MAY 31 '92 21:06 KISSINGER ASSOC

P.5

[y]

4

world order have occurred in the past. But these were changes in the domestic legitimacy of states, and related to how the units engaged in international relations defined themselves. Then there were the changes in the physical capacity of states to affect each other; changes in the values by which states measured their achievements; and, general changes in technology. In the 18th century it never occurred to anybody that political units should be justified on the basis of nationality. By the 19th century, most of the wars being fought had to do with those same empires as had been considered perfectly legitimate when they were founded, but were by then breaking up into national units. In the 18th century, the physical capacity of nations to destroy each other was extremely limited, and it has been growing ever since until the threat of war now involves literally the destruction ofivilged life. Now in our period, all of these elements of change are occurring simultaneously, though not uniformly, around the world. In Western Europe, the concept of the nation is on the decline into larger units. In Eastern Europe, national identity is becoming a major rallying cry for political organizations, and, in the Soviet Union, all

R=97%

05-31-92 11:55PM P005 #43

MAY 31 '92 21:07 KISSINGER ASSOC

P.8

as a companion structure of the Atlantic Alliance, sought to find
a home for a burgeoning Germany and to restore a sense of identity
to a war-shattered Europe by overcoming ancient rivalries.

Today, Soviet armies stand 1000 miles to the east and no one takes an imminent Soviet attack seriously. The number of American troops in Europe is being drastically reduced. Within the European Community, Germany's unification and growing power have revolutionized all institutions. The division of Germany had always been the unspoken premise of Atlantic institutions, especially of the Community. So long as two German states existed, the implicit arrangement was that the Federal Republic would not translate its growing economic and military strength into political coin in return for its partners according to a higher status than they did to its East German rival.

A reunited Germany no longer needs French certification that it is a "good European." Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union depend on Germany for economic assistance. Its Western European partners are only marginally aware of its economic, financial, and

05-31-92 11:55PM P008 #43

MAY 31 '92 21:09 KISSINGER ASSOC

P.11

In that each side of the Atlantic is entitled to and the European Community is already showing symptoms of pursuing economic self-interest even at the risk of Atlantic cohesion. It would be a disastrous error to conclude from these facts that the Atlantic relationship has served its purpose. The new conditions make it more necessary than ever, though it cannot, and should not, continue along the old pattern. We must continue to develop our economies, and we must ensure that our economies are not dependent upon one another. For one thing, the Soviet collapse has not ended every potential threat from the East. Even if the former Soviet Union were to explode into its fifteen constituent republics, the Russian Republic would be far larger and have a much more numerous population than any single European state. And it would retain thousands of nuclear warheads, far exceeding any conceivable European nuclear potential.

(Russia is the heir of a proud and heroic tradition and recent events have been a devastating blow to its self-esteem. It is essential that the Western democracies make clear in actions and in words that they consider Russia an appropriate partner in world affairs and a major country in its own right with legitimate

05-31-92 11:55PM P011 #43

MAY 31 '92 21:11 KISSINGER ASSOC

P.13

11

borders, a significant Western aid program would be in order. This should be balanced with commensurate programs toward the other republics. Such an aid program can, however, be at best of an emergency nature. No democratic government or combination of governments has the resources, and the former Soviet Union lacks the appropriate institutional framework for a Marshall-type program. There is no short-cut to a domestic restructuring that can attract the largest pool of available capital, which is private investment. This will require two steps: the adoption of a constitution which establishes a predictable environment for investment; and, an intermediate step between emergency and long-term aid such as assistance in the field of energy. The Soviet Union has vast energy resources; the world is heading into an energy shortage; the Western democracies have an interest in reducing their dependence on Mideast oil. It should be possible to generate foreign capital rapidly to modernize the infrastructure for exploring, mining and transporting Soviet deposits of oil and gas.

05-31-92 11:55PM P013 #43

P.14

[y]

12

Finally, Western democracies must not become totally preoccupied with events in the Soviet Union. In Eastern Europe, the nightmare is resurgent Russian imperialism. The Western countries must now move decisively to ease those fears. The fate of the democracies of Eastern Europe must be linked rapidly to that of the West. The European Community should end its haggling over ~~move as rapidly~~ possible for

~~East European associate~~ membership in the Common Market. The United States should assist with some aid in a part of the world where substantial governmental assistance can make a difference. Allies on both sides of the Atlantic should consider appropriate security arrangements, short of moving NATO forces to the Soviet frontier.

Twice in a generation, America went to war because American leaders were convinced that Europe dominated by a single hostile power would constitute a threat to its security and economy. That reality has not changed. Though there are no powers ostensibly hostile to America in Europe today, the onset of any hegemonical pattern would rapidly be perceived as hostile. Without designating

05-31-92 11:55PM P014 #43

MAY 31 '92 21:13 KISSINGER ASSOC

P.16

[y]

14

at the center of the Continent is simply unsustainable by any people.

America, therefore, will prove vital to equilibrium within Europe and to Europe's relationship with the East. Without it, Britain and France will not be able to sustain by themselves the political balance in Western Europe. Germany needs America as a gauge by which to keep its nationalistic tendencies in perspective, and as an anchor for keeping outside pressures at bay. And Russia will need America as a long-term partner in global affairs. America too needs Europe - to avoid becoming an island off the shores of Eurasia, and to keep from gradually turning into a second-class economic power.

The French view of the political structure of the Community that America must be kept at arm's length from Community decision-making has been outstripped by events. It is based on three assumptions, each of which is becoming less and less relevant: maintaining Franco-German leadership of the European Community to give France a veto over German national policy;

05-31-92 11:55PM P016 #43

MAY 31 '92 21:15 KISSINGER ASSOC

P.19

16

blackmail. But the United States should agree to European identity
within NATO; France should abandon its efforts to set up a European
defense structure outside of NATO; the European Community should
encourage a large political role for the United States within its
deliberations; and, an economic bargain must be struck between the
United States and the Community lest Atlantic relations dissolve
in bickering over special interests.

A more flexible NATO structure is desirable because the most
likely dangers are ethnic conflicts, as in Yugoslavia, crises among
the republics in the former Soviet Union, or upheaval in the Muslim
world. With respect to these issues, the two sides of the Atlantic
should be in a position to differentiate their tactics. The pattern of the Gulf War, in which America bore the brunt of the effort, could well be reversed - as has in fact happened over the issue of Yugoslavia.

Such a security structure is, however, possible only if France
and that part of Europe following French leadership abandon the
quest for identity in opposition to the United States. France must
win

R-98%

05-31-92 11:55PM

P019 #43

MAY 31 '92 21:16 KISSINGER ASSOC

P.20

17

not stand in the way of a larger American role in political consultations. In existing procedures, the US has no formal role in *European political discussions* until after a decision has been reached. Barely tolerable when issues were economic, this is unacceptable in the face of the political challenges ahead, or of a European identity in the field of defense. What is needed between the United States and Western Europe is not *formal* structure but something intangible like the special relationship that has always existed between the United States and Britain.

The American contribution to Atlantic relations should be to keep sights raised toward the essential. Ironically, the plethora of institutions--the EEC, NATO, CSCE, WEU, and the newest, as yet unlabeled, candidate, the Europe from Vladivostok to Vancouver-- contribute to already rising nationalism. For they provide wide avenues from which to choose whatever institution can most favor a country's immediate national goals on any given issue - as has already happened over the issue of Yugoslavia.

Especially puzzling in that connection have been the numerous

R=98%

05-31-92 11:55PM

P020 #43

MAY 31 '92 21:17 KISSINGER ASSOC

P.1

18

encouraging references on both sides of the Atlantic to the peculiar concept of Europe extending from Vladivostok to Vancouver embracing every country of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and North America in some nebulous institution of undefined purpose. What common objective is to unite these societies? Where does it leave China and Japan? Is it a grouping of Caucasian versus Asian races? If everybody is allied with everybody in that vast area, will anyone have a special obligation to anyone? These vacuities behind the slogan of "Europe from Vladivostok to Vancouver" will, in the end, encourage the most nationalistic tendencies.

A revitalized political dialogue in the Atlantic area will have many subjects before it. In reducing its forces, the United States will have to explain why what remains is important in relation to which dangers, and in combination with which European forces. Europe needs to define where it conceives its borders to be and how it will relate itself to developments in the former Soviet Union, including a joint approach to aid.

R-97%

06-01-92 12:09AM

P001 #44

MAY 31 '92 21:18 KISSINGER ASSOC

P.2

19

No issue is more urgent than to relate the former Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe to Western Europe and to NATO. At least Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary should be permitted to join the Community rapidly. It is hardly to the credit of the West that after talking for a generation about freedom for Eastern Europe, it should do too little to vindicate it. Moreover, if a no man's land is to be avoided in Eastern Europe, NATO should leave no doubt that pressures against these countries would be treated as a challenge to Western security - whatever the formal aspect of this undertaking.

Let me conclude by stressing the following: I have obviously described many problems, but we should keep in mind that these are the problems of an exciting period. It happens very rarely that all the fundamental factors are in flux simultaneously or that the canvas is as open, that it is as possible to create new relationships as at this moment today. Yet the window of opportunity may only prove to be fleeting; we must not let it pass us by.

R-98%

06-01-92 12:09AM

P002 #44

PHILIP MORRIS SPEECH 5/20/92

In the last three years, a truly extraordinary series of events has occurred. I do not know of anybody who foresaw them. Of course there were many general statements about how Communism went against human nature and that it surely could not last, but I do not recall any serious person ever predicting that it would collapse quite so totally, or so quickly, in Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet Union.

I am at work on a book on the various conceptions of world order that have existed throughout history up to the present period. I find the differences between these conceptions as reflected in the diplomacies of individual countries a fascinating study. The United States, for instance, not only did not conduct any foreign policy for 120 years, but it actually prided itself on its lack of experience as a reflection of the unique disinterestedness of its national ethos - that is to say, that the lack of a national interest also accounted, to its way of thinking,

2

for the absence of motives based on self-interest, of the kind that
led to the traditionally European conception of foreign policy.

Now the Europeans had been conducting their foreign policy,
for better or for worse, with elaborate theories, machineries, and
interactions for some 300 years when Woodrow Wilson suddenly
appeared on the scene in 1918. He proclaimed a set of eternal
verities of foreign policy, much of it extraordinarily elevated,
for which there was not, however, a shred of historical evidence.
What he was expressing was a hope, not a truth. And yet if you
read statements by American leaders since Wilson, you will find
that his principles dominate throughout -- having to do with the
essentially pacifist nature of man, the sense of shared
responsibility by the international community to carry out legal
principles, and the notion that aggression is universally
recognized and resistance to it is equally universal. In the
interim, evidence of the validity of these principles has not
exactly been overwhelming. Rather, we have been witnessing the
triumph of faith over experience. I do not at all say this as a

3

criticism because, after all, the United States is a country built
by people of faith, for nothing else could have propelled them
across the Atlantic, or all the way across their continent.

The same attitudes are personified in the American approach
to foreign relations, which worked especially well during the Cold
War because there was always a very real danger throughout, and
because Communism represented a truly terrible system. Human
nature did correspond more closely to American values than it did
to Communist dogma.

But we are in a different world now. Communism has collapsed
both as an ideology and as an economic and political system. The
security considerations that produced NATO, the Japanese security
treaty, and a whole network of relationships is in a process of
fundamental re-examination -- at least it should be in a process
of fundamental re-examination. Not only is there no longer any
single, permanent, enemy, but we now also have the somewhat
abstract popular objective called the New World Order.

Yet how do we actually define it? Certainly changes in the

4

[y]

world order have occurred in the past. But these were changes in
the domestic legitimacy of states, and related to how the units
engaged in international relations defined themselves. Then there
were the changes in the physical capacity of states to affect each
other; changes in the values by which states measured their
achievements; and, general changes in technology. In the 18th
century it never occurred to anybody that political units should
be justified on the basis of nationality. By the 19th century,
most of the wars being fought had to do with those same empires as
had been considered perfectly legitimate when they were founded,
but were by then breaking up into national units. In the 18th
century, the physical capacity of nations to destroy each other was
extremely limited, and it has been growing ever since.

Now in our period, all of these elements of change are
occurring simultaneously, though not uniformly, around the world.
In Western Europe, the concept of the nation is on the decline.
In Eastern Europe, national identity is becoming a major rallying
chord for political organization, and, in the Soviet Union, all

5

these elements are in motion simultaneously.

The world that is emerging will have many power centers, with more coming into being at every moment. At the same time, for the first time in history, we have instantaneous communications. Certain issues -- nuclear, environmental, and of population -- have never existed on a global level before. In the 18th century, the empires of Asia and of Europe had next to no connection and hence no relationships with each other. In the 19th century, policy became global but was defined solely in European capitals. This is the first time in history that there has existed a truly global policy, and therefore, a global order.

Therefore, we must again begin to think in terms of some kind of equilibrium for this New World Order. It will certainly be an order with many complex components, some of which I have already described. To reiterate, among them, crucially, will be the knowledge that the age of the superpowers is coming to an end; that military power will become less significant after a few years; that economic power will become more important; and that new power

[y]

6

centers are emerging and will continue to emerge in even greater
numbers.

In this context, I would like now to turn to the Atlantic
relationship which is for all of us here of special importance. For
a generation, this relationship has been the hinge of Western
foreign policy on both sides of the ocean, and of the unity with
which victory was achieved in the so-called Cold War. Yet it seems
to me that in the new order of things it is eroding from neglect.
Though its institutions were created during the probably most
fertile period of American foreign policy, they are being taken
for granted as the premises on which they were based are
collapsing. A true adaptation to new realities has yet to occur.

The Atlantic Alliance was created in 1949, when Soviet armies
were at the Elbe and an invasion of Western Europe seemed possible,
if not imminent. Germany was divided and demilitarized, and Europe
was just beginning its economic recovery. NATO's importance grew
with the need to embed German rearmament in a framework greater
than the nation state. Similarly, the European Community, conceived

[y]

7

Today, Soviet armies stand 1000 miles to the east and no one
takes an imminent Soviet attack seriously. The size of American
troops in Europe is being drastically reduced. Within the European
Community, Germany's unification and growing power have
revolutionized all institutions. The division of Germany had
always been the unspoken premise of Atlantic institutions,
especially of the Community. So long as two German states existed,
the implicit arrangement was that the Federal Republic would not
translate its growing economic and military strength into political
coin in return for its partners according to a higher status than
they did to its East German rival.

A reunited Germany no longer needs French certification that
it is a "good European." Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
depend on Germany for economic assistance. Its Western European
partners are only too aware of its economic, financial, and

8

military strength. In these circumstances, the European Community no longer needs to act as a restraint on Germany but as the mechanism by which the beneficence of the new German strength can be promulgated. Yet how many in Western Europe actually perceive it this way may explain why European integration, though lauded in principle, finds increasing resistance in practice.

Regarding the economic relations between the European Community and the United States, is it not the essence of a Common Market that its external barriers are higher than its internal ones? It must have been the case, therefore, that a measure of discrimination against America was inherent in the concept of a Common Market from the start - though for most of the post-war period, the overwhelming security concern caused any such competing interests to take a back seat.

In the years ahead, Europe will not find the need for American protection as compelling; America will not sacrifice as much for European security; in due course, Germany will insist on the political influence to which its military and economic power

9

entitle it; and the European Community is already showing symptoms
of pursuing economic self-interest even at the risk of Atlantic
cohesion. It would be a disastrous error to conclude from these
facts that the Atlantic relationship has served its purpose. The
new conditions make it more necessary than ever, though it cannot,
and should not, continue along the old pattern.

For one thing, the Soviet collapse has not ended every
potential threat from the East. Even if the former Soviet Union
were to implode into its fifteen constituent republics, the Russian
Republic would be far larger and have a much more numerous
population than any single European state. And it would retain
thousands of nuclear warheads, far exceeding any conceivable
European nuclear potential.

10

security interests. But a Russia extending from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok and possessing thousands of nuclear weapons no longer needs the territorial buffers for security it considered so essential throughout its history. What it needs is to devote resources hitherto spent on imperial expansion to economic recovery.

At the same time, Russia must be given to understand that new expansionism -- by force or blackmail -- will exact a heavy price. It would clash with US principles and frighten Russia's neighbors. And it would reactivate the cycle of confrontation between Russia and the world. We should rapidly expand economic and cultural contacts with the key new republics, keeping in mind that an imperial heritage has left most of them little experience in international affairs. They need sensitive encouragement. We must balance the attention Yeltsin deserves with the support the new republics require. And we must find subjects to talk to them about other than nuclear control.

If Russia respects the new situation and remains within its

11

borders, a significant Western aid program would be in order. This
should be balanced with commensurate programs toward the other
republics. Such an aid program can, however, be at best of an
emergency nature. No democratic government or combination of
governments has the resources, and the former Soviet Union lacks
the appropriate institutional framework for a Marshall-type
program. There is no short-cut to a domestic restructuring that
can attract the largest pool of available capital, which is private
investment. This will require two steps: the adoption of a
constitution which establishes a predictable environment for
investment; and, an intermediate step between emergency and long-
term aid such as assistance in the field of energy. The Soviet
Union has vast energy resources; the world is heading into an
energy shortage; the Western democracies have an interest in
reducing their dependence on Mideast oil. It should be possible
to generate foreign capital rapidly to modernize the infrastructure
for exploring, mining and transporting Soviet deposits of oil and
gas.

12

Finally, Western democracies must not become totally preoccupied with events in the Soviet Union. In Eastern Europe, the nightmare is resurgent Russian imperialism. The Western countries must now move decisively to ease those fears. The fate of the democracies of Eastern Europe must be linked rapidly to that of the West. The European Community should end its haggling over East European associate membership in the Common Market. The United States should assist with some aid in a part of the world where substantial governmental assistance can make a difference. Allies on both sides of the Atlantic should consider appropriate security arrangements, short of moving NATO forces to the Soviet frontier.

13

a leading candidate for that role, a challenge could evolve from chaos on the territory of the former Soviet Union, from ethnic conflicts and political instability in Eastern Europe, and from the redefinition of Germany's role. The great achievement of the post-war generation of Western leaders was to recognize that if America did not engage early in preserving stability, it would be obliged to restore equilibrium under far worse circumstances.

[This is even more true today. Germany has become too strong for existing European institutions to establish by themselves a balance between Germany and its partners, even less between Germany and the former Soviet Union. It is in nobody's interest for Germany and Russia to perceive each other as their principal policy options. If they become too close, they raise the danger of hegemony; if they quarrel, they will involve the world in escalating crises.]¹ Europe has an interest in avoiding what history has taught it repeatedly - that a purely national policy

¹HAK: If you want to include this section, perhaps you can re-word it.

14

The French view of the political structure of the Community
- that America must be kept at arm's length from Community
decision-making - has been outstripped by events. It is based on
three assumptions, each of which is becoming less and less
relevant: maintaining Franco-German leadership of the European
Community to give France a veto over German national policy;

15

[y]

keeping America in reserve if the bet on the Franco-German condominium fails, but without permitting American involvement until France calls for it; and, finally--or simultaneously--an option toward Russia as a hedge should both the German and the American relationships falter.

France has neither the population nor the resources to play such a complicated game. Germany will not accept a subordinate role, nor America a passive one. Being forced constantly to choose between America and France will accelerate German nationalism. If America is asked to act as a French auxiliary, its isolationism will grow. Russia, if it chooses a Western partner, is more likely to opt for Germany than for France, [and for the United States over either]. If all, or even some, of these combinations were to occur, France's quest for identity would have produced the nightmare of being subordinated to powerful neighbors which it has sought to avoid since the days of Richelieu three hundred years ago.

NATO is crucial because it remains the sole institutional link between America and Europe, and the best protection against nuclear

16

blackmail. But the United States should agree to European identity
within NATO; France should abandon its efforts to set up a European
defense structure outside of NATO; the European Community should
encourage a larger political role for the United States within its
deliberations; and, an economic bargain must be struck between the
United States and the Community lest Atlantic relations dissolve
in bickering over special interests.

17

not stand in the way of a larger American role in political
consultations. In existing procedures, the US has no formal role
until after a decision has been reached. Barely tolerable when
issues were economic, this is unacceptable in the face of the
political challenges ahead, or of a European identity in the field
of defense. What is needed between the United States and Western
Europe is not more structure but something intangible like the
special relationship that has always existed between the United
States and Britain.

18

19

No issue is more urgent then to relate the former Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe to Western Europe and to NATO. At least Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary should be permitted to join the Community rapidly. It is hardly to the credit of the West that after talking for a generation about freedom for Eastern Europe, it should do too little to vindicate it. Moreover, if a no man's land is to be avoided in Eastern Europe, NATO should leave no doubt that pressures against these countries would be treated as a challenge to Western security - whatever the formal aspect of this undertaking.

PHILIP MORRIS SPEECH 5/15/92

I am at work on a book on the various conceptions of world
order that have existed throughout history up to the present
period. I find it fascinating that the United States not only did
not conduct any foreign policy for 120 years, but that it prided
itself on having no experience with foreign policy at all. The
Europeans conducted their foreign policy, for better or for worse,
with elaborate theories, machineries, and interactions for some 300
years. Then Woodrow Wilson appeared on the scene in 1918 and

2

proclaimed a set of eternal verities of foreign policy, much of it
extraordinarily elevated, for which there was not a shred of
historical evidence. What he was expressing was a hope, not a
truth. And yet if you read statements by American leaders since
Wilson, you will find that his principles dominate throughout --
these having to do with the essentially pacifist nature of man, the
sense of shared responsibility by the international community to
carry out legal principles, and the notion that aggression is
universally recognized and resistance to it is equally universal.
In the interim, evidence of the validity of these principles has
not exactly been overwhelming. Rather, we have been witnessing the
triumph of faith over experience. I do not say this as a criticism
because, after all, the United States is a country built by people
of faith, for nothing else could have propelled them across the
Atlantic, or all the way across their continent.

It is also something that personifies the American attitude
toward foreign relations, which worked particularly well during the

3

Cold War because there was always a very real danger out there throughout, and because Communism represented a truly terrible system. Human nature did correspond more closely to American values than it did to Communist dogma.

But we are in a different world now. Communism is collapsing both as an ideology and as an economic and political system. The security considerations that produced NATO, the Japanese security treaty, and a whole network of relationships is in a process of fundamental re-examination -- at least it should be in a process of fundamental re-examination. Not only is there no longer any single, permanent, enemy, but we now also have the somewhat abstract popular objective called the New World Order.

Yet how do we actually define it? Certainly changes in the world order have occurred in the past. But these were changes in the domestic legitimacy of states, and related to how the units engaged in international relations defined themselves. Then there were the changes in the physical capacity of states to affect each

4

Now in our period, all of these elements of change are
occurring simultaneously, though not uniformly, around the world.
In Western Europe, the concept of the nation is on the decline.
In Eastern Europe, national identity is becoming a major rallying
chord for political organization, and, in the Soviet Union, all
these elements are in motion simultaneously.

5

Therefore, we must again begin to think in terms of some kind
of equilibrium for this New World Order. It will certainly be an
order with many complex components, some of which I have already
described. To reiterate, among them, crucially, will be the
knowledge that the age of the superpowers is coming to an end; that
military power will become less significant after a few years; that
economic power will become more important; and that new power
centers are emerging and will continue to emerge in even greater
numbers.

6

In this context, I would like now to turn to the Atlantic relationship which is for all of us here today of special import. For a generation, this relationship has been the hinge of Western foreign policy on both sides of the ocean, and of the unity with which victory was achieved in the so-called Cold War. Yet it seems to me that in the new order of things it is eroding from neglect.

Its institutions were created during the probably most fertile period of American foreign policy. Yet they are being taken for granted as the premises on which they were based are collapsing. A true adaptation to new realities has yet to occur.

Similarly, the European Community, conceived as a companion

[y]

7

structure of the Atlantic Alliance, sought to find a home for a
burgeoning Germany and to restore a sense of identity to a war-
shattered Europe by overcoming ancient rivalries.

Today, Soviet armies stand 1000 miles to the east and no one
takes an imminent Soviet attack seriously. The size of American
troops in Europe is being drastically reduced. Within the European
Community, Germany's unification and growing power have
revolutionized all institutions. The division of Germany had
always been the unspoken premise of Atlantic institutions,
especially of the Community. So long as two German states existed,
the implicit arrangement was that the Federal Republic would not
translate its growing economic and military strength into political
coin in return for its partners according it a higher status than
they did to its East German rival. The so-called French leadership
of the Community depended on Bonn's abstinence from challenge.

8

depend on Germany for economic assistance. Its Western European partners are only too aware of its economic, financial, and military strength. In these circumstances, the European Community no longer needs to act as a restraint on Germany but as the mechanism for making German strength more palatable. This is surely a growing perception among many in Western Europe and explains why European integration, lauded in principle, finds increasing resistance in practice.

Regarding relations between the European Community and the United States, is it not the essence of a Common Market that its external barriers are higher than its internal ones? It is the case, therefore, that a measure of discrimination against America has been inherent in it from the start - though for most of the post-war period, the shared security concern caused these competing interests to take a back seat.

9

European security; in due course, Germany will insist on the political influence to which its military and economic power entitle it; and the European Community is already showing symptoms of pursuing economic self-interest even at the risk of Atlantic cohesion.

10

events have been a devastating blow to its self-esteem. It is
essential that the Western democracies make clear in actions and
in words that they consider Russia an appropriate partner in world
affairs and a major country in its own right with legitimate
security interests. But a Russia extending from St. Petersburg to
Vladivostok and possessing thousands of nuclear weapons no longer
needs the territorial buffers for security it considered so
essential throughout its history. What it needs is to devote
resources hitherto spent on imperial expansion to economic
recovery.

[y]

[y]

11

If Russia respects the new situation and remains within its
borders, a significant Western aid program would be in order. This
should be balanced with commensurate programs toward the other
republics. Such an aid program can, however, be at best of an
emergency nature. No democratic government or combination of
governments has the resources, and the former Soviet Union lacks
the appropriate institutional framework for a Marshall-type
program. There is no short-cut to a domestic restructuring that
can attract the largest pool of available capital, which is private
investment. This will require two steps: the adoption of a
constitution which establishes a predictable environment for
investment; and, an intermediate step between emergency and long-
term aid such as assistance in the field of energy. The Soviet

12

Finally, Western democracies must not become totally preoccupied with events in the Soviet Union. In Eastern Europe, the nightmare is resurgent Russian imperialism. The Western countries must now move decisively to ease those fears. The fate of the democracies of Eastern Europe must be linked rapidly to that of the West. The European Community should end its petty haggling over East European associate membership in the Common Market. The United States should assist with some aid in a part of the world where substantial governmental assistance can make a difference. Allies on both sides of the Atlantic should consider appropriate security arrangements, short of moving NATO forces to the Soviet

13

frontier.

Twice in a generation, America went to war because American leaders were convinced that Europe dominated by a single hostile power would constitute a threat to its security and economy. That reality has not changed. Though there are no powers ostensibly hostile to America in Europe today, the onset of any hegemonical pattern would rapidly be perceived as hostile. Without designating a leading candidate for that role, a challenge could evolve from chaos on the territory of the former Soviet Union, from ethnic conflicts and political instability in Eastern Europe, and from the redefinition of Germany's role. The great achievement of the post-war generation of Western leaders was to recognize that if America did not engage early in preserving stability, it would be obliged to restore equilibrium under far worse circumstances.

[y]

14

and the former Soviet Union. It is in nobody's interest for Germany and Russia to perceive each other as their principal policy options. If they become too close, they raise the danger of hegemony; if they quarrel, they will involve the world in escalating crises. Every European country has an interest in avoiding what history has amply demonstrated - that a purely national policy is not sustainable in the center of the Continent by any European country.

America is vital to equilibrium within Europe and for Europe's relationship with the East. Without it, Britain and France cannot sustain the political balance in Western Europe; Germany needs America as an anchor to check nationalistic temptations and outside pressures and Russia as a long-term partner in global affairs. And America needs Europe to avoid becoming an island off the shores of Eurasia, and turning gradually into a second-class economic power.

15

decision-making - has been outstripped by events. It is based on three assumptions, each of which is becoming less and less relevant: maintaining Franco-German leadership of the European Community to give France a veto over German national policy; keeping America in reserve if the bet on the Franco-German condominium fails, but without permitting American involvement until France calls for it; and, finally--or simultaneously--an option toward Russia as a hedge should both the German and the American relationships falter.

France has neither the population nor the resources to play such a complicated game. Germany will not accept a subordinate role, nor America a passive one. Being forced constantly to choose between America and France will accelerate German nationalism. If America is asked to act as a French auxiliary, isolationism will grow. Russia, if it chooses a Western partner, is more likely to opt for Germany than for France, and for the United States over either. If all, or even some, of these combinations were to occur,

16

NATO is crucial because it remains the sole institutional link
between America and Europe, and the best protection against nuclear
blackmail. But the United States should agree to European identity
within NATO; France should abandon its relentless effort to set up
a European defense structure outside of NATO; the European
Community should encourage a larger political role for the United
States within its deliberations; and, an economic bargain must be
struck between the United States and the Community lest Atlantic
relations dissolve in the bickering of special interests.

A more flexible NATO structure is desirable because the most
likely dangers are ethnic conflicts, as in Yugoslavia, or crises
among the republics in the former Soviet Union or an upheaval in
the Muslim world. With respect to these issues, the two sides of
the Atlantic should be in a position to differentiate their

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tactics. The pattern of the Gulf War, in which America bore the brunt of the effort while our European allies - with the honorable exception of Britain and to a lesser extent France - confined themselves to political and economic support, could well be reversed - as has in fact happened over Yugoslavia.

Such a security structure is, however, possible only if France and that part of Europe following French leadership abandon the quest for identity in opposition to the United States. France must not stand in the way of a larger American role in political consultations. In existing procedures, the US has no formal role until after a decision has been reached. Barely tolerable when issues were economic, this is unacceptable in the face of the political challenges ahead, or of a European identity in the field of defense. What is needed between the United States and Western Europe is not more structure but something intangible like the special relationship that has always existed between the United States and Britain.

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The American contribution to Atlantic relations should be to keep sights raised toward the essential. There has been too much of a tendency to avoid controversy by blessing every conceivable multilateral initiative. Ironically, the plethora of institutions-the EEC, NATO, CSCE, WEU, and the newest, as yet unlabeled, candidate, the Europe from Vladivostok to Vancouver--contribute to rising nationalism. For they provide a wide choice of whatever institution most favors a particular country's immediate national goals on any given issue - as indeed happened on the issue of Yugoslavia.

Especially puzzling in that connection have been the numerous encouraging references to the peculiar concept of Europe extending from Vladivostok to Vancouver embracing every country of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and North America in some nebulous institution of undefined purpose. What common objective is to unite these societies? Where does it leave China and Japan? Is it a grouping of Caucasian versus Asian races? If

19

everybody is allied with everybody in that vast area, will anyone
have a special obligation to anyone? The vacuities behind the
slogan of Europe from Vladivostok to Vancouver will in the end
encourage the most nationalistic tendencies - which may be its
attraction to some of its European sponsors.

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Europe, so little is done to vindicate it. Moreover, if a no man's
land is to be avoided in Eastern Europe, NATO should leave no doubt
that pressures against these countries would be treated as a
challenge to Western security - whatever the formal aspect of this
undertaking.

Let me conclude by stressing the following: I have obviously
described many problems, but we should keep in mind that these are
the problems of an exciting period. It happens very rarely that
all the fundamental factors are in flux simultaneously or that the
canvas is as open, that it is as possible to create new
relationships as at this moment today. Yet the window of
opportunity may only be very fleeting; we must not let it pass us
by.

May 5, 1992

SPEECH FOR PHILIP MORRIS SUMMIT

In the last three years, a truly extraordinary series of events has occurred. I do not know of anybody who foresaw them. In fact, it is a lucky thing that you invited me to speak this year because I am sure that two years from now I will have convinced myself that I saw it all clearly and had predicted it all along. But since we are not yet at that stage, I can say freely that I know of no analyst who expected this. Of course there were a lot of general statements about how Communism went against human nature and that it surely could not last, but I do not recall any serious person ever predicting that it would collapse quite so totally, or so quickly, in Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet Union.

2

-- something that will not be inflicted on you in the immediate
future as it is a huge assignment. I find it fascinating that the
United States not only did not conduct any foreign policy for 120
years, but that it prided itself on having no experience with
foreign policy at all. The Europeans conducted their foreign
policy, for better or for worse, with elaborate theories,
machineries, and interactions for some 300 years. Then Woodrow
Wilson appeared on the scene in 1918 and proclaimed a set of
eternal verities of foreign policy, much of it extraordinarily
elevated, for which there was not a shred of evidence. What he was
expressing was a hope, not a truth. And yet if you read statements
by American leaders since Wilson, you will find that his principles
dominate throughout -- these having to do with the essentially
pacifist nature of man, the sense of shared responsibility by the
international community to carry out legal principles, and the
notion that aggression is universally recognized and resistance to
it is equally universal. In the interim, evidence of the validity
of these principles has not exactly been overwhelming. Rather, we

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Thus through much of America's international experience it has
oscillated between acts of crusade and acts of conversion. Even
at the height of the Cold War, there was a certain nostalgia for
conversion, as evidenced by the hope that behind their facade,
maybe Soviet leaders were really just regular fellows. When they
came to visit they were invariably taken to see a farm in Iowa.
In this I am reminded of an American friend of mine who is of the
view that there is no such thing as a British accent. He believes
the English speak the way they do to intimidate Americans and that
if you were to catch a Briton unawares, for instance by waking him
up at four in the morning, he would talk like a normal human being.
Now this also personifies the American attitude toward most foreign

4

relations, which worked particularly well during the Cold War
because there was always a very real danger out there throughout,
and because Communism represented a truly terrible system. Human
nature did correspond more closely to our own values than it did
to Communist ideals.

But we are in a different world now. Communism is collapsing
both as an ideology and as an economic and political system. The
security considerations that produced NATO, the Japanese security
treaty, and a whole network of relationships is in a process of
fundamental re-examination -- at least it should be in a process
of fundamental re-examination. Because there is no longer a
single, permanent, enemy, we now also have this somewhat abstract
popular objective called the New World Order.

Yet how do we actually define it? Certainly changes in the
world order have occurred in the past. But these were changes in
the domestic legitimacy of states, and related to how the units

5

engaged in international relations defined themselves. Then there
were the changes in the physical capacity of states to affect each
other; changes in the values by which states measured their
achievements, and general changes in technology. In the 18th
century it never occurred to anybody that political units should
be justified on the basis of nationality. By the 19th century,
most of the wars being fought had to do with the same empires which
had been considered perfectly legitimate when they were founded,
but were by then breaking up into national units. In the 18th
century, the physical capacity of nations to destroy each other was
extremely limited, and it has been growing ever since.

Now, in our period, all of these elements of change are
occurring simultaneously, though not uniformly, around the world.
In Western Europe, the concept of the nation is on the decline.
In Eastern Europe, national identity is becoming a major rallying
chord for political organization, and, in the Soviet Union, all
these elements are in motion simultaneously.

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The world that is emerging will have many power centers, with more coming into being at every moment. Nor will it have a uniform perception of security because there will not be any one particular threat. At the same time, for the first time in history, we have instantaneous communications. Certain issues -- nuclear, environmental, and of population -- have never existed on a global level before. In the 18th century, the empires of Asia and of Europe had next to no connection and hence no relationships with each other. In the 19th century, policy became global but was defined solely in the European capitals. This is the first time in history that there has existed a truly global policy, and therefore, a global order.

Therefore, we must begin to think in terms of some kind of equilibrium for our world. And whenever we talk about a New World Order we have to address these issues. Even in the field of economics, we are moving into a different era. It is very well to

7

say that the Common Market should be nondiscriminatory. The only
problem is that what makes it a common market is that it is
discriminatory. It is the very essence of a common market that
its external frontiers are higher than its internal barriers.

For instance, the French view of the political structure of
the European Community -- that America must be kept at arm's
length from Community decision-making -- has been essentially
outstripped by events. It is based on three assumptions, each of
which is becoming less and less relevant: maintaining the Franco-
German leadership of the European Community to give France a veto
over German national policy; keeping America in reserve if the bet
on the Franco-German condominium fails, but without permitting
American involvement until France calls for it; and, finally -- or
simultaneously -- an option toward Russia as a hedge should both
the German and the American relationships falter.

The concept is too clever by half; France has neither the

8

population nor the resources to play such a complicated game.
Germany will not accept a subordinate role, nor America a passive
one. Being forced constantly to choose between America and France
will accelerate German nationalism. If America is asked to act as
a French auxiliary, isolationism will grow. Russia, if it chooses
a Western partner, is more likely to opt for Germany than for
France, and for the United States over either. If all, or even
some, of these combinations were to occur, France's quest for
identity would have produced the nightmare of being subordinated
to powerful neighbors which it has sought to avoid since the days
of Richelieu 300 years ago.

Now, with regard to the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the world into
which we are emerging, the New World Order will have many
components. To repeat, among them are that the age of the
superpowers is coming to an end; that military power will become
less significant after a few years; that economic power will become

9

For 250 years Russia has been pressing on Europe. Even if the
Russian Republic emerges out of this intact, it will still have a
population of 160 million and a huge nuclear stockpile. We should
not too lightly deprecate the tremendous achievements of the
Russian people over the centuries, for they will no doubt emerge
again as a strong nation. In the interim, it would be highly
desirable to tie the countries of Eastern Europe, especially of
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, as closely as possible to
Western institutions so that the historic Soviet rhythm of using
these countries to expand its security belt is interrupted.

What we have been witnessing in the former Soviet Union are
two huge revolutions: (1) the revolution against communist central
planning, which has unraveled seventy years of communist history,
and (2) the revolution against Russian imperialism, which unravels

10

three hundred years of Russian imperial history. They are not the
same phenomenon; you can be on one side of one of these revolutions
and on the other side of the other, and neither of them would
necessarily make you a democrat. When I read statements by
American leaders saying, "This is now a democratic experiment," and
"we have a commitment to democracy," I must admit I have very great
doubts that that is what is really going on in the Soviet Union.
For it is the essence of revolutions that they seem to
contemporaries like a series of unrelated incidents. Especially
a country like the United States, which takes stability for
granted, has a tendency to consider upheavals as a temporary
deviation from the familiar. This is why Yeltsin is treated there
as the linear descendant of Gorbachev and the so-called
Commonwealth of Independent States as if it were the old Soviet
Union with a different name.

These attitudes, understandable as they may be, overlook the
most important consequences of the second of the two Russian

11

revolutions: the collapse of an imperial state that from the time
of Peter the Great brought pressure on all its neighbors, started
more wars than any other European state and culminated in a
Communist monolith. Because of the emergence of new national
states on the territory of the former Soviet Union, Yeltsin cannot
be dealt with as if he were Gorbachev. The Russian Republic is the
largest of the successor states and comprises three fourths of the
former Soviet territory and half its population. But there are
also 11 other republics; the largest, Ukraine, has a population
nearly as big as France's.

The evolution of the new Commonwealth is bound to be long,
painful and possibly violent. The various republics were glued
together forcibly over four centuries under the aegis of what is
today the Russian Republic, which stifled local initiative and
filled the key governmental posts with Russians. Inevitably, the
new Commonwealth reflects a melange of motives. Most Russian
leaders see it as a way to keep alive what can be salvaged of the

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traditional union and perhaps of Russia's historic domination. The
larger republics such as Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan consider
the Commonwealth a regrettable halfway house on the road to full
independence; this is why Ukraine prefers the term "community."
The smaller republics, especially in Asia, view the Commonwealth
as a modest improvement over the old Union which, given their
fragile economies, is the best they can hope for. It also gives
them a certain amount of maneuvering room with respect to Turkish
and Iranian designs.

The ambiguity of the Founding Document reflects these
crosscurrents. Neither the competencies nor the composition of the
Commonwealth ministerial committees, which are supposed to
"coordinate" the republics, have been spelled out. The Council of
Heads of States of the republics is to make decisions by consensus,
which sounds unworkable. Ukraine has so far refused to consider
a Commonwealth constitution.

13

The Commonwealth economic policy is equally ambiguous and potentially more explosive. The parties have declared an interest in creating an "economic space" and have forsworn economic coercion against each other. Yet they have neither defined what that term means nor do they practice what it implies. Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin has asserted that all the republics will use the ruble. Ukrainian President Leonid M. Kravchuk is committed to introducing a separate currency in the spring. In the meantime, Ukraine has already introduced a separate coupon system to keep products inside their borders.

The Commonwealth agreement declares the borders of each republic to be inviolable. But it does not explain how these borders are to be demarcated or who is responsible for security. Yeltsin and the Defense Ministry have spoken of a commonwealth responsibility. The president of Ukraine insists that the republics should control their own borders.

14

There is no agreement on how citizenship in the Commonwealth
is to be defined. If economic progress in the various republics
continues unevenly, citizenship will become a crucial privilege.
It will also prove central to the definition of what constitutes
a "minority."

A recent trip to the former Soviet Union brought these
clashing perspectives home to me. No Russian I met accepted that
Ukraine can be truly independent; no Ukrainian wanted any central
organs to survive. To a man, the Ukrainians spoke of the threat
of Russian imperialism -- a view shared by the leaders of several
other republics I have since met. The Russians argued that Ukraine
agreed to an "economic space" but then immediately issued its own
currency. The Ukrainians insisted that Russia accepted their
independence but immediately challenged Ukraine's borders by
raising questions about the status of the Crimea. The Russians see
the Commonwealth as a mechanism to preserve as much of the central
machinery as they can. The Ukrainians envision it as having no

15

permanent status or organs -- not even a secretariat to prepare
foreign-minister meetings. They totally reject any concept of a
united armed force.

The practical disagreements are concentrated in three areas:
nuclear weapons, the future of the Black Sea Fleet, and command and
control over conventional weapons. But the deepest issue is the
future of the Army. Russia sees Ukraine's armed forces as a
militia to protect politicians and buildings and wants the
Commonwealth to defend Ukraine's borders. I met no Ukrainian who
would tolerate that view. They would consider such a defense
establishment an army of occupation.

Over all this floats the General Staff in Moscow, now for the
first time effectively without political control by Party, KGB or
government. It represents the Commonwealth, which has neither
political institutions nor personnel. The political vacuum has
left the General Staff with unprecedented independence, though in

16

practice it has put itself at the service of Yeltsin.

What does this mean for the Western democracies? What do we want from any state located on the territory which was once the Soviet Union? In my view, our goal should above all be peaceful, non-threatening conduct. That is what the neighbors of the Russian Empire have never had, under tsars or commissars, in 400 years of modern Russian history. We should encourage institutions which guarantee that goal.

The Soviet Union is the heir of the Tsarist empire, which started as the duchy of Muscovy and in the course of 250 years spread to the center of Europe, to the shores of the Pacific, and to the gates of India, inundating entire countries and peoples like the sea. Many of the republics that are now seeking independence have been Russian less than 150 years. There was never any act of free choice that created the "union" that the coup plotters, and many officials still in power in Moscow, wanted to preserve. Not

17

a single republic voluntarily joined the Russian Empire.

Creating obstacles to this relentless expansionism is the most
desirable outcome for the peace of the world. Ideally, the
republics on the territory of the former Soviet Union -- other than
the Baltics -- should be strong and cohesive enough to defend
themselves but not so centralized as to be able to launch attacks
abroad. Confronted with an overwhelming danger, the republics
would have the means to cooperate, but not to mobilize a consensus
for foreign aggression. Western support for this degree of
decentralization should not be viewed as a matter of self-interest.
Rather, such an outcome would benefit the Soviet people above all
by allowing them to concentrate for the first time on improving
their own well-being.

The western democracies face two challenges that may seem
contradictory but are in fact quite complementary. On the
international scene, they should work closely with the Russian

18

Republic, because a non-expansionist Russia would have nary a
clashing interest with the free world.

But the welcome vista of close cooperation on the
international scene should not lure us into inadvertently
encouraging Russian domination of the other peoples of the former
USSR. A lasting structure of peace requires close cooperation with
Moscow, but this will work only if it is made compatible with the
existence of independent republics on the territory of the former
Soviet Union. For attempts to recentralize would require methods,
policies and justifications bound to rekindle tensions reminiscent
of the Cold War.

All factions in the former Soviet Union, within as well as
between the republics, are fighting their battles in the name of
democracy. It is important to encourage the genuinely democratic
forces. But do we really know enough about the players to take
stands in all the political contests now developing in faraway

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republics? We should be wary of encouraging efforts to recentralize the former Soviet Union in the name of loosely and perhaps cynically applied democratic rhetoric.

The window of opportunity for supporting pluralism in the former Soviet Union may turn out to be very fleeting. In addition to fostering relations with the Russian Republic, we should therefore accelerate diplomatic, economic and cultural contact with at least the larger republics.

The following principles seem to me important:

- Russia is the heir of a proud and heroic tradition and recent events have been a devastating blow to its self-esteem. It is essential that the Western democracies make clear in actions and in words that they consider Russia an appropriate partner in world affairs and a major country with legitimate security interests. Russia extending from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok and possessing

20

thousands of nuclear weapons no longer needs the territorial buffers for security it considered so essential throughout its history. And it needs to devote resources hitherto spent on imperial expansion to economic recovery.

-- At the same time, Russia must be given to understand that new expansionism -- by force or blackmail -- will exact a heavy price. It would clash with US principles and frighten Russia's neighbors. And it would reactivate the cycle of confrontation between Russia and the world.

-- We should rapidly expand economic and cultural contacts with the key new republics. We must remember that an imperial heritage has left most of them little experience in international affairs. They need sensitive encouragement. We must balance the attention Yeltsin deserves with the support the new republics require. We must find subjects to talk to them about other than nuclear control.

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-- If Russia respects the new situation and remains within its borders, a significant Western aid program would be in order. This should be balanced with commensurate programs toward the other republics. Such an aid program can, however, be at best of an emergency nature. No democratic government or combination of governments has the resources, and the former Soviet Union lacks the appropriate institutional framework for a Marshall-type program.

There is no short-cut to a domestic restructuring that can attract the largest pool of available capital, which is private investment. This requires two steps: the adoption of a constitution which establishes a predictable environment for investment; and, an intermediate step between emergency and long-term aid such as assistance in the field of energy. The Soviet Union has vast energy resources. The world is heading into an energy shortage. The Western democracies have an interest in

22

Finally, Western democracies must not become totally
preoccupied with events in the Soviet Union. In Eastern Europe,
the nightmare is resurgent Russian imperialism. The Western
countries must now move decisively to ease those fears. The fate
of the democracies of Eastern Europe must be linked rapidly to that
of the West. The European Community should end its petty haggling
over East European associate membership in the Common Market. The
United States should assist with some aid in a part of the world
where substantial governmental assistance can make a difference.
Allies on both sides of the Atlantic should consider appropriate
security arrangements, short of moving NATO forces to the Soviet
frontier.

23

If the former Soviet Union evolves in the direction foreseen here, Russia's neighbors will be freed of a threat that has been part of their landscape since Peter the Great. With new republics along the Soviet western border, with the Ukraine declaring itself independent and Belarus part of a loose confederation, the institutional basis for Russian westward expansion will diminish, if not disappear. This would lay the basis for linking Russia to Europe in a way that has always been thwarted by Russia's scale and the ambitions of Russian rulers.

Such a realignment will also bring about a shift in the center of gravity of Russian foreign policy. At this point, it is too early to tell whether the Muslim republics with their 65 million people will opt for independence or association. In either case, they will be very sensitive to developments in the Islamic countries along their borders. That will make it likely that Russia, whatever its new frontiers, will become an increasingly active player in the Middle East.

24

As the Russian center of gravity moves toward the Urals, Moscow may resume a historic activism in Asia. It was within this century, after all, that Russia and Japan fought a war over which country should govern Manchuria and Korea. It is far too early to speculate about the long-term initiatives of the new leadership in Moscow. But it is not too early to begin reflecting about the nature of a new world order in conditions that now seem quite foreseeable. This should be a subject of intense consultation with all friendly countries, our allies as well as China. Above all, it should be on the agenda of US-Russian dialogues.

The great historic opportunity for peace resides in pluralism among the republics of the former Soviet Union side by side with a close and confident relationship between the Western democracies and a Russian Republic that is non-expansionist for the first time in its history. Such an architecture would open up unprecedented prospects for all the peoples of the world, and especially for the

25

long-suffering populations of the former Soviet Union.

Let me conclude by stressing the following: I have obviously described many problems, but we should keep in mind that these are the problems of an exciting period. It very rarely happens in history that the canvas is as open or that it is as possible to create new relationships. It happens very rarely that all the fundamental factors are in flux simultaneously. International orders change when the political units constituting them also change their character -- as in the movement from feudalism to the nation-state, from the nation-state to something bigger. When the means of interaction change, the principles of justice are altered. All of this is happening simultaneously in our period.

The biggest change we have to make in our thinking is this: During the Cold War we always thought that complexity in the world was represented by some specific disturbance that could be relieved by a mobilization of resources or by dedicated effort. We still

26

talk of peace as if on some magic day all problems will disappear
and the world will live with a consciousness of perfect harmony.
In fact, that has never been the case at any recorded period of
history, and it is not likely to be the case now. And if that is
what we want, then the next decade will be extremely disappointing.
For it will contain much turmoil and will surface definitions of
democracy quite different from those we are used to. It will see
new political forums emerging and will be a more constructive
period than the one we have just surmounted, less shadowed by the
danger of nuclear catastrophe and capable of achieving more
cooperative structures.

I have a Chinese friend who alleges that there exists the
following Chinese proverb (I say alleges because there cannot be
as many Chinese proverbs as they lay upon us): "When there is
turmoil under the heavens, little problems are dealt with as if
they were big problems, and big problems are not dealt with at all.
When there is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to