Helmut Schmidt

Association Jean Monnet
Houjarray

6. Juli 2002

Nachdem wir bisher so viele wichtige Fragen der EU im Detail erörtert haben, möchte ich einige Worte unter dem historischen und dem strategischen Aspekt sagen. Der Mangel an strategischer Erkenntnis und an strategischem Instinkt ist ja einer der mehreren Gründe dafür, daß die gemeinsame deutsch-französische Führung im Prozeß der europäischen Integration seit zwölf Jahren versiegt ist.

Als erstmalig 1946 Winston Churchill in Zürich von den „Vereinigten Staaten von Europa“ gesprochen hat (zu denen er übrigens England keineswegs einbezog) und als er an seine französischen Kriegskameraden appellierte, oder als in jenen Jahren unmittelbar nach dem Kriege Jean Monnet den Schuman-Plan konzipierte, der dann 1950 verkündet wurde, damals waren zwei strategische Motive ausschlaggebend: zum einen die Schaffung eines Bollwerkes gegen den drohenden expansionistischen Imperialismus der Sowjetunion, zum anderen die rechtzeitige Einbindung Deutschlands, von dem man eine ökonomische und politische Wiederherstellung erwarten mußte – damals Westdeutschland, einige 40 Millionen Menschen, die in einen größeren europäischen Zusammenhang eingebunden werden sollten, um eine Fortsetzung jener vielen deutsch-französischen Kriege auszuschließen. Endlich sollte jene seit dem Dreißigjährigen Kriege andauernde Kette der Tragödien abgeschlossen werden, die von Louis XIV und Napoleon über Bismarck und Wilhelm II bis zu Hitler drei Jahrhunderte überspannt hatte.

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Mit dem Zusammenbruch der weit über die eigenen Staatsgrenzen hinausreichenden Sowjet-Macht und dem Ende des kalten Krieges ist das erstgenannte strategische Motiv obsolet geworden, ebenso wie die raison d'être für die Nato. Der Wegfall dieses strategischen Prinzips ist *eine* der Ursachen für den Verfall der deutsch-französischen Entente.

Aber das zweitgenannte strategische Motiv der Einbindung Deutschlands hat infolge der Wiedervereinigung der beiden vorläufigen deutschen Nachkriegsstaaten an Bedeutung noch zugenommen – zumal, nachdem die Vertreibungen von Deutschen aus dem Osten Mitteleuropas heute zu einer niemals vorher gekannten Bevölkerungszahl Deutschlands geführt haben. Nach meiner festen Überzeugung liegt die Einbindung dieses großen Deutschland nicht nur im vitalen Interesse Frankreichs, sondern auch Polens, Hollands usw. – vor allem liegt sie auch im vitalen deutschen Interesse.

Naturgemäß konnte eine auf Kohle und Stahl beschränkte Integration auf die Dauer für die strategischen Zielsetzungen keineswegs ausreichen. Deshalb begann alsbald – unter dem überragenden Einfluß der konzeptionellen Kraft Jean Monnets – der Ausbau in Richtung auf eine Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und auf eine Verteidigungsgemeinschaft. Zwar ist die letztere schon 1954 mit dem Plan Pleven gescheitert, sie wurde durch die Aufnahme Westdeutschlands in die Nato ersetzt. Aber die Idee der Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und eines gemeinsamen Marktes hat sich in Messina in Gestalt der Römischen Verträge 1958 durchgesetzt.

Das Konzept eines die Produkte und die Dienstleistungen aller Wirtschaftszweige umfassenden Marktes – ohne Zölle und ohne

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Grenzen – erwies sich schnell als überaus erfolgreich. Dieser Erfolg wurde zugleich zum Magneten für weitere Staaten. Zwei Jahrzehnte nach dem Schuman-Plan trat England der EWG bei, wahrscheinlich überwiegend wegen der Besorgnis, ansonsten den eigenen Einfluß auf die Gestaltung Europas zu verlieren. Aber für Dänemark und Irland, ebenso dann in den 80er Jahren für Spanien, Portugal und Griechenland, war ausschlaggebend das strategische Motiv des ökonomischen Vorteils. Dieses neue strategische Motiv hat dann in den 90er Jahren zusätzlich den Beitritt Schwedens, Finnlands und Österreichs ausgelöst; es wird im ersten Jahrzehnt des XXI. Jahrhunderts zum Beitritt einer Reihe von Staaten im Osten Europas führen.

Fast alle der heutigen 15 Mitglieds-Nationen blicken auf viele Jahrhunderte nationaler Identität zurück, in Frankreich oder Italien, in Dänemark oder Polen oder Deutschland auf ein volles Jahrtausend oder noch länger. Zwölf nationale Sprachen und nationale kulturelle Eigenarten, vielfältig verschiedenes und auch gegenläufiges nationales Geschichtsbewußtsein haben fast überall zu innenpolitischen Widerständen gegen Souveränitätsverzichte zugunsten der EG und der Union geführt, sie haben vielerlei Krisen im Integrationsprozeß ausgelöst. Daß die Krisen immer wieder überwunden werden konnten, beruht auf der Einsicht der leitenden Politiker, die in jedem Falle letztlich begriffen haben, daß die Befolgung der strategischen Prinzipien im Interesse ihres eigenen Staates und seiner Bürger und Wähler schwerer wiegt als die meisten der jeweiligen taktischen oder opportunistischen Erwägungen, schwerer auch als manches Opfer, das man zu ertragen hatte.

Nun ist im Laufe der allerletzten Jahre ein weiteres strategisches Interesse zunehmend ins Bewußtsein getreten. Zunehmend wird verstanden, daß wahrscheinlich keiner der europäischen

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Nationalstaaten fähig sein wird, sich allein und nur aus eigener Kraft gegen jene neuen Gefährdungen zu behaupten, denen wir im Laufe des XXI. Jahrhunderts von außerhalb Europas ausgesetzt sein werden. Wir werden diesen neuen Risiken und Gefahren nur dann mit Erfolg begegnen können, wenn wir unsere Anstrengungen bündeln. Ich nenne es das strategische Prinzip der gemeinsamen Selbstbehauptung. (Dabei schließe ich den Riesenstaat Rußland nicht ein; Rußland reicht von der Ostsee bis in den Pazifischen Ozean; zwar sind die Russen ein europäisches Volk, aber Rußland ist kein europäischer Staat.)

Ich möchte Ihnen beispielhaft einige der großen Gefahren nennen, die uns im Lauf der ersten Hälfte dieses XXI. Jahrhunderts bedrohen werden.

1. Die Bevölkerungsexplosion, die außerhalb Europas seit Mitte des XX. Jahrhunderts im Gang ist, wird sich fortsetzen. Schon heute steht pro Kopf der sechs Milliarden Weltbevölkerung nur noch ein Viertel der Fläche zur Verfügung, die im Jahre 1900 noch vorhanden war. Im Jahres 2050 wird es höchstens noch ein Sechstel sein.

2. Am Fortschreiten der globalen Erwärmung kann nicht mehr gezweifelt werden. Sie wird klimatische Verschiebungen und jedenfalls einen Anstieg der Meeresoberfläche auslösen.

3. In der Folge von Übervölkerungsdruck und globaler Erwärmung werden lokale und regionale Kriege in Asien und in Afrika zunehmen. Jedenfalls wird sich der auf Europa

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gerichtete Wanderungsdruck erheblich verstärken. Nur eine gemeinsame Abwehr wird unerwünschte Zuwanderungen begrenzen können.

4. Die Globalisierung der Finanzmärkte ist nicht mehr umkehrbar. Habgier und Spekulationismus global agierender privater Finanzinstitute, weltweit unzureichend reguliert und beaufsichtigt, unterlaufen und konterkarieren die Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik unserer Regierungen. Der gemeinsame Euro und die Europäische Zentralbank sind ein wichtiges erstes Bollwerk dagegen; jedoch braucht die EU dringend eine gemeinsame Finanzpolitik nach außen (notabene so auch im IMF und in der Weltbank.).

5. Angesichts moderner Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten ist eine Globalisierung fast aller Technologien nicht aufzuhalten. Eine Proliferation verschiedenster neuartiger Waffen und Massenvernichtungsmittel steht vor der Tür. Vor allem werden aber in wenigen Jahren der hohe Lebensstandard und die Arbeitsplätze der Europäer gefährdet. Gegenwärtig und auf absehbare Zukunft sind die Amerikaner die herausragenden Gewinner des technologischen Wettlaufes. Europa hat deshalb einen wesentlichen Ausbau seiner Forschungsanstrengungen nötig.

6. Satelliten, Internet und Fernsehen werden zunehmend von privaten, weltweit agierenden Konzernen beherrscht. Sie könnten zukünftig alle Informationen manipulieren, sie könnten Desinformation en masse betreiben und der öffentlichen

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Meinung in unseren Staaten unerwünschte Ideologien infiltrieren; sie könnten unsere geschichtlich gewachsenen Kulturen untergraben.

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Keiner der europäischen Staaten allein ist schon seit langem mehr in der Lage, grenzüberschreitende Seuchen wie z.B. Aids zu besiegen. Ein Gleiches gilt für transnational und interkontinental organisierten Drogenhandel, für transnational organisierten Terrorismus verschiedenster Spielarten, für transnational organisierte Kriminalität, für Waffenhandel etc.

Keine der soeben aufgezählten Gefährdungen stellt im Kern eine militärische Bedrohung dar. Auch ist Europa auf absehbare Zeit nicht militärisch von außen bedroht. Deshalb hat - entgegen dem Druck aus Washington - eine generelle Verstärkung unserer Verteidigungsanstrengungen keineswegs eine Priorität. Vielmehr handelt es sich um ökonomische und politische, auch um ideologische Gefahren. Sie bedürfen gemeinsamer politischer Abwehr.

Dazu gehört auch eine gemeinsame bewußte Anstrengung, uns nicht in eine Konfrontation mit dem Islam hineinmanövrieren zu lassen. Der Islam umfaßt mindestens ein Sechstel der Weltbevölkerung, etwa 200 Millionen Muslime leben in geographischer Nähe zu Europa, in der Türkei, im Nahen und Mittleren Osten, in Ägypten, in Tunis, Algier, Marokko und weiterhin in Afrika. Wir Europäer haben ein gemeinsames Interesse daran zu vermeiden, daß es zu einem „clash of civilizations" mit dem Islam kommt. Gott sei Dank verstehen manche Europäer etwas mehr von islamischen Kulturen als die allermeisten Nordamerikaner.

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Seit Ronald Reagan, seit Clinton und seit dem Amtsantritt von George W. Bush hat sich der amerikanische Führungsanspruch innerhalb des westlichen Bündnisses immer stärker zu der amerikanischen Selbsteinschätzung entwickelt, die USA als einzige globale Supermacht brauchten den Rat ihrer europäischen Verbündeten nicht länger; sie bräuchten auch nicht allzu viel Rücksicht auf die Interessen anderer Nationen zu nehmen.

In den zwei Jahrhunderten bisheriger US-amerikanischer Außenpolitik haben immer drei Grundtendenzen nebeneinander existiert:

a) Isolationismus à la Monroe-Doktrin (diese Doktrin kann man auch als eine frühe Spielart von Unilateralismus ansehen);

b) Missionarischer Internationalismus à la Woodrow Wilson oder George Marshall und Dean Acheson oder à la Jimmy Carter (man kann hier auch das Wort Multilateralismus gebrauchen);

c) Unilateralismus à la Theodore Roosevelt oder heute à la George W. Bush.

Wie wir aus der Geschichte wissen, hat zeitweilig die eine, zeitweilig die andere Grundtendenz die Oberhand gehabt – heute also der Unilateralismus Meine Vermutung ist: Der gegenwärtige Unilateralismus in Washington wird mindestens zwei Jahrzehnte andauern. Wir Europäer werden das zu ertragen haben.

Möglicherweise wird später China zu einem äquivalenten Gegengewicht werden – eventuell sogar dann auch die EU.

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Das heißt aber nicht, daß wir uns inzwischen zu Instrumenten
amerikanischer Weltpolitik oder Weltpolizei machen lassen müssen.
Ein zweiter Krieg gegen den Irak könnte hier zur Wasserscheide
werden.

Es war selbstverständlich und richtig, daß die europäischen Nationen
und ihre Regierungen sich nach dem 11. September solidarisch an
die Seite der USA gestellt haben. Das gilt auch für den Kampf gegen
El Qaida in Afghanistan. Es gilt jedoch nicht für die unsinnige Formel
von der „axis of evil", noch weniger gilt es für die seit Jahrzehnten
inkonsistente und unklare amerikanische Politik im Mittleren Osten.
Tatsächlich haben die USA wegen ihrer überragenden militärischen,
technologischen und finanziellen Hebel eine einzigartige, eine
singuläre Position, im Mittleren Osten für Frieden zu sorgen. Dazu
gehören auch die guten amerikanischen Beziehungen zu Israel, zu
Saudi-Arabien, Ägypten und weiteren arabischen Staaten. Daß
Amerika aus vorwiegend innen- und wahlpolitischen Gründen von
diesen Möglichkeiten keinen Gebrauch macht, können wir Europäer
kaum ändern – selbst dann nicht, wenn die EU tatsächlich eine
gemeinsame Außenpolitik hätte.

Dagegen sind die mehreren Besuche europäischer Minister in
Jerusalem und in Ramallah nur hilflose Gesten ohne Bedeutung – sie
dienen zum Teil auch nur der jeweiligen innenpolitischen
Opportunität, ziemlich würdelos.

Schon die vor vier Jahren unter amerikanischer Initiative ausgerufene
„neue Nato“ ließ auf seiten der europäischen Teilnehmer wenig
Würde erkennen. Denn gegen welchen Feind sollte sich die „neue
Nato“ eigentlich richten? Etwa gegen die sogenannten „rogue
states“? Wenn neuerdings in Washington die Rede ist von der

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Einführung einer neuen Strategie des präventiven Erstschlages mit nuklearen Waffen, dann kann sich aus solcher kolossalen Revolution der seit Jahrzehnten einvernehmlich verfolgten Nuklear-Strategie eine ernste Krise ergeben. Jedenfalls muß man davon ausgehen, daß die alleinige Supermachtstellung und der Unilateralismus der USA zwei Jahrzehnte oder auch länger dauern kann. Wir Europäer müssen uns damit abfinden. Das sollte aber keineswegs bedeuten, daß wir uns zu Instrumenten der amerikanischen Weltpolitik und Weltpolizei machen lassen.

Schon seit Mitte der 90er Jahre reden unsere Regierungschefs und ihre Minister zwar von einer „gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik“ der EU, aber tatsächlich ist sie nicht vorhanden – sie wird auch noch in Jahrzehnten bloß punktuell und in einzelnen Fällen erreicht werden. Statt dessen haben Jacques Chirac und Jospin, Blair, Schröder und Fischer, Prodi usw. uns in den letzten beiden Jahren eine Reihe fulminanter Reden über ihre Vorstellung von der „Finalität“ der EU gehalten. Tatsächlich ist aber seit Maastricht 1992 eine Stillstandskrise der EU eingetreten. Seitdem haben weder die Regierungschefs noch ihre Diplomaten und Bürokraten, weder das Europäische Parlament noch die Kommission etwas Wesentliches zustande gebracht. Man hat großzügig zwölf weitere Staaten und außerdem die Türkei zum Beitritt eingeladen, aber man hat versäumt, die Institutionen und die Verfahren der EU, die schon heute bei 15 Mitgliedsstaaten nur noch unzureichend funktionieren, auf einen Verbund von 27 Staaten umzubauen. Man hat auch die finanziellen Anpassungsentscheidungen bisher nicht zustande gebracht.

Weil aber das Jahr 2004 schon ganz nahe gerückt ist, wurde in letzter Minute ein Konvent erfunden. Er soll mit über einhundert Mitgliedern binnen zweier Jahre die Aufgaben lösen, die 15 Regierungschefs über

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ein Jahrzehnt lang nicht lösen konnten. Ich beneide meinen Freund Giscard nicht um seine Aufgabe – aber immerhin bringt er mehr Sachkenntnis und europäische Erfahrung mit als die meisten der heutigen Regierungschefs.

Für die Arbeit des Konvents will ich nur einen einzigen Gedanken aussprechen: Für die Zukunft der EU ist entscheidend wichtig, daß das Ergebnis des Konvents, der neue Grundlagenvertrag, ausreichend Bewegungsspielraum für zukünftige Entwicklungen läßt. Er muß insbesondere Raum lassen für eine engere Zusammenarbeit zwischen einigen der Mitgliedsstaaten, so wie ihn die bisherigen Verträge als Möglichkeit der „verstärkten Zusammenarbeit“ schon enthalten haben. (Nicht jedes Mitglied konnte oder mußte Schengen oder dem Euro beitreten.)

Oder, um es im Klartext zu sagen: Der neue Grundlagenvertrag darf die Möglichkeit der Bildung eines inneren Kerns der EU nicht verbauen. Ich vermute, daß sich ein innerer Kern, eine verstärkte Zusammenarbeit zunächst aus den sechs Gründerstaaten der Kohle- und Stahl-Gemeinschaft bilden wird.

Damit komme ich am Schluß auf die gemeinsame Rolle Frankreichs und Deutschlands. Vom Frühjahr 1974 bis in den Sommer 1989 ist das enge Einvernehmen zwischen Paris und Bonn das Rückgrat und zugleich der Motor des Fortschritts der EU gewesen. Nach der Krise des Winters 89/90 kam als letzter großer Erfolg noch 1992 die Einigung über den Euro zustande. Danach aber trat diplomatisch-geschäftige Routine an die Stelle der Europa vorantreibenden Zusammenarbeit. Die heutige Stillstandskrise ist wesentlich dem Einschlafen der engen Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Regierungen Frankreichs und Deutschlands geschuldet. Zwar hatten einige Regierungen anderer Mitgliedsstaaten in den 70er und 80er Jahren

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des öfteren an der gemeinsamen Führungsleistung Anstoß
genommen und Kritik geübt, jedoch waren sie im Grunde ganz
zufrieden mit deren Ergebnissen.

Die über anderthalb Jahrzehnte erfolgreiche gemeinsame Führung,
die danach auf den Kommissionspräsidenten Jacques Delors
übergegangen ist, beruhte natürlich sowohl in Paris als auch in Bonn
auf der Erkenntnis, daß der Fortschritt der Integration (EWG, später
EG und heute EU) im richtig verstandenen langfristigen strategischen
Interesse des eigenen Staates und der eigenen Nation liegt. (Dabei
spielte auch der immer wieder erneuerte Eindruck eine Rolle, daß die
englische Nation und die englischen Regierungen sich diese
strategische Erkenntnis nicht wirklich zu eigen gemacht haben.)

Wenn ich es geschichtlich sehe, so haben die Franzosen eindeutig
das größte Verdienst. Das gilt am Anfang für Schuman und Monnet.
Es gilt übrigens auch für Charles de Gaulle, der zwar die europäische
Integration nicht sonderlich gefördert, wohl aber durch seinen
Elysée-Vertrag mit Adenauer die enge Zusammenarbeit zwischen den
späteren Regierungen in Paris und Bonn sehr bewußt und erfolgreich
vorbereitet hat. Es gilt sodann für Giscard, für Mitterrands erstes
Septennat und zuletzt für Delors.

Frankreich besitzt völkerrechtliche und vertragliche und nukleare
Trumpfkarten – denken Sie an den Sicherheitsrat der UN oder an den
Non-Proliferations-Vertrag –, die wir Deutschen nicht haben und nicht
haben werden. Darüber hinaus hat die französische Nation unter den
Völkern der Welt ein enormes Prestige, begründet durch Frankreichs
Geschichte und Kultur. Dagegen wird auf uns Deutschen noch
generationenlang die Erinnerung an Auschwitz lasten. Deshalb
bedürfen wir Deutschen auch in Zukunft der Franzosen, ihres
Verständnisses und ihrer politischen Initiativen. Und heute hat

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Chirac, nach seiner Wiederwahl und nach der Wahl zum französischen Parlament für ein halbes Jahrzehnt plein pouvoir für eine europäische Politik.

Selbstverständlich haben alle Franzosen recht - von de Gaulle und Giscard bis zu Chirac -, wenn ihnen ihr *Nationalstaat und ihre nationale Identität unverzichtbar ist*. Auch für uns Deutsche ist der Nationalstaat selbstverständlich und unverzichtbar. Für die übergroße Mehrheit aller Menschen zwischen Mittelmeer und Polarkreis ist ihre nationale Identität der wichtigste psychologische Ankergrund. Dies wird auch im XXI. Jahrhundert so sein.

Wenn wir jedoch die Europäische Union verkümmern ließen, wenn die Union ein ähnliches Schicksal erleiden sollte wie vor Zeiten die europäischen Neuordnungsversuche durch den Westfälischen Frieden oder später abermals durch den Wiener Kongreß, dann würden unsere Nationalstaaten den globalen Gefährdungen nicht standhalten können. Im besten Fall würden wir dann uns auf die *übermächtigen USA* verlassen müssen; wir würden in die Rolle *Athens zur Zeit des Imperium Romanum* geraten.

Es gibt in der Menschheitsgeschichte viele Beispiele von Nationen und Kulturen und von Staaten, die durch fremde Überwanderung oder durch Eroberung untergegangen sind. Es gibt aber kein Beispiel und kein Vorbild für den mühevollen freiwilligen Zusammenschluß von *Nationalstaaten*, für den Verzicht auf Teile ihrer Souveränität aus *eigenem Entschluß*. Deshalb halte ich den bisher im Laufe von fünfzig Jahren erreichten Status der EU für einen stupenden, historisch einmaligen Erfolg! Ich halte es deshalb für realistisch zu sagen: Selbst wenn wir zur Vollendung einer handlungsfähigen Union noch weitere fünf Jahrzehnte benötigen sollten, so werden wir Europäer

[y]

Hans Merkle

Remarks by Henry A. Kissinger

October 4, 2001

Berlin

It is a great honor to be asked to deliver a speech in memory of one of the most remarkable men I have known. It is a daunting task as well. For those in this room who knew Hans Merkle, nothing I can say will be able to reflect his complexity and inspirational quality. For those who did not have the opportunity to encounter his extraordinary combination of dedication and authority, any description of him will, in this age of standardized norms, seem out of scale.

Hans Merkle was a man of seeming paradoxes. He was my friend, yet he rarely spoke a personal word to me. One knew one could always rely on him, yet he would have considered statements to that effect as an elaboration of the self-evident or a derogation from the nature of friendship. Merkle was an inspiring leader who moved people by his aura without having to insist on the prerogatives of hierarchy. Even while achieving enormous success in business (it is no exaggeration to describe him as the most influential German businessman for two decades), he spent much of his free time reading and developing an astonishing erudition in philosophy, history, even poetry – all without a university degree. He displayed this staggering knowledge only rarely in conversations; Hans Merkle would have considered that as so much unworthy ostentation. “One must never say all one knows,” he noted in his speech, “Service and Leadership” (Dienen und Führen).

The range of Merkle's interests is reflected in the titles of his speeches and essays: “The Art of Prediction;” “Man, Machines, and Technology;” “Rights and Duties in the Republic;” “Service and Leadership;” “Elites and How to Encourage Them;” “Profession as Experience;” “A Critique of Technology;” “Virtue and Trust,” among many others. How many modern managers would have thought of writing an essay on the meaning of Caesar going to the Capitol on the day he was assassinated even though he had received many warnings? Did it reflect the virtue of trust in republican institutions or the sin of arrogant self-confidence challenging republican norms?

Merkle's essentially philosophical essays did not deal with the issues directly related to his company. But they do explain its extraordinary success under his leadership, growing from sales of DM 2 billion in 1964 when he took over the reins, to DM 21.2 billion in 1985, and to DM 60 billion in the year 2000. And the smoothness of the transition after he stepped down as chairman shows that Merkle achieved his highest aim of raising management beyond the personal and imparting to his successors the standard of meticulous attention to detail, insistence on a striving for perfection and, above all, on an ethic of decency and a selection based on character, which I consider the hallmark of Bosch.

I met Hans Merkle 24 years ago at a dinner of Chase Manhattan Bank's International Advisory Board, which took place in a New York museum. Sigmund Warburg had urged Merkle to introduce himself to me. That, however, proved easier said than done. Merkle did not want to impose himself, while I waited for him to approach me. Finally I introduced myself. And Merkle's first words to me were: "You should know that I worked in a responsible position in a military ministry in Berlin. I did not like the Nazis, but I served my country during the war. If that bothers you, you should have nothing to do with me."

That night at the museum laid the basis for permanent respect. For it was clear that Merkle wanted nothing less than to obscure the past. He once said that people who deny their history also reject their future. But the appropriate lessons had to evolve in the realm of conscience of the individual and of his society and not in comments to foreigners. Merkle took many actions to make clear where he stood, including the activities of the Bosch Foundation in Israel. But, true to his signature style, he never publicized them.

Hans Merkle was infinitely solicitous of his friends but became embarrassed when one acknowledged his concern as if that would destroy its moral significance as an act of grace. On the occasion of my being made honorary citizen of Fürth, the town in which I was born, Merkle appeared, having driven over two hours to get there. Only later did I learn that it had been the first day of radiation treatment for the illness that ultimately claimed his life and that he had come straight from this exhausting procedure to a formal ceremony and a boisterous lunch.

So when one writes or speaks about Hans Merkle, one deals with the incarnation of intangibles. To him, the central quality of a society or of any organization was trust (Zuversicht). Confidence results less from deliberate policy than from the intuitive acceptance of personalities who inspire by example rather than articulateness. He quoted with approval a line from Alfred Tennyson: "And trust me not at all or all in all." The ultimate requirement of leadership was, as Merkle would quote Peter Drucker, to earn trust: "Trust is the conviction that the leader means what he says."

Merkle always meant what he said. In his view, leadership was service; it avoids self-satisfaction during periods of success and provides inner strength to persist in times of adversity. It consists in equal parts of delegating credit for achievement while assuming responsibility for failure. The chief executive must not only outline a direction but inspire its execution. And he must never rest on what has been achieved. Thus Merkle ended his speech at Bosch's centenary celebration summing up the achievements of the past 100 years with a warning against complacency: "We at Bosch know our worth. But this consciousness does not entitle us to lean back in our chairs in self-satisfaction. We see our challenge not in reaping what we have sown but in sowing what will be reaped tomorrow."

In his style of leadership, Merkle confronted the root dilemma of modern society: how, in a period of rapid change, to bridge the gap between a society's experience and its possibilities, between the preservation of what is valuable and the space needed for the emergence of the new? Societies grow attached to the familiar, but leaders must point toward what does not yet exist. Even if ideas or concepts originate with one or a few individuals, they must be internalized by those who execute them and become, as it were, their own convictions. The role of leadership is, in a sense, lonely, but the execution cannot be solitary; it must reflect a consensus. Democracy is therefore a mandate of modernity. The vitality of a society depends crucially on the interplay between the inspiration of the individual and the translation of it into the commonplace of the society or of the enterprise.

(Y)

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A democracy whose leaders rely only on exploiting the mood of the moment will soon drift without direction and end in dictatorship. But, equally, leadership conceived as the expression of the arbitrary of an individual will turn power into a demonic enterprise. For that reason, a well-conceived concept of national interest is less an assertion of power than a limitation of it.

Hans Merkle feared an unprecedented form of tyranny as potentially inherent in the modern technological world. Permit me to quote from his essay, "The Demonism of Power:" "It is conceivable - and perhaps we have an obligation to face it - that the demonism of power in the future cannot be related to the individual any longer. Power becomes increasingly anonymous but no less dangerous for the free evolution of humanity. Falsification of concepts is the first step toward the development of concentrations of power of a new kind - impersonal, intangible, almost ghostly; one is reminded of Kafka. And because society so emasculated will not be able to deal with social processes without some mechanism, social tasks will be assigned to organs of a new kind. The despotism of tyrants will be replaced by the despotism of the apparatus."

Therefore, the individual's fulfillment must not be subordinated to the demands of politics, and politics must not be defined as the sole, or even the principal, purpose of social life. The ultimate goal of political life should not be imposition of a ubiquitous, interchangeable norm but to promote independence in enterprises and for individuals. Wherever it is forgotten that political duties are, in the end, based on political rights and that these rights must be revitalized in each period, politics turns into manipulation.

Real conservatives - among whom Merkle counted himself - are not opposed to progress; on the contrary, they create the condition for progress by preserving the foundations on which to build and by warning of those steps urged in the name of progress that lead into an abyss.

The executive is tested above all when adversity strikes. A prescient quote from Merkle from 1975 may be appropriate: "Too extended periods of unrestrained growth spoil both managers and workers, distort a sense of proportion, erase distinctions, and weaken the sense for the

[Y]

5

essential, for the necessary, for the possible. They obscure the peril that
threatens every society and every economy which prevails too easily
without having to prove itself. If the wind changes and storms threaten,
the hour of ultimate testing has come; then we will learn who can read
the weather map and who is able to navigate against the wind."

This is why for Merkle - as already for Robert Bosch - the fostering of
talent was a primary preoccupation. The founder of the company had laid
down in the guidelines of the Bosch Foundation, to which he had refused
to give his name in keeping with the Bosch tradition of anonymity (it was
so named only after his death by Merkle), that one of its principal goals
was to prepare society for the adaptation of thought processes and
procedures to the changes subtly latent in all societies. Foremost among
these was the free and unhindered development of the human
personality.

These fragmentary summaries of the thoughts of a remarkable man
explain what I would describe as the "Bosch style:" total reliability, an
unflagging sense of service, a dedication always to function at the
frontiers of knowledge, a notion of profit based on energetic enterprise
and insistent competitiveness with the proceeds always available to the
common good. "To belong to the elite," wrote Merkle, "brings with it
duties rather than rights. To be sure, the performance demanded of
leaders should not and does not remain unrewarded. But the goal of the
effort must never be material reward. Elites should not define
themselves by ruling but by serving - or better, they rule best by serving.
Those who belong to the real elite do not insist on being called elites.
Those who do insist on it do not belong."

This explains the seemingly anonymous, almost impersonal, and yet, in
its ultimate sense, deeply individual style of Hans Merkle. For his work to
be meaningful, it could not be the expression of a personal preference;
this would undermine its moral significance. It had to be a reflection of a
higher obligation which evoked the sense of duty. Merkle would quote
from Max Planck: "The ultimate good of which no power in the world can
deprive us is a pure way of thinking (reine Gesinnung) which finds its
expression in a conscientious carrying out of one's duties." To which
Merkle added: "No more can be expected of us but also no less."

In this spirit, I want to say a few words about the contribution that Hans Merkle and some members of his generation – at least one of whom is here tonight – have made to the rebirth of Germany and its relationship to the international community in the aftermath of the Second World War.

Biographers make much of my German birth. And it is, of course, true that one's environment shapes one's attitudes even in difficult times (which is why I still take an active weekly interest in the four Bavarian football clubs in the *Bundesliga* – although Fürth is regrettably in the second *Bundesliga*). But my real connection with Germany stems from the end of the war. I arrived here with the army of occupation in 1945 after a seven-year absence. Few of you present will remember the devastation, desolation, and spiritual despair of those months; it belongs to the formative experiences of your fathers and grandfathers. There is no time now, and this is not the occasion, to review the political evolution of more than half a century – though it seems like only yesterday to me.

I want to pay tribute to those who had the moral courage to start again, to rebuild their country, and to bring it back to the community of nations by the very qualities I have called the Bosch attributes: reliability, steadiness, enterprise, and an abiding commitment to democratic values. Governments of both major parties established a steady policy tied to the democratic West. In the process, America and Germany together went through two Berlin crises, the building of the Wall, and finally reunification. Occasional disagreements in tactics have never undermined the underlying unity of purpose.

And just when, on both sides of the Atlantic, the end of the Cold War had evoked a seemingly endless debate about the continuing validity of the democratic partnership, the terrorist attack on New York and Washington has returned the democracies to fundamentals. Too many of us had been seduced by the siren song of the end of history, of the reduction of politics to psychiatry and social work, and of the predominance of narrow national concerns. We have learned that there are incompatible values rampant in the world around us and that there are those so eager to destroy our civilization that they will sacrifice their lives to do so and will not recoil before the murder of innocent civilians. It has obliged the West to relearn what it had nearly forgotten: that in its unity and solidarity resides its ultimate strength. So I want to take this opportunity to thank

7

our German friends here for the many expressions of support and
compassion that reached us from all over Germany and for the highly
appreciated demonstrations of solidarity from the German government.

None of this would have surprised Hans Merkle. He was born in what was
then Baden, now Baden-Württemberg, but he incarnated some of the
best values of the Prussian ethos. One of these is, "Always be more than
you seem to be" (mehr sein als scheinen). Applied to Merkle and
adapting it to one of the quotes I mentioned earlier, I would rephrase his
own basic maxim this way: "Always say less than you know and always
do more than you say."

For all I have said, Merkle's posture of aloofness did not reflect a lack of
deep feeling. On the contrary, it was wrested from a deeply passionate
nature. He obscured this aspect of his personality because he did not
wish to impose his sentiments even on his friends. Like one of the heroes
of classical drama, Merkle took on himself the battles to which he thought
destiny had called him. Those of us whom he honored with his friendship
therefore felt as if we had been admitted into a chivalrous order.

The emotions from which Merkle's aristocratic conduct had been wrung
can be seen in a letter he wrote in November 1944, when his hometown
of Pforzheim had been destroyed in the war: "Fate would not pass this
town by. But for me this place is not of brick and mortar; it is founded on
quite a different kind of building block that cannot be reduced to rubble
so long as the heart does not allow it. And the heart will not acquiesce.
It clings to old scenes, to hills and trees, and to the memory of many
days which were gifts of God and of youthful dreams. For, in the end,
ideas are stronger than men and more long-lasting."

A few months after his death, Merkle's daughter Monika and Dr. Scholl
did me the honor of accompanying me to Hans Merkle's grave on a still,
verdant hillside, shaded by trees overlooking the city of Pforzheim which
had risen from the ashes, rebuilt by men and women whose dreams
overcame their reality.

After that occasion, Monika graciously let me see the letter I have just
read to you. I thought then how lonely a life this caring man imposed on
himself, how much of the travail of others he took on himself, and I

8

[Y]

wondered whether some of us might have broken through this solitude by
an act of grace.

But then I reflected that Hans Merkle lived just as he wanted. Duty was
his companion, honor his imperative. He expressed this best in his essay,
"Virtue and Trust:" "Confidence in the future - that virtue of the soul, as
the French put it - must be fought for every day. It involves permanent
exertion, a coming-and-going; yet, as we travel a path so strewn with
stones, a God occasionally consoles us with a smile."

Hans Merkle inspired many of us in traveling these stony paths and
thereby vouchsafed this world an occasional smile from a God.

Helmut Schmidt

August 3, 2001

The InterAction Council of former heads of government, established in 1983, has addressed long-term, global issues mankind is faced with and has made numerous recommendations to our successors throughout the world. The Council normally organizes three meetings every year, one annual plenary meeting and two high expert group meetings. Next year in April we are planning an expert meeting on the further evolution of the European Union and its role vis-à-vis the political, military and economic world powers. I am writing to you to ask for your advice as to whom we might invite as American experts. I am thinking of one person who is close to the present American administration and a second one I would like to call a EU-phobic. I would be thankful if you could confidentially name persons who in your eyes are specialists in our subject.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, personal
Twenty-Sixth Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
U.S.A.

040-3280 220, Fax: 040-3280 510

HELMUT SCHMIDT · 22419 HAMBURG · NEUBERGERWEG 80

The Future of Russia
Her Relationship with European and Asian
Neighbours and the United States

27 - 29 April 2000

Stockholm School of Economics

Statement by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt:
What western policy makers ought to know

The program of our conference on the future of
Russia says that I am to start off with a historical
introduction. But I am in no way a specialist on Russia
and my perceptions may therefore be deeply
erroneous. At the same time it seems to me that
many erroneous Western perceptions of Russia's
political and economic developments and also many

2

well meant but unsuitable Western proposals and advice have so far been based on incomplete knowledge or even misconceived perceptions of Russian history.

Many of well meaning American and well meaning European advisers should have read some thousands of pages of Gogol or Lermontov, Turgeniev, Leskov, Pushkin, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. They should have read Gorky and Sholokhov and not just and only Solzhenitsyn, before conceiving their advice to our Russian neighbours. It does not suffice to be enthusiastic about the music of Mussorgsky, Rimsky-Korsakov or Tchaikovsky or more recently of Stravinsky, Prokofiev or Shostakovich. It does not suffice if we want to understand the psychological, cultural and political conditions of Russia's historical heritage or legacy.

3

If one ventures to give advice to Russia, even if
one only tries to understand Russia's problems, it
seems necessary to understand her socio-economic
and structural legacy from former centuries, to
understand how the legacy was partially transformed
by Lenin and Stalin up to Bresznev and to understand
how all the traditions were called into question by
Gorbachev. It does not seem to be necessary to go
back to the Kievskaya Rus about one thousand years
ago, or even more than that. But it is helpful, in my
view, to know about the orthodox church, since the
14th century centered in Moscow, and about the
orthodox church's self-evaluation and the self-eulogy
as being the Third Rome - "and a fourth will never
be", which is a phrase that the Russian church has
used over quite a long time. It considers Rome/Italy to
have been the "first", Rome, then Byzantium (later on
Constantinopel, today Istanbul) to have been the
"second", Rome, but Moscow being "the third and
ultimate", Rome.

4

I think the sense of mission, which has characterized all the great Russian leaders, stems from that clerical background. In a way, Ivan Grozny in the 16th century and as well Peter the Great in the 17th century, thought of themselves as having to carry out a great mission, a mission beyond the then boundaries of their state. So did several Czars in the 18th century and again in the 19th century, so did Lenin and other communist leaders in Russia.

The consequences of the self-inflicted breakdown of the Soviet Union, in approaching the end of the 20th century, do include the painful experience of the failure of Russia's mission, at least for the present and for the foreseeable future. This loss, it seems to me, does make it understandable that quite a few Russians in their present situation are suspicious of Western advice. There is at least a two hundred years old tradition of mistrust and of suspicion vis-à-vis-à-

5

[L.C]

vis Western influences in Russia. The conflict between Pan-slavism on the one side and the so-called Westerners on the other side has been going on in Russia since about the years after eighteen hundred or so. At that time, namely after the final defeat of Napoleon, Russia has been the strongest continental power inside Europe. The Czarist regime was ultra-conservative and reactionary. The era of enlightenment which started already in the 17th century and swept over most Western and Northern European countries and also over North America, did never really reach Russia - with the non-effective exceptions of parts of the intelligentsia, which therefore were subdued by the Czars and as well later on by the Communists.

It seems necessary to bear in mind that Russia, all over the 19th and also the 20th centuries, did not develop civil rights of the individual, nor did it develop a legal culture of public law, nor did it develop the

6

roots for the political culture of division of powers or
of democracy. Nor did Russia develop a modern
economy based on private ownership, on private
farmers, on private entrepreneurs, on open markets
and on a dependable legal and judiciary system. It
seems to me that the great French author Alexis de
Tocqueville was right when he, around 1835/1840 or
so, emphasized the fact that in a certain way Russia
has condensed all the powers inside its society into
one human being, namely the Czar. Tocqueville is
mostly remembered for his prophecy about America
and Russia both of them destined to rule one half of
the globe. Well, one hundred years later, it looked as
if that prophecy had come true. Today, another half a
century later, the picture has changed considerably.
But this is not the end of history.

Coming back to the structure of the Russian
society or economy at the end of the 19th century: At
that time, despite several steps of reform, Russia still

7

[LC]

had in the main an agricultural structure, politically characterized by an absolutist regime, the great masses of the population living in rural circumstances, stamped by the landed gentry. Of course, one did have some manufacturing industries as well, for instance textile industries in Moscow, some coal and steel in the Donets basin, for instance shipbuilding, shipping and foreign trade in Petersburg, also in Odessa. But a general upswing of manufacturing industries did only happen as late as the very last decade of the 19th century. At that time, there did hardly exist any entreprenerial bourgeosie, mostly were the manufacturing industries owned by parts of the nobility. Financial industries were absolutely underdeveloped and, by the way, they still are.

When Lenin took over in 1917, the extent of the industrial proletariat was still very limited despite the armaments efforts during World War I, the agricultural proletariat still was by far outnumbering

8

the numbers of people employed in manufacturing.
This situation did change only very slowly during the
period between the two wars. It is true that then the
numbers of people employed in heavy industries and in
manufacturing did grow at an hitherto unusual pace,
but the factories were owned and run by the state. It
was the state bureaucracy or the party bureaucracy
(which practically speaking was one and the same
thing) that decided what to produce and how much;
the bureaucracy decided to whom to deliver the
products, it decided the prices; and it decided the
projects and provided the financial means. Banks
were not really necessary, except for carrying out
some payments, otherwise, one did not need banks.
Also private saving was not necessary and, by the
way, it was not even possible. Also a functioning
inland revenue system and a functioning tax system
were superfluous due to the price dictate; the income
side of the state budget stemmed from the surplus
which was provided by the prices fixed by the state.

9

[LC]

This system of a pre-planned command-economy was continued during the enormous effort to modernize and extend the industrial production during World War II and also during the forty years of the Cold War with the West. When Gorbachev started perestroika in the late 1980s, there still was no single private entrepreneur. There was no entrepreneurial experience, there was no competition, there was no experience with what competition requires from participants, there was no legal framework for private ownership, nor was there any legal framework for private corporations and private companies. All industries were still state owned and state managed, also of course the banks and practically speaking agriculture as well.

On the other hand, Russia had in the meantime created a great number of first-class scientists and first-class engineers who in the main served the

10

defense industries and as well space fare. You will
remember that they were the ones who put Sputnik
into orbit even earlier than the Americans. They
were first class people. Their products were of high
quality, but they were not really needed by consumers
or society. Of course the military industrial complex
did get - and demanded! - financial support from the
government and directing assistance as well. It needs
to be understood that there have been only very, very
few side effects for the benefit of the civilian
economy, which was absolutely different from the
situation in the United States of America. First-class
scientists, first-class engineers, chemists, etc., but
almost no positive side effects for the civilian
economy!

Because the all-too-hasty perestroika created
enormous budgetary deficits, the government took
recourse to printing money and opened up the avenue
for a crippling inflation. The rest of that story is

11

known well enough. The only part of the economy
that still was functioning well was the defense
industries. But the defense industries could earn
money only by sales to foreign countries, they could
not earn money within their own state. Selling
military products to foreign countries was indeed what
they did - and what they are still doing. But at the
same time, it seemed almost impossible, particularly
for political reasons, to convert parts of the defense
industries into civilian productions. Also was it very
difficult to privatize the big industrial complexes in
the fields of oil, gas, electricity, heavy industries,
manufacturing, etc., because one was anxious not to
sell out to foreign capitalists and because domestic
private capitalists did not exist, at least none who had
gained and collected considerable private capital in a
legitimate or in a legal way.

The social situation was aggravated by the
shortage of houses due to the repatriation of almost a

12

million Russian soldiers who so far had been serving outside Russia on the soil of the East of Central Europe (for instance, on the soil of East Germany) and on the soil of Central Asian Republics. They also had to allocate those Russians who fled back from former Soviet Republics which now had become sovereign non-Russian States.

To sum it all up: When perestroika started, there were hardly any entrepreneurs or managers who did have any experience in operating within an open market or any experience in competing with others, any experience in marketing, etc. There were no trade unions which deserved that name. There did not exist a functioning inland revenue system nor did there exist an adequate system of taxation. Nor did there exist a functioning judiciary system which was capable of settling disputes. Altogether, there did not exist any valuable economic experience, not to speak of traditions. There was no experience or training as

13

to how an open society and an open economy can
work.

So far, the three Baltic Republics, the Czech
Republic and Hungary were much better equipped for
the transformation process, much better equipped due
to their historical heritage, than was Russia. Also
Poland was partially better equipped for the
transformation process than was Russia. And
certainly were the coastal provinces of China better
equipped for a transformation process than all of
Russia.

The Chinese example does, in my view at least,
deserve a qualification. The standard of living of more
than one thousand million Chinese, at the time when
Deng Xiaoping's leadership started off, was much
lower than the standard of living of three hundred
million Soviet citizens. I am talking of the end of the
seventies, 78, 79 and 80. Nevertheless, over the last

[LC]

14

twenty years the Chinese transformation process has
been much more successful than the Russian. It seems
to me that there are three reasons for that. Firstly, in
China there still did exist some entrepreneurial
traditions and memories in trade, shipping, financing,
manufacturing, memories still vivid in the coastal
provinces, from Tientsin to Shanghai and to Hong
Kong, and Kanton. Secondly, Deng - and also later on
Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji - undertook his transition
operation in a very cautious, very gradual manner,
starting with a few so-called special economic zones in
coastal provinces in the beginning. They have been
progressing only one step after the other, very
cautiously. And thirdly, they did have the assistance
of fifty million overseas Chinese; a great deal of them
living in Taiwan, but not only in Taiwan, not only in
Singapore or Hong Kong, but also in Indonesia, in the
Philippines and in other places. These people have
maintained contacts with mainland China. They have
maintained contacts with their relatives in mainland

15

China and quite a few of the overseas Chinese are confident enough to invest considerable parts of their private fortune, of their private capital, inside the old mother country.

By contrast, the Russians tried to do it all at once, there were no entrepreneurial traditions and also did there not exist any overseas Russians who might have been able and willing to invest part of their fortune in the old mother country Russia. Instead some well meaning foreigners but also some not so well meaning speculators did import capital into Russia. And the West, particularly the International Monetary Fund and many Americans, advised the Russians to open up their borders for Western credits, not only from state to state, not only from central bank to central bank, or from the IMF to the central bank of Russia, but open up their borders also for private capital and private money. The inclusion of short-term money was the most serious mistake in advising the Russians.

16

Foreign short-term money could be withdrawn also at
very short-term.

It was in fact withdrawn at very short-term. The
consequence was that after a few years the Russian
debtors could not pay back their debts, in many cases
they could not even pay interest. So the IMF had to
come to rescue. But then these rescue operations
(particularly the very last one, of around 4 billion
dollars) did not provide Russia with fresh money; but
in effect they did bail out Western creditors who
otherwise would have lost a lot of their capital.

In my view, most of Western economic advice to
Moscow has been of rather questionable merit. And
much of present Western criticism of Russia's
economic, financial and domestic behavior, much of
these criticisms are being voiced from a solid base of
ignorance and in some cases ignorance plus
arrogance.

17

If one looks back into the 19th century, and also into the 20th century during the Bolshevik period, one finds that Russia never was keen on accepting Western advice or Western ideologies or behavior. The present American high-handed criticisms do only reinforce those old anti-Western suspicions among Russians. And if these criticisms are being served in a cocktail of which another ingredient is American self applause for having won the Cold War and having defeated Russia, and a third ingredient of that cocktail being demonstrative lack of respect for the great Russian nation - after all, a nation of almost one millenium of national history and national legacy - then such cocktail becomes totally unpalatable for some Russians and not just for Communists or former Communists. Such cocktail could as well serve to revive Russian nationalism and even lapsing back into expansionism.

18

It is not uncommon in the world that governments who are unsuccessful at home do take refuge to aggressive foreign policies. Many governments have done so and there does always exist the temptation to make up for domestic failure by foreign political or even military successes.

At least since Ivan the Terrible, Ivan Grozny, at least since then have the Russian Czars steadily enlarged the territory of their empire. They called it collecting of Russian soil, which certainly has been a misnomer, most of the soil had not been Russian before they conquered it. This has lasted since let us say the middle of the 16th century to the end of the 19th century. Collected were Finland, Poland, many other territories in the East of Europe, collected were great parts of Central Asia, all of Siberia and even Alaska. I remember to have seen, north of San Francisco, a so-called Russian river, that seemed to me was the most southern point to which the Russians

19

got on the Pacific side of what nowadays is the United
States. They later on sold Alaska for a cheap price.

Russia did reach its greatest geographical
extension at the beginning of the 20th century, or you
might as well say at the end of the 19th century, with a
few little and unimportant exceptions. If one does
compare the territorial status of Russia today with the
situation a hundred years ago, then in the later course
of the 20th century, particularly in the 1990s, they
have lost enormous parts of what formerly had been
the territory of the Russian Czars. They have lost
great parts due to the fact that 16 non-Russian
nations have acquired or regained their national
sovereignty. Good for them, very good indeed for
Finland or Poland or the Baltic Republics, just to
mention a few. But if you look at it from a Russian
nationalistic point of view, what an enormous loss! I
would like to mention that the only newly acquired
territories have been South Sakhalin in the Pacific

20

and the city of Kaliningrad, in what formerly was East Prussia.

If one hopes that Russia will not try to reconquer some of those territories and their inhabitants, that had belonged to Russia at the end of the 19th century, then it seems advisable not to provoke Moscow, but do deal with that giant country with caution and with prudence, and with all the respect that is due to a world power. A world power Russia will remain to be, however long her present economic and domestic weaknesses may last (they might last 25 years or even longer). There might happen several severe crises on their way. There might not develop a Western European type of democracy, instead there might evolve a system of rights and duties of the individual that differs considerably from European or American ideals or ideologies. And certainly will the socioeconomic evolution take a very long time because it can be mastered successfully only if and when it is

21

operated in a piecemeal fashion, one step after the
other; even if the present situation is not very inviting
for a stepwise, a piecemeal-wise operation.

Right now and already over the decade of the
1990s, the American attitude vis-à-vis Russia is
ambiguous and ambivalent and unsteady - very much
like the American policies that deal with China. China
will be the third world power in the 21st century. The
European States and also the European Union would
in my view be well advised not to permit themselves
to be dragged into superfluous, because ideologically
inspired tensions or conflicts with Russia nor with
China. On the other hand, there is neither realism nor
is there responsibility on the side of those Europeans
and Americans, who dream of including Russia or
including at least the Ukraine into the European
integration, be it an economic or political or even
military integration. Such ideas are either
romanticisms or geostrategic megalomania.

22

What we can do is to be a dependable partner in
diplomacy, trade and finances, to be helpful if being
asked for assistance. But please let us avoid any
paternalistic or patrimonial attitudes, because Russia
is a heavily injured and therefore touchy world power.
It is a power that stretches over eleven time zones,
from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea. The
greatest part of it is in Asia. It is in Asia where the
bulk of Russian hidden mineral treasures still wait for
exploration and for exploitation; permafrost will not
for all times remain to be an unsurmountable obstacle.

There is little use and little to be gained, if we go
on to urge Russia to follow Western recipes. Putin
and others after him will have to find their own ways.
Certainly will their ways differ considerably from
Scandinavian ways or from West European ways and
also will they differ from American ideals.

[Y]

HENRY A. KISSINGER

August 1, 2001

Dear Helmut:

Thank you for your letter concerning the conversation you
had with Dr. Henning Voscherau. Having just returned from my
own meetings in Moscow, I read the views you shared with interest
and agreement.

I would look forward to meeting with Dr. Voscherau and I
may travel to Germany in the Fall. Can you help me arrange it? Or
how do I proceed? In the meantime, I hope you will let me know if
you plan to be in New York. It would be good to see you again.

His Excellency
Helmut Schmidt
Former Chancellor
Federal Republic of Germany
Miglied des Deutshen Bundestages
11011 Berlin
Germany

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919
FACSIMILE (212) 759-0042

Helmut Schmidt

JUL 27 2001

July 24, 2001

A couple of days ago I had a long conversation with my old friend Dr. Henning Voscherau (you might probably have met him in former years; he has been the Mayor of Hamburg over a decade, nowadays 60 years old, a member of the Federal Executive of the Social Democratic Party). Voscherau reported at length over long private conversations which he recently has had with Wladimir Putin and also with Zhu Rongji.

In essence: Putins feels to be delt in a dishonest way by the west and his humiliation might lead to some emotional reaction in the future.

Since the acquaintance between Voscherau and Putin goes back many years, stemming from times long before P. came to the top, P. appears to have been unusually

SEP 04 2001

Helmut Schmidt

Summer School

Hamburg, 20.8.2001

## Who governs the world in the 21st century?

As regards the title-question in your program, let me try to be a bit more modest. No professor nor even the most advanced computer can give you a prognosis covering the globe over a full century. And I am neither a knowing-it-all-professor nor a computer, but only an ordinary citizen, just a has-been political leader and – even worse – a life-time economist. Therefore I will limit myself to touch upon some of the phenomena which I do expect for the next couple of decades.

### I.

Any forecast, be it related to the weather or the economy or the tennis-tournament at Wimbledon, has to start from the facts and the tendencies of the present. Let me start by hinting to ten of the **factors that foreseeably enough will have a major impact on the future:**

1. You have to expect that the **global population** will continue to grow at the present pace which has no precedent in the 19th or any earlier century. Mankind did number 1 1/2 billion people in the year 1900, but by the year 2000 the figure had risen to beyond 6 billion. Within a few decades we will trespass 9 billion human beings. The space that is available

2

per person will further shrink. This population explosion is
in the main happening in Asia, in Africa and in Latin
America. In these three continents we will therefore have to
expect more local or regional wars, international as well as
intrastate, so-called civil wars.

2. Global warming is highly likely to continue, although we don't as yet have reliable forecasts as to the velocity of the increase of temperature. We do as well not have as yet reliable forecasts as to the climatic and physical living conditions in certain areas - for instance due to the rise of the level of the oceans or changes in the major oceanic currents. But we have to expect that global warming might in its effects intensify the afore mentioned conflicts.

3. Population growth plus climatic changes plus wars will cause growing tendencies for migration. Europe and North America will ever more become attractive for potential immigration, whether legal or otherwise.

4. At the same time, globalisation of information and of technology will continue. During the last two decades the number of human beings, whose lives directly or indirectly are under strong influence of economic globalisation have doubled, due to the opening of China and to the liberation of almost 30 states which hitherto had been dominated by the Soviet leadership and had been closed off from the global economy. It is unclear, whether and to what extent quite a few of the developing countries will as well open up

3

[LC]

to fuller participation in the global economy.

5. But recent experience appears to suggest that _only strictly organized developing countries can economically and socially benefit from globalisation_. South-Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong-Kong and as well the People's Republic of China did well under strict one-party-rule. One might – with some reservation – call these examples economically enlightened dictatorships. On the other hand a greater number of developing countries tried to establish democracy, but failed economically or politically – or both at the same time. The collapse of the Soviet Union was in the main due to the abrupt introduction of both perestrojka and glasnost over night.

6. Clearly a number of relatively new, _non-traditional security problems are looming large_ over the horizon, like international drug traffic, international organized crime and also terrorism, small arms traffic, Aids, BSE, foot and mouth and other diseases.

7. The _emphasis of national governments on strong military capabilities is still uninterrupted_. This goes as well for the developing countries, were on average the military expenditure is many times higher than the development aid (ODA), which they receive. It is also true in the field of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction; within the last 5 decades the number of nuclear weapons states has increased from one to presently eight – its further

4

increase seems rather likely. The technologically far
advanced countries are undertaking strong efforts to
qualitatively improve most of their military capabilities.

8. At the demise of the Soviet Union some people, f.i. in the U.S., thought of a <u>new era in the global power constellation</u>; they foresaw an end of the balance of power-game, America remaining as the only superpower and expected a so-called „peace dividend“. But today it is obvious China is to be respected as a worldpower, still Russia as well, maybe later on as well India and Brazil.

Japan will at least figure as an economic and financial world power. The same seems likely in regard of the European Union, although it will take at least all the three oncoming decades until we in the EU will truly arrive at one common foreign and security policy.

In other words: To maintain peace between the major powers of the world will as well in future necessitate the sense and the will for balance and fair compromise – plus highly skilled diplomacy.

9. The <u>globalisation of information</u> will also need diligence.
Beside its undeniable advantages we must as well expect
new forms of crimes; also globally dominant or even
monopolist networks are thinkable; they <u>might become</u>
<u>capable to originate worldwide political or ideological</u>
<u>campaigns, also mass psychoses</u>. The Europe-wide

5

[LC]

emotions at the car accident and death of a hitherto disputed English princess, created by the electronic mass media, has given us a foretaste, as well as the TV-pictures of injured and dead humans in Kosovo, the latter were useful for stimulating public opinion to agree to military intervention against Serbia.

10. This leads me to my last example of existing tendencies which will have an impact on our common future, namely the _forecast of a clash between civilisations_. Certainly the danger of a general clash between Islam and Western civilisation cannot be ruled out as unthinkable. But it would be an unexcusable mistake to think of such a clash as being unavoidable and thereby make the forecast of a possibility into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In other words: Under the circumstances of the ever higher density of the worlds population and ever higher interdependence, religious and ideological tolerance and respect for others' beliefs becomes an indispensable necessity.

## II.

If we compare the beginning of the new century with the beginning of the 20th century we can observe new chances and new challenges at the same time. Some of the old dangers will continue to exist. But others may wither away – like the danger of global war. A couple of decades ago the

6

Club of Rome has lamented loudly about future catastrophies; many young people professed their „Angst“ and somebody called the whole era the „Age of Anxiety“.

Today we find a much more positive mood, particularly in Europe, in the US and also f. i. in China. But the dream of one common world governance has outlived the end of the student revolt of 1968. Historically the dream is much older. After World War I the League of Nations was one first attempt. After 1945, again under American leadership, the UN and its Security Council was a new start. The UN and all its affiliate organisations over more than half a century have not done badly; but they are all together far from what could be called „global governance“. The criticisms of the UN, of the Worldbank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organisation or the G8 are manyfold. A few criticisms are perfectly legitimate. A few of the Non-Governmental-Organisations (NGO’s) have good cases – like for instance Amnesty International.

But some other NGO’s and some of the organized international protestors at Seattle or Genoa tend to evolve from theoretical idealism into violence; some may in the end even become terrorists. They are quite right when they deplore the unjust and unfair distribution of wealth and well-being on the globe. They are wrong in blaming multinational corporations and economic globalisation for all severe shortcomings in the world. But they have not so far come up with any realistic recipes. Their proposals could only be

7

implemented by global dictates, not by democratic decisions
within sovereign states.

They still must learn how difficult and delicate the task of a
democratic leader is, when he has to convince his national
public and electorate of the necessity of transnational
objectives, policies and institutions and how almost
impossible it is to entice popular acception of the
unavoidable losses of national autonomy and of the
necessary economic sacrifices. Take as an illustrative
example the last Irish referendum; the Irish gladly are
receiving enormous financial help from the EU but they have
refused the further enlargement of EU because it would
mean a reduction of Irish net receipts.

Democratic leadership in the age of globalisation,
particularly collective international leadership towards
Global Governance, is much more difficult than democratic
leadership has always been in the age of the sovereign
nation state. For being successful as a collectively acting
international leader in the era of television, you may know
your goal, you may know the necessary ways and means,
but you need to convince the majority of your national
public, meaning that you - on top of it all - have to be a
fairly impressive television actor.

Often enough TV is enticing political leaders into sheer
opportunism. I was not amused when I watched an American
president siding with the protestors at Seattle against WTO,

8

an institution of global governance in which his own
country and he himself were exerting much of the
leadership. And I as well think it was a bit more of
opportunism than realism when in September last year 187
heads of State and of Government at the so-called UN-
Millenium summit declared their resolve „to halve by the year
2015 the proportion of the worlds people whose income is
less than one Dollar a day“. (Let me add within brackets:
except in case that they did calculate the decay of the
purchasing power of one Dollar.)

High hopes at the beginning of a new century are quite
normal. To achieve one's goals one will have to use the
existing institutions and procedures plus their improvement
and reforms or replacement plus additional ones. So far the
world is still governed in the main by national governments,
only partially by <u>global</u> institutions, partially by multilateral
and also bilateral treaties. One might call it a multi-level-
governance or a governance of variable geometry.

### III.

The best working global institutions are still the
international regulations of all traffic in the air and on the
high seas; they serve their limited purpose outstandingly
well.

The <u>by far most important global institution is the UN</u>,
—including its Security Council and the General Secretary. It
has endured the long decades of cold war, serving peace

9

reasonably well – despite and even with the help of the
inevitable right to Veto by a few big powers. But it has to be
noted that not only two powerful multilateral Alliance-
Systems but also a great variety of bilateral and multilateral
treaties have served the abstention from hot warfare quite
successfully, for instance the Non-Proliferation-Treaty (NPT),
also ABM (at least so far), SALT, the Testban-Treaty and so
on.

As yet there does not appear any necessity to change in
principle the existing system of the UN and of the global
constellation of security institutions. But a few recent
events can lead to future complications. On the one hand
the military intervention by NATO against Milosevic's Serbia
was a clear violation of the UN-Charter. It was argued that for
urgent and overwhelmingly imperative humanitarian reasons
one just had to act, although the Security Council had not
taken a vote to do so. One can only hope that this action will
not serve as a precedent for the future; otherwise the
Security Council may become obsolete and the violation of
international treaties may once again become fashionable.

On the other hand the US have announced their intention to
build a National Defense against Missiles (NMD). This
requires either a re-negotiation of the ABM-treaty or its
termination. It will in any event change the security situation
of the world powers. It might contribute to a closer security
cooperation between China and Russia. In any event

10

changes of the multifaceted global security institutions seem inevitable.

It is forseeable that the US will for the next two or more decades have a considerably greater weight in collective global governance than during the cold war. It will require tact and skill to avoid the attitudes of hegemony. Most of the existing global institutions stem from American initiatives and leadership (only the OECD, the Helsinki final act plus OSCE and the G7/8 summits are noteworthy exceptions). It could lead to a deplorable chaotic situation if the US would choose to either abondon the institutions which they once have instigated or to dominate them.

#### IV.

The World Bank has always been dominated by Washington, to a somewhat lesser degree also the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the GATT (nowadays called WTO). These three institutions of world governance have great influence over developing countries and countries in financial crisis. A redefinition of the tasks of the IMF - which has lost its original purpose to maintain a global system of fixed exchange rates already 30 years ago - into the direction of supervision of the globalized financial markets and the highly speculative behaviour of some of its participants appears desirable. Until today the IMF mainly acts as an ever ready lender of last resort for sovereign states, but indirectly as well it is acting as a rescue for related loans and credits given by private Western financial corporations. Such rescue

11

is advantageous for Zürich, London, Frankfurt and
Wallstreet, but by no means is it perfect global financial
governance. It seems likely to me that the IMF can and will
be reformed within the next 20 years.

I am much less confident about the World Trade
Organisation. It has done much to globally liberalize trade. It
has provoked also the creation of so-called Free Trade
areas, which have chosen to efficiently protect some of their
industries, particularly agricultural production. This is true
for the USA, for the EU and for Japan – much to the
disadvantage of a number of developing economies, which
could offer cereals and other foodstuff at much lower prices.
The still very powerful OPEC-Cartel, in collusion with a small
number of globally active oil corporations, is another
violation of the principle of free trade. On top of it you have
a number of unilaterally imposed trade sanctions.

All the offences against the enshrined principle of free trade
are due to national egoisms – committed either by national
governments or by democratic majorities inside sovereign
countries. I am fairly convinced that democracy in the
nations of Western civilisation will last in the 21st century,
but I cannot nourish great hopes that national egoism will
wither away. Still I like to register the fact that the Brussels
Commission of the EU has recently been able to prevent a
giant merger in a foreign continent that was threatening to
create a global market domination by one company.

12

Nevertheless, there is no great hope for a global governance
over fair competition in global markets.

The G7 summits, nowadays G8, have never really been an
institution of global governance, although it may appear
otherwise, which misinterpretation is due to their overloaded
agendas, their pompous statements and their ridiculous
public relations- and TV-circus. They will also in oncoming
decades not become a powerful institution, unless they
come back to the original practice, namely meeting far away
from press and television, at a secluded valley or island, just
the chiefs plus their foreign and finance ministers. Such
rather personal and intimate exchanges are indeed useful –
because none of the heads of government is a seasoned
diplomat, all of them will speak plainly, all will be left on their
own. They will learn thereby and understand, especially
those who are new in office. Of course it is highly desirable
to include China, also India and as well Brazil.

V.

Summit-meetings do nowadays abound, whether as UN, G8
or WTO or NATO or every six month EU, a waste of effort.
Even greater is the waste, the gap between costs and
effectiveness, in most permanent global institutions. They
abound of bureaucrats and bureaucratic red tape and are
characterized by the absence of democratic control. **But the
democratic deficit of any global body is in fact unavoidable.**
Therefore anybody who favors more powerful institutions for
global governance, ought to be aware of the lurking

13

Leviathan, namely the evergrowing selfish and tyrannical
but de facto uncontrollable bureaucracy.

But still, many people do believe in additional global
controls lest otherwise _globalized capitalism_ will emerge as
the ultimate regent of the whole world. Such fear is indeed
plausible. In my view there are three areas in which
potentially _dangerous effects of transnational capitalism_ are
obvious:

1. The spread of the _ridiculous ideology_ that elevates „shareholder value“ into the one and only principle of entrepreneurial behaviour can lead to deep going cultural changes. Mergers and takeovers normally lead to cutting jobs. Raiders do not feel guilt to put off tens of thousands of employees. The ideology of a managements natural right to hire and fire is indeed spreading. It goes against ingrained cultural traditions in Europe, in Japan and elsewhere. In the end at least the European democracies will resist a de-routing of our inherited principles of social civilisation. But the results in parts of Asia and Latin America and in most of Africa may be quite different.

2. The global financial markets are an area in which private banking corporations may become too powerful at the expenses of democratically elected governments. We have already seen, about one decade ago, how a privately owned, highly leveraged speculative investment fund could force the British government to devalue sterling. We more recently

14

have witnessed how another highly leveraged fund could
force the U.S. Federal Reserve System to come to its rescue
in order to avoid a domino effect of collapses. The financial
markets and particularly the traffic in short term money do
need globally applied regulations – otherwise some big
private financial houses and corporations may acquire too
much political power. The big banks do not presently govern
the world, but they do have the potential to bring a heavy
political weight to bear on their national governments.

3. As a European I am also worried about the present advances and spreading of influence of privately owned and managed global information systems, from TV to the internet. We have witnessed f.i. how they created the global psychosis that made millions of people to believe in the wrongly so-called „new economy“ and buy new technology stocks at ridiculous prices. We are also witnessing an owner of TV-channels becoming the political head of 60 million Italians.

Global information and propaganda-systems are indeed
capable to exert economic and political and cultural
influences far beyond their home country. There is a
looming potential for usurption of parts of global
governance. Not so much capitalism as such but specifically
TV- and information-capitalism may become a global
challenge. It may even develop into a challenge to
democracy.

15

VI.

One might ask: **What kind and what degree of global governance appears desirable?** The answers might differ due to one's national and cultural background. As a European I would mention seven points:

1. The desirability to maintain any nations ability to determine its constitution and to decide its own affairs by themselves. Only so far as their national means are not sufficient to solve a problem, due to the transnational specifics of that problem, only in so far is **subsidiarily transnational or even global governance desirable**.

2. Any kind of international and of global authority **should be based on consensus and treaty between sovereign states.**

3. The UN is to be **maintained and also strengthened**. Its Security Council ought to be **the one and only authority that has the right to legitimate the use of military force outside national borders** - except in cases of self-defense.

4. Among the most urgent of new or improved treaties and agreements is a **new concept for the World Bank and Official Development Aid: O.D.A.** ought to be made conditional on a recipient country's efforts to efficiently establish planned parenthood and on the countries limitation of its military armaments and budget.

16

5. A new concept for the IMF also is desirable; its main future task should be to maintain efficient rules of behaviour and fair order in global financial markets.

6. A global compact is desirable in order to limit the emittance of greenhouse gases and also other human activities that contribute to global warming.

7. A worldwide system of new or of improved treaties is desirable in order to limit armaments. This ought to embrace nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, also means for warfare in outer space, also land mines, and – most important of all – curtail the export of weapons, particularly of small weapons etc. etc.

VII.

So far for the desirable goals. But what will happen in reality? It is an eternal problem of mankind that there always is a great gap between our wishes and hopes and on the other hand the ugly reality. Also in the oncoming decades will the desirable only to a very limited degree become reality. What in reality is likely to happen during the next 30 years?

My guess is, that we will see many geographically limited wars. Neither the UN nor NATO will be able to prevent them. In the contrary the charter of the U.N. will many times be violated by U.N.-member states. The afore mentioned desirable agreements will partially be realised but it will take

17

long years, and several crises will occur along the road. And sadly enough, any sweeping limitation of arms exports is unlikely.

The population explosion will go on. Unsufficiently governed overpopulated developing countries will suffer as hitherto. Well organized countries will gain from globalization, as far as they enable themselves to adapt their economies to new technologies and new competitors. The Americans will in effect dominate in many fields.

**America** will for quite some time remain to be more equal than the other world powers. One cannot exclude the possibility that Americans willfully try to exert control over other countries. A cold war between the U.S. and China is becoming thinkable; in such case the EU would be faced with a difficult decision.

**The EU** has created one major crisis for itself by offering membership to a dozen countries without sufficient structural and financial preparation; disappointments are due to happen. It will probably take **more than the next three decades** until the EU develops into a **world power** – but this must not let the Europeans shrink back. After all the European integration process, starting with Jean Monnets Schuman-Plan, has so far taken 50 years – its completion might alltogether take 100 years. Don't be too impatient!

18

VIII.

My last remark is addressing you, the highly intelligent
young women and men at the Summer School. It is you, who
will be faced with growing future problems of global
governance. Many of you will become leaders, be it in
manufacturing or commerce or financing, be it in academia
or in the political arena. You will need a good overview prior
to making decisions which do affect others. They may affect
others even beyond your national borders. You may be
confronted with the tension between the interest of your
corporation and on the other hand the interest of the
community or the society or the country. You may even be
confronted with the dilemma of national sovereignty versus
global governance.

Growing global interdependence means a growing potential
for conflict as well as for compromise. Nobody is entitled to
exclusively pursue his or her rights and claims. Every human
also does have responsibilities and moral duties. No
leadership without accountability!

And please, do not ever forget the ancient Roman wisdom
which was relayed to us by Cicero: Salus *publica* suprema
lex.

[Y]

Helmut Schmidt

Hamburg, 20.8.2001

**Who governs the world in the 21st century?**

2

an ordinary citizen, just a has-been
political leader and – even worse – a life-
time economist. Therefore I will limit
myself to touch upon some of the
phenomena which I do expect for the
next couple of decades.

I.

Because any forecast, be it related to
the weather or the economy or the
tennis-tournament at Wimbledon, has to
start from the facts and the tendencies
of the present. Let me start by hinting to
ten of the factors that foreseeably

enough will have a major impact on the
<u>future:</u>

1. You have to expect that the <u>global</u>
<u>population</u> will continue to grow at the
present pace which has no precedent in
the 19th or any earlier century. Mankind
did number 1 1/2 billion people in the
year 1900, a hundred years later by the
year 2000 the figure had risen to beyond
6 billion. Within a few decades into the
21st century we will trespass 9 billion
human beings. The space that is

available per person will further shrink.

This population explosion is in the main
happening in Asia, in Africa and in Latin
America. In these 3 continents, we will therefore have to
expect more local or regional wars,
international as well as intrastate, so-
called civil wars in these three
continents.

5

[Y]

well not have as yet reliable forecasts as
to the climatic and physical living
conditions in certain areas – for
instance, the rise of the level of the
oceans or changes in the major oceanic
currents. But we have to expect that
global warming might in its effects
intensify the afore mentioned conflicts.

3. Population growth plus climatic changes will cause growing tendencies for migration. Europe and North America will ever more become

4. At the same time, <u>globalisation of information and of technology will continue.</u> During the last two decades the number of human beings, whose lives directly or indirectly are under strong influence of economic <u>globalisation</u>/have doubled, due to the opening of China and to the liberation of almost 30 states which hitherto had been dominated by the Soviet

leadership and had been closed off from
the global economy. It is unclear,
whether and to what extent quite a few
of the developing countries will as well
open up to fuller participation in the
global economy.

5. But recent experiences appear to suggest that only strictly organized developing countries can economically and socially benefit from globalisation.
South-Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong-Kong and as well the People's Republic

8

of China did well under strict one-party-
rule. One might – with some reservation
– call these examples economically
enlightened dictatorships. On the other
hand a greater number of developing
countries tried to establish democracy,
but failed economically or politically – or
both at the same time. The collapse of
the Soviet Union was in the main due to
the abrupt introduction of both
perestrojka and glasnost over night.

9

[Y]

7. The _emphasis of national governments on strong military capabilities is still uninterrupted._ This goes as well for the developing countries, were on average the military expenditure is many times

10

higher than the development aid (ODA),
which they receive. It is also true in the
field of nuclear weapons and other
means of mass destruction; within the
last 5 decades the number of nuclear
weapons states has increased from one
to presently eight – its further increase
seems rather likely. The technologically
far advanced countries are undertaking
strong efforts to qualitatively improve
most of their military capabilities.

11

8. At the demise of the Soviet Union some people, f.i. in the U.S., thought of a new era in the global power constellation; they foresaw an end of the balance of power-game, America remaining as the only superpower and even expected a so-called „peace dividend“. But today it is obvious China is to be respected as a worldpower, still Russia as well, maybe later on as well India and Brazil.

In other words: To maintain peace
between the major powers of the world
will as well in future necessitate the
sense and will for balance and fair
compromise - plus highly skilled
diplomacy.

9. The _globalisation of information_ will also need diligence. Beside its undeniable advantages we must as well expect new forms of crimes; also globally dominant or even monopolist networks are thinkable; they _might_ become capable to originate worldwide political or ideological campaigns, also _mass psychoses_. The Europe-wide emotions at the car accident and death of a hitherto disputed English princess, created by the electronic mass media, has given us a foretaste, as well as the

14

10. This leads me to my last example of existing tendencies which will have an impact on our common future, namely the **forecast of a clash between civilisations**. Certainly the danger of a general clash between Islam and Western civilisation cannot be ruled out as unthinkable. But it would be an

15

In other words: Under the
circumstances of the ever higher
density of the worlds population and
ever higher interdependence, religious
and ideological tolerance and respect
for the others beliefs becomes an
indispensible necessity.

16

II.

If we compare the beginning of the new
century with the beginning of the 20th
century we can observe new chances
and new challenges at the same time.
Some of the old dangers will continue to
exist, ~~but~~ others may wither away – like the
danger of global war. A couple of
decades ago the Club of Rome has
lamented loudly about future
catastrophies; many young people
professed their „Angst“ and somebody

17

18

new start. The UN and all its affiliate
organisations over more than half a
century have not done badly; but they
are all together far from / what could be
called „global governance“.
The
criticisms of the UN, of the Worldbank,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the World Trade Organisation or the G8
are manyfold. Some criticisms are
perfectly legitimate. Some of the Non-
Governmental-Organisations (NGO's)
have good cases – like for instance
Amnesty International.

19

But some NGO's and some of the organized international protestors at Seattle or Genoa tend to evolve from theoretical idealism into violence; some may in the end even become terrorists.

They blame multinational corporations and economic globalisation for all severe shortcomings in the world. But they have not so far come up with any realistic recipes. Their utopian proposals could only be implemented by

Democratic leadership in the age of
globalisation, particularly collective
international leadership towards Global
Governance, is much more difficult than
always democratic leadership has been in the
age of the sovereign nation state. For

22

being successful as a <u>collectively acting</u>
<u>international</u> leader in the era of
television, you may know your goal, you
may know the necessary ways and
means, but you need to convince the
majority of your <u>national</u> public,
meaning that you – on top of it all – have
to be a fairly impressive television actor.

Often enough TV is enticing political
leaders into opportunism. I was not
amused when I watched an American
president siding with the protestors at

Seattle against WTO, an institution of
global governance in which his own
~~and he himself were~~
country is exerting much of the
leadership. And I as well think/it was a
bit more of opportunism than realism/
when in September last year 187 heads
of State and of Government at the so-
called UN-Millenium summit declared
their resolve "to halve by the year 2015
the proportion of the worlds people
whose income is less than one Dollar a
day". (let me add without brackets: except
in Case that they did calculate the decay of
the purchasing power of one dollar).

High hopes at the beginning of a new
century are quite normal. To achieve the
goals one will have to use the existing
institutions and procedures plus their
improvement and reforms or
replacement plus additional ones. So far
the world is governed in the main by
national governments, only partially by
**global** institutions, partially by
multilateral and also bilateral treaties.
One might call it a multi-level-
governance or a governance of variable
geometry.

25

### III.

The by far most important global institution is the UN, including its Security Council and the General Secretary. It has endured the long decades of cold war, serving peace

26

reasonably well – despite and even with
the help of the inevitable right to Veto by
a few big powers. But it has to be noted
that not only two powerful multilateral
Alliance-Systems but also a great
variety of bilateral and multilateral
treaties have served the abstention from
hot warfare quite successfully, for
instance the Non-Proliferation-Treaty
(NPT), also ABM (at least so far), SALT,
the Testban-Treaty and so on.

As yet there does not appear any
necessity to change in principle the
existing system of the UN and of the
global constellation of security
institutions. But a few recent events can
lead to future complications. On the one
hand the military intervention by NATO
against Milosevic's Serbia was a clear
violation of the UN-Charter. It was
argued that for urgent and
overwhelmingly imperative
humanitarian reasons one had to act,
although the Security Council had not

28

On the other hand the US have
announced their intention to build a
National Defense against Missiles
(NMD). This requires either a re-
negotiation of the ABM-treaty or its
termination. It will in any event change

29

the security situation of the world
powers. It might contribute to a closer
security cooperation between China and
Russia. In any event, changes of the
multifaceted global security institutions
seem inevitable.

30

existing global institutions stem from
American initiatives and leadership
(only the OECD, the Helsinki final act
plus OSCE and the G7/8 summits are
noteworthy exceptions). It could lead to
a deplorable chaotic situation if the US
would choose to either abondon the
institutions which they have instigated
to dominate them.

IV.

31

somewhat lesser degree also the
<u>International Monetary Fund (IMF)</u> and
the <u>GATT</u> (nowadays called <u>WTO</u>).
These three institutions of world
governance have great influence over
developing countries and countries in
financial crisis. A <u>redefinition of the</u>
<u>tasks of the IMF</u> - which has lost its
original purpose to maintain a global
system of fixed exchange rates already
30 years ago - into the direction of
supervision of the globalized financial
markets and the highly speculative

behaviour of some of its participants
appears desirable. Until today the IMF
mainly acts as an ever ready lender of
last resort for sovereign states, but
indirectly as well as a rescue for related
loans and credits by private Western
financial corporations. Such rescues are
advantageous for Zürich, London,
Frankfurt and Wallstreet, but by no
means is it perfect global financial
governance. It seems likely to me that
the IMF can and will be reformed within
the next 20 years.

I am much less confident about the
<u>World Trade Organisation</u>. It has done
much to globally liberalize trade. ~~But~~ It
has provoked also the creation of so-
called Free Trade areas, which have
chosen to efficiently protect some of
their industries, particularly agricultural
production. This is true for the USA, for
the EU and for Japan – much to the
disadvantage of a number of developing
economies, which could offer cereals
and other foodstuff at much lower

prices. The still very powerful OPEC-
Cartel, in collusion with a small number
of globally active oil corporations, is
another violation of the principle of free
trade. On top of it you have a number of
unilaterally imposed trade sanctions.

As I am fairly convinced that democracy

in the nations of Western civilisation will
last in the 21st century, I cannot nourish
great hopes that national egoism will
wither away. Still, I like to register the
fact that the Brussels Commission of
the EU has recently been able to prevent
a giant merger in a foreign continent
that was threatening to create a market
domination by one company.