Eastern European languages.

"[Another] task that broadcasting can serve is the fostering of regional solidarity . . . a feeling that all these people belong to free Europe and ultimately will regain a place in the European community." (Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XIV, Winter 1950-51, pp. 629-666)

Characteristic passages from Linebarger's article:

"Russia's downfall could be gotten ready by the use of three instruments: (1) political warfare, (2) 'white' and (3) 'black' psychological warfare

. . . Black psychological warfare . . . Black psychological warfare is the trade name for secret propaganda waged by disguised agents or other clandestine means . . . .

"For $500 million plus enthusiasm . . . we could launch a massive and terrifying campaign of political, white and black psychological . . . , and some economic, warfare against Moscow.

"Political warfare could support anti-Soviet governments-in-exile for all Iron Curtain countries

. . . We could help set up friendly armies from the Iron Curtain countries. We could [thus] challenge the Reds with the presence of a liberation force . . . Another technique consists of splitting the Communists apart from each other

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Perhaps it is not too late to help turn
the Chinese Communists against Moscow. The Communist
schigmatics in Eastern Europe did not, with the
exception of Tito, obtain our effective help in
time to stay alive ...

"White psychological warfare . . . /through\_ the Voice
of America for example. . . can supplement sub-
version. It can encourage the overthrow of
dictatorship . . . can promise . . . refuge . . .
can boast about the clandestine operations without
giving them away . . .

"Black psychological warfare could involve either
Americans or anti-Stalin Russians publishing
underground newspapers within Russia. . . . It
could attempt to organize Russian intellectuals,
technicians, workers . . . peasants into conspi-
ratorial groups . . . .

"Economic warfare techniques. . . . The Russians
are known to have printed excellent counterfeits of
U.S. currency . . . to have sabotaged factories . . .
encouraged the destruction of raw material . . . .
There is no trick in the . . . Communist arsenal
of subversion . . . we could not match, if we decided
to do so."

(Nation's Business, Vol. XXXIX, April 1951, pp. 29-31)

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At about the same time when Coste and Linebarger came forth
with their plans, Senator McMahon proposed (New York Times
Magazine of June 22, 1951, p. 7 plus "We Can Pierce the Iron
Curtain") that the U.S. "immediately launch a great moral crusade
for peace akin in universality and appeal to the Fourteen Points
and the Four Freedoms."

The article is based on the belief that a bold and constructive
program for peace, piercing the Iron Curtain chiefly but not
exclusively by way of broadcasts, "can convert the peoples of the
Soviet empire into actual or potential allies." Like Sarnoff, the
Senator suggests that light, portable radios be somehow provided
for the people behind the Curtain to pick up the Voice of America.
And while the Sarnoff Plan merely hints at people-to-people
contacts across the Curtain, Senator McMahon states specifically
that U.S. WWII veterans should visit U.S.S.R. WWII veterans and
vice versa; that American workers should tour Soviet industrial
cities and workers' homes, while Soviet workers in return ought
to see "at first hand the automobiles and gardens of typical
American workers in Detroit or Ohio." Even if the Soviet rulers
were to reject such patently reasonable exchange arrangements,
the very refusal, the Senator thinks, would help to open the eyes
of Soviet citizens. He suggests that U.S. fraternal and profes-
sional organizations, labor unions, church groups "even our school
children" embark on a massive letter writing campaign [In English]
to men and women of Odessa, Smolensk and Vladivostok. The Soviet
censors, he admits, would do their best to confiscate these
letters, but, he says, "such a spontaneous outpouring of sentiment

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[L]

from everyday Americans might well corrupt even the censors
themselves." He also envisages mailing millions of mail order
catalogues to Iron Curtain countries, since "nothing can more
tellingly refute lies about American impoverishment than the
consumer's wonderland contained within the pages of a Sears-
Roebuck or Montgomery Ward catalog." He believes that the
hundreds and thousands of Russian soldiers, stationed in Eastern
Europe outside the Soviet Union, can still be reached by the
printed word, i.e., U.S. propaganda pamphlets, etc. and that
those soldiers then might carry home with them "the germ of the
idea of freedom."

He, too, like Sarnoff, Coste and Linebarger, asks for full
support of political refugees from the Soviet sphere whom he calls
"cadres of liberation." Specifically, he endorses the idea of a
University of the Free, "which would serve as a focal point for
the activities of these political exiles." Senator McMahon warns,
however, that "our message must be based on the hard rock of
truth." There is, he insisted, "no place in our program for
half truth, for clever verbal forays intended merely to score
some . . . propaganda victory." At the same time "our efforts
must not be negative or defensive." "The campaign of truth must
have a single theme of such motive force that it cannot fail to
gain supporters." This theme, "which must be appealing to men
of all walks of life and all nations" is: Peace. "If we can
show the world's people that we stand for justice and Stalin
stands for tyranny; that we stand for bread and he stands for
bombs, that we stand for life and he stands for death . . .

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we can deprive Stalin of one thing he needs for conquest--the
support of the people."

* * * * * * * * *

A rather unique scheme of a "great television network
program," particularly for underdeveloped and partly illiterate
nations, was conceived by Senator Mundt. The Senator from
agricultural North Dakota proposed on the Senate floor
(Congressional Record of June 5, 1950, 96, pp. 8130-8139) to
reach the masses in such nations, outside the red orbit, by
audio-video techniques. Pointing out that one picture is worth
10,000 words he suggested that the U.S. establish in such
countries as Indonesia or the Philippines, possibly even in Japan
or Turkey, nation-wide television networks to demonstrate [show-
how programs] to the entire farm population profitable agri-
culture procedures which, he believes, could help to "increase
... farm output 10% to 20% in the [program's] first year of
operation in any given area." He explained that the networks
could also be used to provide for the agricultural, or urban,
population demonstrations in public health, such as proper
methods of child feeding, etc. The envisaged system would not
require individual television receivers, but would use community
receivers. According to Senator Mundt such nation-wide networks
with a central studio and as many as 22 transmissions stations,
considered sufficient to cover even a country of the size of
Indonesia, could be built and fully equipped at a cost of only
$4.6 million.

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* * * * * * * * *

The various "great propaganda schemes" described in this appendix are, of course, not the only ones that have been propounded over the years, but they are highly characteristic and quite typical. In one form or another the basic elements of the great designs developed mostly in the early years of the cold war, by Senators Benton and McMahon, by leading psychological warfare expert Professor Linebarger, by the RCA President Sarnoff and by the former Rumanian diplomat and exile, Coste, recur again and again. Only Senator Mundt's project is more or less a typical one and has been mentioned here merely as one example of a rather special scheme that is not, and does not pretend to be, an overall plan for U.S. psychological warfare. The copious literal quotations found in this appendix are intended as an aid to the reader who wants to form an opinion and draw conclusions of his own regarding these "blueprints".

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