MR. PALMER: Dr. Kissinger, after all the years of working for some kind of a detente, working with SALT, trying to form some relationship of co-existence between the United States and Moscow, how do you view the situation now? Is detente dead? Are we really going back to the 1950s and the Cold War?

DR. KISSINGER: I think it is a mistake to try to encapsulate our relationship with the Soviet Union in one word, either "Cold War" or "detente." We have two seemingly contradictory necessities: One is to prevent Soviet expansionism, either directly or by proxy. The second is to explore the possibilities of peaceful co-existence in a world in which they and we have the capability of destroying mankind. Those necessities do not disappear, whatever the immediate tensions may be. Whenever we emphasize one of these elements to the detriment of the other, we pay a heavy price.

I believe that in recent years we have overlooked Soviet expansionism in Ethiopia through proxies on the Arabian Peninsula and in the first coup in Afghanistan. We are now paying the price for it, but I think, it would be a mistake to try to say we are now in a Cold War situation again.

We have to get a strategy to prevent further Soviet expansion, and we have to be ready for it down the road when real possibilities for negotiations exist, to explore those without illusion and without sentimentality.

MR. PALMER: So you don't feel that detente is necessarily dead at this point?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the basic imperatives of American foreign policy continue along both of those tracks. At this moment, our necessity is to build strength, to restore confidence, and to make clear that the United States will not permit an overturning of the international balance of power without organizing resistance. We must keep open, also, and we must begin thinking about it now, what we want to negotiate about when that possibility comes along again, so that we are not in an endless civil war in this country between those who want to emphasize only detente and those who want to emphasize only military programs.

MR. PALMER: Dr. Kissinger, there have been some published reports at least that perhaps Soviet President Brezhnev is not completely in control any more of Soviet foreign policy. Perhaps some of the generals or other advisers had fostered the idea of this invasion of Afghanistan upon him. Do you subscribe to that idea?

DR. KISSINGER: No. If you look at the literature about the Soviet Union over a generation now, there is always supposed

4

to be a moderate faction and a hard-line faction, and the moderate faction is always being involved as needing concessions on our part so that the hawks don't take over. No one has ever seen any evidence of this. Of course, Brezhnev's physical condition is such that it is unlikely that he is working 10 hours a day, but that had been the case for several years, and I would be absolutely astonished [if] and I see no evidence that there was division in the Soviet leadership or certainly that Brezhnev was overruled.

**MR. MONROE:** Dr. Kissinger, many people feel the hostage crisis in Iran may be playing into Communist hands and maybe to the disadvantage of both countries, Iran and the United States. Wouldn't the national interest of the United States have been better served if President Carter had rejected the advice he got from you and David Rockefeller and kept the Shah out of this country?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I don't suppose that President Carter had any reason to believe that the admission of the Shah would lead to a crisis of the length we are now facing. Secondly, those decisions have to be made by the President of the United States in the light of all of the circumstances, and all we do could do as private citizens is to put before him the medical condition of the Shah. The president had to make the ultimate decision in the light of the overall circumstances.

**MR. MONROE:** In hindsight, would we not have been better off making another decision?

**DR. KISSINGER:** No, I think the president was right in making the decision. Saying it was his decision to make doesn't mean I disagree with the decision, even in retrospect. It was the correct decision, and we can not have reached the point where the kidnapping or the holding as hostage of 50 Americans can make us give up the settled policy of this country, especially toward friends of 37 years.

**MR. MONROE:** Would you have handled the Iranian crisis any differently from the way the president is handling it?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I went through enough crises when I was in office to know there is only one man who can handle it, and that is the president and his principal advisers; therefore, no outsider should give tactical advice while a crisis is going on, or, for that matter, afterwards.

**MR. SEMPLE:** Just to set the historical record straight, isn't it true that Bruce Laingen, the chargé in Iran, warned the White House, or at least the State Department, that there would be grave consequences for the embassy if the Shah were admitted?

5

(lc)

**DR. KISSINGER:** Simply for the historical record, I was not myself involved in any of the discussions in October that led to the admission of the Shah. As I understand it, the medical records of the shah were submitted to the Department of State, and the decision was made on the basis of the medical records, and I suppose whatever other information the president and the Secretary of State had. I was not in contact with Bruce Laingen, whom I know, respect and who performed great services when I was in office. I did not have access to any of this information, and the administration has to decide what steps it wants to take to protect its personnel, and the administration must be able to deal with outside advice. The president has taken responsibility for this. He has indicated he made this decision; he has indicated that neither I nor David Rockefeller talked to him about it, or to the Secretary of State about it. Nevertheless, I believe it was the right decision.

**MR. SEMPLE:** While we are on the subject of Iran, as you know, there is a vague Iranian proposal floating around the United Nations that might lead to return of the American hostages. One element of that proposal would establish an international tribunal of some sort for airing the grievances of the present Iranian regime against the Shah and the United States.

Another element would have the United States and the U.N. recognize the legitimacy of Iranian claims against the Shah and the legitimacy of their request for his extradition.

What price would you pay for the return of the hostages? Would you buy a formula of this kind, for example?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I have great difficulty giving a precise content to this formula. The decision that the president will have to weigh is to what extent he wants to give up—or to what extent the fundamental American principles and fundamental national interests are compatible with any formula that might be put forward and to what extent it may encourage the taking of other American hostages to put forward other proposals. Since I don't know these specific proposals, I don't want to comment on them. I think the United Nations and its key members should be very careful not to exceed the Charter of the United Nations and not to get into things for which the United Nations was never designed, but I would have to see what the precise proposal is before I would apply it to this concrete negotiation.

**MRS. HOUSE:** Dr. Kissinger, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has increased the threat to Iran. What steps can we take to protect our strategic interest in an independent and unified Iran?

**DR. KISSINGER:** Of course, it is impossible to protect a country.

6

try that does not want to at least be independent. I have the impression that what we are facing in Iran is an internal upheaval in which the radical elements are trying to push the Iranian revolution into a much more radical direction and are using the hostages, and, for that matter, even the Shah, as a pretext for the radicalization of Iran and in a curious way of perhaps even making—of forcing Khomeini into a position where he has to run to keep up with his supposed followers.

The obvious security threat to Iran cannot be a country that is 7,000 miles away and is more likely to be a country which has a border of a thousand miles with it that has just militarily occupied an adjoining country. So the leaders of Iran have to decide whether their security threat is their imagined or real grievances of the past, or what is, in fact, going on on their borders. Until they have made that decision, there is very little we can do to give them any support. It is in our national interest to see an independent Iran developing according to its own principles and free of Soviet domination.

**MR. MONROE:** We have less than three minutes.

**MRS. HOUSE:** You have called for putting American military in Pakistan. Would you also favor the use of American military power in Iran if the country should disintegrate, or if the Soviets make any move toward taking a piece of that country?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I believe that the United States has an important interest in the integrity of Iran. I think that question really ought to be seen in the context of the building-up of an American strategic position in the Indian Ocean and of some concept of how they are going to defend threatened countries, rather than deal with it on a country-by-country basis. It requires some change in the political orientation in Iran before it can even be seriously discussed.

**MR. MONROE:** We have about a minute and a half.

**MR. PALMER:** Dr. Kissinger, could we move quite a distance away and talk about politics and particularly your political future. Do you harbor a desire to run for the United States Senate if Senator Javits does not seek re-election from New York State?

**DR. KISSINGER:** No, I certainly don't harbor a desire, and I expect Senator Javits to run, and I expect to support him.

**MR. PALMER:** That leaves open the possibility certainly of your returning to the United States government with another administration. Is there any Republican candidate now running for president whom you would not like to serve with?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I will stay out of the Republican primaries.

7

I think my most useful role is to state general principles of American foreign policy on a nonpartisan basis, and then make my contribution to the political process in this manner.

**MR. PALMER:** Would you like to serve again in some capacity, as either Secretary of State or foreign affairs adviser?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I think this would depend entirely on the circumstances that exist at the time. I have served for eight years, so I have fulfilled any personal ambitions. It would depend on the situation the country faces and what the president at the time conceives to be the necessity.

**MR. MONROE:** We have about twenty seconds.

You recently said the administration ought to try to put together a nonpartisan approach; you said it on this program. Previously you said they should quit playing Micky-Mouse games with the Republicans. What Micky-Mouse games?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I don't think it leads to a nonpartisan approach if every time there is a crisis they go through the files to see whether there can be some document found that shows some Republican origin, and I think there has to be some consultation with Republican leaders prior to decisions, not just afterwards.

**MR. MONROE:** Thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for being with us today on MEET THE PRESS.

8

2

MR. MONROE: Our guest today on MEET THE PRESS is former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger, the singlemost controversial aspect of President Carter's program of retaliation against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is his embargo on grain. Almost every single Presidential challenger to the President has opposed his embargo on grain, including Reagan, Connally, Baker, Bush, Crane, Dole, Kennedy, and Brown. Is President Carter right on this, and all those opponents wrong?

DR. KISSINGER: I think President Carter is right in the decision. I regret the circumstances that made it necessary. I think it is the right decision. I think it should be the first step of a reconsideration of overall policy, but I support that decision.

MR. MONROE: How do you account for the fact that virtually every Presidential challenger, with the exception of Congressman John Anderson, is not supporting the President?

DR. KISSINGER: Partly because they are all very conscious of the caucuses in Iowa, which is a farm state, partly because the decision was announced at a time when it was not yet known what the other grain exporting countries would do, and therefore there was some plausibility to the argument that a disproportionate burden might fall on the American farmer, but I believe it was the right decision, and I believe that the other candidates will come to see it that way, even when they put it

(c) 1968

in perspective.

MR. MONROE: President Carter seems to be leaning increasingly toward a pullout of the U.S. from the Olympics... for changing the site of the Olympics if that turned out to be possible. Do you favor that idea?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the major necessity now is to develop a long-range and hopefully nonpartisan foreign policy and not to concentrate on individual pinpricks. On the whole, I do not think this is a good year to hold the Olympic Games in Moscow in a period of such tension, and so I lean towards moving them to a more neutral site. Perhaps what one should do is to move them permanently to Greece, where they originated, and not have this rotating system. I find it hard to see how the Olympic ideal is likely to be served in Moscow this year.

(Announcements)

MR. MONROE: We will continue the questions for Henry Kissinger with Mr. Semple.

MR. SEMPLE: Dr. Kissinger, was there anything inherently wrong in our foreign policy over the last three years, maybe the last half dozen years, which includes your tenure as Secretary of State, that led the Soviet Union to believe that they could intervene in Afghanistan with impunity?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that we have suffered as a nation for the better part of a decade by national divisions which made us unclear about the role of our power in the world, the relationship, the appropriate relationship with other countries and made other countries uncertain about the degree to which they could rely on us. In the last three years, I believe there has been an excessive attempt to apply what I think were the wrong lessons of the Vietnam War, and we have seen Cuban

4

troops in South Yemen, a Communist coup in Afghanistan, the collapse of Iran, the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam with Soviet support, all of which must have created an impression in the Soviet minds of some of those countries that were threatened about American resolve and American geopolitical understanding. What would you now advise President Carter to do to reverse that trend in Soviet policy?

DR. KISSINGER: I think it is now essential to recognize we face a grave danger which requires a long-range foreign policy. I think the President should put forward a foreign policy that can be supported on a nonpartisan basis that is not perceived around the world as depending on changes in administration in this country and which, in my view, could gain the support of an overwhelming majority of the American people, that makes clear that we do take the question of expansionism seriously, and that we are going to stick to it for an indefinite period of time, and don't tear ourselves apart again with the self-flagellation which has been so dangerous to us.

MR. SEMPLE: More specifically, are there any military options which you would advise the President to take to demonstrate our credibility?

DR. KISSINGER: I would advise against any one measure that has the impression of a gimmick. What we need is some definition of what the threat is and some definition of the strategy by which we are going to meet the threat.

Take, for example, the issues of Pakistan; here we have a country that is now at the front line of the Soviet advance. It has a super power on one border and a very heavily armed India on the other border. Simply to pour arms into that

country, it is hard to imagine that one could give it enough
arms to be able to resist alone; therefore, what we have to
define is the relationship of the United States to Pakistan
and the role of arms deliveries within that context.

What is our position with respect to the integrity of
Pakistan? How are we going to achieve the protection? These
are the questions that must be answered, rather than to think
of one military gimmick.

I do believe that an increased American military presence
in the Indian Ocean is now imperative, but that, too, has to
be related to the overall strategy, as I indicated.

MRS. HOUSE: What steps can we take now to protect Pakistan
without pushing India closer to the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I have thought somewhat about this
question during the last week, because there is a difficult
problem, first, to try to get clear what sort of armament would
make any sense and, secondly, how one can avoid the problem
that for Pakistan to be substantially armed would still leave
a gap of many years during which either the Soviet Union or
India, or the Soviet Union and India in concert as in 1971, might
start bringing pressure on Pakistan.

I have come to the perhaps somewhat reluctant conclusion
that in addition to whatever arms we may give Pakistan, that
we ought to discuss with Pakistan the possibility of
establishing some American air and maybe naval bases in that

6

country for the reason that American military power will be
clearly perceived by India as not suitable for a war of
aggression against India, or should be able to be perceived
and that it would be available for defensive purposes.

Secondly, it is essential that we make some national
declaration by the President, hopefully supported by the
Congress, of our national interest in the territorial integrity
of Pakistan; because, without this, an arms program in the
abstract simply will not make any sense.

MRS. HOUSE: Should we provide arms to the rebels in Afghanistan, because that is obviously going to increase the pressure on Pakistan?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, I was in office during the
Vietnam war, and the Soviet Union supplied billions of dollars
of arms to the Vietnamese that were fighting us.

I think the first issues to settle are those that I have
mentioned: How are we going to prevent a further expansion of
the Soviets' sphere, either by Soviet forces or by proxy
forces? How are we going to give threatened countries the
confidence that this is not just an election year sense of
excitement in this country, but a long-term, settled national
policy; and this is why I think a bipartisan effort is
essential. It is only in that context that we could really
deal with the question of giving arms to those who are resisting
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

DR. KISSINGER: I think it is a mistake to try to encapsulate our relationship with the Soviet Union in one word, either "Cold War" or "detente." We have two seemingly contradictory necessities: One is to prevent Soviet expansionism, either directly or by proxy. The second is to explore the possibilities of peaceful coexistence in a world in which they and we have the capability of destroying mankind. Those necessities do not disappear, whatever the immediate tensions may be.

I believe that in recent years we have overlooked Soviet expansionism in Ethiopia, through proxies on the Arabian Peninsula and in the first coup in Afghanistan; and we are now paying the price for it; but, I think, it would be a mistake to try to say we are now in a Cold War situation again.

8

MR PALMER: So you don't feel detente is necessarily dead at this point?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the basic imperatives of American foreign policy continue along both of those tracks. At this moment, our basic necessity is to build strength, restore confidence, and to make clear that the United States will not permit an overturning of the international balance of power without organizing resistance. We must keep open, also, and we must begin thinking about it now, what we want to negotiate about when that possibility comes along again so we are not in an endless civil war in this country between those who want to emphasize only detente and those who want to emphasize only military programs.

DR. KISSINGER: No. If you look at the literature about the Soviet Union over a generation now, there is always supposed to be a moderate faction and a hard-line faction, and the moderate faction is always being involved as needing concessions on our part so that the hawks don't take over. No one has ever seen any evidence of this. Of course, Brezhnev's physical condition is such that it is unlikely that he is working ten hours a day, but that had been the case for several

9

years, and I would be absolutely astonished, and I see no evi-
dence that there was division in the Soviet leadership or cer-
tainly that Brezhnev was overruled.

MR. MONROE: Dr. Kissinger, many people feel the hostage
crisis in Iran may be playing into Communist hands and maybe to
the disadvantage of both countries, Iran and the United States.
national
Wouldn't the interest of the United States have been better
served if President Carter had rejected the advice he got from
you and David Rockefeller and kept the Shah out of this coun-
try?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't suppose that President Carter
had any reason to believe that the admission of the Shah would
lead to a crisis of the length we are now facing. Secondly,
those decisions have to be made by the President of the United
States in the light of all of the circumstances, and all we do
could do as private citizens is to put before him the medical
condition of the Shah. The President had to make the ultimate
decision in the light of the overall circumstances.

MR. MONROE: In hindsight, would we not have been better
off making another decision?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I think the President was right in
making the decision; saying it was his decision to make doesn't
mean I disagree with the decision; even in retrospect. It was
the correct decision, and we could not have reached the point
where the kidnapping or the holding as hostage of fifty Americans
can make us give up the settled policy of this country,
especially toward friends of thirty-seven years.

10

1

MR. MONROE: Would you have handled the Iranian crisis
any differently from the way the President is handling it?

DR. KISSINGER: I went through enough crises when I was in
office to know there is only one man who can handle it, and
that is the President and his principal advisers; therefore,
no outsider should give tactical advice while a crisis is
going on, or, for that matter, afterwards.

MR. SEMPLE: Just to set the historical record straight,
isn't it true that Bruce Laingen, the charge' in Iran, warned
the White House, or at least the State Department, there would
be grave consequences for the embassy if the shah were admitted?

DR. KISSINGER: Simply for the historical record, I was
not myself involved in any of the discussions in October that
led to the admission of the shah. As I understand it, the
medical records of the shah were admitted to the Department of
State, and the decision was made on the basis of the medical
records, and I suppose whatever other information the President
and the Secretary of State had. I was not in contact with
Bruce Laingen, whom I know, respect and who performed great
services when I was in office. I did not have access to any
of this information, and the Administration has to decide what
steps it wants to take to protect its personnel, and the
Administration must be able to deal with outside advice, and
the President has taken responsibility for this. He has
indicated he made this decision; he has indicated that neither

14

MRS. HOUSE: Dr. Kissinger, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has increased the threat to Iran. What steps can we take to protect our strategic interest in an independent and unified Iran?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, it is impossible to protect a country that does not want to at least be independent. I have the impression that what we are facing in Iran is an internal upheaval in which the radical elements are trying to push the Iranian revolution into a much more radical direction and are using the hostages, and, for that matter, even the Shah, as a pretext for the radicalization of Iran and in a curious way of perhaps even making -- of forcing Khomeini into a position where he has to run to keep up with his supposed followers.

Now, the obvious security threat to Iran cannot be a country that is 7,000 miles away and is more likely to be a country which has a border of a thousand miles with it that has just militarily occupied an adjoining country, so the leaders of Iran have to decide whether their security threat is damaged. Are there real grievances of the past, or what is, in fact, going on in their borders. Until they have made that decision, there is very little we can do to give them any support. It is in our national interest to see an independent Iran developing according to its own principles and free of Soviet domination.

MR. MONROE: We have less than three minutes

13

MRS. HOUSE: You have called for putting American military in Pakistan. Would you also favor the use of American military power in Iran if the country should disintegrate, or if the Soviets make any move toward taking a piece of that country?

DR. KISSINGER: I believe that the United States has an important interest in the integrity of Iran. I think that question really ought to be seen in the context of the building-up of American strategic position in the Indian Ocean and of some concept of how they are going to defend certain countries rather than deal with it on a country-by-country basis, and it requires some change in the political orientation in Iran before it can even be seriously discussed.

MR. MONROE: We have about a minute and a half.

MR. PALMER: Dr. Kissinger, could we move quite a distance away and talk about politics and particularly your political future. Do you harbor a desire to run for the United States Senate if Senator Javits does not seek re-election from New York State?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I certainly don't harbor a desire, and I expect Senator Javits to run, and I expect to support him.

MR. PALMER: That leaves open the possibility certainly of your returning to the United States Government with another administration. Is there any Republican candidate now running for President whom you would not like to serve with?

(cc)

14

DR. KISSINGER: I will stay out of the Republican pri-
maries. I think my most useful role is to state general
principles of American foreign policy on a nonpartisan basis,
and then make my contribution to the political process in this
manner.

MR. PALMER: Would you like to serve again in some capacity,
as either Secretary of State or foreign affairs adviser?

DR. KISSINGER: I think this would depend entirely on the
circumstances that exist at the time. I have served for eight
years, so I have fulfilled any personal ambitions. It would
depend on the situation the country faces and what the President
at the time conceives to be the necessity.

MR. MONROE: We have about twenty seconds.

You recently said the administration ought to try to put
together a nonpartisan approach. You said it on this program.
Previously you said they should quit playing Micky-Mouse games
with the Republicans. What Micky-Mouse games?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think it leads to a nonpartisan
approach if every time there is a crisis they go through the
files to see whether there can be some document found that
shows some Republican origin, and I think there has to be some
consultation with Republican leaders prior to decisions, not
just afterwards.

MR. MONROE: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for being with us
today on MEET THE PRESS.