TelCon

Und. Secy. Porter/Mr. Kissinger

12:10 pm, March 29, 1973

K: Hello.

P: Henry, excuse me, one item in connection with the last item
you mentioned. Would that mean a replacement of one of the
political officers--

K: No, we can probably add it.

P: Okay, at what level would it be, have you an idea--on the list where we stand.

K: I can find that out for you.

P: Okay, I just wanted--

K: I've got his name but I don't know what his level is.

P: Well, okay, in any case--

K: Oh, if you can drop somebody we won't object to that, but knowing
that you people will take anything except a reduction in spaces.

P: Well, give me whatever you can about this.

K: I'll let you have it this afternoon.

P: All right, fine.

K: Good, thank you Bill
at

P: Not/all, bye bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Aut. by HAR.Davis

TelCon

Joe Alsop/Mr. Kissinger

12:22 pm, March 29, 1973

K: Hello.

A: Hello.

K: Joe.

A: Yes, Henry.

KXX A: Is there any chance of seeing you for a moment.

K: You are not free for lunch tomorrow?

A: I really can't, I have this scholar, he's coming all the over from Baltimore, and it's a two week old date, and he's doing it for my sake.

K: Because that is now possible.

A: Oh, hell.

K: Is breakfast tomorrow possible?

A: Entirely.

K: Well, let me see if I can switch my breakfast to lunch and then I'll see you for breakfast.

A: Okay. The thing is, you would be by any chance, this is a kind of Hunerous suggestion, like to replace Mr. Haldeman as an extra man, rather grand, the Republicans --- they are giving for George Bush.

K: I'm afraid I can't for the same reasons he can't.

A: You have to be there to see the performance.

K: Exactly.

A: What's it going to be about, domestic or foreign.

K: Both.

CLASSIFIED

TelCon
Dr. Hannah/Mr. Kissinger

2:40 pm, March 29, 1973

H: Hello.

H: Henry

K: John, how are you?

H: Pretty good. I'm calling you about the proposal that's being put together for the President in h9s negotiations with Thieu, and the document that bothers me, not what's in it, but how we use it, that is the possibility of requiring the use of $40/50 million of Development Loan funds in Fiscal '73. Let me back up and say I recognize that there's no more commitment that's more important than that we keep our commitments now only reconstruction and whatever for Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam. I was out there ten <u>week</u> days ago in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and came away with the conviction I've always had, we are going to have to keep this commitment and the number one problem that they are concerned with is not problems in March, April, May or June, but the South Vietnamese are interested in what happens in July, August and September.

K: Right.

H: And they require that there be enough money so that they can provide jobs for their people and in a climate that will hopefully encourage industrial development or investments from outside and all the rest of it. In the conversations with the Minister of Finance, Minister of Economy and with the President and so on, this is made very clear and so on, and I recognize it, and I recognize that--

K: I understand your point. What is your concern.

H: The concern is that if whatever the announcement is that we are going to make available to them Development Loans for them in 1973, that's no problem, but if the intention is, if they are actually going to collect on it in the next month or two, this means that before we can make a development loan to South Vietnam, I've got to get approval, prior approval from <u>Ngoai ve</u> and from Passman. I think I can get it from Passman, but we've been doing an <u>nursing</u> job with Senator <u>Inouye</u> for the last many months, he's coming along pretty well, and he's got a very unfriendly staff assistant, a fellow by the name of ---

K: What is it you say you can live with?

2

H: Well, I can live, Henry, with anything because you are the boss, the President is the boss, but and I haven't any objection with this package which you say we're going up the $50/60 ex or $400 millions of dollars of Development Loans and keep it available to us in South Vietnam as we have to, but I don't want to have to go up and face up Inouye and get approval at the time that we are trying to get not only the opposition bill, but he's going to start his hearings immediately after the recess--the 28th or 29th of April or the 1st of May he's going to start his appropriation hearings and I don't want to--I've had to get through a rucus with him on Development loans for South Vietnam. Now if we come up to the crunch and we have to do it, we won't commit the money. And if we have to in June and it looks like we are not going to get out funding any other way--

K: Well, we have to do something symbolic for them. It hasn't anything to do with the money.

H: That's okay.

K: It's just that we have to show it--why don't you send over some language that you can live with that we could put into the communique. And suggest that this is available but protects you with your Senator.

H: I just wanted you to understand that. There's no objection, I know what you have to do and that's okay as long as we don't have to collect on it at a time that we are starting our hearings on appropriation.

K: Why don't you send over two or three sentences that we could use.

H: I'll get it over to you.

K: Thank you.

H: Thank you, Henry.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Act. No. 5017256

By: A. M. Patsalos

TELCORN

Amb. Bruce/Mr. Kissinger

4:16 p.m. 3/29/73

HK: David?

DB: Hello, Henry.

HK: How are you?

DB: Fine.

HK: Joan Braden told me at lunch she'd never be your emissary again if you
can be bought off so easily.

DB: Ha ha--that's good. Good. How is she?

HK: But I told her you weren't bought off all that easily--only took the most
interesting post we had.

DB: Good for you. That's very good.

tors

HK: David, we've solved the communica problem--

DB: How'd you do it?

HK: We just ordered them to do it.

DB: And it's done.
I think that's wonderful.

HK: We will say that all communica tors should be agency, now--if Rogers
goes to the President on getting one of his men in there we can resist
it. But at a minimum the predominant people will be agency--

DB: I don't see why we care really--

HK: No, it's just --it's one of the usual

DB: No, I think that is excellent--you sure are a wonder at dispatching
business fast.

HK: (laughs)

DB: that's the way to do it. You sure are impressive. And you are off
tomorrow.

HK: That's what endears me so to the bureaucracy.

DB: I think they love you--

HK: Only the ones that deal with me directly.

DB: Yes, I guess the other s do a good deal of hooting --

HK: Yeh. Well, I'm off tomorrow and I'll see you on the 9th.

DB: Wonderful--I 'll see you tonight maybe.

HK: Oh yes. I won't be there at the dinner because the President is giving
a speech.

DB: Good.

HK: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized E017258
By: A. M. R. D. G. I. S. O. I.

TELCOM

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

4:50 p.m. 3/29/73

RZ: Yeh/

HK: That's a friendly greeting.

RZ: Hi, Henry.

HK: I must say you really rush to return my calls.

RZ: I didn't realize you called.

HK: Now the Soviets are going to--the Chinese are going to announce their ambassador and deputy tomorrow.

RZ: Good.

HK: At 9:00 our time. I'd like you to say it at 11:00--that we of course had advance information of this--that Dr. Kissinger knows the Ambassador personally -- and that all of us know the deputy--you can say that and we think it is a very serious token by them

RZ: Should I say all of us have known the deputy since the late 1950's--the mid-1950's

HK: And say that this --the President considers this a token of their seriousness in improving --normalizing relations and we look forward to greeting them here. Okay.

RZ: Tell your secretary to take that part out of the phone transcript about the 50's--I was just kidding of course.

HK: No, no it's staying in. It's going to the President.

RZ: I don't put anything past the secretaries anymore--I'll do this--

HK: Okay.

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. E01725&
By DAVID RAYNORD

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

4:51 p.m. 3/29/73

AD: Hello, Henry. What are you doing on this busy day when the President is preparing for national wide radio and television appearance and

HK: Just go ahead and make cynical comments--we are reducing you to a Liason Office--I hope you realize this.

AD: I wasn't making a cynical comment--just a matter of fact statement--I'm surprised.

HK: Well you are becoming a liason office tomorrow starting--that's what is going to be in the speech.

AD: What speech?

HK: Oh the President is giving a speech tonight--

AD: Yeh, that's why I wondering why you're spending lunch time with the girls.

HK: How do you know?

AD: At Sans Souci or where it was.

HK: They had to translate it from German sometime.

AD: What is he going to say today?

HK: We are recuming the bombing of North Vietnam.

AD: I think it is very nice.

HK: No we'll wait until three weeks until the Brezhnev visit.

AD: (laughs) --then we will postpone the visit as much as possible--

HK: We will have well-established procedures.

AD: You will change you mind--so we'll postpone--otherwise this kind of introduction--it will be quite a delimma for Brezhnev.

HK: Doesn't make any difference how late you postpone it--they're going to do it three weeks whenever he comes.

AD: That's quite a problem--all right. You won this argument--I will think it over.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E01/25/84 -
By A4414101-01/05/84

CLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

Article E017258
By D. M. Dsaly

Page 2

HK: I think there is a good chance of my being able to give you a copy of this--tomorrow.

AD: It is very important

HK: I have already discussed it with the President and frankly he would like to read it again--after--the speech --tomorrow morning, because you and I know that all hell will break loose with our allies if whatever form we do it in.

AD: No, I understand--but

HK: It is so close to your draft that even you with all the illwill with which we know you are animated cannot screw this one up.

AD: Sounds very nice

HK: Some of your translations are bad--

AD: I don't really pretend that we have a very good translator--it --he is only my second--but no one else is involved. So I prepared it simply for me and for Vorontsov (?)

HK: The President is on the other line and I told him I am talking to Dobrynin so you see how important you are. So on Article I there is a slight nuance of a difference and really unimportant. Article 2--again a very tiny nuance and the rest is the same--we have put in again our old Article 4 --I tell you now we will not fall on/sword over it--if you respect it again --

AD: Oh, I understand

HK: I mean, it's not an issue.

AD: Yes, I understand.

HK: And so I think we will be very close after tomorrow--

AD: After tomorrow?

HK: I mean unless he changes his mind overnight.

AD: Oh I see-I hope not -- and tomorrow I would like to give you this about Jewish immigration question--

HK: I'm glad you raised it--I was going to call you and say that if you are going to do something the next two or three weeks, would be very useful.

Page 3

AD: I will bring you some information--I would like to discuss with you--I have it from Moscow.

HK: Yeh. I would like--maybe I could see you briefly tomorrow morning.

AD: If I could talk for a few minutes really--because I would like you to look at--

HK: Let's say at 11:00

AD: Okay.

HK: I won't have a lot of time--maybe about 1/2 hour.

AD: No, no, no, --it would be enough really. I don't have any other questions--just he will give me a draft of preliminary comments--

HK: Oh goddamn it--we've got to see your cultural minister tomorrow--that will also be done.

AD: It will be done?

HK: Yeh.

AD: Good. because you already showed it to Brezhnev and he approved it--so she thinks I couldn't come back without--

HK: No, no it will be done.

AD: When will you call--

HK: I'll call you before the end of the day--I'll see you tonight--

AD: I'll--you could tell me then.

HK: No, no, I'll tell you before then.

AD: Okay, probably about this Jewish thing--I will double check with Mrs ______ before the discussion tomorrow--in order to save you time.

HK: Excellent.

AD: Then you are prepared to have some ideas --otherwise because you have only half an hour.

HK: Anatol, I've just been called to the Presdient. We have one suggestion--

TELCONE

Secretary Richardson/Mr. Kissinger

7:00 p.m. 3/29/73

HK: Hello Elliott.

SR: How was your vacation.

HK: Very pleasant.

SR: I heard just today that one very quiet place where you went--hardly every body on the beach--no sooner you arrived about 12 gorgeous females showed up.

HK: Where did you get that from

SR: From one of my more reliable sources --

HK: I know you got it from These Vitas-- (sp)

SR: Yeh--did you have a good time?

HK: I had a very good time. Elliott I am calling about getting the replacement thing for Vietnam lined up--we are sending you an answer to your proposal on banking some of the things. We would like to keep it at the January 28th level regardless whether it is above authorized strengths and not to go thru the exercise of banking some things with an ICCS that may never function properly and we'd like to have this so that we can inform Thieu that this is going.

SR: Okay. Well my only view concerned here is simply with being sure that the considerations that were in my memorandum were fully taken into account.

HK: Oh no, this is not a criticism--I just wanted to make sure we could in good conscience say that we had given instructions that this be pushed.

SR: Sure. I have your memorandum in front of me.

HK: Oh it did come over already. Good.

SR: Yeh, we'll go ahead. I'd like to get together with you again.

HK: Certainly. When I come back from the West Coast. I am getting a little concerned Elliott about the quality of the JCS input of the arms control discussions--I don't think it's up to the intellectual level that--certainly not up to yours, but there's no criticism of you, but we are getting into

DECLASSIFIED

Allied. fly 03/25/73
By: J. M. D. / 0 / 1 / 93

Page 2

position where almost every proposal we get uses arms control in order to rearm. And sooner or later we'll get caught in a hell of a negotiating bind because we can't get away with most of those positions for any length of time. The chemical warfare JCS position is a good example.

SR: Yeh. I don't have that very vividly in mind at the moment--I'd have to look at that again.
We -- I have been trying to get some time to--

HK: On SALT, we have to --I assure you if the President heads into a summit meeting he won't stick with the position we now have.

SR: I hope by the time I see you, to

HK: I frankly, don't have my mind clarified on this.

SR: I have been trying to snatch a little time for myself to think about it.

HK: It's one of the things you and I should talk about--I'm now saying this as a criticism, because I haven't done any better.

SR: I know we haven't done well enough and I've been trying to take some time --unfortunately, I have been in hearings every day this week and four days next week and 3 or 4 the following.

HK: These top jobs don't lend themselves to reflection.

SR: But I am trying to take some time in between and if we could set aside whatever else we have to talk about at least an hour to talk about this.

HK: Next week I can't do it because I'll be on the West Coast, but the week I come back.

SR: I hope to be by that time in a position to be reasonably intelligent about it.

HK: Then you'll be ahead of me.

SR: I think I'll need the week to catch up.

HK: Now I think see that you have found out a way for keeping Petsa (?) from knowing as much as he does.

SR: I'd say that's a pretty good ply, don't you think?

HK: I think its a masterful ploy--he sure as hell will learn a lot less in that job than in his old job.

SR: Let's hope the press also learns less.

DECLASSIFIED

Actively E017258 -
By DAVID RAY - 09/05/98

CLASSIFIED

DECEMBER 12, 1968

Page 3

HK: If he doesn't know where the leaks are, God help us.

SR: Speaking of people, I need to talk to you about when Eagleburger leaves --we really have got to have him for a substantial additional period.

HK: I was going to suggest May 1.

SR: I think that's a little too tight, really. I have a new candidate for ISA I think--I should know on Monday.

HK: Who is he?

SR: Fellow named Rod Hills, California.

HK: Never heard of him.

SR: Doesn't have must depth of substantive background, although he has a considerable amount of international legal experience.

HK: Is he a lawyer?

SR: Yes.

HK: Good.

SR: Very bright, guy. Stanford graduate, extremely successful. And he was a law clerk for Reeds and I think he is a guy who has filled in what international experience he has had very quickly--best guy I've been able to find.

HK: My experience has been that no technical training in international affairs really prepares you for the issues you face here, unless you really study history in great depth. And therefore, you have given me a first-class mind and I'll take him over a technical expert any time. On my staff I don't hire people on the basis of expertise.

SR: I have been looking for people who if possible had both. In this case,

HK: He'll learn the substance.

SR: I hope to be able to nail this down early in the week. The processes are so constipated over there--clearance and all--take more than a month probably to get him on board--

TelCon

7:50 pm, March 29, 1973

Terry Sanford/Mr. Kissinger

K: Hello.

S: Terry Sanford, how are you. I first want to add one small voice of great congratulations for a job that you've extremely done well.

K: Aren't you nice.

S: I think today is a great day in history.

K: Well, I'm very pleased, you are very nice to say that.

S: I wanted to talk to you, of course, and it's not very satisfactory to-- not at all possible to go into detail of some of the things I thought we might talk about.

K: I'm sorry I had to cancel that appointment.

S: Well surely, but we've got time and I'd like to do it. I think we've got some exciting possibilities that I'd like to suggest to you. The reason I called, I met today with our special committee and I wondered if I might entice you to come to Duke for a commencement speech, an opportunity for us to honor ourselves and recognize some of your accomplishments with an honorary degree on May 13th.

K: Well, you are very nice.

S: I realize this is a terrible imposition, but it also would give you a chance to see a little more of Duke.

K: Right. My hesitation is the speech to tell you the truth, because that always requires an effort of time.

S: Well, I realize that, but on the other hand, you've got so much to say that I think almost anything you said in a period that wouldn't have to be really more than 15 or 20 minutes.

K: Well let me think about it for a couple of days and I'll call you next week. By the middle of the week. I'm very honored.

S: Sunday May 13.

K: I'm very honored and I tell you as a matter of principle I've turned down most -all honorary degrees this year. The mere fact that I'm considering it should show you my--

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E017458
By DAVID M. BLOCH

TelCon
President/Mr. Kissinga er

9:30 pm, March 29, 1973

K: Mr. President

P: Hello, Henry, how are you.

K: I thought it went extremely well. Very well delivered and I think it serves its purpose extremely well. As far as the domestic opinion is concerned the story will be on themat prices.

P: Oh, yes, that'll override everything else.

K: We certainly don't want to debate on Vietnam right now.

P: No, but the point is I knew that would override, but it's well to remind the people about Vietnam and about--

K: Oh, no, I think it's very good, because if you had only Vietnam it would have been--

P: They say that's old story.

K: Well, and you would have had Fulbright and everybody--

P: We stuck a lot to them here.

K: And as far as our chief audiences are concerned on foreign policy in Peking, Moscow and Hanoi this was a very strong speech. And it will have it's effect.

P: Well that's the main thing. I think it will have an effect on the American people too, it stiffen their backs on the defense stuff which I think we did, I mean it was very hard and--

K: And also it for the first explained the reason for the impoundment. I for one didn't know, for example, that we had increased some of these social welfare expenditures.

P: Doubled.

K: By the amount that we had.

P: That Truman thing, the buck stops here, I thought was pretty good.

UNCLASSIFIED

Advisory E01725f -
By: HANNDelG1504

DECLASSIFIED

Agency EO17938

By a NARRATOR

K: Yeah.

P: But you know the most important thing in it is something that you would not probably--well you would feel it, and I would, was what I said at the last about the spirit. The guy that told me that was Risner you know, and broke down and cried when he told me.

K: I think that is the key element.

P: When he said, you know, its fate. He said that it's hard for me to say this, and I had stop him and he just cried and said it was fate. That's the thing Henry. We've just got to have a little faith.

K: Without it it's impossible to do anything.

P: Well our friends won't like, the liberals, oh Christ, they're gonna die. You notice how I stuck it to them on amnesty, but it had to be done, and you know I wasn't -- I said let us put aside the divisions that have divided us, but just go ahead--I was very generous.

K: It was a good moment to make it and it was essential.

P: But I wasn't too rough on the opposition, what do you think.

K: Well, if you remember this afternoon, my recommendations was to go further.

P: But was good to remind them of Cambodia, to remind them--

K: Having heard it, I think it was just as well you didn't.

P: Yeah.

K: Your instinct was right--

P: Okay, Henry.

K: Congratulations.

P: Bye bye.

K: Bye.

TelCon

Sid Goldberg/Mr. Kissinger

10:22 am, March 30, 1973

K: Hello.

G: Mr. Kissinger, this is Sid Goldberg, Executive Editor of North America Newspaper <u>omitting</u> Alliance. Maybe you could solve a mystery for us. For many months now we've been interested in a set of documents called "The Kissers Papers" concerning the Romanots, and we've been told that these would be declassified by the White House, and the de-classification supposedly was delayed several times.

K: I've never heard of them.

G: Never heard of them!

K: No. Why would we have them?

G: Well, this is part of the mystery. We've heard all of this second hand and we've been assured that a man named Peter Bessel has met with you several times.

K: Who's Peter Bessel.

G: Well, he's a former member of Parliament.

K: Oh, yeah, Peter Bessell I met, if he's the one I think it is, I haven't seen him in five years. I saw him I think in 1969 when he was doing something either for or against European unity. I seem vaguely to remember he was against it. Or against Britain joining the Common Market.

G: Right.

K: But I haven't had any contact with him for five years and never in my official capacity.

G: Right. And you would know nothing about an American agent in 1918 or 19 who was filing messages to Robert Lansing.

K: No.

G: This is what the Kissers Papers supposedly is concerned with.

K: Why don't--I'll look into it, but I've never heard of it. But why would I talk to Peter Bessell about that anyway. At any rate I've never heard the words "the Kissers Papers". Or anything like it. I not hiding behind--I have never heard of any papers

UNCLASSIFIED

Article E017258
By a Kees de Vries

concerning the Romanoff that are classified and in our control.

G: Right.

K: I'm not saying there aren't any, but I've never heard of it.

G: Was there ever recently a Mr. Miller who was working with you on any declassification.

K: Again, when I say no, that doesn't mean there couldn't be somebody running around who's technically on my staff. There's no Mr. Miller came to my attention. It is inconceivable, knowing my staff's knowledge of my interest in history, that they wouldn't have brought something like that to my attention.

G: Right. You have helped us very much and saved us a lot of embarrassment.

K: But I am going to look into it now. I just want to find out what the hell people are talking about.

G: Well, this Peter Bessell who with another intermediary, Guy Richards who wrote two books, one called "The Hunt for the Czar" concerning the stolen ST case.

K: If Bessell claims he ever discussed the Romanoff with me then he's a total liar and a little bit nuts.

G: Right. That is a great possibility.

K: I remember Peter Bessell, I believe, but he was connected with a group in 1967/8 that was opposed to Britains joining the Common Market, if it's the one I think it is. He came over once when I was a professor and when he was over here he talked to me about possibly joining some sort of a group with the United States. At that time it was a totally academic exercise for me. If it's the one I think it is.

G: It sounds very much like the one.

K: And if it--if the Romanoffs or classified documents never arose.

G: Right. Do you know of any major declassification of documents that is about to take place.

K: You know, John Ehrlichman was in charge of a general study on declassifications, and that was completed a year ago. And I think they did declassify a substantial number of documents. But again, I've never heard of this series that you're talking about.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E01725f
By DAVID RALEIGH

DECLASSIFIED

Aero. fly. EO17358

By DA HARRIS 09/05/04

G: Right.

K: I'm going to look into the question, not of Bessell which is totally absurd. He has to be demented if he says anything like this, because that can't be a misunderstanding, that's just a total lie.

G: Right. Well this thing is a great mystery to us and I can't understand Bessell's motivations and all of this.

K: Well if he says this I tell you flatly it is a total absolute unqualified lie. I mean that's just nothing that could even remotely misinterpret that way every happened. Now whether there are such a set of documents I will now look into just for my own education.

G: Well, I spoke with Dr. Rhodes who was the Archivist yester.

K: What does he say.

G: He said he once heard reference to a set of papers, the Tivers papers, that some Romanoff buff was looking for, but he says he doesn't know of the existence of them. He says they are certainly not in the National Archives.

K: Well I don't know where they could be then, they are certainly not in the White House.

G: Right.

K: They can't be, because every President takes his papers with him.

G: Right. It may be of total nonexistence and a complete fabrication and the only one we would call was you because--

K: Well I've never heard of it, but I will now ask the State Dept to search its files, just for my own education.

G: All right. I'm sure your secretary took down my number.

K: Right.

G: Thank you very much.

K: Good, bye.

G: Bye.

TelCon
Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger

12:57 pm, March 30, 1973

K: Hello.

MK: Henry, how are you.

HK: Okay.

MK: Henry, I just want to check a couple of facts with you. One, on May 22nd at that first meeting between the President and Brezhnev shortly after you arrived, did you go on that meeting.

K: No.

MK: It was just the two of them.

K: Yes. But I got a transcript of the meeting.

MK: The second question was, in the course of that week is it a fair conclusion that your prime attention was devoted to SALT AND Vietnam and that issue such as Trade, European Security etc., were given off to Rogers Hillebrand.

K: No.

MK: No.

K: __________ to some extent. But I think that's the only one.

MK: Okay.

K: No SALT, Vietnam, all other political subjects were discussed by the President or by me.

MK: And on Thursday, there's areport that I had that the President never saw Brezhnev on that one day. Is that correct.

K: That is correct.

MK: And that was basically the hang up on SALT. Until you could work it out with Gromyko.

K: Yes, but that's where we had a session with Kosykin and Portkorny on trade which the President attended.

MK: Right. The meeting with Brezhnev had been laid on.

K: No.

CLASSIFIED

Antonly E017258
By: H.A. Dersley

2

MK: It was then cancelled.

K: No, it was never laid on.

MK: Was the Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, I know from your own briefing out there, you were very busy well into the night.

K: Right.

MK: Were those mostly on the SALT deliberations.

K: On Thursday night it was SALT, --

MK: Wednesday night you were off to the--

K: And afterward SALT. Wednesday and Thursday night my work was mostly SALT. And Saturday was mostly European matters and the communique and the principles.

MK: And who were you dealing with on Saturday.

K: Gromyko.

MK: Very good, thank you sir. Did you have a good vacation.

K: Very good.

MK: I'm glad. Thanks, Henry.

K: Right.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumn 1975

By DAVID HARRIS

TelCon

Bernard Gwertzman/Mr. Kissinger

9:47 pm, March 30, 1973

K: Hello.

G: How are you, Mr. Kissinger.

K: Okay.

G: Good. There are two problems I've been worrying about a little bit, maybe you have some ideas on this. This is--one is the dilemma with the Soviet Union over this Jackson amendment. It's really seems to me--it seems almost unsolvable, the issue, as long as these Senators keep their position, they keep pushing this, and I'd like to write about it because in a more philosophical sense, I've written about it in a news sense a lot, but the contradictory themes at the time the Soviet Union seems most open--it's running to a real problem.

K: Now, first of all, it is a serious philosophical question, but it should be an objective of American foreign policy to bring about the immigration of one special group. That's point number one which no one seems ever to write. And secondly, I think there has been a major effort on the part of the Soviet Union.

G: Uh huh.

K: So, a

G: I know the situation--

K: This is not for quotation.

G: No, of course. I was just really looking for some--now historically of course, the U.S. Congress has gotten involved in other peoples internal affairs.

K: Like when?

G: Well, we did get involved with this Russian____ back in the turn of the century, I think--

K: But look, that's a hell of a--I don't recall when a major American initiative foretells ______ this way, and particular when its woven in the whole context of our relationship.

G: Yeah. Well I have a suspicion that if this tax continues to be waived

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E01725f -
By DAVID L. BLOCH

2

with a good deal of
for some period of time, it may prove enough // the members of
the Congress, but--

K: I think that may be known true.
Know you

G: But, I never have a time problem here, obviously Brezhnev
can't color this into a hot issue here. I would think, I don't
know. The real problem on this question of aid to Vietnam
I would think these prisoner stories are really pretty ghastly
today.

K: Yeah.

G: And I think privately you said nothing much will happen on this
until May or so, anyway.

K: That's right.

G: Do you expect things to die down by then.

K: Well, we'll have to see. We also have to see whether there is
enough observance of the Agreement to justify an aid request.

G: Uh huh. I'm confused on the infiltration, cause different people
say different things about the seriousness--

K: Well, you know, veracity is not longer the hallmark of this--of
the bureaucracy. It depends what you are talking about. On
men, it's slackened off, on materiel it's still going on.

G: Hh huh. That is more important.

K: That's right, because they can always push in the men after they
get the materiel in place.

G: Uh huh. That's what the President was referring to last night.

K: There is no question if they keep up at this rate, the decision
on whether to launch a major offensive will be entirely up to them.
I mean, there will be no physical constraints. I've unfortunately
got to run.

G: Okay.

K: Are you going out to the West Coast.

G: No. I'll be here. Maybe I can speak to you later.

K: Okay, good. Bye.

G: Bye.

CLASSIFIED

Aero. 102723
By: A. M. D. 1/5/65

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Sec. Rush/Kissinger

7:00 a.m. - 3/31/73

K: Hello.

R: Good morning, Henry, how are you?

K: OK.

R: I hope I didn't wake you up.

K: Not at all.

R: Henry, I called the Hungarian ambassador yesterday.

K: Right. Good.

R: And the Polish Charge and I gave them the full word.

K: Terrific. You're a mind reader. I was going to call you about that.

R: That's why I called you first.

K: I know the President wanted to hear it, I talked to him on the plane yesterday.

R: Well I really gave it to them in full blast and then I not only did that but I had it written up so they could send it in their cables.

K: Well, Ken I don't know what we would do without you. I'm serious.

R: Well, you're very nice Henry, but the Polish Charge the Ambassador was away. The Charge got a little belligerent. The Hungarian was sort of cowled, but the Polish one tried to respond and I cut that pretty short.

K: Good.

R: Now Henry I also have the analysis of the CSDE paper of your friend. Should I send it out to you?

K: Could you send it via Colonel Kennedy?

R: Yes. I'll do that now.

CLASSIFIED

Act. No. E017258
By: D.G. Gilsby

2

K: Now Ken the only thing about that is, have you in any way - you know I consider that their opening position.

R: I'm aware it is.

K: So there is anything we can tell them we would accept or how they could fix it.

R: What I've done is this and I had Walt Stoessel work with me on this.

K: Good.

R: We went through it, we give their position and then we give our statement of what is wrong with that position and the rest is all right.

K: OK.

R: And we do that on each paragraph.

K: And do we have a way of fixing each paragraph?

R: Yes, we then have our own position attack.

K: Oh, Good. Well, let me look at it, if I want any changes before I give it to them. And do you think I could give this to them?

R: Yes, yes. I think you can pass it over to them and let them study it.

K: Good.

R: Now the one thing I haven't done is to rephrase in their language eliminating what we don't want. So what I did really was put in our paper the equivalent of theirs and then I took their paper and put underneath what is wrong or what is right with each statement they had.

K: Ken, when we get back there is one other matter I want to discuss with you in which I am involved with them which will eventually need some backstopping from State.

R: OK.

K: Many thanks. What have you done about. . .

R: I've delayed it about a week so I'll be here when Brandt is here.

DECLASSIFIED
Act. No. E017258
By: A. M. D.

3

K: Oh, terrific.

R: I was very flattered you wanted me here so I'll see you.

K: No, no, you know - you've delayed it two weeks?

R: I've what?

K: What have you done about your trip?

R: I've pushed it up one week.

K: One week. Well, Ken once he's there you may feel that it was all unnecessary.

R: No, I want to be there anyway.

K: But if there's one chance in a hundred that we'll come to a rough patch - and I think you will see - before then I will discuss that other matter with you.

R: OK.

K: I would just like to have you in reserve for that.

R: I'd like to do that and as you know also Henry I really have a very deep personal interest

K: Well, it's almost inconceivable to have the Germans there without you.

R: I would like to see that.

K: And so I'm delighted Ken and will see you then. Well, we'll see you long before then.

R: Yes, we will. As a matter of fact, Henry, I had a paper sent over to Dick Kennedy and you'll get it today or tomorrow and then you can give me a call whenever you're ready.

K: Terrific.

R: So try to get some rest out there.

K: Well, I've been in pretty good shape now since Acapulco. Thank you.

R: Bye, Henry.

K: See you soon.

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E01245f
By A. HARb. Mcclynn

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Dobrynin/Kissinger
7:40 a. m. - 3/31/73

(From HAK's Residence)

D: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: I was with the President so late yesterday, Anatol, that I didn't think I could call you anymore.

D: That's all right because Colonel Kennedy already called me on your behalf.

K: Right. Now let me explain to you. On that first Article we can reverse that.

D: OK.

K: But we have had a long message from the English with their views. They haven't seen your - they haven't seen any draft. But we want to study it because we don't want to hand over a document the day we get the message. And secondly we want to study it to see whether we can accommodate some of their concerns which will not require a major change incidentally. So we will let you have the text on Monday which will be essentially what we discussed and we will transpose those sentences.

D: You will change the first paragraph with the second within the first article?

K: That's right.

D: But do you think it will all right with your exchange with the UK - that you go too far?

K: No. No, no, but on the other hand it's helpful to us to have the British on our side in the subsequent discussions that are going to start.

D: I understand. So, Henry.

K: And I'm being - now don't go and tell this to the British Ambassador.

D: No, no, no, no, no. I understand. One Ambassador was enough.

K: OK.

D: Henry - hello.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: W.N.ATLAS, 00304

2

K: Yes, it's not - let me tell you Anatol it's not as bad as my handing over the Gromyko note to the NATO ally.

D: (Laugs) I know. Henry, so I will mention that you will give on Monday.

K: You will get on Monday and then it will be very constructive. I will send it to Colonel Kennedy and he will get it there.

D: The whole text?

K: The whole text.

D: I would like to have only the Preamble.

K: Yeh, I know.

D: My impression is it doesn't really change anything. You just took your last one entirely.

K: That's right.

D: So please look at it.

K: No, no we looked at yours.

D: No, no, what you gave me yesterday is exactly word-by-word your draft you gave me several days ago.

K: That's right.

D: Not a line from ours.

K: OK.

D: It's not a major change but just to show that you look at it.

K: OK. Fine.

D: We didn't change very much yours, really, only one paragraph actually.

K: As far as I understand you only took out one of our paragraphs.

D: Yes, you just look and compare it just to show that you look at it. You may change two words at least to show that you look at it.

K: I understand. I understand.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E. F. W. H. J.
By: N. A. M. E. A.

["DECLASSIFIED\nAuthority: E012058\nBy: MW, Nita 5-304", "D: ... two weeks ago.", "K: Right, I understand.", "D: And the second, on the end you remember that two paragraphs A and C which. . . . . . . . . . . . .

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012055
By: WW
Date: 04/04/94

D: Well, I think - only 200!

K: You can still keep 70.

D: Oh, I see, I was surprised why only 200.

K: Well, I think we could put that in as Article 7.

D: (Laugs)

K: The Soviet Union

D: You are trying to make. . . . . . to our mutual friend Smirnov.

K: I think Smirnov would have an apoplectic fit.

D: Well, I think he had quite an experience and both you and I too. I'm sure he is preparing - of this I am sure of. As of now is proposal but I am sure he is preparing for the ______ I am sure.

K: Well Smirnov is

D: Sometimes he is given only one day notice.

K: No, he is very able. He is exceptionally able. I look forward - I'll give you a proposal on that the week I come back.

D: Yeh, I think it's good because I think when you are there you will discuss it.

K: Right.

D: He's a good man.

K: Excellent man.

D: OK, Henry, on Monday you will give to Kennedy that message to my boss.

K: Definitely. It may be Monday night given the time differential.

D: I understand.

K: And we have Thieu here so I may not be able to actually get it off until say 3 o'clock our time. But before Monday midnight your time you'll have it.

4

D: Ok. Just to know.

K: No, Monday you will get it.

D: Yesterday I ______ but I didn't say anything really.

K: Good.

D: Henry, what kind of telephone - or do I have to check with Kennedy?

K: What do you mean?

D: If in case there is some urgency.

K: Just call the White House switchboard and they'll get you through.

D: Just call the switchboard and ask for you.

K: Yes. Yes. I mean call 456 - I'll give you a number here if you want it.

D: I think it's very good idea.

K: The number here is Area Code 714/492-0011.

D: 714/492-0011.

K: Right. That's the Western White House.

D: I understand. Just in case something's coming.

K: Because I frankly - it's all hooked up with the Western White House.

D: Just a minute - something's coming. This is not - I thought it was something for you. It is not really because a man came to me and it was telegram and that's why I was holding you. It's not for you. So thank you very much, Henry. On Monday I will await your reply.

K: You will get it before midnight.

D: Ok, thank you very much, Henry. How is the weather there?

K: Perfect.

D: And here is raining and they promise to rain tomorrow too. You're a lucky fellow.

5

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: W.N.APAS, 5/50

K: Come out and talk to me here.

D: Well, I will see what kind of ______ you give.

K: I'd love to have you.

D: Now all I need is a pretext to go.

K: Terrific.

D: Thank you very much, Henry.

K: We still have to take a trip to Hawaii together.

D: Well, I . . . . . . . . .

K: Absolutely not.

D: Well, I think it's a good idea, really.

K: I guess now it'll have to be after the summit.

D: Yeh. I don't know what the weather is then.

K: The weather is always good.

D: Always?

K: Yeh.

D: OK.

K: Good, we'll do it during the summer. We'll go to that Rockefeller place. They have a beautiful place.

D: Well I never was there at all so I don't know.

K: And they have a beautiful hotel and it's not on the big island. It's not on the Honolulu island.

D: Oh, I see, not overcrowded.

K: It's very quiet, it's all by itself.

D: Yeh, I understand.

TELCON (San Clemente)
Dobrynin/Kissinger

Friday, March 31/73 7:40 a. m. - 3/31/73
(From HAK's Residence)

D: Hello, Henry, how are you?

D: OK.

K: That's right.

K: No, No, no, but on the other hand it's helpful to us to have the British on our side in the subsequent discussions that are going to start.

D: I understand. So, Henry.

K: OK.

D: Henry - hello.

DECLASSIFIED

Antonio E017456

By: HAK, P. 05/04

2

K: Yes, it's not - let me tell you Antol it's not as bad as my handing over
the Croydon note to the NATO ally.

D: (Laughs) I know. Henry, so I will mention that you will give on Monday.

D: The whole text?

K: The whole text.

K: Yeah, I know.

K: That's right.

D: So please look at it.

K: No, no we looked at yours.

K: That's right.

D: Not a line from ours.

K: OK.

K: OK. Fine.

D: Yes, you just look and compare just to show that you look at it.
It's not the same as what I meant to show that you look at it.

DECLARED
ASSENTED

E017958
Byron

HARRIS DATED 01/05/69

3

D: ... two weeks ago.

K: Right, I understand.

D: And the second, on the end you remember that two paragraphs A and C which . . . . . . . . . . . revolutionary changes.

K: No, no, I know. We took out where you said "relevant agreements."

D: Why?

K: Why did we take it out?

D: Yeh.

K: Because supposing we decide that in our self-defense we want to do something where there is no agreement?

D: Well, it is a point of course, but I think - I've got to think it over.

K: You see what I mean.

D: Yes, I understand your point. But really it's already in paragraph A by the way. Yes, it is, in paragraph A it says "nothing can impair or affect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ."

K: Right.

D: So it's covered - your objections so I think you could put this whole thing with some of ours so that's why we make an addition in point C.

K: OK.

D: Look in point A.

K: Yes, but I just want you to know here I sit in my house, I don't have the document in front of me. . .

D: I know, I know.

K: But I want you to know I know it by heart, that's how carefully I've studied it.

D: Well, I go through it, sometimes even at night.

K: OK, Anatol, now if you could get rid of only 200 FS-9s all would be easier.

DECLASSIFIED

Anatol E017258
By DAVID HARRIS 6/15/97

CLASSIFIED
NOTices

E0172538 -
By: A.A. RANSEY 11/5/94

D: Well, I think - only 200!

K: You can still keep 70.

D: (Laughter)

K: The Soviet Union

D: You are trying to make it too easy for our mutual friends to smile.

D: Well, I think he had quite an experience and both you and I too. I'm sure he is preparing for this. I am sure of it. As of now, it is proposal but I am sure he is preparing for the ______ I am sure.

K: Well, Smirnov is

K: No, he is very able. He is exceptionally able. I look forward to see you next week I come back.

D: Yeah, I think it's good because I think when you are there you will discuss it.

K: Right.

D: He's a good man.

K: Excellent man.

D: I understand.

CLASSIFIED
APRIL 18 1975

D: Ok. Just to know.

K: Good.

K: What do you mean?

D: 714/492-0011.

K: Perfect.

TELCOM (San Clemente)

Bob Toth/Kissinger

10:00 a.m. - 3/31/73

K: Hello.

T: Hi, I just thought maybe we could set a date for me to come see you.

K: Let's do it on Monday.

T: OK, what time?

K: No, no, I mean let's set the date on Monday.

T: Oh, all right, do you want me to call your office.

K: Call my office Monday morning.

T: All right. People up in LA were wondering whether you would have a chance this trip to come up and talk to the Editorial Group.

K: Well, maybe Thursday or Friday.

T: All right. Well, I'll mention it again to you.

K: Good. See whether that would fit in.

T: Yeh. Good. I'll call you Monday morning.

K: Good. Marvelous.

T: Thank you.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly EO17258 -
Ebya WARUNO1504

TELCOM (San Clemente)

Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger

10:05 a.m. - 3/31/73

K: Hello.

S: Henry.

K: Bill, I have talked to Khendienst about your testimony and he frankly
didn't know a God damn thing about it and he said he's going to have
Olson get in touch with me.

S: Let me say we just met with the lawyers this morning and I think that as a
result of that they may feel that at least I wouldn't be much of a witness
because I might blow the case on cross-examination in the event that
they would ask whether I felt that this disclosure would have had an effect
upon the subsequent negotiations, my answer would obviously have to be
no. The subsequent negotiations in this case took place under circum-
stances in which that stuff was pretty much irrelevant. But what we

K: Well, except in the sense that the whole revelation may have given them
enough confidence to be tough.

S: Yes, I think we can talk in terms of that, but that's putting it very
shorthand. We can talk in terms of impairment of confidentiality and
things of that sort but the impression that they really want said is that
this made it impossible, in fact that's what their testimony was, that
it made it impossible to have subsequent negotiations - that was testimony
that was made prior to the negotiations. What we're probably going to
come up with is a couple of people as suggestions who did not participate
in Vietnam affairs subsequent to 1971 or so and therefore they cannot
be cross-examined on later effect and can talk only in terms of the
classifiability of the information

K: Like who?

S: Well, Sam Berger is the one; Ed G______ is another and then just
on the general question of confidentiality in Diplomacy we've already
had a witness prepositioned out there, former Ambassador Sweeney -
Jeffrey Sweeney.

K: What's his name?

S: Jeffrey Sweeney. He's an Ambassador.

K: OK.

CLASSIFIED
SHEET 2 OF 2

Antonly E017258
by A.D. HARRIS/Dicksey

2

S: So I think it may be working it's way out but what they really want is - they are involved in a little effort of overkill. They've got a pretty good case on proving the defense interests but they are trying to make the extra point to prove that this revelation would have - or did- destroy the prospects of negotiations.

K: Right. OK.

S: Now my whole Cambodian thing should be out with you somewhere. I think they sent it out by LDX this morning.

K: I hope it's fairly tough.

S: It's fairly tough and it suggests a trip by Al. I talked with Al. He's more or less resigned to the idea, but there was also a cable in this morning which I don't think pertains to the mixture I think you can still go ahead with

K: What cable is that?

S: Well, there are a couple of talks that Swank and Enders (?) have had with some of the politicians who indicate had secondhand some of the things that they think is going on but I think that's not a substitute for a direct confrontation.

K: Right, are you going to be out on Monday?

S: Am I going to be out?

K: Yeh.

S: Out where?

K: In San Clemente.

S: No, no. Bill Porter is going to be out.

K: OK. Well, they sent us a message and I'd like a scorcher of a reply. I'll get Kennedy to take it up with you.

S: You mean your Ducky.

K: Ducky.

S: OK. I'll get a hold of Mr. Kennedy. When do you want the answer?

CLASSIFIED

RECLASSIFIED
August 07 1998
By DAVID

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger

11:37 a.m. - 3/31/73

K: Hello, Bill.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: I just want to make sure that in our discussions with the Vietnamese we are working from our draft communique, not the State Department one.

S: Nobody's having any discussion as yet. The only draft that was - I don't think there was a State Department one.

K: Oh, you never gave them yours?

S: Well, I gave them my first draft, but before Phuong took off Brent Scowcroft sent around to them

K: And that is now the working draft.

S: That's what they've got as their ________. Nobody from the State Department who's in California has a copy of either one of those.

K: OK. Well make sure that Bill Porter gets the second one.

S: You'll have to do that from out there because nobody in the State Department group has a copy of it.

K: OK.

S: Now I spoke with Dick this morning and also with Bob Neuter again about this $40 million figure.

K: Yeh.

S: It bothers me that it's in there not so much for international reasons but for domestic reasons. I think it would be a total tactical mistake for Senator Inouye and Passman to learn about this first from a communique without ever having any discussion about it.

K: Yeh, well that's what Hannah tells me too. And Hannah gave me some language which I'm going to get back to you which you should look at to see whether that could be used as a substitute.

DECLASSIFIED
by: A. M. E. L. O. J. S.

Aero. 107256

By: A. M. E. L. O. J. S.

2

S: Right. Now Hannah doesn't want to ante up the $40 million. I want to put up the $40 million.

K: That's right. Now can you develop some language which will take care of the $40 million without mentioning them.

S: Yeh, I think so long as the South Vietnamese know themselves that they're getting the $40 million, they'll buy any language in the communique which doesn't disclose the figure and if we explained to them the tactical reasons for it.

K: Can you do that for me?

S: I'll try to put something together. Can you get the copy of yours - are you in San Clemente?

K: Yeh.

S: Where is Bill?

K: I don't know where Bill Porter is, he's in your Department.

S: He's out there somewhere with you.

K: Oh, is he out here with us already?

S: He's out there. I think if you just give him.

K: We will get the communique to him, that you don't have to worry about.

S: Then I should telephone him.

K: No, but can you telephone with your proposed change with Scowcroft.

S: Ok, unfortunately I'm back home now. The draft is down at the office, but I'll get a hold of Kennedy and we'll work out something.

K: Yeh and Kennedy can LDX it to me.

S: Right. Well, I'll get a hold of Kennedy and we'll work it out.

K: Good and also I will get Kennedy to give you Hannah's - let's see Hannah's says "The US Government today is concluding an agreement to provide an additional grant of $60 million for the support of the Vietnamese economy." What does he mean there? That's probably shuffling some things we're doing already.

SEPTEMBER 1964

AUGUST 1964
BY HARPER

S: I fear it is. Yeh, I wouldn't trust that one. Bob Neuter is out there
too in San Clemente and I'll get him and Porter together.

K: Good. Well, you look at these figures. We want to do something and
we want to give them a development loan and now all we need is the
language.

S: Right. I suspect Hannah's language is a little deceitful because he
does not want to put up that $40 ______ and I do.

K: And the President does.

S: So I'll work it out and get some language that does it and I'll get it to
Dick Kennedy and he'll get them to you.

K: Excellent. Thank you.

S: Bye.

CLASSIFIED

Alexandria E017258

By: a

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Amb. Porter/Kissinger

12:30 p.m. - 3/31/73

K: Hello.

P: Yes, Henry. Bill.

K: You called me.

P: Yes I did, but that was a result that I heard you were looking for me.

K: Oh.

P: Sullivan phoned me.

K: Oh I see. I see.

P: In connection with that.

K: Oh yeh, look let me - I would like to send you a communique which we have informally given to the South Vietnamese so that you can work on it with them. Now we're willing to drop out of it the amount of the development loan fund.

P: Yes, I understand that's what you wanted.

K: And secondly I've got some language from Hannah that he wants to put in instead which I think is tricky because he doesn't want to give the development loan fund. We want to give it, but we want to put it - has Bill explained it to you.

P: Yes, I have the whole problem in hand, Henry. You send me what the paper is and I'll take care of it and have a text for you this afternoon.

K: Terrific.

P: All right.

K: Good. Thank you, Bill.

P: I'll send the text down. You'll be in Los Angeles for a while I gather.

K: I'll be in Los Angeles but I'll be easily reachable.

P: I'll have it back to you. It'll be in your office in the course of the afternoon.

K: Good. Bye.

P: Bye, bye now.

DECLASSIFIED
Aero. by E01758
By: A. M. 6/5/73

TELCONE (San Clemente)

John Gavin/Kissinger

12:55 p.m. - 3/31/73

K: Hello.

G: Hello, Henry, how are you? How was the flight?

K: Oh, it was great.

G: Have a good day.

K: Yeh, it's lovely here.

G: Good.

K: John, I don't think I'll be able to make it tomorrow. At any rate it's
too uncertain because I may either have to come back here for some
Thieu preparations or I may have to have some people come up to
Los Angeles to talk to me about it.

G: Well, that's very understandable. We'll give you a rain check.

K: But I'd love to do it again and will you let me know when you come
to the East Coast.

G: I will indeed.

K: You won't be here next week.

G: No I won't, I'll be out of town all next week. I'll get back a week from
today as a matter of fact.

K: I'm leaving a week from tomorrow.

G: And you're leaving a week from tomorrow. We'll find a way to get together

K: Because I really - I wouldn't say it unless I wanted to - I'd enjoy
seeing you again.

G: It'd be my pleasure, thank you for saying that.

K: So will you take the initiative and let me know when you come East.

G: I will take the initiative.

K: And should I come out here - well I won't come out here until June or July.

DECLASSIFIED
Audio: E01725F

By A.M. HARRIS/SHO