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point of view absolutely preclude fighting limited wars, is valid as this contention is in the abstract, it is unrealistic psychologically. A limited war of any size would absorb so great a proportion of the present army that it would lose a great deal of flexibility to deal with any other threat. The unlikelihood that any Chief of Staff would commit an army of the present size is shown by the attitude of the then Chief-of-Staff General Ridgway with regard both to Indo-China and the Chinese offshore islands. And the doubts of the military will reinforce the inhibitions of the political leadership. Thus another vicious circle is set up: the civilian leadership will tend to make its participation in a limited war dependent on military advice, but the pressure of the military will in all good conscience have to be against involvement either because they do not possess adequate forces or because they lack an adequate doctrine or both. The circle is broken in practice only if a strong President assumes the responsibility for defining the limits of the conflict and the nature of our commitment as happened in the Korean war.

Nevertheless the inadequacy of forces is relatively easily remedied if we can adjust our notion of war to new conditions. Unfortunately we reacted to the frustrations of the Korean war with a determination never to be caught in such a predicament again. Accordingly, we set about to reduce the deployment of our troops overseas and to create a strategic reserve in the United States. As a concept this is unexceptionable. A strategic reserve, however, implies the precise meaning of the term: a reserve for a force which is holding the line. Unfortunately one of the basic facts of the post-war period is the inadequacy of many local forces for this mission or at least their inability to offer prolonged resistance. A strategic reserve which cannot move to threatened areas quickly to bolster local resistance is a contradiction in terms: it will be either too small or too irrelevant for a general war; and too immobile to redress the

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strategic balance locally. The importance of forces ready to intervene rapidly was surely one of the lessons of the Korean war. For whatever the state of our readiness militarily or psychologically, the attack occurred in a fortuitous area, close to our only concentration of troops in Asia. And even these untrained troops, hastily assembled, and understrength managed to establish a perimeter and in a few months to restore the situation. Had we required even one more week to bring troops into Korea, it would have been too late and Korea could probably not have been recaptured without an effort that would have materially increased the chances of general war.

A strategic reserve must have mobility to be strategically significant. In the past this mobility was assured by command of the seas. But in modern war such a leisurely deployment is no longer possible. We therefore have two choices: we can either station ready forces in or close to likely trouble spots or we can keep the major portion of our strategic reserve in the United States, but give it the requisite mobility. The first alternative is politically difficult and strategically risky; the second presupposes two conditions, however: an organization of army units less cumbersome than the present division geared to relative slow cross-country movement and an airlift which will enable us to intervene in threatened areas within a time span that will be strategically effective. The reorganization of army units is required because our tactical organization has been based essentially on a doctrine of a war of position, geared to the speed of the internal combustion engine and the availability of roads. Such a division may prove too large and too cumbersome to fight an effective action in a situation which is not likely to have a stabilized front. Above all, it is too complicated to be transportable efficiently by air. The current infantry division weighs approximately 28,000 short tons. It would require the entire available U.S. airlift, including the civil reserve fleet thirty days to move one such division from the United States to the Middle

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East, provided all air-transport units were in position when the crisis occurred-- a most unlikely contingency. Even the combat element of such a division weighs 7,000 short tons, and could therefore not be moved in less than 10 days.

It is clear that one means for improving mobility is to reduce the weight of army units. Fortunately substantial steps in this direction are taking place. The army has given up its traditional organization of a division on the basis of three regiments and has substituted the Pentana concept: a division composed of five combat teams. This increases the number of self-supporting commands and thereby the flexibility of maneuver; it enables the application of a more discriminating increment of force. In addition a new type of airborne division has been created designed for rapid air-transport. It would weigh 14,300 short tons and its combat element would weigh 5,000 short tons. This would halve the time required to move one division to the Middle East from the United States even with existing airlift.

But the existing airlift places us in a precarious situation from the point of view of limited war. Unless the combat element of a division can be lifted, almost simultaneously it may arrive too late to affect events or in such small driblets that it can be defeated in detail. But to lift the combat element of a new type division would require a fleet of 200 C-133's; to move the entire division within a period of 10 days would require a fleet of 272 C-133's at a cost of 2.6 billion dollars. After this unit were in position it would require 272 planes to airlift 9,438 short tons of supplies to be airlifted over a 30-day period, at the end of which time surface transports would probably take over most of the logistics. To be sure, as the high speed nuclear powered ships which are being planned by the navy become operative in a decade or so, the requirement for airlift may decline. But in the interim period airlift is our only means for attaining strategic mobility for limited war.

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The dispute about the need for airlift has been one of the cardinal disagreements between the Army and the Air Force. It is not the purpose of this book to attempt to resolve a conflict which has occupied the Joint Chiefs of Staff for several years. For the Significance of the dispute resides not so much in the contentions advanced by either side as in the fact that under the present definition of missions it is insoluble and the present organization for arriving at decisions can only exacerbate it. In terms of existing missions both the Air Force and the Army position are unassailable. The Key West agreement gives the Air Force the primary mission of defeating the enemy air arm. To invest 2.6 billion dollars in planes of no combat effectiveness which will add neither to the strategic nor to the tactical capability of the Air Force must to any responsible Chief of the Air Staff appear a diversion of resources. This will be particularly true when each service is operating under a fixed budgetary ceiling, and when the rapid rate of technological change requires large outlays for the introduction of missiles and the reequipping of most units.

But to the Army, charged with destroying its enemy counterpart, its strategic mission becomes meaningless if it cannot get into position to fight. To the Army the airlift is not a marginal requirement but the condition of all effective action. The rigid division of functions among the services, therefore, inhibits the consideration of airlift in terms of over-all strategy. The Army, to which the airlift is essential, is precluded by the Key West agreement from developing it, and Secretary Wilson's latest clarification of missions reinforces the prohibition against an Army air arm.13) The Air Force, which has primary responsibility for air transport must in turn consider it a marginal requirement in terms of its primary mission; indeed, the Key West agreement in effect

13. Department of Defense Press Release, November 26, 1956.

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precludes the Air Force from considering the airlift in the only terms which are
most meaningful to the Army and to the over-all situation: that of over-all
strategic mobility.

Thus our process of arriving at strategic decisions breaks down at the
precise point where the rigid division of functions causes one service to be
assigned a capability which is technically in its area of competence, but which
is subsidiary to its primary mission, although essential to the primary mission
of another service. These situations illustrate how all the pressures in our
military establishment work against considering either force levels or doctrine
in terms of an over-all strategy; how the intimate connection between primary
mission and budgetary awards impels our service chiefs with the best intentions
in the world into becoming essentially advocates of a service point of view. To
be sure, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not considered as represent-
ing a service while they sit on that body -- during the B-36 Hearings, Secretary
of the Air Force Symington went so far as to insist that the Chief of the Air
staff was not responsible to him for his discussions in the joint Chiefs.¹⁴)

But this subtle distinction is meaningless in practice. The service chiefs have
risen to their position through a lifetime of dedication to one arm. They are a
product of its problems, its training schools, its environment. While in office,
moreover, the portion of their time spent in administering their service is far
greater than that devoted to problems of over-all strategy. Maintaining the
morale of their service can never be far from their mind. And the problems of
mastering the primary mission of each service are becoming so complex that they
almost inevitably inhibit a consideration of their relationship to an over-all
mission, or better, they lead to a psychological distortion in which over-all

14. See Symington Hearings, p. (Testimony of General Vandenberg).

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strategy tends to be equated with a service's primary mission. The test of an
organization is how naturally and spontaneously it enables its leadership to
address itself to the problems of greatest over-all concern; there is little in
the organization of our National Defense Establishment that leads the service
chiefs naturally to a consideration of over-all strategic doctrine.

Against the background of the primary mission of the Air Force the
appropriations for additional airlift funds may justly seem exorbitant; but
in the light of the over-all requirements of United States strategy an
expenditure of 2.6 billion dollars to increase our strategic mobility does
not seem too high. It may be objected that airlift presupposes bases close
enough to the combat zone to be useful. But for the foreseeable future we
should be able to count on Okinawa as a staging area for the Far East, on
Cyprus as a staging area for the Middle East and on Britain as a staging area
for Europe. Thus once we possess strategic mobility, it is not at all obvious
that the Soviet bloc could utilize its interior position to assemble an
overwhelming force at any given point around its periphery, particularly in
areas where we can count on a measure of indigenous resistance or Allied support.

But can we counter even the forces they are able to assemble? If we
admit the local war thesis, do we not run the risk of having our army always
at the wrong place? To be sure, the Soviet bloc can pick the initial point
of attack, but the greater mobility of its interior position is illusory because
of the difficulties of communication. Once the Soviet armies are committed
in an area, they cannot be shifted at will against our air power or with greater
speed than we shift ours by sea. The Chinese, for example, cannot draw us
into Indo-China and then attack in Burma with the same army. They can, of
course, build up two armies, but we should be able to learn of this in time
and then decide to defend one or the other area, or neither, depending on the

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strategic situation. In any case, the two armies cannot support each other (the classic advantage of interior lines) and the power of modern weapons places an upper limit to the numbers of troops that can be profitably employed in any given area.

But assuming its feasibility would it be wise to let ourselves be drawn into a war of attrition with the Soviet bloc? Of course, the formulation of the question is somewhat beside the point for war in its very nature is a process of attrition. The problem for strategy is not how to avoid attrition but to determine which kind of attrition is strategically most significant. The notion that land war is inherently wasteful and that there are cheaper ways of winning victory is a legacy of our period of invulnerability. "If it is preferable to engage in a war of attrition" said Secretary of the Air Symington in 1949 "one American life for one enemy life then we are wrong. That is not our way. That is not the way in which the slaughter of American youth in an invasion of Japan was avoided. To whatever extent we can bring it about that weapons fashioned in Los Alamos and carried in aircraft fashioned in Fort Worth can destroy or diminish the power of an enemy to kill American soldiers, sailors and airmen, we are for pursuing that method." 15) "A B-36 with an A bomb" said Secretary Symington on another occasion, "can take off from this continent and destroy distant objectives which it might require ground armies years to take--and then only at the expense of heavy casualties. The B-36 could do the job within 16 hours--all this at the risk of only 16 American lives." 16)

Unfortunately, the transformation of the strategic situation wrought by the growing Soviet nuclear stockpile is the fact that the risk has become

15. Quoted in B-36 Hearings, p. 402.

16. Same, p. 315.

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much more than 16 American lives. Indeed, with the end of our invulnerability the most certain method for trading a life for a life is to engage in all-out thermo-nuclear bombing; this has become the war of attrition par excellence.

Moreover, the elimination of the enemy industrial potential would not affect the strategic equation rapidly enough to avoid catastrophic devastation and conversely the critical point of an war would be over before additional industrial production could become militarily significant. Thus all-out war is precisely the kind of war in which our industrial potential is least significant because each side can inflict attrition on the other almost simultaneously. But attrition is effective only if one side reaches exhaustion while the other still has resources left to impose its will.

Thus strategy conceived as an attempt to make the enemy fight with the weapons system most advantageous to us would actually favor a policy of limited war. A limited war is the only method to achieve a continuous drain of resources without exhausting both sides. It is therefore the best means to derive a strategic benefit from our industrial potential. For the prerequisite for utilizing industrial potential in a strategy of attrition has been defined in the previous chapter as a weapons system sufficiently complex to require a substantial production effort but not so destructive as to leave the victor no effective margin of superiority.

It may be objected that if it is to our advantage to fight a limited war, it must be to the disadvantage of the other side and that for this reason the Soviet bloc will have no incentive to keep a conflict limited. But it does not follow that because the Soviets stand to lose by limited war, that they would be able to calculate a gain from all-out war. As long as we maintain a substantial retaliatory force, the U.S.S.R. confronts the same strategic dilemma as we: that all-out war is useless as an instrument of policy except for acts of desperation. Thus the argument that limited war might turn into a contest of

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attrition is in fact an argument in favor or a strategy of limited war. A war of attrition is the one war the Soviet bloc could not win.

VIII

We have thus reached perhaps the most serious question connected with limited war: whether one of the limitations on the use of force should be to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons. Are nuclear weapons consistent with a policy of limited war? The problem resolves itself into two parts: whether it is possible to use nuclear weapons without the war spreading and whether it is wise to do so.

The argument against the use of nuclear weapons start from the premise that it is now possible to make nuclear weapons of any desired size ranging from below one kiloton to several megatons. As long as this is true there exists no natural "cut-off" point in the use of nuclear weapons even remotely as sharply defined as that between conventional and nuclear weapons. The losing side will therefore have every incentive to redress the balance by using a weapon of greater power and this in turn will provoke counter-retaliation. Thus a limited nuclear war would spread by a series of progressive steps towards an all-out war without any clarity as to which side took the crucial step which caused the war to become total. A distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons would therefore have the advantage of making the "atomic aggression" unambiguous. Moreover, so the argument runs, since the factor that limits a limited war is the risk of all-out thermo-nuclear war a limited nuclear war does not avoid the problem of thermo-nuclear devastation and may even accelerate it. ¹⁷)

17. James E. King, Jr., "Graduated Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1957, pp. ____

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VIII

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These arguments have great force. No one even generally familiar with the destructiveness of modern weapons can regard the prospect of any kind of nuclear war with equanimity. Yet the prospect of nuclear war is with us not by choice but because of the facts of modern technology. The only question for strategy therefore is which course will make all-out war less likely; whether limited nuclear war will add to our dangers or diminish them. It must be admitted at the outset that it is not possible to draw a sharp dividing line in the employment of nuclear weapons, that either side has therefore the technical possibility of expanding its commitment gradually until total war is reached. But the crucial point is surely not whether it can do so technically but whether it will wish to do so psychologically. The distinction between tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons may be difficult to draw on the basis of pure logic but every state will have a powerful incentive to make some distinction however tenuous its logic: the fear of all-out war. It is not likely that a war becomes all-out because of a logical syllogism. Korea should demonstrate the eagerness of both sides to draw limits, however arbitrary and however contrary to military logic. No one "wargaming" the Korean war in advance would have assumed it possible that a war with such ground rules could be fought. As it turned out we would not even retaliate against air bases from which attacks on our forces would be leveled.

Nor is it a foregone conclusion that the losing side, if its defeat is kept within limits which do not threaten its retaliatory capacity, will lightly resort to all-out war. But if it is a foregone conclusion that the losing side will seek to escape its dilemmas by resorting to all-out war, it is difficult to see why it would be restrained by a distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons. For what precisely would be achieved by a distinction between conventional nuclear weapons? To be sure, it would make nuclear aggression unambiguous, but the consequences that flow from this are much less apparent.

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Would the side which is prepared to unleash an all-out thermo-nuclear war to avoid defeat in a limited nuclear war be less willing to do so if it should suffer a setback in a struggle fought with conventional weapons? Conversely what would be the sanction against introducing low-yield nuclear weapons in a war that started as a conventional war? If the reply is to be all-out thermo-nuclear war, reliance on conventional weapons would have brought on what it is designed to prevent. If the response is to use nuclear weapons in turn, but not resort to all-out war, a limited nuclear war would be taking place albeit at the second stage of the conflict.

A limited conventional war could be kept non-nuclear only by the threat of all-out retaliation should any kind of nuclear weapon be introduced. But this will be effective only to the extent that the threat will be credible. Is the use of low-yield nuclear weapons a sufficient provocation to overcome the tremendous inhibitions against all-out war? It is difficult to be certain about reactions to contingencies which have never taken place. It is hard to believe, however, that the introduction into a limited war of low-yield nuclear weapons or even more powerful weapons confined to military targets would be considered the last resort which would induce a power to stake its national substance. It would be both implausible and unwise. For an all-out thermo-nuclear war which started for such a provocation would have brought on catastrophe before all possibilities of avoiding it had been exhausted. And because this is true, there will be every incentive to test the possibility of limited nuclear war before taking the irreversible last step of what President Eisenhower has called the "ultimate" war. A limited nuclear war, moreover, which grows out of a conventional war may be more difficult to limit than a war which starts as a limited nuclear war because it would be breaking out under the worst possible

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conditions. The sudden introduction of nuclear weapons during the course of a war would force the Powers to confront the problem of limitation in the confusion of combat when the possibilities of misunderstanding the opponent's intentions are greatest. And this may be compounded by bureaucratic inertia if war plans postulate the explosion of any nuclear device anywhere as the start of thermo-nuclear conflict.

The only advantage of limiting war to conventional weapons then would be to make the atomic aggressor unambiguous and in practice the consequence of this would either be meaningless or it would make all-out war more likely. Moreover, limited conventional war even if it could be fought would not represent our most effective strategy. For limited war can be compared to a curve plotted on a graph one of the axis of which measures risk and the other measures commitment. At every point on this curve, the calculus of risks changes and every additional commitment forces the opponent to reevaluate the costs of continued war against the goals to be achieved. Somewhere on this curve there is a point for both sides at which they consider the risk of all-out war too great to commit an additional increment of force. If that point is the same for both sides, they will both be willing to run approximately the same risks and the fear of all-out war becomes a mutual deterrent. If one side is willing or able to operate further up on the curve, if, in other words, it is willing or able to increase its commitment further than its opponent, it will gain an advantage. Thus during the Korean war we had an advantage we did not press: that we could better afford an all-out war than our opponents and that the inhibitions against initiating an all-out war should therefore have been greater on the part of our opponents than with us. At the lower end of the curve an increased commitment will only force the opponent to decide whether he will assume an additional risk; as the point of all-out war is approached all calculations will be overlaid by the real or imagined danger of all-out war.

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For this reason one of the problems of limited war is to decide on which part of the curve measuring commitments and risks to operate. The dispute between those who identify limited war with conventional war and those who believe in the possibility of limited nuclear war resolves itself into a question whether it is safer and more productive to operate at the lower or on the upper part of the curve, whether a limited war is kept limited better by a strategy of minimum risk or by starting it with an initially larger commitment. Liddell Hart has argued for example, that deterrence is best achieved by a light screen of token conventional forces for the enemy would know that overrunning them would be tantamount to a declaration of all-out war because we would not accept defeat without resorting to it.18) But this is in effect another version of massive retaliation which interjects one small step -- a limited conventional war -- between peace and a thermo-nuclear holocaust. And it is subject to the same criticism as massive retaliation. It is simply not credible that a defeat of a few conventional divisions should unleash a thermo-nuclear holocaust, nor is a strategy which would go through with such a threat a responsible one. Thus at the lower end of the scale where the deterrence may be ineffective because the risk for the Soviet bloc is small and the threat of all-out war not plausible.

Conventional war, moreover, permits the opponent to substitute manpower for meteriel on the battlefield; it enables him gradually to increase his commitment and to force us to decide at every stage of military operation whether to follow suit. It therefore gives the enemy the benefit of initiative in expanding the war by increments so small, including the jump from conventional to low-yield nuclear weapons, that none will seem a sufficient provocation for all-out war.

18. *Saturday Review of Literature*, May

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Conversely, it will be very difficult on this basis to maneuver the enemy into a position from which he can extricate himself *only* by all-out war -- the conditions for winning or stalemating a limited war.

To operate with a strategy of very limited commitments may therefore weaken deterrence to the point where aggression is encouraged.

The best balance between deterrence and an effective strategy is in the intermediary range of risk and commitment: the area of limited nuclear war. Here a substantial risk is posed for the opponent and one that has the advantage of credibility. The Soviet bloc moreover will be deprived of the advantage of initiative in expanding the war because both sides will be operating close to the upper limit of risk. In short, in a policy of limited war it is safer and more effective to begin with an intermediary rather than a minimum commitment because the threat of all-out war which is the chief limiting condition of war will be more credible here and because the most difficult decision -- whether to resort to all-out war -- is passed on to the enemy most effectively in this manner.

This is not to say that limited nuclear war is always the best or the wisest strategy; it is simply to indicate that it is possible and that flexibility is increased not by attempting to draw a line between conventional and nuclear war, but by creating a smooth curve of non-nuclear and nuclear capability. In a limited war against a non-nuclear underdeveloped country, in a civil war, in a minor police action, the use of nuclear weapons may be unnecessary or unwise either for psychological or political reasons. In some circumstances too, it may be desirable to understate the response against a major power by using conventional weapons. But in a war against a nuclear power or in a war against an enemy whose resources of manpower would enable him to keep increasing his commitment by small increments, a limited nuclear war affords the best strategy for fighting a limited war effectively and for keeping it limited. The advantage of lower-yield nuclear

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weapons is that they shift the contest to a plane where our technological superiority over the Soviet bloc is at a premium. When the destructiveness of individual weapons is small, the significant attrition of war is in manpower and an increment of manpower introduced into a war may overturn the strategic balance. If the destructiveness of weapons is too large, a relatively few weapons will suffice to establish an equilibrium. But in an intermediary range of destructiveness, weapons are sufficiently complex to require highly trained manpower yet discriminating enough to permit the establishment of a significant margin of superiority.

Thus while the growth of the Soviet strategic air force and nuclear stockpile should cause us to revise our concepts of all-out war, the introduction of nuclear weapons on a battlefield will shake the very basis of Soviet tactical doctrine. No longer will the Soviet bloc be able to rely on massed manpower as in World War II and in Korea. On a nuclear battlefield, dispersion is the key to survival and mobility the prerequisite of success. A great deal depends on leadership of a high order, personal initiative and mechanical aptitude, all qualities in which our military organization probably excels that of the U.S.S.R. To attempt to defend a perimeter like that of the Soviet bloc with conventional forces would impose a staggering drain on our manpower and would likely produce casualties far exceeding those of a short sharp nuclear war. Moreover, in a limited war the ability to establish an equilibrium rapidly is itself a factor of limitation. Small, highly mobile units of very great firepower which impose a large measure of dispersal on the enemy offer a better means of achieving this than the much more cumbersome conventional forces.

It may be true, as is frequently argued, that a nuclear war also requires substantial manpower and that its net effect may well involve an expansion of our

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military establishment. The significant point, however, is not the quantity of manpower, but where this manpower is utilized: in a conventional war manpower is required to establish an equilibrium on the battlefield. In a nuclear war, it is needed in supporting technical units. Nuclear war would therefore enable us to utilize our large reservoir of technically trained manpower to best advantage; for despite great strides the U.S.S.R. has made in the training of scientists and technicians in recent years, there can be little doubt that on the over-all balance the Free World possesses an infinitely larger pool of technically trained manpower; and the disparity in the familiarity with technology on the part of the mass of the population which may prove even more important is more pronounced still. To be sure, our technological superiority may be fleeting; with the spread of nuclear power technology many nations may come to possess plutonium and thereby the werewithal to make nuclear weapons. But it is one thing to master the manufacture of nuclear weapons; it is quite another to develop the whole range of supporting paraphenalia: the electronics for control, the light planes for maneuverability, the complex interrelationship between fire and movement. The history of the Soviet arms deal with Egypt illustrates the difficulty of technologically backward nations in operating even complicated conventional equipment. Even should a rough balance in technical manpower and competence exist in time, this would do no more than establish an equilibrium; nuclear war favors the defensive and it is therefore to our net advantage since we are more likely to resist than to initiate aggression. The possibility of a military stalemate all around the Soviet periphery would represent a net strategic advantage for us.

Nuclear war favors the defensive not only because it facilitates the establishment of an equilibrium but also because it may deprive aggression of one of its objectives: to control territory. The same esoteric quality which

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we have seen to characterize all-out thermo-nuclear war, will tend to distinguish limited nuclear war as well. Small, highly mobile units will be excellent tools for fighting their enemy counterparts; they are not efficient means for controlling territory or for rapid strikes to destroy important objectives. The experience of the Hungarian revolution demonstrates the difficulty of a highly mechanized army of controlling even against a practically unarmed population.

In the event the Red Army had to concentrate fifteen armored divisions to occupy a territory without modern arms. Such a concentration against an army equipped with nuclear weapons would be disastrous, however. Thus if nuclear units of high mobility to control the countryside are supported by more stationary types of organizations to man hedgehogs and to prevent a sudden coup against the cities a very difficult problem is posed for an aggressor. From the military point of view he requires highly mobile, small units. From the point of view of controlling territory against a hostile population or even one covered with fortified hedgehogs he requires massive forces. Against a determined enemy it will be very difficult to combine these two objectives; a determined defensive should be able to keep the aggressor constantly off balance by never permitting him to consolidate any gain. And if this is coupled with rapid thrusts by small units deep into enemy territory which, in Europe at least, can be assumed to be hostile to the U.S.S.R. the Soviets might soon face a perhaps untenable situation. The purpose of mobile units in a limited nuclear war would be to disorganize the enemy's rear through the sudden destruction of key installations and the creation of centers of resistance. Our technological superiority, the superior initiative of our people, and the greater social cohesiveness of the Free World should give us a decided advantage in a limited nuclear war. Limited nuclear war would therefore be conducted by small, highly mobile units; its analogy is not traditional land warfare, but naval warfare where self-contained units of high

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firepower gradually achieve domination by destroying their enemy counterpart in
a war of nameuver without physically occupying the terrain.

In any case, the discussion about the advisability of limited nuclear
war is somewhat beside the point. Our whole planning, procurement, research
and development has been built around nuclear weapons to an extent that a change
would put Eurasia at the mercy of the U.S.S.R.'s conventional forces at least in
an intermediary period while we readjusted our planning and procurement. And
the same development is taking place among our allies.¹⁹) To be sure, this is
an argument based on existing policy and policy can be reversed, although too
drastic changes increase the psychological vulnerability. But for the reasons
indicated above, it would be unwise to reverse the policy. Our task should be
to break down the trauma that has surrounded the use of nuclear weapons and not
to contribute to distinctions which may prove illusory in wartime. If we do not
succeed in making nuclear weapons conventional their almost inevitable intro-
duction in a war will produce psychological consequences not warranted by their
employment and inconsistent with the facts of modern technology. For with both
sides possessing nuclear establishments, any war will be nuclear whatever the
weapons system used. At a minimum forces will have to maneuver as if nuclear
weapons might be used because the side which concentrates its forces would offer
a tempting target and thereby give its opponent the precise incentive he requires
to use nuclear weapons. But if forces are dispersed they will not be able to hold
a line with conventional weapons, because the power of conventional weapons is
relatively so small that effective defense presupposes massed fire power. Finally
if an aggressor suddenly introduced nuclear weapons against a conventional defense

19. See Chapter VII below.

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result, a much more substantial degree of dispersion of troops than envisaged in
any previous war will be required to prevent one nuclear weapon from inflicting
exorbitant casualties. And dispersion must be coupled with a high degree of
mobility so that a target is not stationary long enough to invite attack. The
army is currently thinking in terms of battalions spaced more than two miles
apart so that a Hiroshima-type bomb would not be able to destroy more than one
batallion at a time.

Two consequences result: the great dispersion of a nuclear battlefield
makes it impossible to think any longer of a continuous front. The task of
denying territory to an enemy must be accomplished by preventing him from
assembling sufficient force to control it. Dispersal henceforth must be not
only between units but also in depth, with small detachments capable of making
rapid penetrations and equally rapid departures. The second conclusion involves
the consequences of mobility. Current army planning envisions helicopters
capable of carrying ____ men and small field guns, the "flying platform" which
enables an individual to move through the air in a rudimentary fashion for a
distance of ____ miles at a speed of ____ miles. Vertical take-off aircraft
will confer tactical mobility independent of the availability of airfields. Every
combat team will soon be equipped with missiles of ranges between 10 to 400 miles
capable of carrying nuclear warheads. And sophisticated communications systems
permit coordinated action of widely dispersed units.²¹)

These measures, while useful, only constitute a beginning. The ultimate
aim must be to create units which carry the analogy of naval warfare even further.
They should be self-contained both with respect to their supply and their mainte-
nance. Since they will operate without a logistic system in the traditional

21. Symington Hearings, p. (Lt. General Gavin).

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sense and often deep inside enemy territory, they should be able to repair their own equipment and to support themselves from their own supplies. They would therefore approximate a naval vessel as a tactical formation and like a naval vessel they should be able by their very existence and mobility to deny the control of vast areas to an enemy. Since they will be operating in populated regions they will also have to be trained in an understanding of political relationships, hitherto thought outside military concerns. To the extent that they are able to distinguish friend from foe and to draw the consequences from it, they will complicate enemy moves and the reverse would equally be true. The experience of Hungary has shown the difficulty of sustaining warfare against determined civilian resistance. A few U.S. units with the fire-power, mobility and discrimination described here might have made the Soviet position untenable.²²

In this type of warfare many of the targets of traditional warfare have ceased to be strategically productive. One of the reasons for the estimates of high casualties is the belief that in a nuclear war cities would be hit with atomic weapons. But this literal application of the tactics appropriate to conventional war does not follow. In conventional war the large number of troops, their cumbersome equipment and the complicated logistic system confined most movement to road or rail. In these circumstances, it made sense to attempt to interdict maneuver by bombing transportation centers. But when units achieve the degree of mobility envisaged by the armies of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. the bombardment of communication centers may prove unnecessary and militarily unproductive. And on the battlefield, dispersion and mobility should be used to set an upper limit to the size of weapons it is profitable to employ.

22. I am indebted to Dr. Edward Teller for some of these ideas.

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Military formations can thus be protected by the uncertainty of the enemy regarding their location.

It may be objected that whatever the rate of casualties among troops the losses suffered by the civilian population will be enormous because of the necessity of gaining air superiority and the proximity of airfields to centers of population in densely populated Western Europe. Neither the need for air supremacy nor the bombing of airfields are as inevitable as classic air strategy maintains, however. The concept of air supremacy by bombing air fields is itself a symptom of an obsolescent strategy. It was valid only so long as it was more economical to destroy a plane on the ground than in the air, as long, in short, as planes had to be concentrated on a relatively few bases for efficient operation. But the concurrent development of vertical take-off aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles seem to make the destruction of planes in flight at least as economical as the destruction of airfields. Against vertical take-off aircraft there will be no runway left to crater or concentration of planes to hit; it will be possible to achieve almost the degree of dispersion where one weapon can destroy only one plane (which is exactly the relation which obtains in attacking a plane in flight). And within ten years anti-aircraft missiles can make the life of any manned plane exceedingly difficult. In such a situation, tactical air support will have changed its meaning: it will either be accomplished by missiles or by vertical take-off aircraft. It will then become meaningless to speak of air supremacy in the traditional sense. Missile launching sites can be so dispersed and they can be made so mobile that it will be very difficult to locate them and impossible to destroy them all. This is not to say that nuclear war will not be costly, only that its cost should be weighed against the tactics appropriate to it. In any case, compared to the casualties of an all-out thermo-nuclear war those produced by a limited nuclear war would still appear mild.

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Limited nuclear war becomes attractive only compared to the cataclysm which a
total war would produce.

One other aspect of limited nuclear war must be considered: the premium
it places on surprise attack both for psychological as well as for strategic
reasons. It is important psychologically because if the fighting can be trans-
ferred into the opponent's territory, his inhibitions against using nuclear
weapons will be magnified by the concern for his own population. The psycho-
logical balance in the use of nuclear weapons thus favors the aggressor -- a
point explicitly recognized in Soviet doctrine.²³) And the psychological
importance is reinforced by considerations of strategy. In an all-out war a
surprise attack will prove strategically unproductive if it cannot reduce the
counterblow to unacceptable proportions. And as we have seen this will become
increasingly difficult to accomplish. But in limited war a sudden thrust and a
rapid consolidation may permit the aggressor to assume the defensive to hold
what he just captured. And the defensive in a limited nuclear war has a decided
advantage. The rewards for initiative are therefore greater in limited nuclear
war than even in conventional war. For this reason, the side whose doctrine
yields the first blow to its opponent must pay particular attention that both
its military capability and its process for arriving at decisions permit it to
act rapidly enough to prevent the aggressor from consolidating his gain. It is
the paradoxical consequence of a period when technology has never been more
complicated that its effectiveness depends to such an extent on intangibles: on
the subtlety of the leadership and on its conception of alternatives.

23. See below, Chapter

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this argument too shows the persistence of a World War II pattern of thinking. It is fallacious both with respect to a strategy for all-out war as well as with respect to the psychological framework for limited war. The all-out war capability cannot be created by mobilizing during the course of a limited war -- this possibility ended with the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the development of a Soviet Long-Range Air Force. If our all-out capability is not in-being at all times, we not only will not be able to fight a limited war, we will also risk being subjected to an all-out surprise attack. Moreover, substantial mobilization during a limited war could be interpreted by the opponent as the prelude to a show-down and may therefore induce him to anticipate it by unleashing all-out war himself.

Thus limited war, just as all-out war, will have to be fought largely by the forces-in-being. While it is difficult to define force levels in the abstract, these considerations would seem to cast some doubt on the efficacy of a large reserve program, particularly for nuclear war which requires a degree of training and discipline unattainable by part-time training. As a result the major use of reserves may be to replace regular units in home defense and for disaster relief in case of all-out war.

Withal a strategy for limited wars will not eliminate the precariousness of our situation. The best strategy in this period can confer only a relative security for all-out war will always loom in the background as a last resort. Moreover, as nuclear technology becomes diffused other, and perhaps less responsible, powers will enter the nuclear equation. The fear of mutual destruction which is the chief deterrent to all-out war for the major powers may be less effective with nations which have less to lose; indeed, whose negotiating position tends to be improved by their threat to commit suicide. Even in the relations among the major powers the strategy outlined in this chapter will not

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IX

Thus our discussion leads to these conclusions: (a) war between major powers is likely to be a nuclear war. (b) Nuclear war should be fought as something less than all-out war. Only in this manner will it be possible to escape the dilemma of the nuclear age defined above as the choice between Armageddon and defeat without war. The flexibility of our diplomacy depends on the adaptability of our strategy and the adaptability of our strategy depends on our ability to alter doctrines developed in a more secure past. The identification of deterrence with maximum retaliatory power which has been the basis of our entire post-war military thought no longer holds: because it is not credible in most of the disputes [actually at issue] and because it poses exorbitant risks should deterrence fail.

As a result, the challenge to strategy has become much more subtle and complicated. At every point of tension and in every military contingency, strategy must seek to harmonize political, psychological and military considerations to relate military capability to psychological readiness. It cannot strive to combine the best of all possible worlds to pose a maximum threat in its policy of deterrence and yet conduct a policy of minimum risk. It must decide the price it is willing to pay for deterrence, but then [to] make certain that this price will be paid if the need arises. Nor are the vistas which are opened by the discussion of this chapter simple or easy to contemplate. They are the penalty, however, for living in a nuclear period, a penalty we consciously accept when we permitted our atomic monopoly to be broken in the absence of international control.

The strategy described in this chapter must be considered not against the background of nostalgia for a more secure past but against the perils of

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all-out thermo-nuclear catastrophe. It is designed to give us a gamut of options so that the alternative to peace need not always be to stake the national substance, and the dilemma of initiating all-out war on the most difficult decision of our period -- can be passed to our opponent. A strategy of limited war thus is an application of the five principles discussed at the beginning of the chapter. It takes account of the preferred mode of action of the Soviet bloc with its preference for indirect methods of penetration and solutions short of all-out war. It affords the possibility of channeling these efforts by creating a smooth curve of capabilities from conventional to nuclear war and it supplies the flexibility to confront the enemy with unforeseen contingencies. It uses America's assets, the industrial potential and reservoir of technology to best advantage and it achieves its ends at much less cost than all-out war. To be sure, it offers no final solutions and stalemates are more likely than complete victories. But in many areas, now overshadowed by the Soviet threat, the possibility of a stalemate represents a strategic advance.

It may be argued that a strategy which is based on the mutual fear of thermo-nuclear devastation is inherently unstable. In the past new discoveries often have been greeted with prophesies of impending doom or assertions that they had made war impossible and in every case they were used to the limit of their effectiveness. Why should this be different now? It cannot be denied, of course, that many new discoveries have been taken to augur the end of war and concluded by adding to the horror of war. Yet it is equally true that no new discovery has ever added the increment of destructive power to armaments that is represented by nuclear weapons, or ever came into existence so suddenly. Gunpowder, for example, was introduced gradually over a period of centuries. In -- over a century after it became widely known -- Machiavelli could still argue against its use because it was less efficient than the then "traditional"

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be easy to implement. It presupposes a diplomacy which can make its options
clear to the other side and which can keep conflicts from being considered as a
prelude to a final showdown. Above all it requires strong nerves. For we can
make the graduated employment of force stick only if we leave no doubt about
our readiness to confront a final show-down; its effectiveness will depend on
our willingness to face up to the risks of Armageddon.

The American strategic problem can therefore be summed up in these
propositions:

1. Thermo-nuclear war must be avoided, except as a last resort.

2. [No] power possessing thermo-nuclear weapons is not likely to accept unconditional surrender without employing them and no nation is likely to risk thermo-nuclear destruction except to the extent that it believes its survival to be at stake.

3. It is the task of our diplomacy, therefore, to make clear that we do not aim for unconditional surrender, to create a framework in which the question of national survival is not involved in every issue. But equally we should leave no doubt about our determination to achieve intermediary objectives and to resist by force any Soviet military move.

4. Since diplomacy which is not related to a plausible employment of force is sterile, it must be the task of our military policy to develop a doctrine and a capability for the graduated employment of force.

The problem of limited war is therefore not simply a question of military capability or even of strategic doctrine. Before we turn to the consideration of the diplomacy to give it effect it is important to take account of the fact that national policy does not take place in a vacuum. It is important to consider the reactions of our allies, the uncommitted and of the Soviet bloc to the challenge of the nuclear age.

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2. No power possessing thermo-nuclear weapons is/likely to accept unconditional surrender without employing them and no nation is likely to risk thermo-nuclear destruction except to the extent that it believes its survival to be at stake.

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2. No power possessing thermo-nuclear weapons is likely to accept unconditional surrender without employing them and no nation is likely to risk thermo-nuclear destruction except to the extent that it believes its survival to be at stake.

CHAPTER VI

# What Price Deterrence - The Problems of Limited War

Another way of putting this problem is to ask under what conditions power and the willingness to use it are most in harmony. There exists no over-all formula for military superiority nor any one military capability which will achieve deterrence in all circumstances. The same military capability which may prevent war in one contingency, may encourage it in another. The same weapons system which it would be folly to challenge given one set of objectives, may be useless to discourage different purposes. Thus a gap is created between the pressures of technology in the direction of the development of maximum power and the realities of the nuclear period that there exist upper limits beyond which increments of destructiveness do not pay strategic returns.

It is therefore no longer possible to speak of military superiority in the abstract. What does being ahead in the nuclear race mean if each side can destroy the other's national substance? What is the significance of increasing the destructiveness of the nuclear arsenal when the enormity of weapons present/systems already tends to paralyze the will? It may be a hard lesson to learn for a nation which has found safety in the magnitude of its power that henceforth security may depend on the nuance and subtlety with which its strength can be applied. The fate of the dinosaur and the mammoth should be sufficient illustration that brute strength does not always supply the mechanism for success in the struggle for survival.

As long as invulnerability was coupled with the ability to assemble overwhelming power, strategy for us resolved itself into deciding on a

overwhelming power, strategy for use resolved itself into deciding on a

mechanism for success in the argument for survival. The long as invulnerability was coupled with the ability to assemble

sufficient illustration that despite an effort does not always supply the strength can be supplied. The fate of the dinosaur and the mammoth should be that benevolent security may depend on the absence and safety with which it to learn for a nation which has found safety in the absence of its power present\ systems already tends to paralyze the will? It may be a hard-faced weapons increasing the destructiveness of the nuclear armament when the security of can destroy the other's a national advantage? What is the significance of in the abstract? That does being added in the preceding case mean it each side

bet strategic returns.

there exist upper limits beyond which increments of destructiveness do not develop of maximum power and the realties of the nuclear period that a risk is created between the pressures of technology in the direction of the one set of objectives, may be made to discourage different purposes. Time another. The same weapons states which it would be likely to challenge given capability which may prevent or in one contingency, may encourage it in which will achieve deterrence in all circumstances. The same military over-all formula for military superiority nor any one military capability power and the willingness to use it are most in harmony. There exists no another way of putting this problem to ask under what conditions

The Logic of Deterrence - The Problems of Limited War

CHAPTER VI

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certain level of military effort. But this condition was a fortunate historical
accident and fleeting by its very nature. Strategy for other nations has always
involved a sense of proportion as much as a sense of scale; it reflected the art
by which a relationship was established between the various elements of a
nation's strength and its willingness to act. And henceforth this will be
the challenge of the nuclear period for American strategy. Any discussion of
methods to overcome or mitigate the dilemmas of strategy in the nuclear age
must therefore begin with a discussion of the components of strategy in general.
Although there exist as many definitions as books on the subject, it may be
useful to state five principles against which to test any proposed solutions:

1. Strategy must seek to determine the opponent's likely mode of action in devising its weapons system and its tactical doctrine. A weapons system cannot be developed in the abstract; it reflects a set of assumptions about the nature of the war in which it will be employed, and these assumptions will also underlie military training, the purpose of which is to permit an effective response to the widest range of circumstances. The effectiveness of the response depends on establishing the patterns of behavior of combat in advance of actual hostilities because the confusion of battle permits only a minimum number of improvisations. Tactical doctrine therefore seeks to anticipate in training and through indoctrination the contingencies which will be confronted in combat.

As a result, the advantage conferred by surprise is not so much the
ability to confront the opponent with overwhelming force, as the opportunity of
presenting unexpected contingencies. "Nothing is easier to effect" said
Machiavelli'than what the enemy thinks you will never attempt to do." An
unexpected mode of action forces improvisation; it therefore deprives the

["IV", "unprecedented success of action forces in the war. The American forces were able to use the new weapons effectively because of the new technology and the new ideas of the new leaders. The American forces were able to use the new weapons effectively because of the new technology and the new ideas of the new leaders. This was possible because of the new technology and the new ideas of the new leaders.

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opponent of the advantage of sober calculation. Moreover, while improvisation for the individual may inhibit only his best performance, in a group or organization, it may produce more serious consequences. An organization is distinguished from a collection of individuals by its ability to act purposefully as a unit; it does so by reducing most problems to routine--a standard of average performance. Thus the other members of the group are enabled to take certain patterns of behavior for granted and to adjust their actions accordingly. A great momentum is conferred by coupling the specialization of functions with cooperative effort. This in turn frees energies for the solution of problems which are not routine and for pushing forward areas of knowledge or of competence.

The test of any organization then is twofold: (1) whether what it defines as routine in fact applies to the problems it is most likely to confront; (2) whether the attempt to achieve predictability does not inhibit creativity or spontaneous reactions to unexpected contingencies. The two problems are in fact closely related. If the area of the predictable compared to the unexpected is relatively large, the unforeseen can be integrated into existing patterns of leadership; then mental energies can be devoted to the creative and spontaneous solutions of new problems. If an organization is confronted by too many unexpected contingencies, however, its leadership will no longer be able to draw strength from the cooperative effort; on the contrary, the routine on which its action is based may inhibit adaptation; the machinery for making decisions may become overloaded. In extreme cases, members of the group may take independent action and thus increase the indeterminacy of the over-all performance. Or it may lead to panic: the inability to make any response to a challenge except by fleeing from it.

from it.

bajo: la insufficiencia de make any response to a challenge except by facing
increase the indeterminacy of the overall performance. Or it may lead to
extreme cases, например, the group may take independent action and time
adaptation; the machinery for making decisions may become overloaded. In
effort; on the contrary, the routine on which its section is based may befford
federated will no longer be able to draw strength from the cooperative
organisation is confronted by too many uncoordinated configurations, however, it
devoted to the creative and autonomous solutions of new problems. It an
gratified into existing patterns of federated; then should energies can be
compared to the unexpected if relatively future, the motorisen can be int-
problems are in each closely related. If the area of the predictable
creativity or spontaneous reactions to unexpected configurations. The two
contrasts; (2) when the attempt to achieve predictability does not befford
deliver as routine in fact asplite to the problems if it is most likely to
be successful.

The test of any organisation from its whole: (1) whether what it
knows or of conference.

Solution of problems which are not routine and for bringing forward areas of
of functions with cooperative effort. This in turn gives energies for the
accordingly. A great momentum is conduced by confining the specialisation
fake certain patterns of behavior for planned and to adjust their sections
of average performance. Thus the other members of the group are enabled to
unify as a unit; it does so by reducing most problems to routine--a standard
federated from a collection of individuals by its difficulty for not purpose-
organisation, it may produce more serious consequences. An organisation is
for the individuals may befford only in the best performance, in a group or
opponent of the advantage of a better calculation. Moreover, while fumbovulation

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The prerequisite of effective organized response then is a concept of the challenge to which strategy is to be directed. The Romans stampeded when they first confronted Hannibal's elephants. This was not because the elephants were a decisive weapon by themselves; it was simply that the Romans had never considered a mode for dealing with the military use of elephants, and their panic reflected their inability to react as a group. Within a few years they had learned to master the charges of the beasts by discipline rather than through flight; the elephants henceforth became part of the expected mode of warfare, a contingency against which to prepare like any other. Similarly, the German tank thrusts in 1940 demoralized the French above all because such rapid maneuver had been explicitly rejected by French doctrine; it therefore appeared "unnatural" to French commanders: they did not possess a mode of action for dealing with it. Thus a weapons system by itself is useless if it cannot be applied to contingencies which are likely to be confronted and if it is not related to a notion of the kind of war in which it will probably be employed.

2. The second postulate is a corollary of the first; strategy should seek to make the actions of the opponent as predictable as possible. There are two ways of achieving predictability: by understanding the opponent's behavior or by creating a calculus of risks which will induce him to adopt a desired course of action and which will at the least reduce his options. The former is the passive, the latter the active aspect of predictability. To be sure, it is dangerous in either case to ascribe to the opponent one's own notions of what constitutes rational behavior, particularly if the two sides exhibit different cultural patterns or domestic structures. Nevertheless, in

exhibit different cultural patterns or domestic structures. Nevertheless, the notions of what constitutes rational behavior, particularly in the two cases be sure, it is dangerous in either case to sacrifice to the opponent one's own former if the passive, the inferior, the active, the subject of predictability. To a desired course of action and which will at the least reduce in options, the behavior or by creating a situation of risks which will induce him to adopt are two ways of achieving predictability: by understanding the opponent's

2. The second proposition is a corollary of the first: strategy should

to be confronted and if it is not related to a motion of the kind of war in
by itself, it neither if it cannot be applied to contingencies which are first
not because a mode of action for dealing with it. Thus a weapon system
does not become a mode of action for dealing with it. If therefore aspern
 doctrine; if therefore aspern; if therefore aspern to French commanders; they did
spend it become such Ralph maneuver had been explicitly rejected by France
any other. Similarly, the German tank tankette in 1940 demonstrated the French
expected mode of warfare, a consistency against which to prepare fire
rather than through fight; the elements henceforth become part of the
years they had learned to master the charges of the base at discipline
their basic reflected their inability to react as a group. Within a few
years they had learned to deal with the military use of elements, and
never considered a mode for dealing with the military use of elements, and
elements were a decisive weapon by themselves; it was easy that the Romans
when they that confronted Hannibal a要素. This was not because the
the challenge to which strategy is to be directed. The Romans acknowledged
The principles of effective organised reason are then in a concept of

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VI-5

any society is capable of only a limited range of responses to a challenge. This is because the condition of group activity is a degree of predictability of the behavior of society both towards its components and towards other groups. A society which behaves completely unpredictably will appear arbitrary to its members and is dangerous to other groups. It is possible of course that a society behaves predictably towards its citizens and erratically towards other societies. To the extent that it does so, it will not lose social cohesiveness, but it may lose international standing; towards a society which behaves unpredictably in its international relations other states can find security only through superior power; relations between it and the rest of the international community tend to be based on force or the threat of force. However, from the point of view of strategy, where force already reigns supreme, unpredictability is an asset because it complicates enemy calculations. It has been argued that the chief deterrent of the United States is not so much our power as our unpredictability.

No society can behave totally unpredictably, however, for government cannot function without a pattern of continuity. Strategy should seek, therefore, to discover the opponent's pattern of behavior and channel it in the most favorable direction. This is all the more important because ultimately strategy resolves itself into a balancing of risks. Were it possible to be preponderantly strong everywhere and were this strength always coupled with the willingness to use it, strategy would be equivalent to assembling overwhelming power. And this indeed is how it has presented itself to us in the past. But at the precise moment when the problems of strategy have become global, it has also become impossible to assemble a strategically significant over-all superiority. In seeking to defend a perimeter of 20 thousand miles, it is not feasible to be protected against all contingencies.

["thousand miles, it is not feasible to be protected against all consequences.\n\n**Quantitative over-all superiority.** In seeking to defend a perimeter of 30\n\n**Quantitative** and **over-all** are not the same. It is possible to have a\n\n**over-all** power, and this is possible if the power is sufficient to\n\n**overcome** the difficulties of this strategy. It would be equivalent to\n\n**overpowering** the enemy, and this is possible if the power is\n\n**overpowering** the enemy, and this is possible if the power is

W-6

To attempt to do so can lead only to a dispersion of resources physically or psychologically. "He who defends everything" said Frederick the Great, "defends nothing." Thus strategy can only channel the opponent's moves; it can rarely stalemate all of them. It must therefore choose the areas of greatest concern and the ground where the stand should be taken. In these terms a policy of deterrence involves a balancing of risks according to which aggression, on every calculation, must be made to seem to involve a net loss. If military moves are foreclosed to the other side, the struggle with the Soviet bloc will not be finished, but it may occur on a less cataclysmic plane. In the more likely contingency that only certain moves can be foreclosed, strategy should at least seek to channel the remaining Soviet options into areas which are strategically unproductive.

3. The third postulate is the reverse of the first; if it is advantageous not to be surprised, it is equally profitable strategically to seek to confront the enemy with unforeseen contingencies or ambiguous choices. Surprise can be both military and psychological. Militarily it has two aspects: the unexpected timing and the unexpected nature of the conduct of operations. An enemy may be aware of the probable nature of a military move, but he can still be caught off guard by its timing--the secret of Napoleon's successes was that he confused his enemies by the rapidity of his maneuvers. Conversely, it is possible to be aware that an attack is imminent and yet to be found unprepared by its nature--as happened to us at Pearl Harbor. We knew that the Japanese were planning a military move but our plans did not foresee an attack on Hawaii. The Japanese success would have been impossible without the advantage of surprise.

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Psychologically the task of strategy is to present the opponent with as many ambiguous choices as possible. For war has two components: a hostile intention and a hostile capability. A military capability is useless unless it is coupled with the will to employ it. Conversely a superior willingness to run risks can compensate to a certain extent for an inferior military capability. History is replete with examples of nations who grew because they outwilled their opponents--the growth of Rome or Prussia from insignificant beginnings can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address itself to two equations: a physical and a psychological one. The material balance determines the feasibility of measures, the psychological equation their nature and the willingness to act.

The temptation of American strategy is to concern itself only with military capability because traditionally we have fought our wars only against overwhelming threats which left us no choice but to react against ambiguity and because our victories had been produced as much by our productive capacity as by superior strategic skill. Conversely the Soviets have been extremely skillful in taking advantage of the psychological component of strategy. Wherever we have had a superior military capability they have sought to paralyze the intention to use it as with their campaign to ban nuclear weapons which has attempted to attach a special stigma to atomic warfare, the warfare we are best prepared to fight. And whenever they have presented a challenge, they have done so ambiguously either by leaving doubt about their ultimate intention or by posing risks out of proportion to the issue at dispute or by presenting their claim as the expression of a "legitimate grievance" to be assuaged by individual concessions. To the extent that their aims have been obscure they have furnished us an incentive to defer a show-down to

oppose them. They have turned us an incentive to defer a show-down to
be managed by individual concealers. To the extent that their same have been
presenting their claims as the expression of a legitimate grievance, to be
taken or by basing risks out of proportion to the nature of dispute or by
having done so. Additionally, either by leaving doubt about their ultimate intent
or by basing risks out of proportion to the nature of the dispute or by
deciding to leave it as such with their consent to be nuclear weapons which have
been put a superior military capability they have sought to paralyze.

In taking advantage of the psychological component of strategy, however, one must recognize that they have sought to paralyze us. Conversely, the Soviet have been extremely efficient in utilizing their advantages which left no scope for superiority and because military capability because traditionally we have bought our war only.

The adaptation of American strategy is to concern itself only with their nature and the willingness to act.

Balance determines the feasibility of measures, the psychological equation itself to two equations: a biological and a psychological one. The material beginning can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address the needs of their opponents--the growth of home or, vice versa, from a biological capability. History is replete with examples of nations who have because they

if it is combined with the will to employ it. Conversely, a superior military

as many amorphous choices as possible. For, as the two components: a positive

psychologically the task of strategy is to present the opponent with

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a more propitious moment or to a clearer case. Or else they have forced
us to provide against a maximum number of contingencies. This illustrates
the advantage of initiative: every successful move carries with it the
possibility of several others; it therefore forces the opponent into defending
against an ever-growing number of threats; if carried far enough it will reduce
his strategy to sterility by absorbing all his energies in countermoves.

4. The strategy should be adopted which uses their own advantages to best benefit. Just as it is not possible to be strong everywhere so no nation can be superior in every strategically significant category. As a result, strategy must seek to determine the elements of its own superiority and attempt to force the enemy to fight a war where these can be used to greatest advantage. A technologically inferior nation should seek to choose a terrain or a mode of war where manpower can be substituted for material. A seapower will be strongest in regions which can be affected by navies such as islands or continental peninsulas--this indeed was the strategy of Great Britain for over a century. A power which has a superior military establishment may utilize its advantage by fighting before its enemy has mobilized. A nation which has vast territories may trade space for time--as has been the Soviet strategy against both "apoleon and Hitler. A nation which is impotent militarily may seek to use its negotiating skill to escape the consequences of its weakness--this was the Chinese strategy for a century before the Communist revolution.

Thus strategy should seek to utilize its advantages by forcing the
enemy to fight at a time of its choosing, or at a place of its choosing, or
with methods of its choosing. And in the thermo-nuclear age a new dimension
has been added: it is now part of a proper strategy: to make the enemy fight
with a weapons system of one's choosing. When weapons technology was

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relatively stable, the choice of weapons systems was dictated by its avail-
ability. Today, however, there exist weapons systems ranging from conventional
weapons of high complexity, to nuclear weapons with destructive powers from
a kiloton and below to megaton weapons of no inherent upper limit. Each of
these weapons systems, or their combination, has its own consequences for
strategy. [ An all-out war fought with thermo-nuclear weapons would reduce
the importance of industrial potential; it, therefore, gives relative advantage
to the side with inferior resources as long as it can create a force-in-being
adequate to inflict catastrophic blows on its opponent.] The crucial decision
for our strategy is therefore the selection of a weapons system that will
prevent war from assuming the character of a national catastrophe but
which at the same time utilizes the national resources or special abilities
to best advantage. The degree to which these two objectives are reconciled
will give a maximum flexibility to both diplomacy and to strategy.

5. If two strategies are available to achieve the same objective the less costly one should be chosen. This principle is almost at the level of common sense: it implies no more than that national policy should aim for its objectives without paying an exorbitant price. It is the classic principle of the economy of force. The cost of a strategy is determined by two related factors: the nature of objectives and the destructiveness of the weapons systems employed. The more unlimited the objective, the more costly the war, at least against a major enemy. For a war ends only when acceptances of peace terms seem more advantageous or less costly than continued resistance; the more total the victory sought, the more absolute the alternatives which have to be posed. Conversely, the greater the destructiveness of weapons, the—

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more unlimited the objectives of the war tend to become. The more intense
the suffering, the more extreme the peace terms. If a nation can no longer
profit from war, it will tend to derive at least the degree of consolation
conferred by the humiliation of the opponent. The costliness of war is
therefore determined by the degree to which a balance is established between
its objectives and the weapons systems employed. A war of annihilation
fought with weapons of small destructiveness may turn into an exhausting
war of attrition--as happened in the religious wars of the 17th century. A
war for initially limited objectives that inflicts enormous suffering will
soon assume a total character--as was the case with World War I. Thus the
prerequisite of effective strategy is a clear understanding of the national
purpose and the development of a weapons system which is adequate to achieve it.

purposes and the development of a weapons system which is adequate to achieve it. The more limited the objectives of the war tend to become. The more influence the authoring the more extreme the base terms. It is a nation can no longer profit from war. If it will tend to derive at least the degree of concentration more than the population of the country. The cost of the war is concentrated by the manipulation of the obsolescent. The cost of the war is therefore determined by the degree to which a nation is affected between its objectives and the weapons system employed. A war on annihilation is the most destructive and the most destructive may turn into an exsanguinating war of attrition--as happened in the religion war of the fifth century. A war of attrition is a kind of homogeneous annihilation which, in the case with which we are concerned, is a total obliteration--as was the case with World War I. Thus the war for initially limited objectives that indicates homogeneous annihilation will be more effective than the one which was the case with World War II. The more the war of attrition is reduced in the religion war of the fifth century, the more the war of attrition will be reduced in the religion war of the thousandth century. The more the war of attrition is reduced in the religion war of the thousandth century, the more the war of attrition will be reduced in the religion war of the thousandth century.

VI-10

II

VI-11

The five postulates of strategy thus fall into three groups: the first two deal with the consequence of the enemy's actions; the next two involve the flexibility of one's own behavior; the third determines the cost to be paid. The art of strategy is to establish a balance between these considerations in creating a doctrine where power and the willingness to use it are most in harmony.

The reliance on all-out nuclear war inhibits the establishment of this balance, however. By insisting on a single method for dealing with every challenge, it seeks to escape the necessity for gearing strategy to the likely danger or for establishing a relationship between objectives and the force appropriate for them. Its assertion that every threat can be dealt with by overpowering force on the basis of purely military considerations reflects the lessons of our history which has never known a mortal external danger and which has always sought to identify strategic superiority with overwhelming strength.

The very power of modern weapons has made it very difficult, however, to assemble a strategically significant superiority against a major enemy and this in turn has brought into sharp focus the basic problem of strategy in the nuclear age: the relationship between a policy of deterrence and the strategy we are prepared to implement should deterrence fail. A policy of deterrence, moreover, is peculiarly dependent on an assessment of the opponent's intentions and mode of behavior. Since its aim is to keep the opponent from taking action, it must convey to the aggressor that any military move will involve a net loss. And

aggressor that any military move will involve a net loss. And
it is to keep the opponent from taking action, it must convey to the
of the opponent's intentions and mode of behavior. Since its aim
deterrence, moreover, is necessarily dependent on an assessment
are prepared to implement should deterrence fail. A policy of
institution between a policy of deterrence and the strategy we
focus the basic problem of strategy in the nuclear age: the re-
against a major enemy and this in turn has brought into sharp
cult, however, to assemble a strategically significant superiority
The very power of modern weapons has made it very diffi-
identify a strategic superiority with overwhelming strength.
known a mortal external danger and which has always sought to
siderations reflects the lessons of our history which has never
with by overpowering force on the basis of purely military con-
prisite for them. Its assertion that every threat can be dealt
supplanting a relationship between objectives and the force appro-
necessity for gearing strategy to the likely danger or for ee-
method for dealing with every challenge, it seeks to escape the
iftlement of this balance, however. By insulating on a single
The reliance on all-out nuclear war infidates the estab-
if are most in harmony.
in creating a doctrine where power and the willingness to use
strategy is to establish a balance between these considerations
behavior; the third determines the cost to be paid. The art of
action; the next two involve the flexibility of one's own de-
grees: the first two deal with the consequence of the enemy's
The five postulates of strategy thus fall into three
II
VI-IF

II

VI-IF

VI-12

what is considered a loss will for purposes of deterrence be
determined by the opponent's criteria, not ours. It can be
argued, of course, that deterrence is best achieved by assembling
an over-all superiority in strength. But the effectiveness of
the threat of all-out war will depend on the belief of the op-
ponent that it will in fact be implemented. As a result deter-
rence depends above all on a psychological equation, compounded
of the assessment by the contenders of each other's capabilities
and of the importance they attach to given regions; an equation
in which an area may be protected as much by the fact that it is
thought "vital" enough for the threat of all-out war to be credi-
ble as by the balance of forces on the spot. The [paradoxical]
result of the thermo-nuclear stalemate may be that the side which
attaches greater importance to a particular objective than its
opponent may gain an advantage because of its superior readiness
to run risks; the psychological equation may favor it suffi-
ciently to overcome the physical balance. Our reluctance to en-
gage in all-out war has been the shield behind which the Soviets
could repress the revolution in Hungary and the Chinese escape
defeat in Korea.

The reliance on all-out thermo-nuclear war neglects the
psychological aspect of strategy and of deterrence. For the most
agonizing decision a statesman can confront is the problem of
whether to unleash all-out war; all pressures will make for hesi-
tation [short of] an unambiguous attack on the survival of his
state. In any other situation he will be inhibited by the incom-
mensurability between the cost of the war and the objective in
dispute. And he will be confirmed in his hesitations by the

dispute. And he will be confirmed in his expectations by the
menability between the cost of the war and the objective in
state. In any other situation he will be inhibited by the incom-
fation short of an unambiguous attack on the survival of his
whether to unfeard all-out war: all pressure will make for heat-
ingizing decision a statesman can confront is the problem of
psychological aspect of strategy and of deterrence. For the most
The reliance on all-out thermo-nuclear war neglects the
detest in Korea.

could repress the revolution in Hungary and the Chinese escape
age in all-out war has been the shield behind which the Soviet
ciently to overcome the physical balance. Our reluctance to en-
to run risks; the psychological education may favor it until-
opponent may gain an advantage because of its superior readiness
attaches greater importance to a particular objective than its
result of the thermo-nuclear atollamate may be that the side which
pits as by the balance of forces on the short. The paradoxical
thought "vital" enough for the thrust of all-out war to be credi-
ful in which an area may be protected as much by the fact that it is
and of the importance they attach to given regions; an education
of the assessment by the contender of each other's capabilities
reence depends above all on a bayehysical equation, compounded
ponent that it will in fact be implemented. As a result deter-
the thrust of all-out war will depend on the peefet of the ob-
an over-all superiority in strength. But the effectiveness of
arranged of course, that deterrence is best achieved by sampling
determined by the opponent's criteria, not ours. It can be
what is considered a loss will for purposes of deterrence be

What is considered a loss will for purposes of deterrence be
what is considered a gain will for purposes of deterrence be
what is considered a loss will for purposes of deterrence be
what is considered a gain will for purposes of deterrence be
-15-

VI-13

conviction that as long as the strategic retaliatory force remains intact, no shift in the territorial balance is significant. Thus both the horror and the power of modern weapons will tend to paralyze action: the former because it will make few issues seem worth contending for; the latter because it causes many disputes to seem irrelevant to the over-all strategic equation.

These inhibitions will be reinforced if the aggression takes place by proxy, for the sophisticated weapons systems suitable for all-out war are less useful against non-nuclear or underdeveloped powers and the military will always resist their employment for these purposes as a strategic diversion. Thus the psychological equation almost invariably operates against the side which can extricate itself from a situation only by the threat of all-out war. It is not that nations will no longer fight for what they consider their "vital" interests; it is that the line between what is considered vital and peripheral will shift if every objective has to be weighed against a thermo-nuclear holocaust. Who can be certain that faced with the catastrophe of nuclear war even Europe, long the keystone of our security, will seem worth the price? And if all-out war will seem a less and less attractive method for protecting the status quo, it will be almost unthinkable to achieve strategic transformations.

As the power of modern weapons grows, the threat of all-out war loses its credibility. Our capacity for massive retaliation did not prevent the Korean war, the loss of Northern Indo-China, the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal or the Suez crisis. A deterrent before the implementation of which one recoils is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, whatever the credibility of

contradiction in terms, moreover, whatever the credibility of
A deterrent before the implementation of which one recovers is a
Indo-China, the Soviet-Baltian arms deal or the Soviet criteria.
lation did not prevent the Korean war, the loss of Northern
out war loses its credibility. Our capacity for massive recol-

be almost unthinkable to achieve strategic transformations.
and less attractive method for protecting the atmosphere, it will
will seem worth the price? And if all-out war will seem a less
the of nuclear war even Europe, long the keystone of our security,
clear holocaust, who can be certain that faced with the catastro-
shock it: every objective has to be weighed against a thermo-nu-
the line between what is considered vital and peripheral will
right for what they consider their "vital" interests; if it is that
threat of all-out war. It is not that nations will no longer
side which can expropriate itself from a situation only by the
the bayological equation almost invariably operates against the
employment for these purposes as a strategic diversion. The
dereloped powers and the military will always resist their
spite for all-out war are less useful against non-nuclear or un-
take place by proxy, for the soppressives weapons systematize-
these inhibitions will be reinforced if the agreement

disputes to seem irrelevant to the overall strategic equation.
seem worth contending for; the latter because it causes many
to paralyze action: the former because it will make few issues
Thus both the horror and the power of modern weapons will tend
mainly intact, no shift in the territorial balance is significant.
conviction that so long as the strategic retaliatory force re-

VI-13

VT-52

our threat of all-out war; it is clear that all-out thermo-nuclear war does not represent a strategic option for our allies. Thus a psychological gap is created by the conviction of our allies that they have nothing to gain from massive retaliation and the belief of the Soviet leaders that they have nothing to fear from our threat of it; a gap which may actually encourage an all-out war. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons having made it unlikely that any responsible statesman will lightly unleash a general war, one of the gravest dangers of all-out war lies in miscalculation. This is the only war it is within our power to avoid assuming we leave no doubt about our capabilities and our determination. But even this "avoidable" war may break out if the other side becomes convinced that we cannot interfere locally and that our threats of all-out war are bluff. If that should happen the Soviet bloc may then decide, as its nuclear arsenal grows, to absorb the peripheral areas of Eurasia and to confront us with the choice between yielding or the destruction of American cities. And because the Sino-Soviet leaders may well be mistaken in their assessment of our reaction to such a contingency, the reliance on "massive retaliation" may bring about the total war it seeks to prevent.

This is another way of saying that even if successful, the threat of all-out war purchases deterrence at a fearful cost and at potentially exorbitant risk. It either requires us in every crisis to stake our survival on the credibility of a threat we will be increasingly reluctant to implement or it will force us into the kind of war our strategy should make every attempt to avoid. The costs of thermo-nuclear war are too fearful for it

avoid. The costs of thermo-nuclear war are too fearful for it
into the kind of war our strategy should make every attempt to
will be increasingly reluctant to implement or it will force us
create to awake our survival on the credibility of a threat we
at a potentially exorbitant risk. If either requires me in every
threat of all-out war purchase deterrence at a fearful cost and
This is another way of saying that even if successful the
war it seeks to prevent.

the reliance on "massive retaliation" may bring about the total
taken in their assessment of our reaction to such a contingency,
can cities. And because the Soviet leaders may well be mis-
use with the choice between yielding or the destruction of Ameri-
grow; to spread the peripheral areas of Eurasia and to confront
happen the Soviet bloc may then decide, as the nuclear areal
and that our threats of all-out war are blust. If that should
the other side becomes convinced that we cannot interfere locally
determination. But even this "avoidable" war may break out if
avoid scumming we leave no doubt about our capabilities and our
misch calculation. This is the only war it is within our power to
General war, one of the gravest dangers of all-out war lies in
likely that any reasonable statesman will lightly unleash a
war. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons having made it un-
our threat of it; a gap which may actually encourage an all-out
belief of the Soviet leaders that they have nothing to fear from
that they have nothing to gain from massive retaliation and the
a psychological gap is created by the conviction of our allies
war does not represent a strategic option for our allies. Thus
our threat of all-out war; it is clear that all-out thermo-nuclear

VI-15

to be our only response to a challenge. Even if it could be won,
we should seek our objectives at smaller sacrifice. Thermo-nuclear
war has thus set our statesmanship a problem long familiar to less
fortunate nations: that absolute security is no longer possible.
Whatever the validity of the identification of deterrence with
maximum retaliatory power, we will have to sacrifice a measure
of destructiveness to gain the possibility of fighting wars that
will not amount to a national catastrophe. Policy, it has been
said, is the science of the relative. The same is true of strat-
egy and to understand this fact, so foreign to our national ex-
perience, is the task history has set our generation.

III

What strategic doctrine can avoid the dilemmas of all-out
war then? Two basic answers have been given: the first proposal
asserts the continued feasibility of all-out war but it would seek
to reduce its cost by confining it either to military installa-
tions or to a battlefield, however defined. The second solution
would seek to limit the objective of war and strive to establish
a relationship between the purpose of the war and the force em-
ployed. Each will be examined in turn.

The first position accepts the continued possibility of
all-out war but seeks to mitigate its horrors. The proposals
have taken several forms: to refrain from the use of thermo-
nuclear weapons unless the other side uses them first; to confine
an all-out war to specific targets again unless the other side
breaks the agreement, tacit or expressed, first; to retaliate by
a specific formula, for example, by inflicting double the amount

a specific formula, for example, by inflicting double the amount
presume the agreement, fact or expressed, first; to retaliates by
an all-out war to specific targets again unless the other side
unclear weapons unless the other side use them first; to continue
have taken several forms: to refrain from the use of thermo-
all-out war but seeks to mitigate its horror. The proposals
The first position accepts the continued possibility of
blessed. Each will be examined in turn.

a relationship between the purpose of the war and the force em-
would seek to limit the objective of war and arrive to eataplich
time or to a battlefield, however defined. The second solution
to reduce its coat by confining it either to military installa-
asses the continued feasibility of all-out war but it would seek
was then? Two basic answers have been given: the first proposal
that strategic doctrine can avoid the dilemma of all-out

### III

perIENCE, is the task history has set our generation.

By and to understand this fact, so foreign to our national ex-
said, is the science of the relative. The same is true of atris-
will not amount to a national catastrophe. Policy, it has been
of destructiveness to gain the possibility of fighting were that
maximum retaliatory power, we will have to accredit a measure
whatever the validity of the identification of deterrence with
fortunate nations: that absolute security is no longer possible.

War has thus set our statesmanship a problem long familiar to less
we should seek our objectives at smaller sacrifice. Thermo-nuclear
to be our only response to a challenge. Even if it could be won.

VI-12

VI-16

of damage as the opponent; or to eschew any kind of nuclear wea-
pon and fight a conventional war. ) The position of the advo-
cates of this course has been strengthened by a new advance in
nuclear technology: the development of the "clean" thermo-nu-
clear bomb which has little fall-out. The clean bomb eliminates
the last stage of the fission-fusion-fission process which fur-
nished the mechanism for the first thermo-nuclear weapons. Since
it uses fission only to "trigger" the fusion and since fusion
produces very little radioactive material, the fall-out is con-
fined to the radioactivity caused by the trigger mechanism and
this is not a serious problem. Thus it is possible to confine
the effect of thermo-nuclear bombing to a target area, although
the effect from blast and heat would still be considerable.

None of the advocates of what has sometimes been called
"measured retaliation" is naive enough to believe that an agree-
ment to limit targets or to use only "clean" bombs if it could
be negotiated would restrain the other side by its legal force.
The argument is based on an interest which we and the Soviet bloc
are thought to share: to prevent thermo-nuclear devastation.
If this is true, so the argument goes, both sides will have a
powerful incentive to abide by an understanding to limit the ap-
plication of force. An international agreement establishing
certain rules of measured retaliation would not preclude the neces-
sity of preparing for unrestricted thermo-nuclear war -- if the
Soviet bloc felt strong enough to launch a surprise attack with

See, f. e. Leghorn ; Buzzard,
"Graduated Deterrence," World Politics; Amster, "Design for
Deterrent Air System," Convair Corp.

"Graduated Deterrence," *World Politics*, Amater, "Design for

See, I. s. Redhorn ) Buzzard, 

Soviet bloc felt strong enough to launch a surprise attack with
ity of preparing for unrestricted thermo-nuclear war -- if the
certain rules of measured retaliation would not preclude the neces-
plication of force. An international agreement establishing
powerful incentive to side by an understanding to limit the ap-
If this is true, so the argument goes, both sides will have a
are thought to share: to prevent thermo-nuclear devastation.
The argument is based on an interest which we and the Soviet bloc
be negotiated would retrain the other side by its legal force.
ment to limit targets or to use only "clean" bombs if it could
"measured retaliation" is naive enough to believe that an agree-
None of the advocates of what has sometimes been called
the effect fromREAT and REAT would still be considerable.

the effect of thermo-nuclear bombing to a target area, although
this is not a serious problem. Thus it is possible to continue
flamed to the radioactivity caused by the trigger mechanism and
produces very little radioactive material, the fall-out is com-
plete if use fission only to "trigger" the fission and since fusion
finished the mechanism for the first thermo-nuclear weapons. Since
the last stage of the fission-fusion-fission process which fur-
cies clear bomb which has little fall-out. The clean bomb eliminates
nuclear technology: the development of the "clean" thermo-un-
cate of this course has been strengthened by a new advance in
pion and fight a conventions war. The position of the advo-
cate of damage as the opponent; or to eachem any kind of nuclear wes-
VI-JC

VI-17

impunity it would presumably do so. But it might reduce the
probability of an attack caused by a form of bureaucratic inertia:
the existence of war plans built around all-out war may cause
some crisis to set in motion measures designed to forestall an
imagined enemy move. An attempt to establish principles of "mea-
sured retaliation" would have the advantage of forcing the op-
posing military staffs to consider alternatives. While the in-
ternational agreement may not be decisive by itself, it would fur-
nish an additional motive for not precipitating an all-out war
unless the opponent makes the first move. And given the knowledge
by both sides of the consequences of all-out war, a war that is
kept within a certain pattern during its initial phase is likely
to remain limited. In fact many advocates of "graduated deter-
rence" believe that even a unilateral declaration of self-limita-
tion can achieve their purpose.

The opponents of graduated deterrence maintain that any
limitation of the horror of war, if believed, will also reduce
the aggressor's risks and thereby increase the likelihood of at-
tack. It would do this, moreover, without guaranteeing that
eventually thermo-nuclear weapons would not be used, partly be-
cause the tendency of war is towards maximum violence, partly be-
cause distinctions which have practical meaning are very hard to
make: "If the effectiveness of the deterrent," wrote a leading
British weekly, "resides precisely in its certainty and its horror,
then any attempt to reduce either the certainty or the horror
will reduce the power to deter."

) Graduated Deterrence in the **Economist**, November 5, 1955.

) Graduated Deference in the Economist, November 3, 1922.

will reduce the power to deter."
then any attempt to reduce either the certainly or the horror
British weekly, "reads precisely in its certainly and its horror,
make: "If the effectiveness of the deterrent," wrote a leading
cause distinctions which have practical meaning are very hard to
cause the tendency of war to towards maximum violence, partly be-
eventually thermo-nuclear weapons would not be used, partly be-
tack. It would do this, moreover, without guaranteeing that
the aggressor's risks and thereby increase the likelihood of at-
limitation of the horror of war, it believed, will also reduce
The opponents of graduated deterrence maintain that any
tion can achieve their purpose.

To remain limited. In fact many advocates of "graduated deter-
ance" believe that even a unilateral declaration of self-limita-
tion to remain limited. In fact many advocates of "graduated deter-
ance" believe that even a unilateral declaration of self-limita-
tion to be effective by itself, it would fur-
boating military staff to consider alternatives. While the in-
sumed retaliation" would have the advantage of forcing the ob-
simined enemy move. An attempt to eataway principles of "mea-
some criteria to set in motion measures designed to forestall an
the existence of war plane built around all-out war may cause
propensity of an attack caused by a form of bureaucratic inertia:
immunity if would presumably do so. But it might reduce the
VI-17

VI-17

VI-18

The dilemma of the nuclear age is, however, precisely the impossibility of combining both maximum horror and maximum certainty. The greater the power, the stronger the inhibitions against its use. The smaller the risks, the more certain that they will in fact be run. Thus the reliance on an all-out strategy is efficacious only if not put to the test and if put to the test it may produce either a cataclysm or surrender. The argument in favor of "measured retaliation" is its attempt to relate the need for posing an adequate sanction to the willingness to act that it seeks to escape the inconsistency of a policy of deterrence whose major sanction is national catastrophe. To be sure from the point of view of power, an intermediary use of nuclear weapons would reduce the effectiveness of the deterrent because it does not pose the maximum sanction. But from the aspect of psychology, it may reduce the probability of war by enhancing the credibility of the threat and the willingness to act. Graduated deterrence then represents a realization that it is no longer possible to combine the advantage of every course of action, of a deterrent based on a threat of maximum destructiveness and a strategy of minimum risk.

In fact the argument for graduated deterrence falls down at the precise point where its advocates succumb to the temptation to combine incompatible courses. It fails when it is advanced as a cheaper strategy for winning an all-out war. It has been argued for example that a form of graduated deterrence could be employed to deprive an enemy of his nuclear capability. According to this strategy even an all-out war could be confined to

cording to this strategy even an all-out war could be confined to
be employed to deprive an enemy of the nuclear capability. Ac-
been argued for example that a form of graduated deterrence could
be advanced as a cheaper strategy for winning an all-out war. It has
tion to combine incompatible courses. It fails when it is ad-
justed at the precise point where it advocates an end to the remits-
In fact the argument for graduated deterrence falls down
and a strategy of minimum risk.

tion of a deterrent based on a threat of maximum destruction
fonder possible to combine the advantage of every course of ac-
graduated deterrence then represents a realization that it is no
hancing the credibility of the threat and the willingness to act.
best of psychology, it may reduce the propensity of war by en-
beces because it does not pose the maximum sanction. But from the as-
uncient weapons would reduce the effectiveness of the deterrent
be sure from the point of view of power, an intermediary use of
of deterrence whose major sanction is national catastrophe. To
need to act that it seeks to escape the inconsistency of a policy
relate the need for posing an adequate sanction to the willing-
argument in favor of "measured retaliation" is its attempt to
the threat it may produce either a catapult or surrender. The
strategy is efficacious only if not but to the threat and if but to
they will in fact be run. Thus the reliance on an all-out
against its use. The amiller the risks, the more certain that
surety. The greater the power, the stronger the inhibitions
impossibility of combining both maximum horror and maximum cer-
tainty.

The differences of the nuclear age is, however, precisely the
AT-10.

VI-19

military targets such as airfields because the bombing of cities
would be unwise in the early stages of a war and unnecessary
after air superiority has been achieved through the destruction
of the installations of the opposing air force. ) But in prac-
tice this distinction will probably not prove very helpful. To
begin with, most military installations, such as airfields, are
for logistic reasons located close to cities. Any war fought
explicitly to destroy them may therefore involve almost as many
casualties as a war fought without limitations. Even an attempt
to define a concept of "open cities" and to move air force in-
stallations a certain distance from centers of population would
not solve this difficulty necessarily. The problem of fall-out
would remain, indeed an enemy could plan his attack to produce a
maximum of casualties from fall-out. The reliance would there-
fore have to be placed on mitigating the consequences of all-out
war either by using "clean" bombs or by employing lower-yield
weapons of below a megaton whose fall-out is generally not of
major proportions.

In a strategy aiming for total victory, the psychological
equation which makes it profitable for <u>both</u> sides to carry out
these restrictions no longer holds, however. The purpose of an
all-out war is to render the enemy defenseless; or in terms of
nuclear technology to deprive the enemy of his nuclear capability.
Such a strategy is tantamount to a quest for unconditional sur-
render; for an enemy deprived of nuclear establishment will be

) See Paul Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy," *Foreign Affairs*,
January 1956. p.

) Same, p.

) Same, b.

January 1969, b.

) See Paul Nitszé, "Atom, Strategy and Policy," *Foreign Affairs*,

tender; for an enemy deprived of nuclear establishment will be
Such a strategy is tantamount to a quest for unconditional an-
uclear technology to deprive the enemy of his nuclear capability.
) all-out war is to render the enemy defenseless; or in terms of
these restrictions no longer holds, however. The purpose of an
equation which makes it profitable for both sides to carry out
In a strategy aiming for total victory, the psychological
major proportions.

Weapons of below a megaton whose fall-out is generally not of
war either by using "clean" bombs or by employing lower-yield
forces have to be placed on mitigating the consequences of all-out
maximum of casualties from fall-out. The resistance would there-
would remain, indeed an enemy could plan his attack to produce a
not solve this difficulty necessarily. The problem of fall-out
establishments a certain distance from centers of population would
to define a concept of "open cities" and to move air force in-
casualties as a war fought without limitations. Even an attempt
explicitly to destroy them may therefore involve almost as many
for logistic reasons located close to cities. Any war fought
begin with most military installations, such as airfields, are
tice this distinction will probably not prove very helpful. To
of the installations of the opposing air force. But in prac-
ter air superiority has been achieved through the destruction
would be unnecessary in the early stages of a war and unnecessarily
military targets such as airfields because the pumping of cities

VI-10

VI-20

reduced to impotence. It would, therefore, be the most rational
strategy for the side which has a strategic advantage either in
base-structure or in weapons systems, for it would put the enemy
at its mercy at minimum cost. But war is not only an instrument
for imposing one's will on the defeated; it is also a tool for
frustrating this intent by making victory too costly. For the
side which stands to lose the air battle and which seeks to exact
a maximum price for its own defeat, the most rational strategy
may therefore consist of maximum destructiveness. Rather than
fight an air battle it may concentrate on population centers in
order to deprive the opponent of the fruits of his victory or to
make it too costly for him to seek total victory.

Thermo-nuclear weapons coupled with an adequate delivery
system confer precisely this possibility. The transformation
brought about by the thermo-nuclear stalemate is therefore not
that victory in an all-out war has become technically impossible,
but that it can no longer be imposed at acceptable cost, Graduated
deterrence cannot be used as a subterfuge to impose unconditional
surrender or for depriving the enemy of his nuclear capability,
which amounts to the same thing, and any attempt to do so may
bring on a nuclear holocaust.

As a result, many cherished doctrines of air warfare will
have to be abandoned: one of the cardinal principles of aerial
strategy is that the air is indivisible, that wars can be won
only by dominating it completely. ) But any attempt to deprive
the opponent of his retaliatory force would bring an all-out war

) Sir John Slessor, *Strategy for the West*, p. 105.

Sir John Cleاسor, *Stratag* for the *meat*, p. 102.

the opponent of his retaliatory force would bring an all-out war
only by dominating it completely. But any attempt to deprive
strategy is that the air is indivisible, that was can be won
have to be abandoned: one of the cardinal principles of aerial
war is a result, many cherished doctrine of air warfare will
bring on a nuclear holocaust.

which amounts to the same thing, and any attempt to do so may
a surrender or for depriving the enemy of his nuclear capability,
deterrence cannot be used as a掩euge to impose unconditional
but that it can no longer be imposed at acceptable cost. Graduated
that victory in an all-out war has become technically impossible,
proud about by the thermo-nuclear asthmate if therefore not
axiom couler precisely this belligeritv. The transformation
thermo-nuclear weapons coupled with an adequate delivery
make it too costly for him to seek total victory.

order to deprive the opponent of the fruits of his victory or to
fight an air battle it may concentrate on population centers in
which therefore conflict of maximum destructiveness. Rather than
a maximum price for its own defeat, the most rational strategy
aside which stands to lose the air battle and which seeks to exact
frustrating this intent by making victory too costly. For the
for imposing one's will on the defeated: it is also a tool for
at its mercy at minimum cost. But war is not only an instrument
bene-structure or in weapons systems, for it would put the enemy
strategy for the side which has a strategic advantage either in
reduced to imbalance. It would, therefore, be the most rational

p. 103

[y]

VI-21

whatever the means used. A power without a retaliatory capability is at the mercy of its opponent and it will not accept this without using all weapons at its disposal. Thus air-doprise will have to find applications for its power which do not drive an enemy to this extremity. The need for a reassessment of the doctrine of complete air-superiority represents moreover not only a strategic option, but a technological necessity. With the advent of missiles it will be impossible to destroy all launching sites; complete domination of the air against a major power will become technically impossible. But even if graduated deterrence will prove ineffective in setting bounds to the devastation of all-out war, it may be the means to establish the framework for what may prove the greatest challenge to strategy in the nuclear age: the problem of limited war.

) See below, p.

See below, p.

what may prove the greatest challenge to strategy in the nuclear all-out war, it may be the means to establish the framework for will prove ineffective in setting pounds to the devastation of become technically impossible.

But even if graduated deterrence after; complete domination of the air against a major power will vent of misfire if will be impossible to destroy all launching a strategic option, but a technological necessity. With the ad-doctrine of complete air-anxiety represents moreover not only an enemy to this extremity. The need for a reassessment of the will have to find applications for its power which do not drive this without using all weapons at its disposal. Thus air-doctrines pility is at the mercy of its opponent and it will not accept whatever the means used. A power without a retaliatory csps-

VI-37

VI-22

IV

Is limited war a conceivable instrument of policy in the nu-
clear period? Here we must analyze precisely what is meant by
limited war.

It is a historical accident reflecting the nature of our
foreign involvements that we should have come to consider limited
war an aberration from the "pure" case and that we have paid little
attention to its strategic opportunities. In a sense this is due,
too, to the manner in which we legitimized the limited wars we have
fought. For every war in which we engaged in the Western Hemisphere
was a limited war in the sense that it did not involve a mobilization
of all our material resources. But since we generally justified them
as expeditions, punitive or otherwise, they rarely entered our na-
tional consciousness as part of the phenomenon of limited war.

Our wars in the Western Hemisphere illustrate, however, that
limited wars have been both more frequent and more productive than
the disputes produced by the Korean war indicated. The debate which
has since raged on the subject of limited war tended to confuse the
issues, moreover, because it did not sufficiently distinguish bet-
ween the various forms of limited war. Some wars are inherently
limited, for example, because of the disparity in power between the
protagonists. A war between the United States and Nicaragua even if
it engaged the full resources of Nicaragua would not require more than
a fraction of our strength whatever the objectives we set ourselves.

a fraction of our strength, whatever the objectives we set ourselves. It engaged the full resources of Micaragua would not require more than
protagonists. A war between the United States and Nicaragua even if limited, for example, because of the disparity in power between the
when the various forms of limited war. Some wars are inherently
issues, moreover, because it is not sufficiently distinguished pet-
has since raged on the subject of limited war tended to confuse the
dispute between the Korean war indicated. The debate which
limited wars have been both frequent and more productive than

Our wars in the Western Hemisphere illustrate, however, that
logical consciousness as part of the phenomenon of limited war.

as expeditions, punitive or otherwise, they rarely entered our war-
of all our material resources. But since we generally justified them
was a limited war in the sense that it did not involve a modification
thought. For every war in which we engaged in the Western Hemisphere
to the manner in which we legitimized the limited war we have
attention to its strategic opportunities. In a sense this is true,
war an operation from the pure case and that we have laid little
foresee involvements that we should have come to consider limited

It is a historical accident reflecting the nature of our
limited war.

clearly? Here we must analyse precisely what is meant by

Is limited war a conceivable instrument of policy in the un-

IV

AF-55

VI-23

Such a war would be all-out in relation to Nicaragua but limited with respect to us. Another variation of this form of limited war occurs if the stronger power is restrained from exerting its full potential by moral or political or strategic considerations. This was the case in the Korean war in which the Chinese probably made the maximum military effort of which they were capable while we limited our commitment for a variety of reasons. Still another kind of limited war is one between major powers in which the difficulty of supply prevents one side from making a total effort. An example of this kind of war is the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 in which the Russian commitment was limited to the forces that could be supplied over a single-track railway. Finally there are limited wars which result not from limitation of technology or logistics or from a disparity in power but from a conscious policy decision.

If one applies these types of limited wars to the present situation three broad categories can be distinguished: a) Wars involving either the Western powers or the Soviet bloc against powers which are clearly outmatched and where outside intervention is not likely. Examples would be Soviet intervention in the satellites, or United States military action in the Western Hemisphere or perhaps Chinese absorption of positions of Central Asia such as Tibet. b) Conflicts which are initially directed against a minor power or a peripheral area but which involves the prospect of spreading to include one or more of the major powers, such as the Chinese move

Close one or more of the major powers, such as the Chinese move
peripheral areas but which involves the prospects of abducting to in-
conflicts which are initially directed against a minor power or a
Chinese aspiration of possession of Central Asia such as Siberia. (p)
or United States military action in the Western Hemisphere or perhaps
likely. Examples would be Soviet intervention in the satellites,
which are clearly unmatched and where, out of an intervention is not
violating either the Western powers or the Soviet bloc against powers
situation three broad categories can be distinguished:(a) Were in-
If one implies these types of limited war to the present
barity in power but from a connecive policy decision.
result not from fluctuation of technology or logistics or from a dis-
over a single-track railway. Finally there are limited war which
Russian commitment was limited to the forces that could be subordinated
of this kind of war is the Russia-Japanes war of 1902 in which the
of subly prevalence one side from making a total effort. An example
of limited war is one between major powers in which the difficulty
limited our commitment for a variety of reasons. Still another kind
the maximum military effort of which they were capable while we
was the case in the Korean war in which the Chinese properly made
potential by worse or political or strategic considerations. This
occurs if the stronger power is restrained from exerting its full
with respect to us. Another variation of this form of limited war
Such a war would be all-out in relation to Eurasians put limited

VI-53

VI-24

directed against the off-shore islands or the Anglo-French police action" against Egypt or a Soviet military move into the Middle East.

c) Finally there is the problem of limited war which begins explicitly as a war between the major powers. It is clear that this is the most explosive situation. If a war between major powers can be kept limited, it is clear that the first two situations would stand a good chance of being kept from spreading as well.

Of course, limited wars between major powers have been frequent in the history of warfare. For a long time they were due to technological limitations. Before the industrial revolution the productive processes of a country yielded such a relatively small increment above bare subsistence, that wars tended to remain limited for lack of resources: manpower could not be kept in the field indefinitely so that a state had the choice either to hire mercenaries or to see its armies disband as the harvesting season approached.

In neither case could the homefront produce sufficient weapons to sustain the kind of continuous campaign which characterized the two World Wars. Thus considerations of domestic policy, if not a strategic concept, combined to keep wars limited. In the 17th century, for example, Louis XIV employed almost his whole army constantly for a period of close to twenty-five years. But his military establishment utilized only a small proportion of the national resources. This was not due to self-restraint on the part of the French king, but to the nature of his domestic structure which made

French king, put to the nature of his domestic structure which made
sources. This was not due to anti-reaction on the part of the
easternment satisfied only a sort of opposition of the national res-
for a period of close to twenty five years. But his military
for example, Louis XIV employed almost all his whole army against
strategic campaign to keep war limited. In the first century,
World Wars. These considerations of domestic policy, if not a
sustain the kind of continuous campaign which characterized the two
In neither case could the homogeneous process of sufficient weapons to
or to see its arms diapason as the harrowing season approached,
definitely so that a state had the choice either to give mercantiles
for lack of resources: manpower could not be kept in the field in-
crease above bare subsistence, that was beyond to remain limited
productive processes of a country defined upon a relatively small
to cosmological limitations. Before the industrial revolution the
frequent in the history of wars. For a long time they were the
Of course, limited war between major powers have been
a good chance of proving itself from spreading as well.
War is limited, if it is clear that one little two accusations would add
most explosive accusation. If a war between major powers can be
by as a war between the major powers. It is clear that this is true
(c) Finally there is the problem of limited war which pertain to the
action against Britain or a Soviet military move into the Middle East,
directed against the off-shore fanatics or the Anglo-French police

AF-27

[y]

VI-25

made it impossible for him to conscript his subjects or to levy income taxes or to confiscate property. His military establishment was therefore limited by the availability of resources and with it the wars he fought. On the other hand, the wars of Prussia while they did not exceed those of France in scope involved an incomparably greater mobilization of national resources. This came about because Prussia's inferiority in resources enabled her to survive as a major power only by a domestic tour de force which organized the entire state for war. Still Prussia's exertions only gave her a precarious parity with the other powers; she did not force them to emulate her. Wars remained limited because the major powers were able to mobilize only a small proportion of their national resources for war and because the one power which was not so restricted did not thereby gain a decisive advantage.

Since the French Revolution the domestic restrictions on the capacity of governments to mobilize national resources have increasingly disappeared. And this had occurred side by side with the industrial revolution which made it technically possible to devote a substantial proportion of the national product to war without bringing about the kind of privation which would shake the social order.

To be sure, there still exist differences not in the **power**, but in the **willingness** to exact sacrifices: one of the sources of Soviet strength is her readiness to devote a much larger proportion of the

["strength to bear readiness to devote a much larger proportion of the\nwillingness to exact sacrifices: one of the sources of conflict.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nsubstantial proportion of the national proceeds to war without bring-\nning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social order.\nTo be sure, there still exists differences not in the power, but in\ning about the kind of privilege which would arise in the social

VI-26

national income to military expenditures than the United States.
But for purposes of present strategy it is clear that no major
power will be forced to adopt a strategy of limited objectives be-
cause of insufficient resources. With modern weapons, a limited war
will be an act of policy, not of necessity.

What then is a limited war under modern conditions? One can
think of many models: a war confined to a geographic area, a war that
does not utilize the whole weapons system (such as eschewing the use
of thermo-nuclear weapons), a war which utilizes the whole weapons
system but limits its employment on specific targets. But none of
these military definitions seems adequate: a war may be confined
geographically or in terms of targets and yet be total in the sense
of draining the national substance, as happened to France in World
War I. The fact that the most destructive weapons are not employed,
or that the destructive capability of the existing weapons is small,
is no more a guarantee against excessive suffering. In the Thirty
Year's War the power of weapons was negligible compared to modern
armaments and the number of men in each army was small by present-
day standards -- in fact the Austrian Field Marshall Montecucoli put
at 15,000 the absolute maximum number of men which would be effi-
ciently commanded in one army. Yet it is estimated that at least
30 per cent of the population of Germany died during the course of it.

7. Montecuccoli, p. 74 (He insisted that not even Wallenstein's armies exceeded 15,000 men).

armies exceeded 1,000,000 men).

V. Montecuccoli, b. 19 (He initiated that not even Gallipoli).

30 per cent. of the population of Germany died during the course of it.

Scientific commands in one army. Yet it is estimated that at least

at 1,000 the absolute maximum number of men which would be effi-
dy standards -- in fact the American Field Marshall Montecuccoli put

is no more a Guarantee against excessive tolling. In the Thirty

or that the destructive capability of the existing weapons is small.

of draining the national appearance, as happened to France in World

Geographically or in terms of targets and cost be total in the sense

these military definitions seems inadequate: a war may be confined

system but limits the employment of specific targets. But none of

does not utilize the whole weapons system (such as eaching the use

think of many models: a war confined to geographic areas, a war that

what then is a limited war under modern conditions? One can

power will be forced to adopt a strategy of limited objectives, so

AI-50

VI-27

And a new world war fought with what have come to be known as conventional weapons would also produce appalling casualties because the destructiveness of these weapons has increased between five and ten-fold over World War II.

In short, there exists no way to define a limited war in purely military terms; the end result of a reliance on purely military consideration is certain to be all-out war, the attempt to render the enemy defenseless, to deprive him of any possibility of establishing a relationship between cost of continued resistance and the terms sought to be imposed. The goal of such a war is to bring about a situation in which the conditions of peace are dependent entirely on the victor's will.

A strategy based on purely military considerations is therefore an attempt to solve by force one of the dilemmas of international relations: the incommensurability between a nation's approach to domestic and to foreign policy. Domestic policy is limited only by technical feasibility and by the sense of justice of the citizens, at least in a democracy. (Even totalitarian regimes are limited by the sense of justice of their citizens. To achieve acquiescence they institute elaborate propaganda machines to achieve a consensus and a secret police apparatus to liquidate dissenters). But foreign policy adds another dimension: the sovereign will of other states which may have different criteria of

sovereign will of other states which may have different criteria of
different criteria). But foreign policy adds another dimension to the:

achieve a consensus and a secret police subordination to jurisdiction
accordingly they participate collaboratively intragovernmental machines to
limit the scope of justice of their citizens... To achieve:

some at least in a democracy. (Even totalitarian regimes are

by technical feasibility and by the same of justice of the citi-
ment of the majority.

domestic and to foreign policy. Democratic policy is limited only
relational: the incoherence between a nation's approach so
an attempt to solve by force one of the problems of international

A strategy based on purely military considerations is therefore
on the victor's will.

attrition in which the conditions of peace are dependent entirely:

ought to be imposed. The goal of such a war is to bring about a
a relationship between coat of conscripted reistance and the terms
of enemy delinquency, to preserve him of any possibility of establiasing

consideration if certain to be all-out war, the attempt to render the
by military force, the end result of a reliance on foreign military

In short, there exists no way to define a limited war is pure:

ten-fold over World War II.

the destructiveness of these weapons but increased between five and
additional weapons would also produce shattering characteristics because
And a new world war would be fought with what have come to be known as con-

M-57

VI-28

justice and a different conception of its interests. Domestically
foreign policy is _legitimized_ as all other policy by the domestic
standard of justice, for a nation has no other. But internationally,
what is defined as justice domestically becomes an object of
negotiation. It is little wonder that the reaction of a nation like
ours which has never experienced the limits of its domestic
possibilities is a rebellion against this double standard which
treats what is defined as absolute domestically as contingent abroad.
Our predilection for all-out war is a symptom of our quest to trans-
form foreign policy into an aspect of domestic policy, to bring
about a situation abroad where the will of other nations, or at
least of the enemy, is no longer a factor to be considered.

A limited war, by contrast, is fought for a specific objective
which, by its very existence, will establish a certain commensurability
between the force employed and the goal to be attained. It reflects
an attempt to _affect_ the opponent's will, not to crush it; to make
the conditions to be imposed seem more attractive than continued
resistance, but to strive for conditions and not for complete
annihilation.

Limited war presents the military with particular difficulties
however. An all-out war is relatively simple to plan because its
limits are set by military considerations and even by military
capacity. The targets for an all-out war are relatively fixed; the
force requirements determined by the need to assemble overwhelming

force requirements determined by the need to assemble overwhelming capacity. The targets for an all-out war are relatively fixed; the limits are set by military considerations and even by military however. An all-out war is relatively simple to plan because its limited war presents the military with particular difficulties

resistance, but to strive for conditions and not for complete the conditions to be imposed seem more attractive than continued an attempt to affect the opponent's will, not to crush it; to make between the force employed and the goal to be attained. It reflects which, by its very existence, will eat away a certain commensurability of limited war, by contrast, is fought for a specific objective least of the enemy, is no longer a factor to be considered.

About a situation abroad where the will of other nations, or at form foreign policy into an aspect of domestic policy, to bring Our intervention for all-out war is a symptom of our descent to trans-treats what is defined as absolute domestically as contingent abroad. Possibilities is a rebellion against this double standard which ours which has never experienced the fights of its domestic negotiation. It is a little wonder that the reaction of a nation like what is defined as justice domestically becomes an object of standard of justice, for a nation has no other. But internationally, foreign policy is legitimized as all other policy by the domestic justice and a different conception of its interests. Domestically

41-33

VI-29

power. The characteristic of a limited war on the other hand, is the existence of ground-rules which define the relationship of military to political objectives. Planning here becomes much more conjectural, much more subtle and much more indeterminate, if only because a war against a major enemy can be kept limited only if both parties desire it -- and this alone tends to introduce a factor outside the control of planning officers. The military can never be certain how many forces the opponent will in fact commit to the area in dispute and since they will wish to guard against every contingency, they will relate their force levels they request to the capabilities of the enemy, which in practice means that even for limited war, they will request forces adequate to fight an all-out war. The military tend to resist limited war as outside their scope either on grounds of military doctrine or by stating force levels inconsistent with a policy of limited war.

And from the purely military point of view they are correct, for limited war is essentially a political act. Its distinguishing feature is precisely that it has no purely military solution: the political leadership must for this reason assume the responsibility for defining the framework within which the military are to develop their plans and capabilities. To demand of the military that they set their own limits is to set in motion a vicious circle of overstated requirements which paralyze action, of military planning on the basis of crushing the enemy and political planning which becomes increasingly defensive. The prerequisite for a policy of limited war is the reintroduction of the political element into our concept of warfare and the surrender of the notion that policy ends when war begins or that war has goals different from those of national policy.

VI-30

V

This raises the question to what extent the nuclear age permits a policy of intermediary objectives. Do any of the factors apply today which in the past made possible a diplomacy of limited objectives and military policy of limited wars?

In the great periods of European cabinet diplomacy between the Treaty of Westphalia and the French Revolution and between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of the first World War, wars were limited because there existed a political framework which led to a general consciousness of limited risks. This political framework was due to several factors: There was, to begin with, a conscious decision that the upheavals of the Thirty Year's War and of the Napoleonic wars should not occur again. This decision proved most effective in the period immediately following the wars, but it gave the international orders created by the Treaty of Westphalia and the Congress of Vienna the breathing spell necessary to convince the major powers that none of the outstanding disputes involved their survival. More important was the fact that the international order did not contain a revolutionary power. No state was so dissatisfied with the peace settlement that it sought to gain its ends by overthrowing it and no power considered that its domestic notion of justice was incompatible with that of the other states. Finally, in an era of stable weapons technology, both the strength of the powers and the assessment of it were relatively fixed, the risks of surprise attack and of unforeseen technological developments were relatively small. All this did not make conflicts impossible, but it limited them to disputes within a given framework; wars occurred, but they were fought in the name of the existing framework and the peace was justified as the better arrangement of a basically unchanged international order.⁸)

8) For a fuller discussion, see the author's *A World Restored*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957.

VI-31

If we inquire which of these factors -- fear of war, [legitimacy] and a stable power relationship is present today, little cause for optimism remains. None of the major powers accept either the present framework of the international order or the domestic structure of the other states. On the contrary, we are confronted by a power which for over a generation has proclaimed the incompatibility of its domestic notion of justice with that of other states, and which has built an internal control system on the myth of a permanently hostile world. Every agreement with the Soviet bloc has proved temporary because it has been considered by it as a tactical maneuver to prepare positions for the inevitable showdown. The slogan of "peaceful coexistence" cannot obscure the fact that we are living in a revolutionary period. For the justification of peaceful coexistence advanced by the Soviets is precisely their conviction that it will enable them to subvert the existing structure by means other than an all-out war.⁹)

Nor is the nature of power relationships more reassuring. Even with a less volatile technology a two-power world would have an inherent element of instability because an increase in strength of one side cannot be made up by superior political dexterity but is tantamount to an absolute weakening of the other side. Moreover, the weapons technology is far from stable. Almost up to the outbreak of World War II a weapons system would be good for a generation at least, while today it may be out-dated when it has barely passed the blueprint stage. Yet the failure to plan on the basis of these "prematurely aged" weapons might at any given point of time create a vital weakness. In the technological race, moreover, the side which has adopted the military doctrine that its opponent can always strike the first blow is at a distinct disadvantage,

9) For an expansion of these ideas, see below Chapter ____

VI-32

for it cannot afford a single mistake; it cannot afford to fall behind even
for an instant. It must phase its planning and procurement over an indefinite
period while its opponent, if he is determined on a show-down, can plan for a
target date and need prepare only for the war he is planning to fight.

But if neither an agreed legitimacy nor a stable power relationship
exists today, they may be outweighed by the third factor in the equation: the
fear of thermo-nuclear war. Never have the consequences of all-out war been
so unambiguous, never have the gains seemed so incommensurable with the
sacrifices. What statesman who declared war in 1914 would not have recoiled
had he known the shape of the world in 1918? Today every weapons test augurs
much horror. The miscalculation of a short, inexpensive war which produced
World War I is therefore no longer possible. And even a leader of Hitler's
deranged frame of mind would hesitate before the consequences of thermo-nuclear
devastation.

One of the arguments against limited wars asserts that they offer no
inherent guarantee against their expansion and that they may gradually merge
into an all-out war. On purely logical grounds, the argument is unassailable.
But it assumes that the major protagonists will be looking for an excuse to
expand the war while in reality both sides will probably grasp at every excuse,
however illogical, to keep a thermo-nuclear holocaust from occurring. It is
clear that a war cannot be limited unless both sides wish to keep it limited.
The argument for limited war is precisely that both sides have a common and
overwhelming interest to prevent it from spreading. The fear that an all-out
thermo-nuclear war might lead to the disintegration of the social structure
should be used to guarantee the "limits" of both war and diplomacy.

VI-33

The key problem of present day strategy is therefore to devise alter-
native capabilities to confront the opponent with contingencies from which he
can extricate himself only by thermo-nuclear war, but to deter him from this
step by our retaliatory capacity. We have seen that the most difficult decision
for a statesman is whether to risk the national substance for the objective in
dispute by unleashing an all-out war. Thus the psychological advantage will
always be on the side of the power which can shift to its opponent the decision
to initiate all-out war. All Soviet moves in the post-war period have had
this character; they have faced us with problems which by themselves did not
seem worth an all-out war but with which we could not deal with an alternative
capability. We refused to defeat the Chinese in Korea because we were unwilling
to risk an all-out conflict; we saw no solution to the Indo-Chinese crisis
without dangers we were reluctant to confront. A strategy of limited wars
might reverse or at least arrest this trend. Limited war is thus not an alter-
native to massive retaliation, but its complement, for it is the capability for
massive retaliation which provides the sanction against expanding the war.

The conduct of limited war has two prerequisites, however: a doctrine
and a capability. As long as we consider limited war as an aberration from
the "pure" war we will not be able to grasp its opportunities and we will
conduct such wars as we may engage in hesitantly and ambiguously, oscillating
between temptations of expanding it (that is bringing it closer to our notion
of what war should be like) or ending it at the first enemy overture. Such a
doctrine would have to surrender any illusions of what is attainable by limited
war. It is not a cheaper substitute for massive retaliation; on the contrary,
it involves the realization that with the end of our atomic monopoly the
possibility of imposing unconditional surrender at an acceptable cost has

VI-34

disappeared. At the same time a strategic doctrine which admits the possibility of fighting a limited war and the renunciation of unconditional surrender should not be confused with the acceptance of a stalemate. For the notion that there is no alternative between unconditional surrender and the status quo ante is much too mechanical. If the military position of an enemy became untenable and if he were offered choices other than all-out war or surrender, he might accept local withdrawals without resorting to all-out war. In the face of our retaliatory capacity amputation may seem preferable to suicide. Even should limited war give us no more than the possibility of a local stalemate it would represent a strategic improvement for at the moment our problem is precisely our inability to defend major areas except by the threat of the thermo-nuclear holocaust which we should strain every effort to avoid.

There exist two reasons, then, for a strategy of limited war: that limited war represents the only means to prevent the Soviet bloc from overrunning the preipheral areas of Eurasia at an acceptable cost and that it offers our best chance to obtain strategic transformations in our favor. But why must we prevent the hostile domination of Eurasia? Would our retaliatory power not protect us even if we were confined to "Fortress America?"

The argument usually advanced for retaining a foothold in Eurasia is couched in military terms. It is said that we must maintain in friendly hands some areas on the Continent of Eurasia and above all in Western Europe because of the facilities which our allies provide for our Strategic Air Force. But we have a strategic interest in Eurasia independent of the range of our heavy bombers which will soon be increased to intercontinental range and which may in time be made obsolescent by missiles: the geopolitical fact that in relation to Eurasia the United States is an island power at present only in manpower,

VI-35

but later on even in industrial capacity. Thus we are confronted by the
traditional problem of an "island" power -- of Carthage with respect to Italy,
of Britain with respect to the Continent -- that its survival depends on
preventing the opposite land-mass from falling under the control of a single
power, above all one avowedly hostile. If Eurasia were to fall under the
control of a single power or group of powers and if this hostile power were
given sufficient time to exploit its resources, we should confront an over-
powering threat. For the loss of Eurasia would involve the loss or the
upheaval of Africa and were this to happen, the strategic relationship described
in the previous chapter would be reversed. Then we could be attacked from
around a perimeter, then the U.S.S.R. might make good a surprise attack --
and it would not be inhibited by our moral scruples from exploiting its
strategic advantage. At best we would be forced into a military effort not
consistent with what is now considered the American way of life. At worst,
we would be neutralized and cease being masters of our policy.

If this is true, we cannot cast off the peripheral areas of Eurasia
without dire consequences. If the United States ever became confined to
"Fortress America" or even if Soviet expansion went far enough to sap our allies'
will to resist, the Western Hemisphere would be confronted by three-quarters of
the human race and not much less of its resources and our continued existence
would be precarious.

But there is no necessity for this to occur. It should not be forgotten
that the defense of the Free World is a problem not only of power, but of will.
In 1941, Germany alone nearly defeated the U.S.S.R. and today the combination
of the United States and Western Europe should be able to contain it. The
industrial resources of the Free World still exceed those of the U.S.S.R. by a
considerable margin and in Asia, China appears strong at least partly because

VI-36

of the irresolution of her opponents. The task of creating a balance of power
would therefore be far from hopeless if one considered nothing but the avail-
able resources. But the will to use this strength is lacking because of the
memory of two world wars, the ambiguities of nuclear technology, and the almost
uninterrupted expansion of Soviet influence. While a balance is attainable
therefore along existing lines on the Eurasian Continent, it will always remain
tenuous. As long as Soviet armies are poised on the Elbe, Western Europe will
be insecure. As long as China strides unopposed through Southeast Asia, the
uncommitted Powers will seek their safety in neutralism. The Soviet bloc
presents to the outside world a vision of ruthless strength allied with artful
cunning, of a constant readiness to utilize force coupled with the diplomatic
skill to secure the fruits of such use. The United States, therefore, faces
the task not only of stemming the Soviet tide but also of reducing the Soviet
sphere and demonstrating the limitations of Soviet power and skills. The last
is almost as important as the reduction of the Soviet sphere for to the extent
that the Free World, now assailed by a sense of its impotence, realized that
the Soviet bloc, too, behind its facade of monolithic power shrinks from
certain consequences, its resolution and its policy will both become stronger.

A strategy which admits the possibility of fighting limited actions is
more likely to achieve this objective than the threat of a total nuclear war.
The threat of an all-out war will be either considered bluff or it will trans-
form every dispute into a question of prestige which will inhibit any concessions
Actions short of total war, on the other hand, may help restore fluidity to the
diplomatic situation, particularly if we analyze precisely what is meant by
reduction of the Soviet sphere. The Sino-Soviet bloc can be reduced short of
waging general war in two ways: by a voluntary withdrawal or by an internal
split. The former is unlikely and depends on many factors outside of our control

VI-37

but the latter deserves careful study. While it is impossible to predict the
precise circumstances of such a split; its general framework can be traced:
the U.S.S.R. may be induced to loosen its hold on its satellites if it finds
that the effort to hold them in line absorbs ever more of its strength. And
this effort may become increasingly difficult if the satellites should become
convinced that Soviet policy forces them to shoulder risks of no benefit to
their own country. A split between the U.S.S.R. and its satellites can come
about then through the creation of contingencies which accentuate potential
differences within the Soviet bloc. It was not easy for Britain to risk all-out
war for Northern Indo-China but it is doubtful whether Poland would willingly
engage in a "Russian" war, or how much the U.S.S.R. would risk to increase the
power of China. [Similarly,] Tito's break with Moscow was due at least in part
to his disenchantment over the Soviet Union's lukewarm support on the Trieste
issue which in turn was caused by the unwillingness of the U.S.S.R. to risk an
all-out war for a peripheral objective. Thus one of the most fundamental
indictments of the exclusive reliance on all-out war is that its inability to
differentiate its pressures may actually contribute to the consolidation and
the unity of the Soviet bloc.

It is therefore misleading to attack the little war thesis on the ground
that it does not offer a military solution to our strategic problem, for its
merit is precisely that it may provide a political solution. Had we defeated
which we might have done if we had not had a power maneuvering for the benefit and
the Chinese army in Korea in 1951, we would have confronted the U.S.S.R. with the
dilemma whether to risk everything for the sake of increasing the power of China;
attacked early and
and had we followed our victory with a conciliatory political proposal to
Peking we could have caused it to reconsider the advantage of too close an
association with the U.S.S.R. But even if we had failed in our primary task
of dividing the U.S.S.R. and China, we would have greatly improved our position

VI-38

towards our allies and even more toward the uncommitted nations in Asia. The best counter-argument to the charge of colonialism is political moderation after a military victory. A military stalemate, on the other hand, always leaves open the question whether what is advanced as moderation is not in reality a sign of weakness or at least of irresolution. Indo-China gave us a similar opportunity, if under less favorable circumstances, although the Indo-Chinese one might add, though the circumstances would have been far more favorable, problem would hardly have assumed its final dimensions had China suffered a decisive reversal in her first military encounter with the United States. Thus, if limited actions are implemented as part of a policy which offers the other side a way out short of total surrender or total war, they may bring about local reversals which may start chain reactions difficult to control and might magnify the tensions within the Soviet bloc. A strategy of limited war, then, would use our retaliatory power as a means to permit us to fight local actions on our terms or to shift the risk of initiating all-out war to the other side.

VI

Limited war will make extremely heavy demands on the discipline and subtlety of the leadership and the confidence of the public. For limited war is psychologically a much more complex problem than all-out war; an all-out war involves national survival and the suffering it entails will soon eliminate all disputes about the nuances of policy. Limited war, on the other hand, presents no such clear-cut issues: here defeat may not be thought to carry the same penalties nor does victory offer a final solution. The temptations of all-out war or of stalemate will always be present and both tend to inhibit decisive action. Thus while during an all-out war the psychological equation is relatively stable, national survival being at issue for both contenders, in a limited war the psychological equation is constantly shifting. For the

VI-39

limiting condition of limited war is the possibility that it may spread to
become all-out. It is clear that limited war which threatens the opponent's
retaliatory force would stand a good chance of becoming all-out. Similarly
other transformations which seem to threaten national survival, would make the
threat of invoking all-out war more plausible. Thus paradoxically, the psycho-
logical equation in a limited war is constantly shifting against the side that
seems to be winning. The greater the transformation it seeks, the more credible
the threat by its opponent of all-out war will become, and the less prepared
psychologically will the winning side be to test the credibility of the threat.
For while the winning side is staking the chance for a favorable transformation,
the losing side is risking an adverse change of position. The better the
position of the winning side, the more secure it will feel and the fewer the
risks of all-out war it will be willing to take. The more precarious the
position of the loser, the more insecure he will feel and the more likely is he
to increase its commitment, at least if the winning side pushes its advantage
too far. Thus the U.S.S.R. could intervene with impunity in Hungary because
in any calculation of risks of the consequences of attempting to stop them we
could only gain what we never had, while the U.S.S.R. stood to lose territory
it had possessed since World War II. The psychological problem of limited war,
therefore, becomes under what circumstances one side may be willing to pay a
greater price for winning than the other to avoid losing. Otherwise the result
is almost certain to be a stalemate.

Thus limited war has the same psychological complexity as a policy of
deterrence. In some areas, a power will have a considerable psychological
potential for limited war apart from its force levels because the region matters
to it a great deal or is thought by its opponent to matter to it a great deal.

VI-40

This was the case with China in Korea for example; it may be true of the United States in Central America. There may even be areas which are thought so important to one of the contenders that they will be protected by the belief of the opponent that any attack on them will lead to a general war. In such a case, protection for the areas will be achieved less by local defense than by the over-all strategic balance. This has been the case up to now with Western Europe with respect to the United States or the satellite regions with respect to the U.S.S.R. As the horror of thermo-nuclear war grows, however, the over-all strategic balance will be a less and less adequate protection to threatened areas because even fewer regions will seem worth an all-out war. As the consciousness of the nuclear stalemate grows the psychological balance can increasingly be achieved only by the capability for local action. Limited war would therefore become a test for the determination of both sides, a gauge of the importance they attach to disputed issues. If one side attaches greater importance to an area or an issue and is willing to pay a higher price it may achieve a strategic transformation.

In any case, the key to a policy of limited war is to keep the challenge to the opponent below the threshold which would unleash all-out war. The greater the risk in relation to the challenge, the less total the response is likely to be. The possibility of local adjustments therefore depends on three conditions: a) the ability to generate pressures other than the threat of thermo-nuclear war, b) the ability to create a climate of opinion in which survival is not thought to be at stake in every issue, c) the ability to keep control of public opinion should a disagreement arise over whether national survival is at stake. The prerequisite for a policy of limited war is not only the capability for it, but its plausibility to the other side. Soviet reactions to our measures will depend more on what we are thought to intend to do, than what we really intend.

VI-58

These arguments have great force. No one even generally familiar with the destructiveness of modern weapons can regard the prospect of any kind of nuclear war with equanimity. Yet the prospect of nuclear war is with us not by choice but because of the facts of modern technology. The only question for strategy therefore is which course will make all-out war less likely; whether limited nuclear war will add to our dangers or diminish them. It must be admitted at the outset that it is not possible to draw a sharp dividing line in the employment of nuclear weapons, that either side has therefore the technical possibility of expanding its commitment gradually until total war is reached. But the crucial point is surely not whether it can do so technically but whether it will wish to do so psychologically. The distinction between tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons may be difficult to draw on the basis of pure logic but every state will have a powerful incentive to make some distinction: however tenuous its logic: the fear of all-out war. It is not likely that a war becomes all-out because of a logical syllogism. Korea should demonstrate the eagerness of both sides to draw limits, however arbitrary and however contrary to military logic. No one "wargaming" the Korean war in advance would have assumed it possible that a war with such ground rules could be fought. As it turned out we would not even retaliate against air bases from which attacks on our forces would be leveled.

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conditions. The sudden introduction of nuclear weapons during the course of a war would force the Powers to confront the problem of limitation in the confusion of combat when the possibilities of misunderstanding the opponent's intentions are greatest. And this may be compounded by bureaucratic inertia if war plans postulate the explosion of any nuclear device anywhere as the start of thermonuclear conflict.

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For this reason one of the problems of limited war is to decide on which part of the curve measuring commitments and risks to operate. The dispute between those who identify limited war with conventional war and those who believe in the possibility of limited nuclear war resolves itself into a question whether it is safer and more productive to operate at the lower or on the upper part of the curve, whether a limited war is kept limited better by a strategy of minimum risk or by starting it with an initially larger commitment. Liddell Hart has argued for example, that deterrence is best achieved by a light screen of token conventional forces for the enemy would know that overrunning them would be tantamount to a declaration of all-out war because we would not accept defeat without resorting to it.<sup>18)</sup> But this is in effect another version of massive retaliation which interjects one small step -- a limited conventional war -- between peace and a thermo-nuclear holocaust. And it is subject to the same criticism as massive retaliation. It is simply not credible that a defeat of a few conventional divisions should unleash a thermo-nuclear holocaust, nor is a strategy which would go through with such a threat a responsible one. Thus at the lower end of the scale[where] the deterrence may be ineffective because the risk for the Soviet bloc is small and the threat of all-out war not plausible.

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Conversely, it will be very difficult on this basis to maneuver the enemy into a position from which he can extricate himself _only_ by all-out war -- the conditions for winning or stalemating a limited war.

The best balance between deterrence and an effective strategy is in the intermediary range of risk and commitment: the area of limited nuclear war. Here a substantial risk is posed for the opponent and one that has the advantage of credibility. The Soviet bloc moreover will be deprived of the advantage of initiative in expanding the war because both sides will be operating close to the upper limit of risk. In short, in a policy of limited war it is safer and// more effective to begin with an intermediary rather than a minimum commitment because the threat of all-out war which is the chief limiting condition of war will be more credible here and because the most difficult decision -- whether to resort to all-out war -- is passed on to the enemy most effectively in this manner.

This is not to say that limited nuclear war is always the best or the wisest strategy; it is simply to indicate that it is possible and that flexibility is increased not by attempting to draw a line between conventional and nuclear war, but by creating a smooth curve of non-nuclear and nuclear capability in a limited war against a non-nuclear underdeveloped country, in a civil war, in a minor police action, the use of nuclear weapons may be unnecessary or unwise either for psychological or political reasons. In some circumstances too, it may be desirable to understate the response against a major power by using conventional weapons. But in a war against a nuclear power or in a war against an enemy whose resources of manpower would enable him to keep increasing his commitment by small increments, a limited nuclear war affords the best strategy for fighting a limited war effectively and for keeping it limited. The advantage of lower-yield nuclear