STRICTLY PERSONAL
BILDERBERG MEETINGS
E.H.van der Beugel

THE HAGUE, 17 January 1972

SMIDSWATER 1

TELEPHONE 112069

TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

My dear Herr, HAK-405-2/9

We had our Steering Committee meeting of Bilderberg
last Saturday, and I am delighted that everybody was
hoping very much that you will be able to attend the
next Conference, which will be held at Knokke, Belgium
on 21,22 and 23 April 1972.

In the very unhopeful case that you could not make
it, it was decided to invite General Haig.

The subject of the Conference is:

The state of the Western community in the light of
changing relationships among non-communist industrialized
countries, and the impact of changing power relationships
in the Far East on Western security.

Working papers will be prepared by George Ball, Alastair
Buchan, Mike Blumenthal and Max Kohnstamm and myself jointly.

You will of course receive an official invitation
from the Prince, but I give you this advance signal as
early as possible.

Dr.Henry A.Kissinger
The White House
WASHINGTON, D.C.20501
U.S.A.

U.S.A.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201
The White House
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

early as possible.

Buchan, Mike Blmenthal and Max Kohnstamm and wyaeft jointly.
Working papers will be prepared by George Ball, Alatsir

The estate of the Western community in the light of

it, it was decided to invite General Hard.

In the very unhopeul case that you could not make
on 31.22 and 23 April 1953.
next Conference, which will be held at Knوكke, Belgium
hoping very much that you will be able to attend the
last Saturday, and I am delighted that everybody was

E.H.nv der Bende
BILDERBERG MEETINGS

TELEPHONE 11200
SUBMITTER 1
THE DATE 17 JUNUSLY 1955

STRICTLY PERSONAL

E107

[y]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March

General Haig:

Senator Brock's office called to inquire about Mr. Kissinger's travel plans to the Bilderberg meeting. It appears that the Senator is having difficulty getting transportation. David Rockefeller's plane is leaving the 14th of April, but Brock cannot leave that soon. He has heard through Joseph Johnson (Honorary Sec. Gen for the U.S.) a participant in the Bilderberg Meeting that Mr. Kissinger would be leaving around the 20th and is asking whether there would be room on the plane for him.

If Mr. Kissinger does go to the Bilderberg meeting, he is tentatively following that up with a "spook" trip. In view of this, Coleman and I thought it would be best to turn this off but wanted your view.

Should we tell him the plane is full?

" " " Mr. Kissinger's plans are not definite?

Make arrangements for him to fly with HAK?

Other (please specify)

It appears HAK will not allow us to go. Irene

HK

about it at Bilderberg.

Your silence for just Washington sounds fine. I shall talk to you

The Hague, The Netherlands
Budapest, I
Mr. Ernst H. van der Bergel

Henry V. Kissingor

Warm regards,

My very best wishes to you and Mlle. K.

date.
you know something definitely as we get closer to the
ting will occur to keep me from coming but I will let
There is, of course, always the possibility that some-
co to see you again too.

in April. Needless to say, I am also looking forward
to joining the Bilderberg conference in Belgium
China, that is of this writing I am very much looking
I thought I would let you know, before we take off for
I did not think so.

Dear Ernst,

FEB 15 1975

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

345 EAST 46TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

28 March 1972

To: The Participants of Bilderberg Meeting, 21-23 April 1972

From: Joseph E. Johnson

I am sending you herewith the fourth and last of
the working papers which will be discussed at our meeting
in Knokke. This one has been prepared by George W. Ball.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

345 EAST 46TH STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

21 March 1972

To: Participants of Bilderberg Meeting in Knokke, 21-23 April 1972

From: Joseph E. Johnson

Enclosed you will find detailed information about the
meeting which has been sent to us from The Hague.

I am also sending you three of the four papers which
will be discussed at the Knokke Conference. The fourth paper
by George W. Ball will be sent to you next week.

Please let me know if you have any questions about any
of this. We would be grateful if you would send your travel plans
on the enclosed card directly to The Hague, with a copy to us.

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, March 1972

SMIDSWATER I
TELEPHONE 113069
TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

To the participants of
the Knokke Meeting

Dear Sir,

Enclosed you will find a provisional list containing the names and principal functions of all those who can be expected to attend the Bilderberg Meeting, to be held at Knokke-Le Zoute, Belgium on 21, 22 and 23 April 1972 (arrival 20 April).

If you wish to have any change made in the way your name and principal function are mentioned in this provisional list, you are kindly requested to inform the Secretariat in The Hague. The suggested correction will be made in the final list which will be available to all participants at the Hotel "La Réserve".

Your attention is drawn to the enclosed "Notice to Participants" and particularly to the paragraphs "Accommodation" and "Transport". It is recommended to complete the annexed card and return it to the Secretariat as soon as possible in order to avoid delays in reaching Knokke.

Particularly for the use of those participants who arrive on an intercontinental day flight, there will be a private plane leaving Heathrow (London Airport) for Middelkerke (Ostend Airport) very late on Thursday evening, April 20th. If you wish to make use of this facility, we would be very grateful if you would inform us as soon as possible. Particulars about the departure of the plane will be circulated in due course.

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, -2-
SMIDSWATER 1
TELEPHONE 112060
TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

I am sending distinctive badges which you may wish to fix to your luggage (or your car) in order to facilitate identification by members of the Secretariat.

Persons attending a Bilderberg Meeting for the first time are requested to inform the Secretariat whether they wish to receive all correspondence and documents in English or in French. For their personal information I enclose a copy of a pamphlet "Bilderberg Meetings" which gives details concerning the organization, as well as a copy of the summary of the 1971 Meeting in the United States.

Working papers by Mr. George Ball, Messrs. Ernst van der Beugel and Max Kohnstamm jointly, Mr. Michael Blumenthal and The Hon. Alastair Buchan will be circulated as soon as possible.

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

KNOKKE CONFERENCE

21, 22 and 23 April 1972

(arrival 20 April)

PROVISIONAL LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

H.R.H. the Prince of the NETHERLANDS

Chairman

Ernst H. van der BEUGEL

Professor International Relations, Leiden University

Honorary Secretary General for Europe

Joseph E. JOHNSON

President Emeritus, Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace

Honorary Secretary General for the United States

C. Frits KARSTEN

Director, Member of the Board, AMRO Bank N.V.

Honorary Treasurer

AUSTRALIA

BROWN, Neil A.

Member of Parliament

WESTERMAN, Sir Alan

Chairman of the Board of Directors, The Australian Development

Corporation

AUSTRIA

KRAUS, Wolfgang

Secretary General of the Austrian Society for Literature

-3-

## DENMARK

HAEKKERUP, Per
Minister for Economic Affairs

SØRENSEN, Svend O.
General Manager, Den Danske Landmandsbank

TERKELSEN, Terkel M.
Editor-in-Chief, "Berlingske Tidende"

## FINLAND

HORN, Tankmar
Chief Director General, OY Wärtsilä AB

## FRANCE

BAUMGARTNER, Wilfrid S.
President, Rhône-Poulenc S.A.
Honorary Governor, Banque de France

DAVID-WEILL, Michel
Partner, Lazard Frères & Cie.

GIROUD, Françoise
Director and Editor-in-Chief of "l'Express"

NORA, Simon
Director General, Librairie Hachette

RIBOUD, Jean
President, Schlumberger Ltd.

ROTHSCHILD, Baron Edmond de
Director of Companies

SABOURET, Yves
Director of the Cabinet of the Minister of Labour

TATU, Michel
Chief of the Foreign Section of "Le Monde"

-4-

## GERMANY

BIRRENBACH, Kurt
Member of Parliament
Chairman of the Board, August Thyssen-Hütte A.G.

DÖNHOFF, Marion Gräfin
Chief Editor "Die Zeit"

FOCKE, Katharina
State Secretary for European Affairs

SCHMIDT, Helmut
Minister of Defence

SCHRÖDER, Gerhard
Member of Parliament

WISCHNEWSKI, Hans-Jürgen
Member of Parliament

WOLFF von AMERONGEN, Otto
Chairman of the Board, Otto Wolff A.G.

## ICELAND

HALLGRIMSSON, Geir
Mayor of Reykjavik

## INTERNATIONAL

DAHRENDORF, Ralf
Member of the European Economic Commission

DENIAU, Jean-François
Member of the Commission of the European Communities

KOHNSTAMM, Max
President of the European Community Institute for
University Studies

LENNEP, Jonkheer Emile van
Secretary General, O.E.C.D.

LOUDON, Jonkheer John H.
President, The Atlantic Institute

-5-

(INTERNATIONAL)

LUNS, Joseph M.A.H.
Secretary General N.A.T.O.

MALFATTI, Franco M.
President of the Commission of the European Communities

SCHWEITZER, Pierre-Paul
Managing Director, International Monetary Fund

ITALY

AGNELLI, Giovanni
President, FIAT S.p.A.

CITTADINI CESI, Il Marchese
Association pour l'Etude des Problèmes de l'Europe

COLOMBO, Umberto
Director, Istituto Denegani

COLONNA di PALIANO, Prince Guido
President, La Rinascente S.p.A.

DUCCI, Roberto
Director General Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

LEVI, Arrigo
Journalist, "La Stampa"

MARAINI, Fosco
Correspondent of "La Nazione", Florence

NETHERLANDS

DIJKGRAAF, Anton F.J.
Member of the Presidium of Algemene Bank Nederland

't HOOFT, Maria J.
Professor at the Rotterdam School of Economics
Director of the Economic Institute of the Free University

KOSTER, Henri J. de
Minister of Defence

-7-

SWITZERLAND

FLEINER, Thomas

Professor for Law and International Relations,
University ot Fribourg

JOLLES, Paul

Director of the Federal Division of Commerce

REVERDIN, Olivier

Member of the Upper House of the Swiss Parliament
Chairman of the Council of Europe

UMBRICHT, Victor H.

Member of the Board of Directors, CIBA-GEIGY Limited

TURKEY

BEYAZIT, Selahattin

Director of Companies

BIRGI, M. Nuri

Former Ambassador to N.A.T.O.

UNITED KINGDOM

BENNETT, Sir Frederic

Member of Parliament

BROWNE, John

Chairman, Butterfield & Swire Ltd., Hong Kong

BUCHAN, The Hon. Alastair

Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford

LEVER, Harold

Member of Parliament

REES-MOGG, William

Editor, The Times

ROLL, Sir Eric

Director, S.G. Warburg & Co.Ltd.

A Member of the British Cabinet, to be announced later.

UNITED STATES

BALL, George W.

Managing Director, Lehman Brothers Incorporated

BERGSTEN, C.Fred

Brookings Institution

BLUMENTHAL, Michael

President, Bendix Corporation

BRIMMER, Andrew

Member of the Federal Reserve Board

BROCK III, William E.

United States Senator

BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew

Director, Research Institute on
Columbia University

CAMPS, Miriam

Senior Research Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

COLLADO, Emilio G.

Executive Vice-President, Standard Oil Company (New Jersey)

DEAN, Arthur H.

Senior Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell

HAUGE, Gabriel

Chairman of the Board, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company

HEINZ II, Henry J.

Chairman of the Board, H.J. Heinz Company

HOUGHTON Jr., Amory

Chairman of the Board, Corning Glass

KISSINGER, Henry A.

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

MANNING, Bayless

President, Council on Foreign Relations

(UNITED STATES)

MOYERS, Bill D.

Mitchell, Hutchins & Co. Incorporated

MURPHY, Robert D.

Honorary Chairman of the Board, Corning Glass International

PERKINS, James A.

Chairman, International Council for Educational Development

ROCKEFELLER, David

Chairman, The Chase Manhattan Bank N.A.

SALISBURY, Harrison

The New York Times

SCALAPINO, Robert

Professor of Far Eastern History, University of California
at Berkeley

SCHAETZEL, Robert

U.S. Representative to the European Communities

STONE, Shepard

President, International Association for Cultural Freedom

TAYLOR, Arthur R.

Executive Vice President, International Paper Company

ZUMWALT Jr., Elmo R.

Chief of Naval Operations

I

This paper is, of necessity, speculative. No one, I think, will quarrel with the proposition that the structure of the international system which was developed in the later 1940's is now undergoing a considerable modification. In an age of rapid social, economic and technological change, a quarter century is a long time for any one pattern of inter-state relations to endure. Equally no one will quarrel with the suggestion that it is in East Asia, where the interests of four powerful states are involved, that the transformation of alignments, policies, and perspectives may be most marked. 1972 is likely to be a year of dramatic developments and by the end of it the new pattern may be more apparent. But writing at the end of January 1972, before President Nixon's visit to Peking and Moscow, before the Presidential election, before the end of the Vietnam War, and before it is clear how some of the financial and economic problems that have bedevilled confidence between Japan, the United States and Europe are to be resolved, it is difficult to do more than construct a series of alternative hypotheses about the nature and the effect of the new Asian power balance.

At the risk of appearing tiresomely apologetic about one's deficiencies as a prophet, it might be as well to set down at the outset some of the factors that cloud one's estimate of the future. The first concerns the degree of popular and Congressional support in the United States for an active foreign policy over the next eight or ten years. A European, who knows the United States well, is acutely aware not only of the much sharper definition of American external interests which President Nixon has attempted, by comparison with his four predecessors, but also of the growing preoccupation of both the elite and the public at large with domestic concerns as well as of resistance in Congress to the costs

[L.C]

- 2 -

of a large defence establishment and to foreign aid. In particular
it is possible that the American sensitivity to developments in the
Pacific and East Asia which can be traced back to the late 19th
Century may now be undergoing a sea change.

The second uncertainty is that which surrounds Soviet policy;
whether, as the Soviet Union increasingly acquires the
characteristics of a super power of global interests, she will
become more militant and egocentric, or more relaxed and
accomodating in her attitudes to other major states, more or less
concerned with international stability and internal economic
development, less or more cautious in her external policy. There
are few clues to the answer at present, and the only firm one which
1972 is likely to provide, her readiness to make accomodations in
the SALT negotiations, may not affect more than a limited area of
her general foreign policy.

The third is the effect on China and on Chinese policy of
being fully accepted once again as a great power, a member of the
Security Council, in normal diplomatic relations with a growing
number of states. Will it have any effect upon her attitude of
suspicion of the West and of Japan, of hostility towards the
Soviet Union, and on her determination to pose as the champion of
the developing as against the industrial world? Though a major
internal crisis leading, apparently, to the death of Lin Piao,
enshrined in the 1969 Constitution as Mao's successor, seems to
have caused no ripple in her external attitudes, it is possible
that the President's visit may have provided some clues to an
answer before this paper is read.

Finally, there is perhaps the most Delphic question of all.
How will Japan interpret her political and strategic interests as
the relations of the other major powers develop in the next few
years? In what way and for what purpose will she use her
formidable economic power and influence? To this question there
may be no clue for several years, and I am not sufficiently

- 3 -

competent to judge whether the final answer will emerge primarily as a reaction to the policies of the other major actors or primarily out of a process of internal reflection and debate.

But no one can doubt, I think, that the politics of East Asia will henceforward be dominated by a multiple balance in which the policies and attitudes of each of the four major powers will be affected to a greater or lesser degree by those of the other three. Indeed the balance has been multipolar in that area since the early 1960's in the form of a triangular relationship between the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. 1) What may be new in the 1970's is the entry of Japan into this companionship to convert a triangular into a quadrilateral balance. It is not the first time that such a multipolar relationship has existed in East Asia: it occurred in the early part of the century - indeed up to 1940 - (though the relative strength of the major actors was then quite different, with two mainland powers relatively much weaker); and, despite moral disapproval of balance of power diplomacy, the United States participated in it.

One marked difference between the East Asian power balance of the early and of the late 20th century is that the absolute power, strategic, economic, demographic, of all participants has greatly increased. But the nature of the new relationship will be profoundly affected by the forms of power which are considered by participants and their allies as most relevant. Because of the European origin of the concept, the phrase "balance of power" normally evokes the assumption that political and military power are the dominant considerations in maintaining equilibrium. But this was in an era between the end of religious ideology and the rise of massive economic power: today both ideology and exportable wealth - aid, investment, trade - are conventional techniques for asserting the interest and influence of great powers. The unanswerable question at this stage of the game is which form of

1) As brilliantly explored in *The Great Power Triangle*, by Michel Tatu Atlantic Papers no. 3, The Atlantic Institute, 1970.

[L.C]

- 4 -

power will have the greatest relevance in the diplomacy of the East Asian quadrilateral in the next decade and beyond. If it is strategic nuclear power, then the two super powers will be in a much stronger position than China and Japan may remain very much the junior partner. If rivalry and conflict should place a high premium on conventional military power then the United States will henceforth be in a relatively weak position vis-a-vis the mainland states and Japan could more readily augment her strength. If nuclear weapons are seen increasingly as frozen assets and the level of territorial conflict remains low, then economic considerations will become important, which will give a premium to Japan and make China the weakest of the four. If national will and idelological consistency are a prime asset, then China's position will be relatively much stronger. I think the wisest assumption to make at this time is that all four forms of power will be relevant, though probably strategic nuclear power will play a less decisive part than in the first quarter century of the nuclear age or than it still does in Europe.

I think one must enter two further caveats about applying this European concept to the future situation of East Asia, even though one can not escape the stark fact that if power cannot be institutionalised or reconciled it must be balanced. One is that a classic notion of the balance was, as Herbert Butterfield has said "a kind of terrestrial counterpart of the Newtonian system of astronomy. All the various bodies, the greater and the lesser powers, were poised against each other, each exercising a kind of gravitational pull on all the rest." But this is only one form that a multiple balance can assume, and it was largely made possible by the existence of a common diplomatic language and common standards of behaviour among all the European ruling classes, combined with a minimum of domestic political pressures. This is not true of the developing situation in East Asia where the balance is likely to be operated by four powers which, in effect, represent four different civilizations, as well as conflicting ideologies and economic systems. Moreover, the degree

- 5 -

of mutual comprehension that exists in the dialogue between say
Tokyo and Washington, though less than formerly, is still greater
than that between Peking and Moscow or Peking and Tokyo, while
Moscow and Washington have a common vocabulary which Moscow does
not share with Tokyo nor Peking with Washington. Alignments will
be harder to construct and harder to undo than in the ballet dance
of mid-eighteenth century Europe.

Moreover, ambiguity surrounds the Western notion of "balance"
which has been used historically not only in the sense of an
equipoise between a number of states, but also, particularly in
the last hundred and fifty years, in the sense of a coalition to
contain the ambitions of a particularly dangerous power or group
of powers, the Triple Entente, for instance, or the United States
rallying Western Europe, and as much of democratic Asia as she
could persuade, to "contain" the Sino-Soviet bloc in the first
decade of the Cold War. The Asian balance could as easily fall
into this pattern of balance as the classic one, even though at
present there may be a considerable element of mutual distrust
among all four partners.

II

To avoid boring and confusing the conference by the
presentation of the large number of variables which are
theoretically possible in a relationship of four strong powers,
none of whose interests wholly coincide though some may run in
parallel, I propose to make a short list of explicit assumptions
about the participants in and the nature of the developing Asian
power balance. On these I shall try to construct a brief analysis
of combinations and outcomes that seem to me, as a European,
conceivable, discarding some which though theoretically conceivable
do not have the smell of reality.

(1) My first assumption is that there will only be four major
parties to the Asian balance, at any rate for the next decade or
more. India is potentially one and so is Indonesia. I was one of

- 6 -

those who in the period of increasing American involvement in
Vietnam in the mid 1960's thought it worth exploring the
potentialities of an equilibrium in Asia maintained primarily by
the Asian powers themselves (as it appears President Nixon did
also). But Indonesia now has her hands full with domestic
reconstruction; and India now not only has the problem of
recreating a viable balance in the sub-continent itself but has
become an ally of the Soviet Union. In any case neither country
can project any significant power, economic, strategic or political
at any distance from its borders. This would still be the case in
the unlikely event (now she is more closely within the Soviet
orbit) that India becomes a nuclear power, for her preoccupation
will be with her own security not with the use of strategic power
to exert influence.

(2) By the same token I assume that Western Europe will not
be a direct participant in the Asian power balance, as Britain,
France and Germany were in that of the early 20th century.
Western Europe will have an indirect bearing on it by reason of
its relationship to both American and Soviet policy. But the
constituent countries of Western Europe will be too concerned with
their own organization and the codification and protection of
their interests in areas such as Africa, the Middle East and
Eastern Europe to become deeply involved in the politics of the
Far East. I will mention later a pattern of great power
relationships in Asia which I think could elicit more European
support than others. But, just as the last concerted European
intervention in the affairs of East Asia, to suppress the Boxer
Rebellion, took place in the first year of the 20th century, it
is probable that the rest of the century will elapse without
another one.

(3) The third assumption that one must make is about the
American definition of United States' interests in Asia. I do not
belong to the school who would apply Hume's analogy "The
Athenians,... finding their error in thrusting themselves into

- 7 -

every quarrel, abandoned all attention to foreign affairs" to
future American policy. Despite the process of narrowing and
sharpening American external interests which has been going on for
the past three years, despite growing opposition to defence
expenditure and the growing pressure of domestic concerns, the
central position of the United States in the whole structure of
world politics and economics is not going to permit any form of
isolationism, neo or otherwise. But, while President Nixon, if
re-elected, and probably any Democrat who might oust or succeed
him, will fight a strong rearguard action against any precipitate
reduction of military and economic involvement in Europe, major
American force reductions are taking place in Asia: and the
President has made clear that those forces that remain will be
primarily for the support of allies not to maintain a general
concept of international order or to sustain an overall balance
of power in Asia by containing China and the Soviet Union there.
One hears the phrase "never again" after the Vietnam involvement
just as one did after the Korean War but this time with greater
emphasis. The generation that had a sentimental love of China has
disappeared, though China could if she chose probably rekindle it
among the younger generation in a way the Soviet Union could not.
Japan is both admired and feared. The administration has clearly
discarded any suggestion of finding an alternate power base in say
Australia to that she has possessed in Japan, Taiwan, and the
Philippines.

Nevertheless, I think many Europeans remain sceptical about
any generalizations that suggest a diminishing American concern
with the shape of things to come in East Asia. After all her own
territory stretches half way across the Pacific, and an
irridentist Japan or a baleful China could threaten her own
security directly. What is more probable is a narrowing of her
interests from a general sense of responsibility for order in
Asia as a whole (despite the aberration of American diplomatic
involvement in the recent Indo-Pakistani conflict) to certain key
countries of Pacific Asia. It must remain, for instance, a high

- 8 -

American interest to prevent Japan from quitting the Western monetary, economic, and political systems, even though her presence in them poses many difficult problems of adjustment for all concerned.

There will be a difference between the American exercise of this interest, however, as between the past and the next twenty years, in that, if a crisis occurs and conflict between the major participants and their allies should threaten, the United States will be less willing to intervene directly or with military force. This is not so much a consequence of strategic parity or of a Chinese nuclear capability, as of the readiness of the Administration, the Congress, and the electors to deploy ships and divisions across the Pacific. The American role in the Asia power balance will be more diplomatic and economic in its emphasis - or so I am prepared to assume. But I agree with Michel Tatu in his analysis 2) that so far as the United States has enjoyed greater freedom of diplomatic action - and the function of a balance of power is to minimise the risk of conflict while preserving the autonomy of the participants in it; it is not a blueprint for peace - than either Peking or Moscow.

4) The approach of the Soviet Union to the four sided relationship in East Asia may be easier to predict. Moscow is in many ways a more confident capital than at any time in the past two centuries: it has achieved strategic parity (for what that may be worth) with the United States: by its presence in the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent it unbuckled several years ago the Western cordon of containment; it has a useful diplomatic asset of global value in an expanding navy; and it is close to achieving a recognition of the status quo in Europe. But East Asia is the area where the Soviet Union must tread most warily. She shares a very long land border and a bitter ideological dispute with China and though the latter may ameliorate eventually nothing

2) Op.cit.

[LC]

- 9 -

can alter the friction to which the former gives rise; particularly
in view of the popular xenophobia many European Russians feel about
the Chinese menace. She has a somewhat unreliable ally in North
Korea, and supports North Vietnam militarily without appearing to
have very much influence over its policy. She has a diffident
relationship with Japan with three generations of conflict or mutual
suspicion behind it, yet she may become rather dependent on Japan
not only for the development of Siberia but for technological
products in general, especially, if her attempt to obtain them from
Western Europe or the United States involves a political price in
Europe which the Americans and the Europeans are not prepared to
pay.

It seems to me, therefore, reasonable to assume that, though
the Soviet Union is itself an East Asian power, with a limited but
gradually augmenting military and naval potential in the area, she
will pursue a cautious policy there, at least for the next five
years or so. But one of her prime interests is to prevent the
expansion of China's influence into South and South East Asia, into
Africa and the Middle East; and, if possible, to do this in such a
way that it disorients Western interests at the same time. She has
taken a useful forward stride in the 1971 Treaty with India, and
will make an even larger stride if her permanent presence and new
treaty relationship with Egypt should enable her to play the
leading role in securing an Arab-Israel settlement of a kind, thus
opening the Suez Canal to a serious Soviet naval presence in the
Indian Ocean. Of course events and miscalculations on the part of
herself or others may force her to play a more direct role in
East Asia. But my assumption is that in so far as Moscow has
control of events, her approach to the development of the Asian
balance will in the immediate future be more cautious and oblique
than it is in other areas of the world.

(5) One's fifth set of assumptions must concern China's attitude to the emerging balance. Economically she is the weakest of the four, being as has been said the largest underdeveloped

- 10 -

country in the world; her economic diplomacy must be governed by
very strict priorities. Despite a very large conventional military
establishment she can project military power at only a short
distance from her borders. She has a gradually augmenting strategic
nuclear capability, which, if the Russians and the Americans do in
the future as good a public relations job on its behalf as they did
in the later 1960's, may give her influence disproportionate to its
actual size and range: but she will be very vulnerable to any full
scale strategic threat by either of the super-powers. Her principal
source of strength is, or has been, the example she provides to
other developing countries, first of how they can escape the
embraces of the two super-power systems; and second, how a poor
country by rigour, central planning, and discipline can pull itself
up by its own boot straps.

Her attitude to the other three partners in the multiple
balance is likely to be one of almost equal suspicion, although it
is in the nature of a relationship of this kind that each must
decide which is its prime adversary. The mixture of fear, sense of
historic wrong, ideological contempt, and anxiety about super-power
collusion, had made Moscow that prime adversary for the time being:
and so deep are the roots of this conflict that it is difficult to
envisage a rapprochement between Moscow and Peking except for
purely tactical purposes unless a chain of events were to lead to
the appearance of a rising threat from the West to the security of
China.

But identification of the Soviet Union as the prime adversary
implies no rapprochement with either the United States or Japan.
As long as there are American military installations in Thailand
and Vietnam, near China's vulnerable Southern border, the United
States will be seen as an adversary state even though its power
may be in decline. The distrust of Japan is based not only upon fear
of the success of the different social and economic structure of a
country which was originally a cultural province of China, but of
memories of recent aggression; and, perhaps more powerful, the

[LC]

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sense that Japan, even more than the United States, may be the
stumbling block to a recovery of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan
and of influence in Korea.

There is an apparent paradox in the situation confronting the
Chinese leaders in the next decade. A country that for two millennia
or more has regarded itself centre of the world and which has
participated only fitfully in the modern states system (for a short
while, for instance, in the League of Nations) does not take
readily or easily to the adjustments required for maintenance of a
multiple balance. Yet China has a greater interest than the other
three in the maintenance of a four cornered relationship, including
driving a wedge between Japan and the United States. The resolution
of this paradox, I think it is a reasonable assumption, may lead
her to place only part of the emphasis of her foreign policy in
securing the maximum autonomy in her relationship with the Soviet
Union, Japan, and the United States (without of course relaxing
her defences in any way) while making a maximum effort to secure
the moral leadership of the Third World (in the same way that
Canning brought in the New World to redress the balance of the Old),
possibly making full use of the United Nations for this purpose.
But she is not an expansionist power in the territorial sense,
though she is revisionist in relation to the other three partners
on the issues of Taiwan and the Sino-Soviet border.

Finally, what assumptions should one make about Japan? Though
there has been a mercurial quality about Japanese decision making
over the past century; though her sense of national pride has been
bruised by the unilateralism of American decisions about Sino-
American relations and the international monetary system; though
the days of easy access to Western markets for her manufacturing
and capital goods industries may be drawing to a close, I still
assume that a fully independent Japanese foreign policy will be
slow to evolve. Though in domestic terms the next decade may be
one of social and economic consolidation where the 1960's was one
of fabulous economic growth, she will be a large exporter of

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capital and therefore increasingly interested in the political
stability of the societies of the Pacific littoral, Australia and
South East Asia where it will primarily be invested. She will also
be increasingly concerned about markets. But she will continue to
be afflicted by a sense of vulnerability, both to direct strategic
pressure and on her sources of raw materials, and this will make
her unwilling to throw her weight around in East Asia. She has
learnt that economic cooperation with the Soviet Union will not
readily lead to political concessions over Sakhalin and the Kuriles;
she fears the return of Taiwan to China. Because her preoccupation
will continue to be primarily economic, she will be reluctant to
forego her security relationship with the United States, unless
some catastrophe should prove that the United States really can no
longer guarantee her security. Though she could become an
operational nuclear power more rapidly than any other so called
Nth power, I foresee continuing reluctance to take the risks
involved. Some Japanese have more ambitious concepts of the national
interest and see Japan as playing the same balancing role in the
quadrilateral relationship of East Asia as Britain played in the
pentagonal power balance of mid-19th Century Europe; my assumption
is that in terms of real policy choices they will remain in a
minority.

III

All this said, it remains important to examine various
combinations that may develop in different circumstances over the
next decade or more, because it is more than a generation since
we have had any experience of a multiple relationship of strong
powers and we can not expect the future to be a projection of the
immediate past. By my (amateur) calculations there are over twelve
theoretical variations in the relationship of four units, but six
of these are politically so improbable in the near future that