From the point of view of deterrence it is not easy to imagine
the disadvantages of limited and of all-out war.

In most circumstances, limited strategic war will properly comprise
contrasted at every turn by the alternatives of defeat of all-out war.
reckless, a strategy. Once deterrence plus failed they will be
demoralized would tax one'sopes to daring, indeed so
might add to deterrence. It is doubtful, however, whether the
aggressor recall the ease with which matters could get out of hand
Of course, the very thickness of such a course may make the
escalator to all-out war.

to encompass us or to engage in a test of nerves with a public-in
meeting the second condition, the aggressor may be encouraged
obvious will properly strike pre-emptively. If we fail in
accept detect. If we fail in meeting the first condition, the
(p) that we are prepared to resort to all-out war requires thus
risk of all-out war, is not an inevitable brouge to it, and
strategic war or graduated retaliation, while it increases the
aggressor must be convinced (a) that a strategy of limited

II-1

II-8

how a country would convey its determination to resist aggression
by using its retaliatory force while at the same time making clear
that such employment will be limited--at least initially. All
the difficulties described in the previous chapter in making the
threat of all-out war plausible would seem to apply with redoubled
force in this case. The threat of all-out war may lose the last
vestiges of credibility through our efforts to convey our desire
to establish some limitation on the extent of our retaliation.

The threat to conduct limited strategic war or graduated retaliation
may be taken as a symptom of the enormous inhibitions against using
our retaliatory force. On the other hand, if we do not make the attempt
to communicate at least an outline of our intentions to keep the war
limited, no prospect for limitation exists at all.

Moreover, limited use of the retaliatory force does not address
itself to the problem of how to prevent pressure against our allies.
Communist blackmail is based on two factors: the threat of devas-
tation against countries which are unable to retaliate and, even more
importantly, the ability to bring about a fait accompli by overrunning
peripheral areas. Neither of these dangers is reduced by an

belligerent areas. Member of these dangers is reduced by an
influencingly, the ability to bring about a felt accommodation by overrunning
cation against countries which are unable to recalculate and, even more
Committee plan itself is based on two factors: the threat of deاست-
traited to the powers of how to prevent pressure against our will.
Moreover, limited use of the retaliatory force does not abrogate
limited, no broader for limitation exists at all.

to communicate at least an outline of our intentions to keep the war
our retaliatory force. On the other hand, if we do not make the attempt
may be taken as a symptom of the enormous implications against using
the threat to conduct limited strategic war or threatened retaliation
to accept some limitation, some extent of our retaliation.

assumes of credibility through our efforts to convey our desire
force in this case. The threat of all-out war may lose the fast
course of all-out war possible and seem to ably with recombined
difficulties described in the previous chapter in making the
that such employment will be limited--at least initially. VII

by using its retaliatory force while at the same time making clear
how a country would convey its determination to respect aggression

II-8

II-9

American decision to use its retaliatory force in a limited manner. The Communist states would still be able to menace the Prime Minister of a free country somewhat as follows: "If you do not disarm completely, our forces will move in to dismantle your military establishment. To be sure, in that case the Americans may retaliate against us. But this will only give us an added incentive to remain and to restore our economy from your country. Whether the American retaliation is limited or all-out we will respond in kind. We shall see whose nerves snap first. Whatever the outcome of a Soviet-United States war, your country as you now know it will cease to exist." In the face of such a threat resistance may well seem quixotic. For whether we retali ate or not, the threatened country will be overrun. In these circum stances, many nations of the free world may seek to obtain the most favorable terms possible.

Considered from the point of view of the United States, the
concept of either limited strategic war or graduated retaliation

concept of either limited strategic war or graduated retaliation
conferred from the point of view of the United States, the
most favorable terms possible.

as you now know it will cease to exist." In the face of such a
whatever the outcome of a Soviet-United States war, your country
we will rebind in kind. We shall see whose serves we shall first.
country. Whether the American retaliation is limited or all-out
an added incentive to remain and to restore our economy from your
Americans may recalculate against us. But this will only give us
your military nadirism. To be sure, in that case the
do not claim completely, our forces will move in to diametric
Prime Minister of a free country somewhat as follows: "It how
manner." The Communist states would still be able to measure the
American decision to see its recalcitrancy force in a limited

II-9

II-10

is equally compromising. In case of Communist aggression, an American President would be faced with the decision of initiating a type of conflict which could not protect the victim and which might expose the United States to fearful devastation. This becomes clear if one considers a Communist note to the United States delivered concurrently with the ultimatum to an ally somewhat along the following lines: "We are very eager to avoid all-out war.

Moreover, all-out war is pointless since our retaliatory force is invulnerable. To show our good intentions we will overlook attacks you make in the first few hours after this communication. From then on, we will retaliate in precise proportion as you attack, but no more." Is it a foregone conclusion that a President would use our retaliatory force in that case? Or that it would be wise to do so?

### C. Indirect Retaliation.

The strategy of indirect retaliation grows out of an awareness of the risks of attacks on the Communist homeland and particularly on its retaliatory force. On the other hand, advocates of this course

on its retaliatory force. On the other hand, advocates of this course
of the risks of attacks on the Communist homeland and bacterially
the strategy of indirect retaliation arose out of an awareness

G. Indirect Retaliation.

to do so!

use our retaliatory force in that case? Or that it would be wise
put no more." Is it a foregone conclusion that a President would
then on, we will recalculate in briefer proportion as you attack,
you make in the first ten hours after this communication. From
inaccurate. To upon our good intentions we will overlook attacks
moreover, all-out war is boundless since our retaliatory force is
the following lines: "We are very eager to avoid all-out war.

defended concurrently with the ultimatum to an ally momentary along
become clear if one agrees a Communist note to the United States
might expose the United States to terrible defeat. This
a table of conflict which could not protect the victims and after
American President would be faced with the death of initiating
the equally overwhelming. In case of Communist aggression, an

II-10

II-11

consider it impossible to defend the entire Communist perimeter locally. Accordingly they argue that resistance need not occur at the spot where aggression takes place. Rather we should utilize the special advantages of our strategic position, particularly our superior seapower. Aggression against, say, Iran, could be resisted, so the argument goes, by such measures as closing the Dardanelles or a blockade of the Soviet Union. Pressure against Berlin could be countered by economic sanctions against Eastern Europe or perhaps closing the Straits of Denmark.

Such a strategy would avoid many of the risks of the limited use of our retaliatory force. It might increase the credibility of our deterrent by/a threat which is plausible. The gap between deterrence and the strategy we are willing to implement will be smaller.

At the same time a strategy of indirect retaliation has problems of its own. From the point of view of deterrence it may reduce the risk to the aggressor to the point where blackmail or military pressure become tempting. Where the limited use of the retaliatory

bureaucracy becomes combating. Where the limited use of the retaliatory
deterrence can be the aggressor to the belligerent or militarily
issue of its own. From the point of view of deterrence it may reduce
At the same time a strategy of indirect retaliation has become
stronger.

deterrence and the strategy we are willing to implement will be
of our deterrent power which is plausible. The sub between
use of our retaliatory force. It might increase the credibility
such a strategy would avoid many of the risks of capitulated
bureaucracy or perhaps closing the strait of Benaue.

Berlin could be countered by economic sanctions against Eastern
Baltikailes or a blockade of the Soviet Union. Presently against
restated, so the argument goes, by such measures as closing the
superior seaplane. Aggression against, say, Iran, could be
the essential advantages of our strategic position, particularly our
at the shot where aggression takes place. Rather we should utilize
locally. Accordingly they assume that resistance need not occur
consider it unfeasible to defend the entire Communist beltwhile

II-11

II-12

force involves an undue danger of all-out war, most measures
of indirect retaliation are too circumscribed and long-term in
their effect. A naval blockade does not prevent a fait accompli. Closing the Dardanelles could not save Iran and its impact on the U.S.S.R. would be long delayed.

As a result, we would be forced to maintain over an indefinite period measures whose utility every passing day would throw into question. They may in fact supply an incentive to the Communists to demonstrate their immunity to American pressure and the impotence of our response. And, after a sufficient lapse of time, it will be difficult to resist Soviet peace offensives urging us to adjust to facts. The fate of the embargo of strategic goods against Communist China after the invasion of Korea can serve as one example of the difficulty of persevering in a policy of indirect retaliation over a long period. The increasing pressure to accept the Soviet fait accompli in Eastern Europe is another.

If such a strategy presents great complexities for it, it is
perhaps the least desirable cause of action for our allies. The

beside the least desirable cause of action for our allies. The
It needs a strategy that presents great complexities for it, if it is
another.

pressure to accept the Soviet fait accompli in Eastern Europe is
beyond indirect retaliation over a long period. The increasing
can serve as a one example of the difficulty of bereavement in a
certain degree against Communists after the invasion of Korea
arising us to adjust to facts. The face of the enemy of ex-
of time, it will be difficult to resist Soviet peace alternatives
and the obsolescence of our response. And, after a sufficient lapse
the Communists to demonstrate their immunity to American pressure
to throw into question. This may in fact supply an incentive to
deficit period measures whose utility every passing day would
be a result, we would be forced to maintain over an in-
on the U.S.A.2. would be long delayed.

bit. Closing the Bardeenies could not save Iran and the indirect
their effect. A naval blockade does not prevent a fait accompli
of indirect retaliation are too circumscribed and long-term in
force involves an undue danger of all-out war, most measure

II-13

II-13

blackmail situation described earlier will be even more poig-
nant when the American response is so indirect. With Soviet
occupation unavoidable in case of resistance, wide scope
exists for the gradual erosion of morale through steady Soviet
pressure. A strategy based entirely on indirect retaliation
must lead eventually to a disintegration of the free world.

D. Guerilla Warfare.

Many thoughtful people, horrified by the risks of nuclear
war, have come to the conclusion that any war involving the
great powers would carry with it an intolerable risk of expanding
into a nuclear holocaust. They therefore urge that the aggression
be deterred by organizing the civilian population into guerilla
groups and confronting the Communists with the prospect of a long
drawn-out campaign of pacification.
*

One difficulty with this view is that it oversimplifies the
task. There is no known instance of large-scale sustained partisan
activity in any Communist controlled territory. Those uprisings

activity in any Communist controlled territory. Those arbitrary
cases. There is no known instance of large-scale sustained battery
One difficulty with this view is that it overemphasizes the
draw-out campaign of pacification.

Broome and confronting the Communists with the prospect of a long
be determined by organizing the civilian population into guerilla
into a nuclear pogrom. They therefore urge that the aggression
Great Britain must carry with it an intolerable risk of expanding
war, have come to the conclusion that any war involving the
many thoughtful people, permitted by the risks of nuclear

D. Guerilla Warfare.

must lead eventually to a disintegration of the free world.
pressure. A strategy based entirely on indirect retaliation
existe for the gradual erosion of morale through steady Soviet
occupation unavoidable in case of resistance, wide scope
nent when the American reasons is so indirect. With Soviet
placemen situation described earlier will be even more clear-
II-13

1114

which did occur were ruthlessly and quickly suppressed. There
is little in their experience to cause the Communist leaders to
be overly impressed by the threat of popular resistance, and
Communist theory would make them doubt even its possibility.

Popular resistance in Hungary and Tibet did not prove an extended
obstacle to Communist rule.

Moreover, whatever the effectiveness of guerilla warfare as
a strategy, its utility as a threat for purposes of deterrence
is highly questionable. A country relying on partisan warfare
for deterrence would have to convince the potential aggressor that,
while it would offer no organized resistance, it would be able to
train guerilla groups and would persevere in using them until
the aggressor withdrew. These two requirements are to a large
extent inconsistent with each other. The decision not to resist
with organized forces can only be interpreted by the aggressor as
lack of will. The threat to resort to partisan warfare is more
likely to be construed as bluster than as a real menace. It
is not easy to see what concrete steps a nation could take to

it is not easy to see what concrete steps a nation could take to
likely to be constrained as pluster than as a real menace. It
lack of will. The threat to resort to barratian warfare is more
 wish organized forces can only be interdicted by the aggressor as
extant inconsistent with each other. The decision not to resist
the aggressor withpen. These two requirements are to a large
case Guerilla Group and would bereave in using them until
while it would offer no organized resistance, it would be able to
for deterrence would have to convince the potential aggressor that,
its highly questionable. A country relying on barratian warfare
a strategy, its utility as a threat for purpose of deterrence
Moreover, whatever the effectiveness of Guerilla warfare as
oppose to Communist rule.

Barratian resistance in Hungary and Tibet did not prove an excusable
Communist theory would make them doubt even its feasibility.

be overly impressed by the threat of barratian resistance, and

is little in their experience to cause the Communist leaders to
which did occur were naïvely and ducitly subordinated. There

ITV

II-15

demonstrate its readiness for guerilla warfare or how it
could be certain of its ability to carry out its threat.

To make such a deterrent effective, a government would
have to convince an aggressor that, while unable to protect
its people against invasion, it has sufficient prestige to
ask for the most difficult and, for those involved, most costly
form of resistance. The more highly organized a society, the
greater its discipline, the more an aggressor is likely to regard
threat of guerilla warfare as bluff. In highly organized
Western societies the aggressor may count with some confidence
on his ability to coerce the leadership groups to assist him
in restoring order.

Indeed, the measures required to prove a serious intention
to conduct partisan warfare are also likely to inspire a feeling
of hopelessness. The specialization of function on which the highly
integrated Western societies depend requires an efficient admini-
strative group and a cohesive governmental apparatus. The occupying
power has, therefore, many foci for pressure. It can appeal to the
sense of order and discipline of the administrative group and the

sense of order and discipline of the administrative group and the
power, 'superiority' lost for brevity. It can abate to the
operative group and a creative governmental atmosphere. The orbiting
integrated Western societies depend repair on an efficient admi-
nistration. The specialization of function on which the highly
to conduct belligerent warfare are also likely to impose a feeling
of noblesseuse. The specialization of function on which the highly
in restoring order.

on the ability to enforce the leadership groups to suffer him
Western societies the aggressor may conduct with some confidence
thereof by enlisting warfare at point. In highly organized
Greater Power Discipline, the more an aggressor is likely to regard
the form of resistance. The more firmly organized a society, the
ask for the most difficult and, for those involved, most costly
its people against invasion, it has sufficient breath to
have to convince an aggressor that, while unable to protect
To make such a deterrent effective, a Government would
could be certain of its ability to carry out its task.

demonstrate its readiness for Greater Power warfare or how it
will be certain of its ability to carry out its task.

II-12

II-16

governmental apparatus. It can use terror. And if it
fails the breakdown of the subtle interrelationships of
modern society is almost certain to have much more dire
consequences for the indigenous population than for the
occupying power.

Partisan activity has generally been most effective
in primitive societies and precisely because of the ab-
sence of identifiable control. In these societies there
exists no group with sufficient authority against which effec-
tive pressure can be brought. To propose such a strategy for
Europe reveals deep misunderstanding of the requirements of
deterrence and of the psychology of the Western societies.

Guerilla warfare almost invariably requires special conditions
to be possible at all: of terrain, as in Yugoslavia or Algeria,
or overwhelming numbers as in China, or of vast expanse, such
as in Russia. Even then it could be conducted generally only when
there was outside support, both military and moral, giving some
prospect of eventual victory. Partisan warfare can make a

broader scope of eventual victory. Burtiss warates can make a
difference outside support, both military and moral, giving some
one outside support, both military and moral, giving some
to be possible at all: of terrain, as in Yugoslavia or Bulgaria.
Guerrilla warates almost invariably require special conditions
deterrence and of the behavior of the Western societies.

En route reaches deb demarcating of the redractions of
tact pressure can be found. To broach such a strategy for
exists no group with sufficient authority against which effec-
tive identification control. In these societies there
in primitive societies and precisely because of the ap-
portion activity has generally been most effective
occasionally harder.

consequences for the indigenous behavior than for the
modern society is almost certain to prove much worse due
to the breakdown of the simple interrelationships of
governmental apparatus. It can see terror. And it is

II-10

II-17

contribution to other forms of resistance; it cannot be
substitute for them.

### E. The Requirement of Local Defense.

If the Free World is to avoid gradual erosion, it must
be able to avoid the fait accompli of Communist occupation.
A capacity for local defense is essential to bring our deterrent
policy in line with the strategy for fighting a war and the requirements
of our security with those of our allies. A fait accompli changes
our attempt to prevent a given event, which is the basis of deterrence,
to an effort to compel a certain course of action. Our threat then
is no longer designed to induce a potential aggressor to refrain from
attacking; it must force him to withdraw. In attack the psychological
burden is on the aggressor: he must take an affirmative step and his
hesitation will be great in proportion as the objective seems un-
attainable. Once the aggressor is in possession of his prize,
however, the psychological burden is shifted. The defender must now assume
the risk of the first move. The aggressor can confine himself to

the risk of the first move. The aggressor can continue himself to
pursue, the psychological burden is lifted. The defender must now assume
attainable. Once the aggressor is in possession of his brain,

restatement will be great in proportion as the objective seems un-
present is on the aggressor: he must take an affirmative step and put
attacking: it must force him to withdraw. In attack the psychological
is no longer designed to induce a potential aggressor to refrain from
to an effort to combat a certain course of action. Our direct aim
our attempt to prevent a given event, which is the base of deterrence,
of our security with those of our allies. A sufficient accombit changes
policy in fine with the strategy for fighting a war and the requirements
A capacity for local defense is essential to bring our deterrent
be able to avoid the latter accombit of Communist occupation.

It the true world it is to avoid gradual erosion, it must

2. The Requirement of Local Defense.

anticipate for them.

contribution to other forms of resistance: it cannot be

II-17

II-18

outwaiting his opponent whose incentive to persevere is
diminished with every day that the fait accompli endures.

If threatened areas cannot be protected against occupation,
the scope of Communist blackmail will constantly expand. The
disparity in forces suitable for local defense must be remedied
or the Berlin Crisis will prove but an augury of every increasing
pressure. A measure of this security can no doubt be achieved
by schemes for arms control--as will be discussed below. But
unless the present disparity in local power is remedied there
will be little incentive for a serious negotiation.

In building up these forces, the West faces many obstacles,
not the least of which is its own preconceptions. For over a
decade and a half, it has been axiomatic that the West could
not possibly match Communist manpower, interior lines of communi-
cation and more centralized command arrangements. The conviction
is general that technology must substitute for manpower. A
strategy of punishment was seen as the best counter to the
Communist "hordes." These notions have been reinforced by
budgetary considerations: "More bang for the buck" became

pugnately considerations: "More pung for the puck," because
Communist "purge." These notions have been reinforced by
strategy of bunt-hunting was seen as the best counter to the
its general that technology must anticipate for manpower. A
cation and more centralised command arrangement. The conviction
not possessily match Communist manpower, interior lines of commit-
decade and a pugt, it has been automatic that the West could
not the least of which is its own misconceptions. For over a
In putting up these forces, the West faces many obstacles,
will be little incentive for a serious negotiation.

unless the brevet disability in local power is remedied there
by scheme for arms control--as will be discussed below. But
breasure. A measure of this security can no doubt be achieved
or the Berlin Crisis will break put an end to every increasing
disability in forces suitable for local defense must be remedied
the scope of Communist policy will constantly expand. The
It threatened areas cannot be protected against occupation,
demoralized with every day that the Soviet accordit augures.

outwitting its obdurate whose incentive to bereavement is

II-18

II-19

an article not only of strategic but also of fiscal wisdom.

But whatever the merit of these views when they were first developed, the simple choices of our period of invulnerability are no longer open to us. Continued reliance on the military policy of the past decade will produce not deterrence but paralysis. Far from holding our alliances together, it will undermine them. Building up a greater capacity for local defense is no longer a question of choice; it has been imposed on the free world by the technological revolution.

Many of the assumptions regarding the impossibility of local defense are either fallacious or exaggerated. In total available manpower the free world still is superior and its industrial potential exceeds that of the Communist bloc by a factor of three. There is no reason except lack of will why Western Europe and the United States cannot create local forces capable of arresting almost any scale of Soviet aggression. To be sure, in other areas the problem is more complicated. In the so-called gray areas of the Middle East and *See blow'The United States and Europe,' Chapter ____, P. ____/

"See p. 10, The United States and Europe," Chapter 1, b. _________

**complicated.** In the so-called gray areas of the Middle East and
Soviet aggression. To be sure, in other areas the problem is more

* cannot create local forces capable of arresting almost any scale of
no reason except lack of will and Western Europe and the United States
exceeds that of the Communist bloc by a factor of three. There is
militancy in the free world still to be subordinated and its industrial potential
general are either falsifications or exaggerations. In total available

Many of the assumptions regarding the inaptness of local
world by the technological revolution.

to no further a discussion of choice: it has been imposed on the free
undermine them. Building up a greater capacity for local defense
barriers. Far from holding our alliances together, it will
borely of the past decade will produce not deterrence but
are no longer open to us. Continued reliance on the military
developed, the simple choice of one period of incompatibility
but whatever the merit of these views when they were first
an article not only of strategic but also of tactical wisdom.

II-19

II-20

South-East Asia, the Communist block can concentrate its manpower and material against countries weaker and less closely allied than those of the North Atlantic Community. On the other hand, these are also the areas where the political penalties for aggression would be greatest. An attack on an emergent country would antagonize all the other uncommitted nations and it would lead to an increased mobilization of Western resources. Moreover, difficulties of terrain and communications place a ceiling on the number of troops an aggressor could utilize effectively even there. The inability to protect every area locally is no excuse for failing to secure those where it is possible. The minimum goal of local defense must be to prevent the possibility of cheap victories. The optimum situation is when aggression can be held locally. The latter situation is attainable

And the position of other areas can be improved through in Europe. /XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX their own forces and increases in the American limited war capability. Even should the capability for local defense vary in different areas, the overall security of the free world will increase to the extent that it can protect itself to the greatest degree possible against Communist pressure.

["pressure.\n\nThe Communist Party can protect itself to the greatest degree against Communist all security of the tree world will increase to the extent that it the capability for local defense vary in different areas, the over- and increases in the American limited war capability. Even should in Europe. \\X\\X\\X\\X\\X\\X\\X\\X

II-20 a

This is a complex but not insoluble task made all the
more necessary by the starkness of the alternatives. Building
up a capability for local defense will require much effort. But
the rewards are high: to a considerable extent, a strategy
of local defense will lift from us the impossible choices of
current military policy. It will increase the flexibility
of our diplomacy. It..................

of our diplomacy. It will increase the flexibility
of local defense will lift from us the impossible choices of
the revenue are right: to a considerable extent, a strategy
up a capability for local defense will require much effort. But
more necessarily by the strength of the alternatives. Building
This is a complex but not insoluble task made all the
II-30 a

LZ

II-21

is the prerequisite of effective arms control negotiations.

## F. Some Questions and Answers.

But to achieve these goals we must give up the illusions of the past decade and a half and transcend the abstractness of the current debate. Two groups are criticising the concept of local defense: the advocates of all-out war who fear that to ameliorate the destructiveness of our strategy is to weaken the deterrent; and pacifist groups fearful that any attempt to mitigate the worst consequences of war will also remove some of the inhibitions against it. The traditionalists ridicule the concept of limited war because they consider it contrary to all their notions of strategy. The pacifist groups oppose it because they believe that only complete disarmament can avoid our dilemmas--because they refuse to admit that the one-sidedness of our military establishment is one of the chief reasons for the ineffectiveness of arms control negotiations.

The objections to the strategy outlined here usually come to expression in the following queries:

The objections to the strategy outlined here usually come to
chief reasons for the ineffectiveness of arms control negotiations.
The one-ideology of our military establishment is one of the
disarmament can avoid our dilemmas--because they refuse to admit that
belligerent Groome obeys it because they believe that only complete
they consider it contrary to all their notions of strategy. The
it. The traditionalists ridicule the concept of limited war because
consequences of war will also remove some of the prohibitions against
belligerent Groome fear that any attempt to mediate the most
the destructiveness of our strategy is to weaken the deterrent; and
defense: the advocate of all-out war who fear that to emigrate
the current debate. The Groome are criticizing the concept of local
of the past decade and a belt and transocean the effectiveness of
But to achieve these goals we must give up the illusions

II. Some Questions and Answers.

is the bristling of effective arms control negotiations.

II-37

II - B

# Will greater emphasis on limited war forces weaken deterrence?

This objection is applied to all forms of limited war. Starting from the premise that the effectiveness of deterrence is directly proportional to the damage an aggressor can be expected to suffer, traditionalists maintain that to admit the possibility of limitation is to increase the likelihood of aggression. To attempt a local defense is to contest the issue on grounds most favorable to the communists.

Of course the last argument begs the principal question. In any discussion on policy it is important that the alternatives are clearly put. The alternative to local defense is surrender or all-out war. Since surrender can hardly be considered contesting an issue, the argument must be that all-out war is the most effective deterrent and the most useful strategy. This view will not be correct in the 1960's.

Whatever the significance of a strategy of destruction during the years of our invulnerability, in the period ahead of us deterrence will be more complicated. The notion of measuring risk simply in terms of devastation of the aggressor's homeland became firmly entrenched when during World War II we could bomb our enemies without fear of retaliation. When the end of the

we could prompt our enemies without fear of retaliation. When the end of the
the aggressor's powerland became timely encountered when during World War II
complicated. The notion of measuring risk simply in terms of saturation of
our invulnerability, in the period ahead of our deference will be more
whatever the significance of a strategy of destruction during the years
will not be correct in the 1960's.

out war is the most effective deterrent and the most useful strategy. This
can hardly be considered competing an issue, the argument that be that of all-
afterthought to local defense is surrender or off-out war. Since surrender
assumption on policy it is important that the alternatives are clearly but. The
Of course the main last argument pales the brunt of the discussion. In any case
doesn't appeal to the communicate.

To attempt a local defense is to contest the issue on grounds most is
admit the feasibility of limitation is to increase the likelihood of agree-
ment an aggressor can be expected to submit, transitionwise maintain that to
browns that the effectiveness of deference is directly proportional to the de-
This objection is abated to all forms of limited war. Starting from the
Will greater embroils on limited war forces weaken deference?

11-18

II - 23

war saw us in the sole possession of the atomic bomb, this seemed to confirm our view of warfare. Our atomic monopoly appeared to prove that we would always be able to rely on a strategy of punishment. This notion has become so firmly established that the attempt to find an alternative to a holocaust in the age of nuclear plenty and of invul-nerable missile forces, is construed by many as foregoing a unilateral advantage. But abandoning a strategy of destructiveness must be bal-anced against an increased readiness to resist aggression by less dras-tic means. Deterrence is the product of will and power. It fails if either is zero. It is greatest when military capability and the will to use it are high. A strong military capability without the will to use it is empty. Mere determination to resist with inadequate force will lead to disaster. Deterrence is the art of posing the maximum credible risk. In the age of nuclear plenty this is more likely to be provided by a strategy of local defense than a retaliatory threat al-ways in danger of becoming an empty pose.

> If deterrence fails how can we be sure that intra-war deterrence succeeds? If we attempt a strategy of limited war how can we be certain

II - 15

**that it will remain limited?** No other problem lends itself so well to scoring debating points. Since it is the essence of limited war among major powers that they do _not_ commit all their resources, it is easy to "prove" how a conflict once started can expand. No one can "know" whether a country would accept defeat without expanding hostilities. No one can be certain that both sides would not add increment of power until a conflagration occurs. The limitation is psychological. War can be kept limited only if both sides want to keep it limited.

It is easy to understand the objection of the traditionalists to the concept of limited war. They do not believe in its utility either for deterrence or for the conduct of war. But the violence of the criticism of some of the other groups is puzzling. They pretend that those who advocate a greater reliance on limited war wish to bring it about. They give the impression that the choice before us is peace or limited war and they then proceed to demonstrate the easy proposition that peace is preferable.

However, our alternatives are quite different. No responsible person advocates _initiating_ limited war. The problem of local defense will

II - 16

only in use of
arose amid maximum Communist aggression or blackmail. In these cir-
cumstances our choice is not between peace or limited war. If we re-
ject the concept of limited war our only options will be surrender or
all-out war. The worst that could happen by resisting by limited means
is what is almost certain to occur with our present military policy.
It does not make sense to refuse to accept the notion of limited war because
it might lead to a final show-down and then rely on a military policy
which gives us no other choice but all-out war. The conclusion is almost
inescapable that many of those ridiculing the concept of limited war
would in case of Soviet aggression--the only contingency worth discussing
in this contest--prefer surrender to resistance.

On the assumption that this will not be our national policy, it be-
comes important to re-examine the question of whether we can be certain
that wars can be kept limited. The obvious reply is that we cannot be
certain. Limited war is based on a kind of tacit bargain not to exceed
certain restraints. One side's desire to keep the war limited is of no
avail unless the other cooperates: it takes two to keep a limited war
limited or a local defense local. In a limited war between major powers,

II - 26

both sides have available a greater military capability than they employ. Both sides, by definition, have the technical ability to expand the war. It is easy therefore for critics of the concept of limited war to "prove" the unreasonableness of any restraints. As long as either side has uncommitted resources at its disposal, any limitation can be made to appear arbitrary or ridiculous.

However, paradoxical as it may seem, the danger that the conflict may expand is one of the factors that makes for limitation. The risk that any war could become total, places constraints both on its extent and its duration. If either side wanted an all-out war it would be foolish to alert the retaliatory force of its opponent by engaging in local conflict. The mere fact that a limited war is taking place is a signal of the desire to avoid a show-down. Experience has shown that both sides generally lean over backwards to convey their limited aims and methods to the other.

Those who fail to see any logic in specific limitations miss the central point: an illogical limitation is often particularly effective in conveying one's intentions to the other side. Its very lack of

in conveying one's intentions to the other side. It is very hard of
central point: an illegal limitation is often barially eloctive
Those who fail to see and forget in specific limitations vice the
method to the other.

edges generally fall over packards to convey their limited aims and
of the desire to avoid a show-down. Experience has shown that both
of the question to start the retaliatory force of its opponent by engaging in local
and its question. It either side **wars** an all-out war it would be looms
that and war could become total, both confine itself on its extent
may extend to one of the factors that makes for limitation. The risk
However, **barışbox** as it may seem, the danger that the conflict
abbr. arbitrarly or arbitrary.

has uncommitted resources at its disposal, and limitation can be made to
*to prove* the unreasonableness of any restrictions. We found as earlier above
the war. It is easy therefore to notice that the concept of limited war
broads. Both edges, *p* definition, have the technical applitiy to extend
both edges have available a greater widely adaptability than typical em-

II - 45

II - 19

However much the notion is ridiculed, it is essential that both sides understand the intention to avoid a showdown and that what is intended as limited resistance is not construed as the prelude to all-out war.

However intense the desire to limit a conflict which breaks out through accident, desire or miscalculation, it could expand because of a failure of communication.* For these reasons, the limitation which inspire greatest confidence are those which might most "naturally" occur to both parties assuming they wish to establish limitations—and without this desire no limitation of any kind is feasible.

For example, any limited war must have some sanctuary areas—if only because a global war cannot be considered limited. There is no particular reason for establishing the boundaries of these sanctuaries in any particular place. In practice, however, the danger of misunderstanding is least if the sanctuary follows national boundaries. Such a demarcation line will be easier to recognize than one chosen entirely at random. The more "unfamiliar" the limitations the more difficult it will be to make them stick. This consideration will be of importance

* For a brilliant discussion see Schelling, Thomas, "Bargaining, Communication and Limited War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

II - 29

in discussing the relative emphasis to be given to conventional or nu-
clear weapons in limited war.

Part of the concern about limited war is produced by the fear that
side
the losing/will/be strongly tempted to expand its commitment in order to
escape defeat and that this will lead to all-out war step by step. It
must be admitted that all-out war is a possible outcome of limited war.
At the same time this danger is the key factor in keeping the war limited.
Provided both sides really wish to avoid all-out war--and if they did not
they would not engage in limited war in the first place--all pressures
would make for caution. Limited war gives an opportunity not an assur-
ance for avoiding a holocaust. But if we assume that the aggressor is
prepared to run all risks and can run none the result is foreordained:
the gradual collapse of the free world.

Nevertheless, it would be irresponsible to minimize the risk of
what has come to be called "escalation." It will be great in proportion
as limited war is considered entirely as a strategic problem and not as
an opportunity for a pause to permit negotiations. A prolonged limited
war fought entirely from the point of view of military advantage carries

II - 31
1942

them. Limited war is not a solvent for all contemporary problems. It is not a substitute for a constructive policy. A strategy based on it does provide an opportunity of deterrence does fail, for both sides to reassess the situation before embarking on a final show-down. To create alternatives to catastrophe would seem a task worthy of our best thinking and surely too important to be dealt with by debater's points.

No one can doubt that limited war is palatable only when compared with other even starker alternatives. It is a subtle and complex task, and it presupposes a rare blend of psychological, political and military skill. Yet we will not be able to master our future if we refuse to face our choices squarely. Facts cannot be evaded by refusing to admit their existence. Horror of the consequence of war is not a guide to action. We do not have the time to lament our condition. Our best thought is required for adjusting to new conditions in a world where the truths of one decade become the obstacles to understanding of another.

Many issues await for their resolution our creativity and energy. In the field of strategy none is more puzzling than the relative emphasis to be given to nuclear and conventional weapons.

[Y]

# CHAPTER I THE NECESSITY FOR CHOICE

As the 20th century enters its seventh decade, America has reached a turning point in its relations with the rest of the world. The patterns of action of a secure past no longer work. We have come to the end of the policies and of the men that dominated the immediate post-war period.

Whatever aspect of American policy we consider, the need for new departures is apparent. The issues which have gone unresolved for a decade no longer permit delay. At every turn America confronts directly and urgently the necessity for choice.

The nature of the challenge can be stated as follows: the United States cannot afford another decline like that which has characterized the past decade and a half. Fifteen years more of a deterioration of our position in the world such as we have experienced since World War II would find us reduced to Fortress America, confronting upheavals and tensions in a world in which we had become largely irrelevant.

It is futile now to debate the causes of this state of affairs. Many of the misconceptions of the immediate post-war period

I-5

when we enter negotiations with an agenda almost every item of which
was placed there by Communist pressure or initiative, only self-deception
can keep us from admitting our decline to ourselves.

Of course, much of the deterioration was inevitable. We could not
expect to perpetuate indefinitely the fortunate accident of the security
conferred by two great oceans. It was one of history's cruel jokes
that the atomic age, which was to make us totally vulnerable, was
ushered in by a brief period which seemed to demonstrate that we were
forever totally secure. But though we could not have maintained our
traditional invulnerability, it was not foreordained that we should
become so defensive and so insecure. It was not inevitable that all
over the world peoples find less and less in America with which to
identify themselves. They may admire our achievements, but we have
not succeeded in making either our values or our accomplishments seem
applicable to their tasks. More and more leaders of the new nations
have proclaimed that democracy is *not* relevant to their situation.

have proclaimed that democracy is not relevant to their situation.
addictive to their tasks. More and more leaders of the new nations
not succeeded in making either one's self or one's accomplishments seem
identify themselves. They may admire one's achievements, but we have
over the world people find less and less in America with which to
become so delinquent and so ineffectual. It was not inevitable that all
traditional incompatibility, it was not foreseen that we should
forever totally become. But though we could not have maintained one
narrered in by a strict period which seemed to demonstrate that we were
that the atomic age, which was to make us totally vulnerable, was
concluded by two great oceana. If we were one of history's cruel jokes
expect to be perpensate indefinitely the fortunate accident of the security
Of course, much of the deterioration was inevitable. We could not
can keep us from admitting one's decline to ourselves.
was placed there by Communist Breake or initiative, only self-deception
when we enter negotiations with an agenda almost every item of which

I-2

I-7

For all innovation spells loneliness. Creativity invariably
involves doing the unfamiliar. It requires a willingness to
leave behind what is generally understood. When rapid change
is occurring, in technology, in political structures, in human
aspirations, creativity requires a willingness to alter even
the seemingly successful. Rarely before--and never in our his-
tory--has every accomplishment so much contained its own seeds
of failure or every advance so threatened to turn into a road-
block.

Whatever aspect of policy is considered, the need for new
departures is apparent. It is not so much that we confront
unsolved problems--in a world of revolutionary change this
could hardly be otherwise. It is rather that in many areas
of policy we lack yardsticks by which to judge our alterna-
tives or the "progress" which is being so insistently demanded.

........

times or the "progress" which it being so unfortunately demanded
of policy we lack arguments why which so little om om after-
con doing hardly be otherwise. If it is rather that in many areas
unresolved problems--in a world of revolutionarily change this
debturene is apparent. It is not so much that we confront
Whatever affect of policy is considered, the need for new
policy.

of failure or every advance so threatened to turn into a road-
tory--has every accomplishment so much contained in its own seeds
the seemingly successful. Hereby before--and never in om pi-
substitutions, creativity requires a willingness to suffer even
its occurring, in technology, in political structures, in human
leave pending what is generally understood. When rapid change
involves doing the million. It requires a willingness to
for all innovation abelaboneliness. Creativity invasively

I-7

I-209

Because we lack a strategic doctrine and a coherent military policy, it is inevitable that our proposals on arms control are fitful. In the absence of a coherent military policy, we are in no position to know whether a given plan enhances security, detracts from it or is simply irrelevant. As a consequence, proposals are developed under the pressure of competing groups and without an overall sense of purpose. Instead of urging disarmament conferences because we wished to advance a scheme in which we had confidence, we have reversed the process: typically we have been forced to assemble a set of hasty proposals because we have agreed to go to a conference under the pressure of world opinion or Soviet diplomacy. The confusion is demonstrated by the fact that though our military establishment is built around nuclear weapons, our arms control negotiations have stigmatized the strategy on which we have been relying. To conduct both policies simultaneously is clearly disastrous.

NATO, the cornerstone of our foreign policy, has not been adapted to changed strategic and political relationships. The role of the

to changed strategic and political relationships. The role of the
WTO, the conference of our foreign policy, has not been adapted
poor policies simultaneously is clearly demonstrated.

agreed to the strategy on which we have been refocusing. To conduct
its built up nuclear weapons, our arms control negotiations have
demonstrated by the fact that though our military adaptation
breasts of world opinion or Soviet diplomacy. The conversation is
probable because we have agreed to go to a conference under the
process: tacitly we have been forced to assume a set of partly
to advance a scheme in which we had confidence, we have reversed the
bureaus. Instead of making disarmament conference because we wanted
under the breather of combating front and without an overall sense of
the implicitly irrelevant. As a consequence, proposals are deferred
to know whether a given plan enhances security, detracts from it or
In the absence of a coherent military policy, we are in no position
policy, if it is inevitable that our proposals on arms control are tiffy.
Because we lack a strategic doctrine and a coherent military

I am

I-1D

military forces in Europe, the future of Germany, the nature of Atlantic relationships, have all gone largely undefined. Formal declarations of unity cannot obscure the confusion within the alliance. The diplomacy prior to the abortive summit conference of 1960 was characterized by indecision and squabbling among the principal partners, each of which made a separate approach to the Soviet dictator. Mr. Khrushchev's intransigence at Paris caused these fissures to be papered over. Yet the malaise is deep-seated. Unless NATO overcomes its evasions, the confusion and disarray which followed Mr. Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum will surely be repeated.

The situation is no more reassuring in the diplomatic field. Instead of debating the goals of diplomacy, attention has been focussed for several years on a fruitless controversy over whether we should be "conciliatory"

"consultatory"

........................

for several days on a truceless controversy over whether we should be
acted of departing the Bosia of Diplomacy, attention has been focussed
The situation is no more reassuring in the diplomatic field.

In-
which will surely be debated.

conclusion and clarity which followed Mr. Kurnanechea's Berlin visit-
ted the metasea in deep-aseated. Unless NATO overcomes its evasions, the
transparency at Paris caused these tangles to be cleared over. Yet
made a separate approach to the Soviet dictator. Mr. Kurnanechea's in-
public indecision and despatching amongst the principal partners, each of which
may bryor to the a sportive summit conference of 1960 was characterized
of which cannot opaceme the conclusion within the alliance. The qibio-
relationship's, have all gone faraday intuined. Former declarations
wiftely force in Emobe, the future of Germany, the name of Atlantic

I-JD

I-13

Equally worrisome is our interpretation of the process in which
we find ourselves engaged. Throughout a decade of almost continuous
decline the notion that time was on our side has been at the basis
of much of our policy. Our attitudes therefore tend to remain passive.
When history contains a guarantee of eventual success, survival can
easily become the primary goal. Creativity, innovation, sacrifice,
pale before tactical considerations of dealing with day-to-day con-
cerns. A powerful incentive exists for deferring difficult choices.
It is not surprising, then, that our policies have lacked vitality
and that public discussion has focussed on symptoms, not causes.
But it is equally clear that such attitudes doom us to sterility in
a revolutionary period.

of American policy is the desire to have something for nothing, to rely
-on history or evolution to bring about what we lack the energy or the
-conviction or the spirit of sacrifice to strive for.

If these trends continue, the future of freedom will be dim indeed.

It is difficult for Americans to visualize national disaster. Yet the outlines of what may be ahead are not too difficult to discern.

Tempted by the growing disparity in power, strength, the Soviet Union will bring pressure on all surrounding areas. The loss in ideological dynamism will be more than compensated by the increasing opportunities presented by our weakness. Communist policy will alternate between protestations of peaceful intentions and spasms of intran-sigence designed to demoralize the West. Negotiations will become

If the West can be humiliated over a
a kind of psychological warfare./

A period of time, the new nations, whatever their moral preference, will consider Communism the wave of the future. The success of Moscow and Peiping will have the same kind of attraction as the accomplishments of Europe in the 19th century. No amount of economic assistance will

I-14/16

disarmament, the Communist leaders may address themselves seriously to the problem of how to reduce the tensions inherent in an unchecked arms race. Then co-existence may become something other than a slogan. But whatever Communist purposes may be, our task is essentially the same: to define for ourselves the nature of a peace consistent with our values and adequate for our security.

To be sure, in the 1960's the goals we can set ourselves are different from those still open to us a decade ago. Then we still possessed a wide margin of safety and, therefore, considerable scope for constructive action. In many areas of national policy only foresight was required to shape the future. But in the 1960's many choices which were available earlier have been foreclosed. Many relatively minor problems have become full-fledged crises. And this process will accelerate unless we change our approach to policy. The price we will have to pay for deferring choices will go up with each passing year.

Nothing is more important for America than to give up its

Morning is more important for America than to give up its
right for deliberating choices will do sb with each beautiful hour.
we change om abscissa to bo fraction. The brice we will have to
full-tieded erica. And this process will accelerate unless
been foreclosed. Many relatively minor problems have become
But in the 1960's many choices which were available earlier have
national bo fraction would foreclose was required to achieve the future.

singlespe seabe for constructive action. In many areas of
we still beseased a wide margin of safety and, therefore, con-
are different and choose still open to us a decade ago. Then
To be sure, in the 1960's the USA we can get omnaeles
for om security.

the nature of a peace consistent with om values and adequate
pe, om task is essentially the same: to define for omæles
the other than a slogan. But whatever Communist purpose may
in an unmcacked arms race. Then co-existence may become some-
seriously to the problem of how to reduce the censations inherent
dismantlement, the Communist leaders may address themselves

I--JQ 10

I-18 17

illusions. Too much of our domestic debate gives the impression
that we are working towards a static condition called peace con-
ceived as tranquillity and the absence of strife. We sometimes
argue as if only a single new initiative or one brilliant move
stood between us and normalcy. Many of us seem to believe that
we can dramatically sweep all before us in an atmosphere of uni-
versal approbation.

But even with the wisest policies we can expect nothing
of the sort. Our generation will live in the midst of change.
Our norm is the fact of upheaval. The success of our actions
is not measured by short-term tranquillity. It is defined by
whether we can shape the currents of our time in the light of
our values. What is needed even more than different policies
is a different style and a more dynamic attitude.

The decade of the 1960's will require heroic effort and
we will not always have the solace of popular acclaim. Almost
all the essential measures are long-term in their effect and
require detailed, patient labors. Neither in the field of

{continued on page 18-4}

(continues on page 140)

require detailed, definite, definite. Neither in the field of all the essential measures are long-term in their effect and we will not always have the science of popular science. Almost The decade of the 1960's will require huge effort and is a different style and a more dynamic attitude.

our values. What is needed even more than different policies whether we can shape the currents of our time in the light of is not measured by short-term tranquillity. If it is defined by our norm is the fact of independence. The success of our actions of the sort. Our generation will live in the midst of change. But even with the wheat policies we can expect nothing aerial appropriation.

We can dramatically sweep away before us in an atmosphere of unit- stood between us andnormandy. Many of us seem to believe that argue as it only a single new initiative or one brilliant move ceved as tranquillity and the absence of smile. We sometimes that we are working towards a static condition called peace con-

I-78 14

I-25/18

military policy, nor in our alliance policy, nor in arms con-
trol nor in relations with the new states can we expect drama-
tic results.

There is an inevitable difference in time scale between
our efforts and those of Communism. The main interest of Com-
munism is to prevent stability by fanning all resentments.
Chaos can be produced rapidly. Those seeking to exploit dis-
satisfaction need not concern themselves with long-term effects.
We, on the other hand, have a duty to seek to construct a new
set of international relationships--a task where the rewards
cannot be immediate. We must seek to counteract the temptation
to conduct policy by striking poses. We must strive to convince
those in need of assistance of our concern but also of the need
for patience and for the willingness to go through a painful
period of constructions--qualities likely to be in direct con-
flict with their image of themselves. And we must carry out
these measures while our security, indeed our survival, is di-
rectly and immediately menaced.

I-25/19

All this will make demands on us unprecedented in our history and perhaps in the history of any nation. It would be idle to pretend that all our problems are soluble or that all errors can be avoided. We can, however, attempt to get our choices straight. In our domestic debate two groups have tended to inhibit understanding even though each pays lip service to the other. While making a bow to the need for an imaginative diplomacy, one segment of opinion identifies foreign policy with the development of military power. While paying obeisance to the need for security, another segment in effect equates diplomacy with negotiating skill and ascribes all our difficulties to an overconcern with military factors.

As a nation of specialists we like to believe that a problem is either political, or spiritual, or economic or military. And we are tempted to assume that among all our challenges we can concentrate on those most in keeping with our predelictions. One of the most anguished students of American policy has

I-20

1
written:

To my own countrymen who have often asked
me where best to apply the hand to counter
the Soviet threat, I have accordingly had
to reply: to our American failings--to the
things we are ashamed of in our own eyes:
to the racial problem, to the conditions in
our big cities, to the education and environ-
ment of our young people, to the growing gap
between specialized knowledge and popular
understanding. I imagine that similar answers
could be found for other Western countries.
I would like to add that these are problems
which are not going to be solved by anything
we or anyone else does in the stratosphere.
If solutions are to be found for them it will
be right here on this familiar earth, in the
dealings among men and in the moral struggles
of the individual.

But the times do not permit such an order of priorities.

We do not have the time to deal with the choice between improving ourselves and dealing with the menaces to our security. We must be willing to face the paradox that we must be dedicated both to military strength and to arms control, to security as well as to negotiation, to assisting the new nations towards freedom and self-respect and yet to making our influence felt in favor of democratic institutions and the protection of human dignity. If we cannot do all these things, we will not be able to do any of them. Our ability to master the seeming paradoxes will test

1. George F. Kennan, *Russia, the Atom and the West*, New York, 1957, p. 13.

["1962, p. 13.", "J. George B. Kennon, *Guns, the Atom and the West*, New York, of them. On spilt to mean the seeming barsooxes will fear we cannot do all these things, we will not be able to do any cratic institutions and the protection of human dignity. It respect and het to making on influence left in favor of demo-station, to assating the new nations towards freedom and self- strength and to same control, to security as well as to equity to face the barsoox that we must be dedicated to military dealing with the menaces to our security. We must be willing we do not have this kind of choice between improving omnefares and but the times do not permit such an order of priorities.", "of the individualist. desiring among men and in the worst arrangements be right here on this familiar earth, in the last solutions are to be found for them if will we or anyone else does in the atmosphere, which are not found to be solved by adapting I would like to add that these are problems could be found for other Western countries. understanding. I imagine that similar measures between specified knowledge and cooperation of om. long be done, to the growing abom. pit circle, to the education and environment of om. long be done, to the growing abom. pit circle, to the education and environment of om. long be done, to