- 15 -

the question of who decides how to go to nuclear war. Yet when almost every Western head of state tries to prove his special ability to deal with the Soviet leaders there results a constant tendency to conduct every kind of negotiation essentially bilaterally. It is hard to imagine how one can have an integrated strategy for nuclear matters while diplomacy remains bilateral. In fact, the sensible procedure would be to start at the other end of the scale, to integrate the diplomacy and work from there to strategy.

Thus I would argue that the presuppositions of the late forties and early fifties no longer fit the current situation. One of the worst things that De Gaulle is doing is to press his challenge so intransigently and so objectionable a manner as to obscure the fact that he is raising some very important questions. Even if we do not like his answers, we have to consider that the questions are valid.

In the late 1940's and early 1950's the integrated commands and the nature of the command structure symbolized the political commitment of the United States. Within NATO in the 1950's, strategic debates were on the whole a substitute for the political debates which were made impossible by the fact that Europe was so completely dependent on American support.

In the next decade this condition is bound to change. A different balance has to be established between the political and military priorities in the alliance. Our tendency in recent years has been to try to avoid these debates by creating new command structures for nuclear defense--or, more

debates by creating new command structures for nuclear defense--or, more
in the alliance. Our tendency in recent years has been to try to avoid these
balance issues to be established between the political and military priorities

In the next decade this condition is bound to change. A different
due to that Europe was so completely dependent on American support.

whole a sentiment for the political debates which were made impossible by
United States. Within NATO in the 1960's, strategic debates were on the
nature of the command structure amorphized the political commitment of the
In the late 1940's and early 1950's the integrated commands and the

the questions are valid.

important questions. Even if we do not like his sn owers, we have to consider that
objections a manner as to opacne the fact that he is raising some very
that De Gaulle is doing is to press his challenge so intrinsically and so
early titles no longer fit the current situation. One of the worst things

Tina I would argue that the prepositions of the late torttea and
of the scale, to integrate the diplomacy and work from there to estratagy.

pilots. In fact, the aenable procedure would be to start at the other end
have an integrated strategy for nuclear matters while diplomacy remains
of negotiation essentially pilotslly. It is hard to imagine how one can

the Soviet leaders there results a constant tendency to conduct every kind
every Western head of state tries to prove his special ability to deal with
the question of who decides how to do to nuclear war. Yet when almost

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- 16 -

specifically, by suggesting the creation of various nuclear forces. I
believe, that this policy attempts to deal with the effect rather than the
basic cause of the problem. The following statement seems to me true
about nuclear forces, Atlantic or multilateral. None of the nuclear forces
thus far proposed will enable any nuclear country to be forced into a nuclear
war against its will. No country presently able to go to nuclear war can be
prevented from going to nuclear war as a result of these forces. No non-
nuclear country will be able to go to nuclear war as a result of these forces.
In other words, nothing is changed, except some shifting of expenditures.
Therefore one is not buying a solution, but a permanent crisis. No country
that has contributed a few billion dollars to such structures is going to
remain satisfied with the kind of arrangements that are now proposed.
Nor, is it likely that we can maintain indefinitely a position in which out
of one side of our mouth we tell the Germans that their participation in
these nuclear forces enables them to play a role in nuclear strategy, while,
out of the other side, we are telling the Soviets that participation in these
forces prevents the Germans from getting their finger on the nuclear trigger.
Sooner or later somebody is bound to recognize that these two propositions
are mutually exclusive.

Finally, I believe that the issue of nuclear control is a hopeless
issue on which to attempt to unify European and American policy. It is
inconceivable that any voting formula is going to induce any country to run

inconceivable that any voting formula is going to induce any country to run
faire on which to attempt to unify European and American policy. It is
humbly, I believe that the issue of nuclear control is a hopeless

are mutually exclusive.

Booner or later somebody is bound to recognize that these two propositions
forces prevents the Germans from detting their finger on the nuclear trident.
out of the other side, we are telling the Soviets that participation in these
these nuclear forces enables them to play a role in nuclear strategy, while,
of one side of our month we tell the Germans that their participation in
Nor, is it likely that we can maintain indefinitely a position in which out
remain situated with the kind of arrangements that are now proposed.
that has contributed a few billion dollars to such structures is going to
Therefore one is not playing a solution, but a permanent crisis. No country
In other words, nothing is changed, except some shifting of expenditures.

nuclear country will be able to do to nuclear war as a result of these forces.
Prevented from doing to nuclear war as a result of these forces. No non-
war against its will. No country presently able to do to nuclear war can be
thus far proposed will enable any nuclear country to be forced into a nuclear
spont nuclear forces, Atlantic or multilaterals. None of the nuclear forces
basic cause of the problem. The following statement seems to me true
believe, that this policy attempts to deal with the effect rather than the
specifically, by and beating the creation of various nuclear forces. I

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[A]

- 17 -

the risks of nuclear war. No President, having voted against going to
nuclear war, will go to nuclear war because a majority of his allies holds
the view that we should do so. Our allies can be protected by a political
structure in which their vital interests are considered as our vital interests,
and not by a constitutional formula. If we disagree in our definition of
vital interests, no voting formula is going to change the situation.

Therefore, I would conclude that the important problem in American-European
relationships in the future is not the problem of military strategy in its
traditional, technical sense. Indeed, the only way we can contest the
proposals that are being made to us is by offering some conceptions that
are adequate for dealing with the problems of the next decade and not by
attempting to make the future simply a projection of the past.

I believe that the internal structure of Europe is a matter that
should be left primarily to the Europeans. I believe also that before we
can come up with any technical remedies we have to face some facts that
may be rather painful; but which seem to me to be a pre-condition of
relationships that developed after the war, while they represented a great
American achievement, are not healthy in the long run, either for us or
for the Europeans. It is not healthy in the long run for us because, looking
ahead to the next decade or two, I would expect the United States to become
increasingly engaged in areas outside of Europe. Given the fact that our

increasingly engaged in areas outside of Europe. Given the fact that our
 ahead to the next decade or two, I would expect the United States to become
 for the European Union. It is not healthy in the long run for us because, looking
 American achievement, are not healthy in the long run, either for us or
 relationships that developed after the war, while they represented a great
 may be rather painful; but which seem to me to be a pre-condition of
 can come up with any technical remedies we have to face some facts that
 should be left primarily to the Europeans. I believe also that before we
 I believe that the internal structure of Europe is a matter that
 attempting to make the future simply a projection of the past.

are adequate for dealing with the problems of the next decade and not by
 proposals that are being made to us by offering some conceptions that
 traditional, technical sense. Indeed, the only way we can contest the
 relationships in the future is not the problem of military strategy in its
 Therefore, I would conclude that the important problem in American-European
 vital interests, no voting formula is going to change the situation.

and not by a constitutional formula. If we disagree in our definition of
structure in which their vital interests are conjoined as our vital interests,
the view that we should do so. Our allies can be protected by a political
unclear war, will do to unclear war because a majority of his allies holds
the risks of unclear war. No President, having voted against doing to

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[x]

- 18 -

top personnel is already overburdened with decisions in many parts of the world, I do not see why it is wise for us to fight for the privilege of making all the decisions in every square inch of territory around the Soviet periphery and particularly in an area with a tradition of political vitality and resources to play a more autonomous role. I think it is not healthy for us to be the only country in the West that has to make all the decisions. I think we require somebody from another group that has an organic capability to act autonomously.

I do not think it is healthy in the long term for Europe to abdicate all decisions to the United States because, while this may end the danger of Gaullism, it may produce neutralism and abdication from the international scene and may leave us extremely lonely in the crises of the years ahead. It cannot be in our interest or in Europe's interest for Europe to become a Greece to our Rome to which one goes for the good life, but which otherwise does not play a significant political role. Therefore, for political and psychological, and not strategic reasons, I have always been very dubious about schemes which seek to perpetuate the present situation in which decision-making is centralized in Washington and the Europeans act primarily as advisers. The only European country that can carry that off is Great Britain. No other European country could operate in such a system

in Great Britain. No other European country could operate in such a way if
primarily as advisors. The only European country that can carry that off
decision-making is centralized in Washington and the European Union
apart schemes which seek to pervert the present situation in which
psychological, and not strategic reasons, I have always been very much
into does not play a significant political role. Therefore, for political and
a Greece to our Rome to which one does for the good life, but which otherwise
It cannot be in our interest or in Europe's interest for Europe to become
accuse and may leave us extremely lonely in the crises of the least needs.
Gallipoli, it may produce neutralism and apportion from the international
all decolonies to the United States peacemakers, while this may end the danger of
I do not think it is healthy in the long term for Europe to apportion
act autonomously.
require somebody from another group that has an organic capability to
only country in the West that has to make all the decisions. I think we
to play a more autonomous role. I think it is not healthy for us to be the
and particularly in an area with a tradition of political vitality and resources
all the decisions in every admeasure inch of territory around the Soviet periphery
world. I do not see why it is wise for us to fight for the privilege of making
top personnel is already overburdened with decisions in many parts of the

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[N]

- 19 -

without abdicating sooner or later.

Let me conclude with one further comment. The tragic element
in any consideration of foreign policy is that when the scope for action is
greatest, the knowledge on which to base such action is relatively small.
Once the knowledge has been acquired; the scope for creativity is relatively
limited. I have presented to you, not the truth, because only the future
can reveal that, but an assessment of what may be or perhaps should be
an historical process. When these assessments are made nobody can know
whether they are correct, and I know many dedicated people who hold
completely different views from mine and I have great respect for them.

The problem in any revolutionary period is this: Foreign policies
tend to be made by bureaucracies, and bureaucracies operate by a standard
of routine, by a standard operating procedure. Their tendency is to project
the past into the future. As long as events continue according to traditional
patterns the inherited wisdom of an existing policy is helpful. The dilemma
that revolutions present is that they require a change in routine and that the
pre-suppositions of one period become the obstacles to an understanding
of the next period. What one cannot tell in advance is whether one is living
in a revolutionary period or whether the inherited wisdom is still valid. My
argument is that Atlantic relationships are in a fundamental state of flux, that

argument is that Atlantic relationships are in a fundamental state of flux, that in a revolutionary period or whether the inherited wisdom is still valid. My of the next period. What one cannot tell in advance is whether one is living pre-subpositions of one period become the obstacles to an understanding that revolutions present is that they require a change in routine and that the patterns the inherited wisdom of an existing policy is helpful. The dilemma the past into the future. As long as events continue according to traditional of routine, by a standard operating procedure. Their tendency is to project tend to be made by purismocracies, and purismocracies operate by a standard The problem in any revolutionary period is that: Foreign policies completely different views from mine and I have great respect for them. whether they are correct, and I know many dedicated people who hold an historical process. When these assessments are made nobody can know can reveal that, but an assessment of what may be or perhaps should be limited. I have presented to you, not the truth, because only the future Once the knowledge has been acquired: the scope for creativity is relatively greatest, the knowledge on which to base such action is relatively small. in any consideration of foreign policy is that when the scope for action is Let me conclude with one further comment. The tragic element without dedicating sooner or later.

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[A]

[Y]

- 20 -

the challenges we have received are not accidents, that the questions
that have been put to us cannot be answered with self-righteousness and
with moral indignation, but that they can be dealt with only by better
answers.

Institute of World Affairs, March 11-13, 1966

Henry A. Kissinger

AMERICA AND EUROPE - A NEW RELATIONSHIP

I will speak to you this evening about American-European relationships, and I will do so against a background of the recent discussion of the reorganization of NATO, which again raises the presumption in the minds of many that everything in the Atlantic Alliance would be tried were it not for the rather self-willed policy of the President of France. The proposition that I would like to make to you is that the difficulties that exist in American-European relationships may be symbolized in the personality of President DeGaulle, but they are not caused by him. They reflect rather deep-seated, structural changes in the nature of foreign policy in the contemporary period. These changes are in part due to the successes of previous American policies, but like every successful policy, every success provides a point of departure and not a final resting place. One of my friends in Washington once said to me, "How is it possible that one man can stand up against two-hundred and fifty million people?" And to that the answer is that one man cannot stand up to two hundred and fifty million people. And if there are certain difficulties that have persisted for many years, it is time for us to inquire what the causes are and to reflect what the possible shape of the future may be.

Now let me divide the issues into two categories. Some are structural causes and others that reflect decisions of policy. Let me first speak of the structural causes. Of those, the most important is, of course, the recovery of Europe. At the end of the war the period of greatest American strength coincided with the period of the greatest European weakness, and there developed a relationship between Europe and the United States which was based on the necessities of the period of the emergency, but which to many of these who created it, has come to seem as the only possible relationship. At the end of

- 2 -

the war every European country, with the exception of Great Britain, had been
defeated at one stage or another during the war. Every European country had,
with the exception of Great Britain, had been occupied at one stage or another
during the war. Societies were shattered. Political confidence was low. Europe
was dependent on the United States for economic support, for political assistance,
and above all for military security. And inevitably there developed a relation-
ship which was necessary in the forties, but which in my view would be unhealthy
as a permanent relationship. There developed a relationship of a certain
"father knows best" attitude on our side, and on the part of the European countries,
with the exception of Great Britain, foreign policy consisted of an attempt to
influence essentially American decisions.

Since that era, Europe, partly due to the impact of American assistance, has
recovered economically. And with this economic recovery, some of the political
confidence and the traditional political dynamism returned as well. Also, with
European economic integration, the relationships between Europe and the United
States were bound to be put on a new footing. Much of the discussion about the
European Common Market, for instance, speaks of the necessity of the desir-
ability of an "outward looking" Common Market and the undesirability of an inward-
looking Common Market. I agree with this, but it is important to keep in mind
that a common market inevitably in its relations to the United States must be,
to some extent, inward looking. By definition a common market is formed because
the outside tariff barriers are higher than the inside tariff barriers. It is
therefore inevitably somewhat discriminatory towards those who are not members,
of the common market. And the only issue is the degree of the discrimination,

not the fact of the discrimination. A unified Europe, moreover, representing
a greater way, must structurally be a more difficult negotiating partner. I
say this, not because I am opposed to a united Europe, I believe that this is
a price well worth paying, but some of us have been reluctant to admit that
there was a price to be paid.

Secondly, the process of de-colonization, as far as Europe is concerned,
has produced a shift in perspective between Europe and the United States, and,
indeed, a reversal of roles between Europe and the United States in the last
ten years. In the 1950's many Europeans were arguing, rightly or wrongly, that
in their colonial areas they were not defending their right of possession, but
the larger interests of freedom. The United States replied in turn that the
larger interests of freedom required it to disassociate itself from its European
allies in all matters that did not concern the defense of Europe. And whatever
the reasons, the process of de-colonialization, as far as Europe is concerned,
has been largely accomplished. Painfully, with serious domestic difficulties,
Europe is now concentrating primarily on European problems. Now it is the
United States that finds itself engaged in controversies and conflicts outside
of Europe and is appealing to its European allies for support in areas distant
from the NATO area. And, it is receiving approximately the same reply from its
European allies that they received from us in the 1950's. This is not due to
the fact that the Europeans do not understand our position. I think it is going
to be a permanent feature of the next decades. Having left these areas with
great emotional turmoil, the Europeans are finding it psychologically and
politically impossible to return. In the future it is likely that any extra-
European problems will have to be dealt with largely by the United States and
without very great European support, regardless of who is in office in specific
European countries.

- 4 -

Thirdly, when the Atlantic relationships were formed, the Europeans were obsessed by two dangers: one, they believed that a Soviet attack was, if not imminent, ~~was~~ been at least highly possible; and two, they believed that the United States might revert to its traditional isolation. They, therefore, were eager to construct an alliance which tied the United States organically as much to ~~as~~ the defense of Europe, as it was possible. Most of the command structure of NATO had almost all of its military deployment in its early stages, had as far as the Europeans were concerned, the primary purpose of creating an automatic commitment by the United States to the defense of Europe. The Europeans wanted an American general in charge of the defense of Europe because they wanted to make sure that any war that occurred would be as much an American-Soviet war as they could make it. They wanted American troops in Europe because they wanted, to put it crudely, hostages so that they were not ~~dependent entirely~~ on the unsupported promise of an American president. This has always created a difference in perspective, because once you put an American in charge of the defense and locate American troops in Europe, inevitably the United States would try to make some rational sense out of the military deployment, ~~and~~ ever since the early 1950's there have been constant debates between the United States and the Europeans in which every measure that we proposed to strengthen the defense of Europe in Europe was interpreted by the Europeans as weakening the defense of the NATO area. Because the Europeans were not primarily interested in admitting that defense of Europe, they wanted to create a political commitment by the United States to the defense of Europe, which was a different thing.

Be that as it may, both of these conditions have changed. Most Europeans no longer believe that a Soviet attack is probable, and they have been so convinced of the American commitment to their defense that they no longer feel that there

- 5 -

are hazards in pursuing policies that may not reflect our wishes. In many respects, the policies that are now being pursued by President DeGaulle and by some others in Europe with more careful methods, reflect not lack of confidence in the United States commitment, but a great deal of confidence in the American commitment. It is precisely because they are certain that the United States will come to their defense in most foreseeable circumstances that our opponents in Europe believe that they can pursue policies which may be contrary to our intentions. And this is reinforced by the nature of modern technology.

Modern weapons produce a kind of dispute which is unique in military history. In the past, a nation which was threatened with attack had two choices. It could either surrender or it could resist. If it resisted, it had to resist at the place at which the aggression took place. It could not debate with its allies about shifting the scene of devastation to some other territory. Modern weapons provide this precise technical possibility. Many of the proposals made by the United States about the defense of Europe have the practical consequence of limiting any war that might break out to the European continent. A war like this would be relatively palatable to us if there must be a war. To the Europeans on whose territory this war would be fought, and with memories of conventional wars, which were highly destructive, the prospect seems to be less tolerable. And therefore their tendency is to promote a strategy in which war, if it becomes inevitable, will take place largely as a nuclear exchange over their heads.

Secondly, the growth of nuclear stockpiles on both sides has produced a somewhat paradoxical change in the nature of commitments. Last year in his

- 6 -

defense review Secretary McNamara said that in case of a general nuclear war
under certain hypotheses anywhere between 120,000,000 and 150,000,000 Americans
might be killed in a matter of days. A little later in this defense review
he said, "Nevertheless, the American commitment to the defense of Europe has
remained unchanged." I would submit that this is a meaningless statement. It
must make a difference to an American President whether no Americans civilians
are likely to be killed, which was the situation in 1949, or whether he must make
the decision against the background that 120,000,000 to 150,000,000 might be
killed. It is not to take away from the solemnity of our commitments to admit
that we are living in a different world in 1966 requiring different assessments
of risks, and anyone who says that the commitments have not changed as a result
of this technology may be simply engaged in a formalistic exercise.

So, on the one hand, of course, the nature of modern technology must create
enhanced reluctance to go to nuclear war, and would if President De Gaulle were
sitting in Washington. And it has nothing to do with the personality of any
particular American President. On the other hand, those issues with respect
to which a nuclear commitment is still credible are likely to be so fundamental
that they may be carried out regardless of whether a formal commitment exists.

In the past, an alliance was necessary, or was thought to be necessary, because
it reinforced a basic community of interests. In the nuclear age such a rein-
forcement may no longer be necessary. In 1962 when Communist China attacked
India, Nehru was asked in the Indian Parliament whether he had sacrificed
anything by not having been a formal ally of the United States. And in one of
his less elevated moments he said not in the slightest because by not being an
ally and waiting until he was attacked, he could get the weapons at reduced
rates, while if he had been an ally, he would have had to pay the going rate

for American weapons. I think the point is that India in 1962, though neutral, received about the same support that Pakistan would have received, though an ally. And it received that support because of the intrinsic importance of India, which did not require reinforcement by a treaty. Similarly, allies may now believe that in so far as our commitments continue, they are not likely to be affected by anything that they do, nor need they be purchased by a particularly conciliatory policy.

This leads to the paradoxical situation in which we live in a world where neutrals receive some of the protection that used to be reserved for allies, and allies reserve for themselves the privileges of policies that used to be associated with neutrals. This is a hard world, and it explains the exasperation of some of our policy-makers, but I consider it to be a fundamental factor of the contemporary scene.

Moving from the structural problems to the problems that are subject to political decision, let me list first the policy issues that exist today in European and Atlantic policy. Let me then explain what I think the American reaction to them to be, and let me state where I agree or disagree with the American reaction.

First, the policies. One of the fundamental questions concerns the nature of European organization: whether Europe should continue to be composed of nations in the traditional sense, whether Europe should form a confederation or whether Europe should move toward supranational institutions and a federal state.

The second policy to be viewed is that whatever the organization of Europe, what is its relationship to the United States? What kind of Atlantic community is likely to emerge. Is a unified Europe a precondition to forming a closer

- 8 -

[Y]

Atlantic partnership or will it make it more difficult? A third problem concerns the nature of East-West relations. What conception does one form of the evolution of the Communist world? How does one attempt to influence it and, above all, who is going to try to influence it? Is it to be done by the Atlantic areas as a unit, by Europe as a unit and by the United States as a unit, or by the United States and every European state separately?

36

38

39

39

40

41

There is the pervasive problem of German unity. This is a problem which has been swept under the rug for twenty years and which I would predict is going to become one of the important issues and potentially divisive issues, both in Europe and in the Atlantic area, in the next twenty years. For the first twenty years after the war, Germany has been absorbed in economic reconstruction, and it has tried to achieve equality within the Atlantic Alliance. It avoided the issue of unity together with its allies by the postulate that any growth of strength would automatically promote German unification. It is now clear that whatever German unity will look like and however it is achieved, it will not be NATO plus German reunification. It will not be the European Economic Community without any changes plus unification. German unification inevitably will require a consideration of the issue of Germany's eastern frontier, of the nature of troops and deployment in central Europe, and, specifically, of nuclear weapons, and of the whole political structure of Europe and the Atlantic area. I am not saying that any changes in these respects would promote Germany unification. I am saying that since German unification will be a prime issue in Germany, and therefore in Europe, and that since one cannot really think about German unification without considering these issues, these issues are going to be on the agenda of both Europe and the Atlantic area in the next twenty years.

- 9 -

Then there are the global problems which I have already mentioned: The relationship of Europe to American involvement outside of Europe. There is the whole range of strategic doctrine, which in the past twenty years has been developed more or less unilaterally by the United States with some contribution from Great Britain. But in the first fifteen years of its existence, most of the internal NATO debates were sparked by essentially unilateral American proposals with respect to strategic doctrine. There have been at least three major changes of American strategic doctrine bearing on the relation of conventional to nuclear forces, on the role of tactical nuclear weapons and on the doctrine of the use of strategic forces. In recent years the big issue in the field of strategic doctrine has concerned the participation by the Federal Republic of Germany in the issue of nuclear weapons and the proposal by the United States of various forms of nuclear sharing, of which the NATO multilateral force is the most obvious example.

Let me summarize what I think to be the American attitude with respect to each of these problems. First of all, with respect to European integration, the United States has passionately promoted European federalism. It has argued that the American experience is a good model for the European experience.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Schaetzel once said in 1962, "The United States with its balance of power and federal and state division is the unique political experiment in federation about which we are proud and self-conscious. We believe that our system works. It is a natural human reaction to believe that it might work also for others."

The United States has promoted European federation, not only because it believes in federalism in the abstract, but because the United States has been convinced that a federated Europe was necessary in order to form an Atlantic

- 10 -

Community. The reason why we believed it was necessary was that a United Europe was believed to possess the resources to play a global role together with the United States. It has been argued that only an inadequate economic scale is keeping the Europeans from supporting us in areas outside of Europe. And it has been maintained that if Europe united, we could create an Atlantic Community on the basis of what is called the "twin-pillar concept": *A pillar in Europe and another one on this side of the Atlantic.*

With respect to East-West relations, the United States has up to now conducted those largely bilaterally and so has every other member of the Atlantic alliance.

I have already mentioned the problems with respect to global involvement.

With respect to strategic doctrine, the debate in recent years has concentrated on the attempt to create an integrated NATO defense structure for nuclear weapons, the attempt to create a nuclear force which at one and the same time would give the Germans a voice in nuclear planning, but would not give them a finger on the nuclear trigger.

I think that these policies which I have described, briefly and therefore inadequately, but which I see by your program that you are about to discuss at much greater length, that these policies had been wise when they were executed, but that they may now be based on premises which do not necessarily reflect the realities of the next decade. Let me explain my views, some of which are not what you are used, but let me explain them anyway.

First, while I am personally in favor of European unity, I have never understood why it is primarily an American interest to promote one particular form of European unity. With all due respect to the splendid experience of American federalism, I do not believe that the experience of American federalism is completely relevant to the European scene. The United States was built by

- 11 -

states of similar cultural background, with the same history, the same language, having just fought a war together, and having very similar political institutions. Europe is composed of countries whose concept of nationalism has been developed by opposition to each other and, therefore, any federation in Europe would present greater difficulties than it does in the United States. This does not mean that I would not like to see it happen. I am simply saying that one simply cannot apply the American experience, mechanically.

53

54

Secondly, while we should, of course, be happy if a supranational Europe developed, it is not self-evident to me that a federal Europe would be easier to deal with for the United States than a confederal Europe. It is an accident that Jean Monnet, who is in favor of federalism, is also a friend of the United States, while President De Gaulle, who is in favor of a confederal solution, happens not to be a friend of the United States. It would be a great mistake to deduce from that that the structures which inevitably follow their preferences. A confederal Europe would permit the United States to maintain some influence at many centers, while a federal Europe would require the United States to stake everything on relations with one center. And when I ask myself how this center is likely to operate, I again reach the heretical conclusion that if a united Europe is formed by smashing too many of the existing structures, it is not inconceivable that its sense of identity will derive from anti-American feelings. This is not inconceivable to me, because if it derives from anti-Soviet feelings it will be driven towards Atlantic conceptions and it will not need a European policy.

55

If I try to think of an electoral campaign that reaches from Scotland to Sicily and from Schleswig-Holstein to the Spanish border, I would not say that demagogic appeals are inconceivable. And in those circumstances, I at

56

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least would warn against assuming that there is an automatic relationship
between federal institutions in Europe and a pro-American policy. Again, if
it happens organically and naturally, we should not oppose it. Indeed I think
the internal organization of Europe is primarily a European problem. I would
simply warn against too mechanical a conception drawn from models which may fit
economics, but not necessarily politics.

I question the proposition that a united Europe will inevitably share our
burdens around the world. I do not think it is true that the reason the
Europeans are not assisting us, say in Vietnam, or with economic aid in other
parts of the world, is due to the inadequacy of their economic resources. On
the contrary, if I look at history, I find that Holland having small resources,
possessed a vast empire thousands of miles away; and I see the United States
possessing vast resources before World War II, conducting no global policy.
In order to share other countries' burdens, one must have a community of interest
and one must believe that unless one shares these burdens they will not be
carried at all. Neither of these conditions exists today. No British policy
before World War II could have obtained American support, because we were
essentially convinced that on any issue that was vital enough to involve our
interests, Britain would have to commit itself before we did. And this is the
situation that exists in many parts of the world today. Incidentally, whenever
I speak of Europe I would put Britain into an intermediate position.

I think that there is an inconsistency between the attempt to develop
integrated defense structures for the Atlantic area and the conduct of bilateral
foreign policy. All of the events within the NATO area in recent years have
concerned the question of who decides how to go to nuclear war. And yet the
conduct of diplomacy, where every head of state in the West, running for office

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[y]

tries in the period before election to prove his special ability in dealing
with the Societ leaders on a bilateral basis leads to the constant tendency
to conduct every kind of negotiation essentially bilaterally. It makes it very
hard to imagine how one can have an integrated strategy for nuclear matters
while diplomacy remains bilateral. In fact, I would argue that the sensible
procedure is to start at the other end of the scale, and to try, if one is to
integrate at all, to integrate the diplomacy and work from there to strategy.

Then I would argue that the presuppositions of the late forties and early
fifties no longer fit the current situation. One of the worst things that
De Gaulle is doing is to press his challenge so intransigently and in a manner
so objectionable to the American mentality that the nature of this challenge
obscures the fact that he is raising some very important questions. Even if
we do not like his answers, we have to consider that the questions require an
answer.

Now in the late 1940's and early fifties the integrated commands and the
nature of the command structure was a substitute for a symbolic significance
with respect to the overall political commitment of the United States. And
within NATO in the fifties, strategic debates were on the whole a substitute
for the political debates which were made impossible by the fact that Europe
was so completely dependent on American support.

In the next decade or so, while this condition is bound to open, this
does not mean that the integrated command must be abolished. It means that
a different balance has been established between the political and military
priorities in the alliance. Our tendency in recent years has been to try to
avoid these debates, to overcome these debates, by creating new command struc-
tures for nuclear defense, specifically, various nuclear forces. I believe,

[Y]

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as I have pointed out, that this starts the problem at the wrong end. If you
*statement* seem to me true should nuclear forces, atlantic & multilateral, analyze the nuclear forces you will notice that none of the nuclear forces so far proposed will enable any nuclear country to be forced into a nuclear war against its will. No country presently able to go to nuclear war can be prevented from going to nuclear war as a result of these forces. *No country can be forced to go to nuclear war as a result of these arrangements.* No non-nuclear country will be able to go to nuclear war as a result of these forces.
In other words, nothing is changed, except some shifting of expenditures, & therefore one is not buying a solution, but a permanent crisis. No country that has contributed a few billion dollars to such structures is going to be satisfied with the kind of arrangements *that is now proposed*. Nor, given the nature of modern communications, is it likely that we can maintain indefinitely *a provision* in which out of one quarter of our mouths we tell the Germans that their participation in these nuclear forces enables them to play a role in nuclear strategy, while telling the Soviets that participation in these forces prevents the Germans from getting their finger on the nuclear trigger. These two propositions are likely to be combined by somebody at some point.

Finally, I believe that the issue of nuclear control is a hopeless issue
on which to attempt to unify European and American policy. It is inconceivable
that any voting formula is going to induce any country to run the risks of nuclear
war. *It is inconceivable* that any president, having voted against going to
nuclear war, will go to nuclear war because a majority of his allies *has the*
view that we should *go to nuclear war*. The only protection for our allies is
not a constitutional formula, but a political structure in which their vital
interests are considered as our vital interests. If we disagree in our defini-
tion of vital interests, no voting formula is going to change matters. *And to*

[v]

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attempt to substitute a constitutional device for a political solution is going to lead to endless, futile disputes. Therefore, I would conclude that the important problem in American-European relationships in the future is not the problem of military strategy in its traditional, technical sense. Nor is the important problem to find some answer to the immediate technical challenges about commands that may be posed by President De Gaulle. Indeed, the only way we can contest the proposals that are being made to us is by some conceptions that are adequate to the next decade and not by an attempt to make the future a projection forward of the past.

I believe that the internal structure of Europe is a matter that should be left primarily to the Europeans, and that our problem is to develop a relationship with whatever emerges in Europe. I believe also that before we can come up with any technical remedies we have to face some things that may be rather painful; but which seem to me to be a pre-condition to a creative policy.

We have to face the fact that the structure and the pattern of relationships that developed after the war, while they represented a great American achievement, is not healthy in the long run, either for us or for the Europeans. I think all our foreign policy must start with this. It is not healthy in the long run for us because, as I look at the next decade or two, I would expect the United States to become increasingly engaged in areas outside of Europe.

In these conditions, given the fact that our top personnel is already overburdened with decisions in many parts of the world, I do not see why it is necessary for us to make a fight for the privilege of making all the decisions in every square inch of territory around the Soviet periphery and particularly in an area with a tradition of political vitality and resources to play a more autonomous role. I think it is not healthy for us to be the only country in

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the West that has to make all the decisions. I think we require somebody
from another group that has an organic capability to act autonomously, and
therefore require us and them to try to convert common policies.

I do not think it is healthy in the long term for Europe to abdicate all
decisions to the United States because, while this may end the danger of
Gaullism, it may produce a danger of neutralism and of abdication from the
international scene in which we could find ourselves extremely lonely in the
crises of the years ahead. It cannot be to our interest or to Europe's
interests that Europe becomes a Greece to our Rome to which one goes for the
good life, but which otherwise does not play a significant political role.
Therefore, I have always for political and psychological, and not strategic
reasons, been very dubious about the many schemes the common feature of which
would be that decisions would remain centralized on the present model with the
Europeans being primarily advisers in American decisions. The only European
country that can carry that off is Great Britain. No other European country
could operate in such a system without abdicating sooner or later. Indeed, if
would argue that we face with Europe the problem that most parents face with
adolescent children. We can take the attitude that our interests will never
differ. The Europeans can always ask us or the children can always ask one
for what they need, and it will always be given to them. Or one can take the
attitude that because the interests are not likely to differ and because one
has confidence one will promote their autonomy and will then rely on their good
judgment to develop common attitudes. I believe that the latter course is the
only one that is consistent with dignity, self-respect, and long-term, healthy
relationships. And it is that latter course upon which we must concentrate.

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Now let me conclude by pointing out one thing. The tragic element in any consideration of foreign policy is that when the scope for action is greatest, the knowledge on which to base such action is relatively small. But the knowledge has been acquired; the scope for creativity is relatively limited. I have presented to you, not the truth, because only the future can reveal that, but an assessment of what may be or perhaps should be an historical process. When these assessments are made, I repeat, nobody can know whether they are correct, and I know many dedicated people who hold completely different views and I have great respect for them.

The problem in any revolutionary period is this: Foreign policies tend to be made by bureaucracies, and bureaucracies operate by a standard of routine, by a standard operating procedure. Their tendency is to be to project the past into the future. As long as events continue according to traditional patterns the inherited wisdom of an existing policy is helpful. The dilemma that revolutions present is that they require a change in routine and that the pre-suppositions of one period become the obstacles to an understanding of the next period. What one cannot tell in advance is whether one is living in a revolutionary period or whether the inherited wisdom is still valid. My argument is that Atlantic relationships are in a fundamental state of flux, that the challenges we have received are not accidents, that the questions that have been put to us cannot be answered with self-righteousness and with moral indignation, but that they can only be dealt with if we give better answers to the challenges.

Henry A. Klaander

Sincerely yours,

Best regards.

time.
manuscript within a reasonable
I will do my best to edit the

April 3rd and your nice comments.
Thank you for your letter of

Dear Mr. Hadley:

Los Angeles 7, California
University Park
University of Southern California
Institute of World Affairs
Executive Secretary
Mr. Paul E. Hadley

April 8, 1966

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES 7, CALIFORNIA

INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

APR 7 1966

5 April 1966

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I take this opportunity to express the thanks of the Executive Committee of the Institute of World Affairs for your participation in our March 11 program. I am pleased to report that your talk was well received and set a high standard for the ensuing parts of the program. Much discussion, most of it fruitful, revolved about the points you stressed. I am sorry you could not be present to hear all of what Mr. Thomas Fina of the Department of State had to say on Sunday morning in rebuttal to your talk. Even though you were not present to defend your theses, you had many friends in the audience.

You will recall that we intend to publish the papers delivered at the Institute. I am sending a copy of the typescript of your speech. Our transcription is quite literal, and you will wish to edit it. If you will do this at your earliest convenience, I shall be grateful.

Again allow me to express the appreciation of the Institute
and my own personal satisfaction in having received you once again.

PEH:cm

Enc.

Air mail