Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Rabin

8:15 p.m., October 21, 1970

K: Mr. Ambassador, how are you?

R: Fine. I was asked by the Prime Minister yesterday after the talk that she had yesterday morning with the Secretary of State in New York and before the meeting of the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and the President will take place tomorrow to give you some of her views on the phone.

(1) We learned yesterday from the talk with the Secretary that in yesterday's talks with Gromyko on the violation of the standstill part of the ceasefire, the Soviet Union position was the Soviet Union was not party to any agreement and therefore it is none of their business.

(2) When it comes to Egypt, even though the Secretary explained that there were contradictions that Riad said that he was not personally involved in the arrangement of the ceasefire, there were no violations and if there were violations they were of no importance. To sum up, Egypt is not intending, have no intentions to take any step in trying to rectify a no ______ to all that situation there and the same basically the situation of the Soviet Union. The second point that we learned, there might be an agreement between Egypt and the Soviet Union to bring about a resolution to bring about a change in the ______ or at the best as the Secretary explained to have a resolution to have a ______.

K: I know all this, to repeat the resolution.

R: A resolution to ignore basically the violations when it comes to the first possibility we believe it would not be able to muster a 2/3 vote and we had a talk with Hambro and he said to us very clearly, I would come up and say that it was an illegal resolution. According to what we learned from the Secretary of State only Egypt will be against it. I think this is how the Secretary put it to the Prime Minister -- there should be no mistake as to where we stand. There were violations, the U.S. came up and said there were violations and we stress without any affect on the part of Egypt, on the part of these violations there will be no talks. But there are no problems on our part of extending the ceasefire or the no shooting part of the ceasefire.

K: Okay

R: I think the President said when he talked to her that he would use strong language with the Russians about this point.

K: Yeah.

By KHU NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Rabin

8:15 p.m., October 21, 1970

R: I wonder if what has been done could be considered strong language.

K: Right.

R: She believes either the U.S. will extend in the U.N. General Assembly not to bring about any resolution that will ignore completely the violations of the ceasefire.

K: You know I just came back from the West Coast, I will talk to the President and I will transmit this to him.

R: I have been asked to try to do to you.

K: What?

R: This is what I have been asked to try to do to you.

K: I will transmit this to the President.

wgh

By: KHW NARA, Date: 5/13/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ray Price
10/21/70; 8:25 p.m.

K: I have just started reading your draft and this is just -- there is one major problem which was highlighted by the Gromyko speech. What we have about the Soviet Union right now is the sort of canned.... assistant professors of peace groups. I know you got 90% of it from the President. If we say before the UN all the reasons why we must work together without even a slight slap of what they have done, we will make ourselves look totally ridiculous. I find it hard to see what Gene McCarthy would have had different than what we have here. I think we should go back to what we had. What you say on page 2 should be made in reference to the Soviet Union, instead of a general attack on all countries. What we have on the Middle East is dangerous in the extreme. What does he mean we are working -- does he want an explosion from the Jewish community ten days before the elections and for what. Are we announcing that we are going into discussions again? What is he trying to say?

P: That is verbatim from a tape he dictated.

K: Let's take out the phrase, "in all available forums." We have to tone down paragraph on page 7. We must not work together -- that's exactly what has been happening. Somebody who has just kicked us in the teeth and then has just repeated it in a speech to the UN -- it just doesn't sound right. We must "work" -- leave out "together"

P: What he is ax saying is not that we have been -- but that we should.

K: I guarantee you this paragraph is going to -- no one listened to me in June.

P: It didn't come across to me as soft. It came across to me as a warning to the Soviets.

K: I am not going to argue because this is not the way to write a speech. But I tell you that anything under these conditions which gives us a condominium impression is going to be serious. I don't mind saying we must strive, we must work, but together just has to go. I don't like the whole paragraph because it doesn't say anything. It is canned -- it doesn't mean anything. What does he have in mind? The Soviets kicked us in the teeth by violating the agreement and they have refused to rectify it. Are we going to say let by-gones be by-gones. What do you suppose it means?

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

P: That they have not worked together in the past and they have to now.

K: I am telling you the Soviets will tell us they accept the paragraph and let's get going working together. We have two choices -- either work together or work on alternative paragraphs.

P: I think there ought to be a paragraph from you that he could work at.

K: I would prefer to have him have one instead of driving him up the wall. I consider this paragraph lousy -- it's just not related to the issues on the table. This can get us in the dilemma that got us in the mess to begin with. I don't believe Sisco will approve this. Will you try to redraft this to take my concerns in mind. Can we get it within the next hour so we can send it to the Department. I would like a paragraph that takes note of the Gromyko speech that says he will however not engage in recounting our list of grievances, to say one of the paramount problems of this period is that we have to transcend the approaches in which each country was to achieve for itself the greatest possible gain. Do you see what I mean? Say because such an approach could lead to confrontation. This is all the more important because there are bigger things with regards to the Soviet Union. I think we are letting them off in a way -- this speech now reads as if nothing happened this summer.

P: It doesn't to me.

K: Look, I have been a party to all discussions with the Soviets. What could we not have said on page 6 or 7 in June. Everything we said in June is the universal truth. The Soviets have a big decision whether they are to confront or cooperate. What the New York times said today is what I AGREE with -- of course, they got it from my backgrounder in Hartford. (laughter)

P: I will try to work out something.

feg

By KHLW NARA, Dale 5/12/04

Telecon
The Vice President
10/22/70 8:25 a.m.

VP: I have a meeting this morning with the Vice President of Nationalist China and I am sure he's going to want a follow-up on the MAP situation.

K: We are going to ask MARXX for a supplemental for MAP and try to restore funds in that supplemental up to the planned level, whatever it was that we cut it from. And we are tacking it onto the Israeli aid bill so we have a good chance of getting it through.

VP: We went ahead with the cut as planned for the regular bill?

K: The regular bill doesn't have countries specifically listed; it is a global plan. This will include Cambodia, Korea and Nationalist China and they all will be specifically listed.

VP: We went from 24 back to 12.

K: And my recollection is that we are asking for 12 back. We do this because we had to piece something together for Cambodia.

VP: I think he'll be very happy about this.

K: But he shouldn't talk about it, because we haven't told Congress yet.

VP: But I can mention it to him.

K: Yes, but get as many people out of the room as you can.

VP: Okay. With regard to Canada's move on Communist China, what do I say?

K: We maintain our position. They need some encouragement.

VP: We sure do.

K: It's getting to be the worst thing that can happen to a country to be an ally of a Western power. As soon as we amass some capital, there are people around ready to spend it.

VP: Twas ever thus.

Telecon
Amb. Dobrynin

10/22/70 8:35 a.m.

K: You kept your promise on the speech.

D: It was much better than it was before. What I mentioned to you from now on has full backing . . . "in a constructive way."

K: I understand and I pointed out to you what would happen. It was no surprise. I called about what we discussed Saturday. We will follow that. The Foreign Minister will ask the President for an agenda. The President will suggest the agenda you and I agreed to and will ask the Foreign Minister to make some general opening remarks and then follow what we discussed.

D: I understand. Very good. How should we go?

K: Why don't you come in the Northwest gate entrance off Pennsylvania Avenue. The Entrance to the right when you face the White House.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E1-0258
By CNAR Date Stot

By: KHLU NARA, Date: 10/12/04

Telecon
Amb. Dobrynin

10/22/70 8:35 a.m.

By KML NARA, Dale S/12/04

TELCON

Haldeman/issinger

9:35 am

10/22/70

H: I understand you insist Marshall Wright be a guest.

K: He works with the Assist. Secys.

H: How did they get on?

K: They think they are prima donnas and we need someone to speak and mingle with them.

H: The President will scream when he sees these people.

K: They are all Heads of State and they don't get the usual thrill from being at the WH.

H: Some of them do.

K: It's not a normal mixing group. Some are rivals.

H: You think Wright has to be there?

K: I would appreciate that.

H: The other is the sister of the Shah.

K: I am neutral.

H: The justification is that she has special title and we have to deal with Iran.

K: She is higher than a foreign minister.

H: Non are invited.

K: If you don't want to do it --

H: I think we have to justify it.

K: I will see what I can do. I think we can justify it.

H: I hate to get into a flap on this dinner again.

K: There's no one else in her position. And we have a special relationship with the Shah.

H: She is had of delegation and higher than all others not Heads of State.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/13/04

Haldeman/Kissinger

9:35 am 10/22/70

-2-

K: How is the election going?

H: The President's campaigning is going well but whether we are winning there's no way to tell.

K: I decided not to make the pitch for Murphy in front of the editorial staff. I took Otis Chandler aside.

H: How did you get along?

K: It was better to do that way then in front of their staff.

H: Was Guffman there?

K: Yes.

H: Then it was better.

K: Otis says that we feel we are out? ? ? ? ?. I said let's talk in your office.

H: That's good.

K: I hope -- did you get good reports from the fundraiser?

H: Finch said it was spectacular.

K: I got a lot of phone calls but I don't know what that means on the West Coast.

H: Let me know.

Telecon
Amb. Dobrynin

10/22/70 10:35 a.m.

K: In my movie director's role, to see that all the actors know what all the others know . . .

D: I wanted to check on the first one. The Foreign Minister first asks about the agenda and then they talk about it.

K: And the President then asks the Foreign Minister to make . . .

D: Yes, I understand.

K: What I wanted you to know. That exchange in July about an agenda for an eventual summit. That is only known to the President and me, so he should not refer to it.

D: He will say "As you know . . ." and so on.

K: But he should not talk about the agenda. When the President takes him away he will talk about the agenda and say it should be worked out by you and me.

D: Okay. I understand.

K: If we can keep all these things straight, we will have achieved a minor triumph of U.S. -Soviet cooperation.

D: I hope so.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01258

By

CHNARA Date 05/20/70

*

By KHLNARA, Dale 5/13/04

Telecon
Amb. Dobrynin

10/22/70 10:35 a.m.

D: Yes, I understand.

D: Okay. I understand.

D: I hope so.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCONE
Rogers/Kissinger
2:11 pm 10/22/70

R: I have just gone over changes in the President's speech. Not many.
Two or three will irritate him because they sound like dribble but they are
important to the UN. They will be over right away.

K: As the NVN would say, we will approach them with good will and serious intent. We will accept them if they don't throw the whole balance of the speech off.

R: I understand.

K: The attitude will be to accept them rather than the opposite. Could you asterick those that are essential. We will consider all of them.

R: I don't think any are important. Many are good but none essential.

K: We will try to put them in.

R: I think the meeting was good. I don't mean to interrupt him on progress --

K: What you said was essential. They can give us internal access in Berlin which means nothing.

R: I don't think that's what we said. We want a solution.

K: They did agree to (present them?)

R: Now they say microscopic. The whole holed up was the condition. We had to eliminate FRG in Berlin. They backed away from that. They did in NY and again today. He made it clear. I am going to work on the other thing. Let's not say anything.

K: That's in your hands. We will not do anything.

R: Javits said Israel had to do something. He asked if he could do anything. I said tell Meir we had? ? ?

K: I will put Presidential weight to Rabin when I hear from you.

R: I think Russian Russians things have gone well. We have taken the chill out of it but it's not hearts and flowers.

K: I think it's well.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Franklin Murphy/Kissinger
2:20 pm 10/22/70

M: I am sorry I didn't get back to you. Did you have anything special?

K: They wanted me to raise the Murphy endorsement and I didn't see a way of doing it.

M: You are right and I am glad you didn't. You have to keep, of all the people in the WH, the most non-political course. I am glad you didn't. We are having some conversations about it. We are in a difficult position. Previous comments we have made. It's where it's been and will have to stay. I wanted to tell you I ran into Norman Chandler the next morning. He said I have great respect for that man and I am glad he is in the WH.

K: That's nice. I like him.

M: We really appreciated your getting together with them.

K: Let's get together when you are next in town.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Ray Price/Kissinger

2:45 pm

10/22/70

K: We have monkeyed with this draft a little bit. I would like to get a copy to you. I want to reduce the psychological pressure on him. Will you let me know how problems you have? I have only moved a few of your paragraphs around and taken out a few phrases.

P: I have a few fiddling things on it to.

K: Let's deal with him together. I will discuss these things with you and vice versa. I don't want to drive him out of his mind.

P: OK, fine.

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

J. Chancellor/Kissinger
4:10 pm 10/22/70

C: Thank you for calling back. I wondered if you got a sense today -- could you give me anything on the atmospherics today?

K: It was businesslike and friendly.

C: Did you find he was as hard -- the speech he gave yesterday was very old-fashioned harangue.

K: The tone here was directed to the future.

C: Any flexibility on my position in the M.E.?

K: I don't want to go into specifics.

C: It was you and they testing the air.

K: That's right.

C: I don't know what to say about the Administration position on this. It looks like the line is hardening a bit.

K: I think we wanted to make clear that we will respond to toughening of their line. We prefer negotiation rather than confrontation. The President will make statements at the UN tomorrow which will illuminate. They will not be in same backward look as yesterday.

C: Did you get the impression that SALT was imperiled by this new language?

K: ? ? ?

C: I appreciate your taking the time. I know you have a very busy schedule.

Telecon
Amb. Dobrynin

10/22/70 4:15 p.m

K: Are you going to drive?

D: Yes. We intend to leave around 5:00. We have just finished lunch with the Minister. We had lunch quietly.

K: If you feed him the way you feed me, he won't be in any condition to do anything but sleep. There were two points the President wanted me to make. First, when we talk about SALT what we mean by "Limited" is something that covers the items on the last proposal. We considered the first "comprehensive" and the last two limited. He didn't mean ABM alone would be acceptable for example. Second point, which he made to the Foreign Minister and wanted to make sure I made to you, relying on the excellence of your communications. He would like to aim for an announcement of the major topic toward the end of next week, the 29th or 30th.

D: All right. I will mention that.

K: If you could do that. My understanding is that in the private talks he did mention the points you thought he should about our channel.

D: He did not tell me everything. There wasn't a chance. He just began.

K: These were the two items the President wanted me to mention to you.

D: You will be there tomorrow?

K: Yes, and I am staying overnight in New York; I'm not going back with the President.

D: But it's always difficult to find you there.

K: Not if you go to the right places.

D: I guess it's just differences of taste.

K: The White House operators always know where to find me.

D: That's dangerous for you?

K: No, not at all. I am always available. I am glad you are keeping up with all my activities in your usual efficient manner.

D: I have to know where to find you in case. I have heard that tomorrow's

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E1012582
By CNARA Date Stato

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012368
By CHINARA Date 05/22/70

Telecon
Amb. Dobrynin

10/22/70 4:15 p.m. page 2

speech will be a major one on our relations. Is that true?

K: It will contain some significant references, but I told you the spirit in which they will be made. It will be somewhat less polemical than previous speeches.

10/22/70 4:45 p.m.

D: I have checked about what you mentioned. About the 29th or the 30th and about SALT. He was not quite positive; now I want to check, about the three points the Foreign Minister mentioned, you remember. He would like to check his impression. Is it possible that we could get a reply while he is still here?

K: My personal opinion . . . or would you rather that I check first?

D: I think I would like you to check.

K: I think you cannot get a formal reply while he's here.

D: It's not a question of a formal reply but one on which we could rely.

K: What would you like to have?

D: Some kind of private + ______ between you and me and him that there will be a beginning, something approximate.

K: I understand. My personal opinion, I could try and I would check this, . . . to get you a private understanding. In that case, we have to be realistic. If we are serious about what you said, we have to do it in a way so that there wouldn't be screaming like there was in July. You have to rely on us to do it in the best way possible.

D: Will we be able to talk tomorrow?

K: Yes, we could talk in New York. What sort of an understanding do you want? Try to get the Jarring mission started again?

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: Are you going to drive?

D: That's dangerous for you?

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/13/04

Telecon
Amb. Dobrynin

10/22/70 4:15 p.m. page 2

10/22/70 4:45 p.m.

D: Some kind of private + __________ between you and me and him that there will be a beginning, something approximate.

By KHLW NARA, Dale 5/12/04

Telecon
Amb. Dobyynin
10/22/70 page 3

D: The two of us work together and with the understanding that it would happen in a certain time. Clear understanding within the lines he mentioned. Understanding that you really think it will happen and we can rely on that. In this sense can you tell me something tomorrow?

K: I will try. We can talk tomorrow and I may be able to tell you something more definitive Sunday afternoon. I can probably give you some indication of the President's attitude tomorrow and by Sunday tell you what the chances are of getting it done. But we have to keep this in our channels.

D: He would like to have a more positive and definitive answer if possible. If not possible we will have to send it to him. I think it would be useful. To whatever extent you can do it tomorrow and Sunday would be useful.

K: I can get word to you tomorrow. I will be in the President's entourage. Where can I find you?

D: The Indonesian lobby.

K: The President is going afterward to the U.S. mission; he will be there for 45 minutes.

D: I will wait in the Indonesian lobby within 45 minutes after he leaves the UN building.

By: KHU NARA, Dale: 5/12/04

TELCON

H. Kaplow/Kissinger

4:40 pm

10/22/70

K: The obvious -- is the President likely to say something about Communist China?

HAK: I doubt it.

K: There's talk in NY that he might.

HAK: No.

K: Is his briefing to the Hartford editors a good basis to start on -- his not-for-quotation remarks -- a good tone of speech tomorrow?

HAK: I don't want to go into that but it will be a constructive speech. It will be tending toward a positive direction.

K: Will there be specifics in it?

HAK: It will concentrate on a general approach.

K: What did Gromyko approach have to it?

HAK: To the speech? It was a constructive meeting.

K: Anything beyond that?

HAK: It laid basis for improving our relations. A lot depends on what specific measures we take. We want into the topics he (I) mentioned.

K: Was it exploratory or moving ahead?

HAK: A full exploration. We are talking here for background.

K: I would like to say what happened generally at the meeting.

HAK: Without saying WH sources because I am the only living WH source.

K: Right. Would you say you moved ahead?

HAK: I don't want to -- I think we have some idea of which directions one might move but I don't want to claim anything and leave it at that.

K: This morning you got some idea?

HAK: Of what?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E1-2358
By CHNARA Date 6-20-70

Telecon
Amb. Dobrynin

10/22/70 4:15 p.m. page 2

10/22/70 4:45 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012368
By CHARA Date 5/10/10

D: The Indonesian lobby.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/13/04

Telecon

Davex Krustaw Herb Kaplow

10/22/70 5:00 p.m.

K: I wanted to pick point out that the meeting was scheduled for an hour and it lasted two and a half hours. That should indicate that there was a fair amount of substance covered. I thought I should add this.

Kap: Can you tell what the general tone was?

K: Constructive and looking to the future to see where we go from here.

Kap: I know your problem of not being able to go into detail. But on something like the Middle East, would the "constructive" description apply to that?

K: I think about the basic attitudes rather than about the specifics.

Kap: This is helpful; that's about as far as you can go?

K: Yes, that's about as far.

Kap: I'll use this on a background basis.

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCOM

Chalmers Roberts/Kissinger

5:27 pm

10/22/70

K: I call you because I admire your editorial policy so much.

R: I don't write editorials. I hear sweet mood music over there after the
President's meeting with Gromyko. I want to be sure I hear the right tune.
After hearing Gromyko's <u>new</u> remarks yesterday and what Zeigler put
out, it seemed to accent the positive and not the negative in Soviet relations.
Zeigler says the President will say something on this tomorrow. I got the
impression that the crunch is over. You said in one backgrounder you didn't
know if they were going to a hard line and the impression I get that since
Cuba is taken care of we are bacc at the status quo ante.

K: How could we take care of something that didn't exist?

R: You will never find -- I didn't say it didn't exist. I quoted people at
State who said that.

K: That's right. The <u>xxx</u> crunch is over <u>xxx</u> is premature but we are trying
to move in a positive direction. The major differences remain. We can
say that we are trying to move differences from confrontation to negotiation.
The last two months have shown that pressure tactics don't work and we are
ready to persue the other course.

R: When are you going to tell us what really happened on Cuba?

K: In due course.

R: Did you read my article on Sunday?

K: You are factually wrong but psychologically on the track. Not fadually
wrong but facts <u>xxx</u> not quite right but you were psychologic a lly on the
right track. It's essential --

R: I was cautious on facts since I don't have much.

K: It was a reasonable statement. I can't confirm facts. You were on the
right track.

R: I have not seen what the Pentagon said on the last day or so. Has everything
moved out of Cienfuegos?

K: Yes but one ship still in another port but it can't do what it could in
Cienfuegos. Also, in the past -- we have an on the record commitment about
submarine bases.

By KHLW

NARA, Dato

5/13/04

Roberts/Kissinger

5:27 pm

10/22/70

-2-

R: And reference to Cuba '62.

K: A public acknowledgment of Cuba '62 and it's extension to a submarine base. It puts things again on a different footing.

R: On recollection of Cuba '62 issues, Castro wouldn't play and Kennedy said he would live with the deal that was consumated.

K: Because we didn't ? ? ? ? ?. It gave us an extra choice.

R: You take Gromyko yesterday as being nothing more than pro forma?

K: That speech was written before he left.

R: If the crunch is not quite over, what remains?

K: The rectification problem and how to handle the Suez problem. Are they trying to put the squeeze on the other we can handle as a negotiating problem.

R: That's what you said about a tactical advantage. When are we going to sit down?

K: You and I? Let's aim for next week.

R: Why was SALT brought up again?

K: We wanted to make sure we are heading in the same direction. The meeting was scheduled for one hour but lasted 2 and a half, and it was a small segment.

R: You had interpreters.

K: One way. He will only speak in Russian. SALT was only mentioned.

R: How about Berlin?

K: More specific on that.

R: The M. E. ?

K: Let's wait a bit. Call David Young early next week.

*

By: KLC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON

Marvin Kalb/Kissinger

6:10 pm

10/22/70

HAK: I am returning your call from yesterday which is probably outdated.

K: I can get you on today's stuff.

HAK: Never give an astute sex operator an opportunity.

K: Yesterday is over but if you could respond to one bit of mystery. I am very puzzled --

HAK: I am among the few in the WH whose favorite people you are one of.

K: Why has the impression been made this week -- State Dept. sources in NY -- are things really better between the US and USSR? Last week things were difficult and now everything is fine. It's changed.

HAK: If you read what I and the President have been saying, we never said we went quite so far as talking about a period of testing. We wanted to be sure positive side would win out. Pressure on us wasn't way to get it anywhere. During the summer Cuba, ceasefire, Berlin air corridors have been worrisome symptoms. But if you read my backgrounders when I spoke about Cuba you have to be careful to avoid getting tactical advantage out of every situation and get ______ of peace. We have had Jordan and other near confrontations and we are trying to convey that if they are prepared to have a fundamental appraisal, we are. They want to get into Cuba but they have given us assurances on Cuba '62 and submarine bases. For your own guidance, if you look at Gromyko's performance yesterday you can see his tone today is more like directed towards the future. That doesn't mean we have come close to an agreement. This is the WH preception.

K: I am told that counts these days.

HAK: Over a period of time it tends to prevail.

K: You think it's a more up-ting tone -- in the future but not in current problems.

HAK: We have major differences and we must seriously at them.

K: And they are willing?

HAK: Yes and if they don't we are not lowering our guard but perhaps some lessons have been learned. We are not claiming anything along that line.

K: I understand.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Kalb/Kissinger

6:10 pm

10/22/70

-2-

HAK: That it's conclusive.

K: From their questions --

HAK: 60/40 on the side of confrontation two weeks ago and now 50/50.

K: That's in the right direction.

HAK: Don't say a WH source said this.

K: No, not at all. On this stuff it's a constant education process.

HAK: When we talk to them and when we act. They may have thought they were getting a jump on us this summer in the M. E. but they learned how precarious this is. Supposing the Israelis had moved? The possibility they would have lost their missiles was great and if Nasser had died in the middle then you can see what they could get out of these. This was within hours of happening. Not short hours but not two weeks either. That's what I mean.

K: Each time we have the impression that the Russians are learning. Long conversations with McNamara. Maybe you are ______ something he started.

HAK: I tell McNamara he would be proud of his students at the SALT talks. I hope some of the things we are trying to do -- Very often when we say things here our audience isn't just in America.

K: In this particular point will the P resident tomorrow pick up themes he enunciated at Hartford?

HAK: He will not respond to Gromyko in kind.

K: I was going through what he said at Hartford and this constant theme --

HAK: If you see what I said on the Cuba thing and what we both said at Hartford, you will have our general philosophy. Don't quote me.

K: Who can?

HAK: Don't say the fellow with the German accent.

K: I never do.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Jim Cannon

9:55 p.m., October 22, 1970

C: Did I understand you to say the other day that you might be able to come to New York and make a speech for Governor Rockefeller?

K: I offered two months before he blew it all with his Vietnam speech on television. It was a disaster.

C: When was this, I didn't see it.

K: I read it in the New York Times today.

C: Oh, you saw it in the Times, I thought you said television. I didn't mention this to him, I wanted to check back with you.

K: What is your proposal?

C: He didn't see how if you can't be quoted and so on that he doubted it would be possible.

K: What I am willing to do, I can meet -- I can do what I did for the President in California. I met with about 200 Los Angeles opinion leaders of which about 2/3 were Jewish. They say that they raised more money than they have ever raised in California before. I can not give a public speech or a campaign speech for him but what I can do is if you can get opinion leaders together or newspaper people or anything at all which can be helpful to the Governor.

C: How did you prevent it from leaking in California?

K: I don't know.

C: They may be a little more honest there.

K: What do you mean, how could I prevent it from leaking. They would be violating an understanding. What do the polls in fact show?

C: I have not seen the new secret polls but the Governor tells me that he is a little better than 2 points ahead but suspect he knows more.

K: They always say the President is secretive but he can't hold a candle to you or the Governor.

C: He is slipping among the Jewish, the voters are voting for Goldberg on a Jewish basis. The Jews do not realize he is their friend.