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DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By C.D. NARA Date 6-8-04

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)

UNCLASSIFIED

Telcon

HAK/Mr. Maw

April 18, 1974; 8:28 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Good morning, Henry.

K: Carl, I can't find Kubisch.

M: He should be there any minute. We left there about well, I got home around 3 o'clock. You have downstairs a draft in four languages which is almost acceptable. It's not going to say much,

K: What is the main sense?

M: What they really wanted to put in the communique was all that trash that was in their paper.

K: Yeah.

M: And they wanted to use the communique as something for home consumption and political things like...

K: Of course there were a few points in that paper we wouldn't mind having in there.

M: And we think we sorted them out and they're there. Now Jack is probably down in that conference room. He was going to be there by 8:30 to meet the people who couldn't be there last night and go over with them what we did.

K: Yes, but can I see a draft?

M: Yes, tell them that it's down in the conference room.

K: Well, I'm in the White House right now.

M: I'll have it... how long will you be at the White House?

K: Oh, another hour.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-74

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

*

M: Do you want it brought over there to you?

K: Well, I'd like to know what we're doing.

M: Well, I'll have it sent over there to the White House to you. And the ____ is on the way. It will be on your desk when you get to State.

K: Yeah, OK.

M: I think it's within reason. We did another hour on it this morning.

K: Yeah, but, I just don't like communiques to be completed without any consultation whatsoever with me.

M: It won't be. That's why it's where it is. And none of your foreign ministers' associates have yet seen it either.

K: Yeah, but I don't give a damn about that. If they don't control their bureaucracies that's their problem.

M: Oh, I see. Well, Henry, it's there on the first floor, and I'll have somebody start right over with it.

K: OK.

M: Right.

UNCLASSIFIED

TELCOM

McCloskey/HAK

April 18, 1974 - 8:58 a.m.

K: About Mrs. Kissinger's day.

M: Are there any specific things I should know about today? I want to be sure that it's done right and what I would recommend is that pictures be permitted at Blair House where she is having lunch.

K: Right.

M: And not say anything about the Smithsoneian trip unless it becomes learned

K: It's up to you.

M: Alright. I'd like to speak to you at some point about her programming.

K: That's what I wanted to do. Why don't you just assume you're in charge of developing a program. Could you?

M: Yes indeed.

K: You'll have a hell of a lot of requests and I don't know what to do with them.

M: You know this young woman in the press office don't you, who you see around with the photographers. Now she is very, very good.

K: Yes, but somebody has to tell her what the policy is.

M: OK. I'd like to introduce her to Mrs. Kissinger if I may at some point.

K: Good. OK. Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12/95
By 10-1 NARA Date 6-8-94

TELCON
Kubisch/HAK

April 18, 1974 - 9:09 a.m.

AHK: How are we doing on this G.D. thing.

K: Have you seen the draft yet?

HAK: Yes. It isn't all that bad.

K: I don't think so either. I must say we did a little rewriting after they left about 2:30 this morning.

HAK: I don't see -- on the subject of trade, "the Foreign Ministers attach special importance" to the status quo.

K: That needs to be clarified. That commitment is at a standstill. We'll clarify that as soon as they get here.

HAK: You can't say that. Because that has all the wrong connotations. Then we should have a paragraph or two which gives a little lift to the G.D. thing.

K: Christ, you know we had it and we argued about it. They want to keep the rhetoric out. They want to make it just a statement of the facts of what was discussed and what the agreement was consensus of. We have some sentences in the beginning and the end but very little.

HAK: But that makes it a catalog of things they are asking of us.

K: What I'll try and do if you agree is try and weed some phrasing in and around, or if you want, we could, we had a paragraph in on about between one and two and....

HAK: Also, I don't know whether that economic coercion paragraph is doing us much good.

K: As a matter of fact, let me tell you we rewrote the second sentence of it after the Ecuadorians left because they are the ones that had it in there and they had a sentence in there that they -- the foreign ministers -- the Latin American foreign ministers expressed their concern to you about the consideration being given in the U.S. Congress to. They were going to restrict imports, etc. They also expressed concern over proposals that would tend to restrict access. The whole theme of that, even the title of that article is a problem for us.

HAK: That is right and that is what should be pointed out in it.

K: Yes.

HAK: That's exactly right. XXXXX

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By C0 NARA Date 6-8-94

- 2 -

K: If we could make it a more balanced thing. The way we've got it now is that all forms of economic coercion from relations among the countries of the Americas. You know, we're subject to economic coercion in a sense at times too. It might be a charter of rights and duties, etc., by the time you get some balance both ways. That is what we were seeking to turn it to that. We don't favor economic coercion measures against us either. On the Panama thing, let me tell you that there was a disagreement privately between me and the Panamanian representatives on one point. The other two paragraphs stated the second paragraph is excellent. The first paragraph he wants to put in he said his Minister is insisting that they put in the first paragraph that the Latin American Foreign Ministers expressed their solidarity with Panama in exasperation as they had done in Bogota. I said, look, we went through that in Mexico. We wouldn't accept it there. The United States can't sign -- the Secretary of State can't sign that and I said we just can't do it, and to issue such a statement here in Washington, I said do you want a treaty or don't you.

AHK: They can do it separately if they want to.

K: On the other hand I do remember your comment at one point yesterday when we were talking about the 30 some Senators.

HAK: But not as part of a communique I signed.

K: Yes. The thing is, would you, if I can work this, would you be willing to have something in there that shows that they are pressuring you hard and they have solidarity with Panama.

HAK: Yes.

K: It is balanced so that it doesn't look like you are giving away the whole ballgame. You know if they are just thrilled with the way things are going on the negotiation with Panama then we must be giving everything away so there ought to be a little criticism of us or a little pressure on us in it, do you think so?

HAK: Yes, that doesn't bother me that they say I took note of their concern for progress.

K: OK.

HAK: That doesn't bother me so much but now look, I have the problem that the President wants to see the Egyptian Foreign Minister at 11:30 this morning and I have no way of not being there.

K: How about this. Why don't we have our meeting and then at 11:15 or something you call a recess for the drafting committee to do a redraft of the communique and then.....

HAK: And begin again when, at 2:30

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 50 12958
By 10 NARA Date 6-8-87

K: Whenever you wish. We've got a buffet lunch available for all the delegates. They can just come and go, serve themselves. You can come or not as you please.

HAK: And then we meet again at 2:30.

K: That would be for the wrap-up. What we could do at 10. Have the discussion of the panorama of U.S. - Latin relations and that's when the Cuba thing is going to come up. Then consider the communique as it stands now, try and get a decision on these couple of items, whether it is going to be working groups or not, then you do a review of the international situation if time permits and call upon the drafting committee to go back and do a redraft and resubmit it to the ministers at 2:30. How about that.

HAK: OK. Good.

K: I'll see you at 10.

HAK: Good. Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-94

Telcon

HAK/Joseph Sisco

April 18, 1974; 12:41 p.m.

K: Joe, can you send the other resolution over here.

S: Sure.

K: So that the President can see it?

S: The one that we didn't like?

K: Yes.

S: Yes, I'll get it right over to you.

K: So then we know what the basis...

S: It's not to be shown to Fahmy, however, because he hasn't seen that. That was what the British came out of the European.

K: Oh, no. What is the nonaligned one?

S: Well, the nonaligned one came in about 48 hours ago. Why don't I get that one over to you right away.

K: That's the one - let's not get these two confused by getting the European resolution in.

S: That's right. No, no, I'll get that one for you because I know it's utterly impossible and will demonstrate the point that you made. I can LDX that to you right away if you like.

K: Good. And we are not going to have any - there's to be no discussion that this was even discussed with Fahmy.

S: Well we can do that too.

K: Absolutely. That's essential.

S: Yeah.

K: So at the press briefing just say that the President and Fahmy had a general review of the situation and the Lebanese issue didn't come up.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12758
By CO NARA Date 6-8-74

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S: In our press briefing here.

K: Well, if it comes up.

S: Well, I don't think anybody in our press even knows that I've seen
you on this matter. Certainly I haven't mentioned it to anybody
so how would, you know. The question could come up, however,
and I'd better just tell them right away that you just had a general
discussion about the Lebanese thing.

K: Fahmy is to be kept out of the Security Council discussion altogether.

S: Altogether.

K: Right.

S: All right.

K: One idea which I think is a very good one. You should send a message
to Franji, urging him to instruct his Foreign Minister to cooperate
closely with us. And what we should do is to send a message saying,
look, please keep in mind we must get maximum pressure from Jewish
groups and so forth on the Israelis - I mean, put it more elegantly so
that it doesn't leak. With respect to Syrian disengagement.

S: Do you mind, if I can sell Bill Buffum on this as to whether that gambit of going to Franji at this moment while we have talked to the Foreign Minister is apt to explode in our face or not. He knows this Foreign Minister very well and he knows the relationship between them.

K: OK, but draft something to me to look at.

S: All right. I'll get this resolution to you right away.

K: Good. Over at the White House.

Telcon

HAK/ Joe Sisco

April 18, 1974; 12:45 p.m.

K: Hello.

S: Yes, sir.

K: I don't think we should circulate a draft even informally, even for
discussion.

S: Well, we're not at this point. You see, what we're doing is put a
stop to everything ~~and~~ pending discussions tomorrow.

K: Exactly, good.

S: That's what we're trying to do.

K: Good.

S: Bear in mind that there's been discussion of this draft yesterday
based on what we had instructed our British and American delegations.

K: Now, secondly, I would like you to call Ramsbotham.

S: Right.

K: And tell him I consider it essential that the British make an absolute
maximum effort, not just a token effort to get a decent draft. And
a really maximum effort. Explain to him that I am meeting with the
leaders of the Jewish community here next week. And if we are forced
to veto, then we lose the Arabs. If we abstain, I might just as well quit.

S: Sure, well, let me say this - I will do this, but on the whole the British
were very good yesterday, I want you to know.

K: Yes, good isn't enough. They've got to be massive.

S: I know what you mean. OK, I'll do it.

K: But tell him I appreciate everything he has done.

S: Sure, sure.

K: Should I call Callaghan?

S: No, I don't think so at this point. You may need some help at some
later stage, you'll like to.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-84

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By C0 KARA Date 6-8-95

TELCOM

Fahmi/Sec. Kissinger

April 18, 1974

1:35 p.m.

F: Hello, Henry.

K: Ismail, I wanted you to know that I just had a telegram from Damascus in which -- you know I had informed him of the Soviet proposal to meet in Damascus possibly. I said I would meet him in Geneva, but on that occasion, Gromyko proposed that we meet in Damascus. Asad said if we both agreed that's all right with him. But that puts me into an impossible position.

F: You shouldn't have sent this proposal to Asad.

K: I shouldn't?

F: No. Then you have to tell him back that as long as you are going to meet him in Geneva there is no need for meeting him in Damascus. In my own way, I will speak to the President, I will send him a message now.

K: Good.

F: But you should reply, you know, as long as you are going to meet him in Geneva that there is no need that you meet him in Damascus. This may complicate things.

K: Yes.

F: O.K.

K: Right.

F: And (ask) the President to contact us.

K: I tell you it will be impossible. The Israelis will do nothing.

F: Yes, but you shouldn't tell us of ________.

K: But I was afraid the Russians would.

F: Yes, but then, if the Russians would contact him then he will contact you what's your reaction and then you would tell him that you would not (dream) of it. And he should keep it for himself. You shouldn't worry but you have to send him back an answer that as long as you are going to meet him in Geneva that there is no need for him. This may complicate things. Then I will ask the President to contact Asad.

K: Good. That's what I will do. Thank you Ismail. Goodbye. END

TELECON
Joe Sisco/Secretary Kissinger

April 18, 1974

6:10 PM

S: Mr. Secretary, we've looked at the Fahmy draft, it's worse than the draft. It's shameful he would even hand you something like this.

K: Now, just stop raving.

S: Alright. My recommendation is that you go back to him by saying that there is a draft now that is being discussed that has broad support and you'd be glad to make it available to him and it would be this draft that you just looked at a few minutes ago.

K: But who has that -- who's supporting it. The French are supporting it?

S: Yes. That's what we're told.

K: I can't believe it.

S: Well, I can't believe it, but you know one has to believe ones reports. We're told by the British, the British are aboard and the French, the Australians and the Austrians.

K: That makes it five.

S: And us is five. You see.

K: So we can block anything anyway.

S: If they stay together, but the French won't stay together. I think there will be further negotiation with what you will find is as soon as some of these other get at this, the British will tend to stick pretty well, but I can tell you the rest are like soft . spaghetti and the French will be absolutely pro-Arab.

K: Not being an Italian soft spaghetti, can you put it into __ to him?

S: Say, I loved that soup you served Sunday night, it was very good. I loved it.

K: That was quite good. What did you think of our friends?

S: I'll tell you, I thanks you the other night and I thank you again. To me that was one of the most fascinating conversations I've ever been in. You gave them an opening for example, for the Prime Minister, they didn't pick it up. It was clear that there were certain special words that they expressed to you

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Sisco - page 2

and you expressed to them where it was -- I found the whole conversation very reassuring.

K: I do too, but you know, Joe, these guys are about ten notches below Joe and I had the impression that he's had it.

S: Yes, I'm afraid so. I heard what you said and you're able judge this. I have no judgment, not having experienced it before. But if that's the case, then it's lost group. For example, if now they continue to refer in everyone of those points, you remember what Mao said to you.

K: No, that's alright. That's guaranteed continuity. That's why they did that.

S: Right. So that was alright. It's just a failure to mention, is that what you're really....

K: Yes. Quoting Mao was bad.

S: On this matter, what do you want to do. Do you want to call Fahmy?

K: Yes.

S: Now, I have one other very quick thing to take up with you. Yamani has called and wants to talk to you. Let me tell you what the problem is. On Monday five oil executives are going to testify before the Jackson committee. It relates to a private deal which the Saudi Arabians made with us in assuring that our defense people got their oil for our fleet. Yamani is worried that the Jackson committee will make this public. DOD we are told, they talked to the Jackson people some weeks ago and that at that time they received an assurance from the Jackson committee, Feldman and the other people that are involved, that they would not make this public. Now the recommendation that I have is this. Yamani wants to talk to you (ask (a)) would you authorize me to call him on your behalf to say to him that the Secretary is aware of his concerns and that we will do everything in our power to keep this matter from being aired in the committee publicly, although obviously we can't guarantee it.

K: Absolutely.

S: And then secondly, will you authorize, I don't know who would be the best person either me or someone else, to call the council staff, Mr. Feldman, and to remind him that they've given this commitment and this is very important from the point of view of our national interest.

K: Absolutely.

S: OK, I'll proceed on that basis.

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Sisco - page 3

K: Now, OK, you're getting that schedule done for me.

S: Yes and we owe you an Assad letter as well and a couple of ~~hundred~~ hundred things. You really have gotten a little work out of me today.

K: Joe, that's why you stayed.

S: You ought to get me a raise you know. I only make $40,000, I'm broke.

K: Is it in my power, incidentally?

S: No, there's no ~~ax~~ way. As you said two months ago, there isn't a thing you can do for me and I'm here just for the love of it.

K: Yes.

S: So you be nice to ~~her~~ me.

K: Right.

S: OK.

END