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DR. KISSINGER: No ULMS submarines will be operational until after the freeze is over. There will be provisions in the Treaty for when an existing weapon has to be scrapped in terms of the constructions of the follow-on program. If, in the development of ULMS such a point should be reached before the end of the freeze and if the treaty has not been extended by agreement, then of course those scrapping provisions would go into effect. Otherwise the ULMS would be a follow-on system to the existing one.

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me offer this proposal to you: The signing takes place at 11:00 o'clock. At that time the fact that the SALT agreement is being signed is indeed a fact. There is a briefing scheduled at about 11:20 at the Press Center, a joint briefing between the United States and the Soviet Union. That will be short. We will arrange to make that short. Following that, and giving those who are on deadline -- and I don't believe anyone has any serious problem at that point -- that is the point when we will return to this location, following the joint briefing which we are committed to at the International Press Center. So, if that gets underway at about 11:30, it will be over by about 12:00. We will return here at about 12:30. We will take your questions. Dr. Kissinger will be here and we will proceed.

Q Can't we do it at the hotel?

MR. ZIEGLER: If there is a change, gentlemen, if there is a change in the location, if we can find a place at the hotel, we will arrange for it.

THE PRESS: Thank you, gentlemen.

END (AT 10:55 P.M. Moscow Time)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 27, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Moscow, U.S.S.R.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

INTOURIST HOTEL

1:00 A.M.

MR. ZIEGLER: Let's continue now with the session we began over at the Embassy earlier tonight. Dr. Kissinger's remarks will be on the record.

We are still in the process of typing the agreement. We hope to have that ready for you as soon as Dr. Kissinger is finished. We have had to type that from the originally signed document, because that was the only copy that we had available.

But we can proceed now. We will go right to your questions.

Q Henry, for factual purposes, I think it would help a great deal here, since we do not have the figures available, could you go into the existing figures that are available? In the public domain there are figures.

DR. KISSINGER: In what category?

Q Well, I think because this does cut across the whole range and one will be looking at the total figures of offensive weapons, even the bomber-delivered weapons would have relevance here.

DR. KISSINGER: First, the current figures are that in the field of CBMs the United States has 1,054 and the Soviet Union has about 1,600. In the submarine field, the United States has about 656 and the Soviet Union has, again depending on what missiles you count, something between 680 and 700-plus. I will go into those figures in a minute when I explain the submarine agreement.

The Soviet Union has been building missiles at the rate of something like 250 a year. If I get arrested here for espionage, gentlemen, we will know who is to blame.

Q What kind of missiles? Do you mean intercontinental?

DR. KISSINGER: I am talking about intercontinental, and it has been building submarine missiles at the rate of 128 a year. So this is the backdrop against which you have to assess the agreement.

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Therefore, on any day you would have picked over the last year, over the last two years, and on any day you are going to pick in the future, you will be able to demonstrate a Soviet numerical advantage. Moreover, it was a numerical advantage that was growing, because in the ICBM field we have, as you know, no ongoing program.

In the submarine field, as the question indicated, to which I responded earlier, we also have no program for missiles that will be operational. In the submarine field we have now no submarine under construction. The first submarine that we have that would become operational would do so early in 1979 or late in 1978.

Therefore, any time over the next five years we were confronting a numerical margin that was growing, and a margin, moreover, which we could do nothing to reverse in that five-year period. Therefore, the question of whether the freeze perpetuates a Soviet numerical superiority is beside the point.

The question is: What would this margin have been without the freeze? That is the justification for the margin.

Second: Now, then, what are the figures going to be? The Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, gross or net -- in other words, they will not grow beyond 1,618.

With respect to the submarines, we have developed a very complicated form, and I have to spend some time in explaining it to you. It may also explain why there were so many night sessions this week here in Moscow, first between the President and Brezhnev, and then between me and the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Smirnov and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Basically, the Soviet submarines are frozen at the level they now have. Beyond that, however, since they had an ongoing program of eight submarines a year, they are permitted to trade in old missiles and old submarines for new submarines up to a total level of either 62 submarines or 950 missiles.

Q May I ask a question there? When you say they are frozen at the level, you mean operational and under construction?

DR. KISSINGER: Operational and under construction.

Q Which is?

DR. KISSINGER: Which is in dispute, first between our intelligence agencies, and second between us and the Soviets. Our intelligence agencies give us a certain range. Over a period of a year, this always comes out right, because you can see them. But at any given moment, you cannot be absolutely sure. There is always a spread of two or three. At any rate, it is in the range that was discussed at the briefing.

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When it was asked at the briefing, those figures were not far off. The Soviets claim that they have more than that. As I said at the briefing, the Soviets may not tell us exactly what they have, but they are in a better position to know than we, painful as this is to admit.

Let me finish going through these numbers. Under the formula that we have adopted, the Soviet Union can convert 210 old ICBMs and 30 old submarine-launched missiles into new submarine-launched missiles. In other words, in order to get more submarines, they have to give up 240 old missiles -- older missiles; still useful, but older missiles. That, in effect, is the rough formula.

Now, the formula is somewhat complicated by the fact that they have two types of Soviet boats, one with 12 and the other with 16 missiles. So the Soviets have to make a choice of 62 of fewer missiles or lesser boats of more missiles, but that is a refinement into which we do not have to get in detail.

This is the submarine formula. It is, in short, that the Soviets are frozen at a level of what is currently operational or under construction.

That level had to be somewhat arbitrarily established as between their claims and our assessments. At any rate, beyond that level, they have to trade in all old missiles for new submarines up to a total ceiling that cannot exceed 62 submarines for 950 missiles. Again, I ask you to remember that that level of 62 submarines over the period of the freeze must be compared with the level of 80 to 90 submarines that would have been achieved without the freeze, in which circumstances there would not have been the retirement of the 240 older missiles on top of it.

Now, this is roughly the arithmetic. Does that answer your question?

Q. Yes.

Q. I had a question on that. What in the definition of the words "under construction"?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, some of the more profound minds in the bureaucracy, which is not necessarily saying a great deal, (laughter) have addressed this question, and I believe that the definition of under construction that has been adopted is when the hull sections move into the shed where they are assembled into a submarine. Apparently the submarine is first built in sections. It is then moved into an assembly plant and at that point the submarine is considered under construction. And this may account for the difference in our assessments of what the Soviets have under construction and what the Soviets tell us they have under construction. That is to say they may count the hull sections and we count them only when they enter the shed. There is some technical term for the shed, but at any rate where they put it together.

Q. Can you tell us what the arbitrary compromise line was you established with them between these two? Was it 45 or something like that?

DR. KISSINGER: Because of the difficulty of the fact that some of the Soviet boats have 12 missiles and some have 16 missiles, the Soviet argument was that they had 48 submarines under construction with 768 missiles. Our assessment was less. The figure we adopted is 710, if you consider new missiles, and 740 if you add in the 30 of the older missiles that they have on submarines.

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In either event, if they want to get up to the ceiling of 950 modern submarine launched missiles, they have to retire 30 of the old submarine launched missiles plus 210 of the ICBMs.

Q That are included in the 1618, is that correct?

DR. KISSINGER: That are included in the 1618. In other words, as a result of this agreement, the Soviets exercise every option they have under the agreement -- and, of course, they are not required to exercise it -- but if they exercise the maximum option, then the figure would be reduced by 210 and would be 1408.

Q And the other number would be 950?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. But, actually, Max, if you do the arithmetic, you can't get up to exactly 950 by any combination of 16 and 12 class boats. I think the maximum they can get is 944, but that is a refinement we don't have to get into.

Q Well, they could keep some of the 30?

DR. KISSINGER: They can keep some of the 30. They can piece together the 950, but then they have to keep the old missiles. They cannot come up with 950 new missiles from where they are now under any new assessment.

Q Dr. Kissinger, isn't there a global figure of missiles that both of us are now operating under and we can have any mix we choose?

DR. KISSINGER: No, we cannot have any mix we choose. We can have a mix up to a certain ceiling in submarines and we can retire only the older missiles. It is not permitted under this agreement to take new missiles and turn them into submarine missiles.

In other words, they cannot simply shift SS11s into submarines any more than we can turn Minutemen into submarines. Under this agreement we have the right to convert 54 Titans into three submarines. The missiles built before 1964 can be converted into submarines which gives us three and it gives them a larger number, but in any event there is a global figure.

You are quite right. There is a global figure with a certain freedom to mix, not a total freedom to mix but a certain freedom to mix.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how many of our submarine missiles are being MIRV'd and how many of the Minutemen are being MIRV'd?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know exactly what the number of Minutemen is that is being MIRV'd. Of the submarines, my trouble is I know the number but I don't know whether it is classified or not.

Q It is not.

DR. KISSINGER: It is not? What is it then?

Q. You have deployed eight.

DR. KISSINGER: But you don't know how many we are converting.

Q You are converting 31. (Laughter.)

DR. KISSINGER: I thought all my former staff members joined candidates. (Laughter.)

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That is essentially correct, but whether the submarine is MIRV'd or not has nothing to do with whether it counts against the total. What counts against the total is the number of launchers, not the number of warheads on each launcher.

Q What I am trying to get at is the number of warheads available to both sides.

DR. KISSINGER: I didn't finish the answer to Murray's question, because he also asked me about bombers.

Q Also about bombers, and, Henry, Secretary Laird's posture statement for the current year does give a figure on warheads. I don't happen to have it with me.

DR. KISSINGER: I will give you a rough figure. Everything here is on the basis of reciprocity. Since I have given out the Soviet figures, I might as well give out the American figures. (Laughter)

We have now 460 bombers, and we expect to have 450 bombers at the end of the freeze period. Our assessment is that the Soviets have about 140 comparable bombers. So in terms of the total delivery vehicles on both sides during the freeze, if you count our overseas base forces, they are roughly equal. They are roughly about 2,500.

This is not the best test by itself, because if you compare megatonnage, the Soviet Union has about three times as much. If you count warheads, we have about three times as much during the whole period of the freeze.

But during the period of the freeze, what you have to remember is that the weapons systems that are being frozen, as I pointed out in the other briefing, are the ones in which we had no building program during the period of the freeze, and, therefore, if you want to judge the relative strategic situation during the period of the freeze, you have to consider all the weapons systems, and there a rough parity is being maintained in terms of delivery vehicles. The Soviet Union has more megatonnage; we have more warheads.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you say that the Soviets would be increasing their strategic advantage if they were to exercise their options and convert these various ICBMs and others to submarines?

DR. KISSINGER: First, I know I keep repeating myself about the freeze point, but I cannot say often enough that in the absence of this agreement, the Soviet Union has the possibility of building eight submarines a year for the whole period of the freeze, assuming they do not expand their production capability. On that basis, the Soviet Union, if it continued to build what it is capable of building, could have between 80 and 90 submarines at the end of the freeze period, plus 210 ICBMs, plus 30 submarine-based missiles.

Another provision of this agreement, incidentally, is that missiles on submarines other than nuclear-powered submarines that are modernized are counted against the total of 950. Those missiles, of course, would be outside the agreement altogether.

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Therefore, the first thing one has to say is that the freeze, even without the conversion, is desired. With the conversion, it retires 240 Soviet launchers. On the other hand, I have to answer your question fairly: The 240 launchers that are being retired are less modern than the 240 launchers by which they are replaced.

The only thing you have to keep in mind is that it was not in our power to stop those 240 new launchers in any event. They are not being built as a result of the freeze. They were being built anyway.

Q A technical question: Of the old launchers, the ICBMs they retired would be SS-7 and -8?

DR. KISSINGER: That is correct.

Q And the submarines, if they decided to retire the old ones, would replace what?

DR. KISSINGER: Thirty to thirty-six missiles on the H-class submarines.

Q How about the G-class?

DR. KISSINGER: The G-class submarines can be retired. If they are modernized, they are counted against the 950. Do you see what I mean? They don't have to retire them. They do have to retire the H-class submarines if they want to go up to 950. They do not have to retire the G-class submarines, but if they modernize them, they are counted against the 950.

First of all, the G-class submarines are diesel. Second, the range of their missiles is between 300 and 700 miles, so they are more comparable to our forward-based systems than they are to strategic systems. Third, if these missiles are modernized, if they have a more modern missile on the G-class submarine than the one there now, then that missile is counted against the 950 total and reduces their ability to build nuclear-powered submarines.

It seems to us highly unreasonable to take this step, so we think that the G-class submarines are bound to get retired simply because they wear out. They are the oldest missile-carrying submarine they have.

Q May I ask a non-technical question? On defensive missiles, which they wanted, a treaty was signed to limit the number. On offensive, where we wanted a limitation, there was only a temporary agreement. Doesn't that seem as if we came out on the short end of the stick?

DR. KISSINGER: Not at all, because, first of all, the temporary agreement is linked to the continuation of the defensive treaty, because we have made it clear that the continuation of the defensive treaty depends importantly on there being a follow-on agreement on offensive weapons.

Secondly, with respect to these offensive weapons, the situation was so complex, there were so many weapons in the process of production, that it was an inevitable first step to get an end of the

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production for a while before one could make a rational agreement
on the permanent arrangement. So we have not come out on the
short end of the stick. If the offensive agreement lapses, we
doubt seriously that the defensive agreement will continue.

Q On the question of warheads, since that seems to be an
important part of the total number of ICBMs, you mentioned the
fact that the number of warheads is not affected. Can you then talk
about numbers of warheads we have and they have?

DR. KISSINGER: It is in the posture statement. Why don't
you look it up? In the assessment we now have, it is about 2-1/2
times as many warheads, and we expect at the end of the freeze
period we will have about three times as many warheads.

Q What is the prospect of their developing a MIRV?

DR. KISSINGER: You would have to assume that anything we
can do, they can do, with perhaps some time.

Q How many years?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on it, but I think
it is reasonable to assume that they will develop a MIRV during
the freeze period.

Q Can you also discuss in a little more detail the consultative
committee? What is its make-up? Who will be on it, and how
will that go forward?

DR. KISSINGER: I frankly do not have the details on it.

Q. Can you discuss at all what you would like to see, or you
think the United States would like to see happen in the next phase
of the SALT discussions; the reductions, for example?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, we will try to convert the agreement
into a permanent agreement. Second, we will try to include
categories of weapons not now included, and may address the
question of technological change, which is one of the great
driving forces of the arms race at this particular point.

Q Has there been an agreement on time and place for
resumption of a new round of SALT?

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DR. KISSINGER: There has not yet been an agreement, but we expect it to be within this year.

Q Sometime this year?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. We do not expect there to be a very long inter-
val. We think we have the momentum now. We consider this, as I said in
my opening remarks, a landmark agreement in the relations between the
great powers and in the development of the arms race it is something that
administrations have striven for for the better part of the 1960s, and which
we believe can give us a basis to make very significant advances.

Q On that point, Henry, what about reopening the question of a comprehensive test ban treaty?

DR. KISSINGER: We have been, in principle, prepared to do this. The obstacle has been the debate about inspection, and we are willing to restudy the issue.

Q Does this prohibit them from further testing of anti-satellite systems?

DR. KISSINGER: No, it doesn't prohibit them from testing, but interference with national means of detection would be considered contrary to the treaty, and there is a provision to that effect in the treaty.

Q But if they continue to develop them -- we know they have been -- what happens then?

DR. KISSINGER: It is not contrary to the treaty. What is contrary to the treaty is to use an anti-satellite system, and that would be the issue. There is no way they could use an anti-satellite system without, in effect, causing us to abrogate the treaty. I mean, if they did it on a substantial scale -- I don't want to speak of every individual case.

Q Could you say what was the last hang-up that was settled today?

DR. KISSINGER: As I told you when I met with you in Salzburg, there were four or five issues that had been unsettled. The President took those up with Mr. Brezhnev on Tuesday. As you remember, there were two sessions lasting well into the night. That settled two of them. There were then two other issues that remained to be settled. One was a somewhat esoteric technical one. It was esoterically technical on one level, but it had some significant implications. The second one had to do with the calculation from which we derived the point at which the trade-in of old missiles had to occur, what the number was that had to be traded in to get up to the ceiling, and how you handle the problem of the G-class submarines.

Q When were those settled?

DR. KISSINGER: There was one session that lasted until 4:00 o'clock on Wednesday. There was another session that lasted until 3:00 o'clock last night. This morning at 11:30, at a meeting, those two issues were settled. So at 3:00 o'clock it looked as if we would have to do at least another day or two of work on these two problems, but then this morning we had a meeting at 11:30 and it began to break. By noon I called Ron and told him that it was beginning to break, and at 1:00 we had it settled.

Then the problem was to get the agreement drafted, and I think it was
the first time in the history of Soviet-American relations that joint instruc-
tions were sent to two delegations, so that no misunderstandings could occur,

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and where we were kept informed by the Soviet side about meetings going on
in the Soviet delegation in order to speed up the drafting process.

Then the delegation flew here in the American delegation's plane and
arrived about 9:00 o'clock with the treaty draft in their hands, because the
decisions that were made at 1:00 still had to be put into treaty language.

All we did this morning was to arrive at the general framework. The
delegations then had to put it into language that will be put before you soon.

So a tremendous amount of work was done by the delegation, and it
showed how rapidly things could move in diplomacy when both sides want to
move.

Q Who was at that meeting?

DR. KISSINGER: Who was at which meeting?

Q At the meeting at which things began to break?

DR. KISSINGER: On our side it was myself and several staff members.
On the Soviet side, it was Deputy Prime Minister Smirnov, Foreign Minister
Gromyko, Ambassador Dobrynin, the head of the American Desk in the
Soviet Foreign Office, Komiyenko, and those are all the members.

On my staff it was Mr. Sonnenfeldt, Mr. Lord and Mr. Hyland.

Q One clarifying question on the submarine. I believe the public
record shows it was the United States who pressed publicly for the inclusion
of the submarines ---

Q Secretary Laird said he wouldn't favor a treaty unless submarines
were included.

Q So therefore, the idea that the United States got stuck with a
submarine deal ---

DR. KISSINGER: That is an absurdity. It is a total absurdity. It was
the United States which insisted that the submarines be included. The
United States was in a rather complex position to recommend a submarine
deal since we were not building any and the Soviets were building eight or
nine a year, which isn't the most brilliant bargaining position I would
recommend people to find themselves in.

Therefore, we developed a formula by which the Soviets could trade in
some of their older missiles for submarines as long as they agreed to put a
ceiling on the total construction of submarines. We discussed the issue with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both in terms of what could be done with a rapid
American submarine program, and in terms of the complete proposal that
emerged. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have supported this proposal and I do not
think they are the most Dovish members of the American establishment.

So this is not something that the Soviets forced on us. It is something
that we urged on the Soviets in a field in which we were not under any circum-
stances going to build a submarine before 1979, and they had an on-going
program. So I can understand why there were several meetings of the
Soviet government on this issue this week.

Q What manner of verification can be effective against submarine
numbers?

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DR. KISSINGER: As some of you know, we started this whole
process of negotiation, to the dismay of some of you, very slowly,
because we spent six months within the Government making the most
paintaking study of the possibilities of verification, and before we
agreed to formulate any proposition, we wanted to make sure what the
possibilities of verification were, what the margin of error was, what
counter-measures we could take if we detected violations, and what
risks we were running at each level.

We are confident that we have adequate means of verification.
That does not mean that one or two submarines might not slip
through, although we don't think so. What it does mean is I would
say it is extremely unlikely that the Soviet Union could build submarines
of a number sufficient to upset the strategic balance in violation of this
agreement without our knowing it and particularly if you consider what
the risks of detection would represent for the Soviet Union.

So we are confident that we can do this by national means of detection.
But I must say also that I can't conceive of a country entering an agree-
ment of freeze in order to cheat, given present national means of
detection.

Q Are you confident that this agreement can be sold to the
Senate, and have you been giving some consultation to people like
John Stennis and others?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, we have been consulting with key Senators.
We believe that the overwhelming majority of the Senate, once it
recognizes the nature of the agreement, the long-range implications
of the agreement, and its character, will vote for it.

I do not deny that the initial reaction of some people will be to
look at the gap in numbers. But once they understand the consideration
I put before you, that is to say what the gap would be without this
agreement, and the fact that this agreement for the first time brings
agreed reductions in the missile forces of another country, I believe
that many of those who express some hesitation will come around.
We expect overwhelming passage.

Q. May I follow by asking are the Joint Chiefs unanimously
in support of it?

DR. KISSINGER: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have unanimously
supported the proposal we put forward last night and which was
accepted this morning.

Q I think my question has been partially answered. I believe
all your figures, but who is going to check into all this and what
kind of inspection are you going to have?

DR. KISSINGER: The inspection of the system is through national
means of detection. In other words, each side will have to check the
other by its own national means of detection, and we are highly
confident of those.

Q Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Smith raised the point of this being
the first time where each side has acknowledged deliberately allowed
itself to remain vulnerable to attack by the other side and talked about
psychological and political ramifications.

I wonder if you could address yourself to that?

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DR. KISSINGER: Well, to the extent that neither side is building a territorial defense, it is, of course, vulnerable, and to the extent that neither side can destroy the retaliatory force of its opponent enough to prevent a counter-attack on its population, it remains vulnerable.

The implications of this are what they have always been over the last five years, because both sides are now vulnerable to each other, and, therefore, the simplistic notion of the early 1960s which measured deterrent by the amount of civilian carnage that could be inflicted by one side on the other were always wrong; hence, to consider the mass use of nuclear weapons in terms of the destruction of civilian populations, one faces a political impossibility, not to speak of a moral impossibility.

But this has been a fact, now, for five or six years.

Q Will the SALT machinery be kept in place for continuing negotiations, and if not, what will be the case?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, we have now developed what we believe to be a rather good system for conducting these negotiations; that is to say, we have an extremely able delegation, and very able negotiator who conducts the ordinary business of the negotiations. We have in Washington a series of committees that make the technical studies and that back up the negotiator.

Over the last two years, when the negotiations have reached a deadlock, we have used the mechanism of Presidential exchanges with the Soviet leaders to break the deadlock, in each case by compromise that turned out to be fair to both sides, and I think, having done this now -- and I must say again that the experience of this week confirms it -- that we can talk to each other now in a way that would have been inconceivable five years ago, and in a way in which few countries can talk to each other now, because many of them don't have the technical competence.

So when you talk to each other about the deployment of missile systems, when you have the sort of conversations we have had to have this week in assessing what missiles should be counted, a degree of, if not political confidence, at least confidence in each other's methods of looking at it develops that gives one some hope that these negotiations can be continued in this general framework.

Now, whether we will continue alternating between Helsinki and Vienna, or whether we will choose a permanent place in which these negotiations will go on, that, frankly, has not been decided yet. But we, on our side at least, are very tempted and inclined to continue the procedures that have brought us to this point.

Q Can you tell us if the negotiations at the personal level between the President and the leaders of the Soviet Union this week on this subject have also produced some progress in solving other international problems, in particular Southeast Asia?

DR. KISSINGER: No. I will not go into other topics, but I will say that all topics this week have been discussed with the same frankness. Not all of them are as amenable to bilateral solution as the one we have discussed, but we have had very frank and very thorough discussions.

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Q What were the two issues that the President settled with the Soviet leaders on Tuesday night? Did they concern the submarine issue as well?

DR. KISSINGER: No. One of them had to do with ABM systems. I don't want to go into it in any more detail.

Q What is the other one?

DR. KISSINGER: The other one involved the discussion of mobile missiles.

Q What is left on the agenda now for substantive work by the leaders? Are they done now or is there more?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, they have covered by now almost every topic of significance that affects our two countries, and, of course, there are a number of parallel discussions going on. As you know, Secretary Rogers has been having a series of discussions, and I have been having a series of discussions, in parallel.

So the leaders will often set a general framework which is then being pursued by others.

In general, I would say all topics of significance have been covered, but it is envisaged that there will be one or two more wrapup sessions before the meeting breaks up.

Q Henry, was the United States opposed to on-site inspection?

DR. KISSINGER: No. Early in the negotiations we asked for on-site inspection. One had to do with MIRV's, which are not covered by this agreement. The other had to do with the ABM system. Once we analyzed the mechanism of on-site inspection, we found what Jerry Smith pointed out, that the capability of cheating against on-site inspection is very great, and the national means of detection are more reliable for the kind of agreement we have made here.

I am not saying as we get further down the road with more esoteric problems -- particularly as we address the problem of technological change -- that we may not find some on-site inspection may prove necessary. But for this agreement, we really felt that we were better off with national means, and in all the studies of the verification panel in 1969, this conclusion was confirmed.

To answer your question, there was never a case in which the Soviet Union asked for on-site inspection and we refused it.

Q Why were they opposed to on-site inspection?

DR. KISSINGER: It has been a firm Soviet position in every armament negotiation in the post-war period that on-site inspection is too intrusive, and it has, therefore, generally been resisted, and in those negotiations in which the principle was accepted, such as the nuclear test ban, it was accepted with so many restrictions that its actual operation made it very easy to defeat.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on the MIRV, aren't we really, by deploying MIRV's ourselves so rapidly, kind of forcing them or encouraging them into the MIRV business?

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THIS MATERIAL TOTALLY EMBARGOED
UNTIL 3:00 P.M. MOSCOW TIME

MAY 29, 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE

INTOURIST HOTEL

1:18 P.M.

MR. ZIEGLER: Gentlemen, the statement you have, the Declaration of Principles, is embargoed, as it indicates, until 3:00 p.m. for all transmission.

Also, the communique which is now being run off and will be provided to you at the conclusion of this session is also for release and embargoed until 3:00 p.m. Moscow time.

We will have a general briefing with Mr. Zamyatin where both sides will make statements at about 2:30, and make general distribution of the materials the American press will receive in this room, so I will ask you to consider the documents that were given to you now as your own personal copies, not to be shared.

Dr. Kissinger's remarks this morning will be on the record.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, I realize you have not had too much of an opportunity to read this Declaration of Principles and you have not seen the communique at all, but we have a number of functions this afternoon that we have to attend, so what Ron thought was that I would do some preliminary briefing now and answer your immediate questions, and then I will be prepared to meet in a more relaxed atmosphere with this group in Kiev at a time to be mutually agreed to.

Two documents are being promulgated today. One is a communique. The other is a Declaration of Principles. The Declaration, which states the basic principles which should govern the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, will be signed at 2:00 o'clock by General Secretary Brezhnev and by the President. The communique will be in the usual communique form.

Let me first say a word about the communique, which you have not seen. It basically summarizes the agreements that were signed this week. It states in rather strong and positive language the expectations that both sides have with respect to the further evolution of their discussions on strategic arms and on disarmament in general, and the contribution which they believe that the agreements that have been signed this week have made to a general improvement of the international climate. This is in the first part of the communique, which lists the agreements that were reached during the week.

In the second part of the communique there is a discussion of the negotiations and deliberations that went on this week with respect to various areas of the world. There is a somewhat lengthy section about Europe, in which the two sides express their satisfaction with the general relaxation of tensions that has developed in Europe, and express also the

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view that with the ratification of the German treaties, the imminent signing of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, conditions now exist in which exploratory conversations with respect to the European Security Conference can begin between the parties concerned, and express their readiness to participate in a European security conference as soon as these preparatory discussions, which should be carefully conducted, will be concluded.

The two sides also express their view that a reduction of arms and armed forces, to begin with in Central Europe, could make a contribution to this general process, and they have agreed to begin immediate explorations of the procedure which could most effectively bring this about, the general idea being that simultaneous negotiations would take place on European security and what we called mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe in two forums, the European security conference, of course, being the larger one, and the mutual balanced force reductions forum being confined to the countries primarily concerned or directly affected.

There is a section on the Middle East which calls on both sides to contribute what they can to bringing about a general settlement, and indicating that such a settlement would also contribute to a relaxation of the armaments race in that area.

There is a section on Vietnam in which both sides state their views, which are not exactly identical, but I would say that the issue between us on Vietnam is not whether we have identical views, and it would be an insult to anybody to pretend that we do not have completely different conceptions of the nature of the problem, but the issue before us is whether, given these different conceptions, it is possible for both sides to work to bring about a rapid end to the war on a basis that is fair to all sides, and with respect to that last issue, I believe it is events which will determine what have or have not been achieved, and not a formal statement of the formal points of view in the communique.

With respect to disarmament, we affirm our continued willingness to participate in measures, in disarmament negotiations in addition to the one on strategic arms. And the communique confirms what the statement of principles maintains, that regular consultations between the two sides should continue.

I would like, with respect to the communique, to make two points, one concerning the section on trade, which expands on the proposition that an Economic Commission will be created, part of whose functions will be the establishment of the negotiation of a trade agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that the related issues of lend lease, extension of credit facilities and most favored nations will be dealt with as a joint package in the subsequent negotiations.

Now I have seen a great deal of speculation in the press about the alleged deadlock in trade negotiations. I want to assure you, ladies and gentlemen, that the basic intention with which we came here was to set up the Economic Commission which would then, in turn, settle most of these issues. And all these speculations that I have seen about the linkages between trade and other political problems happen to be quite wrong.

The section in the communique on trade is about what the tentative draft contained before we came here. Therefore, in our negotiations we are about on the schedule that we had set for ourselves.

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Secondly, I think it is fair to point out that many of the agreements, for example, those on space, health, and environment that were signed in the early part of the week, were obviously not negotiated in detail here. Nevertheless, it is equally a fact that the imminence of the summit gave those negotiations an impetus which they would otherwise not have had. And many of the technical problems that developed in all of these negotiations could be pushed to a level which would normally not concern itself with the refinements of such issues as how you measured distances in an incident at sea negotiation, and therefore, in the very real sense the summit, even those of these negotiations that were not in detail covered in the discussions among the leaders here, received a tremendous impetus from the imminence of the summit.

Now let me turn to the Declaration of Principles. The whole post-war period has been characterized by the seemingly unbridgeable conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, a conflict enshrined doctrinally on both sides of what came to be called the Iron Curtain. The foreign policy of most countries in the world has been characterized by this consciousness.

Now, what we have attempted to do, as some of you will remember we stressed to you before, is to attempt to move forward in our relations with the Soviet Union on a very broad front on many issues, some of which were related and some of which were not related, partly because of the intrinsic merit of these negotiations and of these issues, but also partly because we thought that this would create on both sides so many vested interests in a continuation of a more formal relationship that apart from any of the policy considerations there would henceforth be a different attitude in the conduct of the foreign policy of both sides.

Now, we have no illusions. We recognize that Soviet ideology still proclaims a considerable hostility to some of our most basic values. We also recognize that if any of these principles is flouted, we will not be able to wave a piece of paper and insist that the illegality of the procedure will, in itself, prevent its being carried out.

As in every document, this document indicates an aspiration and an attitude, and if either the aspiration or the attitude changes, then, of course, as sovereign countries, either side can change its course. Nothing in this document entitles us to give up our alliances or would justify lowering the efforts that have brought us to this point, but at the same time, it is an event of considerable significance that the country whose seemingly irreconcilable hostilities has characterized the entire postwar period, and the two countries which, between themselves, or, indeed, individually have the capacity to destroy humanity are making an effort which would state some principles which would reduce the dangers of war and which would enable them to promote a more stable international system.

Of course, these principles have to be implemented. If there is bad faith on either side, the aspirations expressed here cannot be realized. Speaking for our side, I can say we will attempt to implement these principles in the spirit in which they were promulgated. We have no reason to suppose that this will not be done by the leaders of the Soviet Union, but if events should prove these hopes on either side to be incorrect, then we will, of course, both of us, have to draw the appropriate conclusion.

I believe that most of these principles are self-explanatory. They call attention to the need for peaceful coexistence. They state that both sides will attempt to their utmost to avoid military confrontation, and that neither will

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attempt to take unilateral advantage in situations, recognizing
that the great nuclear powers cannot be pushed in a position
that jeopardizes their basic survival without noting it and
therefore recognizing that the attempt of traditional diplomacy
to accumulate marginal advantages is bound to lead to disastrous
consequences in the nuclear age.

The two countries have also said they will try to prevent
situations in other parts of the world that will involve them
in direct confrontation, and the two countries have said in no
part of the world do either of them claim special privileges,
and that neither of them is prepared to give up its existing
friends for this period of relaxation, or, to put it in a more
constructive way, that this relaxation of tensions is in the
interests of all people and is not directed and will not be
implemented against the interests of any other country.

These are the general observations that I wanted to make.
I have time to answer questions for another 15 or 20 minutes,
and in the language of the communique, as appropriate, I will
be glad to meet with you in Kiev.

Q Henry, you said something about events determining
the courses of affairs in Vietnam, leaving the impression that
there were understandings reached which you cannot talk about.
Is that what you intended?

DR. KISSINGER: There were long, sometimes difficult and
very detailed discussions of this subject. Whether the two
sides understand each other better or whether what they have
understood provides the basis for a constructive evolution,
only the future can say and I wouldn't want to speculate on
that.

Q Henry, three months ago the President said in the
State of the World that he regarded the use of tensions as a
permanent feature of Soviet foreign policy. Is the signing
of this statement a recognition that this was a wrong judgment?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't have the precise text ---

Q I read it last night.

DR. KISSINGER: --- of the State of the World with me
this morning. And I am touched by the attention that is
given to it.

I think it is a correct judgment to say that in the period
covered by the report and, indeed, in most of the post-war
period, it is difficult to point to any extended length of
time in which tension was not a feature of the foreign policy
or which did not result from the foreign policy that was
conducted by the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, we do not consider this document as
characterizing the past foreign policies. We consider this
document as indicating a direction for the future. And if
this document leads to what it may, then one would have to
say that both countries should act with greater restraint in
both their direct relations towards each other and in their
involvement in other areas of the world from which tension
might result.

So I don't consider this document inconsistent with the
retroactive judgments expressed in the world report. This
document is supposed to characterize relationships for the
future.

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Now, again, I do not want to give the impression here
that we have suddenly gone soft-minded. We do not exclude
that one could return to this previous period. This reflects
our goal. We assume that the Soviet leaders are serious people
and that they would not sign such a document in a rather solemn
ceremony unless they had some serious intention.

If this judgment should turn out to be incorrect, we can
always return to the patterns which have, after all, been well
tried in the last 20 years. So we don't consider this in any
sense inconsistent with past statements. This is a statement
about the future.

Q Dr. Kissinger, if this document had been signed two
months ago, would the mining of Haiphong be considered anti-
thetical, against the spirit of the document?

DR. KISSINGER: No set of principles can be used like a
cookbook that can be applied to every situation. And, of
course, I have a professional interest not to admit that in
any crisis now we just have to look up the appropriate -- what
would I do with the option?

The fact of the matter is that there are many situations
in the world in which both sides are now directly involved
and in which they feel that vital interests are at stake. In
those situations they will naturally have to act in considerable
extent in the light of the circumstances that exist.

Clearly, however, what this document says is that in new
situations that develop, both sides will take each other's
concerns seriously, as indeed we have. We also did in the
anticipation of these actions. After all, these principles
were not totally unknown to us when the action was taken.

So I think we are talking here about a general spirit
which regulates the overall direction of the policy, a spirit
that is reflected in the fact that we are here despite the
tensions that have occured in this or that part of the world.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on this matter of no linkage between
Vietnam and trade, a member of the White House staff used the
word "leverage" with regard to that at one point, that trade
was our "leverage" in Vietnam and if we don't have one agree-
ment we would not have one on the other. Are you denying that
that is the situation?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, I frankly don't know who said
it, in what context and whether it was said on the record or
as his own personal speculation. I am denying that we ever said
to the Soviet leaders, "If you do this for us in Vietnam, we
will do that for you on trade."

You have to recognize that these are serious people and
that we didn't come here to buy them. On the other hand, it has
always been clear, not in any formal discussions here, that
to the degree that the overall relationship, leaving aside any
particular problem, improves, it is easier to get, for example,
those Congressional actions or those actions that require
Congressional approval than they would otherwise be.

So, I can say it is not correct that we used trade, that
we linked trade to Vietnam. It is correct that it has always
been understood, which you could say about any one of these
problems, that as our general relationships improve, we can
accelerate progress in every area, but this is no more true of
trade than it is of anything else and there was never any direct
linkage.

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Q Did the United States side come to Moscow hoping to
sign a declaration of general principles or was that suggested
to us by the Soviets and how different is the language here
than it would have been in a nonaggression pact with the Soviet
Union?

DR. KISSINGER: The evolution of these principles was
as follows: As all of you, I think, recognize, I think it is
safe to say that nothing was raised at the summit that had not
been the subject of extensive preliminary conversation. Neither
side surprised the other by making any proposals that the other
side had not had an opportunity to think about.

When heads of state meet one is not interested in the
spectacular, at least we were not interested in spectaculars.
We wanted something that provided the basis of a firm relation-
ship. So therefore, the idea that there might be some general
principles expressed has been discussed between us for some
months. There was some discussion of it when I was here in
April, including some of the basic texts. But it was decided
that while we could talk about them and what they might look
like and contain, their final versions should be reserved for
the discussions between the President and Secretary Brezhnev
and his colleagues because we did not want to sign an empty
declaration. We wanted something that reflected at least a
conceivable reality in our relationship.

So the final decision to go ahead with these principles
was not made until after several of the conversations between
the President and the General Secretary and his colleagues,
even though the outline of what such a Declaration might
consist of, were it to be made, had existed prior to the summit.
So this was not something that was presented to us when we got
here. This was something that had been the subject of long
discussion, in the content of which it is very difficult to say
which is the Soviet contribution and which is the American
contribution.

Secondly, with respect to how it might differ from a
traditional non-aggression pact, I would have to look at the
text of it. Usually, non-aggression pacts deal with primarily
military considerations. This is an attempt to state a positive
direction of how these two nuclear superpowers, in a period
which is marked both by ideological difference and by funda-
mentally different perspectives, but nevertheless by the reality
that the two of them hold literally the survival of mankind in
their hands, can regulate their relationships in a way that not
only reduces war, but can do some positive good for mankind.

Therefore, you will find many provisions in here which
have nothing to do with non-aggression treaties in the past, but
have to do with how relations could be.

Q There have been some expectations and some expression,
indeed, by people on the other side this week here informally
that there would be at least a minimal agreement on the second
sale of grain by the United States. There appears not to have
been. What was the hang-up? Did it relate to shipping costs,
and what is the situation on that particular subject?

DR. KISSINGER: The hang-up in the sale of grains is
entirely related to shipping problems, and not to any policy
problems, and to shipping problems in which our side has faced
the greater difficulties. Since this is a subject that is still

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being negotiated, I do not want to go into any greater detail about it, except to say that we consider this a soluble problem and that we expect during the course of the summer to have it solved.

Q In December, at the time of the last agreement, it was indicated at the White House that the agreement of the unions to waive the 50/50 situation was not a one-time thing, but a longer commitment on their part. Has that changed?

DR. KISSINGER: This is one of the subjects that we are still in the process of discussing.

Q In connection with the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations here, can you reduce this in any way to numbers that you might expect in any kind of a time frame for reduction of forces in Europe?

DR. KISSINGER: I cannot at this point, but I can tell you this: We will use the same general approach to the negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions as we did with SALT. When we started the SALT negotiations, we were overwhelmed with all sorts of quick-fix solutions, percentage cuts, and so forth. We decided to make a very detailed study of the real strategic implications, plus the verification possibilities of various schemes.

These studies have been in progress with respect to the mutual balanced force reduction for the last year and a half, and we are, therefore, in a reasonably good position to work out with our allies various schemes. I do not want to pre-judge what these schemes might look like except to say that the most obvious answers are not necessarily the correct ones, and that when you have on the two sides very different weapons systems, contrary to what you have in strategic arms, you also have to look at reinforcement capabilities, and such factors as the offensive capability of some weapons as against their defensive capabilities.

Then you have a high incentive to come up with a proposal that represents the best mix which is calculated to reduce the fear of either side of an aggressive move, and maximizes the defensive possibilities. So I do not want to indicate that there will be a particular percentage cut. The proposal may take a different form, depending on different categories of weapons. This is something we are still discussing with our allies. But we will approach it in the same sober spirit that we did the SALT negotiations.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you please give us a clearer view of what the United States expected that the Soviets might be able to do with regard to the Vietnam problem?

DR. KISSINGER: I just do not believe that it is useful at this point to speculate about what anybody might do about this topic. Our views are clearly different, as they are in many parts of the world. The practical issue is to what extent it is possible to find a reconciliation of these differences in the greater interest of peace.

We certainly could not have spent all this time with the Soviet leaders without gaining a clearer awareness of their thinking. But what might follow I do not want to speculate on.

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Q To follow that up, do we have any feeling now that we have a clearer and better understanding of what North Vietnam's intentions are?

DR. KISSINGER: We always have had a pretty good idea of what North Vietnam's position is.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you plan to go back to Paris any time soon?

DR. KISSINGER: I would stop being one of the great bores in Washington if I stopped these secret trips.

Q I can understand your reluctance to go into detail on the Vietnam question, but could you say within those limitations whether the United States side or the two sides at this point have any early expectations of early negotiations resuming?

DR. KISSINGER: Our view toward negotiations, in fact, is expressed in the communique. We have always been ready, and we are reaffirming it, to engage in serious negotiations. There is also enormous impetus on procedural questions: when will negotiations start, whether negotiations start. That is not the issue. It is easy enough to get a negotiation started. What we want is a negotiation that produces a prospect of an early end of the war.

Nobody could be more interested in an early end of the war than the President and this Administration. So, the significant question is not whether negotiations start, but what the negotiations will bring when they start. This is what we are working on with the North Vietnamese and in the general context. It is our intention to bring about a framework that permits a resumption of fruitful negotiations. How soon that will be accomplished, I don't want to speculate on.

Q Has Brezhnev been invited to the United States?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. This is in the communique. The three Soviet leaders have been invited and they have accepted the invitation.

Q When?

DR. KISSINGER: The date hasn't been fixed. It will be by mutual agreement.

Q Was the issue of Soviet Jews raised at this summit conference?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, of course, you have to remember the problem of discussing in international forums what one party is bound to consider an internal issue. But we have done what I said we would do in Salsburg.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how extensive were the discussions on the Middle East, and were there any proposals made by either side, and was there any progress?

DR. KISSINGER: There were discussions between the General Secretary and the President concerning the Middle East. They were, as the communique says, frank and thorough. Of course, this is a subject in which a great deal depends on the parties concerned, and in which the possibility of outside countries is limited, but of course, both sides favor progress toward a peaceful settlement.

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Q Was there discussion about China and the President's trip to China between the General Secretary and the President, or yourself and the Soviet delegation?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, there were no discussions in this sense, but we have made clear throughout that our policies toward either of these countries is not directed against the other. We did not discuss the Soviet Union in Peking and we did not discuss the People's Republic in Moscow. We have sufficient bilateral problems.

Q Will the visit come before the elections? Would that be the foreseeable future?

DR. KISSINGER: My own estimate would be -- and this is strictly on my own -- that they will not come before the election. I think the nervous system of foreigners is not quite up to that experience.

Q The President said in his speech that he had no choice but to mine harbors and bomb the rail lines. Can you give us any idea of the degree to which the Soviet leaders understand that vested interest?

DR. KISSINGER: We did not ask for the approval of the Soviet leaders and had we asked it, my instinct is that there would not have been a unanimity of views. (Laughter.)

MR. ZIEGLER: We have the communique here which we are going to issue to you at this time. If you will remain in your seats, the girls will distribute them to you.

I want to emphasize that this is embargoed until 3:00 p.m., and please consider the material your own personal copies. Obviously you can transmit to your bureaus, but don't move it out on your wires until 3 o'clock.

We will try to have another session in Kiev about 7:30.

END

(AT 2:00 P.M.)

#. # #

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 29, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Kiev, U.S.S.R.)

PRESS CENTER - DNIЕPRO HOTEL

10:50 P.M.

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger's remarks will be on the record.
He will go directly to your questions.

Q. On the trade matter, you really expected before you went
to get a trade agreement, did you not, regardless of whether it
was linked with Vietnam? You really had hoped to get an agreement.
Everybody said so before you went. Can you give us a little more
background?

DR. KISSINGER: Ron's instructions are to say it is obvious
to us you were not at the morning briefing.

Q. I read it word for word.

DR. KISSINGER: The original or the translation? (Laughter)

We never expected to get a trade agreement here. We never
even attempted to negotiate a trade agreement here. The trade
issue has several components. There is the sale of grain on a
long-term basis. There is the maritime issue. There is the
issue of credits. There is the matter of granting the most-
favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, and there is lend-lease.
There is the repayment of lend-lease debts.

We never intended to wrap all of these up into a trade agreement.
Then there is another issue, namely, the development of natural gas
resources in Siberia, which is a very large project in which the
Soviet Union is interested, and about which it has been talking to
various American private concerns.

We never expected or ever intended to wrap all of these up in
Moscow. What we expected to do is to set up the economic commission
within the framework of which they could be systematically addressed,
in which the various parts could be related to each other. We always
expected that when Secretary Peterson comes over here during the
course of the summer that the major progress would be made.

In relation to the total package, there were some peripheral
issues which I pointed out this morning in which we thought some
progress could be made, such as the grain deal and the maritime
issue. Those are linked because the grain deal depends in part on
the solution of the shipping problem and in part on the nature of the
credits that can be extended.

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On lend-lease we made considerable progress, and we settled, in effect, all issues except one. We expect to make further progress on that during the next months, and we expect to make substantial progress on the total package during the course of the summer. So we are substantially on schedule and we have done the key part of it, which was to set up the Economic Commission within the framework of which all these parts could be related to each other.

Q. What does the President plan to discuss with the Shah of Iran? What problems do we have with him, if any?

Q. That is a quick switch.

Q. The man is smart. He can switch.

DR. KISSINGER: Ron gave me instructions, and then changed his mind. Will you stand in front of me so I can see your lips move? (Laughter)

We expect to have a general review of the world situation, particularly developments in the Middle East and in South Asia, since Iran is really a bridge to both of these countries, and no doubt some of the issues of the Persian Gulf will be discussed, including some of the oil problems.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in a recent interview, Secretary of State Rogers said on public television, "So, as effectively as we can, we are going to assure the Soviet Union on this trip that the new U. S. policy toward China is not an anti-Soviet move." Did that come up in the private talks in that way?

DR. KISSINGER: As I said this morning, our basic position with respect to both of these large Communist countries is that we will not discuss one of them in the capital of the other. We recognize that they have serious differences with each other on a number of issues in which the United States is not primarily engaged, one of them being the border dispute, the other one being an ideological conflict over the interpretation of Leninist doctrine with respect to which our competence is not universally recognized. (Laughter)

So, therefore, we do not discuss the bilateral Sino-Soviet issues in the respective capitals. We have made clear both publicly and in private talks that our policy toward the People's Republic is in no sense directed against the Soviet Union: that we have no interest in threatening legitimate Soviet interests, and that we are pursuing our policy toward the People's Republic in order to solve the bilateral issues that exist between us. I think that has been made clear.

Q. Henry, could you possibly give us some additional information in detail, and if it is not possible in detail, in general, on the essence of the conversations that the President had with Mr. Brezhnev, covering the extent, the number of hours, and we would like to know how many hours and how it broke down in time. What I would like to know in particular is, were they here essentially reviewing the post-World War II history of U.S. -Soviet relations?

DR. KISSINGER: You mean all the conversations put together?

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Q. Yes, or were they concentrating on immediate problems? What can you tell us in terms of the scope and range of the discussions?

DR. KISSINGER: There were several types of meetings with Soviet leaders. There were three private meetings with Mr. Brezhnev that extended over a considerable period of time. Then there was an equal number of meetings at which Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny were present with the President. Then, of course, there were three planary sessions. You can check these because they were announced. I may be off by one on each of these.

To answer your question, there were both general discussions and specific discussions. There were at least two occasions that I remember in which there was a general review of the world situation, of the evolution of U.S.-Soviet relationships, but with particular emphasis on the future of what role these countries could play toward each other for the preservation of world peace and stability. For the rest of the time, there were specific topics.

As we told you, for example, on Tuesday both the afternoon and evening session dealt with SALT. The evening at the dacha was primarily devoted to Vietnam. Some of the topics that were discussed between the President and the Soviet leaders were then followed up by Secretary Rogers or myself in other conversations. Secretary Rogers had several extended meetings with Prime Minister Kosygin. I had several meetings, first on SALT with Deputy Prime Minister Smirnov and later on other issues with Gromyko. Therefore, the answer to your question, Murray, is that the talks were extensive, they were very frank and they covered both the general and the specific.

Q. May I ask why there was this joint declaration as a separate document, and why it was not simply included in the communique, and who it was that initiated that idea?

DR. KISSINGER: I covered part of that this morning, but let me answer it again. The original idea was to have some general principles stated in the communique, just as we did in Peking. Then it was suggested that if our relations moved forward on as broad a front as they seemed to be moving, and if we made one or two really significant agreements, that perhaps it would be appropriate if we marked what at least we intended to be a departure in U.S. Soviet relations by something other than a section of a communique, by a somewhat more formal declaration. When this idea was first advanced, it was noted and put aside in order to see whether our relations, in fact, justified attempting to express some basic principles on which to base relations, and while a general outline of what these principles might be existed, it was left open whether they would be folded into the communique or whether they would be made as a separate declaration.

Then the Soviet leaders and the President decided that we could responsibly and indeed should responsibly have a separate document, given the fact that we had moved forward on a broad front, and given also the fact that it was at least our intention -- and we hope, of course, the reality will not belie this -- to mark the transformation from a period of rather rigid hostility to one in which, without any illusions about the differences in social systems, we would try to behave with restraint and with a maximum of creativity in bringing about a greater degree of stability and peace.

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DR. KISSINGER: It did not hang in the air in that sense. In trying to understand these discussions, what I think is striking about them is that here are two countries that conduct a global foreign policy and, therefore, do not have to prove to themselves constantly that they are engaged in this part of the world and that part of the world; that they can talk about particular problems and still be conscious of the fact that there are other problems in the world, all of which they have an interest in at some time, a more or less equal interest.

So it would be incorrect to say that Vietnam was the unspoken assumption of every conversation.

Q. What about the Middle East, Henry, how did that come up and do you have a feeling that there was a better understanding of our position than previously?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the Middle East was fully discussed. I know the Middle East was fully discussed. The degree of the understanding that was achieved will have to wait developments.

I was asked this morning are there secret understandings; is this or that going to happen, just as I was asked on the occasion of my visit here, "Did you have a secret deal with the Soviet leaders"? This is not the way these things happen.

When two great powers deal with each other, one of the best things they can do for each other is to make absolutely sure that they understand each other's point of view. What actions they then take, based on the understanding of that point of view, only the future can tell. Therefore, I don't want to speculate.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us, please, sir, can you expand on what happened with the mention of the Soviet-Jewish problem, please, sir, in any way, shape or form?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I don't go into the detail of any of these things except to repeat again what I said before: This is a particularly complex issue to raise in a country that is bound to consider it an internal problem.

Q. Did you come away with the feeling that the Soviet Union could live with the mining of the North Vietnamese harbors?

DR. KISSINGER: I would have to say that I don't want to speculate on what the Soviet Union will do about particular American actions. Certainly a full opportunity existed for the expression of these points of view and we certainly made clear why we have taken certain actions and why we believe we have to continue them.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said there is one lend-lease issue that remained unsettled. Does that issue have a dollar sign in front of it and if so, can you give us a rough amount?

DR. KISSINGER: If it is unsettled, how can I give you an amount?

Q. What is the issue?

DR. KISSINGER: All the issues of lend-lease concern the terms of repayment. This is one of them. I don't think the amount is the most unsettled issue.

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Q. The President, before he left, cautioned us all against overblown expectations out of the summit. Would you characterize in a few words what you feel and what the President feels came out of this in terms of its success in meeting the minimal expectations that you and he went with?

DR. KISSINGER: What we attempted to do at the summit was to bring together negotiations that have been conducted on a broad front over a period of a year and to see whether they could be formed into a pattern of US-Soviet relationships rather than simply a series of individual actions.

Secondly, and very importantly, we attempted to conclude the SALT negotiations because we do believe that to put the central armaments of both sides for the first time under agreed restraint is an event that transcends in importance the technical significance of the individual restrictions that were placed on various weapon systems.

Thirdly, we wanted to see whether, as major powers, we could take account of the fact that we are living in a period which has some of the characteristics of traditional diplomacy in the sense that you are getting more states that are being active but with one important difference: in traditional diplomacy the aim was to, through an accumulation of small advantages, to gain a qualitative edge over other countries. In the nuclear age, the most dangerous thing to aim for is a qualitative edge over your major rivals.

Therefore, the constant attempt to accumulate petty advantages creates such an atmosphere of insecurity and such an enormous danger that the world may not be able to live with it.

So what we attempted to do was to see, through the SALT agreement and the other agreements, and, above all, through the many conversations across the broad spectrum, to see whether it is possible to express the policies of these countries that do have this great responsibility in some form that recognizes these realities.

This is why these principles should be something more than just platitudes. Now, again, I must repeat: we are not naive. It is perfectly possible that six months from now it will turn out that we are again in a period of extreme hostility.

If that has happened, both countries will have lost an opportunity and the world will have lost an opportunity. So we think the achievement is that we have made these agreements, that SALT has been concluded and that at least there has been a recognition for the first time on both sides not just that this or that problem has to be solved, but maybe that a new style of international relations has to be developed.

How successful we will be in implementing that, only the future will tell.

Q. As we sit here in Kiev talking about this, then, you have met your goals?

DR. KISSINGER: I think we essentially met the goals we set for ourselves. You can still argue with us -- unusual as that would be for Newsweek -- that the goals were not the right ones to set, but I have to say that we more or less met the goals we set for ourselves.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you give us a general idea of the schedule for the European Security Conference and MBFR and is '72 realistic?

DR. KISSINGER: Realistic for what?

Q. That the conference can take place this year.

DR. KISSINGER: Another realistic what?

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Q. That the conference can take place this year?

DR. KISSINGER: Our belief is that both these conferences should be very carefully prepared. We are prepared to engage in preparatory discussions on the European Security Conference and on MBFR this year. We expect the more realistic date for both of them, certainly for the European Security Conference, will be next year. That is, at least as far as we are concerned, the plan on which we are operating. MBFR, as I pointed out, this morning, is a subject of enormous complexity in many ways. It is of much greater complexity than SALT because the weapons are so different. The reinforcement problem is new and you are dealing with an alliance. But we have done a lot of work on it and we will be ready to engage in exploratory talks in the reasonably near future.

Q. Henry, was that exploratory talk on the Security Conference or on MBFR?

DR. KISSINGER: Both.

Q. When Syria got out of hand, when we got worried about activities in Cuba, when we felt we had to mine -- we have had, after all, a pattern of quick consultation, an explanation of what we are doing, in some cases bringing about a change. The President complimented the Russian leaders on finally turning to restraint in the Middle East. You and Ambassador Dobrynin ironed out a reaffirmation of the Cuban agreement. This thing has been going on for sometime. What is so new about the Statement of Principles that would give us a different course?

DR. KISSINGER: We have, in the past, dealt with a series of crises which, when concluded, were expressed in some statement relevant to that crisis. We have not in the past attempted to lay down general rules of conduct ahead of the crisis by which the basic relationships of the countries could be defined.

In fact, you could argue that many of the crises that arose were crises into which one side or the other or both stumbled through a series of events in which they had either not been in sufficient contact, miscalculated each other's reactions, or attempted to achieve some advantage.

Now, again, Max, no one can be so naive as to say that if they built another submarine base in Cuba, that the most telling argument will be the third principle of this declaration. What one would have to hope is that for both sides, before such a step is taken this gives us a possibility for an exchange and possibilities for restraint and arguments for restraint within each government that might not otherwise exist. So, this is to act with foresight on matters that in the past we have had to solve through crises.

Q. What I was really asking is: Haven't these principles really already governed our conduct in many areas?

DR. KISSINGER: It is very rare in foreign policy, Max, that you can say -- and we would not maintain -- that as of this day something totally new, that has never happened before, arose.

Some of these principles have governed our conduct, usually ex post facto after a crisis, and it is true that both sides have on the whole refrained from pushing crises to the extreme. They may have governed our conduct during crises.

What we are not attempting to do is see whether they govern our conduct to prevent crises.

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Q. Dr. Kissinger, as a result of these talks, is any change imminent in our policy of bombing North Vietnam and keeping the mines armed?

DR. KISSINGER: This is an essentially tactical question. What we want in Vietnam -- to which the matters to which you refer are means -- what we want is a serious negotiation leading to a rapid end of the war and, therefore, the end of the operations to which you refer.

It has to be seen in the context of a negotiation and not in the context of actions taken unilaterally. We do not intend to take unilateral actions.

Q. To follow up Max's question, after Mr. Brezhnev's trip to France, there was a statement of basic principles involving relationships between France and the Soviet Union. Following Mr. Podgorny's trip to Turkey, you also had a similar statement of basic principles which follows up the statements of basic principles between the United States and the Soviet Union signed today.

Was that a Soviet initiative that follows in a pattern and how do you relate our statement of basic principles to the other two?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, it makes some difference whether the two great nuclear powers, whose rivalry has characterized the postwar period, sign such a statement than when it is signed by countries which, whatever their importance, do not have the means to affect global policy.

Secondly, it is of no doubt true that the Soviet Union has attempted, for a variety of purposes, to codify its relationships to many countries.

Thirdly, the idea that principles should be expressed at the end of the visit was a joint one. After all, we had them in our Peking summit. The idea to make them a separate declaration was initially a Soviet proposal which we shelved pending an examination of whether we could make a really meaningful statement.

Now, again I want to make clear: We are not saying that these principles can be a cookbook to which you need merely refer to have a guide for future actions; nor are we saying that it is not perfectly possible that these principles can be broken almost immediately: nor am I rejecting the possibility at all that they are intended as a tactical device to lull certain people. All of this is possible.

If any of these events happen, particularly the last event, then we will act with, I believe, a firmness that we have shown in the crisis to which Max has referred, and in that case I would say a great opportunity has been lost and then some other leaders somewhere along the line will have to address the problems to which these principles address themselves, namely, the problem of how to have a peaceful world in an age in which a cataclysm depends on the decisions of men.

So we have laid out a road map. Will we follow this road? I don't know. Is it automatic? Absolutely not. But it lays down a general rule of conduct which, if both sides act with wisdom, they can, perhaps, over a period of time, make a contribution. At this point it is an aspiration. We would not have signed it if we did not believe there was a chance for implementing this aspiration.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, after the non-proliferation treaty was signed, many of us who were trusting and naive believed the defense appropriations would go down. Instead, the Russians' went way up and ours went way up. Can you

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believe that our defense appropriations will go down and there will be a substantial reappropriation of resources, and if not, isn't all of it a waste?

DR. KISSINGER: No. I believe in certain categories the defense appropriations will go down somewhat. I also believe that we will have to continue major programs in those fields in which negotiations are still going forward and in which agreement has not been achieved, because if these negotiations prove anything, it is that it was our unwillingness to disarm unilaterally that has made it possible to get this bilateral agreement.

A substantial reduction of defense expenditures can be a byproduct of disarmament agreements, but the justification for this agreement is that for the first time it levels off the arms race; that in significant categories one can at least see a ceiling from which one can move to other areas instead of a constant multiplication of other weapons which produce their own problems and never give the statesmen an opportunity to see what could be done.

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Incidentally, nobody who had really analyzed the arms race could assume that the non-proliferation treaty would lead to a substantial reduction of armaments, because it affected other countries: it didn't really affect us.

Q. You know, Senator Jackson has said that the Russians now have a 50 megaton missile, and he questions whether the SALT agreement will really give us protection. Can you tell us, first of all, whether he is correct that they have this super-missile; and secondly, whether this agreement cuts off the SS-9s at a safe level? What do you think?

DR. KISSINGER: I wouldn't go into a discussion of the megatonnage of individual Soviet weapons, but it is clear that the Soviets have weapons of substantial explosive power and that they are probably building some that are even more powerful than the ones we have seen.

I would maintain that the argument you have mentioned to us confuses two separate issues: One, the size of the explosive power on warheads of existing weapons; and two, the growth of the arsenal of these weapons. This agreement does nothing about the size of the warheads. This will have to be done, if at all, in a follow-on agreement. It does do something about the number of launchers on which these warheads can be built.

Therefore, the SS-9 is frozen at its current level of 309, but in this category nothing will prevent the Soviet Union from putting larger warheads on those weapons that they have. The argument that some criticism are making, that therefore, the agreement is dangerous, is fallacious because we would face the problem of these larger warheads, plus additional missiles, without the agreement. That is the argument.

We admit we have insisted at a time when most of our critics were denying it that -- and we have always said it -- the SS-9 is a threat to our retaliatory force, and it remains a threat to our retaliatory force. What this agreement does is to freeze the number of launchers. It does not affect the size of the warhead. On the other hand, if there were no agreement, there would be more launchers and more warheads, and therefore, we have reduced the danger by the margin of the number of weapons that would be built were it not for this agreement.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, on the Vietnam issue, did either side advance proposals which the other side indicated that it would respond to at a future time, or is the dialogue at a high level on this issue suspended for practical purposes?

DR. KISSINGER: I just do not want to go into the details of the Vietnam negotiations or discussions because I do not think it would serve any useful purpose, except to say that the discussions were very extensive.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said earlier that the Middle East issue was fully discussed, but did either nation offer any contribution toward achieving some tangible progress, to the talks?

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DR. KISSINGER: A great deal depends here on how you would define "tangible progress," because anything that keeps the situation from becoming more inflamed is at least a negative sort of progress. There was a rather full exchange of views, which I think can contribute to at least this negative progress I mentioned.

Q. At the bottom of the negotiations is the degree of trust between the people involved in them. Can you dwell on the measure of trust that may have developed between the President and the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: It depends on what you mean by "trust". If you mean by that that the leaders have suddenly grown extraordinarily fond of each other and that they will do for each other things just because they have concluded that they are regular fellows, that obviously cannot happen between serious people. On the other hand, usually these leaders deal with each other through cables, and what is filtered through the machinery takes on an increasingly abstract quality as it travels to the higher level.

Now, I think that in the future when a communication of one to the other arrives, they will understand the intangibles of the communication infinitely better than they did before because they will be able to refer to some very detailed and concrete discussions that have taken place. The President has always approached these meetings, if you look at his press conferences, from a totally unsentimental point of view, and he has not had the illusion that he could charm leaders, who have been brought up on their belief of a superior understanding of objective factors, by his personality.

So in the sense that there is now a better understanding of what both sides are really talking about, in the sense that they will now at least have the raw material from which they can assess communications to each other in terms of the motivations and basic attitudes, I think trust has developed, but not to the point that it could survive a major challenge that one side would put to the other that affects its own estimate of its vital interests. So I would put the answer within that limitation.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, another one of the arguments that is made with regard to the strategic arms agreement is that it may have the effect of directing, or redirecting rather, the arms construction effort. What reason is there to think this can be controlled?

DR. KISSINGER: This agreement, if it is not followed on by other negotiations, will, over a period of time, permit a qualitative race or a race in the weapons systems which are not frozen by the agreement.

We have, in this agreement, however, covered a broader range of weapons, because the definition of land based intercontinental missiles and sea based intercontinental missiles, is rather sweeping, if you read it.

I believe, and we believe, and the Soviet leaders agree -- in fact, we have expressed this in our public declaration -- that we should start follow-on negotiations as soon as possible in order to reduce the danger to which you refer. The danger to which you refer is real; it is not imminent, but over a period of time it would definitely exist.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, I believe somewhere in the communique, it said that the two powers recognize the present boundaries in Europe. In a sense, does that mean that we recognize them as they exist in the permanent division of Germany, and do we, in a sense, therefore, return to the old style diplomacy of spheres of influence?

DR. KISSINGER: It seems to be my fate to have to answer the charge of old style diplomacy. We use the phrase, relations should be based -- I don't have the text in front of me -- on certain principles in which inviolability of frontiers was one of them. We did not use the adjective to which you referred.

Secondly, the phrase we used is somewhat less strong than the one that the German government has used in its treaty with the Soviet Union, and it is, of course, somewhat difficult for us to be more German than the Germans on the issue of German unification.

So what we have interpreted this statement, these principles, to mean, is that we do not favor the use of force in changing boundaries, and that we believe the foreign policy ought to be conducted on the principle of territorial integrity, but we do not preclude negotiations.

We do not believe it has anything to do with spheres of influence, because if you look at it, I think it is the 11th principle, you will see that both sides have renounced any claim to special spheres of influence, and we consider that one of the positive aspects of the communique.

Q. Henry, at the risk of your not wanting to write our stories for us, as you have said before, would you admit to any disappointments in the course of this summit conference? Is there anything that you came to get that you didn't get?

DR. KISSINGER: I think, you know, it is a sort of silly answer to say that we achieved essentially what we came to achieve, in that the agenda we had set ourselves and the possible goals were more or less realized.

Now I have to say right away that serious people can quarrel with the goals. Maybe we didn't set the goals high enough. I think I read somewhere early in the Johnson Administration, if you define the miraculous is the attainable, you can perform miracles every day.

It really would be psychologically better if I told you there were two things that we failed at, and of course, perhaps, you know, we didn't conclude the Maritime agreement, though the problem was more on our side than on the Soviet side.

But I would have to say, unbearable as that may make us sound, that essentially what we had planned to do, what we had expected to achieve, was more or less achieved, give or take ten percent.

Q. May I follow that up and say was there anything that was broken through or resolved here, other than the exchange of views on such a high level, that you can point to, that was not expected?

DR. KISSINGER: You see, this summit has been really very painstakingly prepared over a long period of time, and one of the things we said to each other early was, don't let us surprise each

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other at the summit, because when Heads of State suddenly present something unexpected to the opposite number, you can, of course, say maybe you have achieved something spectacular, but more likely you will produce an impasse or an attitude of, "Good God, what am I dealing with here!" Because each leader has his own constituency at home, however you define it, and therefore, we very painstakingly worked out this agenda ahead of time.

Now this doesn't mean that the results were clear ahead of time, but the possible results were understood and they depended, of course, on the kind of conversations that the President had with the Soviet leaders.

"We think that the leaders ought to know what the basic position is they are going to face, roughly what they attempt to achieve, because it is tough enough for Heads of Government who have myriads of other concerns, to gear themselves to each other, without being burdened by the danger that they will suddenly confront something that could be very embarrassing or extraordinarily difficult.

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Q. Dr. Kissinger, I have two brief questions. You spoke of trust, the measure of trust.

DR. KISSINGER: As I defined it in relation to Peter's.

Q. Yes. I would like to relate that to an earlier remark when you said there was discussion, whether it was possible for both sides to bring a rapid end to the war. The question is: As of now, is there any measure of encouragement or optimism that we are -- that is an emotional question, I realize, but I ask it anyway. That is my first question.

DR. KISSINGER: I applied the word trust to the relations between us and the Soviet leaders. I applied "The attempt to bring about a negotiation towards a rapid end of the war," to our relations with Hanoi. So we are talking here about two separate problems. Are we more optimistic about a rapid end of the war as a result of these discussions? I just do not want to speculate about what the impact will be, how Hanoi will interpret this situation. What other things may be done by us, by Hanoi and others just has to be seen as one has seen so many predictions on the issue of Vietnam that we would really now rather concentrate on the results.

Q. The other question is a separate question. I am pursuing an earlier question. We know, of course, that the problem of the Soviet Jews is an internal problem. We know that. But you did say in Salzburg that the President would seek an opportunity to bring it up. And my question is, did he find an opportunity to bring it up?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, he mentioned the problem.

Q. A procedural question. Does this end the President's overseas travel this year?

DR. KISSINGER: I am not aware of any others, but then Mr. Ziegler has not briefed me on that issue.

Q. May I quickly follow up this last question. You said he brought up the Jewish question. Did he bring it up with Brezhnev?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go into anything further on that question. The Soviet leaders are aware of our position on the problem.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have one announcement to make. We will have the schedule, which will take you through Warsaw, available in about ten minutes. The baggage call is about 8:30 in the morning.

The President will lay the wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at 9:55 and the schedule will show the bus departures.

One final thing. In the pool report that was prepared from the Soviet aircraft today, there is a little confusion in the first paragraph. It says, "The pilot's name is" and states the name, and then goes on to state "He is the best pilot in the country." I was making remarks about remarks made to me of the Minister of Aviation, whose name is Bugayev, who is the Minister of Aviation. The pilot who flew the plane is a very good pilot, but the remarks referred to in the first paragraph referred to the Minister of Aviation.

Murray Mardar asked how many hours the leaders spent together. In formal sessions, they spent 20 hours and 22 minutes together; 16 of

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