RADIO - TV
DEFENSE DIALOG

RADIO TV REPORTS INC. WASH., D.C., SUMMARIES NOT TO BE QUOTED.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1972 (BROADCASTS OF DEC 18)

SUMMARY OF NETWORK NEWS IN THIS ISSUE

WALTER CRONKITE, CBS: With the future of the peace talks in doubt, President Nixon took off the kid gloves and once again flexed America's air muscle. BOB SCHIEFFER, CBS: The first confirmation of the new strikes came from Defense Secretary Laird responding to questions during a picture-taking session with his replacement Elliot Richardson. Laird said the bombing operations were underway throughout NVN. MARVIN KALB, CBS: Hanoi accused the administration of an about-face in policy and then toughened its terms for the release of American prisoners of war. NBC and ABC reported the renewed bombing.

JOHN CHANCELLOR, NBC: The breakdown of the cease fire talks in Paris has caused a number of politicians and government officials in Washington to question the credibility of the White House. Some critics are saying the President may have changed his mind about the terms of an agreement after he had won the election. Others say the White House may have been deliberately deceiving the people when it announced on October 26 that peace was at hand. SENATOR STUART SYMINGTON: I took all this talk in October on face value and it just turned out not to be true.

HARRY REASONER, ABC: Henry Kissinger in a strange way has a high degree of credibility. When he said on October 26th, "We give the assurance that we will stick by what we have negotiated and what we have achieved so laboriously," he was in effect reassuring Hanoi that Americans thought he and his boss were speaking to them. Now, apparently, in some misguided euphoria relating to the election, Dr. Kissinger's boss has broken Dr. Kissinger's word. It's very hard to swallow.

ERIC SEVAREID, CBS: In his explanation Saturday, Kissinger put the full blame on Hanoi. By his understanding with Hanoi's negotiators he could not discuss these substantive issues. But the dominating impression is that the real issue is sovereignty. That this question should now rise as a sticking point is astonishing. Sovereignty was the original question many years ago. It's what the war has always been about.

CHANCELLOR, NBC: In Saigon today the US Military Command announced that American troop strength in SVN dropped last week to 24,900. And of course it doesn't include the 100,000 American servicemen fighting the war now from aircraft carriers and from air bases in Thailand. PHIL BRADY, NBC: Interviews American pilots at Khorat Airbase.

REASONER, ABC: Subcommittee Chairman F. Edward Hebert said Lavelle fought the kind of war I was saying should be fought six years ago.

CRONKITE, CBS: On learning of the renewed American bombing strikes, NVN suspended the follow-up technical negotiating session underway in Paris. FOSTER DAVIS, ABC: Reports from Saigon on the reaction to Kissinger's press conference.

CHANCELLOR, NBC: The US is still willing to fight SVN's war from the air, but it has long since told Saigon it must fight its own war on the ground. BOB JONES, NBC: Reports from SVN on the officer corps of the Army that forms the backbone of President Thieu's political organization.

REASONER, ABC: The Soviet Union announced that it will keep its defense spending in 1973 at the same level as in the past two years.

CHANCELLOR, NBC: The Supreme Court ruled mandatory chapel attendance unconstitutional

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NBC NIGHTLY NEWS NBC-TV 6:30

US Resumes Bombing Northern NVN

JOHN CHANCELLOR: The US today resumed bombing of the northern part of NVN, an area that had been put off limits to American attacks on the 23rd of October.

It looked then to the administra-
tion as though a cease fire might
be arranged before Christmas, and
the bombing pause was a gesture of
goodwill.

Now the cease fire is stalled
and the bombing has started again.

The Russian news agency Tass says
American planes have raided the sub-
urbs of Hanoi.

American bombers hit the harbor
of Haiphong with bombs and more
mines. And the area north of the
20th parallel is now open to what
may be the heaviest attacks in the
war.

We have two reports tonight on
this story from the White House
and the Pentagon. First, the Pen-
tagon.

JOHN COCHRAN: The mining began last night, Washington time, the bombing started this morning.

Pentagon officials say this will
probably be the heaviest bombing
effort ever in the Haiphong-Hanoi
area.

Exact locations were not revealed
but the kinds of targets include
rail lines, bridges, power plants
and oil depots. Some targets have
been hit before, some have not.
Officials will not discuss what the
new targets are because the raids
are not over.

The mines were dropped because
some, including those in Haiphong
Harbor Channel were nearing the
end of their lifespan. The mining
is not really new because mine
fields were reseeded even during
the six-week bombing halt north of
the 20th parallel, and officials
here say it is the bombing which
will put new pressure on the NVNese.

How long will the air strikes
continue? Sources here say that's
up to the White House.

John Cochran, NBC News, at the
Pentagon.

RICHARD VALERIANI: The suspen-
sion of the American bombing around
Hanoi and Haiphong in October was

clearly a political act, a demonstra-
tion of goodwill during a sensitive
period in the peace negotiations.
The resumption of the bombing above
the 20th parallel also appears to
be a political as well as a military
act. It's meant to show the NVNese
they have nothing to gain by delaying
on a cease fire agreement. But it's
not clear how long the full-scale
bombing might now last, and officials
here won't say.

The White House said the renewed
bombing was designed to cope with
another enemy buildup that could lead
to another enemy offensive.

No details were provided on the
buildup, but presidential advisor
Henry Kissinger had said on Saturday
there was evidence showing that the
enemy was making a massive effort
to attack throughout SVN just before
the declaration of a cease fire
with the aim of continuing the at-
tacks for some weeks after the cease
fire went into effect.

News secretary Ron Ziegler said
the US is not going to allow the
peace talks to be used as a cover
for a buildup to another offensive.

The tone of the White House re-
marks was tough and it sounded as
though there will be a lot more war
in VN before there is peace.

Richard Valeriani, NBC News, at
the White House.

White House Credibility Questioned

CHANCELLOR: The breakdown of
the cease fire talks in Paris has
caused a number of politicians and
government officials in Washington
to question the credibility of the
White House.

Some critics are saying the Pres-
ident may have changed his mind about
the terms of an agreement after he
had won the election.

Senator Stuart Symington of Mo.
was asked about this today by our
congressional correspondent Paul
Duke, and this is what Symington said

STUART SYMINGTON: I took all this
talk in October on face value and it
just turned out not to be true. And
at the time it was given by Dr. Kiss-
singer and others, people who really
do know something about it in the

2 Tuesday, December 19, 1972

administration told me that it was
not true, that they were not as
close to peace as they were saying
they were, and they have been proved
to be correct.

PAUL DUKE: You feel the admin-
istration lied to the people?

SYMINGTON: Well, I think that
the people were misled. Now,
whether they were misled voluntarily
or involuntarily, because of the
great desire to get peace, I don't
know. But I do know that the posi-
tion that was taken by Dr. Kissinger
presumably he being the no. 1 rep-
resentative of the administration
as we all now know in foreign policy
as given out on October 10 and
October 26, I believe, turned out to
be wrong.

DUKE: And that people told you
that we were not as close to peace
as he indicated.

SYMINGTON: That's right. That
is exactly right.

CHANCELLOR: There was a techni-
cal meeting in Paris today between
American and NVNese experts, but
when word came of the American
raids near Hanoi, the NVNese sus-
pended the talks and may boycott
this week's session of the regular
Paris peace talks.

Le Duc Tho, the NVNese negotia-
tor, returned to Hanoi today to
brief his government on the stalled
cease fire.

Gen. Alexander Haig of the White
House arrived in Saigon on Tuesday
to brief the SVNese on the situa-
tion.

Reports from Saigon indicate the
SVNese are pleased that the talks
have broken down.

US Troops In VN Number 24,900.

CHANCELLOR: In Saigon today the
US Military Command announced that
American troop strength in SVN
dropped last week to 24,900. That's
the lowest figure since February,
1965, when the big American buildup
began. And, of course, it doesn't
include the 100,000 American ser-
vicemen fighting the war now from
aircraft carriers and from air
bases in Thailand.

One of those bases is Khorat and
Phil Brady reports from there.

PHIL BRADY: This is Khorat Air-
base, 200 miles northeast of Bang-
kok. It's only one of seven bases

in Thailand now used by the USAF.

At any given time, there are
about one to two hundred planes
there. While the pilots fly combat
missions all over IC, their special-
ty is finding and destroying the
Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles
protecting NVN. It's a tricky and
sometimes costly business.

Some planes act as bait for the
missile, and if one's fired, reveal-
ing its position, then other Ameri-
can jets go in for the kill. Com-
manders here said they haven't even
been given warning orders to prepare
for a cease fire. It's just busi-
ness as usual.

AMERICAN FLYER: I fly the
same way I did in '67 and every day
since. Every day is a professional
job out and a professional job back.

AMERICAN FLYER: I feel right
about being over here at this time,
particularly when it seems to be one
of the main things we're trying to
do is to get the prisoners of war
back.

AMERICAN FLYER: It's my job and
I've been trained to do it and I
really -- you know these peace rumors
have come and gone before and the
war has never ended

AMERICAN FLYER: You're up there
to do your job and you do it and
your only concern is the accomplish-
ment of your mission. I've got a
job to do and I go out and complete
the job until somebody comes down
and says the job is over.

BRADY: Khorat, they said, is
a long way from Paris.

Phil Brady, NBC News, Khorat
Airbase, Thailand.

In SVN Officers More Than Mainstay
Of The Army

CHANCELLOR: The US is still
willing to fight SVN's war from the
air, but it has long since told
Saigon it must fight its own war on
the ground.

In SVN, as in any other country,
the mainstay of the Army is the offi-
cer corps. But in SVN the officers
are more than that.

Here's a report from Bob Jones.

BOB JONES: SVN has 1.1 million
men under arms. One person out of
every 17 in the country is in the
armed forces.

The officer corps of this Army
forms the backbone of President

3 Tuesday, December 19, 1972

Thieu's political organization.
The happier the officers, the easier
rests the man in the palace.

There are 200 young officers in
this year's graduating class of the
SVNese Military Academy.

About 95% of this year's class
will go straight to combat unit.
Junior officer casualties for 1972
have been high.

Those who go into the elite
paratroop division will be in the
armed force considered most likely
to support a coup if the country
does not go according to their
general's liking.

So far, President Thieu has
handled his Army with a political
finesse unmatched by his predeces-
sors.

Bob Jones, NBC News, Da Lat, SVN.

Mandatory Chapel Attendance At
Service Academies Unconstitutional

CHANCELLOR: The Supreme Court
ruled today that mandatory chapel
attendance at service academies is
unconstitutional.

The Court upheld a lower court
ruling and that means the end of
compulsory chapel attendance at
West Point, the Naval Academy and
the AF Academy.

The suit was brought by two West
Pointers and an Annapolis man.

CBS EVENING NEWS CBS-TV 7 PM

Nixon Flexes America's Air Muscle

WALTER CRONKITE: With the future
of the peace talks in doubt, Presi-
dent Nixon today took off the kid
gloves and once again flexed Ameri-
ca's air muscle.

Out went his October restrictions
against bombing NVN above the 20th
parallel, imposed when it seemed
peace was near. In again is Mr.
Nixon's no holds barred bombing
policy and renewed mining of NVNese
harbors.

The White House said it took the
action to head off a new communist
offensive.

NVN said waves of American planes
planted new mines in Haiphong Harbor
then followed that up with deva-
stating air strikes (their word) on

the Hanoi-Haiphong complex.

Bob Schieffer at the Pentagon
and Marvin Kalb at the State Depart-
ment have reports on today's develop-
ments.

BOB SCHIEFFER: The first con-
firmation of the new strikes came
from Defense Secretary Laird respond-
ing to questions during a picture-
taking session with his replacement
Elliot Richardson. Laird said that
bombing operations were underway
throughout NVN.

He would say nothing more, but
the Pentagon later confirmed that
raids were taking place in both the
Hanoi and Haiphong areas.

The bombing attacks, according
to the best information available,
began about mid-morning Washington
time. This was several hours after
Navy planes dropped fresh mines into
the Haiphong Harbor in a separate
operation.

Literally hundreds of AF planes
and US Navy planes, flying from four
carriers offshore, and from US bases
in Thailand, were taking part in
the raids.

The Pentagon would give no in-
formation about what targets are
being struck but sources describe
the targets as things that have been
hit before: rail lines, bridges,
highways and fuel storage areas.

Once the bare details of the
operation became known, the Pentagon
imposed a strict news blackout, but
a knowledgeable source described the
raids by saying US pilots are now
operating with fewer restrictions
than at any time in the history of
the war.

Bob Schieffer, CBS News, the
Pentagon.

MARVIN KALB: Hanoi accused the
administration of an about-face in
policy and then toughened its terms
for the release of American prison-
ers of war.

In a series of harshly-worded
pronouncements today, the NVNese
stressed that a peace agreement must
not only be signed but, as they put
it, scrupulously and correctly im-
plemented in order to get the POWs
home.

Two months ago when "peace was
at hand," to quote Kissinger, Hanoi
promised to release the prisoners
within 60 days after the signing
of a deal. Now that seems to have

4 Tuesday, December 19, 1972

changed as indeed has the entire
international climate.

Hanoi charging that the US at-
tempted to make basic and essential
changes in the draft agreement, such
as setting up two separate VNese
states.

For its part, Washington is now
saying that Hanoi made a basic de-
cision last week to stall on peace,
but officials here claim they don't
know why also don't know when peace
talks will resume.

Hanoi says there is a deadlock
and prospects for peace are being
destroyed.

US officials say if that is true
it's Hanoi's fault.

Marvin Kalb, CBS News, the State
Department.

## NVN Suspends Technical Negotiations

CRONKITE: If the peace talks
already were in trouble, there
certainly was no improvement today.

On learning of the renewed Ameri-
can bombing strikes, NVN suspended
the follow-up technical negotiating
sessions underway in Paris.
In Saigon, meanwhile, Foster Davis
reports on the SVNese reaction to
Henry Kissinger's weekend assess-
ment.

FOSTER DAVIS: The press confer-
ence made bittersweet reading for
President Thieu. Bitter because of
the firmness with which Kissinger
said Nixon will sign the peace agree-
ment when he, President Nixon, feels
it is right, irrespective of what
Thieu thinks; and sweet because af-
ter growing speculation that Thieu
is the main roadblock to peace,
Kissinger has given the NVNese that
title.

Presidential palace sources say
the conference is being interpreted
as a warning to both Hanoi and
Saigon with the main thrust aimed
at the North.

Officials we talked with showed
little surprise at the latest set-
back.

Dr. Tran Van Do, former Foreign
Minister, an envoy to Paris earlier
this year.

DR. TRAN VAN DO: I have the im-
pression that NVN want to exploit
the desire and the impatience of
the American people to have the
prisoners of war released for Christ-
mas. So they always rise their

price (unintelligible).

DAVIS: Opposition Senator
Tran Quang Tuong.

SENATOR TUONG: Thieu never
surprised us at all because we
understand the attitude of the com-
munists. In legal sessions we under-
stand also the attitudes of the
United States in regards to peace
settlement in SVN.

We realize that the communist
want nothing more than nothing
else than taking over SVN either
by force or by political means.

DAVIS: The VNese learned
patience long ago. They could not
otherwise have survived. And there
was no shock, no amazement in them.

Said one man, "It's only a
bargaining tactic, not really a
deadlock."

Said another, "To be fair, SVN
must be allowed at the talks, it's
only the US and Hanoi."

But no one said, I'm surprised,
I thought peace was almost here.

There seems no room left for
surprise in VN. Everything has
happened again and again to these
people, except peace. The only
peace is on the Christmas cards now
being sold.

Foster Davis, CBS News, Saigon.

## Hebert Praises Lavelle

CRONKITE: Early this year Gen.
John Lavelle was relieved as Comman-
der of the Seventh AF for allegedly
ordering so-called protective reac-
tion air strikes on targets in NVN.
He retired a short time later. But
debate raged on over whether he
should have been court-martialed.

Well today the House Armed Ser-
vices Investigating Subcommittee
said new communist radar devices
pose such a threat the strikes
ordered by Lavelle, quote, were not
only proper but essential.

Chairman F. Edward Hebert praised
Lavelle for fighting the kind of war
he did; whether it was legal or not,
said Hebert, is up to how you read
the facts.

## Analysis On Peace Prospects

CRONKITE: Pope Paul has express-
ed bitter disappointment that there
apparently will be no peace in VN
by Christmas, and he's not alone in
his feelings.

5 Tuesday, December 19, 1972

Here's Eric Sevareid's analysis.

ERIC SEVAREID: The Pope has publicly wrung his hands; the stock market has fallen sharply; strong, resilient Henry Kissinger speaks with nervous uncertainty and political Washington is depressed.

We have returned to full-scale bombing of NVN. Hanoi continues to shove men and tanks down those trails and precipitates local ground battles.

President Nixon who once wrote a book narrating his career in terms of crises, now faces another one.

The current betting is that he cannot end the VN fighting in his first term, which has a month to go.

Immediate prospect is for another war of nerves by military and propaganda means, its duration -- unguessable.

But the weeks past are almost as mysterious to those not privy to the negotiations as the weeks ahead.

What was thought to be an overall agreement began to unravel in October when Hanoi unexpectedly published its terms and the US asked for clarifications.

It seems a fair inference that we underestimated both the intransigence of Saigon and the resiliency of Hanoi.

Sovereignty was the original question many years ago. It's what the war has always been about. Are there two VNs, one illegally aggressing the other, or is it one nation consisting of two zones, temporarily demarked by the demilitarized strip in the middle, a nation that is engaged in a civil war.

Thieu insists on formal recognition that there are two nations, the North illegally occupying parts of the South. That has been the American premise, otherwise our intervention was a violation of international law.

But the Geneva Agreements of '54 described all of VN as one country. And in the American statement of October, the Geneva description is accepted. But apparently we thought

Hanoi would accept formal continuation of the DMZ and that that would satisfy Saigon as a kind of de facto recognition of its sovereignty in a separate South.

We're trying to finesse this basic issue to keep it ambiguous as the best way to get at least a prolonged armistice in an ambiguous war.

It now looks as if Hanoi has done a turnabout upsetting that precarious appcart. And possibly out of conviction that President Nixon had raised peace expectations so high that he could not turn back and must extricate himself by putting the ultimate squeeze on Saigon.

It is a test of wills again, but the current disposition here among most anti-war Congressmen too is to wait, not to jostle the President's elbow and to wait.

ABC EVENING NEWS ABC-TV 7 PM

US Resumes Full-Scale Bombing of NVN

HARRY REASONER: The US has resumed full-scale bombing of NVN, including the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

The NVNese said American planes carried out heavy attacks around those cities tonight and that Hanoi's armed forces shot down a large number of planes and captured several pilots.

The removal of restrictions on air strikes against the North came less than two days after Henry Kissinger announced in effect that peace is no longer at hand.

TOM JARRIEL: The first official word of the renewed bombing came from Defense Secretary Laird, as he was showing his successor, Elliot Richardson through the maze of the Pentagon.

Reporters pressed Laird about US bombing policy. The Defense chief said US air operations are being conducted throughout NVN.

Bombing was halted in late October north of the 20th parallel as a show of good faith toward the peace negotiations. A few hours after Laird's comment, a spokesman here at the White House confirmed that Mr. Nixon had again authorized full scale bombing of the North to include Hanoi and Haiphong.

In revealing the new military

6 Tuesday, December 19, 1972

strategy the White House also em-
phasized the road to negotiations
is still open, clearly hoping pres-
sure of the bombing would cause the
Hanoi leadership to reconsider its
attitude toward the negotiations.

The bombing, it's also explained,
is to cope with yet another enemy
buildup and yet another anticipated
NVNese offensive.

According to allied intelligence
reports during the past month, while
Henry Kissinger has been predicting
peace would break out, the NVNese
have been infiltrating fresh troops
and weapons into SVN at a fantastic
pace.

During the same period, the
SVNese have been generously supplied
with new US weapons. So with both
sides armed to the teeth, the word
from the President is military
pressure will continue until a
peace settlement is reached.

Tom Jarriel, ABC News at the
White House.

REASONER: Although the substan-
tive VN peace talks are suspended,
technical experts from both sides
have gone on with their Paris meet-
ings, seeking to clear up the lan-
guage and other details connected
with a possible cease fire.

There was another meeting today,
but the French News Agency said
the communists have called off one
scheduled for Wednesday in protest
against the renewed bombing.

It also reported that Hanoi's
representatives may boycott the
regular weekly VN negotiations on
Thursday for the same reason.

Lavelle Strikes Were Essential

REASONER: The House Armed
Services Subcommittee today issued
its report on the unauthorized air
raids against NVN ordered by Gen.
John Lavelle last winter.

The committee said the strikes
were not only proper but essential.
It said a new enemy radar system
put American pilots in great danger
of being shot down on any future
missions.

Subcommittee Chairman F. Edward
Hebert said Lavelle fought the
kind of war I was saying should be
fought six years ago. Whether it
was legal or not is up to how you
read the facts.

Lavelle was removed as Commander
of the Seventh AF in VN as a re-
sult of the raids.

USSR To Maintain Defense Spending

REASONER: The Soviet Union an-
nounced today that it will keep its
defense spending in 1973 at the same
level as in the past two years.

The Finance Minister reported to
the nation's Parliament that the
defense budget will hold firm at the
Russian equivalent of $21.5 billion.

He said spending for agriculture
will go up about 10% and there will
increases for science and for social
and cultural programs.

Dr. Kissinger's Boss Has Broken

Dr. Kissinger's Word

REASONER: The news over the
weekend about the VN negotiations
breaking down was very scary and
depressing.

We have been there so often be-
fore that this time we perhaps
should have been skeptical.

But Henry Kissinger in a strange
way has a high degree of credibility
When he said on October 26th, "We
give the assurance that we will stick
by what we have negotiated and what
we have achieved so laboriously,"
he was in effect reassuring Hanoi
that Americans thought he and his
boss were speaking also to them.

Now, apparently, in some mis-
guided euphoria relating to the
election, Dr. Kissinger's boss has
broken Dr. Kissinger's word. It's
very hard to swallow.

As my colleague Howard K. Smith
pointed out, each of the three pre-
vious landslide presidential victor-
ies of this century have been fol-
lowed by disastrous behavior on the
part of the landslide victor.

Warren Harding's Administration
fell into the worst pit of corrup-
tion so far documented in this cen-
tury.

Mr. Roosevelt in 1936 proceeded
to the embarrassing failure of try-
ing to pack the Supreme Court.

Mr. Johnson in 1964 began the
quick slide into the tragedy of VN.

The hope was that Richard Nixon
who studies this kind of history
might avoid this kind of result.

The American people made it

7 Tuesday, December 19, 1972

perfectly clear on November 7 that they did not trust George McGovern to lead them in either domestic or foreign affairs, but I sense that they also gave their votes on the basis that VN was all over because Henry Kissinger told them so and like Heidi, Henry Kissinger wouldn't lie to you.

A second term landslide winner is entitled to some capricious vengeance and few of us would take up a cause because he has banned the Washington Post from covering White House social affairs.

but backing off from a cease fire is a weight and comes very close to a breaking of faith, with Hanoi maybe, with Americans more certainly.

THE TODAY SHOW DEC 18 included a report by Paul Cunningham on VN veterans. Complete transcript is available.

8 Tuesday, December 19, 1972

X to P.R.

THE PLAIN DEALER, FRIDAY, JUNE 17, 1972

Todd Simon

Kissinger Map of Peace Talks

Just before President Nixon hired him as his national security adviser, Harvard Prof. Henry A. Kissinger wrote an essay entitled "The Vietnam Negotiations."

A lot of the Nixon strategy shows through the sentences of that essay. It sounds like President Nixon's own speeches on the war.

Right now this essay seems to have outlined the American plan to end the Vietnam

mess, which has just turned messier again.

Kissinger said U.S. thinking on Vietnam was wrong because "guerrillas rarely seek to hold real estate" but rather seek to control population. But 80% of U.S. forces were in areas containing less than 4% of the population.

So the U.S. war of attrition won no permanent political advantage.

BUT NOW move up to the Paris negotiations. At that time, Saigon was demanding to be a party to those talks.

If the South Vietnamese do get in on the talks, wrote Kissinger, the four-sided conference would serve to legitimize "two subcommittees which need not be formally established and could even meet secretly: (a) between Hanoi and the United States, and (b) between Saigon and the NLF (National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong.)"

"Hanoi and Washington would discuss mutual troop withdrawal and related subjects such as guarantees for the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia. Saigon and the NLF would discuss the internal structure of South Vietnam.

"The third forum would be an international conference to work out guarantees and safeguards for the agreements arrived

at in the other forums, including international peacekeeping machinery."

Well, except that President Nguyen Van Thieu never would talk with the NLF, a group that "represents an important power base," these have continued to be the methods used and goals sought by Kissinger.

THE SAME IS TRUE of his advice to reduce U.S. forces, once the South Vietnam military is strengthened to take over.

"Why should Hanoi accept such an approach?" Kissinger asked.

His answer was that Hanoi cannot force an American withdrawal, and that it may believe the NLF would win in a political contest with the Thieu faction in Saigon.

U.S. withdrawal in fact has not left South Vietnam at the mercy of North Vietnam military power. So that point was certainly right.

It is unlikely that the NLF or Viet Cong themselves, without the covert infiltration of Hanoi's troops and political cadres, could win in an election against the men now in power in Saigon.

That is the reason why Hanoi is hanging onto every inch of land, every hamlet it can keep under its terror or threats right now.

BUT THE NIXON LINE in Vietnam is certainly plainly written in this essay.

"A negotiating procedure and a definition of objectives cannot guarantee a settlement, of course," wrote Kissinger. "If Hanoi insists on total victory, the war must continue. . . . Ending the war honorably is essential for the peace of the world."

It is an essay that has grown more significant as events made real its map of American policy. It and the little book it is in, "American Foreign Policy." give one a new look at the Nixon-Kissinger approach to world affairs.

SIMON

Inside Report

Bombing Decision Fits Pattern

By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

WASHINGTON — President Nixon's difficult decision, reached on Friday, to resume mining Haiphong harbor the following day and unleash full-scale bombing of North Vietnam's heartland Monday morn-

loose end of the policing machinery, counting instead on the mood of world peace to restrain Hanoi's worst impulses in the delicate postcease-fire period.

The second option: Acting more cautiously and insisting on prior agreement from Hanoi on the postcease-fire arrange-

DUNAGIN'S PEOPLE

MARY HIRSCHFELD HEARS...

Watch for the announcement soon of Southeast Growth and Development Forum in Playhouse East, 13520 Miles are blueprinted by Councilman John E. Foundation's thrust, to revitalize the cleaning up junk yards, expanding and paving facilities, bringing back an auto de- make use of major industrial, commercial groups in the neighborhood and seek toernment help that is available for such

James W. Shocknessy, OhioTU chairman, is letting it be known there about any new interchanges that may road. Speculators are trying to figure interchanges may go.

Dr. Leonard R. Rench is opting for after 53 years as an eye, ear, nose and tiring to his records, he was the first osteolimit himself to that specialty in Cl

NEW YORK TIMES 24 DECEMBER 1972

# And Is This to Be America's Hell?

By Leslie H. Gelb
and Anthony Lake

WASHINGTON — America's peace was at hand. Peace still is at hand but it is not being grasped.

Watching Henry Kissinger talk about Vietnam on Dec. 16 one felt numbed, frustrated. Frustration, turned to anger, the anger to more frustration when, last Monday, word came that American bombers again were striking all over North Vietnam, population centers had been hit, and more planes had been lost.

The bombers are harbingers of a bleak future. If no decision for peace was made, America will go on performing barbarities abroad, while Americans do—and can do—little or nothing about it.

Pessimism about Vietnam had been an article of faith for us these past six years. But for once in the closing days of October, we had allowed ourselves to believe that peace for America was imminent. For the first time, it seemed that a President of the United States was approaching the negotiations as a way to extricate our military presence in Vietnam on the best terms possible, and not as a way to achieve our traditional war aims. The American position seemed to recognize the limits of U.S. power and interests, and to honor the fact that any negotiated settlement would have to contain ambiguities.

We were wrong. The President now seems intent on gaining "more than an armistice." He wants to negotiate a "lasting peace." This is good in principle, but it is just not going to happen. A settlement which guarantees the future in any form would require one Vietnamese side or the other to compromise not just its tactics, but its ultimate goals. And this neither side will do.

Buried in Kissinger's statement was the revelation of a fundamental hardening of the U.S. position between October and November. In October, President Nixon had agreed to the concept of Vietnamese reunification by peaceful means, as set out in the Geneva Accords of 1954. And, in effect, we accepted the principle that there are now two administrations and two armies in South Vietnam. Yet in November, to quote Mr. Kissinger, "We wanted some reference in the agreement—however vague, however elusive, however indirect... which would make clear that the two parts of Vietnam would live in peace with each other and that neither side would impose its solution on the other by force."

The North Vietnamese have apparently interpreted this as requiring them to abandon their insistence that there are two legitimate administrative bodies—Saigon and the Provisional Revolutionary Government—now in being in the South. And they cannot give up this point without granting Thieu's sovereignty over all of South Vietnam. It would mean a basic sell-out of their allies.

Why this U.S. shift took place—whether it was because of the strength of Thieu's reaction to the October agreement, or because of the President's re-election, or because of Hanoi's military actions in late October—is less important than the fact

WASHINGTON STAR & NEWS 23 DECEMBER 1972

## 1951 Nixon Plan Would Bar Shift

By ORR KELLY

Star-News Staff Writer

The abrupt reassignment of Gordon Rule from his job as a top Navy procurement official, after Congressional testimony in which he criticized a presidential decision, would have been ruled out by an amendment offered in 1951 by then Sen. Richard M. Nixon.

Rule was notified yesterday that he was being bounced from his $36,000-a-year job as head of the Navy's Procurement Control and Clearance section and sent to Anacostia to work on the curriculum at the Navy Logistics Management School.

On Tuesday, Rule testified at a Joint Economics subcommittee hearing that Nixon's appointment of Roy L. Ash as new director of the Office of Management and Budget was a mistake — and that it was an even bigger mistake for Ash to take the job. Ash was president of Litton Industries Inc. which is involved in a half-billion dollar contract dispute with the Navy.

### 'Freedom From Reprisals'

Early in 1951, Nixon, then involved in a dispute with the

Truman administration over the right of executive branch officials to testify with immunity before congressional committees, offered an amendment — which did not pass — that said a change in a person's job status within a year after he had testified on the Hill would have been, on its face, evidence of retaliation.

"It is essential to the security of the nation and the very lives of the people that we look into these vitally important issues and that every witness have complete freedom from reprisals when he is given an opportunity to tell what he knows," Nixon said in a speech on April 25, 1951.

"There's too much at stake to permit foreign policy and military strategy to be established on the basis of half-truths and the suppression of testimony."

### 'Heartless and Cruel'

"Unless protection is given to witnesses who are members of the armed services or employees of the government, the scheduled hearings will amount to no more than a pade of yes men for administration policies as they exist." Nixon said.

In Rule's case, he was asked to sign retirement papers within 24 hours after his testimony. When he refused, he was transferred to a newly created job with less responsibility and status although at the same pay.

Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., who conducted the hearings, and Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., both sharply criticized the action taken against Rule. Proxmire called it "one of the most heartless and cruel reprisals... ever brought to my attention." He said he had written to Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird and Navy Secretary John Warner asking them to reverse the action.

Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D-La., chairman of the House Arms and Services Committee, who had previously been involved in a bitter dispute with Rule, said that if Rule had been shifted from his job because of his testimony, the action "violated the overriding principle that a witness should be free to tell the truth" to congressional committees.

White House spokesman Ronald L. Zeigler, asked about the case, said it was a Pentagon matter. Aides to Laird said that, while he had been aware of the decision to move Rule, he considered it an internal Navy affair.

Warner, on a Christmas visit to the 7th Fleet, was unavailing for comment.

that it did take place. Now we are left with a standstill negotiations rather than a standstill cease-fire. And once again, America is lashing out at the North Vietnamese like a spoiled child who cannot get his way! Our bombers may force new tactical concessions, but they cannot make Hanoi submit to a surrender either in principle or in fait.

There is still another path to follow. We can stop trying to act as the broker between two Vietnamese parties whose interests are in irreconcilable conflict, and concentrate on those issues that most directly concern us.

Mr. Kissinger stated that an agreement was 99 per cent completed. Hanoi says that the October accords are still 100 per cent acceptable. America's peace can still be grasped, if the United States stops demanding "more than an armistice." We can still use the armistice almost in hand to get our prisoners released and to extricate us from the war. We can still seize this opportunity to separate America's future and prestige from the Vietnam quagmire.

If we do not, the future will look like this: In Vietnam, more fighting, more American bombs to make up for the enduring inferiority of Saigon's forces, more civilians dying under our bombs, more American P.O.W.'s.

To all of us here who watch the war occasionally on television, it is an anseptic, canned hell. To each victim of U.S. bombing in Indochina, it is and will be the reality of hell. And the bombing critics here will not succeed in imprinting this reality on America's conscience. More and more Americans seem to be accepting the proposition that as U.S. combat forces are withdrawn and U.S. casualties reduced, the issue of the war can evaporate like discussion of last year's pannent races.

Another round of newspaper editorials, a few television specials, some more heated debates in the Congress, perhaps legislation in the Senate but not in the House, laments, massive public indifference, more frustration, more boredom. This will be America's hell.

It will make a fine epitaph for these decades: after the second war to end all wars, the United States reached for the stars and grasped Vietnam.

Leslie H. Gelb is visiting professor at the Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Anthony Lake is working on books on foreign policy for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Council on Foreign Relations.

3-F

BOMBING... CONTINUED

trust the public with that simple an explanation, and thus "ancillary benefits" was born.

Other word games have also been used to obscure what was going on in the skies over Southeast Asia. "Protective reaction," for example, will linger as one of the more famous, flexible and at times misleading phrases to grow out of the war. First used to describe quick counter-attacks by small numbers of escort planes against missile or anti-aircraft sites that had fired on U.S. reconnaissance planes, "protective reaction" grew to cover at times raids by hundreds of planes against supply areas as well as air defense sites. And as with Cambodia, where the public could be expected to understand the real circumstances, in some cases the reason for their strikes and the actual targets struck were obscured in official explanations.

## The Lavelle Case

THE ULTIMATE MISUSE of this phrase was the unauthorized bombing of North Vietnam, under the guise of "protective reaction," carried out by former Air Force Gen. John D. Lavelle. Lavelle was found guilty by the Air Force of essentially making a private and unauthorized interpretation of the rules. But the Lavelle case can also be viewed as almost predictable, considering the juggling act that was done with the private and public versions of air war.

The Lavelle case also brought out other peculiarities of this air war. It focused attention on the fact that the Navy and Air Force divide Vietnam into seven geographic segments—with targets sometimes swapped between services and with different types of weapons used.

It further showed that the first real air boss, or single commander, of all Navy and Air Force operations in Vietnam is in Honolulu at the U.S. Pacific Command, and not in Saigon. In most cases, this set-up has worked well. But the situation in Saigon at times has been reminiscent of a negotiation among rival Navy and Air Force air barons, which weakens rather than strengthens proper control.

The Lavelle case is looked upon as an aberration by most military men. But some top Air Force commanders privately express deep concern that it took a sergeant to blow the whistle on falsified bombing reports ordered by Lavelle while a few hundred officers in his command stood silent.

## Where the Bombs Fell

THROUGH MORE THAN eight years of air war, the Pentagon has refused to disclose how many bombs the United States has dropped on the individual countries of Southeast Asia. The total for all of Southeast Asia is released, but there is no way for anyone to know officially that almost 5 million tons of bombs have been dropped on South Vietnam, which we are trying to save, while more than 1 million have been dropped on North Vietnam. The rest is divided unevenly and unofficially between Laos and Cambodia.

STRATEGY: TO WHAT OUTCOME? ... CONTINUED

have forgotten how the U-2 incident and the anti-American riots in Japan had hurt him in 1960, how the Cuban missile crisis defeated him in 1962 and how the bomb halt almost madebert Humphrey President in 1968.

Thus the North Vietnamese wanted a signed agreement; Mr. Nixon wanted a quietus. The Oct. 26 press conference was his way of telling them that though he had got his quietus, they wouldn't get his signature. The Oct. 31 date on which they thought he had promised to sign a peace was now off. They had been had. The President had now begun to consult those whose advice he had neglected during the period when he needed the quietus. He was told that a signing of the Oct. 31 points would bring a collapse of Gen. Tableu, a Communist takeover, a McGovern-style solution. So he changed his mind and began to press for modification in the nine points. The North Vietnamese, feeling cheated, now proposed their own modifications.

What the technical sticking points were in Paris we need not know. The real sticking point to the Oct. 31 agreement is that Mr. Nixon now holds the cards and knows it. Hence he can get a better peace than he had earlier agreed to, a better peace than he offered publicly on May 8 when things looked a lot bleaker. There is very little the North Vietnamese can do about this without great power backing.

The Russians, waiting for the tardy arrival of U.S. wheat shipments to avert localized starvation, are a weak reed for Hanoi. The Chinese may be sturdier allies but the key point here is not-what aid they give but whether they are willing to commit troops in Vietnam or even Korea. If Mr. Nixon does not fear a land war with them, it matters little what support they give to Hanoi.

For it was only the prudent desire to avoid a confrontation with China that gave the United States a stake in the survival of North Vietnam. Our desire to preserve Hanoi as a buffer against China was more important than moral scruple in limiting the bombing under President Johnson.

The Peking summit changed all that. Until such time as there is a change in Chinese leadership, the United

States has no stake in the survival of North Vietnam as the preponderant power in Indochina. Neither does Russia. Neither does China. What Mr. Nixon is now doing to bring this point home to Hanoi is the ugliest thing Americans have seen a President do for many a Christmas, but what is to stop him?

Richard Helms, it is said, will no longer be on hand to leak pessimism from the CIA. Elliot Richardson will be frozen out at the first whisper of disloyalty. William Rogers and Henry Kissinger have been through the Vietnam wringer often enough with Mr. Nixon to be awed by the President's guts.

As for Congress, the President has shown himself willing to sacrifice domestic programs in order to face down his Capitol critics in pursuing his foreign policy objectives.

## Three Types of Settlement

THE KEY QUESTION, then, is whether there exists a peace settlement which Mr. Nixon could accept and whether there is anyone he trusts to negotiate it. If not, the war will go on.

There are three broad types of settlement, each with its own price and risks. None is wholly satisfactory, but that is the nature of Vietnam. None, from the most moderate to the most bloody, is ruled out by Mr. Nixon's action to date.

1. The Laotian-style (or "leopard spot") agreement: This involves an in-place cease-fire, a freeze on spheres of influence, a low level of violence, a good bit of Communist cheating, continuing clandestine American involvement, but no major disruptions. The Paris negotiations aimed at such an agreement, which has worked in Laos for some time. The offer of reconstruction aid for North Vietnam was intended to create a climate for it to work in Vietnam. The presence at Paris of William Sullivan, our former ambassador to Laos, was an attempt to demonstrate American good faith. The talk about elections, coalitions, international police forces and whatnot are

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

Other factors have also served to weaken what would normally be considered checks on the use of military power in a democratic society. The air war is not only remote and impersonal, but the men who fight it are professionals not given to protest. The casualties are fewer, and they apparently are acceptable to a public that has rejected the higher costs of a continued American land war in Southeast Asia—although the recent heavy loss of B-52s, each with a six-man crew, in a bombing campaign linked to a fuzzy dispute in Paris could change things.

Because air war is so remote, so hard to visualize, and because so much of it takes place out of reach of inspection of any kind, it is a form of firepower that is much easier for a President, any President, to invoke.

Thus far, the invocation of American air power has not been met by any

similarly dramatic escalation by the other side. There have been no air attacks, for example, on Saigon or Dangang or anywhere in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese have waged their war on the ground and do not have much capability to strike from the air even if they wanted to.

But they could be given that capability in the form of bombers or surface-to-surface missiles should their backers in Russia and China be sufficiently outraged by B-52 attacks.

The use of air power undoubtedly played a role in turning back Hanoi's major offensive launched last April. But attention still must be given to the questions of control over such power and the requirement to explain how and why that power was and is being used. In the long run, those questions and answers are more important than whether the bombs landed on target.

5-F

WASHINGTON POST 25 DECEMBER 1972

Hanoi Says
POWs Get
Good Care

From News Dispatches

SAIGON, Dec. 24—Hanoi says that though the hearts of the North Vietnamese people are “burning with wrath” over the massive U.S. bombing of the country, they are nevertheless “unanimously determined to continue to provide humane treatment to captured enemy pilots.”

Scores of Hanoi radio broadcasts this past week have portrayed North Vietnam as a nation being cruelly devastated, but still turning the other cheek to care for the American pilots captured while bombing it.

Through the first six days of

the renewed bombing campaign, the U.S., command has acknowledged at least 17 planes downed with 69 American crewmen listed as missing.

This number represents 13 per cent of the total number of 481 Americans known to be prisoners in North Vietnam prior to the resumption of the bombing Dec. 18 above the 20th parallel.

North Vietnam has presented 19 of the newly captured airmen to newsmen in Hanoi. Two others missed the news conference because they were badly wounded, according to Hanoi.

"Since August 1964, hundreds of American enemy pilots who had been guilty of crimes committed in the North and were subsequently captured have been meticulously protected and provided with conditions for comfortable living," Hanoi radio said last week. "Those who were wounded and captured while

committing their crimes were provided with timely medical care."

Hanoi Radio also said at another point:

"Had the Nixon administration honored its agreements with the government of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam and observed the time Oct. 31 set for signing the accord on ending the war ... how many American families would now be enjoying reunion?"

North Vietnam repeatedly has claimed that last Wednesday and Thursday, American bombs hit and damaged the main American prisoner of war camp in Hanoi dubbed the "Hanoi Hilton." A number of American prisoners were reported wounded.

White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler emphasized last week that the United States holds Hanoi "responsible and accountable" for the

safety of American POWs during U.S. air attacks, and said North Vietnam is responsible for not retaining POWs in or near military target areas.

But North Vietnam has repeatedly insisted that the POW camp is "situated in a populated zone of Hanoi, near some embassies and containing no military targets."

"Nixon," said a Radio Hanoi commentary, "is precisely the one who has committed crimes of utmost cruelty against the people of Vietnam and he even poses a threat to the lives of American pilots captured here."

Some relatives of American POWs have accused Nixon of risking the prisoners' lives. A nationwide interfaith group of 44 religious leaders has accused the Nixon administration of "aborting the possibility and betraying the duty of peace" by resuming the bombing.

only window dressing for this approach. The crucial thing is a stable balance of forces and the willingness of all parties not to disrupt it in a major way.

If there is to be a quick settlement it will still be along these lines. In this case, Mr. Nixon's current actions will be read backward as an attempt to convince Hanoi that he seriously wants a Laotian stabilization, not a "figleaf" for surrender. And indeed, the credible threat of American bombing is a technical prerequisite to this approach, which requires that all parties be prepared to disrupt massively in order to assure that each will cheat only minimally. The preparations for another North Vietnamese offensive which the administration says have forced it to resume full-scale bombing, as well as the speedup in U.S. arms shipments to Saigon after Oct. 26, both fit into this pattern.

2. The Korean-style solution (or "victory"): the expulsion of all North Vietnamese troops from the South, the firm establishment of the DMZ, the territorial integrity of South Vietnam with a centralized anti-Communist regime within its present boundaries. This would involve a devastation of North Vietnam to the extent that its army is needed merely to rebuild the country. According to intelligence reports leaked to The New York Times over the summer, this would require two years of intensive bombing. It is objectionable on moral grounds and it would cost a lot of money for planes, a lot of good will at home and abroad. But it is not infeasible and not ruled out by the President's current action. Indeed, the President himself has made no public statement since May of what acts the North Vietnamese could take short of withdrawal that would be satisfactory to him. Why should he, until he sees how hard he can shove them, and how many press conferences he can pump out of Henry Kissinger?

3. The confederal (or "patchwork") solution: It is unlikely that a long-term stabilization of Vietnam will be quickly achieved, but if it were it

would require that spheres of influence be supported by redrawn political boundaries and new constitutional arrangements. It has been clear for some time that South Vietnam cannot defend its northernmost I Corps area without massive American bombing support, so in any redrawing some sort of Hue-based buffer area loosely associated with Saigon but effectively acting as a North Vietnamese sphere of influence would reflect the actual results of the war. Local guarantees of autonomy in South Vietnam and some additional buffer areas in Laos and Cambodia policed by international forces could separate the North and South Vietnamese armies in a way that a Laotian-style agreement cannot. The Paris negotiations still remain far from this decentralized approach, which would limit Saigon's sovereignty without extending that of Hanoi.

A Moral Danger

IT IS OFTEN ARGUED that any approach that involves the United States in minute constitutional arrangements could reinvolve us in case these broke down. That is correct. But the risk of reinvolvement is run in any plan an American President can accept. The United States has spent 18 years making the Vietnam mess; no negotiating proposal is realistic that assumes we can abruptly turn our backs on it.

I have said nothing about the duplicity, bloodthirstiness and determination of the North Vietnamese. But this hardly needs reiterating. They are out for all they can get, and they would of course like to escape paying the consequences for the failure of their spring invasion. They would prefer, despite this failure, to retain the chance of taking all of South Vietnam in the next four years.

But Mr. Nixon also has his problem facing reality. He has won a test of will in a nine-month display of bargaining ability far more impressive and harrowing than the Cuban missile crisis. He has won a landslide election of record proportions. But he has not won for President Thieu the right to rule undisputed over all of South Viet-

nam. Nothing less than the threat of destroying the North will accomplish this aim. If he has some more humane outcome in mind, he might propose it in terms that Hanoi could say "yes" to, as they did under similar duress to his earlier, pre-election proposal.

The longer the President waits to make an authoritative new proposal or to reaffirm his old one, the more senseless his punishment of the North will appear. He has, in effect, reopened his options on Vietnam by generating uncertainty on a few key points: whether Kissinger can still act for him; whether he is still committed to the framework of the Oct. 31 points; whether he intends to guarantee the Communists some lasting base of power in the South; whether he is willing to allow them some face-saving pretext for signing (such as a holiday bombing pause) after the double humiliation of postponement and bombing.

If he does get them to sign, he will probably get a better, tougher deal for America in the narrow context of Vietnam than could have been the case before the renewed bombing. The danger of prolonging the uncertainties is thus not so much prudential as moral. It is not the Russians and Chinese so much as the American people who can now foil the plan for Vietnam in Mr. Nixon's larger design. One cannot hide from them the brute outlines of what is going on. The danger is that, unable to bear the long-drawn-out spectacle of naked power, the public will see foreign policy and the presidency itself as a dirty, petty business fit only for short-term calculations and small-time operators.

The strata from which America recruited its foreign policy constituency in the past have already begun to turn inward, probably irrevocably, under the pressure of Vietnam. The danger now is that those who must replace them will be able to understand America's role only in terms of pushing and shoving. protectionist measures, narrow commercial deals, bluff and blackmail, America was made to give the world more than this.

6-F

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1972

# A Shrewdness of Kissingers: I

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—Numerous words are applied to groups of differing species including a school of fish; an ostentation of peacocks, a pride of lions, a swarm of bees and a shrewdness of apes. In considering the contemporary Kissinger Phenomenon—which exists in other countries besides the United States—I have decided that perhaps the most apt word applicable to this particular species is shrewdness; not, because they are in any way apish but, they have to be unusually astute.

Henry Kissinger, who gives his name to this form of super-counsellor, is not the first in American history. Before him there came such Presidential advisers as Colonel House (for Wilson), Harry Hopkins (for Roosevelt), Mac Bundy (for Kennedy) and Walt Rostow (for Johnson). In the autumn of 1948, when it seemed certain Dewey would be elected U.S. President, I asked his principal foreign affairs expert, John Foster Dulles, whether he would be Secretary of State.

"I haven't yet decided," said Dulles with beguiling absence of modesty. He wasn't certain whether he wanted the job. He might prefer a position like House or Hopkins who had "much more fun." Dulles complained the secretary was too tied up with political maneuvers. In the event, Truman defeated Dewey and Dulles had to wait

four years for Eisenhower's victory. He solved his problem by becoming Secretary of State and serving as his own Kissinger.

Henry Kissinger has proven to be the outstanding Kissinger in American experience and also the outstanding international "Kissinger." But, in varying degrees and with differing operational methods, other Kissingers are active abroad,

A.M. Aleksandrov, assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party, is Brezhnev's Kissinger. Aleksandrov, a quiet, cautious man who speaks good English and adequate French, is attached to the Russian boss's office and handles important policy matters. He travels with Brezhnev and plays a key role in many negotiations.

Gen. Aharon Yariv, former chief of Israeli intelligence, is now said to be Golda Meir's Kissinger. He is a slender, fit, cool officer, unemotional and objective. Egon Bahr, a short, square, 50-year-old German civil servant with long thin nose, mouse-colored hair and brown eyes, is the equivalent of Willy Brandt's Kissinger. A former journalist, he is renowned for his discretion. Some people call him "the fox in the chancery."

Brandt told me: "There is one big difference between our type of government and yours. I have a Cabinet in a different sense than Nixon. While I make decisions on the general lines of foreign policy, my Foreign Minister (Scheel, who also heads the Liberal party in Brandt's coalition) is still responsible for policy vis-à-vis Parliament.

"Bahr gets only ad hoc tasks. And there is stronger coordination between his work and the Foreign Ministry than is the practice in the U.S.A. Kissinger deals with all your foreign policy. Bahr is more my ambassador at large. First he worked on negotiations with Moscow. Then on Berlin and relations with the G.D.R. (East Germany). So it is really different. But I suppose Bahr might be called the nearest thing I have to a Kissinger."

The English Kissinger—or the nearest equivalent—is Sir Burke St. John Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet. Trend is a tall, pale, white-haired man with glasses. He graduated from Oxford where he studied the classics and, after entering the Civil Service, worked for the Education Ministry, then the Treasury. His particular role will be discussed in more detail later.

French President Pompidou likewise has his Kissinger, a short, thin, subtle and highly intelligent man of 51-named

Michel Jobert. Under the Fifth Republic established by de Gaulle, the President has great executive power. Therefore the Secretary-General of the Elysée Palace (presidential residence) has enormous influence although he is rarely well known to the public.

When Etienne Burin de Roziers (now French Ambassador to the Common Market) was de Gaulle's Secretary-General, he was perhaps the second most important man in France although few people were aware of this. The same might now be said of Jobert.

Although, apart from stenographers, he has only two full-time staff members and all told there are only fifteen, including experts on monetary matters, internal affairs and foreign policy, his scope is in some ways even larger than Henry Kissinger's. This and similar comparisons will be discussed in subsequent column.

Harvard's ugly sanctimony

Closed minds and Rhodes scholarships are not generally thought to be compatible.

But Terry Valenzuela, the latest Phoenix resident to be named a Rhodes scholar, certainly demonstrated that they are not always mutually antithetical.

When asked by a reporter whether he thought presidential adviser Henry Kissinger would return to the Harvard University faculty, Valenzuela, a Harvard senior, said Kissinger was not wanted back by students because "he is so closely identified with the war and the Nixon administration."

Of course, Harvard and several other large universities have exhibited this kind of bigotry before.

McGeorge Bundy, Harvard's dean of the arts and sciences faculty when he became a Southeast Asia adviser to President Kennedy, in 1961, found no welcome mat at Harvard when he left the Johnson administration five years later.

Bundy was a war criminal in the eyes of former academic colleagues. Instead of returning to Harvard, he became president of the Ford Foundation.

Walt Whitman Rostow, himself a former Rhodes scholar, joined the Kennedy inner circle in 1960 after 10 years as a professor of economic history at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Rostow was also instrumental in formulating U.S. Vietnam policy during the Kennedy-Johnson years, but was hounded from MIT when he sought to return

there in 1967. He now teaches at the University of Texas in Austin.

John P. Roche, former national chairman of Americans for Democratic Action who taught at Brandeis University for 10 years before he joined the Johnson administration in 1966, was allowed to rejoin the Brandeis faculty. But he is openly scorned as a war criminal.

Daniel P. Moynihan, the eminent urbanologist who has advised three presidents, has been treated with similar contempt since he returned to Harvard.

And Dean Rusk, President Johnson's secretary of State and former faculty dean at Mills College, was also the target of abuse when he later joined the law faculty at the University of Georgia.

It is especially ironic that Cecil Rhodes, the British colonialist who endowed the program, believed strongly in the expansion of Anglo-Saxon influence with a view to securing the peace of the world.

Rhodes would have been among the loudest supporters of U.S. policies in Southeast Asia.

But Rhodes was a tolerant and generous man. He believed that his scholarships would give breadth to the views of young men studying in England "at the most critical period of their lives."

It can only be hoped that Arizona's 10th Rhodes scholar since 1949 will return from his studies at Oxford University with a little less of the unsavory Harvard sanctimony he now voices.

Crime is crime

It is a dividend to society when a police officer making a routine traffic arrest discovers that the offending driver also has a back seat full of stolen TV sets.

Thus, it would be poor law if airport security personnel were inhibited from making an arrest for any obvious crime while searching passengers' hand luggage.

An unnamed assistant U.S. attorney in Phoenix was quoted last week as saying that evidence not relating to federal skyjacking laws

"an officer need not close his eyes to evidence of other crimes which he may discover."

On the federal level, Judge Jack Weinstein of New York district court ruled 18 months ago that "seizure of evidence in crimes other than those involved in boarding aircraft with a weapon is justified."

Some of the current enforcement timidity stems from (a) fear by government and airline officials that expanded arrest powers at screening points would provoke mental challenges of the skyjacking

Does it all hang together? Let me try.

This is cattle country, Black Angus country, and the birth of a calf is nothing that one calls the Rappahanock News to report. Neither was there anything exceptional about Monday morning. It was cold.

When I went outside at 7:15, to bring in some firewood and to hoist a flag on the No. 2 pole, a north wind snatched at the banner, and the flag flapped like a great wild bird in my hands.

On the ridge across the ravine, in black silhouette against the sullen sky, the cow lay in labor. She was stretched on her right side, belly heaving, her dark head straining against the ground. I put the kindling on the hearth. My wife was at the glass door, watching the cow. "I think we're having a calf," she said.

Up in New York City, a thousand light years to the east, Frank McGee and Barbara Walters were chatting

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rebirth.

The relig
temporarily
Lans Deo is
dead long

Yet of chri
day in wh
sun, as the
birth of Ch
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platon

Today's quote

Vice President Spiro Agnew, remarking on the United Farmworkers Union campaign to recall Gov. Jack Williams because of the union's opposition to Arizona's farm labor law, during a speech to Republican contributors in Phoenix:

I am conversant with a rather im-
tinent local issue that has surfaced here
concerning your governor. I was not
asked any questions about it at the air-
port today, but I would simply make

SPIEGEL Titel

Bomber-Beladung auf dem US-Flugzeugträger „Constellation", Bombenopfer in Nordvietnam, zerstörte Stadt in Nordvietnam:

Kissinger - Cowboy ohne Revolver?

Das Ende des Vietnam-Krieges schien vor wenigen Wochen näher denn je - doch seit vorigem Montag fliegt Amerikas Luftwaffe gegen Nordvietnam die brutalsten

Angriffe in der Geschichte dieses Krieges. Wenn Amerika in die alten Fehler seiner Vietnampolitik zurückfällt, ist Henry Kissinger gescheitert - politisch und intellektuell.

Is Henry Kissinger am Mittwoch, dem 13. Dezember, auf der Andrews Air Force Base in Washington aus einer Sondermaschine kletterte, hatte er noch Sinn für Scherze. „Dr. Kissinger, glauben Sie, daß der Friede in greifbarer Nähe liegt?“ fragte ihn ein Reporter. Kissinger: „Das ist eine hübsche Formulierung, wer hat denn die gebraucht?“

Kissinger selbst hatte sie gebraucht, jener Friedenshändler, Reiseweltgeist und Politphilosoph Henry A. Kissinger, der unter dem unscheinbaren Titel „Sonderberater des Präsidenten für Fragen der nationalen Sicherheit“ seit fast vier Jahren der wahre Außen- und Verkeidigungsminister der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika ist, ein Intellektueller unter der aus Anwaltskanzleien und Werbeagenturen stammenden White-House-Besatzung und insofern ein „Kilimandscharo in dürrer Ebene“ („The New York Times“).

„Peace is at hand“, war die klare Auskunft, die der sonst stets vorsichtig formulierende Kissinger der hoffenden Welt am 26. Oktober gegeben hatte, als ans Licht gekommen war, was das geheimdiplomatische Meisterstück des 20. Jahrhunderts hätte sein können: daß Washington und Hanoi ein Vietnam-Papier ausgehandelt hatten, das zur Unterschrift bereitzuliegen schien. Kissinger damals: „Wir können nicht scheitern, und wir werden nicht scheitern.“

Diese öffentlich erklärte Zuversicht des ebenso verschwiegenen wie diszipli-

nierten und skeptischen Nixon-Beraters versetzte Amerika in Euphorie. Immer wieder hatten die Vietnam-Verhandlungen Friedenserwartungen geweckt und dann enttäuscht, hatten Politiker und Militärs Chancen erkannt, die dann keine waren — diesmal aber schien das Licht am Ende des „Tunnels“, in dem Präsident Kennedy Amerika bereits 1962 gesehen hatte, tatsächlich zu leuchten.

Doch von Woche zu Woche wurde es kleiner, und schließlich trat ein müder, kleinlauter, offenkundig angeschlagener Kissinger vor denselben babyblauen Vorhang im Presseraum des Weißen Hauses, vor dem er sieben Wochen zuvor — ernst und ernstgenommen — Zuversicht verbreitet hatte.

Die Stimmung war feindselig und gerreizt. Über eine Stunde lang hatten über 100 Journalisten in dem kleinen Raum auf Kissinger gewartet. Er kam im dunklen Anzug, mit breitgestreiftem Hemd. Das übliche scherzhafte Geplänkel Kissingers mit Nixons Presse-sprecher Ronald Ziegler unterblieb, kein freundliches, erkennendes Nicken des Mannes mit dem Eulenblick für die Reporter in der ersten Reihe.

Kein Scherz, keine Brillanz und kein Echo auch später: Es war Kissingers „schwierigste, vagste und trübsinnigste Darlegung der Außenpolitik in seiner brillanten Karriere im Weißen Haus“, schrieb die „Washington Post“. Er verkündete, daß er seine Pariser Friedensgespräche vorerst nicht fortsetzen werde.

Mit flacher, gepreßter Stimme, langsam und monoton sprechend, schob Kissinger den Nordvietnamesen alle Schuld am Scheitern des Abkommens zu, das er noch immer für 99prozentig ausgehandelt hielt. Statt der üblichen Ironie sprach Wehleidigkeit aus seiner Darstellung, als er beklagte, daß die Nordvietnamesen insgesamt 17 Details hätten ändern wollen, und, nachdem diese bis auf zwei erledigt gewesen seien, erneut 16 Varianten vorgeschlagen hätten.

Sorgsam vermied Kissinger jeden Hinweis darauf, daß es zuerst die Amerikaner gewesen waren und nicht die Nordvietnamesen, die Nachbesserungen an dem Neun-Punkte-Papier verlangt hatten. Sorgsam überging er alle Fragen, wieso Washington im nachhinein noch die kapitale Forderung erhoben hatte, Nordvietnam solle das Regime in Saigon respektieren. Als ein Reporter nochmals nachhakte („Liegt denn hier nicht die fundamentale Uneinigkeit?“), kam eine Stimme aus dem Hintergrund dem Vietnam-Unterhändler zu Hilfe. Ronald Ziegler kündigte das Ende der Pressekonferenz an: „Henry muß jetzt gehen.“

Henry mußte gehen, als erkennbar wurde, daß Washington den Preis drastisch erhöht hatte und daß, wer diesen Preis forderte, kaum noch bona fide sein konnte, Hanoi werde kontrahieren: Amerika verlangte nicht weniger, als daß Nordvietnam auf seine Definition des Vietnamkriegs verzichtete. Denn in

52

Nach sieben Wochen Hoffnung ein Rückfall in die Steinzeit

der Sicht Hanois gibt es nur ein Viet-
nam, ist der Krieg ein Bürgerkrieg, die
Regierung in Saigon illegitim.

Für einen Waffenstillstand war diese
brisante Glaubens- und Grundsatzfrage
belanglos. Jetzt tat Kissinger plötz-
lich so, als habe er nie am Legitimitäts-
anspruch des südlichen Teilstaats ge-
zweifelt. Beklommen verließen die
Presseleute das Weiße Haus.

Abermals zwei Tage später erfuhr die Welt, daß Präsident Nixon möglicherweise entschlossen ist, wahr zu machen, was ein amerikanischer Luftwaffengeral einmal als mögliche Lösung des Vietnamkriegs empfahl: „Wir könnten Nordvietnam in die Steinzeit zurückbomben.“ „Dabei laufen die Vereinigten Staaten selbst Gefahr, in eine Steinzeit-Barbarei zu verfallen und einiges von dem zu zerstören, was an der amerikanischen Zivilisation besonders erhaltenswert ist“, schrieb jetzt die „New York Times“.

Stieß Kissinger auf den Widerstand
seines eigenen Chefs?

Ohne Ankündigung hob Nixon den
am 22. Oktober mit Rücksicht auf die
Schlußphase der Pariser Verhandlungen
erlassenen Teil-Bombenstopp wieder
auf, und seit vorigen Montag fallen
Schwärme amerikanischer Bomber er-
neut über jenes kleine Land her, dessen
Fabriken, Straßen, Schulen und Häuser
sie schon mehrmals in Ruinen verwan-
delt haben, das sie aber entgegen allen
Voraussagen dennoch nicht kapitula-
tionsreif bombten.

Es waren, wie das Pentagon ausdrück-
lich verkündete, die schwersten Luftan-
griffe, die bislang gegen Nordvietnam
geflogen wurden, ausgeführt allein am
Dienstag von über 100 der 200 in Süd-
ostasien stationierten achtstrahligen

strategischen B-52-Bomber und Hunder-
ten taktischer Kampfflugzeuge. Erst-
mais wurden offenbar die Kraftwerke
und Transformatorenstationen der
Hauptstadt getroffen, so daß Radio
Hanoi zeitweise nicht senden konnte.
Erstmals allerdings auch verloren die
USA drei B-52 an einem einzigen Tag,
wurde ein amerikanischer Lenkwaffen-
Zerstörer im Golf von Tonkin von der
Küsten-Artillerie getroffen.

Wie in den Tagen der Johnson-Ära
erfaßte eine Protestwelle die gegen
Vietnam und seine Leiden längst im-
mun gewordene Welt. Schwedens Au-
ßenminister: „Blind und bru-
tal“, Frankreichs „Figaro“:
„Beispiellose Eskalation“,
Roms Papst (allerdings auf
beide Seiten gemünzt): „Heu-
chelei.“ Amerika, das gerade
sein Raumschiff Apollo 17 er-
folgreich aufgefischt hatte,
legte einen politischen Offen-
barungseid ab: Zum Mond
fliegen kann es, doch auf der
Erde Frieden machen, das
kann es nicht.

Der zweite Tag der neuen
Luftoffensive, der 19. Dezem-
ber, war der 26. Jahrestag des
Krieges in Vietnam — eines
Krieges, der sich grausamer
für die Menschen, die ihn er-
leiden, und absurder für die
Mächte, die ihn führen, kaum
denken läßt.

Vietnam, Nord wie Süd, ist
heute weithin eine Krater-
landschaft, entstellt von Na-
palm, Gas, Stahl und Dyna-
mit. Zwei kommunistische
Weltmächte haben nicht ver-
hindert, daß sieben Millionen
Tonnen US-Bomben auf die-
ses Land niedergingen (gegen-
über zwei Millionen, die im

Zweiten Weltkrieg geworfen wurden). Und die Bomben wiederum haben nicht verhindern können, daß Vietnam die wahrscheinlich größte Katastrophe der amerikanischen Geschichte wurde mit noch immer unabsehbaren Folgen für Macht, Moral und Selbstverständnis der stärksten Nation der westlichen Welt.

Zuerst hatte Amerika in Vietnam den Kommunismus eindämmen, zuletzt nur noch den sogenannten ehrenvollen Abzug erstreiten wollen — beides nicht nur moralisch, sondern auch politisch dubiose Ziele. Im Dezember 1972 aber nahm Amerika auch noch den Ruch auf sich, den Krieg nur noch für eine (wie Washington behauptete) Politur an Vertragsklauseln weiterzuführen, die in der Substanz schon ausgehandelt waren — oder aber in der aberwitzigen Absicht, den Gegner durch physische Vernichtung doch noch zur Kapitulation zu zwingen.

Warum hatte Nixon aber dann das Neun-Punkte-Papier überhaupt aushändeln lassen? Etwa nur, um vor den amerikanischen Präsidentschaftswahlen am 7. November Pseudo-Friedensstimmung zu verbreiten und danach Wahlen um so ungehemmter auf Sieg bomben zu können. Richard Nixon fiel mitsamt seinem Kissinger in jene Glaubwürdigkeitslücke, die seinem Vorgänger Johnson die Präsidentschaft verleidet hatte.

Henry Kissinger war als Nixons
Chefberater, was Vietnam angeht, ge-
wiß nie eine Taube gewesen. Daß er

• Mit Dolmetscher (Mitte).

Unterhändler Kissinger, Tho*: Täuschende Bilder

DER SPIEGEL, Nr. 53/1972

aber mit diesem neuerlichen Rückfall in den alten Krieg und die alten Fehler einverstanden war, ist zumindest zweifelhaft. So mehnten sich denn in den letzten drei Wochen die Gerüchte, daß Kissinger mit seinem Neun-Punkte-Papier nicht nur — wie bis dahin angenommen — auf den Widerstand des Saigoner Staatschefs Thieu, sondern auch auf den seines eigenen Präsidenten gestoßen sei.

Victor Zorza, eigentlich Kreml-Astrologe, machte sich an die „Washingtonologie" — und fand Erstaunliches: Auf seiner „Peace is at hand"-Pressekonferenz am 26. Oktober hatte Kissinger insgesamt dreimal gesagt, der Präsident wolle oder meine etwas, auf seiner Pressekonferenz vom vorletzten Samstag hingegen 14mal.

## Schleswig-Holstein als Vorbild für Vietnam.

Ein grundlegender Dissens zwischen Nixon und seinem außenpolitischen Alter ego ist wahrscheinlich, ergibt sich sogar beinahe zwangsläufig aus den gemeinsamen wie den gegensätzlichen, den menschlichen wie politischen Leitlinien des Duos an der Spitze der USA: Für Nixon, den gerade im Triumph wiedergewählten Macher, der sich einen Denker leistet, hat sich mit der Wiederaufnahme der Bombardements politisch nicht viel geändert. Für Kissinger hingegen, den Denker, der zeigen wollte, daß er auch machen kann, wäre ein endgültiger Rückfall in den alten Krieg mit dem vagen Irrlicht am Ende des Tunnels eine vielleicht noch politisch, mit Sicherheit aber nicht intellektuell annehmbare Lösung.

Denn dieser Kissinger, Jahrgang 1923, deutscher Jude aus Fürth in Bayern, 1938 mit seinen Eltern in die USA emigriert und 1954 in Harvard mit einer Arbeit über Metternich zum Doktor der Geschichte promoviert, hatte 1968 immerhin eine Woche gebraucht, um sich zu entscheiden, ob er, der Intellektuelle, es sich leisten konnte, in die Dienste eines Nixon zu treten, jenes Ex-Advokaten, der das personifizierte Middle America ist. Kissinger sagte schließlich zu, als er bei Nixon — unreflektiert — wiederfand, was er selbst sich gedanklich erarbeitet hatte: daß sich Amerika, seiner Kraftakte in aller Welt überdrüssig, auf sich selbst besinnen, sein „Profil niedriger" sehen, seine Außenpolitik stärker an den Reaalitäten ausrichten müsse.

Wer dies als Kissinger im Bund mit Nixon versuchen wollte, mußte sich zuzauen, mit der „Polarisierung zwischen Leuten, die nur denken, und Leuten, die nur handeln" fertig zu werden, „eine der Kernfragen unserer Zeit" (so Kissinger in einem SPIEGEL-Gespräch unmittelbar vor seinem Amtsantritt im Januar 1969). Als aufrichtiger Skeptiker

fügte Kissinger damals hinzu: „Ich weiß nicht, ob ich sie lösen kann." Um sie zu lösen, jagte er in den folgenden Jahren bis zum Mond und zurück — so weit (800 000 Kilometer) sind zusammengerechnet seine Ausfahrten kreuz und quer über den Globus.

Den Präsidenten und den Professor verband der Glaube an die Kraft von Ordnung und Recht, die Solidarität der sozialen Außenseiter, die durch Kampf hochgekommen sind, und schließlich jene Vorliebe für eine einfallsreiche Politik abseits von Öffentlichkeit, Parla-

ment und Bürokratie, die Kissingers Vorbilder Metternich und Bismarck zum Erfolg geführt hatte. Die „Schleswig-Holstein-question", in der Bismarck 1864 das widerstrebende Österreich auf seine Seite komplimentierte, galt dem Deutsch-Amerikaner Kissinger stets als Muster eines schwierigen Verhandlungsfalls.

Doch wenn die „Schleswig-Holstein-question" je Muster für Vietnam gewesen ist, werden hier Kissingers Grenzen deutlich: Seinem politischen Grundkonzept haftet etwas penetrant Akademi:sches an — bei aller Phantasie und Umsicht in der Ausführung.

Vietnam war für Kissinger im Januar 1969 „ein sehr schwieriges und tragig-

sches Problem" — nicht mehr. Wenig später, im April 1969, antwortete er den amerikanischen Kongreß-Abgeordneten McCloskey und Riegle auf deren Dränngen, wann die Regierung ihr Versprechen erfüllen werde, Frieden in Vietnam zu machen: „Wartet! Gebt uns noch sechzig bis neunzig Tage! In der Zwischenzeit schweigt, bitte!"

In der Zwischenzeit übte sich der Intellektuelle im Machen. Er setzte seinen Stab — 46 Mann — an, die Bürokratie (11 000 Mann Außenamt, 27 000 Mann Pentagon) zu außenpolitischer Detail-

planung und zur Erarbeitung von Alternativen für konkrete Fälle zu veranlassen: eine in dieser Präzision nie gekannte Intellektualisierung der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, gesteuert von Henry Kissinger.

Über Kissingers Schreibtisch laufen sämtliche für Nixon bestimmten Vorlagen des Außen- und Verteidigungsmiisteriums sowie die des Geheimdienstes CIA. Kissinger bestimmt und redigiert die entscheidungsreifen Alternativen, die der Präsident zu sehen bekommt, der auf diese Weise völlig abgeschirmt wird. Umgekehrt ist Kissinger zugegen bei allen wichtigen Gesprächen zwischen Präsident und Ministern, allen wichtigen Staatsbesuchen, allen Reisen — ein aufreibernder Job, der dem Mann im Zentrum der Macht doch noch genügend Zeit ließ, mit immer neuen exklusiven Schönen exklusive Restaurants zu besuchen.

Kein Zweifel: Kissinger sichert dem Präsidenten ein Maximum an Entscheidungshilfen bei einem Minimum an Zeitaufwand — und sich selbst einen unerhörten Einfluß, gemildert nur durch diesen Skeptizismus, der ihn vor den Mißgriffen seiner Vorgänger gleichermaßen zu bewahren schien wie die Perfektion des Systems. Noch 1969 antwortete Kissinger souverän auf die Frage asiatischer Journalisten, ob die Nixon-Administration nicht Gefahr laufe, in Vietnam die Fehler der Johnson-Administration zu wiederholen: „Nein, wir werden ihre Fehler nicht wiederholen. Wir werden unsere eigenen Fehler machen, und die werden ganz bestimmt unsere eigenen sein."

Im August 1969 schon traf sich Kissinger am Rande der in die 29. Runde driftenden Pariser Vietnam-Konferenz erstmals mit dem nordvietnamesischen Politbüro-Mitglied Le Duc Tho zu einem Geheimgespräch. Die Kontakte,

Denker Kissinger (r.), Chef: „Wir können nicht...

54

verborgen vor den Augen der Weltföf-
fentlichkeit, wurden zur Routine, bis
Präsident Nixon das Geheimnis am 25.
Januar 1972 lüftete.

Es blieb so lange gewahrt, weil Kis-
singer meist das Wochenende benutzte,
wenn in Washington jedermann annahm,
auch Henry pflege der Ruhe. In Wahr-
heit schlüpfte er Sonntag morgens auf
der Andrews Air Force Base in eine
nicht gekennzeichnete C-135 des Wei-
ßen Hauses, die ihn zum militärischen
Flughafen Frankfurt brachte, wo er in
einen Lockheed-Jetstar Richtung Villa-
coublay bei Paris umstieg. In einem Ci-
troën DS-21 mit verhängten Fenstern
fuhr er dann in den Pariser Vorort
Choisy-le-Roi, den Wohnort der nord-
vietnamesischen Delegation.

Nach etlichen Verhandlungsstunden
ging es auf dem gleichen Weg zurück,
im Flugzeug stets durch Spezialgeräte
mit „Quarterback“, so Nixons aus dem
Football entlehrter Codename, verbunden.
Einige Male schaffte Kissinger die
Tour hin und zurück in 27 Stunden, er
ließ seine Uhr auf Washingtoner Zeit
ingestellt und berichtete dem Präsidenten
mitunter in dessen Schlafzimmer.

Nixon wie Kissinger gingen davon
aus, daß Hanoi einen Verhandlungs-
frieden akzeptieren werde, wenn Wa-
shington nicht verlange, daß Hanoi das
Regime in Saigon auf die Dauer re-
spektiere. „Es kann doch nicht sein", so
Kissinger offenbar gegen eigene Zwei-
fel, „daß die Nordvietnamesen als ein-
ziges Volk sachlichen Argumenten nicht
zugänglich sind."

Im Dezember 1970 erfuhr der SPIEGEL im Weißen Haus, auf welche Vernunft-Formel das amerikanische Kriegsziel inzwischen geschrumpft war: Amerika, so hieß es damals, könne als Weltmacht nicht den Ruf riskieren, für den Zusammenbruch eines Verbündeten verantwortlich zu sein; es kämpfe demnach für ein „decent interval", eine Schamfrist zwischen dem Abzug seiner Landstreitkräfte und dem damit bereits in Kauf genommenen Zusammenbruch des Regimes in Südvietnam.

Sieg der Diplomatie
über das menschliche Leid.

Das Mittel, diese Intervall- oder
Fassaden-Idee in die Tat umzusetzen,
war die „Vietnamisierung“ des Krieges:
Die Streitkräfte Südviетnams sollten
das Intervall überbrücken können, da-
mit sich Amerika von den weiteren
Folgen seines Disengagements nicht be-
lastet zu fühlen brauchte.

Der amerikanisch-südvietnamesische
Einfall nach Kambodscha im April
1970 und die Invasion der Südviетna-
mesen nach Laos im Februar 1971
sollten dem Verhandlungspartner be-
weisen, daß die Vietnamisierung ein
Erfolg sei — doch damit hatten Nixon
und Kissinger endlich doch denselben

Fehler wiederholt wie Johnson: die
Nordvietnamesen durch militärischen
Druck verhandlungsbereiter machen zu
wollen.

Am 25. Januar 1972 enthüllte Nixon
ohne Absprache mit Hanoi, daß Ge-
heimverhandlungen stattgefunden hat-
ten und Amerika dabei ein letztes An-
gebot unterbreitet habe. Wenig später
unterbrach er demonstrativ die Pariser
Vietnam-Konferenz.

Washington glaubte sich diese Spra-
che leisten zu können, weil sich seine
weltpolitische Lage inzwischen drama-
tisch verbessert hatte — dank Henry
Kissinger. Insgeheim war er im Juli
1971 nach Peking gereist und hatte einen
Ausgleich zwischen dem mit Nordviet-
nam verbündeten China und den mit
Nordvietnam verfeindeten USA gema-
nagt. Als Mao Tse-tung im Februar
1972 dem Präsidenten der kapitalisti-
schen Vormacht Amerika in Peking die
Hand reichte, schien eine neue Phase

Während Nordvietnam in Trümmer
sank, sprachen Breschnew und Nixon in
Moskau über Sicherheit und Abrüstung.
Selbst Nordvietnam verhandelte weiter
— eine absurde diplomatische Welt,
spriessend auf dem Hintergrund uner-
meßlichen menschlichen Leids.

Nach zwei Stunden Pause
ein neuer Plan.

Der Durchbruch in Richtung auf einen Vietnam-Frieden kam an einem Sonntagmorgen. Als Washingtons Kissinger und Hanois Le Duc Tho am 8. Oktober zu ihrem 19. Gespräch zusammentrafen, eröffnete der Vietnamese auch diese Unterredung wieder mit der stets erhobenen Forderung, man könne nicht nur über einen Waffenstillstand verhandeln, man müsse zugleich auch über eine politische Lösung für Südvietnam diskutieren. Wie in 18 vorauf-

...und wir werden nicht scheitern": Planer Kissinger im Lageraum des Weißen Hauses

der „Nachkriegsgeschichte anzubrechen
und der Sieg der Diplomatie über die
Ideologie perfekt. Kissinger euphorisch:
„Was wir mit China unternehmen, ist so
gewaltigt, so historisch, daß für Vietnam
nur noch eine Fußnote in der Ge-
schichte übrigbleiben wird."

Am Karfreitag jedoch beantworteten
die angeblich ermatteten Nordvietna-
mesen die unheilige Allianz mit ihrer
seit der Tet-Offensive von 1968 größten
Operation. In großen Materialschlach-
ten eroberten sie die Provinz Quang Tri,
Teile des Zentralvietnamesischen Hoch-
lands und der Grenzprovinzen westlich
von Saigon. Nur Amerikas Minen und
Bomben, massiver geworfen als je zu-
vor, stoppten die Angreifer, ohne sie
wesentlich zurückdrängen zu können —
und die Diplomatie siegte immer noch.

Denn Moskau, durch den amerika-
nisch-chinesischen Ausgleich in die Ecke
gedrängt, lud den Vietnamkrieger Ni-
xon keineswegs von dem durch Kissin-
ger arrangierten Moskau-Besuch aus.

gegangenen Sitzungen lehnte Kissinger
ab.

Da bat Le Duc Tho um zwei Stunden
Verhandlungspause. Und als Henry
Kissinger schließlich von einem langen
Spaziergang durch den Wald von
Rambouillet zurückkehrte, präsentierte
ihm sein Kontrahent plötzlich einen
neuen Plan: Die Nordvietnamesen

▷ verzichteten auf ihre Forderung
nach Parallelverhandlungen über
Waffenstillstand und politische Re-
gelung;

▷ forderten nicht länger den Rücktritt
des Saigon-Präsidenten Thieu als
Vorbedingung für eine Friedensre-
gelung;

▷ beharrten nicht mehr auf einer süd-
vietnamesischen Koalitionsregierung
unter Einschluß des Vietcong.

Das entsprach, in großen Zügen,
einem Friedensplan, den Richard Nixon
auf den Tag genau fünf Monate vorher
vorgelegt hatte, der damals aber von

DER SPIEGEL, Nr. 53/1972

55

Reisender Kissinger (r.), Gastgeber Tschou: „Was wir mit China unternehmen...

den Nordvietnamesen abgelehnt worden war.

Warum Hanoi mit einemmal einlenkte, läßt sich allenfalls aus Indizien ergründen. Möglich ist, daß dreierlei zusammenspielte:

▷ Moskau und Peking, mit Nixon weitgehend ins reine gekommen, hatten ihre Schützlinge wahrscheinlich unter Druck gesetzt;

▷ die Dauer-Bombardements der Amerikaner hatten doch mehr Wirkung gehabt, als Hanoi zugeben mochte;

▷ die Nordvietnamesen, inzwischen von der Chancenlosigkeit ihres Favoriten George McGovern überzeugt, wollten noch vor den US-Wahlen mit Nixon handelseinig werden, weil sie fürchten mußten, ein wiedergewählter Nixon könne seine Drohung aus dem Juli wahr machen: „Wir könnten Nordvietnam an einem Nachmittag erledigen.“

## Vor dem Abflug nach Saigon
ein Brief vom Präsidenten.

Auf jeden Fall schien mit Le Duc Thos neuem Vorschlag das nahezu vier Jahre alte Verhandlungspatt beendet, schien Nixons Anfang Oktober geäußerter Optimismus nachträglich gerechtfertigt: Er rechne, so hatte der Präsident erklärt, noch vor Ablauf seiner ersten Amtsperiode mit einem Kriegsende in Vietnam, die Chancen seien „besser denn je zuvor“.

Kissinger — per Telephon und Telex in Dauer-Kontakt mit seinem Chef im Weißen Haus — und Le Duc Tho benötigten nun nur noch zwei Sitzungen von je 16 Stunden, bis sie einen Neun-Punkte-Plan ausgehandelt hatten. Überschrift: „Vereinbarung über die Beendigung des Krieges und die Wiederherstellung des Friedens in Vietnam.“ Der Vertrag, so planten die beiden Unterhändler, sollte nach Möglichkeit bis zum 31. Oktober unterzeichnet werden.

Doch bis dahin war es noch ein weiter Weg. Denn nach Le Duc Tho wartete auf Kissinger bereits ein anderer, noch schwierigerer Vietnamese: Saigons Präsident Nguyen Van Thieu.

Als Kissinger — nach zweitägigen Intensiv-Beratungen im Weißen Haus — gerade seine Sonder-Boeing-707 besteigen wollte, wurde ihm ein handgeschriebener Brief seines Chefs übergeben. Auf zwei blaßgrünen Seiten vermerkte Nixon: „Tun Sie, was für einen ehrenhaften Frieden erforderlich ist — ohne Rücksicht auf die Wahlen.“

Ein Friedensschluß in Vietnam, sinierte der Präsident, werde gewiß „ein leichtes Plus für die Wahlen“ bedeuten, wahrscheinlicher aber werde sich eine Regelung „aus einer Vielzahl von Gründen... als zweischneidiges Schwert“ erweisen.

Dennoch war Nixon offenbar überzeugt, sein Professor Kissinger werde auch mit Thieu schnell einig werden. Denn vier Tage nach Kissingers Ankunft in Saigon, am 22. Oktober, schrieb Nixon an Hanois Premier Pham Van Dong, Washington werde sich bemühen, den Ultimo-Termin einzuhalten.

Doch Thieu („Dieser Professor ist hierher gekommen, um sich bei uns den Friedensnobelpreis zu verdienen“) zertepte: „Ausverkauf!“ und weigerte sich, dem Abkommen zuzustimmen.

Und da Kissinger darauf bestand, die USA dürften nicht unterschreiben, bevor nicht alle Betroffenen zugestimmt hätten, mußte Nixon bereits am nächsten Tag ein zweites Mal an Pham Van Dong schreiben: Zu seinem Bedauern müsse der Unterzeichnungstermin verschoben werden.

So leicht aber waren die Nordvietnامessen nicht von ihrer Marschroute ab-

zubringen. Aus Sorge, ein wiederge-wählter Nixon könne neue Forderungen anmelden, suchten sie die USA unter Druck zu setzen und die Unterzeichnung bis zum 31. Oktober zu erzwingen. Zunächst einmal gab Premier Pham Van Dong einem „Newsweek“. Reporter ein Interview, in dem er die bis dahin geheimen Absprachen weitgehend enthüllte; dann veröffentlichte Radio Hanoi am 26. Oktober das gesamte Abkommen. Kernpunkte:

▷ Die USA respektieren die Unabhängigkeit, Souveränität, Einheit und territoriale Integrität Vietnams, so wie sie in den Genfer Vereinbungen von 1954 festgelegt wurden.

▷ 24 Stunden nach Unterzeichnung tritt in Südvietnam ein Waffenstillstand in Kraft; die USA stellen die Bombardierung und Verminung Nordvietnams ein und ziehen innerhalb von 60 Tagen sämtliche eigenen und verbündeten Truppen aus Südvietnam ab.

▷ Sämtliche Kriegsgefangenen werden parallel zum amerikanischen Truppenabzug freigelassen.

▷ In Südvietnam finden freie und geheime Wahlen unter internationaler Kontrolle statt, die von einem „Rat für nationale Versöhnung und Eintracht“ vorbereitet und organisiert werden, der sich zu gleichen Teilen aus Vertretern der Regierung in Saigon, des Vietcong und der Neutralisten zusammensetzt*.

▷ Zur Überwachung des Abkommens wird eine internationale Kontrollkommission eingesetzt.

Die Einigung der beiden Parteien ging so weit, daß man sogar detailliert

Verhandlungsort Choisy nahe Paris
... läßt für Vietnam nur eine Fußnote"

* Mit der Einsetzung des Versöhnungsrates verwirklichte Kissinger, was er bereits 1969, vor seiner Berufung in die Nixon-Mannschaft, in einem Aufsatz in der Zeitschrift „Foreign Affairs“ vorgeschlagen hatte: „Eine gemischte Kommission, die den politischen Re-Integrationsprozeß des Landes — einschließlich freier Wahlen — entwickelt und überwacht, könnte sehr nützlich sein.“

56

festgelegt hatte, wann und wo die Amerikaner mit der Räumung ihrer Minen beginnen und nach welchem Flugplan die US-Gefangenen heimkehrten sollten.

Kernsatz der Radio-Erklärung Hanois aber war: „Der festgelegte Unterzeichnungstermin ist der 31. Oktober 1972.“ Wenn Washington sich nicht an diesen Termin halte, sei Amerika „verantwortlich für die Verlängerung des Krieges“.

Als diese Sätze über den Äther liefen, war es in Washington zwei Uhr morgens. Kissinger, vom Lageraum des Weißen Hauses geweckt, stöhnte: „Jetzt geht alles den Bach 'runter.“ Doch dann kam ihm, nach einem Gespräch mit Nixon, eine andere Idee: Er ging selbst in die Offensive.

Am selben 26. Oktober trat Henry Kissinger zu einer seiner seltenen Presekonferenzen vor die White-House-Journalisten — und bestätigte, was Hanoi bei Nacht mitgeteilt hatte. Kissinger: „Der Frieden ist greifbar nahe.“

## Moskaus Kossygin drängte Hanoi.

Allerdings: Die US-Regierung habe zwar „größte Anstrengungen“ gemacht, den Vertrag bis zum 31. Oktober zu unterschreiben, doch es seien noch „sechs oder sieben sehr konkrete Punkte“ offen, man brauche auf jeden Fall noch „eine Gesprächsrunde“, die „nicht länger als drei oder vier Tage“ dauern werde.

„Was noch zu tun ist, ist nichts im Vergleich zu dem, was bereits erreicht wurde“, beruhigte Kissinger alle Beteiligten — und zugleich ließ Washington den Nordvietnamsen als Zeichen guten Willens mitteilen, der Präsident habe die Einstellung aller Bombenangriffe auf Gebiete nördlich des 20. Breitengrades angeordnet.

Wohl protestierte Hanoi gegen die Termin-Auslegung, doch als Sowjetpremier Kossygin die Nordvietnamsen persönlich zur Fortsetzung der Verhandlungen aufforderte, gaben sie nach. Und nun schien der Frieden tatsächlich greifbar nahe:

* In Laos begannen Friedensverhandlungen zwischen der Regierung und den kommunistischen Pathet Lao;

* in Kambodscha wies die Regierung die Presse an, nicht mehr das diffamierende Wort „Kommunisten“ zu benutzen, sondern nur noch von Nordvietnamsen und Vietcong zu sprechen;

* auf der Clark Air Force Base auf den Philippinen stellten die Amerikaner neue Uniformen für die nun in Kürze erwarteten amerikanischen Kriegsgefangenen aus Nordvietnam bereit (einschließlich aller Orden,

## „Fassade einer gewissen Sanftheit“

Hanois Kissinger Le Duc Tho wurde vom Falken zur Taube

Er sagt selten Sätze mit mehr als drei Worten, und auch dann ist meist das Wort „nein“ dabei“ — so charakterisieren Franzosen den Kissinger Hanois, der sich in ihrer Hauptstadt in 21 Geheimgesprächen mit Nixons Kissinger traf, um Frieden auszuhandeln: Le Duc Tho, 62.

Auch Kissinger befand: „Ein sehr ernster, sehr starker und immer höflicher, gebildeter Mann... Ja, ich respektiere Le Duc Tho sehr... Ich glaube, hinter der Fassade eine

sich auf einen langwährenden Volkskrieg eingestellt hat, auch um den Preis der totalen Zerstörung des Landes. Der Moskauer Flügel, angeführt von Parteichef Le Duan, verspricht sich dagegen mehr von einem Verhandlungsfrieden.

Falke Tho noch 1966 in der von ihm kontrollierten Zeitschrift „Hoc Tap“ über seine Tauben: „Sie zeigen Pessimismus, Bestürzung und Widerwillen angesichts der Notwendigkeit, langandauernden Widerstand zu leisten; sie erkennen nicht mit klarem Blick die Täuschungsabsicht, die der Feind mit Friedensverhandlungen verfolgt, und verlassen sich auf Hilfe von außen.“

Im November 1972 aber, nach dem Abkommen zwischen Le Duc Tho und Kissinger, urteilt „Hoc Tap“ über die verhandlungsbereiten Tauben anders: „Manchmal müssen wir ein gewisses Abkommen mit dem Feind akzeptieren... Kommunisten gestatten es der nationalen Selbstsucht nicht, die gemeinsamen Interessen der Weltrevolution und anderer Völker zu kontrollieren und zu untergraben.“

Die Standpunkte Moskaus und Pekings sind entgegengesetzt geblieben: Auf dem Heimweg von Paris nach Hanoi konnte Le Duc Tho im Oktober bei der Zwischenlandung in Moskau „einen gewissen Optimismus“ über die mögliche Friedenslösung registrieren, einen Tag später in Peking das Feldgeschrei vom „eisernen Willen zu kämpfen und zu siegen“ hören.

Nach dem vorläufigen Scheitern der Verhandlungen empfingen ihn in Moskau ein stummer ZK-Sekretär Katuschew, in Peking schriller Triumph und Truong Chinh, der Anführer des nun wieder starken China-Flügels aus Hanoi: Tho wird sich vor ihm rechtfertigen müssen.

Vielleicht hilft ihm ein Zitat von Ho Tschi-minh, der 1946 wegen seiner Verhandlungen mit den Franzosen von Genossen kritisiert worden war. Ho: „Sie warfen mir vor, daß ich zu lange in Paris gelebt und dort zu viele Freunde hätte... Sie dachten nicht daran, daß Sowjet-Rußland 1918 in Brest-Litowsk einen Frieden unterzeichnet hatte, um zunächst einmal den deutschen Vormarsch aufzuhalten, um dann, während der Waffenruhe, seine Armee wieder aufzubauen. Ja, sie begriffen nicht, daß ich dasselbe wollte.“

Vielleicht muß aber auch Tho vor Nordvietnams Falken kapitulieren.

Le Duc Tho

gewisse Sanftheit an ihm bemerkt zu haben...

Als der Sanfte am Pfingstmorgen 1968 erstmals in Orly landete, war ihm von Hanoi eher die Rolle des Scharfmachers zugedacht gewesen. Nach den schweren Verlusten der gerade gescheiterten Tet-Offensive galt es für Hanoi, Härte zu demonstrieren und einen Streit zu vertuschen, der in der Führung Nordvietnams über die künftige Strategie im Volkskrieg des Südens ausgebrochen war.

Le Duc Tho, im Jahre 1910 in Vietnams Nordprovinz Nam Ha geboren, anstudierter Rechtsanwalt, der seit 1930 zur KP Indochinas gehört und mit Ho Tschi-minh ins chinesische Exil ging, war für diese Mission der richtige Mann. Bis 1967 hatte der Familienvater (vier Kinder) fast ununterbrochen den bewaffneten Widerstand in Südvietnam angeführt: erst als Konspirator der Viet-Minh gegen die Franzosen, seit der Teilung Vietnams als Chef-Politruk den Vietcong gegen das Saigoner Regime und die USA.

Tho, ZK-Sekretär für Kaderfragen und seit 17 Jahren Mitglied des Politbüros, ist in der Partei ein starker Mann jenes Pekinger Flügels, der

DER SPIEGEL, Nr. 53/1972

57

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die ihnen in der Zwischenzeit verliehen worden waren);

▷ amerikanische Minensuchboote und Spezialhubschrauber probten im Auftrag des Pentagon die Mineräumung der nordvietnamesischen Gewässer;

▷ die 100 fähigsten Südostasien-Spezialisten des State Department hielten sich bereit für den Abflug nach Saigon, um in der Übergangsphase nach dem Waffenstillstand Hilfe leisten zu können;

▷ Kanada, als Mitglied der internationalen Überwachungskommission vorgesehen, ließ die ersten Soldaten für den Aufpasser-Einsatz in Vietnam impfen.

Zugleich aber auch nutzten beide Seiten die bis zum Frieden verbleibende Zeit, um ihre Schützlinge bis an die Zähne zu bewaffnen. Innerhalb weniger Tage schafften die USA allein 59 Panzer, 100 Schützenpanzer, 210 Kampfbomber, 32 Großtransporter und 280 Hubschrauber nach Vietnam. Um auf keinen Fall zu spät zu kommen, liehen sich die Amerikaner sogar von Taiwan, Südkorea und dem Iran F-5-Überschallbomber aus.

Nixon feierte noch seinen Wahlsieg, da drängten die Nordvietnamesen bereits wieder auf Fortführung der Geschichte: Für den 20. November luden sie nach Paris ein — zu der von Kissinger angekündigten „einen Gesprächsrunde“, auf der nach seinen Worten vor allem Textdifferenzen zwischen der amerikanischen und der vietnamesischen Fassung bereinigt, die Stellung der internationalen Überwachungskommission präzisiert und Möglichkeiten gesucht werden sollten, um Saigon doch noch die Unterschrift unter das Abkommen zu ermöglichen.

Als Le Duc Tho (mit einer Maschine der sowjetischen „Aeroflot“) nach Zwi-

US-Schützling Thieu (r.)

Veto gegen den Frieden

schenstopp s in Peking und Moskau) und Kissinger (mit einer Präsidenten-Boeing) an der Seine eintrafen, schien die Bearbeitung des 58-Seiten-Dokuments wirklich nur noch eine Frage von „drei oder vier Tagen“, hofften die Amerikaner von neuem, die über 500 in Nordvietnam gefangenen GIs würden noch zum Weihnachts-Puter wieder daheim sein.

Und die ersten Bilder, die ersten Berichte aus Paris nährten diese Hoffnung. Da sah man Kissinger, der sich im Gespräch mit einem fröhlichen Tho vor Vergnügen auf die Schenkel schlug, da wurde kolportiert, die beiden hätten sich im Scherz für die Zeit nach Vertragsabschluß wechselseitig Gastprofesuren in Harvard und Hanoi angeboten.

Doch die schönen Bilder von Harmonie und Heiterkeit täuschten. Le Duc

US-Gefangene in Nordvietnam: Hoffnung auf die Heimkehr

58

Tho fand bestätigt, was Hanoi von Anfang an geargcohört hatte: daß Nixon nach seiner Wiederwahl keine Eile mehr zeigen, sondern im Gegenteil neue Forderungen stellen werde.

Nach knapp einer Woche ermüdender Gespräche vertagten sich die Frie-denssucher um acht Tage. Als man sich am 4. Dezember wiedertraf, gaben sich US-Vertreter noch unverändert opti-mistisch: Die Gefahr eines Scheiterns liege bei höchstens fünf Prozent.

Tatsächlich aber nahm das Drama Vietnam abermals einen ganz anderen Verlauf - und wurde nun auch für den vertragsgläubigen Kissinger zur Tragödie. Denn Richard Nixon hatte, offen-bar bedrängt durch kalte Krieger und Kissinger-Gegner in Washington wie Saigon, seinen Chefunterhändler mit völlig neuen Direktiven nach Paris geschickt - sei es, weil er das bisherige Verhandlungsergebnis als direkte Folge seiner Bomben wertete und sich deshalb in der Lage fühlte, noch mehr heraus-zubomben, oder sei es, weil er dem Ab-kommen von Anfang an zweifelnd ge-genübergestanden hatte und sich zu seinem ursprünglichen Einverständnis nur von Kissinger hatte drängen lassen.

„Die Bedingungen sind besser, als Thieu es verdient.“

Im letzteren Fall hätte also Kissinger, der Skeptiker, seine Skrupel für den Er-folg geopfert, den Krieg beendet und den kritischen akademischen Kollegen gezeigt zu haben, daß die Polarisierung zwischen Denken und Handeln doch überwindbar ist, während Nixon, der Macher, Skeptiker geworden wäre ge-genüber dem, was sein Denker für machbar erklärt hatte.

Vor Nixons Wahltriumph war Kissinger noch überzeugt gewesen: „Das Abkommen war das beste, was unter diesen Umständen zu erreichen war.“ Und einer der vielen Regierungsberater hatte sich über den Widerstand des Saigon-Präsidenten Thieu entrüstet: „Zum Teufel, die Bedingungen sind besser, als Thieu es verdient. Alles, was wir von ihm verlangen, ist, einige Ge-biete aufzugeben, die er wahrscheinlich sowieso nicht zurückgewinnen kann, und seiner Opposition eine winzige po-litische Chance zu geben.“

Jetzt aber mußte Kissinger seinen Gesprächspartnern in Paris abverlan-den, was weitgehend ausgerechnet von Thieu und dessen Lobby im Pentagon und der Saugoner US-Botschaft ausge-heckt, im Neun-Punkte-Papier aber be-wußt ausgelassen worden war:

▷ Hanoi sollte sich schriftlich verpflichten, seine von Amerika auf 100 000 bis 145 000, von Thieu auf 300 000 geschätzten Soldaten aus Südvietnam abzuziehen (was Nixon

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DER SPIEGEL, Nr. 53/1972

59

nicht einmal in seinen Friedensvorschlägen vom Januar und Mai 1972 verlangt hatte.

► die entmilitarisierte Zone entlang dem 17. Breitengrad sollte wiederhergestellt werden;

► im geplanten Versöhnungsrat sollten die drei Parteien keineswegs gleichberechtigt vertreten sein.

Mit diesen drastischen Forderungen übertraf Nixon selbst die schlimmsten Erwartungen der Nordvietnamesen. Sie sollten am Verhandlungstisch preisgeben, was sie auf dem Kriegsschauplatz gewonnen hatten, und sich den Frieden durch einen Gesichtsverlust erkaufen: Um sich nicht schriftlich dazu bekennen zu müssen, daß sie Truppen in Süd-vietnam unterhalten, hatten sie sich schon in einer Nebenabrede mit Kissinger zu einem Abzug von 35 000 Soldaten bereiterklärt.

Als loyaler Diener seines Herrn übermittelte Kissinger die neuen

Genau 51 Tage nach seiner Prophezeiung, der Frieden liege „zum Greifen nahe“, mußte Kissinger auf der zweiten Pressekonferenz eingestehen, daß der Friede noch keineswegs „at hand“ sei.

Die Nordvietnamesen hätten stets neue Einwände und Tricks gehabt, klagte Kissinger — nach wie vor loyaler Diener seines Herrn — und nannte Beispiele, etwa: Wenn man anhand des amerikanischen Textes ein Problem besprochen und schließlich den Text geändert hatte, kam dasselbe Problem wenig später wieder auf die Tagesordnung, weil die Nordvietnamesen die Änderungen keineswegs automatisch in ihre Textvorlage aufnahmen.

„Wir bombardieren alles.“

Doch das waren offenkundig nur vorgeschobene Erklärungen. Tatsächlich sprach Kissinger kaum noch für sich, war er stärker denn je Sprachrohr seines Präsidenten.

Vor die Wahl gestellt, ohne Rücksicht auf Thieu einen Separatvertrag mit Hanoi zu schließen oder sich Thieus Forderungen zu eigen zu machen, hatte sich Nixon für den zweiten Weg entschieden. Wahrscheinlich fürchtete er, die Vorbereitungen, die die Kommunisten für die Stunde X des Waffenstillstands getroffen hatten, würden ihm seinen Anstandsabstand doch nicht geben, sondern ihn mit dem Vorwurf belasten, er habe seinen Verbündeten im Stich gelassen, indem er einen vagen Waffenstillstand ohne wirksame Kontrollen anstelle eines präzisen, sicheren Friedensvertrages schloß.

Während Kissinger bereit gewesen sein mag, dieses Risiko in Kauf zu nehmen, weil nur so der Krieg endlich zu liquidieren war, entschied sich Nixon für die vermeintlich handfestere Alternative, die Schamfrist herauszubomben, in der — wohl brüchigen — Hoffnung, Thieu könne den Friedensaufschub militärisch nutzen.

Jedenfalls dürfte die Solidarisierung mit Thieu zwangsläufig zu einer Verlängerung des Krieges führen — wie jeder Erfolg der Amerikaner und ihrer Verbündeten in Vietnam bisher lediglich den Krieg verlängert hat. Während Vietnam-Präsident Thieu den neuen Bombenkrieg dankbar begrüßte, harrten die Menschen in seiner Hauptstadt, wie SPIEGEL-Korrespondent Tiziano Terzani kabelte, beklommen auf den Gegenschlag des Vietcong. Doch der tat, wie so oft in diesem Krieg, tagelang das Unerwartete, nämlich nichts.

Wohl versuchte Nixon vorige Woche, sich eine Art Schiedsrichterrolle beizulegen, indem er Hanoi ein unbefristetes Bombardement, Saigon angeblich den Entzug der US-Hilfe androhte, wohl ließ er beteuern, er strebe nach wie vor den Frieden an Hanoi an — doch es ist ein Frieden auf dem Boden der Gewalt: Um Hanois Unterschrift zu er-

zwingen, „bombardieren wir alles, vom Warenhaus bis zu Straßenbrücken“, dröhnte ein Pentagon-Sprecher.

So unterscheidet sich entgegen dem Anschein, den Nixon durch den Abzug von über 500 000 US-Soldaten weckte, die Vorstellung des Präsidenten von einem Frieden in Vietnam in der Substanz offenbar nicht von jenem „Sieg“, den die Militärs seit Jahren anstreben.

Henry Kissinger hingegen, bislang Nixons wichtigster Berater, wollte keinen Sieg, er wollte Amerika lediglich aus einer Falle befreien, in die es— so Kissinger — ohne Rücksicht auf die Lehren der Geschichte getappt sei. Den Ausweg aus dieser Falle glaubte er schließlich nach knapp vier Jahren gemeinsam mit Le Duc Tho im Neun-Punkte-Abkommen gefunden zu haben — das Nixon dann desavoierte.

So scheint es denn vielen Eingeweihten in Washington nur noch eine Frage der Zeit, wann sich Henry Kissinger,

International Herald Tribune

„Wo ist der Frieden?“

US-Forderungen an seine Gesprächspartner — daß er sie sich zu eigen machte, ist jedoch unwahrscheinlich.

Mochte auch Nixon nicht gewußt haben, daß Hanoi niemals bereit sein konnte, die Souveränität Südvietnams und die Existenzberechtigung des Regimes Thieu anzuerkennen — Kissinger wußte es mit Sicherheit. Denn Nordvietnam hätte damit nicht nur die dauerhafte Trennung des Landes besiegelt, sondern zugleich auch erklärt, ein Vierteljahrhundert lang umsonst gekämpft und geblutet zu haben.

So war es nur folgerichtig, daß Le Duc Tho die neuen Forderungen seines Gegenübers kategorisch ablehnte und nun seinerseits neue Forderungen stellte — die Gespräche waren in einer Sackgasse gemündet, am 13. Dezember wurden sie ohne Aussicht auf baldige Fortsetzung abgebrochen.

Friedens-Reisender Kissinger

„Henry muß jetzt gehen“

überarbeitet, zermürbt und wie viele vor ihm gescheitert, sei es an Vietnam oder an seinem Präsidenten, zurückzieht in die akademische Welt von Harvard.

Denn als Richard Nixon beschloß, den Krieg auf seine Art zu beenden und es nicht mehr Henry machen zu lassen, entzog er Kissinger die Basis für dessen Erfolge.

Kissinger: „Der Hauptgrund (für meinen Erfolg) liegt darin, daß ich immer allein gehandelt habe. Den Amerikanern gefällt das ungeheuer. Den Amerikanern gefällt der Cowboy, der die Kolonne führt, indem er allein mit seinem Pferd voranreitet; der Cowboy, der ganz allein in die Stadt, ins Dorf geht, nur mit seinem Pferd und sonst nichts. Vielleicht sogar ohne Revolver, denn er schießt nicht. Er handelt und damit basta.“

60

"You Don't Have Quite The Right Slant"

# (Mis) Conduct Of Foreign Affairs

## Little State Department At White House Makes Big Decisions

*(Excerpted from an interview with Charles Yost, former U.S. ambassador to the UN, Laos, Syria and Morocco. The interview was arranged by Random House, publishers of Mr. Yost's latest book, "The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs.")*

*What's wrong with the way we conduct our foreign affairs?*

Perhaps the principal problem in the conduct of our foreign policy these days is the confusion as to who is conducting it and how it is being conducted. Some years ago, a National Security Council was created in the White House composed of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet

from time to time with the President and advise him about national security problems. At the outset this Council had a very small administrative staff to prepare its papers and prepare it. But the staff of this Council has gradually mush-

roomed and now amounts to some 120 people, broken down in much the same way as the State Department is broken down, into experts on Europe, the Far East, the Near East and Latin America, experts on economic and monetary affairs, and so on. Well, this means that we really have two State Departments. A big one down in the so-called Foggy Bottom, and a little one in the White House. But under the Nixon Administration, the basic decisions, the main decisions, and much of their implementation, are made in the little State Department in the White House. For example, when an ambassador wants really to get an important decision that concerns his government deeply, he may take it up in the beginning with the State Department, but before he gets his decision he's all too apt to have to run around to the White House and touch base.

Now this leads to a number of serious difficulties. In the first place, it means that there's confusion because the government is sometimes speaking with two voices. Secondly, problems, policies and formulations that are worked out carefully in the State Department by people who have been dealing with these problems for years—all their lives, in some cases—are then referred to the little State Department in the White House and gone over again by people who frequently have had much less experience, and whose knowledge of the area, background and policies is far less keen and comprehensive. In my experience, this frequently causes confusion and long delays in decision-making.

*Does this method of operations present other problems in the Foreign Service?*

One other unfortunate effect of this lack of system is that it's becoming increasingly difficult to persuade talented young men and women to enter the State Department and devote their lives to it. I've talked to any number of young men in the Foreign Service and State Department who are deeply discouraged because they feel that they're doing the menial chores, the day-to-day spade-

work, that the big decisions are being made not only by other people, but even frequently without the knowledge of the State Department.

Unfortunately, this has gone on in the past too. The Bay of Pigs is a sad example of a decision taken by a small group in the White House without consultation with the people who could have told them that the operation had no chance of succeeding. But far from being an occasional affair, this has now become a normal way of doing business, and I think it's a great mistake. Obviously the President has the right to conduct foreign policy in any way he wants and can choose his advisers as he wishes. But it's my belief that he can operate more effectively, from his own point of view, if he makes the man whom he wants to be his chief adviser in the foreign policy field the Secretary of State and puts him in charge of a large, extremely competent establishment which has the best people trained all over the world for years in the conduct of foreign policy. Whomever the President chooses for this position should have this enormous resource at hand and not be expected to build up overnight a separate and much less effective organization in the cellar of the White House.

Admittedly, the present system enables the President to be more private, which presumably he prefers; on the other hand, this modus operandi is one of the chief reasons for the very serious split between the President and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee — and hence between him and the Senate as a whole on foreign relations.

*'...And Draft A Statement For Me, Henry, Telling How Much I Rely On The State Department.'*

mirror
of public
opinion

ays

Government ought to extend its influence just how widespread and inclusive bidding practices may the practices took place in Illinois possibility that they could where.

Congress ought to use its influence to look into penalties for acts. If those indicted in Illinois the maximum penalty is $50,000 a day. This is an unrealistic sum of that the Federal Government should more than a sum in keeping with the laws that can be made through

laws are the major arteries of trade and when a 50-mile section of Illinois costs more than $2 a mile, to build, as the grand jury government should more than die.

Legitimately in withholding licenses from Elks lodges.

A new phase of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected state Supreme Court decision on, in opening its facilities itself within the ambit of the provision of the state human legal view emerging in these states that private clubs may disqualify if their discrimination is in v. a state benefit or if they de their facilities into public

atic Colonel

be ruled by the Koran or face a fine," intones Libya's extremely liberal. Muammar Kadafi. According to a number of unusual decrees

longer work as coiffeur de la Koran stipulates that it is a hair of a woman who is a

girls and women will henceforth length slacks beneath their pants forbids women from show-

emination could send a woman for 15 years and the patient

no foreigner would be allowed to pass his passport was written in

PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN 27 DECEMBER 1972 (29)

Adrian Lee: The View From Here

War Critics'
Logic Is Hard
To Understand

From a half mile away, it looked like a big, rain-blurred exclamation point at the edge of the tree line. But it wasn't. Where an exclamation point should be stationary, this one swung to the monsoon wind blowing over the salt marshes from the east China Sea.

And the nearer the three newspapermen got to it that day, in September, 1966, the more they wanted to believe it was actually an exclamation point, anything except what they really knew it was — a body swinging, rotating, at the end of a rope just off the two-lane highway from Saigo into Vung Tau.

He (it was a minor local-government official) had balked at a Viet Cong levy of 275 pounds of fish on the nearby coastal village of Suoi Ca I; and the VC had hanged him for it, with the halter from his own water buffalo.

IT HAD BEEN RAINING the last 36 hours; and the halter, improvised from bits of rope and GI leather bootlaces, had stretched until the official's feet brushed the black, water-soaked earth.

The rain, sluicing off his face, running down his bare arms and legs, dripping off his fingers and toes, had washed clean all the gashes in his face and arms. He had apparently been tortured before being strung up to the lowermost limb of the big rubber tree. The thick stream of water from his feet to the earth suggested that he was being reclaimed, gradually, by the land he had sprung from.

It is in this wise that the Hanoi Politburo has sought to impose an alien Communist philosophy on the south, in Cambodia and Laos.

And, in the process, it has compiled a record of savagery in the field and duplicity at the Paris peace talks which critics of Mr. Nixon and his bombing policy consistently ignore. It has steeled its VC units and regular army units to the murder of a people sharing a common language, heritage and hatred of colonialism by distorting U.S. aims in Indochina.

IF HAS RALLIED the North Vietnamese peasant-soldier to assassination, torture and the mass murder of fleeing refugees by picturing the U.S. as a greedy "neo-colonialist" power trying to "enslave" Indochina.

And all to one end — to frustrate the U.S. goal of assuring the South Vietnamese the right to vote themselves the kind of government they want, whether it be representative government of the kind the U.S. has tried to cultivate in

Saigon on the Communism Ho Chi Minh and his successors in the Hanoi Politburo have tried to impose with such dedication, loyalty and unflinching resolve.

President Johnson's critics, and now President Nixon's, never seem able to bring this picture into focus. And this lack of focus, a species of self-delusion, seems to extend to virtually every aspect of the current struggle, the terminal test of will in which the U.S. and the Hanoi Politburo are presently engaged.

Instead of reality, they insist on myths.

Instead of a North Vietnamese population with an exceedingly keen aptitude for operating sophisticated Russian anti-aircraft systems, they see a helpless peasant population cowering behind the dikes the Pentagon is trying to "destroy."

Instead of a heavily defended Hanoi-Haijong staging area for the continuing attack in the south, they see only hospitals and homes.

INSTEAD OF HANOI'S duplicity at the peace table, they postulate one of the most dangerous fictions of all: the American President, first Mr. Johnson, now Mr. Nixon, is a liar. And they say so with a certitude to dismay anybody who tries to parse perhaps the most complex peace negotiations the U.S. has ever been party to.

If Henry Kissinger denies being intimidated by Saigon, he is a liar: the U.S. "abrogated" the pre-election draft of a peace treaty by making new post-election demands, specifically echoing Saigon's insistence on the removal of North Vietnamese troops from the South.

It does no good for Kissinger to deny that any such demands had been injected into the negotiations after the election—he "lies," or, at best, is suspect, when he says "we could not agree" — Saigon and the Nixon Administration — to press for removal of all North Vietnamese troops in the south; and the more fervid administration critics simply ignore his final unequivocal assertion: "... none of these (the President's proposals had asked for a withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces.)"

If Kissinger insists on adequate, peace-keeping machinery to keep these same forces from stealing territory they couldn't win, the administration is again lying, trying to "re-vise" an agreement Hanoi entered into in "good faith."

THE CURIOUS THING about it all is why Administration critics should insist on their own truncated view of history.

Is it because they, or at least an exceedingly vocal segment of them, actually want Hanoi to win this venture into subversion, murder and terror?

Has their antipathy for Mr. Nixon blinded them to what Hanoi has done?

Do they really want a peace treaty which would keep Hanoi from robbing the South of the very thing the U.S. has fought for, and the only thing the U.S. wants — the right of self-determination?

It is hard to see and understand their logic: the exclamation point, the body of that nameless minor official, swinging and turning, keeps getting in the way.

Adrian Lee's opinion column also appears on Sunday.

WHAT DERAILED PARIS PEACE TALKS -- CONTINUED

hope to take control of the South and unify the country. But that is a long-range project — they talk of 5 to 10 years — to be carried out essentially through political means.

But on Dec. 11, they decided that the Americans had gone back on the scenario that was to make all this possible, beginning with an early cease-fire. What brought them to this conclusion was Dr. Kissinger's revival of the demand — as they interpreted it — that the North Vietnamese concede to the Americans what the Americans had not been able to win in the field: the removal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam. Admittedly this was not directly demanded by Dr. Kissinger but (in North Vietnamese eyes) was implicit in his insistence that the draft agreement spell out the need for both Vietnams to live in peace and deny North Vietnam's right to interfere in South Vietnam.

As they saw it, he was challenging more clearly than ever before the 1954 Geneva

accord's commitment to a single unified Vietnam to which they say the United States had subscribed in the draft agreed to in Paris in October.

Concessions 'pocketed'

Confronted with these new demands, they say, they chose the only road open to them short of breaking off the talks. They put their October concessions back in their pockets and made once again their pre-October demands: that President Thieu be removed from office; that the United States put a tripartite government in power in Saigon; and that their political prisoners be freed simultaneously with the American POWs.

According to the North Vietnamese, Dr. Kissinger leaped at the "excuse" and flew back to Washington, where he hastened to blame them for the breakdown of the negotiations. As to the charge that captured documents show North Vietnam was about to launch a "major military offensive" after the

cease-fire, they deny it flatly.

Solution 'at hand'

For a weeks last fall, President Nixon seemed to have detached the United States from the long-range political future of the Saigon regime in exchange for a short- and medium-range certainty of its survival. The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong had sacrificed short-term political progress in the South in exchange for possible long-range progress. Thus a solution, acceptable to both sides, while carrying risks for both sides, was at hand.

Whatever led the President to change his mind about the October agreement, his "secret plan" to cut the Vietnam war, much heralded four years ago, seems to have failed — at least for the time being.

In the opinion of the North Vietnamese a new round of "fight-fight," that may last as long as three years, now is following the brief interlude of "talk-talk"

4-F

SPECTRUM

Varying shades of personal opinion on current issues

MURRAY KEMPTON
CBS RADIO NETWORK

DECEMBER 27, 1972

I'm Murray Kempton.

The triumphs and disasters of men of power are not often worth so much as the death of a single child. The men of power whose helplessness set them to bombing Hanoi have declared that these terrible extremes are "a negotiating process rather than a military operation."

So hospitals burn and children cry among ruins, and all these victims have in their agony one unique consolation: they did not uselessly die in war, please take notice, but rather did their part as adjuncts in a negotiating process.

The troubles of Henry Kissinger look very small when set against this horrid canvas. Still, they are the troubles of a decent, if not invariably dignified man; and they too deserve sympathy.

On October 26, Kissinger told us that peace was at hand. Its terms had been announced by the North Vietnamese, and Kissinger complimented Hanoi on the accuracy of its account of them. There would be a ceasefire; all parties would work for a unified Vietnam; all American troops would be withdrawn while 145,000 North Vietnamese would stay in the South. Last month Kissinger came before us again, the limping messenger with the preliminary signal for the B-52s. He said that Hanoi had lied. The North Vietnamese had suddenly raised their demands and insisted on keeping their troops in the South and refusing to recognize the sovereignty of South Vietnam. But those are not new demands of Hanoi's; they are the terms Kissinger himself described as agreed upon three months ago. Hanoi didn't change the terms; Mr. Nixon did; Kissinger knew that. And anyone who stops to compare what he said then with what he says now has to know it too.

It is being said that Hanoi fooled Kissinger and Mr. Nixon; the sad fact is that they fooled each other. Kissinger has said almost publicly for a long time that the war was foolish; and last fall he seems to have taken advantage of the President's electoral bemusement to work out the best deal he could get.

He thought, of course, that the Mr. Nixon who revelled with the tyrants who run Russia and China had risen above prejudice against Communist dictators. What Kissinger did not understand is that Mr. Nixon does not see the world as an arena where the subjugated struggle against their jailers; but rather as a board room where one man of power displays his will before another. Kissinger's peace terms and Hanoi's were finally unthinkable, because someone somewhere might think they indicated a failure of his will. And shows of will require victims as proof; and even though Kissinger is the most comfortable and thus the least of these victims, still he is one to feel sorry for.

I'm Murray Kempton with Spectrum.

The diverse opinions expressed on SPECTRUM are those of the commentators themselves and should not be attributed to CBS or any of its affiliates

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

28 DECEMBER 1972 (29)

Hanoi's leaders
under stress

The writer, a United States foreign service officer, is one of the foremost American specialists in North Vietnamese affairs.

By Douglas Pike

Special to

The Christian Science Monitor

Taipei, Taiwan

Never has the picture in Hanoi been as fuzzy. Never has the ambiguity level been as high.

This is because of normal obfuscation, what Marshal Foch called the fog of war. And it is because North Vietnam is the most closed society on earth.

It also is because we whose occupation is to keep unraveled this cocoon of enigma are forever being caught in between polarized interpretations being pressed upon us. On the one side are the insistently naive who think the North Vietnamese leaders want nothing so much as immediate peace and that any intransigence present comes from the opposite camp. On the other side are the cynics who maintain all of Hanoi's public behavior, for example its peace posturing this year, is mere kabuki drama.

"This much can be concluded with certainty at year's end: The North Vietnamese leadership, the 11 men who run North Vietnam, are under heavier and more sustained pressure than at any time in their 22-year reign.

"These pressures are military, economic, political, social, and diplomatic. Collectively they are psychological.

- Military pressure comes from the failure of the high-technology warfare campaign launched last Easter in the South to deliver decisive victory. And from the retaliatory air strikes, bombings, and waterway closures in the North.

- Economic pressure comes from the logistical and material deprivations with the duction by at least 50 percent of landed imports, from the now chronic manpower shortage and from another mediocre rice crop which failed to meet the anticipated total yield of 5.2 million metric tons.

A matter of doctrine

- Political pressures among the leadership, many of them ancient, turn on doctrine: allocation of resources between the needs of the North and the war in the South, the best way to motivate and mobilize the people of North Vietnam, and most important, how best to proceed to achieve the goal of unification.

The dispute runs deep into the ranks of the Vietnamese Communist Party and it is particularly divisive among cadres in the South where something of a mini-purge has developed. Probably a factor is the advanced age of the Politburo membership. The average age now is 64.

- Social pressure results from the near permanent condition of insufficientylan war weariness, the ever growing war-widow bloc — and more ominously from the rise of what the Politburo labels counterrevolution.

- Diplomatic pressures, of an unknown degree, come in the form of a steadily growing sense of isolation from the Communist world as well as the ever-widening gulf between the men of Hanoi and their allies in Peking and Moscow.

The effects of these pressures are virtually impossible to anticipate, given our paucity of information. But probably there is not much certitude even among the 11 members of the Politburo. Like a balloon being squeezed, a

CHICAGO TRIBUNE 28 DECEMBER 1972 (29)

Warren Rogers

Hanoi bombing
a calculated risk

WASHINGTON—Behind President Nixon's tightening of the screws on North Viet Nam, thrust resuming the bombing, was a decision to take a calculated risk that neither Congress nor Russia and China would force him to change his game plan.

Sources close to the President say that Nixon has been concerned for some time that Hanoi was using the bombing lull during peace talks to build up more fighting capability in the South.

"They had repaired the bridges and other damages," one source said. "They were getting a free ride and trying to extend it by stalling the Paris negotiations with Henry Kissinger."

The President's aim, despite the heavy toll of U. S. aircraft and crewmen, was to take away whatever advantage accrued to Hanoi from not being bombed, it was explained. He knew there would be flarebacks from congress and abroad, it was added, but he decided the risk was worth taking.

AS FAR as Congress is concerned, sources said Nixon fully expects to have a Viet Nam settlement early enough next year to avoid any rush to end the-war legislation, including moves to cut off U. S. war funds and economic-military aid to Saigon.

Russia and China were seen as obviously the biggest drum-beaters in anticipated objections around the world to resumption of full-scale bombing. According to informants, Nixon discussed the situation with his top foreign policy advisers, including Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Kissinger, and came to the conclusion that Moscow and Peking would talk a lot but do little, if anything.

Blasts have indeed come from both Communist capitals. During a 3½-hour speech celebrating the Soviet anniversary, party leader Leonid Brezhnev warned the war could seriously affect U. S. Soviet cooperation. And Peking spokesmen called the bombing "barbarous."

But White House advisers insisted these were but "predictable noises" and the important thing is they were

not accompanied by anti-U. S. actions. Specifically, they said, there was no sign of increased and massive shipments of war goods to North Viet Nam from either Russia or China. Nor, they added, did either give an inkling of trying to apply the brakes to newly begun efforts to bury East-West tensions.

The analysis was that Russia and China fear each other more than they fear the United States, and both look to Washington for help of some sort against the other. It was noted, in this connection, that Brezhnev, while cautious in his criticism of the United States, spent a lot of time and effort in his speech denouncing China.

"NEITHER MOSCOW nor Peking views Indochina as a major point of conflict with us," one official said. "The main thrust of the Russians is to tidy up their European flank out of fear of China, and the Chinese want to tidy up their Asian flank out of fear of Russia."

The Russians have a number of items on their shopping list when they look to Washington. One is most-favoured-nation status, which must be approved by Congress, to gain them a break in trading. Another is export licenses, being given U. S. manufacturers helping the Russians build the world's biggest truck assembly plant on the Kama River. Still another is assistance in developing, along with the Japanese, two huge, multibillion-dollar natural gas fields in Siberia.

China's biggest concern is those 45 Soviet divisions, all nuclear-equipped, on the Sino-Soviet border. The fear is that, in a crunch, the Russians might try to knock out China's missile capability, including the Lop Nor test site and other, secret facilities, before Peking achieves reliable means of delivering its atomic weapons.

In any event, the mood at the White House is that the President knew what he was doing and is confident he can come out of the current tense situation with an early and honorable withdrawal from Indochina.

© 1972, The Chicago Tribune

bubble pops out here or there, always unpredictably.

None of this, however, is to suggest that the pressures are sufficient to force the Politburo to abandon its long-time goal of unification.

The goal has never been hidden, as even a casual inspection of the speeches and public pronouncements of the men of the Politburo during the past decade clearly demonstrates. Neither has the Politburo ever deviated from this objective as far as we know nor lost confidence in its ability ultimately to achieve it. Unification long ago passed from mere state policy to holy cause.

Rule of thumb

This fact is the basis for the single most valuable rule of thumb for assessing or predicting Politburo behavior: Every act is intended to move along the cause of unification. Nothing is ever done, if avoidable, which would impede progress toward unification.

Neither the naive nor the cynic is correct. Authentic and vast change is being wrought by and on the North Vietnamese leadership.

The wonder in this is not that the great glacier at last is beginning to move, but that it has taken so long to begin and even now moves so slowly.

9-F

WASHINGTON POST 28 DECEMBER 1972 (29)

# Yet Another Obstacle for South Vietnam's President Thieu

DESPITE President Nguyen Van Thieu's screams of anguish about Hanoi's front-line troops staying in South Vietnam after a ceasefire, his far more dangerous peace problem is not foreign troops but whether he can control the sudden opening up of the political system.

Thieu is being strongly advised to stop worrying about Hanoi's military strength in South Vietnam (centered in the North). U.S. experts here and in Saigon are convinced that, once a settlement is reached, the pledge of basic political freedoms to anti-Thieu neutrals and Communist elements loyal to Hanoi, will confront Thieu and his own savvy as a politician with his most serious challenge.

As of today, this may seem a moot question for Thieu, with North Vietnam again under fierce American bombing and any settlement apparently far in the future.

Nevertheless, Thieu is being privately but strongly advised to prepare far advance for a post-settlement political career which for the first time will pit him publicly and openly against hardarned opponents. The advice boils down to these essentials:

1. Thieu, now occupying the far right in Vietnamese politics, must move sharply toward the center.

2. To show his willingness to shift some of his power from the inner circle of generals and province chiefs who now surround him to a more broadly based constituency, Thieu should be prepared to fire his more notoriously corrupt political allies.

3. Even if the final peace agreement fails to carry a proviso compelling him to release some 40,000 or so political prisoners (including many Communist agents), Thieu must open the prison gate, to thousands of them. To refuse, highly placed American experts believe, would be to hand the Communists a glittering issue that could undermine his popularity and destroy him.

That popularity today is at its highest point. Even by conservative estimates, a genuinely free election in South Vietnam would overwhelmingly reelect Thieu.

But the foundation of his popularity has been his role as champion of South Vietnamese nationalism, effectively battling both Communists in Hanoi and Americans in Washington.

Once a settlement is reached, that foundation could crumble. Thieu will become an incumbent president with no lot war to use as a rallying point either for his army or his people, beset with huge economic problems and for the first time stripped of active help from Washington. Instead of umbrella protection against every adversity, Washington will supply only economic aid, a few technicians and limited military aid.

But the element of time is now working for Thieu. With a settlement apparently weeks or months in the future, he can begin to plan a political style and strategy to fit the open politics of a new era, in which Communist and pro-Communist politicians, underground for 20 years, will suddenly find equal access to the press, the speaker's platform and political organization.

PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN

27 DECEMBER 1972 (29)

Wm. F. Buckley Jr.

## Hanoi resorted to tricks

New York — Let's get it straight: Richard Nixon's resumption of the bombing is the logical not the illogical, the honorable not the dishonorable, consequence of the breakdown of the negotiations in Paris as the result of North Vietnamese mickey mouse.

The effort is being made to distinguish between the views of Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon on the matter of a satisfactory settlement. It will not succeed because it is not true.

### Hanoi 'played games'

Dr. Kissinger, when he said that peace was in sight, interpreted several commitments made by the North Vietnamese as made seriously. When, on returning to Paris he discovered that they were playing games — that, for instance, "international supervision" of the cease-fire, as agreed to in October, was being interpreted by the North Vietnamese as a mere 250 supervisors instead of the 5,000 deemed necessary by the State and Defense Departments, that half of those 250 would have to stay in Saigon, and the other half could not use even a Piper Cub to detect illegal military movement — Kissinger came back to Washington.

What was it that changed the mind of the North Vietnamese?

Clearly, the ease with which they absorbed the landslide victory of Mr. Nixon on November 7. Remember.

Hanoi had been predicting that if Richard Nixon were reelected, Hanoi would disappear from the face of the map. When November 8 came along and the skies were clear, Hanoi obviously decided to resort to verbal tricks in Paris, and the result was the breakdown in negotiations.

### Three factions

It is reasonable to suppose — indeed there is in fact some evidence that that is the case — that the men who govern North Vietnam are, as regards the war in the South, of three general dispositions. There are the hawks, who would fight to conquer the South even if it meant losing half the population; the swing voters, who would like to push on to victory if it can be achieved with moderate exertion; and the doves who believe that North Vietnam has fled too much, and that it is better to end the war now and perhaps resume it later on politically.

During October, the middle group swung over to the doves. In November, they swung back to the hawks. They can swing back tomorrow, and that is the strategy of Mr. Nixon: not to give up hope, but to make it plain that the consequences of failing to negotiate, are — more war.

### 'Jubiliation' justified

American critics of Mr. Nixon and of President Thieu are strange in their analysis. They decry what they themselves characterize as the "jubilation" felt by South Vietnamese at the resumption of American bombing. Now as we speak thus primarily about the use of bombs over North Vietnam, there are lodged in South Vietnam about 150,000 enemy troops. The American equivalent would be about two million enemy troops lodged in various parts of this country.

Why would it be obscene, in such circumstances, for Americans to be jubilant on learning that the military bases supplying those enemy troops are being bombed by an ally?

The element of time is crucial. Thus, when Henry Kissinger arrived in Saigon last Oct. 19 with the peace formula he had just worked out with Le Due Tho in Paris, neither Thieu nor U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker had the faintest idea what he was bringing with him.

Thieu was stunned when Kissinger opened up his surprise package, not so much by its content, but because — according to the Washington-Hanoi plan — it would take effect within a few weeks.

In retrospect, some highly-placed American officials believe that Thieu's screams of anguish had two purposes:

First, and least important, his hope of forcing changes in the package; second, and far more important, to give him time to prepare for the ceasefire.

One such official told us: "Thieu's nightmare was a sudden ceasefire, mass defections from his army as the boys ran home to plow their fields and utter disorganization inside his government."

The deadlock in the peace talks—which Thieu powerfully helped bring about—has given him more time. His problem now is to use it wisely in preparation for the radically transformed politics that lies ahead.

© 1972, Publisher—Hai Syndicate

10-F

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 28 DECEMBER 1972 (29)

# Series of misjudgments led to collapse of peace talks

By JAMES McARTNEY

*Of Our Washington Bureau*

WASHINGTON.—For a long moment in history — some seven weeks — the world believed that peace in Vietnam was at last “at hand.”

It was to be a Christmas present for 1972, wrapped and tied.

But the world was wrong. It was misled.

And the Christmas present, instead, is a newly re-escalated Vietnam War, with a new round of pain and death — not the promise of peace, nor the return of U. S. prisoners.

What went wrong — and why? What brought the hope of peace crashing down?

I have pursued that story around the world in the last seven weeks — In Saigon, in Bangkok and in Paris.

And what I have seen, and heard, convinces me that peace was never truly “at hand.”

It indicates, to me, that top U. S. officials — President Nixon and Henry Kissinger — made a crucial series of misjudgments about U. S. powe to control events in Vietnam.

First, they misjudged Hanoi's true position in the negotiations. They assumed that Hanoi had been bombed to its knees and was ready to settle on U. S. terms.

Second, they misjudged South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. They assumed he could be pressured, because of his dependence on U. S. military aid, into accepting a U. S.-negotiated agreement.

But available evidence suggests more.

It indicates that Kissinger's now famous declaration, of Oct. 26, that peace was “at hand” was a desperate political gamble, rather than a statement of fact.

It indicates that the U. S. continues to pursue a will-of-the-wisp search for a “victory” in Vietnam that in fact, is not possible.

It indicates that President Nixon still wants a kind of peace agreement that North Vietnam can not seriously be expected to accept.

It suggests strongly that Nixon and Kissinger, his chief negotiator, are not in complete accord on what will be necessary to bring peace.

And it all adds up to another national tragedy over Vietnam — a morass, somehow, from which we cannot seem to escape.

The outlook now is for an extensive military stalemate, with more death and more destruction.

The events of the last seven weeks it seems to me, have made the achievement of peace even more difficult, and more complex, than it was before.

For peace negotiations, under any circumstances, must be based on some sort of good faith between the negotiators.

At one point in October Kissinger clearly believed that “good faith” was present. But then the U. S. itself backed out of an agreement that had been reached.

It is hard to see how “good faith” can

On Oct. 27, the day after Henry Kissinger declared that Vietnam peace was “at hand,” Knight newspaper correspondent James McCartney was dispatched to Saigon to cover the end of the war. But the war didn’t end and McCartney has just returned. Here is his personal assessment of what went wrong—and why.

be re-established by more bombs.

To understand what happened it is necessary, it seems to me, to turn the clock back to a crucial point in the secret negotiations in late October, a few days before the Kissinger Oct. 26 conference.

There had been, on Oct. 8, what Kissinger considered a major breakthrough in his secret negotiations with Hanoi's Le Duc Tho in Paris.

The wording of an agreement had been hammered out, and a set of dates discussed when it might be signed.

This deal was, to put it mildly, messy. It was ambiguous, and subject to a variety of interpretations, on virtually every important point over which the war had been fought for a quarter of a century.

It was a paper deal — papering over the issues of the war. In effect, it would officially recognize a stalemate. No one I ever talked to thought it would end the war — only postpone the fighting until the U. S. withdrew.

It was a Kissinger kind of deal: Let everyone think he won, and get out.

Kissinger wanted it, and was prepared to sign.

On Oct. 18 Kissinger flew from Paris to Saigon to clear the agreement with Thieu. His plan was to fly on to Hanoi on Oct. 22 to initial the agreement.

But right then — in Saigon — the deal began to fall apart. Thieu would not buy it, and Nixon felt it vital to obtain Thieu's acceptance. A cease-fire without Thieu's acceptance could hardly work.

On Oct. 20 — two days after arriving in Saigon — Kissinger notified Hanoi that he couldn't keep the Oct. 22 signing date, and asked to postpone the initialising until Oct. 24.

Kissinger clearly believed he could work out Thieu's objections in a couple more days. But he couldn't.

On Oct. 23, before the world knew how close a peace agreement might be — Kissinger notified Hanoi that “difficulties” had arisen in Saigon that would make further negotiations necessary.

That same day, a dispirited Kissinger left Saigon for Washington to report his failure to President Nixon.

Thieu had clearly stopped a peace agreement.

His objections are now well known — the presence of North Vietnamese troops, the failure to formally identify the right of South Vietnam to exist, his concern that a coalition government was being “imposed.”

As one of his top officials told me, Thieu had “cold feet” about peace. In

fact, he is operating a military dictatorship and could probably not survive a real peace, and he knows it.

The U. S. misjudgment of Thieu was virtually complete.

An important footnote is that Thieu all but hates Kissinger — and feels Kissinger tried to sell him out. That is why Kissinger's top aide Gen. Alexander Haig, now represents the White House on trips to Saigon.

Ironically, it was just about this time that the press picked up inside information about the agreement that was under discussion and trumpeted, all over the world, that peace was imminent.

In fact, the press was slightly behind events.

Kissinger's decision to return to Washington from Saigon on Oct. 23 — rather than to go to Hanoi — represented a breakdown in the negotiations, not a triumph.

Yes, Hanoi was ready to negotiate and did make concessions. But there was a limit beyond which Hanoi was not ready to go.

Hanoi wanted the paper deal. It wanted the deal that would make continued struggle possible. It did not want all the “holes” buttoned up.

Kissinger has since acknowledged that his declaration that peace was “at hand” was aimed primarily at Hanoi — to indicate that the U. S. still had faith that “major” problems had been worked out, and only “minor” ones remained.

Incidentally, of course, the White House was claiming the virtual achievement of peace in Vietnam on the eve of the election. The notion that peace was “at hand” was good politics — true or not.

It is a classic pattern in U. S. elections. No President in modern times has campaigned for war.

After the U. S. elections, and after negotiations resumed, the illusions persisted: Hanoi would accept important changes, Thieu could be brought around.

Hanoi then took matters into its own hands. On Oct. 26 Hanoi radio blew the cover on the secret talks. It revealed the essential outline of the agreement, and castigated the U. S. for backing down on the signing.

Nixon and Kissinger faced a dramatic problem.

The U. S. election was only 12 days away. Thieu wasn't cooperating. Yet Kissinger was convinced that Hanoi had made major concessions on Oct. 8 that Hanoi was serious about wanting peace.

Hanoi's decision to make the agreement public must have come as a shattering blow at the White House, for it clearly presented an attempt to put public pressure on the U. S. to sign.

Kissinger and Nixon decided on a bold tactic: to put the best face on what had suddenly turned into a nightmare.

The words are now probably immortalized: “We believe peace is at hand.”

Was it a lie?

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

5-F

Knocks 'American' war

Thieu hasn't unified S. Viet, monk says

By Donald Kirk

Far East Correspondent

Chicago Tribune Press Service

SAIGON, Viet Nam, Dec. 27—In the shadows of the An Quang Pagoda, over the sounds of monks chanting a morning prayer, one of the venerables denounces the Saigon regime in terms reminiscent of another era in the war.

President Nguyen Van Thieu "is only a puppet of the Americans," says the Venerable Lieu Minh, member of the Council of the Pagoda, headquarters of the antigovernment wing of the Buddhist Church of Viet Nam.

"The Americans are the patrons of the house," Minh goes on, "If the patrons want him to stop fighting, he [Thieu] — will stop."

"THIS WAR IS AN American war," adds the monk, who was active in the bloody 1966 revolt against the government, then led by Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky as premier. "The peace should be an American peace. That is all."

The voice of antiwar, antigovernment, antiAmerican protest by Lieu Minh represents perhaps the harshest denunciation heard here since the Presidential campaign.

It is all the more surprising because the An Quang Pagoda of late has adopted a self-consciously nonpolitical attitude and has ordered its monks and laymen to focus only on internal problems of the church.

YET, LIEU MINH, seated at

a rough wooden table behind the main meeting room, insists he is talking as the Pagoda's official "spokesman."

"The An Quang Policy is that the An Quang will not talk about the future of President Thieu because Thieu's future is the responsibility of the Americans," says Minh.

"The An Quang policy is not to recognize U. S. aggression in Viet Nam," Minh explains, "but the U. S. government tries to force An Quang to accept an aggressive war."

IT WAS BECAUSE the pagoda defied American policy, says Minh, that President Nixon "ordered Thieu's men to attack the pagoda and arrest our members." Since then, Minh claims, "Thieu has kept big pressure on An Quang activities throng the country."

The sharpness of Minh's attack appears to contradict the impression of American officials that Thieu has united the country around him more strongly than ever before. Minh's words not only indicate the depth of opposition to Thieu, but may also signal a renewed campaign by the An Quang Pagoda to build up militant support against him. As in the early years of the war, when monks burned themselves to death by setting matches to their kerosene-drenched clothes, the watchword is "peace."

"The An Quang appeals to the American people and the American government to help South Viet Nam get out of this war and have peace soon," says Minh. He is particularly critical of the renew-

al of full-scale bombing thru-out North Viet Nam.

"Now the United States is rebombing, and everything starts at the beginning," he says. "The An Quang once again appeals to the American government and people to stop the war here and let the two people, north and south, live together as friend and brother."

LIEU MINH'S TONE seems to verify the view that some elements of An Quang would gladly enter into a coalition government—perhaps as a "third" or "neutral" force between the present Saigon regime and the National Liberalization front.

Minh does not confirm this view in so many words, but freely endorses the peace agreement drafted in October by U. S. Presidential Adviser Dr. Henry Kissinger and North Viet Nam's Le Due Tho.

"Sooner or later the South Vietnamese government will have to accept the agreement," says Minh.

THE AGREEMENT CALLS for reform of a tripartite election council that might provide the basis for a coalition—a point to which Thieu particularly objects.

"If the agreement is not approved," Minh warns, "then this war will detonate war throughout the world. And if the Americans continue the war in Viet Nam, it will spread to American soil and annihilate all the United States."

One surprise in Minh's criticism is that he can make such statements without apparent fear of arrest.

The Vietnamese National Police every day arrest hun-

dreds of opponents—many simply as draft-dodgers, others as serious undercover activists.

ONE REASON for Minh's freedom may be that Thieu does not want to create adverse publicity by arresting major critics of his government. Minh is especially important because he chairs a committee of the pagoda charged with examining facilities for prisoners His arrest could outrage a wide segment of the opposition.

Thieu has shown his desire to placate even his milder critics by apparently deciding not to request an extension of special emergency powers, granted him last June after a bitter fight in both houses of the National assembly. Important members of the Senate, while supporting Thieu's military policies, denounced the emergency powers bill as a dictatorial measure.

Another reason Minh talks so openly could be that he shields himself by claiming to direct his remarks only at the United States, Thieu's patron.

"The An Quang policy is to keep on appealing to Americans to return sovereignty and independence for South Viet Nam," says the venerable. "The overthrow of Thieu is an internal affair of the Americans. Thieu would surely fall if the Americans left, because he is only a traitor of the nation."

NEW YORK TIMES
29 DECEMBER 1972

Celebrating his 89th birthday Wednesday in Cleveland, Cyrus S. Eaton, the industrialist who has long advocated improved American-Soviet relations, talked about the Vietnam war. "This is a giant and brutal destruction, a great departure from ordinary warfare," Mr. Eaton said. "It is time for the industrial leader, the banker, the businessmen to speak up against this."

SERIES OF MISJUDGEMENTS LED TO COLLAPSE OF PEACE TALKS... CONTINUED

That is strong language. It is probably best described as a gamble.

But it was a gamble based on a crucial assessment of Hanoi's position — an assessment that has proven to be wrong.

U. S. officials throughout Southeast Asia, both civilian and military, endlessly recited their conviction that Hanoi had been bombed into making concessions.

The White House also apparently believed that U. S. bombing and mining had brought Hanoi to its knees — just as President Nixon predicted it would last April.

Thus in October the White House expected to be able to wring further concessions from Hanoi.

The misjudgment now seems clear.

But Kissinger's news conference on Dec. 16, in which he admitted negotiations had broken down, was also a concession that the U. S. had been mistak-

ened.

Somehow, as he put it, "the negotiations have had the character where a settlement was always just within our reach, and was always pulled just beyond our reach when we attempted to grasp it." He accused Hanoi of standing in the way of agreement—saying that somehow Hanoi was no longer negotiating in "good faith."

It is a tidy theory. But the facts appear to be that the U. S. also hardened its position, and demanded new concessions.

Nixon clearly became convinced that Thieu had valid objections to the agreement and it had to be changed.

The tragedy, to me, is the nature of the U. S. misjudgments.

No one close to the war who I have talked to in Southeast Asia believed that Hanoi was ready to toss in the towel

completely—to abandon its revolutionary objective to take over South Vietnam.

No one I talked to believed Thieu could be persuaded to enthusiastically support the proposed agreement.

The White House continues to act as though the U. S. can guarantee a non-Communist South Vietnam—which would be the same as winning the war.

But the U. S. hasn't won the war on the battlefield. It has only prevented Hanoi from winning.

I am convinced that the war can end only when the U. S. is bold enough to cut itself loose from Thieu—and to force him to win or lose his own war.

But that time has not yet come.

By President Nixon's decision, we are still involved and hundreds, perhaps thousands, are dying every week.

It was a sad Christmas for Vietnam.

6-F

UPI 1137

(KISSINGER)

PALM SPRINGS, CALIF. (UPI)--HENRY KISSINGER IS SPENDING THE HOLIDAY WEEKEND IN THIS DESERT RESORT BUT IS KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE WHITE HOUSE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM.

THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER ARRIVED TUESDAY TO REST BUT HAS BEEN BUSY ON THE TELEPHONE, HE TOLD NEWSMEN.

HE IS STAYING AT THE HOME OF THEODORE E. CUMMINGS, WEALTHY RETIRED FOOD MARKET OWNER.

DURING A BRIEF MEETING WITH NEWSMEN, KISSINGER WAS INTERRUPTED BY A CALL FROM PRESIDENT NIXON.

HE SAID ONE OF THE REASONS FOR SELECTING THIS AREA FOR A BRIEF VACATION WAS ITS ACCESSIBILITY TO THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK AT SAN CLEMENTE, CALIF.

HE SAID HE MAY LEAVE SUNDAY FOR WASHINGTON OR STAY OVER UNTIL TUESDAY.

AMONG FRIEND SEEN HERE WITH HIM WAS ROBERT EVANS, HEAD OF PARAMOUNT STUDIOS AND ESTRANGED HUSBAND OF ACTRESS ALI MACGRAW.

UPI 12-29 04:11 PES

# Nonexpectations
Of a Negotiated Peace

Maxwell D. Taylor

WASHINGTON—If confusion” has been the chronic state of the American public mind during most of the Vietnam conflict, there is little to suggest that its terminal phase will be a period of enlightened understanding. Since Oct. 26 when we first became aware of the sudden hope in the Paris negotiations, our understanding of the situation has become increasingly clouded by veiled or inadequate official statements supplemented by endless media speculations.

Presumably we know what our Government is trying to obtain—a supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina, the return of our prisoners of war concurrently with the withdrawal of our remaining forces, and a political settlement worked out by the contending Vietnamese parties during the cease-fire. In the course of this sequence we would insist that no preconditions be imposed which would prejudice a fair chance of survival for South Vietnam.

As for the position of North Vietnam, we have only its nine-point summary of Oct. 26, but this is sufficient to reveal a wide disparity, with the American negotiating objectives. Although we are led to believe that the Hanoi terms have changed in the meantime, we do not know enough about the changes to form a judgment as to what to expect from further efforts to reach an agreement.

In the present uncertainty we can at least record certain things which we can not expect to take place. And I shall offer my list of principal nonexpettations.

To begin with, I would not expect Hanoi ever to abandon the myth that there are no North Vietnam forces in South Vietnam, a myth carefully fostered in the nine-point draft. Its acceptance would have the effect of excluding the most important body of enemy forces from the terms of a cease-fire and from the provisions of any agree-

ment covering noninfiltration or troop withdrawal. Neither would I expect Hanoi to accept any form of effective international supervision of a cease-fire arrangement. From these nonexpectations I draw the conclusion that no genuine cease-fire worthy of the name can be expected under present circumstances in South Vietnam.

Next, I would never expect supervised general elections ever to take place. Communists have almost never been willing to stake their political future anywhere on the one-man, one-vote principle. The proposed National Council of Reconciliation and Concord is a troika monstrosity charged with organizing general elections which, by its tripartite composition of equal numbers of Communists, non-Communists and "neutrals," would guarantee that general elections would never take place.

I would never expect Saigon to recognize the status of political equality accorded the Vietcong in the Hanoi document any more than Hanoi would ever acknowledge formally the legitimacy of the Saigon Government. Nor will Saigon ever agree to a coalition government imposed by a political settlement.

Finally, I would never expect Hanoi to release our prisoners until every possible advantage had been extracted from this priceless asset. When it occurs it is likely to be one of the final acts of a deliberately protracted negotiation.

So much for nonexpectations.

If we cannot expect to achieve a supervised cease-fire, general elections, a negotiated coalition or a prompt return of our prisoners in a finite time, it is hard to see how we can expect to attain our present objective of a negotiated peace assuring a fair deal for South Vietnam. May it not be time to reconsider the possibility and even the

desirability of terminating our American commitment without resort to a formal agreement involving Hanoi and the Vietcong?

We have no need of such an agreement to withdraw our remaining forces, to continue to exploit our air power as we see fit in either North or South Vietnam, and to transfer our share of responsibility to Saigon for the conduct of future political negotiations. And we can do these things without diminishing the fair chance for survival which we owe our ally.

It is true that such a course of action would not guarantee "peace in our time" for Indochina, but neither would a signed statement of honorable intentions from the warring parties if such a statement could be extracted from them by force, threats, or bribes. It would not establish a firm date for the return of our prisoners, but that date is far from firm if their release depends upon the successful conclusion of a negotiated settlement.

But it does leave us with leverage to apply to both sides to influence future events; our air power, the possibility of postwar economic aid for all Indochina, and the need of Saigon for our future support. It removes the fear on its part of the South Vietnamese of a settlement which would eventually assure a Communist take-over. It permits Hanoi to retain the hope of fighting again on a better day, even if obliged to draw back now. Obviously it is not a perfect solution but it offers us a better chance of an early and honorable disengagement than would further pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp of a negotiated peace. We would come out, if not with colors flying, at least without leaving our colors in the hands of the enemy.

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor (Ret.) served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Ambassador to South Vietnam.

# 'We Must Tell the President'

WASHINGTON—Can we scientists meet in Washington and ignore the fact that our national Administration is launching from this city the most massive air attacks in history? It is launching those attacks against concentrated centers of civilian population, while blandly announcing lists of military targets that under these circumstances insult the intelligence of every thinking person, North Vietnam hardly contains military targets; and a B-52 bombing pattern one and one-half miles long by one-half mile broad, dropped from an altitude of 30,000

This statement was prepared for the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and signed by these members: Dr. George Wald, Nobel Laureate, Harvard University; Dr. Salvador Luria, Nobel Laureate, M.I.T.; Dr. Albert Szent-Gyorgy, Nobel Laureate, Marine Biology Laboratory, Wood's Hole; Dr. Everett Mendelsohn,

1968. Beginning the Sunday morning after Christmas, Dec. 26, and continuing until Dec. 31—as we met—1,000 bombing sorties were flown over North Vietnam. We know now that bombing has continued ever since; and now as we meet again in another Christmas season, it is being enormously intensified.

Is our science to serve life, or death? That planet that is in our care—this environment that concerns us so seriously—can we talk of ways to foster and preserve it here while wondrously destroying it there?

vice president A.A.A.S.; Dr. John Edsalle, Professor of Biochemistry, Harvard; Dr. E. W. Pfeiffer, Professor of Zoology, University of Montana; Dr. Arthur Galston, Professor of Biology, Yale University; Dr. Arthur Westing, Director of the Herbicide Assessment Commission, A.A.A.S.; Dr. Richard Lewontin, Professor of Biology, University of Chicago.

We must speak out, as Americans, as scientists, against this outrageous misuse of the fruits of science for death and destruction.

We must tell the President where we stand. Let us insist on an immediate end to the bombing. Let us insist that the cease-fire we were told he was virtually ready to sign last Oct. 26 be signed now.

feet, cannot pick out targets. Yet such bombings are now crisscrossing some of the most densely populated cities in the world, in an unprecedented orgy of killing and destruction that horrifies people everywhere—as Guernica, Coventry and Dresden once honored them. And all, once we are

As scientists we bear a special responsibility. Explain as we will—that science is not technology; that most of us do not make proximity fuses, B-52 bomb sights and all the sophisticated super-weaponry of electronic battlefields—we have also too often claimed

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

7-F

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 30 December 1972

# When bombing was policy

By Godfrey Sperling, Jr.

Washington

As the bombs continue to fall in North Vietnam, apparently as a means to pressure Hanoi to a settlement, it is important to note that, in the spring of 1969 Henry Kissinger thought the enemy was being persuaded to negotiate peace for just the opposite reason: because the United States bombs were not falling.

It was at a Monitor-sponsored breakfast meeting with a small group of reporters that Dr. Kissinger confided that the end to our bombing at that time "had reduced their (Hanoi's) war energy." By this he said he meant there was evidence that the North Vietnamese were showing a "lassitude" as a result of the bombing end - that they were now showing more concern with postwar affairs. This falloff in the will to fight among the North Vietnamese people, he said, was pushing Hanoi toward a settlement.

Clearly implicit in the Kissinger remarks at that time was that U.S. bombing - like that of the Germans on England in World War II - had actually been strengthening, not weakening, the resolve of those being bombed to carry on the war.

Thus it was that only a few months after the President had taken office his chief White House advisor on foreign affairs was under-scoring the great assets in not bombing: "Personally," he said, he thought Hanoi was moving toward a settlement.

At this point in the breakfast Dr. Kissinger detailed what he saw as Hanoi's "serious problems:" he said that General Giap had recently given a visiting Italian journalist

figures on his casualty rates which seemed to confirm "our own estimates." His losses, said Dr. Kissinger, by his own estimate are proportionately the equivalent of what the loss of 5 million men would mean to us. This means, Dr. Kissinger said, that even if they prevailed over us, they would be too drained of manpower to be able to defend themselves against the Chinese. "The Chinese problem is a difficult one for Hanoi," said Dr. Kissinger. "They (North Vietnam) have been saved from the Chinese year after year by a series of crises in other parts of the world. But they know they can't count on that going on indefinitely."

Dr. Kissinger pictured a Hanoi regime that was very likely ready to talk peace - concerned as it seemed to be by the prospect of having to protect itself from Peking and with the continued bombing halt cutting deeply into its people's resolution to carry on the war.

It is only fair to say that this was not all that Dr. Kissinger said at the breakfast. He also said that while he thought he saw a settlement drawing closer, he also recognized that "no one can be sure." And here he supplied a quote that jolted all of us at the table. "This may be one of those problems," he said of the war, "which destroys everyone who touches it."

That breakfast was notable for other Kissinger comments.

He said that "we will never impose a government on South Vietnam." But, he added, we will not object to any government which the parties themselves agree upon. He said he did not expect such an agreement.

He said he couldn't conceive of either side

agreeing to supervised elections. But he said he could conceive of "interim arrangements" arrived at locally which might lead on to some workable if informal political settlement.

He said that coalition was not likely. He could only conceive of it - as in the case of Laos - as a face-saving device for covering up a partition.

He said that Hanoi "knows" that a negotiated settlement must include one feature very unpleasant to its leaders - South Vietnam must continue for some time to be autonomous.

All these Kissinger observations occurred quite a while back, of course. The administration would doubtless argue today that nonbombing did not turn out to be the impelling force toward a settlement that the President and Dr. Kissinger had obviously thought it was going to be. But when historians scan this war, they should note that nonbombing was an important part of United States policy in the early Nixon months - and that Dr. Kissinger expressed confidence at that time that this policy was leading to peace.

Also, the opposite side of the Kissinger rationale early in 1969 could well have been said to be this: that a resumption of bombing would intensify Hanoi's resolve to carry on. Is it possible that this is what the bombs are doing now?

Mr. Sperling is national political correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor.

NEW YORK TIMES 30 December 1972 P1

# The War Is Suddenly Grim for the B-52 Fliers
on Guam

By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The New York Times

ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, Guam, Dec. 29 — "The flight crews are different now," said the young Air Force sergeant, a ground crewman. "Before, when they came back, they were always clowning around. Now they're shaken. They just get out of the plane and into the bus and go to the debriefing."

Since 1965, when the United States began bombing in Vietnam, the crews of the B-52 bombers had flow what some fliers call a "milk run" and others a "bus ride" over South Vietnam, where they faced little opposition from air defense.

The crewmen flew for about six hours from here to Vietnam, used radar to find targets they couldn't see, pressed a button to drop their bombs into a rectangle 3,000 by 9,000 feet, turned around and flew six hours back to their huge base on this tropical island. Their only enemy was boredom.

On Dec. 18 all that changed. For the first time the B-52's were ordered to bomb North Vietnam steadily, including the

1 dove upward and No. 3 veered to the right in evasive action. He motioned with his hands as fliers have since the days of the Wright brothers.

"But No. 2 stayed right on course and got it right in the belly and they got blown right out of the sky," he said, holding his left hand palm down and jabbing a finger up into it.

## First Combat Losses

In the 12 days since President Nixon ordered the resumption of the bombing, Washington has officially conceded losing 15 of the B-52's to enemy fire, the first losses in combat they have suffered. Hanoi says it has shot down 33.

A sampling of the crews here indicates that many believe neither figure. By their count, the number lost is somewhere in between. Of the 150 bombers based here, six or seven are believed to have gone down, the rest of the losses being sustained among the 50 bombers based in Thailand.

A further sampling indicated one constant and several variables in the reactions of the flight crews to the sudden increase in the danger they face. It has risen abruptly from practically nothing to

here, "and they are going to do that job." Whether anyone questioned the morality of the bombing could not be determined.

But a few fliers have reportedly declined to go up. An Air Force spokesman denied that anyone had quit but several islanders say they have friends among the crews who have found ways to get out of the dangerous missions. They say the Air Force prefers to send them home quietly rather than make a public issue of it.

## Sabotage Is Reported

There are also reports here that members of flight crews have deliberately caused some of the complicated electronic machinery aboard a bomber to break down and thus cancel a mission. Some have reportedly neglected to arm the bombs so that they would not explode after they were dropped.

An Air Force spokesman said, however, that that had "absolutely not happened." He said that the B-52's here had a 96 per cent rate of effectiveness — of 100 bombers readied for a mission, 96 had flown to the targets and unloaded their bombs.

Perhaps the best place to hear what the fliers think is in the bars of the officers' club here. In one room, a group of young lieutenants and captains were like the fliers of old—boisterous, swaggering, and loud in their talk of danger and death.

"You know what the most

said an officer last spring.

Thus, when the B-52 bombing of North Vietnam began on Dec. 10, the same tactics were used. Flights of three took off from here every 30 or 40 minutes, in staggered patterns, on round-the-clock missions so that about 72 planes were in the air every 24 hours.

## A Change of Tactics

But that stream of bombers allowed the North Vietnamese to concentrate their air defenses on each three-plane flight. The Air Force appears to have violated a basic principle of warfare—never to send forces into battle piecemeal because they can be chewed up by the enemy.

After the 36-hour pause in the bombing over Christmas, the Air Force partly switched tactics. The first raid that left here Tuesday afternoon was a World War II-style armada of 77 bombers, of which 76 returned. A group of about 24 bombers left here Wednesday morning and another of 21 bombers Wednesday night. Thursday night, a group of 27 hit North Vietnam.

In between, there have been flights of three and six bombers but at much wider intervals than before. They may have been sent on missions over South Vietnam, where they face little opposition, but that could not be determined.

In any event, the massing of the B-52's appears to have

National Enquirer

12/31/72

By MALCOLM BALFOUR

"Henry Kissinger makes a woman feel very special," said lovely Joanne Carson, ex-wife of TV's Johnny Carson.

Confided Angel Tompkins, costar of the new TV series, "Search": "I would have been willing to go out with him again, but it never happened."

And movie star June Wilkinson affirmed: "All the good things everyone says about him are true."

These are three of the glamorous young women who have been seen recently in the company of Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's top adviser, who has become almost as famous for his exciting social life as for his dramatic international negotiations.

To find out why so many beauties have dated the middle-aged, divorced statesman, The ENQUIRER asked some of them directly.

"He's fascinating!" replied Miss Carson, who now has her own TV talk show in Hollywood. "He's extremely brilliant, of course, but in addition he cares about you. He talks to you like you're the only person in the world at the moment, and that's his special charm."

"You can talk to him, too. He pays very special attention to what you say. It's an experience."

"I met him at a dinner party last year and he's escorted me a couple of times since and called me from Washington. We've been, you know, friends."

"The thing that impresses me most about Henry is that he's gentle. He is a gentleman in the true sense. He gives of himself and his time. And on top of that he has a fantastic sense of humor."

"Why shouldn't he go out with a lot of beautiful girls? He's a very eligible man." Angel Tompkins went out only once with Dr. Kissinger — on a date arranged by her studio at the time, Universal — but she confirmed much of what Miss Carson said.

"I found him to be a very charming man, very much a gentleman," said the actress. "The stories

HENRY KISSINGER

—As Seen by 3 of
The Glamorous Women
Who Have Dated Him

he told were funny and interesting. And he appreciates a sense of humor in others. For example, I asked him several questions which might have gotten into the area of national security.

"He replied with something like, 'Why should I tell you?' and I answered, 'Because maybe you don't have anybody else to tell!' He laughed wholeheartedly and said, 'That's a good answer!' So his sense of humor can make things very enjoyable for a girl. Our relationship after that evening was limited to two phone conversations.

"I found him very likeable and, as I say, I would have been glad to go out with him again."

"But things never came about . . . and that's the way the world goes."

June Wilkinson said she first met Dr. Kissinger at the home of comedian Buddy Hackett in Malibu Beach and then they went out together one evening.

"I found him a very charming, personable and considerate gentleman," she declared.

"I'm reluctant to talk about him because so many girls have abused their friendships with him. She was referring to several young women who have publicly boasted of their relationship with the statesman.

"Also, I don't want people to think that there's anything more between us than the fact that we went out together."

"But I certainly had a most pleasant evening."

**FASCINATING!** That's the word Joanne Carson (Johnny's ex-wife) uses to describe Henry Kissinger after having several dates with him.

Depression Is a Disease That
Goes Untreated Most of the
Time, Claims Psychiatrist

By MICHAEL ADLER

Hundreds of thousands of Americans walk the streets suffering from various forms of depression, a serious disorder about which average people know little or nothing, according to a noted psychiatrist.

DOCTOR
Leonard Cammer

"It is an illness that goes untreated most of the time, though its impact on family life and performance of daily tasks is incalculable," said Dr. Leonard Cammer.

"It brings on emotional stresses, social and economic chaos and causes people to take their lives.

"Normal people have depressions. These are only passing experiences of gloom and sadness. But when these 'blues' cannot be shaken off, or interfere with normal living, then the mood may be leading to depression."

Acute depression can strike anyone, said Dr. Cammer, author of the best-seller, "Up From Depression," and former associate clinical professor of psychiatry at New York Medical College.

The pace of modern day living he explained

Actor Loses 'Don Juan' Role but Wins Brigitte Bardot

French actor Laurent Vergez auditioned for a part as "Don Juan" in a film with Brigitte Bardot. He didn't get the part. But he DID get Bardot. They're shown above, about to share an apple.

Bardot, naturally keen to look over the new love of her screen life, watched auditions held on location in Sweden. Her former husband, the film's

director Roger Vadim, decided that American actor Robert Walker was the man he wanted to play the romantic Latin lead.

But Bardot, 38, thought that 25-year-old Laurent, was more the man for her, at least offscreen.

Since the audition the couple has been inseparable. Their love is, for the moment, undying.