INTERNATIONAL

As the Cheers Fai

T
HOSE OF US WHO QUESTIONED THE
wisdom of the diplomacy preceding the
war over Kosovo owe it to the Clinton
administration to express our respect
for the fortitude with which it perse-
vered, and the skill with which it but-
tressed Allied unity and achieved Rus-
sian acquiescence. But victory leaves us with just
as severe a challenge: to avoid being permanently
mired in a corner of the Balkans as the modern
equivalent of the Ottoman and Austrian empires.
The so-called Petersberg plan risks turning into an
open-ended commitment toward ever deeper in-
volvement, casting us in the role of gendarme of a
region of passionate hatreds and where we have
few strategic interests.

Many commentators emphasize the differences between the plan put forward by the Finnish president and ratified by the Yugoslav Parliament, and the Rambouillet proposals in the name of which the bombing was initiated. And there are nuances of some consequence. The NATO forces are entering Kosovo on the basis of a U.N. mandate rather than an agreement between Belgrade and the Atlantic Alliance. Kosovo is explicitly described as a part of Yugoslavia, albeit an autonomous one (Point 5); the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia are affirmed (Point 8). The provision for a referendum at the end of three years has been abandoned, and the initial insistence on complete NATO control has been watered down to some extent by a series of U.N. mandates and the presence of Russian forces.

But even where the peace plan still parallels
the Rambouillet accords it threatens near-perma-
nent American involvement in an endless set of
predictable conflicts and possible guerrilla war.
The turgid language of the accord was designed
to be impenetrable, so that each party could inter-
pret the inevitable ambiguities as favorable to it-
self. This diplomatic device is not without prece-
dent, but it is a special problem when it involves
parties that have refined their volatile passions
for centuries in the crucible of mutual slaughter.
The Petersberg plan provides for four stages of po-
litical evolution: (1) an interim reign over Kosovo
by a designated administrator; (2) an internation-
al civil presence; (3) substantial autonomy for the people of Koso-
vo *within* Yugoslavia, under the aegis of the U.N. Security Coun-
cil; (4) the development of provisional democratic self-governing
institutions.

Every aspect of this scheme is a potential land mine. According to Point 8, the political framework is supposed to take full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. How

can those objectives possibly be reconciled? Rambouillet provided for the occupation of Kosovo by NATO and a referendum on the future of Kosovo at the end of three years. The peace plan stops at autonomy and repeatedly affirms Yugoslav sovereignty. But the KLA fought and suffered for independence, not autonomy. After what its members and the population of Kosovo endured during the ethnic-cleansing campaign, remaining within Serbia will be inconceivable to them. The additional provision of Point 8, for the

Secretary Albright
exults at a refugee
camp in Macedonia

Having fought on the side of the Albanians
resisting them (or perhaps even fighting th

NEWSWEEK JUNE 21, 1999

de

The Kosovo deal could lead to U.S. involvement in an endless series of conflicts—and even guerrilla war
BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

for their autonomy, we may find ourselves
them) over the issue of their independence

"demilitarization of the KLA" by NATO, is even more difficult to imagine happening.

If any of these provisions are to be realized, they must be imposed by American and other Allied military forces. We will be in the ironic position that, having fought on the side of the Albanians for their autonomy, we may find ourselves resisting them (or perhaps even fighting against them) over the issue of their independence. And having gone to war to defend the Albanian popu-

lation against Serbian ethnic cleansing, we may now be obliged to protect the Serbian population against the rage of their Albanian neighbors. Unless we are willing to sustain a near-permanent military occupation, ethnic cleansing of the Serbian population could well be the outcome.

The confusion is magnified by another provision of Point 8 that envisions "negotiations between the parties." But who are these parties? Presumably they are the Serbs and the Albanians. It adds that deadlock "should not delay or disrupt the establishment of self-governing institutions"—a provision that could paradoxically guarantee deadlock. The agreement is silent as to who should shoulder the task of imposing such self-governing institutions—implicitly leaving that responsibility with the United States. Not only are we imperceptibly on the road to replacing the Ottoman and Austrian empires in the Balkans; in time, we may face the same hostility from the native populations that they did.

The projected command arrangements compound the ambiguity. The military forces, in the words of the U.N. resolution, will be substantially NATO's. Additional troops from Russia will be assigned under uncertain command arrangements. To prevent the partition of Kosovo, Russian troops will not be given a separate area—unless they pre-empt the decision by occupying a part of Kosovo unilaterally, as they seemed to be doing last week. Moreover, the role of all these forces is vague and their rules of engagement are defined by the Security Council.

Analogies to Bosnia are misleading. The Dayton agreement ending the Bosnian conflict was negotiated and approved by all the parties. In Kosovo, NATO has imposed an agreement on both sides. In Bosnia, the three armies ended up on homogeneous territories specifically assigned to them by the Dayton accords. In Kosovo, there is no such equivalent solution. Nor are there armies to separate, since Serb forces will presumably have left. NATO's task—to confirm the departure of Serb forces, to disarm the KLA and to protect Kosovo's borders—is likely to bring them into conflict with Albanians seeking to influence events in Kosovo or Macedonia. All this may place our troops squarely in the middle of a civil guerrilla war, posing the same dilemma we encountered in Somalia.

Arrangements for civil administration contain comparable potential conflicts. The enormous tasks of reconstruction will fall to the civil administrator appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General "in consultation with the Security Council" and operating under a mandate established by a U.N. reso-

lution. The administrator will need to organize a police force and oversee the restoration of essential services in a totally devastated country. As indigenous Kosovar institutions come to life, they are likely to challenge the civil administrator's authority in the name of independence. What if the KLA emerges as the police force of the autonomous authority? And, as Serbia recovers, it may challenge—possibly with Russia's backing—the civil administrator in the name of Yugoslav sovereignty.

JUNE 21, 1999 NEWSWEEK

INTERNATIONAL

The situation in Kosovo differs from Bosnia in yet another important respect. Bosnia was, in a way, sui generis. The evolution of Kosovo is bound to have a profound impact on its neighbors. The immediate impact is likely to be on the Albanians in Macedonia, who comprise about a quarter of the population. They are likely to demand, at a minimum, the same status for themselves that the Kosovars are given. And the disintegration of Macedonia could ignite another Balkan explosion. Comparable pressures can be expected from the smaller Albanian minority in Montenegro. As well, there exists a drive toward a greater Albania, encouraged both from Tirana and by émigré Albanians supplying much of the financial muscle.

Aware of these tendencies—and as a sop to Russian and Yugoslav self-respect—the West has conceded Belgrade's sovereignty over Kosovo in order to keep it from emerging as an independent international presence. But the plan cannot possibly work smoothly. Russia and Yugoslavia will have every incentive to affirm Yugoslav sovereignty, while America and NATO cannot indefinitely stand in the way of Albanian self-determination.

In short, if we try to implement the U.N. resolution for any length of time, we will emerge as the permanent party to arcane and bitter Balkan quarrels. It would be far wiser to cut the Gordian knot and concede Kosovar independence as part of an overall Balkan settlement—perhaps including self-determination for each of the three ethnic groups of Bosnia. In such an arrangement, the borders of Kosovo and its neighbors should be guaranteed by NATO or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. As in Bosnia, the international forces would then patrol both sides of these borders for at least a substantial interim period.

Moving the issue to a definite resolution as quickly as possible is all the more important because of the hostility of the international environment. Most nations either supported or tolerated the Dayton accords. This is not the case in Kosovo. Russia may have thrown in the towel on seeking to shape the immediate outcome significantly. But it feels deeply humiliated; Kosovo has become a public symbol of Russia's loss of influence and public degradation by the West. It has no incentive to facilitate the arrangement once it is in place. Rather, Moscow is likely to seek occasions to obstruct it or to oppose elsewhere what it perceives as America's hegemonic tendencies. From the U.S. point of view, the quicker the Kosovo issue is removed from the Russo-American agenda, the better for our long-term relations. And Russia should have no interest in perpetuating a state of affairs in which it can embarrass us but cannot prevail.

The same is true, to a lesser extent, of China, which rejects the unilateral manner in which NATO intervened in what Beijing perceives as the internal matters of Yugoslavia. Indeed, most of the nations of the world will have an incentive to create obstacles to the application of the Rambouillet principles enshrined in the Kosovo agreement. Countries concerned that they may be the subject of unilateral NATO action may distance themselves from us after the dust settles. They may have an incentive to acquire weapons of mass destruction as the surest deterrent to America's conventional superiority. How ironically history repeats its patterns. During the cold war the democracies relied on nuclear weapons to balance an assumed Soviet conventional superiority. In the post-Kosovo period it is the smaller

countries which may turn to weapons of mass destruction in response to America's overwhelming technological edge in conventional weaponry. For all these reasons, it is imperative to undertake a major assessment of how to relate the new foreign policy to an international consensus.

Even the Atlantic Alliance will never be the same after Kosovo. The Clinton administration skillfully held the Alliance together through more than 10 weeks of bombing. But the decision of the European Union's heads of state at Cologne to accelerate a unified European defense and foreign policy reflects deep uneasiness about Europe's relative impotence in face of the imperious American tactics. A serious European effort to build autonomous centers of decision would be far from undesirable provided Europe backs up its new organizations with appropriate resources. But it also requires a new thoughtfulness on both sides of the Atlantic if the vital American interest in close transatlantic cooperation is to survive.

For the foreseeable future, America will have a division and a half of our soldiers on near-permanent sentry duty at the fringes of the Balkans. We should therefore temper triumphalism with some reflection on the need to establish geopolitical priorities. Before we treat Kosovo as the model for a new era of humanitarian diplomacy, we should examine where else either the diplomacy or the strategy might apply. There are some 22 million refugees around the world and scores of ethnic conflicts. To which of them would a comparable mix of force and diplomacy be relevant? Where else could we bomb for 10 weeks without U.S. military casualties, a prohibitive risk of escalation or creating untenable precedents? The demonstration of what democracies can accomplish when aroused will stand us in good stead in the years ahead. But the ultimate legacy of Kosovo will depend on whether our diplomatic endgame matches the display of our power. ■

The Bosnia peacekeeping operation set the precedent for American and Russian troops working cooperatively

> The initial insistence on complete NATO control [in Kosovo] has been watered down to some extent by a series of U.N. mandates and by the presence of Russian forces

50 NEWSWEEK JUNE 21, 1999

EMRIC-AP

Newsweek

June 21, 1999

# As the Kosovo War Fades

Fax Copy

T
HOSE OF US WHO QUESTIONED THE wisdom of the diplomacy preceding the war over Kosovo owe it to the Clinton administration to express our respect for the fortitude with which it persevered, and the skill with which it buttressed Allied unity and achieved Russian acquiescence. But victory leaves us with just as severe a challenge: to avoid being permanently mired in a corner of the Balkans as the modern equivalent of the Ottoman and Austrian empires. The so-called Petersberg plan risks turning into an open-ended commitment toward ever deeper involvement, casting us in the role of gendarme of a region of passionate hatreds and where we have few strategic interests.

But even where the peace plan still parallels the Rambouillet accords it threatens near-permanent American involvement in an endless set of predictable conflicts and possible guerrilla war. The turgid language of the accord was designed to be impenetrable, so that each party could interpret the inevitable ambiguities as favorable to itself. This diplomatic device is not without precedent, but it is a special problem when it involves parties that have refined their volatile passions for centuries in the crucible of mutual slaughter. The Petersberg plan provides for four stages of political evolution: (1) an interim reign over Kosovo by a designated administrator; (2) an internation-

al and pre-Point 8, for the people of Kosovo *within* Yugoslavia, under the aegis of the U.N. Security Council; (4) the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions.

Every aspect of this scheme is a potential land mine. According to Point 8, the political framework is supposed to take full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. How can those objectives possibly be reconciled? Rambouillet provided for the occupation of Kosovo by NATO and a referendum on the future of Kosovo at the end of three years. The peace plan stops at autonomy and repeatedly affirms Yugoslav sovereignty. But the KLA fought and suffered for independence, not autonomy. After what its members and the population of Kosovo endured during the ethnic-cleansing campaign, remaining within Serbia will be inconceivable to them. The additional provision of Point 8, for the "demilitarization of the KLA" by NATO, is even more difficult to imagine happening.

If any of these provisions are to be realized, they must be imposed by American and other Allied military forces. We will be in the ironic position that, having fought on the side of the Albanians for their autonomy, we may find ourselves resisting them (or perhaps even fighting against them) over the issue of their independence. And having gone to war to defend the Albanian population against Serbian ethnic cleansing, we may now be obliged to protect the Serbian population against the rage of their Albanian neighbors. Unless we are willing to sustain a near-permanent military occupation, ethnic cleansing of the Serbian population could well be the outcome.

(continued)

Newsweek

June 21, 1999

# As the (G)reat

T
HOSE OF US WHO QUESTIONED T
wisdom of the diplomacy preceding
war over Kosovo owe it to the Clinton
administration to express our respect
for the fortitude with which it perse-
vered, and the skill with which it but-
tressed Allied unity and achieved Rus-
sian acquiescence. But victory leaves us with just
as severe a challenge: to avoid being permanently
mired in a corner of the Balkans as the modern
equivalent of the Ottoman and Austrian empires.
The so-called Petersberg plan risks turning into an
open-ended commitment toward ever deeper in-
volvement, casting us in the role of gendarme of a
region of passionate hatreds and where we have
few strategic interests.

al for the people of Kosovo within Yugoslavia, under the auspices of the U.N. Security Council; (4) the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions.

If any of these provisions are to be realized, they must be im-
posed by American and other Allied military forces. We will be in
the ironic position that, having fought on the side of the Albani-ns for their autonomy, we may find ourselves resisting them (or
perhaps even fighting against them) over the issue of their inde-
pendence. And having gone to war to defend the Albanian popu-
lation against Serbian ethnic cleansing, we may
now be obliged to protect the Serbian population
against the rage of their Albanian neighbors. Un-
less we are willing to sustain a near-permanent
military occupation, ethnic cleansing of the Ser-
bian population could well be the outcome.

(continued)

Newsweek

June 21, 1999

# As the Cheers Fade

al civil presence; (3) substantial autonomy for the people of Kosovo *within* Yugoslavia, under the aegis of the U.N. Security Council; (4) the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions.

(continued)

Arrangements for civil administration contain comparable potential conflicts. The enormous tasks of reconstruction will fall to the civil administrator appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General "in consultation with the Security Council" and operating under a mandate established by a U.N. resolution. The administrator will need to organize a police force and oversee the restoration of essential services in a totally devastated country. As indigenous Kosovar institutions come to life, they are likely to challenge the civil administrator's authority in the name of independence. What if the KLA emerges as the police force of the autonomous authority? And, as Serbia recovers, it may challenge—possibly with Russia's backing—the civil administrator in the name of Yugoslav sovereignty.

(continued)

(continued)

JUN 11 '99 11:22AM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

P.4

[Y]

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT: PG:

Many commentators emphasize the differences between the plan put forward by the Finnish president and ratified by the Yugoslav parliament, and the Rambouillet proposals in the name of which the bombing was initiated. And there are nuances of some consequence. The NATO forces are entering Kosovo on the basis of a UN mandate rather than an agreement between Belgrade and the Atlantic Alliance. Kosovo is explicitly described as a part of Yugoslavia, albeit an autonomous one (Article 5); the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia are affirmed (Article 8). The provision for a referendum at the end of three years has been abandoned, and the initial insistence on complete NATO control has been watered down to some extent by a series of UN mandates and the presence of Russian forces.

But even where the peace plan still parallels the Rambouillet accords it threatens near permanent American involvement in an endless set of predictable conflicts and possible guerrilla war. The turgid language of the accord was designed to be impenetrable, so that each party could interpret the inevitable ambiguities as favorable to itself. This

IN0425 Page 2 of 11

P.5

[Y]

IN0425 **kissinger**

DEPT: PG:

diplomatic device is not without precedent, but it is
a special problem when it involves parties that have
refined their volatile passions for centuries in the
crucible of mutual slaughter. The Petersberg plan
provides for four stages of political evolution: (1) an
interim reign over Kosovo by a designated admin-
istrator; (2) an international civil presence; (3) sub-
stantial autonomy for the people of Kosovo *within* Yugoslavia, un-
der the aegis of the UN Security Council; (4) the development of
provisional democratic self-governing institutions.

Every aspect of this scheme is a potential land mine. According
to Article 8, the political framework is supposed to take full ac-
count of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

How can those objectives possibly be reconciled? Rambouillet pro-

-------- End of column --------

vided for the occupation of Kosovo by NATO and a referendum on
the future of Kosovo at the end of three years. The peace plan stops
at autonomy and repeatedly affirms Yugoslav sovereignty. But the
KLA fought and suffered for independence, not autonomy. After
what its members and the population of Kosovo endured during
the ethnic cleansing campaign, remaining within Serbia will be in-
conceivable to them. The additional provision of Article 8, for the
"demilitarization of the KLA" by NATO, is even more difficult to

imagine happening.

IN0425 Page 3 of 11

JUN 11 '99 11:23AM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

P.6

[Y]

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT: PG:

If any of these provisions are to be realized, they must be im-
posed by American and other Allied military forces. We will be in
the ironic position that, having fought on the side of the Albanians
for their autonomy, we may find ourselves resisting them (or per-
haps even fighting against them) over the issue of their indepen-
dence. And having gone to war to defend the Albanian population
against Serbian ethnic cleansing, we may now be obliged to protect
-------- End of column --------

the Serbian population against the rage of their Al-
banian neighbors. Unless we are willing to sustain a
near permanent military occupation, ethnic cleans-
ing of the Serbian population could well be the out-
come.

The confusion is magnified by another provision
of Article 8 that envisions "negotiations between the
parties." But who are these parties? Presumably
they are the Serbs and the Albanians. It adds that
"deadlock should not delay or disrupt the establish-
ment of self-governing institutions"—a provision
that could paradoxically guarantee deadlock. The
agreement is silent as to who should shoulder the
task of imposing such self-governing institutions—
implicitly leaving that responsibility with _presumably_ the Unit-
ed States. Not only are we imperceptibly on the
road to replacing the Ottoman and Austrian em-
pires in the Balkans; in time, we may face the same
hostility from the native populations that they did.

IN0425 Page 4 of 11

P.7

[Y]

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

The projected command arrangements com-
pound the ambiguity. The military forces, in the
words of the UN resolution, will be substantially
NATO's. Additional troops from Russia will be as-
signed under uncertain
command arrangements. To prevent the partition of
Kosovo, Russian troops will not be given a separate
area—unless they preempt the decision by occupying
a part of Kosovo unilaterally, as they seemed to
be doing last week. Moreover, the role of all these
forces is vague and their rules of engagement defined by the Security Council.

Analogies to Bosnia are misleading. The Dayton
agreement ending the Bosnian conflict was negoti-
ated and approved by all the parties. In Kosovo,
NATO has imposed an agreement on both sides. In
Bosnia, the three armies ended up on homoge-
neous territories specifically assigned to them by
the Dayton accords. In Kosovo, there is no such
equivalent solution. Nor are there armies to sepa-
rate, since Serb forces will presumably have left.
NATO's task—to confirm the departure of Serb
forces, to disarm the KLA and to protect Kosovo's
borders—is likely to bring them into conflict with
Albanians seeking to influence events in Kosovo or
Macedonia. All this may place our troops squarely

IN0425 Page 5 of 11

P.8

[Y]

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

Arrangements for civil administration contain
comparable potential conflicts. The enormous
tasks of reconstruction will fall to the civil adminis-
trator appointed by the UN Secretary General "in
consultation with the Security Council" and operat-
ing under a charter established by a UN resolution.
The administrator will need to organize a police
force and oversee the restoration of essential scr-
vices in a totally devastated country. As indigenous Kosovar insti-
tutions come to life, they are likely to challenge the civil adminis-
trator's authority in the name of independence. What if the KLA
emerges as the police force of the autonomous authority? And, as
Serbia recovers, it may challenge—possibly with Russia's back-
ing—the civil administrator in the name of Yugoslav sovereignty.

The situation in Kosovo differs from Bosnia in yet another im-
portant respect. Bosnia was, in a way, sui generis. The evolution of
-------- End of column --------

Kosovo is bound to have a profound impact on its neighbors. The
immediate impact is likely to be on the Albanians in Macedonia,
who comprise about a third of the population. They are likely to
demand, at a minimum, the same status for themselves that the
Kosovars are given achieve. And the disintegration of Macedonia could ig-
nite another Balkan explosion. Comparable pressures can be ex-
pected from the somewhat smaller Albanian minority in Montene-
gro. As well, there exists a drive toward a greater Albania,

IN0425 Page 6 of 11

P.9

[Y]

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

encouraged both from Tirane and by emigre Albanians supplying
much of the financial muscle.

Aware of these tendencies—and as a sop to Russian and Yugo-
goslav self-respect—the West has conceded Belgrade's sovereignty
over Kosovo in order to keep it from emerging as an independent
international presence. But the
plan cannot possibly work
smoothly. Russia and Yugo-
goslavia will have every incen-
tive to affirm Yugoslav sover-
eignty, while _and_ America and
NATO cannot indefinitely
stand in the way of Albanian
self-determination.

In short, if we try to carry out the UN resolution, literally,
we will emerge as the permanent arbiter of arcane and bitter
Balkan quarrels. It would
be far wiser to cut the Gordian
knot and concede Kosovar independence as part of an overall
Balkan settlement—perhaps
including self-determination
for each of the three ethnic
groups of Bosnia. In such an
arrangement, the borders of

for any length of time
a
party to

IN0425

Page 7 of 11

JUN 11 '99 11:24AM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

P.11

[Y]

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

The same is true, to a lesser extent, of China, which rejects the unilateral manner in which _that_ NATO intervened in what Beijing _it_ perceives as the internal matters of Yugoslavia. Indeed, most of the

------- End of column -------

nations of the world will have an incentive to create obstacles to the application of the Rambouillet principles _of Rambouillet as enshrined in the Kosovo agreement_. Countries concerned that they may be the subject of unilateral NATO action may distance themselves from us after the dust settles. They may have an incentive to acquire weapons of mass destruction as the surest deterrent to America's conventional superiority. How ironically history repeats its patterns. During the Cold War the democracies relied on nuclear weapons to balance an assumed Soviet conventional superiority. In the post-Kosovo period it is the smaller countries which may turn to weapons of mass destruction in response to America's overwhelming technological edge in conventional weaponry. For all these reasons, it is imperative to undertake a major assessment of how to relate the new foreign policy to an international consensus.

Even the Atlantic Alliance will never be the same after Kosovo. The Clinton Administration skillfully held the Alliance together through more than ten weeks of bombing, But the decision of the European Union's heads of state at

IN0425 Page 9 of 11

P. 12

[Y]

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

Cologne to accelerate a unified
European defense and foreign
policy reflects deep uneasiness
about Europe's relative impo-
tence in face of the imperious
American tactics. A serious
European effort to build au-
tonomous centers of decision
would be far from undesirable
provided Europe backs up its
new organizations with appro-
priate resources. But it also re-
quires a new thoughtfulness on
both sides of the Atlantic if the
vital American interest in close
trans-Atlantic cooperation is to
survive.

For the foreseeable future,
America will have a division
and a half of our soldiers on
near permanent sentry duty at
the fringes of the Balkans. We
should therefore temper tri-
umphalism with some reflec-
tion on the need to establish
geopolitical priorities. Before
we treat Kosovo as the model for a new era of humanitarian diplo-

IN0425 Page 10 of 11

⊕

P.13

[Y]

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

macy, we should examine where else either the diplomacy or the
strategy might apply. There are some twenty-two million refugees
around the world and scores of ethnic conflicts. To which of them
would a comparable mix of force and diplomacy be relevant?

Where else could we bomb for ten weeks without casualties, a pro-
hibitive risk of escalation or creating untenable precedents? The
demonstration of what democracies can accomplish when aroused
will stand us in good stead in the years ahead. But the ultimate
legacy of Kosovo will depend on whether our diplomatic endgame
matches the display of our power.

IN0425 Page 11 of 11

11/06 '99 21:59 FAX 86 10 65053170

CWH HORIZON CLUB

☑ 004

JUN-10-1999 20:38

IND425 kioginger

ter. The Petersburg plan provides for four
stages of political evolution: (1) an interim
reign over administration for Kosovo by a designated adminis-
trator; (2) an international civil presence;
(3) substantial autonomy for the people of
Kosovo within Yugoslavia, under the aegis
of the UN Security Council; (4) the develop-
ment of provisional democratic self-govern-
ing institutions.

Every aspect of this scheme is a potential
land mine. According to Article 8, the politi-
cal framework is supposed to take full
account of the Rambouillet accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. How can those objectives possi-
bly be reconciled? Rambouillet provided for
the occupation of Kosovo by NATO and a
referendum on the future of Kosovo at the
end of three years. The peace plan stops at
autonomy and repeatedly affirms Yugoslav
sovereignty. But the KLA (the military arm of the Kosovo Albanian population) fought and sub-
fered for independence, not autonomy.

After what its members and the population
of Kosovo endured during the ethnic cleans-
ing campaign, remaining within Serbia will
End of column

DBPT:

PG:

P.05/14

[Y]

IND425 Page 3 of 12

S.d

JUN 10 '99 06:25PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

CWH HORIZON CLUB

☑ 005

JUN-10-1999 20:38

P.06/14

[Y]

IN0425 kissinger
be inconceivable to them. The additional
provision of Article 8, for the "demilitariza-
tion of the KLA" by NATO, is even more dif-
ficult to imagine happening.

If any of these provisions are to be real-
ized, they must be imposed by American
and other Allied military forces. We will be
in the ironical position that, having fought on
the side of the Albanians for their autonomy,
we may find ourselves resisting them (or
perhaps even fighting against them) on the
issue of their independence. And having
gone to war to defend the Albanian popula-
tion against Serbian ethnic cleansing, we
may now be obliged to protect the Serbian
population against the rage of their
Albanian neighbors. Unless we are willing
to sustain a near permanent military

stay in occupation and use forces nearly permanently, ethnic cleansing of the Serbian population could well be the likely outcome.

The confusion is magnified by another
provision of Article 8 that envisions "negoti-
ations between the parties." But who are
these parties? Presumably they are the Serbs

and the Albanians. That this guarantees a deadlock is revealed by the provision It adds that "deadlock
should not delay or disrupt the establish-
ment of self-governing institutions"—a pro-

DEPT: DC:

IN0425 Page 4 of 12

9' d

JUN 10 '99 86:2PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

CWH HORIZON CLUB

☑007

JUN-10-1999 20:39

P.08/14

[Y]

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT: PG:

Dayton accords. In Kosovo, there is no such
equivalent solution. Nor are there armies to
separate, since Serb forces will presumably
have left. NATO's The task— of NATO forces task will be to confirm the
departure of Serb forces, to disarm the KLA
and to protect Kosovo's borders—is a task likely to
bring them into conflict with Albanians
seeking to influence events in Kosovo or
Macedonia.
Alfonspässer

The enormous tasks of reconstruction
and rebuilding civil society will fall to the civil administrator appointed
by the UN Secretary General "in consulta-
tion with the Security Council" and operat-
ing under a charter established by a UN res-
olution. Whatever the charter. The administrator will need to
organize a police force and oversee the
restoration of essential services in a totally
devastated country. As Kosovar indigenous Kosovar
institutions come to life, they are likely to
End of column
challenge the civil administrator's authority
in the name of Kosovar independence. What if the
KLA emerges as the police force of the
autonomous authority? And, as Serbia
recovers, it may challenge—possibly with
Russia's backing backed by Russia—the civil administrator in
the name of Yugoslav sovereignty.

IN0425

8'd

JUN 10 '99 06:26PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

11/06 '99 21:59

FAX 86 10 65053170

CWH HORIZON CLUB

☑011

JUN-10-1999 20:40

P.12/14

[Y]

IN0425 kiseinger

DEPT: PG:

During the Cold War the democracies relied on nuclear weapons to balance an assumed Soviet conventional superiority. The same may occur in the post-Kosovo period in response to offset America's overwhelming technological edge in conventional weaponry.

Even the Atlantic Alliance will never be the same after Kosovo. The Clinton Administration skillfully held the Alliance together through more than ten weeks of bombing, But the decision of the European Union's heads of state at Cologne to accelerate a unified European defense and foreign policy reflects deep uneasiness about Europe's relative impotence in face of the imperious American tactics. A serious European effort to build autonomous centers of decision would be far from undesir-

IN0425

P.12

JUN 10 '99 06:22PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

JUN-10-1999 20:40

CWH HORIZON CLUB

012

P. 13/14

[Y]

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

able provided Europe backs up its new organizations with appropriate resources. But it also requires a new thoughtfulness on both sides of the Atlantic if the vital American interest in of close trans-Atlantic cooperation is to survive.

For the foreseeable future, America will have a division and a half of our soldiers military on near permanent sentry duty at the fringes of the Balkans. We should therefore temper triumphalism with some reflection on the need to establish geopolitical priorities.

Before we treat Kosovo as the model for a new era of humanitarian diplomacy, we should examine where else either the diplomacy or the strategy might apply. There are some twenty-two million refugees around the world and scores of ethnic conflicts. To which of them would a comparable mix of force and diplomacy be relevant? Where else could we bomb for ten weeks without casualties, a prohibitive risk of escalation or creating untenable precedents for other countries' pressures? The demon-

------- End of column -------

stration of what democracies can accomplish when aroused will stand us them in good stead in the years ahead. But the its ultimate

IN0425

ETd

EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION 06:2PM 06/10/99

JUN 10 1999

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

the Rambouillet proposals in the name of
which the bombing was initiated. And there
are nuances of some consequence. The
NATO forces are entering Kosovo on the
basis of a UN mandate rather than of an agree-
ment between Belgrade and the Atlantic
Alliance. Kosovo is explicitly described as a
part of Yugoslavia, albeit an autonomous
one (Article 5); the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of Yugoslavia are affirmed
(Article 8). The provision for a referendum
at the end of three years has been aban-
doned, and the The initial insistence on com-
plete NATO control has been watered
down.

But at its *the core of the problem is the arrangements in the peace plan* still parallels
*that parallel* the Rambouillet accords in ways that

For these threaten near permanent American involve-
ment in an endless set of predictable con-
flicts. The turgid language of the accord *peace plan* was
designed to be impenetrable, so that each
party could interpret the inevitable ambigu-
ities as *in a way* favorable to itself *it*. This diplomatic
device is not without precedent, but it is a
special problem when it involves parties
that have refined their volatile passions for
centuries in the crucible of mutual slaugh-

IN0425 Page 2 of 12

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

Every aspect of this scheme is a potential
land mine. According to Article 8, the politi-
cal framework is supposed to take full
account of the Rambouillet accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. How can those objectives possi-
bly be reconciled? Rambouillet provided for
the occupation of Kosovo by NATO and a
referendum on the future of Kosovo at the
end of three years. The peace plan stops at
autonomy and repeatedly affirms Yugoslav

sovereignty. But the KLA (the military arm of the Kosovo Albanian population) fought and suf-
fered for independence, not autonomy.

After what its members and the population
of Kosovo endured during the ethnic cleans-
ing campaign, remaining within Serbia will
-------- End of column --------

IN0425

Page 3 of 12

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

be inconceivable to them. The additional
provision of Article 8, for the "demilitariza-
tion of the KLA" by NATO, is even more dif-
ficult to imagine happening.

stay in occupation and use force nearly permanently, ethnic cleansing of the Serbian
population could well be <u>is the likely outcome.</u>

IN0425

[Lc]

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

Bosnia was, in a way, sui generis. The evolu-
tion of Kosovo is bound to have a profound
impact on its neighbors. The immediate
impact is likely to be on the Albanians in

Macedonia, who comprise _comprising_ about a third of
the population. They are likely to demand,
at a minimum, the same _a status for them-

Montenegro. As well, _and there exists as well_ a drive
toward a greater Albania, encouraged both
from Tirane and by emigre Albanians sup-
plying much of the financial muscle.

Aware of these tendencies—and as a sop
to Russian and Yugoslav self-respect—the
West has conceded Belgrade's _Yugoslav_ sovereignty
over Kosovo in order to keep it _the Kosovars_ from emerg-
ing as an independent international pres-
ence. But the plan cannot possibly work
smoothly. Russia and Yugoslavia will have
every incentive to affirm Yugoslav sover-
eignty and America and NATO cannot

IN0425

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

During the Cold War the democracies relied
on nuclear weapons to balance an assumed
Soviet conventional superiority. The same
may occur in the post-Kosovo period in
response to offset America's overwhelming tech-
nological edge in conventional weaponry.

For all these reasons, it is imperative to
undertake a major assessment of how to
relate the new foreign policy to an interna-
tional consensus.

Even the Atlantic Alliance will never be
the same after Kosovo. The Clinton
Administration skillfully held the Alliance
together through more than ten weeks of
bombing, But the decision of the European
Union's heads of state at Cologne to acceler-
ate a unified European defense and foreign
policy reflects deep uneasiness about
Europe's relative impotence in face of the
imperious American tactics. A serious
European effort to build autonomous cen-
ters of decision would be far from undesir-

IN0425

IN0425 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

able provided Europe backs up its new orga-
nizations with appropriate resources. But it
also requires a new thoughtfulness on both
sides of the Atlantic if the vital American
interest in of close trans-Atlantic cooperation
is to survive.

Before we treat Kosovo as the model for a
new era of humanitarian diplomacy, we
should examine where else either the diplo-
macy or the strategy might apply. There are
some twenty-two million refugees around
the world and scores of ethnic conflicts. To
which of them would a comparable mix of
force and diplomacy be relevant? Where else
could we bomb for ten weeks without casu-
alties, a prohibitive risk of escalation or cre-
ating untenable precedents for other countries' pressures? The demon-

--------- End of column ---------

stration of what democracies can accom-
plish when aroused will stand us them in good
stead in the years ahead. But the its ultimate

IN0425

1981 WORDS

KISSINGER NEWSWEEK ARTICLE 6/10/99 II

Those of us who questioned the wisdom of the diplomacy preceding the war over Kosovo owe it to the Clinton Administration to express our respect for the fortitude with which it persevered, and the skill with which it buttressed Allied unity and achieved Russian acquiescence. But victory leaves us with the challenge to avoid being permanently mired in a corner of the Balkans as successors of the vanished Ottoman and Austrian empires.

The obvious relief of the foreign ministers of the G-8 when they agreed on June 8 on the United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the international presence on Kosovo,

[Y]

2
reflected how close-run the operation had been in terms of
domestic support and Allied cohesion. But the plan itself risks
turning into an open-ended commitment towards ever deeper
involvement, casting us in the role of gendarme of a region of
passionate hatreds and where we have few strategic interests.

Many commentators emphasize the differences between the so-
called Petersburg plan put forward by the Finnish president and
ratified by the Yugoslav parliament, and the Rambouillet
proposals in the name of which the bombing was initiated. And
there are nuances of some consequence. The NATO forces are
entering Kosovo on the basis of a UN mandate rather than of an
agreement between Belgrade and the Atlantic Alliance; Kosovo is
explicitly described (Article 5) as a part of Yugoslavia (albeit
an autonomous one); the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
Yugoslavia are affirmed (Article 8); the provision for a
referendum at the end of three years has been abandoned. The

[Y]

3

initial insistence on complete NATO control has been watered
down.

But the core of the problem is the arrangements in the peace
plan that parallel the Rambouillet accords. For these threaten
near permanent American involvement in an endless set of
predictable conflicts.

The turgid language of the peace plan was designed to be
impenetrable so that each party could interpret the inevitable
ambiguities in a way favorable to it. This diplomatic device is
not without precedent, but it is a special problem when it
involves parties that have refined their volatile passions for
centuries in the crucible of mutual slaughter.

The Petersburg plan provides for four stages of political
evolution: (1) an interim administration for Kosovo by a
designated administrator; (2) an international civil presence;
(3) substantial autonomy for the people of Kosovo *within*

[Y]

4

Yugoslavia, under the aegis of the UN Security Council; (4) the
development of provisional democratic self-governing
institutions.

According to Article 8, the political framework is supposed to
take full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles
of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. How can those objectives possibly be reconciled?
Rambouillet provided for the occupation of Kosovo by NATO and a
referendum on the future of Kosovo at the end of three years. The
peace plan stops at autonomy and repeatedly affirms Yugoslav
sovereignty. But the KLA (the military arm of the Kosovo Albanian
population) fought and suffered for independence, not autonomy.

After what its members and the population of Kosovo endured
during the ethnic cleansing campaign, remaining within Serbia
will be inconceivable to them. The additional provision of

[Y]

5

If any of these provisions are to be realized, they must be imposed by American and other Allied military forces. We will be in the ironical position that, having fought on the side of the Albanians for their autonomy, we may find ourselves resisting them (or perhaps even fighting against them) on the issue of their independence. And having gone to war to defend the Albanian population against Serbian ethnic cleansing, we may now be obliged to protect the Serbian population against the rage of their Albanian neighbors. Unless we are willing to stay in occupation and use force nearly permanently, ethnic cleansing of the Serbian population is the likely outcome.

The confusion is magnified by another provision of Article 8 that envisions "negotiations between the parties." But who are these parties? Presumably they are the Serbs and the Albanians,

[Y]

6

That this guarantees a deadlock is revealed by the provision that "deadlock should not delay or disrupt the establishment of self-governing institutions." The agreement is silent as to on whose shoulders the task of imposing such self-governing institutions would fall - presumably ours. Imperceptibly, we are on the road to replacing the Ottoman and Austrian empires in the Balkans. In time, [we will be] facing the same hostility from the subject populations that those empires did.

The projected command arrangements compound the ambiguity. The military forces, in the words of the UN resolution, will be substantially Nato's. Additional troops from Russia will be assigned with ambiguous command arrangements. However, to prevent the partition of Kosovo, Russian troops will not be given a contiguous area. But the role of all these forces is vague and their rules of engagement are defined in the first instance by the Security Council.

[Y]

7

Analogies to Bosnia are misleading. The Dayton agreement ending the Bosnian conflict was negotiated and approved by all the parties. In Kosovo, NATO has imposed an agreement on both parties. In Bosnia, the three armies of the ethnic contenders ended up on homogeneous territories specifically assigned to them by the Dayton accords. In Kosovo, there is no such equivalent. Nor are there armies to separate since Serb forces will presumably have left. The NATO forces' task will be to confirm the departure of Serb forces, to disarm the KLA and protect Kosovo's borders - a task likely to bring them into conflict with Albanians seeking to influence events in Kosovo or Macedonia.

The enormous tasks of reconstruction and rebuilding civil society will fall to the civil administrator appointed by the UN Secretary General "in consultation with the Security Council" and operating under a charter established by a UN resolution.

Whatever the charter, the administrator will need to organize a

[Y]

8

police force and oversee the restoration of essential services in
a totally devastated country. As Kosovar indigenous institutions
come to life, they are likely to challenge the civil
administrator's authority in the name of Kosovar independence.
What if the KLA emerges as the police force of the autonomous
authority? And, as Serbia recovers, it may challenge - backed by
Russia - the civil administrator in the name of Yugoslav
sovereignty.

The situation in Kosovo differs from Bosnia in yet another
important respect. Bosnia was, in a way, sui generis. The
evolution of Kosovo is bound to have a profound impact on its
neighbors. The immediate impact is likely to be on the Albanians
in Macedonia - comprising about a third of the population. They
are likely to demand, at a minimum, a status for themselves
analogous to that of the Kosovars. And the disintegration of
Macedonia could ignite another Balkan explosion. Comparable

[Y]

9

pressures can be expected from the somewhat smaller Albanian minority in Montenegro. And there exists as well a drive toward a greater Albania, encouraged both from Tirane and by emigre Albanians supplying much of the financial muscle.

Aware of these tendencies - and as a sop to Russian and Yugoslav self-respect - the West has conceded Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo in order to keep the Kosovars from emerging as an independent international presence. But the plan cannot possibly work smoothly. Russia and Yugoslavia will have every incentive to affirm Yugoslav sovereignty and America and NATO cannot indefinitely stand in the way of Albanian self-determination. To do so, it will place our troops squarely in the middle of a low-level but intense civil war that may repeat the dilemmas of Somalia.

If we try to operate the system defined by the compromise in the UN resolution literally, we will emerge as the permanent

[Y]

10

arbiter of arcane and bitter Balkan quarrels. It would be far
wiser to cut the Gordian knot and concede Kosovar independence as
part of an overall Balkan settlement - perhaps including Bosnia.

In such an arrangement, the borders of Kosovo's neighbors should
be guaranteed by NATO or the OSC_ and Kosovo would renounce any
attempt at expansion. The international forces would then patrol,
as in Bosnia, both sides of these borders for at least a
substantial interim period.

Moving the issue to some definite solution as quickly as
possible is all the more important because not only the local but
the international environment is less hospitable to the Kosovo
outcome than to that in Bosnia. Most nations were either
acquiescent or supportive of the Dayton accords. This is not the
case in Kosovo. Russia may have thrown in the towel on seeking to
shape the immediate outcome significantly. But it feels deeply
humiliated; Kosovo has become a public symbol of Russia's loss of

[Y]

11

influence and public degradation by the West. It has no incentive to facilitate the arrangement once it is in place. Rather, it is likely to seek occasions to obstruct it or to reduce elsewhere what it perceives as America's hegemonic tendencies. From the American point of view, the quicker the issue is removed from the Russo-American agenda, the better for our long-term relations.

And Russia should have no interest to perpetuate a state of affairs in which it can embarrass us but cannot prevail.

The same is true, if to a lesser extent, of China, which rejects the unilateral manner of NATO's military intervention in what it treats as the internal matters of Yugoslavia. Indeed, most of the nations of the world will have an incentive to create obstacles to the application of the principles of Rambouillet as enshrined in the Kosovo agreement. Countries concerned that they may be the subject of unilateral NATO - or other - action may distance themselves from us after the dust settles. They may have

[Y]

12

an incentive to acquire weapons of mass destruction as the surest deterrent to America's conventional superiority. How ironically history repeats its patterns. During the Cold War the democracies relied on nuclear weapons to balance an assumed Soviet conventional superiority. The same may occur in the post-Kosovo period to offset America's overwhelming technological edge in conventional weaponry. For all these reasons, it is imperative to undertake a major assessment of how to relate the new foreign policy to an international consensus.

[Y]

13

A serious European effort to build autonomous centers of
decision would be far from undesirable provided Europe backs up
its new organizations with appropriate resources. But it also
requires a new thoughtfulness on both sides of the Atlantic if
the vital American interest of close trans-Atlantic cooperation
is to survive.

For the foreseeable future, America will have a division and
a half of our military on near permanent sentry duty at the
fringes of the Balkans. We should therefore temper triumphalism
with some reflection on the need to establish geopolitical
priorities. Before we treat Kosovo as the model for a new era of
humanitarian diplomacy, we should examine where else either the
diplomacy or the strategy might apply. There are some twenty-two
million refugees around the world and scores of ethnic conflicts.
To which of them would a comparable mix of force and diplomacy be
relevant? Where else could we bomb for ten weeks without

[Y]

14

casualties, a prohibitive risk of escalation or creating precedents for other countries' pressures? The demonstration of what democracies can accomplish when aroused will stand them in good stead in the years ahead. But its ultimate import will depend on whether our diplomatic endgame matches the display of our power.

JUN-10-99 THU 08:56

GOLDHAMMER

FAX NO. 5617450358

5

provision for a referendum at the end of three years has been
abandoned. The initial initiative on complete NATO control has been noticed elsewhere.

The turgid language of the peace plan was designed to be
impenetrable so that each party could interpret the inevitable
ambiguities in a way favorable to it. This diplomatic device is
not without precedent, but it is a special problem when it
involves parties that have refined their volatile passions for
centuries in the crucible of mutual slaughter. It provides for
four stages of political evolution: (1) an interim administration
for Kosovo by a designated administrator; (2) an international
civil presence; (3) substantial autonomy for the people of Kosovo
within Yugoslavia, under the aegis of the UN Security Council.

[Y]

JUN-10-99 THU 08:56

GOLDHAMMER

FAX NO. 5617450358

P. 07

6

Every aspect of this scheme is a land mine. According to Article 8, the political framework is supposed to take full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. How can those objectives possibly be reconciled?

Rambouillet provided for the occupation of Kosovo by NATO and a referendum on the future of Kosovo and repeatedly affirms the independence of the autonomous part of the KLA (the military arm of the Kosovo Albanian population) fought and suffered for independence, not autonomy.

After what its members have endured during the ethnic cleansing campaign, remaining within Serbia will be inconceivable to them.

The additional provision of Article 8, for the "demilitarization of the KLA" by NATO, is even more remote from reality. The KLA is not likely to give up its arms.

007

CWH HORIZON CLUB

11/06. 99 02:30 FAX 86 10 65053170

JUN-10-99 THU 08:57

GOLDHAMMER

FAX NO. 5817450358

specifically assigned to them by the Dayton accords. In Kosovo, there is no such equivalent. Nor are there armies to separate since Serb forces will presumably have left. The NATO forces' task will be to disarm the KLA and protect Kosovo's borders - a task likely to bring them into conflict with Albanians seeking to influence events in Kosovo or Macedonia.

Whatever the charter, the administrator will need to organize a police force and oversee the restoration of essential services in a totally devastated country. As Kosovar indigenous institutions come to life, they are likely to challenge the civil administrator's authority in the name of Kosovar independence.

0100

CWH HORIZON CLUB

11/06.99 02:30 FAX 86 10 65053170