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THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE AMBASSADOR

Jackson Subcommittee Papers on the Conduct of American Foreign Policy

Edited by Senator Henry M. Jackson. Now in book form—the authoritative staff reports and hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations. "Should command careful study by officials and students."—The New York Times

1964

203 pp.

P-181/$1.95

THE AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE

An Interpretation

Alexander DeConde "Illuminating and well-written interpretation of the history of the President's lieutenant in the field of foreign relations."

—New York Herald Tribune

1962

192 pp.

U-520/$1.75

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE
UNITED STATES ABROAD

Revised Edition

Edited by Vincent M. Barnett, Jr. The original background papers for the Ninth American Assembly—now rewritten to assess the continuing problems and policy questions posed by the enlarged and changing nature of U.S. overseas representation. Published for the American Assembly, Columbia University

1965

265 pp.

U-572/$1.95

IN PURSUIT OF WORLD ORDER

U.S. Foreign Policy and International Organizations

Richard N. Gardner Introduction by Harlan Cleveland "An admirable guide to the intentions and hopes of the United States in the United Nations. IN PURSUIT OF WORLD ORDER offers a lucid, readable, and authoritative account of the present status of international organization, its problems and its responsibilities."—ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., in The New Republic

1965

281 pp.

P-175/$1.95

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Gabriel A. Almond "This is an important book. No previous analysis has penetrated deeper in the heart of an immensely important problem, the problem of public opinion and the conduct of foreign affairs."

—Saturday Review

1960

299 pp.

U-546/$2.25

U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

A Short History

Edwin Lieuwen The author of *Arms and Politics in Latin America* traces the major stages of U.S. policy, from the isolationism of the Monroe Doctrine through the intervention in the Dominican Republic.

1965

150 pp.

U-592/$1.75

THE AMERICAN SOUTH IN THE 1960's

Edited by Avery Leiserson "Sixteen authorities . . . present both a penetrating study of the political South over the past decade and an assessment of its future."

—Western Political Quarterly

1964

258 pp.

P-157/$1.95

THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY

A Critical History

Irving Howe and Lewis Coser Detailed, analytic history from 1919 to the present. "There is no other single volume of comparable merit and scope."

—HARRY SCHWARTZ, in The New York Times

1962

612 pp.

PPS-64/$2.95

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The College Department

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A Concise History

H. C. Allen, *Commonwealth Fund Professor of American History, University of London*

Now in paperback—H. C. Allen’s unanimously praised new history of the United States—a brilliantly concise, uniquely objective work that should be the ideal basic text for the American history survey course. From a review of the clothbound edition, published early in 1965: “Professor Allen is a discerning historian and acute critic in the Bryce-Brogan tradition. . . . This book is not only a history of the American past, but also a penetrating study of its present, written with grace, authority, and a rare sense of perspective.”—JOHN BARKHAM, *Saturday Review Syndicate*

H. C. Allen has taught and lectured at Harvard, Johns Hopkins, and the universities of California, Virginia, and Rochester.

1965

399 pp.

3 maps

U-580/$2.95

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

Fourth Revised Edition

Ernest S. Griffith, *Dean of the School of International Service, The American University*

A best-seller from the time it became the third Praeger Paperback, in 1959, this text is today an acknowledged leader in the American government field. Now, Dr. Griffith has largely rewritten the book to include important new material on the judiciary and the Supreme Court, the role of political parties and Presidential elections, and the changes wrought in our governmental structure by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

"A remarkably compact book by one of the true experts in our discipline. Its compactness is as desirable and admirable as it is deceptive. It is full of insight and reaches the essence of the American system of government."—HENRY J. ABRAHAM, *Professor in Political Science, The University of Pennsylvania*

"The best short text in American government now available."—PROFESSOR PAUL P. VAN RIPER, *Cornell University*

1965

179 pp.

U-502/$1.95

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER

111 FOURTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10003

Like its widely adopted predecessor, *The Secretary of State and the Ambassador, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL* is a landmark in Congressional investigative studies. In this succinct volume, analysis, opinion, and suggestions for improvement in the workings of the Council are offered by some of its most distinguished members and ex-members, and by the Senators on the Subcommittee on National Policy Operations, from whose hearings these papers are drawn. Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, Nelson Rockefeller, Robert Lovett, Thomas Gates, McGeorge Bundy, and many others offer their views on Cabinet decision-making, the executive offices, and the Council itself; the Subcommittee staff reports, which are also included, provide a concise bipartisan survey of how national-security problems must be approached and what solutions may be possible.

1965

311 pp.

P-195/$2.50

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I. The Nature of Modern Power

1. Escalation as a Strategy, by Herman Kahn

2. The Delicate Balance of Terror, by Albert Wohlstetter

I. The Presumed Automatic Balance

II. The Quantitative Nature of the Problem and the Uncertainties

III. The Delicacy of the Balance of Terror

IV. The Uses and Risks of Bases Close to the Soviet Union

V. Deterrence, Accidents, and Disarmament

3. The Theory and Practice of Deterrence, by Arthur Waskow

The Counter-force Theory of Deterrence

Objections to the Counter-force Theory

The Combined-Deterrent Theory

Objections to the Combined-Deterrent Theory

The Theories Confounded

Necessary Practical Steps for Congress

4. Quantitative Analysis and National Security, by James R. Schlesinger

I

II

III

IV

V

II. Strategic Doctrine and United States Defense Policy

5. The Spectrum of Defense, by Robert S. McNamara

6. Our Defense Needs: The Long View, by Roswell L. Gilpatric

I

II

III

7. American Deterrent Policy, by Alain C. Enthoven

NATO Strategy--Conventional Forces

The Nature of the Soviet Threat

Implications for NATO Strategy

Effects on the NATO Deterrent

Amount of Conventional Force

Control of Nuclear Weapons

Nature of the Problem

Appraisal of Sharing of Planning

Appraisal of National Nuclear Forces

Appraisal of a Multilateral Integrated Force

NATO Machinery

14. U.S. Strategy and the Defense of Europe, by Pierre M. Gallois

Soviet Acquisition of the ICBM

The Continuum of Conventional and Atomic Weapons

Invulnerable Retaliatory Weapons

Incompatibility Between Nuclear and Conventional Weapons

Contradictions on U.S. Policy toward NATO

Increase in Conventional Forces

The Pause Concept

Limiting Weapons Modernization

Tactical Nuclear Support from Outside Europe

Nuclear Disengagement and the Multilateral Force

A Conventional or Nuclear Defense?

13. The Multilateral Force: An Historical Perspective, by Alastair Buchanan

I

II

III

IV

August 20, 1965

1. "Escalation as a Strategy," by Herman Kahn. Here I think all you need is a brief explanation of why, in fact, this is a good essay to begin the whole book with. Perhaps you can weave in a few sentences about his general position and theories over the years.

Herman Kahn began his career as a mathematician and physicist. From 1948 until 1961, he was with the RAND Corporation, where he served as a senior physicist. He has been a consultant to the Atomic Energy Commission, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and various private firms. Mr. Kahn's writings have appeared in numerous journals both here and abroad; he is also the author of the best-selling *On Thermonuclear War* (1960), a book that urged the U.S. to take civil-defense measures to ensure survival in the event of nuclear war; *Thinking about the Unthinkable* (1962); and *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios* (1965). He is presently Director of the Hudson Institute, a policy-research organization that analyzes international affairs for the Pentagon and other clients.

2. "The Delicate Balance of Terror," by Albert Wohlstetter. I think it imperative that you make clear *when* this article was written (1958) and in what way it reflects or transcends the issues of that year. Otherwise it is confusing to plunge straight into it after the 1965 Kahn.

Albert Wohlstetter, formerly a senior staff member of the RAND Corporation, is now University Professor at the University of Chicago. During World War II, he was a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a consultant to the War Production Board. He was an advisor to the U.S. delegation at Geneva during the 1958 discussions with the USSR on prevention of surprise attack. He has written numerous RAND reports and journal articles on deterrence, technology, and national strategy. (Incidentally, this is how the Wohlstetter is introduced in a competing textbook:

"A.W. describes the difficult military requirements which must be met if a deterrence policy is to work. A potential attacker will not be stopped by contemplating the prewar might of his adversary. His calculations will assess probable residual forces remaining to the victim after the attacker's first strike." This kind of brief remark is helpful, although *this* one is inane.)

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3. "The Theory and Practice of Deterrence," by Arthur Waskow. Again, I think it would be good if you pointed out what point of view this represents, as expressed four years later than the preceding Wohlstetter, etc., why this point of view is significant, etc.

Arthur Waskow, the author of *The Limits of Defense* and co-author of *America in Hiding*, is a member of the Senior Staff of the Peace Research Institute, Washington, D. C.

4. "Quantitative Analysis and National Security," by James R. Schlesinger. I imagine the poor illiterate reader will have to be told why this subject is so important, why it is relevent to "Problems of National Strategy," where it came from, etc. Schlesinger rather plunges in medias res, so something must precede it along this line.

5. "The Spectrum of Defense," by Robert McNamara. You might point out that this speech was delivered four days before Kennedy's death. I don't think you need more than a brief sentence or two about why and how it is characteristically Kennedy-esque and McNamara-ian. Could you refer to the Ann Arbor speech and any further modifications of policy this represents, or that sort of thing?

6. "Our Defense Needs: The Long View," by Roswell L. Gilpatric.

7. "American Deterrent Policy," by Alain C. Enthoven.

With both of these, I think you need only briefly point out the authors' "high official" status and the ways in which their articles reflect U.S. policy on given major points, how defense policy has changed regarding these major issues, etc. I suppose one could point out a bit about their careers, if you feel it is relevant--Gilpatric's previous term of office as Under Secretary of the Air Force, lawyer in New York City, etc., Enthoven's job as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Systems Analysis, and his former jobs at RAND and Brookings.

8. "Defense Against Ballistic Missiles," by Freeman J. Dyson. I suppose a short word on the "expert witness" stature of the author, perhaps a word or two on scientists and national strategy? I think one might also mention the present status of ABM and what have you.

Freeman J. Dyson, an English physicist, came to this country in 1951. He is presently Professor of Physics, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J. He has served as a consultant to the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

9. "Nuclears, NATO, and the New Strategy," by Thomas C. Schelling.

In these and all the following essays on NATO, I really can't presume to suggest what should be in the introductory notes. Whatever

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you feel is a suitable short preface explaining the author's position,
the importance of the particular article, etc. Perhaps some
chronology can be woven in to clarify the changes over the past years.

Thomas C. Schelling is Professor of Economics at Harvard and
a faculty member of the university's Center for International
Affairs. Dr. Schelling, now a member of the Scientific Advisory
Board of the U.S. Air Force, has served with the Economic
Cooperation Administration and the FA and in many other posts
related to the national security and foreign policy. He is
author of *The Strategy of Conflict* and co-author of *Strategy
and Arms Control*.

10. "Nuclear Sharing: NATO the n + 1 Country," by Albert Wohlstetter. See above for biographical data on Wohlstetter. No need to repeat it.

11. "Nuclear Strategic Options and European Force Participation," by Malcolm W. Hoag.

Malcolm W. Hoag is a staff member of the Economics Department
of the RAND Corporation. A former Professor of Foreign Affairs
at the National War College, he is a long-time student of NATO
problems, of national strategy, military operations, and
economics of defense policy.

12. "Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance," by Robert R. Bowie.

Robert R. Bowie is Director of the Center for International
Affairs and Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs
at Harvard University. He was formerly General Counsel and
Special Adviser to the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany;
Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State; and
Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning.

13. "U.S. Strategy and the Defense of Europe," by Pierre M. Gallois.

General Pierre Gallois, former Deputy Chief of the French Air
Staff, has served as an adviser to the French Government on
military and nuclear affairs and as a member of the Planning
Group of SHAPE. He is the author of *Strategy in the Nuclear Age*
and other studies.

14. "The Multilateral Force: An Historical Perspective," by Alastair Buchan.

Alastair Buchan is a former Assistant Editor of *The Economist*
and has served as Washington, diplomatic and defense correspondent
for *The Observer* (London). Presently the Director of the
Institute for Strategic Studies in London, he is the author of
*NATO in the 1960's* (1960; rev. ed., 1963).

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15. "What Price Conventional Capabilities in Europe?," by Bernard Brodie.

Bernard Brodie is a senior staff member of the RAND Corporation and lecturer at the University of California. During the years 1945-61, he was Professor of International Relations at Yale University. He is the author of *Sea Power in the Machine Age*, *The Absolute Weapon*, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, and *A Guide to Naval Strategy*. He is a frequent lecturer at war colleges in England, France and the United States.

16. "Unconventional Warfare," by J. K. Zawodny. Here I think the reader perhaps needs a sort of bridge passage relating the previous sections of the book to this one, relating "unconventional warfare" to the other kinds of warfare that are discussed in most of the rest of the book. Incidentally, I am a bit concerned about the part-title that covers this and Lindsay's article: "National Security Policy, Neutralism, and Counter-Insurgency Warfare." It seems rather more broad than these two articles actually are. Is there any way of rectifying this?

J. K. Zawodny is Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania. He fought for four years in the Polish underground movement during World War II and is the author of *Death in the Forest: the Katyn Forest Massacre*.

17. "Unconventional Warfare," by Franklin Lindsay. You might say here that although the title is similar to Zawodny's, the article is really about counterinsurgency.

Franklin Lindsay was chief of the U.S. military mission to Yugoslavia in 1945. The author of the study on the National Security Council prepared by the second Hoover Commission and a member of the Rockefeller Special Studies panel on economic policy, he is presently President of the ITEK Corporation.

18. "Managing the Arms Race," by Thomas C. Schelling. As in the other sections, I think all we need is a brief summary of the major issues and how Schelling reflects them, etc. A few facts about the history of disarmament efforts would not be amiss, I suppose. Biographical data above, no need to repeat.

19. "Minimal Deterrent vs. Saturation Parity," by Leo Szilard. What is needed most is an elucidation of the vocabulary, I imagine, and how it has changed over the years. Szilard's position in the "defense establishment" could be clarified.

Leo Szilard, who died in early 1965, was Professor Emeritus of Biophysics, the University of Chicago, and a Fellow of the Salk Institute for Biological Studies. Born in Hungary, he came to the United States in 1937. With Enrico Fermi, he devised the

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chain-reaction system used to create the first atomic explosion--
the work of the famed Manhattan Project at the University of
Chicago. In 1959 he was awarded the Atoms for Peace Award. He
was the initiator and co-chairman of the Scientists Committee
for the Council for a Livable World.

20. "Nuclear Testing and Disarmament," by John F. Kennedy.

21. "The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Symbol of a New Course," by Dean Rusk. Perhaps just a few comments on the history leading up to the resumption of testing in the first case, and the treaty in the second. The introductory remarks, in other words, need only set the stage--as opposed to those for some of the other chapters, where the vocabulary needs a bit of explaining or the subject matter some elucidation.

22. "The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," by Edward Teller. Perhaps you
could indicate how much support Teller's position actually had, as
well as Teller's particular role in the debate on national strategy.
Edward Teller, a physicist born in Hungary who came to the
United States in 1935, was a prominent figure in the history
of the development of the atomic bomb--both at Chicago and
Los Alamos. He has been Professor of Physics at the University
of California since he left Los Alamos in 1951, and he is
associate director of the Radiation Laboratory at Livermore,
California.

23. "The National Security Council," by the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. I think a short history of the work of the Subcommittee, its exemplary Congressional review of Executive policymaking, and the effects of its reports would be in order. It should be pointed out that this staff report was issued in 1960, that Kennedy walked into the White House with it under his arm, etc., and that he actually carried out many of its suggested reforms--abolishing the OCB, etc. (I enclose some copy from one of our volumes of the Jackson Subcommittee papers, from which you might want to crib.)

24. "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Military Unification," by Roswell Gilpatric. A few facts about the most recent history of this issue will help, but the comments need not be more than perfunctory. It might be well to indicate where, in the spectrum of opinion on this subject, Gilpatric stands.

25. "Inter-service Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services," by Samuel P. Huntington. Here again, just a brief identification of the author's position and the history of the issue is enough.

Mr. Huntington is Professor of Government, Harvard University.
He has been a Research Associate of the Brookings Institution

August 24, 1965

Mrs. Elisabeth Sifton
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.
111 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York 10003

Dear Elisabeth:

I am enclosing the introductory notes for each
article and a revision of the Introduction. The
Introduction should now be set up as follows:

Sections I and II should be my introductory
statement. Thereafter, the sections on Alliances, etc.
should introduce the readings on each subject. The two
pages of conclusion, p. 57-58, should follow all the
readings.

I am assuming that the Introductory notes for each
article precede the article.

All of this has turned out to be much more work than
I bargained for originally primarily because Maury Feld
turned out to be a complete washout. I would, therefore,
like to ask you to keep any other demands to a minimum.

You will also notice that I have shifted some of the
articles around. I have indicated this on the enclosed
outline.

Best regards.

Henry V. Klaasager

Sincerely yours,

Best regards.

outline.
articles around. I have indicated this on the enclosed
You will also notice that I have omitted some of the
like to ask you to keep any other demand to a minimum.
turned out to be a complete washout. I would, therefore,
I bargained for originally primarily because Harry held
All of this has turned out to be much more work than
article precedes the article.

I am assuming that the introductory notes for each
readings.

pages of conclusion, p. 27-28, should follow all the
should introduce the readings on each subject. The two
statements. Thereafter, the sections on Alliances, etc.
Sections I and II should be my introductory

Introduction should now be set up as follows:
article and a revision of the Introduction. The

Dear Elizabeth:

New York, New York 10003
111 Fourth Avenue
Frederick V. Praeger, Inc.
Mrs. Elizabeth Sitton

August 24, 1992

BIOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL (corrected)

August 20, 1965

"A.W. describes the difficult military requirements which must be met if a deterrence policy is to work. A potential attacker will not be stopped by contemplating the prewar might of his adversary. His calculations will assess probable residual forces remaining to the victim after the attacker's first strike." This kind of brief remark is helpful, although *this one* is inane.)

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5. "The Spectrum of Defense," by Robert McNamara. You might point out that this speech was delivered four days before Kennedy's death. I don't think you need more than a brief sentence or two about why and how it is characteristically Kennedy-esque and McNamara-like. Could you refer to the Ann Arbor speech and any further modifications of policy this represents, or that sort of thing?

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Bernard Brodie is a senior staff member of the RAND Corporation and lecturer at the University of California. During the years 1945-61, he was Professor of International Relations at Yale University. He is the author of *Sea Power in the Machine Age*, *The Absolute Weapon, Strategy in the Missile Age*, and *A Guide to Naval Strategy*. He is a frequent lecturer at war colleges in England, France and the United States.

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August 23, 1965

1. "Escalation as a Strategy" by Herman Kahn.

"Escalation as a Strategy" provides a comprehensive presentation of the range of conceivable international conflict beginning with official expressions of disagreement and concluding with resort to all-out violence. The approach is analytical and descriptive, not narrative. National security policy is treated as a logical and reasoned extension of foreign policy. In Mr. Kahn's view escalation is a process whereby measures which individually appear logical and reasonable generate a momentum of their own. Mr. Kahn's essay represents a substantial evolution of his earlier point of view. On Thermonuclear War, published in 1960, tended to treat war as a catastrophe whose effects could, to a considerable degree, be controlled and modified by rational and painstaking planning and preparation. The most serious danger lay in a widespread view that thermonuclear war was incalculable. Such an attitude would guarantee a catastrophe if war did break out for whatever reason.

"Escalation as a Strategy" examines thermonuclear war from another perspective: as the "next step" in a process whose previous stages have appeared to be obvious, logical and justifiable. In On Thermonuclear War, Kahn warned that if thermonuclear war was considered "different" so as to be incalculable, the result might invite disaster. In "Escalation as a Strategy" he shows how assimilating thermonuclear war into the conventions of "the manipulation of violence" can cause the chief actors to slide towards the abyss because they lose the ability to make vital distinctions.

This article was written in 1958, when it was generally believed that nuclear war could take only a single form: a cataclysmic final catastrophe, which was made unlikely because of its very enormity. It was also thought that the major nuclear

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countries would always possess overwhelming offensive strength--regardless of the scale of attack to which they might be exposed. Professor Wohlstetter was the first to call attention to the existence of a wide range of possible nuclear attacks and to the various thresholds which determine whether a country's nuclear power produces deterrence or constitutes an invitation to aggression. He showed that the balance of terror between the major powers was "delicate," depending on a subtle interplay of invulnerability and offensive power. He demonstrated the theoretical possibility of the elimination of an opposing hostile striking force without unacceptable damage to the attacker. The existence of a powerful delivery capability, he argued, was not in itself an assurance of security. Its effectiveness would depend, in addition to its striking power, on its invulnerability, and the state of opposing active and passive defenses. He defined various "thresholds" which had to be overcome if a retaliatory force was to be effective.

Professor Wohlstetter's article has an important place in the history of the debate on national security. It demonstrated concretely how the increase in complexity and variety of nuclear delivery systems might tend to complicate rather than simplify the problems of security and deterrence. It underlined the need for planners to deal not with a single all-inclusive concept of nuclear war but rather with a family of possible variants such as those on the final rungs of Kahn's escalation ladder. He emphasized the inextricable connection between strategic doctrine and the choice of weapons. More than any other individual, Mr. Wohlstetter provided the intellectual impetus for the recasting of American military strategy in the Sixties.

### 3. "The Theory and Practice of Deterrence," by Arthur Waskow.

This article appeared in 1962 as a critique of the Wohlstetter school of thought. Accepting the Wohlstetter thesis that the balance of terror is delicate, Mr. Waskow argues that the complexities of deterrence do not diminish the risks of war; on the

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contrary they increase its likelihood. According to Waskow, each attempt to remedy the military balance has made the situation more complicated and explosive. Thus the world situation requires not greater sophistication in the theory of deterrence, but the abandonment of the concept. According to Waskow, the attempt to make strategy scientific falsifies contemporary issues which are essentially political, economic and social rather than military.

Thus Mr. Waskow accepts most of Wohlstetter's premises but draws opposite conclusions from them. Mr. Waskow's insistence that national security policy ultimately depends on moral, political and social factors is useful. The weakness of his position is the implication that strategic analysis and moral concerns are antithetical, an attitude representative of the school of thought which, in effect, considers strategic analysis in itself dangerous.

### 4. "Quantitative Analysis and National Security," by James R. Schlesinger.

Professor Schlesinger's essay, published in 1963, represents another critique of the method of strategic planning which came to be dominant in the Pentagon with the advent of the Kennedy Administration in 1961. Professor Schlesinger's attack, as opposed to Waskow's, challenged not the concept of strategic theory, but a particular application of it known as the method of "systems analysis."

This method seeks to allocate limited resources among competing systems on the basis of cost effectiveness. The cost effectiveness method, in brief, tries to group all relevant costs of a particular weapons system, regardless of service, and project them over a five-year period. These costs are compared with similar costs for competing systems. This relatively simple notion presupposes an ability to define what constitutes a mission and what the relevant costs are. Its utility is the ability to provide quantifiable criteria for decision. Its drawback is that the emphasis on

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what is quantifiable may obscure elements of decision-making which depend essentially
on value judgments.

Professor Schlesinger's article examines both the scope and the limits of the cost effectiveness method. It shows how cost effectiveness models are constructed and the conditions of their reliability. It explores the degree to which policy-makers by the very nature of the decision-making process are restricted in the range of strategic options which they are able to consider. Cost effectiveness is most useful when the criteria are unambiguous; its quantitative apparatus, however, must not obscure the value choices which present the most difficult problems in the field of national security.

This speech was delivered four days before the death of President Kennedy. It focuses on how intelligent planning and programing have placed the United States in a position to confront a wide variety of challenges through a flexible series of options. In its concern with virtuoso performance it is notably characteristic of the intellectual atmosphere of the Kennedy Administration. It is an excellent statement of the basic objective of American national security policy defined by President Kennedy as follows: "Our weapons systems must be usable in a manner permitting deliberation and discrimination as to timing, scope and targets in response to civilian authority." In succeeding pronouncements Secretary McNamara's confidence that the decision-maker can maintain control whatever the level of violence has become somewhat tempered.

6. "American Deterrent Policy," by Alain C. Enthoven.

This speech is by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) who has been largely responsible for implementing the cost effectiveness method

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described earlier. Mr. Enthoven's speech represents an elaboration of a particular set of options in Secretary McNamara's list. His basic argument is that the most reliable "firebreak" is between conventional and nuclear weapons. Once that threshold is crossed rapid escalation is probable. He therefore argues that the United States should never be in a position to have to resort to nuclear weapons because of the inadequacy of its conventional arsenal--in other words, he would prefer the United States to be in a position where it is able to resist any conventional challenge by conventional arms.

7. "Our Defense Needs: The Long View," by Roswell L. Gilpatric.

This article by the then Deputy Secretary of Defense was written toward the end of Mr. Gilpatric's enture in office in April 1964. While Secretary McNamara's and Mr. Enthoven's speeches deal with America's options during the conduct of military operations, Mr. Gilpatric's article describes the United States military posture during a period of peace. He emphasizes that security cannot be found in the accumulation of armaments. Rather, it requires that the arms race be brought under control. He outlines reductions in military budgets and changes in overseas deployment which a prolonged period of relaxation of tensions could bring. Mr. Gilpatric's article thus shows that elements of Mr. Wohlstetter's concepts and some of Mr. Waskow's considerations have been incorporated into United States security policy.

As the Schlesinger article has indicated, one of the major problems in national security policy is to define the boundary-line between the technical expert and the policy-maker. The process of technological change can produce dilemmas in which technical feasibility turns out to be the least significant aspect. When scientific change brings in its train major strategic and political upheavals, the scientific

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expert can, by default or by a transfer of expertise from one field to another, become a major shaper of national policy. Much of the strategic debate has been conducted by scientists whose entry into the field came through a consideration of the technical aspects of particular weapons systems.

Professor Dyson's article illustrates this point. Starting from a demonstration of the technical feasibility of an anti-ballistic missile system, Professor Dyson goes on to argue the political and strategic undesirability of such a program. It is Professor Dyson's view that an anti-ballistic missile program will upset the strategic and political balance in a way which will outweigh any military benefits. Nevertheless, Professor Dyson is somewhat fatalistic about the future. He feels that the technical feasibility of an anti-ballistic missile program and the likelihood of Soviet progress in that area will eventually force us to enter this aspect of the arms race.

9. "Nuclears, NATO and the New Strategy," by Thomas C. Schelling.

Professor Schelling's essay deals with one of the major areas of national security policy: the debate within the Atlantic Alliance about nuclear weapons and a common strategy. It examines the relationship of nuclear delivery systems to various prevalent concepts of national interest and international relations. These systems are treated as counters in a bargaining process involving not only potential enemies but also traditional allies.

Professor Schelling's dominant thesis is that the members of the Atlantic Alliance are subject to two contradictory pressures. As individual nations they are tempted to try to achieve maximum freedom of action. Yet the Alliance can be effective only if there is a measure of mutual responsibility. Because in the early Fifties Western Europe was too weak to pursue independence, the illusion was created

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that the Atlantic Alliance had escaped tensions inherent in other coalitions. The political and economic recovery of Western Europe has made the coordination of autonomous military policies one of the key problems of the Atlantic Alliance. Because each member of the Alliance pursues simultaneously somewhat contradictory purposes, unity depends on the ability to achieve consensus on strategic doctrine. Professor Schelling deals with the problems raised by this effort within the framework of tacit bargaining which is his distinctive contribution to strategic thought. (See below, Selection 18.)

10. "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the n + 1 Country," by Albert Wohlstetter.

The possession of nuclear weapons is regarded by some of America's allies--especially Britain and France--as the key factor in the attainment of strategic independence. However, complete independence is unattainable in the nuclear age, and the quest for it runs counter to Alliance policy. One of the chief problems of NATO has been how allies can achieve access to nuclear control without proliferating nuclear weapons and ultimately undermining the Alliance. In one of his seminal articles, Professor Wohlstetter discusses the various methods of nuclear sharing and the strategic and political problems arising from them. He evaluates four logical possibilities: (1) the rejection of nuclear weapons, of the American guarantee, and of all association with nuclear powers; (2) the development of autonomous national forces; (3) a jointly controlled nuclear force, specifically a NATO multilateral force; and (4) reliance on the United States guarantee.

Professor Wohlstetter firmly advocates the last option. He believes that any drastic modification of the existing nuclear structure and, more importantly, any attempt by America's allies to develop autonomous nuclear forces would undermine the

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United States nuclear guarantee and thus the political and military stability of the North Atlantic Alliance. A proven and credible arrangement would be replaced by something unfamiliar which would invite constant probing. Professor Wohlstetter's views on nuclear control in NATO were dominant in the Pentagon through the Sixties.

In this article, Mr. Hoag offers a detailed examination of the practical requirements for achieving the third of Wohlstetter's nuclear options: a jointly controlled nuclear force. His position combines aspects of Schelling's and Wohlstetter's theses. He shares Schelling's concern with relating the strategic preferences of the various members of the Alliance to each other. He supports Wohlstetter's insistence on central control of all the nuclear weapons of the Atlantic Alliance. He argues that it is impossible to prevent nations possessing advanced technology from becoming nuclear powers if their strategic assessment demands it. If central control over nuclear weapons is to be achieved in an alliance of technologically advanced countries, the problem becomes how to prevent Allies from developing a <u>desire</u> for an autonomous nuclear capability.

Mr. Hoag recommends the creation of a multi-national nuclear striking force, including the existing national forces together with NATO-manned elements. Such a force in Mr. Hoag's view, would reinforce the concept of a greater Atlantic Community and eliminate any doubt about the credibility of the American commitment to the defense of Western Europe. He argues that any joint solution, whatever its difficulties and risks, is far preferable to strategy which emphasizes national nuclear forces.

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12. "Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance" by Robert R. Bowie.

Professor Bowie's article takes Mr. Hoag's arguments one step further. While Mr. Hoag is willing to tolerate existing national nuclear forces provided they are part of an intergrated command system, Professor Bowie regards the existence of national nuclear forces (other than those of the United States) insurmountable obstacles to the unity of the Alliance. Independent nuclear forces, however coordinated, would, according to Professor Bowie, generate independent strategies. These in turn would have political repercussions which would greatly weaken the Alliance. Not the least important of these results is the impetus given to the nuclear appetites of other countries.

Professor Bowie's proposed solution is the creation of a multilateral NATO force (the MLF) jointly manned by crews drawn from the countries participating in it. This, in his opinion, would prevent autonomous action; it would symbolize Atlantic unity; it would provide the twin options of an evolution toward a purely European force or else toward a completely integrated NATO force in which the United States, without a veto, would be one member.

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13. "The Multilateral Force: An Historical Perspective" by Alastair Buchan

Mr. Buchan is a distinguished British student of strategic affairs.
As military correspondent for the influential _London Observer_ and since
1958 as Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies he has made
major contributions to strategic thought. With respect to the Atlantic
Alliance, Mr. Buchan has consistently called attention to the importance
of defining priorities properly. In his view, the issue of nuclear control
is primarily a political problem. Therefore, he has been extremely
sceptical of efforts to solve it by primarily technical expedients, like
the MLF. His constant thrust has been to bring about closer political
consultation and to recast the military command structure in order to
harmonize political and military objectives.

In this selection, Mr. Buchan traces the various forces and
considerations which produced the proposal for a NATO multilateral
force. He demonstrates how a coalescence of frequently conflicting
motives contributed to the exacerbation of the debate about nuclear
control and why the underlying problems continue.

14. "U.S. Strategy and the Defense of Europe," by Pierre M. Gallois

General Gallois is perhaps the best known advocate of independent
nuclear forces within the Atlantic Alliance. In this role, he is also
an active critic of American national security policy.

The major thesis of this selection is that little in the defense
posture of the United States or in its attitude toward the Soviet Union
inspires confidence among its allies. In his view, a nuclear stand-off

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exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. This condition exposes allied countries to nuclear blackmail. No nation will commit suicide for another no matter how closely allied, to the extent that the nuclear stalemate demands this of the superpowers their nuclear guarantees lose their credibility.

According to Gallois, the United States pressure for a conventional build-up in Europe stems from the desire to avoid having to fight a nuclear war in defense of its allies. If the United States did use nuclear weapons, they would probably be tactical. Fear of retaliation would keep the nuclear powers from attacking one another's homeland. Europe would thus bear the burden of destruction.

General Gallois holds that these dangers can be avoided only by countries possessing independent nuclear strategic striking forces. He considers conventional armaments irrelevant to the defense of Europe. All this provides an interesting contrast with the selections by McNamara, Wohlstetter, Gilpatric, Bowie and Enthoven. Though General Gallois draws extreme and one-sided conclusions which are by no means representative of European opinion, the uneasiness he expresses is fairly typical of the fears and attitudes which have produced the debate within the Atlantic Alliance.

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15. "What Price Conventional Capabilities in Europe?"

by Bernard Brodie.

Dr. Brodie is one of the pioneers of the study of nuclear strategy in the United States. He was the first to attempt an assessment of the new technology shortly after the end of World War II. He has been one of the leading strategic thinkers since. After 1961 he has frequently criticized the views of Secretary McNamara and of his former colleagues at the Rand Corporation, such as Wohlstetter, Hoag, Enthoven, especially with respect to the feasibility of a conventional defense of Europe.

In this selection, Dr. Brodie argues that the emphasis on conventional defense in Europe is unrealistic for at least two reasons: (a) Europeans may find the level of destruction of a massive conventional war highly unattractive. They, therefore, see no reason to make major sacrifices for a strategy which may weaken deterrence for no significant advantage; (b) the existence of substantial nuclear establishments in Europe makes it probable that any massive attack would soon become nuclear. Mr. Brodie gently but brilliantly shows the extraordinary improbability of a massive Soviet conventional attack in Europe and the even greater improbability that it would remain conventional if it occurred.

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In Dr. Brodie's view emphasizing a remote contingency as
the chief target of strategic planning undermines the cohesion
of the Alliance. It uses up American prestige for the attainment
of objectives of at best peripheral significance. It emphasizes
differences in perspective which a wise coalition policy would
not make explicit.

16. "Unconventional Warfare" by J.K. Zawodny.

In no other area of national security policy is the
interrelationship between technology, strategy and the political
environment so obvious and so varied as in counterinsurgency
warfare. The article by Professor Zawodny shows how in
counterinsurgency warfare political and social conditions determine
military strategy and tactics. His initial thesis is that purely
military approaches intensify resistance, further alienate the
population and aggravate the condition they were designed to
cure. There is a sense in which "wars are won and lost in the
minds of men." The successful conduct of unconventional warfare
requires constant awareness of the psychological and political
element and systematic application of strategy and tactics toward
influencing the attitudes and behavior of local populations.

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17. "Unconventional Warfare" by Franklin Lindsay.

This article--though its title is identical with the preceding one--is much more specific in subject matter. It deals in detail with one particular problem: that of organizing effective counter-measures to the tactics of guerilla insurrection perfected and employed by the Communists since the end of World War II. Like Professor Zawodny, Mr. Lindsay contends that, though the instruments are military, the problem is essentially political. The key to success is the establishment of a set of political goals which the average person can both understand and accept.

Mr. Lindsay does not belittle the military aspect of the problem. He insists that it becomes decisive only in terms of a political frame-work. He emphasizes that attracting and supporting skillful and dedicated local partisans is a complex and arduous business. It is, unfortunately, an activity for which the West has, up to now, shown little aptitude. Nevertheless he stresses that along with the development of military skills, a systematic effort must be made to work out techniques and train experts in the political aspects of village warfare.

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18. "Managing the Arms Race" by Thomas C. Schelling.

Two occasionally contradictory considerations must shape national security policy in the nuclear age: (a) the consequences of a decision for the society making it; (b) the effects of the same decision on the behavior of possible opponents. On one level national security policy involves mobilization of national resources. On another, it is a form of tacit bargaining by which potentially hostile nations adjust their relations. Professor Schelling's concern is to transform this bargaining from a haphazard process into deliberate and rational acts. He is interested in determining how unilateral programs can be transformed into a coordinated system of maximum stability.

This article complements the earlier selection by Professor Schelling. In "Nuclears, NATO and the New Strategy," (Selection 9) he was concerned with harmonizing strategic doctrines among friends, specifically the U.S. and its NATO partners. In this essay, Professor Schelling deals with the even more complicated problem of how potential enemies can concert their strategic doctrines and programs in order to achieve maximum stability. According to Professor Schelling, what appears as an arms race thus contains elements of arms control. A relationship of conflict at the same

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time includes complicated forms of international negotiation. And the
reverse is also true. Any form of arms reduction must be seen in
relation to the sanctions against violation and the risks of evasion.

The previous article explored how even unilateral arms policy can
produce incentives for an opponent to act in a way to enhance stability.
In the following selection, the late Professor Leo Szilard discusses
how some areas of mutual interest could form the basis for *explicit*
agreements to reduce the level of arms.

According to Professor Szilard only one valid objective exists for
national security policy: a level of nuclear armaments sufficient to
inflict *unacceptable* damage in a counterblow. This is called minimum
deterrence and is in sharp contrast to the concept of multiple options
of Secretary McNamara according to which the United States should retain
the capability to conduct many kinds of nuclear operations, including
some confined to purely military objectives. Professor Szilard insists
that a choice between these two approaches is crucial, particularly since
both of the major nuclear powers are on the verge of achieving
"saturation parity," that is, the capability to destroy the entire urban
population of the opponent. Once that stage is reached, a new and more
intensive arms race is likely to begin. Professor Szilard argues that
the Soviet Union might be prepared to enter into an agreement which

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envisages step-by-step reduction of nuclear armaments to a minimum deterrent level. He believes that effective inspection procedures are possible and urges measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In 1958, the United States and the Soviet Union voluntarily ceased nuclear testing pending the negotiation of a test ban treaty. On September 1, 1961, the Soviet Union ended this moratorium and conducted a series of tests lasting two months. On the 5th of September, 1961, President Kennedy authorized a resumption of United States tests. On March 2, 1962, he announced that the United States would resume atmospheric testing in the later part of April.

In 1962, the Cuban missile crisis brought the two major nuclear powers into direct confrontation. Whether as a result of this clash or for other reasons, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, in July 1963 concluded a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. The two selections are explanations of this treaty to the American people by the President and the Secretary of State.

Ever since the debate over whether or not to build the hydrogen

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bomb in 1951, Edward Teller has been perhaps the most prominent scientific advocate of continuous and intense research on the problems of weapons development. His basic argument has been that the advance of scientific knowledge cannot be halted by international agreement, especially when the agreement is with the Soviet Union. He believes that most arms control schemes--and certainly the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty--jeopardize the security of the free world. His position has been supported by many senior military officers and by a portion of the United States Senate. Professor Teller's views have alienated him from many of his colleagues in science.

The work of this committee has been well described by its distinguished Chairman, Senator Henry Jackson, as follows:

> ... One of the major purposes of this Congressional consideration of executive activities is an educational one. As long as we govern with the democratic system, the ultimate test of a government policy is its acceptance by the people. In the final analysis, the people must be persuaded of the effectiveness of the policy process and the wisdom of the policies and programs they are asked to support--and pay for. Congressional study and debate can be a vital element in this educational task.

With such considerations in mind, in 1959 I initiated a Senate study of the national security policy process. Authorized by resolution of the Senate, it was the first full-scale review since the discussion and debate preceding the creation of the National Security Council by Act of Congress in 1947.

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The inquiry of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery--
of the Senate Committee on Government Operations--was not
directed to the substance of policy decisions. Rather, it was
concerned with how the processes of government help or hamper
prompt and effective action in national security affairs. The
Subcommittee assumed that this was a national problem, transcending
either political party or any particular administration.

President Eisenhower, and then President Kennedy, assured the
cooperation of their staffs with the Subcommittee's work.
Throughout, the study was conducted on a professional and
non-partisan basis. . . .

The Subcommittee solicited the views of present and former
government officials and students of the policy process. It held
extensive hearings over a period of two years, during which
time eminent witnesses gave generously of their counsel. The
Subcommittee also issued a series of staff reports with detailed
findings and suggestions for improvement. The studies found a
wide audience in official Washington, in the academic community,
and among private citizens. Upon the conclusion of the inquiry
in 1962, successor Subcommittees, which I have had the honor to
chair, have continued to monitor the operations of the Executive
Branch in national security affairs. . . .

Trends in administrative philosophy influenced by the Subcommittee's
study include: support of the principle that each President
needs freedom to adapt his Executive Office and policy procedures
to suit his own style; resistance to proposals for super-Cabinet
officers and super-staffs that clog the established line of
authority from the President to executive department heads;
emphasis on the authority of the individual executive who takes
the oath of office--giving him responsibility, expecting him to
use it, and holding him accountable for the use of it; upholding
of the Secretary of State's right and responsibility to be the
President's chief adviser on national security affairs; acceptance
of the principle that no government is better than the men and
women it can develop through career service or attract from private
occupations; and recognition that the criterion for appointment to
a top national security post should be ability to do the job--
regardless of party. . . .

Actual reforms carried out in government operations that were
sparked by the Subcommittee's study include: a simplification of