FBIS 24

PEKING REPORT ON KISSINGER ARRIVAL

PEKING NCNA DOMESTIC SERVICE IN CHINESE 1206 GMT 20 OCT 71 B

(TEXT) PEKING, 20 OCTOBER 7-DR. KISSINGER AND HIS PARTY, TOTALLING 14 PEOPLE, WHO WILL MAKE CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT TO CHINA, ARRIVED IN PEKING AT NOON TODAY BY SPECIAL PLANE.

GREETING THEM AT THE AIRPORT WERE: YEH CHIEN-YING, CHI PENG-FEI, YU SANG, HSIUNG HSIANG-HUI, HAN HSU, MA JEN-HUI, → Civil Air Admin.
WANG HSIAO-I, CHIEN TA-YUNG AND OTHERS.

CHANG WEN-CHIN, WANG HAI-JUNG, TANG WEN-SHENG, AND OTHERS MADE A SPECIAL TRIP TO SHANGHAI TO GREET AND ACCOMPANY THEM TO PEKING.

WHEN DR. KISSINGER AND PARTY PASSED THROUGH SHANGHAI THIS MORNING, FENG KUO-CHU, MEMBER OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE GREETED THEM AT THE AIRPORT.

20 OCT 1236Z KH/CAT

FBIS 24 ......

GREETING THEM AT THE AIRPORT WERE: YEH CHIEN-YING, CHI PENG-FEI, YU SANG, HSIUNG HSIANG-HUI, HAN HSU, MA JEN-HUI, WANG HSIAO-I, CHIEN TA-YUNG, AND OTHERS.

20 OCT 123Z KH/CAT ......

Wally McNamee—Newsweek

The President discusses travel plans with Kissinger: A case of good statesmanship equaling good politics

From Peking to Moscow to San Diego

A meeting of the Democratic National Committee had broken for lunch in Washington's Mayflower Hotel last week when someone hurried into the lobby with the news that President Nixon planned a trip to Moscow. Stunned by the announcement, one influential Democrat turned to another and sighed: "He's killing us." It was only a slight exaggeration. Mr. Nixon's Soviet summit, scheduled for late next May, threatened to snatch another prime election issue away from the Democrats. Coming on the heels of his China initiative—and in the midst of his earnest efforts to straighten out the economy and wind down the Vietnam war—it left even Hubert Humphrey temporarily speechless. Worst of all for the Democrats, Mr. Nixon's latest bombshell was not just good politics; it also seemed to be good statesmanship.

From the President's point of view, there was a lot more at stake than the chance to sock it to the Democrats. "The greatest honor history can bestow," Mr. Nixon declared in his Inaugural Address, "is the title of peacemaker." After 34 months in office, it appeared that Mr. Nixon was finally getting his shot at the title. For the fact that the President could afford to announce his Moscow trip only days before Henry Kissinger left on a second visit to Peking late last week demonstrated that his Administration had managed to get the two mutually antagonistic giants of the Communist world to simultaneously lend him a helping hand.

Mr. Nixon had been aiming for a Soviet summit ever since he took office. According to White House sources, the first serious discussion of such a meeting occurred when the President received

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko last fall. But other high officials believe that the President himself took the crucial initiative in a private letter to Leonid Brezhnev shortly after he announced his intention of visiting China. As these sources tell it, the Russians were reluctant and, instead, they hinted that Premier Aleksei Kosygin could drop in on the President after his visit to Canada this month. But Mr. Nixon asserted that the Russians owed him an invitation in return for Khrushchev's 1959 U.S. visit. And at a meeting in the White House late last month, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko came through with that invitation.

Motive: The President was careful to emphasize that the trips to China and Russia were not designed "for the purpose of exploiting what differences may exist between the two countries." And there was no reason to believe that Washington had some crude plan to play the Communist rivals off against each other—a tactic that Henry Kissinger scornfully dismissed not long ago as "two-bit Machiavelli." The Chinese were informed of a possible U.S.-Soviet summit by Kissinger during his secret mission to Peking last July, and they were given advance warning of last week's announcement (as were Japan and the European allies). But the fear that the U.S. and China might team up was clearly one motive for the Kremlin's invitation to the President, and the fact that such combinations were very much on Russian minds was heavily underscored last week when Kosygin told a group of visiting American governors that, on the other side of the coin, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had no intention of "ganging up to dictate their will" to other nations.

Beyond that, the Soviets were anxious to keep the ball rolling on European détente, and they had come to recognize that they needed U.S. cooperation for that purpose. In addition, they were eager to expand their commercial ties with the U.S. "The Russians are far behind us in many areas of technology," observed a U.S. official. "They have decided that the quickest way to close the gap is to buy modern equipment from the West and, to them, that means American equipment."

The Soviets went out of their way last week to indicate that the Nixon visit probably would not produce any dramatic progress on such difficult issues as Vietnam or the Middle East. But there did seem to be a good chance that by the time Mr. Nixon arrives in Moscow, he will be in a position to wrap up—and possibly even sign—an agreement limiting anti-ballistic-missile systems, and perhaps even a compromise solution limiting the deployment of offensive missiles as well. For Mr. Nixon, moreover, the trip would provide a Moscow summit experience that was denied to Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson, both of whom had to cancel scheduled visits (General Eisenhower's visit was shot down by the U-2 affair, and Johnson's plans unfortunately were undone by the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968).

The Moscow trip was uniformly well-received in Congress. Even the few legislators who had been critical of the visit to Peking—including Sen. Peter Dominick, chairman of the Senate Republican campaign committee—were quick to endorse the Soviet summit. And such was the aura of correctness and inevitability sur-

20

rounding the trip that not a single Democratic Presidential hopeful even issued a statement about it. "Nixon's making so much news lately that it seems he's competing with himself for the front page," lamented an aide to Hubert Humphrey. "You can't be issuing reaction statements all the time."

There was no denying the fact that, from a political point of view, the Moscow and Peking trips had positioned Mr. Nixon beautifully. The President had pre-empted a major campaign issue by doing exactly what many Democrats had been urging all along. And the timing was little short of perfection. At the moment, the best guess is that Mr. Nixon will go to China shortly after the first of the year, when the 1972 campaign will be gathering steam. And the Moscow trip will take place at about the same time as the Oregon and California primaries—a short but respectable interval before the Republican Presidential convention meets in San Diego in August to crown its nominee. By then, the Democrats presumably will have spent many months squabbling with each other, but Mr. Nixon will have established an enviable campaign position: a statesman who has visited the Communist capitals in earnest search of world peace. Moreover, the Moscow summit could be useful political insurance, in case the projected visit to Peking turns out to be embarrassingly unproductive.

**Image:** It is true that, except in time of war, foreign policy rarely decides a Presidential election. But in these war-weary times, a peacemaker image could be more than normally helpful. And although the economy still appears to be the critical election issue, the President's ambitious globetrotting could be useful distraction if his economic program falls a little short of success. In addition, by making tangible progress toward replacing confrontation with negotiation in foreign affairs, Mr. Nixon will be keeping another of his 1968 campaign promises (as he has attempted to do, in his own fashion, with Vietnam and the economy). But perhaps the best argument for the political value of the Chinese and Russian trips is simply that they make diplomatic sense at this moment in the world's history.

Considering all the domestic problems that have occupied him recently, it was significant that Mr. Nixon had still found time to arrange the Soviet summit. "President Nixon is foreign-policy-oriented," explained a top Republican Congressional leader. "It may strike some as curious that a man who has the vision and boldness to take diplomatic steps that his predecessors didn't dare to try can also do some really foolish things on the domestic front, such as naming G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court. You may ask how one man could perform so unevenly. My answer is that his real interest, his absorbing interest, is foreign policy. I don't think he cares a hell of a lot about domestic issues." Indeed, diplo-

macy does seem to be the President's strong suit. At least for the moment, he has enlisted both the Soviet Union and China in the pursuit of American objectives, and that is something that no other postwar President ever managed, even briefly.

The President, moreover, still has plenty of room in which to maneuver. His next announcement on Vietnam troop withdrawals is scheduled for the middle of next month, and in the process of lining up the Russians and Chinese, he has managed to avoid mortgaging his

freedom of action on that critical subject. Of course, there was also plenty of time for Mr. Nixon's foreign-policy game plan to fall apart. But the announcement of the Moscow summit capped a remarkable three-month period in which the President dramatically improved his political prospects. "He can be beaten because he's Richard Nixon," remarked an assistant to Sen. Birch Bayh, who last week took himself out of the running for the Democratic nomination (page 27). "But it won't be as easy as a lot of people thought."

## THE VIEW FROM THE SUMMIT

Since the start of World War II, U.S. Presidents have participated in eight East-West summit conferences. Some of them, like the 1945 Yalta summit, helped reshape the map of the world. Others, like the 1967 meeting at Glassboro between Lyndon Johnson and Aleksei Kosygin, were hastily arranged and just as quickly forgotten. Below, views of the summit by some who have been there:

"The personal meeting with Staiin [at Potsdam in 1945] enabled me to see at firsthand what we and the West had to face in the future."

Harry Truman

"We have made a lot of agreements with the Russians and some of them have stood up and others have been broken. But the agreements that have stood up the best are not made at the summit."

John Foster Dulles

"[Summit conferences are] not diplomacy or negotiation at all. They are propaganda tournaments in which the protagonists are aiming not at those with whom they talk, but at their rivals' public opinion. This is well understood by the totalitarians, but only partly by democratic politi-

cians, and not at all by the democratic public."

Charles de Gaulle

"Like mountain summits, political summits are normally barren."

Dwight Eisenhower

"We are for holding a summit meeting. But wouldn't it be better to take the American imperialists by the scruff of the neck, give them a good shaking and make them know they cannot commit such acts of aggression?"

Nikita Khrushchev following the capture of U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1960

"Summit talks can provide a preliminary exchange of views or smooth out final points where basic agreement has already been reached. But it is impossible at summit talks to negotiate if preparatory work has not been done, or if there are wide differences of opinion."

W. Averell Harriman

"Summit diplomacy is to be approached with the wariness with which a prudent physician prescribes a habit-forming drug—a technique to be employed rarely and under the most exceptional circumstances."

Dean Rusk

The Big Three at Yalta: Summits can be useful—like drugs

UPI

October 25, 1971

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TIME
THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE
October 25, 1971 Vol. 98, No. 17

THE NATION

AMERICAN NOTES

The Nixon Genre

As he himself admits, Richard Nixon has a face that invites caricature. But lately the lampooning of the President has expanded far beyond the cartoonist's drawing board and become a minor genre of the arts. Documentary Film Maker Emile de Antonio has compiled *Millhouse* (TIME, Oct. 18), a wistfully derisive splicing of Nixoniana. Novelist Richard Condon (*The Manchurian Candidate*) has come forth with *The Veritical Smile*, a politico-sexual farce whose hero, Duncan Mulligan, is a Wall Street lawyer, transvestite and presidential candidate known, lest anyone miss the point, as "Funky Dune."

Finally, Novelist Philip Roth (Goodbye Columbus, Portnoy's Complaint) has written *Our Gang*, due out in November, starring President Trick E. Dixon, his wife Pitter. Attorney General Malicious, Vice President What's-his-name and others, including Jacqueline Charrisma Colossus. In Roth's manically scurrilous satire, Dixon stealthily retires to a bombproof White House locker room during a national crisis and suits up in his "Prissier College" football uniform to bolster his confidence. At times, the mimicry of Nixon's manner and cadences is brilliant. Alternating between the Swiftian and the sophomoric, Roth has Dixon assassinated by drowning in an oversized Baggie and ending up in Hell, running for the office of Devil against Satan himself.

There may be some nasty fun in all of this meat ax malice, and some political truths as well. But most of it is

so extravagantly hostile that even a determined Nixon hater may find himself feeling an unexpected sympathy for the victim. With enemies like that, Richard Nixon may have to lean less on his friends.

Fire on the Right

With his China initiative, the President is also taking some satirical fire from the right. William Loeb, publisher of the Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader and conservative thinker somewhat abait of Coriolanus, regards the Peking trip with such horror that he instituted a reader contest to rename the President's plane, now called *The Spirit of '76*. That title, Loeb asserted, is totally inappropriate.

The contest winner was bland enough: *Freedom's Futile Flight*. A few of the other, somewhat more imaginative entries: *Red Airing* (second prize), *Ping Pong Express*, *Tricky Dickie's Chicken Ship*, *Neville Chamberlain Express*, *Yellow Bird*, *Judas Jet*, *Air Farce One*, *Asian Flew*, *Ding-A-Ling Dickie's Rickety Red Rickshaw* and *Go Mao, Pay Later*.

A Parcel of Posts

Living in the future places quite a burden on language. For some years intelllectuals have sought a vocabulary to describe a society that has, in its own mind, passed outside familiar landmarks into unexplored realities. For a time, as the quarterly the *Public Interest* observes, the voguish literary modifier was "beyond"—beyond tragedy, beyond ideology, beyond capitalism.

Now the new modifier is "post." The *Public Interest* has collected 19 of the new signposts: post-bourgeois, post-capitalist, post-Christian, post-civilized, post-economic, post-historic, post-industrial, post-liberal, post-literature, post-market, post-materialist, post-modern, post-organization, post-protestant, post-puritan, post-scarcity, post-traditional, post-tribal and post-welfare.

Although the terms are sometimes interesting and useful, they have the effect of turning life into a kind of chartless supervoid. Perhaps the real problem is that too many sociologists and other thinkers have grown post-articulate.

THE SPIRIT OF '76

THE PRESIDENT'S PLANE

Or Ding-a-ling Dickie's Rickety Rickshaw.

NIXON'S MOSCOW KITCHEN DEBATE (1959)

Summitry:

AND now, Moscow too. Bent on becoming a Sino-Soviet summiteer, Richard Nixon accepted an invitation to visit the Soviet capital late in May for talks with Soviet leaders that will cover "all major issues" affecting the two powers. The Moscow mission will thus apparently follow by several months the President's journey to Peking. If the world does not, in fact, move from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation, it will clearly not be because Nixon did not try.

Yet it was still to Peking that the President was looking first. Only a few days after the Moscow announcement, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and nine aides took off for China to make arrangements for the Nixon trip, now expected to take place early in January. After a two-day stopover in Hawaii so that they can arrive rested, the group will spend four days in Peking. While Kissinger and State Department China Expert Alfred Le S. Jenkins seek agreement on a general agenda, other aides will work out the logistics, including the possibility of using a communications satellite to facilitate press coverage.

After the China trip, if nothing upsets his plans, Nixon will become the first sitting U.S. President to visit Moscow and only the second to meet Russian leaders in the Soviet Union. Franklin Roosevelt traveled to Yalta for a fateful wartime conference with Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill in 1945. Despite the postwar chill between the two nations, recent Presidents have been more than willing to seek better relations with the U.S.S.R. by going to Moscow. But Dwight Eisenhower's plans to visit the Kremlin crashed with the shooting down of a U.S. spy plane over Russia in 1960. At the time John Kennedy was killed, talks were under way about a possible presidential visit to Moscow in the spring of 1964. Lyn-

"Surprise-of-the-month club."

NIXON AFTER ANNOUNCING MOSCOW TRIP

## From Peking to Moscow

don Johnson was about to announce his acceptance of a Soviet invitation when the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968.

No Euphoria. Nixon was tense and solemn as he announced his latest travel plans at an unscheduled press conference. Then he accepted questions. No, the trips to Peking and Moscow were not directly related. "Neither trip is being taken for the purpose of exploiting what differences may exist between the two nations." Yes, Peking had been informed of the Moscow plans. So had Japan and the NATO allies. Both trips will be working trips, will include both Secretary of State William Rogers and Kissinger, and will be attended by "an absolute minimum of ceremony." Said Nixon: "The purpose of both visits is not simply cosmetics. We are not taking a trip for the sake of taking a trip." He still felt that summit meetings without a probability of substantive agreements ought to be avoided, since they only "create euphoria." Added the President: "We are not making that mistake."

The go-ahead for the Moscow visit thus rested partly on a common belief in both capitals that a climate of co-operation has been achieved. As Vice President in 1959, Nixon held a famous finger-waving "kitchen debate" with Nikita Khrushchev at an American exhibition in Moscow; he was completely snubbed by Soviet officialdom when he visited Moscow as a private citizen in 1967. But shortly after he became President, he talked publicly of wanting to meet Soviet leaders eventually. He and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko privately discussed the possibility in Washington last year, but agreed that progress on access to Berlin and arms limitation must come first. Now there has been a preliminary four-power agreement on Berlin, and a consensus on limiting defensive missiles seems near in the SALT talks. Gromyko

returned with a formal invitation last month, and Nixon accepted. Throughout, the matter was handled with the complete secrecy of which the President is so fond. Thus Nixon was able to complete his trinity of stunning surprises: the Peking trip, the New Economic Policy and the Moscow summit.

Although Nixon cautioned that he does not expect all of "the very great differences" between the Soviet Union and the U.S. to be resolved in a single visit, Premier Aleksei Kosygin last week contributed to the mood of better Soviet-American relations by cheerily welcoming a group of eight U.S. Governors to the Kremlin and asking them to convey his greetings to Nixon. He hailed the coming Nixon visit as a move toward cementing friendship between the two governments. But what can reasonably be expected from the meeting? The possibilities include agreement on:
**NUCLEAR ARMS.** Nixon hinted that arms control will top the agenda. Even as Pentagon officials were warning of a continuing Soviet arms buildup, Nixon said that he and Soviet leaders should be able to agree "that neither major power can get a decisive advantage over the other" so as to launch "a pre-emptive nuclear attack" or "engage in international blackmail." Defense Secretary Melvin Laird seemed to be arguing that the U.S.S.R. was seeking such an advantage when he told a press conference last week that the Soviet navy was building nuclear missile submarines at a rate that would enable it to match the U.S. Polaris submarine force by 1973—about a year ahead of previous U.S. estimates. He also alluded to the detection of nearly 100 large empty silos in the Soviet Union that still puzzle U.S. intelligence.

Actually, U.S. and Soviet officials concur privately that some kind of first-phase agreement arising from the continuing SALT talks will be signed by

the heads of state at the Moscow meeting. This first step is expected to include a limitation on anti-ballistic missiles to just two sites for each power, and a freeze on intercontinental ballistic missiles. Compliance will presumably depend upon the ability of satellite surveillance to detect violations.

**EUROPEAN SECURITY.** There could be an agreement to hold meetings between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations aimed at reaching a mutual and balanced reduction of forces (MBFR) in Europe. This would deal not only with conventional forces, but also with at least two other problems that SALT is expected to leave unresolved: whether to limit shorter-range nuclear missiles and tactical nuclear weapons borne by carrier-based aircraft. The U.S. might conceivably yield to the persistent Soviet call for a broader European security conference. Such a conference would deal with the status of the two Germanys and the nations of Eastern Europe; the

KISSINGER LEAVING FOR PEKING

DON CARL STEFTER

["Russians will presumably want to formalize the existing political arrangements there. Moscow and Washington alone could not, of course, determine whether such a conference should be held, but U.S. agreement would make its realization likely.", "MIDDLE EAST. At the least, the two powers could agree to avoid escalation of arms shipments to Israel and Egypt—a practice that once again seems on the verge of another round. Finding ways to encourage a settlement will be far tougher, but in the meantime the mere announcement of the pending meeting tends to reduce the probability of a new outbreak of warfare.", "SOUTHEAST ASIA. As with the Peking summit, speculation inevitably arises that the U.S. may try to coax the Communist powers into applying pressure on Hanoi to negotiate a settlement in Viet Nam or join in a Geneva-style regional conference that would deal with all of Southeast Asia. But the North Vietnamese remain reluctant. Hanoi feels that it was sold out by the superpowers at the last Geneva conference in 1954, and now sees its goals within reach. Neither Moscow nor Peking seems eager to cooperate in applying pressure, although this remains a remote possibility. At the same time, Washington abounds with rumors that Nixon may just pull another surprise in November when he deals with troop withdrawals from Viet Nam; he could virtually end U.S. military involvement by a fixed date. That would reduce—if not practically eliminate—Viet Nam as an issue at both summit meetings.", "Other less momentous matters could be resolved in Moscow. The Russians seem eager to increase their trade with the U.S., particularly by buying equipment to advance Soviet industrial technology. Agreement seems possible on ways to avoid military collisions at sea caused by ships observing each other's naval maneuvers; negotiations on this topic began in Moscow last week.", "Despite Nixon's *pro forma* attempt to separate the Moscow and Peking trips—the timing was elaborately arranged to minimize suspicion in each capital that he might be working in collusion with the other—the high-level diplomacy is obviously interrelated. By arranging to visit both Peking and Moscow, Nixon shrewdly made it difficult for either of the rival Communist capitals to back down. More broadly, the two visits symbolize the transition from a period in which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. enjoyed a bipolar dominance into a multipower era in which China and Japan will become increasingly significant factors in global politics. The Kremlin leaders will undoubtedly pump Nixon, however discreetly, on what he may have learned in Peking.", "The impending double dose of summitry means that the Nixon-Kissinger dream of a new era of negotiations has taken general shape. The next step is to give it substance.", "## Nixon's Not So Supreme Court", "WITH the death of Justice Hugo Black and the simultaneous retirement of Justice John Harlan, President Nixon had an unusual opportunity to redress the embarrassment of his two unsuccessful Supreme Court nominations—G. Harrold Carswell and Clement F. Haynsworth. Surely he must now avoid renewed humiliation by proposing Justices of impeccable credentials and unquestioned eminence. But last week, when the names of six potential appointees, including two women, were made known, Richard Nixon once again demonstrated his inability or unwillingness to nominate renowned jurists to the highest tribunal in the land.", "That the President was opting for mediocrity and playing politics at the same time became obvious when the White House first floated the name of U.S. Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia. Nixon would be hard-pressed to find a candidate less qualified than Byrd or one more certain to touch off bitter controversy around the country—if not in the Senate, where Byrd replaced Teddy Kennedy as Democratic whip this year.", "Eat Crow. An organizer for the Ku Klux Klan in the '40s, an affiliation he has since recanted, Byrd, 53, has a less", "master stroke and urged", "Connally's thesis, reported picking Byrd would make eat crow. After rejecting H. and Carswell, it would now with rejecting one of its own. Even Byrd's Senate critics themselves in a corner. Courted that the Senate would prove him because he was of the club. The assessment ably correct. A quiet Administration indicated that ten Senators would vote no.", "As speculation—\"and dism", "JUDGE MILDRED LILLIE\nNo approach to dist", "Bar Association last week.", "HERSCHEL H. FRIDAY, 49. \"For has not latched on to a relevant, petent,\" says Philip Kaplan, an attorney who has opposed times in court. \"But still, F. F. F. F. F. F. F.

...U.S., ALBANIAN POSITIONS, p. 1

...CONNALLY REMARKS, EEC ACCORD, p. 12

OPENING OF U.N. CHINA DEBATE

Summary

As the U.N. debate on China mounted in intensity, media in many countries prominently reported the American and Albanian statements and U.S. efforts to rally support for its dual-representation proposal.

Much comment called attention to U.S. tactics of persuasion:

The Manchester Guardian said Secretary Rogers' "tough diplomatic arm-twisting has apparently swung a number of key delegations."

French television said the U.S. was "desperately trying to bribe poor countries" to vote for its resolutions.

West German TV asserted that the "battle for votes which has been created by the U.S." had caused "a lot of bad feeling." Die Welt of Hamburg, speaking of U.S. "arm-twisting" of "mini-members," observed that "what seemed to be a hopeless game for the U.S. at the beginning is now an open game."

Henry Kissinger's current trip to Peking generated scattered speculation, despite a news vacuum surrounding his activities:

--_Corriere della Sera_ of Milan said, "The parallel of Kissinger's mission to Peking and the U.S. pressure to support Taiwan at the U.N. indicates that the U.S. has already reached an agreement with Peking that the final U.N. vote, whatever it may be, will not alter the Washington-Peking dialogue and will not jeopardize Nixon's Peking visit."

--_Austria's Neue Zeit_ of Graz and some others expected Mr. Kissinger to "try to generate some understanding for the U.S. position in the U.N."

--_L'Opinion_ of Rabat maintained that "the fact that President Nixon is sending his special adviser...to Peking at this precise moment indicates that the American President perhaps does not intend to oppose the expulsion of Taiwan as firmly as the State Department says."

* * *

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## London TV, Radio Coverage

British television and radio on Monday gave wide play to Ambassador Bush's address at the U.N. During a radio discussion, commentator John Gittings of the "China Quarterly" said that expulsion of Formosa was the only solution the PRC would accept. He predicted that if the two-China policy were approved, "without a doubt Peking would stay out."

BBC-TV carried an interview in which Mr. Bush explained the U.S. position on China representation.

## "U.S. Pursues Unviable Policy"

Today's independent London *Financial Times* stated:

"The fact that the U.S. is persisting with its two-China policy must be put down in the first place to a reluctance to desert former protégés. If President Nixon had announced his support for the admission of Peking without at the same time attempting to protect the position of Taiwan, he would have suffered a drastic loss of credibility with other Asian governments including that of South Vietnam, whose fate is of vital importance to Washington.

"Rather than allow such a thing to happen, President Nixon has chosen to pursue a patently unviable policy at the U.N.-- and he is pursuing it with all the vigor which the U.S. has traditionally devoted to keeping China out of the world organization.

"But both the President and his advisers must be aware that in the long run there is no alternative to the admission of China, and very little chance of saving anything for Taiwan. Without such an assumption it is unlikely that the U.S. would ever have embarked on its campaign for closer relations with China."

## "U.S. Arm-Twisting Swings Delegations"

Yesterday's liberal Manchester *Guardian* said in a story from the U.N., "Until this week the Nixon Administration's two-China policy was not given much chance of success, but Secretary of State Rogers' tough diplomatic arm-twisting has apparently swung a number of key delegations."

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On Saturday, the independent *Times* of London reported that "U.S. officials emphasize that Dr. Kissinger will not discuss the subject of China's entry into the U.N. during his visit to Peking, but will confine his mission to a review of the preparations for the Presidential trip..."

## Paris TV: "Frenzied Ballot Hunt"

French media attention to the U.N. debate dwindled today after topping foreign news yesterday.

A U.N. correspondent reported on state-run television:

> "The Americans have been engaging for a month in a frenzied ballot hunt in which they employ every imaginable tactic. In this round-up, unfavorable elements play against them, including the fallout from the Peking visit which was decided upon without consulting the allies: Many countries are unwilling to antagonize Peking as long as the U.S. may be seeking an arrangement with China behind their backs."

## "U.S. Tries Bribes"

The state-run radio's report yesterday said that Washington "is desperately trying to bribe poor small countries" to vote for its pending resolution. It cited the "case" of the Republic of Maldives, which was allegedly offered a free trip to New York for its delegation in exchange for a favorable vote.

## "U.S. May Find Self in Minority"

Influential *Le Monde* of Paris declared:

> "... The new and striking fact is that many friends and allies of the U.S. refuse to follow it on a question which it takes very seriously and that the Americans consequently are likely to find themselves in the minority in an Assembly over which they have ruled for so long. The majority of U.N. members are visibly tired this year of the neutralization of the international organization by the double American and Russian superintending.... The U.N. majority is bristling..."

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# "China Entry Might Redistribute Influence"

Roger Massip wrote in yesterday's moderately conservative *Figaro* of Paris that the entrance of China into the U.N. "is bound to cause... a new distribution of influence and, probably, a drift toward the Chinese pole of attraction by a numerous and fluctuating clientele of developing nations endlessly looking for a protector, and who up to now have hesitated to choose between Washington and Moscow."

# "Washington and Peking Not Concerned?"

Left-of-center *Combat* of Paris remarked yesterday that "the tension which reigns in the U.N." on the China debate "contrasts strikingly with the almost merry atmosphere in which preparations for Nixon's trip to Peking are taking place. This might mean neither the U.S. nor China is primarily concerned with the outcome of the debate."

# "Israel's Vote Could Be Decisive"

Radio Luxembourg yesterday stated that the balloting on the Taiwan issue "is expected to be so close that Israel's vote will be decisive."

# West German TV: "U.S. Warnings and Threats"

West German media gave prominence to the U.N. debate, including Ambassador Bush's speech. A first TV network commentator yesterday regarded the outcome as "still wide open."

However, a commentator for the second network said on Monday, "Observers consider a diplomatic defeat of the U.S. not only possible but likely." He then introduced this report by a correspondent at the U.N.:

"The debate... has been opened with sharp tones. It is not the speeches that are creating tension, but the atmosphere of a battle for votes which has been created by the U.S....

"George Bush gave a speech like a star lawyer and evangelist and appealed to the conscience of the world. That, along with the immense pressure exercised by the U.S. over its allies, raised a lot of bad feeling here..

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"Suddenly, delegations are flown in from countries which never could afford the travel expenses and there are suddenly, let us say, raised sugar quotas for Mauritius. There is no lack of warnings and threats, and a few foreign diplomats even speak of blackmail.

"While Dr. Kissinger is on his second trip to Peking, the U.S. expects others to weave the net which is to protect the tightrope act of its policy..."

## "Arm-Twisting of Mini-Members"

Hamburg's independent *Die Welt* today carried its New York correspondent's report that there has been much "arm-twisting" and intensive effort by the U.S. delegation to induce the "mini-members" of the U.N. to support the U.S. position.

The correspondent asserted that Ambassador Bush's speech was marked by "freshness and dashing buoyancy." He added that Mr. Bush no doubt would have impressed American voters, but "sounded amateurish" to U.N. diplomats.

"However, what seemed to be a hopeless game for the U.S. at the beginning is now an open game."

## "Bush May Get the Votes"

Right-center *Frankfurter Allgemeine*'s correspondent at the U.N. wrote that Mr. Bush has a reputation as a "spectacular vote-getter" and "in spite of predictions to the contrary, he may succeed in getting enough votes in the U.N. General Assembly for the complicated American maneuver of dual Chinese seating in the U.N."

Munich's independent *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* maintained that "what Bush wants to achieve requires more than suasion. He can only be successful if the U.S. Government throws its entire weight behind its motion that Peking be admitted without Taipei's losing its seat." It added:

"Formosa indubitably exhibits the characteristics of a state, and since not everybody is blind to this there still remains a possibility of Bush's being successful.

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"Backstage, the U.S. is trying to persuade the hesitant that its support for Formosa is much more than mere lip service. This leads U.N. members to ask themselves whether failure to toe the American line would serve their national interest. The method the U.S. uses in its efforts remains hidden to outsiders. 'Actually, all of us should have our right arm in a sling,' a Latin American diplomat said."

## "Suasion, Promise, Pressure, Juggling"

The Washington correspondent of left-center Frankfurter Rundschau declared today that "Peking's possible admission at Taiwan's expense would create serious domestic problems for Nixon, with the influential rightist circles accusing him of a sellout to the Communists."

Meanwhile, she wrote, "Rogers has tried to win over undecided nations by suasion, promise and pressure, and by juggling the U.N. Charter and agenda."

## West Berlin: "Taipei Should Withdraw"

A West Berlin paper yesterday urged Peking's U.N. membership and Taipei's withdrawal. Pro-Social Democratic Telegraf wrote:

"Chiang Kai-shek has maneuvered himself out of the U.N. through his claim of sole representation, for there is no doubt that the People's Republic of China is the real Chinese power. This perception should cause the Nationalist Chinese Government to correctly judge the situation and withdraw voluntarily from the world organization."

The paper added that it hoped Mr. Kissinger would be able to agree with Peking on a solution "which can correct the U.S. policy failure of the last 20 years, so that Washington can emerge from this situation without loss of face."

On the other hand, independent Der Abend of West Berlin asserted last Saturday that in the U.N. debate, "U.S. credibility with its allies will be at stake."

"Washington's problem is to get Peking into the U.N. and to prevent the ousting of Formosa."

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## Milan: "Tension Over Italy's Vote"

Influential *Corriere della Sera* of Milan asserted that "there is practically unanimous agreement on Peking's admission."

It reported a "tense situation" over Italy's vote and rumors that Italy would vote for Peking and "abstain from voting on Taiwan's expulsion."

The paper's Hong Kong correspondent observed:

> "Although Chou En-lai has said China can wait another 21 years... there is every indication that the Peking Government is anxious to be admitted.... If it failed, People's China would suffer a serious setback which might have domestic consequences."

## "Kissinger Trip Indicates Agreement"

However, its New York correspondent maintained:

> "The parallel of Kissinger's mission to Peking and the U.S. pressure to support Taiwan at the U.N. indicates that the U.S. has already reached an agreement with Peking that the final U.N. vote, whatever it may be, will not alter the Washington-Peking dialogue and will not jeopardize Nixon's Peking visit."

Influential left-of-center *La Stampa* of Turin reported that "nobody is making any more forecasts on the final vote. But until yesterday the expulsion of Formosa was considered probable."

Rightist *Il Tempo* of Rome maintained that if Italy voted against the U.S. position it would be "a stab in the back of a Government which has always been prodigal in its friendship."

Socialist *Avanti* argued, "It is immoral...to insist on the presence of two Chinas at the U.N.... Taiwan's U.N. seat is no more than a provocation."

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## Communist Paper: "Maldive Delegation Held Back"

Pro-Communist Paese Sera of Rome reported from New York that the U.S. was trying to "bribe" some U.N. members with "dollars and free trips for a vote against Peking's admission....

"The Maldive delegation could not reach New York for economic reasons. It reached Tokyo by a U.S. aircraft. Its trip will be completed if the delegation assures the U.S. that it will support the U.S. motion."

## Vienna: "U.S. Wrongly Accused"

Independent Die Presse of Vienna commented yesterday:

"On the one hand, America is accused of attempting to keep Peking out of the U.N. by the dual representation thesis. On the other hand, it is accused of trying to gloss over the abandonment of an old and loyal ally in Asia.

"Both charges are wrong. This is proved by the hectic diplomatic activity shown by Secretary of State Rogers in a special attempt to win the small countries over to the U.S. resolution.

"The small countries in particular ought to react with great sensitivity to the question. If Taiwan is expelled with its 14 million inhabitants and its indisputably established regime, who is to say that other small countries would not fall victim to the same opportunism sooner or later?"

Official Wiener Zeitung declared that "the Americans made a compromise proposal which has much in its favor if the whole matter is viewed soberly." But the paper said, "In view of the impossibility of reaching a compromise, there is only the clear-cut choice--either Peking or Taipei will be outside the U.N."

## "At Stake Is U.S. Credibility in Asia"

Socialist Neue Zeit of Graz said of Dr. Kissinger's trip to Peking:

"Kissinger will probably try to generate some understanding for the U.S. position in the U.N. In this connection it is interesting to hear some comments that the U.S. would not be too unhappy if its own proposals were defeated.

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"This view is not refuted by the fact that the U.S. is actively seeking support for its China resolutions. At stake is Washington's credibility among its Asian allies, and that is why it must demonstrate it is not abandoning Formosa. But if its effort to save Formosa's U.N. seat founders, the road for China into the U.N. will be open. And this is part of the new American China policy."

## Tokyo Headlines

The U.N. debate was the top story today and yesterday in many leading Tokyo papers. Today's accounts stressed Japanese delegate Aichi's speech. Typical heads and subheads read, "Aichi Appeals for Protection of Republic of China.... Albanian Resolution Denounced.... Expulsion of ROC Would Endanger Far East."

## Seoul: "Confusion If U.S. Loses"

Independent moderate Joongang Ilbo of Seoul today warned of "great confusion and upheaval...not only in the U.N. but in the whole sphere of international politics...if the U.S. resolution is defeated and the Albanian resolution passed."

## Manila: "Taiwan Expulsion Would Be Inauspicious"

The conservative Philippines Herald of Manila said the U.N.'s "capacity for continuing as a vital instrument of world peace" hinged on "the decision it will make after this great debate." It saw Peking's admission as a "foregone conclusion," but argued that expulsion of Taiwan "would be quite an inauspicious sign for the U.N... submitting to the dictation of Communist China at the very start."

## "U.S. Cannot Buy World Opinion"

The nationalistic Manila Chronicle maintained that "the diplomatic extortion proposed by Senator Buckley...gives the people of the world the chance to tell certain Americans that even with their money they cannot command the rest of mankind to share their prejudices.... World opinion on the rights of the Chinese is not for sale, even at such a handsome price as a continued American subsidy of the U.N."

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Singapore: "No One Sure What U.S. Wants"

The independent *New Nation* of Singapore declared today that "no one seems to be really sure what the Americans want. Do they really wish to see Peking in the U.N.? If so they are putting a very heavy roadblock in the way."

The paper saw several "advantages to East and Southeast Asia of postponing a final resolution of the China question," but it warned that the "hiatus over China's position" which it said would be created by the U.S. resolution also meant that "America is opting out of major decision-making in the area."

The influential *Straits Times* of Singapore and Kuala Lumpur suggested:

"The American resolution...could have the same effect as its earlier attempts to keep China out. Peking will not go to the U.N. unless Taiwan is removed.... The U.S., however, is confident.... It has enlisted the support of Japan, Australia and the Philippines. Not all of them are wholehearted in their support."

Madras: "No Morality in Expelling Taiwan"

The *Mail* of Madras, one of India's oldest papers, maintained that the issue of Taiwan's role in the U.N. "needs objective examination...

"On what ground can Taiwan be expelled? It has all the attributes of statehood.... Its political stability and economic prosperity are the envy of many Asian and African countries. It has diplomatic relations with 62 nations....

"It may be objected that without U.S. aid Taiwan cannot last for a week and that it is an American satellite. The objection cannot be sustained. Without Soviet aid the Arab countries cannot resist Israel for a week.... All small countries today depend upon one of the big powers to preserve their sovereignty....

"There is neither morality nor legality in the expulsion of Taiwan, which has been in the U.N. much longer than many of its members..."

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## Tel Aviv: "Vote a Dilemma for Israel"

Both Tel Aviv's semi-official *Davar* and pro-Government *al Hamishmar* asserted that Israel "faces a dilemma on the China vote." The former said that some day China may play a larger role in the Middle East as a counter to the Soviets, and Israel would then want good relations with China, although prospects now are "not at all rosy."

The two papers agreed that Israel has an interest in seeing that the expulsion of a member should be only by a two-thirds vote.

The pro-Government *Jerusalem Post* also concluded that Israel's interest dictated opposition to Taiwan's expulsion.

## Rabat: "Formosa Not a 'Member State'"

Semi-official *La Depeche* of Rabat asserted yesterday that "the reestablishment of Peking's legitimate rights in the U.N. is undoubtedly the most important problem the organization ever had to solve." It said:

> "Mr. Bush is defending as best he can a lost cause....The international organization, on the other hand, has recovered its realism and is considering the Chinese question more objectively.

> "It has understood that expulsion of Formosa would not at all mean the expulsion of a member state but merely the removal of the representatives of a dissident and minority regime."

## "Kissinger Trip Indicates De Facto Recognition"

Opposition *L'Opinion* wrote that "the fact that President Nixon is sending his special adviser...to Peking at this precise moment indicates that the American President perhaps does not intend to oppose the expulsion of Taiwan as firmly as the State Department says.

> "Does not the presence of the Presidential adviser in Peking constituting a de facto recognition of People's China's sovereignty over all of China?"

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Tunis: "End Illogical Attitude"

Independent as-Sabah of Tunis yesterday called upon the General Assembly "to preserve its honor from being polluted" through "once again adopting an illogical attitude and giving similar status and representation to a China which represents 750 million and a China which represents 12 million."

Mexico City: "Dilemma Over Taipei"

Conservative El Sol de Mexico headlined yesterday: "Expulsion of Taipei, Not Admission of China, Is the Dilemma."

Yesterday the paper declared that "the question is not one of knowing whether Formosa stays in the U.N. or has to go, but of what is going to happen after the U.N. admits Peking." It said the "15 million Chinese living in Formosa" "will not welcome genocide" and so will fight against "invasion by Mao's hordes."

CONNALLY STATEMENTS, EEC AGREEMENT

Summary

West European commentators reacted sharply and negatively to reports over the weekend that the U.S. was ready to consider a selective lifting of the import surcharge.

Yesterday's agreement among EEC Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg on the need to adopt a common position in trade and monetary negotiations with the U.S. was widely interpreted as a "closing of the ranks."

A number of observers expressed skepticism over denials in Washington and Bonn that a bilateral understanding had been reached to lift the surcharge for West Germany.

Mr. Connally's reported statements last weekend were criticized as "dangerously provocative tactics" (Times of London), "obvious goading" (France-Soir) and an "unrestrained attempt to divide European states into good and bad ones" (Muenchner Merkur).

* * *

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London: "EEC Closes Ranks"

Today's independent *Times* of London wrote:

"The EEC yesterday publicly closed its ranks in response to the suggestion of a bilateral deal between West Germany and the U.S. in the current monetary and trade crisis. All member countries had agreed, officials said, that the confrontation with the U.S. had to be conducted on a community and not a national level."

"U.S. Provocative Tactics"

The paper asserted in an editorial yesterday, "Mr. Connally has elected to employ dangerously provocative tactics. It is no exaggeration to say that the basis of the postwar monetary and trading system is now at risk...."

"The prospect has been seriously worsened by Mr. Connally's suggestions over the weekend that the U.S. might be prepared to withdraw the 10 per cent surcharge bilaterally in certain cases for countries that have fallen in with American wishes on currency revaluation.... It seems inevitable that we shall now face a period of mutual recrimination..."

"It is one thing to accept restrictions on the American market to help the U.S.; it is quite another thing to accept restrictions which are not equally borne by the other exporters to the U.S. That no one will meekly agree to."

The conservative London *Daily Telegraph* said in a story today, "Present and future member states of the Common Market... must close their ranks to meet attempts by America to undermine the Community, foreign ministers of the Six agreed in Luxembourg yesterday. They called for an over-all settlement of all issues causing tension between Western Europe and America and gave a specific warning that there was a limit to their patience over President Nixon's trade measures."

"Damage to U.S. Relations With Friends"

Yesterday, the paper reported that Mr. Connally had called America's trading partners "crybabies." It said:

"The tone of Mr. Connally's weekend statements comes at a time of growing resentment among Western European diplomats in Washington. They consider his truculent 'Texas Ranger' approach to international trading problems is causing severe damage to America's relations with its friends and allies."

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## Paris: Sharp Reaction

French media today reacted sharply to Secretary Connally's reported offer of a selective lifting of the surcharge as a "reward" to West Germany. They underscored Foreign Minister Schumann's warning in Luxembourg that West German acceptance of such a proposal would be "the end of the Common Market."

State-run French radio this morning reported that Mr. Schiller has reassured his allies that "the Connally statement had been wrongly interpreted."

Gaullist La Nation today accused the U.S. of trying "to upset the unity of European nations."

"Is it really by such maneuvers that the West will be consolidated? We do not doubt the U.S. can profit by this in the short term. But can we believe that Germany might play the game for 30 pieces of silver?"

## "Shopkeeper Haggling"

Michel Garibal commented in financial Les Echos today:

"The power which has militated for years for multilateral agreements and free trade...is now bent on petty shopkeeper haggling characterized by a search for concrete advantages snatched from individual countries."

Mass-circulation France-Soir noted that "officially the U.S. Treasury is keeping silent and merely denying that there was an agreement between Mr. Connally and Mr. Schiller." It said:

"...The goading is obvious. This is fair fighting on the part of the U.S., but very dangerous for Europe."

## West German Reporting

West German media gave prominence to the EEC's reported agreement in Luxembourg to take a common position during coming negotiations with the U.S. on monetary and trade affairs.

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Right-center Handelsblatt of Duesseldorf said today that statements by Government officials in Bonn had "eliminated the basis for speculation about a bilateral U.S.-German arrangement" on elimination of the U.S. import surcharge.

## "Connally Attempt to Divide Europeans"

However, pro-Christian Democratic Muenchner Merkur judged, "Semi-official Bonn's constrained reaction to Connally's unrestrained attempt to divide European states into good and bad ones prompts suspicion." The paper held that an FRG statement that it must wait for a text of Mr. Connally's remarks "is not the way to dispel rumors in Paris and elsewhere that Connally had cleared this compensation for good conduct with Schiller. Maybe this is unimportant.

> "What is important is that Connally has done a big favor for his German colleague: What emphatic appeals to European solidarity have failed to achieve may now be achieved by American pressure..."

Several papers today carried wire service dispatches from Washington saying that the U.S. will not exempt the FRG from the U.S. surcharge in a "secret" arrangement. It was reported that the Treasury Department and West German officials in Washington denied reports that Mr. Connally and Mr. Schiller had negotiated the Federal Republic's exemption from the levy.

## Milan: "Common Front Was in Danger"

Prestigious Corriere della Sera of Milan said today that the agreements reached by EEC ministers in Luxembourg were "aimed at preserving the common front of the EEC which has been in danger in the past few days following the U.S. attempt to reach a bilateral agreement with West Germany."

## Salzburg: "Germ of a Trade War"

Austria's leading provincial Salzburger Nachrichten today deplored Denmark's decision to impose a 10 per cent import surcharge, because along with the American measure it "carries the germ of a trade war that would serve nobody and hurt everybody." It elaborated:

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"In view of a notable slowdown in some Western industrialized nations, the protectionist germ could grow to epidemic proportions and destroy a lot of what has been achieved by hard work in years past."

## Copenhagen on Danish Surcharge

Prestigious, conservative *Berlingske Tidende* of Copenhagen asserted in an editorial today that by deciding to impose a 10 per cent import surcharge, Denmark was turning the clock back to the economic nationalism of the Thirties. The paper said that by following in the U.S. footsteps Denmark is only making the argument stronger for any country which might decide to do the same.

## Mexico City: "We Are Not Crybabies"

Mexican newspapers yesterday quoted Finance Minister Hugo Margain, replying to the charge attributed to Secretary Connally that some nations are "acting like crybabies" over the 10 per cent surcharge:

"We are only defending ourselves from what others are trying to do to us. We are not crying. We are not wasting our time in recriminations."

Moderate *Novedades* of Mexico City said yesterday that "from the Mexican point of view" the statements attributed to Secretary Connally "should be classified as stupid at the very least.... If we had no part in the birth of the monetary and financial problem... then we should play no role in the solution..."

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

20 October 1971

# The Kissinger watchers

By John Hughes

Washington

Mention "China" in official Washington these days and strong men flinch, old friends in high places quail, and State Department officials pull up the drawbridges and say nobody's home.

The President has passed the word that nobody in the official family is to discuss mainland China—least of all with journalists—until after his visit to Peking. It's been made clear that the consequences of disobeying this decree are dire.

Upon unofficial China-watchers, however, there are no such restraints. Among many of these there is the buzz of speculation—and suspicion—about Dr. Kissinger's current visit to Peking. They believe the trip was hastily planned. They suspect Dr. Kissinger is on graver business than deciding how many water glasses should be on the negotiating table, and how many reporters should accompany the President when, and indeed if, he goes to Peking.

They suspect, in short, that difficulties have developed along the road to Sino-United States rapprochement, and that Dr. Kissinger has been sent posthaste to smooth them out.

These China-cum-Kissinger-watchers see three possible complications that may have given the Chinese Communists pause:

1. The vigorous United States campaign to keep Nationalist China in the United Nations. (Peking expected Washington to pay lip-service to this goal, but may have been chagrined by the strong-arm character of the U.S. diplomatic offensive among UN members.)

2. The pointedly unenthusiastic reaction of Hanoi to the projected Nixon visit to Peking.

3. Sour reaction to the Nixon visit from hard-liners in the Chinese military, particularly those hankering for advanced weapons, and who see their prospects of getting them jeopardized by a relaxation of tension with the United States.

If such issues as these are indeed rolling Peking, the situation is immeasurably complicated by the upheaval apparently under way in the Chinese Communist power structure. Mao Tse-tung himself has finally popped up. Chou En-lai, the effervescent Mr. Fixit of Chinese diplomacy, bustles hither and thither. But Mao's designated successor, Marshal Lin Piao, remains absent from the public scene. And so do a number of key Chinese Army, Navy and Air Force commanders. Western analysts of China are well-advised to approach their task with a fair dash of humility. But they can be forgiven, in the face of all this, for the confident deduction that something is afoot in China, though what, they know not.

If the succession to Mao is being hampered out behind the facade of returning normalcy in Peking, there may be a dingdong debate between vying factions over the manner, the style, and the speed with which China has moved to warm up its relations with the United States.

This relative cordiality toward the United States in recent months has coincided with the restoration of stability in China following the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution. Today more than half of China's government ministries are back in operation. Diplomats of ambassadorial rank have been sent to 51 of the 58 countries with which China has diplomatic relations — a striking contrast to the days of the Cultural Revolution when all but one of China's ambassadors were called home. And in all of China's provinces, the party organization has been reestablished.

The probable argument of the practical men in Peking who have called for reduced tensions with the United States is not difficult to follow. They have merely reappraised the potential threats to China.

In their eyes, the United States has suffered a major defeat in Indo-China. The American role in Asia is declining. At home, Americans are weakened by internal turmoil.

By contrast, the Russians look ever more threatening. The Chinese were shaken by the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. They were alarmed by the Brezhnev doctrine permitting Soviet intervention in a socialist country to preserve the dictatorship of the proletariat — Moscow's code phrase for a Communist Party congenial to Moscow. Sparring since then between Russian and Chinese troops along their common border has done little to calm Chinese fears.

Then there is Japan, a traditional enemy of China, and one whose economic tentacles are spreading throughout Asia. Of late, Peking has been preoccupied with Japan. Peking eyes Japan's military potential. It notes that 30 percent of Japan's export capital is invested in Taiwan, a province of China.

Thus Peking upgrades Russia and Japan as threatening forces, and downgrades the United States.

But if the succession to Mao Tse-tung is at stake, internal power is now the central issue in China, not logic and reason in foreign affairs.

Hence the speculation that there may be special urgency and import to Dr. Kissinger's Peking visit.

John Hughes, now Editor of the Monitor, was a correspondent in Hong Kong from 1964 to 1970.

WASHINGTON POST

21 October 1971

# Lon Nol Calls
Democracy
'Sterile Game'

From News Dispatches

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia, Oct. 20—Prime Minister Lon Nol announced today that he had established a military dictatorship to avert anarchy and that democracy in wartime was a "sterile game."

The semi invalid Cambodian chief said in a brief radio address that because "certain groups, clans and associations" were "seeking to divide the nation by sowing confusion," Cambodia has been heading "ineluctably toward defeat."

Lon Nol spoke at midday, shortly after a 2½-hour silent demonstration by Buddhist monks in Phnom Penh. The monks were seeking reinstatement of the Cambodian parliament, stripped of its power last Saturday by government decree.

They carried banners declaring "We want to live in democracy." There was no violence.

In his speech, Lon Nol asked: "Should we vainly play the game of democracy and freedom which will lead us to complete defeat, or should we curtail anarchical freedom in order to achieve victory?"

In answering his own rhetorical question, Lon Nol said: "The government has made its decision. We have selected the way that will bring us to victory."

From now on, the prime minister said, his government will rule by "ordinance," that is to decree, under a "state of emergency."

The U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh had no official comment on Lon Nol's announcement. But the embassy has reported hopeful that economic reforms it had been pushing will now move more smoothly without a parliament.

There was some confusion over what the prime minister meant when he spoke of "groups, clans and associations." Some persons believed that he referred to the embryonic political parties which were formed after the ouster of Chief of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in March, 1970.

However, Information Minister Long Boret said Lon Nol was referring to a "fifth column," serving the Vietcong.

Lon Nol made himself dictator officially last Sunday when the government ordered the two houses of parliament to

31

AMS 23
KISSINGER

BY JAMES PRINGLE

PEKING, OCT. 19. REUTER--PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY HENRY KISSINGER ARRIVES TOMORROW ON A SECOND DISCREET MISSION TO PEKING TO PAVE THE WAY FOR PRESIDENT NIXONS OWN VISIT.

THERE WAS NOTHING IN PEKING TONIGHT TO INDICATE THE
IMPORTANT TRAIN OF POLITICAL EVENTS WHICH WILL FOLLOW
KISSINGERS VISIT.

WHILE CHINA OCCUPIED THE CENTER OF THE WORLD POLITICAL
STAGE, BOTH FOR AMERICANS HOPEFUL OF DISTRIBUTE WITH THE PEKING
GOVERNMENT, AND AT THE UNITED NATIONS, THERE WERE NO STIRRINGS
HERE WHICH GAVE A HINT OF THIS.

NEITHER THE UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON CHINAS
ADMISSION NOR THE FACT THAT KISSINGER IS ARRIVING TOMORROW
HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN THE OFFICIAL MEDIA.

EVERYTHING CONNECTED WITH THE VISIT TO KISSINGERS
GROUP IS SURROUNDED BY SECRECY.

THIS IS IN KEEPING WITH PRESIDENT NIXONS OWN INSTRUCTIONS
TO THE KISSINGER TEAM TO MAKE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS DURING
THE VISIT.

FOREIGN MINISTRY INFORMATION DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN HERE HAVE
DECLINED TO ANSWER QUERIES ABOUT WHERE KISSINGER WILL ARRIVE
(THERE ARE THREE AIRPORTS NEAR PEKING) OR IN WHICH OF FOUR
POSSIBLE GUEST HOUSES HE WILL BE STAYING.

THE SPOKESMAN ANSWERED ALL QUERIES WITH A BLAND STATEMENT
SAYING THERE ARE NO PLANS TO ASSIST CORRESPONDENTS IN COVERAGE
OF THE ARRIVAL OF KISSINGER TO MORROW.

DIPLOMATS, TOO, ARE IN THE DARK AND FEW HAVE ANY EXPECTATION
OF CONTACT WITH THE KISSINGER PARTY DURING THE FOUR DAYS
OF TALKS WITH THE CHINESE ON THE PROGRAM AND AGENDA FOR THE
VISIT BY PRESIDENT NIXON.

ON THE EVE OF KISSINGERS VISIT THE NEW CHINA NEWS
AGENCY TUESDAY NIGHT PREFACED ITS BULLETIN OF NIGHTLY NEWS, CIRCULATED
TO FOREIGN EMBASSIES HERE, WITH THE SLOGAN OF CHAIRMAN MAO
TSE-TUNG BEGINNING "PEOPLE OF ALL LANDS UNITE, DEFEAT THE U.S.
AGGRESSORS AND ALL THEIR RUNNING DOGS."

THE SLOGAN ENDS "MONSTERS OF ALL KINDS WILL BE
DESTROYED."

(WHEN HE LEFT WASHINGTON ON A LEISURELY JOURNEY TO
PEKING OCT. 15 KISSINGER BRUSHED ASIDE ALL QUESTIONS,
REPEATING ONLY THAT HIS FOUR-DAY TRIP WAS TO WORK OUT AN AGENDA
AND MAKE OTHER TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NIXONS TRIP.

(THE PRESIDENT HAS HIMSELF SAID HE PLANS TO VISIT CHINA
BEFORE NEXT DAY. HIS ENVOY IS EXPECTED TO WORK OUT AN
ITINERARY MUTUALLY AGREEABLE WITH THE CHINESE DURING THE
PEKING TALKS THIS WEEK.

(SENIOR SECRET SERVICE OFFICIALS, STATE DEPARTMENT SPECIALISTS
IN CHINESE AFFAIRS AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS
OFFICE -- TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE HUNDREDS OF REPORTERS WHO WANT
TO TRAVEL WITH MR. NIXON TO
XXXX

(SENIOR SECRET SERVICE OFFICIALS, STATE DEPARTMENT SPECIALISTS
IN CHINESE AFFAIRS AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS
OFFICE -- TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE HUNDREDS OF REPORTERS WHO WANT
TO TRAVEL WITH NIXON TO CHINA -- ARE INCLUDED IN KISSINGERS PARTY.

(KISSINGER PAID A FIRST, SECRET VISIT TO PEKING FROM
JULY 9 TO 11 TO ARRANGE DETAILS OF NIXONS TRIP TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE
NEXT SUMMER.)

REUTER MB/MJ 151.9

ARTHUR HOPPE

# Peking Gets Whistle-Stop Scenario

**Scene:** The East Is Red Room in The People's Great Hall of 100 Blooming Flowers, Peking, China. Seated on one end of a wicker couch is the U.S. presidential advance man, Hughes Kissingernow. Seated at the other end, as afar away as possible, is the Chinese Director of Tourism, Tsing En-pei. Both are smiling. Grimly.

**Kissingernow:** Now, then, I'm afraid the only dates the President has open for his trip to China are between the Viking-Packers game and The Rams-49er game or between the Rose Bowl and the Super Bowl. Which would you prefer?

**Tsing:** A moment, please. While we are happy your President will honor us with a visit, we must again protest your two-China policy. You must choose whether to recognize them or us.

**Kissingernow:** We'd like to, Tsing. But it's our policy, frankly, that all you Chinas look alike to us. Now about the crowd at the airport...

**Tsing:** What crowd? What airport?

**Kissingernow:** Peking Airport. The President can't fly into an airport without a crowd to greet him. It would look like he's losing his drawing power. I'd say you should turn out about 100,000. They can wave the usual signs. You know, "Nixon's the One!" or "Dick's Our Boy!" Do you think "Nixon for President!" would be suitable?

**Tsing:** No.

**Kissingernow:** Yes, I suppose it's too early. Now, of course, the six jumbo jets carrying the 1,342 members of the press will land first so the President can be photographed stepping from Air Force One. Then on the motorcade...

**Tsing:** Motorcade?

**Kissingernow:** We can't have him sneaking onto town like a common criminal, can we? Let's see, I'd suggest about a half million lining the route. Is the Peking police chief friendably? Maybe we can get him to double his crowd estimate. As I see it, they're waving American flags and...

**Tsing:** American flags?

**Kissingernow:** ...shouting, "Give 'em hell, Dick!" Could you ge them to shout it in English? No offense, but back home the Chinese vote isn't worth a hill of beans. Now at the hotel, we'll need first a Press Hospitality Room. Let's see, 1,342 times a fifth a day is over...

**Tsing:** Give who hell?

**Kissingernow:** Now for his personal use, the President will require five pounds of cottage cheese, two bottles of catsup and a television set. Say, do you have pro football?

**Tsing:** Only Ping-Pong and gymnastics.

**Kissingernow:** Then you better throw in a bowling alley. Now his big speech will come from the hotel balcony. We're billing it as a major prime-time TV address. You know, something about "stemming the rising tide of Communism."

Then on the motorcade back to the airport...

**Tsing:** Wait a minute. What about the talks with our leaders?

**Kissingernow:** Sure, sure. The President always likes to squeeze in a private chat with the local pols whenever his busy schedule permits. But on the motorcade back to the airport...

**Tsing:** (Frowning): The trip is off!

**Kissingernow:** But look at all the trouble the President's taking to bring his campaign to your fair city. Surely, after all that, you're not still afraid he won't recognize the place?

**Tsing:** No, we're afraid we won't.

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NTO. Different

For Better Ideas in value

ARTHUR HOPPE

Scene: The East Is Red Room in The People's Great Hall of 100 Blooming Flowers, Peking, China. Seated on one end of a wicker couch is the U.S. presidential advance man, Hughes Kissingernow. Seated at the other end, as afar away as possible, is the Chinese Director of Tourism, Tsing En-pei. Both are smiling. Grimly.

Kissingernow: Now, then, I'm afraid the only dates the President has open for his trip to China are between the Viking-Packers game and The Rams-49er game or between the Rose Bowl and the Super Bowl. Which would you prefer?

Tsing: A moment, please. While we are happy your President will honor us with a visit, we must again protest your two-China policy. You must choose whether to recognize them or us.

Kissingernow: We'd like to, Tsing. But it's our policy, frankly, that all you Chinas look alike to us. Now about the crowd at the airport...

Tsing: What crowd? What airport?

Kissingernow: Peking Airport. The President can't fly into an airport without a crowd to greet him. It would look like he's losing his drawing power. I'd say you should turn out about 100,000. They can wave the usual signs. You know, "Nixon's the One!" or "Dick's Our Boy!" Do you think "Nixon for President!" would be suitable?

Tsing: No.

Kissingernow: Yes, I suppose it's too early. Now, of course, the six jumbo jets carrying the 1,342 members of the press will land first so the President can be photographed stepping from Air Force One. Then on the motorcade...

Tsing: Motorcade?

Kissingernow: We can't have him sneaking onto town like a common criminal, can we? Let's see, I'd suggest about a half million lining the route. Is the Peking police chief friend-ly? Maybe we can get him to double his crowd estimate. As I see it, they're waving American flags and...

Tsing: American flags?

Kissingernow: ...shouting, "Give 'em hell, Dick!" Could you ge them to shout it in English? No offense, but back home the Chinese vote isn't worth a hill of beans. Now at the hotel, we'll need first a Press Hospitality Room. Let's see, 1,342 times a fifth a day is over...

Tsing: Give who hell?

Kissingernow: Now for his personal use, the President will require five pounds of cottage cheese, two bottles of catsup and a television set. Say, do you have pro football?

Tsing: Only Ping-Pong and gymnastics.

Kissingernow: Then you better throw in a bowling alley. Now his big speech will come from the hotel balcony. We're billing it as a major prime-time TV address. You know, something about "stemming the rising tide of Commu-

Tsing: Wait a minute. What about the talks with our leaders?

Kissingernow: Sure, sure. The President always likes to squeeze in a private chat with the local pols whenever his busy schedule permits. But on the motorcade back to the airport...

Tsing: (Frowning): The trip is off!

Kissingernow: But look at all the trouble the President's taking to bring his campaign to your fair city. Surely, after all that, you're not still afraid he won't recognize the place?

Tsing: No, we're afraid we won't.

<table><thead><tr><th colspan="5">DEPT. DISTRIBUTION</th></tr><tr><th colspan="5">ORIGIN/ACTION</th></tr><tr><th>RS/R</th><th>REP</th><th>AF</th><th>ARA</th><th>1</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>EUR</td><td>EUR</td><td>NEA</td><td>CU</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>INR</td><td>E</td><td>P</td><td>10</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>L</td><td>FBO</td><td>AID</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>PM</td><td>S/S</td><td>Sy</td><td>S/P/S</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>10</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>AGR</td><td>COM</td><td>FRB</td><td>INT</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>LAB</td><td>TAR</td><td>TR</td><td>XMB</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>AIR</td><td>ARMY</td><td>NAVY</td><td>OSD</td><td>34</td></tr><tr><td>USIA</td><td>NSA</td><td>CIA</td><td></td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>10</td><td>3</td><td>16</td><td></td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>USY</td><td>FBI</td><td></td><td>1</td></tr></tbody></table>

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

<table><thead><tr><th colspan="4">POST ROUTING</th></tr><tr><th>TO:</th><th>Action</th><th>Info.</th><th>Initials</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>AMB/PO</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>DCM</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>PO</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ECM</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>CO</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ADM</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>AMB</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>USN</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>CS</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>CS</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>FILE</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

Action Taken:

Date:

Initials:

<table><tr><td colspan="2">DEPARTMENT OF STATE</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">AIRGRAM</td></tr><tr><td>Original to be Filed in</td><td>Decentralized Files.</td></tr></table>

FILE DESIGNATION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

A-385

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : POZNAN

OCT 16 12 25 PM 1971

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy WARSAW

DATE: Oct. 12, 1971

SUBJECT : "Zycie Warszawy" on Kissinger Peking Visit

REF :

SUMMARY

In the first, and so far only, direct commentary on the Kissinger visit to Peking, a Warsaw newspaper, in much more specific terms than we have heretofore seen, portrayed US-China rapprochement as anti-Soviet in motivation.

* * * * *

The Polish press of October 6 and 7 carried factual announcements of the forthcoming Kissinger visit to Peking, citing the views of "observers" in Washington and Peking as to the purposes of the visit. The first, and to date the only, commentary appeared October 8 in the Warsaw daily "Zycie Warszawy". There has been no commentary thus far in the official Party organ "Trybuna Ludu".

In an editorial entitled "The Inestimable Kissinger," "Zycie" described the purpose of the visit as twofold: to size up the present situation in the Chinese leadership; and to attempt to determine the conditions for a US-Chinese modus vivendi before the President makes his trip. The editorial commented that "it is no secret in Washington that Kissinger is considerably more intelligent than his chief," and Kissinger must reach some sort of compromise with the Chinese leaders to which the President can affix his signature.

FORM
10-64 DS-323

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECONTROL)

For Department Use Only

In

Out

<table><tr><td>Drafted by:</td><td>POL:GDMalone@rf</td><td>Drafting Date:</td><td>10/8/71</td><td>Phone No.:</td><td>210</td><td>Contents and Classification Approved by:</td><td>POL:GDMalone@rf</td></tr><tr><td>Clearances:</td><td>TX</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>CHARGE:DEBoster; ADCM:IISchiffman; P&C:JWShirby(A draft)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>O-12634</td></tr></table>

Warsaw A-385

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2

Recalling Gromyko's UN statement that an improvement in US-Chinese relations is "normal" if it is not connected with "anti-Soviet accents," the editorial concluded that "unfortunately such accents are being repeated--in a more veiled fashion in Washington and in an entirely clear fashion in Peking."

The editorial, signed with the initials "gj", was presumably written by Grzegorz Jaszunski, author of the recent "Zycie" article on possible political changes in China.

COMMENT: Concern about possible anti-Soviet motivations in a US-Chinese rapprochement has been a regular feature of Polish treatment of this issue, but the charge that this is the chief motivation, while not quite explicit even here, has not been made so bluntly before. The negative personal comment about the President, in this or any other context, however, is highly unusual as the Poles have been most circumspect for some time now in their treatment of the President and his Administration. It is particularly difficult to understand in this instance, where the comment was wholly irrelevant to the substance of the editorial. Judging from what we know of Jaszunski, we are inclined to attribute this comment primarily to his known bitter anti-American prejudices; in the present confused state of Polish censorship, such things are possible.

BOSTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE NATION

AMERICAN NOTES

Toward Z.P.G.

The National Center for Health Sta-
tistics reported last week that the Amer-
ican fertility rate dropped in July to the
lowest monthly level since the late 1930s.
While the birth rate is still 2.5 per couple
—.4 above the optimum sought by ad-
vocates of zero population growth—the
figures suggested that the concept of
family planning is taking firmer hold.

Some population experts theorize that
the declining economy, together with ris-
ing costs for health services and edu-
cation, has led many young couples to
postpone marriage and children. Birth
control and environmental campaigns
against the population explosion have
also had an effect. Liberalized abortion
laws in 17 states have brought down
the birth rate. University of Chicago So-
ciologist Donald J. Bogue has another
suggestion. Among other things, says
Bogue, a world in which the young re-
ject their parents, use drugs and break
laws may make parenthood seem sim-
ply less inviting than it once was.

Days of Rest

Some 500 U.S. business and in-
dustrial firms have been experimenting
with a four-day work week—an in-
ventive concept that reconciles the
work ethic with the leisure culture.
For ten weeks during the summer,
the Chicago-based Zenith Life Insurance
Co. tried a four-day, 35-hour routine,
with half of its 33 employees working
Monday through Thursday, 8 a.m. to
5:30 p.m., the other half Tuesday
through Friday. Now Zenith has pro-
nounced the plan a startling success
and made the arrangement permanent.
Recruiting is easier, absenteeism re-
duced, overtime pay decreased and em-
ployee morale vastly improved.

The four-day plan has yielded un-
usual payoffs in other areas. For the
past two months, the Pontiac, Mich.,
150-man police department has been
on a four-day week of ten-hour days. Re-
sponse time on emergency calls is down,
arrests have increased by 9%, and ab-
senteeism has been cut by 16%. The ten-
hour days allow for overlapping shifts,

thus concentrating police coverage dur-
ing high-crime hours.

If four-day schedules become a na-
tional routine, presumably various three-
day "weekends" will have to be stag-
gered throughout the week to ease pres-
sure on already overburdened recre-
ational facilities. In an increasingly
secularized society, what began as the
Sabbath will be turning into Tuesday,
Wednesday and Thursday "weekends."

Teaching by Horoscope

The president of the New York City
board of education last week suggested
a novel teacher's aid: astrology. At an ed-
ucational forum, Isaiah E. Robinson said
that "if astrology is correct," some class-
room problems of misbehavior may be
caused by pupils whose birth signs con-
flict with those of other children, or pos-
sibly their teachers'. It may be, Rob-
inson suggested, that teachers should
take the planets into consideration to un-
derstand the kids better. Presumably, a
Taurian heaving erasers at an Aquarian
may have his cosmic reasons.

After Saigon, Peking Ahead

WASHINGTON was relieved. The embarrassing one-sided presidential election in South Viet Nam was finally over. Whatever the condition of democracy in that battered land, President Nguyen Van Thieu, the man whom the U.S. considers the best bet for stability, seemed firmly in charge. The Nixon Administration was only too eager to turn its attention from Saigon's problems to other more portentous matters: post-freeze economic plans and the return of National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger to Peking late this month to make final arrangements for Richard Nixon's visit to that long-forbidden city.

"Don't Tell Me." Indeed, the
Administration has fallen into the
habit of talking as though the war
in Viet Nam were already over.
Nixon is fond of repeating, almost
casually, the claim that "we are
ending the longest war in the his-
tory of the U.S." Secretary of De-
fense Melvin Laird not long ago
startled top aides at the outset of
his weekly military briefing by or-
dering: "Don't tell me about Viet
Nam now. I don't want to hear
about it until the end." Viet Nam
always used to be first on his agen-
da. Now U.S. officials seem confi-
dent that the South Vietnamese
military forces can withstand
Communist pressure as U.S. troop

levels decline. They even speak
wistfully of how military victory
might have been within reach.

Unfortunately, Thieu's high-
handed re-election tactics botched
the Administration's plan for a
graceful exit from Viet Nam. Nix-
on had hoped to be able to point to
the election as evidence that de-
mocracy is taking hold in South
Viet Nam. Now, almost no one in
Washington believes Saigon's fig-
ures on either the high voter turn-
out (87.7%) or Thieu's vote of
confidence (94.3%). Nixon merely
noted that "the road toward de-
mocracy and contested elections is
a long and hard one." Almost apol-
ogetically, he argued that Thieu's
unchallenged victory was no rea-
son to cut off U.S. aid, since two-
thirds of the 91 nations now get-
ting U.S. funds also show little
taste for political competition.

Sigh of Relief. However dis-
appointed he is in the Saigon elec-
tion charade, Nixon is apparen ly
not going to change course. In No-
vember he is expected to announce
a stepped-up withdrawal rate that
will bring the U.S. involvement
down from 213,900 troops now
present to a residual force of about
40,000 by next spring. The men
who remain will be mostly lo-
gistical troops and Air Force per-
sonnel. At that level, Adminis-
tration leaders contend, the war

NIXON & KISSINGER
Mysterious talk of historic events.

TIME, OCTOBER 18, 1971

31

will no longer be a big issue in U.S. politics. "No one will get worked up about it any more," argues one State Department official. "Everyone will just sigh with relief that we got out." The Administration's confidence that the war is no longer much of a problem politically has been reinforced by the waning influence of congressional doves.

**Easy Up, Hard Down.** The temptation to link Nixon's Peking trip to the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Viet Nam is being deliberately discouraged by Washington officials. It would be naive, they say, to expect Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to exert pressure on Hanoi to make concessions to the U.S. By merely agreeing to sit down with Nixon while the U.S. is involved in battle with Communist forces, Chou is straining China's relations with North Viet Nam. Any pressure from Peking might cause Hanoi to turn to Moscow for more help in its long struggle to dominate South Viet Nam.

Still unanswered in all of the speculation over the Peking trip is precisely what the U.S. can expect to gain from a Chou-Nixon meeting. The Administration modestly insists that it seeks only a "normalization of relations" between the two powers. This presumably would include exchanges of trade missions, scholars and journalists, plus some means of regular government-to-government communication, short of formal diplomatic recognition. That package in itself would be a significant breakthrough after a quarter-century of virtual noncommunication. Yet Nixon has long warned that summitry is a dubious tactic unless the expectations it usually creates can be fulfilled. He undoubtedly would agree with a Chinese

saying that can apply to political as well as geographical peaks: "Easy to climb up, hard to get down."

So suspicion persists that Nixon may have something more specific in mind than merely enhancing his re-election prospects with the trip's inevitable harvest of publicity. One remote chance is that Nixon might try to coax China into joining a multinational conference on easing tensions throughout Southeast Asia, including Laos and Cambodia as well as Viet Nam. That would permit the U.S. to leave Viet Nam with less of an implication that it was forced out, or was deserting any of its Asian allies. However, Hanoi is a block to such an arrangement; it has repeatedly refused to consider any such regional negotiations. Other, even more distant possibilities include the signing of a non-aggression pact between Washington and Peking, or an agreement by both powers to renounce the use of force in any dispute in Asia. Either kind of agreement would seem to offer Peking no particular advantage and would tie its hands militarily in its avowed determination to regain control of Taiwan. Moreover, either would be taken as an unnecessarily friendly gesture toward the U.S. by Peking's allies in Hanoi and North Korea —and Peking has no desire to give the U.S.S.R. any greater influence in those two nations along its own borders.

**Fatal Blow.** There are other accommodations that can more reasonably be expected to result from Nixon's trip. For one thing, longstanding friction between the U.S. and China over the status of Taiwan could be eased. By the time Chou and Nixon meet, the U.N. controversy over whether to admit Peking at the expense of ousting Taipei will

probably have been settled. Last week the U.S. gave the appearance of fighting desperately to keep Taiwan from being excluded. Secretary of State William Rogers even warned some delegates that Congress might cut off U.S. financial support of the U.N. if the vote goes against Taiwan. Given the U.N.'s frail financial structure, such a blow could prove fatal. Yet other delegates say that the U.S. is not serious about its pro-Taiwan stand. They contend that Kissinger's return to Peking at about the time of the U.N. vote makes the U.S. devotion to Taipei seem unconvincing.

Once the U.N. matter is out of the way, Nixon could assure Chou that the U.S. recognizes the indivisibility of China and considers the Peking-Taipei struggle an internal Chinese issue. There are limits to how far Nixon can go, however. The U.S. can hardly be expected to renounce its defense treaty with Taiwan, although it might gradually reduce its military support to Chiang if the mainland Chinese do not push the matter too hard or too fast. Nixon is also expected to try to allay Peking's fear that the U.S. might encourage a Soviet nuclear strike against China or in any way abet a resurgence of militarism in Japan.

**Unusual Aside.** At a time of Nixonian surprises and the continuing confusion in China (see THE WORLD), the outcome of Sino-American summitry remains difficult to predict. Secretary of State William Rogers and Kissinger are both downplaying expectations, while the President, oddly enough, keeps them alive. In an unusual aside during his brief television talk on the economy, Nixon declared that 1972 "can be a year in which historic events will take place on the international scene, events that could affect the peace of the world in the next generation, even in the next century." His listeners could not be blamed if they thought that his sweeping statement referred less to international monetary matters than to Nixon's Peking trip, which now seems likely to occur some time around New Year's Day of 1972.

LURIE—UNITED FEATURE SYNDICATE

LURIE

G.I. IN TANK AT TAY NINH

*In Washington, the war seemed already over.*

32

TIME, OCTOBER 18, 1971

INTERNATIONAL

Round-Trip
Ticket
To Peking

One by one, the pieces of the great China puzzle were beginning to fall into place. At a reception for Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie last week, Chairman Mao Tse-tung made his first public appearance in two months, finally scotching the rumors that he was dead, disabled or the victim of a palace coup. At the same time, it now appeared that Mao's chosen heir, Marshal Lin Piao, was somehow the focus of the continuing shake-up in Peking. And it also became clear that Richard Nixon's planned journey to the mainland was in no jeopardy. For it was jointly announced in Peking and Washington that later this month a group of Americans will travel to China to make preparations for Mr. Nixon's trip, and that they will be headed by the most important "advance man" in the history of Presidential travel: Henry Kissinger himself.

Although many people inevitably interpreted it as an impromptu attempt to find out whether Mr. Nixon was still welcome in Peking, the Kissinger trip had actually been planned far in advance. During his first, secret mission to China last July, it was decided that the President's national-security adviser would make a second visit to wrap up the agenda for Mr. Nixon's talks with Mao and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and to arrange logistics. Then, in mid-September, the two governments set last week's date for the public announcement of Kissinger's return trip.

Because the U.S. has no diplomatic representatives in China, Kissinger and his companions face a job of awesome complexity. Appointments secretary Dwight Chapin will have to map out each step of the President's trip, while press staffer Timothy Elbourne will try to make arrangements for the horde of American newsmen who hope to accompany Mr. Nixon. ("I believe that the Chinese, in their long and distinguished history, have never encountered anything like a Presidential press party," Kissinger joked last week.)

**issues:** Kissinger, who has been boning up on China recently (page 52), will also take along two key members of his National Security Council staff and a State Department China watcher. No one was saying just how far these men would

Chairman Mao greets Haile Selassie: Saving the best for last

AP

go in discussing substantive issues with the Chinese, but it seemed reasonable to assume that each side would want to get at least a general idea of what the other had in mind for the Nixon-Chou talks, if only to avoid unpleasant surprises. The advance party will probably wind up its work in four days or so. Then, sometime in November, the White House will announce the actual date of the President's trip. It will be difficult, one official admitted last week, to squeeze the trip in before the end of the year.

In some quarters, the announcement that Kissinger was going to China seemed to undercut the Administration's drive to preserve a seat for the Nationalist Chinese in the United Nations. "It's a real stab in the back for Taiwan," one European diplomat remarked to an American journalist. "What country is going to vote for your 'two Chinas' resolution when your No. 1 foreign-policy man is sipping tea in Peking?" But Kissinger himself chose to accentuate the positive. At a rare on-the-record press briefing, he declared that China's mysterious "internal developments" had not altered its desire for broader contacts with the U.S. He also disclosed that direct communications between Washington and Peking had continued "without interruption throughout this period and without any reduction in either frequency or seriousness."

**Mood:** The Chinese were equally interested in keeping up appearances, for their internal chaos might have persuaded some U.N. members that there was no real urgency about voting Peking into the world body this year. Accordingly, Chou En-lai went out of his way last week to reassure the world that Peking was still in an outward-looking mood. At a reception given for some 60 Americans, including Black Panther leader Huey P. Newton and former State Department China hand John Stewart Service, Chou revealed that Mao himself had made the decision to invite the American Ping Pong team to China last

spring, overriding the objections of some Chinese officials.

Despite Chou's confident performance, however, there was mounting evidence of serious disarray within Peking's ruling circles. China watchers in Hong Kong and elsewhere believed that the dispute erupted at a Communist Party Central Committee meeting in Peking a month ago, when the entire Chinese leadership, including Chou En-lai, dropped out of sight for four days. All signs pointed to a showdown between the relatively moderate members of the government, including Chou and Army Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, and the surviving radicals from the now-discredited cultural revolution. These "ultraleftist adventurers" probably included Chen Po-ta, long Mao's secretary and technically the fourth-ranking man in the leadership, and Air Force Chief of Staff Wu Fa-hsien, a burly, triple-chinned protégé of Lin Piao. General Wu was a major power behind the cultural revolution, and at one stage, he allowed his air force security troops to crush military resistance to the Red Guards, an act that hardly endeared him to his fellow generals.

**Purge:** The fight between the moderates and the radicals apparently raged for some time, and Chou and Huang were said to have been in danger for a while. But in the end, they seemingly prevailed. By last week, the resilient Chou had made frequent public appearances, and General Huang, judging from radio messages intercepted in Hong Kong, was back in business, sending cod-ed orders to his army commander on China's southern frontier. As for the radicals, Chen Po-ta had already been consigned to some sort of political limbo, General Wu seemed to be in deep trouble and some analysts believed that the air force, the last refuge for military supporters of the cultural revolution, was finally being thoroughly purged.

None of these events, however, was necessarily important enough to explain

Newsweek, October 18, 1971

INTERNATIONAL

the cancellation of the annual National
Day parade or the other recent myste-
ries. For that reason, diplomats outside
China theorized that the basic power
struggle turned around Lin Piao. The
64-year-old Lin has been suffering from
tuberculosis, anemia and insomnia and
reportedly still carries in his body a bullet
from World War II. Some Sinologists
speculated that he might be dead or se-
iously ill. But it was considered equally
likely that a purge of those who master-
minded the cultural revolution could
have reached by now to Lin himself—
since Mao is presumably sacrosanct.

In Chinese minds—particularly those
of the army—few officials are more close-
ly identified with the chaos and econom-
ic disruption of the cultural revolution
than Lin Piao. Already, there were at
least a few pieces of evidence to suggest
that he was under a cloud. For four

years now, the standard toast at banquets
on the mainland or at Communist get-to-
gethers in Hong Kong has always been:
"Long live Chairman Mao and his close
comrade in arms, Vice Chairman Lin
Piao." Now, for the first time, Lin is no
longer being toasted.

A further omen popped up at the re-
ception for Haile Selassie in Peking's
Great Hall of the People late last week.
Until then, there had been no sign of
Mao during the Emperor's visit. But the
Chinese must have been saving the best
for last, for the 77-year-old Mao turned
up looking fit and lively. After posing for
photographs with Haile Selassie, Mao re-
marked: "Let us liberate ourselves from
photographers and have a talk." Taking
the Emperor by the hand, Mao led him
into another room for a long private chat.
Throughout the jovial proceedings, Chou
En-lai was very much in evidence—but

there was no sign at all of Lin Piao.

If Lin has indeed been shunted aside
for reasons of either health or politics,
the ensuing power struggle could be im-
mense. In recent years, the assumption
that Lin will succeed Mao has been
drummed into the Chinese people, but
if the succession should again become a
wide-open race, the political unrest in
China could go on for weeks or months.

For the time being, however, U.S. of-
ficials profess to be relatively uncon-
cerned about precisely who will grab the
reins of power in China, provided that
the moderates as a group are in com-
mand. As one diplomat put it: "We don't
care if Madame Mao or Senator Gold-
water is head of the Chinese Air Force,
as long as U.S.-China relations are still on
the track toward improvement. And the
news that Kissinger is going to Peking
means that they are."

THE MAKING OF A
NEW CHINA HAND

When he left his book-lined office at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs three years ago, Prof. Henry Alfred Kissinger was already established as one of the nation's foremost foreign-policy analysts. The author of four weighty tomes and numerous scholarly papers, he was well versed on topics ranging from the life of Metternich to the nuances of Gaullism. But although his colleagues regarded Kissinger as a geopolitical theoretician in the classic European mold, no one ever thought of him as "an old Asia hand." Nonetheless, Kissinger had had the prescience to write of the Chinese leadership as early as 1966 that "if its attitudes are modified, policy could probably be altered much more dramatically than in the more institutionalized Communist countries." And the Harvard political scientist set to work in 1968 for a President who was vitally interested in charting new American policies on China. It was against this background that Kissinger recently undertook what might be called his own cram course in Chinese affairs.

Over the past few months, he has
met with such eminent China scholars
as A. Doak Barnett of the Brookings In-
stitution and Allen Whiting of the Uni-
versity of Michigan. In addition, he has
made unpublicized trips back to Harvard
for informal skull sessions with John K.
Fairbank, James C. Thomson Jr. and
other specialists. "At the start," confided
one Asian scholar, "Henry knew very lit-
tle about China in any detail, though he
had a command of the big picture." But,
added a colleague, "he was reasonably
honest about his ignorance-unlike his
predecessor, Walt Rostow, who had a
completely closed mind on China." Un-
derstandably, however, Kissinger was

less candid about the reasons for new-
found interest in China. "The political
things he keeps close to his chest," said
one China specialist who participated in
a discussion that, as it turned out, direct-
ly preceded Kissinger's secret trip to
Peking last summer. "He told us nothing
of his plans. He wasn't bouncing any
ideas off us but instead listened to what
we had to say on a variety of topics."

Sources: Some observers argue that Kissinger's lack of previous expertise on China may have been a help rather than a hindrance, enabling him to approach the problem without preconceptions. And even yet no one is quite sure what conclusions he has drawn from his Chinese studies. Experts in the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong—all of whom have been supplying Kissinger with day-to-day details on China—have no idea what weight he gives to his various sources of information. “We have been practicing our trade as usual,” said one China watcher in Hong Kong, “and we just assume that a good deal of it ends up in Kissinger’s hands.”

Similarly, Kissinger's personal China
staff, a group of discreet men who con-
scientiously shun publicity, remains some-
thing of a question mark. ("I guess," says

an official of another government depart-
ment, "you don't get on Kissinger's staff
by babbling in public.") Two National
Security Council staffers who accom-
panied Kissinger to Peking last July,
John Holdridge and Winston Lord (an
accomplished Ping Pong player), are
slated to go with him again. And among
the new faces added to the traveling
party for this month's trip is Alfred le S.
Jenkins, director of the State Depart-
ment's office of Asian Communist affairs,
a onetime student in China whom one
Asian scholar describes as "a seasoned
and able diplomat of just the sort you
want along—not top-rate at eliciting in-
formation but good at perceiving what
behavior is called for."

Ultimately, of course, Professor Kissinger will be graded according to what the China experts in Peking itself think of his performance. And while some Sinologists wonder whether he has mastered the nuances of Chinese political thinking or has a gut feel for negotiating with the Chinese, most expect him to pass his final exams with characteristic aplomb. "He's free of ideological hangups and he looks at reality objectively," one U.S. official summed up. "And that's going to make his dealings with the Chinese a helluva lot easier."

Wally McNamee—Newsweek

Kissinger with Holdridge, Lord, Jenkins: Cram course for the professor

52

Newsweek, October 18, 1971

Confidential

Foreign Report

Published by the Economist Newspaper Limited

25 St. James's Street, London, SW1

1217 7 October 1971

Contents

Will the Democrats 'draft' Kennedy?

Kissinger, Chou and the UN

Israel: (1) Efforts to woo the Africans

Israel: (2) Standing firm on Jerusalem

**President Nixon's** image has received something of a boost, or a face-lift, in the controversial book, 'Nixon in the White House', by the well-known Washington columnists, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, which has just been published in America. Far from being the 'tricky Dick' of legend, he is portrayed as being not nearly tricky or devious enough. This apparently startling notion will horrify the Democrats, who cannot brook the idea that Mr Nixon is beating them at their own game: sophisticated handling of foreign policy, generally, and detente with the communists, in particular.

Nevertheless, the Democrats are convinced there are serious chinks in his armour which, if exploited, could still enable them to win the 1972 presidential election – though they do not under-rate the difficulty of beating an incumbent chief executive, especially one as shrewd and single-minded as Mr Nixon. The Democrats, however, remain the majority party in the United States. Voter registration continues to be about 60 per cent Democratic, 40 per cent Republican, and in most elections the 'independents' – ie, those who do not register in either party – tend to divide in approximately the same ratio.

Moreover, Mr Nixon is far from being a beloved national figure. He is respected

1

by many voters, but he arouses no emotional enthusiasm. This is one of the chief reasons for the continuing speculation that the Democrats *nearly* will turn to Senator Edward Kennedy, who is presumed to have acquired a share of his family's charisma, as well as his share of its material riches.

Most important of all, there is the economic issue. If unemployment remains at 6 per cent of the labour force at election-time next year (this works out at about five million persons out of work, and if wives and grown dependents are included this figure is trebled), the Democrats believe it will count more heavily with the electorate than the President's dramatic trip to Peking and other foreign policy successes.

The 1972 election will therefore have a special historical significance; it will test the importance of foreign policy in American political campaigning. Mr Nixon likes to be known as a foreign policy President; but except in wartime only one American President, Woodrow Wilson, has been re-elected on the basis of foreign policy issues. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak argue that Mr Nixon seriously neglected domestic problems in his first two years - and certainly he stuck to his original economic plans too long.

California is a case in point. Mr Nixon has lavished attention on this crucial political battleground, which will have 45 electoral votes in 1972, the largest number of any state. He carried California in 1960 and 1968, but the state's unemployment rate is now 7 to 8 per cent and the Republicans are in trouble. The Field Public Opinion Poll, a respected survey, showed in August that only 22 per cent of California's voters listed Mr Nixon and Vice-President Agnew as their first choice in 1972.

As a result, the contest for the Democratic nomination to oppose Mr Nixon is almost unprecedentedly wide-open. No less than nine prominent figures are mentioned. In addition, a drastic expansion of the system of state primary elections has diminished the power of party bosses to dictate the choice of a candidate.

By all reckoning, Senator Muskie, the party's 1968 Vice-Presidential nominee, remains the leading contender. Some factors are certainly in his favour - his Lincoln-esque image of rugged honesty, his strong appeal to the young in 1968, his identification with the anti-pollution issue, and the masterly way in which he heaped quiet scorn on Mr Nixon in a now-famous speech at the end of the 1970 Congressional campaign.

Muskie, however, has many hurdles to overcome. Because the party establishment that favours him has had its power curbed, he must enter and win several important primaries in order to stay ahead. As the highly-visible front-runner, he can be badly hurt if others demonstrate greater voter appeal in the primaries.

Even if he survives primary challenges from men such as Senator McGovern and Senator Jackson, a potentially greater threat lurks beyond the primaries, in the person of Edward Kennedy. It is a sad comment on American *mores* that despite the Chappacquiddick affair, Kennedy's standing in the opinion polls remains consistently high.

Kennedy has said that he is not a candidate for the presidency and will enter no primary contests. But his political associates have made it abundantly clear that they are hoping for a deadlock at the Democratic national convention; that would almost certainly lead to a 'draft-Kennedy' movement. Meanwhile, Kennedy has shrewdly seized on the issue of the high cost of health care to embarrass Mr Nixon - and to offset Muskie's command of the pollution issue. And at the drop of a hat he can set into motion the Kennedy machine.

Senator McGovern, the first declared candidate, has little chance of first place on the ticket unless he triumphs in several important primaries. But despite his avowed

2

disinterest in the Vice-Presidential nomination, a Muskie-McGovern combination is a distinct possibility. It might be one of the strongest tickets the Democrats could present, though it is hard to see it beating a Nixon-Connally partnership.

**Senator Jackson,** a conservative Democrat, has shown early strength among party professionals and in the South; he conceivably could slip in, if there were a split in the liberal ranks between Muskie and McGovern. This, as a matter of fact, is already the chief argument against Jackson - that his nomination would hand the election to Mr Nixon by alienating liberal voters opposed to Jackson's pro-military stance.

As for the Democratic convert, **Mayor Lindsay** of New York, the primary route offers the only hope - and it is a faint one. Lindsay will have to set the country afire by winning resounding victories in the state contests. He conceivably could do so; his popular appeal is undeniable, as a group of large-city mayors learned on a recent tour (Lindsay was the only one who got any attention). But Democratic professionals distrust him as a 'turncoat Republican'.

The rest of the field seems to have little chance: Senator Fred Harris of Oklahoma, who announced his candidacy recently; Chairman Wilbur Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee; ambitious Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, who is campaigning hard (and fruitlessly); and the perennial Hubert Humphrey, the 1968 nominee. Humphrey has said he may enter some of the later primaries, but he is not likely to get the Democratic nomination a second time unless no one else wants it - that is, unless by next summer Mr Nixon appears unbeatable.

The 1972 party conventions will be preceded by no less than 23 state primaries (twice the number in 1968), beginning with New Hampshire on 7 March and ending with Arkansas on 27 June. With voters in so many states expressing their presidential preference, the Democratic contest could be a 'free-for-all'.

The most important primaries will be those in New Hampshire, Florida, Illinois, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Nebraska, California and New York. If one candidate won most of these 10 contests, he would probably get the Democratic nomination. But it is highly unlikely that anyone will pull off such a political coup.

## Kissinger, Chou and the UN

The visit of **Henry Kissinger** to Peking later this month overshadows all other aspects of the great China mystery - and may do something to resolve it. The Kissinger trip will almost certainly take place after the question of the Chinese seat at the United Nations has been resolved (the crucial debate should be on or around 18 October).

This further sign of Sino-American detente did nothing, however, to temper the vehemence of the Albanian Foreign Minister's attack on the Americans in the General Assembly on Tuesday; and the whole question of the Chinese representation continues to keep UN delegates in a ferment. The Washington-Taiwan axis, if it may be called that, seemed to win the opening round on 25 September when the General Assembly rejected by 65 to 47, with 15 abstentions and 3 absentees, an Albanian move to ban the inscription on its agenda of a 'dual representation' item, which would seat communist China while permitting the Nationalists to remain. (This is the formula which the Americans are sedulously pushing with some show at least of zeal.) At the time, the American ambassador, **Mr George Bush**, professed to be 'tremendously pleased'.

But in fact, the 65-47 result was deceptive; for an analysis of the voting, plus the

3

speeches of the delegates in the general debate and the gossip of the corridors, indicates a deteriorating trend for Taiwan. Some countries which were prepared to support the mere *inscription* of the American formula will not necessarily back it when it comes to the crucial vote on or around 18 October.

Seven member states (Argentina, Ecuador, Israel, Qatar, Mexico, Tunisia and Turkey) spoke after the vote emphasising that their supporting votes should not be taken as prejudging their positions on the substantive issue later, thus probably indicating abstentions. Italy and Ruanda said quite clearly that, though they supported inscription, they would vote 'no' on 18 October. Countries like Britain and France, and Kuwait, which abstained on 25 September, have similarly made clear that they will vote against Taiwan at the later stage. In fact the margin of 18 (65 against 47) was unusually close for a procedural decision about the inscription of an item on the Assembly's agenda.

Until a few days ago, the Americans professed to hope that they would muster a narrow majority for their proposition that the ousting of Taiwan is an 'important question' which, for adoption, requires a two-thirds majority of those voting in the Assembly. But close observers of the UN scene, who have been analysing the voting on 25 September and the speeches of delegates, are now forecasting that the United States and Taiwan may lose by a handful - by something like 54 or 55 to 50.

It can be argued mathematically that, if last year's vote is taken as the basis of comparison (the 1970 vote was on the simpler question of whether communist China should be seated), Peking's margin of victory will be even higher: about eight or nine. Eight of the 66 countries which took up a pro-American stance last year have shifted to an 'anti' position (Britain, Cameroun, Canada, Guyana, Iceland, Sierra Leone, Italy and Bhutan), though against that should be set the fact that four African countries, disenchanted with Peking, will either vote for the American formula or abstain: Burundi, Ghana, Kenya and Uganda.

But the politics of the China question at the UN is not all mathematics. In the speeches of delegates in the general debate, and in the hints and mutterings in the lobbies, there have been a number of significant straws in the wind. For example, in his speech, **Mr Gromyko** referred ominously to the consequences of the Soviet American rapprochement; it was 'directed against the legitimate interests and the security of the Soviet Union,' he alleged. The White House took note; President Nixon discussed this matter with Gromyko for half an hour when the Russian Foreign Minister went on to Washington.

It is also noteworthy that it is the Russians, more than anybody else, who have been sedulously whispering in the lobbies that 'great events' are taking place in China; they are thus speaking in unison with the delegates of Taiwan. (Relations between the journalists and other news media men of these apparently irreconcilable countries have been getting almost visibly warmer, in so far as this has any significance.)

Another significant development which has passed relatively unnoticed is that Peking seems to be retaining the option *not* to come to New York, even if it should be voted in on its own terms. About two months ago, **Chou En-lai** hinted vaguely at this possibility in an interview given to Mr James Reston of the *New York Times*. More recently Peking has formulated a new demand that the General Assembly should pass a resolution confirming the 1943 and 1945 declarations by the wartime allies that, after Japan's defeat, Taiwan should be returned to China.

Despite its present pro-Peking mood, the Assembly is unlikely to go so far. Firstly,

6
i
F

4

it is doubtful whether it has the competence, and, more important, the three western powers (the United States, Britain and France) regard these wartime pronouncements as declarations of intent rather than legal contracts. In their different ways, they still essentially regard Taiwan's future status as unsettled. Neither wants to be forced to declare itself on this delicate aspect of an already intractable problem – and the last thing the Americans want is a 'free-for-all' in the Assembly which might torpedo Mr Nixon's visit to Peking

Mr Nixon's visit to Peking

Many experts at the UN argue that Peking must be fully aware of all these factors; and that Peking is really preparing a pretext for refusing to come to New York, if for reasons of its own it prefers to wait outside. Perhaps this is one of the uncertainties which Dr Kissinger's visit will resolve.

Last year 28 out of the Organisation of African Unity's 41 member-states voted for an anti-Israeli resolution at the United Nations General Assembly; most of the others abstained. Throughout this year Israel has mounted a diplomatic offensive in Africa, but it seems to have had little effect.

The most high-powered initiative came in June, with a tour by **Mr Abba Eban**, the Israeli Foreign Minister, of seven countries – Kenya, Congo (Kinshasa), Cameroun, Ghana, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone. With the exception of the Ivory Coast, these countries all came out against Israel at the UN; and the attitude of the Congolese must have been specially galling, for Israel has given the Kinshasa regime important economic and military aid for some years.

During his tour Eban did not disguise his view that a clear link existed between Israel's aid and the Middle East policy of recipient countries. He seemed to score two significant successes. **President Houphouët-Boigny** of the Ivory Coast promised to do his best to block any anti-Israeli resolution at the OAU summit which was about to take place; and Sierra Leone (which is in the Security Council) agreed to appoint an Ambassador to Israel. Israel promised to step up aid to Sierra Leone.

Last month, however, Sierra Leone's Foreign Minister announced that his govern-

ment fully understood the Arab point of view. The Ivory Coast effort at the OAU was even more disappointing; far from blocking hostile discussions, the summit condemned Israel's occupation of Arab territories as 'a serious threat to the regional peace of Africa' and deplored Israel's 'defiance' of Dr. Jarring, the UN mediator. The conference set up a commission of ten African leaders under the current OAU chairman, President Ould Daddah of Mauretania (a Moslem country), who are to 'use their influence with Israel' to establish peace through the full implementation of the 1967 Security Council resolution. In general, the atmosphere was hostile; Kenya – usually pro-Israel – told the summit that 'Egypt has done all that could reasonably be expected to seek a peaceful solution.'

During the committee's first meeting in Kinshasa recently only the representatives from Nigeria, Senegal, and Cameroun turned up, and those present turned themselves into a sub-committee which, under the auspices of Ould Daddah, is to visit Cairo and Tel Aviv in the next few weeks. President Mobutu, who has cancelled all his other foreign engagements for health reasons, made a point of stressing last week that he would be available for this mission; Isarel has just signed a new agreement with Kin-

5

shasa, increasing the number of senior Israeli officers in the Congo paratroop force.

Israel's diplomatic offensive has been neutralised by a counter-offensive from the North African Arab states, particularly Libya, which can out-bribe the Israelis and has recently signed important aid agreements with Niger and Mauretania, apart from stepping up diplomatic contacts elsewhere. Nigeria shares important oil interests with the North Africans, and **President Ahidjo** of Cameroun was prominent last month among those who attended Libya's anniversary celebrations. Niger abstained from voting on the anti-Israel resolution last year; so did Cameroun and the Central African Republic, which has recently declared itself 'on the side of the Arabs', closing the offices of an Israeli diamond company and expelling the firm's staff.

But more important to Israel than the diplomatic offensive has been its military involvement in strategically placed countries - those bordering the Red Sea and its approaches, and those adjoining hostile Arab countries, such as Sudan and Libya. Israeli military assistance to Ethiopia is long-standing. A recent visit by the Israeli Chief of Staff, **General Bar Lev**, to that country was described by Israeli sources as a 'holiday'; the Arabs and the Moslem-supported Eritrean Liberation Front claim that the visit was to arrange for Israeli military installations near the Red Sea.

Israeli military personnel have also been active in Uganda for some time, and their involvement is now being stepped up - **General Amin** has been to Israel twice in the last two months. This has led to renewed Sudanese accusations that the Israelis are supplying military aid to the rebels in the south. The Sudan is in some ways a mirror image of Chad, where the nomadic Moslems of the north are fighting a Christian-negro government in the south. Chad allegations of an attempted coup in August with Libyan help for the plotters led to a break in diplomatic relations between the two countries; Tripoli blames Israel for the trouble.

The involvement of the Israelis on one hand, and the Arabs on the other, in these ethnically divided African countries is thus building up an explosive situation in wide regions of east and central Africa. Ethiopia, the Sudan and Chad are already in a state bordering on civil war. The extension of the Middle East tensions further south might well lead to hostilities which could be even less amenable to big-power restraint than the armies facing each other across the Suez canal.

## Israel: (2) Standing firm on Jerusalem

The Israelis now claim that the Palestinians of the occupied areas, including Gaza, are better off and more at ease than at any time since the end of the war of 1967.

This may or may not be true; but Israeli officials will continue to shrug off the criticisms of outside parties, such as the Director of UNRWA, over the construction of the high-rise apartment blocks at Ramat Eshkol, in east Jerusalem, and the bulldozing of the overcrowded Jebaliye camp in Gaza. 'Since when have those stinking huts become such desirable residences?' is the most typical Israeli comment. This spirit also informs the government's attitude to U Thant's proposal that a three-man mission should investigate the situation in Jerusalem. ('What can U Thant's three men see that 107,000 Arab summer visitors could not see for themselves?')

Factors which, to some extent, sustain the Israelis' argument are:

(a) The sense of outrage widely felt in the Arab world over King Hussein's treatment of the Palestinian guerrillas - though this is hardly a basic factor.

6

(b) The return to their homes in the occupied areas of notables like 'oussa el-Alami and Anwar Nusseibeh.

(c) The acceptance of the mayoralty of Gaza by the wealthy citrus-grower, Haj Rashad Shawwa, whose father and brother were mayors before him. His brother was turned out by the Egyptians when they returned to the Gaza Strip in 1957.

(d) The willingness to co-operate demonstrated by Sheikh Mohammed Ali Ja'abari, the Mayor of Hebron, and other personalities who met recently to discuss the threatened Arab League boycott of Gaza and West Bank produce, and ended by agreeing to meet again to discuss 'political matters': this, with the blessing of the Israeli military government.

Such developments have led some to argue that Dayan's 'open-bridge' policy is at last paying off; that it was wise after all to allow Arab university students to study in neighbouring, and technically 'hostile', countries, and return home for the vacation in the normal way. Others see the first signs of one of those 'new facts' of which Israeli politicians always speak – the emergence at last of that elusive Palestinian 'entity'.

In terms of internal politics the hostile tenor of the recent Security Council debate on Jerusalem, coupled with President Sadat's repeated warnings that 1971 must end in peace or war, have helped strengthen **General Dayan's** position. He is seen more than ever as a firm, unyielding guardian of Israel's security. His apparent success with the West Bankers, his habit of turning up in his helicopter after any major incident – and being photographed doing so – have fortified his claim to be regarded as the legitimate heir to Mrs Golda Meir. One is only barely aware of the claims of Mr Eban, the Foreign Minister.

But the thorny question of defence costs may provoke a serious clash between Dayan and **Mr Sapir**, the Finance Minister and Dayan's rival for the succession. Sapir wants a ceiling on defence spending in the next two years: £600 million in 1972 and £520 million in 1973.

Dayan and the former Director-General of the Defence Ministry, Moshe Kashti, would fight any such proposal; the question is how Dayan would choose to fight. If he stood his ground, the odds are that the pressure of events would swing things in his favour. The cease-fire cannot go on for ever; and while the American Phantoms that Israel wants to guarantee any peace settlement would be expensive, so would any locally-built substitute already within their capability. In any case, defence costs tend to rise as fast in peacetime as during an emergency, and well-wishers abroad are less likely to foot the bill. But if Dayan chooses to make the pending clash with Sapir the occasion for a melodramatic resignation speech, it could be his last.

Sapir is currently enjoying a fair measure of public support for his tough line on costs and wages. If the Israeli government seems to have been hard-nosed toward the UN and pro-Arab critics, it is no less so toward its domestic trouble-makers. Rising prices, higher taxes and a wave of strikes affecting the post office, Lydda airport and Ashdod docks, have impelled the government to take tough action in the economic field.

A recent statement by the Minister of Transport, **Mr Peres**, was almost startling in its social implication. It was not the worst-off who were striking, he said, but 'those with reasonably good incomes'. Far from being due to inadequate worker-representation, the strikes arose because 'works committees have extraordinary powers without having to accept any responsibilities'. These seemingly endless labour troubles, concluded Mr Peres, were 'a confrontation between democracy and anarchy'.

7

The same hard-nosed policy was manifest in the publication recently of a full-page announcement in the press, telling the public what prices could legitimately be raised as a result of devaluation, and where to complain of any attempt to over-charge them.

Nor is the foreign investor as free as he once was to invest in real estate and then sell at a profit. Many Israelis, particularly in Jerusalem, had almost given up in despair the seemingly endless quest for a decent house, at a price they could afford. They bitterly resented the tactics of some of the new immigrants, mainly Americans, who bought apartments in the controversial high-rise blocks in East Jerusalem, and sold them a year or so later at a handsome profit.

The government has now acted to prevent speculators from taking all their profits out at once in scarce foreign currency. Henceforth, overseas residents selling real estate, purchased with foreign currency less than five years previously, will be permitted to take out no more than their original foreign currency investment. The remainder can only be drawn out at the rate of 7 per cent a year until the balance is exhausted.

These economic tensions may have an indirect effect on Israel's foreign policy. Rightly or wrongly Mrs Meir's government feels it is not getting sufficient support, both militarily and economically, from its allies. Internal economic pressures will tend to make its attitude more intransigent. Meanwhile, Israel's press has already vehemently condemned Mr Rogers's latest proposals - and the line is current that the United States is no longer fit to act as an 'honest broker'. And, for good measure, Mrs Meir's government is now manufacturing the Jericho missile, said to be fitted to carry a nuclear warhead. If this report is true - as it almost certainly is - an ominous new factor is emerging in the Middle East.

© WORLD COPYRIGHT RESERVED 1971 THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD.

'FOREIGN REPORT' IS SUPPLIED ON THE CONDITION THAT IT IS REGARDED AS CONFIDENTIAL BY THE RECIPIENT.
IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES MAY THE CONTENTS BE REPRODUCED WHOLE OR IN PART.

PRINTED BY WATERLOW & SONS LTD., LONDON, FOR THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD., LONDON, S.W.1.

Washington Star, Wednesday, Oct. 6, 1971

Thaw Move
Was Mao's,
Chou Says

By JULIAN SCHUMAN

PEKING (UPI) — Premier Chou En-lai said last night that despite U.S. and Chinese diplomatic reluctance Mao Tse-tung was responsible for inviting the American ping pong team to China, an invitation which signaled a thaw in Sino-American relations.

During his two-hour meeting with the Americans, including

Chinese Premier Chou En-lai invited every American living in or visiting China to a meeting last night in the Great Hall of the People. Among the 60 Americans reported present was Julian Schuman, who has been living in Peking for some time. His report of that meeting is transmitted by United Press International.

Black Panther party leader Huey P. Newton and former U.S. State Department officer John Service, Chou conducted a free-wheeling discourse on China's foreign policy.

Chou said:

* China agrees with President Nixon that this is now an era of negotiations, but Chinese leaders also feel that, if necessary, it is an era of armed struggle.

Border Dispute

* China is willing to negotiate its border dispute with Russia, using the 19th Century territorial treaties as the basis for talks.

* China is keeping an open mind on Nixon's visit: "It is all right if the talks succeed and it is all right if the talks fail."

* No matter how far negotiations go, China will never let her guard down and stop preparing for war.

Chou said the decision to invade the American ping pong players was made by Mao at a time when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. State

Continued From Page A-1

Department attitude was to wait for a while.

Chou said he himself was looking over a preliminary Foreign Ministry dispatch regarding the American table tennis team in Japan when Mao decided on an immediate invitation.

"There were two messages, but the world only knows the second," Chou said.

Tells of Second Visit

Discussing Nixon's visit, Chou said, "He (Nixon) publicly expressed his willingness to come to China and negotiate. We had made no response. It would not have been proper for a state so antagonistic. Therefore, we agreed to (presidential adviser Henry) Kissinger's coming.

"For us, it is all right if the talks succeed and it is all right if they fail," Chou said.

At this point, about 30 minutes before a simultaneous announcement was to be made in Washington and Peking about Kissinger's second trip to Peking, Chou told the Americans of the presidential assistant's visit.

"This time Kissinger is coming openly," Chou said.

The Chinese premier said China's willingness to negotiate was nothing new. "We did this (negotiate) with the arch enemy Chiang Kai-shek for almost 10 years."

Although critical of the stationing of Russian troops on the Chinese borders, Chou said China's basic policy is to negotiate with Moscow.

"There are 1 million troops on our borders — army, air force, naval units in the coastal areas, nuclear weapons and guided missiles," Chou said. "They have sent 300,000 troops into the Peoples Republic of Mongolia, including missile units. The Mongolian government did not behave like the Czechs, so what is the purpose? It obviously is against China, to create a state of tension along our borders.

"Nevertheless, our policy is to negotiate to solve the boundary questions and bring about good neighborly relations," Chou said.

Even though the 19th Century territorial treaties imposed on China by the Czarists were unequal and did not agree with China's maps, Chou said that with a few exceptions those treaties should serve as a basis for continued negotiations.

No Threat to Long Island

"As for us, we do not like armed struggle and we do not provoke others. Not only have we not gone to Long Island, we have not gone to Honolulu. Even with the U.S. Navy in the Taiwan Strait, we are for negotiations," he said.

Chou said, "If we are only prepared for negotiations without preparing against armed war, that is not good. If a war is launched against China, what should be do? How have we prepared? It may sound impossible to our friends, but we must think of it.

"We are ready. We are building underground tunnels, and this has been done in every big and small city.

"Only when one dares to engage in war, can one negotiate, and if one wants peaceful negotiations, he must be prepared ..."

Chou briefly mentioned the United Nations situation, saying there had been no change from the Foreign Ministry statement issued Aug. 20—China firmly opposes two Chinas, one China, one Taiwan; and any independent Taiwan. All were unacceptable, he said, and if anything the third even less so.

Chou said, however, he hopes to see more Americans visiting China. "More and more have been coming," he said. "Though Japanese visitors have been the most numerous, the number of Americans coming should catch up with them in the 1970s."