DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC. Publishers

277 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017 TEL: 212 TA 6-2000

Anchor Books

May 26, 1965

MAY 27 REC'D

Mr. Henry Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Doubleday has accepted for publication a history of American strategic thinking, by Urs Schwarz of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung. Mr. Schwarz, with whom I understand you are acquainted, has written a brief study, about half historical background and half explanation of contemporary strategic theory for the layman. We will publish it first as a hardcover edition and later as an Anchor paperback.

We think that, because his name is not well known in this country, the book would be helped by a brief introduction from someone who is a familiar figure in the field, and I am writing to ask whether you would be willing to consider doing this for us. We would be delighted if you would.

Mr. Schwarz would also be very pleased although he has no wish to take advantage of his acquaintance with you to help his book. When I first thought of you, I did not realize that you had met him, so we hope that you will consider the suggestion on its own merits, apart from the author.

If you have the time and are willing to think about it, I shall send you a copy of the manuscript to read. I very much hope you will find the idea agreeable.

KS:bp

277 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 TEL: 212 TA 6-2000

Anchor Books

June 4, 1965

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Thank you for your letter. I'm very glad to
know that you are willing to consider writing
a brief introduction to Mr. Schwarz' book, and
I enclose the manuscript.

Understanding that if you choose to write a
piece it will be very short, we would like to
offer you $350, and we hope very much that you
will want to do it.

KS:bp
Manuscript enclosed herewith.

8 June 1965

Miss Kay Scheuer
Doubleday and Company, Inc.
277 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10017

Dear Miss Scheuer:

Thank you for sending me Urs Schwarz'
manuscript. I am leaving for Europe tomorrow
and, therefore, will not have a chance to look
at the manuscript until early in July.

However, admiring Mr. Schwarz as I
do, it is highly probable that I will undertake
what you have asked, provided we both under-
stand that it will be very short.

Kind regards.

June 8, 1965

Mr. Urs Schwarz
<u>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</u>
Falkenstrasse 11
Zurich, Switzerland

Dear Urs:

Thank you for your letter of May 31st.

Doubleday has sent me a manuscript of your book which I will read and then decide whether to write an introduction.

I do not feel that I need to agree with everything in the book in order to do the Preface as long as I think it is of high enough quality.

I am practically certain that I will do it. But, I am leaving for a trip to Europe (again) tomorrow and will not get to it until July.

See you at the ISS in October.

Best regards.

September 27, 1965

Preface to Urs Schwarz's book

by Henry A. Kissinger

The impact of American strategic thought is one of the crucial
components of contemporary world affairs. It is no exaggeration to say that
what Americans think about their power determines the security of their
friends and sets the framework for the calculations of their enemies. While
American power is no guarantee for a constructive foreign policy, no constructive
foreign policy is possible without it.

It has always been true that until power is used, it is what people
think it is. Throughout history, strategic doctrine has determined which
of the available choice in weapons, tactics or policy a state would, in fact,
follow. Doctrine as used here should not be considered as something abstract
and esoteric: Rather it defines the likely challenges and how to deal with
them; it specifies the possible goals and how to attain them. Its test is
whether what it defines as probable is in fact the most frequent occurrence
and whether its prescribed mode of action turns out to be relevant to the
problems at hand.

2.

This historic role of strategic doctrine has been magnified in the
nuclear age. Weapons are novel and untested. A technology of unprecedented
distructiveness is allied with a rate of change which produces obsolescence
every five years. This gives its strange quality to some disputes with
our allies. Many of our critics in Western Europe cite the changesbility
of American strategic doctrine as a proof of the fickleness of American
policy. However, given the rate of technological change they should be more
concerned if the United States clung to obsolescent conceptions when it seeks
to adapt them to new realities.

Strategic doctrine affects not only our relations with out allies but
with potential opponents as well. Because of the enormous distinctiveness
of modern weapons, their most important function is deterence: to prevent
an undesirable action by a threat. But the deterrent relationship is largely
psychological. Its effectiveness depends on the calculations of the side
being threatened, not of the side which makes the threat. For purposes of
deterrence a threat which is meant as a bluff but is taken seriously is more
useful than a serious threat which is interpreted as bluff. Psychology,
policy, technology, and strategy therefore merge.

3.

Moreover, deterrence is tested negatively by actions or events which do **not** take place. It is impossible, however, to demonstrate why something has **not** occurred. It can never be proved whether peace has been maintained because the existing strategic doctrine is the optimum one or whether it is only marginally effective. Indeed it cannot ever be demonstrated whether the opponent had any intentions of attacking in the first place. Thus side by side with the elaboration of strategic doctrine there has developed a school of thought attacking the necessity of it.

Despite the central importance of strategic doctrine, its formal development as a theoretical discipline is relatively recent in the United States. To be sure, the United States has possessed strategic plans since the early days of the Republic. And writers in military affairs have had a major influence on shaping particular military services--such as Malan with respect to the Navy. But strategic doctrine as the interplay of political and military factors has been inhibited by an American tradition which saw war and peace as phases of policy. War was understood on the basis of purely military considerations; to intrude "politics" into it was considered wrong. Until victory was achieved the diplomats had to stand aside. Unconditional surrender is therefore a traditional American war aim.

4.

By the same token during periods of peace, American policy-makers have often acted as if international relations were like a gigantic debate with victory going to the side presenting the most reasonable arguments. The relevance of power to foreign policy was insufficiently organized. This separation of power and policy had the result that military policy often took the form of simply amassing resources; while diplomacy too often confused rhetoric with achievement.

Only the last decade and a half has seen an attempt to merge these two realisms. But precisely because the field was so new, these engaged in developing a theory for it sometimes forged the mood for the ties. Conscious of disagreements over fine point, they have sometimes refined sophisticated elaborations at the expense of an over-all systematic approach.

It is the great merit of Urs Schwarz's splendid book, that it brings together in a small compass, all of the relevant thinking about American strategic doctrine. He traces the history of American strategic thought, showing the traditional sharp division between military affairs and foreign policy and its gradual erosion after World War II. He devotes over two thirds of his book to the significant trends in American strategic thought

5.

since the end of World War II. With extraordinary skill, he pulls together
the various strands of American thinking about strategy both governmental
and academic.

His success in this effort is no accident. As foreign editor of the most
distinguished newspaper in the German language--the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*--
Mr. Schwarz combines a sharp power of observation with the ability to write
tersely and precisely. As a Swiss, he is in the fortunate position of being able
to be sufficiently detached to be able to distinguish the essential from
the peripheral. I know of no American who could have presented the
American strategic debate so fairly. Those of us who have admired his
writings in the past can only be grateful that his thought is now available
to an American audience and on a subject of such vital importance for all
free peoples.