WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF THE

AUSTRIAN EMBASSY

PRESS AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

2343 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N. W.

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

DU 7-2477 ext. 28 & 29

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THE NEW IMAGE OF AMERICA IN EUROPE

Address by Dr. Bruno KREISKY, Foreign Minister of Austria

In a recent address General de Gaulle spoke of the
"double hegemony" of the United States and the Soviet
Union. He was quoted as having said: "If two privileged
States are always to have a monopoly of power that would
be turning the world over to a double hegemony, and a
country like ours cannot accept that.

Reading these quotations out of context one might
come to the conclusion that Europe has to defend herself
against two dangers: Firstly against the expansion of
communism by the Soviet Union; and secondly, against a
kind of neo-colonialism by the United States of America.

I am convinced that General de Gaulle did not mean
it that way and I shall now try to offset this - in my
opinion completely misleading - impression with what I
believe to be the true situation in present-day Europe.

What I have to say to you today is taken from a book
of mine that will appear in Europe within the next few
days. I mention this because I want to impress upon you

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the fact that in presenting my views, I am not making
concessions simply to please an American audience. Of course,
you will not expect me to be unfriendly towards the United
States; but neither shall I be simply friendly and un-
critical. The French author Georges Bernanos once said:
"I am here to tell the truth, and nothing but the truth.
A man tells the truth when he speaks his mind."

As early as the First World War America took the
economic lead away from Europe; America, which only a short
while before had been Europe's debtor, became creditor
of all the industrial countries which took part in the First
World War. After the war, national currencies foundered;
there was a shortage of raw materials; there was shortage
of foodstuffs; the working capital of industry was reduced
to nothing by inflation. It was in this situation that whole
nations realized the need for external credit, and that
meant especially need for the assistance of the United
States dollar. At that time United States economic parti-
cipation in Europe was not organized and effected only those
countries which could guarantee political stability. As a
result, precisely those countries which were in most urgent
need of this economic assistance, did not benefit from the

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flow of United States capital.

Relations between Europe and the United States took a completely different form after the Second World War. In 1945 Europe was more devastated by war than it had been in 1918; Millions of human beings - whole generations - had been destroyed; Europe's cities lay in ruins; the last economic reserves had been exhausted; currencies tottered on the brink of inflation. Then the United States Foreign Secretary, George C. Marshall, delivered his historic speech at Harvard University on 3 June 1947, in which he stated:

"It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this government. ...... The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a

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joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations."

And so the dollar came back to Europe, but this time in a different way: No political conditions were attached to the United States offer of assistance. The United States lent, and to a certain extent donated, 12 billion dollars to Europe. Thus, and only thus, was it possible in a short time not only to restore the pre-war level of production of the European industrial countries, but also to achieve a prosperity unprecedented in Europe's economic history. This assistance gave the democratic countries of Europe the strength to advance towards prosperity while depriving communism of the economic conditions required for it to spread. Admittedly, Communist parties in Italy and France are still very powerful today, but this is attributable to political and psychological factors and not to the impoverishment.

The Marshall Plan was a bold enterprise of economic assistance, and more, it was a gesture of international solidarity between the people of the United States and the European Nations. And, over and above that, it was part of a brilliant political idea to save democracy in Europe.

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American foreign policy has been a target of criticism ever since President Wilson delivered his message to Congress on 8 January 1918 on the war objectives of the United States - the so-called "14 points". Wilson at that time demanded a community of nations, based on the right of self-determination, and proposed a general League of Nations. Congress, however, refused to sanction United States membership therein.

In the present context it would be irrelevant to analyse the development of United States foreign policy since the end of the First World War. I will restrict myself to a few remarks concerning Roosevelt's foreign policy, because it is criticised as having been "credulous and naive" and responsible for rendering Eastern and Central Europe to Bolshevism. It is occasionally asserted that Roosevelt "allowed" the Russians to penetrate into Central Europe towards Berlin and Vienna. The fact that the decision of his General Staff was the determining factor in the President's attitude is taken into account by only a small minority of critics.

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General Mark Clark alone supported the British idea that the Allies should push ahead across the Balkans towards Yugoslavia. Moreover, the opinion that a pertinent British concept ever existed is strongly disputed by important historians and experts of Eastern Europe such as Seton Watson. What carried more weight with Roosevelt, however, was the fact that an offensive from the Balkans against the German armies and the establishment of a second front in Europe - long before Stalingrad - would without the slightest doubt have cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of British and United States soldiers, quite apart from the fact that a new "Gallipoli offensive" might have failed as it had in the First World War.

Roosevelt then cabled Churchill as follows:

> "For purely political reasons over here I should never survive even a slight setback in Overlord if it were known that fairly large forces had been diverted to the Balkans."

Chester Willmott reports that Roosevelt had to avoid any act that might be used to support the criticism that he was using United States forces to promote British political objectives. He knew that a Balkan campaign would have exposed him to such suspicion.

But only a Balkan offensive, a successful "Gallipoli offensive", would have made it possible to penetrate, simultaneously with Soviet troops, into Central Europe. In this connexion, it is extremely doubtful Stalin would have agreed to such an offensive; and the danger might

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have been conjured up of a separate Hitler-Stalin peace.
Since neither the United States nor the British Govern-
ment was ready or able, at such an early stage, to
establish a second front, Eastern and Central Europe was
totally occupied by the Soviet troops after the defeat of
the German armies at Stalingrad.

The advance of the Soviet troops to Berlin and Vienna
and the conquest of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe cost
the lives of millions of Russian soldiers. Neither Roosevelt
nor Churchill could ask their democratic countries
to pay a similar price. And so Europe was divided. One
thing is certain: at the outbreak of the Second World War,
Russia's borders were 600 to 700 kilometres distant from
Vienna and Berlin. Hitler and Goebbels, with their "anti-
communist campaign" are primarily responsible for bringing
the Soviet soldiers into the middle of Europe. Hitler is
to blame for the fact that in the spring of 1945 they
paraded on the Ringstrasse in Vienna and the Kurfuersten-
damm in Berlin.

In July 1947, an article entitled "The Sources of
Soviet Conduct", signed by Mr. X, appeared in the United
States magazine "Foreign Affairs". It was the first
authentic presentation of the policy of containment and
was written by George F. Kennan, then head of the State
Department's Planning Commission. This policy of erecting
bulwarks against Soviet expansion was the most constructive

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contribution made by the United States to the maintenance
of world peace.

In the cold war, the Western world has scored six
decisive points:

(1) The end of the civil war in Greece, and the
Soviet hope of securing a bastion stretching far into
the Mediterranean through the transformation of Greece
into a people's democracy, was shattered. Today Greece
is closely linked in a military alliance with the West.
This was the first reverse suffered by Stalinist post-
war policy.

(2) The Berlin blockade resulted in the most successful improvisation in military history, an air bridge operated by British and United States air forces. The final lifting of the blockade was a triumph for the combination of bold military planning and the political determination of leading democratic statesmen. It was Reuter, then mayor of Berlin, and Willy Brandt of the German Socialist Party, which was then in power in Berlin, who told the Allies that, if they could manage to supply the city, the people of Berlin would hold out.

(3) The Marshall Plan was carried out, despite
the efforts of the Communist International to prevent it.
Communist stevedores in Leghorn and Marseilles unloaded
the Marshall Aid ships just as Soviet occupation troops
in Austria ate bread that was baked from flour provided

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under the Marshall Plan.

(4) The peace treaty with Japan, which was con-
cluded in spite of the Soviet Union's abstention, made
Japan an ally of the United States and of the Western
world.

(5) The formation of NATO was an answer to the fall of democracy in Czechoslovakia.

(6) The United Nations action in Korea showed that the West - particularly the United States - is able and ready to make a military appearance even in the remotest theatres of the cold war.

All these world conflicts arose during the Stalin
era. Since Khrushchev came to power, two quite obvious
attempts were made to return to the methods of peaceful
negotiation: the signing of the State Treaty with Austria
in 1955 and the recent partial nuclear test ban treaty.
The policy of containment has borne fruit. In spite of
the polarization processes in international politics,
not one square yard of any democratic country in Europe
has been lost since this policy was embarked upon.

On the other hand, on 4 October 1957, the United
States suffered a psychological setback in the course
of the cold war when the Soviet Union succeeded in
launching into space the first earth satellite "Sputnik".
The shock which this produced in the Western world was

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all the greater since at that time the West tended to underestimate the technological capability of the Soviet Union so far as military development was concerned.

United States foreign policy had now to take into account the fact that, as a result of Soviet superiority in inter-continental ballistic missiles, the strategic position of the United States had changed. When NATO was established the determining factor was that, even combining their total potential, Western and South-Eastern Europe was unable to defend itself with its own resources and was in urgent need of the alliance with the United States which was not directly threatened at the time. Today the American continent is no longer beyond the range of a direct threat from Soviet attack. In December 1957 the _Washington Post_ stated that, in the event of a worldwide conflict, the first blows would presumably be directed against the United States. The NATO bases for medium-range missiles today serve the purpose not only of protecting the Western European countries of the Atlantic Alliance but also of directly protecting the United States. Thus the European allies of the United States constitute a valuable and necessary supplement to the United States potential.

Hence there are two circumstances which have led to a change in the relationship between Europe and the United States: the special strategic importance which

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therefore supported European unity which has slowly been taking place since 1947. It would be in the interest of the United States for Europe to become a real world power.

United States foreign policy is at present concentrating on a new concept, without abandoning the policy of containment. I wonder whether the policy of containment and of strategic and military equilibrium does not generally constitute one of the fundamental premises of co-existence. At the moment it seems to be essential for United States foreign policy to determine whether there are possibilities of achieving a détente whether in the major and decisive areas of friction in the world, solutions can be found in the sense of at least a temporary calm.

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This can come about only by establishing contact between
the two super-Powers, and the attitude that the mere
holding of talks is a concession to the Soviet Union must
therefore be avoided. Only by direct talks with the Soviet
Union is it possible to form any clear ideas about its
intentions - and even then there is still a large field
for analyses and speculation. Lack of communication bet-
ween the great Powers involves dangerous and unforeseeable
risks. Therefore an earnest endeavour must be made to
ascertain how far the Soviets are prepared genuinely to
achieve real solutions. In view of the deep mistrust which
prevails between the Powers, presumably they will have to
be satisfied, during the first phase, at best with a few
test cases. Only after these have shown themselves to be
successful can further and more substantial opportunities
arise.

So how does the new United States policy appear to
the European observer? The President and his Administration
are trying to find new approaches without discarding old
and tested methods. Cooperation with Europe is therefore
being intensified; and here it cannot be denied that there
is still misunderstanding on both sides. On 4 July 1962, in

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Independence Hall, Philadelphia, President Kennedy spoke of the "concrete Atlantic partnership with Europe". He advocated a "Declaration of Interdependence" between the United States and Europe which was to be striven for in the same spirit as the great Declaration of Independence of 1776.

But great questions are still pending: Will it be possible to develop a lasting policy of cooperation with the Latin American States? The Alliance for Progress based on President Kennedy's initiative, is a hopeful beginning. It has decided on an impressive program, but the difficulties are far from being overcome merely with the formulation of the program. Will it be possible to concord the recalcitrant forces of the Western Alliance? Will the present crisis in nuclear co-operation with the most important United States allies be overcome? Will fruitful co-operation be achieved between the United States and the great trading systems of Europe - the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association? Can a basis of mutual trust be created with Asia and Africa? In the United Nations with its 112 members, will the United States be able to play a leading role, in the moral sense, in dealing with

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recurrent problems as they arise? Governor Stevenson has
accomplished much in the last few years.

The great illusion of eternal prosperity which culminated at the end of the twenties and which, in the thirties, led to a rude awakening, gave a dynamic impetus to the United States economy and gave this country a leading position in modern political economy. One of the most prominent modern economists, Paul A. Samuelson, denies this dominant position, because he is wary of falling into the role of the patriotic Greek "who insisted that the moon of Athens was different from the moon of Sparta. American economics is plainly in the tradition of Western economics generally," he said.

In recent years American economics and policy has been facing one problem, deriving exclusively from foreign policy: The problem of the United States trade balance, which the British Chancellor of the Exchequer once referred to as the "balance of generosity". This problem may seem all the stranger to some because in the post-war era the dollar rapidly became the world's currency.

The United States balance-of-payments difficulties are of a political nature exclusively and have nothing, or

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scarcely anything, to do with any inadequacy of the
American economy. America has provided 125 billion dollars
to the world, which, among other things, has led to the
closing of the so-called "dollar gap", from which Europe
suffered for so long. The extent to which things have
changed in the last ten years is apparent from the de-
velopment of foreign exchange reserves in the central
banks of America and Europe:

Gold and foreign exchange holdings amounted to
16,2 billion dollars in the United States and to 17 billion
in the countries of the European Economic Community. In
1962 alone these reserves climbed, in the EEC countries,
by 600 million and fell by 900 million in the United
States. In these circumstances it is obvious that the
United States is becoming increasingly less willing on
the long run - to quote from the "Economist" - "to carry
the largest share of everyone's burden."

In this context, however, I would like to make a
remark which, I believe is pertinent. The United States'
capital exports resulted, among other things, in the setting
up of large American subsidiary companies in Europe, which
in their turn supply the European market. This is, in

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particular, the case with some of the most efficient branches of American industry. As a result, Europeans automatically and necessarily buy, for instance, less American cars from the United States but instead buy from the American subsidiary companies in Europe. I am not an expert in this domain but I believe I am not wrong in stating that the number of cars produced in Europe by American subsidiaries is larger than the production of the biggest European company. One cannot of course, achieve both aims: On the one hand, produce cars in Europe and, on the other, achieve higher expert figures for cars produced in the United States. And this, of course, applies to other industries as well.

I would like to make here a few remarks concerning the cultural relationship between the United States and Europe. In Europe there still remains a considerable degree of complacency, which is occasionally expressed by the fact that people on the continent talk about the so-called "European World Culture." They mean, in fact, that the cradle of modern world culture stood in Europe and claim from this a certain superiority. Whenever I can, I try to say in reply to those who proclaim European cultural

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superiority - they actually recognize the economic and military superiority of the United States - that Europe's cultural development, especially during the past decades, received considerable impetus from America.

American universities, colleges and other institutions have provided many European scientists, scholars, doctors and artists, who were forced to leave their native lands, with chairs and facilities for continuing their scientific work - with a lack of prejudice and with an openmindedness which are characteristic of academic life in the United States. The history of our world knows of no comparable expulsion of intellectuals as took place in Europe at the end of the thirties. The whole hostility to the intellect of the Nazi dictatorship manifested itself in this expulsion, and the European thinkers and poets who were spared did not have the strength or the courage to rise up in the name of Western culture. Twentieth century Europe has failed to live up to this act of cultural militancy, while America opened its doors to those who were expelled. This alone is a great deed which will one day be worthily inscribed in the annals of history.

To some of you, part of what I was saying may appear too friendly. I therefore want to reiterate what I mentioned

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before, namely that a presentation like the one I am giving
here can necessarily be but highly subjective. I could
very well imagine that there are people who would, in the
framework of such a presentation, attach priority to
other questions. I don't want to attempt to give an outline
of how such a speech could be set up, but I feel on the
other hand obliged to stress one particular aspect: All
open-minded people in Europe follow with the utmost
attention your efforts to find a solution to the racial
problem. I know, that in this context nobody has the
right to throw stones at others since in Europe, too, many
unfortunate happenings were a consequence of prejudice.
Whatever may happen, America is at present the object
of world-wide attention. This is because you took over the
leading role in the free world 40 years ago. It is unthinkable
that a country as big as the United States and with such
tremendous economic and moral resources would be free
to decide if it wants to play this role or not. Some may
consider this development as an act of providence and
others as a result of more rational reasons. However, America
is today - in spite of other opinions voiced in one or the
other European country - for us in Europe the power which

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carries the greatest political and moral responsibility for
the destiny of the world and no policy can revert this
process. History itself has already decided.

And this is a good thing. I will readily admit
that there are many amongst you who think that the burden
is very big and the responsibility almost too heavy.
But all of this will become easier in the foreseeable
time through genuine partnership between democratic
Europe and the United States.

For the first time in 40 years Europe has become
so strong economically as well as politically that
genuine partnership has really become possible.