Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELECON

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., February 11, 1971

R: I wanted to thank you for your help on that labor thing.

K: Aren't you nice. I thought it was the right thing to do.

R: George was set in his ways on it, and it would have caused
difficulty.

K: It isn't right to put the Secretary into a confrontation with
the Foreign Service.

R: Especially when they excluded the FBI and CIA and not the
Foreign Service.

K: George was very eager to put you on the same basis as the
other departments.

R: Thanks very much.

K: You were nice to call.

lds

By: KHC NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

TELCON
Taft Schreiber/Kissinger

12:40 p. m.

2/11/71

K: I am delighted you are going to be here on the 27th. Want to lunch that day?

S: Lunch there.

K: And if your wife is here --

S: She will be.

K: Bring her. I didn't even know they had a ________. It's an
advantage of having culturally inclines friends.

S: First in Chicago and then Boston. We are going to be in NY anyway so I thought I would come down there and bother some friends. We would love to have lunch and if you have to go to Camp David, no problem. We will be in on the 27th and staying at the Madison.

K: Call me when you are East so we nail down the place and time. I enjoyed the dinner with you so much.

S: If you are going to be in NY the week of the 20th or the week after, Rita and I would like to take you on the town. We will be at our apartment at the Sherry Netherlands. If you are coming out and free for dinner or later, holler.

K: It could work out. We will see you on the 27th.

S: Look forward to it and I will call you.

By KLC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Professor Doty/Mr. Kissinger

12:45 p.m., February 11, 1971

K: Paul, how are you? We have learned something from Cambodia. We are arranging earthquakes when we engage in ventures.

D: Were any of your friends hurt?

K: I've been checking around, you lecherous old man.

D: I have three points. I forgot when I came back from Russia to suggest if you would have the time, it would be awfully nice to get Averell's views of the atmosphere.

K: I plan to get his views. I like Averell.

D: Don't discuss Vietnam -- but he has a good ear for the Russian scene.

K: I want to see him. I will get a lunch with him in the next two weeks.

D: Secondly, I am coming down on the afternoon of Tuesday, February 23 and will perhaps remain over for the morning of the 24th, to do some work with members of the group. Carl Kazen said yesterday he wanted very much to see you. We both could be down there that day. If you give David the go-ahead, we will fix up a date on the afternoon of the 23rd or the morning of the 24th.

K: I would love to see you and Carl. On SALT -- now, you don't do this -- but the less public pressure this month, the better possibility we have of doing it.

D: It affects the atmosphere.

K: I would love to see Carl Kazen. I haven't seen him in ages.

D: We ourselves will go ahead and start working on Olds. I will call back to David to see if he can find some time on the 23rd or 24th.

lds

By KLC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

8:35 p.m., February 15, 1971

K: How are you?

L: Very good, how are you?

K: Coming back on the plane with the President, he mentioned that you were going to brief the Cabinet tomorrow morning. He would like for you to lay it in to them on a positive line because they leak like crazy. If there are any doubts that you might have, don't bring them up.

L: I don't have any doubts. Things are going along very well.

K: He would like you to stress the positive to this group.

L: The only problem is the talking about the CIA so damn much.

K: You mean Herb Klein.

L: The figures are so damn wrong and I have to justify those figures before the Committee.

K: The figure first of all is wrong.

L: The figure is wrong and I only talked to 5 people in the Senate and 5 people in the House.

K: It shouldn't have been done absolutely.

L: This story is not true.

K: They were hit by the enemy.

L: We were off target but we were not on that target.

K: How are things going?

L: Very good. Even if the operation terminated tomorrow, it was a success. They did a good job of disrupting the supply lines, changed things as far as that area was concerned and things are going along very well.

K: Haig tells me that Intelligence reports that Tri is teed off because not enough supplies.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

8:35 p.m., February 15, 1971 -- page 2

L: I think he is more concerned that he isn't getting more publicity. Attention is being focused on the other operation. I think it has as much to do with it as anything else. We will give him anything he wants. Tri has done most of the planning with his staff.

K: He seems to have done very well.

L: He is not getting much attention.

K: It seems to have soured it.

L: As far as the Tri operation is going, it is going very well. The Saigon press is not getting much attention because the Laos thing is getting all the attention and I don't know what you can do about that, Henry. Getting into there again tonight with the big birds.

K: In the northern part.

L: Yeah. Think the thing's coming along alright. There will be fighting up there in the next week and it will be kind of tough.

K: We sort of expected that.

L: I think we can give a good report so far. He only wanted 10 minutes.

K: 10 minutes is enough.

L: If we get Government officials to stop talking about that operation in the North. It just gives it credibility.

K: Is there anyone else but Herb Klein?

L: It was Herb's briefing but I wish he would check those things out with Ron or ______ beforehand.

K: It never occurred to me that Klein ...

L: I thought they had the Special Action Group.

K: We had guidance and everyone did. I will get Herb under control.

L: Those figures were the wrong ones. ... direct out of the transcripts. All over the town we classified them. How did your trip go?

*

By: KH V NARA, Date: 5/12/94

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

10:10 a.m.

2/16/71

R: On the question, I have lost track of where it stands, on business of military assistance being transferred to military budget, it's still up for grabs.

K: It is but I agree with you it should go to foreign relations.

R: The most persuasive reason is it cannot be changed. Doc says he won't permit it another way.

K: Last year the President decided the defense committees so we put a stop to it. If there's any change on it or a decision may go the other way, I will warn you.

R: In view of the supplemental, we now have control of the committees. We have now taken the steam out of the operation. I said to Congress, you authorized aid to Cambodia. It does show we have to meet them some place and we can get to the committees now. If it looked like Fulbright could block assistance programs, I would feel differently but I don't.

K: There will be no change unless you talk to the President.

R: What time schedule on foreign policy?

K: We are sending you the penultimate draft. You will find it has 98% of the comments made by the departments.

R: I want to go over it carefully. The two I have-I don't think we should give the Russians the advantage we have if we say we are even strategically, and that we are submitting a report --

K: That's in it.

R: I have a footnote that the Secy. of State will give a report taking in more detail and regionally.

K: We have to look at last year and see how it can be softened. The second is easier.

R: Did we make it in last year's?

K: I think so. After you have read it let's get together on the things you are personally interested in.

R: I don't like that "laying foundation and building on it" in the first paragraph. I think we should develop our own cliches.

K: That's a good motto.

*

TELCONE
Safire/Kissinger

3:45 p. m.

2/16/71

K: The President is anxious for me to look at your draft.

S: I will get it to you in 15 mins.

K: Up to 2500 words.

S: It's up to 3100 but the cuts can be made easily.

K: He wants it finished by Friday night and approved by me then.

S: Look at it today and give me guidance.

K: Could you get it to me right away? I'm leaving for NY.

S: I'll bring it right over.

By: KHL

NARA, Dato:

5/12/04

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCONE
R. Zeigler/Kissinger
morning 2/16/71

Z: Gen. Qui -- thought I would give him a boost.

K: Don't let Laird bug you on that.

Z: I shouldn't refer to it?

K: No, purpose will be served if they all descend on Cambodia.

Z: You mean the press?

K: Yes. I think Laird was lying through his teeth.

Z: I will say "I don't know" and that's all I give. I will stay there.

Further conversation:

Z: The Soviet Union has broken the understanding by steaming the submarine above the surface into Cienfuegos. I will say that the defense dept. talks about the movement of ships in the area and ifx I have nothing to say. What if I am asked if it's a violation -- I will have to fuzz.

K: We will say that the Soviet Union is fully aware of the understanding. Refer to what the President said on Jan. 3. That servicing of nuclear submarines in or from Cuba is a violation of the understanding. We know more than that one thing. Just quote.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FEO 12958
 Authority
By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELECON (Tape)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

K: Mr. President.

P: How are the people reacting in the columns to the report?

K: I think... I haven't read anything yet, but you saw the Star gave it a huge play.

P: No, I didn't see the paper.

K: Yeah, they had it on the front page and practically a whole page on the inside.

P: Good. We gave them, of course, the p.m. stories which gave them an advantage.

K: Yeah. I haven't frankly seen whether they made any editorial comments yet.

P: They would have had time.

K: That's right, but it's been treated.

P: You'll get editorial comments tonight, of course -- and the Post too.

K: But it's been treated very respectfully by the journalists I've talked to. I saw that Scali comment in the news summary that it was a close decision -- 52-48. I don't know where he got that from. It wasn't Chancellor; he hasn't said anything yet. It was Scali.

P: That was curious because he's -- oh, well, it's just something that he probably picked up. Be that as it may, that's a pretty good choice.

K: That's right. Well, that doesn't make you look bad because...

P: I thought Moorer, incidentally, was good today. One thing about him, Henry, I think he's totally honest.

K: And I confess, I've been bugging them a little bit, but they've done all the things that they needed to do now. They are moving up on 914 which is the only route, and they've put in 6,000 more men, and they are taking out the airborne division which takes these heavy casualties and doesn't have heavy equipment. So, now every concern that I expressed

Telecon (tape)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

- 2 -

K: (cont'd) to you yesterday has really been met.

P: Well, the thing that I think is encouraging is Moorer says don't worry; we're going to stay. They seem to be confident they can stick it out. I have a feeling the other side is having one heck of a time. They haven't got much left.

K: They have exactly one division left in North Vietnam. If we could land an armored division there, we could drive to Hanoi. I mean it's not something we ought to do but they are stretched to the limit and if one looks at it from their point of view, they haven't cracked the South Vietnamese 10 miles from their border in an area in which they have their munitions stockpiled.

P: Well, I think one thing that is very important at this stage is this is one time that will be effective is that aerial strike, _______________.
I'd get all three.

K: But Mel called this evening about it. He is bringing it with him to the NSC.

P: He doesn't want it.

K: He doesn't want any, he thinks it is politically very dangerous right now.

P: Well, I tell you, how does he -- on what grounds?

K: He thinks it will look like an act of desperation.

P: Could be or do you think that's just something to say?

K: Well, I'm sure if it weren't that argument, he'd find another one because this fellow Pursley is just dead set against it. But we are not in that much of a hurry, we can wait a few days.

P: Yeah, we could do it next week.

K: That's right.

P: I tell you it can have a crucial effect in time. If they start moving out ...... around ...... this desperation argument is ridiculous. Mel opposed this thing, he opposed Cambodia, let's face it.

K: That's right. And he opposed every strike you've done before.

MWO E12958
DECLASSIFIED
Autonumber
By - NARA Date 6/1/04

Telecon (tape)

Mr. Kissinger/The President

P: That's right.

K: He then carries them out with great vigor.

P: That's right. Well, nevertheless we're going to take a look at it and even suppose it is desperation, so be it. How's that interpret?

K: I don't think that's a valid argument.

P: Okay.

K: I talked to Bill about that ENTERPRISE visit to Chile.

P: Yeah, what's he say?

K: He's against it.

P: Good, Well, don't have it go.

K: And Helms is against it.

P: Well, basically Zumwalt shouldn't have agreed to it.

K: Well, Zumwalt offered it. I have the transcript of the conversation.

P: Well, he's not going to -- we're not going to do it.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: We're just not going to do it. See you tomorrow at the Swearing-in.

K: Right, Mr. President.

DECLASSIFIED

MJD F.O. 12958

By NARA Date 6/10/04

TELECON
The President

P: Well, how are your uh. . . how are the people reacting
to your columnists and so forth, the report.

K: I haven't read anything yet, but you saw the Star gave it a
hugh play.

P: Good, _________________

K: I haven't frankly seen whether they made any editorial com-
ment yet.

P: They wouldn't have time. . . it was given out in advance

K: That's right. But it's been treated . . .

P: You'll get editorial comments in Time of course and the Post
too. . .

K: But it's been treated very respectfully by the journalists
that I've talked to. I saw that Scalli comment in the news summary that it
was a close decision, 52 - 48. I don't know where he got that from.

P: Yeah, that was the one I was . . .

K: It wasn't Chancellor, he hasn't said anything. It was Scalli.

P: That was curious because, he's uh. . . Oh well. It's just
something that he's probably picked up. . . but if he had his
that's a pretty good chance, pretty good choice, isn't it.

That's right.

K: Well, that doesn't make you look bad because . . .

K: Right, well. . .

P: One thing about him Henry, I think he's totally honest.

K: That's right and I confess I've been bugging them a little bit,
but they've done all the things that they needed to do now. They are moving
up on 91 4 which is the only route. . . and they've put in 6,000 more men
and they are taking out the airborne division which takes these heavy aasualties

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority
 By NARA Date 6/1/04

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 6/10/64

TELECON
The President

p. 2

and doesn't have heavy equipment. So now every concern that I expressed
to you yesterday has really been met.

P: Well, the thing that I think this incursion. . . Moorer says
don't worry, we're going to stay and they seem to be confident they can stick
it out.

K: Right.

P: I have a feeling the other side is having one heck of a time.
They haven't got much left.

K: Mr. President, they have exactly one division left in North
Vietnam. If we could land an armored division there we could drive to
Hanoi, I mean it's not something we ought to do, but they are stretched to
the limit and if one looks at it from their point of view, they haven't
cracked the South Vietnamese ten miles from their border, in an area in
which they have their munitions stockpiled.

P: Well, I think one thing that's very important ______ is that aerial strike. I'd get all three . . .

K: Mel called this evening about it. He's bringing it with him to
the NSC . . .

P: __________

K: No, he doesn't want any. He thinks it's politically very
dangerous right now

P: On what grounds?

P: Could be . . . . . . .

K: Well, I'm sure if it weren't that argument he'd find another
one, because this fellow Purcell is dead set against it, but we are not
in that much of a hurry. We can wait a few days.

P: No, we can do it next week.

K: That's right.

P: . . . it can have a crucial effect . . . at a time . . . If
they start moving out . . . this desperation argument . . . But Mel opposed

TELECON
The President

p. 3

this thing, the Cambodian operation...

K: That's right. And he opposed every strike you've done before. He then carries them out with great vigor.

P: That's right. Well, nevertheless we're going to take a look at it.

K: Oh I don't think that's a valid argument. I talked to Bill about that Enterprise visit to Chile.

P: Yeah, what does he say?

K: He's against it.

P: Godd, well, don't have it go.

K: And Helms is against it.

P: Well basically, Zumwalt shouldn't have agreed to it.

P: Well he's not going to . . . we're not going to do it.

k: Right Mr. President.

P: We're just not going to do it. See you tomorrow at the swearing in.

K: Right Mr. President.

MWO EO 12958
DECLASSIFIED

Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

Telcon (tape)

Mr. Kissinger/The President

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, you have something else you want to talk to me about --
Bob was saying you ....

K: Oh, well, no. I had a long talk with Sisco and I think we made
some progress today.

P: Good.

K: One. I got them to stop making ....

P: I talked to Rogers and he seemed to be -- at least he said all the
things that we were talking about so I just listened, so that's that.

K: Right.

P: But that was right after I talked to you so what did Sisco say?

K: They were going to make a public statement tomorrow condemning
the Israeli position.

P: Let's not make any mistake -- that's the wrong thing to do.

K: That just doesn't get us anything. Then I got them to soften their
cable, I couldn't get them to stop going to a Four-Power meeting
even though I think they should have waited for an Egyptian reply.
But, I also told him that you needed to see a package deal in which
we would tell the Israelis what we do want and ....

P: What we will do, that's right.

K: And what we will do for them.

P: That's what I told, that's what I told Bill too and that at the right
time I would talk to the Israelis.

K: Right. Well, now Sisco is working on that and he will have that
by Tuesday or Wednesday.

P: The thing is there, we don't want to do until we have got something
that is really worthwhile and then, of course, you can't use the big
gun very often but I'm prepared to do it. But they have got to get
something together that is ......

DECLASSIFIED

MWO E0 2958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/1/04

Telcon (tape)
Mr. Kissinger/The President

K: Well, the smart way to do it would be to get it from them and then to see whether we can broker it with Dobrynin and get something from the Russians for it too.

P: Yeah, that would be, wouldn't it?

K: Because if we could get the Russians to withdraw their troops.

P: Yeah.

K: Incidentally, that note I handed them on Monday on Cuba seems to have worked, the Russian ships left today.

P: They left again.

K: Yeah.

P: That's sort of in and out, isn't it?

K: Yeah.

P: What was the reason do you think that they were at the UN with it. From some report, I noticed they had such reaction to the World Report.

K: I haven't read that yet.

P: Well, it was in one of the news summaries, somebody had just saw it being blast. Oh, what did the Russians say about it, are they ...

K: I haven't seen anything except one broadcast directed at Africa.

P: Maybe that was it.

K: In which they tore it to pieces.

P: That was the one I guess, yeah.

K: But that I thought was more for the audience.

P: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, I just wondered, I didn't -- they didn't take it out on -- the main thing they didn't it on -- at least they didn't take it on SALT or anything like that.

MJD F.O. 2958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By. NARA Date 6/1/64

DECLASSIFIED

MWO F.O. 12958

Authority

By NARA Date 6/4/04

Telcon (tape)

Mr. Kissinger/The President

K: Oh, no. Oh, no.

P: Well, that's all I care about.

K: What infuriates them is the China section.

P: Oh, that might have been it too. This was something that -- I don't know where I got the impression that something -- where they had said something at the UN. I don't know what it is.

K: Well, I'll look it up, Mr. President.

P: It may not be in the new summary, it may have been something that maybe Bush was telling me or something -- I don't know what it was but it was just a fleeting thing that somebody up there at the United Nations was whining around about it. But nothing -- maybe it wasn't anything public. I don't have the slightest idea. It didn't come from State or anything but it was just something that stuck in my mind, I don't know what it was. Well, it may have been the African thing, it didn't -- but I just wanted to see what the -- but I guess the China thing would -- why the hell -- well, of course, it would.

K: Well, because of all it's the first public document in which we called the Communist Chinese the People's Republic of China.

P: Yeah, which I didn't particularly like that but we did it.

K: And where we say we will talk to anybody -- well, you had done it already in your talks to Ceausescu.

P: I know, yeah, yeah, I know. But what I mean is I don't like the idea but I know we have to do it.

K: Right.

P: That's not much to give.

K: And where we said we are willing to talk with them anyplace.

P: Umhum.

K: So, the whole tone of the China section undoubtedly annoyed them. And also, of course, they have to even if they do the things we are talking about, they are not going to give the impression that there is a great reconciliation here.

DECLASSIFIED

MWO E0 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/10/04

P: No, let me ask this -- with regard to getting our things ready for the press thing, I think the main point -- the main question that we will try to zing in on is this phony issue, you know of the South Vietnamese going North and all that sort of thing which I understand Thieu is now -- he said they would and then he said they wouldn't and so forth and so on but, I think we have got to get a very careful thing about it.

K: I was going to talk to you about this tomorrow. I think we ought to do a backchannel to Bunker telling him to recommend to Thieu that he cool this sort of public comment.

P: Well, he has already cooled it some you know. I don't know why he did the other one, maybe he did it just to keep them off balance.

K: Well, then to keep their troops up there but I think what we should tell them is ....

P: You see what we don't want to do is to give the Senate Doves a chance to pass some silly resolution on it which say we won't or to restrict us for something because as you know, we don't plan -- first, they don't plan to go North; second, we don't plan to do anything but we have deliberately kept it open just for the purpose of tying down those forces.

K: Well, I think what -- we will work something out.

P: You understand the whole purpose of what we have said is exactly right in terms of the military situation.

K: Exactly.

P: On the other hand, it could create a needless issue here where we don't need to and the real question is how we handle it. If you will read my press statement -- you should go over and get exactly what I said, I covered it in two different places. One, I said I won't speculate on what the South Vietnamese will do to defend their own security, I will say only that our policy will be that we will not, of course, use ground forces but that we will use air power if and when I determine it is necessary to defend our forces in the South and so forth.

K: Right.

P: Then, they went on to say well, if there is a South Vietnamese move and so forth, will we support it. I indicated no we had no intention of doing it, so we are covered pretty well but what really I think set the thing off is not anything I said but it's really what Thieu said later where he said they would go North, don't you think that's the problem?

K: I think that's right, Mr. President, but I think what we should do is call attention to the fact that it is the North Vietnamese who have been invading everybody else.

P: That's correct.

K: Secondly, that if the North Vietnamese return to their own country, there is no conceivable possibility that anyone would invade them. I think we can give them this assurance.

P: Yeah.

K: So that we are talking about a war situation where the North Vietnamese are attacking the South and even in that case, the United States -- I'd leave that about where you had it the last time.

P: Except that we do not want to leave it in any position where we can let a Cooper -- not Cooper but more Church, you know he's got money he's passing around, to get some sort of a resolution to say that the United States will not support a South Vietnamese invasion of the North. You see that's what we want to avoid. Now, in two months we will be over it, for the next two months we've got to keep it in a situation where we -- you see a resolution could be very harmful to the South Vietnamese and to us, and very encouraging to the North. Apart from what we say, we just don't want to do anything -- I just don't want to leave it in the position where the resolution is inevitable.

K: Well, I was thinking in any event given that note that Dobrynin handed me which wasn't too aggressive on Friday, if you were to say something at your press conference that indicated that there is no American plan to do anything like this.

P: I've already said that, of course, if you will read what I said in the office press conference, I said we have no plans. I just said I won't speculate on what they would do, you see.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By: NARA Date 6/1/04

K: Well, if you were to repeat that, then I think I should tell it to Dobrynin the day before and pretend that it is a response to his suggestion, just to keep that dialogue going.

P: True. I'm not concerned really so much, Henry, about Dobrynin. I'm really concerned ....

K: No, you are concerned with the public position here ......

P: I'm concerned about, frankly, the Senate moving off on other jackass Cooper-Church Amendments see? Whether a huge damn debate about it and so forth; then, what we don't expect to do, they say well, we restrained them. See my point?

K: Oh, absolutely.

P: That's how Cooper-Church all came out. So we don't have to decide it tonight but we will give some heavy thought to that between now and the time of the conference .........

[End of tape]

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Authorized
By. NARA Date 6/9/04

3

TELECON
The President

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President

P: Henry, did you have something else you wanted to talk to me about. Bob was saying you were . . .

K: Oh well no. I had a long talk with Sisco and I think we made some progress today.

P: Good.

K: One, I got them to stop making . . .

P: I talked to Rogers. . . He seemed to be on . . . at least he said all the things we were talking about. I just listened, so that's that that. But that was right after I talked to you, so what did Sisco say.

K: Well, they were going to make a public statement tomorrow condemning the Israeli position.

P: That's not . . . let's not make any statement. That's the wrong thing to do.

K: That just doesn't get us anything. Then I got them to soften their cable. I couldn't get them to stop going to a Four Power meeting even though I think they should have waited for an Egyptian reply, but I also told him that you needed to see a package deal in which we would tell the Israelis what we want and . . .

P: What we'll do, that's right.

P: That's what I told Bill too. And that at the right time I would talk to the Israelis.

K: Right. Well now Sisco is working on that and we will have that by Tuesday or Wednesday.

P: The thing is there we don't want to do that until we've got something that is really worthwhile. Of course you can't use the big gun very often. I'm prepared to do it but they've got to get something together that is . . .

K: Well, the smart way to do it would be to get something if from them and then to see whether we can broker it with Dobrynin and get something from the Russians for it too.

DECLASSIFIED

Moj F0 12/58
Authoritative

By NARA Date 6/1/64

Brought in
CAB/11

TELECON
The President

p. 2

P: Yeah, that would be wouldn't it?

K: Because if we could get the Russians then to withdraw their
troops . . .

P: Yeah.

K: Incidentally that note I handed them on Monday on Cuba
seems to have worked. The Russians ship left today?

P: They left again?

K: Yeah.

P: That's sort of in and out isn't it?

K: Yeah.

P: What <u>went</u> was the reason you think that their guy at the
UN from some report I noticed had such a reaction to the State of the World
Report?

K: I hadn't read that yet.

P: Well, it was in one of the news summaries. Somebody I
guess sort of saw it . . . what did the Russians say about it?

K: I hadn't seen anything except one broadcast directed at
Africa.

P: Maybe that was it.

K: But that I thought was more for the audience . . .

P: Yeah, well I just wondered. I didn't really take it on. The
main thing is . . . at least they didn't take it on on SALT or anything like
that.

K: Oh no, no.

DECLASSIFIED

Mojave 2958
Authority

NARA Date 6/1/64
By ---

TELECON
The President

p. 3

P: Oh, that might have been it too. This was something that I . . . I don't know where I got the impression . . . something about where they said something at the UN. I don't know what it is.

K: Well, I'll look it up Mr. President.

P: It may not have been in the news summary. It may be something that, I don't know, Bush was talking about or something. I don't know what it was but . . . just a fleeting thing that somebody up there at the United Nations was whining around about it. But nothing . . . maybe it wasn't in public. I don't have the slightest idea. It didn't come from State or anything but it's just something that stuck in my mind. I don't know what it was.

K: I haven't seen it.

P: Well, it may have been the African thing. But I just wanted to see what the . . . I guess the China thing would have . . why the hell, well, of course it would . . .

K: Well, first of all, it's the first public document in which we call the Communist Chinese the Peoples Republic of China.

P: I didn't particularly like that, but we did it.

K: And where we say we'll talk to anybody. . . . Well, you had done it already in your talks to Ceausescu.

R: I know, yeah, I know, I know. But what I mean is I don't like the idea, but I know we have to do it. Doesn't bother me. That's not much to give.

K: And where we said we're willing to talk with them anyplace, so the whole tone of the China section undoubtedly annoyed them. But . . . and also of course they have to . . . even if they do the things we're talking about they're not going to give the impression that there is a great reconciliation yet.

P: No. Let me ask this. With regard to the . . . getting our things ready for the press thing, I think the main point that we want to try to . . . the main question that we'll try to zing in on is this phony issue you know of the South Vietnamese going North and all that sort of thing, which I understand Thieu is now . . . he said they would, then he said they wouldn't and so forth and so on. But I think we've got to get a very careful thing about it.

K: I was going to talk to you about this tomorrow. I think we ought to do a backchannel to Bunker telling him, to recommend to Thieu that he cool this sort of public comment.

DECLASSIFIED

MILFEO 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/10/64

TELECON
The President

p. K

P: Well he's already cooled it some. You know, I don't know why he didn't the other. Maybe he did it just to keep them off balance.

K: Well, and to keep their troops up there. But I think what we should tell them is ...

P: You see, that what we don't want to do is to give the Senate doves a chance to pass some sort of resolution on it which they won't. Or to restrict us or something because, as you know, we don't plan ... First they don't play to go North, second, we don't plan to do anything but we have deliberately kept it open just for the purpose of tying down those forces.

K: Well, I think what ... we will work something out but ...

P: You understand the whole purpose of what we have said is exactly right in terms of the military situation. On the other hand, it could create a needless issue here where we don't need to. The real question is how we handle it. If you'll read my press statements, press conferences very ... you should go over and get exactly what I said because I covered it in two different places. One, I said I won't speculate on what the South Vietnamese will do on their own ... to defend their own security. I will say only that our policy will be that we will not, of course, use ground forces, but that we will use air power if and when I determine it's necessary to defend our forces in South ... and so forth. Then when they went on to say, well if there is a South Vietnamese move will we support it. I said, I indicated that no, that we had no intention of doing it. So we're covered pretty well. But really, I think, set the thing is not anything that I said; it's really what Thieu said later where he said they would go North, don't you think that's the problem.

K: I think that's right Mr. President. But what I think we should do is call attention to the fact that it is the North Vietnamese who have been invading everybody else.

P: That's correct.

K: Secondly, that if the North Vietnamese return to their own country there's no conceivably possibility that anyone would invade them. I think we can give them this assurance.

P: Yeah.

K: So that we are talking about a war situation where the North Vietnamese are attacking the South and even in that case the United States ... it leaves that about where you had that in the last time.

DECLASSIFIED
MAY 12958
Author:
By: NARA Date 6/1/19

TELECON
The President

p. 5

P: Except that we do not want to leave it in a position where we can let a Cooper . . . not Cooper but a Church -- he's got one he's passing around, some sort of a resolution to say that the United States will not support a South Vietnamese invasion of the North. See that's what we want to avoid. Now in two months, we'll be over it but for the next two months we've got to keep it in a situation where we . . . a resolution could be very harmful to the South Vietnamese and to us, and very encouraging to the North, apart from what we say we just don't want to do anything. I just don't want to leave it in a position where a resolution is inevitable.

K: Well, I was thinking in any event, given that note that Dobrynin handed me, which wasn't too aggressive on Friday for you whether if you were to say something at your press conference that indicated that there's no American plan to do something like this.

P: I've already said that. Of course, if you'll read what I said in the office press conference I said we have no plans. I just said I won't speculate on what they would do.

P: True. I'm not concerned really so much Henry about Dobrynin. I'm already concerned . . .

K: No, you're concerned with the public position here.

P: I'm concerned about frankly the Senate moving off on another jackass Cooper-Church amendment see. With a huge damned debate about it and so forth and then what we don't expect to do they say we've restrained them. See my point?

K: Oh absolutely.

P: That's how Cooper-Church all came out. So, we don't have to decide it tonight, but we'll give some heavy thought to that between now and the time of the conference.

End of tape

MAY 12 1958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

K: Hello Bill.

R: Yeah Henry.

K: I just wanted to touch base with you. I tried to reach you at noon and I then have been talking to Sisco. We went along with that cable with just some changes in it of no consequence which I discussed with Sisco and which I'm sure he discussed with you. The general . . . I don't know whether you've had a chance to talk to the President today . . .

R: Yeah, I did.

K: Okay, well then there's no need for me to . . . His general attitude was to cool any . . . as much of the public confrontation as possible as he no doubt told you.

R: I don't know that we need to have much of a . . .

K: Exactly.

R: I'm about to send a telegram on successor to Brosio, telling Ellsworth in effect that there doesn't seem to be a consensus developing in . . . to favor Brosio's retention and therefore we should . . . if the others want Lundt (?) to go along. I still quite strongly favor Brosio. I'm sort of re-drafting this a little bit to encourage others to support Brosio, but I guess if we can't, if there's no particular interest, then I guess we'll probably have to go along with the others.

K: I guess that's right. The ones available . . . he'd be harder to deal with than by far than Brosio.

R: Yeah, well Brosio is -- particularly in the next year or so -- would be a great advantage. He gets everybody in line. Luns is going to . . . I don't think he'll be so difficult for us but he just doesn't have the . . .

K: Well French isn't so important but he doesn't have the capacity to smooth things over.

R: No, that's right, he doesn't have the stature of Brosio. Well, I'm going to redo this. We'll send it over to you. See I guess we're sort of stuck with it though. We certainly don't want to go out in front sort of insisting on Brosio, but I wish we could . . .

K: No, but if we could get a consensus developing I would think we . . . On a public statement tomorrow don't know whether -- on the other issue -- I don't know whether that's necessary.

R: I don't believe we need one, do we?

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/1/04

Telcon (tape)

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers

K: Hello, Bill.

R: Yeah, Henry.

K: I just wanted to touch base with you. I tried to reach you at Noon and I then have been talking to Sisco. We went along with that cable with just some changes in it, of no consequence, which I discussed with Sisco which I am sure he discussed with you. I don't know whether you have had a chance to talk with the President today.

R: Yeah, I did.

K: Okay, then there is no need for me to -- his general attitude was to cool any -- as much of the public confrontation as possible.

R: Sure.

K: As he no doubt told you.

R: I don't know as we need to have very much of it.

K: Exactly.

R: I am about to send a telegram on successes of Brosio, telling Ellsworth in effect that there doesn't seem to be a consensus developing into favor of Brosio's retention and therefore if the others want Luns to go along, I still quite strongly favor Brosio.

K: Yeah.

R: I am sort of redrafting this a little bit to encourage others to support Brosio but I guess if we can't -- if there is no particular interest, then I guess we probably have to go along with the others.

K: I guess that's right. If Luns is available, he will be harder to deal with by far than Brosio.

R: Brosio is particularly for the next year or so would be a great advantage. He gets everybody in line. Luns is gonna -- I don't think he will be so difficult for us but he just doesn't have the ....

K: Well, the French isn't so important but he doesn't have the capacity to smooth things over.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD E0 12958
Authority
By NARA Date 6/9/04

Telcon (tape)

R: No, he doesn't have the stature of Brosio. Well, I'm going to redo this, we'll send it over to you. We're sort of stuck with it, we certainly don't want to go out front sort of insisting on Brosio.

K: No.

R: But I wish we could ....

K: No. But if we could get a consensus developing, I would think --

R: Right, right.

K: On the public statement tomorrow, I don't know whether -- on the other issue -- I don't know whether that's necessary.

K: No. On the Middle East, I think --

R: We can talk about that, I don't think there is any necessity at the moment for that.

K: Right.

R: Okay.

K: Okay.

R: Good.

K: Fine.

MJD EO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Senator Brooke/Mr. Kissinger

4:05 p.m., February 16, 1971

B: Henry, how are you? Thanks for calling. I am calling you on the Trade Bill for 1971 which I have been doing work on. I worked with Ed Muskie on our side on the 1970 Trade Bill. Muskie is now off the Committee. I presume Mondale will pick up the reins. Of course, I am committed to promoting trade with the countries of Eastern Europe -- reducing the restrictions. I was informed that some policy papers were sent to you in December recommending that the Administration propose legislation which would accomplish removal of the ban on the Most Favored Nations -- also removal of the prohibition on the Ex-Im Bank.

K: One of the favorite sports of the bureaucracy is to blame my office. Those things go to the President -- they don't go to me. Well, it came through me. As a matter of fact, it's before the President now -- it's not in my office.

B: I want to track it down. If the Administration would move ahead, it would be good politically. Muskie or Mondale would take the lead regarding Export Administration Act -- that is why I am calling you on it. I want to get going on it as soon as possible. Is there anyone you can tickle?

K: I will talk to the President's people about it.

B: I would be very much interested in it.

K: I will keep you informed.

B: Thank you. Are things going well?

K: As well as can be expected. Good to talk to you.

lds