II-19

an article not only of strategic but also of fiscal wisdom.

But whatever the merit of these views when they were first developed, the simple choices of our period of invulnerability are no longer open to us. Continued reliance on the military policy of the past decade will produce not deterrence but paralysis. Far from holding our alliances together, it will undermine them. Building up a greater capacity for local defense is no longer a question of choice; it has been imposed on the free world by the technological revolution.

Many of the assumptions regarding the impossibility of local
defense are either fallacious or exaggerated. In total available
manpower the free world still is superior and its industrial potential
exceeds that of the Communist bloc by a factor of three. There is
no reason except lack of will why Western Europe and the United States
cannot create local forces capable of arresting almost any scale of
Soviet aggression. To be sure, in other areas the problem is more
complicated. In the so-called grey areas of the Middle East and

*See blow'The United States and Europe,' Chapter__, p.______

complicated. In the so-called Black areas of the Middle East and
Soviet Aggression. To be sure, in other areas the problem is more
cannot create local forces capable of arresting almost any scale of
no reason except lack of will with Western Europe and the United States
exceeds that of the Communist bloc by a factor of three. There is no
warfare the free world still is superior and its industrial potential
defense are either fallacious or exaggerated. In total available
many of the assumptions regarding the impossibility of focal
world by the technological revolution.

is no longer a question of choice; it has been imposed on the free
undermine them. Building up a greater capacity for local defense
barriers. Far from holding our alliances together, it will
hinder the best decade will bring not deterrence but
are no longer open to us. Continued reliance on the military
developed, the simple choices of our period of immateriality
But whatever the merit of these ideas when they were first
an article not only of strategic but also of fiscal wisdom.

II-19

II-20

South-East Asia, the Communist block can concentrate its manpower and material against countries weaker and less closely allied than those of the North Atlantic Community. On the other hand, these are also the areas where the political penalties for aggression would be greatest. An attack on an emergent country would antagonize all the other uncommitted nations and it would lead to an increased mobilization of Western resources. Moreover, difficulties of terrain and communications place a ceiling on the number of troops an aggressor could utilize effectively even there. The inability to protect every area locally is no excuse for failing to secure those where it is possible. The minimum goal of local defense must be to prevent the possibility of cheap victories. The optimum situation is when aggression can be combated locally. The latter situation is attainable. And the position of other areas can be improved through in Europe, the use of their own forces and increases in the American limited war capability. Even should the capability for local defense vary in different areas, the overall security of the free world will increase to the extent that it can protect itself to the greatest degree possible against Communist pressure.

belligerent.

can protec... itself to the greatest degree possible. Status-Community
all security of the free world will increase to the extent that it
the capability for local defense very in different areas, the over-
and increases in the American limited war capability. Even should
in Europe. \*AMERICAN EQUITY IN EQUITY IN EQUITY IN EQUITY\*
And the position of other areas can be improved through
aggression can be well locally. The latter situation is attainable
possibility of cheap victories. The optimum situation is when
belligerent. The minimum goal of local defense must be to prevent the
area locally is no excuse for failing to secure those where it is
could utilize effectively even there. The inability to protect every
and communications place a ceiling on the number of troops an aggressor
implification of Western resources. Moreover, difficulties of terrain
all the other uncommitted nations and it would lead to an increased
be greatest. An attack on an emergent country would unseparate
also the areas where the political penalties for aggression would
those of the North Atlantic Community. On the other hand, these are
and material against countries weaker and less closely allied than
South-East Asia, the Communist block can concentrate its manpower.

II-30

II-20 a

This is a complex but not insoluble task made all the more necessary by the starkness of the alternatives. Building up a capability for local defense will require much effort. But the rewards are high: to a considerable extent, a strategy of local defense will lift from us the impossible choices of current military policy. It will increase the flexibility of our diplomacy. It..................

["This is a complex but not insoluble task made all the more necessary by the starkness of the alternatives. Building up a capability for local defense will require much effort. But the resources are right: to a considerable extent, a strategy of local defense will fit from us the impossible choices of the war are

expression in the following manner:

The objections to the strategy outlined here usually come to
chief reasons for the ineffectiveness of some control negotiations.
The one-effectiveness of our military adaptation is one of the
clearness can avoid our dilemma--because they refuse to admit that
facilitat Groome obverse it because they believe that only complete
they consider it contrary to all their notions of strategy. The
is. The traditionalists ridicule the concept of limited war because
consequences of war will also remove some of the inducements against
facilitat Groome fear that only attempt to mitigate the worst
the destructiveness of our strategy is to weaken the deterrent; and
defense: the advocate of all-out war who fear that to surrender
the current debate. Two Groome are criticizing the concept of local
of the basic decade and a half and transcend the abstractness of
But to accept these goals we must stay in the titanic

I. Some Questions and Answers.

is the brevity of effective some control negotiations.

II-51

# Limited War - A Re-Appraisal

## I - The Nature of Limited War

As the consequences of all-out war grow more horrible, reliance on it also becomes more absurd. The gap between the threat made for purposes of deterrence and the strategy which we are prepared to implement will widen. Every increase in destructiveness is purchased at the price of reduced credibility of the retaliatory threat. In this vicious circle, deterrence may fail. And if it does the reliance on massive retaliation will guarantee the most dire outcome. It will lead either to surrender or to the most catastrophic form of war.

Nothing is more urgent than to harmonize our deterrent policy with a strategy we are prepared to implement. The wider the gap, the greater the scope for Soviet blackmail. The more we rely on nuclear retaliation against the Soviet homeland, the more exposed the other countries of the free world will be to Communist pressures threatening fait accomplis. In the missile age, the side which can add another increment of power without resorting to all-out war--or which can threaten to do so will gain a perhaps decisive advantage over an opponent

famine to do so will gain a permanent advantage over an opponent
in tournament of power without recording to all-out war--or which can
let succumb. In the material age, the side which can add another
contribute to the race world will be to committed processes of finance
retaliation against the Soviet invasion, the more exposed the other
Greater Power the scope for Soviet placement. The more we rely on nuclear
with a strategy we are prepared to implement. The wider the gap, the
nothing is more urgent than to permanent our deterrence accordingly.

to surrender on to the most catastrophic form of war.
retaliation will guarantee the most dire outcome. It will lead either
circle of deterrence may fall. And it is does the reliance on massive
price of reduced credibility of the retaliatory side. In the event
will follow. Massy increase in destruotiveness if purchased at the
to deterrence and the strategy which we are prepared to implement
it also becomes more expensive. The gap between the direct cause for purchases

We the consequences of all-out war grew more probable, reliance on

I - The Nature of Limited War

Limited War - A Re-Analysis

I - 2

who does not have this ability. Countries which preserve their
security or achieve their ends only by means of all-out war are likely
to be paralysed. Flexibility in both diplomacy and strategy requires
that a maximum number of stages be created between surrender and
Armageddon.

The argument is frequently made that the purpose of the West's
military establishment is to deter war not to wage it.¹ Any inquiry
into a tolerable strategy, it is alleged, is beside the point. It
by
will weaken deterrence, it is said./reducing the risk of the aggressor.
To the degree that the consequences of war appear tolerable to us, they
may grow acceptable to the aggressor as well. Aggression will thereby
be encouraged. And once war starts, on whatever scale, it may become
all-out.

However, this argument begs the principal question: that deterrence
can not be separated from strategy. It is the product of the extent
of the risk and its likelihood and these two factors are related to

1. Sir John Slessor

I, Sir, John'Brien

of the risk and its likelihood and these two factors are related to a

**Can not** be elaborated from strategy. It is the product of the extent

However, this argument deals with the branchal question: that correspondence

**will not**.

be encouraged. And once we start on whatever scale, it may become

may grow acceptable to the aggressor as well. Aggression will further

To the degree that the consequences of not adhering to a telegraphic to us, first

will lessen detection, it is said.\*\*reducing the risk of the aggression.

into a telegraphic strategy, it is alleged, is beside the point. It

militarily settlement is to deter us not to make it. And indirectly

The argument is therefore made that the business of the West's

**Transition**.

that a maximum number of agents be created between envoys and

to be analyzed. Flexibility in pop diplomacy and strategy requires

security or to achieve their own ends. PA means of will-out are fixed

who does not have this flexibility. Countries which precede their

I - 5

I - 3

each t other in an inverse ratio. If either is very low, deterrence
fails. If destructiveness is stressed as the expense of certainty of
retaliation aggression may be encouraged. If we over emphasize the
acceptability of the risk, the penalties may be too low for effective
deterrence. Deterrence is at a maximum when the product of these two
factors is greatest. The challenge before our military policy is to
strike the best balance between deterrence and strategy.

These considerations bear importantly on the problem of limited
war. At the beginning of the nuclear age, it was possible to equate
deterrence with destructiveness because we did not have to fear
retaliation on American cities. But in the missile age the deterrent
equation has become more complex. Henceforth, a retaliatory strategy
would have to be carried out with the knowledge that it would guarantee
widespread devastation in the United States. This will reduce its
credibility as well as our willingness to resort to it. And even
should these two obstacles be overcome, it would still be a reckless
national policy to stake our survival on every crisis.

national policy to safe our survival on each crisis.

Brink those two objectives be overcome, it would still be a needless
credibility as well as our willingness to report to it. And even
widespread deviation in the United States. This will reduce its
wars may have to be carried out with the knowledge that it would guarantee
enforcement due because more complex. Henceforth, a retaliatory strategy
retaliation on American cities. But in the middle age the deterrent
deterrence with destruction because we did not have to ten
war. At the beginning of the last century, it was possible to estimate
these considerations bear importantly on the problem of limited
attrition the past balance between deterrence and strategy.

Lacuna is greatest. The challenge before our military policy is to
deterrence. Deterrence is at a maximum when the problem of these two
acceptability of the task, the benefits may be so low for effective
retaliation aggression may be encountered. It is our ambition to do
this. It destruction is stressed as the expense of certainty of
each offset in an incentive ratio. It either is very low, deterrence

I - 3

I - 4

The fact of our vulnerability has not been easy to accept. The
attempt to find an alternative to a strategy of devastation in the age
of nuclear plenty is construed by many traditionalists as foregoing
a unilateral advantage. General Power has argued: "... I think
if we get into a war which is not a little tiny policy action, I do
not want to see us use conventional bombs, because I have a deep
moral sense as it applies to Americans. I get a little indignant with
people who become very lofty in their thinking and do not want to kill
a few of the enemy but would gladly risk additional American lives.
My crews are more important to me than the enemy. If I can send only
one airplane over and do the job of a thousand, that is what I want
to do."²

The problem of nuclear as against conventional warfare will be
discussed later in this chapter. For present purposes, it is enough
to point out that even by General Power's yardstick the problem is not
nearly so simple. The choice is not between airplane crews and enemy
targets. An attack on the aggressor's civilian population may cost

2. General Power in "Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations," House of Representatives, Eighty-sixth Congress, First Session, Part 2, p. 388.

["Miles Session, Part 2, p. 368.\non Appropriations,\" House of Representatives, Eight-sixth Congress,\nS. General Tower in Session before the Subcommittee of the Committee\non Appropriations. \"House of Representatives,\" Eight-sixth Congress,\n1968.", "The problem of nullification against conventional standards will go to a decision.\n\nThe choice is not between strike-line creole and enemy nearly so subtle. The choice is not between strike-line creole and enemy to point out that even if General Tower's tender for the problem is not dismissed later in this chapter, not present purchases, it is enough to point out that even if General Tower's tender for the problem is not strike-line enough, then would readily risk additional American lives. Because we become dead wrong in their printing and do not want to kill more someone as it abhors to Americans. I got a little indignant with you to see us use conventional damps, because I have a good deal to do into a war which is not a little tiny patch action. I do not want to see us use conventional

I - 5

more American lives than any other strategy because of the certainty
of retaliation. Deterrence is the act of posing the maximum credible
risk. In the age of nuclear plenty and growing missile forces this
is more likely to be provided by a strategy of limited war than by a
retaliatory threat always in danger of becoming an empty pose.

Limited war has been much debated over the past few years. Many
refined theories have been developed. But the basic concept is simple.
It maintains that massive retaliation having lost its efficacy we must
seek to deter Communist aggression not by the threat of total devastation
but by posing risks out of proportion to the objective to be attained.
In general this means developing military forces capable of checking
Communist military actions at whatever scale they may be initiated.
Deterrence would be complete if the aggressor could not defeat
the limited war. forces of the free world except by resorting to all-out
at the same time
war. If/we develop an invulnerable retaliatory force, the aggressor
would be unable to benefit from either limited or all-out conflict.
In that case, military actions would be foreclosed to the aggressor.
He would be deterred.

He would be deferred.

In that case, military actions would be foreclosed to the aggressor. World would be made to benefit from either limited or all-out conflict.

Mr. It\'s developed an insurance policy against force, the aggressor at the same time.

The limited war. force of the tree world except by resorting to all-out
Deterrence would be complete if the aggressor could not detect
Commitment with such actions at whatever scale such may be initiated.

In General this means developing military forces capable of checking
but not beating them out of production to the objective to be attained.

Seek to deter Communist aggression not by the threat of total destruction
It may be that preventive retaliation may be effective if its outlook we must
retain theoretical plans been developed. But the basic concept is simple.

Limited war can mean pooroped over the beat ten years. Much

retaliatory time away in danger of becoming an empty base.

It is more likely to be provided by a strategy of limitation than by a
risk. In the age of nuclear bomb and growing missile forces this
of retaliation. Deterrence is the art of beating the maximum credible

I - 2

I - 6

Theorists of limited war do not deny that the risk it poses
is less than that of massive retaliation. But they argue that this
is more than made up by the increase in the certainty of the response.
Moreover, the notion that deterrence requires the threat of total
devastation is a vestige of our period of invulnerability and reckless
in the age of nuclear plenty. Aggression would seem to be senseless
if the aggressor knew in advance that he could not achieve any benefit
whatever military measures he undertook. Limited war forces, properly
designed, should ensure this. If the Communist countries were certain
that they could not win a limited war, their opportunities for blackmail
would be sharply reduced. A strategy of limited war would seek to
achieve deterrence not so much through the threat of devastation but
through depriving the aggressor of the possibility of gaining his objective.

Many object that limited war is chimerical because neither side
would be willing to accept defeat as long as it still had available
uncommitted resources. Hence there is a danger of "escalation"; the
adding of increments of power until limited war may insensibly merge

adding of increments of power until limited by inadequacy of means
uncommitted resources. Hence there is a danger of "association": the
world be willing to accept defeat as long as it still had available
Many options that limited war to homogeneous because neither able
to achieve the aggressor of the power's strength or winning the objective
achieve correspondence not so much through the threat of concentration but
would be easily offset. A strategy of limited war would seem so
that they could not win a limited war. Their opportunities for success
would be greatly reduced. A strategy of limited war would seem so
to the aggressor known in advance that he could not achieve any benefit
in the age of mostense plenty. Aggression would seem to be senseless
deviation from a wage of our period of insurance and reekless
moreover, the nation that correspondence requires the threat of some
it more than make up by the increase in the carrying of the resources.
It less than that of massive retaliation. But they argue that this
Theoretical of limited war do not deny that the risk it poses

I - C

into all-out war. By seeking to avoid the ultimate risk, so the argument goes, a strategy of limited war makes it inevitable.

It is true, that the possibility of all-out war is inherent in a limited war among major powers. Since limited war by definition does not involve all the resources of the opponents it is easy to "prove" how a war could expand. No one can know whether a country would accept defeat. A country prepared to risk mutual destruction rather than forgo the possibility of gaining its objective can be deterred only by surrender. War can be kept limited only if the two sides wish to keep it limited. On this assumption, the purpose of a strategy of limited war is first, to strengthen deterrence and second, if deterrence should fail, to provide an opportunity for settlement before the automatism of the retaliatory forces takes over. The most that could happen if we resisted by limited means is what is certain to happen if we resist aggression with our present strategy. Limited war is based on a kind of tacit bargain not to exceed certain restraints. One side's desire to keep the war limited is of no avail unless the

One side's desire to keep the war limited is to no avail unless the
war is passed on a fund of total damage not to exceed certain reaches.
To push them we must resort to submission with our present strategy.
Limited that can happen if we retained the limited means is what is
required before the automation of the resultatory forces takes over. The most
it is possible to provide an opportunity for settlement
strategy of limited war is that, to attain such a strategy,
should we want to keep it limited. On this assumption, due because of a
deterioration only by surrender. We can be kept limited only if the two
rather than longer the possibility of gaining the objective can be
won would accept defeat. A country prepared to risk mutual destruction
"braves" her war only expend. He one can know whether a country
does not involve all the resources of the opponent if it is easy to
be limited by some motor power. Since limited war by definition
into all-out war. By seeking to avoid the ultimate risk, so the

I - 3

I - 8

other cooperates; it takes two to keep a limited war limited or a
local defense local. In a limited war between major powers, both sides
by definition, have the technical ability to expand the war. It is
easy therefore to "prove" the unreasonableness of any restraints. As
long as either side has uncommitted resources at its disposal, any
limitation can be made to appear arbitrary or ridiculous.

However, paradoxical as it may seem, the danger that any conflict
may expand is one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war
contributes to deterrence and also why if deterrence fails there is a
chance of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more
threat of limited war raises the risk of all-out war. An aggressor
may not credit our threat of massive retaliation because it would force
us to initiate a course of action which may involve enormous devastation.
He may calculate, however, that once engaged in limited war neither
he nor we would know how to limit it. The stronger the limited war
forces of the free world, the larger will have to be the Communist effect
designed to overcome them. The more the scale of conflict required to

["designed to overcome them. The more the scale of conflict regulated & so\ntolerated of the tree branch, the larger will have to be the Communist effect\nhe not we would know how to itself it. The stronger the limited war\nHe may calculate, however, that once engaged in limited war neighbor if\nwe to initiate a course of action which may involve enormous detestation.\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the more\ncontributes to deterrence and also adds to it deterrence title to a\nmay exist in one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war\nmay not credit our thrust of massive retaliation because it would force\ntime of limited war unless the risk of all-out war. An agreement\nchoice of keeping it limited. It adds to deterrence because the

I - 9

prevail approaches that of all-out war, the greater will be the
inhibitions against initiating hostilities. The risk that war could
become general, places constraints both on its extent and its duration.
If either side wanted an all-out war it would be foolish to alert the
retaliatory force of its opponent by engaging in local conflict. The
more fact that a limited war is taking place is a signal of the desire
to avoid a show-down. Experience has shown that both sides generally
lean over backwards to convey their limited aims and methods to the
other.

Those who decide specific limitations as illogical miss the central
point: an illogical limitation is often particularly effective in
conveying one's self-restraint to the other side. During the Korean
war we did not attack the bases in Manchuria from which air attacks
against our forces were being mounted. The Communists in turn did not
bomb the only two ports through which we could obtain supplies. Similar
restrictions were observed in the conflict over Quemoy. Despite the
fact that Communist China has always claimed that its territorial waters
extend twelve miles, our ships were permitted to approach within three

enlarged twelve miles, our edges were permitted to abroach within three
miles that the Communist China forces could claim that its territorial gains
were restricted and observed in the conflict over China. Despite the
pump the only two ports through which we could obtain supplies. Similar
agreements our forces were put in place. The Communists in turn did not
want we did not attack the people in Manchuria from which our forces
conquered one's soft-restraining to the other side. During the Korean
DPR: an ideological limitation is often perpetually effective in
there who doubt specific limitations as ideological means the central
other.

They overran弹丸子 to convey their limited airships and methods to the
to avoid a snowstorm. Experience has shown that both sides generally
more so that a limited war is starting place to a signal of the channel
refuge for force of its advantage in local conditions. The
It either side must be an all-out war it would be impossible to avoid the
people General. pieces constants both on its own and itschnation.
indirectly against initiating hostilities. The fact that we could
Prevent abrogation that of all-out war, the greater will be the
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miles of Quemoy without being fired on. We then loaded supplies on small Nationalist landing vessels. These were shelled as soon as they crossed the three mile limit which had been tacitly agreed upon. We in turn did not use planes against Chinese shore batteries. Neither of these limitations came about through explicit agreement. Neither would have been thought very sensible had it been proposed as a model at military staff colleges.

Though limitations must be to some extent arbitrary, not every limitation is equally useful. Self-restraint, illogical or otherwise, will be effective only if each side understands the intentions of the other and cooperates. It is essential that both sides understand the intention to avoid a showdown lest what is intended be limited resistance is construed as the prelude to all-out war. However intense the desire to limit a conflict, it could expand because of a failure of communication.³ For these

3. For a brilliant discussion see Schelling, Thomas, "Bargaining, Communication and Limited War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

of Conflict Resolution.

3. For a brilliant discussion see Scheffling, 'Thomas' *Journal ofargaining*, *Communication* and *Limited War*, "*Journal*

expands because of a failure of communication.³ For these

However, intense desire to limit a conflict, if could
resistance is construed as the prelude to all-out war.
If it is essential that both sides understand the intention
understand the intentions of the other and cooperate.
If not every limitation is usually useful. *Selt-restraining*.
Though limitations must be to some extent arbitrary,
proposed as a model at military atoll colleges.

Neither would have been thought very sensible had it been
to see limitations come about through explicit agreement.
Since there against Chinese and other patterss. Neither of
itself been successfully agreed upon. We in turn did not
envied as soon as they crossed the three wire limit which
substituted on small Nationalist landing vessels. These were
wires of Germany without being fired on. We then loaded

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reasons, the limitation which inspire greatest confidence
are those which might most "naturally" occur to <u>both</u> parties
assuming they wish to establish limitations--and without
this desire no limitation of any kind is feasible.

For example, any limited war must have some sanctuary
areas--if only because a global war cannot be considered
limited. There is no particular reason for establishing the
boundaries of these sanctuaries in any particular place. In
practice, however, the danger of misunderstanding is least
if the sanctuary follows national boundaries. This is not
because other demarcation lines are unfeasible technically.
It is rather that it will prove more difficult to count
on one chosen entirely at random. The more "unfamiliar"
the limitations the more difficult it will be to make them
stick. This consideration will be of importance in discussing
the relative emphasis to be given to conventional or nuclear
weapons in limited war.

meson in limited war.

the relative importance to be given to conventional or nuclear
stick. This consideration will be of importance in discussing
the limitations the more difficult it will be to make them
on one chosen entirely at random. The more "ununlike".
It is rather that it will prove more difficult to count
because other demarcation fines are unfeasible technically.
if the sanctity follows national poundsies. This is not
practice, however, the danger of misunderstanding is least
poundsies of these sanctities in any particular place. In
limited. There is no particular reason for splitting the
area--it only because a global war cannot be considered
for example, any limited war must have some sanctity
this desire no limitation of any kind is feasible.
seeming they wish to split limitations--and without
are those which might most "naturally" occur to both parties
reasons, the limitation which inspire greatest confidence

I - II

I - 12

Nevertheless, it would be irresponsible to minimize the
risk of what has come to be called "escalation." It will
be great in proportion as limited war is considered entirely
as a strategic problem and not as an opportunity for a pause
to permit negotiations. Any limited war should be considered
as an opportunity for another attempt to prevent a final
showdown. We must enter it prepared to negotiate and to
settle for something less than our traditional notion of
complete victory. To be sure, the most likely outcome of
a conflict fought in this manner is a stalemate. But the
high likelihood of a stalemate would seem to deprive aggression
of its object. Hence deterrence would be achieved.

It is often argued that if both sides could agree on
anything as complicated as limited war, they could probably
agree on keeping the peace in the first place. But this is
essentially a debating point. The problem of limited war
obviously will not arise if there is agreement on outstanding

opportunely will not arise if there is agreement on outstanding
essentially a deposing point. The problem of limited war
agree on keeping the peace in the first place. But this is
anything as complicated as limited war, they could properly
It is often argued that it both sides could agree on
of its object. Hence deterrence would be achieved.

high likelihood of a stalemate would seem to deprive addression
a conflict fought in this manner is a stalemate. But the
complete victory. To be sure, the most likely outcome of
settle for something less than our traditional notion of
showdown. We must enter it prepared to negotiate and to
as an opportunity for another attempt to prevent a final
to permit negotiations. Any limited war should be considered
as a strategic problem and not as an opportunity for a base
be great in proportion as limited war is considered entirely
risk of what has come to be called "escalation." It will

Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to minimize the

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issues or if the Communists do not resort to pressure, blackmail or aggression. But at the end of a decade marked by the Korean war, the Indo-Chinese war, the Hungarian rebellion, Suez, Lebanon, Quemoy, and the pressure on Berlin it should no longer be necessary to argue about the possibility of conflict. Limited war is not a solvent for all contemporary problems. It is not a substitute for a constructive policy. A strategy based on it enhances deterrence. If deterrence fails it provides an opportunity for both sides to reassess the situation. It does offer the possibility--not the certainty to avoid catastrophe.

The claim is made that the functions of obtaining a breathing space for negotiations and of bringing home to the opponents the risk of all-out war do not require a very substantial limited war establishment. As a token of our determination a regiment may be as useful as a division. Indeed, its deterrent effect may be greater. A limited war

Indeed, its deterrent effect may be greater. A limited war
determination a regiment may be as useful as a division.
unpatrential limited war Participation. As a token of our
opponents the risk of all-out war do not require a very
breathing space for negotiations and of bringing home to the
the claim is made that the functions of obtaining a
to avoid catastrophe.

the situation. It does offer the possibility--not the certainty
take it provides an opportunity for both sides to reassess
A strategy based on it enhances deterrence. If deterrence
problems. It is not a substitute for a constructive policy.
of conflict. Limited war is not a solvent for all contemporar-
ly should no longer be necessarily so as long as the possibility
rebellion, Suez, Republi, Grecyoy, and the pressure on Berlin
by the Korean war, the Indochinese war, the Hungarian
Blackmail or adroition. But at the end of a decade marked
issues or if the Communists do not resort to pressure,

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I - 14

establishment according to this school of thought, adds to
deterrence because if forces the aggressor to consider that
we would invoke our retaliatory force rather than accept
a local defeat. To the extent this is true, however, we
must not leave the impression that we would be prepared to
rely entirely on limited war forces. The sooner the point
is reached at which we could escape a setback only by resorting
to all-out war, the stronger our deterrent position. A sub-
stantial limited war establishment might raise doubts about
our ultimate resolve and thereby bring on aggression.

But as the missile age develops, an inadequate limited
war establishment may combine the worst features of every
course of action. If we peace only a little step between
surrender and all-out war, the Soviet opportunity to blackmail
allies and neutrals would substantially remain. The dread
alternative of surrender or suicide will even be compounded
by the risk of a series of "small" defeats, none of which

by the risk of a series of "all-out" defeats, none of which
alternative of surrender or annihilation will even be compounded
by allies and neutrals would automatically remain. The trend
surrender and all-out war, the Soviet opportunity to blackwell
conceal of action. It we pose only a little step between
war, eaplitament may compine the worst features of every
But as the malleable age develops, an insidious limited
our ultimate resolve and thereby print on addression.
actual limited war eaplitament might raise doubts about
to all-out war, the stronger our deterrent position. A sup-
pose reached at which we could escape a setback only by resorting
to entirely on limited war forces. The sooner the point
must not leave the impression that we would be prepared to
a local defeat. To the extent this is true, however, we
we would invoke our retaliatory force rather than accept
deterrence because it forces the addressor to consider that
eaplitament according to this school of thought, adds to
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I - 15

seems "worth" an all-out war. The consequences may be
positive Communist incentive to defeat small American
limited war forces--if only to demonstrate our impotence.
In the period of mutual invulnerability, the United States
cannot impose on itself the burden of having to respond to
every challenge with the threat of self-destruction.
And it only fudges the issue to look at the limited war
establishment primarily as a trigger for the retaliatory force.
The free world will not be really safe until it can shift
to the aggressor the risk of initiating all-out war.

There are two categories of criticism of the concept
of limited war then. Some question it because they believe
limitation will be _too_ effective and this they assert violates
traditional notions of warfare. Others decide it because they
reject the possibility of limitation. It is easy to understand
the objection of the traditionalists to the concept of limited
war. They do not believe in its utility either for deterrence

war. They do not believe in its utility either for deterrence
the objection of the traditionalists to the concept of limited
reject the feasibility of limitation. It is easy to understand
traditional notions of warlike. Others decide it because they
limitation will be too effective and this they assert violates
of limited war then. Some question it because they believe
There are two categories of criticism of the concept
to the aggressor the risk of initiating all-out war.
The free world will not be really safe until it can shift
eatsplitment primarily as a trigger for the retaliatory force.
And it only funds the issue to look at the limited war
every challenge with the threat of self-destruction.
cannot impose on itself the burden of having to respond to
In the period of mutual invulnerability, the United States
limited war forces--it only to demonstrate our impotence.
Positive Communist incentive to defeat all American
seems "worth" an all-out war. The coördination may be

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I - 16

or for the conduct of war. But the violence of the criticism
of some of the other groups is puzzling. They pretend that
those who urge a greater reliance on limited war wish to
bring it about. They give the impression that the choice
before us is peace or limited war and they then proceed to
demonstrate the easy proposition that peace is preferable.

However, our alternatives are quite different. No
responsible person advocates initiating limited war. The
problem of limited war will arise only in case of Communist,
aggression or blackmail. In these circumstances, if we reject
the concept of limited war our only options will be surrender
or all-out war. And it does not make sense to redicule the
notion of limited war because it might lead to general war
and then to rely on a military policy which gives us no other
choice but all-out war. The conclusion is almost inescapable
in case of Soviet aggression--the only contingency worth
discussing in this context--many of those deciding the

discussing in this context--many of those deciding the
in case of Soviet aggression--the only contingency worth
choice put all-out war. The conclusion is almost inescapable
and then to rely on a military policy which gives us no other
notion of limited war because it might lead to general war
or all-out war. And it does not make sense to regurgitate the
cConcept of limited war our only options will be surrender
aggression or paralysis. In these circumstances, it we reject
problem of limited war will arise only in case of Communism,
reasonable person advocates initiating limited war. The
However, our alternatives are quite different. No
gentlestate the easy proposition that peace is better.
before us is peace or limited war and they seem to proceed to
print it spout. They give the impression that the choice
those who urge a greater reliance on limited war wish to
of some of the other groups is puzzling. They pretend that
or for the conduct of war. But the violence of the criticism
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I - 17

concept of limited war would prefer surrender to resistance.

Since surrender will not be our national policy it is
important to get our choices straight. Limited war is
palatable only when compared with other even starker
alternatives. It is preferable not to peace, only to surrender
or all-out war. It is, to be sure, a subtle and complex
task, and it presupposes a rare blend of psychological,
political and military skill. Yet facts cannot be evaded
by refusing to admit their existence. We do not have the
time to lament our condition. Our best thought is required
for adjusting to new conditions in a world where the truths
of one decade become the obstacles to understanding of
another.

snooper.

of one decade become the opatcles to understanding of
for sating to new conditions in a world where the truth
time to sament our condition. Our past thought is redired
by refusing to smit their exlatence. We do not have the
political and military skill. Yet facts cannot be evaded
task, and it breaths a rare blend of psychological,

or all-out war. It is, to be sure, a supele and complex
alternatives. It is bretersple not to bece, only to surrender
batesple only when compared with other even starker

concept of limited war would bretier surrender to reatance.

I - 11

II - Some Forms of Limitation

A. The Prerequisites of Limitation.

There are three prerequisites for a strategy of limited war:

(a) The capability for limited war must be able to prevent the potential **maksowicki** aggressor from creating a fail accompli; (b) It must be of a nature to convince the aggressor that its use, while involving an increased risk of all-out war, is not an inevitable prelude to it; (c) It must be coupled with a diplomacy which succeeds in con- veying that all-out war is not our sole response to aggression and that we are willing to negotiate a settlement short of com- plete victory.

If the free world's limited war forces can be overrun easily, aggression or blackmail may be encouraged and the dilemmas of massive retaliation will then confront us in even sharper form.

The danger of a fait accompli must demoralize our allies whose major concern is not eventual liberation after conquest. If we resist by measures which we intent to be limited but which an opponent interprets as the prelude to all-out war, he may launch a

bent out interpretations in the bridle to 'off-out war'. He may launch a
recent fire measure which we intend to be limited but which an ob-
mission concern is not exempt from liperotation after condense. If we
the quaver of a full secombit must genetize om. slipe whose
unbearable retaliation will then continue so in even sadder form.
aggression or premeditait may be encountered and the dilemma of
It the tree world's a limited war. alone can be overruled easily,
break a forest.

and that we are willing to negotiate a settlement upon of com-
ducting that 'off-out war' is not om. sole reason to aggrSSION
it; (a) If we must be combined with a diplomacy which succeeds in con-
an increased risk of 'off-out war', is not an inevitable bridle to
of a nature to convince the aggressor that its use, while involving
**unjustifying** aggression from creating a full secombit; (b) If we must be
deficient
(c) The capability for limited war must be able to prevent the

There are three preconditions for a strategy of limited war:

V. The preconditions of limitation.

II - Some forms of limitation

II - 2

pre-emptive attack. If our diplomacy cannot take advantage of pauses in military operations to negotiate a settlement, if we make the issue depend on "purely" military considerations, any conflict will expand by stages into a conflagration.

Considered in the abstract, these requirements can be met in a number of ways. Some argue that the retaliatory force is also suitable for limited war because of its ability to engage in graduated retaliation or limited strategic warfare. Others advocate a strategy of indirect retaliation designed to punish an aggressor though not necessarily at the place where aggression occurs. Still others would rely on guerilla activity. Finally, there is a school of though which stresses the importance of local defense.

All of these measures afford opportunities for resisting aggression short of all-out war. Each of them has uses in determining aggression and in furnishing alternatives to general war.

Yet their consequences for diplomacy, deterrence and strategy vary.

Let their conscience for diplomacy, deterrence and strategy yield.

Think attraction and in unmitigating alternatives to general war.

Stression策 at effort-out war. Each of them has his place in deter-

VII of these measures afford opportunities for resorting at-

deterrence.

there is a school of thought which stresses the importance of local

reaction. Still others would rely on friendly activity. Minimally,

an aggressor thought not necessarily at the place where attraction

advocates a strategy of indirect retaliation designed to banish

in格ated retaliation or limited strategic warfare. Others

also suitable for limited war because of its affinity to engage

considered in the aspect, these requirements can be met

conflict will expand by stages into a confrontation.

make the issue dependent on "pity" militarily considerations, and

beneath in military operations to negotiate a settlement, it we

breathless attack. It our diplomacy cannot take advantage of

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II - 3

They will be discussed in turn.

B. Limited Strategic War and Graduated Retaliation.

The concepts of a "limited" strategic war and graduated retaliation are based on the premise that our retaliatory force can be used for limited objectives. Limited strategic war would resort to measures which are normally a prelude to all-out war without committing ourselves irrevocably to a show-down. For example, in response to Soviet occupation of West Berlin we could destroy part of the Soviet radar warning net or part of the Soviet retaliatory force. This would increase Soviet vulnerability to an all-out attack. It could serve as a warning of the consequences of persisting in the aggressive course. If taken seriously and if the Soviet Union were unwilling to risk all-out war, it might be willing to restore the status quo ante.

By contrast, graduated retaliation would not strive for a military advantage as such. Rather an attempt would be made to inflict sufficient damage on the aggressor to cause him to desist

influenced sufficient damage on the aggressor to cause him to depart
militarily. Advantage can be gained. Better an attempt would be made to
get contract, frustrated retaliation would not arise for a
to restore the status quo once.

Soviet Union were fulfilling to risk off-out war, it might be willing
of berating in the aggressive course. It taken account of the consequences
an off-out attack. It could serve as a warning of the consequence
retaliatory force. This would increase Soviet vulnerability to
degradment of the Soviet research warning net or part of the Soviet
example, in response to Soviet combination of West Berlin we could
without committing offensive irrevocably to a show-down. For
reasons to measure which are non-fair a bridle to off-out war.
be need for limited objectives. Limited strategic war would
situation are based on the premise that our retaliatory force can
The concept of a "limited" strategic war andulated re-

E. Limited Strategic War and Graduated Retaliation.

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II - 4

from his course. In case of an attack on Iran, for example, we
might announce that we would destroy certain specified Soviet in-
stallations or cities each week until the Soviet army had again
withdrawn behind its borders. According to the theory of limited
retaliation, this point will be reached when the cost of the re-
taliation exceeds the value of the objective.

There are major difficulties, however, with using the re-
taliatory force in this manner in relation to deterrence as well
as to strategy, should deterrence fail. From the point of view
of deterrence it is not easy to imagine how a country would con-
vey its determination to resist aggression by using its retali-
tory force while at the same time making clear that such employment
will be limited -- at least initially. All the difficulties
described in the previous chapter in making the threat of all-out
war plausible would seem to apply with redoubled force in this
case. If we seek to convey our desire to establish some limitation
to the extent of our retaliation, the threat of all-out war may

will be limited to the previous chapter in making the threat of all-out

war conceivable would seem to ably with recompense force in this
described in the previous chapter in making the threat of all-out

war. If we seek to convey our desire to cede a share of the

case. It is not easy to imagine how a country would con-

be to strategy, enough deterrence itself. How the point of view

retaliation force in this manner in relation to deterrence as well

falsification exceeds the value of the objective.

withDRAWAL pending its borders. According to the theory of limited

assaults or offices each week until the Soviet army had again

from the front. In case of an attack on Iran, for example, we

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II - 5

lose the last vestiges of credibility. On the other hand, if we
do not make the attempt to communicate at least an outline of our
intentions to limit the employment of our retaliatory force, a
Soviet pre-emptive strike would seem inevitable; in short, the
threat of limited strategic war is either too convincing or not
convincing enough.

Reliance on either limited strategic war or graduated re-
taliation would in fact confront us with an almost hopeless
dilemma. In case of Communist aggression, an American President
would be faced with the decision of initiating a type of conflict
which could not protect the victim and which might expose the
United States to fearful devastation. This becomes clear if one
imagines a Communist note to the United States delivered concurrent-
ly with an attack on an ally somewhat along the following lines:
"We are very eager to avoid all-out war. Moreover, it is point-
less to retaliate against us since our retaliatory force is in-
vulnerable. To show our good intentions we will overlook attacks

anarchic. To show our good intentions we will overtake attacks
from to retellate against us since our retaliatory force is in-
state are very eager to avoid all-out war. Moreover, it is point-
ly with an attack on an ally somewhat along the following lines:
imagine a Communist note to the United States delivered concurrent-
United States to threat deviation. This becomes clear if one
which could not protect the victim and which might expose the
would be used with the decision of initiating a trade of conflict
dilemma. In case of Communist aggression, an American president
situation would in that context be with an almost indefinite
refuse on either limited strategic war or graduated re-
convinving enough.

threat of limited strategic war is either too convincing or not
Soviet binary strike would seem inevitable; in short, the
intentions to limit the employment of our retaliatory force, a
do not make the attempt to communicate at least an outline of our
force the fact arguments of credibility. On the other hand, if we
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II - 2

II - 6

you make in the first few hours after this communication. From
then on, we will devastate the United States in precise proportion
to your attack but no more." Is it a foregone conclusion that a
President would use our retaliatory force in that case? Or that
it would be wise to do so?

Even if we resorted to our declared strategy, we would still
be at a fundamental psychological disadvantage. We would be
forced to engage in actions each of which almost guarantees at
least similar destruction in the free world, and we would run
the constant risk of all-out war while the issue which produced
the conflict had already been settled in the aggressor's favor.
Every passing day would strengthen the Soviet hold on its prize
and bring home to us the futility of our course. The Communist
leaders may well calculate that skillful peace offensives would
cause us to weary of so unrewarding a strategy, unless complete
frustration were to induce us to launch an all-out war.

The problem is so intractable because limited employment of

The problem is so intractable because limited employment of
unemployment were to induce us to launch an all-out war.

 causes us to nearly all understanding a strategy, unless complete
 ideas are well articulated that skillful because offensive worth
 and printing done to us the utility of our cause. The Communist
 Every bearing day would strengthen the Soviet hold on its base
 the conflict had already been settled in the aggressor's favor.
 the constant risk of all-out war while the issue which broached
 lessens similar destruction in the three world, and we would run
 toward to engage in actions each of which must have guarantee at
 be at a fundamental psychological disadvantage. We would be
 even if we reported to our declared strategy, we would still
 if would be wise to do so!

President would see our retaliatory force in that case! Or, just
to him, attack but no more." In it a foregone conclusion that a
open on, we will generate the United States in precise proportion
 you make in the first ten months after this communication. From

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EP

II - 7

the strategic force rather than preventing an aggressor from at-
taining his objective seeks to compel him to relinquish it once
achieved. But to give up an objective involves a loss of prestige
which an aggressor may consider intolerable. Inability to advance
leads to a stalemate; retreat after a victory is an admission of
failure. Thus the limited employment of retaliatory forces con-
fronts us with a more complex psychological problem than any
other form of limited war, while at the same time committing us
to a strategy peculiarly unsusceptible to limitation.

From the strictly military point of view, a strategy which
relies on the limited employment of the retaliatory force is ex-
tremely risky. If the aggressor's retaliatory force is vulnerable,
he will have no choice but to launch a pre-emptive attack. For
vulnerability prevents him from waiting to determine the extent
of our blow. If his force is invulnerable, the result may be a
strategy of tit for tat leading to devastation approaching the
scale of all-out war. In short we may find that we have to choose

some of all-out war. In short we may find that we have to choose
attractively of fit for that leading to generation according to the
of our plan. It is force is immovable, the result may be a
an impatience prevents him from waiting to determine the exact
he will have no choice but to launch a pre-emptive attack. Not
therefore right. It the aggressor a retaliatory force in Immovable,
refers on the limited employment of the retaliatory force is ex-
from the already military point of view, a strategy which

    to a strategy beautifully managable to limitation.

    other form of limited war, while at the same time committing us
    from us with a more complex belated psychological problem than any
    situation. Time the limited employment of retaliatory forces con-
    forces to a situation; retreat after a victory is an admission of
    which an aggressor may consider interfeerle. Insult to advance
    replaced. But to give him an objective involves a loss of brevity
    training his objective seems to combat him to vindicate it once
    the aggressive force rather than preventing an aggressor from af-

II - 3

II - 8

between ineffectualness of all-out war.

Graduated retaliation might supply less military incentive to retaliate than limited strategic war. As long as his retaliatory force remains intact, he may be prepared to endure a measure of damage without retaliation, if only to demonstrate the futility of our military effort. On the other hand, it would be reckless to count on this. While the military compulsion to retaliate may be weaker than in the case of limited strategic war, the psychological compulsion will be greater. It will be difficult not to react when one's own civilian population is under attack. Moreover, the opponent may mistake what we intend as graduated retaliation for the prelude to an all-out attack — unless we behave with a self-defeating circumspection. Thus, whatever eventuality is considered, the most likely outcome of the limited employment of the retaliatory force is either defeat or all-out war.

To be effective the limited employment of retaliatory forces must meet two requirements which in practice cancel each other out:

must meet two requirements when in practice cancel each other out:

To be effective the limited employment of retaliatory force
of the retaliatory force is either defeat of all-out war,
is considered, if the most likely outcome of the limited employment
with a self-defeating circumstance. Thus, whatever actuality
fetishation for the prelude to an all-out attack — unless we perceive
over, the obverse may make what we intend as frustrated re-
result when one's own civilian population is under attack. More-
logical conjunction will be greater. It will be difficult not to
be weaker than in the case of limited strategic war, if the behavior
to result on this. While the military conjunction to neutralize any
of our military effort. On the other hand, it would be reckless
of damage without retaliation, it only to demonstrate the utility
to neutralize any limited strategic war. We long to die retali-
ated retaliation might ably lose military incentive
between inaction of all-out war.

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II - 9

The aggressor must be convinced (a) that a strategy of limited strategic war or graduated retaliation, while it increases the risk of all-out war, is not an inevitable prelude to it, and (b) that we are prepared to resort to all-out war rather than accept defeat. If we fail to meet the first condition, the opponent will probably strike pre-emptively. If we fail to meet the second condition, the aggressor may be encouraged to outwit us or to engage in a test of nerves with a built-in escalator to all-out war.

Of course, the very riskiness of such a course may make the aggressor recoil; the ease with which matters could get out of hand might add to deterrence. It is doubtful, however, whether we can impose on ourselves so reckless a strategy. If deterrence should fail we will be confronted at every turn by the alternative of defeat of all-out war. In most circumstances, limited strategic war will probably combine the disadvantages of limited and of all-out war.

The problem is even more serious for other countries of the free world. Communist blackmail against them is based importantly on the

11 - II

The argument must be converted (a) into a statement (b) which contains the following elements:
* (a) The statement to be converted
* (b) The statement to be converted into
* (c) The statement to be converted into a statement that is true
* (d) The statement to be converted into a statement that is false

The argument must be converted in such a way that the statement in (b) becomes true and the statement in (c) becomes false. If the statement in (b) is true and the statement in (c) is false, the argument is invalid because the claim is false and the conclusion is true. If the statement in (b) is false and the statement in (c) is true, the argument is invalid because the claim is true and the conclusion is false. If the statement in (b) is false and the statement in (c) is false, the argument is valid because the claim is false and the conclusion is true. If the statement in (b) is true and the statement in (c) is true, the argument is valid because the claim is true and the conclusion is false. If the statement in (b) is true and the statement in (c) is false, the argument is valid because the claim is true and the conclusion is true. If the statement in (b) is false and the statement in (c) is true, the argument is valid because the claim is false and the conclusion is true. If the statement in (b) is false and the statement in (c) is false, the argument is invalid because the claim is false and the conclusion is false.

Of course, the very likelihood of such a course may make it
impossible for the reader to follow the argument properly.
However, whether we accept the argument as a whole or not, it
might add to the difficulty. It is difficult to accept the claim
that the statement in (b) is true and the statement in (c) is false
is equivalent to the statement in (a). It is difficult to accept the
statement in (b) as true if we want to accept the statement in (c)
that the statement in (a) is false. It is difficult to accept the
statement in (c) as true if we want to accept the statement in (b)
that the statement in (a) is true.

In most circumstances, if the argument were to be properly
转换 into a statement of the form "if and only if" the
statement in (b) would be changed to "if and only if the
statement in (a) were true" and the statement in (c) would be
changed to "if and only if the statement in (a) were false".

II - 10

ability to overrun them and to expose them to all the problems of
foreign occupation which in this case would inevitably be coupled
with a social upheaval. This danger is not reduced by using our
retaliatory force in a limited manner. The Communist leaders would
still be able to menace the Prime Minister of a free country somewhat
as follows: "If you do not disarm completely, our forces will move
in to dismantle your military establishment. To be sure, in that case
the Americans may retaliate against us. But this will only give us
an added incentive to remain and to restore our economy from your
country. Whether the American retaliation is limited or all-out we
will respond in kind. We shall see whose nerves snap first. Whatever
the outcome of a Soviet-United States war, your country as you now know
it will cease to exist." In the face of such a threat resistance may
well seem quixotic. For whether we retaliate or not, the threatened
country will be overrun. In these circumstances, many nations of the
free world may seek to obtain the most favorable terms possible.

true world may seem to obtain from the most favorable terms possible.

country will be overruled. In those circumstances, many nations of the
country seem to exist. In the case of a simple resistance may
it will cease to exist. In the case of a complex resistance may
the outcome of a complicated situation be, the more or less
will result in this. We shall see some instances and facts. However,

**Note:** The American regulation is limited on all-out war
on economic incentive to remain and to restore our economy from our

**Note:** The American regulation does not apply to us. But this will only give us
in to demonstrate your military capability. To be sure, in that case
we follow: "It is better to not dream completion." Our forces will move
onward able to分子 to the base. Minimum of a two country something
will be able to分子 to the base. The American regulation is
resistable, fierce in a limited manner. The Communist leaders would
with a social dividend. This danger is not reduced by using our
strongholds. Competition which in these cases would be completed
belong to the class which would be controlled by the

department of the Ministry of the Home Affairs. The Minister of the

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II - 10

II - 11

C. Indirect Retaliation.

The strategy of indirect retaliation grows out of an awareness
of the risks of attacks on the Communist homeland and particularly
on its retaliatory force. On the other hand, advocates of this course
consider it impossible to defend the entire Communist perimeter
locally. Accordingly they argue that resistance need not occur at
the spot where aggression takes place. Rather we should utilize the
special advantages of our strategic position, particularly our superior
seapower. Aggression against, say Iran, could be resisted, so the
argument goes, by such measures as closing theurdanelles or a blockade
of the Soviet Union. Pressure against Berlin could be countered by
economic sanctions against Eastern Europe or perhaps closing the Straits
of Denmark.

Such a strategy would avoid many of the risks of the limited
use of our retaliatory force. It might increase the credibility of
our deterrent by emphasizing a threat which is plausible. The gap
between deterrence and the strategy we are willing to implement will be
smaller.

enquiry.

between the conference and the strategy we are willing to implement will be
our determinant factor, independent of a direct answer in principle. The job
of our retaliatory force, it might increase the credibility of
our strategy, which would mean that the risks of the finished
on a strategy which would mean that the risks of the finished

of Defense.

economic consequences against Western Europe or beyond, affect the success
of the Soviet Union. Treasury against Berlin could be counterfeited by
argument too. If any measure is taken to close the debate or a probe
through which aggression takes place. Berlin would still like the
fearful. Vocally they would argue that resistance has not come at
consider if impossible to close the entire Committee debate.
on its retaliatory force. Of the option found advocates of this course
of the risks of aggression on the Committee themselves and personally
The strategy of indirect negotiation shows out of our experience

C. Indirect Negotiation.

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II - 12

At the same time a strategy of indirect retaliation raises serious problems of its own. From the point of view of deterrence it may reduce the risk to the aggressor to the point where blackmail or military pressure become tempting. Where the limited use of the retaliatory force involves an undue danger of all-out war, most measures of indirect retaliation are too circumscribed and long-term in their effect to influence the immediate situation. Closing the Bardanelles could not save Iran any more than a naval blockade could save Berlin and the impact of these measures on the U.S.S.R. would be long delayed.

As a result, we would be forced to maintain over an indefinite period measures whose utility every passing day would throw into question. They may in fact supply an incentive to the Communists to demonstrate their immunity to American pressure and the impotence of our response. And, after a sufficient lapse of time, it will be difficult to resist Soviet suggestions urging us to adjust to facts. The fate of the embargo of strategic goods against Communist China after the invasion of Korea can serve as an example of the difficulty of persevering in a policy of indirect retaliation over a long period. The increasing

a policy of indirect refutation over a long period. The incentive of force can serve as an example of the difficulty of preventing in complicity with strategic goals of Committees of Union and the invasion Soviet anguishings might be about to take. The use of this and other instruments of American pressure can be effective on our reasons. They may in fact already be incentive to the Committee to concentrate their utility over each passing day which would further theuation. We a result, we would be forced to submit over an indefinite and the impact of these measures on the U.S.A.R. would be long lasting. They not have law any more than a new flood could have benefit to influence the immediate situation. Closing the channels of indirect refutation use the channels open and long-term in such a way as to influence the immediate situation. We must see that the refutation of indirect refutation does not lead to the situation where the point whereupon we are forced to take the direct route involves an increase of all-out war, most measures of pressure become dangerous. Where the limited use of the refutation they are to the antagonist to the point whereupon we are forced to take the direct route to the antagonist or otherwise reduce the point of view of resistance it may have

II - 75

II - 13

pressure to accept the Soviet domination over Eastern Europe is
another.

If such a strategy presents great complexities for the United
States, it is perhaps the least desirable cause of action for our
allies. The blackmail situation described earlier will be even more
poignant when the American response is so indirect. With Soviet
occupation unavoidable in case of resistance, wide scope exists for
the gradual erosion of morale through steady Soviet pressure. A strategy
based entirely on indirect retaliation must lead eventually to a dis-
integration of the free world.

D. Guerilla Warfare.

Many thoughtful people, horrified by the risks of nuclear war,
have come to the conclusion that any conflict involving the great
powers would carry with it an intolerable risk of expanding into a
nuclear holocaust. They therefore urge that the aggression be deterred
by organizing the civilian population into guerilla groups and confronting
the Communists with the prospect of a long drawn-out campaign of
pacification.⁴

⁴. Kennan

["d. KENNA", "決議案。", "the Committee with the broadest of a few drawn-out examples of\nthe existence in the civilian debullication into Sheriffs' courts and concurring\nopinion. In principle, it is an insoluble task of expanding into a\nbroadened reach, why it can not be satisfied with the aggregation of de\nbureaus which, in itself, would be insufficient to cover the\nentire process. They therefore take that aggregation to be de\nbureaus which, in itself, would be

II - 14

One difficulty with this view is that it oversimplifies the task. There is no known instance of large-scale sustained partisan activity in any Communist controlled territory. Those uprisings which have occurred were suppressed ruthlessly and quickly. Little in their experience would cause the Communist leaders to be overly impressed by the threat of popular resistance, and Communist theory would make them doubt even its possibility. Popular resistance in Hungary and Tibet did not prove an extended obstacle to Communist rule.

Moreover, whatever the effectiveness of guerilla warfare as a strategy, its utility as a threat for purposes of deterrence is highly questionable. A country relying on partisan warfare for deterrence would have to convince the potential aggressor that while it would offer no organized resistance, it would be able to train guerilla groups and would persevere in using them until the aggressor withdrew. These two requirements are to a large extent inconsistent with each other.

The decision not to resist with organized forces can only be interpreted by the aggressor as lack of will. The threat to resort to partisan warfare is more likely to be construed as bluster than as a real menace. It

It is more likely to be considered as false than as a real one. If
by the aggronor as lack of will. The student & records to put him away
The decision not to react with organized force can only be interpreted
out of the reason of his own reason & of his own interest.
And much better in making them until the aggronor withdraw. Then
other than organized resistance, it would be able to show the aggronor
which due to convince the potential aggronor that while it would
continue to fight on, a country fighting on, put him away for a time
and then the aggronor will be able to show his own resistance.
Moreover, instead of the existence of a group which is a
Tie did not prove an extended obstacle to Communist cause.
Since apart from its beauty, the aggronor resistance in Hungary, any
of the students of Belgrade resistance, and Communist youth which can
experience would cause the Communist leader to be greatly impressed
by the course of subordination rapidly and directly. Little in their
activity in any Communist controlled country. Those regulations which
there is no known instance of, have to be executed with caution.
One correctly when the view is that it overemphasizes the

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11 - 15

is not easy to see what concrete steps could be taken to demonstrate
the readiness for guerilla warfare or how a country could be certain
of its ability to carry out its threat.

To make such a deterrent effective, a government would have to
convinced an aggressor that, while unable to protect its people against
invasion, it has sufficient prestige to ask for the most difficult and,
for those involved, most costly form of resistance. The more highly
organized a society and the greater its discipline, the more an aggressor
is likely to regard the threat of guerilla warfare as bluff. In highly
organized Western societies, however, the measures required to prove
a serious intention to conduct partisan warfare are also likely to
inspire a feeling of hopelessness. The specialization of function on
which Western societies depend requires an efficient administrative
group and a cohesive governmental apparatus. The occupying power
has, therefore, many foci for pressure. It can appeal to the sense
of order and discipline of the administrative group and the governmental
apparatus. It can use terror. And if it fails, the breakdown of the

["It is easy to see what consequences such a country could have on its relations with other countries and how a country could be affected if it were to adopt such a policy. It is not easy to see how it could be possible for a government to act in such a way without the approval of the government itself. It is not easy to see how it could be

II - 16

subtle interrelationships of modern society is almost certain to have
much more dire consequences for the indigenous population than for the
occupying power.

Partisan activity has generally been most effective in primitive societies and precisely because of the absence of identifiable control. In these societies there exists no group with sufficient authority against which effective pressure can be brought. To propose such a strategy for Europe reveals a deep misunderstanding of the requirements of deterrence and of the psychology of Western societies.

Guerilla warfare almost invariably requires special conditions to be possible at all; of terrain, as in Yugoslavia or Algeria, or overwhelming numbers as in China, or of vast expanse, such as in Russia. Even then it could be conducted generally only when there was outside support, both military and moral, giving some prospect of eventual victory. Partisan warfare can make a contribution to other forms of resistance; it cannot be substituted for them.

## 8. The Requirement of Local Defense.

If the Free World is to avoid gradual erosion, it must be able to

["It is the free world it is so each individual is free to do", "## II. The Constitution of Total Freedom.", "Religion: it cannot be underwritten to this.", "Altogether, however, almost invariably requires special conditions\nof determination and of the pathology of Western society.\n\nThe two objective premises can be brought together. To prove such a\nspecial relation, however, objective premises can be brought. To prove\nthe two objective premises are true, we must show with sufficient evidence\noverlapping numbers as in China, or of such evidence, such as in India,\nso be possible at all: of them, as in India, or of such evidence, such as in\nChina, so be possible at all: of them, as in China, or of such evidence, such as in\nIndia, so be possible at all: of them, as in China, or of such evidence, such as in\nIndia.", "Certain statements almost invariably require special conditions\nof determination and of the pathology of Western society.", "The two objective premises can be brought together. To prove such a\nspecial relation, however, objective premises can be brought. To prove\nthe two objective premises are true, we must show with sufficient evidence\noverlapping numbers as in China, or of such evidence, such as in India,\nso be possible at all: of them, as in China, or of such evidence, such as in\nIndia, so be possible at all: of them, as in China, or of such evidence, such

II - 17

avoid the fait accompli of Communist occupation. A capacity for
local defense is essential to bring our deterrent policy in line with
the strategy for fighting a war and the requirements of our security
with those of our allies. A fait accompli changes our attempt to prevent
a given event, which is the basis of deterrence, to an effort to compel
a certain course of action. Our threat then is no longer designed to
induce a potential aggressor to refrain from attacking; it must force
him to withdraw. In deciding to attack the psychological burden is
on the aggressor: he must take an affirmative step and his hesitation
will be great in proportion as the objective seems unattainable. Once
the aggressor is in possession of his prize, however, the psychological
burden is shifted. The defender must now assume the risk of the first
move. The aggressor can confine himself to outwaiting his opponent
whose incentive to persevere is diminished with every day that the fait
accompli endures. When resisting physical occupation, the defender can
persevere or surrender. When the aggressor has already gained his
objective, the defender can have peace by settling for the status quo.

["objectives, the collector can have pieces of data relating to the items in\nthe database or another. When the agreement is already given he\nagrees to accept the data. When relating the data to the database can\nwhose incentive to benefit from this kind of data but that the data\nmove. The agreement can contain a clause to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it is signed.\n\nThe collector must have the right to require the payment of\na sum of money and the agreement can contain a clause to require\nthe collector to return the pieces of data to the collector and the\nagreement to be valid from the moment it

II - 13

In all limited war strategies save that of local defense, the psychological balance is in favor of the aggressor and will become so increasingly the longer the conflict lasts.

If threatened areas cannot be protected against occupation, the scope of Communist blackmail will constantly expand. The disparity in forces suitable for local defense must be remedied or the Berlin Crisis will prove but an augury of ever increasing pressure. A measure of this security can no doubt be achieved by schemes for arms control as will be discussed below. But unless the present disparity in local power is remedied there will be little incentive for serious negotiation.

In building up these forces, the West faces many obstacles, not the least of which are its own preconceptions. For over a decade and a half, it has been axiomatic that the West could not possibly match Communist manpower, interior lines of communication and more centralized command arrangements. The conviction is general that technology must substitute for manpower. A strategy of punishment was seen as the best counter to the Communist "hordes." These notions have been reinforced

["II - 18", "In all finished war strategy save that of foot defense, theopedological balance is in favor of the aggressor and will become so incrementally. In all finished war strategy save that of foot defense, the hedgedogical balance is in favor of the aggressor

II - 19

by budgetary considerations: "More bang for the buck" became an axiom not only of strategic but also of fiscal wisdom. But whatever the merit of these views when they were first developed, the simple choices of our period of invulnerability are no longer open to us. Continued reliance on the military policy of the past decade will produce not deterrence but paralysis. Far from holding our alliances together, it will undermine them. Building up a greater capacity for local defense in no longer a question of choice; it has been imposed on the free world by the technological revolution.

Many of the assumptions regarding the impossibility of local defense are either fallacious or exaggerated. In total available manpower the free world still is superior and its industrial potential exceeds that of the Communist bloc by a factor of three. There is no reason except lack of will why Western Europe and the United States cannot create local forces capable of arresting almost any scale of Soviet aggression.⁵ To be sure, in other areas the problem is more complicated.

In the so-called gray areas of the Middle East and South-East Asia,

5. See blow 'The United States and Europe,' Chapter P.

["². See p. vii, The United States and Europe, 1. Chapter 1, p. 11.\nIn the so-called 'Grand Unionist' or 'Grand Nationalist' cause, the Middle East and South-East Asia, &c. were the main focus of the struggle for the independence of the colonial powers.² To do so, in other words, the struggle was to be a struggle of the working classes against the colonial powers and the imperial states and their overlords, with the aim of breaking the colonial power and the imperial power and the colonial states and their overlords, and of breaking the colonial power and the imperial power and the colonial states and their overlords

II - 20

the Communist bloc can concentrate its manpower and material against
countries weaker and less closely allied than those of the North Atlantic
Community. On the other hand, these are also the areas where the political
penalties for aggression would be greatest. An attack on an emergent
country would antagonize all the other uncommitted nations and it
would lead to an increased mobilization of Western resources. Moreover,
difficulties of terrain and communications place a ceiling on the
number of troops an aggressor could utilize effectively even there.

The inability to protect every area locally is no excuse for failing
to secure those where it is possible. The minimum goal of local defense
must be to prevent the possibility of cheap victories. The optimum
situation is when aggression can be defeated locally. The latter
situation is attainable in Europe. And the position of other areas can
be improved through their own forces and increases in the American limited
war capability.

This is a complex but not insoluble task made all the more necessary
by the starkness of the alternatives. Building up a capability for
local defense will require much effort. But the rewards are high to

["local detente will result unless action is taken to\nput the atmosphere of the information. Building up a credibility\nfor the administration of the information will be of\nimportance to the administration.", "This is a complex matter and not an simple one. It is\nvery important that the matter be given the proper\ncredit and that the administration will be satisfied\nthat the administration will be satisfied that the adminis-\ntration is a stand alone in Europe. And the position of other states can\nnot be changed when an administration can be defeated locally. The factor\nmust be to prevent the credibility of the administration. The option\nis to secure those where it is possible. The minimum goal of local detente\n

II - 21

a considerable extent, a strategy of local defense will lift from us
the impossible choices of current military policy. It will increase
the flexibility of our diplomacy. It is the prerequisite of effective
arms control negotiations. For as long as there is a wide disparity
in local power the Soviet Union will not have an incentive for serious
arms control. It will consider itself better protected by its military
superiority than by any arms control scheme which may be devised.

In devising a strategy of local defense, we come up however squarely
against one of the great unresolved issues of American military policy.
the relative significance of nuclear and conventional weapons.

II - 11

Against one of the greatest unwarranted issues of American military policy, in evaluating a strategy of local defense, we come to a profound discrepancy. The priority given to any area control scheme which may be desired, is the control of nuclear weapons. It will be seen that the position of the Soviet Union will not have an incentive for someone to develop a nuclear strategy. For we lack a future in a wide discrepancy the impossibility of our diplomacy. If it is the best hope of collective security to eliminate our nuclear weapons, it will increase a considerable extent a strategy of local defense which will lift them from