THE TIMES THURSDAY FEBRUARY 10 1972

PRESIDENT NIXON'S POLICY

President Nixon's report to
Congress yesterday stands out im-
mediately as one of the most weighty,
most serious, and best argued state-
ments of American foreign policy to
be made since the end of the Second
World War. In manner it is sober,
factual, clear, without any obvious
tremolo passages or over-contrived
rhetoric. In substance it goes into
American deeds, hopes, and difficul-
ties in almost every part of the earth
and above the earth. The main thread,
appearing in several parts of the im-
mensely long report, is provided by
the sustained comments on the Soviet-
American rivalry and on the search
for a new relationship.

It may seem odd that in a report
published only a week before the
President leaves for Peking, China
should take so little a part and Soviet
Russia so great. But that balance is
logical. In Peking Mr Nixon will be
picking up old and almost forgotten
links again; he will be beginning a
new process, unsure of what he will
find, with little to guide him. In
Moscow, when he goes in May, he
will be pursuing negotiations that the
two countries have been busy with
for years. Whereas China has mainly
been on the sidelines since 1949, the
American-Soviet rivalry has been at
the very centre of the world, over-
shadowing it, throughout that time.
Mr Nixon puts the predicament well :

Since the nuclear age began, both
the world's fears of Armageddon and
its hopes for a stable peace have rested
on the relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
For most of that period, the policies
of both countries have been directed
more to the fearful possibility than to
the larger hope.

How to swing the direction more to
the larger hope? Mr Nixon records
many of the agreements that have
been made in recent years—a heart-
ening list—before coming to his
reading of Soviet policy today. He
is very far from the roll-back-com-
munism school. Like others, he is
puzzled by what he calls the
ambiguity in Soviet intentions. More
precisely, he does not know—any
more than anyone else—which way
Moscow will be turned by develop-
ments and events both within the
communist camp itself and outside.

For example, will the tensions
between Russia and China and within
eastern Europe make Moscow more
militant or more ready to seek easier
relations with the United States and
its Nato allies? So far Moscow
seems to be pursuing the second
course. Mr Nixon puts a less familiar
and more interesting question. Will
the spread of Moscow's influence
and resources in the Middle East and
South Asia be increasingly danger-
ous; or, "hopefully", will it give
Moscow a new interest in regional
stability and encourage it to use its
influence in the cause of restraint ?
If the latter, "the USSR and the
United States could act on parallel
courses". But it is certainly too
early to count on such a prospect.

Yet a third example of uncertainty
is whether—at a time when Russia
can produce both massive arms and
(increasingly) consumer goods—the
people's evident desire for still more
consumer benefits will itself encour-
age more normal relations with the
industrialised West? Or will sus-
picions remain?

These are all fair and proper
questions for President Nixon to raise,
even as Soviet military strength
grows and its sphere of action abroad
expands. The President is doing his
very best to be fair. A fuller picture,
of course, would have to bring in the
suspicions and doubts on the Soviet
side. Russians do not forget, as the
West is apt to do, the chain of
American bases near the Soviet
frontiers. Nor are they convinced
that America is really determined to
withdraw from its once enormous
commitment in Vietnam. Looking
further back, they are always ready
for endless bitter argument over
responsibility for the cold war.

One of the strengths of Mr Nixon's
survey is that it does not go too far
back on the past, and at every point
he indicates that the United States
Administration are ready to take the
more favourable view of Soviet policy
if Moscow gives them half a chance.
He says this even while heavily stres-
sing elsewhere in his report the
anxieties raised by Russia's arms
build-up, by her attitude in the Indian-

Pakistan crisis, and her expansion in
the Middle East.

It is on the arms build-up that Mr
Nixon is entirely unequivocal. It is
on this he gives his clearest and
gravest warning. It is the strongest
single theme in his report. He gives
accounts of Soviet increases in
strength in arms conventional and
nuclear. He gives details of naval
expansion, and of the great military
supplies sent to Egypt. After listing
the Russian developments in nuclear
weapons of various formidable kinds,
his verdict is the more convincing for
being phrased in measured words:

> The Soviet Union is continuing to
> create strategic capabilities beyond a
> level which by any reasonable stan-
> dard already seem sufficient . . .

> We cannot know the intentions of
> the Soviet leadership but we must
> assume that this trend reflects a
> calculated policy within the frame-
> work of an overall strategic
> rationale . . .

> If the Soviet Union continues to
> expand strategic forces, compensating
> United States programmes will be
> mandatory.

Some men might have been tempted
to end there. Mr Nixon's warning
certainly remains as strong as it can
be: nothing elsewhere in the survey
weakens it. But equally firm is his
expressed belief that the Russians are
unlikely to be planning to use their
nuclear forces "in an all-out
manner". And no less firm is his
intention to go on negotiating. He
sets out all that he hopes to talk about
in Moscow and describes how he sees
the strategic arms talks (Salt) progres-
sing both before and after his visit.

On their side the Russians have
been presented with a policy docu-
ment of major perspectives. Their
propaganda services have lately been
particularly busy in attacking Ameri-
can acts and supposed plans. They
have been given something more solid
in return, something that should
occupy several Politburo meetings.
They will produce their criticisms and
their counter-arguments. But they
can hardly deny one evident truth,
"We have the opportunity to usher
in a new era in international relations.
If we can do so, the transformation
of Soviet-American relations can
become one of the most significant
achievements of our time."

Return
of a great
power's
confidence

In his latest Foreign Policy Report, President Nixon sees 1971 as the watershed year. Judging from the direction and tone of the report, 1972 might well be remembered as the year when the United States regained its self-confidence as a great power in the world arena.

The first of these annual reports, known in Washington as the State of the World Message, was published two years ago when Mr Nixon, ably supported by Dr Henry Kissinger, his national security adviser, began to reexamine a national security policy established during the Cold War. The talk of a Nixon Doctrine frightened some people, who assumed an imminent American return to isolationism, but this year's report proves beyond any doubt that this is not the case.

The original objective remains unchanged. President Nixon, as did his predecessors, is trying to foster peaceful conditions in the world in order that the United States, and by inference other countries, may flourish.

The changes are in method. They have been dictated by many factors, above all by the ending of the bipolar postwar world and by the passing of America's indisputable superiority in strategic weapons.

Impatience

No less indisputable has been

the impatience of most Americans with the burdens of Pax Americana. Vietnam appeared to prove it a ghastly failure, but national confidence is now returning with the realization that an alternative policy is not beyond the wit or bank accounts of Americans.

President Nixon sees 1971 as a watershed because of the opening to China, the beginning of new relations with the Soviet Union, Europe and Japan, and the creation of a new environment for the world's monetary and trade activities.

He might be claiming a bit too much. The last Administration surely deserves some credit for better Soviet-American relations, but the report disproves the cynical theory that the Peking and Moscow visits were only election campaign gimmicks.

Anyone who has read the three reports can only be impressed by the progression of what Mr Nixon describes as the philosophical conception. Shrewd politician as he is, he has not been unaware of the political profit to be expected from the Peking and Moscow visits, but world security is not being cynically misused.

The tribes who for so long have served under American standards on the imperial glaciers can be reassured, but much is still expected of them. One of the new factors President Nixon sees in this changing world is the regained vigour and self-assurance of Europe and Japan.

They are expected to share a greater portion of the burden of world leadership. There should be few complaints from those, and that includes most of us, who at times found American leadership too overpowering, but it will need a national self-confidence no less than that expressed by President Nixon in his report today.

Louis Heren
Foreign Editor

VI. 11 Feb 72

UNITED KINGDOM

Y 1

PRESS EVALUATES STATE OF THE WORLD MESSAGE

Message 'Sober, Factual, Clear! '

London THE TIMES in English 10 Feb 72 p 15 L

[Editorial: "President Nixon's Policy"]

[Excerpts] President Nixon's report to Congress yesterday stands out immediately as one of the most weighty, most serious, and best argued statements of American foreign policy to be made since the end of the Second World War. In manner it is sober, factual, clear, without any obvious tremolo passages or overcontrived rhetoric. In substance it goes into American deeds, hopes, and difficulties in almost every part of the earth and above the earth. The main thread, appearing in several parts of the immensely long report, is provided by the sustained comments on the Soviet-American rivalry and on the search for a new relationship.

It may seem odd that in a report published only a week before the President leaves
for Peking, China should take so little a part and Soviet Russia so great. But that
balance is logical. In Peking Mr Nixon will be picking up old and almost forgotten
links again; he will be beginning a new process, unsure of what he will find, with
little to guide him. In Moscow, when he goes in May, he will be pursuing negotiations
that the two countries have been busy with for years. Whereas China has mainly been
on the sidelines since 1949, the American-Soviet rivalry has been at the very centre
of the world, over-shadowing it, throughout that time.

Mr Nixon records many of the agreements that have been made in recent years--a heartening
list--before coming to his reading of Soviet policy today. He is very far from the
roll-back communism school. Like others, he is puzzled by what he calls the ambiguity
in Soviet intentions. More precisely, he does not know--any more than anyone else--
which way Moscow will be turned by developments and events both within the communist
camp itself and outside.

For example, will the tensions between Russia and China and within Eastern Europe make
Moscow more militant or more ready to seek easier relations with the United States and
its NATO allies? So far Moscow seems to be pursuing the second course. Mr Nixon puts
a less familiar and more interesting question. Will the spread of Moscow's influence
and resources in the Middle East and South Asia be increasingly dangerous; or, "hope-
fully", will it give Moscow a new interest in regional stability and encourage it to
use its influence in the cause of restraint? If the latter, "the USSR and the United
States could act on parallel courses". But it is certainly too early to count on
such a prospect.

Yet a third example of uncertainty is whether--at a time when Russia can produce both
massive arms and (increasingly) consumer goods--the people's evident desire for still
more consumer benefits will itself encourage more normal relations with the industrialized
West? Or will suspicions remain?

VI. 11 Feb 72

Y 2

UNITED KINGDOM

One of the strengths of Mr Nixon's survey is that it does not go too far back on the past, and at every point he indicates that the United States administration are ready to take the more favourable view of Soviet policy if Moscow gives them half a chance. He says this even while heavily stressing elsewhere in his report the anxieties raised by Russia's arms build-up by her attitude in the Indian-Pakistan crisis, and her expansion in the Middle East.

Mr Nixon's warning certainly remains as strong as it can be: nothing elsewhere in the survey weakens it. But equally firm is his expressed belief that the Russians are unlikely to be planning to use their nuclear forces "in an all-out manner." And no less firm is his intention to go on negotiating. He sets out all that he hopes to talk about in Moscow and describes how he sees the strategic arms talks (SALT) progressing both before and after his visit.

On their side the Russians have been presented with a policy document of major perspectives. Their propaganda services have lately been particularly busy in attacking American acts and sapproved plans. They have been given something more solid in return, something that should occupy several Politburo meetings. They will produce their criticisms and their counter-arguments. But they can hardly deny one evident truth. "We have the opportunity to usher in a new era in international relations. If we can do so, the transformation of Soviet-American relations can become one of the most significant achievements of our time."

## Alert to Dangers in Europe

London DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 10 Feb 72 p 18 L

[Editorial: "Our American Ally"]

[Text] Ever since President Nixon started talking about his desire to present a "low profile" in international affairs, his allies have been apprehensive and uneasy. Could this mean that he was about to follow the example set by Lt Pinkerton, USN, that he was about to shuffle off his responsibilities and leave us, like Madam Butterfly, holding the baby? No one who has studied his third "State of the World" report to Congress could suspect this of him any more. He fully recognises America's inter-national obligations. He is also obviously alert to various dangers which he might perhaps have overlooked in the search for a detente with Russia and China.

In particular he recognises the need for a powerful American conventional presence in Europe. This need is not less than it was but greater, in view alike of Russia's growing military power and of the "ambiguous and contradictory trends" in her foreign policy. There will be, it is clear, no unilateral outs in America's forces in Europe, as have been so irresponsibly demanded by Senator Mansfield and others. The possibility of reciprocal reductions, to be negotiated with the Warsaw Pact countries, is indeed not ruled out. But here too, Mr Nixon shows himself fully aware of the dangers. As he points out, a straight reduction on an equal percentage basis would be most damaging to NATO, since Russia, unlike America, is in Europe, always ready to strike.

VI. 11 Feb 72

Y 3

UNITED KINGDOM

Reassuring as Mr Nixon's words may be, Western Europe should not become complacent. Presidents less resolute and cautious, less loyal and trustworthy than he, are, alas, quite possible. He gave details of what his European allies are doing to defend themselves. This may not be adequate, even if America continues to do her stuff. Gen Sir Walter Walker, retiring NATO commander in Oslo, has warned us. We should never rest easy till we can look after ourselves.

## Kissinger's Mark Evident

London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 10 Feb 72 p 16 L

[Editorial: The Nixon Doctrine in Operation]

[Text] The American empire, in the form that it assumed in 1945 and retained until, say, the brief attack on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon in 1968, has ceased to be. The United States is now a more experienced, and somewhat chastened, republic. Its allies, from Japan to Western Europe, are more self-confident; its natural adversaries are no longer united in a single monolithic bloc. Yet its military power remains the force upon which the nations of the West must ultimately depend for their security. These facts of present-day international life are clearly recognised in Washington, and not least by Dr Henry Kissinger, the adviser to the President whose manner of analysing foreign policy can be discerned on almost every page of Mr Nixon's voluminous report to Congress yesterday.

### Coherence

As a result the report has a certain intellectual coherence, even though it is tinged with the claims and assertions that are perhaps inevitable in an election year. References to "a generation of peace" must be taken as part of the political rhetoric; a close look at the report's analysis of foreign policy as a whole reveals something more profound than mere slogans. Boiled down, it is this: America now sets its foreign policy objectives, and contemplates the means of reaching them, in an intellectual atmosphere that is quite different from, and far less ambitious than, the one that prevailed 10 years ago. Two quotations may best make the point. President Nixon said yesterday that his government has begun to give effect to "our new policy of insisting that the United States has neither the prescriptions nor the resources for the solution of problems in which ours is not the prime national interest. It is coming to be widely understood that we are in earnest when we say that it is for others to formulate solutions to these problems, and that our contribution should be viewed as a supplement to the application of major resources from those primarily at interest."

### Contrast

The second quotation, taken from President Kennedy's inaugural Address of January 1961 is in stark contrast. "Let every nation know," President Kennedy said, "...that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty." In those days before the decline of America's conception of its place in the world the policy towards China remained one of containment; yesterday Mr Nixon was blandly reporting to the Congress that "the ultimate relationship between Taiwan and the mainland is not a matter for the U.S. to decide."

This is a change of so great a magnitude that it is not easy to appreciate it fully while we are still so close to it. In his search for rapprochement wherever he can find it Mr Nixon will soon travel to Peking, and, for the first time that any American President has made such a trip in his official capacity, to Moscow. [paragraph continues]

VI. 11 Feb 72

Y 4

UNITED KINGDOM

The report shows many signs of awareness, bordering at times on nervousness, of
the possibility that the Soviet Union might seek to take advantage of the new mood.

For this reason it is as well to note the streak of realism in the Kissinger
analytical method. Where America sees its interests as being directly threatened,
the report warns, it will not allow its still considerable military and diplomatic
strength to be forgotten. The other Western nations must take the lesson: They
need to decide how broad a view of its direct interests Washington now proposes
to take if they are to ensure that some of their own interests are not left
unguarded by default.

LONG-TERM TRADE PACT INITIALED WITH HUNGARY

Budapest MTI Domestic Service in Hungarian 2025 GMT 4 Feb 72 L

[Text] Hungarian-English economic talks were held in London between 24 January and 4 February. The parties agreed on the text of a long-term economic and trade agreement which insures further possibilities in developing trade between the two countries on the principle of a new, up-to-date trade policy. The new agreement that representatives of the negotiating parties initialed replaces the long-term trade agreement signed in 1968, which was still in force.

In addition, the representatives of the two countries agreed to regulate Hungarian-
English economic, industrial and technical cooperation in a separate agreement.
By this the two governments express the fact that they agree with and support
cooperation agreements of Hungarian and English enterprises in production, trade and
other economic fields. The agreement comprises measures of various sorts, including
organizational ones which the two governments will use to promote the cooperation
mentioned. The agreements were initialed on the Hungarian side by Tibor Peter Antal,
deputy department chief of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and on the English side
by H.N. Woodruff, assistant secretary of a division in the English Department of
Trade and Industry. The signing of these agreements will take place later.

Also on the agenda of the talks was the drawing up of commodity lists regulating
barter trade for 1972. At the same time representatives of the two countries signed
protocols on their implementation. The quotas of the commodity lists included in
the protocol increase the export possibilities of many articles of both countries.

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1972

135, FLEET STREET, LONDON, E.C.4.

TEL: 01-353 4242. TELEX: 22874/5/6.

CLASSIFIED ADVERTISEMENTS: 01-583 3939.

OUR AMERICAN ALLY

EVER SINCE President NIXON started talking about his desire to present a "low profile" in international affairs, his allies have been apprehensive and uneasy. Could this mean that he was about to follow the example set by Lt Pinkerton, USN, that he was about to shuffle off his responsibilities and leave us, like Madam Butterfly, holding the baby? No one who has studied his third "State of the World" report to Congress could suspect this of him any more. He fully recognises America's international obligations. He is also obviously alert to various dangers which he might perhaps have overlooked in the search for a détente with Russia and China.

In particular he recognises the need for a powerful American conventional presence in Europe. This need is not less than it was but greater, in view alike of Russia's growing military power and of the "ambiguous and contradictory trends" in her foreign policy. There will be, it is clear, no unilateral cuts in America's forces in Europe, as have been so irresponsibly demanded by Senator MANSFIELD and others. The possibility of reciprocal reductions, to be negotiated with the Warsaw Pact countries, is indeed not ruled out. But here too, Mr NIXON shows himself fully aware of the dangers. As he points out, a straight reduction on an equal percentage basis would be most damaging to Nato, since Russia, unlike America, is in Europe, always ready to strike.

Reassuring as Mr NIXON's words may be, Western Europe should not become complacent. Presidents less resolute and cautious, less loyal and trustworthy than he, are, alas, quite possible. He gave details of what his European allies are doing to defend themselves. This may not be adequate, even if America continues to do her stuff. Gen. Sir WALTER WALKER, retiring Nato commander in Oslo, has warned us. We should never rest easy till we can look after ourselves.

NIXON TO
SEEK ARMS
PACT

By STEPHEN BARBER
in Washington

PRESIDENT NIXON said yesterday that his talks with China's leaders later this month will represent "a necessary and a giant step towards the creation of a stable structure of world peace."

He expressed optimism that his next summit, with the Kremlin leaders in May, would mark the beginning of a new relationship with Russia, but he referred to "ambiguous and contradictory trends" in Russian policy and their "dangerous implications."

Although Mr Nixon appeared confident that at least an initial agreement on nuclear arms limitation would be achieved at his Moscow talks, he emphasised that the unabated build-up of Russian military power was his one deep concern.

He was going to Moscow, he said, in his foreign policy report to Congress to test Russia's willingness to break with the traditional patterns of Soviet-American relations.

Military expansion

Throughout the report he asserted that Russia continued to pursue expansionist military policies in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, as well as in the Indian sub-continent, while overtaking America in the deployment of nuclear weapons.

He said the Russians had so sharply expanded their arms supplies to India as to cause concern about their objectives. Tanks, guns, missiles, submarines and ships worth £300 million had been delivered to India in six years.

During the week of Dec. 6, the United States received "convincing evidence" that India was seriously contemplating seizing Pakistan-held Kashmir and the destruction of Pakistan's military forces in the West.

"We could not ignore the fact that when we repeatedly asked India and its supporters for clear assurances to the contrary, we did not receive them." This was the basis for a third appeal to the Security Council which was vetoed by Russia.

Arms race Warning—P.4.

Editorial comment—P.16

Nixon warns
Russia over
arms race

PRESIDENT NIXON bluntly threatened Russian leaders yesterday with a new arms race if they do not show restraint in their nuclear missile build-up.

The President, in his 95,000-word foreign policy report to Congress, also warned the world not to expect too much of his trip to China next week. "The trip to Peking is not an end in itself but the launching of a process," he declared, adding that it was an attempt to open communications with China after two decades of separation and hostility.

### Crucial turning point

Mr Nixon said he looked to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) for agreements to scale down the arms race and to set the foundations for further steps to ease tension.

But he said: "We are approaching a crucial turning point in our strategic arms programmes. If the Soviet Union continues to expand strategic forces, compensating American programmes will be mandatory.

"The preferable alternative would be a combination of mutual restraint and an agreement in SALT. But under no circumstances will I permit the further erosion of the strategic balance with the Soviet Union."

Mr Nixon told Russia that its actions in the coming months would demonstrate whether it was genuinely interested in improved relations and lessened world tensions.

He agreed that the Berlin agreement and other steps taken in the past year could mean the beginning of a new relationship.

But he said that "there were ... other developments in 1971 which make it unclear whether

we are now witnessing a permanent change in Soviet policy or only a passing phase concerned more with tactics than with a fundamental commitment to a more stable international system."

Serious questions, he said, were raised by Soviet weapons development, its arms shipments to Egypt in the Middle East, its military and diplomatic support of India in the recent war with Pakistan, and what he termed "the expansionist implications of the Soviet naval activities" throughout the world.

### "Watershed" year

The President called 1971 the "watershed year," in which America had made a dramatic opening to China and the beginning of a new relationship with the Russians, as well as the laying of a foundation for healthier relations with Japan and its European allies.

He described Soviet actions in South Asia and the Middle East, as well as in the field of nuclear disarmament, as developments with dangerous implications.

Mr Nixon confirmed unofficial reports that the Russians had supplied Egypt with 80 surface-to-air missile installations. several squadrons of combat aircraft with their pilots, 5,000 missile crew members and technicians, and about 11,000 other advisers since 1970.

He said the Russians had also sent in SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, the Foxbat and other advanced MiG aircraft, and TU-16 bombers equipped with long-range air-to-surface missiles.

The President said his biggest disappointment had been the failure of his efforts to persuade Hanoi to end the Vietnam war through a negotiated settlement. He said that America would never meet North Vietnam's demand for the elimination of the Saigon Government headed by President Nguyen Van Thieu.

On Western Europe and Nato, the President said American policy was to maintain and improve its military forces on the Continent and not reduce them except through reciprocal reductions negotiated with the Warsaw Pact nations, Reuter.

THE ECONOMIST FEBRUARY 12, 1972

YAVRUS VADIMAMA

43

THE WORLD

American Survey

When Kissinger breached the Chinese wall

The thoughts of Chairman
Nixon before his travels

Washington, DC

President Nixon's third annual report on foreign policy went to Congress this week as the preparations for his visit to Peking were nearing their final stage: he flies to Hawaii, the first of two overnight stops on the way, next Thursday. As he now explains in the report, he made a start on his approach to Peking within two weeks of his inauguration in 1969:

> I ordered that efforts be undertaken to communicate our new attitude through private channels, and to seek contact with the People's Republic of China.

While he was feeling around for reliable intermediaries and trying out channels of communication, he was also engaged in his series of limited improvements and relaxations in the American official attitude to communist China. By the autumn of 1970 messages began to come back from Peking; last spring the pace of the limited gestures of relaxation accelerated; and in July Dr Kissinger found himself sitting in a chair

opposition to Chou En-Lai.

The narrative does show awareness of the fact that the elements of secrecy and surprise in the way that this was done left several friendly governments disconcerted or annoyed. But, says the President, "there were over-riding reasons for keeping Dr Kissinger's July visit secret." These, substantially, were the fears that inflated expectations might lead to disillusionment and that both governments might have been forced "to take public positions which could only have frozen discussion before they began." He says nothing to confirm the suspicion that he actually enjoys surprising people, but also little to rebut it.

Even now the President is most reluctant to say what results he expects from his long journey. He will discuss primarily "bilateral questions"; still, either side can raise any subject that it wishes; even so, Mr Nixon will not negotiate on behalf of third parties or settle anything at the expense of

friends. That is all, except that the visit is a necessary step in a long process of moving "from antagonism to communication to understanding."

Relations with the Soviet Union, by contrast, are not in so rudimentary a state that a mere improvement in atmospherics, as Mr Nixon puts it, or in communications is of any particular interest. He envisages a more organised agenda for his talks in Moscow in May. He seems confident that a partial agreement in the strategic arms limitation talks is not far off. Perhaps it will still need discussion when he goes to Moscow, or perhaps it will be completed before then; if the latter, he can use the Moscow visit to prepare the second stage of the Salt talks. There are some other bilateral questions, including trade—"a variety of fields in which United States-Soviet co-operation would benefit both." The common involvement in European security has to be discussed, but the report throws in a reassurance to the western European allies: no agreements will be made in this area without them.

Mr Nixon also wants to discuss the Middle East, one of his confessed disappointments so far. Not only are some substantial American interests threatened by the failure to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, but there is also danger of recurring tension there between Russia and the United States.

President Nixon puts the blame on the Russians and once again he reproaches the Soviet government for using the Arab-Israeli conflict "to perpetuate and expand its own military position in Egypt." In general, however, though he has the familiar word of caution about "the continuing buildup of Soviet military power," he is relatively mellow about American-Soviet relationships. He lists a series of improvements since the tense period of 1970 and is in a guarded way hopeful that the competition of the two superpowers "need not be translated into hostility or crisis."

The difficulty of a document of this kind is that on the one hand it sets out to propound a general view or, as

44

AMERICAN SURVEY

it is called in the White House nowadays, a "philosophy" of American foreign policy: but, on the other, it has to be made to serve immediate tactical ends. The general view is required to show the American public what its government is after, to help foreign governments understand American actions and because the domestic debate on foreign policy needs a "framework."

Yet it would be asking too much to expect the Administration to refrain from using this document to send signals to foreign powers and, like its predecessors, the report is replete with such signals. Mr Nixon, since he wants to be re-elected this year and since for that and other reasons he wants to be thought of as a success, would also like his foreign policy achievements to look good in this, the year of fruition of his first term.

Perhaps that is why the Soviet Union, at the end of a little lecture on the error of military expansionism, gets an unexpected word of commendation for having "in the end" played a restraining role in the Indo-Pakistani war. Turning to the passage on South Asia one finds a claim that in early December the United States "received convincing evidence that India was seriously contemplating the seizure of Pakistan-held portions of Kashmir and the destruction of Pakistan's military forces in the west." What it amounts to is that, while the United States did not succeed in saving East Bengal from being over-run, it did stop the Indians from attacking, and perhaps overrunning, West Pakistan: and it is for restraining India, on American urging, that the Russians get their word of commendation. A touch of self-justification has perhaps to be expected here and there.

It goes almost without saying that self-justification is not absent from President Nixon's explanation of another area of disappointment, in Indochina. Here he anticipated the report by disclosing on January 25th the prolonged secret negotiations conducted by Dr Kissinger and the American peace offer as it stood then. The act of disclosure itself suggested that the secret negotiations were at an end. Mr Nixon's formal position is now that his offer is still open and that "the choice is up to Hanoi." But nothing in the report, or in the broadcast in which he explained the report to the public on Wednesday, suggests that he still seriously entertains the hope of a negotiated ceasefire before November's presidential election.

Plainly this presents him with a problem of public relations. After all in 1968 he asked the voters to trust him to bring about a negotiated peace. After three years in power he has still not managed it and plainly does not think that it is imminent. How to explain this, beyond the statement that unfortunately the communists would not accept his terms? There is an obvious temptation to blame political sabotage by the Democrats and the past 10 days have seen Mr Nixon struggling not very successfully with this temptation.

After he had disclosed the secret negotiations and his peace offer, Senator Muskie, the leading Democratic contender for the Presidency, took a characteristically long pause for breath and then, on February 2nd, dismissed Mr Nixon's plan as hopeless. Next day the Secretary of State came down heavily on Mr Muskie in a televised press conference, calling his speech very harmful to the prospects of successful negotiations to end the war. This week one of Mr Nixon's chief assistants, Mr H. R. Haldeman, took the matter further in another interview on television. Without naming any names, Mr Haldeman said that the Democratic critics of Mr Nixon's peace plan "are consciously aiding and abetting the enemy of the United States." When the interviewer, taken aback, asked him to say that again, he said it again. Severely limited as is the definition of treason in the American Constitution, it does include giving "aid and comfort" to the enemies of the United States. Mr Haldeman was accusing Senator Muskie, Senator McGovern and the other critics of treason and he was manifestly doing it deliberately. The critics resented it.

President Nixon never said it himself. He went out of his way, in his broadcast about the foreign policy report on Wednesday, to assert the value of free debate and criticism. He added that he did not "question the patriotism or the sincerity of those who disagree with my policies to bring peace." However, Mr Nixon went on, he did hope that any presidential candidate would take care that "nothing he says might give the enemy an incentive to prolong the war until after the election." There may well have been an element of seriousness in this remark. Still, it outlines not only a theme for use against critics of his foreign policy but also a possibly useful explanation for hope unfulfilled, in a presidential election contest that has started already.

Financial Times (cont'd)

# U.S. foreign policy 'turning point'

BY PAUL LEWIS, U.S. EDITOR

WASHINGTON, Feb. 9.

AMERICAN foreign policy is now at a turning point marked by the emergence of a new and more balanced relationship between Washington and its allies and a more constructive one with its traditional enemies.

Along with the rundown in the Vietnam involvement, this has opened the door to "a generation of peace" based on a wider, though more complex, international consensus that would place a new premium on compromise and moderation in diplomacy.

This is the essence of President Nixon's third foreign policy message to the Congress, which was released here to-day. It is essentially a political document of greater interest than its two predecessors because it sets out to demonstrate the success of the Administration's policies in this election year.

For the past three years, the report says, the Nixon Administration has been working quietly to recast America's foreign policy to the realities of the present day world. It has sought to end the period of cold war confrontation between the western alliance and the Communist nations by seeking a more cooperative relationship with Moscow and bringing China into the world system.

## Most proud

At the same time, however, the growing economic strength and political self-confidence of Europe and Japan has shifted the centre of gravity in the Western Alliance away from the U.S. In recognising this, the Administration has sought to refashion its traditional ties in a more equitable way that takes account both of America's reduced weight in world affairs and of its partners' ambitions to play a more prominent and distinctive role.

It is in the field of East-West relations that President Nixon is clearly most proud of the contribution he has made to this remodelling of American foreign policy over the last three years. However wide the differences with China may still be, he holds out his visit to Peking as an historic gesture ending 25 years

of "implacable hostility with the creation of a stable peace."

Although somewhat less dramatic, the President believes that his forthcoming trip to Moscow will be no less important than the Peking visit as a breakthrough in American relations with the Communist world. He cites a number of signs that the Russians may now be looking for a more peaceful relationship with the West—the Berlin agreement, the treaty banning ocean floor weapons etc.—and is optimistic that this year will see a first agreement in the SALT talks that could lay the foundations for further disarmament measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields.

The report suggests that the Soviet Union's achievement of approximate nuclear parity with the U.S., has contributed to the progress of the SALT discussions by giving both countries a common interest in freezing defence expenditures.

Nevertheless, it acknowledges that one price of this development has been the emergence of the USSR as a world power in the conventional sense, with a large fleet and a new interest in influence and prestige. It warns that only time can show whether this tendency will disrupt its new-found concern for world stability.

Where Europe is concerned, the report suggests that the transformation in American attitudes reflects the success of earlier policies.

The post-war recovery of these countries and Japan has equipped them to play a more prominent role in their own defence and forced the U.S. to pay closer regard to its own economic interests. That this change could strain their relations quite seriously was made plain by the August 15 crisis: but President Nixon argues that the Smithsonian agreement and his parallel round of summit talks has averted the danger and laid the foundations for a more equal and more viable Atlantic partnership.

In separate chapters on the alliance and the international economic order, the President contends that the old trading system had begun seriously to undermine the political unity of the western world by creating

recurrent monetary crises which strained America's relationship with its allies.

The prospect of enlargement of the Common Market—which the U.S. had always supported—threatened to compound these difficulties still further and made imperative from every point of view "not a patchwork adjustment, but a more fundamental change in the manner in which the non-Communist world economy is managed."

## Less rigid

The report goes on to argue that the "drastic unilateral measures of August 15" were taken in order to stimulate just such a multilateral settlement of the problem.

"We did not, in the period that followed, resort to bilateral agreements. We sought instead a new international agreement which all would participate in decreasing."

The first stage came in the Smithsonian settlement, but President Nixon goes on to underline that this must be followed up by the creation of a more balanced monetary system and a more equitable trading environment.

On monetary reform, the report calls for a less rigid system in which the burden of exchange rate adjustment would fall more evenly on both surplus and deficit countries alike. It suggests that the Special Drawing Right scheme offers an "invaluable" means of diminishing the role of gold and avoiding "the excessive reliance on reserve currencies that had become characteristic of the system." As regards trade, the President calls for "a broad international assault" on the remaining barriers and warns that protectionist or "neCommercialist" policies by any group of countries would "deal a severe blow to the international co-operation which underlies the strength and prosperity of all nations."

The report argues that the dislocation caused in America's political relations with Europe by the August 15 programme and the unexpected announcement of the President's visit to Peking, was ironed out during the summit meetings in December and

early January. But it acknowledges that the more fundamental shift in the balance of Atlantic power that has also occurred has brought "an end to American tutelage and an end to the era of automatic unity."

The challenge now is to establish "a new practice in Atlantic unity—finding common ground in a consensus of independent policies instead of in deference to American prescriptions."

Leaving aside Europe and the Communist world, President Nixon admits that his policies have been less successful in many other areas of the globe.

The most prominent setback has been in Indo-China with the failure of his secret negotiations with Hanoi to produce a settlement that would leave the future of the South Vietnamese in their own hands. But he is also pleased with the outcome of the Indo-Pakistan war, reserved about the prospects for Africa and disturbed by South America's ambivalent attitudes towards the United States.

## Overstated

From the domestic political point of view as well as the international, the main comment to be made on this year's foreign policy report is that it overstates the achievements of the Nixon Administration so far. There is indeed encouragement in the field of disarmament, in improving relations with the Communist world and in refashioning the Atlantic alliance. But the main fruits of these labours have yet to be seen and are in fact not easy to predict.

The President himself is careful to enter a note of caution about his dealings with the Communists—although this detracts from his claim that 1971 was a "watershed" in American foreign relations. But he comes close to equating a call for monetary and trade reform with final agreement and he takes credit for resolving the problems that he himself created, with the August 15 programme.

This is, in fact, an electoral document which shows that on foreign policy, as with the domestic economy, President Nixon is campaigning as much on promises as on concrete achievements.

Le Monde

11 Fèb. 1972

## LE MONDE VU DE WASHINGTON

Le seul fait que, depuis le retour des républicains à la Maison Blanche, le président des Etats-Unis s'étende chaque année en détail sur l'« état du monde » dans un volumineux document passant en revue, région par région, les questions de l'heure et les perspectives d'avenir atteste que la « doctrine Nixon » n'est pas une doctrine de « décrochage ».

Le message présenté le 9 février le confirme à propos du Vietnam. M. Nixon déplore qu'aucune de ses ouvertures à Hanoï n'ait jusqu'ici convaincu l'adversaire de traiter, mais il se félicite en même temps de constater que ce problème « ne détourne plus notre attention des problèmes internationaux et nationaux fonda-mentaux ». Le rideau s'est relevé sur le théâtre de l'univers, dont les personnages comparaissent un à un devant le chef de l'exécutif américain, qui distribue avec équanimité conseils, éloges ou avertissements peinés.

On pourrait voir dans cette attitude une simple métamor-phose de l'« arrogance du pou-voir » reprochée à l'intervention-nisme de M. Johnson. Il y a quel-ques jours, M. Nixon lui-même n'encourageait-il pas les indus-triels américains à redoubler d'ef-forts pour conserver à la puis-sance américaine la « première place » sur le marché de l'innova-tion et des échanges ? Est-ce la meilleure manière d'arriver, ainsi que le rapport en exprime l'aspiration, « à une claire défi-nition » des objectifs des Etats-Unis, au lieu de se complaire, comme dans le passé, « à l'idée d'avoir une mission spéciale à remplir » ? Cela dit, si l'on peut s'interroger sur l'ampleur de la conversion américainaine annoncée par M. Nixon, on ne saurait mé-connaitre la sincérité de l'entre-

prise de réajustement d'iplomatique et militaire menée sous sa conduite. Sans doute les Etats-Unis doivent-ils tenir compte de la dilapidation de ressources et de confiance que leur ont value leurs emportements des années 60.

Devenus plus économies, ne continuent-ils pas cependant à se croire, avec une fois plus technocratique que pragmatique, enfin en possession de la « bonne » méthode pour aborder leurs difficultés extérieures et intérieures ?

Ces réserves une fois énoncées, on retiendra que, pour M. Nixon, il n'y a que trois zones où les Etats-Unis solent sonlagés de pouvoir se décharger de la « tutelle », selon l'expression pré-sidentielle, qu'ils exercaient avec plus ou moins de bonheur : l'Europe, l'Amérique latine et l'Afrique. Dans les trois cas d'all-leurs, il s'agit moins d'un déga-gement que d'un recul per-mettant d'amorcer une coopéra-tion sur des bases nouvelles, en particulier avec l'Europe, que le président souhaité voir jouer, une fois trouvée son « identité », un rôle mondial de partenaire de la puissance américaine.

C'est évidemment à ses pro-chains voyages en Chine et en Union soviétique que M. Nixon pense en premier lieu quand il essaie de trouver ce que pourrait être une ligne médiane entre « parité » et « passivité », face au renforcement du potentiel milli-taire soviétique, entre un rap-prochement avec les adversaires « implacables » de Jadis et la fidélité aux alliances conclues pour leur faire plèce. Sa vue d'ensemble repose sur l'idéal d'une stabilisation progressive des forces habituées à se défler, d'un apaisement des conflits rebelles à une cure immédiate ; bref, d'une modération généralisée plus que d'un réalignement miraculeux des pions de l'échiquier inter-national. Le recours à la force en moins, c'est une vision très proche en somme de celle de Metternich, qui reste pour le docteur Kissinger le... modèle de l'homme d'Etat.

Le Monde 11 Fob. 1972

Le rapport de M. Nixon
sur la politique étrangère

Le rapport de M. Nixon sur la politique étran-
gère a été présenté au Congrès le mercredi 9 fé-
vrier. Il est précédé d'un préambule dans lequel
le président déclare notamment :

« 1971 a été l'année du grand tournant. Les fondements jetés par les mesures précédemment adoptées et l'effet cumulatif qu'elles n'ont pu man- quer d'avoir nous ont permis d'apporter à notre politique étrangère, au cours de l'année écoulée, des modifications d'une ampleur et d'une signification historiques : ouvertures vis-à-vis de la République populaire de Chine ; inauguration de relations nou- velles avec l'Union soviétique ; établissement d'une assise sur laquelle pourront être édifiés des rapports plus sains et plus durables avec nos alliés euro- péens et le Japon ; création d'un nouveau climat dans le domaine des activités monétaires et com- merciales. (...)

> L'axe de cette nouvelle conception de notre rôle est une alliance plus équilibrée avec nos amis et des rapports plus constructifs avec nos adversaires.

La fin d'un interlude stérile

» A l'égard de la République populaire de
Chine, nous avons mis fin à une période de vingt-
cinq ans d'une hostilité implacable, qui était la
caractéristique dominante et réciproque de nos
politiques nationales. Aussi fragile soit-il, le
rapprochement entre le pays le plus peuplé et
le pays le plus puissant du monde pourrait avoir
une signification plus grande pour les générations
futures que toute autre mesure que nous avons
pu prendre cette année.

> Ma visite à Pékin, en février, n'amènera
certainement pas une solution rapide aux pro-
fondes divergences qui nous séparent de la Répu-
blique populaire de Chine. Mais elle constituera
un début et marquera la fin d'un interlude stérile
et vain dans les relations entre deux grands
peuples. Enfin, elle représentera un pas gigan-
tesque et nécessaire vers la création d'une struc-
ture stable pour la paix mondiale.

» Avec l'Union soviétique, nous avons réussi à
donner un nouvel élan aux perspectives de rela-
tions plus constructives grâce à une série d'accords
concrets qui touchent aux causes de tension entre
nos deux pays. Les accords varient en importance,
mais ils fournissent les uns et les autres de sérieux
motifs de croire qu'une amélioration fondamentale
dans les relations américainso-soviétiques est sans
doute possible. (...)

» Cependant, d'autres événements sont survenus
en 1971 qui ne permettent pas de voir clairement
si nous assistons maintenant à une évolution
durable de la politique soviétique ou seulement à
une phase éphémère dictée davantage par des
considérations tactiques que par un ralliement
fondamental à un système international stable.
Le développement des armements soviétiques et les
activités qui président à leur déploiement, la poli-
tique suivie par Moscou en matière de livraison
d'armes au Moyen-Orient, l'attitude soviétique
pendant la crise indo-pakistanaise et les impli-

cations expansionnistes des activités de la marine
russe, tous ces indices soulèvent de sérieuses
questions.

» Quoi qu'il en soit, le nombre et la portée des éléments positifs nous ont amenés à la conclusion qu'une rencontre au plus haut niveau était opportune et pourrait fournir le stimulus nécessaire à de nouveau progrès, notamment dans le domaine de la limitation des armements et la sphère de coopération économique. Donc, en mai, pour la première fois dans notre histoire, le président des États-Unis se rendra en visite à Moscou. Nous irons à cette rencontre avec l'espoir et la volonté de réussir.

Créer une paix mondiale stable

» Nos alliances ne sont plus destinées par essence
à endiguer l'Union soviétique et la Chine derrière
le bouclier américain. Elles tendent, au contraire,
à créer avec ces puissances une paix mondiale
stable. Cette tâche exige absolument le maintien
de la force alliée du monde non communiste. »

A propos de la crise monétaire, M. Nixon a dit :
« Nous avons pris, le 15 août, unilatéralement, des
mesures radicales, et ce, par un étrange paradoxe,
en vue de stimuler un règlement multilatéral du
problème. (...) En décembre 1971 est intervenu le
réalignement général des monnaies. C'était la
première mesure indispensable. Avec nos parte-
naires, nous rechercherons, au cours de la pro-
chaine ou des deux prochaines années, un système
monétaire plus équilibré et un climat commercial
plus équitable. Qui plus est, nous avons agi de
concert pour faire face à nos problèmes écono-
miques tout en renforçant notre unité et en
garantissant l'avenir de notre coopération.
Nous avons ainsi écarté le danger imminent de voir les
intérêts économiques en conflit conduire à l'effi-
lochement de la cohésion du monde libre. »

Enfin, M. Nixon a rangé parmi les « vives
déceptions de l'année », « l'échec des efforts inten-
sifs que nous avions déployés en public et en
privé pour mettre fin à la guerre du Vietnam par
un règlement négocié ». « Le seul obstacle sérieux
à un règlement qui subsiste encore, a-t-il dit, est
l'insistance que met l'ennemi à exiger que nous
coopérions avec lui pour imposer à notre allié à
la table de négociation une solution que l'ennemi
ne parvient pas à lui imposer sur le terrain, et ne
veut pas confier à un processus politique. Et cela,
nous nous y refusons. »

Une autre déception a été la guerre indo-
pakistanaise : « Nous avons tenté de rendre la
crise moins aiguë en entreprenant un effort massif
de secours et en menant une campagne diploma-
tique intensive pour promouvoir une solution
politique. Mais la guerre était emportée par son
propre élan. La violation de la paix en Asie du
Sud a eu des conséquences néfastes pour la stabi-
lité des autres régions de tension dans le monde,
et pour nos efforts visant à établir des relations
plus encourageantes avec nos adversaires. »

Le rapport proprement dit, qui compte deux
cent trente-six pages, revient plus en détail sur
tous ces problèmes. On y relève notamment :

DIE WELT Nr. 34 - Donnerstag, 10. Februar 1972

# Nixon: Moskaus Vorschläge zur Sicherheitskonferenz illusorisch

Von unserem Korrespondenten HEINZ BARTH

Washington, 9. Februar

Als vage und illosorisch weist Präsident Nixon in seiner außenpolitischen Botschaft, die er am Mittwoch dem Kongreß zuleitete, die bisherigen sowjetischen Vorschläge für eine europäische Sicherheitskonferenz zurück.

Wie Nixon feststellte, werden sich die USA erst nach „Vollzug“ — also nicht schon nach Unterzeichnung — des Schlußprotokolls des Berlin-Abkommens an West-Ost-Sondierungen beteiligen, die der Vorbereitung der Konferenz dienen sollen.

Mit dem 236 Seiten langen Dokument, das in seinen wichtigsten Kapiteln die Handschrift Henry Kissingers verrät, unterbreitet der Präsident dem Kongreß zum drittenmal einen ausführlichen Jahresbericht über die Weltlage, der damit neben der Botschaft über die Lage der Nation zu einer ständigen Einrichtung seiner Administration geworden ist. Zwölf Tage vor dem Besuch in Peking distanzierte sich der Präsident in seiner Analyse mit Nachdruck von der Absicht, China gegen die Sowjetunion auszuspielen. Die Botschaft läßt jedoch erkennen, daß die langfristigen Perspektiven der Annäherung an Peking positiver beurteilt werden als die Entwicklung des Verhältnisses zu Moskau.

„Nach Ansicht der Westmächte“, heißt es in dem Dokument, „ist das Berlin-Abkommen die Vorbedingung für europäische Verhandlungen auf breiter Basis. Wir haben vor, die Fragen der

europäischen Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit eingehend mit unseren Verbündeten zu diskutieren und mit ihnen eine koordinierte Position des Westens zu entwickeln. Falls bis dahin das Berlin-Abkommen vollzogen (consummated) sein sollte, werden wir zu multilateralen Sondierungen mit anderen möglichen Konferenzteilnehmern übergehen.“

Die Nixon-Administration bemängelt, daß sich der Konferenzvorschlag des Warschauer Paktes mit einer Gewaltverzichtserklärung und einem Abkommen über erweiterte kulturelle und wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit begügt. „Eine bloße Entspannungsatmophäre“, bemerkt der Präsident, „ist unzureichend, weil sie nicht von Dauer wäre und es schwierig erscheint, den Wert von Maßnahmen zu ermessen, die im Namen einer so vagen Zielsetzung vorgeschlagen werden. Allgemeine Absichtserklärungen, deren Auslegung zu schweren Differenzen führen kann, haben einen illusorischen Nutzen und sind sogar gefährlich. Es genügt nicht, sich im Abstrakten über die Zusammenarbeit zu verständigen.“

Seite 6: Nixon

Die Welt (cont'd)

Botschaft zur Weltlage: US-Präsident bezeichnet Berlin-Abkommen als Meilenstein

# Nixon will seine Rußland-Politik nicht auf Vermutungen stützen

Washington, 9. Februar

Der Gedanke, daß die Vereinigten Staaten ihr Verhältnis zur Sowjetunion nicht nach den vermuteten Absichten, sondern nach den Aktionen Moskaus in allen Fragen aus-

richten werden, die beide Mächte trennen, zieht sich wie ein roter Faden durch die außenpolitische Botschaft des amerikanischen Präsidenten Richard Nixon.

Es sei der Kern der amerikanischen Rußland-Politik, so betont Nixon in seiner am Mittwoch veröffentlichten Kongreß-Botschaft über die Weltlage, sich auf die Substanz, nicht auf das Klima der Beziehungen zu konzentrieren. Die Rivalitäten im kommunistischen Block seien zu einem wichtigen Faktor der sowjetischen Außenpolitik geworden und legten die Vermutung nahe, daß Moskau an einem Abbau der Spannungen mit Amerika und seinen atlantischen Verbündeten interessiert sei.

In seiner Botschaft zählt Nixon neben dem Berlin-Abkommen, das er einen „Meilenstein“ nennt, eine längere Reihe von technischen Vereinbarungen auf, die 1971 mit den Sowjets getroffen wurden. Gleichzeitig beklagt er aber die Widersprüche der sowjetischen Haltung und verweist dabei auf die Expansion der russischen Militärmacht sowie auf das Verhalten des Kreml in der Pakistan-Krise und im Nahen Osten. Wie der Präsident feststellt, ist die Sowjetunion auf dem Gebiet der bodenstationierten Offensivraketen den USA im Verhältnis 1520:1054 überlegen und hat mit den Vereinigten Staaten, was die strategische U-Boot-Waffe betrifft, nahezu (500:656) gleichgezogen.

## Verhärtete Position

„Die Sowjetunion“, fährt der Präsident in seinem Bericht fort, „weitet ihre strategische Kapazität über das Niveau aus, das nach allen Maßstäben der Verunft ausreichend erscheint. Es ist daher unvermeidlich, daß wir uns fragen, ob die Sowjetunion Streitkräfte anstrebt, die erforderlich wären, um vitale Elemente unserer strategischen Kräfte anzugreifen und zu vernichten.“ Die Verhärtung der amerikanischen Position kommt auch in der Feststellung Nixons zum Ausdruck, er könne keinesfalls eine weitere Erosion des strategischen Gleichgewichts zwischen beiden Mächten zulassen.

Der Präsident hält an dem mit Moskau vereinbarten Junktim zwischen der Begrenzung der strategischen Offensiv- und Defensivwaffen fest. Trotz der „anfänglichen Priorität“, die er einem SALT-Abkommen über die Kontrolle der Abwehrraketen zugestand, sei für ihn eine gleichzeitige Vereinbarung über strategische Angriffswaffen unverzichtbar. Das einzige Zugeständnis,

das er zu machen bereit ist, liegt im umfassenden Charakter des ABM-Abkommens, während er sich hinsichtlich der Offensivraketen mit einer provisorischen, die Sowjets auf eine zweite Verhandlungsphase verpflichtenden Abmachung begnügen will.

Nixon spricht von „intensiven Verhandlungen“, die noch nötig seien, um das SALT-Abkommen unter Dach zu bringen. Als Hauptziele seiner Mission in Moskau bezeichnet er den Abschluß dieses Abkommens, die Vorbereitung der zweiten Verhandlungsphase über strategische Waffen, eine Aussprache über die Situation im Nahen Osten und die Diskussion der europäischen Sicherheitsprobleme. Auffallend scharfe Töne schlägt der Präsident bei der Erörterung des Pakistan-Konfliktes an. „Die Sowjet-Politik“, erklärt er, „verfolgt hier die gleiche Tendenz, die schon 1967 im Nahen Osten und 1970 in der Jordanien-Krise zu beobachten war — sie ließ die Spannungen kochen, um aus ihnen politischen Gewinn zu ziehen.“ Nixon beschuldigt die Sowjet-Führung, durch ihren Freundschaftsvertrag mit Indien und ausgedehnte Waffenlieferung der indischen Regierung bei der Invasion Ostpakistans Rückendeckung gegeben zu haben.

Amerika, so heißt es weiter, habe ein neues Gleichgewicht zwischen seinen internationalen Verpflichtungen und der zunehmenden Selbstverantwortlichkeit seiner Alliierten durch die Entwicklung der Nixon-Doktrin geschaffen. Hingegen weite die Sowjetunion ihre politische und militärische Präsenz in vielen Gegenden der Welt aus. „Während der letzten drei Jahre“, versichert Nixon, „versuchten wir, konstruktive Entwicklungen in unserem Verhältnis zur Sowjetunion zu fördern. Es wäre eine Gefahr für den Weltfrieden, wenn unsere Entspannungsbemühungen als eine Gelegenheit für die Expansion der Sowjetmacht von der Gegenseite mißverstanden würden.“

## Mit Voraussagen sparsam

Im Vergleich zu diesen Warnungen sind die Ausführungen Nixons zur China-Politik leise gestimmt. Die Geheimhaltung der ersten Kissinger-Mission in Peking vor den Verbündeten Amerikas wird damit entschuldigt, daß man ihres Erfolges nicht gewiß sein konnte. Eine vorzeitige Enthüllung hält-

te zu Pressionen von dritter Seite gegen beide Länder geführt und das Unternehmen vielleicht zum Scheitern gebracht.

Mit Voraussagen der Resultate seiner Reise ist der Präsident sparsam. Wie er ankündigt, werden bei seinen Gesprächen mit den Chinesen die bilateralen Probleme Vorrang haben. Es werde nicht zu einer Verschiebung des Schwergewichts der amerikanischen Asien-Politik von Tokio nach Peking kommen. „Es wäre kurzzeitig“, formuliert der Präsident in seiner Botschaft, „enge Bindungen an einen wichtigen Alliierten mit der Milderung der Feindschaft eines hartnäckigen Gegners zu vertauschen.“ Ebensowenig werde Amerika seine Bündnispflichten gegenüber Taiwan vernachlässigen.

## „Madrid“ erscheint doch wieder

Gö. Madrid, 9. Februar

Die liberale Abendzeitung „Madrid“, die im vergangenen November von der spanischen Regierung verboten wurde, wird in Kürze wieder erscheinen.

Die neue Gesellschaft „Madrid Diario de la Noche S.A.“ wird vom Madrider Presesverband und der syndikalen Organisation gebildet, die die noch ausstehenden Löhne für die Zeit der Nichtbeschäftigung vom 26. November bis jetzt auszahlen will. Mit der Bindung an die Syndikate verliert die Zeitung allerdings ihre bisher tapfer verteidigte Unabhängigkeit in weitem Maße. Das Wiedererscheinen wurde möglich, nachdem die Syndikate auf essentielle Forderungen des „Madrid“-Treuhänders Trevijano sowie der Redakteure und Arbeiter eingeningen. Der bisherige Chefredakteur Fontan, engster Mitarbeiter des inzwischen ins Exil gegangenen Verlegers Calvo Serrer, ist im Interesse des Wiedererscheinens zurückgetreten.

Einige Regierungsmitglieder sollen in letzter Minute auf einen für das Unternehmen und die Belegschaft annehmbaren Vertrag gedrungen haben, um zu verhindern, daß die Zeitung durch den angekündigten stückweisen Verkauf des Grundstücks, der Maschinen und anderer Einrichtungen nur langsam stürbe.

III. 11 Feb 72

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

PEKING LEADERS PLAN TO BETRAY VIETNAM, DEAL WITH U.S.

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1815 GMT 10 Feb 72 L

[Text] A group of French parliamentarians who visited the PRC and met Chou En-lai have stated that the Peking leaders are not prepared to take part in talks to work out any guarantees capable of securing peace in Vietnam. Moreover, as AFP reports, Chou En-lai stressed that the Vietnam problem will not be discussed during President Nixon's visit to the PRC.

The situation might appear to be paradoxical. The United States is, after all, bringing big naval forces into the Gulf of Tonkin and building up its bomber force. However, the Maoists' hypocrisy rests in the fact that while shouting about their aid to the Indochinese people, who are fighting for their freedom and independence against the American aggressors, they are in fact betraying at every step their interests and openly setting out to make a deal with the Yankee imperialists.

U.S. HOPES PEKING WILL BE ACCOMPLICE IN ASIAN POLICY

Moscow in Mandarin to China 1600 GMT 10 Feb 72 B

[Commentary by station observer Latyshev]

[Text] The question of Sino-U.S. relations occupies an important place in President Nixon's report to the congress on U.S. foreign policy in the 1970's. On this question Latyshev, an observer of this station, writes:

The entire report by President Nixon shows that U.S. foreign policy in the 1970's still will not be changed. U.S. imperialism has voiced beautiful words such as "hope for peace" and "the era of negotiations", but it cannot cover up its real aim of ruling the world, of opposing communism, and of suppressing the national liberation movement.

In analyzing achievements made in foreign affairs and in dealing with problems to be solved, the U.S. President constantly stresses the advantages the United States has tried to gain in its relations with other countries. It is from this standpoint that this report assesses the relations between China and the United States.

The U.S. imperialist clique hopes that China will become an accomplice in its Asian policy. The report particularly points out: "In the long run, there should be no conflict of basic interests between China and the United States." It says that "China and the United States have many interests in common and can do many things together to enrich the life of the people of the two countries."

From their historical experience, the Chinese workers have a profound realization of what the imperialists term "enriching the life of the people of the two countries". means. The consequences of the "concern" shown by the colonialists for the people's welfare have yet to be eliminated up to the present time. The work of "enriching" the life of the South Korean people in which the U.S. imperialists have participated has actually become a most ruthless oppression and persecution of the people in that country.

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USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ASIA & PACIFIC

Speaking in particular of Japan's relations with the USSR, Miki notes that these relations must not be different in principle from the relations which have taken shape recently between the Soviet Union and France. A dialog is necessary--that is the main thing. Japan must in no way play on the differences between different powers. He explains that here he has in mind Soviet-Chinese differences.

Another leader of the ruling party--Masayoshi Ohira, also a former foreign minister--reiterates, in our conversation, an idea that I have frequently heard in Western Europe and even in the United States itself: The United States can no longer act in all parts of the world--it must define the limits of its possibilities. The dollar crisis was a special alarm signal for Japan on maintaining close relations between the United States and Japan, not on the former principles of subordination and patronage, but under conditions of equality.

"The gods so created Japan," Ohira says, "that in the region where it is situated the policies of the United States, the USSR, and the PRC meet as though at a crossroads. If Japan holds its interests dear it must have friendly relations with all three of these powers. This is a difficult task but there is no other sensible path."

Japan has various problems, he continues, with regard to each of these states. With the United States it is the problem of achieving equal rights, with the USSR that of intensifying and developing relations. The Soviet Union is pursuing a sensible foreign policy and there are no difficulties at present in Japanese-Soviet relations either on the economic or the political plane. The prospects for the future are good.

There are many complications with the PRC. The historical past and the Taiwan problem, with regard to which there are many arguments and different viewpoints in Japan, are obstacles of course, Nixon's trip to Peking creates a new aspect of this problem. It can accelerate the establishment of Japan's relations with the PRC. The U.S. President has not thought of this, Ohira adds meaningfully.

The editors of the main Tokyo newspapers also touch on the same questions of foreign policy. Ohara says in YOMIURI that the dollar crisis and the devaluation of U.S. currency connected with it and the revaluation of the Japanese yen are slowing down the rates of Japan's economic development. Japanese business circles are faced, in connection with the inevitable difficulties in foreign trade, with the task of intensifying the export of capital to the United States and mainly to Latin America and the Asian countries. The world is changing and foreign policy cannot no longer be built on relations with one country alone. In the newspaper MAINICHI, chief editor Saito speaks of Japan's future independent foreign policy:

"Our country cannot confine itself to one foreign state. It must have good relations with all states, without linking itself by any special ties. It is precisely from such a train of thought that the idea of neutrality is arising in Japan."

BRIEFS

GROMYKO, DRV ENVOY--On 7 February USSR Foreign Minister Comrade Gromyko received Comrade Kwon Hui-kyong, the newly appointed DPRK ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the USSR, in connection with the coming presentation of the latter's credentials. [Text] [Moscow in Korean to Korea 1130 GMT 8 Feb 72 T]

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B 4

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA

NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT ELICITS COMMENT

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2030 GMT 10 Feb 72 L

[Text] President Nixon's foreign political report to Congress has caused disillusionment among the U.S. public and press organs. In particular, that part of the report in which an attempt is made to justify the present course of the U.S. Government with regard to Middle East problems is sharply criticized.

The striving of the Republican administration to create a favorable picture of its policy including its stand on the Middle East, writes international affairs journalist Viktor Aleksandrov, is quite understandable, since 1972 is an election year in the United States. However, even taking this into account, the report does not contain any positive points or ideas which would testify to Washington's intention to renounce its unlimited support for the aggressive policy of Tel Aviv and to make a contribution to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The report admits that a threat to peace and (?stability) exists in that area. However, what solution does the American Government propose to the current crisis situation in the Middle East? A careful analysis of the formulations and statements contained in the report confirms that the main attention of the United States is to be concentrated on increasing deliveries of offensive weapons to Israel. And that represents one of the causes of the aggravation of the Middle East situation. The report stresses that the continuation of military assistance to Israel is allegedly necessary to preserve the military balance in that area. The desire to mask the pro-Israeli position of the United States is so strong that the author of the report ignores the recent statement of his secretary of state, Rogers, who openly stated that even if the balance of forces in the Middle East were in favor of Israel, the United States would nevertheless continue to supply it with new deliveries of weapons.

The second direction of U.S. efforts in the Middle East, according to the report, is to further the achievement of an agreement on opening the Suez Canal. However, it is well known that it was precisely Washington, together with Israel, that did everything not only to thwart the Egyptian initiative on this question but also to freeze the Jarring mission and to paralyze the quadripartite consultations in the United Nations on the Middle East.

Therefore, it is not surprising that Washington's Middle East course, in spite of all efforts of the Republican administration to whitewash it, is being subjected to ever sharper criticism.

U.S. ISRAELI EFFORTS TO HINDER JARRING MISSION SCORED

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Feb 72 Morning Edition p 1 L

[L. Koryavin dispatch: "Who is Sabotaging the Jarring Mission?"]

[Text] Cairo--The meeting in Rome of K. Waldheim, UN secretary general, with G. Jarring, his special Middle East representative, and their discussion of the Middle East crisis have attracted great attention in the Cairo press. The declaration made during the meeting that one of the sides in the conflict--Egypt--supports the UN Decisions was welcomed here.

III. 11 Feb 72

B 5

The Arab Republic of Egypt [ARE] has pronounced itself in favor of the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution, and declared its intention to cooperate with Jarring's mission which has the task of promoting the practical implementation of this important document. Its position has also been constructive and consistent regarding Jarring's own proposals to which the ARE has responded positively. Recently, Cairo again confirmed its support representative. The joint Soviet-Egyptian communique contains a proposal about the immediate resumption of Jarring's mission.

However, Tel Aviv's position remains contrary, as before. It has not only approached the Security Council November resolution from obstructionist positions, but has also done everything to hinder the normal work of Jarring's mission. The U.S. position, too, is being subjected to sharp criticism in Cairo, for the United States is encouraging Israeli obstructionism. Attention is being drawn here to the fact that Washington, while declaring once again its "mediatory position" in a Middle East settlement, is in fact striving to replace Jarring's mission.

U.S. Secretary of State Rogers declared bluntly the other day that he sees no reasons why "parallel" negotiations should not be conducted under the "aegis of the United States." However, the difference is, as local commentators stress, that Jarring's mission is bringing with it constructive steps for a solution of the Middle East crisis, while the American "proposals" do not envisage precise measures for the main condition of a settlement--the withdrawal of the Israeli aggressors' troops from the Arab lands.

The fact that the United States has decided to reinforce its "peacemaking" efforts in the Middle East with new military deliveries to Israel is also significant. As a REUTER correspondent reported from Washington, alluding to well-informed sources, the United States has agreed to deliver to Israel an additional 42 Phantom and 90 Skyhawk planes. Delivery will start at the beginning of next month. And the New York TIMES writes that certain planes will be transported to Israel directly from "U.S. navy squadrons," by which is meant the aircraft carriers of the American 6th Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean Sea.

GEORGADZE MEETS WITH EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR

Moscow TASS International Service in English 1302 GMT 10 Feb 72 L

[Text] Moscow, February 10, TASS--Mikhail Georgadze, the secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, today received Yahya Abd al-Qadir, the ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

A friendly conversation took place.

ARTICLE SEEN AS SOVIET FEELER ON LINKS WITH ISRAEL

Report on Article

London The TIMES in English 10 Feb 72 p 7 L

[By Moscow correspondent David Bonavia]

[Text] Moscow, 9 February--The Soviet press has floated what appears to be a carefully calculated trial balloon about the possibility of better relations between Russia and Israel.

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THE AMERICAS

NIXON REPORT POINTS UP U.S. PROBLEMS THROUGHOUT WORLD

Moscow in Polish to Poland 1700 GMT 10 Feb 72 L

[Commentary by Geliy Shakhov]

[Text] In his foreign policy report President Nixon refers to the profound transformation of America's role in the world. It is difficult to disagree with this. While in the past we witnessed a confrontation between the United States and the socialist community, the present report deals in detail--to put it mildly--with complications in relations with many countries of Western Europe and Asia, particularly Japan. In a word, the difficulties are many and their number keeps increasing.

The question arises as to who is responsible for these complications. The report does not answer this question, although in conformity with the unanimous view held by political leaders of many West European and Asian countries, the one-sided--in fact, egoistic--strivings of Washington produce all these complications. Judging by the past, the course adopted by the U.S. ruling quarters will not alter in the nearest future.

When I studied more carefully the President's report I noticed first of all that the words do not tally with Washington's actions. Let us take Vietnam. The message says that the continued participation of the United States in the Indochinese conflict is the cause of universal alienation. If we translate this complex phrase into language understandable to all it transpires that it refers to widespread dissatisfaction in the United States and the whole world due to the policy of war escalation being waged by Washington in Southeast Asia.

According to the latest new coming from that area, the Pentagon certainly is not looking for a light in the tunnel and is not striving to leave Indochina. On the contrary, the U.S. military establishment steps up the volume of its intervention in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Let us take another issue: The situation in the Middle East. Who is responsible for the fact that there still is no peaceful settlement of the problems relating to that area? Washington and Tel Aviv bear the responsibility. The ruling quarters of the United States and Israel do not want peace in the Middle East. Their main aim is to preserve and intensify tension in that area. It suffices to recall the details of the new military agreement between Israel and the United States. It became clear that both countries achieved agreement on immediate deliverables of large consignments of Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft to Israel. This happened at a time when the prominent leaders of the Soviet Union and Egypt, during their talks in Moscow, once more appealed for a peaceful solution of the Middle East problem and for every possible support for the mission of the special representative of UN Secretary General Gunnar Jarring in the interest of implementing the UN resolution of 22 November 1967.

We have deliberately dealt with only two problems to illustrate Washington's statements about its alleged striving for peace. One could only add to this Washington's attitude during the Indian-Pakistani conflict, when, according to secret State Department documents published in the U.S. press, the U.S. ruling quarters openly aimed at increasing tension in that area.

The last element of U.S. foreign policy which I would like to mention is disarmament. In words Washington allegedly aims at a solution of this issue. In practice the question looks quite different. It suffices to recall that the U.S. military expenditure in the coming fiscal year will exceed all postwar records.

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USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
WESTERN EUROPE

Roland Leroy, a member of the Politburo of the French Communist Party, used ever more violent words when he stated on 30 January at Marseilles that the leadership of the Socialist Party (?was trying) to put an end to the policy of class collaboration. In fact, the leadership of the Socialist Party does not seem to have made up its mind if it really wants unity of action with the communists.

Statements by the first secretary of the Socialist Party, Francois Mitterand, show that despite what he says he has not yet given up the policy of distrust toward the communists and that the socialists still have not shaken off the unstated (?belief) of the leader of the French Social-Democrats--the idea of anticommunism.

But there is more. The present socialist leaders would like to exert pressure on the French Communist Party by intimidating it with threats of isolation if it does not agree to follow the socialists' point of view on their conditions. The socialist weekly paper (EVENEMENTS ACTUELS) recently claimed that the socialists have no fears that leftwing unity will not come about. For this eventuality we have the tactic of election alternative, the weekly paper stressed. We get on well with both the radicals and the center progressive republicans. This statement is not at all surprising.

It has been known for some time that there exists among the leadership of the Socialist Party an influential group which recommends alliance with the centrists. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that even by allying themselves with the centrists could the socialists form a serious threat to the majority in power. For without the communists, who are the main political force on the left flank of the French political arena, they do not stand a chance of bringing about political change in France.

Therefore, 1972 is a decisive year in the struggle for the unity of leftwing forces in France. If they do not succeed this year in creating a leftwing united front, it is doubtful that the present majority group in power will fall. Any attempt to bring together the leftwing forces without the communists--and what is more, against the communists--is doomed to failure.

But if the right-thinking forces of the Socialist Party leadership want to overcome the resistance of leaders from the anticommunist right, in this case the creation of a united front on the eve of the parliamentary elections, of a front with [words indistinct] is quite possible.

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USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
THE AMERICAS

We must at the same time take into consideration that as a result of the untiring efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, trends showing the weakening of international tension are noticeable in the world. There is also a growing striving for mutual understanding and rapprochement. On the other hand, the report stresses emphatically that in foreign policy U.S. might is an indispensable element.

Summing up what we have said, we arrive at two conclusions: Washington's foreign policy has entered a phase of chronic crisis, but at the same time the U.S. ruling quarters intend to continue their policies which concretely disprove the U.S. statement about its strivings for a change from the era of confrontation to an era of negotiation.

## Latin American Policy

Moscow in Portuguese to Brazil 2200 GMT 10 Feb 72 L

[Leonard Kozichev commentary]

[Summary] The part of Nixon's foreign policy report devoted to Latin America analyzes the general trends of U.S. policy in Latin America in recent years. It seems that U.S. policy on the continent will not change in the future. It is obvious, however, that the White House cannot completely ignore the just demands of the Latin American countries for a change in their relations with the United States. Dissatisfaction with the U.S. policy on the continent extends to new areas, including areas which until recently believed the pretended good intentions of the United States.

Nixon's report naturally expresses U.S. concern with the turn of events on the continent and with the desire of the Latin American countries to put an end to their economic and political dependence on the United States.

"This is why he tried to present the Nixon doctrine on equal relations between the United States and Latin America as a new idea which corresponds more closely to the political reality. However, the practice of relations between the United States and Latin American countries since the proclamation of this doctrine proves that it is no more than a propagandistic camouflage of the old imperialist policy, a tactical adaptation to the new conditions."

Nixon's report also shows that the U.S. policy on the continent during the seventies will be dictated above all by the interests of the United States. This attitude reflects the essence of Washington's policy in Latin America, whatever the camouflage disguising it.

"Nixon's report to Congress states that Washington's policy toward any one country will not depend on its domestic structure. However, this statement is refuted by the U.S. attitude toward Chile and Cuba. The United States intends to apply the most rigid policy toward these two countries. This is made clear in the report."

The interests of the Latin American countries are diametrically opposed to the policy proposed by the United States for the seventies.

## Further Commentary

Moscow in Spanish to Cuba 2330 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Leonid Levchenko commentary]

[Text] U.S. President Richard Nixon read to Congress today his report on U.S. foreign policy for the seventies. Here is what Moscow radio correspondent Leonid Levchenko says on the part of the report devoted to Latin America:

III. 11 Feb 72

G 3

In the foreign policy report read by President Nixon one can again detect concern that the United States cannot change the development of events in Latin America.

The message reflects disappointment that last year Washington--as Nixon said--was not able to find a solution to the clash between the efforts of Latin American countries to achieve independent development and to be free of American dependence, on the one hand, and the U.S. policy aimed at curtailing this process, on the other hand. The 3 years in power of the present U.S. administration have shown that its Latin American program has failed.

It is well known that the main task of Nixon's Latin American doctrine was to create on the continent the false impression that the United States would not abuse its power, submit Latin American countries to cruel exploitation, or interfere in their domestic affairs. The American leaders stated that their relations would be as between equal partners and that Washington would even support reforms in Latin America, but, as the magazine NEWSWEEK stated, setting one essential condition: That these reforms be carried out only by conservative governments prepared to defend U.S. interests.

The entire course of events on the continent confirms that Washington continues to apply its old policy in Latin America, trying to readjust it to meet the new realities.

In his latest foreign policy report President Nixon proves in fact that the policy of his government vis-a-vis Latin America in the seventies will basically remain unchanged. Nixon's foreign policy report states that relations with each of the Latin American countries will not depend on the internal structure of the country. Washington tries to appear unconcerned with the social and political processes that have flared up in several countries of the continent, including Chile. The only criterion to be taken into consideration by the United States will be the measure to which their policies and actions will impinge upon U.S. interests and those of the inter-American system. Thus the U.S. ruling circles confirm in a veiled sort of way their intention to strongly defend their investments in Latin America and punish the government of any Latin American country which limits or ends the activity of the U.S. monopolies.

It is here that the essence of the new Washington attitude toward the Latin American countries is revealed. Concealing their aims with statements about Washington's supposed concern for the interests of the inter-American system, the U.S. ruling circles try to justify the repressive measures adopted against several Latin American countries by their desire to restore harmony within the inter-American community. Clinging to the concept of pan-Americanism, the United States tries to prevent the crumbling of the inter-American system which serves Washington's interest. While issuing slogans calling for inter-American solidarity, the United States tries to dismember the united front of Latin American unity based on an anti-U.S. platform.

President Nixon confirmed again in his foreign policy report that the United States would continue its anti-Cuban policy and not reconsider its attitude toward the well-known OAS resolutions on the breaking off of relations with Cuba. Washington hints that it will torpedo any initiative by the Latin American countries aimed at revoking the anti-Cuban resolutions.

However, events which have taken place in Latin America are irreversible. They cannot be restricted to the interests of U.S. policy. Washington's unsuccessful policy cannot continue to be implemented on the continent, in spite of any changes in its ideological wrapping as produced by U.S. statesmen.

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G 4

U.S. Reaction to Report

Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1808 GMT 10 Feb 72 L

[Text] Washington, 10 February--The President's foreign political report to Congress in which he tried to detract from dissatisfaction over the government's Vietnam policy has been criticized by U.S. Congressmen.

"President Nixon would like to hinder criticism," Senator Muskie said, "but he must realize that disagreements surrounding this war have been going on for 5 or 6 years."

Yesterday White House supporters made an unsuccessful attempt to insure the mass support of Congress for the government's Vietnam policy, but only 57 of 311 Democratic members of the House of Representatives agreed to sign a letter approving U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. A similar letter circulated in the Senate was supported by only 36 senators, all of whom represent the ruling party.

Leading American newspapers have taken a critical attitude toward President Nixon's report to Congress. The New York TIMES points out that the state of American foreign policy was described in the report in deliberately "light tones." The paper explains this by the fact that the report was intended for American voters and "is basically a document aiming at the 1972 presidential elections."

The New York TIMES notes that despite attempts by the President to present the government's foreign policy in a favorable light "the results of this policy are painful." The paper criticizes the government for the stand it took in the recent Indian-Pakistani conflict. Unilateral measures adopted by the United States against its partners and "the deepening of the world monetary and trade crisis have left scars that will not be easy to remove."

The New York TIMES subjects to particularly sharp criticism those parts of the report which concern the war in Vietnam. The paper recalls that as early as 1968 Nixon promised to end the war. However, the war continues, and it is now clear that "unless a political solution is reached by talks the war will continue."

French, Indian Criticism

Moscow in English to Africa 1500 GMT 10 Feb 72 L

[Text] President Nixon's message on foreign policy is being criticized in various countries. The Paris newspaper L'HUMANITE condemned the United States Government for refusing to set the exact date for the withdrawal of its troops from Indochina. The paper said that the course proclaimed in Nixon's message means the United States will continue the aggression and will go on ignoring the peace proposals of the DRV and the PRGRSV.

UPI Reported that government circles in India expressed disappointment with the section in the Nixon message which states the U.S. position on the conflict on the Indian subcontinent. Our correspondents in various capitals report that the democratic press points out the contradiction between the President's assertion that the United States must go on building up its military might and his statement about transition from the age of confrontation to the age of negotiations.

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USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
GENERAL

- 0 -

The problem of the multilateral cessation of nuclear weapons tests, including
underground tests, must be resolved urgently. This is pressingly required by
the interests of peace and international security.

As for the means of resolving the problem of banning underground nuclear tests, the simplest and most direct means is proposed by the Soviet Union, which is ready for the immediate conclusion of an agreement on banning underground tests on the basis of national means of control. For this there are now both the scientific and technical preconditions. The USSR, which has great capabilities in the field of seismology, proceeds from the fact that national means can insure a full guarantee of the observance of the ban on underground nuclear tests.

Talk of the need for further study of the possibilities of control are only a pretext for abandoning the examination of the real issue. To conclude an agreement only the political decision of the states is needed. Unfortunately the United States and a number of its allies are not setting about this solution. Nor is the PRC leadership setting about this. Movement is thereby virtually blocked on the party to solving the problem of nuclear disarmament, which is a most important precondition for stable peace and the peoples' security.

NIXON REPORT SHOWS U.S. AGGRESSIVENESS CONTINUES

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 10 Feb 72 L

[Text] In spite of the demand by peoples for the liquidation of hotbeds of tension in the world, the United States intends to continue military intervention in various areas, including Southeast Asia. This can clearly be seen from the report on U.S. foreign policy addressed by President Nixon to Congress. The foreign press points out that Washington still does not intend to make any substantial changes in its foreign political course, the characteristic feature of which is orientation toward aggression.

(over)

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MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA

NIXON MESSAGE EVADES ISSUE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

Moscow in Arabic to the Arab World 1600 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Unattributed commentary: "Contrary to the Interests of Peace in the Middle East"]

[Text] The Soviet-Egyptian joint communique, issued on the occasion of the visit to the Soviet Union by President Anwar as-Sadat, referring to the situation in the Middle East, said that the aggressive expansionist policy pursued by Israel with U.S. support is considered the main reason for the continuing dangerous situation in the region. This policy constitutes a danger to world peace and creates an obstacle in the path of a just settlement of the Middle East crisis. This evaluation underlined the past and recent course of events in the Middle East.

It is worth referring, in this connection, to the foreign political report submitted by U.S. President Nixon to Congress, a report which dealt with international issues, including the Middle East. It was clearly evident that President Nixon, defining the American course toward the Middle East, completely evaded the main issue, namely the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories which they have been occupying since 1967.

Israel's refusal to comply with this 7 and a 1/2 year demand for withdrawal obstructs a settlement to the Middle East question. If the United States were truly seeking to restore peace to the Middle East, as U.S. President Nixon alleges, it should above all clearly define its stand toward this question by denouncing Israel's expansionist plans and actions. But this is not happening. On the contrary, all the U.S. actions and steps indicate that it intends in the future also to turn a blind eye to Israeli aggression and expansion at the expense of the Arab countries.

Recently Washington decided to send a further substantial consignment of Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft to Tel Aviv. The anti-Arab action of the United States is also manifested in its offer to help Israel produce many types of modern weapons under American license. The American decision evoked pleasure and happiness in Tel Aviv and strengthened the insatiable expansionist ambitions of the Israeli rulers.

In his report to Congress, President Nixon spoke about the role of the big powers in settling the Middle East crisis and pointed out that their attitude could speed up or complicate the process of reaching an agreement. In fact, the UN Charter commits the big powers, as permanent members of the Security Council, to help implement UN resolutions. But what is the United States doing in this connection? It is not only failing to help, but also trying to obstruct the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council on 22 November 1967 and by the General Assembly on 13 December 1971.

The alleged American diplomatic activities in recent months and the ignominious task of American mediation are aimed at undermining the mission of Gunnar Jarring, the special envoy of the UN secretary general, and at complicating the search for peace in the Middle East. It was not surprising that the disgraceful task of American mediation ended in utter failure and was categorically rejected by the Arab Republic of Egypt and other Arab states on the grounds that it was a false move and an attempt to deceive the Arabs and world public opinion.

III. 10 Feb 72

B 2

The General Assembly, in its resolution of 13 December 1971, denounced the U.S. mediation and called for the immediate resumption of the Jarring mission. Yet, the United States continues its dangerous and mean game in the Middle East.

The Cairo papers rightly say that the United States is trying to resurrect the false idea that it holds the key to a solution of the crisis, and for this reason it again arrogates to itself the role of mediator in the talks between Egypt and Israel on resuming international navigation through the Suez Canal. Israel rushed to announce its agreement to hold these talks. The American papers themselves write about the lack of any prospect for the success of the new plot which is being hatched by Washington, for Israel is unwilling to link the reopening of the canal with the withdrawal of its forces, and this is something the Arabs will not accept.

Clearly what is involved here is a maneuver by Washington and Tel Aviv, whereby they want to overcome the deep international isolation into which they were led by their own adventurous policy. It is worth mentioning that the maneuvers of the aggressors and their overseas protectors coincided with the visit of Egyptian President Anwar as-Sadat to the Soviet Union, where the two countries expressed their determination to struggle for a just settlement of the Middle East question on the basis of implementing all the provisions of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, which call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories and insuring the rights and interests of all countries and peoples of this region, including Palestine.

It is not difficult to realize the extent of the concern felt by the aggressors and their imperialist protectors, concern which is forcing them to resort to foolish maneuvers. The actions of Washington and Tel Aviv, which contradict the interests of peace in the Middle East, were clearly shown up against the obviously positive talks and attitude during the Moscow visit of Egyptian President Anwar as-Sadat.

U.S. DEEDS IN AFRICA CONTRADICT STATED POLICY

Moscow in English to Africa 1500 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Georgiy Tanov commentary]

[Text] According to President Nixon's message to Congress the other day, American policy in Africa aims at setting up honest relations with the people of the continent and their governments. That's the theory.

In practice, America is glaringly violating the sanctions against Rhodesia. The New York TIMES has pointed out that America's violations are a colossal moral stimulus for the white government. Let me add that it's far more than a moral stimulus. America's purchases of Rhodesian chrome are also a mighty financial and economic bulwark for Ian Smith's racist regime.

President Nixon said the United States also seeks understanding in Africa and diplomatic support in a wide range of political issues. But the New York TIMES once again gave the President the lie. It reported that Washington had supplied Portugal with credits totalling $436 million. This, the paper said, would not fail to lighten the burden of Portugal's burden of expensive wars against liberation movements.

The New York TIMES dwelt on many problems not mentioned in the President's message. It gave numerous examples of a noticeable rise in African national liberation movements.

It would be wrong, however, to suspect that the New York TIMES, the mouthpiece of the American imperialist monopolies, liked such developments. It gives a crude and nervous story with unconcealed alarm about the changes taking place in Africa. This alarm is flanked by equally frank threats against the African nations. The paper talks about the Africans getting away with their fight in certain instances, but ends up by the thinly veiled appeal to the world to take a good look at the cracks in the bastions of white minority rule in the south of Africa and think them over. It is obvious who the New York TIMES invites to do his thinking and how.

You could leave matters at that, writes in conclusion our observer Georgiy Tanov. However, another idea expressed by the (?writers) in the columns of this big American daily paper is also worth mentioning. In its report about the intensifying fight of the Africans in Namibia, the New York TIMES complained that even if the Africans are suppressed at the present stage their conditions will never again be the same as they were. This reflects the main (?trend)--that the uprooting of colonialism and racism on the African Continent is inevitable.

BRIEFS

DEPARTURE OF GUINEAN MINISTER--Moscow February 9 TASS--Member of the Political Bureau of the Democratic Party of Guinea and Minister of Trade Nfamara Keita left Moscow today. During his stay in the USSR, agreements were signed on questions of trade between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Guinea for 1972. [Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in English 1805 GMT 9 Feb 72 L]

G 1

THE AMERICAS

TASS, RADIO REACTION TO NIXON FOREIGN POLICY REPORT

TASS Reportage

Moscow TASS International Service in English 2000 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Text] Washington, February 9, TASS--President Nixon has sent to Congress a report on the foreign policy of the United States. The American press assessed this document as an intention of the U.S. Government in the year of the presidential elections to present the results of its world policies in a light advantageous to it. As is known, these policies are criticised by broad segments of the public.

Even in the report, while asserting that U.S. policy scored outstanding progress last year, its authors admit that there were also disappointments on the road of progress, and first of all the dissatisfaction caused by the American war in Indo-China that caused serious tension inside the country. Many Americans, the report says, believe that the government is not doing all that is necessary to achieve a settlement of the conflict by means of talks. The report also contains an admission of a weakening of U.S. positions in the system of world imperialism. During the period of the present administration's stay in office, the report says, the United States passed from the dominating role it played in the post-war period to a new role.

Implied hereby are the monetary difficulties now experienced by the United States because of the drop in the dollar exchange rate. In this connection, the report says, rigid measures were taken to show other countries that the United States is seriously concerned and that a reform of the international trade system and a general revision of the exchange rates of currencies can no longer be postponed.

The report says that the unilateral measures taken by the United States in the field of the economy evoked a sharp aggravation in relations with the trade partners of the United States in the whole world. It is noted, in particular, that serious tension has originated between Japan and the United States. America's contacts with China and the economic measures dealt a blow at the Japanese-American relations and placed the Japanese Government into a difficult position, the document says.

The report points to the change in the U.S. positions in Western Europe. The President notes with alarm that the appearance of a new European grouping of ten countries will lead to a gigantic concentration of economic might and that this cannot but have consequences for the trade positions of the United States. The coordination of conflicting economic interests, Nixon admits, will require difficult political decisions.

President Nixon proclaimed his government's intention to build up and strengthen further the military machine of the North Atlantic bloc whose main element, as before, are the American nuclear forces and troops stationed in Western Europe. The strategic nuclear forces that are now given top priority in the Pentagon budget are the key element of U.S. military might, Nixon stated.

III. 10 Feb 72

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Now the treaties are to be studied by the second chamber of the FRG parliament--the Bundestag. The first reading of the bills on the ratification of the treaties is to take place on February 23 and 24.

FURTHER DETAILS ON SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S TALKS

Moscow TASS International Service in English 1448 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Excerpt] Moscow February 9 TASS--The Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Aleksey Kosygin received in the Kremlin today the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Krister Wickman.

Questions of further developing bilateral and other international problems of mutual interest were discussed [as received] in the course of the conversation that passed in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding.

[L--Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1600 GMT on 9 February, reporting Gromyko's talks with Wickman, says: "Those taking part in the conversation on the Soviet side were Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador to Sweden Yakovlev, and on the Swedish side Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jarring and General Secretary of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Leobri)."

FURTHER MALTESE-BRITISH TALKS 'UNLIKELY'

Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1130 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Text] Malta's prime minister, Mr Mintoff, finds that further talks with Britain on her bases in Malta are unlikely. He stated his views upon his return to La Valletta. His meeting with Lord Carrington, just as the previous round of talks, produced no results.

Meanwhile, Lord Carrington made it clear in London that Britain will continue to exert pressure on Malta so as to retain her bases. The North Atlantic bloc is highly interested in this. It regards Malta as an important stronghold in the Mediterranean.

KOSYGIN, BELGIAN PREMIER EXCHANGE TELEGRAMS

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 10 Feb 72 L

[Text] Comrade Kosygin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, has sent a congratulatory telegram to Belgian Premier Eyskens, in connection with his appointment to the premiership.

In a reply telegram the Belgian premier expressed profound gratitude for the congratulations.

III. 10 Feb 72

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Nixon described the four-power agreement on West Berlin as an important milestone. The report outlines the known position of the United States in respect of conveni the conference on questions of European security.

Touching on Soviet-American relations, the President noted that problems separating the United States and the USSR are real and serious ones. They involve the security and welfare of both countries and therefore require concrete agreements on specific questions that cause tension. He said useful talks were held by the two countries in 1971. The number and nature of positive phenomena brought the U.S. to the conclusion that a summit meeting would be appropriate and could give an impetus to further progress, the President stated.

Touching on the Middle East situation, Nixon said that a threat to peace and stability existed in that area. But when listing the measures that should be taken to ease tensions, he actually again declared for increasing deliveries of offensive weapons to Israel, encouraging thereby its aggressive policy.

Speaking of the forthcoming visit to Peking, Nixon stated that this visit is the result of a thoroughly organised series of steps and will become a culmination of three years of mutual efforts.

Nixon admitted that certain political circles in the United States were exerting pressure to utilize the new approach to Peking for exploiting the Sino-Soviet tension. In this connection the President said that the policy of the United States was not directed against Moscow. The United States and the USSR should resolve problems of prime importance and it would be costly to impede progress by new antagonisms.

President Nixon again contended that American might is indispensable in pursuing the foreign policy. But this approach contradicts the statement contained in the very same report that the United States strives to pass from the era of confrontation to an era of talks.

Radio Commentary

Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Text] President Nixon's state of the world message to Congress details his foreign policy platform for the presidential elections in November. The message points out that the American forces will remain in South Vietnam until the American terms are accepted. It adds that Washington will continue to support the Saigon regime.

The section of the message dealing with the Middle East has been written entirely from pro-Israel positions and points to the administration's unwillingness to achieve fulfillment of the Security Council's resolution providing for the complete withdrawal of the forces of occupation.

President Nixon, who earlier asked Congress for additional appropriations for military purposes, reaffirms his intentions of continuing to build up stockpiles of strategic weapons.

President Nixon admits a worsening of the United States' relations with a number of Latin American countries and also with India and Bangladesh.

II. 11 Feb 72

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YUGOSLAVIA

Amilcar Cabral had talks with representatives of the Socialist Alliance of Yugoslavia on cooperation between this Yugoslav organization and the Party of African Liberation. Also discussed during the talks was the assistance which the Socialist Alliance is offering to the liberation movements in Africa, particularly to the Party of African Independence. Cabral paid recognition to Yugoslavia, on that occasion, for its consistent political support and assistance to the peoples of Africa which are fighting for their independence.

The guest acquainted in detail his hosts with the latest developments in Guinea Bissau and the developments of its liberation forces.

FURTHER COMMENT ON NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY MESSAGE REPORTED

Milan Zupan Report

Belgrade TANJUG International Service in English 1351 GMT 10 Feb 72 L

[Excerpt] Belgrade, February 10 (TANJUG)--"We have favorably received the section of President Nixon's report on relations between Yugoslavia and the United States which reaffirms United States' interest in, and readiness for, the further development of relations with non-Aligned Yugoslavia, extension of the scope of our economic relations, and exchange of opinions at a high level."

"We also attach importance to the sections of the report in which President Nixon speaks of Yugoslavia as a factor of peace and stability in Europe and elsewhere and of the indivisibility of peace and security in Europe."

This was pointed out by the official spokesman of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, Milan Zupan, at a press conference here today. He added that thereby, President Nixon had reaffirmed the positions from the joint statements of the two presidents, issued at the end of President Tito's visit to the United States late last year. ("?We) may add," Zupan said, "that on the Yugoslav side too there is readiness for, and interest in, the further strengthening and development of relations with the United States, in accordance with and upon the foundations of the joint statement of Washington."

Sundic Commentary

Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 10 Feb 72 L

[Milika Sundic commentary: "Nixon's Report to Congress Represents a Step Forward as Regards the Main Points of U.S. Foreign Policy Hitherto"]

[Text] Nixon's foreign policy report to congress, as distinct from his recent State of the Union Message, has all the characteristics of a rational and, for everyone to whom it is intended, important document. Many of Nixon's points can be disputed, but taken as a whole the report to congress also gives hope to the whole world, considering that such a great power comprehends the inevitability of negotiations and peaceful life with all regardless of the ideological differences and special interests.

An important place in the U.S. President's report belongs to the relations with our country, that is to the talks which the head of the White House held last year with President Tito. It is true that the extent of this part of the report cannot be compared with what was said about relations with China and the Soviet Union, but in spite of this the part dealing with Yugoslavia illustrates the essential points of our foreign policy, especially as regards our views on Europe.

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YUGOSLAVIA

Our attitude, as a nonaligned country, is taken from the communique on the Tito-
Nixon talks, while the fact that the American President refers to it in his report
to Congress represents great recognition of our efforts in the struggle for permanent
and just peace as well as--which this time is of special importance--a (?clear)
denial of all those speculations which the reactionary Western press is spreading in
recent times about an alleged weakening of our international position. Namely,
Nixon accepts without reservations the basic Yugoslav thesis that a (?permanent)
peace and true security are inseparable and that they can be achieved in Europe only
by taking Europe as a whole and not only this or that part of it. For us, this is
the basic principle of the European policy because during the past 2 years of the
East-West agreement-making there was a justified query as to whether the relaxation
of tension in central Europe also meant a secure peace in southern Europe, or in
all other regions. We say straight away that this question has not lost any of its
topicality because, in the first days of 1972, tendencies have appeared to divert
Yugoslavia in some way from its track of nonalinement. These tendencies are based
on some completely erroneous assessments of our domestic situation. Even some
American newspapers have not refrained from making such forecasts and it is very
good that Nixon does not think so.

For us it is also no less important that the head of the White House speaks about Yugoslavia as a nonaligned country, in which we see a U.S. interest that we remain such and that it is possible to reckon with such a Yugoslavia today and in the future. We can only welcome such an attitude toward us and we are fully justified in our insistence that all other international factors, too, treat us in the same way.

As we said at the beginning, Nixon's report pays main attention to the relations
with China and the Soviet Union. We think that he dealt with both countries in a
way which can satisfy them in spite of the reproaches at the expense of the Soviet
Union, which Moscow will not like. Namely, among other things, the American
President shifted the responsibility for many failures in his policy onto the Soviet
Union. [sentence indistinct] Nixon is obviously optimistic about the further
development of relations with the two great socialist countries and this will very
likely have some influence also on the talks which he will soon conduct in their
(?capitals).

Nixon's report to the Congress will also have a considerable influence on the way
Americans will vote in the forthcoming presidential elections. [sentence indistinct]

TANJUG COMMENTS ON NIXON'S UPCOMING TRIP TO CHINA

Belgrade TANJUG International Service in English 0926 GMT 11 Feb 72 L

[Text] Washington, February 11 (TANJUG)--The trip to Peking closes one and opens another chapter in the relations between the Peoples Republic of China and the United States. President Nixon has said, having unexpectedly appeared at the regular press conference in the White House. He said that a chapter of war conflicts and hostilities is being closed and a new one opening which, he said, the United States wants to be a chapter of greater intercommunication and steady expansion of fields of negotiation and contracting of zones of confrontation. The President also cautioned that the trip should not be regarded with too much optimism, nor with pessimism, but it should be approached as the watershed in the 25 years of relations, or rather practical non-existence of relations between the two countries.

II. 10 Feb 72

YUGOSLAVIA

I I

REPORTAGE, COMMENT ON NIXON FOREIGN POLICY MESSAGE

TANJUG Report

Belgrade TANJUG International Service in English 1147 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Text] Washington, Feb 9 (TANJUG)--The opening toward China, the beginning of new relations with the Soviet Union, the laying of foundations for sounder and more rational relations with West Europe and Japan and the creation of a fresh atmosphere for monetary and commercial activities in the world were enumerated today by President Nixon as the four most important fields in which American foreign affairs were engaged last year.

In his 236 page report to the Congress today, Nixon described the past year as a key year in the changes and a new tracing out of American foreign policy, which he said was "historical in volume and importance" and is a transformation of American foreign-policy relations both with friend and with foe.

In his customary annual message about the state of the world and the United States role in it, which the president's close aide and adviser, Dr Kissinger, told newsmen constituted rather a United States philosophical approach to the world and that much more concrete data would be published in the State Department document which follows, the president singled out, along with the four basic fields, also positions that United States world supremacy in strategic potential is gone and instead a strategic nuclear balance has been struck between the United States and the Soviet Union; that the postwar bipolar division of the world into exclusive blocks has vanished and a multipolar world entity of nations and states with strong tendencies towards independence has appeared; that foes are not given for all time but are also conversible and that, owing to this, foreign policy should display more restraint, more preparedness to solve contradictory national interests by negotiation and not by confrontation.

To this idea he immediately added his policy of opening toward China, which he described as constituting simultaenously "one end and one beginning", the end of his, as he said, three-year efforts to cut the twenty-five year period of hostilities and mutual isolation, and the beginning of new processes.

As in all his hitherto appearances, Nixon promised nothing special from his trip to Peking, but expressed confidence that "a chapter will be closed at the highest level" in the relations between the most populated nation and the mightiest country in the world, and also determine what can be done further, whether, as he said, the two great nations can at length extricate themselves from the era of confrontation and enter into a phase of communication and understanding. [sentence as received] While not detracting from but rather enhancing the magnitude of the differences--ideological, systematic, practical and principled--dividing the two countries, Nixon expressed confidence that neither Peking nor Washington will insist that the other side should renounce its positions, principles of obligations towards its allies so as to facilitate rapprochment. On the contrary, while recognizing and honouring differences, fields of better understanding and coincidence of interests will be sought.

II. 10 Feb 72

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ROMANIA

UNESCO COMMITTEE--The proceedings of the Internationale Committee for Preparing the Sixth Regional Conference of the European National UNESCO Commissions were held today in Bucharest. The conference will take place 3-9 May in Bucharest. The proceedings were attended by representatives from Austria, Belorussia, Switzerland, Italy, Yugoslavia, Norway, Holland, Poland, Romania, and Hungary. Professor Dr Jean Livescu was elected chairman of the committee. [Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1600 GMT 7 Feb 72 A]

DPRK ARMY DAY NOTED--Bucharest, AGERPRES, 7.2.1972--Army General Ion Ionita, minister of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Republic of Romania, sent a congratulatory telegram to Army General Choi Hyon, minister of national defense of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK], on the 24th anniversary of the Korean People's Army Day. A meeting to mark the event took place in Bucharest at the Army Central House on February 2. The attendance included generals, officers, and NCO's of the Bucharest Garrison. Kang Yong Sop, ambassador of the DPRK to Romania, and members of his embassy were present. Son Kwan-sun, military, air and naval attache of the DPRK in Bucharest, spoke about the significance of the event. The military, air and naval attache of the DPRK met didactic staff and pupils of the "Mircea Cel Batrin" school for navy officers. [Text] [Bucharest AGERPRES International Service in English 1120 GMT 8 Feb 72 L]

GUINEAN CONSTRUCTION MINISTER--Bucharest, AGERPRES, 9.2.1972--Nfamara Keita, minister of construction of the Republic of Guinea, arrived in Bucharest on February 9, to sign the protocol on trade exchanges for 1972 between his country and the Socialist Republic of Romania. [Text] [Bucharest AGERPRES International Service in English 1940 GMT 9 Feb 72 L]

NEW MARINE INSTITUTE--By a decree of the State Council a marine institute will be opened in the municipality of Constanţa, beginning with the 1972-1973 school year. It will be a higher institute for training officers in the commercial marine field. The institute will have a section for navigation officers and naval electromechanical officers. The courses will extend over a period of 4 years. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunication will publish the date and enrolling conditions for the entrance examination to this institution. [Text] [Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1400 GMT 9 Feb 72 A]

INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS--The Seventh International Congress of Estetics will be held in Bucharest in May this year. The proceedings will be sponsored by State Council President Nicolae Ceausescu. The congress is organized by the Academy of Social and Political Sciences and will be attended by over 400 scientists from 30 countries. [Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1400 GMT 9 Feb 72 A]

ORDER TO POPESCU-BUZAU--Emil Bodnaras, vice president of the State Council, presented the Medical Order of Merit, Second Class, to Dr Mitica Popescu-Buzau, general secretary of the Balkan Medical Union. This order was awarded him for his valuable contribution to promoting Balkan scientific cooperation in the medical field and on the occasion of his 70th birthday. Emil Bodnaras congratulated Dr Popescu-Buzau, wishing him good health, strength and new successes in his activity. [Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1100 GMT 9 Feb 72 A]

II. 10 Feb 72

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YUGOSLAVIA

In this context he advanced the interesting idea that "there ought to be no conflicts of basic national interests over a longer period" between China and the United States, and even that the two countries have "many parallel interests" which might more easily find expression if the two countries cease regarding one another as "perpetual enemies".

The United States President also expressed the view that it is in the interest of the United States and the world if the People's Republic of China assumes a correspondent place in the regulation of world affairs.

With the exception of Vietnam, the section about China is the longest devoted to a single country in Nixon's report, though the Soviet Union (two pages of space less than about China) has taken first place in the presidential report by the stress that has been laid on it.

Nixon himself underlined the difference between his trip to Peking and that to Moscow by describing his mission to Peking as "an opening of the doors" and that to Moscow as a dialogue long since established, which now requires to explore what concrete arrangements can be closed that can in the interest of the two countries. The differences is also in that change in the relations of world forces which Nixon described as the striking of a strategic nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Probably because of this he used the gradation that the long-term interests of the world's peace are certain to require rapprochement between the United States and China, but that also the immediate and long-term hopes of the world for stability "rest upon courteous and mutually useful relations between the United States and the Soviet Union."

Having stated a series of concrete, positive achievements in the hitherto relations--progress in SALT, the Berlin agreement, the biological weaponry ban agreement, Secretary of Commerce Stans' visit to Moscow, etc.--President Nixon said that the Moscow summit should occupy itself with the following most important matters: The conclusion of a basic agreement limiting nuclear strategic armament or determination of foundations for further strategic atomic limitation talks negotiations, discussion on the problems of the Mideast and on the reasons for which peaceable solutions have so far not been found, discussion on European security, exploration of other world fields in which the interests of Moscow and Washington coincide, or conflict and can be adjusted, and finally a consideration of possibilities for the development of bilateral cooperation.

Here again, Nixon refrained from encouraging false hopes for great achievements. He insisted on a realistic and shared interest in seeing a start made on the solution of certain major world problems, underlining again that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could be expected to make an about face on policies which correspond to their national interests. What we are ready to do and what we will insist on, said the United States President, is that the utmost restraint be shown in the implementation of such policies.

Of the other major world problems mentioned in the president's message, the most attention went to Vietnam, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the United Nations and East-West relations including disarmament and armament, the mutual withdrawal of troops, European security and the like.

II. 10 Feb 72

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YUGOSLAVIA

There was nothing new on Vietnam in the presidential message. The most recent eight-point proposal was elaborated on as were other moves on the part of the United States, and the responsibility for the further continuation of the war was placed primarily on the other side.

In referring to the Middle East, Nixon placed the accent on interim solutions which, in the forms put forth up to now, have not been accepted by either side. He blamed the Soviet Union for the failure of efforts to date to reach a peaceful solution.

His basic tenet as concerns Europe is that no danger exists of a nuclear war but that this in itself increases the need for reinforcing conventional forces and the presence of the United States on the continent.

In relation to East-West relation, initiatives for troops reductions or the convening of a European security conference, Nixon's fundamental position is that Western cohesion is of exceptional importance to European stability. Hence, any troop reductions or security conference must be preceded by thorough preparations. Tangible proof is necessary that such actions as troop reductions would not endanger instead of strengthen European security. A European conference would have to be prepared in more concrete detail and the way cleared for the conference to be able to deal with fundamental questions pertaining to European security and cooperation and not be just a "tribune for a lot of talk and the creation of a friendly atmosphere".

In dealing with Eastern Europe, in his annual foreign policy message to the United States congress, President Nixon spoke in favor of further developing economic, technical, cultural and other ties between the United States and the Eastern European countries, underlining the principle that each country must be "sovereign and independent" in defining its policies. Furthermore, each Eastern European country must determine for itself the degree to which its relations with the United States should be advanced according to its (town) interest and needs.

However, in the part of his message where he takes up the countries of the Western community and the goals standing before them, the President was critical in his appraisal of a "zeal for independence" which was being evidenced by certain members and which could, as he said, threaten the unity of the community by its "separatist tendencies".

## References to Yugoslavia

Belgrade TANJUG International Service in English 1347 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Text] Washington, Feb 9 (TANJUG)--"Our relationships with nonaligned Yugoslavia are a factor of peace and stability in Europe, in the Mediterranean and in the Mideast," said President Nixon today in his foreign affairs message to the Congress.

Having also underlined that he is the first President of the United States who has ever visited Yugoslavia and that President Tito returned the official visit to the United States last year, President Nixon added: "We have decided to continue the high-level exchange of views and to expand the field of our economic relations."

Referring to the joint statement on the visit of President Tito published in Washington on 30 October 1971, President Nixon cited the position reflecting the firm conviction of President Tito and his own that "firm peace and genuine security are indivisible and can be attained only in Europe as a whole, and not merely in one part of it or in another." Actually President Nixon took this position as the maxim of the whole section of his report on the relations between the United States and the East-European countries. [sentence as received]

II. 10 Feb 72

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YUGOSLAVIA

In this context he stressed also that the relations between the countries of East and West Europe since the war have long been "affected" by the conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union, and described this state of affairs as unnatural, declaring that there can be neither lasting peace nor real cooperation in Europe if they are built upon principles which "divide the continent."

The President of the United States pointed again in this reference to the favourable development of relations between the United States on one side and Yugoslavia and Romania on the other, and underlined that these relations" are based on mutual respect, independence and sovereign equality."

"We share the conviction that this should be the basis of relationships between countries irrespective of differences or similarities in social, economic or political systems, said Richard Nixon. He also described some elements in the positive development of relations with Poland and Hungary."

Belgrade Radio Report

Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 9 Feb 72 A

[Text] Submitting the usual report on the state of U.S. foreign policy shortly before his trip to Peking, U.S. President Nixon has listed the four most important fields in which Washington's foreign policy was engaged last year. These are the opening toward China, the beginning of new relations with Moscow, the creation of foundations for better relations with West Europe and Japan, and the creation of a new atmosphere for monetary and trade activities in the world.

Speaking about the opening toward China, President Nixon stressed that this policy constitutes an end and a beginning. He explained that this was the result of his 3 years of efforts, as he put it, to break the 25-year period of hostility and mutual isolation and to begin new processes. Regarding his talks in Peking, Nixon made no special promises, but he expressed the conviction that a chapter in relations between the most populous nation and the most powerful state in the world will be closed at the highest level.

According to Nixon, the talks in Moscow should concern the reasons why the Middle East crisis has not been resolved peacefully, European security, and finally, the development of bilateral cooperation. President Nixon directed several accusations at the Soviets' global foreign policy, ascribing to the Soviet Union the responsibility for the Middle East crisis, the outbreak of the Indian-Pakistan war, the crisis of decisionmaking in the United Nations, and so forth.

Nixon's basic position regarding Europe is that there is no danger of a nuclear war breaking out, but that this increases the need to strengthen the conventional forces and the U.S. presence on the continent.

Speaking about relations with Yugoslavia, President Nixon pointed out: Our relations with nonaligned Yugoslavia are a factor for peace and stability in Europe, in the Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

Recalling the joint statement on President Tito's visit to the United States, he quotes a passage from this statement which, he says, reflects the firm conviction of both himself and President Tito that firm peace and true security are indivisible, and that they can be achieved only in Europe as a whole and not merely in a part of it.

The U.S. President expressed himself in favor of the further development of economic, technical, cultural and other contacts between East European countries and the United States.

- 0 -

II. 10 Feb 72

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YUGOSLAVIA

VICE PRESIDENT CRVENKOVSKI RECEIVES CABRAL FOR TALKS

Belgrade TANJUG International Service in English 1350 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Text] Belgrade, Feb. 9 (TANJUG)--Vice President Krste Crvenkovski this morning received the delegation of the African Independence Party of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. The delegation, who are headed by Amilcar Cabral, the secretary general of the party, are in Yugoslavia as guests of the Socialist Alliance. During this call the guests described the success of the people of Guinea in their Liberation struggle.

LCY STUDY DELEGATION DEPARTS FOR USSR

Belgrade TANJUG International Service in English 1834 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Text] Belgrade, February 9 (TANJUG)--A study delegation of the League of Communists has left for the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. The delegation is being led by Stane Kranjc, member of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Presidium and includes Nikola Bozale, member of the Central Committee Secretariat of the League of Communists for Macedonia; Ljubomir Berberovic, secretary of the Municipal Conference Secretariat of the League of Communists for Sarajevo; and Zvonko Damjanovic, chairman of the Central Committee Commission for Science and Culture (?of the) League of Communists for Serbia. (?During) their stay in the Soviet Union the delegation will study the activity of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee in the sphere of scientific research and other related activity.

MARKET STABILIZATION, TRADE CORRUPTION HIGHLIGHT ECONOMIC HORIZON

Price Regulations Amended

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Feb 72 p 1 A

[Summary] According to a report of the Secretariat for Information of the Federal Executive Council, the Federal Executive Council held a session yesterday under the chairmanship of Dzemal Bijedic and agreed on the implementation of tasks resulting from the action program adopted at the Second LCY Conference.

The Federal Executive Council also discussed documents of the federal organs on the effect of the devaluation of the dinar on prices and draft measures to combat the negative effect of the devaluation on prices. On the basis of today's discussion, the federal organs were requested to urgently prepare concrete measures.

The Federal Executive Council also amended and supplemented the decree on maximum prices of all products and services. These amendments deal with products and services whose sale and prices are of seasonal nature, such as fresh fruits grown in glass houses, fruit and vegetables kept in cold storage, lamb, seasonal clothing and footwear, tourist catering, and artificial fertilizers. The maximum prices of these products and services are the same as those in the corresponding seasons of last year. The amendments also define more precisely the formation of prices for new products.

The Federal Secretariat for Finance, the National Bank of Yugoslavia, the Social Accounting Service and the Federal Foreign Exchange Inspectorate have already reported on irregularities in the operations of the Yugoslav Agricultural Bank.

IV. 10 Feb 72

JAPAN

C 1

NIXON'S STATE OF WORLD MESSAGE DRAWS MIXED REACTION

JAPAN TIMES on Foreign Ministry

Tokyo JAPAN TIMES in English 10 Feb 72 p 5 T--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Noting that U.S. President Richard Nixon made specific mention of Japan in his State of the World message to Congress, Foreign Ministry sources said this morning that this showed the United States attached importance to its relations with Japan as a member of the five big powers--the U.S., Russia, the European communities, China and Japan.

The sources said, however, that, as the report implied, the U.S. desire to keep close ties with Japan was motivated in part by a wish to use this country as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.

World politics, especially related to military affairs, was under the control of the big two--the U.S. and Russia, they added. Therefore, the fact that Nixon played up Japan's status as one of the big five should not be taken at face value, the sources said.

They took special note of that section of the Nixon report which said promotion of cooperative and friendly ties with Japan was indispensable to Japan. But, at the same time, they pointed out that Nixon expressed hope that Japan would step up trade and investment liberalization.

On the whole, the Nixon report on the state of the world is aimed at selling Nixon's foreign policy to other nations. This is in contrast to his Jan. 20 State of the Union message in which Nixon gave prominence to domestic affairs.

On the Vietnam war, President Nixon did not indicate any new policy presumably because he preferred not to irritate Russia and China, both of which are deeply concerned over the course of the war.

JSP Criticism

Tokyo KYODO in English 0824 GMT 10 Feb 72 T

[Text] Tooyo Feb 10 KYODO--The Japan Socialist Party Thursday criticized President Richard Nixon's foreign policy report to Congress as a rehash of the so-called "Nixon doctrine" aimed at domination of the world through new strategy adopted after the collapse of his cold war policy.

Kanji Kawasaki, director of the party's International Affairs Bureau, said in a statement that Nixon's planned visit to China would not reap any fruits or settle the Vietnam and Taiwan problems so long as he sticks to the present lines of policy.

The statement said the JSP would urge the Japanese Government for a shift in foreign policy from one centered on the Japan-U.S. security system to one of unarmed neutrality and peace.

The attitude taken by the government and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party toward defense spending in fiscal 1972, the JSP charged, was nothing but their faithful response to the U.S. demand for more Japanese military burdens.

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MAINICHI DAILY NEWS Assessment

Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 10 Feb 72 p 2 T--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Editorial: "What Nixon's Message Implies"]

[Text] In his annual foreign policy message to Congress, U.S. President Richard Nixon emphasizes the importance of Japanese-American relations. He says that his visit to Peking does not mean the United States is "switching political priorities from Japan to China....it would be shortsighted indeed to exchange strong ties with a crucial ally for some mitigation of the hostility of a dedicated opponent."

On the other hand, Nixon admits that "our China and economic initiatives were a shock to the U.S.-Japanese relationship. They had an unsettling effect upon Japan, which had become accustomed to a U.S.-Japanese relationship rooted in the postwar period and based on a bipolar concept of world power."

"The shocks of 1971," he continues, "only accelerated an evolution in U.S.-Japanese relations that was in any event, overdue, unavoidable, and in the long run, desirable."

In short, Nixon is of the opinion that, although Japan is the most important ally in Asia, Japan can no longer behave like a spoilt child since it has become an economic power.

The new historical role of the United States in the multipolar ages is being sought by Nixon in the establishment of more balanced relations with its allies and the attainment of more creative relations with hostile countries. The more balanced allied relations with friendly nations would mean shifting the heavy burdens the United States has borne to this day to the shoulders of the allied countries. These would be controlled under the common objective of maintaining the unified power of the non-communist world. Japan will naturally come under the same setup.

U.S.-Japanese relations are indeed in the process of change. The postwar cooperation system under the bipolar world should give way to a new setup in which there would be stronger mutuality and greater respect of each other's independence in drawing up policies.

This is easy to say but difficult to carry out. A danger to Japan is that the stronger mutuality might impose an undue burden on Japan and respect of independence might lead to the strengthening of independence on the American side alone. For example, while planning to approach China independently, Nixon has forced Japan to reconfirm the treaty with Taiwan to prevent Japan from carrying out an independent policy.

In order to put the new cooperation structure on a stable basis, exercise of creative wisdom on both sides will be indispensable. This is what the message points out starkly.

GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES BANGLADESH REGIME

Tokyo KYODO in English 0103 GMT 10 Feb 72 T

[Text] Tokyo Feb 10 KYODO--The Japanese Government notified the Bangladesh Government Thursday of its decision to recognize the new regime. The notification was made through Masatada Higaki, consul-general at Dacca, immediately after the government decided at the Cabinet meeting Thursday to recognize Bangladesh.

IV. 11 Feb 72

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

B1

OBSERVERS SKEPTICAL OVER NIXON'S STATE OF WORLD MESSAGE

Taipei CNA in English 0105 GMT 11 Feb 72 B--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Taipei, Feb. 11 (CNA)--President Nixon has passed a wrong judgement on Peiping by assuming that it will shape its policy toward the United States with a "reciprocal attitude," diplomatic observers here said yesterday.

Commenting on Nixon's lengthy foreign policy message, the diplomatic observers said the Chinese communists will never shape their external policies with a "reciprocal attitude." Nixon said in the message he is going to Peiping, "assuming that the 'People's Republic of China' will shape its policy toward us with a reciprocal attitude."

He is scheduled to visit the Chinese mainland Feb. 21-28.

"Peiping's about-face change in its policy toward the United States is strategic in nature," one of the observers said. The purpose, he added, is to make use of a better relationship with the United States to cope with Russian military pressure. "Never has Peiping wanted to reciprocate what the United States has offered to it," the observer said.

Another observer, who is also specialized in Chinese communist affairs, said the Chinese communists have to resort to blackmail and threat of war against their neighbors for their precarious survival. "They have to bluff other countries on the one hand," the observer said, "and continue to persecute and exploit the people on the mainland on the other."

As the world situation changes, he pointed out, the Chinese communists may become pro-Russian or pro-American or anti-Russian and anti-American. "All this is expediency," he pointed out. There can be no change in Peiping's basic policy of world conquest, he added. When they overran the mainland, the observer recalled, the Chinese communists were honeymooning with Moscow. "They were strongly anti-America," he said. "Now the Peiping regime is honeymooning with Uncle Sam and trying to fight against the Soviets," he said. He asked: "Who can tell when Peiping will turn anti-American again?"

The diplomatic observers described as "another expression of wishful thinking" the China section of President Nixon's foreign policy message. "There's nothing new," they said. "President Nixon listed all the steps he has taken in the past 3 years to establish a dialogue with Peiping," they said, "and in return he got an invitation to visit the mainland." They said the balance sheet would show that it doesn't pay to take all the trouble.

Nixon was right in believing that "a peaceful and prospering China is in the U.S. national interests," the observers said. "However," they added, "he has chosen the wrong one." He was wrong in placing his hope on the Peiping regime, which is detested by all the Chinese people. There can be little doubt, the observers said, that peace, stability and progress in Asia and in the world require China's positive contribution, "but," they pointed out, "that China is not the one on the mainland."

The China that can make that contribution, the observers said, is the Republic of China, which has always championed the cause of freedom and democracy.

IV. 11 Feb 72

JAPAN

C 1

NIXON'S STATE OF WORLD MESSAGE CONTINUES TO DRAW REACTION

SANKEI 11 Feb Editorial

Tokyo SANKEI in Japanese 11 Feb 72 Morning Edition p 5 T--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Editorial: "Limit of U.S. 'Balanced Diplomacy'--" "Japan's Share in Peace Strategy"]

[Text] In short, Nixon's State of the World report gave us the impression that, regardless of his enthusiasm for foreign policy, he did not throw enough light on its essential points, and that the report has unilaterally presented a "peace program for the United States alone." We cannot understand why Nixon did such a thing.

The outline of the U.S. foreign policy has already been made clear in this year's State of the Union message. Therefore, the State of the World report was designed to give a detailed explanation of U.S. foreign policy and to disclose the prospects for achieving peace. Internationally, with his visits to China and the Soviet Union, and domestically, a presidential election near at hand, Nixon probably made special efforts to clarify his eagerness to achieve peace through the report. As is shown in its subtitle on the emerging structure of world peace, the contents of the report clearly indicate the structure of the Nixon-Kissinger line.

Japan and the United States are maintaining inseparable relations in military, diplomatic, and economic affairs. Therefore, the most important task for Japan is to grasp the exact direction of the U.S. foreign policy through this report and try to establish a basic foreign policy based on Japan's national interests in order to deal with U.S. diplomacy.

This year's State of the Union message and State of the World report leave us with the impression that Nixon's diplomacy adheres to the ideology of trying to "maintain the balance." For example, Nixon's State of the World report devoted a great deal of space to his upcoming visits to China and the Soviet Union, while advocating his efforts for peace. In particular, he emphasized that the opening of a dialog between the United States and China represents an important step toward creating world peace. This is highly similar to the dove faction's line.

However, this year's State of the Union message places emphasis on the "policy of force," obviously aimed at augmenting military strength with the declaration that "high-powered defense is the guardian of peace." When we compare it with the State of the World report, we can say that they reflect the contradictory, two-faced character of the Nixon diplomacy.

Such a character was observed in Nixon's "new departure in U.S. foreign policy," when he made a drastic change in the wording of his second State of the World report last year. In other words, Nixon, who has asked for "negotiations rather than confrontation" in his first State of the World report called for the "replenishment of power for negotiations" in last year's report. This reflects the instability of Nixon's foreign policy, which is always wavering to seek the balance between "confrontation" and "dialog," as well as the limits of his peace strategy.

IV. 11 Feb 72

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JAPAN

What is most significant in Nixon's "balanced diplomacy," is that he is urging U.S. allies to "share responsibilities," In this respect, this year's State of the World report has imposed difficult tasks on Japan. The report admitted the Nixon shock of Japan, but said that this had accelerated Japan's return to independence. Furthermore, his attitude seemed to demand that Japan assume responsibilities by augmenting its military strength. We can say, therefore, that "desirable Japan-U.S. relations" sought by the report is "give-and-take" relations based on the "balanced" share of responsibilities.

In short, the fundamental principle of Nixon's diplomacy is to push negotiations with China and the Soviet Union while maintaining its "stand of power" and to have its allies shoulder the burden of heavier responsibilities in the economic and defense fields in exchange for fulfilling its promises to them and for offering them nuclear umbrellas.

It might be unavoidable for the United States to adopt such policy in the transition period after the cold war period because the international situation is at a delicate turning point and the prospects for the U.S. negotiations with China and the Soviet Union are uncertain. Also, the weakening of the national power of the United States has deprived it of its almighty confidence. It is doubtful, however, that such U.S. policy will lead to genuine peace.

First, there is a danger that the policy of "peace based upon the balance of power" will lead to a chain reaction of military preparations by the communist bloc and the free world. Also, there is a possibility that such a policy will develop into a plan to divide spheres of influence among the nuclear powers. When this policy is carried out with realism divorced from idealism, it might descend to a Machiavellist diplomacy aimed only at protecting U.S. interests.

It is true that the foreign policy message says the coming Sino-U.S. dialog will not be conducted at the sacrifice of Japan's interests; however, the possibility is undeniable that the nature of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which is based on the U.S. "containment of China," and other defense systems in Asia will change in the long run as a thaw in Sino-U.S. relations develops.

The second problem is what kind of burden of responsibility the United States would like Japan to shoulder. Now that the U.S.-Japan security treaty is an important factor for Japan's security, we have no opposition to the assertion that Japan should carry a defense burden suitable to its ability and its domestic situation. Judging from the nature of Nixon's two-face diplomacy, however, there is a possibility that, under the name of equalizing the burden, Japan must shoulder a burden only in the case of a "showdown of power" with China. What Japan desires is, rather, a burden in the field of a "dialog" with China. To break the deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations, Japan must keep close contacts with the United States and must develop its own approach to China.

In this respect, one can hardly deny the shadow of a U.S. intention behind President Nixon's China visit to [promote] U.S. interests out of the current Sino-Soviet rift by using the U.S.-China dialog as a feint against the Soviet Union, while in the long run warding off Japan and China's growing influence by playing off one against the other within the bounds of their balance of power. Since Nixon's foreign policy is based on complete realism, such a policy of befriending distant countries against neighbors is, as a matter of logical possibility, not alien to his power politics.

IV. 11 Feb 72

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JAPAN

What Japan desires is not "pax-Americana" but "universal peace," and what it is after
is genuine coexistence with the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. We want
no hostilities with other countries nor to be a chessman in the game of power politics
between major countries. However, in order to stand as such, it is a prerequisite that
Japan establish its foreign policy position adequately in order to protect its national
interests amid the tripartite rivalry. Time and again we had pointed out that Japan
must no longer follow a policy of subservience to the United States nor should it lean
one-sidedly toward China. What we want for Japan now is a policy which would give birth
to a relaxation of tension in Asia on its own initiative. In this connection, it is a
help to us that Nixon's foreign policy is still in the development stage and needs, as
his foreign policy message has clarified, policy adjustments with Japan on the basis of
mutual independence and reciprocity in order to establish a framework for Asian peace.
Whether Nixon's foreign policy can contribute to the establishment of genuine stability
in Asia depends on Japan's posture toward the formation of a new order. It can be said
in this aspect that the foreign policy message this year has assigned an important
task to Japan's foreign policy.

DAILY YOMIURI 11 Feb Editorial

Tokyo DAILY YOMIURI in English 11 Feb 72 p 1 T--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Editorial: "Nixon's Realistic Look"]

[Text] U.S. President Nixon's foreign policy report to Congress shows clearly how the U.S. is trying to adapt itself to the new world situation, arising from the end of an era of American and Soviet dominance.

The U.S. wants to achieve this realistically without breaking the global balance of
power. Nixon's highly objective view of Japan-U.S. relations is a manifestation of his
realism.

Nixon's realistic foreign policy has a faulty aspect, evidenced by his emphasis on power in his State of the Union message last month and the importance he attached to maintenance of the balance of power in his latest message.

On the other hand, we see merit in his pursuit of realistic measures to reduce the role of the U.S. in the world in accordance with changes in the international tide. This will be conducive to the maintenance of global peace.

Nixon apparently views the improvement of U.S.-China relations as the keynote of his peace strategy. The President said that he will visit Peking "without having any illusion."

For the U.S. to really improve its relations with China, it will be necessary to settle the Taiwan problem and the Indochina war. These issues obviously cannot be solved immediately. But the events of 1971 showed that situations can and do change. We should not underestimate the apparent U.S. willingness to adapt itself to changes in the world.

Nixon quite understandably said that the U.S. was seeking to improve its relations with the Soviet Union too. Still we wonder if the U.S. is not overlooking the positions and interests of the smaller countries in its haste to improve relations with the big powers.

IV. 11 Feb 72

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JAPAN

Give-and Take

The Nixon message dealt with Japan-U.S. relations in greater detail than ever before. This is quite natural, too, in view of the China visit and economic "shocks" he gave Japan last year. The President went so far as to say that these shocks came belatedly.

This may be viewed as criticism of the Sato government, which leaned too much on the U.S. and closed its eyes to the changing world scene.

Nixon said that "it is not conducive to the maintenance of wholesome friendship between Japan and the U.S. to expect that the other side will modify its claims concerning its own interests just to maintain a friendly atmosphere." The President thus implied that he had to wake up the Japanese Government, which put too much emphasis on the creation of a friendly atmosphere between the two countries.

Both our government and business leaders should learn a lesson from Nixon's words. Japanese business firms think nothing of spending huge sums of money in entertainment expenses to win orders. This typically Japanese way of winning others' hearts does not work in the stark realities of international society. It should not be forgotten that the basic rule of diplomacy is calculated give-and-take.

Sharing Burden

One of the things that the U.S. wants Japan to do is take over a part of the economic and military burden shouldered by the U.S. so far. The Nixon report said that "we anticipate that the mutual dependence of Japan and the U.S. will be deepened further in the future."

If Japan takes the role of helping to maintain security of South Korea and Taiwan and thereby reinforce the U.S. position, then Japan will become more subordinate to the U.S. under the name of strengthened mutual dependence.

What this country should do is to negotiate with China for the restoration of diplomatic relations, without taking such a position of power. Only then will an era of truly new relations open up between Japan and the U.S.

Opposition Parties Comment

Tokyo KYODO in English 1241 GMT 10 Feb 72 T

[Text] Tokyo, Feb 10 KYODO--U.S. President Nixon's foreign policy report submitted to Congress Thursday did not contain any concrete proposal for building what Nixon called "a stable structure of world peace," a spokesman for the Democratic Socialist Party has asserted.

The spokesman made the comment in connection with Nixon's contention in the report that he was searching for such a world structure.

The No. 3 opposition party regarded Nixon's report merely as an explanation of his new China and dollar-saving policies which had a profound impact throughout the world last year.

Nixon indicated in the report, the spokesman said, that Japan's diplomacy had failed to catch up with the world trend which prompted the U.S. President to announce his new China and monetary policies.

IV. 11 Feb 72

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JAPAN

Now is time for Japan to seriously consider adjustment of its relations with the U.S., including a review of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, in order to ease tension in Asia, he said.

Meanwhile, the Komeito Party expressed regret that Nixon implied in his report that Japan should strengthen its military power and take over the U.S. military role in Asia.

It demanded that the Japanese Government immediately stop conforming to U.S. military role in Asia.

It demanded that the Japanese Government immediately stop conforming to U.S. foreign policy and instead put forward a new foreign policy aimed at promoting peace in Asia.

The Japan Communist Party said that Nixon's foreign policy report was based upon his diplomatic strategy of taking advantage of the current Sino-Soviet dispute to reestablish the U.S. Indochina aggression policy.

The party called on the Japanese people to take note of the fact that Nixon openly advocated strengthening the Japan-U.S. military alliance.

FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ON SECRET MISSION TO HANOI

Tokyo KYODO in English 0800 GMT 11 Feb 72 T

[Text] Tokyo Feb 11 KYODO--Two Japanese Foreign Ministry officials secretly sent to Hanoi have been conducting first-hand talks with North Vietnamese Government leaders since Tuesday to "broaden Japan's diplomatic front" in the light of the changing world political situation, according to reliable sources here.

The unprecedented visit to North Vietnam of a Japanese Government delegation was disclosed by the sources Thursday night who also explained the mission's character. Although the mission is "clandestine" in character, it could be actually considered as an important Japanese Government-sponsored mission, they emphasized.

Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda and some other Foreign Ministry leaders had approved the sending of the two officials to Hanoi, they said.

They identified the pair as Wasuke Miyake, head of the First Southeast Asia Division, Asian Affairs Bureau, and Kichisaburo Inouye, a staff member specializing in Vietnam affairs of the same division.

According to the sources, the ministry had been planning to send them to Hanoi with Miyake as the leader for several months before the end of January. After necessary arrangements had been made with Hanoi, Miyake and Inouye left Tokyo February 2 and flew into Hanoi over a circuitous route which took them first to Paris, then Bangkok, and Vientiane.

Officially, their tour had been registered as "a trip to the United States for studies on Indochina affairs" to cover up their true destination and mission, the source said. According to the sources, it is not yet clear with whom and on what subjects the two officials have been talking in Hanoi. But, the sources presumed that they had contacted some Hanoi leaders to ascertain Hanoi's current basic policy lines

VI. 11 Feb 72

VENEZUELA

K 1

## CALDERA REMARKS ON NIXON STATEMENTS ON LATIN AMERICA

Caracas Domestic Service in Spanish 2300 GMT 10 Feb 72 C

[President Caldera's weekly press conference--recorded]

[Excerpt] Reporter Eliseo Sanchez from the San Cristobal paper LA NACION will now put his question to the head of state.

[Question] Mr President, U.S. President Richard Nixon, focusing once again on the situation in Latin America, has stated that a hemisphere divided by a gap between wealth and poverty is not a community. He also stated that Latin America is a partner of the United States and is not dependent on the United States. Mr President, as Venezuelan head of state, what is your opinion of President Richard Nixon's statement?

[Answer] I have not had time to fully analyze President Nixon's foreign policy statement; however, I must point out that I find several positive points in this statement. One of these is the acknowledgement that Latin America is a regional entity and that it has its own individual and distinct character which is different--as I had the opportunity of pointing out when I visited Washington. To say we are different is not to say we are better or worse. It is merely to state a fact. To recognize and publicly admit that we have an individual personality, that our respective countries should carry out their development programs as they see fit, that our ideas should be respected and that the phenomenon of nationalism should be recognized as a very characteristic part of the current Latin American situation--these are undoubtedly specific facts which should be acknowledged.

## REPORTAGE ON ROLES OF DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY, FUP

### Deal Involving Betancourt

Havana PRENSA LATINA in Spanish 1505 GMT 10 Feb 72 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Caracas, 10 Feb--A high-level secret agreement between what is known as the prodevelopment group and Democratic Action [AD], to guarantee the support of the Venezuelan oligarchy for Romulo Betancourt's candidate in 1973, today threatens all "adecos [AD supporters]."

Pedro Tinoco, current finance minister for the COPEI regime and known leader of the prodevelopment group, met secretly in Bern, Switzerland, with former president and again presidential aspirant Romulo Betancourt, well-informed sources disclosed today.

According to insiders, Tinoco offered prodevelopment's full support and funds from the powerful oligarchical families such as the Vollmers, Machados, Zuloagas and Mendozas, if AD nominates Betancourt as its presidential candidate for the 1973 elections.

The shock of this revelation was so powerful that AD's national leaders met hurriedly today to study the situation while some dailies and radio stations commented on the possible agreement between the rightist forces of the oligarchical prodevelopment and AD for the next elections.

Top AD leaders have refused to comment on such a thorny affair; but, it would seem, their messages are confused [as received] for, while some hasten to belie the collusion, others reject it, considering any alliance between AD and the oligarchy "impossible."

VI. 11 Feb 72

J 2

URUGUAY

2. It must make permanent concessions to Uruguay.

3. It must stipulate that the products to be exported by Uruguay have gone through the first stage of processing.

The Argentine minister revealed the government's concern over the reaction in Uruguay to the measures adopted by his country when it extended the suspension of the duty-free status enjoyed by certain Uruguayan exports, and he showed an interest in analyzing the situation and seeking solutions at the highest level. Speaking of this, he said Argentina was willing to buy all the Uruguayan agricultural production surplus, and alluded to the industrial integration of both countries through which Argentina would export to Uruguay semiprocessed goods and then buy them back after they had been completely processed.

Amestoy found this offer acceptable [as received] and Girelli promised that Argentina, through its representative in LAFTA, will introduce a negotiating agenda next Monday which, in his opinion, will satisfy Uruguay's demands. He refused to furnish any details beforehand, and left for Buenos Aires.

The Uruguayan trade minister, said however, that Argentina's offer does not go far enough, and added that this was not the best time for Uruguay to make important agricultural exports. He also said that he could not commit himself to what Girelli termed an industrial marriage until such time as the negotiations through LAFTA are sufficiently satisfactory to Uruguay. First of all, he added, Argentina must give Uruguayan export trade a good chance.

Local trade sources said this morning that the Argentine trade minister's visit, instead of calming anxiety within Uruguayan industries over Argentina's suppression of the duty-free status of their products, actually generated more uneasiness in the already pessimistic climate of trade relations between the two countries. Furthermore, the Uruguayan Chamber of Industries issued a statement today urging Uruguay's ambassador to LAFTA, Julio Lacarte Muro, to take the necessary measures in order to meet the situation created by Argentina's decision which, it says, has caused real anguish for more than 20 export firms. The organization especially urges that Uruguay use the legal measures granted by the LAFTA treaty to obtain the advantages of the special list, and solve this serious situation by adapting the direct or indirect fiscal advantages to the terms agreed upon, eliminating the non-negotiated preference margins of profit, and taking complete advantage of the (time extension) clauses of the Montevideo Treaty.

BRIEFS

NEW TRANSPORT MINISTER--Uruguayan President Jorge Pacheco Areco today appointed Jose Maria Labandera as the new transportation, communication and tourism minister.
[Montevideo Radio Sarandi in Spanish 0000 GMT 10 Feb 72 P]

AMBASSADORS TO FOREIGN MINISTRY--Montevideo, 2 Feb--President Pacheco Areco has reassigned the following ambassadors to the Foreign Ministry: Dr Aurelio Pastori (Japan), Dr Mateo Jorge Magarinos de Mello (Sweden), Leslie Close (Czechoslovakia), Elbio Quintana Solarin (Colombia), Dr Manuel Sanchez Morales (Chile), Dr Carlos Romero (Egypt), (Alberto Guani) (Bolivia), and Dr Jorge Barreiro (UK). Advisor Jose Lissidini was appointed consul general to South Africa.
[Madrid EFE in Spanish 0115 GMT 3 Feb 72 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY]

NEW AMBASSADOR TO PERU--Montevideo, 2 Feb--President Jorge Pacheco Areco has named Gen Cesar R. Borba as the new Uruguayan ambassador to Peru. Borba was formerly defense minister.
[Madrid EFE in Spanish 0118 GMT 3 Feb 72 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY]

VI. 11 Feb 72

CUBA

01

MEDIA CONTINUE TO REACT TO NIXON FOREIGN POLICY MESSAGE

Coverage in GRANMA

Havana PRENSA LATINA in Spanish 2005 GMT 10 Feb 72 C

[Text] Havana, 10 Feb--A cartoon which depicts President Richard Nixon in search of his predecessor Teddy Roosevelt's big stick heads GRANMA's report concerning the U.S. President's recent declarations.

GRANMA, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Cuba, stresses Nixon's acknowledgement that difficulties between the United States and Latin America will increase during the coming years.

It also refers to the paragraphs of the U.S. foreign policy message in which Nixon repeats his attacks against the Cuban revolution and threatens Ecuador, Chile and Peru with economic reprisals.

Relations With Latin America

Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 1800 GMT 10 Feb 72 F

[Text] Richard Nixon, President of the Yankee imperialism, sent his traditional message on the foreign policy of his administration to Congress. In the extensive part of the message devoted to Latin America he was threatening and overbearing, pointing out to Ecuador and Peru that basic U.S. security interests are involved in the seizure and fining of Yankee fishing boats which violate the territorial waters of those countries.

He also uttered threats against Chile and Peru because of the expropriation of Yankee companies, considering it incompatible with international law. He spoke of U.S. respect for the right of nonintervention, but he said that he would veto loans to countries which would expropriate Yankee property without paying indemnification to Yankee monopolies. He repeated his wornout measures for the isolation of Cuba and praised the Brazilian gorillas as another veiled threat against the continent.

Other than his direct and indirect threats, Nixon showed an extraordinary cynicism when he spoke of international law and nonintervention. It is the imperialists who for more than a century have violated laws and principles with interventions, invasions, and coups d'état in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, of which their war against the people of Indochina, the invasion of Playa Giron, the invasion of Santo Domingo in 1965, and their permanent aggression against Panama by usurping part of its territory against the people's will are good examples.

However, Nixon could not avoid confessing that Latin America is determined to decide its own future. That decision is more powerful than all the threats contained in Nixon's message to the Congress against the countries which struggle for their complete and unrenounceable independence.

Additional Radio Comment

Havana in Spanish to the Americas 2230 GMT 10 Feb 72 C

[Feature: "World Events"]

[Text] An old Roman proverb, "there is nothing new under the sun," is sufficient on this occasion to describe in a few brief words the extensive, verbose and demagogic report delivered by President Nixon to Congress on the state of the world. This is Nixon's latest report to Congress in what remains of his current term of office.

VI. 11 Feb 72

02

CUBA

Really, it is not different from the three earlier reports, presented in the same way, and bearing the stamp of the same maneuver. Its purpose is to present the image of Nixon on the eve of the presidential elections as an important international statesman.

The report on international policy includes a reiteration of the so-called peace plan presented by the U.S. President as a solution to the Indochina conflict. With the elections only 9 months away, Nixon donned the disguise of a kind patrician and evoked as his most heartfelt dream that of a whole generation living throughout the world without the shadow of a single armed conflict. Growing enthusiastic over his false role, Nixon went so far in his report as to shamelessly blame the Indochinese patriots for the continuation of the war in that strategic area of Asia.

What clearly emerges from his plaintive words is a concrete threat: Either accept peace on our terms or the aggression will continue. The threat is now new. Nor will the firm answer of the Indochinese fighting men be new. They are determined to continue the fight as long as may be necessary until the final freedom and independence of their peoples are obtained.

Throughout the 236 pages of his report on international policy, Nixon maintains his preaching: that it is the others who are guilty of everything. I am good and, therefore, the victim. Thus, we see that in the Middle East conflict, according to the turgid Nixonian prose, in which the hand of Henry Kissinger--the real brain of the current government--is also sensed, the Soviet Union is blamed for the current state of affairs. Israel, a three-times aggressor, and as such condemned by the United Nations, is not mentioned. Nor is anything said of the imperialist support of the Zionist dreams of expansion and domination in that part of the world. And, as if the hypocrisy contained in the previous accusations were not enough, the U.S. presidential report also blames the Soviet Union for the arms race.

Yet, the United States for many years has been developing its whole policy on the basis of a war economy, a philosophy of aggression, and a diplomacy based on positions of strength and brinksmanship.

Latin America in general, too, was reproached by Nixon, for whom the growing demonstrations of political independence evident in some countries of the hemisphere are mortifying and unacceptable.

This brief radio report on the presidential message, reduced to the limits of this commentary, reflects the true image of its author: the demagogic politician, the aggressive wolf disguised as an innocent lamb, the man of a thousand faces, all false.

We are advancing with history, Nixon says in the conclusion of his report and he adds: better yet, we are advancing history. No, Mr Nixon, your fine words of peace, so in conflict with your aggressive actions do not confuse anyone. We are, in fact, advancing with history, but history is advancing impelled by the peoples. It is the struggle of the peoples which make progress, write history, and build the future-- a future in which Nixon and imperialism, which he so adequately represents, will have no place. They are both destined to the trash heap of history.

VI.

11 Feb 72

03

CUBA

Weakening of U.S. Position

Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 0048 GMT 11 Feb 72 F

["Inside the News" commentary by Jose (Virroenas) and Roberto Perez Sanchez]

[Excerpts] Jose (Virroenas): Yesterday during his foreign policy statement Richard Nixon dealt with several points of his policy including Indochina, relations with China, the problems with Latin America, and several other important questions [words indistinct].

We see that negotiations, in the specific case of Indochina, are (?at a standstill) because the United States has again adopted a position of strength which is no longer acceptable either to the governments of Vietnam or to any other government in Asia, Europe, or Latin America.

(Virroenas): Obviously, Roberto, we are witnessing a revival--if one can call it that and I do not think that is the correct word--of a big stick policy which Nixon appears to have borrowed from Teddy Roosevelt. For while in the case of Indochina the U.S. position closes all doors to a solution to the problem, in the case of Latin America there has undoubtedly been an escalation in the positions of what we might call the White House's aggressive policy. In which way did Nixon refer to this matter?

Perez Sanchez: Nixon, in fact did repeat his threats toward the countries that are nationalizing U.S. property, the misuse of which has aroused indignation in Latin America. The U.S. monopolies, which for dozens of years have plundered the Latin American countries, would now like to prevent them from recovering at least part of their resources which Washington usurped. In recent years the United States has extracted from Latin America profits amounting to 3.5 billion dollars annually. The United States has withdrawn more than $70 billion dollars from the hemisphere during the entire postwar period. Of course, on this occasion President Nixon said that his government is facing difficulties which will increase in the future as a result of the decision of the Latin Americans to be the masters of their own fate. He added that the 70's in Latin America will be marked by a rapid and turbulent change, an intensified nationalism, new ideologies, and political movements, new and varies political ideas and the expansion of ties between the Latin American countries and the rest of the world.

Nixon was particularly referring to the differences which have arisen between the United States, Chile, Peru and Ecuador since last year in the dispute over fishing rights and expropriations. By directly threatening these three countries, Nixon suggested the U.S. power to veto credits by the so-called multinational organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and others where it is in charge of the lending policy in accordance with its interests and foreign policy positions.

However, as we said in the beginning, this was a message directed to the United States because the U.S. threats no longer possess their former impact on the three above-mentioned countries or on the other countries of the world. Things have now changed in the world and, of course, no one pays any more attention to such threats.

VI. 11 Feb 72

04

CUBA

RADIO SCORNS CLAIMS ABOUT BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENT

Havana in Spanish to Americas 2310 GMT 9 Feb 72 C

[Feature: "Our America"]

[Summary] "Yankee imperialists and Brazilian gorillas are weaving a continuous propaganda campaign around the alleged development of Brazil." This propaganda campaign cites impressive examples of economic development and quotes inaccurate figures. The recent publicity given to the growth of the Brazilian iron and steel industry is such an example. This publicity, however, fails to state that 80 percent of this Brazilian industry belongs to foreign capitalists, most of whom are Americans.

"What is involved here is an expansion of imperialist penetration into Brazil's economy--an intensification of the imperialists sacking of this South American territory." The propaganda also fails to mention that the major industries in Brazil have headquarters in Sao Paulo, while the rest of the nation is plagued by under-development, hunger, illiteracy, exploitation and poverty.

There are other areas of Brazilian life which have been adversely affected since military reactionaries usurped power in April 1964. Culture is one of these areas.

"There are hundreds of Brazilian intellectuals, film directors, musicians, scientists and actors who are imprisoned in the dictatorship's jails; they are being persecuted or have succeeded in fleeing abroad to escape the persecution to which they are subjected." Noted authors have been censored and their works have been withdrawn from bookstores by order of police officials. Musicians and radio and television actors have encountered a similar fate. Book imports have also been restricted by the Brazilian dictatorship's censorship, which sees conspiracies and conspirators everywhere."

"Brazilian militarymen have not only murdered many revolutionaries, but are also destroying national culture, which is currently suffering from the repressive policies of a regime which is mistakenly being set forth as an example for the other countries of our America."

GARCIA INCLAN SPEAKS ON REVOLUTIONARY JOURNALISM

Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 2230 GMT 10 Feb 72 F

[Guido Garcia Inclan commentary: "Closing Ranks"]

[Excerpts] We said yesterday, speaking of our revolutionary journalism, that it is now time that all journals close ranks in favor of the revolution and to help our government. There are several missions in our profession. Jesus Montane and Armando Hart have spoken extensively about this. They have agreed that the journalist with revolutionary freedoms should be more attentive than anyone else to the needs of the people, the imperatives of the great community. Radio, for example--and we say this to point out our means of dissemination which because of its quality and power is able to enter houses without knocking on the door--has to be, must be, a permanent service at the orders of the community.

Yes, friends, the great men of the world have always kept an eye on the most rapid, reliable, better means of communications. That is why we brought this newscast into being and we maintained our broadcasts as a newspaper.

II. 10 Feb 72

EAST GERMANY

E1

NIXON MESSAGE AFFIRMS AGGRESSIVE U.S. COURSE

Main Points Reviewed

East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1953 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Text] Washington--In a message to Congress on the state of the world, President Richard Nixon affirms Washington's aggressive course at all focal points in the world and its policy of obstructing peace and security. The annual report published on Wednesday contains a program of continuing the Indochina war, continued support for the aggressor state Israel, sabotaging UN resolutions on the situation in the south of Africa and strengthening the U.S. military presence in Western Europe.

Besides slandering the peace policy of the socialist states and particularly the Soviet Union, the message also asks the NATO allies to bridge the contradictions between them in the interest of imperialism's global strategy.

Nixon rejected the DRV and PRGRSV proposals for ending the war in Vietnam. Regarding their demand to abolish the Saigon puppet regime, he said the United States would not leave its friends in the lurch. The war would end for America through the "Vietnamization" of the conflict.

On his coming trip to China, Nixon said no U.S. foreign policy step had ever been prepared so minutely as the approach to People's China. After a period of cautious probing and growing trust a "reliable means of communication" had been created between Washington and Peking.

The U.S. President supported the maintenance of American force levels in Western Europe and wants to improve their striking power. He called moves in the U.S. Congress to reduce forces a "false economy and foolish policy." He solemnly appealed for NATO unity. The enlargement of the EEC had created fresh contradictions, he said. He termed the agreement to offset the cost of U.S. forces stationed in the FRG as "proof of cooperation". At the same time he announced new financial demands on his NATO partners.

Nixon linked his formal approval of a European security conference with a series of demands. Agency reports speak of "rather harsh" U.S. terms in regard to the conference. In his remarks on Europe he said that the military interests of Western Europe and America and their "East-West diplomacy" were basically similar. Nixon tried to blame the continued arms race on the Soviet Union and used this as a pretext to threaten an extensive new arms programs by Washington.

In the Middle East conflict, too, Nixon indicated no change in the U.S. policy which is geared to aggression. He vilified the liberation struggle of the peoples in the south of Africa by equating the resistance of the racially and socially oppressed majority with the brutal actions of its oppressors.

NATO Arms, European Conference

East Berlin Voice of the GDR Domestic Service in German 1700 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Text] U.S. President Nixon tonight announced more arms for NATO in the years ahead. According to AP, in his message to Congress on the state of the world, he reacted negatively to all efforts for a detente by the socialist and other states. He said NATO had decided on additional military programs. They provide for another 400 warplanes and 20 warships this year. The U.S. President did not reject a European security conference but said it could take place only next year.

II. 10 Feb 72

E 2

EAST GERMANY

Vietnam Problem Discussed

East Berlin Domestic Service in German 1800 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Excerpt] Nixon devoted much space to U.S. China policy. He referred in particular to his coming visit to Peking. Nixon made it clear that the United States is not interested in a peaceful solution to the Vietnam problem. He said Washington would not respond to the demands of the DRV and the PRGRSV for the unconditional withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam and the deposing of the Thieu regime in Saigon.

Uhlig Commentary

East Berlin Voice of the GDR Domestic Service in German 0705 GMT 10 Feb 72 G

[Dr Ingrid Uhlig commentary]

[Text] It really cannot be said that President Nixon made it very easy for himself, at least as far as the effort is concerned. Somebody took the trouble to count the words. They came to about 94,000 which, after all, cover the tidy number of 236 pages.

He had to say something about almost everything: Europe, the dollar crisis, the Middle East, Indochina, Latin America. Apropos Latin America. Here, the President dwelled especially on Cuba and said that the alienation between his country and the island republic will continue as long as the government in Havana does not change its policy. Especially its ties to the Soviet Union, were evaluated as, and I quote, "an obvious and direct threat."

What arrogance, dear listeners, and what distortion of facts. Who threatened whom, and not only threatened but attacked with hired traitors and tried to cause economic ruin through a blockade? Who can prevent Cuba from seeking its friends where, out of profound inner conviction, one advocates its revolution with words and deeds?

But the one who pretends to be the world gendarme would like to have everybody dance to his tune. Wherever this does not work, he instantly sees this as a threat. What was true for Cuba is true for South Vietnam. Here, Mr Nixon lately sees a danger in the cooperation of all parties and social forces for the preparation of democratic, free elections proposed by the PRGRSV. With such a procedure--Nixon says--a communist seizure of power is almost certain. [Words indistinct] this statement allows some conclusions as to the mood of the South Vietnamese population about which, apparently, there are no illusions in Washington. The question is: what does this U.S. President actually arrogate for himself?

For more than 8 years the Vietnamese in the north and in the south have been struggling for their right to self-determination. Time enough for Mr Nixon to comprehend that U.S. tutelage is unwelcome in Indochina and by the way, also in Cuba and in other parts of the world.

- 0 -

II. 10 Feb 72

HUNGARY

F 1

REACTION TO NIXON FOREIGN POLICY MESSAGE REPORTED

Tibor Koeves Report

Budapest MTI Domestic Service in Hungarian 1920 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Text] MTI Correspondent Tibor Koeves reports from Washington:

President Nixon opened his radio speech today with this sentence: For the first time in the life of a generation the world's most powerful and most populous nations--the United States and the PRC--have embarked on a process of exchanging ideas.

Later in his speech, he said that the U.S. allies would have "to assume more responsibility for their own defense," and, with regard to world trade, he noted that for the first time in the life of a generation there are "fairer competition conditions" which he attributed to his own initiatives.

He then declared that the "positive steps toward peace" made a meeting with Soviet leaders at the highest level timely, particularly regarding arms limitations and economic cooperation. "That is why, for the first time, an American president will visit Moscow. I am not going to the meeting in May with any naive illusions, but with some reasonable expectations," the President added.

Nixon said that within 2 weeks he would set out on his "peace journey" to Peking. He said that "the agreement on the meeting and the mutual trust required for organizing the first visit of an American head of state to the PRC has been a very important breakthrough."

The U.S. President said that in the past the American alliance system "was aimed exclusively at containing the Soviet Union and the PRC, but now the alliance must be capable of more, for it is easier to unite against, than for, something." Under such circumstances, the President went on, "it is much more complicated to hold an alliance together, but we do not shrink from the complexity of the task."

Nixon stressed that he had not started the Vietnam war and "had done his best to end it with honor". He claimed to have made "the most magnanimous peace offer in the history of wars."

President Nixon ended his broadcast speech by emphasizing his intent "to insure peace for the lifetime of a whole generation."

Commentator Criticizes Policy Views

Budapest in English to Europe 2130 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Charlie Coutts commentary]

[Text] President Nixon's foreign policy message tells us a great deal about the reasons for the recent publication of the subject of confidential talks on Vietnam and the eight-point package plan submitted during those talks. The package is unacceptable to the people of Vietnam, so the President now converts this into the intractability of Hanoi, which he claims prevents a settlement of the conflict by negotiations. He also argues that when the representatives of Vietnam say a political settlement can only follow the resignation of the Saigon dictator, President Thieu, this means a communist takeover before the departure of the Americans.

II. 10 Feb 72

F 2

HUNGARY

These are specious arguments, too specious to debate, for they simply show Washington's rejection of the moderate realistic proposals of the DRV and the Revolutionary Provisional Government of South Vietnam. Radio Budapest's Washington correspondent, discussing their issues, points out that President Nixon devoted special attention to the relations developing between his government and Peking, which, as he puts it, are dictated by reality and not by ideals. President Nixon emphasizes that People's China must fulfill the role incumbent upon her in the community of nations, and then hastens to add that there are between China and the United States many parallel interests. In other words, President Nixon hopes the new relations developing with China will strengthen American positions in the Middle East and Europe.

The Washington correspondent adds that now for the third time President Nixon referred concretely to the agenda of his planned talks in Moscow, and he held out the promise that the first provisional SALT agreement would be signed during the course of his visit to the Soviet capital. It may also be of some significance that President Nixon said he considers a European security conference can be held, although he implied the usual American proviso that it must follow careful long and thorough preparations.

BRIEFS

LEADERS GREET WRITER--Janos Kadar, Central Committee first secretary, Gyorgy Aczel, Central Committee secretary, and Pal Ilku, minister of culture, have greeted Jozsef Darvas, Kossuth Prize winning writer, on his 60th birthday and presented him with a Central Committee greetings letter and a gift from the Ministry of Culture. [Text] [Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1400 GMT 9 Feb 72 L]

DELEGATION BACK FROM ITALY--The trade union delegation led by Sandor Gaspar, member of the MSZMP Politburo and secretary general of the National Trade Union Council, which paid a friendly visit to Italy at the invitation of the CGIL [General Confederation of Italian Labor] has returned to Hungary. [Text] [Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 8 Feb 72 p 8 A]

II. 10 Feb 72

POLAND

G 1

MEDIA ANALYZE PRESIDENT NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT

Message Aimed at Electorate

Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1900 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Text] The U.S. President's annual message on foreign policy has been published in Washington. It transpires from this document, numbering 236 pages of typescript, that the American administration intends to continue armament programs and will not withdraw its forces from West Europe. At the same time it does not renounce the possibility of coming to an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic armaments.

Referring to his planned visit to Peking, Nixon stated that he is going there without any illusions. However, in his opinion this trip will be meaningful for future generations. As regards the Vietnam question, the U.S. President considers his eight-point proposals submitted on 26 January as final.

Concerning the Middle East conflict, the message confined itself to the statement that the American initiatives have failed to yield any results until now.

President Nixon continues to try to put off the convening of the European security and cooperation conference, saying that he is guided by considerations requiring its thorough preparation.

At the same time, he declared his readiness to continue the development of trade with East European countries.

In the opinion of observers, President Nixon's message clearly had an electoral character, and was addressed not to the Congress but to the U.S. people.

Position of Strength Approach

Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1800 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

["Echoes of the Day" program by Jan Zakrzewski]

[Text] Finally a topic which today kept the press agencies very busy. I do not have in mind here the Winter Olympics in Sapporo but the 95,000 words of the document on U.S. foreign policy presented today by U.S. President Nixon to the U.S. Congress. Since it would take us too long to deal even briefly with all the ideas contained in the 95,000 words, we will deal only with a few points.

Here are a few of President Nixon's ideas:

He is worried about the implementation of the Soviet program for expanding nuclear forces. He stated that he was ready to continue the arms race. He expressed the hope that the Soviet-U.S. SALT negotiations would subsequently check the arms race and provide the basis for reducing tension on a worldwide scale. These are beautiful words.

Regarding his trip to Peking Nixon expressed so-called cautious optimism that, after 20 years of complete separation and hostility, at least a lasting exchange of views will take place with China. As regards the May trip to Moscow, Nixon said that both sides--the Soviet and the American side--will no doubt show sincere interest in the improvement of mutual relations and that the treaty on West Berlin and other measures adopted last year may indicate the emergence of these new conditions.

II. 11 Feb 72

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

D1

NIXON TRIES TO JUSTIFY FOREIGN POLICY TO CONGRESS

No New Initiatives

Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 10 Feb 72 L

[Excerpts] U.S. President Richard Nixon yesterday submitted to Congress the state of the world message. This extensive document contains no new initiative but rather explains the foreign policy pursued by Nixon so far. Viliam (?Rosek) makes the following comment on Nixon's message:

In evaluating the foreign policy pursued so far and the fact of the planned trips to Peking and Moscow, the most pronounced emphasis is on Nixon's personal merit in attaining these successes. Yet international agencies note that in this 236-page report--the most extensive so far--one cannot detect, apart from disappointments, any contribution to U.S. foreign policy.

The message has been described as a sort of philosophical essay. Nixon devoted a substantial passage to confessing his own personal disappointment at the progress of the conflict in Indochina and in the Middle East. Nixon is disturbed by the emergence of the new West European Group of 10, which, I quote, "cannot remain without consequences for the U.S. trade position." The coordination of American and West European--thus conflicting--economic interests will, according to Nixon, require difficult political decisions.

As regards Soviet-American relations, Nixon believes that it is necessary to reach concrete agreements on all questions which are causing tension. He described the planned trip to Moscow as a meeting that can be a stimulus for further progress in mutual relations. The United States and the USSR, Nixon said, must resolve problems of foremost importance and we would pay dearly if the progress were slowed down by new antagonisms.

Political observers believe that the whole message is intended first of all for American voters to make them cast their votes for Nixon again.

Indignant Arab Reaction

Prague CTK International Service in English 1132 GMT 10 Feb 72 L

[Text] Beirut, Feb 10, CETEKA--President Nixon's foreign policy message to Congress has raised indignation and sharp criticism among the entire Arab public and the press.

Arab commentators are denouncing Nixon's assessment of the Middle East situation as an absolutely one-sided attempt to conceal the fundamental fact that Israel is still occupying territories of three Arab states and the United States is giving Israel unlimited military assistance.

The United States is stepping up its campaign of threats against the Arabs and is trying to camouflage its aid to Israel, writes AN-NIDA. AN-NAHAR points out that the United States bears full responsibility for the situation in the Middle East.

NIXON PRESS CONFERENCE DEVOTED MAINLY TO PRC TRIP

Prague Domestic Service in Czech/Slovak 1100 GMT 11 Feb 72 L

[Text] At a press conference in the White House yesterday, President Nixon occupied himself primarily with his forthcoming visit to China.

II. 11 Feb 72

C 5

BULGARIA

They are striving to eliminate the main contradiction of today's world: the contradic-
tion between two opposed social systems which is a sui generis expression of the con-
tradiction between the public character of production and private expropriation,
between labor and capital, between capitalists and working people. They are striving
to replace this contradiction with a nonexistent one. Thus the Chinese leaders want
to orient the natural hatred of peoples for the United States against the great country
of socialism. Maoism wants to turn the masses into captives of feelings which would
contradict their own interests, it wants to push class struggle in the world along
a false road.

Blinded by anti-Sovietism, which would be envied even by the Nazi henchmen, the Chinese leaders do not hesitate to use the feelings of some of the most backward strata in "third world" countries, strata for which a white man or a European is synonymous with oppression, as well as the saccharine nationalistic dreams and groundless claims of some politicians regarding the "special role of medium and small states" in determining international policies. The Maoists are striving to unite all these trends against the Soviet Union and crush the unity of progressive forces in the world. Thus they actually help imperialism and its reactionary plans.

Captives of this harmful policy, the Chinese leaders recently went even further to the
right and started an open collusion with U.S. imperialism in their struggle against the
Soviet Union and the progressive forces in the world. No matter how improbable it may
sound, after taking their place in the United Nations, the Maoists launched a vicious
campaign not against the United States, which for decades prevented China's inclusion
in the organization, but against the Soviet Union which constantly struggled for
China's admission.

China's UN representatives were the only ones to join the American position against the
Soviet Union's proposal to convene a world disarmament conference. They took a
similar position on the proposal to ban all thermonuclear tests.

The Chinese and American positions were fully identical regarding the Bangladesh
people's struggle against the Pakistani military regime. The PRC representatives,
although they pretend to be leaders of the peoples struggling for national independence,
sacrificed without hesitation the interests of the Bangladesh liberation movement. Tak-
ing a position completely on the side of Yahya Khan's Pakistani administration, the
Maoists strived to crush the struggle of the Bengalis and exert pressure on India.
While U.S. imperialism sent its naval units and aircraft carriers to the Bay of Bengal
to blackmail India, Chinese troops were concentrated on the Indian-Chinese border.

There can hardly be any doubt that China and the United States are unanimous on the re-
sumption of air raids against North Vietnam. At a time when Nixon is looking forward
so much to his Peking visit, he would hardly order a resumption of air raids had he
not been assured of the tacit agreement of the Chinese leaders.

All this shows that the struggle against the "two superpowers" proclaimed by the
Chinese leaders is in fact a struggle only against the Soviet Union. The threats
against imperialism and the entire leftist phraseology which accompanies all state-
ments by Chinese leaders are empty incantations to camouflage Peking's collusion with
Washington.

II. 10 Feb 72

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

D 1

NIXON TERMS 1971 YEAR OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS

Prague Domestic Service in Czech/Slovak 0830 GMT 10 Feb 72 L

[Text] President Nixon yesterday presented to the U.S. Congress his message on the state of the world. It does not bring any new diplomatic initiatives, but rather explains Nixon's foreign policy to date to those who will be electing a new U.S. president this year. This is why the message is in a predominantly optimistic vein and speaks about the past year, a year in which Nixon announced his intention to meet with the highest representatives of China and of the Soviet Union, as a year of outstanding successes for U.S. foreign policy.

About his journey to Peking, Nixon said that this coming visit is the outcome of a carefully prepared series of moves and the culmination of 3 years of mutual efforts by the United States and China.

In his remarks dealing with U.S.-Soviet relations, President Nixon admitted that the problems dividing the two countries are real and serious, yet he declared that last year useful negotiations took place between the United States and the Soviet Union and that this has led the two countries to the conclusion that a summit meeting would be suitable and might become a stimulus to further progress.

U.S., USSR TAKE STEPS IN RIGHT DIRECTION IN VIENNA

Budapest Domestic Service in Slovak 1130 GMT 9 Feb 72 A

[Tibor (?Paloucky) commentary]

[Text] The Soviet-U.S. Talks on limiting the development of the most modern and most destructive arms forming the basis of the military forces of the two great powers have been going on now for over 2 years alternately in Vienna and Helsinki. The last--sixth--round of the dialog in Vienna lasted 20 weeks. The first three rounds served to sound out positions, whereby both sides formulated certain criteria and the classification of strategic arms. In the fourth round they went as far as to outline the points on which the possibility of an agreement was ripening. In the fifth round of talks attention was focused mainly on antimissile defense systems, which represent a complicated complex controlled by a network of radar installations, computer centers and electronic equipment. What did the sixth round which has just ended in Vienna bring?

According to the brief communique, further progress was achieved in the talks on certain points in the questions under discussion, that is, on the one hand, on questions concerning the limitation of defense missile systems and on the other, in the talks on a preliminary agreement on limiting strategic offensive weapons. This must be understood to mean that in fact two agreements were prepared during the sixth round of the negotiations. The first, concerning the limitation of antimissile defense systems, may even have been roughly formulated, as the New York TIMES indicated. The second agreement, which the communique describes as preliminary, is infinitely harder, since the two sides have at their disposal different types of strategic arms in different numbers and with different degrees of effectiveness.

II. 10 Feb 72

C 4

BULGARIA

Today, Aleksandr Savelev, secretary of the Committee for Sea Safety attached to IMCO, ended his 7-day talks and consultations connected with the preparatory work and procedures on signing a trilateral agreement among the United Nations, IMCO and the Bulgarian People's Republic for rendering financial and technical assistance. He met with leading figures of Bulgarian shipbuilding and with the leaders of NIPKTIK, Prof Yusef Guliev from IMCO, and Eng Petur Bogdanov, assistant director of NIPKTIK.

The project provides for the construction of an up-to-date experimental-research compiled on maritime hydrodynamics attached to NIPKTIK with financial and technical assistance from the United Nations during 1972-76. It will be built near the science highway between the sea resorts of "Druzhba" and "Zlatni Pyasutsi." This complex will supply the Bulgarian shipbuilders with technical means for selecting the best types of ships.

## SEVENTH TRADE UNION CONGRESS TO CONVENE 7 MARCH

### Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 9 Feb 72 p 1 A

[Text] In fulfillment of the decision taken on 14 October 1971 by the 18th plenum of the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions, the Seventh Congress of Bulgarian Trade Unions will open on 7 March 1972.

## BRIEFS

**DELEGATION TO VERSAILLES ASSEMBLY--**A Bulgarian delegation composed of Grudi Atanasov, chairman of the Public Committee for Solidarity with Vietnam, deputy chairman of the Fatherland Front National Council and head of the delegation; Georgi Pirinski, chairman of the National Committee for the Defense of Peace; and Blaga Dimitrova, secretary of the Public Committee for Solidarity with Vietnam, left for Paris today to attend the World Assembly on Peace and Independence for the Peoples of Indochina to be held in Paris 11-13 February. [Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1430 GMT 9 Feb 72 A]

**KOMSOMOL DELEGATION TO CARACAS--**A delegation of the Komsomol Central Committee led by Dimo Minchev, member of the Central Committee Bureau and chief of the Students Department, left yesterday for Caracas to attend the Third Congress of the Venezuelan Communist Youth Union. [Text] [Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 8 Feb 72 p 2 A]

**VELCHEV ACTIVITIES--**A session of the Sofia City People's Council was held in Sofia today. The plan of the socioeconomic development of Sofia during 1971-1975 and the 1972 plan were approved. Boris Velchev, Politburo member and secretary of the BCP Central Committee, attended the session. Ivan Panev, chairman of the Sofia City People's Council Executive Committee, read a report on the tasks facing the council during the sixth 5-year plan. [Text] [Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 9 Feb 72 A]

**DELEGATION RETURNS FROM MOSCOW--**The Bulgarian Komsomol Central Committee delegation led by Eng Encho Moskov, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, which acquainted itself with the experience of the Leninist Komsomol in Moscow, has returned home. [Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 9 Feb 72 A]

**UN VISITOR--**Tano Tsolov, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, today received Raymond (?Pekichas), representative of the UN European Development Program, visiting Bulgaria. Measures for the accomplishment of the long-term program for Bulgaria's cooperation in the UN development program during 1972-1976 were discussed. [Text] [Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 2030 GMT 9 Feb 72 A]

II. 11 Feb 72

BULGARIA

PRESS QUESTIONS TRUE INTENTIONS OF NIXON'S MESSAGE

OTECHESTVEN FRONT Scores Inconsistencies

Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian 10 Feb 72 p 3 A

[Text] Washington, 9 Feb--Today President Nixon presented to Congress the annual report on U.S. foreign policy, known as the "State of the World" message.

Nixon began his extensive report with relations between the United States and the USSR. He expressed confidence that his forthcoming visit to Moscow would lead to progress in the improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In Moscow, the U.S. President continued, we will have three central objectives: to complete work on those issues which have been carried to the point of final decision, to establish a political framework for dealing with the issues still in dispute and to examine with the Soviet leaders the further development of the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the years ahead.

After this, President Nixon listed the main points of the agenda for his talks in Moscow:

1. An exchange of opinions of an initial strategic arms limitation agreement or on the issues to be discussed at the next stages of the SALT negotiations.

2. A discussion of the problem of the Middle East and the reasons for the failure to reach a peaceful settlement of this issue.

3. A discussion of the problems connected with European security in all their aspects. Nixon stressed that "no agreement in this area will be made without our allies."

4. An exploration of the policies of both countries on problems affecting other parts of the world, problems of joint interest for both sides and of importance for stability.

5. An examination of the possibility for bilateral cooperation, especially in the economic sphere.

The steps taken so far, Nixon declared at the end of the section on Soviet-U.S. relations, have been significant but are below the existing potential.

As regards the new U.S. policies toward the PRC, Nixon declared that they have been dictated by facts and not by feelings. The Peking visit is not an end but a beginning of alinement. Nixon declared that he is undertaking this visit "without illusions." "There is no question," Nixon went on, "of abandoning as useless the solid ties linking us with Japan--one of the crucial U.S. allies--under the pretext of hoping to establish relations with the PRC, a country which despite everything remains a 'sworn enemy.'" Neither is there any question of repudiating the commitments undertaken for Taiwan's defense.

In the section devoted to Western Europe, Nixon appeals to the United States and Europe to overcome their economic rivalries so as to preserve their political unity, which Nixon considers "a necessary condition for a lasting reduction of tension with Eastern Europe."

II. 11 Feb 72

C 3

BULGARIA

He stressed that it is necessary to maintain the "unity of the West" and liquidate
the causes behind the cooling of economic relations between the United States and the
European Economic Community.

As regards Indochina and the Middle East, Nixon declared in his message that they are
a source of "bitter disappointment" for the United States. He attempted to shift the
blame for the failure to reach agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Indochina
conflict onto the DRV, and for the failure to reach agreement on the peaceful settlement
of the Middle East conflict onto the USSR.

The new message of the President is another typical example of the great gap existing
between White House declarations and true intentions.

TRUD: Goals Remain Unchanged

Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 10 Feb 72 pp 1, 4 A

[BTA correspondent G. Todorchev dispatch]

[Text] New York, 9 Feb--U.S. President Richard Nixon today presented to the U.S.
Congress his message on the country's foreign policy, a bulky 236-page document.

In a 15-minute radio speech, Nixon summed up some of the more important aspects of the
message.

The U.S. President described 1971 as a "year of dramatic developments" under "new
conditions," demanding "fundamental changes in America's role in the world" and
"search for a 'new structure of peace'." Nixon spoke of last year as a "watershed
period" and stressed four basic elements which heralded changes "of historic scope and
significance" in U.S. policies: a beginning of "a new relationship with the Soviet
Union," a reorientation as regards the PRC, the laying of foundations for a "healthier
and more sustainable relationship" with the U.S. European allies and Japan, and "the
creation of a new environment for the world's monetary and trade activity."

Nixon pointed out that the change of U.S. policies toward China has been accomplished
after almost 3 years of patient, meticulous and "necessarily secret preparations." The
President said that he did not expect his Peking visit in 2 weeks' time to lead to a
"fast overcoming of the deep differences" between the United States and the PRC, but
it would, nevertheless, be a "necessary step" toward improving relations between
the two countries.

Despite declarations on the existence of an American striving for a "more mature
political partnership" with the "allies" and statements about their increased role,
Nixon still maintains the old U.S. policy of consolidating military blocs, the policy
"from a position of strength." The President laid stress on the U.S. line of
reservation and "cautiousness" on European security questions and again expressed
"reservations" toward those initiatives which lead to greater understanding between
East and West in Europe.

In his message, Nixon fully defended his entire policy of "Vietnamization" of the war
in Indochina, appealed to the American people to support his "new plan" for peace, and
sharply criticized those politicians who express disagreement with the plan and point
out its unacceptability and limitations.

Nixon reaffirmed the U.S. political positions on problems in the Middle East, Latin
America, South Asia, the United Nations and others. He pointed out that his foreign
policy would remain based on the principles of "leading U.S. role in world affairs"
in keeping with U.S. interests.

II. 11 Feb 72

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Despite the carefully edited and pleasant-sounding--especially in this election year--formulations in the message and despite its declarative "flexibility," the President's message on the international situation gives no reason to believe that changes would occur in U.S. policies as regards their main goals and their imperialist nature.

JOURNALIST CONTROVERTS CHINESE 'SUPERPOWERS' THEORY

Séfia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian 9 Feb 72 p 4 A

[Dimitur Mitev article: "Blinded by Anti-Sovietism: The Maoists' Collusion With Washington; What is Hidden Behind Peking's Theory of the 'Two Superpowers'"]

[Text] Over a decade has passed since the Chinese leadership advanced its proposal for a general line of the international communist movement. This was an attempt to reject the political line of almost all communist parties--elaborated collectively when their representatives gathered in Moscow in 1960--an attempt to impose the Chinese course which was totally coordinated with Peking's anti-Marxist and great-Han views. These attempts by the CCP leadership failed. The international communist movement remained loyal and continued to observe the evaluations contained in the 1960 declaration, evaluations which were further developed in the documents of the third Moscow conference in 1969.

Ever since, the Chinese party-state leadership has taken numerous international and domestic steps, and has launched numerous "theories," thus demonstrating that it follows its course more and more strictly. This course is characterized by retreat from the class positions of theproletariat and alinement with the U.S. p.l.llicies which are hated by all mankind. This sliding toward increasingly reactionary attitudes generates great hardships for progressive forces all over the world and, naturally, causes great concern.

One of the latest theories offered by the Chinese leadership is the theory of "two superpowers" and the attitudes of peoples of the world toward them. The Chinese politicians and theoreticians are trying to convince the peoples of the world that the Soviet Union and the United States are today the main enemies of mankind, that they oppress and exploit the peoples and that, consequently, the main task of the communist movement and the progressive forces in the world is, as Mao Tse-tung has stated, to build "a united anti-American and anti-Soviet front."

What are the goals pursued by this theory?

The Chinese leaders have used it once again to express their overt hatred for the Soviet Union. The country which produced the titan of the revolution, V.I. Lenin, the country which was the first to destroy the exploitation of man by man and thus open a new era in human history, the country which today is the mainstay of socialism, national independence and progress throughout the world, the country which is the main obstacle blocking the attempts by imperialists to fan a new world war--this is the country which the Chinese leaders place on the same plank with the United States, the citadel of capitalism and international retrogression.

By equating two countries which are similar only because they are large and strong, but which are two diametrical opposites in both their social nature and their role in the world, by attempting to prove that the main current task of the peoples is to struggle against them, the Chinese leaders again commit treason against progress.

II. 10 Feb 72

B U L G A R I A

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NIXON MESSAGE STRESSES 'INITIATIVES' OVER 'RESULTS'

Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 9 Feb 72 A

[Petur (?Stupov) commentary]

[Text] [Words indistinct] even a passing glance at the message which was broadcast by the world news agencies, one is impressed by the comparatively uncertain voice of the President--the emphasis was more or less laid on his so-called "new initiatives" rather than on the concrete results of them.

The international balance in 1972 cannot in fact encourage any assurance and optimism in Washington. The currency and financial crisis of the capitalist world (?completely undermined) the dollar's stability and thus liquidated the last illusions about the state of the U.S. economy. The famous doctrine of the Nixon-Kissinger team on solving the problem of Indochina also showed no results. The prospect of achieving a military victory in Indochina, so much desired by the White House, is further away than ever before.

Regardless of Nixon's assurances that the basic aim of U.S. foreign policy has been peace throughout the world, the war in this region continues. World public opinion expected something more concrete on this subject in the U.S. President's message.

The text of Nixon's message available so far again indicates that Nixon has limited himself to the framework of traditional attacks against the Vietnamese people. It is obvious that those who were expecting the U.S. President to take a more constructive and realistic approach toward the conflict in Indochina will be disappointed. Actually, this should not be surprising because this only confirms Washington's comprehensive policy which manifested its aggression and military intervention in this region long ago. Even Nixon himself stressed in the message that the United States was disappointed with developments in Indochina. This disappointment is quite understandable after following such a unimaginative policy in this region.

Another region which disappointed the U.S. President was South Asia. Regardless of the fact that he does not specify [what disappointed him], it is not difficult to understand that Nixon had in mind the latest development of events in the Hindustan peninsula. Nixon's disappointment in this respect is due primarily to the failure of his policy to correctly appraise the objective national liberation process, which was crowned with the independence of the people of Bangladesh.

Touching on the situation in a number of regions, the President could not generally conceal his uncertainty over the stability of the U.S. positions and prestige.

Nevertheless, Nixon took advantage of the opportunity to praise himself on the process of rapprochement with China. On this issue the President warned that he was leaving for Peking with no illusions whatsoever. This confirms more and more the pessimistic remarks lately spread in Washington about the results of this flirtation. It is obvious that the U.S. President has begun to understand that such a rapprochement, the initiator of which was Peking, by the way cannot exist on the anti-Soviet principles of the two countries alone, while ignoring the basic differences of their world interests. No one at present can assert that the path to true peace bypasses Moscow. This fact cannot be neglected by the U.S. President.

II. 10 Feb 72

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PRESS CITES POLITICAL, ECONOMIC TIES WITH EGYPT

Sofia BTA International Service in English 0837 GMT 9 Feb 72 L

[Text] Sofia, Feb 9 (BTA)--The fruitful visit by Todor Zhivkov to Syria is giving rise to an ever livelier interest also in the forthcoming official and friendly visit to be paid shortly by the Bulgarian party and state leader to Egypt.

Expectations are that the talks at a high level which Bulgaria and Egypt are to have will give a fresh impetus to the further expansion of the friendly Bulgarian-Egyptian relations.

Today the national dailies carry material of a wide variety dealing with the fruitful friendship and cooperation which unite the two countries and the two fraternal peoples.

The NARODNA ARMIYA newspaper stresses the following in part: "With the development of Bulgarian-Egyptian cooperation, the combat solidarity of the Bulgarian people with the people of the Arab Republic of Egypt is getting stronger in the struggle against the Israeli aggressor, imperialism and neocolonialism. Bulgaria is backing and popularizing the effort of friendly Egypt in its just struggle for doing away with the traces of the aggression, and for its building-up along a noncapitalist road, in friendship and cooperation with the socialist states."

Particular prominence is given by the press to the long-term growth of economic relations between the two countries. It is pointed out that if trade amounted to 9 million U.S. dollars in 1965, in 1971 it increased to 48 million dollars. It is further stressed that Todor Zhivkov's visit to Egypt in 1965 has contributed to a very large measure to the promotion of the political, economic, scientific, technological, sport and cultural relations, resting on the principles of equality and mutual benefit.

The national newspaper OTECHESTVEN FRONT carries in its morning edition an interview by Nihad Abdelatif, the commercial representative of Egypt to Sofia. He expresses the gratitude of his people for the assistance and backing which Bulgaria is giving to Egypt in its just struggle against Zionism and imperialism.

"I see great prospects for our cooperation. We may work together in order to achieve progress for the welfare of our two peoples and to the benefit of world peace," Abdelatif said.

UNITED NATIONS PROGRAM AIDS BULGARIAN SHIPBUILDING

Sofia BTA Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1050 GMT 8 Feb 72 A

[Text] Varna, 8 February--At its January 1972 session, the United Nations, or more particularly, (?UNIDO) adopted a program for rendering financial and technical aid for the purpose of developing shipbuilding in the Bulgarian People's Republic, and approved a project for expanding the Scientific-Technical, Designing-Construction and Technological Institute for Shipbuilding (NIPKTIK) in Varna.

This was stated by Aleksandr Savelev, representative of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) with residence in London, who is visiting Bulgaria. This organization is assigned the task of fulfilling development programs.