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Dear Prof. Kaiser:

Sorry I was unable to call you back. Dr. Kissinger
did not give me an answer until it was too late to
telephone.

This will be the final version, except for a short
conclusion which he will add later (possibly ex-
temporaneously).

He felt that if Atlantik-Brucke could translate it
for him, it would end up being a better speech than
an extemporaneous one. These were thoughts that
he wanted to express.

He very much appreciates your assistance.

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FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION REPORT

TO: Professor Karl Kaiser

FROM: Suzanne McFarlane - Office of Dr. Kissinger

DATE: February 29, 1988

RE:

Dear Prof. Kaiser:

This will be the final version, except for a short conclusion which he will add later (possibly ex-temporaneously).

I would like to take this opportunity to sketch briefly
the main tasks facing the Atlantic Alliance.

Any discussion of the state of NATO must begin with the
recognition that it represents one of the great success
stories of the post-war period. For more than forty years
Europe has known no wars--the longest period of peace in
Europe since the creation of the modern state system. While
it is never possible to prove conclusively why something has
not happened, the Western democracies have every reason to
take pride in their collective achievement.

Success breeds two contradictory dangers however: on
the one hand complacency and on the other a temptation to
tinker that takes the achievement for granted and seeks to
combine it with basically irreconcilable objectives.

The Atlantic Alliance faces both dangers: complacency
in the reluctance to come to grips with the major political
and technological changes that have occurred; tinkering in
the restless quest for negotiating formulae often heavily
influenced by domestic considerations that will in the long
run undermine the cohesiveness of the Western democracies.

Part of the cause for this state of affairs lies in the
failure to resolve contradictions that have beset the
alliance since its early days. These contradictions were
tolerable so long as the democracies possessed a vast
military superiority. But the growth of nuclear stockpiles
on both sides and the resulting nuclear balance requires
that they be dealt with if the achievements of the postwar
generations are not to be jeopardized.

## NATO Strategy

The present NATO deployment of five American divisions
and supporting air and naval forces evolved in the 1950s,
when NATO's doctrine was massive retaliation. The strategy
then was to react to aggression with an immediate and
overwhelming nuclear blow against Soviet territory. From
the perspective of massive retaliation this deployment had a
political, not a military rationale. On the one hand NATO
did not wish to tempt Soviet conventional aggression by
doing anything to suggest that a Western response would be
limited to non-nuclear means. On the other hand the
European members of NATO sought for political reassurance:
they wanted to make sure America was organically committed
to nuclear retaliation even in the face of conventional
aggression. Both European and American conventional forces
were conceived as a trip wire for an American nuclear
riposte. From the birth of NATO a full conventional defense
has been part neither of its strategy nor of its efforts.

2

A substantial non-nuclear establishment was created nevertheless to give credibility to the nuclear threat.

This situation became precarious when the growth of Soviet strategic forces altered the credibility of the nuclear threat. Yet NATO deployment has been essentially unaffected by the change. NATO has improved its conventional defenses but not as fast as the Soviets have improved corresponding capabilities; hence the gap in conventional forces remains and is perhaps greater than ever. As the current NATO commander made clear recently, even counting the five American divisions that have remained in Europe, the alliance is still unprepared to withstand a major Soviet ground attack for more than a few weeks. Ambivalence continues 35 years after NATO's creation. Our allies remain unwilling to develop forces strong enough to provide an alternative to nuclear weapons; the United States would surely not reintroduce the draft. Yet much of public opinion and many leaders shy away from even thinking about the practicalities of nuclear deterrence. Indeed they constantly affirm the unthinkability of nuclear war while basing their security policy on its deterrent effect.

The need to build up NATO's conventional capability has been passionately affirmed for a long time; for an equal period the goal has proved elusive. This is partly because our European allies have less confidence in conventional defense than some American systems analysts. History teaches them that deterrence with conventional weapons is a chancy enterprise. For hundreds of years Europeans have seen wars break out between armies that were thought to be evenly matched. (Even at the outset of World War II the French army was considered to be--and in fact was--superior in numbers and equipment to the German army.) In conventional war, leadership, concentration of force, and tactics, play a role which make systems analysis calculations a hazardous guide. It can be no accident that all wars in the postwar period have broken out where there were no American forces and no nuclear weapons.

NATO has never solved its perennial problem: the proper mix between conventional and nuclear forces and the appropriate strategy for the use of nuclear weapons albeit as a last resort. The doctrine of flexible response was to resolve these issues. But NATO is still some distance from a conventional capability that could sustain itself for even the thirty days envisaged in some scenarios. And the elaboration of a doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons runs into two obstacles: Some anti-nuclear groups insist that nuclear war must necessarily be all-out extermination of civilians lest governments be tempted into nuclear adventures. Some of our allies start at the opposite end of the political spectrum but reach the same conclusion: that

3

anything less than the threat of all-out war would weaken
deterrence.

However, statesmanship and morality both demand that so
long as nuclear weapons exist governments seek ways to limit
their use and to terminate any war before it turns into a
world holocaust. In a world of tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons, it is reckless to teach that any nuclear incident
must automatically escalate into a cataclysm. If the worst
happens--for whatever reason--governments have an obligation
to humanity and to history to limit the consequences. Only
nihilists or abstract ideologues can shirk that duty.

The situation is made more complex because in nearly every NATO country the consensus on defense and foreign policy has broken down. As a result, national security policy is too often overwhelmed by domestic politics. The result has been an unworthy debate in which for example the recent American proposals on modernization are presented by critics as a means of shifting the risks of nuclear devastation to Europe.

Competitive avoidance of nuclear risk cannot possibly
be the basis of NATO strategy. It is essential to develop a
strategy that distributes risks equitably but effectiveness
must be the ultimate outcome. This is why the issue of
modernization should become the occasion for a careful and
bipartisan reappraisal of NATO strategy and arms control
policy. Otherwise the Alliance will be left with a
precarious combination of the formal NATO doctrine of
flexible response which, however, now has to be applied
under conditions of nuclear stalemate, growing nuclear
pacifism, a subtle Soviet strategy to separate the US and
Europe -- especially in the nuclear field -- and continued
inadequacies in conventional forces.

INF and NATO Modernization

Divisive trends have been magnified by the INF
agreement. This is not the occasion to analyze the merits
of what will soon be an accomplished fact. If the Senate
were to refuse ratification, domestic pressures in all
European countries would force the withdrawal of these
missiles in any event. The current choice is between
unilateral withdrawal or the quid pro quo envisaged in the
agreement.

To understand the impact of this state of affairs some
discussion of the background of INF is important. The
formal justification for INF as a counterbalance to the
Soviet SS-20's was always a mistake and led directly to the
so-called zero option. The INF weapons were never aimed at
the SS-20's. Their ultimate justification was to prevent
the nuclear blackmail of Europe by linking the strategic
defense of Europe with that of the United States. With

4

CYJ

intermediate range American weapons in Europe the Soviets could not threaten Europe selectively; any nuclear attack and any successful conventional attack would trigger an American counterblow from European installations since the Soviets would have to calculate that the United States would use its missiles before they were overrun. Hence the Soviets would have to attack the missiles if they used even conventional weapons in Europe; that in turn would trigger a counterblow on Soviet territory. Were the war confined to Europe this would inflict an unacceptable level of damage on the Soviet Union. But the Soviets could escape this challenge only by initiating general nuclear war against US territory--a decision out of proportion to any likely objective. Hence the defense of Europe and the US were "coupled."

INF in short was a reassurance for defense-minded Europeans that America would use its nuclear capability on behalf of Europe's survival. But the defense-oriented leaders in Europe faced bitter opposition. In the end the INF missiles were introduced only after riots and demonstrations that shook the domestic tranquility of many countries for months. It is impossible to understand the psychological impact of the INF agreement without considering what the current leaders went through when the missiles were installed.

The NATO challenge can thus be summed up as follows:

- The INF agreement and the pressures it generates against the remaining nuclear systems places the predominant burden of nuclear defense on weapons based in the United States or at sea.

- In the process, many Europeans are convinced a gap is being created that in time will enable the Soviet Union to threaten Europe while sparing the United States. In technical terms, the defenses of the two sides of the Atlantic may be "decoupled."

- This fear is all the greater because the Soviet conventional superiority has not been reduced. The threat that generated NATO in the first place remains intact.

- The modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear weapons must be seen in this context. The Atlanticists in the Federal Republic have been traumatized by the removal of intermediate range weapons. They fear another change in American position while the critics of US policy feel confirmed in their view. Both now tend to unite against a scheme that can be represented as making Germany a nuclear battlefield. Sentiment is therefore being generated for the removal of these missiles--the third zero option. And modernization of short-range weapons is likely to face the same domestic opposition as the intermediate range weapons a decade ago.

5

On the other hand, the denuclearization of the Federal Republic--the nearly inevitable consequence of the third zero option--would create profound splits in the Alliance. A nuclear free zone logically implies the adoption of a "no first use" concept, because otherwise the zone would still be under nuclear threat from weapons outside. And once the alliance has proclaimed that it would not use nuclear weapons first, it is committed to accepting defeat with conventional weapons rather than escalating to nuclear war. Once the principle of defeat is accepted the neutralization of Central Europe, the goal of Soviet policy for 40 years, will be nearly complete. The nuclear armed members of NATO would be asked to assume risks on behalf of the Federal Republic which that country is not prepared to run for itself--an impossible state of affairs.

## The Future of the Atlantic Alliance

A single statement can do no more than outline directions. A complete policy must emerge out of a detailed debate within the United States as well as within the Alliance. But restoration of the unity of the Atlantic Alliance must be a prime objective of American foreign policy; without it a continuation of current East-West negotiations will lead to the unravelling of all that has been achieved by forty years of bipartisan foreign policy.

### a. A Coherent NATO Strategy

The ambiguities that have beset NATO for forty years--some of which have been outlined above--must be overcome. On the part of the United States it requires an end to the rhetoric that America's goal in East-West negotiation is the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. Such a goal is neither possible nor desirable and Western leaders do their publics a disservice if they shrink from avowing this truth. Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have been produced by the superpowers; hundreds by medium-sized countries; dozens by recent entrants into the nuclear club. No scheme of disarmament could account for all these weapons. Nations would insist on residual forces to protect themselves against cheating, or against the fact that the factories that produced the weapons would remain, or, should by some improbable chance these too be destroyed, against the knowledge in the minds of men from which these factories and weapons sprang in the first place. Mankind cannot unlearn the secret of the atom. For the immediate future--even assuming forseeable reductions--that level will remain quite high; the real issue before us will be the nature of deterrence, and its components.

6

CYD

At the same time our European allies have an obligation to face strategic and technological realities. Too many of them create the impression that deterrence can be separated from defense and that it depends entirely on the vastness of the threat. But deterrence in fact is the product of the threat and credibility. If credibility is zero even the most devastating threat will amount to nothing. Europe has a right to insist that the United States use all the means necessary to stop Soviet aggression. It can have no interest in a strategy that has the end of all civilized life as its inevitable corollary. The elaboration of other options is in the interest of both sides of the Atlantic.

It is therefore urgent to end the demoralizing debate over which side of the Atlantic is seeking to escape what risks and responsibilities. The goal must be an effective defense at tolerable cost. The deterrent threat cannot be separated from what the Alliance is prepared to implement without opening a psychological gap which sooner or later will tempt aggressive conduct.

## b. Arms Control Policy

The idea of arms control is novel, if not revolutionary. Developed in its present form in the 1950's arms control strove explicitly for stability by reducing the incentive for surprise attack not through arms but through agreement. The historically extraordinary notion emerged that a country's vulnerability was a strategic asset; with the civil populations of both sides at risk--so the argument ran--neither side would dare to launch its weapons. Arms control theory contributed--in the West--to an aversion to defensive weapons; it also caused every offensive system to be subjected to extended scrutiny lest it somehow "destabilize" the military equation. Never before in history had military policy been judged by such criteria; the Soviets for their part have shown no such inhibitions in their unilateral weapons decisions.

This is not the place for an analysis of arms control theory which included many valuable and indispensable insights. However, arms control, to be effective, requires an unusually delicate understanding of the elements of strategy. Nations had often suffered catastrophe in the past even when they fancied themselves superior; negotiating equality with an adversary calls for an unprecedentedly sophisticated analysis. The measurement of equality has been maddeningly complicated by the novelty of the weapons, by the asymmetry in the design of the weapons systems of the two sides, in their geostrategic positions and in the unpredictability of technological developments. Thus even were the Soviets ready for a serious effort, negotiations would be difficult because the weapons of the two sides are

7

designed by different criteria and serve different strategic ends.

Since its early days, arms control theory has developed a life of its own. It used to be argued that arms negotiations should be an essential complement to broader strategic and foreign policies. Today the tail comes close to wagging the dog. Care must be taken lest esoteric arms control schemes become an end in themselves thereby eliminating any relationship to defense strategy.

The issue of NATO modernization illustrates the point. Before the INF agreement modernizing the Lance weapons stationed in the Federal Republic was considered an internal NATO matter not subject to international discussion. The INF agreement has turned it into an East-West issue. Modernization is opposed by the Soviets with the argument that it violates the non-circumvention clause of the INF agreement. And it is opposed by significant segments of German political opinion because it allegedly singles out the Federal Republic for nuclear risk. The so-called "compromises"--linking modernization to some new arms control measure--nevertheless accept the principle of denuclearization of the Federal Republic; the controversy concerns the price.

All this repeats the INF experience. None of the schemes account for the fact that the Soviet Union as a nation state will retain the capacity for nuclear threats while NATO as an alliance in need of 16 sovereign decisions gradually loses that capacity as nuclear weapons are being delegitimized while the conventional inferiority remains. Even assuming full compliance with foreseeable agreements the Soviet Union will always retain categories of weapons on that part of its national territory outside the agreement from which it can launch a threat to Europe. But the removal of categories of weapons in NATO denuclearizes nations--not parts of a national territory. Hence it throws an increasing burden of decision on the United States and elaborates different perspectives between the US and Europe and between the nuclear and non-nuclear countries within Europe.

This is all the more worrisome because NATO depends on nuclear weapons more than the Soviet Union. Finally, large reductions in START work against the discriminating use of nuclear weapons and hence underline the declining credibility of the threat of general nuclear war at a time when the INF negotiations force ever greater reliance on a nuclear strategy founded on weapons based in the United States or at sea. In short, arms control policy and alliance strategy must be brought into harmony lest they paralyze each other. Or else arms control becomes a device by which the Soviet Union gains a veto over Western defense policy without meaningful reciprocity.

8

### c. A Larger Role for Europe.

In the early days of NATO the United States had first an atomic monopoly and later a huge nuclear superiority coupled with economic predominance. It was inevitable in these circumstances that the Alliance structure came to be dominated by America. But since then Europe has recovered economically and restored some of its military strength. Britain and France have developed nuclear forces of their own. In the process, existing arrangements have become unbalanced. When one country dominates the alliance on all major issues--when that country chooses weapons and decides deployments, conducts the arms-control negotiations, sets the tone for East-West diplomacy and creates the framework for relations with the Third World--little incentive remains for a serious European effort to redefine the requirements of security or to coordinate foreign policies. Such joint efforts entail sacrifices and carry political costs. Leaders are not likely to make the sacrifice or incur the cost unless they feel responsible for the results.

An imbalance such as the one now existing cannot be corrected by "consultation," however meticulous. In the long run, consultation works only when those being consulted have a capacity for independent action. Then each side takes the other seriously; then each side knows that the other's consent has to be won. Otherwise consultation becomes "briefing." Agreement reflects not conviction but acquiescence for want of an alternative.

Moreover, military dependence on another nation has a cumulative impact. When dependence no longer results from wartime destruction but from a policy choice, made under conditions of relative prosperity, it can breed guilt, self-hatred and a compulsion to display independence of the senior partner wherever doing so is safe, especially with regard to some Third World issues, the Middle East and certain aspects of East-West relations.

For all these reasons the United States has a positive interest in encouraging the evolution of a more autonomous European voice in security matters. During the entire postwar period it has been an axiom of American policy that for all the temporary irritation it might cause us, a strong, United Europe was an essential component of the Atlantic partnership. We have applied that principle, insofar as it depended on American actions, in all areas except security. With respect to defense, the US has been indifferent at best--at least since the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954--to any sort of Europeanization. Many seem to fear that a militarily unified Europe might give less emphasis to transatlantic relations and thus weaken the common security.

9

CJD

The opposite is almost certainly the case. In the economic field, integration was bound to lead to transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination. What defines a Common Market, after all, is that its external barriers are higher than its internal ones. In the field of defense, by contrast, increased European responsibility and unity would almost certainly promote closer cooperation with the US. A Europe analyzing its security needs in a responsible manner would be bound to find association with the US essential. Unity in defense matters would also enable the Federal Republic to escape the fear of isolation and enable the Atlanticists to resist nationalist tendencies.

Greater unity in defense would also help to overcome the logistical nightmare caused by the attempt of every European nation to stretch already inadequate defense efforts across the whole panoply of weapons. For example, there are at least five kinds of battle tanks within NATO, different types of artillery and different standards for calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. In a major conflict, it would be a herculean task to keep this hodgepodge of forces supplied.

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance requires Europe to develop greater identity and coherence in the field of defense. I am not talking about traditional "burden sharing", paying more for the existing effort. I have in mind something more structural--a more rational balance of responsibilities. The present allocation of responsibilities fails to bring the allies to reflect naturally about either security or political objectives. Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative in changing the present arrangement, lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise or antagonize the United States. There is no foreseeable East-West conflict in which Europe will not be better off with American support. This is why, if the British and French can agree on coordinating their nuclear forces, the United States should encourage it as an important first step toward a greater European role in the joint nuclear defense. Above all the United States should make clear that European union on defense matters will be viewed as strengthening not weakening Atlantic ties.

## East-West Relations.

Too many in the West seek to escape their dilemmas by taking refuge in the personality of Gorbachev. Without entering into the debate as to the long range purposes of the Soviet leader, the democracies cannot make themselves dependent on a single personality, especially as every Soviet leader except Lenin has been disavowed by his successor.

10

Gorbachev's personality is no doubt striking. But is it wise to treat his person as the deus ex machina to solve all the West's dilemmas--a communist leader who will bring peace and tranquility without any real effort on the part of the free countries? Do these attitudes do justice to the actual choices facing the Soviet leadership? It is easy to forget that Gorbachev has emerged at the top of what must be the toughest competition in the world--one in which losers are rarely heard from again. He has never wavered from basic communist doctrine. And how could he, never having held any position other than as a member of the communist hierarchy?

Reality no doubt imposes at least a respite on Soviet foreign adventurism, perhaps even an end to it no matter who governs in Moscow. But Gorbachev, as any prudent leader, is unlikely to court unnecessary domestic problems. He will not volunteer changes in political and strategic arrangements that powerful factions within his bureaucracy would find unpalatable. Obviously, he will push those programs most advantageous to his own country.

More fundamental issues must be addressed. What exactly is it that the West wants the Soviet Union to stop doing? What is the American and Western notion of cooperative conduct? In the contemporary situation is glasnost or human rights progress enough, or are other changes necessary? Can four centuries of Russian expansionism be due to personalities, or do they reflect more permanent geopolitical and strategic elements? The absence of criteria causes domestic disputes to fester. The reluctance to endow peaceful coexistence with political content produces an overemphasis on numerical nostrums and threatens to open up a gap between strategy and arms-control policy in which each checkmates the other.

I do not know how Gorbachev would react if presented with a comprehensive program that would reduce nuclear and conventional weapons simultaneously. Or how he would respond to a serious attempt to discuss the US-Soviet role in the world a decade or so ahead of us. I am convinced that he has the intelligence and imagination to make a significant and constructive response. And if he refused, we would at least understand the nature of the challenge better than we do now.

## Conflicts Outside the NATO Area.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a response to the fear of Soviet aggression against Europe. At that time, 40 years ago, the United States had a huge nuclear superiority and was dominant economically, while Europe was only beginning its recovery from the war. Conflicts outside Europe were produced by the process of decolonization; the

11

Soviet role in them was relatively minor. The United
States, reluctant to be involved in colonial wars, insisted
that the obligations of the Atlantic Treaty did not extend
outside of Europe.

Since then, conditions have changed dramatically.
Europe has recovered its economic dynamism and is moving,
although fitfully, toward political unity. The fear of
Soviet invasion has diminished. American nuclear
superiority has been replaced by rough parity with the
Soviet Union, and European allies increasingly question the
credibility of the nuclear deterrent.

But on the issue of relationships towards third area
conflicts the early problem remains almost unchanged,
although the two sides of the Atlantic have exchanged their
roles. Now it is Europe that insists that the treaty's
obligations do not extend to the developing world. And it
is Europe that feels free to dissociate itself from US
actions where indigenous upheavals and Soviet efforts to
outflank the alliance produce contemporary crises.

That process of dissociation has been accelerating for
at least 15 years. During the 1973 Israel-Arab War, Britain
and West Germany refused to grant the US permission to use
American bases for reconnaissance--or blocked American arms
shipments to the Middle East from their territories. Allied
governments almost unanimously opposed American policy
toward Iran during the hostage crisis, on Central America
and Grenada. To be sure, cooperation in the Persian Gulf
has been much better. But as Europe develops its own
autonomy explicit arrangements for third area conflicts and
tolerable dissociation become more important. The Alliance
will be weakened if interests considered vital by one
partner are consistently neglected by the other.

[c]

Mr. Chairman,

## NATO Strategy

[c]

2

[c]

3

Competitive avoidance of nuclear risk cannot possibly
be the basis of NATO strategy. It is essential to develop a
strategy that distributes risks equitably but effectiveness
must be the ultimate outcome. This is why the issue of
modernization should become the occasion for a careful and
bipartisan reappraisal of. NATO strategy and arms control
policy. Otherwise the Alliance will be left with a
precarious combination of the formal NATO doctrine of
flexible response which, however, now has to be applied
under conditions of nuclear stalemate, growing nuclear
pacifism, a subtle Soviet strategy to separate the US and
Europe -- especially in the nuclear field -- and continued
inadequacies in conventional forces.

INF and NATO Modernization

[c]

4

5

[cc]

The ambiguities that have beset NATO for forty years--some of which have been outlined above--must be overcome. On the part of the United States it requires an end to the rhetoric that America's goal in East-West negotiation is the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. Such a goal is neither possible nor desirable and western leaders do their publics a disservice if they shrink from avowing this truth. Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have been produced by the superpowers; hundreds by medium-sized countries; dozens by recent entrants into the nuclear club. No scheme of disarmament could account for all these weapons. Nations would insist on residual forces to protect themselves against cheating, or against the fact that the factories that produced the weapons would remain, or, should by some improbable chance these too be destroyed, against the knowledge in the minds of men from which these factories and weapons sprang in the first place. Mankind cannot unlearn the secret of the atom. For the immediate future--even assuming forseeable reductions--that level will remain quite high; the real issue before us will be the nature of deterrence, and its components.

6

[c]

## b. Arms Control Policy

7

[c]

8

[x]

9

## East-West Relations.

[10]

10

11

Conclusion

This is a vast agenda. And it cannot possibly be
accomplished except in a bipartisan setting. The national
security interest of the United States does not change every
four or eight years. That possibility makes us a factor of
instability. Weapons decisions, arms control strategy and
serious diplomacy have a lead time longer than the term of
office of a single Presidency. There will always be
disagreements over tactics; but the fundamental issues must
be settled. It should be the highest priority of a new
Administration and of both sides of the Congress.

[x]

Mr. Chairman,

## NATO Strategy

2

3

[x]

INF and NATO Modernization

4

5

6

## b. Arms Control Policy

[d]

7

8

### C. A Larger Role for Europe.

[v]

9

## East-West Relations.

10

Gorbachev's personality is no doubt striking. But is it wise to treat his person as the deus ex machine to solve all the West's dilemmas--a communist leader who will bring peace and tranquility without any real effort on the part of the free countries? Do these attitudes do justice to the actual choices facing the Soviet leadership? It is easy to forget that Gorbachev has emerged at the top of what must be the toughest competition in the world--one in which losers are rarely heard from again. He has never wavered from basic communist doctrine. And how could he, never having held any position other than as a member of the communist hierarchy?

11

## Conclusion

SAM NUNN, GEORGIA, CHAIRMAN

JOHN C. STENNIS, MISSISSIPPI

J. JAMES EXON, NEBRASKA

CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS

JEFF BINGAMAN, NEW MEXICO

ALAN J. DIXON, ILLINOIS

JOHN GLENN, OHIO

ALBERT GORÉ, JR., TENNESSEE

TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, COLORADO

RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA

JOHN W. WARNER, VIRGINIA

STROM THURMOND, SOUTH CAROLINA

GORDON J. HUMPHREY, NEW HAMPSHIRE

WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE

DAN QUAYLE, INDIANA

PETE WILSON, CALIFORNIA

PHIL GRAMM, TEXAS

STEVEN D. SYMMS, IDAHO

JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA

ARNOLD L. PUNARO, STAFF DIRECTOR

CARL M. SMITH, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

December 22, 1987

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Suite 102
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

DEC 28 1987

Dear Henry:

During late January and February 1988, the Senate Armed
Services Committee will conduct a second series of hearings on
U.S. national security strategy and its military strategy
component. The Committee's initial hearings during 1987 addressed
a full range of strategy topics. The next series will focus
primarily on strategy for NATO defense. Senate consideration of
the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty will make
examination of the broader context of NATO's security posture
particularly timely. During the hearings, the Committee will also
review the treaty itself, in coordination with the Foreign
Relations and Select Intelligence Committees.

The details of the Committee's hearing schedule have not been
fully developed. Nonetheless, at this early date, we want to
extend an invitation for you to appear before the Committee during
these important hearings. We will provide you with the specific
program as soon as possible. An early indication of your
agreement in principle to testify would be appreciated.

The Committee's hearings will focus on five principal topics:

1. assessment of NATO's current security posture;

2. formulation and articulation of NATO's future political and military objectives, strategic concepts for attaining them, and supporting policies and resource decisions;

3. within the broader context of item #2, special emphasis on objectives, concepts, and policies for conventional arms reductions;

4. examination of the INF Treaty in the context of NATO's current security posture and the strategic direction formulated for the future; and

5. review of key features of the INF Treaty, including its verification provisions.

Mr. Chairman,

NATO Strategy

3

CYJ

C]J

8

CYD

INF and NATO Modernization

To understand the impact of this state of affairs some discussion of the background of INF is important. The formal justification for INF as a counterbalance to the Soviet SS-20's was always a mistake and led directly to the so-called zero option. The INF weapons were never aimed at the SS-20's. Their ultimate justification was to prevent the nuclear blackmail of Europe by linking the strategic defense of Europe with that of the United States. With intermediate range American weapons in Europe the Soviets

10

LYJ

could not threaten Europe selectively; any nuclear attack
and any successful conventional attack would trigger an
American counterblow from European installations since the
Soviets would have to calculate that the United States would
use its missiles before they were overrun. Hence the
Soviets would have to attack the missiles if they used even
conventional weapons in Europe; that in turn would trigger a
counterblow on Soviet territory. Were the war confined to
Europe this would inflict an unacceptable level of damage on
the Soviet Union. But the Soviets could escape this
challenge only by initiating general nuclear war against US
territory--a decision out of proportion to any likely
objective. Hence the defense of Europe and the US were
coupled.

||

CYD

-- This fear is all the greater because the Soviet
conventional superiority has not been reduced. The threat
that generated NATO in the first place remains intact.

-- The modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear
weapons must be seen in this context. The Atlanticists in
the Federal Republic have been traumatized by the removal of
intermediate range weapons. They fear another change in
American position while the critics of US policy feel
confirmed in their view. Both now tend to unite against a
scheme that can be represented as making Germany a nuclear
battlefield. Sentiment is therefore being generated for the
removal of these missiles--the third zero option. And
modernization of short-range weapons is likely to face the
same domestic opposition as the intermediate range weapons a
decade ago.

13

CYJ

a. A Coherent NATO Strategy

CYD

b. Arms Control Policy