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arms. This means that Sadat must tie Egypt organically to the Soviets. The Russians can use the threat of withholding arms as a big level against Egyptians. But as long as the Russians know that Egypt would lose a war to Israel, and as long as they know that the United States will not allow Russian supplies to Egypt to change the balance of power in the Middle East, the situation will remain delicately balanced. The Russians, of course, were very nervous when Rogers went to Cairo. This is what forced the treaty. The treaty is one thing. But the fact is that either Egypt or Russia will have to come to the United States in order to break the deadlock in the Middle East; currently the situation is one of equipoise.

**Question:** In May, President Nixon indicated that at SALT we will have both an ABM agreement and an agreement regarding offensive weapons. Now there are news reports that we will have only an ABM agreement.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I saw the article you are referring to. I must say that we have an undisciplined delegation in Helsinki. If the members of our delegation spent more time on negotiations and less time talking theory of arms strategy, we might be closer to an agreement. But one thing is clear--there will be no ABM agreement without an agreement on offensive weapons. The agreement on offensive weapons will not be difficult. The only real difficulty is in the area of submarine weapons. Russia is not causing difficulty in the offensive weapons area. The junior members of the delegation in Helsinki are theorizing on abstract grounds, not speaking about the facts of the negotiation.

**Question:** But with the Poseidon and that other long-ranged thing, aren't submarines really the key?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) There is one curious aspect about the current situation in SALT. It involves the question of whether we are freezing ourselves in an inferior position. Without the freeze we would also be in an inferior position. Exactly those people who won't vote us the money to reduce whatever gaps exist, are now claiming fear that we might freeze ourselves in an inferior position. On the ABM systems, neither our system nor the Russian system can work well enough to be wholly effective. And neither side can get to

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the other's submarines. Under those circumstances, the fair question to ask is what difference a certain amount of numerical superiority makes. But also, the SALT agreement has a clause providing for abrogration of the agreement if such comes to be in the "supreme national interest" of one participant. It is quite clear that if the Russians get far ahead in submarine missile development, we would have to act under the "supreme national interest" clause. But the real danger with the Russians involves land-based missiles. We are building and continue to build....

**Question:** Can't our Polaris missiles knock out their landbased complexes?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) No; really, only a few very optimistic Navy officers hold the view that our submarine missiles could do an effective job against their ICBM's.

**Question:** But the Polaris can do an enormous amount of damage.

**Answer:** Yes; as a retaliatory weapon, it can do tremendous damage in their cities. The fact is that their Polaris cannot aid their first strike capacity, and that ours can't hit their ICBM's. Under these circumstances for the coming few years at least on the submarine issue, it is fair to ask if all that power isn't irrelevant.

**Question:** Irrelevant?

**Answer:** Accuracy and power, of course, are two different things. Ability to deliver a payload accurately is what really counts. Changes in accuracy potentials are what could really change the strategic balance.

**Question:** How important is the Cannikin test to the SALT negotiations and to our missile programs?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The AEC and the military agree that we need the Cannikin test for the development for the new Spartan missiles. The issue is really whether it is worth it to President Nixon to really alienate the environmentalists. The test won't affect the SALT negotiations; but if we scrap the test, then we scrap the Spartan. Whether we really need the Spartan is something that can be well debated on both sides.

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You know, the problem of getting objective scientific evaluation is one that has become increasingly acute. Gentlemen, I put it to you that I can predict with 95% accuracy which scientists on any given list will oppose a military proposal and which ones will support it. The ones who will oppose it will always say either that our current system is adequate, or that a super-system will be coming in the near future which will make unnecessary the proposed development. Supporters, on the other hand, will always argue that any possible gain is so stu-pendous that it must be pursued. We simply cannot get objective scientific analysis.

**Question:** What has been the scope of debate in Russia about our intentions in the China initiative?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) In the initial stages there were misjudgments here about the effect of our China initiative on Russia. There was widespread thought that we would see a violent reaction. I remember after the China trip that three very senior State Department foreign service officers felt compelled to come to the President and declare to him that they were convinced that the China initiative would wreak havoc and disaster on our relations with the Russians. Nothing like that has happened. In fact, the Russians reactions have been the opposite. Our relations with the Russians have actually improved in recent months. I thought that first there would be a violent Russian reaction, followed by a resignation and an understanding that they had to accept the China initiative as a fact. That hasn't been the case; the degree of violence in their reaction and in their diplomacy has gone down, not up; but their nervousness has increased. They are paranoid about China. They continue to talk about collusion. How ridiculous can they be? What sort of collusion could we enter into with the Chinese? What could we do with the Chinese? Invade Russia? This insecurity on the past of the Russians is okay as long as it is not too extensive.

Gentlemen, we are not pin-pricking China either. We want to stay out of the Russian-Chinese problems as much as possible. Ours is a delicate role. We are in the balance between two paranoids. Honesty has been the key to our policy. We are going to continue to avoid cheap thrills, cheap stunts that could ruin the balance. Of course, we can err. We might do something that they misread, mis-interpret; the whole balance could be thrown off.

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**Question:** Is a meeting between President Nixon and Kosygin barred when Kosygin is on his Canada trip?

**Answer:** I doubt that trip would pose the best framework for it.

**Question:** You were here with us before, and you spoke about Allende. Much of what you said has come true.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I am very impressed by Allende's tactics. Up to now, I cannot see a single mistake that he has made. You know, we had no illusions about Allende. A man who 24 years ago, without any hope of success became the socialist opposition in Chile and who has remained there over the years is not someone whose convictions are likely to change when he comes to power. I had no thoughts that he would throw his serious convictions away. His situation is touchy. He is a minority President, and the majority in Chile has not wanted a one party system. Allende has been slicing the salami to carry out his programs without coalescing the opposition. If he continues, in three to four years Chile will have a one-party state of the socialist variety something near to communism. Already the opposition is operating without the news media and without the television. Allende has tremendous control over the economy in Chile, and if he continues to coalesce this type of control, elections can be rendered meaningless. So what about our policies? The key thing here is to isolate our interests and pursue them. We don't want to push Allende further along his anti-capitalist, anti-American course. Our problem is that if we help him, we may moderate him; but make his victory more certain. If we don't help him, we strengthen his arguments against us. We need a balance here, some economic aid, some military assistance, etc.

**Question:** Wasn't it counterproductive, then, to deny the Ex-Im loan on the planes? They are getting the planes anyway.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) We did not say to the Ex-Im Bank "Don't make the loans", what we said was "Pursue normal banking judgment". Of course, we could have forced the Ex-Im Bank to make the loans. We didn't do that.

**Question:** Are the matters regarding the expropriation of copper interests still pending?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Yes.

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**Question:** You seem so relaxed. I wonder what is most on your mind. You know, we would sleep better if we thought you weren't so relaxed, if we thought you were doing a bit more worrying.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) You know, I find that I worried more at the middle levels than I do now. Now I know that after I have done what I can, all that remains is to let events take their course. I suppose my big worry, though, is first of all Vietnam. If I had been able to meet with you in July, you would have found me quite cocky about the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. At that time, the North certainly had no hope that next year would be better than this year. I am less sure now. I still think that the North will end the war by negotiation. I simply can't believe that the North will allow President Nixon to be reelected prior to the end of the war. The North can only continue the war if they are sure that President Nixon will lose the election. Look at the times the North has made other settlements -- the bombing halt, the shape of the table. In each case, the trigger was a domestic political situation in the United States. The bombing halt came before the election; the shape of the table was something they wanted settled before President Nixon came in, to pre-empt from him the prestige of reaching such an agreement. Gentlemen, I have long known that the Vietnamese, both North and South, have an infinite capacity to break your heart; and this summer has certainly been a setback diplomatically for us. Perhaps we could have foreseen the difficulties. If it all falls apart now . . . you know this situation in Vietnam is purely coincidental. . . What an accident that the 1967 election was followed by a four-year term. Now that term has expired at the climax of Vietnamization, at a time when all elements in Washington have coalesced in the debate, arguing, for getting out! In the South, the contenders for power are all jockeying for the post-U.S. situation. Thieu, of course, needs an overwhelming demonstration of strength to maintain his power after the U.S. presence is reduced. He misunderstood our reaction to his election conduct. In 1966 and 1967, both Minh and Ky would have stayed in the race. You know, the document on election rigging that Minh had was not really all that horendous; putting aside the pages that were clearly faked, all it really evidenced was that Thieu was pressing the provincial chiefs to keep him advised. But who in Vietnam would ever have thought that the bureaucracy there would be neutral? Our view has always been that Thieu would win a two-man race overwhelmingly, and a three-man race comfortably. The interest of Minh and Ky, of course, is for each to lay a political base for the future. In 1966 and 1967, as I say, their interests would have been to stay in the race to develop these bases. But, peculiarly enough, this year a situation developed in which staying out of the election came to a way for them to build for the future. The whole structure of the crisis has been caused by the probability of our withdrawal; of course, to negotiate an end to the war successfully, we must have something in South Vietnam that is worth preserving; on this ground I am less optimistic than I was earlier in the year.

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**Question:** Could we have forestalled these developments if we had seen them coming?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I have anguished about that. But really, threatening to cut off all of our aid unless Vice President Ky was on the ballot would have simply been too cynical. After all, we wouldn't even let Ky come to the United States -- how could we then turn around 180° and say that without him in the race, there would be no fairness in the Vietnam election? We really are in a dilemma. We almost have together all of the elements necessary for a solution of the Vietnam problem. If the South blows part in chaos now, we are not going to have time to put it back together again.

**Question:** What sort of time frame are you talking about?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) We have some of our brightest staff men in Vietnam right now, trying to find out the answer to that question. You know, this Vietname issue, in our view, is not likely to be an issue politically useful to either side in the coming election. Ending the war gets us nothing. We have been promising that. If we don't end the war, I really can't imagine that the Democrats, with their history of escalation, can make too big a deal out of the small number of troops that will be left in Vietnam by election time. The real problem here is the need to end the war with dignity. We cannot make a mockery of our past policies and achievements there. What is heartbreaking now in the South, is to see the possibility that the political situation can become unstuck and that we could lose our opportunity to tie it altogether. But one thing is clear, the direction is set.

At this point Otis Chandler indicated that it was 4:00 P.M. and the meeting ended.

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