PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 2, 1975

#59

No. 312

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

SALZBURG, AUSTRIA

JUNE 2, 1975

**MR. NESSEN:** The two Presidents, of course, have given you their views of the meetings they held here. A number of you have asked for elaboration and further explanation of some of the points, so the Secretary of State has come down to do that.

After Dr. Kissinger has talked to you I will have perhaps three or four items in the way of schedule announcements to make.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I need hardly say how much I have been looking forward to an opportunity to have the press conference in Salzburg. (Laughter) I have been rehearsing for it for a year.

The two Presidents have really stated their positions, and there is nothing I could add to those, but I thought it might be helpful to answer some questions. So within the limit -- yes?

**QUESTION:** Can you give us your reaction to the decision by the Israelis to thin out their forces east of the Canal, please?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The question is to give my reaction to the decision of the Israelis to thin out their forces east of the Canal.

We think that that is a constructive move. It has clearly the intention of easing possible Egyptian concerns about Israeli artillery in range of the Canal, and while not decisive on no unilateral step can be a decisive step at this point, I think it is a helpful contribution to the process which the United States is strongly attempting to encourage in which both parties should make an effort to move towards peace.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how long have you known about this Israeli decision?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we have talked about this Israeli decision -- I mean, about this concept or about a concept like this -- previously. The actual decision we learned about this morning.

Yes?

**QUESTION:** Did the Egyptians indicate there was any change in their negotiating position since last March? And if there was, was there enough to encourage a resumption of a negotiation with Israel on a partial agreement?

For further information contact:

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The purpose of these talks was not for the two heads of State to get into detailed negotiations on the issues of peace in the Middle East or on the issues of an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel. As I pointed out to a number of you previously, the intention of this meeting was to permit the two leaders an opportunity to look over all the various roads to peace that have so far been identified in the Middle East and to see which of them might be more promising or how to pursue those that were available.

I think the discussion proceeded from the assumption that if progress towards peace is to be made all parties must make a contribution, and in that sense I thought there was a positive spirit. It is too early to tell whether it permits a resumption of any particular negotiation because we must now talk to the Israeli Prime Minister and see whether his ideas coincide with those we have heard from the Egyptian President or whether there should be perhaps some American suggestions.

But the atmosphere was constructive; the attitude was constructive. And together with the Israeli move that was made today perhaps we are moving into a period where some momentum can be put behind peace efforts again.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate Egypt making some parallel confidence-building moves? And also, does the shift of Syrian forces to the Iraqi front have any bearing or depend in any way to signal Syrian interests in a peace effort with Israel?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I believe that, of course, whether Egypt will make some response, it is too early to say. But in general, the Israeli announcement, as I understood it, was intended as a response to the Egyptian opening of the Suez Canal despite the suspension of the negotiations in March. So that maybe that concludes the sequence of moves.

We have no confirmed reports about the shift of Syrian forces away from the Israeli frontier but it is very possible that if it did take place it is caused by reasons unrelated to the settlement issue, though it could have an effect on the settlement.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could you be a little more precise on what form an American policy statement will now take after you have conferred with the Israeli Prime Minister? Will it be a general statement or will you lay out a specific set of recommendations?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, as you know, we have always been reluctant to make specific recommendations unless we felt the parties were sufficiently close for these recommendations, to bridge the gap. Certainly, the President will state his general views at some point after he has talked to the parties concerned. Whether he will make any specific proposals will really depend on how close he judges the parties to be.

Murray?

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, that certainly was not a very happy, exhilarated looking group in the courtyard today. The two Presidents and those of you who were standing with him did not exactly -- did not by any means look like it had lived up in any way to President Sadat's talk of a bit meeting marking a historic moment.

Can you say whether from your perception the Egyptian leaders had much higher expectations which could not be fulfilled because of the American timetable?

And secondly, can you tell us whether the deadline of the expiration of the mandate in the Sinai is pressing with any urgency on your considerations?

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As I understood Mr. Marder's conclusions, I don't --
If he formed the impression that this was not a happy, exhilarated group
that he saw standing in the courtyard at the Residence -- that is the
name of the place -- and he wondered whether the expiration of the mandate
in the Sinai might have been pressing on the consciousness of the
unexhilarated group that was standing there.

If I can be frank and not be offensive to you ladies and gentlemen, you
didn't look like a pretty exhilarated group to me, either. (Laughter)
It could be that the atmospheric conditions had something to do with it
because, I don't know how you show exhilaration when somebody holds an
umbrella over you and rain is pouring down on your back. But I am
just beginning my lecture.

Basically, we thought it was a very constructive meeting. It was not
intended to reach any specific conclusions -- and it achieved that
purpose. It was not intended to reach any precise conclusions that would
lead to an immediate negotiation. It was, however, very positive, very
constructive, and I think it provides the basis for useful talks with
the Israelis. And I really think, Murray, that your impression was
just not right.

The second part of your question was whether the imminence of the UNEF
expiration was weighing on the leaders. I don't think it played any role
in the discussions. It was never involved; it was never mentioned by
either side. But I really want to go back to the first point.

It was not an occasion in which you could say a conclusion -- a final
conclusion -- was reached, but I think the possibility exists for con-
structive further discussions with other parties.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, did President Ford promise President Sadat an American aid program at least as large as last year's? Was there talk or was there agreement reached on American participation in an international consortium that could help the economic development of Egypt?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. The question is: Did the United States promise aid at least as large as last year's and did the United States promise participation in an international consortium on Egypt's long-term economic progress?

With respect to the first question, the final decisions on American aid
figures to Middle East countries will be reached after the conclusion
of the general reassessment. But it is clear that we will retain an
interest -- as the President made clear in his luncheon toast -- in the
economic development and progress of Egypt, and it is our intention to
make a substantial contribution to that, but what the precise figure is
we will have to wait until the general decisions are made.

With respect to the idea on the long-term program, I think the word "consortium" is probably exaggerated, but we have indicated to a number of other countries that we favor assistance to Egypt for its long-term economic problems.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, to what extent do you feel there was a similarity of views between the two Presidents on what should constitute the basis of an overall settlement?

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We did not go into a discussion of the details of a final settlement. We discussed, rather, what approaches would be used if a final -- if that were the road that all parties decided they prefer to take, and how the discussions might be conducted. Of course, we are familiar with the Egyptian point of view on these matters -- which has been stated repeatedly and publicly -- but we have not taken any position on -- we have not taken a formal American position; for that matter, we have not taken an American position on an overall settlement.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the Egyptian spokesman here yesterday seemed to give short shrift to your shuttle diplomacy, and step-by-step seems to be landing in the ash can. Did you have any consensus with Sadat -- before, have any consensus with Sadat on the one promising rule -- you know, the approach to this problem?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The question is: The impression was created by the Egyptian spokesman yesterday that Egypt was not interested any longer in a step-by-step approach.

**QUESTION:** For a prolonged period.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course, for a long period -- and that this seems to have given short shrift to one of the promising avenues.

Let me make clear, the United States is not pushing any one approach. As both the President and I have stated repeatedly, we are prepared to go to a Geneva Conference and we are prepared to discuss in that framework. At the same time, our conviction is that whatever approach is most promising should be pursued; and therefore, if other avenues open up we are prepared to pursue them.

I did not have the impression from the talks that any avenue was excluded or that there was any strong preference for one approach rather than another. There was a preference on which both parties agreed that some progress towards peace in the Middle East was essential. We do not want to commit ourselves to which of the approaches is the more likely to succeed until we have heard the Israeli views on that subject.

But I did not have the impression that the Egyptian side precluded any of the approaches.

**QUESTION:** Will you have a meeting of minds?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We cannot have a meeting of minds until we have heard from the Israelis.

**QUESTION:** Well, I mean meeting of minds between U. S. and Egypt?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think that we clearly understand the Egyptian view of what is in their view, what are the elements of an interim agreement, and also the Egyptian view of the procedures and content of an overall agreement. Now we have to get the Israeli views on this subject and then we can see how closely they mesh; and of course, as we have stated with respect to the interim agreement, both sides will have to look at their positions compared to what they were at the end of March, if one wants to get movement.

**QUESTION:** Before this meeting began, a senior American official said that there probably would be no announcements. He also said that would not mean an important decision was not reached. Are you now telling us that there was no important development here?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I am trying to tell you that on the whole we are encouraged by these talks, in defense that we believe that serious discussions can be continued now on the issue of moving towards peace.

I have stated previously -- and so did the senior spokesman -- that no dramatic announcement could be expected here. It is the nature of things since the decisions involve many other parties. But we consider this meeting to have been helpful and we plan to have other meetings, and, of course, you know of the other meetings which will now be taking place.

QUESTION: Do you anticipate that any of the subsequent discussions will take place at Geneva, either at an overall conference or in a step-by-step basis but in Geneva, with other parties participating apart from the United States?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is no question that the Geneva Conference will have to be reassembled at some point. This is a view we have always had even during step-by-step diplomacy, and that view has not changed. All the parties are agreed to it. We are agreed to it.

What the next step will be, we want to reserve our judgment until we have had our other conversations. But it is my impression that on the basis of the discussions that have been taking place that there are possibilities for useful talks.

QUESTION: You have said on about a half a dozen occasions -- just now from the podium -- that what happens now depends on talks with the Israelis. Would it be unfair to say that in some way the Israelis have a hang-up to finding a path,--

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I think this -- we have gone through this on many of the shuttles. There always is somebody you have talked to last and you are going to talk to next. It is, therefore, inevitable that when you get into the talks with the next person, that in the nature of the sequence you have to get their views before you can determine what is going to happen. We are not saying that any country is the hang-up. We did not elaborate a specific proposal with Egypt that will now be put forward with Israel. Rather, after we have discussed with Israel, we will then be in a position to see whether both parties should be encouraged to come forward with specific proposals or whether the time isn't right to go towards a more comprehensive solution.

But it is not of a nature where we can say here is a proposal and now ask Israelis to accept it. It is rather to get the Israeli point of view and then we would perhaps be in a position -- then we will be in a position to see whether both sides should be asked to be more complete.

Thank you.

* * * *

[lc]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 4, 1975

No. 317

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JUNE 4, 1975

MODERATOR: This is the easiest job I have ever had: Dr. Henry Kissinger.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, when Chuck Percy said he is in political trouble, it meant he was down to 65 percent in the popularity polls in Illinois and panicking. [Laughter]

As you know, I only returned late last night from the Presidential trip to Europe. But I wanted to take this opportunity to welcome you here, to make a few remarks about our interest in Latin America and then perhaps to answer two or three questions.

Before I go into the subject of Latin America, let me emphasize a more fundamental point.

We are this moment, as a country, having to adjust our policies and our perceptions to a world that is fundamentally different from that of the early post-war period. When America first ended its more or less traditional isolation, we were the dominant country militarily, economically and politically. Foreign policy for a lot of our friends really became an effort to influence our own decision-making process.

But in the last decade we have seen the split within the Communist world; we have seen the emergence of new centers of power around the world; we have seen the emergence of newly developing countries; we have seen our friends in Europe and Japan gain in strength and economic and political influence. In other words, we are dealing with a world infinitely more complex than the one in which the foreign policy of this country was first designed in the immediate post-war period.

And most particularly there has emerged in recent years the increasing importance of economic policy — the relationship among the industrialized countries; the relationship between the industrialized countries and the developing countries. The whole agenda of interdependence that is reflected in energy, in raw materials, in food — and in the attempt of many nations, especially the less-developed nations, to organize themselves to bring about what they consider a different approach to the economic arrangements of the world — all of this has involved the United States in a very profound way. And it involves us, not only as an economic problem, but from the point of view of the structure of the world, of the relationship various nations feel towards each other.

No international system has ever been maintained or has ever been relatively stable unless the countries that comprised it felt they had a stake in it. And one of the tasks that the United States has at this moment is to bring about, or contribute to, an international environment in which the major nations — and in which those who are associated with us in any way — feel that they have a stake in the maintenance of order, stability and progress.

PR #317

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I have made these general observations because our relationships to Latin America are very crucial in this respect. Even though we have a tradition of isolation, our relationship with Latin America is more continuous than with any other part of the world. We are connected here with countries that have comparable political origins, with countries sharing similar cultural traditions and having comparable economic aspirations.

Therefore, in many important ways the test case of America's ability to relate itself to the less-developed nations is our ability to live in peace and progress in the Western Hemisphere. This is why we have started the so-called "new dialogue" which attempts to cut through some of the shibboleths that have developed and enable the countries of Latin America and the United States to exchange views on their actual problems and which attempts, also, to solve some of the outstanding political issues, such as the Panama issue, before they become unmanageable.

Now I think we have made some progress, and I believe that the recent OAS meeting, in the spirit of its discussions and in the relative lack of acrimony, was a tremendous advance. But still a great deal remains to be done.

On our side, I think it is important not to proceed in too doctrinaire a fashion and to realize that, unless the concerns of Latin America are heard here and are understood here, there is no basis for a serious dialogue.

We have a great missionary tradition, and therefore our tendency is to try to believe that our maxims are the only possible ones. But unless we understand that other parts of the world have their own concerns, then this spirit of confrontation, which is already too widespread in the world, will grow unmanageable.

On the other hand, it is incumbent on Latin America not to seek its sense of identity simply by confrontation with the United States.

So both sides ought to approach the issues in a new spirit.

We have recently, at the OECD and in other forums, made clear that we are prepared to approach the dialogue with developing countries with a fresh attitude, taking into account some of their serious concerns. And we are particularly prepared to practice this in the Western Hemisphere.

I have had, unfortunately, to postpone a trip I had planned to Latin America on a number of occasions, but I firmly plan to do it within the next few months. Under the leadership of Bill Rogers, I believe that the State Department has had the most dynamic and interested concern for Latin America that has existed here in many a year.

So I am delighted that this group is meeting here. I strongly support what you are seeking to do. We hope you will find that the policies we are trying to pursue here help you in your efforts, and I know that what you are doing helps us in ours.

Perhaps the best way we can proceed now is that I will take a few questions and let you go to lunch.

**QUESTION:** May I have the first question?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Don't make it too technical; it's been a long night. [Laughter]

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, a question came up a couple of times during the meeting and it was on the problem of the pricing of commodities — the famous commodity problem — and some of your predecessors asked us to ask you the question. [Laughter]

PR #317

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I read in the newspapers with rapt attention about all the tremendous intramural fights that are allegedly going on in Washington on this issue. And the new sport in Washington is to take to the newspapers those issues which you never raised in the Departmental meetings. [Laughter]

The view with respect to commodities: We are not attempting to organize global cartels which will fix the price of every commodity — or indeed of any commodity.

On the other hand, we are engaged in discussions with many countries on the problem of energy. It is also a fact that for many countries the primary source of development income derives from the sale of their commodities. It is a demand that has been made rather insistently in the energy context, and it has been made outside the energy context.

The United States is opposed to indexing. The United States is opposed to fixing the prices of commodities by international agreement. But there are many other issues with respect to commodities that can be discussed — the relationship between aid and income stabilization, for example — regardless of what the price of the commodity is. That does not have to be tied to fixing the price of the commodity. The problem of assured markets and assured supply.

I think there are many aspects with respect to the commodity issue that can be discussed in international forums and in which we can express our opinion and listen to the concerns of other countries.

The United States has offered, in the OECD meetings, to create a monitoring group that will review those negotiations that will in any event be going on in other frameworks and to do any additional work that may be needed to meet the concerns of various groups. But we have specifically rejected the idea of indexation, and we do not anticipate international price fixing agreements.

**QUESTION:** [Inaudible]

**MODERATOR:** Can you repeat the question? I can't hear.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I can; I heard the question all right. But I have the feeling that we've got a ringer here. [Laughter] That's a newsman who is asking, who is trying to turn this into a press conference. [Laughter]

**MODERATOR:** I didn't notice that. I can't see him.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Yes, I think his shape looks a little familiar. I can't swear -- [Laughter]

**MODERATOR:** May we have the question?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I'll answer the question. I don't want him to think that I am running away from him.

There was, as part of the New Dialogue, a group that was dealing with multinational corporations and which would have dealt with this particular problem.

As a result of the cancellation of the Foreign Ministers meeting, the sub-groups that were related to these Foreign Ministers meetings also cancelled their discussions. At the same time we have created, within the framework of the OAS, the sort of informal possibility of dialogue which these Foreign Ministers meetings were supposed to create when the OAS machinery was still more formal.

PR #317

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The United States is prepared to resume these discussions. We recognize that this is a concern of many Latin American countries; and if they are prepared to deal with it on a concrete basis and not on a highly theoretical basis, I think some progress can be made.

MODERATOR: Mr. Secretary, I think that I interpret the feeling of all my Members of the Council and their guests in thanking you from the bottom of our hearts for coming here today.

We know that you just got back yesterday from an extremely strenuous trip all over Europe, and we really don't want to detain you.

Thank you very, very much, sir.

[Applause]

*****

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 12, 1975

No. 332

PC #60

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
THE WHITE HOUSE

JUNE 12, 1975

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I really don't have a very long statement to make.

As we pointed out after the meeting between President Sadat and the President, the purpose of these meetings is not to reach any definitive conclusions or to engage in any detailed negotiations, but rather to enable the President to establish a personal contact with the principal leaders in the area, to review the alternatives, and to clarify the positions.

The meeting between the Prime Minister and the President was conducted in a very cordial and friendly atmosphere. We evaluate the results as very constructive. I think the alternatives have been brought into sharper focus, the implications of the various roads that can be pursued seen more clearly.

We will now continue consultations with other interested parties. As you know, the Foreign Minister of Syria is coming here next week. And we will, of course, be in touch with other parties in the area. We will stay in close touch with the Government of Israel. And we hope that within the next few weeks we can reach a final clarification of the best course that could be pursued, on the basis of consensus among all the parties concerned.

Now I will take some questions.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the President does not yet know enough to go forward with his policy statement, as he said he would?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think the President is not likely to make a policy statement within the next week or two. But I do believe that the meetings that have just concluded mark a considerable step forward, and we evaluate them in a positive manner.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how would you evaluate the chances for a resumption of negotiations between Israel and Egypt on another partial settlement in the Sinai?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think there are chances, but we cannot yet make a final decision.

**QUESTION:** The tendency seems to be becoming aware that an interim settlement is a preferred solution, rather than a return to Geneva. Is that correct?

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. As I pointed out at Salzburg, the United States is not pushing any one particular approach. The United States is committed to progress in the negotiations. The United States believes that a stalemate in the diplomatic process in the Middle East would not be in the interest of any of the parties or in the interest of world peace.

We have found in the talks that this conviction is shared by all of the principals, and it is clearly and emphatically shared by the Prime Minister of Israel.

So, we are not pushing any particular approach, but we will support whichever approach seems most promising.

**QUESTION:** Have you found in your talks with the Egyptian and Israeli leaders any signs that either or both are willing to adjust their positions that existed at the end of March?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have told both sides that if an interim agreement is to be reached, both sides would have to modify their positions.

I call your attention to the decision of the Israeli Cabinet last Sunday in which the Israeli Cabinet pointed out the Israeli willingness to modify their position if Egypt were prepared to modify its own position.

We have the impression that therefore there is a certain parallel approach on both sides. What remains to be seen now is when one goes into the details, whether that permits a sufficient concreteness.

**QUESTION:** You really haven't gotten into the details yet?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have gone into the parameters, but not into the details.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, when you speak of touching base with other representatives, other groups, do you include the Palestinians?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, were you able to assure Mr. Rabin that the United States will continue its military and economic aid to Israel?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There has never been any question about the United States continuing economic and military aid to Israel. The question has been within the framework of the very large request that we have before us, how to relate it to all the other considerations.

So, about the principle of economic and military aid, there is no debate at all. But there were some discussions on that issue, and I will continue them at lunch, if you let me get there.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, there has been --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** This will keep the Israeli journalists from asking questions. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** There has been a reported hold-up of deliveries of certain military equipment, including the Lance missiles, and I think the F-15. Has the decision been made to go forward?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. The F-15 was a question of a technical evaluation team coming over here. It had not been a question of holding up any

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equipment. But the point is, it has always been clear that these particular
items were related to the whole process of a free assessment. And as
this process is coming to a conclusion, these decisions will be made with
respect to these items.

**QUESTION:** Will you make another trip to the area before the reassessment is completed, or how soon do you plan another trip to the area?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Whether I make another trip to the area depends on which of the approaches that are open to us is going to be pursued. But a trip is not excluded.

**QUESTION:** Do you have any opinion, Dr. Kissinger, as to what they would prefer? Do you get a feeling from either one or both that they would prefer you to start shuttle diplomacy again?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think it is too soon to say this precisely, but I would say that nothing that has happened in the discussions between President Sadat and President Ford, and between Prime Minister Rabin and President Ford, has made the prospect less likely, and much that has happened has made it perhaps more possible.

**QUESTION:** So you sort of expect to resume sometime?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That would be premature to say. But certainly neither side has precluded a re-examination of the interim approach.

**QUESTION:** How will you get into details -- through diplomatic channels, or do you have to go out there yourself?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think through both, if we go beyond a certain -- we will start through diplomatic channels, and at that point we will decide whether --

**QUESTION:** You just want to know whether there is enough for agreement before you go out, so you have to know the details?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That is correct. As I pointed out, we will now stay in close consultation with the Government of Israel, and we will also be in close touch with the other interested parties. And after we have all their views, we will then be in a position to make the decision whether they are close enough for me to take a trip to the area.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, what are the other parties that you have been talking about that you are going to consult with before you make a decision?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, as I said before, the Foreign Minister of Syria is coming here next week. We are obviously going to be in touch with the Government of Egypt. And we will be talking to other Arab countries.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you know very well what the particular issues were that held up the March agreement. Are you really --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** After I read a lot about it, I didn't know any more whether I knew. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Are you really telling us you are no further along on understanding whether either side has changed its position to make an agreement possible?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I am saying that obviously there has been an evolution in the thinking of both sides. I am saying that we are not yet at a sufficient degree of detail for me to be able to say whether an agreement is

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possible and that we have not been engaged in an actual detailed process of negotiation. Neither side has been asked to put forward a specific position at this moment.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the President has stated that he was going to make a definitive statement or a statement about this when the reassessment is complete. Could you tell us how definitive that is likely to be, how long? Does it include re-examination of the whole question?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think it depends in part on which of the options before him, of those that he has described, he is likely to pursue. And I think obviously when the President states the direction in which we are going, he will do it with sufficient concreteness to explain what we hope to achieve and where it is likely to take us.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the President made reference to the desirability of Israel being more flexible. I have asked several times at the White House and can get no definition of any specific of how Israel could be more flexible. I was wondering if this request that it be more flexible means that Israel should give up Mitla and Giddi in exchange for nothing but Egyptian words, not even guarantees of shipping in the Canal or diplomatic recognition.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, you are way ahead of me in the precision of the negotiation. I don't believe that the President has said that Israel should be more flexible. There was one reference to his evaluation of the March negotiations. I don't think that it would serve any purpose now to apply adjectives to the various positions of the parties. The issues that led to the breakdown, as Mr. Kalb said, are clearly understood. I think the two sides know in which area the major concerns of the other are. We have done our best to explain the positions of each side to the other as we understand it. We have found a general receptivity to looking at the prospects for making progress. And I can assure you, as someone who has negotiated with Israeli negotiating teams, the danger of their giving away something for nothing is extremely remote.

Mr. Koppel.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I can understand why it was necessary for President Ford to establish some kind of personal contact with Mr. Sadat, whom he had never met before. I'm a little harder pressed to understand why it is necessary with Mr. Rabin, who he knows quite well. Is it then a fact that this is the only need for that meeting, to establish personal contact?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. The need for this meeting was the necessity of reviewing the positions and options of all sides in the Middle East and of the American relationship to it.

Since this involves rather fateful decisions for Israel and very crucial decisions for the United States, it was imperative for the Prime Minister and the President to meet, not just to exchange ideas on technical details but to gain an understanding of their perception of the Middle East situation. I think the meeting was extremely important from that point of view as well as from others. And I don't believe either of these two leaders would have been prepared to make the decisions that need to be made without having a full opportunity to understand not only the technical but also the intangible aspects of the other side.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the President said the other night that, if step-by-step does not work, he would have a comprehensive plan of his own to present possibly at Geneva. Did he reveal to Mr. Rabin what the outlines of that comprehensive plan would be?

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PR 332

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The two leaders had an extremely frank and detailed review. The President's habit is always to put forward his thinking as fully as he can, and he did put before the Prime Minister his best judgment of the situation in some detail, yes.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, following the breakdown there was a widespread impression -- and I can understand your unwillingness to engage in use of adjectives -- there was a widespread impression left as a result of official statements on the record and background record, that the Israelis were stubborn and arch and were responsible for the breakdown. As a result of today's meeting, is that impression not justified any more? Has that been wiped off?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, an Israeli friend of mine has once defined objectivity as a hundred percent approval of the Israeli point of view. And maybe some of these impressions that you describe arose from that particular definition of objectivity. Be that as it may, we are now looking to the future; and we believe, as I pointed out before, that all the parties with whom we have talked are interested in making progress towards peace. As the Prime Minister pointed out in his toast last evening, no country can have a greater interest in peace than Israel. Therefore we will work with the parties concerned with the attitude of seeing how we can help ease tensions and help them to achieve what is above all in their overwhelming interest.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you have spoken to both sides now, and it has been made public by the Israelis that they would like an agreement of long duration defined as three to five years. Now that you have spoken to both sides, is this a likely prospect?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't want to go into any of the details of the various aspects. But as I pointed out, from what I have seen of the positions of the parties, the possibility of progress is by no means precluded.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, one last question. When will the aid program be presented to the Congress on the Middle East?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We don't have a precise date yet, but I have stated our general view with respect to aid.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

* * * *

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 12, 1975

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

THE BRIEFING ROOM

12:23 P.M. EDT

MR. NESSEN: This will be on-the-record for taping and filming, no live feeds back to your office, no filing until the briefing is over. The Secretary has a lunch that he is actually going to be late to even if he only takes 15 minutes, so let's hold this to 15 minutes.

We will have still pictures at the front and silent film for three minutes and then move to the back so the reporters have a chance to see and hear.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course, the problem is that, the shortest statement I can make is 50 minutes, based on my proposition.

Q Start at the end.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I really don't have a very long statement to make. As we pointed out, after the meeting between President Sadat and the President, the purpose of these meetings is not to reach any definitive conclusions or to engage in any detailed negotiations but, rather, to enable the President to establish a personal contact with the principal leaders in the area to review the alternatives and to clarify the positions.

The meeting between the Prime Minister and the President was conducted in a very cordial and friendly atmosphere. We evaluated the results as very constructive. I think, the alternatives have been brought into sharper focus; the implications of the various roads that can be pursued are seen more clearly. We will now continue consultations with other interested parties.

As you know, the Foreign Minister of Syria is coming here next week, and we will, of course, be in touch with other parties in the area. And we will stay in close touch with the government of Israel, and we hope that, within the next few weeks, we can reach a final clarification of the best course that could be pursued on the basis of consensus among all of the parties concerned.

Now, I will take some questions.

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- 2 -

Q Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the
President does not yet know enough to go forward with
his policy statement, as he said he would?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the President is
not likely to make a policy statement within the next
week or two, but I do believe that the meetings that
have just concluded mark a considerable step forward, and
we evaluate them in a positive manner.

Q Mr. Secretary, how would you evaluate
the chances for resumption of negotiations between Israel
and Egypt on another partial settlement in the Sinai?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think there are chances
but we cannot yet make a final decision.

Q The tendency seems to be becoming aware
that an interim settlement is a preferred solution
rather than a return to Geneva; is that correct?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. As I pointed out at
Salzburg, the United States is not pushing any one
particular approach. The United States is committed to
progress in the negotiations. The United States believes
that a stalemate in the diplomatic process in the Middle
East would not be in the interest of any of the parties
or in the interest of world peace.

We have found in the talks that this conviction
is shared by all of the principals and it is clearly,
emphatically shared by the Prime Minister of Israel. So
we are not pushing any particular approach, but we will
support whichever approach seems most promising.

Q Mr. Secretary, have you found in your talks
with the Egyptian and Israeli leaders any signs that
either or both are willing to adjust their positions that
existed at the end of March?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have told both sides
that if an interim agreement is to be reached both sides
would have to modify their positions.

I call your attention to the decision of the
Israeli Cabinet last Sunday in which the Israeli Cabinet
pointed out the Israeli willingness to modify their
position if Egypt were prepared to modify its own position.
We have the impression that, therefore, there is a
certain parallel approach on both sides. What remains
to be seen now is when one goes into the details whether
that permits a sufficient conclusion.

Q You really have not gone into the details
yet?

MORE

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have gone into the parameters, but not into the details.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when you speak of touching base with other representatives, other groups, do you include the Palestinians?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

Q Mr. Secretary, were you able to assure Mr. Rabin that the United States will continue its military and economic aid to Israel?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There has never been any question about the United States continuing economic and military aid to Israel. The question has been within the framework of a very large request that we have before us, how to relate it to all the other considerations. So, about the principle of economic and military aid, there is no debate at all but there were some discussions on that issue, and I will continue them at lunch, if you let me get there. This will keep the Israeli journalists from asking questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, there has been a reported hold-up of deliveries of certain military equipment including the last missile, and I think it is the F-15. Has the decision been made to go forward?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The F-15 was a question of training of a technical evaluation team coming over here. It has not been a question of holding up any equipment. But the point is it has always been made clear that these particular items were related to the whole process of free assessment. And as this process is coming to a conclusion, the decisions will be made with respect to these items.

Q Will you make another trip to the area before the reassessment is completed, or how soon do you plan another trip to the area?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Whether I make another trip to the area depends on which of the approaches that are open to us is going to be pursued. But a trip is not excluded.

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- 4 -

Q Do you have a feeling, Dr. Kissinger, as to what they would prefer? Do you get a feeling from either one or both that they would prefer you to start shuttle diplomacy again?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it is too soon to say this precisely, but I would say, nothing that has happened in the discussions between President Sadat and President Ford and between Prime Minister Rabin and President Ford has made the prospect less likely, and much that has happened has made it, perhaps, more possible.

Q So, you sort of expect to resume sometime?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That would be premature to say, but, certainly, neither side has precluded a reexamination of the interim approach.

Q How will you get into details, through diplomatic channels, or do you have to go out there yourself?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think, through both. If we go beyond a certain -- we will start through diplomatic channels, and at that point, we will decide whether --

Q You just want to know whether there is enough for agreement before you go out, so you have to know the details?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is correct. As I pointed out, we will now stay in close consultation with the government of Israel, and we will also be in close touch with the other interested parties. And after we have all their views, we will then be in a position to make the decision whether they are close enough for me to take a trip --

Q Mr. Secretary, what are the other parties you have been talking about, that you are going to consult with, before you make a decision?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I have said before, the Foreign Minister of Syria is coming here next week. We are, obviously, going to be in touch with the government of Egypt, and we will be talking to other Arab countries.

Q Mr. Secretary, you know very well what the particular issues were that held up the March agreement. Are you really --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I read a lot about it. I didn't know anymore whether I knew.

Q Are you really telling us you are no further along on understanding whether either side has changed its position to make an agreement possible?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. I am saying that, obviously, there has been an evolution in the thinking of both sides. I am saying that we are not yet at a sufficient degree of detail for me to be able to say whether an agreement is possible and that we have not been engaged in an actual detailed process of negotiation.

MORE

10

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Neither side has been asked to put forward a specific position at this moment.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President has said he was going to make a definitive statement, or a statement, about this, when the reassessment is complete. Could you tell us how definitive that is likely to be -- how long? Does it include reexamination of the whole question?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it depends, in part, on which of the options before him -- of those that he has described -- he is likely to pursue, and I think, obviously, when the President states the direction in which we are going, he will do it with sufficient concreteness to explain what we hope to achieve and where it is likely to take us.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President made the reference to the desirability of Israel being more flexible, and I have asked several times, here, in the White House -- and can get no definition of anything specific -- of how Israel could be more flexible. I was wondering if this request, that it be more flexible, means that Israel should give up Mitla and Giddi Passes in exchange for nothing but the Egyptians' word, not even guarantees of shipping in the Canal or diplomatic recognition?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You are way ahead of me in the present situation of the negotiations. I don't believe that the President has said that Israel should be more flexible.

There was one reference to his evaluation of the March negotiations. I don't think that it would serve any purpose, now, to apply adjectives to the various positions of the parties. The issues that led to the breakdown, as Mr. Kalb said, are clearly understood.

I think the two sides know in which area the major concerns of the other are. We have done our best to explain the positions of each side to the other, as we understand it. We have found a general receptivity to looking at the prospects for making progress, and I can assure you, as someone who has negotiated with Israeli negotiation teams, the danger of their giving away something for nothing is extremely remote.

Q How about 1956? (Laughter.)

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- 6 -

Q I can understand why it was necessary for President Ford to establish some kind of personal contact with Mr. Sadat, whom he had never met before. I am a little harder pressed to understand why it is necessary with Mr. Rabin, whom he knows quite well. Is it in fact that this is the only need for that meeting, to establish personal contact?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, the need for this meeting was the necessity of reviewing the positions and options of both sides, of all sides in the Middle East, and of the American relationship to it. Since this involves rather faithful decisions for Israel and very crucial decisions for the United States, it was imperative for the Prime Minister and the President to meet, not just to exchange ideas on technical details but to gain an understanding of their perception of the Middle East situation.

I think the meeting was extremely important from that point of view as well as from others, and I don't believe either of these two leaders would have been prepared to make the decisions that need to be made without having a full opportunity to understand not only the technical but also the tangible aspects of the other side.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President said the other night that if step-by-step does not work that he would have a comprehensive plan of his own to present possibly at Geneva. Did he reveal to Mr. Rabin what the outlines of that comprehensive plan would be?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The two leaders had an extremely frank and detailed review. The President's habit is always to put forward his thinking as fully as he can, and he did put before the Prime Minister his best judgment of the situation in some detail, yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, following the breakdown, there was a widespread impression -- and I can understand your unwillingness to engage in the use of adjectives -- there was a widespread impression that was left as a result of official statements on the record and background record, that the Israelis were stubborn and arch, and were the key to the -- were responsible for the breakdown.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: An Israeli friend of mine has once defined objectivity as 100 percent approval of the Israeli point of view. And maybe some of these difficulties, some of these impressions that you describe, arose from that particular definition of objectivity.

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- 7 -

Be that as it may, we are now looking to the
future and we believe, as I have pointed out before,
that all the parties whom we have talked to are interested
in making progress towards peace.

As the Prime Minister pointed out in his toast
last evening, no country can have a greater interest in
peace than Israel, and therefore we will work with the
parties concerned, with the attitude of seeing how we
can help ease tensions and help them to achieve what
is, above all, in their overwhelming interest.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have spoken of both
sides now and it has been made public by the Israelis
that they would like an agreement of long duration,
defined as three to five years. Now that you have spoken
of both sides, is this a likely prospect?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't want to go into
any of the details of the various aspects. But, as I
have pointed out, from what I have seen of the positions
of the parties, the possibility of progress is by no
means precluded.

Q Mr. Secretary, one last question. When
will the aid program be presented to the Congress, on the
Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We don't have a precise
date yet, but I have stated our general view with respect
to aid.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 12:40 P.M. EDT)

Exclusive Interview

SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER

"We Are
Moving
Into a
New
World"

With events at a critical juncture—in the Mideast, dealing with Russia, China, NATO, the energy crisis—Mr. Kissinger takes a sweeping, analytical look ahead in this interview with editors of the magazine.

**Q** Mr. Secretary, a year ago everyone was hailing American foreign policy as a great success story. Now everything seems to be coming apart at the seams. What's gone wrong?

**A** First of all, I don't think everything is "coming apart at the seams." Our foreign policy is, I believe, effective and strong.

Our relations with Western Europe and Japan have never been better. Our relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are essentially on course. With respect to the "third world," we have developed new initiatives at the recent meetings of the OECD [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development] and the IEA [International Energy Agency] in Paris.

We have had a temporary setback in the Middle East, but I expect that momentum will soon be restored. Further interim discussions or some form of over-all discussions are inevitable. What has been done previously has laid the basis for what is being done now.

The collapse of Indo-China was, of course, both a setback and a tragedy—and, we believe, an unnecessary one. But it has nothing to do with the architecture of our foreign policy.

**Q** How then do you explain the widespread criticism of U.S. foreign policy?

**A** I believe that many of these criticisms reflect a turmoil in our domestic situation and not the reality of our foreign policy.

I have consistently said that you cannot have foreign policy without authority, and that to the extent that the central authority is undermined for whatever reason—even if it's the

fault of the central authority—it will ultimately affect the conduct of foreign policy.

Curiously enough, the price we paid during Watergate, while harmful, was not extreme. While Watergate was going on, debate on foreign policy was muted. But then, after Watergate was over, there suddenly was an orgy of criticism. Pent-up concerns about Chile, Turkey and Vietnam all crystallized into extremely controversial issues. All of them coming together produced a serious multiplier effect.

I have the sense that this phase was terminated with the collapse of Vietnam. While Congress is now not in an uncritically accepting mood, it is also not in an uncritically contentious mood. The position of the Presidency—which is, after all, the central element in foreign policy—has been considerably strengthened in recent weeks. The dialogue between the Executive and the Congress is now on a healthier basis. Therefore, the effectiveness of our foreign policy is on a healthier basis.

**Q** Why did the collapse in Vietnam bring that change in Congress?

**A** First of all, because no one can debate any more that there was a "domino effect"; this is self-evident. Secondly, no one can deny that it has had a shocking impact even where there was no domino effect. Thirdly, I believe that the American public is not in a mood to see the country's world position decline. Whatever the public's reaction was to the merits of our involvement in Vietnam, the public reaction to its aftermath is that the United States should not be seen to be retreating in the world.

The support for the handling of the *Mayaguez* incident and the general public attitude which are reflected in the votes on the defense bill seem to indicate that the American public now feels that the period of turmoil—of the Vietnam debate, of the Watergate debate—should be ended.

**Q** As you see it, are the American people still prepared to accept the defense burden and other sacrifices necessary to support a world role for this country?

**A** Yes, that is my impression. I think our biggest asset is

20

Copyright © 1975, U.S. News & World Report, Inc.

Editors of U.S. News & World Report with the Secretary.

USN & WR

widespread public support—which was never as weak as the noise level in Washington would have indicated.

**Q** What effect has the Vietnam collapse had in the rest of the world?

**A** I think the sudden collapse of Vietnam brought home to a lot of countries the central role of America and its foreign policy. It led to a profound concern in many countries about the conclusions we might draw from that event.

Basically, what happened in the NATO meeting [summit conference in Brussels, May 29-30] was what we were hoping to achieve in the "Year of Europe" in 1973. Our basic argument then—in 1973—was that security, political and economic factors are all related and that the Atlantic nations, together with Japan, had to deal with them simultaneously and with a concept of what kind of future we wanted for ourselves and our children.

Frankly, our allies were not ready for this approach in 1973. But in 1975—at Brussels—Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada put forward as his own idea, and without any previous discussion with us, exactly this proposal. And all heads of government present accepted it—with France, which was not represented by the head of government, being the only exception.

So I think that in this sense the events in Indo-China have brought things into perspective.

**Q** Do you expect that our allies, as a result of this, will now do more to keep America involved around the world?

**A** First, the Allies have understood they cannot necessarily take America for granted and that there is a point beyond which disappointment could push us into a more isolationist position.

Secondly, the central importance of the American role for both peace and progress has been brought home to them in no uncertain terms.

And, thirdly, I think that the President's calm and strong leadership has had a very positive effect.

**Q** As you look to the future, what lies ahead for the United States?

## KEY POINTS MADE BY MR. KISSINGER

**Israel:** "We have a historic commitment to the survival and the well-being of Israel. . . . But we are in no way committed to the status quo."

**Foreign-policy setbacks:** "I don't think everything is coming apart at the seams." Relations with allies "have never been better," and with Russia and China they "are essentially on course."

**Oil-price increase:** In view of increases over the past two years, "another rise is clearly not justified." The U.S. would "certainly strongly oppose" the $4-a-barrel increase that some OPEC countries have mentioned.

**Arab oil embargo:** "I think it would be a very rash action, and—outside the context of a Middle East war—I would not anticipate it." In any case, "it would be extremely dangerous for the United States to let its foreign policy be determined by oil-price manipulation."

**Detente:** "Détente has not been a one-way street. The agreements we have made with the Soviet Union have been based on reciprocity."

**Brezhnev visit:** The Washington visit by Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev this fall will depend on a new SALT agreement. Chances of an agreement "are better than even."

**SALT violations:** "The Soviets have worried us in several areas" with respect to alleged violations of the strategic-arms-limitation agreement. Most questions have been resolved, but "one or two issues are still unsettled."

**U.S. and China:** "What Chinese leaders have told Asian leaders and some of our leaders" indicated they want the U.S. to stay in Asia. As a result, they are "not interested in an exacerbation of tensions in Asia."

**War danger in Korea:** U.S. was "profoundly concerned that the leaders in North Korea should not misread the American position." But recent events make it clear "it would be a wildly rash adventure to use military force in Korea."

**Communism in Portugal:** At some point "we will have to make a decision whether this is still an Allied government or a neutralist government."

**European neutralism:** "In many of the European countries, neutralist forces are growing—not in the governments but in political life."

**Effect of Vietnam:** As a result of the collapse in Indo-China, "the Allies have understood they cannot necessarily take America for granted and that there is a point beyond which disappointment could push us into a more isolationist position."

**President vs. Congress:** "The position of the Presidency has been considerably strengthened in recent weeks. The dialogue between the Executive and Congress is now on a healthier basis."

**U.S. world role:** "I believe that the American public is not in a mood to see the country's world position decline," and they are prepared to accept the burdens and sacrifices necessary to sustain it.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 23, 1975

INTERVIEW WITH HENRY KISSINGER

[continued from preceding page]

A We are moving into a new world. The kind of world that emerged in the immediate post-World War II period had substantially eroded by the late '60s and early '70s. We are in a period of adjusting the American role in the world to a new environment.

Today's world is marked by multipolarity among countries, divisions in the Communist world, growth of Europe and Japan, and greater assertiveness of the underdeveloped countries. All this fragmentation has occurred at the same time that economic interrelationships are demonstrating the interdependence of the world.

So you have confrontation on a political level, and on an economic level the need for co-operation. You have on the political level continued ideological hostility, but you have on the nuclear level the realization that there is no alternative to peace.

Q What does that mean as far as American foreign policy is concerned?

A We had to design a much more complex strategy than the one that characterized the immediate postwar period. We are trying to design a policy that is not a response to crisis but to the realities of the present and the hopes of the future; a policy that looks at the evolution of history and the American contribution to it. While any policy has imperfections, I think we are clearly moving in the right direction.

On the other hand, the architecture is not completed; many issues remain unresolved. There is still an unfinished agenda.

But I would like to point out that if you interview a Secretary of State three years from now he, too, should have an unfinished agenda. It is an American illusion to believe that foreign policy ought to lead to a solution to all problems. Foreign policy cannot do that; it is always a dynamic process.

Q Turning to Soviet-American détente: How do you answer the criticism that is so often heard that this is a one-way street that benefits only Russia?

A I am certain that in Moscow whatever opponents of détente there may be are making exactly the same argument. What you get, as the result of three years of détente, is that people like all the benefits of détente, plus all the psychic satisfaction of a tough posture.

There is no question that the American public prefers peace to war and anti-Communism to Communism. So the question is—and it's not an easy one: How do you bring these two into balance with each other?

Détente has not been a one-way street. The agreements we have made with the Soviet Union have been based on reciprocity; both sides have benefited. Some of the events that have happened in the world that have been against our interests have been caused by the Soviets; others have not. Some have been caused by our failure to take adequate unilateral actions. For those we have no one but ourselves to blame.

Détente is not a substitute for American action. Détente is a means of controlling the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Détente is not a substitute for American strength. But it can enable us to reduce the risks that we will ever have to make use of that strength.

Q Do you mean that under the rules of détente, one side is free to exploit a local situation to gain an advantage?

A Of course not. I am saying that the minimum objective of détente must be to reduce the dangers of general nuclear war. That we have certainly done with some success.

The second objective is to reduce direct conflict in areas of vital importance to both countries, such as Central Europe. That we have done remarkably well.

USN & WR

"We are the only non-Communist
country strong enough and cohesive
enough to play a world role."

The third objective is to create links that will provide incentives for moderation. Progress here has been uneven, and we have been weakened by the Trade Act.

The fourth objective is to reduce conflict in peripheral areas. And here, to be frank, we have not made as much progress as we should.

Q You mentioned the Trade Act, which made economic concessions to Russia contingent on more-liberal Soviet emigration policies. How has that weakened the policy of détente?

A Relations with the Soviet Union must have incentives for moderation and penalties for intransigence. The penalties for intransigence are supplied mostly by our defense budget and by our foreign policy. I think that is going reasonably well.

As for incentives for moderation, the Trade Act was one of the elements we had hoped to have available. We have always held the view that to inject the emigration issue into it hurt our relations with the Soviet Union, hurt us economically and—most tragically of all—hurt the people it was supposed to help.

Q How can you reconcile what the Russians have done in Vietnam, the Mideast and Portugal with détente?

A Let's discuss each of these.

First, Vietnam was not caused by the Russians. Vietnam had its own dynamics. Secondly, the Soviet aid level in Vietnam remained relatively constant. But our aid level dropped—by 50 per cent in each of two successive years—to the point where no equipment and very few spare parts were delivered in Vietnam after May, 1974. The GVN [Government of South Vietnam] even reached the point where ammunition had to be rationed for the Vietnamese forces. Therefore, what happened had many causes of which Soviet actions were only a part.

The situation in Portugal was not caused by the Soviets. It was caused by the internal dynamics of Portugal itself. If we have not assisted the democratic forces adequately, the reasons lie far more in our own domestic debates than with the Soviets.

Q And the Middle East?

A In the Middle East, I would not be surprised if in

22

Moscow they made the same argument and said that we have been using détente to improve our position.

At any rate it is not evident to me—in contrast to our own position—that the Soviet Union has improved its position in the Middle East in the last two years. The opposite seems to me to be the case.

**Q** Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied that the Russians are not cheating on the strategic-arms-limitation agreement that was signed in 1972?

**A** When you have strategic forces on both sides in the present state of technical complexity and in the process of modernization, it is inevitable that questionable actions will emerge.

The Soviets have worried us in several areas. We have taken those up in the Soviet-American standing commission which is designed to deal with such complaints. With respect to a number of these issues, we have received answers which—while not fully satisfactory—are moving in the right direction. One or two issues are still unsettled, but they do not go to the heart of the SALT agreement. But we will pursue them nevertheless. One or two issues that have been reported in the newspapers seem to me mischievous and special pleading.

**Q** What about SALT II? Is there going to be an agreement this fall?

**A** The issues of principle with respect to SALT have been more or less settled. What now remains to be worked out is the technical implementation of issues that are very complicated. I should think that the chances are better than even that we will have a SALT II in the fall. But we could fail, either because we just can't solve the technical issues or because political tensions rise.

**Q** Is a visit to Washington by Soviet leader Brezhnev in the fall firmly set, or will that depend on a SALT agreement?

**A** That will depend on SALT.

**Q** In other words: no SALT agreement, no Brezhnev visit?

**A** I would think that Brezhnev, too, would prefer to mark his visit with some significant result.

## REFUSING TO LET MIDEAST "FESTER"—

**Q** President Ford recently spoke of the Middle East as the most dangerous problem in the world today. What are the prospects now of making progress toward a settlement of the conflict there?

**A** Logically, the conditions should be there—either on an interim or an over-all basis. As the President has said, we are determined to make progress. If we cannot get it on an interim basis, we will promote an over-all settlement. We will not permit the situation simply to fester.

**Q** How do you prevent it from festering?

**A** By engaging in active diplomacy and using our influence—which, after all, is not inconsiderable in that area—to encourage progress.

**Q** What has resulted from President Ford's meetings with President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel that will open the way to new negotiations for a Middle East settlement?

**A** The meetings with President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin have been extremely important in helping to crystallize our thinking on how best to proceed. They have helped us understand the views of both on how they think the negotiating process might be renewed.

They were both constructive, though neither meeting was an occasion for coming to detailed decisions. We, as well as the two governments concerned, are now reflecting on the best course to follow. We will be following up with both Israel and Egypt through diplomatic channels, as well as talking with Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam here in the

coming days. We will also stay in close touch with other interested governments.

From all of these consultations we hope a decision can be taken on how to move toward the negotiated settlement we all seek.

**Q** Is it feasible to go for an over-all settlement if you can't get Egypt and Israel to agree even on a limited settlement in the Sinai?

**A** That remains to be seen. It probably won't be an extremely rapid process.

**Q** Can you count on any help from the Russians in promoting a settlement—or are they mainly interested in perpetuating a conflict that they can exploit?

**A** On the one hand, you can argue that they like the tension in the area because it creates a chance for enhanced influence. On the other hand, it can be argued that tensions which force a country to take positions which it then cannot implement do not, in the long run, enhance its influence.

So I would think that, as a result of the events of recent years, the Soviet Union could come to the view that it is running risks disproportionate to what it is getting out of. And if that is true, perhaps conditions for a more constructive relationship will develop. Certainly in recent months the Soviet Union has not been as aggressive about the Middle East as they might have been.

**Q** How is your negotiating position in the Middle East affected by the fact that 76 Senators have signed a letter in support of Israel?

**A** I did not recommend the letter be sent. But we will take it into account. We will study it.

## "TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP FOR ISRAEL"—

**Q** Six Presidents have declared a commitment to the survival and security of Israel. In practical terms, what does that really mean?

**A** We have a historic commitment to the survival and the well-being of Israel. This is a basic national policy reaffirmed by every Administration. But we are in no way committed to the status quo. Israel itself has said that it does not insist on the existing territorial arrangement for a final peace.

The art of our foreign policy is to reconcile as many of America's interests as we can, and not to emphasize one to the exclusion of all of the others. We have many interests that need to be accommodated:

We have an interest in good relations with the Arab countries. We have an interest in the economic well-being and security of Western Europe and Japan. And we have an interest in not having unnecessary confrontations with the Soviet Union. We believe all these interests can be reconciled with our traditional friendship for Israel.

**Q** What do you think of suggestions that an Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967 borders would tend to lower oil prices?

**A** I think it would be extremely dangerous for the United States to let its foreign policy be determined by oil-price manipulation. We have refused to discuss our political objectives in relation to the price of oil, and will continue to do so.

**Q** More generally on the oil problem: Can we live with another $4-a-barrel increase that's being talked about for the fall?

**A** I do not know that there will be a $4 increase in the price of oil. That would be an increase of over 30 per cent. We are strongly opposed to an increase. We believe that the increases of '73 and '74 have been so inflationary and so disruptive of the world economy that another rise is clearly not justified. To impose a $4 increase on top of the present precarious world situation is not even in the interest of the OPEC countries. We would certainly strongly oppose it.

**Q** But what can we do to oppose any increase that the

23

## INTERVIEW WITH HENRY KISSINGER

**Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries chooses to make?**

**A** Basically, we cannot fight unilateral increases effectively until we create the objective conditions which will transform the market forces. It is another area where it is easy to strike a tough verbal stance. But a tough verbal stance unrelated to objective factors is not going to do us any good.

We are attempting in the International Energy Agency to create the objective conditions which will transform power in the marketplace by reducing consumption and developing alternative energy sources. At the same time, the capacity of OPEC to cut production in order to sustain prices will diminish as development programs in other countries grow and the producers' need for real resources mounts.

Therefore, some point inevitably will be reached where the market must shift. How quickly it is reached depends on the decisiveness with which the industrialized consumer countries co-operate. This is the effort in which we are now deeply—and reasonably successfully—engaged.

**Q** A year ago the Administration was talking about getting the price of oil down. Now you're talking about keeping the price from going up. Why has the objective changed?

**A** The policy has not changed. But policy and rhetoric need to be kept separate. We would like prices to come down. But we cannot get them down until after we have succeeded in keeping them from going up.

At a time when OPEC is threatening to increase prices, it's senseless to talk about getting them down. We are opposed to the current prices. We are even more opposed to higher prices. We will work with determination to bring about conditions in which this cannot continue.

If OPEC insists on raising its prices, I have no doubt that it will lead to increased consumer solidarity and a speeded-up program to shift market conditions. This is our policy—to change market conditions—and I think it will succeed.

We are pursuing the only sensible policy available to bring about a price cut. You can talk about embargoes and counter-embargoes, but when you analyze them you will find they usually hit the countries that politically give us the strongest support and whose role may not be decisive. Furthermore, these measures generally would not be backed by the other consuming countries.

So if we pursued them we would be putting ourselves at a political and probably economic disadvantage. But we are determined to bring about an improvement in the market conditions of oil.

**Q** Why is it so difficult to get the industrial consuming countries to co-operate on the kind of joint policy that you advocate?

**A** Because none of the consumer countries want to risk a confrontation. Therefore, to some extent the producer countries can blackmail at least some of the consumer nations.

Another reason is that independence requires difficult domestic efforts. Consumption cuts are unpleasant and occasionally painful.

So, many countries—including ours—are using the fact that there is a recession which imposes oil conservation as an excuse to avoid policy-induced conservation.

**Q** How much will the success or failure of this whole program depend on action by Congress?

**A** The role of the Congress is absolutely pivotal.

The United States consumes 50 per cent of the world's energy; many of the resources for alternative programs must come from American technology. Without a major American program there can be no effective policy among consumer nations.

USN&WR

> "Relations with the Soviet Union must have incentives for moderation, penalties for intransigence."

**Q** Is the energy program that Congress appears likely to approve sufficient to do the job?

**A** It is sufficient to make a start on the policy. It is not, however, adequate to do the whole job.

**Q** Have you been surprised at the ability of the OPEC countries to cut production as deeply as they have in order to maintain their price?

**A** No. I think they are beginning to approach a point where production cuts will become more and more painful.

**Q** But isn't pressure on OPEC countries to cut production going to ease as we get economic recovery here as well as in Europe and Japan?

**A** It is going to be a very serious problem. The recovery will increase our need for oil, but it will not affect the ability of the OPEC countries to make further production cuts.

**Q** Do you anticipate another oil embargo by the Arabs?

**A** I think it would be a very rash action, and—outside the context of a Middle East war—I would not anticipate it.

**Q** Getting back for a moment to the aftermath of Vietnam: We keep hearing that China wants the United States to stay in Asia. Is that based on any direct assurance you've had?

**A** It is based not on assurances but on fairly hard evidence—that is, on what Chinese leaders have told Asian leaders and some of our leaders.

**Q** Why do they now want us to stay after agitating for so many years to get us out of Asia?

**A** The Chinese are extremely realistic. They realize that their security depends on a world equilibrium. They understand that the United States must inevitably be a major part of such an equilibrium. For this reason, they do not want to open up Asia to the aspirations of other countries whose intentions toward them might be less benevolent.

**Q** In that connection, is there any truth to reports that China has tried to dissuade North Korea from going to war against the South?

**A** I cannot confirm those reports. But our general impression is that the People's Republic of China is not interested in an exacerbation of tensions in Asia.

**Q** What, in your judgment, are the chances of war in Korea?

**A** In the immediate aftermath of Vietnam, we were

24

[continued from page 24]

profoundly concerned that the leaders in North Korea should not misread the American position. We were also concerned that a collapse of South Korea would have a disastrous impact on Japan.

The events of recent weeks are beginning to make clear that the United States is prepared to defend its interests in the world and that it would be a wildly rash adventure to use military force in Korea. Many of the problems that existed with respect to Vietnam do not exist with respect to Korea.

**Q** Because the United States has a mutual-security treaty with South Korea—

**A** That's right.

**Q** In view of the Vietnam debacle, is President Ford still planning to go to China this fall?

**A** That is still the plan.

**Q** Is it possible for him to go without discussing the Taiwan situation?

**A** No, but it is possible for him to go without bringing that situation to a conclusion.

**Q** Will the United States be obliged to change its relations with Taiwan?

**A** Not in order for the President to go to China.

**Q** Looking a bit further ahead: Do you expect the triangular Soviet-American-Chinese relationship to survive after Mao Tse-tung and Leonid Brezhnev are gone?

**A** The problem in foreign policy is to be able to discern the realities of the situation and not to tie it to personalities. The realities could shift to some extent—and all foreign policy is subject to change.

The reality of Asia is the geopolitical impact on each other of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, plus the memory of what has happened. We are not exploiting this. We are not encouraging it, and we didn't create it.

To some extent the reality will continue. There may be shifting accents that will affect us, and we must be aware of these. It is also important not to be so obsessed with immediate threats that one forgets long-term threats.

But the essential architecture of our foreign policy is sound and will be seen to be sound. The fact that it has survived some of the shocks of this past year proves that it is sound.

**Q** A final point concerning Europe: Why is it left to this country to deal with major problems in Europe while Europeans turn their backs—problems such as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey?

**A** It is left to the United States because fate has put us in the position where we are the only non-Communist country that is strong enough and domestically cohesive enough to play a world role. Therefore, if certain things are not done by us, they will not be done by anyone. And while it might be fairer if somebody else took some of the responsibility, the fact is that a catastrophe is no less real for having been brought about by attempts to shift responsibility to others.

Portugal, of course, is primarily a Portuguese problem. Many of the European countries are extremely active with respect to Portugal. However, as the strongest country in the Alliance, we have to state a position with respect to Portugal, and particularly its relationship to NATO. This is all we have done, in addition to some economic aid which we have given.

With respect to Spain, we are the only Western country that has a defense relationship with Spain. For some European countries there is a domestic problem with respect to dealings with Spain. But it is also clear that if Spain is left totally isolated, the evolution there could take very traumatic forms, and this is what we are attempting to deal with.

Greece, Turkey: Again, we have a problem of the eastern

end of the Mediterranean, of the domestic evolution in both of these countries, and of the world equilibrium. We were perhaps projected into it somewhat more dramatically than we might have desired by certain domestic events in the United States, and we have been forced to stake more on this than might have been thought desirable from an abstract consideration of foreign policy.

But we do have an interest in retaining both of these friendly countries in NATO, in maintaining our traditional friendships with both countries and not have the eastern end of the Mediterranean turn into uncontrolled chaos—or, for that matter, controlled chaos.

**Q** Why does the U.S. seem so much more concerned than the Europeans about the Communist influence in Portugal?

**A** All we are saying is that at some point the evolution in Portugal will have reached a stage where we will have to make a decision whether this is still an Allied government or a neutralist government. At that point, we will have to consider the implications of our actions for Italy, Spain and the other European countries.

We have told our European allies that this is not something to be determined in the abstract. We are continuing our economic-aid program to Portugal for the time being. But we do not believe that we have to delude ourselves about what is going on there.

**Q** Outside Portugal, do you get the feeling that neutralism is spreading in Western Europe?

**A** No, I have the sense that, with the present governments, the awareness of the importance of the Atlantic Alliance is increasing. However, in many of the European countries, neutralist forces are growing—not in the governments but in political life. And that is a worrisome phenomenon for the middle and longer term. It is one of the factors we are keeping in mind with relation to Portugal.

**Q** All in all, Mr. Secretary, are you optimistic about the future?

**A** I'd like to repeat: We're moving into a new world, and I think that we are moving in the right direction.

There will always be unfinished business, and the more effective you are, the more unfinished business you will have.

[END]

USN & WR

> "It is an American illusion to believe foreign policy ought to lead to a solution to all problems."

27

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

June 16, 1975

No. 337

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT A LUNCHEON GIVEN BY
THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE
MAYFLOWER HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

JUNE 16, 1975

MR. GUNN: Ladies and Gentlemen, some twenty years ago, back at the dawn of public television and one of the most distinguished careers in diplomacy since Genghis Khan, Public Television Station WGBH in Boston presented a panel discussion on principal global issues that were then current twenty years ago.

The Program Panel contained members of the academic community drawn from both MIT's Center of International Affairs, and Harvard's Center of International Relations, a distinction presumably between theory and practice.

The Television moderator for this panel discussion some twenty years ago now, was the then Associate Director of the Harvard Center. He was quite the youngest of them, but, as you will see, he is rapidly approaching his mature side.

I recall that he, as the moderator, opened the discussion with a general question, which he then proceeded to answer, in a brilliant stroke, to the amazement of his seniors on the panel.

What has been Public Television's loss as a moderator has been the country's gain. Dr. Kissinger is still raising the great bulk of the questions of our day. He is still giving the answers.

PR #337

-2-

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Secretary of State of the United States, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen -- it must be at least twenty years since anyone asked me to moderate anything. At that time, nothing used to infuriate me more than a senior official, or even not a senior official, who would come and say that all options had been considered, the best possible one had been chosen, and that if his audience only knew as much as he did, they wouldn't bother him with the question period.

Well, I am here to tell you that all options have been considered, the best possible ones have been chosen, and if you knew as much as I did, you wouldn't ask any questions.

It did seem to me that it would be more fun for all concerned if rather than my delivering a rather stilted and deadly account of the brilliant successes of American foreign policy, I would make the same points in answer to your questions.

Before I do, I want to take this occasion to pay tribute to your work. I understand that you are now exporting more programs than you are importing. So one could argue that you are appreciated more abroad than at home. This is a feeling with which I can sympathize.

I am also glad to be here on an occasion when the BBC is being honored. I have always been impressed with their programs. I have never been quite sure whether it is entirely their programs, or their magnificent accent in which they are delivered -- something in which of course I am peculiarly competent.

I have a friend, in any event, who holds the view that the British accent is mostly fake and that if you can only take a Britisher unawares, like at three o'clock in the morning, and wake him up out of a sound sleep, he will talk like anybody else.

At this time, when the policies of all nations, and especially the experiences of our nation, are undergoing such a revolutionary change, it is difficult to present to the public the nature of the problem and the essence of the answers. The news reports, in the nature of things, emphasize the spectacular and the tactical. They emphasize the urgent very often rather than the important. What is badly needed is what PBS and other programs around the world are attempting to do -- to explain the context of events, to have some analysis of their significance, not necessarily geared to the headlines of the moment.

I had some discussion with Mr. Gunn about this many months ago concerning how to conduct foreign policy in an environment in which the real issues can very often not be discussed on some of the media because of pressures of time and the nature of the medium.

PR #337 (cc)

-3-

I would like to say that what PBS has done in many of your programs is a major contribution to the understanding of international affairs. And therefore I am glad to accept this opportunity to come and meet with you.

Now I think we can proceed most usefully if I answer your questions.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, my question is: will the United States use troops to defend South Korea if it is invaded by the North Koreans?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There are American troops in South Korea, and an attack on South Korea would be barely possible that did not involve American forces. And we have a security treaty. Of course we would follow constitutional procedures and the provisions of the War Powers Act. But we are bound by international obligations that have been ratified by the Congress to come to the assistance of South Korea.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, would you tell us the differences, as you see them, between serving as Secretary of State under President Ford as compared to serving as Secretary of State under former President Nixon?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think this is not a question that I should now answer, or perhaps should ever answer. Obviously each President has his own style and has his own intellectual cast. I think that both have made a major contribution to American foreign policy.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I have a question from President Ford's home town for you. Would you please comment on the role of Congress and the President in international affairs: how much should its members be informed; how much is your personal diplomacy; how much of it is the domain of Congress and the President?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There are several parts to that question.

First, should the Congress be informed? Secondly, of what should it be informed? And third, who should be informed?

Now, I have always believed -- and of course President Ford as a long-time member of the Congress feels this equally strongly -- that it is essential to keep the Congress informed of the nature of our foreign policy. The issue is not only of keeping the Congress informed, but what information it should be given and who can handle that information.

The Congress, in our view, should be consulted on all the main lines of American foreign policy; that is, the major decisions and those that effect changes of course or fundamental commitments. The Congress is in a poor position to handle the day-by-day details of American foreign policy -- although, of course, of those, too, they should be informed in a general way.

PR #337

-4-

But if you consider the mass of information that comes into the Depart-
ment, day after day, there is no staff in the Congress that could
possibly absorb all this information.

The third problem is, who in the Congress should be informed.

When I started out as Secretary of State, I established a very close
relationship with the leadership of the House and the Senate, and with
the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and what is now called the
International Relations Committee in the House. In the last two years,
however, there has been a revolution in the Congress, especially in the
House, so that the traditional leadership can no longer speak for the
members as it did in the past. And the traditional committees that
concerned themselves with international relations no longer represent
the group that is primarily or that is exclusively concerned with foreign
policy. So that the requirements of briefing now become enormous. I
must say I spend at least twenty-five percent of my time on the Congress,
and my associates spend more. One of the problems we face is to identify
a leadership group in the Congress which we can keep informed and with
which we would share all relevant information.

PR #337

-5-

So the problem of informing the Congress is soluble if the Congress can
organize itself to receive it.

The next question is the degree of Congressional supervision in the conduct
of policy. Again, I believe that the main lines of policy should be
developed on the basis of the closest consultation between the Congress
and the Executive. But again, even though the line cannot be clearly
drawn, for the Congress to get into the tactical issues is likely to
be extremely counter-productive. We have seen it with the Trade Act,
which hurt relations between the Soviet Union and the United States
and hurt the very people it was supposed to help. We have seen it with
respect to the cut-off of military aid to Turkey, which could have very
serious repercussions. And we have seen it in a number of other
instances.

On the other hand, we are prepared to take into account Congressional
concerns and to set up a system of consultation so that legislative
actions don't become necessary.

I recognize that some of this is a reaction to what is conceived in
the Congress as excesses of Executive authority, and some of those
Congressional concerns are quite justified. We will do our best to
meet them.

Indeed, I must say that in recent weeks, in fact in recent months, the
problem which seemed so acute earlier this year has improved enormously,
and the cooperation between the Executive and the Legislative branches
is now going along much more smoothly than earlier.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you think the CIA is important to the conduct of our foreign policy or do you think it has damaged our foreign policy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think the CIA is important to the conduct of our foreign policy, and I do not believe that it has damaged the conduct of our foreign policy. I believe, at least in my experience, the CIA has acted within Presidential authority. I think it is essential for the United States to have a first-rate intelligence organization under strict control by the political leadership and under such controls as the Congress can now establish. There obviously have been some abuses that have been described in the Rockefeller report and others that may come out in the reports of the various Congressional committees. But I consider the CIA essential for the conduct of our foreign policy, and I hope that it will not be damaged by these various investigations.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you think you can really get the Middle East situation calmed down permanently without further full-scale wars?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the Middle East has been torn by tensions throughout most of its history, and certainly through the last generation. Therefore it would be a rash man to say that it can be calmed down permanently. We will make a major effort to make progress towards

PR #337

-6-

a peace settlement, either in the form of an interim agreement or in the form of an overall agreement. I am hopeful that it can be done without war. I think another Middle East war would be a catastrophe for all of the parties. It would settle none of the issues that are now before them, and at the end of it they would be exactly at the point they have reached now, which is how to negotiate progress towards a lasting peace. I think we can make progress, and we are working very hard to promote some progress. I think it is imperative that it be done without war.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, California is a region of the country where many of the recent Vietnamese refugees, now immigrants to the United States, are being concentrated. Many of our citizens out there are asking what can the Federal Government do, what can the Ford Administration do, to ameliorate the economic impact on our region from this group of new immigrants.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, of course I am not an expert on the domestic economy, as my colleagues would be eager to tell you. I can't make that point emphatically enough. So quite frankly, I don't know what specific steps we can take to ameliorate the impact of refugees in various communities. My impression has been that the number was relatively small in terms of the overall labor market; that the number in any one location would not be decisive. I am sure that an effort will be made to ease it. But I cannot give you an answer, because I don't know what these efforts are. It is not in the province of my Department, and everyone knows how meticulous I am not to step over that boundary.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, it has recently been alleged that the strength of the OPEC oil cartel is due in some part to your Middle Eastern policy of conciliation of both the Arabs and Israelis. If there is any substance to this allegation, is peace in the Middle East worth the price that we must now pay for oil — that is, world inflation?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't agree with the allegation. It is easy to take a verbally tough stance.

First of all, conciliation of the Israelis, which is not what I have been accused of in the last few months, has nothing to do with the oil price. Secondly, with respect to the oil price, it will not come down by a tough declaration. It will come down only when the objective conditions are created which shift the forces of the market or which create political incentives to reduce the price. This is what we are working on with great energy. We have created over the last year the International Energy Agency which brings together all of the consuming countries in joint programs of conservation, in developing alternative sources and in joint research and development programs. It will take some time to take full effect. But even today the market forces have already shifted somewhat in favor of the consumers, though not yet in a decisive manner. Until they have moved in a more clear-cut manner, no amount of verbal tough talk is going to change this — all the more so since the victims of this are usually the countries that will not

-7-

PR #337

join an oil embargo — which we have to keep in mind, in view of Middle East tensions, and that have otherwise cooperated with us.

So I believe that the policies we are pursuing are designed to bring the oil price down and that they cannot be described as conciliating those who want to bring the price up.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, your policies obviously are based on your perceptions of the world we live in today and were formed, I think, as we heard, nearly twenty years ago. I wanted to know if they are still valid or have they really in fact changed?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** My views?

**QUESTION:** Yes, sir.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Since they were elaborated twenty years ago?

I'll tell you — I have not read anything that I have written since I came down here. And there is good reason for that — because there is a British reviewer who wrote about one of my books, "I don't know whether Mr. Kissinger is a great writer, but anyone who finishes this book is a great reader."

I think it is possible — at least I leave open the theoretical possibility — that I might have changed my mind on something in my life, but don't press me too hard.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the United States has been recently accused of buying the friendship of other countries with gifts, which kind of resulted in a loss of credibility. I was wondering how we are going to counteract that.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't believe it would be a valid criticism to say that we are trying to purchase the goodwill of other countries with gifts.

**QUESTION:** I don't believe so, either. But it seems like other people think that.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think basically relations between countries have to be based on their perception of common objectives and their perception of parallel interests.

Through the immediate post-war period, when the United States was economically and militarily the dominant country all over the world and when other countries were either just getting started or were in disarray, it is true that the United States' material contribution was quite essential and that this might have created some of the atmosphere that you describe. I don't think this is the situation today. Today the big problem is to bring the nations of the world together in a recognition of the fact of interdependence and to deal in a cooperative manner with the issues of energy, raw materials, food, that none of them