Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

The President/Mr. Kiss--
11:55 a.m., February 19, 1971

P: I don't want any of the White House leaking or backgrounding to the press. The press will ask, 'isn't this operation slower?' We mustn't let that get out.

K: We are not disappointed actually. We have cut the road.

P: We must take a very optimistic line on these things -- that will be at least 70 per cent of this battle.

K: Absolutely.

P: Thanks, Henry.

lds

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger
12:47 p. m. 2/17/71

K: I have talked to Haig about the TV thing. Hi view and mine is as follows.
Better not to do it. Second would be for me to do it. Third that Rogers and
Laird do it. I am not much for two. After we have put out the report the
only thing we can do on Sunday is to try to get into cracks of the thing. We will
have a lot of interpretive reporting on Sunday. Everyone will be comparing
the two reports. We think best not to have it.

H: That's probably right.

K: He feels very strongly as do I that the two brethern will get us screwed
up. The one who could do it best if he were still here is Elliott Richardson
but he has the mind to do it.

H: They wouldn't have let him do it anyway.

K: Probably not.

H: That's probably right.

K: Will you take care of it?

H: Yes.

By KHW NARA, Date 5/13/94

TELECON

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

5:40 p.m., February 17, 1971

R: I wanted to check on what you want. I don't want to send our report over until I have a chance to go over it. If it's going to be delayed for 3-4 weeks as the President said...

K: I wanted to look through it as a check list for topics.

R: We can send you the index. I don't want any circulation until I go over it. Obviously the President should decide on what to put in, and ours has to be consistent with his. If anything is unsatisfactory, we will change it.

K: There are two problems -- one is consistency and to see if there are any gaps. We only have 48 hours to see if there are any topics we should have covered.

R: I don't want any circulation of ours until I have looked at it. I have glanced over the contents as to general subject matter and general format. I have told my people it has to be totally consistent with the President's report. I don't want it to get around until I go over it.

K: I won't make an issue of it. We went through this last year. Pederson and I had an agreement. But if you don't want to do it, you don't have to do it. It's fine with me.

R: Let me repeat -- I have to look at it.

K: We wanted to see if there were any gaps in ours that should be covered and weren't covered. For example, Mexico wasn't mentioned -- your people hadn't flagged it to us. It's deserving of two sentences. I am sure we have all the important things.

R: On the Mexican thing, there's no reason why... It's nothing serious, but it's a good thing to have.

K: He was involved in meetings with the Mexicans twice. It isn't a big deal; no one who reads the report will notice, but the Mexicans might wonder, in 55,000 words, why we couldn't remember his visit there.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kussinger
5:40 p.m., February 17, 1971

R: Is it really 55,000 words?

K: We had 76,000; we cut it to 55,000.

R: That's larger than last year's; how are we going to explain that?

K: Maybe the accomplishments were more -- but it's about the same as last year's. It's now substantially cut from the chapters you have seen. All we could do with your report is leaf through it to see if we have everything covered.

R: Have Marshall Wright or someone like that come over and go through it. So many people gossip in this town that I don't want to circulate it.

K: Why don't I send Colonel Kennedy over to leaf through it. I don't give a damn about reading it myself. But there may be something the President can say he has done that we have missed. We are so locked in anyway.

R: What about the SALT decision?

K: I have taken all of Gerry's suggestions and have given another chapter back to him. I don't have his final reaction.

R: Could you send me a copy of the revised version?

K: Everything -- every chapter -- will be coming to you today.

R: When do you want our input?

K: By tomorrow.

R: On Southeast Asia, it's the first time we have seen it. We will try to do it before Friday.

K: Okay.

lds

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissner

5:50 p.m.

2/19/71

R: I just talked to Gerry Smith and he is opposed to the last draft on SALT and Mel is and I don't see any reason to ( do it the way we are doing it).

K: I find Gerry Smith hard to understand because he wanted the President to make a speech pointing them out. Now he says they shouldn't be spelled out and then not spelled out with others. I think the President will have to decide that.

R: We should get together with the President. It's contrary to what we have told the Russians.

K: What are we using?

R: Setting forth the positions we have done.

K: And what is Gerry putting through to the committees?

R: So it's all public?

K: It will be by the end of March.

R: Then we should tell the Russians we have changed the rules. If we are going to change it, we should tell them.

K: Whatever you work out with the President is okay.

RL: Not that way but not your way either. I will see if Mel is here and we will get together tomorrow.

K: Okay.

*

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Rogers
2/17/71; 6:45 p.m.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: I wanted to talk to you about this meeting with the President tomorrow. I will arrange it but I won't be there myself because I know how he hates confrontations. At least we can make it in a context that avoids an argument.

R: I don't mind doing it separately.

K: Let me read you a letter which Gerry Smith wrote the President (K read the letter rather quickly). Now we took every single suggestion that Gerry made in rewriting the damn thing and our judgment was that there should be some symmetry so that the report is not just talking about defense matters. He is still opposed to it.

R: And I gather Mel is to. In my own view I don't see anything to be gained by it.

K: Have you read the new versions? We put forward a position on, for example, (K began to read it quickly). That's all it says -- not the numbers, not what the requirements were. It also says we put a second position -- reduction of defense forces. The Washington Post has ten times more than that.

R: The question I have in my mind is whether the President should say that.

K: This is now so vague.

R: As I said, I am at a disadvantageous because I have not seen it yet. It has gone so well -- but to have the President himself present it for not particular reason -- I don't know -- I don't see much to be gained. I think the thing to do is let me read it. I don't want to have a confrontation with the President either.

K: It will be done. I just wanted to ask you first of all to read it and to remember that Gerry himself saw some advantageous. I don't want to argue.

R: As long as we are not under the gun -- we have until Friday -- then let's think about it. I agree with you. Let's not present a big problem to the President if we can work it out.

K: Military policy is not our only road to security. As I said, almost everything in their except two pages which I asked Gerry to redraft are from him.

P: What I think we should try to do is work it out tomorrow and if we can't then let's talk it to the President. I would rather take it to the President in a paper. What did he say on the Cuban thing -- there wasn't much in his press conference on the radio.

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

-2-

K: He said exactly what he said before -- there is an understanding about defense missiles.

R: Does he distinguish in his thinking between submarines carrying nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered submarines?

K: He tends to lump them together. Any vessel that carries offensive weapons. . . The missile problem we have in Cuba in my view, and I talked to Alex and he agrees, is with the damn tender.

R: There is a limit to what we can do about it.

K: I think we ought to keep quiet a while. We can't do anything right now. The guidance I have given to Ziegler is just to keep going back to the Presidential statement and not elaborate.

R: I think that is right. Okay, Henry.

feg

TELECON (Tape)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

Wednesday evening, February 17, 1971

(11:12 p.m.)

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, I was just calling you at the German Embassy in order to impress the damn Germans.

K: Oh, I had just left -- weren't you nice.

P: I was just going to tell you, though, I had the military reception and, by God, you know, after seeing these wonderful guys go through strong, straight and their lovely wives. The men, of course, would brown-nose, but the wives are saying... I said some nice things about the military and how hard it was to be a real leader in this period when you didn't have the country behind you -- how it would be hard in peacetime, and that they were the men that were responsible for the morale. The leaders were the ones that make morale and so forth. The wives were all saying, "We just want you to know that we are so proud of your leadership." You know, they really were very...

K: Well, and Mr. President, they mean that deeply. The military were losing faith in themselves. They were getting to be the outcasts and if you imagine what would have happened in a Democratic administration. And that is what you are now, in a way, taking all this anguish for.

P: But I also felt -- I came to this conclusion, by God, Henry, we are not going to allow... General Stillwell was there -- you remember Stillwell?

K: Oh, yes. Big Stillwell. Yes, he's G-3 of the Army.

P: Well, I hope you are keeping in touch with him. He's a very bright fellow.

K: Very good.

P: Very tough. He told me in 1966 -- he showed me we ought to cut that Trail; you know he's a helluva hawk. Sometime you might just have him case the thing or maybe have Haig do it.

K: No, maybe... I know him quite well. I'll have him come over and just talk to him about it.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELECON (Tape)

The President/Mr. Kissinger (11:10 p.m.)

- 2 -

P: All right. Will you do that?

K: Definitely, Mr. President.

P: And what I was going to say is this. We cannot allow what is basically the last war -- it may well be the last -- be one that goes down in failure -- the proud history of the American military. God damn, our guys are brave; they have fought selflessly; they have helped ...

K: Under the most impossible conditions in Vietnam.

P: They have been kicked around by everybody and then made the goats of things that weren't their fault. By God, we've heard them do it, and I think really the Cambodian thing was a lift for them and the Laotian thing is a lift for them.

K: Absolutely.

P: They'll get a lift out of what I said at the Press Conference.

K: Oh, that was very firm.

P: I was just thinking back... I left a lot of real subtle hints out there. You know, I don't know how they play it, but I didn't close many options.

K: You certainly didn't and you left them out there in a way that was ... it was hard for others to challenge you and yet Hanoi understood very well.

P: The only thing I said was... Lisagor asked, of course, a cute question. ______ said, "Well, suppose North Vietnam does ______, WWWW will we support ______."

I said, "Now, look, ______."

K: Well, you had a thousand -- Hanoi will notice you had a thousand opportunities to slide off that one, and they know under no circumstances and, for that matter, actually you never said flatly you wouldn't send ground combat troops up north.

MJD E0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

The President/Mr. Kissinger (Tape)

(1/10 p.m.)

P: Oh, no.

K: ...the way you had done with Laos and Cambodia.

P: I said I would do what was necessary. Well, I think I may have
said that against the north, we would use air power.

K: Yes, but you hadn't specifically excluded ground combat -- not
that we have ... you have any intention of doing that.

P: I said, too, if they came across the DMZ...

K: That was a powerful answer.

P: ...there were no understandings if they came across, they
were all broken.

K: And you also pointed out that those were American troops
guarding the DMZ in blocking positions. First, you said you would
do everything necessary to protect American forces and, in case anyone
thought maybe the American forces won't be in danger, you then said
well, remember, they are right there at the DMZ. So, I thought that
that was again a particularly subtle answer.

P: There will be more questions, so we've got ourselves a first-rate
avenue re. air support.

K: Hanoi will read every word and Hanoi knows that every threat
you've ever made, you've made good on.

P: Don't you think, too, that it was good to repeat publicly what I
said to the POW wives that as long as there was one prisoner, we are
going to have Americans in Vietnam.

K: Essential.

P: Just let them shake ________________. It said, look,
boys, if you think you can keep these prisoners, by God, we are going
to have them there, and we will.

K: They are both essential. I thought that the Press Conference
... actually, as I said to you, from an intellectual point of view the
office Press Conferences are better than the others. The others are
greater virtuoso performances.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: [REDACTED] DATE: 2/17/71
By: NARA Date 6/10/71

(11:10pm)

- 4 -

P: Oh, yeah.

K: Because you have to compress so much into a one-minute answer. But these are much more thoughtful, and of course, they were trying to lay traps for you in practically every question -- certainly in every question on the foreign field. Well, Scheel, the idiot, was very impressed by his meeting with you.

P: Really?

K: Oh, yeah, he was ... For example, the fact that you said ... you referred to it in the toast... you had said Europe was the principal concern of the United States and also when you had said about Germany's need to be tied to the West. You made your points to him. He is, of course, such a lightweight.

P: But he'll report it all to Brandt.

K: Exactly, and the Ambassador who is quite a sharp fellow...

P: I noticed that he made some notes at the right time.

K: That's right, and he'll report it all to Brandt.

P: But I think the Ambassador, too, deep down he really agrees.

K: Oh, yeah. He was appointed by Kiesinger. He's in a tough spot there.

P: ______________ a little stronger man there as Chancellor.

K: Actually, if Kiesinger had won the election, that would be quite a line-up in Europe right now. I met with the new British Ambassador today. He's a nice fellow and intelligent, but he's not in the class of Freeman.

P: I know; I know. He's a businessman. He'll be one of those straight-arrow, typical British diplomats.

K: Exactly.

P: But he'll do exactly what Heath says.

K: Exactly, and he will transmit what we want him to transmit to Heath, and that's really what we want.

MJD FE 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/9/04

The President/Mr. Kissinger (Tape) (11:00pm)

- 5 -

P: Did you have a good talk with him?

K: Yeah; we had a good talk, and I assured him of your interests and that we would do anything we could, and we'll have a good relationship.

P: Okay, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President. Well, this was quite a day, and I think...

P: Yeah, and I've got a tough one tomorrow. I'm going to have Vogt give the Democratic Senators a 10-minute thing.

K: Right. We ran through it.

P: I told him to make it 10 minutes.

K: That's right. He's a good fellow, and he'll do it very well.

P: I'd just as well he stick it out there straight to these bastards. The southerners are all with us, I think.

K: And the others don't really say very much, and after all, I think this is now the toughest period probably in terms of the anti-aircraft fire we are facing in another week or so when they are sitting astride all of these roads. Well, they are sitting across three of them now, and we are not sure we are going to go after that fourth one because that's about 30 miles further over, and we've got Laotian battalions operating against it already and all our air power, all of which, as you know, can now concentrate on one road where previously they had to cover four. They've got to hit something sometime, particularly as the traffic now has to be in the open.

P: Well, just get those B-26's out there.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Those things can fly at night, too, can't they?

K: I'm pretty sure -- certainly if they are lined up with the sensors on the ground.

P: So I assume they re-equip them for all...

K: Oh, yes.

*

By KHL NARA, Dated 5/13/64

TELCONE

U. A. Johnson/Kissinger (secure phone)

late afternoon 2/17/71

K: Al told me of his conversation with you. We will schedule a WSAG tomorrow. We will have a word on Cuba at the end of it. What's your tentative thought.

J: I would go after the tender tomorrow. I reviewed the records on this.
I think it's the tender we should go after them.

K: If they had made a port call with a nuclear submarine, we wouldn't
have objected.

J: I think we should go after them promptly on it.

K: Did you see what the President said?

J: No.

K: He said there's an understanding regarding offensive weapons and
nuclear submarines.

J: He did that deliberately? I don't think we are on solid grounds on that.
I think it may come back to haunt us. They may come back at us with
that. On Jan. 4 statement it was passed over and people read
that as --

K: We could go back to the record.

J: I went back to your conversation on that and it's clear. I think we should
stay with that. We are on good ground with that. I think we have a problem
of what we do with the Soviets.

K: What should we do?

J: Call Dobrynin in and say howcome? Go back on the record on this tender.
It's more than an occasional port call. Get dates out on ________. We don't
think its in accord with our agreements on this. On the public side --
?? ?? ?? and what Defense said today people will probe on why defense
wasn't more explicit. Then someone will say both a submarine and tender
there.

K: Why don't you write a record what you think the understanding is
in 3-4 sentences. I think time is to hand it to him again and say this is it.

J: I will do that.

K: Then let's discuss it tomorrow.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCON
Safire/Kissinger

9:44 a.m. 2/18/71

S: The speech needs a lead which it doesn't have now. A paragraph about the Soviet Union, Communist China or SALT. Something the reporters can zero in on.

K: You could say something about dedicating ourselves to getting a SALT agreement early this year.

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM
Safire/Kissinger

10:25 a.m.

2/18/71

K: I was there when the President called you. Come over about 11:00.

S: I can give you the suggested insert.

K: I have don't have the text in front of me so I don't know what he is talking about. Come over at 11:00.

S: ok

By: KHLW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

J. Alsop/Kissinger

11:37 a.m. 2/18/71

A: When can we forego ______?

K: I have this world affairs report. Can it wait until next week? It almost has to. When? With it and of what I can do (?). Laos, the world report, and constant sniping?

A: How about lunch on Sunday?

K: I will be in NY.

A: Are you going before lunch on Sat.?

K: I might be able to do that. If I get through with the world report before lunch I would be glad to have lunch with you.

A: I want to talk about Israeli thing and also about one other matter.

K: I notice that Joe Kraft corrected this thing today in the process of taking me on again. I don't understand why he is ______. And Nancy would be delighted to come a week from Sat. And let's aim for a lunch on Sat.

*

TELCORN

Amb. Rabin/Kissinger

11:40 a.m.

2/18/71

K: How are you?

R: Not so fine.

K: I don't know why I am laughing. I'm not really, it's just because I am not surprised by your answer.

R: I was called this morning back to Israel for consultation. I think it will be very important if I would be able to see you.

K: When are you leaving?

R: I have to leave about 3:00-3:60. I tried to get to you all morning but you are busy. 15 mins. will be x enough.

K: 2:30.

R: Which entrance? The diplomatic?

K: Yeah.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Ambassador Lucet/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., February 18, 1971

L: Good morning, Henry. I have one matter. I had a call from Mrs. Hunnebelle.

K: She is your national. She wants you to give a dinner?

L: She wants to be received by the President.

K: She is your national. I have nothing to do with her. There is no chance that the President will receive her.

L: That is what I told her; but I told her I would be in touch with you.

K: I think it's out of the question. Let her call Ziegler. I will certainly not get myself involved.

L: I understand that very well, but she is on the phone twice a day.

K: It is not a foreign policy problem, and she is not a personal problem of mine. I wish her well.

L: I shall leave it with Ziegler.

K: I won't do a thing.

L: Thank you very much. I will talk to you soon.

lds

*

By: KHL NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

TELECON

3:30 p.m., February 18, 1971

R: I thought the agreement was we would get Defense, State, ACDA and your people together.

K: We did this morning.

R: Defense wasn't there. Phil said you didn't want Defense. So we have to go around the track again.

K: My patience with this harrassment is getting to an end. It must have been some bloody administrative snafu.

R: It's not my snafu. Who set it up?

K: It was handled by Haig.

R: Don't get made at me. It was your own staff.

K: When we first discussed it, Smith and I would get together.

R: I said get Defense because they oppose it, too. We all should get together to see if we could work it out. There's no point in doing it piecemeal.

K: There has been no intention to do it piecemeal.

R: It's your staff. I didn't set up the meeting. You will have additional problems with Defense. If we all get together, we can probably work it out. Will you check it and see?

K: I didn't notice anyone raised it this morning.

R: I don't understand what you mean.

K: The last thing I would want is to have Defense excluded from a thing like this.

R: Why weren't they there?

*

By KHL NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
3:30 p.m., February 18, 1971

- 2 -

K: I will have to look into it. This whole thing...

R: If it was a mistake, let's correct it.

K: This is turning into an absurdity. If people think they can
make me back up, let them go ahead and do it.

lds

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

3:40 p.m., February 18, 1971

L: Bill is with the Prime Minister of Italy now. He will call back. I will give him some words. It wasn't my idea to meet with you, Henry. When I was asked by Bill this morning -- and you were there -- I didn't even know about a meeting. I said I would designate Gardner Tucker. We weren't called, and we don't give a damn whether we are called.

K: I had all your comments.

L: I will tell Bill I had breakfast with you.

K: Rather than go through with a lot of wordpicking, they designated Farley to meet. They came up with what looks like an agreement. Bill said I excluded Defense. It looks like the whole town is displeased. If that is the case, the hell with it.

L: I will let you know if I have a problem with it that way.-- if I think I am excluded. On that other matter we talked about privately, I have taken care of it. It will probably be done within the next month or six weeks.

K: I appreciate that.

L: On this other thing, if I have a bitch, I will bitch to you.

lds

*

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Tom Braden/Kissinger
morning 2/18/71

B: What's the -- two questions -- what's the Jos. Kraft column? Is it correct?

K: I don't understand it, much less is it correct. Can you tell me the point of that column?

B: I can't. The point is that you are not in some kind of argument to impose a ban on ABM.

K: That's total nonsense. We have imposed a ban on ABM. The argument is how much detail you put in. There's no substantive argument. It's absolutely absurd.

B: Do you understand what he is talking about, Frank?

F. Mankiewicz: No, but when I hear there's no substantive argument, there's a hell of an argument.

K: I give my word the only issue is how much to put into the report.

M: I think that's right. He is trying to blow it up into more. I question whether to open up a discussion on how much is disclosed in the report.

K: That's an editorial decision. It's not a bloody one. It exists on every chapter being written. The way Joe makes it sound, it's a substantive argument between the WH, State, and Defense.

M: And you are not aware of that?

K: Not except what's been going on for a year and a half.

K: Why are you confident there's no problem with China?

K: Who says? I am confident we will not have trouble unless we go to their borders. What would they accomplish? The NVN are not short of manpower. They have material in the north but they have to get it across south. I don't see how the Chinese will add to that. If we came into the North -- but that's not necessary because the NVN can handle that -- NVN would consider it against them as much as for them. The NVN don't want them.

B: That's what we are banking on?

K: Not that but ... It's pretty already overstretching their supply capacity. I don't see that putting in men there is the critical issue. NVN are putting in as many people as they can.

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Ortona

9:55 a.m., February 19, 1971

K: Mr. Ambassador, I don't know whether it was necessary to call you about this. I saw in the Washington Post social column today a remark attributed to me -- a joking remark. I hope it doesn't cause you any concern.

O: The consonant remark or the Foreign Office remark?

K: The Foreign Office.

O: We feel very flattered.

K: Somebody came up and said Colombo and the Foreign Minister are dull people. I said they are no such thing. I said on the contrary, no Italian is dull -- it's one Foreign Office where they prefer to talk about other things and not just business.

O: It was very well taken. It was very XXX kind of you to call. What about tomorrow morning? What is the scenario of the visit?

K: It will be about a half hour. You tell me what you want. We will make sure some photographers are outside.

O: I wonder if Mr. Moro might be included; he is number 2 in the party.

K: I will do my best.

O: He is the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

K: I find him a fascinating man. I would not want to engage him in a contest of political maneuver.

O: But not all of the delegation.

K: The Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Ambassadors. We will get a picture taken. I will see you tonight at your reception.

O: We will talk only in consonants.

K: You liked that remark?

O: Yes.

lds

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Walter Judd/Kissinger

10:10 a.m.

2/19/71

J: I wondered if there was sometime I could talk with you for 15 mins.

K: Could it wait a few days because I have to put together the report on foreign policy.

J: That's what I thought. I would like to see you before that.

K: Early next week?

J: I cannot do it Mon. or Tues. I would Wed.

K: What about tomorrow?

J: I have to be at Airlie House. I could this afternoon.

K: If I can do it I will call you. I can reach you on this number?

J: Yes.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCON
Amb. Ortona/Kissinger

12:15 p.m.

2/19/71

O: Could you tell me whether we can announce to the Italian press that we have a meeting tomorrow morning with the President?

K: I don't have the membership cleared.

O: I think the Foreign Minister should be included. Jack Amdon has already written about it.

K: You can confirm the meeting. Go ahead and say the FonMin will meet too.

O: You will have to do more than what you said this morning. 6-7 at the most is what you want. So we can say that this is it.

K: I haven't checked with the President but I will take my chances. He is not available now.

O: I will tell the Prime Minister to say he is grateful to the President because he will see him tomorrow morning for awhile too.

K: Go ahead and let him say that the FonMin. will be there too.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers

3:10 p.m., February 19, 1971

K: I wanted to ask when you expect some of the comments that may still be made.

R: We have almost all of them now -- we are in the process of typing them. SALT, I gather, is all worked out.

K: This contains about 95 per cent of the original comments.

R: One thing I would like very much to be sure is in -- a sentence in the first part where it says the NSC is the principal forum to the effect that 'in addition, of course, there are direct contacts from the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.'

K: Oh, sure. Where is that sentence?

R: I think it's in the NSC machinery section. We don't have any areas of substantial disagreements now. It's in good shape. I have one or two political things I want to suggest: (1) On the common market, we say, "I am willing to pay an economic price for European integration." I don't think we mean that. It could be taken out of context that we are willing to pay. What we mean is we are willing to suffer some short-term costs.

K: If your people could suggest the language they want...

R: They are doing that. Will I have a chance to look at the galley? When you get it, can I go over it?

K: Sure. I want to warn you -- all of us will have the galleys for only a few hours. The whole thing will be printed in three days. With that proviso, I will make sure you get the galley. We are putting that other thing into the letter of transmittal in the front of the book. That is better than a footnote -- it's better for you.

R: That is better -- a footnote looks sort of silly. We will have this over in the next hour or so.

K: We have to put these changes on our master and proofread it.

R: We will have it over shortly.

lds

["Reproduced from the open files\nof the Nixon Presidential\nMaterials Staff", "DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "*", "By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04", "TELCORN", "Robt. O. Anderson/Kissinger", "4:35 p.m.", "2/19/71", "A: I ran into something that is of such a nature that you should know about it. The VN embassy in Washington on Jan 25 -- they issue a monthly newspaper newsletter -- Vol. 5, #54. There's an article on offshore leasing to American oil companies and there's no question there's something to it. The sale is supposed to be in March. We heard about it through the underground press and would like to be in a bad spot. We heard about it through the underground press and would like to be in March. We heard about it through the underground press and would like to be

By: KHW NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

*

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Bill Safire

6:25 p.m., February 19, 1971

K: When you send that to the President put a note on it that we worked together on it. I don't want it for credit -- it's just so he doesn't bug me. He has asked me a few times to review it before he got it.

S: It has your name and mine at the top. Your name is first -- it's my greatest single sacrifice.

K: That isn't why I wanted it. I didn't want him to be rooting around -- he will read it somewhat less negatively.

S: One change I have made on the first page -- I have said: 'In this way we raise the level of our own discussion of foreign policy and make it easier for other nations...'

K: The major thing to say is 'no one in this country has a monopoly...'

S: That sounds belligerant, doesn't it? You doves aren't the only ones. Let us try it without it.

K: Could we say, 'All Americans are united on this,' and let somebody else make the argument?

S: All right. I will leave a copy for you on my way home.

K: All right.

lds

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President
6:50 p.m., February 19, 1971

P: I got tied up, Henry.

K: I just wanted to tell you that I have worked over with Safire all day on that speech and I think it still needs rhetoric only you can give it. But in terms of substance, there's no smashing news but it's a good speech. At this point when everyone is worried about headlines on Laos, it could have a very soothing effect. Starts out with what we have achieved in Vietnam.

P: How does Safire feel about it?

K:q Very good, he thinks it needs one more headline caption.

P: Whether we can find one remains to be seen. I can't bother with it tonight though. I'm going to see Colombo tonight and in the morning, I'll see Colombo, Moro and the whole bunch but I don't know what I'm going to talk about.

K: Just so that they can get their pictures taken.

P: They ought to feel good.

K: This was the best received reception for them. If he wins, in the next election, it will be all to your credit.

P: Is it that important?

K: In Italy, this is a tremendous asset.

P: Think it was good that we went all out.

K: Very important, very, very important. He needs that, coming into a risky period. They will cut each other up on the December election.

P: What else is new? Anything important?

K: They are continuing to cut these roads in various places now.

P: How about Route 9 -- are we still able to bomb?

K: We are having superb weather.

P: Are we using it well?

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/The President

6:50 p.m., February 19, 1971 -- Page 2

K: Very well. The pipeline is cut now, fires over 200 feet in the air.

P: In the pipeline.

K: They got a Soviet tank today, the third they have captured and ______ pounds of rice. There was a North Vietnamese attack on a battalion of South Vietnamese that has went very well.

P: How about the Chinese huffing and puffing?

K: They haven't said anymore.

P: ????

K: That is a sign of weakness, not a sign of strength. It is the first time they have felt it necessary to say that.

P: I really think the press conference had a salutary effect.

K: Humphrey was in today, you might be interested in that. He told me that Muskie told Kosygin and it wasn't picked up in any of our reports that you didn't have the support of the American people for your foreign policy but he wanted you to know that he was outraged by it -- that anyone would say that in a foreign country. He said on the contrary, foreign policy is your strong suit and when he goes on ______ he says that and then he goes after you on domestic policy.

P: I think he was very impressed by what I said.

K: Oh, that's another thing, he wanted you to know how moved he was by what you said. He was very, very appreciative.

P: Okay, Henry, we'll let this other thing go until tomorrow.

K: Right, Mr. President.

wgh

*

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Adm. Moorer/Kissinger (secure phone)

10:35 a.m.

2/20/71

M: I was talking with Abrams and I know you are going away and I want to give you a wrap up. He says we are going to have a tough fight. The enemy is focusing on the objective area. We are going to have an isolated area with ranger battalion but we have TARGETS (?). He is confident that everything is going right and no reason to change anything. We knew at the outset we would have hard fights or it wouldn't have been valuable. On the Chup Plantation, Theiu will find a hell of a fight in 24 hours. He said that's what we want. The way the press handles it every sentence is negative.

K: How about in the TIMES today, there's a SVN statement that they have cut only a few of the roads. They should avoid that.

M: They have cut roads and are really hurting them.

K: They shouldn't make those statements.

M: I will try to get the word across but it could be a Lt. or who knows.

K: It was said a Vietnamese source.

M: That just means his skin is yellow ad not white. I will do what I can; They are expecting hard fighting and expected it when they drew up the plans.

K: They are expecting hard fighting.

K: Are they going to move xxx forward?

M: When they have the situation in hand they will go ahead. The pipeline is about gone. They got 110 tons of rice in one place. They have so many people in the south they will have trouble feeding them.

K: I hope they can keep cutting the roads. That's our principle concern.

M: That operation they have the ______ on Highway 23. Not much traffic there yet. About 50 north and 50 south and those are just censore indicators. Those are just trucks. They got about ______ and they got about 1/2 of them. They got the gunships last night and one Soviet T-34 tanks. Give the President the feel for that before he goes away so he won't wonder all weekend. We will get you the paper on the censore thing. We should set it up so the Soviets cannot threaten us but not in some rigid say that we have problems anytime they task force over here.

K: The paper you have comes close to that.

M: We have a better paper. You will have it in 20-30 mins. Before you leave.

*

By: KHC NARA, Dato: 5/13/04

TELCOM

Rowland Evans/Kissinger

10:50 a.m.

2/20/71

E: Are you going to be in this morning?

K: Yes but we have to put the foreign policy report to bed today. Do you want to have breakfast Mon.?

E: I have breakfast already and the man is coming from Mississippi to see me.

K: Drop names to your old friends. I have to explain -- 5 mins.

E: What about breakfast another day next week?

K: How about Tues.?

E: Tues would be fine. I will call David and see whether Tues or Wed.

K: Wed is better. If there's a Cabinet meeting it will be that morning. In my office Wed. at 8:30.

E: Is the Laos thing going all right?

K: When I get the newspapers I get scared out of my mind. We cut roads except one further west. Wait a minute -- I have a breakfast Wed.

E: Tues then at 8:30.

K: Right. When you come in I will show you a map. The next road is 30 miles west.

E: That's a long way over.

K: The latest intelligence on that road we have not had more than 50 trucks. Route 23. It doesn't go anywhere. It doesn't get them into 1st or 2nd Corps and they have to go half across Cambodia to get to 3rd and 4th corps.

E: Others have been cut.

K: They have by-passes that they can use but if you are in Hanoi planning supply operations, by passes are a problem. We are picking up caches. It's hell to prove things that don't happen.

E: That's right. It might work. The press has been poor on this.

K: It's appalling. They say they are stalled. Until they make a forward there's not sense in going along roads that are already cut. I will show you the maps and make your own judgment.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
J. Alsop/Kissinger
12:45 p.m. 2/20/71

K: Rt. 23 -- 50 trucks maximum. It doesn't get into 1st and 2nd Corps. Supply system not going through there. The pipeline is out.

A: You will find I have paid my respects to my colleagues on Mon.

K: They are fighting hard which indicates raw nerves. Any significant road is cut but the one you mentioned has been not been part of supply system. They haven't got that one on road ______ and we have guerillas against it.

A: And protected on the flanks.

K: Then we will go for the road. They talk to a bunch of soreheaded GIs waiting at Khe Sanh. What GI ever knows what's going on? Unless Abrams is lying to us. Moorer talked to Abrams this morning and Abrams says everything is going ahead. He wants an attack on our flank. Why extend his flank until he has defended it? They are picking up a lot of caches. We are not announcing caches because it's not a goal of the operation. 200 thousand gallons of gas and substantial rice.

A: Won Bin Trong (?). I wrote for Mon. morning saying if there was anything less trivial then yesterday I wasn't aware of it. Everyone focused about the goal without reporting on what's going on.

K: Everyone is afraid it will succeed.

A: You have been unspeakable too.

K: I think they are trying to put me into the Rostow category.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELCON
Peterson/Kissinger
3:25 p.m. 2/20/71

P: Your prognosis was amazingly accurate. I told them what you and I first said that the summit deal involves the President and what was consistent with our decision. I said if you forget whether it's a summit conference or what there's the problem of what we are after and what they are after and what we can negotiate. On the first item, they said they could guess where I got that from and I told them I had a number of reports. I bet they were thinking of you.

K: The safest answer is the President. I can assure you of the President's reaction.

P: Then a fascinating reaction to what you said. They said we know the President reviewed this with the Secy. and he got a favorable reaction.

K: Just pull it into the system. The President this weekend was in the Bahamas with Rogers and others for an evening. I was working on the annual report. He may have said it would be useful and the President said it's interesting.

P: I guess that's what happened. On substance, I got through with my speech -- When you are dealing with tripartite it's harder and it's necessary to understand both sides. They said that's one side but another approach is to start the negotiation and see what evolves. I said you don't know me very well but I will tell you what I think. The State Dept. has a general view of what they think they are after but on special meaty specifics neither you nor Agriculture know what you want. I cannot involve myself in a proposal that doesn't know what it wants and (b)? ? ? ? ?. I will set up a // / /a state dept initiative even on format you will not get it from me. So if you want to assume a task-force interdepartmental issue --

K: OK I would follow that up with a directive within 24 hours or they will try to set up their own group. You have to prevent that and have the recommendation come through you to the President.

P: OK but I thought you would be interested in case you get any flak.

K: I won't do anything in this area without talking with you. They will try to play us off against each other.

P: They were trying to do that with that comment but I said I had a lot of information and it didn't make any difference.

*

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/13/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

6:13 p.m.

2/20/71

L: I am going to talk to Bill but I haven't yet but I thought I should check with you so it wouldn't take you by surprise. We have an area near Tchepone in which Godley will not give authority to hit with B-52. He says it's based on intelligence over a year old that there may be American POWs in the area. We have nothing to substantiate that. I don't like to have them massing forces. I am going to Godley and say I know we have an understanding.

K: Just tell him we want it done.

L: I will tell him SecState agrees with me but I think you should know about it.

K: You can use the President's name. You cannot set up a 7-mile sanctuary in a combat zone.

L: And it's near Tchepone.

K: How's it going?

L: Looks good but I think the NVN wix are getting ready. That's why I want to raise a little hell. I will just go ahead and do it. One other point on the Baltic. I understood you were going to discuss that yesterday and you didn't get around to it.

K: In the afternoon. That's right.

L: When will you do that? We told them they would be able to put forth their points.

K: If they have complaints let them come to me. The President wants it.

L: I would like to make as many port calls in the Baltic as we had in 69.

K: We want something cruising around in the next few weeks to get the message.

L: Do you think they will?

K: They will.

L: Did the meeting work out okay?

K: It was fine and it was all right. From now on he will assume you have a complaint you will make it and not listen to anyone.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Laird/Kissinger

6:13 p.m. 2/20.71

-2-

L: Pursley spoke to Haig. Gardner said they wanted him to make suggestions on improvements. I said I hope you didn't give the impression we were upset.

K: We have no complaints. It went well.

*

By: KML NARA, Dato: S/13/04

TELCOM

1t:40 p. m. 2/22/71

K: I just wanted to make sure that you had a chance to look at that --

J: I have. Let me say the more I get into this exercise I wonder if we should pursue it. Trying to get this down on paper. I had difficulty trying to write mine. The re-draft attempted to deal with the difficulties I had and it makes new difficulties. I wonder if we should try to fix the get it on paper to give to them. My problem is that I have such difficulty expressing what we mean. So hard to find words that describe it. (connection broken and then reinstated) First, I have great difficulty with definition of offensive weapons. We mean ______, IL-28 (?) and submarine launched ballistic missiles but? ? ? ? we don't mean but I don't want to say that. Two, This deployment into or from Cuba and the business of the hemisphere won't the Soviets have to come back and challenge that?

K: We can drop the hemisphere.

J: They gave you to understand that they will not keep a tender down there on any basis and the real issue is that they are keeping one. I don't see a difference of view with you and Dobrynin.

K: That's right.

J: Can't we call him in and say what gives? This is contrary to what you said to me and what do you have to say? Then if he says we never agreed to this or that, then we can take him up on it but I am worried about giving him a paper he feels he has to challenge and two, we seem to give them sanction on this we don't want to give them sanction on. We don't want to say that it's all right for them to deploy missile carrying submarines into the Caribbean or things like that.

K: Let us leave it -- Moorer has sent another version. Let me get it to you and then talk again. I see the force of your arguement.

J: I don't see that we gain from doing it this way. I will wait on word from you.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Mr. Hewitt/Kissinger

11:50 a. m.

2/22/71

K: I am probably waking you up.

H: Perfectly all right.

K: I have a direct question to ask you. You called a couple of weeks ago about our ambassador. I was wondering on a personal pasis how serious that is because we are reviewing a number of things and we want someone there you can work with. We know you are not saying anything officially.

H: Of course. I haven't thought about it since I rang you but I would say the position is as it was at that time.

K: And that is what?

H: It's not easy and simple relationship at all and that if you could improve it I think it would be a good thing.

K: That's what I wanted to be sure was the case and that it wasn't a temporary irritation. And you are sure he did what you said he did?

H: That's correct. It's based on what the PM said to me which is on an authentic report.

K: We are having a meeting on this issue and I want to be sure we understood.

H: It was not a temporary irritation and the situation continues.

K: I appreciate it. I hope to see you soon again.

H: I hope so.

K: Are you coming over?

H: I hope so during the course of theyear. But now we are domestic --

K: I think you should stop by some day so we can catch up. We are prepared to be quite open with you. Give the Prime Minister our warmest regards.

H: I will. Thank you for calling.

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

J. Scali/Kissinger

noon-ish 2/22/71

S: We have an interview of one of our reporters inside Laos who is task force commander of Airborne 11 -- Lt. Col Dung -- near Tchepone. He says some serious things -- a. poor intelligence prior to the operation. Poor reconnaissance. Road is very badly mined and as a result our armored cannot move ahead since Feb. 11 and the Vietcong are using 32 Soviet x tanks and air power not good because the guns in there have been there for a long time. He said they are not only stopped but are not sure they can get back. He says it's unfair test of Vietnamization.

K: At this level you see only your side of your troubles. I don't know if the road is mined. It's not inconceivable that with two weeks warning they would. The strategic concept -- the reason they are not advancing is because of the build up on their flank and because the roads are cut anyway and they don't want to extend their flank sough. They want to fight that battle first. I don't believe there are 32 Soviet tanks. No intelligence shows that.

S: Do you think that as the intelligence gets ahead that the original intelligence will not be good?

K: We knew it wasn't good because we couldn't get in there but so far it's developing as we thought it would.

S: He also says his task force was supposed to be in Tchepone on Feb. 11. You said it wasn't a major objective.

K: As Feb. 11 ? ? ?? ? . Not in the figures I saw. I don't know what happens in the next phase when it's translated into Vietnamese and what they tell their people.

S: Feb. 11 wasn't a target date for anything. What do you assess overrunning of this fire base?

K: You can't fight 10 miles from the NVN border without getting hit. But 600 NVN bodies and 500 weapons (were recovered). But with air power and ______ we put in there it's not a plausible not to hit anything. It will be shown in a few weeks. The fact that one fire base was overrun -- there will be others.

S: ? ? ? ?

K: The reports we get.

S: I wanted to be sure, absolutely sure. I want to figure out tonight.

K: If they run right through two fire bases tonight I will not say it's possible.

I am giving you information as it looks now.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

J. Scalli/Kissinger

noon-ish 2/22/71

-2-

S: That's what I want. I am urging our people not to see Dong as commander in chief of the operation.

K: It's the hardest we have to face.

S: A task force commander wouldn't be very high.

K: Would you ask an American major for an assessment?

S: He is to clear the road.

K: We have made no effort to push ahead since we cut the roads.

S: Doing it deliberately so we won't get a flanking attack.

K: That's right.

S: I just wanted to be absolutely sure of this.

K: Thank you.

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Herb Kaplow/Kissinger
3:05 p.m. 2/22/71

K: What is the situation on Laos thing? Is it --

HAK: Look, I can only tell you how it looks here. I couldn't guarantee what will happen overnight or 3 nights from now. The basic objective is to cut the roads and we have cut all important ones. Not 23. We have two out of three and the other is under constant harrassment. 92, 914, 23 and Route 9. We have forces physically across 9.

K: Going East-West?

HAK: Down 9 to 92. That's objectively completely cut. 914, we are across that too. 234 loops off that. We are not permanently across that but it would be a daring commander to send trucks down that road because it's under easy mortar launch and under observation.

K: The trails are not negotiable by truck.

HAK: Not that I am aware of. On the military situation they are mounting a major attack from 9 south. They have inflicted losses and have suffered losses. What remains to be determined is if SVN can hold them then the major strategic objective would be achieved -- cut off the roads and keep them cut for some time.

K: You said that --

HAK: Also another thing if SVN can keep off a major attack from south of DMZ it's good indication that vietnamization is working.

K: What about pulling this unit through?

HAK: Proves nothing. Over 600 bodies around that perimeter. You would expect something like this to happen.

K: Even if a crack outfit?

HAK: If they had 600 dead there were a lot of men against it.

K: You said 1/2 the series (?) being cut last week. 234 only one open.

HAK: And 23.

K: From East-West what percentage is open?

HAK: One is open and the other one is not open.

K: 23 is still open.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

-2-

HAK: 23 doesn't go anywhere. Towards the center of Cambodia. They have never used it in the past. They would have to transfer their supply system.

K: So 4 counting Route 9.

HAK: 5. They can use 9 mfx so it's only ____.

K: Of the 5 -- 23 open but goes to the center of Laos to Cambodia. Then they would have to find a way of getting from there. And another that is not severed. But under visual and mortar launch. And 214 and ____ are severed. Then they are progressing.

HAK: Yes. If we could keep them in place then the present situation I would consider it a success. The battle of Route 9 depends.

K: Where they're mounting a major offensive?

HAK: Have mounted a series of attacks.

K: How are the ARVN troops --

HAK: About 370. They flew out 200 which left 200 to fight it out and some were lost.

K: On 3 hills 1000 ARVN guys in trouble. I don't know how accurate that is.

HAK: You will have to check the Pentagon for details.

K: What about other ____ of ARVN?

HAK: Not at this point. I cannot tell you whether they can take a sustained pounding. Nothing has happened that's untoward. You would expect casualties. The question is whether they can take it over a period of time.

K: You are talking starting 5 days ago.

HAK: If they can hold this must have, in addition to route cutting, a major impact on the NVN.

K: You think you will be answered in a month?

HAK: If the SVN can hold the NVN in the area where the NVN are concentrated they would have to say chances of defending ____ 200-300 miles in would be diminished.

K: What about other troops? Are they moving?

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Kaplow
Dr. Kissinger / Kissinger
12: 3:05 p.m. 2/22/71

-3-

HAK: They are moving around in south cutting roads. Not moving in the north until the battle is decided. There's nothing to cut after 9 except 23. To consider extending the flank until this is decided -- from a road cutting view it would be foolish to go ahead faster.

K: So they are not stalled, but cannot go ahead.

HAK: Nothing to move to.

K: Has resistance there been stronger than you anticipated?

HAK: Yes.

K: More men or what?

HAK: More men in place than what we thought. We think they had an idea of launching an offensive into I Corps which we think we stopped. I have to go to a meeting and called you because I know you have a deadline.

K: OK. If any questions I will try and check back with you.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Bill Safire/Kissinger
6:30 pm. 2/22/71

S: You on the run or have a few minutes?

K: I have people in my office. I stepped out. How's it going on the M. E.

S: I talked with Rogers and Sisco xap separately and they suggested a turn at writing it but I said no, that's my bag. I listened to their views and now I will write it up as the President said. Taking more credit, taking a more positive attitude and putting a caveat in. I don't have to get it to the President until Wed. so I will give it to you tomorrow.

K: I will call you tomorrow morning.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/The President
9:23 p.m., February 22, 1971

P: How did your meeting go?

K: It went very well. I gave him that note on Cuba saying first that I didn't want to discuss it but that it certainly affects things if we can't rely on one another. I gave him your letter on SALT and he was right with it, started editing it and making suggestions. Some of his suggestions were most constructive. There was a list of what would be permitted but he said whatever is not prohibited is permitted, this isn't the treaty, this is just something that gets the negotiations started and I will get the answer soon, that he realized that it would have to be before March 15.

P: Um-hum.

K: And so he was -- he fell all over himself. He offered again to talk about the Middle East and I ducked that question. On Berlin, I gave him some of the stuff I had from Rush and Bahr. I think we are going to make progress on that too, but when you see that fool of a foreign minister ....

P: I know.

K: ... But then I had an interesting thing -- when I saw him on January 9, we were talking about Vietnam. He said at the time something to the effect, what if they separate political and military issues and I said we can't/won't discuss ________. He said, what if we talk about withdrawal separately from that we had originally just talked about military issues on Berlin. Said he had a message from Hanoi, the Soviets had transmitted to them what we had said about talking out loud ... (interrupted). ......... that secondly, recent events in Indochina make them doubt that we are serious about military ________. Thirdly, any time we want to resume negotiations, they are ready. It shows that they are not at all, they are willing to transmit messages more than they have ever wanted to do before. In this case these guys seem to me to be talk.

P: Um-hum. Yeah, they seem to be willing to talk.

K: That in itself -- they have never talked while they were under pressure.

P: Not yet at least.

K: It is getting a little late.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

9:23 p.m., February 22, 1971 -- page 2

P: Well, I think I would just let that rest for a little while.

K: They seem to have subsided in their northern flank.

P: Of course, it is night over there.

K: No, it is day but they haven't launched any attacks within the last 24 hours.

P: The South Vietnamese launched some attacks.

K: They seem to be moving up one of those roads.

P: At least the dialogue is open.

K: Yes, the dialogue is open and I think we have a chance.

P: The fact that they are not jumping up and down means something.

K: They are for some reason pinning (?) after a .......

P: When is their Party meeting?

K: March 24th and I think they want things settled before then.

P: You mean this SALT thing?

K: Yes, Mr. President.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
2/23/71 8:10 a.m.

K: The President is having connictions about TV reports last night and this morning saying Defense and State are saying the operations are stalled, the roads aren't cut and the White House is putting an optimistic loss on it all. We shouldn't be in that position; we have got to make people shut up. The purpose of it is to cut roads.

L: Is to disrupt operations, and our statements are going along that line. I read over that transcript when they asked if the Ranger defeat was a substantial one and I thought the answer Jerry gave was excellent. He said the enemy is standing and fighting. The reports of their losses aren't in and finalized yet but when they are in they will be substantial. He said the Secretary of Defense has indicated there will be tough fighting and that not every battle will be a victory. The problem is people are trying to give the idea we are going to Tchepone; they should keep that down. There are 25 separate roads in there -- we are across a quarter of them already. . . . the South Vietnamese are across a quarter of them already.

K: What we have been saying here is based on the briefings Moorer sends over every morning, that of the three motorable roads we have got 2: 914 and 929(?).

L: The thing about it is that I think the idea of having big success now is not as important as it's going to be three or four weeks from now.

K: No, what we are concerned about is the press saying the White House is putting a gloss on it. We don't need to claim big successes now because we are still going to take more setbacks. But we shouldn't let the press play one off against another. Most of these troubles occurred on a background basis.

L: We didn't give any on a background basis.

K: And you'll give a confident one tomorrow?

L: Yes, and I'll be up on the Hill today. But I shouldn't be over-confident. This Tri loss is a big loss.

K: Thinh xinxucharge isn't in charge now -- it's a General Minh.

L: Right now the man actually running the show is Thinh.

K: But he's not as good as Tri?

L: No. They are going to put Minh in but he's not as good as Tri. It's a big loss and they are getting ready for one hell of a fight down there.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird

2/23/71 8:10 a.m. page 2

K: You think it was an accident or some sabotage?

L: I think it was an accident. I don't know, but I just assume it was.

K: It never happens to the bad guys.

L: Is this Ron's statement they are playing against Jerry?

K: Apparently. I got a call at midnight with people being upset. The President saw the late news last night and was mad as hell.

L: I see this Washington Post story.

K: That's the one.

L: [Reads from W. P.]

K: Oh well that's all right.

L: "At the White House Ron Ziegler said tough fighting was expected but the main goal of the drive had been accomplished . . . "

K: I'm just talking about what was picked up on TV -- I'm not saying anyone did anything wrong.

L: I'll talk to Dan and Jerry right now.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
2/23/71 8:55 a.m.

L: Henry I've been checking out these various statements around town -- and I think we are going to run into more of this. There were four briefings in Washington yesterday: One here, one in State and two in the White House.

K: What were the two in the White House.

L: One by Herb Klein's group and one by Ron Ziegler. And if you read them over you can find differences. Then there was one in MACV and one in Region One. If I was a newspaper man I'd crucify this Administration with this.

K: Of course, you are absolutely right. I am going to shut off Klein right now. What can we do about the others?

L: When they talk, everyone should know what the other guy is going to say. State made a big thing out of Tchepone -- they've got to all talk the same way.

K: You are right; I couldn't agree with you more. I am going to make sure he (?) gets them all together every morning. I'll do what I have just told you in this building.

L: Okay. Also I understood the President was thinking of having Al go to Southeast Asia.

K: Yes.

L: I hope you don't send him till the operation is about half-way through. Abe will react if he sends him right when something goes a little bad.

K: Let me talk with you about this -- I've just been called to the President.

L: Okay. I feel very strongly about it -- I think Abrams would really resent it right now.

K: Can I talk with you about it later?

L: Okay.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Sen. Dole/Kissinger

10:05 a.m.

2/23/71

D: Do you have any thoughts on how to handle the action of the Democratic policy committee? ~~Anxxx~~ Ending the war by '72.

K: By or before?

D: They are talking about the 92nd Congress which will end in '72. Handle it as endorsement of the Nixon policy?

K: Just say we will stand on our record. We have been withdrawing troops.

D: I thought we might be able to ~~snack~~ snake it around. At least we should answer. Say we are proceeding on schedule?

K: And that we will stand on our record in '72.

D: It's an indication --

K: I don't think we should nail ourselves to a time certainty. We need it to play with for our diplomacy.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

John Chancellor/Kissinger

10:18 a.m.

2/23/71

C: Has anybody asked you to the radio and TV correspondents dinner?

K: I am invited, yes.

C: I just wanted to ask you. Another thing -- we have a small and discreet
lunch group that meets with people in the administration and on the HILL.

There's Otten and Dave Kraslow. Littlerand (?) and Nolan. (listed several
others). We meet on a total background basis and we wondered if you want
to come and talk about things.

K: Contrary to what I usually do.

C: Not about politicics.

K: Sure.

C: Mar. 22 and 29 are open and we wondered --

K: Unless I go on vacation then. I am thinking of going the week of the 22nd or
29th.

C: We have both dates open at the moment. We can be flexible about it.

K: I have the 15th open. I will not be away then.

C: Let me call you back.

K: The other two dates will be all right but I may not make up my mind for
a week or two.

C: We will keep both dates and if you can't do either then we will get someone
else. I will call you about Mar. 10.

K: By that time I will certainly know.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

McGeo. Bundy/Kissinger

10:24 a.m.

2/23/71

K: I want to tell you that I put your institute in the President's annual report and if that doesn't show interest, nothing will. I have told Jack Irwin and even the bureaucracy will have to look at the report.

B: Thank you. Sorry to add to your wordage. How is Laos?

K: It's cutting the roads which is its primary objective. But the press stories that are getting through are 4-5 days behind events.

B: I am worried about their people and ours.

K: Whether the SVN can hold the lines north of Route 9. Right now it looks okay.

B: Their stake in success is greater than anyones.

K: Abrams has not put in the reserves he has and tells us it's under control and the other side has heavy casualties and he cannot see how they can keep it up. If the SVN hold them given the scale of attacks, then it will be more important. The NVN will draw conclusions from that. If they don't hold we will fight out what we would have found out next year.

B: Do you have a sense of length of the testing time?

K: 3-4 weeks.

B: I can imagine being on your side of this one. It's not easy.

K: You can tell who your people are.

B: You have avoided the things that (offended?) me. Not having speech and not having U.S. were good not to have.

K: We are not claiming spectacular success. If the SVN are routed it will lead to somber examinations. But we would have found that out next year anyway. If they hold, the opposite will be true. Right now the evidence is they are holding.

B: The long term problem is how you do support is not easy. That's the unanswered question in currently stated policy. Maybe your review answers that.

K: Not in great detail.

B: I can't blame you for that.

K: One has to give it a great deal of thought.

NARA, Dalo

5/26

McGeo. Bundy/Kissinger

10:24 a.m.

2/23/71

B: Let me give you one you don't want to know about. I think there's a solution. The President's environmental message speaks of an environmental institute. We are behind it and put it into Train's head. It's all set to go but Haldeman made a whack at Entoven. He didn't know the grounds but I think these fellows decided a McNamara whiz kid must be bad but he is a great guy.

K: I have talked with Shulta and I am conscious of the problem. McNamara has been very conscientious to us. Entovan has strong views but he's a good character. I am trying to Marshall people and get a whack at it.

B: The people you will know better than I but the truth of the matter and I have made these two points -- this is so widely known that if it fails on this ground no one can prevent the backlash. We are not interested in trouble but Kaysen knows about it and the scientific board.

K: We should avoid a Frank Long blow-up.

B: It will not be if it's straightened out. Everyone is holding his breath.

K: But it can't be a test of strength.

B: I am not suggesting that.

K: I know your not. If Carl could be --

B: He won't do anything.

K: Give me a week or two on it.

B: Alan is quite hopeful.

K: So am I. I think it can be managed but best if it's done so people don't have to reverse themselves but put forth as their own view.

B: There's evidence that overall that -- look at Alan's book and he gives tribute to Jackson, etc.

K: Our defense policy isn't that different from yours.

B: It's not that kind of issue. I am very much impressed by Geo.'s approach to this matter and make the government understand what has to be done and it's that sense of hope that makes me sorry about the failure. If it were 3 other guys it would be bad for one but there are not 3 other guys.

K: I am glad to know of your interest.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

McGeo. Bundy/Kissinger

10:24 a.m.

2/23/71

K: We are half committed if we can agree on the leadership. We will put in $2 million a year.

K: When I go through the defense budget and they speak of trivial item of $20 million.

B: Thank you for calling. Can I talk to John Irwin about this? He needs to send out a signal.

K: Wait until tomorrow.

B: I will wait until I see it in the papers and then offer help.

K: I will see him for lunch and tell him.

By

D

NARA, Date

5/26

TELECON

Taft Schrieber/Mr. Kissinger

1:15 p.m., February 23, 1971

K: Taft, how are you? It's nice to hear from you.

S: I just wanted to reaffirm that we will be down this weekend. We are looking forward to visiting with you. However, if for any reason you have to move it, don't hesitate.

K: No, I'm counting on lunch with you on Saturday.

S: Where shall we meet you?

K: Come to my office and we can walk over to the Sans Souci.

S: I will have Rita with me.

K: She's been in the White House?

S: We have been there for dinner a couple of times.

K: I thought maybe she would want a tour.

S: No. We will come in the back?

K: No, come in the west portico at the northwest corner. Where are you staying?

S: At the Madison.

K: How about 12:45 or 1:00?

S: We'll be there at 12:45. Thank you, Henry.

K: I look forward to seeing you.

lds

By. NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCORN
H. Klein/Kissinger
4:47 p.m. 2/23/71

K: It went very well this morning.

HAK: I don't want it distributed. The transcript.

K: We never do. I get a copy for review. Brandon -- I don't know how he got in. He must have walked in with someone else. It's the first time that's happened. Laos -- we are building an emotional that we feel we are trying to block something.

HAK: We are letting correspondents in now.

K: I just talked to Hencken. He thought there was a change in 72 hours.

HAK: They have been authorized to go in in American helicopters.

K: Not according to him in the last 5 mins.

HAK: The President has authorized it.

K: Whatever you could do to push it -- from our standpoint, not theirs.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
2/23/71 5:05 p.m.

L: I wanted to go over a little bit with you the correspondence and context with Abrams -- he is doing a hell of a job.

K: I know he is.

L: We shouldn't be raising too much hell with him at this time.

K: But the President is eager to have Haig go there.

L: You tell the President I am very much against it and want to talk with him before he sends him.

K: But he isn't doing it against Abe.

L: But that's the way he'd take it. The best time for Haig to go is in two weeks. This is a hell of a bad idea. Sends Abe right up the wall -- it really is. I'll talk to you and I want to talk to the President about that. This is what everyone things. Ask Tom; he'll tell you the same thing.

K: That's assuming Haig is going to go in and run the war, which he isn't. He's going there to talk to Bunker and Abe to get a feel for what we do after this. The last thing anyone would do is to tell a Brigadier General to do in there and conduct the operations. We haven't asked him to do that.

L: But they got the idea that that's what he went for last time.

K: I'll ask the President to call you about it.

L: We've got to rely on Abe. Whether we like it or not he's the best man we could possible have in this particular job at this time.

K: No question about it. He did a superb job in Cambodia.

L: I have been on the Hill testifying all day. We can keep this in perspective if everyone doesn't panic.

K: That batallion was no problem at all -- that's what we expected.

L: No, and we don't want to overstate what we're doing either. There are 15 roads or major arteries. They are wanting to discuss road numbers with me. I said I won't because every day things will change around. We are not staying camped on Route 92 -- we may fade off and on.

K: Some of this came out in the briefing of leaders this morning. And some came from what Vogt had done when he talked with the Democrats. On the maps they show me they just have 3 or 4 motorable roads shown. Lot of frails for bicycles.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird

2/23/71 5:05 p.m. page 2

L: Well there's a lot of stuff that doesn't go by trucks. On Route 92 there are four major bypasses and sometimes as much as six where you can use trucks.

K: We will be careful about that in the future.

L: We are going to do well on this.

K: I am sure we will, but it's not Haig's purpose to . . .

L: After we get a little further along Abe will be in a better position to give a message to the President on the success of the operation. Kx I'd rather wait for two weeks and then let him go so he can have a hopeful report.

K: Let me take that up with the President.

L: This is nothing against Al; I think Al is great.

K: No, it's nothing against Al.

L: But the problem is not wanting to bug Abrams while he is in the middle of a crucial operation.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Rick Smith

7:05 p.m., February 23, 1971

S: I see the Republican battalions have been sent in.

K: What does that mean?

S: The Scotts and Fords -- sense the hand of the field marshal. I have a few questions based on what they said.

K: We didn't announce that we had cut the coca cola line yet.

S: (laughter) This business of three out of four roads.

K: I don't want to get into the military business. This was to explain to the leaders. There are 3 out of 4 motorable truck routes -- this doesn't mean that there aren't bicycle trails that they can still use.

S: I don't know whether they got those numbers -- maybe where possible three out of four roads.

K: You have to look at what area he is talking about.

S: The three roads -- 9, 92, and 914.

K: That's essentially right.

S: But 9 is running east-west.

K: And then there is 223 (?)

S: Is that motorable?

K: 234 is marginally.

S: Marginally motorable -- what about other ones in this area? The picture we got is that 3/4 of the job is done.

K: Look, Rick, I don't want to get into this publicly. I tried to explain the strategic concept to these guys.

S: Maybe it wasn't the field marshal -- talking to Hugh Scott for privacy is pretty tough to do.

K: The hammer lock ......... don't want to get into this business right now. Another 2-3 weeks is soon enough to get into it on a military basis.

NARA. Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Rick Smith

7:05 p.m., February 23, 1971

S: 914.... Route 223 further west but more vulnerable to (reading) ....................

K: Yeah, but 920 -- I haven't got it right in front of me.

S: Am I going to be misleading people?

K: I don't think -- you won't be radically misleading.

S: How about the former ........

K: It depends what period you were talking about. It is not high.
Certainly reduced but we have to wait.

S: From the week immediately before the operation.

K: The week after the operation.

S: They went like bloody crazy.

K: I would think it would be reduced from the period before. I am
in the process of analyzing this but will be in a better position
later. If you were talking about direct traffic, it has been
reduced. ______ back and forth on the routes has not been
reduced.

S: Well, do you have a feeling at this stage -- do you know whether
or not this will affect the American withdrawals?

K: Much too early.

S: The first setback, would that _______?

K: Westmoreland's 200,000.

S: I am still being attacked for disclosing that. Why the bombing? ? ? ?

K: No, but that was really the missile sites.

S: No supply depots, corollary targets?

K: Only if they are closely associated with the SAMs.

S: In the same category -- in other words they were not supply targets.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Joseph Kraft

7:25 p.m., February 23, 1971

K: You wanted me to call you.

JK: Oh, no, I passed a message to Dave Young which is really all I wanted to say. I can repeat it for you although it is not so easy for me. I just really wanted to say out of a long acquaintance with you -- I think it doesn't help so much now. I think people are reacting in a negative way to ________.

K: Not that much to be humorous about.

JK: You do have a humorous way but I just wanted to say that.

K: Okay, Joe.