Statement by NAR

The United States must clearly and firmly adopt the following policy goals:

(1) The removal of all Soviet troops and weapons from Cuba.

(2) The stopping of all Cuban sponsored Communist subversion, sabotage and guerrilla warfare against other Latin-American peoples.

(3) The opportunity for the people of Cuba to exercise freely the right of self-determination.

In order to accomplish these objectives, the United States must re-establish the unity of the western hemisphere based on mutual trust, confidence and respect, and must seek the cooperation of its NATO allies. This also means that unity and mutual confidence must be restored within NATO by ending the Democratic administration's policy of negotiating unilaterally with the Soviet Union. Consultation and the joint consideration and formulation of policy are vital to the strength of NATO.

In the western hemisphere, the United States must also move vigorously to re-establish the principle of consultation and joint hemispheric action in order to develop a truly hemispheric solution to a hemispheric problem.

From 1940 through 1945, as Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, I had the privilege of working with the people and governments of the other American Republics in developing, through consultation, common objectives and joint programs of action to unite the western hemisphere in the defense of freedom and promotion of the well-being of the peoples of the Americas.

Because of the size and strength of our country, if the United States' position is weak and vacillating, it undermines the capacity for effective joint inter-American action.

Cuba is a dramatic example of the need for an administration in Washington that will set clear goals, and is ready to take decisive action to achieve them.

The Republican party can and will provide an administration in Washington that will discourage the enemies of freedom and hearten freedom's friends by closing the "leadership gap."

[L]

DRAFT

May 22, 1964

# CUBA STATEMENT

On April 21st, I proposed an eight point program for the revitalization of the Western Hemisphere system. Adoption of this would enable us to demonstrate that freedom and democracy can be the wave of the future. However, progress in this task requires that we frankly face the biggest challenge to freedom in the Western Hemisphere: the existence of a Communist state ninety miles off our shores.

The time has long since come when the Democratic Administration should take clear, decisive and purposeful action to meet the critical problem of Communism in Cuba.

It seems almost incomprehensible to me that after over four years of Communist rule in Cuba, after twenty months of the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba, after repeated instances of attempted Cuban subversion in other Latin governments and after two unfortunate lessons on how *not* to get the Communists out of Cuba, this Administration apparently has no policy at all on Cuba.

Cuba, even with Russian troops, is not a severe *military* threat to the United States.

Cuban communism *is* a threat to the existence of, and the prospects for, democratic government throughout Latin America. The Castro regime is a base for agents spreading the seeds of dissension and revolt to all quarters of the Continent. The Communist propaganda barrage says, "Look what Castro did! He humiliated the Colossus of the North! And he did this with our assistance." It can be an impressive argument, and it is manipulated in the hands of well-trained organizers.

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Castro thus has become the symbol of inept leadership by the Democratic Administration. First we sponsored an invasion of the island but did not have enough confidence to give the effort a real chance. Then, though we secured the withdrawal of Soviet missiles, we failed to take advantage of our opportunities to end the use of Cuba as a base for subversion by giving up our demands for inspection of the island. And today we seem not to know what to do, so we are doing nothing.

Every failure has led to an increase of Soviet influence. Every missed opportunity has made the task that much harder. At the Bay of Pigs, U.S. aircover could probably have accomplished Castro's overthrow. If we had insisted on the demand for inspection during the missile crisis in 1962, we could have achieved at least the removal of Soviet troops.

Today these tasks are far more difficult. The Soviet Union has now formally and publicly committed itself to the defense of Cuba.

At the very least we should face facts.

The people of Cuba are being brutally deprived of freedom and the right of self-determination. Cuba itself is a base for subversion against every country in the Western Hemisphere. Venezuelan charges of Cuban aggression have been confirmed by the Organization of American States.

Cuba's impact extends far beyond the Western Hemisphere. Some Cuban arms have been shipped to Algeria and it is reported that they have been sent from there to foment revolutions in other parts of Africa. Some of the guerrillas of the Zanzibar revolt were trained in Cuba.

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A failure to define U.S. policy objectives in Cuba clearly
coupled with the U.S.-Soviet wheat deal, encouraged our European
allies not to take seriously our trade embargo against Cuba. But
the Administration's response was absurd:

- On February 18th it was announced that the U.S. had terminated all foreign aid to Britain and France in retaliation for their limited trade with Cuba. The assistance to Britain and France did not amount to $100,000 of military aid in either case.

- At the same time the Administration announced that no new aid commitments would be made to Spain and Morocco. However, five days later it was reported that the Administration had reversed its position on stopping aid to Spain. It had apparently become clear that halting military aid to Spain, which amounted to $30 million in 1963 and was expected to be larger in 1964, would endager our bases there.

The reasoning behind this American policy is obscure at best.
Spain is the largest Western trader with Cuba. U.S. aid to Spain
is considerable; U.S. aid to Britain and France is insignificant.
Logic would seem to dictate that a cut in aid to Spain might be
effective but that a cut in aid to Britain and France would not be
effective. Nonetheless, the American policy has been to cut aid to
Britain and France and not to cut aid to Spain.

Apparently we are willing to invoke sanctions big enough to
annoy but too trivial to be effective. The principal effect of our
action is further division in the Western Alliance.

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Is it any wonder that our capacity for world leadership is
increasingly being questioned?

Castro's action in shutting off the supply of water to the
10,000 Americans at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay was evi-
dence of the lack of respect for the determination and purpose and
will of the present Administration in Washington. But the U.S.
response to this insulting, but not injurious, act has made the
situation even worse:

President Johnson constantly refers proudly to the fact
that when Castro cut off the water supply to Guantanamo, the United
States responded by sending an Admiral to cut off the pipes. This
is a debating gimmick not a policy. It is an example of frivolity,
not of statesmanship.

Let us all be sure we understand this. The water pipe,
which President Johnson is so proud of having cut, was not being
used because there was no water coming through it. It was a water
pipe *into* our own base. In what way does President Johnson believe
such an act is any kind of response? His pride in this policy is
even more astonishing than the policy itself.

The present situation presents a grave challenge. We must
face the fact that many of the opportunities which existed three
years ago and at the time of the missile crisis are now irretriev-
ably lost.

Nevertheless, the United States government must clearly and
firmly enunciate the following policy objectives:

1. The removal of <u>all</u> Soviet troops and weapons from Cuba;

2. The stopping of all Cuban-sponsored Communist subversion, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare against other Latin American peoples;

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3. The opportunity for the people of Cuba to exercise freely the right of self-determination.

In order to accomplish these objectives, the United States must seek the cooperation of the other member nations of the Organization of American States. The United States must move vigorously to re-establish the principle of multilateralism which flourished in the early 1940's in order to develop a truly hemispheric solution to a hemispheric problem.

For twenty years in public life, I have counseled that the U.S. in its policies toward Latin America adopt the multilateral approach -- that we seek with our neighbors common solutions through the joint consideration of problems. But multilateralism is surely not inconsistent with the role of leadership. In defending the Western Hemisphere against the threat of Communism, the U.S. as the most powerful nation in the Hemisphere is by necessity in a leadership position.

The governments of Latin America must be confused by U.S. policy. They have looked to us for decisive action and they have seen indecision. They have looked to us for a clear sense of purpose and they have seen only contradiction. They have, in short, looked to us for leadership and have seen only vacillation.

The United States should urge the following graduated steps in carefully phased sequence, all of which are consistent with the Rio Treaty, the Act of Bogota and the Punta del Este Resolution:

1. Encouragement of the various Cuban groups in exile to commit themselves to a program of democracy and social progress for the day that Cuba returns to the community of free nations.

[L.C]

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Such a program would demonstrate to the Cuban people that the
overthrow of Castro would not mean a return to the conditions
prior to his revolution.

2. An OAS announcement that a Cuban government adopting such a program would be welcomed again as a valued member of the Organization of American States.

3. When the Cuban exile groups have established their unity and defined the programs they would support in Cuba, the United States and the Latin American governments can consider the advisability of recognizing the united refugee movement as the legitimate government of Cuba in exile.

4. Creation, under the OAS, of an Inter-American Subversion Control Board to assist member governments in identifying the sources of Communist propaganda and subversive activities, to provide a system for the exchange of information on known Communist agents and subversives who travel to Cuba, and to direct the activities of our own security agents in a cooperative effort to arrest, resist, and prevent subversive activities throughout the Hemisphere.

5. The Organization of Special Navy Squadrons of fast and efficient craft to patrol the Caribbean in constant communication with air surveillance teams. The purpose of these squadrons would be to protect innocent fishermen, refugees and others from harassment and to prevent the gun-running activities of small Cuban craft which are ideal vehicles for the delivery of subversive materials. These special Naval Squadrons could eventually lead to a full-fledged Inter-American Coast Guard.

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6. An OAS quarantine to prevent the shipment *from* Cuba of any weapons to any country, except for the return of Soviet troops with their arms to the USSR. OAS inspection teams would assure the effectiveness of the quarantine by inspection of every vessel leaving the island.

7. The use of the quarantine to prevent shipments of weapons *to* Cuba.

8. A complete OAS embargo against trade, communications and travel between member states and Cuba.

9. A comprehensive system of sanctions by OAS members against all shipping lines which continue to trade with Cuba, and use ports in any OAS country.

At the same time the United States should urge its NATO allies to adopt economic policies consistent with the policies of the OAS. The United States should immediately urge upon its NATO allies the following measures:

1. A NATO embargo against trade, communications and travel between member states and Cuba.

2. A system of sanctions against shipping lines which continue to trade with Cuba and use ports in any NATO country.

3. A NATO policy to direct member states to curtail the sale of any goods to Communist countries which have shipped similar goods to Cuba.

The continued existence of a Soviet Communist outpost in the Western Hemisphere, only ninety miles from the United States, cannot be tolerated.

With determined United States leadership, working through the Organization of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty

DRAFT 2

June 2, 1964

CUBA STATEMENT

It seems almost incomprehensible to me that after over four years of Communist rule in Cuba, after twenty months of the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba, after repeated instances of attempted Cuban subversion in other Latin governments and after two unfortunate lessons on how not to get the Communists out of Cuba, this Administration apparently has no policy at all on Cuba.

Cuba, even with Russian troops, is not a severe military threat to the United States.

Cuban communism is a threat to the existence of, and the prospects for, democratic government throughout Latin America. The Castro regime is a base for agents spreading the seeds of dissension and revolt to all quarters of the Continent. The Communist propaganda barrage says, "Look what Castro did! He humiliated the Colossus of the North! And he did this with our assistance." It can be an impressive argument, and it is manipulated in the hands of well-trained organizers.

Castro thus has become the symbol of inept leadership by the Democratic Administration. First we sponsored an invasion of the island but did not fully commit ourselves to the effort to give i real chance. Then, though we secured the withdrawal of Soviet missiles, we failed to take advantage of our opportunities to remove any military threa of Cuba . by giving up our demands for inspection of the island. And today we seem not to know what to do, so we are doing nothing.

Every failure has led to an increase of Soviet influence.
Every missed opportunity has made the task that much harder. At
the Bay of Pigs, U.S. aircover could probably have accomplished
Castro's overthrow. If we had insisted on the demand for inspec-
tion during the missile crisis in 1962, we could have achieved at
least the removal of Soviet troops.

The people of Cuba are being brutally deprived of freedom
and the right of self-determination. Cuba itself is a base for
subversion against every country in the Western Hemisphere. Vene-
zuelan charges of Cuban aggression have been confirmed by the
Organization of American States.

- 3 -

-- On February 18th it was announced that the U.S. had terminated all foreign aid to Britain and France in retaliation for their limited trade with Cuba. The assistance to Britain and France did not amount to $100,000 of military aid in either case.

-- At the same time the Administration announced that no new aid commitments would be made to Spain and Morocco. However, five days later it was reported that the Administration had reversed its position on stopping aid to Spain. It had apparently become clear that halting military aid to Spain, which amounted to $30 million in 1963 and was expected to be larger in 1964, would endager our bases there.

- 4 -

- 6 -

[L.C]

- 7 -

DRAFT 3

June 5, 1964

CUBA STATEMENT

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Castro thus has become the symbol of inept leadership by the Democratic Administration. First we sponsored an invasion of the island but did not fully commit ourselves to the effort to give i real chance. Then, though we secured the withdrawal of Soviet missiles, we failed to take advantage of our opportunities to remove any military threat from Cuba by giving up our demands for inspection of the island. And today we seem not to know what to do, so we are doing nothing.

- 3 -

- 4 -

[Lc]

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1. Encouragement of the various Cuban exile groups to unite and to commit themselves to a program of democracy and social progress for the day that Cuba returns to the community of free nations.

- 6 -

[Lc]

- 7 -

- 5 -

In order to accomplish these objectives, the United States must seek the cooperation of the other member nations of the Organization of American States. The United States must move vigorously to re-establish the principle of <u>multilateralism</u>, which flourished in the early 1940's in order to develop a truly hemispheric solution to a hemispheric problem.

The governments of Latin America must be confused by U.S. policy.
They have looked to us for decisive action and they have seen indecision. They
have looked to us for a clear sense of purpose and they have seen only contra-
diction. They have, in short, looked to us for leadership and have seen only
vacillation.

- 6 -

The United States should urge the following graduated steps, all of which are consistent with the Rio Treaty, the Act of Bogota and the Punta del Este Resolution:

1. Encouragement of the various Cuban groups in exile to commit themselves to a program of democracy and social progress for the day that Cuba returns to the community of free nations. Such a program would demonstrate to the Cuban people that the overthrow of Castro would not mean a return to the conditions prior to his revolution.

3. An OAS quarantine to prevent the shipment from Cuba of any weapons to any country, except for the return of Soviet troops with their arms to the USSR. OAS inspection teams would assure the complete effectiveness of the quarantine by inspection of every vessel bound for the island.

4. The use of the quarantine to prevent shipments of weapons to Cuba.

5. A complete OAS embargo against trade, communications and travel between member states and Cuba.

6. A comprehensive system of sanctions by OAS members against all shipping lines which continue to trade with Cuba, and use ports in any OAS country.

7. An OAS policy to direct member states, particularly the United States, to institute a system of pre-emptive buying to prevent trade with the Cuban government.

2. A system of sanctions by NATO members against all shipping lines which continue to trade with Cuba and use ports in any NATO country.

3. A NATO policy to direct member states to institute a system of pre-emptive buying to prevent trade with the Cuban government.

4. A NATO policy to direct member states to curtail the sale of any goods to Communist countries which have shipped similar goods to Cuba.

With determined United States leadership, working through the Organization of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it can be eliminated.

The time for decisive action is now.