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CHAPTER V

ISSUE OF NUCLEAR CONTROL--THE MULTILATERAL FORCE (MLF)

His Role in the Multilateral Force

New major innovations of American policy have produced the conflicting emotions of the NATO Multilateral Force (commonly referred to as MLF). Though its fate is still uncertain, so much American prestige has been invested in this project for so long that regardless of whether it succeed or fails, it will affect the shape of the Alliance. It is therefore important to understand how the MLF was conceived and what goals were so intent to be accomplished.

The MLF which emerged in February 1963 as America's principal role in restoring the cohesion of NATO, had previously been treated at length by the Kennedy Administration. After De Gaul's veto of France's membership in the Common Market, it was resurrected and pushed forward in reasing passion. The United States concentrated its energies on the problem of nuclear control partly because the French challenge seemed relate political autonomy to nuclear independence, partly because Washington feared the twin specters of a German national nuclear program and Franco-German collaboration in the nuclear field.

The original proposal for a NATO multilateral force grew out of military "requirement" which had been generated in accordance with the TO doctrine prevalent in the late Fifties. According to this concept, SACEUR was to have the capability to destroy whatever weapons might be aimed at Europe. Thus when the Soviet Union began to deploy large numbers of medium-range ballistic missiles in Western Russia, two TO requirements emerged: a modernization program to replace vulnerable

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tactical aircraft with missiles; an interdiction mission giving NATO the capability to destroy the Soviet MRBM's.

When the issue of counteracting the Soviet MRBM's was raised in 1959, the first impulse of the Eisenhower Administration was to go along with a proposal of SACEUR (then General Norstad) which envisaged the installation of a mobile land-based version of the Polaris missile in Europe under the double-veto system. Upon further consideration this proposal was rejected. It was argued that large numbers of missiles constantly moving on European roads might disquiet the populations and thus encourage neutralist tendencies. The double-veto system was believed to provide inadequate safeguards against the ultimate control of nuclear weapons by Germany. Accordingly, a State Department study group headed by Professor Bowie proposed that NATO's MRBM requirement be met by Polaris missiles installed on ships (in the early version, submarines). These ships were to be jointly owned, operated and financed by the participants and were to remain under SACEUR's control at all times. To prevent the withdrawal of national contingents, each ship was to be manned by crews of mixed nationality. Each participant was to have a veto. The multilateral scheme was submitted to the NATO Council by Secretary of State Herter in December 1960 for study. A final decision was delayed until the new Administration could assess the problem.

There occurred a hiatus of several months while the new Administration reconsidered NATO's strategy. Having concluded that greater reliance should be placed on conventional forces and that control over nuclear weapons should be centralized, the Kennedy Administration did not look with particular

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favor on the creation of any new nuclear force within NATO. Thus, on May 17, 1961, in a speech on NATO's nuclear arrangements, President Kennedy mentioned the MLF only very indirectly. He urged the European allies to meet the conventional goals of NATO before "... we look to the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO seaborne force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by our allies, once NATO's nonnuclear goals have been achieved." In the course of the next year, Administration spokesmen invited our allies to analyze the problem and to develop a satisfactory control plan.

The two conditions put forward by the United States--a prior conventional build-up and European agreement about a control plan--suggested that the MLF could not have very high priority. Most of America's allies doubted the need for a conventional build-up. They could not afford both to strengthen their ground forces and to contribute to a NATO nuclear force. Moreover, none of our allies possessed a sea-borne nuclear system. Since a command and control system for even a national nuclear force is far from a simple matter, the probability that our allies would come up with a meaningful control system for a multilateral sea-borne force was not great. Indeed there were many in the Administration who believed that the problem would be found insoluble. It was expected that the allies would then ask the President to act as Executive Agent for the Alliance on nuclear matters. Central control over nuclear weapons would be established.

¹ John F. Kennedy, "The Common Aims of Canada and the United States,"
Speech at Ottawa, May 17, 1961, DOSB, Vol. XLIV, No. 1145 (June 5, 1961),
p. 841.

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When this did not happen, the United States in 1962 continued its gingerly approach to the multilateral force. In September 1962, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, spoke hedgingly of a multilateral *European* force.

> It would also be wrong to suppose that the reluctance
> which we feel with respect to individual, ineffective, and
> unintegrated forces would be extended automatically to a
> European force, genuinely unified and multilateral, and
> effectively integrated with our own necessarily predominant
> strength in the whole nuclear defense of the alliance.
> Any possible arrangements for assistance and cooperation
> in such an enterprise would, of course, require full
> consultation and approval by all appropriate agencies
> of our Government.²

The speech said nothing about what the United States meant by "multilateral,"
"unified" or "integrated."

A month later Under Secretary of State Ball returned to the theme
of a NATO nuclear force. He insisted that it was militarily unnecessary
and he continued to stress the priority placed by the Kennedy Administration
on the build-up of conventional forces. But he added:

> . . . should other NATO nations so desire, we are
> ready to give serious consideration to the creation
> of a genuinely multilateral medium-range ballistic
> missile force fully coordinated with the other
> deterrent forces of the North Atlantic Treaty
> Organization.³

²
McGeorge Bundy, "Building the Atlantic Partnership: Some
Lessons from the Past," speech on September 27, 1962, _DOSB_, Vol. XLVII,
No. 1217 (October 22, 1962), pp. 604-5.

³
George W. Ball, "NATO and the Cuban Crisis," speech on
November 16, 1962, _DOSB_, Vol. XLVII, No. 1223 (December 3, 1962), p. 835.

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In the following weeks an American briefing team toured Europe to explain the American concept of a multilateral force, including the provision for crews of mixed nationality. It did not elicit a significant European response.

In December, Secretary Rusk spoke vaguely of a force "not . . . so heavily dependent upon the United States alone." But he stressed that it was up to the Europeans to formulate a concrete proposal:

> We also have expressed our willingness, if our allies wish to do so, to consider a multilateral nuclear force which would not be so heavily dependent upon the United States alone. Now, we have not ourselves put forward a precise plan in this regard. This is something that our friends across the Atlantic would presumably wish to do if they conclude what it is they would like to propose in this field.⁴

At the regular NATO ministerial conference in December 1962, the United States took no initiative with respect to the NATO multilateral force. A week later at Nassau the United States and Great Britain decided to subscribe part of their national nuclear forces to a NATO multilateral force:

> Returning to Polaris the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the purpose of their two governments with respect to the provision of Polaris missiles must be the development of a multilateral NATO nuclear force in the closest consultation with other NATO allies. They will use their best endeavors to this end.⁵

Dean Rusk, News Conference on December 10, 1962, DOSB, Vol. XLVII, No. 1227 (December 31, 1962), p. 995.

Text, Joint Communique and Attached Statement on nuclear defense systems issued on December 21, by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, DOSB, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1229 (January 14, 1963), p. 44.

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This was one of the many ambiguities in the Nassau Agreement and an exegis of it absorbed energies on both sides of the Atlantic for many months. Did "multilateral" mean the assignment of national contingents to NATO as Great Britain argued? Or did it involve a commitment to create a mixed-manned, sea-borne force as the United States urged? For a few weeks after the Nassau Agreement, the term multilateral was in fact used interchangeably for either arrangement. Whatever the answer, it is obvious that until De Gaulle's press conference on January 14, 1963, what came to be known as the MLF was far from a high priority goal of American foreign policy. In the face of indifference at the highest level, it had in fact been kept alive in the government only by a very small group of enthusiasts who, in the words of one acute observer, engaged in "a public relations campaign to gain official, political and academic support of an energy and ruthlessness unknown since Harriet Beecher Stowe . . ."

Whatever the hesitations of the Administration, they were resolved by De Gaulle's press conference. Within a week, Secretary Rusk said in a television interview that the United States would proceed with the NATO Multilateral Force even without France (though he did not make clear whether he was using multilateral in the American or the British sense). On February 9th, the Legal Counselor of the State

6. Alastair Buchan, "Is This NATO Crisis Necessary?" *The New Republic*, Vol. 151, Nos. 6-7 (August 8, 1964), pp. 19-21.

7. Dean Rusk, "Today," NBC Television, January 21, 1963, *DOSB*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1233 (February 11, 1963), p. 206.

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Department, Abram Chayes, explicitly advanced the Multilateral Force as an alternative route to the Grand Design which De Gaulle had sought to block with his veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market.

By March 1963 the United States had dropped the conditions of a non-nuclear build-up and of a prior European agreement to a control plan. Indeed, it now argued that a final decision on the control problem should await the actual creation of the Multilateral Force. Ambassador Livingston Merchant was assigned to carry out the negotiations to bring the Multilateral Force into being. On April 27, 1963, Under Secretary Ball laid down four criteria for the Multilateral Force: (a) there must be many participants; (b) the force must not be based predominantly in one country; (c) through mixed manning the components must be made unavailable for withdrawal; and (d) the decision-making must be collective.

He went on to describe the MLF in glowing terms:

> The kind of multilateral force I have described has much to commend it. Not only is it the best means of dealing with the nuclear problem in the present political framework; it is also a means of promoting gradual and constructive evolution within that framework. The multilateral force would offer the great advantage of a further opportunity to work toward greater unity in Europe and closer partnership between Europe and the United States.

8

Abram Chayes, "European Integration and American Foreign Policy," February 9, 1963, DOSB, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1236 (March 4, 1963), p. 321.

9

George W. Ball, "The Nuclear Deterrent and the Atlantic Alliance," speech April 26, 1963, DOSB, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1246 (May 13, 1963), p. 739.

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During 1963 the Multilateral Force became the main focus of American NATO policy. The original posture of responding to European wishes was abandoned. American spokesmen ever more insistently urged the MLF as a major contribution to restoring Allied cohesion--indeed as the principal available step. Thus, on October 27, Secretary Rusk, speaking in Frankfurt, said:

> Such a multilateral missile fleet would be militarily effective. Its accurate and well-protected missiles would be counted toward the total needs of Western deterrence.

> It would strengthen Atlantic partnership by binding the United States and Europe in an inextricable nuclear tie. The missiles and warheads would be jointly owned and controlled; they could not be unilaterally withdrawn.

> And it would strengthen European cohesion by providing the presently nonnuclear powers an opportunity to share in ownership, manning, and control of a powerful nuclear force on the same basis as other members of that force.¹⁰

The full apparatus of American persuasion--official, semi-official and unofficial--pressed the MLF on our European allies. In September 1964 Thomas K. Finletter, United States Representative at the NATO Council, went so far as to say: "As goes this fleet, so may go the defense of the West and our efforts to prevent war." There were strong intimations that if the other allies procrastinated the United States would go ahead with the MLF as a German-American project--a position supported by Chancellor Erhard on October 6, 1964.

10 Dean Rusk, "Toward a New Dimension in Atlantic Partnership," speech at Frankfurt on October 27, 1963, DOSB, Vol. XLIX, No. 1272 (November 11, 1963), p. 730.

11 *New York Times*, September 11, 1964.

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This onslaught overcame the initial reserve of many of our allies. After a brief period of hesitation, the government of the Federal Republic agreed to the scheme. While its original motive may well have been to prove that the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship was not inconsistent with continued loyalty to the American Alliance, the Federal Republic soon became nearly as enthusiastic an advocate of the MLF as the United States. Greece, Turkey and Italy agreed in principle to participate. Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands joined the other countries in a study of the technical feasibility of mixed manning. France refused any degree of participation.

However, the large number of participants in the technical studies was deceptive. United States insistence has made it difficult for allied governments to face the issue of the MLF on its merits. The Defense Ministries of our allies (except Bonn)--which might be thought to have a vested interest in the MLF--were opposed or lukewarm while the Foreign Offices, fearful of the political consequences of a refusal, were pressing it. The scepticism or indifference of the military was countered by the concern that rejection of this American overture might jeopardize the American commitment to the defense of Europe.

Moreover, American negotiating tactics were deliberately designed to avoid all difficult political issues. During 1964, American diplomacy concentrated on studies regarding the technical feasibility of mixed manning. Efforts were also made to draft a charter for the operation of the MLF if the governments concerned later agreed to join. The negotiations thus had a curious aspect. Some governments participated in order to be

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not to refuse a project which had already advanced so far. The smaller
European countries would follow the British lead. France would be
isolated.

But the expectation that so far-reaching a scheme as the MLF could
be pushed through without facing the central political issues proved to be
mistaken. The notion that France would stand idly by while a project
which had the practical consequence of isolating her was being implemented
emerged as an illusion. As American pressure increased the opposition of
France came into the open. The Federal Republic found itself caught between
the conflicting views of its closest allies. The new British government
began to make explicit those misgivings about the MLF which had been previously
obscured only by the imminence of elections. It fought the project not openly
but indirectly by seeking to redefine the meaning of multilateral. The
Secretary General of NATO, Brosio, announced that in his view so radical
a step toward integration as the MLF required unanimous consent even of the
countries not participating thus giving France an effective veto. The
MLF which was supposed to restore allied cohesion became an additional
element of discord. At this point, President Johnson wisely removed American
deadlines to permit a calmer consideration of NATO's nuclear
problem. Whatever its ultimate fate, it is already clear that many of the
extravagant claims made for the MLF are unfulfillable and that what will
finally emerge may have little relationship to the original project.

B. <u>The Case for the MLF.</u>

How did it happen that for nearly two years the MLF became the
focus of United States NATO policy? What were the reasons that caused the
United States to stake so much on the issue of nuclear control?

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As happens so often, the MLF emerged as the keystone of United States NATO policy because several conflicting pressures and points of view in our bureaucracy suddenly coalesced. The immediate impetus, as we have seen, was supplied by SACEUR's requirement for medium-range missiles to counteract Soviet missiles aimed at Europe. This military requirement acquired a symbolic significance because of German uneasiness about the early versions of the doctrine of flexible response. Though German demands for reassurance about the continued validity of the American nuclear guarantee generally concerned the disposition and use of _tactical_ nuclear weapons on German soil, they were interpreted in Washington as the forerunner of more sweeping proposals which the MLF was designed to deflect.

Another motive behind the MLF was to prevent other allies from embarking on national nuclear programs with the arguments used on behalf of the British and French nuclear forces. To the extent that national weapons programs were justified by the unreliability of American assistance, they gave an incentive to other allies to develop nuclear arsenals of their own. According to the line of reasoning, the British nuclear program had produced the French effort and the French program would inevitably evoke similar aspirations in Germany.

12

12

Indeed President Kennedy saw prospects of nuclear spread to countries which must have been startled to find themselves listed as possible candidates for the nuclear club. Thus in his television interview of December 17, 1962, President Kennedy said: "The question is whether the United States should join in helping make France a nuclear power, then Italy, then West Germany, then Belgium. How does that produce security when you have 10,20,30 nuclear powers who may fire their weapons off under different conditions?" (The CBS Television Network, Transcript of an Interview with President John F. Kennedy, December 17, 1962, p. 13).

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The MLF was given additional impetus by the reluctance of the NATO nuclear powers to share their planning and strategic decisions with their non-nuclear allies. The Nuclear Committee of the NATO Council, which was created in April 1962 to provide a forum for the nuclear powers to discuss their strategic policy, remained dormant. Proponents of joint planning hoped to fill this gap through the MLF.

Another pressure for the MLF came from American strategic doctrine. Though the United States Defense Department would have preferred that all nuclear weapons of the Alliance remain under American control, it accepted the MLF as the next best expedient so long as the American veto remained unimpaired. The Pentagon was further attracted by the proposition that the MLF might provide a "safety net" into which the nuclear allies might jump in order to dispose of their nuclear arsenal.

An opposite view was taken by the advocates of European integration. Their objection to the nuclear programs of France and Britain was less that they divided the Alliance than that they divided Europe. Too weak to encourage self-reliance, too nationally oriented to provide a focal point for European loyalties, these programs prevented both European integration and the "dumbbell concept" of Atlantic partnership. It would be different with a European nuclear force. According to the European integrationists, both in the State Department and overseas, a European nuclear force would have the advantage of promoting European unity, and it would be strong enough to become a respectable partner for the United States. The MLF was accepted by Jean Monnet's influential Action Committee for a United Europe for precisely the opposite reason that the Pentagon resigned itself

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to it: The European integrationists (and their allies in the State Department) saw in the MLF the kernel of a separate European nuclear force. They supported the MLF because they wanted to provide another basis for a united Europe than French nuclear claims and at the same time build a bridge for Britain to enter this united Europe.

These motives might have canceled each other out had it not been for President de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, excluding Britain from the Common Market. Many American policymakers reacted with a sense of personal outrage and began to cast about for some suitable response. They chose the MLF partly because the French challenge seemed to them to base itself on nuclear autonomy, partly because the MLF happened to be the one "integrationist" project which was available and had a strong group of supporters within the government. In other words, conversion of the United States government from aloof receptivity to European initiatives to passionate advocacy of the MLF was less the result of positive conviction than a reaction to French intransigence. Nothing had changed between December 10, 1962 when Secretary Rusk stated in effect that it was up to the Europeans to formulate a plan with respect to the MLF and January 21, 1963, when he first committed the United States to pressing it except De Gaulle's veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market. The MLF was an attempt to implement the Grand Design without France and, if necessary, against it.

13

For a splendid historical account of the MLF see Alastair Buchan, "The Multilateral Force: An Historical Perspective," Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, Number Thirteen (October 1964).

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Once the United States committed itself to the MLF, the official arguments on behalf of it went something like this: The issue of nuclear control is the fundamental problem before the Alliance and the one in which American leadership has been most explicitly challenged. The cohesion of the Alliance therefore requires that it be "solved." Only three solutions are conceivable: American hegemony which is psychologically unacceptable; proliferation to other countries of NATO which is politically divisive and strategically dangerous; the MLF. The MLF moreover will give the Federal Republic equal status; it will give new impetus to European integration; it will strengthen Allied cohesion.

There were, however, several difficulties with this policy. The first was the lack of clarity about our real objectives. The MLF became the focus for many diverse hopes and the support for it was drawn from many contradictory motives. It was supposed to revitalize NATO, yet reduce the role of France in Europe. It was to prevent nuclear proliferation and yet satisfy alleged German desires for a share of nuclear control. It simultaneously sought to meet the requirements of the Pentagon for central control over nuclear weapons and the hopes of many Europeans for the emergence of a European nuclear force. Perhaps these aims were not irreconcilable. But, because an explicit consideration of them was avoided in favor of the technical problem of mixed manning, the final debate when it occurred in the winter of 1964 was mortgaged by many previous evasions and ambiguities, some of them deliberate.

These inconsistencies became all the more serious because the issue of nuclear control was inherently divisive. A project which involved giving Germany access to the ownership of nuclear weapons was bound to bring on

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almost instinctive reactions of disquiet which were magnified by the hints
from Washington and Bonn that, if necessary, the MLF might be turned into
a special German-American relationship. French hostility compounded the
uneasiness of almost all the other allies. To be sure,

if the need was urgent the United States might well have been justified
to vindicate its leadership position by pressing on despite the doubts
of its allies. A great deal, therefore, turns on the answer to two related
questions: How good was the analysis which produced the MLF? How good
was the remedy?

C. <u>The MLF--Wrong Problem; Wrong Answer</u>

The military case for the MLF has usually been put in terms of the
MRBM "requirement" developed by SACEUR in the late Fifties. However, this
"requirement" reflects many of the unsolved problems of NATO doctrine.

Whether the MLF contributes to the cohesion of NATO or becomes merely
another forum for articulating existing disagreements depends in part on
whether its military mission makes sense and commands a consensus. But
there is reason to believe that the American and British view of the
military role of the MLF differs from that prevalent in the Federal Republic
and at NATO headquarters.

Could there be mutually agreed, what I mean is that in the Cold War, it is not possible that "making military sense" in a nuclear world would not command a consensus of NATO members.

Existing NATO doctrine assumes that all the missiles necessary to
eliminate the Soviet MRBM's should be under SACEUR's command. But should
a counterforce mission deep into Soviet territory really be a top priority
task of SACEUR? Indeed does it make any strategic sense when missiles on
both sides are numbered in the hundreds and can be either hardened or
made mobile? In any event, the MLF as originally conceived is much too

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small for dealing by itself with the Soviet MRBM's. Those who cite the SACEUR "requirement" on behalf of the MLF encourage later pressures for increasing the size of the MLF so that it can conduct effective counterforce operations. This would require many more missiles than the two hundred projected in the initial MLF plans.

If, on the other hand, the task of neutralizing the Soviet MRBM's is to be given to the MLF in conjunction with SAC, it becomes relevant to inquire why it is necessary to have two nuclear forces in the Alliance in both of which the United States has the final say. Since SAC would be the key element in any coordinated strategy, the MLF is at best a cumbersome and costly device to accomplish what remains a necessity in any event: to give our allies greater access to American strategic planning. In other words, if joint planning is confined to the MLF, it will be inadequate; if it is extended to cover all relevant strategic forces, the MLF is unnecessary.

However, the military case for the MLF has never been decisive. Successive SACEURs have been at best lukewarm about the project. And until six weeks before it emerged as a principal objective of American NATO policy, our highest officials had declared the MLF militarily unnecessary.

The key argument on behalf of the MLF has always been political. Specifically, the MLF was supposed to contribute to preventing nuclear proliferation by providing a framework within which our nuclear allies could abandon their nuclear programs. It was to discourage other allies from entering the nuclear field. Above all, it was to give equal status to the Federal Republic in nuclear matters.

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The first objective has been negated by the refusal of France and, to a lesser extent, of Great Britain to abolish their national forces. As for the other allies, none except the Federal Republic has either the resources or the motivation for a national nuclear program. The issue then becomes whether the MLF is a good device for absorbing Germany's nuclear ambitions.

There is no doubt that the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance depends importantly on the long-term orientation of the Federal Republic. The Federal Republic must be treated as an equal partner and must be able to participate fully in developing common policies. It is another question whether access to nuclear weapons should have been made the criterion of equality. It will never be known whether a subconscious desire for the possession of nuclear weapons did exist in Germany or what form it could have taken if it had. Was there a nuclear problem in Germany or did the United States create it--in the words of the former Defense correspondent of the London *Times*--by the passionate advocacy of its solution?

The trouble with self-fulfilling prophesies is that in retrospect it is impossible to demonstrate whether what happened was predicted or caused by the prophecy. The fact is that once the theory of a German appetite for nuclear weapons had become established, every German proposal was interpreted to become consistent with it. Thus, in 1960 Chancellor Adenauer stated that French and British possession of nuclear weapons should not give these countries a privileged position within NATO. The advocates of the MLF used this to demonstrate a veiled German desire for nuclear weapons. It is more likely that Chancellor Adenauer was concerned lest the

continue on page 18a

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Directorate proposed by President de Gaulle exclude the Federal Republic. It
was a demand for political equality not necessarily for nuclear weapons.

A similar interpretation was put on the strategic views of former
Defense Minister Strauss. He argued for more information about the nuclear
stockpiles in Germany, for a guarantee that these would not be withdrawn
without the consent of NATO and for a degree of unspecified joint control

continued on page 19

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14 over weapons fired from German soil. But Strauss' concern was primarily with control of tactical nuclear weapons already in the NATO stockpiles and of a range not suitable for a retaliatory strategy.

Whatever the _arriere pensees_ of Chancellor Adenauer and Minister Strauss, the question remains whether it would not have been wiser to take their statements at face value rather than gear our policy to guesses about their unstated desires. The spread of nuclear weapons to Germany was much more complicated than simply applying British and French precepts. It was a grave error to act as if Germany by a unilateral decision could enter the nuclear field. No country faced greater obstacles in developing a national nuclear program. In the treaty establishing the Western European Union which made German rearmament possible the Federal Republic renounced the production or testing of nuclear weapons on its territory. There is a curious inconsistency between the proposition that the Federal Republic wanted nuclear weapons so badly that it might break that treaty, and the argument that another treaty could then restrain this desire.

Moreover, the issue was hardly urgent. At least until the elections of 1969, it would have been impossible to mobilize domestic support within Germany for a national nuclear program. This was all the more true because any attempt to develop German national nuclear weapons would have awakened latent distrust all over Europe. It is doubtful that NATO could have survived if the Soviet Union had used the existence of a German national nuclear program as a pretext to unleash a series of crises. No European

14 See for example, the _Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung_, April 21, 1962.

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country would have run major risks so that Germany might have nuclear weapons under national control. Whatever Germany's real desires, it would have been wiser to give Germany fuller access to political decision-making in the Alliance than to become an advocate for German claims in the nuclear field which the Federal Republic could not have articulated for itself.

Such a course would have dealt with the real pressures behind the spread of nuclear weapons within the Western Alliance. Was the French nuclear program--begun by De Gaulle's predecessors--really inspired by the example of Great Britain as so many of our policymakers seem to believe? It is likely that the experience of Suez, with its dramatic demonstration of how American and European policies and interests might diverge, was a more powerful catalyst than speeches in the House of Commons. The fact that we gave Britain a special status in East-West negotiations did more to emphasize the political utility of Britain's nuclear arsenal than the claims of British Defense Ministers. Thus, whether the Federal Republic in fact felt a sense of discrimination would depend above all on its political role. A scrupulous concern for German interests--especially in the conduct of East-West negotiations--and an intimate system of political consultation might well have met the demands likely to be advanced by any foreseeable German government in the Sixties.

Instead, a vicious circle was created. ... The United States put forward a proposal based on a theoretical conception of *German* desires which the Germans felt obliged to accept because they did not want to thwart *American* wishes. What was originally intended as a device to tie

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the Federal Republic to NATO and the United States to Europe became
an end in itself.

Regardless of whether the MLF responded to German nuclear appetites
or whether it stimulated them, it is unlikely to contain whatever nuclear
aspirations exist in Germany. Its primary role will be to shift the
debate from the issue of the ownership of nuclear weapons to the issue of
control of a force in which the Federal Republic is the largest European
shareholder. Indeed since the MLF has overcome the political and
psychological hurdles to German ownership of nuclear weapons, the way is
open for the Federal Republic to seek alternative arrangements either if
the MLF fails or if it comes into being with control arrangements which
prove unsatisfactory. Then we may yet see two MLFs, one sponsored by the
United States and one by France, or perhaps even a national program based
on competence acquired through membership in the MLF.

A great deal depends therefore on the ability to solve the complex
issue of control of the MLF. Heretofore, strangely little attention has
been paid to this problem in MLF negotiations. The United States has taken
the view that since the Multilateral Force does not yet exist the issue
of nuclear control need not be faced until later. Official spokesmen have
also implied that the United States would be willing to consider a modification
of the initial control arrangements, including giving up the veto.

Both of these arguments raise serious questions. Physical operation
of the MLF will offer next to no insight into the problem of political
control. Knowledge of how to operate a missile-carrying ship is irrelevant
to the complex issue of how a coalition of sovereign states decides to enter

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a nuclear war. The problem will not become easier as time goes on--the primary change the passage of time will bring to the position of countries which will by then have made a major financial contribution to the MLF and whose interests with respect to its control arrangements are likely to diverge from ours.

The complexity of the issue of nuclear control is demonstrated by the three kinds of nuclear forces which will exist in NATO if the MLF comes into being. They are: (a) national nuclear forces such as SAC, the French *force de frappe* and, depending on its ultimate disposition, perhaps the British deterrent--these would remain under exclusive national control; (b) nuclear forces "assigned" to NATO which, depending on the meaning attached to the word "assignment," will be available to NATO for planning purposes even though they are also subject to national decisions; and (c) the MLF, whose employment would require unanimity at least in its early phases.

An MLF in which each contributor has a veto will not fundamentally change the situation with respect to nuclear control in NATO. No country which is presently unable to initiate nuclear war will be able to do so as a result of the MLF. No country able to go to nuclear war can be prevented from doing so because of the existence of the MLF. No country can be made to enter nuclear war through membership in the MLF.

In case of disagreement with our European allies, one of two things would happen. If we decided to resort to nuclear weapons against the wishes of our allies, the MLF would be inactive; but we could use SAC and the Polaris submarines assigned to NATO. If the situation were reversed--that is, if

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our allies wished to use nuclear weapons and we disagreed--neither the NATO force nor SAC could operate. A force which multiplies safety catches and is too small for its mission is certain to produce two sets of pressures: (a) to turn it into a militarily more significant instrument by increasing its size at least to the level of the Soviet MRBM's in Western Russia; and (b) to dilute the unanimity principle to avoid paralysis in times of crises. These pressures are likely even among allies initially indifferent or hostile to the MLF. Defense ministers will be forced to justify continuing expenditures. They will feel obliged to make the MLF a significant institution.

There have already been hints of things to come. The German Defense Minister von Hassel has stated that the veto of all the participants, while acceptable initially, will have to be reconsidered once the MLF has come into being. In the United States two possible solutions have been proposed: an eventual surrender of the United States veto and a less radical solution according to which the United States veto is retained but that of the smaller contributors is eliminated.

Can the United States seriously consider giving up the veto, as American spokesmen for the MLF have occasionally stated? Robert R. Bowie who originated the concept of the MLF and who has been one of its most influential defenders has written:

> We should be ready to concede to a multilateral force the same degree of ultimate autonomy as has already been granted the British national force. The final outcome might take the form of either (1) an integrated NATO force in which the United States, without a veto, would be one member, [Emphasis added] or (2) an integrated European force

15

Interview in *Christ und Welt*, (October 23, 1963), p. 7

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[y]

(without the United States as a member), closely coordinated with United States forces, but under ultimate European control.¹⁶

It is not easy to see how so fateful a decision as the use of nuclear weapons can be abdicated to a majority vote of even very close allies. The Constitutional provision that a declaration of war requires the consent of two-thirds of the Senate may well prove insurmountable. The Congressional debate on such a proposition could not avoid discussing the circumstances in which a nuclear war might break out. This would force the Administration to define contingencies in which in its judgment the use of nuclear weapons would _not_ be appropriate. The doubts generated by such a debate would do more damage than any benefit that it could possibly bring.

For precisely what would giving up the veto actually imply? Does it mean that when requested by a majority of our allies we would agree to go to war with the small part of the total nuclear arsenal of the Alliance represented by the MLF while SAC remained inactive? Or does it mean that we would be prepared to go to war with our entire nuclear arsenal? The former interpretation would be utterly contrary to the strategic doctrine elaborated so persistently by Secretary McNamara and his associates. To enter nuclear war with only the MLF, which is a small part of the total nuclear force of the Alliance and one not exceptionally well-suited to discriminating targeting, would make no military sense. It would prevent a strategy of flexible response. And Soviet retaliation against

16

Robert R. Bowie, "Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance," *International Organization*, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (1963), p. 728.

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a blow by a force in which we participate will surely not take into account
our negative vote on the control body.

But if the second interpretation is correct--that we would be
committed to go to war with our _entire_ strategic force--it is not clear
why a special multilateral force must be set up. Then it would be wiser
to create a political control body for the Alliance as a whole and agree
to go to war on the basis of whatever majority vote seems indicated.

Difficult as it will be to decide on a control mechanism for
entering nuclear war, the political control over the actual military
operations of the MLF will be even more complex. Who is to be responsible
for the decisions to change planned targets (retargeting in strategic
jargon) or for determining the scale of individual attacks? How is the
MLF to fit into wartime negotiations? How does one go about ending
hostilities? On the basis of one vote or unanimity? With whom would
the Soviet Union deal when nuclear operations are to be stopped? To
evade these questions until irrevocable decisions are made is to invite
endless controversy later on.

A final problem of control is raised by the attribute of the MLF
which attracts many of its advocates: the international status of the
crews produced by mixed-manning. If each national contingent is to
remain responsive to national direction, the only problem is one of
communications and the difficulty inherent in control by the threat of
mutiny. If, however, the crews are to develop a real international status
and if their loyalties are to transcend national considerations--as the
proponents of the MLF urge--serious control problems may develop in time.

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The unauthorized use of nuclear weapons by national military units which has produced so much dubious fiction is restrained by long traditions of civilian supremacy and by habits of obedience. International crews separated for long periods from their societies may be less subject to such restraints. To start integration in the nuclear realm before a corresponding political framework exists may thus create a dangerous imbalance.

What about the other claims being made on behalf of the MLF by its advocates? Will the MLF promote European integration or eventually develop into a European nuclear force? Secretary Rusk has praised the MLF because of its potential contribution to European cohesion. Deputy Assistant Secretary J. Robert Schaetzel has argued that:

> The multilateral force would also inevitably make easier the eventual development of a European nuclear force, should this be the desire and within the grasp of the Europeans.¹⁸

The then Vice President Johnson said much the same thing:

> The movement to Atlantic partnership makes this [MLF] possible. The movement to European unity makes this desirable--as a first step toward a greater European voice in nuclear matters. Evolution of this missile fleet toward European control, as Europe marches toward unity, is by no means excluded.¹⁹

17 Dean Rusk, "Toward a New Dimension in the Atlantic Partnership," DOSB, Vol. XLIX, No. 1272 (November 11, 1963), p. 730.

18 J. Robert Schaetzel, "The Nuclear Problem and Atlantic Interdependence," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1963-4), p. 567.

19 Lyndon B. Johnson, address at Brussels on November 8, 1963, DOSB, Vol. XLIX, No. 1275 (December 2, 1963), pp. 853-4. See also Robert R. Bowie, speech before the Western European Union Assembly, December 3, 1963, op. cit., pp. 127-8.

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The influential Action Committee for a United Europe headed by Jean Monnet has endorsed the MLF as the precursor of a European nuclear force.

Two problems are raised by the prospect of transforming the MLF into a European force: (a) the relative role of Germany and (b) the relationship of the United States to the emergence of such a force.

The problem of Germany is acute because (as the MLF was originally conceived the Federal Republic was to be by far the largest European contributor paying close to seventy per cent of the European share.

Participants were promised influence in the control body and command over a number of ships proportionate to their financial contribution. Thus, if there was to be a European point of view within the MLF, its spokesman was likely to be the Federal Republic.

Such a prospect is not in the interest of NATO, of European cohesion, of the Federal Republic or of international stability. It would push the most exposed ally into the forefront of every dispute. It would make the Federal Republic which already has the largest conventional army also the most significant nuclear power in Europe. This would again raise fears that a decade and a half of farsighted German policy have only begun to erase. It might fuse anti-nuclear feelings into a dangerous wave of neutralism.

Some of the advocates of the MLF argue that the prospect of German domination will make Britain and France more eager to join. This may be the case. But it is also possible that Britain and France will in time move away from an alliance that threatens to turn into a special German-American arrangement. Even if the assumption proves correct, however, such a process of solving NATO's nuclear problem would be extremely worrisome.

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It would be better for the long-term stability and cohesiveness of Europe for the Federal Republic to join an institution in which France and Britain are the senior partners, than for Britain and France to be obliged to seek membership in a grouping to which Germany is the largest European contributor and in which ultimately it may play the same role as France does in the Common Market. History has been altered by smaller nuances.

The fear of German domination apart, the MLF is a poor chrysalis for a European nuclear force. Such a force could grow out of the MLF in only one of two ways: (a) by an American decision to withdraw from the MLF, or (b) through a European request that we leave it. Either course will be divisive in the extreme. It is one thing for a European nuclear force to develop from the present national programs which have existed for many years. It is quite another for a European force to come about through a United States withdrawal, voluntary or forced, from a joint Atlantic enterprise. Such an act might raise serious doubts about the continued validity of America's commitment to the defense of Europe.

In short, to leave open the two most important and interrelated problems of the MLF--that of control and that of evolution of the force--will magnify tensions later. If the MLF comes into being, the United States may, in fact, be haunted for years to come by the inconsistencies of its arguments on behalf of it. To the Federal Republic, the MLF has been represented as a device to give non-nuclear countries an increased participation in nuclear matters. To Soviet and European critics, the MLF has been advocated as decreasing, if anything, the role of its members in the decision to go to nuclear war. Thus Gerard C. Smith, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for the MLF, said on April 22, 1964:

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Any wartime decision to fire the missiles would be
by multilateral agreement, rather than by bilateral
agreement as in the case of these earlier strategic
missiles. The MLF will thus increase the number of
states with fingers on the safety catch, rather than
on the nuclear trigger. /Emphasis added./

There would be no increase of risk of compromise
of weapons design data under MLF. Multilateral
custodial procedures would assure that individual
countries had no greater access to information about
how to design and manufacture weapons than at present
under the NATO atomic stockpile.²⁰

The dilemma of how to reconcile the requirement of central control
over nuclear weapons with the sovereignty of our allies is real. But for
the long-term vitality of the Alliance it would have been better to face
this issue honestly than to present different versions of the control
problem to different audiences. If there is a German demand for nuclear
weapons--as the advocates of the MLF have alleged--it is unlikely to be
satisfied by "increasing the number of states with fingers on the safety
catch, rather than on the nuclear trigger." If other countries do wish to
enter the nuclear field, they are not likely to be put off by a device
which creates the illusion of participation while giving "no greater access
to information about how to design and manufacture weapons than at present."
The MLF cannot at one and the same time satisfy demands for nuclear sharing
and assuage concerns about nuclear proliferation.

20

Gerard C. Smith, "The Nuclear Defense of NATO," speech on April 22, 1964, DOSB, Vol. L, No. 1299 (May 18, 1964), p. 785.

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Originated to fulfill SACEUR's military requirement, pressed as a counter to a French challenge, the MLF stands in danger of compounding every problem which it was supposed to solve. It has prevented a reconsideration of the strategic missions which gave rise to the military requirement. Rather than create a structure to heal the rift in the Alliance, the MLF is likely to multiply divisions.

French policy has chosen to make the MLF a symbol of its disagreements with the United States. All over Europe--and especially in the Federal Republic--Gaullist and American factions have begun to struggle over the symbol of the MLF. While this conflict has always been latent, it would not have crystallized so rapidly (or at all) if it were not for the pressure created by the MLF. French policy could not by itself have forced this decision. If, as a result, impetus toward European unity should be lost or if Franco-German relations should deteriorate further, many even among those now paying lip service to the MLF may turn against us.

To be sure, France cannot be given a veto over every measure to strengthen the Alliance. But Franco-German friendship so painfully achieved should be hazarded only for a great gain. Before embarking on a collision course, we should be sure that a disputed scheme commands wide support and that it will in fact bring about a structure which enhances the long-term vitality of the Alliance.

There is reason to doubt that the MLF meets either of these conditions. Though the proponents of the MLF have tended to blame all objections on the manipulations of shortsighted men, the opposition of France, Belgium and

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the Secretary-General of NATO, the indifference of most other NATO allies and the split within the Federal Republic cannot be simply shrugged off. Outside of the Federal Republic there is not a single country whose agreement to the MLF represents *something* more than acquiescence to American pressure.

Proponents of the MLF often compare their project to the Schumann Plan which despite heavy initial criticism laid the basis for European economic integration. Unfortunately while many constructive innovations have had to withstand criticism when first proposed, not everything that is criticized is necessarily constructive. The Schumann Plan promoted Franco-German cooperation in areas where long-term interests were parallel. The longer the Coal and Steel Community lasted, the more obvious grew the benefits of common action.

The opposite is likely to be the case with the MLF. Once established, the conflicting motives of the participants will become increasingly apparent. There is a latent difference of opinion between the Federal Republic and the United States and Great Britain about the size of the force as well as about its composition, specifically about whether land-based missiles should supplement the sea-based MLF. It is likely that the Federal Republic regards the MLF as a first installment in meeting SACEUR's MRBM requirement while the United States and Britain considers it a final satisfaction of existing needs. Though this will not become apparent in the early stages of the project, it is bound to lead to difficulties later on.

*continued on page 31a*

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Another potential dispute derives from the fact that the Federal Republic favors the Multilateral Force partly to increase its share of nuclear control. Most other countries--especially Great Britain--participate in order to prevent an increase of German control. This difference too can be obscured in the early stages of the MLF; it, too, will become more and more acute as time goes on.

continued on page 32

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Yet another cause of dissension will be the continued existence of national nuclear forces. If possession of nuclear weapons is in fact a sign of equal status, the MLF will not end discrimination against the Federal Republic unless Britain and France renounce their nuclear programs. But if German pressures in this direction are added to those of the United States a very unfortunate reaction could occur.

Finally, an extremely divisive debate in the Federal Republic can be avoided only if the MLF treaty contains a "European" clause providing for the possibility of transforming the MLF into a European nuclear force once European political integration is further advanced. The Italian government (whose Parliamentary support for the MLF is dubious in any event) has taken a similar position. Great Britain, on the other hand, will not agree to such a prospect; indeed its participation in any new nuclear arrangement is conditional on a British veto over any structural changes. It is one thing to create an institution whose evolution is likely to strengthen common objectives; it is quite another to stake so much on a device where conflicting interests have been kept from becoming obvious only by avoiding a consideration of the key issues.

The MLF may therefore strengthen the very tendencies it seeks to combat. For in its advocacy of the MLF, the United States has granted almost all of the propositions of its European critics. It has agreed that possession of nuclear weapons is a criterion of equality. It has granted that ownership of some strategic forces is essential for participation in strategic planning and political decisions. It has admitted that influence in the Alliance somehow depends on access to a strategic nuclear arsenal.

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It has differed only about the nature of ownership and the way control should be exercised. But since the control procedures of the MLF patently favor United States hegemony, they can be used by the nationalists and extremists as a proof of American duplicity. If the Federal Republic finds itself at odds with the United States about control, or with its other allies about the evolution of the force, a serious backlash could develop.

Advocates of the MLF often argue that it is easy to pick holes in any existing nuclear control plan but much harder to offer a constructive alternative. To be sure if the issue of nuclear control is, in fact, the cause of Allied tensions, the MLF proponents have a point. However, the issue of nuclear control is a symptom, not a cause of NATO's difficulties. There exists no neat solution for it as long as NATO is composed of sovereign states. Nor does the MLF "solve" it. The basic problem in the Alliance is political and not strategic. There is something incongruous about the absorption in technicalities of mixed manning while the West lacks a common policy toward the Communist world, flounders dividedly in the former colonial areas, and has yet to concert a strategic doctrine. To devote so much energy to the problem of who pushes the button in the remote contingency of nuclear war, while neglecting the issues which confront the Alliance daily, comes close to being escapism. The imagination and dedication expended on the MLF would have been better spent in creating structures to assure each ally that its interests will be taken seriously not only during the improbable eventuality of general nuclear war but during the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy and in crisis situations.

Insofar as the German conversion to the MLF was not the result of American

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missionary zeal, it reflected above all a desire to establish a claim not to be excluded from further East-West negotiations.

The MLF is at best a circuitous way to achieve this result. American policy would have been better advised to have worked directly for an Atlantic political structure. It would have been wiser to set up a body to develop common policies for the many unsolved problems of the Alliance in East-West relations, strategic doctrine, trade policy, arms control or relations with the emerging nations. If France had refused to participate, the disruptive intent would have been obvious. France would have stood aside from an effort which commanded a real consensus. Moreover, it would have been much easier for a later French government to join such a group than the MLF where eventual French participation could easily be precluded by financial considerations alone. If such a group had then decided that some way must be found to relate the Federal Republic to the ownership of strategic weapons, the political context would have been entirely different. It would have represented the common view of all allies rather than the pressure of one. Regardless of the ultimate fate of the MLF, a political body to coordinate Alliance policy and to manage crises remains essential.

The MLF, as originally conceived, is not likely to be realized. Too much opposition exists so that even the most passionate advocates will have to modify the scheme. It may be useful, however, to inquire what lessons can be drawn from the experience.

21

For an elaboration of such a policy-making body, see below
Chapter VIII.

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The most important lesson is to avoid solving political problems with technical expedients. Confronted with a political and philosophical challenge in De Gaulle's exclusion of Britain from the Common Market, American policymakers reacted by solving everything on a scheme of nuclear control about which they had previously been lukewarm. They then spent two years negotiating its mechanical aspects. In the process the deeper causes of NATO's disarray were neglected. The ends and means became confused. ~~The original timetable of the MLF had been maintained, which would only have shifted disputes to a new forum.~~

De Gaulle's question had been addressed to a future ten or fifteen years hence. The American response was in terms of a technical expedient to an immediate dispute which commanded no real support outside of Washington and Bonn and which largely avoided the fundamental political issues. At its best, the MLF was irrelevant to the deepest problems of NATO. It would have repeated within its framework many of the disputes which it was supposed to overcome.

In Washington, this was obscured because one group in the government had become so deeply committed to the MLF that it acted as a lobbyist rather than an organ for calmly weighing alternatives. This has made it difficult to determine whether what was represented as European views did not really reflect European acquiescence in the passionate advocacy of one segment of our bureaucracy. The result was a whole series of misjudgments. European support for the MLF has been grossly overestimated. Despite the repeated criticisms of the MLF by British Labor leaders when in opposition, it was expected that the new British government would agree to a treaty setting up

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the MLF within two months of coming into office. The divisive impact of the threat of a German-American nuclear partnership was misjudged. Throughout, some American officials acted as if selling the MLF was an end in itself: By using whatever argument was convenient to this purpose a whole list of partially inconsistent promissory notes have been handed out. Sooner or later, some of these may fall due.

The pressure of a relatively small group of officials in the State Department gave an impression to our allies of a monolithic American point of view which was misleading. The Pentagon had accepted the MLF only on the assumption that ultimate American control would remain unimpaired. The group in the State Department which originated the MLF proposal and pressed it on our allies was much more sympathetic to the ultimate emergence of a separate European nuclear force. Indeed, it occasionally urged the MLF as a means to this end. Although the cohesiveness of our society depends on understating conflicting views, it is dangerous to engage in major international innovations unless we are clear about our ultimate direction.

All of this suggests the need for a re-examination of some governmental procedures. There is required a focus for planning less geared to immediate crises and more capable of developing concepts responsive to fundamental trends. There should be less reliance on the accidents of bureaucratic pressures. Some means must be found to chart a clear course before we commit our prestige rather than use the process of negotiations to clarify our views. Not to reveal what we intend is a question of tactics; not to know is to mortgage the future.

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Fortunately, partly because of the initiative of the new British government, partly because of President Johnson's removal of previous time limits, an opportunity exists to take a new approach to the MLF project. The British proposal for an Allied Nuclear Force has the dual advantage of relating existing nuclear forces to each other and of reducing the relative importance of the mixed-manned element. Both of these objectives are desirable. The MLF hides so many contradictions and evasions that it cannot be the keystone of NATO. A new approach to the nuclear issue would enable the Alliance to reconsider its priorities. The Alliance should begin with a definition of political needs and then develop strategic devices to serve these rather than the other way around.

President Johnson has wisely reduced the pressures for the original MLF project and has thus smoothed the way for a new study of the entire problem. In this reassessment, we must, of course, keep in mind that in many countries, notably in the Federal Republic, leaders have staked their careers on our previous proposals. Though another approach to the issue of nuclear control would have been preferable, future policy must consider that simply abandoning the MLF now would have a different significance than earlier. Moreover, some of the objectives which the MLF has sought to realize are important. For example, the goal of political equality for all members of the Alliance is crucial. Means must be found to satisfy those objectives of the MLF project which are essential to Allied cohesion. The controversy about the MLF will have served some useful purpose if it

22

For a fuller description of the British proposal, see below
Chapter VI.

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permits the Alliance to return to fundamentals: the definition of
common purposes and an answer to the question of what the members of
the Alliance really want in the nuclear field.

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# CHAPTER VI

## THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM - WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

### A. Strategic Weapons

Each of our allies has two somewhat contradictory aims in its NATO nuclear policy: It wants to prevent being forced into nuclear war against its will, and it wants to be sure of our nuclear support when its vital interests are at stake.

What our allies understand by nuclear support is less clear. They want the *appearance* of nuclear support so that the Soviets never challenge their vital interests. Whether they are actually prepared to face the consequences of nuclear war is ambiguous. Their tendency to base NATO's military policy entirely on deterrence suggests, that many allies might be above all concerned with their veto if nuclear war seemed imminent. They may be more interested in not being forced into nuclear war against their will than in being able to force us into a nuclear war against our will.

Whatever the real motives of our allies, their two incompatible goals highlight the dilemma of a coalition of sovereign states. If no conflict of interests were conceivable, the concern with either veto or triggering ability would not exist. But as a sovereign state is the final judge of its interests, absolute reassurance is unobtainable. No one can predict with certainty how hard-pressed leaders will react under the unprecedented stresses of imminent nuclear war--not only with respect to the decision to use nuclear weapons but also with respect to the many nuances of bargaining during crises. The jealousy with which the United States has heretofore guarded its

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freedom of decision is as significant a symptom of this dilemma as France's excessive claims to independence.

American proposals--including the MLF--have largely avoided this problem. The United States, starting from the technically unexceptionable premise that the conduct of nuclear war is indivisible, has striven to create a structure in NATO which makes it physically impossible for other nations to act independently. We have been less ready to face the inevitable rejoinder: Those nations which are being asked to entrust their nuclear defense to the United States will insist, in return, on a common world-wide diplomacy and a voice in the management of the *entire* strategic forces of the United States. This has been the thrust of the proposals of the British Labor Party.

France, on the other hand, has expressed the implications of sovereignty clearly and correctly, but it has neglected the technical requirements of nuclear strategy. In the face of the risks of a nuclear holocaust, no country can have complete freedom of decision--least of all a nation with a nuclear force strong enough to start a nuclear war but far too weak to finish it. Where the United States has overemphasized the technical aspects of central command and control, France and those Europeans agreeing with her have pushed the legal implications of sovereignty to a point where they clash with the technical realities of the nuclear age.

This *impose* reflects above all a difference in perspective between us and some of our European allies. We tend to discuss the nuclear role of our

1

Patrick Gordon Walker, "The Labor Party's Defense and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (April 1964), pp. 391-8. The proposals of the new British Labor government tend in the same direction.

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allies in terms of military operations. Our allies are more concerned with obtaining some insurance against the unexpected contingencies in which their history abounds. When we ask our allies to justify their nuclear programs in terms of systems analysis we evoke an inherently misleading reply. It forces them to project a remote nightmare into the present; they describe the collapse of the Alliance against which they want to guard as if it were already taking place. We in turn confuse their fears with their wishes. The ensuing recrimination is usually more conducive to righteousness than to constructive thought.

We react bitterly when Europeans suggest that no one can foresee how even the most solemn commitments will be interpreted over a period of time and in the stark circumstances of a nuclear showdown. But when we argue against the nuclear forces of Britain and France, we seem to understand this problem very well. Then we have a tendency to act as the spokesmen of the non-nuclear countries of NATO with many of the arguments the nuclear European allies use against us and to generate suspicions where none had been articulated before. Thus J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, explained why even a joint Franco-British nuclear force which shared command and control responsibilities with other European countries would still not meet the need as he saw it:

> [An agreed European control mechanism] would still not answer the basic question of these non-nuclear countries: In the moment of crisis would the nuclear powers of the arrangement --the powers which owned and operated the nuclear forces--in fact consult and collaborate on an equal basis with their associate members?

2

J. Robert Schaetzel, "The Nuclear Problem and Atlantic Interdependence," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1963-64), pp. 565-566.

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Carrying Schachzel's argument one step further, it may be relevant to ask why if our European allies cannot rely upon formal commitments among themselves, they should have absolute trust in the United States which is three thousand miles away and has a recent history of isolation.

But the real issue goes deeper. Europeans live on a continent covered with ruins testifying to the fallibility of human foresight. They have had too much experience with the nuances of interpretation that can all but nullify formal commitments not to want to reserve some control over their destiny. In this century each of them has seen alliances disintegrate; indeed each of our partners has had to leave some ally to his fate at some point. The concern for a European role in nuclear affairs expresses above all a desire to obtain a measure of insurance against the unforeseeable in history.

The nuclear programs existing in Europe reflect this state of mind. The British program is a vestige of a period when it was considered axiomatic that a great power should possess all categories of weapons under its own control. For the greater part of its existence, it had the support of both major political parties. The French program is in effect a research and development effort. Its role is similar to that of the American army before World War II: to provide a base for expansion and a possibility for acquiring technical competence. In an age where nuclear technology has already spread to countries certain to pursue anti-Western policies, it is not self-evident that the American effort to prevent nuclear proliferation should begin with an attempt to wreck the modest programs of our oldest allies.

From the point of view of the conduct of a general war, the United States insistence on central control over nuclear weapons is <u>unexceptionable</u>.

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But from the point of view of deterrence, of the conduct of diplomacy, and of keeping open some options for the future, a measure of European autonomy in nuclear matters makes a great deal of sense. The American schemes for nuclear control increase military efficiency. They add nothing to deterrence because their multiple vetoes include our own. And while they increase our partner's know-how of nuclear matters, they reduce incentives for a real assumption of responsibilities.

The issue then is to what contingencies the Alliance should gear its efforts: the conduct of a general war or the diplomacy preceding it. If the primary problem is to guarantee integrated strategic operations, the United States approach has much to commend it. If the primary problem is to discourage nuclear blackmail against Europe either while the United States is engaged elsewhere or as the result of crises originating in Europe, some autonomy in nuclear matters for Europe is preferable.

Many influential Americans resist this conclusion. They consider European autonomy--either in the form of the existing national nuclear forces or of a European nuclear force--divisive and dangerous. However, it is likely that nuclear autonomy is the least divisive form of European self-assertion. In the economic field, competition between Europe and the United States involves at best indirect risks. In the political arena, the temptations for independent action are great and the penalties small. In military matters--and particularly in the nuclear field--all the pressure of self-interest and technology provide incentives for the closest association between Europe and the United States. Whatever the degree of their formal autonomy, it is inconceivable that our allies could *prefer* to go to war with the relatively small nuclear forces available to them and *without* the support of our necessarily

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preponderant arsenal. American fears that a European nuclear force--or even the existing national forces--may involve us in a war against our will are therefore highly theoretical. The notion that the French nuclear force of less than a hundred delivery vehicles could be seriously considered as an alternative to our arsenal of thousands is to give little credit to the ability of our allies to perceive their own interests. It is to carry logical extrapolations to doctrinaire extremes. The French and British nuclear programs are a hedge against a disastrous contingency, not a strategic preference. Taking out fire insurance does not indicate a liking for fires. On the contrary, it may prevent a remote possibility from turning into an obsession and thus free energies for more constructive tasks.

Some American policymakers grant that a united Europe with a single political head capable of making decisions should be conceded nuclear autonomy. They reject such a role for the nuclear forces of Great Britain and France. But history cannot be forced to conform to theoretical blueprints. A single political head for Europe is unthinkable during the next decade. Thus the practical consequence of the American point of view is that American policy seeks to eliminate those elements of European nuclear autonomy which now exist and from which a European identity might eventually emerge. This effort is futile because neither France nor Britain have shown any willingness to abandon their nuclear programs. It forces France into theoretical justifications which assume the end of the Alliance and absorbs energies in scholastic disputes with Britain over the significance of such terms as "assignment" and "irrevocable." It has already led us to elaborate the MLF which in the name of thwarting the existing nuclear programs in Europe brings a whole host of presently non-nuclear countries into the nuclear field. Even if

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we accomplished our objective of wrecking the British and French nuclear programs, the result is more likely to be complete abdication of these allies from the field of defense than a concentration in the categories of weapons which we prefer. Have we thought through the implications of a world in which we alone must defend all the perimeters? Would it not be wiser to build on existing structures than to smash them so that we can realize an abstract and ideal model?

This is not to say that we should encourage a European nuclear force or that we should urge Britain or France to stay in the nuclear field should they decide to leave it--indeed the United States should in general show more restraint about the internal arrangements of Europe and concentrate its efforts on Atlantic relationships. It does mean that we should not use our influence to destroy those elements from which a European force could emerge in favor of alternatives--such as the MLF--which will eventually cause much greater difficulties. The notion that our own security requires opposition to the British and French nuclear programs, lest we be forced into a nuclear war against our will, seems based on a grave misapprehension. France and Great Britain must know at least as well as we--though we can hardly expect them to advertise this fact--that using their nuclear forces independently against the Soviet Union would be a desperate last resort. Whatever they may say publicly, they undoubtedly think of their nuclear forces much as Sweden and Switzerland think of their armies. Neither country is able to withstand a full-scale attack by a major nuclear power. Both have built military forces to give them the ability-when all else fails--to pose risks that an aggressor may consider out of proportion to the objectives to be achieved.

For this limited task, the British and French nuclear forces are not so ineffective as we sometimes insist. The ratio of the combined British

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and French forces to those of the Soviet Union is more favorable than was
that of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States in the Fifties. Despite
the overwhelming strategic superiority of the United States, no one would
maintain that the Soviet strategic force had no deterrent value. Moreover,
the issue of peace and war rarely arises in clear-cut terms. There are
many intermediate stages in which a country's bargaining position depends on
the risks to which it can expose an aggressor. To some of our European
allies, it appears that even a small nuclear force can contribute to this
bargaining process.

Of course, the Soviets could launch a pre-emptive blow at the bases
of European nuclear forces. However, such a course would be extraordinarily
risky. As long as the NATO treaty retains any validity, it would be
extremely foolhardy for the Soviets to make a full-scale nuclear attack on
Europe without taking into account the near certainty of American involvement.
European nuclear forces should not be viewed as an alternative to United
States strategic power, but as a complement. Close coordination is dictated
by self-interest; and Europeans have even more to gain from it than the
United States.

It is high time, therefore, to stop investing American prestige in
the essentially sterile effort to force our allies into a structure which
makes autonomous action physically impossible. The far wiser course is to
create a relationship which while granting autonomy reduces the desire for
it. American policy should use its ingenuity in a new and systematic
effort to develop a common strategy which puts the existing nuclear forces
in the service of an agreed conception. There should be less concern over
such theoretical problems as whether this arrangement is to be labelled

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"assignment," "integration" or "coordination" and a greater willingness to treat the existing nuclear programs of our allies less as legitimate parts of a common NATO strategy. It makes no sense to bring presently non-nuclear countries into the nuclear field--as the MLF seeks to do--if no common strategy can be developed with the allies now possessing nuclear weapons.

Any rearrangement of nuclear forces in the Alliance should therefore begin with the forces which exist and attempt to devise a common doctrine for their use. The initial negotiations should be conducted by the three nuclear countries within NATO--the United States, Great Britain and France--together with the Federal Republic as the most exposed ally and the one making the largest conventional contribution. This group--which could eventually be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council--should begin with a definition of the missions to be performed by the strategic forces of the Alliance. Only then can a meaningful decision be made whether a new strategic element--like the MLF--makes strategic sense. This seems to be the thrust of the proposals made by the British government in their scheme for an Allied Nuclear Force.

Will an attempt to base NATO nuclear strategy on the existing nuclear forces with the Federal Republic sharing equally in strategic planning meet German desires? After two years of being told by American policymakers what their ultimate wishes might be, it is doubtful whether even the Germans know what their actual desires are. Not the least useful aspect of beginning a negotiation with a consideration of strategic doctrine is that it gives all

3

See below Chapter VIII, p..

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partners an opportunity to become clear about their actual priorities.
For example, if the main interest of the Federal Republic in the MLF
is to obtain a voice in eventual East-West negotiations, it should be
possible to achieve this objective by less divisive and more direct methods.
If the real German aim is to participate in joint strategic planning, an
effort should be made to determine whether a major German role in the
targeting and deployment of existing nuclear forces might not fill the need.

But how about the discrimination inherent in the continued existence
of national nuclear forces--even if they are assigned "irrevocably" to
NATO--as Britain has proposed? Would this not place the Federal Republic
in the position of a second-class ally? It has been argued, for example,
that unless Germany obtains exactly the same status in the nuclear field
as Britain and France, its loyalty to the Alliance might be shaken. But is
this really true? Is it wise to encourage even the implication that the
German commitment to the Alliance depends on access to nuclear weapons?
There are enough responsible people in the Federal Republic to understand
that failure to obtain access to ownership of nuclear weapons is a very
small price to pay for the legacy of the past generation. This is all the
more true because in the proposed Allied Nuclear Force,
the Federal Republic would possess the same vote in the control body as
the European nuclear countries.

Some argue that an Allied Nuclear Force composed of national
contingents contains no assurance that these forces will not be withdrawn in
a crisis. The British government has sought to get around this problem by
offering to assign its strategic forces "irrevocably" to NATO. But it

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seems futile to devote energies to terminological quibbles about the meaning of such phrases as "assignment" and "irrevocable." No sovereign government is going to be forced into war against its will--whatever the arrangement of nuclear forces, whether it is the Allied Nuclear Force or the MLF. In any situation where Britain is prepared to wreck NATO, it could also break the additional commitment inherent in "irrevocable assignment." In other words, the Allied Nuclear Force is no protection against situations where the Alliance has already collapsed. Neither is the MLF which could be paralyzed by a veto of each ally. There is no technical or legal expedient which can serve as a substitute for political unity or which could protect the Alliance against failure to achieve it.

Chancellor Adenauer's original instinct was undoubtedly correct.

The Federal Republic has every claim to political equality. Participation in vital negotiations should not depend on the possession of a national nuclear arsenal. But it is a dangerous fiction to pretend that NATO policy must be geared to preventing the Federal Republic from acquiring its own nuclear weapons or, that a national nuclear weapons program depends on a unilateral German decision. Neither the international system nor the Atlantic Alliance could stand the strain of a German national nuclear program and it is high time that all parties concerned face this fact.

What would be the mission of an Allied Nuclear Force drawn from national contingents? It would appear that its most useful role would be deep interdiction, say, from a distance of some three hundred miles behind the combat zone. It would be important to recognize, however, that effective counterforce operations against several hundred MRBM's are unlikely. Whatever

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its targets, the Allied Nuclear Force should be so designed that it is
able to conduct discriminating nuclear operations according to the
principles of "flexible response."

All the weapons suitable for its mission should become part of the
Allied Nuclear Force. It should include major portions of the British
and French national forces, and a comparable contingent of American
strategic weapons, probably in the form of Polaris submarines. The
longer range nuclear weapons now in Europe, such as the Pershing missiles
and the F-104 airplanes, which are now under the double-veto system, should
also be assigned to this force. Political control should be exercised
by the NATO Executive Committee to be described below.

With respect to the MLF, the best course would be to admit frankly
that it was a mistake and to satisfy German desires by improving the
process of political consultation and by an equal role in the control of
the Allied Nuclear Force. But if it appears that the German desire for
access to ownership of nuclear weapons has been so stimulated as to be
irreversible, we may feel honor-bound to proceed with some form of mixed-manned
element as a part of the Allied Nuclear Force. However, in that case, the
purpose and size of the MLF should be redefined.

In the context of an Allied Nuclear Force, the previous extravagant
claims for the MLF could be abandoned. It would no longer by the central
focus of United States nuclear policy. There would be no need for American

4

See Chapter VIII, p.

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(or German) pressure on reluctant allies to join. The decision would not be a test of friendship for the United States, but an individual judgment of the various governments. The size of the mixed-manned force should be reduced to become consistent with the mission to be assigned to the Allied Nuclear Force.

In its original conception, one of the purposes of the MLF was to dwarf the British and French nuclear programs and thus cause them to appear irrelevant. The MLF was expected to emerge as the chief instrument of Allied nuclear policy. But this concept in turn raised fears of German pre-eminence in the nuclear field. Our European allies would be much less uneasy if the mixed-manned element were scaled down so that it was simply one component of a larger force.

The Allied Nuclear Force could be placed under SACEUR. However, it seems wiser to have SACEUR concentrate on the land battle and to create a distinct NATO Strategic Command. This would provide a "firebreak" in the command structure and closer political control of the decision to engage in deep penetration of hostile territory. The purpose would be to group all the weapons--European and American--relevant to the European portion of general nuclear war. Tactical nuclear weapons of ranges up to three hundred miles would remain under SACEUR.

In bringing such a force into being the United States has obvious interests in ensuring that its European components meet certain criteria. The following seem most important: (a) European forces should be well protected so that they do not invite pre-emptive attack or have to be used precipitately because of their vulnerability. (b) These forces should possess an effective command and control system so that they are at all

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times responsive to political direction. (c) They should be a part
of a strategy that includes the possibility of flexible response.

(d) They should be coordinated as part of a common NATO strategy.

Some European allies will undoubtedly object to the creation of
a separate NATO Nuclear Strategic Command. They will see such a command
as the first step toward nuclear disengagement. These allies seem to
feel that since SACEUR is located in Europe, he will be more sensitive to
European needs than the President in Washington. But such attitudes are
not healthy in the long run.

SACEUR's primary responsibility should be the land-battle; he
should not be burdened with military or political missions irrelevant
to that important and complicated task. From a military point of view,
operations that involve large sections of Soviet territory cannot be
conducted as an adjunct to ground operations in Europe. SACEUR does not
have sufficient information about the over-all strategic context; he will
be too preoccupied with conditions within the European theater of operations.
Deep penetrations of Soviet territory should be conducted only as part
of an over-all concept of general nuclear war. A NATO Strategic Command
could be closely coordinated with SAC; its mission would be to conduct
the portion of general nuclear war affecting Europe directly.

From a political point of view, the notion that unfavorable arms control
measures can best be prevented by freezing the existing NATO command
structure demonstrates the need within the Alliance for a focal point to

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develop common political objectives. The issue of arms control in Central Europe has been before the Alliance for many years. It has been evaded because some allies have been reluctant to express their fears and others have been loath to voice their hopes. Such an attitude makes the Alliance the prisoner of events. The absence of a consensus guarantees that the issue will always arise at a moment of maximum embarrassment. Decisions will be taken by subterfuge and under stress. Distrust will grow. SACEUR cannot possibly be used to paper over this problem indefinitely. Its solution must be sought by developing a common political program for the Alliance as a whole.

Within the framework of a newly created NATO Strategic Command and a corresponding political control body, the Alliance could finally address itself to the tasks which must be undertaken rather than spend energy on legalistic debates about who has a right to do what in contingencies that no one can describe. With some insurance available for the improbable contingency that the United States might interpret its interest differently from those of Europe, our allies are likely to come to conclusions very similar to ours about the desirability of a strategy of multiple options.

Such a system would be more flexible than the MLF. It would give the strategic forces existing in the Alliance a clearly defined mission. It would create a structure which France could ultimately join if not under its present government, certainly under its successor. The United States would sacrifice a measure of physical control as compared to the MLF, but the Alliance as a whole would gain in political cohesion. Moreover, such an arrangement forecloses the fewest options for the future. If

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European political union progresses, the European contingents in the Allied Nuclear Force can merge into a European nuclear force. If desired by the European members, the Western European Union could be given official status in the Allied Nuclear Force from the beginning as the focus for the European vote of the arrangements. If integration proceeds more slowly the major allies can play a role individually in the planning of the Allied Nuclear Force. In either case, the United States will remain closely linked to Europe in a structure the European component of which can develop under its own initiative. An Allied Nuclear Force in which an American contingent is an integral part and which controlled all the weapons relevant to its mission would be a better symbol for the indivisibility of Atlantic interests than an MLF whose strategic role would be, at best, marginal.

To bring about this result a change in attitude is required on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States would have to abandon its futile insistence on physically controlling all the nuclear weapons in the Alliance. Our allies would have to stop arguing the theoretical virtues of autonomy and begin dealing with the problem of how autonomous nuclear forces can achieve a coordinated strategy. We have often been dogmatic in defending the theoretical virtues of "integration." But our allies--especially France--bear a heavy responsibility for the current state of affairs because they have never spelled out concretely what they mean by their alternative of coordination. While sensitive to their own needs, our nuclear allies have not always shown an equal sense of responsibility for the requirements of their own non-nuclear partners.

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Finally, we should realize that the threat of withdrawing from Europe
in order to obtain our preferred strategic arrangement is both dangerous
and empty. It is dangerous because it indicates that our commitment
is conditional; and it is empty because we can no more withdraw from
Europe than from Alaska. This is what makes relationships within the
Alliance so intractable. But it also insures that disputes about the
right of independent action in the nuclear field are acute only when
they are theoretical. Any crisis serious enough to cause the allies to
consider the use of nuclear weapons is also likely to reveal the
underlying community of interest. It is this community rather than
American physical predominance which is the best guarantee of the
cohesion of the Alliance.

B. Tactical Nuclear Weapons.

One of the consequences of the obsession with the MLF has been that
many issues requiring urgent attention have been swept under the rug in
order to maintain the momentum behind the Multilateral Force. One of
these problems concerns the role and control of tactical nuclear weapons.

Tactical nuclear weapons have had a checkered history in NATO
strategy. They were first introduced into the NATO arsenal in the middle
Fifties in order to offset what was then believed to be a permanent
numerical superiority of Soviet manpower. As a result, thousands of nuclear
weapons were shipped into Europe. They included almost everything from
artillery pieces with ranges of about fifteen miles to Pershing missiles
with ranges up to 700 miles (in the improved versions). The term tactical
was defined to include all weapons placed under the authority of SACEUR

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even though the consequences of some of the longer-range weapons would be indistinguishable from those controlled by SAC. From its beginning, the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent raised formidable problems of coordination which were obscured only because the dominant American strategic doctrine predicted that any nuclear war was likely to be massive and all-out.

The advent of the Kennedy Administration in 1961 changed this state of affairs. Committed to a strategy of multiple options, the new Administration began to look at the nuclear establishment on the Continent from the point of view of its suitability for discriminating military operations. Its conclusions were sceptical: Early in the Kennedy Administration, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric rejected the notion of tactical nuclear war with the argument that it was impossible to build any limit into a nuclear war. 5 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain Enthoven has insisted that once the dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons is crossed, no obvious "firebreak" exists short of large-scale thermonuclear war. 6 Secretary McNamara has spoken deprecatingly of a limited nuclear war short of some "ill-defined threshold of strategic exchange." 7 These views were given urgency by the problem of exercising political control over the nuclear weapons stationed on the continent.

5 Roswell L. Gilpatric, Press Conference on June 6, 1961, New York Times, June 7, 1961.

6 Alain Enthoven, "American Deterrent Policy," Survival. Vol. V, No. 3 (May-June 1963), p. 96.

7 Robert S. McNamara, "Major National Security Problems Confronting the United States," speech made before the Economics Club of New York, New York City, November 18, 1963, DOSE, Vol. XLIX, No. 1277 (December 16, 1963), p. 917.

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Controlling a few hundred strategic weapons during military operations is difficult but soluble. Controlling thousands of weapons of many different ranges and characteristics in the confusion of combat is another matter.

At the same time, even though it has been sceptical about the utility of much of the tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe, the Administration has muted its doubts in order not to complicate further the disputes over the role of the conventional weapons and the MLF. Indeed, tactical nuclear weapons have been used as a means to reassure the Europeans about the continued validity of our nuclear guarantee and to ensure German support for the MLF. As a result, the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent has been substantially increased since 1961--by some sixty per cent according to Secretary McNamara's announcements. The thousands of nuclear weapons on the Continent thus exist in a shadow-land. To our allies they have become a touchstone of the American commitment while American planners regard them with extraordinary ambivalence. To build up the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent without clarifying its mission would seem to combine the worst feature of all available options.

The question whether so much reliance should have been placed on tactical nuclear weapons ten years ago must not obscure the need to deal with the current situation which is dominated by the following facts:
(1) On the Continent there exists a large and growing arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons without a clearly defined mission to which all allies agree. The United States is solemnly committed to maintain this arsenal in

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Europe. (2) The Soviet army is equipped with tactical nuclear weapons; therefore, the decision to use nuclear weapons is no longer entirely up to the West. (3) NATO ground forces are inadequate to withstand a full-scale Soviet onslaught. Even the proposed build-up of NATO ground forces to thirty divisions would leave the West numerically inferior to a fully mobilized Soviet army--and this does not take into account the inevitable disadvantage of a coalition against a single state. If NATO doctrine leaves a gap between strategic and conventional war, European uneasiness is likely to mount and the issue of nuclear control will grow acute with respect to tactical nuclear weapons. (4) The tactical nuclear establishment in Europe is extremely vulnerable. Because strategic weapons are relatively secure, fears that they will tempt a disarming, pre-emptive blow are usually exaggerated. But the classic pre-emptive situation does exist with respect to the tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe. As now deployed it is capable of inflicting severe damage; it is, in turn, highly vulnerable to a first strike. This may well add to the deterrence; at the same time, it increases the probability of escalation should war occur.

There exists yet another inconsistency between our military deployment and our strategic doctrine: Pentagon officials have indicated a clear preference for resisting even a major Soviet attack by conventional weapons. At the same time, they have announced repeatedly that we would not accept a conventional defeat without resorting to the use of tactical nuclear weapons at least. Considering the extreme vulnerability of the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent and the fact that the Soviets would

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not attack without expecting to win, these two propositions tend to cancel each other out. **If** there is a large-scale attack--an admittedly improbable contingency--the Soviets have every incentive to extend it to NATO's tactical nuclear arsenal.

All of this suggests that it is imperative to reconsider the mission and deployment of the tactical nuclear arsenal on the Continent. Some argue that all nuclear missions--including the so-called tactical ones--can be performed by the strategic forces which are more easily controlled and more suitable for discriminating operations. They maintain that any use of nuclear weapons would bring about so much confusion as to make the situation in the combat zone appear to be relatively unimportant. Finally, some officials have implied that the nuclear arsenal in Europe is militarily unnecessary. Secretary McNamara has on occasion seemed to share this view. For example:

> There is no question but, today our strategic retaliatory forces of bombers, missiles and Polaris are fully capable of destroying Soviet targets, even after absorbing an initial nuclear surprise attack. Allowing for losses from an initial enemy attack we calculate that our forces would destroy virtually all Soviet targets without any hope from deployed tactical air units or carrier task forces which, of course, have the capability of attacking these targets with nuclear weapons.⁸

In a way, of course, such arguments are academic. In view of the evolution of NATO doctrine and our solemn commitments, any attempt to abandon the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent altogether would have

8

Robert S. McNamara,

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drastic political consequences. Moreover, there are at least three reasons for questioning the view that all tactical missions can be performed by strategic forces: (a) the probability of uncontrolled escalation if battlefield weapons are used; (b) the suitability of strategic forces for tactical operations; and (c) the feasibility of conducting nuclear operations confined to a battlefield.

Escalation has two aspects: escalation within the theater of operations and escalation into general war. As long as NATO's tactical nuclear establishment is so vulnerable, the danger of escalation of any military operations within Europe is enormous even if military operations begin with conventional weapons. The precondition of any effective use of tactical nuclear weapons--as of strategic weapons--is to enhance their invulnerability.

The probability of escalation to general war depends on the vulnerability of the opposing retaliatory forces. If the strategic forces are extremely vulnerable, any use of nuclear weapons is likely to escalate very rapidly. In that case, any large-scale military operation--even a conventional one--in an area as vital as Europe would involve risks out of proportion to any conceivable gain. In short, the original basis for the doctrine of massive retaliation will exist.

Under the conditions of increasing invulnerability of retaliatory forces, which Secretary McNamara has postulated, the pressures against

9

See below, p.

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rapid escalation would seem to be considerable. There may be no *logical* stopping place once nuclear weapons are being used. There is, however, a very crucial *psychological* obstacle to automatic escalation. When mutual invulnerability guarantees catastrophic destruction and offers no prospect of great military advantage, neither side can be very eager to let escalation proceed automatically. Both sides are likely to look for excuses to limit not to expand military operations.

This is not to say that in case of a full-scale Soviet attack on Europe our response should be confined to battlefield weapons. On the contrary, there are important political reasons for making sure that the Soviets are under no misapprehension that a full-scale attack on Europe could be confined to Europe. If the Soviets have shown a willingness to conquer Europe, the war is by definition no longer local. It cannot end with the *status quo ante*. At a minimum, there must be guarantees against a recurrence of the attack. Moreover, if the Soviets come to believe that as a result of an attack on Europe their territory would be spared but we would devastate Germany by confining the use of nuclear weapons to the combat zone, they may have an incentive for aggression. Such a strategy, even if it succeeded in stopping the aggression, would eliminate Germany as a factor in international politics; it would guarantee that any other threatened country would surrender.

Nevertheless, even though a full-scale attack on Europe would inevitably bring the strategic forces into play, there is a problem of relating their action to local operations. Strategic forces are not designed to affect a local situation *directly*. Whether used demonstratively,

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punitively, or in discriminating counterforce operations, their purpose
is to force the aggressor into ordering an end to his local attacks, not
to blunt the attacks themselves.

But is it wise to neglect the local outcome entirely? It is at
least possible that once strategic weapons are used, however discriminatingly,
all other considerations could become submerged in the desire to end a
spiral toward ever greater devastation. If the aggressor has made major
advances, the ensuing confusion and panic may well enable him to consolidate
his gains.

This suggests that together with an agreed doctrine for the use of
strategic forces, the Alliance requires a nuclear capability to deny an
aggressor a significant territorial advance. Tactical weapons used fairly
early in the face of a full-scale attack could perform this role. If a
standstill in military operations can be forced, a major objective of the
defense will have been achieved. Aggression would have no object if it
were certain to result in a stalemate.

Thus the nuclear components of NATO must have two aims: (a) they
should be able to force a standstill of the initial onslaught, and (b)
they should be able to inflict sufficient punishment on the aggressor
so that he is forced into negotiations. The aggressor must not believe
that our response will shift all the risks of nuclear devastation to the
victims of aggression. But there must also be a local response capable of
preventing a major *fait accompli* and an attempt to negotiate on the basis
of it.