STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL
BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA TO THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

February 7, 1984

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues and I appreciate this
opportunity to discuss with the Committee on Foreign Relations
the work and the report of the National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America.

I should first note, Mr. Chairman, that a distinguished
member of this Committee, Senator Charles Mathias, contributed
significantly to the deliberations of the Commission. He
served along with Senators Domenici, Inouye and Bentsen as
senior counsellors to the Commission, as did Congressmen
Wright, Barnes, Bloomfield and Kemp. Senator Mathias found
time in his crowded schedule to attend many of our meetings.
And he provided us with invariably wise counsel. But I do want
to emphasize that neither Senator Mathias nor the other senior
counsellors who gave us such valuable assistance bear any

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responsibility for the Commission's report. That
responsibility rests solely with the 12 members of the
Commission.

As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, it was the late Senator
Henry Jackson who proposed the establishment of a bipartisan
commission on Central America. He saw that the crisis
confronting this country in that nearby region called for a
national response, above party and above partisanship of any
kind. As a man who devoted his life to the national welfare,
he well knew that such a challenge demands a bipartisan
policy. In his mind was the Marshall Plan, that historic
example of how the Congress and the Executive can work together
across party lines to safeguard the national interest and
advance our nation's ideals.

In the spirit in which the Commission was conceived we have
delivered to the President and the Congress a report reflecting
a broad and truly bipartisan consensus on the basic issues for
U.S. policy in Central America. We on the Commission were of

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diverse backgrounds and diverse political convictions. Among
our members were liberals and conservatives, Democrats,
Republicans and Independents. But during more than five months
of intensive labor we laid aside partisan considerations and
party labels. Our report is the statement of an independent
citizens group, animated in the best American tradition only by
concern for the common welfare. It seeks to convey an
objective account of what we found to be the realities of
Central America and of what we believe should be done for the
good of our neighbors there -- and for the good of the United
States.

Let me briefly state what this bipartisan, or perhaps
better said non-partisan, consensus embraces.

First, the Commission has determined unanimously that the
United States has fundamental interests, including national
security interests, at stake in Central America. We have
concluded that these interests are in jeopardy because of an

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[y]

acute crisis in the region -- a very real crisis demanding
urgent action.

The region's grave situation has indigenous roots. These
lie in a long history of the exploitation of the many by the
few -- in social injustice, maldistribution of national income,
closed political systems and governmental oppression. We
subscribed fully in the report to the statement of the Catholic
Conference of Latin American Bishops in 1979 that there is a
"contradiction of Christian existence" in the "growing gap
between rich and poor."

But in our judgment Central America's predicament has been
brought to a head by the confluence of Soviet-Cuban
intervention and international economic recession. It is the
first that threatens all efforts to achieve peace and progress
in the region. It is the second that aggravates human
suffering and makes the prospects for its alleviation so
difficult.

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The economies of Central America, highly dependent on the export of primary commodities and on inter-regional trade, have been devastated by world recession and local violence. Gross domestic product per capita has declined since the late 1970's by

-- 35 percent in El Salvador

-- 12 percent in Honduras

-- 23 percent in Costa Rica

-- 14 percent in Guatemala

-- 38 percent in Nicaragua.

These are grave statistics. What they mean in human terms is massive unemployment, more hunger and diminished hope that the fearful consequences of the region's grinding poverty can be overcome. Today one-third of all the people in Central America lack sufficient income to feed themselves at an adequate nutritional level.

But the Commission determined that a restoration of economic growth alone would not reach the roots of the Central

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American crisis. Fundamental social and political reforms must go forward in several countries if lasting solutions are to be achieved. Above all, it was clear to us after these months of intensive study that the overwhelming majority of Central Americans aspire to live in freedom -- in democratic, pluralistic societies. Thus, the cornerstone of the program we propose is the commitment of all the nations of Central America to democratization -- and a corresponding commitment by the United States to support and assist in that process. We can contribute substantially through expanded exchange programs, through the National Endowment for Democracy, by encouraging grass-roots organizations where democratic practices are learned and, above all, by making free societies a central objective of every one of our development programs.

Injustice and poverty create the conditions in which subversion and insurgency can thrive. The Commission's report argues that more widespread economic opportunity is critically important to the region's future well-being. We have proposed

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a series of measures to support agricultural development,
strengthen small business and the small farmer, promote
cooperatives and generally to broaden opportunities for those
who until now have been kept on the margins of economic life.
Reform will ultimately depend, of course, on the policies of
the Central American governments themselves. But the United
States can do much to encourage and reinforce movement in the
right direction.

We also put forth an extensive list of proposals in
response to the pressing needs of Central America's poor for
basic education, better health and housing. These include
measures to reduce dramatically the scourges of disease and
malnutrition among children, to eradicate malaria and dengue
fever, to broaden literacy and primary education, and to expand
low-cost housing programs, particularly through private-sector
initiative. The United States in our judgment should
demonstrate an unmistakable commitment to the goal of a better
quality of life for Central America's poverty-stricken

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peoples. By doing so we serve both our strategic and moral
interests. Here, as in the effort to advance democracy, those
interests coincide.

Our report addresses the requirement for immediate action
to arrest the alarming decline in economic and social
conditions in Central America. We recommend an increase now in
U.S. economic assistance of $400 million, as well as other
measures to deal with the short-term impact of the crisis. But
the Commission recognized, as I am sure this committee does,
that it will take many years to overcome the legacies of social
injustice and economic underdevelopment. We have therefore
emphasized the necessity for a long-term program, solidly based
on coherent and steady U.S. policy -- a lasting commitment by
this country to the freedom and welfare of our neighbors in
Central America.

The Commission's program is ambitious, but by no means
extreme or gargantuan. What we are recommending in tabling the
figure of $8 billion for economic assistance over the next five

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fiscal years is not much more than double what the United
States is doing now. This figure reflects a careful analysis
of the region's external financing requirements and is based on
what I would describe as rather optimistic assumptions. In
terms of Central America's needs, it is a moderate request, one
designed to help these countries return by 1990 to where they
were in 1978-1980 when per capita income was growing at about
three percent a year.

To give structure, consistency and continuing direction to
this sustained effort the report proposes that authorities at a
high level of our government meet with Central American
counterparts to negotiate the creation of the Central American
Development Organization (CADO). In our concept CADO would
provide guidance and review for the development programs --
economic, political and social -- of those Central American
nations eligible to join by reason of commitment to internal
reform and democracy, as well as to external non-intervention.
We envisaged other democracies outside the region as

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prospective participants. It was our judgment that to be
effective CADO should serve as a channel for significant
external assistance to the region.

Mr. Chairman, the distinguished President of Costa Rica,

Luis Alberto Monge, has characterized the report of the

Bipartisan Commission on Central America as an "intervention

against misery and against ignorance..." Those words are

heartening indeed to my colleagues and me. That was our

intention: to call upon our government and our people to

engage fully at the side of our Central American neighbors in

the struggle against misery and ignorance.

For that effort to prosper, however, more than reform and
resources will be required. There must be an end to the
violence that wracks Central America today. The killing must
stop so that the building of better societies can go forward.

A fundamental conclusion we reached after months of careful
study was that the various elements of the crisis -- the
economic, social, political and security issues -- form, as the

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report puts it, a seamless web. They cannot be separated.
Each impacts one on the other. For example, lasting progress
on the economic and social fronts requires peace. The pace of
reform and economic expansion simply does not match that of
insurgency. Guerrillas can destroy much faster than reformers
can build. But on the other side, peace cannot be achieved
unless there is tangible hope for escape from misery and
oppression. Thus, the Commission has proposed a comprehensive
program to deal with all these elements. We are gratified that
the Administration has adopted that approach in announcing the
forthcoming submission to the Congress of the "Central America
Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative Act of 1984." It
is our hope that the Congress too will find the concept of a
comprehensive program in the national interest.

I believe the report makes clear that essentially two
situations in Central America threaten the security of the
region and thereby the interests of the United States. The
first is in Nicaragua where an unprecedented military buildup,

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an ideological commitment to the export of revolution and
military ties to the Soviets and Cubans weigh heavily on
neighboring countries. Last year 15,000 tons of arms reached
the Sandinista armed forces from abroad, including Soviet-built
armored vehicles and other heavy armaments. There are now at
least 25,000 regular troops and another 50,000 active reserves
and militia in that country of no more than three million
people. No less than 2,000 Cuban military advisers are in
Nicaragua, and as the Commission found for itself on our visit
to Managua, the Sandinista military establishment is closely
tied into the Cuban-Soviet intelligence network.

Nicaragua's menacing military machine, the Soviet-Cuban
connections and active Sandinista support for insurgency and
subversion in neighboring countries create fear in the region
-- and threaten it with arms races and general militarization.

To deal with these issues, the Commission's report proposes
a vigorous negotiating effort directed toward including
Nicaragua in a regional settlement designed to ensure lasting

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security guarantees for all the nations of Central America.
Such a settlement would be squarely based on the principles
contained in the 21-point proposal of the Contadora group.
These would include non-intervention and respect for national
sovereignty; an end to the arms traffic and other actions
directed at subverting governments; the prohibition of foreign
military forces, advisers and bases; a substantial reduction in
the size and armaments of military forces; and the commitment
by all countries of the region to internal pluralism and free
elections. I emphasize that this last point would apply to all
the nations of Central America. My colleagues and I felt
strongly that it would be unjustifiable to ask more in this
context of El Salvador than of Nicaragua. And we believed that
by calling for democratization as an important element of
regional security, as the Contadora proposals do, we were
identifying ourselves with the deepest aspirations of the
peoples of Central America.

In framing these recommendations the Commission drew
heavily on our consultations with the leaders of the Contadora

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countries. We had the opportunity to discuss the issues of negotiations and peace with the presidents and other high officials of Mexico, Venezuela, Panama and Colombia -- the four members of the group. Their efforts to construct a peaceful settlement constitute a most important initiative, one meriting the unstinting support of the United States. You will note, Mr. Chairman, that the Commission's report urges such support and endorses the Contadora process as "deserving the gratitude and encouragement of all the nations of the hemisphere."

El Salvador's tragic civil war is the second situation in which critical security concerns must be addressed. It was the Commission's judgment that a stable resolution of that bitter conflict consonant with the aspirations and well-being of the Salvadoran people must be based on the democratic process.

The Commission determined that proposals for what is commonly described as "power-sharing" did not meet that essential criterion. Dissolving the existing elected government and replacing it with a provisional regime in which

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the insurgents would have a major role seemed to us neither
fair to the people of El Salvador nor workable in terms of
reconciling the contending forces. As we saw it, the final
outcome of such a scheme could well be Marxist-Leninist
domination and the imposition of a government unwilling to rest
its authority on the consent of the governed.

But our report does recognize the importance of bringing
into the democratic process those elements of the guerrillas'
political-military front prepared to participate and abide by
the popular will. In addition, the report emphasizes the
necessity to establish conditions in which all political
movements, including those of the left, can compete freely and
peacefully for the voters' favor.

Further, we concluded that the establishment of such
conditions should properly be the subject of negotiations
between the insurgents and the government. But we found that
time constraints and the circumstances now prevailing in El
Salvador make it unlikely that meaningful negotiations can be

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carried out before the national elections scheduled for March
25. The report therefore calls for these negotiations to take
place once the new government is elected. The objective would
be to enable all who so desired to take part fully and without
fear in the subsequent legislative and municipal elections.

I cannot stress too strongly how much importance the
Commission attached to vigorous diplomacy on the part of the
United States, diplomacy carried out, as the report states, to
achieve the broad objectives of

- stopping the war and the killing in El Salvador;

- creating conditions under which Nicaragua can take
its place as a peaceful and democratic member of the
Central American community; and

- opening the way for democratic development throughout
the isthmus.

But it was also our conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that
diplomacy and negotiations do not take place in a vacuum. We
cannot escape the fact that the Cubans, Soviets and Nicaraguan

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Sandinistas are engaged in a serious and substantial effort to promote Marxist-Leninist revolution in the region. The armed insurgents who serve their cause are unlikely to perceive negotiations as anything more than a tactical maneuver as long as they believe they can win power on the field of battle. Similarly, the Sandinistas would have no apparent cause to redeem the promises of democracy and non-alignment they made to the OAS in 1979 unless significant incentives and pressures were present to move them in that direction.

The diplomatic effort then can complement but not substitute for the other actions necessary to an increased sense of security and rising prospects for political and economic progress in the region. As I previously suggested, Mr. Chairman, our report reflects the Commission's judgment that all the elements of the crisis must be addressed simultaneously. We found no short cuts -- no gimmicks, negotiating or otherwise -- to produce quick solutions. Rather, it was the view of the Commission that to attempt to

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deal singly with any one aspect -- diplomatic, economic, political or security -- would be a certain recipe for failure. Thus, as one element of a broad program, the report recommends increased military assistance under proper conditions to the governments of El Salvador and Honduras.

That assistance will reinforce the diplomatic effort by helping to create the conditions under which peaceful settlements may be reached and the objective of a better life in freedom for all Central Americans successfully pursued.

Gonzalo Facio, the former Foreign Minister of Costa Rica and a man well known to members of this Committee, has said of our report that it sets forth "the form in which these political, economic, social and military problems can be confronted today -- problems which have been incubating for centuries and which are now being exploited by the Soviet Union and its Cuban satellite." I believe that statement summarizes very well what we of the Commission were trying to do.

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To return to the question of consensus, Mr. Chairman, you
are aware that members of the Commission attached six notes to
our report offering individual views on certain of its
aspects. Two concern the anti-Sandinista guerrillas -- the
so-called *contras* -- and one, which I signed with two other
Commissioners, supports conditionality as applied to military
aid to El Salvador but asks that it not be interpreted in a way
that would lead to a Marxist-Leninist victory in that country.
Another note concerns the conviction of one member that the
report should have stressed to a greater and more specific
degree the need to facilitate Central American exports to the
U.S. The remaining notes strike me as more in the way of
observations or amplifications than dissents. Altogether these
views take up a little more than four pages of a report 132
pages long.

To provide a general perspective, I would like to cite the
concluding paragraph of the Introduction to the report. It
reads as follows:

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Because the Commission has 12 members, each with strong
individual views, there obviously are many things in this
report to which individual members would have assigned
different weight, or which they would have interpreted
somewhat differently or put differently. Such is the
nature of commissions But these differences were personal,
not partisan. This report, on balance, does represent what
all of us found to be a quite remarkable consensus,
considering the often polarized and emotional nature of the
debate that has surrounded Central America. Among
ourselves, we found a much greater degree of consensus at
the end of our odyssey than at the beginning. This in
itself gives us hope that the nation, too, as it learns
more about Central America, its crisis and its needs, will
find its way to a united determination to take and support
the kind of measures that we believe are needed in the
interests of the United States and of the hemisphere, and

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for the sake of the sorely beleaguered people of Central
America.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize that in proposing
this comprehensive program for U.S. policy toward Central
America the Commission does not promise success. There are
many obstacles. The problems run very deep, and have, as Mr.
Facio says, been incubating for centuries. But it is the firm
conviction of the Commission that a failure on our part to make
this difficult effort will later cost our nation dearly. The
threat to the interests of the United States can only mount
rapidly as turbulence and subversion in Central America
spread. Time is short. Let us make that effort now.