# Zionist criticism of Kissinger is growing

WASHINGTON — The first glimmerings of a potentially ominous attack against Secretary of State Henry Kissinger by pro-Israel hard-liners have begun appearing in this country's Zionist press, deeply worrying more moderate Jewish leaders.

Muted criticism of the first Jewish secretary of state began immediately after his brilliant performance separating Egypt and Israel in January. The Zionist Organization of America, a hard-line Zionist lobby, in its February Bulletin criticized that agreement as "strengthening the position of the belligerent Arab world and the Soviet Union."

By March, ZOA no longer muted its criticism. Directly attacking Kissinger for the first time, it next criticized the political leadership of Israel itself which, it said, regards Kissinger "as a second Disraeli."

"In the United States, on the other hand," the Bulletin continued, "Jewish leaders, both Zionist and non-Zionist, are jittery, wondering whether he is not leaning over backwards as a Jew to placate the Arabs and their Soviet protectors."

This toughening ZOA line in no way reflects opinion in the political center of the powerful American-Jewish community. But some of these

moderate Jewish leaders now fear this may change as a result of the dangerous increase in Syrian-Israeli military activity on the Golan Heights.

Kissinger has never underestimated the delicacy of his position toward the American-Jewish community. He has remarked privately that if either the Israeli government or the American-Jewish community ever concludes that he is pushing Israel too hard, he could be outflanked.

Although the moderate Jewish leadership's political roots are deep in the Democratic party, it gave President Nixon substantial support for re-election in 1972 and declared a moratorium on criticism of the administration's Mideast policies when the Yom Kippur war began Oct. 6. Now that truce is showing signs of strain, quite apart from the hardline position of the ZOA.

An example is Rabbi Israel Miller, president of the Zionist Federation of America (an umbrella organization which embraces many organizations). He was less than enthusiastic in a statement last week giving Kissinger good marks in handling both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the question of emigration by Soviet Jews.

Kissinger has tried hard to keep the

American-Jewish community neutralized in his hazardous effort to reverse 25 years of American diplomacy. But in his zeal to prove U.S. good faith to Arab leaders, he opens the door — probably inevitably — to Jewish complaints that he has gone too far.

Considering the modest border adjustments Kissinger has mediated so far, all this gives the merest hint of what he can expect. Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal was far less painful than others in store for Israel. Kissinger is now concentrating on the Golan Heights, but after that comes the emotional question of the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Here Kissinger's problem is compounded by the flimsy structure of Prime Minister Golda Meir's new government. As a price for giving her

a parliamentary majority, the new Religious party extracted this concession: No change on the West Bank (Samaria and Judea) without a plebiscite.

Moreover, some Jewish leaders here are convinced that Israel's true interests — and certainly this country's — require major border rectifications, including establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank. In trying to achieve this, they see another trap for Kissinger: President Nixon's own vulnerability to pro-Israeli hardliners in Congress whose votes he needs in the impeachment battle.

So far, there is no disagreement between Kissinger and the President, who desperately needs another foreign policy triumph: Political solution of the 25-year Arab-Israel war. To get it, he seems willing to take limited risks with his hard-line Jewish constituency.

But each Kissinger move ahead will tighten battle lines at home and in Israel, potentially subjecting Mr. Nixon to increasing political threats. To manipulate and control these pressures may be beyond anyone, even so subtle a diplomat as Dr. Kissinger. The rising tide of Jewish criticism shows that.

Publishers-Hall Syndicate

By
Rowland Evans
and
Robert Novak

LA TIMES

3/23/74

# Kissinger's World May Be Coming Unhinged

BY MAX LERNER

NEW YORK—With a foray into Russia, followed by another into the Middle East, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger runs the danger of becoming a figure of fun as a candidate for perpetual motion.

Kissinger gets his effects, says one commentator, by sheer speed — a continuous, breathless juggling of his various projects, punctuated by surprises. It is like saying that a ropewalker gets his effects by waving his arms. If the inner discipline and the body's cunning were not there, the arm-waving would do little good. Kissinger has control of his material, and he has the cunning that comes from reading the blurred shape of the future in the remembered outline of the past.

But things are getting harder for him in the present. There are signs that his carefully contrived world is coming unhinged. In fact, George Ball suggested the other day in Brussels that Kissinger himself was coming unhinged from flying fatigue combined with jet lag. Maybe so. But Kissinger exhausted can claim to have done more to change world diplomacy than Ball and his associates ever did in the State Department at their freshest.

Kissinger's problem is not his travel addiction nor his work neurosis: Most government servants would be better if their lives contained more of both. The real problem is that the task is too vast, and his political resources on his home turf are too lean.

The task has been nothing less than the reorganizing of world diplomacy. There was a burning Faustian will in it, and some felt that—like Faust—Kissinger sold his soul to the devil to achieve his dream. There are some who still feel that way, who won't forgive him because he works for President Nixon.

There are signs of discontent with the results of Kissinger's policies.

In China there are moves, doubtless with Mao Tse-tung's approval, pointing to a new Cultural Revolution, this time directed at Chou En-lai, who committed himself to a new deal with the United States.

In Russia there are discontents in the Kremlin, largely because Kissinger has been too successful and has given the United States the center of the stage as

Mideast mediator and peacemaker, pushing Leonid I. Brezhnev and the Russians into the background.

In Europe there are discontents because Kissinger, wearied of the serpentine maneuvers of European (especially French) diplomacy for the past decade and more, has chosen to play a bad-guy role, and talk tough both at Paris and Brussels.

There are also discontents at home. The conservatives feel that Mr. Nixon should never have shaken Mao's hand or Brezhnev's. Those for whom Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) is spokesman feel that Kissinger hasn't bargained enough—inside the detente with Russia—for freedom of emigration and dissent in the Soviet Union. Across political lines, many feel that the United States got the short end of the stick on the wheat sale and—far more important—on the SALT talks.

Thus the discontents pile up. In some degree they are a price Kissinger pays for his successes. His spectacular Middle East

role, including his strong working relationship with President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, has not delighted the Russians. Nor has the lifting of the Arab oil embargo helped the mood in Moscow. The French, too, are worried at Kissinger's headway on the energy crisis.

Yet in the end it isn't his successes that will spoil Kissinger's plans, but the shrinking of the ground he stands on.

For however fast he whirls around the globe, he is lamed by President Nixon's darkening destiny at home. The danger to Kissinger is not primarily—as sometimes put—that the Russians no longer trust Mr. Nixon's power to carry through his trade undertakings. The greater danger is that Brezhnev, sensing Mr. Nixon's increasing weakness, will decide to crowd him in the coming negotiations, especially on the SALT talks.

That is why even the subtlest diplomat may find it ever harder to work for a President whose world is falling around his shoulders.

Copyright 1974 Los Angeles Times CORKY

"Of course we're always happy to have you, Dr. Kissinger—
allow me to show you to your room!"

of the metropolitan area
and we want to be part of
it."

Does the fact that down-
town often is jammed with
cars, that the region is de-
ficient in public transpor-
tation concern the Port-
man interests?

"Eventually every major
city will have rapid tran-
sit," Lembcke said. "But
there is no single format
that will suit Los Angeles,
A system must be de-
signed that will meet the
city's needs and its devel-
opment patterns."

He said the new hotel is
being planned to handle a
sufficient number of cars.
But, he added, parking is
not a major problem since
there is ample space, some
already built and the rest

sharp departure from the
normal large convention
facility.

Plans call for a six-story
interior atrium with shops
on each floor in the central
35-story cylinder. Hotel
rooms will be above the
atrium with the top three
floors devoted to restaur-
ant and other dining and
entertainment facilities.

The four smaller cylin-
ders, each 30 stories, will
contain more hotel rooms.

The towers will rise
from a two-story plaza
covering the entire block.
Exhibition halls, meeting
rooms and banquet facili-
ties for 2,000 will be
housed below the plaza
level.

In a recent discussion of
his plans for the Bunker

people in other cities have
and enjoy, the people in
Los Angeles would re-
spond," he said.

Portman's largest
project is his $300 million
Peachtree Center in Atlan-
ta, a complex of four office
towers, a merchandise
mart, and the famed Re-
gency Hyatt Hotel with a
22-story interior atrium.
The complex also will in-
clude a 70-story hotel now
under construction.

In San Francisco, Port-
man designed and built
the 1,200-room Regency
Hyatt, part of the Embar-
cadero Center project, and
is the chief architect and
planner for Renaissance
City, a residential-com-
mercial development in
Detroit.

dustrial, governmental
and some residential cus-
tomers and the four asso-
ciations named in the suit
do about one-third of the
trash hauling business in
the city.

The city's Bureau of Sa-
nitation collects all the so-
lid-waste trash from res-
idential customers in the
city, but the bureau re-
quires that the trash be
placed by the curb for
easy pickup.

Private haulers—doing a
$100 million annual busi-
ness in Los Angeles—ser-
vice residential customers
who want more than
weekly pickup or — like
some apartment houses—
choose not to place their
trash by the curb.

As a result of "noncom-
petitive, collusive and

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Moscow Parley Falls Short

By BARRY SCHWEID

LONDON (AP) - Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger flew toward home today with Soviet proposals that fall far short of the "conceptual breakthrough" needed to produce a new treaty limiting nuclear weapons.

However, a joint United States-Soviet communique said the two sides had agreed "there are possibilities for reaching mutually acceptable solutions," and that they were determined to keep making "energetic efforts to find such solutions."

A senior U.S. official acknowledged the Soviet proposals fell short of what Kissinger sought, but he said President Nixon intends to go ahead with a summit meeting with Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, in Moscow in early summer.

Without detailing the differences, the official said flatly: "What they gave us is not acceptable."

He added, however, that the United States would try to come up with counterproposals, and that Kissinger probably will go back to Moscow in May.

In the meantime he will confer regularly with Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to Washington, will see Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko at a United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York next month, and technical negotiations will continue in Geneva between the United States and Soviet representatives.

Kissinger flew to Moscow last weekend saying he expected a break-through to set the stage for an agreement in Geneva that Nixon and Brezhnev could sign at their third summit meeting.

Acknowledging that this forecast was too optimistic, the official said of Kissinger's discussions with Brezhnev over the last three days: "There was movement but I would not yet describe it as a breakthrough."

At the same time, there was an evident shift in U.S. strategy during Kissinger's Kremlin visit. Instead of seeking a permanent ban on offensive nuclear weapons, the two sides now are concentrating on trying to agree on "add-ons" to the 1972 U.S. Soviet treaty.

The pact, signed by Nixon and Brezhnev at their first summit, limited defensive systems and established controls on some offensive weapons for five years.

Kissinger and Brezhnev concentrated principally on missiles carrying multiple warheads.

The United States currently has a predominant advantage in this category but the Soviets would be expected to make concessions in launch power where they are ahead.

Permanent bans would be left to subsequent negotiations between the two countries.

Although Kissinger failed to achieve a nuclear breakthrough he apparently

obtained the prospect of substantial concessions from Brezhnev on the question of Jewish emigration.

U.S. officials declined to discuss details until Kissinger conveys the Soviet proposals to congressional leaders.

A majority of both the Senate and the House so far has blocked trade credits and tariff concessions because of restrictions on Jews and other minorities trying to leave Russia.

Kissinger may have won potential Soviet agreement to increase the outflow above the 35,000 Jews who were permitted to emigrate in 1973.

Before arriving in London, Kissinger told newsmen at Moscow's Vnukovo

See TALKS, Page 16A

Arab oil producers, whose embargo fueled the energy crisis.

All of these factors point to a need for political decisions to deal with raw materials problems in the years ahead. And that, the experts agree, will require more information.

newsmen at the airport. "I prefer to show it to Dr. Kissinger first."

The Israeli minister's meeting with Kissinger marks the start of negotiations in Washington for a troop disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel similar to the one Kissinger negotiated between Egypt and Israel.

Dayan was carrying to Washington called for an exchange of all prisoners of war, the withdrawal of Israel's troops from all but a three-mile strip of the Syrian territory captured in the October war, and a six-mile-wide buffer zone manned by United Nations troops between the two armies on the Golan Heights.

(NEA Photo)

This dependable watchdog, fashioned from snow, is guaranteed never to leave his post before this Verdun, Canada, home. He's guaranteed as long, that is, as cold weather holds out.

## Promise Margarine can help lower cholesterol. Promise.

AVE
ONE

Kissinger's Moscow Talks End
Without Sign of Breakthrough

BY MURRAY SEEGER

Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW—Three days of talks between Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Soviet leaders ended Wednesday night apparently without the kind of agreements the American delegation was seeking.

The U.S. Embassy issued a cryptic statement announcing the talks had ended, after nearly five hours, at 9 p.m. and said they had been "businesslike and constructive." Apparently, no further talks were planned.

The matter-of-fact tone of the embassy statement suggested that Kissinger and Communist Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev failed to make the "conceptual breakthrough" on nuclear arms limitation negotiations that Kissinger said he was seeking when he arrived in Moscow Sunday night.

After two long days of talks, the Soviet leaders canceled the scheduled Wednesday morning session to

hold a meeting of the Communist Party Politburo in the Kremlin. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko attended a lunch given by Kissinger, but they did not meet with Brezhnev again until late in the afternoon.

Asked if the Politburo meeting, coming in the middle of their talks, was a negative sign, Kissinger answered, "You could read it the other way."

The evening meeting ended earlier than the sessions of Monday and Tuesday nights, and Kissinger made no change in his original plan to leave Moscow for London at 10 a.m. today.

When he arrived, Kissinger was optimistic on his chances for reaching an agreement with the Russians on the general lines to be followed by negotiators at the strategic arms limitation talks in Geneva. Those ne-

Please Turn to Page 20, Col. 1

Heights.

AFL-CIO President George Meany told Congress that the Arab oil embargo and other trade developments have left Administration trade reform proposals worse than no trade reforms at all. Urging the Senate Finance Committee to kill the House-passed trade bill, Meany said the nation was "clearly in a recession" and claimed that the 1973 trade surplus came at the expense of the consumer.

forces in the two nations.

West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's government officially approved a new two-year plan with the United States to contribute to the upkeep of American military forces in that country. Details were not announced, but Bonn sources said that payments to the United States for the fiscal years 1973-74 and 1974-75 will be about $2.24 billion, compared with about $2.06 billion for the previous two fiscal years.

Newsmakers---

Daley Would Relive Chicago's

—If he had to do it over again, said Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley, he still would have wanted the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, despite all the bloodshed, rioting, confusion and ensuing court

cases that became a national controversy. Daley did his reminiscing about the Democratic assembly when he spoke to a national convention of the telephone branch of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. He said that

—Gloria Swanso
watching a series of library. As for m
States: "The violent American movies and emotionally si

—A petition with tish government from his 1968 con delivered to Prim

Kremlin Session Focuses on Mideast

Kissinger Holds Lengthy Talks

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writer

MOSCOW, March 26—Secretary of State Henry Kissinger spent another long day in the Kremlin today in meetings with the Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders.

The Soviet government made special efforts to create a friendly and hopeful atmosphere around the talks, and an official communiqué issued late tonight described the discussions as "businesslike and constructive."

Neither side provided any concrete details. The communique said the Soviet's discussions concerned the Middle East, "questions of security and cooperation in Europe including the limitation of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe," and bilateral questions "in particular in the economic and trade field."

This last phrase seemed to be a hint that Kissinger had raised the sensitive issue of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, which has become the major barrier to expanded economic relations between the two superpowers. U.S. officials said before the talks began that it would come up in the discussions on trade.

The U. S. Congress has shown an unwillingness to approve most-favored-nation tariff status or government-sponsored trade credits for the Soviets until they remove all restrictions on the emigration of their citizens. The Soviets have already made major concessions on this issue, but have not indicated any willingness to move further to satisfy congressional demands.

Despite obstacles like this one—and regardless of the threat of impeachment to President Nixon—Soviet officials and journalists have repeatedly told Americans with Kissinger that they have high hopes for these talks, and for Mr. Nixon's projected visit in June.

The Soviet message has been that the superpowers have many agreements under negotiation, and that they should complete them swiftly. Their comments suggest that the Soveits are anxious to invigorate the process of debate this spring.

Tonight's communique implied that Kissinger and Brezhnev also feel the time is ripe for progress on many issues. While wet snow fell outside, they spent eight and a half hours together in the Kremlin today. They scheduled more meetings to begin at 11 a.m. Wednesday.

Soviet sources suggested that Kissinger's stay here—due to end Thursday morning—might be extended by a day, and U. S. sources said this idea had been suggested. If the talks are prolonged, Kissinger's timetable for meetings in London Thursday and then in Washington with Israel and Syrian officials could be upset.

[A State Department source said late yesterday that Kissinger

would not delay his Moscow departure by more than a couple of hours on Thursday. The secretary also plans to go on a long-scheduled vacation on Saturday, the source said.]

The Americans and Soviets appeared to share a desire to conceal all details of their talks from public view. In an unusual reversal of roles, one Soviet journalist confided to American colleagues that he could not say much about the talks because "Kissinger insists that everything be kept secret."

Soviet sources conveyed the impression that their government hoped for progress in all

the areas discussed today. They said the Soviet Union would not automatically try to derall Kissinger's Middle East peacemaking efforts, which have left the Soviet Union on the sidelines, looking on with evident anxiety about its future role in the Arab world. The same sources expressed hope, however, that Middle East peace negotiations might again be moved to the Geneva conference, where Moscow has a more obvious role.

On trade, Soviet sources have repeatedly said they hope for a substantial expansion, but will not abandon debate if congressional opposition

makes this temporarily impossible. "The general line (of improved Soviet-American relations) must go on," one senior journalist observed. "If obstacles appear, they must be circumvented and surrounded" by progress in other fields.

Soviet journalists conveyed messages like these at a reception for the American press organized this evening by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The reception, conducted around a long table filled with platters of food, vodka and Soviet wines, "was held in a friendly atmosphere," in the words of Tass, the government news agency.

Kissinger's Meeting
With Soviet Leader
Focuses on Mideast

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, March 26 —
Leonid I. Brezhnev and Secretary of State Kissinger, meeting for a second day at the Kremlin, dwelt today on approaches to a settlement in the Middle East, an area that has lately been a source of strain in Soviet-American relations.

The Soviet side, annoyed in
recent weeks by Mr. Kissinger's
bold one-man diplomacy, was
understood to be seeking as-
surances of closer coordination
in the negotiations. But today's
discussion was not expected
to alter Mr. Kissinger's plans
to begin separate talks later
this week in Washington with
Israeli and Syrian representa-
tives on a disengagement of
their forces.

> [In Cairo, diplomats said the
> Soviet Union was pressing to
> join American and British
> naval teams in clearing the
> Suez Canal. Page 3.]

The Soviet party leader and
Continued on Page 4, Column 4

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

NYTimes 3/27/74

41 M

# Who's Spoking Whose Wheel?

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—One curious aspect of the continuing superpower negotiation is that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is exactly sure how strong it is vis-à-vis the other. Thus it is not always certain what is uppermost in the minds of each party at any particular phase of their colloquy.

Just before the current Kissinger-Brezhnev meeting the Russians had been indicating they looked forward to a resumed dialogue in order to get the SALT II talks moving again. They made plain this was now their primary objective. It is obvious that if a spring visit by President Nixon to Moscow is arranged, a basic accord on strategic armaments will have to be in the works.

But why are the Russians so eager for this when more and more experts conclude the Soviet Union has probably overtaken the United States, at least in Europe where NATO and Warsaw Pact armies confront each other?

Gen. Andrew Goodpaster writes in "Strategic Review" that the Soviet Union has geographical advantages over NATO whose forces are inferior to those of the Warsaw Pact, and NATO, as a defensive alliance, is forced (in terms of a chess analogy) to "always play with the black pieces."

Mr. Brezhnev preceded his conference with Mr. Kissinger by sending Foreign Minister Gromyko on a Middle East tour to try and recapture what the Kremlin thought was its waning influence (lost to Washington). Nevertheless, the U.S. Strategic Institute publishes a contradictory analysis by Lt. Gen. (retired) Ira C. Eaker who commanded Allied air forces in the Mediterranean during World War II.

General Eaker contends the United States was "the big loser" in the October Arab-Israeli war, adding: "It cost this country at least $4 billion, used up scarce reserves of weapons and supplies and lost the critical Arab oil. The U.S.S.R. was the big winner...."

"It restored Russian prestige with the Arab world; it weakened and isolated its only world-power rival, the U.S.... it demonstrated, for all the world to see, that Russia can control the vital flow of Arab oil to the Western world... [and] the Soviets gained an unexpected bonus, the break-up of the solidarity of NATO."

The explanation of these apparent contradictions is that probably the military-industrial complex and high command of each superpower is in-

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

clined to exaggerate the potential of its principal adversary while the political leadership has to assess the over-all picture including relative economic power.

Against this background one may weigh the cost to the U.S.S.R. of a military budget larger than that of the U.S.A., when recalling the Soviet gross national product is but half that of America.

Obviously, no matter whose generals are right in measuring the might of the respective superpowers, Moscow is paying through the nose to keep up its end of the see-saw and, by an accord on SALT, would like to reduce this onerous expense.

Together with a further step toward lessening the mutual arms burden, Mr. Brezhnev clearly hopes to urge Mr. Kissinger again to soup up trade relations in order to boost the Soviet economy or, as he demanded before his June, 1973, summit with President Nixon, "large-scale trade worthy of the scale of our two great countries."

Russia stands to gain more than America from any such massive commercial increase on something like the terms agreed to with Mr. Nixon in the past. However, the U.S. President, because of his political difficulties at home, has a diminishing chance of getting Congress to approve most-favored-nation (MFN) status for the Soviet Union—unless Moscow first eases emigration restrictions and relaxes its campaign against internal dissent.

Yet Mr. Brezhnev not only resents such American demands as unwarranted interference in Soviet internal affairs; he would run into trouble with his own hard-core opponents in the party leadership if he seemed to yield on the home front in order to obtain advantages abroad. This places him in a quandary because of his insistence on MFN as the principal token of American goodwill for Russia.

Almost certainly Mr. Kissinger's deft diplomatic touch will obtain a compromise formula for avoiding another freeze and getting the SALT talks moving again, something Mr. Nixon wants as much as Mr. Brezhnev. But Mr. Kissinger is even less likely to sell all this—with assurances on emigration and dissidence—to the U.S. Congress than Mr. Brezhnev is to persuade his Politburo that Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov and Soviet Jews are Washington's legitimate concern.

When in Doubt, Smile!

By James Reston

There are fashions in diplomacy these days as there are in the latest Paris dresses, and the current fashion among world leaders is the official smile. Whatever else the great men wear, it seems they must wear a smile for the photographers—and the greater their differences, the wider their smiles.

Thus we now have by satellite out of Moscow on our front pages and on the box, photographs of Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet party chief, and Secretary of State Kissinger not only smiling but laughing with one another like old buddies at a Harvard reunion.

Not so long ago, Mr. Kissinger was being embraced and kissed in Arab country and grinning for the photographers with Senator Scoop Jackson of the State of Washington, his most persistent and irritating critic.

This is something comparatively new in the world of politics. It used to be assumed that the conduct of human events was a very serious business and that statesmen, even if they wanted to giggle about human folly and pretension, had to look serious and solemn.

Everybody has seen Mr. Nixon on the television smiling through his tears and tension, even when confronted by Dan Rather of C.B.S., but whoever saw a grinning picture of Mr. Lincoln?

Still, there is something important and maybe even genuine behind this official pretense. Even when Messrs. Brezhnev and Kissinger are disagreeing in private about the control of atomic weapons, the negotiations in the Middle East, and the immigration of Jews from Russia, they feel that they must pretend to be agreeing because their peoples want peace and compromise. Smiling is good domestic politics for Mr. Brezhnev in Pravda and for Mr. Nixon in Pittsburgh.

So the great men call in the photographers to the Kremlin and flash the pictures around the world. These pictures remind both Cairo and Tel Aviv that Washington and Moscow have

WASHINGTON

their own common interests. They also raise questions in Peking, as Mr. Kissinger's pictures with Chou En-lai (who never plays the smiling game) raised doubts in Moscow.

There is, however, an aspect of unreality about all this, even an element of fraud. Governments keep manipulating the competitive press and television of the Western world for their own propaganda purposes. "Give them pictures but don't give them facts." "Thow them a headline: Brezhnev and Kissinger for détente—coexistence 'irreversible.'"

It is the modern diplomatic game, using words to conceal rather than to publish the truth, and it keeps the reporters busy and justifies the not inconsiderable expense of their transportation, food and lodging in Moscow.

But mainly, it is a good holding operation, making things look good while the great men are quarreling in private and it won't hurt you much unless you inhale it.

But meanwhile the reality is hidden. The Soviet Union wants in on the Middle East talks and the U.S. thinks this would be a disaster for the Middle East and for U.S.-Soviet relations. Brezhnev and Kissinger have their differences over the control of strategic arms, the future of Europe, trade, credits, the opening of the Suez Canal, Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and Soviet and U.S. naval power in the Indian Ocean.

All this is clearly the subject for tough and very private negotiations, which would undoubtedly be ruined by day-to-day reporting in the press. The reality is not amiable but solemn. They differ but insist on pretending they agree.

This is the only flaw in the diplomatic practice of amiability. It is intended to mislead the public, but it doesn't really do it. It is a passing fashion, and is important only if you take it seriously.

March 27, 1974 (28)

Aerospace Daily

PENTAGON SAYS EIGHT MINESWEEPING HELICOPTERS TO BE USED IN SUEZ

Only eight RH-53D minesweeping helicopters will be involved in clearing the Suez Canal, although Navy mine hunting ships may have to be used, the Pentagon said yesterday in refining details released last week.

Earlier DOD spokesmen said "about a dozen" of the Sikorsky Sea Stallions would be required (DAILY, March 20, 21). But in briefings to newsmen in Norfolk, Va, and Charleston, S.C., the number was reduced. In addition, seven support helicopters, all Marine, will be used.

"A requirement for USN minesweeping ships is not anticipated at this time. However, we do have the capability and they may be required as the full scope of the effort is determined later on." At the earlier briefing in the Pentagon, a spokesman ruled out use of U.S. surface ships, saying the British had been approached for the job by Egypt.

To clear wrecks in the canal, the Navy has been asked to lease two heavy salvage craft to Murphy Pacific Salvage Co., which has had contact with the Egyptian government. There are 16 hulks in the waterway and Egypt needs aid to remove 10.

DETENTE -- CONTINUED

temporarily abated the tensions concomitant with an unregulated nuclear-arms race.

That short list of instances where détente has been successful is counterbalanced by a long one of issues that have remained unaffected by détente and may even have been aggravated by its partial achievement.

That is particularly true of Europe, where the conferences on European security and on mutual and balanced troop reductions are deadlocked and where the very fact of détente in Central Europe and the apparent overall détente between the United States and the Soviet Union have accentuated the disintegrative tendencies within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In the Middle East, the two superpowers compete for power and influence, as they do in the countries bordering on the Indian Ocean. The thrust of Soviet expansion from the eastern Mediterranean through the Middle East to South Asia, supported

by rapidly increasing naval power and movement in to the empty spaces left by the liquidation of the colonial empires, is likely to create new points of tension.

Two factors are bound to put into question the few instances of real détente achieved: the deadlock of the present strategic-arms negotiations and the American reaction to certain domestic policies of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet general quoted here on "political détente" has indeed a point. The continuation of an unlimited nuclear arms race will create tensions wiping out the limited gains made by détente thus far.

For since each side will suspect the other of seeking a first-strike capability, such an arms race will introduce an element of instability into the present balance of terror, which—and not détente—has actually prevented the outbreak of nuclear war.

While this development is still a

matter of conjecture, the negative impact of the domestic policies of the Soviet Union upon détente is an observable fact.

American concern with these policies is not, as Soviet spokesmen would have it, meddling in the domestic affairs of another country. Rather it reflects the recognition that a stable peace, founded upon a stable balance of power, is predicated upon a common moral framework that expresses the commitment of all the nations concerned to certain basic moral principles, of which the preservation of that balance of power is one.

As long as the excesses of domestic brutality in the Soviet Union indicate the absence of such a common moral framework, détente can only be limited and precarious.

Hans J. Morgenthau is Leonard Davis Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the City College of the City University of New York.

U.S. -- CONTINUED

week's supply of ammo, the Israelis literally wept when the giant U.S. C-6 A's lumbered down the runways to stop with their huge cargo of weaponry. The Russians, Dr. Kissinger carefully explained later, displayed commendable restraint during and after that war. He didn't mention that the Russians sold $2.5 billion in arms to the Arab nations, at that time.

Meanwhile, détente has also meant an unusual, almost affectionate relationship between some U.S. industrialists and bankers and the directors and sub-directors of Soviet economic activity. This is partly because autocratic managers have much in common: Henry Ford, the original, also got along with the Bolsheviks.

Anyway, there is more cultural, scientific, educational, technical and economic exchange. And that's for the good.

But there are many shortcomings to détente. As Melvin R. Laird, former secretary of defense, has pointed out, the Russians have not opened up communications with the U.S. in terms of free expression of ideas.

Their military spending remains nearly twice ours, measured by gross national product, and more than twice as much in weaponry. They are passing us in strategic missiles. Mr. Laird says détente shouldn't lull us into complacency about the Russians.

"They can extract deals from us now because of the troubles in the administration," he told me this week. "I believe in trading with the Soviets, but they shouldn't get better credit or trade arrangements than the democratic nations we deal with. Let's not have another wheat deal.

"The Soviets have time on their side. They know that the Chinese leadership is old and will be gone in 5 to 10 years, and that China will be weakened by regionalization. Meanwhile, the Soviets can build their armament and build and build."

No question that the Russians will talk tougher to Dr. Kissinger this week than before. The Russians need economic relief in the form of trade relations and credit. They are somewhat paranoid about what they think De-

SOVIETS -- CONTINUED

creased the total number of organized divisions that could be mobilized with reserves from 140 to 162 (105 motorized rifle divisions, 50 tank, and 7 airborne). These troops are being re-equipped with modern tanks, artillery, and antitank weapons."

These disturbing figures, again, might not cause great concern if the United States were enaged in bold programs of research and development. Here, too, the comparison is dismaying. Since 1968 our own R&D has been cut by 21 percent while Soviet R&D "has been sus-

fense Secretary James R. Schlesinger's views are on national security. They are hung up about Jewish political and economic power in the U.S., which, admittedly, is considerable. They think Senator Henry M. Jackson is a real danger. And they are aware of the strong rumblings from the left and right in the U.S. against the Russians and Mr. Nixon, the man they bet on.

Moreover, the much traveled Dr. Kissinger must

tained at a level 50 percent higher than ours." Most of our research necessarily has to be concentrated on "safe bets." The Soviets, with twice as many projects in motion, are much more likely to come up with far-farther weapons that could make the imbalance of power drastically worse.

Buckley is not a pessimist, a defeatist, or a prophet of doom. It is not too late for the United States to regain a qualitative parity in this vital competition. But he asks the country to understand what is happening as the Soviets build up—and we let down.

know his welcome wears thin if there are too many "talks." After all, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger used to tell the nation that the trouble with earlier symmetry (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) was that it was too much concerned with atmospherics and that the U.S. really didn't show up to make a deal.

It seems to me Dr. Kissinger's travels are also tending to atmospherics. Are all those trips necessary?

2-F

NEW YORK POST, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, 1974

Max Lerner

WILL SUCCESS SPOIL HENRY?

With a foray into Russia, to be followed by another into the Middle East, Henry Kissinger runs the danger of becoming a figure of fun as a candidate for perpetual motion. Some are tempted to dismiss him as a dervish, others as a false magus, still others as a tribal shaman. All the images are from necromancy and its allied areas. Which is what legend feeds on.

Kissinger gets his effects, says one commentator, by sheer speed—a continuous, breathless juggling of his various projects, punctuated by constant surcharges. It is like saying that a rope-walker gets his effects by waving his arms.

But things are getting harder for him in the present. There are signs that his carefully contrived world is coming unhinged. In fact, George Ball suggested the other day in Brussels that Kissinger himself was coming unhinged, from flying fatigue combined with jet lag. May-be so. But Kissinger exhausted can claim to have done more to change world diplomacy than George Ball and his associates ever did in the State Dept. at their freshest.

His problem is not his travel addiction

nor his work neurosis: most government servants would be better if their lives contained more of both. The real problem is that the task is too vast, and his political resources on his home turf too lean.

The task has been nothing less than the re-organizing of world diplomacy. There was a burning Faustian will in it, and some felt that—like Faust—Kissinger sold his soul to the Devil to achieve his dream. There are some who still feel that way, who won't forgive him because he works with President Nixon.

There are signs of discontent with the results of Kissinger's policies. In China there are moves, doubtless with Mao's approval, pointing to a new Cultural Revolution, this time directed at Chou En-lai, who committed himself to a new deal with the U. S.

In Russia there are discontents in the Kremlin, largely because Kissinger has been too successful, and has given the U. S. the center of the stage as Mideast mediator and peacemaker, pushing Brezhnev and the Russians into the background.

There are also discontents at home. The conservatives feel that Nixon should never have shaken Mao's hand, or

Brezhnev's. Those for whom Sen. Jackson is spokesman feel that Kissinger hasn't bargained enough—inside the tentate with Russia—for freedom of emigration and dissent in the Soviet Union. Across political lines many feel that the U. S. got the short end of the stick on the wheat sale and — far more important—on the SALT talks.

Thus the discontents pile up. In some degree they are a price Kissinger pays for his successes. His spectacular Middle East role, including his strong working relationship with President Sadat, has not delighted the Russians.

Nor has the lifting of the Arab oil embargo helped the mood in Moscow. The French too are worried at. Kissinger's headway on the energy crisis, which may account for Foreign Minister Jobert's new-found concern about an equal oil deal for Holland and Denmark.

For however fast he whirls around the globe, he is lamed by President Nixon's darkening destiny at home. The danger to Kissinger is not primarily, as sometimes put, that the Russians no longer trust Nixon's power to carry through his trade undertakings.

The greater danger is that Brezhnev, sensing Nixon's increasing weakness, will decide to crowd him in the coming negotiations, especially on the SALT talks. If they feel that politically Nixon needs another Russian treaty, and especially needs his planned June trip to Moscow, they may exact a very high price for what he needs.

The nearest thing to it will be the great impeachment trial of the firebrand Tory parson Henry Sacheverell, who was tried and impeached for treasonous utterances by a Whig House of Lords in 1709. The trial was held in Whitehall, where special grandstands were erected. Tickets went for huge sums. Queen Anne came every day in a coach and six. Crowds rioted for and against Sacheverell.

But the coming McLuhanesque impeachment trial will render even that pale by comparison. P.T. Barnum, where are you now that we need you?

Oh, yes, Sacheverell was convicted.

(C) King Features Syndicate

equally ungettable last news conference that seemed to put a period to Nixon's political career. Some period!

Edmund G. Brown Jr., at the moment the favorite to win the Democratic nomination and the governorship, is young — 36 — and untried, and old hands here say rather brutally that his big lead in the polls is due largely to his name. Not many doubt his talents, however, and he might ultimately become a national figure (although long-odds bettors here also like the chances of Flournoy — Houston, not James L. Even so, it's hard to get as excited as usual about California politics.

(C) New York Times News Service

Kingsbury Smith

Kingsbury Smith

Best Hold Am.

Henry, the Face-Saver

3.26.74

NEW YORK—One of the primary purposes of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's latest mission to Moscow is to work out a face-saving formula for Russia in the Middle East military disengagement plans.

The Soviet government is known to be angry over being left out of the negotiations which led to the disengagement of forces agreement between Egypt and Israel and which are now being conducted by the United States with Syria and the Jewish state.

Moscow feels its influence in the Arab world is being endangered by the spectacular success of Kissinger's diplomacy in the Middle East, which not only succeeded in defusing the October conflict, but secured the cease-fire agreements on both the Syrian and Suez Canal fronts and brought about the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces. It also led to a dramatic change in the attitude of most of the Arab countries towards the United States.

In the opinion of top ranking diplomatic officials, the Soviet leaders are not only worried about what they consider an alarming expansion of American influence in the Arab world, but they feel deeply humiliated by the dramatic activities of Kissinger in the Middle East.

Following the cease-fire agreement, Russia and the United States became co-chairmen of what was heralded as the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East. When it was found impossible to reach an agreement in Geneva on Israeli-Egyptian disengagement, Kissinger began his solo efforts to bring about an understanding between President Anwar Sadat and the Israeli government—shuttling back and forth between Aswan and Jerusalem.

President Sadat's choice of Aswan as his meeting place with Kissinger for the crucial negotiations was particularly humiliating to the Soviets. Russia has built the Aswan Dam for Egypt after the United States refused to do so.

When Kissinger succeeded in getting the disengagement agreement, he was hugged and kissed publicly by Sadat and warmly welcomed in other Arab capitals.

On the other hand, Soviet Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko had to play the humiliating role of arriving in the Arab capitals in the wake of Kissinger's visits to find out what had happened. He was also received coolly, without any hugs or kisses.

All this despite the fact Russia had armed Egypt, Syria and Iraq with billions of dollars worth of weapons, had supported the Arab world in the war against Israel—even

to the extent of risking nuclear confrontation with the United States. Yet the United States, which provided Israel with $2 billion worth of arms, is getting all the credit for bringing about an end to the Arab-Israel conflict.

After Kissinger negotiated the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement, the Soviet government wanted a meeting of the Geneva peace conference to summarize what had been achieved and have it appear that they were at least partly responsible.

At the time, the Israeli and American governments felt such a meeting might rock the boat and lead to a reopening of negotiations. Now Kissinger feels it might have been better to have had the Geneva meeting and let the Soviets share in the credit.

He knows Russia definitely wants to be included in a Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement. The Soviets are determined not to be humiliated in Damascus as they were in Aswan.

To avoid the danger that Moscow might encourage Syria to stall on a disengagement agreement with Israel, Kissinger is willing to arrange for some symbolic Soviet participation in the settlement, if not the negotiations—perhaps through Soviet presence at the final stage of signature and ratification. He has sought and obtained the Israeli government's approval of this plan, the details of which he hopes to work out in his current Moscow talks with the Soviet leaders.

If Kissinger can obtain Soviet cooperation on this basis, it is believed in Israeli diplomatic circles that Syria will be persuaded to conclude a disengagement agreement with Israel within the next few months. For one thing, Egyptian President Sadat is known to be pressing the Syrian government to do so. He is most eager to have Syria sign such an agreement with Israel to prove that he is not the only Arab leader to have entered contractual relations with the Jewish state.

Furthermore, if full scale hostilities were resumed on the northern front, Syria might have to fight the war alone. With United Nations forces now separating the Israeli and Egyptian forces on the Sinai front, it would be much more difficult for Egypt to become involved, even if Sadat wished to do so—which is considered highly unlikely.

● Kingsbury Smith is European director and chief foreign writer for The Hearst Newspapers.

Soviet Disappointed
By Results of Detente

A Return to Rivalry

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, March 23—A renewed sense of rivalry and frustration with the United States now colors the Soviet policy of détente, so warmly proclaimed when President Nixon visited Moscow 22 months ago.

On such key issues as trade, strategic-arms negotiations and European security, the Soviet leadership acts as if it feels that Washington has not come through with the kind of accommodation that was promised, either explicitly or implicitly, in Mr. Nixon's talks with Leonid I. Brezhnev in 1972 and 1973.

Still Committed to Policy

Moscow's mood, on the eve of a visit here by Secretary of State Kissinger, is definitely one of disappointment. Even Mr. Kissinger himself, once held in awe by Soviet officials, has come in for public criticism over his Middle East diplomacy amid a reawakened Soviet sense of competition with the United States in that region.

Mr. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist leader, has staked much of his personal prestige on accommodation with Washington and the West. He privately assured Ambassador

Continued on Page 28, Column 4

Detente Leaves the Russians Disappointed

Continued From Page 1, Col. 2

Walter J. Stoessel Jr. three weeks ago that he was still committed to accommodation with Washington and that he looked forward to another visit from Mr. Nixon this year.

But in recent speeches he has struck a somewhat defensive tone, accusing the Western press of "malicious attacks" on Moscow aimed at stalling any relaxation of tension, and he has charged Western politicians with raising trivial issues in the area of human rights to block his cherished goal of an East-West security conference to sanctify the present division of Europe.

Deadlicked negotiations with Washington on key issues expose Mr. Brezhnev to domestic criticism from potential rivals now that his strategy has produced neither big American credits for Siberian development projects nor a slowdown in arms spending that would let Soviet planners direct a larger share of funds into modernizing the civilian economy.

## Criticism of Brezhnev Seen

Although Western diplomats see no imminent danger to Mr. Brezhnev's power because of the present difficulties with détente, some of the stepped-up criticism of the United States in the Soviet press is being read here as oblique criticism of Mr. Brezhnev's policy, as well.

In its evident uneasiness over the course of relations with Washington, the Brezhnev leadership group has lately taken to emphasizing big new commercial deals being signed or in the offing with West Germany, Japan and France, as

if to quicken the American competitive instinct and hedge against a lack of progress with Washington in the future.

Just last night, the Government newspaper Izvestia, accused the United States of welshing on "firm obligations" entered into by Mr. Nixon in 1972 to end high American tariffs against Soviet goods and thus to help promote the kind of large-scale Soviet-American trade and technology exchange that Moscow regards as central to détente.

Izvestia blamed Congress for blocking tariff reductions and warned Washington not to try to use Soviet interest in trade as leverage for bargaining in other negotiations.

But other published commentaries and private remarks or some Soviet officials and journalists also reflected a belated recognition of Mr. Nixon's problems at home and disenchantment over his inability to bring Congress into line on the trade issue.

In addition to worries about Mr. Nixon, Soviet policy-makers have been upset this spring by the pronouncements of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and his proposals for expanded American spending on new strategic-arms systems.

And Mr. Kissinger, warmly toasted by Mr. Brezhnev in May, 1972, and eagerly received in later meetings, is now perceived in Moscow as a rival as well as a partner, after his effective promotion of American influence among the Arabs.

The tarnishing of Mr. Kissinger's image here is perhaps most symptomatic of the current Soviet wariness. Last October, after he helped stitch together the joint Soviet-American resolution for a Middle

East cease-fire, Mr. Kissinger was privately hailed as a brilliant and effective negotiator. But this winter, when, alone, he arranged the Egyptian-Israeli troop disengagement, his diplomacy was belittled and later ridiculed as a "mountain that produced a mouse."

Some Western diplomats have come to suspect that Moscow fears, and perhaps privately opposes, an ultimate Middle East peace settlement because this would reduce its usefulness to the Arabs and thus its leverage in the Arab world.

In the arms field, some analysts have felt that Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, the Defense Minister who was elevated to the Politburo last spring, was putting pressure on Mr. Brezhnev not to make any new agreement on limiting strategic arms that would preclude Soviet superiority in the future. Marshal Grechko's public speeches have lately emphasized the need to press ahead with the Soviet weapons build-up.

## Aims to Gain Time

Moscow's evident objective in the negotiations at Vienna, according to Western diplomats, has been to gain time for its defense establishment to build numerical advantages in land and sea-based missiles and to start testing multiple warheads for these missiles, while trying to find a way to hold back American improvements in areas where Washington holds advantages.

Both at the strategic-arms negotiations and at talks on force reductions in Central Europe, Soviet negotiators have reportedly sought controls on American nuclear air squadrons without accepting the American contention that these must be matched against Soviet in-

intermediate-range missiles aimed at Europe.

Whatever the Soviet dissatisfaction with the trend of the arms talks or preparations for a Europena security conference or Mr. Brezhnev's embarrassment over the issue of trade, tariffs and credits with the United States, Western analysts assert that détente with the United States has still proven sufficiently profitable for Moscow's leadership to hold to its course.

## In Mideast and Vietnam

Mr. Brezhnev, echoed by the Soviet press, has emphasized several times that accommodation with Washington prevented last fall's confrontation over the Middle East from exploding into a hot war. Less frequently, Soviet spokesmen have recalled that the Vietnam cease-fire followed the first Nixon-Brezhnev talks, although lately Vietnam has become a sore point because of Hanoi's unhappiness with the political situation in the South.

More fundamentally, Western diplomats assert, accommodation with the United States remains an important umbrella for accommodation with Western Europe and Japan. Even without large credits from Washington, relatively good relations with the United States promote the kind of international atmosphere that enables Moscow to expand trade and tap the technology of Washington's Western rivals.

Indeed, some analysts suggest that Moscow is now using the policy of accommodation to play upon differences between the United States and Western Europe much as Mr. Nixon used his openings to the Communist world to play upon differences between the Soviet Union and China two years ago.

who taught supporters among
Congressmen from other urban
areas as the House prepared to
debate the education bill,
which is expected to reach the
floor next week.

The debate will include a
proposal by Representative
James G. O'Hara, Michigan
Democrat, to sever education
aid from economic need. This
proposal runs counter to the
history and philosophy of title
I. A $1.5-billion program de-
signed to help improverished
children.

If Mr. O'Hara's amendment
continued to gain momentum,
Mr. Perkins said, the Peyser
proposal would become a via-
ble alternative.

"If we go in the direction
of general aid to education
without regard to poverty, that
would be a horse of a difficult
color," said Representative Per-
kins, a Kentucky Democrat, in
an interview.

Same Are Pessimistic

Many committee members be-
lieve, however, that the odds
are stronger against such a
possibility.

"I just wish that we had
some of these proposals in com-
mittee when we were trying to
solve this most difficult prob-
lem," Mr. Perkins added.

The O'Hara formula would
distribute two-thirds of Title I
remedial-education finds on the
basis of school-age population,
and the remaining third of the
basis of income.

"Title I should be used to
provide remedial work without
regard to the income of a kid's
father," Mr. O'Hara said.

The schools should be pre-
served for middle-class chil-
dren as well as the poor, he
added.

Although the O'Hara formula
would mast benefit the suburbs,
it also would help New York
City and state. Mr. O'Hara's
proposal would give New York
state $235-million, compared
with $200-million from the
Perkins committee formula, and
$236-million in current Federal
aid. Mr. O'Hara's plan would
ive New York City $9 million

# Kissinger Departing

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 23— Secretary of State Kissinger heads for Moscow tonight concerned about signs of a chill in Soviet-American relations but hopeful of progress toward another accord on strategic arms and of big-power cooperation in Middle East diplomacy.

Mr. Kissinger will stop in Bonn for three hours tomorrow morning for talks on European and East-West problems with the West German Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel, before arriving in the Soviet capital tomorrow night.

## Irritated Over Mideast

His latest trip to Moscow "comes at a very important time," Mr. Kissinger said on Thursday, because of recent indications that strains were developing in Soviet-American relations. Although some of his aides believe that Mr. Kissinger may be overestimating the strains, the Secretary has said privately and publicly during the last two weeks that he was going to Moscow "at a more difficult period" than during his earlier visits.

Mr. Kissinger has expressed concern that Moscow was growing increasingly irritated over his successful one-man

Continued on Page 28, Column 1

The French Ambassador Replies to an Evans and Novak Column

Wash
POST

3/26/74

It was with surprise and, indeed, indignation that I read the caption under Mr. Jobert's photo published in the issue of Saturday, March 23, of The Washington Post. Moreover, the (Evans and Novak column) entitled "Mr. Nixon's Challenge to Europe" questions the French policy in terms which are regrettable, and it contains appraisals which call for an answer.

Acutally, some of the accusations are so outlandish that they would be laughable if it were not such a serious matter for all of us.

(1) The French Foreign Minister never advised the Syrian government, or any other Arab country, "Don't lift the oil boycott." This is pure fabrication and at the very limits of slander. If you discover any statement or declaration by the French government implying a hostile policy on the part of France vis-a-vis the United States in the Middle East, please let me know.

Furthermore, why would Mr. Jobert have advised precisely Syria about lifting the oil embargo? Syria is one of the few countries in the Middle East that has no oil!

We were never in favor of any embargo, for it is not in the interest of France or anyone else, it makes the prices of crude oil rise by creating a shortage on the international market, and we are far more affected by the increase in prices than the United States. Remember that France is dependent on Middle East oil for almost 80% of its needs. Moreover, an embargo sets a very dangerous example for everybody.

What some people seem to consider

an intolerable criticism of American policy in the Middle East is no more than the expression of a French policy which has constantly affirmed its goal for the past seven years, and many in your country have now recognized that this policy is well founded.

(2) Far from being opposed in whatever manner to the efforts currently being made to restore peace in the Middle East, it is the French government that in recent years has continually drawn the attention of governments and of world public opinion to the major threat to peace caused by the maintenance of the situation that has existed in the Middle East since the 1967 war. On many occasions, the French government had expressed its preoccupations to all the governments concerned and had seized the highest international organizations of this problem well before it was at the crux of the American government's preoccupations. It was not because of us that the American government deliberately kept France, and the Europe of which it is a part, outside the current attempts to reach a settlement. There is here a regrettable "splitism" affecting the efforts that could have been made jointly by all those who were directly involved in the restoration of peace.

(3) It is absurd to imagine that the Euro-Arab project of cooperation and the conference proposed by the Nine for next fall could jeopardize the present American efforts. In fact, European influence in the Middle East is in the very interest of the Western world, of the United States and of peace in general. The cooperation of the Nine

— as a community — will be a factor of balance and stability in the area: this is in the interest both of the Arabs and of the Israelis. President Nixon himself said: "It is in the interest of Israel itself that the United States be the friend of Israel's neighbors." Why could what is true for the United States not be true for the Europeans?

(4) I believe in fact that the present difficulties stem not from the different ways of evaluating the need to restore peace in the Middle East, but quite obviously from the concepts some people have here in the United States of the nature of the relations that should exist between the United States and Europe while Europe is being organized, albeit as American diplomacy had long hoped it would be. The public statements made in recent weeks on this subject of capital importance, both by

Washington and by the Nine, leave no doubt about this, and as a European, I cannot help deploring the efforts at division, which are becoming apparent, aimed at keeping, in one way or another, a European determination from taking shape that would however be a very important factor of stability in the difficulties of international relations we are experiencing today.

Let me tell you in conclusion that the comparison between the recent toughness of the American authorities towards France and the bombing of Hanoi just before the 1972 summit meeting is not only shocking for the oldest friend and ally of the American people, but is the expression of a psychological escalation as regrettable as it is incomprehensible.

We have important problems to solve. It requires above all fairness, self-restraint and an objective assessment of the true facts.

JACQUES KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET,
French Ambassador to the United States.
Washington.

Editor's Note: The photo caption to which the ambassador refers was, indeed, misleading in that it quoted Mr. Jobert as saying to Syria, "Don't lift the oil boycott." The quote was intended to reflect the information in the Evans-Novak column rather than an actual statement by Mr. Jobert. We regret any misunderstanding this may have caused. As to the content of the column, Messrs. Evans and Novak reply: "We repeat what our column stated: The French intrigued with the Syrians to continue the anti-U.S. oil boycott."

Foreign Minister Jobert

revealed by this evidence: to produce everything we country.

Reduce more than any other nation, 35% of the world's energy and highest standard of living in history of man.

Listening to the critics of our society, using less energy, and the pins.

On, fewer jobs, lower demand followed by still further diminished and galloping unemployment is eventually reduced to the

to take more — not less — energy efficiency to maintain our present standard of living. And the poor are still with us. What of them? Reduced energy will hurt them the most.

With oil and gas in short supply where will that energy come from?

It can come from electricity, generated by coal — which won't come near short supply for over 500 years.

And once we've dug it we can begin to put electricity to work in all the places where it can be used, and assign to oil and gas those tasks where nothing else can be.

Coal — reliable coal — is the solution.

But coal can't be used unless our

2. To release the Government own the West.

If America didn't own about 1/2 known supply within its own working man in the country, something to worry about.

And that's not nonsense.

America
than the
has c

## American Electric Power System

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2 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10004

KT

# EDITORIALS

BALTIMORE SUN 26 March 1974

## Mr. Kissinger's Pinch of SALT

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

25 March 1974 (26)

### Moscow problems

There is one great big difference between Henry Kissinger's present trip to Moscow and those which went before. Before he was seeking a detente. Now he has it, and must do difficult diplomatic business inside its framework.

Detente never was a magic formula which would make easy the solution to all world problems. It is nothing more or less than an agreed framework within which the superpowers would seek solutions without using the threat of nuclear war as a bargaining counter.

When Dr. Kissinger was in search of detente with the Soviets — and accommodation with the Chinese — he had an easy time of it because both Soviets and Chinese were ready for a less dangerous framework for international life. But now Dr. Kissinger goes to Moscow on specific problems — the first of which is the Middle East.

Right now there is a clear conflict of interests between Washington and Moscow. Dr. Kissinger is pushing for a military disengagement between Syria and Israel to complete his effort to stabilize the whole of the Middle East. But he has a secondary objective which is to improve American relations with the Arab countries and by so doing reduce Soviet influence in the area.

Moscow does not want to be squeezed out of the Middle East. It has already lost out in Egypt which is now on the best of terms with Dr. Kissinger. And elsewhere in the area Moscow influence is down to a new low level. It is no longer regarded by many Arabs as the shield and buckler of Islam against the American-Israeli combination.

This condition of inherent rivalry for influence in the Middle East makes for a particularly difficult problem over getting military disengagement between Israel and Syria. Syria has watched Egypt get back some of the territories lost to Israel in the 1967 war. Why should Syria not do as well? If Moscow were to accommodate Dr. Kissinger by telling the Syrians that they must lose all of the Golan Heights permanently, Moscow would lose face and credibility as a friend among the Arabs.

Moscow wants a settlement in

Of all the foreign policy initiatives that Secretary of State Kissinger is juggling, detente with the Soviet Union is the most important. Of the broad range of matters within its compass, from the introduction of Pepsi Cola on the Moscow market to whether Mrs. Panov will be allowed to emigrate with Mr. Panov, the arms race matters most. Of the issues of military rivalry, from the stalled negotiations on troop withdrawals in Europe to the enlarged naval presences in the Indian Ocean, the chief one is an agreement to limit and eventually reduce offensive nuclear weapons. This is SALT II, the negotiation that has been deadlocked in Geneva for a year. It is the central concern that Mr. Kissinger has gone to Moscow to talk about.

In terms of domestic American politics, Mr. Kissinger's brief is to prepare for a successful visit by President Nixon to Moscow later this year. In the wake of failure to induce the Western European allies to create suitably triumphal reasons for Mr. Nixon to go to Brussels next month, Mr. Kissinger's Moscow burden is all the greater. To be a worthy successor to Mr. Nixon's May 1972 visit, which unveiled the SALT I agreement limiting anti-ballistic missiles, or to Chairman Brezhnev's Washington visit of June 1973, which set bold guidelines for SALT II, the next summit must produce the promised second phase of arms limitation.

This will not be easy. The military-industrial complex is straining through the confines of SALT in an effort to put all major nations in hock to development of ever more expensive and exotic

arms. Marshal Andrei Grechko, chief spokesman of the Soviet military-industrial complex, has risen to membership in the Politburo and increased Kremlin influence since SALT I was achieved.

In lesser matters, the tokens of good faith, detente is not doing well. The European Security Conference is as stalled as the troop reduction talks. The Western Europeans think that security means the free flow of ideas and people across the Iron Curtain, a notion which scandalizes the Kremlin. The Russian rulers suspect Mr. Kissinger's Middle East peace initiative as a plot to supplant their influence with the Arabs, and have been undercutting it. Repression of intellectual dissent and Jewish emigration goes on. For Americans, the wheat deal went sour. Congress refuses to deliver the most favored nation trading status that Mr. Nixon promised. As his power over Congress deteriorates, so does Mr. Kissinger's power of persuasion.

But at its core, detente is not about ballet or chess, or the Kremlin's rosy view of Watergate or the White House unenthusiasm for Alexander Solzhenitsyn, or even about American wheat or Siberian gas. It is about the avoidance of World War III. Mr. Kissinger is said to carry a "conceptual breakthrough," whereby the Soviet missile lead may be reconciled with the American warhead advantage. On this, the peace and sanity of the world depend. It cannot wait until the Kremlin stops disillusioning those who live outside its writ, or until they stop offending it.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 26 March 1974

## Kissinger's mission in Moscow

On arrival in Moscow for several days of talks with Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger predicted "we will make concrete progress on a number of outstanding issues." We hope he's right—but if he makes even tentative progress in only one or two issues the visit will be worthwhile.

The agenda is awesome: nuclear arms control, troop withdrawal in central Europe, trade relations, peace negotiations in the Middle East, to mention just a few. Underlying it all are preparations for a return trip to Russia by President Nixon in June.

Soviet leaders are as aware as Mr. Kissinger that President Nixon is having troubles at home and would be especially receptive to an opportunity for spectacular diplomatic successes. The danger is that the Soviets may make proposals with more window dressing than substance—figuring that Mr. Kissinger might be over-eager for the appearance of success.

Momentum toward detente should be maintained, by all means, but optimism needs to be restrained by realism. Whatever is accomplished this week, or this June, will be steps in a long journey on which we have barely begun.

the Middle East, but not exclusion of Soviet influence from the Middle East. The role of "protector of Islam" is worth a lot to the men in the Kremlin. They are not happy at all watching Dr. Kissinger monopolize the peace-making role. They are getting nothing out of the affair, not even the easier access to American markets which President Nixon promised them the last time he was in Moscow.

The detente is not in danger, at

least not now. But the Soviet Union and the United States are rivals in many ways and on many subjects. Since Dr. Kissinger has not yet been able to deliver "most favored nation" tariff treatment to the Russians, he can hardly expect them to go out of their way to be helpful about Syria. In other words the solving of the Syrian problem will call for even higher diplomatic skill than anything Dr. Kissinger has yet managed. He has our best wishes.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES 25 March 1974 (26)

# A Difficult Mission to Moscow

It is just as well that Secretary of State Kissinger has made clear from the start that his current talks in Moscow come when relations between the two nations are more difficult than during most of his past visits. There is need for stringent realism, clearer understandings, before the United States moves any closer to another summit with the Soviet Union.

There are uncertainties in both Washington and Moscow about each other's intentions. Soviet behavior during the October war reawakened many old fears about Soviet intentions for expansion and troublemaking. And congressional foot-dragging on trade legislation has left Moscow wondering if it will ever get what it most wants from the new relationship.

The most conspicuous thing about Soviet-American relations at the moment is the failure to deliver on the hopes inspired by the first two Nixon-Brezhnev summits.

No disappointment has been greater than the failure to go substantively beyond what the 1972 summit did to limit defensive missile systems and adopt an interim agreement on strategic offensive arms. There has been no deceleration of the arms race. The negotiations have not been fruitful. And some developments since that agreement was signed have raised doubts that it achieved as much as at first appeared accomplished, which has encouraged those American critics of the agreement who thought from the start that the United States

had given more than it received in the agreed limits on warheads and delivery systems.

The disappointment has extended to that center-piece of the 1973 summit, the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. The ink was hardly dry before the Soviet Union was responding to the October war with arms and actions that ultimately brought the United States to a war alert for its armed forces. The question arose: Was there substance to detente?

Soviet reaction has been most concerned with the trade and economic dimension of the new relationship. Kissinger may find it difficult to explain to Leonid I. Brezhnev the strictures of Congress and the General Accounting Office that have stalled trade legislation and cancelled credit extensions. But the congressional reaction represents more than anxiety about the status of Jews in the Soviet Union. It represents a reevaluation of just how much in the American national interest it would be to provide some of the most sophisticated American technology to a still-suspect Soviet Union.

Kissinger's mission has been described as preparation for a third Nixon summit this summer. It would be better to think of it as exploratory. Mr. Nixon said his recent refusal to meet in Europe with old friends was because he could not see what lay beyond the summit. He should be all the more certain about what lies on the other side before he goes to the summit with a former enemy.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS 25 March 1974 (26)

# Scratching South Vietnam

It is not particularly surprising that Senator Edward M. Kennedy and a number of his liberal colleagues should be leading a fight to block a Pentagon request for $474 million in additional military aid for South Vietnam this year. If the Senate doves had their way, South Vietnam would long since have been denied the means of defending itself against aggression from the North and the struggle for survival ended once and for all.

It is very surprising, on the other hand, to hear Senator Barry M. Goldwater lending his support to the Senate doves in blocking the transfer to South Vietnam of leftover Defense Department funds. As Goldwater put it the other day with characteristic bluntness: "For all intents and purposes, we can scratch Vietnam. I think it's evident that the South will fall into the hands of the North."

This is a brutal and quite possibly self-fulfilling prophesy. If South Vietnam is denied the military and economic aid on which its survival depends, it is indeed likely that the North will take over the country and its 18 million brave people. But it happens that South Vietnam is by no means on the verge of falling at this

point. Goldwater's pessimism, it would seem, arises from a profound and most unfortunate ignorance of the situation in the country today.

Despite severe economic strains caused by the American departure from South Vietnam, the nation is more than holding its own against continuing Communist pressure. The North Vietnamese control considerable territory in sparsely populated parts of the country. In violation of the peace agreement, they have continued a massive infiltration of forces — 130,000 troops by conservative estimate, some 600 tanks, long-range artillery and anti-aircraft batteries. Within South Vietnam, they have built a complex of twelve airfields, an oil pipeline and a road system.

For all this, however, they have failed in heavy fighting to make appreciable military gains. The Saigon government controls all of the major population centers and provincial capitals. The threat, to be sure, shows no signs of abating. But the South Vietnamese appear more determined than ever to defend their country and increasingly confident of their ability to do so.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS

25 March 1974

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THEY KNEW THEY were breaking the law and that they would suffer the penalties for their actions if they returned, says Rep. Lawrence J. Hogan, R-Md., of those young men who fled to Canada to avoid the draft. Therefore, Hogan said, those who fled for whatever reason "be it conscience, morality or cowardice" must now live with that decision and Hogan says he opposes any amnesty measure. Hogan has introduced a resolution in Congress opposing any pardon, reprieve or amnesty.

In this situation, it is utter nonsense to talk of "scratching" South Vietnam and reneging on the solemn pledges of assistance that have been made. The amounts that will be needed will depend on how quickly the economy can be brought under control and the amount of military aid furnished to North Vietnam by China and the Soviet Union. The point is, however, that the United States has already invested 50,000 lives and more than $130 billion in the defense of South Vietnam. And for all their own problems, one suspects that the American people do not want to see that investment written off.

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