[4]

SECRETARY'S CALENDAR OF EVENTS - Friday, September 24, 1976

<table><tr><td>7:50</td><td>Wake up</td></tr><tr><td>8:20</td><td>Senator Javits called</td></tr><tr><td>8:29</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>8:30</td><td>Breakfast in Suite</td></tr><tr><td>8:32</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>8:44</td><td>Saw Messrs. Rogers, Lord and Wisner</td></tr><tr><td>9:00</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>9:15</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>9:30</td><td>Saw Ambassador Schaufele</td></tr><tr><td>9:32</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>9:40</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>9:45</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>9:50</td><td>Departed for Foreign Secretary Crosland's residence with Ambassador Armstrong and Ambassador Schaufele</td></tr><tr><td>11:15</td><td>Returned to Claridges Hotel</td></tr><tr><td>11:26</td><td>Departed Hotel</td></tr><tr><td>11:37</td><td>Arrived American Embassy</td></tr><tr><td>11:40</td><td>Press Conference</td></tr><tr><td>1:00</td><td>Arrive Airport</td></tr><tr><td>1:15</td><td>Wheels up</td></tr><tr><td>3:30</td><td>Met with Press</td></tr><tr><td>5:15</td><td>Arrived Andrews AFB (local time)</td></tr></table>

SECRETARY'S RECORD OF SCHEDULE - Thursday, September 23, 1976

<table><tr><td>7:45 am</td><td>Wake-Up</td></tr><tr><td>8:15 am</td><td>Breakfast</td></tr><tr><td>8:05 am</td><td>Saw Amb. Schaufele</td></tr><tr><td>8:07 am</td><td>Amb. Reinhardt joined</td></tr><tr><td>8:40 am</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>8:42 am</td><td>Saw Amb. Schaufele</td></tr><tr><td>8:50 am</td><td>Saw Amb. Reinhardt</td></tr><tr><td>9:00 am</td><td>Saw Amb. Marshall</td></tr><tr><td>9:07 am</td><td>Departed hotel for meeting with President Kenyatta at Kakuru</td></tr><tr><td>9:27 am</td><td>Arrived airport</td></tr><tr><td>9:41 am</td><td>Departed airport</td></tr><tr><td>10:11 am</td><td>Arrived Kakuru</td></tr><tr><td>12:05 pm</td><td>Departed Kakuru</td></tr><tr><td>12:40 pm</td><td>Arrived airport</td></tr><tr><td>1:00 pm</td><td>Wheels up from Nairobi, Kenya</td></tr><tr><td>6:25 pm</td><td>Arrived Souda Bay, Crete</td></tr><tr><td>6:30 pm</td><td>Met with Amb. Kubisch</td></tr><tr><td>7:30 pm</td><td>Departed Souda Bay, Crete</td></tr><tr><td>9:12 pm</td><td>Arrived London</td></tr><tr><td>9:22 pm</td><td>Departed Heathrow Airport directly to 10 Downing St. for meeting with Callaghan et al</td></tr><tr><td>11:31 pm</td><td>Departed 10 Downing Street</td></tr><tr><td>11:39 pm</td><td>Arrived Claridges Hotel -- directly to interview with Bernard Kalb (11:58 pm)</td></tr><tr><td>midnight</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>12:01 am</td><td>Called Sen Javits (Inc)</td></tr></table>

SECRETARY'S CALENDAR OF EVENTS - Wednesday, September 22, 1976

<table><tr><td>7:45</td><td>Wake-up</td></tr><tr><td>7:55</td><td>Mrs. Kissinger called</td></tr><tr><td>8:40</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>8:45</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>8:48</td><td>Breakfast with Mr. Nguza (Peter Rodman notetaker)</td></tr><tr><td>10:00</td><td>Departed Marble Palace</td></tr><tr><td>10:05</td><td>Arrived President Mobutu's Office</td></tr><tr><td>1:30</td><td>Departed for President Mobutu's Boat Luncheon aboard Boat</td></tr><tr><td>3:20</td><td>Departed President's Boat for Airport</td></tr><tr><td>3:45</td><td>Arrived Airport</td></tr><tr><td>4:10</td><td>Wheels up</td></tr><tr><td>5:00</td><td>Met with press (5:20)</td></tr><tr><td>7:30</td><td>Met with Schaufele, Wisner, and Reinhardt</td></tr><tr><td>10:03</td><td>Arrived Hotel</td></tr><tr><td>10:05</td><td>Saw Messrs. Rogers and Schaufele</td></tr><tr><td>10:06</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>10:30</td><td>Saw Messrs. Schaufele and Reinhardt</td></tr><tr><td>11:15</td><td>Saw Messrs. Schaufele and Reinhardt</td></tr><tr><td>11:40</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>11:44</td><td>Called General Scowcroft (talked: Mr. Hyland)</td></tr><tr><td>11:55</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>12:20</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>12:30</td><td>Saw Mr. Reinhardt</td></tr><tr><td>1:00</td><td>Talked to General Scowcroft (in staff office)<br>Saw Messrs. Eagleburger, Schaufele and Reinhardt<br>(in staff office)</td></tr></table>

SECRETARY'S RECORD OF SCHEDULE - Tuesday, September 21, 1976

<table><tr><td>6:30 am</td><td>Wake-up</td><td>Breakfast on plane</td></tr><tr><td>6:32 am</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>7:08 am</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>7:16 am</td><td>Departed hotel for State House</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>7:20 am</td><td>Arrived State House</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>7:25 am</td><td>Meeting with Nkomo, Rodman (notetaker)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>8:25 am</td><td>Departed State House for airport</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>8:40 am</td><td>Wheels up</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>11:45 am</td><td>Arrived Dar es Salaam</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>11:55 am</td><td>Proceed directly to State House for photo opportunity and meeting with President Nyerere</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>1:50 pm</td><td>Arrived hotel</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>1:55 pm</td><td>Saw Amb. Schaufele and Win Lord (2:01)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2:08 pm</td><td>Saw Amb. Schaufele</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2:20 pm</td><td>Saw Amb. Schaufele</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2:26 pm</td><td>Saw Mr. Rogers</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2:29 pm</td><td>Saw Amb. Schaufele (2:33)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2:33 pm</td><td>Saw Mr. Larry Eagleburger</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2:34 pm</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2:50 pm</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger and Bill Rogers</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>3:00 pm</td><td>Saw British High Commissioner Brown, Mr. Samuel, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Lord, Amb. Schaufele (3:40)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>4:00 pm</td><td>Nap</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>5:04 pm</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger and Frank Wisner and John Trattner</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>6:05 pm</td><td>Saw Amb. Spain</td><td></td></tr></table>

Record of Schedule - Monday, September 20, 1976 - Page Two

<table><tr><td>7:00 pm</td><td>Drinks with Members of the press from plane and Messrs. Rogers, Eagleburger, Lord, Schaufele, Reinhardt, and Amb. Low, Mrs. Rogers and Mrs. Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>8:00 pm</td><td>Departed with Chona for State House for dinner</td></tr><tr><td>10:30 pm</td><td>Arrived hotel</td></tr><tr><td>10:53 pm</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>10:55 pm</td><td>Saw Mr. Rogers</td></tr><tr><td>11:00 pm</td><td>Saw British High Commissioner and Mr. Samuel, Mr. Rogers and Mr. Wisner (notetaker)</td></tr><tr><td>11:40 pm</td><td>Mr. Schaufele joined (12:20)</td></tr><tr><td>12:30 am</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>12:32 am</td><td>Saw Win Lord, Mr. Rogers, and Amb. Schaufele (12:50)</td></tr><tr><td>1:00 am</td><td>Retired</td></tr></table>

SECRETARY'S CALENDAR OF EVENTS - Sunday, September 19, 1976

8:00 Wake-up
8:15 Breakfast
8:25 Saw Bill Rogers
8:41 Saw Jock Covey
8:53 Saw Larry Eagleburger and Bill Rogers
9:00 Called Mrs. Kissinger
9:10 Saw Jock Covey
9:14 Saw Bill Rogers
9:20 Saw Jock Covey
9:29 Saw Winston Lord
9:35 Departed for Ambassador's Residence
9:45 Meeting with Mr. Ian Smith and Rhodesians with Mr. Rogers, Mr. Lord, Mr. Eagleburger and Peter Rodman
10:09 Secretary called Jock Covey from Residence
2:15 Departed Residence for Hotel
2:24 Arrived Hotel
2:30 Called Sir David Scott
2:47 Saw Ambassador Schaufele
2:50 Saw Jock Covey
3:00 Lunch in suite
3:20 Saw Jock Covey
3:25 Saw Ambassador Schaufele
3:40 Saw Mr. Rogers, Ambassador Schaufele, and Jock Covey
3:55 Saw Sir David Scott, Mr. Samuel, Ambassador Schaufele, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Lord, and Mr. Wisner (notetaker)
4:55 Saw Jock Covey

SECRETARY'S RECORD OF SCHEDULE - Saturday, September 18, 1976

<table><tr><td>7:00 am</td><td>Wake-up</td></tr><tr><td>7:29 am</td><td>Was Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>7:30 am</td><td>Breakfast with Mrs. Kissinger</td></tr><tr><td>7:40 am</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>7:46 am</td><td>Saw Hal Saunders</td></tr><tr><td>8:08 am</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>8:17 am</td><td>Saw Messrs. Rogers, Schaufele, Reinhardt, Lord, Wisner (notetaker, and Bowdler</td></tr><tr><td>9:00 am</td><td>To Prime Minister's residence - "Libertas"</td></tr><tr><td>11:40 am</td><td>Departed Prime Minister's Residence</td></tr><tr><td>11:53 am</td><td>Arrived hotel; proceeded directly to give remarks to Embassy staff</td></tr><tr><td>12:05 pm</td><td>Returned to suite</td></tr><tr><td>12:10 pm</td><td>Barber</td></tr><tr><td>12:55 pm</td><td>Saw British: Sir David Scott, Mr. Samuel, Amb. Bowdler, Amb. Schaufele, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Lord, Mr. Wisner (notetaker)</td></tr><tr><td>1:40 pm</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>1:45 pm</td><td>Saw Dr. Wolfe</td></tr><tr><td>2:00 pm</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>2:01 pm</td><td>Luncheon</td></tr><tr><td>2:29 pm</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>2:30 pm</td><td>Nap</td></tr><tr><td>2:45 pm</td><td>Wake-up</td></tr><tr><td>2:47 pm</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>2:54 pm</td><td>To Ambassador's Residence - met Black leaders (see attached schedule)</td></tr><tr><td>6:58 pm</td><td>Departed Ambassador's Residence</td></tr><tr><td>7:05 pm</td><td>Arrived hotel</td></tr></table>

RECORD OF SCHEDULE - Saturday, September 19, 1976

2.

<table><tr><td>7:10 pm</td><td>Saw Peter Rodman</td></tr><tr><td>7:14 pm</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>7:24 pm</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>7:30 pm</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>7:35 pm</td><td>To Press Backgrounder with Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>8:12 pm</td><td>Saw British: Mr. Samuel and Sir David Scott, Amb. Schaufele, and Mr. Wisner (notetaker)</td></tr><tr><td>8:27 pm</td><td>Departed for Working Dinner at Ambassador's Residence</td></tr><tr><td>11:40 pm</td><td>Departed Ambassador's Residence</td></tr><tr><td>11:46 pm</td><td>Arrived hotel</td></tr><tr><td>11:48 pm</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>11:50 pm</td><td>Saw Bill Rogers</td></tr><tr><td>12:05 am</td><td>Saw British Group: Sir David Scott, Mr. Samuel, Amb. Schaufele, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Wisner (notetaker) (12:24 am)</td></tr><tr><td>12:25 am</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>12:30 am</td><td>Called Mrs. Kissinger in Capetown</td></tr><tr><td>12:40 am</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger (12:45 am)</td></tr><tr><td>1:30 am</td><td>Retired</td></tr></table>

BEST AVAILABLE
9/16/76 - 9:00 pm

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

SECRETARY'S SCHEDULE
SEPTEMBER TRIP

Friday, September 17

<table><tr><td>3:50 pm</td><td>Secretary's aircraft arrives at Waterkloof Air Base. No arrival ceremony. (Press will be at airport and microphone will be installed should Secretary wish to make a statement.)</td></tr><tr><td>3:55 pm</td><td>Secretary and party proceed to waiting motorcade.</td></tr><tr><td>4:00 pm</td><td>Motorcade departs Waterkloof.</td></tr><tr><td>4:10 pm</td><td>Secretary and party arrive at Burgerspark Hotel. Hotel Manager, Karel Herle, will be at entrance to escort Secretary to his suite.</td></tr><tr><td>4:10 pm</td><td>Personal time.</td></tr><tr><td>4:50 pm</td><td>Secretary departs for Prime Minister's Residence "Libertas."</td></tr><tr><td>5:00 pm</td><td>First Working Session</td></tr></table>

Participants:

<table><tr><td><strong>US</strong></td><td><strong>SOUTH AFRICA</strong></td></tr><tr><td>The Secretary</td><td>Prime Minister Vorster</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Foreign Minister Muller</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Secretary Fourie</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Ambassador Botha</td></tr><tr><td>6:30 pm</td><td>Prime Minister and Secretary rejoin delegation and discussions continue</td></tr><tr><td>7:30 pm</td><td>Drinks followed by working dinner at "Libertas."</td></tr></table>

RECORD OF SCHEDULE - FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1976

2.

<table><tr><td>4:10 pm</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>4:35 pm</td><td>Saw Amb. Bowdler</td></tr><tr><td>5:00 pm</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>5:05 pm</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>5:10 pm</td><td>Called General Scowcroft (talked to Hyland)</td></tr><tr><td>5:25 pm</td><td>To meeting with South Africans at Prime Minister's residence "Libertas"</td></tr><tr><td>5:45 pm</td><td>Arrived "Libertas"</td></tr><tr><td>6:00 pm</td><td>Met alone with Prime Minister Vorster (8:10)</td></tr><tr><td>8:10 pm</td><td>Working dinner (9:15)</td></tr><tr><td>9:15 pm</td><td>Met alone with Prime Minister Vorster (10:00)</td></tr><tr><td>10:00 pm</td><td>Full meeting resumed (10:40)</td></tr><tr><td>10:45 pm</td><td>Departed Residence</td></tr><tr><td>11:00 pm</td><td>Arrived Hotel</td></tr><tr><td>11:04 pm</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>11:07 pm</td><td>Saw British Ambassador and Mr. Samuel Amb. Bowdler, Amb. Schaufele, Messrs. Rogers, Rodman (notetaker) (12:16)</td></tr><tr><td>12:16 am</td><td>Met with Messrs. Rogers, Schaufele and Rodman (12:33)</td></tr><tr><td>12:38 am</td><td>Called General Scowcroft</td></tr><tr><td>12:40 am</td><td>Saw Mr. Saunders (12:55)</td></tr><tr><td>1:00 am</td><td>Retired</td></tr></table>

Friday, September 17

Participants:

SECRETARY'S CALENDAR OF EVENTS - Thursday, September 16, 1976

7:00 Wake-up

7:30 Saw Jock Covey

8:10 Saw Ambassador Spain

8:25 Departed Kilimanjaro Hotel for Airport

9:00 Wheels up for Lusaka

Saw Press aboard plane

10:10 Arrive Lusaka

Arrival Statement at Airport

10:50 Arrived Intercontinental Hotel with Foreign Minister Mwale

10:56 Escorted Foreign Minister Mwale to lobby of hotel

11:05 Saw speechwriters: Messrs. Rogers, Eagleburger, Lord, Rodman and Covey

12:30 Nap

1:15 Wake-up

1:30 Lunchin suite

1:30 Saw Larry Eagleburger

1:55 Saw Dr. Wolfe

2:13 Saw Jock Covey

2:20 Departed for Foreign Ministry - Call on Foreign Minister Mwale

2:53 Departed Foreign Ministry for State House

3:05 Private meeting with President Kaunda followed by Expanded meeting

6:20 Returned to Hotel

6:30 Saw Jock Covey

Thursday, September 16, 1976 - continued

2.

<table><tr><td>6:35</td><td>Saw Ambassador Schaufele</td></tr><tr><td>6:40</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>7:00</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>7:27</td><td>Departed for State House with Mrs. Kissinger</td></tr><tr><td>7:30</td><td>Pre-dinner drinks at State House with President Kaunda</td></tr><tr><td>8:00</td><td>Working dinner hosted by President Kaunda - State House</td></tr><tr><td>9:43</td><td>Returned to Hotel</td></tr><tr><td>9:50</td><td>Saw Ambassador Schaufele</td></tr><tr><td>9:55</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>10:05</td><td>Saw British High Commissioners Miles (Zambia) and Samuels (Tanzania); Mr. Rogers, Amb. Schaufele, Amb. Low and Peter Rodman (notetaker) (10:37)</td></tr><tr><td>10:43</td><td>Saw Ambassador Schaufele and Mr. Rogers and Mr. Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>11:10</td><td>Called General Scowcroft (spoke with Mr. Hyland)</td></tr><tr><td>11:30</td><td>Retired</td></tr></table>

SECRETARY'S RECORD OF SCHEDULE - Wednesday, September 15, 1976

<table><tr><td>8:00 am</td><td>Wake-up</td></tr><tr><td>8:30 am</td><td>Breakfast</td></tr><tr><td>8:36 am</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>8:42 am</td><td>Saw Hal Saunders and Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>8:52 am</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger and Ambassador Schaufele</td></tr><tr><td>9:10 am</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>9:35 am</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>9:47 am</td><td>Saw Jock, Bill Rogers and Amb. Schaufele</td></tr><tr><td>10:00 am</td><td>Departed hotel for State House with Acting Foreign Minister Kuhanga</td></tr><tr><td>10:07 am</td><td>Arrived State House (see attached schedule)</td></tr><tr><td>12:45 pm</td><td>Returned to hotel</td></tr><tr><td>12:46 pm</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>12:47 pm</td><td>Saw Amb. Schaufele, Messrs. Eagleburger, Lord and Rogers</td></tr><tr><td>1:21 pm</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>1:30 pm</td><td>Departed for State House Luncheon</td></tr><tr><td>2:50 pm</td><td>Returned to Suite</td></tr><tr><td>2:52 pm</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>2:55 pm</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>3:07 pm</td><td>Saw Mr. Saunders</td></tr><tr><td>3:14 pm</td><td>Saw British High Commissioner Brown, Mr. Samuel, Mr. Rogers, Amb. Schaufele and Mr. Wisner (Notetaker) (3:36 pm)</td></tr><tr><td>4:40 pm</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>4:45 pm</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>4:50 pm</td><td>To State House for tete-a-tete with Pres. Nyerere</td></tr><tr><td>5:45 pm</td><td>Returned to hotel suite</td></tr><tr><td>5:50 pm</td><td>Saw Larry Eagleburger and Amb. Schaufele</td></tr></table>

-4-

4:50 pm Mr. Ngatwika (Protocol) meets you in your suite in the Hotel Kilimanjaro and escorts you to the lobby to meet Acting Foreign Minister Kuhanga.

4:55 pm Acting Foreign Minister Kuhanga accompanies you to State House.

5:00 pm Arrive State House greeted by President Nyerere.

Meeting with President Nyerere.

Participants:

US
The Secretary
Peter Rodman
(notetaker)

Tanzania
President Nyerere
J. W. Butiku, Personal Secretary
(notetaker)

7:00 pm
(approx)

Return to Hotel Kilimanjaro

Personal time

7:30 pm

Mr. Eagleburger escorts you to the Tanzania Room on the Mezzanine of the hotel.

Photo opportunity and questions from the press (Length: 15 minutes maximum)

7:45 pm

Return to your suite

Personal time

Thursday, September 16

8:20 am

Acting Foreign Minister Kuhanga accompanies you to the Airport

8:45 am

Arrive at Airport

Proceed directly to aircraft.

9:00 am

Wheels Up for Lusaka.
(flight time 2:10; time change -1)

SECRETARY'S CALENDAR OF EVENTS - Monday, September 13, 1976

9:50 am Depart Andrews AFB
Saw Press Aboard Aircraft

10:30pm Arrived Zurich, Switzerland (local time)

10:55 Arrived Dolder Grand Hotel

11:00 Called General Scowcroft

11:10 Called Mr. Habib

11:20 Saw Winston Lord, Larry Eagleburger and
Mr. William Rogers

11:53 Saw Jock Covey, William Rogers and Larry Eagleburger

12:15 Saw Larry Eagleburger

12:30 Retired

SECRETARY'S RECORD OF SCHEDULE - Tuesday, September 14, 1976

<table><tr><td>8:30 am</td><td>Wake-up</td></tr><tr><td>8:44 am</td><td>Saw Mr. Rogers (9:38)</td></tr><tr><td>8:50 am</td><td>Jock Covey joined (9:38)</td></tr><tr><td>9:39 am</td><td>Saw Mr. Rogers</td></tr><tr><td>9:40 am</td><td>Called Foreign Secretary Crosland with Mr. Rogers inside</td></tr><tr><td>9:47 am</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>10:00 am</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>10:11 am</td><td>Saw Mr. Rogers</td></tr><tr><td>10:20 am</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>10:31 am</td><td>Saw Jock and Mr. Rogers</td></tr><tr><td>10:47 am</td><td>Saw Jock Covey</td></tr><tr><td>10:51 am</td><td>Departed Dolder Grand Hotel</td></tr><tr><td>11:10 am</td><td>Arrived airport</td></tr><tr><td>11:25 am</td><td>Wheels up from Zurich</td></tr><tr><td>5:15 pm</td><td>Met with press aboard aircraft (5:35)</td></tr><tr><td>9:50 pm</td><td>Wheels down Tanzania</td></tr><tr><td>10:20 pm</td><td>Arrived Hotel</td></tr><tr><td>10:30 pm</td><td>Met with Ambassador Spain and Mr. Eagleburger</td></tr><tr><td>10:40 pm</td><td>Left suite for delivery of arrival statement in hotel lobby</td></tr><tr><td>11:07 pm</td><td>Called President Nyerere with Amb. Spain inside</td></tr><tr><td>11:14 pm</td><td>Met with Amb. Schaufele, Amb. Spain, Messrs. Lord, Rogers, Jock Covey (Notetaker)</td></tr><tr><td>11:26 pm</td><td>Met with British High Commissioner Brown, Mr. Richard C. Samuel (Councilor British Embassy in Washington), Mr. Rogers, Mr. Lord, Amb. Schaufele, Mr. Wisner</td></tr><tr><td>11:55 pm</td><td>Mr. Eagleburger joined</td></tr><tr><td>12:05 am</td><td>Meeting ended</td></tr><tr><td>12:15 am</td><td>Came into office and talked with Messrs. Lord and Rodman and Saunders (12:20)</td></tr></table>

[LC]

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 14, 1976

No. 435

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON ARRIVAL IN DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA
SEPTEMBER 14, 1976

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I have come here at the direction of President Ford to talk with President Nyerere about the prospects for peace in southern Africa. This initiative started at the request of African leaders during my visit in April. Every step that has brought us here has been carefully discussed with leaders in Africa and especially with the front line presidents. Every step we will take in the future will be closely co-ordinated with the front line presidents. The United States wants nothing for itself except its interest in peace and in economic and social progress. The conflict that we are trying to end is a conflict which will affect most of all the peoples of Africa. The progress we are trying to bring will benefit above all the peoples of Africa. We will do what we are asked to do, we will do nothing that is not requested, we will take no initiatives that are not invited and whatever progress will occur depends on the attitude of the parties and the goodwill of the participants.

We are prepared to make the effort that is encouraged. And in this spirit I look forward very much to my talks with the distinguished leader of this country, President Nyerere, with whom we have had close communications over the recent months and who has encouraged us in our enterprise.

Thank you very much.

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For further information contact:

[lc]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 15, 1976

No. 437

PC #112

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
HOTEL KILIMANJARO
DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA
SEPTEMBER 15, 1976

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I understand this is a day of press conferences. We will go right to the questions.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, we've just come from a press conference with President Nyerere which was, to say the least, not encouraging for your mission. On both the Namibian and the Rhodesian questions, he said he received nothing of encouragement. In fact, on the Namibian question he said he is now less hopeful than before. Does this reflect your views on the future?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have said from the beginning that whatever can be achieved depends on the attitude of the parties. All the United States can do is to enable the parties to deal with each other; to bring whatever ideas they have; occasionally to offer a suggestion, based on their knowledge of having talked to the parties, of what might be possible. But ultimately it is up to the parties to decide. Nothing has changed from what was known a week ago, and therefore I cannot make judgments based on fluctuating moods.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, isn't the fact alone that nothing has changed since last week an unhopeful sign?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, nothing could change since last week, since the positions of the parties — the purpose of my visit here was to get clear about the view of Tanzania. I will then take the views of the front line-presidents to Pretoria and then I will return to Lusaka and here. At that point we will be able to judge whether any progress has been made. But it is not possible to judge that on the first day.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, one of the other purposes of your visit here was to find out what decisions were taken at the five-nation African summit. Can you give us some idea as to what the consensus was at that summit?

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have a rather clearer idea now of what the views were. I do not believe that it is up to me to discuss the decisions of the five-nation African summit. I think this is a question that should be addressed to President Nyerere.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, what if the worst comes to the worst? Should the peaceful negotiations you are undertaking right now fail and the armed struggle is intensified, which side will the United States support?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We can give no blank checks in advance. We are here to find peaceful solutions. We have at this moment not given up expectations of peaceful solutions, and that is a question that can be addressed when we know the circumstances which made peaceful solutions impossible.

**QUESTION:** Will you clarify the four points put by the Tanzanian Government on fear of the American intervention in the present situation in southern Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has made clear on many occasions that it has no intention of intervening in southern Africa. The United States pursues a policy that African development should be in the hands of Africans. We also oppose the intervention of any other outside powers. The United States has no intention by itself to initiate intervention in Africa.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere made clear that he thought only the South Africans and SWAPO should be represented at a constitutional conference on Namibia. Is it the American view that the tribal and ethnic groups that were represented at the Windhoek Conference should also participate?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States is putting forward no program of its own. The United States communicates the positions of the parties, each to the other, with the explanation that each party gives for its position. At the end of that process the parties will have to decide whether they can reconcile their differences. And in any negotiation each side has a tendency to state its optimum conditions at the outset, and if a solution is reached, it will depend on whether there is a willingness to compromise by one or both sides. That determination will have to be made later.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, both in the statement by the Tanzanian Government yesterday and in the press conference of President Nyerere, there was a strong implication and a fear expressed in a way that your approach, the American approach, towards the problems of southern Africa, is unduly obsessed with the fear of the spread of communism here. Since this does seem to be a rather important fear here, I wonder if you would address yourself to it?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** They are two separate problems. We do not say that the liberation movements are communist, and we do not fear the liberation movements, either in their own right or because they are

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communist. On the other hand, we are concerned when there are inter-
ventions from outside the continent here. But, in themselves, our
concern here is to help bring a peaceful solution, to enable the
peoples of this area to make progress. We can only repeat that the
lives that will be saved will be African lives. The progress that
will be made will be African progress. It is not something from
which the United States benefits, and it is not a part of an anti-
communist crusade against any particular movement because it is pre-
cisely these movements that will untimately benefit from a peaceful
solution.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, on the basis of what you heard here today, are you more or less hopeful about the possibilities of finding a peaceful solution?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** My views are approximately those with which I came. That is to say, I have heard the views now explained in greater detail by the President of Tanzania. I am certain that, since this is the beginning of the process, they were not understated. These views have been expressed; they will be faithfully conveyed in Pretoria. The views of the other side will be equally faithfully repeated here. I found no surprises and nothing to change by basic view, which is that the chances are somewhat less than fifty-fifty; that the worst that can happen if this mission does not succeed is what is certain to happen without this mission; that no one else was available — no other country was available — to undertake it; that the effort has to be made, and if it should fail and conflict should prove unavoidable, at least we will know it is not because the United States failed to make a major effort.

**QUESTION:** Would you be able to confirm what President Nyerere said, and that was that Cuban intervention in Angola took place only after South African intervention?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First, I hope you all realize I have not seen a transcript of President Nyerere's press conference. Our understanding is that Cubans were in Angola before South Africans, and I seem to recall a speech by Fidel Castro in which he pointed out that the reason they reinforced the Cubans is because some of them had been killed by South Africans, from which one would assume they were there before the South Africans. But I would have to check this to make sure.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, another thing President Nyerere indicated was that — in fact, he said something to the effect — that he didn't understand how even intelligent people could be so preoccupied with the subject of Cuba. I think we might infer from that that there has been rather a difference of opinion between yourself and the President on the subject. Has it come up?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The subject of Cuba was not discussed between President Nyerere and myself.

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**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, yesterday the Tanzanian Government asked that the United States declare its support for the freedom fighters in the event that negotiations fail. Have you given President Nyerere such assurances or are you prepared to make such a declaration of support?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As I have indicated, we do not operate on the assumption that negotiations will fail, and until the negotiations have failed we cannot make any such commitment.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere put it slightly differently today. He said that because of an ambiguity it would be a good thing if the United States would say it will not help those who are fighting majority rule — in other words, the Smith regime — if the guerrilla war should become worse. Can you —

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We stated our position in the Lusaka speech and this remains American policy. I am conducting my conversations with President Nyerere privately and not by commenting on his press conference.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, can you at this point clarify at all what you regard as the specific obstacles you are facing in trying to be helpful in both the Rhodesian and the Namibian situations?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is clear that a conflict that has gone on for so many years and has such a long history has created profound distrust, and so many efforts have failed that the parties are becoming more and more committed to the process of struggle rather than to the process of negotiation. I think this is the basic underlying obstacle — the reluctance of anybody to admit that negotiations are possible before they know that negotiations will succeed. And of course they will never find out whether negotiations will succeed until they first admit that they are possibe. This is the underlying difficulty. Then there are many specific issues: the composition of conferences, the basic agenda that conferences might address, what issues should be dealt with as preconditions, and which issues can be left to the conference. All of these are before the various parties and all of these will be explored over the next few days.

**QUESTION:** I'd like to follow that up. Have you made at this stage any advance in these procedural questions?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** An Advance has been made over the time that these discussions started. But it would be rash to say that a solution is in sight.

**QUESTION:** Would the process of negotiation in Rhodesia toward majority rule be hastened if the present government were to be removed or otherwise removed itself?

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We are dealing with the issues and not with the personalities and structures. We are telling each side what we believe the requirements of a successful negotiation are. Which authorities carry this out is for the people concerned to determine.

**QUESTION:** Early this year the United States participated in the Security Council triple veto which saved South Africa from United Nations military and economic sanctions. With United States national investments and political interests in South Africa, do you really think the United States can be an impartial peace-maker in southern Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** On my visit to Africa in April, every African leader that I saw urged me to get in touch with Prime Minister Vorster since it was their belief that he held the key to a solution in southern Africa. We would not be engaged in this process if we did not believe that our influence can bring about peace, and in the direction that has been requested by black African leaders. Whether it will succeed or not is for the future to determine and depends on the attitude of all of the parties.

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**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere spoke of the possibility of a proclamation between yourself and Ian Smith being drawn up. Can you tell us if this was in fact discussed? And secondly, was the question of compensation for white settlers in Rhodesia discussed today?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There is absolutely no possibility of a joint proclamation between Ian Smith and the United States Government. The question of compensation -- the issue isn't compensation. The question of a financial guarantees plan was discussed and met with the approval of President Nyerere.

**QUESTION:** The President said that this did crop up. Do we take it from that you rejected the question of a joint proclamation?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The issue of a joint proclamation has never come up, was never discussed between President Nyerere and myself, has never been requested by the Rhodesians or anybody else. Indeed, we have not been in touch with the Rhodesians so it could not have come up. At any rate, that is not a possibility.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, one of the apparent issues of difference, though, is that President Nyerere said that it was his belief that the great majority of whites in Rhodesia would leave. Is that an African consensus and how does it square with your own views on the future of Rhodesia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not know whether he said should or would. And our position has been that the communities should be enabled to live together, that there should be no discrimination of one side against the other, but that the final relationship between the communities is one that has to be settled by a constitutional conference or some other devise, which is at this point premature.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your problem about measuring any degree of progress at this particular time. But after all, you've had a weekend of talks with Prime Minister Vorster; you've had today with President Nyerere. Do you find, even in a tentative way, the possibility of coinciding views that in fact makes you a touch more optimistic than you're prepared to concede today?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There are several coinciding views, and several sharply different views. The question which we face in the next week is whether the different views can be bridged. This I cannot judge until we have had further conversations. If there were not some possibility of bridging these views we would not have undertaken the journey.

**QUESTION:** On the question of guarantees to the white community in Rhodesia -- in addition to the perhaps billion dollars that is being talked about to safeguard the white minority in Rhodesia, there seems to be another element, an element concerning the relationship or some guarantees being given by a black majority government to the white

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community in Rhodesia. Now, would these guarantees include things
like the right to live, work and vote in Rhodesia like any other
citizen, or is there something else involved?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It has always been my understanding from the African Presidents that they want a society that is not based on any racial discrimination from either side. I have never been given any other indication. What specific guarantees will be worked out in this connection will depend on a conference, if there is a peaceful settlement, that will eventually have to take place between Rhodesian nationalists and the Rhodesian white settlers under British aegis. I am in no position to go into the precise details. The United States is not prescribing the details of the settlement. The United States indicates its general attitude on the kind of solution it favors, but it cannot compel the parties to accept that preference.

**QUESTION:** Certain circles have said that the sudden interest the United States has shown in the southern Africa problem is because of the fear of Communism. Would you subscribe to that?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I do not know who these circles are. On my previous visit all of the leaders I met were very critical of the United States for not showing sufficient interest in Africa and urged us to show interest in Africa. Now we are showing interest in Africa. Why can you not ascribe it to the persuasiveness of your leaders?
(Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, wouldn't it be logical for anybody, for an African in particular, to take the United States initiative suspiciously, particularly when you consider that it is the Americans who are propping up the Smith regime economically?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** What we are seeking to achieve is what African leaders have been asking for. Every move we have made has been made in close consultations with the leaders of Africa. If the leaders of Africa are suspicious and if the leaders of Africa believe that the American initiative cannot be helpful, then we will of course stop this initiative. We will have to be judged by the results. And we have tried in good faith to prevent a conflict, the major impact of which will be on Africa. It is now up to Africans to decide whether they will wish to continue to cooperate with this or not. So far everything that has been done has been with the encouragement and with the approval of African leaders.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, there are American troops in (inaudible)?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has no objection to the MPLA as a political force. The Frelimo in Mozambique, whose political views are nearly indistinguishable from MPLA, was recognized by the United States as soon as it took office, and we have established a reasonable relationship with Mozambique. Our objection to Angola was the massive

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infusion of Soviet military help to begin with, followed by the sending of an expeditionary force which was not, or could not, have happened on the part of so small a country as Cuba without Soviet support. Therefore, it seemed to us a massive outside intervention into the affairs of Africa. This is the view of the United States on that subject and it is a quite different matter whether an expeditionary force appears in a civil war or as part of a normal alliance relationship.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, last week the summit conference was attended by President Augustinho Neto. In view of the fact that your government does not recognize his government, do you expect you might have to meet with him at some point and how would you surmount this problem?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not believe that I will meet President Neto on this trip.

**QUESTION:** Last month the State Department had stated that the South African promise to grant Namibia independence did not go far enough. What would you find acceptable in terms of independence?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have stated that simply giving a date for independence did not go far enough. Our view is that there has to be a procedure by which all authentic groups can participate in the negotiations, and a conference which is acceptable to those parties most concerned.

**QUESTION:** On the question of South Africa, I understand that you did discuss this with President Nyerere today, but it was widely reported that during your talks with Prime Minister Vorster in Zurich you were seeking to find out whether or not Vorster was willing to detach or separate the future of South Africa from the futures of Namibia and Zimbabwe. You have yourself stated on several occasions that you see the necessity for the end of the apartheid system in South Africa. But the logical extension of ending apartheid in South Africa is black majority rule, and therefore it would seem that any detachment or separation of the issues of southern Africa would only be a matter of time. If it is correct to assume that eventually we would be looking for black majority rule in South Africa, then what kind of time period are we talking about? Are we talking about one year, ten years or maybe a hundred year?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would not want to speculate about the amount of time. You are quite right that time is what is implied by the phrase of separating the problem. But time is of the essence if a peaceful solution to so complex a problem as that of South Africa is to be found. We have no precise timetable. Some timetables were given publicly by African leaders. We have no timetable of our own.

**THE PRESS:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

* * * * * * * *

[lc]

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 16, 1976

No. 439

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
HIS EXCELLENCY SITEKE MWALE
FOREIGN MINISTER OF ZAMBIA
UPON THE SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL IN LUSAKA, ZAMBIA
SEPTEMBER 16, 1976

MINISTER MWALE: Mr. Secretary of State, Mrs. Kissinger, Honorable Ministers, Your Excellencies, it is my great pleasure to welcome you, Mr. Secretary of State, once again to Zambia. I am particularly pleased that this time around you have come with your charming wife to visit us here. Although this is a business trip I hope you will find some time, and indeed I hope your distinguished delegation will find some time to see a bit of Zambia. The last time you were here, Mr. Secretary of State, you honored Zambia with a major statement on southern Africa. We have followed your travels, Mr. Secretary of State, we have been interested in what you have been doing as follow up on the major statement that you made from Lusaka. We know that the job is not easy. The best we can do, Mr. Secretary of State, is to wish you the best of luck in your difficult work. The stand of Zambia on the situation in southern Africa has already been made quite clear and indeed we have welcomed your initiatives, although we have indicated that having tried in our own way to negotiate for peace in southern Africa and having reached a point where we felt that we have failed, we have decided, in conjunction with the resolutions of the OAU, the Lusaka Manifesto and indeed the Dar es Salaam Declaration, that we will support intensified armed struggle. But we want to assure you, Mr. Secretary of State, that if your efforts, your genuine efforts, can bring about majority rule in Zimbabwe, in Namibia and indeed can lead to the eradication of apartheid in South Africa, today or tomorrow, we will cease to fight because the point of fighting won't be necessary once majority rule has been achieved. We are quite aware, sir, what you have done already. You have done quite some remarkable job and we can only hope that the diehards of the racist regimes in southern Africa will appreciate your very difficult task and respond favorably because time is against us. With those few words I once again want to welcome you to Zambia and as I was saying as we came I think we ought to set up a constituency here for you. Thank you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Foreign Minister, it is a great pleasure for me to return to Lusaka, the place where the United States announced its new Africa policy. It was no accident that we chose Lusaka. We have known and admired its humane and distinguished leader, President Kaunda. We know what efforts he has made to bring peace through negotiations. We know that Zambia, bordering on the troubled areas of southern Africa, understands better than many the importance of peace and the importance of the world in which the peoples of southern Africa can develop their aspirations for progress and human dignity. The United States is supporting these efforts. The United States is seeking

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to help realize peace, justice, and progress in southern Africa. The initiatives we have taken so far have been taken on the basis of the closest coordination with the front line presidents and close consultation with President Kaunda. The steps we will take in the days ahead will be similarly closely coordinated with President Kaunda. It is our hope that we can contribute to peace and justice in southern Africa. It is a great pleasure for me to see my old friend the Foreign Minister whom I have known from a long association in Washington and almost monthly meetings over the past year. I look forward to my stay in Zambia and to my conversations with President Kaunda.

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[LC]

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 16, 1976

NO. 443

REMARKS OF
PRESIDENT KENNETH DAVID KAUNDA
OF ZAMBIA
AND
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT STATE HOUSE
LUSAKA, ZAMBIA
SEPTEMBER 16, 1976

PRESIDENT KAUNDA:

Mr. Secretary of State, may I say first of all welcome to Zambia
again. We welcome you in the name of the party, Government and
people of Zambia because we like to believe, Mr. Secretary, that
your President, you yourself, and your Administration are inter-
ested in helping the peoples of southern Africa to find a peace-
ful solution to their problems. Indeed, we pray very hard that
you should succeed, because if you don't succeed, I can only
use Mr. Vorster's own words "the alternative will be too
ghastly to contemplate." On our part I can assure you that
we want to seek peace, but we want peace for every human being
in this part of the world. We want peace with honor, we want
peace with justice and freedom and independence. Less than
that is not peace at all. At least we would not contribute to
the type of peace that is simply the excess of war. We want
peace, Mr. Secretary of State, that means dignity and man's
honor, peace and freedom and independence and justice. These
are the principles for which your Governments stands and I
believe this is what has propelled your Administration to send
you out here once again. In the next few days we will be able
to know whether your mission will succeed or not. Fortunately
for us, our stand is very clear. Some few years back, leaders
of East and Central Africa met here in Lusaka and they worked
out what was being called the Lusaka Manifesto on southern
Africa. This manifesto became an OAU document. Later on it
became a UN document and both your great country and mine are
members of the UN and therefore we must subscribe to the con-
tents of this document. This document states very clearly
that Africa, black Africa, accepts men and women of all races.
We want them to make their homes there because not so much
because of their skills but that they are fellow human beings,
made by the same creator as the one who made us. This document
states very clearly that we accept a South Africa as independent,
but abhor and indeed, we will fight apartheid in any shape
or form. I would have thought, Mr. Secretary, that Mr. Vorster
would help us by accepting the sincerity, the honest purpose
behind this document and help you because, by the accident of
your birth, you happen to be white and where we failed because

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we carried the wrong color, have had the right passport and therefore, I hope that he will be able to see sense and accept the importance of your mission. Failing that, Mr. Secretary of State, I can only use his own words - "the alternative would be too ghastly to contemplate." We demand what's right and fair and just to all men over the question of Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe-to-be. Demand what is fair, just and fair to men, over the question of Namibia. We want majority rule immediately. We want complete destruction of the abominable policy, policy if it is at all of apartheid, philosophy if it is at all. If we fail to get that peacefully, the manifesto says, fight. We pray very strongly that Mr. Secretary of State has informed President Ford that this, that for us there can be no compromise over the issue of freedom, independence, peace and justice. Not only the peace, we don't accept that.

Mr. Secretary of State, we have no romantic views about armed struggle, none at all. We don't like to see lives wasted, but what alternative are we left with, except to fight, to help obtain for the people of Rhodesia what we have for ourselves. Yes, we will fight, until the last man if necessary. We feel strongly because there is no other reason why the black people of Rhodeisa and Namibia and South Africa should be treated any differently from how we treat ourselves here. God made them black; it is not a sin, Mr. Secretary, to be black. So we must fight. If the mission fails, we will fight. I have made it clear several times to your Ambassadors here and Ambassadors in western countries that the system they support, financial means, is not Christian. I have said on the personal bit, we can't understand those people, the white people of Rhodesia, white men in South Africa, white men in Namibia calling themselves Christian. I can't. I don't know that God they pray to. I don't understand him. The God I believe in is a God of love of human races as a whole. He does not discriminate. In short, what I am saying, Mr. Secretary of State, if you fail, if your mission fails, we will fight. We don't make arms here; no African country makes arms, so we have to get them from somewhere else. The West won't give them to us. We will get them from whoever is ready to give them to us. It is not a matter of being neglected. We hope your mission succeeds. You are here for the second time within a space of six months. We accept your sincerity but I am afraid your mission will need more than sincerity and honest purpose. You are dealing with people who don't live in this world. They live in a different world. I don't know what your Ambassadors have told you about South Africa, but I am sure you have read enough to know why we feel so strongly about this. Compromise, there is none, Mr. Secretary. Your mission has got to succeed. If it fails, we fight. The destruction of life and property that will follow is miserable. Those who have invested in Namibia will have to accept the dire responsibility for what happens. It's really incredible. I don't understand the West at all. I have met the Secretary

[LCJ]

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of State and I hope that your ability to impress on your fellow men, in this case your fellow Westerners, will be able to impress them so much that they can act with you on this issue. In my opinion--it is humble-- I don't think the U.S. acting alone will succeed. You might have to call upon some of your colleagues, western countries to join you, but time is not with you. Who knew that I would ever meet Mr. Vorster, shake his hand -- all in the course of the manifesto on southern Africa I have to do that. Literally, I went to Cape Town. I did not go there physically, but I met Mr. Vorster here on Zambian soil. I have never dreamt of doing that. But I knew well that failure to negotiate with him -- I can't do more on behalf of the Zambian people to their party, other than to impress upon you, Mr. Secretary, that your mission is very important. You only have a few days, not weeks, to succeed. If you fail, we shall reach a point of no return. May God help you in your mission.

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

Mr. President, I appreciate very much the very moving words you have just spoken. I appreciate them all the more because in describing events they are often cast in cold political abstract terms. You, Mr. President, have described correctly what the fundamental issues are. They are the dignity of man of whatever color and of whatever race. They are the justice of the people to each other of whatever color and of whatever race. If truly spoken of peace, it must be a peace that all, the rich and the poor and whatever race, can participate in and can feel that it is their own. There is no stability in oppression and there is no permanence in injustice. I will never forget our meetings on the occasion of your visit to Washington when you foretold the prospects that were ahead for all of man-kind in southern Africa. We realize that what you have said is only too true and the President has sent me on this mission despite the inevitable preoccupations of our national elections, because he shares your views that time is running out. And if it is running out we have an obligation to ourselves, to our values, and to the rest of humanity, to make the best effort of which we are capable. You can be sure that I am conscious of the responsibility we face. I don't know whether we can succeed in an effort that others have attempted for over a decade and have not brought to a conclusion, but we will receive impetus from the knowledge that if we bring peace many lives will be saved. Many aspirations can be fulfilled. And if it should be said some day that the people of southern Africa from some point on could live in justice, in mutual respect between the races, and in human dignity, I would like to believe that it may have started here six months ago in Lusaka and that it was continued here today in Lusaka.

I will return on Sunday evening or Monday morning to report to you, Mr. President, about the progress we have made, and I

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pray for all of us, for your people and for our people that I
can bring you encouraging news. Justice is not divisible,
peace cannot exist in only corners of the globe without leading
to grave dangers. The United States has now found itself in
the position where no one else was available to play this
role. We will play it with dedication, with conviction, inspired
by the values of human dignity that you have avowed here, and
as I said before I left the United States, it will never be
said that we failed for lack of effort. And if we succeed we
will know that those who had the courage to seek peace for
a decade, those who have the courage to make efforts at recon-
ciliation that must have been very painful, will have paved the
way and will have the ultimate responsibility for their execution.
We have moved together this far, Mr. President, and I look
forward to our further association. I want to thank you on
behalf of my colleagues for having given us this opportunity to
be of some service.

* * * * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 17, 1976

No. 447

PC #113

STATEMENT BY
AND PRESS CONFERENCE OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON DEPARTURE FROM LUSAKA, ZAMBIA
SEPTEMBER 17, 1976

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Mr. Foreign Minister, on behalf of my whole delegation, I would like to thank you and President Kaunda for the warm reception we have received here. This was not a stop for negotiation. It was a stop to clarify the principles that will be taken to Pretoria and that we hope will form the basis for progress toward justice and peace in southern Africa.

We were encouraged by the spirit of the talks and by the moral support which we have received here, but it is of course clear that the serious negotiation lies ahead of us and that the decision on whether the objectives of peace — in human dignity — can be achieved are not going to be made in Lusaka. So Mr. Foreign Minister, I leave with the determination to make a major effort. I have been strengthened in this by my conversations with your President and his associates, and I want to thank you once again for the extraordinary reception we have had here.

Now I will be glad to take a few questions.

**QUESTION:** Will your stop in Pretoria be a negotiating stop?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** My stop in Pretoria I hope will move matters forward, so that when I return to Lusaka we will have something more precise to work with than is the case today.

**QUESTION:** Are you going to see Smith?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I stated last Saturday before I left Washington that I would meet Smith only under the condition that this was the final element in reaching a satisfactory conclusion. I do not have this knowledge today, and therefore there is no basis for my meeting him at this time.

**QUESTION:** Could you spell that our for us, Mr. Secretary?

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have stated my view and the American position. There is no point in repeating it every day, since I have not heard anything yet about the discussions between Prime Minister Vorster and Mr. Smith. I will not see Mr. Smith to negotiate; I will see him if it helps to move matters to a conclusion and only if some clear result is in prospect. Since that is not the case today, there is nothing that I can add to what has already been said.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary of State, if your negotiations fail and other friends of Africa come to help with the only other alternative of armed struggle, will you still be talking about outside intervention?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States is opposed to outside intervention in Africa. All the African presidents with whom I have spoken mentioned their determination to deal with these questions as an African problem. There is no point in my speculating now about what may happen, since I have not come here to fail.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, what are your chances now that you have had two views from Tanzania and Zambia that the armed struggle should be intensified? What are your chances in the event of total rejection of your initiatives?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not want to speculate about what the United States will do in the case of the failure of a mission whose failure we do not anticipate. We stated our policy here in Lusaka as supporting the objectives of majority rule, minority rights, freedom and human dignity in southern Africa. These objectives we will support regardless of the success of one diplomatic mission.

**QUESTION:** With regard to your talks with John Vorster, how nearer is Namibia to independence?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I believe that we have made some progress or I would not have come here. I thought that the progress that had been made warranted this effort because I agree with President Kaunda's statement of yesterday — that if we do not make this effort, and if peaceful efforts fail, the consequences for the southern part of Africa will be too ghastly to contemplate.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, are you worried about Communist influence in Namibia and Rhodesia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have to separate two problems. One is the internal direction of African movements. We believe that African nationalism will take care of its own evolution and of its own direction. The second problem is outside military intervention from outside Africa, either from the Soviet Union or from other countries supported by the Soviet Union. That we oppose. The direction of the liberation movements is a matter for Africans to settle, and we will not intervene in this.

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**QUESTION:** Has Britain got any special role to play in your initiatives?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Britain has the legal and historic responsibility for Rhodesia. Every initiative that we have taken has been taken in the closest coordination with Great Britain. And if my efforts either on this trip or later should succeed, Great Britain will have to provide the legal framework by which a further evolution takes place. This has been agreed to by all of the parties.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would share with us your feelings as you are about to embark on the South African trip?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I believe that a combination of factors has produced a situation where the United States, alone in the world, is in a position to make a contribution to avoiding a conflagration. We have this responsibility which we did not seek. It is in the interest first of the peoples of southern Africa but eventually of all of the peoples of the world that the world not be divided between races, that there not be a race war and that outside powers not manipulate the aspirations of the people. If I can help on behalf of the United States, I believe that this reflects the values of human dignity and freedom and justice for which the United States has always stood.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, can you be a little more specific about what you hope to accomplish in South Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have stated the objectives repeatedly. We will try to move Rhodesia and Namibia toward independence, majority rule, minority rights and a constitutional framework in which, as President Kaunda said yesterday, all the races and all the people can live side by side in human dignity.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how do you explain America's late arrival on the scene?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has gone through a very difficult decade in which it was occupied with many problems in other parts of the world. Secondly, until the process of decolonization had reached a certain point, it was not possible for the United States to make its influence felt the way it is attempting to do now.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary of State, the front-line countries have discussed this type of negotiations before, but it failed. Now they have adopted that the only solution is to intensify armed struggle. Now America has arrived on the scene late. Are you genuinely shuttling diplomacy or are you simply displaying some kind of intellectual superiority?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I do not see how I can demonstrate intellectual superiority by failing. I am here. When I was in Africa in April, all of the African countries, including this, urged the United

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States to make an effort. I know all previous efforts have failed, and I told President Kaunda this morning that if we fail, we will join a distinguished company. But I also said I have not come here to fail. A just peace and a just solution must be one that the people of the area accept and believe in. It cannot be one that outsiders impose on them. And it has nothing to do with demonstrating any particular quality.

**FOREIGN MINISTER MWALE:** Members of the press, it is my duty as a host to ensure that my guests keep to their schedule. I am afraid that unless we have two more questions, I will have to ask that we close this session.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, there are four front-line states; that is, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique. But the Secretary of State has only visited Tanzania and Zambia. Is there any special reason why he has not gone to Mozambique or Botswana?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Associates of mine have already visited Mozambique and other associates of mine will visit Botswana on Saturday. And in any event, we recognize that the decisions will be taken by the four front-line presidents. We count on their unity, and we will work with them cooperatively.

**QUESTION:** But precisely, has John Vorster indicated to you at any time that he is prepared to give independence to Namibia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I hope that when I return here, the principle of independence for Namibia will be beyond question.

**FOREIGN MINISTER MWALE:** Mr. Secretary of State, Madam Kissinger, once again on behalf of the Party, the Government and indeed the people of Zambia, we wish you all the success in your difficult task and wish you a safe trip to Pretoria and back to Zambia.

Thank you very much.

* * * * *

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 19, 1976

No. 448

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH THE RHODESIAN DELEGATION
AMERICAN EMBASSY
PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA
SEPTEMBER 19, 1976

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The Rhodesian delegation and we have met for about four hours. I presented to the Rhodesian delegation the joint United States-British views on the subject of the political and economic future of Rhodesia. I presented also in detail the views of the presidents of black Africa as to the essentials of a settlement in Rhodesia. The Rhodesian delegation has now returned to their hotel to study and to reflect on these considerations. At five o'clock a smaller group of Rhodesians, the Prime Minister of South Africa, and some colleagues and I are going to meet at the residence of the Prime Minister of South Africa to receive the reactions of the Rhodesian delegation to the considerations that were put before them, which I repeat contain US-UK considerations and the considerations of the presidents of black Africa.

Thank you very much.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, would you characterize this in any way as progress at this stage?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** At this stage I would have to consider it clarification. We put forward all the views and answered questions.

* * * * *

[lc]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 19, 1976

No. 449

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH
HIS EXCELLENCY BALTHAZAR JOHANNES VORSTER
PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE RHODESIAN DELEGATION
AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESIDENCE
PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA
SEPTEMBER 19, 1976

I reported to Mr. Smith the propositions developed jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom in close consultation with the presidents of black Africa. Mr. Smith and his colleagues considered these propositions, and they have now returned to Salisbury. I am satisfied that Mr. Smith and his three close collaborators will report favorably to their other colleagues. After consultation with their colleagues, they will have to present these propositions to their party caucus. While the Rhodesian institutional processes are taking place, I will seek certain clarifications from the presidents of black Africa, particularly President Kaunda and President Nyerere. We expect that this process of clarification and consultation will be concluded towards the end of this week.

Thank you very much.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether you feel more hopeful about the possibility of a breakthrough towards majority rule in Rhodesia now that you've spent eight hours in conversation with Prime Minister Smith?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think my statement speaks for itself and obviously if progress had not been made there would be nothing to report to the Rhodesian cabinet.

**QUESTION:** Is it only progress, sir, or do you think you are nearing a breakthrough?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I believe that my statement speaks for itself.

* * * * *

[10]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 22, 1976

No. 453

STATEMENTS BY
NGUZA KARL-I-BOND
COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
AND
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON THE ARRIVAL OF THE SECRETARY
KINSHASA, ZAIRE
SEPTEMBER 21, 1976

COMMISSIONER NGUZA:

Mr. Secretary and dear friends:

A few months ago you were in Zaire within the framework of a visit of friendship that you were making in a number of African countries. Here you are again today on another visit, a visit of a very special nature. In Zaire we believe that you are carrying out a mission of peace and goodwill and any man who loves peace and justice will acknowledge that you are engaged on a noble mission.

It is in this spirit that we welcome you and that I am entrusted by the President, founder of the Party of the Revolution, and President of the Republic and by the Executive Council as well, to welcome you most warmly in Zaire, this hospitable African land and to express our friendship to you because we welcome not only the Secretary of State of the United States, but a personal friend of our President and our country.

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

Mr. Foreign Minister, it is a great pleasure for me to be here among my friends in Zaire. I have undertaken this journey in order to contribute whatever the United States can for peace in southern Africa and to contribute to the bringing of progress and justice to this area. There is no country whose views mean more to us in this respect, no country which has a greater stake in these efforts than Zaire, and I therefore look forward to my talks with our friends, the President and the Foreign Minister. While in Zaire I will also have the opportunity to stress again America's interest in the security and well-being and economic progress of this country with which we have been closely linked since its independence and especially in recent years. So I thank you, Mr. Foreign Minister, for your very warm welcome and I look forward to my stay which is all too brief in your country.

Thank you.

* * * * *

[lc]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 22, 1976

No.

PC#114

KINSHASA, ZAIRE
SEPTEMBER 22, 1976

**QUESTION:** What did you discuss with our president?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We had a very friendly and cordial talk in which we reviewed primarily the situation in southern Africa. After this press conference we will have another meeting over lunch in which we will discuss primarily U.S.-Zairian bilateral relationships. I reported to the President about the diplomatic steps that have been taken to attempt to ease the situation in southern Africa and to bring progress towards independence and majority rule. Of course I had kept the President informed throughout, by letters and cables and we had a very good exchange of views on the situation in southern Africa and throughout Africa.

**QUESTION:** We will have a chance to ask President Mobutu later but do you now feel you have the support of the Zairian Government in your plan to set up negotiations in southern Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course the President will have to answer for himself, but I had the impression of being given great encouragement.

**QUESTION:** One has the impression that your government attempts to avoid direct contact with African nationalists. What is your government doing for the African nationalists?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** This is not correct. Our position is that the problems of Africa should be dealt with by Africans and therefore we have asked all super powers to avoid contact with the African nationalist movements and to permit the African presidents to deal directly with the nationalist movements. On this basis and on this basis alone do we believe that the evolution of Africa can be in African hands. We will meet with African nationalist movements if the African presidents ask us, but we do not want super powers or anybody else to begin supporting one group against another because this will export the rivalries of the super powers into the continent and it will prevent these nationalist movements from pursuing nationalist objectives. So we have given the leadership of these various conflicts in Africa to the African presidents and we are working through the African presidents.

**QUESTION:** But still, Mr. Secretary, you do not hesitate to have direct contact with the holders of power of white rule in southern Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** When I was in south Africa I talked to a group of TOP further information contact:

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black leaders, many of whom were in strong opposition, in fact all of whom were in strong opposition, to the governmental leaders, and members of my party talked to other black leaders, so in South Africa I made it a point to talk to the leaders of the black and colored community.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, can you confirm that Ian Smith has accepted the principle of the accession of the majority to rule?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** For me to perform the function that I am trying to exercise it is important that I do not speak for the parties and permit the parties to speak for themselves. I have indicated that I believe considerable progress has been made. I think it is clear that majority rule is the objective, so I will wait until Mr. Smith has spoken for himself -- which I understand will take place on Friday -- but I have indicated that in my judgment considerable progress has been made.

**QUESTION:** The last time we were here, sir, there was great concern about the presence of Cuban troops in Angola which is a neighboring state. Could you tell us now what the situation is with respect to the situation is respect to the Cubans in Angola?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have no clear indications. We received reports of some having been withdrawn, maybe on the order of 2,000 to 3,000 but on the other hand we also have reports of many civilians coming into replace them. The withdrawal of the Cuban troops, if there has been any, has not been strategically significant because over 10,000 still remain and we remain concerned about an African country whose government can sustain itself only by the presence of an expeditionary force from across the ocean.

**QUESTION:** Since your talks with President Nyerere, have you communicated any further views of the black African presidents to the Smith regime in order to provide any further clarification which would produce a positive decision by the Rhodesian white minority?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As part of my efforts here I attempt to make sure that all of the parties know what the other parties are thinking. I have conveyed through the South Africans my understanding of the thinking of President Kaunda as well as of President Nyerere to the Rhodesian authorities so that they can take it into their consideration as they make their decisions this week.

**QUESTION:** You've talked about Rhodesia. Now I should like to know what you have resolved about Namibia.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The discussions about Namibia are still in progress. Everybody agrees that progress has been made. The United States is in favor of the participation of all the authentic groups, including SWAPO, in any discussions concerning Namibia. We are also in favor of a UN role in this and I believe that progress has been made towards achieving these objectives as well as South Africa's role in the discussions. The precise relationship of the various groups to each other in these negotiations still remains to be worked out but we are hopeful that in the weeks ahead we can make further progress towards the objective of setting up a conference about

PR#459

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the independence of Namibia. Before we end the press conference I want to say that in my discussions with President Mobutu he suggested that it would be important that the OAU be formally informed about the results of our efforts in southern Africa. I accepted his suggestions and I will send an emisarry to see the President of the OAU to inform him of the efforts that have taken place during the last week.

**QUESTION:** Who is the President of the OAU?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That's the Prime Minister of Mauritius.

* * * * *

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 22, 1976

No. 459

STATEMENTS BY
HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES OSOGO
MINISTER OF HEALTH AND ACTING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF KENYA
AND THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON THE SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL IN NAIROBI, KENYA
SEPTEMBER 22, 1976

**MINISTER OSOGO:** This evening we welcome his excellency, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the United States of America. He has arrived here from wherever he is coming from, and he will be with us here a day or so, and I would like to welcome him to Nairobi once again — he has been here before — and present him to you, members of the press so that he can greet Kenyans on his arrival.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Thank you.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is my third visit to Nairobi since April. It is here that I paid my first visit to Africa as Secretary of State and it is here that I indicated that the United States would make a major effort to promote peace, justice and progress in Africa, with special attention to southern Africa. I remember the very warm welcome I received the last time I was here and my very cordial and constructive conversations with your distinguished President Kenyatta. I look forward very much to seeing him tomorrow.

Since my last visit, Kenya has been much in the news. The United States believes strongly and supports strongly the independence, security and progress of our friends in Kenya, and I will underline this interest again tomorrow in my talks with President Kenyatta.

So let me say that I am here at the end of a trip which I hope has contributed to peace in Africa and to the conditions for progress. It is a great pleasure to be able to visit my friends in this great country, and I look forward to my too-short visit very much.

Thank you.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[lc]

September 23, 1976

No. 463

INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BY
O. R. T. F.
(OFFICE DE RADIO ET DE TELEVISION FRANCAIS)
KINSHASA, ZAIRE
SEPTEMBER 22, 1976

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could you just tell us what the fundamental tenets of the new African policy that you are developing are?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States would like to see the developments in Africa be guided by African motives and by African nations, and therefore to prevent superpower intervention. We are supporting majority rule, minority rights and economic progress and therefore we are encouraging those African nations that are prepared to pursue this by peaceful means and using all our efforts to enable them to achieve it by peaceful means.

**QUESTION:** Does this extend also to the Republic of South Africa in the future?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It applies to all African problems.

**QUESTION:** Why do you think all superpowers are interested in Africa today?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the United States is primarily interested in letting Africans settle their own future. I believe that there are other superpowers that are pursuing their own strategic and ideological objectives here and I believe they would serve world peace better if they permitted African problems to be settled by Africans.

**QUESTION:** Neither the U. S. really, nor Russia, nor China were represented at the Berlin Conference when Africa was carved up the first time. Do you think that this is a new carving up?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States does not want any sphere of interest in Africa. The United States accepts the conclusions of

PR. #463

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African leaders. What the United States opposes is outside powers picking out their own spheres of influence and pouring in military equipment in order to achieve their own objectives. We want no American sphere of influence here.

**QUESTION:** Would the U. S. be as interested if Russian and Chinese influence had not been growing over the last few years on the African continent?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Who knows what a country would have done. The fact is our policy is as I have stated it and, for that matter, we support the French efforts which seem to me to go in the same direction.

*****

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 23, 1976

No. 466

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
JAMES OSOGO
ACTING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
UPON THE DEPARTURE OF THE SECRETARY
NAIROBI, KENYA
SEPTEMBER 23, 1976

**MR. OSOGO:** Members of the press, once again are here, at the end of the visit of the Secretary of State who just arrived from Nakuru after seeing the President and would like to say a few words of Kwaheri to the Kenyans and the world press. Mr. Secretary.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Mr. Acting Foreign Minister, I would simply like to thank the President and the people of Kenya for the very warm reception we have had here. The President and I discussed the relations between Kenya and the United States which are excellent.

I also briefed him on the American action in bringing together or in attempting to bring together the various groups in southern Africa and to make progress towards a peaceful solution based on justice and human dignity. I was very satisfied with my talk and I leave Africa, from here, with warm feelings and a sense of hope.

Thank you.

* * * *

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 23, 1976

No. 467

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE JAMES CALLAGHAN
PRIME MINISTER
AND
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THEIR MEETING
LONDON, ENGLAND
SEPTEMBER 23, 1976

**PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN:** I want to welcome Dr. Kissinger here after his very arduous journey. I want to emphasize that the British and the American Governments have a common perception that what is required in Rhodesia, namely the acceptance of the principles of majority rule; elections within two years in accordance with the statement I made on March 22 and in which Dr. Kissinger has emphasized that he has been working on during the last few days in Africa. I am naturally looking forward with great eagerness to hear an account of Dr. Kissinger's visit, but I suppose both of us are really waiting to hear what will come from the Rhodesian authorities tomorrow. The solution will have to come out of Africa and it is to Africa that we look and to the Africans and the Europeans in Rhodesia to provide that solution. I think that is all I wish to say now. Henry, do you want to add anything?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I agree we have been working within the framework of the proposal made by the Prime Minister, that a common perception of the issues and with the conviction that the final solution has to be an African solution worked out on the spot between the Europeans and the Africans involved.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, there is no sort of firm news from Salisbury tonight. I assume you have been keeping in touch with the hopeful noises that have been coming out of there. Do you think that perhaps you have pulled it off once again?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am hopeful that we will proceed, but I do not want to say that any one person pulled it off. We worked very closely with the British Government and, after all, on a British plan.

**QUESTION:** Have you received any leaks from the caucus meeting in Salisbury?

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PR 467

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have not received any leaks from the caucus meeting, but I think matters have gone so far that it would be surprising if they turned it down.

**QUESTION:** So you are hopeful that when you are talking about pulling it off, you have indeed pulled it off, Dr. Kissinger?

**PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN:** Let me intervene here for a moment. What Dr. Kissinger has constantly said to me over the last few days is that he does not wish this to be regarded as a personal matter. He probably would want to say that himself, but it should come from me because he has been working within the personal framework of a common plan. But I want to emphasize once again that it is up to the Rhodesian authorities to say whether they themselves are willing to put forward this plan and whether they themselves are willing to enter into negotiations with the Africans to settle the matter there, and then we can proceed from that point onwards.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I agree.

**QUESTION:** Are you ready if necessary for a conference here in London to sort out the details.

**PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN:** I think they have got to get down first of all to settle any interim government that they have got to get into with the Africans. That is the question.

Thank you, gentlemen.

* * * * *

[lc]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 23, 1976

No. 468

STATEMENTS BY
HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES CALLAGHAN
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING
LONDON
SEPTEMBER 23, 1976

**QUESTION:** [Inaudible]

**PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN:** I think I said all I wanted to say before we went in, but clearly, if the proposals that have come up in Rhodesia are satisfactory, then both the United States and Britain would want to play a constructive role. And I am sure that the African countries, including President Nyerere, President Kaunda and President Sese Seko, would all wish to do the same.

**QUESTION:** [Inaudible]

**PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN:** At the moment I am awaiting a statement from Rhodesia, and it will depend upon that statement what will be the nature of any responses made by Britain and, I am sure, by the United States.

**QUESTION:** You mention the African leaders. Are you confident that any proposals and any acceptance by Dr. Smith would be acceptable also to the African leaders who seem to be quite divided at the moment?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Based on my conversations with President Kaunda, President Nyerere and the public statements, President Nyerere, I believe, said if Mr. Smith says what we hope he will say, that then will be considered the basis for negotiations.

**QUESTION:** And including the AMC as well?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has taken the position that the African presidents are responsible for producing a consensus among the liberation leaders and therefore we have done our best for the African presidents.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could you tell us if the talks you have had in the last hour and a half have been merely a briefing or whether you have had some substantive contingency planning and discussing?

PR #468

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, throughout we have dealt in the closest cooperation with the British Government in attempting to get a full exchange of views which we hope to take tomorrow to the Foreign Office.

**QUESTION:** Are you going to the Foreign Office just to meet the Foreign Secretary?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** And his associates.

**QUESTION:** When any news comes from Rhodesia — which one would expect tomorrow — you will be at that time in consultation with the Foreign Secretary. Is that right?

**QUESTION:** But you are staying on for that meeting?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I would be on my way back, but I would expect that there will be a parallel [inaudible]. If you have any more questions, you will get only diplomatic answers. [Laughter]

**THE PRESS:** Thank you very much, indeed.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 23, 1976

No. 469

INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BY
WALTER CRONKITE
CBS-TV "EVENING NEWS"

SEPTEMBER 23, 1976

**MR. CRONKITE:** Dr. Kissinger ended his 11-day African shuttle today and flew to London to brief British officials. I was able to talk with Dr. Kissinger via satellite about the situation in southern Africa.

Dr. Kissinger, it appears that at this hour this evening congratulations are in order. Rhodesian sources say that Premier [sic] Smith's party has accepted your proposals to achieve racial peace there — proposals, I know, originally put forth by the British. Can you tell us now specifically what the proposals are?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. I think that we should wait until Mr. Smith speaks to his people tomorrow. But they follow in the main the basic proposals that were made by the British Government last March and which have now been worked out, with some modifications, with the Rhodesian authorities, apparently.

**MR. CRONKITE:** Do the modifications, may we ask, change the timetable? Does it still provide majority rule after two years?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The timetable has not been changed.

**MR. CRONKITE:** We've been led to believe that the proposals provide a cessation of black guerrilla activities during the transition period. Is that correct, sir?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It has always been understood that at some point in this process guerrilla activity would cease. But again, we are at the beginning of a very delicate process. Mr. Smith has not yet spoken; the African states have not yet reacted; negotiations which will involve also Great Britain have yet to be conducted. So I don't think I should go into the details until the first step has as yet been taken.

**MR. CRONKITE:** Dr. Kissinger, the African ministers met at the UN today, and we understand that spokesmen for the neighboring nations — Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique — all said that they would continue

PR #469

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liberation activities — guerrilla activities, in other words — until
the transfer of power to majority rule actually was made. Now does
that surprise you? Does that throw a block into this process?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. This is consistent with the discussions that have been taking place. We have all been speaking to the authorities in Rhodesia, to the South African Government and to the black African states, and what is emerging hopefully is a consensus to which all parties agree.

**MR. CRONKITE:** What is the next step, sir?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The next step is that Mr. Smith state the circumstances in which he is prepared to solve the constitutional crisis. Then Britain, as the country that has the constitutional responsibility, will probably seek to facilitate a conference between the black national movement and the settlers in Rhodesia and that this will bring about the negotiation which will produce a final settlement.

**MR. CRONKITE:** If this doesn't work, do you have any other plan to fall back on?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** If we had not made this effort, there would have been a race war in southern Africa which was already escalating, which would have brought a great risk of foreign intervention, and which would have spread to neighboring countries. We hope that we have contributed to averting this; and, having brought it this far, we are not counting on it failing.

**MR. CRONKITE:** Dr. Kissinger, there was more rioting in Johannesburg today. When you saw Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa, did you get any indication that there will be any change in South Africa's attitude toward apartheid at this time?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The South African situation is extremely complicated. I made clear our views on the subject and our hope that there would be an evolution that would bring more harmony.

**MR. CRONKITE:** Any assurances from him to give you encouragement?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is a complicated process that will take longer than the one that we have negotiated in the last few weeks.

**MR. CRONKITE:** Thank you very much, Secretary of State Kissinger, in London.

* * * * *

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 24, 1976

No. 472

PC 115

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND HIS EXCELLENCY ANTHONY CROSLAND
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
U.S. EMBASSY
LONDON
SEPTEMBER 24, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, I wanted to thank Mr. Crosland for agreeing to come over here. After it had been set up as a press conference for me, he agreed to join me.

I wanted to make only one point before we go to questions — that I have seen many references that the Rhodesian authorities are now considering a Kissinger proposal. I think it is well to understand what is being considered in Salisbury, or what has been considered in Salisbury all week. First of all, the basis of the proposals is the plan put forward by Prime Minister Callaghan on March 22. This has been elaborated in detailed consultations between the British and American Governments. There have been five missions to Africa — three American and two British — in which these ideas were discussed in great detail with the African presidents and refined in the light of their comment. So what is being considered in Salisbury is not the plan of an individual but what we hope reflects a consensus between the United States, the United Kingdom and the essential requirements of the leaders of Africa. It is on this basis that we hope to make our contribution to the solution of the future of southern Africa.

FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND: I would like to underline that. The British Government for the last two or three weeks has deliberately remained in a not very visible position on the grounds that you couldn't have people trying to negotiate vicariously over a distance of 5,000 miles or whatever it is. But what Dr. Kissinger says is right. This has been very much of a joint plan. I think my first event as Foreign Secretary was to meet Dr. Kissinger on an airfield in Lincolnshire and since then we have met six times at least — with the Prime Minister very often —

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to discuss this. Respective officials — British officials — have been to Washington many times. State Department officials have been to London many times and, as Dr. Kissinger says, the missions to southern Africa have been, to some extent, shared between the two countries. So he's quite right to say — though I should add that this in no way diminishes the very high proportion of the total credit that he, Dr. Kissinger, deserves. He's quite right to say that the plan within the broad framework of which he's been operating in recent weeks, and indeed in recent months, has been to a very large extent a collective one.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, if I could follow that up with a question to both of you gentlemen. Now that the shuttle is finished — I presume you are not going back — does the lead in the diplomatic process now pass to the British?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** If the Rhodesian authorities decide favorably, the next step will have to be a discussion of legal and governmental coordination in Rhodesia. Britain has a historic and legal role in this respect and it would therefore seem to us natural that Britain would be in a position to be very helpful to the parties, if the parties requested it. But the United States will be prepared to back up whatever efforts Britain will make and to continue its interests in a peaceful solution of this problem.

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** I think that's absolutely right. Britain has a constitutional and a legal responsibility which, of course, the United States does not have, and therefore it will fall to Britain in any event to carry through the required legislation to validate and legalize what hopefully will emerge in Rhodesia. But quite apart from that, if diplomatic help is wanted to bring the two sides together in the early stages in particular, Britain, I think, would have to take the lead in providing such diplomatic assistance as we could, which would help towards an agreed settlement.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, assuming that there is a peaceful transfer of power in Rhodesia, what steps have you taken, or what guarantees have you sought, that you won't end up with another Angola where the Russians come in and back one faction very heavily and there's a civil war and a radical regime takes over?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course, the major responsibility to prevent this will be with the presidents of Africa, and we would assume that they could not want Africa turned into an arena for great power competition. It is our understanding that once an interim government has been formed, guerrilla war would cease.

**QUESTION:** Two points, sir. Has a document of any kind been passed to the Smith government? Is there anything that has been signed, initialled or exchanged in the form of papers? And

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secondly, you started to say what happens if the operation goes
well in the hand-over to the British. What happens if it gets
sticky?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We'll get the blame. [Laughter]

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** That's right. [Laughter]

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** With respect to your first question, no document has been initialled or signed. Several points have been put forward as our best distillation of the consensus that I have earlier described, and it is those points which the Rhodesian authorities have been discussing all week. We do not know precisely what Mr. Smith is going to say tonight, although he knows precisely what we think the basis of a settlement would be.

**QUESTION:** Could you just follow up on that? Are those points oral or are they in writing so there can be less ambiguity about what's been said?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We gave him the points in writing.

**QUESTION:** Could you describe the arguments that you put to Mr. Smith when you talked to him in South Africa and which seem to have persuaded him to accept a deal?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't believe I should go into it at this [inaudible].

**QUESTION:** Secretary Crosland, could you please tell us in view of the possible threat of outside intervention in Rhodesia or to one of the liberation groups, what is your feeling about how quickly the constitutional conference should be convened and an interim government should come into existence?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** Well, generally as quickly as possible. It's impossible to lay down or foresee a precise time-table for this. But the last thing we want, assuming that Mr. Smith's response tonight is "yes," unequivocally "yes," the last thing we want then is a long delay in which everything would get muddled and other people would start poking their noses in and the rest of it. I can't set a time, but I would much rather that it was a matter of weeks at the most. Anyway, as soon as possible.

**QUESTION:** Before constitutional conference or before an interim government?

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**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** Well, first of all, before talks take place between the whites and the blacks on the formation of an interim government, and secondly, before the formation of an interim government. And, as soon as an interim government is formed, then we will take, in London, the necessary legal and Parliamentary action to legalize it.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, have you any doubts at all as to whether Mr. Smith will accept the peace plan?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am hopeful that he will. I have no doubt at the moment, but we just cannot be sure until he has spoken.

**QUESTION:** Do you think that the Rhodesia peace plan has removed the danger of a race war in southern Africa if it proceeds to plan?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think it has given us the possibility to avoid that danger, and it has already sharply reduced it.

**QUESTION:** Can you give any idea of the cost to Great Britain and the United States of the peace plan if it's carried out?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We are going to be studying this next week jointly in Washington. We have not arrived at a figure yet.

**QUESTION:** Do you think that at some point that, as part of this process, Rhodesia will have to renounce UDI [Unilateral Declaration of Independence]?

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PR 472

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** Well, if this process goes well there are two constitutional acts that are involved. The first one is to legalize the interim government that will come, we hope, into being in a short space of time and the second is at the end of two years, when majority rule has been achieved within the conditions laid down by the Prime Minister on March 22nd. We shall then need final legislation which will confer total independence on what will then be a majority black government in Rhodesia.

**QUESTION:** Sir, did you mean to say "at the end of two years" as firmly as that?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** Well, I can't say. Nobody has laid down the actual day, but Dr. Kissinger as I understand it, and the British Government, have been consistently talking within the phrase used by the Prime Minister on March 22nd, of eighteen months to two years.

**QUESTION:** Is that Dr. Kissinger's view too about the terms in which he has been conducting the talks?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That is and has been my view.

**QUESTION:** You spoke of the talks within Rhodesia between black and white about the formation of an interim government before any United Kingdom legislation. Is there a possibility that those talks could break down in view of the divisions on the African side or do you have assurances from the African side that an interim government can be formed?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we have taken consistently the position that the African side is responsible for its representation and for its program. The African presidents seem to be confident that they can produce a delegation and we would expect that, after all the anguish that both sides have gone through, that they would conduct the discussions with a sense of responsibility and on that basis we believe a solution could be found.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, given the history of military dictatorships and so forth in Africa, what kind of future do you see for Rhodesia in the event that black majority rule is established?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I think we should-- we have not even taken the first steps on that road yet and it is premature to speculate until we see how these discussions are going.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Crosland, this two years more or less--when does the clock start running-- today, at the point of Mr. Smith's announcement or at the beginning of a constitutional conference or when?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** I can't give you a cut and dried answer on a particular day. Let's wait and see what Mr. Smith is going to say tonight. Let us wait and see what reaction there is to that from the black African states and then we shall be able to lay down the kind of timetable and program which we want to see fulfilled.

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PR 472

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, since you have been so concerned about the danger of the racial war in southern Africa, I wonder if you could explain once more how the establishment of black, and quite possibly militant regimes, on the borders of South Africa, will reduce the pressure leading to such confrontations in that country.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We now have a war going on in Rhodesia, and we have the danger of war in Namibia. What we are attempting to do is to demonstrate the possibility of peaceful solutions and of the utility of negotiations. Any step that is taken is not going to be a final step in that process. We believe that, if this process, that hopefully will start today, will be carried out to its conclusion, it will contribute to moderation in Africa and to create additional incentives for negotiated solutions.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary--two questions. Is it your understanding that during the interim government Mr. Smith will remain as Prime Minister? Secondly, who do you now understand will share the constitutional talks?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** You must understand that before Mr. Smith has spoken it would not be appropriate for me to go into the details of all the ideas that he may put forward for all of the negotiations that would ensue. The United States has generally taken the position that it is for each side to put forward its representatives and that the United States would not prescribe to either side who should represent it in any talks that might result and, so, let us wait until after Mr. Smith has spoken and then see what delegations are actually being produced by the two sides.

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PR #472

**QUESTION:** On the constitutional talks?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** On the constitutional talks. We haven't actually thought through the chairmanship. We believe that Britain has an important contribution to make.

How it will exercise this will obviously depend on the parties and on the decisions of the British Government.

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** Could I just add one word to that? We can't see the nature of the constitutional talks at the moment. We don't know whether this will take the form of a standard regular type of conference or whether the talks will be very much more informal. So any discussions of who will take the chair is premature, but I repeat what I said earlier — that as far as diplomatic help and activity is concerned, the British Government will give all the assistance that it possibly can to whatever talks occur and to make sure they come to a successful conclusion.

**QUESTION:** Does that mean, Foreign Secretary, that you are opposed in principle to Britain taking the chair at such constitutional talks?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** No, I'm not opposed in principle, I'm not in favor in principle. I can't see the scenario and so I've got to keep all the options open until I can see the scenario more clearly.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Crosland, are you expecting Mr. Smith to come to London for the constitutional conference as part or as head of that delegation and would you be happy for that to take place?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** I think it highly unlikely that the constitutional conference would take place in London to begin with. I think it would almost certainly take place in Africa.

**QUESTION:** And would the British Government be happy for Mr. Smith to be part or head of that Rhodesian delegation?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** Well, we wouldn't be responsible. I've said we'd give what help we can to the constitutional conference but the people to answer that question would be the black negotiation team, not the British Government.

**QUESTION:** But you're still prepared for Mr. Smith to be the head of the interim government until the transfer of power takes place?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** I'm not either prepared nor unprepared. This is a matter which has got to be the subject of agreement between the white Rhodesians whoever they're led by in a week's time on the one hand and the black Rhodesians, or the black presidents behind them on the other hand and it's not for the British Government at this moment of time to say that we think should come out of that negotiating process.

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[L]

PR #472

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could we hear from both you and from Mr. Crosland, if you could, on your views as to what has produced what you hope will be a successful conclusion? What have been the factors which at this time, after eleven years, seemingly have brought the situation to this climax?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Personal charm (laughter). I think --

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** As soon as he said personal charm someone said Mr. Crosland. (Laughter)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It was a combination of factors -- a continuation of the war; the assessment by the Rhodesian authorities of the likely trends; the participation of the South African Government in the negotiations and the commitment of the United States Government to a peaceful solution and its willingness to engage itself, together with the efforts that Great Britain has been making consistently, produced new factors in the situation.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Crosland, could you tell us which will come first -- the constitutional conference or the interim government?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** No, I can't tell you.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Crosland, do I take it from your earlier reply of the two constitutional acts that are required, that it will be unnecessary for Mr. Smith to actually renounce UDI -- in a formal way?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** Let me make this absolutely clear -- that we have -- that Dr. Kissinger has been pushing, as a joint approach to both sides, a certain number of possibilities that form part of a plan which we hope will be broadly adopted and will lead to the two sides negotiating together. But if Mr. Smith says what we hope and if the American sides react favorably to that, then at that point it becomes for negotiations in Africa to answer the various questions that have been raised during the last two or three minutes. It is not for the United Kingdom Government, nor if it comes to that, for the United States Government, to say in advance they want this, they don't want that -- the other. This is for the whites and the blacks in Africa to agree amongst themselves.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere of Tanzania is quoted as saying that you put a lot of pressure on Rhodesia through South Africa. What kind of pressure did you put and what kind of ultimatum did you deliver?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We delivered no ultimatum and we reviewed the likely evolution of events and the alternatives that were available and we believe that this contributed to the decision. There were no addition -- there were no threats or pressure.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, may I bring you back to the question of money, please? There have been reports that in order to get this plan, a safety net in the amount of 1 1/2 to 2 billion dollars is being considered with

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an American contribution that could run to 400-500 million dollars. Could you now sort out the money figures for us please?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, none of the figures have any official status. Secondly, the idea of a safety net is a somewhat crude description of a complicated scheme that has been discussed among officials, that would be alternatively available for the investment or for an insurance scheme for those who might eventually wish to emigrate. There will be discussions next week in Washington between American, British and South African officials to try to refine this and come up with specific figures. At this point no specific figures have been agreed to.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** You said just now that you assumed that there would be a cease-fire in the guerrilla war as soon as the basic settlement had been accepted by Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith has used the device of saying that there has not been a cease-fire to wriggle out from previous obligations. Are you now confident --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I said when an interim government is formed. But I believe that this too should await Mr. Smith's speech and the negotiations that we hope will follow this speech.

**QUESTION:** Has Mr. Smith asked that the guerrilla cease-fire should be a condition of his implementing your suggestions?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Again, I believe that Mr. Smith will have to speak for himself but I -- my impression is that he will put forward whatever -- if he -- what he says without preconditions.

**QUESTION:** Is there any room for Mr. Smith today to say, "Yes, but " or does he have to say "yes" or "no" specifically to the total package? Is there any room for him to hedge on this?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I really am in no position to speak for Mr. Smith. Our impression is, as he has said himself, that his statement will be clear and unambiguous and will leave no room for evasion -- this I gather from his own public statements.

**QUESTION:** But does he have to accept the total or reject the total or can he accept most of it and say, "But I don't want this piece"?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We'll know in a few hours. We think the process would be helped most if the total package were put forward.

**QUESTION:** If there is any prospect of them not accepting the total package, would you consider returning or would you say that that's the end of negotiations?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think that the matter has gone so far that it must be concluded. But why speculate about what may happen tonight?

**QUESTION:** I just wondered what you think might happen if he didn't accept.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I don't operate on that assumption. I operate on the assumption that -- that the total package will be put forward.

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PR 472

**QUESTION:** Which do you think should come first -- the constitutional conference or the formation of a government?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think it extremely important that the solutions for southern Africa be seen to be African solutions, and that the United States and the United Kingdom, whose primary interest has been to produce peace in southern Africa, not appear to be dictating the precise outcome. Therefore, I believe that we should wait for, first, Mr. Smith's speech and then the African reaction. As my colleague has already stated, the United Kingdom is willing to be helpful; the United States is prepared to be supportive, but let us first get some other reactions on the table.

**QUESTION:** Have you spoken with Mr. Smith since leaving Africa or any representatives of his government?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I have not.

**QUESTION:** Do you expect any trouble from the Soviet Union, Dr. Kissinger, because they have been kicking you rather hard over what you have been trying to do? Do you think that they can stir up diplomatic trouble in the UN or elsewhere in Africa to try and sabotage the whole plan?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We believe that it should be in the interest of all countries to promote peace in southern Africa and we would hope that the Soviet Union would not, for the sake of ideology or great power rivalry, try to introduce an element of contention which must above all hurt the peoples of southern Africa and destroy an opportunity for peace.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Kissinger, it seems from both you gentlemen then, the U.S. and the UK do not want to take much responsibility for the actual solutions. Can you say how it would be possible for the blacks and whites in Rhodesia to work out an interim government by themselves?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, we did not say they should do it by themselves. I think we both said that we would be active, supportive, cooperative, in any way that we are asked and in any way that can be useful.

Thank you, gentlemen.

* * * * *