Fußball in Amerika: gleich hinter Kegeln
Nur Henry Kissinger versteht das Spiel

WASHINGTON. Acht von 260 Millionen Nordamerikanern spielen Fußball. Die meisten sind junge Mädchen, die daran Freude haben, bevor mit vierzehn Jahren das „Dating“ und also der Ernst des Lebens beginnt. Doch die Millionen in den Jugendklubs — die Nationalmannschaft eingeschlossen — sind allenfalls Hobbykicker und keineswegs zugleich bereit, eine Eintrittskarte zu kaufen oder sich ein Spiel im Fernsehen anzusehen. Das ist der ernüchtern-de wirtschaftliche Aspekt. Hinzu kommt, daß nur ein Amerikaner vom Fußball wirklich etwas versteht: nämlich der deutsche Einwanderer Henry Kissinger.

Schon als Präsident Nixons Sicherheitsberater wußte er diplomatische Kanäle anzuzapfen, um unverzüglich die Ergebnisse der Bundesliga zu erfahren. Auch als Privatmann und weltreisender Berater in Sachen Außenpolitik nutzt er unverändert sein globales Kommunikationsnetz, um sogar die Resultate aus der heimischen Bezirksklasse in Fürth einzuholen. Tapfer hat er sich jetzt in einem Artikel für die „Washington Post“ zu Wort gemeldet. Er warb für eine Sportart, in der die westliche Supermacht ein Zwerg geblieben ist, während die Sowjetunion sogar gelegentlich in die Viertelfinale vorzudringen vermag.

Sachkundig, völkerpsychologisch einfühlsam und mit unerbittlicher Logik beschrieb er die Eigenarten großer Fußballnationen wie Brasilien, England, Italien und natürlich Deutschland: „Die deutsche Nationalmannschaft spielt Fußball, wie der Generalstab den Krieg vorbereitete. Ihre Spiele sind genau geplant, und jeder Spieler versteht sich sowohl auf Angriff als auch auf Verteidigung.“ Darin sah Kissinger die Grundlage der großen Erfolge im Laufe von vier Jahrzehnten. Doch der Historiker entblößte auch die Schwäche. Die deutsche Nationalmannschaft leide unter dem gleichen Mangel wie der berühmte Schlieffen-Plan, auf den sich die Strategie im Ersten Weltkrieg gründete: „Es gibt da eine Grenze menschlicher Voraussicht. Der psychologische Streß, der auf jenen lastet, die mit der

Ausführung äußerst komplexer Manöver beauftragt sind, kann nicht im voraus kalkuliert werden.“ Ein Satz wie von Dettmar Cramer. Er beweist, daß es gibt, was Amerikas strategisch wie taktisch unterentwickelter Nationalmannschaft fehlt: ein Fußball-Metternich.

Tatsächlich hat Kissingers Liebeserklärung an dieses eine Ballspiel vielen Amerikanern erst nach dem Schlußpfeiff in Mexiko bewußtgemacht, daß sie wömöglich etwas verpaßt hatten. Nur einer interessierten Minderheit war im Sommer vergangenen Jahres aufgefallen, daß ihr „Soccer Team“ bei der Qualifikation — nein, nicht von Nicaragua — von Costa Rica aus dem Wettbewerb geschossen wurde. Ein Unentschieden hätte gereicht, um zum ersten Mal seit 1950 wieder bei einer Weltmeisterschaft dabeizusein. Doch schon die Ortswahl war fatal. Anstatt in Wisconsin oder Iowa, wo wenigstens die Nachfahren deutscher Einwanderer für moralischen Rückhalt hätten sorgen können, wurde in Südkalifornien gespielt. Die meisten der zehntausend Zuschauer waren Mexikaner, legal oder heimlich durch den porösen Grenzzaun geschlüpft. Sie feuerten den Gegner an.

Mannschaftskapitän Rick Davis, der zu goldenen „Cosmos“-Zeiten in New York an der Seite von Pelé und Bekkenbauer spielen durfte, war von diesem Erlebnis nach eigenen Angaben „erschlagen“. Drei Wochen sperrte er sich in sein Zimmer ein. Alle Ursachen der amerikanischen Fußballmisere wurden ihm offenbar: die fehlenden qualifizierten Trainer, der fehlende Profiwettbewerb in einer nationalen Liga (wegen finanzielllem Mißmanagement löste sich der Dachverband NASL vor zwei Jahren auf) und der unleugbare Umstand, daß die amerikanischen Kinder abrupt däss Interesse am Fußball verlieren, sobald sie erwachsen werden. Das „Wall Street Journal“ analysierte dieser Tage mit Seitenblick auf den Kassenmagnetismus die 25 beliebtesten Sportarten. Fußball war nicht darunter. Der Sportkanal des Kabelfernsehens erforschte das Phänomen noch gründlicher und fand heraus, wo in der Publikumsgunst der Fußball rangiert — hinter Kegeln.
LEO WIELAND

TLCJ

August 20, 1986

MEMO FOR HAK

FROM: Rosemary

SUBJECT: Query on Nixon/Pompidou Summit December 1971 from Britisher

You saw this previously. You had a query a while back from a British professor who was then at the Humphrey Institute in Minnesota and is now back in England, asking whether it was Pompidou "alone" who asked that exchange rates be included on the agenda for the Azores meeting in December 1971, or whether you or Nixon "indicated" to Pompidou that if "he" proposed inclusion of exchange rates, the US was ready to settle. All you had to do was check the correct box.

As I pointed out at the time, your memoirs are not explicit, nor is it clear that the choice has been framed correctly. The issue of exchange rates was there from the beginning of that year's economic crisis. Short of a big research effort to go back to the files, I am not sure we can respond.

With your approval a stall letter was sent, referring him to your memoirs. Now the professor has come back saying that they do not answer the specific question he put to you. He hopes you'll reconsider and give him a reply, checking off the correct answer, for use in his study on US foreign economic policy.

Options

✓ Let die without reply

____ Approve attached letter for RN sig

____ RN - Call Hormats and see if he remembers anything enough for a line or two of reply

June 12, 1986

MEMO FOR HAK

FROM: Rosemary

SUBJECT: Professor/Author Query on the Nixon/Pompidou Azores Meeting of December 1971

At back is an either/or choice put to you by a professor doing a
study on post-WW II US economic policy at the Hubert Humphrey
Institute for Public Affairs.

Does your recollection conform to the way in which he has posed
the question?

Your account of the economic 'shock' of 1971 is covered in _White House Years_ pages 949-967 and especially p. 958 ff concerning arrangements (at your initiative) for a Pompidou/Nixon meeting on December 13, 1971. You are not explicit on whether Pompidou made any prior condition or that you or RN pre-wired the agenda with Pompidou. Indeed, the issue of exchange rates had been there from the start of the crisis and the agenda at Azores reflected all that had been discussed with (and not resolved by) the allies prior to that time. The Azores meeting did conclude with working out the exchange rates for key world currencies.

Do you have a specific response and do you wish to reply personally -
or at all?

Alternatively, I could sign the attached letter drawing attention to your
written account (it is not clear from the letter if the author has seen
it). We could then see if he comes back to you again.

Guidance for HAK reply:

HK approved
RN can sign attached; no HK reply necessary

IT HAS BEEN THREE YEARS SINCE WE BEGAN THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, IT IS TIME TO TAKE STOCK, TO ASSESS AND TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE.

A GREAT DEAL HAS HAPPENED SINCE THE PRESIDENT INTRODUCED THE NATION TO HIS VISION OF A WORLD FREE FROM THE THREAT OF INSTANT ARMEDGEDDON. SDI HAS NOT ONLY BEEN PART OF THAT CHANGE, BUT ALSO HAS BEEN INFLUENCED BY IT. THE SDI MUST ADAPT TO A NEW CIRCUMSTANCE, IT MUST ADJUST TO A NEW REALITY OR IT WILL LIKELY BE RELEGATED TO A SECONDARY POSITION, A VISION OF SUBSTANCE AND MERIT, BUT OUT OF REACH, SUPECEDED BY FISCAL CONSTRAINTS AND A RAPIDLY EVOLVING STRATEGIC CONTEXT.

IN SHORT, SDI MUST COME OF POLITICAL AGE, IT MUST COMPETE FOR SCARCE DEFENSE RESOURCES, IT MUST OFFER NOT ONLY HOPE FOR SOME DISTANT FUTURE, BUT UTILITY IN THE NEAR TERM. WE CAN NO LONGER AFFORD THE LUXURY OF ASSESSING WHAT SDI MIGHT DO FOR US SOMEDAY, WE MUST DEFINE WHAT SDI MUST DO SOON, AND WE MUST BEGIN RIGHT AWAY.

[Lc]

BUT THAT WAS THREE YEARS AGO. TODAY, DEFENSE BUDGETS ARE UNDER ATTACK. NOW, EVEN HOLDING THE BUDGETARY GROUND WON IN THE EARLY EIGHTIES IS UNCERTAIN. DEFENSE INCREASES ARE PART OF THE PAST.

THE PRESIDENT'S ONCE VAUNTED STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS MIRED, THE MX IS CAPPED AT FIFTY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT FIFTY ARE VANISHINGLY SMALL, AND THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO THE MX IS TOO EXPENSIVE AND LACKS MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS.

THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY BOMBER, ONCE THE UNQUESTIONED HEIR OF THE AIR BREATHING LEG OF THE TRIAD IS UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE DUE TO ITS COST AND SECRECY. THIS YEAR, FOR BUDGETARY REASONS ALONE, THE ATB MAY BE SLIPPED ONE OR TWO YEARS IN TERMS OF ITS AVAILABILITY. SIMILAR CUTS NEXT YEAR COULD WELL-DOOM THE STEALTH BOMBER.

THE ASAT PROGRAM, ONCE THE VANGUARD OF A NEW SPACE POLICY, IS GROUNDED BY CONGRESSIONAL BANS ON TESTING. AND NOW, THE DRUMBEAT HAS BEGUN ON THE FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY OF THE D-5, ITSELF A POTENTIAL IOC CASUALTY OF THIS YEAR'S BUDGET.

[Lc]

3

THREE YEARS AGO, THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM TO REBUILD OUR DEFENSES WAS ON TRACK. DEFENSE BUDGETS, ALTHOUGH NOT EXACTLY WHAT THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAD PRESCRIBED, WERE GROWING AND ENJOYING A GREAT DEAL OF SUPPORT IN THE CONGRESS. THE CENTERPIECE OF THE PRESIDENT'S DEFENSE REARMAMENT, HIS STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, WAS FULLY FUNDED AND, ALTHOUGH CRITICISM HAD RISEN OVER THE VULNERABILITY OF THE MX IN MINUTEMAN SILOS, THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION SEEMED TO HAVE INSURED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN ON SCHEDULE.

IN THIS CONTEXT, THE SDI AND ITS RESEARCH PROGRAM WERE A PERFECT COMPLEMENT TO THE EVOLVING STRATEGIC PLAN. HAVING LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR AN APPARENT CLOSURE OF THE "WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY," AND FOR A REDRESS OF THE IMBALANCE OF FORCES FROM THE SEVENTIES AND A PROPER AND REALISTIC APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL, A LONG RANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH OUR EXISTING TREATY OBLIGATIONS, AIMED AT A VISION OF PROTECTING OUR NATION AND OUR ALLIES FROM THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SEEMED THE PERFECT ENDING TO A DREAM SCRIPT. IN A GRAND AND SWEEPING GESTURE THE UNITED STATES HAD RECAPTURED THE INTELLECTUAL LEAD IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. WE WERE ON THE MARCH TO A SAFER, MORE SECURE, AND YES, EVEN MORE MORAL WORLD AND SDI WAS THE FUTURE.

[lc]

IN SHORT, OFFENSIVE MODERNIZATION IS IN TROUBLE. THE PROGRAMS HAVE LOST THEIR AURA OF INVINCIBILITY, AND MONEY IS SHORT. WERE SHOULD BE THE CONGRESS TO TAKE AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD APPROACH TO DEFENSE CUTS OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, CHOOSING TO REDUCE LEVELS OF SPENDING FOR ALL PROGRAMS RATHER THAN SELECTIVELY FUNDING AMONG THEM, WE COULD WELL FACE A SHORTFALL IN OFFENSIVE DETERRENCE IN THE MID-NINETIES THAT WILL RIVAL OR EVEN EXCEED THE DANGEROUS SHORTFALL OF THE LATE SEVENTIES. THE GAP BETWEEN THE THREAT AND OUR DETERRENT CAPABILITY WILL ONLY WIDEN. DEFENSE, BOTH STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL, CAN AND MUST PLAY A ROLE IN CLOSING THAT GAP.

indeed, the strategic debate has taken a sharp turn to the pragmatic in 1986, a course not likely to be altered for the foreseeable future. "Let's do it right the first time" has become "Let's get it as right as we can... for the money". Philosophical solutions are out... practical solutions are in.

[lc]

HOW DOES THE SDI FIT INTO THE NEW STRATEGY OF THE FIGHTERS?
BE
WILL IT PART OF THE PROBLEM OR PART OF THE SOLUTION? IS THE
^ PRESIDENT'S VISION ITSELF IN JEOPARDY? IN MY OPINION, THE
ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS DEPEND CRITICALLY ON HOW THE SDI
PESPONDS TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENT. MY FEAP IS THAT FOR POLITICAL
AND STRUCTURAL REASONS, THE SDI IS NOT CAPABLE OF MUCH ADAPTATION
AND, AS A CONSEQUENCE, IS AT RISK OF BECOMING AN UNAFFORDABLE
PIPE DREAM, SALVAGEABLE ONLY AS AN ARMS CONTROL BARGAINING
CHIP.

IN ORDER TO BECOME RELEVANT TO THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT,
THE SDI MUST OFFER INTERMEDIATE SOLUTIONS TO CRITICAL TACTICAL
AND STRATEGIC PROBLEMS. IN DOING SO, DEFENSIVE SOLUTIONS MUST
COMPETE WITH OFFENSIVE ALTERNATIVES. UNLIKE THE INITIAL STRATEGY
OF OFFENSIVE MODERNIZATION FIRST, DEFENSIVE DEVELOPMENTS SECOND,
WE MUST TRANSITION TO A COMPETITION BETWEEN OFFENSES AND DEFENSES
NOW AND LATER.

THE IDEA THAT THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE SHOULD OFFER
COMPETITIVE SOLUTIONS TO STRATEGIC PROBLEMS INVOLVING PARTIAL
DEPLOYMENTS IS NOT NEW. IN ITS 1983 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY, THE SO
CALLED HOFFMAN PANEL RECOMMENDED THAT THE "PREFERRED PATH TO THE
PRESIDENT'S GOAL [IS BY] INTERMEDIATE OPTIONS."

[10]

ACCORDING TO THE HOFFMAN REPORT:

THE PRINCIPAL BENEFITS OF AN R&D PATH PROVIDING OPTIONS FOR EARLIER, PARTIAL DEPLOYMENTS ARE:

0. POSSIBILITIES FOR AN EARLY CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVING THE DETERIORATING MILITARY BALANCE.

0. ITS EXPLICIT PROVISION OF A HEDGE AGAINST RISKS INHERENT IN A PROGRAM WHERE EACH OF A LARGE NUMBER OF DEMANDING TECHNOLOGICAL GOALS MUST BE MET IN ORDER TO REALIZE ANY USEFUL RESULT AT ALL.

0. THE LIKELIHOOD THAT EARLY DEPLOYMENTS OF PARTS OF THE ULTIMATE SYSTEM MAY ALSO PROVE TO BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE PATH TO ACHIEVING SUCH A SYSTEM; EARLY OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH SOME SYSTEM ELEMENTS CAN CONTRIBUTE USEFUL FEEDBACK TO THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS."

BUT THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM FOR THE SDI HAS BEEN QUITE THE
OPPOSITE. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON THE DEPLOYMENT STRATEGY FOR
THE SDI IS THAT UNTIL THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO DEPLOY A
BOOST PHASE INTERCEPT SYSTEM WE SHOULD DEPLOY NO DEFENSES AT ALL,
EVEN IF WE COULD, LEST PROGRESS TOWARD THE ULTIMATE PROMISE OF A
THOROUGHLY RELIABLE DEFENSE BECOME BOGGED DOWN BY A LENGTHY
CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE OVER STRATEGY AND TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

THE OFTSTATED FEAR IS THAT IF WE FIRST DEVELOP INTERMEDIATE
PARTIAL SYSTEMS, LIKE A DEFENSE FOR NATO AGAINST SHORT RANGE
BALLISTIC MISSILES, OR A TERMINAL DEFENSE OF U.S. STRATEGIC
ASSETS, THEN WE WILL NEVER DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE DEFENSE.

ADHERENTS TO THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ARE RIGHT TO STEADFASTLY
PURSUE A COMPREHENSIVE DEFENSE, BUT ARE QUITE WRONG TO THINK THAT
DOING SO, WE CAN IGNORE THE THREATS SO MUCH CLOSER AT HAND.

[10]

SUPPORT FOR INTERMEDIATE OPTIONS NEED NOT THREATEN SUPPORT FOR COMPREHENSIVE DEFENSES. TO THE CONTRARY, ONCE ALLIES AND CONGRESSIONAL CRITICS ARE ASSURED THAT MORE IMMEDIATELY THREATENED TARGETS ARE SAFEGUARDED, THEY WILL HAVE LESS CAUSE TO BEGRUDGE POLITICAL SUPPORT OR RESOURCES TO IMPLEMENT A COMPREHENSIVE DEFENSE.

A WORD ABOUT THE ABM TREATY. THE REALITY IS THAT THE TIME IS NEAR WHEN WE SHOULD EITHER AMEND THE TREATY TO PERMIT BOTH COLLABORATION AND TECHNOLOGY SHARING WITH OUR WESTERN PARTNERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF BOTH NEW GROUND-BASED AND NEW SPACE-BASED ABM DEFENSES -- OR, IF UNABLE TO SECURE SOVIET AGREEMENT, WE SHOULD, PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE TREATY, SIGNAL OUR INTENTION TO GO AHEAD WITH OUR ALLIES WITHOUT SOVIET AGREEMENT.

[L]

LET US RECOGNIZE THAT THE ABM TREATY DEBATE IS INEVITABLE. (BECAUSE DEPARTURE FROM IT CAN NEVER BE ACCEPTABLE TO IT'S THEOLOGICAL ADHERENTS TO WHOM IT IS AN ARTICLE OF ABSOLUTE FAITH, WHATEVER THE ARGUMENTS FOR CHANGE). WE SHOULD ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT INTERMEDIATE OPTIONS PROMISE TO SO IMPORTANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO OUR SECURITY AND ALLIANCE STABILITY, THAT RATHER THAN PREJUDICING COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEMS, AN IRRESISTIBLE POLITICAL IMPERATIVE WILL ARISE FOR THEM.

BY FAR A MORE IMPORTANT IMPEDIMENT TO ADAPTATION FOR THE SDI, HOWEVER, ARE PROBLEMS POSED BY ORGANIZATIONAL AND STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE SDI PROGRAM ITSELF.

[Lc]

- 11

AT ITS CREATION IN PRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE 119 AND AS REFLECTED IN THE FISCAL YEAR 1985 DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST, THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE HAS INSTITUTIONALIZED A RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 1983 CHALLENGE THAT WAS HEAVILY BIASED AGAINST DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF AN INTERMEDIATE RATHER THAN COMPREHENSIVE NATURE. THAT BIAS IS CLEARLY REFLECTED IN THE VERY LANGUAGE OF THE REPORT OF THE DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGY STUDY TEAM (HEADED BY DR. JAMES FLETCHER) THAT SERVED AS THE FOUNDATION FOR THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM: "WE HAVE CREATED AN AGGRESSIVE, TECHNICALLY RESPONSIBLE PLAN THAT EMPHASIZED DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATIONS CONTRIBUTING TO TOTAL SYSTEMS EFFECTIVENESS IN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD) RATHER THAN AN EARLY DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY."

[lc]

AS A RESULT, THE SDI ORGANIZATION HAS STRUCTURED ITS RESEARCH PROGRAM INTO BROAD TECHNOLOGY AREAS. IN EACH, A RESEARCH GROUP IS CHARGED WITH PROVIDING TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS AND BACKGROUND RESEARCH UPON WHICH ONLY DEVELOPMENT DECISIONS ARE TO BE MADE, AT SOME FUTURE DATE. THE RESEARCH IS HEAVILY FOCUSED ON GENERIC DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES LIKE DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS; KINETIC ENERGY WEAPONS; AND SURVEILLANCE, ACQUISITION, TRACKING AND KILL ASSESSMENT. THE PROGRAM IS INTENTIONALLY NOT ORGANIZED ALONG MISSION LINES. IT IS NOT AIMED AT SOLVING SPECIFIC DEPLOYABLE INTEGRATING POLICY AND WPN SYSTEMS PROBLEMS OF TERMINAL, MIDCOURSE AND BOOST-PHASE, DEFENSE ANY PHASE OF DEFENSE OR ORS.

AS A RESULT, POLICY OR MISSION-RELATED ISSUES LIKE THOSE RELATING TO AN INTEGRATED BOOST PHASE DEFENSE CAPABILITY, OR A CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE OF NATO ARE RELEGATED TO A RELATIVELY SMALL AND OVERBURDENED CENTRAL STAFF.

[lc]

13

THE SDI PROGRAM'S EMPHASIS ON LONG-TERM RESEARCH RATHER THAN NEAR-TERM CAPABILITY IS REFLECTED IN ADMINISTRATION POLICY STATEMENTS LIKE THE FOLLOWING: "THE PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO ANSWER A NUMBER OF FUNDAMENTAL SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING QUESTIONS THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED BEFORE THE PROMISE OF THESE NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAN BE FULLY ASSESSED. THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM WILL PROVIDE TO A FUTURE PRESIDENT AND A FUTURE CONGRESS THE TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT A DECISION IN THE EARLY 1990'S OF WHETHER TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY SUCH ADVANCED DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS." THE PROGRAM'S EMPHASIS UPON THE LONG TERM IS ALSO REFLECTED IN THE HIGHER LEVEL OF FUNDING GIVEN TO THE ADVANCED DIRECTED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES (FREE ELECTRON LASERS AND X-RAY LASERS) THAN IS GIVEN TO SYSTEMS LIKE EXOATMOSPHERIC REENTRY INTERCEPT SYSTEM AND AIRBORNE OPTICAL ADJUNCT THAT ARE STRONG CANDIDATES FOR A FIRST GENERATION DEPLOYED SYSTEM. // RATHER THAN FOCUSING ON THE ENGINEERING AND PRODUCTION ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING THESE MATURE DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES, WE ARE FOCUSING ON COST REDUCTION EFFORTS THAT WILL ENABLE US TO HAVE THE MOST REFINED -- AND THEREFORE TOO LONG DELAYED -- SOLUTION.

[L]

WHILE THIS STRUCTURE AND RESEARCH APPROACH MIPKORS THOSE
RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES,
IT EFFECTIVELY IGNORES THE RECOMMENDATIONS OFFERED BY THE
PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON DEFENSIVE STRATEGY, THAT CHAIRED BY DR. FRED
HOFFMAN. THIS IS THE MORE REMARKABLE BECAUSE OVER TIME THE
ADMINISTRATION AND EVEN THE SDIO HAVE COME TO RELY MORE AND MORE
ON THE POLICY RATIONALE OFFERED BY THE HOFFMAN PANEL, AND YET,
THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE OR NO CHANGE TO THE RESEARCH PROGRAM
REFLECTIVE OF THE HOFFMAN POLICY. THUS, WE ESPOUSE A POLICY OF
EFFECTING A TRANSITION FROM OFFENSE TO DEFENSE AND OF ENHANCING
OFFENSIVE DETERRENCE ALONG THE WAY, BUT EFFECTIVELY HAVE NO
PROGRAM FOR MAKING THIS TRANSITION. WE HAVE A HOFFMAN POLICY AND
A KEYWORTH/FLETCHER PROGRAM...AND A DISCONNECT BETWEEN THEM.

15

[lc]

CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT DISCONNECT BETWEEN POLICY AND PROGRAM MAY WELL THREATEN THE RELEVANCE AND ULTIMATELY THE ATTAINMENT OF THE LONG TERM GOALS THAT ARE THE PRESENT AND IRONICALLY MYOPIC FOCUS OF SDI.

THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE SDI TO TURN AWAY FROM ASSESSMENTS OF WHAT STRATEGIC DEFENSES CAN DO FOR OUR NATION'S SECURITY IN THE LONG RUN. THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE SDI TO FOCUS ON TASKS AND MILESTONES THAT IT MUST ACCOMPLISH TO MEET OUR NEEDS IN THE NEXT DECADE. I BELIEVE THAT THE SDI MUST BE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING A DEFENSE AGAINST TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE EARLY 90'S, THAT IT MUST BE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING AN AFFORDABLE DEFENSE OF OUR CRITICAL STRATEGIC ASSETS BY THE MID-90'S AND MUST PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE DEFENSE OF OUR NATION AND OUR ALLIES AGAINST ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES SOON AFTER THE TURN OF THE CENTURY. THESE SHOULD BE THE TASKS OF THE SDI, IT IS OUR JOB TO INSURE THAT ANY AND ALL IMPEDIMENTS TO ACHIEVING THESE TASKS BE ELIMINATED.

THE CENTER FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS

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MAR 1 0 1986

[LC]

OFFICERS

THOMAS WINSHIP
President

JAMES D. EWING
Vice President/Treasurer

GEORGE A. KRIMSKY
Vice President/Executive Director

BOARD OF ADVISORS

HAROLD W. ANDERSEN
President
Omaha World-Herald

JAMES K. BATTEN
President
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.

WARREN E. BUFFETT
Chairman
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.

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Chairman & Editor
The Bulletin

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Vice President
Omni/Dunfey Hotels

KATHERINE W. FANNING
Editor
The Christian Science Monitor

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Chairman
The Washington Post Company

HANNA HOLBORN GRAY
President
University of Chicago

JAMES HOGE
Chief Executive Officer & Publisher
New York Daily News

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Director
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Los Angeles Times

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Senior Vice President & Editor
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Group Managing Editor
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Publisher
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RICHARD WALD
Senior Vice President
ABC News

ANDREW YOUNG
Mayor
Atlanta, Georgia

March 5, 1986

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Dear Henry,

It was so nice catching up with you last night. I was riveted by your comment about the lack of realistic, free wheeling research going on in arms control and arms negotiations in this country. I think the next Kissinger monument should be heading up some sort of a prestigious study of arms development and arms control, within the context of the political realities of the two great powers. There needs to be another voice other than the administration voice. I say that in a very nonpartisan way, because I would feel the same way if a Democrat was in the White House. This ridiculous gallop toward bankruptcy in the United States and in the Soviet Union should be stopped, shouldn't it?

In a visit at the Carnegie Foundation this morning, I mentioned your comments to the number two person there, my old friend, David Robinson. I wouldn't be surprised if David Hamburg gave you a ring. As you know, Carnegie, along with the other foundations, is pouring zillions into arms control studies, all over the academic map.

TW/co