DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

9:50 a.m.

11/16/71

R: When I was talking Geo. Bush was here. I think the President is concerned about the whole picture, particularly the political picture. I think the 4 of us should sit down with him.

K: I understand very well and I will ask him.

R: I think he should see the speech.

K: This office is not usually accused of being too soft.

R: He has a political problem and unless he looks at the speech he won't understand if as well. You can imagine the conservatives who read it will crack at it.

K: We are putting something in they will recognize,

R: I think if George does it it will be kept out of Washington.

K: I agree.

R: It will help the President with the conservative types.

K: Where should George do it?

R: I want to be sure the President has a chance to react so he doesn't think we have missed the boat. My own judgment is that he will say when he gets out up there to say he has no comment and any comments he has he will make at the UN in NY and that will keep it in NY.

K: We have a statement that is ready. If he makes it in NY it can be longer. Otherwise it will be two paragraphs.

R: If he says he will wait until NY --

K: When is he out of committee?

R: In an hour. He will call me when he gets out. He can make a statement when he gets back to NY and say he was sorry about making the statement in the initial speech.

K: I will have this in a few minutes and get it to you.

R: One thing that is disappointing is that they did singled us out. The implied the Russians but they attacked us by name several times. The part on VN is gratitutous. I need information on your trip.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELOCN
Rogers/Kissinger

10:15 a.m. 11/16/71

K: I am sending over something that we recommend that George say. It's drawn from rebuttal sentences that I said there and which Chou will recognize. How can we get it to him?

R: We will send it. We have some wording too. I will compare them.

K: I complained to Chou when they had signs up. I returned a sign like that in my room and it was left by mistake. Next day Chou said it was empty cannons of rhetoric. So I said it was unfortunate that there had to be empty cannons of rhetoric.

R: OK, that's good.

K: I will not call George.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Fob 12/57
By L/P NARA Date 6-1-57

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin

11/16/71 11:45 a.m.

K: I wanted to wish you a happy birthday.

D: Thank you very much. That's very thoughtful. I just received something from you. Even before seeing it I would like to thank you very much.

K: It was only to tell you that I wish you well and hope we can cooperate for a long time.

D: I hope so too. It was very thoughtful of you. I just received a telegram that they want me in Moscow for the plenum of the Central Committee.

K: When?

D: Monday.

K: So we can still meet here.

D: Yes. I am leaving Friday. They are discussing foreign affairs.

K: So it will still be Thursday at 8:30?

D: Yes.

K: And I hope you can take some time off and celebrate today.

D: I will be seeing my old friend Goldmann . . .

K: Yes, hiw son was a student of mine.

D: He told me. We first met in around 1957. Dag Hammerskold (?) was a good friend of ours. He is the only guest I have on my birthday. But he doesn't know it.

K: All the best to you. Whatever else may happen, I have always enjoyed working with you. You have always represented your country flexibly and honorably.

D: And I have always enjoyed working with you. Until Thursday . . .

K: Yes, Thursday.

D: Thank you very much.

TELECON
Secretary Connally

11/16/71 11:50 a.m.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

K: Three things. If you would send over a paragraph for each country you visited for a Presidential letter that would show he had some personal awareness of the concerns they expressed, and we'll add some general reflections to it. That would be very helpful.

C: All right.

K: Secondly, I ran into Cromer and he mentioned to me that this Dutchman is running loose.

C: He is.

K: My views are that you ought to be doing this.

C: Yes.

K: We can't have three or four guys peddling ideas.

C: I agree, and Arthur and I have had words about it. Anyway, I don't think he will do any harm.

K: I don't know what he is doing.

C: No one does.

K: But I think when we move in the direction of a solution we should be going in our own way.

C: I agree.

K: I think you ought to call the shots on it.

C: Burns went ahead. He said he had talked with me but he didn't. I gave the guy instructions, but what he's done has far exceeded what we talked about

K: I told Cromer I didn't know about it, that I knew his instructions didn't come from the White House.

C: I think he's given him some ______ ideas -- I hate to say that.

K: Third, in connection with our discussion yesterday, the Beecher story on the New York Times front page about the proposal made to the President which he rejected -- on troop withdrawals -- and now we find it on the front page of the NYT. He did this deliberately for a complicated game. It could have gone eight months. But we wanted to create maximum uncertainty in Hanoi's mind. So now they've gone ahead and leaked it anyway.

C: Jesus Christ! It makes me want to . . . . . Okay Henry.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Wm. Sullivan/Kissinger

11:55 a. m.

11/16/71

S: He said all the right things at the right place and a positive gain all around and he left the Japanese at the point where they are asking what they can do for us. I have been catching up on things and Porter called from Paris this morning. On the statement in Thursday morning.

K: We want him to tread water.

S: How will.

K: No waves made.

S: On the third point, where the President singles out ceasefire and of war. Do you want them emphasized or slipped over quietly?

K: Slipped over quietly this week.

S: One other question. They had to do with the statement our Secy. made on rehabilitation which he wanted to bring in. A comment on that.

K: I wouldn't object to that. If he does it in a mild way.

S: Everything is under control except for the aid bill.

K: The fact that Chinese clients are not following the script.

S: That's expected. I sat across from him 18 months in Geneva (?) and he never said anything else.

K: didn't ask for a deadline or replacement for Thieu.

S: Maybe a problem for Hanoi because they said it so mildly.

K: That's what I think.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Rabin/Kissinger

2:19 p. m

11/16/71

K: I talked with the President about the PM visit. He will see her if she announces that she is coming for something and in connection asks for an appointment with him.

R: What's the date?

K: We haven't set it. Between the 5th and 10th. That might slip. We could to it as early as the second or third probably.

R: I understand that she wants as soon as possible.

K: She has to have a plausible reason. Can you turn off Dayan?

R: If it's between the 2nd and 5th I can arrange that he will not come.

K: I think it's a mistake that Rogers and Laird talk with Dayan. There will be so much confusion.

R: May I tell her that the President will see her if she has a plausible reason? I talked with Sisco. He wouldn't commit himslef.

K: Just ask him. He can't refuse to pass it.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Shultz/Kissinger
2:28 p. m. 11/16/71

(missed first half of conversation)

S: I don't think we can let too much time pass here myself. Let me talk with him and we can compare.

K: I don't think we should go back to him for a few days. I think you and I are the only two people that he moderately trusts.

By. NARA, Dale

5/26

TELCOM

November 16, 1971 7:10-7:15 p.m.

William Rogers/Henry Kissinger

WR: Mel Laird called about seeing the President about leaks. I'm not really interested in that. I am not involved in it.

HAK: No one said you were involved in that. I don't think you even knew things....

WR: No, no one knew.

HAK: No, I was with the President when he was discussing it with Mitchell and there wasn't the slightest notation that you were. I can assure you that. You can see the President on this issue if you want though.

WR: No, I don't care to see him about it. I think Mel was getting me into the action.

HAK: One other thing. I told the President we were to have ______ made but not on TV. Otherwise he agreed. I agreed with it, but said it would be better on TV.

WR: I read over the summary of your conversations-- they are interesting.

HAK: Well, I took a little time putting it together.

WR: It shows we have a hard row to hoe. If the President gets absorbed in the problem a little more, it would be better. They have taken a hard line.

HAK: Yes, I agree. and they are doing it much subtler than the Russians.

WR: I think we have positioned us well domestically.

HAK: Yes, it was well done. I think it is good you put it the way you did.

WR: If you haven't had any contact with someone for 22 years and this trip has a good climate, then this is a good sign. Maybe if I suggest to the President that he read it carefully

HAK: I have already done that

WR: Oh, then we could sit down and go over it. It spells out the problem areas --it is something we should be fearful of.

HAK: Absolutely, no it isn't a joy ride.

WR:

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

President/Henry Kissinger

November 16, 1971 7:25-7:30 p.m.

RN: I just got a report. We struck out on Amadore, but we will try to get Renchard. Amadore won't do it--his wife won't go along with it. We could get that fellow Reneau--do you think we should take Stuzzel?

HAK: I think of the foreign service officers--he is the best.

RN: He wouldn't get into trouble. We couldn't find anybody else. How about Nitze--he is strong. He is establishmentarian--doesn't see things my way a lot of times.

HAK: He is tough-minded and a protege of Acheson. I would be very much for him. Smith would give an endorsement.

RN: Nitze though--Fulbright has it in for him.

HAK: But NATO is different.

RN: We will have to fight it. The whole of Washington would be for him--he is honorable and behaves well. I think he would like it. Ask Stuart (?) what he thinks of him.

By. NARA. Date 5/26

TELCORN

Ambassador Rabin/Mr. Kissinger

8:00 p.m., November 16, 1971

K: I won't be available tomorrow so I thought I would find out what you wanted to talk to me about.

R: I wanted to talk to you about two items. One was the Joe Sisco request. I didn't tell him that she would come any how. The UGA -- now it is final that she will talk on the 11th. Available anytime before that. They asked me if anybody knew about it and if there was contact with the White House. I said, "No."

K: Did they tell you not to have any?

R: Almost.

K: If he doesn't push it up to me, then I could say that you mentioned it --

R: I said it until 5:00.

K: Thursday I could say you called in yesterday and mentioned it.

R: Fine. He said, "Of course she would like to see the Secretary too," and I said, "Of course, she would like to see the Secretary." Joe said it would be impolite not to see the Secretary and what could I say.

K: Of course, I think she should see the Secretary anyway.

R: Between the 6th and the 11th. I put it this way to Joe.

K: It is acceptable and the President will accept it.

R: The second point I would like to mention to you is Mr. Goldmann came to see me in my office. He saw the Russian Ambassador, Mr. Dobrynin.

K: Yeah.

R: And Dobrynin said to him that he was sure the Middle East will be brought up in the Summit meeting and one of the issues to be discussed. Goldmann asked Dobrynin if this is the situation, there must be certain preparations and certain discussions and according to Goldmann, Dobrynin said, "Yes, of course, there are two possible ways: negotiate with the U.S. Government, either with Sisco or

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Rabin/Mr. Kissinger

8:00 p.m., November 16, 1971 -- page 2

R: (cont'd) Dr. Kissinger. With Sisco, it is not serious and Dobrynin prefers to do it with Dr. Kissinger and he believes that this kind of talk must start quite soon. Mr. Goldmann asked, "Well, do you think it will start soon?" No answer -- but expects it would be quite soon. Dobrynin expects to leave Monday (?) to go to the Central Committee meeting.

K: Yes, he called me and told me. It gives me a good excuse to delay an answer.

R: Good way to keep him informed.

K: Do you believe that?

R: No, when a Russian says something, I do not believe it. But Goldmann was very much impressed. I only had about 40 minutes to talk with him.

K: It is an objective. What will happen?

R: I made it very clear. I was willing to keep Goldmann in the picture to the extent he would like to and I wanted to let you know. He promised Mrs. Meir that he would inform her about my talks with Dobrynin and it seems that Dobrynin talks ......... Well, he serves his own purpose.

K: Well, I never had any doubt about that at any rate. It doesn't make any difference.

R: No, the problem is he talks about it and I don't know to whom else he would talk about it.

K: Well, I got the picture. I have some experience in dealing with him. When it becomes essential, I will slap him down. At this point, it doesn't make any difference.

R: Goldmann was so excited about it. He is always excited by Dobrynin, I know it.

K: Up to now, that is not incorrect.

R: In most cases he was not completely incorrect in the past when he had discussions with Dobrynin. All right.

By. NARA, Date. 5/26

TELCOM

Amb. Rabin/Mr. Kissinger

8:00 p.m, November 16, 1971 -- page 3

K: Good, I will -- you will let me know when you have an answer to our conversation of this morning.

R: Yeah.

K: I will let you know when I have an answer to your formal request.

R: Only at 5:00 this afternoon.

K: If you had accepted the interim agreement, I would know it by now.

R: (laughter)
No,

K: I mean in proximity.

R: This would not have been it. (laughter)

K: You will give me advance warning before you do.

R: Okay, bye, bye.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

8:12 p.m., November 16, 1971

P: What do you think on this Nitze thing?

K: I think it is a good idea. I asked Stewart Alsop and he thinks it is a good idea.

P: Take a run at that. Another one that occurred to me in that same league -- no, no, it wouldn't work. The Nitze thing would be so unusual coming off the Arms Control and the fact that he has taken a strong support on this. He has hasn't he?

K: Yes, he would be a good NATO man. You might want to think about it overnight. He is in Vienna so I would have to call him there.

P: Oh, yes, we will think about it and talk about it in the morning. How did you get along with Stuart?

K: He is with us.

P: Good. Okay, Henry.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Marvin Kalb

11/16/71 p. m.

HK: I think we've sufficiently demonstrated that we don't want anything from a PR point of view.

MK: I told your secretary you had the best excuse in town.

HK: Or else the President found out who I was going to have lunch with and would have none of it. How about next Tuesday?

MK: Fine.

HK: Again at 1:15 and at the Metropolitan Club. I suggest that because it ought to reduce the chances of having happen what happened today. Or Let's say 1:00.

MK: Fine.