[Lc]

-11-

one of the Great Powers, countries in this area are well within range of the nuclear forces normally deployed between Gibraltar and the Bosporus. Nevertheless, in many areas of the globe, whether or not covered by formal nuclear-free zones, it would be advantageous for the Soviets and Americans to make arrangements to avoid the movement of nuclear forces during any periods of crisis.

There are significant obstacles to such arrangements, including especially the dual capabilities of many naval forces. It would be hard to avoid ambiguity in showing the flag by moving naval vessels toward some theater of crisis, but perhaps discussions could produce some understandings that designated elements of the respective fleets would be construed as conventional systems whose deployment would not be taken as evidence that tactical nuclear forces were being brought into position for possible use. It is, after all, extremely improbable that nuclear weapons would be worth very much in a third world crisis scenario.

Schemes of this nature would require a great deal more analysis than is attempted here. The point is simply that coordination of crisis behavior has become a matter of paramount importance. The dangers which have arisen should be the subject of thorough-going explorations between the two governments. Their objective should be to dampen the tendency to emphasize the strategic nuclear equation in an effort to extract local advantage.

(2) One of the most serious omissions of the 1972 agreements was the lack of a joint exposition of strategic doctrine. It is precisely this omission which has amplified suspicion that the Soviet Union is not truly

[Lc]

-12-

interested in restraint but dedicated to superiority. Without a basic
agreement on strategic principles to govern their weapons development and
deployment activities, the two sides can only grope toward a kind of acciden-
tal and possibly temporary coincidence of interest. Activities which might
be compatible with a policy of restraint acquire sinister overtones when
viewed through a veil of profound uncertainty about the other side's true
strategic purposes.

In this manner the value of the ABM treaty as an indication that the
Soviet Union and the United States had come to accept their mutual vulner-
ability has steadily diminished because of the lingering obscurity of Soviet
motives. Did the treaty signify a commitment to mutual deterrence as the
only realistic basis for the relationship? Or was the treaty merely a hold-
ing action stemming from Moscow's concern over the United States' lead in
ABM technology? Is Moscow's hidden motive actually to gain time for perfect-
ing an improved ABM option, more extensive civil defenses, and an overwhelm-
ing war-fighting capability centered on new counterforce systems?

Despite repeated professions of the U.S. acceptance of mutual deterrence,
similar questions have arisen regarding American strategic initiatives in
recent years. Having justified its multiple warhead (MIRV) missiles as
necessary to saturate Soviet defenses, why did the United States proceed to
deploy several thousand MIRV warheads after Moscow agreed not to erect an
ABM system? Given repeated assurances by the President and Secretary of
Defense that hard-target counterforce MIRV systems would be avoided, lest
they be misconstrued as designed for a first strike capability, what signifi-
cance should be attached to former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger's

[Lc]

-13-

shift in doctrine to favor highly accurate and larger-yield warheads? And

does the rapid movement toward sophisticated cruise missiles capable of

nuclear, as well as conventional, delivery represent a deliberate evasion

of the ceiling established in principle at Vladivostok?

Many such questions have spawned a corrosive suspicion that Moscow and
Washington remain intent on seeking advantage rather than accommodation.
Such issues could be muted, if not removed from contention, by more explicit
definition of a common strategic doctrine. The specification of such a
doctrine, at least in bare outline, deserves high priority in the next phase
of negotiations.

One may be doctrinal, however, without being dogmatic. To argue for a
doctrinal agreement does not require one to demand in advance that the product
comport in all particulars with our doctrine. The naked vulnerability of the
Russian and American people to nuclear attack is a technological fact, not a
moral ideal. It is a condition with which we must cope, not one from which
we can derive satisfaction. Yet the inescapable truth is that, in the fourth
decade of the nuclear age, no one has articulated a plausible alternative to
mutual deterrence. If the Soviet Union has identified a better basis for the
strategic relationship with the United States, it is incumbent on Moscow to
present its ideas and persuade Washington that they are mutually beneficial.

If, as one surmises, Soviet strategists have no superior analysis in which
to anchor the relationship, then both countries must come to terms with the
realities which bind our fates together.

One of those realities is that the attempt by either side to alter the
stability of deterrence by overcoming its own vulnerabilities is bound to be

["[Lc]", "-14-", "dangerous. A unilateral quest for escape from the paradox of deterrence is a reckless and counterproductive gesture calculated only to jeopardize both countries' security. If we are to make our way out of the deadly embrace in which Soviets and Americans are entwined, we shall have to act together. Meanwhile, we can only make matters worse by defying the dread logic of deterrence.", "Americans remain somewhat divided and anxious over these doctrinal issues, but the burden lies more heavily on the Soviets. They must appreciate that their lack of clarity in these matters has created a festering mistrust in the United States which is feeding back into increased military efforts to counter the Soviet Union. Listen to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, justifying major increases in U.S. defense spending: \"The Soviets by their activities indicate that they are not interested in mutual assured destruction . . . . Prudence requires that we take into account the other and darker face presented by the Soviet Union . . ." A majority of Americans have now turned back toward a preference for greater defense spending and Congress has joined hands with the executive branch to satisfy that demand. Partly because of Soviet reticence to set forth a doctrine of restraint by which their military programs can be evaluated, the fear level has been rising, and it threatens to swamp hopes for additional strategic arms agreements.", "It is perhaps necessary to underscore the fact that a doctrinal agreement would have direct consequences for appraising particular weapons programs on both sides. In the context of a consensus on mutual deterrence, for example, a number of current strategic programs would be difficult to justify. So long as the ABM treaty remains in force, and so long as security is founded"]

[c]

-15-

on both sides' awareness that they face assured retaliation for any nuclear strike, U.S. movement toward an excessively accurate MX missile with a larger warhead capable of counterforce strikes would be insupportable. So would Soviet deployment of additional giant ICBMs. The incentives on both sides should be bent toward reliance on smaller, rather than larger, missiles. The fundamental imperative would become not to threaten the other side's strategic forces, but to guarantee the survivability of one's own.

There are other reasons for wishing to launch deeper discussions of strategic doctrine. It would be helpful to raise doctrinal issues to the political level of discourse between the governments. One has the impression, confirmed by many of the corridor conversations connected with the strategic arms limitation talks, that the extreme compartmentalization of the Soviet government has insulated the Foreign Ministry and key elements of the Soviet Presidium from active participation in the refinement of strategic concepts. Although Secretary Brezhnev has displayed a keen sense of the awesome hazards of nuclear conflict, strategic doctrine has remained very much the province of the uniformed military establishment. Evolving in that setting, Soviet strategic thought has retained its classical emphases on heavy defense outlays, hints of pre-emptive attack, and allusions to the inevitability of war.

By engaging the Soviets in a debate on doctrine at the political level, many of the anomalies which appear in Soviet military writings could be highlighted and brought to the attention of the Kremlin leadership. Such discussions might oblige the Soviet Defense Ministry to modify some of its tenets or to reconcile its programs with its premises. In this manner SALT, already a valuable learning experience, could provide still more useful instruction

-16-

to all participants. And, should the process generate explicit strategic principles to which the governments can agree, they would be relieved of the necessity to defend subsequent accords against the charge that they merely disguise fundamental disagreements.

In short, if there is in fact a strategic consensus on which to ground the security of our peoples, then it ought to be stated. And if there is not, then we should be forewarned that SALT is an exercise in ad-hocery which, though serviceable on some scores, may be of dubious reliability.

(3) Now we come to the heart of the case. If SALT is to fulfill its promise, the time has arrived to transform the negotiations from an exclusive focus on strategic capabilities to a broader elucidation of strategic intentions.

The harsh fact is that no one has contrived a persuasive approach -- even with the most intrusive inspection schemes imaginable -- to eliminate nuclear weapons capabilities from the planet. Notwithstanding President Carter's admirable tribute to the ideal of general and complete nuclear disarmament, the goal for our generation and for many to come must be to manage an inventory of horrors which will not go away. The weapons will exist; our objective must be to insure that no government chooses to use them.

This will require steps to create the habit of restraint on the part of nuclear powers and a prudent basis for trust among them. It will require, in other words, concerted scrutiny of the intentions of governments. Only if diplomacy can harmonize the behavior of regimes potentially in conflict will it be able to achieve those reductions in strategic capabilities and

[lc]

-17-

related measures which will move the world toward the ultimate goal of abolishing nuclear weapons.

On this analysis one is led to the familiar -- should one say the chronic -- dilemma of intelligence: "capabilities versus intentions," as it is so often and so misleadingly stated. The military capabilities of a state are more or less observable, while a nation's intentions tend to elude objective assessment. Optical and electronic surveillance can provide extensive information regarding weapon systems and deployments, but, as Fred Iklé once put it so aptly, not even the best camera can detect an intention from 50,000 feet.

For the understandable reason that intentions are so hard to discern and so easy to alter, capabilities are the preoccupation of intelligence agencies, military planners, and arms control negotiators. One is tempted to overstatement: arms control, as someone said of science, progresses by substituting the unimportant questions it can handle for the important ones it cannot.

Capabilities are crucial, and one need not dismiss the importance of addressing them in SALT as a basis for the more arduous task of estimating the parties' intentions. The central point is that constraints on forces may serve primarily, not as physical impediments to nuclear war, but as testimony to both sides' common purpose not to wage one.

This perspective dictates a different attitude toward future SALT negotiations than the one which has surrounded the discussions since 1969. The concentration on a small number of highly verifiable numerical limitations needs to be supplemented by what one might call an architectural

[cc]

-18-

approach. That is to say, SALT should shift its emphasis from individual
building blocks to an awareness of the political and strategic structure in
which each element will be imbedded and appraised. Such an approach becomes
all the more essential when one realizes the limited potential of the quanti-
tative restraints which have consumed most of our diplomatic energies during
the last decade.

That potential is limited in several respects. Only a few categories
of weapons are both relevant to the strategic balance and susceptible to
meaningful limitations. Without accompanying controls on technological develop-
ment, quantitative ceilings and reductions may be offset by qualitative
changes in the weapons themselves. And of increasing significance is the
fact that even quantitative limits on some types of systems may not permit
the extremely high standards of verification which have been levied on the
first agreements.

The latter point deserves a special comment. Several weapons systems
now emerging in the inventories of both countries, especially cruise missiles
and mobile ICBMs, compound the verification problem severely. To be sure,
one can conceive of ways to mitigate the verification difficulties, even in
these instances. For example, mobile ICBMs might be more observable if they
were deployed in trenches of known locations and dimensions, rather than per-
mitted to operate more extensively throughout a nation's road or rail network.
Similarly, air-launched cruise missiles might be accounted for by identifying
the aircraft capable of launching them and assuming that all such aircraft
are so equipped. Long-range cruise missiles launched from ships, which
could conceal large numbers of such weapons, would pose far tougher problems

[Lc]

-19-

for detection and monitoring. I do not wish to contend that verification will necessarily become more problematic in the future, only that in some instances this is likely to occur, especially if we must depend on the "national means" which have heretofore been acceptable. This prospect is serious enough to require a re-thinking of the verification standards and methods to which the two sides have become accustomed.

In these matters, total certainty is impossible. To assert that verification is inherently probabilistic is not an argument for diminishing efforts to maximize the possibilities of verification. It is, rather, to preface the idea that *confidence in an arms control regime may be enhanced by relying more on the breadth of verification than on its depth in any single case*. Unless both governments are attentive to this trade-off, the opportunities for strategic restraint may soon run up against unachievable demands for verification of compliance with individual arms controls. This could turn the prolonged deadlock in SALT II into the final defeat of SALT III.

The escape from this diplomatic *cul de sac* may lie through the paradox of complexity. For good and sufficient reasons, negotiators have strived for the utmost simplicity in SALT agreements. At this stage, however, further progress may well depend on substantially complicating the SALT agenda. The theory that commends itself is quite straightforward: instead of relying on a small set of controls geared to the highest feasible levels of verification, the United States and the Soviet Union could derive greater security from a diverse group of controls which are compatible with more modest verification requirements. This is a realm in which art must aid politics in crafting a mosaic of strategic understandings in which the removal of a single piece

[LC]

-20-

would not destroy the integrity of the whole.

A principal strength of this approach is its contribution to bridging the capabilities-intentions gap. To build confidence in the good faith of the signatories it is desirable to devise as many tests as practicable for them to demonstrate by action their commitment to strategic restraint and peaceful accommodation. The task is to create an array of constraints, all of which are reasonably verifiable and useful in curtailing activities that tend to generate strategic instabilities, and none of which, if broken, would prove lethal to stability. By diversifying the types and increasing the numbers of controls over development and deployment of strategic systems, one can multiply the indicators of strategic intentions. On this basis one may hope gradually to create a climate of mutual confidence in which actual reductions of forces may proceed.

This is all very neat in theory, but, one may ask, can we identify specific elements of this "multiple-indicators" design? Indeed we can, and many of them have already been subjected to careful analysis. Furthermore, there are major precedents in Soviet-American bargains for virtually every element in the array. And, most hopefully of all, President Carter seems drawn to a more comprehensive and variegated approach to break the stalemate in SALT.

Let me illustrate a plausible mix of proposals. On the assumption that, even if the two sides eventually wish to frame another doctrine, their immediate interest lies in stabilizing deterrence, at least three types of agreements are appropriate: (1) measures to minimize threats to the survivability of retaliatory forces, (2) measures to ensure the survivability and effective-

[L]

-21-

ness of each side's surveillance capabilities, i.e. "national means of verification," and (3) measures to moderate the technological competition in order to facilitate movement to a stable balance at lower force levels. Some proposals would serve more than one of these functions.

One of the most promising ways to diminish threats to the survivability of land-based missiles would be for the Soviet Union and the United States to limit the number of missile tests to perhaps ten or fifteen a year. This could slow the trend toward hard-target silo killers.

The parties might usefully restrict such tests to missile systems already deployed or firmly scheduled for deployment in the very near future, e.g., the Trident I missile and the SS-16. New re-entry vehicles designed for the greater accuracies needed to attack missile silos, as well as maneuvering re-entry vehicles, could be prohibited.

All tests of ballistic missiles should take place over agreed ranges with prior notification of the launch site, missile type, and impact area.

To avoid suspicion that space launches may be used to cover clandestine tests, Moscow and Washington should also undertake to exchange information regarding planned space launches, including the time and location of launches, booster configuration, payload, mission profile and orbital parameters.

There should also be agreement that no more than one test missile should be fired within a twenty-four hour period, in order to reduce apprehension about the occasional multiple launches which the Soviet Union has made. If tests are launched from operational sites, as has

[L]

-22-

occurred, the launcher's geographic coordinates should be identified
in advance.

Furthermore, to ward off sneak attacks on bomber bases and other
priority targets, neither side should test missiles in a "depressed-
trajectory" mode.

Undertakings of this nature would parallel and expand upon the test
restrictions accepted by both governments in the ABM treaty, which contains
a host of qualitative limitations of anti-ballistic missile tests. They
would also rest on the little-noticed article 4 on the 1971 Agreement on
Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War in which each party
promised to notify the other of planned missile launches "if such launches
will extend beyond its national territory in the direction of the other
party." Under this arrangement the Soviet Union has generally given public
notice of missile tests whose impact areas have been in the Pacific ocean,
with the exception of a single missile which seems to have strayed from its
intended re-entry over the Kamchatka Pennisula.

It would also be useful to reinforce the already substantial invulner-
ability of ballistic missile firing submarines. Although anti-submarine war-
fare capabilities and operations are frequently multi-purpose and ambiguous,
one can identify some distinctive schemes to protect strategic submarine
(SLBM) fleets.

There should be no continuous tracking of SLBM boats, particularly
by hunter-killer submarines.

The two sides might also wish to give further study to the creation
of possible sanctuaries for such boats into which no ASW forces would

[lc]

-23-

penetrate.

A valuable quantitative control would be an agreed ceiling on the number of hunter-killer submarines capable of threatening the missile-launching platforms. Lest some breakthrough in detection and tracking expose SLBM boats to destruction, the ratio of hunter-killer submarines should not exceed two to one.

Admittedly, these suggestions would impose some constraints on conventional ASW capabilities, but their value as strategic indicators should justify their acceptance.

The existing commitments of both sides not to interfere with each others' "national technical means of verification" invites additional assurances on that front.

Beyond general agreement not to interfere with observation satellites, the governments should consider a flat prohibition on development and testing of "satellite killers."

They should specifically prohibit a close approach by one country's satellite to that of another without prior notification and full description of the approaching satellite's mission and capabilities.

It becomes increasingly essential for the two sides not to perform high-energy laser tests in outer space.

Equally important, they should agree not to station in space large nuclear reactors or other power sources capable of generating threatening levels of laser output. The purpose here is not only to protect deployed satellites, but to enforce the agreed interpretation of the ABM treaty to seek specific limitations on potential ABM systems "based

[Lc]

-24-

on other physical principles" than those of interceptor missiles.

At the same time, acting on lines set forth in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the 1967 ban on basing weapons of mass destruction in outer space, the United States and the Soviet Union would do well to establish mutual visitation rights to facilities operating in space. For many years they have carried out amicable mutual inspections of their bases on the south polar continent.

To insure that satellites conform to the proposed rules, the parties should arrange for joint visits to space stations and other man-made objects orbiting the earth. Here the joint space mission of 1974 is a helpful indication of technical and political feasibility. and the coming space shuttle a suitable vehicle.

There should be explicit agreement that, during joint visits to satellites, non-destructive external inspections would be permissible.

Where satellites are inaccessible to visits by joint crews, e.g. in zones of dangerous radiation, procedures should be drawn for remote inspection on an agreed schedule by unmanned satellites equipped for optical, electromagnetic and other radiation measurements.

Arrangements of this character will involve costs in information which could increase the vulnerability of satellites to countermeasures in time of conflict. Nevertheless, since some of the gravest threats to stability on earth may emerge from developments in space, it behooves us to operate there on the principle of maximum disclosure. Ideally, as confidence grows between the parties, a simpler system of pre-launch inspection of all space payloads would be preferable and much less expensive.

[L]

-25-

Within this framework of interlocking assurances, the so-called Threshold Test Ban on Nuclear Weapons, signed in 1974 but not yet ratified, takes on a different aspect. Evidently, a comprehensive prohibition on tests holds more promise for promoting anti-proliferation policies. President Carter's suggestion of a complete Soviet-American nuclear test moratorium for a period of years and his willingness to proceed in this direction whether or not China and France adhere promptly are sound initiatives to discourage further spread of nuclear weapons. However, the threshold ban and related protocol, together with subsequent arrangements on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), include quite significant provisions for exchange of detailed information regarding the geology and seismic characteristics of specified test sites, as well as calibration data on the yield, time, depth and coordinates of particular tests. The PNE agreement contemplates actual foreign inspection of multiple detonations whose total yield exceeds the threshold of 150 kilotons. These are quite extraordinary precedents, and pending satisfactory arrangements for a comprehensive ban, they probably justify acceptance of the accords, especially since American procrastination in ratifying the pacts has provoked Soviet suspicion.

In shaping multiple indicators as a guide to strategic intentions, one's attitude may change regarding the usefulness of basing limitations on certain deployed forces. Analysts have been cautious in weighing such notions as the possibility that the Soviet Backfire bomber, which has been a source of great contention, might be denied an intercontinental potential by confining it to designated zones. Air refuelling, it is thought, could still make possible one-way strikes on the United States with recovery of the planes in Cuba. Yet, if the Soviets genuinely wish to demonstrate that the Backfire is

[L]

-26-

strictly a theater weapon, a combination of limits on tanker aircraft capabilities and clear indications that the plane would be based well out of range of the United States, with no logistical facilities to support the aircraft from more northerly bases, might suffice.

Similarly, if there are to be mobile land-based missiles at all, the two sides should restrict their ranges and withhold them from areas close enough to threaten the other party.

The incipient deployment of the Soviet Union's SS-20 intermediate-range mobile missile is troublesome, but perhaps manageable. Washington should press Moscow to spell out its full plans for the system, and should determine whether the Soviets plan compensating reductions in older IRBM forces in Europe. Most importantly, the United States should urge that Moscow confine each missile to an agreed block of territory, possibly 25 to 50 square miles in size and with no fully enclosed revetments. Limited mobility within such sectors would afford ample survivability but could facilitate the accounting necessary for arms control. In addition, to prevent conversion of this missile to intercontinental capabilities, its canister dimensions should be fixed and there should be neither testing nor retrofitting of an additional stage on such rockets. Such schemes are in several respects inadequate as limits on capabilities but, in conjunction with other measures, they could be useful indicators. Any movement of the designated systems into forbidden zones would then provide strategic warning of hostile intentions.

The most important factor in weighing a "multiple-indicators" approach may well lie in an emerging shift in Soviet psychology. As strategic parity

[lc]

-27-

has materialized, the major argument for Moscow's resistance to greater
disclosure of its capabilities -- the persistent fear of exposing its
weakness -- has surely declined. Thus, one contrasts the traditional Soviet
attacks on Western inspection proposals with more recent hints of a willing-
ness to offer necessary assurances for good-faith compliance with arms control
agreements. Confidence-building measures seem to have become more negotiable,
whether one speaks of prior announcements of military maneuvers in Central
Europe, arrangements to avoid incidents among naval forces in the open seas,
hookups of the two nation's manned spacecraft and visits to key space
facilities, exchanges of meteorological, geological and seismic data relevant
to military assessments, or even the prospective on-site inspection of certain
nuclear explosions. No one should underestimate the psychological advances
to which these agreements testify. A concerted effort to fathom strategic
intentions may now be both prudent and practical.

Fortunately, the current American president seems instinctively to
perceive this fact. He has already alluded to his interest in a number of
the proposals mentioned here -- limits on missile tests, anti-satellite tech-
nology, the comprehensive nuclear test ban and other ideas. Obviously, some
of these concepts are more significant than others, some are more verifiable,
some more negotiable. But their collective promise outweighs their individual
features. The achievement of a sizeable fraction of these suggestions would
afford unprecedented insights into the likely strategic behavior of coming
decades.

It may be that Jimmy Carter's distinctive acquaintance with nuclear
technology will be the decisive ingredient in this situation. No other

[Lc]

-28-

president in the nuclear age has had such familiarity with the hardware. None has had the confidence that comes from grappling with the mysteries of nuclear technology. Mr. Carter is less likely to be intimidated by such issues or to be vulnerable to distorted presentations of the technical intelligence on which national security decisions rest so heavily. His comfortable grasp of nuclear matters is akin to Dwight Eisenhower's lack of hesitancy in coping with the military establishment from which he came. These qualities may enable the first president of America's third century to move boldly where others have trod but timidly.

Jack London once wrote of "the menacing truce that marks the meeting of wild beasts that prey." The United States and the Soviet Union have been locked in such a truce for a full generation. It is a fate unfit for human beings. The task for the next generation is to transform that truce into a more affirmative and more secure relationship. To banish fear is too much to expect, but to govern strategic capabilities and to mold compatible intentions are well within our reach.

The goal is to move from mutual assured destruction to mutual assured restraint. The irony may be that, as another student has put it, we must have both, or we shall have neither.

* * *

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE | 58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 | TEL. (212) 734-0400 | CABLE: COUNFOREL, NEW YORK

ALTON FRYE
Director
International Affairs Fellowships

August 30, 1977

Dear Henry:

We are pleased to announce the International Affairs Fellowship competition for 1978-79. As in the past, the Council will offer a number of grants to outstanding candidates between the ages of twenty-seven and thirty-five from government, academic life, business and the professions.

If you know of an exceptional man or woman who might be a suitable nominee for the program, we would be very pleased to have your suggestions. We need to know the name, age, and address of your candidate, and we would appreciate a brief description of his or her background together with the reasons for your recommendation. You need not go into great detail since we will request a full curriculum vitae from each person we invite to apply for the competition.

We are especially interested in promising people in public service who have displayed notable intellectual gifts and whose professional growth would benefit from a period of reflection and writing about an important contemporary issue in international relations.

We plan to extend our invitations promptly, so nominations should be submitted as soon as possible; the closing date is September 30, 1977.

Thank you very much for your interest and I hope we shall be hearing from you.

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 520
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Enclosures

[LC]

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM

Announcement of Awards

1976-77

Since 1967 the Council on Foreign Relations has maintained a unique program of fellowships offering outstanding young men and women between the ages of twenty-seven and thirty-five an opportunity to broaden their expertise in the field of international affairs. The distinctive character of the International Affairs Fellowships lies in the provision of contrasting experiences for young professionals working at the nexus of policy research and policy action. Thus academics and other professionals from the private sector are enabled to apply their humanistic disciplines in a policy-oriented environment, and government officials are encouraged to consider problems in a scholarly atmosphere free from the pressures of decision-making.

Thanks to major new grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities, together with the continuing support of the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Council is pleased to announce the appointment of the following International Affairs Fellows for 1976-77.

2.

[Lc]

* RONALD D. BRUNNER "Mass Politics and Psychology in the Energy Crisis." Born in Greeley, Colorado, Mr. Brunner received his Ph.D. in political science from Yale University in 1968 and subsequently joined the faculty of the University of Michigan, where he is currently associate professor in the department of political science and associate research scientist at the Institute of Public Policy Studies. He has published widely on political development theories and on the simulation of human behavior in various fields. Building on a two-year study of the public's response to the global energy crisis, Professor Brunner expects to spend his fellowship year in Washington working on the social psychological aspects of planning an effective energy policy.

* ROBERT L. GALLUCCI "Incentives for European Cooperation in Non-Proliferation Objectives." Holder of a Brandeis University Ph.D. in politics, Mr. Gallucci is the author of the recently published *Neither Peace Nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Viet-Nam*. He is currently a staff member of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and has served as lecturer at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. Dr. Gallucci plans to examine the attitudes of key European countries regarding security and commercial aspects of nuclear proliferation problems and to study the bureaucratic politics of the major European governments concerned with nuclear proliferation issues. During portions of his fellowship year, Mr. Gallucci will be based at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and the Harvard University Program for Science and International Affairs.

* National Endowment for the Humanities International Affairs Fellows.

3.

* RODNEY W. JONES "Controlling Commercial Proliferation of Nuclear Technology in Developing Countries." An assistant professor at Pomona College, Mr. Jones was born in India and received his doctorate in international relations from Columbia University. He has recently published *Urban Politics in India: Area, Power and Policy in a Penetrated System*, and is currently serving as a visiting member of the University of Texas (at Austin) faculty. Mr. Jones will concentrate on nuclear developments in India as a case study in the spread of nuclear technology to the developing nations. Given the importance to American foreign policy of India's decisions on nuclear matters, Mr. Jones hopes to pursue his project in connection with a suitable agency of the United States government.

* ARNOLD KANTER "Improving Organizational Performance in the Department of Defense: Obstacles and Opportunities." Now assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan and assistant research scientist at its Institute of Public Policy Studies, Mr. Kanter taught previously at Ohio State University following the completion of his Ph.D. in political science at Yale University, where his dissertation, "The Organizational Politics of National Security Policy: A Budgetary Perspective", was co-winner of the American Political Science Association's Leonard D. White Award. Professor Kanter has published a number of articles on bureaucracies and career patterns and hopes to spend his fellowship year as a participant-observer in the foreign policy process. He hopes to identify the principal obstacles confronted by civilian defense officials in managing a personnel system principally shaped by the values, rewards and incentives reflected in the military officer corps.

4.

[lc]

**RICHARD C. MARSTON** "Public Policy Toward the International Financial Markets."

A native of Maine, Mr. Marston received his Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, following study at Yale University and Oxford University. He has published extensively on the Euro-dollar market and the international financial system. Presently an assistant professor at the University of Pennsylvania, Mr. Marston will study problems of coordinating national policies among the industrial countries in order to regulate the international financial markets. In particular his study will review the banking crisis of 1974 and seek to gauge the need and feasibility for active intervention in the Eurocurrency markets.

* **STEVE R. PIECZENIK** "International Terrorism: Behavior, Management, Policy." Dr. Pieczenik received his M.D. from Cornell University Medical College with a diploma in psychiatry from Harvard University in 1974. He is also currently a Ph.D. candidate in international relations at MIT. Since 1969 he has been affiliated with the National Institute of Mental Health as director of international activities and, a post from which he has taken leave to serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. Building on recent close experience with problems of terrorism, Dr. Pieczenik will devote his fellowship to a review of current policy and guidelines for coping with terrorist activity, analyzing the impact of the media on terrorist incidents, and attempting to devise improved policy for dealing with these difficult problems. In formulating fresh recommendations, Dr. Pieczenik contemplates a multidisciplinary approach which will bring to bear insights from psychiatry, political science, anthropology and sociology.

* National Endowment for the Humanities International Affairs Fellow.

5.

[lc]

* **NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON** "Global Environmental Protection: Reconciling Competing Policy Goals." Trained at Brown University and Columbia University School of Law, Mr. Robinson is a member of the law firm of Marshall, Bratter, Greene, Allison and Tucker. He has served as a member of the United States Delegation on Environmental Law Exchange under the US-USSR Bilateral Agreement for Cooperation on the Environment. In addition he has been an advisor to the director of the United Nations Environmental Programme and a participant in the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, 1972. A frequent lecturer, Mr. Robinson is editor-in-chief of the *Earth Law Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law*. As a fellow, his objective is to devise methods for reconciling environmental demands with other equally legitimate claims on public policy. He plans to pursue his project in New York City, working at Columbia University, the United Nations, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

*ELINOR YUDIN SACHSE* "Multinational Economic Policies: An Improved Basis for Choice and Evaluation." Chief of the International Economy Division of the World Bank, Mrs. Sachse received her Ph.D. in international economics from Columbia University and subsequently taught at New York University and Princeton University. She has published several articles dealing with questions of real growth and inflation and now contemplates a thorough evaluation of the differing policies emerging from the diverse systems of economic analysis, modelling and accounting employed by various international economic agencies. By emphasizing the close relationship between the policies applied by agencies working on common problems, Mrs. Sachse seeks to devise a framework to relate these diverse models and analyses more systematically as a basis for more coherent multinational choices of economic policies.

6.

[LC]

* **JOAN EDELMAN SPERO** "The Making of United States Policy on International Monetary Reform." Born in Iowa, Professor Spero is a member of the Columbia University department of political science, where she has worked on a variety of problems related to Francophone Africa and to contemporary economic policy. She will spend her fellowship year as a staff member of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York studying US policy-making on international monetary reform from 1972 to the present. By a close study of the management of international capital flows, the relationship between liquidity creation and development finance, and other aspects of the topic, Professor Spero hopes to identify means for improved integration of international monetary policy-making with other elements of American foreign policy.

**EDWIN M. TRUMAN** "The Role of Economic Analysis in the Evolution of the International Monetary System." Mr. Truman was educated at Amherst College and Yale University, where he received his Ph.D. in economics in 1967. His study, "The European Economic Community: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion", appeared in *Yale Economic Essays* in 1969 and he has published numerous articles in the field. Since leaving the Yale faculty to join the Division of International Finance of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mr. Truman has gained extensive experience on the relationship between professional economic analysis and public policy. From this experience and further research as a fellow, Mr. Truman will attempt to suggest ways to maximize the utility of economic analysis and to mobilize it more effectively in support of international monetary decisions.

7.

[lc]

*+ **SANDRA L. VOGELGESANG** "In Pursuit of Consensus: Role of Human Rights in United States Foreign Policy." Currently a member of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff, Ms. Vogelgesang was previously a political economist in the Department's Bureau of European Affairs following the completion of her Ph.D. in European affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Her doctoral dissertation, *The Long Dark Night of the Soul: The American Intellectual Left and the Vietnam War*, was published by Harper and Row in 1974. She has also been a frequent contributor to the *Foreign Service Journal* and the State Department's *Newsletter*. Dr. Vogelgesang seeks to examine the alleged inconsistency between current US government policy and traditional and declared support for human rights.

* **JOHN A. ZYSMAN** "Financial Markets and Industrial Policy: The Basis of National and International Economic Strategies." Now an assistant professor of political science at the University of California at Berkeley, Mr. Zysman previously lectured at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he received his Ph.D. in 1973. A native of New York City Mr. Zysman received his undergraduate education at Harvard College and was a special student in economics and sociology at Essex University in England. He is the author of *A National Industry in the International Economy: French Industry Between the Market and the State*, recently published by the University of California Press. In expanding his initial work on economic policy-making, Dr. Zysman will investigate the effects of differences in the structure of national financial systems on the financing of industry, on international financial policy, and on the politics of business-state relationships. He will conduct a major portion of his study in London as a guest of the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House.

+ Ms. Vogelgesang was selected in an earlier competition but was obliged to delay her tenure as a Fellow.

OCT 21 1977

HENRY A. KISSINGER

October 21, 1977

Dear Alton:

It is with great pleasure that I offer the name of
Robert Hormats for membership in the Council on
Foreign Relations.

Bob is one of the most promising young men in the
field of foreign economic policy. For a young man
he has had extraordinary experience in policymaking
at the highest level and has made an exceptional
contribution. He has demonstrated a mastery both
of bureaucratic organization and of the essential
interrelationship of economics and national security
policy. On the National Security Council staff he
played a key role of coordination and leadership and
was respected by all his colleagues in the U. S.
Government, many of them much senior to him. In my
period of office Bob made a major contribution to
the most important policy pronouncements of two
Presidents and one Secretary of State on the range
of economic issues -- energy, relations with the
industrial democracies and with the Third World,
and others.

While he should not be blamed for any of my short-
comings in the economic sphere, much of what I know
is due to his wise tutelage.

I strongly endorse him for membership in the Council.

Mr. Alton Frye
Director, Membership Affairs
Council on Foreign Relations
58 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

Wednesday, June 29, 1977

The Washington Star

A-13

# Yugoslavs Say Soviets Readying Whip for Satellite Parties

By William R. Frye

Special to The Washington Star

BELGRADE — Something ominous is happening in the Soviet bloc, and the Yugoslavs — who are among the world's most experienced Kremlin watchers — are getting worried.

It has a whiff of 1968 to it — and 1968 was the year of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Moscow is making a major effort to tighten discipline within the Communist parties of both East and West. It is reasserting its authority and demanding obedience. It is even trying to coerce Yugoslavia back into the bloc.

The message out of Moscow these days is, "We're in charge — and don't forget it. We intend to keep it that way."

This was the psychological and ideological well from which the Czechoslovak invasion was drawn; it led to the so-called Brezhnev doc-

trine, justifying Red Army intervention to keep Eastern Europe Communist. East and West have been trying to erode that doctrine; Brezhnev now is reasserting it.

WHY THE KREMLIN should think it necessary to crack the whip is not hard to discern. Obviously Moscow fears that human rights activism will get out of hand. And that East European governments will be tempted or forced to emulate the "Prague spring" during which communism in Czechoslovakia was given a human face and Czechoslovakia's loyalty to the Warsaw Pact was placed in doubt.

It was this process of liberalization which the Kremlin refused to tolerate in 1968, and the signs are multiplying that it will refuse again if necessary.

The very possibility of Red Army tanks rolling into Warsaw, Budapest or East Berlin is enough, in itself, to discourage a liberalization process.

Eastern bloc leaders are extremely sensitive to such hints. When the bear growls, they shiver.

This Yugoslav capital was itself among the first targets of the Brezhnev drive seven months ago.

The Soviet leader came here in November with nine specific demands, all adding up to insistence that Yugoslavia toe the Moscow line.

ACCORDING TO Yugoslav Foreign Office sources, Brezhnev "forget he was coming to Yugoslavia and not to some other country where he could get positive answers more easily." In other words Yugoslavia said, "No."

Western sources accept that version of the encounter.

Brezhnev's visit here took place only a few weeks after the then-presidential candidate Jimmy Carter had said in debating President Ford that the United States would not fight for Yugoslavia. When Carter was

elected, Brezhnev may have thought Yugoslavia would feel abandoned and would be softened for a "kill."

It was not. And in recent weeks Vice President Walter F. Mondale has been here to reiterate NATO's support for Yugoslavia's independence and territorial integrity — thus restoring the constructive ambiguity about NATO's intentions which helps to inhibit the Kremlin. So has West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and so has Canadian External Affairs Minister Donald Jamieson.

THIS HAS NOT discouraged Brezhnev from trying the same gam bit elsewhere. Within recent days and weeks he and others speaking for the government:

* Have lectured West European Communist parties sharply about obedience to the Kremlin. Independent so-called Eurocommunism, it has been made clear, will not be tolerated if Moscow can help it. "There is

only one communism," the weekly Novoye Vremya wrote. "Fidelity to the principles of internationalist solidarity" is required.

* Have talked tough — for example, to French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing — about East-West relations. This has heightened tension a notch or two, and in time of tension each bloc tends to coalesce around the superpower that leads it.

* Have taken a stern, sometimes even belligerent, stance at the Belgrade conference on security and cooperation in Europe. "We're not here to focus on human rights," the Soviet delegate has said in effect. "Get off our backs." The West wants human rights high on the Belgrade agenda.

All this has an ominous sound to Yugoslav ears, trained for decades to catch the nuances of Soviet policy. If they are right, it could be a long, hot summer.

Washington, D.C. 20008
2220 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Empaasay of Japan
Fumihiko Todo
His Exefficiency

Barbara Honck

With great appreciation for your assistance,
it to Minister Fukuda.
I wonder if you would be so kind as to forward
transmitted from him.
to Minister Fukuda for the message you recently
Dr. Klaasinger has written a note of appreciation
Dear Mr. Ambassador:

April 7, 1977

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
TOKYO

February 22, 1977

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

A month has already gone by since you left the high office of the Secretary of State. During your past eight years in government, you have indeed played a central role in shaping the future of mankind. I wish to take this opportunity to express to you my highest personal admiration for your dedication and accomplishments in the pursuit of the lofty cause of world peace and prosperity.

The relations between Japan and the United States have never been better, and you deserve the highest praise for your contribution in cementing the everlasting friendship between our two countries. I will be visiting President Carter in late March so that we may maintain and develop the continuing dialogue that Japan and the United States have successfully established with each other. In this connection I look forward to your continued active interest and participation in the furtherance of Japan-U.S. relations.

May I send you and Mrs. Kissinger my very best wishes for continued good health and happiness.

Takeo Fukuda
Prime Minister of Japan

November 5, 1977

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I am gratified to learn that you have kindly agreed to spare your busy time to see Mrs. Hiroko Sato, wife of the late former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato. Mrs. Sato will be accompanied by Mr. Minoru Kusuda, who used to be Executive Assistant to Prime Minister Sato. I am sure that you will have an enjoyable chat with Mrs. Sato over pleasant memories of the days when you and late Mr. Sato were both actively engaged in the affairs of state.

Mr. Kusuda is now working for me as an Advisor to my Cabinet, and I would appreciate it very much if you could take this opportunity to convey through Mr. Kusuda your frank and enlightening views on matters of both bilateral and global scope.

With my best wishes,

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Washington D.C.
U.S.A.

July 1, 1977

Dear Mr. Fulton:

Jock Covey asked me to answer on his behalf,
as Dr. Kissinger's public appearances fall
more into my bailiwick than his.

I believe I have already written you that
Dr. Kissinger will consider each proposition
on its merit, and I cannot answer your question
unless I (and he) have full information about
the educational film you mentioned. If you
feel it is something of sufficient stature
that Dr. Kissinger would want to lend his name
to it, I invite you to pass along all details.

Mr. Richard Fulton
Richard Fulton Inc.
850 Seventh Avenue
New York, New York 10019