3

neighbors, started more wars than any other European state,
and finally culminated in a Communist Empire. The emergence of
new nationalities on the territory of the former Soviet Union
is perhaps the single most important event of the current
period. Yeltsin is not Gorbachev, if for no other reason than
that he is only President of the Russian Republic - the
largest of the successor states comprising two thirds of the
former Soviet territory and half its population. But there are
also ten other republics of which the Ukraine is the largest.

American policy, nostalgic for the simpler verities of a
single power center, has been hesitant to deal with this
reality. But the hesitation and attendant emphasis on
stability could encourage already strong tendencies toward
recentralization in the Russian Republic and cause a
recurrence of the historic tragedy of the peoples of the
former Soviet Union - that the attempt to hold together the

4

polyglot Empire requires the militarization of its society and
a perpetual state of latent hostility toward the outside
world. As a result, no people has been more abused by its
government and no country has been in a more permanent state
of conflict with its environment.

The U.S. must not wind up on the wrong side of the conflict
between the imperial center and the emerging nationalities
inherent in every process of decolonization. On the territory
of the former Soviet Union it is compounded by the fact that
the territories seeking to assert their independence are
contiguous and that all the republics are undergoing major
economic and political crises which accentuate the conflicts
between them.

The economic crisis is the legacy of decades of stagnation
caused by the Stalinist central command system. The Russian
Republic has courageously tried to deal with this issue by

5

freeing prices. The hope is that rising prices will bring out
hoarded goods and stimulate production. The question is
whether the process can work quickly enough before the
immediate privations it must bring wreck the political system.

At this relatively early stage of the process as a visitor I
was more aware of austerity than of progress. There was a
general feeling there that they must produce results quickly;
Gaidar, the chief economic planner, spoke in terms of 3-4
weeks. He and others were hopeful that prices were starting to
head down, though that is not clear. Everybody seemed to think
that the critical period would be March/April when social
disturbances are expected.

While Gaidar insists that his plan is on target, this is a
minority view. Prices are certainly outrageous (a kilo of beef
costs half a month's salary in both Kiev and Moscow).
Meanwhile, Yeltsin is under attack and busily criticizing

6

"predators" for raising prices too high. Recently, he peremptorily lowered the price of sausages in one store he visited - in other words, the "free markets" concept is not yet firmly established.

Food prices continue to be barely manageable so long as consumers draw down their savings. But what will happen when they run out and when Gaidar freezes wages? I saw nothing to contradict the view that prices have been released into a void. No provisions have been made to assure adequate supplies of consumer goods and many doubt there will be any soon. To date, privatization plans have been just a gleam in the planners' eyes. One leading reformer told me that agricultural reform cannot begin this year because the Russian parliament has refused to act on it at all.

While Yeltsin and others express the hope that the economy can be stabilized by October, Gaidar admits that it will take

7

about two years *provided* responsible economic policies are
followed - of which there is as yet no conclusive evidence.
Others predict a further 30% decline in GNP this year with
stabilization in mid-to-late 1993. Can the political structure
last that long?

The economic crisis exacerbates the tensions within and
among the republics. And the "old thinkers" are taking
advantage of that situation. One melancholy reformer noted
that on some levels the August coup "succeeded." The
bureaucracy is permeated by Communists though they are no
longer in the government. They are, however, in the enviable
position of being able to sabotage the government's policies
while they are criticizing them. For the Communists were
always better at destroying than they were at creating.

The political dynamics, at least in Russia and the Ukraine,
are moving toward the nationalists. Russians worry about the

8

"fascist nationalism" symbolized by Zhirinovsky, who won by only 6% in the Presidential election but, according to one person, now commands five times as much support. In the Ukraine, the nationalists are pressing Kravchuk to confront Russia on the many military issues between them.

In Russia, nationalism means traditional imperialism made more tolerable by a measure of administrative autonomy. A major personality in the Russian parliament who only a year ago had been a vocal opponent of Gorbachev's alleged centralizing tendencies, said in response to my suggestion that the Commonwealth might become a loose confederation like the European Community: "We would never have put forward the Commonwealth had we thought it possible that the Ukraine might declare itself independent. I will never accept Kiev as a foreign city."

9

At a dinner in Moscow with a group of ten young Russians who are considered promising examples of the coming generation, my opposite number argued that the union must be kept together and hinted strongly that the Baltics belonged to their sphere. They also felt that the United States was taking advantage of the current situation, and that our use of the term "new world order" was highly presumptuous because it assumed that Russia would no longer be a significant factor in world affairs.

Yeltsin as President of Russia and Kravchuk as President of the Ukraine are probably responsible enough to manage the situation. But as discontent accelerates, they could be replaced in each capital by less accommodating personalities - not that either was brought up on the principle of democratic debate.

No Ukrainian would accept that the union survives; no Russian I met accepted that the Ukraine can be truly

10

independent. The Ukrainians to a man spoke of the threat of
Russian imperialism while, to varying degrees, the Russians
insisted that the Ukraine - or at least Crimea - can never
leave. The Ukrainians said that Russia accepted their
independence but immediately challenged the Ukraine's borders;
the Russians argued that the Ukraine agreed to an "economic
space" but then immediately issued its own currency. In other
words, the two republics disagree profoundly not only about
what was agreed upon, but about the very purpose of the
Commonwealth. The Ukrainians see it as having no permanent
status or organs - not even to prepare meetings of the Foreign
Ministers - and certainly no united Armed Force. The Russians
see it as a mechanism with which to play for time (they spoke
to me of a transition period of 2-3 years) in which to
reassert control over the others. Moreover, the dispute

11

between Russia and the Ukraine parallels similar conflicts
with other key republics.

In calmer times Russia and the Ukraine might be able to
compose their political differences, though not if Russia's
intention is to regain its colonies. And a series of military
disagreements can only worsen the atmosphere. There are
serious differences. First, there is a fundamental conceptual
difference. Russia's concept of the Commonwealth as an
instrument of control necessitates a centrally controlled
Commonwealth army. That is why Yeltsin has not formed a
<u>Russian</u> army. The Ukraine naturally sees the Commonwealth
armed force as a centralizing menace. Two senior military
leaders in Moscow told me they wanted a 2-3 year transition
period in which the existing armed forces would remain to
"solve" disputes. One of them flatly stated - twice in case I
missed it - that Yeltsin should simply take over <u>all</u> the armed

12

forces by decree and then ask the Ukraine to negotiate. "It
would," he smugly noted, "put us in a stronger position for
the talks."

The disagreements are concentrated in three areas:

[1]. **Nuclear Weapons.** Though it seems they have agreed on strategic weapons, whether or not Kravchuk realizes that his "button" is not hooked up to anything is open to question.

There will be more skirmishing on tactical nukes. While there is agreement in principle to remove them by July 1st, there is no accepted procedure for moving them. One Ukrainian told us that the Russians had unilaterally begun shipping them out the Friday before. Kravchuk implied that if ships with tactical nukes aboard were to disappear before July 1st, it would be fine with him [but what about Rukh?]. I would judge that the issue of nuclear weapons will be the easiest to solve.

13

[2] **The Black Sea Fleet.** Both republics agree that it will be split. But the Russian concept is that the Ukraine gets only a few coast guard vessels. The Ukraine thinks it will get everything that does not carry nukes. There is no agreement at all on where they will be based. The Ukraine says that since Sevastopol is theirs, the Russian portion of the fleet must be reassigned elsewhere. Russia says that is impossible.

[3] **Conventional Forces.** This is by far the most difficult set of issues. There are at least five: [A]. The oath, which can probably be fixed since the Russians can always ignore it if they want to in a crisis; [B] The number of troops in the Ukrainian Army, complicated by the fact that the Ukraine has no reliable independent figures for the existing army; [C] The "social issues" of housing, etc., as well as the Russian insistence that all the military educational establishments are theirs; [D] Command and Control mechanisms. The Russian

14

view is that all forces should report to the Commonwealth
CINC. They would allow the republics to provide quartermaster
services to forces in their territory but operational command
must proceed from the CINC; [E] The role of the armed forces.
Russia sees the Ukraine's forces as "Republican Guards"
confined to protecting politicians and buildings. The
Commonwealth army would protect the Ukraine's external
borders. This concept of the armed forces cannot be acceptable
to any Ukrainian leader.

These are not easy problems. They are compounded by a nearly
total lack of trust between the republics. Each of them told
me that they had asked the other why they needed such large
armed forces. Neither got a satisfactory answer. Finally, the
military in Moscow, as many reminded me, are now for the first
time effectively without Party, KGB or political control. The
political vacuum has left the General Staff headquarters with

15

unprecedented influence. In effect, Russia is playing for
time. Instead of using the historic Russian tactic of giving
up territory to the enemy, the better to regroup, Russia today
gives up time hoping that Russia will recover quickly enough
to reassert its authority.

What does all this mean for the United States? At present,
U.S. policy seems to be driven by two concerns: the immediate
food crisis, and the issue of control of nuclear weapons.
These are important challenges. But the former is in the short
run a technical problem of distribution and in the long run
merges with the overall recovery of the former Soviet Union.
The latter has received a great deal of technical attention
and much useful American help. We must take care, however,
that the issue not be exploited by centralizers to achieve
much more sweeping designs.

16

The United States has been remarkably slow in dealing with the new republics. The Ukraine, a country with a population as large as France, had only two American diplomats when I was there and with no direct communication to Washington, though this is being rectified. I suspect that the American presence in the other republics is even more negligible. This attitude involves the risk of encouraging Moscow's claim to dominance.

Thus the United States should pursue two seemingly contradictory but in fact complementary policies:

[1] Washington must remember that Russia is the heir of a proud and heroic tradition. Recent events have been a major blow to its self-esteem. It is essential that Washington make clear in actions and in words that it considers Russia even within its present borders a major country entitled to security and an appropriate partner in the conduct of world affairs. This proposition runs so counter to Russia's

17

historical experiences that several of my interlocutors asked
me to repeat it more than once.

Yet it is true. Russia extending from St. Petersburg to
Vladivostok and possessing thousands of nuclear weapons no
longer needs the buffers it considered so essential throughout
its history. And if it could devote to its own people the
resources hitherto spent on imperial expansion, it could much
more rapidly overcome its economic crisis.

[2] At the same time, Russia must understand that imperial
expansion - by force or blackmail - will have a price sooner
or later and will clash with American principles. It will
frighten all of Russia's neighbors and start again the
historic cycle of confrontation and conflict.

[3] The United States should rapidly expand its economic and
cultural contacts with at least the key new republics. We must
remember that the imperial heritage has left most of them

18

little experience in international affairs. They need
sensitive encouragement. We must balance the attention Yeltsin
deserves with the support the new republics require.

[4] If Russia shows respect for the new situation and
remains within its own borders a significant Western aid
program would be essential.

We are experiencing an extraordinary opportunity - a
fundamental recasting of relations between the former Soviet
Union and the rest of the world. If dealt with successfully,
it can open an unprecedented era of cooperation. But such
moments are fleeting and they must not be wasted by dealing
with symptoms.

["IN0206", "DEPT.", "PAGE-2", "Ukraine, where I met with Gorbachev and aides to Yeltsin as well as a wide range of middle-level officials and ordinary citizens, I was struck by the growing nationalist", "sentiment in both republics. In Moscow, I had dinner with a group of ten young Rus-", "sians who are considered promising exam- ples of the coming generation. With only one exception, they felt that the union", "should stay together. They also felt that that the United States was taking advan-", "tage of the current situation, and that our use of the term ``new world order'' was highly presumptuous and seemed to as-", "sumed that Russia would not longer be a significant factor in world affairs. +", "[17]", "The current American discussion has all but overlooked the dangers of resurgent nationalism. It is almost entirely focused on the issues of who will control nuclear weapons and how to get the people through the winter. Yet these are issues of an emer- gency nature that could easily be turned over to technicians. The real issue is how the relations between Russia and the other independent republics are going to evolve? What impact will those relations have on", (((MORE)))))"]

On the whole, our pre-trip analysis of the economic situation was borne out by what we saw and heard in both Republics. The political scene is more tense and intractible than anticipated.

There are two races on: one is between economic reform and political disintegration; the other, between Russia's need to play for time and Ukraine's efforts to break free. I judge that disintegration is winning both races.

## Economy

The bad news is that the food is still bad. The good news is that there isn't much of it.

There was a general view ~~everywhere~~ that they must produce results fast; Gaidar mentioned within 3-4 weeks. He and others were hopeful that prices were starting down, though that is not clear. Everybody seemed to think that the critical period would be March/April when social disturbances are expected.

While Gaidar insists that his plan is on target, this is a minority view. Prices are certainly outrageous (half a month's salary for a kilo of beef in both Kiev and Moscow). Meanwhile, under attack Yeltsin is busily criticizing "predators" for raising prices too high. On Sunday he preemptorily lowered the price of sausages in one store he visited. Not a very convincing advocate of "free markets" can be found in other words, not even family

While Popov believes Moscow will get through the winter, he noted that he had to use the old command economy to lay in sufficient supplies. The food prices are perhaps barely manageable now as consumers draw down their savings (and "excess rubles"). But what happens when they run out and when Gaidar freezes wages? ~~as~~ salary as

Gaidar has taken most of the heat for the reform plan. He is viewed( in Kiev as well as Moscow) as young and inexperienced (though he is undoubtedly smart and dedicated and has some even brighter guys around him). He is rumored to be the first one off the back of the sled, perhaps within months. But Yeltsin, as his reception in the streets shows, cannot for long avoid the taint. Yeltsin can be consoled by the fact that the food shortage at least means there are no eggs to throw at him.

Page Two

The economic program has two serious structural weaknesses.

1. Nothing we saw and heard contradicted the view that the prices have been released into a void. No provisions have been made to assure a supply response and many doubt there will be one any time soon. Even Gaidar confessed that there were few incentives for increased production. The privatization plan is just a gleam in his eye. Popov said that they probably won't even begin the agricultural reform this year because the Russian parliament has refused to act at all on it.

2. They cannot balance the budget soon. Both the revenue and expense sides are unrealistic. Fully half of the revenues are supposed to come from a hefty (28%) VAT and an income tax, neither of which are likely to be collected. On the other hand, the head of the Central Bank has left the credit spigot open. While he may be fired soon, unless they can cut subsidies and control wages quickly, the printing presses will just keep rolling.

While Yeltsin and others say they hope to stabilize the economy by October, even Gaidar admits that this will take about 2 years provided they follow responsible economic policies. Others (including Aslund) predict a further 30% decline in GNP this year with stabilization in mid-to-late 1993. Can the political structure last that long?

## Politics

The poor economic outlook is going to exacerbate the political tensions within and between the republics. And the "old thinkers" are taking advantage of the situation.

As Popov noted, contrary to popular impressions, the August coup "succeeded". The communists still control the bureaucracy but are not in the government. So they have the enviable position of being able to sabotage the government's policies all the while criticizing them. The communists always were better at destroying than at creating.

The political dynamics, at least in Russia and Ukraine, are moving toward the nationalists. Russians worry about the "fascist nationalism" symbolized by Zhirinovsky, who won only 6% in the Presidential election but according to one person now commands five times as much support. The people inhabiting these fever swamps have unlimited imagination, reading into your visit an example of "Zionist" plots to undo Mother Russia. In Ukraine, the nationalists in Russia are pressing Kravchuk to stop Russia on the many military issues between them.

Page Five

unilaterally begun shipping them out on Friday.
Kravchuk implied that if the ships with tactical nukes
aboard were to disappear before July 1, that would be
fine with him (but what about Rukh?). I judge that the
nuclear issues are the easiest to solve.

2. **Black Sea Fleet.** Both agree that it will be split.
   But the Russian concept is that Ukraine gets only a few
   coast guard vessels. Ukraine thinks they get
   everything that doesn't carry nukes. And there is no
   agreement on basing. Ukraine says Sevastopol is theirs
   so the Russian portion of the fleet has to be
   reassigned elsewhere; Russia says impossible.

3. Conventional Forces. The most difficult set of issues.
There are at least five.

A. The oath, which can probably be fixed (since Russians can ignore the oath if they want to in a crisis).

B. The number of troops in the Ukrainian Army.
Complicated by the fact that Ukraine has no
reliable independent figures for the existing
army.

C. The "social issues" -- housing etc. In addition,
Russian insistence that all the military
educational establishments are theirs.

D. Command and Control mechanisms. Russian view that all forces should report to the Commonwealth CINC. They would allow Republics to provide quartermaster services to forces in their territory. But operational command proceeds from the CINC.

E. Role of the armed forces. Russia sees Ukraine's forces as "Republican Guards" confined to protecting politicians and buildings. The Commonwealth army would protect Ukraine's external borders. This concept of the armed forces cannot be acceptable to any Ukrainian leader.

These are not easy problems. They are compounded by a near
total lack of trust between the Republics. Each of the Republics
told us they had asked the other why they needed such large armed
forces. Neither got a satisfactory answer.

Page Six

And the military in Moscow, as many people reminded us, are now effectively without Party, KGB or political control for the first time.) The political vacuum has left the hard-eyed fellows at the General Staff Headquarters calling the shots. While Kobetz said he was troubled by this, in fact his policies would be if anything rougher towards Ukraine that the General Staff.

In effect, Russia plays for time. Instead of using the historic Russian ploy of giving up territory to the enemy, the better to regroup, Russia today gives up time hoping that Russia will recover quickly enough to reassert her authority.

## Conclusion

It is not a happy outlook. There is about the economic situation a quiet desperation, a mystical Russian belief that everything will somehow work out. Politics will get lots noisier, and heads will roll.

Behind it all lurks the real possibility of war with Ukraine. Certainly it would be illogical, for Russia is many times stronger than Ukraine. But a similar analysis could have been made in Charleston in the fall of 1860.

cc: ARB, AS, WDR, File

["IN0206\nVER # 00", "DEPT. MWHITA", "BU: HJ: Y 00244 LINES(INCL.HEAD)\nPG: ISSUE: ; 92A\nIN0206 -MWHITA-PVT\nMWHITA ;01/29,14:12", "By Henry A. Kissinger+", "□In just a matter of months, U.S. policy toward the former Soviet Union has shifted from an over-emphasis on Mikhail Gorbachev to an over-emphasis on Boris Yeltsin. Once again, Americans are obsessed with personalities at a time when underlying forces need to be understood. The problem with this is not only that as President of the Russian Republic, Yeltsin does not occupy as powerful a position as Gorbachev. In its preoccupation with Yeltsin, the United States risks overlooking a greater danger: that almost by instinct, the Russian republic may eventually try to reexert control over the whole country. If that were to happen, the outside world would sooner or later have to object. The outcome could be another Yugoslavia, yet on a far grander and more dangerous scale.→", "[1]", "□On a recent visit to Russia and the", "[19]", (((MORE))))"]

IN0206

DEPT.

Ukraine, where I met with Gorbachev and aides to Yeltsin as well as a wide range of middle-level officials and ordinary citizens, I was struck by the growing nationalist sentiment in both republics. In Moscow, I had dinner with a group of ten young Russians who are considered promising examples of the coming generation. With only one exception, they felt that the union should stay together. They also felt that that the United States was taking advantage of the current situation, and that our use of the term ``new world order'' was highly presumptuous and seemed to assume that Russia would not longer be a significant factor in world affairs.

The current American discussion has all but overlooked the dangers of resurgent nationalism. It is almost entirely focused on the issues of who will control nuclear weapons and how to get the people through the winter. Yet these are issues of an emergency nature that could easily be turned over to technicians. The real issue is how the relations between Russia and the other independent republics are going to evolve? What impact will those relations have on

[17]

(((MORE))))

["IN0206", "DEPT.", "the politics of neighboring countries? And\nwhat impact will they have on the pros-\npects for stability and peace in the world?+", "What the West must try to preempt is the\ngrowth of Russian nationalism to unman-\nageable proportions, and a return to the\nattitude of latent hostility between Mos-\ncow and the outside world that has been the\ncurse of the Russian empire under tsars\nand commissars. The way to avoid this is\nthree-fold:", "1. The United States must do whatever it can to prevent an economic crisis that could fuel nationalism and create a platform for political demogues. The danger is a reprise of weimar Germany, and the emergence of semi-democratic, semi-fascist system that expresses itself in frequent plebiscites. This kind of crisis can only be avoided with continued U.S. aid, dispensed not only to Russia but to the other major republics and directed not only at food shortages but at underlying economic problems like the distribution system.", "2. The United States must also make it clear to Russia that it does not need the", "[14]", "[8]", "[13]", {"bbox": [751, 1400, 882, 1424], "category": "Page-footer", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["IN0206", "DEPT.", "other republics to be recognized as a great\ncountry. Even without the other republics,\nRussia would extend from St. Petersburg to\nVladivostok, over eleven time zones. It\nwould have a population of 160 million. It\nmust not be forgotten that Russians still\nthink of themselves as a great people. If\nthey are not treated accordingly, they will\nbegin again to nurse their historical feelings of persecution and inferiority, and become tempted to reconsolidate the empire\nin order to be regain the stature they believe they deserve.", "□(3) At the same time, the United States\nmust make it clear that a return to imperial expansionism will not be accepted.\nWashington should not encourage republics to break away from the commonwealth, but it should also discourage any attempt, direct or indirect, at forcible recentralization. Any republic that declares itself independent through a democratic process should be recognized, and should be given economic help within the limits of U.S. capabilities.", "Over the short term, the United States", "[15]", "[12]", {"bbox": [764, 1372, 896, 1396], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["IN0206", "DEPT.", "may be powerless to prevent a major clash\nbetween Russia and the Ukraine. On my\nvisit, every Ukrainian I met, in the govern-\nment and the opposition, was fiercely com-\nmitted to independence. Yet the only Rus-\nsians who were willing to entertain this\nproposition were in a research institutes.\nAll the practicing politicians and military\nofficers were of the view that one way or\nanother, the Ukraine had to be part of a\ncommon economic and military system.\nOne top adviser to Yeltsin even told me\nthat they only agreed to the Common-\nwealth because they saw it as a tolerable\nway to maintain a union with the Ukraine.\nHe said that if they had known the Ukraine\nwanted to be independent, they would not\nhave agreed to the Commonwealth.", "The main focus of this power struggle\nwill be the military. The leaders in Moscow\nstill give the impression of presiding over\nthe capital of an imperial country. They\nthink of all of the former republics, includ-\ning even the Baltics, as part of their sphere.\nThe Ukrainians are provincials, concerned\nonly with local issues and how to achieve\nindependence. They have no experience in", "[19]", {"bbox": [756, 1399, 888, 1423], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["IN0206", "DEPT.", "PAGE-6", "foreign policy, and few people capable of\nthinking in global terms. +", "[11]", "The defense ministry is now technically part of the Commonwealth, but in practice it reports to Yeltsin. They view of defense officials is that the republics can have their independence, but issues of security must be centrally controlled, and that must be done in Moscow. They are willing to let the republics have militia for internal security, and republican guards to protect their presidents, but they are determined to keep the handling of outside defense in the hands of the central command in Moscow. +", "[12]", "The United States does not have to take sides on these internal issues, but it should try to prevent the conflicts from escalating out of control. That implies maintaining strong and direct relations with the Ukraine and the other major republics as well as Moscow. In particular, the United States should not permit its relationship with the republics to be driven entirely by the nuclear issue. Ukraine and Kazakhstan are the only other republics besides Russia that still have control of nuclear", (((MORE)))))"]

["IN0206", "DEPT.", "PAGE-7", "weapons, and they are unlikely to sell them\nto the outside world because they are even\nmore dependent on our good will than Rus-\nsia is. What should be of greater concern is\nthat that scientists and technicians and\nmilitary people who know something about\nthe nuclear will be hired in foreign\ncountries.→", "[20]", "□ The nuclear control question ought to be\nmade a technical issue as quickly as possi-\nble. There are about 20,000 tactical nuclear\nweapons in the territory of the former Sovi-\net Union, and the capacity for destroying\nthem may be no more than a thousand a\nyear. It will also take three or four years to\nmove all the strategic weapons out of their\ncurrent locations. All of this should be done\nin a way that does not antagonize the other\nrepublics by adding to the nuclear stock-\npile of the country they consider the biggest\nthreat to their independence. In other\nwords, a system in which their weapons are\ndestroyed commensurately with Russian\nweapons would make the process a lot\neasier.→", "[17]", "□ U.S. economic aid should be dispensed in", (((MORE))))"]

["IN0206", "DEPT.", "such a way as to maintain good relations\nwith all the republics and minimize fric-\ntion between them. The chief organizers of\nYeltin's reform program are all highly in-\ntelligent, very interesting young men, but\nthey face a situation in which the entire\nbureaucracy is used to a central command\nstructure and all the industrial enterprises\nare the products of that structure. In the\nthird week of the new reform program,\nwhen I was in Moscow, there was no sign\nthat things were improving. It is still early.\nBut intellectually, it is very difficult to see\nhow without any way increments in pro-\nduction, the reforms will bring more goods\nto market unless there has been hoarding\nfor a long time and the public trusts the\nnew currency enough to give up what they\nhave been hoarding.", "□Emergency food aid can only be one ele-\nment of U.S. economic assistance. Sending\nfood packages feels good, but it does little\ngood to send more supplies into a system\nthat can't distribute them. If we want to\nhelp, we should try to focus on the distribu-\ntion system and other middle-term reforms\nthat can help the economy develop. At the", "[20]", (((MORE)))))"]

["IN0206", "DEPT.", "same time, we should recognize that giving\ntoo much assistance in these areas runs the\nrisk of making Russia even stronger if\nsomewhere down the road it emerges as a\nformidable competitor. +", "During the visit, one democrat who is\nnow in a high-level position told me that\nthe August coup may not have failed after\nall. It may have succeeded by forcing Yelt-\nsin and the democrats, who would have\npreferred to remain in opposition for two\nmore years, to assume power and take re-\nsponsibility for getting the country\nthrough the current economic mess. They\nhave to meet that challenge through a com-\nmunist command structure bureaucracy\nthat remains impervious to change, and\ndealing with a communist party that in\nopposition can exploit all the popular dis-\ncontent that will inevitably be generated\nby a responsible program. +", "Yeltsin may turn out to be a transitional\nfigure. Whether he does or not, there re-\nmains a strong likelihood of greater chaos\nin the new Commonwealth, and an attempt\nto reestablish central control. Each phase", "[13]", "[16]", {"bbox": [766, 1374, 897, 1397], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

IN0206

DEPT.

of this historical transition is going to be
very difficult and painful, and may not be
all that attractive to American eyes. Therefore,
we ought to get clear now what it is we
really want from Russia and the other re-
publics, and what we can realitically
achieve. The goal must be to keep Russia
inside its own borders and and maintain an
equilibrium that does not pose a threat to
the rest of the world. But we must realize
that we are not in a position to dictate how
that equilibrium is achieved.

(((END)))

[17]