FIRST DRAFT

# I. THE STRUCTURAL PROBLEM: MILITARY BIPOLARITY AND POLITICAL MULTIPOLARITY

As the Twentieth Century nears the end of its seventh decade, crises in almost every part of the globe form the headlines of the day. For a pragmatic people, the temptation is great to deal with each issue as it arises "on its merits." For a society which considers peace as the normal condition, it is natural to identify foreign policy with crisis-management and to believe that as each issue is surmounted, the underlying stability will reassert itself.

Yet the central issue before American foreign policy is to recognize that most current crises are symptoms. The deepest causes of contemporary unrest are structural; many of our difficulties have been conceptual. The international system which produced stability for a century collapsed under the impact of two world wars. The age of the superpowers is nearing its end. But of p. 6, Add political?

In much of American discussion, there is a tendency to talk of peace as if it were identical with consciousness of harmony or a permanent state of tranquility. It would be difficult to find support in history for such notions.

Periods of relative calm have been characterized less by the absence of conflict than by a limitation of its scope. What seems as tranquility to posterity appears to contemporaries as the constant effort to adjust differences within some system of

The distinguishing feature of our period is not the existence of conflict but its scope, not the fact of tension but the absence of structure or concepts for dealing with it. root

The cause of international tensions is the collapse of the international system which insured a measure of stability for the century prior to World War I. (World War I in this sense was an accident. The major countries did not think they were entering a conflict destined to overthrow the international order; all expected a relatively quick settlement on the model of the three rapid wars of Prussia in the 1860's). Stable periods have been characterized by some or all of the following features: a multiplicity of states of roughly equal strength; a relatively stable technology; a similar outlook by political leaders about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy; limited domestic claims; a frontier permitting compensations. In such conditions, the main goal of foreign policy becomes to prevent one state from upsetting the entire system; the general equilibrium seems to the major powers more important than any disputes within it.

All of these conditions existed prior to World War I. What was called the concert of Europe was maintained by five great powers: Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire with Italy clamoring for recognition. A multiplicity of states permits diplomacy to substitute for strength; political adjustments can take the place of a contest of arms (after the turn of the century, this flexibility was lost because of the development of two quite rigid military alliances so that the international system took on the characteristics of a bi-polar world).

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A stable technology removes the insecurities of a qualitative arms race. Countries may still seek to increase the numbers of their weapons or their mobilization potential. They will be less tempted to act in order to forestall a technological breakthrough by an opponent or to gear their society to a major technological effort directed against a potential enemy.

A similar outlook about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy eases the tasks of diplomacy -- it may even be a precondition for it. In the classical periods of diplomacy, diplomats spoke the same language, not only in the sense that French was the lingua franca, but more importantly because they tended to understand intangibles in the same manner. In the absence of such a consensus, diplomats can still meet but they lose the ability to persuade. More time is spent on defining contending positions than in resolving them. What seems most reasonable to one side will appear most problematical to the other.

The scope of domestic claims determines the resources available for the conduct of foreign policy and therefore for conflict. If the states' ability to mobilize resources is limited, so is the impact of their power and the severity of their conflict. The wars of the 18th Century were limited partly because the aims of the leaders were limited but also because none of the rulers by "divine right" dreamt of levying increase taxes or conscripting their subjects. Similar limitations obtained through much of the 19th Century. It is no accident that the destructiveness of war has mounted with the ability of governments to marshal resources for the national effort.

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The existence of frontiers provided an outlet for rivalries that otherwise might have produced war. Thus, after the Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck encouraged France's expansion into Africa partly to ease the resentment over losing Alsace-Lorraine, partly to embroil France with Britain and thus contribute to her isolation.

This system collapsed under the impact of the first World War. After 1918, two of the major powers explicitly rejected the prevailing international system: Germany because it felt humiliated by the Treaty of Versailles; the Soviet Union because of her ideology and because of the suspicions of its purposes by other Powers. World War II completed the disintegration.

The fragmentation of the international system has occurred when for the first time in history, foreign policy has become global. In the past, the various continents conducted their foreign policy essentially in isolation from each other. Throughout much of history, the foreign policy of Europe was scarcely affected by events in Asia. When, in the late 18th and 19th Centuries, the European powers spread their influence around the world, the effective decisions remained located in a few great European capitals. Today, foreign policymakers face the unprecedented problem of conducting policy toward well over a hundred countries. Frontiers permitting compensation no longer exist. Every nation, no matter how insignificant, is part of the international system. At the same time, the claims of the state on national resources have mounted. Coupled with the technological revolution, this

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means that there are no longer any technical limits to the
exercise of power in the field of foreign policy. Ideological
disagreements and historical experience combine to prevent a
consensus about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy.

All these elements mark our period as an age of revolution.
The changes fall under three general headings: (a) the number of
participants in the international order has increased and their
nature has altered; (b) the technical ability of these participants
to affect each other has vastly grown; (c) the scope of purposes of
these units has expanded,

Whenever the participants of the international system change,
a period of profound dislocation is inevitable. This change can
happen because new states enter the political system. Or it can
occur because there is a change in values as to what constitutes
legitimate rule. Finally, it can come about because of the
reduction in influence of some traditional units. In our period,
all three factors combine. Since the end of the second World War,
several score of new states have come into being. The emergence of
even a few new nations in the 19th Century produced decades of
adjustment. The post-World War I world never assimilated the
successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Our age has yet
to find a structure which matches the aspirations of the new nations
to their responsibilities.

The emergence of so many new states is compounded by profound
challenges to previous notions of legitimacy. Ideological conflict
produces a condition where political loyalties no longer necessarily
coincide with national boundaries. Conflicts among states become

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extended into divisions within nations; the dividing line between domestic and foreign policy begins to disappear. At least some states feel threatened not only by the foreign policy of other countries, but also, and perhaps especially, by domestic transformations. A liberalized *Communist* regime in Prague -- which had in no way challenged Soviet pre-eminence in foreign policy -- caused the Kremlin to believe that its vital interests were threatened and to occupy the country without even the pretext of legality.

The tensions produced by this state of affairs are compounded by the reduction in influence of the pre-World War I great powers which has in effect made the world bipolar on the military plane. Only two powers -- the U.S. and the USSR -- possess the full panoply of military might. Over the next decade, no other country or group of countries is capable of challenging their physical pre-eminence. Indeed, the gap in military strength between the two giant nuclear countries and the rest of the world is likely to increase rather than diminish over that period.

In a bipolar world, diplomatic adjustments are difficult because any relative gain for one side appears as an absolute loss for the other. Every issue seems to involve a question of survival. The smaller countries are torn between a desire for protection and a wish to escape big power dominance. Each of the superpowers is beset by the desire to maintain its pre-eminence toward its allies, to increase its influence among the uncommitted and to adjust its relations to its opponent. The fact that some of these objectives may well prove incompatible adds to the strain on the international system.

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The current international environment is, however, bipolar
only in the limited sense of nuclear confrontation. In other
important aspects, military bipolarity has not only failed to
prevent, it has actually encouraged political multipolarity.
Allies are convinced that their defense is in the overwhelming
interest of the senior partners. Hence, they see no need not to
purchase its support by acquiescence in its policies. The new
nations, even though technically neutral or uncommitted, feel
protected by the rivalry of the superpowers. Nationalism leads
to ever bolder assertions of autonomy.

Military power, while greater than ever, has also become
less useful for establishing political control. The disparity
in strength between the advanced and the developing countries
is more pronounced today than in the heyday of colonialism. Yet
the ability to impose this power is inhibited by domestic
opposition, international opinion and the nature of legitimacy
in the modern period. In the 18th Century, the European powers
could engage in decades of colonial wars without opposition from
public opinion either at home or internationally. Today, any
developing country willing and capable to resist for a number
of years can count on domestic divisions and pressures of world
public opinion to assist it. Even in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet
Union has experienced the fragility of power without legitimacy.

This political multipolarity does not necessarily guarantee
stability. Nationalism may succeed in curbing the pre-eminence of
the superpowers; it remains to be seen whether it can supply an
integrating concept of order more successfully in this century
than in the last. Only the superpowers have the incentive or the
resources to conduct a truly global foreign policy; yet the super-

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powers are inhibited by domestic bureaucratization as well as
by the facts of nationalism from shaping the new trends. Few
countries have the capacity, almost none have the resources, to
become informed about global issues. Yet instantaneous communication
and domestic pressures draw them into taking stands on major issues.
The result is a diplomacy often geared to domestic politics or more
concerned with striking a pose than contributing to international
order. In short, one central challenge to American foreign policy
is how to help create an international order which combines military
bipolarity and political multipolarity and which can channel the
tensions inseparable from this process in a constructive direction.

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## II. THE PROBLEM OF EQUILIBRIUM: THE NATURE OF POWER IN THE MODERN PERIOD

Any stable international order has two components: an equilibrium of power that makes it physically difficult to over-throw the system and a degree of moral consensus which induces the major powers to refrain from the attempt by limiting their claims.

Both of these tasks are complicated in the modern period. The nature of power is particularly elusive. The problem goes beyond defining the requirements of military security. It involves traditional notions of defense and the use to which power can be put in the modern period.

The destructiveness and range of modern weapons have become well understood. Any part of the world can be reached from any other in a matter of minutes. Statesmen face risks inconceivable to any previous generation. Never has foreign policy had to be conducted with the knowledge that the ultimate sanction is likely to involve mutual suicide.

Throughout history, the minimum aims of foreign policy was to assure the survival of the state. Military power was considered the final recourse; its minimum aim was to assure the impermeability of the territory. As late as World War II, a state's strength could be measured by its ability to protect its population from foreign attack.

The nuclear age has destroyed this relationship between power and impermeability. Offensive power and defensive power are no longer commensurable. Increasing strength does not necessarily

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confer the ability to protect the population. No forseeable force
level -- even operational ballistic missile defenses -- can prevent
levels of damage eclipsing those of the two world wars. Operational
definitions of victory in any sense that would have been meaningful
in the past -- even by World War II standards -- are almost impossible.

The changed nature of power affects not only military policy
(which is being dealt with in a separate essay) but all aspects of
foreign policy. Throughout history, statesmen considered that
-to acquire additional increments of power was one of their dominant
problems. As late as twenty-five years ago, it would have been
inconceivable that a country could possess _too much_ strength for
effective political use; in other words, every additional increment
of power was -- at least theoretically -- politically effective.

In the contemporary period, the major problem has turned out
to be to discipline power into some relationship to objectives in
dispute. The major nuclear powers are capable of devastating each
other. But they do not know how to put this power to political use
except to prevent direct challenges to their own survival -- and they
interpret this condition with increasing strictness. The capacity
to destroy is difficult to translate into a plausible threat even
against countries with no capacity for retaliation. The paradox of
contemporary military power can be stated as follows: power has
never been greater but this very fact has eroded its relationship
to policy. The margin of superiority of the superpowers over the
other states is widening; yet other nations have an unprecedented

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scope for autonomous actions. In relation to many domestically
weak countries, a radio transmitter is a more effective form of
pressure than a squadron of B-52's. In other words, power and
influence are less related than at any previous period. (This
does not mean that impotence increases influence, only that power
does not automatically confer it).

American political thought has never been comfortable with
the balance of power. It has come to be accepted only belatedly
and ambivalently -- at a moment when its presuppositions stand
in profound need of re-examination.

The criteria for the traditional balance of power were
territorial. A state could gain overwhelming superiority only
by conquest; hence, as long as territorial expansion was fore-
closed, or severely limited, the equilibrium was likely to be
preserved. In the contemporary period, this is no longer true.
Some conquests add little to effective military strength; major
increases in power are possible entirely through developments
within the territory of a sovereign state. If China conquered
all of Southeast Asia, it would gain less in real military power
than it did through the acquisition of nuclear weapons. If the
Soviet Union had conquered Western Europe, but had remained with-
out nuclear weapons, it would be less powerful than in its present
extent with the existing nuclear arsenal. In other words, the
really fundamental changes in the balance of power have all
occurred within the territorial limits of sovereign states. This
suggests an urgent need to reconsider just what is understood by

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balance of power in the modern period and what this implies for
United States foreign policy.

In a world in which power has never been greater but also
never been more difficult to translate into policy, deterrence has
become the dominant military policy. But deterrence depends above
all on psychological criteria. It seeks to keep an opponent from
an undesirable course by posing risks he is unwilling to confront.
For purposes of deterrence, the opponent's calculations are
decisive. A bluff taken seriously is more useful than a serious
threat interpreted as a bluff. Military strength must be assessed
as it is seen by the other side.

This would be difficult enough were technology stable. It
becomes enormously complicated when a scientific revolution
produces an upheaval in weapons technology at five-year intervals.
Slogans like "superiority," "parity," "assured destruction" compete
without clear definition of their operational military significance,
or without consensus as to their political implications. The gap
between expert and decisionmakers is widening. The decisionmaker
rarely has as many hours to study a problem as the expert has years
for the task. The result is that the decisionmaker runs the risk
of unprecedented dependence on his technical staff. He is informed
by "briefings" -- a procedure which stresses theatrical qualities
and leaves its subject with the uneasy feeling that he has been
taken, even -- or perhaps especially -- when he does not know quite
how. Decisions may reflect an attempt to ward off conflicting
pressures rather than a clear conception of long-range purpose.

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When the domestic decisionmaking powers are so uncertain, the
possibility that the two superpowers will understand security
in the same manner becomes increasingly complicated.

The abstract, esoteric nature of modern power affects
the domestic structure in yet another way. Deterrence is tested
negatively by things which do _not_ happen. But it is never possible
to demonstrate why something has _not_ occurred. Is it because we
are pursuing the best possible policy or only a marginally
effective one? Or perhaps there was no need for a defense policy
in the first place because the opponent never meant to attack?
Bitter debate among those who believe in the necessity of defense
policy is inevitable and bound to be inconclusive. At the same
time, the longer peace is maintained -- or the more successful
deterrence is -- the more it furnishes arguments for those who
are opposed to _any_ defense policy. In the modern state, defense
is likely to be a highly divisive domestic issue.

The difficulty of forming a conception of power is paralleled
by the problem of how to use it diplomatically. In the past,
measures to increase readiness signaled the mounting seriousness
with which an issue was viewed (sometimes these measures got out
of control; the mobilization schedules were one of the principal
reasons for the outbreak of World War I). But when weapons are
always at a high state of readiness -- solid-fuel missiles require
less than 10 minutes to be fired -- and hidden underground or
under the oceans such measures are becoming more difficult and
dangerous. With respect to nuclear weapons, signaling increased
readiness will either

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prove unsuccessful or if it succeeds, it may trigger a pre-emptive strike.

But even with conventional weapons, the problem grows increasingly complicated. After the capture of the Pueblo, the U.S. called up 13 thousand reservists and moved an aircraft carrier off the shores of Korea. Did the fact that we had to call up reserves when challenged by a fifth-rate military power signal that we meant to act or that we were overextended? Did the move of the aircraft carrier indicate a decision to retaliate or was it intended primarily to strike a pose? What indeed was the appropriate response?

The history of our escalation in Vietnam demonstrates the difficulty of becoming clear about the political use of military power. It would have been difficult over the past five years to receive a clear definition of victory. Throughout the war, a massive breakdown of communications occurred. Our troops were deployed as if the President had not extended an open-ended offer of negotiations. In other words, our deployment did not take into account that it might have to support a negotiation -- the timing of which could be chosen by the opponent. Measures we meant to signal resolve were interpreted by Hanoi as within its capability to withstand. What we thought would end the war quickly, spurred renewed determination by our opponent. Strategy divorced from foreign policy has proved sterile; diplomacy unrelated to strategic conceptions has produced posturing.

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These problems have spurred a new interest in arms control negotiations,

These negotiations are important. But to be conducted effectively, they require an intellectual resolution of the issues which have bedeviled the formulation of military policy. Superiority is often contrasted to stability and it is argued that arms control negotiations should strive for the latter. But unless we are able to give an operational meaning to these terms, negotiations will lack criteria by which to judge progress.

Thus, whatever the course -- a continuation of the arms race or arms control -- a new look at U.S. national security policy is essential. It is over ten years since there was a bi-partisan panel to review that subject: the Gaither committee. A new Administration should move quickly to constitute such a group.

It should deal with some of the following questions:

a. Definitions of national interest and national security.

a. The nature of military power in the present period.
The relation of military to political power.

b. Implications and feasibility of various postures -- superiority, parity, etc. -- both militarily and politically.

c. The implications both political and military of new developments such as MIRV (multiple warheads) and ballistic missile defense.

d. The prospects for arms control including specific measures to moderate the arms race.

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### III. EQUILIBRIUM AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM

At a moment when the traditional measurements of power have lost a great deal of their relevance, the psychological aspect of stability takes on increasing importance. The modern bureaucratic state for all its panoply of strength increasingly finds itself shaken to its foundations by seemingly trivial causes. Its brittleness and the world-wide revolution of youth -- especially in the advanced countries -- suggests a spiritual void, an almost metaphysical boredom with a life which increasingly emphasizes bureaucratic patterns and offers no deeper purpose than material comfort.

The heroes of these protest movements are such unlikely figures as Guevara or Ho -- leaders of backward countries and repressive societies. The absurdity of founding a claim for freedom on protagonists of the totalitarian state only underlines the fact that the travail of the new countries spills over even to societies which share none of their immediate problems. For it is in the new countries that the issue of the purpose of political life and the meaning of political legitimacy -- key problems also of the modern state -- poses itself in its most acute form. These nations weigh little in the physical balance of power. But the forces unleashed in the emergence of so many new states may well affect the moral balance of the world.

For all their confusion and torment*, future historians are likely to class developments in the new world with

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the great movements of religious conversion. Continents which had been dormant for centuries have suddenly developed political consciousness. Regions which for scores of years had considered foreign rule as natural, struggle for independence. Yet it has been an independence of a curious nature: defined not as European nationalism by common language or history but often primarily by the common experience of foreign rule. Boundaries -- especially in Africa -- have tended to follow the administrative convenience of the colonial powers. Divided along religious or tribal lines, the new nations have faced both a problem of identity and of political authority. They lack social cohesiveness or they are split into competing groups each with a highly developed sense of identity.

The problem of the definition of the nature of political authority -- inseparable from the nature of justice -- affects the new nations in a particularly acute form. Almost all of the new countries suffer from the revolutionary malaise: revolutions succeed through the coming together of all resentments. But the greater the success in sweeping away the existing structure, the greater is the difficulty of finding an adequate consensus for positive action. Contrary to all expectations, the task of construction has emerged as less glamorous and more complex than the struggle for freedom. Sooner or later, positive goals must replace resentment of the former colonial power as a motive force. In the absence of autonomous social forces, this unifying role must be performed by the state in the new countries.

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But this produces another problem. When social cohesiveness
is slight, the struggle for control of authority becomes increasingly
bitter. When government is the principal, sometimes the sole
expression of national identity, opposition tends to be considered
as treason. The profound social or religious schisms of many of the
new nations, turns the issue of political authority quite literally
into a matter of life and death. The rule of the majority is
bearable only if the minority can hope at some point to transform
itself into a majority. But where political obligation follows
racial, religious or tribal lines, self-restraint breaks down.
Domestic conflicts take on the character of a civil war. Such
traditional authority as exists is personal or fuedal. The problem
is to make it "legitimate" -- to develop a notion of political
obligation which depends on legal norms and not exclusively on the
existence of coercive power or on merely personal loyalty.

This process took centuries in Europe. It must be accomplished
in decades in the new nations where preconditions of success are less
favorable than at comparable periods in Europe.

Outside forces have a constant temptation to exploit internal instability. There is a premium on foreign adventures to bring about domestic cohesiveness. The disappearance of familiar patterns of obligation without replacement by new reference points unleashes forces whose elemental passions will in time spill over into the advanced countries as well.

The American role in the effort of building legitimate
authority is in serious need of re-examination. The dominant
American view about political structure has been that it would

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follow more or less automatically upon economic progress and that
it would then take the form of constitutional democracy.

Both assumptions are subject to serious questions. In
every advanced country, political stability preceeded rather than
emerged from the process of industrialization. Similarly, where
the rudiments of popular institutions did not exist at the
beginning of the industrial revolution, they did not receive their
impetus from it. To be sure, these institutions were broadened and
elaborated as the countries prospered -- but their significant features
antedated economic development and are not attributable to it. In
fact, whatever system of government has brought about industrial-
ization, has tended to be confirmed and elaborated by this achieve-
ment.

This is no accident. Industrialization -- in its early
phases -- multiplies dislocations. It smashes the traditional
framework. It requires a system of values which makes the sacrifices
involved in capital formation tolerable -- and which furnishes some
integrating principles to contain psychological frustrations.

Communism has never succeeded in the
industrialized countries for which its theory was devised; its
greates successes have been in agricultural societies. This is
because Leninism, far from being a successor to liberal democracy
in promoting economic growth is an alternative to it. It supplies
a legitimacy for the sacrifices inseparable from capital formation
in an age when the maxims of laisser-faire are no longer acceptable.

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Too, it provides a rationale to revolutionary leaders for holding on to power. After all, the leaders of the new countries sustained themselves through the struggle for independence by visions of the transformations to be brought about after victory. They are not predisposed even to admit the possibility of giving up power in their hour of triumph. Since they usually began their struggle for independence while in a small minority and sustained it against heavy odds, they are not likely to be repelled by the notion that it is possible to "force men to be free." Democracy is far from a natural evolution of nationalism.

In the last century, it depended on the existence of an aristocratic ruling class -- not professional revolutionaries -- whose estimate of itself was founded outside the political process and a political philosophy which considered the state to be a referee of the ultimately important social forces rather than the principal force of national consciousness.

The ironic feature of the current situation is that Marxism, professing a materialistic philosophy is accepted in many new countries because of its idealistic components while the U.S., professing an idealistic philosophy often fails because of its heavy reliance on economic factors. This does not mean that our goal should be to transfer American pluralistic institutions to the new nations. The pluralism of the West had many causes which cannot be duplicated elsewhere. These included; a church organization outside the control of the state and therefore symbolizing the limitation of governmental power; the Graeo-Roman philosophical

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tradition of justice based on human dignity reinforced later by
the Christian ethic; an emerging bourgeoisie; a stalemate in
religious wars imposing tolerance as a practical necessity; a
multiplicity of states. Industrialization was by no means the
most significant of these factors. Had any of the others been
missing, the Western political evolution could have been quite
different.

The fact remains that the issue of political legitimacy
is the key to political stability in regions containing two-thirds
of the world's population. An American agenda must include some
conception of what we understand by it. The problem should not be
simplified into simple slogans like preventing the spread of
Communism. Whatever its formal philosophy, the dominant pattern
in the new countries is unlikely to be the bureaucratic formalism
of Moscow. Even a victorious Communism will be shaped by nationalist
forces that will make it difficult to control centrally.

The fact remains that the United States cannot remain aloof
even if it wishes. In an age of instantaneous communication, we
cannot pretend that what happens to over two-thirds of humanity is
of no concern or interest to the United States. Irrelevance to one
of the great revolutions of our time will mean that we will ultimately
be engulfed by it -- if not physically, then psychologically. The
presuppositions of the physical equilibrium have changed drastically;
those of the psychological balance remain yet to be discovered.

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IV. THE TRANSITION FROM THE MILITARY TO THE POLITICAL APPROACH TO WORLD ORDER: THE CHANGED NATURE OF ALLIANCES

In the first decade after the end of the war, it was assumed that Stalin's foreign policy was similar to Hitler's and that Hitler's aggression was made possible by the lack of certainty about the resistance he would confront. Hence, it was essential to create military groupings which would remove any ambiguity from the minds of a potential aggressor. It was believed that American nuclear power represented the chief shield against outside attack. Inevitably, our alliances -- principally NATO -- reflected the facts of bipolarity. The major decisions remained in the hands of the United States; our allies were confined to a largely advisory role. The alliances -- especially NATO -- were supposed to serve a political purpose as well; as a chrysalis from which a larger political community comprising the Atlantic nations might emerge.

Alliances to be effective, must meet four conditions:

(1) There has to be a common objective -- usually defense against a common danger; (2) There must be some degree of joint policy at least sufficient to define the canes belli; (3) There must be some technical means of cooperation in case common action is decided upon; (4) There must be some penalty for non-cooperation; the protecting power must be believed to have some alternative to extending assistance.

These conditions were never met outside the NATO area and the last is difficult to fulfill even there. In SEATO or CENTO

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(to which we have belonged in all but name) there has been no
common conception of the threat. Pakistan's motive for obtaining
U.S. arms was not security against a Communist attack, but pro-
tection against India. The Arab members of CENTO armed not against
the USSR but against Israel. Lacking a common conception of inter-
national affairs, the members of these alliances were never able to
develop common policies with respect to issues of war and peace.
Had they been able to do so, these policies might well have been
stilborn, because the technical ability to cooperate has been lacking.
Countries with great difficulty in maintaining order in their own
territory do not increase their strength by combining with states
suffering similar disabilities. In these circumstances, SEATO and
CENTO have become, in effect, unilateral American guarantees. But
because the United States seemed more eager than the guaranteed
country to engage in its defense, no penalty for an independent
policy has existed. As a result, SEATO and CENTO have become
moribund as instruments of collective action; at best they provide
a legal basis for bilateral US aid.

The case is different with NATO. Here we are united with
countries of similar traditions and domestic structures. At the
start, there was a common conception of the threat. The technical
means for cooperation existed. Mechanisms for developing common
policies came into being.

Nevertheless, NATO is in disarray as well. Some of this
decline in Allied cohesiveness is due to US actions -- above all,
to unilateral changes of US policy. But the most important cause

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is the transformation of the international environment. When NATO was formed, Europeans suffered from a dual fear: (1) the danger of an imminent Soviet attack (2) the prospect of eventual US withdrawal. By the late 1960's, the fear of Soviet invasion has declined. Even the attack on Czechoslovakia is likely to restore anxiety about Soviet military aggression only temporarily. At the same time, two decades of American military presence in Europe coupled with American predominance in NATO planning, have sharply reduced the fear that America might wash its hands of European concerns. As a result, Europeans neither believe that the need for American support is as urgent as two decades ago nor that US assistance against aggression must be purchased by acquiescence in our policies.

Moreover, when NATO was formed, it seemed that the principal threat was a Soviet attack on Europe. In recent years, Europeans have come to believe that the greatest risks are likely to be caused by trouble spots outside of Europe which to Europeans do not appear to threaten their independence immediately. In the Fifties, Europeans were asking for American assistance in areas outside of Europe with the argument that they were defending the greater interests of freedom. The United States replied that these very interests required American aloofness. Today, the roles are precisely reversed. It is Europe which evades our entreaties to play a global role; that is to say, Europeans do not consider their interests at stake in America's extra-European involvement.

The most important reasons for the decline of NATO are deeper however, The changed nature of power was bound to affect NATO

profoundly. The risks of nuclear war cannot help but undermine
the credibility of traditional pledges of support. In the past,
a country would carry out a commitment because it could plausibly
be argued that the consequences of not doing so were worse than
those of coming to the ally's assistance. However, each of the
last three annual statements on the US defense posture has estimated
that in case of a general nuclear war, United States' <u>dead</u> would
range from 40 to 120 million. This trend will, if anything,
increase. It will then become more and more difficult to demonstrate
that anything is worse than that contingency. Basing the defense of
NATO increasingly on a variant of the doctrine of massive retaliation
complicates the problem even more. Though the <u>chance</u> of US
policy has no doubt contributed to loss of confidence in US leadership,
some of the problems are inherent in the nature of modern technology
and cannot be removed by the ritualistic repetition of the reassurances
of the late Forties.

Another fundamental fact is the growth of European economic
strength and political self-confidence. When NATO was formed,
Europe was dependent on the United States for economic assistance,
political stability and military protection. In these circumstances,
American predominance was inevitable. European statesmen dealt with
the United States as lobbyists rather than as diplomats. Their
influence depended less on the weight of their countries than on
their weight as personalities. A form of consultation grew up whereby
Europeans sought to influence American actions by giving us a
reputation to uphold or -- to put it more crudely -- by oscillating
between flattery and almost plaintive appeals for reassurance.

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The United States, secure in its predominance, in turn concentrated
more on soothing occasional European outbreaks of insecurity than
on an analysis of their causes.

Tutelage is a comfortable relationship for the senior partner,
but it is not healthy. It breeds illusions of omniscence on one
side and attitudes of impotent irresponsibility on the other. In
any event, the United States could not expect to perpetuate the
accident of Europe's post-war exhaustion into a permanent pattern of
international relations. Europe's economic recovery inevitably led
to a return to more traditional political pressures in relations with
the United States. Rapid, unpredictable oscillations in United
States policy have contributed to the reduction in American influence.
De Gaulle has accelerated this process. However, the basic causes
have been structural and could not have been removed by however wise
an American, or however conciliatory a European posture,

This change has been difficult for those in the United States
who deserve most credit for forging existing Atlantic relations.
But their aim of returning to the "great days" of the Marshall Plan
is impossible. Nothing would sunder Atlantic relationships so surely
as the attempt to reassert the notions of leadership appropriate
to the early days of NATO. Events will no longer conform to an
American design; the challenge of the Seventies will be to tap the
energies of a pluralistic Atlantic world.

It is often argued that the breakdown in Atlantic relationships
is technical: inadequate European resources for playing a global
role or inadequate consultation. The former is to be accomplished

- 27 -

by encouraging European unity which would give Europe the economic base to share our global responsibilities. But while there are strong arguments for European unity, playing a global role is not one of them. A nation assumes responsibilities not only because it has resources; it depends very much on the society's view of itself. Through the greater part of its history -- until World War II -- the United States possessed the resources but not the philosophy for a global role. Today, the poorest West European country -- Portugal -- has the widest commitments outside of Europe because its historic image of itself has become bound up with its overseas possessions. This condition is unlikely to be met for any other European country -- with the partial exception of Great Britain -- no matter what their increase in power. Partially as the result of de-colonization, Europeans are unlikely to conduct a significant global policy whatever their resources or their degree of unity. Cooperation between the United States and Europe will have to take other forms than a global partnership. A basic problem in Atlantic relationships will be to devise partly coordinated, partly divergent policies for the various portions of the world.

The problem of consultation is complex. No doubt unilateral American action has compounded the uneasiness produced by American predominance and European weakness. Whatever the merit of individual policies, the shift in the emphasis of American policy from a focus on the NATO multilateral force to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the frequent unilateral changes in strategic doctrine have tended to produce disquiet and to undermine the domestic situation

- 28 -

* of ministers who had staked their future on supporting the American viewpoint.

It is, however, far from self-evident that more extensive consultation within the existing framework can do more than ameliorate the difficulty. Any political process - including consultation - involves not only a problem of advice but also an issue of decision. Even within governments, the ultimate outcome usually requires the overruling of some group or interest. Indeed, in the modern bureaucratic state, the resolution of conflicting sources of advice has proved much more difficult than obtaining it. Those who argue for a greater European voice in our decision-making process -- often in return for some concession like giving up nuclear weapons -- rarely explain what they mean. A veto over all of US foreign policy? A veto over SAC plans? Do Europeans know what is meant by the joint planning in a bureaucracy operating so much on a case-by-case approach and in which plans almost never influence crisis actions? Have American advocates of this argument thought through the problems of a decision-making process which even in an American context has great difficulty absorbing the available information and which for really crucial decisions tends to be confined to an ever smaller range of key decision makers? Have foreigners understood the staffing requirements for such a procedure? How are disputes resolved if views differ or interests do not coincide? No amount of consultation will remove the different perspective about extra-European involvements. The disagreement here is caused not by a failure of understanding but because the two sides understand each other only too well. - Non seurat? *

- 29 -

One issue concerns technical competence. In any large bureaucracy -- and an international consultative process has many similarities to domestic administrative procedures -- the weight given to advice bears some relation to the competence it reflects (it also depends on the options of the advisor). If one partner possesses all technical competence, the process of consultation is likely to remain barren. The minimum requirement for effective consultation is that each ally have enough knowledge to give meaningful advice. The NATO nuclear committee

has made a great contribution in this respect for the military problem.

But the final problems of consultation are not technical. The losing party in a domestic dispute has three choices: (a) it can accept the setback with the expectation of winning another battle later on -- this is the usual bureaucratic attitude and it is based on the knowledge of being able to force another hearing later on; (b) if advice is consistently ignored, the losing party or group can resign and go into opposition; (c) opposition can have the purpose either of inducing the existing government to change its course or to replace it. If all these avenues are closed, violence or mounting frustration are the consequences.

Only the first option is open among sovereign states bound together by an alliance. The partners cannot resign. They cannot affect the process by which allied decisionmakers are chosen though this may be crucial for his fate. They cannot go into opposition without wrecking the alliance. Indeed, so long as the need to maintain the alliance overrides all other concerns, sustained

- 30 -

disagreement is likely to be stifled. Advice without responsibility, and disagreement without an outlet can turn consultation into a frustrating exercise which compounds rather than alleviates discord.

The effectiveness of consultation -- even domestically -- depends party on technical competence, partly on the options thought to be available in case of disagreement. Even domestically, those departments whose enthusiastic support on a wide range of activities is necessary -- such as the Department of Defense -- are likely to get a fuller hearing than those whose competence is primarily technical or advisory. This is even more true internationally. However abrupt his methods, de Gaulle has grasped that influence depends not only on intellectual qualities but on a certain capacity to maneuver.

Consultation is especially difficult when it lacks an integrating overall framework. The consultation about the Non-Proliferation Treaty concerned specific provisions but not the general philosophy underlying it which was of the deepest concern to the Federal Republic especially, but also to some other allies. Each ally makes its own approach to Eastern Europe or the USSR without any coherent concept for the total enterprise. In these circumstances, consultation runs the risk of being irrelevant. The issues it "solves" are peripheral; the central issues are inadequately articulated. It deals with answers to undefined questions.

ultimate

The problem in our relation to Europe concerns the evolution we foresee in Atlantic relationships and East-West contacts. Is

- 31 -

the future to be based on an adaptation of existing relationships
or is a new pattern necessary? Should the present framework be
made more bearable or does it require a new approach? What kind
of a world are we aiming for? The Atlantic nations require above
all a new philosophy [not a new policy.] They require a concept of
the future if they are to build it.

For two decades, American policymakers have paid lip service
to European autonomy. But the operational definition they have
given to it has tended to recoil before its implications. Partner-
ship has too often been interpreted as enabling Europeans to share
our burdens, to apply on a global scale the pattern of cooperation
heretofore confined to the Atlantic area.

Such a view is not in keeping with the realities of the
current international solution.

If the United States
insists on remaining the trustee of every non-Communist area, it
will exhaust its psychological resources above all. No country can
act wisely simultaneously in every part of the globe at every
moment of time. If we cannot trust the area closest to us in tradition
and with a long history of independent foreign policy to conduct an
autonomous policy, the future is dim indeed for other areas of the
world. Far from discouraging autonomous centers of initiative,
we should foster them especially in areas whose fundamental interests
are likely to parallel our own. Painful as it may be to admit we
could benefit from a counterweight to discipline our occasional
impetuosity and to supply historical perspective to our penchant
for abstract and "final" solutions. We will have to assume that

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Europeans will understand the requirements of their own survival without pervasive American tutelage and that if they do not, American tutelage will not long be able to substitute for lack of European understanding.

It is sometimes argued that such a course will encourage Third Force tendencies in Europe. This depends on how one understands that term. Europe as a powerful and responsible entity, is in our interest even if it does not always follow our preferred prescription. But the memory of European impotence and American tutelage should not delude us into believing that we understand Europe's problems better than it does itself.

This is precisely the attitude which must be overcome in all of our policy -- especially in the Atlantic area. If the emerging multipolarity is to be used creatively, a decentralization of decisionmaking -- including the military field -- is the prerequisite for closer cooperation on the issues which really matter. These are unlikely to emerge from debates about strategy primarily. The exegesis of existing military guarantees cannot change the reality that under current conditions, no statesman will risk a cataclysm simply to fulfill a legal obligation. The only motive for running the risks of nuclear war is likely to be a degree of political cooperation which causes the fate of each partner to be felt to be at stake in the survival of the others. This requires an entirely new order of political creativity. It also suggests cooperative efforts in hither to neglected areas. For example, under present circumstances, a community of interests can be developed especially meaningfully in the social sphere. All modern states face problems

- 33 -

of bureaucratization, pollution, environmental control, urban
growth. These problems should be addressed by the best minds
free beyond the confines of national considerations. If the
nations of the Atlantic work together on these issues -- either
through private or governmental channels or both -- a new
generation used to cooperative efforts could develop similar
Similarly,
to that spawned by the Marshall Plan. /why does our space program
have to be a national effort? Would not European participation
in it supply an effective answer to the "technological gap?"

But beyond specific remedial measures, it is time that
the nations of the North Atlantic address - formally and
systematically - questions as these: (a) what are the relative
roles of Europe and the US in East-West contacts? (b) is a
division of functions conceivable in which Western Europe plays
the principal role in relation to Eastern Europe while the US
concentrates on relationships with the USSR? (c) what forms of
political consultation does this require? (d) in what areas of the
world is common action possible? Where are divergent courses
indicated? How are differences to be handled?

These issues involve the heart of our foreign policy problem;
the relationship between the physical and the psychological
equilibrium between military bipolarity and political multipolarity.
The facts of technology make for centralization; political and
psychological realities the encouragement of pluralism. Ad hoc
consultation will not get to the heart of the problem. What is
needed above all is a philosophical deepening.

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V. A CENTRAL ISSUE: THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM

A philosophical deepening faces major obstacles in the American approach to foreign policy. Pragmatism tends to create a case-by-case approach. Problems are segmented into components, each of which is dealt with by experts in the special difficulty it involves. The heavy influence of the legal profession magnifies this tendency. It leads to high analytical skill with respect to the immediate problem but a reluctance to confront the "hypothetical" cases involved in long-range planning. The problem of world order is seen in extremely personal terms.

A society which considers peace normal and a terminal point, tends to treat tension as the result not of structural causes but of wicked or shortsighted individuals. Foreign policy is seen as an attempt to wait for the opponent's change of heart. Peace is thought to result either from the automatic operation of economic forces or the emergence of a more benign leadership.

The debate between "hard liners" and "soft liners" illustrates this problem. Both sides tend to agree that the purpose of American policy is to bring about a more benign evolution of Soviet society -- containment was after all supposed to bring about a Soviet domestic transformation. They are at one, that a settlement presupposes a change in the Soviet system. Both groups give the impression that the nature of a possible settlement is perfectly obvious -- neither Mr. Acheson nor Mr. Dulles ever defined what would be the American program when the situation of strength which was the goal of their policy had in fact been achieved. Nor have the advocates of relaxation of tensions tended to emphasize

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precision; they have been more concerned with the atmosphere than
with the substance of talks. In fact, the difference between the
"hawks" and "doves" has usually concerned an issue of timing;
the "hawks" have maintained that a Soviet change of heart, while
inevitable, was still in the future while the "doves" have argued
that it has already taken place.

In the process, whatever the issue -- whether Berling or
Vietnam -- more attention has been paid to whether to get to the
conference room than what to do once we got there. The dispute
over Communist intentions has diverted attention from elaborating
our own purposes. The test of dedication to peace has been whether
Soviet intentions can be interpreted in the most favorable manner.

But it should be obvious that the Soviet domestic situation
is complex and its relationship to foreign policy far from obvious.
It is true that the risks of general nuclear war should be as
unacceptable to Moscow as to Washington; but this truism does not
automatically produce detente. It can also be used to lessen the
risks of local intervention. No doubt the current generation of
Communist leaders lacks the ideological dynamism of their pre-
decessors who made the revolution. At the same time, they have at
their disposal a military machine of unprecedented strength and
they must deal with a bureaucracy of formidable vested interests.
After all, senior elements in the Soviet hierarchy felt sufficiently
threatened by freedom of the press in Prague to unleash the Red
Army for the third time in a decade and a half against an allied
country. Unquestionably, Communist consumers press their leaders

- 36 -

to satisfy their demands. It is equally true that an expanding
modern economy is able to supply _both_ guns and butter. Some
Soviet leaders may have become more pragmatic. It can also be
argued that once power is seized and industrialization is largely
accomplished, the Communist party faces a difficult situation: it
is not needed to conduct the government; it has no real function
in running the economy (though it tries to do both). _It may develop_
_a vested interest in vigilance against outside danger and thus in_ a
_fairly high level of tension._

It is beyond the scope of this essay to go into detail on
the issue of internal Communist evolution. _But it may be appropriate_
to inquire why in the past every period of detente has proved
_stilborn._ There have been at least five periods of peaceful
coexistence since the Soviet seizure of power. Each was hailed in
the West as ushering in a new era of reconciliation and indicating
a final change in Soviet purposes. Each was ended by a new period
_of intransigence._ There were many reasons for this. But a con-
tributory cause was surely the tendency to wallow in changes of
Soviet tone, and to confuse atmosphere with substance. This has
enabled the Communist leaders to postpone the choice which they
must make sooner or later; whether to use detente as a device to
lull the West or whether to move to a resolution of the outstanding
differences. Postponing the choice in turn has the result that
latent crises may run away with the principal protagonists.

- 37 -

The eagerness of many in the West to emphasize Soviet domestic trends and to make a favorable evolution of Soviet trends a test of good faith may have the paradoxical consequence of strengthening the Soviet hard liners. Soviet troops had hardly arrived in Prague when Western leaders insisted that this would not affect the quest for detente. The risk is great that if there is no penalty for intransigence, there is no incentive for conciliation. The Kremlin may use negotiations as a safety valve rather than as a serious attempt to remove the scourge of nuclear war.

Gearing policy discussions to Soviet purposes confuses the debate in two ways: (1) Soviet trends are too ambiguous to offer a feasible guide -- it is possible that not even Soviet leaders fully understand the dynamics of their system; (2) it deflects us from articulating our own purposes which we should pursue, whatever Soviet intentions. Peace will not, in any event, result from one grand settlement but from a process of adjustment and this requires some clarity as to our destination.

In this effort, America faces a long agenda of conceptual issues that require clarification. We have tended to ascribe all tensions to the evil intentions of aggressive foreign leaders and have geared policy to the day when they would have a change of heart. But the world is confronted with profound structural problems. These are to a considerable extent independent of the intentions of the principal protagonists and they cannot be solved in fits of good will. Can anyone seriously suppose that all tensions would disappear if the Soviet Union became a

- 38 -

Or, for that matter, if this S.U. were elated at the absurd case

[y]

parliamentary democracy? The history of dealings with Russia
before 1918 would suggest otherwise. Is it to be believed
that a China with a strong central government presents problems
to its neighbors only because of its ideology? A thousand
years of Chinese suzerainty over neighboring territories
indicates the opposite. Whatever the governments, political
evolution would not stop. A conception of what we understand
by a stable world order is essential whatever assumptions we
make of Communist purposes.

This requires that we address ourselves to a question
from which we have historically shied away; an inquiry into the
essence of our national interest. It is part of the American
folklore that while other nations have interests, we have
responsibilities; while other nations are concerned with
equilibrium, we are concerned with the legal requirements of
peace. We have a tendency to offer our altruism as a guarantee
* of our reliability: "We have no quarrel with the Communists,"
Secretary of State Rusk said on one occasion, "all of our
quarrels are on behalf of other people."

Such an attitude makes it difficult to develop a con-*
ception of our role in the world. It inhibits other nations from
gearing their policy to ours in a confident way -- a "disinterested"
policy is likely to be considered "unreliable." A mature
conception of our interest in the world should obviously take
into account the general interest in stability and peaceful
change. It would deal with two fundamental questions: What is
it in our interest to prevent? What should we seek to accomplish?

The answer to the first question is often confused by the

- 39 -

proposition that we will resist aggression anywhere since peace
is indivisible. A corollary is the argument that our opposition
to certain policies concerns the method of change rather than the
fact of change. Thus we find it hard to articulate truly vital
interest -- which we would defend however "legal" the challenge.
It leads to an undifferentiated globalism and confusion as to
our purposes. The notion that we resist aggression in the
abstract and not a particular transformation which threatens our
interests, causes us to multiply our commitments while
diminishing our staying power when we try to carry them out.
Lack of clarity as to our purposes has characterized our
commitment in Vietnam which has been justified variously in terms
of stopping Communist China, aggression by North Vietnam or as a
fulfillment of SEATO obligations.

Part of the reason is our reluctance to think in terms
of power and equilibrium. For example, a State Department
memorandum in 1949 justified NATO as follows: "(The treaty)
obligates the parties to defend the purposes and principles of
the United Nations, the freedom, common heritage and civilization
of the parties and their free institutions based upon the
principles of democracy, individual liberty and the role of law.
It obligates them to act in defense of peace and security. It
is directed against no one; it is directed solely against
aggression. It seeks not to influence any shifting balance of
power but to strengthen a balance of principle."

Principle, however lofty, must at some point be trans-
lated into practice; stability has always been related to an

[Y]

- 40 -

equilibrium which made physical domination difficult. Interest
is not necessarily immoral; moral consequences can spring from
interested acts. Britain did not contribute any less to inter-
national order for having a clear-cut concept according to which
it was in her interest to prevent the domination of the Continent
by a single power (no matter how it happened) and the control
of the seas by anybody (even if the immediate intentions were
not hostile). No more important challenge confronts a new
Administration than to relate the commitments of America to its
interests and its obligations to its purposes.

The task of defining positive goals is more difficult but
even more important. The first two decades after the end of
World War II posed problems well suited to the American approach
to international relations. Wherever we turned in the world,
massive dislocations required attention. Our pragmatic, ad hoc
tendency was an advantage in a world clamoring for technical
remedies. Our legal bend contributed to development of some
instruments of stability.

In the late Sixties, the situation is more complex. The
United States is no longer in a position to operate programs
globally; it has to encourage them. It can no longer design
its preferred solution; it must seek to evoke it. In the Forties
and Fifties, we offered remedies; in the late Sixties and
Seventies our role will have to be to contribute to a structure
in which the initiative of others can be fostered. We are a
superpower physically, but our designs can be meaningful only

- 41 -

if they generate the willing cooperation of others in the
design of a new world order. We can continue to contribute to
defense and positive programs; but we must seek to bring about
a situation which our contribution makes the difference between
success and failure; in general, ours cannot be the sole or even
the principal effort. This task requires a different kind of
creativity and another form of patience than that which has
distinguished us in the past. Enthusiasm, belief in progress,
the invincible conviction that American remedies can work
everywhere must give way to an understanding of historical
trends, an ordering of our preferences and above all an under-
standing of the difference which our preferences in fact can
make.

Whether such a leap of the imagination is possible in
the modern bureaucratic state remains to be seen. New administra-
tions come to power convinced of the need for purpose and com-
prehensive concepts. Sooner, rather than later, they find
themselves subjected to the pressures of the immediate and the
ad hoc. Part of the reason is pragmatic, issue-oriented bias
of our decisionmakers. But the fundamental reason may be the
pervasiveness of modern bureaucracy. What started out as an aid
to decisionmaking has developed a momentum of its own.
Increasingly, the policy maker is more conscious of the pressures
and the morale of his staff than of the purpose this staff is
supposed to serve. (Thus overruling the staff has psychic and

- 42 -

not only substantive costs. In any event, the policymaker may lack the knowledge to do so). The policymaker becomes a referee among quasi-autonomous bureaucratic bodies. Success consists of moving the administrative machinery to the point of decision leaving relatively little energy for analyzing its merit. Lip service is paid to planning; but it consists more often in projecting the present into the future than in true creativity. These problems which are serious enough within any society are compounded when two huge administrative machines confront each other; they may become unmanageable when this confrontation is hostile. The modern bureaucratic state begins to resemble the dinosaur; its very bulk inhibits the capacity to adapt to its problems.

It is the essence of a satisfied, status quo, advanced society that it puts a premium on operating the familiar. It draws its motivation from the present and it defines excellence by the ability to manipulate an established framework. But for the major part of humanity, the present becomes endurable only through a vision of the future. To most Americans -- including most American leaders -- the significant reality is what they see around them. For most of the world -- including many of the leaders of the new nations -- the significant reality is what they wish to bring about.

This difference in perspective accounts for the inclusiveness of much of the dialogue between the West and many of the leaders of the new countries. To individuals concerned primarily with the present and with economic wellbeing, it is easy to identify an increase of the Gross National Product with

- 43 -

political stability. But to the charismatic heads of the new nations, this seems too limited a goal. Their aims -- for better or worse -- are of a more heroic cast. If we remain nothing but the managers of our physical patrimony, we will grow increasingly irrelevant. And since there can be no stability without us, the problems of world order will become ever dimmer.

But we require a new leap of the imagination not so much for the sake of other countries as for our own people, especially the youth. The contemporary unrest is no doubt exploited by some whose purposes are all too clear. But that it is there to exploit is due to a profound dissatisfaction with the merely managerial and consumer-oriented aspect of the modern state and with a world which seems to generate crises by momentum. The young people who in their thousands volunteered for the Peace Corps, coming out of an idealistic tradition, could not fail to respond if their challenge were part of helping to construct a new world order which leaves scope for the creativity of all.

In the best of circumstances, the next Administration will be beset by crises. In almost every area of the world, we have been living off capital -- warding off the immediate, rarely dealing with underlying problems. These difficulties are likely to multiply when it becomes apparent that one of the legacies of the war in Vietnam will be a mounting American reluctance to risk overseas involvements.

- 44 -

A new Administration has the right to ask for compassion and understanding from the American people, for an end of a nihilistic perfectionism -- especially among intellectuals -- which seeks to destroy what it does not conform to its notion of utopia. But they must found their claim not on patent solutions so much as on asking the right questions. Above all it must recognize that we will never be able to contribute to building a stable and creative world order unless we first form some conception of it.