

industry is given urgent attention in the Kremlin; a priority reason is the
because the pattern is consciously interlocked. The growth of Soviet
from the military potential and requirements put, at least in part, exactly
Soviet non-military accesses result not from dissociation of these efforts
States today stem from Soviet actions in other than military fields. But
it is true also that some of the toughest problems confronting the United
security equation the United States would still have its military problems.
It is true that even if the Kremlin factor were not in the U.S.

be indicated, and that is the purpose of this Introduction.
be meaningful or even manageable. But it is important also that the plan
many aspects that some sort of subdivision is necessary for discussion to
division of the overall subject, the total of which is so complex in its
its purpose if it subplies a good reminder that reasonably discrete and-
of the paper is to turn off an outline for discussion, and it will have served
These comments fit within such an assumption. The main purpose
about it he must have reached at least some tentative conclusions.
invites him to done some thinking about it. And having done some thinking
The invitation to set forth some thoughts on the subject indicates that the
such as the following enters into the affair with certain preconceptions.
It is a fair assumption that anyone embarking on a commentary

## Introduction

# WEAPONS AND MISSIONS

## THE PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLANNING

- 2 -

military one. Soviet smiles abroad which we today regard as sinister
would be comic instead were it not for the Soviet military potential and
power objectives behind them.

Power and policy. The phrase is of course lifted from the cover
of Mr. Finletter's well-known book. It is used here because it says
concisely what is the heart of the matter in any examination of the inter-
relationship between U. S. and Soviet military capabilities.

Atomic weapons mean different things to different people. But,
taken together with an adequate capability for their employment, they mean
power above all else.

One of the important and fortunate facts of life in the world today
is the military power capability of the United States. This is not to
depreciate the many other important elements -- economic, social, or
spiritual -- which go to make up the total capability for survival and
expansion of freedom. Our major national objectives are deeply rooted in
human values and must continue to be. Nevertheless, U. S. military power
is the keystone of the force structure that restrains the Soviet physical
threat, and this also must continue to be, for the threat must be restrained
if there is to be hope that it may in good time be satisfactorily reduced.

Although a restraint is of itself negative, the force behind it is
positive. Historically, nations survive competitively and expand in influence
according to the force they generate and according to their understanding of

DRAFT

DRAFT

according to the force they generate and according to their understanding of
positive. Historically, nations survive competitively and expand in influence
Although a restraint is of itself negative, the force behind it is

it there is to be hope that it may in good time be satisfactorily reduced.

if the keySTONE of the force structure that restrains the Soviet physical

spiritual -- which go to make up the total capability for survival and
debalance the many other important elements -- economic, social, or

power above all else.

of Mr. Finletter's a well-known book. It is need here because it says

power objectives behind them.

would be comic instead were it not for the Soviet military potential and
military one. Soviet smiles abroad which we today regard as najster

- 3 -

[fc]

- 3 -

its application to survival and growth. Today, the trappings of military
power are new and awesome, and their development is going at a breath-
taking rate. But the essential power problem is still the _use_ of power,
and that is still amenable to good judgment and common sense.

The United States has the capability of creating and maintaining
all the power necessary to remain the bolster and the focus of leadership
for freedom. The practical question is one of understanding the interplay
of such power in the age of air power and atomic weapons as, for example,
the British understood it in the times when the element of power mobility
was the sea. From such an understanding comes the wisdom necessary to
capitalize on power, in terms of exploiting it in support of the overall
objectives of peace with freedom, and to guide technology for its enhance-
ment, in terms of priorities on new military capabilities to be built and
maintained.

Some good and thoughtful people in the country are concerned over
the future of our democracy, for one reason and another, but their concern
surely derives in large part from the fact that some of the hard decisions
which must inevitably be taken, in the framework of the atomic age, are
unfamiliar in terms of our _national_ experience. But there are no obvious
demands now imposed on us as a nation which we do not already accept as
individuals, the main ones being for steady courage and a willingness to do
all that is necessary to insure that the Kremlin will always regard total war
as an unacceptable risk.

DRAFT

DRAFT

as an unacceptable risk.

Still that is necessary to insure that the Kremlin will always regard total war
individuals, the main ones being for steady courage and a willingness to do
governments now imposed on us as a nation which we do not already accept as
unsubstantiated in terms of our *national* experience. But there are no opinions
which must inevitably be taken in the framework of the atomic age, so are
surely derived in large part from the fact that some of the hard decisions
the future of our democracy, for one reason and another, put their concern
some good and thoughtful people in the country are concerned over

maintained.

ment, in terms of priorities on new military capabilities to be built and
objectives of peace with freedom, and to guide technology for its enhancement
capitalize on power, in terms of exploiting it in support of the overall
war the axis. From such an understanding comes the wisdom necessarily to
the British under stood it in the times when the element of power mobility
of such power in the age of air power and atomic weapons as, for example,
tor freedom. The practical question is one of understanding the interplay
all the power necessarily to remain the polater and the focus of leadership
The United States has the capability of creating and maintaining

But the essential power problem is still the same of power,

power are new and sweaker, and their development is going at a breath-

its application to survival and growth. Today, the trebings of military

- 3 -

[r]

- 4 -

[LC]

This is an article of faith perhaps, and disregards some
ominous perils, but without some such tenet to start from "you (probably)
can't get there from here". In any case, it is a reasoned faith and con-
tains no component more mystical than a belief that the country's leaders
will continue through the years ahead to prove worthy of the people and
the national capabilities they represent.

On the other hand, confidence must not fall into complacency. It
is impossible now to foresee a time when we can relax in applying our best
wits and all other necessary resources to the problem of our survival as a
nation. We are in danger, and will continue to be for an indefinite time,
possibly a very long time, with periods of peril possibly much greater than
that of today. The necessary survival insurance is not going to be cheap,
although its cost need not strain our resources or our liberties if we are
intelligent in our continuing assessment of the threat and in designing our
means for controlling it. In this particular respect, the military means are
especially important because they are the most expensive.

There is room, too, for some concern that through a sort of latent
dread or fear of our great power we may fail to apply it wisely and effectively.
This is a potential source of hazard: the trembling hand, the faltering
confidence in our strength and clear national destiny. It is surely the fore-
most obligation on all who presume to lead public thinking that they lead in
steadfastness and not teach a dangerous vacillation under the beguiling title
of flexibility.

DRAFT

DRAFT

of flexibility.

atmospheric and not teach a dangerous oscillation under theéglecting title
moat obligation on all who breathe to lead public thinking that they lead in
confidence in our strength and clear national destiny. It is surely the fore-
This is a potential source of hazard: the trembling hand, thealtering
dread or fear of our great power we may fall to apply it wisely and effectively.

There is room, too, for some concern that through a sort of latent
aspecially important because they are the most expensive.

means for controlling it. In this particular respect, the military means are
intelligent in our continuing assessment of the threat and in dealing with our
although its coat need not strain our resources or our liberties if we are
that of today. The necessarily arrival insurance is not going to be cheap,
possibly a very long time, with periods of brief possibly much greater than
nation. We are in danger, and will continue to be for an indefinite time,
while and all other necessarily resources to the problem of our arrival as a
is impossible now to foresee a time when we can relax in applying our best
On the other hand, confidence must not fall into complacency. If

the national capabilities they represent,
will continue through the years ahead to prove worthy of the people and
thus no component more analytical than a peeling that the country's leaders
can't get there from here". In any case, it is a reasoned faith and con-
omineous faith, but without some such tenet to start from "you (propably)
This is an article of faith perhaps, and disregards some

- 4 -

[rC]

- 5 -

[LC]

Of course it is better to be clever than stupid. But the United
States, by reason of its size and power, and by the nature of its people
and the form of its government, is not very good at being clever. Nor is
stupidity the alternative. Rather it is rightness, and that certainly includes
being clear as to what our power objectives are, not just for one year or
four but for as long into the period of our danger as cool headed forecast
can take us.

Bright spots appear on the horizon from time to time, as they
must, for the menace has the unnatural form of an attempt to turn back the
clock on human liberties, and can not therefore last forever. Tito's
success may be such a bright spot, although it is not now clear whether the
jockeying is for control of Yugoslavia or of the Soviet Politbureau. The
East German riots in 1953 and the present troubles in Poland and Hungary
are new testaments to the fact that the essential truculence of freedom re-
mains a powerful force in the affairs of men.

But beyond Russia is the rising power of China. And beyond China
lies the possibility that technology may at some time supply to lesser
aggressors the capability of threatening the world.

There rests the bias of this paper. It is written in the conviction
that the United States must aim at ending on top or our system may end on
the bottom, and the growth of freedom may be profoundly retarded every-
where. The paper does not suffer, however, from the delusion that its

DRAFT

DRAFT

where. The paper does not amuse, however, from the delusion that its
the bottom, and the growth of freedom may be profusely retarded every-
that the United States must aim at ending on top of our system may end on
There reates the chaos of this paper. It is written in the conviction
aggravates the capability of threatening the world.

lie the capability that technology may at some time supply to lesser

But beyond Russia is the rising power of China. And beyond China
maintains a powerful force in the arena of men.

are new treaties to the fact that the essential truculence of freedom re-
East German riots in 1963 and the present trouble in Poland and Hungary
jockeying is for control of Yugoslavia or of the Soviet Politburo.
The
success may be such a bright spot, although it is not now clear whether the
clock on human liberties, and can not therefore last forever. Tito's

must, for the menace has the unusual form of an attempt to turn back the
Bright spots appear on the horizon from time to time, as they

can take us.

tom put its long into the period of our danger as cool headed forecast
being clear as to what our power objectives are, not just for one year or
instability the alternative. Rather it is rightness, and that certainly includes
and the form of its government, is not very good at being clever. Nor is
States, by reason of its size and power, and by the nature of its people
Of course it is better to be clever than stupid. But the United

- 5 -

[r]

- 6 -

[w]

writing can affect the development of an explicit, modern concept of our
national destiny. That must come from the grass roots, nationwide, and
generally seems to be doing so.

The necessary military contribution to the concept starts from
a viable scheme of military power and its application to the concept. As is
well known, the professional services have disagreed on a number of the
specifics of such a design, and on some points where they have agreed their
civilian superiors have taken yet a different view, usually in the matter of
costs. Is this bad? In truth, the answer is sometimes yes and sometimes
no, and it is hardly the role of this paper to settle the complicated and
detailed questions of professional judgment and pride that are involved. It
may, however, be useful to set down two cardinal conceptual points on
which U. S. military professionals are in general agreement (providing the
statements are made in general terms), before proceeding to list some of
the elements of the total problem which tend to produce aberrations and
uncertainties where one would wish that all were clear and sure.

The survival of the United States is of paramount importance, and
the military forces designed for the ultimate case take precedence over all
others. (Disagreement among military men on priorities, intra- as well
as inter-Service, are matters of degree and judgment as to force capabilities.)
Among such forces, the military power to destroy the Soviet war machine if
need be if a fundamental requirement in keeping low the likelihood that the
need will arise.

DRAFT

DRAFT

need will arise.

need be it a fundamental requirement in keeping low the likelihood that the
Among such forces, the military power to destroy the Soviet war machine it
as inter-service, are matters of degree and judgment as to force capabilities.)
others. (Disagreement among military men on priorities, intra- as well
the military forces designed for the ultimate case take precedence over all
The survival of the United States is of paramount importance, and
uncertainties where one would wish that all were clear and sure.

the elements of the total problem which tend to produce operations and
statements are made in general terms), before proceeding to list some of
which U. S. military professionals are in general agreement (providing the
msa, however, be made to set down two cardinal conceptual points on
detailed directions of professional judgment and pride that are involved. It
no, and it is hardly the role of the paper to settle the complicated and
coats. Is this bad? In truth, the answer is sometimes yes and sometimes
civilian superiors have taken yet a different view, usually in the matter of
specific of such a design, and on some points where they have agreed their
well known, the professional services have disagreed on a number of the
a viable scheme of military power and its application to the concept. As is
The necessarily military contribution to the concept starts from
generally seems to be doing so.

national destiny. That must come from the grass roots, nationwide, and
writing can affect the development of an explicit, modern concept of our

- 6 -

- 7 -

[lc]

Beyond the requirements of the "survival force" lie a variety of other military requirements related to our ability to project our power in timely fashion to the places where it may be needed to protect freedom or to assist its expansion.

As one moves down the list of these latter requirements, away from the relatively simple if rigorous regimen of the "survival force", the need in many ways increases for concert in strategic concept, and between the military and other elements of national policy for the use of the total of our strengths in pursuance of our national objectives. As the need for concert increases, so do the difficulties, generally for the same reasons. The easy things have usually already been done.

Let us now look at the total problem of integrated strategic planning, using the tested method for eating an elephant: begin by cutting into bite size pieces. There are many ways it could be cut up. This is one way.

## Some Bites of the Problem

* Statement of the problem; it is vast in scope, new in important respects, and vague in some of its objectives.

* Our peaceful intentions often clash with our hard responsibilities.

* Our overseas garrison requirements conflict with our need for force flexibility.

* Our timing problem is acute; the tools of military victory are in the flux of volatile technology; the cost of defeat is imponderable.

DRAFT

DRAFT

example.

in the limn of volatile technology; the coat of defeat is indom-
Our timing problem is acute; the tools of military victory are

force flexibility.

Our peaceful intentions often clash with our hard reasonable liabilities.

rebects, and vague in some of its objectives.

Statement of the problem: it is vast in scope, new in important

## Some Bites of the Problem

one way.

into bite size pieces. There are many ways it could be cut up. This is
planning, using the tested method for eating an elephant: begun by cutting

need for concert increases, so do the difficulties. Generally for the same
the total of our strengths inurance of our national objectives. As the
between the military and other elements of national policy for the use of
the need in many ways increases for concert in strategic concept, and
from the relatively simple it rigorous regimen of the "survival force".

to assist its expansion.

timely fashion to the places where it may be needed to protect freedom or
other military requirements related to our ability to project our power in

- 1 -

- 8 -

[Lc]

The democratic process is wonderful for democracy, and its preservation is our primary goal, but it was hardly designed for efficiency in shifting conditions of hostile truce.

There are uncertainties as to the comparative vulnerability of the U. S. and the U. S. S. R.

We are a pragmatic people more prone to action and reaction than to manipulation of events -- a patsy on occasion.

# 1. Statement of the Problem.

"Relations between States are primarily the concern of the statesman, a matter of international policies; but they are also among the data which the strategist has to consider." (Admiral Mahan).

"Military policy and its included strategic planning is not separate and distinct from our foreign policy. The two of them are part and parcel of our overall policy for the safety and security of our nation." (General Omar Bradley).

"There is often no clear line of demarcation between foreign and military policy in the formulation of national policy. Instead, there is overlap. There are military implications in foreign policy and, conversely, political implications in military policy." (Admiral Radford).

Indeed, although it has been the contention or refuge of military leader and statesman alike (usually on different occasions) that the military and political arts are mainly separate one from the other, no major nation has ever in crisis regarded such to be fundamentally true. It is not useful

DRAFT

DRAFT

has ever in create regarded such to be fundamentally true. It is not useful
and political ends are mainly separate one from the other, no major nation
leader and statesman alike (nearly on different occasions) that the military
Indeed, although it has been the contention or refuge of military

political implications in military policy." (Admiral Hartford).

overlap. There are military implications in foreign policy and, conversely,
military policy in the formulation of national policy. Instead, there is

Omar Bradley).

of our overall policy for the safety and security of our nation." (General
and distinct from our foreign policy. The two of them are part and parcel
"Military policy and its included strategic planning is not separate

man' a matter of international policies; but they are also among the data
"Relations between States are primarily the concern of the states-

1. Statement of the Problem.

than to manipulation of events -- a catastrophe on occasion.
We are a pragmatic people more prone to action and reaction

of the U. S. and the U. S. B. R.

designed for efficiency in shifting conditions of hostile truce.
its preservation is our primary goal, but it was hardly
the democratic process is wonderful for democracy, and

- 8 -

- 9 -

[LC]

to try to discuss military objectives and planning in military terms
alone.

In a recent book* Walter Millis lists five approaches taken
during recent years toward defining military force requirements. First,
the "offensive a outrance" -- the irresistible strategic air-atomic capa-
bility. Second, the creation of ground armies to match the Red army on
its own terms, said to be an early NATO concept. Third, the introduction
of large numbers of tactical atomic weapons in the equipment of conven-
tional forces to reduce the need for numbers of those forces. Fourth, the
"brushfire" capability, achieved by ultra-mobile, airborne, highly trained
and professional forces armed generally with conventional or non-atomic
weapons. Fifth, universal disarmament.

The first fails as improved air defenses tend to balance off the
offensive. The second is economically and politically unrealistic. Neither
the third nor the fourth meets the full challenge. The fifth has been tried
many times and always failed.

In all cases where the passage of time has not already done the
job, Mr. Millis himself discards the postulate (a pity, since many students
in the field have only one consistent thesis, at best). He ends, however,
with the guess that the human race will get along somehow, although the

* Arms & Men, A Study of American Military
History, G. P. Putnam Sons, 1956.

DRAFT

DRAFT

History, G. P. Putnam Sons, 1956.
* Arms & Men, A Study of American Military

with the guess that the human race will get along somehow, although the
in the field have only one conatent theatre, at best). He ends, however,
Jop, Mr. Millie himself discards the boatload (a bit), since many students
in all cases where the passage of time has not already done the
many times and always failed.

the third nor the fourth meets the full challenge. The fifth has been tried
offensive. The second is economically and politically unrealistic. Neither
The first fails as improved air defences tend to balance off the
weapons. Fifth, universal disarmament.

and professional forces armed generally with conventional or non-atomic
"precision" capability, achieved by ultra-mobile, airborne, highly trained
tional forces to reduce the need for numbers of those forces. Kornbluth, the
of large numbers of tactical atomic weapons in the equipment of conven-
its own terms, said to be an early NATO concept. Third, the introduction
plicity. Second, the creation of ground armies to match the Red Army on
the "offensive a entrance" -- the irrevocable strategic air-atomic capa-
during recent years toward defining military force requirements. First,
In a recent book Walter Millie lists five approaches taken
slower.

- 3 -

- 10 -

how is not very clear. It will be no surprise that this paper shares his
guess but by no means all of his doubt.

The world is now engaged in general war, <u>the</u> war perhaps, with
everything shifting about and likely to continue to do so; weapons advan-
tages, economic advantages, political effectiveness, neutrals, and even
sometimes allies. If it turns out that we win this one, and there is no
more all-out shooting war, some things will be possible to say in retrospect
on that happy future day which if said now, in advance, would be reasonably
good planning guide lines. Such as:

a. We made sure at all times that the Kremlin, even when hardest pressed to maintain control of its diminishing holdings, could never calculate an advantage in directly attacking its nemesis, the United States.

b. We managed somehow to prevent the loss of freedom in
enough of the world to make possible its regaining everywhere.

Such is the material of strategic planning. The definition of the
problem is implicit in it, and it lies between the simple and the unmanage-
able. That is the justification of the existence of this paper.

2. The Problem of Vastness.

It is trite to say that the U. S. strategic problem is global in scope.
Communications make it possible for us, and also for the U. S. S. R., to
operate on a global scale, and since both U. S. responsibilities and Soviet

DRAFT

DRAFT

operate on a global scale, and since both U.S. responsibilities and Soviet communications make it possible for us, and also for the U.S. Air Force, to

It is trite to say that the U.S. strategic problem is global in scope.

### 2. The Problem of Vastness.

The problem is implicit in it, and it lies between the simple and the complex. Such is the material of strategic planning. The definition of the enough of the world to make possible its regaining everywhere.

We managed somehow to prevent the loss of freedom in calculate an advantage in directly attacking its nemesis, the United States. hardest pressed to maintain control of its diminishing holdings, could never

a. We made sure at all times that the Kremlin, even when good planning guide lines. Such as:

on that happy future day which it said now, in advance, would be reasonably
more all-out shooting war, some things will be possible to say in retrospect
sometimes allies. If it turns out that we win this one, and there is no
tage, economic advantages, political effectiveness, neutrality, and even
everything shifting spont and likely to continue to do so: weapons adven-

The world is now engaged in General war, the war perhaps, with

Guess but by no means all of his doubt.

How is not very clear. It will be no surprise that this paper assumes his

- 10 -

[rd]

[L]

- 11 -

ambitions are global in their compass, our operations are similarly wide-
spread.

This vastness is however only superficially a matter of geography.
It is easy enough to get to the Middle East or Far East, by ship and by air.
All things being relative, it is even reasonably easy for the U.S. to get
sizeable military forces to any part of the globe. That only requires money
and physical effort. A tougher question is what to do on arrival -- and,
tougher yet, what are our objectives in the first place, and how can they be
achieved with or without farflung expeditionary forces?

As we came into World War II we knew at least what the military
job was to be done if we got into war. The prospect of war then, from the
military point of view, had boundaries on it. The prospective enemies had
certain land, sea, and air forces. Their objectives were reasonably
straightforward. Their defeat was clearly foreseen to be an enormous task,
but one in which there was a minimum of mystery.

Now, there are a variety of wars underway or possible -- at least
two or three, perhaps four or five, perhaps more, depending on one's
definition of terms.

First, there is the war for the survival of the United States. The
significant military forces are those meaningfully related to the sort of
war that would be fought directly with the Soviet Union, principally Strategic
Air and the Air Defenses of the North American continent. The tools come

DRAFT

DRAFT

Air and the Air Defense of the North American continent. The tools come
war that would be taught directly with the Soviet Union, principally Strategic
significant military forces are those meaningfully related to the sort of
Fiat, there is the war for the survival of the United States. The
definition of term.

two or three, perhaps four or five, perhaps more, depending on one's
Now, there are a variety of ways underway or possible -- at least

straightforward. Their defeat was clearly foreseen to be an enormous task,
certain island, sea, and air forces. Their objectives were reasonably

military point of view, bad boundaries on it. The prospective enemies had
job was to be done if we got into war. The prospect of war then, from the

achieved with or without farfthing expeditionary forces?

tougher yet, what are our objectives in the first place, and how can they be
and physical effort. A tougher question is what to do on arrival -- and,
unspeakable military forces to any part of the globe. That only requires money

VII things being relative, it is even reasonably easy for the U.S. to get
It is easy enough to get to the Middle East or Far East, by ship and by air.

applied.

- 11 -

- 12 -

mainly from technology. The strategy contains a minimum of subtlety.
It would not necessarily be general war in the sense of actively involving
a multitude of nations, but it would nevertheless be the Big War in the
history of all nations.

It is the war the President undoubtedly had in mind when he said:
"We are in the era of the thermonuclear bomb. War has become not just
tragic but preposterous. Plainly, the objective now must be to see that
such a war does not occur at all." And it probably will not, with enough
hard work on our part, and willingness to pay the bill. "There are those
who believe that the Russians will keep away from a general war as long
as possible; that they are doing so well in the Cold War that there is no
point in their starting a hot one. This may be. But even the most con-
vinced believer that the Russians will not make general war would not want
to put us in the position of being in jeopardy of a Russian decision." *

The capabilities required in any event to guard against this war
have a large bonus value. They are a guard also against the blackmail of
similar Soviet capabilities, and they provide a force necessary to insure
that "limited wars" remain as their name implies. Going further, to
quote the thoughtful and eminently sober Secretary of the Air Force, Mr.
Quarles: "If it were obvious that limited aggressions would be met with
the full force of atomic weapons, I do not believe that such aggressions would
occur."

* Thomas K. Finletter, Atlantic, November 1953.

DRAFT

DRAFT

November 1933.

* Thomas K. Fin letter, Atlantic,

occurs."

Charles: "It were obvious that limited aggressions would be met with

quote the thoughtful and eminently proper Secretary of the Air Force, Mr.

similar Soviet capabilities, and they provide a force necessarily to issue

to but us in the position of being in jeopardy of a Russian decision."

advanced belief that the Russians will not make general war would not want

point in their starting a hot one. This may be. But even the most con-

who believe that the Russians will keep away from a general war so long

hard work on our part, and willingness to pay the bill." "There are those

such a war does not occur at all." And it properly will not, with enough

tragic but preposterous. Plausibly, the objective now must be to see that

"We are in the era of the thermionic pump." War has become not just

it is the war the President undoubtedly had in mind when he said:

history of all nations.

- 13 -

- 13 -

A second war is the general war which the world, in a very real sense, now finds itself. Korea and Indo-China -- and others? -- are the surface manifestations, but not the essence. The essence is the war of position and maneuver by which Soviet Communism hopes to achieve world domination. It is a war in which the tempo of battle is quick, and mistakes are as costly as ever they were in a shooting war.

This was has been called a war for men's minds -- and that is a part of it. It is said by some that the main Soviet objective is to harrass us in all ways to the point where our economy falls apart -- and such may be part of the Kremlin's hopes. It is a war of many tactics, subversion in free countries; preying on the aspirations of new-found freedoms; dividing allies; playing (contemptuously one may be sure) with those who would find peace through neutralism, and who would pretend for one reason or another that Washington and Moscow are equal menaces to world peace.

This is the complicated war. The tools come partly from technology to be sure, but also from many other among our resources in strength. The strategy is subtle, although not unrelated to the straightforward strategy of the defense of the United States.

Third, fourth, fifth, and so on, are other wars. The gaining of Formosa is a repititiously announced objective of Communist China. The formerly active wars in Korea and Indo-China have taken new form, but

DRAFT

DRAFT

formerly active war in Korea and Indo-China have taken new form, put
Formosa is a repatriation announced objective of Communist China. The
Third, fourth, fifth, and so on, are other war. The giving of

strength. The strategy is simple, although not unrelated to the straight-
noon to be sure, put also from many other among our resources in

This is the complicated war. The tools come partly from tech-
world peace.

one reason or another that Washington and Moscow are equal menaces to
those who would find peace through neutralism, and who would pretend for
freedoms; dividing allies; playing (contemptuously one may be sure) with
supervision in three countries; preying on the aspirations of new-found
and may be part of the Kremlin's hopes. It is a war of many tactics,
harassment in all ways to the point where our economy falls apart -- and
a part of it. It is said by some that the main Soviet objective is to

This was has been called a war for men's minds -- and that is
quick, and mistakes are so costly as ever they were in a shooting war.
achieve world domination. It is a war in which the tempo of battle is
the war of possession and maneuver by which Soviet Communism hopes to
are the antise manifestation, put not the essence. The essence is
rest sense, now finds itself. Korea and Indo-China -- and others? --
A second war is the general war which the world, in a very

- 13 -

- 14 -

continue. North Burma is infiltrated. At least two sorts of wars are
under way in the Middle East.

Thus we measure the vastness of the strategic planning problem.

Geography presents its difficulties but it is only the beginning.

DRAFT

DRAFT

under way in the Middle East.

continue. North Burma is insulted. At least two sorts of wars are

- 14 -

HOLD FOR RELEASE

HOLD FOR RELEASE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

HOLD FOR RELEASE

HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL 6:00 P. M. (EST)
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council

SUBJECT: Clarification of roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense

Important changes in organization and in roles and missions are not easily decided upon or effected. It is not as though we were starting fresh with a clean sheet of paper, so to speak, or could set up a theoretically perfect organization and division of responsibilities between the Military Departments. Assignment of responsibilities must continue to recognize the precedents of the past and the availability of men and facilities for carrying out assigned missions. Problems of this nature would be easier to solve if there were always complete unanimity of opinion among all responsible executives of the Defense Department, both military and civilian. The very nature of the problems, however, and the varying background and experience of the individuals serving in responsible positions make some differences of opinion normal and to be expected.

In spite of the differences of opinion which may exist, there are times when conditions require that changes should be made in administrative responsibilities and at such times decisions are mandatory. That is the situation now.

The National Security Act of 1947 states:

"Declaration of Policy"

"Sec. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments, separately administered, for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy, (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction

[Lc]

- 2 -

under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff (but this is not to be interpreted as applying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Joint Staff)."

Nine years of experience operating under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, have proved the soundness of this comprehensive program for national security.

The statement of roles and missions recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Key West and Newport and approved by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, and as modified in 1953, have also proved to be sound and effectively to implement the intent of Congress as expressed in the National Security Act.

No basic changes in the present roles and missions of the armed services are necessary but the development of new weapons and of new strategic concepts, together with the nine years' operating experience by the Department of Defense have pointed up the need for some clarification and clearer interpretation of the roles and missions of the armed services. We have recognized the need for a review of these matters and from time to time certain steps have been taken and we are now taking others to improve the effectiveness of our overall military establishment, to avoid unnecessary duplication of activities and functions, and to utilize most effectively the funds made available by the people through Congress.

I would like to point out that clarification and interpretation of roles and missions does not in itself predetermine the weapons to be used by each of the armed services and their numbers, nor the numbers of men to be trained in various fields. It should be clearly understood that the approval of roles and missions of the armed services for guidance in peacetime does not predetermine the weapons or forces which a commander in the field would be permitted to use in the event of war. Also, the development of a weapon by a particular military department does not in itself predetermine its use. Such determinations rest with the Secretary of Defense after considering the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

The recent clarification of command responsibilities for field commanders should be most helpful in determining weapons and forces to be employed in various missions and should assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in making recommendations in this regard to the Secretary of Defense

[Lc]

in order to determine approved requirements for each of the armed services.

We have recently reviewed five important problem areas which need to be cleared up. The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to these matters have been carefully considered and their differences of opinion carefully weighed. In addition, I have given consideration to the opinions in these areas of responsible officials, both military and civilian, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These matters are being resolved as follows:

1. Use of Aircraft by U.S. Army.

In matters affecting the use of aircraft by the U.S. Army, the combat zone is defined as extending not more than 100 miles forward of the general line of contact between U.S. and enemy ground forces. Its extension to the rear of the general line of contact will be designated by the appropriate field commander, and normally extends back of the front lines about 100 miles.

The Army Aviation Program will consist of those types of aircraft required to carry out the following Army functions envisaged within the combat zone:

a. Command, liaison, and communications.

b. Observation, visual and photographic reconnaissance, fire adjustment, and topographical survey.

c. Airlift of Army personnel and materiel.

d. Aeromedical evacuation.

The Army Aircraft Program to carry out these functions will be subject to the following limitations:

a. Fixed wing aircraft, convertiplanes, and vertical/short take-off and landing aircraft will have an empty weight not to exceed 5,000 pounds. Rotary wing aircraft will have an empty weight not to exceed 20,000 pounds. Specific exceptions to weight limitations for specific aircraft for specific purposes may be granted by the Secretary of Defense after consideration of Army requirements and appropriate Air Force functions and capabilities. (For example, the Secretary of Defense has just approved the purchase by

[LC]

- 4 -

the Army of five DeHavilland DHC-4 airplanes, "Twin Otter", for
test and evaluation and is giving consideration to another project in-
volving a plane in the development stage.)

b. The provision of a limited airlift capability within the Army Aviation Program shall not serve as a basis for increasing or decreasing Air Force forces necessary to support or protect the Army airlift forces. Provision of this limited airlift capability will apply only to small combat units and limited quantities of materiel to improve local mobility, and not to the provision of an airlift capability sufficient for the large-scale movement of sizable Army combat units which would infringe on the mission of the Air Force.

c. As limited Army Aviation airlift capability becomes available to active Army Forces, provision should be made for compensation reductions in other forms of Army transportation designed to operate within the combat zone.

d. The Army Aviation Program will not provide for aircraft to
perform the following functions:

(1) Strategic and tactical airlift.

(a) Airlift of Army supplies, equipment, personnel and units from exterior points to points within Army combat zone.

(b) Airlift for evacuation of personnel and materiel from Army combat zone.

(c) Airlift for air movement of troops, supplies and equipment in the initial and subsequent phases of airborne operations.

(d) Aeromedical evacuation from Air Force operating locations within the combat zone through Air Force casualty staging units to hospital facilities outside combat zone, and aeromedical evacuation from an airhead or an airborne objective area where airborne operation includes air landed logistic support by Air Force.

(2) Tactical reconnaissance.

(3) Interdiction of the battlefield.

(4) Close combat air support.

[lc]

- 5 -

e. The Army will not maintain unilateral aviation research facilities but will confine itself to development and determination of specific requirements peculiar to Army needs, to evaluation of proposals, and to user testing of equipment. The Army will make maximum use of Air Force and Navy aircraft research and development facilities. The Air Force and Navy will be responsive to Army needs in such research activities on a reimbursable basis.

f. The Army will use existing types of Navy, Air Force or civilian aircraft when they are suitable, or may be suitably modified, to meet Army requirements, rather than attempt to develop and procure new types.

With regard to the 4 November 1952 Pace-Finletter Memorandum of Understanding, I am directing my staff to prepare an appropriate technical and detailed directive for coordination and issuance. Until this directive is approved, the Memorandum of Understanding will remain applicable except as specifically amended herein or by subsequent Secretary of Defense direction.

## 2. Adequacy of Airlift.

There has been a great deal of discussion and consideration given to the requirements for the airlift of tactical units and supplies. The current composition of the Air Force structure has been carefully examined, and it appears that it presently provides adequate airborne lift in the light of currently approved strategic concepts.

## 3. Air Defense.

Consideration has been given to distinguishing between Air Force and Army responsibility for surface-to-air guided missile systems for defense of the Continental United States on the basis of area defense and point defense, as well as the criterion of an arbitrary range limitation.

Area and point defense systems cannot be defined with precision. Area defense involves the concept of locating defense units to intercept enemy attacks remote from and without reference to individual vital installations, industrial complexes or population centers. For such a defense system to be effective, extensive information gathering networks such as the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system are required to trace continuously the enemy attack and transit and present the data in usable form for guiding the defense weapons to counter the attack. As applied to surface-to-air missiles, this means that area

[LC]

- 6 -

defense missiles, because of their more widespread sitings, will normally receive their guidance information from the network system rather than from acquisition and tracking radars located in the vicinity of the missile launching site.

Point defense has as its purpose the defense of specified geographical areas, cities and vital installations. One distinguishing feature of point defense missiles is that their guidance information is received from radars located near the launching sites.

The present state of the art justifies development of point defense surface-to-air missile systems for use against air targets at expected altitudes out to a horizontal range of the order of 100 nautical miles.

It must be clearly understood that the Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, who has been given the responsibility for the Air Defense of the Continental United States, Alaska, and the United States area of responsibility in the North East, also has the authority and duty for stating his operational need for new or improved weapon systems and for recommending to the Joint Chiefs of Staff all new installations of any type. Therefore, no Service shall unilaterally plan for additional missile installations of either category (point or area defense) in support of CINCONAD's responsibilities until and unless they have been recommended by CINCONAD to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and approved by that body.

In conformance with the above:

a. The Army is assigned responsibility for the development, procurement and manning of land-based surface-to-air missile systems for point defense. Currently, missile systems in the point defense category are the NIKE I, NIKE B, and land-based TALOS.

b. The Air Force is assigned responsibility for the development, procurement and manning of land-based surface-to-air missile systems for area defense. Currently, the missile system in the area defense category is the BOMARC.

c. The Navy, in close coordination with the Army and Air Force, is assigned responsibility for the development, procurement and employment of ship-based air defense weapon systems for the accomplishment of its assigned functions.

- 7 -

[lc]

d. The Marine Corps is authorized to adapt to its organic use, such surface-to-air weapons systems developed by the other Services as may be required for the accomplishment of its assigned functions.

e. In overseas areas, the U.S. theater commander should normally assign responsibility for air defense to an air component commander, with appropriate participation by other components. Under this arrangement, Army units in the combat zone should continue to be responsible for their own local defense, employing organic means. Other Army air defense units should carry out point defense missions under the air component commander. Air Force units should carry out the area defense missions. Special emphasis should be given to simplicity, flexibility and mobility of weapon systems employed in air defense in overseas areas. Navy forces should continue to be responsible for their own air defense at sea, employing organic means. As approved by the theater commander, the air component commander should establish such procedures for coordinating Army, Navy, and Air Force air defense forces as may be required to carry out his responsibilities, and, in addition, should establish such detailed procedures as are necessary for proper coordination with national air defense commanders of allied countries.

4. Air Force Tactical Support of the Army.

The Army will continue its development of surface-to-surface missiles for close support of Army field operations with the following limitations:

a. That such missiles be designed and programmed for use against tactical targets within the zone of operations, defined as extending not more than 100 miles beyond the front lines. As such missiles would presumably be deployed within the combat zone normally extending back of the front lines about 100 miles, this places a range limitation of about 200 miles on the design criteria for such weapons.

b. That the tactical air support functions beyond those that can be provided by Army surface-to-surface missiles as above defined remain the responsibility of the Air Force.

It is evident that the tactical air forces programmed for Army support should be reconsidered and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been requested to furnish me with their recommendations for specific adjustments as to the number and types of planned Army guided missile and unguided mocket units and with the number of Air Force tactical wings which may be eliminated as a result of these decisions.

In preparing these recommendations, the development of balanced and interrelated Army and Air Force tactical support forces for the accomplishment of overall U.S. national security objectives must be considered, rather than the development of completely independent Army and Air Force forces to accomplish tactical support tasks. In developing force recommendations in this area, as well as for other U.S. military forces, it should be recognized that all operations in which our forces will be employed will be conducted under the command of the designated commanders who will have the necessary forces assigned to them for the conduct of their missions by higher authority.

- 8 -

5. Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IIBM).

In regard to the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles:

a. Operational employment of the land-based Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile system will be the sole responsibility of the U. S. Air Force.

b. Operational employment of the ship-based Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile system will be the sole responsibility of the U. S. Navy.

c. The U. S. Army will not plan at this time for the operational employ-
ment of the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile or for any other missiles
with ranges beyond 200 miles. This does not, however, prohibit the Army from
making limited feasibility studies in this area.

(The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile has previously been
assigned for operational employment to the U.S. Air Force.)

There are a number of other matters relating to research and
development of particular weapons that will affect the choice of weapons
to be used for various missions in the armed services. These choices can only
be made after a careful technical review of the capabilities of the various
weapons under development. I refer particularly to weapons systems such as
the NIKE and TALOS and the multiple approach (JUPITER-THOR) to developments
such as the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile. This memorandum does not
attempt to answer those questions which can only be decided after studies now
in progress are completed, and should not be so interpreted.

In the meantime, these competing weapons systems will be continued
with support from Fiscal Year '57 funds until the completion of the technical
evaluation referred to above. Budget support in Fiscal Year '58 for the land-
based TALOS, as required, will be provided by the U.S. Army. Budget support
in Fiscal Year '58 for the land-based Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
Program, as required, will be provided by the U.S. Air Force.

In view of the great interest in these matters in the Congress,
copies of this memorandum are being sent to the appropriate Congressional
Committees. In addition, in order that there can be full understanding of
these decisions within the Military Departments and by the public, copies
of this memorandum are being made available to the press.

/s/ C. E. WILSON