ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY

U. S. Infantry Association, 1893-1950

U. S. Field Artillery Association, 1910-1950

HONORARY PRESIDENT

COL. HARRY S. TRUMAN

President of the United States

PRESIDENT

LT. GEN. GEORGE H. DECKER, USA (Inf)

VICE PRESIDENT

GEN. JOHN E. HULL, USA (Inf)

SECRETARY-GENERAL MANAGER

COL. JOSEPH I. GREENE, USA-Ret (Inf)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

COL. ARTHUR SYMONS, USAR (Arty)

TREASURER

MARGUERITE MATTISON

ASSISTANT TREASURER

MAJ. ORVILLE C. SHIREY, USAR (Inf)

ATTORNEY

COL. FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER

USAR (JAGC)

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

For the term ending June 1953

MAJ. GEN. GEORGE I. BACK, USA (SigC)

BRIG. GEN. HARRY MCK. ROPER, USA
(Arty)

COL. ERNEST C. NORMAN (Arty)

COL. FREDERICK S. LEE (MPC)

COL. LAWRENCE L. HEINLEIN, NGUS
(CE)

COL. ROBERT F. COCKLIN, NGUS (Arty)

Vacancy

For the term ending June 1954

GEN. WADE H. HAISLIP, USA-Ret (Inf)

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM H. ABENDROTH,
NGUS (Armor)

BRIG. GEN. GEORGE C. STEWART, USA
(Inf)

BRIG. GEN. HARRY H. SEMMES, USAR
(Armor)

BRIG. GEN. CLAUDE H. CHORPENING,
USA (CE)

COL. CHARLES A. H. THOMSON, USAR
(Inf)

CAPT. WILLIAM M. GLASGOW, JR. (Inf)

For the term ending June 1955

LT. GEN. ANTHONY C. MCAULIFFE, USA
(Arty)

MAJ. GEN. EGBERT F. BULLENE, USA
(CmIC)

BRIG. GEN. MALCOLM F. LINDSEY, USA-
Ret (Inf)

BRIG. GEN. JOHN C. OAKES, USA (Arty)

COL. RICHARD P. OVENSHINE (Inf)

COL. JOHN LEMP, USAR (Arty)

COL. CHESTER V. CLIFTON, JR. (Arty)

U. S. ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

The Combat Forces Journal is not the mouthpiece of the Department of Defense. The fact that an article appears in its columns does not indicate the approval of the views expressed in it by any group or any individual other than the author. It is our policy to print articles on subjects of interest to the Armed Forces in order to stimulate thought and promote discussion; this regardless of the fact that some or all of the opinions advanced may be at variance with those held by the officers of the Association of the U. S. Army and the editors of Combat Forces Journal.

UNITED STATES ARMY
COMBAT FORCES

Journal

INFANTRY JOURNAL

1904-1950

FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL

1910-1950

EDITOR

Col. Joseph I. Greene, Inf-Ret.

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

John B. Spore

ASSISTANTS TO THE EDITOR

Col. Arthur Symons, Arty-USAR

N. J. Anthony

Esther E. Bennett

ASSISTANT EDITORS

Col. Robert F. Cocklin, Arty-NGUS

Maj. Orville C. Shirey, Inf-USAR

Vol. 3, No. 6

January, 1953

COVER: President-Elect Dwight D. Eisenhower, the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon. (Photos by United Press, Harris & Ewing, Department of Defense and Department of State.)

TO THE EDITORS
'FAR FROM DEFEATISM.'

2

General Eisenhower's statement on his trip to Korea 5

COMMAND POST FOR THE COLD WAR.

Dwight D. Eisenhower 6

Frigidus Strategicus 7

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 10

UNIFIED PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES. Brig. Gen. A. S. Newman 12

DOES WAR WORRY YOU? Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg 16

PROMOTION PROBLEMS 18

TALKING TACTICS. Capt. Clay Schoenfeld 20

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE INFANTRY? SFC Armored Infantryman 23

WHAT'S IN A NAME? Maj. Reginald Hargreaves 24

MOBILITY AND THE FIRE DIRECTION CENTER.

Lt. Col. John D. Byrne 29

ROADBLOCK. Maj. John C. Fralish 32

CEREBRATIONS 38

FRONT AND CENTER 40

IRONS IN THE FIRE 42

BOOK REVIEWS 44

OFF-DUTY READING 45

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is published monthly by the Association of the United States Army. Publication date: 25th of preceding month. Publication, Editorial and Executive Offices: 1529 Eighteenth Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Copyright, 1952, by Association of the United States Army. Entered as Second Class Matter at Washington, D. C., additional entry at Richmond, Va., under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Circulation Manager: D. A. Mulloy

Assistant: Doris Montgomery

One year $5.00; two years $9.00 when paid in advance; three years $12.00 when paid in advance. Group subscriptions to units and activities of the Armed Forces $4.50 each when paid in advance. Subscriptions for libraries, civilian groups or activities, and others not eligible for membership in the Association of the U. S. Army $5.00 per year. Foreign subscriptions $6.00 payable in advance. For other rates write Circulation Manager, Combat Forces Journal, 1529 18th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

Advertising Director. Robert F. Cocklin

Assistant. Lenna Pedigo

ADVERTISING REPRESENTATIVES

New York Office

55 West 55th Street, New York 19, N. Y.

Judson 6-4099

San Francisco Office

Duncan A. Scott Co.

Mills Building, San Francisco, Calif.

Garfield 1-7950

Los Angeles Office

2978 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif.

Dunkerque 8-4151

Advertising rates furnished upon request to any of the advertising offices

Consider Equipment... Facilities...
Manpower... Experience-

ONLY THE
RAILROADS

can handle the
toughest transportation
assignment

Bigger, better equipped, and more
experienced than all other public trans-
portation systems put together
—that's the Railroads' story
in one simple statement.
From coast to coast, from Canada to the
Gulf, the Railroads are ready to
help you. They'll deliver dependable,
efficient, comfortable transportation
... wherever you want to go,
whenever you want to go.
For one or many—today's
best transportation is travel by train!

Attractive reduced
fares for furloughees

Also 10% discount allowed
for all military travel
on transportation requests

The
Railroads
of the United States

America's most complete transportation system

JANUARY, 1953

1

★ To the Editors ... ★

Belle
of the barracks!

Out of the secret laboratories where war-time communications are perfected comes your passport to faraway places. Here is a portable radio so vastly superior in quality and precision it challenges and defies comparison! The brilliant new-

hallicrafters

World-Wide

8-Band Portable

The favorite in any barracks—or anywhere you find a man with an interest in what's going on in the rest of the world. Just a few minutes' demonstration will show you the difference *precision*—Hallicrafters Precision—makes to you. •

with magic-carpet ease you'll tour the world. Moscow, Paris, Rio, Tokyo, Rome—they are all at your fingertips. Marine broadcasts, police radio, amateurs, aircraft, and of course, far more powerful regular broadcast reception, too.

Guaranteed to outperform any portable radio, anywhere, any time, at any price. Plays on trains, planes, ships. Humidity-proofed. Three antennas. Dynamic Turret Tuner. 117 volt AC-DC or battery.

hallicrafters

CHICAGO 24, ILLINOIS
World's Leading Manufacturer
of Precision Radio Communications
Equipment for the Armed Services

*"Stress the Fundamentals"*

To the Editor:

Compliments on the November issue.

I thought "Stress the Fundamentals," by General Collins, was one of the finest articles ever published. Hope that you can have some more like that.

How about a good article on armor stressing the application of these fundamentals and the close support of infantry and artillery in such a situation?

LT. COL. EVERETT H. RUNKLE
USAR

3517 N.E. Bryce St.
Portland 13, Ore.

* Colonel Runkle's letter typifies many other favorable comments on General Collins' article. We'll see what we can do about a similar article on armor.

Iron Discipline Needed

To the Editor:

I am afraid to speak out critically lest someone think I'm another pipsqueak like Pvt. Hargrove, but I'm mightily afraid that the Army at its lower level is horribly untrained, undisciplined and incompetent.

I say this because I want to see us have a good Army, not because it is unpleasant to me individually.

Contrary to popular belief, the American soldier is at heart a goldbrick, eight-ball and all around yo-yo who would rather do anything than fight. To be sure there are a certain number of priceless youngsters who are hot for bloodletting but they are all too few.

I have seen so many Americans do less than their duty in combat that I am now a violent and unashamed advocate of the cat-o'-nine-tails and the hangman's noose.

Once a soldier becomes used to brutal treatment from his noncoms and the noncoms understand that they are part of an Army, not a Boy Scout troop, then you can begin to treat them decently. By that time they have learned to appreciate leniency. You need not worry about the conscientious soldier—he will stay out of trouble and will be heartened when he sees that the shirkers are forced to do theirs or suffer.

I have seen the American soldier acquit himself with a nobility that is beyond belief. I have also seen many soldiers of other nations doing likewise. But our namby-pamby discipline make us, I fear, the laughingstock of professional soldiers of other nations.

We have the best artillery, splendid engineers and good weapons—everything but superior close-combat troops. We can do much better—and must.

Don't use my name please.

SGT. CHESTY

Ex-187th Airborne RCT
Korea

Marine Tanker

To the Editor:

In regard to "The Maintenance Platoon," by Lt. Col. McFalls in the October issue, I would like to comment and add the views of a company maintenance sergeant of a Marine Corps tank battalion.

My section is equipped with an M32-B3 retriever. Our tanks, except for two dozer tanks, are M46 and M46A1.

Often when using the retriever's winch we also use as many as four snatch blocks, depending on how deep a hole the crippled tank is in. The big drawback is the time it takes to rig all this tackle. And in certain conditions, time is everything.

As for towing, an assist from an M46 is a big help. The slippage of the torque converter is a boon to the retriever's clutch. However, I'm not suggesting that our next retriever be equipped with a torque converter type transmission. They stall out too easily.

Here are a few items I'd like to add to Colonel McFalls's "ideal retriever." An individual engine for powering the winch, an auxiliary generator, air compressor for impact winch, and the boom mounted on a revolving turret.

But leave off any kind of hydraulic gear, "A" frame or otherwise. Maintenance of hydraulic gear is too much trouble.

T/Sgt. JAMES L. BELL
USMC

1st Tk Bn, 1st Mar Div, FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, Cal.

House Trailers

To the Editor:

As a member of the Association and a serviceman who lives in a house trailer, I would like to request the investigation of possible legislation (if not already under study) concerning the transportation cost of moving trailers when servicemen receive PCS orders. As a first lieutenant I am allowed 7,500 pounds of household goods. The Army will crate and ship them to my new post, at considerable cost to the Government. But families with large trailers have to pay from 18 to 28 cents per mile to have them moved. The government pays them nothing to move their household goods.

If the government paid each serviceman living in a house trailer 25 cents per mile, it would no more than equal the cost of shipping that same family's household goods.

LT. ROBERT E. SKIMIN

Fort Bragg, N. C.

Mixed Captions

To the Editor:

In regard to the article, "Why Not SP" by Lt. Col. Moore in your November issue, I believe that the captions under the

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

2

COMMAND POST
FOR THE COLD WAR

Frigidus Strategicus

IN the months following the outbreak of the Korean conflict several U.S. divisions were sent to Germany to bolster our forces there and to show the world that we were prepared to live up to our NATO commitments. These were military moves and the divisions sailed directly to German ports and moved into training areas of the U.S. Zone.

It was proposed at the time that one of the divisions be disembarked at a French port and routed through Paris where it could parade. The appearance of a newly arrived American division marching through Paris would be tangible evidence of American determination and would help spike the Soviet propaganda that we expect the Europeans to do our fighting for us. Of course, this would have been a more expensive move than the other, but the propaganda benefits could have been enormous. The proposal got short shrift, if any, in Washington and one reason is clearly because our national policy makers have become so involved in the military task of winning World War III that they are missing opportunities that will help win the cold war.

And yet it is our definite, committed policy to fight a cold war in the expectation that victory in it will prevent a hot one.

This failure is largely due to the lack of an effective over-all command post in Washington that can give direction and meaning to all our cold war efforts. These efforts lie in four principal fields: political, military, economic and psychological. Many of our past failures have been due to overplaying one type of effort and underplaying another. Most underplayed of all has been in the area of psychological warfare.

General Eisenhower recognized this weakness in our organization and at San Francisco on 9 October he outlined his plans for creating an organization in Washington that would call the signals for the entire U.S. team.

A number of postwar moves have given us a stronger security system. The three armed forces have been harnessed into a single Department of Defense; the National Security Council has been formed to coordinate political and economic policy and military power; and the Central Intelligence Agency was created to provide the President with the national estimates needed as a base for his decisions. But the cold war requires something still more—an element in the government capable of giving strategic direction to the operating departments and agencies, similar to the guidance the Army, Navy and Air Force receive from the JCS.

A glance at the present system will show why we need a cold war command post that can think and act and direct all of our power towards victory.

REAL security depends first upon effective foreign policies. The Secretary of State is the principal adviser to the President on these matters. The Department of State in close concert with the Defense Department makes the major contribution to the first essential element in assuring national security—the determination of a sound foreign policy.

As the next step, the NSC selects broad American objectives—such as shoring up the Middle East, negotiating for base rights with Spain, or defending Formosa. The applica-

The author of this article has been in a position to observe some of the deficiencies of our organization for fighting the cold war.

JANUARY, 1953

7

tion of national policy is normally the
responsibility of the governmental de-
partment or agency having the principal
interest in the particular task. The
President usually designates one depart-
ment head as the coordinator of all
aspects of a given program. The NSC
—the top policy body—keeps out of any
coordination of operations.

This arrangement has often broken
down. In assisting the President and
determining foreign policy, the State
Department occupies a special position.
In working out its portion of a given
policy by traditional diplomacy, it is on
a par with other departments and agen-
cies of the government. But as of now,
there is no government quarterback,
other than the President, who can blend
the purely diplomatic moves of State
with the military deployment of Defense
and the foreign activities of other agen-
cies. This gap is the missing element in
our machinery to win the cold war.

GENERAL EISENHOWER proposes
to fill that gap—to bring "all our
forces at the same time under the same
plan on the same target."

This is his plan in broad outline:

"First: We must adapt our foreign policy to a 'cold war' strategy that is unified and coherent.

"Second: In spirit and resolve we should see in this cold war a chance to gain a victory without casualties, to win a contest that can quite literally save peace.

"Third: We must realize that as a nation, everything we say, everything we do, and everything we fail to say or do will have its impact in other lands. It will affect the minds and wills of men and women there.

"Fourth: We must choose a man of exceptional qualifications to handle the national psychological effort. He should have the full confidence of, and direct access to, the Chief Executive. I have suggested in other talks that this function may be best worked out through a revitalized and reconstructed National Security Council."

THE President, of course, is superior to
all government departments. But he,
as an individual, requires a staff group to
help him discharge his command func-
tions over the weapons used in today's
cold war. The President is confronted
daily with big international problems
which he cannot possibly consider ade-
quately. He needs a staff to help him
weigh and act upon the military, eco-
nomic, and diplomatic factors involved
in the daily changing world situation.

The NSC as presently conceived
does not do this. It functions in the
manner of a committee of equals and
not as a staff. The fallacy of conduct-
ing warfare, whether cold or hot, by
the committee method has often been

demonstrated. The cold war is in many
ways less susceptible to committee man-
agement than a hot war. Besides, the
Department heads who are members of
the NSC are burdened with the opera-
tion of large departments. These re-
sponsibilities prevent them from being
available to work on the problem from
the same point of view as the President.

The need for improving the govern-
mental machinery for our psychological
and related cold war efforts was officially
recognized in April, 1951, when Presi-
dent Truman created the Psychological
Strategy Board. Confusion and divi-
sion of responsibility for the charting of
strategic offensives in the propaganda,

political, economic fields, and military
deployment—which taken together spell
the Cold War—were behind President
Truman's decision to create a separate
agency for that purpose. This new
agency, an independent unit, operates
through the State and Defense Depart-
ments and the Central Intelligence
Agency, and reports to the National Se-
curity Council. It can coordinate and
exhort but never direct the departments
and agencies that comprise it.

The experience gained by Psychologi-
cal Strategy Board can help shape the de-
tailed design of the cold war mechanism
envisioned by our new President. Its en-
davors to coordinate the psychological
operations of the member departments

and agencies have conclusively demon-
strated that our present governmental
machinery is organized primarily for con-
ducting its foreign relations in either a
period of genuine peace or in a period of
officially recognized war—but not for
"cold war."

TO tighten our cold war machinery, General Eisenhower proposes "a revitalized and reconstructed National Security Council." Barring any claim to prophecy, these characteristics are likely to be incorporated in its ultimate design:

(1) The National Security Council will be given the proper authority and staff to bring into a single focus the plans and operations of all U.S. agencies involved in the cold war.

(2) It will assume, absorb and enlarge upon many of the planning functions now charged to the Psychological Strategy Board.

(3) It will provide the President with a strong staff to which he can look for advice and through which he can transmit his orders and instructions to the cold war battle fronts. Actual cold war operations will continue to be conducted by existing departments and agencies.

TWENTIETH century totalitarianism
has produced a revolution in the con-
duct of international relations which
combines political, military, economic,
and propaganda warfare into a whole,
making it more than the sum of isolated
functions.

The Soviets believe the crushing of
the will to resist or fight is the primary
aim of warfare. Consequently, they al-
ways give the highest place to means of
capturing the "minds and wills of men."
Until recently we have sought to keep
Soviet aggression at bay primarily with
economic or military aid programs
(UNRRA, ECA, MDAP), or as in Ko-
rea, we have met aggression head-on
with arms. We have sometimes forgot-
ten that we can't win unless we appeal
to and capture "the minds and wills of
men"—unless we use all our weapons on
this vital endeavor.

The creation of the Psychological
Strategy Board was the right approach.
These beginnings, if transplanted to a
"revitalized NSC," will provide top-level
coordination and supervision in behalf
of the President on State, Defense, Mu-
tual Security, and other agency pro-
grams required to carry out national
psychological objectives. Let's take a
quick look at these four major programs.

Diplomacy is the tool by which politi-
cal influence is applied by one nation
upon another. While diplomacy is a

8

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

major function of the Department of State, other agencies also conduct activity which is political in nature and which should fall within the framework of an over-all plan of political action.

Many elements of government may utilize these political means. The MSA Ambassador in Europe has often been directly involved in political activity in the broad sense by giving support to such undertakings as the Schuman Plan. Likewise, General Eisenhower, while Supreme Commander of SHAPE, had to concern himself with political as well as military affairs. His London speech in July 1951, suggesting a European Army, was one striking example. Military missions, likewise, have political significance. Needless to say, the commercial activities of American airlines and oil companies have political consequences in the strictest sense of the word. The significance of the presence of American oil companies in Saudi Arabia is one bright mark in a troubled area.

The Department of Defense has the primary task to consider the force element in international relations. The military situation, however, can be altered by psychological and economic action outside of the direct competence of the Department of Defense. The scale down of the NATO defense goals for both economic and political reasons is a case in point. Promotion of effective alliances, an essential element in a total military program, can only be accomplished by the most careful support of all other means by which understandings are reached with other nations.

At least four agencies in the government are engaged in purely propaganda activities. Propaganda means the planned use of all kinds of communications to influence the actions of other peoples. A State Department committee now exists for coordinating the purely propaganda activities of these agencies. So far, this mechanism has not created an over-all propaganda plan, nor fully utilized all the propaganda machinery within the Government. It likewise has lacked the authority to suggest and to coordinate actions by which conditions most appropriate for propaganda exploitation could be created.

American economic programs impinging on the rest of the world, such as Mutual Security, or Point Four technical aid, must also be coordinated with the other major forces through which national policies are executed. The Soviets pitch their whole propaganda in Asia

and the Middle East on the promise of economic betterment. In Europe the close connection between our military and economic aid programs is everywhere evident.

In résumé, all departments and agencies have a primary interest in at least one of the four major fields through which foreign policies are implemented. The principal ones—State, Defense and MSA—have a significant interest in fields which are not their primary concern. In the past it has been too often taken for granted that all the activities being sponsored either directly or indirectly by the various departments in a given field represent all that could or should be undertaken. Yet piecemeal planning has left inevitable gaps and duplications in our political, economic and

### Appointment with History

We are not trying to remake the world in the image of America. We are not trying to force any man to our way if it is not his. We are not trying to buy peace or bring peace with the sword.

But we are a people who are strong in faith and purpose and moral courage. And we have an appointment with history.

If we can show to all the peoples of this earth by measures like those I have described tonight that their hope is our hope, that their goal is our goal, then we shall keep that appointment with history.

And that appointment is the most important that history has ever made, for it can bring peace on earth.

### GENERAL EISENHOWER

San Francisco, 9 October 1952

psychological programs. It is impossible for the Secretary of any department to see the inadequacies of what should be a national "cold war" program from the viewpoint of his own portion of the total job. Inadequacies and duplications can be spotted, and specific improvements proposed, only by individuals charged with guiding and monitoring the tasks of the separate departments from an over-all point of view. This fundamental organization fact underlines most pointedly the need for transforming the National Security Council into the President's right arm for running the cold war.

There is a growing awareness in our armed forces that cold war actions are not incidental but directly related to their national defense mission. General Bradley's remark that our Korean POW stand (adopted with regard to the total

cold war situation) may help us go a long way toward avoiding World War III, is a significant example.

The POW issue in Korea and other events are leading soldiers to think not only in terms of material defense but at least as urgently in the psychological element. In this view, the whole SHAPE enterprise is as important psychologically as it is militarily. But this recognition places all of our defense efforts on quite a different timetable. We should be less concerned with some hypothetical future conflict, and more acutely conscious of the one we are engaged in now. Nor should we forget that the enemy believes that he might win without a global war ever occurring.

The Defense Establishment is vitally interested in bringing creeping aggression to a halt without a shooting war. But to date, the positive part the armed forces should play in an all-out cold war offensive has never been clearly defined. The statutory obligation of the armed forces to defend this country against military attack is clear. The contribution they should make to the cold war's prosecution needs equally concise definition.

A COMPLICATED but by no means unsolvable problem is how to best harmonize our military preparations for a possible hot war with an integrated national cold war strategy. In the 1953 world the term foreign policy is meaningless unless it intelligently includes the tool of military power. Military deployments abroad are the ultimate expression of our foreign policy. We need a national strategy in the execution of which the political, psychological, economic, and military forces of the nation would all be employed. Without such an over-all strategy the plans and programs developed by civilian agencies of the government and the armed forces cannot be truly effective.

We must continue to plan, of course, to utilize our military power against armed aggression as well as to exploit that same military power to prevent it from ever taking place. America's cold war strategy would create a favorable strategic situation which might by itself bring the decision or else, if war ensues, be best designed to bring about a successful conclusion. If upsetting the hostile communist program becomes a prime purpose of American military strategy, we must seek military deployments that will ensure this aim and which will simultaneously provide sound emergency dispositions. A large order, but not impossible.

JANUARY, 1953

9

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

There are no easy black and white solutions for the problems which face this country. How to secure the formation of capital necessary to our plant replenishment, how to secure a tax system which will provide the incentive and the opportunity for the individual acquisition of capital, how to balance between a military organization sufficiently formidable to give any other country reason to stop, look and listen, without at the same time its eating our national heads off—these are segments of a very complex matter which must trouble any citizen who understands it.

JAMES V. FORRESTAL, 18 October 1948

THE greatest Secretaries of War (and some of the most mediocre) have been lawyers. This can be accounted for in part by the fact that it is easy for lawyers to enter politics and successful political lawyers often find themselves serving in the Cabinet of the man they helped get into the White House. There were sixteen Secretaries of War between 1899 and 1947 when the office was abolished. All but four of these sixteen were lawyers! But if this explains why so many lawyers have been Secretaries of War it doesn't explain why the most successful Secretaries have been lawyers. Indeed some of the greatest of the lawyers were not appointed merely because they helped their President politically. Stanton was not Lincoln's original choice for Secretary of War. Neither was Baker Wilson's. And as we all know, Mr. Stimson certainly didn't support Mr. Roosevelt in either 1932, 1936 or 1940. These three-plus Mr. Elihu Root-were possibly the greatest of all Secretaries of War. Some would add the names of Monroe and Calhoun, and for very good reasons.

During the Second World War a number of businessmen served with distinction in the military and naval departments. Colonel Knox and Mr. Forrestal both came to Washington from the business world. Colonel Knox was a publisher and Mr. Forrestal a financier. Mr. Robert Lovett, the present Secretary of Defense and World War II Assistant Secretary of War for Air, like Mr. Forrestal, was a Wall Street financier. Mr. W. Stuart Symington was a successful manufacturer before he entered the Government as Assistant Secretary of War for Air and later Secretary of the Air Force.

But none of these businessmen-Colonel Knox, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Lovett or Mr. Symington-has represented that class of businessmen whose profession is really Industrial Management. This is a new profession developed by the growth of corporate business. Many Industrial Managers appeared in Washington during the Second World War. The names of Mr. Donald Nelson of Sears Roebuck, Mr. Charles E. Wilson of the General Electric Corp., and Mr. William Knudsen of General Motors are best known. All but Mr. Knudsen served in civilian mobilization posts where they had close relationships with military and naval officers but not in the military establishments. Mr. Knudsen became a lieutenant general and a strong right arm of General Somervell and Mr. Patterson.

CHARLES E. WILSON

—the President of General Motors Corporation, was an electrical engineer in his early days. He made the first automobile-starting motor for Westinghouse in 1912 and during World War I he was in charge of design and development of Westinghouse radio generators and dynamotors for the Army and Navy. Later he became a factory manager for General Motors and still later a Vice President in charge of expanding GMC's parts and accessories businesses. In this period he mastered salesmanship, production planning, financing and labor management. In 1940 he became acting President and in 1941 President of GMC.

10

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

March 4, 1953

Lt. Col. W. R. Kintner
800 N. Carolina St., S.E.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

I am absolutely ashamed about my behavior towards you and I only hope
that you don't draw the conclusion that when a person leaves Washington,
my relations with him cease. The reason for my long silence is simply that
I returned only three weeks ago from a lengthy trip through Europe and then
found myself so overwhelmed with work and so involved in tedious negotiations
that I had to let all personal relations slip. I much appreciated the copy
of the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL with your article and you know how much I agree
with your basic approach from our previous conversations. I thought it was
a solid and thoughtful piece.

Your letter to my home was buried among a litter of direct mail pieces
and therefore I never got to see it until three of four days ago. I do not
know your present whereabouts and for all I know, this letter may reach you
in Korea. I would be delighted to give you letters of recommendation in
Japan. Since I do not know precisely what you are interested in, I am only
writing two at the moment, copies of which are enclosed. Komatsu is President
of the Harvard Club of Japan and an important industrialist while Kimura is
one of the coming Professors at Tokyo University, extremely able and very
knowledgeable. I think you should stress very definitely the private nature
of your trip and, if at all possible, visit them in civilian clothes. I
could give you any number of additional recommendations, particularly to
newspapermen, but do write me first and tell me just what it is that you are
interested in.

I suppose that after Washington, a combat zone will be a breath of fresh
air. Do let me know what your impressions of Korea are. If you are in Seoul,
do see the Mayor. He is one of the finest cut-throats I have ever met

23 August 1953

Hq UNC MAC APO 72
c/o PM San Francisco, Cal

Time and circumstance permit as to make a long overdue report. For the last month I have been working with the UN part of the Military Armistice Commission at Munsan-ni. Thus far Armistice-making has been as demanding on time and energy at war itself - worse than war in certain intangible ways. Now you are bound to find accord for the enemy whereas only a few weeks ago you had to deal with a technical problem of eliminating him.

A hot, humid Sunday night may not offer the best occasion for reviewing the recent past but here goes. The tape unwinds better backwards so I'll start with arrival -

At Munsani - on the 25th of July - two days before the signing ceremony. I'm a honcho (Eastern slang for wheel) in the Opn Div - the people who "staff" the UN members of the MAC, a group of asserted gents, 5, and one admiral - one a Britisher and one a Thailander (our active Oriental ally here for the obvious). The MAC is a joint show laboring in harness with the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers (these names very important - at one meeting our side inadvertently called the other Chinese Communists, who were mightily put out, and threatened to call us Americans in lieu of United Nations). There have been many sticky questions left unresolved and covered by the convenient phrase, the responsibility of the MAC. The first month has been a whirlwind of papers, meetings, positions and counter-proposals.

The nucleus of the staff here had been planning this deal for the past two years in Tokyo - never has so much planning been done by so few. Most of the framework has been well laid. Some of the staff after having been lost in the esoterics of planning were not fully geared to be operational once the goods sounded. Hence the shake down cruise was essential and is still underway. Many of the working difficulties can be traced to the fact that this is an armistice between equals - not a victor, looser relation - and this is foreign to our experience.

Around the main ring there are many separate undertakings. The Neutral Nations Supervisory (inspection) Commission for one - get the Poles, Czechs, Swiss and Swedes on one team was quite a hassle - these worthies keep tracking of incoming and outgoing materiel and personnel - so that neither side will "reinforce" its total strength. The Red Cross visitations which have resulted in many headaches, the Commies moving into South Korea more as agent prevacteurs than humanitarians. But the element which as the most complications but may pay big dividends is the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission - the five pronged body, chairmaned by India which will assume custody over those prisoners "who do not wish to exercise their right to be repatriated." For the last two weeks I've been up to my neck in the practical implications of this - getting ready for the Custodial Forces India to set up a camp for 25,000 PWs in the Demilitarized

Zone. The Indians are bringing a force of 5,000 men. The idea of
setting up camp there on our side of a narrow zone was accepted after
Rhee objected to them coming into the country at all - so we plan to
bring them into the country by helicopters from ships off the coast.
At this camp the Chinese anti-commies will be subjected to "explanations"
from the other side as to why they should be happy to go home to the
people's democracy - in the presence of one Swede, one Swiss, one Czech,
one Pole, One Indian, one UN rep, three interpreters and one Commie
rep - Designing and building a camp for such a melange, procuring
atta for the Indians and making certain that none of the ROKS will
get near the place - is a sample of the soup we are brewing. We had a
series of conferences here with a high priced Indian delegation, their
Foreign Sec, Nehru, cousin of their P.M. and their C/S heading it. I
went back to Tokyo with them for final conferences and thus had a chance
to be exposed to some of the accoutrements of civilization. A real
impression of Tokyo - quite a bustling, noisy city - very close in
temperament to NY or Frankfurt, although in weather it matched Foggy
Bottom drop for drop. The Indian participation in this affair will
have many interesting angles. They are going to play their neutral
role for all its worth, but in the long run that will be a positive gain
for us. I can't help but feel that their leaders, trained so remarkably
well to the British tradition, will become decreasingly enchanted with
their infatuation for Peiping. At least this show, will make the fall
season in Munsan-ni anything but boring.

I've managed to get to Panmunjom several times - observing
the chanting, on call, Chinese, throw their good GI boots away as
they approach their lines. Saw some of our men come in today at
Freedom Village, these looked in good shape, but all were the far-
seeing stare of people who didn't believe what was happening to them.

Coming here toward the end of July was quite a shift in metier.
Beginning one July I had been Regt. Ex. and was just ready to move to
the Division staff when I was pulled out for this. Most of July was
preoccupied with Pork Chop - my regiment had a five day battle there
from 6 to 11 July - it seems a tragedy in retrospect it took place
so shortly before the peace as our casualties were high even though we
were credited with breaking the back of a Chinese Division before we
were ordered to pull off - in the interest of the Armistice. I was
more than ever impressed with Chink artillery - approximately 15,000 (daily)
rounds of mixed mortar and arty on a bn size sector, and their capacity
to dig and be militarily effective under every kind of fire we could
bring to bear. We launched three bn size counter-attacks to knock
them off the place (we each held part of the hill during the battle)
and every unit got there in the face of withering fire. The remarkable
thing was that these men were trained only for defensive warfare, and
because we were in the line constantly since Jan 1, had had no training
to speak of in the finer points of fighting. Taking these troops,
innured by our defensive posture and the enervating effect of our
policy regarding the war, and asking them to fight in an area as
tough as anything World War II offered - (and our WWII troops were
trained months on end to make the key assaults) seemed almost out of
the question. But their performance, amateurish but spirited, makes
me believe that we can demand far more of ourselves than our leadership asks.

Someday I hope to get time to write this battle up as it had much to teach us. Worked on the immediate after action report the first week after the fight was over - but it takes a little time to see it in perspective - and time to get things down - and time have-no - to use the local argo. The ability the Marines have to move in and organize important ground right under our noses, made possible by their willingness to use manpower on as extendable a basis as we use gunnies gives them an edge which has important political implications - a real adjunct to their screening overall offensive. And as they show increasing ability to catch up with us in manpower on the whole scale from mortars through artillery to nuclear weapons, the side that is willing and able to organize and use manpower will move out in front.

Oddly enough my whole spring seemed to be involved in getting ready for this July hassle on Pork Chou. The Marines hit the place April 17 (as they had in March and in Dec). We held it but it was pretty well flattened. By then had the job of cleaning up the debris and start the reconstruction - a major undertaking employing some 500 men a day - including own troops, engineers, and KSCs - the Korean labor corps. This job was undertaken around the clock in full sight of the enemy - movement to and from the place was in armored personnel carriers, and while the work was going on the chinks kept up a daily serenade of mortar and artillery, with frequent nite time probes and harrasment of outposts. Put in about 40 days of this before shifting to the adjacent outpost - called Eriek-Arsenal - on the very tip of T-bone - about a mile east of Pork Chou. Neither position made much military sense - each was about half mile in front of our main line of resistance, but until the spring chink offensive they were to be held at all costs - and most of them were bitterly fought over many times. However, under the pressure to take an armistice they (outposts in general) were many times conceded to the chinks - all of which will be used in good time in their romance that they forced the advance upon us. None of us liked giving up Pork Chou by orders from on high after so much sweat and sacrifice had gone into the holding and rebuilding of it. Gradually it became a question of the will to succeed, very much like Verun and to be ordered to give up without being forced to, kind of goes against the grain - against this. the other day visited Freedom Village when a round of our PWS came in. There saw Jim Lucas - the World-Telegram writer who has done some excellent nite-time columns on this - and he mentioned to me that we should have stopped where we did. Whether we will be able to create as readily another army that can fight as well as this while denied the right to seek victory is something to which our politicos should give serious thought.

In the process I learned a lot more than I had ever occasion to previously observe concerning men under the pressure induced by the ever present evidence of their mortal status. Most men it seems to me (and this is no novel observation) make a better showing under the demands of sacrifice than they do elsewhere. Consequently, the general atmosphere on the line is a lot cleaner and less pretty.

than the average working relation one runs into elsewhere - less backbiting, throat-cutting, etc. Appreciate more and more the terms, "the faith" as applied to the infantry - something about it which only the initiated can understand.

But all that is water over the dam. The business at hand is both interesting and exasperating. Yesterday, for example, participated in a staff meeting with our opposites over the simple problem of establishing a neutral area for the MAC headquarters - haggling continues because of the black and white difference in personal security and freedom held by both sides. This was conference no. 9 on this subject, each one a long drawn out affair via 3 language interpretation.

I've been too close to what I am doing to speculate very often on the trend of the big picture since I left Washington. I've enjoyed the insights I have received and would welcome more so that when I eventually return, except for 3-D, I will have no major re-orientation to make with the American scene.

Had no time in 3 days in Tokyo to look up the people you met there.

Trust that your efforts areпролетар to be fruitful. Would appreciate seeing

the conference - just to talk to the average Japanese community.

How are the new duties for the Corporation doing - 2 anne you are still in contract.

All the best,

Ryū Kato

October 19, 1953

Colonel William Kintner
HQ UNC MAC
APO 72
c/o PM, San Francisco, California

Dear Bill:

It was good to receive your long letter of August 21st which reached me just at a time when I had been scouting around to find out what had happened to you. I found your discussion of the Korean situation fascinating and it evoked many memories and many reflections on missed opportunities. You know my views on this subject. It seems to me that the present Armistice is giving the Chinese a maximum objective - that is, tying down the U.S. forces at practically no cost to themselves, while we have let go to waste one of the best U.S. armies that I have ever encountered. I can very well understand Van Fleet's bitterness. Moderation should not be shown in the conduct of the war but in establishing the conditions of peace. A conciliatory American attitude after a crushing Chinese defeat, which was certainly possible in 1951, would have had a tremendous psychological impact at least in Europe. Our present position I am afraid may be mistaken by the Communists as a symptom of weakness. At any rate, I admire their skillful maneuvering. All this, of course, may look different to you from up close.

You asked me about the new directors of the corporation. You are right. I am still in contact with them and I wish I could say some nice things but the factors that drove you to Korea have driven me to withdraw more and more into my activities here. Corruption may have been cleared out in a material sense; I doubt whether it has been in a moral sense. The lack of funds against which nobody had the courage to fight is crippling things painfully built up over many years and one doesn't even have the excuse that those who are applying the cuts don't know what they are doing. The cuts are made in precisely those areas which are of crucial importance but which will not show up for a few years to come.

Colonel Kintner

-2-

October 19, 1953

There are a great many other things I could tell you but I don't want to go into them by letter. I will defer them until we meet sometime which I hope will be soon. You know my views about the previous administration. I cannot say that I am enchanted with this one.

I do hope you will keep me informed of your activities and when you return to the U.S., do let us arrange a meeting.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Sincerely, John,

Best wishes.

return to the U.S., go let me arrange a meeting.

I go to bed you will keep me informed of your activities and when you

tation. I cannot say that I am acquainted with this one.

which I hope will be soon. You know my wife wants the previous evening to go into them by letter. I will determine from until we meet sometime there are a great many other things I could tell you but I don't

Colonel Kincaid

S-

October 10, 1933

NOV 2 1953

UNCMAC Opns Div
APO 72
P.M., San Francisco, Calif.
26 October 1953

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
10 Weld Hall
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

Upon return from my first leave to Japan, I found your letter of
October 19. I enjoyed hearing from you and agree with your analysis
of our failure to capitalize on our victory in 1951.

I must also concur in your estimate of the old concern. While in
Tokyo, I talked to somebody from it whom I knew quite well and he gave
me much the same impression. All in all, the picture does not seem to
be very encouraging, either there or elsewhere in the bureaucracy. We
can only hope that the opposition is having the same difficulties and
evidence indicates they are.

Took advantage of your letter of introduction to meet Mr. Takashi
Komatsu and had a very stimulating hour discussion with him. He
certainly possesses much personal charm and appears to be genuinely
motivated in his endeavors. My conversation with many people stationed
in Japan indicate the need of a reciprocal effort. We Americans seem
to be repeating in Japan our common failure to meet other people in the
intangible ways that really matter.

Have no idea as to what I will be doing next, but hope we can go
over the record when I do return around the first of the year.

HAK:ep

Henry V. Kieinger

With kind regards.

tion. We shall look forward to seeing you here.
time, and he asks of you with respect and affec-
tion, we meet Arthur Schlesinger Jr. from time to
to see you. We will see you as soon as the American press re-
ports the results of the last election.

present them unless the situation has changed
broadly be as simple as the American press re-
ports the results of the last election. Things cannot
evening together. I would be fascinated to learn
you will come and look me up. We might spend an
afternoon with the rehabilitation problem finally out of the
way. You should be leaving Korea soon. I do hope
with the rehabilitation problem finally out of the
way. You should be leaving Korea soon. I do hope
with the rehabilitation problem finally out of the
way. You should be leaving Korea soon. I do hope
with the rehabilitation problem finally out of the
way. You should be leaving Korea soon. I do hope

Dear Bill:

c/o B. M. San Francisco, California
VSO 55
UNCMAC Obue Dia
Col. William Kingner

February 13, 1954

DRAFT #3
Col. Kintner/ fhs

30 August 1954

SUBJECT: Implications of U.S. Policy Trends

1. There is a basic contradiction between the current U.S. policy for the use of nuclear weapons as the primary element in U.S. military strategy and the integrity of the U.S. alliance system. A strategy which is based on the hydrogen bomb as the primary means of deferring aggression or waging war does not require allies. In fact, strict adherence to a total nuclear strategy is inconsistent with the political requirements of a coalition. Therefore, if a nuclear strategy is to be employed a logical element of it is to develop self-sufficiency (non-dependence on foreign bases) for the conduct of offensive operations exploiting the use of nuclear weapons. It is in this direction that the U.S. policy is leading.

2. The U.S. nuclear strategy paradoxically may facilitate Soviet plans for expansion. The Soviets visualize the world as divided into two hostile camps. Their strategy seeks to increase the strength of their armed bloc by acquisition of peoples and territory in Eurasia now aligned with the Free World, thus eventually confronting the U.S. with an overwhelming preponderance of power. The U.S. nuclear strategy cannot defend the Free World nations situated on the periphery of the Communist Bloc either from nuclear destruction in a general war or from surface aggression whether part of a general or a limited war. The inability of the U.S. nuclear strategy to assure the territorial integrity or population survival of our allies is increasingly recognized in the United States, by the Soviets, and by the leaders of the

allied world. It is reflected in a growing independence of allied nations
from U.S. leadership and a growing tendency toward disengagement from the
U.S.-Soviet conflict. The logical outcome of this trend will be a political
and military isolation of the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. and
its near-by Western Hemisphere satellites will then face the vast bulk of the
human race mobilized under Communist control.

3. The real danger to the U.S. system of alliances may well be not
communism but nationalist governments who to prove their independence of the
U.S. will lean increasingly on the U.S.S.R. The above is ~~not~~ set forth
to introduce the conditions within which forward U.S. strategic thinking must
take place.

4. The possibility of the political-military isolation of the U.S., if
present trends continue, presents the U.S. with a fundamental security
dilemma. In relation to the Eurasian land mass, the U.S. is an island power
with inferior resources, at present only in manpower but in time even in
industrial capacity. Therefore, the U.S. should not permit the consolidation
of the Eurasian continent under the domination or control of one power.
Consequently, although U.S. strategy should have as its primary object the
struggle with the U.S.S.R. allied relationships are a fundamental part of
that strategy. Allied relationships are soluable only as part of a conceptual
framework which recognizes that the Soviet sphere can under no circumstances
be permitted to expand. In fact, it should be split or reduced, for the con-
solidation of a Chinese-Soviet-East European satellite bloc must in time
present mortal dangers to the security of the U.S.

5. Geography, which once seemed so favorable to the United States, is
now a handicap. American development of nuclear weapons and of long-range

delivery systems have destroyed the military significance of the ocean barriers which were once our final protector against Eurasian influence on our affairs. Excessive reliance on these means will not only produce politically disastrous results but at the same time will frustrate positive efforts to maintain a U.S. foothold in Europe and Asia.

6. Nevertheless, current U.S. policy, increasingly oriented toward nuclear war and military self-sufficiency, appears to facilitate the eventual consolidation of the Soviet Bloc and the progressive neutralization of its remaining allies in Europe and Asia. An alliance system which is not based on a mutually acceptable strategy cannot long survive. The French alliances in Eastern Europe collapsed prior to 1939 because the French were incapable of giving them any military justification.

7. If the effort toward achieving military self-sufficiency results in political isolation the nature of a fortress America existing in the midst of a hostile world should be recognized. It is doubtful whether "the American way of life" could continue to exist. The necessary restrictions of freedoms which would accompany an intensified effort to maintain a precarious military balance and simultaneously to insulate our society from hostile ideological penetrations would in the long run destroy America's essential character.

Further, the loss of markets and resources abroad, the loss of prestige and the ever present fear that would exist in such a situation would stimulate an almost inescapable urge to break out of our continental containment by force even if the effort should result in bringing nuclear ruin upon both the U.S. and the USSR. Thus a policy, whose apparent purpose is to deter war and decrease U.S. involvement in Eurasia, might well lead to nuclear war.

8. The U.S. strategic problem can be summarized as follows:

a. To restore the vitality of its system of alliances.

b. To attempt to restore fluidity to the international situation.

c. To reduce the Soviet sphere.

It is still not too late to solve this problem, militarily, provided the U.S.
develops the means to halt further military expansion by the Soviet Bloc and
demonstrates its willingness to employ these means. Three general steps
will contribute to the solution. (Any alternative selected must be in addition
to maintaining our retaliatory capacity and improving our defensive capabilities
against hostile nuclear attack.)

a. The creation of adequate conventional forces prior to the Soviet
entrance into the period of effective nuclear plenty.

b. The development of a concept whereby nuclear weapons can be
used on a limited basis (limited either with respect to targets -- strategical
versus tactical or limited according to area of employment without regard to
targets or weapons employed).

c. The ability to create rapidly effective barriers to conventional
advance which can be defended by a limited number of conventional ground-
tactical air forces.

9. Any alternative solution will probably require a considerable increase
in conventional forces above that now planned for in the Free World. Recogni-
tion of a problem is not tantamount to its solution. Levels of military
strength among our allies require more than U.S. policy to generate them.
The governments of our Allies often agree to U.S. proposals but lack domestic
support to implement them.

10. Since the nature of the Soviet threat is not understood or
remembered by the public opinion of our Allies, Soviet "peace offensives" have
made inroads which will be even more difficult to block in the future. U.S.
strategy has assumed Soviet bad faith and intransigence and had conceived its
task as primarily technical: the creation of an adequate defense force. But

the problem is primarily psychological: the bringing about of a psychological
climate which will support the necessary forces.

11. Once recognition is given to the political and psychological elements of the U.S. strategic problem, it is easy to go over to the other extreme and believe that a political-psychological solution is possible which ignores the military factor. Military force alone cannot assure victory in today's cold war but the right kind of military force must provide an essential underpinning for any soundly conceived political-psychological strategy.

12. It seems likely that many in Europe today would prefer appeasement to war. Yet without Europe, America will become isolated and its position may be rendered untenable. The difficulties of generating a new political-military vitality in Europe are producing currents in both Europe and America which can only be advantageous to the Kremlin. People who would blanch at the prospect of being left alone in Europe with the U.S.S.R. are most antagonistic to U.S. programs. Europe's swing toward neutralism is matched by a rising plea by articulate Americans that we should bring home our token forces in uniform and begin to make the U.S. impregnable since America's first line of defense lies in North America. If these attitudes continue, the Kremlin need only bide its time and await the political crack-up of the Western alliance.

13. In the last analysis a victory over the Kremlin is possible only on the political front. Yet, the political, economic and military prongs of an integrated American strategy must be coordinated in order to make any one of them effective. Without a dynamic political offensive the optimum military defense cannot even be created.

14. The U.S. must substitute a crusade aimed at inspiring political cohesion and promoting economic growth in place of a conservative defense

- 5 -

of the status quo in which the U.S. is recognized as the chief beneficiary.
A program aimed at inspiring economic growth throughout the Free World is
actually, for the U.S., an act of essential enlightened self-interest. For,
in view of the present apathy of the Free World, the military forces required
to contain the Soviet Bloc after the advent of mutual nuclear plenty can
only be provided if there is sufficient economic expansion to:

a. Create these forces without undue strains on the rest of the
Free World's economy, and if,

b. The psychological upsurge accompanying such growth motivates
the people of the Free World to want to defend themselves.

15. Side by side with a constructive U.S. political-economic program, there must be a concerted effort to expose the true nature of Soviet imperialism, and to exploit the schisms within the Soviet Bloc just as the Kremlin has succeeded in exploiting the significant frictions which exist within the Free World. Only through a dynamic diplomatic offensive designed to expose the Soviet aims on concrete issues (Germany, Austria, Korea, atomic disarmament, etc.) will it be possible to convince the peoples of the Free World of the unpleasant reality of Soviet ambitions. A new political-psychological climate which could be created by these means throughout the Free World may permit the creation of forces capable of holding the Soviet army in check without necessarily resorting to nuclear warfare.

16. The relatively short span of years remaining before the Soviets achieve nuclear plenty necessitates an urgent solution to America's strategic dilemma. The basic contradiction which exists between trends in U.S. strategy and the security requirements of the U.S.-led coalition must be resolved while time permits.

-3-

The satellites represent an accretion to Soviet strength only if they do not merely absorb Soviet power in an effort to hold them down. If the satellites do not in their majority become more of less willing allies, they will represent a drain on Soviet strength and in these circumstances the U.S.S.R. may prefer to let them shift for themselves. But the most effective bond in a totalitarian society is ideological conformity. Indeed, Russian interference from the Elbe to the Yalu could hardly be legitimized on a nationalistic basis. U.S. strategy should therefore not permit the U.S.S.R. to ride two horses at the same time — the nationalist in its appeal to European neutralism and the ideological in relation to its satellites. Put in another way, U.S. strategy should attempt to demonstrate the incompatibility of the ideological and the nationalist motivation of Soviet policy; or if there has been a change in the nationalist direction within the Soviet Union to accelerate it, to take away its options, to commit it decisively. This is not a purely propagandistic task. Little will be gained by a largely verbal analysis of logical inconsistencies. Rather the U.S. effort should be to force the Soviet policy into one or the other direction, to makes its commitment less indeterminate. If then the ideological element should triumph, we will be able to continue the cold war during a period of internal consolidation for the U.S.S.R. having at the same time relied our Allies. If the nationalist element should win out we might restore fluidity to the situation and reduce the Soviet sphere at least in Europe.

But what inducement can there be for the Soviet Union to relax its pressures on the satellites and to adopt a nationalist line? There are two: one negative, the other positive. The U.S.S.R. must be made to realize that a continuation of the cold war, and even more its intensification, will lead to a hot war. And the Soviet Union must be made to feel secure within its own territories, for no Soviet relaxation is possible as long as she conceives the present period as but a prelude to an inevitable war. We should attempt to demonstrate to the present Soviet leadership that inflexible intransigence assures not security, but disaster, that a continuation of the policy of the post-war period must bring about the very things they fear most: a mortal struggle for the very existence of the Soviet state and on a world-wide scale. By moderation where we have the upper hand and unyielding perseverance under pressure, the U.S. may be able to build the bridges to lead or to force the Soviet Union into a more conciliatory attitude — (a very moderate peace offer after Inchon would have been worth much). But it can not be repeated too often, a conciliatory attitude on the part of the U.S.S.R. which is permitted to remain largely formal is more dangerous than a continuation of the cold war. By relaxing the pressure and leaving the Soviet Union in unchallenged possession of its phare, it permits the completion of the internal consolidation and leaves the ultimate choice of policy and its timing in the hands of the Soviet leaders. Thus the U.S.S.R. would obtain at little or no cost its maximum objective — gaining time and disrupting the U.S. system of alliances.

The present moment seems particularly auspicious for a major diplomatic effort. The transfer of power in a dictatorship is never a simple matter. Even if the transfer of the organs of power is handled smoothly, the creation of a new principle of legitimacy remains difficult for the new regime must prove its ability to govern and its function. The very concentration of power in dictatorship makes it psychologically most unlikely that any prior arrangement can provide the machinery for the solution of a real conflict of

-4-

opinion, partly because of the omnipresence of the still living dictator, partly because of the impossibility of predicting the nature of all contingencies. Thus the Soviet leadership needs a period of peace to consolidate itself; it can hardly establish itself and fight a war at the same time. In fact, its domestic "legitimacy" may call to its ability to bring peace and to raise the standard of living. But what if Soviet leadership is "sincere"? What if it has had a real change of heart? It is difficult to determine what sincerity means when security and ideology command such parallel courses. It is doubtful if the Soviet leadership itself knows how "sincere" it is. In any case, the U.S. strategic problem in the short run will remain unaffected for the reasons stated above. We must prevent any further extension of the Soviet sphere; we must attempt to reduce it. If Soviet leadership is still motivated by Stalinist ideology, we should not give it a breathing space and if the Soviet Union is withdrawing to a more national base this is not too early to test it.

U.S. strategy is thus confronted with a great opportunity: We can at once reverse the tide within our Alliance and increase the pressure on the U.S.S.R. by boldly capturing the peace offensive. By reducing the peace offensive to concrete terms, we can explode the myth of U.S. intransigence among our Allies; we can create a series of contingencies for Soviet leadership which may increase internal tension; we may restore fluidity to the international situation; we may be able to take first steps in reducing the Soviet sphere.

## C. Measures of U.S. Strategy

The U.S. strategic problem can be summarized as four-fold: (a) to restore the vitality of its system of alliances, (b) to demonstrate, in so far as this is possible, that the U.S. has no designs on the territory of the U.S.S.R., proper, (c) to attempt to restore fluidity to the international situation, (d) to reduce the Soviet sphere.

It would seem that a Four-Power meeting, called by the U.S. for any point outside the U.S.S.R. would be a useful initial step. The reception of Churchill's speech, the fact that even the Vatican found it necessary to associate itself with a proposal for international conferences shows the strength of popular feeling among our Allies in this respect. The U.S. should therefore demonstrate by a series of acts, concrete and simple enough to be able to become symbols, that the widespread belief in U.S. intransigence is unjustified. The justice of that belief is not at issue here, its existence is a fact to be reckoned with.

The membership of a meeting will represent a problem. If at all possible, France should be invited but the U.S. should refuse Chinese participation by insisting that Far Eastern problems are to be dealt with at the Far Eastern conference in any case. The Soviet Union would then confront the dilemma of wrecking the conference or of excluding China. The best method of achieving a Four-Power meeting would be to confine the agenda primarily to European problems.

What specific issues could constitute the agenda of such a meeting? If as stated above it should be the U.S. objective to create a series of contingencies which may maximize dissension between the U.S.S.R. and its satellites as well as internal dissension within the U.S.S.R., Germany would seem to provide the best issue. It is a problem which we will have to face sooner or later in any case.

-6-

of allies. Europeans have long maintained that for them the crucial victory is not the last but the first — that they can not again survive a foreign occupation. If this is true, a sufficient incentive exists for European rearmament, backed by a U.S. guarantee.

There are other objections to a Four-Power meeting: the effect of a conference as assisting the stability of the Soviet regime; the relationship of the conference to NATO and the UN; the danger to the Western defense effort. But, aside from the fact that great gains are never achieved without risks, the objections are not convincing: The Soviet leadership has never depended for its legitimisation on foreign approbation; NATO need not be affected although EDC would be postponed and Western rearmament would be spurred rather than delayed.

But, in any case, the possible delay in a rearmament program distinguished primarily by paper plans would be more than outweighed by substantial advantages. These fall into two groups: advantages produced by the very fact of a U.S. initiative in concrete terms and advantages obtained should the Soviet Union agree to the U.S. proposals.

The following gains would be achieved by a U.S. proposal for calling a Four-Power meeting:

(a) It would provide a symbol of U.S. peaceful intentions and in case of rejection by the U.S.S.R. of Soviet intrinsigue.

(b) It would explode the myth of U.S. belligerence and would rally our Allies. All the advantages of Churchill's speech might accrue to such an effort.

(c) The intelligence potential would be considerable. It would enable the U.S. to form some estimate of the real Soviet leadership. It would provide an answer to an interesting question: Would Malenkov dare to leave the U.S.S.R. without taking all his competitors with him?

(d) The preparation for a Four-Power meeting might increase internal dissension in the Soviet leadership. We should, in any case, force them to move at our speed, not at theirs.

(e) The effect on China of a Four-Power meeting sacrificing a Soviet satellite might be profound, particularly if a subsequent Asian conference should prove unproductive.

(f) This distrust may be reinforced by putting on the agenda a mutual guarantee of each other's boundaries by the Four Powers, but excluding China.

If the conference failed, its very failure would provide the psychological basis for extended military preparations.

The following advantages would result from a Soviet agreement to all or a substantial part of the proposals outlined above:

-7-

(a) (a) It would be the first roll-back of Soviet power anywhere in Eurasia where Communism had been entrenched. To be sure, it is only a follow-back of some 100 miles. But on the small European scale 100 miles are not inconsequential. Europe divided along the Oder would resume a more familiar aspect and thus strengthen European morale. The myth of Soviet all-pervasiveness would be shaken.

(b) It would represent the sacrifice of a satellite government. The psychological effect of this on the remaining satellites can not be over-emphasized, all the more so since there can be no doubt about the fate of the present East-German government. A free election would return triumphant pro-Western majorites. Moreover, the Socialists of the Eastern zone, with a direct experience of Soviet rule, will provide a useful counter-weight to the more narro nationalisms of their Western brethren. It is not unreasonable to expect that the personal fate of many East-zone functionaries would poison Soviet-German relations for many years.

(c) A unified Germany and a liberated Austria will exert a tremendous pressure on Czechoslovakia. We should not forget that although a Soviet army on the Oder is only 75 miles from Berlin, a pro-Western Army in Germany is only 50 miles from Prague and in Austria only 15 miles from Bratislava.

(d) A unified Germany would reduce for a time the pressure for markets for West German industry. The impoverishment of the East Zone should provide a market for consumer goods at least over the short run.

(e) The pressure on the other satellites already affected by Yugoslavia would be substantial. To be sure, the Soviet Union may be able to keep them in line by force. But if a Four-Power meeting should guarantee Russia's western boundaries, the U.S.S.R. may not consider it worthwhile to diffuse its power on its periphery, particularly in the Balkans.

The list of arguments could be continued on both sides but the essential argument can be summarized into four propositions: (1) A Four-Power meeting would reverse the psychological current *within* the Western Alliance. (2) A unified Germany outweighs EDC. It would reverse the *real* strategic balance of which rearmament is only a reflection. A unified Germany can not long remain disarmed. (3) A Four-Power meeting might increase Soviet dissensions internally as well as in its relation with the satellites. (4) A Four-Power guarantee of their boundaries and a special one for Germany might help bring about the Soviet trend towards a more narrowly nationalist policy.

All this is based on the assumption that the U.S.S.R. would accept both a Four-Power conference and an agenda substantially as proposed in this paper. This seems more than unlikely, however. The rigidity of a dictatorship probably does not permit as radical a change of policy as the one proposed in this paper. The incentive to the U.S.S.R. would be two-fold: a four-power guarantee of its boundaries at a potential sacrifice of some of its satellites or an intensified cold war. The question is open: Would the U.S.S.R. fear more accepting or rejecting such a guarantee?

September 16, 1954

Col. William Kintner
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Thank you very much for your letter of Sept. 3rd. I think that both of us were looking concurrently on the same problems except that I am afraid that I am more verbose than you were. You will see from the enclosed memorandum that I am in substantial agreement with you. I would appreciate your observations on it.

I shall be in Baltimore at Fort Holabird between September 12 and 27th. I will probably be down in Washington one of those weekends and perhaps we can get together then.

Kind regards.

Sincerely,

Sincerely,

Kind regards,

perhaps we can get together then.
be down in Washington one of those weekends and
between September 18 and 24th. I will properly
I shall be in Baltimore at Fort Hoelapold

appreciate your observations on it.
I am in substantial agreement with you. I would
You will see from the enclosed memorandum that
alright that I am more verbatim than you were.
currently on the same problems except that I am
I think that both of us were looking con-
I thank you very much for your letter of Sept.

Dear Riff:

Washington 32, D. C.
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Cef. William Kintner

September 16, 1954

December 9, 1954

Colonel William Kintner
N.S.C. Group
Department of Defense
Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill,

I have been writing one of my perennial papers
on strategy which will undoubtedly suffer the fate of its pre-
decessors, and which I thought you might be interested in seeing,
although I would appreciate it if you did not circulate it. I
should be interested to know what you think of it.

I plan to be in Washington for some days between
Christmas and New Year, and maybe we can have a session together.

I met General Bonesteel when he was up here. I thought
rather well of him. It seems remarkable to me that the Army had a
so much more constructive view than the experts on foreign affairs.
It would be interesting to reflect on why this should be so.

I have had a rather acrimonious debate with one of
the top men in your old organization which I will tell you about
when we meet.

Kind regards.

HAK:jm

Enclosure

Brochure

HVK:Jm

Henry V. Knaufner

Kind regards.

when we meet.
the job men in your old organization which I will tell you about.
I have had a rather schmaltzous debate with one of
the men who did the work.

If you'd be interesting to reflect on what this should be so
so much more contractual after the experience on foreign staffs.
I met General Bonesetler when he was in here. I thought
I had better have a talk with him. It seems remarkable to me that the Navy had a
superior man of him. I see some remarkable people so I don't know
I met General Bonesetler when he was in here. I thought
Christmas and New Year's, and maybe we can have a season together.

I plan to be in Washington for some days between
should be interested to know what you think of it.

I definitely I would appreciate it if you did not circulate it. I
recipients, and when I thought you might be interested in seeing
our strategy which will undoubtedly amuse the late of its pre-
I have been writing one of my personal labors

Dear Bill,

Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
Department of Defense
M.B.C. Group
Colonel William Knutson

December 3, 1961

January 11, 1955

PERSONAL

Lt. Colonel William Kintner
N.S.C. Group
Department of Defense
Pentagon, Washington D.C.

Dear Bill:

It was good to see you again the other day in Washington. I
hope you will find it possible to come up here soon. I can assure you
that I feel more comfortable in the company of Army officers than of the
somewhat degenerate intellectuals I am forced to associate with here.

I am writing to you today primarily about the problem we discussed when I last saw you. I have taken it up with Elliott at some length and he fully agrees with what it also my point of view, that you should not leave the Army at this time. We do not doubt that you might perform considerable service in the position that has been offered to you, but in the long term you may overestimate the impact one can have from the outside. In the Army, as far as I can tell, you have considerable prestige, and as long as you remain in the Army your influence with intellectuals is likely to be greater than if you became one of them. No matter how frustrating things are now, in about ten years you ought to be in a position where you can influence things directly. I can assure you from my experience, and this again is shared by Mr. Elliott, that you will be no less frustrated once you are outside the hierarchy than you are in it. I have always found it much easier to talk with high ranking officers than with people of much lesser rank in civilian life.

I would therefore strongly urge you not to make any major step
hastily. Although, as I have told you, Mr. Elliott fully shares these
views, he would be very willing to talk with you personally about it, and
perhaps you could arrange an appointment with me at one of the sessions
of the Planning Board.

Please do not be deceived by the outward tranquillity of academic
life. Once you are in it you will discover abysses in it which I never
thought existed while I was in the Army. Whatever you decide to do, however,
you will be able to count on my sympathy and any help that I am able to
give you.

With kindest regards.

HAK:jm

4925 Sherrier Pl NW

Washington DC

24 Jan

Dear Henry:

I very much appreciated your thoughtful letter of 11 Jan. All I can say is that another's frustrations often look more endurable than one's own. Surprisingly enough those with whom I have discussed this matter within the Army are generally for it, more of those outside oppose it.

Thus far I have not made a final decision as I have been waiting to see a specific proposition in black and white. However, I am inclined to take the plunge for several reasons. The first, as my judgment as to the time left before a reversal of attitude may be too late. The next is my own appraisal of achieving a position of real influence in the army. Many of those, like myself, who have a much broader range of interest than strictly military, will run into hard sledding when it comes to selecting generals - my boss Bonesteel is a case in point - it took an extraordinary amount of outside pressure to "make" him although he's heads and shoulders above most generals. What one espouses now as a "rising" young turk is a lot easier advanced than comparable things ten years from now, especially if one is not speaking from the inner circle. I have known too many excellent colonels who have been not chosen. What I am saying is that my career pattern is not in the groove and though my record is, in matter of fact, superior, it will mitigate against me in comparison with the more GI types. The final thing is that I have no intentions of becoming a strict "professor". Perhaps Bill Elliot has discussed the group with you. It will be located in but not part of the strict academic milieu. In addition the people backing it are also interested in an "information" campaign to be conducted simultaneously - it is this side, with all of its aspects, which challenges me the most because of my convictions that the contest has already shifted into the realm of fundamental attitudes - and unless the American attitude is transformed, we are in for rocky times. Finally, if I take this step, I plan to take an active reserve role - and as a full colonel - which I will be in a short while, could operate on a lot of points pertaining to improvements in the army itself, which are badly needed (the army in general is in the middle of a long trough) - I also plan to keep alive contacts here, with the eventual hope, that if the school we belong took finally wins out, I may play a direct role in shaping a new course.

February 8, 1955

Lt. Colonel William Kintner
4925 Sherrier Place N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

Thank you very much for your letter of January 24. I have
since heard from Elliott about his conversations with you so that I am
pretty well up on your plans.

I am sure there are substantial arguments on both sides. I
had not considered you in the same category for promotion as Bonesteel
who really is not an overly military type. I had rather thought of you
in the category of General Bolling who, whatever you may think of him, has
gone pretty far. Also, I have seen many groups like Strausz-Hupe's started
with great enthusiasm only to wind up either in a bureaucratic rut, or in
academic pedantry. Still, if you should join it, both these dangers would
be minimized; and I know that whatever you will do, you will add a great
deal to whichever organization you finally throw your lot in with.

I am writing to you today in part to ask your advice on behalf
of a young friend of mine, a graduate of Harvard College, a Rhodes Scholar,
and now a member of the Society of Fellows. He is joining the Army in
September, and naturally would like to know what he could most usefully do.
He is quite willing to stay in some extra time if this would enable him
to obtain a commission and do some interesting work. I should like to
emphasize that this is not one of the Harvard aethetes who thinks that the
Army is just too rough for words and who is afraid of losing his soul in
it; quite the contrary. He is willing, indeed eager, to go through
infantry basic, but afterwards would like to find something in which his
abilities could be more fully utilized. I am enclosing a biographical
statement which he has prepared.

I clearly would not write this letter if I did not think well
of him. I think he would fit well into the Army environment. He is very
athletic and generally a good type. I don't know whether there is any
advice you can give him, and I don't want to burden you with any extra
work at a time when you have to make other decisions, but I have been
so out of touch with the non-Intelligence side of the Army that I don't know
precisely what to advise him. I could, of course, help him to get into
C.I.C.

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

PUBLISHER

Col. Arthur Symons, Arty-USAR

EDITOR

John B. Spore

BUSINESS MANAGER

Associate Editors

Brig. Gen. Charles S. Harris, USA-Ret.

Norman S. Poser

Contributing Editors

Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong, USA-Ret.

Membership & Circulation

D. A. Mulloy

Assistants

N. J. Anthony

Esther E. Bennett

Doris Montgomery

Mary F. Grant

EDITORIAL POLICY

The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army.

The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL strives to—

Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

February 1955

Vol. 5, No. 7

THE CURRENT SCENE

There is an Army Story. .................................... 13

Army Forces ... the decisive component .................... 13

Mission for the Army: the Winning of World War III. ........ 16

LOGISTICS

The Evolution of Management for Logistics. Lt. Gen. W. B. Palmer 21

Confusion in Supply Depots. .................... Col. Anston D. Marston 46

MEN AND METHODS

Tough Preparation for a Tough Profession. ....... Bill Mauldin 25

Solidarity Is the Key to the Mass Army. ....... Capt. Roger W. Little 26

This Concerns You. .................................... 37

TRAINING

The Proof of the Pudding. .................... Maj. Mark M. Boatner III 32

The Survivor .................................... Capt. George Tanham 34

How S2 Caught the Crooks. .................... Col. Waller B. Booth, Jr. 38

Today's Finest Experience: Troop Command in Korea.

Lt. Col. Henry Harmeling, Jr. 41

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Targets That Talk. .................... Lt. Col. Francis S. Kelly 44

The Commander's Communications. ............ Col. David P. Gibbs 48

DEPARTMENTS

Association's Journal ............ 4 Irons in the Fire ............ 52

The Month's Mail ............ 6 The Month's Reading ............ 54

The Month's Authors ............ 8 The Word from the Schools ............ 56

Front and Center ............ 40 The Month's Books ............ 59

Cerebrations .................... 49

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is published monthly by the Association of the United States Army. Publication date: 25th of preceding month. Publication, Editorial and Executive Offices: 1529 Eighteenth Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Copyright, 1955, by Association of the United States Army. Entered as Second Class Matter at Washington, D. C., additional entry at Richmond, Va., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Articles appearing in THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Department of the Army, the officers and members of the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, or the editors. RATES. One year $5.00; two years $9.00 when paid in advance; three years $12.00 when paid in advance. Subscriptions for libraries, civilian groups or activities, and others not eligible for membership in the Association of the U. S. Army $5.00 per year. Foreign subscriptions $6.00 payable in advance. For other rates write Circulation Manager, 1529 18th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

ADVERTISING information and rates available from the Business Manager or any of our advertising representatives, who are:

New York office—19 West 44th St., Murray Hill 2-5254

San Francisco office—Duncan A. Scott Co., Mills Bldg., Garfield 1-7950

Los Angeles office—2978 Wilshire Blvd., Dunkerque 8-4151

FEBRUARY 1955

5

(L)

THE MONTH'S MAIL

TRUST Troopers

* It was with pride and honor that I read "TRUST: Mission Accomplished" [December]. I served in this command in TRUST Headquarters, and then with Company A, 351st Infantry.

I've always contended that an American, or any man for that matter, will do his best when his back is against the wall. We in Trieste had our backs to the sea at all times. This tended to unite all units and give the command a oneness of purpose. Training was the toughest and the longest, but it was entered into with that spirit which made the units the envy of other commands.

If anyone is interested, the 351st Infantry has been transferred to Camp Rucker, Ala. I am greatly interested in hearing from former TRUST troopers who have any ideas regarding the formation of an association.

SFC. ALBERT J. BÉRUBÉ, JR.
227 Clermont Ave
Brooklyn 5, NY

Income Tax Exemption

* Now that a pay raise for service personnel is up for consideration again, how about income tax exemption on all service pay and allowances?

The exemption of all service pay and allowances would be a pay raise that would be worthwhile. In my viewpoint, the requirement that service men pay income tax on their service pay and allowances has been nothing more than a reduction in pay, and it would be to the best interests of the Government if income tax were not collected on service pay and allowances. After all, it is hardly fair to service men and women that they should be expected to devote all their time to their country and at the same time pay income tax on the compensation received from the federal government for that service.

The dent in collected taxes made by this exemption will not mean a great loss in tax revenue, and would mean a sizable increase for service personnel, who are in need of a pay raise at this time.

5th Gen Hosp
APO 154, NYC

PFC. JOHN M. KILGUS

Artillery Integration

* In the November and December issues conflicting thoughts were presented on the validity of the merging of the field artillery and the antiaircraft artillery. As an officer

who has been cross-assigned, I cannot help but agree that it was a good idea, but that it does not work. With less than three years of active commissioned service, I was transferred to the AA. I can learn and am learning the equipment and duties to the best of my ability. However, the concepts of employment, mission, and matériel are all quite different from those of the FA. Result to date: jack of two trades, master of neither. If such is the desired result, why not merge the infantry and field artillery? Both have cannon, rifles, and machine guns. Or with armor. Again the armament is cannon and machine guns. ...

LT. R. TILLERY

Support and Supply by Submarine

* After having read "Assault Troop Submarine" [November] it appears to us that the author has neglected to give serious consideration to the problems of support and supply of the troops he proposes landing from his troop-carrying submarines.

A careful study of the problem of landing a large force (Commander Kittredge wrote in terms of divisions) from submarines in amphibious assault reveals some mighty big problems. Would surfaced submarines carrying the supplies and heavy lifts (heavy ordnance such as artillery and tanks) be any less vulnerable to attack than any other type of ship? We think not. Would it be practicable to build a submarine so large that it could even carry such heavy items? According to FM 101-10, it takes 513 short tons per day per division in an amphibious assault. That's quite a load.

There is a lot more to amphibious assault than just putting the troops on the beach and then submerging and going home. Considering the follow-up phases of the invading force the "hydrogen bomb-hostage" concept is not valid. Our Navy would be working over the enemy submarines when they attempted resupply. Coming by submarines, the enemy could not have air power, which leaves our troops free to maneuver at will and, in our opinion, our troops could eliminate the enemy with no great damage to Rockland.

To sum up, troops landed on a hostile shore without the necessary support and supplies would be at best a nuisance value to the home troops, and Rockland would never be in danger of being a hostage.

The three steps mentioned in the article for a successful landing are: (1) the softening of the enemy, (2) the landing of troops, and (3) the logistical build-up.

Step 1 may be eliminated by the surprise feature mentioned, *but* steps 2 and 3 cannot be avoided if the landing is to accomplish any given mission. It is step 3 that will bring the headaches to this type of operation. Unless the new type submarines can unload guns and tanks and rations under water, they will be as vulnerable to air attack as any transport group.

It appears that until the submarine troop carriers whip the supply problem, they will be carrying relatively small units on amphibious raids such as the one against Makin.

LT. COL. R. J. MEEKER
Artillery

LT. COL. R. S. JOHNSON
USMC

Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

Power and Policy

* Colonel Reinhardt in "War Without Men" [November] raises many interesting points. His proposition, however, that in order for the free world to survive, "the armies of the United States and its allies must approach in size those of the armed hordes of communism," is debatable. The size of our army is predicated pretty much on how and by what means our enemy is going to wage the next war.

In their quest for world domination the Soviets have two alternate means of overcoming the United States: gradual attrition or quick destruction in war. (I take it that an effective opposition to their plan can come only from the U. S., and its allies.) Which of these two lines of action the Soviets will eventually resort to lies hidden in the crystal ball. In the light of postwar events, their minds are probably set on the first. Also, gradual attrition would be better for the Russian people, and perhaps just as effective in the long run.

The underlying thought of the Communists in the case of gradual attrition may very well be that the constantly maintained strain on the nerves of our people will exhaust us and finally induce us to give up in disgust, and let the USSR have her own way. (In the meantime, there is no strain on the nerves of the people inside the Iron Curtain; they just don't know what is going on.) If this is the line of action they shall pursue, then by all means an army equal or nearly equal to their "hordes" is the answer. With an armed force of this size we shall be able

6

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 15, 1955

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
10 Weld Hall
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

Thanks for your piece on Metternich, I will read
it with interest. I had a call today from The Annals regard-
ing a piece I was going to submit for their "Air Power" issue.
I had to withdraw mine for special reasons and they asked
whether someone else might sign it. I suggested that you
might be willing to develop the same ideas -- perhaps you
have been contacted about this. If you do, please feel free
to use the material but make it unrecognizable as far as
attribution.

Looking forward to seeing you here in Washington.

March 16, 1955

Colonel William R. Kintner
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Bill:

This is just a note to tell you that I have reluctantly declined to sign my name to your very interesting article. The reason is not that I disagree with it, but that I am publishing two articles this month on the same general theme, and I think the Editors of the two journals in which my articles will appear might justly feel aggrieved if I published the same thoughts once more in a different journal.

I look forward to seeing you on the 25th, and I
shall stay in Washington through Saturday.

HAK:jm

March 29, 1955

Dear Bill:

It was good fun to have dinner with you on Saturday night. I always think well of George Pettee and I very much enjoyed our discussion. I am sending you a paper I wrote which, though it is a little abstruse, may bear on the problem of the relation between values and action that we discussed. You can skip Part II which is not essential.

In reflecting upon the papers which you showed me, I am strongly convinced of their usefulness from the Army point of view. I think the great advantage that the Air Force and the Navy, but particularly the Air Force, have in public consciousness is their superior ability to get their point across on a national basis. This is done in a number of ways, with most of which I am sure you are familiar and which essentially involve getting people in key public opinion-forming positions favorably disposed to the Air Force point of view.

You may have read in *Time* about Professor Leach's Defense Policy Seminar at the Harvard Law School. This is a high level affair with top officials and good publicity. If I had not sat in on a session yesterday, more or less by accident, it would have become entirely an Air Force show with *Finletter* carrying the ball and some Air Force Reserve generals backing him up.

Would it be possible for the Army to create a group of top level consultants from various fields either by giving them high Reserve commissions or in any other capacity, and give them the feeling that they are on the inside of Army policy? I think you will agree that this can be done without running into security problems and without surrendering any of the important pre-rogatives of the Chief of Staff. If they were taken on a junket once or twice a year to say Benning or Leavenworth, they would automatically, when they got back into their civilian spheres, do the job you want them to do.

All of this is, of course, implied in your paper and it does require a
permanent Army staff organization to back it up.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

P.S. Enclosed is the only copy of a personal data sheet I have handy. I don't know whether it will help you with my reserve problem.