III - 23

military training. Are the Communes then an organization
of farmers who also are trained as soldiers? Or are
they soldiers, part of whose duties include farming?
Threatened countries may consider the distinction academic.
Given the present social organization of Communist China,
dramatically announced troop reductions are almost meaning-
less. This indicates that paramilitary organizations and
mobilizable reserves will have to be included in any
control scheme against local aggression.

Then there is the problem of geography. Interior lines
of communication enable the Communist countries to concentrate
on one point and threaten to overwhelm it. By contrast,
the power of the free world is scattered around the
globe and its effectiveness is reduced further by the
disparate interests of the countries comprising it.
In devising arms control schemes against local aggression
care must be taken not to demand too much of the inspection
apparatus.

substance.

care must be taken not to demand too much of the inspection
In deviating from same control same effects against focal aggression

istherate interests of the countries comprising it.
Grosje and its electiveness is required further by the
the power of the free world is scattered across the
on one point and further to overwhelm it. By contrast,

of communication enable the Communist countries to concentrate
Then there is the problem of geographical inferiority lines
control agriculture against focal aggression.

militaristic reserves will have to be expended in and
less. This indicates that paramilitary organizations and
quantitatively announced troop requisitions are almost meaningless
Given the present social organization of Communist China,
Threatened countries may consider the瓜分 of the academic

they soldiers, but of whose duties include learning?
ot tumors who also are trained as soldiers? Or are
military training. Are the Communies then an organization

III - S3

III - 24

Any scheme for dealing with local aggression must meet these requirements: (a) it must establish an equilibrium of forces suitable for local war through a combination of build-up in the West, reduction in the Communist countries and inspected ceilings on manpower. Though this appears to be one-sided, it is the condition of stability. The less desirable alternative is a unilateral Western build-up to be followed by a control scheme. (b) An inspection system adequate to monitor the level of forces within acceptable limits of error. (c) Arms control measures, to deal with local aggression, must provide for zonal limitations, because local aggression depends not only on the size of the forces on but ~~their~~ deployment.

This suggests that a control scheme against local aggression could be combined with the system to deal with surprise attack described earlier. In that case, the zones

embittered attack described earlier. In that case, the zones
aggression could be combined with the system to deal with
this attack that a control scheme against local
local deployment.

put them in deployment.

local aggression doesn't only on the size of the forces
aggression, must provide for some limitations, because
of error. (c) Any control measure, to deal with local
monitor the level of forces within acceptable limits
control scheme. (d) An inspection system adequate to
be a sufficient Western build-up to be followed by a
condition of stability. The less desirable alternative
manpower. Through this scheme to do one-aided, it is the
decisive countries and inspected ceilings on
a combination of build-up in the West, reduction in
equilibrium of forces usable for local war, through
meet these requirements: (a) it must satisfactorily
Any scheme for dealing with local aggression must

III - 54

III - 25

of unlimited inspection should be located to adjoin
troubled or disputed areas. Fixed inspection points as
proposed by the Soviet Union could control access into
other zones where only inventory inspection would take
place. At some agreed interval, say, once a year, a
census of forces in the "restricted" areas would be
carried out to determine that they do not exceed agreed
levels. This scheme should establish not only an over-
all ceiling on forces, but also a ceiling on forces to
be maintained in particular zones, embodying the principles
laid down on the discussion on arms control in Europe. ⁹

But we must not delude ourselves. Any significant
arms control scheme presupposes a willingness on the
part of the Soviet Union to allow meaningful inspection.

⁹ See above, The U.S. and Europe

["See Spivey, The U.S. and Europe", "part of the Soviet Union to effect meaningful inspection of arms control agencies. Broadsides a willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to allow meaningful inspection of other zones where only inventory inspection would take place. By the Soviet Union control access into restricted areas should be located to enable of unmitigated inspection should be located to enable

III - 25

of unlimited inspection should be located to adjoin
troubled or disputed areas. Fixed inspection points as
proposed by the Soviet Union could control access into
other zones where only inventory inspection would take
place. At some agreed interval, say once a year, a
census of forces in the "restricted" areas would be
carried out to determine that they do not exceed agreed
levels. This scheme should establish not only an over-
all ceiling on forces, but also a ceiling on forces to
be maintained in particular zones embodying the principles
laid down on the discussion on arms control in Europe. ⁹

III - 26

If neither negative evidence nor positive evidence
nor inventory inspection prove negotiable, Mr. Khrushchev's
speech at the United Nations in favor of complete dis-
armament will stand revealed as a cynical propaganda
hoax. Nothing less than the control scheme described
here would be adequate to monitor comprehensive arms
control.

control.

there would be adequate to monitor comprehensive arms
poison. Nothing less than the control scheme described
amounts will stand revealed as a clinical propaganda
speech at the United Nations in favor of complete dis-
nor inventory inspection before negotiable, Mr. Kramaprasad's
It neither negative evidence nor positive evidence

III - 5c

I - 1

The challenge to the free world, and to the United States as its strongest single component, is enormous. The world is undergoing a historic upheaval; everywhere conditions accepted for centuries have come to seem oppressive; human aspirations and technological change combine to overthrow established patterns. In any revolutionary period the fact of change may seem inevitable. But its direction depends on the dedication and imagination of those caught up in the process of transformation. Nothing could be more disastrous than the belief that we are witnessing only a temporary dislocation or that our efforts are likely to have a terminal date. We can never return to the patterns of the past. We shall live our lives in the midst of change. Our choice is not between tranquillity and effort; it is whether we are creative enough to shape events or whether we shall become their prisoners.

In terms of this task, there is reason for serious concern not only about our policies but about the state of mind they reflect. Confronted with one of the great revolutions of history, we have in the past decade taken refuge in day-to-day expedients without con-

the best chance taken refuge in day-to-day expedients without concern.
Contrasted with one of the great revolutions of history, we have in
not only about our bottomless pit about the state of mind they reflect.
In terms of this task, there is reason for serious concern

*efforts; if it is whether we are creative enough to escape events or*
*in the might of change. Our choice is not between transmissibility and*
*never return to the better of the best. We shall live our lives*
*or that our efforts are likely to have a terminal date. We can*
*than the節of that we are winning only a temporarily déviation*
*in the process of transformation. Nothing could be more diabolical*
*reaction depends on the dedication and imagination of those caught up in*
*temporarily period the loss of change may seem inevitable. But its di-*
*change confined to overthrow accomplished better. In such revolu-*
*ions come to seem objective: human aspirations and technologies*
*ing a historic imbalance; everywhere conditions accepted for centuries*
*its strongest single component, is enormous. The world is undergo-*
*ing the challenge to the free world, and to the United States as*

I - 1

I - 2

ception or purpose. Sometimes pretending that a peace we could
never describe was just around the corner, sometimes denying the
very fact of a challenge, sometimes confusing rhetoric with policy
we have been at a loss both about the nature of the world we wish
to see emerge, not to speak of the means to attain it. Perhaps the
most worrisome symptom of the passivity of our attitudes is the de-
gree to which history has taken the place of purpose. Evolutionary
theory almost completely unknown a century ago has made the leap
from an explanation of biological development to becoming a sanction
for political action. Whatever else divides the West from Communism,
the basic approach to the nature of policy is uncomfortably close.
They differ less in their assumptions than in the conclusions drawn
from them.

Both Communism and many in the West believe that the political
frame-work is determined by the economic structure. Both interpre-
tations are convinced that economic development has inevitable
political and moral consequences. They disagree in their views
about the political frame-work which is emerging. Where the Commu-

about the节流阀triangle which is emerging. Where the Comm-
boilcoat and worst consequences. They disagree in their areas
functions are convinced that economic development has inevitable
triangle is determined by the economic structure. Both interplay-
Both Communism and may in the West believe that the political
from them.

They differ less in their assumptions than in the consequences drawn
the past shown to the nature of budget is uncolonized close.
tor political version. Whatever else divides the West from Communism,
from an explanation of political development to becoming a sanction
theory almost completely unknown a century ago has made the task
gree to which historically has taken the place of budget. Accidentally
most marriages endow of the beauty of our attitudes is the de-
so see emerge not to ask of the means to attain it. Because the
we have been at a loss about the nature of the world we knew
very fact of a challenge, sometimes concerning reference with budget
never describe was just around the corner, sometimes denoting the
ception or budget. Sometimes pretending that a bovine we could

I - 3

I - 3

nists maintain that history trends towards the dictatorship of the
proletariat, many in the West see a "natural" evolution of any society
towards liberal institutions. Communism and the West differ, too,
in the attitude which is produced by their evolutionary theories.

Communism uses its philosophy of history as a spur to effort; it provides the conviction for major exertions. Too many in the West rely on history as a substitute for effort; to them, as a result, survival becomes the primary goal. All will end well, if we live to see it.

This raises the not very comforting query whether the successes of Communism are due not to its ability to forecast events but to its self-assurance in shaping them, while the West, waiting for history to do its work for it, stands in danger of being engulfed by the currents of our time.

An example of the reliance on evolutionary theory is the fre-
quently heard argument that the Soviet Union is in the midst of
profound transformations. As it produces more consumer goods, it
will become a blander, less ideological society, less militant, more
concerned with material comforts. As Soviet citizens develop a

I - 4

greater stake in their society, so the argument goes, they will be exerting increasing pressure for the freedoms long since familiar in the West. Industrialization requires the training of a managerial class and education fosters a questioning spirit. The managerial class will not submit to the pressures of a police state. The methods appropriate to foster economic development will no longer mock in a highly elaborated society. Khrushchev's Russia, as distinguished from Stalin's, is a "going concern" and therefore less interested in aggressive policies.\* A key goal of Western policy accordingly must be to promote this beneficial evolution. To the extent that there is a relaxation of external tensions, the Soviet leaders will have no choice except to ameliorate the political system. To the degree that we can encourage the Soviet Union to concentrate on the economic development of its vast area, we will also foster all these elements inconsistent with dictatorial rule and aggressive foreign policy.

Similar propositions are advanced with respect to the underdeveloped countries. They are said to be in the phase of industrial

* N. P. A. p.

I - 5

development where political liberty is an almost incomprehensible term
and where the requirements of economic growth inevitably take pre-
cedence over those of political organization. Policy is identified
with the ability to promote industrialization and a rising standard
of living. Means will necessarily be subordinated to ends. In
the early stages of development some form of dictatorship is there-
fore extremely likely. The West would make a great mistake were
it to seek to foster its own political forms which are inapplicable
to most of the new nations and which are either not understood by
them or interpreted as a newer and subtler form of foreign interven-
tion. The hope for the West in the underdeveloped areas is to iden-
tify itself with the striving for economic growth. Competition with
the Communists should take place not so much in the realm of poli-
tical ideas as in that of industrialization. Our task is to prove
our ability to promote the raising of the standard of life more ef-
ficiently than our Communist opponent and without resorting to their
methods of regimentation. In the long run the satisfaction of wants
will promote a more liberal economic evolution as well. Indeed, if

will promote a more flexible economic environment as well. Indeed, it
methods of refinement. In the long run the anticipation of many
fluctuations from our Commodity obsolescence and without resulting to fresh
our ability to promote the ranking of the standard of life more etc.
these ideas as in that of industrialization. Our task is to prove
the Communists should take place not so much in the realm of belf-
ery itself with the arriving for economic growth. Competition with
the nation for the West in the unbalanced areas is to iden-
IFY or interpreted as a new and stronger form of togetherness.
so much of the new nations and which are either not understood by
it to seek to later its own political form which are insubstantive
as living. Means will necessarily be appropriated to same. In
with the ability to promote industrialization and a strong standard
coherence over phase of political organization. Policy is identified
and where the requirements of economic growth increasingly take pre-
development where political liberty is at some of incombustible forms

1-2

I - 6

we can keep the new nations from going Communist in their quest for
economic advance, their institutions will not be able to withstand
the liberalizing impact of industrialization. Our approach to the
has
new nations/therefore this much in common with that towards Commu-
nism: in both cases we expect ultimate results not from the impact
of a dynamic set of political ideas but from the indirect tendencies
of a transformation of the economy.

In a brilliant treatise widely hailed as an alternative to
Marxism, W. W. Rostow developed perhaps the most sophisticated state-
ment of this view. All societies go through five stages of growth,
he argues, whose duration can be compressed but whose sequence is un-
changeable. The critical problem of a country seeking industriali-
zation is to reach the "take-off" point--the stage of growth after
which capital formation is self-sustaining. The methods of approach-
ing this take-off point can be various. Historically it has been
reached both by the capitalist as well as by the Communist route.
Indeed the irony of Communism in Professor Rostow's view is that

Indeed the front of Communism in Professor Boston's view is put
rescued from by the abhorred as well as by the Communist route.
If the fake-oil point can be various. Historically it has been
which capital formation is self-sustaining. The methods of Abbrac-
sion is to reach the "fake-oil" point--the state of growth after
crises. The critical problem of a country seeking industrialist-
ship arises, whose duration can be computed but whose duration is nu-
ment of this view. VII. accretions Go through five stages of growth.
Marxism, W. M. Boston developed because the most sophisticated state-
In a brilliant treatise widely read as an alternative to
of a transformation of the economy.

of a dynamic set of political ideas but from the indirect consequences
of it in both cases we expect ultimate results not from the impact
new nations\therefore this may in common with that former Comm-
the stimulating impact of industrialization. Our approach to the
economic advance, their institutions will not be able to withstand
we can keep the new nations from going Communist in their dross for

I - D

I-7

having proclaimed itself as the successor to capitalism it emerges
as its alternative. Both are means to achieve self-sustaining
growth. Both face the problems of how to give meaning to life in
a consumer-accented economy. Both will undergo fundamental trans-
formations the further they leave the take-off point behind. With
respect to the underdeveloped nations Professor Rostow draws the
conclusion that the critical problem is to help them reach the take-
off point as rapidly as possible. Even if it does not guarantee
liberal regimes, no liberal regimes are possible without it. As
for the Soviet Union, it is now in the critical phase immediately
following the take-off point, where the choice has to be made be-
tween devoting the increased productivity to policies of national
expansion or to domestic consumption. If the decision is in favor of
domestic development, the chances are high that Soviet society will
become blander and less aggressive with every step ahead on the
road to industrialization.

In assessing these views it is important to distinguish two

I - 8

aspects: their utility for an analysis of a process of development and their value for purposes of policy making. The two are not necessarily the same. Understanding a process is not the same as being able to master it. The relationship of revolutionary theory to action is independent of the validity of the theory. Each of these problems will be dismissed in turn.

The relationship between economic development and a moderate foreign policy is much less direct than the cruder versions of the above beliefs maintain. Industrialization did not make Germany less militant; quite the contrary. A rate of economic development exceeding that of any of the contemporary new nations did not make Japan a peaceful country. Nor is the historical record unambiguous on the connection between education, industrialization and constitutionalism, much less the attainment of political liberty. The educational system of Germany was one of the glories of the nation. Germany was the most highly industrialized state of the Continent. This did not prevent one of the most vicious dictatorships of history from springing up there. And opposition to it did not center in the

I - 9

universities, but in the two poles of traditional society, the
aristocracy and the Social Democratic party. It is axi curious
to observe the transformation of the doctrine which at various
times in the past has charged industrialists with a tendency towards
Fascism, now looking to this same group as the hope for the ameliora-
tion of Communism.

Indeed there is no historical record of democracy developing in
authoritarian societies after industrialization. In all the tradi-
tional democracies, the essentials of the governmental system were
established at the very beginning of the industrial revolution; in
the United States in fact when it was still an agricultural country.
In so far as economic considerations influenced the consequence of
democratic form, it was in reaction to the feudal principle which
prevented careers open to the talents and the mercantile system which
placed commerce into a straitjacket of governmental maximum regula-
tions. Democracy in its economic causes was considered not the re-
sult of economic progress but a tool to achieve it. There is no
record of industrialists manning the barricades after their factories

Record of industrial relations during the pastures after their factories
out of economic progress put a foot to achieve it. There is no
fraction. Democracy in its economic causes was considered not the re-
placed commerce into a straitjacket of Governmental maxims reful-
prevented careers open to the failure and the meanness states which
democratic form, it was in reaction to the tendal bridle which
In so far as economic considerations influenced the consequence of
the United States in that when it was still an agricultural country,
equalized as the early beginning of the industrial revolution in
total democracies, the essentials of the Governmental scheme were
authoritative societies after industrialization. In all the tradi-
tion there is no historical record of democracy developing in
fashion of Communism.

Revolt, now looking to find some group as the hope for the amelior-
tion in the past has charred industrialize with a tendency towards
to observe the transformation of the doctrine which at various
periods and the Social Democratic party. If it is true everyone
universities, put in the two poles of traditional society, the

HISTORICAL

I - 6

I - 10

were built and their markets well-developed.

When industrialists were most vocal defenders of democratic government this was due to the accident of a particular economic theory. It was not that political liberty was so highly esteemed but that government was considered essentially irrelevant to the fundamental concerns which were economists'. The main task of government throughout the period of the growth of democratic institutions was conceived to be to maintain a legal frame-work within which laissez-faire economies could produce the greatest good for the greatest number. Economic theory urged limited government not as a moral maxim and not because liberty was the highest good but because absence of governmental control was considered the precondition to the operation of the ultimate economic laws. Throughout the period of the elaboration/democratic institutions both in the United States and in Europe, the maxim that the best government is the least government was rarely challenged. The congruence of economics, and political freedom was based on the premise that government had few positive tasks to perform. In the realms which did matter--

I - 11

that of economics—the concern of industrialists was much more
traditional. Here there was no notion of democratic organization.
Within industrial plants the watchwords were rationalized adminis-
tration, efficiency and productivity. Though enlightened managers
sought to improve the condition of their employees, they did so
less as an outgrowth of the humanitarian principles of democratic
theory than as a contribution to increased output. The justifica-
tion for the amelioration of the position of the worker was much
more frequently a notion of increasing productivity than an out-
growth of a concept of human dignity. The combination of demo-
cracy and industrialization is, to say the least, not inevitable.

This does not mean that industrialists in the United States and
other Western countries are not deeply attached to the democratic be-
liefs of their society. But to the extent that they affirm the
principles of freedom and human dignity on which the democratic
societies are based they do so because of values derived from
fields other than the industrial. Living in societies where these
beliefs have been basic for centuries, the managerial group has been

people have been for centuries, the management through the past
times other than the industrial. Living in societies where these
societies are based they do so because of values derived from
principles of freedom and human dignity on which the democratic
titles of their society, but to the extent that they still in the
other Western countries are not deeply attached to the democratic po-
itics does not mean that industrialize in the United States and
crack and industrialization is, to say the least, not inevitable.
Growth of a concept of human dignity. The combination of demo-
more frequently a notion of increasing productivity than an out-
tion for theification of the position of the worker was much
tuory than as a contribution to increased output. The justification
less as an outgrowth of the humanitarian branches of democratic
ought to improve the condition of their employees, they did so
friction, efficiency and productivity. Though suffrage managers
Within industrialized countries were rationalized adminis-
traditional. Here there was no notion of democratic organization,
that of economics—the concern of industrialists was much more

I - II

I - 12

as dedicated to the consensus of their society as any other. The reason, however, has not been the impact of maxims derived from their primary activity. Rather it proves that in political life the values of society at large can transcend those of economics. Wherever industrial managers are vocal defenders of democratic beliefs, they prove either their devotion to laissez-faire economics or that they prize other values more highly than efficiency.

Industrialization rather than producing democracy may remove the economic incentive for it. Once economic development is self-sustaining it will tend to confirm whatever political frame-work exists, perhaps elaborating it but not transforming it. Political liberalization cannot await the elaboration of economic life; if it does not precede or at least accompany it, it will remain stilborn. The values of industrialization are productability, efficiency, productivity. These may require a certain constitutionalism—the elaboration of a set of rules commonly understood and to which it is possible to adjust. From the point of view of the manager, how these rules are arrived at is less important than how they are applied. The

I - 18

combined to produce political evolution of extraordinary dynamism.

When the circle of those entitled to valid political opinions
is more restricted or when political and economic legitimacy is more
closely fused, the process of development follows quite different
paths. Throughout the medieval period, for example, it was thought
that a divine standard not made by man and therefore by definition
not changeable by any political process, including majority rule,
defined justice and reasonableness. The elaboration of this legi-
timacy was in the hands of the Church—and within the Church of the
priesthood. It was generally accepted that only those who had
mastered the liturgy could have a valid view on Church doctrine. A
special language and ritual symbolized the exclusion of Church mem-
bership from the ultimate decisions. In spheres that did not touch
"ultimate" matters a great deal of freedom of thought could be con-
ceded—it must not be forgotten that it was the Church which sal-
vaged the West's store of knowledge in the Dark Ages and which main-
tained the system of education into the modern period. It did not

I - 19

occur to the laity that it could conceivably have a voice in Church affairs much less in spiritual matters. But freedom could be conceded for temporal affairs. This did not mean that political freedom had to be a corollary or that the independent judgment was the ultimate arbiter. Rather it was due to the fact that temporal affairs were not considered finally significant. Freedom in the non-religious sphere was the price paid for orthodoxy in spiritual matters.

Rebellion occurred not in the name of freedom but in that of a different interpretation of the basic orthodoxy. It arose inevitably from within the ranks of those legitimized to have views on spiritual matters—the priesthood. It took the form of heresy, not of a struggle for liberty. The freedom demanded was not the right of independent judgment but that of imposing a different doctrine. The independent conscience of the Reformation, though the secularized version was one of the causes of political democracy, was not so conceived originally. The assumption was not that every opinion was equally valid but that all right thinking people had inevitably to come to similar conclusions. By definition dissent had to be due

I - 20

to wickedness and ignorance and was violently suppressed.

The Communist regime is much more similar to a monastic society
than to the modern democratic state. A priesthood--the Communist
party--controls the legitimacy. It has a militant organization. It
relies on a doctrine of considerable complexity and a special liturgy
with its own vocabulary. Those not part of this monastic order have
no right to a valid opinion and it would probably not occur to them
that
they did. Those within the Communist hierarchy conduct their dis-
putes as a struggle over doctrine. Opposition when it takes place
expresses itself as reinterpretation of the existing orthodoxy. In-
variably it is confined to the circle of those legitimized to have a
political opinion. The monastic nature of Soviet society is shown
by the fact that in every contest for the control of the state,
those who were in charge of the legitimacy defeated those who relied
on the traditional levers of power. Stalin and Krushchev defeated
Trotsky and Malenkov though Trotsky was head of the Red Army and
Malenkov was in control of the bureaucracy. In both cases doctrine
proved more powerful than physical strength. Whatever schisms may

I - 21

develop in the Soviet Union they are more likely to originate in the
Communist party than in groups outside such as the intellectual
community or the industrialists. Or to the extent that these groups
overlap they act politically not in their capacity as intellectuals
or scientists or industrialists but in their role of Communists. The
future direction of Soviet evolution—which is inevitable—will be
more basically influenced by the existing doctrine and structure
then by industrialization. Economic development may provide the mo-
tive for change; the existing framework is likely to shape its
direction.

A fundamental transformation is particularly difficult as long
as the ruling groups in Communist countries remain reasonably alert
to the task of recruiting the ablest people into their ranks. A
revolution always has two prerequisites: a feeling of grievance
against the existing order and a group of ability willing to pay the
price of opposition and capable of leadership. The liberal revolu-
tion of the 18th and 19th century were successful importantly be-
cause the feudal rulers excluded the ablest and most energetic group

I - 22

—the bourgeoisie—from participation in the affairs they considered most significant. Since there was no way the most talented people could be integrated or achieve respect, they were a ready-made reservoir of leadership for all opposition. This group organized also the Russian Revolutions. When a career is available to the talented, however, only the most dedicated will take the road of rebellion, ostracism. The temptation is nearly overwhelming even for those with serious reservations about the existing system to seek to ameliorate it through participation rather than to overthrow it and substitute different forms. This will give an additional impetus to the persistence of the basic forms.

A major obstacle to a real change of the Communist system

Soviet resides in the systematic/attempt to integrate the ablest group into the existing order through preferment, indoctrination, propaganda, and, if necessary, pressure. The stability of Communist rule has nothing to do with state ownership of the means of production, even less with the fact that the Soviet Union is a worker's state. It is largely due to the fact that by combining the realm of politics

I - 23

with that of economics, the managerial group in given both impetus
and legitimacy. And by constantly recruiting the ablest people into
its ranks, any potential opposition is deprived of leadership. The
instability of Soviet rule is due primarily to the weakness of any
doctrinaire orthodoxy: the inability to settle disputes without
branding the dissidents as heretics.

Thus the prospect of change in the Communist system should not
be assessed in terms of the Western experience. Its direction is
not nearly as foreordained as is often alleged. It will not neces-
sarily produce democratic forms or even a more peaceful foreign
policy. Amelioration at home may be the condition for daring abroad.
The absence of police oppression does not spell the respect for human
dignity. It may merely mean that other forms more subtle and per-
haps more insidious for obtaining compliance have been discovered.

Above all the expectation of Soviet change cannot be the pri-
mary basis of Western policy. The West, if it is not to lose any
ability to influence whatever evolution may take place in Commu-
nist countries, must be able to maintain a more dynamic attitude

than the bland expectation that the spread of a common economy
will cause Communist societies to become as unenergetic as it is
itself.

It is well to remember that the West was most persuasive to
the rest of the world when it was most self-assured. However self-
righteous and hypocritical the Victorians and Edwardians may appear
in retrospect they left/profound imprint on the rest of the world
than their blander and more cynical grand-children. The belief in
human dignity and freedom however inadequately practiced was deeply
held. These principles spread across the world even in the face of
imperialism and economic evils within the Western countries. The
young Russians who came to Europe in the 19th century saw in it
progress and sought to transplant its values at home. It is doubt-
ful that the same impetus can be given by the present West offering
the prospect of ultimate mediocrity. If the West is serious about
promoting Soviet evolution or for that matter the political de-
velopment of other countries it should address itself to the question
whether its own principles possess sufficient vitality to seem

I - 25

relevant to other societies. If the answer is in the negative whatever evolution takes place could be significant for us only by accident. We would be passive spectators of a process which we have lost the ability to influence. Much more depends on the depth of Western conviction than on its ability to generate expedients for particular crises. Indeed one is impossible without the other.

But before dealing with this problem it is necessary to discuss another evolutionary process, in the long run probably more significant than that of Soviet system: the emergence into nationhood of formerly subject peoples all over the world.

of formerly subject people off over the world.

It is then that of Soviet system: the emergence into maturity
another exogenous process, in the long run properly more start-
ing than that of Soviet system: the emergence into maturity
but before dealing with this problem if it is necessary to decline
benevolentocracy. Indeed one is improbable without the other.
Western conviction than on its spinity to generate expedients for
lost the spinity to influence. Much more debate on the depth of
accident. We would be證ative spectators of a process which we have
whatever evolution takes place could be significant for we only p
relevant to other societies. It is the answer if in the negative

I - 52

II

No aspect of the contemporary revolution is more
significant than the triumph of nationalism in the formerly
colonial areas of Asia and Africa. Since the end of World War
II __ new nations have achieved independence. Hardly a year
passes without seeing another new country launched on the
perilous journey towards identity and development. The
uncommitted third of the world looms ever larger in international
affairs. It controls a growing number of votes in the United
Nations. Its allegiance is said to determine the ultimate
outcome of the contest between the free world and Communism.

There is no doubt that the emergence of the former
colonial areas into independence represents one of the great
revolutions of history. Even had Communism never been heard of,
this would be an age of upheaval. For each new sovereign state
requires an adjustment of the international system. Since an
attribute of sovereignty is an independent will, each new nation

attributed to sovereignty is an independent will, each new nation
requires an adjustment of the international system. Since an
independence of this kind would be an age of subjection. For each new sovereign state
revolutions of history. Even had Communism never been heard of,
colonial areas into independence represents one of the greatest
outcomes of the contest between the free world and Communism.
It is aflerance is said to determine the ultimate
alliance. It controls a growing number of votes in the United
uncommitted third of the world looms ever larger in international
belonging journey towards identity and development. The
basis without seeing another new country founded on the
II new nations have achieved independence. Hardly a year
colonial areas of Asia and Africa. Since the end of World War
significant than the triumph of nationalism in the formerly
No respect of the contemporarily revolution is more
II

II

II-2

represents a fresh challenge for diplomacy, a new need for
readjusting relations. In the nineteenth century the emergence
of only a few new nations in the geographically confused area of
Europe created endless turmoil as the older countries sought to
establish a new equilibrium. In the event they never succeeded.
The result was an arms race and World War I. In our time, the
new nations are counted in the scores and the arena where the
adjustment takes place is world-wide. To work out a new set of
relationships would be difficult in the best of circumstances.
The existence of the Communist states deliberately exacerbating
all tensions compounds the problem.

This task is not eased by the conception about its
nature current in the free world or by the inevitable difficulty
of the new nations in defining the direction of their policy. It
is often argued in the West that a form of economic competition is
taking place in the underdeveloped countries. The desire of the

taking place in the underdeveloped countries. The centre of the
is often engaged in the West that a form of economic competition is
of the new nations in defining the direction of their policy. It
naturally current in the free world or by the inevitable billions
This task is not easy by the conception apart it is
all tenacious competition the problem.

The existence of the Communist states deliberately exacerbating
relationships would be difficult in the past of circumstances.
Equilibrium takes place in world-wide. To work out a new set of
new nations are counted in the scores and the sums where the
result was in some sense and World War I. In our time, the
event is a new equilibrium. In the event that never succeeded.
Europe created endless trouble in the older countries sought to
of only a few new nations in the geographically closest area of
reducing relations. In the nineteenth century the emergence
represents a trend challenge for diplomacy, a new need for

II-3

II-3

Communists to devote resources to this effort is given as one of
the reasons for the Soviet slogan of peaceful coexistence and for
the presumed Soviet interest in disarmament. The somewhat
contradictory argument is advanced that we must respect the
neutrality of the new nations *and* win them over to our side, or
that we will gain their allegiance only by respecting their
neutrality. The impression is sometimes created that international
affairs are like a debate in the Oxford Union with the uncommitted
sitting in the referee's chair and awarding the prize.

There can be no doubt that the ultimate course taken
by the new nations will importantly affect the shape of the
international order which is emerging. Unquestionably the future
of freedom in our time depends importantly on the ability to make
the values of political liberty and human dignity seem relevant
to the aspirations of the uncommitted third of the world. But
this is a far cry from speaking of competition as if it were

["this is a far cry from shaking of competition as it were in\nthe aspirations of the uncommitted third of the world. But\nthe arise of political liberty and human dignity seem relevant\nof freedom in our time depends importantly on the ability to make\ninternational order which is emerging. Unfortunately the future\nby the new nations will importantly affect the shape of the\ninternational order which is emerging. Unfortunately the future\nwill be no doubt that the ultimate come taken\nsituation in the reference's chair and emerging the prize.", "There can be no doubt that the ultimate come taken\nsituation in the reference's chair and emerging the prize.\n\nIt is like a debate in the Oxford Union with the uncommitted\nnations are like

II-4

a sporting contest or of assigning to the emergent nations an
arbiter's role in international relationships.

It is generally agreed that one of the main difficulties
faced by the new nations is to acquire an understanding of the
problems they confront even in their area of primary concern --
that of domestic development. As they are said to require
assistance and in all fields of social and economic life. But
it is against all reason to expect governments which have
difficulty governing their own countries or even understanding
its problems to make themselves responsible for disputes far
away which they must inevitably consider irritating intrusions
on their primary task of domestic construction. To say that we
must turn over a problem like Berlin to the United Nations is
not to devise a formula for settling the issue but for liquidating
it on Soviet terms. This is not because the new nations are
pro-Communist. It is rather because of their lack of interest in
the problem and the overriding desire to avoid embroilment. There

the problem and the overriding desire to avoid unemployment. There

**pro-Communist.** It is rather because of the lack of interest in

not to depart a formula for settling the issue but for liquidating

what turn over a problem like Berlin to the United Nations is

on their primarily task of domestic construction. To say that we

ask which they must inventive people consider irritating instructions

to problems to make themselves reasonable for disputes tar-

difficultly governing their own countries or even understanding

it is essential all reason to expect governments which have

assistance aid in all fields of social and economic life. But

that of domestic development. But they are said to require

faced by the new nations to acquire an understanding of the

**author:** a role in international relationships.

a aborting contest or of satisfying to the emergent nations an

II-4

II-5

is no reason why governments barely come into existence should
have a sophisticated understnading of an issue as complex as that
of a European settlement. They are not uncommitted, after all,
not because we have failed to present persuasive arguments against
neutrality but because they do not wish to assume international
responsibilities. Non-commitment is not the result of the
inadequacy of our policies. It reflects a deep spiritual need.

The United States should have particular understanding
for this state of mind. In the first 150 years of our existence
no conceivable British policy could have resulted in an American
alliance. Our desire not to become involved was stronger than
any views we might have had on international issues, save those
affecting the Western Hemisphere directly. We would have resented
being asked to assume responsibilities and our predisposition
would have been to invent reasons for not doing so. British
policy towards us could have the negative aim of not threatening

policy towards us could have the negative effect of not threatening
would have been to invent reasons for not doing so. British
being asked to assume responsibility and our prediction
reflecting the Western Hemisphere directly. We would have resented
any views we might have had on international issues, save those
alliance. Our desire not to become involved was stronger than
no conceivable British policy could have resulted in an American
for this state of mind. In the first 120 years of our existence
The United States should have particular understanding
insincerity of our policies. It reflects a deep apathy need.
reasonableness. Non-commitment is not the result of the
neutrality put because they do not wish to assume international
because we have failed to present bilateral arguments against
of a European settlement. They are not uncommitted, after all,
have a sophisticated understanding of an issue as complex as that
is no reason why governments purely come into existence upon

II-2

II-6

what we considered to be our basic interests. It could be
sympathetic to the quest for economic development -- though the
notion that a country had a right to economic assistance was not
yet current. But it could not hope for and it would have been
foolish to seek American day-to-day support in political problems.

It is no different with the new nations now emerging.
We must show sympathy and support for their effort to realize
their economic aspirations -- to an extent considerably beyond
our current contribution. We must respect their desire to stand
aloof from many of the issues that divide the world. But they
cannot eat their cake and have it too. They cannot demand from
us that we respect their neutrality -- as we should -- and yet
expect to play the role of arbiters of international disputes.
We in turn must not overestimate the interest of the new nations
in issues far away except the negative one of avoiding conflict.
To gear our policy to the hope of short term support in the

To fear ourích to the job of apert form anbort in the
in issuance faraith except the negative one of avoiding conflict.
We in turn must not overestimate the interest of the new nations
except to play the role of arbitrators of international disputes.
We that we respect their neutrality — as we should — and yet
cannot eat their cake and have it too. They cannot demand from
swool from many of the issues that divide the world. But they
our current contribution. We must respect their desire to stand
their economic aspirations — to an extent considerably beyond
We must show almpathic and anbort for their effort to realize
It is no different with the new nations now emerging.

Tooliau to seek American stay-to-day anbort in political problems.
Yet current. But it could not haveLER and it would have been
notion that a country had a right to economic assistance was not
almpathetic to the great for economic development — though the
what we considered to be our past interests. It could be

II-e

II-7

uncommitted nations is to build policy on illusion. No conceivable
Western policy can get Asian or African support on European issues.
It is too much to expect the colonial areas to settle the disputes
of their former masters. There is no convincing argument for such
a course. Tibet wمز made an impact on India where Hungary did not.
This was not because the Chinese action was more wicked; rather it
represented a physical menace and not a theoretical one. The
statement of Prime Minister Toure of Guinea with respect to Soviet
rule in Eastern Europe that "colonialism is only what we fight in
Africa," is significant in this respect.

The attempt to assign an arbiter's role to the
uncommitted nations is certain to demoralize international
relationships. As it is, the new nations are torn by two partly
contradictory, partly complementary emotions: the desire to be
recognized as major factors internationally and the unwillingness
to assume commensurate responsibilities. Undoubtedly the leaders
of the newly independent states see as an attribute and a reward

of the newly independent states see as an attribute and a reward
to assume commercial respona:;bilitys. Undoubtedly the leaders
recognized as major factors internationally and the maniflowness
contradictory, partially comprehensively emotional: the desire to pe
relationshipa. As it is, the new nations are form p. two barly
uncommitted nations is certain to generate international

The attempt to assign an attribute, a role to the
Attica, "is significant in this respect.

Life in Eastern Europe that "colonialism" is only what we light in
statement of Prime Minister Tonde of Gains with respect to Soviet
represented a biological menace and not a theoretical one. The
This was not because the Chinese section was more wicked; rather, it
a course. Tonde was made an impact on India where largely did not.
of their former masters. There is no convincing argument for such
It is too much to expect the colonial areas to settle the disputes
Western beach can get Vatan or African anbert on European issues.
uncommitted nations is to build policy on inflation. No conceivab

The race was not because the Chinese section was more wicked; rather, it
a course. Tonde was made an impact on India where largely did not.
of their former masters. There is no convincing argument for such
It is too much to expect the colonial areas to settle the disputes
Western beach can get Vatan or African anbert on European issues.
uncommitted nations is to build policy on inflation. No conceivab

II-1

II-8

of sovereignty the ability to make pronouncements on outstanding issues. They are flattered by the rewards that fall to the uncommitted in the competition of the major powers. For many of them, moreover, playing a role on the international scene is more dramatic and, paradoxically, simpler than the complex job of domestic construction. But striking a pose is not the same as developing a responsible program. The very factors that make entry on the international arena so tempting -- the possibility of being wooed, the chance of escaping from intractable domestic problems -- also militate against the seriousness of the effort.

It is the symbolic quality of international forums that is most attractive to many of the leaders of the new nations. Here is an opportunity to declaim on the general maxims which never seem to apply quite so simply at home or to the foreign policy problems in which the uncommitted nation is directly concerned. The result is that all issues are fudged; many problems evaded. Abstract

is that all issues are argued; much propaganda exists. What
is that uncommitted nation is directly concerned. The result
in which the uncommitted nation is directly concerned. The result
to slightly diverse so simply at home or to the foreign territory
an opportunity to claim on the general maxime which never seem
attractive to many of the leaders of the new nations. Here is
it is the arithmetic quality of international terms that is most
problematic — also militaries against the seriousness of the effort.
point toward, the chance of achieving from intractable domestic
on the international arena so combating — the feasibility of
developing a reasonable program. The very factors that make entry
gameatic construction. But striking a blow is not the same as
dramatic and, barehoseally, simpler than the complex top of
them, moreover, playing a role on the international scene is more
uncommitted in the competition of the major powers. For many of
issues. They are flattered by the rewards that fall to the
of sovereignty the spiltty to make pronouncements on outstanding

II-8

II-9

declarations substitute for the concrete negotiation which alone
can lead to basic settlement. Such a procedure may be a useful
device to defer decisions. If it is used to develop actual
solutions it will lead the West onto a slippery slope where it
will never come to grips with the issues confronting it.

In fact, in so far as any specific solution is sought,
the pressure of the uncommitted is likely to favor the side which
is more intransigent or which is more feared. Since most of the
new nations prize their lack of commitment above any issue except
those affecting them most directly, they will go to great lengths
to pose the alternatives in a manner which spares them the need
of giving up this role. The reluctance of so many new nations
to take a stand on Hungary reflected less obtuseness than a
spiritual necessity. To do otherwise would have meant surrendering
the non-commitment on which their image of themselves -- and
their bargaining position -- depends. While we must have

their pertaining position — depends. While we must prove
the non-commitment on which their image of themselves — and
spiritual necessity. To do otherwise would have meant surrendering
to take a stand on Humpty reflected less openness than a
of giving up this role. The reluctance of so much new nations
to base the alternatives in a manner which shares them the need
those affecting them most directly, they will go to great lengths
to new nations brim with their lack of commitment above and issue exceeds
it is more insignificant or which is more feared. Since most of the
the cause of the uncommitted is likely to favor the side which
In fact, in so far as any specific solution is sought,
will never come to arise with the issues confronting it.
solutions it will lead the West onto a slumbery stage where it
devote to deter decisions. It is need to develop actual
can lead to basic settlement. Such a procedure may be a meaningful
decisions and substitute for the concrete negotiation which alone

II-9

II-10

compassion for the travail that produces these attitudes, we
must also understand that in any given crisis the requirements of
the desire to maintain neutrality will induce many of the new
nations to seek a position somewhere between the two contenders,
regardless of the merit of the dispute. The Communist countries
may thereby profit from intransigeance. Even if the new nations
support Communist demands only partially the Communist bloc can
add the pressure of the uncommitted to its own in favor of a
program short of the maximum Communist demands but still considerably
in advance of their starting point. This formal approach to
mediation will too often see a compromise in a Communist willingness
to settle for something less than originally demanded. Moreover,
in any given crisis, the urgings of the new countries eager above
all to maintain the peace will often be directed against us, not
because they disagree with our position but because we are
considered the more tractable, or at least because opposition to

II-11

our policies carries with it no risks and few penalties.

The tendency to see in the uncommitted the arbiters of international disputes can easily become a device to escape all difficult choices. It simply does not make sense to assert that countries in need of assistance in every phase of their public life should be able to play this role. Our role in relation to the new nations is much more complicated. Rather than using them as an alibi for a failure of will in areas where for the foreseeable future we must retain the major burden of responsibility we should contribute on a major scale to their economic, social and political development. Rather than divert the new nations into international problems they are ill prepared to handle, we should encourage them to concentrate on the domestic construction which if not solved will deprive their new found independence of all meaning and their voice in foreign affairs of any weight. This task is sufficiently complex and subtle to require their best efforts.

redouble their past efforts.

of and weight. This task is an efficiently complex and ample to

integrandence of all meaning and their voice in foreign affairs

construction which it not so easy will derive their new found

pandemic, we should encourage them to concentrate on the generic

nations into international problems each are ill prepared to

purity we should contribute on a major scale to their economic,

foreignesspele future we must retain the major purgus of reason-

them as an end for a lifetime of will in areas where for the

to the new nations it was more complicated. Rather than saving

public life should be able to break this role. On role in relation

to that countries in need of assistance in every way of their

of international diseases can easily become a device to encroach

The tendency to see in the uncommitted the aspirants

on policies carries with it no risks and few benefits.

II-11

II-12

The problem then is not to induce the uncommitted areas to take sides in current disputes. Our sympathy for their travail should not blind us to the fact that their contribution here is likely to be irrelevant or dangerous. Rather the challenge posed by the new nations is the degree to which we can assist them on the road towards a development which fulfills both economic needs and human aspirations. This is a task of great delicacy. Most of the new countries are at the point of their development where it has become apparent that the overthrow of the existing system is not the end of a process but its beginning. As in all revolutions, the difficult struggle for independence has been sustained by millenial hopes. The emergent nations now face the dilemma that however great the dedication of the revolutionary phase, a new society cannot be built on motives of negation. Opposition breeds intense conviction about what is rejected. But too often the positive part of the program has been submerged in the immediate

possessing part of the program he has amended in the immediate
immediate conviction about what he rejected. But too often the
society cannot be built on moles of negotiation. Objection preceds
this however, great the dedication of the revolutionarily base, a new
pyramidal people. The emergent nations now face the dilemma
revolutions, the difficult straits for independence in sustained
it not the end of a process but its finalizing. We in fact

it has become apparent that the overuse of the existing system
of the new constitution are at the point of their development where
and human aspirations. This is a fact of their difficulty. Most
the road towards a development which utilises both economic needs
by the new nations is the degree to which we can start at them on
likely to be irrefutable or dangerous. Further the challenge posed
should not blind us to the fact that their contribution here is
to take sides in current disputes. On ambiguity for their travel
The problem then is not to induce the committees areas

II-13

II-13

needs for success. The evils of colonialism which are real enough
are blamed for the entire gap between expectation and reality.

The past is held responsible for all current frustrations and is
often an excuse for not dealing with immediate problems. This is
why in their hour of victory so many revolutions -- and the
anti-colonial one is no exception -- continue to manufacture
enemies. For the condition of their cohesion has been the common
act of negation often uniting men of many diverse views as to
the kind of society they meant to create. The need for an enemy
is directly proportional to the lack of a commonly felt purpose;
it is a substitute for a sense of direction -- a form of nostalgia
for the period of struggle, which in retrospect seems so glorious
and simple. Indeed the more successful the effort to sweep away
the existing structure, the greater may be the difficulty of
finding an adequate consensus for positive action. Revolutionaries
are generally subject to the illusion that the new order for which

are generally subject to the influence that the new order for which
fledging an adequate consensus for positive action. Revolutionsaries
the existing structure, the greater may be the difficulty of
and simple. Indeed the more successful the efforts to meet such
for the period of struggle, which in retrospect seems so glorious
it is a substitute for a sense of direction — a form of nostalgi
is directly proportional to the jack of a commonly left handside;
the kind of society which was meant to create. The need for an enough
act of negotiation often muddling men of many diverse views as to
encounter. For the condition of their composition has been the common
anti-colonial one is no exception — continue to manufacture
which in their power of victory so many revolutions — and the
often an excuse for not dealing with immediate problems. This is
the best in paid reasonable labor for all current transactions and is
the pionee for the entire sub between expectation and reality.
needs for success. The话 of colonialism which we read enough

II-13

II-14

they strive will have all the benefits of their ideals added to
the advantages of the old structure. But victory reveals that
every action has a price; new departures are obtainable only at
the sacrifice of the stability and regularity that has been taken
for granted. In the formerly colonial areas the price of freedom
is often the administrative efficiency and the available capital
of the former rule. The resulting frustration can lead to chaos
or to terror, to a sense of hopelessness or a tour de force. It
presents the turning point of a society's development when things
are most fluid, determining the shape of its future.

Almost all the new countries find themselves in this
position. The period of exaltation is over. Contrary to all
expectation the task of construction has emerged as less glamorous
and more complex than the struggle for freedom. For a while
resentment of the former colonial ruler can serve as the focus
for uniting the people. But sooner or later the quest for identity

for uniting the people. But sooner or later the quest for identity
rests upon the former colonial ruler can serve as the focus
and more complex than the struggle for freedom. For a while
expectation the task of construction has emerged as less tremendous
beside. The period of exasperation is over. Contrary to eff
almost all the new countries find themselves in the
same fluid, determining the shape of its future.

presents the turning point of a society's development when things
or, to error, to a sense of hopelessness or a tom do force. If
of the former rule. The resulting frustration can feed to ones
it often the administrative efficiency and the available capital
for granted. In the formerly colonial areas the brunt of freedom
the sacrifice of the stability and regularity that has been taken
evenly action has a brunt; new departures are possible only at
the advantages of the old structure. But victory reveals that
clearly strive will have all the penalties of their ideals added to

II-14

II-15

must develop positive goals. Tasks of construction must replace
the former resentment as a motive force. The question then
becomes what the content of this purpose is to be; what meaning
these new societies will give to their life. This and not their
reaction to immediate problems of foreign policy is the challenge
posed by the emergent nations.

This is why President Eisenhower's trips at the end of
his term however successful in the short run missed the cardinal
point. By concentrating on public demonstrations and symbolic
actions, they in a sense catered to all the attitudes in need of
being overcome. They diverted attention from the need for hard
thought and precise programs. The temptation to conduct policy
by striking a posture already too prevelent in many new countries
can only be compounded when a ceremonial visit seems to have no
other aim than the creation of abstract good-will. It is not
that good will is unimportant. It will however be submerged in

that good will be a misnomer. It will however be understood in
other terms than the creation of abstract good-will. It is not
can only be combounded when a ceremonial visit seems to have no
py artriking a postern already too heavy in many new countries
thought and precise programs. The combustion to conduct heavy
being overcome. They diverted attention from the need for purd
sections, they in a sense scattered to all the attributes in need of
point. By concentrating on public demonstrations and hydraulic
fire term power, successfully in the short run, wasted the cardinal
This is why President Mac power's strike at the end of
based by the emergent nations.

reaction to immediate problems of foreign policy is the challenge
these new societies will give to their life. This and not their
becomes apparent the content of the burden is to put what meaning
the former resegment as a motive force. The question then
must developed positive goals. Tasks of construction must rehash

II-12

II-16

the general disillusionment if no answers are forthcoming to the concrete issues that face the peoples of the new nations every day. Popularity will be fleeting unless we can make our contribution to the tasks of construction that will become more intractable the longer they are delayed.

In this respect, Premier Khrushchev's problem on his Asian visits is much simpler. His basic interest is to prevent stability. He can appeal to all the resentments of the anti-colonial revolutions; to all the frustrations of new-found independence. It is enough for him to harvest public acclaim, for to the degree that he creates an illusion that progress is simple he will make the painful coming to grips with reality that much more difficult. When Mr. Khrushchev strikes a pose he is appealing to the wishful thinking that he knows will radicalize politics. When President Eisenhower pursues a similar course striking short-term successes only obscure the fact that

conseque striking sporadic successes only because the fact that
regardless of politics. When President Roosevelt buries a similar
is abating to the weighty thinking that he knows will
that much more difficulty. When Mr. Krugman attacks a base he
simply he will make the beautiful coming to strike with reality
to the degree that he creates an illusion that progress is
inadequate. It is enough for him to present his case with
anti-cooperative revolutionist to all the instructions of non-tariff
broadband stability. He can abate to all the statements of the
on his own visits to any simpler. His past interest is to
in this respect, Premier Krugman's problem now

inhabit the longer they are deferred.
contribution to the tasks of construction that will become more
quickly. Popularity will be fleeting unless we can make one
concrete issues that face the peoples of the new nations easily
the General Welfare. If any government it would be forthcoming to the

II-16

II-17

he mortgages the future. Nothing can spare the free world the
need of coming to grips with the moral and political content of
the new systems emerging everywhere.

Because the immediate needs are so pressing, the
temptation is great to see in them the total challenge. Because
all nations want a dramatic rise in their standard of living, it is
easy to forget that while it is important to meet the revolution
of rising expectations, a great deal depends on the principles in
the name of which they are fulfilled. If Western societies should
have learned anything from their own history it is that a
standard of living is not an end in itself, however difficult this
is to imagine when even minimum conditions of subsistence are
remote. Though economic development is a precondition to any
successful program it cannot itself be the final goal. Without
it there will be chaos; its absence would prevent any constructive
policy. But its existence is not a guarantee of stability, much
less of enlightened institutions.

Loss of enlightened institutions.

Polity. But its existence is not a guarantee of stability, much
it there will be chaos; its presence would prevent such contractual
succession program it cannot itself be the first goal. Without
remote economic development it is a broomstick to end
it to imagine when even minimum conditions of напасти are
standard of living is not an end in itself, however difficult this
have learned adapting from their own practice it is that a
the name of which they are unfettered. It is water societies about
of rising expectations, a great goal depends on the principles in
easy to forget that while it is important to meet the revolution
efficacy must dramatic rise in their standard of living, it is a
tombstone is great to see in them the total challenge. Because
Because the immediate needs are so basic, the
the new systems emerging everywhere.

need of coming to terms with the worst and best content of
the mortgage the future. Nothing can arise from the tree world the
II-1-1

II-1-1

II-18

Whatever our contribution to economic development --
and even here a much more massive effort is required -- we have
neglected almost completely the political frame-work. Instead
we have applied to the new nations the same theory of evolution
which also characterized our interpretation of Soviet developments.
Our major problem was thought to be to help their economies reach
the "take-off point" of self-sustaining growth. As capital
accumulated and a consumer economy developed a democratic or at
least an enlightened society, sharing many of the values familiar
to us in the West, was believed certain to emerge. Removing the
grievance of low living standards would undermine the chief
source of Communist recruitments. The requirements of industriali-
zation would bring about more or less automatically a modernization
of other aspects of life. These views could only be strengthened
by the insistence with which economic progress was demanded by the
newly independent states, so much so that at times it seemed to
exhaust the range of their aspirations.

II-19

Against the background of political stability of their own countries it was natural for many Western experts to see the problem of the new nations primarily in economic terms. The experience of the Marshall plan in Europe seemed to confirm that a causal relationship existed between political stability and economic progress. However European conditions are rarely duplicated in the new nations. In Europe the political frame-work had been elaborated over centuries. The administrative structure was well developed; the cohesiveness of society well tested. The threat to existing institutions arose because the war had shattered the industrial plant and because despair was threatening to produce extremism. By removing the causes of economic discontent, the Marshall Plan revitalized an *existing* political framework without which economic progress might have proved illusory.

These conditions do not apply to any emergent nation -- with the possible exception of India. The end of colonial rule

II-20

has also meant the disintegration of political order. Every new
state faces the problem not only of economic growth but of devising
political institutions. Without these industrialization may be
impossible. The choice of them is all the more crucial because,
as we have seen, they are more likely to be confirmed than
transformed through economic development. And this is no accident.
Economic development requires capital accumulation and capital
accumulation depends on the deprivation of the present for the
sake of the future. Foreign assistance can ease this process;
it cannot eliminate it. No country can develop entirely by means
of foreign capital. Thus a government which can impose the
discipline necessary for economic development is likely to emerge
from the process of industrialization with enhanced prestige much
as the present Communist rulers now claim credit for the results
brought about by the suffering of the previous generation. By the
same token without a stable political framework and a government

II-21

strong enough to establish a pattern of legal rules economic
development may never get started. Economic assistance then
becomes a means of enriching those in control; it does not produce
growth. A new political framework is all the more essential
because industrialization to get started must sweep away the
last vestiges of feudal rule and therewith for many countries the
existing system of government.

Yet to be aware of the need of a political framework
is not the same as achieving it. Our dilemma is real in this
respect. Communism, proclaiming the unity of politics and
economics, possesses a legitimacy for discipline and effort.
Postulating the state as owned by the workers and therefore just
by definition it can impose a system of savings and national
effort. The only limitations on governmental power, particularly
in the early stages of Communism is the technical ability of the
political leadership to make its will prevail. The success of

Bollicot's leadership to make it a free, free, free
in the early stages of Communism is the historical switch of the
effort. The early limitations on governmental power, horizontally
by definition it can impose a dragnet of savings and national
poverty in the state as much as the workers and therefore that
economic' because a fetichistic touch for discipline and effort.
respect. Communism' proofreading the mind of politics and
is not the same as achieving it. Oh, dilemma is key in this
Yet to be aware of the need of a political framework
existing system of government.

that addresses the tender age and breadth for many countries the
population innumerable to get started must absorb many tips
growth. A new political framework is all the more essential
because a means of enriching those in control; it does not preclude
governmental may never get started. Economic assistance then
amounts enough to establish a pattern of federal rules and economic

II-31

II-22

The success of Communism in promoting economic development is not due to its economic theory. Rather it results from its insistence on imposing a system of political order before embarking on the process of industrialization.

It is one of the ironies of the contemporary situation that the in practice professedly materialist Communists rely on the ability to establish a concept and structure of legitimacy while the West, proclaiming its devotion to liberty, relies on the automatic operation of economic progress to bring it about. Even when theoretically aware of the importance of a political framework, the West is torn by conflicting Exporting considerations./ KREISIMIKING democracy has become unfashionable; it smacks too much of self-righteousness; the attempt to do so is believed to constitute interference in the domestic affairs of other states.

Yet if we fail to offer any answer to the political problem our only criterion can be efficiency. This will lead us to support any government capable of an adequate economic performance, counting on the long-term effects of industrialization to establish a more humane and liberal regime. The effect of reliance on evolutionary change

II-23

in the Communist bloc is to make survival one of the ultimate tests of political wisdom. The same attitude applied to the new countries can only appear as cynicism in the face of the most difficult choices which have to be made. In either case, our passivity, while not preventing change, will make us the prisoner of events.

In purely economic terms, these is no meaning to our dispute with Communism. If the contest resolves itself simply into a debate about the relative capacity to promote economic development the issue is fore-ordained. In terms of physical capacity to increase output Communism has certainly proved its mettle. If we cannot make meaningful the sacrifice of human dignity at which it is achieved, more and more peoples will be attracted by its simpler administrative patterns that the Soviet system offers. If we are embarrassed to affirm that we consider some values more important than efficiency, we may succeed in obtaining economic progress but only at the sacrifice of the quality of life which gives it meaning. If we rely on history to bring about automatically what we lack the conviction

on history to bring about automatically what we lack the conviction
sacrifice of the quality of life which gives it meaning. It we rely
we may succeed in obtaining economic progress but only at the
affirm that we consider some values more important than efficiency.
patterns that the Soviet system offers. If we are embarrassed to
and more people will be attracted by its simpler administrative
insight the sacrifice of human dignity at cost it is achieved, more
Communism has certainly proved its mettle. It we cannot make mean-
to fore-ordained. In terms of physical capacity to increase output
about the relative capacity to promote economic development the issues
with Communism. It the context resolves itself simply into a debate
In purely economic terms, these is no meaning to our debate
of events.

beauty, while not preventing change, will make us the brainer
difficult choice while have to be made. In either case, our
countries can only appear as chutzpah in the face of the most
tales of political wisdom. The same attitude abetted to the new
in the Communist bloc is to make survival one of theHighlights

II-33

II-24

even to describe, much less to strive for, we may find that economic
progress has merely refined the tools of a more permanent and more
persuasive slavery. Obviously there is no question of imposing
our system of government. There are clearly definite limitations
to our ability to make our preferences prevail. But this hardly
absolves us from the task of having preferences or of stating to our-
selves what we consider to be the relevance of the values we profess
to the problems of the emergent nations.

If we inquire, however, what goals except efficiency are possi-
ble, serious problems arise. This is not the place to develop a
theory of democracy. And perhaps one of our difficulties is that we
have not adequately described the *uxurik* reality of even our own in-
stitutions to ourselves. But if it is possible to reduce a complex
matter to a few essentials, they can perhaps be stated as follows:

Democracy in the West grew out of a tradition which maintained that
the standards of justice were rooted either in the essential nature
of man or in a divine dispensation or both. In any case, justice
not being a creation of man, could not be modified by him. The

not being a creation of man, could not be modified by him. The
of man or in a divine dimension or both. In any case, justice
the standards of justice were rooted either in the essential nature
democracy in the West grew out of a tradition which maintained that
matter to a few essentials, they can perhaps be stated as follows:
statutes to ourselves. But if it is possible to reduce a complex
have not adequately described the nature reality of even our own in-
tegrity of democracy. And perhaps one of our difficulties is that we
pity, serious problems arise. This is not the place to develop a

If we industry, however, what goals except efficiency are possess-
to the problems of the emergent nations.

selves what we consider to be the relevance of the ideas we propagate
specifies us from the task of having references or of stating to our-
to our ability to make our preferences prevail. But this hardly
our system of government. There are clearly definite limitations
persuasive slavery. Obviously there is not question of imposing
progress has merely refined the tools of a more permanent and more
even to describe, much less to strive for, we may find the economic

II-54

II-25

The actions of governments could be judged by criteria which transcended the mere assertion of will or the simple exercise of power. When democracy developed, it made explicit this restraint through specific institutions designed to safeguard individual rights.

Man was the ultimate standard either because his conscience was the final court of appeal or in religious terms, because it was the salvation of his soul which was at stake. Either attitude established restraints on government by insisting on the uniqueness of the individual and on the fact that he was the repository of ultimate values.

While other forms of government would undoubtedly also claim that their actions are just, they would derive their legitimacy from the fact of being in power. Any inquiry into the decision of, for example, the Presidium of the Communist party, is considered an act of heresy which must be suppressed. Other forms of government do not submit to a standard of justice; they presume to define it.

The key test then is not the claim of justice--this is made

II-26

by any system==but the limits to which it is pushed. Democracy,
whatever its formal institutions, cannot function unless it is
based on self-restraint. There must be some mechanism for dealing
with dissent other than destroying it. When the mere possession
of the tools of power confers legitimacy, opposition will
necessarily be treated as subversion. The key to the functioning
of any democratic system is the acceptance of limitation to the
exercise of their power by those who are in control. And this
limitation must be understood not simply as an act of grace--
as an enlightened form of despotism--but as deriving from the
nature of man and from the proper function of government.

nature of man and from the broader function of government.

as an enlightened form of despotism--but as deriving from the
limitation must be understood not simply as an act of it grace--
exercised by their power by those who are in control. And this
of any democratic system is the acceptance of limitation to the
necessarily be treated as supereratlon. The key to the functioning
of the code of power connotes legitimacy, opposition will
with dissent together than destroying it. When the mere possession
based on self-restraint. There must be some mechanism for dealing
whatever its formal institutions, cannot function unless it is
by any system--but the limits to which it is bused. Democracy.

II-30

II 27

Self-restraint--the setting of limits even to the exercise of
righteous power--has two seemingly contradictory requisites. On the
part of the individual it presumes an identification of his own wel-
fare with the welfare of society. On the part of society it requires
an attitude that the individual concerns are intrinsically valuable a
and indeed the chief reason for the social effort. This conviction
is expressed in a limitation on governmental power.

If the individual behaves purely selfishly, organized social
effort becomes impossible (unless of course one postulates that
organized social effort is a selfish end and that man should act
unselfishly in the proper understanding of his selfish interests).

Whatever the motive, a truly free cooperative effort cannot be achieved
unless a significant majority of the population is convinced that
in exercising self-restraint in matters of conduct and property and
passion, they will not simply place themselves at a disadvantage
with respect to other groups less inhibited. This is why democratic
government loses its spontaneity as soon as there exists a substan-
tial minority that does not accept its restraints. If it suppresses

that minority that does not accept the restrictions. If it aborates
Government loses its abuseness, as soon as there exists a subfan-
with respect to other groups less independent. This is why democratic
beast, first will not simply place themselves at a disadvantage
in exercising self-restraining in matters of conduct and property, and
unless a significant majority of the population is convinced that
Whatever the motive, a truly free cooperative effort cannot be achieved
unselfishness in the broader understanding of the selfish interest).
Organized social effort is a selfish end and that man should not
effort becomes impossible (unless one recognizes that
It the individual behaves purely selfishly, organized social
is expressed in a stimulation on governmental power,
and induced the chief reason for the social effort. This conviction
an attitude that the individual concerns are intrinsically valuable a
take with the welfare of society. On the part of society it requires
part of the individual if he recognizes an identification of his own wel-
righteous power--has two seemingly contradictory responsibilities. On the
Self-restraining--the setting of limits even to the exercise of

II

II - 10

its opponents, it may evade the limitation on governmental power
which is of the essence of democracy. If it permits its enemies to
persist and to organize, they can destroy democracy by appealing to
its deepest values and then use their victory to eliminate all
restraints. If all groups in a society act in this manner the in-
evitable result is chaos or a dictatorship.

As for the limitations on government, these have historically
been produced by at least these four factors:

1. **Technical Incompetence:** Limited governments have often resulted not from a conscious decision but from the lack of technical or administrative skill. An oppressive government must be able to collect information in order to determine where to apply its pressure. Effective authoritarianism requires not only a doctrine that legitimizes the unrestrained use of governmental power but also a ruling group of high morale and great cohesiveness—one that places the interests of the governing class above the self-interest of its members, so that absolute authority cannot be ameliorated by corruption. In many such countries despotism has been tempered by inefficiency.

["In such multistriated economies we can figure out a sufficiency:\nper se, so that adequate authority cannot be meliorated by corruption.\nthereof the governing class above the self-interest of its num-\nbers of high morale and great cohesiveness...one that places the in-\nmost the unutilized use of Governmental power but else a ruling\ntactile and authoritative regime must be a doctrine that fegit-\nification in order to determine where to apply its brakes. El-\nustrative effort. An objective Government must be able to collect\nnot from a conscious deficit put from the lack of funds or ap-\nproach a conscious deficit put from the lack of funds or ap-\npro

by the inability of the governing group to define the goals of its
power or to make its policy prevail. Self-restraint may emerge simply
as the limit of competence.

2. **Tradition:** Limited government can emerge as the result of the crystallization of an inchoate but nevertheless very real code of behavior. Certain things are not done not because they are "illegal", but because they are not conceived of or if conceived of are considered outside the pale of acceptable behavior. The kings ruling by divine right were absolute in the sense that there existed no institutions capable of thwarting their will. At the same time their power was limited because certain measures were prohibited by tradition. None of the "absolute" monarchs of the 18th century could have levied direct taxes or conscripted his subjects into the army. Their very claim to divine right limited the exercise of their authority. It remained for the French Revolution with its notion of the general will—and therefore by implication by the irrelevance of traditional restraints—to expand governmental power into areas heretofore not even imagined.

therefore not even imagined.

of traditional requirements--to expand governmental power into areas
the General will--and therefore, by implication, by the irrelevance
thoroughness. It remained for the French revolution with its notion of
their verbatim to divine right limited the exercise of their su-
have left direct taxes or conscripted the subjects into the army.
condition. None of the "specific" monarchies of the 18th century could
power was limited because certain measures were prohibited by law,
tutions capable of financing their will. At the same time though
divine right were absolute in the sense that there existed no inauth-
dered outside the base of acceptable peacemaker. The kings ruling by
put because they are not conceived of or it conceived of are conef-
peacemaker. Certain things are not done not because they are "illegit".
errantification of an innovation but nevertheless very real code of

5. **Tradition:** Limited Government can emerge as the result of the
    as the limit of competence.

by the inaptitude of the governing group to define the scope of its
power or to make its boffish brevity. Self-restraining may emerge simply

11 - 29

II - 30

By the same token the democracies which have been most suc-
cessful have been those obeying essentially aristocratic or at least
traditional forms. Aristocracies by their very structure must op-
pose the preeminence of the individual and therefore absolutist rule.
At the same time they legitimize themselves by a concept of quality
inconsistent with the excusses of egalitarian democracy. The self-
restraint which thus develops can take the form of custom as in Great
Britain. Or it can express itself in legal restraints as in the
United States Constitution. In either case, if democracy is to remain
vital or even meaningful, the aristocratic concept can not remain
the province of a minority. A democracy is true to itself only
if the tradition of self-restraint becomes the conviction not simply
of the ruling group but of a significant majority of society as well.
This is why democracy is themost subtle form of government, capable
of producing the maximum fulfilment of the individual but also the
greatest degree of oppression. Without self-restraint it can lead
to the most violent form of attack on any minority. In such circum-
stances, the majority by definition representing the people will

recognize no limits to the exercise of their rule and may treat all
dissent as sedition. The challenge to any democracy is whether the
society can live by values which in previous centuries were thought
to be the province of minorities. A democracy that does not set
its sights this high is likely to fall prey to either conformity or
dictatorship.

3. **Legal Institutions:** Here self-restraint is brought about by judicial restraints. A constitution or another code is the final arbiter of the permissible sphere of governmental action. Though the limitation on authority is more formal than in the traditional societies it is really produced by similar factors. Law to be accepted must reflect a tradition as pervasive as other customs.

Constitutional limitations have been effective only in societies with a well-established tradition of self-restraint, one of whose symptoms is great respect for legal forms. Otherwise constitutions became merely another form of law subject to change by whichever group controlled the levers of powers. It becomes a means to express authority, not to limit it. This has been the function of the many

autonomy, not to limit it. This has been the function of the many
freedoms the powers of government. It becomes a means to express
merely another form of law subject to controls by whom ever such con-
trols respect for legal forms. Otherwise constitutions become
a self-established tradition of self-restraint, one of whose symptoms
Constitutional limitations have been effective only in societies with
civilized law reflect a tradition as pervasive as other customs.
Societies it is really produced by similar factors. Law to be ac-
tually effective on authority is more formal than in the traditional
system of the benamable sphere of governmental action. Though
judicial restraint is a constitution or a scheme code is the limit
of the law.
F. FELIX INSTITUTIONS: Here self-restraint is brought about by
qacistorship.

the states give high he likely to fall back to either economy or
to be the province of minorities. A democracy that does not set
sovereign can live in absence which in previous centuries were thought
different as nation. The challenge to any democracy is whether the
recognize no limits to the exercise of their rule and may treat all

II - 31

II - 32

French constitutions since the Revolution.

4. A Conviction that Politics Does Not Matter: The constitution of limited government throughout the 19th century was a conviction that politics was not the most significant field of human activity; that the primary function of government was to create a frame-work for the free play of forces which did matter finally. If government is not considered the primarily important, the ablest and most energetic people will be attracted into other fields. The game of politics may still be played to the hilt by the practitioners. But the price they must pay for their own legitimacy is that the methods they use on each other do not extend to them population at large. When government is viewed negatively, freedom comes to be seen as the absence of restraint. Authority has a utilitarian not an ethical function. Its task is considered regulatory, not directive. Society in a sense is ruled extra-governmentally by social or economic pressure, by "things that are taken for granted."

All these ingredients are missing to a greater or lesser degree in the new countries. Both on the part of the population as well as

in the new countries. Both on the part of the population as well as
all these ingredients are moving to a greater or lesser degree
in "things that are taken for granted."

a sense is raised extra-governmentally by social and economic pressure,
the task is considered seriously, not directionally. Society in
sense of restraint, authority has a sufficient man not an ethical time-
government is viewed negatively, freedom comes to be seen as the up-
use on each other do not extend to these population at large. When
braces must be put for their own benefit, is that the method they
use with still be backed to the full by the practitioners. But the
safe people will be attracted into other fields. The same of both-
the not considered the primarily important, the spread and most ener-
tive for the tree branch of trees which did suffer timeously. It Government
that the primarily function of Government was to create a time-work
that the government was not the most sufficient field of human activity;
of limited government throughout the last century was a conviction
that the constitution that the constitution does not matter: The constitution
means constitution since the revolution.

II - 35

of the government, in so far as self-restraint exists in a society,
it reflects a high degree of social consciousness. Yet this is the
precise quality which is most likely to be lacking in the new nations.
Many of the emergent states do not represent a common history or
a common culture or even a common language—the chief unifying
forces of European nationalism. The primary factor of cohesion is
very frequently the common experience of colonial rule. Frontiers
—particularly in Africa—reflected primarily the administrative
convenience of the colonial powers or the outcome of their struggle
among themselves. Most of the new states therefore are in quest
not only of independence but of identity. They either lack a
social consciousness or they are split up into competing groups,
each with a highly developed sense of identity of its own.

When there is no society in the strict sense, government becomes the primary unifying force. In these conditions, the struggle for the control of authority becomes increasingly bitter. When schisms are deep—when there exist competing groups with a highly competitive sense of identity—the question as to which group

competitive sense of identity—the direction so to which groups
emerge are deep—when there exist competing troubles with a highly
tor the control of authority becomes increasingly bitter. When
come the primary unifying force. In these conditions, the struggle
when there is no society in the strict sense, government pe-
son with a highly developed sense of identity of its own.
social consciousness or they are split up into competing troubles,
not only of independence but of identity. They either lack a
among themselves. Most of the new states therefore are in due
convenience of the colonial powers or the outcome of their struggle
--bitterly in Viceroy--reflected sharply the administrative
acidly traditionally the common experience of colonial rule. Frontiers
forces of European nationhood. The primary factor of cooperation is
a common culture or even a common language—the chief unifying
link of the emergent states do not represent a common history or
breviate diversity which is most likely to be lacking in the new nations.
it reflects a high degree of social consciousness. Yet this is the
of the Government, in so far as self-restraining exists in a society,
II - 33

11-34

becomes a matter of life and death. The rule of the majority is
bearable only if the minority can hope to transform itself at some
point into a majority. The prospects of fluctuating factions sets
limits to the exension of authority or/the violence of opposition.

On the other hand when a permanent majority exists or comes into
being democracy has a hollow ring to all other groups, to whom it
then appears a device to legitimize arbitrary rule. (This is the
attitude of both colors and Arabs in Algeria and it is a fine point
whether oppression is more just when exercised by a majority against
a minority or vice versa.) Even when this element of struggle is
lacking and the missing ingredient is simply the absence of national
consciousness, self-restraint tends to disappear. If government is
the chief unifying force, indeed the only expression of national
identity, opposition takes on the overtones of treason. The insis-
tence of so many leaders of the newly independent countries that
they do not need parties since objectives are shared throughout
society reflects quite the opposite of an underlying unity. In
so far as it is not merely a desire to hold on to power--and it is

so far as it is not merely a desire to hold on to power—and it is
society reflects some of an underlying multi. In
which do not need barriers since objectives are shared throughout
sense of so many leaders of the newly independent countries that
identity, opposition taken on the overture of treason. The inside-
the central unifying force, indeed the only expression of national
consciousness, self-restraining force to discharge. It government is
fracking and the missing ingredient is simply the presence of national
a minority on one area.) Even when this element of strength is
whether opposition is more just when exercised by a majority against
attitude of poor colors and Areas in Alberta and it is a true point
then appears a device to legitimate such rule. (This is the
being democracy has a hollow ring to all other ears, to whom it
On the other hand when a permanent majority exists or comes into
limits to the extension of authority or the violence of opposition.
to
point into a majority. The proofs of financing legislation sets
people only if the minority can hope to transform itself at some
become a matter of file and death. The rule of the majority is

11-34

well to remember that the notion that power might be relinquished
voluntarily is both subtle and recent--it indicates a feeling that
there exists an intermediary point between total rule and chaos.

As for the other restraints on governmental authority, most of
them are destroyed by the very process of development. As administra-
tive skill increases--as it inevitably must if industrialization is
to succeed--so will the technical ability to repress liberty. If
the growth in technical competence is not matched by an increasing
sense of respect for human dignity industrialization will merely
refine the tools of slavery. Nor can tradition provide a focus for
self-restraint in most new nations. Most of them have developed in
rebellion against their own past. They tend to blame it for the
weakness which made colonialism possible. To the extent that they
lose the cohesive ness of custom they may be tempted to substitute
force. It is the same with legal restraints. Constitutional pro-
hibitions have proved empty in almost every new nation with the
possible exception of India. There has been hardly any greater
hesitation to alter the Constitution of the new countries than to
change their laws. Finally the belief that government is not ulti-

change their laws. Purify the pelt of that Government is not sufficient. Restitution at after the Constitution of the new country than to beable exception of India. There has been publicly and furtheritions have proved empty in respect every new nation in the world. If it is the same with legal restraints. Constitutional power the cohesiveness of ones may be depended to appreciate weakness which made confederation possible. To the extent that they repelled against their own best. They tend to blame it for the self-restraint in most new nations. Most of them have developed in spite the fangs of awards. Nor can tradition provide a loans for sense of respect for human dignity. Industrialization will merely the growth in technical competence if not watched by an increasing to succeed--so will the technical aptitude to replace it. It five skill increases--as if inevitably must it industrialization is from which are destroyed by the very process of development. As administ- Ve for the other restraints on governmental authority, most of there exists an intermediate point between total rule and chaos. Voluntarily is both ample and recent--it indicates a feeling that well to remember that the notion that power might be reindustrified

EJ

11 - 32

II - 36

mately decisive however useful in limiting the exercise of authority
in the 19th century, is almost without relevance in major areas today.
All the new nations see in the state the chief instrument for social
progresses as well as the primary unifying force.

In these circumstances it is senseless to identify freedom with
minimum government. Rather a great deal depends on the criteria
which determine the action of the state. Restraint will have to be
impelled by moral and not by utilitarian considerations. If govern-
ment is not based on beliefs in human dignity, the same form of
despotism seems almost inevitable.

This suggests that unless a deliberate effort is made to create
institutions which protect human dignity the process of economic
development is most likely to bring into power some kind of authori-
tarianism whose power and prestige will be enhanced by the very
successes of industrialization. This is the only meaning that can
be given to the much-vaunted economic competition between us and
the Communist states which in the opinion of many holding to the
evolutionary theory will determine the future of the uncommitted area.