3

also disagreement about the nature of the threat. That
is the central issue before the Atlantic Alliance today.
It requires a fundamental, even radical--in the literal
sense, of going to the root--remedy.

* * * *

Among the problems now gnawing at the Alliance,
four in particular stand out:

1. Lack of an agreed, credible strategy. The gap between NATO's formal strategy and what the public will support has widened dangerously. The so-called "flexible response" devised in the 1960s, remains NATO's official doctrine. It contemplates a defense of Europe that begins with conventional weapons and then goes up the ladder of nuclear escalation--reaching whatever level is necessary to halt Soviet aggression. The fatal weakness of this doctrine, in today's circumstances, derives from the fact that neither the existing nor the projected NATO

conventional forces are adequate to repel a major Soviet conventional attack. Therefore, the doctrine would require a nuclear response at an early stage. Yet the present conditions of strategic nuclear parity deprive the threat of strategic nuclear war of much of its credibility; mutual suicide cannot be made to appear as a rational option. And no alternative nuclear strategy has been developed. Partly for this reason public opinion, essentially unopposed by the NATO governments, is moving powerfully against *any* reliance on nuclear weapons--even tactical nuclear weapons.

The Alliance is thereby trapped in a precarious combination of (a) inadequate conventional forces, leading to (b) reliance on nuclear weapons, in (c) a strategic environment that makes the threat of their use, and therefore their deterrent value, less and less credible, and (d) a public climate of growing nuclear pacifism that undermines

5

what credibility otherwise remains. The lack of a cohernet
defense policy leaves the Alliance, possessing a huge
stockpile of enormously destructive weapons, disarming
itself psychologically.

2. Intermediate range weapons and arms control.

The arrival of the first American intermediate range weapons in Europe a few weeks ago was properly hailed as a considerable success. For if the combination of public demonstrations and Soviet pressure had succeeded in blocking that deployment the Soviet Union would in effect have achieved a veto over NATO's military dispositions. But unless the Alliance clarifies the purpose these missiles are supposed to serve, the accomplishment is likely to be transitory.

For the basic European attitude toward the missiles
remains that of a host toward a now unwanted guest
whose previous invitation to dinner it would be too

6

awkward to withdraw. Some prominent Europeans purport
to see in the missiles' presence a hidden American design
to confine a nuclear war to Europe. Others treat them
as one of those peculiar American aberrations that periodically
upset the Alliance's equilibrium. Too few recognize,
and even fewer are willing to admit, that in fact the
missiles link the strategic nuclear defense of Europe
and the United States; they are a means of emphasizing
America's commitment to the defense of Europe, not a
way to escape it.

European ambivalence makes it excruciatingly difficult
to define "progress" toward an acceptable arms control
agreement on the subject, while the nearly desperate
eagerness with which "progress" is pursued makes its
achievement less likely. The Soviets have refused even
to discuss any proposal that would balance American intermediate
range missiles in Europe against the Soviet arsenal at

7

a lower level. They insist on a total withdrawal of
American missiles while retaining a substantial number
of their own. The Soviet goal of leaving Europe vulnerable
to Soviet blackmail is obvious. Yet significant segments
of European opinion persist in blaming the United States
for the deadlock. Both in Europe and in the United States,
this attitude must in time erode the public support needed
both for the missile deployment, and for coherent arms
control.

3. East-West relations. Behind the sharp differences
over defense strategy and arms control lies a parallel
dispute over the posture the alliance should take toward
the Soviet Union--a dispute which reflects sharp differences
in assessments of the United States, as well as in attitudes
toward the Soviet Union. Too many Europeans accept the
caricature of their political cartoons to the effect
that the United States is run by belligerent cowboys

8

and that U.S. belligerence has provoked Soviet intransigence. Even the more conciliatory tone adopted recently by the United States has not changed this attitude. Many Americans, on the other hand, consider such European preconceptions naive and believe that together with the waves of pacifist and neutralist demonstrations, they reflect a trend toward appeasement which encourages Soviet intransigence.

4. **Relations with the Third World.** Most European leaders believe that they have a special opportunity to establish preferential relationships with countries in the Third World. In the flashpoints of the Middle East, Africa and Central America, they consider U.S. approaches as hopelessly tainted by an obsession with Soviet ambitions; and some, whatever their own views, perceive an opening they can exploit in the Third World by an ostentatious dissociation from the United States. More than a few Americans view such European behavior

9

either as a free ride paid for by U.S. sacrifices or
as a positive incitement to Third World radicalism.

* * * *

These differences could be healthy if out of them
emerged compatible and constructive policies for the
1980s and '90s. So far this has not happened. Mutual
recriminations have mounted, creating opportunities for
Soviet political warfare even during this period of stagnation
in the Kremlin leadership. The Politburo is obviously
convinced that the West has become so paralyzed with
respect to nuclear weapons that there is no urgency about
nuclear arms control; it can simply wait for a while
to harvest the fruits of Western anxieties. By contrast,
there may be some concern in Moscow that NATO will move
to close the gap in conventional forces; hence the willingness
to resume the talks about limiting conventional arms
which have been moribund for ten years. Does it reflect

a genuine interest in arms control or is it a means to
place obstacles in the way of the desperately needed
Western conventional build-up by creating the same conditions
by which public opinion was mobilized on the missile
question? [C] One may be permitted to question Soviet devotion
to controlling conventional weapons at a moment when
Soviet arms are streaming into Third World trouble spots
everywhere from the Middle East to the Caribbean. In
short, [C] Europe is not moderating the United States, and
the United States is not stiffening Europe's spine, as
the folklore on each side of the Atlantic would have
it. More likely, each side of the Atlantic is in danger
of paralyzing and demoralizing the other.

This state of affairs has proceeded too far to be
blamed on particular policies or specific actions on
either side. The trouble lies deeper. With respect
to some issues, the fact seems to be--to put it delicately--

11

that interests are no longer inevitably perceived as common. And even where the common interest is still taken for granted, as it is in the defense field, the existing structure is simply not working, either in defining the threat or arriving at methods to meet it.

Existing arrangements are unbalanced. When one country dominates the alliance-on all major issues--when that one country chooses weapons and decides deployments, when it conducts the arms control negotiations, sets the tone for East-West diplomacy and creates the framework for relations with the Third World--little incentive remains for a serious joint effort to redefine the requirements of security or to coordinate foreign policies. Such joint efforts entail sacrifices and carry political costs. Leaders are not likely to make the sacrifice or pay the cost unless they feel responsible for the results.

An imbalance such as the one now existing cannot

12

be made up for by "consultation," however meticulous.

In the long run, consultation works only when those being consulted have an alternative and a capacity for independent action. Then each side takes the other seriously; then each side knows that the other's consent has to be won. Then each has an incentive to be responsible. Otherwise consultation becomes "briefing". Agreement reflects not conviction but acquiescence for want of an alternative.

It cannot be an accident that the European country least beset by pacifism and neutralism is France which has also been most insistant on making its own judgments on matters of defense. The present imbalance is not new. It has existed ever since World War II. But dependence on another nation has a cumulative impact. When the feeling of impotence no longer results from the unavoidable necessity of wartime destruction but from a policy choice, made under conditions of relative prosperity, it can

13

become destructive. Against that economic background,
Europe's continued military dependence on the United
States breeds a combination of guilt, self-hatred, and
a compulsion to display independence of the United
States wherever doing so is possible and safe, especially
with regard to some Third World issues and certain aspects
of East-West relations. ...

The problem has become even more acute because the
generation of leaders that built NATO has virtually disappeared.
Those who governed Europe during those early postwar
years were still psychologically of the era when Europe
bestrode the world. Global thinking came naturally.
European leaders assumed responsibility for their own
nations' security policies as a matter of tradition,
and gave it up only reluctantly because of special postwar
circumstances. But nearly forty years have passed now
since the end of World War II. The new generation of

14

leaders was reared in an era when the United States was preeminent. Sheltered by the same alliance which is under assault by their publics, they take it for granted that they can delegate the military defense of Europe to us. For the rest, too many of them seek to position themselves somewhere between the superpowers--the first step toward psychological neutralism. Thus the European schizophrenia: a fear that the United States might not be prepared to risk its own population on a nuclear defense of Europe, coupled simultaneously with the anxiety that America might drag Europe into an unwanted conflict by its clumsy handling of Third World issues or East-West relations.

The rush to condemn our actions in Grenada by so many of our European allies is a case in point. What could have been in the minds of their leaders? Even making allowance--especially in the case of Britain--

15

for totally inadequate consultation, and whatever their
view of the wisdom or necessity of our actions, they
could hardly have wanted us to fail. That would surely
have affected our willingness to run risks in defense
of other areas--ultimately including even Europe. Rather,
they must have assumed that their actions were irrelevant
and costless: that we would not be deterred, that we
would exact no penalty, and that therefore it was safe
to use the incident to score a few points with "progressive"
constituencies at home and with Third World radicals
abroad. Needless to say this attitude was deeply resented
in the United States.

The change in the nature of European leadership
has been paralleled in the United States. Our new elites
do not reject NATO any more than do their European counterparts.
But for them, too, the alliance is more a practical than
an emotional necessity, more a military arrangement than

16

a set of common political purposes.

On both sides of the Atlantic, we find ourselves
threatened by the dominance of domestic politics over
global political strategy. In Europe this leads in too
many countries to a faintly disguised neutralism. In
the United States it accelerates our already strong tendency
toward unilateralism and isolationism.

U.S. leaders have too often adjusted foreign policies
to political pressures, bureaucratic infighting, or changing
intellectual fashions. The history of the American attitude
toward intermediate range missiles in Europe is a case
in point. These were proposed to the Europeans in 1958,
installed in Italy and Turkey in 1960 and withdrawn in
1962. They then reappeared in 1963 as a part of a so-
called NATO multilateral force, and were abandoned once
again in 1965. They were put before NATO for the third
time in 1978 and then embodied in the current "double

17

track" decision in 1979. Not surprisingly, those Europeans
organizing to stop the current deployment are encouraged
by their knowledge that previous American decisions have
not proved immutable.

Similarly, in a matter of months, our allies have
had to adjust from passionate U.S. advocacy of SALT II
to its rejection, and then to the fact that we have chosen
to observe a treaty we refuse to ratify; from a strategic
doctrine of massive retaliation to one of flexible response;
from a policy of detente to a policy of confrontation
and back to conciliation--all in addition to the reassessments
that in the past decade have occurred automatically whenever
a new administration comes into office. Each change
of course leaves victims among European leaders who have
staked their domestic positions on policies which the
United States later abandons. Each lurch encourages
a kind of neutralism, as Europeans seek to avoid being

18

made hostage to sudden swings in American policy.

A continuation of existing trends is bound to lead first to stagnation and in time to the disintegration of the Western Alliance. An explicit act of statesmanship is needed to give new meaning to Western unity and a new vitality to NATO. In my view such an effort must have three components: (a) a more significant role for Europe within NATO, (b) a reform of the NATO organization and (c) a reassessment of current NATO deployment.

I shall discuss these in turn.

## A New Role for Europe

During the entire post-World War II period it has been an axiom of American policy that for all the temporary irritation it might cause us, a strong, united Europe was an essential component of the Atlantic partnership.

We have applied that principle with dedication and imagination-- in so far as it depended on American actions--in all

19

areas except security. With respect to defense, however,
the United States has been indifferent at best--at least
since the failure of the European Defense Community--
to any sort of Europeanization. Many in this country
seemed to fear that a militarily unified Europe might
give less emphasis to transatlantic relations or that
it might botch its defense effort and thus weaken the
common security.

The opposite is almost certainly the case.

In the economic field, integration was bound to
lead to transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination.
What defines a Common Market, after all, is that its
external barriers are higher than its internal ones.

In the field of defense, by contrast, increased European
responsibility and unity would promote closer cooperation
with the United States. A Europe analyzing its security
needs in a responsible manner would be bound to find

20

association with the United States essential. Greater
European unity in defense would also help to overcome
the looming logistical nightmare caused by the attempt
of every European nation to stretch its already inadequate
defense effort across the whole panoply of modern weapons.
For example, there are five kinds of battle tanks within
NATO, different types of artillery and different standards
for calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. In
case of a major conflict it will be nearly impossible
to keep this hodge-podge of forces supplied.

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic
Alliance requires Europe to develop a greater identity
and a more distinctly European coherence in the field
of defense. I am not talking about traditional "burdensharing,"
of paying more for the existing effort. I have in mind
something more structural--a more rational balance of
responsibilities between the two sides of the Atlantic.

21

My basic reason for proposing this is not that the financial
burdens are unfairly distributed--although they are.

Rather the present allocation of responsibilities simply
makes no sense. It fails to bring the allies to reflect
naturally about either security or political objectives.

Neither side of the Atlantic has by itself sufficient
incentive for a long-range objective study of the choices
posed by the new situation. Everyone has been afraid
to take the initiative in changing the present arrangement,
lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise. But since
drift will surely lead to unraveling--if more imperceptibly--
statesmanship impels a new approach.

Structural Reform

Structural reform cannot substitute for a sense
of purpose and clear doctrine. But if pursued with care
and sensitivity it can help catalyze the development
of shared political purposes. In my view these common
objectives require that European judgments on security

22

and East-West diplomacy (and other matters) emerge from Europe's own analysis. Mere acquiescence in American decisions, briefings, and pressures provides a facade of unity; shared purposes require a deeper sense of participation.

Specifically:

1. By 1990 Europe should assume the major responsibility for the conventional ground defense. This is well within the capability of a continent with nearly one and one half times the population and twice the GNP of the Soviet Union, which moreover has to divide its forces on at least two fronts.

2. To reflect the new responsibilities, a European officer should then take the traditionally American place as "Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe" (SACEUR), probably with a U.S. deputy. Such a change is also likely to give a new perspective to Allied strategic

23

planning. The United States has generally achieved its military successes by the weight of the equipment which our superior industrial potential made available. This has tempted our military leaders to equate strategy with logistics. European nations have rarely enjoyed such a material margin; they have had to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics--precisely what NATO needs in an age of nuclear parity and renewed emphasis on conventional defense.

3. Since the beginning of NATO, the Secretary General--the official responsible for running the political machinery of NATO--has been European. In the new structure it would make more sense for the Secretary General to be American--whenever the new Secretary General, Lord Carrington, decides to retire. This would reflect the need for political coordination on both sides of the Atlantic. In the meantime, there is no Western leader better qualified for guiding

24

NATO's transition than the wise and able new Secretary
General.

4. Europe should take over those arms control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil. The INF negotiations with the Soviets (involving intermediate range missiles) and the MBFR negotiations (concerning conventional ground forces) have heretofore been [conducted] by American delegations. Both of these negotiations should be "Europeanized" as quickly as possible, with a European chairman, an American deputy and a mixed, though predominantly European, delegation.

The structure I propose would enable Europeans to confront--on their own initiative and in their own context-- a whole series of issues that have been evaded for at least two decades: the precise definition of an adequate conventional defense; the nature of the so-called nuclear threshold--the point where there is no choice except conventional defeat or nuclear escalation; the relationship

25

between strategy and arms control. A European SACEUR
will minimize the temptation of European leaders to justify
sacrifices as a response to American pressure. Since
nuclear weapons would presumably be used only if conventional
defense fails, Europe would bear the responsibility for
setting the nuclear threshold by its own efforts; it
could relieve its nuclear anxieties by the simple expedient
of augmenting its conventional defenses. And if it did
not, increased reliance on American nuclear guarantees
and deployments would clearly be Europe's own choice.

By the same token, European leadership in the MBFR
and INF negotiations would place the final responsibility
for both conventional force levels and the intermediate
range missile deployment in Europe with the leaders whose
countries will have to bear the brunt--for good or ill--
of the outcome of these negotiations. This is especially
important with respect to the American intermediate range

26

missiles in Europe. That deployment makes sense only if the allies genuinely believe that the prospect of a nuclear blow from Europe on Soviet territory contributes significantly to deterring a Soviet conventional attack. If our principal allies do not share this conviction-- if they indulge the absurd suspicion that American missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union are a subterfuge to confine such a war to Europe or if they agree to these missiles only as a kind of favor in response to American entreaties--the psychological basis for the deployment will evaporate.

European chairmanship of the INF negotiations would oblige European leaders to face the issue head-on: they would be in a position to abandon the missiles through negotiation; if they did not--as in terms of their security interests they should not--their domestic critics would no longer be able to argue--as they do now--that American

27

intransigence is the principal obstacle to arms control.

As for the United States it would of course
participate in these deliberations--in a less dominant
position--through its continued membership in the integrated
command, its responsibility for nuclear defense, and its
ground, naval and air force in Europe.

Redeployment

The issue of redeploying American forces touches
raw European nerves like no other. The slightest hint
of altering present arrangements jangles sensibilities;
it evokes fears of American withdrawal and prospects of
European neutralism. But if present trends continue it
is certain to become a central issue in the Alliance
relationship. Before dealing with it in the context of
a program of NATO reform, a few generally recognized
facts must be noted:

28

A. The present NATO deployment of five American divisions and supporting air and naval forces evolved in the 1950s when NATO's doctrine was massive retaliation-- to react to aggression with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear blow against Soviet territory. Massive retaliation, paradoxically required that the total forces on the Continent be kept below the level required for conventional defense. NATO did not wish to tempt Soviet conventional aggression by doing anything to suggest that a Western response would be limited to non-nuclear means. Hence the American conventional deployment in Europe reflected political, not military, criteria: it was intended to give us no choice about nuclear retaliation and to leave no doubt in the Soviet mind that this would be the consequence of even a conventional war. The parallel European conventional forces represented a similar political decision: thus they, too, were conceived as a trip wire for our nuclear

29

riposte. From the birth of NATO a full conventional
defense has been part neither of its strategy nor of
its efforts.

B. This situation became anomalous when the growth
of Soviet strategic forces deprived general nuclear war
of much of its credibility. Yet NATO deployment has
been essentially unaffected by the change of NATO doctrine
to one of flexible response. NATO has improved its conventional
defenses but has not closed the gap in conventional forces.
As the current NATO commander has made clear recently,
NATO is still unprepared to withstand a major Soviet
ground attack for more than a few days, even counting
the five American divisions which have remained in Europe
for a generation. European ambivalence continues thirty-
five years after NATO's creation. Our allies remain
unwilling to develop forces strong enough to provide
an alternative to nuclear weapons--and yet much of their

30

public opinion shies away from even thinking about the
concept of nuclear deterrence.

C. Were we to start all over again, we would therefore
hardly repeat the decision of the Fifites in today's
circumstances. Let us assume a group of wise men from
both sides of the Atlantic were called together to plan
a global strategy unconstrained by the past. Assume
further that it started from the premise that ultimately
the defense of the West is indivisible and that European
security should be viewed under the aspect of the defense
of the West in Europe--as a thoughtful French observer,
Francoise de Rose put it. Such a group would almost
surely conclude that the sensible division of responsi-
bilities would be for Europe, possessing economic resources
and manpower exceeding those of the Soviet Union, to
concentrate on the conventional defense of their continent.
To maintain the global balance of power--by definition,
as essential for Europe as for America--the United States

31

would emphasize highly mobile conventional forces capable
both of backing up Europe and contributing to the defense
of, for example, the Middle East, or Asia or the Western
Hemisphere.

Such a division of responsibility would also
enable our military establishment to shift some of its
intellectual energies and scientific research from a
hypothetical esoteric war in an area where we have
major allies to the defense of regions where conflict
is much more likely, our allies are less prone to see
their interests immediately engaged, and the countries
being threatened are in a worse position to assist in
the defense effort.

Even in the hypothetical case of starting all over
again, an irrefutable case would exist for maintaining
<u>some</u> considerable American ground forces in Europe. This
would be essential to keep our allies from feeling abandoned
and to eliminate any Soviet misunderstanding that the

32

defense of Europe no longer reflects a vital American
interest. In a new division of responsibilities we should
also at least preserve and preferably strengthen the
existing U.S. landbased airpower on the continent. And
we should continue our responsibility for both strategic
and tactical nuclear defense, assuming that we and the
Europeans could agree on a strategy for the latter. American
intermediate range missiles should remain in Europe to
"couple" the nuclear defenses of both sides of the Atlantic
so long as European leaders desired them. No change
in naval deployments would be involved.

Why then is such a division of responsibilities
not realized? Why is not a group of wise men assembled
to tell us what is right? The principle obstacle is
psychological. For all their criticisms of American
policy, Europeans dread a return to isolationism. Americans
fear that any tinkering with deployment would drive Europe
into explicit neutralism. And some in the Pentagon prefer

33

to maintain our divisions in Europe in a less than rational
deployment rather than return some of them to the United
States where they are more exposed to Congressional budget
cutters.

The question remains whether an existing, historically
based deployment that is losing any current rationale
arrests or accelerates these attitudes. In my view, it
will accelerate them. After all, pacifism and neutralism
are on the march in Europe even under the present set-
up; isolationism in America is not yet so vocal but is
being powerfully encouraged by endless Allied disputes.
An Alliance that cannot agree on strategic doctrine and
arms control positions; an Alliance rent by increasingly
frequent controversies over East-West and North-South
relations cannot sustain itself by rigidly clinging to
military arrangements decided a generation ago in totally
different circumstances. With current trends the issue
of the rationale for the NATO deployment will become

34

unavoidable. If it arises not as an integral component
in a comprehensive design of modernizing and strengthening
the Alliance, but as a single question of whether to
continue stationing American troops in Europe, unilateral
changes will be arbitrarily imposed by the potentially
most destructive means--the American budgetary process.

Then indeed we might see in America a psychological wrench
away from Europe and in Europe a panicky resentment against
the United States. Withdrawal without a positive political
and strategic purpose, withdrawal for its own sake, might
indeed shock our allies into neutralism; it could mislead
our adversary and tempt aggression. It is precisely
my conviction that current trends make this outcome ultimately
probably, that has impelled me to write this article.

There is an urgent need for a serious, frank and
rapid reexamination of NATO doctrine, deployment and
policies. It should be conducted by a high level group

35

composed of men and women known for their dedication
to Western unity. Obviously the group must begin with
one of the most divisive issues before the Alliance:
an agreement on the nature and the scope of the threat.
In offering solutions it must learn from experience and
avoid the pedantry that has marked previous such efforts
when mountains of unread-memoranda overwhelmed clear
thought and abstract percentage goals were set which
being either irrelevant or unachievable magnified the
problem. A deadline for completion should be set--certainly
no longer than two years.

Theoretically, such a study could lead to one of
three outcomes: (a) the group could come to the same
conclusions about the optimum division of responsibilities
outlined above involving a strengthening of the European
conventional component of NATO and a withdrawal of some
American ground forces in the context of an agreed Alliance

36

strategy. Given the disagreements about the nature of
the interests involved in regions outside of Europe and
the domestic priorities of most European countries such
a conclusion however rational is extremely improbable.

(b) The group could argue that the strategic interests
of the West require a full conventional defense but that
for practical and psychological reasons Europe can undertake
the required effort only if the present American ground
deployment in Europe is maintained intact. (c) The group
could decide that the realities of European domestic
politics preclude more than the current gradualistic,
marginal improvement of European defense efforts.

If Europe should in fact agree to build a full
conventional defense and if it were prepared to express
that commitment in unambiguous, agreed yearly obligations
to increase its forces, the United States should accept
the judgment that its present ground forces in Europe
are an indispensable component--whatever contrary

37

conclusions systems analysis might dictate. But if Europe
should opt for a perpetuation of the present ambivalence
and confusion--or for only a marginal improvement at
its fringes--the United States will owe it to the sustainability
of its strategy before our public and to the overall
requirements of global defense to draw certain conclusions.

When deployments reflect political, not security considerations,
we will have no choice but to opt for a European deployment
explicable to the American people. If nuclear weapons
remain the ultimate deterrent to even conventional attack,
a gradual withdrawal of a substantial portion (perhaps
up to half) of our present ground forces would be a logical
result. To provide time for necessary adjustments that
withdrawal could be extended over a period of five years.

To ease the transition further we could, if Europe agreed,
keep the excess ground forces in Europe for an interim
period afterward in a new status analogous to that of

38

the French forces, prepared for use in Europe in support of
European defense but also available for use in emergencies
outside of Europe. Of course any withdrawal would make
sense only if the redeployed forces were added to our
strategic reserve; if they were disbanded the effect would
be to weaken the overall defense.

The proposed redeployment would leave intact the air
and naval forces as well as the deployment of intermediate
range missiles so long as Europe wants them. A useful
byproduct of the process would be a systematic reevaluation
of the existing highly miscellaneous inventory of the very
short-range tactical nuclear weapons--a legacy of three
decades of ad hoc decisions--which now represent at one and
the same time an increment to deterrence and the greatest
danger of unintended nuclear war--because of the unpredictability
of weapons deployed so far forward that they are unusually
subject to the exigencies of battle.

In this scheme withdrawal would be not an
end in itself--as it will if frustrations on both sides of

39

the Atlantic go much further--but one component of a
process extending over eight years that rededicates the
United States to the Alliance for the indefinite future.
It does so by putting before the American people a rational,
hence sustainable strategy which takes account of changing
circumstances.

Psychology is immensely important in international
relations, especially when policies turn not only on
cold, professional assessments of the national interest by
trained political leaders, but crucially on public opinion
and public attitudes. I would like to believe that
once the initial shock inseparable from breaking with
the familiar has worn off it would be seen that restructuring
the alliance to place greater responsibility for European
defense on Europeans is, not an abandonment of Europe;
it is an embrace of Europe. It is a means of enlisting
Europeans as full partners in the process of decision
on which their safety as well as ours depends. It is

40

a move to take Europe and Europeans seriously, confident
that together we will then approach jointly and constructively
the requirements of our common defense. And we will
be fulfilling the obligations of leadership by putting
forward as an initiative what otherwise may well be imposed
by necessity in much worse circumstances.

## Political Objectives

By themselves, neither organizational nor doctrinal
adaptations can remedy the political incoherence rending
NATO. This article has emphasized security issues. However,
a few general observations on the Alliances' political
problems are necessary to place the security recommendations
into perspective:

A. Those leaders on either side of the Atlantic
who value the Alliance, with all its failings, as the
ultimate guardian of Western freedom, must seek urgently
to end the political disputes over East-West relations

41

and general North-South policy and especially Western
conduct in the flashpoints of conflict in the Third World.

The tendency to grandstand before domestic audiences,
the growing self-righteousness will in time make a mockery
of the key assumption of the Atlantic Alliance: that
we share a common approach to the problem of security.

Defense requires after *all some* agreed political purpose
in the name of which it is conducted--at a minimum an
agreement on the nature of the threat.

B. The United States can not lead the Western alliance
or even contribute to its cohesion if we do not restore
bipartisanship to our foreign policy. Ever since the
Vietnam war shattered our bipartisan unity in foreign
policy we have disquieted our friends and confused, where
we have not emboldened, our adversaries by periodic wide
swings with respect to essential elements of our policies.

As a nation we must accept the reality that the national
interest does not change every four or eight years. At

42

some point the national interest must be accepted by
our public as clearly recognizable and constant. Otherwise,
we shall become a source of dangerous instability, still
relevant for our power but irrelevant for our ideas.

A Presidential election year is probably not an ideal
time to forge a bipartisan consensus. But whoever wins
the Presidential election faces no more important and
urgent challenge than to restore bipartisanship to our
foreign policy.

C. European governments must meet head-on the distrubing
trends toward pacifism and neutralism in their countries.
These movements are led by men of conviction; they cannot
be defused by accommodation. They can only be resisted
with a compelling vision of a new future and not by insisting
on the immutability of every existing arrangement, alternating
with assaults on the transatlantic partner. If European
governments feel obliged to defend what are perceived
as largely American decisions; if they continue to humor

43

those who profess to see the danger to the peace in a
bellicose America, not an intransigent Soviet Union,
they will not be able to avoid being engulfed by a wave
of abdication; they will make concession after concession,
progressively becoming hostages of their critics.

The current condition of the Alliance cries out
for a rethinking of its structure, its doctrine and its
unifying purposes. The creativity and courage with which
we approach this challenge will depend whether the Alliance
enters a new and dynamic period or gradually withers.

I have outlined proposals to reinvigorate allied
cohesion by defining a clear set of responsibilities
for each side of the Atlantic to be implemented gradually
over a period of seven years. On that basis European
leaders could defend cooperativeness with the United States
as something they sought as a matter of their own conviction
and in their nation's interest. American leaders would

44

have a rational, understandable policy to defend and
they would benefit from dealing with a more equal partner.

If the new arrangements are developed gradually and with
sensitivity, mutual confidence can grow with each step.

A new era of allied creativity and American dedication
could give inspiration to the generation that has come
to maturity since World War II, and since the postwar
crises that gave birth to NATO and inspired its creators'
generation with their sense of common purpose.

I have given long and careful thought to whether
it is appropriate for a former Secretary of State to
put forward such far-reaching proposals for the Alliance.

In the end--appalled by the tone and nature of the transatlantic
controversy--I came to the view that it would be better
if the initiative were taken by a son of Europe clearly
and deeply committed to Western unity rather than letting
it pass by default to the neutralists, pacifists and

45

neo-isolationists who systematiclaly seek to undermine
all joint efforts.

The nations bordering the North Atlantic need above
all faith in themselves and the will to resist the siren
calls of those who use fear and panic as instruments
of policy or of domestic debate. In the end we must
fulfill our trust: to preserve and strengthen that North
Atlantic Alliance which represents the hope of human
dignity and decency in our world.