DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MW NARA Date 08106198

TELCON
Dean Acheson
Mr. Kissinger

4-1-69 9:35 AM

A said he received K's letter and he would be happy to give him
his thoughts on African business - asked when K wanted it. K said
the latter part of April will be fine. A said he would have it to him
by then if not before.

A said he talked to Bill Rogers this morning about two people
being considered for head of AF Bureau - Nielsen and Fredericks.
A told Rogers it was xhawex sheer poison. K thanked A - said he
had been wondering how to tackle this problem himself.

K said President was pleased with his conversation with A and
it will be resumed soon.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
By MW NARA Date 08/06/88

TELCOM

Secy Hickel
Mr. Kissinger

Fax 4-1-69 9:55 AM

H said he was calling about coal mine disaster across the border in Mexico - 168 men trapped, 14 bodies have been gotten out. This occurred at 5:30 last night and H said the reason he was calling K was to suggest that he might want to call the local Ambassador and offer to send down any technical men that might be needed. H said we have technical people available that might guide them on disaster - it is an American operated mine. K said he thought that was good idea and asked where mine is located. H said in the vicinity of Barroteran near Rosita, about fifty miles from the border. K said he would call the Mexican Ambassador.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
By MW NARA Date 08100408

TELCON
Elliot Richardson
Mr. Kissinger

4/1/69 3:25 pm

Richardson said he had been talking with Bob McCloskey about the testimony Laird gave. HAK said that when the President hears that, there will be fur flying, mostly HAK's. Richardson said the explanation should be, simply, explicitly, that it was because of budgetary restrictions. HAK said the point is, if we can fly the same number of sorties for less money, that's one thing; but the President will not agree to de-escalation. Richardson stated that we should not be ambiguous. HAK said we've been fighting in this government for three weeks; the President has ruled against it each time it comes up. HAK said it's his clear understanding it's not going to be done; he will raise it with the President at the earliest opportunity, but he can't believe it will be done. It's in NSDM which he signed yesterday that it isn't going to be done. HAK said he understood that Laird has since rectified it, in so far as that is possible. What he thinks should be said is that we'll try to do the thing more economically. Richardson said he understood that Laird stated we will de-escalate B-52 bombing. HAK asked, Has he actually said we will de-escalate bombing? Richardson said it was Bob's understanding we would reduce the number of sorties -- Richardson said, if this were true, if we have to do it, it would be better to leave it ambiguous.

HAK said if he understands the President's thinking at all, it won't be done. He has several times in the last week made it clear that it shouldn't be done. HAK (referring to Laird's statement): No, he sure as hell said the number of sorties will be reduced. He said it in his testimony April 1. Then he put out a correction -- well, he said something that's beyond my comprehension in order to correct it. What it says, if I understand it, is that he is maintaining the sortie figure that Clifford recommended, which is, however, less than the one we have been maintaining. Richardson said, I take it that's inconsistent with what you thought. HAK said, I know it's inconsistent with the President's policy; it may not be inconsistent with anything else. Richardson said, To me, if you are going to do it, do it for whatever mileage you can get out of it. The worst way to say it is that we can't afford it. HAK said he would go upstairs to see if he couldn't get a few minutes with the President to see what his view is.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

TELCON
Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger
4/1/69 3:45 p.m.

Laird: Warren says there was some misunderstanding over there on the B-52 figure. The budget stopped the 1800 on April 1. We are continuing the 1800 to June 30 and then going to the budget figure. The budget figure was 1600. We didn't add on, except to carry on the 1600 level.

HAK: The only thing we are trying to avoid is the impression of de-escalation.

Laird: Abrams has asked for 1800 next year; then we have to add to the Johnson budget to get that. It's 1800 a month. The Johnson budget provided that it go to 1600 on April (1) ? We've put in money to continue 1800 to June 30 (?). Then we go to the Johnson budget level. We re-examine it. We can maintain 1800 but cut down on some tactical that isn't doing a good job. I didn't get an increase over Johnson budget. My testimony made it very clear. I said that for budgetary reasons we are not adding to the Johnson budget on this figure.

HAK: The thing that Warren reported to us--someone came in and said that Laird has announced de-escalation of B-52. President had said three times there won't be any de-escalation.

Laird: This is exactly the figure that is in the budget. I wanted to go to 180.0. But I convinced them and they agreed to go up to 1800 and add on through June 30. Originally, I recommended going 1800 all next year. But that's a substantial add-on -- you have to add substantial amount of money together. I had to get $80 million -- there's no reduction in the budget for Vietnam.

HAK: We are being deluged with newspaper queries -- what shall we say?

Laird: This is level for 1970 and this will be re-examined. We have gone forward to increase the amount of our June 30 to maintain 1800. And above budget, over and above last Administration. We are prepared to re-examine it at any time, and I made it very clear to that committee that we would re-examine it. I told Budget we would have to continue. The President can say he repeats what he has always said, that there would be no de-escalation axxx except as a result of withdrawal.

HAK: The State Dept is flapping all over the place; they feel that since you have offered de-escalation.....

Laird: This same figure that was submitted in the budget in January...

HAK: I think we can handle it; we can handle it easily now....

DECLASSIFIED

TELCOM

Secretary Laird
4/1/69 4:25 p. m.

HAK called Laird to ask him if the following statement is OK with him--
we would make such a statement here tomorrow if anyone says there is
de-escalation:

It is the policy of the United States that reductions of military
operations must be brought about by the phased mutual withdrawal
of external forces. Budget planning figures will be brought in line
with this policy on the basis of periodic review.

Laird said this was fine. HAK said that doesn't disavow anything Laird said.
HAK said we want something ready so Paris and State can use it for
negotiating purposes.

Laird went on to say the problem is that he would like to have agreed with
Abrams on 1800 for the full year, but he went along and agreed with
him part way. But this would have been another increase over and
above the Johnson budget. He can't recommend too many increases here.

HAK said there's no ill feeling about Laird at all.

Laird felt someone planted this story about de-escalation.

HAK said if Laird didn't mind, we'll put out the above paragraph tomorrow.
Laird repeated he was all for it, but what he'd like to know is why people
are casting it in this light since the figure was an increase not a decrease.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958

By MW NARA Date 080608

Telecon

John McCloy

8:45 a.m. April 2, 1969

HAK said someone had told him McCloy might be interested in
heading up a committee of citizens for the ABM.

McCloy said he had been approached by Sen. Percy and someone
else had talked to Scoop Jackson. McCloy said he did not offer --
it had been suggested. He feels since he was an adviser to the
President and Secretary of State on arms control, his Chairman-
ship on such a committee would not be right.

HAK asked if he would testify and McCloy said he would be happy
to do anything he could since he believes in the President's ABM
proposal and feels also that the opposition is wrong in their
arguments. HAK said the opposition's point that we are stimulating
the arms race by increasing our ABM's to match that of the S. U.
is completely incorrect. McCloy said that he had had contacts
with a Russian and they wanted to know why we weren't setting up
or going ahead on our ABM. HAK also wanted to know where we
would stand in NATO when the ABM is signed. HAK felt that the
NATO allies didn't fully understand the "safeguard" system. McCloy
agreed.

McCloy made a speech recently on this subject recently and is
sending HAK a copy. They made tentative arrangements to see
each other next Friday. HAK said he would be in touch.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958
By MW NARA Date 080608

TELCOM

Dr. Burns
Mr. Kissinger
4-2-69 10:30 AM

Burns said he was calling about corn sales to the USSR - there is a memo
from Ken Cole which was sent to B, K, Stans and one or two others.

B said he hesitates to express a definite opinion on this on the basis of
the information presented and he has no time to do research on it.

B asked what K's stand is. K said he has no stand because he has not
addressed himself to it. B said it was due on April 1. K said he would
look at it. B said he thinks it is something the NSC should present a
document on and B asked K to look into it with a view to what procedure
should be followed and give B his advice. B said he is inclined to advise
Cole that he will withhold his decision until he sees an NSC document.

K promised to call B back by early afternoon.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958
By MW NARA Date 08/06/68

TELCORN

Senator Javits
Mr. Kissinger

4/2/69 12:25 p. m.

Javits said he needed an entirely personal favor from HAK -- namely, he has a group of very distinguished New Yorkers who are going to finance his campaign deficit (they will have raised $350,000) -- Jock Whitney will host a dinner for Javits, and this group have one wish: that is to have HAK attend, to hear him and to talk with him entirely privately. This will be May 12 (Monday).

HAK said he had sort of planned to go to the Bilderberg meeting in Europe that weekend, and to go to Bonn and Paris afterwards. But in light of Jake's desire, he will see whether he can do it the other way around. Besides, he will probably not be able to go anyway. Javits said it would be a tremendous favor to him. HAK said Jake, you have a claim on me; you know I like you; let me put it down and I'll let you know within a week whether there's any problem. HAK said if they set it for the 19th he could do it easily -- or even the 26th -- in fact, any day except May 12.

Javits referred to a group who had seen HAK -- including Case and himself. They think they really have to talk to the President and HAK again before this movement on Safeguards gets rolling. Javits is going to talk with Aiken. HAK will be hearing from either Aiken or Case. Javits' guess is it would be a group of 4 senators: Aiken, Cooper, Case and Javits -- or, if HAK wants to open up-- Brooke and Percy. They'll make a formal request re who, why, where.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/08

TELCON

Deputy Prime Minister Pattakos (Greece)
Mr. Kissinger

4-2-69 12:30 PM

K said he was sorry he would be unable to see P before his departure this afternoon. K said we have an interest in the closest relations with P's government. K said our primary concern is the foreign policy of countries - we have too many domestic problems of our own to become involved domestically in other countries. P said he has written a letter to the President. (P was a little hard to understand but he said something about their belief in our sincerity and referred to the Greek Asian situation.)

P said: "Be sure you are obliged to protect the freedom of the world. You must know that the Communist people want to take over the whole world. Please believe us, we are against them, we are with you. We care - we believe in the freedom. We believe in democracy and we are going to help民主democracy. It is very difficult for our people. We do not believe we are the best, but we believe. Please don't believe anyone who are not in authority - they do not know exactly what is the problem."

K said P could be certain that we will deal with the established government. While our general convictions are clear about what government we prefer, our policy is to work with the existing government. We understand P's difficulties. K said the President has great respect for P and we will not add to their difficulties.

P said he would write to K - K said to please do so, he would like to keep in touch. P said to give his respects to the President, who is the best man now for America and the free world.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
By MW NARA Date 08/06/68

TELCOM

Admiral Moorer
Mr. Kissinger
4/2/69 4:00 pm

Admiral Moorer said he knew HAK was seeing Robert Anderson, and that it has to do with his proposal to construct a free port in Malta. HAK said he knew about it and he means to stay out of it. HAK said he would call Admiral Moorer tomorrow morning (Thurs.) about it before seeing Anderson. But his general disposition is to stay out of it.

Moorer says "our position is that anything that would bolster up the economy of Malta would make it easier for them to resist economic and political pressure from the Soviet Union." Not to use it ourselves, but we would like to see it denied to the other side. We do not want to make commitments. We cannot say that we would use this facility.

HAK repeated that he would call Moorer in the morning.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

Telecon

Sec Packard

April 3, 8:30 a.m.

(Missed first part of conversation but assume it concerns the
verdict of Capt. Bucher)

P said the decision would probably come very soon now. HAK
said his immediate problem was how to get the President
personally involved in the decision.

P said they can give him a non-judicial punishment and then
Bucher would aske for a court martial or they can let him off
completely which P doubted they would do. If Bucher asks for
a court martial, the whole thing would come out in the open
again. P also said that there was enough evidence to merit
Bucher's getting off completely. P said the President or
the Department of Defense could override the decision.

HAK said he would rely on P recommendation in this matter
and the President would rely on HAK's. HAK thought that
Packard, Ad Moorer and he ought to get together and discuss
this and give the President pros and cons so he can make a
decision. P said he would be in touch with Ad. Moorer about
when the decision would be coming up and a meeting with the
three of them would be satisfactory. HAK mentioned that the
President should know all the alternatives.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

Telecon

Pete Vakey

9:10, 4, 3, 69

V said he would be talking to Irwin this afternoon. He will be coming in tonight and would want to lay his recommendation and return Monday.

V said Irwin's recommendation is that we use administrative processes and defer the Hickenlooper Amendment. HAK said he thought the Peruvians didn't want to use administrative procedures but want judicial remedies. V said the main point is that Irwin would like to be able to present his recommendations to the President and Sec. Rogers Friday or Saturday. HAK said he knew the President would be very reluctant to see him this weekend and thought that the Pres. should have a rest. HAK said he would look at the paper and then call the President. V said Nachmanoff sent it over. HAK said he sent the Pres. a memo on this last week and knew it would end up like this. HAK didn't think the Pres. should be put into a corner. He added that the range of things that could have ax happened was very narrow. HAK wanted to know why Irwin had to negotiate for 2 1/2 weeks to come up with the proposal he has. V said it was unclear what their intentions were. They are applying political and economic pressures now which is the reason Irwin wants to get it a decision this weekend. HAK said he was not in favor of applying the Hickenlooper Amendment on them.

HAK said he would approach the President with this but thought it would be better for Irwin to see the Pres. monday rather than this weekend. Vakey said he would call HAK this afternoon after he has talked with Irwin.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

TELCON
Frank Shakespeare
Mr. Kissinger

4-3-69 10:10 AM

S asked if K were familiar with the name of Manuel Yellow (?). He was
Minister of Science and Commerce in Peru under Belounde - put together
IPC - very pro-American. He is coming for dinner this evening
and Charles Mayer will also be there and S wondered if K would like to
attend - 8:00 or so. S asked if he could tentatively say yes. K said
he would try to come because he needs to clear his mind. S said
if he shows, fine. - if he doesn't, fine.

S asked if K knew Otten from Chase Bank and K said no. S said he seemed
very knowledgeable. Both agreed they were appalled with State Department's
handling of this. K said S made an imaginative proposal the other day
on how to handle it and wondered if S could put that on a piece of paper
for K - just so K knows he understands it. S said he would be glad to.
S said if we are going to move, we have to try to isolate Peru.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

TELCON
Greek Amb
Mr. Kissinger
4-3-69 10:55 AM

Amb said he understood it was not possible for K to come and see the King. K said he is completely overwhelmed and it is not possible for him to get away. Amb said when the King went to see Mr. Rogers yesterday he told him he was a little bit displeased because he did not have the occasion to talk to Mr. Nixon. Amb said that is why he thought if the King could have contact with K (of even a few minutes) it would help. Amb said the King is leaving at 2:30 PM. K said today is just out of the question. Amb asked about talking to the King on the phone. K agreed to call the King at 11:30. The Amb said as K knows the King is in a difficult position and it would help if we could soothe his feelings a little bit. K said he did not see the Deputy PM either. Amb said he realized that. Amb said he xxx is much indebted to K and one day when things quiet down a bit, he would like to come and see K.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/89

TELCONE

Ron Ziegler (Key Biscayne)

Mr. Kissinger

4/3/69 11 05 am

Ziegler said Secy Rogers is thinking about having a press
conference. HAK said "the country can't survive it."

Ziegler told McCloskey next week would be a better time; he thinks
he should definitely check with the President about this -- anyway,
Rogers may have a press conference tomorrow. And if HAK wants
to turn it off he better start now. Ziegler said the Secy has been
saying for quite a while that he is going to have a p. c. and they're
getting pressure over there. Ron also said if he has one tomorrow--
with all this other stuff in the news -- it may complicate things a bit.
HAK said he doesn't think we're in a position to tell the Secy of State
he can't have a press conference. Ziegler said he wanted HAK to
be aware of the above.

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon

John Ehrlichman

11:10 a.m. 4/3/69

E said he had a Presidential order for HAK. HAK said, "Drop dead?"
E. said no. He wants you to take Sunday off. He is going to call you
at 11:30 to discuss things.

E said the Pres. agreed to move the NSC meeting to Tuesday. The
Pres. asked about the NATO speech. He wa nts some new ideas.
He will also go into the Peru thing with HAK.

E said the Pres. wants to spend an hour with HAK Monday morning.
HAK said he would arrange this with Chapin.

HAK said he was sending down three important packages -- NATO,
Vietnam, and Peru. The other things are just routine. E said to
send them to his attention and he would see that they got on top of
the pile.

HAK said our negotiator in Peru has lost his cool. He wants to see
the President. E said he didn't want Irwin down there unless HAK
was and HAK said he would be talking to Vakey later on this
afternoon to see what Irwin's schedule was.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

TELCORN
The President
Mr. Kissinger
4-3-69 11:25 AM

K told P we are having following problem with Peru. Irwin went down there without having worked out appropriate step. K said he gave Pres a memo over weekend and situation is now as follows. On strictly legal grounds, we might have to apply the Hickenlooper Amendment. On the other hand, we have made practically no political preparations for this. K said State's recommendation would be to apply the Hickelooper amendment. Bill has not decided yet. K said he thought we should not apply the Amendment now but accept administrative procedures which run until August 6. State has been waiting and waiting for something to happen to settle the whole thing - they are not prepared at this point to apply amendment unless there is some support from LA countries.

Pres asked about business community and K said he thought we could handle it - the business community would be divided on this issue. K said one problem is that Irwin wants to come back and talk to Pres. K said he thinks we could hold Irwin off until Monday morning if Pres agrees with this approach. Pres said his main concern is that they have not done political preparations with other LA countries. It would be hard to apply amendment and be out there alone - we would have another Aswam Dam on our hands. However, if we do not do it, they will say we are weak and we are letting them kick the US around. K said that is why he recommends tough economic sanctions. If it ends the way the Iran thing did in 1953, we will be alright. K said Frank Shakespeare has a number of imaginative ideas on what we could do to isolate Peru. Pres said good. Irwin looks mushy to him so far. K said Irwin is in favor of not applying the amendment. There is meeting with Valesca this morning and it may be that they will give a little. K said Irwin did not have any clear concept of where he was going. Pres said State was again not prepared for this.

K said Kendall was in yesterday with Edwards, the Chilean and filled Pres in on conversation.

Pres said to try to take it to Aug 6 and not apply the Amendment - we will take the Congressional heat. K said he would send down Peru package by end of day and also one on VN. Pres said there is no need for Irwin to come up and talk to him.

K and P discussed NATO speech. K said Ray Price had done a good job on it. K has a few ideas and will get them to Pres. Pres said not yet to send down, he would see on Monday.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Amb. Lucet
Mr. Kissinger
4/3/69 12 40 pm

Lucet checked with HAK about Debre and his visit to Washington.
Debre is arriving in Washington Tuesday evening (Apr. 8).
He has an appointment with the Secy of State at 3:30 pm on April 9.
HAK told Lucet we would let Lucet know later today about a time for
Debre, since he was very anxious to see him. (HAK later buzzed
and said to set aside an hour for him with Debre, preferably on the 9th,
and let Lucet know.) Lucet also mentioned that Debre would also like
, if possible, to see the President for a few minutes. HAK said, "Let
me see what can be done."

Lucet said he noted in the papers that HAK was leaving for Florida.
HAK asked if it was already in the papers or did Lucet have spies in
the WH.

DECLASSIFIED

TELCON

Gerard Smith
Mr. Kissinger

4/3/69 12:40 pm

Gerard Smith talked to McCloy yesterday about General Advisory Committee matter, and McCloy asked, "Do you really want me to be reappointed as Chairman.... because I am a hawk..." Smith has said in the past, yes, we would like to have you reappointed. Yesterday McCloy made a new point--that if he were no longer associated with GAC he would feel free to testify, but he had reservations about being a member and testifying, too. Smith asked if the White House would prefer to have McCloy as a witness, or as Chairman of the GAC. HAK's instinct was that it would be wrong to use up a man in one hearing; after all, York, Kistiakowsky and the other bunds have testified, and they are on the committee. Smith said McCloy has apparently questioned the propriety of testifying.

(McCloy)

Smith has talked to Rogers, who would like to see him/stay on as Chairman of the General Advisory Committee. HAK said probably the President has asked him to stay on.

Smith said his feeling is he should stay on as Chairman, and testify, too -- and HAK said that would be our feeling. Smith said he would see if we can persuade him to do both. HAK thought that would be the President's feeling. Smith said "Let me see what McCloy says."

Z

DECLASSIFIED

TELCON
King Constantine
Mr. Kissinger
4-3-69 12:45

K said he was very soory he could not keep their appointment this morning but we had a crisis in LA. K recalled pleasure he had of meeting the King in Greece in 1962. King said to a certain extent what he was a little disappointed with his trip here - mainly concerned with what is going to happen in his country. Thought it would be useful to discuss it with K and bring him up to date on how he sees the situation. King said all other heads of state saw Pres, including his PM when he was at the White House. K said difficulty was that Pres had to leave for Abilene and this jamed his schedule completely. K said Pres has high personal regard for the King. King said that does not help very much. K said it is not a question of Pres not wanting to help but the enormous difficulties he would have if he injected himself into domestic affairs of country in so visible a way. K said if King could find a way to come here so private visit what could be arranged, he (Pres) would be happy to talk with King. King said he did not really think it would be considered in any case an injection in the intervention in the affairs of his country if the President had seen him as he did all other heads of state. His country expected it as much as he did. King said he understands there is a problem and he can arrange to come to US anytime that would suit the President. K said there is no objection on President's part to seeing King quietly and if King could arrange a private visit to US an interview could be arranged that has less formality. King asked if he could ask his Amb to keep in touch with K - he will let him know when he can come. K said fine. Kx said Pres will be away in the summer. King said perhaps he could arrange it for end of May or June.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority - E012958
By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

Telecon

Scottie Reston

3:45 April 3, 1969

Reston wanted to know if the Laird statement was a signal to Hanoi or Saigon. HAK said do you mean the reduction of B-52s. R said yes. HAK said we expect that the war is likely to go down in intensity in the next year and took that into account.

R said he took it that way but "I don't want to play games with you. Cy Vance was in here and he said to me that he thought the sticky point was that we had not made a decision in the sense that de Gaulle had made a decision about Algeria and that he thought we were still monkeying around and hoping that something would turn up. Vance also said I think that's wrong. A decision has been made. I don't want to mislead you. I am not privy as to what is going on now but I have a very clear impression that a decision has been made and the problem is tactical."

HAK said that is what I was trying to tell you when you were here a week ago. (HAK registered a complaint -- Reston quoted him as saying that in six months there would be a change. He didn't mean that we would go the old way and if that didn't work out in six months we would do something different. He meant that it would take six months to see the results of the policies we are now pursuing.)

Reston continued to say - "Vance then went on to say that he thought when troop withdrawals did begin, they would be at a much larger rate than announced in the press." HAK said he didn't feel he should discuss troop withdrawals.

HAK said we have a very clear idea as to what we are doing-- not exactly in the same line as de Gaulle but a line that has not been done previously. R said that de Gaulle denied everything and then came out with the exact thing he was denying. R said "you feel for tactical reasons to make clear your position is to hurt your movement toward your objective?" HAK said that's exactly what he was trying to tell him all along. HAK said it will become apparent and it is a question of timing. Reston said he took the B-52 reduction as a signal to both Saigon and Hanoi because you don't do a thing like this for purely budgetary reasons. There are other ways to get the same results. It cannot be read by Hanoi as anything except as a move toward their primary objective which is for the withdrawal of our forces nor by Saigon as anything except a warning as to a commitment by the U.S. Reston added that he was probably too dense to read HAK's point before and now understood.

sa

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon

Secretary Rogers

4:00 April 3, 1969

HAK said he was calling about the Peru thing. He wanted R to know that the only thing we got involved in this morning was the issue as to whether Irwin should go down to Key Biscayne. HAK mentioned it to the President. R said he didn't feel Irwin should go and was against it. HAK said whatever decision the Pres. makes, it would look like a crises. R agreed.

R wanted to know what Laird was trying to do. He mentioned something to the press today about the progress being made in the private talks. HAK said he had just had a call from Scottie Reston asking what signal we were trying to give with the B-52 reductions. R said that the other was worse though since everyone agreed that there would be no publicity regarding the private talks since that would make them not private anymore. HAK said Hanoi may feel we are trying to use this for our own domestic opinion. HAK also stated that the government's public relations was falling apart. R said he didn't want to call Laird on it but someone should. HAK said he would handle it from here and would call on R if he need help or support. R mentioned his press conference and felt that he was at a loss as to what to say about this. HAK said the only thing he could say was to reiterate the Pres. wishes by not discussing the private talks. HAK thought that R should go ahead with the press conference and maybe this statement would reassure Hanoi of our intentions.

sa

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012957
By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

Telecon

Secretary Rogers

6:35 April 3, 1969

Rogers said if his throat clears up, he will have the press conference tomorrow. HAK said he thought it was the right thing to do. He added that he had had such a complicated explanation on the B-52s that he was now confused.

R said that was a story in the Paris Harald Tribune that the Pres. had discussed with de Gaulle about making nuclear weapons information available to the French. The article also said that HAK had mentioned this to Birrenbach. HAK said this was absolutely untrue. HAK said he had not seen the Pres. record of his talk with de Gaulle and as soon as he did, he would get back to Rogers with an answer on it. HAK said he was not in favor of this and he certainly wouldn't talk to a German about it if he were.

Rogers wanted to know if HAK had seen the Trudeau decision on NATO. He decided to stay in NATO but would phase out some of his troops. HAK suggested that Rogers' answer on this would be that it will be discussed and that he should make no comment on it until after the discussions.

sa

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01 2958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/88

TELCOM

Secy Rogers

Mr. Kissinger

4/4/69 9:15 a. m.

Secy Rogers has decided to have his press conference on Monday, April 7, rather than today (Good Friday). Among reasons for the change is that it would look like a stern rebuke to Laird -- Rogers said he can't avoid taking issue with him, but he wants to be awfully careful to do it as inoffensively as possible and at the same time to be fairly firm about it. This thing just gets out of hand -- we agreed we wouldn't discuss private talks, or whether progress or lack of progress was occurring; nor did we say anything about a coalition government. HAK said he had missed the point about a coalition government, but apparently Laird said he would be willing to accept some kind of coalition government. Rogers has taken the position that the political questions are matters for them to decide. As Rogers understood the position, Thieu was willing to have an election supervised by impartial observers and inspectors to guarantee fairness of election. HAK said, as for Laird's saying he would accept a coalition government, we are not in a position to accept anything.

Rogers is going to lay down some guidelines and check with the President. HAK said one reason for doing it on Monday, you get more press coverage then.

Rogers referred to Scottie Reston's piece this morning which mentioned we will withdraw 50,000 troops. HAK said that too was started in part by Mel. And Cy Vance said it may be more (than 50,000). HAK said by the time we do anything it will be a disappointment.

Rogers also said Cabot was concerned about statement on B52's. Mel thought reducing B52's will be helpful in negotiations. Cabot said "it won't be helpful to me." HAK said in any case, any such statement shouldn't be coming from Defense -- Rogers should play that card.

HAK said the President is coming back late Sunday night. Rogers thought he might talk to the President about the p. c. Earlier in the conversation he mentioned he'd work on what he would have for the press conference and show it to the President. His statement that he would talk to the President may take care of the matter.

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon

McGeorge Bundy

April 4, 1969 10:30 a.m.

B said he had a call yesterday with (missed the name). To Bundy's surprise, they were willing to go ahead on the East-West Advanced Study group. They have accepted it in principle and have proposed a meeting in Moscow in May. They stressed a couple of points: (1) that they want it to be non-governmental. They don't want the group to be as closely attached with the government as it was with the Johnson Administration. The other point was that since they have the confidence in Bundy they would like him to be an integral part of the program. Bundy said this would be o.k. with him but he did have a lot of things on his shoulders here -- whatever the President or HAK decided. HAK thought that it would be a good thing for Bundy to stick with it.

Bundy thought an appropriate non-government agency should sponsor this group and suggested the National Academy. He asked if Lee DuBridge couldn't be consulted and HAK agreed. HAK thought the President would agree to the meetings but hasn't had any further input other than the original. HAK said we could indicate the program has the President's personal attention without his making a political issue as far as the public is concerned. Bundy agreed with this point.

Bundy is going to send in a paper which HAK said he would present to the President. HAK said he would get together with Bundy after the NATO meetings.

sa

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
By MW NARA Date 080608

TELCORN

Howard Simons (Washington Post)
Mr. Kissinger

4/4/69 10:55 a.m.

(this concerns the edited version of HAK's remarks at UCLA last spring)

Simons said that what HAK is offering him in lieu of what he said a year ago is so emasculated that he couldn't publish it (he is sending to California for a copy, because he never got back the original.) So his choice would be not to publish it at all, or to do a story saying "a year ago these were his thoughts..."

HAK said the only thing he is conscious of taking out was some comment with respect to McNamara, who is a good friend. HAK thought he was talking in a small private seminar, and didn't know they were going to publish what he said.

Simons said he is not trying to play a game. But some of HAK's off-the-cuff comments are still valid as an essay on bureaucracy -- he referred to a part at the end when HAK talks about how Presidents pick up intellectuals as part of their entourage sometimes quite by accident. HAK interjected, "It isn't true in this particular case." Simons said it must be true in other cases. HAK said he was talking about politicians; he was thinking of some senatorial candidates he had known in Massachusetts when he made that particular comment. He recalls he said political leaders.

Simons said he has not made a decision but on the face of the essay HAK sent over he would say No. It doesn't do what he wants it to do. HAK joked, "I have never been refused for publication before, but nothing could please me more." Simons joked back, "I'm going to have to extract a quart of blood if I decide against it. I jealously regard Outlook as something very special for me."

HAK said, "When you get that thing, will you talk to me about it?"
He said his problem is, in order to be useful, he shouldn't appear like a
megalomaniac. He admitted to making a few flippant comments which
he'd like not to have in there.

Simons is waiting to see if there is anything salvageable which they could
both live with. HAK said he will certainly make every effort to look at Simon's
problem. Simons said he's not out to hang HAK at all.

HAK said he feels the Post has been more than fair in its relation to him,
and, for that matter, to the Administration. You can't expect always full
agreement, but they have been most responsible.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MN, NARA Date 08/06/89

TELCONE
Bob McCloskey
Mr. Kissinger
4/4/69 11:25 a.m.

McCloskey said he wanted HAK to know they cleared the decks for his lunch with the Overseas Press people by not having a press conference with SecState. (joke) HAK said he thought he was meeting on a background basis with 10 or so newsmen. He had never been at one of this type-- what do I do?

McCloskey said, talk for 5 or 10 minutes, and then take questions. They're a senior group. It will be for deep background, which doesn't prevent them from using information; but whatever they use is on their own, no attribution to any source, official or otherwise.

HAK asked what he should talk about. McCloskey said he would have to talk a little about Vietnam, & when we might expect to get into talks with Russia. HAK said he didn't realize until yesterday it was a semi-public function. He thought it was a regular WH backgrounder such as he does once a month. McCloskey said it would be 100-125 people. When HAK asked if McCloskey thought he should talk about strategic arms talks, McCloskey said HAK might indicate we are moving further ahead to getting them started. (Rogers announced that Smith would be negotiator, which is a new fact.) So far as he knew, we have not gone to the Soviets that we are ready. We are in a state of willingness, as differentiated from readiness.

HAK said we have an NSC meeting scheduled for June 4 on it -- it's hard for HAK to imagine we can start much before then.

McCloskey said he may be asked some rather specific questions about this story of US forces in Cambodia. They both agreed it was almost treasonable. McC said, say that we're just not going to discuss that kind of thing. It is the policy of the Administration not to widen the war--and try to leave it at that.

Another thing HAK might get today would be the Canadian decision on NATO. HAK might express some disappointment. HAK said he would say it was their business. It's awfully hard to see how you can be for SALT talks and reduce your forces unilaterally.

Also there's a NATO meeting coming up. McC not sure what our policy is here. He assumes it's still that there can't be any conference on European security if US doesn't participate. HAK supposed they would let us participate now.

HAK said he isn't going to do that sort of thing again. He appreciated Bob's guidance. Bob pointed out this would be an answer to some of the complaints

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958
By MW NARA Date 08/06/89

TELCONE

Secy Hardin
Mr. Kissinger
4-4-69 4:00 PM

H asked if K was involved on cotton sales to India. K said
not that he was aware of. H said someone over there had reacted
on a cotton matter. K said it is conceivable that someone on his
staff had been involved but it never reached K personally. K asked
if H thought the wrong recommendation had been made. H said
yes in this instance as this will make the Indians feel they have
to develop cotton. K said he would look into the matter
and call H back.

H asked K's advice on a personnel matter and K suggested he
get in touch with Peter Eak Flannigan.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
By MW NARA Date 080698

Telecon

Robert Osgood

4:15 April 4, 1969

HAK wanted to know if Osgood recalled any mention of nuclear cooperation between us and the French during the Birrenbach meeting. Osgood said he was positive the whole conversation was about the NPT. HAK said the story is -- from Birrenbach -- that nuclear cooperation had been discussed but the story came through a second party.

Osgood again said he didn't recall any mention -- not even k
in his separate meeting with Birrenbach.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012957
By MW NARA Date 08/06/68

TELCORN
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger

4-4-69 4:20 PM

R said he raised the subject with Laird and showed him NY Times article which he had not see. R said he either does not remember what he said or. K interrupted to say he what he claims to have said he did not say. K said Laird told him what R is going to say and that is the most tactful way of doing it. R said any way he puts it, will be a rebuke to him. R said he if we were in Hanoi's position and we saw in the newspaper we would think they were exploiting private talks for political purposes. K said that is right, particularly if most bellicose member of the Administration does it. R said he does not want to bother the President with it in Florida, but he does want to talk to him before press conference. R said L's statement on B 52s was also helpful. R asked if K had any thoughts on what he should say if that came up. K said the White House put out a statement that no one has ever covered which said it was a planning figure - no deescalation. R asked K to send it over and K said he would.

They discussed K's Overseas Press Club luncheon meeting.

jm

Tlecon

Robert Kleiman

April 4, 1969 6:00

Kleiman had written an article which is to appear in Monday's Times and wanted HAK to hear it in case he had any drastic objections. In the last few days, Kleiman has had other information on the State Dept's view on SALT talks and because of the recent discussions on Safeguard -- this is the reason for the article. He then read the article.

HAK thought it was a responsible article but didn't want to comment on it. Kleiman said he understood but just wanted to make sure he didn't have any strong objections. The only thing HAK wanted him to change was -- settlement in Central Europe to settlement in Berlin.

sa

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958
By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

DECLASSIFIED

Authority - E012958
By MW NARA Date 09/06/68

Telecon

Sec. Hardin

6:25 April 4, 1969

On the cotton business -- we sent (HAK said) up a package to the President and got approval of a proposal for % $55 million which didn't include cotton. The full package is to be presented May 1. The Indians would like to substitute cotton for one of the other items and HAK said as far as he was concerned this \*\* could be done very easily. Hardin thought the original figure was $85.6 million. HAK said that would probably be the full package.

HAK suggested that Hardin make a recommendation for the substitution of cotton for any item Hardin things is replacable and submit it. We would have no problem getting it through here.

Hardin agreed.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

TELCOM

Gerard Smith
Mr. Kissinger
4/4/69 6 40 pm

Gerard Smith said Dr DuBridge suggested Spurgeon Keeny to take
Pete Scoville's place as head of their Science and Technology Board--
would it be all right with HAK if they asked Spurge?

HAK said although he would regret losing Keeny, he thinks he could stand a
change; he has been in this job for a long time. If Smith wants him and
Spurgeon really wants to go, HAK wouldn't stand in his way.

Smith said all signs indicate Spurgeon would be very good for this job.
HAK thought he would be too, and repeated that if Smith wanted him, HAK
would want to stand in his way--but on the other hand he would be happy
to keep him.

Smith hadn't talked to Spurgeon yet, but he said he will.

HAK SAID "I know you won't fail."

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon
Hal Saunders
Mr. Kissinger

4/4/69

HAK said Hal, I think this briefing book we have is useless for the President. He just does not operate that way. HAK said it is much too much. Putting this before the P guarantees he will not look at it. It is not in a form he likes.

S said well, I got with Sneider and he said it was exactly like the format of the book for the Gorton meeting.

HAK said what you have is right but much too short. Actually, what you had in the memo to me on "Where we Stand" is much more what he likes.

S said, can we assume he has seen that memo?

HAK said, no we cannot assume he has seen it. I am having all the Middle East stuff put in the book for him before he sees Hussein. HAK said to S, you will have to assume that the book we put together is the only thing he will have. HAK said one thing should be the State of play with Egypt, another the state of play with Jordanians and then some talking points. HAK said then the rest is background.

S said there is a summary of talking points and right behind that is a three or four page memorandum elaborating on that.

HAK said, I am sorry, I did not see that. HAK said what you have to do is put your stuff into the front of the book. HAK said redo the book. Put first the covering memorandums, then the talking points and then background.

S said how about the Rogers memorandum.

HAK said we will give it to him in separate paper. I will tell Al what I want.

S said, fine, I will be in tomorrow and work with Al on it.

mlh

DECLASSIFIED

TELCOM

Gerard Smith
Mr. Kissinger
4-4-69 PM

S said he wondered if there was anything to the newspaper story in Paris Tribune re atomic arms. K said absolutely nothing - K has reviewed every memcon he could get hold of. K said someone said K had said something to the Germans and that is absurd and another story alleges the President said something to de Gaulle. S asked about US and France soon aprix opening talks about coordination of forces. K said he thought that proposal is not as impossible as nuclear assistance. S said he agreed and also suggests joint work on targetting if we are going to have a political impact in Europe or it would make it easier for Germany not to sign the NPT.

H said he knows of no such intention of doing this for two reasons (1) it is inconceivable, and (2) even if it were conceivable we have no intention. That means S would get a crack at stating his views.

jm/sd