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message to the Czechs and East Germans: Moscow wanted the refugee problem resolved before Gorbachev arrived in East Berlin—and, Shevardnadze stressed, the Soviets wanted it resolved “with or without the GDR’s approval.” Knowing the Czechs had no choice but to abide by Moscow’s wishes, the Honecker government gave the emigration its sullen blessing.

Some Western analysts speculated that Gorbachev might lobby privately for Hon-

ecker's removal. A senior West German diplomat said the East German leader could be gone from office "in a matter of weeks" through the combined pressure of Moscow, Bonn and the East German public. That is probably premature. Next spring, however, the regime will hold a critical Communist Party congress. "Up until now, every public and private signal has been that there won't be any changes in authority," said one U.S. offi-

cial. "If that begins to shift, you can assume the fix is in."

It was doubtful, however, whether a successor would be any improvement. Moscow would clearly prefer a committed reformer such as Hans Modrow, the hugely popular Dresden party chief who openly advocates the overhaul of East Germany's political and economic institutions. It was more likely, though, that any successor would be drawn from

## How Kissinger Sees It

As East-bloc unity disintegrates, the future of the two Germanys gains new importance. Former secretary of state Henry Kissinger met with NEWSWEEK editors last week to discuss "the German question." Excerpts:

We are watching a political process in Europe in which the Soviets are losing political control in Eastern Europe, while NATO's military position progressively weakens in Western Europe. I consider what's going on now to be the lull before some storm. The problem in Eastern Europe is a disintegration of the concepts of the satellite empire. The communist parties, to the extent that they become national parties and participate in the electoral process, must adopt an attitude independent of Moscow because it's the only way they can legitimize themselves. In Poland and Hungary the communist parties may believe that by calling themselves social democrats they will save national communism. But this can't work in East Germany, because there you cannot be a national communist; as a nationalist you have to be for unification.

The basic dilemma of the West Germans is that they're emotionally cut loose from some of their Western moorings. It is a standard phrase of West German politics now that Germany has a special vocation in the East. They keep saying: we're good allies, we're reliable members of NATO, we are dedicated Eu-

ropeans, but everybody has to recognize that we have a special mission in the East. Where have they proved their special vocation in Eastern Europe other than in the military field? To speak of a German special historical relationship in Poland is absurd.

West German industrialists want to use Eastern Europe for low-cost manufacturing of German technology. They're putting a lot of money into some of these countries. What happens when the Soviets wake up and find that they have lost Eastern Europe economically to the Germans, and that East Germany is blowing up. Is it likely they will acquiesce to losing their Eastern European empire to the Germans? I can't conceive that. The internal disintegration could have reached a point where they will accept it, but I wouldn't want to base American policy on that proposition. What if the Soviets decide to demonstrate their power in Central Europe, perhaps in Berlin?

We have to come up with a political concept for the future of Europe, or we will be endlessly whipsawed between accelerating unilateral disarmament in NATO and the political disintegration of Central Europe. The art of foreign policy is to understand trends and to manage them. I would have preferred a more orthodox evolution. I would have preferred to maintain the present military structures and a gradual easing of tensions within them. But a trend exists.

DPA—PHOTOREPORTERS
A disintegrating empire: Calling for reform in East Germany

Events in the East will produce a situation where the United States has to take a position. The only question is whether we do it ad hoc, reacting to each crisis as it develops. Or whether we say that we're in a new period, however we got there. That new period requires the following concepts: the bipolar approach will no longer work. Therefore, we have to see how to manage trends in a manner that does not leave us at the end with a Europe less stable than the one we've known before. You already see in the Balkans that all the old quarrels are coming up again. You can visualize the German-Slav problems will be there again. You'll be back to traditional European politics without a concept and without the forces to handle them. What do we do if one of these countries decides to leave the War-

saw Pact? Should we try to get them out? Or should we encourage them to stay?

It must be in the Soviet interest not to be the permanent policeman of Eastern Europe, thereby jeopardizing a relaxation with the West. We have to find a way to give the Soviets assurances of security within their 1941 borders, and convince them that it is in their interest to get out of physical control of Eastern Europe—which, however, can be turned into a zone to make military attack against them impossible. We need a concept for Germany, for the evolution of Eastern Europe and for defense in a new political environment. We've gotten ourselves obsessed in the West. We were so militarized in our thinking that we're now militarized in our diplomacy—on both sides. And we have to get away from that.

NEWSWEEK : OCTOBER 16, 1989 45

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the ranks of East Germany's Stalinists, men such as 52-year-old Egon Krenz, who emerged as heir apparent while Honecker was reported close to death following gallbladder surgery over the summer. Currently the head of the security police, Krenz is favored by party hard-liners who are seeking to hold back the tide of reform. "These are old men, immobile, petrified, unable to cope with changing times," said one official in Bonn. "They do not

understand why people are unsatisfied."

With the closing of the Czech border, East Germany exposed itself as a country that can no longer compete for its citizens' allegiance. Instead, said Dorothee Wilms, West German minister for intra-German relations, "The GDR [is] more than ever a state built on walls." East Germans' increasingly panicky claustrophobia is threatening to get out of hand. "In those circumstances," said a U.S. State Depart-

ment official, "who knows where Gorbachev's visit could lead? Will he urge them to liberalize? Will he urge Honecker to leave office? Will the population respond so overwhelmingly that it risks another Tiananmen Square?" After admitting its political illegitimacy, East Germany can either reform, repress or explode.

HARRY ANDERSON with MICHAEL MEYER and KAREN BRESLAU in East Berlin, MARGARET GARRARD WARNER in Washington and bureau reports

## Behind the Masks of Eastern Europe

In Eastern Europe last week, NEWSWEEK Executive Editor Stephen Smith and Bonn bureau chief Michael Meyer spoke with leading politicians and activists about the pace of change in their countries. Excerpts:

**Mieczysław Rakowski, Polish Communist Party chief:** The political situation is not stable. A new balance is emerging. The Communist Party is seeking an identity, as is Solidarity. As for reforms, there are no barriers, theoretically. In practice, you have to ask how much people are willing to see a decline in their living standards. In my opinion, Polish society is not prepared to make sacrifices of this kind. You have this horrible contradiction: you need radical moves but you have the resistance of the people.

The real challenge is to change people's mind-set. Poles would like to work in socialism but live in capitalism. We like the demands on us to be low. Most Poles are attached to the peaceful life. The greatest barrier to reform lies in people's psychology, what I call the "awareness barrier." Changing this is not a matter of a year or five years; it will take a generation. As it is, the system has demoralized people. I may be wrong, but after the first radical steps, and the subsequent social reaction, the new government will retreat.

**Imre Pozsgay, Hungarian Politburo member and a leading reformer:** A crisis prevails in Eastern

Europe. There is no political or even geographical unity. What you call the East bloc is an artificial linkage, a hybrid imposed after Yalta. The crisis of Europe lies in its division. Protracted problems here will lead to protracted problems in Western Europe as well. We have an unprecedented opportunity for creating a united Europe. It's not a matter of money. We want access to Western technology, to economic innovation and foreign investment. We want entrepreneurs who can teach us management skills as well.

We have seen no sign that Moscow wants to pull us back. To the contrary, Gorbachev's *perestroika* is a wind at our back. Hungary has reached a point where there is no going back.

The Hungary of the future will be similar to West European social democracies. The party state will cease to exist.

Dictatorial socialism will disappear. We must create a constitutional state ruled by law. The goal should be a parliamentary government freely elected from among competing parties. If defeated, the party will transfer power as in any democracy. Hungary is not an oligarchy: we should be able to change our leaders at any time.

**Milos Jakes, Czechoslovak Communist Party leader:** [Restructuring] certainly does not mean edging away from the ideals of socialism . . . We keep a close eye on those developments [in Hungary and Poland], which in many respects give us concern, and draw the necessary lessons—for example, that the party as the leading force in society must not lose control over the situation.

**Vaclav Havel, Czechoslovak playwright and political activist:** For

20 years socialism was deprived of the moral side. All was apathy and depression, a hopelessness prevailed. But over the last year we can see remarkable change. First, a new generation has grown up that did not go through the trauma of 1968. Second, developments in Hungary and Poland are stimulating our society. Third, the current policy of our leadership is growing sterile. The leadership is tired and growing old. It's becoming petrified.

A dictatorship in crisis typically makes contradictory moves. I can imagine a situation that one day my play will open in Prague, and the next day I'll be in prison. This may seem implausible, but at the moment of crisis, when power is shaken, anything can happen. For 20 years the communists exploited the future. Now come the results of this very dangerous policy. Within eight to 10 years, [we] will be like Poland—$40 billion in debt and no basic foodstuffs. We keep telling the regime that it is not necessary to wait until the bitter end before starting a social dialogue. A lot of suffering could be prevented.

But do not forget, in a totalitarian system we can observe an interesting phenomenon. People in power will speak out only when the time is ripe. Our leaders all wear a uniform mask and declare identical phrases. Perhaps at a moment of history, the masks will fall, and it is only at that moment that we know who is who. It is possible then that we may be surprised to find that the masks concealed an intelligent face.

BISSON—SYGMA

The challenge is to change people's mind-set: Rakowski, Pozsgay

SHEPARD SHERBEL—SABA

46 NEWSWEEK : OCTOBER 16, 1989