Though well-educated and well-read, Kohl appeared on the domestic scene as a symbol of the German *Bürger*, the epitome of bourgeois morality and tastes. This bearing obscured his unusual sensitivity to the intangibles of power – especially in foreign policy. He also had a keen psychological sense – including for the weaknesses of his adversaries. Kohl managed to gain the confidence of three American presidents with extremely different personalities: Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton. This confidence was a kind of capital on which he could draw. It stood him in particular good stead during the process of unification of Germany. Kohl maintained an even closer friendship with French President Mitterrand and a respectful relationship with Gorbachev. Endowed with these qualities, Kohl moved through the thickets of international complexities while avoiding the temptation of playing off against each other the contending forces impinging on Germany – a temptation that he believed his country would not be able to sustain and that had contributed to its disasters in the 20th century. In fairness, one must emphasize that in domestic politics and in the assessment of his domestic adversaries, Kohl was less generous; nor was he given the opportunity to be so.

All of these qualities suffuse these memoirs, in detailed descriptions of meetings with colleagues, adversaries, and allies. Kohl explains the reasons for his actions – prudent, often wise, geared to the necessities of the moment or to the character of his interlocutor. These observations reveal a clear sense of direction and great subtlety in dealing with the arising circumstances. They enable the reader to follow the acts and motives of a remarkable leader whom history will recognize as an important builder, if not a great theorist.

1325 WORDS

12/19/05-#2

KOHL MEMOIRS REVIEW

Helmut Kohl served as chancellor of Germany for 16 years. His term of office began with the stationing of American intermediate-range missiles on German soil in a divided country. It ended after these missiles had been withdrawn from a united Germany. During Kohl's term as chancellor, Germany played a leading role in transforming the European Economic Community into the European Union; the euro replaced the plethora of European currencies; a

process [for] creating a constitution for a united Europe [was initiated and] will need despite a temporary relapse.

When Kohl left office, he had achieved what conventional wisdom had declared impossible: a unified Germany as a major partner in the Atlantic Alliance and, for the first

Dec 20 05 07:32a

time in modern German history, in good relations with all its
neighbors. He had culminated the achievements of Konrad Adenauer,
postwar Germany's first chancellor, who restored self-confidence to his
defeated country and helped reestablish Germany as a respected
member of the international community; of Willy Brandt, who made
possible German reconciliation with the countries of Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union; and of Helmut Schmidt, who began the process
of making Germany a major participant in global affairs on issues
beyond the Cold War. Statesmen are judged in part by the degree to
which the world as they left it differed from that which they inherited.
By these standards, Kohl must be treated as one of the most
significant leaders in German history.

Yet his own compatriots have not always perceived him in this
light. They recognize his individual achievements, but they take the

(N)

Dec 20 05 07:32a

magnitude of them for granted. With the passage of time, they find it
difficult to recall the complexities of the Cold War, the fears of nuclear
catastrophe, the suspicions of Europe regarding a unified Germany,
the obstacles to a united Europe, and the relationship between a

the obstacles to a united Europe, and the relationship between a
and Europe in the process of unification.
united Europe and America. Kohl seemed to master these challenges
so effortlessly that his contemporaries never realized how easily it
might have been otherwise.

I had the privilege of knowing personally almost all the key
actors of the period. And I am aware how ambivalent most of them
were about the great building blocs of Kohl's policy - especially with
respect to German unification. François Mitterrand, a great advocate
of reconciliation with the Federal Republic and a good personal friend
of Kohl's, nevertheless found the idea of a unified Germany so contrary
to historic French policy that he was exploring alternatives he might

Dec 20 05 07:32a

have pursued had he been able to muster encouragement, especially
from the United States and the Soviet Union. Margaret Thatcher found
her already considerable suspicions of Germany compounded by the
prospects of a powerful united Germany as a major player in a united
Europe. The distrust of the Soviet Union based on two world wars,
only somewhat mitigated by the personality of Mikhail Gorbachev,
could have easily coalesced into systematic opposition had Kohl not
preempted all these temptations by seizing the process of unification
and espousing an energetic policy of reassurance toward both ally and
adversary.

Kohl was able to do this because he had established an
extraordinary degree of confidence by building on the two main
strands of Germany's postwar foreign policy: Adenauer's close ties

P. 4

Dec 20 05 07:32a

with the West and Brandt's policy of reconciliation toward the countries

of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union,

coincided with the debate over the installation of intermediate-range missiles on European soil. This decision had led to the disavowal of Helmut Schmidt by his own party and to a change of government in Germany. It produced intense anti-American demonstrations, some of them led by Kohl's later successors.

War, which spelled the end of Soviet attempts to split the alliance.

That effort had been implicit in the blockade of Berlin in 1948; it continued with the overtures for neutrality in return for neutrality in the 1950s, was reinforced by the new Berlin crisis of the 1960s and 1970s, and culminated in the missile controversy of the 1980s. In

p.5

Dec 20 05 07:32a

each case, the Soviet Union appealed to its expectation of being able

to exploit what it hoped were differential interests between the allies, 28
was counting on the acquiescence of some allies to
hoping that some country would not risk nuclear destruction for Berlin,

that Germany would choose to escape the Cold War in favor of
unification, and finally, that the risks of nuclear devastation were so

great that whatever the formal commitments, America would not
undertake them.

longer
in the end

The missile deployment put an end to that illusion. For that
forward deployment linked the nuclear defense of Europe to that of the

United States. No longer could the Soviet Union hold Western Europe
with the fear
hostage because of the presumed incredibility of nuclear retaliation

from America. Henceforth an attack on Europe with conventional

weapons almost automatically implied retaliation, at a minimum to
prevent the capture of the nuclear deployment. The Soviet Union,

g.p

Dec 20 05 07:32a

therefore, could not risk war in Europe without neutralizing the
American nuclear deployment in Europe, and it could not avoid this
danger by a simultaneous attack on the United States without risking
Armageddon.

Kohl held firm in the face of a bitter domestic division. Within
less than five years, the Soviet Union, realizing the impasse into which
it had maneuvered itself, agreed to a removal of all intermediate-
range missiles from both sides of the Iron Curtain; less than three
years later, the movement toward German unification had become
irreversible. Two years later, the Maastricht Treaty creating the
European Union capped Kohl's historic achievement.

Kohl's *Erinnerungen* are an indispensable guide to tracing this
extraordinary evolution. Well-written, they are all the more important
because unlike Brandt, who had a great capacity for symbolic

8

gestures, or Schmidt, who has an extraordinary ability for conceptual
presentations of his dramatic sense, was focused more on the management
analysis, Kohl's ability to dominate a situation an solution
of his domestic situation than on putting forward a theory on
his personality and his practical sense, from
international relations. Adenauer was similarly practical, but he was
more remote, and his very role as Germany's first chancellor endowed
him with an aura of uniqueness. To be sure, Kohl's contemporaries
respect him as the chancellor in whose term of office German unity
was restored.

Though well-educated and well-read, Kohl appeared on the
domestic scene[, however,] as a symbol of the German Bürger, the
epitome of bourgeois morality and tastes. This bearing obscured his
unusual sensitivity to the intangibles of power – especially in foreign
policy. He also had a keen psychological sense – including for the
weaknesses of his adversaries. Kohl managed to gain the confidence

p. 8

Dec 20 05 07:33a

9

This confidence enabled him to traverse the crises described here; it

was a kind of capital on which he could draw, for the unification of
Germany. Kohl maintained an even closer friendship with French
President Mitterrand and a respectful relationship with Gorbachev.

Endowed with these qualities, Kohl moved through the thickets of
international complexities while avoiding the temptation of playing off
contending forces impinging on Germany against each other – a
temptation that he believed (his country) would not be able to sustain
and that had contributed to (its) disasters in the 20th century. In
fairness, one must emphasize that in domestic politics and in the
assessment of his domestic adversaries, Kohl was less generous; nor
was he given the opportunity to be so.

p. 9

Dec 20 05 07:33a

2

achievements of Konrad Adenauer, who restored self-confidence to his defeated country and helped reestablish Germany as a respected member of the international community; of Willy Brandt, who made possible German reconciliation with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; and of Helmut Schmidt, who began the process

major participant in global affairs
of making Germany an integral [partner in the alliance] on issues beyond the Cold War. Statesmen must be judged in part by the degree to which the world [as they left it] differed from that which they inherited. By these standards, Kohl must be treated as one of leaders
the most significant in German history.

Yet his own compatriots have not always perceived him in this light. They recognize his individual achievements, but they take [the] magnitude [of them] for granted. With the passage of time, they find it difficult to recall the complexities of the Cold War, the fears of

(N)

212 759 0042 P.02

KAI

DEC-19-2005 13:29

nuclear catastrophe, the suspicions of Europe regarding a unified
Germany, the obstacles to a united Europe, and the relationship
between a uniting Europe and America. Kohl (seemed to) master
these challenges so effortlessly that his contemporaries never realized
how easily it might have been otherwise.

I had the privilege of knowing personally almost all the key
actors of the period. And I [am aware] how ambivalent most of them
were about the great building blocs of Kohl's policy - especially with
respect to German unification. François Mitterrand, a great advocate
of reconciliation with the Federal Republic and a good personal friend
of Kohl's, nevertheless found the idea of a unified Germany so contrary
to historic French policy that he was exploring alternatives he might
have pursued had he been able to [muster] encouragement among
[signatures] and [other allies, especially] Margaret Thatcher found her
[signature]

00

3

212 759 0042 P.03

KAI

DEC-19-2005 13:29

4

already considerable suspicions of Germany compounded by the
prospects of a powerful united Germany. The distrust of the Soviet
Union based on two world wars, only somewhat mitigated by the
personality of Mikhail Gorbachev, could have easily coalesced into a
systematic opposition to German unification, had Kohl not preempted
these temptations by seizing the process of unification and [espousing
an energized] policy of reassurance toward both ally and adversary.

Kohl was able to do this because he had established an
extraordinary degree of confidence by continuing the two main strands
of German [y's postwar] foreign policy: Adenauer's close ties with the
West and Brandt's policy of [openness] toward the countries of Eastern
Europe, including the Soviet Union.

[This] was not an easy assignment. For Kohl's [start] as
chancellor coincided with the debate over the installation of

(N)

212 759 0042 P.04

KAI

DEC-19-2005 13:29

5

intermediate-range missiles on European soil. This decision had led to
the disavowal of Helmut Schmidt by his party and to a change of

government in Germany. It produced intense anti-American
some of whom led by Kohl's later successors
demonstrations. Kohl held to a course that proved the turning point of

the Cold War. For it spelled the end of Soviet attempts to split the
Tilat-Affair led by
1948 G.P.
alliance. It was implicit in the blockade of Berlin in the 1940s; [it]

continued with the overtures for neutrality in return for neutrality in
the 1950s [1]; the new Berlin crisis of the 1960s and 1970s, and
ultimately the missile controversy of the 1980s. In each case, the

in
ultimately the missile controversy of the 1980s. In each case, the
Soviet Union appealed to its hope for differential interests, that some
leaving that same
a country would not risk nuclear destruction for Berlin, that Germany

(D)

212 759 0042 P.05

KAI

DEC-19-2005 13:30

them.

The missile deployment put an end to that illusion. For that
forward deployment linked the nuclear defense of Europe to that of the
United States. No longer could the Soviet Union hold Western Europe
hostage because of the <u>presumed</u> <u>incredibility</u> of nuclear retaliation from
<u>hostile</u> America. Hence an attack on Europe with conventional weapons
<u>automatically</u> <u>almost organically</u> implied retaliation, at a minimum to prevent the
capture of the nuclear deployment. The Soviet Union, therefore, could
not risk war in Europe without neutralizing the American nuclear
deployment in Europe, and it could not avoid this danger by a
simultaneous attack on the United States without risking Armageddon.

Kohl held firm in the face of a bitter domestic division in which
several of his successors a decade and a half later played a prominent

212 759 0042 P.06

KAI

13:30

DEC-19-2005

7

role: Within less than five years, the Soviet Union, realizing the impasse into which it had maneuvered itself, agreed to remove all intermediate-range missiles from both sides; less than three years later, the movement toward unification became irreversible. Two years later, the Maastricht Treaty capped Kohl's historic achievement.

Kohl's *Erinnerungen* are an indispensable guide to tracing this extraordinary evolution. Well-written, they are all the more important because Kohl has not received among his contemporaries the recognition he deserves. To be sure, they respect him as the chancellor in whose term of office German unity was restored. But unlike Brandt, who had a great misjudgment for symbolic gestures, or Schmidt, who has an extraordinary ability for conceptual analysis, Kohl's dramatic sense was focused more on the management of his domestic situation. Adenauer was similarly practical, but he was more

(10)

212 759 0042 P.07

KAI

DEC-19-2005 13:30

8

remote, and his very [role] as [Germany's] first chancellor endowed
him with an aura of uniqueness.

Kohl, though well-educated and well-read, appeared on the
domestic scene as a symbol of the German Bürger, the epitome of
bourgeois morality and tastes. This bearing obscured his unusual
sensitivity to the intangibles of power – especially in foreign policy. He
also had a [keen] psychological sense – including for the weaknesses
of his adversaries. Kohl managed to gain the confidence of three
American presidents [with] extremely different personalities. This
confidence enabled him to traverse the crises described here; it was a
kind of capital on which he could draw for the unification of Germany.

Kohl maintained an even closer friendship with French President
Mitterrand and a respectful relationship with Gorbachev. Endowed
with these qualities, Kohl moved [through] the thickets of international

(D)

P.08

212 759 0042

KAI

13:30

DEC-19-2005