J. See Appendix V for organization of the Control Authority.

authority in Germany and acts in item 1 of a central German
The Control Council is the repository of supreme
organs what be anathema.

Decisions of the Control Council as of each the Thursday-bartite
directorsates on which the four powers are equally represented.
and a Control Staff contending of 15 divisions or
a Coordinating Committee composed of the four genial com-
Council contending of the four Allied Commanders-in-Chief,
Allied Control Authority. It is composed of a Control
of Allied policy in Germany has been, since July 1943, the
The agency reasonable for operational integration

battite policy communication has therapy become inoperative.
Foreign Ministers has occurred since December 1947. Onagr-
ences to produce a deadlock. No meeting of the Council of
German question was taken up, if required only two confer-
starting with the Moscow conference of March 1947, the
toing on its stands for the German problem. When finally,
of Foreign Ministers. For nearly two years no place was
Its task was assumed in July 1948 by the Council
Commission was largely successful.

to future variations in interpretation, the work of this
problems of a very general nature, which have wide scope
of immediate engendered by the war, confining itself to
II.

12.

Government. Liaison with other United Nations Governments is maintained through military missions to the Council. The Council meets at irregular intervals and considers an agenda suggested by the staff or the Coordinating Committee.

Although a considerable number of laws, orders and directives have been issued, the divergent views of the occupation powers, especially in the operational field of interpretation and implementation of agreed policies, have thwarted effective joint policy. In a practical sense, Germany has come to be governed in separate compartments by the respective zonal Commanders, merely reflecting the lack of agreement on the intergovernmental level. Even agreed four-power policies often merely prescribe general principles which are variously interpreted and applied in the respective zones.

The punitive aspects of Allied economic policy are coordinated by the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency. Its area of jurisdiction is confined to the Western zones of occupation since all reparation, from the Soviet zone, and 25% of the reparations from Western Germany have been allocated to the U.S.S.R. and Poland. The 18 nations represented on the agency divide the remaining 75% of Western German reparations. In view of conflicting economic policies in the

In view of conflicting economic policies in the
the agency divide the remaining 48% of Western German repa-
to the U.3.A. and Lojang. The 18 nations represented on
the reparations from Western Germany have been allocated
from since all reparation, from the Soviet zone, and 58% of
of jurisdiction is confined to the Western zones of occu-
coordinated by the Inter-Afflied Reparations Agency. Its area
The primitive subjects of Allied economic policy are
respective zones.

ciples which are nationally interpreted and applied in the
lown-power policies often merely prescribe general prin-
agreement on the intergovernmental level. Even agreed
decisive zones of Commanders, merely reflecting the lack of
come to be governed in separate compartments by the res-
effective joint policy. In a practical sense, Germany has
preparation and implementation of agreed policies, have thinned
bation powers, especially in the operational field of inter-
directives have been formed the divergent views of the occu-
Although a considerable number of laws, orders and
agreed by the staff on the Coordinating Committee.

Council meets at irregular intervals and considers an agenda
is maintained through military missions to the Council. The
Government. Liaison with other United Nations Governments

13.

13.

various occupation zones this agency has not been able to
operate effectively. The U.S. has, since the change of
emphasis of her policy, opposed further dismantling and
has been at odds not only with the Eastern European nations
of the agency but also with the United Kingdom. In line
with their efforts to establish a stable and sound Western
German state, the U.S., Great Britain and France agreed in
February 1949 to cease further dismantling in their zones
of occupation. The Inter-Allied Reparations Agency has
therefore ceased to function.

The intergovernmental coordinating devices, both on
the governmental and operational level have tended to re-
flect the basic disagreements between the U.S.S.R. and the
Western powers. The necessity of unanimity has proved no
more workable in the case of control of Germany than in the
Security Council of the U.N. The mere existence of coordin-
ating devices has not been a substitute for the lack of
agreement on central objectives. As Secretary of State,
Byrnes pointed out in his Stuttgart speech, "So far as most
vital questions are concerned, the Control Council is neither
governing Germany nor allowing Germany to govern itself."

The Allied Control Council has not met since April
1948. The Kommandatura, the Allied agency for four-power

["1948. The Kommandantur, the Allied agency for foreign-power governing Germany nor allowing Germany to govern itself. The Allied Control Council has not met since April 1945. Control Council is neither a formal institution nor concerned with the control of Germany. The control council is neither a formal institution nor concerned with the control of Germany.

14.

control of the City of Berlin, has not met since May 1948.
Quadri-partite policy formulation has thus ceased on all
levels. The only effective remedy seems to be - assuming
that quadri-partite control is desired at any future time -
to create central German governmental organs charged with
implementing general directives. This would eliminate con-
flicting interpretations of general policy principles, but
would introduce a new factor which might further distill
basic U.S. objectives.

b. U. S. Instruments of Policy.

The effective control of Germany has been exercised
by the zonal commanders. They retained exclusive jurisdic-
tion in all matters not covered by quadri-partite agreement
and were the effective interpreters of such agreements.

The formulation of U.S. policy has presented pecu-
liar difficulties. Started as only a temporary military
government, with control to be turned over to the State De-
partment at the earliest possible moment, it has in fact re-
sulted in a situation where policy formulation as well as
execution have become the almost exclusive responsibility
of the War Department. Since the War Department was organ-
izationally not equipped for long-range policy planning, the
Military Governor of the U.S. zone has had a larger share in
policy determination than the Military Commander of any other

Policy determination than the Military Commander of any other Military Governor of the U.S. zone had a larger share in functionally not equipped for long-range policy planning the of the War Department. Since the War Department was organ-
ization have become the almost executive responsibility
asulted in a situation where policy communication as well as
partment at the earliest possible moment, it has in fact re-
government, with control to be turned over to the State De-
fear difficulties. Started as only a temporary military

The formulation of U.S. policy has presented be-
and were the effective interpreters of such agreements.
tion in all matters not covered by quadri-partite agreement
by the zone commanders. They retained exuvialary triadic-
The effective control of Germany has been exercised
p. U. S. Instruments of Policy.

basic U. S. objectives.

would introduce a new factor which might further distill
flicting interpretations of general policy principles, put
implementing general directives. This would eliminate com-
to create central German governmental organs charged with
that quadri-partite control is desired at any future time -
jevels. The only effective remedy seems to be - assuming
quadri-partite policy formulation has thus ceased on all
control of the City of Berlin. has not met since May 1948.

14.

15.

occupation power.

By interdepartmental agreement, the State-Army-Navy-Air-Force Coordinating Committee (SANAC) was charged with the coordination of occupation policy. Specifically its task was to the framing of all policy "which required concerted study, consideration or coordination by the State, War, Navy and Air Departments." This somewhat ambiguous directive further included the proviso that all directives of SANAC (or SWNCC as it was then called) were to be transmitted to the Military Governor through War Department channels. The War Department therefore, maintained exclusive control over the execution of policy directives and its weight in policy formulation became preponderant.

The Department of State has never been able to exert a decisive influence on occupation policy. Despite the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of State for Occupation Affairs, charged with coordinating and formulating State Department policy and the assignment of a Political Advisor from the Foreign Service (Murphy) to the Military Governor, State Department influence on policy was effective only in cases where the Department of State and the Department of the Army were in agreement. Indeed the War Department for a long period jealously guarded its

1. This is based on interviews with Prof. C. J. Friedrich and Dr. F. G. A. Kraemer, Political Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of the Army.

I. This is based on interviews with Prof. C. J. Friedrich and Dr. E. G. A. Kraemer, Political Advisor to the

the War Department for a long period seasonally awarded its
and the Department of the Army were in agreement. Indeed
was effective only in cases where the Department of State
Military Governor, State Department influence on policy
tical Advisor from the Foreign Service (Muntry) to the
ing State Department policy and the assignment of a Poli-
Occupation Affairs, charged with coordinating and formular-
ting the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of State for
exert a decisive influence on occupation policy. Despite
The Department of State has never been able to
and its weight in policy formulation became preponderant.
clusive control over the execution of policy directives
channels. The War Department therefore, maintained ex-
mitted to the Military Governor through War Department
of SMAC (on SMCC as it was then called) were to be trans-
directive further included the proviso that all directives
War, Navy and Air Departments." This somewhat ambiguous
certed study, consideration or coordination by the State,
task was to the framing of all policy "which required con-
the coordination of occupation policy. Specifically its
Air-Force Coordinating Committee (SAMAC) was charged with
By interdepartmental agreement, the State-Army-Nav-
occupation power.

18

16.

preponderant position even to the extent of looking with
disfavor on the establishment of U. S. consulates in prin-
cipal German cities.

The War Department which inherited the German problem
largely by default was ill-equipped for the task of long-
range policy formulation. In line with its policy of giving
the Theatre Commander maximum responsibility, it retained
little more than nominal control over most aspects of
initial occupation policy. This has resulted in a situa-
tion where policy too frequently lagged behind operations.

The assumption of responsibility for policy formu-
lation by the Theatre Commander has had several unfortunate
consequences. To begin with, the overwhelming necessities
of a nation in defeat, the desire to minimize the load of
a direct subsidy represented by the Gariola funds, has re-
sulted in a loss of perspective on the part of U. S. offi-
cials in Germany, whose pre-occupation with the immediate
problems tends to make them lose sight of the larger frame-
work of total U. S. policy. U. S. relations with France
in particular have suffered as the result of certain rash
acts on the part of the Military Command in Germany parti-
cularly in respect to reparations.

The attitude of the U. S. representative for Bizone
at the Paris meeting for the allocation among European

1. Interview with Prof. C. J. Friedrich.

J. Interview with Prof. C. J. Friedrich.

The attitude of the U. 3. representative for France
similarly in respect to reparations.

sets on the part of the Military Command in Germany part-
icular have allured as the result of certain rash
work of total U. 3. policy. U. 3. relations with France
problems tend to make them lose sight of the larger frame-
works in Germany, whose pre-occupation with the immediate
arising in a loss of perspective on the part of U. 3. all-
some directly unpaid represented by the Carlsberg funds has be-
come a nation in defeat, the desire to minimize the loss of
consequences. To begin with the overwhelming necessaries
of a nation in defeat, the Theatre Commander has several unforseen
sequences by the Theatre Commander has had several unforseen
The assumption of responsibility for policy commu-
nication where policy too frequently lagged behind operations.
initial occupation policy. This has resulted in a situation
where more than nominal control over most aspects of
the Theatre Commander maximum responsibility, it retained
range policy formulation. In line with its policy of giving
largely by default was fully-equipped for the task of long-
time. The War Department which inherited the German problem

cibal German cities.

I
 диалог на ​​те етапистането от У. 3. консулата в бри-
бондентарен боятю ве от тя оте extent of looking with

16

17.

nations of ECA funds is another case-in-point. On that
occasion, the U. S. representative threatened the indefin-
ite suspension of ECA aid - by refusing assent in an organ
requiring unanimity - unless Bizone were granted a sum which
incidentally exceeded that of France. This abrupt behavior
by a U. S. representative on a Commission designed to aid
Europeans in solving their own problems, and all the more
difficult to explain since the Gariola funds are almost
double even the maximum sum of ECA aid, finally could only
be resolved by intergovernmental agreement.

Relations of the European Command with other govern-
mental agencies, particularly ECA have hardly been more fortun-
ate. The establishment of an ECA representative in Bizone
was strenuously objected to. Considerable friction has
developed over the refusal of Military Government to supply
data to ECA to justify its requests, culminating in the recent
decision to use counterpart funds even without ECA approval.

Since 1947 the War Department has developed machin-
ery to formulate long-range policy and to avoid some of the
difficulties outlined above. An Under Secretary of the Army
was created, with the task of formulating policy while an
Assistant Secretary of the Army was charged with its imple-
mentation. The separation of operations and policy did not
work too well at this level and since the resignation of
the Undersecretary (Gen. Draper), his position has remained

the Undersecretary (Gen. Draper). His position has remained
work too well at this level and since the resignation of
mentation. The adaptation of operations and policy did not
Variaient Secretary of the Army was charged with its imple-
ment, with the task of formulating policy while an
difficulties outlined above. An Under Secretary of the Army
er to formulate long-range policy and to avoid some of the
Since 1947 the War Department has developed machin-
decision to use countermand funds even without ECA approval.
data to ECA to justify its requests, culminating in the recent
developed over the refusal of Military Government to supply
was anomalously objected to. Considerable friction has
etc. The establishment of an ECA representative in Bizone
mental agencies, particularly ECA have hardly been more fortun-
ous of the European Command with other govern-
mental agencies.

Relations of the European Command with other govern-
mental agencies was largely settled in 1947. The War Department has developed machin-
decision to use countermand funds even without ECA approval.
data to ECA to justify its requests, culminating in the recent
developed over the refusal of Military Government to supply
was anomalously objected to. Considerable friction has
etc. The establishment of an ECA representative in Bizone
mental agencies, particularly ECA have hardly been more fortun-
ous of the European Command with other govern-
mental agencies.

be resolved by intergovernmental agreements.
double even the maximum ann of ECA aid. Finally could only
difficult to explain since the Garofola funds are almost
Europeans in solving their own problems, and all the more
difficult to explain since the Garofola funds are almost
double even the maximum ann of ECA aid. Finally could only
difficult to explain since the Garofola funds are almost
Europeans in solving their own problems, and all the more
difficult to explain since the Garofola funds are almost
double even the maximum ann of ECA aid. Finally could only
incidentally exceeded that of France. This abrupt behavior
beginning unanimity - unless Bizone were granted a ann which
itse anabasement of ECA aid - by refusing assent in an organ
occasion, the U. S. representative threatened the indelin-
nations of ECA funds is another case-in-point. On that

IV.

18.

unfilled with total responsibility assumed by the Assist-
ant Secretary of the Army for Occupation. He is assisted
by a staff-branch-called ERP Group with the dual function
of maintaining liaison with ECA and advising on the ad-
ministration of the Gariola funds.

This arrangement has not totally eliminated a
1
certain overlapping of functions. G-5 of the General
Staff of the U. S. Army, working under the direct control
of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army is responsible for the
formulation of policy on certain specific topics, such as
Demilitarization, Reparations, Displaced Persons and Secur-
ity. The Military Commander in Germany is thus faced with
the necessity of reporting to two different agencies: in
his capacity as Theater Commander he is under the general
control of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; as Military
Governor his channel of command is the Assistant Secretary
of the Army. Though the Secretary of the Army can func-
tion as the ultimate coordinating agency, the problems
raised by this division of jurisdiction are considerable.

The instruments of policy implementation within the
U. S. zone did not attain definite shape until 1946. In line
with the policy of maximum responsibility to subordinate
commanders, the U. S. zone was divided into two military

1. See Appendix B.

J. See Aboufik B.

commanders, the U. S. zone was divided into two military
with the policy of maximum reasonability to correspond
U. S. zone did not attain definite shape until 1946. In line
The instruments of policy implementation within the

raised by this division of jurisdiction are considerable.
tion as the ultimate coordinating agency, the problems
of the Army. Though the Secretary of the Army can fine-
Governor his channel of command is the Assistant Secretary
control of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army: as Military
his capacity as Theater Commander he is under the general
the necessity of reporting to two different agencies: in
ity. The Military Commander in Germany is thus faced with
Demilitarization, Reparations, Displaced Persons and Comm-
communication of policy on certain specific topics, such as
of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army is reasonable for the
Staff of the U. S. Army, working under the direct control
certain overlapping of functions. C-2 of the General
I

ministration of the Generals' funds.
of maintaining liaison with ECA and advising on the ad-
just a staff-prandecertified EIB Group with the chief function
and Secretary of the Army for Occupation. He is associated
unfilled with total reasonability assumed by the Asatist-

18.

19.

districts (not counting Berlin or the Bremen enclave) under the command of the appropriate army commander. This resulted in almost completely unrelated policies in such vital areas as denazification. This was compounded by the fact that the specialized Military Government personnel, trained for the specific task of occupation was merely part of one of the staff-sections of the Army or Theater Commander.

It was not until March 1946 that this situation was remedied. The policy aspects of occupation were separated from the security problems and placed under a new office: OMGUS. The command of troops were placed under a separate command. This separation roughly corresponded to the division of responsibility within the Department of the Army.

OMGUS effected its control over German policy by a Regional Governmental Coordinating office, as well as control offices in the three states of the U. S. occupation zone. Liaison offices were maintained on all levels of the German civil administration. Nevertheless it is probably safe to state that due to inadequacy and shortage of personnel this supervision has been largely minimal.

U.S. policy in Germany then has been effected

1. See Appendix C.

I. See Abendz C.

U.2. policy in Germany then has been effected

a sonnel this augmentation has been largely minimal.
safe to state that due to inadequacy and shortage of per-
Germán civil administration. Nevertheless it is properly
zone. Liaison offices were maintained on all levels of the
control offices in the three states of the U. S. occupation
a Regional Governmental Coordinating office, as well as
OMGVA effected its control over German policy by

Army.

division of responsibility within the Department of the
command. This separation roughly corresponded to the
OMGVA. The command of troops were placed under a separate
from the security problem and placed under a new office;
remedied. The policy aspects of occupation were separated
I
It was not until March 1948 that this situation was

Commander.

part of one of the staff-sections of the Army or Theater
trained for the specific task of occupation was merely
fact that the specialised Military Government personnel,
vital areas as densification. This was corresponded by the
beaufected in almost completely unrelated policies in each
under the command of the appropriate army commander. This
districts (not counting Berlin or the German enclaves)

19

20.

primarily through the Department of the Army. With its
primary mission military victory the army was not too
well prepared for the difficult task of administering a
defeated enemy country in the absence of any indigent
apparatus on which to rely. The latitude allowed the
Theater Commander, while probably effective in military
operations, has tended to make U. S. policy in Germany
sometimes seem unrelated to the larger concepts of U. S.
foreign relations. The establishment of a civilian High
Commissioner may well give other departments the deciding
influence in policy formulation and thus restore policy
making to the Department chiefly concerned; the Department
of State.

of state.

making to the Department chiefly concerned: the Department
influence in policy communication and thus restore policy
Commissioner may well give other departments the deciding
foreign relations. The establishment of a civilian High
sometimes seem unrelated to the further concepts of U. S.
operations, has tended to make U. S. policy in Germany
Theater Commander, while properly effective in military
operations, on which to rely. The latitude allowed the
delegated enemy country in the absence of any indigent
well prepared for the difficult task of administering a
primary mission military victory the army was not too
primarily through the Department of the Army. With its

80.

21.

## Conclusions:

The occupation of Germany is a striking demonstration of the inseparability of policy and operations. It shows that any interdepartmental coordinating device will tend to be dominated by the department controlling the operational personnel. In the light of the unreadiness of the Department of State to assume responsibility for occupation administration, its machinery for occupation policy planning became largely without influence.

Another factor tended to weaken the influence of coordinating devices. Due to the fact that a long-range policy was lacking, SANAC was forced frequently to act as a coordinating agency for mere operational problems, which in turn became very difficult in the absence of a clear standard of reference.

It would appear that stricter control of the Theater Commander would have offered greater possibilities of firm policy coordination and might have eliminated many points of friction with friendly Western European nations. Perhaps the Administration of Overseas Affairs, recommended by the Hoover Commission, would offer a device to remedy some of the difficulties encountered in Germany. To be fully effective, it would, however, have to obtain some measure of control over operational personnel.

measure of control over operational personnel.
fully effective. It would, however, have to obtain some
some of the difficulties encountered in Germany. To be
by the Hoover Commission, would offer a device to remedy
the Administration of Overseas Alliances, recommended
by the United Nations. Per-
hotikoff coordination and might have eliminated many points
Commander would have offered greater hostilities of this
It would appear that a strict control of the Theater
at command of reference.

in turn become very difficult in the absence of a clear
a coordinating agency for mere operational problems, which
hotikoff was looking. ZAMAC was forced traditionally to act as
coordinating device. Due to the fact that a long-range
Another factor tended to weaken the influence of
hotikoff planning because largely without influence.
occuperation administration its machinery for occupation
of the Department of State to assume responsibility for
operations personnel. In the light of the unneCESS
 tend to be dominated by the department controlling the
 shows that any interdepartmental coordinating device will
 tion of the inappropriability of hotikoff and operations. It
The occupation of Germany is a striking demonstration.

Conclusions:

S1.

22.

The efficiency of International Commissions has been proved in Germany, as well as in other international organs, to be dependent on a basis of fundamental agreement among the participating nations. The mere existence of machinery is no guarantee of cooperation. It is the result rather than the cause of amity among nations.

The occupation of Germany is being shifted to civilian agencies, particularly the Department of State as the formation of a Western German State continues apace. It is too early to tell whether this will result in more clearly formulated policies and better integration.

Perhaps some of the difficulties discussed above were inherent in the nature of the problem and insoluble. Yet with the emergence of the U. S., the major power in the world it can be expected that responsibility for an increasing number of foreign operations will have to be assumed. A study of the occupation of Germany in a spirit of constructive criticism, might yield useful clues for a more thorough and more long-range formulation of U. S. policy, as well as its better coordination.

policy, as well as its better coordination
more thorough and more long-range formulation of U. 3.
of constructive criticism, might yield useful clues for a
assumed. A study of the occupation of Germany in a spirit
increasing number of foreign operations will have to be
the world it can be expected that reasonableness for an
Yet with the emergence of the U. 3., the major power in
were inherent in the nature of the problem and inadmissible.
Perhaps some of the difficulties discussed above
clearly commuted policies and better integration.

It is too early to tell whether this will result in more
as the formation of a Western German State continues space.
civilian agencies, particularly the Department of State
The occupation of Germany is definitely affected to
result rather than the cause of amity among nations.
of machinery is no guarantee of cooperation. It is the
ment among the participating nations. The mere existence
origins, to be dependent on a basis of fundamental agree-
been proved in Germany, as well as in other international
The efficiency of International Commissions has

23

REFERENCES

Occupation of Germany - Policy and Progress
State Department Publication 2783

European Recovery and American Aid - A Report by the
President's Committee on Foreign
Aid - November 1947

First Report to Congress of the
Economic Cooperation Administration October 4, 1948

Interview with Dr. F. G. A. Kraemer

Political and Economic Advisor to the Assistant Secretary
of the Army

Interview with Prof. G. J. Friedrich

[Y]

1.

I. Introduction

The history of the U. S. occupation of Germany from
an administrative point-of-view, is a study of the difficulty
of achieving foreign policy coordination in the absence of
clearly defined objectives, with the necessity of action by
the man on the spot imperative in a complete moral, econo-
mic and political void. Whether clearly defined objectives
were attainable in an atmosphere of urgency of war is de-
batable. Whether it is ever possible to shape policy unin-
fluenced by the necessary operational decisions of the day
is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet certain lessons
from the history of the U. S. occupation of Germany seem
inescapable.

It seems strange that the country which had been the
moving force in formulating an 'unconditional surrender'
policy for Germany should have been without clearly defined
concepts of basic policies, in view of the fact that uncon-
ditional surrender involved the total responsibility for all
phases of administration. 'Unconditional surrender' proved
perhaps an effective slogan but its efficacy as a policy
ended with the armistice. If the original conception had
been one of a 'caretaker' Military Government, with major
responsibility for policy formulation in the State Department
and an assumption by the State Department of even the

and an assumption by the State Department of even the
reasonability for policy formulation in the State Department
been one of a 'caretaker, Military Government,' with major
ended with the annihilation. If the original conception had
belonged an effective aforesaid put its efforts as a policy
phases of administration. :Unconditional surrender, proved
conditional surrender involved the total reasonability for all
concepts of past policies, in view of the fact that non-
policy for Germany should have been without clearly defined
moving force in commencing an 'unconditional surrender.'

It seems a strange that the country which had been the
inequitable.

From the history of the U. S. occupation of Germany seem
is predicated the scope of this paper. Yet certain lessons
learned by the necessary operational decisions of the day
were attainable in an atmosphere of urgency of war is de-
mi and political void. Whether clearly defined objectives
the man on the spot imperative in a complete moral, economic
and political point-of-view, is a study of the difficulty
an administrative point-of-view, is a study of the difficulty
The History of the U. S. occupation of Germany from

I. Introduction

I.

[A]

2.

operational aspects of the occupation, the realities of the
situation soon forced a revision. To begin with, decisions
made by Military Government in the interim period, were in
important areas bound to set limits to the possibilities of
policy formulation by other departments. It became soon
apparent, that the State Department was in no position from
an administrative and personnel point-of-view to assume
operational control of the occupation. With the War Depart-
ment, not only the creator of our initial policy - but also
charged with its execution, its share in future policy
decisions was perforce considerable.

To be sure, coordinating devices to make the views
of other departments felt existed. The State-Army-Navy-
Coordinating Committee (SANAC) was charged, by interdepart-
mental agreement, with coordinating occupation policy. In
matters of high policy the National Security Council un-
doubtedly exercised - after 1947 - some direction. The
assignment of a Political Adviser as a State Department
representative to the Military Governor of the U. S. Zone,
sought to integrate operations and policy.

The crucial point in all these coordinating devices,
however, was the practical requirement of unanimous agree-
ment. Failing that, with the necessity of operational
decisions making delay impossible, the War Department was
free to formulate its own policy. Co-ordination was

J. Interview with Prot. C. J. Friedrich.

The crucial point in all these coordinating devices, sought to integrate operations and policy.

Representative to the Military Governor of the U. S. Zone, assignment of a Political Advisor as a State Department undoubtedly exercised - after 1947 - some direction. The matters of high policy the National Security Council must also exercise - with the necessity of operational convenience, was the practical requirement of unanimous agreement. Failing that, with the necessity of operational decisions making delay impossible, the War Department was ment. 

To be ame, coordinating devices to make the views decisions was hermeneutic considerable. charged with its execution, its share in future policy ment, not only the creator of our initial policy, but also operational control of the occupation. With the War Depart- an administrative and hermeneut point-of-view to assume apparent, that the State Department was in no position from policy formulation by other departments. It became a soon important areas pound to set limits to the possibilities of made by Military Government in the interim period, were in situation soon laced a revision. To begin with, decisions operational aspects of the occupation, the realities of the

3.

effective therefore, only in integrating already harmonious
views. Nothing illustrates better the difficulty of coor-
dinating operations in the absence of a clearly defined
policy and with interdepartmental committees when the con-
trol of personnel is completely under one of the departments
to be integrated.

The study of occupation policy becomes then an analy-
sis of the administrative fitness of the War Department in
implementing its policy. The relations of the Department of
State and newer agencies, such as the ECA will be summarily
treated. But occupation policy has been effectively War
Department policy. This paper will be an examination of
the organs available for implementing that policy, some of
the difficulties encountered in selected areas, and their
implications on the larger aspect of U.S. foreign relations.

implications on the larger aspect of U.S. foreign relations.
the difficulties encountered in selected areas, and their
the organs available for implementing that policy, some of
Department policy. This paper will be an examination of
freted. But occupation policy has been effectively War
state and newer agencies, such as the ECA will be summarily
implementing its policy. The relations of the Department of
state of the administrative fitness of the War Department in
The study of occupation policy becomes them an analy-
sis of the administrative fitness of the War Department in
The study of occupation policy becomes them an analy-
trof of benacome is completely under one of the departments
policy and with interdepartmental committees when the con-
dating operations in the absence of a clearly defined
views. Nothing illustrates better the difficulty of occur-
-effective therefore, only in integrating such a harmonious
8.

[A]

4.

1

## II. Background

There are two aspects to U. S. policy in Germany. One involves U.S. as a party to international agreements and as such required international Control Machinery. Common policy with respect to Germany was the primary concern of the major nations participating in the war: the U.S., Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and after Potsdam, France. It was elaborated in a number of conferences between the heads of governments. The most significant policy decisions were set forth in the Crimea declaration of February 1945 and the Potsdam Declaration of August 1945. The Crimea declaration provided for unconditional surrender and the destruction of Nazism, its laws and institutions, complete disarmament and the eradication of military influence from public and cultural life. Reparations were to be made in kind. An economy adequate to sustain the German people was to be retained, but German power to sustain war eliminated. These somewhat contradictory pronouncements of general policy, were followed by the Potsdam Declaration. This elaborated the political and economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period and included agreements about reparations, disposition of German eastern areas, transfer of populations and punishment of war criminals. To provide coordination, an Allied Control

1. A good summary is to be found in "Occupation of Germany", State Department publication 2783, August 1948.

["State Department publication 5483, August 1948.\nJ. A Good summary is to be found in \"Combination of Germany\".", "war criminals. To provide coordination, an Allied Control\neastern area, transfer of internations and punishment of\ninjured agreements about reparation, dispositions of German\nthe treatment of Germany in the initial control period and\nejected the political and economic principles to govern\nbelliger, were followed by the Potagam Declaration. This\nacted. These somewhat contradictory pronouncements of General\nwas to be retained, put German power to an end war elim-\nking. An economy adequate to sustain the German people\nbump and cultural life. Reprisals were to be made in\narmament and the eradication of military influence from\ntion of Nazism, its laws and institutions, complete dis-\narmament provided for unconditional annihilation and the destru-\ntion provided for unconditional

5.

Council and an Inter-Allied Reparations Commission were created. Faced with the necessity of unanimous agreement, the experience with international control was not a satisfactory one. The basic agreements were interpreted by the respective occupation powers to suit their own ends and the policy of the U. S. Zone became primarily the policy of the U.S.

U. S. policy can be roughly divided into two periods. The first was characterized by the "Morgenthau" conception of the treatment to be accorded Germany and is exemplified by JCS 1067. This derived the power of the Military Governor from the Unconditional Surrender of Germany. It clothed the Military Governor with supreme legislative, executive and judiciary authority with particular emphasis on the punitive aspects of the Crimea Declaration. Within Germany it was characterized by the policy of the four D's; Denazification, de-industrialization, de-militarization and demobilization. In the economic field it was marked by the removal of plants for reparation and the setting of a level of industry at 80% of the 1936 level.

The second stage was ushered in by Byrnes' Stuttgart speech of September 6, 1946. This contained assurances of U. S. interest in seeing a democratic Germany find her place

U. 2. interest in seeing a democratic Germany find her place
beyond of September 8, 1948. This contained assurances of
The second stage was reached in by Barnes' Stuttgart
of the 1928 level.

for reparation and the setting of a level of industry at 80%
In the economic field it was marked by the removal of blunts
de-industrialization, de-militarization and demobilization.
characterized by the policy of the four Ds: Demobilization,
services of the German Declaration. Within Germany it was
Judiciary authority with particular emphasis on the punitive
Military Governor with supreme legislative, executive and
from the Unconditional Surrender of Germany. It cloaked the
by JCS 1067. This derived the power of the Military Governor
of the treatment to be accorded Germany and its exemplified
The first was characterized by the "Morgenthau" concept
U. 2. policy can be roughly divided into two periods.

U. 3.
policy of the U. 3. Zone became primarily the policy of the
respective occupation powers to suit their own ends and the
factory one. The basic agreements were interpreted by the
experience with international control was not aasis-
created. Based with the necessity of unanimous agreement,
Council and an Inter-Allied Reprations Commission were

6.

again in the family of nations and pledged U. S. support
to a democratic government in the revitalization of the
German economy. It is probably fair to say that Stuttgart
marked the end of any attempt to rule Germany by quadri-
partite agreement. The period since 1946 has been marked
by an ever increasing assumption of authority on the part
of elected German governmental organs, culminating in the
call for a constituent Western German assembly and the fram-
ing of a Constitution for a Western German State.

Economically the Western Zones of Germany have made
a startling recovery. The level of Industry agreement of
1945 has been superseded by several other plans, the real
limiting factor being no longer Allied control, except in
the case of certain select industries such as synthetic oil,
but German capacity to produce up to permitted levels.

This consolidation of Western Germany has not
occurred without serious repercussions on U. S. relations
with other nations. The U.S.S.R. has consistently opposed
efforts aimed at the economic and political integration of
the Western occupation zones. In an effort to block the
creation of a Western German state, the Soviet Command
interrupted U.S. rail communications with Berlin for almost
eleven months. The lifting of the blockade has not, how-
ever, lessened Russia's bargaining position for she can

ever, reassured Russia's pertaining position for she can
eleven months. The lifting of the blockade has not, how-
interrupted U.S. air communications with Berlin, for almost
creation of a Western German state, the Soviet Command
the Western occupation zones. In an effort to block the
efforts aimed at the economic and political integration of
with other nations. The U.S. S.R. has consistently opposed
encountered without serious rekonversions on U. S. relations
This consolidation of Western Germany has not

put German capacity to produce so to be benefited levels.
the case of certain effect industries such as automotive of,
limiting factor being no longer Allied control, except in
1942 has been emboldened by earlier other claims, the real
a starting recovery. The level of industry agreement of
Economically the Western Zones of Germany have made
ing of a Constitution for a Western German State.

call for a constitution Western German as well as the trans-
of elected German governmental organs, eliminating in the
py an ever increasing assumption of authority on the part
barite agreement. The period since 1948 has been marked
marked the end of such attempt to rule Germany by dictat-
German economy. If it is properly fair to ask that Stuttgart
to a democratic government in the revitalization of the
again in the family of nations and tied U. S. apart

8.

7.

now appear at the Council of Foreign Ministers as the champion of German unity.

U. S. relations with other European countries were also seriously affected by U. S. occupation policy. France, with a static population, overrun three times in 70 years by the German army can not remain indifferent to the resurgence of even a Western German state, which harbors greater manpower and economic potentials than France. Other European countries, even outside the Russian orbit, have objected to certain phases of U. S. policy. They question, in view of their recent experience with German military might, whether German economic recovery is the sole key to a peaceful Europe.

On the other hand the importance of Germany to Europe both economically and politically can not be overstated. The European coal and steel deficit since 1945 can almost be expressed as the decline in German coal and steel production. The export trade of such countries as Italy has been traditionally predicated on barter agreements with Germany. Until their resumption an essential element in Italian economic recovery will be lacking. The great Dutch port of Rotterdam has derived its major revenue from German trade flowing down the Rhine.

Politically Germany's position is hardly less crucial. It has been the traditional center of Marxist agitation, conceived as the key to an eventual communization of Europe.

conceived as the key to an eventual communication of Europe.
It has been the traditional center of Marxist agitation.

Politically Germany's position is hardly less clear.
trade flowing down the Rhine.

Port of Rotterdam has derived its major revenue from German
Italian economic recovery will be lacking. The great Dutch
Germany. Until their resumption an essential element in
has been traditionally predicated on partner agreements with
production. The export trade of such countries as Italy
almost be expressed as the decline in German coal and steel
stated. The European coal and steel deficit since 1948 can
Europe both economically and politically can not be over-

German economic recovery is the sole key to a successful Europe.
their recent experience with German military might, whether
certain phases of U. S. policy. They question, in view of
countries, even outside the Russian orbit, have elected to
power and economic potentials than France. Other European
of even a Western German state, which purports greater men-
the German army can not remain indifferent to the resonance
with a static population, overrun three times in 40 years by
also serfically affected by U. S. occupation policy. France.

U. S. relations with other European countries were
broad of German policy.

now absent at the Council of Foreign Ministers as the cham-

A.

[x]

8.

The U. S. has sought to combat this trend by restoring as large a measure of self-government as conditions permitted, thus giving the Germans a stake in their own continued in-dependence.

The U. S. is thus faced in Germany with the problem of deciding between several possible policies, though the introduction of a new factor in the practically independent Western German state serves to further limit U. S. freedom of action. The U. S. can press the creation of a Western German State integrated in a larger Western European system, the recipient of benefits of the Marshall plan, though the direct subsidy represented by the Gariola funds may be progressively lessened. It is hoped that such a policy may eventually create a Western Germany of such strength that the Eastern occupation zones could not resist its attraction.

The U. S. could alternatively attempt a policy designed to achieve a basis of cooperation with the U.S.S.R., resulting perhaps in the development of a joint policy, though previous experience with quadri-partite control augurs not too well for such efforts. This might go hand in hand with a European policy with France as a cornerstone in contrast with present conceptions of Germany as the most effective barrier to further Russian expansion.

effective partner to further Russian expansion.

in contrast with present concepts of Germany as the most
in hand with a European policy with France as a cornerstone
ensure not too well for such efforts. This might go hand
though breviation experience with拼接-barrage control
resulting benefits in the development of a joint policy,
signed to achieve a basis of cooperation with the U.S.S.R.¹

The U. S. could alternatively attempt a policy de-
the Western occupation some could not relief its attraction.
eventually create a Western Germany of such strength that
greatly threatened. It is hoped that such a policy may
directlyaida rerepresented by the Garde Units may be mo-
the recipient of penalties of the Marshall plan, though the
German State integrated in a larger Western European system,
of action. The U. S. can press the creation of a Western
Western German state serves to further limit U. S. freedom
introduction of a new factor in the practically independent
of deciding between several possible policies, though the
The U. S. is thus faced in Germany with the problem

geobegence.

thus giving the Germans a stake in their own continued in-
farce a measure of self-government as conditions permitted.
The U. S. has sought to combat this trend by restoring as

8.

[A]

9.

In any case it will be necessary to conceive of
German policy apart from mere German necessities and fit it
into a frame-work of larger foreign policy concepts. The
next chapter will deal with instruments presently available,
as well as the adequacy of past occupation policy instru-
ments.

ments.

into a framework of larger foreign policy concepts. The

German policy apart from mere German necessities and lift it

9.

[H]

10.

## III. Instrument of Foreign Policy in Germany.

The instruments of foreign policy in Germany correspond to the two aspects of occupation discussed in the previous section. There are organs for the implementation of Allied decisions and purely U. S. instruments. Allied coordinating agencies are characterized by the necessity for unanimity and by the absence of a deciding authority in case of conflicting interpretations of agreement. The chief instrument of U. S. occupation policy has been the War Department.

### a. Allied Commissions. 1

The agency for coordinating Allied policy for Germany prior to the surrender was the European Advisory Commission, created by the Moscow conference of November 1943. It included representatives of the U.S., Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and, in its later stages, France. The Commission met in London from December 1943 to July 1945. Its principal achievements were the formulation of terms governing the surrender of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority by the four chief Allied powers, the determination of zones of occupation, the creation of control machinery and the drafting of additional requirements to be imposed upon Germany after surrender. In the atmosphere

1. See Appendix A.

J. See Abendgix V.

Imposed upon Germany after surrender. In the atmosphere
innerly and the grating of additional requirements to be
lion of zones of occupation, the creation of control mea-
sure authority by the four chief Allied powers, the determining
the surrender of Germany and the annihilation of supreme
of all achievements were the formulation of terms governing
met in London from December 1943 to July 1948. Its bin-
U.2.2.R. and, in its later stages, France. The Commission
cluded representatives of the U.S., Great Britain, the
created by the Moscow conference of November 1943. It in-
before to the surrender was the European Advisory Commission.
The agency for coordinating Allied policy for Germany
a. Allied Commissions. I

War Department.

Chief instrument of U. S. occupation policy has been the
in case of conflicting interpretations of agreement. The
for unanimity and by the absence of a deciding authority
coordinating agencies are characterized by the necessity
of Villedoctines and merely U. S. instruments. Allied
brevions section. There are organs for the implementation
respond to the two aspects of occupation discussed in the
The instruments of foreign policy in Germany cor-

10.

11.

of immediacy engendered by the war, confining itself to
problems of a very general nature, which gave wide scope
to future variations in interpretation, the work of this
Commission was largely successful.

Its task was assumed in July 1945 by the Council
of Foreign Ministers. For nearly two years no place was
found on its agenda for the German problem. When finally,
starting with the Moscow conference of March 1947, the
German question was taken up, it required only two confer-
ences to produce a deadlock. No meeting of the Council of
Foreign Ministers has occurred since December 1947. Quadri-
partite policy formulation has thereby become inoperative.

The agency responsible for operational integration
of Allied policy in Germany has been, since July 1945, the
Allied Control Authority. It is composed of a Control
Council consisting of the four Allied Commanders-in-Chief,
a Coordinating Committee composed of the four deputy com-
manders and a Control Staff consisting of 12 divisions or
directorates on which the four powers are equally represented.
Decisions of the Control Council as of each the quadri-partite
organs must be unanimous.

The Control Council is the repository of supreme
authority in Germany and acts in lieu of a central German

1. See Appendix A for organization of the Control Authority.

I. See Vößengitz A. A. for organization of the Control Authority.

Authority in Germany and acts in item 1 of a central German
The Control Council is the repository of supreme
organs must be numerous.

Decisions of the Control Council as of each the next-bast
Directorates on which the four powers are equally represented.
Mandates and a Control Staff consisting of 18 divisions or
a Coordinating Committee composed of the four branch com-
Council consisting of the four Villed Commanders-in-Chief,
Allied Control Authority. It is composed of a Control
of Allied forces in Germany has been, since July 1942, the
The agency responsible for operational integration

barrite policy. It has thereto become inoperative.
Foreign Ministers has occurred since December 1944. The
enacts to produce a seeplock. No meeting of the Council of
German nation was taken up, it resulted only two confer-
starting with the Moscow conference of March 1944, the
long on its agenda for the German problem. When finally,
of Foreign Ministers. For nearly two years no trace was
It was done in July 1942 by the Council
Commission was largely successful.

to future variations in interpretation, the work of this
problems of a very general nature, which gave wide scope
of immediate engendered by the war, confining itself to
If.

12.

Although a considerable number of laws, orders and directives have been issued the divergent views of the occupation powers, especially in the operational field of interpretation and implementation of agreed policies, have thwarted effective joint policy. In a practical sense, Germany has come to be governed in separate compartments by the respective zonal Commanders, merely reflecting the lack of agreement on the intergovernmental level. Even agreed four-power policies often merely prescribe general principles which are variously interpreted and applied in the respective zones.

["In view of conflicting economic policies in the\nagencies. The Agency divided the remaining 43% of Western German rebar-\ntion from Western Germany have been allocated\nfrom the U. S. A. R. and Poland. The 18 nations represented on\nthe rebations have been affiliated\nby the Inter-Allied Reprations Agency. Its areas\nare coordinated by the Inter-Allied Reprations Agency. Its areas\nare the same as the areas of Allied economic policy are\nrespective zones.", "The 18 nations represented on the inter-governmental level. Have agreed to the joint formulation of a common program of action. In a practical sense, Germany has adopted the general principles of the inter-governmental policy. In a practical sense, Germany has adopted the general principles of the

13.

1948. The Commandments, the Allied Agency for London-bomber
The Allied Control Council has not met since April
Governing Germany nor allowing Germany to govern itself.
After questions are concerned, the Control Council is neither
Burnes pointed out in his Stuttgart speech, "So far as most
agreement on central objectives. As Secretary of State,
ating devices has not been a substitute for the lack of
Security Council of the U.M. The were existence of coordi-
nate workable in the case of control of Germany than in the
Western powers. The necessity of unanimity has moved no
flect the basic agreements between the U.S.A.H. and the
the Governmental and operational level have tended to re-
The intergovernmental coordinating devices, poor on

therefore ceased to function.

of occupation. The Inter-Villied Rebarations Agency has
February 1948 to cease further diamantling in their zones
German state, the U.S.A. Great Britain and France agreed in
with their efforts to establish a staple and sound Western
of the Agency put a law with the United Kingdom. In fine
has been at odds not only with the Western European nations
emphasize of her buffer, opposed further diamantling and
operate effectively. The U.S. has, since the change of
divisions occupation zones this Agency has not been able to

13.

14.

Quadri-partite policy formulation has thus ceased on all levels. The only effective remedy seems to be - assuming that quadri-partite control is desired at any future time - to create central German governmental organs charged with implementing general directives. This would eliminate conflicting interpretations of general policy principles, but would introduce a new factor which might further distill basic U.S. objectives.

## b. U. S. Instruments of Policy.

The effective control of Germany has been exercised by the zonal commanders. They retained exclusive jurisdiction in all matters not covered by quadri-partite agreement and were the effective interpreters of such agreements.

The formulation of U.S. policy has presented peculiar difficulties. Started as only a temporary military government, with control to be turned over to the State Department at the earliest possible moment, it has in fact resulted in a situation where policy formulation as well as execution have become the almost exclusive responsibility of the War Department. Since the War Department was organizationally not equipped for long-range policy planning the Military Governor of the U.S. zone has had a larger share in policy determination than the Military Commander of any other

bolloch determination than the Military Commander of any other
Military Governor of the U.S. zone has had a larger share in
formationally not equipped for long-range bolloch planning the
of the War Department. Since the War Department was organ-
execution have become the almost exclusive reasonableness
enlisted in a situation where bolloch communication as well as
department at the earliest possible moment, it has in fact re-
government, with control to be turned over to the State De-
fair difficulties. Started as only a temporary military
The communication of U.S. policy has presented been-
and were the effective interpreters of such agreements.
tion in all matters not covered by quadri-barbitite agreement
by the sons of commanders. They retained exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the effective control of Germany has been exercised
p. U. S. Instruments of Policy.

phase U.S. objectives.
would introduce a new factor which might further stipify
enforcing interpretations of General policy principles, put
implementing General directives. This would eliminate cou-
to create central German Governmental organs changed with
that quadri-barbitite control is desired at any future time -
benefits. The only effective remedy seems to be - assuming
quadri-barbitite policy communication has thus ceased on all
control of the City of Berlin, has not met since May 1948.
14.

15.

occupation power.

Assistant Secretary of the Army.
and Dr. E. G. A. Kraemer, Political Advisor to the
J. This is based on interviews with Prof. C. J. Friedrich

the War Department for a long period temporarily. Ended
and the Department of the Army were in agreement. Indeed
I was effective only in case where the Department of State
Military Governor, State Department influence on policy
tical Advisor from the Foreign Service (Munby) to the
ing State Department policy and the assignment of a Poli-
Ocoupation Attaine, charged with coordinating and commu-
tating the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of State for
exert a decisive influence on occupation policy. Despite
The Department of State has never been able to
and its weight in policy formulation became preponderant.
Elastic control over the execution of policy directives
channels. The War Department therefore, maintained ex-
mitted to the Military Governor through War Department
of SAMAC (or SWAC as it was then called) were to be trans-
directive further included the provinces that all directives
War, Navy and Air Departments. This somewhat ambiguous
certed a study, consideration or coordination by the State,
task was to the training of all policy "which required con-
tact with the coordination of occupation policy. Specifically its
Air-Force Coordinating Committee (SAMAC) was charged with
By interdepartmental agreement, the State-Army-Navy-
occupation policy.

18.

[A]

16.

The assumption of responsibility for policy formu-
lation by the Theatre Commander has had several unfortunate
consequences. To begin with the overwhelming necessities
of a nation in defeat, the desire to minimize the load of
a direct subsidy represented by the Gariola funds has re-
sulted in a loss of perspective on the part of U. S. offi-
cials in Germany, whose pre-occupation with the immediate
problems tends to make them lose sight of the larger frame-
work of total U. S. policy. U. S. relations with France
in particular have suffered as the result of certain rash
acts on the part of the Military Command in Germany parti-
cularly in respect to reparations.

I. Interview with Prof. C. L. Brießhof.

at the Paris meeting for the allocation among European
The attitude of the U. S. representative for Biene
onarily in respect to reorganizations.

acts on the part of the Military Command in Germany barri-
in particular have snattered as the result of certain rear
work of totals U. S. bölled. U. S. relations with France
problems tend to make them one sight of the larger frame-
works in Germany, whose pre-occupation with the immediate
a direct and acidly represented by the Garde la Fange has re-
of a nation in defeat, the desire to minimize the load of
consequences. To begin with the overwhelming necessities
fation by the Theatre Commander has had several unfortunate
The assumption of responsibility for policy comm-
tion where policy too frequently lagged behind operations.
initial occupation bölled. This has resulted in a series of
little more than nominal control over most aspects of
the Theatre Commander maximum responsibility, if retained
range policy formulation. In fine with its bölled of giving
largely by default was ill-executed for the task of long-
The War Department which inherited the German problem

certain German cities.
I
statement on the establishment of U. S. consulates in bin-
bundesanstaltern boteftion even to the extent of looking with

18.

17.

the Undersecretary (Gen. Mader), his position has remained
work too well at this level and since the resignation of
mentation. The separation of operations and policy did not
Vasatant Secretary of the Army was charged with its imple-
was created, with the task of commending policy while an
difficulties outlined above. An Under Secretary of the Army
er to commute long-range policy and to avoid some of the
since 1944 the War Department has developed machin-
decision to use counterpart funds even without NCA approval.
gaps to NCA to justify its requests, eliminating in the recent
developed over the refusal of Military Government to accept
was erroneously objected to. Considerable friction has
ate. The establishment of an NCA representative in Bizone
mental agencies, particularly NCA have largely been more tor-
 Relations of the European Command with other Govern-
  be resolved by intergovernmental agreements.
department even the maximum ann of NCA aid, finally could only
difficult to explain since the Gardeins funds are almost
Europeans in solving their own problems, and all the more
pa U. S. representative on a Commission designed to aid
incidentally exceeded that of France. This a sprout peevish
resulting unanimity - unless Bizone were granted a ann while
the suspension of NCA aid - by refusing assent in an organ
occasion, the U. S. representative threatened the indiget-
ness of NCA funds is another case-in-point. On that

IV.

[N]

18.

unfilled with total responsibility assumed by the Assist-
ant Secretary of the Army for Occupation. He is assisted
by a staff-branch called ERP Group with the dual function
of maintaining liaison with ECA and advising on the ad-
ministration of the Gariola funds.

1. See Appendix B.

J. See Abendlich B.

commanders, the U. S. zone was divided into two military
with the policy of maximum reasonability to correspond
U. S. zone did not attain definite shape until 1946. In line
The instruments of policy implementation within the
related by this division of jurisdiction are considerable.

tion as the ultimate coordinating agency, the problems
of the Army. Though the Secretary of the Army can func-
Governor his channel of command is the Assistant Secretary
control of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; as Military
his capacity as Theater Commander he is under the General
the necessity of reporting to two different agencies: in
fity. The Military Commander in Germany is thus faced with
Demilitarization, Reparations, Displaced Persons and Secur-
ties of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army is responsible for the
Staff of the U. S. Army, working under the direct control
of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army is responsible for the
Staff of the U. S. Army, working under the direct control
of the General
This arrangement has not totally eliminated a
ministration of the Garde States Landa.

of maintaining liaison with ECA and advising on the ad-
pa a staff-prepared called EHP Group with the chief function
and Secretary of the Army for Occupation. He is assisted
multiplied with a total reasonability assumed by the State-

18.

19.

It was not until March 1946 that this situation was remedied. The policy aspects of occupation were separated from the security problems and placed under a new office: OMGVS. The command of troops were placed under a separate command. This separation roughly corresponded to the division of responsibility within the Department of the Army.

OMGVS effected its control over German policy by a Regional Governmental Coordinating office, as well as control offices in the three states of the U. S. occupation zone. Liaison offices were maintained on all levels of the German civil administration. Nevertheless it is probably safe to state that due to inadequacy and shortage of personnel this supervision has been largely minimal.

1. See Appendix C.

I. See Abbr.ix C.

U.2. below in Germany then has been effected

somef this subordination has been largely minimal,
sale to state that due to inadequacy and shortage of ben-
German civil administration. Nevertheless it is properly
some. Liaison offices were maintained on all levels of the
control offices in the three states of the U. S. occupation
a Regional Government Coordinating Office, as well as
OMGAS2 effected its control over German below dy
U.2. below in Germany then has been effected

division of responsibility within the Department of the
command. This subordination roughly corresponded to the
OMGAS2. The command of troops were placed under a separate
from the security problems and placed under a new office:
remedied. The policy aspects of occupation were elaborated
It was not until March 1948 that this situation was
Commander.

but of one of the staff-sections of the Army on Theater
trained for the specific task of occupation was merely
let that the specialized Military Government personnel,
after areas as generalization. This was corresponded by the
resulted in almost completely unrelated policies in each
under the command of the subordinated army commander. This
districts (not counting Berlin or the Berlin environs)

19.

[x]

20.

primarily through the Department of the Army. With its
primary mission military victory the army was not too
well prepared for the difficult task of administering a
defeated enemy country in the absence of any indigent
apparatus on which to rely. The latitude allowed the
Theater Commander, while probably effective in military
operations, has tended to make U. S. policy in Germany
sometimes seem unrelated to the larger concepts of U. S.
foreign relations. The establishment of a civilian High
Commissioner may well give other departments the deciding
influence in policy formulation and thus restore policy
making to the Department chiefly concerned: the Department
of State.

of State.

making to the Department chiefly concerned: the Department
influence in policy formulation and thus restore policy
Commissioner may well give other departments the deciding
tongue relations. The establishment of a civilian High
sometimes seem unrelated to the further concepts of U. S.
operations, has tended to make U. S. policy in Germany
Theater Commander, while probably effective in military
abroad on which to rely. The latitude allowed the
delegated enemy country in the absence of any indigent
well prepared for the difficult task of administering a
primary mission military victory the army was not too
primarily through the Department of the Army. With its

80.

21.

## Conclusions:

The occupation of Germany is a striking demonstration of the inseparability of policy and operations. It shows that any interdepartmental coordinating device will tend to be dominated by the department controlling the operational personnel. In the light of the unreadiness of the Department of State to assume responsibility for occupation administration its machinery for occupation policy planning became largely without influence.

measure of control over operational operations.
fully effective, if used, however, have to obtain some
some of the difficulties encountered in Germany. To be
by the Hoover Commission, would offer a device to remedy
the Administration of Overseas Affairs, recommended
of irritation with friendly Western European nations. Per-
hotely coordination and might have eliminated many points
Commander would have offered greater possibilities of tim
If would appear that a stronger control of the Theater
standard of reference.

in turn become very difficult in the absence of a clear
a coordinating agency for mere operational problems, which
hotly was lacking. SAMAC was forced prematurely to act as
coordinating device. Due to the fact that a long-range
Another factor tended to weaken the influence of
hotly planning become largely without influence.

cooperation administration its machinery for occupation
of the Department of State to assume responsibility for
operations personnel. In the light of the unreasonableness
tend to be dominated by the department controlling the
shows that any interdepartmental coordinating device will
fall to the inappropriateness of hotly and operations. If
The occupation of Germany is a striking demonstration.

Conclusions:

Sf.

[x]

22.

Perhaps some of the difficulties discussed above were inherent in the nature of the problem and insoluble. Yet with the emergence of the U. S. the major power in the world it can be expected that responsibility for an increasing number of foreign operations will have to be assumed. A study of the occupation of Germany in a spirit of constructive criticism, might yield useful clues for a more thorough and more long-range formulation of U. S. policy, as well as its better coordination.

belliger, as well as its better coordination.

more thoroughly and more long-range formulation of U. 2.

Yet with the emergence of the U. 2., the major power in

were inherent in the nature of the problem and in principle.

perhaps some of the difficulties discussed above

clearly commuted hostilities and better integration.

If it is too early to tell whether this will result in more

result rather than the cause of symmetry among nations.

organisms, to be dependent on a basis of fundamental agree-

been moved in Germany, as well as in other international

[4]