SUPPLEMENTAL CLIPS: FRIDAY, 5 NOVEMBER 1982

PROGRAM Good Morning America

STATION WJLA-TV
ABC Network

DATE October 25, 1982 7:00 A.M.

CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Kissinger on China / The Middle East

DAVID HARTMAN: Eleven years ago Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State, made a secret, that first secret visit to China. He met with the Chinese leaders. And that visit eventually set the stage for normalization of relations between the United States and China. Dr. Kissinger has just come back from a private trip to China, where he met many of the current leaders. And he's with us this morning to discuss the problems with our current relationship with China.

Since 1972, your Shanghai Agreement, our relationship with China seems to have proceeded smoothly until a couple of years ago. Deng Xiaoping said just recently, three weeks ago, that the relationship is in some trouble now because of our policy toward Taiwan. How responsible is the Reagan Administration for these current problems we're having with China?

HENRY KISSINGER: I think there are a number of factors that cause ups and downs in our relationship with China. One has to do with the internal situation in China and with the various groups that are jockeying -- that have been jockeying for position there. Another has to do with the whole process of modernization in China. The third has to do with the overall international situation. And then there is the element of Taiwan, of American policy on Taiwan, which early in the Administration and during the campaign President Reagan made perhaps too exuberant statements. But I think, in fact, his policy recently has gone as far as he can possibly go.

HARTMAN: In what regard? The key seems to be our balancing Taiwan and the People's Republic, China. Bill Safire of the New York Times wrote recently that we -- that the PRC,

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that China has not made any guarantees, they have made no
promises about whether or not they would use force against
Taiwan. Our policy seems to be based on the fact that we have
promises from China not to use force against Taiwan.

What's the case?

KISSINGER: Well, it depends whether we want to base
our policy vis-a-vis China on realities or on legalisms. The
Chinese have said repeatedly that they do not intend to use force
in solving the Taiwan issue, as they call the problem.

HARTMAN: But it's not in writing.

KISSINGER: Well, they've said it in many public
statements. But they take the position, which is understandable
to me, that this is not a promise made to the United States.
They consider Taiwan part of China, and we have recognized Taiwan
as part of China. Therefore they feel that they cannot be asked
to make an internationally-binding commitment to us about what
tahey intend to do with the future of China. They can state
unilaterally what they will do, but they will not make something
that we can enforce as an international agreement.

I think if we all keep quiet now and carry out the
recent communique that was signed between China and the United
States, in both the letter and the spirit, that there will in
fact not be an invasion of Taiwan.

But we cannot say, because it isn't true, that they have
made a promise to us that they will not do that.

HARTMAN: What should we do now? What should President
Reagan right now? What should Secretary of State Shultz do right
now to make...

KISSINGER: I think the most...

HARTMAN: I'm sorry. Deng Xiaoping said the other day
that we're not a reliable partner. So how does Mr. Shultz change
this?

KISSINGER: I think that the most important thing to be
done in relations between China and the United States is to start
a dialogue on matters -- on the overall international situation,
which is what brought us together in the first place. I think a
meeting between Secretary Shultz and the Chinese leaders would be
of the greatest importance, and a meeting in which they do not
rehash what has now been settled in the recent communique on
Taiwan, but in which they look at the international situation,
each side states its perception, each side explains to the other

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where they are going, and on that basis, I believe that the interests on many issues are quite compatible and will produce parallel policies.

So that seems to me to be the most important next step.

HARTMAN: Briefly, is there any concern we should have in the United States that these talks between China and the Soviet Union are going to cause problems for us with China down the road?

KISSINGER: I believe that the Chinese have conducted an independent foreign policy for 3000 years, and there are a number of realities that they will not forget. They have a frontier of 3000 miles with the Soviet Union, there is a million Soviet troops on the other side of that frontier, there are Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia, there is a Soviet alliance with Vietnam, and there are Soviet troops in Afghanistan, all bordering China. They cannot go and they do not want to go beyond a certain point.

If they ease the state-to-state relationship slightly and cut out some of the name-calling, it should not send us into a panic. In fact, if we show panic we may accelerate a process that has its own inherent limits. And I am not particularly worried about Sino-Soviet negotiations if we behave intelligently.

HARTMAN: Doctor, thank you.

And when we come back in just a couple of minutes, we'll talk with Dr. Kissinger about the Middle East and how we might achieve a lasting peace there.

HARTMAN: Continuing with Dr. Henry Kissinger, now talking about the Middle East.

Dr. Kissinger, over the weekend King Hassan of Morocco suggested that if Israel will withdraw from the occupied territories, the Arabs will recognize Israel. How should Israel respond?

KISSINGER: Well, I think Israel should enter negotiations with the Arabs on the basis of some of the principles of the Reagan proposal, quite independent of what Hassan said. I think what Hassan said reinforces it.

I would add one point, however. One should not believe that the negotiation can be based on simply trading Israeli real

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concessions for recognition. Recognition is what most negotiations begin with for other countries. When India and Pakistan negotiated with each other, they recognized each other to start with. It's an unusual feature of the Middle East that Israel is asked to pay a price for what all other nations have to begin with.

HARTMAN: Former President Nixon was with us the other day and he suggested that Mr. Begin should seize the moment right now, that he should make this move to, if not recognize the PLO, talk with them, recognize them, and starting talking about this Reagan plan. Do you agree with that?

KISSINGER: Well, the Reagan plan does not require Israel to recognize the PLO. And I would not identify negotiations on the Middle East with the PLO at this point. The Reagan plan, as I understand it, suggests that the Israeli negotiating partner should be Hussein, that at some point further down the road the Palestinians -- that at all points the Palestinians can participate, and at some point further down the road maybe the PLO can find its place in it.

At this stage, the decision the Israelis have to make is to open negotiations with Hussein on the basis of the principles of the Reagan plan, that there should be no West Bank Palestinian state, that there should be some sort of federation between the West Bank and Jordan, and that the border has to be determined on the basis of the degree of normalization that can be developed between the countries. So all of these are principles -- and of Israeli security. I think these area principles that I believe Begin should accept. There are other aspects that I believe, in the plan, that are not as necessary that he accept. And therefore he could accept the principles and state his reservations. But I do believe that Israel ought to negotiate.

HARTMAN: And now.

KISSINGER: Now. Yes.

HARTMAN: As soon as possible.

What can King Hassan of Morocco deliver? He said the Arabs will recognize Israel. Does he have that kind of clout? Can he speak for the Arab World?

KISSINGER: King Hassan, himself, does not have that kind of clout. He is a very wise and very moderate leader and a good friend of the United States. He represents an Arab consensus that was formed at a recent meeting of Arab heads of government at Fez. And he was in Washington not in his capacity

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as King of Morocco, but as the host of that conference,
interpreting its meaning to our government. In that sense, he
represents a consensus.

One has to keep in mind, however, that this recognition,
even as phrased by King Hassan, was rather indirect and
ambiguous. Though I believe that was its meaning.

HARTMAN: How likely is it, given their past history,
that Arafat and the PLO can allow King Hussein to negotiate for
them? Is that really likely to happen, realistically?

KISSINGER: Well, what is their alternative? If they do
not let King Hussein negotiate for them, there'll be no
negotiation at all. The current stalemate continues. And it has
been abundantly proven now that the stalemate cannot be broken by
Soviet arms or Arab unilateral military efforts.

So, I believe that the conditions for negotiations have
never been better. And it is in the interest of both sides to
have negotiations.

HARTMAN: What should the United States do now? How
should we proceed as of right now? How much pressure and where?
Maybe not pressure, but what should we do?

KISSINGER: I think the United States should -- for one
thing, should persevere. We should not change our plan or our
basic approach under the pressure of either side.

Secondly, I think, with patience, we can bring the two
sides to the negotiating table. Then we should act as the honest
broker. From time to time, it is not to be excluded that we
should put forward our own ideas to break a deadlock.

President Reagan pointed out last Friday that the Arabs
cannot avoid the problem of negotiating with Israel directly, and
Israel cannot avoid the problem of negotiating about the West
Bank. The international community or American public opinion
will not hold still for the annexation of the entire West Bank or
of the West Bank into Israel.

I think if we persevere on this course, considering that
we are the only party that can talk to both sides, considering
the Soviet impotence in the Middle East has been proved, I
believe we will make major progress. And I think the chances for
a breakthrough towards peace in the Middle East have not been
this good in ten years.

HARTMAN: Dr. Kissinger, thank you.