DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
President/Kissinger
later afternoon 3/29/71

P: One other that I thought would be good for you to call -- would be Geo. Meany.

K: Right.

P: Did I cover him with you this morning?

K: No, you did not.

P: I just think it would be a good idea. You were at the breakfast.

K: I indeed was.

P: Did you send him over a little of that business?

K: No, but I will send it tomorrow. He's on my list.

P: And you could say, you know, that the President felt this and that. You see we've just made this announcement on the Davis-Bacon. He's not going to be enthused but he will be better than he was before because we got off the hook on it.

K: Right.

P: I mean, just say that we appreciate his really sturdy support and that he will not be disappointed when he hears the President next week. I would just put it that way.

K: I'll call him tomorrow.

P: Without giving him any hint I would just say, you know, you will not be disappointed. Don't you think that's a good idea?

K: I think it's a good idea to keep in touch with him and to give him the sense that we know what we are doing and that we're thinking of him.

P: Because this guy -- by gosh, when you think of people we can count on, he's one of the few left, isn't he?

K: He certainly is. You wanted me in addition to call Sam Yorty. I'll him tomorrow.

P: For the reason that Sam is a good fellow who's been needling Muskie and just say, "look, you're on the right track, boy, don't loose your nerve. But things are coming out okay." In other words, I think the thing now is to sort of start a little quiet talk that everybody is competent at the White House. And we are.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

K: Absolutely.

P: We know what we are doing. Basically you know x very well if you were to mark out x American public sentiment at the moment, heck, we'd be home free. We got these guys on the run. There's nothing --

K: Hell, if it weren't for the hysteria that the media are engender we'd be in good shape.

P: Right. I think if you could call Sam, in each of these when you call, say the President and I were talking and he wanted you to know on a very confidential basis -- that really had a good effect with Reagan didn't it?

K: Oh, Reagan was delighted. He was really pleased. He kept me on the phone for nearly half an hour.

P: That's all right. You see that's really money in the bank because here's a guy we have to hold and we want him to -- we can talk all we want you know, well, on other issues, like in Calif, like fellows like Bob Finch are all with us and the rest aren't, this is not very good. So you gotta have a Reagan out there hitting the ball.

K: That's right. That's right. Bix Bob Hope, you know, he isn't a politically powerful figure, but he's --

P: But he's with us, I'm telling you. I'll bet he was touched that you called.

K: Oh, he was very touched.

P: You'll Graham a call to, will you?

K: Right. He may call you tomorrow, Bob Hope said, he said he'd try to get you out on a golf course. I couldn't tell him not to x call you.

P: Yeah, that's all right. Well, he's such a great fellow and when Billy Graham as he's in a crusade in Kentucky and he always, you know, he's likely to make a little press statement -- he's likely to sit it right out here, "I support the President." That's the kind of thing we need right now.

K: Right, right. I'll get him also, I'll get him first thing in the morning.

P: I x still have a sneaking hunch -- I have intuitions about these things. These people you know with their almost -- well, it's almost unseemly to be this disgusting willingness to jump on a carcass but by golly, when I think of their country and the rest -- when I think of the opportunities I had when I was out of office to kill Johnson and kill the rest, and kept my mough shut, and here these clowns are doing this, boy, I tell you --

By NARA, Date 5/26

-3-

K: You know, if they did it in Sept. '72, if they called you the worst kind of incompetent in the book, it would be bad because one doesn't conduct campaigns this was, but one could understand --

P: Everybody understands it, right.

K: But for the 2 years which no matter what they do you are the only one who can bring peace on an issue that has so divided the country, for them to play this sort of a game is un--

P: Particularly when I didn't.

K: That's right.

P: You remember, Henry, for 5 years I was the best supporter of why we were in VN of anybody, you see,

K: And when last Oct. they faked that VN was not an issue, and that they had always been behind you and that it was now united country --

P: It's all right, it's all right.

K: But I think if we pull it off and I really think that--

P: I think we may.

K: That the objective reality is on our side, Mr. President. The only thing is whether the psychological one can hold together.

P: It will hold.

K: But I think it can hold.

P: That's right.

K: I don't think the American people want to bug out.

P: Well, they're going to have a chance to see, believe me, because we are going to put it right to them.

K: That's what I would recommend

P: In the meantime let us start building a few firewood amongst some of our friends and among anybody else of that type you can think of, why let them know.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
President/Kissinger
3/29/71 afternoon

P: I was talking to Ron and I told him to -- he said that NEWSWEEK, he was asked about NEWSWEEK Speculating on the 16,000 thing. I told him that to just tell them that I thought we would just mislead them awhile and to tell them for background it was going to be at 12,500. That's the thing to do to everybody, you see what I mean?

K: That's right. Get them out of the ______.

P: Is that Laird again? How the devil would he--

K: I think he is trying to bracket every possibility now.

P: He's trying to --

K: You said at least so he --

P: At the present level. That's right. Well, just say we are talking about the present level.

K: Well, when I talk to him tomorrow I'll tell him that the only thing you haven't decided yet is the length of time.

P: I think that the present level, in view of everything, that the present level has to be maintained as I indicated. The real question is the length of time.

K: Exactly. And then I'll just say you changed your mind at the last moment.

P: And I just zing it in there.

K: He doesn't mind being outmaneuvered. He does it all the time.

P: He sure does, doesn't he?

K: He's like a little boy with a hand in the cookie jar.

P: One thing about it, he just -- well, the rash of -- and just tell him that for guidance that he really ought to get all of his friends in the press to talk about the present level. Let's get him out on a little limb, shall we?

K: Certainly.

L: Tell him that really the question is the present level, that the President is considering the present level and that's WHAT'S (?) recommended.

K: Yeah, yeah.

L: Tell him that that is what he should say because basically that's what I am considering.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

President/Kissinger

3/29/71

-2-

K: Right.

P: And then when we come up to it I'll just say that --

K: Or that you changed your mind over the weekend.

P: Changed my mind over the weekend and that's going to be that and -- you think the way we handled that is if he just is told on Wednesday, is that correct?

K: Oh, yeah, well that's how we did it last time, Mr. President.

P: How long before you tell him?

K: Well, last time we told one hour and a half before. This time we've got to give him a little more time.

P: Yeah, yeah. We'll you've already told Bill.

K: I've told Bill and Bill will be all right.

P: No problem, he won't tell anybody. He's the only one that knows.

K: Exactly.

P: Now, on Laird.

K: I haven't even told anyone of my staff. The fellow who's drafting the speech is-

P: Hell, no. No, no, no.

K: He's leaving it blank.

P: Leave it blank. On Laird, I guess we just -- how do we handle him?

K: I think I'll call Laird tomorrow and I'll tell him that you've decided to move it up because you've got as many facts now as you're going to have.

P: No, I'd say I'm moving it up because of the Congressional --

K: And because of the Congressional thing.

P: Just give the one reason.

K: That's it.

P: Because of the Congressional.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

President/Kissinger

3/29/71

K: You don't want them to talk --

P: And I don't want it delayed to the 20th.

K: Right.

P: Otherwise we would have to delay it until the 20th.

K: Right.

P: When the Congress gets back. And I don't want to do it while the Congress is out of town.

K: Right.

P: Because I think it is a good source. So I'm going to do it on the 7th.

K: Right.

P: That's the same reason for everybody.

K: Right. I'll give him that and I'll tell him that you are still playing with the figure based on the length of time, you haven't decided yet whether to do it until just after the election --

P: Ask him how many -- what's his view on that.

K: Right.

P: Why don't you ask him that.

K: Right. And I'll also ask him for the Joint Chiefs' of Staff figure because I know that's much lower.

P: Oh, yeah, they want a 75,000 by the end of the year.

K: That's right, so --

P: Jesus Christ!

K: But that will mislead him. That will make him think you are being driven the other way.

P: Yeah. Well, the Joint Chiefs, Abrams and all the rest are going to have to start growing up now.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

President/Kissinger

3/29/71

-4-

K: Well, I told Bunker that for him to know the best thing we could do now was to hold our public opinion. for Thieu

P: That's correct. I don't know, maybe we are wrong, I don't know that this slight increase is going to hold much opinion. Maybe it isn't.

K: Well, Mr. President, it will hold it in that stupid way of figuring the increased rate.

P: What?

K: The low figure, it increases therate.

P: So they've got to say it's an increase.

K: They have to say the rate is increased to 14,000 which is an 20% increase.

P: Right, sure.

K: Now there's no way they can get around it. They were the ones that invented the monthly rate. We never used it before.

P: It's a good figure and it still keeps Thieu with his 200,000.

K: That's right. I promised that to Bunker that we would keep over 200,000 until Oct. 7. So that the heavier withdrawals would be in Oct.

P: When's his election?

K: Oct. 7.

P: Oh, good.

K: So we make the heavier withdrawals that would put it above in Oct. and Nov.

P: That's right. All right. That's good stuff. OK, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President.

should say because basically

am

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
3/30/71 ca. 9:15 a.m.

R: We have a draft message for the President to send to Sadat in response to his letter of some time back. I think it is a good idea to have him answer this.

K: Isn't that the one that's been over for a while?

R: Yes.

K: It's in the President's office now and I'll get it loose today. The President has had it for 10 dyas. I'll get it loose.

R: I have a message from Bergus ☎; he talked with Haikal. I think in view of the time factor it would be good if we did send a message.

K: There's no objection in principle. This is one the President said he personally wanted to go over and he's got it right now.

R: Okay. We're on top of the Pakistan matter and we're thinking about getting people out without calling it an evacuation. We can't do it till Thursday anyway, but we're trying to keep a lid on it.

K: What was the flap about the Voice of America broadcast?

R: I don't know.

K: They picked something up from our Consul General who was not supposed to have a radio there.

R: Oh that. There's nothing we can do about that. We had no communication out of Pakistan so this was our friend's agency.

K: I think the major thing is not to admit it if we can avoid it.

R: No, no problem there. Our only problem is we've got about 750 in Dacca and they've had a meeting and they want out and our Ambassador is requesting it. I'm a little bearish about keeping them there. I don't want it to be an evacuation. But I'll let you know the plans.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Billy Graham/Kissinger
9:23 a.m. 3/30/71

K: I still regret that we have never had a chance to talk.

G: I know how busy you are.

K: Let me know when you are on in Washington and we will get together for lunch, breakfast, or dinner.

G: I will be happy to.

K: The President wanted me to give you a brief call to tell you that with all the hysteria on TV and in news onxxx Laos, we feel we have set up everything we set out to do. Destroyed more supplies then in Cambodia last year. Set them back many months. It's our judgment that we have kept them from a major defensive this year and from launching one next year. We achieved what we were after. We wanted you to know.

G: I appreciate it very much. I will be in Washington about Easter time and I will be back and forth. In the East and West many times. I will give your secretary a list of dates and perhaps we can get together.

K: That will be fine.

G: I deeply appreciate that.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

The President

3/30/71 9:35 a.m.

P: What's new today?

K: It's actually fairly quiet. Activity has slowed in Vietnam. In Cambodia they had a good operation -- claimed to have killed 250 North Vietnamese. But even if they only killed half it's some thing.

P: Half! Cut it in a fifth or a tenth -- it's still a big thing for us. We have to keep this in perspective.

K: That's right. Around Khe Sanh they had one of the usual ambushes. Nothing major. We've got an intercept... a report which may suggest that they are planning something in ______ in the next few weeks.

P: Two weeks.

K: Could be any time, but we've got these reports before, and they never get anything started. 31 March is what they are now expecting... no, 31 March is something else. That's the operation I mentioned to you which is not major, in Base Area 611. I called Billy Graham this morning; he sends you his warm regards. He was very pleased and is behind you. We are getting an intercept from some traffic -- they are beginning to start on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. About 40 percent of it is gasoline, in other words wasted. It is usually 15 percent which means that the pipeline is cut. It's only about ______ tons per day, and they need ______ tons per day to keep up. The entire system is exposed and so forth. So the disruption is undoubtedly very severe. In Pakistan it continues, but there isn't a whole lot we can do about it.

P: No. Are we pressing?

K: No, we may remove the American civilians.

P: That's okay.

K: But even that we won't do before Thursday.

P: But we should just stay out -- like in Biafra, what the hell can we do?

K: Good point.

P: I don't like it, but I didn't like shooting starving Biaffans either. What do they think we are going to do but help the Indians.

TELECON
The President

3/30/71 9:35 a.m. p. 2

NARA, Date

K: They have been ambivalent about it anyway.

P: They are ambivalent about everything.

K: That Consul in Dacca doesn't have the strongest nerves.

P: Neither does Keating. They are all in the middle of it; it's just like Biafra. The main thing to do is to keep cool and not do anything. There's nothing in it for us either way.

K: It would infuriate the West Pakistanis; it wouldn't gain anything with the East Pakistanis, who wouldn't know about it anyway and the Indians are not noted for their gratitude.

P: We've got a lid on the Chinese thing?

K: Yes. I talked to Bill yesterday and we'll keep the lid on it till you are back.

P: I think we should get Bob Murphy and have him go and find out.

K: He is going out on some business anyway, so we have a good cover for him, and we don't have to get everyone churned up.

P: Right. We've got to keep a lid on it. There's nothing in it for us to start slobbering over the Chinese and have them slap us in the face. It would just dismay our friends again.

K: Even the Japanese, and we'll infuriate the Koreans and dismay the Germans. It would be a nice ploy that would get us through one year; but next year we're in the same box again.

P: Don't get too excited about the UN. We've got Bush there and he's a smart fellow and he's on our side. He's not in love with it. Let them flounder around. If they slapped us in the face there would be a hell of an American reaction. The liberals and intellectuals would say fine, but there veterans organizations and . . . and I'd gin them up. There are a lot of poeple right now who want the UN out of this country anyway. We don't realize how low it is.

K: I'm sure it is and deservedly so.

P: When have they helped us?

K: And when you think of U Thant condemning us in Laos when he's been quiet for eight years about the North Vietnamese there.

By. .

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
The President

3/30/71 9:35 a.m. p. 3

P: And I've been up there twice and they've acted cool and lousey. I'm not going to go there and go through the hipocracy about supporting the UN again. It's just hipocracy.

K: I thought the behavior the last time was outrageous when the Secretary General didn't even have the courtesy to meet you at the door.

P: I hope they don't get that new building. That hasn't gone through yet, has it?

K: I don't think so.

P: On the Laotian thing -- that's going to peter out. They'll emote about that for a week or so then have the troop announcement and then they'll emote about that. Then eyes will go to the Congress, about what they'll do about it. It isn't the public sentiment we're talking about.

K: Actually the Congress is going to be going home about the time of the announcement.

P: Yes, the House for a week; the Senate for two weeks. That will help. We hope by the time they come back they'll have something else to talk about. Mark my words Henry, this will taper off now. There has been no explosion over the fire base has there?

K: No, that's off the papers today.

P: The main thing today is Calley -- which is too bad.

K: I saw some interviews this morning -- they were uniformly against the verdict.

P: That's what I mean -- I feel a lot of people are fed up with this beating our breasts on America being always wrong. We've got to start hitting this line. Be sure in your talks that they talk to the columnists back there, lead horses like Smith, Wilson, Noyes, and people like Clark Mollenhoff. The main thing is to mobilize all of our friends. It can be done. There is always a backlash against over-reaction and our opponents over-reacted on Laos, our setbacks there, the defeat and all that.

K: Right, and I think they showed their real colors too early.

P: They showed they were against us.

Bv.

NARA, Dato 5/20

TELCON
Popanak/Kissinger
10:50 a.m. 3/30/71

K: Sorry I couldn't get back to you this weekend.

P: I want to talk briefly about situation in Pakistan. You know more than I do of what's happening.

K: If I don't know what you do, something is wrong.

P: Quite right. What I think is not obvious to those that haven't spent time there.

K: I don't know what it amounts to. I know what's happening.

P: People who have spent time there and over the long term in matter of months it will be untenable for military. They cannot keep that province under control for a substantial length of time.

K: The only thing I cannot judge is that what degree the people in the countryside react to cities. If you control Dacca And Chittagong do you control the countryside? I don't know.

P: Evidence is that it's not the case. ? ? ? . In countryside too the Mujiam League is effective. School teachers, small traders, local xxx lawyers. Rural intelligentsia and bourgeoussie and large land lords. They are quite effectively able to mobilize them. The army will control Dacca and Chittagong but little else.

K: That's how it looks on basis of historical analogy.

P: It's beyond -- that it's an area extremely difficult to administer. Even with Bengali local institutions. All of these are on the other side now.

K: What should we do?

P: If independence is coming what happens -- blood shed and secondly, what will be the posture of the new government that will emerge? I think we loose little and gain to pressure Pakistanis in concert with other countries in cutting off immediate what spare parts and military equipment we supply and make it clear that we will have to re-examine AID program except for food.

K: That will make them enemies.

2.

P: W. Pakistan. But those who hard line vis-a-vis Bengal have been pro-Chinese. Buto will not be a good friend in any case and a lot depends on whether Bengali's ? ? ? or whether it goes on for mongths.

By

NARA, Date

Popanak/Kissinger

10:50 a.m.

3/30/71

-2-

K: Do you think they arrested Mujib?

P: That's what State says but I don't know. k

K: I appreciate this and it's one of those situations where we have trouble finding out what's going on. Our assessment is the same as yours.

K: The Chinese find themselves in problem of losing a lot in Pakistan and have given strong support to the military to have Pakistan on their side against India but reluctant to say their weapons used against Bengalis. More favorable position to drive that contradiction hom and make it diffcult for them to -- make them come out on side of Bengali and central government or have a substantial shift in NW Pakistan. Have you been there?

K: Not in E. Pakistan.

P: It's a big swamp.

K: I don't see how 50,000 troops can dominate 75 ______ people. Unless in cities.

P: 300,000 people in Pakistan army. If they doubled people.

K: Keeping them supplied.

P: Starting to rain some and will be under water. It's made for sabotage and ______.

K: Why do it then?

P: Army has contempt for Bengalis and believe that if they show force and kill a few thousand people, they will become docile and collapse.

K: You think it's wrong?

P: I do. They are hard to govern and have history of guerrillarism.

K: Once they are independent the W. Bengali's will be more trouble for the Indians.

P: Although Pakistan Bengalis have now interest in any kind of amalgamation. Don't want to be dominated from Calcutta. An Axelite movement on both sides of the frontier. These people organized for ______ and small scale guerilla ______.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Popanak/Kissinger

10:50 a.m.

3/30/71

K: At this time last week I thought the thing was settled.

P: Bengali think negotiations were a ploy to bring further troops over. I don't know -- some people here say it was a shift in the army. Those who were pro-Western and less anti-Indian to Gen. Amed and ______ who are anti-Indian and pro-Chinese.

K: Were you aware of the extent of this autonomy feeling?

P: Yes. That's been clear for a long, long time. Two months ago they could have still been able to get a settlement with federal status and it was badly mishandled. Consequent challenges have made Mujiba harder. He would not compormise and it came to open conflict. The Bengalix nationalist parties gained 85% of the vote. Some to the right and others to the left that campaigned on Bengali nationalism and got 85% of vote.

K: That's as close as you can get.

P: Despite fact government on other side and supporting the rightwing Islamic parties.

K: OK.

P: The outcome is ascertain as they ever are that it will come to a parting of the ways. A lot depends on whether we -- there's some disposition in Canadian and British Governments to take a common line.

K: Let me -- I appreciate this very much indeed.

P: Anything I can do. Talk to anyone on your staff or x I will be glad to go to Washington.

K: Call my office next week. I am on the W. Coast now.

P: OK. Check with your office?

K: Right.

P: I will do that. Thank you for calling me back.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Rogers/Kissinger

11:10 a.m. 3/30/71

K: I have a memo here on UNDP replacement and the President has decided to prefer to offer it in order to Rudolph Peterson and then Killifer. He wanted me to call but I think it's better if you do it. In channels. Will you do it?

R: Yes. I think Rudolph Peterson said he now but I will offer it so he knows the President asked.

K: It came through Flanigan's machinery but I think your people were consulted.

R: Hoffman will get mad as hell if we have a replacement before he resigns. I will talk to them in confidence. I know killifer personally but I would be surprised --

K: I have never heard of him. There were 8 choices. The President picked those.

K: I will talk with them. It's better to do it this way.

By. 0

NARA, Dato 5/20

TELCON

Flanigan/Kissinger

11:37 a.m.

3/30/71

K: I called you to tell you that for the sake of public relations with State, I have told Rogers to call Rudolph Peterson and Killifer on UNDP thing.

F: I doubt you will get either but Overby wouldn't take it either and the President like him. So much the better.

K: I wanted you to know I am being meticulous to my Irish friends.

F: I know that you believe that if one is to do a good dead it must should be generous and that's including giving Okinwawa back to the Japanese.

K: Those S.O.B.s. I do believe if you do something, it must should be generous.

F: It's in the Senate and what if 40% of the Senate said to hell with them.

K: That's OK.

F: Shouldn't we consider our stance with the Japanese if it should happen? Say we don't do it and this is the way the opposition Senate reacted and we need to reach an agreement on textiles?

K: What will happen?

F: We will negotiate with the other 3 countries and not get an agreement because you and the others will not want to pay the price. We are going to look weak.

K: What do the maniacs in the textile industry think?

F: Legislature will be very unattractive. Very broad.

K: What do you want me to do about it?

F: Say yes we should get negotiating stance with the Senate ready. Think about the desirability that some Senate friends do that.

K: Decline ratifying it? Is it coming up this year?

F: I thought it was.

K: We haven't completed the negotiation yet.

F: Who can I talk to?

K: Alex Johnson.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Flanigan/Kissinger

11:37 a.m. 3/30/71

-2-

F: I will find that out and come back to you. Some bill had already gone up.

K: I think not.

F: Would you be willing to use it?

K: Not very much. I think we have put as much into the textile negotiation as we should. I don't mind squeezing Japanese on a big thing.

F: It's big on domestic politics. You might want to discuss it with the President. Maybe 40% will see their duty and do it.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Franklin Murphy/Kissinger

12:55 p.m. 3/30/71

M: I am up in Berkley.

K: How have you been?

M: Very well. Fine. I had thought I might be seeing you this week but I gather you will be there while we are meeting here.

K: The President thought it would be a good idea if I met with the editorial board of the LATimes. My influence isn't off that I want to volunteer and I wondered if you could check with Otis.

M: I will check it.

K: Could you get me an invitation?

M: How long are you here?

K: Sunday night and Monday morning.

M: It should be before Sunday.

K: Fri. would be good for me. Thurs. is another possibility.

M: I will call Otis this afternoon when I get home to L. A. and then I suspect we should leave it this way --

K: Let him call me if he is interested. Make it clear I am not seeking it.

M: I will say I was talking about FIA and since he is out here it occured to me that perhaps you want him to come up. How are you? Physically and otherwise.

K: Well, some people in liberal press who doubt my mental capabilities.

M: I doubt that. I will see you in a couple of months.

K: Let me know when you come east. Lunch or something.

M: I will call Otis this afternoon.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Professor Doty
3/30/71 1:20 p.m.

K: I understand my colleagues are circulating a letter again?

D: Yes. I haven't gotten it, but I saw it in the Crimson.

K: Has it been sent?

D: I haven't talked with anyone who has received it, but they say it has been sent. If I see it I'll put it in the mail to you.

K: It's not that I can't wait to receive it.

D: Nothing else very unusual has happened. They are going after the people who broke things up a few nights ago. The ring leaders were former students who had been dismissed.

K: If a university cannot permit free expression, we are in bad shape.

D: That is right and this is going to be a test of it.

K: When are you going to be in Washington?

D: We're hoping the Friday meeting next week still holds.

K: Yes.

D: We are preparing both ______ and the Omaha visit.

K: I'll be ready.

D: Is there any more on SALT you want us to do? Sid and Dick and I talked with Farley and Spurgeon on Friday.

K: What was their view?

D: Nothing has solidified very much.

K: I'd just as soon wait till after the Party Congress unless there's some specific thing you think you can do. I don't think it takes a big intellectual study now -- it takes a policy decision.

D: Yes. Why don't I send you a memo and if you want 10 or 15 minutes while we're there on that we can.

K: Good.

By.

A

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
9:25a.m. 3/31/71

K: Two things -- one mainly. I want to talk about how you handle State and on notification of speech next week. President didn't want to give a number until the last minute. Last time we handled it by saying in general way it will be near the same rate.

R: I said that publicly anyway.

K: Can I have Haig work with Marshall Greene?

R: Sure. They know what's coming anyway. We can say it's at least what it has been. That's what the President said publicly.

K: We don't want ______ of men because of -- Laird consistently leaking. Now he has said we are stepping it up so that we don't have to work with the whole Laos problem.

R: The Senate has kept quiet.

K: It's been great. And have you thought of one proposal Laird has put forward?

R: Not at all.

K: I just wanted to see if it checks with your thinking. The other things is whether you know how we can step on speculation.

R: Since before Laos State hasn't leaked a thing.

K: A uniform line throughout.

R: You notice Fulbright trying to declassify testimony? Vogt and mine, ahead of the thing. I think we can handle it by asking questions he asked off the record. Saying we achieved most of our objectives. So it isn't a failure. We can talk after the speech. Did you talk to the President about the letter to Sadat?

K: I haven't been able to get it from the machinery. I will get it today. I don't know what it is. Has passed it as it was. I had no suggestions.

R: Let me see. Pakistan we are moving ahead. We are trying to move some women and children out. Not evacuating. Have you seen the telegrams from Keating?

K: Between him and Blood we are getting thrown around. I don't see what we would accomplish by it.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Rogers/Kissinger
9:25 a. m. 3/31/71

-2-

R: Not a thing. Someone said that India might recognize East Pakistan. I said unless Keating beats him to the punch.

K: You saw the <u>paratroopers</u> paratroopers landed in Laos?

R: It's a good thing. Otherwise it looks like the SVN are demoralized.

K: Good move.

R: How's the President's frame of mind?

K: Lousy weather but it's good.

R: I wish you would get good weather.

K: Heliked what you told Lisagore.

R: Good.

K: It's a good line to take. It amazes the newsmen that we are calm.

R: Has Lisagore written?

K: No but Bob told him.

R: Lisagor said he had never seen me in such a good frame of mind. Asked if I were an actor. I said I can't act.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Laird

3/31/71 9:40 a.m.

L: Good morning Henry.

K: Hi Mel. I'm following up on some of our discussion yesterday. If we can get this June date ironclad on Resor that will be okay here.

L: Good.

K: There's no other pressure then.

L: That's been the plan all along. I wanted to wait till this trial ... wanted him to take the heat for four or five weeks.

K: They all saw the point and appreciate that.

L: If we put in a clean man then he may take a new position.

K: Okay, and I raised who you wanted out here. That hasn't been shot down yet. I'm not saying it's approved but ...

L: There is one person who talked to me about this and he said he was doing it on the authority of the White House and I assume he was -- Peter Flanigan -- he came to see me about putting Bo Callaway in.

K: I made your point about that here.

L: I told him I'd just as soon have him as Assistant Secretary of Defense but I think we should promote someone who has been here. This will be the toughest job there is. We've got to help the army We've got to put our best man in there.

K: I understand that. I mentioned him to Haldeman and everyone here is well impressed by him as a person. I'm not saying it will be approved, but it didn't get shot down. The other two things I wanted to talk with you about: The Calley case -- is there anything the White House ought to say?

L: The President has got to stick with the Understanding that ... he can't delegate authority of review or intercession to me. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice he can intercede at any time he wants but I think at this time they should request the procedure under the Code before the President intervenes. He has got to say as a reviewing official the President will ...

K: Can you give some thought to what the President could say and send a few sentences out to me. He doesn't have to say more than what the

By NARA, Date 5/26

page 2

procedure is. And finally, everyone here is having conniptions about
the stories that you are coming out for full withdrawal . . .

L: That is a lot of ¢ & * ( % !

K: I can't even get a figure of yours, except what you brought
back from the trip. We wonder whether we couldn't knock this down
once and for all and then have everyone be quiet.

L: Do you want me to have a little press meeting?

K: It will just generate more stories.

L: I'd just as soon meet the press if you want me to.

K: Let me talk to Haldeman about that.

L: You know where these stories are coming from, don't you?

K: They sure as hell aren't coming from out here.

L: No, this Congressional thing . . . All these stories are
floating around. Ford called me and said yesterday, Gee Mel, I sure
hope you're pressing for a higher figure than 12,500. And I said let's
not speculate about this.

K: I think it better for everyone to keep quiet.

L: They are going to be speculating every night, and if you want me
to talk to the press I'll be glad to.

K: Let me talk with Bob and don't do it till you hear from Bob or
me. I talked to Bob about the base in Texas . . .

L: I know; I talked to him and told him I'd rather get these communica-
tions from the Assistant for Security Affairs.

K: Bob agreed with it didn't he?

L: Yes, he said it won't happen again. But Henry you've got to
be hard-nosed about this.

K: If you get something from anyone else, just bounce it back to me.

L: That's what I'm doing.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Rogers/Kissinger

1:50 p.m. 3/31/71

R: I don't know if you saw the attack Agnew made on Fulbright. I want to be sure but doesn the President want to do that?

K: I will check. It's never been mentioned here. What did he say?

R: I realize that Fulbright is no bargain and we have gotten along with him.
"Agnew said Fulbright is a frustrated Presidential candidate and ? ? ? ? ? ? "

K: Never mentioned to me that this was coming out and it normally would be.
I will call in 15 mins.

R: I would like to tell Fulbright it's not an Administrationn--

K: Let me find out what happened so you know where you stand.

R: With Johnson Administration Fulbright was so mad that Rush couldn't go up there. He will not agree with us but if temper is good, it helps a lot.
If I say we want 3 weeks on testimony, he says fine but now it will be tough.

K: I have not heard this coming up but I don't inevitably.

R: If it were Dole I wouldn't mind but --

K: I will check and call you back.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Otis Chandler/Kissinger

2:40 p.m.

3/31/71

C: Getting to the beach?

K: In the afternoon.

C: Frank said he talked with you and you could come up. What's the schedule?

K: Yes. Fri. might be better.

C: How about for lunch? That's best for my gang. I have to leave in the afternoon.

K: It could be either Friday lunch or tomorrow late afternoon?

C: It might be.

K: How late can I let you know? First thing in the afternoon?

C: We could make it Friday early lunch or late. Start it at noon and have you out by 1:00.

K: I generally prefer around 5:00. I know Friday isn't good so it would have to be tomorrow. I will call you late this afternoon or tomorrow. I enjoyed seeing you at the Gridiron.

C: You shouldn't have laughed so much on Rogers.

K: That was painful but it brought us closer together.

C: Did you see the editorial on Calley? I would be interested in your opinion.

K: OK.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
Laird/Kissinger

2:45 p.m.

3/31/71

L: Can you give me a ________ on an item? Albert voted for a resolution on the floor of the House. They gave a report that the President was going to set a time on POW Thing. They got the indication from the visit.

K: Absolutely not. I was there.

L: I am meeting with them shortly.

K: What the President said was that you people have to ask yourselves if you will take responsibility for knifing the President in the back when he is close to success. That was his theme. He never said a word along that line. Don't give encouragement to that.

L: I won't. They voted --

K: I know what it is. It's good for us, isn't it? I would rather they make a irresponsible thing.

L: If they show they forced us, it's not good politically. They are voting on the Gates proposal too. . . -- to end the draft in a year.

K: What are you talking about?

L: The first was the caucus but this is the Gates draft. They are firing in to support Whalen amendment. It will be a close vote. It's come up a couple of times this afternoon.

K: Absolutely untrue.

L: Albert said he was supporting the President and this resolution.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON

Dave Kraslow

3/31/71 2:50 p.m.

DK: Is there any private guidance at all you can give me on the
Washington Daily News story?

HK: I'll say there's nothing to it, but I won't make any other
comment. But there's nothing to that.

DK: You are saying that the assertion that the President will
propose a tital withdrawal by January xlf (?) of '72 contingent upon the
release by Hanoi of the prisoners is a pipedraam?

HK: That's right.

DK: So if you were in my position you would stay completely
away from that story?

HK: As a friend, I have to tell you yes.

DK: Okay, thank you very much Henry.