H. A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

In the course of a two hour conversation at his residence on
January 23, 1966, De la Grandville made the following points:

NATO Reform

De la Grandville said that De Gaulle's original timetable had been to raise the issue of NATO's reform at the end of February or the beginning of March. He was not sure, however, whether the unexpected outcome of the French election and the difficulties in the EEC negotiations have not set back the French timetable. Couve, though unsure when France would begin to ask for NATO reform, had ordered De la Grandville to work out a plan for a possible French line of approach.

De la Grandville had developed a plan which he considered to be the absolute minimum acceptable. Couve had accepted it but De Gaulle had not yet seen it and he feared it would not get by. The main outlines of the plan were as follows:

The basic objection of De Gaulle to NATO was the integrated command structure and the fact that American bases in France flew the American flag and could be used for American purposes without French knowledge. There was a secret protocol according to which in times of crisis the French government had a kind of veto on the bilateral bases, but this was not adequate to present conditions because the distinction between crises and ordinary times was not well defined. De la Grandville believed that the following solutions might be acceptable with respect to the American bases established on a bilateral basis:

with respect to the American bases established on a pilferal basis;

is Grandville believed that the following solutions might be acceptable function between crises and ordinary times was not well defined. De bases', but this was not adequate to present conditions because the dis- times of crisis the French government had a kind of veto on the pilferal French knowledge. There was a secret protocol according to which in the American flag and could be used for American purposes without command structure and the fact that American bases in France flew The basic objection of De Générale to NATO was the integrated the plan were as follows:

not yet seen it and he feared it would not get him. The main outline of
spacetime minimum acceptable. Conve had accepted it but De Générale had
De is Grandville had developed a plan which he considered to be the
Grandville to work out a plan for a belligerent French line of approach.
when France would begin to ask for NATO reform, had ordered De is
statements have not set back the French timetable. Conve, though manne
ed outcome of the French election and the difficulties in the EEC needs
beginning of March. He was not sure, however, whether the expect-
ment to raise the name of NATO's reform at the end of February or the
De is Grandville said that De Générale's original timetable had

NATO Reform

January 23, 1966. De is Grandville made the following points:

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
H. V. Krausler

H. A. Kissinger

**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL**

-2-

[Y]

The American bases should be changed into French bases and the formal command over the bases should be French. This in effect meant that the French flag would have to fly over these bases. The French Commander could delegate all ordinary operations to his American counterpart and the day-to-day operations would not be affected. All "unusual" activities would have to be cleared with the base commander. Thus the provision that the French government possessed a veto during crises would be maintained and perhaps somewhat more formalized. De la Grandville asked me if I thought this scheme might be acceptable from the American point of view. I said that I simply did not know.

The most difficult problem, however, was not that of the bilateral American bases, but of NATO reform. Here the chief difficulty was the concept of integration. I said that this seemed to me a really very theoretical debate, since even the technically integrated units remained under national command in peacetime and were "integrated" only in case of war after the government concerned released them. De la Grandville said that the difficulty was not the peacetime but the wartime status of "integrated" units. According to present arrangements once forces were released to SACEUR, he could use them in any part of the NATO territory as he saw fit without further reference to the governments concerned. This was an intolerable situation for France. France not only wanted to have the right to release its forces in case of war; it also wanted to have a decisive voice

to release its forces in case of war; it also wanted to have a decisive voice
inferiorable situation for France. France not only wanted to have the right
to without further reference to the governments concerned. This was an
SACEUR, he could see them in any part of the NATO territory so he saw
units. According to present arrangements once forces were released to
the difficulty was not the beseetime but the maritime status of "integrated"
<u>after</u> the government concerned released them. De la Grandville said that
national command in beseetime and were "integrated" only in case of war
tical debate, since even the technically integrated units remained under
concept of integration. I said that this seemed to me a really veryوق-
American pasee, but of NATO reform. Here the chief difficulty was the
The most difficult problem, however, was not that of the bilateral
view. I said that I simply did not know.

if I thought this scheme might be acceptable from the American point of
view and perhaps somewhat more formalized. De la Grandville asked me
that the French government beseased a veto during crises would be main-
tained and berisehe somewhat more formalized. Thus the provision
and the day-to-day operations would not be affected. All "mussel" activi-
nesser could delegate all ordinary operations to his American counterpart
that the French fagd would have to fly over these pases. The French Com-
mand would have to be cleared with the pasee commander. Thus the provision
The American pasee should be changed into French pases and the

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

-S-

[1]

H. A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

[Y]

in the conduct of military operations on its territory. It did not want retreats which treated its soil as a pawn in some larger game. De la Grandville thought that a compromise solution might be as follows:

SHAPE should be moved to Luxembourg and made into a forward military headquarters. Some French forces would remain assigned to SHAPE if only to maintain a French presence within Germany, which De Gaulle considered essential to prevent German predominance in Europe. At the same time, the soil of France, except perhaps for some border districts in the northeast, would be put in the same category as Great Britain, which was not SACEUR territory. In other words, if military operations were to be conducted on French soil, the approval of the French government would have to be obtained by SACEUR. De la Grandville thought that these were the absolutely minimum conditions that would be acceptable to France.

## European Policy

De la Grandville said that he had seen no signs that De Gaulle had changed his basic objectives in European policy. On the contrary, his bad showing in the French presidential election had made him, if anything, more obstinate. He felt that he had taken all the humiliation he was going to, and he was not going to sacrifice any further principles. He thought that the intention of the French government was to force a decision on the Common Market before the fall. After agreement on a common

Common Market before the fall. After agreement on a common
that the intention of the French government was to force a decision on the
to', and he was not doing to sacrifice any further principles. He thought
more opatinate. He felt that he had taken all the humiliation he was doing
bad showing in the French presidential election had made him, if anything,
challenged his basic objectives in European policy. On the contrary, his

De is Grandville said that he had seen no signs that De Gaspille had
**European Policy**

would be acceptable to France.
ville thought that these were the absolutely minimum conditions that
French government would have to be obtained by SACEUR. De is Grand-
operations were to be conducted on French soil, the abvost of the
Britain, which was not SACEUR territory. In other words, if military
districts in the northeast, would be but in the same category as Grest
At the same time, the soil of France, except perhaps for some border
Gasville considered essential to prevent German preeminence in Europe.
SHAPE it only to maintain a French presence within Germany, which De
military headquarters. Some French forces would remain sited to

SHAPE should be moved to Luxembourg and made into a forward
Grandville thought that a compromise solution might be as follows:
retreats which treated its soil as a bawn in some harder game. De is
in the conduct of military operations on its territory. It did not want

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
H. V. Klaasen

-3-

H. A. Kissinger

**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL**

-4-

agricultural policy was obtained, De Gaulle would dissolve the Chamber and have an election. This would give him the maximum chance of retaining the Gaullist majority in the Assembly.

The situation was complicated by the fact that the issue of majority vote did not seem subject to compromise for the French. All French students had learned that sovereignty was indivisible and it was very difficult for the French to accept the notion of majority voting. I said that it did not seem to me in practice that majority vote could ever be consistently applied against a major country. De la Grandville said that this was not the point, that De Gaulle would not yield on this issue. In addition, there was considerable animosity toward Hallstein and they would almost certainly demand his humiliation.

Looking at the situation in a wider perspective, De la Grandville said that the most striking fact was the hostility of De Gaulle toward the Germans. At one time he had felt that he could govern the Germans. Now, because of the tough line the Germans had taken against French policy and of the close ties in military procurement to the United States, De Gaulle was beginning to be very uneasy about the FRG. He was returning to France's traditional policy of trying to balance off Germany with the Soviet Union. De Gaulle would like a kind of understanding among the three Western powers (meaning the United States, Great Britain, and France) and the Soviet Union that there would be peace in Europe. Failing that, he wanted

Soviet Union that there would be peace in Europe. Warning that, he wanted
bowers (meaning the United States, Great Britain, and France) and the
Union. De Gaulle would be a kind of understanding among the three Western
France's traditional policy of trying to balance off Germany with the Soviet
was beginning to be very meanly spout the EIC. He was returning to
of the close ties in military procurement to the United States. De Gaulle
because of the tough line the Germans had taken against French policy and
Germans. At one time he had felt that he could govern the Germans. Now,
said that the most striking fact was the instability of De Gaulle toward the
Looking at the situation in a wider perspective, De is Grandville
his immigration.

aldermanly animosity toward Hailstein and they would almost certainly demand
that De Gaulle would not yield on this issue. In addition, there was con-
against a major country. De is Grandville said that this was not the point,
seem to me in practice that majority vote could ever be consistently applied
for the French to accept the notion of majority voting. I said that it did not
demands had learned that sovereignty was indivisible and it was very difficult
vote did not seem subject to compromise for the French. VII French air-
The situation was complicated by the fact that the issue of majority
and the German majority in the Assembly.

and have an election. This would give him the maximum chance of retaining
the German policy was obtained. De Gaulle would dissolve the Chamber

-4-

H. A. Kissinger

-5-

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

to see NATO transformed more and more into an American-British-French
guarantee of German soil against Russian attack.

At any rate, De Gaulle had no longer any confidence that one could
build Europe on Franco-German cooperation. He told any visitor who cared
to listen, including Senator Mansfield, that the major problem was to keep
Germany under control. At the same time, President de Gaulle found it
very important to remain the most attractive Western country for the Soviet
Union to deal with. Part of this was to anticipate United States bilateral
attempts at detente; part of it was in order to maintain the maximum free-
dom of maneuver; part of it, no doubt, was an attempt to woo Communist
voters.

Whatever the reason, keeping open the Soviet option was now basic
French policy. For example, when the McNamara committee was being
discussed by De Gaulle and his ministers, De Gaulle had said that he had
two difficulties with it: (1) he wanted to make sure it would not restrict
France's freedom of action; and (2) he wanted to make sure that Russia
would not object. For this reason Couve had been instructed when he was
in the Soviet Union to test Soviet reaction. The French had found the Soviets
adamant on the McNamara committee. The Russians had explained to
Couve that their objection was not so much that Germany physically possess-
ed nuclear weapons, but that any approach by Germany to equality would so
much strengthen her self-confidence that it would lead to further and further

which strengthens per se self-confidence that it would lead to further and further
ed nuclear weapons, put that and approach by Germany to edemify would so
Come that their objection was not so much that Germany basically possesses
admirant on the McNamara committee. The Russians had explained to
in the Soviet Union to test Soviet reaction. The French had found the Soviets
would not object. For this reason Come had been instructed when he was
France's freedom of action; and (S) he wanted to make sure that Russia
two difficulties with it: (1) he wanted to make sure it would not restrict
discussed by De Galle and his ministers. De Galle had said that he had
French policy. For example, when the McNamara committee was being
Whatever the reason, keeping open the Soviet option was now basic
voters.

dom of maneuver; part of it, no doubt, was an attempt to weak Communist
attitude at defense; part of it was in order the maintain the maximum free-
Union to deal with. Part of this was to anticipate United States pilferst
very important to remain the most attractive Western country for the Soviet
Germany under control. At the same time, President de Galle found it
to irritat, including Senator Mansfield, that the major problem was to keep
paid Eurobe on Franco-German cooperation. He told any visitor who cared
At any rate, De Galle had no wonder any confidence that one could
assurance of German soil against Russian attack.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
H. V. Knaufner
-0-

[A]

H. A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

-8-

demands. For this reason the Russians were as violently opposed to the McNamara committee as to any other form of nuclear sharing by the Germans. As a result of this, Couve had decided to oppose the McNamara committee in the Nato Council.

In the long-term De la Grandville was very pessimistic. The pro-Soviet policy was isolating France from Germany. At the same time Great Britain was throwing its lot in more and more with the United States. As Great Britain's bases east of Suez were being financed by the United States and the major British military effort was being moved into that area, Great Britain would become increasingly an appendage of the United States and therefore not available as a possible counterweight to a resurgent Germany. In the long-term an isolated France would also not be very interesting for Russia, because it had very little to offer. For all these reasons, De la Grandville considered De Gaulle's policy disastrous.

## South Vietnam

With respect to South Vietnam, De la Grandville said that too many people wanted America's humiliation for the United States to give in now. We had to understand that France was far from neutral. Most senior officials in the French foreign office would welcome America's embarrassment with a kind of schadenfreude. Also, France was a very poor channel of communication. He knew of at least three occasions when the French

of communication. He knew of at least three occasions when the French
ment with a kind of academic trend. 'Viao,' France was a very poor channel
officials in the French foreign office would welcome America's emporia-
We had to understand that France was far from neutral. Most senior
people wanted America's humiliation for the United States to come in now.

## South Vietnam

reasons. De la Grandville considered De Gaulle's policy dispositions,
teresting for Russia, because it had very little to offer. For all these
Germany. In the long-term an isolated France would also not be very in-
and therefore not available as a possible counterweight to a resistant
Great Britain would become increasingly an appendage of the United States
States and the major British military effort was being moved into that area.
As Great Britain's pacesheet of sales were being financed by the United
Great Britain was throwing its lot in more and more with the United States.
Soviet policy was isolating France from Germany. At the same time

In the long-term De la Grandville was very optimistic. The pro-
committee in the NATO Council.

As a result of this, Comeback decided to abandon the McNamars
McNamars committee as to any other form of uncleared sharing by the Ger-
demands. For this reason the Russians were so violently opposed to the

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

-8-

H. A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

government had given a delayed and distorted account of information that
might have been important to have about the state of Chinese and North
Vietnamese thinking. For example, the account of Malroux's conversations
in China which were given to us were not consistent with the reports which
were in the files of the Quai d'Orsay. He would not elaborate on this pro-
position. He did say that there were two other events, one involving the
Vietcong and the other Hanoi, in which information that might have been
relevant was passed on to us either too late or in a mutilated form.

Nuclear Testing

De Gaulle had ordered a speed-up in the French nuclear test program because he thought that the period when there was tension between the Soviet Union and the United States and when the Soviet Union was wooing France was a good moment to try to complete as much of the French nuclear program as possible. As a result, a French test series would start around July 1st in the Pacific. Because of the pressure of time, materials for the nuclear weapons had to be flown across Latin America to Taihiti and then assembled there. Thus an assembly plant for nuclear weapons had to be produced at enormous expense. A regular airlift was being envisaged. Negotiations to that effect would be starting within the next few weeks.

France had not yet solved the technical problem of developing a
hydrogen bomb. The warheads that were going to be tested in the Pacific
were a marginally improved design from that exploded in the Sahara--some

were a marginally improved design from that exploded in the Sputnik--some
hydrogen pump. The warheads that were going to be tested in the Pacific

France had not yet solved the technical problem of developing a
that effect would be starting within the next few weeks.

enormous expense. A regular airlift was being envisaged. Negotiations to
to there. Time an assemblage plant for nuclear weapons had to be produced at
weapons had to be flown across Latin America to Talbitt and then assembled
in the Pacific. Because of the breake of time, materials for the nuclear
as possible. As a result, a French test series would start around July 1961
was a good moment to try to complete as much of the French nuclear program
Union and the United States and when the Soviet Union was moving France
became he thought that the period when there was tension between the Soviet
De Galleu had ordered a speed-up in the French nuclear test program

## Nuclear Testing

relevant was based on to us either too late or in a mutilated form.
Aietcong and the other Hanot, in which information that might have been
position. He did say that there were two other events, one involving the
were in the files of the Guat d'Orsay. He would not elaborate on this pro-
in China which were given to us were not consistent with the reports which
Vietnamese thinking. For example, the account of Malronx's conversations
might have been important to have spont the state of Chinese and North
dovernment had given a defamed and distorted account of information that

PERSONNEL AND CONFIDENTIAL
H. V. Knauper

-1-

H. A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

-8-

improvements in the weight to yield ratio. The major tests would involve
air-drops from a Mirage plane.

Domestic French Politics

De la Grandville felt that the defeat had made De Gaulle, if anything,
more obstinate. The return of Debre meant that the left Gaullists and the
theoreticians were gaining the upper hand against the pragmatists repre-
sented by Pompidou. The latter had been badly weakened by the electoral
results as well as by the Ben Barka affair. Ben Barka had been abducted
by the French Secret Service as a favor for the Moroccan Secret Service,
because the Moroccan Secret Service was being used by the French as the
key agency for infiltration in Africa. When the Ben Barka operation back-
fired, De Gaulle decided that it was more important to salvage the prestige
of the regime than to protect the individuals that had been involved.

Conclusion

Altogether De la Grandville's assessment of the situation was as
gloomy as always. He felt that our handling of the French was psychologic-
ally very unwise. For example, during the fall the French government had
already decided to engage in joint planning with American strategic forces.
The only issue that had not yet been settled in internal French discussions
was whether a small part of the *force de frappe* should be kept under exclu-
sive French control for symbolic reasons. It had been found that the *force*