VIRGINIA KIRKUS BULLETIN
New York, N. Y.

MAR 15 1965

LITERARY CLIPPING SERVICE

April 26

Kissinger, Henry A.

McGraw-Hill

THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP:
*A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance*

$5.95

This is the first of the twelve volume *Atlantic Policy Studies* being sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. In taking up the subject of United States relations with Europe, Dr. Kissinger has been able to expand the material he touched upon in *The Necessity for Choice*. His examination, of course, is primarily in terms of Western defensive strategy and heavily influenced by his complex theories on nuclear deterrence which he introduced in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. The military problems of the Alliance are closely involved with and interact upon its political and structural situation. The tremendous recovery of war-torn Europe, coupled with a re-identification of national attitudes, must be reconciled with the need for European integration, and the United States must be willing to re-evaluate its standing with the European nations individually and as a unit. Politically this involves reaching an agreement on the reunification of Germany and an understanding of the divisiveness of Europe, which has been too easily symbolized by De Gaulle's refusal to include Great Britain in the Common Market. Dr. Kissinger probes into the inconsistencies of NATO's defenses especially with regard to the use of conventional weapons, and provides an alternative to the Multilateral Force in terms of the stronger, more cohesive Europe which he forsees. For the astute in international affairs this is a provocative study by Harvard's military analyst.

expect. It is much more important, for it is a book about those who come to see for themselves what the United States is. The bridge the gap of understanding between different cultural backsets, the summation of the experiences of the escort-interpreters ass partment to accompany-- and help-- these visitors to a sound understanding are seeing. The techniques developed, the viewpoints, the varying approaches hold sound advice for Americans in their increasing encounters with other nationals. The problems relating to specific different peoples here presented, are those involving the Africans, the Japanese, the Soviet citizens, the Latin Americans. The areas of difficulty are varied, encompassing extreme color consciousness, distortions based on ideological misconceptions, difference in widely divergent cultural traditions and social customs, preconceptions as to American motives and morality, barrier to understanding in language, in central values, etc. This book holds much to interest and challenge.

Bberding, Andrew H.

DULLES ON DIPLOMACY

Van Nostrand

$4.95

Few secretaries of state have been such controversial figures as Secretary Dulles. The fast changing diplomatic scene has this one constant—current history stems from Dulles whether it be Viet Nam, Egypt, Cuba, Cambodia or what have you. And it seems he has had no chance to defend his policies. Now, Berding, his Boswell, his constant companion in some 200,000 miles of travel, uses Dulles' own words, taken down in meticulously exact shorthand to build his case: to indicate his thought at the time which provided the argument that to him seemed incontrovertible. Berlin and the re-unification of Germany, disarmament, the United Nations, and all the rest.

["Seite 12 — ZEIT Nr. 19", "Freitag, den 7. Mai 1965", "PROGRAMME DEUTSCHER BÜHNEN", "<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Preis.</th><th>Seite.</th><th>Preis.</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Arache, D. (19.10.65)</td><td>13.00 Uhr</td><td>Die Maus</td><td>13.00 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Grosses House</td><td>15.00 Uhr</td><td>Makropkleid</td><td>15.00 Uhr</td><td>Die Schuhe</td><td>15.00 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Kramerspiegel</td><td>20.00 Uhr</td><td>Die Klinge</td><td>20.00 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Deutscher Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Schultheater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>Die Mönche</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td></tr><tr><td>Stedimanns Theater</td><td>19.30 Uhr</td><td>

THE NEW REPUBLIC

impressive in his public and personal
troubles quite as much as the picaroes,
back-broken professors and *luftmensen*
*chen* who populate current American
fiction.

Alas, there is another side of *Second Generation* - that dealing with Peter Owen, the muddled young student straddling university and factory - which comes off poorly. One would suppose Williams to know intimately the life of an English university, since he teaches at Cambridge; but this is not the first demonstration that novelists thrive more on what they remember than what they see. Here, in pages devoted to egocentric left-wing dons and the drifting apolitical young, Williams is betrayed by an unearned or at

least, in the context of this novel, un-
justified animus toward university
cleverness, and the result is a nervous
disengagement from his own material.
In writing about Peter, Williams tries
very hard, perhaps too hard, but while
he understands what troubles such a
boy he does not manage to bring him
alive. Perhaps as a sign of these dif-
ficulties, the prose here becomes ex-
tremely woolly.

Those American readers whose lit-
erary horizons are bounded by Golding,
Salinger, Baldwin and Burroughs will
find *Second Generation* pokey and dull.
But there is likely to be a minority of
*New Republic* readers to whom the
portrait of a man like Harold Owen
will seem consequential and moving.

Fragments of a Dream

by Nathaniel McKitterick

When the White House was Camelot,
one of the dreams of the roundtable
was the Grand Design for an Atlantic
partnership. Europe, nurtured by the
United States through its postwar con-
valescence, protected by the United
States during the threatening years of
the 1950's, promised in the 1960's to
have the resources to share the bur-
dens of world leadership. Once Britain

The Troubled Partnership

by Henry A. Kissinger

(McGraw-Hill; $5.95)

joined the Common Market, Europe
would be a partner equal in size and
potential to the United States.

The dream was shattered on January 14, 1963, when Charles de Gaulle blackballed Britain's Common Market application. Even to those of us who were only bit part players in the drama to implement the Grand Design the awakening was rude. The subsequent, desperate attempt to assert an identity of interests through a multilateral nuclear force only accentuated different perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic and became a symbol of American bitterness at French intransigence.

In his new book, Professor Kissinger
redemolishes the dreams of yesteryear,
and like Hans Morgenthau and Walter

Lippmann, he is likely to bring down
the thunder of a frustrated officialdom.

The Grand Design and the strategic
doctrines associated with it, he argues,
were conceived in ignorance of real
differences between the United States
and Europe, differences which cannot
be reconciled except through a sharing
of sovereignty far beyond anything
seriously considered up to now. "A
decade and a half of hegemony have ac-
customed us to believing that our views
represent the general interest," he
writes. But alas, Europe, with the pos-
sible exception of Britain, cannot be
expected to have today the same inter-
est in Asia, Africa and Latin America
which it had before the humiliations of
decolonization. It cannot reasonably be
expected to see its security threatened
in far off Vietnam. And US policy only
accentuates this reduced interest when
it asserts "our often invoked sense of
world responsibility." Our very exten-
sive global commitments "reduce the
incentive of our Allies to share in them,
much as the commitment of Britain
and France to the European balance of
power permitted the United States to
evade the problems of security in the
period before 1941."

American strategic doctrine during the
Kennedy years was conceived with a
similar disregard for different perspec-

tives, according to Kissinger. The
United States has insisted for techno-
logical reasons on a centralized (i.e.
American) control over nuclear weap-
ons. So long as our strategic concept
was based on automatic and massive
retaliation against a Soviet attack, this
concept did not give rise to very serious
political difficulties in Europe. But
when, responding to changes in tech-
nology, Kennedy and McNamara con-
ceived a strategy of "flexible response"
and assigned Europe the role of provid-
ing conventional forces under that
strategy, European doubts came out
into the open. Inevitably, a "flexible
response" would leave more discretion
as well as power in American hands,
unless there were some countervailing
sharing of political decisions. There
was none. The strategic dilemma within
NATO reached ultimate frustration
when the US asserted that independent
European nuclear forces were unneces-
sary, when we came to equate the
French *force de frappe* with simple dis-
trust of the US. Those nations, as
Kissinger says, which were being asked
to entrust their nuclear defense to the
United States were bound in the ab-
sence of some sharing of political de-
cision to strive for greater autonomy
even in nuclear matters. "To insist on
centralized strategy, while diplomacy
remains national, guarantees mounting
disputes."

While the rhetoric which surrounded
Kennedy's European policies (the "Dec-
laration of Interdependence" speech on
July 4, 1962, for example) suggested
that some real sharing of political
sovereignty was intended somewhere,
sometime, the application of those poli-
cies appeared even in the eyes of some
very sympathetic European observers,
to do no more than perpetuate Ameri-
can hegemony.

Kissinger is not sanguine about any
formal sovereignty-sharing in the fore-
seeable future. His "interim" prescrip-
tion is for trying to work out within
NATO coordinated political views on
basic world problems, particularly East-
West problems:

"There is something incongruous
about NATO's absorption in the
technicalities of mixed-manning [in
the MLF] while it lacks a common

22

BOOKS AND THE ARTS

Old Workers, New Students

by Irving Howe

Neither swinger nor black-humor man, evangelist of orgasms nor prophet of racial apocalypse, Raymond Williams is an English writer who can hardly expect anything from contemporary America but honorable neglect. As a novelist he promotes no sensations; finds no special grace in obscenity; lusts not for violence, either of word or blood; and writes about common-

Second Generation
by Raymond Williams
(Horizon; $4.95)

place people, a little battered, a little square. Williams began his career, and is best known, as a literary and social critic. Only recently has he begun to publish fiction, with the result that he is still clumsy and inexpert as a novel-ist. But some of the clumsiness may be due to the fact that he is a thoughtful man who has no taste for flash or filigree, and who allows his reflective-ness - which is also to say, his uncer- tainties - to sink into the texture of his novels.

Williams' first major book, *Culture and Society*, was a distinguished study of the way "the idea of culture" arose in 19th Century English writing, from Burke and Corbett through Matthew Arnold, first as a value kept secret from and then as a standard fiercely directed against industrial society. This theme has steadily dominated his work: he seems to be haunted by the idea of an "organic" or "common" culture, one that will heal the split between "high" and "low," and will absorb the traditional excellence of minority culture into the mainstream of social life. While a sophisticated intellectual, he shows a decided antipathy toward the sleek and brittle - I guess he would call it sleek and brittle, though at times I would add, accomplished and cosmopolitan - "Establishment" of London culture. A left-wing socialist in politics,

Williams differs sharply from his political fellows in the United States: he is more deeply rooted than we are likely to be in a regional or provincial culture, and he displays a certain suspicion, or at least uneasiness, toward modern urban life. His strongest ties are with the Welsh working class from which he is descended; here at least is one intellectual who has remained loyal to the class of his origins, despite a degree from Cambridge. His style of thought and, unfortunately, his prose suggest the influence of F. R. Leavis; and in general, his intense moral seriousness and firm plebeian attachments speak well for that provincial culture which was so vital a force in 19th Century England and seems still to have retained a measure of strength into the present.

*Border Country*, William's first novel, which appeared a few years ago, is an honest and unsentimental journey backward into Wales. Written with a severe, almost repressed lyricism, and told through the voice of a worker's son who has become a London intellectual yet respects his father's life, *Border Country* has the enormous advantage of fiction composed out of an authentic nostalgia: it is dominated by a single and sustained tone.

*Second Generation*, Williams' new novel, is more complex, more ambitious and very much more uneven. Williams follows two brothers, Harold and Gwyn Owen, who, unemployed in the thirties, move from the Welsh border country to find work in an automobile factory at the rim of a university town. Here the two families live in modest comfort and growing uneasiness: Harold totally immersed in his trade union, Gwyn devoted to his garden and a muted sense of private relations, and Harold's son Peter moving into the alien precincts of university research. What Williams is trying to do is to

show both the continuities and differences between the old England of "classical" capitalism and the new England of the welfare state, as these are reflected in the experience of a troubled but vigorous family. Because the subject is large in resonance and Williams writes of it with a dry and steady humaneness, the part of *Second Generation* that deals with the first generation is beautifully done. It constitutes, I think, a minor breakthrough in English fiction - for in regard to the novel a conquest of new material ought to be considered an innovation quite as significant as a new technique.

Harold Owen is presented in considerable depth, without indulgence or condescension. He is the kind of man who carries the local trade union, who is seriously engaged though he may never have heard about engagement, and who in his own experience sums up the painful struggle of a generation of workers, now in their fifties, to reach articulateness. He is proud, rightly enough, of the results of that struggle, but he also senses vaguely that it has not quite prepared him for the world he has helped establish. He grows isolated in the union; a kindly dullness settles over his marriage; and he is aware that, for all his increase in material benefits, he remains a factory hand, vulnerable to the shifts of the market, low in the English hierarchy, and quite as far as he has ever been from the true centers of social power.

There are strong vignettes scattered through *Second Generation* of Harold Owen writing a union circular in cumbersome English, trying to establish relations both with the uninvolved and more militant members of his unions, and, with a blend of dignity and discomfort, "negotiating" a lay-off of workers with a smooth personnel man at the factory. As Williams quietly draws him, Owen is neither the proletarian muscle-man of Marxist fiction, nor the brimming folk-hero of D. H. Lawrence, nor the mindless high-spirited animal of Alan Sillitoe. He is a tired but unresigned human being,

21

MAY 15, 1965

policy toward the Communist world, flounders... in the former colonial areas and has yet to concert a strategic doctrine. ... NATO requires a mechanism for managing political crises even more than a military staff for planning a war."

But Kissinger isn't even very sanguine about consultations. He has interesting things to say about the German problem and the future of East-West relations, but he seems to have more faith in Europe sorting out its own internal problems, fashioning a unity of sorts in the West and a truly autonomous voice in world affairs, than he does in the future of Atlantic cooperation. He offers an effective apologia for de Gaulle's vision of Europe's future, even as he deplores the man's bad manners and persistent habit of depicting American actions in the worst possible light. He predicts that the autonomy which de Gaulle demands, first for France and then for a Europe of States, will someday come to be appreciated here for its inherent benefits. "If we insist on remaining the sole trustees of policy everywhere, including Europe," he writes, "the strain on our resources and ingenuity may well be too great. ... The day will come when we will consider a measure of autonomy in Europe a blessing rather than an irritant."

But Kissinger's own insights into the psychology of present-day Europe raise considerable doubt that the continent will achieve much more unity than it has now if left alone to sort out its internal problems. He is right in stressing again and again that political equality among the Atlantic partners is the prerequisite to "burden-sharing" in defense or in sharing responsibility for affairs beyond Europe's borders. Why not, then, ask the question which the knights of the Kennedy roundtable never did ask: how much sovereignty are we willing to sacrifice for Western unity?

Kissinger is more sensitive to European reactions and institutions than he is to our own. Thus, after deploing the attempt to resolve basic political problems through the technical device of the MLF, he cannot resist laying blame on "one small group in the government [which] had become so deeply committed to the MLF that it acted as

a lobby rather than an organ for calmly weighing alternatives." Elsewhere in the book, he recognizes that the structure of the American government often makes lobbyists even out of professional diplomats. He is willing in the case of de Gaulle to separate carefully the structural from the personal problem, but he is not willing to do so for those whom he is criticizing in Washington. It's a flaw in an otherwise brilliant book.

Effective diplomacy requires, first, a good understanding of what makes other governments tick. To feed such an understanding into the decision-making process of a complex government such as ours requires giving the corps of professional diplomats a status well above that of lobbyists in the formulation and conduct of policy. The Foreign Service of the United States has not been accorded this status since World War II. Instead of being treated as a highly trained team of experienced professionals, our diplomats have been

looked upon as individual performers available for hire by a succession of political appointees in a variety of short-term tasks. The present intention of Washington's top public administrators to further submerge the Foreign Service as an entity into a kind of huge second civil service, encompassing all government employees who happen to travel or work abroad is only going to make matters worse. But it is the system which breeds mistakes, rather than small groups of conspirators, hiding out in the State Department.

This is the first book in the Council on Foreign Relations' current Atlantic policy series. The series is being directed by another veteran of Atlantic policy wars, H. Van B. Cleveland, whose own contribution will take up the future of the Atlantic Alliance more or less where Kissinger leaves off. If the ensuing books match the high analytical standards of this one, the Council will have made an important contribution.

## After Selma

"... the knife-order."
— T. E. HULME

Let him lie sober when he tells the lie
That horror has no times to match these times.
The warning is a storm in his own eye.

We have a sign to follow in the sky,
With flags and triggers, to protect our dreams.
Let him lie sober when he tells the lie.

Bars-sinister and - dexter mortify
Visiting pilgrims who commit no crimes;
The warning is a storm in his own eye.

This land will bury you before you die,
Bombard your churches and blast out your homes.
Let him lie sober when he tells the lie.

Whoever wounds you must consent to buy
Silence, a scar-tissue of wordless names.
The warning is a storm in his own eye.

Discarded winding-sheets will tell you why
We meet the dead in living pantomimes.

Let him lie sober when he tells the lie.
The warning is a storm in his own eye.

STEPHEN MOONEY

23

THE NEW REPUBLIC

Lord Avon's Vantage Point

by Patrick O'Donovan

There are many reasons why a man writes his memoirs and most of them are inadequate. Some write because an autobiography is the only book they are capable of and they desire that dim form of immortality which consists in leaving behind something between hard covers. Some are possessed of a

The Reckoning
by Anthony Eden
(Houghton, Mifflin; $8.50)

gentle truth and when they write about their nannies and the rose garden and the day that King Edward quite definitely had too much brandy and what happened when they visited the surviving eunuchs in Peking, these are writing a sort of history and often a form of art. There is another sort of memoir which since the last war has become the speciality of politicians and sol-

diers. These are almost invariably a straight bid for immortality, an attempt to raise a monument more lasting than their careers, a longing to justify and excuse, a special pleading, an attempt to smooth out the rough places and retouch the portrait where the warts have been left only too plain. Such memoirs are seldom even the raw material of serious history except as evidence of the attitude of one of the protagonists.

Sir Anthony Eden, who is now Lord Avon, has produced a third volume to the memoirs that have occupied his retirement. It is an honorable addition to the genre. It gives, fairly, an account of a life of full public service. It displays the British angle on the last war from the Eden vantage point and, not surprisingly, Eden himself looms large in the foreground. Americans are chided a little, Churchill is kept under

a sort of control and Stalin is impressed.

But there is a fascinating problem about Eden himself to which this book gives no real answer. All his career, Eden was damned by a quality of unfading youth that never left him. It is true that he did not look particularly young close to and that his colleagues called him "mothballs" - behind his back. He was always the brilliant and debonair young man whose real career lay ahead. It is true that it is impossible to recall a single memorable phrase out of all his public talking. But that is true of all except a few. Still, there was the perpetual promise of that slim figure, with its First-World-War moustache and its engagingly deprecating air. And when his time did come, he was discovered to be old beyond his years and ill and unsuited for what all his life had been a preparation.

There is a real tragedy in this. This is recognized and he is never vilified in Britain. Nor for that matter is he treated as an Elder Statesman. When the Tory party went into its arcane huddle to choose a new leader, Eden was not consulted. He appears briefly in the news because he has gone to the West Indies or because he has had another operation. But politically he has disappeared as surely as if he had never existed.

Of course every politician who appoints himself as a suitable subject for election lays himself open to this sort of tragedy. It seems to strike more cruelly in Britain where the aftermath of power or failure to reach the top can twist a man's old age into bitterness. Melbourne, Lloyd George and Ramsay MacDonald are the archetypes of this sort of deprived loneliness. The ends of their lives seem almost to invalidate what went before. Perhaps because he is brave and is debonair this sort of squalor seems to have left Eden alone.

Eden has had it all. He is a Knight of the Garter and a, presumably, belted Earl. He was a brave young officer in the First World War and a brilliant and serious undergraduate at Oxford after it, at a time when his contemporaries were being elaborately decadent on cushions to prove their civilian status. And quietly, up the conventional ladder, he became Foreign Minister in his mid-thirties. He was a prominent,

BEACON PRESS, BOSTON

SALT
OF THE
EARTH

IN LUCE VERITATIS

*Time* saw it as "a work of vigorous art."
Bosley Crowther saw it as
"a rugged and starkly poignant story."
Did you see it? Very few did. Why?

Herbert Biberman, the director of this award-winning film, was one of the Hollywood Ten. The film was made after he was released from jail. SALT OF THE EARTH is the story of this film with the screenplay and stills included.

Read SALT OF THE EARTH by Herbert Biberman $5.95

IN LUCE VERITATIS

BEACON PRESS, BOSTON

24

GUEST LIST

Reception given by
THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
and
THE McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY

To celebrate publication of first two volumes in the Atlantic Policy Studies

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE

Thursday, May 27, 1965

5:00 to 7:00 p.m.

JOSEPH ALLEN
The McGraw-Hill Book Company

FRANK ALTSCHUL
Vice President & Secretary
Council on Foreign Relations

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
Foreign Affairs

PIERRE ARTIQUE
Belga News Agency

MAX ASCOLI
The Reporter

BELA BALASSA
Yale University

NICHOLAS BALINT
The Saturday Review

CHARLES F. BARBER
Committee on Studies,
Council on Foreign Relations

ROBERT BLUM
Director, U.S. & China in World
Affairs Program
Council on Foreign Relations

HARRY BOARDMAN
Council on Foreign Relations

EDWARD BOOHER
President,
The McGraw-Hill Book Company

NATALIE BRAVERMAN
Current Magazine

LORNA BRENNAN
Council on Foreign Relations

JOHN BREON
The McGraw-Hill Book Company

RICHARD BROWN
New York Herald Tribune

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
Columbia University

Mrs. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

WILLIAM A. M. BURDEN
Board of Directors,
Council on Foreign Relations

ROSS CLAIBORNE
Dell Publishing Company

HAROLD van B. CLEVELAND
Director, Atlantic Policy Studies
Council on Foreign Relations

Mrs. HAROLD van B. CLEVELAND

JOHN J. CODELLA
Codella, Duffus, Baker, Inc.

- 2 -

JANET COLEMAN
New York Review of Books

GRANDIN CONOVER
The Nation

JOHN COOLEY
Council on Foreign Relations

LESLIE J. COOLEY
Library Journal

Mrs. LESLIE J. COOLEY
Library Journal

ROBERT CRANDALL
McGraw-Hill Book Company

GRACE DARLING
Council on Foreign Relations

W. PHILLIPS DAVISON
Council on Foreign Relations

MAURICE DOLBIER
New York Herald Tribune

ARNOLD DOLIN
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers

ROY C. DUFFUS
Codella, Duffus, Baker, Inc.

LUTHER EVANS
Columbia University

JAMES F. FIXX
The Saturday Review

COLONEL EDWARD P. FOOTE
Council on Foreign Relations

GEORGE S. FRANKLIN, Jr.
Council on Foreign Relations

MILTON FREUDENHEIM
Chicago Daily News

LILLIAN FRIEDMAN
Brentano

ARTHUR GAGLIOTTI
UNESCO

ELIZABETH GEISER
R. R. Bowker Company

BRENDAN GILL
The New Yorker

IRA GLASSER
Current Magazine

LEE GRAHAM
WNYC

CHANDLER GRANNIS
R. R. Bowker Company

FRANCES GREENE
Current Magazine

DAVID GRIFFITH
World Affairs Book Center

HANNAH GUNTHER

STUART HARRIS
Harper & Row

L. LAYTON HARRISON
New School for Social Research

GEOFFREY HELLMAN
The New Yorker

GEORGE A. HIRSCH
Time-Life International

TOSHIO HORIKAWA
Kyodo News Service

PHILIP C. HORTON
The Reporter

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## The Atlantic Policy Studies

The Atlantic Policy Studies is a series of volumes being published by McGraw-Hill and sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and written under the direction of Harold van B. Cleveland. Formerly with the State Department as Deputy Director of the European Division, Mr. Cleveland also served with the Economic Cooperation Administration and was most recently Associate General Counsel of the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company.

The Atlantic Studies were undertaken in the belief that the strength and growth of human civilization will depend in considerable part on how well the free countries of the Western world can work together to offset the increased power of the Communist bloc and help the developing nations find a satisfying future in an orderly world. It is of the greatest importance, therefore, to take a fresh measure of the potential resources-- political, economic and strategic--of the Atlantic countries and to consider how they can best shape the kind of world in which freedom can flourish.

The first book published was "THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance" by Henry A. Kissinger, Professor of Government at Harvard University and author of the prize-winning "NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY."

-2-

Dr. Kissinger's book deals with the great and increasingly critical problems of the Atlantic Alliance. He undertakes a penetrating inquiry into the whole future of the Atlantic Community in political, economic, and military terms. This is an authoritative, highly informed and incisive discussion by one of the most knowledgeable and experienced men in the entire field of modern arms and foreign policy. $5.95.

The second book was Zbigniew Brzezinski's "ALTERNATIVE TO PARTITION: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe." Professor Brzezinski is Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University and is the author, with Samuel P. Huntington, of "POLITICAL POWER: USA/USSR."

The cold war in Europe has lost its old meaning. Today, the Western Alliance requires a new purpose to justify the Atlantic relationship, and in this exceptional and timely book Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski proposes a basic reassessment of the American position in Europe and the American relationship to Europe. Professor Brzezinski takes as his central theme the fact that America is becoming irrelevant to a divided but secure West Europe, which is in turn faced by an increasingly independent East Europe. Illustrated, $5.95.

The series of at least ten books comprising the Atlantic Policy Studies will analyze four major areas of Atlantic involvement: the Atlantic Community's external environment; Western military policy and organization; political relationships in the Atlantic Community; and economic relationships, including trade arrangements, agricultural policy, financial systems, and economic relations with underdeveloped countries.

Wanted: Warmer Hands Across the Sea

THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A Re-
appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. By
Henry A. Kissinger. 266 pp. New York:
The McGraw-Hill Book Company. $5.95.

By DREW MIDDLETON

HENRY A. KISSINGER'S mas-
terly study appears at an op-
portunity moment. An understandable
preoccupation with the war in Viet-
nam has diverted American attention
from the very serious problems that
face the United States in the Atlantic
community. "The Troubled Partner-
ship" is an outspoken analysis of
these problems and some thoughtful
suggestions on their solution. As the
first volume in The Atlantic Policy
Studies, it is a valuable contribution
to our understanding of the complex
relationships of the North Atlantic
Alliance.

The structural problems of the Al-
liance, the political and the strategic
issues and the political prospects are
dealt with lucidly and firmly. Mr.

Kissinger has strong opinions on most
points and he is never reluctant to
make them known. This is all to the
good. Some of the difficulties the
United States is now encountering
with the European allies spring from
the Pollyanna view of interallied re-
lations. In this view, it is foolish to
worry: there are more things uniting
us than dividing us. Possibly true 10
years ago, this is most emphatically
not true now.

The reader must do his homework,
if he is to get the most out of "The
Troubled Partnership." Mr. Kiss-
singer is an expert, and too often
he seems to be writing for other ex-
perts. He has a tendency, too, to di-
vorce high policy from the rough
give and take of politics on the low-
est levels. There is a connection be-

Mr. Middleton, of The Times, has
covered European politics since World
War II.

tween the two, and when the pundits
lose sight of it even their most pro-
found conclusions lack credibility.

Mr. Kissinger's introduction to the
structural problems of the Alliance
is the best writing I have encoun-
tered on this issue. He understands
the forces that have contributed to
Europe's renewed political dynamism
and, more perceptive than some diplo-
mats, he knows that General de
Gaulle is a spokesman, an exceed-
ingly trenchant and forthright one,
for attitudes toward the Alliance and
the United States that are by no
means confined to France. And Mr.
Kissinger is surely right when he
says "the deepest problem before the
Alliance is that the pressures of the
new technology run counter to tra-
ditional notions of national sover-
eignty."

However, it is difficult to accept
his suggestions that "although tradi-
tionally a (Continued on page 21)

The New York Times Book Review

May 30, 1965

Hands Across the Sea

(Continued from Page 3)

state's diplomatic influence cor-
responded roughly to its mili-
tary strength, this is no longer
inevitably the case." Unfortu-
nately it is the case where the
Soviet Union and China are
concerned. For all their talk of
Marxism and Leninism, both
governments are concerned
chiefly with military power.
General de Gaulle's force de
frappe (striking force) may
be a joke in the Pentagon, but
it has given France a standing
in Eastern Europe she has not
had since before the last war.

Mr. Kissinger's analysis of
the case for and against the
Multilateral Force (Polaris-
armed fleet with mixed crews
from NATO countries), which
he judges the wrong answer to
the wrong question, is an ex-
cellent piece of critical writing.
The origins of the force, its
political implications, its weak-
nesses as a bargaining counter
in Europe are dealt with vigor-
ously. One does not have to agree
with the author to admire the
manner in which he has brought
into the picture the other as-
pects of the European nuclear
situation, including the very ex-
tensive array of so-called "tac-
tical" nuclear weapons already
present in the NATO military
structure. If the MLF ever is es-
tablished, a long shot at the
moment, there will then be
three kinds of nuclear forces
in the Alliance, representing an
infinitely difficult problem of
control and command.

"The controversy about the
MLF," Mr. Kissinger notes, "will
have served some useful pur-
pose if it permits the Alliance
to return to fundamentals: the

definition of common purposes
and an answer to the question
of what the members of the
Alliance really want in the nu-
clear field."

This question is linked to the
increasingly urgent problem of
Germany's future. There seems
to be a tendency in Washington
to avoid this problem. It cannot
be avoided. It is the one prob-
lem that seizes both East and
West in Europe. Germany, East
and West, clearly is close to a
crisis over unity. As Mr. Kiss-
singer points out, "thrown on its
own resources by the rivalry
between France and the United
States, the Federal Republic has
been forced to become increas-
ingly conscious of its own na-
tional aspirations."

We are in fact within meas-
urable distance of a prolonged
dispute over German unity, one
which, the author points out,
may be used by the Soviets to
restore solidarity among the
wavering brethren of Marx in
Eastern Europe. General de
Gaulle may be on the wrong
track when he proposes nego-
tiation among Germany's neigh-
bors. But he is right in thinking
that 20 years of discussion un-
der the present arrangements
have got nowhere and that it
is time to rethink the problem
from the bottom up.

"The Troubled Partnership"
covers a very wide and intri-
cate field. But even considering
the war in Vietnam and the
danger in Southeast Asia and
Communist infiltration in Af-
rica and Latin America, this
field remains of the utmost im-
portance to Americans. For if
the Atlantic community loses
its coherence and purpose,
everything else, from Guam to
Kuwait, is in jeopardy.

# Wanted: Warmer Hands Across the Sea

THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. By Henry A. Kissinger. 266 pp. New York: The McGraw-Hill Book Company. $5.95.

By DREW MIDDLETON

HENRY A. KISSINGER'S masterly study appears at an opportune moment. An understandable preoccupation with the war in Vietnam has diverted American attention from the very serious problems that face the United States in the Atlantic community. "The Troubled Partnership" is an outspoken analysis of these problems and some thoughtful suggestions on their solution. As the first volume in The Atlantic Policy Studies, it is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the complex relationships of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The structural problems of the Alliance, the political and the strategic issues and the political prospects are dealt with lucidly and firmly. Mr.

Kissinger has strong opinions on most points and he is never reluctant to make them known. This is all to the good. Some of the difficulties the United States is now encountering with the European allies spring from the Pollyanna view of interallied relations. In this view, it is foolish to worry: there are more things uniting us than dividing us. Possibly true 10 years ago, this is most emphatically not true now.

The reader must do his homework, if he is to get the most out of "The Troubled Partnership." Mr. Kissinger is an expert, and too often he seems to be writing for other experts. He has a tendency, too, to divorce high policy from the rough give and take of politics on the lowest levels. There is a connection be-

tween the two, and when the pundits lose sight of it even their most profound conclusions lack credibility.

Mr. Kissinger's introduction to the structural problems of the Alliance is the best writing I have encountered on this issue. He understands the forces that have contributed to Europe's renewed political dynamism and, more perceptive than some diplomats, he knows that General de Gaulle is a spokesman, an exceedingly trenchant and forthright one, for attitudes toward the Alliance and the United States that are by no means confined to France. And Mr. Kissinger is surely right when he says "the deepest problem before the Alliance is that the pressures of the new technology run counter to traditional notions of national sovereignty."

However, it is difficult to accept his suggestions that "although traditionally a (Continued on page 21)

May 30, 1965

# Hands Across the Sea

(Continued from Page 3)

state's diplomatic influence corresponded roughly to its military strength, this is no longer inevitably the case." Unfortunately it is the case where the Soviet Union and China are concerned. For all their talk of Marxism and Leninism, both governments are concerned chiefly with military power. General de Gaulle's force de frappe (striking force) may be a joke in the Pentagon, but it has given France a standing in Eastern Europe she has not had since before the last war.

Mr. Kissinger's analysis of the case for and against the Multilateral Force (Polaris-armed fleet with mixed crews from NATO countries), which he judges the wrong answer to the wrong question, is an excellent piece of critical writing. The origins of the force, its political implications, its weaknesses as a bargaining counter in Europe are dealt with vigorously. One does not have to agree with the author to admire the manner in which he has brought into the picture the other aspects of the European nuclear situation, including the very extensive array of so-called "tactical" nuclear weapons already present in the NATO military structure. If the MLF ever is established, a long shot at the moment, there will then be three kinds of nuclear forces in the Alliance, representing an infinitely difficult problem of control and command.

"The controversy about the MLF," Mr. Kissinger notes, "will have served some useful purpose if it permits the Alliance to return to fundamentals: the

definition of common purposes and an answer to the question of what the members of the Alliance really want in the nuclear field."

This question is linked to the increasingly urgent problem of Germany's future. There seems to be a tendency in Washington to avoid this problem. It cannot be avoided. It is the one problem that seizes both East and West in Europe. Germany, East and West, clearly is close to a crisis over unity. As Mr. Kissinger points out, "thrown on its own resources by the rivalry between France and the United States, the Federal Republic has been forced to become increasingly conscious of its own national aspirations."

We are in fact within measurable distance of a prolonged dispute over German unity, one which, the author points out, may be used by the Soviets to restore solidarity among the wavering brethren of Marx in Eastern Europe. General de Gaulle may be on the wrong track when he proposes negotiation among Germany's neighbors. But he is right in thinking that 20 years of discussion under the present arrangements have got nowhere and that it is time to rethink the problem from the bottom up.

"The Troubled Partnership" covers a very wide and intricate field. But even considering the war in Vietnam and the danger in Southeast Asia and Communist infiltration in Africa and Latin America, this field remains of the utmost importance to Americans. For if the Atlantic community loses its coherence and purpose, everything else, from Guam to Kuwait, is in jeopardy.

Escalation

Cartoon by Hugh Haynie from the Louisville Courier-Journal.

Cartoon by Bob Palmer from the Springfield (Mo.) Leader and Press.

By DREW MIDDLETON

3

yields no fresh insights into Freud's
mind and character. Popular biogra-
phy can be readable and informative,
as this book is. To be popular, how-
ever, is to repeat the legend of the
subject as that legend has been cre-
ated in earlier work. Mr. Costigan
has repeated, accurately and well.

Much of the book consists in reci-
tation of the conventional facts—
and conventional interpretations—of
Freud's life and work. We are given
quotations from Goethe that might
or might not "foreshadow" Freud's
thought, and then treated to undi-
gested generalities about the "excite-
ment over Darwin's theories" in
Freud's time. We are told that "it
had long been [Freud's] intention to
become a lawyer, but so stimulated
was he by hearing Goethe's 'short,
incomparably beautiful essay' on
'Nature' read aloud on one occasion
...that he at once determined to de-
vote himself to natural science."
Though we are handed the familiar
string of quotations from Goethe's
essay, "in which poetic feeling is
blended with scientific intuition," the
author cannot persuade us that his
"astonishment" is anything but me-
chanical, a convention of hagiograph-
ic writing, when he ruminates on
"how many aspects of Freud's life
and thought are foreshadowed" in
this single essay.

Freud's conversion from law to
medicine, if it was a conversion,
should at least be set against the
background of special difficulties any
Viennese Jew would encounter in a
legal career; the public courts were
even more difficult for Jews to enter
than were laboratories, clinics or pri-
vate consulting rooms. Freud's con-
temporary, the Zionist Theodor Herzl,
gave up the law for just such con-
siderations.

The main difficulty with repeating
the mere legend of Freud is that
readers may not easily recognize the
functional equivalents of what I
might call the "cherry-tree" school of
biography—and the cherry-trees of
Freudian legend do continue to be
chopped down by this culture-hero
of the age of psychological man.

The present book follows the canon
of events and motifs in the hero's
life as fixed by Jones in that final
and quite subtle monument to 19th-
century hagiographic writing, the

Mr. Rieff, professor of sociology
at the University of Pennsylvania, is
the author of "Freud: The Mind of
the Moralist" and the forthcoming
"Uses of Faith."

end must be affirmed over and
again.

Mr. Costigan is professor of his-
tory at the University of Washington,
but in this book he is not working
as a historian. As a popular biogra-
pher, he can take his subject's self-
interpretation at face value; equally,
as a popular biographer, he can take
the apologetic and argumentative tra-
dition of the psychoanalytic move-
ment, powerful as it is, at face value.
Indeed, this biographer treats the
legend even more piously than did
Jones, its appointed chief architect.

The narrative technique chosen by
Mr. Costigan, matching events in
Freud's life with apt quotations from
Freud's writings, demonstrates the in-
vulnerable piety of the genre. The
birth of Freud's brother, Julius, im-
mediately calls up the standard refer-
ence to sibling rivalry and its vicis-
situdes, established in the Freudian
corpus some 50 years later. Freud's
legend is worked by fusing his life
to his art, to the exclusion of other
arts which might reconstruct his life
somewhat differently—and certainly
less tendentiously.

If the psychoanalytic legend of
Freud is by no means full of "cherry
trees," the conventions of interpreta-
tion, for all their subtlety and pow-
er, are no less obfuscatory. The life
conforms to Freudian doctrine, until
teacher and what he taught take on
the same normative cast. Early in

Sculpture by Abram Schlemowitz. Collection
Jerry Lichtman. Courtesy Roko Gallery.

Me-You Patterns Have to Be Wat

THE FUSION OF PSYCHIATRY AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE. By Harry Stack Sulli-
van. With Introduction and Commen-
taries by Helen Swick Perry. 346 pp. New
York: W. W. Norton & Co. $7.50.

By PATRICK MULLAHY

THE author of this book first be-
came known for his studies of
schizophrenia, a field in which he
was an acknowledged master. In the
course of a generation Harry Stack
Sullivan developed the theory of in-
terpersonal relations, and, concomi-
tantly, a "system" of psychotherapy
which is closely related to his inter-
personal theory. This theory includes
a more or less systematic outline of
personality development. The theory
holds, essentially, that human experi-
ence is primarily constituted by in-
teractions or transactions of people.

All but one of these "people" may,
on occasion, be "imaginary," that is,
symbolic abstractions of previous ex-
perience, as in many dreams, fan-
tasies, psychotic experiences. Still

again, human interactions may be
"blend" of the real and imaginar-
as in many instances of "romantic
attachments, where the partners su-
tain various illusions about each
other. Sullivan's theory thus tends
merge with social psychology. Ps-
ychiatric prognosis, he said, is large
a specialized technique in social ps-
ychology. Therapy aims at significan
improvement in the patient's inte-
personal relationships.

Thus psychiatry becomes fused
with social science. It is, in fact,
specialized branch of social science-
though supplemented by a knowledge
of human biology. The psychiatri-
must take account of social structur-
and social change, since the patient
difficulties are an outcome of his
socialization, or education in the
broadest sense, and of his current
social relations. These, in turn, are

Mr. Mullahy is the author of "Oedipus, Myth and Complex" and other books.

4

# Hands Across the Sea

*(Continued from Page 3)*

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THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW

Summer 1965

A MIXTURE OF PROBLEMS

477

Middle East problem ("The hand," Eden reported to Churchill in March, 1940, "is extraordinarily difficult to play"), the always neuralgic relationship with de Gaulle and the difficulty of reaching agreement with the United States on policy towards the Free French, the failure to protect the cause of the London Poles ("Stalin gave us a very dusty answer"), and many other cloudy episodes. At the same time, it is a welcome addition to the growing literature on Winston Churchill, for the Prime Minister bulks very large in these pages, in all his moods, belligerent, snappish, jovial, sulky, forgiving, quarreling furiously with Eden about the quality of the army command ("I'm sorry, Anthony, that all your generals seem to be such bad generals") or about his right to send an ill-considered note to another power and then admitting, after his rage had passed, that he had been wrong—and always possessed of that vigorous sense of purpose and that courage which, as Eden writes, "carried him undismayed over obstacles daunting to lesser men." Readers with a low tolerance for the long quotations from telegrams, dispatches, and ministerial minutes which liberally sprinkle these pages will be rewarded for persistence by the dozens of Churchill anecdotes hidden between them.

A MIXTURE OF PROBLEMS

BY CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL

RUSSELL Baker's columns in The New York Times warn occasionally about the problem problem—the situation of having run out of things to worry about in our public and personal lives. A book of a few months ago by the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning implicitly foreshadowed such a stage for United States foreign policy. Now our minds are set at ease by "The Troubled Partnership," latest of the books issuing with astonishing regularity from Professor Henry Kissinger's able hand. Ac-

*The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance.* By Henry A. Kissinger, McGraw-Hill Book Company. $6.95.

VIEW

small coun-
and to San-
ion was born
the Soviet

the people
come of his
ertling. It
hing like
es of one
ng into a
and it is
 political ap-
ment that
at the less
that the
rs, would
upon the
sible case
onclusion
ry least,
erous.
merican
escribed
ess, and
Eden's
ernment
Africa.
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478 THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW

cording to its message, it is far too early to start worrying
about an end to worries. Even—perhaps I should say espe-
cially—with respect to our transatlantic relations, the area
of the most notable policy successes since World War II, the
list of matters undone or overdone is formidable. The North
Atlantic Alliance has yet to unite on a cogent long-term
strategy. Nuclear control is charged with paradoxes. No one
has any good ideas about stemming nuclear proliferation.
The United Kingdom is ambivalent between continental and
transatlantic ties. France's President de Gaulle remains ob-
durately aloof to schemes for supranationality fancied by our
policy-makers. France and Germany, both resurgent, do not
quite know whether to be friends or rivals. Contradiction is
implicit as between German reunification and West Ger-
many's rôle in the Alliance. Lingering disorderliness at the
core of the Soviet system, along with the Soviet Union's
basically unbudged adherence to revolutionary ideology, con-
tinues to impede a general settlement.

"The Troubled Partnership" attempts to make this prob-
lem mixture comprehensible. Nothing in an expanding
literature about causes and cures for Alliance difficulties sur-
passes it. Its caveats against subtle and complex policy form-
ulas is persuasive. It scores impressively in exposing contra-
dictions in the jerry-built plan for a nuclear navy with
mixed-up crews—simultaneously "represented as a device to
give non-nuclear countries an increased participation in nu-
clear matters" and "advocated as decreasing, if anything, the
rôle of its members in the decision to go to nuclear war." It
points up ambiguities of United States discourse in its ha-
bitual disparagement of national sovereignty along with ex-
altation of "nationalism as the most reliable bulwark against
Communist domination everywhere except in Western Eu-
rope, where the concept originated." The book puts de
Gaulle and his doctrines in perspective, providing a salutary
contrast to foolish things said by some of our official spokes-
men—for example, a State Department hierarch's predic-
tion, after the blackballing of the British from the common

market
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A MIXTURE OF PROBLEMS

479

VIEW

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market, of no more than a footnote as de Gaulle's place in
history. The book says wise things also about a current fal-
lacy of thinking that, because trends toward national Com-
munism within the Communist realm are favorable to our
interests, such trends in whatever region are to be condoned.

To single out one aspect—the book aptly analyzes diffi-
culties of negotiating with the Soviet Union and reasons for
the barrenness of summit diplomacy. The containment pol-
icy postulated eventual conversion of the Soviet Union's
leaders from wayward paths. Through prolonged frustra-
tion, they would be brought to renounce their dogma and to
mend their ways. The Alliance would tide over, pending that
change of heart. Leaders on this side have been all too ready
to credit the hope and to flatter themselves as having special
graces for helping along the process. “Domestic considera-
tions,” the author writes, “impel many Western leaders to
present themselves . . . as the architects of a lasting peace.
The temptation is . . . strong to treat a more conciliatory
Communist tone as a permanent conversion . . . and to
gear everything to personal diplomacy.” Again, “Each na-
tional leader, depending on his temperament, has visions of
appearing as the arbiter of a final settlement or of adding
Communist pressures to his own as a bargaining device
within the Alliance. This sets up a vicious circle. Since lead-
ers generally do not reach eminence without a touch of van-
ity and since some stake their prestige on their ability to woo
their Soviet counterparts, they tend to present their contacts
with the Soviets as a considerable accomplishment.” All of
this is illusory. “Communist negotiators cannot admit that
they could be swayed by the arguments of opponents whose
understanding of the basic laws of historical development is,
by definition, inferior to their own. They cannot reciprocate
‘concessions’ because they believe that concessions are made
to reality, not to individuals. . . . No Soviet leader could make
an agreement based on the proposition that he has been im-
pressed by the personal qualities of a capitalist statesman.”

The Soviet duumvirs' rebuff earlier this year of President

480 THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW

Johnson's broaching of an exchange of visits served to spare us from having to worry about a renewal of the futility of summitry. What the times call for is not more of the heroic approach to peacemaking but a great deal of systematic and unspectacular effort to make the Alliance as effective as an instrument for dealing politically with the Communists as for deterring them. The book makes a case for elaborating conciliar institutions to provide continuous interchange—not exactly in the tripartite pattern once propounded by de Gaulle but rather a five-sided arrangement among the United States, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Italy, with the lesser equals participating in selective rotation. The unifying aims would not be confined to the area guaranteed by the North Atlantic Treaty but would embrace other areas as well. I wonder—perhaps because I am inherently skeptical about institutional embellishments. Anyway, I shall not press my doubts.

Toward the close I puzzled over the author's use of *evolve* and cognate terms in application to assumed courses for Europe if only the United States would desist from its supra-national predilections. Such deterministic words, which have no valid place in a discussion of foreign policy choices, are quite at variance with such undeterministic observations as, "The West requires nothing so much as men able to create their own reality." It was astonishing also to find so distinguished an author—a Professor of Government at Harvard indeed—assuming concurrence by two-thirds of the Senate as a constitutional precondition for declaring war. The book's closing precepts about policy—the need of creativity, the folly of nations' seeking "their future in their past," the worth of steadiness and reliability, the unwisdom of sterile debate, and so on—are all truths scarcely disputed even if often ignored, but they do not help much toward figuring out what to do. In foreign policy, as in all of life, saying what not to do is simpler than laying out a course. I have to tell myself that every day, and it is not amiss to say it of "The Troubled Partnership"—a generally excellent book.

Book Reviews

Three Views of Europe

DECLINE AND RISE OF EUROPE, by John Lukacs, New York: Doubleday, 1965, 295 pp., $4.95.

ALTERNATIVE TO PARTITION,
by Zbigniew Brzezinski, New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1965, 208 pp., $5.95.

THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP,
by Henry A. Kissinger, New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1965, 266 pp., $5.95.

THE MEN OF MUNICH who thought they had worked out a settlement with Hitler 27 years ago did not know that what they had really done was to consign half of Europe to the domination of the Soviet Union. When the German armies withdrew in 1945 it was Stalin who inherited Hitler's suzerainty over the nations of eastern Europe, and ever since then the word "Europe" to most Western ears has tended to mean "our Europe"—the part of Europe on this side of the iron curtain. Now at last there are signs that the partition of the continent may turn out to be relatively brief, as history goes. People who live in Europe are coming increasingly to think of themselves as Europeans, and the air is full of projects (some of them pretty elaborate) for putting the continent together again.

The most radical proposals are
those of France's President Charles
de Gaulle, who thinks America
should get out of Europe and leave
the Europeans to organize them-
selves. He believes that the American

presence inhibits an over-all Euro-
pean settlement. His opponents reply
that Europe cannot unite itself with-
out the support of the United States
and Britain as part of an Atlantic
Community. France is not strong
enough to lead a united Europe, the
argument runs, and furthermore the
Russians would drive too hard a bar-
gain. The three books under review,
by a Hungarian-American, a Polish-
American and a German-American,
argue respectively for the Gaullist
viewpoint, for a more sophisticated
American response, and for a re-
consideration of the Atlantic Alliance
in the light of the Gaullist critique.

An Historian's Approach

While most writers on European
politics are concerned with pragmatic
questions of power or with the solu-
tion of particular problems (e.g.,
what to do with NATO, or how to
control nuclear weapons), Professor
Lukacs is more interested in the
growth of a European consciousness.
The tendency of Germans and
Frenchmen and Hungarians and
Poles to think of themselves as part
of a larger entity is a recent de-
velopment in history, but he sees
this as the key to the continent's fu-
ture. "It is not the creation of Euro-
pean super-bureaucracies, not the ex-
istence of European economic organ-
izations, but the existence of the Eu-
ropean consciousness that may in the
end bring about some kind of higher
European unity."

Like de Gaulle, he is opposed to the

efforts of bureaucrats, economists
and internationalists to prod Europe
into federating around NATO or the
Common Market. These are artificial
constructs based on abstract ideas of
the kind that "Atlantic intellectuals"
are prone to. Europe must wait until
it is ready, and must organize itself.
It is not true, Lukacs says, that
America and Europe are growing
more alike; in some ways they are,
but in other ways they are becoming
more different and developing their
own national characteristics. Amer-
ica has many preoccupations that Eu-
rope cannot share, such as its grow-
ing concern with Latin America and
its heavy involvement in the Pacific.
Europe's destiny lies in becoming a
New Force between America and
Russia.

Just how this is to be brought
about, and who is to organize the new
Europe and lead it, is a question that
Prof. Lukacs leaves unanswered. For
an historian this is perhaps just as
well, but anyone who aligns himself
with the President of France is not
only writing history but helping to
make it. He concedes that the prob-
lem of Europe contains within it the
very difficult problem of Germany,
and that the reunification of Ger-
many wouldn't dominate Europe,
a necessary step in the unification of
Europe. This leads of course to the
question whether a reunified Ger-
many wouldn't dominate Europe,
and whether most Europeans are
ready to face such a prospect. At this
point his argument seems to stop.

48

If the other nations of Europe, together or in confederation, feel that they are simply not strong enough to resist the domination of Germany; if they are not confident enough to attract and bind the Germans spiritually, and to balance German power politically and industrially, then all the talk about the revival of Europe, indeed, all talk of a united Europe, is empty and vain.

But an even more difficult question is that of Germany and Russia. He notes that Germany's role in eastern Europe is bound to increase as those countries are drawn toward a united Europe. This indeed is the fear of many east Europeans, particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the communist governments play upon it assiduously for their own purposes. One may doubt whether the Russians will ever accede to a significant expansion of German influence on their borders, particularly if it involves a lessening of their own. At any rate, the new Europe cannot very well be made until this problem is solved. Prof. Lukacs answers that one must not confuse states with nations. While relations on the state level between Russia and Germany are not very promising, he finds solace in the fact that culturally the Russians have borrowed much from the Germans; this leads him to hope that their relations in the future may be determined more by their common European consciousness than by the superficial hostilities of their governments.

Despite the difficulties raised by the German question, the Gaullist point of view is heartening to a lot of people who fear that Europe is being swallowed up by two competing empires. Such a confirmed Atlanticist as Walter Lippmann recently wrote that "there is no real conflict between Greater Europe as a community or concert of sovereign national states and the inevitable fact of history and geography that Europe and the Americas are tied together in their ultimate interests because they are connected by the Atlantic Ocean." He urged that the US "give up the idea of leading Europe" and, instead, "assist and encourage the movement toward that greater Europe which is actually under way."

## Peaceful Engagement

The growing interest in de Gaulle's "European Europe" has awakened a variety of counter-responses in America. Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that the United States must make a special effort to dispel the "growing European feeling that America is becoming irrelevant to the future of a divided, safe, but somehow frustrated Europe." His *Alternative to Partition* is an examination of what America might do to speed Europe's unification—all of Europe, not just that Western portion which is now in NATO or the Common Market or OECD.

By taking the initiative in developing policies designed to bring both Russia and East Europe into a closer relationship with the West, and thereby to end the European partition, America would be furthering its own basic interests. First of all, the very fact of such commitment would do much to revive America's waning relevance to Europe. Secondly, it would provide a framework for restoring the East European nations to independence without simultaneously creating new instabilities or stimulating narrow nationalisms. Finally, by laying the foundations for a broader East-West settlement, it would eliminate the persisting European fears of an American-Soviet power duopoly. All that would be consistent with domestic American values and the American quest for world order.

Prof. Brzezinski agrees with the Gaullists that the partition of Europe is a thing of the past, but maintains that Europe by itself is not powerful enough to achieve unity. A new Europe will require Soviet-American cooperation to bring it about and to stabilize it. He would replace the current concept of an Atlantic Community, extending from the Elbe to the Pacific, with the image of "a future cooperative community, involving eventually four major units, America and Russia as the peripheral participants, and West Europe and East Europe as the two halves of the inner core (in time perhaps becoming still more closely linked)."

This is a distant and uncertain prospect, but no more improbable as

a picture of the future than the Gaullist one. From the strategic standpoint his proposal has the advantage of preserving the balance of power between the US and the USSR in Europe. It avoids on the one hand the risks that would be entailed by an American military withdrawal from the continent; on the other, it avoids the threat to Soviet interests inherent in policies which seek to draw the east European countries away from Russia, and it does this by approaching them jointly with Russia. On the latter point Brzezinski emphasizes that instead of encouraging them to defect we ought to favor tendencies which "would begin with the internal liberalization of the East European societies and lead toward their gradual evolution into a Greater Europe jointly with the Soviet Union."

Brzezinski has much to say on the question of German reunification. Although his arguments would not win him many votes in this fall's elections in the Federal Republic, his basic viewpoint corresponds with the evident assumptions of current German, French and American policies. This is that reunification is still a long way off, and that it will come "only as a consequence of a gradual but qualitative change in the relationship between both Russia and East Europe and the West." In working toward this, the West should endeavor to isolate Ulbricht's satrapy by establishing closer ties with the other eastern states and reducing their interest in maintaining a divided Germany. The West should also assure them that a united Germany would not serve to advance NATO to the Oder River. Finally, East Germany's economic ties to the USSR would have to be maintained after reunification because of their importance to the Soviet economy.

On the much-discussed question of East-West trade, Brzezinski belongs to those who feel that the West should trade more with the East, but at the same time should use its economic influence—including long-term credits—for political ends. "In very broad terms, American economic assistance policy with respect to East Europe should be guided by

49

two basic criteria: whenever a country increases the scope of its external independence from Soviet control, it should be rewarded; whenever a country appreciably liberalizes its domestic system, it should be rewarded." The opposite would also apply.

Ties of all kinds—economic, social, cultural—should be built up between East and West on a multilateral basis. The eastern countries should be encouraged to establish links with international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, GATT, the Common Market and OECD. They should also link up with each other as much as possible.

He ends his suggestions for "peaceful engagement" by proposing a kind of Marshall Plan for European economic development, to be financed by the US and western Europe. Since it would have as its premise the eventual reunification of Germany, he recognizes that it might be rejected by Moscow much as the original Marshall Plan was. Even so, the United States could not but gain by taking this sort of initiative. At least we would be adopting an "honest and rational" policy on German reunification instead of giving it lip service and following policies that work against it.

## Strengthening the Alliance

Henry Kissinger, in *The Troubled Partnership*, takes a less optimistic view of European union. While he has much to say on the need to revise US policies toward Europe, his conclusion is that Americans should concentrate on improving the Atlantic Alliance. That indeed is the subject of his book. But he recognizes that one of the biggest long-run problems facing the Alliance is German reunification, and that a German policy depends in turn upon one's conception of East-West relations. Here there is need for a common Western viewpoint, and the lack of one has been a serious handicap of the West in its dealings with Moscow. There has been a running dis-

agreement between those who tend to "treat every Soviet peace offensive as the beginning of a new era of international cooperation," and those who see in Soviet peace offensives "merely a variation of tactics, not a major shift in objectives."

The current Soviet peace offensive, which began after the Cuban de-bacle in 1962, is only the latest of a number. Kissinger points out that each of them was brought on by "some internal or external strain on the Soviet system," and argues that the present détente may end as the others did—"when an opportunity for expanding communism [presents] itself." But even if the détente should continue for a long time it still would bring problems, for a period of relaxation tends to produce conflicts in the Western alliance between those who welcome a breathing space and those, particularly in West Germany, who fear that it will lead to an acceptance of the status quo in central Europe.

Very well then, why not put forward a policy that looks toward the eventual reunification of Germany, and do so now while there is some chance of a dialogue between East and West? In a period of relaxation it may be possible to show the eastern countries that they stand to gain nothing by their continued support of the Ulbricht regime. Kissinger briefly considers the proposals of those who want to isolate East Germany by improving relations with the other states of eastern Europe. He suggests that one possible solution would be for the West to accept the continued existence of a separate East Germany for, say, 15 years in exchange for a new government chosen by free elections. Such an East Germany should be independent, neutral and demilitarized.

"Nevertheless," he concludes, "it is improbable that any negotiating formula will advance German unity. Even the most reasonable program is likely to be rejected by the East." Thus German unity is only a long-run hope, and the real business before the West is to get on with repairing the strains in the Atlantic Alliance. "A united Western Eu-

rope," he argues, "... will be a powerful magnet for the countries of Eastern Europe."

Kissinger feels that de Gaulle has been misunderstood in the United States, and devotes a whole chapter to arguing that French and American views are not as different as is often supposed. When de Gaulle speaks of a Europe extending "from the Atlantic to the Urals," he does not mean anything very revolutionary by it. "The reorganization of Europe to which de Gaulle refers is to take place after communist ideology no longer dominates in the Soviet Union, that is, when Russia is once more a national, and not an ideological, state pursuing a policy dictated by its national interests. This is the precise eventuality postulated by four American postwar administrations as the prerequisite of a final settlement."

He agrees with de Gaulle that the US has been too paternalistic, and that it is time for Europeans to work out their own problems. Rather than seeking to impose American ideas of federation upon Europe, the US should conduct itself so that its Allies will always consider the advantages of the Atlantic partnership to outweigh those of a narrower European solution.

On paper there seems to be no approach to Europe that will get a unanimous vote from the experts. As Prof. Lukacs would say, the present partition is an historical question and the workings of history transcend the purely mental and logical. Just as the division of Europe was not something thought out in advance, its unification—when and if it comes—will depend on the illogical and incalculable happenings that make up the behavior of nations. Changes in the Soviet Union, in the communist world and in western Europe, which cannot now be foreseen, will obviously determine the choices open to American policymakers in coming years. But it is time for Americans to consider the real meaning of their past and present policies in Europe and to realize that sooner or later new policies will have to be made.

F. P.

50

Observer: The Paper Tiger Blues

By RUSSELL BAKER

WASHINGTON, April 24—
There are fat, warm rain clouds
over the Potomac and the smell
of war on the air. It is harder
to think calmly. Tulips are
bursting open and in the streets
the girls go ungirdled. Troops
moving, marines engaged. With
each fresh headline, you can
feel the language being esca-
lated.

They have begun to lob the
big ones in. Words like honor,
patriotism, appeasement. There
is no defense against the big
words. They are argument bust-
ers, debate enders. It is very
risky venturing out with an un-
Pentagon opinion once the lan-
guage is escalated.

Smack 'em Down

Stand among the daffodils
wondering if this war is abso-
lutely necessary and the big-
word boys zoom in and smack
you with "appeaser," as Sena-
tor Fulbright has just discov-
ered. The latest pacifist demon-
strators at the White House are
no longer dismissed with the
low-tonnage epithets, "inno-
cent," "unrealistic," "unsophis-
ticated," which hit the mark
neatly without making a mess.

With the language escalation,
they are now charged with pro-
moting national dishonor, with
weakening the President's hand
or with giving comfort to Ho
Chi Minh. Their patriotism is
questioned. The aim at this
stage is no longer to understand
them, but to give them such a
blasting that they will not dare
to venture from under cover
again.

Verbal Escalation

This is still not total word
war, however. In that stage
they will be given a dose of the
2,000-pounders — words like
"Communist stooges," "draft
dodgers," "cowards," "traitors."
This stage usually occurs when
the casualty lists start to swell.
The purpose of the escalation
in its present limited stage is to
encourage people to think less
and emote more.

The process by which war is

escalated in controlled stages is
well understood, but nobody
knows how language escalation
is managed. One day, everybody
is discussing the war threat
very sensibly and saying there
must be calm thinking; the
next, by some mysterious proc-
ess, everybody is shouting "hon-
or," "patriotism," "appease-
ment" and "Don't weaken the
President's hand."

This is a dangerous situation.
Philosophers like Herman Kahn
and Henry Kissinger have given
us a clear understanding of how

FOR JOY UNSPOKEN

This is the only happiness;
To have the papers there
Lamp glowing, the sea beating
And the stars like steel splinters
To know the body strong
Mind rinsed of passion
Words moving on the page
And the smell of brine
Far off, like a message
Of the hunger that seizes you
For places far
And the fish leaping and play-
ing.

All life, all words then
Dedicate to the pure wind
And the rocks without benefit
of leaping plants
Of the stripped sea free of boats
And the beach bereft of wrack
And the cleansed heart alive
In the ribs like a leaping bird.

Charles Higham

to control war. Thus far, the
President and his men seem to
have learned it so well that
they can control the pressure in
Vietnam as cannily as a good
chef controls his oven tempera-
ture.

The lack of any controls on
the language, however, means
that the country may easily es-
calate into a big-word state of
mind and slip into a froth of
emotionalism just when the
President wants to de-escalate
the war for diplomatic advan-
tage. In that situation, the
President must face the risk of
being bombed with "appeaser,"
"dishonor," "traitor" and all
those other 2,000-pounders that
make it so hard for Presidents
to reverse escalators.

Right now, however, it is
every man for himself in Wash-
ington, and the pacifists are not
gentler than the hawks. Eve-
nings out are evenings of peril.
You can never be certain which
side the big words will fall
from.

Shrimp Warfare

Strangers bore in on you over
the shrimp demanding to know
if the war in Vietnam is not
terrible. Say, "The President
offered to negotiate," and they
call you "warmonger." Murmur
a noncommittal, "Terrible, ter-
rible," and hawks swoop across
the room.

"You talk like a paper tiger,"
the hawks say. It is no good
trying to wriggle out of it

lightly. ("Actually I'm a plastic
tiger.") The hawks have a way
of turning into fang-claw-hide-
and-hair tigers right under
your nose and roaring, "Ap-
peaser! Honor! Patriotism!
Weakener of the President's
hand! Ho Chi Minh lover!"

Who gave these people per-
mission to escalate the lan-
guage? Nobody knows. At a
moment when everybody ought
to be thinking with absolute
precision, they have been wan-
tonly licensed to make life
miserable for anybody who
tries.

What Kind of War?

Here, for example, are the
latest summaries of the Viet-
nam situation. They say that
it is a civil war for independ-
ence but that it is a war of
naked aggression by alien pow-
ers. They say that it cannot be
won by either side but that
neither side can lose. They say
that it is deepening the division
between Peking and Moscow
but bringing Peking and Mos-
cow closer together.

They say that American troops
must not fight on land but that
American troops must fight on
land, and that while relations
between the Vietcong, Hanoi
and Peking are strained, rela-
tions between the Vietcong,
Hanoi and Peking are very
close.

Could we tone down the lan-
guage long enough to get the
score?

The Boston Globe
(EVENING)

D. 149,058 SUN. 517,080

MAY 10 1965

Book of the Day

H. A. Kissinger Calls
For NATO Overhaul

The Troubled Partnership:

A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance, by Henry A. Kissinger; McGraw Hill Co., New York; 266 pp., $4.95.

It is ironic that this lucid and provocative analysis of the ills besetting the Atlantic Alliance should appear at a moment when the war in Viet Nam points up so clearly the contrast between the global policy responsibilities of the United States and the basically European-oriented preoccupations of our associates in N.A.T.O.

Prof Kissinger, who is a

faculty member of the Harvard Center for International Affairs, director of the Defense Studies Program at that university, and one of the country's authorities on problems of nuclear strategy, makes but passing reference in "The Troubled Partnership" to Southeast Asia. Yet his admonitions to the West, especially the United States, that time is running out on them in N.A.T.O. are being powerfully reinforced in several respects by events in that far quarter of the world.

When it comes to deal-

ing with specifics of N.A.T.O.'s ailments, Dr. Kissinger is no claustral academician. The Alliance, he notes, is suffering from the debilities wrought by change. It is increasingly outdated in structure and more and more irrelevant to a world its creators could not foresee. It is, in sum, the victim of its own earlier success.

The economic rehabilitation of Europe has outmoded its magnificent achievements between the late 40s and 1960. The wholesale shuffling off of Europe's colonial possessions, which began soon after India's emergence to freedom, has revolutionized allied national viewpoints beyond the Atlantic. The gradual onward march of European integration exemplified in the Common Market is having political consequences which no longer suit yesterday's plans. The time has come, he insists, not merely for a drastic overhaul of N.A.T.O.'s structure and objectives but, more importantly, for a broad new demonstration of the dynamic creativity which brought the Alliance into existence in the first place.

Dr. Kissinger's admiration for de Gaulle aside, this volume merits close and prayerful attention from all member nations in N.A.T.O. His story of the political bloopers that marked the progression of policy from the Berlin crisis through the M.L.F. misadventure is superbly recounted.

JAMES H. POWERS

(Mr. Powers is a Globe editorial writer and historian.)

THE NEW REPUBLIC

MRS.

DARLING

[LW]

impressive in his public and personal troubles quite as much as the picaroes, back-broken professors and *luftmenschen* who populate current American fiction.

least, in the context of this novel, unjustified animus toward university cleverness, and the result is a nervous disengagement from his own material. In writing about Peter, Williams tries very hard, perhaps too hard, but while he understands what troubles such a boy he does not manage to bring him alive. Perhaps as a sign of these difficulties, the prose here becomes extremely woolly.

Those American readers whose literary horizons are bounded by Golding, Salinger, Baldwin and Burroughs will find *Second Generation* pokey and dull. But there is likely to be a minority of New Republic readers to whom the portrait of a man like Harold Owen will seem consequential and moving.

## Fragments of a Dream

by Nathaniel McKitterick

When the White House was Camelot, one of the dreams of the roundtable was the Grand Design for an Atlantic partnership. Europe, nurtured by the United States through its postwar convalescence, protected by the United States during the threatening years of the 1950's, promised in the 1960's to have the resources to share the burdens of world leadership. Once Britain

The Grand Design and the strategic doctrines associated with it, he argues, were conceived in ignorance of real differences between the United States and Europe, differences which cannot be reconciled except through a sharing of sovereignty far beyond anything seriously considered up to now. "A decade and a half of hegemony have accustomed us to believing that our views represent the general interest," he writes. But alas, Europe, with the possible exception of Britain, cannot be expected to have today the same interest in Asia, Africa and Latin America which it had before the humiliations of decolonization. It cannot reasonably be expected to see its security threatened in far off Vietnam. And US policy only accentuates this reduced interest when it asserts "our often invoked sense of world responsibility." Our very extensive global commitments "reduce the incentive of our Allies to share in them, much as the commitment of Britain and France to the European balance of power permitted the United States to evade the problems of security in the period before 1941."

tives, according to Kissinger. The United States has insisted for technological reasons on a centralized (i.e. American) control over nuclear weapons. So long as our strategic concept was based on automatic and massive retaliation against a Soviet attack, this concept did not give rise to very serious political difficulties in Europe. But when, responding to changes in technology, Kennedy and McNamara conceived a strategy of "flexible response" and assigned Europe the role of providing conventional forces under that strategy, European doubts came out into the open. Inevitably, a "flexible response" would leave more discretion as well as power in American hands, unless there were some countervailing sharing of political decisions. There was none. The strategic dilemma within NATO reached ultimate frustration when the US asserted that independent European nuclear forces were unnecessary, when we came to equate the French force de frappe with simple distrust of the US. Those nations, as Kissinger says, which were being asked to entrust their nuclear defense to the United States were bound in the absence of some sharing of political decision to strive for greater autonomy even in nuclear matters. "To insist on centralized strategy, while diplomacy remains national, guarantees mounting disputes."

While the rhetoric which surrounded Kennedy's European policies (the "Declaration of Interdependence" speech on July 4, 1962, for example) suggested that some real sharing of political sovereignty was intended somewhere, sometime, the application of those policies appeared even in the eyes of some very sympathetic European observers, to do no more than perpetuate American hegemony.

Kissinger is not sanguine about any formal sovereignty-sharing in the foreseeable future. His "interim" prescription is for trying to work out within NATO coordinated political views on basic world problems, particularly East-West problems:

> "There is something incongruous about NATO's absorption in the technicalities of mixed-manning [in the MLF] while it lacks a common

22

MAY 15, 1965

policy toward the Communist world, flounders . . . in the former colonial areas and has yet to concert a strategic doctrine. . . . NATO requires a mechanism for managing political crises even more than a military staff for planning a war."

But Kissinger isn't even very sanguine about consultations. He has interesting things to say about the German problem and the future of East-West relations, but he seems to have more faith in Europe sorting out its own internal problems, fashioning a unity of sorts in the West and a truly autonomous voice in world affairs, than he does in the future of Atlantic cooperation. He offers an effective apologia for de Gaulle's vision of Europe's future, even as he deplores the man's bad manners and persistent habit of depicting American actions in the worst possible light. He predicts that the autonomy which de Gaulle demands, first for France and then for a Europe of States, will someday come to be appreciated here for its inherent benefits. "If we insist on remaining the sole trustees of policy everywhere, including Europe," he writes, "the strain on our resources and ingenuity may well be too great. . . . The day will come when we will consider a measure of autonomy in Europe a blessing rather than an irritant."

## After Selma

"... the knife-order."

— T. E. HULME

Bars-sinister and -dexter mortify
Visiting pilgrims who commit no crimes;
The warning is a storm in his own eye.

STEPHEN MOONEY

23

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PLEASE DO NOT TYPE IN THIS COLUMN

THIS IS AN UNEDITED REVIEW.
BECAUSE SOME OF THE WORK
MAY BE CHANGED AND BECAUSE
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SATURDAY REVIEW
NEW YORK, N.Y.
W. 372,586

[L3]

MAY 1 1955

# SR's Check List of the Week's New Books

## Anthologies

THE FATAL EGGS AND OTHER SOVIET SATIRE. Edited and translated by Mirra Ginsburg. Macmillan. $4.50.

FAVORITE STORIES OF HYPNOTISM. Edited by Don Ward Dodd. Mead. $4.50.

A LEMONTOON READER. Edited and translated by C. G. Darls. Macmillan. $5.

## Art

WHAT'S THERE—Lou Bernstein's Photographs, an Aesthetic Realism Art Inquiry. By Eli Siegel. Terrain Gallery (39 Grove St., NYC). $2.50.

## Crime, Suspense

BABES IN THE WOODS. By Lillian O'Donnel. Abelard-Schuman. $3.50.

CUNNING AS A FOX. By Kyle Hunt. Macmillan. $3.95.

MURDERERS SANE AND MAD. By Miriam Allen deFord. Abelard-Schuman. $5.

THE NEUTRON BEAM MURDER. By Terry Johnson King. Abelard-Schuman. $3.50.

## Current Affairs

AN ACT OF CONSCIENCE. By Len Holt. Beacon. $4.95.

CRISIS IN THE CONGO: A U.N. Force in Action. By Ernest W. Lefever. The Brookings Institution. Hardbound. $3.50. Paperback. $1.95.

AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGY. By Andre Beaufre. Praeger. $4.95.

THE MAKING OF A QUAGMIRE. By David Halberstam. Random House. $5.95.

THE NEW FACE OF WAR. By Malcolm Browne. Bobbs-Merrill. $5.

TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. By Henry A. Kissinger. McGraw-Hill-Council on Foreign Relations. $5.95.

UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: America and the Third World. By C. L. Sulzberger. Atheneum. $5.

## Fiction

EMERGENCY IN THE PYRENEES. By Ann Bridge. McGraw-Hill. $5.50.

THE FLIGHT OF THE FALCON. By Daphne du Maurier. Doubleday. $4.95.

FRUIT OF THE POPPY. By Robert Wilder. Putnam. $5.95.

THE HOMECOMING. By Marlena Frick. McKay. $3.75

MR. RIGHT IS DEAD. By Rona Jaffe. Simon & Schuster. $4.50.

NOT WITH A BANG. By Chapman Pincher. New American Library. $4.95.

THE OLD ORDER AND THE NEW: A Novel of Africa. By Wilfred Fowler. Macmillan. $5.

THE SECOND Miss Wu. By Agnes Sanford. Lippincott. $3.95

## History

GERMANY. By Hanns Reich. Hill & Wang. $8.95.

THE GREAT PROTEST TRIAL. Edited with notes by Robert C. Tucker and Stephen F. Cohen. Grosset & Dunlap. Hardbound, $5.95. Paperback. $2.95.

GUNS AT THE FORKS. By Walter O'Meara. Prentice-Hall. $6.95.

MEN AGAINST THE MOUNTAINS. By Alson J. Smith. John Day. $5.95.

PRELUDE TO WORLD POWER: American Diplomatic History. 1860-1900. By Foster D. Dulles. Macmillan. $5.95.

## Law, Government

LAWYERS AND JUDGES: The A.B.A. and the Politics of Judicial Selection. By Joel B. Grossman. John Wiley. $6.95.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN FRANCE. By F. Ridley and J. Blondel. Barnes & Noble. $6.50.

## Literary Criticism

THE SATURNIAN QUEST: A Study of the Prose Work of John Cowper Powys. By G. Wilson Knight. Barnes & Noble. $3.75.

## Miscellany

AND THEN I TOLD THE PRESIDENT: The Secret Papers of Art Buchwald. Putnam. $4.95.

COMPLETE BOOK OF OLD CLOCKS. By Alan H. Lloyd. Putnam. $5.95.

ETIQUETTE: The Blue Book of Social Usage. By Emily Post. 1965 edition revised by Elizabeth L. Post. Funk & Wagnalls. $5.95.

USE YOUR HEAD: The Art of Personal Problem Solving. By Aaron Levenstein. Macmillan. $4.95.

THE WORLD OF BEES. By Murray Hoyt. Coward-McCann. $4.95.

## Music

THE CONDUCTOR'S ART. Edited by Carl Bamberger. McGraw-Hill. $6.50.

## Personal History

HEMINGWAY: An Old Friend Remembers. By Jed Kiley. Hawthorn. $3.95.

HIMMLER. By Roger Manvell and Heinrich. Putnam. $5.95.

ROYAL SPY. By Edna Nixon. Reynal. $6.

A ROYAL AFFINTY: The Story of Frederick the Great and His Sister, Wilhelmina of Bayreuth. Constance Wright. Scribners. $6.50.

TAKEN CARE OF: The Autobiography of Edith Sitwell. Atheneum. $5.

ULBRICHT: A Political Biography. By Carola Stern. Praeger. $5.95.

THE WOEFUL VICTORIAN: A Biography of John Addington Symonds. By Phyllis Crosskurth. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. $6.95.

## Poetry

THE POEMS OF ROBERT HERRICK. Edited by L. C. Martin. Oxford Univ. Press. $7.

## Psychology

CARING FOR YOUR DISABLED CHILD. By Benjamin Spock, M.D., and Marion O. Lerrigo, Ph.D. Macmillan. $4.95.

THE TEACHER OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED. By Leon Charney and Edward La Crosse. John Day. $3.95.

## Religion, Philosophy

THE CONDITIONS OF PHILOSOPHY: Its Checkered Past, Its Present Disorder and Its Future Promise. By Mortimer J. Adler. Atheneum. $5.95.

LITURGY AND CHRISTIAN UNITY. By Romey P. Marshall and Michael J. Taylor. S.J. Prentice-Hall. $4.95.

TRUTHS IN TENSION: New Perspectives on Religion and Science. By John Habgood. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. $4.50.

## Science

THE MAN THEY WOULDN'T LET DIE. By Alexander Dorozynski. Macmillan. $4.95.

WANDERERS IN THE SKY: The Motions of Planets and Space Probes. Edited by Thornton Page and Lou Williams Page. Macmillan. $7.95.

## Sociology

EMILE DURKHEIM. By Robert A. Nisbet. Prentice-Hall. Hardbound. $4.95. Paperback, $2.45.

GEORG SIMMEL. By Lewis A. Coser. Prentice-Hall. Hardbound. $4.95. Paperback, $2.45.

MAIN CURRENTS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT. Volume I. By Raymond Aron. Basic Books. $4.95.

## Travel

FODOR'S GUIDE TO THE CARIBBEAN, BAHAMAS, AND BERMUDA. Edited by Eugene Fodor. McKay. $5.95.

FODOR'S GUIDE TO GERMANY. Edited by Eugene Fodor. McKay. $5.25.

-Compiled by RUTH BROWN.

3.

of Teilhard de Chardin by Helmut de Terra (also Harper) and Teilhard de Chardin: *A Biographical Study* by Claude Cuenot (Helicon).

***

On Page 3, Alfred Kazin makes his second appearance in BOOK WEEK with an essay-review on H.L. Mencken: *The American Scene*, a new reader of Mencken's work selected by Huntington Cairns (Knopf).

June 13th!

***

Four important new books on world affairs are reviewed in the issue: Alastair Buchan, director of the British Institute for Strategic Studies, is enthusiastic about Henry A. Kissinger's *The Troubled Partnership* (McGraw-Hill) and NATO in Transition by Timothy W. Stanley (Praeger). William C. Baggs, editor of the Miami News, which has received the Pulitzer Prize for its coverage of Castro's Cuba, is full of praise for Theodore Draper's *Castroism: Theory and Practice* (Praeger). And Merle Fainsod, director of Harvard's Russian Research Center, greatly admires Bertram D. Wolfe's *Marxism: One Hundred Years in the Life of a Doctrine* (Dial Press).

***

Also in the issue: Russell Lynes on *The Professions in America* edited by Kenneth S. Lynn and the editors of Daedalus (Houghton Mifflin) ...William H. A. Carr on *The Rockefeller Billions* by Jules Abels (Macmillan) ... Pete Hamill on *The Overreachers by Gay Talese* (Harper & Row) and *Self-Creations: Thirteen Impersonalities* by Thomas B. Morgan (Holt, Rinehart & Winston) ... On the New Fiction page, R.Z. Sheppard is enthusiastic about *A Pile of Stones* by Hugh Nissenson (Scribners), *Negatives* by Peter Everett (Simon & Schuster) and *Yes from No-Man's Land* by Bernard Kops (Coward-McCann).

...Alan Pryce-Jones' Page 2 is on Nan Fairbrother's *The House in the Country* (Knopf), and Maurice Dolbier's Behind the Lines is on Maurice Edelman.

## FROM THE BUSINESS SIDE / RICHARD BROWN

My Lordy but that Chicago's a fine town. Among its many charms, we're told, is the fact that, despite its size, it has retained more than a little of the Conostoga Wagon flavor of earlier days.

We've been going out there off and on for as long as we've been in publishing and if that Conostoga Wagon business is meant to denote a certain rough and tumble character, we're here to tell you that it's so. Back in the late fall of 1959 we were sales and promotion manager for Pennington Press (a firm long gone bankrupt) and the star author on our list was a prominent Chicagoan by the name of Roger "The Terrible" Touhy, an old-time prohibition rival of Al Capone's.

Roger had been cooling it in the state penitentiary for some 26 years and in his book, "The Stolen Years" (written with *Sun-Times* reporter, Ray Brennan, incidentally), he reminiscent about the old gang wars and told of how he'd been framed (there was reason to believe that he'd been serving time on the wrong charge). Anyway, to cut a long story as short as possible, "The Stolen Years" got a promotion send-off unique in publishing history for Touhy was gunned down within three weeks of publication. What made it particularly scary for us was that it followed by roughly half an hour his meeting with Brennan and your gentle and not terribly courageous BOOK WEEK

4.

Business Manager (it subsequently
developed that had we not gone
our separate ways upon breaking
up there would probably have
been a group shoot on North
Michigan Avenue).

The whole thing got stickier
and scarier, but we'll leave that
for another time. Suffice it say
for now that Chicago sales sky-
rocketed (Kroch's was ordering
from us at a rate of 500 a day)
as Pennington's most famous (and
final) offering became the most
popular gift under Mafia Christ-
mas trees throughout the land.

This is hardly the report
on Chicago we promised you in
the last newsletter. Our pro-
duct is considerably more re-
spectable these days and we trust
our cultural contribution to the
Windy City will be of a sub-
stantially higher grade, but we
thought we might as well establish
our Chicago credentials before
trying to sell you on the market.

The small coincidence rep-
resented by our previous Sun-Times
association through Ray Brennan
is compounded by the fact that
the paper's present Sunday book
page (over which Hoke Norris
presides) also bears the title
of Book Week. To take coincidence
one step further, the Sun-Times
--or more accurately, the old
Chicago Sun -- created the first
separate book supplement to
appear in Chicagoland back in
November 1942 and it, too, was
called Book Week (the Chicago
Tribune's Magazine of Books did nt
debut until February 1946; it was
converted to Books Today in March
1946).

A.C. Spectorsky, who has gone
on to greener pastures as
Associate Publisher of Playboy,
was the first editor. Spectorsky,
who also authored the book, "The
Exurbanites," held the post until
1946. He was followed by John

William Rogers, a Texan. Emmet
Dedmon, present Executive Editor
of the Sun-Times, followed Rogers
and edited the Book Week section
until it was discontinued when
Marshall Field bought the Chicago
Times in the summer of 1947 and
the paper was converted to a tab-
loid format.

That takes care of personal
and historical asides. It also
establishes beyond doubt the Sun-
Times place on the Chicago lit-
erary scene. What concerns us
now is the present and the imme-
quate future. We've been optimistic
about BOOK WEEK's Chicago prospects
from the start and our conversations
last week with local booksellers,
wholesalers and publishers added
fuel to our enthusiasm.

We think we've made it clear
these past few months why Chicago
and the Sun-Times are important
to advertisers. It is equally
important for publishers to know
that the addition of BOOK WEEK
to the Sun-Times is the result
of a decision of no little con-
sequence on their part. This
paper's on the move on all fronts
and BOOK WEEK figures prominently
in the overall strategy. We'll
have more to say about Chicago
promotion (it's already underway)
in future newsletters, but you
can rest assured that we'll not
be tiptoeing into town.

Finally, we hope we've made clear
that the Sun-Times is our kind
of paper, just as Chicago is our
kind of town -- an exciting,
swinging town that's made to order
for an exciting, swinging supple-
ment like BOOK WEEK.

***

Bob Carter poses some very
provocative questions concerning
the usefulness of special juvenile
and paperback sections in this
week's Guest Spot column. Do read
it and let us know what you think.

BOOKWEEK NEWS
230 West 41st Street, New York, N.Y. 10036

[L]

June 2, 1965

THE EDITOR'S PREVIEW / RICHARD KLUGER

The only time I have seen Jerome B. Wiesner, dean of the school of science at M.I.T. and President Kennedy's top science advisor, was at the press conference just before the presentation of the National Book Awards in New York earlier this spring. Dr. Wiesner was there to represent the late Norbert Wiener, whose "God and Golem, Inc." was an NBA winner. Dr. Wiesner's candor and intelligence marked his every response at the press conference. A few weeks later Ralph E. Lapp's new book, *The New Priesthood: The Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power* (Harper & Row), came in for review. The ideal reviewer, it seemed clear to us, would be Jerome Wiesner, a very busy man. When BOOK WEEK asked him, Dr. Wiesner was interested in seeing the book. After seeing it, he was interested in reviewing it -- only he needed more time than was available if the review was to run in the issue immediately following publication. But given the choice between being on time with an adequate review by an informed reviewer and being a few weeks late with an incisive review by a man superbly qualified to write it, we'll take the latter.

Dr. Wiesner's review is on the cover of our June 6th issue. While he finds some quite good things in Dr. Lapp's book, he argues with a number of the author's attitudes and positions. His essay raises some critical issues for our technological society; the main problem, he thinks, is not the potential abuse of our new-found

power by the scientists in charge but just how to harness the power most efficiently for the most constructive ends. Our headline on his piece: PROMETHEUS UNBOUND.

* * *

Denis Warner, a native of Australia, is widely regarded as the best journalist now covering the tense Southeast Asian scene, and his book on the subject "The Last Confucian," was warmly praised when it appeared a few years ago. His review of *Report from a Chinese Village* by Jan Myrdal (Pantheon) appears on page 3. One of the problems in reviewing Myrdal's book, which is a report on the month he and his wife were allowed to spend in a village of 50 families in 1962, is the scarcity of Western people who have been to the China mainland in the past decade who are clearly not apologists for the Mao regime. Mr. Warner has not been to China in recent years, yet his work is constantly pulling him within the orbit of Red China. He is, furthermore, constantly on the move throughout Asia and brings to his task as reviewer the breadth, perspective and skepticism of a distinguished journalist.

* * *

Philip W. Quigg, managing editor of Foreign Affairs magazine, is enthusiastic about *The Washing of the Spears: A History of the Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation* by Donald R. Morris (Simon & Schuster). The big, richly graphic book focuses on the Zulu wars of 1879 "when an army of British

2.

soldiers supported by Boers, Eng-
lish settlers and Xhosa tribes-
man -- 16,800 strong -- invaded
Zululand. Twelve days later its
central column was virtually wiped
out by Zulus armed largely with
spears. More than 4,000 lay dead
at Isandhlwana and Rorke's Drift,
and the campaign had to be temp-
orarily suspended. The spears
had been washed in blood, as Zulu
custom required of each generation
of warriors, but the price of
victory was so high that the might-
iest black nation in the history
of Africa never recovered and
defeat followed six months later."
The author, incidentally, is an
American who works for the Defense
Department.

***

Last week I read Herbert J. Muller's classic study, "The Uses of the Past," for the first time. It is impossible not to admire Professor Muller's extraordinary reach through time, not to mention his wonderful skills as a writer. In this issue of BOOK WEEK he reviews Asia in the Making of Europe: Volume I, The Century of Discovery by Donald F. Lach (University of Chicago Press). Muller writes: "While the European penetration of Asia in the 16th century has long been recognized as a major turning point in world history, Donald Lach observes that very few historians have investigated the significance of the discovery of Asia for the development of Western civilization itself... His tone is consistently sensible, modest, and fair-minded. And in view of the world situation today, he is recounting an important story."

***

Harry S. Ashmore, Pulitzer-
Prize winning former editor of
the Arkansas Gazette and now a
director of the Fund for the Re-
public, says John Gunther's new
book, *Procession* (Harper & Row),

"is a tour de force that comes
very close to establishing John
Gunther as the prominent journalist
of his time." The book is a
gathering up of 50 personality
sketches of leading world figures
taken from 25 of Mr. Gunther's
books.

***

Elsewhere in the issue: Wylie
Sypher writes an absorbing piece
on one of the few anthologies we
have reviewed in some time -- *The
Modern Tradition: Backgrounds of
Modern Literature* edited by
*Richard Ellmann* of Northwestern
(who, coincidentally, has the Page
2 essay spot this week with a piece
on W.B. Yeats and T.S. Eliot) and
Charles Feidelson Jr. (Oxford
University Press)...On the New
Fiction page Arthur R. Gold has
praise for *Twelve Chases on West
Ninety-Ninth Street* by Roy Bongartz
(Houghton Mifflin), Stoner by
John Williams (Viking) and *Corona-
tion* by Jose Donoso (Knopf)...Louise King reviews *August* Is a
*Wicked Month* by Edna O'Brien (Simon
& Schuster)... And Dick Schaap's
Behind the Lines is on Harry Kemelman,
author of *Friday*, the *Rabbi Slept
Late* (Crown).

***

On the cover of the June 13th issue of BOOK WEEK, two eminent French priests are spotlighted -- R.L. Bruckberger and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Martin E. Marty, historian on the University of Chicago Divinity School faculty and an editor of The Christian Century, writes a fine essay on Father Bruckberger's *The History of Jesus Christ (Viking)*, which he finds an extraordinary work, and also discusses, more briefly, *The World of Josephus* by G.A. Williamson (Little, Brown). Sharding page 1 is Stringfellow Barr writing on two of Teilhard's books, *The Future of Man* and *Hymn of the Universe* (both Harper & Row), and two books about him -- *Memories*.

Too many cooks and not enough KPs

By Alastair Buchan

THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. By Henry A. Kissinger. McGraw-Hill. 266 pp. $5.95.
NATO IN TRANSITION: The Future of the Atlantic Alliance. By Timothy W. Stanley. Praeger. 417 pp. $7.50.

In the past six months, the angry debates between Washington and Paris or between London, Bonn and Paris have been somewhat muted. But this is not because any of the central difficulties of the Atlantic relationship have been solved: it is simply the quiescence of exhaustion or a sign of a temporary preoccupation with other problems, notably Viet Nam. Whatever happens in the Far East, the question of the relationship of Germany, its status within the Western alliance and its relationship to its European partners must soon rise again to the top of the international agenda. And when that happens, probably after the German elections in the fall, the years which we have wasted, the failure to resolve the Franco-American argument over higher policy control, to ratify the MLF or to consider better alternatives for associating the non-nuclear powers with strategic planning, or to make our ideas about the defense of Europe correspond to the changing political relationship between the two halves of Europe, may rekindle the old NATO arguments in an even more embittered fashion.

This is one reason why Henry Kissinger's interest-
ing and powerful book is so timely. It is the work of a
craftsman in a rare but highly skilled trade, the making
and repair of alliances between sovereign states. Kis-
singer is not a military theorist, like some of the men
at RAND or elsewhere, and his one excursion into
this field—an attempt to evolve a viable theory of
limited nuclear war—was unfortunate. Rather, he is a
diplomatic historian with a fine grasp of American
military and European political realities. “The deepest
problem before the Alliance,” he points out, “is that the
pressures of the new technology run counter to tradi-
tional notions of political sovereignty.”

Since the advent of the Kennedy Administration brought so many members of the Harvard and M. I. T. faculty into government, Kissinger has been a somewhat lonely figure. He has opposed the attempt, so much associated with the New Frontier, to impose on Europe a largely American conception of what form European unity should take: he has pointed out that de Gaulle's arrogance obscures a service to France's restored morale and vitality which her allies must respect. And, with others, he has argued that the attempt to evade the awkward choice of relinquishing full American freedom of action in the interests of allied confidence by such devices as a mixed manned force must in the end be self-defeating. Now, however, there are probably more people in the major capitals of the alliance, including Washington, who agree with Kissinger than who dispute him.

The starting point of his present survey is the
curious paradox created by the strategic stalemate be-
tween the Soviet Union and the U. S. which has had
the effect of increasing the political freedom of action
of the smaller members of the alliance and creating
a situation in which the U. S. has fewer sanctions to
keep her allies in line. Yet military strategy must re-
main centralized if deterrence is to be maintained.
Kissinger writes: "But, from a psychological point of
view, unless centralization of strategy is coupled with

an effective sharing of political decisions—far beyond
anything so far envisaged—the practical consequences
could be a growing sense of irresponsibility among our
allies."

He then applies this point to a close analysis of the
Franco-American relationship of recent years. "Wash-
ington insists on a structure which makes separate ac-
tion physically impossible by assigning each partner a
portion of the over-all task. Paris insists that a con-
sensus is meaningful only if each partner has a real
choice," he says. "The irony of the Franco-American
rivalry is that de Gaulle has conceptions greater than
his strength, while the United States's power has been
greater than its conceptions." Kissinger offers no
apologia for the arrogance of the French president's
style nor for the short-sightedness of many of his ac-
tions, but rather displays an ability to understand the
quite different French conception of the word "alli-
ance" that is rare among Anglo-Saxons.

He passes from the Franco-American debate to an
examination of the strange confusion of thought that
has arisen about the defense of Europe, particularly
as it concerns the American attempt to reconcile a de-
sire for greater flexibility of response to various levels
of Soviet attack with the disposition of an increasing
number of nuclear weapons in Europe. Here, perhaps
he is less fair to American official intentions—a little
readier to take at their face value European confusions
about what American policy really is—than the situa-
tion warrants.

But he has a superb chapter in which he dissects
the curious history of the proposed multilateral force,
a proposal which the Germans and other European
non-nuclear powers were induced by the more ardent
New Frontiersmen to believe was the one and only
road both to European unity and a more successful
strategic relationship with the U. S. In view of the
consistent American anxiety to prevent proliferation—
one national interest that it clearly holds in common
with the Soviet Union—the MLF was and is a fraud
upon the allies. "The MLF cannot at one and the same
time satisfy demands for nuclear sharing and assuage
concerns about nuclear proliferation."

The essential failure of such mechanistic conceptions

as the MLF brings Kissinger back to his starting
point: "Central command and control over all the
nuclear weapons of the Alliance is incompatible with
undiluted sovereignty. The United States cannot insist
on integration of strategy while jealously guarding its
complete freedom of political decision." This leads him
to re-formulate a position in which he has often been
isolated in the American debate of recent years, but
with which more and more people would agree today—
namely, that there can only be a political solution to
the problem of the NATO alliance, that there must be
a deliberate attempt by the U. S. to create an entente
out of its relationship with its principal European allies.
This implies more than perfunctory consultation be-
tween countries pursuing independent and unco-or-
dinated foreign policies in large formal bodies like the
North Atlantic Council.

Kissinger proposes an Atlantic Executive Committee composed of the U. S., Britain, France, Germany, Italy and one other NATO member in rotation. This may be the right answer. But, as he points out, consultation between independent countries is often more effective in implementing a consensus than in achieving it, and what is required is a change of perspective as well as of machinery. Kissinger notes, "A decade and a half of hegemony have accustomed us to believing that our views represent the general consensus" and that Europe can only acquire the right of dissent by developing power equal to that of the U. S. itself. Such unified European power may be very long in developing, may never develop, may be unnecessary. But in the process of waiting for it to develop, for a genuine European-American partnership to come into existence, the Atlantic Alliance may decay when put to the test by such events as Viet Nam where European power is irrelevant but European support is essential. "What is needed," Kissinger argues, "is that it is in the long term interest of the United States to share responsibilities even more than burdens."

A new phase of European-American relations started when President Johnson came to office and decided to suspend many of the policies of his predecessors. These have not yet been replaced by new ones, and Henry Kissinger should provide a most important stimulus to the process of re-formulating new ones.

Timothy Stanley has written a very different book
though one of equal utility to serious students of the
NATO alliance. It is a detailed examination of the
strategic and military problems of the alliance, together
with a close professional analysis of the faults in its
machinery. He attacks these problems from a radical
standpoint—namely, that NATO is the nucleus of a
more universal system of security. "The central thesis
of this book is that the Atlantic alliance is in transition
from a regional security mission to the task of pro-
viding leadership in building a viable world order,"
Stanley writes.

He is prepared to argue, moreover, that the U. S.
stands to gain more than loss by relinquishing some of
its apparent freedom of action in relation to its NATO
partners, and that ending NATO with some supra-
national characteristics ought seriously to be con-
sidered rather than indefinitely extending it as a mere
national coalition.

This is one of the most competent books on the al-
liance that has been written.

Page 4

BOOK WEEK June 13, 1965

Deftly bagging
the rubes

By Alfred Kazin

H. L. MENCKEN: The American Scene. A Reader. Selected and edited by Huntington Cairns. Knopf. 542 pp. $8.95.

Here is Mencken, pushed back on stage again in 1965. Of all his many gifts, his greatest was his unvarying lucidity, his definiteness, his concreteness, his hard-headedness—in a word, his air of possessing all the common sense, irreverence and sociability needed to make him the ideal companion, the most reliably interesting of friends. So the friends are always faithful to his memory—his publisher republishes him with love, his old editor on the Baltimore Sunpapers still audibly “chuckles” when he remembers Henry roaring forth on an assignment, his old proteges among tough young novelists of 40 years ago can not and never will forget that first acceptance from The American Mercury, old Baltimoreans cannot look at new Baltimore without weeping in copious mourning for the days when H. L. M. personified the most comfortable, the most Germanically self-satisfied, the most *gemutlich*, the most gastronomical, of all Eastern seaboard cities.

So Mencken is pushed on stage again, doing all his familiar stunts and reciting all his best pieces. And looking at him up there—as hard, charming, pointed in his effects as an old vaudevillian, one imagines for a moment that it is the 1890s again or the 1920s still (for Mencken all the same period): i.e., that it is still the age of Victorian hypocrisy and Comstockian prudery, of Woodrow Wilson's unctuousness, of Calvin Coolidge's thin-lipped craftiness, of Upton Sinclair's crusade against rotten meat, of The Society For the Suppression Of Vice, Elihu Root, red-light districts and Pilsner from Pilsen.

There is good cigar smoke floating under the chandellers of our music hall, the waiters are all named Otto or Emil, and they cavesdrop with rapture on James Gibbons Huneker: “Down went a *Seidel* of Pilsner—and out came the authentic last words of Whitman, gasped into poor Horace Traubel's solicitous ear, and too horrible, almost, to be remembered in a Christian land. Down went another—and out came a precise and meticulous description of Liszt's vast floillla of warts and wens: the purple ones and the little ones. Down went a third—and the theme was the virtuous love affairs of Gounod, or Wagner's encounter with the lascivious Swedish baroness...”

It is 19th-century positiveness, which lasted until the depression, Hitler and the Bomb, that rises up before me again in all its innocent pretentiousness when I read Mencken again. For if Mencken was first of all a satirist of society at large and all its arid little corners, it was because his America was so pleased with itself; if he was the most deliberately *irreverent* of satirists, it was because the new plutocracy disguised the brutality of its wealth behind evangelical poses; if he was the most vehement and outraged of individualists, it was because nowhere was the power of “popular” opinion, of the respectable, timorous, mass opinion, so easy to enlist—and to make fun of. If he was the cockiest and most belligerent critic of our culture, it was because the culture was still in bondage to English names and English books, still colonial, and as moralistic as it was provincial.

Mencken began as a newspaperman in the 1890s—a time when it was natural, still, to believe that a lively

and independent writer must start as a newspaperman. It was a time when important newspapers were owned by men as brazenly independent-minded as they were wealthy, when managing editors were often more genuinely heretical than many a sad soul in Greenwich Village. And perhaps most important in his development, Mencken learned his trade in an age of oratory, of pious buncombe, of late-Victorian rhetoric thick and bedazzling. It was this that helped to form Mencken's most personal and important gift—his inimitable *spoken* style, the style in which every detail is clear and hard, the style of a man talking right at you, aiming every shot straight at the audience, beating the audience down with the fury of his performance.

Before Mencken, our greatest oral performer in print was Mark Twain. And although Mark Twain had a genius for narrative and Mencken was more of a virtuoso at newspaper writing than anything else, it is a fact that Mencken's showy, self-conscious, hilariously self-justifying performances came out of the same tradition: the clever American newspaperman ready, at any hour of the day or night, on any subject from Ibsen to William Jennings Bryan, to “astonish” an audience that modestly thought itself in need of learning and exhortation on every subject under the sun. Mark Twain could get up on a table at three in the morning and whip to tears with sob stories about the war an audience of Civil War veterans already stupefied by a long night of speeches. When he wrote comic squibs for Nevada papers, when he attacked James Fenimore Cooper, when he complained to the gas company, when he fended off his wife, when he avoided reading Henry James, he had, always in the same manner, to “astonish.” Everything he said, thought, believed, wanted to believe, loved, hated, had to come out witty and strong, emphatic and sharp. This became Mencken's great trick and forte; no wonder he adored Mark Twain. And if Mencken succeeded in “astonishing,” as Huck Finn liked to say about certain performances he had seen up and down the river, it was because at the end of the Victorian era, in Mencken's America as in Shaw's England, the writer formed in this school of public performance could still get a hold on his audience—and his audience on him. Each knew just where and what the other was. There were no “ambiguities,” no age of “anxiety,” no unspeakable

Nazi horrors—only speakable faults, laughable politicians, pompous fools, innocent rubes.

Imagine a world in which the majority of Americans still believe that democracy is the normal aspiration of most other people, have never seen a play, think Theodore Dreiser's *The Genius* immoral, are afraid of Ibsen's *Ghosts*, and don't know the difference between Burgundy and Bordeaux, between Thomas Mann's first period and Thomas Mann's second period. Imagine a world of American hicks who still believe by the hundred million in the sanctity of marriage, that might makes right, that we went to war to save the world for democracy, that we took over Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines for the sake of little brown brother. Imagine a world in which a man who had *three times* been a candidate for the Presidency of the United States could actually deny in a Tennessee courtroom that man is a mammal. Imagine a world in which it still has to be proved, with examples, that the American language is as vital for literary purposes as the English —in which the fact that Walt Whitman was fired from a miserable clerkship in the Department of Interior because the Secretary of the Interior had discovered that this said Walt Whitman had published an immoral book called *Leaves Of Grass*, was, 40 years later, as important an instance of the general American stuffiness and mediocrity as the pompous funeral obsequies, in 1882, of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Imagine a world in which a newspaperman with a lot of learning could tell his readers that Sidney Lanier's book on English prosody was “the first [and last] intelligent work ever published upon the nature and structure of the sensuous content of English poetry”—who said in passing that poetry rested on self-delusion, by fact-denying, of “saying what isn't true”—who just had to tell his readers that Beethoven “was preeminently a modern man, with all trace of the barbarian vanished.” Mencken always *knew*.

In that vanished world all the rubes were in one corner, with the Woodrow Wilsons, the Henry Van Dykes, the Henry Cabot Lodges—and Mencken and Nietzsche and James Gibbons Huneker were in the other. What a contrast between free spirits like the latter and William Jennings Bryan, that muttonhead, that imbecile, that religious fanatic, with “his huge catfish mouth set in a hard line, his great eyes glittering, his black hair clumped in sweaty locks over his epicycloid dome!”

Does all this sound as if Mencken were hopelessly old-fashioned? Not always in his content is he out-of-date, far from it; but what comes out of another time and belongs to it is his clanging positiveness, his assurance, his archaic personal conceit, his *air*. Take that masterpiece of rhetorical attack on the aridity of the South, “The Sahara of the Bozart.” Much as the South has improved since the Twenties, it hasn’t changed enough to make irrelevant Mencken’s uproarious crescendo of complaints. But who today would *want* to write of the South that “down there a poet is now almost as rare as an oboe-player, a dry-point etcher or a metaphysician. It is, indeed, amazing to contemplate so vast a vacuity. One thinks of the interstellar spaces, of the colossal reaches of the now mythical ether. Nearly the whole of Europe could be lost in that stupendous region of worn-

(Continued on page 13)

BOOK WEEK June 13, 1965

Page 3

» BOOKS · ARTS · MANNERS «

Is There an Enemy?

M. STANTON EVANS

Henry Kissinger's third book on the Cold War confirms his already substantial reputation as a major commentator on international strategy and politics. Like its predecessors, it displays Kissinger's rare ability to examine and make clear a class of issues peculiar to our age—that half-political, half-technical thicket of obscurity which has sprung up at the confluence of nuclear sophistication and the forward rush of Communist aggression.

The partnership in Kissinger's title is the NATO alliance. Its trouble is an accelerating tendency towards disintegration, brought on by a number of causes among which Kissinger rates transformation of nuclear technology and abrupt shifts in American nuclear strategy as foremost. He sets out to analyze these causes, to isolate correctable problems from those mandated by the nature of things, and to suggest a program for putting the former right and getting the alliance back on its feet.

The chief difficulty, Kissinger argues, is a radical disjunction between the nuclear strategy the United States has for almost two decades been preparing itself to follow, and the non-nuclear strategy it is today

talking about following and urging its allies to adopt. We have staked Free World prospects for survival on a program of nuclear deterrence, equipped our air force with nuclear payloads, tipped our missiles with nuclear warheads, and stuffed Europe with tactical nuclear weapons. Now

The Troubled Partnership, by Henry A. Kissinger. McGraw-Hill, $5.95

we suddenly take to promoting a non-nuclear strategy, cut back on our strategic arsenal, declare our reluctance to use even tactical nuclear weapons, engage in a nuclear test-ban treaty with the Soviet Union, and in general put atomic weaponry as far from us as possible.

Kissinger anatomizes the baleful effects of this reversal on the NATO countries. The Europeans, he notes, down deep still tend to believe their security lies not in their own efforts but in the nuclear arsenal of the United States. Alternatively, if their security is not dependent on that arsenal, they see no reason for con-

tinued deference to Washington as the senior and ruling partner in the Atlantic Alliance. And they are confused—as who is not?—by such things as the continued buildup of tactical nuclear weapons on the continent and the proposal to equip mixed-man forces with atomic hardware alongside insistent statements that nuclear weapons are *verboten*.

There is no one better than Kissinger in turning such issues this way and that to catch every stray wisp of meaning or to anticipate the remotest objections to his line of reasoning. Along the way towards demonstrating what he charitably calls the "ambiguity" of U.S. policy, and what might be more accurately described as no policy whatever, he strikes off instructive and frequently brilliant comments on such matters as Washington's obsessive fear of nuclear "proliferation," de Gaulle's concern to maintain freedom of action for France, the curious hodge-podge known as the Multi-Lateral Force, our government's habit of undercutting its allies, our strangely uneven treatment of Germany, etc. All of these criticisms, however, are sub-

ordinate to his central theme—that we have been prepared, and in large measure are still prepared, for one kind of strategy, and are now behaving as if that strategy were the last thing on earth we are prepared to act upon.

Seeking the deeper sources of this alteration and the European mood it has helped create, Kissinger fixes on the widespread belief (promoted by our own government) that substantial parity exists between the two major powers in their ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons, creating a balance of terror in which both nations can destroy each other and the rest of the world; and the partly resultant, partly contradictory, belief that the United States and the Soviet Union are ready to call a halt to the Cold War, and have for all practical purposes entered a period of accommodation. These ideas, the central precepts of current American policy toward Moscow, are fatal to the Atlantic coalition.

FOR AN ALLIANCE to come into being and operate with reasonable effectiveness, two conditions must exist. There must be something to ally about—generally some common ad-

versary; and there has to be something the alliance can *do*, some project which will yield benefits from concerted action. If present assumptions governing American policy are true, neither of these conditions is met. If the *détente* is real,

there is no enemy, and therefore no reason to have an alliance. If the threat of nuclear holocaust makes war unthinkable, the Soviet Union, even if it is an enemy, cannot be effectively resisted. That, in essence, is the dilemma Kissinger describes.

If the premises are true, however, it is difficult to see why there is a dilemma. If war is unthinkable and Moscow is mellowing, why do we need

512 NATIONAL REVIEW

ership of flocks, herds, etc., that has
prevailed in the Arab world from
time immemorial. Royalist com-
mandos mined the roads used by
Egyptian armor, blew up tanks, motor
convoys, staff cars, and artillery pieces
with considerable regularity. Egyptian
patrols were picked off and even in
broad daylight no Egyptian dared to
get very far away from his unit. It
was only command of the air that
allowed the occupation forces to keep
the royalists bottled up in the north-
ern and eastern mountains.

Nasser urged his old friend, John S. Badeau, the American Ambassador in Cairo, to persuade President Kennedy to accord diplomatic recognition to the new republic. He promised Badeau that as soon as Washington recognized the new regime the Egyptian army would leave Yemen. On December 19 the U.S. accorded the desired recognition to San'a in the belief that the royalists would be discouraged and quit fighting and that Nasser would keep his promise to withdraw his troops.

But the war continued. Fearing the
extension of the struggle the State
Department next negotiated a "phased
disengagement" agreement. The
Egyptians again declared readiness to
get out of Yemen if the Saudi Arabi-
ans, who they said were supporting
al-Badr, would do the same. The
United Nations sent "observer teams"
to Yemen to check on both parties.
After a year of such supervision UN
Secretary General U Thant acknowl-
edged that the Saudi Arabians had
kept their promises to let the Yemeni
fight it out among themselves, but
Nasser again had broken his word.

Today Cairo has 75,000 infantry
and technical troops in Yemen plus
artillery, air, and tank units. All that
this Soviet-equipped and-trained es-
tablishment has been able to accom-
lish is to occupy the chief cities, the
coastal areas, and the central plain.
Offensives directed against the
mountain strongholds of the royalists
in the north and east cost Cairo 25,000
men killed, 10,000 seriously wounded,
many prisoners, and the loss of huge
quantities of weapons and munitions.

The failure of the latest thrust,
designed to crush resistance in the
Haradh and Razeh areas in northern
Yemen, caused thousands of tribes-
men to leave Egyptian-held territory
and tender their submission to al-

Badr. Especially telling was the de-
fection of the great Hashed Confed-
eracy which holds the region between
San'a and the chief city of the north,
Sa'da.

On December 16, 1964, Sa'da fell
into the hands of the royalists. This
is the first city of any consequence
that they have captured. Then on
January 3 almost a thousand Egyptian
and Yemeni republican troops,

trapped on the Jebel Razeh mountain,
surrendered. Further disasters have
followed. In the Arab sector the front
has advanced to within eighteen miles
of San'a itself. Bani al-Harith tribes-
men have surrounded the Soviet-
built ar-Rahba air base only ten miles
from the capital. As an iron ring
seems to be tightening about the
capital from the north and east
savage revolts are raging in Ibb
province south of San'a. Here Bani
Matar clansmen are threatening the
road leading from San'a to Hodeida
on the Red Sea. This is the Egyptian
lifeline to the coast. Its loss would
mean that the Egyptian forces based
in San'a would have to be supplied
by air.

Nasser's Forces Diluted

The Egyptians were expected to
launch an all out offensive this spring.
But the royalists beat them to the
punch by opening up new fronts in
hitherto quiet sectors. Nasser's gen-
erals have had to disperse their forces
to deal with this new situation and
have been unable to build up at key
points for a breakthrough. Forty dif-
ferent fighting fronts exist in Yemen
today and enemies are rising up in
the rear of the Egyptians whichever
way they turn. On March 10, the roy-
alists took Harib on the eastern front.
This is the second major town that

they have captured. Although the
Egyptians suffered only about 100
casualties here their defeat is symp-
tomatic of a general deterioration of
the military situation. More import-
ant, the Egyptians have been unable
to retake Harib. At the moment their
garrisons in eastern Yemen have to
be supplied by air.

The most effective tactic employed
to date by Nasser's people is the

deliberate and systematic destruction
of crops, animals, and homes in areas
contiguous to the royalist-held zones.
So the State Department's decision
to send food to the Mutawakelite
Kingdom, the existence of which it
hasn't recognized for more than two
years, is opportune. Probably the
moulders of American diplomatic
destinies made this gesture to the
royalists in the hope that it would
moderate the opposition evinced by
Congress to the continuation of food
shipments to Egypt. Some congress-
men couldn't follow the State De-
partment argument that for "humani-
tarian reasons" the United States
should feed Egyptians when the latter
were doing their best to starve the
Yemeni. Without the $50 million in
U.S. aid Nasser is receiving, he might
have had to pull his army of or
Yemen before this.

Today the State Department finds
that the government it recognized
more than two years ago exists only
on paper. And that the government it
wrote off at the time is not only a
going concern; it has taken the offen-
sive. It is to be hoped that the Yemeni
will remember only the food ship-
ments that they may receive from
America (if they ever get them) and
will forget the diplomatic tragi-
comedy that preceded them when
peace returns to Yemen, if the time
comes that it ever does.

JUNE 15, 1965 511

The story
no one dared
write-until now!

In this shocking new book, two veteran newspapermen (who were given free access to confidential F.B.I. files) expose in full for the first time the incredible espionage activities being carried on against the United States by Russian diplomats at the U.N. — and the F.B.I.'s all-out war against them.

From Coplon and Gubitchev to Butenko and Ivano, RED SPIES IN THE U.N. reveals the fully documented facts behind fifteen ruthless cases of espionage. All of them were masterminded by agents trained at the infamous Soviet School for Spies in Moscow who are now free to operate in America under the cloak of diplomatic immunity.

**Says HENRY CABOT LODGE:**

> "In this book, Mr. Huss and Mr. Carpozi give chapter and verse on instances of attempts by Soviet spies to penetrate official American secrets and thus directly to endanger the security of the United States. ... I applaud their putting this sinister and unsavory record between two covers."

RED SPIES
IN THE U.N.
By Pierre J. Huss and
George Carpozi Jr.

Illustrated with photographs
$5.50 at bookstores, or from

COWARD-MCCANN, INC.
200 Madison Ave., N.Y. 10016

him and he—you won't believe this—discovers that he *really loves* her, and they kiss and make up. The novel is 404 pages long; if you space it right, you can make it last through four sessions at the beauty parlor.

PIERRE BOULLE, who wrote *The Bridge over the River Kwai*, has concocted in *Garden on the Moon* a satire so close to the bone of current events that its science-fiction gimmick may be an actuality even as I write, or as these words ride through the press, or as you read them. That is, the moon, inspirer of lunatics, may have a Soviet or American or—as M. Boulle imagines—a Japanese rocketeer standing neck-deep in its uniform desert of vacuum-cleaner dust. Several jokes are at work here. "Our Germans are cleverer than your Germans," Russia and the United States can snap at each other, for Peenemünde was the cradle of all the buffs now in the space business.

M. Boulle considers the delicious possibility of a Japanese scientist at Peenemünde. He had worked quietly and, having no problems about the *return* that stymies the American and Russian programs for moon visiting, blasts off on a one-way trip. There he builds a Zen garden in the dust, writes a haiku in the inert dust, paints a water color, and commits the most devastating *sepuku* since Dickens dispersed a villain by spontaneous combustion. He opens his space-suit and atomizes. This is a charming piece of tushery, worth reading for its scenes at Peenemünde and for its deft incorporation of the real into a

fantasy that, for all I know, may be history tomorrow morning. Among the characters you will find Adolf Hitler, Jack Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson, all saying words which, as footnotes attest, they have said.

Ivo Andric is a novelist of a wholly different order from Messrs. Monsar-rat and Boulle. He writes within a sense of form and clarity, as they for money. Andric is a Bosnian Serb who was active in the formation of Yugoslavia. His stories of his coun-try's patchwork-quilt nationalities and religions won him the Nobel Prize in 1961. A diplomat, he has served in most of Europe's capitals. As a writer he is spare of detail, swift of plot, sharp of gaze. His world reminds one of old postcards in sepia; his people are bleakly real. *The Woman from Sarajevo* is as melanc-choly as a Balkan graveyard, but as clear in its drawing of character as Sophocles at his sternest.

The story is of a woman usurer who gets richer with the years, begin-ning at her father's financial ruin and death when she was a girl. She learns money with a scientific exactitude. She becomes the saint of exchanges; thrift is her chastity; the breeding of interest, her theology. Money is her grace. There are saints in Heaven who spent less time at their devotions than she before her francs, silver, and gold. That she dies in poverty and of poverty is but the rounding out of a truth that any gypsy could have told her, and is the severe beauty of the novel. This is a classic story of purity of devotion. But it happens not to be about anything Godly.

Cuckoo's Egg in the 'Britannica'

ROGER A. FREEMAN

IF A SOVIET encyclopedia misrepresents conditions in the USSR and the U.S.A. for propaganda purposes it only does what we have come to

William Benton, "The Teachers and the Taught in the USSR," *Britannica Book of the Year, 1965*. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., $5.95

expect. But if a renowned American encyclopedia makes itself the vehicle for derogatory comparisons between the Soviet Union and the United States by use of fictitious claims and

false figures, it does great damage. The lead article in the *Encyclopedia Britannica's Book of the Year* for 1965 compares education in the U.S.A. and USSR. Written by William Benton, former U.S. Senator and Assistant Secretary of State and now U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO as well as publisher of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, it is certain to be extensively quoted by the Soviets to contrast, for the enlightenment of the rest of the world, the "low status" of education in the U.S. with that in the Soviet Union.

514 NATIONAL REVIEW

NATO, and what is it supposed to do? Why should we demand concerted action? On these terms, the dissolution of the Atlantic Alliance may be worrisome as a symptom of other difficulties, but it is not a problem in and of itself.

Kissinger suggests two rebuttals, one of which he partially disclaims, the other of which he advances as his own. The first is that we need the alliance to deal, not with the Soviet Union, but with the new villain, Red China. But if Red China with its concededly primitive economy and backward military establishment is the only real threat, then European nations may be forgiven for thinking their assistance is hardly needed by so immense a super-power as the United States. As for the much-discussed fear of "escalation," this makes sense only if the Soviet Union re-enters the picture, which means the assumptions about holocaust and détente re-enter with it and the discussion reverts to its original basis.

The other argument, which Kissinger himself professes, is that the alliance has other purposes to serve—purposes of the Atlantic Union, economic-and-political-development sort. He suggests this can best be accomplished through a NATO Executive Committee, to which all members would surrender an undefined portion of their sovereignty, which would iron out existing differences over military strategy and which would—presumably its most important function in view of the supposed détente—prevent the West from "consuming its substance" and go about the business of "forging unity from diversity." This rebuttal, however, seems as tenuous as the other.

WHATEVER THE prevalent attitudes of Europeans, it is certain this step toward supergovernment—for such it is, although Kissinger is vague about its non-military duties—would be a topic of hot controversy among Americans. If this sort of union is to be attempted, on however modest a scale, it should not be brought in by the side door of NATO. There is no justification for improvising even a tentative form of it as a *fait accompli* from a body created for another purpose, and even less reason for making the improvisation an urgent

objective of American policy.

There is, in fact, only one good reason to be worried about the disintegration of NATO; namely, if there is an enemy, and if there is something NATO could and should be doing about it. "The troubled partnership" is a priority item only if the *détente* is not real, and if concerted action among the Atlantic nations can make us more secure against the hostile initiatives of the Soviets. It is our own network of assumptions about Communist mellowing, etc., which is destroying NATO. If the alliance is something we should be deeply concerned about, it can only be because

THE FATTEST of these novels is the worst; the thinnest, the best. Realism is a dead duck, and it is realism in its debased sense of verbal cinema that makes nine out of ten fat novels a boredom unto coma. There is always, of course, the novel-ist with lots to tell. Realism has come to mean Describe Everything, significant or not. You don't have to worry about the right detail if you chuck them all in. The novels at hand are all entertaining and readable; they are, however, by men at different stages toward mastery of their craft.

Omnes amorem vincunt. Nicholas Monsarrat, one of the glossiest romancers of the decade, writes in Technicolor. His characters, coming direct from Make-Up, speak pure Steve Canyon, sashay around in sets as posh as any Hollywood ever slicked up to frame a lacquered leading lady and her winsome cavalier servante, and act out their arch frivolities with a style that can only be called cool. But for all the taffy, jazz and chrome, the fare is still unabashed melodrama. Our heroine is a rich, beautiful South

*The Pillow Fight*, by Nicholas Monsarrat. Wm. Sloane Associates, $5.95

*Garden on the Moon*, by Pierre Boulle. Vanguard, $4.95

*The Woman from Sarajevo*, by Ivo Andric. Knopf, $5.95

those assumptions are wrong—which of course they are.

Kissinger, so incisive on other points, is silent about this central and contaminating error. While he can give us a dozen reasons why the Multi-Lateral Force is absurd, he has nothing to say about the imbecile notion that history's champion aggressors have suddenly mended their ways and embarked on a quest for peace. Perhaps it is ungrateful to suggest that a book which contains so many good things should also contain something more. But this particular something more, alas, is the key to everything else.

## Technicolor and a Serbian Postcard

GUY DAVENPORT

African, sharp as a tack and cute as a bug's ear. She is also a career girl, all business and no fluff, until there comes along a boyish genius who has a social conscience and is writing a book about South Africa.

WELL NOW, we are supposed not to suspect that this self-satisfied filly who's due to inherit a gold mine and diamond farm could possibly fall in love with the unpressed smarty pants but, bless my soul, *amor vincit omnia*, and she *does*. Well, they fornicate all over the Rand (fornication being the glossy novelist's tip-off that sincerity has made the scene) and, once the unkempt but frightfully keen writer's book is published and a grand success (it is so wise and generous a book that even South African millionaires read it with admiration), they get married. Golly. Well, things take a turn here. The book falls into the hands of Broadway. Although it is a serious study of racial strife and injustice, dear old Broadway turns it into a musical, a zany laff fest, in fact. Miss Priss, of the *Suidafrikaner Meisterrasse*, has by this time found a social conscience and is appalled by the musical. But he (Good God!) has been corrupted by success and can be found in Florida, drink in one hand, floozie in the other, as grieved about South Africa as the Grand Dragon of Mississippi. The tables, you see, have turned. Well, it's not that awful in the end, for his wife leaves

JUNE 15, 1965 513