MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

SENSITIVE/NODIS

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
TIME Editorial Board (List Attached)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant
to the Secretary for Press Relations
Peter W. Rodman, National Security
Council Staff PMR

TIME & DATE: Thursday - November 11, 1974

PLACE:
The F Street Club
1925 F Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

**Donovan (Editor in Chief):** We will speak on a background basis as usual. We are grateful that the Secretary has come here, in view of his many exertions. I have just been re-reading two remarkable documents, the Secretary's excellent statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on detente, and the Secretary's interview with Reston, with some credit to Reston for asking some very good questions. I think these two things would be considered a tremendous output for any journalist or professor, and especially so thinking of what else the Secretary has been doing. The level of conceptualizing and thoughtfulness is remarkable.

For a combination on a very impressive scale of thought and action in high office, Secretary Kissinger is remarkable. Mr. Secretary?

**Kissinger:** First, can we do it on DEEP BACKGROUND.

**Schecter:** That means no tape recording!

**Kissinger:** I thought that, rather than having me talk, why don't I respond to questions.

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**John Shaw:** I am the Moscow correspondent. Let me ask you, are the Soviets being helpful in any way in the Middle East? And second, you more than any other Westerner have had greater contact with Soviet leaders and, in particular Leonid Brezhnev, than any other. Can you give us some impressions?

**Kissinger:** On the Middle East, you asked: Are the Soviets being helpful in any way? The answer is no, and why should they, from their point of view? One ought to compare the Soviet attitude to us in 1972 and 1974. In 1972, I came to Moscow on a secret trip -- since Brezhnev's vanity required a secret trip since the Chinese had got a secret trip. [Laughter] The principal reasons were domestic reasons for both sides -- he for his vanity and we for Bill Rogers. But it was more so on their side.

At any rate, that was at a time when the North Vietnamese had taken Quang Tri and were surrounding Kontum. But nevertheless I had the sense that we had many more options that the Soviets, and they were still in awe of our flexibility, our technical potential -- and they had other problems like getting the West German treaty ratified. Since then, they must have had second thoughts -- our domestic crisis doesn't end; our flexibility is being circumscribed. And while they are still in awe of us, and I believe Brezhnev has the fear of war in his bones, I think they're watching us until they see a strategic opportunity.

The Middle East has been an extremely painful experience for them. They put in an extreme amount of money and see it disappear. Until even the October War, we treated them as spokesman for the Arabs and we were the spokesman for Israel. Now they see us roaming around the Middle East, without referring at all to them. They hector us that we can't make a settlement without them -- but they know perfectly well that we could make a settlement without them, and the Arabs would like us to make a settlement without them, and the only thing stopping us is the domestic situation here. It is a humiliation.

We can probably get away with one more round of this, but not more.

**John Shaw:** Are they being obstructive in Syria?

**Kissinger:** In Syria they're giving arms. In Egypt the problem is our failure to deliver -- they are getting no arms, no nuclear agreement. The only thing we deliver on is PL 480. Even that couldn't prevent a Syrian settlement. But the problem is the Israeli settlements [on the Golan].

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Their [the Soviet] position is defensive; they're hanging on in the Middle East. I don't have the sense that the Syrians particularly like them either.

**Question:** Are the Israelis preparing to do something irresponsible?

**Kissinger:** No. They are trying to pretend to be very dangerous, so the Arabs won't attempt anything.

**Question:** Then there is no danger of war?

**Kissinger:** I don't see a war imminent.

**Question:** What about our extremely heavy arms sales to the Middle East? Billions of dollars are going in, of sophisticated weapons -- F-14, F-15.

**Kissinger:** To Iran.

**Question:** To other countries too.

**Kissinger:** No.

**Question:** How can we be sure it isn't destabilizing or dangerous?

**Kissinger:** Our heaviest arms shipments in the Middle East are to Israel. Other weapons go to Iran. Saudi Arabia isn't getting F-14's; it's not even getting F-4's. With that much money, the only thing they can spend it on is arms. Development, maybe, but with a population of a maximum of 8 million, and no trained civil service... And if they don't buy from us, they'll only get it from Britain and France.

**Question:** What is the theory behind our sales? Balance of payments needs? To prevent Russian sales?

**Kissinger:** In the Middle East, only two countries outside of Israel are getting American arms in any quantity -- Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia is not going to be a military force no matter what level it is; the danger is transshipment [to other Arab states]. But it is not up to the sophistication of forces of the so-called confrontation states. Jordan is getting some.

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The major use of arms to Saudi Arabia is to maintain a political connection and a source of political influence. When we sell to Iran, this has strategic significance. Iran is the stablest country in the area; it is a counterweight to Iraq; it is some block to the Soviet Union. It is playing a responsible role in the Indian Ocean, and even on oil. He is the fall guy for Yamani.

What are we going to gain from not selling arms? We didn't sell to Peru; now they got 200 Soviet tanks and Cuban advisers. So now Chile wants more arms because of the buildup in Peru. Since they need spare parts and instructors, it's political influence.

In Africa, Congress set a total limit at $40 million. In Ethiopia, the new leaders want arms from us -- partly because of an external threat and partly because they are military and want to show they can produce something for the military. Sadat said, "Why don't you sell to Ethiopia and keep the Russians out of there?" I said "There is a Congressional limit." He said "It's the source of the Nile." [Laughter]

**Question:** Why not talk about this with the Soviets. Why shouldn't arms limits be part of detente?

**Kissinger:** It depends on the area. In the Middle East, in the past they have said that as a part of settlement they would be prepared to discuss an arms embargo. But their idea of settlement is a total package deal, including Jerusalem, instead of our approach step-by-step.

Also, the problem now is that you would have to cover the whole area. Even Abu Dhabi has Mirages. What could Abu Dhabi possibly do with Mirages?

**Question:** You said we couldn't have a settlement.

**Kissinger:** No, a final settlement like the Russians want is almost out of the question because it would mean the 1967 borders, it would mean Jerusalem, it would mean the return of the refugees. If such a settlement is imposed on them, it would have a psychological impact comparable to the amputation of Czechoslovakia in 1938. So I am talking about a partial settlement that would last a number of years. I am not saying a Golan settlement is possible. But if they had had a settlement policy on Golan like their policy in Sinai -- if they were on the cliffs, which they have to hold...

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**Question:** Is it worth doing with Sinai?

**Kissinger:** It is worth doing. The problem is whether it is possible.

**Donovan:** You said that if it were not for the American political situation, the Soviets could be driven out of the Middle East.

**Kissinger:** If we could deal with Israel as we did with Vietnam -- and just do what we had to do for global strategic reasons... But we can't for political reasons and also for moral reasons. If the decreasing Soviet influence were our only principle, we could do enough over the next several years to keep the Soviets off balance in the Middle East for several years.

**Donovan:** In a "Papa Knows Best" spirit, what would we want to do?

**Kissinger:** I haven't thought it through. If Israel could look at it from a cosmopolitan point of view, it would have to realize that three million people can't stay in confrontation with 100 million, who are piling up $65 billion in arms, with the Soviet Union and Europe and Japan all opposed to them. They would have to reach some reasonable accommodation. But they have been cushioned from having to do it. I say this... I mean, I am the one who has helped cushion them.

**Question:** Do you think you, speaking for the country, could be tough enough to do this? We had discussions here this afternoon on whether we in this country are free enough to ask them to do this.

**Kissinger:** Let me make this clear. We haven't asked Israel to make any move on the Golan. I was talking analytically. We are doing it the hard way, trying to move without Syria. Are we strong enough to do it? What are we strong enough as a nation to do anyway in foreign policy? We lack a consensus in the Establishment. I was thinking of a comparison between my tenure and Acheson's. I have greater popularity and have been attacked less, but I nevertheless think he was in a much stronger position. Since Nixon's resignation -- not because of his contribution, but because we had some support for foreign policy as the one area that shouldn't be allowed to go under... I am more popular but I have no Establishment support. When I go around, who do I represent? Acheson represented the Establishment, the leading newspapers, and the intellectual trend in the United States. Who was the opposition to Acheson? John Foster Dulles -- but that was a difference of personality. Liberation? But he never did it.

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The extraordinary caution of Dulles after Stalin's death in what must have been the period of weakness for the Soviet Union... I am not criticizing.

What is our conception of China? Of the Soviet Union? It is not even divided; it is totally amorphous.

When you raise a particular idea like imposing on Israel, I don't know.

**Question:** There is a sort of unity behind you, behind your skill.

**Kissinger:** That is a sort of acrobatic, athletic thing [Laughter].

**Question:** Don't knock it!

**Kissinger:** I am trying to separate the appearance from the reality. The question I was most asked on my trip was why did we do this on Turkey? Sadat cannot understand it, the Shah can't understand it. The most probable war is between Syria and Israel, in the Eastern Mediterranean, and why are we driving out the anchor of the Eastern Mediterranean? And for what?

**Question:** One problem between now and the Acheson period is that our goals are more complicated now.

**Kissinger:** I am not so worried about Congressional support. The Turkish thing was a sudden disintegration of Congress on everything.

Now there is no Establishment support.

**Question:** It is related to domestic events.

**Kissinger:** Certainly.

**Schecter:** Why is the President going to Vladivostok? And what can he accomplish in this atmosphere?

**Kissinger:** What is his alternative? To sit here and wait for a consensus? The only way he can get one is by national action. He must act as if he has one, and maybe he will get one.

Why is he going? First, Brezhnev wants to meet President Ford, and given Brezhnev's personality, this is not insignificant. Second, we may make some progress on SALT. As I said in my statement on detente, it

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doesn't make a difference whether the ceiling is at 1,800, 2,200, or 2,800 -- both have the power to destroy humanity. But if we don't bring some control over this race, both sides will be driven to postures that are not compatible with the kind of relations we want. I find that Brezhnev is the only one who can make the decisions on strategic matters. And it is the only subject on which Brezhnev is interesting as a person. On military matters he is quite good. I also think he is somewhat on the dovish side. In June with President Nixon, he actually got into arguments with generals who were jumping up and down and criticizing what they were giving up. In a way that the American generals wouldn't! So a meeting would have a tranquilizing effect.

**Question:** Why do they want a meeting?

**Kissinger:** Because they wanted to size up Ford, whom they didn't know except as a right-wing Congressman who voted for a high defense budget. They want to know if our policy has continuity.

**Question:** What about the problem of the 4th World? As a military problem, a political problem.

**Kissinger:** As a military problem, I don't take them seriously. Even as a political problem. We were told that if we vetoed the South African resolution, tremendous consequences would follow. Nothing happened, partly because they operate in a quite narrow range of options.

In the food conference, my concern is quite different. Just as in the 18th and 19th century we went from a feudal system to the nation-state, this is a period when we have to go from the nation-state to some wider sense of responsibility. If we don't, we would just have tests of strength; it could lead to a new barbarism, just like periods when every nation just marched across and took what they could.

The journalists on my plane said it was an uncharacteristic speech, because it had visionary elements. [Laughter] It was a happy group! We have always felt that food was special because it was the area where we had the most freedom of decision, and the power to shape the policy. The only way we could ask for conduct in energy was to set a standard in food. Unfortunately the whole debate has been over the food-aid level. Humphrey's idea was to get the moral benefit of a big package; the other argument was that a big announcement would hike the price and undercut the whole program. That is not a trivial argument.

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We hoped to have a program for raising production, and if it succeeds, aid would become peripheral.

**Question:** Would Israel negotiate with the PLO? Would you meet with Arafat? Is there any chance for Hussein to become a factor again?

**Kissinger:** There is no reason for me to meet Arafat. The Rabat decision was irresponsible -- they chose epic poetry over policy. [Laughter] It's not the first time. If they were smart, they would have let Hussein negotiate for the West Bank, and then settle among the Arabs who gets it. Ironically, if it was a Hussein-Israel negotiation, we could have been more flexible towards the PLO. There is nothing in it for the US to move towards the PLO.

**Question:** Could you please elaborate?

**Kissinger:** The Arab leaders know they were naughty boys. I saw them all the next week. [Laughter]

I think the PLO will spend its next six months trying to gain recognition, not to negotiate with Israel. A negotiation would be almost as dangerous for them as it would be for Israel.

**Question:** To what extent should the US be organizing pressures against the oil producers, either through not making recycling easier, or even impeding it, or reducing consumption?

**Kissinger:** I am giving a speech later this week. I am in favor of drops of consumption. Impeding recycling -- that depends on what you mean. I favor recycling within the industrial world; otherwise the oil-producers will have a commanding position using economic power against selective targets.

We have actually had a systematic program since the Washington Energy Conference. Therefore our action is tied to the pace for consumer cooperation. We have a program of consumer cooperation. The Washington Energy Conference created the International Energy Program which means there would have to be a general embargo if there is any, which will mean a political confrontation. With the safety nets, we can talk with the producers and we have a chance to get the price down.

**Question:** Are there any compelling reasons for the consumers and producers to get together?

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**Kissinger:** Not until the consumers know what they have to say. Otherwise it's nothing more than the bilateral talks you have now. When I see Faisal, it is a consumer-producer dialogue. With everyone making separate deals -- that's what you have now. A conference now, especially with the other developing countries present, and with the consumers divided, is a prescription for irresponsibility. Because the poorer ones tell us to go ahead with consumer cooperation because publicly they are in debt to the producers and can't say anything themselves.

**Question:** What is the basis for the consumers to act?

**Kissinger:** Sharing, conservation, alternative sources, financial cooperation.

What reason do the producers have? The abstract well-being of the advanced countries, which never felt responsible for them? Which they never felt responsible for? But as Mexico, Algeria, Venezuela have development programs, then the allocation of production cuts becomes a serious problem. Saudi Arabia doesn't care at all how much it produces.

Right now, it is a seller's market. But by 1978, I have seen analyses in the State Department which express the worry that the prices might break below the level at which we're bringing in alternative sources. So we are prepared to discuss with producers on a long-term price that would keep the alternative sources, and not go down to a price which would put them back to where they started.

**Donovan:** There is a possible collapse in Britain, Italy and other places. What can we do?

**Kissinger:** We have to develop means of helping Britain and Italy on a systematic basis, not just with $2 billion every six months. We need to set up structures for this, and also to safeguard things until these take hold.

We propose these things but they are not automatically accepted, because they don't have the Monnets anymore. I think the French may prefer to be saved by Arab money rather than American money, even if it means a total reorientation of the political structure of the West. It would lead to a political transformation; it already has.

**Question:** What if there is no price change until 1978?

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**Kissinger:** We can't allow it to happen.

**Question:** What would we do?

**Kissinger:** It would have to be faced. It would mean a fundamental political transformation of the kind that has never been effected before without war. These massive revenues are a claim on resources, which sooner or later will have political consequences.

**Donovan:** If honored.

**Kissinger:** If honored. Maybe they won't be. But maybe it will be carried to its conclusion.

**Question:** If the measures don't work, given the time lag, can't you say we will get to that crunch?

**Kissinger:** As a historian, I would have to say that I believe Western governments won't do what is necessary. But as a practicing political figure, or whatever, we have to act as if what we are proposing can work. Every evasion now means a worse crisis in 1977. Nothing foreseeable will happen which will remove the problem.

**Birnbaum:** Does an Israeli settlement help this problem?

**Kissinger:** Not really. Marginally. War would wreck it. Because the Arabs probably will be forced to put on an embargo, whatever their judgment. Second, the idea of consumer solidarity will go down the drain because the Europeans will blame us for not having been tough enough on Israel. This is the European idea. I am speaking of a general war.

I don't think the Arabs will pay us much for services already rendered.
[Laughter]

**Question:** Presumably you told this to the President.

**Kissinger:** Yes.

**Question:** What was his reaction?

**Kissinger:** He agrees with it.

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**Question:** Shouldn't a speech of this cosmic magnitude come from the President?

**Kissinger:** He knows I'm giving it. [Laughter] I'm giving it because it deals with the international aspects. He laid out a domestic program, and will do more in detail in the State of the Union address.

**Question:** That will be a long time from now.

**Kissinger:** No, six weeks.

**Grunwald:** You said the foreign policy Establishment doesn't support you.

**Kissinger:** It doesn't oppose me either.

**Grunwald:** A member of the Establishment wrote in *Atlantic* that you have excessively personalized diplomacy -- Tom Hughes. He says you have excluded not only the State Department bureaucracy but the intellectual community.

**Kissinger:** It simply is not true that the State Department is excluded from the making of foreign policy. The Assistant Secretaries are more involved in foreign policy than ever before since Acheson -- but not on the things they like to do, for example, having you clear cables. I am trying to educate them in concepts. Cables, you know, always have a certain plausibility -- it is addressed to one person, it gives you nothing about the purposes or strategy underlying the policy. Jerry [Schecter] spent the day with me. I don't spend a lot of time on nitpicking details.

We are in a transition period in the Department. I guarantee if I stay there long enough it will have high morale and will be a permanent institution. It is better than a year ago -- it was well organized to handle tactical situations but not for the conduct of foreign policy. It will take another year or two. I don't think Tom Hughes will feel in two years that the State Department is not being used.

For a variety of reasons, related to the previous President and the transition, a great deal of attention is focused on me. Because I don't go to the Quito meeting, which we didn't want in the first place and in which we are going to abstain anyway [Laughter], three foreign ministers

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are making speeches attacking me for my absence! Given the state of
our domestic situation, it has certain advantages -- because I couldn't
have sent an Assistant Secretary to the Middle East after Rabat and calm
everybody down for one, two or three months. Intellectually I agree with
Tom Hughes; it shouldn't be personalized. But I didn't have a choice.

**Donovan:** Should we in our spare time be worried about the Soviets and the Chinese making friends?

**Kissinger:** The only evidence we have that they are making friends is the Chinese statement that both sides should reduce their forces, and have a non-aggression pact, if they withdraw from the disputed territory -- all of which is on the Soviet side. All these elements were made before. Is it a Chinese move before Vladivostok to tell us not to get too eager? Is it Chou buying off the left so he does have the American option? Is it the Chinese responding to Kosygin's or Brezhnev's initiative, which invited them to state their terms, and in which the Soviets stated an unreasonable position? I think there are objective limits beyond which they can't go to give up the American option. It would be extremely risky. But to the extent that we give the impression of weakness, we lead them to want reinsurance.

**Schecter:** How far can we go toward China? On Taiwan? On claims?

**Kissinger:** Our bilateral relations are all right. The claims are related to Taiwan. There is no sentimentality on their side; it is all on our side. There are Americans who think both were unfulfilled being apart for so long. That is nonsense. The Chinese lived happily for 2,000 years without us, and will. [Laughter] They are interested only in what support we can give them.

In their dealings with me, Taiwan is a subsidiary issue. It is up to us
how far we want to go.

Our relations with China have been steady and coldblooded over the last
15 months.

**Question:** What about our relations with the European Community, Mr. Secretary?

**Kissinger:** The tragedy is that we are now in such a state of rivalry.
We are in no public dispute, and we are not pressing them on anything,
and we got in the Declaration on paper what we wanted. The tragedy is,

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except for Germany, there is no government that takes the long view. The Economic Community is stagnant as an institution. In foreign policy they are running around picking up advantages where they can get it, running no risks, and asking our military protection. There is no great hostility.

They claim we don't understand them. If you look at the record, you would see we never make a move with the Soviets without consulting them, never make a move on SALT without consulting them.

**Question:** You don't put Gissard in this group?

**Kissinger:** I don't think Gissard thinks about foreign policy when he shaves in the morning. He is an economist basically. [Laughter.]

**Schecter:** There is something wrong with him!

**Kissinger:** I think the Quai d'Orsay is gradually pulling him back into Jobert's foreign policy. We went out of the way to bring them back in. We called the Camp David meeting to bring them in, so we wouldn't have to go through the Washington Energy Conference. We consulted every step of the way; they never objected to anything. Then suddenly they spring this consumer-producers conference.

What position are the Saudis going to take? They came to us to ask what they should do. They don't know what to do outside of OPEC.

Then Sauvagnargues gives this speech in the Assembly with this tired old bore of Soviet-American condominium. Maybe the French bureaucracy and the realities of the French political situation, under three Presidents and four Foreign Ministers, are beyond the influence of any American policy.

**Leob:** What would happen if there is no progress in preventing the oil situation over the long term?

**Kissinger:** We have to create this solidarity, and if not, we will just have to wait until the US, by restraints and alternative sources, can bring this about.

**Leob:** What about Faisal, who is not a healthy man?

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**Kissinger:** The oil crisis basically dooms the Saudi monarchy. There is no way you can modernize Saudi Arabia without removing the King. It is not like Iran, where the leader is a modernizer. It is a feudal kingdom, run like a feudal kingdom. Every Bedouin who comes into town is a potential revolutionary, or undermines the basis of authority. The question is when some commander decides to move.

**Question:** Is this an alarming prospect?

**Kissinger:** In terms of the tough decisions we will have to make, the question is whether we can tolerate a Qaddafi in Saudi Arabia.

**Question:** You say there can be no real settlement without a settlement of the Palestinian question.

**Kissinger:** Correct.

**Question:** You say you pin your hopes on the Israeli-Egyptian side and the Syrian-Israeli side, and there can be nothing with Hussein. At what point do the Palestinians fit in?

**Kissinger:** At the point you described -- when there is another territorial move. If the PLO is still a viable force twelve months from now, it has to be addressed.

**John Shaw:** Can you fill us in on the progress, or nonprogress, on SALT II?

**Kissinger:** Why nonprogress?

**Shaw:** You have been there three times recently in various capacities...

**Kissinger:** With all due respect, I tried to suggest after my last trip that there was significant progress. There are technical complexities and discrepancies, but I felt that conceptually there was substantial progress. I can visualize what an agreement will look like, which I could never do before. In March, the Soviets made a proposal which could have been done if the arithmetic could have been worked out, but there was an enormous breakout potential at the end, when both sides were gearing up new programs for immediately afterwards. I am glad that it didn't work, because it would have been a mess in 1978.

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**John Shaw:** Something can still be reached by the end of next year?

**Kissinger:** Yes.

**Question:** If consumer cooperation is the sine qua non of a dialogue with the producers, and cooperation from the Europeans is impossible, how can we do it?

**Kissinger:** If the Europeans won't do it, we could do it alone. It would be damaging to the unity of the West, so we don't want to. Since we can do half of the energy savings and since we will do nine-tenths of the new sources, and since we can handle Venezuela, Mexico, through other means -- political pressures -- if we have to...

**Question:** It would be a sad outcome.

**Kissinger:** It would be a sad outcome because it would relegate the Europeans to a second-rate status.

**Question:** Are you getting adequate support from Treasury? [Laughter]

**Kissinger:** There are people in Government who think more adequate solutions can be done in the short term through confrontations. But this will be sorted out.

**Schecter:** When you set up the trips to Japan and Vladivostok, you assumed there would be a Vice President?

**Kissinger:** Yes.

**Schecter:** Do you think the President should leave the country without a Vice President?

**Kissinger:** I think he has to go ahead now that it is set up. Of course, it was set up when the President thought Rockefeller would be confirmed before the election.

**Schecter:** What do you think about Rockefeller?

**Kissinger:** I think it is a national disgrace. We knocked off a President, then a Vice President, and now a Vice President-designate. The man has 30 years of public service, whose whole self-image was in justifying

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his money through public service. With Agnew, you could ask how the man got to be Vice President. With Nixon, there were many views. But Rockefeller... I am a friend of his, so I may get carried away. But I think it is a national disgrace. There should be no question of his confirmation.

**Question:** You were pessimistic about the future of the US. In what way do you see the weakness of the US, and how is it seen by foreign countries?

**Kissinger:** I am not pessimistic about the US. Any country that could go through the crisis we went through and advance in foreign policy while doing it is basically healthy. But when you see what responsibility has devolved on the US, which is in a way greater than after the war -- because then we were really following through on the New Deal which we knew how to do, closing the gap between expectations and reality. Now we have to conduct a balance of power while trying to build interdependence. Bhutto had a good image: He said never has a country been asked to build a new building while tearing down the old beams and not letting the structure collapse. It is a good image.

The gentleman here [Shaw] asked about the Soviet leaders. They are all mediocre. If you go around the world, who understands?

**Donovan:** Present company excepted, who does think about foreign policy while shaving? [Laughter]

**Kissinger:** In the world?

**Donovan:** In this city.

**Kissinger:** I think Nelson Rockefeller does. I think the President does -- but it is new to him, which is no secret. Many of my associates in the State Department do. Schlesinger, from his vantage point, I think is a conceptual thinker.

Around the country, it is hard to tell -- what Tom Hughes thinks -- whether it is my excluding them or their excluding themselves. I have made extravagant efforts to get the Establishment down here. With respect to the academics, it is entirely their fault because they are so enamored of the Kennedy period that they want to go in the boiler room and run everything. They want to devise tactics. SALT I was carried by intellectual work done that was in the academies in the 1950's and 1960's. In SALT II, there was nothing from the academies, and all the intellectual work was done in Government.

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Viet-Nam left such a fissure. We have had no normal presidency since
1960, in the sense of people who leave and come back in public service.

<u>Donovan</u>: Two years are not enough.

<u>Kissinger</u>: If Ford is reelected, we may get some of this.

<u>Donovan</u>: Elected.

<u>Kissinger</u>: Elected. If not, it won't be until the late 1980's. The people who worked with Kennedy and Johnson are shell-shocked.

<u>John Shaw</u>: Is there room for the input of a man like Senator Jackson?
Of is he obstructive?

<u>Kissinger</u>: I gave him credit in [my press conference in June in] Brussels.
Look: Emigration was 400 in 1969, then it went up to 35,000 in 1972, before Jackson was heard of. Then in 1972 he got hold of the exit visa issue.
Then emigration dropped in 1973. This is OFF THE RECORD: the essential concessions were agreed to a year ago; Jackson wanted more, and then he yielded. What determines emigration? Not a letter that I write to Jackson. But whether they want US-Soviet relations to continue. I grant that without Jackson, there wouldn't have been so much attention to emigration -- but without detente he wouldn't have had anything to operate on. The way he made it public will endanger emigration considerably.

But there is room for his pressures. It is useful to have a right wing in
dealing with the Soviet Union.

<u>Schecter</u>: You are suggesting it is possible to have private understandings and compliance.

<u>Kissinger</u>: No, I am saying emigration is a matter of the domestic jurisdiction of the Soviet Union and therefore can't be made a matter of an agreement. Making it public wasn't a problem, but doing the letters from the White House was something they told us they couldn't agree to.

<u>Schecter</u>: Everyone knew that was one of the issues.

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**Kissinger:** Except us. Let me separate two things: The role that Jackson plays is helpful, leaving aside the way the letters were released and the fact that he was claiming victory while the concessions were in place for a year. What was new was President Ford's willingness to talk to Jackson; this was his contribution. But it is helpful to have Jackson there. We will see whether the number goes up from 35,000. We will do the best to bring it about. If that happens, it will be partly to his credit. But without detente, it couldn't happen.

**Question:** What does the US get out of energy sharing, if countries like Norway don't participate.

**Kissinger:** Norway will associate itself in some way. The sharing is sharing of imports. What we get is strengthening the ability of the allies to resist rather than become pressure points against us.

**Question:** It is not sharing domestic production?

**Kissinger:** No.

**Question:** May I ask a question about Greece, Turkey and Cyprus?
[Laughter] Turkey has no government; Greece is having elections.
Do you see any possible solution and any US role in helping the solution?

**Kissinger:** If it hadn't been for the Congressional action, we would have some Turkish moves in October. By the time we got the Turkish moves organized, they had a crisis which may or may not have affected Ecevit's prestige. It is a pity we couldn't get the moves last week, because it would have strengthened Karamanlis. It is maddening, because if people had just kept their hands off it, it would have come off. We may still get it back on track, though it is too late to help Karamanlis. But he will probably win anyway. The main outlines of what has to be done are pretty well understood by everyone, including Makarios. So it is not like the Middle East. Karamanlis wanted unilateral Turkish concessions to help him but not to make concessions himself.

**Donovan:** Well, we'll let you go now, and thank you.

[The Secretary departed around 11:30 p.m.]

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