The Secretary
of State

## Press Conference

### MAJOR TOPICS: SALT Compliance, Angola, Palestine Liberation Organization

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, before I go to your questions I thought it would be helpful to review some of the SALT issues that have been raised. I will not get into a debate with aspirants to political office, either statewide or national. Therefore, I will not deal with specific testimony that may have been given except to note that no opportunity was presented to any member of the Administration to present the truth. What I would like to do is to deal with categories of assertions that have been made and then to explain the real state of affairs with respect to them.

The assertions have been made that there have been massive Soviet violations; that the Administration colluded with the Soviet Union in masking these violations; that the Administration has not pursued the issue of violations diplomatically; and that senior officials, especially the President, have not been kept informed about the facts with respect to these violations.

I would like to discuss with you the procedures that the government is following with respect to SALT compliance and illustrate them with one or two examples.

First of all, it is important to keep in mind that with respect to SALT or with respect to the strategic forces on both sides, we are dealing with military establishments of great technical complexity, that are constantly engaged in military activities. These military establishments, moreover, on both sides are in the process of constant change, so that there is great fluidity in what one observes.

December 9, 1975

Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

We are not dealing with a static situation; we are dealing with a fluid situation. Therefore, too, the information that is obtained has to go through various stages of analysis.

The first information about any event is usually extraordinarily illusive and ambiguous, and one part of the process of the government is to refine the information until we reach a point at which senior officials can make a reasonable decision. I believe it is a good working hypothesis to assume that government is not run by conspiracy but by serious people trying to come to serious conclusions about difficult topics, especially when the charge of a violation of a formal agreement is not a minor matter to be introduced into the diplomatic discourse.

Now first of all, what is meant by a violation? There are several meanings that can be attached to the notion of violation that are being used interchangeably in the current debate.

* A violation can be a deliberate violation of a SALT limitation, aimed at increasing the Soviet strategic capability in ways which the agreement was intended to preclude.

* Second, a violation can be an action inconsistent with the sense or the spirit of the agreement and tending to undermine its viability, even though it is not prohibited by the agreement. There can be borderline situations where a technical violation cannot be established, but where the activity strains the interpretation of particular provisions.

* Third, there can be unintended violations

PR 596/79

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occurring; for example, through negligence of higher officials responsible for insuring compliance by their subordinate organizations.

* Fourth, there can be actions not banned by an agreement but which complicate verification of the agreement.

* Fifth, there can be ambiguous activities resulting from differing interpretations of the provisions of the agreements.

* Sixth, there can be activities that are assessed as ambiguous due to inadequate information or misinterpretation of information which suggests a violation where in fact none exists.

I want to repeat that many compliance issues will arise initially as ambiguous activities which could apply to any of these categories. Our policy is to seek clarification of ambiguous situations as soon as there is a tangible basis for doing so and to resolve ambiguities as quickly as possible in order to preclude development of a more serious situation.

Now to go to the procedures for handling allegations of violations. Any one of these categories would be initially reported in intelligence channels, either from the Central Intelligence Agency or from the Department of Defense. The Department of State and the White House have no independent means of acquiring any of this information. There is no instance in which a reported violation was not immediately—an alleged violation—was not immediately reported to the President. And we have searched all the files of all the incidents.

I will, in a minute, discuss the handling of intelligence, and I would like to talk now about the procedures that are followed.

In order to deal with the problem of compliance, there are four institutions. There is a special intelligence committee, which was established by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the summer of 1973. This committee makes a quarterly report on the problem of SALT compliance. This committee—I'm looking now for how many meetings it has held; well, it has met quarterly since July 1973, so you can figure it out for yourselves—and all of its reports have gone directly to the President as well as to every senior member of the Administration that is dealing with the problem of strategic arms.

In addition, there are three other bodies. There is the Verification Panel of the NSC

[National Security Council]. There is the Verification Panel Working Group. And there is, of course, the NSC itself.

The Verification Panel Working Group of the NSC has met on SALT matters 11 times since the middle of 1973. The Verification Panel has met four times on SALT matters—has met four times on compliance issues exclusively since 1973. But in addition, it has met 40 times on SALT matters since 1973. Each of these meetings, each of these 40 meetings, is preceded by a CIA briefing that includes all compliance issues. So that in addition to the four formal meetings, there were 40 meetings of the Verification Panel where whatever compliance issues existed at the time were brought to the attention of the Verification Panel.

The President has been briefed on compliance matters 10 times since the middle of 1973, six times in the Administration of President Ford. There has been one NSC meeting solely devoted to compliance issues and parts of others.

The procedure is that the working group will attempt to determine what is going on and will devise either options or recommendations for consideration by the Verification Panel. The Verification Panel then reviews it and makes a recommendation or defines options. In all the meetings that I have described of the Verification Panel, there was never a split decision. The allegation that individuals or departments have held up consideration of compliance issues, have obscured consideration of compliance issues, have refused to deal with compliance issues, is a total falsehood. All the decisions of the Verification Panel with respect to compliance have been unanimous. That is to say, they were agreed to by the Department of Defense, by the [Joint] Chiefs of Staff, by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, by the Central Intelligence Agency, and by the State Department.

There is no doubt that there may have been differences of opinion in the working group as these papers were being considered. I am not familiar with these disagreements, because unless they are passed on to the Verification Panel there would be no particular reason for me to deal with them.

Let me now turn to the handling of intelligence. First of all, I think it is important to understand how the flow of information to the President is handled, because it is a rather grave matter if it can be alleged that information is being kept from

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the President of the United States. The flow of information to the President is handled in the following way:

The President receives daily, unabbreviated and without a covering summary, the President's daily brief and the daily intelligence bulletin of the Central Intelligence Agency. These are placed on his desk together with separate notes from various departments every morning and waiting for him when he comes to his office.

In the period of the Presidency of President Ford he has had, until recently, the practice of reading those two intelligence summaries in the presence not of a member of the National Security Council staff but in the presence of a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency. Therefore any intelligence item that would deal with compliance would come to his immediate attention. And in compiling a list of the various compliance issues, it is apparent that the President's daily bulletin would reflect the information of the Central Intelligence Agency, as you would expect, within no more than 2 weeks of its first appearance on a technical level.

Secondly, any memorandum from a Cabinet member or from the head of an agency is transmitted to the President, usually in those cases with a summary by the NSC staff on top of it. But never is the summary alone sent to the President. Therefore any Cabinet member, any member of the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, all have the opportunity, and know they have the opportunity, to address the President directly. Never has the Assistant to the President held up any memorandum from any of these individuals, or any other memorandum addressed to the President by the head of an agency.

However, there is no memorandum in the files by any of these individuals, by any Chief of Staff of any of the services, by any head of any department raising any of the issues that have been alleged in recent testimony. There is nobody who has claimed that the issue of compliance was not being adequately pursued. There is nobody who has objected to the handling of the information. There has been no reclama of any of the decisions of the Verification Panel, except in one case where one department that had first recommended one course of action—that course of action being not to protest a seeming issue of noncompliance because

it wanted to protect its sources of intelligence—later changed its mind and recommended that the issue be raised in the Standing Consultative Commission.

When that department changed its mind, the President agreed with that new position, and the decision of the Verification Panel was changed.

The reason there have been so few NSC meetings on the subject is because the decisions of the Verification Panel have always been unanimous, and because no member of the Panel has ever appealed to the President with a contrary view.

With respect to the handling of intelligence, all intelligence concerning alleged noncompliance was immediately distributed to all the members of the Verification Panel and by them to those of their senior members that were concerned with SALT.

For the period that a preliminary investigation was going on, the intelligence was not distributed in the technical publications that were addressed to those whose primary responsibility was not concerned with SALT at a level below the Cabinet level. The longest time this ever took place was a period of 2 months, and usually the so-called hold has been for a period of about a week or two to permit the refinement of intelligence.

There has been no case in which the intelligence was not distributed in the quarterly intelligence publication that was concerned with the question of SALT monitoring. And in no case was intelligence kept from members of the Verification Panel.

Even during the period that this refinement was going on, the United States did not feel itself precluded from taking diplomatic action. For example, in one instance, which I will get into in a minute in greater detail—in one instance there were reports of unidentified construction in Soviet missile fields. We received this report on June 20 [1973] at a time when [General Secretary] Brezhnev was in the United States. It seemed improbable that the Soviet Union would violate the agreement by blatantly building additional missile silos; and therefore, a further study of the subject was ordered.

Nevertheless, on June 26 the United States sent a note to the Soviet Union, in the Presidential channel, raising the issue of that construction, even before we had begun our detailed examination of the issue. In that case the distribution of that infor-

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mation was kept out of those journals that went to individuals not concerned with SALT matters, until August 8, when it was generally distributed. In that interval two American notes had been sent to the Soviet Union, in the Presidential channel, raising that issue.

Now as I have pointed out, the issue of compliance is an extremely complicated one, and in rummaging through the files of various departments it is not difficult to find memoranda written by subordinates who have no idea of what is going on in the overall picture, who will write down their own perceptions of what they think is happening—usually in the modern form of memoranda of conversation to themselves that nobody ever sees, on which no one can ever comment, and which appear 3 years later in a context that no one can ever discover.

But let us take the case of these missile silos. There appeared in the summer of 1973 in a number of Soviet missile fields, the beginning of some construction that clearly looked like additional silos. If these had been converted into missile silos, there was no question that they would have represented a clear violation of the agreement.

The construction of a silo generally takes 2 years to complete. And it is important for you to keep in mind, in any event, that almost any of these noncompliance events extend over a time span that, to be significant, is months and usually years, so that those of us who are engaged in policymaking, and not rhetoric, must have an opportunity to study the problem before we draw any final conclusions. And we do have this opportunity.

Now when we approached the Soviet Union within 6 days of receiving that information in the White House, we were told that these would be command and control silos and that as the construction proceeded it would become increasingly evident that they would be command and control silos.

This, incidentally, was also the judgment of our intelligence community. Our intelligence community believed that almost certainly these were command and control silos. The question being raised was whether, at some later time, they could be converted into missile silos.

It is also fair to point out that the Soviet Union, in reply, raised certain questions about certain ambiguities in American practices, which we

were not excessively anxious to have publicized, and which accounted for the fact that these exchanges were conducted in a rather less dramatic manner than some people might have thought appropriate.

There were six exchanges in this channel of increasing specificity, in which we began to advance criteria which could be met in order to assure us that these silos were in fact intended for command and control. This extended over a period of a year. At that point in 1974 we moved the discussion from the Presidential channel to the Standing Consultative Commission and made formal representations building on the previous exchanges. We have since received assurances, and I believe it is the unanimous opinion of all agencies, that we are dealing with command and control silos. We have been given criteria which seem to us for the time being adequate; and there is no agency that today disputes that this issue is for the time being quiescent, though we will be vigilant in making certain that any unusual construction activity at these silos would raise profound questions.

For a variety of reasons, including the fact that the information about alleged noncompliance inevitably involves sensitive intelligence, I cannot go through all of the allegations that have been made; though I would perhaps mention one other, which is the most serious one and which comes closest to the borderline of a possible violation, which has to do with the testing of certain antiaircraft radars in what might be considered an ABM [antiballistic missile] mode.

The issue is complicated by the fact that, at American insistence, the ABM treaty includes a provision that antiaircraft radar could be used—could be tested—in a manner in space for range instrumentation purposes. I might point out that this was our idea, and if we had not included that, that issue of the SA-5 radar could have been more rapidly resolved.

We received information that some testing was going on with respect to the SA-5 radar in 1973. At that time it was routinely distributed, and nobody paid any attention to it because it was not put into connection with a possible ABM testing program. Between April and June 1974 some more tests took place which at least raised the problem that the radar might be tracking incoming missiles. That clearly is not permitted by the

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treaty, though it raises an ambiguity with respect to whether this is done for range instrumentation purposes.

In any event, several meetings of the working group and the Verification Panel took place. The first decision in December 1974 was, on the recommendation of the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, that this issue not be raised because we did not wish to reveal the source of our intelligence.

In January 1975 the Defense Department reversed itself and recommended that the issue be raised. As a result, the issue was raised in February 1975. Since then, within a 17-day period after we had raised the issue, this activity has stopped, has not since been resumed. It was at the borderline of violation, but it has now stopped.

There are other issues, some having to do with unilateral American statements which the Soviet Union specifically disavowed. I think it is at least open to question whether the United States can hold the Soviet Union responsible for its own statements when the Soviet Union has asserted that it does not accept that interpretation. Therefore the issue of SALT compliance has been handled in a serious manner. It stands to reason that no responsible U.S. official could wish to make an agreement with the Soviet Union and permit the Soviet Union to violate it with impunity. It stands to reason that the United States would not accept noncompliance with an agreement that had any conceivable impact on the strategic equation.

I would, in fact, suggest that this debate of the allegation in which some violations are invented, and in which the lack of vigilance of the Administration is asserted, may tempt the very noncompliance which it claims to seek to avoid, because it may create the impression that the U.S. Government would make a serious agreement on a matter affecting the survival of the United States and that its senior officials would then collude in a violation of this agreement.

Let no foreign government believe that this is conceivable. And I think the time has come that we deal with each other more seriously.

I want to make just one other point before I go to your questions. That point concerns the endless allegations that a secret agreement was made with the Soviet Union respecting 70 missiles to be placed on submarines that by now are 30 years old, or 25 years old, that have not been off the coast of

the United States since 1967.

On the face of it, this charge should be too absurd to require any commentary. I dealt with it at great length in a press conference on June 24, 1974, and June 26, 1974. It concerned a highly technical issue: Which missiles were eligible for retirement as part of those that had to be dismantled in order to shift from land-based to submarine missiles, and whether and what kind of new missiles could be placed on submarines without being counted.

I refer you all to this press conference, if you want to go into the technical complexities of this issue, except to say there was no secret agreement, that whatever there was in that interpretative statement was stated publicly by me at the press conference that I gave in Moscow the night the SALT agreement was signed on May 26, 1972. It was repeated in a discussion of the Verification Panel on June 5, 1972. It was contained, practically verbatim, in a note distributed to all the agencies on June 19, 1972, and it was testified to by Gerard Smith before the Jackson committee in July 1972. There was no secret agreement.

Some overawed technocrats found what they thought was a loophole by which, if the Soviets wanted to design a missile that they didn't have anywhere for just that one category of Diesel submarines that was 25 years old, they might conceivably place it on that submarine. We, of course, would never have accepted this.

When we raised this loophole with the Soviet Union, even though they thought it was—shall we put it kindly—a rather strained interpretation, they nevertheless closed the loophole, and despite some rather excited testimony last week, let me say flatly that no price was paid for closing a loophole that did not exist and that we would never have accepted and that ran counter to the whole record of the discussion.

I think I can stop at this point and take your questions on this or any other topic.

**THE PRESS:** Mr. Secretary, to what extent is politics interfering today with your attempts to work out a new SALT agreement? And do you see a deadline beyond which it would be, because of the political campaigns, impossible to make any real progress on a treaty?

**A:** As Secretary of State it is my obligation to recommend to the President what I believe to be in

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the national interest. My recommendations are not affected by the political situation and I have, so far, seen no evidence that his decisions are affected by the political situation.

I cannot say that the debate that is going on greatly enhances the atmosphere of confidence in the country, but our recommendations are not affected by the political situation. We are not operating against a deadline.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, can I just change the subject for a moment? Have you proposed to the Israeli Government, as reported today, that it should drop its boycott of the Security Council debate? And also, do you see any indications the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] may be shifting its attitude with regard to its recognition or nonrecognition of Israel's right to existence?

**A:** I will answer this question, but may I then recommend that we take all SALT questions and then go to all other questions? I will answer this one, though.

The United States has indicated to the Israeli Government that it would be better served if it participated in the Security Council debate, though it is of course clear that the Israeli Government may not wish to be in the room while the PLO delegate is actually speaking.

This position of ours has been clear.

Our attitude with respect to the PLO is unchanged. I haven't reaffirmed it for about 48 hours, so it is about time that I do it again: We will not deal with the PLO, negotiate with the PLO, or urge Israel to deal with the PLO, as long as the PLO does not recognize the existence of Israel and as long as the PLO does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. That will be our attitude during the Security Council debate, and I would like to stress again that the only resolutions that the United States considers relevant for the Security Council debate are Resolutions 242 and 338, and we will not accept any resolution that tries to introduce any element that goes beyond 242 and 338.

**Now on SALT?**

**Q:** Yes, now on SALT—do you have any evidence today that the Soviet Union is prepared to offer, in your own words, a reasonable and serious counterproposal to the last American proposal that was made to the Russians?

**A:** The exchanges which we have had with the Soviet Union since November indicate that the

Soviet Union realizes that no settlement is possible on the basis of its present proposal, and that it is willing to negotiate on the basis of the proposition that it must modify its position, and that we are then also prepared to look at our position. And it is on this basis that a trip by me to Moscow has been discussed.

**Q:** Are there plans for such a trip in the immediate future?

**A:** I would expect such a trip to take place within the next 4 weeks ...

**Q:** Mr. Secretary ...

**A:** ...4 to 5 weeks.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, in your discussion earlier you made some reference to the fact that at one point, as I recall, after the evidence had emerged that the Soviets were building a certain kind of silo—at one point the Soviets raised some questions about American practices that we, as I understood you, were not anxious to publicize. Could you tell us any more about what those practices might have been?

**A:** No, the basic point that I wanted to make is this: It was in our interest—we were interested, as long as there was no conclusive evidence—to keep the debate on the confidential level and to permit both sides to raise with each other technical issues in which they could raise questions and clarify questions.

I would say that the issues that the Soviet Union raised did not in fact involve violations of the agreement by the United States, but from the point of view of Soviet photography they might not have been self-evident. And it is, therefore, one of those issues where ambiguous evidence is produced, in good faith, that can be clarified by further exchanges. There have been no American violations of the agreement except in the technical sense that I have described.

**Q:** Are they satisfied with your response to that?

**A:** It is still being discussed, but I think we are making progress.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, you touched most lightly on the strongest issue, which is a continuing one in Congress, which is a claim that Soviet performance on the agreement has failed to live up to your own assurances of what you told Congress the Soviet Union was expected to do.

**A:** I said ...

**Q:** You referred to the unilateral agreements.

(LC)

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One of the issues which is a continuing one up there, of course, is the question of conversion of Soviet light missiles to heavy missiles. Could you deal broadly with the question, which you only touched on earlier, of the unilateral statements and the Soviet nonagreement and nonperformance on those unilateral statements?

A: All right, let me first deal with another issue. One of the arguments that is being made is that the SALT agreement was sloppily negotiated—between myself and [Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly F.] Dobrynin, usually—and that we are now suffering from the draftsmanship, from that draftsmanship.

Well, first of all, I do not believe that the SALT agreement was sloppily negotiated. But in any event, the text of the agreement was negotiated in Helsinki. There is not one paragraph in that document that was drafted by any other group than the negotiating teams in Helsinki, which included representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Department, the State Department and, indeed, all interested agencies, and which was backstopped by a technical panel here. So that the charge that documents were drafted in the absence of technical advisers is absolutely ludicrous.

Now the exchanges that took place between Dobrynin and me, first of all, were confined to very few matters and usually concerned a question of principle; such as, whether offensive weapons should be dealt with simultaneously with defensive weapons or whether they should be dealt with separately. That question, strange as it may seem today, took 3 months of exchanges to settle, and those of you who followed SALT matters will remember that at the end of May 1971 it was settled with an agreement in principle that offensive and defensive negotiations should proceed in parallel. That did not require great technical knowledge.

As soon as that decision was made, it was shifted to the SALT delegation in Helsinki, and all the implementing negotiation of that was conducted in Helsinki.

Then on my visit to Moscow in April 1972, the Soviet Union made a proposal and for the first time—in which, for the first time, they agreed to include submarine missiles in the offensive count and proposed a procedure by which this could be accomplished by the retirement of land-based or other missiles.

I might add that one of the most ardent advocates of this particular solution is a prospective candidate for the Senate—from Virginia, in case any of you have any question of whom I am talking about [laughter]—because he did not wish to build any additional nuclear submarines at that time.

This general proposal was brought back by me from Moscow, was put before the National Security Council at a meeting in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Arms Control [and Disarmament] Agency and our chief negotiator were represented. Specific instructions were given how to work out the technicalities of it, and it then was worked out in detail in Helsinki. Those were the two areas in which I was most active.

Now let us deal with the specific issue of the conversion of light to heavy missiles. In the agreement there is a provision which was also put in, in part at our request—but at any rate which we accepted without any difficulty—to the effect that the existing silos could be increased by 15 percent in the process of modernization. This is the only legal requirement of the agreement; that is, if either side increased any of its silos by more than 15 percent, it would be in violation of the agreement. There is no charge that this has been done. In fact, it has not been done. The intelligence community agrees that the increase in silo dimensions in the modernization program of the Soviet Union does not exceed 15 percent.

The United States added another unilateral statement to the effect that, if in these SS-11 holes a missile were placed which was significantly larger than the SS-11, that we—I don't know what phrase we used, at any rate, that we ...

*Q: "Significantly larger?"*

A: "Significantly larger" was the phrase. I don't know whether we used the phrase, "We consider this a violation ..."

*Q: Substantially larger?*

A: No, "significantly larger" is the phrase. But I don't know whether we said it's a violation or what we said, what the specific—incidentally, that statement was drafted by the delegation.

*Q: But wasn't it on your instructions from ...*

A: That unilateral statement?

*Q: That was issued by the delegation, as I recall, the last day of the negotiations, just to finish up the piece of paper.*

A: Wait a minute. Let me make clear—I don't

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want to play a game. I agreed with everything the delegation did. I think the delegation did a good job. Everything that the delegation did was finally approved in the White House.

The text of it, however, was not drafted by me but approved by me, and I am therefore fully behind it. I am simply trying to get the sequence straight.

Now for about a year, our intelligence indicated that the two new Soviet missiles that were being developed, the SS-17 and 19, were about 15 to 20 percent larger than the ones that had existed in 1972.

Q: Yes.

A: Fifteen to 20 percent-don't hold me to these precise figures, because I am doing it from memory. But it is in that range, and it is always with an inaccuracy factor.

Starting in the middle of 1974, it became apparent that at least one of them, the SS-19, could be as much as 40 percent larger. So we had the dilemma that we have a missile that is larger, by that percentage, than the SS-11 put into a hole that is not, however, in violation of the agreement by a better utilization of existing space and more efficient use of fuel. And that raises a serious question.

We are attempting-the assurances I gave in 1972, which were based on the provision of the agreement, obviously dealt with the missiles we then knew. We obviously did not know in 1972 what missiles the Soviet Union would be testing in 1974; and the questions I was asked were always concerned with whether the Soviet Union would be able to put the SS-9 into the SS-11 hole-the SS-11 hole being the smaller one. And all of my answers, obviously, had to be directed toward the missiles I knew, and not toward the missiles that came along 2 years later.

With respect to the SS-19, we are attempting to put limitations on this in the current round of SALT negotiations, and it is in that category, which Secretary Schlesinger [former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger] has also described, of no specific violation but of being sufficiently ambiguous to raise some questions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, a 3-part question. What evidence do you have that the Soviet Union realizes no settlement is possible on the basis of its last known existing proposal? Secondly, do you have reason to believe that there is now, or soon

will be, a new Soviet proposal? And what are the prospects for a new SALT agreement within the next 3 or 4 months?

A: If I go to Moscow-or the fact that I say that I will in all probability go to Moscow- indicates that I have evidence that the Soviet Union will not insist on its last proposal, because otherwise there would be no point in going.

Q: But is there a new one in the works?

A: When that proposal will be surfaced- whether it will be surfaced then, when I am there, or whether it will be surfaced ahead of time-that remains for discussion.

Your second question? What was it?

Q: The second part: Is there a new proposal?

A: At any rate, since I have stated that we will not accept their last proposal, if there is no new proposal there will be no settlement. There is no possibility of our accepting the last Soviet proposal.

Now what do I think the chances are? I believe that if both sides make a serious effort, the differences should be solved. The Soviet Union must make a serious effort, and we are prepared to make a serious effort. I am moderately optimistic.

Q: Well even to be talking about going to Moscow, you must know something that we don't. You would not go there just for the winter weather. Do you have a reason to believe that if you ...

A: I said I had reason to believe that they will not insist on their last proposal.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the news reports in connection with Admiral Zumwalt's [former Chief of Naval Operations Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.] testimony carry the phrase here that the Admiral suggested that "Mr. Kissinger's lack of candor"-and I am quoting from a news report, sir-"sprang from a personal and political commitment to the success of the detente policy" which made him "reluctant to report the actual facts." How do you react to that, sir?

A: I have stated how we have handled information, and I think my statement makes it absolutely clear that the Admiral got carried away by his political ambitions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned among the possible violations Soviet interference with national means of inspection. Have they interfered with our...

A: No, I have listed that as a...

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Q: A possibility, yes. Have they interfered, or are they now attempting to interfere, with our national means of inspection? And while I have the floor, how are you doing on the threshold test ban, and what are the prospects in that agreement?

A: The question of interference with national means of detection: There has been a Soviet program from the middle—it dates back from the middle of the 1960's—to make photography and other means of detection more complicated.

There have been some actions since the SALT agreement in that category. Several of those have been raised with the Soviet Union. Some of those that have been raised have been ended. None of those, up to now, have fundamentally interfered with our national means of detection.

Q: Are they currently trying to interfere?

A: Well you know there are so many separate things going on, there is always an effort. We have several things before them at this moment. I have said that, up to now, nothing has decisively interfered with our national means of detection.

And the second question is: How are we doing on the test ban?

Q: And what are the prospects of getting a settlement on that quickly? There is a deadline on that, I believe, coming up.

A: We are negotiating it. There are only one or two issues left, and therefore it can be settled any time but it hasn't been settled yet.

Q: Aren't those the same issues, though, that existed last July?

A: That's true. And so either they will be settled or they will not be settled. And I know that is going to be the headline tonight. [Laughter.]

Q: Mr. Secretary, I think you know that this issue to which you have addressed yourself here this afternoon is so complex that many of us, and probably most of the members of the public, are unable to understand the details that you are referring to. I wonder if...

A: Yes, but they can understand the procedures to which I am referring, and those are perfectly plain.

Q: I am just wondering, Mr. Secretary, if you would address yourself to the various political charges—or the various charges that you claim arise from political motives—and in simple language, categorically deny them, if that be the...

A: Well I am not saying all of them arise from political motives. Some do, some don't. But I don't

want to go into the question of motives.

I think I have dealt with all the essential charges. The charge that information has been deliberately withheld is false. The charge that the President was not briefed is false. The charge that either I as Secretary of State or as Assistant to the President have refused to deal with compliance issues is false. The charge that there were secret agreements is essentially false.

And I think these are the major items; if there is anyone else who wants to ask—or if I have left one out I will be glad to...

Q: If I may just follow up: Why do you say "essentially" false?

A: Because there was an interpretative statement that for some reason was not distributed to the bureaucracy, even though the essence of it was distributed to the bureaucracy and even though the bureaucracy was instructed to testify as to its contents. Why it was not distributed, I cannot for the life of me remember now. But the bureaucracy was told that such an interpretative statement would be negotiated, its content was distributed to it, so technically speaking this was not seen, but the content was known.

Q: Mr. Secretary, two questions: On SALT Two, just so that I am clear, you said you would probably go to Moscow within 4 to 5 weeks. Is it a fair assumption that you are not going on this trip you leave on tomorrow?

A: That is correct.

Q: And if so, what has happened? I think you left the impression you would go to Moscow before Christmas. Was there some slippage, or some bureaucratic problem, here or in the Soviet Union?

A: Well I think there is no sense going to Moscow until we have our positions prepared in great detail and until we are confident also that on the Soviet side there is sufficient understanding of what is needed. And given the travel schedules of all of the key members here, it seemed on the whole best not to hurry the process and to move at a pace that permitted a very detailed examination of all of the issues.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the second part of that question deals with another ambiguity, or what-have-you: It's the charge that the Soviets have perhaps built another ABM test site at Kamchatka. Can you address this?

A: This is an issue that is now under discussion with the Soviet Union, and I simply want to

10

explain the issue. It is one of these technical issues. There is no dispute that the radar in Kamchatka faces the Soviet Union and not the United States. And therefore we are dealing with a test radar. The ABM treaty requires that ABM testing could take place only at agreed test ranges, and we listed ours. The Soviet Union didn't list theirs.

*Q: You listed one for them.*

**A:** We unilaterally listed one for them, and the Soviet Union gave an ambiguous reply to that, saying what their test ranges were was generally known, but they would not confirm or deny the one we gave for them; and I think we claimed two for ourselves.

If the Soviet Union had claimed the Kamchatka range for itself at that time, there would be no problem. If the Soviet Union told us today that the Kamchatka range is an ABM test range then, supposing we were satisfied about the characteristics of the radar, there would be no significant problem.

So here we are dealing with a technical issue of what an agreed test range is—since there is no disagreement that the radar in Kamchatka faces into the Soviet Union and therefore must be used for some sort of internal tracking.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that you wouldn't have made these very important announcements here today and this report on intelligence and evaluation and how it all works if it hadn't been for the investigations on Capitol Hill?*

**A:** I didn't say anything about the investigations on Capitol Hill.

*Q: Yes, I know you didn't—but I mean this obviously is a reply to them, right?*

**A:** I did not criticize the investigations.

*Q: No, I didn't say you did. But I say, isn't it a good thing that we have had all this come out today, and isn't it true that it wouldn't have come out had it not been for the investigations up there?*

**A:** Well then the question is whether it could have come out without some of the wild charges that were made. But be that as it may, I am not criticizing the effort of the Congress to get clarity about how the intelligence process operates. And to the extent that my briefing today was elicited by the Congress, I have no objection if you give some credit to them.

*Q: Do you think this will take care of the subpoena now? You say you think this will be...*

**A:** No, no, on the subpoena—the subpoena

has nothing to do with this. The subpoena concerns covert operations and recommendations of Secretaries of State when I was not in office. It has nothing to do with any recommendations I made—recommendations of a previous decade to previous Presidents.

The President has exercised executive privilege with respect to that. I am under instructions from the President with respect to it. The resolution of this issue is between the White House and the committee. It is not an issue that concerns any actions while I have been Secretary of State, and it has nothing to do with the SALT issue. It has to do with the subject of covert operations, and the reason the President has exercised executive privilege is because he believed that recommendations of Cabinet members to the President should be protected. But I am not expressing a personal opinion on that subject.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, can we turn to another subject?*

**A:** Can we wind this up fairly soon? I have some luncheon guests upstairs who are getting restless.

*Q: All right. Mr. Kissinger, on the subject of Angola, you and the President have made some accusations. A protest has been made to the Soviet Union about alleged intervention. There's comments about Cuban intervention there. Isn't it about time that you told us roughly what the United States has done in the way of helping forces in Angola, and since when?*

**A:** I have said that the United States has tried to be helpful to some neighboring countries. Whatever we have done has started long after massive Soviet involvement became evident. So this is not a case that really lends itself to great dispute on that subject, because the Soviet Union has been active there in this manner since March. But I would rather not go any further until we see what can be done in the present diplomatic effort.

*Q: What can be done, Mr. Secretary?*

**A:** Well that's what we are trying...

*Q: What are the available opportunities open to the United States...*

**A:** That's what we are trying to find out. We have stated repeatedly that outside powers should stay out of Angola, and especially, extra-continental powers should stay out of Angola.

*Q: What do you mean, Mr. Secretary, when you say whatever we have done started long after*

ACTION

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

INCOMING

AMERICAN EMBASSY, BRUSSELS

CONTROL: 29364

ORIGINATING POST

MRN: 291384

10 DEC 75 72 31

S/S

EXDIS

S/S

NODIS

S/S

DE RUEHC #1384/1 3442149
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 102126Z DEC 75 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEADWW/USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT PRIORITY 4014
INFO RUFHBS/USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

BT
UNCLAS

STATE 291384 TOSEC 240013

E.O. 11652: NA

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: RADIO/TV HIGHLIGHTS, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10

FOR FUNSETH FROM S/PRS (ANDERSON)
NO. 1

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF THIS MORNING'S NEWS SHOWS AND
SOME AFTERNOON RADIO BROADCASTS, NOT RECEIVED BY SECRETARY'S
OFFICE BEFORE DEPARTURE.

CBS RADIO, SCHIEFFER ("FIRST-LINE REPORT") -- "PRESIDENT
FORD ONCE SAID THAT PALACE FEUDS PUT HIM IN A BAD HUMOR.
THAT BEING THE CASE, HE MUST BE IN A FOUL MOOD THESE DAYS.
HERE ARE TWO RECENT EXAMPLES OF INTER-OFFICE FRICTION AT
THE WHITE HOUSE.

DURING ONE LEG OF THE CHINA TRIP, SECRETARY KISSINGER WANDERED BACK TO THE PRESS SECTION OF AIR FORCE ONE. MOST REPORTERS WHO TRAVEL WITH THE PRESIDENT GO ABOARD CHARTERED COMMERCIAL PLANES, BUT A FEW RIDE ON MR. FORD'S PLANE. WHILE DOING SO, THEY REPRESENT THE ENTIRE PRESS CORPS, AND FILE A BRIEF REPORT ON ACTIVITIES ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE. THAT INFORMATION, CALLED A POOL REPORT, IS GIVEN TO OTHER REPORTERS AT THE NEXT STOP. IN THIS CASE, KISSINGER CHATTED INFORMALLY WITH THE REPORTERS, AND THEY WERE INCLUDING HIS REMARKS IN THEIR POOL REPORT. LEARNING OF THAT, KISSINGER SAID HE HAD BEEN MIXED UP ON THE GROUND RULES AND THOUGHT HE WAS TALKING ON "DEEP BACKGROUND." THAT IS, TALKING WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HE WOULD NOT BE QUOTED BY NAME AND THAT HIS REMARKS WOULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL. KISSINGER'S REMARKS HAD NOT BEEN ALL THAT NEWSY, AND AFTER SOME DISCUSSION THE REPORTERS AGREED THAT THERE PROBABLY HAD BEEN A MIX-UP. THEY DECIDED TO GIVE KISSINGER THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT, AND TREATED HIS REMARKS AS CONFIDENTIAL.

UNCLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION

CHRON

COPIES

INITIALS

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(L0)

"THAT THERE IS NO LOVE LOST BETWEEN KISSINGER AND WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY RON NESSEN IS NO SECRET AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE, BUT WHAT HAPPENED NEXT SURPRISED EVEN VETERAN WHITE HOUSE OBSERVERS. AFTER KISSINGER LEFT, NESSEN APPEARED IN THE PRESS SECTION AND BERATED REPORTERS FOR GOING EASY ON KISSINGER. THIS REPORTER WAS NOT PRESENT, BUT A PERSON WHO HEARD THE CONVERSATION SAID NESSEN COMPLAINED THAT ONCE A PUBLIC OFFICIAL SAYS SOMETHING, IT CANNOT BE WITHDRAWN. HE CHIDED REPORTERS FOR NOT BELIEVING IN FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, AND OBSERVED THAT THEY WOULD NEVER GIVE HIM THE SAME BREAK THEY HAD GIVEN KISSINGER.

"THE SECOND INCIDENT ALSO INVOLVED NESSEN. AT ONE POINT DURING A CHINA TRIP, SUSAN FORD, THE PRESIDENT'S DAUGHTER, SUDDENLY CANCELLED A LUNCHEON ENGAGEMENT. REPORTERS SUSPECTED THE CHINESE WERE ABOUT TO SCHEDULE A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN MAO, AND THAT SUSAN HAD BEEN TOLD TO RETURN HOME AND STAND BY SO SHE COULD ACCOMPANY HER FATHER. NESSEN SAID, HOWEVER, THAT MISS FORD'S CANCELLATION HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HER FATHER. HE ADVISED REPORTERS TO CHECK WITH MRS. FORD'S PRESS SECRETARY FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS. REPORTERS NOTED MRS. WEIDENFELD WAS OUT OF POCKET AT THE MOMENT. NESSEN WAS OVERHEARD TO GRUMBLE TO AN AIDE, 'MRS. WEIDENFELD WAS ALWAYS OUT OF POCKET.' THEN HE TURNED TO A GROUP OF REPORTERS AND ADVISED THEM TO TRACK DOWN MRS. WEIDENFELD. 'THE TAXPAYERS ARE PAYING HER TO GIVE YOU INFORMATION,' HE SAID. 'IF YOU CAN'T FIND HER, YOU SHOULD COMPLAIN AND COMPLAIN LOUDLY.' AS IT TURNED OUT, REPORTERS GOT THEIR ANSWER BEFORE MRS. WEIDENFELD COULD BE LOCATED. AS SUSPECTED, AND DESPITE NESSEN'S EARLIER DECLARATION TO THE CONTRARY, THE CALL HAD CONCERNED THE PRESIDENT. SUSAN HAD BEEN CALLED BACK TO ACCOMPANY HER FATHER TO SEE MAO, AND SHE DID JUST THAT.

OVERT-FRICTION BETWEEN NESSEN AND SOME OF THE OTHER WHITE HOUSE STAFF SEEMS TO BE ON THE UPSWING THESE DAYS. THE PRESS SECRETARY HAS BEEN TELLING FRIENDS LATELY HE EXPECTS TO BE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY FOR AS LONG AS GERALD FORD REMAINS PRESIDENT. THE WAY THINGS ARE SHAPING UP, IT COULD TURN OUT TO BE A LONELY POST. WILLIAM GREENER, THE DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY, AND A MAN WHO IS WIDELY RESPECTED BY NEWSMEN WHO COVER THE WHITE HOUSE, WILL DEPART SOON. HE'S BEEN NAMED AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND, IF CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE, WILL BECOME THE PENTAGON'S CHIEF SPOKESMAN. AT LEAST THREE OTHER TOP AIDES IN THE PRESS OFFICE ARE LOOKING FOR EMPLOYMENT ELSEWHERE. AS ONE PRESS OFFICE EMPLOYEE PUT IT THE OTHER DAY, 'THE FACT IS, EVERYBODY ON NESSEN'S STAFF IS LOOKING FOR ANOTHER JOB. SOME ARE JUST LOOKING MORE ACTIVELY THAN OTHERS.' NESSEN HIMSELF WAS UNAVAILABLE FOR COMMENT. AIDES SAY HE HAS DECIDED TO TAKE A LONG VACATION."

CBS-TV MORNING NEWS (BRUCE MORTON AND DANIEL SCHORR), INTERVIEW WITH CONGRESSMAN PIKE --

UNCLASSIFIED

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MORTON: "MR. PIKE, IS THERE GOING TO BE A COMPROMISE?"

PIKE: "I REALLY BELIEVE THERE IS. I HAVE NOT YET TALKED TO THE PEOPLE WHO WENT DOWN TO THE WHITE HOUSE. I UNDERSTAND THEY WERE GIVEN A LOT OF INFORMATION WHICH WE HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN UP UNTIL YESTERDAY. IF THE STAFF AND THE MEMBERS DEEM THAT WHAT WE WERE GIVEN WAS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH OUR SUBPOENA, OBVIOUSLY THAT ENDS THE MATTER."

SCHORR: "CONGRESSMAN, YOU HAD A 10-2 VOTE IN YOUR COMMITTEE TO GO TO THE HOUSE, RECOMMEND CITATIONS OF CONTEMPT. AS OF YESTERDAY, IT LOOKED AS THOUGH, EVEN IF YOU HADN'T GOTTEN A NEW CONCESSION, YOUR COMMITTEE MIGHT HAVE VOTED, I'M TOLD, 9-4 TO HOLD UP ON THAT. WHAT CAUSED THE EROSION OF THE SITUATION IN YOUR COMMITTEE?"

PIKE: "WELL, I THINK THERE WAS VERY INTENSIVE LOBBYING FOR ONE THING, BY BOTH THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE STATE DE-

PARTMENT. THEIR REPRESENTATIVES WERE PROWLING THE HALLS OF CONGRESS WELL AND EFFECTIVELY. I THINK THAT WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN VOTED WAS A DELAY IN ORDER TO GET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR CREATE AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, AND I DON'T THINK THAT WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN VOTED WAS ANYTHING MORE THAN A DELAY."

SCHORR: "BUT DO YOU FEEL LET DOWN BY ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR COMMITTEE, OR DO YOU FEEL THAT THE LOBBYING HAS GONE TOO FAR?"

PIKE: "I THINK THAT THE LOBBYING -- THE ABILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO LOBBY THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, NOT JUST ON THIS ISSUE BUT ON ANY ISSUE, IS ONE OF THE THINGS THAT HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE OVERALL WEAKNESS OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH AS COMPARED TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH."

SCHORR: "IN THAT CONNECTION, THERE DOES SEEM TO BE A VERY STRONG KISSINGER, OR PRO-KISSINGER, LOBBY. YESTERDAY, SECRETARY KISSINGER APPEARED TO BE TALKING BACK TO ONE OF YOUR WITNESSES, ADMIRAL ZUMWALT, ON THE QUESTION OF ARMS CONTROL AND INDICATING THAT THIS WAS FALSE AND THAT THAT WAS FALSE. WAS ADMIRAL ZUMWALT ALL WRONG?"

PIKE: "WELL, I THINK ADMIRAL ZUMWALT WENT TOO FAR WHEN HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY BRIEFED. I DON'T THINK ADMIRAL ZUMWALT KNEW WHAT BRIEFINGS WERE GIVEN TO THE PRESIDENT, AND I KNOW THAT OUR COMMITTEE DOESN'T KNOW WHAT BRIEFINGS WERE GIVEN TO THE PRESIDENT. BY THE SAME TOKEN, WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT WITHHOLDING INFORMATION, OR INTELLIGENCE, AND THAT'S WHAT OUR JURISDICTION IS, THERE'S NOT THE SLIGHTEST QUESTION IN MY MIND THAT INTELLIGENCE REGARDING POSSIBLE SALT VIOLATIONS WAS WITHHELD, NOT ONLY FROM CONGRESS BUT FROM KEY PEOPLE IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ITSELF."

SCHORR: "LIKE WHO?"

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PIKE: "WELL, U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, WHO WAS THEN IN GENEVA AS THE HEAD OF OUR DELEGATION NEGOTIATING ON THESE ISSUES. AND BY 'WITHHOLD' I DON'T MEAN FOREVER, BUT I MEAN IT WAS HELD UP FOR A PERIOD OF TIME. AND THIS WAS INFORMATION WHICH, IN MY JUDGMENT, HE DARN WELL SHOULD HAVE HAD."

SCHORR: "WITH THE APPARENT INTENTION OF AFFECTING THE COURSE OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS?"

PIKE: "NO, I DON'T THINK IT WAS FOR THE PURPOSE OF AFFECTING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I THINK IT WAS TO TRY TO PERHAPS GET THE RUSSIAN VIEWS ON WHAT THE RUSSIANS WERE DOING, BEFORE THIS WAS DISSEMINATED."

MORTON: "WELL, YOU SAY 'POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS.' YOU KNOW, THERE'S A GRAY AREA IN THERE. WAS HARD INFORMATION THAT THE RUSSIANS VIOLATED THE AGREEMENT HELD UP, OR --"

PIKE: "NO, I DON'T THINK THAT IT IS POSSIBLE AT ALL TO SAY THAT HARD -- AT LEAST, I HAVE NO EVIDENCE, AND I DON'T BELIEVE THAT IT IS TRUE THAT HARD EVIDENCE THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE VIOLATING THE AGREEMENT WAS HELD UP. I THINK THAT THERE WAS HARD EVIDENCE OF POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS. THERE WERE THINGS THE RUSSIANS WERE DOING WHICH WE REALLY DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT, DIDN'T UNDERSTAND, AND IT COULD HAVE BEEN VIOLATIONS, IT COULD HAVE BEEN NOT VIOLATIONS. BUT IT WAS INTELLIGENCE WHICH WAS HELD UP."

SCHORR: "CONGRESSMAN, YOU PROBABLY KNOW MORE THAN ANYBODY ELSE IN THE EXECUTIVE RIGHT NOW ABOUT WHAT'S GOING ON IN ANGOLA AND WHAT OUR GOVERNMENT IS DOING THERE. WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA?"

PIKE: "WELL, I'M NOW UNDER ONE OF THESE INHIBITIONS, THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN TWO SUCCESSIVE DAYS HAS LEAKED LITTLE TIDBITS ABOUT OUR INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA, AND I DO KNOW ABOUT OUR INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA, BUT I'M DENIED PERMISSION TO SPEAK ABOUT IT. SO I THINK IT IS A VERY TRICKY SITUATION OVER THERE, A VERY TOUCHY SITUATION OVER THERE. I'M JUST NOT FREE TO TALK ABOUT IT."

SCHORR: "WE ARE THERE?"

PIKE: "OH, THERE'S NO QUESTION BUT THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE ADMITTED THAT WE ARE INVOLVED TO SOME DEGREE, AND I THINK HONESTLY THAT THERE IS OBVIOUSLY A WAR GOING ON OVER THERE. WE ARE INVOLVED TO SOME DEGREE --"

SCHORR: "WITH MORE THAN MONEY?"

PIKE: "I'M JUST NOT GOING TO GO INTO THE DETAILS."

SCHORR: "BUT MORE THAN MONEY?"

PIKE: "I AM NOT GOING TO GO INTO THE DETAILS. I'M NOT ALLOWED TO GO INTO THE DETAILS, AND I'M JUST -- I DO THINK

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THAT IT IS THE KIND OF SITUATION IN WHICH, IN A REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE MUST BE BROUGHT INTO THIS DECISION-MAKING PROCESS."

MORTON: "MR. PIKE, DAN, THANK YOU VERY MUCH."

ABC-TV MORNING NEWS (BARRY DUNSMORE) -- "WHEN HENRY KISSINGER RETURNED FROM THE FAR EAST ON TUESDAY, HE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED TO GO TO MOSCOW TO DISCUSS A BREAK IN THE DEADLOCK ON THE SALT TREATY BEFORE CHRISTMAS. AT HIS NEWS CONFERENCE, HE TOLD US THAT THE MOSCOW TRIP WILL NOW TAKE PLACE WITHIN FOUR OR FIVE WEEKS. HE WAS VAGUE AS TO THE REASONS FOR THE TIME CHANGE, SO WE ARE LEFT TO SPECULATE."

"ORIGINALLY, KISSINGER SAID HE WOULD NOT EVEN TALK TO THE RUSSIANS ABOUT STRATEGIC ARMS UNTIL THEY MADE A COUNTER PROPOSAL TO THE AMERICAN ONE THEY REJECTED LAST MONTH. KISSINGER SAYS IT CAN BE INFERRED FROM HIS APPARENT WILL-

INGNESS TO GO TO MOSCOW NOW THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SOME NEW RUSSIAN IDEAS, BUT THEY APPARENTLY AREN'T THAT SPECIFIC. ALSO, THE AMERICAN SIDE MAY BE HAVING SOME DIFFICULTIES IN ITS OWN RIGHT, CITING PRECISELY WHAT COMPROMISES IT MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MAKE. AFTER ALL, CONSIDERING THE FUROR OVER SUPPOSED RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE FIRST SALT AGREEMENT, THE PRESIDENT IS IN LESS THAN A HURRY TO GET INTO A SECOND ONE THAT WOULD BE POLITICALLY CONTROVERSIAL, ESPECIALLY IN AN ELECTION YEAR."

"FINALLY, THERE IS HEAVY RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA, WHICH IS GIVING THE U.S. PAUSE TO WONDER HOW SERIOUS THE RUSSIANS REALLY ARE ABOUT DETENTE. AND SO, ALL TOLD, THERE APPEAR TO BE SOME GOOD REASONS NOT TO RUSH OFF TO RUSSIA."

ABC-TV MORNING NEWS (TED KOPPEL) -- "THE BASIC CHARGE THAT HAS BEEN LEVELED AGAINST THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS THAT HE WITHHELD INFORMATION FROM THE PRESIDENT ON SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE SALT AGREEMENT. KISSINGER DENIED THAT CHARGE YESTERDAY AS A TOTAL FALSEHOOD, BUT HE IS ALSO ACCUSED OF NOT CALLING THE SOVIETS TO ACCOUNT ON EVERY OCCASION THAT A VIOLATION WAS DISCOVERED/ AS PART OF HIS ANSWER TO THAT CHARGE, KISSINGER MADE AN INTRIGUING IMPLICATION THAT U.S. HANDS WERE NOT TOTALLY CLEAN EITHER."

KISSINGER: "IT IS ALSO FAIR TO POINT OUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IN REPLY RAISED CERTAIN QUESTIONS ABOUT CERTAIN AMBIGUITIES ID AMERICAN PRACTICES WHICH WE WERE NOT EXCEPTIONALLY ANXIOUS TO HAVE PUBLICIZED."

"ABC NEWS HAS LEARNED THAT THOSE AMBIGUITIES WERE ACTUALLY ENVIRONMENTAL COVERS, A FANCY WAY OF DESCRIBING PROTECTION AGAINST THE WEATHER, THAT HAD BEEN ERECTED BY MEN WORKING AT U.S. MISSILE SITES. WHILE THE COVERS MAY HAVE BEEN PUT UP TO KEEP OUT THE WEATHER, IT ALSO SHIELDED THE MISSILE SILOS AGAINST THE PROBING EYES OF SOVIET SATELLITES. THE SALT AGREEMENT EXPLICITLY PROHIBITS EITHER SIDE FROM DOING ANYTHING THAT WOULD INTERFERE WITH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE OTHER SIDE'S NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION. IN OTHER WORDS, BOTH SIDES HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHECK ON WHETHER THE OTHER IS CHEATING, AND NEITHER HAS THE RIGHT TO HIDE ANY ACTIVITIES COVERED UNDER THE SALT AGREEMENT.

"SO TECHNICALLY, AT LEAST, THE UNITED STATES HAD VIOLATED THE SALT AGREEMENT AND DIDN'T FEEL QUITE AS VIRTUOUS ABOUT CERTAIN SOVIET VIOLATIONS AS SOME OF KISSINGER'S CRITICS DO."

CBS RADIO 2:00 NEWS (REID COLLINS) -- "A SENIOR OFFICIAL SAID ABOARD A PLANE COMING BACKFROM CHINA THE OTHER DAY THAT THE U.S. IS INVOLVED IN CERTAIN STEPS DESIGNED TO COUNTER THE OVERT SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE IN THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF ANGOLA IN AFRICA.

"TODAY THE ISSUE OF DISCLOSURE WAS THE SUBJECT OF A DEBATE IN WASHINGTON BETWEEN THE CIA DIRECTOR, WILLIAM COLBY, AND OTIS PIKE, THE DEMOCRAT WHO CHAIRS THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE. COLBY ARGUED FOR SECRECY, BUT PIKE DISAGREED:

> COLBY: "THERE ARE CERTAIN ACTIVITIES WHICH BY DEFINITION, IF THEY ARE GOING TO BE SECRET, CANNOT BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE."

PIKE: "I HAVE TO JUST SAY THAT I FIND THIS CONCEPT PRE-POSTEROUS. IT'S A WAR GOING ON OVER THERE. THAT'S WHAT IT IS, AND FOR US TO SIT HERE IN THIS ROOM, IN THIS NATION -- A FJEE NATION WITH A FREE PRESS -- AND READ IN OUR PRESS DAY AFTER DAY ABOUT WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE DOING BUT HAVING NO KNOWLEDGE AS TO WHAT AMERICA IS DOING, IS TO ME A TRAVESTY ON OUR CONSTITUTION." (APPLAUSE)

CBS RADIO 2:00 NEWS -- "SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER IS BOUND FOR BRUSSELS NOW, AND A NATO SESSION THAT KICKS OFF NINE DAYS OF TOURING WESTERN EUROPE. THE SECRETARY GOT SOME GOOD NEWS BEFORE LEAVING WASHINGTON THIS MORNING: OTIS PIKE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, ANNOUNCED THAT COMMITTEE IS NOW SATISFIED WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE TO DEMANDS FOR SOME TOP SECRET INFORMATION. THE NEW YORK DEMOCRAT SAYS, THEREFORE, THE MATTER OF TRYING TO CITE KISSINGER FOR CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS IS A DEAD ISSUE."

INGERSOLL

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

December 11, 1975

No. 603

REMARKS TO PRESS
BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER DIMITRIOS BITSIOS
FOLLOWING BILATERAL MEETING
U. S. MISSION TO NATO
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
DECEMBER 11, 1975

**QUESTION:** (Unintelligible) on the Cyprus situation?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The Foreign Minister and I had a very friendly talk and reviewed the Cyprus situation and general relationships between Greece and the United States. With respect to the Cyprus situation, the United States feels that the time for negotiations is here and that there are really no further obstacles to negotiations. We strongly support resumption of the intercommunal talks between the two communities and a solution based on justice and equity and respecting the sense of dignity of both communities. And we will use all our efforts in that direction.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Prime Minister, would you agree that there are no obstacles to negotiations with Turkey?

**FOREIGN MINISTER BITSIOS:** I would say there are no more obstacles of the kind that the Turkish Government was putting forward before. You remember - elections and all of that. And I fully agree on the line which the Secretary of State took. We think that it is high time that the negotiations be resumed, for a solution. The situation cannot go on in Cyprus like that. I think the representatives of the communities must sit down for meaningful negotiations.

**QUESTION:** Does that mean that you now expect meaningful negotiations to get underway?

**FOREIGN MINISTER BITSIOS:** You must be two, that's inevitable. I explained to you our position.

**QUESTION:** The Turks have been interested in enlarging the intercommunal talks. How do you regard that proposal?

**FOREIGN MINISTER BITSIOS:** I have made a statement last Saturday.

**QUESTION:** And could you repeat that statement for us today?

**FOREIGN MINISTER BITSIOS:** I don't see any reason why we should change the existing forum.

**QUESTION:** But that forms an obstacle then, because you have one position and the Turks have another.

For further information contact:

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 12, 1975

No. 604

REMARKS TO THE PRESS
BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER IHSAN SABRI CAGLAYANGIL
FOLLOWING BILATERAL MEETING

BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
DECEMBER 12, 1975

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The Foreign Minister and I had a very constructive talk in the atmosphere of friendship that characterizes the relationship between the United States and Turkey. We discussed bilateral relationships and I am very hopeful that we will solve the question of the American bases in Turkey and the mutual defense relationship in the very near future. With respect to the Cyprus problem, we, I am very hopeful that negotiations can be started in the near future, I believe that the differences between the parties are relatively--the procedural differences between the parties are relatively small and that a solution can be found this afternoon when the Foreign Minister of Turkey and the Foreign Minister of Greece meet to resume the communal talks in an appropriate setting. So I am very pleased with this talk.

**FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL:** (in French) I share the opinion of my colleague. I think that we have had a very constructive negotiation, especially in bilateral relations. I hope, after having had a negotiation with my Greek colleague, that perhaps we can advance a little in our relations.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Minister, do you speak English?

**FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL:** My English is very poor. I am very sorry.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That's a trick to give time to think while I talk.
(Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Why are you confident Mr. Secretary about the bases question?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Because we reviewed the issues that divide us or that are still unsolved, and I believe that they are manageable. I am going to meet with our Ambassador to Turkey tomorrow in London and we will be giving him new instructions. And I have invited the Foreign Minister of Turkey to come to the United States at the end of January and I am extremely hopeful that whatever differences remain will be solved on that occasion.

**FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL:** (Statement in Turkish.)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Valeriani, ask a question on that.

**QUESTION:** In what language?

-2-

PR 604

FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL: (Interpreter's translation from Turkish.)
In relation to our bilateral relations with the United States, I join the
views expressed by Secretary of State Kissinger and I hope that in the
near future we can solve these problems and find a compromise.

QUESTION: (in French). When do you have the meeting with the Greek
Minister?

FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL: (in French) Today at 3 o'clock.

QUESTION: (in French) Here?

FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL: No, at NATO.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Nice of you to have come.

FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL: Thank you.

FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL: (Says farewell in Turkish).

QUESTION: (Repeats Turkish farewell.)

FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL: Bravo. No need to translate.

QUESTION: (inaudible question on negotiations on Cyprus)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am quite confident that we can get the communal
talks started again in order that some real impetus will now be given
to them. It is more than just resumed.

QUESTION: Will you be able to report back to the President who can
report to Congress that you have got real progress going now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think we have something.

* * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 12, 1975

No. 605

INTERVIEW OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BY GERMAN TELEVISION
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
DECEMBER 12, 1975

**QUESTION:** The NATO states will make the offer in Vienna also to withdraw nuclear weapons from Western Europe. Isn't this a dangerous concession?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Let me explain it in English. I do not believe that it goes too far, because we will be offering a category of weapons which, due to modernization, some have become dispensable, in return for withdrawal of substantial Soviet ground forces. But the United States remains firmly committed to a strong local defense in Europe, and the United States will under no circumstances participate in anything that will lead to the denuclearization either of Europe or of any part of Europe.

**QUESTION:** You are just leaving the *Deutschland-Essen* [Allied meeting on Berlin and Germany]. The responsibility of the Western states was underlined during that meeting. Does this hide the fear that the friendship agreement between the Soviet Union and Berlin would influence the representation of the four powers?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is not directed at any particular event. It is a permanent feature of the four power relationship that the freedom of Berlin is central to all of our policies and of course the pre-condition for any relaxation of tensions.

**QUESTION:** One of the most important conditions to keep the alliance capable of defense is to unify weapons. What do you think of the declaration of the European states in this matter?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we strongly favor it, and we are pleased that the Europeans will discuss the problem first among themselves and then will solve it in close coordination with the United States. And I think it is a significant step towards the strengthening of NATO.

**QUESTION:** How serious is the offer of the United States to buy weapons in Europe?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is a serious offer. It, of course, depends on the ability of the Europeans to rationalize their production and to produce them at comparable prices. Both should be possible.

**QUESTION:** Were you disappointed over what came out of the Helsinki Conference?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Frankly, not particularly. I didn't expect too much, and I was not disappointed.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 12, 1975

No. 606

PC#80

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOLLOWING NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
BRUSSELS, DECEMBER 12, 1975

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Ladies and gentlemen, the U.S. delegation considers this meeting to have been very successful. It was conducted in the spirit of friendship and close consultation which characterizes the relationship in the North Atlantic Community. The communique speaks for itself and, therefore, I will go straight to your questions.

**QUESTION:** There are reports in both the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* today of United States contribution of $50 million to Angola in recent months. Could you respond to those reports?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have not had the privilege of reading either of these distinguished newspapers today, and I will not go into any details. I have stated the other day that the United States cannot be indifferent to massive Soviet supplies of arms and is in contact with other interested African countries.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, on that point, could you amplify this aspect of it? Do you have any concern that there will develop in Angola, if there is not already, a war of proxy between the major powers? And in addition to that, how would you distinguish between the degree of major power involvement in Angola and the Vietnam situation, the Vietnam history?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States wishes that the situation in Angola be handled as an African problem and it would support a solution in which no outside power participates and in which the Organization of African Unity will cooperate with the parties inside Angola to find an African solution. The United States did not become concerned until there had already taken place substantial Soviet involvement and the introduction of massive outside equipment and later the introduction of Cuban forces. I think, as I have pointed out repeatedly, there should not be a war by proxy of the great powers. I do not think it is a situation analogous to Vietnam because in Vietnam the conflict had a much longer and more complicated history, but the United States cannot be indifferent to what is going on in Angola.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you frequently say that the United States should not be indifferent. But in what manner would the United States respond? Can you tell us what sort of counter-measures the United States might take in this situation?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States favors a solution in which all of the parties in Angola can negotiate with each other free of outside interference and in which the problem of Angola is handled as an

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PR#606

African issue. The United States will support any solution in this direction. Failing that the United States will try to prevent one party by means of massive introduction of outside equipment from achieving dominance.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, on a previous occasion you mentioned the possibility that the Angolan involvement of the Soviet Union couldn't help but affect other aspects of the Soviet-American relationship. Do you see it at any point as endangering the entire policy of detente?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Incidentally, I ought to make one thing clear. The press reports yesterday gave the impression that all of the afternoon session was devoted to Angola. The afternoon session yesterday was devoted to East-West relations, in which Angola played a relatively minor role. So, this is a NATO meeting. This is not a meeting of African problems, and I think this should be clearly understood. It cannot but affect relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as I stated publicly before, if the Soviet Union engages in a military operation or massively supports a military operation thousands of miles from Soviet territory in an area where there are no historic Russian interests and where it is, therefore, a new projection of Soviet power and Soviet interests. But again let me emphasize to you, ladies and gentlemen, that this was a NATO meeting, in which Angola played a relatively insignificant role and was used only as an illustration of more general problems.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary General (sic), did you talk about Spain, or did you propose bringing Spain closer to NATO?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We did not have an opportunity to go into the problem of Spain and the future relationship of Spain in any formal sense. The United States favors a closer relationship of Spain both to the Atlantic organization as well as to Western Europe.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could expand a bit, amplify this extreme concern the United States has over Angola. Why is this situation so different? You referred to distance, but after all the Soviet Union has massively armed many countries in the world and I don't remember this type of strong talk from the United States. What is it about Angola -- ?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Should I point out again to you, ladies and gentlemen, that this was a NATO meeting? You may have received certain briefings yesterday. The subject was not Angola. The subject was the Western alliance and, while I am glad to answer questions on Angola, I want to point out that it is being raised by you, ladies and gentlemen, much more acutely than it was raised by us.

**QUESTION:** This has continued as a process now of several weeks where the United States has been extremely concerned publicly.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It makes a difference whether the Soviet Union is arming a country or whether it is arming a faction in a country. It makes a difference whether the Soviet Union is operating in an area of traditional relationships or whether it is attempting to establish a new pattern of dominance.

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PR#606

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the last time you attended a NATO meeting, just before it you expressed your conviction that Portugal would not easily remain a member of the Alliance because it was going Communist. What is your assessment now? What has been Soviet behavior with respect to Portugal and what does that mean in terms of Angola?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I hope that the non-American members here noted the single-mindedness with which the American press pursues its obsessions. Now, first let me make clear I did not say the last time that Portugal could not easily remain a member of NATO because it was going Communist. I said it the other way around. I said if Portugal went Communist, it could not easily remain a member of NATO. I believe that, on the whole, the situation in Portugal has improved. The danger of Portugal going Communist seems less. The possibility of a pluralistic evolution seems better. So, therefore, this particular danger which I referred to last time is not as acute as it was then.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you didn't answer about the Soviet Union's role in Portugal.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think that the Soviet Union's role in Portugal is not as acute as its role in Angola.

**QUESTION:** Will the U.S. bases in Turkey reopen? And when? And to what extent do you consider them inoperative ever since they were closed?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Closed bases are generally inoperative, but I had a very good talk with the Foreign Minister of Turkey this morning. I expect that the negotiations about the bases will soon be given a new impetus and I have invited the Foreign Ministers to come to Washington by the end of January. I hope that we will be able to conclude the negotiations by then.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I assume that you mentioned the Middle East in your discussion. If this is correct, are you happy about the state of affairs in the Middle East now as a result of your step-by-step diplomacy? Isn't there any change of heart from the part of the United States regarding the Palestinians and the PLO to accelerate the process of peace in the Middle East?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't think the Middle East was designed to inspire happiness and, therefore, I cannot say I have reached that state of contentment with it. With respect to the Palestinians, I have not repeated the American position for 48 hours and never in Brussels. So let me say that the United States cannot change its position until the Palestinians recognize the existence of Israel and until they accept the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. At that point we will look at our position again.

**QUESTION:** Do they have to recognize Israel before Israel recognizes them or must this come simultaneously? For you cannot ask the Palestinians. It's fair enough that both of them recognize each other at the same time, isn't it?

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PR#606

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is in the context that the United States can look at its position, but not under present circumstances -- in the context that I have given.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you think that the stands of Greece and Turkey are more conciliatory now for the solution of the problems between the two countries and that of Cyprus?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Having talked to the Foreign Ministers of both Greece and Turkey, I have the impression that the conditions for a resumption of the communal talks are good. Of course, they will meet each other this afternoon and it would be a rash man who would predict what happens when an actual interaction occurs between Greek and Turkish representatives. My impression is that the conditions for a resumption of communal talks are good and that both Foreign Ministers recognize the importance of making rapid progress towards a settlement. We believe that a package deal is necessary and that it should take into account the sense of dignity of both communities. We will use our influence in that direction.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, have you got any new evidence from the Soviet Union which makes you confident that you will be ready to go in four or five weeks, as you had said you would, on SALT? Also, what assurance is there that the conflicts within the United States Government on SALT will be resolved within four or five weeks?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I wouldn't describe the discussions in the American Government as "conflict". The issues are technically complicated and require careful study. I am confident that we will come up with a solution that will have support of all the agencies. As I have pointed out, going to Moscow is based on the presupposition that both sides will be prepared to modify their positions; and, therefore, it is based on the assumption, indeed in the knowledge, that the Soviet Union, as well as we, will be prepared to modify the last positions which each side took. I'm quite confident that the date that has been indicated, or the approximate date, will be maintained.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you said that Angola was a minor issue in the discussion and the main topic was East-West relations. So, after this discussion, what is your assessment of the present status of East-West relations?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There are worrying elements such as Angola. There remains, nevertheless, the necessity to attempt to improve relations between East and West on the basis of reciprocity and there is a recognition on the part of all allies that the process of improvement of relations requires an undiminished concern for Western security.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you said yesterday that the United States supports the resumption of the inter-communal talks, but you also mentioned something about a way of relating other interested parties to it at a later state. What would you envisage by that?

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PR#606

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The most interested parties, of course, are the Governments of Greece and Turkey, and this is a question that the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey will deal with this afternoon. It is my impression, having talked to both of them, that they are approaching a consensus on this and I expect that this problem will be solved. But I'd leave it up to them to announce the details.

**QUESTION:** Yesterday you expressed your concern about the Communist pressure on the southern countries of the Alliance. What is your opinion on the Italian situation and, also in your opinion, what would be the consequences for the Alliance of having participation of the Italian Communists in the government which, as you know very well, is not terribly improbable for the future?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I did not yesterday express any opinion on the questions which you raised. Of course, we consider the Italian domestic situation a matter for Italians to decide -- all the more so as our advice is likely to have the opposite effect from the one we wish to bring about. But if I were forming a government in Italy, which is unlikely, I would not move in the direction of an "historic compromise".

**QUESTION:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

* * * * * * * * *

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 15, 1975

No. 607

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT FUERTH, WEST GERMANY

DECEMBER 15, 1975

Mr. Foreign Minister, Mr. Minister-President, Mr. Lord Mayor, Distinguished Guests, Friends:

This is not the first time in the last thirty-five years that I have paid a sentimental visit to Fuerth. I enjoyed a brief but warm stay in 1959. I have often exchanged letters with your distinguished Lord Mayor and his predecessor, and have been encouraged and strengthened by their good wishes in many periods of my public life. When the honor I am now receiving was first offered to me, I accepted with pleasure.

I am proud to be here as the Secretary of State of perhaps the only country in the world where it is possible for an adopted son to have the opportunity for responsibility and service that I have enjoyed. I am happy to share this occasion with my family, my parents, who have never lost their attachment to this city in which they spent the greater part of their lives. I believe that my visit here exemplifies the extraordinary rebirth of friendship between the American people and the German people.

This is why the central role in this event of my colleague and friend Hans-Dietrich Genscher means so much to me. The partnership that he and I carry out every day in international affairs is given a deeper quality by the personal affection and comradeship that exists between us.

Our generation has witnessed -- and has no excuse ever to forget -- the dark force of brutality and raw power at large in the modern world. As I stand here today, suffering is still dominant in many parts of the globe. Of all the species on this planet, man alone has inflicted on himself the great part of his own anguish.

Yet our generation more than any other also has the possibility and indeed the imperative of something better. We live in a world of some 150 sovereign nations, in an era of both instant communication and ideological competition and in the shadow of nuclear cataclysm. No longer can we afford to submit to an assumed inevitability of history's tragedy. The interdependence of states links our societies, our economies and our destinies; we will either progress together or we will decline together. Much has happened from which we can take hope and courage. Free societies have come closer to the dream of well-being and justice than any earlier period has witnessed. Our two nations have moved from bitter conflict to peace and from peace to reconciliation and common endeavor. We have been leaders in the quest for peace -- in Europe, and in the world.

Our common challenge is to help build an international structure of relationships which keeps continents stable and nations secure, which ties nations to each other by bonds of mutual interest, which fosters the habits of restraint and moderation in international conduct, which gives free rein to man's striving for freedom and justice. Our goal is a peace which all --

-2-

PR 607

the small as well as the large -- have a share of shaping, a peace that will endure because all -- the strong as well as the weak -- have a stake in making it last.

We know that such a peace will not come -- nor can it be maintained -- without effort and courage. We must be conciliatory without weakness, and tolerant without moral confusion; we must temper strength with wisdom, and seek justice while respecting the sense of justice of others. Posterity will not forgive either truculence -- or the failure to act firmly in defense of interests and principles. Posterity will not forgive either illusions -- or the failure to grasp opportunities that come fleetingly and may never return.

In our search for a peaceful world we must never forget:

-- that freedom must be vigilantly defended;

-- that stability depends on restraint among as well as within nations;

-- that no nation or group of nations can achieve satisfaction of its needs alone;

-- that the best must not become the enemy of the good;

-- and, above all, that every great achievement is an ideal before it becomes a reality.

Thus in its deepest sense this simple ceremony, which shows to what extent we have overcome an unhappy past, symbolizes as well the future for which we must strive -- a world of nations which find pride in their reconciliations, not their power; an era in which convictions are the source of moral strength rather than of intolerance or hatred.

One of America's first and greatest leaders, Benjamin Franklin, expressed a universal hope of human society: "...God grant that not only the love of liberty, but a thorough knowledge of the rights of men, may pervade all nations of the earth, so that a philosopher may set his foot anywhere on its surface and say, 'this is my country'."

Human history has not yet reached this ideal. But we must persevere until what is now unfamiliar becomes natural, what is now a vision of peace becomes a reality and our legacy to our children.

In this spirit -- and on behalf of my family as well -- I accept your distinction and shall treasure it. I am honored and moved, and grateful.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

December 15, 1975

No. 610

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON ARRIVAL AT ONLY AIRPORT
PARIS, FRANCE
DECEMBER 15, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Good evening. We have two international problems or two major international problems: the problem of peace and war, which concerns primarily East-West relations, and the problem of development and social justice, which deals primarily with North-South issues.

The conference that I am attending here will attempt to deal with the problem of the economic development of the entire world: the problem of social justice.

The United States is coming to it in a cooperative spirit and the realization that our economies are all inter-dependent and that our destinies are inter-linked. We will deal with it with a sense of responsibility and attempt to shape a better future, and we hope that our colleagues will approach it with the same attitude. Thank you.

* * * * *

The Common Challenge in the Search
for an Enduring Peace

Following are remarks made by Secretary
Kissinger at Fuerth, Federal Republic of
Germany, on December 15 upon accepting
Fuerth's Gold Medal for Distinguished Na-
tive Citizens.

Press release 607 dated December 15

Mr. Foreign Minister, Mr. Minister-Presi-
dent, Mr. Lord Mayor, distinguished guests,
friends: This is not the first time in the last
35 years that I have paid a sentimental visit
to Fuerth. I enjoyed a brief but warm stay in
1959. I have often exchanged letters with
your distinguished Lord Mayor and his prede-
cessor and have been encouraged and
strengthened by their good wishes in many
periods of my public life. When the honor I
am now receiving was first offered to me, I
accepted with pleasure.

I am proud to be here as the Secretary of
State of perhaps the only country in the
world where it is possible for an adopted son
to have the opportunity for responsibility
and service that I have enjoyed. I am happy
to share this occasion with my family, my
parents, who have never lost their attach-
ment to this city in which they spent the
greater part of their lives. I believe that my
visit here exemplifies the extraordinary re-
birth of friendship between the American
people and the German people.

This is why the central role in this event
of my colleague and friend Hans-Dietrich
Genscher means so much to me. The partner-
ship that he and I carry out every day in
international affairs is given a deeper quality
by the personal affection and comradeship
that exists between us.

Our generation has witnessed—and has
no excuse ever to forget—the dark force of
brutality and raw power at large in the mod-
ern world. As I stand here today, suffering is
still dominant in many parts of the globe. Of
all the species on this planet, man alone has
inflicted on himself the great part of his own
anguish.

49

Yet our generation, more than any other, also has the possibility and indeed the imperative of something better. We live in a world of some 150 sovereign nations, in an era of both instant communication and ideological competition and in the shadow of nuclear cataclysm. No longer can we afford to submit to an assumed inevitability of history's tragedy. The interdependence of states links our societies, our economies, and our destinies; we will either progress together or we will decline together.

Much has happened from which we can take hope and courage. Free societies have come closer to the dream of well-being and justice than any earlier period has witnessed. Our two nations have moved from bitter conflict to peace and from peace to reconciliation and common endeavor. We have been leaders in the quest for peace—in Europe and in the world.

Our common challenge is to help build an international structure of relationships which keeps continents stable and nations secure, which ties nations to each other by bonds of mutual interest, which fosters the habits of restraint and moderation in international conduct, which gives free rein to man's striving for freedom and justice. Our goal is a peace which all—the small as well as the large—have a share of shaping; a peace that will endure because all—the strong as well as the weak—have a stake in making it last.

We know that such a peace will not come—nor can it be maintained—without effort and courage. We must be conciliatory without weakness and tolerant without moral confusion; we must temper strength with wisdom and seek justice while respecting the sense of justice of others. Posterity will not forgive either truculence or the failure to

act firmly in defense of interest and principles. Posterity will not forgive either illusions or the failure to grasp opportunities that come fleetingly and may never return.

- That freedom must be vigilantly defended;

- That stability depends on restraint among as well as within nations;

- That no nation or group of nations can achieve satisfaction of its needs alone;

- That the best must not become the enemy of the good; and

- Above all, that every great achievement is an ideal before it becomes a reality.

Thus in its deepest sense this simple ceremony, which shows to what extent we have overcome an unhappy past, symbolizes as well the future for which we must strive—a world of nations which find pride in their reconciliations, not their power; an era in which convictions are the source of moral strength rather than of intolerance or hatred.

> . . . God grant that not only the love of liberty, but a thorough knowledge of the rights of men, may pervade all nations of the earth, so that a philosopher may set his foot anywhere on its surface and say, "This is my country."

In this spirit—and on behalf of my family as well—I accept your distinction and shall treasure it. I am honored and moved and grateful.

50

Department of State Bulletin

The Secretary
of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[LC]

Speech

December 16, 1975

Paris, France

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

ENERGY, RAW MATERIALS, AND DEVELOPMENT:
THE SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Conference on International Economic Cooperation.*

The challenge of our time is to build a stable and just international structure. This task has two principal dimensions. There is the imperative of peace—the more traditional problems of building security, resolving conflicts, easing tensions. These issues dominate the agenda of relations between East and West. No less urgent is the imperative of justice—the compelling requirements of global economic progress and social advance. These are now the major issues in the relationship between North and South. They too carry the potential for either conflict or order. Neither the goal of peace nor that of social justice can be achieved in isolation. We must succeed in both quests or we will succeed in neither.

Social justice and economic progress are our concerns at this conference. We meet here to launch the dialogue that has been so often urged and so long awaited. The convening of this meeting should itself be a reason for hope. For we believe it represents a commitment to the path of conciliation. It demonstrates a recognition that consumer and producer, industrial and agricultural, developed and developing, rich and poor must together address the challenges of the global economy.

The United States will work with dedication and energy for a positive outcome. We will do so in our own self-interest and in the interest of a more just and prosperous community of nations.

We will do our utmost to help mobilize the world's resources and the talents of men and women everywhere in the service of economic progress and common well-being.

In the past 2 years we have all learned that no nation or group of nations can solve its economic problems in isolation. In a world which is becoming increasingly interdependent, we have witnessed that inflation and recession affect us all. We have seen that no country can achieve redress by exporting its economic difficulties or by exacting an exorbitant economic price from others.

But our deepest challenge is political. Economic distress magnifies the problems of government in all our countries, clouding the prospects of social peace and democratic institutions. We have seen that national economic problems thus become international; they spawn clashes of interest and protectionist pressures that strain the fabric of collaboration, even among traditional friends. We have all come to understand that, if unresolved, the competing claims of developed and developing, consumer and producer, will thwart any effort to build a stable and progressive international structure.

Our future depends now not on blind economic forces but on choices that statesmen make. The world's nations can struggle in national or ideological contention—or they can acknowledge their interdependence and act out of a sense of community. The United States has chosen the path of cooperation.

The United States, as the world's strongest

PR 612

2

(le)

economy, has demonstrated its resilience: we are on the road to recovery. We might best survive any new round of economic warfare. But it is my country's conviction that tests of strength benefit no nation. The approach that we took at the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly in September reflects our vision of a more positive future.

The special session reached consensus on an impressive range of economic problems. This commitment to cooperation can become a benchmark in human affairs—if its spirit is carried forward. We owe our people solutions, not slogans. So let us set to work. Let us implement the consensus of the special session and take up its unfinished tasks. Let us make this conference a decisive step toward their achievement.

## The Road to This Conference

We are here because 2 years ago the international structure was gravely tested by a crisis in energy. No problem on the international agenda is more crucial to the world economy. As this conference demonstrates, it has led us to a much broader consideration of the range of related issues.

The unprecedented expansion of the global economy in the decades since World War II relied upon the plentiful supply of energy at reasonable prices. It produced economic growth, fostered industrialization, and encouraged development in every quarter of the globe.

Thus the energy crisis—caused by a combination of the 1973 embargo and the fivefold increase in the price of oil—has dealt a serious blow to global stability and prosperity.

Inflation, recession, and payments balances significantly worsened in all the industrialized world and in those developing nations which had realized substantial progress toward industrialization. The poorest of the developing countries, struggling to make modest steps toward progress, were dealt the cruelest blow of all. Their hopes for growth were—and continue to be—thwarted. Their development planning has been disrupted. Even their agricultural production has been undermined by the increased cost of petrochemical fertilizers. For the vast majority of the developing world economic justice was poorly served.

In response to the energy crisis, the United States sought first to reach a consensus among the industrialized nations. We worked together to as-

sure basic security against future arbitrary disruptions in oil supply and against potential oil-induced financial difficulties. We pledged ourselves to long-term cooperation in energy conservation and the development of alternative energy supplies. We agreed not to resort to protectionist measures, and we began unprecedented cooperation in our economic policies as dramatized by the recent economic summit in Rambouillet [November 15-17, 1975].

These actions were not taken in a spirit of confrontation. Most are prudent steps of self-protection which have effect only if confrontation is provoked by others. Others involve an urgent program for the development of alternative sources to the benefit of all.

But the collaboration of the industrial countries has always been conceived as only part of a larger program for economic progress. From the beginning, we have foreseen an effort to develop a constructive dialogue leading to close and mutually beneficial long-term economic ties with oil-producing nations—so that our investment and technical support would contribute to their development, and their prosperity would contribute to the worldwide expansion of trade and development. We recognize that the only durable basis for constructive relations is an economic system which fosters the prosperity of all. Each of us has a stake in the progress of others.

Last April, at the invitation of the President of France, we agreed to begin this discussion. The industrial nations wanted to focus on energy. The oil-producing and other developing nations wanted to give equal priority to a wider range of development issues, including prices and markets for other raw materials, and to international financial questions. The industrial nations regarded these issues as too varied and complex to be addressed effectively in a single forum. The April preparatory conference failed to reconcile these positions.

To demonstrate its desire for a constructive and cooperative solution the United States worked closely with other participants in developing a mutually satisfactory arrangement: energy, the concerns of the less developed countries about raw materials, development, and related financial matters would be addressed as part of a discussion of global economic problems, while maintaining enough distinction between them for a useful dialogue.

3

The United States is committed to a serious and wide-ranging program of cooperation with the developing world. My country understands full well, and has shown in its many proposals, that this dialogue must encompass issues of concern to all sides—including the needs of the many nations not in attendance here. For us, this clearly requires a discussion of the effects of energy prices on the world economy. For cooperation depends on mutual respect, mutual understanding, and mutual benefit.

To this end, at the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly 3 months ago, the United States made a series of proposals in several areas:

* To insure the economic security of developing countries against shortfalls in export earnings, food shortages, and natural disasters;

* To accelerate their economic growth by improving their access to capital markets, technology, and foreign investment;

* To better the conditions of trade and investment in key commodities on which many of their economies are dependent, and to set an example in the vital area of food;

* To improve the world trading system and make it better serve development goals, and realize through the multilateral trade negotiations a strengthening of developing country participation; and

* To address the especially urgent needs of the poorest countries devastated by current economic conditions.

The Seventh Special Session ended on a note of conciliation and cooperation. The spirit of the session was carried forward to the October preparatory conference in Paris where the declaration laid the basis for our meeting today.

This will be the attitude of the United States here. Progress has been made in many areas, and this conference must move us forward.

## The Work of the Commissions

The four commissions that this conference is establishing have much work before them:

* The Commission on Energy should promote an effective world balance between energy demand and supply. It should work for practical cooperation among industrialized and developing countries to develop new energy supplies. And it should lay the foundations of a mutually beneficial long-term relationship between energy producers and consumers.

* The Commission on Raw Materials should work to establish the conditions for stable, long-run supplies of raw materials vital to global progress at prices that are remunerative to producers and fair to consumers.

* The Commission on Development should strive to accelerate economic development in all nations, especially the poorest. In particular, it should bring together industrial nations and oil-wealthy nations to provide financial support for the development initiatives of the U.N. Special Session.

* The Commission on Finance should address financial issues as they relate to the work of the other three commissions. It should seek to strengthen the sense of shared financial responsibility for the health and growth of the international economy.

With a cooperative approach, the commissions can give direction and impetus to related activity in other forums and organizations, under whose jurisdiction a number of these issues fall. They can serve as clearing houses for information and motivate other organizations doing similar work. They can identify areas where necessary work is not being done, and devise new initiatives where needed.

The United States will support progress on a broad range of topics in the context of the four commissions. But we have a special interest in the following areas:

*First, the price of oil and the security of oil supply as they affect the international economy;

*Second, the serious balance-of-payments problems of developing countries;

*Third, the conditions of international investment;

*Fourth, the issues of key commodities, especially food;

*Fifth, the problems of trade; and

*Sixth, the urgent needs of the poorest countries.

Let me discuss each of these in turn.

4

## Energy

First, energy. The application of science and technology to tap the vast energy potential imprisoned beneath the earth, radiated by the sun, generated by the movement of wind and water across the earth's surface or locked in the core of matter, is fundamental to the hopes of millions to pull themselves above a bare struggle for existence. For the expansion of the global economy for both developed and developing countries depends heavily on our harnessing and efficiently employing the world's energy resources.

Some nations are particularly well endowed with these resources; some have the scientific and technological expertise to explore and utilize that potential. The international flow of energy, investment capital required to produce it, and goods produced from fuels have become in effect a global energy system which sustains all our economies. Only through international cooperation can all nations benefit from these processes and can the world economy harness its energy resources most effectively.

The United States is committed to a cooperative approach. We have much to offer. We have produced more energy than any other nation in the history of mankind; our energy science and technology are the most advanced and we have tremendous potential for future energy development in our country and abroad. The United States also has much to gain from cooperation. Our energy needs are the world's largest; our ability to raise living standards for all our citizens depends on greater energy production and the more efficient use of energy resources.

This dialogue and this conference have these tasks:

* First, it is time to reach a common evaluation of the relationship between changes in energy prices and the stability and performance of the world economy. The abrupt and arbitrary increase in the price of oil has been a major factor in rates of inflation and unemployment unprecedented since the 1930's. It has led to serious balance-of-payments deficits, indirectly through global recession and directly through higher-priced imports.

By extraordinary effort the industrial countries, on the whole, put their payments back in balance over the last year, although at a high cost to the well-being of their peoples. Thus the im-

mediate burden of the massive petrodollar deficit is now borne largely by the developing countries which have little or no oil resources.

Developing countries by definition tend to have less of a margin to reduce consumption, to restructure energy use, or to shift to alternative sources when the oil price rises. They are the most vulnerable—and the most wounded.

A lower oil price would make possible more rapid economic recovery around the globe. It would assist the developing countries by easing their enormous balance-of-payments burden and their debt burden, and increasing foreign demand for their exports. A lower price, along with stability of supply, would also benefit producer nations over the long term by easing the urgency for consuming countries to develop alternative supply sources.

Conversely, any further increase in prices would seriously hamper economic recovery, retard international trade, compound the internal difficulties of many countries, weaken the ability of the advanced nations to assist the developing, and strain the fabric of international cooperation.

It is time for a serious discussion of this issue. We are prepared to make a sustained effort to achieve understanding.

* Second, we must collaborate to find new sources of energy and intensify our conservation efforts. All consuming countries, developed and developing, must use energy more efficiently and develop more abundant supplies. Producers need to prepare their economies for the day when they will have exhausted their easily accessible oil reserves.

Individually, the industrialized countries are accelerating the development of their own energy sources. The United States is developing its conventional fuels and also new sources, including nuclear power, to replace fossil fuels. We have committed massive resources to research and devoted our best talents to this effort; we expect it to result in a substantial increase in U.S. energy production. In Europe, major efforts have been launched along the same lines, with the North Sea as the most dramatic example of the potential. The development of alternative energy sources is vital.

In the near future, the industrial countries will take the first steps toward welding these national programs into a coherent cooperative program. These programs are designed to promote

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conservation and to accelerate the development of alternative energy supplies through large-scale joint projects and cooperation in research and development. We will demonstrate our commitment to the maximum development of new energy by agreeing not to permit imported oil to be sold in our internal markets below a common minimum safeguard price.

This effort will bring a better balance to the world energy market. But as it gathers support, it will bring important benefits to developing as well as industrial countries. The programs that the industrial countries are undertaking, and those that many developing countries have within their potential to undertake, can lead to additional and more secure supplies of energy, which can be a spur to their prosperity and development. All nations will have access to a larger pool of energy resources, and there will be less competition for oil. The efforts of developing countries to increase their own production of energy, if supported, can be the single most important step they take to secure their development for future generations.

At the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly, the United States proposed an international energy institute. Through such an organization, the developed countries and OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries can assist poorer developing nations to utilize energy more efficiently, increase their own production, and improve allocation and distribution of existing resources. It could identify current or new energy technologies most relevant to their special needs. The institute can help oil-producing countries to improve the use of their own energy.

Using the most advanced techniques of analysis, the institute could help assess all countries' energy resources and requirements. Staffed by experts drawn from government, industry, and academic life in both industrialized and developing countries, it could provide training for local and regional technicians or specialists in energy problems. It could become a central point of contact where policymakers and experts could exchange ideas on plans and programs. We see the institute as a first bridge between the massive effort the industrialized countries have now launched to develop alternative sources of energy and the effort which the developing countries must now undertake.

In addition, the United States has suggested a number of other means by which the talents and

experience of the developed nations, collectively and individually, can assist developing states to find and exploit new energy sources and conserve their national patrimony. We will advance these proposals in the Energy Commission. We anticipate a full exchange of views on their scope and substance.

Oil producers and nations with the technology to help develop oil resources share an interest in cooperation on conservation and exploration. But this cooperation will be easier to forge in a stable energy market with a more appropriate structure of energy prices.

● Third, the United States seeks a greater participation and contribution of the oil-producing countries in the international economy. With the extraordinary transfer of wealth that has taken place, it is in the common interest that the oil-producing nations be constructive members-not challengers-of the world economic system; that investment and the latest technology be made available to them on a reimbursable basis for their development programs; and that the flow of goods and services be enhanced between producing and consuming countries.

We believe that these three issues-a better understanding of the effects of oil price increases on the world economy, cooperation on conservation and new production, and the orderly integration of OPEC economies into the global economy-are priority tasks for the energy forum.

## Balance of Payments

The balance-of-payments problems of developing countries are an immediate and urgent task for this conference to address, closely related to the energy issue. Current projections indicate that the developing world in 1976 will be collectively in deficit by about $35 billion. Bilateral and multilateral aid, along with direct investment, will finance roughly $25 billion of this. The question is whether borrowing from international capital markets can again this year make up the remainder. If not, some countries will be forced to reduce imports, cut back development programs, and further mortgage their future. The deficits of the developing countries thus could endanger not only their own well-being but also the stability of the

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international trade and financial system.

A multitude of ideas and proposals are already before us. Let us address steps that can be taken now.

* First, the members of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] should promptly agree on the details of the trust fund which the United States has proposed to furnish concessional financing for the poorest countries. It would provide these countries additional resources of $1-$2 billion a year, using the profits from IMF gold sales as well as national contributions. We are well on the way to resolving outstanding issues on IMF gold; let us take final action on the trust fund in January.

* Second, the members of the IMF should complete negotiations next month on the new development security facility. The United States made this major proposal to provide more substantial financing to countries facing temporary shortfalls in export earnings due to the world business cycle or commodity fluctuations. We proposed this on September 1; its realization in January would be an impressive demonstration of international resolve and responsiveness.

* Third, the IMF should approve on one-third increase in member quotas, thus expanding its potential financing for all members.

Final approval can and must be taken on each of these proposals at the meeting of the IMF Interim Committee in Jamaica in early January. Together with substantial unused regular drawings still available to developing countries, these measures will add significantly to the capacity of developing countries to sustain their needed imports and their development programs. But however substantial these facilities, they may not be enough. Once the trust fund and these other proposals have been implemented in January, we must determine how best to respond to the remaining balance-of-payments problems of the developing countries.

The United States is committed to finding a constructive solution. Our specific response will depend in part on whether there is a general across-the-board financing problem or one concentrating on a few countries. One promising approach would be to expand the credit that developing countries can draw from the IMF by liberalizing the rules governing access to regular IMF resources. The IMF

Board could, for example, increase the size of each credit drawing, base them on expanded new quotas, or add a new drawing beyond those now available. Decisions on such proposals will need to be based on close analysis of their effect on the financial integrity of the IMF. Secretary [of the Treasury William E.] Simon will present our analysis and proposals for increased use of the IMF at the Interim Committee meeting.

We cannot emphasize enough the need for immediate action in this area to supplement the long-term proposals which have already been made. The responsibility does not lie with the industrialized countries alone. We cannot be expected to bear the major burdens for remedying balance-of-payments problems in which the actions of others play such a significant role. There is a collective obligation to act; there must be a joint program involving the industrialized, as well as the oil-producing, countries.

## Investment and Technology for Development

The balance-of-payments deficits of the developing countries will perhaps moderate as the global economy recovers from recession. But sustained economic growth requires the continuous application of capital, technology, and management skills to development needs.

Private investment has always been a major factor in the growth of the global economy. My own country has benefited from foreign investment throughout its history. Today more than ever the developing countries need this capital in addition to the limited supply of official development assistance.

To make this possible, governments of developing countries need better access to world capital markets. The United States has urged that technical assistance and expertise be provided to developing countries that are ready to enter long-term private capital markets for the first time. We have proposed a major expansion of the resources of the World Bank's International Finance Corporation [IFC] to strengthen the private sector in developing countries and to enhance their international competitiveness for private capital. We have recommended creation of an international investment trust to mobilize private portfolio capital for investment in local enterprises. And we are contributing to the work of the IMF/World Bank Development Committee to assist in removing

7

impediments to developing countries' access to capital markets.

But we also believe that one of the most important vehicles for transferring capital, technology, and management skills to where they are most needed is private enterprise. There simply is not enough governmental capital available. Because of ideological considerations, these private enterprises operate in an investment climate increasingly clouded by unpredictable national legislation and uncertain rules of the game. In this environment everybody suffers. Host countries are deprived of the capital resources, technology, and management which these enterprises uniquely provide, as well as a source of tax revenue. Home countries are deprived of the overseas markets, investment income, and the new ideas and techniques which come with foreign contact. And the enterprises themselves are squeezed at both ends, making overseas investment less worthwhile for them and reducing their contribution to home and host country alike and to the global product.

The United States has taken an active part in international efforts to facilitate international investment on a basis that serves the interests of all parties. We are willing to explore voluntary guidelines for the behavior of both transnational enterprises and governments. At the United Nations I stated four basic principles that should be included:

* Transnational enterprises must obey local law and refrain from unlawful intervention in the domestic affairs of host countries.

* Host governments must treat these enterprises equitably, without discrimination among them, and in accordance with international law.

* Both governments and businesses must respect the contractual obligations they freely undertake.

* Principles for transnational enterprises should apply to domestic enterprises where relevant.

But efforts should not be limited to general guidelines for investment. Other remedial measures are possible.

Taxation is one such area. Because they operate in multiple jurisdictions, transnational enterprises may sometimes be subject to either double taxation or inappropriate tax incentives. The result in either case is that investment patterns

are distorted. We must find ways to enable both host and home countries to coordinate their tax policies and make them more equitable to each other and to productive enterprises.

A second area for improvement is inter-governmental consultation on investment disputes. This is especially important to developing countries whose progress is dependent on a climate conducive to an adequate flow of investment. It is time to develop generally accepted international rules for the settlement of investment disputes and the arbitration of differences and other guidelines for dealing with problems arising between governments and enterprises. The United States recommends that the World Bank's International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes be given a greater role in solving important investment controversies.

International assistance for development must also focus on the advancement, selection, and application of modern technology. Many countries in the developing world are already on the path of industrialization. They have proved their capacity to take advantage of the vast storehouse of modern technology. The United States encourages this endeavor. We have long been in the forefront of the effort to train more managers, technicians, and researchers in the developing countries to carry this forward.

Most technology transfer takes place through international investment and the operations of transnational enterprises on a licensing, equity, or contract basis. The United States understands the concern of many developing countries not to become the repository of obsolescent technology. Technology must be suited to local needs, the terms and conditions must be mutually acceptable, and it must be effectively managed and utilized. Developing countries must be enabled to make their own informed choices of foreign or domestic technology, to adapt it to their own needs and conditions, and to manage its application skillfully. This technology transfer requires the development of human capabilities—the management and skills that constitute the infrastructure of technological development.

People—their training and their placement in a country's management systems—are the key to making technology a producing resource. International cooperation can make no greater contribution to development than to foster the training

8

of a corps of specialists in each country competent to select, bargain for, and manage technologies. We see this requirement as an important topic for consideration by the Commission on Development, and we will make concrete proposals to this end.

## Commodities

A healthy global economy requires that both producers and consumers find protection against the cycle of raw materials surplus and shortage which chokes growth and disrupts planning. We must insure more reliable supplies of vital commodities on terms fair to all.

The problem is most urgent in food, mankind's most critical need. The cycles of feast and famine, widely fluctuating prices of basic foodstuffs, and breakdowns in the system of storage and transportation continue to afflict mankind. These show few signs of abating. And in the long run, growth in demand for food threatens to outrun the expansion of supply.

As the world's largest producer and exporter of food, the United States recognizes its special responsibility: At home, we have been committed to policies of maximum food production and have removed all production restraints; internationally, we have proposed a system of grain reserves to help moderate fluctuations in world prices and supplies.

We believe that our grain reserves proposal can be a model for cooperation on other commodity problems. It takes into account the interests of producers and consumers. It makes special provision for the concerns of developing countries. Its reliance on buffer stocks minimizes the distortion of trade and improves the efficiency of the market. We now await the cooperation and commitment of others to help implement this proposal.

Most importantly, we are increasing our assistance to developing countries-not merely for short-term relief, but to help them boost their own agricultural production. Our bilateral aid programs in this area have been expanded greatly. We also strongly support the proposal first made by oil-exporting countries for an international fund for agricultural development. We have announced our willingness to make a contribution of $200 million, or one-fifth of the worldwide goal of $1 billion.

Other commodities are of critical importance

to many countries, either as producers or consumers. Many developing countries depend crucially on earnings from commodity exports to lift their people above subsistence levels, to support basic social programs, and to finance the beginnings of industrialization. The solution to commodity issues will affect not only the developing countries, but also the industrial countries- who are in fact the largest producers, consumers, and exporters of commodities. The economies of all countries are affected by the instabilities of the market-the vulnerability of agricultural commodities to the vagaries of weather and shifts in world demand; the sensitivity of agricultural and mineral markets to fluctuations in the business cycle in industrial countries; and the higher prices of critical energy imports.

At the Seventh Special Session a consensus was achieved that commodity issues should be approached cooperatively. The U.S. position is that a realistic and constructive approach will require that we:

* Establish producer-consumer forums for discussions of key commodities;

* Reduce obstacles to producers' access to markets and to consumers' access to supplies;

* Rely more on buffer stocks, where feasible and necessary, in preference to restrictions on trade and production;

* Improve the productivity and marketability of agricultural raw materials; and

* Expand worldwide production capacity in other key commodities.

We now stand ready to cooperate in establishing producer-consumer forums and discuss copper, bauxite, and other commodities. We plan to address the question of supply and market access in the multilateral trade negotiations [MTN] in the next several months. We have proposed that the IFC and the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] make available increased financing for mineral development and look forward to progress in the near future. We plan to support the U.N. Revolving Fund for National Resources Exploration. Finally, we have proposed establishment of an organization to finance and coordinate research on nonfood tropi-

9

cal products to improve their productivity and
competitiveness.

We look forward to additional discussion of
these measures in the Raw Materials Commission
of this conference.

## Trade

An expanding and more open international
trading system is a principal factor in the growth
and development of both developed and develop-
ing nations. We are committed to the strengthening
of this system so it can better serve the needs of
the international community and include, impor-
tantly, the developing nations.

Trade enables nations to earn their own way.
It is the most consistent with national dignity and
with the efficiency of the economic system.

Over the last 5 years, in a major step of inter-
national cooperation, all the major industrial na-
tions have committed themselves to establish a
generalized system of tariff preferences, giving de-
veloping countries better access to the markets of
all industrial nations.

The United States will implement its general-
ized system of preferences in 2 weeks' time. Under
this system we will eliminate duties on 2,724 tariff
items, representing some 19 percent of dutiable
non-oil imports from eligible countries in 1974.
This will open up significant potential new markets
for the products of developing countries in the
United States.

Tropical products are a promising area of ex-
port expansion for many developing countries. The
international trading system should encourage this
expansion. In the multilateral trade negotiations in
Geneva, work is beginning on a package of tariff
concessions on tropical products for early imple-
mentation. We attach much importance to this ef-
fort.

Tariff escalation—the process by which tariffs
are progressively increased on goods as they move
higher on the ladder of processing—is an obstacle
to the exports and industrialization of many de-
veloping countries. At the U.N. Special Session we
proposed that reduction, or in some cases elimina-
tion, of tariff escalation be an important goal for
the multilateral trade negotiations. The effort to
identify and negotiate specific changes will begin
next year.

This effort, however, is related in our view to
the issue of access to supply of raw materials. Con-
sumers cannot be expected to improve access to
their markets for finished products if they face re-
strictions on supplies of related raw materials. Thus
the Geneva negotiations must also improve access
to supply as well as access to markets.

Reducing or eliminating nontariff barriers to
trade is another major task facing the international
trading community. We will make a particular ef-
fort to negotiate special and differential treatment
for developing countries in this area.

An improved and strengthened world trading
system would not be complete, however, if it did
not insure greater sharing by developing countries
of both benefits and responsibilities. Developing
countries should gradually take on the normal obli-
gations of reciprocity and trade rules as they
progress.

The multilateral trade negotiations are the
most effective forum for pursuing all these objec-
tives.

The United States put forward proposals in
many of these areas at the recent meeting of the
Trade Negotiations Committee in Geneva as goals
for 1976. The developing countries will also bene-
fit from progress in all other areas of the negotia-
tions, which we now hope will be completed in
1977.

The United States is committed to a role of
leadership in the multilateral trade negotiations.
We will seek rapid progress for the benefit of both
developing and developed countries. I believe that
this conference and its relevant commissions
should endorse the work of the MTN. It should
provide continued support for the negotiations by
monitoring and contributing ideas to the work in
Geneva.

## Global Poverty

Our deliberations here must address the plight
of the one-quarter of mankind whose lives are over-
whelmed by poverty and hunger and numbed by
insecurity and despair. This group has suffered im-
measurably from high prices of food and fuel.
Their export revenues have been seriously under-
mined by global recession.

In these regions less than one person in five is
literate; one baby in 10 dies in childhood, and in

10

some areas closer to one out of two; life expectancy is less than 50 years; and birth rates continue to be intolerably high. Public expenditures for education and health care are low—and their per capita income has been declining for the last 4 years.

And so today, alongside the Third World with its increasing power and assertiveness, there has come into being a fourth world, where human beings still struggle for bare existence.

In one international conference after another, we have all pointed to the fourth world with sincere intentions of giving immediate help, providing long-term assistance, and devising special arrangements. We have agreed that this is a major test of a just international structure. It is time for all of us here to act on our words. Three areas need immediate action.

* First, many of the poorest cannot finance balance-of-payments deficits because they cannot gain access to capital markets or because of high interest rates on what little finance they can obtain. The trust fund which the United States proposed in the IMF to provide up to $2 billion for emergency relief is of special benefit to them. Let us reach a consensus to create this trust fund at next month's IMF meeting in Jamaica.

* The second area for immediate action is food aid. No obligation is more basic than our insuring that the poorest are fed. This fiscal year the United States expects to provide more than 6 million tons of food aid—or more than 60 percent of the 10 million ton global target set by the World Food Conference and a 20 percent increase over last year's contribution. Others must donate their fair share.

* Third, the poorest countries need preferential and expanded access to official concessionary financial aid. The United States will do its part. More than 70 percent of our bilateral development assistance now goes to low-income countries. The concessional financing of the international financial institutions should also be expanded. At the Seventh Special Session, my government pledged to support the fifth IDA [International Development Association] replenishment and the regional development banks. We are making every effort to secure congressional appropriations for funds already committed. We hope that the traditional and

new donors will help the poorest through financial contributions to both bilateral and multilateral programs.

Let us urgently rededicate ourselves to action on behalf of the poorest among us. Such action is the responsibility of the entire world community—not just the industrial countries, but also the more affluent in the developing world. While no one commission will be dealing with the totality of problems of the fourth world, each commission has a responsibility to be conscious of the need for special consideration for the poorest.

## Conclusion

The nations and economies of the world are many; our differences are great. But our reasons for pulling together are far greater. Therefore our dialogue here must be candid but with a positive spirit and cooperative attitude. The prosperity, the progress, and indeed the security of the world may depend upon whether we succeed in finding realistic answers to the kinds of problems before us at this conference. For lasting peace around the globe will depend not only on containing conflict, but mounting progress. It requires not merely the preservation of stability, but the fulfillment of human aspirations.

The issues we face are often technical, but their implications could not be more profound. They go to the heart of our future. Only rarely in history does mankind consciously swing out from familiar, well-marked paths to move in new directions. Only rarely does humanity comprehend as clearly as we do today that change is imminent and that the direction to be taken is subject to human decision. The nations of the world face such an opportunity now.

We have the possibility of forging international relationships that will govern world affairs for the next several decades. We can bring together developed and developing, producer and consumer, in common endeavors—or we can go our separate ways, with every one of us paying the price for a lack of vision in lower standards of living and increased international tensions. Mutual interest should bring us together; only blindness can keep us apart.

The American people have always believed in

The challenge of our time is to build a stable and just interna-
tional structure. This task has two principal dimensions. There is
the imperative of peace -- the more traditional problems of building
security, resolving conflicts, easing tensions. These issues dominate
the agenda of relations between East and West. No less urgent is the
imperative of justice -- the compelling requirements of global economic
progress and social advance. These are now the major issues in the
relationship between North and South. They too carry the potential
for either conflict or order. Neither the goal of peace nor that of
social justice can be achieved in isolation. We must succeed in both
quests or we will succeed in neither.

Social justice and economic progress are our concerns at this
Conference. We meet here to launch the Dialogue that has been so often
urged, and so long awaited. The convening of this meeting should itself
be a reason for hope. For we believe it represents a commitment to
the path of conciliation. It demonstrates a recognition that consumer
and producer, industrial and agricultural, developed and developing,
rich and poor, must together address the challenges of the global
economy.

The United States will work with dedication and energy for a
positive outcome. We will do so in our own self-interest and in the
interest of a more just and prosperous community of nations. We will
do our utmost to help mobilize the world's resources and the talents
of men and women everywhere in the service of economic progress and
common wellbeing.

In the past two years we have all learned that no nation or group
of nations can solve its economic problems in isolation. In a world
which is becoming increasingly interdependent, we have witnessed that
inflation and recession affect us all. We have seen that no country
can achieve redress by exporting its economic difficulties or by
exacting an exorbitant economic price from others.

But our deepest challenge is political. Economic distress magnifies
the problems of government in all our countries, clouding the prospects
of social peace and democratic institutions. We have seen that national
economic problems thus become international; they spawn clashes of
interest and protectionist pressures that strain the fabric of colla-
boration even among traditional friends. We have all come to understand
that if unresolved, the competing claims of developed and developing,
consumer and producer, will thwart any effort to build a stable and
progressive international structure.

-2-

ideological contention — or they can acknowledge their interdependence and act out of a sense of community. The United States has chosen the path of cooperation.

The United States, as the world's strongest economy, has demonstrated its resilience; we are on the road to recovery. We might best survive any new round of economic warfare. But it is my country's conviction that tests of strength benefit no nation. The approach that we took at the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in September reflects our vision of a more positive future.

The Special Session reached consensus on an impressive range of economic problems. This commitment to cooperation can become a benchmark in human affairs— if its spirit is carried forward. We owe our people solutions, not slogans. So let us set to work. Let us implement the consensus of the Special Session and take up its unfinished tasks. Let us make this conference a decisive step toward their achievement.

## The Road to this Conference

We are here because two years ago the international structure was gravely tested by a crisis in energy. No problem on the international agenda is more crucial to the world economy. As this conference demonstrates, it has led us to a much broader consideration of the range of related issues.

The unprecedented expansion of the global economy in the decades since World War II relied upon the plentiful supply of energy at reasonable prices. It produced economic growth, fostered industrialization and encouraged development in every quarter of the globe.

Thus, the energy crisis — caused by a combination of the 1973 embargo and the fivefold increase in the price of oil — has dealt a serious blow to global stability and prosperity.

Inflation, recession and payments balances significantly worsened in all the industrialized world and in those developing nations which had realized substantial progress toward industrialization. The poorest of the developing countries, struggling to make modest steps toward progress, were dealt the cruelest blow of all. Their hopes for growth were — and continue to be — thwarted. Their development planning has been disrupted. Even their agricultural production has been undermined by the increased cost of petrochemical fertilizers. For the vast majority of the developing world economic justice was poorly served.

In response to the energy crisis, the United States sought first to reach a consensus among the industrialized nations. We worked together.

- 3 -

to assure basic security against future arbitrary disruptions
in oil supply and against potential oil-induced financial difficulties.
We pledged ourselves to long-term cooperation in energy conservation
and the development of alternative energy supplies. We agreed not
to resort to protectionist measures, and we began unprecedented cooperation
in our economic policies as dramatized by the recent Economic
Summit at Rambouillet.

These actions were not taken in a spirit of confrontation. Most
are prudent steps of self-protection, which have effect only if a
confrontation is provoked by others. Others involve an urgent program
for the development of alternative sources to the benefit of all.

But the collaboration of the industrial countries has always
been conceived as only part of a larger program for economic progress.
From the beginning, we have foreseen an effort to develop a constructive
dialogue leading to close and mutually beneficial long-term economic
ties with oil-producing nations -- so that our investment and technical
support would contribute to their development, and their prosperity
would contribute to the worldwide expansion of trade and development.
We recognize that the only durable basis for constructive relations
is an economic system which fosters the prosperity of all. Each of us
has a stake in the progress of others.

Last April, at the invitation of the President of France, we
agreed to begin this discussion. The industrial nations wanted to
focus on energy. The oil-producing and other developing nations
wanted to give equal priority to a wide range of development issues,
including prices and markets for other raw materials, and to international
financial questions. The industrial nations regarded these
issues as too varied and complex to be addressed effectively in a
single forum. The April Preparatory Conference failed to reconcile
these positions.

To demonstrate its desire for a constructive and cooperative solution the United States worked closely with other participants in developing a mutually satisfactory arrangement: energy, the concerns of the less developed countries about raw materials, development and related financial matters would be addressed as part of a discussion of global economic problems, while maintaining enough distinction between them for a useful dialogue.

The United States is committed to a serious and wide-ranging
program of cooperation with the developing world. My country understands
full well, and has shown in its many proposals, that this dialogue must
encompass issues of concern to all sides -- including the needs of the
many nations not in attendance here. For us, this clearly requires

- 4 -

To this end, at the Seventh Special Session of the
United Nations General Assembly three months ago, the United
States made a series of proposals in several areas:

- To ensure the economic security of developing countries against shortfalls in export earnings, food shortages, and natural disasters;

- To accelerate their economic growth by improving their access to capital markets, technology, and foreign investments;

- To better the conditions of trade and investment in key commodities on which many of their economies are dependent, and to set an example in the vital area of food;

- To improve the world trading system and make it better serve development goals and realize through the Multilateral Trade Negotiations a strengthening of developing country participation; and

- To address the especially urgent needs of the poorest countries devastated by current economic conditions.

The Seventh Special Session ended on a note of conciliation and cooperation. The spirit of the Session was carried forward to the October Preparatory Conference in Paris where the Declaration laid the basis for our meeting today.

This will be the attitude of the United States here. Progress
has been made in many areas, and this Conference must move us forward

- 5 -

The Work of the Commissions

The four Commissions that this Conference is establishing
have much work before them :

-- The Commission on Energy should promote an effective world balance between energy demand and supply. It should work for practical cooperation among industrialized and developing countries to develop new energy supplies. And it should lay the foundations of a mutually beneficial longterm relationship between energy producers and consumers.

-- The Commission on Raw Materials should work to establish the conditions for stable, long-run supplies of raw materials vital to global progress at prices that are remunerative to producers and fair to consumers.

-- The Commission on Development should strive to accelerate economic development in all nations, especially the poorest. In particular, it should bring together industrial nations and oil-wealthy nations to provide financial support for the development initiatives of the United Nations Special Session.

-- The Commission on Finance should address financial issues as they relate to the work of the other three commissions. It should seek to strengthen the sense of shared financial responsibility for the health and growth of the international economy.

With a cooperative approach, the Commissions can give direction and impetus to related activity in other forums and organizations, under whose jurisdiction a number of these issues fall. They can serve as clearing houses for information, and motivate other organizations doing similar work. They can identify areas where necessary work is not being done, and devise new initiatives where needed.

The United States will support progress on a board range of topics in the context of the Four Commissions. But we have a special interest in the following areas :

- 6 -

- First, the price of oil and the security of oil
  supply as they affect the international economy;

- Second, the serious balance of payments problems
  of developing countries;

- Third, the conditions of international investment;

- Fourth, the issues of key commodities, especially food;

- Fifth, the problems of trade, and

- Sixth, the urgent needs of the poorest countries.

## Energy

First, Energy.

Some nations are particularly well endowed with these resources; some have the scientific and technological expertise to explore and utilize that potential. The international flow of energy, investment capital required to produce it, and goods produced from fuels have become in effect a global energy system, which sustains all our economies. Only through international cooperation can all nations benefit from these processes and can the world economy harness its energy resources most effectively.

The United States is committed to a cooperative approach. We have much to offer. We have produced more energy than any other nation in the history of mankind; our energy science and technology are the most advanced, and we have tremendous potential for future energy development in our country and abroad. The United States also has much to gain from cooperation. Our energy needs are the world's largest; our ability to raise living standards for all our citizens depends on greater energy production and the more efficient use of energy resources.

- 7 -

This Dialogue and this Conference have these tasks :

First, it is time to reach a common evaluation of the rela-
tionship between changes in energy prices and the stability and
performance of the world economy.

The abrupt and arbitrary increase in the price of oil has been
a major factor in rates of inflation and unemployment unprecedented
since the 1930's. It has led to serious balance of payments
deficits, indirectly through global recession and directly through
higher priced imports.

By extraordinary effort, the industrial countries, on the
whole, have put their payments back in balance over the last year,
although at a high cost to the wellbeing of their peoples. Thus
the immediate burden of the massive petrodollar deficit is now
borne largely by the developing countries which have little or no
oil resources.

Developing countries by definition tend to have less of a
margin to reduce consumption, to restructure energy use, or to
shift to alternative sources, when the oil price rises. They are
the most vulnerable -- and the most wounded.

A lower oil price would make possible more rapid economic
recovery around the globe. It would assist the developing countries
by easing their enormous balance of payments burden and their
debt burden, and increasing foreign demand for their exports. A
lower price, along with stability of supply, would also benefit
producer nations over the long term by easing the urgency for
consuming countries to develop alternative supply sources.

- 8 -

Individually, the industrialized countries are accelerating
the development of their own energy sources. The United States is
developing its conventional fuels and also new sources, including
nuclear power, to replace fossil fuels. We have committed massive
resources to research and devoted our best talents to this effort;
we expect it to result in a substantial increase in US energy
production. In Europe, major efforts have been launched along
the same lines, with the North Sea as the most dramatic example
of the potential. The development of alternative energy sources
is vital.

In the near future, the industrial countries will take the
first steps towards welding these national programs into a coherent
cooperative program. These programs are designed to promote
conservation and to accelerate the development of alternative
energy supplies through large-scale joint projects and cooperation
in research and development. We will demonstrate our commitment
to the maximum development of new energy by agreeing not to permit
imported oil to be sold in our internal markets below a common mi--
nimum safeguard price.

At the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly, the
United States proposed an International Energy Institute. Through
such an organization, the developed countries and O.P.E.C. countries
can assist poorer developing nations to utilize energy more
efficiently, increase their own production, and improve allocation
and distribution of existing resources. It could identify current
or new energy technologies most relevant to their special needs.
The Institute can help oil-producting countries to improve
the use of their own energy.

-9-

Using the most advanced techniques of analysis, the Institute could help assess all countries' energy resources and requirements. Staffed by experts drawn from government, industry, and academic life in both industrialized and developing countries, it could provide training for local and regional technicians or specialists in energy problems. It could become a central point of contact where policymakers and experts could exchange ideas on plans and programs.

We see the Institute as a first bridge between the massive effort the industrialized countries have now launched to develop alternative sources of energy, and the effort which the developing countries must now undertake.

Oil producers, and nations with the technology to help develop oil resources, share an interest in cooperation on conservation and exploration. But this cooperation will be easier to forge in a stable energy market with a more appropriate structure of energy prices.

Third, the United States seeks a greater participation and contribution of the oil-producing countries in the international economy. With the extraordinary transfer of wealth that has taken place, it is the common interest that the oil-producing nations be constructive members, not challengers, of the world economic system; that investment and the latest technology be made available to them on a reimbursable basis for their development programs; and that the flow of goods and services be enhanced between producing and consuming countries.

We believe that these three issues - a better understanding of the effects of oil price increases on the world economy; cooperation on conservation and new production; and the orderly integration of OPEC economies into the global economy - are priority tasks for the energy forum.

-10-

Balance of Payments
---

The balance of payments problems of developing countries are an immediate and urgent task for this Conference to address, closely related to the energy issue. Current projections indicate that the developing world in 1976 will be collectively in deficit by about $35 billion. Bilateral and multilateral aid, along with direct investment, will finance roughly $25 billion of this. The question is whether borrowing from international capital markets can again this year make up the remainder. If not, some countries will be forced to reduce imports, cut back development programs, and further mortgage their future. The deficits of the developing countries thus could endanger not only their own well-being but also the stability of the international trade and financial system.

First, the members of the IMF should promptly agree on the details of the Trust Fund which the United States has proposed to furnish concessional financing for the poorest countries. It would provide these countries additional resources of $1 - 2 billion a year, using the profits from IMF gold sales as well as national contributions. We are well on the way to resolving outstanding issues on IMF gold; let us take final action on the Trust Fund in January.

Second, the members of the IMF should complete negotiations next month on the new Development Security Facility. The United States made this major proposal to provide more substantial financing to countries facing temporary shortfalls in export earnings due to the world business cycle or commodity fluctuations. We proposed this on September 1st; its realization in January would be an impressive demonstration of international resolve and responsiveness.

Third, the IMF should approve a one-third increase in member quotas, thus expanding its potential financing for all members.

- 11 -

But however substantial these facilities, they may not be enough. Once the new Trust Fund and these other proposals have been implemented in January, we must determine how best to respond to the remaining balance of payments problems of the developing countries. The United States is committed to finding a constructive solution.

One promising approach would be to expand the credit that developing countries can draw from the IMF by liberalizing the rules governing access to regular IMF resources. The IMF Board could, for example, increase the size of each credit drawing, base them on expanded new quotas, or add a new drawing beyond those now available. Decisions on such proposals will need to be based on close analysis of their effect on the financial integrity of the IMF. Secretary Simon will present our analysis and proposals for increased use of the IMF at the Interim Committee meeting.

We cannot emphasize enough the need for immediate action in this area to supplement the long-term proposals which have already been made. The responsibility does not lie with the industrialized countries alone. We cannot be expected to bear the major burdens for remedying balance of payments problems in which the actions of others play such a significant role. There is a collective obligation to act. There must be a joint program involving the industrialized as well as the oil-producing countries.

The balance of payments deficits of the developing countries will perhaps moderate as the global economy recovers from recession. But sustained economic growth requires the continuous application of capital, technology, and management skills to development needs.

Private investment has always been a major factor in the growth of the global economy. My own country has benefited from foreign investment throughout its history. Today, more than ever, the developing countries need this capital in addition to the limited supply of official development assistance.

To make this possible, governments of developing countries need better access to world capital markets. The United States has urged that technical assistance and expertise be provided to developing countries that are ready to enter long-term private capital markets for the first time. We have proposed a major expansion of the resources of the World Bank's International Finance Corporation to strengthen the private sector in developing countries and to enhance their international competitiveness for private capital. We have recommended creation of an International Investment Trust to mobilize private portfolio capital for investment in local enterprises. And we are contributing to the work of the IMF/World Bank Development Committee to assist in removing impediments to

-12-

But we also believe that one of the most important vehicles for transferring capital, technology and management skills to where they are most needed is private enterprise. There simply is not enough governmental capital available. Because of ideological considerations, these private enterprises operate in an investment climate increasingly clouded by unpredictable national legislation and uncertain rules of the game.

In this environment everybody suffers. Host countries are deprived of the capital resources, technology and management which these enterprises uniquely provide, as well as a source of tax revenue. Home countries are deprived of the overseas markets, investment income, and the new ideas and techniques which come with foreign contact. And the enterprises themselves are squeezed at both ends, making overseas investment less worthwhile for them and reducing their contribution to home and host country alike and to the global product.

- Transnational enterprises must obey local law and refrain from unlawful intervention in the domestic affairs of host countries.

- Host governments must treat these enterprises equitably, without discrimination among them, and in accordance with international law.

- Both governments and businesses must respect the contractual obligations they freely undertake.

- Principles for transnational enterprises should apply to domestic enterprises where relevant.

.../...

A second area for improvement is intergovernmental consultation on investment disputes. This is especially important to developing countries whose progress is dependent on a climate conducive to an adequate flow of investment. It is time to develop generally accepted international rules for the settlement of investment disputes and the arbitration of differences, and other guidelines for dealing with problems arising between governments and enterprises. The United States recommends that the World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes be given a greater role in solving important investment controversies.

.../...

- 14 -

Most technology transfer takes place through international investment and the operations of transnational enterprises on a licensing, equity or contract basis. The U.S. understands the concern of many developing countries not to become the repository of obsolescent technology. Technology must be suited to local needs, the terms and conditions must be mutually acceptable, and it must be effectively managed and utilized. Developing countries must be enabled to make their own informed choices of foreign or domestic technology, to adapt it to their own needs and conditions, and to manage its application skillfully. This technology transfer requires the development of human capabilities -- the management and skills that constitute the infrastructure of technological development.

People -- their training and their placement in a country's managements systems -- are the key to making technology a producing resource. International cooperation can make no greater contribution to development than to foster the training of specialists in each country competent to select, bargain for and manage technologies. We see this requirement as an important topic for consideration by the Commission on Development, and we will make concrete proposals to this end.

## Commodities

A healthy global economy requires that both producers and consumers find protection against the cycle of raw materials surplus and shortage which chokes growth and disrupts planning. We must ensure more reliable supplies of vital commodities on terms fair to all.

The problem is most urgent in food, mankind's most critical need. The cycles of feast and famine, widely fluctuating prices of basic foodstuffs, and breakdowns in the system of storage and transportation continue to afflict mankind. These show few signs of abating. And in the long-run, growth in demand for food threatens to outrun the expansion of supply.

- 15 -

-- At home, we have been committed to policies of maximum food production and have removed all production restraints.

-- Internationally, we have proposed a system of grain reserves to help moderate fluctuations in world prices and supplies.

We believe that our grain reserves proposal can be a model for cooperation on other commodity problems. It takes into account the interests of producers and consumers. It makes special provision for the concerns of developing countries. Its reliance on buffer stocks minimizes the distortion of trade, and improves the efficiency of the market. We now await the cooperation and commitment of others to help implement this proposal.

Most importantly, we are increasing our assistance to developing countries -- not merely for short-term relief, but to help them boost their own agricultural production. Our bilateral aid programs in this area have been expanded greatly. We also strongly support the proposal first made by oil exporting countries for an International Fund for Agricultural Development. We have announced our willingness to make a contribution of $200 million, or one-fifth of the worldwide goal of $1 billion.

Other commodities are of critical importance to many countries, either as producers or consumers. Many developing countries depend crucially on earnings from commodity exports to lift their people above subsistence levels, to support basic social programs, and to finance the beginnings of industrialization. The solution to commodity issues will affect not only the developing countries, but also the industrial countries -- who are in fact the largest producers, consumers and exporters of commodities. The economies of all countries are affected by the instabilities of the market -- the vulnerability of agricultural commodities to the vagaries of weather and shifts in world demand; the sensitivity of agricultural and mineral markets to fluctuations in the business cycle in industrial countries; and the higher prices of critical energy imports.

The United States position is that a realistic and constructive approach will require that we:

-- Establish producer-consumer forums for discussions of key commodities;

-- Reduce obstacles to producers' access to markets and to consumers' access to supplies;

- 16 -

-- Rely more on buffer stocks, where feasible and necessary, in preference to restrictions on trade and production;

-- Improve the productivity and marketability of agricultural raw materials; and

-- Expand worldwide production capacity in other key commodities.

We now stand ready to cooperate in establishing producer-consumer forums to discuss copper, bauxite, and other commodities. We plan to address the question of supply and market access in the multilateral trade negotiations in the next several months. We have proposed that the IFC and the IBRD make available increased financing for mineral development and look forward to progress in the near future. We plan to support the UN revolving fund for national resources exploration. Finally, we have proposed establishment of an organization to finance and coordinate research on non-food tropical products to improve their productivity and competitiveness.

We look forward to additional discussion of these measures in the Raw Materials Commission.

## Trade

An expanding and more open international trading system is a principal factor in the growth and development of both developed and developing nations. We are committed to the strengthening of this system so it can better serve the needs of the international community and include importantly the developing nations.

Over the last five years, in a major step of international cooperation, all the major industrial nations have committed themselves to establish a generalized system of tariff preferences, giving developing countries better access to the markets of all industrial nations.

The United States will implement its generalized system of preferences in two weeks' time. Under this system we will eliminate duties on 2,724 tariff items, representing some 19 percent of dutiable non-oil imports from eligible countries in 1974. This will open up significant potential new markets for the products of developing countries in the United States.

Tropical products are a promising area of export expansion for many developing countries. The international trading system should encourage this expansion. In the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva, work is beginning on a package of tariff concessions on

- 17 -

tropical products for early implementation. We attach much
importance to this effort.

Tariff escalation -- the process by which tariffs are
progressively increased on goods as they move higher on the
ladder of processing -- is an obstacle to the exports of
and industrialization of many developing countries. At the UN
Special Session, we proposed that reduction, or in some cases elimination, of tariff escalation be an important goal for the
multilateral trade negotiations. The effort to identify and
negotiate specific changes will begin next year.

This effort, however, is related in our view to the issue
of access to supply of raw materials. Consumers cannot be expected
to improve access to their markets for finished products if they
face restrictions on supplies of related raw materials. Thus, the
Geneva negotiations must also improve access to supply as well
as access to markets.

Reducing or eliminating non-tariff barriers to trade is another major task facing the international trading community. We will make a particular effort to negotiate special and differential treatment for developing countries in this area.

An improved and strengthened world trading system would
not be complete, however, if it did not ensure greater sharing
by developing countries of both benefits and responsibilities.
Developing countries should gradually take on the normal obligations
of reciprocity and trade rules as they progress.

The multilateral trade negotiations are the most effective
forum for pursuing all these objectives.

The United States put forward proposals in many of these
areas at the recent meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee
in Geneva, as goals for 1976. The developing countries will also
benefit from progress in all other areas of the negotiations,
which we now hope will be completed in 1977.

The United States is committed to a role of leadership in the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. We will seek rapid progress,
for the benefit of both developing and developed countries. I believe
that this conference and its relevant commissions should endorse
the work of the MTN. It should provide continued support for the
negotiations by monitoring and contributing ideas to the work in
Geneva.

- 18 -

Global Poverty

Our deliberations here must address the plight of the one-
quarter of mankind whose lives are overwhelmed by poverty
and hunger and numbed by insecurity and despair. This group has
suffered immeasurably from high prices of food and fuel. Their
export revenues have been seriously undermined by global
recession.

In these regions less than one person in five is literate; one baby in ten dies in childhood, and in some areas closer to one out of two; life expectancy is less than fifty years; and birth rates continue to be intolerably high. Public expenditures for education and health care are low -- and per capita income has been declining for the last four years.

And so today, alongside the Third World with its increasing
power and assertiveness, there has come into being a Fourth World,
where human beings still struggle for bare existence.

In one international conference after another, we have all
pointed to the Fourth World with sincere intentions of giving
immediate help, providing long-term assistance, and devising
special arrangements. We have agreed that this is a major test
of a just international structure. It is time for all of us here to
act on our words.

First, many of the poorest cannot finance balance of payments
deficits because they cannot gain access to capital markets or
because of high interest rates on what little finance they
can obtain. The Trust Fund which the United States proposed in the
IMF to provide up to $2 billion for emergency relief is of special
benefit to them. Let us reach a consensus to create this trust
fund at next month's IMF meeting in Jamaica.

The second area for immediate action is food aid. No obligation
is more basic than our ensuring that the poorest are fed. This fiscal
year the United States expects to provide more than six million
tons of food aid -- or more than 60 per cent of the ten million-
ton global target set by the World Food Conference and a 20 per cent
increase over last year's contribution. Others must donate their
fair share.

Third, the poorest countries need preferential and expanded
access to official concessionary financial aid. The United States
will do its part. More than 70 per cent of our bilateral development
assistance now goes to low-income countries. The concessional
financing of the international financial institutions should also be

- 19 -

expanded. At the Seventh Special Session, my government pledged to support the fifth IDA replenishment and the regional development banks. We are making every effort to secure Congressional appropriations for funds already committed. We hope that the traditional and new donors will help the poorest through financial contributions to both bilateral and multilateral programs.

Let us urgently rededicate ourselves to action on behalf of the poorest among us. Such action is the responsibility of the entire world community -- not just the industrial countries, but also the more affluent in the developing world. While no one commission will be dealing with the totality of problems of the Fourth World each Commission has a responsibility to be conscious of the need for special consideration for the poorest.

## Conclusion

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The nations and economies of the world are many; our differences are great. But our reasons for pulling together are far greater. Therefore, our dialogue here must be candid but with a positive spirit and cooperative attitude. The prosperity, the progress and indeed the security of the world may depend upon whether we succeed in finding realistic answers to the kinds of problems before us at this conference. For lasting peace around the globe will depend not only on containing conflict, but on mounting progress. It requires not merely the preservation of stability, but the fulfillment of human aspirations.

We have the possibility of forging international relationships that will govern world affairs for the next several decades. We can bring together developed and developing, producer and consumer, in common endeavors -- or, we can go our separate ways, with every one of us paying the price for a lack of vision in lower standards of living and increased international tensions. Mutual interest should bring us together; only blindness can keep us apart.

- 20 -

The American people have always believed in a world of
conciliation rather than a world ruled by intimidation, pressure
or force. My country, in spite of its own strengths and
advantages, has chosen the path of cooperation. We will remain
committed to that path. But we cannot travel it alone; others
will have to join us. All of us here must base our policies
on the reality that we have a practical and moral stake in
each other's well-being.

I am confident of our cooperation and of our success. The
result will be a fair and prosperous world economy of benefit
to all nations, and with it new hope, opportunity and justice for
all peoples.

Thank you.

Director: Frazier Draper

Printed by: USIS

2, rue Saint-Florentin
75001 - Paris

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 16, 1975

No. 614

INTERVIEW OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BY
ABC, NBC, CBS TELEVISION
HOTEL MAJESTIC
PARIS, FRANCE
DECEMBER 16, 1975

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, since you feel that the non-oil-producing countries bear the brunt of the high oil prices, do they have the duty to help the IEA bring the oil prices down?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The basic theme of my speech is not concerned with any one single problem. It has to do with the fact that economic progress for all countries has to be part of an overall approach in which energy prices, development, commodities, all play a significant role. The United States will make a major effort to bring about constructive world economy, but it needs the cooperation of other nations and my speech here was an appeal (inaudible).

**QUESTION:** Mr. Kissinger, you seem to be going (inaudible)...cause and effect on the crisis...

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I was pointing out that the developing countries that do not produce oil face special difficulties. That is a fact, but I also pointed out that the oil-producing countries and the industrialized countries together have an opportunity to remedy many of these difficulties. The basic theme of the speech was a pledge of cooperation by the United States and an appeal to cooperation by other nations.

**QUESTION:** And if the other nations are not forthcoming in their cooperation, will we have to reduce our share of the...

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** One nation cannot cooperate by itself, but I am hopeful that this conference will succeed, so we can face that problem if it should unexpectedly arise.

**QUESTION:** How do you think the producers will respond to your request that they make a greater contribution to the world economy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** How can they resist me?

* * * * *

UNCLASSIFIED

RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
RUFHOM/AMEMBASSY ROME
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
RUFHBS/USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO
BT
UNCLAS SECTO 24104

FOR S/PRS - AMBASSADOR ANDERSON FROM FUNSETH
PASS TO NSC FOR MR. SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S TELEVISION INTERVIEW

1. FOLLOWING TEXT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S INTERVIEW WITH ABC, NBC, CBS TELEVISION IN FRONT OF HOTEL MAJESTIC, PARIS, DECEMBER 16:

2. BEGIN TEXT. Q. MR. SECRETARY, SINCE YOU FEEL THAT THE NON-OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES BEAR THE BRUNT OF THE HIGH OIL PRICES, DO THEY HAVE THE DUTY TO HELP THE IEA BRING THE OIL PRICES DOWN?

A. THE BASIC THEME OF MY SPEECH IS NOT CONCERNED WITH ANY ONE SINGLE PROBLEM. IT HAS TO DO WITH THE FACT THAT ECONOMIC PROGRESS FOR ALL COUNTRIES HAS TO BE PART OF AN OVERALL APPROACH IN WHICH ENERGY PRICES, DEVELOPMENT, COMMODITIES, ALL PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE. THE UNITED STATES WILL MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT A CONSTRUCTIVE WORLD ECONOMY, BUT IT NEEDS THE COOPERATION OF OTHER NATIONS AND MY SPEECH HERE WAS AN APPEAL (INAUDIBLE).

3. Q. MR. KISSINGER, YOU SEEM TO BE GOING (INAUDIBLE) ... CAUSE AND EFFECT ON THE CRISIS. ...

A. I WAS POINTING OUT THAT THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THAT DO NOT PRODUCE OIL FACE SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES. THAT IS A FACT, BUT I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES AND THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES TOGETHER HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REMEDY MANY OF THESE DIFFICULTIES. THE BASIC THEME OF THE SPEECH WAS A PLEDGE OF COOPERATION BY THE UNITED STATES AND AN APPEAL TO COOPERATION BY OTHER NATIONS.

Q. AND IF THE OTHER NATIONS ARE NOT FORTHCOMING IN THEIR COOPERATION, WILL WE HAVE TO REDUCE OUR SHARE OF THE ...

A. ONE NATION CANNOT COOPERATE BY ITSELF, BUT I AM HOPEFUL THAT THIS CONFERENCE WILL SUCCEED, SO WE CAN FACE THAT PROBLEM IF IT SHOULD UNEXPECTEDLY ARISE.

Q. HOW DO YOU THINK THE PRODUCERS WILL RESPOND TO YOUR

UNCLASSIFIED

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

December 17, 1975

No. 618

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
THE HONORABLE ALLAN MACEACHEN
CANADIAN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
BEFORE A BILATERAL MEETING

PARIS, FRANCE

DECEMBER 17, 1975

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I didn't know we had any problems until a few days ago.

**SECRETARY MACEACHEN:** Well, do we have any?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No.

**SECRETARY MACEACHEN:** I don't think so either.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have an excellent relationship.

**SECRETARY MACEACHEN:** I've been saying to you and to myself and to all others that the state of our relationship was excellent. In fact, I think it is better than it has been for some time.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think the state of our relations is excellent. Between two countries of our size there are always some problems, but we are solving them in a spirit of cooperation and friendship. Our relations are good. The Prime Minister and the President's relations are very good also.

**SECRETARY MACEACHEN:** Well, that is, I am glad to say, this is the interpretation that the Prime Minister has put on all these comments that have been made recently in the House of Commons. And his interpretation is that his relations with the President are good and with you.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course, without problems life would be dull. But the problems we have...

**SECRETARY MACEACHEN:** Of course, there are problems and we have agreed that we want to consult about them and work them out.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think that our relations haven't been better, at least since I have been in Washington. This is my assessment of the situation.

**SECRETARY MACEACHEN:** Well, I agree with that. I can only comment with respect to my own period in office and I think the atmosphere is better now than it was a year and a half ago.

* * * * *

GOLDA MEIR: UNVEILING OF PORTRAIT

Friday, December 19, 1975 - 12:30 pm

Mrs. Meir, Dr. Ripley, Mr. Sadik, distinguished guests and
friends:

I have been reading through Mrs. Meir's memoirs, which
are an extraordinary document:

-- I noticed that she organized and led her first
successful fund-raising campaign -- for school
textbooks in Milwaukee -- at the age of eleven!

-- I noticed that when she settled in Israel, her
principal worry was that she would be regarded
as too soft, because she was an American!

-- I also noticed some very friendly references
to me, which I fear may be modified in the second
edition. The friendly references to my wife will,

I expect, remain, and for that I am grateful.

I can remember one meeting I and my colleagues had with her negotiating team at 2:00 o'clock in the morning after flying in from Damascus, after a month of negotiation. We talked until 3:00, and the Israeli Cabinet was scheduled to meet again at 7:00. At about 3:00 o'clock, she said casually: "We should adjourn now. The young ones need their sleep."

I am proud to welcome Mrs. Meir once again to America, which she will always be entitled to regard as a second home.

The world has seen many leaders, many politicians, many strong personalities. But few have shown the human qualities that she has displayed, and for which she is known and loved -- her courage, her total integrity, her compassion for her people. As I can testify from working with her in many periods of her

-3-

country's agony, she saw the crisis above all in human terms:
the lives of men and women -- every soldier, every prisoner
of war, every child -- and the intangible of trust between her
government and its people.

She used to say that the spirit of her people was their
greatest strength, more decisive than arms or strategies or
territories. No one embodies that spirit better than she.

We worked closely together; we often argued -- as between
members of a family, facing common trials. I still seek her
counsel, and value it. Those hours and weeks and years that
we worked together will remain with me always, as among
the most memorable and proudest of my public life. Because
I firmly believe that her years of leadership will some day be
recognized as the beginning of the achievement of Israel's dream --
of security, peace, and reconciliation.

PR #627

2

were started prior to the events of last week and that have
become severely complicated by the Congressional action. If
these do not succeed by the time that the Congress returns,
we will go back to the Congress and present the situation as
it then exists.

As far as our relations with the Soviet Union are
concerned, we consider the actions in Angola incompatible with
a relaxation of tensions, and they are certain to affect our
relationship unless a diplomatic solution is found.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you plan to go to Moscow
sometime after the first of the year?

A My present plans are to go to Moscow in the
second half of January to discuss primarily SALT and other
issues, but we will have to see what the situation is in
January.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you expect that visit to be
complicated by the events in Angola, specifically the
Congressional action on Angola? Will that make it harder?

A The Congressional action on Angola makes the
situation in Angola much more difficult. As a result, it
will also hurt our negotiating position with the Soviet Union.
We will have to make a judgment later on, when the diplomatic
moves that are now in progress will have had an opportunity

PR #627

3

to play themselves out, just how serious the effect will
have been.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it true, as published
this morning, that the CIA has found that Israel's request
for American aid has been greatly inflated and that, should
it receive the $2.3 billion requested in U.S. assistance, it
would have a budget surplus of $500 million?

A Of course, I don't know who is on the
distribution list for what reports. I don't know whether
I am on all the distribution lists that some of the press
people are. The reports that I am familiar with and the
studies that I have seen indicate that, even at the level of
$2.3 billion that we have requested, Israel will have to
engage in an austerity program in order to make ends meet.
And our figure was based on an interdepartmental study which
came to the conclusion that the figure that we requested
from the Congress enables Israel to meet its needs on an
austerity basis. We have never heard of a figure that
enables Israel to achieve a surplus. And, of course, we
would not support that. But we have no evidence whatever
for that.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you say you consider
the Soviet actions in Angola incompatible with detente, what

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does that mean? What is the "or else," and how incompatible?

A Let us make a few observations here about
detente. And let us separate two things: The relationship
with the Soviet Union that is inherent in the relation of two
superpowers; and, secondly, those relations that are subject
to decisions and that we can regulate in terms of Soviet
behavior.

The basic problem in our relations with the Soviet
Union is the emergence of the Soviet Union into true super-
power status. That fact has become evident only in the 1970s.
As late as the Cuban missile crisis, the disparity in strategic
power between the United States and the Soviet Union was
overwhelming in our favor. In the 70s and 80s the Soviet
Union will have achieved, and is on the road to achieving,
effective strategic equality, which means that whoever may
be ahead in the damage they can inflict on the other, the
damage to the other in a general nuclear war will be of a
catastrophic nature.

This being the case, in the past the emergence of
a country into superpower status -- such as, for example,
imperial Germany vis-a-vis Great Britain -- has generally
led to war. Under the conditions of the nuclear age, it
must not lead to war. That is a fact of the period that

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any Administration, and any opponent of the Administration, would
have to face if they had to assume responsibility. How to
manage the emergence of Soviet power without sacrificing
vital interests is the pre-eminent problem of our period.
That part of the Soviet-American relationship cannot be
abolished. That is inherent in the relationship.

The second problem we have is whether we can
accelerate this process of moderating this potential conflict
by conscious acts of policy. This has been called detente.
In this respect, it requires conscious restraint by both sides.
If one side does not practice restraint, then the situation
becomes inherently tense. We do not confuse the relaxation
of tensions with permitting the Soviet Union to expand its
sphere by military means. And that is the issue, for example,
in Angola. The danger to detente that we face now is that
our domestic disputes are depriving us of both the ability
to provide incentives for moderation, such as in the
restrictions on the trade act, as well as of the ability
to resist military moves by the Soviet Union, as in Angola.

If the Soviet Union continues action such as
Angola we will, without any question, resist. And failure
to resist can only lead other countries to conclude that
their situation is becoming increasingly precarious, because

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in Angola we are not talking about American participation;
we are talking about giving military and financial assistance
to people who are doing the fighting, to local people who are
doing the fighting.

To return to your question, unless the Soviet
Union shows restraint in its foreign policy actions, the
situation in our relationship is bound to become more tense,
and there is no question that the United States will not
accept Soviet military expansion of any kind.

Q Mr. Secretary, in a democracy when there is this
kind of conflict between the Executive branch and the
Legislative branch and the Legislative branch is not moving
and is not responding to your requests and to your entreaties,
how is that eventually resolved? I mean, you can't act without Congress.

A It will become resolved when the consequences of
these actions become apparent. The danger is that they usually
become apparent too late. We warned and warned about the
implications of the amendments with respect to Soviet trade.
The end result was that the trade act could not be implemented,
or the trade agreement could not be implemented, and the people
who were supposed to be helped were hurt in the sense that
Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union fell from 38,000 to
10,000.

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We warned and warned about the implications of the Turkish aid cutoff, and it is now perfectly evident that our relations with Turkey have been damaged beyond any immediate hope of recovery, though we have made some progress. And we are warning now that what is happening in Angola has nothing to do with the local situation in Angola.

We were prepared to accept any outcome in Angola, before massive arms shipments by the Soviet Union and the introduction of Cuban forces occurred. We are not opposed to the MPLA as such. We make a distinction between the factions in Angola and the outside intervention. We can live with any of the factions in Angola, and we would never have given assistance to any of the other factions, if other great powers had stayed out of it.

Q Mr. Secretary, if these Congressional restraints on action in Angola by us, or for Angola, are not removed -- and there isn't any sign that they are going to be -- how can you make your statement stick that the United States will not accept Soviet military expansion of any kind? It ties your hands, does it not?

A It ties our hands, but it is my conviction that if one does not discharge one's responsibilities in one place, one will be forced to do so

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elsewhere under more difficult circumstances. The problem
will not go away. The situation will become more difficult.

Q Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, if I could
ask a complicated question on that: I thought that one of
the lessons of Vietnam was that the United States is no
longer going to be the policeman for the world. There are
no vital U.S. interests at all in Angola. You said that
publicly. The Russians have a long history of failures in
Africa. Why is it necessary every time the Russians get
involved anywhere in the world, even in places where American
interests are not affected, that you feel that you are
compelled to go confront them?

And in connection with that, if you consider it
so important, why do you do it in a clandestine way? Why
don't you take it to the Congress and say, "This is important;
we need money for it," and have it debated at the beginning,
instead of having it blow up in your face?

A May I separate out some of the strands of
this exposition?

First, the phrase that the United States cannot
be the world's policeman is one of those generalities that
needs some refinement. The fact of the matter is that
security and progress in most parts of the world depend on

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some American commitment.

Now, with respect to Angola: the issue, I repeat, is not whether a pro-Soviet faction is becoming dominant in Angola. The United States policy until well into the summer was to stay out of Angola, to let the various factions work out their own arrangements between themselves. We accepted in Mozambique without any difficulty a pro-Marxist faction that came to power by indigenous means, or perhaps with some minimum outside support, in the Frelimo. What happened between March and the middle of the summer was a massive introduction of Soviet military equipment, which was then followed by Soviet advisors and large numbers of Cuban troops--large at least in relation to what it takes in Angola to affect the situation.

Therefore, the issue is not whether the country of Angola represents a vital interest to the United States. The issue is whether the Soviet Union, backed by a Cuban expeditionary force, can impose on two-thirds of the population its own brand of government. And the issue is not whether the United States should resist it with its own military forces. Nobody ever suggested the introduction of American military forces. The President has made it clear that under no circumstances will we introduce American military forces. The

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issue is whether the United States will disqualify itself
from giving a minimal amount of economic and military
assistance to the two-thirds of the population that is
resisting an expeditionary force from outside the hemisphere
and a massive introduction of Soviet military equipment.

If the United States adopts as a national policy
that we cannot give even military and economic assistance
to people who are trying to defend themselves without
American military forces, then we are practically inviting
outside forces to participate in every situation in which
there is a possibility for foreign intervention. And we are,
therefore, undermining any hope of political and international
order.

Now, as far as the Congress is concerned, let us
keep in mind we are talking about trivial sums. We are
talking about tens of millions of dollars. And there is
something wrong if one says that, if one approves tens of
millions of dollars, the next thing you know is you will
have spent $150 billion and have 500,000 troops there. A
country must know how to make distinctions. We are talking
about tens of millions of dollars in a situation in which
our whole strategy was to produce a negotiated solution, of
which the first step was going to be the speech I made in

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Detroit at the end of November.

We did it in a clandestine way because we did not want to have a public confrontation if we could avoid it. Nor is it correct to say that the Congress did not know about it. Congressional committees were briefed on 25 separate occasions about what we were doing in Angola. Every stage of additional expenditures was put before the six Congressional committees that have supervisory responsibilities. Some of them have designated only two members to receive these briefings; others have designated as many as 13 members to receive these briefings. But the designation is not the Administration's decision; it is the decision of the Congress. But six Congressional committees were briefed at least 25 times. In addition, the two intelligence committees were briefed, I believe, a total of four times, two each. And I briefed the Church committee myself for two and a half hours. So we followed the procedures that had been established. We were expecting to bring this matter to a negotiated solution, without a huge controversy, in a reasonably brief period of time.

And again, we should remember that this whole controversy is breaking out about American equipment asked for by African countries to support other Africans, and which amounts to some tens of millions of dollars.

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Q Mr. Secretary, I just want to check.

You have left the impression that if the Soviets continue
in their current support in Angola, your trip to Moscow
would be in jeopardy later this month, or it might not
take place.

The second point is, if indeed the Angolan
situation is really a test between the Soviet Union and
the United States, why not go to the heart of the issue
on a question like grain shipments to the Soviet Union and
things like that, in which the Soviet Union has a direct
interest and some pressure can be brought to bear?

A I think it is a rather curious method to
say "you go ahead and take over Angola with 5,000 foreign
troops, but in the meantime we will start harassing you
with some other things."

We are talking to the Soviet Union within the
context of our overall relationship, and there is no
question that our overall relationship will suffer if
we do not find an adequate solution to the Angolan problem.
Where it will suffer and in what ways, I am not prepared
to say. I have not said that the trip to Moscow will be
in jeopardy. I said we will have to look at the situation

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closer to the time of the trip before we can answer the question whether it is in jeopardy or not.

The question of strategic arms limitations is a matter that is in our mutual interest and that should not be lightly discarded.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have often said that no policy can be effective without American public support. Unless you can show some clear and compelling national interest involved in Angola, how do you propose to win American public support?

A I think I have shown -- in my view, what I have said here this morning shows -- a clear and compelling American national interest to do the things that we had wanted to do, which were minor expenditures compared to what is involved internationally.

We are talking about, I repeat, tens of millions of dollars. We are not talking about an American expeditionary force. We are not talking about a major American involvement. The debate has been misrepresented, in which American assistance to indigenous forces becomes an American commitment to fight a war. That is not the case. And therefore, if we do not succeed in convincing the public or the Congress, then we will certainly lose. And then the

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question is -- then we will certainly lose on this issue. And then we will face the problem that is always faced in these cases. Those who are trying to resist are doing so because they want to prevent a worse contingency. If they could prove that worse contingency without any question, everybody would agree with them. A danger avoided can never be demonstrated. Therefore, if those of us who hold the view that I have described here are correct, we will face more serious dislocations and dangers further down the road. And when the dangers become serious enough, they will unify the American people and the Congress and the Executive.

We are trying to avoid that contingency from arising. If we turn out to be wrong and the Congress is right, I will be delighted.

Q Mr. Secretary, implicit in all of these questions, though, is the fact that Vietnam began as a very minor involvement, began with material assistance, not just military assistance. Implicit in all of this is the understanding that if, in fact, you are not successful with the tens of millions of dollars, that the next request then will be for hundreds of millions of dollars.

How do you respond to that?

A First of all, the situations in Angola and in Vietnam are totally different.

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In Vietnam, we were involved with a state of some size that had fought a civil war for decades, and that had shown a substantial ability to conduct its own war against the French and against its own opponents in the country.

In Vietnam, in fact, the analogy, if there is any, is the Soviet support for Hanoi. And if the Soviet Union had taken the position the Senate is now taking vis-a-vis Hanoi -- namely, that they would not support them once we got involved -- then we would certainly have won the war.

Now, in Angola we are dealing with three factions, none of them very large, none of them very well organized. Without outside support, the war would end on the basis that the Organization of African Unity has proposed, through some sort of coalition among the local forces. That is all that we want. We have no permanent interests in Angola and I repeat again, we have no objection to the MPLA as long as it is an African organization.

Now, the only way we would have to come back for more and more funds is if the Soviet Union decided, on its side, to put hundreds of millions of dollars

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into Angola. If the Soviet Union were prepared to do this
in an area 8,000 miles away from its borders, in which it
has no historical interest, if it were willing to fight a
proxy war with the United States that far away from its
borders, then we better know about it. Then we can make
all sorts of decisions.

It was our belief, and it remains our belief,
that this is a situation that can be solved by negotiation.
And if we have the minimum degree of unity in this country
and the minimum degree of confidence in ourselves, it will
be resolved. But if a country is afraid to spend $10 million
lest it spend $10 billion, then it is getting itself
into great difficulties. And let us not fool ourselves
about what happened in Vietnam. We did not start in Vietnam
with a few hundred men and woke up one morning and had
500,000 troops there. Every step in Vietnam was a
conscious decision that was publicly known and to which
there was no significant objection when there was time to do
something about it.

There is no possibility that the same thing
could happen in Angola, when even the first step has
produced such an intense debate. And therefore I would
warn against our putting ourselves -- against drawing such

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facile analogies to Vietnam.

Q Mr. Secretary, can we switch to the Middle East for a minute and ask you if the United States has asked the Rabin government not to allow further settlements in the Golan Heights, or, indeed, if the United States has suggested anything in this regard to the Rabin government?

A I do not want to comment about Presidential messages. It has been our general policy to point out that the creation of new settlements on the Golan Heights and elsewhere complicates the diplomatic process. And we have from time to time brought this to the attention of the Israeli Government.

Q Mr. Secretary, you spoke earlier of the emergence in this decade of the Soviet Union as a superpower, and you also spoke about detente as an effort to modify Soviet behavior by conscious acts of policy. Why are you waiting to affect the overall relationship of detente through those means by which we reinforce the Soviet ability to grow as a superpower; in other words through economic and food shipments, in which the Soviets can then divert their resources into becoming a military superpower.

A First of all, American credits to

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the Soviet Union have been minimal and have always been
tied to specific projects which, in our judgment, did not
affect the basic Soviet strategic position. The major
amounts of credits to the Soviet Union from the outside
world have come from the West Europeans and Japan and not from
the United States.

With respect to grain shipments, the sale of
grain to the Soviet Union does not enable them to divert
resources. It affects their standard of consumption and
the happiness of the population, but it would not basically
affect the Soviet strategic position.

The fact we have to face is that the Soviet
Union, as a major industrial power, will develop inevitably
associated military capabilities. The Soviet Union has
been prepared to spend a greater percentage of its gross
national product for military forces than the United States,
and has therefore been able to translate it into stronger
forces for each new conflict than the United States. That
is not a result of detente; that is a result of domestic
priorities in the two countries which we have it in our
power to change and which we should change.

We have to make a decision whether, with an
emerging superpower, we should conduct our foreign

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policy entirely on the basis of unbridgeable hostility or whether, through a combination of moderation or creating incentives for moderation, and firmness when challenged, channel the inevitable competition into a direction which prevents what has generally happened when a new superpower emerged, namely, a war. And a war under present circumstances would have catastrophic consequences for all of humanity.

Now, this is the problem of detente. And I must stress again we are being deprived now of both the incentives for moderation and the capacity to resist, and this must lead to an extremely dangerous situation.

Q Mr. Secretary, is Cuba's military intervention in Angola going to result, in your view, in an indefinite postponement of our normalization of trade and diplomatic relations?

A We will not continue the process of normalization until Cuban forces return to Cuba.

Q Mr. Secretary, how can you say you are going to continue to press for more and freer trade and to change the Trade Reform Act to get rid of some of the restrictions on trade with the Soviets at the same time we are trying to meet them with firmness in Angola?

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A We are not likely to press for that at this time.

Q Mr. Secretary, is the confrontation between Congress and the Administration on Angola crucial enough for you to resign over?

A I do not want to give them an incentive for more confrontation. [Laughter]

Q Mr. Secretary, can you say anything about those diplomatic moves you were mentioning in order to achieve the solution in Angola? Can you say what they are? Are they especially in the direction of the Organization of African Unity?

A We believe that the appropriate solution in Angola should be sought by the Organization of African Unity. It should be done on the basis that the three factions in Angola should agree among themselves on an appropriate coalition or anything else that they agree among themselves-- that foreign forces, as I said the other day, from the Soviet Union, from Cuba, and from South Africa should be withdrawn from Angola. Under those conditions, Angola will cease being a significant interest of the United States, and we will cooperate with its economic development as part

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of our overall African policy.

We have no national objectives in establishing
a pro-American or pro-Western government in Angola. We
want an African government that is not imposed by anybody
from the outside.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is the Soviet response when you talk about the need for restraint in Angola and suggest that broader detente relations, bilateral relations, may be endangered by this?

A Well, we were only at the beginning of
the diplomatic process when we got diverted into
congressional hearings. But so far, obviously, the
response has not been conclusive.

Q Do you see any sign of moderation, of
reduction of arms shipments?

A My view was that a solution was achievable
- in the relatively near future, especially if we could have
pursued it with quiet diplomacy.

Q Mr. Secretary, on your basic problem
here with the Congress and the public, isn't it going to be
necessary, in order to have a prayer of marshalling any
support, for the Administration to come cleaner with the
public than it has about what it is involved in in Angola --

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the time sequence, exactly what it has put in, whether there
is any attempt to recruit mercenaries, the numbers of
advisors? You say the Soviet Union is blocking an attempt
at a coalition government. The Soviet Union claims that
it is the United States that foreclosed an attempt to have a
coalition government in the earlier period of
this year.

A That is untrue.

Q Well, the public is really bereft of facts
on the record here to deal with this situation. Is it not
possible to have some more candor about it? You said that the
basic situation in Vietnam was open and known. Certainly,
that cannot be said very clearly here about Angola.

A The situation in Angola, you have to remember,
was not a major enterprise. The situation in Angola was
one that was resoluble by diplomatic means. It is absolutely
untrue that a coalition government was offered by the Soviet
Union earlier this year, or by anybody else earlier this year,
and rejected by the United States. It has been the fixed
American policy to foster a coalition among the parties.
It has been the fixed American policy to support the OAU
in its efforts to bring about conciliation among the parties.

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And at no time has the United States attempted for any
particular group to prevail. It was only massive Soviet
intervention that has prevented this.

We had hoped that on the relatively small
scale that the operation was conducted-- and with the very
extensive Congressional briefing that was going on -- that
to escalate the problem too much would complicate its
solution.

It is perfectly clear now that, if we go back
to the Congress for additional support, we will have
to put the facts in all their details before the Congress.

But I would also point out that there is an area
in which confidential diplomacy must have an opportunity
to operate or every problem becomes that much more difficult.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Mr. Secretary --

A Mr. Binder first.

Q Mr. Secretary, isn't it a fact that a
year ago the primary outside forces engaged in Angola,
that is the supplies and advisors, were China and the
Soviet Union and that the Chinese withdrew sometime in
the summer and that the United States more or less filled
the gap left by the Chinese?

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A That is, with all respect, a rather superficial way of putting it. Our involvement -- and again, I must repeat -- our involvement is relatively small financial support to African countries that have asked us to help other Africans. It is not a commitment of American forces in Angola. Ours occurred when a very substantial influx of Soviet forces, extending over many months, beyond any capacity of the Chinese to match, seemed to create a situation where an outside power imposed its solution on the country. It was not coordinated with the Chinese. It was not discussed with the Chinese. It was done for our own reasons.

Q Mr. Secretary, why do you consistently minimize any reference to South Africa's involvement in your statements on Angola? Are you less concerned about South African involvement than Soviet involvement? And what diplomatic pressures, if any, are you taking to get South Africa to withdraw?

A I believe that the removal of South African forces is a relatively simpler matter than the removal of Cuban and Soviet forces. And the United States, I have stated publicly, and I have repeated it today,

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is in favor of the removal of both Cuban and South African forces, and of all outside intervention.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you have any realistic hope or expectation of getting money from Congress to continue your efforts in Angola; and two, if you do not, these dangers that you warn of, what practical consequences might there be?

A Well, we are going to make a major effort, both diplomatically and on the ground, to make do with what we have, to generate as much support from other countries as we can. And we have had very positive responses from many African countries over the last few days. And we will also make our views known to those countries that will attend the OAU summit meeting on January 10 and 12. So we are not operating on the assumption that it must necessarily fail.

Q Mr. Secretary, you can have a diplomatic dialogue with the Soviet Union by hinting that detente or SALT or other initiatives are threatened. But what pressure points do you have with the Cubans who have 5,000 or 6,000 expeditionary troops there?

A First of all, let us keep in mind one thing: that SALT and what I described as detente is in our common interest.

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It is not a favor we grant to the Soviet Union. It is
an inherent necessity of the present period. Avoiding
nuclear war is not a favor we do anybody. Avoiding
nuclear war without giving up any interests is the problem
that we face now.

As far as Cuba is concerned, we have no particular
additional pressure points. And, on the other hand, we do
not believe that Cuba would do what it is doing except
under Soviet advice.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

A May I say Merry Christmas to you all.

(Whereupon at 11:45 a.m. the press conference
was concluded.)

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT THE SWEARING IN OF
SAMUEL W. LEWIS

AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

DECEMBER 24, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Lewis, Mrs. Lewis, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Lewis has taken on one of the most challenging diplomatic assignments how to be a communicator between two Harvard professors of not exactly underdeveloped egos (laughter), a certain capacity to express themselves and united by at least one strong conviction. But no Yale man is going to tell either of us how to conduct our affairs. (Laughter)

It has been said of Mr. Lewis that he combines the modesty of a Texan with the compassion of a Yale man. (Laughter) So he should be well equipped for that assignment.

The recent session of the United Nations General Assembly has shown to us the world community in all of its complexity, with its aspirations for progress, its disputes, and in many respects its contemptible irresponsibility. But it is our obligation always to remember that beyond the disputes

2

of the moment we have the task to shape an international
environment in which our values can survive, our interests
can be protected, but in which other nations also feel
that their sense of justice and their aspirations can find
an expression.

We have an obligation to be conciliatory when we
can do so without appearing weak. We have to be ready to
confront when our interests require this, but we also have
to remember that confrontation isn't an end in itself. And
in navigating this difficult course we have had, of course,
outstanding leadership in New York in Ambassador Moynihan,
who has given a new approach to the conduct of his office
and who requires also that we here look at the complexities
of the situation at the United Nations and within the world
community.

As I said, we want to be both conciliatory and firm.
We must relate our bilateral to our multilateral diplomacy.
We must end the compartmentalization in which bilateral and
multilateral relations were kept strictly separate. Therefore,
we are delighted that we could convince Mr. Lewis to take on
the responsibilities of Assistant Secretary in IO at this
period in which our approach to the world organization is
in a process of change which we believe, however, will lead

3

to a strengthening of the world organization, and which
we believe must give impetus to the imperative of our
times of creating a larger world community.

It also reflects the efforts that have been made
to advance younger officers as quickly as possible to make
sure that in every position there are individuals with a
general policy orientation, which, of course, Mr. Lewis'
experience on the Policy Planning Staff eminently qualifies
him for, and in which the foreign policy can be
institutionalized, not by bureaucratic procedures but by
having the ablest people, who understand our purposes, in
the key positions.

So for all these reasons I welcome Mr. Lewis. I
know he has been warned by Mr. Lord about what direct
contact with me entails, but it's too late now. He's sworn
in. (Laughter)

So, on behalf of all of the Department, we wish
you well, and your success will be all our success.

Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. LEWIS: Mr. Secretary, colleagues, friends,
I suspect this is the only time I will ever have the
undivided attention of Henry Kissinger, Pat Moynihan, and

4

Joe Sisco, so I have been trying to think how to make the most of it.

All of you know, I think, that this is a very proud moment for me. Foreign Service has proved to be the kind of career that I dreamed of. There are a number of people over the years who have helped me stand before you this morning. I think back to Yale, Arnold Wolfers, a great professor who first intrigued me with the business of foreign policy, and to another Yale man, Chester Bowles, whom I worked for for some years, who opened my eyes and my heart to the problems of the developing world, a world which represents much of the business of the United Nations. And more recently, to the kind of leadership that Secretary Kissinger has given to the formulation of policy and the selection of hard choices from very difficult issues, and the kind of standard of rigor of analysis that we seldom reach but then he would seldom expect us ever to achieve a standard he sets for us.

And most recently to the finest person I ever worked for, Win Lord, who has an extraordinary capacity of humanity as well as brains that gets just a little extra out of each person with whom he deals. He has worked under a fairly tough master, and he has told me a few warning

5

notes.

And Bill Buffum, a remarkable diplomat who is retiring to go on to work for Secretary General Waldheim from the position that I am now entering, a man of great knowledge and understanding of the United Nations and a man whose shoes are very tough to even consider filling.

I've learned a lot from these and many of you, and I suppose the one thing I've learned most of all is that jobs and achievement in Washington are both terribly demanding and terribly ephemeral but that the requirement for all of us to do our best for our Nation is enduring.

The Foreign Service has been much maligned. In the 21 years I've been in it, it has been through all sorts of the roller coaster cycle. No President has ever been satisfied with us, none ever will be, because we deal with the intractable issues reconciling intractable interests.

Recently the United Nations has been much maligned, and to some extent deservedly, but there remains the irrefutable fact that if there were no United Nations we would have to create one. And it seems to me that it behooves a great power not to walk away from the world community but to try to lead the world community. That's the lesson of the League of Nations, and it seems to me it's the lesson

6

that Secretary Kissinger has referred to for our time as
well.

Speaking of institutionalizing foreign policy,
Mr. Secretary, a friend of mine the other day was talking
with another friend and asking him how you were doing
about institutionalizing foreign policy in the State
Department. Friend Number 2 said, "Oh, he's doing very
well. Practically all of us are ready for an institution.
(Laughter) I trust that is no prediction of my fate. With
Ambassador Moynihan in New York to keep me in the straight
and narrow, I suspect that it will not be; and with
Secretary Kissinger in Washington I know it had better not
be.

I have always believed in the United Nations.
I've always believed that we had an important stake in it.
I was reassured at my confirmation hearings the other day
that many members of the Senate share that view. We must
play an active role; we are playing an active role. I'm
confident that the nation will permit us to continue to
lead where we can a group of nations whose own interests
and ours come together in one abiding area -- the requirement
that the world must solve its problems by negotiation, not
by war.

7

Secretary Kissinger at a recent UN dinner in honor of the 30th Anniversary of this organization summed it up, I thought, extremely well, and I think I will try to take for my text the words that he used on that occasion.

He said that the UN Charter sets a standard for international cooperation. Implicit in it are basic truths: that diversity of principle and belief must be respected; that disputes are to be settled by fair and peaceful means; that international decisions must recognize the interests of all those involved so that all will have a stake in their observance; that practical agreements, not rhetoric, are the only way to lasting progress; and that mutuality of benefits is essential to sustain cooperation. He said that is the attitude of the United States. And that is the crede by which I will try to live.

Thank you very much.

(Applause)

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 29, 1975

No. 629

INTERVIEW OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BY JEREMIAH O'LEARY
THE WASHINGTON STAR

(Interview conducted in the Department of State December 24, 1975)

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has been at the center of a colossal array of diplomatic events — war, revolution, triumph — since taking over the National Security Council and related assignments in 1969. To some, he is seen as the lightning rod of these stormy times — a gathering point of intensities, energies and controversy. To many, he is the storm-maker — a generator of swirling emotions, ideas and debate. To others, he is the storm itself. Kissinger discusses here with Washington Star Staff Writer Jeremiah O'Leary some of the attitudes which he brings to this complex picture.

**MR. O'LEARY:** You are seen in different ways by different people. How do you see your own role as director of American foreign policy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, obviously in this job all the perceptions are heightened, because there are always more problems to deal with than you can possibly address. And therefore I suppose both the exhilaration and the frustration are greater than it can be in any comparable job, except the Presidency. But in general, throughout my life, I have always looked for opportunities to do the things I believed in. And I have never taken jobs just for income. As a result, I think those people who have worked with me have generally found that I work rather intensely. I like not to do things that are not worth doing intensely.

**MR. O'LEARY:** If you were not Henry Kissinger, would you say that you were a nice guy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would say I am certainly a complicated man.

**MR. O'LEARY:** All members of the human race are complicated. In what way are you uniquely complicated?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** To go back to your previous question, I don't know whether "nice" is a very precise attribute. I think I am a reliable friend to my friends. And as for the rest, in working, I think my associates know that whatever happens is done for an objective and not for harassment. And those who have stayed with me have almost invariably become close friends.

**MR. O'LEARY:** You are said to be a reasonably demanding taskmaster.