Jib:2/52/70

90054
West Los Angeles, California
238 Bel Air Road
Miss Zee Zee Gabor

Henry A. Kissinger

Warm regards,

to seeing you when you are in New York.
I missed your partly and am looking forward
Please stay in touch. I too am sorry that

name next.
never knows where he is going to see his
That is one publication I rarely see. One
me the page from "The Hollywood Reporter."
Many thanks for your note and for sending

Dear Zee Zee!

MAY 27 1970

(312) 399-2101

ROBERT W. GALVIN

5725 EAST RIVER ROAD
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60631

October 29, 1973

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The invitation you tendered Friday was and is deeply appreciated. In addition to your personal graciousness, I noted that you moved directly to the subject. This mannerism pleased me also.

Much of this weekend was devoted to evaluation of the conceivable factors. Comparing all factors leads to the conclusion that I should not encourage my nomination and should withdraw my consideration of your generous offer.

Having come directly to the point, as you so ably did, permit me to amplify briefly.

First, I have written this Special Delivery letter instead of calling so you can receive my reply at your convenience and save your precious time.

Second, I want to go on written record to emphasize two of the positive factors, that it would be a privilege to additionally serve and aid the President, whom I support, and play a small part in each of your momentous efforts.

Finally, because I desire that this brief response not be misconstrued, I want you to know of my willingness to come to Washington and review in detail my analysis with you or an associate if you so designate.

With gratitude and admiration,

Robert W. Galvin

RWG:MB

RECEIVED
DEC 9 1975
CENTRAL FILES

DER BUNDESMINISTER
DES AUSWÄRTIGEN

Bonn, den 13. Juli 1976

Seiner Exzellenz
Dem Außenminister der Vereinigten
Staaten von Amerika
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Washington D.C.

zweihundert Jahre sind vergangen, seitdem mit der ameri-
kanischen Unabhängigkeitserklärung die Grundlage der poli-
tischen Existenz der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika ge-
schaffen worden ist.

In diesen Tagen denken wir an die dreifach entscheidende
Hilfestellung, die die USA uns vor 30 Jahren gegeben haben:
bei der Errichtung unseres innerlich stabilen, freien Ge-
meinwesens, das auf der soliden Basis unseres Grundgesetzes
beruht, beim wirtschaftlich-sozialen Wiederaufbau durch
den Marshallplan und beim Schutz der Freiheit gegen akute
Bedrohung in Berlin. Hier denke ich besonders an die Luft-
brücke. In drei Jahrzehnten ist hieraus eine enge deutsch-
amerikanische Verbundenheit gewachsen, die einer der sta-
bilsten Faktoren in der heutigen sich rasch wandelnden
Welt geworden ist.

Für uns Deutsche waren die Vereinigten Staaten nicht irgend-
ein fremdes Land, sondern lange Zeit das Land der Sehnsucht
und der Hoffnung vieler deutscher Einwanderer. Einer von
ihnen war Carl Schurz, der wie kaum ein anderer bleibende

-2-

[1c]

- 2 -

Spuren in Deutschland und Amerika hinterlassen hat. Als Vertreter der geistigen und politischen Kräfte von 1848 in Deutschland hat er versucht, seine Vorstellung einer freiheitlich-demokratischen Ordnung zu realisieren; als Senator von Missouri und später als Innenminister hat er aktiv das politische Leben in den USA mitgestaltet.

Ich freue mich, daß ich Ihnen aus Anlaß des 200. Geburts-
tages der amerikanischen Unabhängigkeit dieses Album mit
dem Carl Schurz-Sonderpostwertzeichen der deutschen
Bundespost überreichen kann.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

INSTITUT CHARLES DE GAULLE

PARIS, le 31 mars 1972

Monsieur le Conseiller,

Conformément au souhait du Général, l'Institut Charles de Gaulle a été créé l'an dernier sous la présidence d'André Malraux et la vice-présidence de Gaston Palewski, Président du Conseil Constitutionnel. L'Institut a pour but de constituer un centre vivant d'études et d'échanges sur l'oeuvre et la pensée du Général.

Nous souhaitons faire publier (par les Editions de l'Herne) un volume d'études et de témoignages sur le Général de Gaulle. Déjà, le Roi Hussein de Jordanie, le Président Senghor, Michel-Ange Asturias, Pablo Neruda nous donnent leur concours et, à leurs textes, nous aimerions ajouter le vôtre. Nous avons pensé que votre présence serait indispensable à l'éclat de ce livre. Nous nous permettons donc de solliciter un article de votre part. Nous remettrons à l'éditeur les manuscrits de cet ouvrage vers la fin du printemps.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Conseiller, à
l'assurance de mes sentiments de très haute estime.

Le Délégué Général,

Olivier Germain-Thomas.

Monsieur le Conseiller Kissinger.

5, rue de Solférino - Paris 7e

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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APPROVED BY EUR: MR. ANDERSON
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TEU:MHOFFMANN
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074715

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

UNCLASS STATE 028734

F.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, SOPN, WB

SUBJECT: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE FOR RIAS

PLEASE PASS TO RIAS DIRECTOR GERT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM THE SECRETARY:

BEGIN QUOTE: THIRTY YEARS AGO THE RADIO IN THE AMERICAN SECTOR BEGAN BROADCASTING TO THE PEOPLE OF BERLIN. TODAY, I WISH TO EXTEND MY CONGRATULATIONS TO THIS UNIQUE INSTITUTION WHICH HAS WON RESPECT WORLDWIDE. RIAS HAS ACHIEVED AN UNPARALLELED RECORD IN REASSURING AND INFORMING ITS LISTENERS, IN BERLIN AND BEYOND.

WHEN RIAS FIRST WENT ON THE AIR, MUCH OF BERLIN LAY IN THE PURS OF WORLD WAR II. THE FIRST BROADCASTS BROUGHT NEWS OF RELIEF AND RATIONING, OF QUEUES AND COUPONS. OVER THE YEARS, THE RIAS ROLE EXPANDED. IT BECAME A PRIMARY

UNCLASSIFIED

COLGATE UNIVERSITY

HAMILTON, NEW YORK 13346
(315) 824-1000

Program in Peace Studies

December 26, 1972

Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

As a political scientist grateful for the lucidity and
wisdom which you have brought to your scholarly writings, and
as a citizen grateful for your personal efforts to tame the
hostilities of nations, I write in the hope that you will
take some significant action to challenge the senseless
new round of bombings of North Vietnam.

I do not know how to credit press reports which speculate
on possible differences of view between yourself and the President
in this matter. Your own past concern for rationality and pro-
portionality in world politics encourages me to hope that you
may be as vexed by the irrationality, immorality, and impolitic
qualities of these bombings as I am.

The most dramatic act you could take would be to resign
and to give public reasons for your resignation. Your prestige
would make that just about the most significant gesture on behalf
of sanity and peace that this nation had witnessed for many years.

But there may be other actions which, in your judgment,
would have more positive results. What seems intolerable is to
let many days go by without some decisive act which can help us
outsiders stem the tide of disillusionment and cynicism which
engulfs almost everyone who really cares about peace.

I implore you to act.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 19, 1975

Dear Mr. President:

Please accept my deepest thanks for the
warm welcome my colleagues and I received in
Paris. The results of our visit confirms to
me that the "Spirit of Martinique" represents
a genuine improvement in the tone and sub-
stance of Franco-American relations.

I personally am sincerely grateful for
the opportunity to benefit from your wisdom.
I greatly value your views and will welcome
them always.

Warm regards,

His Excellency
Valery Giscard d'Estaing,
President of the French
Republic,
Paris.

INFORMAL TRANSLATION

Office of the Ambassador
French Embassy, Washington
September 3, 1975

Mr. Secretary of State:

I am happy to transmit to you the attached telegram
of congratulations from Mr. Valery Giscard d'Estaing.

I allow myself to add to it the expression of
my personal admiration. Success never disarms critics,
quite to the contrary! But all those who know the
problems of the Middle East and the difficulties of
the way towards peace will pay tribute to the excep-
tional work you have accomplished.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the
assurance of my high consideration.

/s/
Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet

The Hon. Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington

INFORMAL TRANSLATION

Paris, September 3, 1975

I send you my very friendly congratulations for
the success of your persevering and intelligent
accomplishment for peace.

Valery Giscard d'Estaing

[LC]

Ambassade de France
aux Etats-Unis

L'Ambassadeur

Washington, le 3 septembre 1975

Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat,

Je suis heureux de vous transmettre ci-joint un télégramme
de félicitations de Monsieur Valéry GISCARD D'ESTAING.

Je me permets d'y joindre l'expression de mon admiration
personnelle. Le succès ne désarme jamais les critiques, bien au contraire !
Mais tous ceux qui connaissent les problèmes du Moyen-Orient, les difficultés
du cheminement de la paix, rendront hommage au travail exceptionnel que
vous avez accompli.

Je vous prie de bien vouloir agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire
d'Etat, les assurances de ma haute considération.

The Hon. Henry KISSINGER
Secrétaire d'Etat

WASHINGTON D.C.

THE LORD GLADWYN

23. CHAPEL STREET.
LONDON.
SW1X 7BY

01-245 9220

January 18, 1974.

I am afraid that your kind letter of December 3rd last only reached me today on my return from the January meeting of the European Parliament! I think this can only be because it was addressed to me at 23 Chapel Street without the indication "S.W. 1." - and there are several Chapel Streets! But perhaps your secretary could sometime let me know exactly how it was despatched? Anyhow it is a great disappointment as of course if I had received it in time I would have come back from the December meeting of the Parliament and attended the Pilgrims' Banquet.

As things are, might I just say - in case you have a moment to glance at this screed - that my Report will probably be given a preliminary reading by the Political Committee of the Parliament on February 21st, a second on March 21st and (with luck) come up for debate in the Plenary, and for the possible passing of a resolution, during the second session of the Parliament in April.

Its main recommendation is that France should join, not the Eurogroup itself (which she will not do), but the potential arms procurement agency known as EURONAD, at present

/consisting

The Honble. Dr. Henry Kissinger,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

THE LORD GLADWYN

- 2 -

consisting of the armaments directors of the states concerned. This Committee, though it would clearly have to remain in Brussels, might at least change its rather ugly name. En revanche there should be constituted a "Security Policy Committee" within the existing Political Committee machinery of the Foreign Ministers, consisting, to start off with, of the Defence Ministries' equivalents of the Foreign Ministries' Political Directors, but eventually of the Defence Ministers themselves, who would work out "directives" to be given on the one hand to the (reinforced and re-christened) EURONAD and on the other to a Western European Chiefs-of-Staff Committee - an expansion of the existing informal FINABEL, of which France is a member. The latter would meet, for the time being, wherever the Foreign Ministers happened to be meeting. We shall hope in this way to "tendre la perche aux Français", but whether they will rise remains to be seen.

I need hardly say it is made clear that any "directive" should be cleared with the Americans in the first instance. The chief object of the exercise will be to put the Europeans in a position in which they should be able to combine to manufacture many of the ultra-modern "conventional" weapons that are necessary if the general defence of Western Europe is not going to get increasingly "incredible" over the years. The "W.E.U. solution" is for various reasons rejected and it is made clear that if the Danes and the Irish will not play then the proposed new machinery should be put in hand without them.

/My

THE LORD GLADWYN

23, CHAPEL STREET.

LONDON.
SWIX 7BY
01-245 9220

- 3 -

My impression at the moment is that the Christian Democrats, the British Conservatives and the Liberals (minus two Danes) will all be strongly in favour of such a conception: the Socialists will be divided into two; and the position of the Gaullists will be unpredictable, all the more so since my spies tell me that in the last fortnight or so the influence of such ultra-nationalists as Sanguinetti has been increasing and that poor Monsieur Jobert may not be authorized to go as far in the direction of Western European defence cooperation as he would like. On the other hand, Mitterand seems to be parting with the Communists in "Europe", which may mean that we shall have a few extra Socialist votes.

Please allow me, dear Henry, to say in conclusion that my admiration for your achievements increases daily. We really are incredibly lucky to have you as, in a sense, the spokesman of the Western World. Don't worry about any jealousies that may emerge, more particularly, I fear, on the French side. I propose to quote at some length from your masterly contribution to the debate at the Serbelloni Conference on World Order (in 1967) in my Winston Churchill Memorial Lecture which I shall deliver in Lausanne on February 15th next, and will send you a copy in due course.

In the meantime I am sending you a copy of a new book called "The History Makers" which might distract you one day in an aeroplane.

/I am

THE LORD GLADWYN

- 4 -

I am responsible for the piece on De Gaulle;
the Longfords for that on Winston; and
John Wheeler Bennett has contributed a really
masterly chapter on Kaiser Bill. Lew
Douglas on Clemenceau is not bad, but too long.

Please regard this letter as entirely personal and do not show it to anybody. I am not supposed to disclose the goings on in the Political Committee and I really can't imagine what "mes collegues français" would think if they knew that I was in correspondence on the subject with an American, however distinguished

S/S 7318942

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

October 18, 1973

COPIES TO:
S/S-S(TS)
EUR
RF-HJB

Dear Gladwyn:

As you know it was necessary for me to cancel
my London visit because of the Middle East situation,
and I am not certain when the trip can be rescheduled.

Thank you for sending me copies of your pre-
liminary reports to the Political Affairs Committee of
the European Parliament and for the reprint of your
article from Foreign Affairs. These are valuable
contributions to an assessment of the options available
to us in continuing to provide an effective defense of
Western Europe. Your colleagues in the Parliament
will want to see your work continued, and I encourage
you in the task. I hope when I am next in Europe we
can find time to discuss the matter.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

The Right Honorable
Lord Gladwyn, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., C.B.,
23, Chapel Street,
London.

Revised in S/S-S:Romeo will.kz 10/17/73

THE LORD GLADWYN

7318342

23. CHAPEL STREET.
LONDON.
SW1X 7BY
01-248 9220

October 1st, 1973.

May I first of all congratulate you most sincerely on your appointment? It is indeed a relief to all of us that somebody so obviously qualified as yourself should be in charge of our destinies at such a critical time.

You are coming to address the British Pilgrims on October 15th and unfortunately I shall not be there to hear you as I shall then be attending a plenary of the European Parliament in Strasbourg. If you could, however, spare me a quarter of an hour during your trip I should be more than grateful for the following reason:-

I am the Vice Chairman and Rapporteur on Defence of the Political Affairs Committee of the Parliament. In that capacity I have, on instructions, already circulated a preliminary and "objective" Report, together with some personal reflections on the Nuclear Problem. These I attach, together with an article which I contributed to the April number of "Foreign Affairs". You will not have time to read these efforts, but your staff might perhaps give you their general purport.

In October, or maybe November, it is possible, and even likely, that the various political groups in the Parliament, having

/studied

His Excellency
The Hon. Dr. Henry Kissinger.

THE LORD GLADWYN

23. CHAPEL STREET.
LONDON.
SWIX 7DY
01-245 9220

2.

studied my 'preliminary' documents, may authorize me to produce a more profound study complete with a draft Recommendation. It was, as a matter of fact, due to my own efforts last spring that the Socialists were induced at least to consider defence problems. Defence is now, therefore, no longer an unmentionable word with them though they still boggle over the word "nuclear".

If, by any chance, a Recommendation should emerge before the end of the year, then it will be apparent that the Parliament is taking up a definite line and it is conceivable that such a line might influence the Ministers and thus be of a certain political importance.

I have already seen most of the Ministers interested - though not, as yet, the French. I hope, however, fairly soon to have a go at Michel Jobert, whose utterances seem to become more and more mantic and contradictory as time goes on.

If you can give me an interview you have only to name the time and the place and I will duly make arrangements accordingly, if necessary coming back from Strasbourg.

SUMMARY

The Defense of Western Europe

By Lord Gladwyn
Foreign Affairs

A Quarterly Review

April 1973

1. The American nuclear deterrent is presently the cornerstone of Western European defense.

2. As American forces are withdrawn from Europe, for any combination of reasons, the credibility of a U.S. nuclear first strike against the USSR in defense of Western Europe will be increasingly called into question. Total withdrawal would mean a near certainty that the U.S. would not resort to such a strike.

3. European use of tactical nuclear weapons -- even if they had them in sufficient quantity -- in these circumstances is inconceivable. Russian use of nuclear weapons as a first strike is considered improbable.

4. Therefore, Europeans must organize a credible conventional defense. The object would be to hold up a Soviet armored thrust in the central theater without resort to nuclear weapons.

5. The force would employ anti-tank weapons from ground to ground rocket emplacements, helicopter gunships, specially designed fighter aircraft, and, above all, many small mobile land units.

6. These units would be backed up by a conscript militia, mobilized at short notice, to guard vital points against paratroop attack. Some sort of European Arms Procurement Agency and a European Combined Chiefs of Staff would be necessary. In reserve would be the British and French strategic

nuclear force -- not necessarily "combined."
 COMMON targetting would be required.)

7. This arrangement would result in net savings in defense expenditures by standardizing procurement and diminishing the size of the standing force.

8. The American umbrella, i.e., U.S. naval forces, would still be necessary for defense of the flank countries.

9. Planning for such an arrangement would not jeopardize detente but would forestall a moral collapse which could begin with MBFR. "The way to detente is for Western Europe, in close co-operation with the Americans, to secure, or begin to secure, its own defense before talking; not to start talking before it has secured its defense."

# The Effects of a European Foreign Policy on Defense Questions

Noting the European Parliament's assertion that foreign and defense policy cannot be divorced, Gladwyn's study attempts to describe, "A) the attempts that had been made in the past or that are being made now, to achieve European Defense cooperation, and B) the main options by which a greater degree of European defense cooperation might be achieved."

The first part of Gladwyn's study outlines efforts to coordinate Western European and Atlantic defense since World War II. The second part, concerning future options, is based on three main considerations:

- for the foreseeable future, any form of European defense cooperation can only make sense in the wider framework of cooperation with the U.S.

- the next few years will see a sizeable reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, whether balanced or not by Soviet troop cuts.

- all nine EC members, in perhaps different ways, will be sufficiently concerned about Western Europe's defense to reject neutralist alternatives and at least contemplate taking some collective action.

Gladwyn then discusses his three options. These relate to conventional defense only. He touches on nuclear questions in a separate paper (see below).

1. An intensification of measures of cooperation within the Euro-group. Gladwyn says there is no doubt that this proposal, which assumes a close relationship with the Atlantic Alliance, would be favored by seven of the nine EC members barring some major change in French or US policy. The major question mark is Euro-group's relationship with France.

2. A form of defense cooperation embodying the so-called Davignon proposal for incorporating foreign political matters into the machinery of the EC. This procedure, Gladwyn says, has recently been much improved

Some Reflections on the Nuclear Problem

Gladwyn concludes that the creation of a credible second-strike European nuclear capability can only be accomplished in concert with the U.S. However, he acknowledges that the European Parliament may consider that such a goal is impossible or even undesirable. Should this be the decision, Gladwyn warns, the result would be that the EC would not develop into a real political entity since the absence of a defense policy would prevent the development of a foreign policy except in limited spheres.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

WEST EUROPEAN STUDIES

471 BROADWAY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

May 18th, 1970

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

I'm sending down last weeks *Gazette* and Friday's and
tomorrows *Crimsons* which refer to the Schelling et.
al. visit. As you probably know, Channel two (WGBH)
had a brief interview with Schelling and Yarmolinsky,
in which Adam, in particular, went to some lengths to
emphasize that the visit was not in any way directed
against you; that it's purpose was primarily to convey
the feelings of the group to the President.

I hope that you had some rest and good weather in Key
Biscayne.

I'll be down in Washington in the middle of next week
and very much hope that there will be a chance to see
you.

With warm regards.

Temple Israel

1400 SOUTH PENINSULA DRIVE
DAYTONA BEACH, FLORIDA 32018
Telephone 252-3097

PAUL T. LEIBOVITZ, PRESIDENT
DAN DEMICK, VICE PRESIDENT
MRS. BARNEY KRAFT, TREASURER
MRS. MERVIN KATZ, SECRETARY

MARVIN GOLDSON, M.A., D.H.L.
RABBI'S STUDY 255-4333

February 25, 1972

Via Air Mail

Dr. Henry Kissinger
National Security Council
Washington, 25, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I am writing to you confident in the hope that you will
give the contents of this letter your attention.

For many years now, I have felt the need for the erection
of a National Holocaust Monument in memory of 6 million Jews
who were slaughtered during the Nazi period.

Many people have encouraged me in this work. I know you
can appreciate the significance and meaning of such a sacred
project.

The memorial would include the monument *per se*, an exten-
sive library on Holocaust literature, a museum, an administra-
tion building, etc.

I need your endorsement of this project. It would mean
a great deal towards the success of this project if we could
have your sanction. That's all I want. The noted author,
Elie Weisel has written to me indicating his endorsement. Other
national figures are expected to follow.

Please, may I have your reaction to this?

I anxiously await your reply.

Rabb:MG/mn

BARRY GOLDWATER
ARIZONA

P750174-1995

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

COMMITTEES:
AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES
ARMED SERVICES

PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE
TACTICAL AIR POWER SUBCOMMITTEE
INTELLIGENCE SUBCOMMITTEE
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

7523234

November 17, 1975

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

We've been having a hard time getting together for a meeting but I'm grateful that possibly we can do it this week.

There are two things I want to specifically discuss with you.

1. My constant interest in having the President just drop off in Taipei to say hello. We are not going to change the attitude of the Red Chinese toward us regardless of what we do because we are necessary in their scheme of things just as they are necessary in ours. We can, however, cement forever the friendship of the Free Chinese if the President will just drop off.

2. I know that the Prime Minister of South Africa would like to visit the United States and I am in hearty accord with that desire and would hope that your office would see its way clear to suggest to the President that he invite the Prime Minister. The apartheid situation in South Africa has nothing to do with integration or segregation, it actually is a matter involving a feeling of nine tribes who were not there before the white man came and one tribe which was there before that time. We must keep in mind, also, that South Africa is the source of a lot of gold, and if we want to make it tough enough for them to react, they could react in a way that would not be healthy for us.

Let's talk about these two subjects.

With best personal wishes,

Barry Goldwater

ACTION
is assigned to

<table><tr><td>EA</td></tr></table>

AF

FAORE
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

1975 NOV 17 FRI 24 8

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 8, 1973

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I dropped by your office while on my way back to Madrid, where I live and am now in business, just to pay my respects. Sorry I missed you.

My very best wishes for your continued success in your most important mission. Needless to say, I am proud to note the outstanding success you are having, which is vital to all of us.

Former commander of 1st Bn., 334th Inf.
334th Inf. Regt.
333rd Inf. Regt.

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

P.S. I was calling on Bud Leinbaugh when passing through.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
WEST EUROPEAN STUDIES

5 BRYANT STREET
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

December 24, 1972

Dear Professor Kissinger,

I have been reluctant the past four years to presume
upon our relationship at Harvard by communicating with
you on policy matters. I do so now out of anger,
disappointment, and frustration.

Can you really find justifiable the recent bombing
raids by B-52's of Hanoi? I simply do not see what
prevents agreement on the bases of the October clauses,
and quite frankly I find very hard to believe that
the North Vietnamese have changed so drastically since
then. Newspaper accounts imply quite the opposite--
that it is the American government which has shifted.
Assuming it is the North, can whatever they now ask
warrant massive bombing of a city?

Your conduct is teaching terrible lessons to the
American political system, lessons it hardly needs ---
that strength and success are their own justification;
that secrecy, non-accountability, misrepresentation,
and destruction are all excusable if one gets away
with it. You did have a message to teach -- that
simple moralism and ideologizing are bad bases for
policy. The Vietnam policy is destroying that work
by corrupting the meaning of 'realism'.

You must believe that I have learned too much from you
to find the moral questions simple or light. It is
indeed partly from reflection on your own lectures and
writings that I find it hard to understand how you
can find either wise or desirable the present conduct
of the Administration.

If, as many say, you dissent from that policy, I urge
you strongly to disassociate yourself publically and
unambiguously and emphatically from it. Too many have
stayed hoping to influence from within, alas to no
apparent good.

GOWR IE

Kissinger

Aug 1

JB

Despite all the rows and analyses of President Nixon's foreign policy during the past eighteen months, the man who has done most to form it, Dr. Henry Kissinger, still has a peculiarly mixed reputation.

Some liberals call him a #disaster.' Old colleagues from Harvard, where he was a professor until Nixon hired him, have attacked him publicly. And yet, as I discovered during a recent visit to Washington (where I paid several calls on Dr. Kissinger, an old friend from the days when I worked at Harvard) everyone - including his old colleagues - thinks that he is eminently suited to the job.

Kissinger's two predecessors as Assistant for National Security Affairs were also from Harvard. But McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow were considerably less important under Kennedy and Johnson than Kissinger is under Nixon. Bundy acted as a ~~cablepool~~ of information for Kennedy and his close circle of advisers; Rostow was used mainly to confirm Johnson's own views. But Kissinger, with a staff of 40, is doing nothing less than trying to formulate a coherent foreign policy for the United States all over the world. His position is rather like that of a Shakesperian favourite: both very influential and very vulnerable.

GOWRIE Kissinger p 2

Kissinger is now 46, and the first thing you notice about him is that he thinks fast although he speaks slowly. Behind his horn-rimmed spectacles his eyes glance quickly from one person to another as he evaluates what they are saying and why they are saying it.

He is startlingly self-aware, and specialises in deadpan humour. Some of his lines - 'At last I have a job large enough to satisfy my ego.' - when delivered in a low monotone and foreign accent (he was born in Germany) can leave American listeners with confused, ambiguous feelings about whether he is really joking or not. IXEXUIN

He puts enormous energy into his endeavours and is highly sensitive to personal criticism of signs of mistrust. In his White House office he has a photograph given to him by the Russian Ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin; it shows a frightened bulldog being approached by a vet holding a hypodermic. On the back is written, "Henry. Don't be too serious. Take it easy. Relax. Anatol."

Kissinger's day starts around seven o'clock in his pretty, rented house overlooking Rock Creek Park. If you want to talk to him about personal matters you may catch him on the telephone during the next ten minutes, or perhaps see him during dinner. Otherwise his time - often far into the night - is the President's.

He spends up to four hours a day with Nixon. When Nixon travels, Kissinger nearly always goes too. He takes part in most White House social occasions: he was at the dinner for Prince Charles and Princess Anne. White House telephone calls follow him everywhere. One restaurateur proudly showed him to a table for dinner with a telephone all ready and waiting on it.

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When he leaves his office in the evening, his aides cram papers into a bursting brief case; just as it is shut, something else vital for him to read that night is brought in and they start again, trying to decide what can possibly be left out. One of his aides told me that some sixty per cent of the papers read by the President come through Kissinger's office.

However different Presidents may structure their administrations, the importance of any one job is ultimately decided by personalities. President Nixon likes order and method. He likes to get short written memos, and then discuss the issues at length, using a Socratic question-and-answer method. Kissinger is good at both the memos and the answers, and the President and he have arrived at a personal awareness and acceptance of each other, with Kissinger somewhat in the role of tutor. One day, in the White House Oval Office, Nixon's dog insisted on chewing the carpet. The President tried and failed to stop the dog and ended up by giving it a biscuit to keep it quiet. 'Mr. President,' said Dr. Kissinger, 'you have just taught the dog to chew the carpet.'

Yet despite the excellence of Kissinger's relationship with Nixon, his job is virtually impossible. To begin with, the work-load is prodigious, and so too is the workload of the White House. partly because Kissinger tries to involve all the government's best talents in policy-making. This means collecting ideas from the bureaucracy, sifting them, and scrupulously feeding back reactions so that the various departments know how and why policies are selected.

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One object of this method is to get the departments on Kissinger's, and the President's, side in getting decisions put into effect, which is far harder than making them.

For example, the groundwork for the Salt (strategic arms limitation) talks between the United States and Russia was carried out in this way. Kissinger and his staff drew up a number of proposals for putting to the Russians; then they spent hours working over and amending them in consultation with the bureaucracy, so that the proposals they eventually sent to the Vienna conference had already been cleared by all relevant departments. Previously the process had worked the other way round: and painfully negotiated points would often be amended out of existence during their subsequent progress through the State, Defense, and Budget departments.

This conscientious procedure generates a flood of paperwork. The stack of documents marked urgent with red corner-tags in Kissinger's office can build up to a pile three feet high. Then there are the endless telegrams from abroad, which all have to be evaluated, plus everything related to foreign policy churned out by the State Department, the Defense Department, the Budget Department, and the CIA.

Besides, Kissinger sets great store by personal contacts and meetings in order to coordinate policies and make sure that communications have been understood. He is often said to be inaccessible, but in fact he sees a stream of people, many from outside the Government - ranging from angry students, to John Berryman, the poet, and even our own David Frost.

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His old office in the basement of the White House (he has now moved upstairs to a new office) used to be so full of chairs that getting in and out of it was like an obstacle race.

Kissinger reads at high speed, is systematic, and can handle a number of issues at the same time. In a crisis, he is at his best. Minor administrative problems can irritate him and make him act with abrupt impatience. It is hard for him to delegate when he is the channel to the action centre. Also, since he is one of the very few original minds in the President's entourage, he is expected to be productive on the ideas front; but it is virtually impossible for him both to hold down his job and have time to think fresh thoughts.

Perhaps not surprisingly, Kissinger has also had problems with his staff. Some have resigned, either because their personalities and notions about their jobs turned out to be incompatible with Kissinger's, or because they became disenchanted with the Administration in general - unable to accept, as one aide put it to me, 'that you don't have to defend Spiro Agnew because you work for Henry Kissinger.' The survivors look as if they are enjoying themselves and the way Kissinger drives them, but a few suffer from a feeling of isolation from the actual decision-making. Any memo prepared for the President by a Kissinger staff member always returns to that person with the President's comments, but it is Kissinger himself who has to be the focus for their ideas, not the President, because Nixon likes to deal with Kissinger direct.

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Despite all this, Kissinger is thriving. He has put on weight. 'This job would be quite enjoyable if it wasn't for Vietnam,' he told me. He enjoys his curtailed social life: 'If a girl is bored with me now, she thinks it's her own fault.' He is thriving even though some of his old Harvard colleagues think he has betrayed them. A group of them, most of whom had served in government, went down to Washington during the Cambodia crisis to tell him that they were 'through with trying to help him deal with the country's problems as he saw the problems.'

It was a painful meeting on both sides, though there was never any threat (as was reported at the time) that Kissinger might never be welcome at Harvard again. Officially he is on a two-year leave of absence ending next January. After that, if he wants to go back, it's a question of whether there is a chair available for him.

Nevertheless, the harsh fact is that a wide gap has opened up between Kissinger and his old friends. Professor Tom Schelling summed up the difference over Cambodia between Kissinger and himself as follows: 'You look out of the window, and you see a monster. And you turn to the guy standing next to you at the very same window and say, "Look, there's a monster." But he doesn't see a monster at all. How do you explain that there really is a monster?' The professors saw the Cambodian invasion as the crossing of a border, comparable to Johnson's instigation of the bombing of North Vietnam and they felt 'once you've crossed one border, you can cross them all;' that it was an escalation of the war and 'if Henry didn't see it as such, he needed to look again.'

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It is impossible to discover whether going into Cambodia was Kissinger's own recommendation. He certainly felt that Prince Sihanouk's downfall 'upset the applecart' of American progress towards leaving Vietnam, but he has not changed his mind about the need to leave.

Kissinger's rift with his Harvard colleagues has left him without the protection of his old academic constituency. Though this has hurt him - he has called the confrontation 'inhuman' - he is still buoyant, perhaps because he always was a different kind of professor from his colleagues. He was very much part of Harvard, but he never looked entirely at home there. Lately he was quoted as saying: 'I have been accused of magalomania. Actually I suffer from paranoia, and the good thing about working in the Government instead of the academic world is that I can have real enemies.'

He has been more actively concerned with the possibilities of power than most academics. He was seriously engaged in the foreign policy field before he was hired by Nixon: he is an intellectual, but he is not a natural academic, and he wants to see his ideas tried out. As a professor of government, he not only gave undergraduate classes, graduate seminars, planned courses, read theses, and invented a special international summer seminar of his own, which brought together foreign policy experts from all over the world; he also travelled constantly to Europe - where he has many long-standing contacts among editors, pundits, foreign office people and politicians; commuted to New York to direct special studies for the Rockefeller brothers, and acted as an adviser to Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson.

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He was involved in one serious peacemaking mission with Vietnam for LBJ, and has been to Russia, the Middle East and South-East Asia. He always operates at the same pitch whether powerful or not. It used to be as hard to get him on the telephone at the Centre for International Affairs as it is in the White House. His (English) secretary became used to taking dictation in a taxi to the airport or even while Kissinger hurried on foot to a Party Club lunch.

The regular rough-and-tumble of White House life churns him up, but not more than the rough-and-tumble of Harvard used to. [American foreign policy, (and hence Kissinger himself) is] wide open to criticism, but though he draws strength from his self-knowledge and from the consolations of history, it would be surprising if he did not sometimes reflect on the fate of other faithful presidential servants who were brought down by Vietnam. Thinking of his predecessor, Walt Rostow, who is now at a university in Texas, Kissinger challenged one girl-friend by asking, 'Would you be happy in a small town in Arizona?'

It is a further Kissinger strength that his hopes are not too high. He sees the world not as black and white but as gry, adopting a standpoint of what might be called mature disillusion. He sympathises with Leftist ideals, but thinks that existing political structures should be adjusted, not destroyed. He sometimes seems more like a European than an American - he never sounds rhetorically idealistic - and his thinking has an uncommon detachment.