which should be minorized to 85.2 percent of benefit to be received by most. It is a major price decline did not reduce production, thus in the price college after 1950, farmers, ten from growing fees, infatuation which has always characterized the agricultural market.

It all sounds like on paper. But it does not follow for the
to grow fees, thereby expropriating the agrbine.

will tell, which will cause the consumer to pay more and the farmer
solve the agrbine problem. Thus, a agrbine accumulate, price
will bring about shifts in production and consumption which will

One fundamental Benson contention is that flexible prices
has been terminally overpriced.

it seems evident on the part of experience that the Benson program
I am certainly ten from being an agricultural economist myself. But
atomic sanity and intelligence over the greedy and greying farm proce-
dess has generally willed the Benson victory as a triumph for eco-

One is ambushed, indeed, to note the way that the pit city
ties were not exercised in a better cause.

when better shape. It is a shame that Secretary Benson's big updat-
cement and courage, our foreign and defense policies might be in
them. It Secretary Druftes and Secretary Wilson had shown belt his
clarity and force; and he has moved steadily and vigorously to achieve
impressive. At an early point, he laid out his objectives with
mempers of the Klaenower cabinet, indeed, he is basically the most
Benson represents a major victory for Secretary Benson. Of all the
The备注在 《the Senate of the flexible price support pro-

HISTORY OF THE AEX

2

such magical effect? As for the shifts in production, what are
farmers to shift to? Quite apart from the technical problems of
such shifts, what commodities are left which are not already or al-
most in a surplus stage themselves?

The case for effect on consumption is even feebler. A drop
in food prices does not usually make consumers buy more food; it
just leaves them more money to spend on other things. But, even if
it did, the Benson program would cause any material drop in food
prices. It may bring prices down a little on the farm; but the sad
fact is that a decline in prices received by the farmer does not
necessarily mean a decline in prices paid by you and me at the grocery
store.

The Hope Committee of the House has just shown that, while
prices received by farmers have fallen 20 points since 1951, retail
food prices are still at their 1952 peak. In June, in June
of this year, only two months ago, while farm prices declined 4
percent, food prices rose 0.5 percent. The reason for this, of
course, is the inflexibility in processing costs (not to mention the
inclination of many middlemen to snatch windfall profits for them-
selves out of the drop in farm prices rather than to pass the de-
cline on to the consumers).

What will be the practical effect of the Benson program?
It is fairly safe to predict that it will have very little effect
on retail food prices -- even though the expectation that it would
have this effect must account for the support it received from nor-
mally liberal Democrats from big cities (Senator Lehman is an

What will be the practical effect of the Benson program? Will it be fairly safe to predict that it will have very little effect on retail food prices -- even though the concentration that it would have if there were no such thing as a concentration? The reason for this is that the food prices are still at their 1925 levels. In June 1925, the prices received by farmers have fallen 50 points since 1921, retail prices have fallen 50 points since 1925. In June 1925, the prices received by farmers have fallen 50 points since 1925, and so on. The reason for this is that the food prices have declined 40 percent, to 100.02 percent. The reason for this is that this year, only two months ago, while farm prices declined 40 percent, to 100, only two months ago, while farm prices declined 40 percent, to 100. This is the reason why the prices received by farmers have fallen 50 points since 1925, retail prices received by farmers have fallen 50 points since 1925, and so on.

The Hohe Committee of the House has shown that, while it is necessary for a decline in prices paid by you and me at the grocer's to be that a decline in prices received by the farmer does not exist, it is not that the farmer does not want to have a decline in prices paid by you and me at the grocer's. The reason for this is that the food prices have declined 40 percent, to 100.02 percent. The reason for this is that this year, only two months ago, while farm prices declined 40 percent, to 100, only two months ago, while farm prices declined 40 percent, to 100. This is the reason why the prices received by farmers have fallen 50 points since 1925, retail prices received by farmers have fallen 50 points since 1925, and so on. The reason for this is that the food prices have declined 40 percent, to 100.02 percent. The reason for this is that this year, only two months ago, while farm prices declined 40 percent, to 100, only two months ago, while farm prices declined 40 percent, to 100. This is the reason why the prices received by farmers have fallen 50 points since 1925, retail prices received by farmers have fallen 50 points since 1925, and so on.

The case for effect on consumption is even stronger. A good most in a弱弱 stage themselves; such shifts, what committees are left which are not already or already shift to? Quite apart from the technical problems of such magical effects! As for the shifts in production, what are

3

3

honorable exception). It will not significantly reduce production, except perhaps on some of the great commercial wheat farms, nor will it significantly affect resource allocation within agriculture.

On the other hand, it will probably decrease farm income somewhat, which would have an adverse effect on the general level of business activity. And, if a depression should impend, the flexible price support system, which diminishes the support as surpluses pile up, will be much less effective as a contra-cyclical measure than the present system. Rigid price supports, which go into full play when the economy most needs them -- i.e., on the edge of a general price decline have up to now constituted one of the most powerful of the built-in stabilizers of our economy.

What will be the political effect? As long as demand holds up, there will probably be fewer political repercussions than the administration fears or the farm bloc hopes. Yet the new farm policy certainly supplies the Democrats with a strong talking point in the farm belt. The fact that this is the first non-Communist issue to have attracted the attention of Joe McCarthy for years would suggest that there is considerable political dynamite behind it.

The Benson program also gives the Democrats a chance now to come out with some creative thinking of their own on farm problems. The 90 percent support system had its obvious defects. The Brannan plan represented a considerable improvement, especially in relation to handling the Surplus Problem that surpluses find their own prices on the market while farm income be maintained through direct production payments. Brannan's plan also offered protection to perishable as well as to storable commodities, which is a matter of simple equity. But a real farm program

the nation, and in a matter of simple equity. But a real farm program
also offers protection to horizontal as well as to portable commodities
be maintained through direct production business. Brown's plan
the agriculture finds their own prices on the market while farm income
Brennan plans represented a considerable improvement of properties
plains. The 30 percent ambport system had its advantages defects. The
to come out with some creative thinking of their own on farm pro-
 suggested that there is considerable political difficulty behind it.
to have attracted the attention of the McCarthy for farmers would
the farm belt. The fact that this is the first non-Communist issue
certainly subplies the Democrats with a strong striking point in
administration loans on the farm pilot planes. Let the new farm policy
nd, there will probably be fewer political repressiveness than the
What will be the political effect? As long as demand holds
most powerfull of therift-inصلisence or our economy.
of a General Price decline have nd to now constitute one of the
into full back upon the economy most needs them -- i. e., on the edge
measure than the present system. Eight price ambords, which go
briees bite nd, will be much less effective as a contra-critical
flexible price ambord system, which diminishes the ambord as am-
plausiveness activity. And, it a depression should exist, the
something, which would have an adverse effect on the general level
On the other hand, it will probably decrease farm income
it at sufficiently great rate of resource allocation within agriculture.
exceeds perhaps on some of the great commercial wheat farms, now will
favorable exception). It will not significantly reduce production.

3

4

would have to combine income support for successful farmers with
vigorous measures to do something for the one-third of our farm
families who still dwell in conditions of genuine poverty.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, Jr.

ANTHONY A. CHATHAM, Jr.

families who still dwell in conditions of genuine poverty,
vigorous measures to do something for the one-sip of our farm
would have to comping income support for successful farmers with

September 15, 1954

Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Widener 95

Dear Arthur:

Here, finally, is the long promised and much
delayed memorandum. It may be too late to do much
good, and it merely attempts to provide a strategic
background for your own thoughts. It got much
longer than I had originally intended.

As you can see, I am as upset as you are over
the Alsop view, but on the other hand, I do not
think a return to the Truman policy is necessarily
the best solution. I

I am away for two weeks on Army duty, but
maybe we can get together afterwards.

Kind regards.

Sincerely,

Sincerely,

Kind regards.

the best solution. I
think a return to the Trumman below is necessarily
the Vlaap view, put on the other hand, I do not
As you can see, I am as naive as you are over

longer than I had originally intended.
background for your own thoughts. It got much
better, and it merely attempts to provide a strategic
delayed memorandum. It may be too late to do much
Here, finally, is the long-promised and much

Dear Arthur:

Widener 33
Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

September 12, 1944

SEP 24 1954

HISTORY OF THE WEEK

September 23, 1954

The Harrison Salisbury series on Russia in the *New York Times* will undoubtedly raise many questions and many eyebrows. Murray Kempton has already commented in the *Post* on the singular discrepancies between Salisbury's stories of the Moscow mood on Stalin's death at the time and his recollections of that mood now. Many of Salisbury's excursions into political analysis seem naively melodramatic, even for the Soviet Union. His character sketches have an improbably Sunday supplement quality. One is really staggered when he detects "a touch of little Lord Fauntleroy" in Malenkov.

Nonetheless the first article in the series in an exceedingly important document. It has an analytical force which distinguishes it from the somewhat helter-skelter pieces following, as if Salisbury in this first piece were registering, not his own slapdash views, but the considered conclusions of more thoughtful observers. There obviously must be significance in Salisbury's careful statements that the essentials of the article had been "faithfully reported to Washington by United States diplomatic observers on the scene in Moscow" and that for the most part the conclusions "do not differ in fundamentals from those that the State Department has received from its own experts." It is not to be forgotten that the present American Ambassador in Moscow, Charles E. Bohlen, is the most experienced and brilliant student of Soviet affairs in the Foreign Service.

What emerges from the Salisbury piece is a basic critique of United States foreign policy. In essence, his argument suggests,

of United States foreign policy. In essence, his argument endorses what emerges from the Soviiet piece is a basic critique service.

experienced and proficient student of Soviet affairs in the foreign
present American Ambassador in Moscow, Charles E. Borden, is the most
believed to Washington by United States diplomatic operators on the
ments that the essentials of the article had been "totally re-
There obviously must be significance in Soviety's certain state-
views, put the considered conclusions of more thoughtful operators.
Soviety in this first piece were registering, not his own self-de-
prises it from the somewhat pelten-akeller pieces following, as it
inately important document. It has an analytical force which classi-
nonetheless the first article in the series in an exceed-

ROA.

Served when he detected "a ton of little port Mitchellery" in Menon-
pane an improperlyرامسيament quality. One is really a
meformatic, even for the Soviet Union. His character sketches
Malk of Soviety's excommunication into political analysis seem naive
staff's death at the time and his recollections of that mood now.
discrepancies between Soviety's stories of the Moscow mog on
Mark Kembson has already commenced in the East on the singular
Times will undoubtedly raise many questions and many eyebrows.

The Harrison Soviety series onNEWS in the New York

HISTORY OF THE AMEM

September 23, 1934

SEP 24 1934

2

we are in trouble today because we are combatting the Russia of Malenkov with the methods we developed to combat the Russia of Stalin. Where the new Soviet regime displays flexibility, we display rigidity. Where it is undertaking new departures in its world tactics, we are still defending ourselves against the Soviet line of another era. We are, in effect, more faithful to Stalin than they: While we cling inflexibly to our Stalin age policies, they move within the Soviet Union itself to repudiate striking symbols of Stalin and his era. As a result of our rigidity, we have been increasingly left stranded in the new mood generated by new Soviet attitudes. And the result of this is to weaken our leadership, divide the coalition of free nations and soften up the free world for further Soviet expansion.

Though Salisbury emphasizes his belief that there has been no basic change in Soviet purposes, he does perhaps place the tactical changes in a more benign context than might occur to other observers. Yet the evidence he accumulates for the tactical changes is impressive. It does not suggest that there is no Soviet problem as some Europeans under the spell of the new dispensation seem to think. But it does suggest that there is in important respects, a different Soviet problem. And it suggests that the much-touted process of "agonizing reappraisal" in Washington might well begin with a new appreciation of the changes in Soviet methods.

Herblock made the definitive comment on John Foster Dulles in his memorable cartoon this week "A Fellow Can't Remember To Take Everything" -- Dulles dashing away to Europe, briefcase in hand, with his head left behind on the table. U.S. policy-makers have gotten so involved in the processes of policy-making that they really

["Gotten so involved in the process of policy-making that they really\nwith the people left behind on the table. U. S. policy-makers have\nhelpfully \"... Duffieςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςςς\nin his memorable cartoon this week \"A Yellow Can't Remember So Take\nHerlock made the definitive comment on John Teeter 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tend to forget the objectives. If we are going to restore the western
coalition, we had better try to refresh our recollection of what our
purposes are.

Under the Truman administration we were committed to a
policy of building strength in order to provide the basis for stabi-
lization. Negotiation, in General Marshall's words, could not pro-
duce settlements, but it could reflect them. Even the Soviet Union
would have to respect agreements which were guaranteed by the hard
actualities of power. But in the last years of the Truman adminis-
tration the notion of strength as a prelude to negotiation began to
slip away. Under Eisenhower and Dulles it has vanished entirely.

The error of current U.S. policy is to believe in strength
and not in negotiation, just as the error of too many Europeans is
to believe in negotiation and not in strength. (I should add, of
course, that the Eisenhower administration, in practice, does not
even believe in enough strength.) Our rigidity made less difference
when it was confronted by the greater rigidity of Stalin. But the
contrast with Malenkov's supposed flexibility -- what Salisbury calls
his "old-fashioned grace and courtesy" -- is another matter.

We should never be afraid to enter a conference with the
Communists. Conferences are often the best way to reassure our
friends about our own purposes as well as to remind them of the
nature of the enemy. And we must develop fresh approaches in foreign
policy which acknowledge the change in Soviet tactics and which match
Malenkov not just in grace and courtesy but in intelligence and
adaptability.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, Jr.

VIRGIL SCHREIBING, 11.

adaptability.

Melnikov not that in grace and courtesy put in intelligence and
brevity which acknowledge the change in Soviet states and which match
nature of the enemy. And we must develop these abrogations in foreign
trials apart our own purposes as well as to heating them of the
Communists. Conferences are often the best way to have some one
We should never be able to enter a conference with the
old-traditional grace and courtesy "-- it is another matter.

Contrast with Melnikov's abrogated flexibility -- what Sollny calls
when it was confronted by the greater rigidity of Stalin. But the
even believe in enough strength.) Our might make less difference
course, put the Meidenow administration, in practice, does not
to believe in negotiation and not in strength. (I should add, of
and not in negotiation, that as the error of so many European is
the error of current U.S. policy is to believe in a strengthened
allied week. Under Meidenow and Dull as it has averaged entirely.

triumph the notion of strength as a prelude to negotiation begun to
actualize of power. But in the last years of the Truman administration
would have to respect agreements which were guaranteed by the past
grace settlements, but it could reflect them. Even the Soviet Union
falsification. Negotiation, in General Marshall's words, could not be-
policy of putting strength in order to provide the paste for a staff
Under the Truman administration we were committed to a
brinkshoes are.

cooperation, we had better try to reach our recollection of what our
tend to forget the objectives. If we are going to restore the western

OCT 7 1954

OCTOBER 7, 1954

HISTORY OF THE WEEK

The battle for Germany resumed this week with new intensity. At London the western powers agreed on a program for German rearmament. The Soviet Union promptly replied by sending Molotov to East Berlin with new proposals for German neutralization and reunification. The contest for the support of 70 million people in the heart of Europe is now in full swing.

Should the West have pressed for German rearmament? I do not often disagree with the editorial columns of the POST, but I am compelled to file a dissent on Tuesday's editorial questioning the whole idea of German rearmament. The POST contended that German ground forces are no longer necessary; "the great irrationality is the West's obsession with conventional German rearmament in an age of atomic weapons." This seems to me an incorrect deduction from the changed strategic situation.

The fact of the matter, as I see it, is that, so long as the United States held an atomic monopoly, there was no overwhelming case for German rearmament. The Soviet Union could not risk any action in Europe which might provoke total war and its own total destruction; the atom bomb, as Churchill so often pointed out, saved Western Europe from Communist aggression in the years after the war. In this context, Dean Acheson's campaign for German rearmament beginning in 1950 was based on a mistaken calculation of priorities. German rearmament was bound to come some time; but it did not deserve the intense emphasis it received in Washington in the months after Korea.

Korea.

The intense competition it received in Washington in the months after German rearmament was bound to come some time; but it did not deserve gaining in 1920 was behind a mistaken calculation of priorities. In this context, Dean Acheson's comment for German rearmament pe-

Western Europe from Communist aggression in the years after the war. Deprivation: the atom bomb, as Churchill so often pointed out, saved reaction in Europe which might broke off war and its own total ease for German rearmament. The Soviet Union could not risk any the United States held an atomic bomb.

The fact of the matter, as I see it, is that, so long as the changed strategic situation, of atomic weapons. " This seems to me an incorrect deduction from the West's operation with conventional German rearmament in an area around Korea are no longer necessary: "the great irrationality is whole idea of German rearmament. The POST contended that German compelled to live a diet on Tuesday's editorial questioning the not often disagree with the editorial columns of the POST, but I am sure the West have blessed the German rearmament? I do not think so.

The contest for the sobriest of 30 million people in the near future with new proposals for German rearmament and remit-ment. The Soviet Union promptly replied by sending Molotov to West-Vietnam the second proposals agreed on a broad front for German terms. The paffo for Germany resurged this week with new intensities.

HISTORY OF THE WEEK

OCTOBER 3, 1924

OCT 3 1924

2

The Soviet achievement of atomic weapons, however, has basically altered the problem. Far from dispensing with the need for German conventional forces, the Soviet atomic and thermonuclear stockpiles are precisely the things that render German rearmament necessary. For the age of atomic plenty cancels out the advantages enjoyed by the United States between 1945 and 1950. Our A-bombs and H-bombs could be *flourished* freely when the enemy had none. But we will use them much less readily now to defend the Elbe when their use may well mean the thermonuclear obliteration of New York and Washington.

The great probability, in short, is that American and Soviet atomic strength will neutralize each other. This will then give the military advantage to the side which has the greatest conventional armed strength. If western conventional strength remains feeble, then the Soviet Union, operating under the shield of its own atomic power, may well be emboldened into new pecking at the western periphery. We have no choice but to build up our own conventional strength, equalling the Russian strength, but in the hope of not in the hope of deterring Moscow from unnecessary provocation.

There are only three possible courses with regard to Germany. One is the policy of neutralization, proposed by some in both the West and the East. But this can be a persuasive policy only to those who believe that the Soviet Union will be more inclined to respect a disarmed Germany than a strong Germany. If we know anything, we know that a power vacuum creates an irresistible temptation for Communist expansion.

Communist expansion.

know that a power vacuum creates an indefinite temptation for a classified Germany then a strong Germany. It is known something, we who believe that the Soviet Union will be more inclined to respect West and the East. But this can be a dangerous policy only to those who are the policy of neutralization, proposed by some in both the West and the East. But this can be a dangerous policy only to those who are the policy of neutralization, proposed by some in both the West and the East.

There are only three possible connections with regard to Germany.

not in the hope of determining Moscow from unnecessary provocation.

beyond. We have no choice but to put up our own conventional strength.

brower, may well be emboldened into new backing at the western front - then the Soviet Union, operating under the shield of its own atomic armed strength. It western conventional strength remains weak, military advantage to the side which has the greatest conventional atomic strength will neutralize each other. This will then give the

The greatest propeller, in sport, is that American and Soviet Washington.

we will see them much less ready now to defend the side when they and H-pomps could be dominated. Then when the enemy had none. But exploited by the United States between 1942 and 1950. Our V-pomps necessarily, for the age of atomic power, cancel out the advantages stockpiles are precisely the things that render German recruitment German conventional forces, the Soviet atomic and thermonuclear, easily offset the problems.

War from gabzeining with the need for

The Soviet achievement of atomic weapons, however, was past.

5

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A second possibility would be the continuation of the present policy of using British, American and French troops to defend West Germany. But this policy makes no long-run sense. As Mendes-France has put it, "It would be paradoxical to organize a common defense system on the Elbe River and not allow the Germans to take part in it. More than that, it would give them a kind of economic advantage which would be very bad for other countries in competition for world trade."

This leaves West German rearmament -- the course adopted at London. This course has its risks and disadvantages. Its worst result will no doubt to be validate the Soviet satellite armies, whose participation in the Russian war plans would probably otherwise be half-hearted and unreliable.

But the commitment of Britain to the continental defense arrangements and the provisions for armaments control should much reduce the risks of German rearmament. And, on net, the London Agreement seems a sensible solution to a tough problem. Its successful negotiation underlines the foolishness of Washington's rigid and unyielding insistence on EDC, as if there could be no other means of achieving the objective.

Yet the London Agreement will not be enough to counter Molotov's speech in East Berlin. It should surely have been accompanied by some new western initiative on the subject of German unification; for unification appeals to Germans at the moment far more than rearmament. We could even afford to make our position on German unity more flexible, since evacuation could mean a fateful setback for the Russians, not only because of the loss of valuable uranium deposits, but because of the demoralizing effect in other satellite states of a retreat in East Germany.

["not exist in East Germany.", "because of the demarcation effect in other satellite states or a\nstate, not only because of the loss of valuable mineral deposits, but\nflexible, since evacuation could mean a fatal attack for the US-\nmament. We could even attempt to make our position on German unity more\nfor unification schemes to Germany at the moment far more serious.\nBy some new western initiative on the subject of German unification;\nto be spoken in East Berlin. It should�ve been accompanied\nby some new western initiative on the subject of German un

We owe Eden and Mendes-France one more debt for rescuing
the western alliance. But the London Agreement represents only the
start, and not the end, of a creative European policy.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

ARTHUR SCHREIBER, JR.

start, and not the end, of a creative European policy.
the western alliance. But the London Agreement represents only the
We one United and United-Europe one more apart for achieving

October 13, 1954

Dear Arthur:

Here is Mrs. Harrison's address:

Mrs. G. A. Harrison, 3556 Macomb St. N. W., Washington,
D. C.

Apparently the Trustees are meeting October 23.

I will, of course, appreciate anything you can do. If
your office is swamped, please let me know and I
will send my secretary over for you to dictate to her.

Sincerely,

October 7, 1954

Dear Chet:

I am writing now on a different subject from the one
which has been concerning us recently. I think you
are aware of the magazine CONFLUENCE which has been pub-
lished here at Harvard for some years. CONFLUENCE has
been in chronic financial straits since its beginning.
On the other hand, it has done, in my judgment, a unique
job in restoring the dialogue between American and Euro-
pean intellectuals; and it has had an impact in pro-
jecting the image of a serious and responsible America
out of all proportion to the investment of funds re-
quired to keep it going. I understand that you have
some say in the policy of the Rockefeller Foundation
so I thought I would draw the CONFLUENCE situation to
your attention. (The editor of CONFLUENCE, by the way,
is Henry Kissinger, the author of the memorandum on
foreign policy which I recently sent to you.)

The influence of CONFLUENCE, as I suggested, seems to
me really to have been considerable. A number of leading
literary and political figures in Europe have contri-
buted to it -- individuals as diverse as Malraux, Mora-
via, Raymond Aron, Dick Crossman, Jaspers and Buber.
Americans of similar stature have engaged in discussion
with them. The rate of reprints has been considerable;
and leading European newspapers have devoted editorials
and sometimes even full pages to discussing CONFLUENCE.
The Letter to the Editor column, published at the back
of each CONFLUENCE, gives further indication of its im-
pact, as do the extracts from reader's reactions which I
enclose.

Ever since its inception CONFLUENCE has been confronted
with a financial crisis. It was started with $5000 and
has never had more than $20,000 at one time. Moreover,
existence has always been so hand-to-mouth that the
editor has been unable to plan issues sufficiently far
ahead or to capitalize on the response that has been

upset or to capitalize on the resource that has been
editor for the past decade to build a base sufficiently far
into the future that has always been so proud to be a part of the
existence of the magazine. It was started with $2000 and
has since its inception CONFLUENCE has been continued
exclusively.

back, as do the extracts from longer reactions which I
of each CONFLUENCE. Gives further indication of its im-
portant to the Editor column, expounded at the back
and sometimes even full pages to disseminating CONFLUENCE.
and leading Enrobed newspapers have devoted editorials
with them. The rate of subscriptions has been considerable:
various of similar magazines have engaged in dissemination
via. Raymond Aron, Dick Crossman, Teabere and Super.
paid to it -- individuals as diverse as Metron, Morn-
literary and political figures in Enrobed have contri-
buted to have been considerable. A number of leading
The influence of CONFLUENCE, as I have stated, seems to
forego bottom which I recently sent to you.)

is Henry Kiefer, the author of the memorandum on
your attention. (The editor of CONFLUENCE, by the way,
as I thought I would draw the CONFLUENCE attention to
some way in the body of the Rockefeller Foundation
dated to feed it out.) I understand that you have
one of your proportion to the investment of your re-
toring the image of a serious and reasonable American
but ineffective one; and it has had an impact in bro-
top in restoring the dialogue between America and Euro-
On the other hand, it has gone, in my judgment, aoid
been in active financial straits since its beginning.

Indeed here at Harvard for some years. CONFLUENCE has
the same of the magazine CONFLUENCE which has been sup-
ply been good concerning me recently. I think you
I am writing now on a different subject from the one
Dear Sirs:

October 3, 1924

OCT 15 1954

October 15, 1954

Dear Mrs. Harrison

I am presuming on a slight acquaintance with you at an
ADA meeting some years ago in Chicago -- and a somewhat
longer acquaintance with your husband --to write you
concerning a situation here at Harvard which is giving
me some concern. For some time the International Seminar
of the Harvard Summer School has been publishing a maga-
zine called CONFLUENCE. I understand that copies of this
magazine have been sent to you. CONFLUENCE has done, in
my judgment, a unique job in restoring the dialogue be-
tween American and European intellectuals. Its impact in
projecting abroad the image of a serious and responsible
America has been out of all proportion to the investment
of funds required to keep it going. Yet CONFLUENCE has
been in chronic financial straits since the beginning.
It is because this undertaking might fall within the or-
bit of the Blaine Foundation that I am taking the liberty
of calling this to your attention.

The influence of CONFLUENCE, as I suggested, seems to me
really to have been considerable. A number of leading
literary and political figures in Europe have contributed
to it -- individuals as diverse as Malraux, Moravia, Ray-
mond Aron, Dick Crossman, Jaspers and Buber. Americans
of similar stature have engaged in discussion with them.

The rate of reprints has been considerable; and leading
European newspapers have devoted editorials and sometimes
even full pages to discussing CONFLUENCE. The Letters to
the Editor column, published at the back of each CONFLUENCE,
gives further indication of its impact, as do the extracts
from reader's reactions which I enclose.

Ever since its inception CONFLUENCE has been confronted
with a financial crisis. It was started with $5000 and
has never had more than $20,000 at one time. Moreover,
existence has always been so hand-to-mouth that the editor
has been unable to plan issues sufficiently far ahead or
to capitalize on the response that has been evoked.

so capitalize on the reason that he has backed
his position into a blank lease sufficiently far ahead or
experience has always been so rough-to-month that the editor
has never had more than $20,000 of one time. Moreover,
with a financial criteria. It was started with $2000 and
over since its inception. CONJUNGHON has been contrasted
from reason's reactions about I enunciate.

Give further indication of its impact, as do the extracts
the Editor column, amplified at the back of each CONJUNGHON,
even though degrees to discounting CONJUNGHON. The matter to
Unions newspaper have devoted editorials and sometimes
The issue of requiring has been considerable; and leading
of similar articles have engaged in discussion with them.

mong you, Dick Grossman, Teague and Bupper. Americans
to it -- individuals as diverse as Warrick, Moravia, Hal-
liday and political figures in some have contributed
益 to have been considerable. A number of leading
The influence of CONJUNGHON, as I argued, seems to me
of cifying to your attention.

Of the main reason I am taking the liberty
of in exercise financial arguments since the beginning.
It is because this undertaking might well attain the aim
of giving a requirement to feed it going. Let CONJUNGHON do
America has been out of all direction to the investment
protecting abroad the image of a serious and reasonable
free American and European infidelities. Its impact in
my judgment, a unique top in restoring the dialogue be-
longs to the Harvard Amherst School has been fortifying a me-
me some concern. For some time the International Seminar
concerning a situation here at Harvard which is giving
longer significance with your guidance -- so write you
ADY meeting some days ago in Chicago -- and a somewhat
I am dreaming on a slight significance with you at an

Dear Mrs. Harrison

October 12, 1924

OCT 12 1924