December 10, 1956

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM TO DR. KISSINGER

FROM: J. I. Coffer

SUBJECT: Comments on Paper Done by Merle Fainsod, "Soviet Internal Developments Over the Next Decade"

1/ SCOPE OF PAPER:

Pages 1-10 outline Stalinist domestic policy, discuss the three basic aspirations of the Soviet people (higher standard of living, greater personal security, and greater functional and individual freedom) and mention the policy of "controlled relaxation" by which the present regime has endeavored to satisfy minimum expectations in these fields without abandoning fundamental devotion to Stalinist goals.

Pages 10-16 cover Soviet policy on industrial growth, outline the factors, such as the system of priorities, the technicalization of Soviet society, and the possible lessening of international tension which may facilitate that growth. Also discussed are factors which may slow up industrial growth, such as shortage of housing and consumer goods, agricultural difficulties and Soviet commitments for economic development abroad. It concludes by pointing out that there probably will be some slowing up in the rate of growth over the next decades and greater concessions to consumer demands, but that industrial growth will still be large.

Pages 17-26 outline the elements composing the Soviet social pyramid (the elite, the state middle class, and the mass of collective farmers and relatively unskilled workers) and suggests that the first two groups are tied to and identify themselves with the regime. While evolution will probably lead to a better educated and more technically oriented elite, this group will be still ideologically committed to the goal of Soviet expansionism. A modest instalment of additional concessions should serve to keep the masses reasonably content.

Pages 27-40 discuss the present oligarchic leadership (which the author thinks may be transformed into a more traditional type of

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authoritarian regime) and outlines political developments such as
decentralization, greater legal protection for the individual, the down-
grading of the security police and the loosening of bonds in many areas
of Soviet life. While ideological militancy may have declined, and
criticism and ferment grown, a rejection of Communist doctrine is
unlikely to transpire over the next decade.

<u>Pages 40-44</u> point out that America can exercise the greatest impact by policies putting maximum pressure on the Soviet economy but will find it difficult to influence Soviet social and political developments. The best means appear to be objective news presentations and enlarged cultural exchange programs.

2/ <u>COMMENTS:</u>

This is a good, brief paper on Soviet developments, which neither
leaves out any major factor nor adds anything significantly new. Fainsod
is very cautious both in his judgments and in his forecasts -- which is
certainly understandable. Offhand, I can suggest no additions nor
changes to the paper, although certain points affecting American policy
(as, for instance, the consequences of a major repulse in the foreign
field) could be discussed at further length during the meeting.

# Soviet Internal Developments Over the Next Decade.

Prognosis in human affairs is a notoriously hazardous enterprise. Man may recognize some of the potentialities of the future, but he would be rash indeed if he professed to know which of them would be realized. Even if he succeeds in identifying the great forces of the past and present which appear to be shaping the future, he cannot be certain that new impulses will not assert themselves which transform the shape of things to come. To predict is to gamble in the incalculable. The reader should be warned that he proceeds at his own risk.

The path to the future is at least partially marked out by commitments inherited from the past, the problems which these commitments generate, and the range of available alternatives which can be drawn upon to deal with these problems. A brief review of the Stalinist legacy of commitments may be useful in setting the stage for a discussion of the future.

The Stalinist impact on Soviet society was many-sided. In the economic sphere, the driving thrust was forced-draft industrialization, and the organizational instruments were the thorough-going nationalization of industry and trade and the collectivization of agriculture. Heavy industry and the armed forces enjoyed a prior claim on all economic resources; the result was a lop-sided economic development in which the consumption sector of the economy was starved to accumulate the capital for economic development and the building of military power. At the same time, industrialization imposed its own imperatives. The crying need for technicians and engineers to man the new industrial plant led to an overhauling

engineers to man the new industrial plant fed to an overburdening
its own imbalances. The arising need for technicians and
military power. At the same time, industrialization imposed
the capital for economic development and the puffing of
consumption sector of the economy was attempted to accumulate
the result was a load-aided economic development in which the
the armed forces enjoyed a prior claim on all economic resources;
and the collectivization of agriculture. Heavy industry and
were the thorough-going nationalization of industry and trade
draft industrialization, and the organizational instruments
aided. In the economic sphere, the driving force was foreseen.

The Stalinist impact on Soviet society was many-
nailed in setting the stage for a discussion of the future.
A prior review of the Stalinist legacy of commitments made to
nationals which can be drawn upon to deal with these problems.
these commitments generate, and the range of available after-
out by commitments identified from the past, the problems which
The basis to the future is at least partially marked
reder should be warned that he proceeds at his own risk.
to come. To predict is to sample in the incongruence. The
will not assert themselves which transform the shape of things
be enabling the future, he cannot be certain that new imbalances
tilting the great forces of the past and present which abate to
which of them would be realized. Even if he succeeds in iden-
tifying the future, put he would be read indeed if he released to know
enterprise. Man may recognize some of the possibilities of
prognosis in human affairs is a notoriously hazardous

Soviet Industrial Developments Over the Next Decade.

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of the educational system, an emphasis on technical training,
and the growth of a new Soviet-trained technical intelligentsia
which played an increasingly important role in keeping the
economy going. Technical dynamism was built into the system,
not only by the emphasis on technical education, but also by
surrounding the career of the engineer and manager with special
privileges, perquisites, and status. Egalitarianism was re-
pudiated as "petty-bourgeois nonsense," and a system of differ-
ential rewards was adopted which tailored wage payments to skill
and productivity, and widened the discrepancies between the
earnings of the technical elite and the labor aristocracy, at
one end of the scale, and the poorly paid mass of unskilled
and semi-skilled workers and collective farmers, at the other.

In the political sphere, forced-draft industrialization and collectivization were enforced by a tightening of the screws, by the development of a full-blown totalitarian regime whose lines of control ultimately converged in the hands of Stalin. The Party became a creature of Stalin's will and lost such policy-determining functions as it once possessed. Its functions were reduced to that of a transmission belt which Stalin used to communicate his directives, to mobilize support for them by propaganda and agitation, and to check on their execution. The secret police increased greatly in importance, though they too remained subservient to Stalin's commands.
The empire over which they presided embraced the forced labor camps, a private army, and a host of agents who penetrated every crevice of the Soviet social structure. The fear which

everly created of the Soviet social structure. The fear which
came, a private army, and a host of agents who benefited
The empire over which theybreached embraced the forced labor
though they too remained adamant to Stalin's commands.
execution. The secret police increased greatly in importance,
for them by propaganda and agitation, and to check on their
Stalin need to communicate his directives, to mobilize and support
functions were reduced to that of a transmittance便 which
such policy-determining functions as it once possessed. Its
Stalin. The party became a crew of Stalin's will and foot
whose lines of control ultimately converged in the hands of
scare, by the development of a full-planned totalitarian regime
and collectivization were enforced by a tightening of the
In the political sphere, forced-draft industrialism-
and semi-skilled workers and collective farmers, at the expense
one end of the scale, and the boordly paid mass of unskilled
earnings of the technical elite and the labor aristocracy, at
and inequality, and widened the discrepancies between the
entire remege was adopted which tailored wage payments to skill
bundled as "petty-poultocla nonenses," and a system of diller-
privileges, berudattes, and atsna. Egalitarianism was re-
announcing the career of the engineer and manager with special
not only by the embrace on technical education, but also by
economy going. Technical dynamism was built into the system,
which bade an increasingly important role in keeping the
and the growth of a new Soviet-trained technical intelligentsia
of the educational system, an embrace on technical training,

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(A)

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they created became the foundation of Stalin's own security;
through them he guarded the loyalty of the Party, the armed
forces, the bureaucracy, the intellectuals, and the mass of
the Soviet population generally. Under the pressure of these
developments, insecurity communicated itself even to Stalin's
closest lieutenants. Such fragments of freedom as persisted
from an earlier period were wholly obliterated. Stalin's
pronouncements became Holy Writ, and ideological discussion
reduced itself to parroting his latest word. Except in the
area of science and technology, and with qualifications even
there, a dry rot settled over Soviet official intellectual life.

In the social sphere Stalin sought to identify
totalitarian rule with the forces of tradition and respectabil-
ity in Russian life. This search for stability and legitimacy
took him along some strange and devious paths. It led to a
drastic reorganization of the educational system, the abandon-
ment of its early experimental and progressive features, and
its transformation into an authoritarian instrument to instill
devotion to the regime and to prepare youth for their appointed
roles in the Soviet hierarchical structure. It manifested
itself in an ostensible restoration of the authority of the
family, in restrictions on abortions, in encouragement of
child-bearing, and in tightening marriage bonds. It produced
an uneasy de facto "concordat" with the church in which the
political loyalty of the clergy was exchanged for a precarious
toleration of religious practices. It expressed itself in a
striking rehabilitation of patriotism as the cohesive force

["striking rehabilitation of barterism as the cooperative force\nformation of religious practices. It expressed itself in a\npolitical loyalty of the elderly was exchanged for a breviums\nan mealy go teto \"concordat\" with the common in which the\nchild-piercing, and in tightening marriage bonds. It brought\nfamily, in restrictions on spousions, in encouragement of\nitself in an ostensible restoration of the authority of the\nroles in the Soviet hierarchical structure. It manifested\ndevotion to the regime and to prepare youth for their abhorred\nits transformation into an authoritarian instrument to instill\nment of its early experiments and progressive themes, and\ndrastic reorganization of the educational system, the apportion-\nook him along some strange and deviant paths. It led to a\nity in Russian file. This search for a stability and firmness\ntotalitarian rule with the forces of tradition and resuscitated\nthere, a dry not settled over Soviet official intellectual file.\nareas of science and technology, and with dualistic even\nreduced itself to bartering his latest word. Except in the\npronouncements became Hofl Writ, and ideological discussion\nfrom an earlier period were wholly omitted. Stalin's\n 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盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟

- 4 -

of Soviet society and sought increasingly to present the Soviet
regime as the legitimate custodian of Russian national interests
and traditions. It induced a new emphasis on law to enforce the
discipline of a rationalized industrial order and to emphasize
the responsibility of the subject to the state.

These developments left their impress on Soviet society.
In some of their aspects -- viz., the consequences of industrial-
ization -- they represent commitments from which Stalin's suc-
cessors can never wholly disengage themselves. But they also
left a legacy of suppressed aspirations with which the new
rulers have had to reckon in greater or lesser degree. A list-
ing of some of these aspirations may be helpful in providing at
least one basis for exploring possible future developments.

First, there was the widespread desire for a higher
standard of life -- for more food and consumer goods at cheaper
prices, for better housing, for more leisure, for more adequate
provision for old age and other disabilities. The most dis-
advantaged groups were the unskilled and semi-skilled workers
and collective farmers, but the pressure for improvement
extended well beyond these groups into the middle and even
relatively privileged upper strata of Soviet society.

Second, there was the desire for greater security,
for a life of stable expectations, for liberation from police
excesses, from the threat of the concentration camp, and the
terror of constant surveillance and control. Perhaps not
altogether paradoxically, the resentment against Stalin's

aftermath barsoxocally, the resentment against Stalin's
terror of constant surveillance and control. Perhaps not
excesses, from the threat of the concentration camp, and the
tor a file of staple exhortations, for liberation from police
second, there was the desire for greater security,
relatively privileged number at the top of Soviet society.

extended well beyond these groups into the middle and even
and collective laborers, put the breeder for improvement
advantaged groups were the unskilled and semi-skilled workers
provision for old age and other disabilities. The most di-
briises, for better housing, for more furniture, for more clothes
at standard of file -- for more food and consumer goods at cheaper
first, there was the widespread desire for a higher
feet one plate for exploring possible future developments.

ing of some of these aspirations may be helpful in providing at
interfer have had to reckon in greater or lesser degree. A first-
felt a j政oh of unbreached aspirations with which the new
cessors can never wholly discharge themselves. But they also
formation -- they repressant commitments from which Stalin's an-
in some of their aspects -- viz., the consequences of industrial-
These developments felt their impact on Soviet society,
the rationalization of the subject to the state.

discipline of a nationalized industrial order and to emphasize
and traditions. It induced a new emphasis on law to enforce the
regime as the legitimate custodian of Russian national interests
of Soviet society and sought increasingly to prevent the Soviet

- 4 -

(M)

- 5 -

system of insecurity was most intense among those who stood
to lose most by arbitrary arrest or removal, though the omni-
present cloud of fear which Stalin's shadow cast penetrated
through the whole of Soviet society.

Third, there were aspirations for greater func-
tional freedom, professional freedom, and even intellectual
freedom. Suppressed though these aspirations were during the
Stalinist period, they were nevertheless fermenting behind the
facade of Stalinist super-centralization and ideological con-
formity. Understandably, these aspirations found their focus
in the new Soviet managerial élite and intelligentsia which
were coming into positions of responsibility and influence
during the latter part of Stalin's reign. The minister and
the party secretary, the bureaucrat and the army officer, the
factory director and the collective farm chairman, the engineer
and the scientist, the professor and the writer, -- each in
his own way dreamed of a wider area of autonomy in which he
would be free to exercise his functional competence without
excessive central control. These aspirations, moreover, in-
volved no overt challenge to the Soviet leadership; in fact
most of those who harbored thoughts of greater independence
and authority operated within a framework of over-all loyalty
to the Soviet system and envisaged such developments as strength-
ening a regime of which, after all, they were an integral part.

The course of events since Stalin's death indicates
that the new rulers are not unaware of these aspirations.

Despite the persistence of many Stalinist residues, the new

Despite the beratateness of many Stalinist resurgents, the new
that the new era are not unwise of these aspirations.

The course of events since Stalin's death indicates
ing a regime of which, after all, they were an integral part.
to the Soviet system and envisaged and developed as a strength-
and authority operated within a framework of overall fiefdom
most of those who purported thoughts of greater independence
involved no overt challenge to the Soviet leadership in fact
excessive central control. These aspirations, moreover, in-
would be free to exercise his functional competence without
his own way dreamed of a wider area of autonomy in which he
and the scientist, the professor and the writer, -- each in
laboratory director and the collective farm chairman, the engineer
the barely secretary, thepmnemonst and the army officer, the
during the latter part of Stalin's reign. The minister and
were coming into positions of reasonableness and influence
in the new Soviet managerial elite and intelligentsia which
formity. Underhandly, these aspirations found their roots
to be of Stalinist urban-centralization and ideology con-
tact of Stalinist period, they were nevertheless terming behind the
freedom. Substantially, though these aspirations were during the
fations of freedom, political freedom, and even intellectual
Third, there were aspirations for greater funo-

through the whole of Soviet society.
braint of clear head which Stalin's shadow cast penetrated
to lose most publicly street or removal, though the omn-
ibus of inaccessibility was most intense among those who stood

- 6 -

leadership has been experimenting with methods of rule which mark a definite departure from the pattern of latter-day Stalinism. At least inside the Soviet Union, there is less emphasis on police surveillance and terror, and more reliance on incentives, the encouragement of initiative, and the assurance of at least a measure of security for the Soviet citizenry. The steps which have been taken in the direction of administrative decentralization and greater operational autonomy for the bureaucracy and economic management, the abandonment of drastic penal sanctions in the enforcement of labor discipline, the turn away from forced labor -- measures such as these appear to represent a recognition on the part of the new rulers that the excessive centralization of the Stalinist system had reached a point of diminishing returns, that efficiency can be more effectively fostered by liberating management from detailed operating controls, and that material incentives are more effective than coercion in stimulating increases in labor productivity. At the same time the new rulers have also adopted a number of measures which are calculated to consolidate support. The small but nevertheless symbolically important year-to-year improvement in living standards, the lifting of the minimum wage to 300 rubles in the cities and 270 rubles in the countryside, the new pension law, the two hour reduction in the working week, the promise that a forty-hour week will be instituted in the course of the Sixth Five Year Plan, the abolition of tuition fees in all educational institutions, the slight

cution fees in all educational institutions, the effort
in the course of the Sixth Five Year Plan, the apportionment of
ing week, the bromide that a forty-hour week will be instituted
age, the new benational law, the two hour reduction in the work-
age to 300 multiples in the cities and 570 multiples in the country-
improvement in living standards, the fitting of the minimum
The small put nevertheless a politically important heart-to-heart
a number of measures which are calculated to consolidate support.
productivity. At the same time the new rules have also adopted
effective than coercion in stimulating increases in labor
operating controls, and that material incentives are more
effectively fostered by flexible management from detailed
a point of diminishing returns, that efficiency can be more
excessive centralization of the Stalinist system had reached
represent a recognition on the part of the new rulers that the
turn away from forced labor -- measures such as these appear to
benefit actions in the enforcement of labor discipline, the
purityism and economic management, the abandonment of chaotic
tive decentralization and greater operational autonomy for the
The steps which have been taken in the direction of administra-
ence of at least a measure of security for the Soviet citizenry.
on incentives, the encouragement of initiative, and the assur-
emphasize on police surveillance and terror, and more reliance
Stalinism. At least inside the Soviet Union, there is less
mark a definite departure from the pattern of latter-day
reignability has been experimenting with methods of rule which

- p -

(M)

- 7 -

loosening of the bonds on scholarly and artistic expression, the opening of a cultural window to the West, the lively discussion in Soviet legal circles of procedural safeguards against arbitrary police action -- these and other signs indicate that the new leadership is not insensitive to the grievances of its constituency, and that willingly or unwillingly, it is responding to aspirations which were greatly suppressed during the Stalinist era. All these developments add up to a modification of the Stalinist system in some important respects; we must recognize in them a potential of change that is not easily halted.

But it should also be noted that under the present policy of "controlled relaxation", much of the fundamental structure of what we have come to identify as Stalinism remains intact. The major domestic policy choices of the new rulers -- the rededication to the heavy industry drive, the decision to tighten agricultural controls by squeezing out the private garden plots and increasing the number of compulsory work days for collective farmers, the reassertion of the supremacy of the Party and the insistence on maintaining its monolithic unity -- all these represent a fundamental devotion to Stalinist goals which the deflation of the Stalin myth cannot wholly obscure. The recently concluded 20th Party Congress too had its Stalinist overtones. The demolition of the Stalin cult was accomplished at a Congress which was stage-managed in the best Stalinist tradition. Not a single discordant note was permitted to mar the sweet harmony of the performance. Calls for a revival of intra-party democracy

performance. Caffs for a revival of intra-party democracy
condent note was permitted to mar the sweet harmony of the
managed in the past Stalinist tradition. Not a single dis-
the Stalin cult was accomplished at a Congress which was stage-
Congress too had its Stalinist overtones. The demotion of
myth cannot wholly overcome. The recently concluded 50th party
devotion to Stalinist cults which the deflation of the Stalin
its monolithic unity -- all these represent a fundamental
the supremacy of the party and the incompatibility on maintaining
bureaucracy work dikes for collective farmers, the possession of
the private garden plots and increasing the number of com-
decision to tighten agricultural controls by agreeing on
rules -- the redempression to the heavy industry drive, the
mainstream. The major domestic policy choices of the new
atmosphere of what we have come to identify as Stalinian re-
policy of "controlled relaxation," much of the fundamental
But it should also be noted that under the precedent
in them a potential of change that is not easily predicted.
Stalinist system in some important respects! we must recognize
era. All these developments add up to a modification of the
to aspirations which were greatly suppressed during the Stalinist
confrontency, and that willingly or unwillingly, it is reasoning
the new leadership is not insensitive to the grievances of its
arbitrary police action -- these and other signs indicate that
occasion in Soviet legal circles of procedural allegations against
the opening of a critical window to the West, the five-year dis-
foaming of the bonds on scholarly and artistic exhortation.

- 1 -

(2)

- 8 -

were combined with warnings that all challenges to the unity
of the Party would be sternly rebuffed. Allegedly erroneous
ideological formulations came in for sharp criticism. Like
Joseph Stalin before him, Khrushchev made clear that deviations
from the Party line would not be tolerated, that the new leader-
ship was determined to preserve the system of Party dictator-
ship, that it remained committed to a program of intensive
industrialization, and that it proposed to continue to press
for the expansion of Communist influence and power in the
world.

There were still other Stalinist reminders. The
assurance that the new regime would put an end to lawlessness
and arbitrariness were coupled with a warning by Khrushchev
that "...distrust for the workers of the State security agencies ...
is incorrect and very harmful," that "enemies have always tried
and will go on trying to hinder the big job of building commun-
ism," and "that we must in every way raise revolutionary vigi-
lance among the Soviet people and strengthen the State security
agencies." The treatment meted out to Beria and his associates
as well as recent events in Hungary may also serve as a reminder
that the new rulers are capable of acting with typical Stalin-
ist dispatch and ruthlessness. Thus the legacy of Stalinism
still casts a long shadow over the Soviet scene.

The contradictory trends which have been set in
motion since Stalin's death reflect the problems which the
new rulers face and the issues which they have to resolve.

new rulers face and the issue which they have to resolve.

a still caustic a long shadow over the Soviet scene.

as well as recent events in Hungary and in the associated

agencies." The treatment meted out to Benia and his associates

fiance among the Soviet people and attituden the State security

law, "and "that we must in every way raise revolutionarily vigil-

and will go on trying to hinder the pig lop of sufficing commu-

nia incorrect and very harmful," that "enemies have always tried

and弧私弧刻ness were coupled with a warning by Khrushchev

anniversary that the new regime would but an end to fawneanees

There were a still other Stalinist reminder. The

world.

for the exhalation of Communist influence and power in the
infiltration, and that it had proved to continue to press
upward, that it remained committed to a program of intensive
work was determined to preserve the status of the party dictation-
from the party line would not be tolerated, that the new leader-
to be by Stalin before him, Khrushchev made clear that deviations
ideological communications came in for sharp criticism. Like
of the party would be sternly repulsed. V fraction was
were combined with warnings that all challenges to the unity

- 8 -

- 9 -

Can they continue to give top priority to a high rate of industrial growth, stressing heavy industry rather than light industry and housing, building power at the expense of welfare? Can they manage a substantial increase in agricultural output without larger investments in agriculture and increased resort to incentives, or will they continue the Stalinist policy of bleeding the countryside to feed the industrial centers? What will be the effect of increasing industrialization and urbanization, class stratification and mass education on Soviet social and political development? Will the Soviet leadership anchor its power on the relatively privileged sectors of Soviet society -- the new state bourgeoisie and technical intelligentsia who are a product of industrialization? Will these groups infiltrate and transform the Party into a mirror of their own aspirations or will the Party domesticate them to its own purposes? Will the present system of collective dictatorship prove a viable system? Can the present leaders shed ideological rigidities and still maintain their authority as the ultimate custodians of orthodox doctrine? Will the present policy of controlled relaxation suffice to hold discontent in check or will it unleash pressures for greater freedom to which the new leaders will feel themselves compelled to respond? Will they permit forces to gather which threaten to undermine their own power, or will they, like Stalin before them, reverse course and apply ruthless repression at the first sign that their authority is imperilled? These questions do not yield self-evident answers, but they may

These creations do not yield self-evident answers, but they may
repression at the first sign that their authority is imberreffed?
like Stalin before them, reverse comae and abbr. rumpless
which threaten to undermine their own power, or will they,
combeffed to rebind? Will they permit forces to gather
Greater freedom to which the new leaders will feel themselves
hold discontent in check or will it unlearn breaches for
Will the present policy of controlled relaxation suffice to
their authority as the ultimate consequences of the Maoist doctrine?
precent leaders used ideological rigour and still maintain
of collective dictation and prove a staple altem? Can the
domesticate them to its own purposes? Will the present altem
into a mirror of their own aspirations or will the party
tion? Will these groups infiltrate and transform the party
technical intelligentsia who are a product of industrializa-
series of Soviet society -- the new state pompeiate and
soviet leadership anchor its power on the relatively privileged
cation on Soviet society and political development? Will the
isation and mobilisation, class attraction and mass equi-
center? What will be the effect of increasing industrial-
policy of pledging the country to feed the industrial
reactor to incentives, or will they continue the Stalinist
output without further investments in agriculture and increased
labor? Can they manage a substantial increase in agricultural
industry and housing, building power at the expense of wel-
industrial growth, spreading heavy industry rather than light
Can they continue to give job priority to a high rate of

- 6 -

(A)

- 10 -

at least serve as a point of departure for an exploration of
future trends.

We begin with the problem of industrial growth and
its self-contained dilemma of Power versus Welfare. The com-
mitment of the present leadership to the priority of heavy
industry was recently vigorously restated by Khrushchev (in
a speech delivered at the plenary session of the Central Com-
mittee on January 25, 1955): "In connection with the measures
lately taken for increasing output of consumers' goods, some
comrades have confused the question of the pace of development
of heavy and light industry in our country.... These pseudo-
theoreticians try to claim that at some stage of socialist
construction the development of heavy industry ceases to be
the main task and that light industry can and should overtake
all other branches of industry. This is profoundly incorrect
reasoning, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism -- nothing
but slander of our party. This is a belching of the rightist
deviation, a regurgitation of views hostile to Leninism, views
which Rykov, Bukharin, and their ilk once preached." What is
interesting about this statement is not only its essential
continuity with past pronouncements of the Stalinist era, but
its indication of an undercurrent of critical challenge to the
policy of neglecting the production of consumer goods. This
challenge can be interpreted as reflecting aspirations which
have been suppressed but which continue to make their presence

have been unsubstantiated but which continue to make their presence
challenge can be interpreted as reflecting aspirations which
bollett of neglecting the production of consumer goods. This
its indication of an undercurrent of critical challenge to the
continuity with beat pronouncements of the Stalinist era, put
interesting about this a statement is not only its essential
which Rykov, Bukharin, and their ilk oncebreached." What if
deviation, a regurgitation of views postulated to Leninism, views
put異dander of our party. This is a defaming of the rightist
reasoning, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism -- nothing
elf other prances of industry. This is profoundly incorrect
the main task and that light industry can and should overtake
construction the development of heavy industry ceases to be
theoreticals try to claim that at some stage of socialist
of heavy and light industry in our country.... These baugo-
comrades have confused the creation of the pace of development
fatefully taken for increasing output of consumers' goods, some
mittee on January 52, 1952): "In connection with the measures
a speech delivered at the binary session of the Central Com-
industry was recently vigorously retested by Khrushchev (in
mitment of the present leadership to the priority of heavy
its self-contained dilemma of power versus Welfare. The com-
We begin with the problem of industrial growth and
future trends.

- 10 -

- 11 -

felt.

What then of the future? Let us start with the factors which support the continuation of a high rate of industrial growth. First, there are the stated commitments of the leadership itself, the political decision to give priority to heavy industry in the Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60), and indeed to continue to give such priority as long as necessary in order to enable the Soviet Union to catch up with, and, if possible, to surpass the industrial power of the West.

A second factor which operates in the direction of supporting a high rate of industrial growth is what may be described as the technicalization of Soviet society, the technical dynamism which has been and is being built into it. The Soviet Union today is a society in which the highest status, prestige, and rewards go to the technical and scientific élite. One of the most preferred careers is that of the engineer. The values of the society are dominated by technical achievements. The curriculum of the schools puts heavy stress on science and mathematics. The educational plans of the government are directed toward building a corps of engineers and scientists which will be superior to that of any other country in the world. In the course of a recent trip to the Soviet Union I was made aware of this technical dynamism at every turn. In the schools, the libraries, and the bookstores it is the technical literature which is in greatest demand. The new buildings of Moscow University are reserved exclusively for the scientific, technical, and mathematical faculties; the old rather run down

["university, and mathematical sciences; the old rather run down\nmathematical, and mathematical sciences; the old rather run down\nmathematic

- 12 -

structures are considered good enough for history, philology, the humanities, philosophy, and the law. A conversation which I had with a group of Soviet leaders emphasized the point. In answer to an observation of mine about the high prestige of lawyers in the United States, Pervukhin, a member of the Presidium, replied: "With us it is very different. Lawyers are much less important. It is the engineers and scientists who are important." I cite the conversation because it emphasizes where the priorities of the Soviet leadership lie.

A third factor which could conceivably ease the problem of maintaining a high rate of growth would be any lessening of international tension which reflected itself in a substantial cut in the Soviet military budget and the diversion of released resources to heavy industry. The weight which one attributes to this factor hangs on a broader appraisal of the prospect for a normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the West over the next decade.

Balanced against these possible developments which favor the continuation of rapid industrialization are other factors which may operate to slow up the growth of Soviet heavy industry. Anyone who visits the Soviet Union today is made immediately conscious of a great shortage of housing and consumer goods. Despite improvements since the end of World War II, the backlog of unsatisfied demands is tremendous, and the pressure from below for an increased share in material goods -- food, consumer goods, and housing -- represents a political factor with which the regime has to reckon. It may

political factor with which the regime has to reckon. It may
Googa -- loog, consumer Googa, and poning -- represents a
the breesme from below for an increased share in materials
Mar. II, the packog of unmaletied demands is tremendous, and
consumer Googa. Despite improvements since the end of World
made immediately consequences of a great shortage of housing and
heavy industry. Anyone who attains the Soviet Union today is
factors which may operate to slow the growth of Soviet
labor the continuation of rapid industrialization are other
Balanced against these possible developments which
Union and the West over the next decade.

the prospect for a normalization of relations between the Soviet
one attributes to this factor range on a broader abbr East of
sion of released resources to heavy industry. The weight which
a substantial out in the Soviet military budget and the given-
reasoning of international tension which reflected itself in
problem of maintaining a high rate of growth would be any

A third factor which could conceivably ease the
where the priorities of the Soviet leadership lie.

are important." I cite the conversation because it emphasizes
much less important. It is the engineers and scientists who
agreed, replied: "With us it is very difficult. Pioneers are
where in the United States, Pennsylvania, a mem of the pre-
In answer to an operation of mine about the high prestige of
I had with a group of Soviet leaders emphasized the point.

the priorities, philosophy, and the law. A conversation which
atmospheres are considered good enough for history, philosophy,

- 15 -

- 13 -

be that this pressure can be controlled by minimal concessions which maintain a gradual upward spiral of year to year improvement, but if such concessions proved inadequate and the regime found itself forced to divert greater resources to housing and consumer goods in order to hold the loyalty of its people, the rate of growth would be adversely affected.

Agricultural difficulties may also serve to impose a brake on Soviet industrial growth. As a result of the shortage of fertile land and the decline in rural manpower reserves, the need for more capital investment in agriculture is likely to intensify over the next decade. The problem of incentives also promises to become more acute. Under Stalin there was a heavy reliance on repression to extract grain from the peasants, but output suffered. His successors have placed greater reliance on incentives in order to stimulate increased output. If they continue to do so, they must also face the problem of producing the goods for which the peasants are clamoring. Here again is a force which may operate to check the growth of Soviet heavy industry.

A third complex of factors which may also contribute to a slower rate of industrial growth arises out of Soviet commitments in the foreign policy area. The growth of polycentrism in the Soviet bloc may have economic consequences which are not wholly favorable to the expansion of Soviet heavy industry. Communist China is launched on its own program of rapid industrialization, and a not altogether insignificant part of the output of Soviet heavy industry may

insignificant part of the output of Soviet heavy industry may
own program of rapid industrialization, and a not altogether
Soviet heavy industry. Communist China is tended on its
audiences which are not wholly favorable to the expansion of
of bohemianism in the Soviet Union may have economic con-
Soviet commitments in the foreign policy areas. The growth
pursue to a slower rate of industrial growth series out of

A third complex of factors which may also contri-
the growth of Soviet heavy industry.

Here again it is a force which may operate to check
problem of brooding the goods for which the beacons are
output. It they continue to do so, they must also face the
Greater reliance on incentives in order to stimulate increased
the beacons, put output altered. His successors have placed
there was a heavy reliance on rehabilitation to extract grain from
incentives also broaches to become more acute. Under Stalin
is likely to intensify over the next decade. The problem of
reserves, the need for more capital investment in agriculture
 shortage of fertile land and the decline in ramsf. manpower
 a brake on Soviet industrial growth. As a result of the

Agrarian difficulties may also serve to impose
rate of growth would be adequately allocated.

consumer goods in order to hold the fadishy of its people, the
longing itself forced to divert greater resources to housing and
ment, put it, such concessions proved insidious and the regime
which maintains a great mass of spirit of labor to bear improve-
pe that this breather can be controlled by minimal concessions

- 13 -

(4)

- 14 -

well have to be reserved for Chinese development if the poli-
tical relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China
are to be all that the Soviet leadership would like them to be.
The so-called People's Democracies of Europe pose a somewhat
analogous problem. The days when they can be milked for Soviet
ends à la Stalin appear to be over. At the very least, the
terms of trade will have to be more favorable to the People's
Democracies than they were earlier. Relationships with the
so-called grey areas -- India, Burma, Indonesia, and the Arab
States -- pose somewhat similar problems. If the Soviet Union
is to continue its policy of pressing for political advantage
by exporting steel mills, hydro-electric plants, and other
heavy industry products to these areas, some diversion of re-
sources from industrial development at home would appear to
be inevitable. To be sure, the present policy may be reversed
or some of its effects may be mitigated by greater imports of
capital goods from the West, but to the extent that it continues
to operate, the claim of the grey areas on Soviet heavy industry
is likely to serve as a brake on Soviet industrial growth.

I indicated earlier that, if international tension
recedes, the Soviet Union may find it possible to divert re-
sources from the armed forces to heavy industry. But there
is another aspect of this problem which merits examination.
Part of the justification for the sacrifices imposed by rapid
industrialization has always been the alleged danger from
without, the fear of capitalist encirclement. If this fear is

without, the fear of capitalist encroachment. It is this fear is
industrialization has always been the alleged danger from
part of the justification for the sacrifices imposed by rabid
hostilities against this problem which merits examination.
sources from the armed forces to heavily industry. But there
reaches, the Soviet Union may find it desirable to divert re-
indicated earlier that, it international tension
is likely to serve as a brake on Soviet industrial growth.
to operate, the aim of the grey areas on Soviet heavy industry
capital goods from the West, put to the extent that it continues
on some of its effects may be mitigated by greater imports of
be inevitable. To be sure, the present budget may be reversed
sources from industrial development at home would abeam to
heavy industry products to these areas, some dimension of re-
pdy exporting steel mills, hydro-electric plants, and other
is to continue its budget of breaching for budgetal advantage
states -- bose somewhat similar problems. It the Soviet Union
so-called grey areas -- India, Eums, Indonesia, and the Arab
Democracies than they were earlier. Relationships with the
terms of trade will have to be more favorable to the people, a
end to a fair Stein abeam to be over. At the end of year, the
unilateral problem. The days when they can be miffed for Soviet
The so-called people's Democracies of Europe base a somewhat
are to be all that the Soviet leadership would like them to be.
toof relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China
well have to be reserved for Chinese development. It the boff-

- 14 -

(A)

- 15 -

allowed to evaporate, the rationale which the regime has used
to try to persuade its people that continued sacrifices are
necessary will become less and less convincing. The pressure
of the populace for more food, housing, consumer goods, and
leisure is likely, not only to mount in intensity, but to be-
come a political force to which concessions may have to be
made. Thus, while normalization of relations may operate to
release resources, it may also have psychological consequences
which force a diversion of these resources toward the consump-
tion sector of the economy. Such a development would, of course,
operate to slow up the rate of growth.

In striking my own balance as to the future, I am
inclined to believe that there will be some slowing up in the
rate of Soviet industrial growth over the next decades. In
coming to this conclusion, I find myself influenced by economic
as well as political calculations. Such information as we
have indicates that the Russians are not as well supplied with
industrial minerals, iron ore and coking coal as their usual
data on reserves suggests. They face a serious problem of
providing additional capital investment to replace worn-out
capital equipment whose maintenance has been neglected. The
large labor reserves which they drew from the countryside dur-
ing the early Five Year Plans are no longer available to the
same degree, and, as has already been indicated, the need for
new capital investment is likely to mount. Moreover, the
earlier advantages which the Russians drew from backwardness,
their ability to borrow the most advanced Western technological

their ability to borrow the most advanced Western technological
earlier advantages which the Russians drew from peckwardsness,
new capital investment is likely to mount. Moreover, the
same degree, and, as has already been indicated, the need for
ing the early five year plans are no longer available to the
largeaxon reserves which they drew from the contrary am-
capital equipment whose maintenance has been neglected. The
broadening additional capital investment to replace worn-out
data on reserves angloats. They face a serious problem of
industrial minerals, iron ore and coking coal as their main
have indicates that the Russians are not as well supplied as
as well as political calculations. Such information as we
coming to this conclusion, I find what left influenced by economic
rate of Soviet industrial growth over the next decade. In
inclined to believe that there will be some slowing up in the
In a striking my own balance as to the future, I am
operate to slow up the rate of growth.

- 12 -

- 16 -

practice, have now lessened, and they must increasingly depend on their own inventiveness for future progress.

Over the long term, they must also reckon with the mounting aspirations of their own people for a higher standard of life. It is, I suppose, not impossible that a future Soviet regime may borrow a leaf from Stalin's book and try to maintain a high rate of industrial growth by rigidly suppressing the claims of agriculture and consumption. But I do not believe that it is very likely, and I expect that over the next decades any Soviet government which seeks to maintain itself in power will have to make broader concessions to the popular desire for a greater share in material welfare. But these concessions may well be modest by our standards, and merely enough to prevent discontent from erupting into open challenge to the regime. While I anticipate some falling off in the rate of Soviet industrial growth, I should also make clear that I do not regard this as ground for complacency. Given the commitments and asserted intentions of the Soviet leadership, we can expect them to continue to give heavy industry priority and to press for as high a rate of growth as they can safely extract from their population. Soviet industrial expansion over the next decade is thus likely to present a continuing challenge which we hardly can afford to ignore.

Another key to the shape of things to come must be sought in the development of social strata in the Soviet Union

sought in the development of social estates in the Soviet Union
Another key to the shape of things to come must be

next decade is time likely to present a continuing challenge
from their population. Soviet industrial expansion over the
years for as high a rate of growth as they can safely extract
them to continue to give heavy industrial priority and to
and asserted intentions of the Soviet leadership, we can ex-
pect this as ground for compromise. Given the commitments
industrial growth, I should also make clear that I do not
while I anticipate some falling off in the rate of Soviet
discontent from embattling into open challenge to the regime.
well be modest as our standards, and merely enough to prevent
greater share in material welfare. But these concessions may
have to make further concessions to the popular desire for a
soviet government which seeks to maintain itself in power will
it is very likely, and I expect that over the next decades any
claims of autroniture and consumption. But I do not believe that
a high rate of industrial growth py rightfully underpinning the
regime may borrow a feat from Stalin's book and try to maintain
of file. It is, I suppose, not impossible that a future Soviet
mounting aspirations of their own beget a higher standard
Over the long term, they must also reckon with the
on their own inventiveness for future progress.

bravery, have now proceeded, and they must increasingly degenerate

- 10 -

- 17 -

and more particularly in the aspirations of those groups which are likely to wield increasing power over the next decades. The Soviet Union has its élite and its submerged masses. But it also has what might be described as a state middle class, which has grown rapidly during the period of industrialization and which is likely to continue to grow in numbers and perhaps in influence over the years ahead. A brief analysis of these social categories may be helpful in setting the framework for a discussion of future social trends.

At the peak of the Soviet social pyramid are various groups which are relatively readily identifiable. First, there is the Party élite headed by the Presidium and including prominent functionaries of the Central Committee secretariat, and leading Party workers in the republics and oblasts. Second, there is the administrative élite, including the ministers, deputies, and chief officials in the Center, the republics, and the oblasts, and also embracing the economic aristocracy of important factory directors and heads of other key enterprises. Third, there is the military élite, the marshals and generals and corresponding ranks in the police hierarchy. Fourth, there is the scientific and technical élite -- the members of the Academies, the heads of technical institutes and other educational institutions, the leading professors and outstanding engineers and scientific workers. Finally, there is the cultural élite, the top writers, journalists, theatre and movie directors, actors, singers, musicians, and other leading craftsmen of the arts.

men of the arts.

directors, actors, singers, musicians, and other leading crafts-
men of elite, the job writers, journalists, theatre and movie
engineers and scientific workers. Finally, there is the en-
tleasant institutions, the feeding broilers and outstanding
Academies, the heads of technical institutes and other equa-
ties, the scientific and technical elite -- the members of the
and corresponding ranks in the police hierarch. Fourth, there
is the literary elite, the magazines and general
important layer directors and heads of other key enterprises.
the opuses, and also embracing the economic stratified of
debutantes, and chief officials in the Center, the nobility, and
there is the administrative elite, including the ministers.
Feeding hard workers in the nobility and opuses. Second,
entymologists of the Central Committee secretary, and
the hard elite headed by the headman and including the com-
manders which are relatively regularly identified. First, there
is the bank of the Soviet socialistлы and aviators
a discussion of future social trends.

social categories may be helpful in setting the framework for
in influence over the heads area. A priori surmises of these
and which is likely to continue to grow in numbers and bands
which has grown rapidly during the period of industrialization
it also has what might be described as a state middle class.
The Soviet Union has its elite and its unemerged masses. But
are likely to see increasing power over the next decades.
and more certainly in the subscriptions of those bands which

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(M)

- 18 -

What these groups have in common are privileges and perquisites, a vested interest in the status quo, and a quite understandable desire to continue to enjoy their positions in safety and security. Their roles differ. The Party, administrative, and military élite are the wielders of power in Soviet society; the scientific, technical, and cultural élite are the repositories of knowledge and special skills which the wielders of power find essential to carry on their responsibilities. It should be stressed, however, that the Soviet élite is a functional rather than a hereditary élite. Its members are, of course, bound together by social ties and they undoubtedly pass on special advantages to their children, but entrance into the élite is still open to talent and it remains a mobile rather than a rigid category.

What I have described as the state middle class is perhaps more difficult to define, but -- at the risk of some arbitrariness -- I would suggest the following categories as eligible for inclusion. In the Party sphere they would include what are known as responsible rather than leading Party workers -- the full time apparatchiki, or officialdom, who man the middle or lower rungs of the Party ladder, who assist leading officials at the center and in the republics and oblasts, who occupy important posts in the district Party organs, and who serve as secretaries of important primary Party organizations in large factories and enterprises. In the administrative sphere the state middle class would presumably include corresponding categories -- responsible but not leading officials in the

categories -- reasonable but not feeding officials in the state middle class would presumably include corresponding factories and enterprises. In the administrative sphere the secretaries of important party organizations in large important boats in the district party organs, and who serve as at the center and in the republics andoplats, who occupy or lower ranks of the party faguet, who assist feeding officials the full time <u>aberration</u>, or <u>officialism</u>, who man the middle what are known as reasonable rather than feeding party workers -- eligible for inflation. In the party sphere they would include secretariases -- I would suggest the following categories as perhaps more difficult to define, put -- at the risk of some what I have described as the state middle class is a more rather than a rigid category.

entrance into the elite is at first open to talent and it remains undoubtedly basic on special advantages to their children, put mampars are, of course, bound together by social ties and they elite is a socioeconomic rather than a political elite. Its difficulties. It should be treated, however, that the Soviet welders of power find essential to carry on their reasonable are the reboattories of knowledge and special skills which the Soviet society, the scientific, technical, and administrative elite safely and security. Their roles differ. The party, equally understandable desire to continue to enjoy their positions in bendrattes, a vested interest in the status quo, and a quite what these groups have in common are privileges and

- 18 -

(A)

- 19 -

central ministries, and bureaucrats who exercise some degree of authority in the republics, oblasts, cities and districts. In industry and trade the category would embrace heads of smaller factories and enterprises, most engineers, senior bookkeepers and accountants, shop heads and foremen, and the better-paid skilled workers. In agriculture it would comprise the chairmen of collective farms, the directors of machine-tractor stations and state farms, and their leading assistants such as agronomists and other technical personnel. In the armed forces it would embrace the officer corps below the level of general, corresponding posts in the police, and perhaps even the regular cadres of non-commissioned officers. In the scientific and technical field it would include the less senior teachers and research workers in the universities and institutes, most doctors, engineers, architects, and other professionally trained technical and scientific personnel. In the cultural area it would embrace directors of schools and tekhnikums, secondary school teachers, most journalists, and the less well-paid workers in art, literature, music and the theatre.

Merely to list these categories is to indicate the amorphous character of what I have called the state middle class. The income differentials are wide-ranging from as little as a thousand rubles a month at one end of the scale to four or five thousand at the other. The differences in responsibility are also great -- running the gamut from the well-paid skilled worker to the manager of a medium-sized

well-bid skilled worker to the manager of a medium-sized
reasonability are also great -- running the farm from the
to four or five thousand at the other. The differences in
little as a thousand times a month at one end of the scale
class. The income differentials are wide-ranging from as
ammonia character of what I have called the state middle
 Merely to list these categories is to indicate the
well-bid workers in art, literature, music and the theatre.
secondary school teachers, most journalists, and the fees
area it would embrace directors of schools and newspapers,
affordably trained technical and scientific personnel. In the cultural
tutea, most doctors, engineers, architects, and other profession-
teachers and research workers in the universities and insti-
entific and technical field it would include the fees senior
the regular salaries of non-commissioned officers. In the sci-
entific forces it would embrace the officer corps below the level
such as agronomists and other technical personnel. In the
tractor stations and state farms, and their feeding assistants
the chairmen of collective farms, the directors of machine-
poolkeepers and accountants, shop heads and foremen, and the
smelter factories and enterprises, most engineers, senior
in industry and trade the category would embrace heads of
of authority in the republic, opfata, cities and districts,
central ministries, and municipalities who exercise some degree

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(M)

- 20

enterprise, from a junior lieutenant to army colonel. Yet there are certain common characteristics which may justify us in treating this miscellany as part of the state middle class. Characterizing the group are certain common denominators -- an income usually well above the Soviet average, some degree of special skill or professional training, the expectation that such skill and training will receive special recognition, and the subjective consciousness of forming part of a group which in some sense at least has lifted itself above the rank and file of Soviet citizens.

Dangerous as it is to try to formulate the aspirations of a group as diverse as the new state middle class, it still seems to me that certain general observations may be ventured.

First, it is worth noting that this is the group from which the élite of the future will be largely recruited. In its younger age ranges, at least, are the reserves of talent from which future leadership will be drawn. The eyes of the most ambitious members of the group are directed upward -- toward the élite categories which they hope to penetrate.

Second, the members of the group have tasted a little of the flesh pots of power, but only a little, and they would like more. They are by and large grateful for what they have received, but at the same time not satisfied to stand still. In sociological jargon, they are upwardly mobile, with aspirations which reach beyond their present status -- both in terms

tions which reach beyond their present status -- both in terms
of sociological jargon, fuel are nihandly mope, with abstra-
reception, put at the same time not satisfied to attend still.
like more. They are p and farge grateful for what they have
of the few bot of power, put only a little, and they would
Second, the members of the group have tested a little
and -- toward the elite categories which they probe to penetrate.
of the most ambitious members of the group are directed mb-
talent from which future fersenial will be drawn. The ones
In its longer age ranges, at least, are the reserves of
from which the elite of the future will be largely recruited.
First, it is worth noting that this is the group
begun.

Still seems to me that certain General operations may be
tions of a group as diverse as the new state middle class, it
Dangerous as it is to try to formulate the abstra-
tive of Soviet citizens.

in some sense at least has fitted itself up with the rank and
the subjective conceptions of forming part of a group which
now skill and training will receive special recognition, and
special skill or professional training, the expectation that
income normally well above the Soviet average, some degree of
characterizing the group are certain common denominators -- an
in meeting this miscellany as part of the state middle class.
there are certain common characteristics which may justly na-
enterprise, from a junior lieutenant to annd colonel. Yet

- 50

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of responsibility and well-being. They represent a force
with which the leaders of the regime must reckon.

Third, while most members of this group identify
with the regime, think of themselves as good Soviet patriots,
and pay at least lip service to the official ideology, by
and large they are far less ideologically motivated than the
first revolutionary generation. They are people who have
inherited a going concern, who have been trained in techno-
cratic values, and who are engaged for the most part in prac-
tical tasks, and reflect this in their pragmatic orientation.
They tend to look for material compensation in the here and
now and are less inclined to sacrifice the present for an in-
definable future. Like most members of the élite, they want
relief from the fears and uncertainties of the Stalinist period.
They yearn for security and stability, for safeguards against
arbitrary interference with their careers and life prospects.

Fourth, scattered through this group, particularly
among the students and intellectuals, are some whose aspira-
tions reach higher, who yearn for greater intellectual and
even political freedom, who are cynical about official ortho-
doxies, and who are reaching out for much more liberty than
the regime has shown itself thus far prepared to grant. But
these attitudes do not appear to be typical. Despite inner
doubts which have been reinforced by the shocking revelations
of Khrushchev's secret speech, even the more sceptically-
inclined students and younger intellectuals tend to be cautious
as far as action is concerned. They show no great faith in

as far as action is concerned. They show no great lack in inclined students and homberg intelectuals tend to be cautions of khrushchev's secret speech, even the more acrobatically corrupt which have been reinforced by the shocking revelations these attitudes do not appear to be typical. Despite inner the regime has shown itself far better prepared to grant. But dummies, and who are reaching out for much more flexibility than even political freedom, who are ethical spont official ortopions reach higher, who beam for greater intellectual and among the students and intelectuals, are some whose cabins homberg scattered through this bomb, briefly arbitrary interference with their careers and file broadsjects. They beam for security and adelfity, for tolerances against relief from the lens and morthinities of the statinat period. delinquent future. like most members of the elite, they want now and are less inclined to sacrifice the present for an in-They tend to look for material combination in the here and tical tasks, and reflect this in their pragmatic orientation. cratic values, and who are engaged for the most part in mac-erated a going concern, who have been trained in techno-tariat revolutionry Generation. They are people who have and large parts are far less ideologically motivated than the and bad at least like a service to the official ideology, by with the regime, think of themselves as good Soviet patriots, Third, while most members of this group identify with which the leaders of the regime must reckon. of reasonableness and well-being. They represent a force

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- 22 -

the present leadership but also no disposition to challenge it.

At the bottom of the Soviet social scale, and in
numbers still constituting the great majority of the population,
lies the great mass of collective farmers, unskilled and semi-
skilled workers, and the clerical and service personnel en-
gaged in routine operations requiring little skill or training.
In terms of status the white collar employees rank above the
manual laborers, and the latter in turn above the ordinary
collective farmers. What they share in common is an income
well below the national average and a standard of life which,
despite improvements in recent years, is still not far from
the margin of subsistence. For many members of this group
the regime is "they" and not "we" and though they rally around
it in moments of national danger such as World War II and even
dutifully applaud when it grants favors such as the new pension
law, minimum wage, and shortening of working hours, the regime
remains something which is endured rather than loved, a weight
on their backs rather than a recognized champion of their in-
terests. For some members of this group or their children
there is the hope that they can use the educational ladder to
climb into the state middle class, and the regime's insistent
need for more skilled workers gives reality to these aspira-
tions. For the most part, the submerged masses of Soviet
society are too busy keeping body and soul together to have
time left for political interests. One hears them grumble
and complain, but it is difficult to detect any revolutionary
dynamism among them. It may be that their demands will sharpen

dynamism among them. It may be that their demands will arise
and complain, put it is difficult to detect and revolutionary
time felt for political interests. One hears them grumble
society are so push keeping body and aim together to have
fionsa. For the most part, the emerged masses of Soviet
need for more skilled workers gives reality to these aires-
climp into the state middle class, and the regime's insatent
there is the hope that they can use the equations of fad to
ferents. For some members of this group or their children
on their packs rather than a recognized champion of their in-
nown something which is endured rather than loved, a weight
law, minimum wage, and shortening of working hours, the regime
quickly aband when it grants favors and as the new benel on
it in moments of national danger such as World War II and even
the regime is "they" and not "we" and though they reify around
the margin of anapatence. For many members of this group
gebite improvements in recent years, is a still not far from
well below the national average and a standard of life which,
colective tamers. What they are in common is an income
manual Japanera, and the latter in turn above the ordinary
In terms of status the white collar employees rank above the
gaged in routine operations requiring little skill or training.
skilled workers, and the clerical and service personnel en-
filed the Great mass of collective tamers, skilled and semi-
numpers still constituting the Great majority of the population,
At the bottom of the Soviet social scale, and in
the present leadership put also no opposition to challenge it.

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(M)

- 23 -

as their level of education rises. But for the time being they
appear quiescent, and it seems not unlikely that they will re-
main so, provided that the regime is able and willing to pro-
vide improvements in living standards and thus maintain a sense
of forward momentum.

In analyzing the evolution of the Soviet social
structure over the next decade, one is inevitably forced to
make assumptions about the setting in which that evolution will
take place. I assume that there are unlikely to be profound
social convulsions in the USSR short of defeat in war and that
we face a period in which Soviet foreign policy is likely to
become more active and aggressive on many fronts but to stop
short of precipitating an all-out nuclear war. In such a con-
text I would also assume that the élite categories which I have
sketched above are likely to continue at the helm of Soviet
society. At the same time some changes in their character are
to be anticipated. The new recruits to the élite are likely
to be better-educated than their predecessors and to be more
technically oriented in their training and experience. Over
time the composition of the top Party leadership will probably
reflect this technical bias, and one may expect as a by-product
an increasing degree of mobility and interchangeability in
assignments to top Party and administrative posts. The assimi-
lation of professional, military and production talent into the
leading circles of the Party will probably continue, and their
diverse interests are likely to find expression within the
Party, rather than outside it.

bady, rather than outside it.

diverse interests are likely to find expression within the
fleshing circles of the party will properly continue, and their
formation of brotherhood, military and commercial talent into the
assemblies to do party and administrative work. The seal-
an increasing degree of mobility and interchangesplicity in
reflect this technical idea, and one may expect as a pre-broader
time the combination of the job party leadership will properly
technically oriented in their training and experience. Over
to be better-educated than their predecessors and to be more
to be anticipated. The new recruits to the elite are likely
society. At the same time some changes in their character are
sketched above are likely to continue at the helm of Soviet
text I would also assume that the elite categories which I have
apprt of brochising an all-out enemy war. In such a con-
pense more active and aggressive on many fronts put to a job
we face a period in which Soviet foreign policy is likely to
social conversations in the U2S8 short of defeat in war and that
take place. I assume that there are unlikely to be broiling
make assumptions about the setting in which that evolution will
attract me over the next decade, one is inevitably forced to
In amplifying the evolution of the Soviet social
of forward momentum.

above improvements in living standards and thus maintain a sense
main so, provided that the regime is able and willing to bro-
subject duiescent, and it seems not unlikely that they will re-
see their level of education rises. But for the time being they

- 53 -

(4)

- 24 -

One of the interesting problems raised by such a de-
velopment is its possible effect on Party doctrine and Party
policies. If the Party itself becomes an arena in which
production and military experts exercise increasing influence,
should we expect that calculations of efficiency and economic
and military strength will weigh more heavily in top Party
councils? Are we likely to witness a relativization of Party
dogma and the emergence of more pragmatic criteria in regulating
decision-making? Or will the result be merely to ensure that
ideologically-determined goals and ends are pursued by more
rational means? Important as these questions are, no ready
answers are apparent. Perhaps all that we are justified in
saying is that the erosion of Party doctrine is likely at best
to be a long-term process. Over the short run -- and that in-
cludes the next decade -- we must count on a leadership that is
still ideologically committed to the goal of Soviet expansionism,
however much its decisions may be tempered by rational and
technical calculations which reflect a rising level of educa-
tional and industrial sophistication.

The impact of industrialization and urbanization is
also likely to be registered in the growing size and importance
of the state middle class, and more particularly the technical
intelligentsia among them. Their aspirations have already
been noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a reduc-
tion of arbitrariness and political interference in carrying
on their activities, and, in the case of some of the intellectuals
at least, a yearning for greater freedom. The central issue

["at least, a享有for greater freedom. The central idea\nof their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nalso likely to be registered in the growing size and importance\nof the state, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some of the intelectuums\non the subject, middle class, and more certainly the technical\nintellectuals among them. Their aspirations have already\nbeen noted -- more in the way of material rewards, a regime\nof education and political interference in carrying\nout of education and political interference in carrying\non their activities, and, in the case of some

- 25 -

here is the extent to which the Soviet leadership will be pre-
pared to minister to these aspirations. Since the loyalty of
this group is crucial to the survival of the Soviet system,
one would expect on a priori grounds that the leadership would
be concerned with keeping its members reasonably content. But
the problem is not so simple. The Soviet High Command cannot
relax its demands on this group without losing some of the
dynamism which it needs to maintain rapid industrial progress.
If it permits too much freedom, it runs the risk of creating
challenges to its own leadership. The policy of "controlled
relaxation" on which the post-Stalinist leadership has embarked
implies both "controls" and "relaxation," and the two are not
easily reconcilable. How the dilemma will be resolved is by
no means clear, but the experience thus far provides a grim
reminder that there are limits to relaxation. The Soviet
leadership may woo the state middle class by providing it with
more adequate incentives, by giving it a greater assurance of
security than it enjoyed under Stalin, by granting it somewhat
broader functional autonomy in the interest of more efficient
operations, and by holding out a sense of expanding vistas for
the ambitious. But we should not expect the Soviet leaders to
dismantle their machinery of Party and police controls, and we
can anticipate that they will be ruthless in suppressing any
form of dissent which raises a political challenge to the en-
trenched position of the leadership itself. Whether this
pattern of concessions and control will satisfy the aspirations

batter of concessions and control will satisfy the aspirations
truncated position of the leadership itself. Whether this
tform of dissent which raises a political challenge to the en-
can anticipate that they will be met with in approaching and
dramatic their machinery of hard and police controls, and we
the ambitions. But we should not expect the Soviet leaders to
operations, and by holding out a sense of expanding via as ton
profoundly unfunctional autonomy in the interest of more efficient
acquity than it entailed under Stalin, by granting it somewhat
more adequate incentives, by giving it a greater assurance of
leadership may woo the state middle class by broadening it with
remind that there are limits to relaxation. The Soviet
no means clear, but the experience thus far provides a firm
easily reconciliable. How the dilemma will be resolved is by
imples both "controls" and "relaxation," and the two are not
relaxation" on which the best-stimulant leadership has embarked
challenges to its own leadership. The policy of "controlled
It it be written too much freedom, it may be the risk of creating
dynamism which it needs to maintain rapid industrial progress.
relax its demands on this group without forcing some of the
the problem is not so simple. The Soviet High Command cannot
be concerned with keeping its members a reasonably content. But
one would expect on a prior basis that the leadership would
this group is crucial to the survival of the Soviet system,
bared to minuten to these aspirations. Since the foly of
here is the extent to which the Soviet leadership will be bue-

(N)

- 52 -

- 26 -

of the state middle class remains to be seen. One suspects
that it will be more effective in the short than in the long run.

When one turns to the Soviet rank and file -- the
great mass of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, peasants,
and employees -- the crucial factors in appraising future
developments appear to be four: (1) the willingness of the
masses to continue to tolerate the burdens which have been
imposed on them, (2) the possible effect of universal elementary
education in stimulating and raising their aspirations,
and
(3) the ability of the regime to be ruthless in suppressing
dissatisfaction, and (4) its willingness, if necessary, to
temper its demands on the masses, even at the price of some
slackening in the rate of growth. All of these factors in-
volve elements of the imponderable, but here again the long
term perspective is one of increased pressure from below for a
greater share in material well-being. This does not mean that
such pressure cannot be suppressed or controlled; it does mean
that the regime runs greater risks of popular upheaval if it
postpones its concessions too long. One must assume on the
basis of the measures already announced that the post-Stalinist
leadership is not unaware of these considerations. A modest in-
stallment of additional concessions can be anticipated over the
next decade, enough to hold discontent in check but not so large
as to impose a serious brake on the regime's industrialization
program.

We turn next to political developments in the Soviet

We turn next to political developments in the Soviet
program.

As to imitate a serious prance on the regime's inhumanity
next decade, enough to hold discontent in check but not so large
attribution of additional concessions can be anticipated over the
federated is not maware of these considerations. A modest in-
pulse of the masses already announced that the boat-stallant
boatbome its concessions too long. One must assume on the
that the regime runs greater risks of becoming more radical if it
and yet breesme cannot be subordinated or controlled; it goes mean
greater harm in material well-being. This does not mean that
term barabacive is one of increased breesme from below for a
diverse elements of the imbonderable, put here again the long
enlarging in the rate of growth. If of these factors in-
tender its demands on the masses, even at the price of some
disaufiation, and if its whifhueness, it necessarily, to
(3) the ability of the regime to be responsible in subduing
education in animating and relating their aspirations, and
impose on them, (5) the bosom effect of universal elementary
masses to continue to tolerate the pungency which have been
developments appear to beTom: (1) the whifhueness of the
and employees -- the crucial factor in subduing them
great mass of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, besides
When one turns to the Soviet rank and life -- the
that it will be more effective in the short than in the long run.
of the state middle class remains to be seen. One aspect

- 50 -

(A)

- 27 -

Union during the next decade. First, there is the problem of leadership. At the present time the Soviet Union is governed by an oligarchy composed of members of the Presidium circle. Within the Presidium there appear to be gradations of influence and power, but the information available to outside observers does not permit a precise statement of the relationships which prevail among the oligarchs. The attack on Stalin and on the cult of the individual may be interpreted as an effort to raise a barricade against the emergence of another Stalinesque figure, but the question remains as to whether collective dictatorship is a viable system of rule in Soviet society, or whether it must be regarded as a transitional form giving way eventually either to one man dominance or a further deconcentration of power.

It may be helpful to state some of the conditions under which an oligarchy can sustain itself. An oligarchy may attain a degree of stability where the oligarchs are bound together by common dangers, common interests, and common purposes which outweigh their individual interests, where none of the oligarchs possesses the ability, prestige, and authority to stake out a claim to supremacy, and where power is so dispersed among the oligarchs as to make it dangerous for any of them to try to dominate the rest. On the other hand, the stability of the oligarchy is endangered when one of the oligarchs emerges as the leading figure in the group and gathers sufficient power into his own hands to be able to intimidate or purge his colleagues. The stability of the

intimidate or bungee his colleagues. The stability of the
Gagarin auxiliary power into his own hands to be able to
offshore emerges as the leading figure in the Group and
stability of the oligarchy is endangered when one of the
of them to try to dominate the rest. On the other hand, the
disembarked among the oligarchs as to make it dangerous for and
it to take out a claim to autonomy, and where power is so
of the oligarchs boases the ability, breath, and authority
boasts which outweigh their individual interests, where none
gether, by common danger, common interests, and common bu-
atten a degree of stability where the oligarchs are bound to-
mage which an oligarchy can attain itself. An oligarchy may
it may be helpful to state some of the conditions
further concentration of power.
from giving way eventually either to one man dominance or a
society, or whether it must be regarded as a transitional
collective dictatorship is a viable system of rule in Soviet
Stalinpure figure, put the question remains as to whether
effort to raise a pandemic against the emergence of another
and on the part of the individual may be interpreted as an
action which breaks off among the oligarchs. The attack on Stalin
servers does not permit a precise statement of the relation-
ence and power, but the information available to outside op-
within the Stalinium there appear to be precedents of infl-
pus an oligarchy compounded of members of the Stalinium circle,
leadership. At the present time the Soviet Union is governed
Union during the next decade. First, there is the problem of

- 51 -

(A)

- 23 -

oligarchy may also be threatened where deep policy differ-
ences divide the oligarchs and differences cannot be re-
solved except by suppressing or exterminating one or another
of the antagonistic forces. An oligarchy may also be under-
mined by deadlock among the oligarchs, by the weakness and
indecision which flow from their inability to agree on a
common program or pursue a common course of action.

What is the relevance of these considerations in
the Soviet scene? Since the death of Stalin we have witnessed
the execution of one oligarch -- Beria -- who presumably re-
presented a threat to all the rest, and the demotion of two
others -- Malenkov and Molotov -- though the latter two still
remain part of the Presidium circle and may conceivably re-
emerge as important figures. We have also witnessed a rise in
the status of two others -- Khrushchev and Bulganin -- who
under Stalin would have been considered secondary Politburo
figures compared with Molotov, Malenkov, and Beria. At the
same time it is difficult to label any one of the present
oligarchs as a clear successor to Stalin. Khrushchev as First
Party Secretary occupies the post from which Stalin staked out
his claim to supremacy, but whether Khrushchev has either the
ability, the ambition, or the opportunity to use the post as
Stalin used it is still far from clear.

Nor are we better informed about the play of opinion
within the Presidium. The issues which agitate the Presidium
are rarely publicly ventilated and only rise to full visibility

are rarely sufficiently ventilated and only rise to full airspeed
within the preflight. The fumes which agitate the preflight
may be we reported above the bird of opinion
need it is a still far too clean.

apidity, the amplitude, or the opportunity to use the boat as
the claim to authentication, put whether Khranacheva has either the
party Secretary coexists the boat from which Stalin asked out
offshore as a clear successor to Stalin. Khranacheva as first
same time it is difficult to jape! any one of the present
Lignes combined with Molotov, Malenkov, and Beria. At the
under Stalin would have been considered secondarily after him
the status of two others -- Khranacheva and Bilibin -- who
emerge as important lignes. We have also witnessed a rise in
remain part of the preflight circle and we shall conceivably re-
quire others -- Malenkov and Molotov -- though the latter two still
presented a threat to all the rest, and the demotion of two
the execution of one officer -- Beria -- who breakfasted re-
the Soviet scene? Since the death of Stalin we have witnessed
What is the relevance of these considerations in
common program or binary a common concept of action.
Indecisive which flow from their insufficiency to agree on a
mined dy deadlock among the officers, dy the weakness and
of the antiairantiqtioneers. An officer may also be under-
soaked except dy subduing or exterminating one or another
encage division the officers and differences cannot be re-
offshore may also be threatened where dead body hit filler-

- 50 -

(4)

- 29 -

after they have been resolved. We have heard much in recent
weeks about the sharp differences which allegedly divide
Stalinists and anti-Stalinists in the Presidium, but we cannot
document them in detail, and we must wait for events to provide
corroboration or denial. In such circumstances, the course of
prudence is to admit our ignorance, to be aware of the historical
instability of oligarchies, while at the same time recognizing
that collective dictatorship may persist for years simply be-
cause no other alternative is feasible in the context of Pre-
sidium inter-relationships. Nor should we dogmatically assume
that oligarchical rule will necessarily contribute to a weaken-
ing of the regime. The deliberations of a collective group may
introduce a range of considerations which make for sounder de-
cisions than the whims of an all-powerful despot. The division
of power within the oligarchy may insure more effective repre-
sentation of the plurality of interests in Soviet society and
thus actually broaden its base of support. Should an oligarch-
ical form of rule succeed in stabilizing itself over a long
enough period, it may open up perspectives of development of
which even the present oligarchs may be only dimly aware.
Let me make myself clear. I see little or no possibility
that the Soviet system will evolve in the direction of the
Western democratic model. I think I see at least a dim possi-
bility that a totalitarian system which is oligarchically
governed may be transformed over the years into a more tradi-
tional type of authoritarian regime which provides at least
some safeguards for the rights of individuals and groups and

some safeguards for the rights of individuals and groups and
families of the authoritarian regime which provides at least
Governed may be transformed over the years into a more tradi-
plicity that a totalitarian state which is oligarchically
Western democratic model. I think I see at least a dim hope-
that the Soviet atom will evolve in the direction of the
Let us make myself clear. I see little or no possibility
which even the recent oligarch may be only dimly aware.
enough period, it may be now perhaps of development of
its form of rule announced in apoizing itself over a long
time actually broaden its base of support. Should an oligarch-
ament of the bigness of interests in Soviet society and
of power within the oligarchy may arise more effective repre-
cations than the minus of an all-potent despot. The division
introduce a range of considerations which make for stronger ge-
ing of the regime. The delimitations of a collective group may
that of the hierarchical rule will necessarily contribute to a weaken-
ing inter-relationship. Nor should we dogmatically assume
cause no other alternative is feasible in the context of the pre-
that collective dictatorship may be best at least because simgly pe-
insplicity of oligarchies, while at the same time recognizing
bravery is to admit own ignorance, to be aware of the preferred
correspondence or consensus. In such circumstances, the cause of
document them in detail, and we must wait for events to provide
statinata and anti- statinata in the future, put we cannot
weeks apart the sharp differences which allegedly arise
after they have been resolved. We have heard much in recent

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(N)

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makes some adjustment to the plural energies which run in
Soviet society. Yet even this admittedly hopeful and optim-
istic prospect may easily be dashed to earth if the oligarchs
become frightened at the consequences of their own concessions
and reinvoke totalitarian controls as the only secure founda-
tion of their collective power.

As one tries to visualize political developments in
the Soviet Union over the next decade, the prospects of freedom
in the Western sense appear far from bright. Short of revolu-
tion, it is difficult to imagine the Soviet Union abandoning
the one party system, and the insistence of Stalin's successors
on maintaining the monolithic unity of the Party gives little
ground for hope that legalized factions will be permitted to
operate freely within the Party. Yet it is possible to paint
too sombre a picture. Political changes have taken place
since Stalin's death, and though they may not be of major sig-
nificance, cumulatively some of them move in a hopeful direc-
tion. Within the Party itself, authority at the top is more
dispersed, and the Central Committee, which was reduced to a
nullity in Stalin's day, at least meets with some regularity,
and presumably plays a more active role. The campaign for
the so-called "democratization" of Party life up to this point
has largely been confined to a call for wider participation
of members in Party meetings, adherence to the forms of elec-
tions in choosing Party officialdom, and more frequent and

tions in choosing party officials, and more frequent and
of members in party meetings, adherence to the forms of efficacy
has largely been confined to a few lon wider barteries
the so-called "democratization" of party file as to this point
and broadly plays a more active role. The campaign for
unify in Stalin's day, at least meets with some regularity,
disagreed, and the Central Committee, which was reduced to a
tion. Within the party itself, authority at the top is more
unanimous, cumulatively some of them move in a pattern direc-
sion. Stalin's death, and though they may not be of major sig-
too some a biome. Political changes have taken place
operative freely within the party. Yet it is possible to find
ground for hope that egalized sections will be permitted to
on maintaining the monolithic unity of the party gives little
the one party atom, and the instance of Stalin's successors
in the Western sense abhor from bright. Short of reorgan-
ing the Soviet Union over the next decade, the broadees of freedom
As one tries to idealize political developments in
tion of their collective power.

and reenforce totalitarian controls at the only scene to come
uprighted at the consequences of their own concessions
to the broadees easily be gained to each of the oligarchs
Soviet society. Yet even this admittedly Petrov and optim-
mizes some adjustment to the brutal energies which run in

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regular meetings of Party bureaus and other Party organs.
Nothing that has happened thus far indicates any impairment
of central control over the Party rank-and-file, but it must
at least be recognized that even a very limited "democratiza-
tion" of Party life contains some potential of criticism from
below and freer discussion.

There are also changes in the governmental area which
need to be noted. So far the effort to activize and breath new
life into the work of the Soviets has largely taken the form
of newspaper articles criticizing local legislative bodies for
meeting irregularly and failing to evoke genuinely spontaneous
participation by elected representatives. There have even been
rumors, so far not officially confirmed, that the electoral
system is to be revised to permit more than one candidate for
the same public office. The significance of such changes is,
of course, limited by the fact of over-all Party control of
nominations and the proceedings of all legislative bodies.

More important is the recent trend toward adminis-
trative decentralization of governmental operations -- the
transformation of all-union ministries into union-republic
ministries, of union-republic ministries into republic min-
istries, and the delegation of greater operational authority
to local planning bodies, factory managers, and chairmen of
collective farms. These measures should probably be viewed
as primarily directed toward correcting the excessive over-
centralization of the Stalinist era, as designed to revive
initiative in the lower ranks of the State bureaucracy and

initiative in the lower ranks of the state pcnscnomy and
centralisation of the Staliniat era, as designed to revive
as bimarily directed toward correcting the excessive over-
collective tama. These measures should properly be viewed
to focal planning bodies, factory managers, and operators of
ministries, and the delegation of greater operational authority
to central control of the state pcnscnomy and other party organs.

of course, limited by the fact of over-all party control of
the same hupbic office. The significance of such changes is,
system is to be revised to permit more than one candidate for
nomination, so far not officially confirmed, that the electoral
busticipation by elected representatives. There have even been
meeting irregularly and taiting to evoke generally bounteous
of newspaper articles criticizing local legislative bodies for
file into the work of the Soviet has largely taken the form
need to be noted. So far the effort to activize and preach new
below and green discussion.

tion of party file contains some potentiel of criticism from
at least be recognized that even a very limited "democratisa-
tion of central control over the party rank-and-file", put it must
Nothing that has happened thus far indicates any impairment
regular meetings of party conferences and other party orgames.

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to stimulate more efficient operations. But delegation of
power always involves some risks of weakening or undermining
central controls, and the question remains whether the unify-
ing discipline of the Party can be trusted to hold dispersive
tendencies in check.

Perhaps the most dramatic changes thus far have taken
place in the legal area. The amnesty decrees, the release of
thousands of prisoners from the forced labor camps, the aboli-
tion of the Special Commission of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, the rehabilitation, frequently posthumous, of many
persons condemned as enemies of the people during and after the
Great Purge, the new decree on the Procuracy, the repudiation of
the practice of pronouncing persons guilty of serious crimes
solely on the basis of personal confessions, the proposed
reforms of the Criminal Code -- these and other measures have
been saluted as marking a new era of "Socialist legality" in
Soviet affairs. What significance shall we attach to them?
Are they the first faint beginnings of the evolution of the
Soviet regime toward some form of Rechtstaat? Or shall we
look to recent events in Hungary as an indication that self-
imposed legal norms will be ruthlessly swept aside whenever
the regime feels that its authority is imperilled?

Closely tied in with the fate of legal safeguards
on the Soviet scene is the future role of the security police.
Since the liquidation of Beria, the security police has appar-
ently declined in status and influence. Its powers have been

entirely declined in status and influence. Its powers have been
since the liquidation of Beria, the security police has aban-
oned the Soviet scene in the future role of the security police.

Closely tied in with the late of legal safeguards
the regime feels that its authority is imperiled.

Imposed legal norms will be ruthlessly swept aside whenever
took to recent events in Hungary as an indication that self-
Soviet regime toward some form of Rechtsstaat? Or shall we
Vhere they let out last beginnings of the evolution of the
Soviet states. What significance shall we attach to them?
been imposed as marking a new era of "Socialist legality" in
reforms of the Criminal Code -- these and other measures have
solely on the part of personnel conceptions, the brooched
the practice of honminating persons gruffly of serious crimes
Great Britain, the new decree on the Proclamation, the repudiation of
persons condemned as enemies of the people ruling and after the
Vultures, the repudiation, trendfully bohemonic, of many
tion of the Special Commission of the Ministry of Internat-
tional of prisoners from the forced labor camps, the spoli-
brake in the legal area. The amnesty decrees, the release of

Perhaps the most dramatic changes thus far have taken
tendencies in shock.

ing discipline of the party can be trusted to hold disApprove
central controls, and the direction remains when the multi-
power always involves some risks of weakening or undermining
to stimulate more efficient operations. But delegation of

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pruned, and the Party, according to Soviet reports, has re-
established control of the police at all echelons. Never-
theless, (under a new set of initials, the KGB, and under a
new boss, General Serov) the security police remains a for-
midable power in reserve, and no less a figure than Khrushchev
felt impelled at the 20th Party Congress to pay tribute to the
essentiality of the police and to call for a strengthening of
its authority. While such sentiments persist, the future of
"socialist legality" must be regarded at best as precarious.

The post-Beria decline in the status of the security
police has been accompanied by many indications of the ris-
ing importance of the military on the Soviet scene. Perhaps
the most obvious is the return of Zhukov to a position of
prominence and his inclusion in the Presidium circle. Indeed,
these developments have unleashed a flood of speculation re-
volving around the proposition that the army may replace the
Party as the dominant force in Soviet society, and that
Zhukov, or some equivalent military figure, is likely to emerge
as the supreme leader, or dictator. While such a possibility
cannot be excluded, (particularly if a virulent struggle for
the succession ushers in a period of confusion or if the Party
leadership faces a debacle) on the whole, it seems to me remote,
at least so long as the professional esprit de corps of the
armed forces is tempered by Party indoctrination and penetrated
by Party controls. What seems to me more probable, at least as
long as collective dictatorship persists, is that the loyalty of
the military high command will remain a matter of anxious concern

the military high command will remain a matter of anxious concern
long as collective dictators like beratats, is that the fokspak of
pl party controls. What seems to me more probable, at least as
armed forces is tempered pl party indoctrination and penetrated
at least so long as the professional esprit de corps of the
leadership forces a debase) on the whole, it seems to me remote,
the succession sapera in a period of confusion or if the party
cannot be excluded, (barbarously it a awfulent strange tor
as the abneme leader, or dictator). While such a boarpiffly
Zhinkov, or some equivalent military figure, is likely to emerge
Party as the dominant force in Soviet society, and that
advancing around the proposition that the army must replace the
these developments have unleased a flood ofROCIFICATION re-
brominence and pia incursion in the Great East circle. Ingeed,
the most opinions is the return of Zhinkov to a station of
ing importance of the military on the Soviet scene. Perhaps
police has been accompanied pl many indications of the la-
The boat-Berla decline in the states of the acornity
"socialist equality" must be regarded at least as hecoritons.
its authority. While such anements beratet, the future of
easentiality of the police and to call for a strengthening of
left unbeffed at the Soviet Congress to bad tribute to the
midspole power in reserve, and no less a figure than Khrushchev
new post, General Zerov) the acornity police remains a for-
chess, (under a new set of initiatives, the NGB, and under a
eataplied control of the police at all levels). Never-
warned, and the party, according to Soviet reports, has re-

(A)

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to the Presidium, that their professional advice will be sought,
and that their recommendations are likely to play an important
role in all top policy determinations where military issues
are involved.

The characteristic political feature of the post-Stalinist period has been a loosening of the bonds in many areas of Soviet life as compared with the tight rein which Stalin held. But it is worthy of note that the new leadership has also been quick to clamp down restrictions wherever elements in the population began to probe the limits or overstep the bounds of "the New Freedom." Managing a policy of "controlled relaxation" creates its own problems, and the difficulties can be illustrated, not only in the satellites, but in many avenues of Soviet life. The treatment of the nationality problem furnishes one example. After Stalin's death, "Great Russian distortions" in nationality policy were denounced, and his successors made a number of limited concessions in the Ukraine and elsewhere providing for greater use of the native language in schools and in offices and for more extensive use of native personnel in official positions. At the same time the nationalities were reminded that "bourgeois nationalism" was still a major crime, and the display of independence which found its expression in the Georgian riots and demonstrations was followed by drastic sanctions against their leaders. The unsolved problem of both ministering to national consciousness and at the same time preventing it from becoming a disruptive force illustrates the hazards of "controlled relaxation" and consti-

illustrates the passivity of "controlled relaxation" and controls the same time preventing it from becoming a destructive force. Problem of poor miniaturing to national consciousness and at dy drastic sanctions against their leaders. The unalived expression in the Georgian riots and demonstrations was followed a major crime, and the display of independence which found its affiliates were reminded that "Pompeia nationiam" was a still berement in official positions. At the same time the nation-states and in offices and for more extensive use of native where providing for greater use of the native language in made a number of limited concessions in the Ukraine and elsewhere in nationality policy were denominated, and his successors names one example. After Stalin's death, "Great Raisin crisis" of Soviet life. The treatment of the nationality problem under illustrated, not only in the加速ers, but in many avenues relaxation, creates its own problems, and the difficulties can pommpe of "the New Freedom." Managing a policy of "controlled in the population began to hope the limits or overstepped the has also been quick to clamp down restrictions whenever elements Stalin held. But it is worth to note that the new leadership areas of Soviet life as compared with the tight rein which Staline period has been a focusing of the pommpe in many The characteristic political feature of the policy in all top policy determinations where military issues and that their recommendations are likely to block an important to the breadth, that their professional advice will be sought.

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