HENRY A. KISSINGER

January 30, 1996

Dear Minister Habibie:

Having just returned from another trip, I at last
have the opportunity to thank you for meeting with
me in Jakarta. It was a great pleasure to see you
again and I greatly enjoyed our enlightening
discussion. I look forward to when our paths shall
cross again so that we can continue our
conversation.

With appreciation and every good wish,

His Excellency
Bacharuddin J. Habibie
Minister for Research &
Technology
Gedung BPPT, 24th floor
Jl M.H. Thamrin No. 8
Central Jakarta
Indonesia

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR • 350 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 • (212) 759-7919

MAY 08 '96 12:15PM B.J. HABIBIE 0062-21-3904541

P.1

FAX TRANSMISSION (BPP TEKNOLOGI)

DATE : 8 Mei 1996
NUMBER OF PAGE : (ONE) PAGE, INCLUDING THIS PAGE
TO : Ms. Suzanne S. McFarlane
Executive Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022-6022
FAX NO. : 001-212-759-0042
FROM : Dr. Fuadi Rasyid
Special Assistant to Minister Habibie
FAX NO. : 021-390 4541

Dear Ms. McFarlane,

Thanks you very much for your fax on May 6, 1996. The time for the meeting at 3:30 PM on May 22 is acceptable.

As far as I understand from our last meeting in Jakarta, the location of the meeting will be arranged by the Kissinger Associate in New York.

It is suggested to arrange the location of the meeting closed to the airport.

I thank you very much for your attention and wait for your further confirmation.

MAY-08-1996 01:12

0062 21 3904541

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DATE : 30 April 1996
NUMBER OF PAGE : (ONE) PAGE, INCLUDING THIS PAGE
TO : Ms. Suzanne S. McFarlane
Executive Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022-6022
APR 30 1996
FAX NO. : 001-212-759-0042
FROM : Dr. Fuadi Rasyid
Special Assistant to Minister Habibie
FAX NO. : 021-390 4541

Dear Ms. McFarlane,

In responding to your fax on April 24, 1996 related to the planned meeting between H. E. Minister Habibie and Dr. Kissinger on May 22, 1996, I have conveyed the message of Dr. Kissinger to H. E. Minister Habibie.

H. E. Minister Habibie can accept the proposed meeting by Dr. Kissinger in the late afternoon of April 22. The Minister is ready to talk with Dr. Kissinger between 15:00 - 17:00 and then, we have to leave for Washington D. C. Moreover, the schedule of the Minister is already full and we can not arrange the meeting on May 23.

I thank you very much for your kind attention and wait for your reply.

0062 21 3904541

APR-29-1996 23:01

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JUN-11-1996 15:52

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403 0303

T.02/02

From: vicki halliday, 103360,3172
To: vicki halliday, 103360,3172
Date: Fri, Jun 7, 1996, 5:24 PM
RE: Dole and odds

Tehran (Reuters) -- For the past few weeks, the behind-the-doors discussion at many Iranian newspaper and magazine publishing outfits seems to be revolving not around political, social and economic issues, but the spelling of Bob Dole's name instead. It turns out that the proper spelling of the Republican Party's likely nominee, Dole, is exactly the same as that for the word penis in Persian.

"At first it might seem funny to some people, but it's creating a serious issue for us. How can we write headlines using that word?," said Majid Fanni, a pre-press specialist at a Tehran service bureau.

Professor Hassan Khadem, a Persian literature lecturer at New York University added, "It's actually not a real problem. In Persian, certain vowels are optional. [Therefore] they could write his name a couple of different ways to avoid the ambiguity. But for an exact pronunciation, 'Dowl' as opposed to 'Dol', well, they'd have to spell it that way."
Fanni explained, "It's not easy. In print, especially for headlines, we don't use [optional] vowel symbols. Because of that, his name can be read in that way."

Ali Zarkoob, a grade school teacher in Western Tehran, said, "I'm sure kids will find it very funny. The humor magazines will probably go crazy over it, too."

A columnist for Tehran's Hamshahri daily who requested to remain anonymous stated, "It's a real problem that no one wants to face. Think about it.

What should we write if he wins? 'Clinton loses Presidency'? That's not right. 'Penis wins US Presidency' isn't exactly acceptable either."

JUN 12 1996

JUN-11-1996 15:35

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Alice S. Harary

Attorney At Law

January 3, 1996

Dr. Henry Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

JAN 10 1996

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I would like to give you a follow - up on my efforts regarding the MIAs. After speaking with the White House, the State Department, USIA, as well as another individual who does not want to be mentioned who has a file on the matter, there seems to be a strong consensus that the three soldiers, that being Zachary Baumel, Yehuda Katz, and Zvi Feldman, are dead. The feeling is that although they know that they are dead, they do not possess the physical proof in order to tell the parents. The White House has told me that they are dead, that there never was a parade in Damascus, that they were killed on the battlefield, and that there was an eyewitness. Apparently, the eyewitness was one of the soldiers in their group who saw Zachary Baumel and Zvi Feldman mortally wounded, and who when he opened the tank saw Yehuda Katz with his head blown off. Please forgive me for these graphic details. The other fact that keeps coming up is that the burial place for these soldiers is quite possibly a Palestinian Refugee Camp in Damascus, the exact whereabouts of which I am in the process of determining. The White House at this point is examining this possibility. As well, both the White House and the State Department have assured me that they have analyzed aerial photographs of this battle. However, I have an independent source who has access to these photographs and I intend to follow this up.

Having said all this, there are a lot of questions that come to mind. Why wasn't the testimony of this eyewitness sufficient to put this issue to rest ? Did the Israeli military go back to attempt to retrieve the bodies and/or their tanks and fail ? Why is the Israeli Government reluctant to provide the answers on this issue ? Did something go awry ? Might it be that these soldiers should never have been there in the first place ? Is the fact that all these sources agree simply because they all got their information from the Israeli Government as opposed to doing an independent investigation ? Why won't the Israelis ask for closure on this when they sit with the Syrians ? Is it because they already know the answers ? Something feels terribly wrong to me.

I would be grateful for your thoughts when you have a spare moment. As well, I am enclosing a photograph that I took in your office. I would be terribly honored if you would sign it for me. I have enclosed a self addressed mailing envelope.

115 EAST 87TH STREET
SUITE 21-A
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10128
Telephone 212-410-7117

TUE, 07-MAY-96 10:38

HAREWOOD

0113 2886684

P. 01

HAREWOOD HOUSE
LEEDS LS17 9LG
UK

FACSIMILE MESSAGE COVER SHEET

Please call us IMMEDIATELY if the copies you receive
are incomplete or illegible

Our Telephone No: 0113 288 6654

Our Fax No: 0113 288 6684

TO: DR.,HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: THE COUNTESS OF HAREWOOD

DATE: 7-v-96

FAX NO: 00 1 212 759 0042

PAGE(s): 1

MAY 07 1996

MESSAGE (if any)

When I spoke to your wife a few weeks ago she mentioned that you were going to visit this country for football reasons. Knowing that you share our enthusiasm for this sport we wondered if you would like to pay another visit to Harewood for one of the European Championship matches to be played at Leeds which are :-

Sunday June 9th at 2.30 Spain v. Bulgaria

Saturday 15th at 6.00. Spain v. France

Tuesday 18th at 4.30 Spain v. Romania

We shall probably be going to the England v. Switzerland match on Saturday 8th at 3 p.m. and coming here after it. On Friday 14th we have a concert here.

We should be so pleased if we could see you both sometime. Anything which might suit you would fit in with us - staying before or after a match (except that we have to go to London after the one on June 9th), perhaps coming up after the Wembley match on 8th and going to the one on 9th or coming for the concert and staying on for the match next day? Whatever you could manage would be fine. After two false starts Our fault!) it would be lovely if we could arrange something! *

You never know - you just might have time to see the House next time!

TOTAL P. 01

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0113 2886684

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From: Bill Harrington To: Henry Kissinger

Date: 3/29/96 Time: 01:52:54

Project: **Eight Sixty Three**

01...Correspondence

W.A. (Bill) Harrington
7055 Washington Ave.
Whittier, Calif. 90602
(310) 698-3077/696-0067

MAR 29 1996

Dr. Henry Kissinger
c/o Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue, 26 th floor
New York, New York
(212) 759-0042

Dr. Kissinger,

The historian at Boeing did a little piece of research for me concerning my ongoing efforts to accurately record the subtle details of the events leading up to the SALT I treaty.

U.S. Intelligence services were involved in a spectacular "capture" of metrics surrounding a Soviet test launch of an SS 9 triple warhead variant, five hundred miles to the northwest of Hawaii on the 21st of May 1969. The three platforms involved in the intelligence coup were the U.S.S. Vandenburg, the U.S.S. McMorris at ground zero, and the radar aircraft Cobra Amber. According to John Newhouse, who has been extremely helpful in my research, the incident was responsible for the formation of the SALT Verification Panel, as the CIA and the DIA were at loggerheads over the real accuracy and significance of the data collection. (The old MIRV/MRV debate)

The Boeing historian has a paper-trail that proves the production contract of our Minuteman III MIRV variant was unofficially let in the *last week of May* rather than the *third week of June* as congressional records indicate. The authorization to proceed with production was made via a phone call "off the record" even though the official paperwork supporting the edict did not arrive at Boeing for more than a month thereafter.

MAR-29-1996 03:41

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HENRY A. KISSINGER

January 30, 1996

Dear Art:

When your family asked if I would jot down a memory
or two of some occasion we shared, it was impossible
to pick any single event. What I will never forget,
however, is your indispensability as we suffered
the strains and stresses of our many trips together
during an exciting time when the seeds for the
later "new world order" were first sown. You
earned (and have never lost) my enormous respect
for your steady competence, your dedication and
loyalty, and your wise judgement - not to mention
your forbearance in putting up with Sonnenfeldt and
me!

Your later career demonstrated the State Department's
high regard and confidence when you were appointed
Ambassador to two of its most important and sensitive
posts, France and the Soviet Union. Here, too, you
served with the greatest distinction.

On your 70th birthday, therefore, I would like to
salute you not only as an admired and trusted friend
but also as a statesman and a great American. May
you have many happy returns!

The Hon. Arthur A. Hartman
c/o Ms. Debbi Hartman
1227 Greenridge
Rochester, MI 48309

January 18, 1996

JAN 23 1996

Dear Family and Friends of Arthur Hartman,

It is hard to believe, but we are coming upon the 70th birthday of our
dear ol' Dad. We are very pleased to be able to share this momentous event
with him at a reunion of our family in the Caribbean. We are writing to you
because we'd like as many of you as possible to participate in our celebration
by contributing to an album we plan to present to him there. The only
constraint on what you might send is that it fit in such an album (though
exceptions can surely be made). No presents wanted -- just your notes, letters,
poems, pictures, reminiscences, funny stories -- anything you would like to
roast and toast him into this new decade. All will be gratefully appreciated.

We know this will be a special gift for him and for all of us. Many of
Arthur's friends are being approached yet surely there are many who should
be contacted whom we do not know. We ask that you either contact us
(Sarah- (h) (718) 230-3177 (w) (212)787-1539) or pass along a copy of this letter if
you know someone who would want to be included. Since we will be
together the last week of February, we need to have the material in our hands
by the 10th of February to assemble it. We know time is short, but hope this
will not prove too difficult.

*****Please, too, keep the secret from both Arthur and Donna*****

For those of you in the States, your offerings can be sent to Debbi
Hartman, 1227 Greenridge, Rochester, MI 48309 (810-375-0048). For those for
whom a European address is easier, please send to Lise Hartman, 4 rue de
Naples, 75008 Paris, France (33-1-45-22-78-03). Our sincere thanks in advance
for helping us to make this an unforgettable birthday for Arthur.

Best wishes,

David, Debbi, John, Abbe, Sarah, Peter, Lise, Bertrand, Ben, and Donna

P.S.--If this letter doesn't get to you in time, please write anyway and we will
include what you send later.

CROSS REF:HARTWICK, DOUGLAS

HENRY A. KISSINGER

January 5, 1996

Dear Mr. Goenka:

A relentless travel schedule and a holiday trip
since I was in Delhi have prevented me from
writing sooner. However, I have wanted to tell
you how sorry I am that our meeting had to be
cancelled. My schedule just got the better of me
and I ran out of time. I very much regret any
inconvenience you may have been caused and hope
we can get together the next time I come to India.

Mr. R.P. Goenka
Chairman
RPG Enterprises
505 New Delhi House
27 Barakhamba Road
New Delhi
India 110001

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919

HAK:

United States of America

Doug Hartwick forwards the address of Mr. R.P. Goenka, to whom you mentioned you wanted to drop a note. If so, you'll have to tell me what to say.

1995

Never mind

Just do a "sorry we couldn't get together" note

ssm

Dear Mr. Secretary,

It was a pleasure to meet with and assist you during your recent visit to Delhi. Ambassador Wisner and I thoroughly enjoyed the travel, and we believe the substantive impact of your visit should prove beneficial in helping shape our bilateral relationship. I am aware that you and Ambassador Wisner have since been in touch about candidates for a high level dialogue.

I have been negligent in not providing you earlier with the name and address of Mr. R.P. Goenka, the Indian industrialist who sought a brief meeting with you the evening of your departure but then suddenly canceled. You had indicated that you might drop him a line. The issue has not come up to my knowledge since your departure.

I enclose a few still photographs of our trip to Udaipur which I thought you and Nancy might enjoy. Please thank her for the kind note she sent me recently. I've also included a photo of Maharaja Frank Gallager, master of our lunch vessel.

Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Mr. R.P. Goenka
Chairman
RPG Enterprises
505 New Delhi House
27 Barakhamba Road
New Delhi, India 110001
tel: 331-7838 332-1685
FAX: 331-9631

HÅK:

[4]

My recollection is that you always avoided
any contact with Ryoichi Sasakawa because
of his questionable reputation in Japan.

May I tell this journalist who is writing
his biography that you did not know him
personally and have no comments?

Fine ____ Just don't reply at all ✓
per ItK

ssm

X

"BORN IN THE NORTH TO DIE IN THE SOUTH"

It was billed as a show not to miss. Colonel Tu, the 25th Division commander, was going to interrogate the North Vietnamese soldier who had been captured on the ill-fated Duc Hue operation. Colonel Tu was an arrogant, boisterous officer who had been Colonel Hau's superior when he had served in the 25th Division. The big event was to take place in Colonel Hau's office, and my counterparts urged me not to miss it.

Captain Sang, Captain Nga, and I arrived at Hau's office just as the prisoner was escorted into Colonel Tu's presence by one of Nga's G-2 sergeants. Most of the province staff had crowded into the small room to witness the spectacle.

The prisoner was about five feet four inches tall; his crew cut had grown out, and his face showed the strain of combat. Nonetheless, he held his head up as he strode into the room. He wore olive drab fatigues with no insignia, and his left cheek was caked with dried blood from a small shrapnel wound below his eye.

The North Vietnamese was not permitted to sit, and the room fell silent as Colonel Tu lit a cigarette. Flicking the match to the floor, Tu led off sharply, "What is your name?"

"Do van Lanh," answered the prisoner in a strong voice. He was either unintimidated by the setting or he was a good actor.

"Rank?" snapped Colonel Tu.

"Combatant," replied the prisoner.*

"Unit?" queried the colonel.

"Two Hundred Seventy-First Independent Regiment, D8 Battalion, C3 Company," answered the prisoner, looking squarely at his interro-

*In the North Vietnamese Army, a combatant is a private.

137

138

SILENCE WAS A WEAPON

gator in a glaring display of cheekiness. Prisoners were supposed to be appropriately humble and look at the floor.

"Where is the 271st Regiment now?" pumped Tu, who for the moment was ignoring the prisoner's audacity.

"I don't know. Over in Cambodia, maybe," replied the prisoner evasively. He's pressing his luck, I thought. Captain Nga gave me a glance that said if the prisoner had answered this way to one of his G-2 interrogators, he would have been beaten.

"What were you doing when captured?" asked Tu.

"They just told us to hide there and keep track of the enemy forces that entered the area," replied the North Vietnamese.

"Before you crossed the river, where did your unit hide?" Colonel Tu was maneuvering.

"I don't know. I was in a dispensary with malaria, and I only joined my unit after it had crossed the river. I don't know anything about its other operations." The prisoner was no dummy. He was employing the "I don't know anything so don't waste any more time on me" tactic.

"Do you know what this stands for?" Tu asked, pointing to his own shoulder patch and grinning at his audience.

"Yes, the 25th Division," replied Do van Lanh.

"And what did your comrades say about the 25th Division?" continued the beaming Colonel Tu.

"We heard that the soldiers of the 25th would drop their weapons and run, just like they did when we attacked them in Tay Ninh," shot back the feisty prisoner. I had to choke to keep from laughing. Colonel Tu didn't think it was funny. Redfaced, he didn't like the prisoner's arrogance one bit. For a moment, I thought he was going to hit him. Then, abruptly, Tu's mood and tone of voice changed. Pointing to a chair, he politely invited the prisoner to sit down, then offered him a cigarette. The prisoner accepted, then suddenly spoke up.

"May I ask something?" The room fell silent. Didn't this upstart North Vietnamese understand that prisoners were supposed to answer questions, not ask them?

"Ask!" snapped the surprised Colonel Tu.

The prisoner spoke. "Has President Nixon gone to Moscow yet? Is it true that we are only forty kilometers from Ho Chi Minh City?" He blurted out both questions in one breath, as if afraid that he wouldn't get a second opportunity.

By now, most of the onlookers had begun to pull silently for the underdog prisoner in his battle of wits with the supercilious Colonel Tu. Captain Sang, an ethnic North Vietnamese, jabbed me in the ribs and

139

grinned. Could this prisoner possibly know that his reference to President Nixon's impending Moscow visit would strike South Vietnamese sensitivities over our policy of détente with the Russians? I decided at that moment that I would have to get to know Do van Lanh better.

Colonel Tu was again thrown off balance, both by the prisoner's audacity and by the political tone of his questions. "You were captured by the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam, forty kilometers from the capital of Saigon," growled the colonel. "And President Nixon has not gone to Moscow yet." Motioning to Captain Nga's jailer, Tu indicated that the interrogation was over.

I contacted Colonel Bartlett immediately. With his permission, I wanted to pull Do van Lanh out of normal prisoner of war channels. To do so we would have to get the province chief's approval. Normally, a North Vietnamese prisoner would remain in Hau Nghia a few days at most, enough time to be interrogated by the heavy-handed and incompetent Sergeant Tran. If there was even a remote chance of gaining a prisoner's cooperation, one session with Sergeant Tran would end it. Unless we intervened, Combatant Do van Lanh would soon find himself sitting out the war in a South Vietnamese POW camp.

Colonel Bartlett didn't hesitate, and within the hour, I was sitting in Captain Nga's office waiting for the prisoner. When they brought him in, I sensed immediately that he was not the same person whom I had observed that morning dueling with Colonel Tu. That Do van Lanh had stood erect, eyeballed his interrogator, and spoken out boldly when addressed. The Do van Lanh who stood in front of me was a withdrawn, sullen, and dispirited shadow of the other Lanh. I bristled, certain that he had just been interrogated and abused by Sergeant Tran. But Captain Nga insisted that nothing of the sort had happened. Since the encounter with Colonel Tu, the prisoner had been debriefed by one of his lieutenants—a man whose methods were humane. The prisoner had repeated his story that he had spent the last two months in a dispensary somewhere in Cambodia, recovering from malaria contracted during his walk down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. He had stuck to his story that he had no knowledge of his unit's operations, staging areas, or intentions. Nga insisted that he had been humanely treated.

The North Vietnamese prisoner's change of demeanor puzzled me, but I passed it off to the trauma of captivity and proceeded to implement my game plan. Introducing myself, I extended my hand and told him that he and I were going to "my house" for a few days. Did he understand? Startled at hearing me speak his language, the prisoner hesitated before he limply grasped my hand and nodded that he understood. Captain Nga

140

SILENCE WAS A WEAPON

shot me a confused look, crossing his wrists. Did I want the prisoner
bound? I shook my head and headed out the door, motioning Do van
Lanh to follow me. As we walked across the courtyard of the headquar-
ters, the officers and sergeants of the staff stared as they realized that my
companion was one of Nga's prisoners.

Our first stop was at the home of a Filipino doctor who worked at the province hospital. The doctor obligingly treated the shrapnel wound under the prisoner's eye. That done, we headed across the alley to my quarters, where the guard admitted us without so much as a glance. Our guards had become used to the motley collection of companions I paraded in and out of the villa.

I motioned for Lanh to sit down. Once again, his uncomfortable reaction to what was happening to him was evident. Eyes cast down, he merely nodded his head yes or no when I asked him anything.

"Are you hungry?" A nod. I sent a guard out to pick up a meal.

"Thirsty?" Again a nod.

"Do you drink beer?" An attempt to get a rise out of him. He shook his head—lifeless.

"Tea?" Of course. Another nod. He still hadn't said two words since I picked him up.

The guard arrived with a large plate of steamed rice, a bowl of vegetables, and a small fish on a plate. I beckoned my guest to sit down and eat. He obeyed silently, and the entire meal disappeared in minutes. In the meantime, I asked one of the guards to go to the market and pick up a cheap set of civilian clothes and a pair of sandals. We could get the maid to make any necessary alterations. I was not yet ready to take my new charge to the market.

The next step was to clean him up. He looked and smelled like he hadn't had a bath for weeks—which was probably about right. I led him to the bathroom and instructed him to take a shower. When I heard the water running, I opened the door to retrieve his uniform. Instead of showering standing up, he had hunched down on the floor below the faucet and was splashing the water on himself with his hands. I took his Hanoi-issue outfit and left in its place a pair of black slacks and a white shirt that the guard had just brought me. We would save his uniform for future use.

When he emerged from the bathroom, I told him he looked *dep trai* ("handsome") in his new clothes and showed him to his room. Still no reaction. Just the sullen stare. His room was directly across the hall from mine and furnished with a bed, nightstand, coffee table, and a seventeen-inch portable television set. I turned on the TV and demonstrated the

141

channel selector. The set only received two channels: the American Armed Forces station and Channel 9, the Saigon government station. The television set got me my first reaction. Wide-eyed, he hunched down on the floor and tuned in.

"If you get tired," I told him, "turn it off here and go to sleep. I've got to go back to work."

He nodded without removing his gaze from the television. The Saigon channel was showing newsreel scenes of North Vietnamese tanks that had been knocked out by "the heroic defenders of An Loc." I told Lanh apologetically that I would have to lock his door, but that if he needed to go to the bathroom, he could knock and the guard would let him out. Another nod signaled his understanding. Before departing, I briefed the guards on the need for one of them to sit in the living room outside the prisoner's door. The house was full of weapons of every sort, and for now, at least, we had to assume that our new guest was hostile. I also told the head guard to pass the word that the prisoner was to be treated as much like a member of the family as possible.

Back at the headquarters, I picked up a copy of the report that had resulted from the prisoner's brief interrogation. From it, I learned that Do van Lanh claimed to be nineteen years old and a native of Ha Tinh province in southern North Vietnam. Drafted at the age of eighteen, he had undergone basic training at a camp northwest of Hanoi and been assigned to the 271st Regiment. The 271st was originally a militia unit, and most of the men in it were natives of Ha Tinh and neighboring Nghe An province—Ho Chi Minh's birthplace. Lanh and his comrades had commenced their infiltration into South Vietnam in November, 1971, and the long trek had taken them more than a hundred days. Lanh had told his interrogator that he had contracted malaria on the way down the trail and lain in a Cambodian dispensary until just prior to his capture. He claimed that the skirmish in which he had been captured had been his first combat engagement.

With this report in hand, I dropped by the MSS office to see Captain Sang. Sang glanced over the report and raised an eyebrow when he came to the prisoner's native village. "This will be easy to check," he observed. "He says he is from my native village. If he is telling the truth, we will have common acquaintances. If he is lying, I will know immediately." One of Sang's orderlies brought two tall Cokes as we discussed my plan. Briefly, I proposed to Sang that we convert the young prisoner into a cooperative source, using decent treatment and a bit of psychology. I felt certain that he had been told nothing but the worst about the situation in the south and that he had no doubt been filled with horror stories

JAN-31-1996 10:31

C050

F.06

JAN 31 1996

To the Editor, Wall Street Journal

Stephen B. Young (letter to the Editor January 23, 1996) says that Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, "misled" by Henry Kissinger, told President Thieu that Kissinger's proposals would require all North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units to leave South Vietnam as part of a peace agreement. Young's presentation ignores the realities of that time and obscures the real source of the "betrayal" of South Vietnam.

I was Chief Staff aide to Ambassador Bunker during the period in question. Bunker never wavered from his view that the United States had an obligation to help bring about the departure of all NVA forces. The fact was, however, that this could not be achieved through a negotiated agreement. American domestic political pressures made this simply impossible. Thieu understood this throughout the critical months leading up to the agreement signed on January 27, 1973. The question then debated was how to get the NVA out of the south in the post-agreement period.

By producing an agreement to which the Government of the Republic of Vietnam was a full legal party, the basis was laid for insisting that Hanoi's troops had no right to be in the South. Intelligence analysis at the time clearly concluded that the communist forces in the south "were on their last legs". The analysts were correct; the Thieu-Bunker-Abrams effort had won the war on the ground and sealed it with the defeat of the Communist's Easter invasion of 1972. The Paris agreement provided for continued U.S. supply of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. That army, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, and the U.S. mission all were ready, willing and able at the time of the agreement to make it work, and that was entirely possible had the U.S. continued to supply our allies as promised.

But when Minister of Foreign Affairs Tran Van Lam, who had signed the Paris Agreement for the Republic of Vietnam, visited Washington shortly afterward to discuss continued US supply he found that not one single member of Congress was willing to meet with him. This was the real moment of betrayal. Even then, with our allies utterly cut off, it took over two more years before Hanoi's forces were able to gain sufficient strength to conduct their final conventional military assault across the demilitarized zone and international borders to take Saigon in April 1975.

244 Bradley Street
New Haven, CT 06510
(203) 777 6625

JAN-31-1996 10:27

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In a secret visit,
Kissinger makes
Yale appearance

By Ali Mohamedi

YDN Staff Reporter

It may not have been as important
as his clandestine trip to open diplo-
matic relations to China during the
early 1970s, but it certainly was as
secret.

In an unpublicized, covert visit to
the Yale campus, former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger spoke before an
audience of approximately 40 under-
graduates yesterday in the Berkeley
College Master's House, offering his
opinions on U.S. intervention in for-
eign affairs.

Kissinger visited Yale to address 15
members of Charles Hill's "The U.N.
and Statecraft in the New World
Order" international studies seminar
and two students from each residential
college chosen by their masters.

Kissinger, who wanted his visit to
remain secret from the larger Yale
community, spoke for 15 minutes
before fielding questions for an hour.

His visit was also attended by sev-
eral Yale administrators, including
President Richard Levin, who ducked
out of a meeting with pro-labor student
activists to meet with the diplomat.

The former Nixon Administration
cabinet member outlined his views on
the United States' role in world affairs,
ranging from approval of continued
support for peace negotiations in the
Middle East to condemnation of Presi-
dent Bill Clinton's deployment of
troops in war-stricken Bosnia.

Kissinger voiced his disapproval for
several recent interventionist U.S. for-
eign policy decisions, citing China and
Bosnia as nations on which the Presi-
dent has taken recent action despite
their irrelevance to the greater Ameri-
can cause.

But he fell short of chastising the
U.S. role as international policeman
entirely and indicated support for the
Middle East peace process as intrinsi-
cally vital to both America and the
world.

Kissinger rose to national promi-
nence while serving as Nixon's
national security advisor and later as
Secretary of State. A noted author as
well as a diplomat, he has remained in
the public eye as a noted critic of for-
eign policy, penning several books.