Election: Comment

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Mr. Carter, a Georgian born and bred, will probably be unbeatable. In other words, Mr. Reagan is strongest in just those areas where his strength counts least.

Considerations like these will have to influence the wiser heads in the Republican party. -- (6/10/76)

Ford Team Claims 'It's All Over'
(By Godfrey Sperling Jr., excerpted, C.S. Monitor)

Barring unforeseen difficulties, President Ford's campaign forces believe they have won the nomination -- "that it's all over."

Melvin R. Laird, a close political adviser of the President, told a group of reporters over breakfast that Mr. Ford (now viewed in the GOP camp as leading challenger Ronald Reagan, 976 to 869), will pick up 136 delegates to Mr. Reagan's 191 in the remaining 11 convention states -- making it 1,112 for Mr. Ford and 1,060 for Mr. Reagan.

Mr. Laird insists that his projection is "pessimistic -- the very worst it could turn out in the convention states." His table follows:

Missouri -- Reagan 34, Ford 15 ("Ford might well get more");
Iowa -- Reagan 16, Ford 20; Minnesota -- Reagan 12, Ford 30 ("We
expect to do better there").

Washington -- Reagan 38, Ford 0; Delaware -- Reagan 0, Ford 17;
New Mexico -- Reagan 21, Ford 0; Montana -- Reagan 20, Ford 0

North Dakota -- Reagan 9, Ford 9; Colorado -- Reagan 16,
Ford 15 ("Reagan might get a few more here"); Connecticut --
Reagan 5, Ford 30 ("We might get all of them."); Utah -- Reagan 20,
Ford 0.

Beyond presidential involvement in the convention states, the Ford strategy will focus on wooing the uncommitted delegates. Mr. Laird says that he himself has called up a large number of this group and found them ready to support the President. -- (6/10)

Election: Comment

# Reagan's 'Nice Guy' Image

William Loeb, the voice of conservatism in New Hampshire as publisher of the bellwether Manchester Union-Leader, has decided the only thing wrong with his champion, Ronald Reagan, is that the well-cured old hambone is "too nice."

There is as much truth to this as to some of the dandies Reagan has been dropping by the wayside like so many plucked daffodils, such as that the Social Security trust fund is more than "$3 trillion" out of whack, or that the Panama Canal is "ours," just as much as Alaska, which to anyone else but the true believers in untruth, would be as much as, say, Arkansas is. (We are all Panamanians now.)

As with Reagan himself, then, it is not the reality or lack of it of the Loeb assessment of Reagan that matters. It is the *illusion* of reality that so many Americans prefer to the real uncut stuff. This has been pointed out about Reagan, especially, many times by many different pointers, and all of them were and are right.

The reality of Reagan's campaign against the original "Mr. Good Guy" himself, Gerald Ford, is that Reagan, having had the presumption to add an "11th Commandment" to the Ten that had been knocking around for a good many years before he first flickered onto the silver screen, Reagan than became the very first man concerned to break it. Indeed, he may be the only figure in history to have broken a single formal Commandment of his own, since Moses, so far as we have been told, was formally caught out by God only once—and he had a total of 10 of 'em.

In trying to pile this second fallacy on top of the basic fallacy that is Reagan himself, Bill Loeb may still be rationalizing to a degree his failure to deliver New Hampshire for Reagan in the nation's usual first presidential primary of the year, the Loeb myth always having been that every word of his guiding editorials is immediately graven on the foreheads of the stony-faced citizens of the Granite State. This year, they demonstrated that they were

so Republican as to prefer someone who was put up for membership in the Party of their Fathers at birth—as one is put up for enrollment at Groton or Sandusky State at birth—to a man who in the past trucked with the ancient enemy party.

There is this much to be said for Loeb's analysis of the Reagan image of being a nice guy when he goes on to explain that the image had its genesis in his candidate's rarely if ever having played anything but nice guys even in the awful Westerns. This is true, we think, but what Loeb does not go on and do is ask the corollary question, which is whether they would have loved him as they showed they did in, say, the Arkansas Republican primary last Tuesday, if their present favorite had played only Edgar G. Robinson parts or that one where Jimmy Cagney shoves half a grapefruit into Mae Clarke's face. The answer, we think, is, "No!"

Besides, wasn't it Richard Nixon himself who informed us without benefit of an interpreter that his biggest flaw, his only one, really, was that he was just too sweet a guy, just a big old soft well of human compassion.

Arkansas Gazette, 6/2/76

Election: Comment

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No. 2 Spot Remains Second-Rate Job

(By J.F. terHorst, excerpted, Baltimore Sun)

Historically, a presidential nominee's choice of a running mate is an act of healing, the application of a soothing bandage to the loser's wounds so that the party can march strongly toward victory in November. This year it promises to be something else for the Republicans, and perhaps for the Democrats. It may amount to rubbing in the salt.

Since Reagan's candidacy rests on the right wing's pathological distrust of Rockefeller and GOP "liberals," he could hardly pick a running mate from their ranks. Such a move would amount to betrayal of his own supporters, and Reagan knows it. He has said he would choose a vice presidential nominee much like himself. That wouldn't be an act of reconciliation; it would resemble Barry Goldwater's act of defiance in choosing William E. Miller to share the ticket of 1964.

Ford will have an equally difficult task. If he should offer the running mate spot to Reagan or to someone acceptable to the Reagan camp, chances are that GOP moderates would be tempted to desert the ticket in wholesale fashion in November. Ticket-balancing suggests that the conservative President should fill this second spot with someone to his left, perhaps even renewing Rockefeller's lease on the job. But that would send the Reaganites right up the wall.

Among the Democrats, Jimmy Carter is in the strongest position to use the vice presidential spot as a means of healing the party. As a centrist and as a Southerner, Carter would be expected to choose a running mate who is Northern and liberal -- someone like, say, Sen. Glenn of Ohio, Mondale of Minnesota or Stevenson of Illinois

All of the foregoing, of course, treats the Vice Presidency as merely a political Band Aid, and mocks its real purpose in the American system -- to provide the country with a trustworthy person capable of stepping into the Presidency in an emergency. Despite the sorty lessons of the recent past, the selection of a vice presidential nominee in each party remains a haphazard matter. -- (6/10/76)

Foreign Policy: Comment

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How Reagan Stands on Rhodesia
(Editorial, excerpted, Arkansas Gazette)

The wind-up days of the presidential primary campaign in California were enlivened by yet another glimpse into what goes on inside Ronald Reagan's cranial cavity when someone strikes a chord on some great world issue of delicate diplomatic import like... well, like Rhodesia. (Ron's skull is hinged, fortunately, so there is never anything to taking another little peek.)

During a Q. and A. session, he was asked whether he would send American troops into Rhodesia if nominated and elected. Only on condition that their presence had been formally requested by the present Rhodesian government was Ron's ready response.

Extrapolating, extrapolating, Reagan at Sacramento said soothingly that he did not think an actual commitment of American troops to Rhodesia would be necessary.

By the time Reagan got to a fund-raising party in the San Francisco suburb of Cupertino later in the day the stuff was all in the fan or at least on all the instant electronic news analyses and there the plausible Ron was obliged to explain, "It isn't true, I'm not going to declare war on Rhodesia. I made the mistake of speaking to the Press Club over in Sacramento. You have to be careful what you say..."

You sure do -- especially when they've got the tape on you.

The day's damage was not done yet. At another rally in another Bay Area suburb still later, Reagan brought up Rhodesia two more times, saying first that he thought "they'll say I want to go to war over Rhodesia. [Where would anybody get an idea like that?] I really don't. I like things just as they are." But later on in the same speech the old glands took over again, the adrenal especially, and so: "I joked a little while ago about charges I might want to start a war. I don't. But I do know that we can't abdicate our leadership of the Free World without abdicating our ability to keep the peace."

So we are back to ground zero again, or Reagan at least hopes that he is back to where he was before he had been unwise enough to get up to his orange juice that morning.

It must have been comforting to him as the shadows fell to know that he had not been alone that day in the explaining of explanations. His campaign chief of staff Mike Deaver, somewhere along the way told reporters that what Reagan really believes is that a UN force "might be a better way" to preserve the peace than an exclusively American force. By now, we suppose, Reagan has had to explain away Deaver's boner, for, as we all know: "Get US Out

Of UN'" -- (6/2/76)

Foreign Policy: Comment

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Kissinger's Call for Rights

(Editorial, excerpted, Christian Science Monitor)

In Santiago this week, Henry Kissinger quite properly challenged violations of rights in Cuba and other countries in the hemisphere along with Chile. But his remarks on Chile were particularly significant. For it was U.S. efforts to destabilize Chile's previous, constitutionally elected government that tarnished the U.S. in international eyes. Now Dr. Kissinger was plainly criticizing the military junta which had bloodily overthrown the earlier regime.

Speaking to the current general assembly of the OAS, Dr. Kissinger referred to a report by the OAS human rights commission that charged the military with "arbitrary jailings, persecutions, and tortures" -- and propaganda efforts to cover them up. He noted a reported reduction in the number of rights violations. But there were still too many.

In other words, the U.S. expects Chile to do something substantive to expand human rights -- and it is to be hoped the information is correct that Dr. Kissinger has private assurances from Chile that steps will be taken in this direction. The spelling out of this stand follows Dr. Kissinger's similar spelling out of U.S. support for the rights of the black majority in Rhodesia.

As the demand for reducing disparities grows in the world, it becomes not only ethically correct but pragmatically important for the U.S. to align itself with the legitimate aspirations of people everywhere. Wisely the Ford administration is not seeking military aid for the Chilean junta this year. Such policy positions can help to make Dr. Kissinger's strong words more than lip service. It is to his and the President's credit that he has been saying them at a time when it might have been politically easier at home not to raise such questions. -- (6/10/76)

Kissinger at the OAS

(Editorial, excerpted, Baltimore Sun)

Secretary Kissinger, at least, is not letting Governor Reagan dictate his part of the administration's policy. Not when he is showing his fellow foreign ministers of the Organization of American States what a good neighbor the U.S. can be. One of the most beneficial moments at the OAS meeting came when Panama and the U.S. jointly assured that they hope to move into the final stage of negotiations over the Panama Canal this year.

Mr. Kissinger also appeased his Latin American and domestic liberal critics rather than Mr. Reagan by denouncing the Chilean junta's denial of human rights. Chile is not the only country in Latin America with political prisoners or torture, but it is a moral

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Foreign Policy: Comment

albatross around the Yankee neck because of CIA complicity in
imposing President Pinochet on the Chilean people.

Pressure by the OAS, meeting in the Chilean capital of Santiago, is likely to have a positive effect, far more than os-tracism of the Pinochet regime would have achieved. The U.S. could not have ignored the Human Rights Commission without sabotaging it, reason enough for Mr. Kissinger to have supported it. In the end, the U.S. can never be just another Pan-American state. Colombia and Costa Rica recognized this by campaigning for U.S. trade preferences to compensate for European Common Market preferences for African goods. The role of Uncle is not easily given up. An uncle should try to be a good neighbor, if not always a soft touch. -- (6/10/76)

More One Way Detente?
---
(Editorial, excerpted, *Chicago Tribune*)

At a time when the Soviet Union's acts smack less and less
of detente, it seems anomalous that the West is lending Moscow more
and more money. Economic generosity seems an inappropriate re-
sponse to insincerity.

The Chase Manhattan Bank reports that Western banks made loans of $2.5 billion last year to the Eastern Bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Loans are being made at a faster rate this year than last, thanks to poor harvests in the East and a continuing demand for Western machinery.

The rise in loans to the Soviet Union and its puppet regimes
is in striking and paradoxical contrast to the decline in our
confidence in Soviet intentions toward the West.

We should be using our economic clout to compel the Soviets
to enter into a true, fully rounded detente. How can economic
detente go on with any hope of success when political and military
detente appear to have hit the skids? We entered into negotiations
with the Soviets because we sincerely wanted a relaxation of ten-
sions. This cannot come about as long as Moscow engages in an
offensive military buildup that mocks our hopes of peace. Good
will and brotherly love on our part do not require us to finance
Soviet preparations to dominate us. -- (6/10/76)

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Foreign Policy: Comment

Economic Summit
(Editorial, excerpted, *Atlanta Journal* and *Constitution*)

It is obvious that the non-Communist industrial nations share a common economic bond and if one suffers financial distress the others will feel the malaise. That is undoubtedly the justification for a seven-nation economic parley just before the Republican National Convention. It is being billed as a follow-up to the conference held last November in Rambouillet, France.

Despite the timing of the economic summit the White House has predictably denied that there is any connection between the conference and the desire to enhance President Ford's image just before the GOP convention in Kansas City.

We certainly endorse the concept of these nations working together in terms of economics as well as in terms of mutual defense. It makes sense to do so. But we believe that joint efforts can be realized without calling for an economic summit on relatively short notice. Moreover, we believe the conference would enhance its credibility if it were not timed for political mileage for President Ford -- a timing that is either distressingly deliberate or a distressing coincidence.

Perhaps this proposed economic summit may be more constructive and more substantial than was Rambouillet. But we have yet to be convinced. --(6/6/76)

Rambouillet II
(Editorial, excerpted, New Orleans Times-Picayune)

The six-nation economic summit President Ford has arranged for the end of this month in Puerto Rico is under something of an election-year cloud. He is accused by some of staging a campaign-oriented international media event less than two months before the GOP convention. But there may be heavier clouds over it than that.

The purpose of the summit is "to chart a course to keep the recovery moving forward," "to determine what our nations can do, working together, to create a more prosperous and secure future for all of our citizens."

The June summit is a follow-up for the three-day summit last November in Rambouillet, France. A general judgment last November was that the summit had smoothed out some national and personal ruffles that had hitherto impeded effective cooperation, and that fact argued for later work. In the meantime, for reasons economists uncertainly debate, recovery has proceded encouragingly, giving the summiteers some momentum to spring from.

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Foreign Policy: Comment

Let us hope that the seeds of Rambouillet will bear fruit in Puerto Rico, for the industrial world, for all its latent power, is badly in need of the unity required to focus it on common problems. -- (6/7/76)

Energy: Comment

Energy's Mixed Bag

(Editorial, excerpted, Atlanta Journal)

The Federal Energy Administration still holds gallantly to its predictions that the nation can achieve energy independence in the decade ahead.

And the agency is still holding to the belief that substantial increases in coal and oil production, coupled with an acknowledgment of conservation measures, will be the primary forces for coping with the energy crunch in that period.

With the difficulty in predicting the economic picture in the energy forecasts, the FEA is making some risky assumptions that some may legitimately question today and perhaps directly refute in the near future.

The impact of economic and pollution control regulations is simply too difficult to pin down at this point in the nation's hazy energy picture. As yet there is even no comprehensive energy policy that might help clear the outlook. One factor is quite clear, however. There are no panaceas. A strong energy conservation plan must be coupled with a good mix of old and new energy sources. That is the best foundation. -- (6/4/76)

Congress: Comment

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'Full Employment' Issue
(Editorial, excerpted, Memphis Commercial Appeal)

Building up steam in the halls of Congress is the major issue of how to approach the nettlesome problem of unemployment. The controversy is not over whether the nation should strive for "full employment," but rather on a definition of the term, and on whether the federal government should invent a massive mechanism to guarantee jobs.

The bill at hand has been nicknamed the Humphrey-Hawkins bill. Opposing it are the Republican Party and President Ford, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

The predicted scenario is for the Democrats in Congress to pass the bill in expectation that Ford will veto it and then go to the hustings charging that the President and his party are cal-lous toward the unemployed.

Humphrey-Hawkins would lower the unemployment level to 3 percent with a target deadline of four years after enactment. Anyone 16 or older would be covered.

That in itself is Utopian. The bill would require the president to submit to Congress annually a comprehensive program to achieve "full employment and balanced growth." The president would have to tell how he intended to use fiscal and monetary policy, tax revision and other tools -- with no assurance that market forces would react as expected -- in his quest of the goal. Congress then would have the right to approve, reject or change his ideas. The Federal Reserve Board would have to coordinate its monetary policies (which it hates to forecast) with those of Congress. Now, there's the rub, or at least one of them. Not only would the president's economic hands be tied, so would those of the Fed, which is supposed to be independent.

You don't get Utopian plans without masterminds to run them. It is folly to believe that the 535 members of Congress, a cageful of untamed political animals, can run this country's economy better than the free, private business sector, guided by the Council of Economic Advisers, the Treasury and the Fed.

It's unfortunate that full employment has to be made such a partisan issue. But in reaching for the goal it is important to guard against policies that are inflationary, or that destroy work incentives, or that add up to a new burden on the taxpayer, or that turn government into "an employer of last resort" as this bill does.

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Congress: Comment

Current Ford administration policy sets no precise goal, but it is designed to stimulate growth and jobs -- without heating up inflation unbearably.

It seems to be working. And it remains a more sensible -- if perhaps too slow -- policy than the controlled economy of the Humphrey-Hawkins concept.

As one congressman has said, "Mainland China has full employment but not much personal freedom." -- (6/3/76)

## Television Commentary
### Low Key Issues Help Carter

(By Howard K. Smith, ABC)

Yesterday, in this space, we just dismissed, a little cavalierly, the fact that issues played little role in the record-long primary season -- general impressions, personal image was dominant.

I'd like to delve a little into why issues played little part. Undoubtedly, it was partly the normal politicians wish to avoid previous commitments and to offend as few people as possible with specifics. But equally doubtless, the national mood in this country has improved markedly. We have differences, but issues are no longer aflame. The violent, self-scorching passions of past elections are simply not there anymore. We're a much more united and tolerant people than we've been in a long time.

How else to account for Jimmy Carter, coming out of some 30 head-on fights, with no hatreds, no real enemies. He's even considering some of his toughest opponents for second spot on his ticket. Moreover, he made no Republicans mad. The New York Times today said that 35% of them, weary of a fraction fighting a fraction in their party, may desert their party and vote for Carter. It's welcome, healing thesis, but if Carter does win the big peanut in the end, a caviat should be added. The last time such a mood prevailed in this country, the affible Warren Harding replaced the brilliant, controversial Woodrow Wilson. And there ensued 10 years of the worst, sleepiest government we ever had, leading to a depression which led to a war. Well, Mr. Carter is no Harding, but we'd feel a lot better if he would now deal a little more in specifics and prove it. -- (6/10/76)

PERSPECTIVE: Foreign Policy

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# Media Hopes Summit Will Produce Real Economic Benefits

Despite widespread suspicion that calling the Economic Summit Conference may have been done for domestic political reasons, the few newspapers commenting on it expressed hope that the Puerto Rican conference will produce substantial results.

James Deakin (St. Louis Post-Dispatch), the *New York Daily News*, Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe, Atlanta Journal, New Orleans Times-Picayune, and Memphis Commercial Appeal observed that the improved world economic situation and the timing of the summit -- less than a year after Rambouillet and only seven weeks before the GOP convention -- suggest it was designed to improve the President's chances for nomination.

"For an embattled chief executive involved in a difficult election campaign, the latest summit may provide some extra dividends, the *New York Daily News* wrote in an editorial (6/3).
"President Ford will be in a position to claim an international vindication of sorts of his economic policies, and in an attention getting format just before the Democratic National Convention where his opponents will be going after those policies hammer and tongs."

The *Atlanta Journal* endorsed the concept of the economic summit, but argued in an editorial (6/6) that "joint economic efforts can be realized without calling for an economic summit on relatively short notice. Moreover, we believe the conference would enhance its credibility if it were not timed for political mileage for President Ford -- a timing that is neither distressingly deliberate or a distressing coincidence."

The *Wall Street Journal*, *Boston Globe* and *New York Daily News*, however, maintained that despite political motives, changing world economic and political factors make a summit appropriate at this time. "It's not a bad idea," the *Journal* wrote (6/7), "even if this were not an election year, and the folks at the White House were not trying to dream up ways to make Jerry Ford look more presidential.

"While the U.S. economy and the world economy are in better shape than a year ago, they're still a long way from good health. Britain and Italy are still in terrible condition, psychologically, politically and economically. They would benefit most by going to Puerto Rico with the attitude that they don't know what they are doing wrong and candidly seeking friendly counsel."

In addition, the *Journal* wrote: "We hope Mr. Ford gains a perspective from some of the other participants that he's not getting at home. The West Germans and Japanese should not be bashful in explaining why they oppose the various schemes, including Henry Kissinger's, to prevent a boom in commodity prices

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PERSPECTIVE: Foreign Policy

by transferring resources to producing nations.

"The group might also discuss ways of expanding the piece of the international monetary system (fashioned at Rambouillet) into a whole system that might save the baffled British and Italians from themselves. Or if it is too soon for that, at least persuade them that they could solve their problems by hewing closer to the U.S.-West German monetary policy, and by adopting fiscal policies appropriate to that task. In general, the Puerto Rico meeting should reinforce the lesson that world money growth must be brought under control through continued monetary restraint."

"The conference also could take up anew the issues of trade and international payments left largely unresolved by the month-long meetings of the U.S. Conference on Trade and Development in Nairobi," the Globe wrote (6/4). "The meeting would provide the opportunity to add Canada to the roster of participants...helping overcome the notion, spawned by the French at last November's session, that Canada was somehow just a U.S. province. Last, the meeting might inspire the tariff talks still taking place in Geneva."

What is the likelihood that such goals will be achieved? James Deakin (St. Louis Post-Dispatch), the Memphis Commercial Appeal, Atlanta Journal and Chicago Tribune think the chances are slim.

"It may be that these leaders can succeed in formulating some economic plans in Puerto Rico which will be more significant than the statement they issued after Rambouillet, but it seems doubtful," the Commercial Appeal wrote (6/5). "After all, this conference was called without even as much preparation as went into the November meeting and, without solid spadework by staffs before such an event, there is usually little that can be done."

More fundamentally, Deakin argued (6/6) that the Ford Administration's decision not to move towards economic restraint or to urge other countries to do so leaves little to talk about at the summit. "The result is that Puerto Rico is unlikely to produce specific decisions, even though some U.S. officials have expressed deep concern about the apparent inability of some Western European nations to do what is needed to control inflation."

If, as Deakin warned, the summit produces nothing of value for the U.S., the President will have to take the blame, the Wall Street Journal and Boston Globe maintained.

"If the President calls the meeting to 'look presidential,' as has been suggested, he had better have something to show the public at the end," the Globe wrote. "It would be a disservice

PERSPECTIVE: Foreign Policy

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to all those who want greater international economic cooperation if the meeting produced only platitudes. That would be a bad mark on Gerald Ford's record -- win, lose or draw in November."

But "if the summit actually produces something of value to the United States," the *Journal* observed, "Mr. Ford will be justly rewarded. That's what Presidents are for."

SPECIAL EDITION -- 29 JUNE 1976

were able to establish a Middle East beachhead. Inhibited by our special attachment to Israel, the Arabs' common enemy, as well as by our economic interest in oil concessions, we Americans could not have maintained the Middle East as an exclusive sphere of influence—as Britain had done in an earlier day—even had we wished to do so.

The awkwardness of the American position was made worse by the decisiveness of Israel's victory in the Six Day War of June, 1967, which humiliated and demoralized the whole of the Arab world. Disturbed that the Israelis had struck without advance notice, much less consultation, the Johnson Administration tried to initiate at least the beginning of a peace agreement. After intense haggling, the United Nations Security Council, in November, 1967, finally approved Resolution 242, based on a British initiative, which established the broad framework for a settlement. That resolution provided for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in recent conflict." It also provided for the "termination of all claims of states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force."

But Resolution 242 remained a bare framework, never a completed edifice. Although endless conversations took place between the State Department on the one hand, and Israeli and Arab leaders on the other, the situation settled into stalemate. No serious progress seemed possible. By the end of 1967 the Arabs, frustrated and unhappy, had issued an extravagantly hard-line declaration at a conference at Khartoum, while the Israelis, convinced that time was working on their side, had persuaded themselves that if they only continued long enough to occupy and develop the territories they had taken in 1967, the world would accept the new boundaries as a fait accompli.

I was made vividly aware of this latter attitude when, as United States Ambassador to the United Nations, I flew over Israel in 1968 with the Israeli Minister of Defense, General Moshe Dayan. Looking through the helicopter windows at the verdant land below, I remarked on Israel's extraordinary achievement in making the desert blossom like a rose. "But," I said, "when I look out over the sands of the Sinai, I wonder how long you can sit on all that real estate and still have any security."

"Security?" Dayan replied. "Why do you talk about security? Never have we had such security. For the first time, we have defense in depth, we have the possibility of an early air alert, we have boundaries with the Arab world only half as long as they were before. Why do you speak to me of security?"

"All right," I said, "let me rephrase the question: How long do you think you can sit on all that real estate?"

"How long has it been since 1948?" he replied.

Though the incident is of no historical import,

Dayan's reaction reflected the belief, then widely held by Israeli leaders, that the Arabs were too divided and incompetent to regain the occupied lands by their own efforts, and that no other nation would intervene to help them.

Five years later the war of October, 1973, shattered Israeli complacency. During the first days of fighting, not only did the Arabs succeed beyond anyone's expectations—including their own—but Israelis began to ask whether time was still working on their side, if, indeed, it had ever been. No one could take for granted any longer that 3.5 million Israelis would be able forever to stand off 100 million hostile Arabs—particularly after the February, 1974, increase in oil prices assured the Arab world of unlimited funds to buy armaments. Thus, some Israeli sentiment developed for a political settlement, while the Arabs, with their pride restored, also adopted a more flexible stance.

Once a cease-fire had been negotiated (under pressure from the Soviet Union) on October 24, 1973, America had no option but to arrange for the separation of the hostile forces on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. This was essential for avoiding a resumption of the shooting, and was a prerequisite for a lifting of the oil embargo, which Europeans were blaming on America's pro-Israel policies.

Although it was a task unsuited to routine diplomacy, particularly since we then had no formal relations with Egypt, there were ample precedents for the President or Secretary of State to dispatch a special emissary to try to work out a settlement. But the seductions of virtuoso diplomacy were too great, and, in spite of the fact that newly installed Secretary Kissinger was promising to "institutionalize" our foreign policy, he could not resist the temptation to play the emissary role himself.

One can argue that the success of his effort vindicated the Secretary's personal involvement, yet it established a clumsy pattern. It kept the Secretary of State away from Washington for an average of one out of every six weeks during 1974 and 1975, and his involvement impaired the usefulness of less newsworthy emissaries. Thus, no one should have been surprised that Kuwait refused to accept a visit from the able and respected Joseph Sisco, then the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, insisting that it would be infra dig to receive anyone other than Henry Kissinger.

But, more important than these immediate effects, shuttle diplomacy had major political implications, since, by dramatizing our preemption of the negotiations, it notified the world that the United States would go it alone. By rigorously excluding the Soviet Union from any part in the negotiations, we reduced Moscow to so humiliating a position that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Groemyko felt compelled to fly repeatedly to Damascus to see President Hafez al-Assad of Syria, each time

2

"How long do you think you can sit on all that real estate?" I asked Dayan.

arriving after Kissinger had left town—in the man-
ner, as one wit put it, of the assiduous lover of a
traveling salesman's wife.

If the initial round of shuttle negotiations could be justified as a limited diplomatic operation to achieve battlefield redeployments, the search for a substantive settlement involved political commitments far more complex and important than the mere movement of armies. Yet the time was propitious as never before for a concentrated drive for such a settlement, since, by a fortunate coincidence, there were relatively moderate leaders in all the relevant capitals.

Although President Assad of Syria was not to-
tally a free agent, as there were hard-liners in his
own government, he would have preferred an over-
all settlement that would enable him to concen-
trate on the peaceful development of his country
rather than accept increasing Soviet domination as
the price of keeping peace with Israeli armaments.
Even the chance for rational Palestinian leadership
seemed brighter in the early months of 1975 than
at any time since that explosive weekend in Rabat
the preceding October, when Arab leaders had
pushed the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) forward to negotiate the Palestinian issue
and administer whatever Palestinian state might
emerge. The swaggering appearance of the PLO
leader, Yassir Arafat, before the United Nations
General Assembly on November 13, 1974, had
been largely forgotten. Lacking a clear political
base, the PLO had receded into the impenetrable
fog of Arab politics, while by his courage, per-
sistence, and skillful diplomacy, the moderate King
Hussein of Jordan had gradually worked his way
back into Arab respect.

In Israel also a fresh appraisal was in progress. The bloodletting of the October, 1973, war had injected a certain realism into popular attitudes, particularly since many recognized that increased oil wealth had added new potential to Arab military power. Thus many Israelis turned toward the practical possibilities of a lasting settlement with their neighbors that would provide them the opportunity to develop their country in peace.

Finally, now that Nasser, with his dreams of a
pan-Arab empire, had been succeeded by Anwar
Sadat, Egypt was led by a reasonable man who
saw his country's future in strictly national terms.
Sadat, moreover, needed peace, needed it desper-
ately, if for no other reason than to keep pace with
the pressures engendered by Egyptian fecundity.
The population was growing at the rate of 2.7 per-
cent, doubling between 1947 and 1975 and threat-
ening to double again within twenty-five years. Al-

ready the benefits of the Aswan Dam, in terms of
increased agricultural production, had been more
than offset by the 14.6 million people added to the
Egyptian population since the dam was begun in
1956.

Egypt was, and still is, in desperate economic
and financial shape, with 30 percent unemploy-
ment, and the Egyptians could not face the ex-
pense of another war—at least not unless somebody
else paid for it. But Moscow was not prepared to
pour money endlessly into a nation capable of
launching hazardous military adventures on little
advance notice, adventures that were expensive in
material terms and might lead to a Soviet-
American confrontation.

With the evolving mood of the area creating fa-
vorable conditions for a major American effort to
bring about peace, Kissinger had available at least
two possible approaches. He could continue to pur-
sue shuttle diplomacy between Israel and Egypt in
the hope of arranging a truce on the Western front
that would buy time, or he could try to engineer a
final settlement that would dispose of the funda-
mental issues of the Golan Heights, the Palestin-
ians, and Jerusalem, and thus bring about a per-
manent settlement.

A bilateral deal between Israel and Egypt of-
fered the seductive attraction of speedy results, for,
apart from the Abu Rudeis oil fields, the arid
desert of the Sinai had only military significance.
Moreover, to an inveterate tactician such as Kissin-
ger, there was classic beauty in the prospect of di-
viding the Arab world, thus neutralizing Egypt,
which contains one third of the world's Arab popu-
lation and has historically been Israel's principal
military threat. The approach promised at least the
illusion of progress with little pain, for it would en-
able the United States to avoid the hard, sub-
stantive problems—such as the Golan Heights or
Jerusalem or the Palestinians—which engaged deep
emotional reactions resulting from long-held griev-
ances or from religious passions or fear. And fi-
nally, even though Henry Kissinger was publicly
committed to détente, he saw advantages in ex-
cluding the Soviet Union from participating in the
negotiations, thus preventing Moscow from gaining
a more solid foothold in the area. (He did concede
that the Soviets would have to be brought in at
some point before a final settlement could be
achieved.)

Those were the points Kissinger's staff empha-
sized to all who might give them currency. But
they did not tell the whole story. Above and be-
yond those reasons was the fact that further shuttle
diplomacy would keep Henry Kissinger in exclusive
control of the negotiating process, would place him
squarely in the spotlight of world attention, would, if

3

A bilateral deal between Israel and Egypt offered the seductive attraction of speedy results.

successful, contribute further to his legend, and would help President Ford in the 1976 election.

The arguments for continuing bilateral diplomacy were, in my view, far from persuasive. In fact, I felt deep regret as I watched the United States turn its back on a serious effort to solve the problem in favor of a tactical maneuver that bought time at the expense of ultimate peace. To exploit Sadat's strong desire for peace merely in order to separate Egypt from the rest of the Arab world was the profligate waste of an invaluable asset, since it removed the strongest and most moderate voice from Arab councils. By engineering Sadat's defection from the broader Arab cause, yet leaving the basic issues and grievances untouched, we would appear in Arab eyes to be supporting Israeli ambitions to consolidate their hold over the territories seized in 1967. Thus, with Egypt alienated from the more radical Arab states, and with those states increasingly embittered by a growing sense of isolation and betrayal, a separate Egyptian truce would assure the continued division of the Middle East into armed camps, with each side building toward an even more explosive war.

In early 1974, with the Secretary of State pondering his next move, I published a magazine article outlining the basic approach that was needed, elaborating it further in a newspaper piece in April, 1974. The essential first step, as I saw it, was for the United States to establish its own independent position. To that end, I proposed that the President announce a set of principles which should, in the United States's view, govern a final settlement. Such a statement of principles, designed to amplify the provisions of Resolution 242 which the United Nations Security Council had adopted following the 1967 war, would set forth certain propositions:

- The United States would continue to give its full, unremitting support to the secure existence of Israel.

- This did not mean, however, that we envisaged Israel's retention of the territories taken by force in 1967. A final settlement must involve the withdrawal by Israel to the borders existing prior to the 1967 war, subject to such minor boundary recitations as might be achieved through negotiation. For this purpose, we would support the principle of direct negotiations between the parties.

- A final settlement must provide for full, non-discriminatory treatment of Israel by the other states in the area. That should include de jure diplomatic recognition; the cessation of hostile propaganda; provision for the free movement of peoples; the right of Israeli ships, as well as cargoes,

to pass through the Suez Canal, and so on.

- The issue of the Golan Heights should be settled by demilitarization and the maintenance in the area of a United Nations presence that could not be withdrawn by either party. The West Bank should also be demilitarized and treated as belonging to the Palestinian people, leaving it to the Arab states and the Palestinians, with the help of the United Nations, to decide by some process of self-determination how and by whom the area should be governed. The issue of Jerusalem should be settled by international arrangement.

In making this statement the United States would insulate itself against the pressures of those who still held larger territorial ambitions for Israel. These principles were in accord with established international law and with the United Nations Charter; they would provide the United States with a morally unassailable position, unbiased in favor of either side, thus enabling it to play an effective role as impartial peacemaker. It was essential for the President to assert these principles publicly in order to establish America's freedom of action, since, in spite of Kissinger's desire not to be hobbled in his diplomacy, Israel was insisting that the United States take no positions not approved in Jerusalem.

Once having made these principles public, we should promptly ask the nations of Western Europe and the Soviet Union to join with us in seeking a final settlement. I even proposed that the United States make Soviet agreement to such common action a condition to the President's attending the summit conference at Helsinki in the summer of 1975 to sign the declarations developed by the European Security Conference. But the time is now past when that might have been done.

Since the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France constitute four of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, we should then be able to obtain a Security Council Resolution setting forth the terms of a final settlement on the basis of these principles. Such terms would necessarily include ample provision for buffer zones and for the insertion therein of United Nations forces. Nor should we foreclose the possibility that the United States and the Soviet Union might jointly guarantee the final boundaries, and that we might both supply elements for the United Nations forces, just as American and Soviet forces jointly patrolled Vienna in the days before the Austrian State Treaty. Finally, we should seek with the Soviet Union and the Western European arms-producing countries an agreement to limit the flow of weapons and military equipment into the area.

I discussed this approach with Secretary Kissinger, but it was not the course he adopted. Instead

L4

of announcing a statement of principles, he and the President used the threat of such an announcement to bring pressure on Israel to make concessions for a bilateral arrangement with Egypt.

There is no need to recount the events that marked the diplomatic activity following the breakdown of negotiations on March 22, 1975, nor to describe the impact of those events on American domestic politics. On a preliminary shuttle reconnaissance last February, Kissinger gained the impression that, when he began his second round of talks on March 8, the Israelis would move beyond the position they had taken earlier and agree to a Sinai withdrawal without insisting that the Egyptians make a full declaration of non-belligerency. When such movement was not forthcoming and the talks broke down, the Secretary signaled his intention to slow down delivery of advanced arms and in other ways indicated Washington's displeasure with what Kissinger tended to regard as Israel's duplicity. But his efforts to press for a more conciliatory line were largely offset by a letter signed by seventy-six senators which, in effect, urged that Israel be given what it wanted.

Here, then, in the spring of 1975, was another moment when America had the chance to alter course and launch a drive to settle the underlying causes of Middle Eastern turmoil. But Egypt was eager for quick action that would bring a period of respite, and Israel saw a bilateral deal with Cairo as preferable, at least in the short term, to a statement of principles by the United States which might require Israel to yield the occupied territories. Thus both countries encouraged Kissinger's natural inclination to vindicate his earlier, abortive effort by once more seeking an Egyptian-Israeli truce in exchange for a limited Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai.

Unhappily, the enterprise lacked the useful element of symmetry, since both Henry Kissinger and Anwar Sadat wanted a partial settlement far more than did Yitzhak Rabin and the Israelis. Kissinger did not conceal his desire to buy time. Without Egypt, it would take months for the more radical Arab states to get ready for war, creating a period of relative quiet lasting beyond the 1976 American elections. Meanwhile, Kissinger would enjoy applause for a major diplomatic coup.

Sadat desperately needed a truce in order to prevent the total disintegration of an already rapidly crumbling economy. He was gambling on the chance that, if granted two or three years of peace, he could halt the rot and get Egyptian industry and agriculture moving.

Israel's problems were more complex. In principle, a separate truce with Egypt was the lesser of two unattractive possibilities, while to resist all movement would hazardously strain Israel's vital relations with Washington. Egypt had always been her major military threat; if the Egyptians could be eliminated from the leadership of the Arab

side, some Israelis hoped, Israel might avoid having to give up the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and Jerusalem. Yet, when they faced the issue in concrete terms, the proposed arrangement seemed illusory. To relinquish the Sinai oil fields was a significant hardship for a country that had few other indigenous oil sources; moreover, even though the oil fields might be passing the peak of production (the reports are not clear on this), the cost of importing oil would be a further foreign exchange drain on Israel's already depleted reserves. To hand over both the Gidi and Mitla passes also posed grave problems, both military and emotional—for did Israel dare yield a position of strategic advantage without being sure its security would be adequately underwritten through other means? Here was a major sticking point. Sadat at his most forthcoming could not be expected to offer a permanent state of non-belligerency so long as large areas of Egyptian territory remained in Israeli hands; to move any distance at all toward a separate truce would risk infuriating the rest of the Arab world, including the Saudis and Kuwaitis, on whom Sadat must count for enormous subsidies if his leaking economic boat is to have even half a chance of staying afloat.

To overcome the Israelis' grave misgivings, Kissinger had to employ elaborate means of persuasion. Yet the senators' letter severely limited his leverage, since the Israelis felt, and did not hesitate to tell him, that they had the political strength in Congress to override any sanction he might threaten. What they failed to remember, of course, is that the interests of nations are often worse served by their friends than by their enemies. The letter was not in Israel's long-range interests: by making it possible for the signers to display their allegiance to Israel under conditions that cost them nothing, it freed them to argue later, when the Senate would consider specific measures, that since they had already expressed their support and sympathy, they could now take a more balanced position.

But, for the time being, the letter did circumscribe Kissinger's means of persuasion. Because it ruled out the use of the stick, he had to provide carrots in abundance. Thus, to secure the partial settlement he devoutly wanted, he had to promise to tie America's diplomacy and military support far more closely to Israel than was good for either country.

Had the Egyptian-Israeli agreement really been, as many thought, a first step toward a final settlement, much could have been said for it. But, unfortunately, Kissinger's tactical objective of buying time was not in the interests of peace.

Far from easing the road to a final settlement, the tactic of trying to split the Arab world may well have created an insuperable impediment to a settlement. By promoting a separate arrangement

5

Israel will be compelled to remain a garrison state so long as she continues to be an occupying power.

with Egypt, the United States discredited Egypt's moderating influence on the other Arabs, leaving negotiations to the more radical states so directly affected by the Palestinian issue as to be incapable of diplomatic flexibility. Geographically separated from the critical area, Egypt could take a relatively relaxed view of the Palestinian problem, but the Arab nations at the eastern end of the Mediterranean were under much sterner constraints.

Moreover, Sadat no longer had to worry about Israel for the next three years, so Egypt had no strong incentive to participate in further diplomatic effort. Instead, in order to try to mollify other Arab leaders, who would inevitably accuse him of defection, Sadat had to take an extremely hard line regarding any settlement—as he is now doing. And by putting the Sinai issue to rest for the foreseeable future, the agreement eliminated from the arsenal of bargaining counters a whole geographical area where trade-offs were easy to envisage.

If the agreement deprived Egypt of both the incentive and the power to bargain, it rendered Israel equally rigid. Having made a national decision of the most agonizing kind in agreeing to a partial Sinai withdrawal, the Israelis were in no mood for additional concessions. They felt that if they had achieved anything, they had bought peace on the Egyptian front for at least three years. They had been promised by the United States enormous supplies of military equipment as well as an underwriting of their oil requirements. Still, many Israelis feared that they had been bludgeoned into making concessions against their interests in return for Egyptian promises of dubious reliability. What it all added up to was that we exhausted the Israeli tolerance for further compromise.

Even more than that, the temporizing nature of the arrangement revived the hope that the Israelis might retain most of the territories taken in the 1967 war. Thus, perhaps without meaning to, we reinforced the long-standing tendency of many Israelis to equate territory with security. It is an understandable reflex for the people of a small country who, as shown by General Dayan's comments to me in 1968, put great weight on the indispensability of defense in depth and an early air alert. Yet it is a view subject to progressive obsolescence, since forecasts of renewed Middle East fighting more and more emphasize the importance of surface-to-surface missiles and other weapons of long-distance destructive power.

But, even more fundamental, the Israeli hope of maintaining present borders is based on an illusion because, in the long run, the effort to keep possession of the occupied territories is more likely to undermine than assist Israeli security. History has repeatedly shown that there is no more potent generator of conflict than irredentism, that fierce amal-

gam of frustration, homesickness, and bitterness that follows the displacement of men and women from the lands they tilled and on which they have lived and brought up children—emotions which grow more bitter and irrational with the passage of time. They are emotions deeply felt even by Palestinians who have never seen the occupied territories but who have been indoctrinated in refugee camps with a profound sense of grievance. In addition, the issue of Jerusalem-related more to religion than home-sickness—will not remain quiescent so long as the holy places of Islam are in Israeli hands.

Today, of course, Israel is militarily stronger than her neighbors, and we have promised to keep her so. Yet some cold-bloodedly realistic Israelis view with fear projections of Arab military potential. The three states on Israel's northern front—Syria, Iraq, and Jordan—have an aggregate population three times that of Israel, while the funds that the oil-rich Arab states can potentially afford to provide for arms and equipment will, in the long run, far exceed anything Israel can count on from the United States. Nor can Israel indefinitely sustain the expense of its inordinately large military establishment.

Yet Israel will be compelled to remain a garrison state so long as she continues to be an occupying power. For can anyone seriously believe that the 1.5 to 3 million Palestinians (nobody knows exactly how many) scattered over the Arab world will be content forever to accept Israeli occupation of the West Bank? The Palestinians are not, as many Americans assume, merely wretched refugees without political clout. They are a gifted people, and there is hardly an Arab capital in which some Palestinians do not hold influential government posts. Moreover, what they regard as Egypt's defection is already driving them toward more extreme leaders and positions.

Nor can anyone be sure that Syria and Iraq will always remain semihostile to one another. The continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands could well drive those two states not only to increase their dependence on the Soviets as their principal supplier of arms, but to close ranks and join forces. Finally, so long as the bitter key issues remain unsettled, the major oil-supplying states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will feel under irresistible pressure to commit more and more of their oil wealth to the rearmament of Syria, Iraq, and even Jordan; in fact, Saudi Arabia may feel required to play a more active military role against Israel.

To assess the future realistically, one must also ask how enduring is Egypt's commitment not to use military force. Does the Sinai agreement represent a solemn pledge of the Egyptian people, or merely the promise of Anwar Sadat? Having had two heart attacks, he is anything but a healthy

6

The Sinai agreement is the work of a tactician when the times call for a strategist.

man; nor is his tenure in office assured for a long term. His very eagerness to achieve a period of tranquility attests to the fragility of his situation, since he knows he must get capital and technology for Egypt's economy, and weapons for its soldiers, if his regime is to survive.

It seems likely that he has roused expectations he can never fulfill. I have been told by a well-informed Egyptian, for example, that Sadat has promised the commanding officers of the Egyptian armed forces that, as a result of the Sinai agreement, they will receive arms and equipment in magnitude and sophistication comparable to those America is now giving to Israel. But, if my information is correct, disillusion is just around the corner. If the United States Congress were to give Egypt any military equipment at all, which seems doubtful, it would be limited in amount and purely defensive in character. How long will the Egyptian army sit still once that realization has been fully grasped?

If it is not to get arms from America, Egypt will not have the funds to buy them elsewhere. Having turned its back on the more radical Arab states, it can expect little additional financial help from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia is a feudal kingdom in a sea of progressive Arab states: its legitimacy depends on its taking a strongly pan-Arab line, sending assistance to the front-line Arab states rather than to Egypt, the defector. With a relatively small population (probably less than 8 million), it simply does not dare cross the better-armed and more radical Arab nations. Nor does Kuwait have any military defense whatever against its activist neighbors.

So the oil-rich states are unlikely to provide Egypt subsidies for arms procurement, and there seems little chance that they will supply anything like the funds Egypt requires to finance, for instance, the $2 billion worth of infrastructure projects in housing, roads, transportation, and refuse disposal needed just to keep Cairo in livable condition.

Egypt has no chance whatever to satisfy its requirements from America. All that the Administration has asked Congress to provide to Egypt in the fiscal year 1976 is $700 million, which is a drop in the bucket compared with what Egypt urgently needs for its industry and agriculture. President Sadat's hopes for the injection of private investment by American business may also be disappointed.

Realistically, we can expect the American government to take no serious initiatives regarding the Middle East until after the presidential election in 1976 and the installation of the newly elected President in January, 1977. Whether Sadat will be able to survive during the intervening months (inevitably a time of disillusion for the Egyptian people and their armed forces) is

by no means certain. What is almost certain, however, is that, if he does not survive, his successor will be far more demagogic, bellicose, and adventurous, and much more likely to lead the Egyptian people back toward Moscow. After all, there is a perceptible rhythm in Egyptian affairs, a tendency to play first with one great power and then another, and the resumption of an even closer Moscow-Cairo relationship than we have seen in the past is by no means to be excluded unless America moves with determination to try to bring about a final settlement.

Yet we should not minimize the difficulty of that task. Now that we have neutralized the most powerful Arab voice for moderation, it will be extremely hard to make progress in resolving the substantive issues. To think that we can go further with bilateral diplomacy is quite absurd. The Sinai pattern simply does not apply to the Golan Heights. The Heights now contain Israeli settlements, they are too small to permit the Israelis to yield significant territory, and their strategic high ground is considered vital to Israeli security. Even less can the Jerusalem and Palestinian issues be settled by bilateral negotiation, for they involve the interests of all, the Arab states.

So far, Secretary Kissinger has pursued a practice that most medical doctors would deplore: he has sewn up part of the wound, leaving a raging infection inside. But since no one can make time run backward, we must treat the patient as best we can. What, then, should be the next American move? I return to the fundamental proposition I have urged all along: that, if negotiations are to make real progress, the United States must focus the discussion on a specific outline of settlement we ourselves put forward. Moreover, particularly since the Secretary of State has now publicly agreed that no final settlement is possible without Soviet concurrence, we should try at an early point to gain Soviet, as well as British and French, agreement to support—or at least not oppose—that proposed settlement before convening any formal or informal meeting of the parties.

Nor should we disparage the utility of obtaining United Nations Security Council approval of a plan once the Soviets have expressed agreement. To utilize the Security Council thus would accomplish several objectives. It would first of all test the real meaning of détente. It might enable the Soviets and the United States to limit the arms flow into the Middle East rather than accelerate it through a mindless competition. If the Soviets agreed to join with us in a serious effort to establish an enduring peace in the Middle East, it would mean that détente extended beyond the mere improvement in Soviet manners and the development of East-West trade and other strictly bilateral problems. It would also offer some promise that, after three decades, the peace-making ma-

7

chinery of the United Nations might begin to function in the manner its designers intended.

Thus, with Soviet assent to a plan for a Middle East settlement, the parties to the struggle would have something concrete to discuss. More than that, by renewing the role of the Security Council, we might work our way toward a more rational world order in which, over the years ahead, the Cold War could recede into the mists of history. It may be too much to expect, but the experiment is worth trying.

It is clear that we will get nowhere by gnawing at further bits and pieces of the problem. If the Palestinians and front-line Arab states finally lose hope of a settlement, we shall, sooner or later, face an explosion far more costly and dangerous than any previous Arab-Israeli conflict.

By agreeing to assign two hundred technicians to man the early warning system in the buffer area, we have engaged American interests more deeply than ever before. There is a danger that terrorists might kill or injure one or more of our personnel, which would create a strong emotional reaction in America; or our men might be caught in cross fire if one side or the other decided to launch a quick strike. In addition, the mere fact of an American presence creates a psychological impression that we are more willing than in the past to commit military forces if the fighting should resume. Call it what one likes—a "trip wire," or an implied guarantee—it gives visual reinforcement to written commitments we have made to each side that, in the event of a violation of the agreement, we will consult with the aggrieved side "as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by

the United States Government." Moreover, we have also agreed that, should a "world power" (for which read Soviet Union) take military action in the region, the United States will view that action "with particular gravity" and "in the event of such a threat, consult promptly with the Government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance" with United States constitutional practices.

The ultimate meaning of all this is that the United States has, although in ambiguous language, committed its undefined support primarily to Israel in a situation seething with turmoil.

Viewed in retrospect, the Sinai agreement clearly bears the unique Kissinger imprimatur. Like the Paris accords that ended the Vietnam War, it is highly complex and reinforced by secret commitments. Like those accords, it was primarily intended to buy time—a "decent interval" in the case of Vietnam and, with luck, three or more years in the case of the Middle East. Like those accords, the Sinai agreement, by avoiding the tough issues, has created a situation of inherent instability. Just as the Paris agreements left armed elements of North Vietnamese fighting forces scattered throughout South Vietnam, the Sinai accords have left Israel in control of the territories it occupied in 1967. Thus the agreement has assured a brief season of relief followed, unless we pursue a more active diplomacy than appears likely, by a fearful catastrophe. It is the work of a tactician when the times call for a strategist. ☐

8

FRIDAY MORNING, 11 JUNE 1976

COST
(CONTINUED)

shipyards had come to terms with the Pentagon negotiators, Clements said that the government and Newport News and Litton were "close to $200 million" and "just under $100 million" apart respectively.

Adm. H. G. Riekover, head of the Navy's nuclear propulsion program, and Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) are allied in opposing the use of Public Law 804—with Proxmire accusing the Pentagon of trying to bail out the shipbuilders.

Clements said yesterday that "the somewhat vocal opposition" to using that law "played no part at all" in the Pentagon's decision to call off the effort to settle the $2 billion in back bill.

He said Congress would have supported the legislative shortcut. "We have no question" about it, Clements said.

But Proxmire yesterday credited his Joint Economic subcommittee and Rickover for Clements' reversal on Public Law 804. Said Proxmire: "It was the administration's testimony before my committee which demonstrated to Congress that he be paid."

unaudited claims should not, Navy leaders, who were stung by Clements' earlier criticism of the way they had treated shipbuilders, expressed worries yesterday that the latest breakdown in negotiations would strengthen the hand of lawmakers trying to reduce the amount of shipbuilding money in the fiscal 1977 Navy budget now under consideration.

Other Pentagon officials interpreted Clements' press conference as an attempt to put more pressure on shipbuilders to come to terms with his negotiators.

"One way or another,"

WAR
(CONTINUED)

fective cease-fire and political accommodation by the parties in Lebanon that will preserve the independence, sovereignty, unity, political cohesion and territorial integrity of Lebanon."

When an official was told that the State Department's statement seemed a "classic example of diplomatic fence-sitting," Mr. Brown said that the United States, which previously had publicly opposed any outside intervention in Lebanon, did not want to undercut an inter-Arab effort that might prove successful.

At the same time, he said, the United States wants to keep the Arabs aware of the possibility that if fighting flares up again, there is always the risk that either Israel or other Arab states might become involved.

Washington has felt frustrated by the continuing destruction in Lebanon and the failure of its own and other mediation efforts.

Although publicly warning against outside intervention,

in his press conference, said Clements at one point "we intend to get those ships" built which are now snagged on how much is owed on them. There are about 70 ships involved in the $2 billion in claims, with $1.4 billion of that dollar total claimed by Newport News and Litton.

Clements said the government could resort to special war powers, if necessary, to get the ships built. He said "there is a strong likelihood" the dispute will wind up in the federal courts.

Diesel said in a telephone interview that Newport News during the negotiations had offered to forget about the $890 million it claims the Navy owes the company if the Pentagon would cover the cost of inflation on past and future work.

With that offer rejected,

PLANE
(CONTINUED)

viewed as a growing Warsaw Pact capability in Europe.

The whole question is tied up in the broader consideration of standardization of NATO armaments and the purchase of arms manufactured in Western Europe. West Germany, although a supporter of the system, is awaiting an American decision on the purchase of the West German-made Leopard tank.

American officials tacitly supported the Syrian military moves in the last few weeks in the hope that they would compel the warring factions to stop fighting.

But the Syrians clearly underestimated the militaryity of the leftist forces in Lebanon who refused to accept their intervention and actually dealt some sharp blows against the Syrian armored force.

Diesel said "we will have to do everything we can to disengage from government business."

Newport News is still inclined to accept a contract to build the third Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Vinson, Diesel said. He said the yard has received about $130 million for work on that carrier, but "we haven't got a contract" for the entire ship because of "complete chaos" in contracting.

"We're going to press to go into court," Diesel said, because "we have now exhausted every administrative remedy."

Clements said he hoped the shipyards would come forward with a proposal to break the impasse—making it clear throughout his press conference that the Pentagon considers the next move up to them.

NEW YORK TIMES

11 JUNE 76 Pg.6

Israeli Chief of Staff
Says Beirut Battles
Fortify Arab Force

Special to The New York Times

TEL AVIV, June 10—Israel's top military commander said today that Palestinian guerrillas fighting in Lebanon were governing battle experience that they would use against Israel after the war.

Lieut. Gen. Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense forces, said Yasir Arafat's forces of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which were fighting alongside the Lebanese Lebanese Moslem leftists, as well as Saqa guerrillas who were on the Syrian side, were both practicing street fighting and combat against regular forces. They were also learning to operate in larger formations, General Gur added. "So we must expect if the fighting ends in Lebanon, these forces will be turned against us," he said.

General Gur spoke at the close of an exercise by a military formation, consisting mainly of soldiers of the Druse community, a breakaway sect from Islam. He congratulated the formation on its record in eliminating terrorist marauders from Lebanon before they could reach inhabited areas, but he said they must not rest on their laurels.

Israeli settlements in the Galilee area, which had been targets of terrorist raids from Lebanon, have enjoyed a respite since the guerrillas became the border have been preoccupied in the civil war.

Israeli's have not concealed their pleasure at seeing their enemies—the guerrillas and the Syrians—fighting each other but they have expressed concern and sympathy for the Lebanese Christian community threatened with extermination.

General Gur's remarks reflected a widespread opinion here that events in Lebanon would make the northern border more difficult for Israel.

NEWS SUMMARY -- CONTINUED

keeping force sent by the Arab League arrived at Beirut airport. But Lebanese President Franjlieb, a right-wing Christian, vowed to fight them. Syria, meanwhile, agreed to pull back 2,000 Syrian and Syrian-controlled Saqa guerrilla forces from the edge of Beirut, turning the positions back to Lebanese leftists. On the country's war fronts fighting died down, and the toll was one of the lowest in the 14-month-old civil war.

The Syrian move was the first major concession by any side since it, the Palestinian guerrillas and their Lebanese leftist allies began peace talks.

Israel could accept a "symbolic" joint peacekeeping force in Lebanon as long as it didn't threaten Israel's security, Israeli government officials said. The sources reiterated that Israel would base its policy toward Lebanon on considerations of national security.

Wayne Hays became unconscious and was hospitalized after apparently taking an overdose of a sleeping medication prescribed for a stomach ailment. The Ohio Congressman, benter of a sex scandal, was said by his physician to be in an "extremely weakened condition," though his vital signs

were described as stable. Earlier, the House voted 400 to 0 to speed an Ethics Committee investigation of the charges against him.

The Supreme Court ruled public employees have no right to a hearing before they are fired unless a contract provides for one. The five-to-four decision said public employment isn't a property interest protected under the Constitution from arbitrary loss. The ruling was seen spurring further attempts by such employees to join unions and obtain collective bargaining rights to hearings.

An order closing public schools in New Jersey was let stand by the Supreme Court. The state court's order will close the schools July 1 unless the legislature appropriates funds for school refinancing.

Kissinger proposed reforms to the Organization of American States' charter at the close of meetings in Santiago, Chile. He called for more frequent general assembly sessions, such as the one just ended, the abolishment of separate councils in the organization, a more equitable system of national assessment and for universal membership.

The federal job-safety program will be the focus of a White House task force to be sent in to help deregulate the Labor Department's agency. The Occupational Safety and Health-Administration has been widely criticized by the business community. Republicans and conservatives.

Daniel P. Moynihan, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, announced he will seek the "Democratic nomination for U.S. Senator from New York."

A North Atlantic Treaty Alliance report said there is a dangerous military vacuum in the south Atlantic and Indian oceans. The chairman of NATO's military committee said that in the event of hostilities, Soviet sea and air attacks could disrupt allied supply lines for oil and other raw materials. U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, in Brussels for the annual spring NATO meeting, said that, despite earlier reports, there isn't any sign that Cuban troops have begun to leave Angola.

Died: Adolph Zukor, pioneer movie-maker and chairman emeritus of Paramount Pictures, at the age of 103.

3

FRIDAY MORNING, 11 JUNE 1976

BOSTON GLOBE

10 JUNE 1976, Pg 1 (11)

# Boston probe set by US in sales of meat to Army

By Stephen Wermiel
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—A Federal grand jury in Boston will soon begin looking into allegations of fraud and bribery in Army meat purchasing and inspection procedures.

The probe is being run by the Justice Department Criminal Division in Washington, but the focus is on practices in the Boston meat-packing industry—the subject of three days of Senate subcommittee hearings last month.

The grand jury presentation which sources here said could start as early as next week will be handled by James T. Graham of the Justice Department here with assistance from the office of US Atty. James Gabriel in Boston.

A Federal grand jury in New Haven, Conn., had already heard testimony from witnesses on the same subject, according to several sources, but the "extensive transactions" in the Boston area have prompted a shift in focus for the investigation.

On May 10, 12 and 13, a Senate subcommittee heard a string of allegations involving the payment of bribes to military meat inspectors by the owners of G and G Packing Co. in Roxbury, who were using low grade cuts to fill military orders for top quality beef.

Other testimony from Ferdinand (Fred) Romano, one-time manager of the now defunct G and G, outlined allegations of a price-fixing scheme between G and G owners and another Boston firm, State Beef Co. of South Boston, which enabled the two firms to both win and increase the value of military contracts for diced beef.

NEW YORK TIMES 11 JUNE 1976, Pg 20

# SENATORS TO LOOK AT ACADEMY CASE

By JAMES FERON

A subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee announced yesterday that it would begin hearings later this month in Washington on the operation and possible abuse of the West Point honor code. Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia and chairman of the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, said the hearings would begin June 21 and include testimony from officials and cadets at the United States Military Academy.

He said the subcommittee also would "examine in detail the operation of the honor codes at all of the military academies." Senator Nunn said later that the aim would to determine if the code "can be made more compatible with reality." "The question is not whether to discard the honor code, but whether it can be properly enforced, whether it is being properly enforced and who is responsible for the latest abuses of the code," the Senator said.

Tre decision to conduct Congressional hearings stems from a growing controversy over the role of the honor code in a cheating scandal at West Point. It began with the discovery by faculty members of widespread collusion on a graded electrical engineering home assignment in March. Cadets among the first 48 second classmen, or juniors, to be accused complained that prosecution by publicity-conscious Academy officials had been selective and minimal.

Led by Sen. Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.) and Sen. Lowell Welcker (R-Conn.), the subcommittee heard testimony that the owners of G and G Packing and Blue Ribbon Frozen Foods in Hamden, Conn. were substituting a lesser cut of beef called knuckle for top sirloin in filling military contracts and were using ungraded cattle and passing these off as US Department of Agriculture (USDA) choice.

The two owners, unrelated, are Harry Goldberg and Frank Goldberg, both of suburban New Haven.

Testimony alleged both co-owners were aware of cash bribes paid to a military inspector and a civilian employee of the Army Veterinary Inspection Service in Boston to look the other way as the military contracts were filled. Other former inspectors told of gratuities received

## Results of New Inquiry

A new inquiry has since produced more than 100 additional suspects, as well as charges by a larger number of cadets and their Army lawyers that "hundreds" more were involved in the casually and seemingly acceptable exchange of what the cadets said was more an exercise than a test.

The inquiry is expected to be welcomed by those cadets who have sought for the last two months to encourage Congressional interest in what they felt had been an attempt by West Point to obscure a growing dispute over the role of the code.

Declaring that "a cadet will not lie, cheat or steal, nor tolerate those who do," the code is enforced by cadets at its preliminary stages. Critics rave argued that it is selectively and unfairly administered, often without regard to due process of law.

Senator Nunn, a grandnephew of former Representative Carl Vinson, who was chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said, "It is important to determine if the Army is going about the investigation of the honor code violations in the right way." He added:

"We want to hear from the Secretary of the Army [Martin R. Hoffmann] and others about what they plan to do about it."

Secretary Hoffmann last month rejected a request by 10 Army lawyers at West Point for an outside inquiry into the Academy's conduct in the cheating scandal.

The Secretary said later that a review of the code might be in order, but that any investigation would remain within the military establishment.

from Romano such as paid weekends on Cape Cod and in New Hampshire, perfume, free liquor and suits of clothing.

Romano was eventually granted "use immunity" by the subcommittee but only after a sealed packet of information was turned over to the Justice Department on April 28. The immunity means Romano's testimony in public at the subcommittee hearings cannot be used to prosecute him.

But sources here say virtually all the testimony given by Romano in public was previously obtained through investigation and placed in the sealed packet for Justice Department use.

There remains an unassessed question of whether the Justice Department will grant Romano immunity for the grand jury probe or end his immunity now and leave him open to possible prosecution.

BALTIMORE SUN

11 JUNE 1976

Pg 2

# Rebels open new front in Rhodesia

Salisbury, Rhodesia (AP)— A band of black nationalist guerrillas entered Rhodesia from neighboring Zambia, opening up a second front in their fight against the white minority regime, a government spokesman said yesterday.

The Rhodesian defense minister, Pieter Van der Byl, said 1,300 black guerrillas had previously crossed into the country from Mozambique.

"More are going to come in and are getting ready to come in and will come in," Mr. Van der Byl warned.

He said the blacks operating from Zambia were responsible for the explosion that damaged three aircraft at a remote air strip near the Zambian border over the weekend.

Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda announced recently his government would let the guerrillas operate from Zambian territory.

Rhodesian security forces said yesterday four African children were killed when their toy cart detonated a mine. The announcement also said guerrillas burned several huts at a government-protected village, the first successful attack on a fenced and protected town.

The government said three more guerrillas and one Rhodesian soldier have been killed in fighting since June 7, bringing the total for the month to 38 guerrillas and 4 soldiers.

Swiss authorities said they were considering halting all exports to Rhodesia.

WASHINGTON POST

11 JUNE 1976, Pg 21

## Moscow Outlines
Troop-Cut Proposal

VIENNA, June 10 (UPI)— The Soviet Union today presented a "major new initiative" on reducing forces in central Europe, that apparently still fell short of meeting the West's criteria for an ultimate balance.

A Soviet spokesman declined to give details of the proposal presented on behalf of the Warsaw Pact states, but he said it contained additions to previous proposals introduced by the East bloc.

The Warsaw Pact previously has insisted on equal percentage reductions of forces and weapons by all participants, but the West said this would perpetuate the current preponderance of Soviet-led forces in the area.

6

FRIDAY MORNING, 11 JUNE 1976

AO30

R I

PM-LEBANON SKED 6-11

EDITORS: UPI COMMUNICATIONS WITH BEIRUT HAVE BEEN CUT SINCE
THURSDAY AFTERNOON. THE FOLLOWING STORY INCORPORATES OUR LATEST
INFORMATION FROM LEBANON.

BY UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

PALESTINIAN OFFICIALS IN CAIRO CHARGED THURSDAY THAT SYRIAN FORCES
ROCKETED SECTIONS OF BEIRUT AND A PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMP, VIOLATING
AN UNOFFICIAL TRUCE THAT TEMPORARILY HAD STILLED FIGHTING ON
LEBANON'S FOUR WAR FRONTS.

AT THE SAME TIME, ARAB LEAGUE OFFICIALS MET IN THE EGYPTIAN
CAPITAL TO BEGIN ASSEMBLING A 4,500-MAN JOINT ARAB FORCE TO POLICE A
LEBANESE CEASE-FIRE.

CAIRO NEWSPAPERS SAID LIBYA AND ALGERIA -- TWO OF SIX CONTRIBUTORS
TO THE JOINT SCHEME -- ALREADY HAVE BEGUN SENDING TROOPS TO DAMASCUS,
FROM WHERE THEY WOULD BE TRANSFERRED SOON TO LEBANON.

BUT ARAB DIPLOMATS SAID THEY FEARED SYRIAN REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW
COMPLETELY FROM LEBANON AND FIERCE OPPOSITION FROM LEBANON'S LAMEDUCK
PRESIDENT COULD SCUTTLE THE FORCE.

ADDING TO THE APPREHENSION WERE REPORTS FROM BEIRUT, DISTRIBUTED
BY PALESTINIAN OFFICIALS IN CAIRO, OF A SUDDEN FLARE-UP OF FIGHTING
BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND SYRIAN FORCES LATE THURSDAY NEAR BEIRUT
AIRPORT.

THE OFFICIALS SAID SYRIAN FORCES ROCKETED SECTIONS OF THE CAPITAL
AND THE REFUGEE CAMP OF BORJ AL PARAJNEH AND SEVERAL SYRIAN GUNBOATS
APPEARED OFF THE COAST OF BEIRUT.

EARLIER THURSDAY, FIGHTING SUBSIDED THROUGHOUT LEBANON ALTHOUGH
ALL SIDES INSISTED THERE WAS NO FORMAL CEASE-FIRE.

PALESTINIAN, LEFTIST AND INDEPENDENT SOURCES ALL SAID THE KEY
ISSUE HOLDING UP A FORMAL CEASE-FIRE WAS THE ISSUE OF SYRIAN
WITHDRAWAL.

PALESTINIAN AND LEFTIST LEADERS HAVE DEMANDED A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL
OF SYRIAN TROOPS, WHICH SYRIAN PRESIDENT HAFEZ ASSAD HAS REJECTED,
THE SOURCES SAID.

ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY-GENERAL MAHMOUD RIAD, IGNOREING THE LATEST
DIFFICULTIES, DECLARED A MILITARY MISSION WOULD TRAVEL TO DAMASCUS
WITHIN 48 HOURS TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE JOINT
FORCE.

THE DECISION TO SET UP THE FORCE -- TO BE DRAWN FROM LIBYA,
ALGERIA, SAUDI ARABIA, SUDAN, SYRIA AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION -- WAS APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY THURSDAY BY AN EMERGENCY
CONFERENCE OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS.

LEBANESE PRESIDENT SULEIMAN FRANJIEH, A CHRISTIAN, REACTED BY
VOWING TO FIGHT ANY ARAB PEACEKEEPING FORCE "WITH ALL OUR MEANS AND
RESOURCES."

FRANJIEH, WHO HAS REFUSED TO RESIGN AND LET PRESIDENT-ELECT ELIAS
SARKIS TAKE OFFICE, SAID LEBANON WAS NOT INVITED TO ATTEND THE
CONFERENCE AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT BE BOUND BY ANY DECISIONS REACHED
AT THE MEETING.

IN TEL AVIV, GOVERNMENT SOURCES SAID ISRAEL COULD ACCEPT A
"SYMBOLIC" JOINT ARAB PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN LEBANON IF IT DID NOT
THREATEN ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

THE SOURCES SAID ISRAEL WOULD BASE ITS POLICY TOWARD LEBANON ON
CONSIDERATIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERVENING ONLY IF IT FELT
THREATENED.

CLASHES BETWEEN SYRIANS AND LEFTISTS IN THE RUGGED CENTRAL
MOUNTAINS 12 MILES EAST OF THE CAPITAL, AROUND THE ANCIENT SOUTHERN
PORT OF SIDON AND ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF NORTHERN TRIPOLI DIED DOWN
THURSDAY AFTER A DAY OF DEADLY ARTILLERY DUELS.

IN BEIRUT, RIGHTIST AND LEFTIST HEAVY GUNS FELL STILL AFTER FIERCE
OVERNIGHT EXCHANGES.

UPI 06-11 03:23 AED

THIRD SUMMARY-TAKE 3

APB041

036

(MEXICO CITY) -- SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER IS SCHEDULED TO HOLD
TALKS FRIDAY WITH PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA (EH-CHEN-VAY-REE'-AH) AND OTHER
MEXICAN OFFICIALS. THE DISCUSSIONS IN MEXICO CITY ARE TO CENTER ON
GLOBAL AND WESTERN HEMISPHERE ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE TREATMENT
OF AMERICANS HELD IN MEXICAN JAILS.

MORE THAN 500 U-S CITIZENS CURRENTLY ARE IMPRISONED IN MEXICO,
MOSTLY ON DRUG CHARGES. AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS SUBSTANTIATED
ABOUT 250 COMPLAINTS OF MISTREATMENT. KISSINGER ARRIVED IN MEXICO CITY
THURSDAY NIGHT FOLLOWING VISITS TO SEVERAL OTHER LATIN AMERICAN
NATIONS.

02:22AED

06-11-76

RADIO - TV
DEFENSE DIALOG

RADIO TV REPORTS INC. WASH., D.C., SUMMARIES NOT TO BE QUOTED.

FRIDAY, JUNE 11, 1976 (BROADCASTS OF JUNE 10, 1976)

SUMMARY OF NETWORK NEWS IN THIS ISSUE

Ford ROWAN, NBC News, reports that President FORD is concerned because of Soviet evesdropping on federal government employee phone calls. He reports the Soviets are using satellites to pick up long distance phone calls being transmitted by microwave towers. The government is considering using scrambler phones for economic information calls. Connie CHUNG, CBS Morning News, reports that foreign embassies are also evesdropping on telephone calls to obtain economic information.

Jerry KING and John SCALI, ABC News, John SHEAHAN, CBS News, report that there is an uneasy truce in Lebanon between the Syrians and Muslims and Palestinians, and that the people don't expect the truce to last. They report also that the Syrians are losing face militarily and that the first units of an Arab multi-national force are on their way, although the Christians object. SCALI reports that State Department officials are pessimistic about the chances of this truce holding and are skeptical that an Arab many nation force will get off the ground.

Dan RATHER, CBS News, reports that the Vietnamese Government will hold trials for enemies of the state, although details were not disclosed.

John LAURENCE, CBS, reports that some thirteen mercenaries who were captured in Angola -- including three American former Marines -- will be tried in Luanda and are expected to be found guilty.

David DOW reports for the CBS Morning News that there was agreement on progress toward an American-Panamanian treaty over the canal. He reports that this was expected to be a major issue but was not as explosive as it could have been. Differences remain.

Richard VALERIANI, the "Today" show NBC, reports that Secretary KISSINGER is trying to get the Chilean Government to make more progress toward civil liberties for its citizenry and is pressuring them in the background.

PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE (SAFAA) AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL MATTERS WITHIN THEIR OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES.
FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THIS PUBLICATION CALL MR. HARRY ZUBKOFF, OX 52884

CBS MORNING NEWS CBS TV

7:00 AM JUNE 10

Panama Canal

HUGHES RUDD: The Organization of American States may be moving towards some form of unity on the issue of control of the Panama Canal.

Secretary of State KISSINGER is at an OAS meeting in Santiago, Chile now and he's reporting progress in negotiations on a new treaty with Panama.

And the Panamanians are saying the same thing.

DAVID DOW: Even before KISSINGER arrived here, delegates to the OAS conference were predicting that if the U.S. and Panama could get together on a joint statement on Panama Canal negotiations, other Latin nations would not make an issue of it.

As it turned out, the prophecy came true. In the wake of this week's U.S. primaries, Panama's Foreign Minister, Aquilino BOYD, read a joint U.S.-Panama statement saying that the two countries have made significant progress toward a canal treaty in the last year but differences remain on important issues. But both parties, as he put it, cherished the hope that a treaty will soon be agreed on.

Later, with KISSINGER still present, several Latin nations proposed a resolution expressing hope that the impetus to conclude a new treaty would come within, quote, "this U.S. Bicentennial year." The U.S. and all other nations virtually jumped on as sponsors.

So the Panama Canal became the always potentially explosive issue that never exploded at this conference. To observers it signalled that the Panamanians were understanding of the realities of this U.S. election year and if they were understanding, no other Latin nation was going to make a wave.

Today KISSINGER concludes his visit here with meetings with four foreign ministers, including BOYD of Panama, then flies on to meetings in Mexico.

David Dow, CBS News, Santiago, Chile.

Hearings On Marine Corps

CONNIE CHUNG: One former and one current chief psychiatrist at the

Marine Corps Base on Parris Island testified that last year more than one in six recruits who started training at the base were discharged for mental problems. And two years ago more than half of Marine recruits interviewed said they had received serious flagrant physical punishment.

Former Chief Psychiatrist Dr. Jonathan COHEN (.) and current head psychiatrist Captain Eugene EVANS (?) testified before the House Military Manpower Subcommittee yesterday.

COHEN cited instances where recruits were repeatedly punched, knocked to the ground and choked. He said some had their eyes gouged, others hit on the head with a rifle butt. He says the Marine Corps doesn't know when to stop.

Senate Intelligence Report

CHUNG: The technology of spying is so advanced it's possible for foreign embassies here to monitor transmissions of stock exchange and other financial news and use this information for money making purposes.

That according to a report on the history of the CIA published by the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The report says there appears to be no way to forbid foreign embassies from monitoring such transmissions.

THE TODAY SHOW NBC TV

7:00 AM JUNE 10

U.S. and Chile

LOU WOOD: Secretary of State KISSINGER is flying to Mexico today from Chile, where he has been attending a meeting of the Organization of American States.

KISSINGER will spend three days in Mexico talking with top officials there.

But during his stay in Chile, KISSINGER tried to persuade the rightist Chilean government to relax its policies on civil liberties.

Richard Valeriani reports.

RICHARD VALERIANI: KISSINGER took time out from the OAS conference to meet privately with President Augusto PINOCHET, the head of Chile's military dictatorship.

U.S. officials said KISSINGER emphasized American concern about

2 Friday, June 11, 1976

political repression here, including
arbitrary arrest and even torture.

But when KISSINGER later discussed
the issue of human rights in the OAS
General Assembly, his criticism of Chile
was indirect and extremely mild. He
did point out that the violation of
human rights was a growing problem
throughout the hemisphere.

It is KISSINGER's style to work on
such sensitive issues as political
repression behind the scenes, rather
than make flamboyant public statements.

He made his very presence here
conditional on Chile's cooperation with
the OAS investigation into violations
of human rights here. And in the past
few weeks, several hundred political
prisoners have been released through
American intervention.

But in coming to grips with this
issue the administration has lagged
far behind the U.S. Congress, which has
cut off military aid to Chile until the
political situation here is improved.
And the Chilean government has now
promised to write new and more effective
guarantees of political liberty into
its constitution.

Richard Valeriani, NBC News, in
Santiago, Chile.

### NBC NIGHTLY NEWS NBC TV
7:00 PM JUNE 10

### Telephone Evesdropping

FLOYD CALBER: A constant worry
these days for the FORD Administration
is the Russian evesdropping on telephone
calls made by federal employees.

The White House is so worried, in
fact, that several drastic plans,
including an increase in the number of
scrambler telephones in government
offices are being considered.

Here's a report.

VICE PRESIDENT NELSON ROCKEFELLER:
If you don't want it known, don't use
the phone.

FORD ROWAN: Vice President ROCKEFELLER says the Russians are listening to our phone calls. He says President FORD is taking steps to protect telephones used by federal employees.

(words unintelligible)...the Soviet
intelligence agency uses space
satellites to listen in on phone calls
by monitoring these microwave
antennas.

Most long distance calls are trans-
mitted over antennas like these right
near the Capitol. Recently the phone
company built a roof over these micro-
wave towers, although company spokesmen
said it was not designed to block
Soviet evesdropping.

In fact the Senate Intelligence
study asserted this week that it is
very easy to monitor all phone calls.
That's why Russian evesdropping on
government phone calls has the White
House so worried, enough to have the
National Security Council is considering
a highly secret plan to increase the
number of scrambler phones in government
offices. Scrambler phones code the
conversations during transmissions.

Right now scrambler phones are not
used except for defense secrets. Under
the proposal a modified form of
scrambling would protect economic
information. As many as half a million
government phones could be coded.

One problem with the proposal is that
it would route all such government
calls through a central coding
facility. Sources say that could
permit the National Security Agency,
which is in charge of codes, to listen
in on all the calls of federal employ-
ees.

Ford Rowan, NBC News, Washington.

### ABC EVENING NEWS ABC TV
7:00 PM JUNE 10

### Situation In Lebanon

HOWARD K. SMITH: There is a pause
in the fighting in Lebanon today and
the guns fell silent. But there was
no pause in the maneuvering of other
Middle East powers. The Arab League
continued to try to build a multi-
nation peace-keeping force and token
contingents of Algerian and Libyan
troops arrived on Lebanese soil.

Palestinian leaders called on Syria
to withdraw all its troops immediately
from Lebanon. Their Syrian Government
told its forces stay.

Jerry King reports now.

JERRY KING: There's a lot of
cleaning up to do in Beirut these days
and many people wonder if it's all
worth it, is the so-called cease-fire
being worked on by the Arab League
countries anything more than merely
cosmetic surgery? Everywhere there are

3 Friday, June 11, 1976

grim reminders of the 14 months of war-
fare here which has seen any number of
traces collapse in yet another orgy of
death.

This time no one is quite sure why
the shelling has largely halted. The
uncertainty is reflected in the
reluctance of Beirut residents to ven-
ture far from home.

In the mountains north of Beirut
these Palestinians and leftists are
still in position despite the Arab
League announcement it is sending a
multi-nation Arabic security force to
ensure a cease-fire.

And the Syrians are still in position. Unofficial sources in Damascus tell ABC News that whatever their public position, Syria will not abandon its attempt to make the Lebanese stop their civil war. They are merely consolidating their positions and securing their supply line.

These grim results of a battle in
Sidon, south of Beirut, show Syria has
not had the fighting of the past four
days all its own way. In fact the
Syrians have now had to bypass this
coastal town in their efforts to cut
the main road to Beirut and blockade
the city.

This would allow them to slowly
starve the Palestinians and left wing
Muslims in Beirut without being
subjected to the kind of bloodbath
which ensued in Sidon. Here the tanks
were allowed to enter the city and
were then ambushed. It's a kind of
urban war in which particularly the
guerrillas would have the tactical
edge unless whole areas were flattened
by shelling first.

The Syrians reportedly had more than
450 tanks in Lebanon and are bringing
in supplies and weapons daily, preparing
for what many fear could be a resump-
tion of the fighting.

A Palestinian source told me today
the resistance movement believes the
cease-fire to be the end of round one.

Jerry King, ABC News, Beirut.

SMITH: Lebanon's titular president FRANJIEH objected to the Arab League plan for a multi-national peace-keeping force. He said the Christians would resist it with all their means and resources.

Israel on the other hand said it
would not oppose the Arab force so long
as Israeli interests are not threaten-
ed.

In Washington ABC's John Scali
found U.S. officials have little faith
in the current de facto truce.

JOHN SCALI: Key American officials
believe it unlikely that any all Arab
peace-keeping force can succeed at
ending the shooting in Lebanon.

It is far more likely, they believe,
that the present unofficial cease-fire
will collapse. They expressed this
view even after the reported arrival
of the first few Arab peace-keeping
troops at Beirut airport.

Plans for creating a multi-nation
force are so confused, they say, that
many days will elapse before it can be
organized into an effective force, let
alone seek to separate the opposing
sides.

Despite pledges to cooperate, it's
believed that Syria will be exceedingly
reluctant to allow it the necessary
freedom of movement in the war zone.

This pessimistic assessment coincides with confidential reports that more Syrian reinforcements are crossing the border as the prelude to a possible new offensive. Syrian military leaders are reported anxious to recover from the loss of face suffered in the past few days and finish the peace-keeping task that Syria set for itself alone.

John Scali, ABC News, Washington.

CBS EVENING NEWS CBS TV
7:00 PM JUNE 10

Truce In Lebanon

DAN RATHER: New fighting reported
in Lebanon tonight after day long
relative calm. The Reuters News
Agency quotes a Palestinian guerilla
spokesman in Cairo of saying Syrian
armored units opened fire and advanced
toward a refugee camp on the outskirts
of Beirut.

The first units of an Arab peace-
keeping force arrived earlier in the
day in Beirut. That force is bitterly
opposed by Lebanese Christians.

The Syrian armored units are dug in
12 miles east of Beirut outside the
southern port of Sidon and near Tripoli
in the north.

We have a report from John Sheahan
in Beirut.

JOHN SHEAHAN: For Lebanon it's
another chance at a political solution
rather than an even bloodier war.

The road to agreement on the mixed
Arab peace-keeping force was paved by

4 Friday, June 11, 1976

the Syrian invasion. But for Syria, even in purely military terms, it was a defeat.

Syria intervened single-handedly and promised a quick end of the civil war. What the Syrians didn't count on was that their former allies, the Lebanese Moslem leftists and the Palestinians, would turn on them.

In unfamiliar mountain terrain the Syrian tank columns were at the mercy of the guerrillas. It soon became clear that there would be no quick, clean end to the civil war, and the Syrians found themselves mired down in a war of their own and rapidly losing face.

Syria first rejected the Arab League peace effort, then decided it would be better to talk than to go on fighting and losing. The negotiations leave Syria in place on three routes. The mixed Arab force will joint them and attempt to set up operations patterned on the United Nations peace-keeping forces between the Arabs and the Israelis.

The Syrian invasion pushed the Christian against Moslem civil war into the background. The Christians are lying low and the major test will be whether they allow the mixed Arab force into their part of Beirut.

Even with the new style intervention, peace or war depends on very delicate negotiations among Christians, Moslems and Palestinians. And there is still no force in position to separate them if the fighting starts again.

John Sheahan, CBS News, Beirut.

## Vietnam War Crime Trials

**RATHER:** The Communist Government of South Vietnam now says it will hold war crimes trials for what it calls lackeys for U.S. imperialists and other enemies of the state.

This is the first indication that there will be formal proceedings against those who opposed the Communist takeover of the South 13 months ago.

It is not yet clear when or how many persons will be tried or their possible punishment.

## Angola Mercenary Trials

**RATHER:** Last February, in the final days of the Angolan civil war, the eventual winners, the Soviet-backed Popular Movement, captured 13 foreign mercenaries fighting for the pro-western side. Tomorrow in the Angolan capital of Luanda the 13, including

three Americans go on trial for their lives.

The proceedings come two days after mass rallies demanding death for those on trial.

John Laurence reports.

**JOHN LAURENCE:** This is where the trial will soon take place. It is under heavy guard. The three American and ten British mercenaries, call them soldiers of fortune, ideological adventurers, or whatever, will be tried for their lives.

It's the biggest public event since the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the MPLA, celebrated its victory in last winter's bitter and brutal civil war, a war that brought foreign troops first from South Africa then Cuba and finally a few hundred from Britain, America and other western countries.

Of those who were not killed, or managed to escape, 13 were captured on the losing side. They are the ones to go on trial.

**Daniel GERHARDT (?)**, a 34-year-old Vietnam veteran from Washington D.C., is one of the soldiers who signed up with the pro-Western faction fighting in Angola.

**Gary ACKER (?)**, 21, from Sacramento is an ex-Marine who served aboard ship in the South China Sea during the Vietnam War as a corporal.

**Gus GRILLO (?)**, 27, was born in Argentina but carries American citizenship. He too was a U.S. Marine who served in the Vietnam war.

The chief government spokesman of Angola is Louise de ALMADE (?), the director general of information.

**LOUISE DE ALMADE:** They killed more than 160 people, the Americans. And they violated the sovereignty of our independent country. And they came and they have been captured with weapons.

**LAURENCE:** Two of the Americans who were captured are being given legal representation. Robert Cessner, an attorney from Ohio and his assistant William Wilson, have just recently arrived in Angola and met their clients.

**ROBERT CESSNER:** I found them to be in good health. Apparently during the time that they were there they were not mistreated. They have been fed well. Their state of mind I think is good.

The short period of time that they were over there before their capture, it seems unlikely that they had time to become involved in substantial military activity in this country. And, of course, interviews with the men

5 Friday June 11, 1976

have borne that out. They were in a
situation where they had not fired upon
anyone and now are facing what we have
determined to be the death penalty.

LAURENCE: It is apparent in Angola
that the defendants will be found
guilty, but on what charges is not yet
clear.

John Laurence, CBS News, Luanda.

PLEASE NOTE: Complete transcripts of
the following are available:

News WNEW/NY 6:30 AM May 28, 1976.
West Point.

News Radio 88 WCBS/NY 3:15 PM May
29, 1976. West Point Story.

News Center 4 WNBC-TV/NY 11:20 PM
June 2, 1976. Broadcast Excerpt.

Evening Report WCBS-TV/NY 6:00 PM
June 2, 1976. West Point Story.

News WPIX-TV/NY 10:27 PM June 2, 1976
West Point Story.

Eyewitness News WABC-TV/NY 11:00 PM
June 2, 1976. West Point Story.

Midday Report WPIX-TV/NY 1:40 PM
June 3, 1976. Broadcast Excerpt.

Late News Final WPIX-TV/NY 1:30 AM
June 3, 1976. West Point.

News WWJ/Detroit 6:00 PM June 4, 1976
Seafarer.

News WABI/FM/NY 6:30 PM June 4, 1976
Broadcast Excerpt.

Ten O'Clock News WNEW-TV/NY 10:10 PM
June 5, 1976. Broadcast Excerpt.

Editorial WPIX-TV/NY 10:55 PM
June 5, 1976. Union For Armed Forces.

ABC Saturday Night News ABC Net/ NY
6:45 PM June 5, 1976. Broadcast
Excerpt.

Kup's Show WETA TV 11:00 PM June 6,
1976. Excerpts.

The World Tonight WTOP Radio/CBS Net
6:00 PM June 7, 1976. Military
Contracts.

News and Information Service WRC Radio
11:15 AM June 7, 1976. Egypt and
Chinese Agreement.

News and Information Service WRC Radio
11:16 PM June 7, 1976. Air Force
Academy and SEC.

News and Information Service WRC Radio
10:15 AM June 8, 1976. Japan Won't
go Nuclear.

News and Information Service WRC Radio
1:30 PM June 8, 1976. Armed Forces
Caravan in California.

News WTOP Radio 7:30 PM June 8, 1976
Defense Budget and Secretary.

Good Morning, America WMAL TV ABC Net
7:00 AM June 8, 1976. Part II:
Westmoreland Interview.

Jack Anderson In Washington WAVA Radio
12:40 PM June 9, 1976. Sadat Seen
in Jeopardy At Home.

Jack Anderson in Washington WAVA Radio
12:40 PM June 9, 1976. Easing of
Honor Code Predicted.

One Moment Please WAVA Radio 7:25 AM
June 10, 1976. Full Text.

First Line Report WTOP Radio CBS 9:35
AM June 10, 1976 Full Text.

Jack Anderson in Washington WAVA Radio
12:40 PM June 10, 1976. Support
of Repressive Regimes Likely.

CBS Morning News WTOP TV 7:00 AM
June 10, 1976 Harrison Salisbury
Comment.

## Coming Radio-TV Programs of Interest

SUNDAY, JUNE 13, 1976

Face the Nation, 11:30 a.m., Ch. 9,

WTOP(CBS): Guest not announced at this
printing.

Issues and Answers, 12:00 noon, Ch. 7,

WMAL(ABC): Ralph Nader and Dr. Carl

Walske, President of the Atomic Industrial
Forum.

Meet the Press, 12:30 p.m., Ch. 4,

WRC(NBC): Former Secretary of the Treasury
John Connally.

THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 1976

Today, 7:00 a.m., Ch. 4: Adm. Elmo Zumwalt
(Ret.), the Democratic candidate for U.S.
Senator from Virginia.

6 Friday, June 11, 1976