RELEASE 8 P.M.

ADDRESS DELIVERED

by

H.E. M. HERVE ALPHAND, FRENCH AMBASSADOR

TO THE UNITED STATES

TO THE HARVARD RADCLIFFE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COUNCIL
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
ON WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 1963 AT 8 P.M.

For the past few weeks, the positions taken by France in two vital fields, that of defense on the one hand, and that of the construction of a united Europe on the other, have created a certain amount of turmoil. At times, it appeared as if the relations between the Western allies were somewhat stormy. However, never did this storm reach the proportions of a cataclysm and already the over emotional reactions seem to be giving way to a more objective consideration of the problems.

After all, it is normal that such complex questions give rise to discussions which basically are useful and sound, within an alliance which members have always cherished, as one of their most precious assets, the liberty of thought and expression. It is because deep changes have occured in the world, which are shaking down preconceived ideas and which we must take into account if we wish to remain realistic.

The first fact, a capital one which can, at any time, imperil the very life of each nation is the atomic fact. From now on, wars would no more end up with the loss of a province,

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the destruction of capital goods or human lives. A generalized thermonuclear conflict would produce completely different results since, within a few minutes, it could annihilate everything. Indeed the very future of our planet, the very future of the human race would be at stake. This is why the former political strategic and even moral conceptions are upset to their very roots. This is why our relationship with our opponents, but also sometimes with our allies, happen to be altered under unforeseeable conditions.

There is a second element of the Western world which we must take into consideration if we do not want to find ourselves outdated: and that is the extraordinary expansion of a Western Europe anxious to assert herself, uniting in the economic field today, and tomorrow on the political and perhaps military fields. This recent evolution is the result of the European wars, then of the amazing effort of reconstruction which was made easier and accelerated by the American aid. Please rest assured that we do not forget in France and in Europe that the Marshall Plan allowed us to rebuild and modernize our economies, this being the best possible answer to the ambition of totalitarian imperialism.

Thus, circumstances are by no means what they used to be 15 years ago. At that time, a staggering Europe was unable to take an effective part in its own defense; at that time also, this defense could easily be taken care of, thanks to the atomic monopoly held by the United States, monopoly which no longer exists today, since the Soviet Union in turn has endowed itself with a powerful nuclear armament.

These new factors being taken into consideration, how does France answer the questions raised in the field of defense or in the field of Europe ? How does she conceive the cooperation

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of the free nations of the West in the atomic era ? These are
the problems which I would like to examine briefly before you,
without however hoping to satisfy entirely your curiosity in
such a short time.

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France faces these problems with modesty - inspired by
the fact that, in the modern world, her power is relatively
limited when compared to those of the United States and the
Soviet Union - but also with the hope that she can contribute
in a useful manner to our mutual ideal of liberty and of world
peace.

Two key words inspire her policy : these two words are "alliance" and "independence". We must bear these words in mind in order to answer many prejudiced and distorted interpretations of our intentions.

In our view, independence means, for France, possessing
an autonomous atomic force. This is a prospect which has raised
among our friends and especially in the United States a great
number of criticisms. It has been said here and then, and in a
somewhat contradictory manner, that it was impossible to set up
a French atomic force, that it was useless, that it was dangerous,
that it was inconsistent with the interests of the Alliance. I
will answer briefly these four criticisms.

According to our plans, the nuclear force of France will
consist in the first stage of supersonic bombers carrying A bombs,
then ultimately of missiles and of submarines capable to launch
H bombs. Now, it has been contended that these bombers would be
obsolete even before existing. This assertion is in accordance

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neither with the opinion of French experts nor even with that expressed by the best British and American specialists who believe that planes flying at twice the speed of sound and at low altitude are today practically invulnerable. Besides, if we are wrong on this point, why is it that in Great Britain as in the United States large orders are being placed for planes which characteristics are very close to those of our prototype ?

Moreover, our objectives are far less ambitious than those of the greater atomic powers. We do not pretend and we do not need to have a "global" missile. What we want is, not a force allowing us to attack or to "strike", not a "force de frappe", but a deterrent force, making it possible to avoid being blackmailed by a potential enemy who, taking into account the considerable harm we could inflict upon him right from the first stage, would think twice before threatening us. Therefore, it seems to us possible to set up this small deterrent without going beyond our technical or financial means and to do it although we neither ask for nor receive help from anyone.

But - as our detractors go on saying - this small French nuclear force is useless since, according to the Atlantic Pact, France enjoys the protection of the huge American force. Our determination, I hasten to say, does imply in no way a sign of mistrust towards the commitments made by our allies : we recognize that the American nuclear force is gigantic and that it remains today the main garanty of world peace ; it is our wish that the six American divisions remain in Europe, as long as their presence there is indispensable for the protection of the free world as a whole.

However we do not know what the international situation will be in ten or fifteen years and if there will not be cases - no doubt exceptional cases - when the interests of France might

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be threatened at a time when those of her allies might not be
subjected to an equal danger. This reasoning differs in no way
with that of Mr. Macmillan and Lord Home when they justify the
development of a British atomic force. Why should a policy be
considered as reasonable when it is carried out by London and
criminal when Paris wants to implement it. Furthermore, let us
not forget that the development of a nuclear force will contribute
greatly to the opening of new fields, connected with the explora-
tion of the atom, for our technicians, for our engineers and for
our industrialists.

It is also said that we are setting a bad example to the
world, that we are going to contribute to the dissimination of
the atomic arm, thus increasing seriously the risks of war. I
want to emphasize that France is not favorable to the dissimina-
tion of atomic weaponry. For instance, the treaty of cooperation
which she has just signed with Germany does not include the nuclear
field. However, in our opinion, this danger is not as great and
immediate as is generally assumed, because in order to start such
a program not only one must not be limited by international
commitments but also one must possess in sufficient quantity the
necessary raw material that is to say : uranium, have trained
for many years scientists and technicians, dispose of experimental
sites and the necessary financial resources. We believe that we
possess all these assets, but that today very few countries have
them all. In any case, we have not yet discovered how, if such is
the movement of history, one could prevent those nations which
might possess the same assets as we do, to follow the same path.

Is our policy inconsistent with the interests of our
allies ? We do not believe so. In our opinion, a French atomic
force - even a small one - will add to the strength of the West
and - by the same token - make the task of our opponent much more
complex. Because, although we intend maintaining our control over

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this force, by no means do we exclude to combine its use with
that of our allies ; by no means do we exclude - if such is also
your wish - a nuclear cooperation with you, both in the technical
and strategical fields.

The outlook would probably be completely different if
the second aspect of the French policy were not the "alliance".
I am aware of the fact that hateful rumours have been spread in
that respect concerning our intentions. Some even went so far as
to write that France wanted to "reverse the alliances" and this,
at the very moment when she was concluding an agreement with Bonn.
It was asserted that we were seeking to create a "neutral third
force" in Europe, intended to act as an arbiter between East and
West. I want to make very clear that all these accusations are
absurd and without foundation. As long as the threat which menaces
the West has not disappeared, the Atlantic Alliance remains - in
our view - indispensable to our survival, as well as to yours.

Our reason for wishing to build a powerful Europe is that
we want to strenghten the West, in order that we may be in a
position to better resist all that might imperil the principles
and the civilization which we defend together.

No doubt there is room for discussion about the changes
to be brought as regards the form, and the methods of the Alliance,
which now have been in force for thirteen years and which perhaps
do not seem perfectly adapted to present circumstances. We could
do it at leisure, take a close look at the compared values of the
notions of cooperation and of integration, at the proportions to
be kept between conventional and atomic forces, the theory of the
"flexible response", of the "pause" etc.. This in no way affect
our common will to use all our means to meet the threat when time
comes.

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These problems as a whole are being carefully studied at the present time within the Atlantic Organization, and more especially with regard to the intended creation of an interallied and multilateral NATO force, combining elements supplied by Great Britain, the United States and perhaps by other countries. As you well know, these propositions result from the agreement concluded in Nassau between the London and Washington governments, agreement which France was invited to join. In his press conference of January 14, General de Gaulle explained why we could not follow this path : first of all, because, as I have just explained, France wishes to have its own independent atomic force ; therefore the idea of taking part in an integrated force is politically contrary to this conception. But there are also technical reasons preventing us from taking into consideration an offer similar to that which could satisfy Britain. How do we know that it would be possible for us to manufacture the thermonuclear warheads and the submarines adaptable to the use of the Polaris missile ? In this respect, we are far less advanced than our British friends and it may be years before we catch up. Moreover, is it conceivable that we should make at the same time the huge financial and technical effort that we have undertaken - with no intention of abandoning it - to build up a French atomic force and the added effort which would enable us to participate in the Atlantic force ? As the President of the Republic said and I quote : "... for us, in terms of technology, this affair is not the question of the moment".

This does not imply that we oppose efforts presently made by Mr. Livingston Merchant to try and implement this plan. We merely size up the big obstacles to be overcome : what will be the composition of this NATO force so as to make it both effective and "credible" ; who will be entrusted with the control of its use, taking into consideration the wish of the Europeans to increase their responsibilities in that field, and the policy of the United

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States to keep its veto power; how will the financing of the enterprise be worked out? These are many question marks that remain to be answered.

But, if it is impossible to overcome these obstacles, would it not be possible some say, to plan a European nuclear force to which the already existing national atomic forces would contribute? Indeed, this may be a possible answer. However I do not believe that this idea could be carried out in the near future, at least not as long as a united political Europe is not in existence, and disposing of some kind of an "executive", entrusted with the control and the use of this nuclear force.

In fact, this political Europe does not exist today, in spite of the efforts made by the French Government to initiate it. Several months ago, we suggested to our partners of the European Economic Community some formulae with a view to - in a first stage - bring about a cooperation going beyond the economic framework and embracing diplomatic, cultural and perhaps military affairs. As this attempt did not materialize, we took up similar ideas with the government of the German Federal Republic and we signed on January 22, an agreement which, not only put an end to centuries of war between our two countries but could also be the first element of this politically unified Europe, to which I was referring, provided that our other partners accept our suggestion to come and discuss with us the conditions of their eventual participation. This treaty, as you see, is by no means exclusive. It represents the corner stone of Europe.

Since 1950, France has constantly favored the creation of a European entity and - first of all - in the economic field. The Treaty of Rome which institutes this community of 170 millions inhabitants became effective and has developed under most satisfactory conditions. In order to dispel certain misconceptions

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I would like to tell you in a few words what are the basic principles that inspire our European policy.

1. — Contrary to what you read or hear, France is not endeavoring to create in Europe a unit which would be protectionist, autarchic, "inward looking". It is true that, with no custom barriers and the harmonization of our economies, trade among the Six will be made easier. But the very creation of this large market will allow them to increase their resources and, consequently, develop their trade with all the countries of the world, particularly with the United States of America.

Since the Common Market began operating three years ago, United States exports of industrial products to the six countries of the Common Market have increased by 70 %; exports of agricultural products have increased by 41 %. These are not the signs of protectionism but, on the contrary, those of expansion. We do not intend to build around us a prohibitive tariff. We do not intend to practice an agricultural policy which develops artificial productions. If the Common Market continues to build up as we expect — especially in the field of agriculture and of association with some African countries — we will be willing to discuss with you mutual lowerings of custom duties — without, however, going so far as creating an "Atlantic free trade area", which, besides, neither you nor we desire.

A few days ago, the six countries of the Common Market decided, upon a proposition made by the French Delegation, to apply, without waiting for the results of the GATT Tariff negotiations, a new decrease of each of their national custom tariffs, taking as a basis a common external tariff, reduced by 20 % for industrial products. This is a striking demonstration that the Common Market is not the protectionist fortress that for the last three months a great many people have presented as a

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sort of frightening scarecrow.

2. It is our hope that Great Britain will, one day, be able to join us without restrictions. If, up to now, it has not proved possible, if the negotiations were interrupted in Brussels, it is because, for perfectly legitimate reasons which are related to her ties with other countries in the world and, particularly, with the Commonwealth as well as the special structure of her agriculture, Britain has not been in a position to accept without restrictions all the provisions of the European Community. But, if tomorrow, she decided to conform to the "rules of the club", we would be the first to welcome her in our midst.

It has been said that the French objections were little justified. But when I read the British press, even the conservative press, when I hear the statements made by the new leaders of the Labor Party, I can see that our point of view that Great Britain was not yet ready to join us, is shared by a large and influential sector of British public opinion.

Moreover, this situation does not appear to me dramatic. For years, and in spite of the fact that she had been invited, Great Britain refused to participate in the negotiations with the Six. No one, particularly not in the United States, had found at the time that this attitude would lead to serious damages for Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. Why should it be different today since we are ready to examine with all our allies the ways and means of increasing our trade and of building our unity ?

French policy, such as I have just summarized it for you, thus seem to us clear and unequivocal. It was formulated by our Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a few words which I would like to quote : "... Western Europe, to which, I hope,

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Great Britain will be joined without restrictions, must become a coherent political unit capable of cooperating fully with the United States in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and of constituting that element of balance necessary to an overall settlement."

Indeed, what we must endeavor to bring about one day is a "modus vivendi" between East and West. In this respect, as General de Gaulle has often stressed, the threat coming from the East must stop. A real relaxation of tension must take place, so that serious matters may be discussed seriously, matters such as disarmament and assistance to under-developed countries. Such are our aims, which are certainly not different from yours.

Please remember that in critical circumstances, for example when the Soviet Union destroyed the hopes for a summit conference or when she brandishes threat in Cuba or in Berlin, France has always been the most resolute, the firmest among the allies. Her determined policy, her conceptions regarding the organization of Europe and of the West, her concern in seeking, when time comes, a global settlement, do not constitute only the personal views of an exceptional man. They are supported by a freely elected Parliament and - every time it has been consulted - by the massive votes of the French people.

This policy corresponds to the permanent interests of both France and the United States. I would like to end by quoting from the words that our Prime Minister M. Pompidou was pronouncing last week when he received the Gold Medal of the American Legion : "French and Americans, we must not forget the need for a union that lives because of our mutual loyalty and in which today we find ourselves still together, for the defense of freedom"./.