However, having said this, I don't know what I'm doing here. Because if somebody asked me to give a speech on China, one of the first things I would do is to call up my friends at the Agency and say, "What's your current assessment?" Over the past year, particularly, under George's tutelage, and Dennis Wilder's, and others, I've been meeting quite often with your analysts to learn from you what you know about the evolution in China. In fact, I'm somewhat handicapped in my sources. The only people I know in China are the leaders. I've never met, or almost never met, ordinary Chinese. I have always been concerned with the big picture. But I have not had the opportunity to study China in detail the way you do. I am not a China expert. I'm somebody who has thought about China, who has dealt with China at the level at which I have worked, and, therefore, I reflect a particular limited kind of experience.

I got involved in China by accident. When President Nixon took office, he had a vague idea of opening to China. He had written about it. He had no concept of how to do it. I had written a statement for Nelson Rockefeller, whom I was then advising, along the same lines. I want you to know, incidentally, since many of the books written about me speak of my obsessive pursuit of the position of Security Advisor, the clever way in which I approached this: I became Nixon's Security Advisor by supporting his major opponent in three Presidential primaries. In fact, you can judge my political acumen--if you were permitted to do analyses of Americans--you could judge my political acumen by the fact that I have never supported the winning candidate in a Republican primary.

Neither Nixon nor I had any specific idea on how to proceed. We were triggered into it in part by Soviet clumsiness. For the first three months in office, the Soviet Ambassador came to see me every few weeks to tell me about the evils of the Chinese. We were more or less convinced of that, anyway, at that time. He began to brief me about military clashes they had

4

had at the Siberian border, which was a degree of consultation not previously experienced. Soon we started plotting these purported events on a map just to see where all this was going on, because the Ussuri River meant nothing to me. We found that most of these clashes were close to Soviet supply bases, and far from Chinese supply bases, from which we drew the not very difficult conclusion that it was not very likely that the Chinese would initiate military action against the Soviet Union at places that were logistically so disadvantageous to them.

At that point we started asking more questions of the Intelligence Community. And we developed the idea that the danger was that the Soviet Union might attack China, rather than that China was provoking a war with the Soviet Union. Since we basically believed that balance of power was a key component of international stability, we decided that it was against the American interest to permit the Soviet Union to do to China what they had just done to Czechoslovakia.

To prevent this, we began to move towards China in an admittedly very clumsy way. For example, we permitted the US tourists in Hong Kong to buy $100 in Chinese goods. I don't know whether the Chinese noticed it right away, but several of our senior Foreign Service Officers who were Soviet experts did. George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, Foy Kohler and Tommy Thompson requested an appointment with President Nixon in order to warn that any overture towards China would surely lead to military conflict with the Soviet Union. Therefore, they urged us to restrain our impetuosity.

We did not take the advice. Our first overtures failed because we misunderstood the internal Sino-Soviet relationship. Believing that Communist emissaries would add credibility, we approached the Romanians. We don't know whether that message was ever delivered, and we don't know what the Chinese said. Recently in China, Nancy Tang, who had been Zhou En-

lai's interpreter, told me that they had actually received the message from the Romanians, and that they had actually made a reply. It was certainly never delivered to us.

But, to show that misconceptions governed both sides, Mao made a similar mistake. Mao invited Edgar Snow to be on the reviewing stand with him at the October parade in 1969, as a signal to America that he was open to rapprochement. And he gave an interview to Snow saying that Nixon would be welcome to visit China as a tourist. But, at the time, we were being deluged by left-wing intellectuals who were going to Hanoi, and who were telling us that they had made great breakthroughs to peace. It always proved to be an illusion. So we looked at Edgar Snow as just another left-winger who had gone off, except he had gone to Beijing instead of Hanoi, and we did not pay any particular attention to him.

Finally, a contact was established through Pakistan. We received handwritten messages, and we sent back typed messages on paper that had no watermarks on it. It was great cloak-and-dagger stuff. But you always read about how ping-pong diplomacy was a breakthrough. I can tell you, to us in the Nixon White House, ping-pong diplomacy was a nightmare because we were exchanging secret messages, and we were preparing what turned out to be my secret trip, when suddenly Zhou En-lai invited ping-pong players to Beijing. The press was full of stories and, of course, immediately Vice President Agnew proclaimed that the Chinese were forever unacceptable as interlocutors and Congressmen and Senators beseeched us, "Were we going to sell anybody out?" Most of the time, of course, they were urging us to sell out in Vietnam.

Here is the reason we maintained the secrecy. Actually, we had started doing it the formal way through channels and the State Department and through Warsaw, which by mutual agreement in the 1950s had been designated as a site for contacts. But, as soon as some feelers came from Beijing, we received a paper from the State Department that suggested the following:

6

they wanted an agenda that would deal with blocked assets, diplomatic immunity, communications, arms control, etc., before we even had one substantive conversation. And then they wanted to brief some forty Congressmen and Senators, as well as nineteen different countries. So we thought we'd never get from here to there if we followed that procedure. So we did it secretly. One of the handicaps was that I could not inform myself as well as I should have before I went there. And I confess that I did not know much about China when I got there, and now that you all have access to the conversations that were conducted, some of you may think I proved it.

In fact, we initially had a number of fairly simple objectives. First, we had as our domestic objective a desire to demonstrate to the American public that the war in Vietnam was an aberration, and that we had a strategy for bringing about peace in the rest of the world. Indeed, we thought we had a strategy for bringing about peace in Vietnam. Secondly, we thought that it was against the national interest to have the Soviet Union achieve predominance in China. We probably overestimated the Soviet capability for doing so, but, in the light of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the atmosphere of the Cold War, this had to be a basic conviction. Third, we thought that with skill, we might be able to set up a triangular relationship in which we were closer to Moscow and Beijing than they were to each other, and that we could use each side's fear of the other to maximize America's options. Fourth, we sought to use our relationship with China to bring an end to the Vietnam War. We did not expect China to intervene actively on our behalf in Vietnam, but we did believe that the mere fact of a relationship with China would unsettle the Vietnamese and, to the degree that China developed a commitment to an American relationship, it would restrain Chinese reactions in case the situation in Vietnam required escalation. And, fifth, of course, we wanted to do all of this without selling out Taiwan.

7

Now, contrary to what you read, settling the Taiwan issue was not our overwhelming objective. Our objective was to manage the existing relationship with Taiwan while improving our contacts with China. And, if you read the dialogue between Zhou En-lai and myself in the early meeting--there were some newspaper stories a few weeks ago that counted the number of pages that were devoted to it, and tried to deduce from that profound conclusions--fundamentally, we told Zhou En-lai we would reduce some of our forces after the war in Vietnam was ended, and more of our forces as conditions in the region improved, therefore making two conditions that had to be met without a deadline and without any specific assurance of what would happen when normalization was discussed. If you look at American policy in the 1970s in our Administration and in our successors', we managed to maintain this ambivalent relationship, and this ambiguous relationship, for eight years after the initial opening to China. Now, as our relations with China developed, it became more and more obvious that China's overwhelming fear was that of Soviet hegemony and of a possible Soviet attack.

I had five meetings with Mao and many more with Zhou En-lai. Let me give a few observations. I found Mao the most cold-blooded analyst of international affairs that I have encountered. The only one comparable to him, in my experience, was DeGaulle. I never heard any ideological analysis from Mao. He was convinced that the Soviet Union was his principal threat, and he wanted to talk about how to organize the world to create the maximum pressure on the Soviet Union. Mao had a way of speaking elliptically and in Socratic dialogue, unlike the leaders who have a piece of paper in front of them and say, "There are five points I've got to make." He would conduct the conversation by asking, "What is your consideration about...," whatever. And then you'd say something, and then he'd respond, "Well, have you thought about this way of looking at it?" He had a way of being threatening in a jocular manner. In one of my

8

early conversations, he said, "Let me tell you a story. Somebody from Romania came to see me. And he said, 'You're both Communists, you and the Russians. Why don't you settle it?'" Mao claimed to have said, "There's no sense talking to me, I will fight the Soviets for 10,000 years." The Romanian said, "Really, it's inappropriate," so Mao said, "Okay, I'll reduce it by a thousand years, so for 9,000 years..." And this went on until Mao was down to 7,000 years. When the Romanian still protested, Mao claims to have said at this point, "I've made my last concession." And then Mao said to me, "You see, Professor, it's easy to deal with me. Every time I make a concession, it's for a thousand years." But what he was really warning me was that he was dangerous and that if we got into a confrontation, it would last for 7,000 years.

In our early conversations with the Chinese, there was none of the usual stuff of diplomacy to talk about. There were no economic relations. There was none of the paraphernalia of international politics, so we had to talk about fundamentals. Zhou En-lai was not as insightful as Mao. Perhaps he was too afraid to be insightful, but he was a great technician, and a great tactician. The major point I want to make is that our relationship started because we had a common interest, and we had some, I think, extremely thoughtful strategic discussions on how to conduct the Cold War. This was our fundamental concern. You read a lot of analysis that we let Beijing down on Taiwan, or China was disappointed about this or that. This is largely untrue.

What really weakened our relationship somewhat, as the 1970s continued, was the domestic turmoil in the United States as a result of Watergate and Vietnam, and the fact that the Chinese caught on to our basic triangular diplomacy, according to which we were positioning ourselves not as their ally, but between the two sides with some bias towards China, because they were the weaker. And they did not particularly like it. As Mao said to me once, "You're trying

9

to get to Moscow by standing on my shoulders." One of the problems in conducting such a policy is that this balance of power approach is not really compatible with the American way of thinking about policy. And it's very hard to find a constituency for it. Americans are better at crusades than we are at protracted international confrontations. Every international problem we deal with has, historically, been presented to our people and to our Congress as having a clear-cut solution with a terminal point, while the Cold War was something of rather extended confrontation with no clear-cut terminal point. Détente debate was really the Soviet variation of our China policy.

The next Chinese leader I dealt with was Deng, who was a truly great man. To have the courage to do what he did to the China of 1971 was a heroic posture. Who would have believed that it was possible to move more or less to a consumer economy, cut military expenditures, and set up a different economic system without the old system disintegrating? In foreign policy, Deng was no different from Mao, except it didn't interest him so much, and he just took it for granted that the Soviet Union needed to be opposed. In 1989, I saw Deng about three months before Tiananmen Square, and he told me that he was going to eliminate a major role for the Communist Party. He said, "From now on, the Communist Party will deal primarily with philosophical questions." I said, "Give me an example of a philosophical question." He said, "Well, if we wanted to make an alliance with the Soviet Union, that would be a philosophical question that the Communist Party would have to deal with." Well, that wasn't likely to come up all that frequently. And I think without Tiananmen Square, Deng would have gradually reduced the role of the Communist Party, and from that point of view, it was a tragedy for the domestic evolution of China, because it skewered the process. Normally, you would expect that as the Chinese economy developed, political evolution would follow, if at some distance. But,

10

y

after the experience of Tiananmen Square--not that I thought Deng was a great political
reformer--China took no chance on political evolution for perhaps too long a period.

We are now about to encounter the fourth generation of Chinese leaders. Mao had the
legitimacy of having unified the country. Deng's legitimacy was of having been a leader of the
revolution and starting reform. Jiang Zemin had the legitimacy of being anointed by Deng,
although he had a lower prestige than Deng. The fourth generation has no legitimacy in the same
sense. They have come up through the political process and have yet to prove themselves.
Anyone who met the Chinese Vice President when he was here came away, more or less, with
the feeling that he could be CEO of a major American corporation. He's undoubtedly a man of
administrative skill, and you don't get to the top of the Chinese Communist Party without some
remarkable qualities. But he is undoubtedly somebody, and his colleagues similarly, who has yet
to prove himself by performance. But by what performance? What is the standard of
performance?

There's no doubt that a new generation of Chinese leaders is coming up. One thing that
strikes me is that the old Communist leaders whom I first met were more courtly and traditional
Chinese in their conduct than the yuppies that you see now in the economic field and, even the
current leaders, who are more standard global issue. This fourth generation has a colossal
domestic task. First, the task of how to complete the development of a country that is attempting
something that has never been tried before, namely, developing the country in stages. I don't
know any other society that has evolved by region so that as one visits China, one sees how
Wuhan today is like Shanghai was ten years ago. And ten years from now, maybe Chongqing
will be like Wuhan is now. But, in the meantime, that means that there are hundreds of millions
who are in the technically disadvantaged areas, and who are moving towards, or at least have the

11

(Y)

option of moving, or the temptation of moving, into the more advanced areas. Zhu Rongji once told me that at any one moment there were 100 million people on the road in China looking for work. That is a magnitude of problem that no country I am familiar with has faced. So there is this inherent economic problem compounded by China joining the WTO and reforming its economy towards market principles without an economic crisis.

Too, there's the problem of the inevitable political evolution that has to follow such an economic change. I have no way of knowing where this political evolution will lead, except that I doubt whether it can lead in a straight line to pluralistic democracy. In fact, I am sacrilegious enough to have my doubts whether Western-style pluralistic democracy is possible without an extended evolutionary process. But that's a philosophical point that deserves more attention than it usually gets. Whatever the outcome, China's new leaders will face an awe-inspiring challenge --the danger of fragmentation without a clear-cut roadmap. In my view, sometime in the first two or three years of their being in office, the new leaders will have to do something that lays out a roadmap and one that is specifically theirs, because the legacy of Jiang Zemin is too indistinct. And the legacy of Deng is too far back, and the legacy of Mao is no longer relevant. So, it's a huge challenge, out of which a lot of domestic tensions could evolve.

Now let me talk about the foreign policy of China and the challenge of it to the United States. As I explained, I started out from the perspective of seeking equilibrium between the Soviet Union and China, with the United States tilting towards China. This was sort of a mechanical approach, but not as easy to execute as to articulate. Nevertheless, it had its fairly simple rationale. The question is, where do we go now? There are a number of different points of view. One point of view is engagement, which means having as much contact with the Chinese as possible in the hope of creating a favorable atmosphere for a benign evolution. In an

12

important sense, I agree with it, but I want to come back to it in a more complex way. Another
point of view, in effect, slides China into the spot vacated by the Soviet Union on the
international chessboard. According to it China is bound, if it continues at the rate of growing at
nine percent a year, to become a superpower in the foreseeable future and, as such, it will sooner
or later challenge us. And in order to prevent this, we must confront China today. We must
teach them the lesson that it's dangerous to confront us down the road. And we must try to
harass them, because they are ideological enemies who violate human rights, which is surely
true, and behave badly in Tibet and other regions. So, therefore, not only must we confront them
strategically, we must also confront them in terms of their domestic structure. Not only must we
confront them, we must try to democratize them. And, if we were to succeed, then all our
strategic problems would more or less disappear, because a democratic China, it is argued, even
if it grows at nine percent a year, and even if it gets into superpower status, will never challenge
us.

I question almost all of these propositions. I do not question the fact that somewhere
down the road China will be much more powerful than it is today. But I would distinguish
between a military threat from China and a geopolitical one. Militarily, from the figures that you
ladies and gentlemen have given me--so, if you don't agree with me, go back to your drawing
board--the maximum Chinese annual military budget is a little less than our annual increase in
the defense budget. So, at that total rate, I see no way they are going to be a strategic threat to
the United States, in the sense that we looked at the Soviet Union, in any time period relevant to
current policy. But I do agree that as their economic power grows, and as their military strength
grows--even though not enough to challenge us directly--the impact on China's neighbors will
mount. And, without any doubt, Beijing will feel they're entitled to the respect and the

13

adjustments that this power represents. I agree with the impact of an economically powerful
China. I do not see how we deal with it by a policy of confrontation. Some argue that we should
try to slow down their economic growth by the sort of embargos that characterized our policy
towards the Soviet Union. Even the people who hold this view are not urging it very
strenuously, at least not for the industries in their states. And, if we were to adopt this policy, we
would have to weigh it against what Japan and Europe would do in stepping into the breach, and
what we would pay down the road when we have stimulated a kind of Chinese nationalism that
is already strong, but would then be turned largely against us. So I do not believe that economic
warfare against China is a realistic option. There is a limited number of technologies that we
should not be eager to share and to spread but, as a general proposition, I do not believe that this
particular policy is open to us.

What is open to us is to make sure that the countries surrounding China have available
options other than submission. I do not think it is desirable to help organize the other states on
the basis of fear of China. But it is in our interest to keep any country from achieving hegemony
in Asia. We should conduct towards Asia more or less what I described in the triangular
relationship. We should foster good relations with all of these countries and throw our weight in
the direction that is most conducive to our national interests as the situation requires. China
should understand that we will not accept geopolitical pressures based on military force, but we
will have to deal with the other pressures by means other than military force.

Can we make China a democratic country? That question raises a number of issues.
First, do we know what a democracy should look like in China? Secondly, assuming we know
what it is, how do we achieve it? That does not mean that we should not make our views clear
with respect to the oppression of nationalities, nor does it mean that we cannot exact some

14

penalties for violations of human rights. But it does mean that we should realize the limits are of
what a day-to-day policy in this respect can achieve, and I think we should be careful in putting
our thumb into the Chinese eye as we have had a habit of doing in recent years for domestic
American reasons more than for geopolitical reasons.

Let me say a few words about Taiwan. If you compare the situation in Taiwan in 1971--
when we started relations with China--with the situation in Taiwan today, the year 2002, and if
you assume that what we did had at least some influence on it, you must say that the policy of
seven American Administrations has been a huge success. Taiwan is economically vibrant. It is
a democratic society. And it is not dominated by the Mainland. Anybody who had told us in
1971 that by 2002 we would be in that position, we from our, perhaps, limited perspective at that
time, would have said, "We'll take it tomorrow. That's terrific. That's a great prospect." So
now the problem is, what does the future hold? It is against our interests, and incompatible with
our global position, to permit the military conquest of Taiwan. Every American Administration
since 1971 has repeated this in one way or another. We have had aircraft carriers in the Taiwan
Strait during crises, and I believe that the Chinese know our seriousness with respect to opposing
the use of military force.

There has been a considerable evolution in the Chinese position. When we first
communicated with Beijing, we were told no progress could be made on anything until the
Taiwan issue was settled. For the longest time, the Chinese took the position that renouncing
force on Taiwan was incompatible with their claim to eventual reunification. Both positions
have been substantially modified. In all the conversations that I've had recently with high
Chinese leaders, they have, in effect, said that they would use force only if Taiwan declared itself
independent. And they have attempted to make clear that they have no intention of using force

15

now. Now, does that bind them in 2010? Certainly not. I say 2010 because I'm convinced that the Chinese are determined to have the Olympics in Beijing as a great success, and they've already now asked for the World Exposition in 2010. Given these markers, I think, it would take something highly unusual to produce a military confrontation.

The conclusion I draw is this: we should not encourage any belief in China that we are disinterested in Taiwan's survival. We must do nothing to encourage the belief that military pressures on Taiwan would not be resisted. But, at the same time, we should do our utmost not to worsen the situation from their point of view. We should avoid situations where they believe that every year another little maneuver is made, edging Taiwan towards independence. And, while they'll grit their teeth and take it for a while, the penalty we will pay for that down the road is out of proportion to the marginal benefits to be gained within the domestic debate.

There are three principles that need to be followed on the Taiwan issue: One, the United States must maintain the principle of "one China." Two, the Chinese must understand that the use of force will be resisted. And, third, all parties must exercise restraint in their day-to-day conduct. This is a message that has to be particularly addressed to Taiwan at this moment, because I believe that between China and the United States, some sort of understanding on that point is emerging. I'm convinced that China, for the reasons I gave, not for love of peace, not because they have become humanistic, but because of the huge problems that they face internally, wants a period of quiet. I believe that it also will pay a considerable price for it. But we have to keep in mind that they have not gone through history and emerged as a great power just in order to be pleasant in the world. As they evolve, they will be a challenge, and it will be a challenge to our ability to relate our national objectives to a long-term view.

16

For us to deal with a country of such a long history and such a huge population is a unique experience. I was in China a few weeks ago. We visited a province with a population of seventy-four million. That's larger than any European country except Russia. And it has to be multiplied twenty-fold to get a sense of the magnitude of China. So we have to bring our engineering approach to world affairs into some perspective to history, and to develop some long-range approaches because, at the end of the day, we should weigh not only the danger of China succeeding, but also the danger of China disintegrating. Do we want twenty Afghanistans, or even two Afghanistans, among ten fragments that could emerge? Do we want tens of millions of Chinese immigrants in the world? Is the present evolution the only danger that we face from China?

Let me conclude by repeating what I said at the beginning. China is a place with respect to which the men and women assembled here are especially important. We have almost no categories of understanding a society like that. Our policymakers are inherently focused on the urgent and don't have enough time for the important, in any Administration. This is why normally I would have come to you and asked you the question you asked me to deal with here. And you would have answered it more briefly and more to the point than I have. Thank you very much.

**Dennis Wilder, China-Taiwan Issue Manager:** I think we have about thirty minutes for questions. As a courtesy to Dr. Kissinger, as you ask your question, please simply state your name and organizational affiliation.

**Dr. Kissinger:** Or disagreements...if anyone has a different analysis, feel free to present it.

17

**David Kornblum (State Department):** Sir, I have a question for you. Do we have a role to play in making peace between the Mainland and Taiwan? Because we clearly have a role to play in making war.

**Dr. Kissinger:** I believe we have an important role to play in making peace. First, by urging restraint on both sides; secondly, by understanding the economic evolution of Taiwan. As Taiwan moves many of its industries to the Mainland, the dependence of the two on each other is bound to increase, and new contacts between the Mainland and Taiwan are bound to evolve. To the extent that we can facilitate those contacts, it would be helpful. Thirdly, we can at least think through the implications of some of the proposals the Chinese are making, especially Qian Qichen's comment that he no longer treats Taiwan as a renegade province, but as one China, with two political entities. I sat next to him once. I said, "Were this accepted, would it be possible to have Taiwan in the United Nations?" And he said, "Yes," that it's something that could be explored.

**Warren K. (CIA):** A question regarding our Government's policy towards cross-strait. You said in your speech that during the past seven Administrations, that policy--which we have coined as ambiguity--has been very successful. Now, President Bush during his public speech has, perhaps, tilted or changed policy towards the ambiguity. Perhaps that's morally more appealing and acceptable to American people, but is that strategically pragmatic? Does it eliminate our room for maneuver? Can you comment on that, please?

**Dr. Kissinger:** It's a question whether we have tilted too much in some of our recent statements. I have, on almost all issues, supported this Administration strongly. I said "almost" because I do not fully agree with some of the statements, the tone of some of the statements that have been made on China. I think it is helpful to emphasize the determination to defend Taiwan.

18

But I don't think it's necessary to keep repeating it, especially in the phraseology that is bound to be offensive without really adding to the point.

**Paul Heer (CIA):** You said during your presentation that we should resist the emergence of a hegemon in East Asia. Do you believe that China has strategic aspirations that are fundamentally incompatible with those of the United States?

**Dr. Kissinger:** I believe that even a democratic China would also be a potentially hegemonic power, because democratic countries also have national aspirations. As China evolves, its weight will be a major factor on surrounding countries, and therefore the management of this over a long period of time will be one of the tasks of American politics, regardless of the domestic structure of them. But there are elements in the strategic equation other than China. There is India. There is, theoretically, Indonesia, if we don't over-manage that one. There's Japan. But it's not something we need to organize as a containment policy. It will be much more in the economic and political fields than in the strictly military field. The military field will take much longer to evolve.

**Michael Hale (CIA):** I have a question about the three communiqués and your assertion that we should maintain our "one China" policy.

**Dr. Kissinger:** We should maintain our.....?

**Michael Hale:** Our "one China" policy--as I understand it as stated in three communiqués—is that we acknowledge the position of both sides of the strait that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. But it seems that Taiwan no longer claims to be the sole legitimate government of China, and, in fact, may not even consider itself a part of China, at least from statements of their President. Is it time to reassess the basis of our "one

19

China" policy, given the fact that Taiwan seems to have departed from that? Should our "one
China" policy mean that we support eventual reunification?

**Dr. Kissinger:** First of all, I think the phrase "acknowledge" was only used in the Shanghai communiqué. I don't think it was used in the other two communiqués, but does anyone know?

**Audience Member:** First two.

**Dr. Kissinger:** First two. But I don't rest the argument on this. It was a clever formula for the Shanghai communiqué, because we were in the strange position of being in the capital of a country that we didn't recognize. Instead, we recognized an island that Beijing considered a province, as speaking for all of China. But that's thirty years ago. The question you really asked, is it in our long-term interest to maintain that fiction? I think it's in our long-term interest to avoid a war over Taiwan. I see no national interest served by having a war over Taiwan.
And, therefore, I would think it is highly desirable to avoid situations in which we have to face this issue, because if we were to accept formally what you have said, and recognize Taiwan as an independent state, the possibility of permanent conflict with China would be extremely high.
I'm not saying China would necessarily go to war, but it would not reconcile itself to this for a long, long period, if ever. I see nothing to be gained by such a strategy if it can possibly be avoided. So we should explore whether one can get a de facto situation in Taiwan in which, as China said, Taiwan maintains its own army, and that that army could be supplied from foreign countries. Such a structure would amount to a vague confederation in which the principle of "one China" is maintained. I would consider that a much preferable outcome. But I'm not saying it's obtainable in any brief period of time. For the next decade, I'd be content not to rock the boat, not to tempt the Taiwanese to rock the boat, and let the Chinese know that we will not

20

acquiesce in the use of force. That would be, in my view, the best policy for the next ten years—
after which, I'm not going to be giving any speeches.

**Ray Bowen (CIA):** Dr. Kissinger, I understood you to say that there's a challenge to the fourth-generation leadership to do something in the next two or three years to lay out a roadmap, that it must be unique, and that it will probably involve a great deal of domestic tension within China. If I understood you correctly, could you comment on whether this might involve the Party redefining itself, perhaps beyond traditional Communism? And, if that's a possibility, what likelihood would you assign to it?

**Dr. Kissinger:** First of all, I don't look at the Communist Party of China as I did the Communist Parties of the Cold War period. I look at it as more comparable to the PRI in Mexico before the last election. Secondly, Jiang Zemin has already indicated, and so has Hu Jintao, that a redefinition of the content of the Communist Party is certainly in the cards. Opening up to capitalists is simple in its direction. It won't solve their fundamental problem, which is that, as you get a modern economy, you're going to get different interest groups that may not be possible to contain within one political structure. Now, whether that means a multi-party system in the Western sense, or some other form of multiple expression, I find that hard to predict. But, surely, the first step will be to open the Communist Party to other classes. How long that will last will then be the next question for which I'll come back here for enlightenment.

**Drew Holiday (DIA):** Sir, given historical precedence for the Chinese leadership when pending deterioration of the situation raises its head to resort to a military solution, or a militant solution, and given the historical orientation of the PLA towards a more internal mission than an external mission, would you comment on the likelihood that--faced with the prospect of losing control of the massive internal problems that development will bring—that the fourth generation

21

(D)

might go towards a more martial law crackdown than the liberal development postulate we all seem to have been following. And, what impact might that have on our national security from the standpoint of our regional relations with India and Pakistan or the former Soviet Union?

**Dr. Kissinger:** If some China expert here may be able to enlighten me, is it true that when China has domestic problems it engages in a militant outward policy? I couldn't, off the top of my head, give many examples of Chinese territorial expansion as a reaction to domestic difficulties. But I take your second point; what I have said is based largely on my conversations with the Chinese political leadership. The conversations with the Chinese military leadership, which are less frequent, do not lead me to the same firm conviction that a decade of peace is imminent. For example, during the period of the airplane (EP-3) crisis, the Defense Minister of China, with the President out of the country, stated that, "Unless there is an apology, the Chinese people and the PLA will never understand it," not mentioning the Party nor the government.

This I consider worrisome. And certainly an American geopolitical approach to Asia has to keep in mind that danger and protect itself against it. But even the militant Chinese PLA men, looking around at what's facing them on the border with India, Japan, Russia, would not necessarily conclude that taking on the United States is the best strategic approach for China. Doing so could weaken China in relation to its closest neighbors. Nor would the idea of tackling even one of these neighbors be a very wise course, because that might bring us in together with the other two. So that the strategic problem of China from that point of view is very similar to that of Germany when Germany was an ascendant power. Now, Germany managed to overcome all the intellectual obstacles and launch itself into a war that mathematically it couldn't win. But this is not historically the Chinese approach. But we should certainly be aware that this is a Chinese option, though not a likely one.

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**Dennis Wilder:** A couple of more questions.

**Debbie Young (DIA):** Obviously, Taiwan remains the central issue between the United
States and China, but I'm wondering if you could also comment on the issue of missile defense,
where you believe it ranks in both our bilateral relations, and US policy in the region.

**Dr. Kissinger:** Are you talking about national American missile defense or local missile
defense?

**Debbie Young:** I would welcome a comment on either.

**Dr. Kissinger:** I have strongly favored national missile defense, because I cannot see
how any American President could leave the American public totally vulnerable against a known
danger to which some remedy exists on the basis of abstract deterrence theories. I also don't
think that the Chinese rely on strategic war to the degree that the Soviet Union did. The Chinese
notion of a possible conflict with the United States would center on Taiwan, and their strategy
would not be an attack on territorial United States that would enflame us permanently. Rather, it
would be to exhaust us, and to drag us into an endless conflict. So I don't believe that national
missile defense, which, incidentally, we should do in any event, is the key issue. In my many
conversations with the Chinese, I almost never hear comments about national missile defense.
Local missile defense would be a serious problem. I believe that Japan, sooner or later, will get
it, no matter what theories we develop, for the same reason that I gave before, namely, that they
simply will not want to be vulnerable to dangers that will predictably emerge from the Mainland.
So, then the key question becomes missile defense of Taiwan. I do not think it is a good idea to
place American missile defense on Taiwan, but I would think it feasible to have some American
Aegis cruisers within range of Taiwan, and I'd be fairly sure that the Chinese would get the

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point. But, what they do not want and would resist, is an organic linking of the defense systems of Taiwan and the United States in such a way that it is really separating Taiwan institutionally.

**Major Wes Andrews (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary, Secretary of the Air Force):** You mentioned engagement and the relative importance of engagement within the US-China relations context. We've seen China involve itself somewhat more in the international community—for instance, in East Timor we saw some contribution there, also on the war on terrorism.

**Dr. Kissinger:** East Timor, you say?

**Major Andrews:** Yes, there were, I think, some medical doctors. Can you speak some to what sort of engagement the US and China should engage in? Specifically, on the military front. We've seen some hesitancy on the part of the current Administration to do some of those things, and I am interested in your thoughts on that.

**Dr. Kissinger:** I said in my remarks that I don't like the word "engagement," because it makes it sound as if foreign policy is a kind of social exercise and as if we were a foundation and not a country. It sounds that just being involved somewhere is a good thing. That makes me restless. When the United States is engaged, whether in a dialogue, or in a military exercise, it ought to be able to define it in terms of a national interest or a general interest. I would not die unfulfilled if the Chinese were not active in East Timor. I have no great desire to draw them into that region, and one of the concerns, frankly, that we all had in the 1970s when the future of East Timor was under discussion and up for grabs, was that China was the only country that supported the radical group that finally declared unilateral independence. We were not eager for Beijing to play a strategic role in that archipelago. So, every time when we talk about Chinese engagement in the world, I would like to know what it is before I make a general comment.

24

And, similarly for the United States, I am in favor of cooperative relations with China to the extent that we can assign an American purpose to it—I am not worried about them—they will have a Chinese purpose.

**Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence Jami Miscik:** Let me thank Dr. Kissinger, on behalf of all of us. I think we've had a very special and unique opportunity here this afternoon. Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger. By coming here today, Dr. Kissinger has once again shared his insight with us, and demonstrated his support for the Intelligence Community. And the personal commitment you've made to elevating the quality of intelligence analysis, I thank you for that. It therefore gives me great pleasure, on behalf of the DCI, to present you with the Central Intelligence Agency Seal Medallion. I would like to have Mr. Wilder come up here and read the citation.

**Dennis Wilder:** In military tradition, as opposed to CIA tradition, please stand for the reading of the citation. The citation reads as follows:

"Dr. Henry A. Kissinger is hereby awarded the Agency Seal Medallion in recognition of the extraordinary contributions he has made to the Intelligence Community by willingly sharing with us the benefits both of his profound wisdom as a scholar of international relations and of his truly historic experience as one of the leading diplomats of the 20th Century. Over the course of several decades, Dr. Kissinger has regularly shared with Intelligence Community analysts his rich and unique insights into world affairs, and into the minds of the many foreign leaders with whom he frequently interacts. An avid consumer of intelligence, he has directly enhanced the analytic sophistication of our work through his readiness both to critique it and to contribute substantively to it. Dr. Kissinger has also been an invaluable counsel to the Intelligence Community leaders, sharing his seasoned and well-informed insights on intelligence priorities

25

and trends. All present here today are beneficiaries of Dr. Kissinger's impressive Government service, and, especially, of his invaluable support to the intelligence profession over the course of his remarkable career."

**Dennis Wilder:** Thank you all, again, for coming. This concludes today's event.

Prepared 5/28/02 by CB based on initial transcript

With HAK changes [Y]

China Rising – Dr. Kissinger

7 May 2002

Headquarters Auditorium

**George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence:** We are delighted that you are with us today, Dr. Kissinger. Describing his early years in Washington, Dr. Kissinger once said, and I quote, "I can't recall anyone ever inviting me to dinner to hear my views about China." They did, though, very soon, and they still are for every meal of the day, and for all of the hours in between. When many Americans looked on China as a distant, mysterious enemy, fit only for isolation, Dr. Kissinger saw China for what it was—a huge fact of international life, a country with goals and interests, many hostile to us, and some not. In those days of the Cold War, of tension and competition with the Soviet Union, he saw something else in China—opportunity. An opportunity to reshape in America's favor the balance of power in Asia. But he knew that opportunities are easier to identify than they are to preserve. They tend to pass very quickly, turning timing itself into a decisive tactic of foreign policy.

As we know, the vision, boldness, and timing all came together in 1971 with Dr. Kissinger's groundbreaking trip to China, a mission that paved the way for President Nixon's historic visit the following year. Through study, daring, and a sound read of the world, a piece of inspired diplomacy overcame more than two decades of ignorance and suspicion between the United States and China. It was a key accomplishment in a lifetime of original thinking about the world, a lifetime of asking and answering tough questions in global politics, and of tackling the monumental problems of conflict and conciliation. Through it all, the countless trips, negotiations, meetings, speeches, and articles, Dr. Kissinger has had a single, overriding purpose. As he put it years ago, and I quote, "I'd like to leave

behind a world that seemed to be more peaceful than the one we entered, more creative in the sense of
fulfilling human aspirations."

Like most goals worth having, it is as difficult as it is noble, and it springs from a basic reality,
to build the world as it might be, you must start with the world as it is, with its hopes and virtues, flaws,
and evils. While a boy in Nazi Germany, Dr. Kissinger saw first-hand the absence of freedom. Yet,
when he returned to Germany with the US Army in the closing months of the Second World War, his
aim was not revenge, but reconstruction and the revival of freedom. As a military administrator, he got
local governments up and running. As a counterintelligence officer, he had the task of identifying and
rounding up local members of the Gestapo. He recounted his approach to that challenge, and I quote, "I
merely put an ad in the local paper saying all Germans with police experience who wanted jobs should
show up at company headquarters, the next day at a certain time and sign up." The Gestapo people
showed up and signed up by the dozen, according to Dr. Kissinger. As those very sorry agents could
attest, Dr. Kissinger's talents extend from theory to practice.

When faced with a nuclear doctrine that contemplated the destruction of the world, he devised
alternatives. When faced with a conflict in the Middle East that could have ignited the world, he
promoted an effective mix of deterrence and diplomacy. On issues of enormous complexity and
controversy, he has always sought solutions. That includes the issue he addresses here this afternoon.
Though he joked that President Nixon took a gamble by sending him on his own to China, remarking,
"For all he knew, I was going to sell Alaska," it was, in truth, no gamble at all. For Dr. Kissinger went
with a hope that was ambitious yet clear and realistic that our two countries, with all their differences,
could start what he called a "historic evolution." It is an evolution that continues to this day. So, Dr.
Kissinger, on behalf of all the China specialists from across our Intelligence Community, it is my great
pleasure to welcome a scholar, author, and teacher, a trusted advisor to Presidents, a master of public

diplomacy, and a friend to all who seek a stronger and safer America. I know you will all join me in welcoming Dr. Henry Kissinger.

**Dr. Kissinger:** George, and ladies and gentlemen, I usually make some smart-alecky remark after I hear such a fulsome introduction but I want to tell you how touched I am by what you said, and how glad I am to be here, ~~because I'd like to thank you all for what you're doing for the Country.~~ And I want to thank you for what you have done for me when I was in Government service. This was the group to which I could always turn to get a fair and objective assessment. There were occasions that I didn't agree with the assessment, but I always benefited from it, ~~and~~ on the few occasions that I didn't agree, when I sat down with the analysts, we could achieve a common view. But those occasions were very rare.

I relied heavily on the work of this building, and I suffered from the abuse that some of you suffered every decade, because I knew the motives that had involved you. And, very often, the CIA was given assignments precisely because none of them fit any of the existing categories. None of the existing agencies could, or would, do it. When I think, for example, why was the CIA in Laos? Not because you like to conduct wars. But because there really was no category within which to do what was needed in that particular situation. So every decade I have observed that investigations start, and I have always felt great compassion for what you all went through, and so I'm very happy to be here, to be able to thank you for what you have done over the years that I have been able to observe your work.

Now, however, having said this, I don't know what I'm doing here. Because if somebody asked me to give a speech on China, one of the first things I would do is to call up my friends at the Agency and say, "What's your current assessment?" And I've been meeting over the last year, particularly, under George's tutelage, and Dennis Wilder's, and others, quite often, to learn from you what you know about the evolution in China. In fact, I'm somewhat handicapped. The only people I know in China are in my source.

the leaders. I've never met, or almost never met, ordinary, Chinese. I've been concerned with the big picture. But I have not had the opportunity to study China in detail the way you do. I am not a China expert. I'm somebody who has thought about China, who has dealt with China at the level at which I have worked, and, therefore, it's with some hesitation that I address you.

I got involved in China by accident. When President Nixon took office, he had a vague idea of opening to China. He had written about it. He had no concept of how to do it. When I was Foreign Policy Advisor to Nelson Rockefeller, I had written a statement for him along the same lines, and I want you to know, incidentally, since many of the books written about me and articles written about me speak of my obsessive pursuit of the position of Security Advisor, the clever way in which I approached this, I became Nixon's Security Advisor by supporting his major opponent in three Presidential primaries. In fact, you can judge my political acumen--if you were permitted to do analysis of Americans--you could judge my political acumen by the fact that I have never supported the winning candidate in a Republican Primary.

So, neither of us had any great idea how to proceed, and the way we finally went about it was that we paid lip service to the Soviets were clumsy. For the first three months in office, the Soviet Ambassador came to see me every few weeks to tell me about the evils of the Chinese. We were more or less convinced of that, anyway, at that time. He began to brief me about military clashes they had had at the Siberian border, which was not the usual procedure. So we started plotting them on a map just to see where all this was going on, because the Ussuri River meant nothing to me. We found that most of these clashes were close to Soviet supply bases, and far from Chinese supply bases, from which we drew the not very difficult conclusion that it was not very probable that the Chinese would initiate military action against the Soviet Union at places that were logistically so disadvantageous to them.

(N)

We then started asking more questions of the Intelligence Community about deployments and so forth. And we got the idea that the danger was that the Soviet Union might attack China, rather than that China was provoking a war with the Soviet Union. Since we basically believed that balance of power was a key component of international stability, we decided that it was probably against the American interest to permit the Soviet Union to do to China what they had just done to Czechoslovakia.

We began to move towards China in a clumsy way. We permitted, for example, the US tourists in Hong Kong to buy $100 in Chinese goods. I don't know whether the Chinese noticed it, but three of our senior Foreign Service Officers who were Soviet experts noticed it. And George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, Foy Kohler and Thompson requested an appointment with President Nixon, which was not

so easy to get as you might think, since he didn't like to meet people he didn't know. But, when the appointment was finally arranged, they suddenly warned him that any overture towards China would surely lead to military conflict with the Soviet Union, and that we should restrain our impetuosity.

We tried a number of diplomats, and we misunderstood the internal Sino-Soviet relationship, because we thought that Communist emissaries would add more credibility than capitalist emissaries, so we approached the Romanians, and we don't know whether they ever delivered the message, and we don't know what the Chinese said. It was recently in China, and Nancy Tang, who was Zhou En-lai's interpreter, told me that they had actually received the message from the Romanians, and that they had actually answered the message, and it was probably delivered in Moscow. It was certainly never delivered to us.

But, to show that misconceptions could not be only on one side, Mao made a similar mistake. Mao invited Edgar Snow to be on the reviewing stand with him at the October parade in 1969, and he thought that this was a signal to America that he was open. And, in fact, he gave an interview to Snow saying that Nixon would be welcome if he wanted to visit China as a tourist. Of course, we were being

we were being delayed

beseeched at this moment by left-wing intellectuals who were going to Hanoi, and who were telling us that they had made great breakthroughs to peace, and they had always proved to be an illusion. So we looked at Edgar Snow as just another left-winger who had gone off, except he had gone to Beijing instead of Hanoi, and we did not pay any particular attention to him.

Pakisan

Finally, a contact was established through Mr. Snow, and we received hand-written messages, and we sent back typed messages on paper that had no watermarks on it, and it was great cloak-and-dagger stuff. But you always read about ping-pong diplomacy, and how ping-pong diplomacy was a breakthrough. I can tell you, ping-pong diplomacy to us in the Nixon White House was a nightmare, because we were exchanging messages, and we were preparing what turned out to be my secret trip, when suddenly Zhou En-lai invited ping pong players to Beijing. The press was full of stories and, of course, immediately Vice President Agnew popped off to explain why the Chinese were forever unacceptable as interlocutors and Congressmen and Senators beseeched us, "Were we going to sell anybody out?" Most of the time they were urging us to sell somebody out in Vietnam. Therefore, for us, the ping-pong diplomacy was not at all a breakthrough, and we had to say a lot of things publicly that were contradictory to what we were saying to the Chinese privately in order to maintain the secrecy.

Here is what we know so far.

Now, the reason we maintained the secrecy, was, we actually had started doing it the straight way through the State Department and through Warsaw, but, as soon as some feelers came from Beijing, we received a paper from the State Department that suggested the following: they wanted an agenda that would deal with assets, diplomatic immunity, communications, arms control etc., before we even had led our representatives into conversation. As well, we thought we'd never get there if we didn't way. So at any rate, rightly or wrongly, we did it from the start. And then they wanted to brief Congressmen and Senators in nineteen different countries. So we thought we'd never get there if we didn't way. So at any rate, rightly or wrongly, we did it from the start. And then we had to tell the world that we were doing it secretly. One of the handicaps was that I could not inform myself as well as I should have before I went to the East, had been despondent as a result for contacts.

We had a number of fairly simple objectives. First, we had as our domestic objective a desire to split the American peace movement, and to demonstrate that the war in Vietnam was an aberration, and that we had a strategy for bringing about peace in the rest of the world. Indeed, we thought we had a strategy for bringing about peace in Vietnam, but we thought this was not a debate we could win while the war was going on. Secondly, we believed that it was against the national interests of the United States to have the Soviet Union achieve a position of predominance in China. We probably overestimated the Soviet capability for doing so, but, in the light of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the atmosphere of the Cold War, this was a basic conviction. Third, we thought that with skill, we might be able to set up a triangular relationship in which we were closer to Moscow and Beijing than they were to each other, and that we could use each side's fear of the other to maximize America's position. Fourth, we thought we could use our relationship with China to bring an end to the Vietnam War. We did not think that China would actively intervene on our behalf in Vietnam, but we did believe that the mere fact of a relationship with China would unsettle the Vietnamese, and, to the degree that China developed a commitment to an American relationship, it would restrain Chinese reactions in case the situation in Vietnam required escalation.

And, fifth, of course, we wanted to do all of this without selling out Taiwan. Now, contrary to what you read, settling the Taiwan issue was not our overwhelming objective. Our objective was to do as little as we needed to do to continue the relationship with China. And, if you read the dialogue between Zhou En-lai and myself in the early meeting--there were some newspaper stories a few weeks ago that counted the number of pages that were devoted to it, and tried to deduce from that profound conclusions--fundamentally, we told Zhou En-lai we would reduce some of our forces after the war in

Vietnam was ended, and more of our forces as conditions in the region improved, therefore making two conditions that they had to meet without a deadline, and without any specific assurance of what would happen when normalization was discussed. If you look at American policy in the '70's in our Administration and in our successors', we managed to maintain this ambivalent relationship, and this ambiguous relationship, for eight years after the initial opening to China. Now, as our relations with China developed, it became more and more obvious that China's overwhelming fear was that of Soviet hegemony and possible of a Soviet attack.

I had five meetings with Mao and innumerable meetings with Zhou En-lai, let me give a few observations. I found Mao the most cold-blooded analyst of international affairs that I had encountered in meetings with any of the world leaders. The only one comparable to him, in my experience, was DeGaulle. I never heard any ideological analysis from Mao. He was convinced that the Soviet Union was his principal threat, and he wanted to talk about how to organize the world to create the maximum pressure on the Soviet Union. Mao had a way of speaking elliptically, and, in a Socratic dialogue, unlike the leaders that usually meet who have a piece of paper in front of them, and say, "There are five points I've got to make," he would conduct the conversation by asking, "What is your consideration about...," whatever. And then you'd say something, and then he'd say, "Well, have you thought about this way of looking at it?" He had a way in a jocular manner of being fairly threatening. I think in one of my early conversations, he said, "Let me tell you a story. Somebody from Romania came to see me. And he said, 'You're both Communists, you and the Russians. Why don't you settle it?'" Mao claimed to have said, "There's no sense talking to me, I will fight the Soviets for 10,000 years." The Romanian said, "Really, it's inappropriate" so Mao said "Okay, I'll knock off a thousand years, so for 9,000 years..." And this went on until Mao was down to 7,000 years. Mao claims to have said at this point, when the Romanian still protested, "I've made my last concession." And then Mao said to me, "You

see, Professor, it's easy to deal with me. Every time I make a concession, it's for a thousand years. But what he was really telling me was that if we got into a major confrontation, it would last for 7,000 years.

In our early conversations with the Chinese, we had the great advantage that we had absolutely no concrete subject to talk about. There were no economic relations. There was none of the paraphernalia of international politics, so we had to talk about fundamentals. Zhou En-lai was not as insightful as Mao, too afraid to be insightful, but he was a great technician, and a great tactician. The major point I want to make is that our relationship started because we had a common interest, and we had some, I think, extremely thoughtful strategic discussions on how to conduct the Cold War. This was our fundamental concern. You read a lot of analysis that we let Beijing down on Taiwan, or China was disappointed about this or that. This is partly true.

What really weakened our relationship somewhat, as the '70's continued, was the domestic turmoil in the United States as a result of Watergate. And the fact that the Chinese caught on to what we were doing. The Chinese became aware of the fact that we were positioning ourselves not as their ally, but between the two sides, with some bias towards China, because they were the weaker. And they did not particularly like it. As Mao said to me once, "You're trying to get to Moscow by standing on my shoulders." Well, we didn't really try to get to Moscow either, because the Russians had the same basis for complaining. One of the problems in conducting such a policy is that this sort of balance of power is not really compatible with the American way of thinking about policy. And it's very hard to find a constituency for it. We are better at crusades than we are at protracted international confrontations. Every international problem we deal with has, historically, been presented to our people and to our Congress as having a terminal point. What we were doing was something of rather extended

confrontation. Its time had gone in the détente debate, which was really the Soviet variation of our
China policy.

The next leader I dealt with was Deng, who I thought was a truly great man. When you saw
~~told~~ China in 1971 to have the courage to imagine doing what he did, was a heroic posture. Who would
have believed that it was possible to move more or less to a consumer economy, cut military
expenditures, and set up a different economic system without the old system disintegrating? In foreign
policy, Deng was no different from Mao, except it didn't interest him so much, and he just took it for
~~needed & he approved.~~
granted that you opposed the Soviet Union. In 1989, I saw Deng about three months before Tiananmen
Square, and he told me that he had was going to eliminate a major role for the Communist Party. He
said, "From now on, the Communist Party would deal primarily with philosophical questions." I said,
"Give me an example of a philosophical question." He said, "Well, if we wanted to make an alliance
with the Soviet Union, that would be a philosophical question that the Communist Party would have to
deal with." Well, that wasn't likely to come up all that frequently. And I think without Tiananmen
Square, Deng would have gradually reduced the role of the Communist Party, and from that point of
view, it was a tragedy for the domestic evolution of China, because it skewered the process. Normally,
you would expect that, as the Chinese economy developed, political evolution would follow, if at some
distance. But, after the experience of Tiananmen Square--not that I thought Deng was a great political
reformer--China took no chance for maybe too long a period on political evolution.

We are now at the fourth generation of Chinese leaders. Mao had the legitimacy of unifying the
~~about & encounter~~
~~a leader of the~~
~~was~~
~~led a~~
~~the legitimacy of being anointed by Deng, although he has much lower legitimacy than Deng had. The~~
~~fourth generation has no legitimacy in that sense. They have come up through a political process, and~~
~~they have not yet proved themselves at all. Anyone who met the Chinese Vice President when he was~~

here, came away, more or less, with the feeling that he could be CEO of Chrysler. He's undoubtedly a man of administrative skill, and you don't get to the top of his organization without some remarkable qualities. But he is undoubtedly somebody, and his colleagues similarly, who has yet to prove himself by performance. But by what performance? What is the standard of performance?

There's no doubt that a new generation of Chinese leaders is coming up. One thing that strikes me is that the Communist Chinese that I knew were more courtly and traditional Chinese in their conduct than the yuppies that you see now in the economic field, and, even the current leaders, who are more standard global issue. This fourth generation has a colossal domestic task. First, the task of how to complete the development of a country that is attempting something that has never been tried before, namely, developing it in stages, within a country. I don't know any other society that has evolved by a geographic distinction between regions, so that as one visits China, one sees how Wuhan today is like Shanghai was 10 years ago. And 10 years from now, maybe Chongqing will be like Wuhan is now. But, in the meantime, that means that there are hundreds of millions who are in the disadvantaged areas, and who are moving towards, or at least have the option of moving, or the temptation of moving, into the more advanced areas. Zhu Rongji once told me that there were 100 million people on the road in China looking for work at any one moment. That is a magnitude of problem that no country I'm familiar with, or no country, in fact, has faced. So there is the economic problem. And there is the problem of China joining the WTO and surviving without an economic crisis.

Then there's the problem of the inevitable political evolution that has to follow such an economic change. Now, what this political evolution, if I have no way of knowing, I have my doubts whether it will lead in a straight line to pluralistic democracy. In fact, I am very sacrilegious enough to have my doubts whether Western-style pluralistic democracy is possible without an excluded minority process. But that's a philosophical point that deserves more attention than it usually

gets. Whatever the outcome, new leaders will come into power in the next year or so. They will face an awe-inspiring challenge for a Confucian society, a Communist society--the danger of fragmentation without a clear-cut roadmap. In my view, sometime in the first two or three years of their being in office, they will have to do something that lays out a roadmap and one that is specifically theirs, because the legacy of Jiang Zemin is too indistinct, if there is one. And the legacy of Deng is too far back, and the legacy of Mao is no longer relevant. So, it's a huge challenge, out of which a lot of domestic tensions could evolve.

Now let me talk about the foreign policy of China and the challenge to the United States. As I explained to you, I started out from the perspective of equilibrium between the Soviet Union and China, with the United States tilting towards China. This was sort of a mechanical approach, but not as easy to execute as to state. Nevertheless, it had its fairly simple rationale. The question is, where do we go now? There are a number of different points of view. One point of view is engagement, which means having as much contact with the Chinese as possible in the hope of creating a favorable atmosphere. In an important sense, I agree with it, but I want to come back to it in a more complex way. But there's another point of view that, in effect, slides China into the spot vacated by the Soviet Union. That point of view says China is bound, if it continues at the rate of growing at nine percent a year, to become a superpower in the foreseeable future. As a superpower, it will sooner or later challenge us. And in order to prevent this, we must confront them today. We much teach them a lesson that it's dangerous to confront us down the road. And we must try to harass them because they are Communists and thus ideological enemies. And they violate human rights, which is surely true. And behave badly in Tibet and other regions. So, therefore, not only must we confront them strategically, we must also confront them ideologically. Not only must we confront them ideologically, we must try to democratize them. And, if we were to succeed, then all our strategic problems would more or less disappear, because a

I question almost all of these propositions. I do not question the fact that somewhere down the road China will be much more powerful than it is today, but I would distinguish between a military threat from China and a geopolitical threat from China. Militarily, from the figures that you ladies and gentlemen have given me--so, if you don't agree with me, go back to your drawing board--the Chinese annual military budget is a little less than our annual increase in the defense budget. So, at that rate, I see no way they are going to be a strategic threat to the United States, in the sense that we looked at the Soviet Union as a strategic threat, in any time period that I can think of. But I do agree that as their economic power grows, and as their military strength grows--even though not enough to challenge us, they will become a weight on their neighbors. And, without any doubt, they will feel they're entitled to the respect and the adjustments that this power represents. I agree with this potential threat. I don't see how we deal with it by harassing them today, and I don't see what we can do. We could adopt a policy of trying to slow down their economic growth, although we're not doing it. But not even the people who hold this view are urging it very strenuously, at least not for the industries in their states. And, if we were to adopt this policy, we'd have to weigh it against what Japan and Europe would do in stepping into the breach, and what we would pay down the road when we have stimulated a kind of Chinese nationalism that is already strong, but turned largely against us. So I do not believe that this is a realistic option. There are certain technologies that we should not be eager to share and to spread, but, as a general proposition, I do not believe that this particular policy is open to us.

What is open to us is to make sure that the countries surrounding China are in a position where they are capable of creating at least some counterweight as the danger develops. I distinguish this from the containment policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by the fact that I do not think we have to declare

China as the enemy. Nor do I think it is desirable to help organize the other states on the basis of fear of China. I would, in fact, say that it is to our interests to keep any country from achieving its hegemony in Asia. We should conduct towards Asia more or less what I described in the triangular relationship. We should foster good relations with all of these countries and throw our weight in the direction that is most conducive to our national interests as the situation requires. China should understand that we will not accept geopolitical pressures based on military force, but we will have to deal with the other pressures by other means than military force, primarily:

Now, can we make China a democratic country? That question raises a number of issues. First, do we know what a democratic country should look like in China? Do we have a clear idea of what that is? Secondly, assuming we know what it is, how do we achieve it? Now that does not mean that we should not oppose violations of human rights, or that we should not make our views clear with respect to the oppression of nationalities, nor does it mean that we cannot exact some penalties. But it does mean that we should know what the limits are of what a day-to-day policy in this respect can achieve, and I think we should be careful in putting our trust into the Chinese eye as we have had a habit of doing in recent years for domestic American reasons more than for geopolitical reasons.

Now, let me say a few words about Taiwan. If you compare the situation in Taiwan in 1971 with the situation--when we started relations with China--with the situation in Taiwan today, the year 2002, and if you assume that what we did had at least some influence on it, you must say that the policy of seven American Administrations has been a huge success. Taiwan is economically vibrant. It is a democratic society. And it is not dominated by the Mainland. Anybody who had told us in 1971 that by 2002 we would be in that position, we from our, perhaps, limited perspective at that time, would have said, "We'll take it tomorrow. That's terrific. That's a great prospect." So now the problem is, what is the future? It is against our interests, and it is incompatible with our position, to permit the military

I question almost all of these propositions. I do not question the fact that somewhere down the road China will be much more powerful than it is today, but I would distinguish between a military threat from China and a geopolitical threat from China. Militarily, from the figures that you ladies and gentlemen have given me--so, if you don't agree with me, go back to your drawing board--the Chinese annual military budget is a little less than our annual increase in the defense budget. So, at that rate, I see no way they are going to be a strategic threat to the United States, in the sense that we looked at the Soviet Union as a strategic threat, in any time period that I can think of. But I do agree that as their economic power grows, and as their military strength grows--even though not enough to challenge us--the impact China's will have on the rest of the world will become more and more obvious to the respect and the adjustments that this power represents. I agree with this potential threat. I don't see how we deal with it by harassing them today, and I don't see what we can do. We could adopt a policy of trying to slow down their economic growth, although we're not doing it. But not even the people of the world should think that we are serious about trying to slow down their economic growth, although we're not doing it. But not even the people who hold this view are willing it very strenuously, at least not for the industries in their states. And, if we were to adopt this policy, we'd have to weigh it against what Japan and Europe would do in stepping into the breach, and what we would pay down the road when we have stimulated a kind of Chinese nationalism that is already strong, but turned largely against us. So I do not believe that this is a realistic option. There are certain technologies that we should not be eager to share and to spread, but, as a general proposition, I do not believe that this particular policy is open to us.

What is open to us is to make sure that the countries surrounding China are in a position where they are capable of creating at least some counterweight as the danger develops. I distinguish this from the containment policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by the fact that I do not think we have to declare war on China.

China as the enemy. Nor do I think it is desirable to help organize the other states on the basis of fear of China. I would, in fact, say that it is to our interests to keep any country from achieving its hegemony in Asia. We should conduct towards Asia more or less what I described in the triangular relationship. We should foster good relations with all of these countries and throw our weight in the direction that is most conducive to our national interests as the situation requires. China should understand that we will not accept geopolitical pressures based on military force, but we will have to deal with the other pressures by other means than military force primarily.

Now, can we make China a democratic country? That question raises a number of issues. First, do we know what a democratic country should look like in China? Do we have a clear idea of what that is? Secondly, assuming we know what it is, how do we achieve it? Now that does not mean that we should not oppose violations of human rights, or that we should not make our views clear with respect to the oppression of nationalities, nor does it mean that we cannot exact some penalties. But it does mean that we should, if we want to achieve a democratic life in China, learn what the limits are of what a day-to-day policy in this respect can achieve, and I think we should be careful in putting our trust into the Chinese eye as we have had a habit of doing in recent years for domestic American reasons more than for geopolitical reasons.

Now let me say a few words about Taiwan. If you compare the situation in Taiwan in 1971 with the situation--when we started relations with China--with the situation in Taiwan today, the year 2002, and if you assume that what we did had at least some influence on it, you must say that the policy of seven American Administrations has been a huge success. Taiwan is economically vibrant. It is a democratic society. And it is not dominated by the Mainland. Anybody who had told us in 1971 that by 2002 we would be in that position, we from our, perhaps, limited perspective at that time, would have said, "We'll take it tomorrow. That's terrific. That's a great prospect." So now the problem is, what is the future? It is against our interests, and it is incompatible with our position, to permit the military intervention.

conquest of Taiwan. We have said it since 1971, every American Administration has repeated it in one way or another, we've had aircraft carriers in the Taiwan Straits during crises, and I believe that the Chinese know that this is the case.

There has been a considerable evolution in the Chinese position. When we first communicated with them, they said no progress could be made on anything until the Taiwan issue was settled. One of the achievements of the first trip was, after we each had stated our position, for Zhou En-lai to say, "All right, let's go on to other subjects." For the longest time, the Chinese took the position that renouncing force on China was incompatible with their claim to eventual reunification. That position has been substantially modified. In all the conversations that I've had recently with high Chinese leaders, they have, in effect, said that they would use force only if Taiwan declared itself independent. And they have attempted to make clear that they have no intention of using force now. Now, does that bind them in 2010? Certainly not. I say 2010 because I'm convinced that the Chinese are determined to have the Olympics in Beijing as a great success, and they've already now asked for the World Exposition in 2010. So that with these markers, I think, it would take something highly unusual to produce a military confrontation.

The conclusion I draw is this: we should not encourage any belief in China that we are disinterested in Taiwan's survival. We must do nothing that would give them the slightest hope that military pressures on Taiwan would not be resisted. But, at the same time, we should do our utmost not to worsen the situation from their point of view. We should avoid situations where they believe that every year another little maneuver is made, edging Taiwan towards independence. And, while they'll grit their teeth and take it for a while, the penalty we will pay for that down the road is out of proportion to the marginal domestic benefits that can be gained here within the domestic debate.

It seems to me there are three principles that need to be followed on the Taiwan issue: One, the United States must maintain the principle of "one China." Two, the Chinese must understand that the use of force will be resisted, must be given to understand that. And, third, all parties, including Taiwan, must exercise restraint in their day-to-day conduct, and this is a message that has to be particularly addressed to Taiwan at this moment, because I believe that between China and the United States, some sort of understanding on that point is emerging. I'm convinced that China, for the reasons I gave, not for love of peace, not because they have become humanistic, but because of the huge problems that they face internally, wants a period of quiet. I believe that they also will pay a considerable price for it. But we have to keep in mind that they are not a historic power and a great power just in order to be pleasant in the world, and that as they evolve, they will be a challenge, and it will be a challenge to our ability to relate our national objectives to a long-term view.

For us to deal with a country of such a large, long history, and such a huge population, is a unique experience. We were in China a few weeks ago. We visited a province, and asked the governor, "What's the population of this province?" He said, "Seventy-four million." Well, that's larger than any European country except Russia. And that has to be multiplied twenty-fold to get a sense of the magnitude of China. So we have to bring our engineering approach to world affairs into some perspective, and to develop some long-range approaches, because, at the end of the day, we should weigh not only what the danger of China succeeding, but also the danger of China disintegrating. Do we want 20 Afghanistans, or even two Afghanistans, among 10 fragments that could emerge? Do we want tens of millions of Chinese immigrants in the world? Is the present evolution the only danger that we face from China?

Let me conclude by repeating what I said at the beginning. China is a place where people like it when men and women assemble. We are especially important. We have almost no categories of understanding a society like this. And

Our policymakers are inherently focused on the urgent, and don't have enough time for the important, in any Administration. This is why normally I would have come to you and asked you the question you asked me to deal with here. And you would have answered it more briefly and more to the point than I have. Thank you very much.

**Dennis Wilder, China-Taiwan Issue Manager:** I think we have about 30 minutes for questions. As a courtesy to Dr. Kissinger, as you ask your question, please simply state your name and organizational affiliation.

**Dr. Kissinger:** I believe we have an important role to play in making peace. First, by urging restraint on both sides; secondly, by understanding the economic evolution of Taiwan. As Taiwan moves many of its industries to the Mainland, new contacts between the Mainland and Taiwan are bound to evolve. To the extent that we can facilitate those contacts, it would be helpful. Thirdly, we can at least think through the implications of some of the proposals the Chinese are making. I think of Qian Qichen's comment that he no longer treats Taiwan as a renegade province, but says there's one China, with two political entities. I sat next to him once. I said, "Were this accepted, would it be possible to have Taiwan in the United Nations?" And he said, "Yes," that it's something that could be explored.

**Dr. Kissinger:** It's a question whether we've tilted too much in some of our recent statements. I have, on almost all issues, supported this Administration strongly. I said, "almost." I do not fully agree with some of the statements, the tone of some of the statements that have been made on China. I think it is helpful to emphasize the determination to defend Taiwan. But I don't think it's necessary to keep repeating it, especially in the phraseology that is bound to be offensive without adding to the point.

**Dr. Kissinger:** I believe that even a democratic China would be a potentially hegemonic power, because democratic countries also have national aspirations. I don't say that China has today strategic aspirations that conflict with the United States. I believe that as China evolves, its weight will be a major factor on surrounding countries, and therefore the management of this over a long period of time, *regardless of the consequences* will be one of the tasks of American politics. But there are other components. There is India. There is, *theoretically*, Indonesia, if we don't over-manage that one. And there are a lot of other countries that *have their own interests*. There's Japan. But it's not something we need to organize as a containment policy. It is something that can amount to it, but it will be much more in the economic and political field than in the strictly military field. The military field will take much longer to evolve.

**Michael Hale:** "One China" policy. Our "one China" policy--as I understand it as stated in three communiqués—is that we acknowledge the position of both sides of the strait that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. But it seems that Taiwan no longer claims to be the sole legitimate government of China, and, in fact, may not even consider itself a part of China, at least from statements of their President. Is it time to reassess the basis of our "one China" policy, given the fact that Taiwan seems to have departed from that? Should our "one China" policy mean that we support eventual reunification?

**Dr. Kissinger:** First two. But I don't rest the argument on this. It was a clever formula for the Shanghai communiqué, because we were in the weird position of being in the capital of a country that we didn't recognize. Instead we weren't recognized as speaking for all of China. But that's 30 years ago. The question you really asked, is it in our long-term interest to maintain that fiction? I think it's in our long-term interest to avoid a war over Taiwan. I see no national interest served, except the interest of not betraying people who relied on us, by having a war over Taiwan. And, therefore, I would think it is highly desirable to avoid situations in which we have to face this issue, because if we were to accept formally what you have said, and recognize Taiwan as an independent state, the possibility of permanent conflict with China would be extremely high. I'm not saying China would necessarily go to war, but it would not reconcile itself to this for a long, long period. I see nothing to be gained by trying to avoid it if it can possibly be avoided. So what I would have in mind is to see whether one can get a de facto situation in Taiwan in which China said Taiwan could have its own army, and if it were possible to do that, that army could be supplied from

to such a structure would enable it to function as a vague confederation in which the principle of "one China" is maintained. I would consider that a much preferable outcome. But I'm not saying it's obtainable in any brief period of time. For the next decade, I'd be content not to rock the boat, to not tempt the Taiwanese to rock the boat, and let the Chinese also know that we will not acquiesce. That would be, in my view, the best policy for the next 10 years—after which, I'm not going to be giving any speeches.

**Dr. Kissinger:** First of all, I don't look at the Communist Party of China as a Communist Party of the United States. I start from that. I look at it more comparable to the PRI in Mexico before the last election. And, therefore, I consider the process of evolution of their Party more comparable to what happened with respect to the PRI than you would expect in a normal class struggle-oriented Communist Party.

Secondly, Jiang Zemin has already made it clear, and so has Hu Jintao, that a redefinition of the content of the Communist Party is certainly in the cards. That, opening up to capitalists is simple in its direction. It won't solve their fundamental problem, which is that, as you get a modern economy, you're going to get different interest groups, and it is not going to be easy. In fact, it may not be possible, to contain them all within one political structure. Now, whether that means a multi-party system in the Western sense, or whether it means some other form of multiple expression, I find that hard to predict. But, surely, the first step will be to open the Communist Party to other classes. How long that will last will then be the next question for which I'll come back here for enlightenment.

**Drew Holiday (DIA):** Sir, given historical precedence for the Chinese leadership when pending deterioration of the situation raises its head to resort to a military solution, or a militant solution, and given the historical orientation of the PLA towards a more internal mission than an external mission, would you comment on the likelihood that--faced with the prospect of losing control of the massive internal problems that development will bring—that the fourth generation might go towards a more martial law crackdown than the liberal development postulate we all seem to have been following. And, what impact might that have on our national security from the standpoint of our regional relations with India and Pakistan or the former Soviet Union?

**Dr. Kissinger:** If some China expert here may be able to enlighten me, is it true that when China has domestic problems it engages in a militant outward policy? I couldn't, off the top of my head, give many examples of Chinese territorial expansion as a reaction to domestic difficulties. But I take your second point; what I have said is based largely on my conversations with the Chinese political leadership. The conversations with the Chinese military leadership, which are less frequent, do not lead me to the same conviction that they are as convinced of a long period of peace as the political leadership seems to be. It was struck, for example, that during the period of the airplane (EP-3) crisis, that the Defense Minister of China, with the President out of the country, would say that, "Unless there is an apology, the Chinese people and the PLA will never understand it," not mentioning the Party, and not mentioning the government. This I consider worrisome. And certainly an American geopolitical approach to Asia has to keep in mind that danger, and protect itself against that danger to the greatest extent possible. But I would say that even the militant Chinese PLA men, looking around the world, looking around at what's facing them on the border with India, Japan, Russia, would not necessarily conclude that taking on the United States is the best approach because going so could weaken China for what its closest neighbors might do. Nor would the idea of tackling one of these neighbors be a very

**Dr. Kissinger:** I have strongly favored national missile defense, because I cannot see how an American President can say, "I'm going to leave the American public totally vulnerable against a danger that exists" on the basis of abstract deterrence theories. I also don't think that the Chinese rely on strategic war to the degree that the Soviet Union did. I think the Chinese notion of a possible conflict with the United States would center on Taiwan, and their strategy would not be an attack on territorial United States that would enflame us permanently. But it would be to exhaust us, and to drag us into an endless conflict. So I don't believe that national missile defense, which, incidentally, we should do in any event, is the key issue. In my many conversations with the Chinese, I almost never hear comments about national missile defense. Local missile defense would be a serious problem. I believe that Japan, sooner or later, will get it, no matter what theories we develop, for the same reason that I gave before, namely, that they simply will not want to be vulnerable to dangers that will emerge on the Mainland.

So, then the key question is, missile defense of Taiwan. I do not think it is a good idea to place American missile defense on Taiwan, but I would think it feasible to have some American Aegis cruisers within range of Taiwan, and I'd be fairly sure that the Chinese would get the point. But, what they do not want and would resist, is an organic linking of the defense systems of Taiwan and the United States in such a way that it is really separating Taiwan institutionally.

**Major Andrews:** Yes, there were, I think, some medical doctors. Can you speak some to what sort of engagement the US and China should engage in? Specifically, on the military front. We've seen some hesitancy on the part of the current Administration to do some of those things and I am interested in your thoughts on that.

**Dr. Kissinger:** I said in my remarks that I don't like the word "engagement," because it makes it sound as if foreign policy is a sort of a social exercise and as if we were a foundation and not a country. It sounds that just being involved somewhere is a good thing. That makes me restless. I think when the United States is engaged in a dialogue, or in an exercise, it ought to be able to define it in terms of a national interest or a general interest. I would not die unfulfilled if the Chinese were not active in East Timor. I have no great desire to draw them into that region, and one of the concerns, frankly, that we all had in the '70's when the future of East Timor was under discussion and up for grabs was that China was the only country that supported the radical group that finally declared unilateral independence. We were not eager for Beijing to play a strategic role in that archipelago. So, every time when we talk about

Chinese engagement in the world, I'd like to know what it is before I make a general comment. And, similarly for the United States, I'm in favor of cooperative relations with China to the extent that we can assign an American purpose to it--I'm not worried about them—they will have a Chinese purpose.

"Dr. Henry A. Kissinger is hereby awarded the Agency Seal Medallion in recognition of the extraordinary contributions he has made to the Intelligence Community by willingly sharing with us the benefits both of his profound wisdom as a scholar of international relations and of his truly historic experience as one of the leading diplomats of the 20th Century. Over the course of several decades, Dr. Kissinger has regularly shared with Intelligence Community analysts his rich and unique insights into world affairs, and into the minds of the many foreign leaders with whom he frequently interacts. An avid consumer of intelligence, he has directly enhanced the analytic sophistication of our work through his readiness both to critique it and to contribute substantively to it. Dr. Kissinger has also been an invaluable counsel to the Intelligence Community leaders, sharing his seasoned and well-informed insights on intelligence priorities and trends. All present here today are beneficiaries of Dr. Kissinger's

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China Rising - Dr. Kissinger

7 May 2002

Headquarters Auditorium

George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence: We are delighted that you are with us today, Dr. Kissinger. Describing his early years in Washington, Dr. Kissinger once said, and I quote, "I can't recall anyone ever inviting me to dinner to hear my views about China." They did, though, very soon, and they still are for every meal of the day, and for all of the hours in between. When many Americans looked on China as a distant, mysterious enemy, fit only for isolation, Dr. Kissinger saw China for what it was—a huge fact of international life, a country with goals and interests, many hostile to us, and some not. In those days of the Cold War, of tension and competition with the Soviet Union, he saw something else in China—opportunity. An opportunity to reshape in America's favor the balance of power in Asia. But he knew that opportunities are easier to identify than they are to preserve. They tend to pass very quickly, turning timing itself into a decisive tactic of foreign policy.

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⊕

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Dr. Kissinger: George, and ladies and gentlemen, I usually make some smart-alecky remark after I hear such a fulsome introduction but I want to tell you how touched I am by what you said, and how glad I am to be here, because I'd like to thank you all for what you're doing for the Country. And I want to thank you for what you have done for me when I was in Government service. This was the group to which I could always turn to get a fair and objective assessment. There were occasions that I didn't agree with the assessment, but I always benefited from it, on the few occasions that I didn't agree, when I sat down with the analysts, we could achieve a common view. But those occasions were very rare.

I relied heavily on the work of this building, and I suffered from the abuse that some of you have suffered every decade, because I knew the motives that had involved you. And, very often, the CIA was given assignments precisely because none of them fit any of the existing categories. None of the existing agencies could, or would, do it. When I think, for example, why was the CIA in Laos? Not because you like to conduct wars. But because there really was no category within which to do what was needed in that particular situation. So every decade I have observed that investigations start and I have always felt great compassion for what you all went through, and so I'm very happy to be here, to be able to thank you for what you have done over the years that I have been able to observe your work.

Now, having said this, I don't know what I'm doing here. Because if somebody asked me to give a speech on China, one of the first things I would do is to call up my friends at the Agency and say, "What's your current assessment?" And I've been meeting over the past year, particularly under George's tutelage, and Dennis Wilder's, and others, quite often, to learn from you what you know about the evolution in China. In fact, I'm somewhat handicapped. The only people I know in China are

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the leaders. I've never met, or almost never met, ordinary Chinese. I've been concerned with the big picture. But I have not had the opportunity to study China in detail the way you do. I am not a China expert. I'm somebody who has thought about China, who has dealt with China at the level at which I have worked, and therefore, it's with some hesitation that I address you.

I got involved in China by accident. When President Nixon took office, he had a vague idea of opening to China. He had written about it, but he had no concept of how to do it. While I was Foreign Policy Advisor to Nelson Rockefeller, I had written a statement for him along the same lines, and I want you to know, Incidentally, since many of the books written about me and articles written about me, speak of my obsessive pursuit of the position of Security Advisor, the clever way in which I approached this, I became Nixon's Security Advisor by supporting his major opponent in three Presidential primaries. In fact, you can judge my political acumen if you were permitted to do analysis of easily, my historical record is of Americans you could judge my political acumen by the fact that I have never supported the winning candidate in a Republican Primary.

Nixon nor I, of course, and the way we finally got onto it was that we had any great idea how to proceed. So, neither of us had any great idea how to prove it. Proved to my the Soviets were clumsy. For the first three months in office, the Soviet Ambassador came to see me every few weeks to tell me about the evils of the Chinese. We were more or less convinced of that, anyway, at that time. He began to brief me about military clashes they had had at the Siberian border, which was not the usual procedure. So we started plotting them on a map just to see where all this was going on, because the Ussuri River meant nothing to me. We found that most of these clashes were close to Soviet supply bases, and far from Chinese supply bases, from which we drew the not very difficult conclusion that it was not probable that the Chinese would initiate military action against the Soviet Union at places that were logistically so disadvantageous to them.

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We then started asking more questions of the Intelligence Community about deployments and so soon, real not forth. And we got the idea that the danger was that the Soviet Union might attack China, rather than that China was provoking a war with the Soviet Union. Since we basically believed that balance of power

We began to move towards China in a very clumsy way. We permitted, for example, the US tourists in Hong Kong to buy $100 in Chinese goods. I don't know whether the Chinese noticed, but three of our senior Foreign Service Officers who were Soviet experts noticed it. And George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, Foy Kohler and Thompson requested an appointment with President Nixon, which was not so easy to get as you might think, since he didn't like to meet people he didn't know. But, when the appointment was finally arranged, they sullenly warned him that any overture towards China would surely lead to military conflict with the Soviet Union, and that we should restrain our impetuosity.

We met a number of diplomats, and we misunderstood the internal Sino-Soviet relationship because we thought that Communist emissaries would add more credibility than capitalist emissaries.

So we approached the Romanians, and we don't know whether they ever delivered the message, and we didn't, because we don't know what the Chinese said. I was recently in China, and Nancy Tang, who was Zhou En-lai's interpreter, told me that they had actually received the message from the Romanians, and that they had actually answered the message, and it was probably delivered in Moscow. It was certainly never delivered to us.

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to go
there. And I confess that I did not know much about China when I got there, and now that you all have access to the conversations that were conducted, some of you may think I proved it.

In the end
we had a number of fairly simple objectives. First, we had as our domestic objective the desire to split the American peace movement, and to demonstrate that the war in Vietnam was an aberration, and that we had a strategy for bringing about peace in the rest of the world. Indeed, we thought we had a strategy for bringing about peace in Vietnam, but we thought this was not a debate we could win while the war was going on. Secondly, we believed that it was against the national interests of the United States to have the Soviet Union achieve a position of predominance in China. We probably overestimated the Soviet capability for doing so, but, in the light of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the atmosphere of the Cold War, this was a basic conviction. Third, we thought that with skill, we might be able to set up a triangular relationship in which we were closer to Moscow and Beijing than they were to each other, and that we could use each side's fear of the other to maximize America's position. Fourth, we thought we could use our relationship with China to bring an end to the Vietnam War. We did not think that China would actively intervene on our behalf in Vietnam, but we did believe that the mere fact of a relationship with China would unsettle the Vietnamese, and, to the degree that China developed a commitment to an American relationship, it would restrain Chinese reactions in case the situation in Vietnam required escalation.

had to be
would be
I would be
overall
Serve to
that this
the event that
in order
to do
hoped
And, fifth, of course, we wanted to do all of this without selling out Taiwan. Now, contrary to what you read, settling the Taiwan issue was not our overwhelming objective, our objective was to do as little as we needed to do to continue the relationship with China. And, if you read the dialogue between Zhou En-lai and myself in the early meeting--there were some newspaper stories a few weeks ago that counted the number of pages that were devoted to it and tried to deduce from that profound conclusions--fundamentally, we told Zhou En-lai we would reduce some of our forces after the war in

this a variety of
that
profound
conclusions--fundamentally, we told Zhou En-lai we would reduce some of our forces after the war in

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Vietnam was ended, and more of our forces as conditions in the region improved, therefore making two conditions that they had to meet without a deadline, and without any specific assurance of what would happen when normalization was discussed. If you look at American policy in the '70's in our Administration and in our successors', we managed to maintain this ambivalent relationship, and this ambiguous relationship, for eight years after the initial opening to China. Not only is our relations with China developed, it became more and more obvious that China's overwhelming fear was that of Soviet hegemony and possibly of a Soviet attack.

I had five meetings with Mao and innumerable meetings with Zhou En-lai; let me give a few observations. I found Mao the most cold-blooded analyst of international affairs that I had encountered in meetings with any of the world leaders. The only one comparable to him, in my experience, was DeGaulle. I never heard any ideological analysis from Mao. He was convinced that the Soviet Union was his principal threat, and he wanted to talk about how to organize the world to create the maximum pressure on the Soviet Union. Mao had a way of speaking elliptically, and in Socratic dialogue, unlike the leaders that one usually meets who have a piece of paper in front of them, and say, "There are five points I've got to make," he would conduct the conversation by asking, "What is your consideration about...," whatever. And then you'd say something, and then he'd say, "Well, have you thought about this way of looking at it?" He had a way in a jocular manner of being fairly threatening. I think in one of my early conversations, he said, "Let me tell you a story. Somebody from Romania came to see me, And he said, 'You're both Communists, you and the Russians. Why don't you settle it?'" Mao claimed to have said, "There's no sense talking to me, I will fight the Soviets for 10,000 years." The Romanian said, "Really, it's inappropriate" so Mao said "Okay, I'll knock off a thousand years, so for 9,000 years..." And this went on until Mao was down to 7,000 years. Mao claims to have said at this point, When the Romanian still protested, "I've made my last concession." And then Mao said to me, "You

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But what he was really telling me was that if we get into a major confrontation, it would last for 7,000 years.

In our early conversations with the Chinese, we had the great advantage that we had absolutely no concrete subject to talk about. There were no economic relations, there was none of the paraphernalia of international politics, so we had to talk about fundamentals. Zhou En-lai was not as insightful as Mao or even afraid to be insightful, but he was a great technician, and a great tactician. The major point I want to make is that our relationship started because we had a common interest, and we had some, I think, extremely thoughtful strategic discussions on how to conduct the Cold War. This was our fundamental concern. You read a lot of analysis that we let Beijing down on Taiwan, or China was disappointed about this or that. This is partly true.

What really weakened our relationship somewhat, as the '70's continued, was the domestic turmoil in the United States as a result of Watergate, and the fact that the Chinese caught on to what we were doing. The Chinese became aware of the fact that we were positioning ourselves not as their ally, but between the two sides, with some bias towards China, because they were the weaker. And they did not particularly like it. As Mao said to me once, "You're trying to get to Moscow by standing on my shoulders." Well, we didn't really try to get to Moscow either, because the Russians had the same basis for complaining. One of the problems in conducting such a policy is that this sort of balance of power approach has, with America always being the weakling, and it's very hard to find a constituency for it. We were better at crusades than we were at protracted international confrontations. Every international problem we deal with has, historically, been presented to our people and to our Congress as having a terminal point. What we were doing was something of rather extended

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confrontation. Its time had gone in the détente debate, which was really the Soviet variation of our
China policy. Chinese

The next leader I dealt with was Deng, who I thought was a truly great man. When you saw
had
China in 1971, to have the courage to imagine doing what he did, was a heroic posture. Who would
have believed that it was possible to move more or less to a consumer economy, cut military
expenditures, and set up a different economic system without the old system disintegrating? In foreign
policy, Deng was no different from Mao, except that he didn't interest him as much, and he just took it for
granted that you opposed the Soviet Union. In 1989, I saw Deng about three months before Tiananmen
Square, and he told me that he had was going to eliminate a major role for the Communist Party. He
said, "From now on, the Communist Party would deal primarily with philosophical questions." I said,
"Give me an example of a philosophical question." He said, "Well, if we wanted to make an alliance
with the Soviet Union, that would be a philosophical question that the Communist Party would have to
deal with." And that wasn't likely to come up all that frequently. And I think without Tiananmen
Square, Deng would have gradually reduced the role of the Communist Party, and from that point of
view, it was a tragedy for the domestic evolution of China, because it skewered the process. Normally,
you would expect that, as the Chinese economy developed, political evolution would follow, if at some
distance. But, after the experience of Tiananmen Square--not that I thought Deng was a great political
reformer--China took no chance for maybe too long a period on political evolution.

We are now at the fourth generation of Chinese leaders. Mao had the legitimacy of unifying the
country. Deng had the legitimacy of having been in the revolution and starting reform. Jiang Zemin had
the legitimacy of being anointed by Deng, although he had much lower legitimacy than Deng had. The
fourth generation has no legitimacy in that sense. They have come up through a political process, and
they have not yet proved themselves at all. Anyone who met the Chinese Vice President when he was

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here came away, more or less, with the feeling that he could be CEO of Chrysler. He's undoubtedly a man of administrative skill, and you don't get to the top of his organization without some remarkable qualities. But he is undoubtedly somebody, and his colleagues similarly, who has yet to prove himself by performance. But by what performance? What is the standard of performance?

There's no doubt that a new generation of Chinese leaders is coming up. One thing that strikes me is that the Communist Chinese knew were more courtly and traditional Chinese in their conduct than the yuppies that you see now in the economic field, and even the current leaders, who are more standard global issue. This fourth generation has a colossal domestic task. First, the task of how to complete the development of a country that is attempting something that has never been tried before, namely, developing in stages, within a country. I don't know any other society that has evolved by a geographic distinction between regions so that one area in China, one sees how Wuhan today is like Shanghai 10 years ago. And 10 years from now, maybe Chongqing will be like Wuhan is now. But, in the meantime, that means that there are hundreds of millions who are in the disadvantaged areas, and who are moving towards, or at least have the option of moving, or the temptation of moving, into the more advanced areas. Zhu Rongji once told me that there were 100 million people on the road in China looking for work at any one moment. That is a magnitude of problem that no country I'm familiar with, or no country, in fact, has faced. So there is this economic problem, and there is the problem of China joining the WTO and surviving without an economic crisis.

Then there's the problem of the inevitable political evolution that has to follow such an economic change. Now, what this political evolution is, I have no way of knowing. I have my doubts that it will lead in a straight line to pluralistic democracy. In fact, I'm sacrilegious enough to have my doubts whether Western-style pluralistic democracy is necessarily the form that needs to evolve in every country to have democracy. But that's a philosophical point that deserves more attention than it usually

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gets. Whatever the outcome, new leaders will come into power in the next year or so. They will face an awe-inspiring challenge for a Confucian society, a Communist society--the danger of fragmentation without a clear-cut roadmap. In my view, sometime in the first two or three years of their being in office, they will have to do something that lays out a roadmap and one that is specifically theirs, because the legacy of Jiang Zemin is too indistinct, if there is one. And the legacy of Deng is too far back, and the legacy of Mao is no longer relevant. So, it's a huge challenge, out of which a lot of domestic tensions could emerge.

Now let me talk about the foreign policy of China and the challenge to the United States. As I have explained to you, I started out from the perspective of equilibrium between the Soviet Union and China, with the United States tilting towards China. This was sort of a mechanical approach, but not as easy to execute as to state. Nevertheless, it had its fairly simple rationale. The question is, where do we go now? There are a number of different points of view. One point of view is engagement, which means having as much contact with the Chinese as possible in the hope of creating a favorable atmosphere. In an important sense, I agree with it, but I want to come back to it in a more complex way. But there's also another point of view that, in effect, slides China into the spot vacated by the Soviet Union. That point of view is that, if it continues at the rate of growing at nine percent a year, to become a superpower in the foreseeable future, it will sooner or later challenge us. And in order to do that, we must teach them a lesson that it's dangerous to confront us down the road. And we must do to harass them because they are Communists and thus ideological enemies. And they violate human rights, which is surely true, and behave badly in Tibet and other regions. So, therefore, not only must we confront them strategically, we must also confront them ideologically. Not only must we confront them ideologically, we must try to democratize them. And, if we want to succeed, then all our strategic problems will be more or less disappear, because a

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gains democratic China (it is argued), even if it grows at nine percent a year, and even if it gets into superpower status, will never challenge us.

I question almost all of these propositions. I do not question the fact that somewhere down the road China will be much more powerful than it is today, but I would distinguish between a military threat from China and a geopolitical threat from China. Militarily, from the figures that you ladies and gentlemen have given me--so, if you don't agree with me, go back to your drawing board--the Chinese annual military budget is a little less than our annual increase in the defense budget. See that rate, I see no way they are going to be a strategic threat to the United States, in the sense that we looked at the Soviet Union as a strategic threat, in any time period that I can think of. But I do agree that as their economic power grows, and as their military strength grows--even though not enough to challenge us--they will become a weight on their neighbors. And, without any doubt, they will feel they're entitled to the respect and the adjustments that this power represents. I agree with this potential threat, I don't see how we deal with it by harassing them today, and I don't see what we can do. We could adopt a policy of trying to slow down their economic growth, although we're not doing it. But not even the people who hold this view are urging it very strenuously, at least not for the industries in their states. And, if we were to adopt this policy, we'd have to weigh it against what Japan and Europe would do if they were to adopt this policy, we'd have to weigh it against what Japan and Europe would do if they were to step into the breach, and what we would pay down the road when we have stimulated a kind of Chinese nationalism that is already strong, but turned largely against us. So I do not believe that this is a realistic option. There are certain technologies that we should not be eager to share and not spread, but, as a general proposition, I do not believe that this particular policy is open to us.

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China as the enemy. Nor do I think it is desirable to help organize the other states on the basis of fear of China. I would rather say that it is to our interests to keep any country from achieving its hegemony in Asia. We should conduct towards Asia more or less what I described in the triangular relationship: We should foster good relations with all of these countries and throw our weight in the direction that is most conducive to our national interests as the situation requires. China should understand that we will not accept geopolitical pressures based on military force, but we will have to deal with the other pressures by other means than military force primarily.

Now, can we make China a democratic country? That question raises a number of issues. First, do we know what a democratic country should look like in China? Do we have a clear idea of what that is? Secondly, assuming we know what it is, how do we achieve it? That does not mean that we should not oppose violations of human rights, or that we should not make our views clear with respect to the oppression of nationalities. Nor does it mean that we cannot exact some penalties. But it does mean that we should know what the limits are of what a day-to-day policy in this respect can achieve, and think we should be careful in putting our sun into the Chinese eye as we have had a habit of doing in recent years for domestic American reasons more than for geopolitical reasons.

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conquest of Taiwan. We have said it since 1971, every American Administration has repeated it in one way or another. We've had aircraft carriers in the Taiwan Straits during crises, and I believe that the Chinese know that this is the case.

There has been a considerable evolution in the Chinese position. When we first communicated with them, they said no progress could be made on anything until the Taiwan issue was settled. One of the achievements of the first trip was, after we had stated our position, that Zhou En-lai said, "All right, let's go on to other subjects." For the longest time, the Chinese took the position that renouncing force of China was incompatible with their claim to eventual reunification. That position has been substantially modified. In all the conversations I've had recently with high Chinese leaders, they have, in effect, said that they would use force only if Taiwan declared itself independent. And they have attempted to make clear that they have no intention of using force now. Does that bind them in 2010? Certainly not. I say 2010 because I'm convinced that the Chinese are determined to have the Olympics in Beijing as a great success, and they've already been asked for the World Exposition in 2010. With these markers, I think, it would take something highly unusual to produce a military confrontation.

The conclusion I draw is this: we should not encourage any belief in China that we are disinterested in Taiwan's survival. We must do nothing that would give them the slightest hope that military pressures on Taiwan would not be resisted. But, at the same time, we should do our utmost not to worsen the situation from their point of view. We should avoid situations in which they believe that every year another little maneuver is made, edging Taiwan towards independence. And, while they'll grit their teeth and take it for a while, the penalty we will pay for that down the road is out of proportion to the marginal domestic benefits that can be gained here within the domestic debate.

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It seems to me there are three principles that need to be followed on the Taiwan issue: One, the United States must maintain the principle of "one China." Two, the Chinese must understand that the use of force will be resisted, (must be given to understand that) And, third, all parties, including Taiwan, must exercise restraint in their day-to-day conduct, and this is a message that has to be particularly addressed to Taiwan at this moment, because I believe that between China and the United States, some sort of understanding on that point is emerging. I'm convinced that China, for the reasons I gave, not for love of peace, not because they have become humanistic, but because of the huge problems that they face internally, it wants a period of quiet. I believe that they also will pay a considerable price for it. But we have to keep in mind that they are not a historic power, and a great power just in order to be pleasant in the world, but as much as much as they evolve, then will be a challenge, and it will be a challenge to our ability to relate our national objectives to a long-term view.

For us to deal with a country of such a large, long history, and such a huge population, is a unique experience. We were in China a few weeks ago. We visited a province, and asked the governor, "What's the population of this province?" He said, "Seventy-four million." Well, that's larger than any European country except Russia. And that has to be multiplied twenty-fold to get a sense of the magnitude of China. So we have to bring our engineering approach to world affairs into some perspective, and to develop some long-range approaches, because, at the end of the day, we should weigh not only what the danger is of China succeeding, but also the danger of China disintegrating. Do we want 20 Afghanistans, or even two Afghanistans, among 10 fragments that could emerge? Do we want tens of millions of Chinese immigrants in the world? Is the present evolution the only danger that we face from China?

Let me conclude by repeating what I said at the beginning. China is a place where people like you are especially important. We have almost no categories of understanding a society like this. And

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our policymakers are inherently focused on the urgent, and don't have enough time for the important in any Administration. This is why normally I would have come to you and asked you the question you have asked me to deal with here. And you would have answered it more briefly and more to the point than I have. Thank you very much.

**Dr. Kissinger:** I believe we have an important role to play in making peace. First, by urging restraint on both sides; secondly, by understanding the economic evolution of Taiwan. As Taiwan moves many of its industries to the Mainland, new contacts between the Mainland and Taiwan are bound to evolve. To the extent that we can facilitate those contacts, it would be helpful. Thirdly, we can at least think through the implications of some of the proposals the Chinese are making. I think of Qian Qichen's comment that he no longer treats Taiwan as a renegade province, but says there's one China with two political entities. I sat next to him once, and I said, "Were this accepted, would it be possible to have Taiwan in the United Nations?" And he said, "Yes," that it's something that could be explored.

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Dr. Kissinger: It's a question whether we've tilted too much in some of our recent statements. I have, on almost all issues, supported this Administration strongly. I said, "almost," I do not fully agree with some of the statements, the tone of some of the statements that have been made on China. I think it is helpful to emphasize the determination to defend Taiwan. But I don't think it's necessary to keep repeating it, especially in the phraseology that is bound to be offensive without adding to the point.

Paul Heer (CIA): You said during your presentation that we should resist the emergence of a hegemon in East Asia. Do you believe that China has strategic aspirations that are fundamentally incompatible with those of the United States?

Dr. Kissinger: I believe that even a democratic China would be a potentially hegemonic power, because democratic countries also have national aspirations. I don't say that China has today a strategic aspirations that conflict with the United States. I believe that China evolves, its weight will be a major factor in the surrounding countries, and therefore the management of this over a long period of time will be one of the tasks of American policies. But there are other components. There is India, there is, theoretically, Indonesia, if we don't over-manage that one. And there are a lot of other countries that have their own interests. There's Japan. But it's not something we need to organize as a containment policy. It is something that can amount to it, but it will be much more in the economic and political fields than in the strictly military field. The military field will take much longer to evolve.

Michael Hale (CIA): I have a question about the three communiqués and your assertion that we should maintain our "one China" policy.

Dr. Kissinger: We should maintain our.....?

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Michael Hale: "One China" policy: Our "one China" policy--as I understand it as stated in three communiqués—is that we acknowledge the position of both sides of the strait that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. But it seems that Taiwan no longer claims to be the sole legitimate government of China, and, in fact, may not even consider itself a part of China, at least from statements of their President. Is it time to reassess the basis of our "one China" policy, given the fact that Taiwan seems to have departed from that? Should our "one China" policy mean that we support eventual reunification?

Dr. Kissinger: First of all, I think the phrase "acknowledge" was only used in the Shanghai communiqué. I don't think it was used in the other two communiqués, but does anyone know?

Audience Member: First two.

Dr. Kissinger: First two. But I don't rest the argument on this. It was a clever formula for the Shanghai communiqué, because we were in the weird position of being in the capital of a country that we didn't recognize. And were talking about an island that they considered a province, but we recognized as speaking for all of China. But that was 30 years ago. The question you really asking is it in our long-term interest to maintain that fiction? I think it is to be Taiwan. I see no national interest served except the interest of not betraying people who relied on us by having a war over Taiwan. And therefore, I would think it is highly desirable to avoid situations in which we have to face this issue, because if we were to accept formally what you have said, and recognize Taiwan as an independent state, the possibility of permanent conflict with China would be extremely high. I'm not saying China would necessarily go to war, but it would not reconcile itself to this for a long, long period. I see nothing to be gained by this if it can possibly be avoided. But what I would have in mind is to see whether one can get a de facto situation in Taiwan in which China said that Taiwan could have its own army, and if it were possible, that that army could be supplied from

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foreign countries, ~~so that~~ you had just sort of a vague confederation in which the principle of "one China" is maintained. I would consider that a much preferable outcome. But I'm not saying it's obtainable in any brief period of time. For the next decade, I'd be content not to rock the boat, ~~to not attempt the~~
Taiwanese to rock the boat, ~~also to~~ and let the Chinese ~~also~~ know that we will not acquiesce. That would be, in my view, the best policy for the next 10 years—after which, I'm not going to be giving any speeches.

Ray Bowen (CIA): Dr. Kissinger, I understood you to say that there's a challenge to the fourth-generation leadership to do something in the next two or three years to lay out a roadmap, that it must be unique, and that it will probably involve a great deal of domestic tension within China. If I understood you correctly, could you comment on whether this might involve the Party redefining itself, perhaps beyond traditional Communism? And, if that's a possibility, what likelihood would you assign to it?

Dr. Kissinger: First of all, I don't look at the Communist Party of China as a Communist Party. I start from that. I look at it more comparable to the PRI in Mexico before the last election. And, therefore, I consider the process of evolution of their Party more comparable to what happened with respect to the PRI than you would expect in a normal class struggle-oriented Communist Party.

Secondly, Jiang Zemin has already made it clear, and so has Hu Jintao, that a redefinition of the content of the Communist Party is certainly in the cards. Opening up to capitalists is simple in its direction. It won't solve their fundamental problem, which is that, as you get a modern economy, you're going to get different interest groups, and that is not going to be easy. In fact, it may not be possible to contain them all within one political structure. Whether that means a multi-party system in the Western sense, or whether it means some other form of multiple expression, I find it hard to predict. But surely, the first step will be to open the Communist Party to other classes. How long that will last will then be the next question for which I'll come back here for enlightenment.

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Drew Holiday (DIA): Sir, given historical precedence for the Chinese leadership when pending deterioration of the situation raises its head to resort to a military solution, or a militant solution, and given the historical orientation of the PLA towards a more internal mission than an external mission, would you comment on the likelihood that--faced with the prospect of losing control of the massive internal problems that development will bring—that the fourth generation might go towards a more martial law crackdown than the liberal development postulate we all seem to have been following. And, what impact might that have on our national security from the standpoint of our regional relations with India and Pakistan or the former Soviet Union?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, some China expert here may be able to enlighten me as to whether that China has domestic problems it engages in a militant outward policy. I couldn't, off the top of my head, give many examples of Chinese territorial expansion as a reaction to domestic difficulties. But I take your second point; what I have said is based largely on my conversations with the Chinese political leadership. The conversations with the Chinese military leadership, which are less frequent, do not lead us to the same conviction that they are convinced of a long period of peace as the political leadership seems to be. I was struck, for example, that during the period of the airplane (EP-3) crisis, that the Defense Minister of China, with the President out of the country, would say that, "Unless there is an apology, the Chinese people and the PLA will never understand it," not mentioning the Party, and not mentioning the government. This I consider worrisome. And certainly an American geopolitical approach to Asia has to keep in mind that danger, and protect itself against that danger to the greatest extent possible. But I would say that even the militant Chinese PLA men, looking around the world, looking around at what's facing them on the border with India, Japan, Russia, would not necessarily conclude that taking on the United States is the best approach because doing so could weaken China for what its closest neighbors might do. Nor would the idea of tackling one of these neighbors be a very dangerous one.

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wise course, because that might bring us in together with the other two. So the strategic problem of China from that point of view is very similar to that of Germany when Germany was an ascendant power. Germany managed to overcome all the intellectual obstacles and launch itself into a war that mathematically couldn't win. But this is not historically the Chinese approach. We should certainly be aware that this is a Chinese option, though not a likely one.

**Dr. Kissinger:** I have strongly favored national missile defense, because I cannot see how an American President can say, "I'm going to leave the American public totally vulnerable against a danger that exists" on the basis of abstract deterrence theories. I also don't think that the Chinese rely on strategic war to the degree that the Soviet Union did. I think the Chinese notion of a possible conflict with the United States would center on Taiwan, and their strategy would not be an attack on territorial United States that would enflame us permanently. But it would be to exhaust us and drag us into an endless conflict. So I don't believe that national missile defense, which, incidentally, we should do in any event, is the key issue. In my many conversations with the Chinese, I almost never hear comments about national missile defense. Local missile defense would be a serious problem. I believe that Japan, sooner or later, will get it, no matter what theories we develop for the same reason that I gave before, namely, that they simply will not want to be vulnerable to dangers that will emerge on the Mainland.

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Then the key question becomes the missile defense of Taiwan. I do not think it is a good idea to place American missile defense on Taiwan, but I would think it feasible to have some American Aegis cruisers within range of Taiwan and I'd be fairly sure that the Chinese would get the point. But what they do not want and would resist is an organic linking of the defense systems of Taiwan and the United States in such a way that it really separating Taiwan institutionally.

Dr. Kissinger: East Timor, you say?

Major Andrews: Yes, there were, I think, some medical doctors. Can you speak some to what sort of engagement the US and China should engage in? Specifically, on the military front. We've seen some hesitancy on the part of the current Administration to do some of those things and I am interested in your thoughts on that.

Dr. Kissinger: I said in my remarks that I don't like the word "engagement," because it makes it sound as if foreign policy is a sort of a social exercise and as if we were a foundation and not a country. It sounds that just being involved somewhere is a good thing. That makes me restless. I think when the United States is engaged in a dialogue, or in an exercise, it ought to be able to define it in terms of a national interest or a general interest. I would not die unfulfilled if the Chinese were not active in East Timor. I have no great desire to draw them into that region, and one of the concerns, frankly, that we all had in the '70's when the future of East Timor was under discussion and up for grabs was that China was the only country that supported the radical group that finally declared unilateral independence. We were not eager for Beijing to play a strategic role in that archipelago. So, every time we talk about

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Similarly for the United States, I'm in favor of cooperative relations with China to the extent that we can assign an American purpose to it—I'm not worried about them—they will have a Chinese purpose.

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China Rising – Dr. Kissinger

7 May 2002

Headquarters Auditorium

**Dr. Kissinger:** George, and ladies and gentlemen, I usually make some smart-alecky remark after I hear such a fulsome introduction but I want to tell you how touched I am by what you said, and how glad I am to be here, because I'd like to thank you all for what you're doing for the Country. And I want to thank you for what you have done for me when I was in Government service. This was the group to which I could always turn to get a fair and objective assessment. There were occasions that I didn't agree with the assessment, but I always benefited from it, and, on the few occasions that I didn't agree, when I sat down with the analysts, we could achieve a common view. But those occasions were very rare.

C&P

I got involved in China by accident. When President Nixon took office, he had a vague idea of opening to China. He had written about it. He had no concept of how to do it. When I was Foreign Policy Advisor to Nelson Rockefeller, I had written a statement for him along the same lines, and I want you to know, incidentally, since many of the books written about me and articles written about me, speak of my obsessive pursuit of the position of Security Advisor, the clever way in which I approached this, I became Nixon's Security Advisor by supporting his major opponent in three Presidential primaries. In fact, you can judge my political acumen--if you were permitted to do analysis of Americans--you could judge my political acumen by the fact that I have never supported the winning candidate in a Republican Primary

So, neither of us had any great idea how to proceed, and the way we finally got onto it was that the Soviets were clumsy. For the first three months in office, the Soviet Ambassador came to see me every few weeks to tell me about the evils of the Chinese. We were more or less convinced of that, anyway, at that time. He began to brief me about military clashes they had had at the Siberian border, which was not the usual procedure. So we started plotting them on a map just to see where all this was going on, because the Ussuri River meant nothing to me. We found that most of these clashes were close to Soviet supply bases, and far from Chinese supply bases, from which we drew the not very difficult conclusion that it was not probable that the Chinese would initiate military action against the Soviet Union at places that were logistically so disadvantageous to them.

We began to move towards China in a very clumsy way. We permitted, for example, the US tourists in Hong Kong to buy $100 in Chinese goods. I don't know whether the Chinese noticed it, but three of our senior Foreign Service Officers who were Soviet experts noticed it. And George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, Foy Kohler and Thompson requested an appointment with President Nixon, which was not so easy to get as you might think, since he didn't like to meet people he didn't know. But, when the appointment was finally arranged, they sullenly warned him that any overture towards China would surely lead to military conflict with the Soviet Union, and that we should restrain our impetuosity.

We tried a number of diplomats, and we misunderstood the internal Sino-Soviet relationship, because we thought that Communist emissaries would add more credibility than capitalist emissaries. So we approached the Romanians, and we don't know whether they ever delivered the message, and we don't know what the Chinese said. I was recently in China, and Nancy Tang, who was Zhou En-lai's interpreter, told me that they had actually received the message from the Romanians, and that they had actually answered the message, and it was probably delivered in Moscow. It was certainly never delivered to us.

beseeched at this moment by left-wing intellectuals who were going to Hanoi, and who were telling us that they had made great breakthroughs to peace and they had always proved to be an illusion. So we looked at Edgar Snow as just another left-winger who had gone off, except he had gone to Beijing instead of Hanoi, and we did not pay any particular attention to him.

Finally, a contact was established through Dr. Snow, and we received hand-written messages, and we sent back typed messages on paper that had no watermarks on it, and it was great cloak-and-dagger stuff. But you always read about ping-pong diplomacy, and how ping-pong diplomacy was a breakthrough. I can tell you, ping-pong diplomacy to us in the Nixon White House was a nightmare, because we were exchanging messages, and we were preparing what turned out to be my secret trip, when suddenly Zhou En-lai invites ping pong players to Beijing. The press was full of stories and, of course, immediately Vice President Agnew popped off to explain why the Chinese were forever unacceptable as interlocutors and Congressmen and Senators beseeched us, "Were we going to sell anybody out?" Most of the time they were urging us to sell somebody out in Vietnam. Therefore, for us, the ping-pong diplomacy was not at all a breakthrough, and we had to say a lot of things publicly that was contradictory to what we were saying to the Chinese privately in order to maintain the secrecy.

Now, the reason we maintained the secrecy was, we actually had started doing it the straight way through the State Department and through Warsaw, but, as soon as some feelers came from Beijing, we received a paper from the State Department that suggested the following: they wanted an agenda that would deal with assets, diplomatic immunity, communications, arms control etc., before we even had relations. And then they wanted to brief Congressmen and Senators, in nineteen different countries. So we thought we'd never get there if we do it that way. So at any rate, rightly or wrongly, we did it secretly. One of the handicaps was that I could not inform myself as well as I should have before I went

Vietnam was ended, and more of our forces as conditions in the region improved, therefore making two conditions that they had to meet without a deadline, and without any specific assurance of what would happen when normalization was discussed. If you look at American policy in the '70's in our Administration and in our successors', we managed to maintain this ambivalent relationship, and this ambiguous relationship, for eight years after the initial opening to China. Now, as our relations with China developed, it became more and more obvious that China's overwhelming fear was that of Soviet hegemony and possibly of a Soviet attack.

I had five meetings with Mao and innumerable meetings with Zhou En-lai; let me give a few observations. I found Mao the most cold-blooded analyst of international affairs that I had encountered in meetings with any of the world leaders. The only one comparable to him, in my experience, was DeGaulle. I never heard any ideological analysis from Mao. He was convinced that the Soviet Union was his principal threat, and he wanted to talk about how to organize the world to create the maximum pressure on the Soviet Union. Mao had a way of speaking elliptically, and, in a Socratic dialogue, unlike the leaders that one usually meets who have a piece of paper in front of them, and say, "There are five points I've got to make," he would conduct the conversation by asking, "What is your consideration about...," whatever. And then you'd say something, and then he'd say, "Well, have you thought about this way of looking at it?" He had a way in a jocular manner of being fairly threatening. I think in one of my early conversations, he said, "Let me tell you a story. Somebody from Romania came to see me. And he said, 'You're both Communists, you and the Russians. Why don't you settle it?'" Mao claimed to have said, "There's no sense talking to me, I will fight the Soviets for 10,000 years." The Romanian said, "Really, it's inappropriate" so Mao said "Okay, I'll knock off a thousand years, so for 9,000 years..." And this went on until Mao was down to 7,000 years. Mao claims to have said at this point, when the Romanian still protested. "I've made my last concession." And then Mao said to me, "You

In our early conversations with the Chinese, we had the great advantage that we had absolutely no concrete subject to talk about. There were no economic relations. There was none of the paraphernalia of international politics, so we had to talk about fundamentals. Zhou En-lai was not as insightful as Mao or too afraid to be insightful, but he was a great technician, and a great tactician. The major point I want to make is that our relationship started because we had a common interest, and we had some, I think, extremely thoughtful strategic discussions on how to conduct the Cold War. This was our fundamental concern. You read a lot of analysis that we let Beijing down on Taiwan, or China was disappointed about this or that. This is partly true.

What really weakened our relationship somewhat, as the '70's continued, was the domestic turmoil in the United States as a result of Watergate. And the fact that the Chinese caught on to what we were doing. The Chinese became aware of the fact that we were positioning ourselves not as their ally, but between the two sides, with some bias towards China, because they were the weaker. And they did not particularly like it. As Mao said to me once, "You're trying to get to Moscow by standing on my shoulders." Well, we didn't really try to get to Moscow either, because the Russians had the same basis for complaining. One of the problems in conducting such a policy is that this sort of balance of power policy is not really compatible with the American way of thinking about policy. And it's very hard to find a constituency for it. We are better at crusades than we are at protracted international confrontations. Every international problem we deal with has, historically, been presented to our people and to our Congress as having a terminal point. What we were doing was something of rather extended

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The next leader I dealt with was Deng, who I thought was a truly great man. When you saw
China in 1971, to have the courage to imagine doing what he did, was a heroic posture. Who would
have believed that it was possible to move more or less to a consumer economy, cut military
expenditures, and set up a different economic system without the old system disintegrating? In foreign
policy, Deng was no different from Mao, except it didn't interest him so much, and he just took it for
granted that you opposed the Soviet Union. In 1989, I saw Deng about three months before Tiananmen
Square, and he told me that he had been going to eliminate a major role for the Communist Party. He
said, "From now on, the Communist Party would deal primarily with philosophical questions." I said,
"Give me an example of a philosophical question." He said, "Well, if we wanted to make an alliance
with the Soviet Union, that would be a philosophical question that the Communist Party would have to
deal with." Well, that wasn't likely to come up all that frequently. And I think without Tiananmen
Square, Deng would have gradually reduced the role of the Communist Party, and from that point of
view, it was a tragedy for the domestic evolution of China, because it skewered the process. Normally,
you would expect that, as the Chinese economy developed, political evolution would follow, if at some
distance. But, after the experience of Tiananmen Square--not that I thought Deng was a great political
reformer--China took no chance for maybe too long a period on political evolution.

We are now at the fourth generation of Chinese leaders. Mao had the legitimacy of unifying the
country. Deng had the legitimacy of having been in the revolution and starting reform. Jiang Zemin had
the legitimacy of being anointed by Deng, although he has much lower legitimacy than Deng had. The
fourth generation has no legitimacy in that sense. They have come up through a political process, and
they have not yet proved themselves at all. Anyone who met the Chinese Vice President when he was

There's no doubt that a new generation of Chinese leaders is coming up. One thing that strikes me is that the Communist Chinese that I knew were more courtly and traditional Chinese in their conduct than the yuppies that you see now in the economic field, and, even the current leaders, who are more standard global issue. This fourth generation has a colossal domestic task. First, the task of how to complete the development of a country that is attempting something that has never been tried before, namely, developing in stages, within a country. I don't know any other society that has evolved by a geographic distinction between regions so that as one visits China, one sees how Wuhan today is like Shanghai was 10 years ago. And 10 years from now, maybe Chongqing will be like Wuhan is now. But, in the meantime, that means that there are hundreds of millions who are in the disadvantaged areas, and who are moving towards, or at least have the option of moving, or the temptation of moving, into the more advanced areas. Zhu Rongji once told me that there were 100 million people on the road in China looking for work at any one moment. That is a magnitude of problem that no country I'm familiar with, or no country, in fact, has faced. So there is this economic problem. And there is the problem of China joining the WTO and surviving without an economic crisis.

Then there's the problem of the inevitable political evolution that has to follow such an economic change. Now, what this political evolution, is, I have no way of knowing. I have my doubts that it will lead in a straight line to pluralistic democracy. In fact, I'm sacrilegious enough to have my doubts whether Western-style pluralistic democracy is necessarily the form that needs to evolve in every country to have democracy. But that's a philosophical point that deserves more attention than it usually

I question almost all of these propositions. I do not question the fact that somewhere down the road China will be much more powerful than it is today, but I would distinguish between a military threat from China and a geopolitical threat from China. Militarily, from the figures that you ladies and gentlemen have given me--so, if you don't agree with me, go back to your drawing board--the Chinese annual military budget is a little less than our annual increase in the defense budget. So, at that rate, I see no way they are going to be a strategic threat to the United States, in the sense that we looked at the Soviet Union as a strategic threat, in any time period that I can think of. But I do agree that as their economic power grows, and as their military strength grows--even though not enough to challenge us-- they will become a weight on their neighbors. And, without any doubt, they will feel they're entitled to the respect and the adjustments that this power represents. I agree with this potential threat. I don't see how we deal with it by harassing them today, and I don't see what we can do. We could adopt a policy of trying to slow down their economic growth, although we're not doing it. But not even the people who hold this view are urging it very strenuously, at least not for the industries in their states. And, if we were to adopt this policy, we'd have to weigh it against what Japan and Europe would do in stepping into the breach, and what we would pay down the road when we have stimulated a kind of Chinese nationalism that is already strong, but turned largely against us. So I do not believe that this is a realistic option. There are certain technologies that we should not be eager to share and to spread, but, as a general proposition, I do not believe that this particular policy is open to us.

Now, can we make China a democratic country? That question raises a number of issues. First, do we know what a democratic country should look like in China? Do we have a clear idea of what that is? Secondly, assuming we know what it is, how do we achieve it? Now that does not mean that we should not oppose violations of human rights, or that we should not make our views clear with respect to the oppression of nationalities, nor does it mean that we cannot exact some penalties. But it does mean that we should know what the limits are of what a day-to-day policy in this respect can achieve, and I think we should be careful in putting our sun into the Chinese eye as we have had a habit of doing in recent years for domestic American reasons more than for geopolitical reasons.

There has been a considerable evolution in the Chinese position. When we first communicated with them, they said no progress could be made on anything until the Taiwan issue was settled. One of the achievements of the first trip was, after we each had stated our position, for Zhou En-lai to say, "All right, let's go on to other subjects." For the longest time, the Chinese took the position that renouncing force on China was incompatible with their claim to eventual reunification. That position has been substantially modified. In all the conversations that I've had recently with high Chinese leaders, they have, in effect, said that they would use force only if Taiwan declares itself independent. And they have attempted to make clear that they have no intention of using force now. Now, does that bind them in 2010? Certainly not. I say 2010 because I'm convinced that the Chinese are determined to have the Olympics in Beijing as a great success, and they've already now asked for the World Exposition in 2010. So that with these markers, I think, it would take something highly unusual to produce a military confrontation.

our policymakers are inherently focused on the urgent, and don't have enough time for the important, in
any Administration. This is why normally I would have come to you and asked you the question you
asked me to deal with here. And you would have answered it more briefly and more to the point than I
have. Thank you very much.

**Dr. Kissinger:** I believe that even a democratic China would be a potentially hegemonic power, because democratic countries also have national aspirations. I don't say that China has today strategic aspirations that conflict with the United States. I believe that, as China evolves, its weight will be a major factor on surrounding countries, and therefore the management of this over a long period of time, will be one of the tasks of American politics. But there are other components. There is India. There is, theoretically, Indonesia, if we don't over-manage that one. And there are a lot of other countries that have their own interests. There's Japan. But it's not something we need to organize as a containment policy. It is something that can amount to it, but it will be much more in the economic and political field than in the strictly military field. The military field will take much longer to evolve.

**Dr. Kissinger:** First two. But I don't rest the argument on this. It was a clever formula for the Shanghai communiqué, because we were in the weird position of being in the capital of a country that we didn't recognize. And were talking about an island that they considered a province, that we recognized as speaking for all of China. But that's 30 years ago. The question you really asked, is it in our long-term interest to maintain that fiction? I think it's in our long-term interest to avoid a war over Taiwan. I see no national interest served, except the interest of not betraying people who relied on us, by having a war over Taiwan. And, therefore, I would think it is highly desirable to avoid situations in which we have to face this issue, because if we were to accept formally what you have said, and recognize Taiwan as an independent state, the possibility of permanent conflict with China would be extremely high. I'm not saying China would necessarily go to war, but it would not reconcile itself to this for a long, long period. I see nothing to be gained by this if it can possibly be avoided. So what I would have in mind is to see whether one can get a de facto situation in Taiwan in which China said Taiwan could have its own army, and if it were possible to, that that army could be supplied from

foreign countries, and you had just sort of a vague confederation in which the principle of "one China" is maintained. I would consider that a much preferable outcome. But I'm not saying it's obtainable in any brief period of time. For the next decade, I'd be content not to rock the boat, to not tempt the Taiwanese to rock the boat, and let the Chinese also know that we will not acquiesce. That would be, in my view, the best policy for the next 10 years—after which, I'm not going to be giving any speeches.

**Dr. Kissinger:** First of all, I don't look at the Communist Party of China as a Communist Party. I start from that. I look at it more comparable to the PRI in Mexico before the last election. And, therefore, I consider the process of evolution of their Party more comparable to what happened with respect to the PRI than you would expect in a normal class struggle-oriented Communist Party. Secondly, Jiang Zemin has already made it clear, and so has Hu Jintao, that a redefinition of the content of the Communist Party is certainly in the cards. So, opening up to capitalists is simple in its direction. It won't solve their fundamental problem, which is that, as you get a modern economy, you're going to get different interest groups, and it is not going to be easy. In fact, it may not be possible, to contain them all within one political structure. Now, whether that means a multi-party system in the Western sense, or whether it means some other form of multiple expression, I find that hard to predict. But, surely, the first step will be to open the Communist Party to other classes. How long that will last will then be the next question for which I'll come back here for enlightenment.

**Dr. Kissinger:** If some China expert here may be able to enlighten me, is it true that when China has domestic problems it engages in a militant outward policy? I couldn't, off the top of my head, give many examples of Chinese territorial expansion as a reaction to domestic difficulties. But I take your second point; what I have said is based largely on my conversations with the Chinese political leadership. The conversations with the Chinese military leadership, which are less frequent, do not lead me to the same conviction that they are as convinced of a long period of peace as the political leadership seems to be. I was struck, for example, that during the period of the airplane (EP-3) crisis, that the Defense Minister of China, with the President out of the country, would say that, "Unless there is an apology, the Chinese people and the PLA will never understand it," not mentioning the Party, and not mentioning the government. This I consider worrisome. And certainly an American geopolitical approach to Asia has to keep in mind that danger, and protect itself against that danger to the greatest extent possible. But I would say that even the militant Chinese PLA men, looking around the world, looking around at what's facing them on the border with India, Japan, Russia, would not necessarily conclude that taking on the United States is the best approach because doing so could weaken China for what its closest neighbors might do. Nor would the idea of tackling one of these neighbors be a very