TELCORN

Dobrynin/HAK

October 10, 1973/8:13 a.m.

D: When I called you about an hour ago you were still home.

K: An hour ago?

D: No, half an hour. Henry, I received a message for the President and to you from the Secretary General. I have not translated it yet but I will translate from the telegram as I read it.

K: But you'll send over the substance a little later?

D: OK. "Acting in the spirit of mutual understanding reached with the President on this score, we during the last days were having consultations with the leaders of Egypt and Syria on the correction of ceasefire. Frankly speaking these conversations with the Arabs were difficult and prolonged but we have now the opportunity to say to the President that the Soviet Union is ready not to oppose the resolution of the Security Council in favor of ceasefire. The President of course understands that in the present situation to work in the Security Council for the resolution of ceasefire the Soviet Union could not do it but the main thing is that we will not oppose. We will not vote against. Our representative will abstain during their voting. To come to this decision was not really easy. A decisive factor was that we, took into consideration this particular case, the pro-interest of supporting this and other developments, preserving and developing all those positives which have taken place during the last years of the Soviet/American relations and in the international situation in general. We would like to draw attention President, to one more circumstance. It is necessary to limit for the first time being the decision to ceasefire and either we will broaden the resolutions with more additional conditions on this matter for instance about their creating certain kinds of conditions or withdrawing troops on a condition. This very clearly will lead to the failure(?) that would really matter. This would have the ability to act combined. We are mentioning about this only because there were some hints on this kind of decision which were heard in a speech made by the representative of the U.S. during the last Security Council meeting. If that kind of position were put forward it would put us in a very difficult situation and the Soviet representative would be sure in this circumstance to object and vote again. We hope that this will refrain from happening and the combined action of the Soviet Union and the United States will facilitate or help to establish

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01265
Date: 10/10/73
By: W.M. Scott

this line on the Middle East and the resumption of actual efforts to
reach a political settlement. This business about a revelation or
perhaps allegation of your sending supplies to Israel. This was really
a very important step and of course could ruin the whole national
situation and we got rather hot on this matter. We are giving the whole
Security Council, and we hope that they will try, a chance to act in
conjunction with us.

K: We need a few hours to consider this and we will let you know later today.

D: I will wait to hear from you

K: Wait till you hear from me but you can say it's a constructive message.

D: OK.

K: You will hear from me. I have to meet with the President. If you
could get me the text of this sent over.

D: Alright. It will take an hour or so.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012958
By: WW. A. Spada, D.C.C. 00304

TELCORN
Secretary Kissinger/Sec. Schlesinger

8:27 a.m. 10/10/73

S: ...the Soviet resupply operations

K: Yeh

S: That's gone overt now, and in particular the movement of the Saudi
forces up to Syria--

K: Are they moving?

S: Yeh you remember the original brigade which the Jordanians would not permit to move--

K: Yeh

S: They have now requested rights to move other brigades from Saudi proper
through Jordan and Jordan can't really resist it.

K: Yeh

S: So I think that we are going to get into a position in which all of our interests
in Saudi Arabia are at risk and it might be desirable to examine the funda-
mentals of our position--

K: Well what are the fundamentals of our position, as you see it?

S: Well, the fundamentals are that we may be faced with the choice that
likewise lies cruelly between support of Israel, loss of Saudi Arabia
and if interests in the Middle East are at risk, the choice is between
occupation or watching them go down the drain

K: Occupation of whom? {}

S: That would remain to be seen--it can be partial

K: But which country are we occupying?

S: That's one of the things we'd like to talk about.

K: Who's we?

S: Me.

K: Okay, I have heard an urgent message which I've got to take up with the
President and I'll be back to you later this morning and we'll get together
this morning.

S: Okay.

RECLASSIFIED

Original
DATE 01/29/8

Dated 01/29/8

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin
8:39 a.m. 10/10/73

K: Anatol.

D: Yeh.

K: I just wanted to tell you we won't really have a chance for a systematic
examination until after Mobutu has left around 11:30.

D: 11:30?

K: Yes. So we'll get an answer sometime in the afternoon.

D: All right.

K: And we would urge you--because we have to do a lot of talking now also

D: I understand. No, no. If I understand correctly, you do just not want to do anything to discuss--

K: We would appreciate it if you now didn't do anything until we've had
a chance to discuss it here. And then during the course of the afternoon
I'll let you know what our reaction is.

D: Okay.

K: Now, may I say another thing--we notice there is a very substantial airlift of Soviet supplies going into Egypt and Syria

D: Airlift?

K: Airlift. I can give you the numbers and types of aircraft, but I'm sure Grechko knows it.

D: He should know as well as you do. Sometimes he know better, maybe, no?

K: But we really don't think that is very helpful, because that's going to force us to do at least the same.

D: Okay, I will flash to Moscow--I'll get back to Moscow.

K: And we--it really, Anatol

D: You say heavy?

K: Heavy--about 22 airplanes, I consider that pretty heavy.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By: W.J. Mains
Date: 10/10/73

TELCONE

Ambassador Dinitz/Mr. Kissinger

10:46 a.m. 10/10/73

K: How are you Mr. Ambassador?

D: Good, and you.

K: Okay. What is the--how do you see the situation? What is your latest word? head

D: The latest word in the field is the following. The bridge- which the Egyptians have --are occupying in the canal is very narrow; it is 3 to 5 miles. They are completely contained, there were some attempts during the night to break south web and all the tanks were eliminated. They lost some tanks, some planes, the situation is that they are completely contained to narrow--and this is important that the bridge is narrow so they cannot develop a ______. We are continuing--I'm still on the Egyptain--continuing a regular air attacks on air fields and missiles. The Egyptians are guarding their planes, they don't send them up. They are using the missiles instead. We are expecting--we have information about additional ______ squadrons from Libya and a Mig squadron from Algeria as well as some ______ from Iraq.

K: Yeh.

D: On the Syrian side, the thing is going well. The last telephone call we had is we are almost in complete control of the land and the problem that we are trying to do now is to hit the reserve arm brigades that are still outside of the Golan Heights by air action and to prevent the joining of the Iraqi ______ position which according to our information is moving toward Syria. There are increased operation from Lebanon of guerrilla operations--40 incidents. Then we now have information which we cannot confirm so I'll wait with it

K: What is it.

D: That is there is supposedly an airlift Syrian but I don't--

K: That's probably true.

D: Is it?

K: Yeh.

D: You have information

K: I have a pretty good report.

Page 2

D: Well we have it still in a very doubtful question, but we will see how it develops then.

K: We've already warned the Soviets against it. I've given them a very strong warning.

D: Yes. Then I have a message from the Prime Minister to the President.

K: I am in a terrible hurry to get to a meeting to the President, could you give me a two sentences--

vital

D: Yeh. Sure. The sentences are--I was told this morning of the/decision you made to assure the immediate and so on. Your decision will have a great influence in our fighting capability. I know it is now that I can count on your understanding. We are fighting against very heavy odds, but we are fully confident that we will come out victorious. When we do we will have your mind. Golda Meir. And a small message from her to you saying that she is more than words to thank you and she says to tell you, that Israel defense forces are doing everything in their power to hit the enemy effectively and swiftly.

K: The major thing is to get them back to the ceasefire--pre-Saturday lines because we will--we are under unbelievable diplomatic pressure from everybody along that line which we are holding, but you understand.

D: I understand this.

K: And I tried to explain that to you last night. I have the impression from something you said that it might be part of your strategy not to take the bridgehead for a while.

D: No, what I said to you was just my own idea, maybe we would leave some until we finish the job so that they would not be calling for a--

K: I know

D: ---situation.

K: I know but I just

D: But this is not our strategy, our strategy is as soon as we can to drive them out.

K: My feeling is that beyond some point given the oil pressures, I mean I have to talk to you some other time, you have no idea what pressures we are under

Page 3

K: But we are containing. So luckily there is no specific proposal around.
But if a specific proposal gets around, we'll be in trouble and that is what
I meant to say to you yesterday.

D: Right. I got the message yesterday.
I will re-emphasize it today.

K: Good.

D: Can we be in touch later when you finish the meeting

K: Absolutely.

K: And you talked to Scowcroft about supplies in about 15 minutes. I need
his attention which is not easy--

so
D: I have a meeting with Schlesinger at noon on [date] at 2:00/I would like to
talk to you before that.

K: Right. Thank you.

D:

RECEIVED

8
FOT295

Author: E01295
Date: Oct/2/64
D. Schlesinger

TELCOM

Ron Ziegler/Secy Kissinger

10:59 a.m. October 10, 1973

K: Ron, on the way into the President.

Z: Right. ________ did well. The quote is that Mansfield said that as far as the Congress is concerned, we support completely the course of action being undertaken by President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger.

K: Excellent.

Z: Now, the only touchy part and I just wanted to get your quick advice. They were asked about did anything come up about the Soviets encouraging other Arabs to join in and the way they answered that was simply that Dr. Kissinger made it clear that he is in constant touch with the Soviet Union, the PRC, and all permanent members -- you know, constant touch was the line they used.

K: Fine.

Z: Is that the way you want Gerry and me to handle it?

K: No, you can say we are urging in very strong way restraint on all the parties, especially the Soviet Union.

Z: Should I say anything about the message?

K: No, no.

Z: Okay. We are urging restraint.

K: On all parties. Don't ever mention another message between Brezhnev and the President.

Z: All right.

K: Good. Bye.

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

11:45 a.m., October 10, 1973

K: Anatol, I just wanted to tell you the following. We are having a major domestic problem, which as you will see, even you will recognize it's major, which is coming to a head early this afternoon.

D: Yeah.

K: And so there will be decisional delay until I can get you -- But you will get your formal answer.

D: You mean it happens today or tomorrow?

K: By the end of the day I will give you an answer.

D: By the end of the day.

K: I just want you to know. You will see that this is not a delaying tactic.

D: Yeah. But what is the crisis? Could you tell me that?

K: Well, it concerns the Vice President.

D: Oh, I see.

K: So I wanted you to know that and I'll be in touch with you around 4:00 or 5:00 o'clock this afternoon.

D: 4:00 or 5:00.

K: Right.

D: Okay.

K: We are thinking very seriously about what you said.

D: No, I think this is really a chance for both of us.

K: No, no, I recognize it. Now, may I urge you, however, really both you and your friends, not to force us into anything prematurely.

D: But what really our friends could force you, really? I don't -- Could you really mention what our friends could force you, for example?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01205
By: WW
Date: 10/10/73

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

2

K: Well, for example, give us a chance to have a meeting on the subject here.

D: But what they could do up till 5 o'clock, nothing?

K: I don't know what they could --

D: Neither do I.

K: They crossed the Suez Canal, maybe they'll cross the Hudson River.

D: Oh, this is another story. This is another story. (laughs) Well, as for us, there will be no trouble. But as for them, well, I couldn't give a guarantee. They have a Minister here sitting so he knows better than I do. But, speaking theoretically, I do not see any way in which they could force you to do something.

K: No, no. Well, they can't force us but we would like not to be forced into verbal battles.

D: No, no, I understand.

K: No, we can't be forced. You've experienced that often enough.

D: No, no, I know. But as of now, what we are doing there will be no statement from our representative. We will not be eager at all to have another Security Council. So on this side, it's safe. On our side, you're not going to say anything which could --

K: Well, then we will not say anything and I'll be in touch with you around 5'clock.

D: Yeah. And we didn't tell anyone about what **[we]** mentioned to you . . .

K: And just for your information, we have not told anyone. And I repeat anyone.

D: I understand. And Malik has the same instruction. Except he might be in contact with -- He has instruction, I am telling you off-the-record, that if this thing will come, it's settled okay. And it will come Security Council. Then he has instruction to come to Scali before the meeting and tell him how he will vote.

K: Good. But let him not go to Scali either now. Make sure he doesn't go to Scali.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012057
By: N.M. 5/24/94