DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
General Wheeler
5/5/70 8:25 a.m.

K: I just talked to the President. He wanted to make sure that you and Mel will be as positive as possible. Say we never meant to go to COS Headquarters as an operation, but the supplies that support it.

W: That's right.

K: If you can explain that he'd be most appreciative.

W: Okay. That other operation is in the news.

K: Right.

W: So I had better explain that, and that it's a 10 day operation.

K: Right.

By

NARA, Dale

5/26

TELCORN

Haldeman/Kissinger

11:50 am

5/5/70

H: How did that go?

K: He was superb. I would tell him.

H: His point of getting it out is solid. Maybe we can get it out. He doesn't think we are doing anything right.

K: I am really taking the heat in academia.

H: Academia is doing itself proud. Ten college presidents are encouraging their students to strike.

K: They are cowards. I have a meeting to run to.

H: Can we jazz up the alien antenna story?

K: It's true. Sure we can.

H: We can get good play out of it.

K: I will get it up to you.

H: Something with a little mystery.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
MacGeorge Bundy

5/5/70 12:15 p.m.

B: Hard work I'm sure.

K: That is right.

B: I'm going to be in Washington for one of those Airly House
palavers and I'm spending until Friday afternoon and after Sunday morn-
ing with some friends. I'll like to see you. Should I come in Friday or
Sunday? If those times are no good, I'll see you another time.

K: No, I want to see you. Let's aim for 5:30 - 6:00 Friday.

B: I have to leave at 1:30 on Friday.

K: Then let's aim for 10:30 Friday. Or could you come for
breakfast?

B: Yes.

K: 7:45.

B: At the White House?

K: Would you mind?

B: No, I regard it as a good address.

K: I'm getting letters from angry academicians who want to
run me out of academia.

B: KXX Be of good heart. The one absolute rule is never to get
angry back. I did once, and I regret it.

K: No, I'm not answering them. Good see you Friday.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon
General Wheeler
5/5/70 3:30 p.m.

K: Buzz?

W: Yes Mel.

K: No, you got the wrong pain in the neck. We are having
a briefing for the House and Senate foreign relations committees and
we want a rather technical briefing by the military. But, given their
argument that the military is pushing us into it, we wondered whether
Vogt would be the right man.

W: I think so.

K: Do you think that's the right way to do it? You know Fulbright
will go out on the steps and say we heard from the architect of this disaster--
Wheeler.

W: No, I think that's fine. Mel knows about this?

K: Mel is on his way to Georgia.

W: I didn't know that.

K: I'll tell Packard now.

W: Yes, just let Packard know.

K: Good.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Professor Doty

5/5/70 3:45 p.m.

K: You're coming tomorrow for the lunch with the Russians?

D: Yes. I've been trying to find out if it's still on with them.

K: Oh it's still on with them. If our students had as much sense as the Russians, we'd be in good shape.

D: I see.

K: They ostentaciously invited me to the Embassy yesterday. We've had several good exchanges with them. If we can just keep the country from blowing up in the next four weeks, it will be a net gain.

D: Well, we'll see.

K: I'll talk with you about it tomorrow.

D: Bartov (?) began our conversations with the litany on why they had been disappointed in the last few months. They talk about the House [or Senate?] resolution and how the White House had snubbed it.

K: Well, I'm putting on that lunch in the residence in the library so they will get White House service. I'm inviting Imosentsev (?). His feelings were hurt that he wasn't invited.

D: I knew they were, but Arbatov and Milyenshikov told me not to. I think Arbatov is the key person.

K: I had lunch with Menshikov today. He was effusive in his protestations of the desire to have good relations. If they had been turned off they would have been cooler. At a party given by Jeremy Stone, they were more friendly than the Americans present. Anyway they are coming tomorrow, and I don't think Menshikov would have come if a few days' freeze were on. Okay see you tomorrow.

D: Okay. 1:00.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Farley/Kissinger
3:52 pm 5/5/70

K: I keep seeing you at parties for Russians.

F: I decided it's more important that you talk to them than me. What I called about/-- Zyno... called yesterday afternoon and asked if his committee could be given a briefing Thurs. afternoon. My disposition is to be accomodating.

K: I agree.

F: I didn't want to be committed without checking with you.

K: But why more quixotic today?

F: Hal Sonnenfeldt and I have a letter in from a source in Vienna that says they will be ____ tomorrow.

K: That's not what they said yesterday.

F: I didn't think it was consistent with even a reasonable reading. If you don't see an objection I will say I will do it and if something happens tomorrow we can ask for time.

K: Do you think they will break off?

F: No.

K: They may delay for a week but they won't break off.

F: The meeting is scheduled tomorrow. There is only one this week for May Day. But today they haven't given any information along that line.

K: They wouldn't walk out, would they?

F: Well, they would want the most dramatic way.

K: They wouldn't want to embarrass us with the students. No, do that. I think the way this has been backstopped here is ______ great.

F: If you will get Gerry to sign a statement to that I will be more easy in my job.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON

Phil Geylin/Kissinger

7:12 pm

5/5/70

G: I would like to talk to you at some point if you think that's feasible.

K: Sure.

G: I don't have a feeling of particularly understanding what's going on.

K: Can I call you tomorrow morning and set a time? I will see you this week sometime.

G: I am going to Airlie House Friday.

K: Mac Bundy called and said he was going to something.

G: It's a continuing nuclear seminar on arms (control?).

K: They don't invite me it's so? ? ? ? ?

G: They invite you and treat him disgracefully. And you know what they're going to say.

K: That's one of the discouraging things about these is that you can predict the speeches ahead of time. My life right now is incredibly hectic. Every friend from academia is writing me unfriedly letters.

G: Academia isn't where the understanding is.

K: I will be delighted to see you and I will call you tomorrow.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Milton Katz/Mr. Kissinger

7:20 p.m., May 5, 1970

K: How are you?

MK: Is there any chance we could get together over the weekend?

K: Are you going to be down here?

MK: I can come down.

K: I could probably see you on Sunday. Could you call me on Friday? What would you like to discuss?

MK: The Cambodian move, the reaction to it and, more importantly, what's to be done. The reaction is devastating -- very, very bad. I want to explore it in depth, seriously and practically, with you.

K: I will be delighted to talk with you as always. Just for your own information, I notice on the campuses everyone thinks we are going into Cambodia to stay. The one thing you can tell to those who are seriously concerned is that we have no intention of being in there more than 2 months.

MK: The President said July 1.

K: That's the very outside.

MK: This thing is splitting as so often. There is what you and the other had in mind -- our understanding is totally different. Let's not talk about it on the phone. [to which K agreed]

MK: We spent most of the day with our students trying to get things straightened out.

K: If you have a reasonable student delegation, I would be delighted to meet with them. I met with a Princeton group today.

MK: We will talk about arranging that. First, I want to talk with you and then we will decide what to do next.

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/John Roche

7:25 p.m., May 5, 1970

R: Are you holding up?

K: We are not going to yield.

R: Panic comes and it goes by. Are you going to fight back?

K: In a little bit.

R: One way to break its back would be to let something go to the Israelis -- a statement typing it up. You have to sock those bastards. Jackson refused to tackle them. I don't see what you have to lose. It should be laid into them hard. I understand your problem.

K: We are not neglecting the Israeli angle.

R: We didn't either, but we never got publicity for it. I got a statement out of the former Ambassador (who is President of Hebrew University) and they wouldn't let me use it. ... to tie these things in a bag. There is a lot of support that we have to get out and fight. We have to stand on this position. I think you could split it right down the middle. How did you make out with the people on the Hill?

K: President did well with the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Armed Services Committee was no problem.

R: The Yarborough thing has them scared.

K: Let them scream for 4 weeks. This is not going to last more than 5-6 weeks. The kids were rioting before the Cambodian announcement -- it's the weak faculties.

R: It's the behavior of the university faculties and administrations. I don't see why you have to sit back and take this XIX stuff from the college presidents.

K: We will take it for a few weeks and then hit back. They can't stop us for the next few weeks.

R: These kids can't vote against the President more than once.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/John Roche

7:25 p.m., May 5, 1970

K: We are relaxed about these guys. Hanoi has not shot its wad -- it tried in October and is trying now. I appreciate more than I can say what you have done, but we are going through with this unless they cut off our appropriations. If they don't do that, we are going. Tell your friends we are not going to be driven off -- even if they burn down every campus in the country.

R: They weren't our voters.

K: They are not all that sure of themselves. I had a Princeton group in here. It was nice to talk to you. Let me know the dates you will be in Europe.

R: I will send them to you.

K: Send me your itinerary and I will get the world out.

lds

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/John Ehrlichman

7:53 p.m., May 5, 1970

E: How did you get along?

K: He was superlative. I am supposed to KMX buck you up -- on your wailing with him. He says, "John is under pressure -- he needs bucking up. Students panic him." Students don't panic me, so if you need any help...

E: I just had six Kent State boys in.

K: K had 10 Princeton boys.

E: This was simply on the general subject of what happened at Kent State.

K: What I said earlier is not what the President said -- he said to hold firm. We musn't conciliate them. Are you cheered up?

E: I'm currently advocating a Presidential Commission to go to Kent State. You will be staff KONSTANTK consultant.

K: I think that would be a good idea.

E: I think we have to start opening the window somehow to them.

K: To get the facts to them.

E: The President of Kent State wasn't there and the administration abdicated. Would you be on the Commission?

K: It depends on who you put on the Commission.

E: Herb Brownell, Dewey, Alf Landon.

K: Depending on the membership, I would certainly consider it. I believe the success of the operation will determine it. People are going to get sick and tired of these students.

E: We are going to have a pretty sizable flap on Saturday -- on the Elipse. Will you be out of town?

K: No, I will be here.

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

8:45 p.m., May 5, 1970

K: Cooper is at the Harriman's house. I didn't think I should call him there.

P: Don't call him there.

K: I will call first thing in the morning. We will be all set if that thing happens tomorrow. All we have is an intelligence report of what a Soviet journalist said to somebody in Geneva.

P: Sometimes those are tip-offs, and sometimes they don't mean anything.

K: Wanted to make sure that what I transmitted to you... We have a contingency statement for Ziegler to make tomorrow if it happens.

P: I think Rogers should make one, as well.

K: We shouldn't give a definite date, but...

P: When this action is completed, we will be ready to talk again. Don't give anything away.

K: This action is ironic since the weapons were transmitted in Soviet trucks down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and most of them were of Soviet manufacture.

P: Be sure to put that in.

lds

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Amb. Margain (Mexico)/Kissinger

11:05 am

5/6/70

M: I would like to extend to you an invitation in the name of the President of Mexico. He knows of your interest in football and soccer and he would like to invite you to the championship games whihhare going to be played in our country.

K: I would like that very much and I have never visited Mexico, which I also
would like to do very much.

M: Galo Plaza suggested he would like to go with you and they will accompany
you.

K: I am delighted to do it and accept with great pleasure. I talked to Galo Plaza
about a tentitive date. He thought June 17-21.

M: Any place and time you would like. The final contest would be interesting and if you took in the other games you could visit Guaßalajara and other cities.
You are thinking about the 17th?

K: He mentioned that one in the city you named and that's a Wed. and stay through Sunday. This would be with great pleasure. Of course, I am not completely master of my life. Otherwise I would like to do it.

M: We know that and we hope that you will be able to visit my country. I will
inform my government. Thank you very much for calling back.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCONE
Laird/Kissinger

6:08 pm

5/6/70

K: The whole academic community is descending on me.

L: Are they talking with you?

K: They are getting more aggressive.

L: We won our vote but don't let it shock you -- 121 - 144.

K: You thought they should be a wider margin?

L: On the Findley thing I thought we would do a little better. Early today we got word that we should -- through public relations people -- meet with reporters and give them the decision making process.

K: From whom?

L: Klein. LOOK has met with Colson, Magruder and Chappin. They have the times of the meetings. They think they have to that I recommended that earlier and then it was shot off.

K: That's disgraceful.

L: I have told Hencken to talk to nobody. I told Freidheim that the President decision making process was not going to be discussed. I said all he was going to say today at the briefing. The planes were made and I supported them. But to get into that -- they will whip saw.

K: I don't know where Klein gets off. Let me check with him.

L: I have told my people they cannot discuss meetings and times. I am sure that the stories from these kind of briefs will divide instead of unite.

K: In your judgment - The President thought at ______ the Congress was with him. You think it doesn't?

L: Privately, I thought the vote -- 144 decided to use some other vehicle. They didn't accept the Findley bill because it was so close.

K: That's what happened?

L: I don't think we should admit that.

K: What do you think of the student things?

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Laird/Kissinger

6:08 pm

5/6/70

-2-

L: It's tough. There are people who are against the whole war. They are jumping on this and using it. They are trying to misuse the students.

K: We will be through with these in 3 weeks, won't we?

L: 3-6 weeks. We are limiting them. I don't know where the President got that mileage.

K: To hell with that. ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

L: ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On the (Fisk) riverine operation we have Americans in on that. It won't go up for a couple of days.

K: He understands it too. We talked about it this morning.

L: Maybe I am not getting the right dope.

K: He was thinking of the NSDM.

L: I thought he was going to give the riverine thing away.

K: He almost did. How are the operations going?

L: Fine. There will be press people saying these things aren't going well but most people recognize they are going okay. Kalb will say it's living up to Pentagon expectations. We can't police that. We put out that it's better than our expectations. So is Wheeler and Abrams.

K: OK.

L: One other thing. We have got to insist on one thing and you have to help. As we have inserted these people over there they have to have a plan for the use of these troops. Most of these Khmers have never been in a city and to let them wander around Penom Penh -- they have no use for them. They don't have a hell of a lot to do.

K: We will raise that tomorrow at the meeting.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

7:17 pm

5/6/70

L: How did it go?

K: Tremendous. The President did a superlative job. Cooper and Aiken will be cautious now. The President liked your briefing so well this morning he tried to get you but you were on your plane.

L: I thought it was better if I left because Bill was giving me the business about being there.

K: He understood. We got Johnny Vogt to do it.

L: The President understood, didn't he? I will be back tomorrow.

K: Yes. You know about those three other things.

L: You might as well go all out.

K: We will take the heat now and then we will be through. Those Senators didn't have the fighting spirit. Fulbright was nasty but not aggressive. The most obnoxious was Pell because he is a dope.

L: I just wanted to know how it went.

K: I was afraid it would be a disaster but I have never seen the President so effective.

L: Fine.

K: Thanks for calling. I will tell him you called.

L: You can reach me here all night.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Shultz/Kissinger
5-6-70 8:07 p.m.

(Missed first few moments of conversation)

S: . . . that sounds like a wild combination.

K: Where are you?

S: Bob Finch and I are in a dining room near your office. Have been discussing the domestic thing and how to handle it. It involves understanding the foreign scene and what is going on. Would like to talk with you about it.

K: You want to make some suggestions?

S: No, no suggestions. Procedure whereby we can know what is going on which we don't know now. I talked with Ehrlichman . . seems to think it would be OK with the President to have this set up . . . information system for the Administration so we can sound half-way intelligent when we talk to people.

K: Fine. I will be by in about five minutes.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON

Stuart Loory/Mr. Kissinger

9:45 p.m., May 6, 1970

L: I have been working several days trying to piece together the story of what has been going on during the last few months.

K: What conclusion did you draw?

L: I think I know what happened.

K: I thought you were going to tell me a story.

L: I would like to ask you some questions.

K: I will neither confirm nor deny. I don't want to give checklists.

L: The story as I have reconstructed it is: The President during the week before his April 20 speech had made up his mind to withdraw 150,000 troops over a year which is one of the options given to him on one of several schedules in the plan for troop withdrawals which was finished sometime after the Midway meeting. I am told there were 5 options that he could pick or choose at various times. I was told that General Abrams was arguing for a 35,000 withdrawal over 4 months -- which would be roughly 8,000 men per month, as opposed to 11,000-12,000 in the 150,000 figure. When the President went to Honolulu, Admiral McCain got one last crack to represent General Abrams' view and bring the President's views in line with Abrams'. The President remained firm with 150,000, but agreed to hear new arguments previously rejected on cleaning out the sanctuaries. McCain came to San Clemente on Monday and presented the same story to you that day. During the following week, the President was turned around not to go into the sanctuaries and by Saturday night had all been decided on a boatride on the Potomac.

K: The greater part of that is nonsense. McCain, at least in the briefing to me (I wasn't present when he talked to the President) -- didn't even mention the sanctuaries. I am practically certain sanctuaries were not mentioned in any context. I only saw him for 20 minutes. No one could have told you that -- he and I were the only two present. I had never heard sanctuaries mentioned in connection with withdrawal. It may kill a good story. Second, it is not true that any decisions were made on the boatride -- it was purely social.

By NAFA, Date 5/26

Stuart Loory/Mr. Kissinger

9:45 p.m., May 6, 1970

L: I meant the boatride and the Camp David meeting that Saturday.

K: It was laid on at the last minute -- it wasn't scheduled. The President called and asked me to fly up and show him what the choices were. He did not make the decision until Monday night.

L: The choices were the use of ARVN only...?

K: I don't want to into that. There has been enough in the papers about the timing to show you this is simply not right.

L: On the basis of what is in the papers, on the Thursday before (the 23rd) cleaning out of the sanctuaries was not a live possibility as far as Rogers was concerned.

K: I will not go into any other part; of this because I can't do my job if people have to worry about what I reveal about decisions. I merely want to keep you from going off the deep end. McCain never discussed the sanctuaries. He gave me a general briefing about the Pacific and only because the President was impressed the day before and he was in San Diego, and I thought I had an afternoon free. But the speech took more time than expected, so I had only 20 minutes for him. No decision was made on that Saturday evening. There were two more meetings after that -- on Sunday and Monday morning.

L: Of course, when it is told that the decision was made Saturday night, it is not inconsistent with what you say -- the President by that point had virtually made up his mind.

K: If he had, it was not obvious to me. As late as Tuesday morning, I was reviewing with some of my associations what I would say if he asked me for a firm recommendation. I tell you that only to indicate how close the time period was.

L: I am told also that Rogers and Laird were in opposition to use of American troops pretty much up to the end.

K: I will not give a checklist of who recommended what. I really can't do that.

L: Was Mitchell at the final meetings?

By

NARA, Dato

5/26

Stuart Loory/Mr. Kissinger

9:45 p. m., May 6, 1970

K: At some -- not at the Monday meeting; not at David.

L: Did he sit in on the Washington Special Action Group meetings?

K: No.

L: He was in one meeting?

K: The NSC meeting on Wednesday.

L: That was the meeting we were told NIXX would not deal with
Cambodia -- Wednesday, April 22.

K: Stu, you are a great journalist.

L: Can I get back to you maybe tomorrow?

K: You can try. You are on the wrong track. A lot of people you
are talking to don't have any idea what went on.

L: How many people knew the story from beginning to end?

K: Four.

L: Four and not five? The President, you, Rogers and Laird.
To say five would add Mitchell.

K: I would say 4-1/2.

L: Then maybe we get into quarters, eighths and sixteenths.

lds

By NARA, Dalo

5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/David Rockefeller

10:56 p.m., May 6, 1970

K: Sorry to disturb you. I was talking to Nelson this morning. McNamara gave me a list of people he thought were going to be difficult on the war. It included Irwin Miller and Jock Whitney. Nelson thought you might have a particular influence with Miller.

R: I heard from Dick Dillworth this morning that Miller was going to call me. I'm expecting to see him at the Business Council meeting tomorrow night.

K: He is another one.

R: He certainly didn't indicate it to me -- he's terribly concerned about the situation in the country as we all are. I talked to him this morning and at a meeting this afternoon he indicated he was prepared to make a stand against the war as such. I am going in any case to the Business Council meeting tomorrow evening in Hot Springs. I think Irwin Miller certainly will be there. He did not call me today as Dick Dillworth told me this morning he might. I certainly will talk to him about it.

K: There's nothing anyone could do because we will be out of there before any action could be effective.

R: I must say I think time is of the essence. I am terribly disturbed by what one hears on every hand. It is distressing.

K: What people have to ask themselves is what is the cause and what is the symptom -- and whether trying to take weapons away from them with which Americans are being killed, and to implement a policy of withdrawal, justifies wrecking universities and the very fabric of our society.

R: I met with 40 students from the Columbia International Center and had a chance to tell them some of the things you and Bill Rogers said -- but in a general way. I think it was useful. But on the other hand, there is no question that the more moderate ones are terribly upset. I think, myself, if you can succeed quickly, all can be retrieved.

K: Certainly, when I was young, I often felt intensely about something for which I felt ashamed of a few months later. The question is: by yielding to them now, are we helping them?

By [illegible]

NARA, Date 5/26

10:56 p.m., May 6, 1970

- 2 -

R: If it drags on for a couple of months, it can be very difficult to...

K: We are almost certain to conclude it by June 15.

R: The sooner the better.

K: Parts of it will be earlier.

R: How is it going?

K: Militarily and diplomatically, it is a great success. We have doubled the rice amount I told you about yesterday. The small arms captured were 124,000 rounds -- now it's 750,000 rounds; also 6,000 rockets, 2,000 mortars, and 3,700 rifles.

R: Do you think this can prevent them from taking Phnom Penh and taking over the country?

K: It can certainly prevent their launching an offensive into South Vietnam. At least if they take over Phnom Penh, they won't be able to fight with the weapons they have. It may delay it. Our big concern was with South Vietnam. The Soviet reaction has been extremely mild. Hanoi's reaction is very mild. Considering the heavy bombing of NVN this weekend, they only cancelled one meeting in Paris -- they said they would be there next week.

R: I will keep in touch with you and let you know what various people's reactions are. Dick Dillworth indicated that Irwin might get in touch with me -- perhaps he is waiting to see me tomorrow night.

K: The cohesion of our society depends on the leaders sticking together no matter what their reservations are.

R: It's very serious indeed.

K: The time for telling the students is after this immediate situation.

R: Deal with this as quickly as possible. Once this particular episode is closed... The students are concerned that this is really the beginning of a whole new phase of war. They haven't accepted it as part of what has gone on before.

By NARA, Date 5/26

10:56 p.m., May 6, 1970

K: The students are not the problem. But some of their elders who should know better are the problem. Will you call me?

R: I'll be in Hot Springs tomorrow night and for the next two days meeting with the Business Council. I will give you a call.

K: If any group of the Business Council wants to oppose this, at least give us a chance to talk to them.

lds

By

NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Otis Chandler (L. A.)

11:10 p.m., May 6, 1970

K: How are you?

C: Are you working late? What's going on in Indochina, may I ask? We are confused.

K: All we want to do is clean the supplies out of these base areas. We have no intention of staying. We will be out by July 1 and probably well before then. We will be winding up some the end of next week. From the military and diplomatic points of view, it is going very well: 3,800 of the enemy killed; 800 prisoners; 4,000 rifles captured; 1,524 bunkers destroyed; 2 million pounds of rice captured; 800,000 rounds of small arms ammunition; 6,000 rockets; 2,500 mortars; 24,000 pounds of medical supplies. We have captured 8 times as much as the largest single month of any of the war in the Vietnam. We have just begun to search some of these caches. This will go way up. The military objective is being achieved which is to disrupt their supply system. With the rainy season starting, it will take 4 months for them to go in. It will take them another 4-6 months to restock assuming they dare to do it. We gain 8-10 months. Our casualties are extremely light -- 26 in the whole operation.

C: Parrot's Beak?

K: All the operations put together. There were only 3 at Parrot's Beak because that is mainly the South Vietnamese. Diplomatically, the Soviet response was terribly restrained, so we may resume the dialogue by bringing hom to them the risk of confrontation. Hanoi's reaction was very tepid. They cancelled today's conference but announced they would be there next week.

C: Did the Russians move back from the SALT talks?

K: No. There was a brief reference to it today. We were worried they might walk out, but today's meeting was very businesslike and very matter of fact. The problem is with the kids at home. I have been seeing student delegations. The question is: is this issue of the moral magnitude that universities are justified to wreck themselves and tear the fabric of our society? If we allow ourselves to be driven off -- because we are trying to save American lives -- this country will become ungovernable.