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identity. Leading Americans have replied by emphasizing the futility of
seeking to base policy on past glory, the vanity of trying to base European
unity on French hegemony.

Yet both protagonists profess the same objectives.
The professions of objectives are as similar as the accusations.

Both France and the United States avow the goal of European unity. Both insist that their policy will lead to a closer Atlantic partnership. Each side argues that its policy will finally cause the Communist dictatorships to become more tractable and return the Soviet Union to the community of nations.

It could be thought, then, that the dispute is primarily one of tactics.
In fact, the controversy goes deeper. At issue are two conflicting concep-
tions of international order, two different views of the historical process,
two variant visions of the future. What gives the controversy its tragic
quality is that each approach might have succeeded but for the existence of
the other. Each side has the power to prevent the other from realizing its
objective. Neither can create an alternative structure--France even less than
the United States. Any discussion of Atlantic policy must therefore begin

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economic enterprise. He was referring to the efforts of the Scandinavian countries and Austria to enter the Common Market without making a commitment to political unity. The United States threw its weight behind the Common Market on the theory that Britain could be induced to join Europe only if European economic integration was so successful that Britain would have no alternative.

European unity was pressed so urgently because it was considered an essential prerequisite to the formation of an Atlantic Community. On July 4, 1962, President Kennedy proclaimed the Declaration of Interdependence between the United States and a United Europe. A politically and economically integrated Europe would become an equal partner with the United States sharing with us the burdens and obligations of world leadership.¹ To its fervent enthusiasts, such a partnership seemed realizable by only one method: a politically unified Europe in close association with the United States.

Similarly, a single solution was offered for the achievement of European unity:

¹ "The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership," DOSB, XLVII, 1204, (July 23, 1962), pp. 131-133.

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supra-national institutions operating on the basis of majority vote and con-
trolled by a European Parliament.

Prominent among the factors producing *this* single-minded approach was the conviction that the American experience was directly applicable to the European situation. "The United States of America with its balance of power and Federal State divisions is the unique political experiment in federation about which we are proud and self-conscious," said Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Schaetzel. "We believe that our system works. It is a natural human reaction to believe that it might also work for other people."¹ A similar note was struck by President Kennedy in 1962:

> The debate now raging in Europe echoes on a grand scale the
debates which took place in this country between 1783 and
1789. Small states are sometimes fearful of big ones. Big
states are suspicious for historical reasons of one another.
Some statesmen cling to traditional forms--others clamor for
new ones. And every eye is on the hostile powers who are never
far away. All this reminds us of our own organic deliberations.²

¹ J. Robert Schaetzel, "The United States and the Common Market," speech to 1962 Summer Institute of the Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada, August 18, 1962, in *DOSB*, XLVII, 1210, Sept. 3, 1962, p. 351. See also Christian Herter, *Towards an Atlantic Community*, Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, N.Y., & Evanston, 1963, p. 55-56.

² John F. Kennedy, "Trade and the Atlantic Partnership," remarks to Conference on Trade Policy at Washington, D.C., May 17, 1962, *DOSB*, XLVI, 1197, June 5, 1962, p. 907.

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Europe with full integration on the basis of supra-national institutions.

Anything less than that was considered to be not unity at all.

There is no evidence that any serious consideration was given to whether a united Europe would *necessarily* act in harmony with the United States or whether a partnership among equals was really likely to operate as smoothly as official pronouncements suggested. Occasionally the question was posed hypothetically only to be rejected. McGeorge Bundy explained the *disarmament* view as follows: "In the end our confidence in Europe rests on deeper and more solid political grounds. These peoples are our cousins by history and culture, by language and religion."¹ Considering the record of internecine wars of these "cousins", some questions might have been raised about the *solidity* of such confidence.²¹

The notion that there was a harmony of interests between the United States and Europe remained unquestioned. Dean Rusk was expressing the conviction of three post-war Administrations when he said:

¹ McGeorge Bundy, "Policy for the Western Alliance--Berlin and After," speech to Economic Club of Chicago, December 6, 1961, _DOSB_, XLVI, 1185, March 12, 1962, pp. 422-423.

III - II - 6

In 1947, the American Government decided that it would link
the recovery of Europe to efforts at European unification.
We chose quite consciously not to play a balance-of-power
game with the nations of Europe but to build toward a strong
partnership in the affairs of the West.¹

As the years went by confusion emerged between the particular form of European
came to be identified with
organization and the substance of the policy a united Europe was likely to carry out. In the
an
American view, "integrated" Europe would be "outward looking"; a less cohesive
became
Europe would be parochial. An integrated Europe would be a partner to the
remaining
equally
democracies
United States; a less cohesive one would turn into a burden or perhaps an
opponent. In short, an integrated Europe was essential to complete the Grand
22
Design." This was expressed by Under Secretary of State Ball:

> As we have felt the increasing weight of the burdens and res-
> ponsibilities of leadership--increased geometrically by the
> existence of a real and present danger from Communist ambitions--
> we have wished, sometimes wistfully, for a closer and stronger
> Atlantic partnership. Yet a strong partnership must almost
> by definition mean a collaboration of equals. When one partner
> possesses over 50 percent of the resources of an enterprise and
> the balance is distributed among 16 or 17 others, the relation-
> ship is unlikely to work very well. And so long as Europe re-
> mained fragmented, so long as it consisted merely of nations
> small by modern standards, the potentials for true partnership
> were always limited.²

23

¹ Dean Rusk, "Some Issues of Contemporary History," speech to the American Historical Association, Washington, D.C., December 30, 1961, DOSB, XLVI, 1177, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 86.

² George Ball, "Toward an Atlantic Partnership," Speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, February 6, 1962, DOSB, XLVI, 1184, March 5, 1962, pp. 366-367.

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This too was the theme of President Kennedy in his speech at the Paulskirche
in Frankfurt in 1963:

> It is only a fully cohesive Europe that can protect us all against fragmentation of the alliance. Only such a Europe will permit full reciprocity of treatment across the ocean, in facing the Atlantic agenda. With only such a Europe can we have a full give-and-take between equals, an equal sharing of responsibilities, and an equal level of sacrifice.¹

> Partnership presupposed equality of strength; to a strong Europe the United States would concede responsibilities withheld from a collection of nation-states. Thus Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, as well as Secretary Rusk, have hinted that the United States was prepared to concede to a united Europe the nuclear autonomy which it had resisted giving individual allies-- even though many of the arguments made against national forces would seem to apply as strongly to a European nuclear force.

Although United States spokesmen extolled the virtues of partnership with a united Europe, they were rather vague about its nature. Under Secretary McGhee spoke of a "tightly integrated Europe" and a "somewhat looser Atlantic association." Though he described common tasks in aiding underdeveloped nations

¹ John F. Kennedy, Address at Paulskirche, Frankfurt, Germany, June 25, 1963, DOSB, XLIX, 1256, July 22, 1963, p. 122.

III - II - 8

and defending the frontiers of freedom, he did not spell out the content of these objectives or how the partnership was going to function in practice.

There was an implication that the partnership would apply to a sharing of the burdens but that the goals would remain those set by the United States during its period of hegemony--not indeed because we had aspirations to dominance but because unchallenged leadership had accustomed American leaders to believing that their views inevitably reflected the general interest. The goals were self-evident. They grew naturally from a sense of world responsibility. Cooperation would supply its own rationale.

The American view, for all its optimism ignored those factors which made the American experience unique. The American federal union was formed on a new continent by states of similar historical experience. The American colonies had recently fought a war together to achieve their freedom. They were roughly of the same size. They had no tradition of sovereignty in the conduct of foreign relations. Their peoples were of similar cultural background and spoke the same language.

The situation in Europe differs fundamentally. Every European nation

III - II - 9

is the product of many centuries of a history in which identity was often linked to primarily what was identified with what distinguished them from other European countries. Though of the same cultural root, independence for many European states required a long process of struggle, often against their neighbors. The sense of identity in the words was formed of the countries of Europe was established in a manner which emphasized national peculiarities. The conduct of foreign policy and the assumption of responsibility for national defense have been considered among the key attributes of European sovereignty. Any attempt to abolish the nation-states, or to reduce their role drastically, represents a much more profound wrench with the past in Europe than the establishment of the United States of America two centuries earlier. Unification in Europe inevitably would have to allow for more pluralistic forms than federalism in the United States.

The attitude of the European states towards unity and the form which it should take is as different as their history. Smaller countries with a habit of dependence find supra-national institutions easier to accept than those which were major powers at one time. The Federal Republic of Germany, whose sense of identity was smashed in the war, is less reluctant to be amalgamated in a supra-national entity than France or Britain.

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The relative weakness of the nation-state in Europe in the post-war period had in any event been due partly to phenomena which proved to be temporary: the exhaustion of the countries of Europe through the war and the fear of Soviet invasion. Both of these factors emphasized Europe's dependence on the United States. As Europe recovered economically traditional political vigor--and some of its traditional political concepts--returned. The success of economic recovery tended to reduce Europe's receptivity to America's political maxims. This coincided with the belief that the Soviet threat was ending--a development also fostered by American policy.

These factors might have been counterbalanced had Europe wished to play the global role envisaged for it by the Grand Design. But the process of decolonization has sharply reduced Europe's interest in extra-European affairs. And to play a European role, the nation-state is not so obsolete as is sometimes alleged. If European countries are willing to confine their foreign policy to Europe those joint efforts that modern conditions require are mostly technical or economic in nature. These may be left to experts without bringing about the political supra-national institutions favored by the United States. This serves to explain

III - II - 14

their policy are irrelevant; the tendency is inherent in the policies we are
urging. This may be desirable; the price may well be worth paying. But it
is incumbent on United States policy to recognize that there is a price.

Had it not been for General de Gaulle as President of France, these problems might have remained dormant for many years. But his emergence as President of France precipitated a fundamental change in the United States-European dialogue. Deliberately, often cynically, exploiting the weaknesses of the American conception, creating new ones by his intransigence, President de Gaulle has proclaimed a completely different view of Atlantic partnership and European unity. Inevitably this has produced a bitter, often personal, reaction among those who had considered the previous formula as the only possible one. But outraged pride is not a good guide to policy-making. European-American relations will never again be the same as they were before de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, excluding Britain from the Common Market. Waiting for his disappearance is not a policy but an evasion. It, therefore, becomes essential to try to assess without rancor the policies of the French President.

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III. The Illusionist: De Gaulle's Challenge to the "Grand Design"

If an international system could be designed with the symmetry of a geometric axiom, allies would consider primarily the requirements of a common undertaking and adjust their efforts on the basis of division of labor. But such a perfect symmetry is the illusion of Utopians--or of island powers. Historically aloof and geographically isolated, such nations consider that the primary purpose of foreign policy is to remedy the peril which has caused them to involve themselves in Continental affairs. Secure in their identity, they expect their allies to find fulfillment as components of an over-all design. Such was the attitude of Great Britain towards the Continent during the Napoleonic wars.

This, too, has been the tendency of the United States since it assumed major international responsibilities after World War II. To the United States, security seemed to depend on distant defenses coordinated with the defense of other non-communist countries. We therefore expected our allies to fit into an over-all strategy or Grand Design essentially devised in Washington. This led to an egalitarian conception of the international order: states tend to be judged according to their contribution to our

III - III - 2

conception, with relatively little concern for their history or tradition, while any attempt on their part to manipulate their position relative to each other is considered out-dated nationalism.

To itself, however, a society represents something other than its serving as a contributor to an over-all division of labor; it is the expression of an historical experience and a certain set of values. An international system, no matter how rational, cannot be vital unless it conforms, at least to some extent, to the values and the historical image of the states comprising it. Over-all efficiency is one value; but to many countries it is not the decisive one. Over-all security is an essential goal of our allies, but centuries of history have also made them conscious of their relative position towards each other and towards the United States.

The clash of old values with new concepts becomes a particular problem when the international system is in a state of transition. Then old loyalties may clash with the requirements of new organization. If the new structure represents too drastic a break with the past, it will never achieve the spontaneity required for organic growth. (This was in part the problem with the unification of Italy.) If the traditional pattern grows too rigid, a society may break in the face of the need for adaptation.

III - III - 3

A society whose sense of identity is highly developed may find it
psychologically easier to adapt itself than a society marked by doubt.
Change does not threaten the meaning of existence for such a group as it
does for those less sure of their identity. Adaptation, in that case, can
become a matter of prudence and calculation; it turns into an essentially
technical problem. The case is different when a society has undergone
traumatic experiences. Such a society must balance the benefits of a new
set of international arrangements against the dangers of moral disintegration.

Its calculus of prudence is quite different. Before it can risk what it
wishes to become, it may have to rediscover what it is. France has had
this problem since the end of the First World War.

Few countries have experienced the travail which France has suffered
since it lost much of its young generation in World War I. Victorious in
1918, France knew better than any of its allies how close to defeat it had
been. The survivors of the catastrophe felt in their bones that France could
not stand another trial like the one just surmounted. Deprived of its youth,
fearful of its defeated antagonist, feeling misunderstood by its erstwhile
allies, France experienced the inter-war period as an almost uninterrupted

III - III - 4

succession of frustrations. Domestically, the Third Republic witnessed mounting governmental instability. In foreign policy, France was torn between its premonitions and its sense of impotence. Nothing could have expressed France's sense of insecurity better than that it began to build the Maginot Line at a moment when its army was the largest in Europe and that of Germany was limited by treaty to 100 thousand men. What made the action all the more poignant is that France's East European allies could not possibly survive without the prospect of French offensive support and that Germany would never be in a position to attack the Maginot Line without having remilitarized the Rhineland in violation of the Treaty of Versailles.

As if paralyzed by seeing her fears come true, France stood by while Germany rearmed and broke one after another of the limitations put on it by the Peace Treaties of 1918. The collapse of 1940 was as much moral as military. Even though France emerged among the victors of World War II, its leaders were aware, despite all rhetoric and perhaps because of it, that France had been saved largely through the efforts of others. Once more peace brought no respite. Instead, the Fourth Republic underwent the same governmental instability as the Third, and it had to go through the searing

[ ]
III - III - 5

process of decolonization. Humiliated in 1940, the French army had barely been reconstituted when it had to engage in nearly two decades of frustrating colonial wars, each of which ended in defeat.

President de Gaulle's brutal tactics sometimes give the impression that a powerful, self-confident France has been a permanent feature of the post-war landscape. But it is only a few years since the war in Algeria was on the wane, during which time France was threatened to plunge into Civil War. So well has de Gaulle succeeded in his tour de force that even his critics act as if the only problem for Europe were to moderate excesses of French assertiveness, a notion which would have been inconceivable a few years ago. But less than a decade has passed since a wise (and pro-Western) French author could write:

> The pretention to indifference is never completely absent. It is our real nostalgia. At the very moment that we are torn out of our solitude we go on dreaming of it; we want to stand by the wayside and watch the traffic go by.... Our victory in 1918 has cost us too dearly. Since then we have wanted to recoup by counting our pennies; the result is we have lost everything. Strictly speaking the French nation no longer exists. She is disintegrating at this moment. She proved unable to secure her land against invasion because she was no longer strong enough to do so alone, and because her allies were not able to come to her aid quickly enough to prevent occupation. This is why France has had such strong inclinations to declare herself neutral. Then no one would have a right to enter her.... We are living like a ruined land unwilling to seem bankrupt.... We have not been so unhappy in France for a hundred years; our literature has not been so sad; because during this time we have experienced not but disappointments: the Republic in difficulties, socialism bankrupt, our wealth gone, our wars badly conducted.¹

¹ Parrain, Brice, "Against the Spirit of Neutrality," *Confluence*, January, 1956, p. 40.

III - III - 6

This spiritual malaise must be understood for it is the well-spring of President de Gaulle's policy. For the greater part of his career, he has had to be an illusionist. In the face of all evidence to the contrary, he strove to restore France's greatness by his passionate belief in it.

At first he was the leader of an insignificant faction of Frenchmen casting their lot with the Allies. His primary task, as he saw it, was to re-establish the identity and the integrity of France. Churchill and Roosevelt could concentrate on the tangible goal of winning the war. To de Gaulle victory was empty if it did not also restore the position, indeed the soul, of France. Churchill and Roosevelt inevitably considered this quest peripheral to their central objective.

The conflict between the pragmatic and the intangible which started during the war has continued to this day. The United States, blessed with stable government, its sense of identity enhanced by its war experience, could single-mindedly pursue whatever technical schemes its bureaucracy has thought up at any given moment. To de Gaulle, governing a country wracked by a generation of conflict and decades of frustration, the mode of accomplishment has been as important as the objective. A policy, however

III - III - 7

meritorious from the over-all point of view, could not support de Gaulle's objectives unless it also enhanced France's sense of identity.

Though de Gaulle often acts as if opposition to United States policy were a goal in itself, it is likely that his deeper purpose is pedagogical: to teach his people and perhaps his Continent the habit of independence and self-reliance. The "folie de grandeur" of which de Gaulle is so often accused is a peculiar kind, for it is tied to a profound awareness of the suffering and disappointments of his country. This caused him in 1960 to speak as follows:

> Once upon a time there was an old country all hemmed in by habits and circumspection. At one time the richest, the mightiest people among those in the center of the world stage, after great misfortunes it came, as it were, to withdraw within itself. While other peoples were growing around it, it remained immobile. In an era when the power of States depended upon their industrial might, the great sources of power were stingily meted out to it. It had little coal. It had no petroleum. Furthermore, its population was no longer growing as, in some years, it numbered fewer births than deaths. In the doubt and the bitterness which it came to have about itself as a result of this situation, political, social and religious struggles did not cease to divide it. Finally, after two world wars had decimated, ruined and torn it, many in the world were wondering whether it would succeed in getting back on its feet.¹

¹ Charles de Gaulle, Address on June 14, 1960, *Major Addresses, Statements, and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958 - January 31, 1964* (henceforth referred to as *Major Addresses*), French Embassy Press and Information Division, New York, 1964, p. 79.

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The means chosen by de Gaulle to get France back on its feet was
an act of faith powerful enough to override a seemingly contrary reality.

In de Gaulle's view, an almost mystical communion had been established
during the war between himself representing the general interest and the
French people. Thus during an uprising in Algiers de Gaulle could say:

"Finally, I speak to France. Well, my dear country, my old country, here
we are together, once again, facing a harsh test."¹ The aspiration to
greatness required that France regain--wherever possible--the right of
independent decision. France could agree with the decisions of others;
but it had to be clear that its action represented its own volition and
not the abdication of the impotent.

This is why de Gaulle never tires of insisting on his imperturbability in the face of Soviet threats or American criticisms. Thus during the height of the Berlin crisis of 1960, de Gaulle spoke as follows:

> But however resounding these commotions may be, obviously they
could not succeed in upsetting or intimidating France. We are
today strong enough, stable enough, sufficiently self-assured not
to allow ourselves to be impressed by word battles or gesticulation.²

¹ Major Studies, Address on January 29, 1960, *ibid.*, p. 74

² Major Studies, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, *ibid.*, p. 84

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III - III - 9

A great nation, in de Gaulle's concept, moves at its own pace; its objectives are dictated by its interests. Its sense of purpose enables it to become the master of events instead of their prisoner.

Part of the dispute between France and the United States, therefore, concerns the philosophical point of the nature of community. Washington urges the advantages of a structure in which each partner performs an assigned task in the common interest, making separate action impossible. Paris insists that a community can be meaningful only if each partner has a real choice and, therefore, the technical means of autonomous behavior. Washington, postulating a community of interests, looks to "consultation" as a major solvent of all disagreement. Paris insists that influence depends not only on the intellectual content of arguments but also on the options available. Washington considers that the insistence on autonomy is divisive and that it implies a desire for separate, perhaps antagonistic, policies. Paris regards the attacks on its independent stance as hiding hegemonial designs.

Both sides have pressed their arguments with such vigor that their perspective each is raised, and debate has taken on the overtones of what Europeans call a "dialogue among

III - III - 10

the effect. De Gaulle is probably correct in insisting that independence does not exclude cooperation. But he has stressed his autonomy so insistently and with such abrupt methods that French separateness at times seems to have become an end in itself. The United States is correct in affirming an underlying community of interests. But our emphasis on technical remedies blinds us to psychological realities. One particular method of European integration and Atlantic partnership has become as much an end to America as the affirmation of independence has to France. What is involved, ultimately are differing conceptions of truth. The United States, with its instrumental approach, often has analytical truth on its side. De Gaulle, with his consciousness of the trials of France for the past generation, is frequently closer to the historical truth.

Disagreement, of course, is not confined to theoretical issues. In his effort to vindicate a more autonomous role for France, de Gaulle challenges many fundamentals of American policy--in Atlantic relations, European unity, nuclear policy and East-West relations. Where United States spokesmen stress the concept of partnership, de Gaulle tends to emphasize the concept of equilibrium. Many United States officials assert

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that all disputes can be settled by talking things over around a table
in a "community spirit." To make Gaulle sound relationships must be based
on the proper assessment of an existing balance of forces. If there is
correctly calculated, an arrangement is always possible. If not, good-
will cannot serve as a substitute. Philosophic convictions thus combine
with personality to produce de Gaulle's aloof and uncompromising diplomatic
style. To him, being swayed by personal emotion is a form of servitude or
of irresponsibility:

> Man "limited in his nature" is "infinite in his desires."
> The world is thus full of opposing forces. Of course,
> human wisdom has often succeeded in preventing these
> rivalries from degenerating into murderous conflicts.
> But the competition of efforts is the condition of life.
> Our country finds itself confronted today with this law
> of the species, as it has been for two thousand years.¹

The art of statesmanship is to understand the nature of the world
and the trend of history. The great leader is not so much clever as
lucid and clear-sighted. Grandeur is not simply physical power but
strength reinforced by moral purpose. Nor does competition inevitably
involve physical conflict. On the contrary, a wise assessment of mutual

1, Address on May 31, 1960, ibid., p. 75.

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interests should produce harmony:

Yes, international life, like life in general, is a
battle. The battle which our country is waging tends
to unite and not to divide, to honor and not to debase,
to liberate and not to dominate. Thus it is faithful
to its mission which always was and which remains human
and universal.¹

De Gaulle's nationalism is in the tradition of Mazzini, who thought that nations having achieved their independence would respect the dignity of others. His diplomacy is in the style of Bismarck, who strove ¹² ruthlessly to achieve what he considered Prussia's rightful place but who then tried to preserve the new equilibrium through prudence, restraint and moderation.

Inevitably, however, de Gaulle's conception of the role of the
nation-state clashed with the American conviction of its obsolescence.
It is not that de Gaulle wishes to reactivate Europe's traditional
national rivalries as so many of his American critics allege. He
affirms the goal of unity for Europe as passionately as his detractors.
where |
But the American and European "integrationists" insist that European

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

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national parliaments. He urged a European referendum "so as to give
this launching of Europe the character of popular support and initiative
that is indispensable."¹

This affirmation of the need for European unity has been repeated
regularly:

> France. . . must help to build Western Europe into an organized union of states so that gradually there may be established on both sides of the Rhine, of the Alps and perhaps of the Channel the most powerful, prosperous and influential political, economic, cultural, and military complex in the world.²

> Western Europe must form itself politically. If it did not succeed in doing so, the Economic Community itself could not in the long run become stronger or even continue to exist. In other words, Europe must have institutions that will lead it to form a political union, just as it already is a union in the economic sphere.³

¹ __________, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, *ibid.*, p. 93.

² __________, Address on February 5, 1962, *ibid.*, p. 159.

³ __________, Press Conference on May 15, 1962, *ibid.*, p. 174.

[ ] III - III - 15

Western Europe appears likely to constitute a
major entity full of merit and resources, capable
of living its own life, indeed not in opposition
to the New World but right alongside it.¹

Most of these ideas were incorporated in the Fouchet plan for European
integration submitted by France in 1961.

It is often argued that de Gaulle's philosophy is in reality a
subterfuge for a design to establish French hegemony in Europe--the
mirror image of the French claim that American conceptions camouflage
our thirst for domination. It is impossible, of course, to be certain
about de Gaulle's "real" designs. It is clear, however, that if his
hegemony is his aim, he has chosen a curious road toward it. If a
united Europe takes its decisions on the basis of a unanimous vote of
its member states--as de Gaulle has proposed--it can be dominated, if
at all, only by moral leadership. French pre-eminence in Europe would
depend on whether French leaders succeeded in identifying themselves with
the main currents of opinion in Europe. The other states are not likely

1, Press Conference on July 23, 1964.

III - III - 16

to be so blind to their interest or so unsure of themselves as not to
cast a veto. De Gaulle's European policy is thus a gamble on the
reality of intangibles.

Differences between France and the United States over the future
of Europe have been compounded by disagreements over Atlantic policy.
These have gone through two contradictory phases. During his first
three years in office (from 1958-1961), de Gaulle repeatedly urged the
coordination of Western policies on a world-wide basis. In September,
1958 he proposed a global Directorate composed of the U.S., Great Britain
and France. The United States rejected this with the argument that
it could not designate one of its European partners to speak for the
others; no attempt was made to explore de Gaulle's reaction to a wider
forum.

De Gaulle returned to the theme of the need for coordinating
in his press conference of March 25, 1959, when he pointed out that NATO
was incomplete because its sphere of action did not extend south of the

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Mediterranean.¹ He made yet another plea for a common Western world-wide policy in 1960.

We feel that, at least among the world powers of the West, there must be something organized--where the Alliance is concerned--as to their political conduct and, should the occasion arise, their strategic conduct outside Europe, especially in the Middle East, and in Africa, where these three powers are constantly involved. Furthermore, if there is no agreement among the principal members of the Atlantic Alliance on matters other than Europe, how can the Alliance be indefinitely maintained in Europe? This must be remedied.²

This was pressed particularly urgently with respect to the Congo crisis in 1960.

When nothing came of these proposals, de Gaulle reverted to his usual, perhaps preferred, tactic of acting unilaterally and trying to force his partner's hand. After 1961, he stopped urging concerted Western action. Instead, he stressed that only a strong Europe would receive a respectful hearing in the United Nations or from the United States and the U.S.S.R. Increasingly, de Gaulle seemed to count on the development of Europe's strength and sense of identity to leave the

¹ __________, Press Conference on March 25, 1959, *ibid.*, p. 49.

² __________, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, *ibid.*, p. 96.

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United States no choice except to concede a coordination of policy.

This is not to say that de Gaulle's policy was basically a reaction
to being rebuffed by the United States. Rather, two changes in the
international situation caused American support to seem less crucial to
him and made independent action appear extremely rewarding. When
de Gaulle proposed the Directorate, a global show-down seemed likely.
The Lebanese crisis had just occurred; the Berlin ultimatum was imminent.
Europe's colonial difficulties were being brutally exploited by the Soviet
Union. This caused de Gaulle to try to make sure of American support in
case a show down would prove unavoidable. Since 1961 the threat from
the Soviet has seemed to recede, and the need for concerted action has
diminished proportionately. Indeed, with the growth of American involve-
ment in Asia and Latin American, the shoe is now somewhat on the other
foot. It is the United States which presses its European allies to
share its global responsibilities and the Europeans who are reluctant
to assume world-wide risks.

III - III - 19

But while de Gaulle has insisted on developing a French and ultimately a European identity, he has never ceased affirming the need for close association between Europe and the United States. He opposes, not the Alliance, but the concept of integration which he sees as eroding France's identity. And he has insisted that France must control its own atomic armament--regardless of the strategic theories dominant in the United States.

De Gaulle has rejected integration because:

> It is intolerable for a great State to leave its destiny up to the decisions and action of another State, however friendly it may be. In addition, it happens that in integration...the integrated country loses interest in national defense, since it is not responsible for it. The whole structure of the Alliance then loses its resilience and its strength.¹

> Integration would lead to an abdication of responsibility and a sense of impotence. It would oblige France and Europe to accept forever the tutelage of the United States:

1, Press Conference on April 11, 1961, *ibid.*, p. 124.

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France had been morally and materially destroyed by the collapse of 1940 and the capitulation of the Vichy people....

That is why, with regard to the United States--rich, active and powerful--she found herself in a position of dependence. France constantly needed its assistance in order to avoid monetary collapse. It was from America that she received the weapons for her soldiers. France's security was dependent entirely on its protection. With regard to the international undertakings in which its leaders at that time were taking part, it was often with a view to dissolving France in them, as if self-renouncement were henceforth its sole possibility and even its only ambition, while these undertakings in the guise of integration were automatically taking American authority as a postulate. This was the case with regard to the project for a so-called supranational Europe, in which France as such would have disappeared, except to pay and to orate; a Europe governed in appearance by anonymous, technocratic and stateless committees; in other words, a Europe without political reality, without economic drive, without a capacity for defense, and therefore doomed, in the face of the Soviet bloc, to be nothing more than a dependent of that great Western power, which itself had a policy, an economy, and a defense--the United States of America.¹

In pursuit of this policy de Gaulle, in 1959, withdrew the French fleet from NATO command. He argued that naval power by definition was designed for use in areas where the United States itself had insisted that NATO commitments did not apply. According to de Gaulle, this was the reason why the major portion of the American and British fleets remained under national control. When the French army returned from Algiers, ¹, Press Conference on July 29, 1963, *ibid.*, pp. 233-34.