December 12, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

From: Charles Kline

It is readily evident from comparing the 12/11/57 draft *Subpanel II*
copy of Chapter VIII ("Alliances and the Role of Force") with the
editing suggestions I have made that the consequent changes
proposed are very large in number, both as to style and substance.

I write this, because if you can't find the time just now
to discuss it orally, I want to make sure that the reasoning under-
lying the suggested editing is fully known.

At the December 8 meeting I happened to be greatly impressed
both by Mr. Wilde's comment about harmful effects flowing from
excessive use of "our" in the connotation of other nations serving
the U. S. and the attitude of Mr. Bendetsen, who, after all, did
successfully negotiate the further use of bases in the Philippines.

There is, too, a self-evident contradiction in saying at the
outset of the draft how much we intend to defend our allies per se
and then saying on page five that the U. S. never has undertaken
a *complete territorial guarantee* of the territories of the allies.
Properly so, of course, in the latter instance, because we couldn't
unequivocally assure non-penetration of a single hectare of allied
land, even with nuclear weapons employed against the Communists
at the outset. It is, of course, the old point that allies don't want
to think too much about being overrun by an enemy and then "liberated"
however short the intervening interval.

I would like to talk about it.

2 Attachments

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from civil war or economic struglation to slow takeover by communist-guided
and communist-armed fifth columns.

As a result the communist bloc has learned that if it keeps its challenges
sufficiently ambiguous, and below the level which the non-communist world can-
sider to warrant major war, we and our allies may prove unable or unwilling to
take effective action. Neither Korea nor Indochina, for example, seemed to
some of our allies worth an expanded war, nor did our alliances seem to fit the
issues actually in dispute. And now presented an even more difficult problem.
Confronted by an ambiguous threat, even a group of nations whose interests are
very similar find it exceedingly difficult to achieve an effective concerted re-
sponse, especially if this response involves major risks.

Resistant

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decreasing popular support for military programs combine to make the job even more costly and difficult. It is probable that the United States will have to provide -- either directly or indirectly -- much of the equipment needed by our allies, or else see their political stability decline along with their military strength. As a result, U.S. military aid programs will necessarily be increasingly costly.

Nor are the proposed military measures sufficient by themselves. They must be supplemented by positive programs for political cohesiveness, for economic and technical assistance, for education to improve governmental administration, and by other measures discussed more fully by various groups of the overall study project of which this panel is but one part.

The actions required to strengthen our system of alliances will be neither easy nor cheap. And, despite our efforts, we can still expect to be confronted with situations in which the choice may seem to lie between acquiescence in communist aggression or acceptance of splits among our allies. This much we can say concerning such decisions: we must act with resolution or accept grave losses.

# VIII - ALLIANCES AND THE ROLE OF FORCE

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has entered into a wide variety of military agreements with other states ranging from the sweeping multilateral defense arrangements of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Association to a large number of bilateral agreements with individual nations. Our Army, Navy and Airforces overseas are a token of our determination to defend our allies.

## The Basis of the U.S. System of Alliances

Strategically, the U.S. system of alliances is invaluable in the overall world-balance of power. Overseas bases provide advanced observation and warning posts against Soviet aggression. They bring striking forces closer to enemy targets, thus complicating the opponent's defensive problem. The advent of missiles will only increase their importance. On the one hand, missiles will enable the Soviet bloc to make many of our overseas airbases untenable. On the other hand, intermediate and short-range missiles can blanket almost all of the U.S.S.R. from present free-world territory. The geographic relationship is such that intermediate range missiles in our possession or in the hands of our allies have the same strategic significance as intercontinental missiles in the hands of the U.S.S.R. And the shorter range the missile, the more mobile its launching site and, therefore, the more invulnerable to Soviet surprise attack.

At the same time our coalition policy is of fundamental importance to our allies. As long as the United States possessed an atomic monopoly, the chief

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significance of alliances was in furnishing a <u>casus belli</u> for American action. In the face of the conviction that the chief deterrent to Soviet aggression resided in U.S. strategic superiority, there was an understandable reluctance on the part of our allies to make a major military effort of their own. As long as it was believed that the issue of a war would be divided elsewhere, few of our allies saw much significance in a large military contribution of their own. The reliance on an all-out strategy tended to run counter to a coalition policy.

But with the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the means to delivery it, <u>all</u> members of the alliance have an equal interest in removing any Soviet illusion that it might use its capability for all-out war as a shield behind which to expand by more limited means. They also share an interest to keep any war that does break out to the smallest possible proportions. This is possible only to the extentthat local resistance is feasible. Alliance arrangements can provide local forces to deter or check limited aggression. They can strengthen local will to resist because they guarantee that a threatened country would not stand alone. The efficacy of our alliance policy may not only determine victory or defeat in limited war; it is a good insurance against such wars breaking out in the first place.

## <u>Pressures on Our Alliance System</u>

The above statement of the values of alliances does not imply that all is well. Any evaluation must recognize three sets of forces tending to weaken our present system of alliances: the fear of Communist military power, the

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from civil war or economic strugulation to slow takeovers by communist-guided
and communist-armed fifth columns,

As a result the communist bloc has learned that if it keeps its challenges sufficiently ambiguous, and below the level which the non-communist world considers to warrant major war, we and our allies may prove unable or unwilling to take effective action. Neither Korea nor Indochina, for example, seemed to some of our allies worth an expanded war, nor did our alliances seem to fit the issues actually in dispute. And Suez presented an even more difficult problem. Confronted by an ambiguous throat, even a group of nations whose interests are very similar find it exceedingly difficult to achieve an effective concerted response, especially if this response involves major risks.

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Alliance Strategy

Perhaps the greatest problem faced by our alliance policy is to devise a military strategy equally meaningful to us and to our allies. In view of its manifold interests and commitments the United States has been understandably reluctant to commit itself specifically to defend allied territories, and has relied largely on its strategic striking power, supplemented by mobile sea and tactical air power, to deter aggression at all levels. While our allies have of necessity acquiesed in this concept, they have never abandoned their wish to see their own homelands protected from local invasion or devastation. And with the growth of Soviet air-atomic power they have begun to have serious doubts about the willingness of the United States to implement its close strategy.

This difference of concepts has meant that, with the partial exception of NATO, where we have joined in efforts to provide local defense forces, our security arrangements are not based on a mutually acceptable military strategy. This lack of an agreed strategy has resulted in weaknesses, indecisions and contradictions at all levels of our security arrangements. It has led to endless difficulties in formulating and implementing U.S. base agreements and military aid programs. There have been disagreements among the U.S. services concerning military requirements and programs, and there has been a reluctance on the part of our allies to make or to meet specific force commitments, in some measure because the function those forces would perform has been so vague and so meaningless.

The United States must therefore make a concerted effort, together with its allies, to develop and obtain joint plans designed to cope with various types of threats ranging from nuclear attack to armed insurrection by communist-dominated elements. The act of consultation will be of itself of great significance for one of the reasons for the sense of impotence of many of our allies is ignorance about the nature of modern military technology and a sense of being left out from decisions which affect their fate.

However, as is well known, our strategy is largely atomic, those of our allies generally nonatomic, and their forces are designed accordingly. Thus as nuclear weapons and delivery systems increase, present allied forces will become less capable of making meaningful military contributions to other than internal security missions. If allied forces are to be capable of acting in concert with U.S. forces in various types of military operations involving the use of nuclear weapons we will have to assist in their transformation and development. This does not mean we should equip all allied elements along the lines of comparable U.S. units. To the maximum degree possible both the types and levels of equipment provided allied forces should be tailored to the missions which suit their particular security requirements. And we should not set standards for our allies based on our own levels of technology. But we must establish a measure of harmony between the tactical doctrine of our allies and our own and equip the respective forces accordingly.

In effect, the free world is faced with a task of strengthening and reequipping its forces at least comparable in magnitude to that which it faced in 1950, and at a time when both rapidly changing technology and