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European component in NATO. But I think that this attempt to
turn NATO into an instrument of East-West detente will doom
NATO.

Q. Will doom NATO? But I learned just the other day in that
the U.S. community sector was very much in favor of
(?........).

A. Because it's politically the easy thing to do. Also,
it's emotionally satisfying.

Q. Yes.

A. But what's the sense of it.

Q. And a recent survey of the Rand Corp. shows that 57% of
Germans are in favor of a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops,
and 70% in favor of a complete withdrawal of U.S. nuclear
weapons. Doesn't an erosion of public support in Germany for
U.S. military presence constrain U.S. strategic flexibility?

A. To some extent, but it constrains European flexibility
more. The argument for American nuclear forces in Europe has
always been there. We don't need the forces in Europe.

Q. Somewhere somewhere become a member of the Security
Council of the United Nations what do you think.

A. In the course of (..................?) it's inevitable.
Unless there's a European Community and there's only one.

Q. But you don't see it.

A. Unlikely.

Q. And, finally, do you think that Germany should be
prepared to take part in military actions out of NATO area,
under the umbrella of the U.N. combat action?

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A. Preferably not for the '90s.

Q. No you don't see it.

A. No. I don't see why it is desirable to bring about a reawakening of historic fears. If it were a question of life and death for Europe, yes, but only if it is a question of life and death for Europe, I think the wiser course is not to encourage Germany to do that.

Q. OK. Thank you.

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Q. Just to start, a hypothetical question: do you have an idea about how future historians, might evaluate the role of Germany and the Germans played in the downfall of the Bolshevik empire during tge 1989-91 period?

A. First, one really has to go back to 1950; the Truman role will be very highly evaluated as will, I believe, the courage of Adenauer in opting for a Western alignment at a time when there was a temptation for at least attempting a national solution. That was the first major decision. And especially if one looks at the various proposals the Soviet Union made in 1952. UNIFICATION would could not have happened as it did if Germany had chosen a national ROUTE in the 1950s because then Germany would have been back in its traditional role of trying to balance itself against East and West.

Secondly, I believe that the period '89 to '91, which was an historic opportunity that could not come back, the German government showed courage in grasping that opportunity and pushing for unification.

Q. Which was basically the chancellor. And. . .

A. Which was substantially the chancellor. Against the preference of ALL of its allies. AND convincing them and dragging them along was also historically important because if there were two German states today, which was the alternative, then second, that was not the alternative. If the other German state were not Communist it would be a replay of European history after the Thirty Year's

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War, ~~because everybody~~ would then be tempted to try to play the German states against each other. And being Germans, ~~if you~~ ~~only~~ forgive me, ~~they~~ would find a philosophical reason for ~~comprehension~~ ~~ideology~~ existing, and ~~it~~ would have ~~really changed the map of~~ Europe. So I think that Chancellor Kohl will go down in world history if for nothing else and for what he did in '89 '90.

Q. In your columns you sometimes seem to refer to sort of (?)(~~~~~~ types of behavior, nations or national character. Perhaps you (?)~~~~~~ from (?)~~~~~~ to national security. So what about Germany, which in terms of GNP, population, conventional armed forces has become the most powerful nation in Central Europe. Which behavior do you envisage from Germany as nonaligned member.

A. When somebody tells me that a man of 50 has changed his personality completely I'm apt not to believe it. I know, even in the face of numerous movies in which a man has had experience and then suddenly turns 180-degree turn, from what he was. Likewise, I think there is such a thing as national character, a character which results from history, experiences, geography. It is not a racist view, it's simply what seems "reasonable" to people. In the case of Russia--I'll get to Germany in one second--it is true they have tried to expand their security but it developed a dynamism where their attempt to achieve security produced ever more insecurity, and they were therefore on an endless Russian imperialistic expansion which in my view led to their downfall. (They did it) first as a Communist empire and now as a Communist empire, and I think that is the key issue, one which

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people don't pay attention, to

With respect to Germany, First, it was the last country to be unified, the last major country to emerge. It spent all of its most of its intellectual energy becoming unified rather than reflecting on what to do once it was unified. And especially since it was unified in a way that nobody expected, which was, as an expression of pressure rather than as an expression of national

Secondly, its foreign policy was conducted for 19 years by a very great man who was a genius, but was not capable of institutionalizing policy. Though that policy was brilliant, it meant throwing a lot of balls into the air and being in a better position to pull them down than anybody else. None of his successors even understood it, nor were they able to do so.

Then between 1890 and 1914, I believe that Germany conducted what is arguably the first foreign policy that has been conducted in Europe in the modern period.

Q. Right.

A. In which Germany produced all the dangers it feared most. And managed to bring together Britain, France and Russia. It had been in the verge of war

Q. Sure.

A. Which nobody would have thought possible 10 years earlier. Building a navy, putting a military mission into Constantinople

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just to Chester picked two examples for which it is not possible to find a rational Imperial Germany to define procedure

From this I conclude that there is in Germany no tradition of national interest the way there is in England and even in France. So that there is the danger, some people say, of a return of Nazism, which I think that's absolutely out of the question. And, when people say Germany is going to march around Europe again, that's also not possible. What is possible, however, is that Germany may not be able to establish the right priorities, and that in its restless attempt to be intelligent, clever it will disquiet a lot of people, because all located when you're in the center of the continent, and you have more neighbors than anybody else, and you are so powerful you have to conduct a more prudent policy than people who are thirdly removed. The German statesman who understood this best was Adenauer

Q. Yes.

A. And I think Kohl understands it and it is his reason for being so committed to Europe.

But the German danger that I see has nothing to do with imperialism, has nothing to do with evil intentions but may have something to do with a certain romantic restlessness.

Q. Though, but (?) then a (?) who's said to have said about Germany and Germans, you either have them at your throat or at your feet.

A. No. I don't agree with that. I am not worried about a

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deliberately aggressive German foreign policy. The problem, I mean the Hitler problem, was the more one reads about him--is that of a Bohemian psychopath, I don't mean Bohemia but a sort of a "Bohemian" artistic psychopath.

Q. Right. Yes.

A. Got hold of a government. In a country that didn't under couldn't comprehend it.

Q. Yes.

A. The problem of the Germans between 1890 and 1914, which was the other difficult period but never could translate it into anything very concrete. So I think the idea that the Germans would be at peoples' throats is not the danger. The danger is that the Germans without a clear idea of what they want will play every situation purely tactically, and thereby create great disquiet without intending anything particularly unpleasant.

Q. But, as you probably know, what they call the French "political class" is a little bit disturbed.

A. Because, partly, of a real inequality of strength. Germany has a population nearly twice that of France. And it has a more dynamic industry. And, therefore, it has a large influence.

Q. Yes.

A. Now, France, you can reasonably argue, has not come to grips for 100 years with the loss of the preeminent position that the two Napoleons threw away. The French position as the preeminent power in Europe depended on a divided Central

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Europe, of divided Germany and Italy, and especially a divided Germany. That was the French policy since the Thirty Years' War. Once Germany was united, France was bound to be an important but no longer a preeminent country. They have found that very difficult to accept intellectually. So some of the things they're afraid of are unavoidable, and some those things may look to them like excessive assertiveness.

Q. Yes. Now, what about this assertiveness which is called (?)... United States also. What is the reason behind it.

A. I think there are two parts to it. One is that the Adenauer policy, which was followed by most the other chancellors, was to prove themselves reliable allies. And therefore the Germans leaders in most of the post-war years were easier to deal with than is normal with a powerful national state. As long as Germany was divided, West Germany required legitimization from the West, a legitimacy superior to that of East Germany. Now, of course, that Germany's united it has no reason to subordinate itself for that reason, though there may be other reasons.

Q. Yes

A. So it was inevitable that Germany would become more assertive, and that we have to get used to it.

The other element is a German tendency, which might be expressed as " anything worth doing is worth overdoing." I think the Germans are a more romantic people than the French, and less rationalistic than the French. Therefore emotion plays a larger role in German foreign policy and in German

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domestic debate. It would be hard in France to generate so much excitement about tanks to Turkey, or over Kurdistan or over the Kurds. These things are not even--in a strictly rational point of view--in the German interest.

Q. No.

A. So that tendency is inherent in German politics. And that makes people uneasy.

Q. Yes, I see now.

A. But it's less over Kohl than with any other chancellor except Adenauer.

Q. Could you say something about emerging tendencies, worldwide, toward nationalism and internationalism. In the world integration there's this (?)... Do you see economic community? The European Community decided last week to enhance the cohesion of the community, establish even a common currency. And this seems to indicate a decrease of nationalism in Western Europe at the same time as nationalism increases in the former Eastern Bloc. Which tendencies do you think will prevail at the beginning of the next (?)...

A. Both at the same time.

Q. And wouldn't one tendency affect the other. Could it happen that the integrating of the West would be as (?)... touched by America on (?)...

A. You see (?)... even in the West if you look at Scotland.

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Q. Yes. Ireland?

A. Ireland, Belfast, Lombardy. It may be that national states may weaken but not necessarily in favor of internationalism.

But of regionalism. I do not think it is at all self-evident that Europe will form itself into one nation. In fact, based on my perhaps in adequate experience, the people I know in the European countries seem to me to be less European today than they were five years ago, or when they are European they do it rationally. I do not find my great emotion. My warm affection for German friends are not all that enthusiastic about the common currency. So I suspend judgment even about Europe going far beyond some economic integration.

In Eastern Europe, the big problem that, in my view, nobody addresses is that the area between the Polish frontier and Vladivostok is for the first time in 400 years capable of being organized as a region. We all talk about democracy in Russia, market economics. There's no real democracy, and there's no real market economics. And it's not even self-evident to me that democracies never make wars against each other. World War I occurred in countries that were more-or-less democratic to the wild enthusiasm of the population. If you held a plebiscite in Serbia today, I'd bet you 80% of the people would approve what is being done in Bosnia and Croatia, and the same in Croatia, I will respect your decision.

A. So it's not done by dictatorships alone. But I'll put that aside. The major point, it seems to me, is we have this real chance we have.

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area--I mean we don't have it. This area exists for the first time in 400 years, and it is trying to break up into various states. One could make the case for the proposition that this is even better for Russia because it will still be a huge country of 150 million with a bigger territory than any other state but ~~will~~

(......?)

It will not have the incubus? of all these foreign nationalities. I do not see any outside country discussing the relationship of Ukraine to Russia, ~~(1)~~ to Russia. All the actions of the outside countries seem to me designed so as to exalt the role of Russia. Russia maintaining troops in their territory + has diplomatic relations, will item. If these trends continue

That it becomes inevitable that they will recentralize the whole area again and thereby recreate the old Russian problem.

The old Russian problem is that once you have half your population foreign there's no stopping for it. There was a Russian nationalist writer who in the 19th Century said we are now at the (...).? but if we don't reach the Adriatic we have to go back to the (...).

Q. Yeah, Yeah. That one to involve (?).

A. But it's built into the structure so we all talk as if we were a social welfare program in Russia. And that would be this were a social welfare program in Russia. And that seems to me when you say regionalism what is easily possible is that the West now begins to move towards integration. And if we're going to get there, er will stop short. The East will break up into small units but will reintegrate under the tutelage of one imperial power.

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Q. Taking things.

A. This in fact is what I think will happen.

Q. Which will happen you think.

A. More likely than not.

Q. More likely than not.

A. And we're encouraging it.

Q. What should we do?

A. First, I think the Russians ~~find it~~ offensive to be treated as if they were just another European state. The Russians ~~have a long history of being European and not quite~~ European. They're both. They have their own particular culture. I think we can tell the Russians that we can ~~understand~~ Deal we are melting with them, provided they don't repeat Russian expansionist history. And provided that at least the larger units and the historic units are dealt with as if they were nations. If they then want to create something like the European Community on the basis of sovereignty, that's a different matter. So I do not see why we do not make it clearer that we'll consider Ukraine (U), Baltic states and Khazikstan as nations. It is now a very amorphous area. Now it's very similar to what it was between 1917 and 1922. We had a number of defacto separate units appeared but in the back of the Russians' mind, there was the belief, as I believe it is in the present leaders that in a measurable time they'll get them back. Just as they did in 1922.

Q. Should the former U.S.S.R. become more affiliated to the European Community?

A. Absolutely. I believe it is important that we do not

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create a no-man's land between the German border and the Russian border in which the historic contest between Germans and Russians ~~gets reinvited and in which the countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary a minimum are encouraged~~

rapidly to become ~~associated with the West. And I find it~~

troublesome that so much passion is given to economic aid programs for Russia and so little to Eastern Europe. I ~~do not~~

~~the~~ object to aid program for Russia. But we need to get a sense of priority. ~~And we need to get a sense of balance. I think it~~

is in our interest that the transition to market economics and Western values succeed in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. That will in the long run even help inside the former Soviet Union.

Q. But when these states get affiliated to the EC, it would be difficult to envisage that the cohesion of this community would be enhanced.

A. No but I think Greece and Northern Europe are a bigger obstacle to that. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary inwardly consider themselves belonging to the West.

Q. Now coming to NATO. Do the defense ministers of the states of the former U.S.S.R. take part in NATO meetings.

A. Ridiculous. NO

Why?

It guarantees the end of NATO. NATO was a defensive alliance. If it isn't a defensive alliance what is it? It will lead to the moral disintegration of NATO. What common purpose do we have with those defense ministers? And what is the

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danger that we're trying to deal with in NATO. You cannot have
a defensive alliance that does not have some probable danger
and common political objective.
And the central area
republics are no more European than Palermais

Q. So where would you locate the danger?.

A. I could say first of all I don't have to know where to locate the (??...... ?). One of the problems that always happens is you ask an individual what he would do. I I would assume that if these great men who lead world affairs today get together and put all their bureaucracies to work, they might be able to do better than I. Therefore you shouldn't judge the problem. I would say the problem of how the IF? will organize itself over the next five or 10 years. It's a problem that concerns us.

Q. Yes.

A. This may be now more a political than a military problem. And therefore the military forces ~~should~~ can be somewhat reduced. Considerably reduced. Secondly, there are certain ~~special~~ trouble spots that are certain to arise again-- the Persian Gulf, North Africa--even such conceivable cases as Yugoslavia. We need American forces in Europe for the balance between the West European countries and for the balance between Europe and a reawakening of Russia. Because Russia will become again a major country. And, because ~~she~~ is. And therefore we don't ~~need a plan for military operations~~ but then we have to organize it so that in some areas the United States can take the predominant role and in other areas Europe can take a predominant role. And therefore I have always favored a

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Q. Will doom NATO? But I learned just the other day in that the U.S. community sector was very much in favor of (? .........). even though it is and

Q. Yes.

A. In the course of ( .........), it is inevitable. To take the place of a European Community and there's only one.

Q. But you don't see it.

A. Unlikely.

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Q. No you don't see it.

Q. OK. Thank you.

1

4/28/92

## INTERVIEW

Q. Just to start, a hypothetical question: do you have an idea about how future historians might evaluate the role of Germany and the role Germans played in the downfall of the Bolshevik empire during the 1989-91 period?

A. First, one really has to go back to 1950; the Truman role will be very highly evaluated as will, I believe, the courage of Adenauer in opting for a Western alignment at a time when there was a temptation for at least attempting a national solution. That was the first major decision, and especially if one looks at the various proposals the Soviet Union made in 1952. Unification could not have happened as it did if Germany had chosen a national route in the 1950s because then Germany would have been back in its traditional role of trying to balance itself against East and West.

Secondly, I believe that the period '89 to '91, which was a historic opportunity that would come back to the German

3

which in terms of GNP, population, conventional armed forces has
become the most powerful nation in Central Europe. Which
behavior do you envisage from Germany as a nonaligned member?

A. When somebody tells me that a man of 50 has changed his personality completely am I apt not to believe it, even in the face of movies in which a person has a seminal experience and then m in his life. suddenly f takes a 180-degree turn, I do think there is such a thing as national character, which results from history, of experience, of geography. In the case of Russia--I'll get to Germany in one second--it is true they have tried to expand their security, but also their attempt to achieve security produced ever more insecurity. Russian imperialistic expansion was inherently limitless, which in my view led to their downfall. The continuity of a Czarist, and then a Communist empire is the key issue to which people don't pay adequate attention.

With respect to Germany, it was the last European country to
be unified. It spent much of its intellectual energy becoming
unified rather than reflecting on what to do once it was unified.

4

And especially since it was unified in a way that nobody expected, which was an expression of Prussia rather than as an expression of nationalism and liberalism like the other European states.

Secondly, its foreign policy was conducted for 19 years by a genius. Yet Otto von Bismarck was not capable of institutionalizing his policy. Though his policy was brilliant, it meant throwing a lot of balls into the air and being in a better position to pull them down than anybody else. None of his successors even understood it, nor were they able to carry it out.

Then, between 1890 and 1914, I believe that Germany conducted what is arguably the worst foreign policy that has been conducted in Europe in the modern period.

Q. Right.

A. In which Germany produced all the dangers it feared most, and managed to bring together Britain, France and Russia which had been on the verge of war.

5

Q. Sure.

A. Nobody would have thought it possible 10 years earlier. Building a navy, putting a military mission into Constantinople, just to pick two examples of the incapacity of Imperial Germany to define priorities.

From this I conclude that there is in Germany no tradition of national interest comparable to that of England and even in France. The danger of a return of Nazism I consider absolutely out of the question as of German armies marching around Europe again. What is possible, however, is that Germany may not be able to establish the right priorities, and that in its restless attempt to be clever it will disquiet a lot of people. When you are located in the center of the continent, have more neighbors than anybody else, and are so powerful, you have to conduct a more prudent policy than people who are more removed. The German statesman who understood this best was Adenauer.

Q. Yes.

6

being so committed to Europe. But the German danger that I see
has nothing to do with imperialism, has nothing to do with evil
intentions, but may have something to do with a certain romantic
restlessness.

Q. Churchill is said to have said about Germany and Germans, you either have them at your throat or at your feet.

A. No. I don't agree with that. I am not worried about a
militantly deliberately aggressive German foreign policy. That the Germans
would be at peoples' throats is not the danger. The danger is
that the Germans without a clear idea of what they want will play
every situation purely tactically, and thereby create great
disquiet without intending anything particularly aggressive.

A. Because of a real inequality of strength. Germany has a
population nearly twice that of France, and it has a more
dynamic industry. And, therefore, it has a greater influence.

Q. Yes.

7

A. Now, France, you can reasonably argue, has not come to grips for 100 years with the loss of the preeminent position that the two Napoleons threw away. The French position as the preeminent power in Europe depended on a divided Central Europe, and on a divided Germany and Italy, especially a divided Germany. That was the French policy since the Thirty Years' War. Once Germany was united, France was bound to be an important, but no longer a preeminent country. They have found that very difficult to accept intellectually. Therefore some of what they fear is unavoidable, and some aspects inherent in German power may look to them like excessive assertiveness.

Q. Yes. Now, what about this assertiveness which is called (?) ______ United States also. What is the reason behind it?

A. I think there are two parts to it. One is that the Adenauer policy, which was followed by most of the other Chancellors, was to prove Germany as a reliable ally. And therefore, the German leaders in most of the post-war years were easier to deal with than leaders would be, especially with a powerful national

(Y)

8

state. As long as Germany was divided, West Germany required legitimization from the West, a legitimacy superior to that of East Germany. Now, of course, that Germany is united it does not have the same reason to subordinate itself for that reason, though there may be other reasons.

Q. Yes.

A. So it was inevitable that Germany would become more assertive once it was unified, and we have to get used to it. That.

The other element is a German tendency, which might be expressed as "anything worth doing is worth overdoing." I think the Germans are more Romantic and less rationalistic than the French. Therefore emotion plays a larger role in German foreign policy and in German domestic debates. It would be hard in France to generate so much excitement about tanks to Turkey, or over Kurdistan or over the Kurds. These things are not even--in a strictly rational point of view--in the German interest.

Q. No.

A. So a certain emotionalism is inherent in German

(Y)

9

Q. Yes, I see now.

A. ~~But~~ it should be less (with Kohl than any other German leader.

Q. Could you say something about emerging tendencies, worldwide, toward nationalism and internationalism. In the world integration there's this (?) ______ Do you see economic community? The European Community decided last week to enhance the cohesion of the community, establish even a common currency. And this seems to indicate a decrease of nationalism in Western Europe at the same time as nationalism increases in the former Eastern Bloc. Which tendencies do you think will prevail at the beginning of the next (?) ______?

A. Both at the same time.

Q. And wouldn't one tendency affect the other? Could it happen that the integrating of the West would be as (?) ______ touched by America on (?) ______?

A. Regionalism exists even in the West--look at Catalonia,

10

But I do not think it is at all self-evident that Europe will form itself into one nation. In fact, many European countries seem to me to be less European today than they were five years ago. When they are European ~~it is~~ they are so and it is rationally ~~without great emotion.~~ Many of my German friends are not all that enthusiastic about the common currency. So I suspend judgment ~~over~~ about Europe going ~~far beyond some~~ very much ~~a sort of~~ economic integration.

In Eastern Europe, the big problem that ~~in my view~~ nobody addresses is that the area between the Polish frontier and Vladivostok is for the first time in 400 years capable of being organized ~~as~~ something other than a vast empire. We ~~all~~ talk about democracy in Russia, ~~market economics.~~ There's no real democracy, and there's no real market economics. And it's not even self-evident to me that democracies never make wars against each other. World War I occurred ~~in~~ countries that were more or

11

less democratic to the wild enthusiasm of the population. If you
held a plebiscite in Serbia today, I'd bet ~~~ 80% of the people
would approve what is being done in Bosnia and Croatia, and the
same in Croatia with respect to Bosnia.

The major point, it seems to me, is that this vast area ~~for~~ is the first time in 400 years ~~is~~ trying to break up into various states. One could make the case for the proposition that this is even better for Russia because it will still be a huge country of 150 million ~~and~~ but with a bigger territory than any other state ~~without~~ the incubus of all these foreign nationalities. ~~I do not see any~~ outside country discussing the relationship of Ukraine to Russia or of the other republics to Russia. All the actions of the outside countries seem to me designed so as to exalt the role of Russia. Russia maintains troops in their territory and has no diplomatic relations with them. If these trends continue, recentralization of the whole area is likely again, and thereby ~~the~~ And (recreation of the old Russian problem. The old Russian problem is that once ~~you have~~ half your population ~~is~~ foreign there's no

13

For a while, between 1917 and 1922. A number of defacto separate units have appeared, but in the back of many Russian minds there is the belief that in a measurable time they'll get them back just as they did in 1922.

Q. Should the former satellites become more affiliated to the European Community?

A. Absolutely. I believe it is important that we do not create a No Man's Land between the German borders and the Russian borders in which the historic contest between Germans and Russians reemerges. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary at a minimum should be encouraged to become rapidly associated with the West. And I find it troublesome that so much passion is given to economic aid programs for Russia and so little to Eastern Europe. I favor the aid program for Russia, but we need to get a sense of balance. I think it is in our interest that the transition to market economics and Western values succeed in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. That will in the long run (even) help inside the former Soviet Union.

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A. No, but I think Greece and Northern Europe are a bigger obstacle to that. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary inwardly consider themselves as belonging to the West.

Q. Now, coming to NATO. Do the defense ministers of the states of the former USSR take part in NATO meetings?

A. No.

Q. Why?

A. It guarantees the ultimate end of NATO. NATO was a defensive alliance. If it was not a defense alliance, then it will lead to the moral disintegration of NATO. What common purpose do we have with those defense ministers? And what is the danger that we're trying to deal with in NATO? You cannot have a defensive alliance that does not have some probable danger and some common political objective. And the Central Asian republics are no more European than Pakistan.

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A. But what's the sense of it?

Q. And a recent survey of the Rand Corp. shows that 57% of Germans are in favor of a complete withdrawal of US troops, and 70% in favor of a complete withdrawal of US nuclear weapons. Doesn't an erosion of public support in Germany for US military presence constrain US strategic flexibility?

Q. Somewhere become a member of the Security Council of the United Nations what do you think.

A. In the course of the '90s it is inevitable. Unless there's a European Community that takes the place for all of Europe.

Q. But you don't see it.

A. Unlikely.

Q. And, finally, do you think that Germany should be prepared to take part in military actions out of NATO area, under the umbrella of the UN combat action?

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4/29/92

## INTERVIEW

A. First, one really has to go back to 1950; the Truman role will be very highly evaluated as will, I believe, the courage of Adenauer in opting for Western alignment at a time when there was a temptation for at least attempting a national solution. That was the first major decision, especially if one looks at the various proposals the Soviet Union made in 1952. Unification could not have happened as it did if Germany had chosen a national route in the 1950s because then Germany would have been back in its traditional role of trying to balance itself against both East and West.

Secondly, I believe that in the period '89 to '91, the German government showed rare courage in grasping the opportunity

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of pushing for unification which was a historic opportunity that
would come only once.

Q. Which was basically the Chancellor. And..

A. Which was substantially the Chancellor--against the
preference of many of his compatriots and all of his allies.
Convincing them and dragging them along was historically
important because otherwise there would be two German states
today, which was the alternative. Even if the second German
state turned out to be non-Communist, it would have been a replay
of European history after the Thirty Years' War. Other nations
would then have been tempted to try to play the German states
against each other. And being Germans, the two German states
would have found philosophical reasons for existing, and for
competing. So I think that Chancellor Kohl will go down in world
history if for nothing else than for what he did in '89-'90.

Q. In your columns you sometimes seem to refer to a sort of
national character. Perhaps you (?) ______________ from
(?) ______________ to national security. So what about Germany,

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3

A. When somebody tells me that a man of 50 has changed his personality completely I am apt not to believe it, even in the face of movies in which a person has a seminal experience and then suddenly makes a 180-degree turn in his life. I do think there is such a thing as national character, which is the result of history, of experience and of geography. In the case of Russia--I'll get to Germany in one second--it is true they have always tried to expand their security, but it is also true that their attempt to achieve security produced ever more insecurity. Russian imperialistic expansion was inherently limitless, which in my view led to their downfall. The continuity of a Czarist, and then Communist, empire is a key issue to which people don't pay adequate attention.

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P.05

4

Especially since it was unified in a way that nobody expected--
as an expression of Prussia rather than as an expression of
nationalism and liberalism like the other European states.

Secondly, for 19 years its foreign policy was conducted by a
genius. Yet Otto von Bismarck was not capable of
institutionalizing his policy. Though his policy was brilliant,
it meant throwing a lot of balls into the air and being in a
better position to pull them down than anybody else. None of his
successors even understood it, nor were they able to carry it
out.

Then, between 1890 and 1914, I believe that Germany
conducted what is arguably the worst foreign policy seen in
Europe in the modern period.

Q. Right.

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5

Q. Sure.

A. Nobody would have thought it possible 10 years earlier. Building a navy, putting a military mission into Constantinople, to pick just two examples of the incapacity of Imperial Germany to define priorities.

From this I conclude that there is in Germany no tradition of national interest comparable to England or France. I consider the danger of a return of Nazism absolutely out of the question as of German armies marching around Europe again. What is possible, however, is that Germany may not be able to establish the right priorities, and that in its restless attempt to be clever it will disquiet a lot of people. When you are located in the center of the continent, have more neighbors than anybody else, and are that powerful, you have to conduct a more prudent policy than people who are more geographically removed. The German statesman who understood this best was Adenauer.

Q. Yes.

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P.02

being so committed to Europe. The German danger that I see has
nothing to do with imperialism, has nothing to do with evil
intentions, but may have something to do with a certain romantic
restlessness.

A. No. I don't agree with that. I am not worried about a militantly aggressive German foreign policy. That the Germans would be at peoples' throats is not the danger. The danger is that without a clear idea of what they want the Germans will play every situation purely tactically, and thereby create great disquiet without intending anything particularly aggressive.

A. Because of a real inequality of strength. Germany has a
population nearly twice that of France, and it has a more dynamic
industry. Therefore, it has greater influence.

Q. Yes.

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7

A. Now, France, you can reasonably argue, has not come to grips for 100 years with the loss of the preeminent position that the two Napoleons threw away. The French position as the preeminent power in Europe depended on a divided Central Europe, and on a divided Germany and Italy--most especially on a divided Germany. That was the French policy since the Thirty Years' War. Once Germany was united, France was bound to be an important, but no longer preeminent, country. They have found that very difficult to accept intellectually. Therefore some of what they fear is unavoidable, and some aspects inherent in German power may look to them like excessive assertiveness.

A. I think there are two parts to it. One is that the Adenauer policy, which was followed by most of the subsequent Chancellors, was to prove that Germany was a reliable ally. Therefore, the German leaders for most of the post-war years were easier to deal with than leaders would be normally of a powerful

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P.04

8

national state. As long as Germany was divided, West Germany required legitimization from the West--a legitimacy superior to that of East Germany. Now, of course, that Germany is united it does not have the same reason to subordinate itself for that reason, though there may be other reasons.

Q. Yes.

A. So, it was inevitable that Germany would become more assertive once it was unified, and we have to get used to that.

The other element is a German tendency which might best be expressed as "anything worth doing is worth overdoing." I think the Germans are more Romantic and less rationalistic than the French. Therefore emotion plays a larger role in German foreign policy and domestic debates. It would be hard in France to generate so much excitement about tanks to Turkey--or over the Kurds. These are things which are not even--from a strictly rational point of view--in the German interest.

Q. No.

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P.05

9

Q. Yes, I see now.

A. Though it should be less the case with Kohl than any other German leader.

A. Both at the same time.

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(c)

10

But I do not think it is at all self-evident that Europe
will form itself into one nation. In fact, many European
countries seem to me to be less "European" today than they were
five years ago. When they are European they are so rationally
and without great emotion. Many of my German friends are not all
that enthusiastic about the common currency. So I suspend
judgment about Europe going very much beyond some sort of
economic integration.

In Eastern Europe, the big problem that nobody addresses is
that the area between the Polish frontier and Vladivostok is for
the first time in 400 years capable of being organized into
something other than a vast empire. We talk about democracy in
Russia and market economics. Yet there is no real democracy, and
there is no real market economics. And it is not even self-
evident to me that democracies never make wars against each
other. World War I occurred among countries that were more or

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P.07

11
less democratic to the wild enthusiasm of the population. If you
held a plebiscite in Serbia today, I'd bet 80% of the people
would approve what is being done in Bosnia and Croatia, and the
same in Croatia with respect to Bosnia.

The major point, it seems to me, is that this vast area is
for the first time in 400 years trying to break up into various
states. One could make the case for the proposition that this is
even better for Russia because it will still be a huge country of
150 million and with a bigger territory than any other state but
without the incubus of all these foreign nationalities. Yet all
the actions of the outside countries seem to me designed to exalt
the role of Russia. Russia maintains troops on their territory
and has no diplomatic relations with them. If these trends
continue, recentralization of the whole area is likely again, and
thereby the recreation of the old Russian problem. And the old
Russian problem is that once half your population is foreign,
there is no stopping anywhere.

Recentralization will reproduce imperialism. So we must not

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P.08

12

treat aid to Russia as a social welfare program. The political dimension must also be included. It would be a crisis if the West, moving towards integration, began to reverse that process while the East, breaking up into smaller units, will reintegrate under the tutelage of one imperial power.

Q. What should we do?

A. Russia has a long history of being both European and not quite European. Its own particular culture is both. Russia should understand that we are willing to cooperate with it provided it does not repeat Russian expansionist tendencies, and provided that the historic units of the old Empire are dealt with as autonomous nations. If they then want to create something like a European Community on the basis of sovereignty, that's a different matter. I do not see why we do not make it clearer that we'll consider Ukraine, Baltic states and Khazikstan as nations. Right now it is very amorphous, very similar to what it was between 1917 and 1922. For a while a number of de facto separate units have appeared, but in the back of many Russian

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P.09

A. Absolutely. I believe it is important that we do not create a No-Man's Land between the German and the Russian borders in which the historic contest between Germans and Russians reemerges. At a minimum Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary should be encouraged to become rapidly associated with the West. And I find it troublesome that so much passion is given to economic aid programs for Russia and so little for Eastern Europe. I favor the aid program for Russia, but we need to get a better sense of balance. I think it is in our interest that the transition to market economics and Western values succeed in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. That will in the long run help even the former Soviet Union.

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P.10

14

would be enhanced.

A. No.

Q. Why?

A. It guarantees the ultimate end of NATO. NATO was a defensive alliance. If it was not a defense alliance, then what was it? Changing that will lead to the moral disintegration of NATO. What common purpose do we have with those defense ministers? And what is the danger that we're trying to deal with together with them? You cannot have a defensive alliance that does not contain some probable danger and some common political objective. The Central Asian republics are no more European than Pakistan.

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15

A. First this may now be more a political than a military problem. Therefore, the military forces can be considerably reduced. Secondly, there are special trouble spots that are certain to arise again--the Persian Gulf, North Africa, even such cases as Yugoslavia. We need American forces in Europe to keep the balance among the West European countries, and for the balance between Europe and a reawakening of Russia. Because Russia will again become a major country. And since the new challenges will be far more complex than the traditional ones have been, we have to organize NATO so that in some areas the United States can take a predominant role and in other areas Europe can take a predominant role. In fact, I have always favored a European component in NATO. But I think that this attempt to turn NATO into an instrument of East-West detente will doom NATO. Even though it is politically the easy thing to do and is emotionally satisfying.

Q. Yes. And a recent survey of the Rand Corp. shows that 57% of Germans are in favor of a complete withdrawal of US forces from Europe.

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16

A. In the course of the '90s it is inevitable. Unless the European Community takes the place for all of Europe.

Q. But you don't see it.

A. Unlikely.

Q. No you don't see it.

A. No. I don't see why it would be desirable to bring about a reawakening of historic fears. If it were a question of

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☑ 001

CAUTION: This material is strictly embargoed. Its use is authorized
only by subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column. With the
exception of these paid subscribers, its contents must not under
any circumstances be quoted, excerpted, summarized, paraphrased or
in any way published, in whole or in part. Precautions should be
taken to prevent the disclosure of the contents of this material to
third parties prior to publication.

HENRY KISSINGER INTERVIEW

For release Sunday, May 3, 1992

(c) 1992, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

This interview with Henry Kissinger was conducted by Manfred
Geist, editor in chief of Welt Am Sonntag.

Secondly, I believe that in the period '89 to '91, the German
government showed rare courage in grasping the opportunity of
pushing for unification which was a historic opportunity that would
come only once.

A. Which was substantially the Chancellor -- against the
preference of many of his compatriots and all of his allies.
Convincing them and dragging them along was historically important
because otherwise there would be two German states today, which was
the alternative. Even if the second German state turned out to be
non-Communist, it would have been a replay of European history
after the Thirty Years' War. Other nations would then have been
tempted to try to play the German states against each other. And
being Germans, the two German states would have found philosophical
reasons for existing and for competing. So I think that Chancellor
Kohl will go down in world history if for nothing else than for
what he did in '89-'90.

Q. In your columns you sometimes seem to refer to a sort of
national character. What behavior do you envisage from Germany as a
nonaligned member?

A. When somebody tells me that a man of 50 has changed his
personality completely I am apt not to believe it, even in the face
of movies in which a person has a seminal experience and then
suddenly makes a 180-degree turn in his life. I do think there is
such a thing as national character, which is the result of history,
of experience and of geography. In the case of Russia -- I'll get
to Germany in one second -- it is true they have always tried to
expand their security, but it is also true that their attempt to

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KISSINGER 5/03/92

With respect to Germany, it was the last European country to be unified. It spent much of its intellectual energy becoming unified rather than reflecting on what to do once it was unified. Especially since it was unified in a way that nobody expected -- as an expression of Prussia rather than as an expression of nationalism and liberalism like the other European states.

Q. Right.

A. In which Germany produced all the dangers it feared most and managed to bring together Britain, France and Russia which had been on the verge of war.

Q. Sure.

From this I conclude that there is in Germany no tradition of national interest comparable to England or France. I consider the danger of a return of Nazism absolutely out of the question as of German armies marching around Europe again. What is possible, however, is that Germany may not be able to establish the right priorities, and that in its restless attempt to be clever it will disquiet a lot of people. When you are located in the center of the continent, have more neighbors than anybody else and are that powerful, you have to conduct a more prudent policy than people who are more geographically removed. The German statesman who understood this best was Adenauer.

Q. Yes.

A. And I think Kohl understands it and it is his reason for being so committed to Europe. The German danger that I see has nothing to do with imperialism, has nothing to do with evil intentions, but may have something to do with a certain romantic restlessness.

A. No. I don't agree with that. I am not worried about a militantly aggressive German foreign policy. That the Germans would be at people's throats is not the danger. The danger is that without a clear idea of what they want the Germans will play every situation purely tactically, and thereby create great disquiet

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Q. Yes.

A. Now, France, you can reasonably argue, has not come to grips for 100 years with the loss of the preeminent position that the two Napoleons threw away. The French position as the preeminent power in Europe depended on a divided Central Europe, and on a divided Germany and Italy -- most especially on a divided Germany. That was the French policy since the Thirty Years' War. Once Germany was united, France was bound to be an important, but no longer preeminent, country. They have found that very difficult to accept intellectually. Therefore some of what they fear is unavoidable, and some aspects inherent in German power may look to them like excessive assertiveness.

Q. Yes. Now, what about this assertiveness. What is the reason behind it?

A. I think there are two parts to it. One is that the Adenauer policy, which was followed by most of the subsequent chancellors, was to prove that Germany was a reliable ally. Therefore, the German leaders for most of the post-war years were easier to deal with than leaders would be normally of a powerful national state. As long as Germany was divided, West Germany required legitimization from the West -- a legitimacy superior to that of East Germany. Now, of course, that Germany is united it does not have the same reason to subordinate itself, though there may be other reasons.

Q. Yes.

The other element is a German tendency which might best be expressed as "anything worth doing is worth overdoing." I think the Germans are more Romantic and less rationalistic than the French. Therefore emotion plays a larger role in German foreign policy and domestic debates. It would be hard in France to generate so much excitement about tanks to Turkey -- or over the Kurds. These are things which are not even -- from a strictly rational point of view -- in the German interest.

Q. No.

A. So a certain emotionalism is inherent in German politics. And that makes people uneasy.

Q. Yes, I see now.

Q. Could you say something about emerging tendencies, worldwide, toward nationalism and internationalism. Do you see economic community? The European Community decided last week to enhance the cohesion of the community, establish even a common currency. And this seems to indicate a decrease of nationalism in Western Europe at the same time as nationalism increases in the former Eastern

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Bloc. Which tendencies do you think will prevail at the beginning of the next century?

A. Both at the same time.

A. Regionalism exists even in the West -- look at Catalonia, Belfast, Lombardy. It may be that national states may weaken but not necessarily in favor of internationalism.

In Eastern Europe, the big problem that nobody addresses is that the area between the Polish frontier and Vladivostok is for the first time in 400 years capable of being organized into something other than a vast empire. We talk about democracy in Russia and market economics. Yet there is no real democracy, and there is no real market economics. And it is not even self-evident to me that democracies never make wars against each other. World War I occurred among countries that were more or less democratic to the wild enthusiasm of the population. If you held a plebiscite in Serbia today, I'd bet 80 percent of the people would approve what is being done in Bosnia and Croatia, and the same in Croatia with respect to Bosnia.

The major point, it seems to me, is that this vast area is for the first time in 400 years trying to break up into various states. One could make the case for the proposition that this is even better for Russia because it will still be a huge country of 150 million and with a bigger territory than any other state but without the incubus of all these foreign nationalities. Yet all the actions of the outside countries seem to me designed to exalt the role of Russia. Russia maintains troops on their territory and has no diplomatic relations with them. If these trends continue, recentralization of the whole area is likely again, and thereby the re-creation of the old Russian problem. And the old Russian problem is that once half your population is foreign, there is no stopping anywhere.

Recentralization will reproduce imperialism. So we must not treat aid to Russia as a social welfare program. The political dimension must also be included. It would be a crisis if the West, moving toward integration, began to reverse that process while the East, breaking up into smaller units, will reintegrate under the tutelage of one imperial power.

Q. What should we do?

A. Russia has a long history of being both European and not quite European. Its own particular culture is both. Russia should understand that we are willing to cooperate with it provided it does not repeat Russian expansionist tendencies, and provided that the historic units of the old empire are dealt with as autonomous nations. If they then want to create something like a European Community on the basis of sovereignty, that's a different matter. I

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do not see why we do not make it clearer that we'll consider Ukraine, Baltic states and Kazakhstan as nations. Right now it is very amorphous, very similar to what it was between 1917 and 1922. For a while a number of de facto separate units have appeared, but in the back of many Russian minds there is the belief that in a measurable time they'll get them back just as they did in 1922.

Q. Now, coming to NATO. Do the defense ministers of the states of the former U.S.S.R. take part in NATO meetings?

A. No.

Q. Why?

A. First, this may now be more a political than a military problem. Therefore, the military forces can be considerably reduced. Secondly, there are special trouble spots that are certain to arise again -- the Persian Gulf, North Africa, even such cases as Yugoslavia. We need American forces in Europe to keep the balance among the West European countries, and for the balance between Europe and a reawakening of Russia. Because Russia will again become a major country. And since the new challenges will be far more complex than the traditional ones have been, we have to organize NATO so that in some areas the United States can take a predominant role and in other areas Europe can take a predominant role. In fact, I have always favored a European component in NATO. But I think that this attempt to turn NATO into an instrument of East-West detente will doom NATO. Even though it is politically the easy thing to do and is emotionally satisfying.

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Q. Yes. And a recent survey of the Rand Corp. shows that 57 percent of Germans are in favor of a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops, and 70 percent in favor of a complete withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons. Doesn't an erosion of public support in Germany for U.S. military presence constrain U.S. strategic flexibility?

Q. Sometime become a member of the Security Council of the United Nations? What do you think?

Q. But you don't see it.

A. Unlikely.

Q. No, you don't see it.

A. No. I don't see why it would be desirable to bring about a reawakening of historic fears. If it were a question of life and death for Europe, yes, but only if it were a question of life and death for Europe. I think the wiser course is not to encourage Germany to do that.