DECLASSIFIED
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TelCon
Rowland Evans/Mr. Kissinger

10:13 am, July 20, 1973

K: Hello.

E: Henry, how is he.

K: How's who?

E: Our President.

K: He's fine, he just gave a fighting speech.

E: Is he really.

K: Yeah, he said publicly he was never going to resign.

E: Where did he say that.

K: Just now, this minute, as he arrived. There was a little reception for him.

E: Oh, really, was the press there.

K: Yeah.

E: Said he was never going to resign.

K: That's right. He said any talk that he was going to resign is pure poppycock, he said let others wallow in Watergate, we are going to do our job. That's a quote.

E: The word wallow, was that yours.

K: No, I didn't know he was going to say it.

E: That's a very good line.

K: Try saying it with three martinis though.

E: Listen, I said this was a serious matter and it is, I just got a very severe complaint on the column we wrote about a week ago in which we referred to a German incident - Herr. Because the name of the German was in the acusative case, not an anonymity case, we were told it should have been Herrn.

K: En

E: No, that's plural.

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K: Oh, yes.

E: Gee, Henry, I though you--

K: That is correct.

E: If it's not an anonimity case, it's got to be "Herrn".

K: Herrn, yes, and it's about on the level of the usual--

E: You're the only German I know and I just--

K: Well, I'm very flattered that I'm now graduated to being the interpreter for the Evans-Novak public relations firm.

E: How'd you like that picture in the times this morning. n You see it.

K: Yeah, a little - they knock of a percent here and 2 percent there.

E: You think he's really in--

K: It doesn't make--there was no reason to give it such a big spread.

E: That's you're going to Peking.

K: Yeah.

E: Are you gonna see the Prince? The King?

K: I don't think so. But I don't know.

E: When do you go.

K: That hasn't been set yet. You know, not to be used but just so you understand, without the bombing cutoff I would have been there in the first half, with the bombing cutoff, it's a tough problem to go there and have the whole thing focussed around Cambodia and have all the Sino/US relations concentrate on a topic which in terms of of our mutual relations is peripheral.

E: Yeah. But why, because you can't do anything about it. Because we've lost our only weapon.

K: And Sihanouk has lost a lot of leverage too because of ______ and a good chance of winning anyway. They don't even need Sihanouk. They use to be his mortal enemies, if you remember.

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E: You're saying in fact the bombing helped Sihanouk.

K: I'm saying that the bombing, about which Sihanouk had to scream like hell, nevertheless enable him to bring something into the equation if the end of it was given to him. None of this is to be ascribed to me.

E: I understand. Do you think he'd agree to that, privately.

K: Yes.

E: I don't see why it affects your trip to China, though, one way or the other.

K: No, no, I'll go to China.

E: But I mean, why would you go in the first half, if there were no cutoff.

K: Because now if I go and there is nothing happens, then the problem is that China didn't deliver on the negotiations.

E: I see.

K: See what I mean. So now, I will definitely go within the next four to six weeks. It's just a question of finding the right date.

E: Let me get back again on the President. Do you think he's in good shape. You don't see any deeper problem there.

K: No.

E: Physical or psychological.

K: No.

E: He's right on these tapes - totally off the record.

K: I can see his point.

E: Yeah. I can see the other point too.

K: I know, and I must say, the other point is the one to which one comes immediately. But when you think about it a bit, you can see the case for the other side.

E: I think it's going to be awful tough for him to sustain this position. What's he do when Cox asks for him. Is there a separation of power or executive privilege there. Is there. He's part of the administration.

DECLASSIFIED
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K: Well I think--

E: He's sure as hell going to ask for them.

K: He already probably has.

E: He has, he already has. Don't you agree.

K: It looks the same though as with the papers. I mean from the legal point of view, the papers and the tapes, you know, it's the same problem.

E: Well, okay. You not going to change tonight, are you.

K: Yes I am.

E: We'll see you there for dinner. I enjoyed that the other night.

K: I enjoyed it very much.

E: I think your friend is a hell of a nice woman.

K: Yes, she's very nice. Nice girl.

E: I promise you, I give you my sacred word of honor and I have nothing crossed, that one word of that will pass my lips to Nancy, not a word.

K: That I'm counting on.

E: Word of honor.

K: You can read my mind. You have other sources to tell her.

E: What are going to do about the Godley job.

K: I haven't decided yet.

E: If you put Stra in there now, I think it would be damned difficult for them to turn him down, having just approved him for Ambassador to Laos. I know their rationale on it but I think it's a hard position to sell, don't you.

K: Yeah.

E: You think that's still a possibility, pretty good one.

K: It depends on a lot of other developments.

4

DECLASSIFIED
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TelCon

B. Gwertzman/Mr. Kissinger

1:08 pm, July 20, 1973

K: Hello.

G: Hi, how are you.

K: Okay, how are you.

G: Good. Last night the spokesman for the Jewish leaders who met with you yesterday called up to discuss the meeting. And I thought it had some very hopeful signs in it from the immigration point of view. And I just wanted to double check with you, actually what there is. In other words I gather as a result of the Summit meeting that Brezhnev gave you chances that a large number of those Soviet Jews on that list that you gave in May would be released soon.

K: That is correct.

G: Right. Now I gather there is a certain confusion over lists and this was underscored when Brezhnev spoke to the Senators. Apparently there were two separate lists, one of 750 and one of 250, and somehow the 250 list may have been misplaced or something.

K: No, no, no, no, there was a 738 list out of which some 260 are definitely going to be permitted to go, and some others are in the process of being looked at. But Bernie, I have to run off unfortunately, I just wanted to return this call quickly.

G: Uh hum. Okay. Well can I speak to you later on this.

K: Yeah. Can you speak to you later on this?

G: Cause I'm going to do this story tonight, I need that extra thrust.

K: That is the extra thrust.

G: Okay, so.

K: But don't attribute it to me.

G: I wasn't, I won't, I just was double checking.

K: Okay, bye.

G: Bye.

TelCon
Bill Wyant (St. Louis Dispatch)/Mr. Kissinger

3:02 pm, July 20, 1973

K: Hello.

W: Yes Doctor, this is Bill Wyant, St. Louis Post Dispatch. I've had to write a piece for Sunday about this 1970, your B-52 episode over Cambodia and I have Sy Harch's story, of course, in the New York Times. I'm just calling your office to find out whether we've gotten it correct.

K: Now, we are not talking on the record. I just want to get that clear. The thing is correct, I mean the quote in the NY Times is correct, and you can check quote it again.

W: All right sir.

K: We did not order and did know of this falsification. Actually if you analyze, it was done at such a low level, who was trying to fool whom.

W: Exactly.

K: I mean all the top people here knew it and some key Congressional people had been briefed.

W: Yes. I don't see quite what the purpose was, and obviously this Major didn't and the interesting thing to me is just what the intent was if there was any intent. But of course there has been some difficulty with incorrect reporting among the military in Vietnam and this interested me for that reason and I was awfully glad to see what you said.

K: Good. I'm glad you took the troulbe of checking it.

W: Thank you very much, Doctor.

K: Right.

W: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCORN

Bernard Gwertzman/Mr. Kissinger

6:05 p.m., July 20, 1973

G: . . . covering these Colby hearings on the Hill and all that sort of thing.

K: Yeah.

G: The reason I'm calling now is not so much on this thing I was talking to you about earlier but it's another story that Flora Lewis has filed from Paris saying that, I guess, NATO officials are reporting that the U.S. gave the Russians -- she called a secret note reference to that the banning -- to avoid the outbreak of nuclear war -- the agreement to avoid nuclear war. This note stipulating the American interpretation of what the Agreement says and doesn't say, mainly to head off any possible Soviet interpretation that the U.S. and the Russians would gang up on anybody else.

K: Oh, I won't go into any of the discussions. There are no secret notes.

G: Is there --

K: We have stated publicly what our interpretation is and that's all there is to it.

G: And is there any piece of paper you sent to the Russians on this?

K: Look, we can not go into the business of discussing our communications with the Russians.

G: Yeah, right. Okay, what they were wanting is some, you know, I assume it's -- As I know in the first SALT Agreement we did publish eventually a list of our understandings with the Russians on various points in the Treaty and I know it's common diplomatic practice that you stipulate --

K: Yeah, I just don't want to go into how we make clear our -- each side's understanding. That wouldn't be proper.

G: Okay. All right. But there is something I take it. I mean, I'm just -- The story isn't half-cocked. I mean, I gather we --

K: I just don't -- We have stated our interpretation publicly and beyond that I don't want to go how we communicated with the Russians. Obviously, as we negotiated this thing, we obviously discussed interpretations. That stands to reason.

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2

G: Sure. Okay. According to this story, it also says that there was
in the original Soviet draft --

K: Oh, I won't even begin to go into that.

G: Okay, okay. I'm aware of what -- you know, that John Newhouse
version of the original Soviet approach on this.

K: Well, how the hell could John Newhouse possible know it? Maybe he and --

G: ... that thing in Vienna.

K: Oh, yeah. Oh, I see, yeah. Okay.

G: Yeah. I mean, that was I suppose similar kind of language they were
looking for.

K: I suppose.

G: On the Jewish matter, I gather from the Jewish people -- the Jewish
Organization said that you have a feeling that the Russians are going to
move on this pretty soon. On this list anyway.

K: Yeah, they have already to some extent in that they will do more.

G: Yeah. Well, the thing is this whole numbers game is sort of confusing
as hell. You know, the Russians saying they let out 250 -- they'll give
permission to 250 and the Jewish say they only know of 60 and I don't
know. But we've done the story already and it should at least give some
hope.

K: Well, that's right.

G: Yeah. So I don't know where we stand legislatively on this. I have a
feeling in the House there is probably more reason to hope for some
compromise language in the House Ways & Means Committee.

K: That's my impression too. I've got to run.

G: Okay. Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

wgh

TELCOM

Len Garment/Mr. Kissinger

6:15 p.m., July 20, 1973

K: Hello.

G: Henry.

K: Len, I've got here the transcript of the Mardian cross-examination by Weicker and he keeps -- Weicker keeps referring to the Kissinger tapes.

G: Yeah, that's the one thing I heard is that reference to Kissinger tapes

K: And you know in itself there's nothing incriminating about it.

G: So what do you want me to do about it?

K: But can one protest?

G: No, worse thing to do.

K: But how can that son-of-a-bitch call it the Kissinger tape.

G: Because he's a son-of-a-bitch.

K: But why?

G: Because it's dramatic. It associates him with -- you know, he's coined a phrase. It's like the "Pentagon Papers". Now they'll be called the Kissinger tapes. Do you have the transcript there?

K: Yeah.

G: All right. Why don't --

K: But why should one let him get away with it?

G: Well, what are your choices? One can let it ride or one can inflame it into a major national issue by saying it's unfair and unjust and improper. That protest can be lodged by you or me or Ron Ziegler. And if it's you, it will be given the most attention. If me, it would be given perhaps the least attention. But altogether I think it's pointless. It's a little bit like suing a newspaper or a liable when the damage is really not that significant. You blow it up enormously. That's a first and very quick reaction. I have not thought about it at length.

K: Okay.

DECLASSIFIED
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I*

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TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Marilyn Berger

7/21/73

12:00 noon

MB: How are you?

HK: Okay.

MB: It's nice to have something to talk to you about something you didn't
mind talking about.

HK: I think that is almost inconceivable.

MB: This story about the Jewish leaders and the assurances you gave,
did you assure them that there would be a largenumber coming
out--

HK: No, I toldthem, that off a list of 738 they had given me, at least
--about 260 would be coming out.

MB: Ah huh. 260?

HK: Or something like that and plus an additional number--I mean those
were certain, plus an additional number

MB: Anything to the effect that your personal belief that they would move
to accommodate or anything like that?

HK: That who would move to accommodate?

MB: That the Soviets would move th accommodate

HK: To accommodate what?

MB: The American concerns on this issue.

HK: They have already moved substantially to accommodate many concer

MB: There were 2 points when I wasn't able to reach you immediately
I called--

HK: I frankly haven't read the story and I'm right now blind having a
physcial and my eyes are dialated so I can't read it.

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Page 2

**MB:** I'll just tell you one thing that it said," that Brezhnev assured Nixon that a large number of Jews who had repeatedly denied permission would be soon allowed to leave. Participant said that Kissinger stressed his own personal belief that the Soviet leadership is now moving to accommodate the concerns of the US over the problems faced by the Soviet Jews." Now I want to know if you did that, because in the period between when I looked for you and couldn't find you I spoke to some of the leaders and they said nothing could be inferred from that from anything that Kissinger said to us.
And that he [Kissinger] didn't make this statement. He did say that 268 would leave instead of the 258 previously reported but that you didn't say anything about personal assurances and all that sort of thing.

**HK:** That is essentially right.

**MB:** That is right?

**HK:** Yes.

**MB:** So they are now a little concerned about the Times story and they have reiterated now ______, you know, the Jackson business

**HK:** Now you know, Marilyn, I just can't keep--sometimes some sanity has to return to America

**MB:** I know

**HK:** And we can keep on--this is off-the-record--we can go on and on and on and on and building crisis out of nothing and hacking around foreign policy questions--you know what the issue is with MFN, you know that the Soviets have made concessions that go beyond what a sovereign country makes to others usually and what I told the Jewish leaders was an enormous step forward--

**MB:** Did you make that value judgment that it was an enormous step forward?

**HK:** I am telling you that--now I know from their position what their necessities are--

**MB:** Ahhuh. My concern is that we have a small story on it and it just says that [xxxxx] be leaving, etc.

**HK:**

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Page 3

HK: I don't know why Gwertzman blew it up so much.

MB: That's what I'm trying to really thread out actually.

HK: That is what I don't understand and I don't know who Gwertzman talked to--

MB: ______ stepped backwards if you see what I mean--

HK: Of course

MB: Because now they are coming up and saying My God, that's not at all so and I don't know where it came from, etc.

HK: Well it sure as hell didn't come from us.

MB: You didn't say you gave personal assurance or anything else.

HK: I did not talk to Gwertzman except to confirm the numbers that he checked with me.

MB: Hm huh. How come the meeting took place Thursday do you know?

HK: I can explain exactly how themeeting took place--they wanted to come out to San Clemente, I didn't want to make it a national affair so we decided they would come in the first week they could after I returned, Stein was in Europe the week we returned so he can in the week that he had returned.

MB: The reason I asked this is that if it happens, that Wilbur Mills is dealing with MFN next week and so it all--

HK: They wanted to come to the West Coast, I offered them to see them the week of the 9th, Stein was in Europe the week of the 9th, and so we saw him the week of the 16th

MBL: I fully understand that it is a series of things that just now that they are reiterating their support of the other thing when it was quiet for a little while it becomes a--

HK: You know they have to decide to what extent American foreign policy should be subordinated to one group, particularly when one has already achieved major things.

MB: What do you think is the real thing behind Jackson's business?

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AB

TelCon
Mark Frazier/Mr. Kissinger

10:21 pm, July 20, 1973

K: Hello.

F: Hello, Mr. Kissinger. My name's Mark Frazier, I with Jack Anderson. If ________ stories regarding Oxford University, we understand that they turned a request for a lecture by you, and I was wondering if

K: That is totally wrong.

F: Totally wrong. You made no communication with them.

K: I have had no commu--no that is not correct. I have been asked by one of the colleges there whether I was interested in a Fellowship, after I left here, and I said that we would have to hold this in abeyance until I decided to leave.

F: Was that request within the past month or so? Was it for--

K: No, it was about six months ago. But you can assume, just as a general rule, that I never take the initiative for any position. I have not approached any college in Oxford or anywhere else for a lecture. And therefore I was not refused.

F: The way we heard this story was that either you or they made the offer, but then it had been withdrawn.

K: That is absolutely not true.

F: Okay. Good. Well I never appreciate

K: There was never a formal offer to begin with. There had been newspaper reports seven months or so ago that I wanted to go to Oxford after I left here, whereupon one of the colleges wrote me and asked me whether that was true. And I said that it was premature to discuss it, and that's where it is.

F: Did you indicate when you might get back in touch with them.

K: No, I said this would have to be discussed after I decided to leave.

F: Right. Have you made any plans whatsoever about what you might do after you--

K: No, you know when you are in this job you can't really face that. I haven't made any plans. I doubt that I would go to an academic situation right away from here.

DECLASSIFIED
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Telcon

Danny Kaye/Dr. Kissinger

July 23, 1973; 9:20 a.m.

HAK: Where are you?

DK: At home. It's 6:30 here. I'm an early riser. I got home late last night.

HAK: I just wanted to tell you how sorry I was to miss you the week before, but I was with the President in the hospital.

DK: I knew that. When you had not called by 10:30 I figured something must have happened.

HAK: That is what happened.

DK: When are you leaving, Henry?

HAK: I may not go to China until early September now.

DK: In that case I will still be home. Are you still going to the West Coast in August?

HAK: I will be there the middle of August.

DK: I will be home then.

HAK: Terrific! I will see you then.

DK: How long will you be here?

HAK: About two weeks.

DK: I get through the 17th, the south of France. I have to go back to Europe three times the next couple of months. I will come home and will be here around the 19th or 20th for the rest of this month.

HAK: Terrific. We will see something of each other then. I am counting on it. Are you coming through here when you go to Europe?

DK: No, I will probably go over the Pole. Or I may stop in New York for a day, but I doubt it. You know the bridge they are building across the Bosporus? They are going to open it the end of October. They are having 40 heads of state, and I am going to

-2-

have about 200 kids dressed in their native costumes. And
I am going to lead these people from one continent to another
by walking across that bridge -- for UNICEF. That will be
in late October. But I am going to come home the last couple
of weeks. I think Deena may be home that week.

HAK: Good.

DK: But you call me when you get out here.

HAK: Good. I will see you in August. Have a good trip, Danny,
and I will see you when you get back.

DK: Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCONE

Sec. Rush/Kissinger

10:06 a.m. - 7/23/73

K: Ken.

R: Hello, yes, Henry.

K: Yes, Ken. Ken, on this ______ and the COCOM instructions,
could you tone those down and we won't do a letter to Heath on it.

R: You won't do a letter to Heath?

K: No.

R: How do you mean tone them down? We've got them toned down as
much as we can, Henry.

K: Take another look at it and see whether you can tone them down a
little more.

R: OK, we have to oppose it.

K: Yeh, or do you want us to give you the suggestion of modifications?

R: No, I'd be glad to get your suggestions.

K: I'd rather have you do it so as long as it doesn't leak out that you're
doing it at my wishes.

R: OK. Well, I don't know how we can tone it down much more, do you?

K: Not much, but a little.

R: We'll do our best. OK, Henry.

K: OK. Bye.

R: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
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A6

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Marvin Kalb
7/23/73; 11:50 a.m.

HK: Marvin.

MK: Henry, I just want to reaffirm, really, CBS's interest in the proposal that I put to Dick Campbell.

HK: On your coming along to China.

MK: We are thinking of doing something special with it and we are eager. I told them I knew of your arguments against it.

HK: I have never taken anyone along but this is not a normal situation. I am leaning towards it. If I take anybody along, I will take you.

MK: That will be marvelous! I have this feeling that we are so encrusted with this domestic stuff that this would keep me from going insane.

on

HK: I think we need it for the country and where we are going rather than where we have been.

MK: I just wanted to pass along our interest.

HK: We are not quite ready yet with the date. We don't want to get it inextricably intertwined with Cambodia.

MK: But you still think it might be in August.

HK: Probably but it might slip into September -- early September.

MK: Henry, tell me what I should be working on. Could we have lunch or dinner one day? May I check with your girl?

HK: Wonderful. How is your book going? Who is your publisher?

MK: Fine. We are in discussions with Random House.

HK: Oh, they did come through!

MK: I got in touch with my lawyer and he is calling Bernstein and Klupfer(?).

HK: Good. I may not feel that way when I see the book.

MK: I have shown it to three or four people and they all say it is clinically objective.

HK: That's all I can ask. Good.

TELCOM

Sen. Symington/Kissinger

12:20 p.m. - 7/23/73

K: Hello.

S: Henry.

K: Stuart, how are you?

S: Good morning to you. I'm pretty good. I've got a bit of a problem. Give me credit I don't bother you much.

K: I know that.

S: Down in Jamaica was a fellow named Pege DeRoulet (sp?). His wife is my goddaughter and a lovely girl and she is a niece of Jock Whitney. This guy is a tense fellow and he's able.

K: I know him.

S: What he did was he testified over here, as I get the story, and he was against Opie. I am too.

K: Oh, that's Jack Javits'...

S: That's his baby, but nobody guaranteed me anything when I was trying to run my businesses in this country. Well, they got half a billion dollars, I am told by counsel over there, and he asked that he not be questioned about this in open session. He asked Church. In addition to that

K: Over where?

S: Over in the ITT multinational corporation hearings which I have not been at because of Armed Services. So he thought that Church had agreed to that and then Church did ask him in an open hearing without me being around and he answered some questions which he should not have done. But in this case he thought he was in good shape. He saw a Mr. Jones in the White House and I think he was expecting to go to another post. Mr. Jones called him in New York and - he was staying with his mother-in-law, Joan Payson, who is my wife's first cousin incidentally. Mr. Jones said that Mr. Manley that fellow down in Jamaica didn't want him back. Then I got the impression from De Roulet that he also said this sort of clears you for anything else. I don't think that's fair if he served four years down there.

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2

K: He did a good job. I didn't know you new him. So the problem is whether he can be given another post.

S: Yeh, you see Jock and Joan Payson are my wife's first cousins and the girl herself is my godchild you know. The guy is a very intense fellow but he's a loyal Democrat. He's been a very heavy contributor from what I hear. That isn't the basic thing. I just don't like to see his whole concept of an ambassadorial career knocked in the face like that.

K: Look, I think I might be able to do something about it.

S: If you would, I would be even more grateful to you than I am now for taking the flak that you do.

K: You've been a good friend. I'll let you know within 48 hours

S: If you would I would appreciate it.

K: I will call you Wednesday.

S: I would hope that he'd be given another chance.

K: I think we can do it. I don't know the facts which you describe. Is 48 hours enough?

S: That's great.

K: I'll call you Wednesday.

S: You're very kind.

K: Not at all. I hope to see you soon.

S: Bye.

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TELCONE

Sec. Shultz/Kissinger

12:25 p.m. - 7/23/73

K: Hello.

S: Hello.

K: George.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: How are you?

S: All right. I have three questions for you today, sir. One, when the Russians were here Patolichev and I agreed that the next meeting of the US-USSR Trade Commission which is schedule to take place there rather than here, probably in October.

K: That's fine.

S: Now I gather that the President's going to be traveling around in Europe somewhere around then.

K: It maybe early in November. We haven't got a date yet.

S: I see. Do you know whether I would be traveling with him? Or not on that visit or don't you have any idea at all?

K: We haven't frankly focused on it. I could see some advantage on your being in on at least part of it.

S: Well, I'm just trying to think about the time conflict. You would think the first two weeks in October would be safe enough.

K: Absolutely. It cannot be before the last week in October.

S: That settles that question. Second, when we talked sometime ago about China you mentioned to me the name of somebody on your staff that Ken Dam should be in contact with about that.

K: About what - about your trip?

S: Yeh. I ought to get going on that.

K: Well, you can't go until I've been and that won't be now until late August.

2

S: As part of while you're preparing the way for me, we should have thought about

K: You can talk to Eagleburger.

S: Eagleburger. I'll have Ken Dam talk to him so if you would tell him that I'll be

K: Good, but we don't want any approach to the Chinese until I've been.

S: I'm just talking about the content of how you approach this thing.

K: Oh yes, Eagleburger.

S: All right, Ken will get in touch with him. Third, as part of this East-West business, there is a Polish Commission that Pete was the head of and which I'm presuming Ben should be the head of and that seems to be more or less understood, but I understand the Poles are asking about. Then there are various other negotiations that are more or less stirring themselves. There's one with Rumania that is in the works and there is a brewing contest over who is going to do these things. That was the idea that I'm not and the competing interests are Dent who has this East-West Trade group and it's set up. I don't know how he wants to do it. And at the same time the State Department is anxious to do these things and Bill Casey, of course, is pushing for it. Now we're going to have to resolve these things and I wonder if you have any options.

K: Let me talk to Sonnenfeldt. I just don't think very highly of Casey but I may be wrong.

S: Well, I think Casey's quite a good man myself. And I think Dent has been - he is more impressive as you get to know him. He does give off the initial impression of

K: Well, my instinct would be to leave it in existing channels.

S: All right. Well, why don't you think about that.

K: Let's talk about it tomorrow.

S: I'm going to start being a little more active on this and I'd like to have a sense of where I want to wind up before I start.

K: Good. Let's talk about it soon. Thank you, George.

S: OK. Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E 0.12958
By NARA Date 5/9/09

Al

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/07

Telcon
Rowland Evans/HAK

Wednesday, July 25, 1973

9:15 a.m.

K: I have just read your article. I haven't talked to anyone around here.

E: I just have. I just had breakfast over there.

K: I really think whoever gives you this information is really unconscionable.

E: I was up in Jersey polling and most of the reporting on that was done by my partner.

K: I have no personal interest in this. Just to help you evaluate your sources, there wasn't one bit of truth there. I know what Haig wanted to get done. The difference in your source and Haig is that Haig isn't self-serving. I think I am one of Haig's confidantes -- he comes in here and tells me what is bothering him and asks me for my opinion.

E: Did you watch Ehrlichman yesterday?

K: I watched ten minutes. I frankly can't get myself to do it.

E: They moved to a tough position on the tapes. The only inference that can be drawn is that they are incriminating. Then Ehrlichman gets up there and divides the committee and disrupts the Chairman's equinimity.

K: That part of it I don't...

E: I had breakfast with Haig this morning and he made that very clear.

K: There may be a decision to be hard-lining.

E: He said no.

K: I don't think that is true. I think it is more confusing than you think. But it is not true Haig is leading the hard-liners here. I went through this on the troop withdrawal thing. I know how it is -- it gets so confusing no outsider can possibly untangle it. There is no relation between what is said inside and what is done outside, but as far as the Administration is concerned, I don't know whether there is a hard-lined decision.

-2-

E: This is a very hard down and environment to have to report.

K: I know you are a decent man and you know I know you are not
doing this as a hatchet job. I think you have been a little hard
on Haig in several columns. He doesn't know I am calling you.

E: I am sure you are right. I am sure he feels different. I think he is one of the most decent, honorable, upstanding men I have ever met. He has given up a lot to come back to the White House. He has sacrificed a brilliant military career, but I don't think he is the right man for the job. He knows I think that. I don't have a closed mind on it but I started off with a presumption that what Nixon needed was a very tough outside politician. I don't think Nixon can work with a guy like Laird. He couldn't work with Connally. In which case he had to have a Haig in there. Do you see my point?

K: I see your point very well.

E: I may be wrong on that. It may be that in this season he is the only guy that could fit that job.

K: You have to understand this is a terrible sense of siege in here.

E: I understand. We got that this morning. This thing about the committee being partisan is bullshit. This committee is not partisan. If it were, the Republicans would have left it long ago and denounced the chairman. Yet they really believe this in the White House -- the same old paranoia.

K: The country, whoever is doing it, is just being torn apart.

E: I can't agree with you more. I am having nightmares on this. I think we are going right down the wrong road, Henry. I think his decision on the tapes is inexcusable. I don't give a damn about how complex they are. They should have had someone like Cooper or Barry Goldwater sit there and listen and make a report to the prosecutors. To conceal these tapes is the most stupid single act this man has ever committed.

K: It is the second time making the tapes was the first.

E: When he was alone listening to the tapes, it said in the Times this morning, we wonder whether he was bugging himself. What happened, Henry. Easy now to seize as a solution. No salvation.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By NARA Date 5/9/09

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By: NARA Date 5/9/01

K: There has got to be a salvation.

E: We are committing suicide. Al said this morning, if only you guys could see what is going on. You have made your point. The press cannot stop it.

K: Maybe nobody can stop it. I understand. But five years from now when everybody is going to say what insanity was this in '73? What made us head like lemmings over the precipice?

E: To put a very trite phrase on it, it is that the chickens are coming home to roost and there is no way to stop them. When John Ehrlichman gets up and defends a break-in in a doctor's office as clearly within the President's power as Commander-in Chief, and when that man was running the White House for four years, you can see what the chickens are.

K: You have never heard me question the immorality of that episode. How are we going to keep these people who have done so much damage in the past from destroying out future? They would have a posthumous victory that exceeds any damage they did when they were in here. You know what I feel about the break-in and these associated activities. There is no excuse for them.

E: I hear Tanaka may not come. [Asks about possible adverse affect in foreign area.]

K: Tanaka will come. If you ask me on the record I will say no. If you ask me ____________. It's like on the tennis court, if your shots are off one inch, how can you draw the analysis. You start pressing and everything comes harder. If this were the President who solved the Vietnam war in an honorable way and we asked for the Year of Europe they would not have refused us anything. But an extra dimension is missing.

E: Does the President understand that?

K: What can he do about it?

E: Nothing.

K: You know as well as I do, Rowland, that the difference in any effort you have ever known as between greatness and mediocrity is a nuance. You can't describe it. And it took us two years when no one understood what we were doing to get it. One success created the necessity of the other. When it unravels it will go the same way. For two years you won't see anything, and then you start pulling the threads out. I can go to the Hill and say, gentlemen, here are

the dangers. You will have a Mideast war if this keeps up.
And, by the way, there is a danger.

E: I am going up to Maine next week for a week. Are you going to be here the week after -- the week of the 6th?

K: I will be here. Let's get together.

E: Can you block out a breakfast, or dinner, or lunch for me?

K: I will do it.

E: The 7th or the 7th.

K: You can definitely count on me.

E: I will call Dick before I leave. I understood your call.

K: I am not complaining. Really, I did not know you were in here.

E: For breakfast. He is such a decent person.

K: He is, and he is really in an impossible job here.

E: I agree.

K: You haven't written one thing I don't think he isn't trying to do.
But he may not be able to do it.

E: He said they war gamed it and came up with a consensus and nobody screamed.

K: I wasn't at the meeting but that is the report I get. It isn't a fact
that one faction wants to do one thing. What he thought should be
done, Mel also thought should be done, and Haig thought should
be done.

E: I heard they couldn't separate out the important stuff from the stuff
that wouldn't affect the White House. That still doesn't say you
couldn't have a guy like John Cooper or Barry Goldwater listen to
those tapes and write down the pertinent information, if there is any.

K: I haven't heard one of these types. I find it hard to know what
could be done. If the President is going to survive we have to
accept the fact that at the age of 60 he isn't going to discover the
capacity for grace that has eluded him up to now. And those of

TELCOM

Ivan Head/Kissinger

10:14 a.m. - 7/25/73

K: Hello.

H: Good morning, Henry.

K: How are you?

H: I am well, how are you?

K: OK.

H: I wanted to call you and I may be just a couple of hours too late in being the first with the information to you, but the Prime Minister has accepted an invitation from the Government of China and will visit there briefly in October.

K: Oh, good.

H: We are going to make the announcement tomorrow but somehow or other the Chinese slipped it out themselves in Peking yesterday afternoon.

K: What's the date?

H: It was kind of a strange thing, I think it was just an accident on their part. The Chinese Ambassador's calling on me in the next ten minutes and I wish to inquire from him at that time how it happened but it's no big crisis one way or the other.

K: What date are you going to go there?

H: Go in there on the 10th. We'll be arriving in Peking on the 10th. And we'll likely be there for 7 or 8 days; it hasn't been determined in its entirety yet. Not longer than a week anyway.

K: I appreciate your courtesy.

H: You're very welcome indeed. I know I'm getting close to tender ground but I do hope that things are going well for you personally down there and that you're going to hang in.

K: Well, you're very nice and I think I personally will come out of it OK.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By: A6 NARA Date 5/9/69

2

H: Well, I've never heard a single suggestion to the contrary, certainly not in this country and you know from sources elsewhere, I think that your own record is just not only brilliant there but totally stainless and it would be a great shame indeed if

K: I think I'll be all right. What happens to the rest of it I can't predict yet.

H: No, but it's a difficult time, I recognize, I hope you're not considering moving out. You're one of the foundations on which we all put a great deal of faith and hope really on what you've been able to do so far and I hope

K: Well, I'm very touched by this. If I go to China before you do and you want to talk to me I'll be happy to be in touch with you.

H: Oh, very good indeed.

K: Good. Many thanks.

H: You're welcome.

K: Bye.

H: Bye.

E. O. 12/25/58

Authority

By: A4 NARA Date: 6/9/09

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By: NARA Date 6/9/69

AB

TELCONE

Amb. John Scali/Kissinger

1:00 p.m. - 7/25/73

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: John, I'm trying to find out what the hell is going on in that Mid-East thing. Who's giving you instructions?

S: (Laugs) The usual source - the State Department.

K: You see what we're trying to avoid here is a blow-up with the Jewish community on something that doesn't make us any money.

S: Well Henry right now the odds are 14 to 1 veto. The line up as it exists now is that there will be at least 13 votes for the non-aligned resolution and maybe the Australians will abstain and Scali will veto.

K: Yeh.

S: So where are we?

K: No, no, that doesn't give me any pain. You know I don't like it but

S: The language which I floated yesterday as a proposed resolution came from the State Department personally approved, as I understood it, from Sisco and the rest. Now it had two elements in it which Tekoah did not like, namely a mention of the Palestinian people which was just a list from the Brezhnev-Nixon Communique. However, it was the first time we were mentioning it in an international or a multilateral context up here within the United Nations framework and so he is seriously concerned about that. Now the only other element that he had any gas pains over was the mention that the Israelis shouldn't do anything in the occupied territories which would prejudice peace. Now happily for us the non-aligned did not buy that; they didn't think it was enough and so they've gone ahead with their resolution which was tabled about one half hour ago.

K: So we don't have a problem.

S: So we don't have a problem because we intend to make no further move toward the non-aligned and we're just going to sit tight. The prospect is that we're voting tomorrow morning at 10:30 and I don't have any final instructions yet from the State Department but from my discussion with Sisco this morning he thought the instructions would be exactly

Telcon
Jerry Schecter/HAK

July 25, 1973; 3:00 p.m.

K: Hello. How are you.

S: Pretty good, thanks, Henry. I had to come back suddenly last week.
My father died.

K: Oh, I'm so sorry to hear that.

S: Thanks. He had a heart attack and I had to help my mother get...

K: How old was he?

S: 69.

K: It's a good way to go, you know, for him, but it's rough on everyone else

S: Yes. Well, fortunately, I'm on vacation and I'm going to take my mother to Spain with us. But I wanted to call and say hello and tell you that I had some interesting conversations in Cairo about 10 days ago. I was there for the first time and I saw Dr. Hatim and I saw Ghorbal.

K: Oh, yes.

S: Pardon?

K: Ghorbal I know. I don't think I know the other fellow.

S: He's the Vice Premier for Culture and Information. He's very close to Sadat. And he spoke very...the general line I got was speaking very highly of the United States and counting on the United States, sort of why don't you understand us. And Ghorbal's position was one in which, you know, he very much took the initiative in praising you and saying how much he hopes to see you. And there was no kind of expression of disappointment as far as the meeting of Mrs Meir was concerned in the sense that there is no bitterness but a feeling that it's the same old record and why couldn't we move forward and the sort of thing that we'd like to see Dr. Kissinger at any time and please assure him of my high regards, my great respect for him and that sort of thing.

-2-

K: I tell you, after a few weeks here Cairo will look awfully good.
I hope they don't have television there.

S: (laughs) Well, it's a hell of a way to cheer you up, huh, Henry?

K: It's that serious. People are trying to get me out of this town one
way or the other. But no, I think that's very interesting, Jerry,
and not insignificant.

S: Yeah.

K: Because the easy thing for them to do is to make the US the villain
and to concentrate on me because I have certain obvious vulnerabilities.

S: Yeah (laughs). Well, the other thing was, boy, have you got a fan
in Moyshe Dian.

K: Oh, really?

S: Yeah. I had a long session with him, spent a couple of hours with
him. There's a piece in the magazine this week. It doesn't break
any new ground but his comment was, where would we have been
without Kissinger in the White House. And I thought I'd better not
put that in the magazine.

K: No, Jesus Christ, don't put that in.

S: No, I didn't. But I did want to tell you that because I thought get
Ghorbal and Dian in the same room if you've got it roped off.
But they certainly seemed unhappy with the Russians in Cairo.

K: That's our impression too. When are you gonna be back, Jerry.

S: Well, I'm going to be in Spain for a few weeks. I'm leaving tomorrow
night.

K: Well, let me know when you get back.

S: OK. Henry, one other thing I want to take a minute and ask you about.
Remember I talked to you about this fellow Mekulik who's got this
boat, The Star of Peace. He's trying to go into Hanoi with some
medical resupplies.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/69

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/67

K: Oh, yes.

S: Now Bill Sullivan talked to him the other night at a cocktail party at the South Vietnamese Embassy. It's a schooner and he's got it in the Philippines, and it's only a couple of days sail from Hanoi.

K: Can you write me about that? I don't mind passing that on now.

S: Well the problem is this. The thing is pretty far advanced and in order to go, it's no problem with the Vietnamese, but he's got to get something from the Treasury Department to let him take that cargo in there.

K: What has the Treasury Department got to do with it?

S: Well, you know, you're not supposed to trade with the enemy and that is the law in the books that says that no American company can bring boats into North Vietnam without government permission.

K: Let me look into that.

S: OK, and the other thing, the point is this, Henry, that a lot of people in the State Department have talked to him. See, he was originally involved in trying to go in and find out about the MIA's and the POW's, and he was supposed to do it on that basis.

K: Well, let me check it out in State.

S: All right. But let me tell you between us that I'm gonna also be going along with it.

KK

K: Yeah, well that's fine with me.

S: You'll get rid of me that way. You go to Cairo and I go to Hanoi. If anything could be done to see that he gets this permission to go it would be very helpful. He seems like a -- if anything, he's a little bit politically naive -- but he certainly wants to do the right thing and it would help set the right tone if that would be helpful at this point. It's really, I think, a humanitarian initiative.

K: Well, let me look into it. All the best to you Jerry, and I'm very sorry about what you told me.

S: Thank you, Henry. I'll be in touch with you.

K: Best to your wife. Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By AB NARA Dile 6/9/09

Telcon
Secy Schlesinger/HAK

July 25, 1973; 4:32 p.m.

K: Hello.

S: Henry, how are you?

K: Oh, Jim, I'm sorry. The President wanted me to raise one thing with you, and then I wondered whether there is any time tomorrow that would get you near the White House so that I could discuss something that would only take three minutes personally with you.

S: Oh, can we do that over the secure line.

K: Well, let me call you back on the secure line.

S: Oh, there's a Cabinet meeting I see at 10 o'clock. I can probably drop in.

K: Well, why don't you drop in before that.

S: OK, very good.

K: The other thing the President felt we ought to do - we may have done it and it just doesn't get reported - is to make a more effective defense of these Cambodian operations.

S: A more what?

K: Aggressive...

S: Defense.

K: Justification of them. Because what was after all the situation?

S: Well, I just went over that this morning. They don't report that.

K: Do you make clear that we came in at the time that they launched an offensive -- 250 casualties a week. We didn't want to go back to the bombing of the North, but we could not ignore the sanctuaries. So far as we knew they were entirely North Vietnamese. There were no villages there. That's all baloney.

S: No, those are good points. I didn't cover them. I covered the general situation that we had 550,000 troops in country and that they were under attack from sanctuaries. I didn't go into the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By A4 NARA Date 6/9/09

question about the casualties. I did indicate that the North Viet-
namese were occupying these sanctuaries. But the press doesn't
necessarily print.

K: I know it, but the points that I think are important to make is, one, they were launching an offensive despite the bombing halt, violating the understandings. Nevertheless, we didn't bomb the North. They were using these sanctuaries. Our casualties were 230 a week. They dropped progressively as this bombing went on, whether through this bombing or not we are not even maintaining.

S: No, that's a hell of a good line of argument, I'm sorry I haven't employed it heretofore.

K: But you'll have other opportunities, I'm afraid, won't you?

S: I'm afraid so.

K: Not only you, but all Defense spokesmen should do it.

S: No, that's exactly right. I will take it up with everybody in the joint meeting that we have next Monday.

K: Good. Well, the President would appreciate it if you would do that. And, secondly, we have probably asked you for that already. How many of the 81 casualties were incurred before 1968?

S: We are checking on that. A goodly number of them. The operation started in Laos in 1965 and in Cambodia in '67. So a fair proportion of them - we don't know precisely. I think that that has had something of a salutary effect in that it's recognized that it's pre-Nixon.

K: That's what I mean.

S: Yes. And that point has registered.

K: OK. Well, if we could get those two points in, and above all, we have nothing to apologize for, for Christ sake. We were in a war. We are attacked by North Vietnamese troops who are in the so-called neutral Cambodia. The government doesn't object to it. The government establishes diplomatic relations with us while we are bombing them.

S: That's right. The only regrets that we have expressed is that we sent this erroneous report to the Hill in the recent months, not that there was something wrong with the policy.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By A6 NARA Date 5/9/69

TELCONE

Prof. Van der Buegel/Kissinger

6:15 p.m. - 7/25/73

K: Hello.

V: Hello, Henry.

K: Let me read you the telegram I received from you. It says: "Confirm my trip to New York am available Sunday 29 July full day and evening Tuesday 31 July but must be back in New York individual shipment STOP Preparing offers for shipment and possibly but not preferably late Monday evening July 30 STOP Please eable your preference to The Hague or to Regency Hotel where I arrive Saturday evening."

V: That was completely garbled by the telegraph office.

K: You realize everyone here thinks you are communicating in code with me.

V: This is absolutely garbled. I saw the telegram before it left. It said "I arrive late on Saturday, that I am available the whole of Sunday; that I am available on Tuesday, but I must be back in New York about 6 o'clock in the evening and then if this could not be worked out I can arrange it on Wednesday."

K: That gives me almost unlimited choice.

V: Yes, I mean preferably Monday, not during the evening.

K: No, no, Monday isn't good for me either.

V: Sunday, the whole day includes the evening and Tuesday until 6 o'clock.

K: In other words you could come down for lunch on Tuesday.

V: Which do you prefer?

K: What your schedule permits you.

V: Will I come to Washington or you come to New York?

K: I cannot come to New York. Sunday is possible; Nancy will be here but I have no secrets from her.

2

V: What do you prefer? I can come on Tuesday.

K: I will let you know tomorrow.

V: You cable me.

K: I will either cable you or call you.

V: Cable will be better because I will be much out of the house tomorrow.

K: Fine. Would you slightly prefer Sunday?

V: I would slightly prefer Sunday but Tuesday is fine.

K: Let us aim for Sunday unless I call you.

V: When should I come?

K: In the afternoon on Sunday or come for lunch and Nancy usually goes back in the evening. You can stay over night.

V: I could come back with Nancy. Where should I come?

K: We will discuss that when you get there.

V: Good and I will be in New York. Shall I call the White House and leave a message.

K: Why don't you come down during the course of the afternoon on Sunday.

V: It is excellent.

K: That is probably the more relaxed thing for you. It takes about an hour. Or come any time, if you want to come earlier that is fine too.

V: All right. I can come in the -- let me come for lunch on Sunday -- and then I go to the White House?

K: Probably, I will let you know that. I may have to change it tomorrow but I will let you know.

V: You will let me know.

K: Fine

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/09

TELCOM
Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

6:50 p.m., July 25, 1973

HK: You called that you wanted to talk to me.

J K: That's right. I would like to come over and chat.

HK: On what subject?

JK: Just things in general, talk about foreign policy, China, Cambodia, Japan.
And this other subject of national security wire taps.

HK: Well, I think you have pretty well made your judgment on that haven't you.
There's no sense in discussing that any further.

JK: Well, if that's your judgment but it doesn't seem to me to be the right judgment.

HK: While the hearings are going on I don't want to say any more on the subject. On general foreign policy I can't do it this week but could do it sometime next week.

JK: Or thereafter. What should I do, call Dick and make an appointment?

HK: Right, why don't you do that.

JK: All right, fine.

HK: Good.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By NARA Date 6/9/09

A02

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
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Telcon

Bernard Gwertzman/HAK

Thurs. July 26, 1973; 9:25 a.m.

G: Hello, Henry. How are you?

K: OK.

G: Good. I gather that you're not going to be going off to China until the second half of August at the earliest. Is that right?

K: That's right.

G: Is that because you want to wait until the bombing stops to see what it looks like at that time?

K: Well, that is a factor, and they have also probably a Party congress conference coming up.

G: Oh, I see, in the early part of August.

K: Well, I don't know the dates.

G: Uh, huh. But you know, they said the second half. And I guess also Sihanouk will be back by then presumably. But that doesn't mean you'll necessarily talk with him.

K: We'll just have to see how it develops now.

G: Uh, huh. Is there any reason for any hope in Phnom Penh. I mean I just don't see anything.

K: Well, we get very conflicting reports. There are some people who say it's not as bad as it looks, and there are others who say it's every bit as bad as it looks. And, you know, none of this is for attribution.

G: Yes.

K: You know, this deadline is not helpful, to put it mildly.

G: I know.

K: You know, it combines the worst features of bombing and of no negotiations.

-2-

G: Right.

K: Why should the other side negotiate. They have nothing to gain
by not waiting until they see what this hold does.

G: Yeah. Sure. That's why I suppose it would have made little sense
for you to even have been there five days before the bombing was
going to end.

K: No. It would have been senseless.

G: Yeah. Some people I know around town seem to think that in the end
the other side would opt for a kind of Laotian kind of settlement
where they'd have...

K: Well, that's the way it was heading in June.

G: Uh, huh, and then...what's unclear to me is whether it stopped
because of the Congress or just because Lon Nol's government
seemed to fall apart. I don't know.

K: I just don't want to speculate on that. It may be both.

G: Yeah. Right.

K: Look, I have somebody here. I know we didn't get each other
yesterday. That's why I took the call.

G: OK, thanks. Goodbye.

K: Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By NARA Date 6/9/69

Telcon
Mr. Kissinger
Senator McGee
7/26/73; 9:50 a.m.

McG: Is it possible to see you for ten minutes in the foreseeable future--
rather soon.

K: Sure.

McG: Tomorrow or Monday? They are very small matters but I would
rather do it personally.

K: Can you give me a hint but I will see you anyhow.

McG: Two matters. I was involved in the UN Rhodesian chrome matter
and I wanted to stress . . . The other one has to do with an experience
in Peking that I thought ought to be in no report.

K: I would like to see you anyhow. You have been a staunch friend.
I will get my office to call. Are you in town this weekend? Is Saturday
morning a possibility?

McG: It is a real possibility.

K: I wouldn't want to take you away from a golf game.

McG: No, no, I will be here.

K: I will have my office call.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/69

DECLASSIFIED

E 0.12958

By NARA Die 6/9/69

TELCOM
Minister Sykes/Mr. Kissinger

4:48 p. m. 7/26/73

K: I am calling you to tell you that the President is sending a letter to the Prime Minister in response to the letter we received this morning, which you may or may not have seen.

S: Yes, I have seen.

K: Which did not received universal approbation, I may say, and we would like the Prime Minister to understand--that is to say the President wants the Prime Minister to know--that that letter which is being returned to you is was personally dictated by him--it was not a staff effort.

S: You'll be sending it to us, but not on the direct line.

K: No we'll send it on the direct line--if you want a copy, I'll be glad to send you one.

S: It would be very kind, Dr. Kissinger--if you could send a copy up to us so that I'd be aware--

K: I'll be glad to send it to you. The only message I really have for you is to help the PM understand that this was personally dictated by the President--and gone over by him several times.

S: Well, I will make this very clear.

K: Good, fine, now I will see you all at 3:00 on--

S: 3:00 on Monday.
And to avoid any difficulties, if you would like to come round to the back entrance where we go in--

K: That'll be fine, if I get pressed with my schedule, here, I assume you would be willing to come here.

S: Of course.

K: Well let you know on Monday.

S: It's entirely up to you.

K: I'll let you know, if it turns out. Good bye.

TELCOM
UnderSec. Casey/Mr. Kissinger
7:00 p.m. 7/26/73

C: .... been handling it here and knows all the people, knows all the issues, good foreign service officer. I understand that the NSC has put forward to supporting Adolph Schmidt.

K: If they do, it hasn't been brought to me.

C: Yeh. That's what I hear from the personnel pros over there.

K: I sure as hell haven't seen the recommendation.

C: Do you know Schmidt?

K: Yeh, I think he is all right, but I have no particular interest in--

C: Well it is an important spot and I think ...... of value to you over there. He is fellow European knows all the personalities well,

K: I am not putting forward Schmidt--I have no reason to. I don't know where this rumor came from.

C: It--they tell me it comes from the NSC

K: I don't know what that means--it may mean a clerk in the NSC
--Okay, I'll keep this all in mind.

C: You'll what?

K: I'll keep it in mind when the recommendation which reaches me,
which it hasn't yet.

C: Okay, good. Schmidt is a nice fellow but he just isn't really smart enough to reach that job.

K: It hasn't reached me yet.

C: Okay.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/67

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Lloyd Norman
(Newsweek) 7/26/73 7:20 p.m.

LN: Hello, Dr. Kissinger, thank you for taking the call. I am an old Pentagon type--

HK: Yes, I know you.

LN: I wanted to check with you on this before it goes--the boss said to. In talking to the people at the Pentagon.....the cover up of the B-52 raids on C mbodia was ordered by Dr. Kissinger--

HK: Cover up? What do you mean, it wasn't a cover up. Oh well, I have given up on Newsweek.

LN: Don't give up on it Mr. Kissinger--it is my own integrity that is at stake. Can I say Kissinger gave orders that a special--

HK: I didn't order anything on my own. The President ordered it and I acquiesced and it was decided by the National Security Council to do this and it was only for secrecy.

LN: You were talking for the President?

HK: You can write what you want--I don't give a damn. If Newsweek wants to turn everything into a conspiracy, they can do it.

LN: No we are just trying to clarify this for New York--I received a phone call

HK: First of all, there was no cover up, secondly, there was a special arrangement to keep Sihanouk from making a public protest. When the bombing of North Vietnam was going on, American casualties following this went down, after that I had to beging a withdrawal process and all we wanted to make sure that the bombing be done in a process in which Sihanouk agreed. The only instruction the President gave and the national Security Council agreed to was to have maximum secrecy. That a cover up was ordered by Kissinger is bullshit. You might as well just say it was ordered by Laird. There was a decision of the National Security Council and ordered by the President--it was unanimous--but I am not running away--I was in total agreement.

DECLASSIFIED
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LN: Your place in the chain of command is the President, you, Secretary of Defense and Chief--

HK: The decision was made by the NSC and we informed key members of the congress and as a regular procedure, as you can imagine, and established with Sihanouk, while the bombing was going on--------Mansfield was there and Sihanouk didn't say a word about it.

LN: I was told by someone on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Sihanouk told him

HK: Mansfield did not know.

LN: He did not. So it was done by the NSC, the President did it and you passed the order--

HK: I had no particular force any more than any other member--it was made (the decision) on Sunday afternoon in the Oval Office and it was unanimously agreed to and for six weeks every strike was ordered here and after that Laird ordered it. It is a misleading impression to say that Mr. Kissinger ordered it. I am transmitting orders only. The chain goes from the President to Laird and my office transmits the order. I was 100% behind it though. But I object to the word cover up.

LN: Well, I will redo it then.

HK: I am talking this way because of what your foreign editor did to me last week--it is unwarranted unconscionable.

LN: I won't say anything on that.

HK: Hank Trewitt is an honorable man and I know you are but--

LN: I was disturbed when I saw it in Newsweek.

HK: If he had told me that the reason he was coming in here was--I don't object. But he came in to discuss, he said, the Bear of Europe and they start an interview with me and use what I say as a set of smart aleck remarks. But I don't think it is fair to call it a cover up.

LN: Well, I said it for brevity.

HK: This will sound like Watergate--By the way, this is background and it is not attributable to me--just say administrative sources.

LN: Really--well if you like. I'm sorry to bother you. HK: You didn't bother me.

DECLASSIFIED
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By A. NARA Dae 5/9/69

Telcon
Sonnenfeldt/HAK

Thurs. July 26, 1973; p.m.

K: Hal, one thing I have to make a decision on, on which I wanted your judgment. I think under these circumstances there's no point in my going to Europe before the Foreign Ministers meeting.

S: Well, Sheel says let's concentrate on the substance and do nothing to disturb the trend. I think he has a point you know. They are working on the documents at least.

K: Yeah, but in a framework that is suicidal. Unless we shoot one across the bow to them brutally now...

S: Well, I think that you should do.

K: Yeah, but shouldn't I go rather after their meeting than before?

S: I just don't know whether physically you know what you'll find, because these guys are all gonna be coming over here and there's gonna be -- I'm trying to find out what the various travel schedules are.

K: Or, maybe not go at all.

S: Well, they'll all be here.

K: Why don't I just go to Brussels. Why isn't it better if I just play it cool now?

S: Yeah. Brussels is certainly a very legitimate alternative, although it gets you into precisely the forums that we have problems with.

K: Well, we have trouble with these forums for what we want. In the Year of Europe there are better forums. If we could put it back into the bureaucracy.

S: Oh, yeah, sure.

K: I have to plan my trip to China, and, you see, if I don't go to Europe then I'll go to China from the 6th to the 9th and come back through Europe.

S: Yeah, right. Well, obviously the Europeans in that week before the 10th are gonna be wrestling with a piece of paper and to some

-2-

extent it will be a disturbing element for them for you to be there
at that point. On the other hand, if that piece of paper is just a
 (mock?) it's possible that you will shake them up enough that they
will issue new directives to their drafters as a result of that.
But you don't know whether you will see the piece of paper, how
much difference there'll be, and so on. So that's all very
questionable. Maybe you should just think in terms of Brussels
and then, with these people here it does pose a problem if we're
going to adhere to that time schedule for the President's trip.

K: I don't think we're going to make it.

S: Because, you know, it takes it to the end of September by the
time they've all trooped through here.

K: Hal, my point is if I'm going to take a cooler line, whether that
isn't better.

S: Yeah.

K: When am I going to see that letter?

S: It's in the typewriter now, Henry.

K: OK, fine.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E 0.12958
By A. NARA Date 6/9/69

["DECLASSIFIED\nAuthority E0.12958\nBy NARA Dige 6/9/69", "TELCOM", "Mel Elfin/Kissinger", "9:47 a.m. - 7/27/73", "K: Mel.", "E: Yes, Henry.", "K: I had sworn I would never deal with Newsweek again but you people can blackmail me always. Lloyd Norman called me yesterday and read me the beginning of a story that he was going to file which said the cover-up in Cambodia was ordered by Kissinger.", "E: Then he filed an addendum.", "K: If that was ever filed in New York you know they're going to use the first.", "E: No, I talked to them just now.", "K: Because you know there was no coverup.", "E: I will read you what Lloyd filed. After he filed the first thing you know what he said in the first one - I'll just read you the first two sentences attributable only to Administration sources \"The (force) insists it was not a coverup but merely the use of special secrecy precaution. . . . . . . . . . .

E: Look I'm transmitting this thing now. There is a news story right now and in 1969 an event occurred which was secret. The secrecy cover now has come off.

K: Right.

E: As far as

K: But you know Sihanouk cooperated with it, he deceived Mansfield during August of that year, he exchanged 4 or 5 Presidential letters with him, he reestablished diplomatic relations, so he clearly wasn't suffering any pain.

E: As far as I'm concerned...

K: Most news accounts picture it as an attack on neutral Cambodia.

E: I kind of remember back in the period that Sihanouk did approve the thing and Trewhitt was in Vietnam at the time and came back and said they heard reports that Sihanouk had approved the thing. I have already talked to Klein; I am going to talk to Klein again. We must run the story.

K: I am not asking you not to run the story. I am just asking...

E: Cambodia made at least tacit approval of the operation.

K: That's right. this was not a criminal conspiracy. We were trying to save lives, we were trying to protect the withdrawal. The only thing we didn't want to do is announce it in order to keep Sihanouk from being forced to have to... out. It wasn't just a question of embarrassment, we didn't see how by announcing it that Sihanouk would have any choice except to ask us to turn it off.

E: But it had his approval.

K: It had his acquiescence - I think that is the better word. The way this happened was we were protesting about the use of bases. We got a message from him - that's what the State Department referred to - in which he said we do not know what goes on in the unpopulated parts of our country by either side. We figured all right, we hear you. Then when we bombed he never protested. We kept it to within 15 km of the frontier in base areas where we knew there was no Cambodian population.

E: I'm going to go back at these people right now and the points I'm going to make with them are one, that had at least Sihanouk's acquiescence. Two, the Congressional leaders were briefed at the time. Three that it was at a moment that the withdrawal was receding at a pace...

K: We started it when we were contemplating the withdrawal but we had no idea when we first discussed our withdrawal, we didn't know whether the first 25,000 wouldn't become unstuck. In retrospect it all looks inevitable.

E: I'm going to put my own personal addendum on this thing now and I think we can at least

K: Mel, whatever yelling I do at you, it is not directed at you.

E: I know Henry.

K: You know that.

E: I know that and look, if there's anybody who understands the position you're in. . . . You once said something a couple of weeks ago where you and Al Haig and a couple of other people are sort of holding the thing together and I can - one has enormous affection for somebody in that position. You're in a position and I'm in a position.

K: Look Mel, you didn't have 1/10 of 1% of responsibility for what happened last week. You're just the guy. . .

E: No, but it's the same thing that the President must accept responsibility when something goes wrong in the government; I accept responsibility because it happens in my bailiwick. Also all these years I've been hearing about the terrible tempered Kissinger from fired aides and now I know. All right, Henry, and I'm going to shape this thing my way now. I hope I can do it.

K: Good. Thank you.

TELCORN

Danny Kaye/Mr. Kissinger

11:20 a.m. 7/27/73

HK: Danny how are you

DK: Fine and you

HK: Fine

DK How long will you be there?

HK: 10 days

DK: Are you coming down to LA

HK: Oh yeh, I can come down.

DK: I'll be home tomorrow--dan you come down Friday night

HK: Friday I can't do it

DK: Saturday?

HK: How about Monday or Tuesday

DK: Monday would be all right--Tuesday I go East.

HK: Let 's say Monday

DK: Do you want to invite Bob Evans or not
Who would you like?

HK: That would be fine--I haven't given it any thought. Look Danny I
probably have the Chinese Amb. coming the following Friday

DK: I won't be there--unfortunately
I'd love to do that--where?

HK: I thought --first of you to cook--
I was going to do it at a restaurant because I havw to invite notables
and make an affair out of it--they want to show themselves.

DK How many would you have to have?

HK: About 20 or so. I would want to give it.

DK: If we wanted to eat in the little dining room--the conventional dining
room--if you would want me to cook for 20 --I'd probably do it but

DECLASSIFIED
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Page 2

have to come back from the East.

HK: No, I don't want you to cook, but I'd like you to come if you can.

DK: I was to go to NY Tuesday and then Montreal and then I should be back on July 9--I have to be in Montreal--

HK: My affair is July 6

DK: I might be able to work that--I would try to come back

HK: Don't worry about cooking
I think really we'll do that any other time--

DK: All right. Now when I get home tomorrow, I'll call you tomorrow or Friday --you give some thought on who you would like to come and we'll do some things Monday night 9-10 (July 2)

HK: Terrific--be great to see you Danny.

DK: I'm delighted to talk to you--did you talk to David

HK: No I didn't--you were supposed to come back to DC after we met weren't you.

DK: Yes, I did come back--you had gone to Paris.

HK: When I know you are coming--I would do anything to--
Well I missed you. I'll see you next week.

DK: Will you be in SC over the weekend--

HK: Yes.

DK: Would you like to come and stay Sunday night

HK: I don't think I can

DK: Stay at the house Monday night?

HK: I'll leave that open--I may do that--but you will have two security people in your living room--

DK: That's fine. --we'll arrange coffee--and give them the keys to the refrig-
I'll call you Friday when you get home.

Telcon

Tom Mulliken, TIME/HAK

Thurs., July 27, 1973; 12:55 p.m.

M: This is one I thought was ticklish enough not to be a waste of time. Our man in Phnom Penh is filing that the U.S. is pressuring Lon Nol to resign.

K: That is not true.

M: I didn't think it was.

K: It is absolutely not true.

M: We have told him he could come to the U.S. for medical treatment and that is it. It would seem that would be the route to go if he wanted to get out of that city.

K: We are emphatically not pressuring him to resign.

M: You told me to call you if we had a query.

K: Your meticulousness is appreciated.

DECLASSIFIED
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DECLASSIFIED

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By AB NARA Date 6/9/04

TELCOM

Lloyd Norman/Kissinger

3:00 p.m. - 7/27/73

K: Hello.

N: I'm sorry to trouble you with what really is an historical question. I am trying to get the date of that Sunday meeting in the Oval Room and who was present.

K: I do not know the exact date -- it was the middle of March.

N: It was just before the beginning. . .

K: Just before the beginning of what?

N: The B-52s

K: That's what it was about and present were Laird, Rogers, Helms, Wheeler and myself.

N: The President?

K: Of course.

N: I wasn't sure whether they would hold the meeting without him.

K: And this is where the basic decisions were made. This is why I am re-
acting to the fact that there was a special order for secrecy. I do not,
in fact, recall that I transmitted a special order for secrecy but I could
have, but the basic decision was made at that meeting.

N: Did you have a special precaution?

K: Yes, but for overriding reasons. If Sihanouk wouldn't protest we
would not force him into protesting through a publication and therefore
lose the chance of saving American lives and I think I also think it is
important to point out that it was confined to a 10 mile area along the
border that was not populated.

N: I know. We thought it was 3 - 5 miles.

K: I think it was 15 km, but it might not be.

N: Were you informed at that time either through diplomatic or other
sources that Sihanouk was taking this . . . . . . ?

2

K: We had information that led us to believe he might take this attitude.
I don't want to discuss that.

N: I assume that

K: This turned out to be ______ and after all there was an exchange of letters between the President and Sihanouk. Afterwards there was diplomatic recognition, Mansfield was there and

N: The exchange of letters involved the resumption of diplomatic relations?

K: It came during August.

N: After the Mansfield visit.

K: Yes.

N: August of 1969. Fine. And I would assume there was no opposition to the bombing.

K: It was unanimous. Look, when you have 250 casualties a week, when you have already decided to start to pull out. You remember people though! It might unravel the whole thing.

N: I know some of your own personal friends were skeptical. This is essentially what I wanted to check and we will say in the middle of March on a Sunday. I will check the calendar. OK, sir, thank you very much.

K: Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCONE

Saul Pett/Kissinger

3:08 p. m. - 7/27/73

P: What are the chances of seeing you one of these days on the wear and tear of Watergate?

K: Let me think about it. You know Watergate is like waving red flags before people but let me think about it

P: By wear and tear I mean the White House, Government, etc.

K: I know what you mean.

P: Can I call back?

K: Call back in a week or so. Call back the middle of next week.

P: Who should I ask for?

K: Dick Campbell.

P: Oh, he always stops me. I never get by him. Can you leave word with him?

K: Yes.

P: OK.

By: NARA Date: 5/9/09

TELCONE

Ken Fried/Kissinger

3:32 p.m. - 7/27/73

K: Hello.

F: The burning story in the Times is . . . . . Everyone is all excited about it.

K: Look, he got carried away. I told him no date has been fixed yet which is true which I have been saying.

F: How about the impression everybody had that you planned to go back early in August?

K: It never came from me.

F: Was any decision taken that you would not go back until late August until Sihanouk ______. How about that?

K: We are talking for background.

F: Your decision to go after the 15th.

K: Well, it isn't my decision. We haven't really fixed a date yet.

F: How about the American aid negotiators to Paris? There is no intention to send them back until the end of August or later.

K: You mean the Vietnamese?

F: Yes.

K: I frankly don't know but that is a reasonable date.

F: How are things going? About Cambodia, you indicated there were some

K: In the meantime there have been some new developments. My personal judgment is we will sort of bide time until August 15.

F: OK. I talked to Senator Mansfield and he said no one indicated to him to carry any messages to the Prince when he does go to Peking. He would be willing to if someone would contact him. Is there any plan to do that?

K: I am in touch with Senator Mansfield and we will look at this as the time of his trip approaches.

DECLASSIFIED
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A6

2

F: There is one other thing - the matter that this is -- I wonder if you would be willing to meet with me sometime in the next week to talk about the effect of Watergate on foreign policy.

K: Saul Pett asked me the same thing.

F: No, I just got a call from my office saying that he wanted a story by Thursday.

K: Call me Tuesday or Wednesday.

F: All right, I will talk to you then.

DECLASSIFIED
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Telcon
Murray Marder/HAK

5th Friday, July 27, 1973; 3:55 p.m.

M: Henry, I wanted to see if I could untangle a couple of points. Is it correct or incorrect to say your trip has been put back because of Cambodia? It seems to me that was a questionable way of putting it.

K: No, I wouldn't put it that way. And put back that press speculation. I wouldn't ever say when it would be. We said we would announce it when a mutually acceptable date had been agreed.

M: I left San Clemente at a point after which it was reported from there you were going in June, then July, then early August. I don't frankly -- it was not clear what was supposed to be authoritative.

K: The authoritative thing was what we said, which was we would announce it when the date has been agreed on.

M: Is there anything sayable for guidance as to whether there has been a postponement.

K: You can say nothing about a postponement when there hasn't been a postponement. And I wouldn't read any profound significance into it. Our business in Peking is not primarily Cambodia.

M: This is what you told me the other day and earlier, and this is what I was trying to see if it was possible for me to clarify.

K: This is what I am clarifying, Murray.
[Reads from paper]

M: /That was not in conformity with what you told me privately.

K: I think Bernie just shot from the hip a little bit.

M: Your trip will not take place before August 15, is that correct?

K: That is correct.

M: You told me earlier your trip had been set but with the not prior to August 15 date, so it was never set with the August 15 date, is that correct?

K: That is correct.

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M: Is there anything sayable in terms of negotiating prospects on Cambodia?

K: My guess is we will have to wait until the deadline is passed. I mean, that is just elementary logic. Why should people discuss these fears when one part of the equation is likely to end.

M: All right. Is it possible to make any projection at this point as to what the crumbling danger there is after August 15?

K: I don't think anybody knows. We have had the spectrum from two weeks to 9 months.

M: What would be sayable from the guidance standpoint about the negotiating capacity once bombing has ended?

K: It depends entirely on the resilience and strength of the Phnom Penh government.

M: Do you see this increasing at this stage?

K: Again, we get conflicting reports about that. We think now the principal negotiation has to be by the Cambodians.

M: Sihanouk said before he left, he clearly indicated the road was open for negotiations with the Khmer Rouge.

K: The question is whether we under these conditions should be the ones to conduct them.

M: Should we, frankly?

K: I beg your pardon?

M: Should we?

K: I think the primary responsibility is the Cambodians' now.

M: They have kept saying repeatedly that they have no negotiations going on and no particular prospect for them. Is there any change in the physical situation. He is still there I presume?

K: That is correct.

-3-

M: We have a story out today.

K: Which is not true, that we have asked him to resign.

M: Does it look like he is going to stay there after the 15th, or is that determinable?

K: That is not determinable. Sihanouk is in a complex position now. He keeps saying he is not going to talk. The Khmer Rouge does not need Sihanouk and Sihanouk does not control the Khmer Rouge.

M: There is a quotation here. This is familiar to you. If the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong have not left by the 15th we will ask to continue bombing and ask our neighbors as well as the South Vietnamese and the Thais. I recall when Thieu was here he told us that for South Vietnam to come into the Cambodian situation to replace U.S. combat power would probably mean the destruction of the Paris Agreement.

K: Well, I just don't want to speculate on any of this. I have to run, Murray. If you have one more question.

M: Just one more, briefly. To try to avoid a tangled situation in terms of a visit by you, is it more likely now in the September range?

K: I just don't want to speculate. As soon as we have a date we will announce it.

M: I am just trying to avoid having it tangled around the 15th.

K: It won't be on the 16th. It won't be just around the 15th.

M: All right.

Telcon
Phil Geyelin/HAK

July 27, 1973; 5:15 p.m.

G: I would like to see you before I go on vacation.

K: When are you going?

G: Wednesday.

K: How about breakfast Monday.

G: Can we make it Tuesday?

K: Let me think. There is a reason I can't make it Tuesday.

G: [Gave reason he could not make Monday breakfast.]

K: Let me see whether I can change my Tuesday breakfast.

G: Or we can come over some time Monday. I would like to bring Meg along. She is going to be running the thing.

K: I will call you Monday morning and we will either have a drink on Monday evening or breakfast Tuesday morning.

G: I will talk to you Monday.

K: Come in inconspicuously. We have a red wig you can wear.

G: Where do you issue those?

K: I saw one lying around. Do you think that means anything?

G: There must be a safe house somewhere.

K: Just wear a wig and come in on Monday.

G: I will see you.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCOM

Dr. Arthur Burns/Mr. Kissinger

7:15 p.m., July 27, 1973

K: Hello

B: Henry, you know, the subject we talked about. A name occurred to me later on and I don't know if you know the man but I'll tell you the history and something about the man. John Meyer -- now you may think he's too old.

K: No, I don't know who he is.

B: Well, he was the head of J. P. Morgan.

K: Oh, yes.

B: He retired last year. I recommended him to Bill Rogers for that specific post. He came down and there were conversations and then I don't know what happened. They delayed because -- It didn't materialize. But I can tell you this about him, I recommended him because I regard him as by far the best banker in the country.

K: Well, asked between him and the other man you mentioned, whom would you recommend?

B: From an intellectual viewpoint, Meyer is clearly superior. From the viewpoint of reputation world-wide, Meyer is known in this country. I doubt if he has a world-wide reputation. But he is extraordinary really. Sterling character of the highest integrity. So you've got two good names there.

K: Well, this will not happen all that quickly.

B: I know, I know. And I'll keep on thinking. But John Meyer must be 66.

K: That doesn't bother me.

B: No, he comes down now and then to advise me and I see him. He's in perfect health to the best of my knowledge.

K: Let's you and I stay in close touch, Arthur.

B: Right.

really

K: And I appreciated our talk the other morning.

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TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/George Sherman

7/28/73 1:45 p.m.

HK: Aren't you on vacation?

S: No, I assume Irene gave you my request. I am going next week-- Friday and I would like to see you before you leave.

K: I will do my best.

S: I will be writing my column during it. So I'll have something to go on while I am away, ~~I'd like to talk to you.~~

K: Right.

S: Maybe we can have lunch next week?

K: I will call you Monday.

S: Another thing, I gather that this trip of yours to Peking is put off until after August 15.

K: We never set a day.

S: But it will be after the bombing halt?

K: Probably.

S: And this gets to what you said before that you were rather discouraged on how things were going during the past 3-4 weeks on talks to Cambodia.

K: Partially.

All

S: In the Marder article, this morning, was that overdrawn? On the claim to negotiations have been dropped.¹

K: That is overdrawn.

S: You never claimed negotiations were going on did you--with Cambodia

K: No, I have never claimed it.

S: Does this mean contact talks with the Cambodian parties have stopped?

K: No I think it is hard to have negotiations under conditions when a major event is expected to happen.

S: Sullivan was saying to the over seas writers that the crucial period comes after the bombing hald to see if the government can sustain itself and then maybe a negotiation could exist.

K: I think that is right.

S: Regarding the bombing, are we bombing up to the 15th.

K: They are in the process of looking into that.

S: It has somewhat tappered off (regarding the B-52's.)

K: Somewhat yes.

S: What are you looking into now?

K: I can't go into the details of what we are doing and besides it is irrelevant point.

S: Whether it stops suddenly or tappers off.

K: Yes.

S: Are there diplomatic overtones?

K: No.

S: Have the Lon Nol people made any progress in contacting the Khmer Rouge--

K: Not too much.

S: Have they been trying?

K: Yes, but I can't go through the scenario of negotiations.

S: I haven't talked to you in about three weeks--are there any changes?

K: Things have slowed down a bit which is inevitable given the circumstances.

S: Contacts with Russia and China--have they gone as far as we can go--are they aware of our position?

K: Certainly, everyone is aware of our position.

S: We have to see if they will move on there own.

K: Of course they will move on there own. George, I can't give
the details, I am sorry. Murrays' article is one of those super-
clever pieces with little digs but it is exaggerated.

S: Things have slowed down. Was there any significance that
Warren can't say anything --

K: On what.

S: One of his bases for claims about dropping claims to negotiations is
that he didn't answer the question.

K: On what, Cambodia?

S: On Cambodia as negotiations are going forward.

K: When you say that then you have to say with whom and etc, and
it is a complex situation --you know negotiations don't operate
in a vacuum. Everyone will assess who has resources available
and staying power. You can figure that out.

S: Yes, but I like to hear you tell me.

K: You know the situation changes when some of the pressures disappears.

S: You will now accept the halt (bombing) as definite.

K: I have assumed that there is no possibility that Congress will extend it.

S: Okay Henry, you will call me on Monday then

K: Yes.