SPECIAL REPORT

ANTOINE GTOUL—STOMA

Chechnya: A
rebel walks
by Russian
bodies

While concentrating on Yeltsin, America is missing the dangers of a new expansionism. BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

Beware: A Threat Abroad

IN THE UPCOMING RUSSIAN ELECTION, ATTENTION HAS
inevitably focused on the competition between President
Boris Yeltsin and Communist Party leader Gennady
Zyuganov. But whatever the outcome, America's Russia
policy requires an urgent reappraisal. If Zyuganov wins,
such a reassessment is inevitable. But a Yeltsin victory, too,
would impose a new approach. For even under Yeltsin,
Russia is pursuing an increasingly assertive foreign policy, which
already opposes American notions of world order in many parts of
the world.

The administration will have no choice but to disenthrall it-
self from the flawed premises of its Russia policy: the concep-
tual misapprehension of the nature of the Cold War and its
overemphasis on personalities. Many policymakers of Clin-
ton's generation hold the view that the United States has its

own heavy responsibility for the Cold War, which they be-
lieve could have been avoided had the United States pursued
a policy of reassurance rather than of confrontation toward
the Soviet Union. As a result, Clinton's Russia policy has em-
phasized domestic reform and psychological engineering. It
has concentrated on promoting internal change and on reas-
suring the Russian leadership rather than seeking to influence
Russia's actions outside its borders.

Because Yeltsin is viewed as the guarantor of market eco-
nomics, democracy and peaceful international conduct, Clin-
ton has attended more summits with him than he has with
any other foreign leader and with a far greater show of per-
sonal warmth. Though the president has never visited Beijing
or invited a Chinese leader to the White House, he has been
to Moscow three times and has met with Yeltsin on American

JUNE 17, 1996 NEWSWEEK

41

SPECIAL REPORT

soil twice (in addition to meetings at the annual economic summits of industrialized nations). Yet despite these efforts, Yeltsin has embarked on foreign policies which differ only in degree from those urged by Zyuganov, perhaps to stave off the Communists—which have become the largest political party in Russia—or perhaps acting on the basis of his own convictions.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARKET ECONOMICS and democracy—and between democracy and a peaceful foreign policy—is not nearly so automatic as Washington has postulated. In Western Europe, the process of democratization took centuries and did not prevent a series of catastrophic wars. In Russia, which has no tradition of capitalism and participated neither in the Reformation, the Enlightenment nor the Age of Discovery, this evolution is likely to be particularly ragged. Indeed, the early stages of the process may provide incentives for leaders to mobilize domestic support by appeals to nationalism.

Yeltsin himself is hardly cast in a Jeffersonian mold. Nearly his entire adult life has been devoted to serving the Communist Party—a career to which the gentle-hearted have rarely gravitated. In his rise through its ranks, Yeltsin surely had little exposure to pluralistic principles. And while he was courageous in concluding that the moribund and inefficient Communist Party was doomed, Yeltsin has shown few signs since that democratic values, including acceptance of dissent, are a central part of his value system. In short, equating foreign policy with Russian domestic politics has unnecessarily identified America in the minds of too many Russians with the weird Russian hybrid of black markets, reckless speculation, outright criminal

activity and a state capitalism in which big industrial combines are run by their erstwhile Communist managers in the guise of privatization.

This has enabled Russian nationalists and Communists to claim that the entire system is a fraud perpetrated by the West to keep Russia weak. Failure to recognize these realities has caused the administration to emphasize objectives that require a long period of time to evolve, and to neglect matters that need to be shaped in the present.

Our reliance on Yeltsin has lured us into endorsing, if not actually encouraging, such high-handed actions as the military assault on the Russian Parliament and the dismissal of the Russian Constitutional Court—acts difficult to reconcile with democratic pretensions, whatever the provocation. The assumption that Yeltsin must be coddled explains why American high officials, including the president, justified Russian pressures on the newly independent states of the Caucasus as being comparable to American actions in the Caribbean. It is presumably also why they felt it reasonable to compare the Russian military campaign in Chechnya to the American Civil War.

The obsession with participating in Russian domestic politics undermines our ability to conduct a foreign policy geared to the

external conduct of the Russian state. Yet it is precisely the external actions of Russia that present the greatest challenge to international stability. And, paradoxically, the very domestic drama of which we have made ourselves too much a party provides some of the incentive for Russian adventurism.

Foreign policy has emerged as the deus ex machina for Russia's elite to escape present-day frustrations by evoking visions of a glorious past. Russia has always displayed a unique set of characteristics—especially when compared to its European neighbors. Extending over 11 time zones, Russia (even in its present, post-Soviet form) contains the largest land-mass of any contemporary state. St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, which is in turn closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow. A country of that size ought not to suffer from claustrophobia. Yet creeping expansionism has been the recurring theme of Russian history. For four centuries, Russia has subordinated the well-being of its own population to this relentless outward thrust and threatened all its neighbors with it. In the Russian mind, the centuries

of sacrifice have been transmuted into a mission, partly on behalf of security, partly in the service of an alleged Russian superior morality.

In the 19th century, the Russian nationalist writer Mikhail Katkov defined the difference between Western and Russian values as follows: “... everything there is based on contractual relations and everything here on faith. A basic dual authority exists there; a single authority here.” Similarly, Zyuganov describes Russia as a “special type of civilization” based on “collectivism, unity, statehood”—as compared to the West, infected with “extreme individualism, militant soullessness, religious indifference, adherence to mass culture.”

Russia and America have both historically asserted a global vocation for their societies. But while America's idealism derives from the concept of liberty, Russia's sprang from shared suffering and common submission to authority. Everyone is eligible to share in America's values; Russia's have been reserved for the Russian nation, excluding even the subject nationalities of the empire. American idealism tempts isolationism; Russia's has historically prompted adventurist domination.

IN PURSUIT OF SECURITY, RUSSIA HAS PRODUCED INSECURITY for all its neighbors. Russia has generally excluded Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia from the operation of the balance of power, insisting on dealing with them unilaterally and often by force: in the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, in the prelude to the Crimean War in 1853, in the Balkan crisis of 1885 and in the period following the second World War. In Manchuria and Korea, prior to the Russian-Japanese War of 1904, it followed a similar strategy. Even when it participated in European alliances, Russia tended to endow them with a missionary quality that justified permanent military intervention in the domestic affairs of other states—

FREDERIQUE LENGEAINE—CAMMA-LIAISON

Coddling Yeltsin: The presidents share a toast in Moscow in 1994

42 NEWSWEEK JUNE 17, 1996

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Outside moves: Dole's
first task is to settle
nagging squabbles

POLITICS

Family Feuds

Citizen Dole must now unite a party divided by abortion, race and taxes

By HOWARD FINEMAN

BOB DOLE WASN'T FOLLOWING the script. Weeks ago, his campaign had privately settled on a strategy for handling abortion. The Republican platform would keep its strong pro-life plank but would add a "preambles" expressing tolerance for divergent views. Dole's aides had planned to announce the formula late this week, after Dole ended his first post-Senate "heartland tour" of the Midwest and South.

But speaking by satellite to ABC station
executives last Thursday, Dole let the cat
out of the bag—and it was a stray cat. “We
hope to have a plank in our platform that
will reach out to all Republicans,” he said,
confusing planks and preambles. In a sepa-

rate interview with Peter Jennings, Dole
said he wanted to keep existing platform
language, though he no longer supported a
human-life amendment—which is precise-
ly what the current plank calls for.

It's not easy to conduct delicate family
business in public. But after 35 years of leg-
islative horse trading, that's exactly what
Citizen Dole must do. In the old days, "uni-
fying the party" was something a politician
could pull off with quiet deals in a back
room. Now you have to do it yourself in the
echo chamber of the national media. There
is no room for ambiguity, uncertainty or er-
ror. Photo ops aren't enough. You need par-
ticulars to pacify skeptics in your own party
on issues as touchy as abortion, federal tax-
es and affirmative action. And you need to
overcome the mischief-making of your

foes—in this case a White House eager to
confuse the GOP base with conservative
appeals on crime, welfare and culture. Pri-
vately, Clinton spin doctors claimed to wel-
come demonstrations against him by gay
activists in San Francisco last week.

Which is why Dole's camp moved swiftly
after ABC called with word of the candi-
date's remarks. It was especially urgent
since Dole has never been comfortable
talking about abortion. So before newspa-
per deadlines, aides phoned reporters to
explain what the senator was proposing.
They faxed a carefully worded release,
drafted earlier, around Washington.

The phone-and-fax attack worked, for
now. President Clinton made the best of it,
playing to his base by noting that Dole still
supports "a constitutional amendment."

NEWSWEEK JUNE 17, 1996

PHOTOS BY DAVID HUME KENNERLY FOR NEWSWEEK

JUN 07 '96 09:53AM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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WRITER: DFRIED

FROM: RGUTMA; 06/06/96

FILE: KISSINGER-IN-NWK

REVISOR: RGUTMA; 06/06/96, 16:11

By Henry A. Kissinger

In the upcoming Russian election, attention has inevitably focused on the competition between President Boris Yeltsin and Communist Party leader Gennadi Zyuganov. But whatever the outcome, America's Russian policy requires an urgent reappraisal.

If Zyuganov wins, such a reassessment is inevitable. But a Yeltsin victory, too, would impose a new approach. For even under Yeltsin, Russia is likely to continue to challenge America by pursuing an increasingly assertive foreign policy, which already opposes American notions of world order in many parts of the world.

The Administration will then have no choice but to disenthrall itself from the flawed premises of its Russia policy: the conceptual misapprehension

KISSINGER

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of the nature of the Cold War and its overemphasis on personalities. Many of Clinton's generation hold the view that the United States has its own heavy responsibility for the Cold War, which they believe could have been avoided had the United States pursued a policy of reassurance rather than of confrontation toward the Soveit Union. As a result, Clinton's Russia policy has emphasized domestic reform and psychological engineering. It has concentrated on promoting internal change and on reassuring the Russian leadership rather than seeking to influence Russia's actions outside its borders.

Because Yeltsin is viewed as the guarantor of market economics, democracy, and peaceful international conduct, Clinton has attended more summits with him than he has with any other foreign leader and with a far greater show of personal warmth. Though the President has never visited Beijing or invited a Chinese leader to the White House, he has been to Moscow three times and has met with

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JUN-07-1996 10:53

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Yeltsin on American soil twice (in addition to meetings at the annual economic summits of industrialized nations). Yet despite these efforts, Yeltsin has embarked on foreign policies which differ only in degree from those urged by Zyuganov, perhaps to stave off the Communists --which have become the largest political party in Russia-- or perhaps acting on the basis of his own convictions.

DEPT:

PG:

The relationship between market economics and democracy--and between democracy and a peaceful foreign policy-- is not nearly so automatic as Washington has postulated. In Western Europe, the process of democratization took centuries and did not prevent a series of catastrophic wars. In Russia, which has no tradition of capitalism and participated neither in the Reformation, the Enlightenment and

-------- End of column --------

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domestic support by appeals to national-
ism.

DEPT:

PG:

Yeltsin himself is hardly cast in a
Jeffersonian mold. Nearly his entire adult
life has been devoted to serving the
Communist Party--a career to which the
gentle-hearted have rarely gravitated. In
his rise through its ranks, Yeltsin surely
had little exposure to pluralistic princi-
ples. And while he was courageous in
concluding that the moribund and ineffic-
cient Communist Party was doomed,
Yeltsin has shown few signs since that
democratic values, including acceptance
of dissent, are a central part of his value
system. In short, equating foreign policy
with Russian domestic politics has unnec-
essarily identified America in the minds
of too many Russians with the weird
Russian hybrid of black markets, reckless
speculation, outright criminal activity and
a state capitalism in which big industrial
combines are run by their erstwhile
Communist managers in the guise of pri-
vatization.

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JUN-07-1996 10:54

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JUN 07 '96 09:54AM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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DEPT:

PG:

This has enabled Russian nationalists
and Communists to claim that the entire
system is a fraud perpetrated by the West
to keep Russia weak. Failure to recognize
these realities has caused the
Administration to emphasize objectives
that require a long period of time to
evolve, and to neglect matters that need to
be shaped in the present.

Our reliance on Yeltsin has lured
us into endorsing, if not actually encour-
aging, such high-handed actions as the
military assault on the Russian Parliament
and the dismissal of the Russian Supreme
Court--acts difficult to reconcile with
democratic pretensions, whatever the
provocation. The assumption that Yeltsin
must be coddled explains why American
high officials, including the President,
justified Russian pressures on the newly
independent states of the Caucasus as
being comparable to American actions in
the Caribbean. It is presumably also why
they felt it reasonable to compare the
Russian military campaign in Chechnya
to the American Civil War.

KISSINGER

JUN-07-1996 10:54

99%

P. 10

["JUN 07 '96 09:54AM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION", "P.11", "KISSINGER", "DEPT:", "PG:", "The obsession with participating\nin Russian domestic politics undermines\nour ability to conduct a foreign policy\ngeared to the external conduct of the\nRussian state. Yet it is precisely the exter-\nnal actions of Russia that present the\ngreatest challenge to international stabili-\nty. And, paradoxically, the very domestic\ndrama of which we have made ourselves\ntoo much a party provides some of the\nincentive for Russian adventurism.", "Foreign policy has emerged as\nthe deus ex machina for Russia's elite to\nescape present-day frustrations by evok-\n--------- End of column ---------
ing visions of a glorious past. Russia has\nalways displayed a unique set of charac-\nteristics--especially when compared to its\nEuropean neighbors. Extending over nine\ntime zones, Russia (even in its present,\npost-Soviet form, contains the largest\nland-mass of any contemporary state. St.\nPetersburg is closer to New York than it is\nto Vladivostock, which is in turn closer to\nSeattle than it is to Moscow. A country of", "KISSINGER Page 6 of 14", "JUN-07-1996 10:54", "98%", "P.11"]

P.12

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that size ought not to suffer from claustro-
phobia. Yet creeping expansionism has
been the recurring theme of Russian histo-
ry. For four centuries, Russia has subordi-
nated the well-being of its own population
to this relentless outward thrust and
threatened all its neighbors with it. In the
Russian mind, the centuries of sacrifice
have been transmuted into a mission, part-
ly on behalf of security, partly in the ser-
vice of an alleged Russian superior moral-
ity.

DEPT:

PG:

In the 19th century, the Russian
nationalist writer Michael Katkov defined
the difference between Western and
Russian values as follows: "...everything
there is based on contractual relations and
everything here on faith. A basic dual
authority exists there; a single authority
here." Similarly, Zyuganov describes
Russia as a "special type of civilization"
based on "collectivism, unity, statehood"-
-as compared to the West, infected with
"extreme individualism, militant soulless-
ness, religious indifference, adherence to
mass culture."

KISSINGER

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DEPT:

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Russia and America have both historically asserted a global vocation for their societies. But while America's idealism derives from the concept of liberty, Russia's sprang from shared suffering and common submission to authority. Everyone is eligible to share in America's values; Russia's have been reserved for the Russian nation, excluding even the subject nationalities of the empire. American idealism tempts isolationism; Russia's has historically prompted adventure dom

In pursuit of security, Russia has produced insecurity for all its neighbors. Russia has generally excluded Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia from the operation of the balance of power, insisting on dealing with them unilaterally and often by force: in the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, in the prelude to the Crimean War in 1853, in the Balkan crisis of 1885 and in the period following the second World War. In

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Manchuria and Korea, prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, it followed a similar strategy. Even when it participated in European alliances, Russia tended to endow them with a missionary quality that justified permanent military intervention in the domestic affairs of other states—from the Holy Alliance of the early 19th century to the Brezhnev

--------- End of column ---------
Doctrine of the late 20th century.

Thus Yeltsin's "reformist" foreign minister, Koyzerev (since dismissed for being too liberal) put forward a Russian right of military intervention in all the countries containing Russian minorities. At a minimum, that includes 14 states of the former Soviet Union (including the Baltic states)—all of them recognized by the United Nations. Two Russian divisions are being maintained on the territory of Georgia, where Russian intervention in a civil war made that country ungovernable until Russian conditions were met. Russia's encouragement of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has given Moscow a voice in both coun-

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tries and blackmail potential over Azerbaijan's vast oil reserves. Russian troops participate in the civil war in Tajikistan. Russia refuses to demarcate the borders with Ukraine, a country with a population close to 60 million whose independence Russians seem particularly loath to accept. And Russia is pressuring the oil producing nations in Central Asia to export their oil only through pipelines running through Russia—claiming for Moscow a stranglehold on one of the largest oil reserves in the world. All this has happened under Yeltsin and at a moment of Russia's maximum weakness.

The long-term stakes are high. If Ukraine were to share the fate of Belarus and return to Russian satellite status, tremors would be felt all over Europe. A militarization of diplomacy would be nearly inevitable. A Russian stranglehold on Central Asian oil would provide dangerous blackmail potential during the predictable energy crises of the next century. Beyond the geopolitical challenges, Russia, in its attempt to regain what it perceives as ancient glories, appears inclined

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CYJ

Russia's simultaneous thrust in all directions runs the risk of repeating the underlying tragedy of its history: no people has sacrificed more for its vision of security and its sense of mission; none has received fewer tangible benefits from it, or has so often turned its fears into self-fulfilling prophecies. Both the tsarist and Communist empires collapsed, materially and spiritually exhausted by their overextension. The almost paranoid sense of insecurity is all the less appropriate in the present world, where Russia possesses 20,000 nuclear weapons, making a land attack on it almost inconceivable.

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to challenge the U.S. position in the
Middle East and to conduct adventurous
policies in Asia for no other purpose than
to augment its prestige.

Yeltsin has seemed to feel a
necessity to balance every high level
American visit with a move in a more
nationalist direction. Within days of
Clinton's visit to Moscow in 1993, Yeltsin
dismissed Gaidar, the reformer on whom
many American hopes had been based.
The Chechnya war started shortly after a
visit by Vice President Gore. And Clinton
had barely left Moscow in April when
Yeltsin betook himself to Beijing and
Shanghai, where he signed what had all
the appearance of a strategic partnership
with China—a maneuver facilitated by
the lack of direction in Washington's
China policy.

The United States has been far
too slow to recognize these challenges. It
is only in the last year that Ukraine has
received attention commensurate with its
political and strategic importance. In
Central Asia, American policy seems
unable to balance human rights concerns

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with a concept worthy of the geopolitical
importance of that region. In the

Caucasus, flagrant Soviet military or
near-military intervention has been met
with American silence or by American
statements seemingly legitimizing ancient
Russian imperial drives.

The most serious lack has been
of omission. During the Cold War,
America's Atlantic relations were built
from West to East, on the basis of a strong
Atlantic Alliance and an emerging
European Community. Clinton's post-
Cold War policy, influenced by the dog-
mas of the protest movement in which
NATO was regarded as a cause of interna-
tional tensions, seeks to build from East to
West. Focused on Russia, it has failed to
adapt the Atlantic Alliance to the post-
Cold War circumstances. It has offered no
vision of a political or economic partner-
ship in the North Atlantic region, or else
has consigned such prospects to bureau-
cratic studies that never seem to have a
deadline. This is even more true of NATO
expansion—a subject on which

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Administration ambivalence threatens to create a grey zone in Eastern Europe between Germany and Russia, potentially tempting historic Russian drives to create vacuum around its periphery.

Despite mounting evidence in the daily conduct of Russian diplomacy, Washington treats Yeltsin as if he were some tender shoot incapable of withstand-ing the gusts of a realistic foreign policy. This only encourages Russian leaders to compensate for frustrations at home by appeals to Russian nationalism. If we seek genuine reform in Russia, its leaders must be brought to understand that a return to historic drives will replicate the debacles of the past. For the strategic domination of its neighbors can be achieved only at the cost of permanent tensions with the United States and the West.

Such a policy should be based on a rededication to strengthening the Atlantic relationship. NATO expansion requires a decision not a study; its absence will tempt an even further thrust to expand Russia's strategic frontiers. (This is certainly the view of literally all the leaders

DEPT:

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of Eastern Europe.) Even more important, the Atlantic Alliance must deepen its political dimension and extend it to heretofore excluded subjects—Islamic fundamentalism, global energy supplies and other threats to world stability. Finally, the time has come to move the project of a North Atlantic Free Trade area from study committees to the action phase.

As part of such an architecture, Russia could be given an important role in the creation of the new international system. But this presupposes a Russian readiness, to stay within its borders. The challenge for America is whether it can assemble a proper balance of incentives and penalties conducive to maintaining such a world order. And this challenge exists whoever wins the Russian election, though it will be more complex after a Zyuganov victory. That is the kind of

------- End of column -------

reform America can—and should—hope to contribute to in the immediate future.

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FILE: KISSINGER-RGUTMA-PVT

REVISOR: RPRATT; 06/04/96, 13:42

By Henry A. Kissinger

During elections, it is normal for-

American attention to focus on candidates

In the upcoming Russian election, America's attention has been focused on the com-

Zyuganov. What is less normal is the

degree to which American policy toward-

Russia has also been based on personality.

policy requires an urgent reappraisal of the Russian

electors, this deformation of American

policy is bound to end.

If Zyuganov wins, a reappraisal of such a reassessment

impose would require a new approach. For even

the world

The Administration will then

KISSINGER

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from the flawed premises of its Russia policy: the conceptual misapprehension of the nature of the Cold War and its overemphasis on personalities. Many of Clinton's generation hold the view that the United States has its own heavy responsibility for the Cold War, which they believe could have been avoided had the United States pursued a policy of reassurance rather than of confrontation toward the Soveit Union. As a result, Clinton's Russia policy has emphasized domestic reform and psychological engineering. It has concentrated on promoting internal change and on reassuring the Russian leadership rather than seeking to influence Russia's actions outside its borders.

DEPT:

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JUN 04 '96 01:11PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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leader to the White House, he has been to Moscow three times and has met with Yeltsin on American soil twice. (in addition to meetings at the annual economic summits of industrialized nations). Yet despite these efforts Yeltsin has embarked on foreign policies which differ only in degree from those urged by Zyuganov, perhaps to stave off the Communists, -- which have become the largest political party in Russia-- or perhaps acting on the basis of his own convictions.

The relationship between market economics and democracy--and between democracy and a peaceful foreign policy-- is not nearly so automatic as Washington has postulated. In Western Europe, the process of democratization took centuries and did not prevent a series of catastrophic wars. In Russia which has no tradition of capitalism and participated neither in the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Age of Discovery, this evolution is likely to be particularly ragged. Indeed, the early stages of the process may pro-

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vide incentives for leaders to mobilize
domestic support by appeals to national-
ism.

DEPT:

PG:

Yeltsin himself is hardly cast in a
Jeffersonian mold. Nearly his entire adult
life has been devoted to serving the
Communist Party—a career to which the
gentle-hearted have rarely gravitated. In
his rise through its ranks, Yeltsin surely
had little exposure to pluralistic princi-
ples. And while he was courageous in
concluding that the moribund and ineffic-
cient Communist Party was doomed.
Yeltsin has shown few signs since that
democratic values, including acceptance
of dissent, are a central part of his value
system. In short, equating foreign policy
with Russian domestic politics has unnec-
essarily identified America in the minds
of too many Russians with the weird
Russian hybrid of black markets, reckless
speculation, outright criminal activity and
a state capitalism in which big industrial
combines are run by their erstwhile
Communist managers in the guise of pri-
vatization.

KISSINGER Page 4 of 15

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This has enabled Russian nationalists
and Communists to claim that the entire
system is a fraud perpetrated by the West
to keep Russia weak. Failure to recognize
these realities has caused the
Administartion to emphasize objectives
that require a long period of time to
evolve, and to neglect matters that need to
be shaped in the present.

DEPT:

PG:

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The obsession with participating in Russian domestic politics undermines our ability to conduct a foreign policy geared to the external conduct of the Russian state. yet it is precisely the external actions of Russia that present the greatest challenge to international stability. And, paradoxically, the very domestic drama of which we have made ourselves too much a party provides some of the incentive for Russian adventurism.

Foreign policy has emerged as the deus ex machina for Russia's elite to escape present-day frustrations by evoking visions of a glorious past. Russia has always displayed a unique set of characteristics—especially when compared to its European neighbors. Extending over nine time zones, Russia (even in its present, post-Soviet form contains the largest land-mass of any contemporary state. St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostock, which is in turn closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow. A country of

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In the 19th century, the Russian
nationalist writer Michael Katkov defined
the difference between Western and
Russian values as follows: "...everything
there is based on contractual relations and
everything here on faith.. A basic dual
authority exists there; a single authority
here." Similarly, Zyuganov describes
Russia as a "special type of civilization"
based on "collectivism, unity, statehood"-
as compared to the West, infected with
"extreme individualism, militant soulless-
ness, religious indifference, adherence to
mass culture."

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DEPT:

PG:

Russia and America have both historically asserted a global vocation for their societies. But while America's idealism derives from the concept of liberty, Russia's sprang from shared suffering and 'common submission to authority.

Russia's has historically prompted adventureist domination.

In pursuit of security, Russia has produced insecurity for all its neighbors. Russia has generally excluded Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia from the operation, of the balance of power, insisting on dealing with them unilaterally and often by force: in the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, in the prelude to the Crimean War in 1853, in the Balkan crisis of 1885 and in the period following the second World War. In

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Manchuria and Korea, prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, it followed a similar strategy. Even when it participated in European alliances, Russia tended to endow them with a missionary quality that justified permanent military intervention in the domestic affairs of other states—from the Holy Alliance of the ______ End of column ______

early 19th century to the Brezhnev Doctrine of the late 20th century.

Thus Yeltsin's "reformist" foreign minister, Koyzerev (since dismissed for being too liberal), put forward a Russian right of military intervention in all the countries containing Russian minorities. At a minimum, that includes 14 states of the former Soviet Union (including the Baltic states)—all of them recognized by the United Nations. Two Russian divisions are being maintained on the territory of Georgia, where Russian intervention in a civil war made that country ungovernable until Russian conditions were met. Russia's encouragement of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has given Moscow a voice in both coun-

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trics and blackmail potential
over Azerbaijan's vast oil reserves.

The long-term stakes are high. If
Ukraine were to share the fate of Belarus
and return to Russian satellite status,
tremors would be felt all over Europe. A
militarization of diplomacy would be
nearly inevitable. A Russian stranglehold
on Central Asian oil would provide dan-
gerous blackmail potential during the pre-
dictable energy crises of the next century.
Beyond the geopolitical challenges,
Russia, in its attempt to regain what it per-
ceives as ancient glories, appears inclined

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JUN 04 '96 01:13PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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Russian imperial drives.

Cold War policy, influenced by the dogmas of the protest movement in which

NATO was regarded as a cause of international tensions, seeks to build from East to West. Focused on Russia, it has failed to adapt the Atlantic Alliance to the post-

Cold War circumstances. It has offered no vision of a political or economic partnership in the North Atlantic region, or else has consigned such prospects to bureaucratic studies that never seem to have a

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Administration ambivalence threatens to create a grey zone in Eastern Europe between Germany and Russia, potentially tempting historic Russian drives to create vacuums around its periphery.

Such a policy should be based on a rededication to strengthening the Atlantic relationship. NATO expansion requires a decision not a study; its absence will tempt an even further thrust to expand Russia's strategic frontiers. (This is cer-

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JUN 04 96 01:15PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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tainly the view of literally all the leaders
of Eastern Europe.)

Even more important, the Atlantic
Alliance must deepen its political dimen-
sion and extend it to heretofore excluded
subjects—Islamic fundamentalism, glob-
al energy supplies and other threats to
world stability. Finally, the time has come
to move the project of a North Atlantic
Free Trade area from study committees to
the action phase.

As part of such an architecture,
Russia could be given an important role in
the creation of the new international sys-
tem. But this presupposes as a Russian
contribution a readiness. to stay within its
borders. The challenge for America is
whether it can assemble a proper balance
of incentives and penalties conducive to
maintaining such a world order. And this
challenge exists whoever wins the
Russian election, though it will be more

complex after a Zyuganov victory. That is
the kind of reform America can—and
should—hope to contribute to in the
immediate future.

- The end -
14

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By Henry A. Kissinger

During elections, it is normal for American attention to focus on candidates in the upcoming Russian vote on the competition between President Boris Yeltsin and Communist Party leader Gennadi Zyuganov. What is less normal is the degree to which American policy toward Russia has also been based on personality. Whatever the outcome of the Russian elections, this deformation of American policy is bound to end.

If Zyuganov wins, a reappraisal is inevitable. But a Yeltsin victory, too, would require a new approach. For even under Yeltsin, Russia is likely to continue to challenge America by pursuing an increasingly assertive foreign policy, which already opposes American notions of world order in many parts of the world

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the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Age of Discovery, this evolution is likely to be particularly ragged. Indeed, the early stages of the process may pro-

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Foreign policy has emerged as the deus ex machina for Russia's elite to escape present-day frustrations by evoking visions of a glorious past. Russia has always displayed a unique set of characteristics—especially when compared to its European neighbors. Extending over nine time zones, Russia (even in its present, post-Soviet form) contains the largest land-mass of any contemporary state. St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostock, which is in turn closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow. A country of

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Russia and America have both historically asserted a global vocation for their societies. But while America's idealism derives from the concept of liberty, Russia's sprang from shared suffering and 'scommon submission to authority. Everyone is eligible to share in America's values; Russia's have been reserved for the Russian nation, excluding even the subject nationalities of the empire. American idealism tempts isolationism; Russia's has historically prompted adventurist domination.

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JUN 04 '96 01:15PM EDITORIAL HUMANISATION

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----- End of column -----

The most serious lack has been of omission. During the Cold War, America's Atlantic relations were built from West to East, on the basis of a strong Atlantic Alliance and an emerging European Community. Clinton's post-Cold War policy, influenced by the dogmas of the protest movement in which NATO was regarded as a cause of international tensions, seeks to build from East to West. Focused on Russia, it has failed to adapt the Atlantic Alliance to the post-Cold War circumstances. It has offered no vision of a political or economic partnership in the North Atlantic region, or else has consigned such prospects to bureaucratic studies that never seem to have a deadline. This is even more true of NATO expansion—a subject on which

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--------- End of column ---------
complex after a Zyuganov victory. That is
the kind of reform America can—and
should—hope to contribute to in the
immediate future.

- The end -
14

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PRINTED BY: MWHITA; 05/30/96, 3:14 PM

WRITER: DFRIED

FROM: MWHITA; 05/30/96

FILE: KISSINGER-MWHITA-NWK

REVISOR: MWHITA; 05/30/96, 13:43

By Henry A. Kissinger

During elections, it is normal for
American attention to focus on candi-
dates Not surprisingly in the upcoming

vote
Russian election most reporting has been
on
President
directed at the competition between Boris

Yeltsin and Communist Party leader
Gennadi Zyuganov. What is less normal is
the degree to which American policy
toward Russia has also been based on per-
sonality. Whatever the outcome of the
deformation
Russian elections, this is one of American
policy is bound to end.

a reappraisal
If Zyuganov wins, this is
But
inevitable. What is less obvious is that a
Yeltsin victory, too, would require a new approach.

For even is likely to
praised. Even under Yeltsin, Russia will

continue to challenge America by pursu-
ing an increasingly assertive foreign poli-
cy, which already opposes signs of resisting

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policy: the overemphasis on personalities

and its conceptual misapprehension of the nature of the
and its overemphasis on personalities.

Cold War, Many of Clinton's generation

hold the view that the United States has its
own heavy responsibility for the Cold
War, which they believe could have been
avoided had the United States pursued a
policy of reassurance rather than of con-
frontation toward the Soviet Union. As a
result, Clinton's Russia policy has empha-
sized domestic reform and psychological
engineering. It has concentrated on pro-
moting internal change and on reassuring
the Russian leadership rather than seeking
to influence Russia's actions outside its
borders.

Because Yeltsin is viewed as the
guarantor of market economics, democra-
cy, and peaceful international conduct,
Clinton has attended more summits with
him than he has with any other foreign
leader and with a far greater show of per-
sonal warmth. Though the President has
never visited Beijing or invited a Chinese
leader to the White House, he has been to
Moscow three times and has met with
Yeltsin on American soil twice, despite
these

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Yeltsin has embarked on
efforts have not prevented the Communist
foreign policies which differ only
Party from becoming the largest single
in degree from those urged by
party in Russia or from fielding a major

Zyuganov, perhaps
challenge to Yeltsin's rule to stave off

—which have become the largest political party in Russia—the Communists, or perhaps acting on the
basis of his own convictions, Yeltsin has—
embarked on foreign policies which differ—
only in degree from those urged by—

Zyuganov—

This has happened because The
relationship between market economics
and democracy—and between democracy
and a peaceful foreign policy—is not
nearly so automatic as Washington has
postulated. In Western Europe, the
process of democratization took several
centuries
generations and did not prevent a series of

catastrophic wars. Indeed, the early stages
—the process may
of market economics and democratization
have often provided incentives for leaders
to mobilize domestic support by appeals
to nationalism. Failure to recognize these—
— End of column —
historical experiences has caused the
Administration to emphasize change that
requires a long period of time to evolve.—

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and to neglect matters that can be shaped—in the present:

Yeltsin himself is hardly cast in a
Jeffersonian mold. Nearly his entire adult
life has been devoted to serving the
Communist Party—a career to which the
gentle-hearted have rarely gravitated. In
his rise through its ranks, Yeltsin surely
had little exposure to pluralistic princi-
ples. And while he was courageous in
concluding that the moribund and ineffi-
cient Communist Party was doomed,
Yeltsin has shown few signs since that
democratic values, including acceptance
of dissent, are a central part of his value
system.

In short, democracy in Russia is an ongoing drama whose evolution has far from played itself out. Yet American foreign policy has been conducted as if a mature, Western-style democracy was

In short, already nearly in place, Equating foreign policy with Russian domestic politics has gravely mortgaged long-term Russian-American relations. It has unnecessarily identified America in the minds of too many Russians with the dislocations and

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suffering inseparable from the transition
from state planning to market economies.

the entire system
thus claim that market economies is a
fraud perpetrated by the West to keep

Our reliance on Yeltsin has lured us into endorsing, if not actually encouraging, such high-handed actions as the military assault on the Russian Parliament and the dismissal of the Russian Supreme Court— acts difficult to reconcile with democratic pretensions, whatever the provocation. The assumption that Yeltsin must be coddled explains why American high officials, including the President, justified Russian pressures on the newly independent states of the Caucasus as being comparable to American actions in the Caribbean. It is presumably also why they felt it reasonable to compare the Russian military campaign in Chechnya to the American Civil War.

There is no foreign policy-
requirement obliging the White House to-
comment on every Russian internal crisis.
Indeed, The obsession with participating in

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Foreign policy has emerged as the deity ex machina for Russia's elite to escape present-day frustrations by evoking visions of a glorious past. Russia has always displayed a unique set of characteristics—especially when compared to ______ End of column ______
its European neighbors. Extending over nine time zones, Russia (even in its present, post-Soviet form) contains the largest land-mass of any contemporary state. St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, which is in turn closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow. A country of that size ought not to suffer from claustrophobia. Yet creeping expansionism in the name of security has been

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For four centuries, Russia has subordinat-
ed the well-being of its own population to
this relentless outward thrust and threat-
ened all its neighbors with it. In the
Russian mind, the centuries of sacrifice
have been transmuted into a mission, part-
ly on behalf of security, partly in the ser-
vice of an alleged Russian superior moral-
ity.

Insert

Russia and America have both
historically asserted a global vocation for
their societies. But while America's ideal-
ism derives from the concept of liberty,
Russia's sprang from shared suffering and
common submission to authority.
Everyone is eligible to share in America's
values; Russia's have been reserved for
the Russian nation, excluding even the
subject nationalities of the empire.
American idealism tempts isolationism;
Russia's has historically prompted adven-
turist domination.

In pursuit of security, Russia has
produced insecurity for all its neighbors.
In the West, Russia has historically come
up against the European balance of power.

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In the 19th century, the Russian nationalist writer Michael Kothov defined the difference between Western and Russian values as follows: "...everything there is based on contractual relations and everything here on faith... A basic dual authority, exists there; a single authority here." Similarly, Zyuganov describes Russia as a "special type of civilization" based on "collectivism, unity, statehood" -as compared to the West, infected with "extreme individualism, militant soullessness, religious indifference, adherence to mass culture."

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But even when paying lip service to its requirements, Russia has generally Eastern Europe, excluded the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia from its operation, insisting on dealing with them unilaterally and often by force: in the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, in the prelude to the Crimean War in 1853, in the Balkan crisis of 1885 and in the prelude to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Even when it participated in European alliances, Russia tended to endow them with a missionary quality that justified permanent military intervention in the domestic affairs of other states—from the Holy Alliance of the early 19th century to the Brezhnev Doctrine of the late 20th century.

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Russian divisions are being maintained on
the territory of Georgia, where Russian
intervention in a civil war made that coun-
try ungovernable until Russian conditions
were met. Russia's encouragement of the
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia
has given Moscow a voice in both coun-
tries and blackmail potential
over Azerbaijan's vast oil reserves.

Russian troops participate in the civil war
in Tajkistan. Russia refuses to demarcate
the borders with Ukraine, a country with a
population close to 60 million whose
independence Russians seem particularly
loath to accept. And Russia is pressuring
the oil producing nations in Central Asia
to export their oil only through pipelines
running through Russia—claiming for
Moscow a stranglehold on one of the
largest oil reserves in the world.

All this has happened under

Yeltsin and at a moment of Russia's maxi-
mum weakness. To paraphrase what—
Churchill said about Soviet actions in the-
immediate postwar period: "If they act—

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like this in the green wood, what will they
do when the trees are fully grown?

The long-term stakes are indeed—

high. If Ukraine were to share the fate of
Belarus and return to Russian satellite sta-
tus, tremors would be felt all over Europe.
A militarization of diplomacy would be
nearly inevitable. A Russian stranglehold
on Central Asian oil would provide dan-
gerous blackmail potential during the pre-
dictable energy crises of the next century.
Beyond the geopolitical challenges,
Russia, in its attempt to regain what it per-
ceives as ancient glories, appears inclined
to challenge the U.S. position in the
Middle East and to conduct adventurous
policies in Asia for no other purpose than
to augment its prestige.

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The United States has been far
too slow to recognize these challenges. It is
only in the last year that Ukraine has
received attention commensurate with its
political and strategic importance. In
Central Asia, American policy seems
unable to balance human rights concerns
with a concept worthy of the geopolitical
importance of that region. In the
Caucasus, flagrant Soviet military or
near-military intervention has been met
with American silence or by American
statements seemingly legitimizing ancient
Russian imperial drives.

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Cold War policy, influenced by the dogmas of the protest movement in which NATO was regarded as a cause of interna- tional tensions, seeks to build from East to West. Focused on Russia, it has failed to adapt the Atlantic Alliance to the post-Cold War circumstances. It has offered no vision of a political or economic partner- ship in the North Atlantic region, or else has consigned such prospects to bureau- cratic studies that never seem to have a

deadline. This is even more true of NATO expansion—a subject on which Administration ambivalence threatens to create a grey zone in Eastern Europe, potentially tempting historic Russian dri- ves to create vacuums around its periph- ery.

Despite mounting evidence in the daily conduct of Russian diplomacy, Washington treats Yeltsin as if he were some tender shoot incapable of withstand- ing the gusts of a realistic foreign policy. This only encourages Russian leaders to compensate for frustrations at home by

appeals to relying on Russian nationalism, to help-

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keep the society together. If we seek gen-
une reform in Russia, its leaders must be
brought to understand that a return to his-
toric drives will replicate the debacles of
the past. For the strategic domination of
its neighbors can be achieved only at the
cost of permanent tensions with the
United States and the West.

Such a policy requires a rededication to strengthening the Atlantic relationship. NATO expansion is imperative, its absence will tempt an even further thrust to expand Russia's strategic frontiers. (This is certainly the view of literally all the leaders of Eastern Europe.) Even more important, the Atlantic Alliance must deepen its political dimension and extend to heretofore excluded subjects—Islamic fundamentalism, global energy supplies and other threats to world stability. Finally, the time has come to move the project of a North Atlantic Free Trade area from study committees to the action phase.

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as a Russian contribution a readiness tem. But this presupposes a major change

in Russia's attitudes. It must be prepared
to stay within its borders. The challenge
for America is whether it can assemble a
proper balance of incentives and penalties
conducive to maintaining such a world
order. And this challenge exists whoever
wins the Russian election, though it will
be more complex after a Zyuganov victo-
ry. That is the kind of reform America
can—and should—hope to contribute to
in the immediate future.

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Yeltsin has embarked on efforts have not prevented the Communist foreign policies which differ only Party from becoming the largest single in degree from those urged by party in Russia or from fielding a major Z yuganov, perhaps challenge to Yeltsin's rule, to stave off

-which have become the largest political party in Russia-
the Communists, or perhaps acting on the
basis of his own convictions. Yeltsin has-
embarked on foreign policies which differ-
only in degree from those urged by-
Zyuganov.

This has happened because The relationship between market economics and democracy—and between democracy and a peaceful foreign policy—is not nearly so automatic as Washington has postulated. In Western Europe, the process of democratization took several centuries, and did not prevent a series of

catastrophic wars. Indeed, the early stages
the process may
of market economies and democratization
have often provided incentives for leaders
to mobilize domestic support by appeals
to nationalism. Failure to recognize these
-------- End of column --------

historical experiences has caused the
Administration to emphasize change that
requires a long period of time to evolve,

In Russia which has no tradition
of capitalism and participated
neither in the Reformation, the
Enlightenement and the Age of
Discovery, this evolution is likely
to be particularly ragged.

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and to neglect matters that can be shaped-
in the present.

In short, democracy in Russia is-
an ongoing drama whose evolution has far
from played itself out. Yet American for-
eign policy has been conducted as if a
mature, Western-style democracy was
already nearly in place, equating foreign
policy with Russian domestic politics has
gravely mortgaged long-term Russian-
American relations. It has unnecessarily
identified America in the minds of too
many Russians with the dislocations and-

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This has enabled

Russian nationalists and Communists can-
thus claim that the entire system
market economies is a

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Foreign policy has emerged as the deity ex machina for Russia's elite to escape present-day frustrations by evoking visions of a glorious past. Russia has always displayed a unique set of characteristics—especially when compared to — End of column — its European neighbors. Extending over nine time zones, Russia (even in its present, post-Soviet form) contains the largest land-mass of any contemporary state. St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, which is in turn closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow. A country of that size ought not to suffer from claustrophobia. Yet creeping expansionism in the name of security has been

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Insert

American idealism tempts isolationism; Russia's has historically prompted adventurer domination.

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But even when paying lip service to its requirements, Russia has generally Eastern Europe, excluded the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the balance of power, Central Asia from its operation, insisting on dealing with them unilaterally and often by force: in the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, in the prelude to the Crimean War in 1853, in the Balkan crisis of 1885 and in period following the second World War, in Manchuria and Korea, prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, it followed a similar strategy.

Even when it participated in 1904 in European alliances, Russia tended to endow them with a missionary quality that justified permanent military intervention in the domestic affairs of other states—from the Holy Alliance of the early 19th century to the Brezhnev Doctrine of the late 20th century.

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Russian divisions are being maintained on the territory of Georgia, where Russian intervention in a civil war made that country ungovernable until Russian conditions were met. Russia's encouragement of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has given Moscow a voice in both countries and blackmail potential over Azerbaijan's vast oil reserves.

Russian troops participate in the civil war in Tajkistan. Russia refuses to demarcate the borders with Ukraine, a country with a population close to 60 million whose independence Russians seem particularly loath to accept. And Russia is pressuring the oil producing nations in Central Asia to export their oil only through pipelines running through Russia—claiming for Moscow a stranglehold on one of the largest oil reserves in the world. No H

No H

All this has happened under

Yeltsin and at a moment of Russia's maximum weakness. To paraphrase what Churchill said about Soviet actions in the immediate postwar period: "If they act-

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like this in the green wood what will they
do when the trees are fully grown?"

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appeals to reliability on Russian nationalism, to help-

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Such a policy requires a rededication to strengthening the Atlantic relationship. NATO expansion is imperative; its absence will tempt an even further thrust to expand Russia's strategic frontiers. (This is certainly the view of literally all the leaders of Eastern Europe.)

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to stay within its borders. The challenge
for America is whether it can assemble a
proper balance of incentives and penalties
conducive to maintaining such a world
order. And this challenge exists whoever
wins the Russian election, though it will
be more complex after a Zyuganov victo-
ry. That is the kind of reform America
can—and should—hope to contribute to
in the immediate future.

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Newsweek

251 West 57th Street | New York | N.Y. | 10019-1894

Mark Whitaker
Managing Editor

(212) 445-4497
Fax: (212) 445-5146
e-mail: mwhita@nwnet.newsweek.com

Subject: Opinion - not study.

May 30, 1996

Orderly moves - please check for updates

Dear Henry,

This is a terrific piece. It was so well written, in fact, that I've only made a few minor changes in the text. I did, however, make a few significant cuts, both to get it closer to the likely linecount, and also to keep the argument more tightly focused. In practice, that meant losing most of the historical analysis of Russia's resistance to democracy. I thought that was interesting, but a little beside the point of your main argument--that U.S. foreign policy should be geared to restraining Russia's external behavior.

I'm still not sure what the final length would be, but this is probably close. So if you want to reinstate anything, or add additional material, please try to see if you can make commensurate cuts.

The package is now scheduled to close next week, so feel free to take the weekend to tinker. I'll expect any revisions next Tuesday or Wednesday.

Thanks, and congratulations again on a very timely and provocative piece.

Cheers,

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue, 26th floor
New York, New York 10022-6022

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policy: the overemphasis on personalities and its conceptual misapprehension of the nature of the Cold War. Many of Clinton's generation hold the view that the United States has its own heavy responsibility for the Cold War, which they believe could have been avoided had the United States pursued a policy of reassurance rather than of confrontation toward the Soviet Union. As a result, Clinton's Russia policy has emphasized domestic reform and psychological engineering. It has concentrated on promoting internal change and on reassuring the Russian leadership rather than seeking to influence Russia's actions outside its borders.

Because Yeltsin is viewed as the guarantor of market economics, democracy, and peaceful international conduct, Clinton has attended more summits with him than he has with any other foreign leader and with a far greater show of personal warmth. Though the President has never visited Beijing or invited a Chinese leader to the White House, he has been to Moscow three times and has met with Yeltsin on American soil twice. Yet these

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efforts have not prevented the Communist Party from becoming the largest single party in Russia or from fielding a major challenge to Yeltsin's rule. To stave off the Communists, or perhaps acting on the basis of his own convictions, Yeltsin has embarked on foreign policies which differ only in degree from those urged by Zyuganov.

This has happened because the relationship between market economics and democracy—and between democracy and a peaceful foreign policy—is not nearly so automatic as Washington has postulated. In Western Europe, the process of democratization took several generations and did not prevent a series of catastrophic wars. Indeed, the early stages of the process of market economics and democratization may have often provided incentives for leaders to mobilize domestic support by appeals to nationalism. Failure to recognize these

---------- End of column ----------

realistic historical experiences has caused the

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and to neglect matters that can be shaped
in the present.

1/5

Yeltsin himself is hardly cast in a
Jeffersonian mold. Nearly his entire
life has been devoted to serving the
Communist Party—a career to which the
gentle-hearted have rarely gravitated. In
his rise through its ranks, Yeltsin surely
had little exposure to pluralistic princi-
ples. And while he was courageous in
concluding that the moribund and ineffi-
cient Communist Party was doomed,
Yeltsin has shown few signs since that
democratic values, including acceptance
of dissent, are a central part of his value
system.

In short, democracy in Russia is
an ongoing drama whose evolution has far
from played itself out. Yet American for-
ign policy has been conducted as if a
mature, Western-style democracy was
already nearly in place. Equating foreign
policy with Russian domestic politics has
gravely mortgaged long-term Russian-
American relations. It has unnecessarily
identified America in the minds of too
many Russians with the dislocations and

industrial

lives, timbines, are run
by this erudite Communist
mammoth in his form of pumpkins

inhabit

of
Russian Lyubard plasticity in mind to
black markets, seekles speculation

and are brought to
state capital in new

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from state planning to market economics.

Russia weak.

us into endorsing, if not actually encour-
aging, such high-handed actions as the
military assault on the Russian Parliament
and the dismissal of the Russian Supreme
Court— acts difficult to reconcile with
democratic pretensions, whatever the
provocation. The assumption that Yeltsin
must be coddled explains why American
high officials, including the President,
justified Russian pressures on the newly
independent states of the Caucasus as
being comparable to American actions in
the Caribbean. It is presumably also why
they felt it reasonable to compare the
Russian military campaign in Chechnya
to the American Civil War.

There is no foreign policy

Indeed, the obsession with participating in

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writer Michael Katkov defined the difference between
Western and Russian values as follows: "...everything
there is based on contractual relations and everything
here on faith.... A basic dual authority exists there;
a single authority here." Similarly, Zyuganov
describes Russia as a "special type of civilization"
based on "collectivism, unity, statehood and the
aspiration to achieve the highest ideal of good and
justice" - as compared to the West, infected with
"extreme individualism, militant soullessness,
religious indifference, adherence to mass culture."

In 1864, Chancellor Aleksandr Gorchakov wrote with
respect to Central Asia that: "...the interests of
border security and trade relations always require the
more civilized state to have a certain authority over
its neighbors.... where the greatest difficulty is in

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the recurring theme of Russian history.
For four centuries, Russia has subordinat-
ed the well-being of its own population to
this relentless outward thrust and threat-
ened all its neighbors with it. In the
Russian mind, the centuries of sacrifice
have been transmuted into a mission, part-
ly on behalf of security, partly in the ser-
vice of an alleged Russian superior moral-
ity.

bren wden
In the West Russia has historically come
up against the European balance of power

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All this has happened under
Yeltsin and at a moment of Russia's maxi-
mum weakness. To paraphrase what
Churchill said about Soviet actions in the
immediate postwar period: "If they act

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like this in the green wood, what will they
do when the trees are fully grown?"

The long-term stakes are indeed high. If Ukraine were to share the fate of Belarus and return to Russian satellite status, tremors would be felt all over Europe. A militarization of diplomacy would be nearly inevitable. A Russian stranglehold on Central Asian oil would provide dangerous blackmail potential during the predictable energy crises of the next century. Beyond the geopolitical challenges, Russia, in its attempt to regain what it perceives as ancient glories, appears inclined to challenge the U.S. position in the Middle East and to conduct adventurous policies in Asia for no other purpose than to augment its prestige.

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The United States has been far
too slow to recognize these dangers. It is
only in the last year that Ukraine has
received attention commensurate with its
political and strategic importance. In
Central Asia, American policy seems
unable to balance human rights concerns
with a concept worthy of the geopolitical
importance of that region. In the
Caucasus, flagrant Soviet military or
near-military intervention has been met
with American silence or by American
statements seemingly legitimizing ancient
Russian imperial drives.

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Cold War policy, influenced by the dogmas of the protest movement in which NATO was regarded as a cause of international tensions, seeks to build from East to West. Focused on Russia, it has failed to adapt the Atlantic Alliance to the post-Cold War circumstances. It has offered no vision of a political or economic partnership in the North Atlantic region, or else has consigned such prospects to bureaucratic studies that never seem to have a terminal point. This is even more true of NATO expansion—a subject on which Administration ambivalence threatens to create a grey zone in Eastern Europe, potentially tempting historic Russian drives to create vacuums around its periphery.

Despite mounting evidence in the daily conduct of Russian diplomacy, Washington treats Yeltsin as if he were some tender shoot incapable of withstanding the gusts of a realistic foreign policy. This only encourages Russian leaders to compensate for frustrations at home by relying on Russian nationalism to help

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tem. But this presupposes a major change in Russia's attitudes. It must be prepared to stay within its borders. The challenge for America is whether it can assemble a proper balance of incentives and penalties conducive to maintaining such a world order. And this challenge exists whoever wins the Russian election, though it will be more complex after a Zyuganov victory. That is the kind of reform America can—and should—hope to contribute to in the immediate future.

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Newsweek

Mark Whitaker
Managing Editor

May 30, 1996

Dear Henry,

Cheers,

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FROM: MWHITA; 05/30/96

FILE: KISSINGER-MWHITA-NWK

By Henry A. Kissinger

During elections, it is normal for American attention to focus on candidates. Not surprisingly, in the upcoming Russian election most reporting has been directed at the competition between Boris Yeltsin and Communist Party leader Gennadi Zyuganov. What is less normal is the degree to which American policy toward Russia has also been based on personality. Whatever the outcome of the Russian elections, this quirk of American policy is bound to end.

If Zyuganov wins, this is inevitable. What is less obvious is that a Yeltsin victory, too, would force a reappraisal. Even under Yeltsin, Russia will continue to challenge America by pursuing an increasingly assertive foreign policy, which already shows signs of resisting American notions of world order.

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policy: the overemphasis on personalities and its conceptual misapprehension of the Cold War. Many of Clinton's generation hold the view that the United States has its own heavy responsibility for the Cold War, which they believe could have been avoided had the United States pursued a policy of reassurance rather than of confrontation toward the Soviet Union. As a result, Clinton's Russia policy has emphasized domestic reform and psychological engineering. It has concentrated on promoting internal change and on reassuring the Russian leadership rather than seeking to influence Russia's actions outside its borders.

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This has happened because the
relationship between market economics
and democracy—and between democracy
and a peaceful foreign policy—is not
nearly so automatic as Washington has
postulated. In Western Europe, the
process of democratization took several
generations and did not prevent a series of
catastrophic wars. Indeed, the early stages
of market economics and democratization
have often provided incentives for leaders
to mobilize domestic support by appeals
to nationalism. Failure to recognize these
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