△ The Triangle Papers: 60

# Nuclear Proliferation
## Risk and Responsibility

A Report to
The Trilateral Commission

Foreword by
HENRY A. KISSINGER

North American Author
GRAHAM ALLISON

European Authors
HERVÉ DE CARMOY
THÉRÈSE DELPECH

Pacific Asian Author
CHUNG MIN LEE

Comment by
PIERRE GOLDSCHMIDT

Published by
The Trilateral Commission
Washington, Paris, Tokyo
2006

[L]

The Trilateral Commission was formed in 1973 by private citizens of Europe, Japan, and North America to foster closer cooperation among these three democratic industrialized regions on common problems. It seeks to improve public understanding of such problems, to support proposals for handling them jointly, and to nurture habits and practices of working together. The European group has widened with the ongoing enlargement of the European Union. The Japanese group has widened into a Pacific Asia group. The North American group now includes members from Canada, Mexico, and the United States.

These essays were prepared for the Trilateral Commission and are distributed under its auspices. They were discussed at the Commission's annual meeting in Tokyo on April 21-24, 2006.

The authors—from North America, Europe, and Pacific Asia—have been free to present their own views. The opinions expressed are put forward in a personal capacity and do not purport to represent those of the Trilateral Commission or of any organization with which the authors are or were associated.

© The Trilateral Commission, 2006. All rights reserved.

## Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Nuclear proliferation : risk and responsibility : a report to the Trilateral Commission / foreword, Henry A. Kissinger ; authors, Graham Allison ... [et al.] ; comment, Pierre Goldschmidt.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN-10: 0-930503-88-0

ISBN-13: 978-0-930503-88-8

1. Nuclear nonproliferation. 2. Nuclear weapons--Iran. 3. Nuclear weapons--Korea (North) I. Allison, Graham T. II. Trilateral Commission. JZ5675.N8383 2006

--dc22

2006028986

## The Trilateral Commission

www.trilateral.org

1156 15th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005

5, Rue de Téhéran
75008 Paris, France

Japan Center for International Exchange
4-9-17 Minami-Azabu
Minato-ku
Tokyo 106, Japan

# Contents

Foreword v

Henry A. Kissinger

The Authors vii

1 Global Challenges of Nuclear Proliferation 1
*Graham Allison*

2 Iran Case Study: Is There a "Plan B" for Iran? 27
*Hervé de Carmoy*

3 Iran Case Study: Time Is Running Out 59
*Thérèse Delpech*

4 East Asia and Weapons of Mass Destruction 85
in North Korea: Strategic Drivers, Future Paths, and Nonproliferation Dynamics
*Chung Min Lee*

Comment

Challenge of Deterring Nuclear Proliferation 129
*Pierre Goldschmidt*

iii

LcJ

# Foreword

There is no greater challenge to the global nuclear order today than the impending proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increasing likelihood that terrorists may conduct a nuclear 9/11, devastating one of the great cities of the world. The papers presented in this report from the Trilateral Commission's 2006 annual meeting in Tokyo offer a comprehensive and insightful overview of this urgent challenge.

During the Cold War, a balance of terror was precariously maintained between the two superpowers. Leaders of both knew that their first imperative was to avoid a nuclear Armageddon, of which both would be the first victim. Even then, the disparity between the vast consequences of a decision to use nuclear weapons on the one hand and any conceivable political outcome that could be achieved on the other hand had a paralyzing effect on decision making. The deliberate choice to use nuclear weapons in a preventive or preemptive manner defied the principles of rational conduct, since it guaranteed casualties among the civilian populations of both superpowers that were beyond comprehension.

If one imagines a world of tens of nations with nuclear weapons and major powers trying to balance their own deterrent equations, plus the deterrent equations of the subsystems, deterrence calculation would become impossibly complicated. To assume that, in such a world, nuclear catastrophe could be avoided would be unrealistic.

As the world's unmatched military superpower, the United States has a unique role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The Bush administration's National Security Strategy explicitly warns that "there are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD" and that "the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack."

But a preemptive strategy for using force to deny the spread of nuclear weapons is based on assumptions that cannot be proved when they are made. When the scope for action is greatest, knowledge is at a minimum. When knowledge has been acquired, the scope for preemption has often disappeared.

v

[L]

vi

Nuclear Proliferation: Risk and Responsibility

The tension, therefore, is between preemptive and preventive uses of force. Preemption applies to an adversary possessing a capacity to do great, potentially irreversible, damage, coupled with the demonstrated will to do so imminently. The right to use force unilaterally in such circumstances has been accepted for centuries.

Preventive uses of force are measures to forestall the emergence of a threat not yet imminent, but capable, at some point in the future, of being potentially overwhelming. Preventive force is not an issue applicable to relations with an established major nuclear adversary. First-strike threats against established nuclear powers might, if such powers felt their weapons were very vulnerable, tempt them to make a preemptive strike of their own. A policy of using preventive force against aspiring nuclear powers, however, creates incentives for them to acquire nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible and, if thwarted, to develop chemical or biological weapons—either for their own security or as a safety net for assertive or revolutionary policies.

All major powers have a responsibility to take the challenge of preventing nuclear proliferation seriously. A common approach may be possible because what used to be called the "great powers" have nothing to gain by military conflict with each other. They are all dependent on the global economic system. They should recognize that, after the explosion of just one nuclear bomb in one of their great cities, their publics will demand an extreme form of preventive diplomacy to assure that this can never happen again. Without waiting for such a catastrophe, statesmen should now be building a viable international order that will prevent such nightmares from ever occurring.

As the papers in this report argue persuasively, the entire nonproliferation regime is now at risk. North Korea and Iran threaten to become nuclear weapons states. Osama bin Laden seeks nuclear weapons to realize his stated goal of killing millions of American citizens. At the conclusion of a most productive discussion of the Tokyo meeting, members of the Commission were united in the hope that this report will spur all our governments to greater urgency in combating this grave and growing threat.

Henry A. Kissinger

August 24, 2006

8/24/06

Foreword to
2006 Annual Trilateral Commission Report

Henry A. Kissinger

During the Cold War, a balance of terror was precariously
maintained between the two superpowers. Leaders of both knew that
their first imperative was to avoid a nuclear Armageddon, of which
both would be the first victim. Even then, the disparity between the
vast consequences of a decision to use nuclear weapons on the one
hand and any conceivable political outcome that could be achieved on
the other hand had a paralyzing effect on decision-making. The
deliberate choice to use nuclear weapons in a preventive or
preemptive manner defied the principles of rational conduct, since it
guaranteed casualties among the civilian populations of both
superpowers that were beyond comprehension.

As the world's unmatched military superpower, the United
States has a unique role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
The Bush administration's National Security Strategy explicitly warns
that "there are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD"
and that "the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction -
and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to
defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place
of the enemy's attack."

2

[Y]

Preventive uses of force are measures to forestall the emergence of a threat not yet imminent, but capable, at some point in the future, of being potentially overwhelming. Preventive force is not an issue applicable to relations with an established major nuclear adversary. First-strike threats against established nuclear powers might, if such powers felt their weapons were very vulnerable, tempt them to make a preemptive strike of their own. A policy of using preventive force against aspiring nuclear powers, however, creates incentives for them to acquire nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible and, if thwarted, to develop chemical or biological weapons - either for their own security or as a safety net for assertive or revolutionary policies.

Aug 24 06 04:39p

AUG-24-2006 12:55

KAI

Sent by Graham Allison

7/24/06

Draft Foreword

There is no greater challenge to the global nuclear order today
than the impending proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the
increasing likelihood that terrorists will use a nuclear 9/11, devastating
one of the great capitals of the world. The papers presented in this
report from the Trilateral Commission's 2006 annual meeting in Tokyo
offer a comprehensive and insightful overview of this urgent challenge.

During the Cold War, a balance of terror was precariously
maintained between the two superpowers. Leaders of both knew that
their first imperative was to avoid a nuclear Armageddon, of which both
would be the first victim. Even then, the disparity between the vast
consequences of a decision to use nuclear weapons, on the one hand,

Aug 24 06 04:39P

'AUG-24-2006 12:55

KAI

and any conceivable outcome that could be achieved, on the other hand, had a paralyzing effect on decision-making. The deliberate choice to use nuclear weapons in a preventive or preemptive manner defied the principles of rational conduct, since it guaranteed casualties among the civilian populations of both superpowers that were beyond comprehension.

If one imagines a world of tens of nations with nuclear weapons, and major powers trying to balance their own deterrent equations, plus the deterrent equations of the subsystems, who will be seeking to deter whom? A deterrent calculation would become even more complex if deterrence were impossible. To assume that in such a world, nuclear catastrophe could be avoided would be unrealistic.

Aug 24 06 04:40p

'AUG-24-2006 12:55

KAI

The tension, therefore, is between preemptive and preventive
uses of force. Preemption applies to an adversary possessing a
capacity to do great, potentially irreversible damage, coupled with the
demonstrated will to do so imminently. The right to use force
unilaterally in such circumstances has been accepted for centuries.

Aug 24 06 04:40P

'AUG-24-2006 12:59

KAI

that sense, the most obvious targets for preemptive strategy are terrorist organization operating from the territory of sovereign states and capable of generating threats of the kind that were heretofore an attribute of the nation-state.

Preventive uses of force are measures to forestall the emergence of a threat not yet imminent, but capable, at some point in the future, of being potentially overwhelming. Preventive force is not an issue applicable to relations with an established major nuclear adversary. First-strike threats against established nuclear powers might, if such powers felt their weapons were very vulnerable, tempt them to make a preemptive strike of their own. A policy of using preventive force against aspiring nuclear power, however, creates incentives for them to acquire nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible and if thwarted, to develop chemical or biological weapons - either for

Aug 24 06 04:40p

'AUG-24-2006 12:59

KAI

All major powers have a responsibility to take the challenge of preventing nuclear proliferation seriously. A common approach may be possible because what used to be called the "great powers" have nothing to gain by military conflict with each other. They are all dependent on the global economic system. They should recognize that after the explosion of just one nuclear bomb in one of their great cities, publics will demand an extreme form of preventive diplomacy to assure that this can never happen again. Without waiting for such a catastrophe, statesmen should now be building a viable international order that will prevent such nightmares.

from ever occurring

As the papers in this Report argue persuasively, the entire nonproliferation regime is now at risk. North Korea and Iran threaten to become nuclear weapons states. Osama bin Laden seeks nuclear

Sent by Graham Allison

7/24/06

# Draft Foreword
## 2006 Annual Trilateral Commission Report

There is no greater challenge to the global nuclear order today
than the impending proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the
increasing likelihood that terrorists conduct a nuclear 9/11 devastating
one of the great capitals of the world. The papers presented in this
report from the Trilateral Commission's 2006 annual meeting in Tokyo
offer a comprehensive and insightful overview of this urgent challenge.

During the Cold War, a balance of terror was precariously
maintained between the two superpowers. Leaders of both knew that
their first imperative was to avoid a nuclear Armageddon of which both
would be the first victim. Even then, the disparity between the vast
consequences of a decision to use nuclear weapons, on the one hand,

If one imagines a world of tens of nations with nuclear
weapons, and major powers trying to balance their own deterrent
equations, plus the deterrent equations of the subsystems, who will be
seeking to deter whom? Deterrence calculation would become
impossibly complicated. To assume that in such a world nuclear
catastrophe could be avoided would be unrealistic.

[Lc]

3

that "there are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD,"
and that "the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction -
and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to
defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place
of the enemy's attack."

The tension, therefore, is between preemptive and preventive
uses of force. Preemption applies to an adversary possessing a
capacity to do great, potentially irreversible damage, coupled with the
demonstrated will to do so imminently. The right to use force
unilaterally in such circumstances has been accepted for centuries. In

4

[ic]

[Lc]

All major powers have a responsibility to take the challenge of preventing nuclear proliferation seriously. A common approach may be possible because what used to be called the "great powers" have nothing to gain by military conflict with each other. They are all dependent on the global economic system. They should recognize that after the explosion of just one nuclear bomb in one of their great cities, publics will demand an extreme form of preventive diplomacy to assure that this can never happen again. Without waiting for such a catastrophe, statesman should now be building a viable international order that will prevent such nightmares.

As the papers in this Report argue persuasively, the entire nonproliferation regime is now at risk. North Korea and Iran threaten to become nuclear weapons states. Osama Bin Laden seeks nuclear

6

weapons to realize his stated goal to kill millions of our citizens. At the
conclusion of a most productive discussion of the Tokyo meeting,
members of the Commission were united in the hope that this Report
will spur all our governments to greater urgency in combating this
grave and growing threat.

Sent by Graham Allison

7/24/06

With Theresa's suggested edits

Draft Foreword

will

increasing likelihood that terrorists conduct a nuclear 9/11, devastating

If one imagines a world of tens of nations with nuclear
weapons, and major powers trying to balance their own deterrent
equations, plus the deterrent equations of the subsystems, who will be
seeking to deter whom? Deterrence calculation would become
impossibly complicated. To assume that in such a world, nuclear
catastrophe could be avoided would be unrealistic.

that sense, the most obvious targets for preemptive strategy are terrorist organizations operating from the territories of sovereign states and capable of generating threats of the kind that were heretofore an attribute of the nation-state.

Preventive uses of force are measures to forestall the emergence of a threat not yet imminent, but capable, at some point in the future, of being potentially overwhelming. Preventive force is not an issue applicable to relations with an established major nuclear adversary. First-strike threats against established nuclear powers might, if such powers felt their weapons were very vulnerable, tempt them to make a preemptive strike of their own. A policy of using preventive force against aspiring nuclear powers, however, creates incentives for them to acquire nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible and if thwarted, to develop chemical or biological weapons - either for

All major powers have a responsibility to take the challenge of preventing nuclear proliferation seriously. A common approach may be possible because what used to be called the "great powers" have nothing to gain by military conflict with each other. They are all dependent on the global economic system. They should recognize that, after the explosion of just one nuclear bomb in one of their great cities, publics will demand an extreme form of preventive diplomacy to assure that this can never happen again. Without waiting for such a [policymakers] catastrophe, statesman should now be building a viable international order that will prevent such nightmares.

6 American weapons to realize his stated goal to kill millions of our citizens. At the conclusion of a most productive discussion of the Tokyo meeting, members of the Commission were united in the hope that this Report will spur all our governments to greater urgency in combating this grave and growing threat.

'Inbox: FW: Trilateral Forward draft

Page 1 of 6

Web Hosting Web Mail

From: Maggie Halley <mhalley@kmaglobal.com>

To: <tamantea@kmaglobal.com>

Subject: FW: Trilateral Forward draft

Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2006 13:47:17 -0400

We just got this....

------Original Message------

From: Kissinger Office [mailto:Kissinger@csis.org]

Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 1:42 PM

To: Maggie Halley; Theresa Cimino; tamantea@kmaglobal.com

As requested

------Original Message------

From: Meghan_Van_Orden@ksg.harvard.edu
[mailto:Meghan_Van_Orden@ksg.harvard.edu] On Behalf Of
graham_allison@Harvard.Edu

Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 9:51 AM

To: Kissinger Office

Subject: Trilateral Forward draft

The draft of Henry's forward for the Trilateral Report. Please approve
or reply with changes.

https://register.bcentralhost.com/home/mail/new/mbox_message.cgi?pFolder=Inbox&pLas... 7/24/2006

Inbox: FW: Trilateral Forward draft

Page 2 of 6

[Y]

decision to use nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and any conceivable outcome that could be achieved, on the other hand, had a paralyzing effect

Page 3 of 6

As the world's unmatched military superpower, the United States has a unique role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The Bush administration's National Security Strategy explicitly warns that "there are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD," and that "the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack."

Page 4 of 6

so imminently. The right to use force unilaterally in such circumstances
has been accepted for centuries. In that sense, the most obvious targets
for preemptive strategy are terrorist organization operating from the
territory of sovereign states and capable of generating threats of the
kind

A policy of using preventive force against aspiring nuclear power,
however,

possible and if thwarted, to develop chemical or biological
weapons-either

Page 5 of 6

nonproliferation regime is now at risk. North Korea and Iran threaten to become nuclear weapons states. Osama Bin Laden seeks nuclear weapons to

Page 6 of 6

Message

Page 1 of 1

Maggie Halley

**From:** Jessee LePorin [jleporin@kmaglobal.com]
**Sent:** Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:51 AM
**To:** 'O'Neil, Mike (DC)'; 'Christie Neumann'
**Cc:** 'Mike O'Neil'; 'Sue Ellen Sisk'; 'Mary Valder'
**Subject:** RE: Trilateral Commission report on Nuclear Proliferation

Thank you for your e-mail. Dr. Kissinger has agreed to this. In Graham Allison's last e-mail to Dr. Kissinger, he was kind enough to offer to prepare a draft for Dr. Kissinger's review. Dr. Kissinger appreciated the offer and we have contacted Professor Allison's office to request that this draft be prepared and sent to us.

Best,

Jessee LePorin

Jessica P. LePorin
Office of Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10022
TF (212) 759-7919
Fax (212) 759-0042

-----Original Message-----

**From:** O'Neil, Mike (DC) [mailto:MikeO@prestongates.com]
**Sent:** Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:41 AM
**To:** Christie Neumann
**Cc:** jleporin@kmaglobal.com; Mike O'Neil; Sue Ellen Sisk; Mary Valder
**Subject:** Trilateral Commission report on Nuclear Proliferation

Dear Christie:

Dr. Kissinger chaired a panel discussion on Nuclear Proliferation during the recent April 2006 Trilateral Commission meeting in Tokyo. Afterwards, there were discussions with him and among the panelists about turning his comments during that session into a forward to the Trilateral report on Nuclear Proliferation that we will publish this summer using the papers presented in Tokyo. In fact, Tadashi Yamamoto was to have confirmed this with Dr. Kissinger when they met last week. The arrangement that was to be proposed was that his old student, Graham Allison, who was the U.S. panelist, would take Dr. Kissinger's comments from Tokyo plus some elements of the recent op-ed that he wrote on the subject and prepare a draft he would then send to Dr. Kissinger for approval.

Could you check to see if Dr. Kissinger has already agreed to this arrangement or, if he has not, whether he favors it? Graham is anxious that we get this report into print soon as this is the national security topic of the moment.

Thanks very much, Mike O'Neil

8/11/2006

Maggie Halley

From: Maggie Halley [mhalley@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:36 AM
To: 'graham_allison@Harvard.Edu'
Subject: RE: Follow up

In response to Mr. Allison's message of Friday, June 16th, Dr. Kissinger would like to see
a draft of the forward.

Thank you,

Maggie Halley
Assistant to Dr. Kissinger

------Original Message------

From: Simone_OHanlon@ksg.harvard.edu [mailto:Simone_OHanlon@ksg.harvard.edu] On Behalf Of
graham_allison@Harvard.Edu
Sent: Friday, June 16, 2006 12:52 PM
To: mhalley@kmaglobal.com
Subject: Follow up

Memorandum

To: Henry Kissinger
From: Graham Allison
Date: June 16, 2006
Subject: Follow up

Great to see you in London airport. Your comments about Putin and the U.S.-Russian relationship sound just right to me.

I believe Tom Foley or one of the other chairmen may have spoken to you about the
possibility of our allowing the Commission to take an excerpt from your introductory
comments as a forward to the Report. As one of the coauthors, I am certain that this
would certainly enhance the Report. Moreover, I noted in your recent op-ed that we
discussed that you had published a revised version of several of the points that you made
there.

I've told Michael O'Hanlon that if it were useful to you, I would be happy to take the transcript of your comments in Tokyo together with your op-ed and give you a first draft of a two-page forward. But before pulling the pieces together, I wanted to check first with you whether this meets with your approval.

Look forward to catching up in New York soon.

Ps. Thanks again for meeting with the students. At Commencement last week, more than a
half dozen said to me that meeting you was the highlight of their year at Harvard. So
we'll try to do it again bringing the grains of sand in Harvard's mountain to Mohammed.

Best.

Maggie Halley

From: Simone_OHanlon@ksg.harvard.edu on behalf of graham_allison@Harvard.Edu
Sent: Friday, June 16, 2006 12:52 PM
To: mhalley@kmaglobal.com
Subject: Follow up

Memorandum

Best.

DATE 5/18/06

CORR. FILE Allison, Graham

ACTION: Alan Stape Dennis
Jessee Theresa John B.
Maggie Suzanne Rose

COMMENTS:

SUBJ. FILE

CROSS REF.

STAFF MEMO

DC OFFICE:
Christie / Jody / Ann

INFO COPY TO:

ROUTE CC COPY TO:

TO BE FILED

## SESSION 5:

### Henry Kissinger:

**Introduction:**

There is no more important issue before the world today than proliferation. It is not simply the increased danger of casualties in any conflict, it is also of course that proliferation will change the nature of the international system completely. It is said that deterrence has worked reasonably well in the Cold War period, and there is some merit to that. Even in the Cold War period, as somebody who would have been asked about undertaking that decision—I know I speak for everybody else who ever was in that position—the disparity between the vastness of the decision to use nuclear weapons and any conceivable outcome had, over a period of time, a paralyzing effect on decision-making because it meant that one had to act in a manner that was incompatible with rational conduct, because one had to be prepared to threaten huge casualties. Now, between two nations this was barely sustainable. In a world of tens of millions of nations with nuclear weapons, with several deterrent balances going on simultaneously, and with major powers trying to balance their own deterrent equations, plus the deterrent equations of the subsystems. To assume that catastrophe can be avoided in such a world seems to me, extremely unlikely.

[Discusses how papers and presentation are organized. Introduces speakers.]

### Lee Chung-Min

Thank you, Mr. Kissinger. It is a real honor to be here, in front of such experts on my left and of course across the room, as well as Tadashi Yamamoto at the Trilateral meeting here. A few weeks ago, a Washington journalist asked me what are the clear-cut indicators if North Korea becomes a break-out state, and I gave the usual political science answer: long-range missile test, a complete break-out or walk-out from the six-party talks, or perhaps even an underground nuclear explosion. I was tempted however, as I came to this meeting, to say that there is another hidden indicator that I think all of us are not aware of, and that is the Han Sung-joo indicator, because every time Dr. Han joins the Korean government, he seems to precipitate a North Korean nuclear crisis. Of course, Dr. Han, I say that only in jest. I do certainly hope that you do come back to the Korean government.

But on a more serious note, given the limited time, I have a full paper in front of you as well as a pack of Power Point slides. There are four major themes that cut across my paper. The first is that Asia's WMD problem writ large is a global problem. It is not a regional problem. It is not a Korean problem. It is not a Pakistani problem. It is a problem that will, if basically the scales go upside down, really change the global strategic environment. The second point is that there are four major quandaries or tipping points across the Asian fault lines that will impinge upon nuclear futures in Asia. The third point is that I'll give a brief overall description of the Chinese, Indo-Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear capabilities, in addition to what the South Koreans and Japanese *could* do if certain things happened. And finally, what I want to talk about is the mixture between failed states and the role of nuclear weapons in the Asian continent.

If you see, for example, my slides, I think what you will see is there's a bifurcated version of Asia. Many of you have spoken about the robust economic future of the region and I agree

SESSION 5:

Henry Kissinger:

*Introduction:*

There is no more important issue before the world today than proliferation. It is not simply the increased danger of casualties in any conflict, it is also of course that proliferation will change the nature of the international system completely. It is said that deterrence has worked reasonably well in the Cold War period, and there is some merit to that. Even in the Cold War period, as somebody who would have been asked about undertaking that decision—I know I speak for everybody else who ever was in that position—the disparity between the vastness of the decision to use nuclear weapons and any conceivable outcome had, over a period of time, a paralyzing effect on decision-making because it meant that one had to act in a manner that was incompatible with rational conduct, because one had to be prepared to threaten huge casualties. Now, between two nations this was barely sustainable. In a world of tens of nations with nuclear weapons, with several deterrent balances going on simultaneously, and with major powers trying to balance their own deterrent equations, plus the deterrent equations of the subsystems. To assume that catastrophe can be avoided in such a world seems to me, extremely unlikely.

Lee Chung-Min

[L]

with you a hundred percent. But it is the “Jekyll and Hyde” or the “Asian twin” phenomenon. And this is interesting because for the first time in Asian history we have succeeded beyond our dreams both in terms of wealth generation, but also in terms of military capital. And if you look at how Asians conceive of security, there’s a positive market-driven world where more prosperity, the argument goes, the less war you have. But on the other hand, the darker side of Asia is equally compelling. Three of the seven declared nuclear powers are in Asia. Five of the top ten armies are Asian. Two of the most likely break-out states are Asian. And three of the most technologically advanced countries with civil nuclear policies, that could be converted under certain circumstances to military conversion programs are the Japanese, South Koreans, and Taiwanese. And of course we have three major hot spots in the region. And last but not least, you have two powers in Pakistan and North Korea that are also failing states in certain respects. And so the integrity of their national command authority to control their WMD assets I believe should be a question of concern to all of us. So all this means that we are entering into what many have said, a second nuclear age perhaps, or the first Asian nuclear age.

In my personal view, the biggest change in Asia over the last three decades is China's rejection of orthodox Communism, that has enabled it to join the community of nations. Many of us yesterday spoke about the problems confronting for example Russia, but I think many of also do not understand. The positive side of China's rise everybody realizes, but there is another distinct aspect of China's rise as well. Today, for the first time since 1949, there is not a single country that borders Russia that is hostile to the PRC, at least in natural terms. And that is a huge, huge, huge boon for Chinese diplomacy, and I applaud what the leadership has done. But it has also meant that China is now freer to contest other geographic space, which they didn't before. And I think one of the key unintended consequences under Mikhail Gorbachev, with his détente vis-à-vis China and the rest of the world, is that by freeing all these forces from the Soviet-Russian border, the Chinese were able to really focus on their own version of an RMA drive. And that is now beginning to be seen, or footprints of that are beginning to appear throughout the Asian region. So as I said, there are positive and not-so-positive aspects of China's rise that I think many of us in this room will feel with greater urgency perhaps in the years and decades ahead. I do not subscribe to the view that China is an automatic threat, because for one reason, China faces so many compelling domestic challenges that will constrain its foreign forays. But that does not mean that we should be unconcerned about China's strategic footprint.

What then are the key Asian tipping points as you look to the next several years? There are three major sub-zones or fault lines that all of you are familiar with: Northeast Asia, with the Korean peninsula situation and of course the Taiwan Strait; then you have Southeast Asia; and of course South Asia, with Kashmir. Luckily, the propensity of war has declined considerably since the end of the Cold War. But this does not mean that conflicts are going to end, because there are very strong undercurrents that aren't really detectable that I believe at some future time could come back to haunt us. And the first point that I want to share with you is the potential—and I stress the word potential—correlation between the specter of failing states and those that have weapons of mass destruction, and in particular, Pakistan and North Korea. How does one define a failed state? Weakening of a state's monopoly on violence, a profound delegitimization of a regime, de facto economic collapse or erosion, human security crises, etc. Last year, for many of you who are familiar with the issue, *Foreign Policy* magazine and the Fund for Peace published the so-called “failed state index” of the top 60 states that were most vulnerable. I think there are many holes in their analysis and I believe that there is a tremendous argument to be made either way for many of the states who were included in that 60 list. But of the top 20 so-called “alert

[1c]

states,” 13 were Asian, and North Korea ranked number 13 and Pakistan 34. This doesn’t mean that Musharraf or Kim Jong-il will fall down tomorrow. I think the regimes in both Islamabad and Pyongyang are far more resilient, but there are conditions by which they will face critical issues. So the key issue here is, if vulnerabilities in these two regimes go up, will they be able to secure their WMD and nuclear assets and facilities. In other words, will the integrity of their national command authorities be retained.

The second tipping point, which I’ve already alluded to a little bit, is the rise of Asian variants of RMA, or revolution in military affairs. Asia has the highest concentration of military capital and selectively more advanced power projection. Now this pales in comparison to the U.S. defense budget of $440 billion plus, but if you look at it in a selective way, beyond for example ongoing replacement of aging systems, reduction in ground forces is happening, and with a smaller army across the region you have more robust navies and air forces and missile capabilities. And they’re all hedging against contingencies in the next several years or decades ahead.

So, all the major armies in the region—the Chinese, the Japanese, the South Korean, North Korean, Indian, and Taiwanese—are accelerating, given their own budgetary constraints, but still accelerating their force modernizations. And the consequence, I believe, is threefold. The first is, for the first time Asian armies are overcoming the tyranny of distance. They’re able to project power within their realms. And this has resulted in an expansion in their zones of operations, and more importantly, more states may use military force to buttress their political and policy objectives. So even without nuclear weapons, what I’m arguing is that these asymmetrical conventional capabilities are of concern.

The third tipping point is perhaps the most dangerous, which is something we haven’t yet faced, and that is the willing or accidental transfer of WMD technologies to Al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations, or even a grand coalition between drug cartels and terrorist groups. There is no evidence that Iran, North Korea, Syria, or Pakistan have transferred any nuclear technologies or material to Al Qaeda or any other terrorist group, at least in the public domain. But I want you to be concerned about the so-called A. Q. Khan network. And this was a network that was precipitated by the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb that went on for nearly 20 years. And I guess if one is glib about it, this is the nuclear version of Wal-Mart and E-bay, because North Koreans were able to swap their ballistic missile technology in return for nuclear technology from Pakistan. Pakistan basically got their technology from the Chinese, which they then transferred over to the Iranians. So this really grey matter that covered much of Asia and the world is something that is of critical concern. And with all due respect to every member of this group, I think most of the countries in this meeting today—either companies in their countries, their militaries, or their governments, did facilitate the A. Q. Khan network, and this is something that I think many of us will come to regret. But one of the major problems of secondary proliferation is that these dual-use technologies simply cannot be controlled. And that’s something that I think will come back to haunt us in many respects.

Now finally, the final tipping point in this case is basically this. You want to prevent two worst outcomes, Iran and North Korea with nuclear weapons. And that would be a nightmare scenario because it would trigger a bunch of other crises. But if you take that to the logical extreme and you consider military strikes, you will end up with two catastrophic wars, particularly in Korea. So, the final point is that you really don’t have great policy options.

I’m going to go into very brief profiles of China, India, and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons technologies. The key thing that we should worry about is two things. China wants more

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strategic nuclear capabilities. In particular, SRBMs. And if China has a functioning nuclear
submarine force in the decades ahead, that will be of critical concern to every Asian navy in the
region. India, these are private estimates from think tanks, some say that by 2015 or 2020 or so,
India will also have a functioning triad, including up to about 300-400 nuclear weapons,
including thermonuclear warheads. Pakistan's is very India-centric. Now the key problem is
North Korea. New archival material suggests that North Korea had begun a nuclear weapons
program from about the 1960s onward. In February of last year, the North Koreans said they had
nuclear weapons. Intelligence is very, very faulty. In fact, Don Gregg, the former ambassador to
the ROK has said North Korea is the longest-running intelligence failure in U.S. history. I don't
really agree with that, but I do want to share with you one anecdote. Saddam Hussein said for
many years that he doesn't have nuclear weapons and we chose not to believe him. Kim Jong-il
says, "I have nuclear weapons," but I think we do not want to believe him although that may be
the case. Now, the best estimate is that the North Koreans today probably have between three
and six nuclear weapons. If their 50 megawatt reactor is operational, they will have enough
plutonium to run perhaps five to seven nuclear weapons per year.

So what are my very somber conclusions? The first is that, despite the fact that many
people have argued that you need to give Pyongyang security assurances, and that is the only
way you will solve this peacefully, I believe that the specter of that proposal is basically not all
that high. In other words, North Korea needs nuclear weapons as part of regime survival, and I
just don't know how Kim Jong-il will be able to divorce his regime with nuclear weapons and
the Korean People's Army.

The second major conclusion is that unfortunately we may already be living with a
nuclearized Korea. That's what they've said. So we're facing this already. The red line has been
crossed. The red line has been pushed so far back that I think it has lost its color, but North
Korea, if you believe what they say to be true, although there is no independent intelligence,
that's the key issue. So therefore, North Korea, in summary, has been a major beneficiary and an
instigator of secondary proliferation. This is something that I think we really have to watch out
for. My final word is that, heaven forbid, if North Korea does become a fully operational nuclear
power, that would change Japanese and South Korean perspectives on defense and security
options, including perhaps crossing their own nuclear thresholds, although that would be
extremely detrimental to their alliances with America, and I hope that will not happen.

Thank you.

Therese Delpech:

Thank you very much. Let me first thank the Trilateral Commission for the invitation to
speak before this important audience. My own view is that, the reason for this invitation was to
try to correct the gender imbalance of the list of the speakers, so I hope I won't disappoint you
too much.

I began working on Iran at the end of Iran-Iraq war. This was in 1998, sorry, 1988, when
the Iranians were absolutely desperate to get uranium, I mean, the low enriched uranium from
France. And At the time we were ultra cautious because we've made already some mistakes in
the region and we decided to check what kind of HEUs (?) these uranium would represent in Iran
at the time. There was no reactor, there was no fuel fabrication plant, and so at the end of
discussion we said, well, no we won't sell even low enriched uranium to you. Now, it's

interesting to know that almost 18 years afterwards, the feature is not entirely dissimilar. Sure they do have a reactor, this is a Russian reactor at Bushehr, and the problem is that the enrichment activities that are going on in Natanz are completely unrelated to this reactor for at least three different reasons. I mean, the first reason is that the Russian reactor at Bushehr has Russian fuels for the duration of its life, so it doesn't need any other enrichment activities. Secondly, even in Natanz, would have as a purpose to feed this reactor, it would produce only half the core per year. The third reason, is that even this very slow pace would be acceptable in any industrial setting, uranium produced in Natanz could not be in fuel rod that could be put in the Bushehr reactor, because they will need Russian cords that Russians are certainly not ready to give. So, the point that I want to make is that in many ways the situation we had before us now is as strange as it was in 1988.

Now the disconnect between Iranian activities and Iran's declaration has been an imminent feature since February 2003 when the international inspectors began coming to Iran and look at the different facilities. Iran took advantage at this stage. From the tension mounting on Iraq to delay the most important IAEA inspection in October 2002 up to February 2003. And what was done in this period is still very much relevant. Now, since then, since 2003, three years have passed and major questions remain unanswered regarding Inter Alier (or winter earlier?) I would mention only a few problems that we still have before us in terms of verification only to show you how difficult it would be to clarify the Iranian nuclear program in the coming weeks or months if we would rely only on inspectors.

First, there is the history of the two centrifuges. The drawing had been acquired in the mid 1990s and this has been recognized by Iran only when the A. Q. Khan network that Dr. Lee mentioned, was surfaced with federation of Colonel Qaddafi in December 2003.

Secondly, the contamination in LEU, low enriched uranium, highly enriched uranium, in a number of sites is also absolutely not clarified. When I say absolutely not, I am going slightly beyond what the IAEA does say. What IAEA says, is that certain LEU and HIU have not been clarified. The reason why I go beyond is that following. In order to clarify any of these contaminations, which is according to the Iranian, mostly of Pakistani origin, the scientists would have had access to the Pakistani side. And they never did. So, what happened was only expertise with thesis that were brought to be announced, nobody actually knows where those thesis have been coming from. They have been coming from Iran as well. Why do I say that? I say that because it was not the interest of Islamabad to have precise inquiry into this business because A.Q. Khan network is an embarrassment for everybody in Islamabad. Well, I am speaking in my own capacity, of course.

Now, there is an additional question, which is related to plutonium experiment. The plutonium experiments have been, some of them, have been recognized by Iran but additional experiments have been found by the IAEA and are so far unexplained. Another issue is polonium 210 associated with Belugium (?), those familiar with nuclear weapon will understand what I mean. Another issue is the famous 1987 offer, which is a Pakistani-offer, the IAEA has only brief information about this offer and is unable to get any significant detail about what this offer actually encompass. And finally, I mean this is a list of examples, I mean, the list is much longer.

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Finally, I'd mention that acquisition by Pakistan-offered (?) technology that has meaning only for nuclear weapons, which is a technology used for testing and matching uranium metal into (mystical, asymmetrical?) forms. Now, where are we now? I mean there are situations in my view when no good options are available any longer. And this is in my view the situation we face now with Iran. Which is probably the reason why I am not going to accept further invitation to talk about the subject because as the time passes the situation deteriorates. But it seems to me that it has not been always the case and it's interesting to recognize that the number of lost opportunities have actually been lost, but to understand why. The number of past mistakes have been done.

First, I mean, starting with the Europeans, since I am European. The Europeans did not listen to the U.S. in the 1990s when they should have done it. At the time a lot of business was going on between Iran and a number of countries and at that time prevention would have worked. And the morality of this is that strange as it may appear it is not because Washington tells us something that the information is necessarily wrong.

Secondly, Russia. Russia promised to stop nuclear cooperation beyond Bushehr. But Russian authorities may have been unable to control the flow of exchanges that was going on. At some point, during the 1990s, what could find fies (?) Iranians caused in Russian labs. And I would come later to Russia. Because I want to explain something that was said yesterday during the Russian session.

Thirdly, America. I mean, in my view, the mistake America did was the obsession with the Russian deals. And probably Washington did not pay sufficient attention to two other major suppliers. And Dr. Lee talked about them, one major supplier was China, we didn't hear much about this in the 1990s. And another major supplier was A. Q. Khan networks. And these networks as is clear in Dr. Lee's paper, is not completely unrelated to China. I mean, if you remember in the Libyan case, the weapon's design that was found in Libya was of Chinese origin. I mean, coming through Pakistan, of course. Well, finally, the IAEA. The IAEA proved unable to detect what was going on. Which is to prove that even Nobel prizers can fail. You can look at something encouraging, or you can look at something frightening, I mean, it depends on the perspectives.

Now, concerning the present. How can we assess the present situation. I would say that in the present situation the problems are: First, Iran has so far paid no price whatsoever for its violation of international agreement. Secondly, for its unilateral interruption of two agreements with Europeans. Thirdly for its inflammatory rhetoric and in particular, concerning Israel, called the tumor that should be wiped off the map. Secondly in the present, another problem comes from the lack of unity. Well, America and Europe are rather close since 2005. And the problem is that has been for years, to get Russia and China closer. What other result today are China and Russia closer to Europe and America on the Iranian issue? In my view, no. And let me say a few words concerning Russia here. Russia as Sir Roderic Lyne rightly pointed out yesterday, has no interest in the Iranian bombs, certainly not. But unfortunately, if Russia would act in accordance with its interest, we'd know it. The problem is that Russia has no policy on Iran but a number of contradictory objectives. Let me give the list of some of them.

One is to keep the arms deal up and running. And let me underline that this is extraordinary that the nation under IAEA and the Security Council investigation still receives arms from a country that is a depository state of NPT, that's Moscow. Secondly, second objective is to get regularly numerous checks that come with Bushehr. Third objective is to keep Iranians quiet in the Caucasus. Fourth objective is to avoid a hostage crisis with the numerous Russians working at the Bushehr plant. So, this is something which makes a definition of one policy very difficult.

Concerning China, China is a very different story. And in my view, the energy is the only aspect of it. Even if it is an important one. I believe the idea to keep an additional headache for the U.S. and the Middle East is probably tempting as well. And there is North Korean issue, which has some linkage in Chinese mind when they talk about Iran. Now, third point concerning the present is, in my view, the most worrisome element, this is the difference, difference between the pace of diplomacy and the pace of Iranian nuclear program. The pace of diplomacy, you have a good example with the way the presidential statement which is in fact, the lowest statement, the lowest action that the Security Council can take, carries no real legal obligation. And these took three weeks, three weeks, to get the presidential statement. And in this presidential statement, it was not even possible to speak about the peace and security, I mean, of spread of peace and security, when talking about proliferation was not possible, either to have the least of the demands of the IAEA actually listed in the resolution. Now, this message was well understood in Teheran and at the same time the pace of Iranian nuclear program is much faster than expected. And here, one can only recall what has been discovered in mid March, I mean, the first cascade in place and running and the announcement in mid April, concerning enriched uranium.

Now, concerning the future, and I will close here. Concerning the future, the problems are the following: We need to have that in mind in order to think about the present. First, since we are all in this region, it's absolutely obvious to me that North Korea will enormously benefit from this crisis. Secondly, there is a risk of nuclear anarchy and we simply do not understand right now what these actually means. I mean, it isn't only the failure of the possible failure of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, it's also a major failure for the Tehran's. And we can come back to that in the discussion. Now, third point is related to the UN. At the UN level, if the Security Council is no longer seen as efficient enough to perform its task, we run the risk to come back to the situation we had with the League of Nations. With the impotence of the League of the Nations, and even those who don't like the UN, to be concerned by this prospect. Last but not least, we should be aware that the prominent feature of the 21st Century could very well be defined, but what we are witnessing with Iran and North Korea, threats, blackmails, total lack of moderation, inflammatory rhetoric, in short, I mean, exactly the opposite of the international order. And we used to know this in the Cold War in a symmetrical world but we are going to see it probably in asymmetrical ways, and in my view, it won't be more pleasant. Now, what is to be done and this is my conclusion, in my view, the hard work is just before us. We have talked enough and the talk that we have had for two years has been used by the Iranians, we know it, they said it, there is no reason not to believe it. They use this talks in order to perform technical weaknesses, I mean, to, sorry, to fix the technical weaknesses that they still had in their program. They were never interested in negotiations at no point. And what we have to do right now is to face the situation at the end of the month where we get a new report by the IAEA, and the next step, could in my view, only be the resolution under Chapter 7, and sanctions, diplomatic,

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political, but essentially, economic sanctions. And here, it seems to me, we underestimate the
possibility of that are there, because of the dependence of Iran of external world, and particular,
the West is enormous.

Now, if we are afraid of the consequences, and in particular, if we are afraid of all prices
and in Middle East instability, the only question I ask is what would it be the situation
concerning all prices and Middle East stability with Iranian nuclear weapon. Thank you.

Herve de Carmoy:

Chairman, ladies and gentleman, thank you. Point of departure is fairly simple. It is to ask
the question, in case there are almost no strong sanctions by the Security Councils. What do we
do? Is there an alternative? Is there a B plan? And therefore, we looked at the two alternatives
that should be discussed here. One is, has to do with surgical strikes. What are the implications,
and the other is what we call the plan B. And so, if we look at the surgical strikes, I think we
have to accept to look for a few minutes at the complexity that they would generate. And I have
looked at rarely three cases.

The first is the number of countries like China, Russia and the motherhood Middle East
countries which I just visited before I came here. The other is to share with you one observation
on Iran. And the third is Israel, the United States, and obviously Europe. In China, we have to
remember what we heard yesterday. But we also have to remember that 75% of the armed forces
of China are focused on law and order within the country, where according to our information,
there over were 80,000 instances of uprising within the country last year. We have to remember
that 15-dollar increase in the price of oil reduces the gross GNP of China by about .6 to .8
percent. We have to remember that there are 90 million Chinese estimates to 150 million western
estimates of very poor Chinese at the doorstep of China. All of that to tell you that we heard
yesterday that internal consideration is very important of fine policy and therefore, we believe
that the Chinese, we believed a year ago and still believe today that Chinese will consider
(inaudible) extremely strong sanctions as an option that could create internal difficulty for that.
The same conclusions were reached by the Russians, we heard why for seven reasons the self
interest of (inaudible) is to protect the status quo with the Iran. I would add a second
consideration. Should we ask ourselves whether the Russian Iranian condominium over the
Persian Golf was not an enticing game plan for experienced chess players.

So, the third question we have to look at is, are, the motherhood Middle East countries
outside of Iran and Syria. Is turmoil fueling up in most of the Middle East countries as a result
of a shop of power struggle between Shiites and Sunnites and between the haves and have-nots.
Unfortunately, we believe that the positive answer has to be given to this question. Why?
Because ruling elites of most of these countries are practicing the policy of win all take all. As a
result, it is my perception that violence is seeding below the surface and Muslim masses all over
the region are identifying increasingly with Ahmadinejad rather than with corrupt local
leadership.

Iran. Iran is we think we know a lot about Iran. But I'd like to shed somewhat different
light. Most indicators point in the same upward direction. Everything is increasing in Iran. The
population, poverty, corruption, number of people unemployed, size of all, size of the military
budget, number of opponents eliminated, and verbal attacks against Israel and the west. We
could add to this list, the level of ignorance about the United States at a senior level in contrast to
the rest of the world, notably Europe, Latin America and Asia, extremely few Iranians in position
of responsibility in Iran have had die fact knowledge of the USA. In 1936, in my country, out of
the top 200 leaders, less than 5, 5 knew German, or had lived in Germany. Ignorance is a fertile
ground for inconsidered violent action. All of these transmitted plausible that in the case of
military intervention, the population of Iran would rally around the extremists. This applies to
Iran, as well as, possibly to most of motherhood Middle Eastern countries. Preemptive strikes
could ignite local turmoil and cause new regimes to emerge of the Palestinian type.

Europe. Europe, ladies and gentleman, has tried to be an (inaudible). Without perhaps
realizing that tectonic changes in geopolitical power, that have taken place over the last 15 years.
China, India, and Russia because of its natural resources and its game plan, have become key
players. Demography and the refusal of the European constitution have turned somewhat Europe
into the Venice of the 20th century until such time as Europe (inaudible) aside to take its political
and military destiny into its own hands. Events in the Middle East may accelerate that process.
So, Europe is (inaudible) weak. In addition, it has 50 million Muslims living mostly in or near its
cities. Although this number is more than twice the number of Muslims living in the United
States, the Europe has not followed the half policies of the United States which has banned over
100,000 of Muslims living in the U.S. quietly who were classified as potential risk. As a result, a
direct conflict with Iran could ignite the level of uprising in Europe, the intensity of which it is
hard to predict.

The United States and Israel. For the U.S. and Israel, preemptive surgical strikes are the
definite option. America is at war. These are the first four words written by president Bush in
the March 2006 National Security strategy. The U.S. position can be explained by three
considerations. First, as Dick Cheney puts it, the U.S. and (inaudible) the U.S. will not accept
any situation which would prevent its leadership from protecting the U.S. way of life. Gasoline is
of the essence in this continent. Hence, the Persian Gulf must become permanently, if possible, a
quasi American Gulf. By so doing, China is (inaudible), Europe and Japan (inaudible) line, and
the ultimate goal of securing peace in Iraq and the advancement of democracy in the rest of the
region if appears. If not, more (inaudible) achievable at least within which. May I say that in four
years ago, when we met with the Secretary of Defense, these were the statements which he made
to a small group of us excluding the statements on Iraq.

The second powerful motivation of the United States is Israel. The quasi osmatic(?)
relationship between the U.S. government, about 40, 50, 60 million of born-again Christians and
Israel, defies the law of traditional strategic geopolitical consideration to move partly in the
realm of passion and identification. This situation is a fact. And probably a durable fact. It has
been beneficial to both countries, to the U.S. who needs a reliable beachhead in the part of the
world, and to Israel in its fight for survival. It is in our judgment, here to stay, and a powerful
motivation for the U.S.A. to remain preeminent in the Middle East.

The third indication of the third consideration is that all indicators point in the same direction for the U.S.A. The direct of unchallenged global power. The U.S. has a resilient untested political system, strong and innovative economy, and overwhelming military power that can projectors says globally dynamic demography and a vision for the world. So, let us acknowledge reality. The U.S. power has no equivalent in modern or ancient history. The difficulty is in Iraq, the level of national and international U.S. indebtedness, the relative decline in the U.S. soft power are real issues, the United States will deal with that. Because of their recent history, because of demography and lack of will power and courage to carry out in a timely manner, necessarily forms, Europe, China, India, Russia, Japan, and even more the Middle Eastern countries have no prospect to play in any way in the same league in the U.S.A. over the next 25 years. It follows that any plan B, bzab (??) Iran nuclearization (spell?) assuming that there is no change of heart at the UN Security Council, has to be a US plan. At this point, the legendary prudence of Trilateral speakers should have incited me to stop right here. Who am I, who are we to pass a judgment on a issue that goes to the heart of the way the U.S. exercises their global responsibility. Their level of information and their firsthand of experience in exercising worldwide power is definitely in all of us. So, I still day continue (?) and I can only find one reason for that. We are all in the same boat. If the U.S. wins, we all win. If the course of action adopted by the U.S. and Israel rips apart the social fabric of motherhood Muslim governments and (inaudible)ing democracy all over the world it could take us decades to rebuild at a huge human cost of responsible and interdependent world community. In the same breath, if Israel were to be nuclear-attacked by Iran, or frighten of it, it would be a disaster of unprecedented proportion. So having outlined the risks and more of it is in my paper on preemptive strikes, let me focus on the grand bargain.

My point of departure is very simple. When is America at its best, we heard the answer on Saturday night concerning China and Japan. When the U.S. and that was the answer, when the U.S. seeks to integrate. Hence our recommendation of a two pronged approach by the U.S. The U.S. should enter into a direct political negotiation with Iran, while concomitantly setting up a regional Middle Eastern council representing the major nuclear countries. Iran should receive from the U.S. and the council the security assurance that it will be no attempt to change the regime as long as Iran respects the moratorium on nuclear enrichment. The IAEA would have the authority and responsibility to carry out the required levels of (inaudible) verifications. The Iranians will know that none noncompliance of any kind will immediately trigger the total destruction of their nuclear facilities. And the political framework would be complemented by a regional economic program involving the trilateral countries and the wealthiest oil producing countries.

Now, it is clear that the difficulties of implementing, implementation are huge. One needs the commitment of present administration and that looks like a long shot. The agreement from the potential partners and we can(not?) even get it at the security council, and that there will be an issue of implementation of in the field. Against these difficulties, we have to see the risks associated with surgical strikes. What we are saying is that such a program could be a win-win situation for all parties concerned. It would be (inaudible) to position of the U.S. and of Israel in the Middle East both in terms of security and prospect for sustaining economic development. The existence of an action oriented new forum for the Middle East with Japan, Europe, Russia,

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China, India, will provide all participants with an opportunity to work together to promote constructive solutions. Middle Eastern money combined, for instance, with the experience and discipline of the European banks for the construction and development, and Japanese technology, could go long way towards helping eradicate poverty in this region. The fall out benefits of providing hope, infrastructure, and education to millions of Muslims in the Middle East, we have an immense impact on the outcome of the fight against terrorists, and longer term against poverty in Africa. Where Iran to refuse such an effort (or offer?). Then more legitimacy of preemptive strike would be much greater and the risk more containable. So in my judgment, Iran, as Henry said at the beginning, is probably the pivotal issue of this generation. If we handle it with vision, pragmatism and determination, potential benefits are immense. We could avoid uncontrollable escalation of conflicts, cascades of proliferation, not to mention direct threats to Israel's existence to our own existence. The United States must lead, the trilateral countries must support, in America we trust. Thank you.

Graham Allison:

Thank you very much Henry. I think we've had a three excellent presentations that focused on the two most urgent tests to the total system. Let me go back to Peter Southernland's opening comments, where I thought he offered a succinct summary of the mission of the Trilateral Commission in which he said in his words we seek to promote rule-based, multilateral, international system grounded in treaties and institutions. So, if I would summarize the focus of this whole panel and our paper in a single question, it is "Are we now witnessing the unraveling of the rule-based international system based on treaties and institutions of greatest significance in the arena of international security, (inaudible) the greatest such a construction, are that we are seeing in modern times. Are we...if we go back to Dean Achenson's wonderful memoirs of the period right after World War II, which he entitled "Present at the Creation", the creation of the whole institutional framework that provided for the long peace after World War Two from the IMF to the forming of NATO, to U.S.-Japan treaties. I would say the question that we need to focus on is are we now witnessing the unraveling of the nonproliferation regime and the system that held back what was, in effect, John F. Kennedy's nightmare some 40 years ago. Just to remember because I think that so much has happened, it's hard to keep in perspectives. In 1962, as I mentioned in my paper, Kennedy warned that by 1970 there might be 10 nuclear powers instead of the four. And by 75, 15 or 20. Had nations acquired nuclear weapons as they acquired technical capability to build nuclear weapons, that would have been correct. But the purpose in stating that warning so startling by Kennedy, was to motivate the international effort, which was actually undertaking, the centerpiece of which has been nonproliferation treaty in which to date 184 countries have sworn nuclear weapons, including some 40 or 50 countries that can have nuclear weapons if they technically decided to build them.

So, this system, constructed painfully over a substantial number of years, I would say, is currently being tested in the extreme by the events that have been described by Mr. Lee, Carmoy, and Madam Delpech. Let me summarize my comments under three points. First, from North American perspective, let me... I'll just state three central conclusions about the big picture, at

least as I see it. Secondly, against a strategy for prevention, I want to say a few words about how we are performing if I were in my professorial role what grades would I give the performance of the trilateral countries in the system. And in thirdly and finally, what's to be done, particularly looking to the short run because I agree with Henry this is a short run issue not just for the longer run.

First, from the North American perspectives as I say in my paper, three propositions. One. The single most serious threat to the security, the national security of the trilateral countries and the world is nuclear terrorism. The devastation of one of our great cities by a terrorist nuclear bomb. To try to make that more vivid, even in a country that is indeed the only victim, we should remember of the American nuclear bombs dropped in 1945, I gave you in your package a map of Tokyo in which a small nuclear bomb of the sort that thought to be in New York City one month to the day after 9/11. A small bomb that would have made a blast of 10 kilo ton is imagined to be exploded. And in fact, in conjuncture to the book that I've written called Nuclear Terrorism, we've put up a web site in which you can go to nuclearterrorism.org, and put in your own zip code and see what would happen in your own region. Everything inside the first circle disappears instantaneously vaporized in a ball of fire 540,000 degree Fahrenheit out to the second zone to the lot to the far circle, buildings look like the Federal office building in Oklahoma City after the home-grown American terrorist bombed it after 1995. So, I think, Henry made the proposition earlier that if you imagine how the world will be changed after a simply one nuclear bomb goes off in one city. It reminds us that threat is a combination of risks and consequences. Even if you estimates the risks of such an action to be lower than I do, and I take it to be quite a serious risk, if you consider the consequences of one nuclear bomb will change our world.

Second proposition. The nonproliferation regime is today precariously poised at a tipping point. Kofi Annan paneled a high level group in a run up celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the U.N., and this included one of our members, Sadako Ogata, was the Japanese member, Brent Scowcroft (?) was the American member. They reviewed a range of possible threats to the global community over the next 25 years from poverty to climate change. But (inaudible) place to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly to terrorists. And they conclude this most serious threat is the erosion of the nonproliferation regime to what they call a point of irreversibility after which there will be a cascade of proliferation. So, erosion to the point of irreversibility after which a cascade of proliferation, and in a handout, I gave you a little picture of one potential cascade if we imagine North Korea and Iran succeeding with the ambitions that were previously discussed.

The third proposition is the this ultimate catastrophe for each of our countries is preventable by feasible, affordable agenda of actions that a world could take to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist Hiroshima to a nearly zero. But implementing that agenda will require significant departure from current behavior. So my first point is these three conclusions

My second point. Against strategy for prevention. How are we doing? I lay out in the march of paper (?) in this nuclear terrorism book a strategy of prevention under a doctrine of three Nos. No loose nukes, no new nascent nukes, no new nuclear weapons states. No loose nukes means all weapons everywhere in material to which bombs could be maid are locked up

beyond the reach of terrorists. With respect to that, I would say over the period since 9/11 in my paper I gave the international effort about a B-. I would say in the first a couple of years after 9/11 actually I gave us D-. And it's a little known fact but actually in the first 2 years after 9/11, fewer potential nuclear bombs in the former Soviet Union were secure than in 2 years before 9/11, almost inconceivable level of performance. Since the beginning of the second term of the Bush administration and by this rather (?), there has been a significant turn around and behavior significant better under the effort of Sam Batman (?) and (Neil Kiriyuko??? Russian name inaudible) on the Russian side. No new nascent nukes means no new national production of enriched uranium or plutonium which are the stuff of which you can make a bomb. Mrs. Delpech was describing Iran's efforts to enrich uranium that's the goal I am inclined to get across. If they can enrich uranium nationally, they can produce the stuff from which they can make bombs. On this, I would give the overall efforts C-, in particular, I would say in the first term of the Bush administration, to go back to yesterday's conversation, the U.S. was largely AWOL. That is sitting on the sidelines, leaving the Europeans on a mission impossible and coping, expecting to them fail, I think the administration is now in a reality zone. But the problem is hugely worse because of 4 years of neglect.

On the third of no new nuclear weapons states, in there, the test is North Korea. My report part gives the international effort F, an F. And what I think it's clear in Mr. Lee's paper and clear in the facts is since January of 2003 when the U.S. has been focused on Iraq, and the most of the world was looking elsewhere hoping not to notice, Iran, sorry, North Korea has done what? Its withdrawn from the Nonproliferation treaty, kicked out the IAEA inspectors, turned off the video cameras that were previously watching 8000 fuel rods which were frozen under the prior agreement of 1994. We processed those fuel rods to produce enough material for 6 more bombs, and turned on its nuclear bomb production line which is the Yongbyon (?) reactor that produces about two more bombs of plutonium every year. The current policy I would characterize is, out of sight, out of mind. Let's try not to think about it because actually North Korea is more than half way across the line that we said that we'd never been permitted to cross. So, there is my great cheat (?). With respect to the items, let me just say a couple of words about Iran and North Korea under no new nascent nukes and no new nuclear weapons states. On Iran as I mentioned I think yesterday, I would say we are observing a Cuban Missile Crisis in slow motion if would like to have a picture of what's going on, and slow motion is not 13 days, the rush of 1962, but as Henry said, maybe 13 months, maybe 18 months. Not forever but a matter of months. In which the events are moving unexplainably towards a showdown at which the choices for an American president and the community are going to be either Yes in the Iranian nuclear bombs or alternatively attack on Iran's nuclear facilities to prevent that outcome. In 1962, that was the showdown at Kennedy came to at the end of 13 days after blockade had failed to prevent the completion of the missiles that were in Cuba. Kennedy and his advisors looked at the two options. Accept nuclear-armed missiles of the Soviet Union in Cuba, or to attack those missiles to prevent that outcome. Neither option was attractive, and neither option is attractive in the current situation.

In the 1962 case, Kennedy thought that if the missiles remained in Cuba, the Soviet Union and particularly Kruschev would be tempted even greater risk taking in Berlin of which the U.S. was committed. Alternatively, he believed that if the U.S. attacked the missiles in Cuba, there was a one in three chance of a war with the Soviet Union that likely be a nuclear war. So at

i

the last minutes, he basically rejected those options and reached well outside the box of anything that he and his advisors would have thought imaginable or acceptable until they internalized the consequences of the two options that were their only alternatives. I would say that the relevance of the lesson in the case of Iran is that these are the two options (inaudible) nuclear armed Iran, and alternatively attack in order to prevent that. We should be similarly motivated to search for options beyond the box even though they may look a little strange because we're not choosing a good option, just worse, just better than two worse options. And I think that's where (inaudible) idea seems to be promising I have in my paper in a similar version of a grand bargain that would include all the elements of that he suggests but it starts with the Americans being prepared to sit down and negotiate with the Iranians and taking regime change off the table. That is subordinating the regime change to freezing the Iran's nuclear activity and then backing it up on a step by step basis. It would require all the (inaudible) to be assembled from the community and it would also require as part of the deal, a credible military threat to destroy the facilities before they become operational at an industrial level if the deal was not accepted.

On a no new nuclear weapons state and North Korea, as I said before, I think we are in a pickle and we're trying not to recognize the situation of which we find ourselves. If I were to say what's to be done at this point, I think our best hope and prospect again would be, for the American government to be prepared to subordinate the regime change to the freezing and step by step backing up of North Korea and the situation that now we found ourselves. That would require basically persuading the Chinese that we could credibly take regime off the table, the 6-party talks have been in my view, a process in leu of a policy. Americans been able, unable, unable, to agree on a policy among themselves within the Bush administration, agreed on the process as an alternative because the divisions within the administration have been so sharp on this issue between the regime change on one hand and people prepared to negotiate, mostly it's been agreed not to talk about the subject. So, that's been the solution. And I think for the Chinese and the South Koreans, the 6-party talks have largely been about constraining or distracting the Americans so they wouldn't do something worse. So this would require persuading the Chinese that we are prepared to subordinate regime change to a freeze in a current activity and its backing up. If I were playing the hands and I recommend this in the paper, I would add to this a second principle of so-called nuclear accountability. The thing that I fear the most is North Korean sale of nuclear weapon or material of which a nuclear bomb could be made to a terrorist group. Why might one believe that North Korean regime do such a thing? Because it is a criminal regime that sells whatever it makes to whomever will pay. Purely commercially, not ideological, but it is demonstrated to date, that it will sell whatever it has to whomever will pay. And it is currently Missiles are us. If you want to buy missiles, you go to North Korea. They sell missiles. They sell illegal drugs, they sell counterfeited 100 dollar bills, I think that is the extent of their income. That's the extent of income. And I can imagine the point at which they are also in the business of selling highly enriched uranium or plutonium. If that seems too much to believe, we should go back to the points that were made by Mr. Lee about what was discovered in Libya after Qaddafi came clean. In Libya, was enough uranium hexafluoride to make a bomb. And the most likely origin of that uranium hexafluoride was North Korea. So if there was a bright line out there they are already crossed that line, too. A principle of nuclear accountability would assert that if an attack upon the U.S. were (inaudible) occurs by a bomb of North Korean origin, or the material which powers it of North Korea origin, that would be regarded in itself as an attack by Iran upon the United States. To be net quote, with full retaliatory response. And I think that should be

[c]

explained to North Koreans and communicated to North Koreans. So that's why I was going to the North Korean piece.

My third and final piece is basically summarized in the paper so let me be very brief. In the run up we had a discussion yesterday in Russia, a panel about G8 panel about G8 meeting in St. Petersburg in mid July. I think there is not much opportunity for making much progress on many topics there. But one and in which I think it would be conceivable to make the most progress in my view is the nuclear arena and the nuclear security. I proposed in the paper a number of points. First that the parties would make the prevention of nuclear terrorism and the further spread of nuclear weapons an absolutely priority and explain what would that mean. Secondly, that they would establish what I call a new global alliance against nuclear terrorism. The mission of which would be minimizing the risks of nuclear terrorism and this would include several elements including assured nuclear security in which each state and the leader of each state would pledge that all weapons and materials are on the territory would be secured to a gold standard that is would be as secured as gold in Fort Knox or treasures in the Kremlin Armory. And this would be done in an assured fashion that is with sufficient transparency that other leaders would have some confidence and be able to reassure their own populations that weapons or materials wouldn't come from the soil of another state that might be the stuff of terrorist bombs that might blow up one of their cities. There are a number of other elements there too, and I would just close with the point back on Iran. An element in this opportunity at St. Petersburg, and I believe that would be an element at the table, would be to agree on showing (?) up the whole nonproliferation regime by an assured nuclear fuel cycle initiative that would give a country like Iran the opportunity to buy fuel for peaceful nuclear reactors. And if they have that fuel removed but not to produce fuel itself. And there is a proposal by Mohamed Elbadarai in IAEA to have an international, set of international providers with cross-guarantees, perhaps with the ultimate guarantor of material under IAEA control for those purposes, I think that would be a very good idea as part of the overall Iranian package.

So, to conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would quote my own professor Henry Kissinger back to himself. One of Henry's insights that I learned from him when I was his students long ago was the proposition that the cardinal challenge for a statesman is to recognize, and let me quote him, a change in the international environment so likely to undermine national security must be resisted no matter what form the threat takes or how ostensibly legitimate it appears. If the collapse of the nonproliferation regime is not such a change in the international environment, that would be so adverse to our national security, I don't know what would be.

### Kissinger - Wrap-up of presentation session:

I want to make one observation. When one talks about a grand bargain, one cannot talk only in terms of outcomes, but in terms of what has to be accomplished in order to get the grand bargain underway. And what would have to be accomplished is, first, an acceptance by the United States Government that this is the route to take. Secondly, an agreement by our principal allies and Russia and China on the strategy. Third, first within the U.S. Government and then within that same group, an agreement on the proposals to be put forward, covered with an agreement that these proposals would not be modified in the process of the negotiation. Fourth, some assessment

of how to deal with Iranian and North Korean, I assume, delaying tactics, which have already been well tested. All of this wrapped into a commitment that if no progress is made within a specified time, which is 15-18 months, then military force will be used.

That is a heroic assignment to take, but that is what one is talking about when one is talking about a grand bargain. And in our discussion, we should consider also the consequences of resisting against the world in which one accepts the proliferation of nuclear weapons and how one lives in a world of nuclear weapons. If we are neither prepared to use force nor are capable of mounting the 15 months effort that has been described here, we will inevitably then live in a world in which deterrence acquires a whole new character and in which one has to consider the high possibility of some nuclear incident, either from terrorism or from failed deterrence.

## Start of discussion session:

During the break, a number of people asked me how I arrived at the figure of 15 months for having to accomplish the concept of the grand bargain. Let me explain. It is bounded on the one side by Madame Delpech's estimate of two years for an Iranian nuclear weapon and on the other side by the national elections in the United States and Russia in 2008 so that any military confrontation in 2008 will become increasingly difficult, and as I understand the grand bargain, it is the threat of military confrontation that is supposed to make it happen.

## Discussion session

Let me make a brief comment and then ask the panel to express their views. On the issue of North Korea, it's not so much the issue of the grand bargain as of enabling China to do what is in its own national interest under conditions that are compatible with its view of its national interest. It doesn't want nuclear weapons in North Korea, but it does not want the collapse of the North Korean regime and instability on its frontiers as a direct result of settling the nuclear issue. I don't think it is beyond the wit of man to come up with a solution to this problem.

The second issue is that the method of negotiating at the assistant secretary level in endless detail is not going to work because it creates too many obstacles within our government, and too many problems with the six-party talks, so there has to be some relationship between high-level agreements and the technical implementation.

On the Iranian issue, I just want to make a comment on the standard phrase that everybody now uses, which is that we rely on negotiation and not on force. It's not conceivable that negotiations in the abstract can work, and we ought to be honest enough to say that to ourselves. What conceivable incentive does Iran have other than turning the negotiations into a shopping list and demonstrating to itself, to its public, and to the rest of the world, that it can extract unlimited concessions. So unless it is linked to some contingencies that Iran is not willing to face, we are just playing politics with the phrase. And my impression of the Russian leaders is that I don't know anybody else who is more concerned about nuclear weapons in Iran, but they're also very concerned about the consequences of actions that could be taken. But this seems to me to be the fundamental problem.

And I would like to go back to my original point. People who avoid a decision now have to ask themselves what the world will be like, one in which proliferation has gone so far, and secondly in which proliferation has occurred not just as a result of technology but as a result of the defiance of the most powerful states in the world, who are known to be opposed to it and have not been able to bring themselves to stop it. What kind of an international system will we have, with what kind of sanctions if that has occurred? It is an issue that we should think about.

I'm not saying that I have come to a resolution in my own mind about it. But it shouldn't be put simply in terms of negotiation as against force. That's an easy one. Nobody wants force for its own sake. But as somebody who has had to face the question of what to do with respect to nuclear weapons in a two-power world, to imagine it in a thirty-power world. . . . When we had to make decisions, we were pretty sure that we could calculate Russian reactions. That would not be true in a multi-nuclear world. Especially one that has had this tremendous boost of nuclear weapons being achieved in defiance of all the big powers. The impact of that on the international system, and on people that have ethnic minorities that identify with the nuclear proliferators, that is the challenge we face.