ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME AND PLACE: 15 November 1971 8:30 a.m.
The Sonesta Hotel
Thomas Circle
Washington, D. C
Brittany Room

PARTICIPANTS: Members of the German-American Council
(See List Attached)

[ Dr. Kissinger was introduced by George Ball, who indicated that Dr. Kissinger would make brief remarks and then answer questions from the floor. ]

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) It wasn't all that long ago that I was listening to you gentlemen say that you had considered all possible points of view and weighed all the evidence, and that anyone who doubted the conclusions you had reached could so doubt only out of ignorance. Now I am here saying to you that we have considered all possible points of view and weighed all the evidence, and that our policies are such that only ignorance could lead someone to doubt them. (Laughter) This morning I do not want to make a pompous speech. I would prefer to make some general observations and then have you lead me into indiscretions by your sharp questions from the floor.

The main point I want to make about American foreign policy at this stage in its development is that it is at a transition point. At this transition point, it must be realized that we have not forgotten how we got here. We are not about ready to forget our old friends. We have been brought to this transition period by a series of factors, some of them not at all related to choice on our part. Primarily, we have been brought to this point of adjustment by inevitable changes in the post-war world. Indeed, we have been brought here in part due to the success of our very own policies.

At the end of the Second World War the nations of the world were terribly weak. Now that situation has changed and it is inevitable that we must adjust. The change has been a result of an advance in strength on the part of many nations in the world, and also of the surfacing of unexpected complexities in the communist world. It is simply no longer possible for the United States to maintain its position of dominance in the free world in view of the growing

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economic and military strength of other nations around the world. In addition, there has been a change in attitude in the United States toward our international involvement. This change has happened in some part due to frustrations that have been caused by our involvement in the Vietnam conflict. But my main point is this: there are adjustments that we were going through; but no one should view the upcoming summit trips by the President in any way as covers for unilateral withdrawal from Europe by the United States or for a bilateral deal with the Russians on reduced forces in Europe. We won't unilaterally thin out our forces in Europe unless we are forced to. Similarly, we are not seeking a bilateral deal with the Russians. What we seek is a common strategy and a common allocation of burdens with the European nations. We are not seeking unilateral action. We are engaged in diplomacy, and that does not mean naively pursuing the goodwill of opponents at the expense of damaging long-valued relationships with allies. We must be aware of the complex world as we proceed. This is the direction we are headed, and the nature of our effort. Rather than make further remarks, let me take some questions from the floor. George, will you handle these or should I just take them myself?

[George Ball indicates that Dr. Kissinger should field the questions himself.]

**Question:** You mentioned "burdensharing." Regarding two separate items (NATO troops and offset payments), I wonder whether one replaces the other or merely adds to it?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) On burdensharing, we are not concerned about reducing troops *per se*; what we seek is a common approach, even at the technical level. At the technical level, by the way, I have serious doubts about the adequacy of the alliance in emergency situations. I think we are all right, though, in strategic areas.

Let me now turn to the perennial problem of an offset agreement. Those who know American public opinion, and Senator Mathias is surely one of them, clearly understand that the American public simply will not tolerate continued American payments internationally unless other nations begin to assume greater portions of the burden. But this problem should be handled by economic experts--at least unless it gets totally out of control.

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**Question:** You mentioned that despite certain inadequacies, the strategic position of the alliance is still satisfactory. Are you addressing a change in the strategic area?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Of course, as an American public official I shouldn't say anything; but I believe that statesmanship requires more than the denying of facts that are true. In 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis the Russians had approximately 70 missiles; all in the open; each requiring some 10 hours to fuel. Now they have some 1500 missiles lodged in silos; they also have several hundred missiles at sea. This is a reality; our alliance policy must recognize it as a fact of life. I was merely stating a fact when I mentioned that, not a U. S. policy.

**Question:** My question relates to general trends that I see in the alliance. I am worried by steps the United States has taken in the area of foreign economic policy. Nobody in Europe can object to the United States putting its own house in order. In fact, economically we very much depend upon the United States having its own house in order. But our common problems in the post-war era have been approached with a certain style, a certain concern for interrelationships, a certain multilateralism. Now there are indications that this multilateral basis is being undercut.

One such indication is the surcharge; a second is a changed attitude toward the European economic community. Secretary Connally hinted at a special deal if Germany could adjust its monetary policies to the satisfaction of the United States. This may have pleased some people in Germany, but it shocked others (and I am included among the latter persons). Here is my question. I am concerned that an attack now on multilateralism in economics might be followed by a change in multilateral approach in the area of security. So far, multilateralism has remained vital in the security area; this is evidenced by the Berlin agreement and the SALT negotiations. I am worried that the economics change in approach might also cut into multilateral security arrangements.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I think first that we must distinguish tactics from long-range policies. In the United States, politics is in the process and the result of conflicts among many feudal barons. Sometimes we simply have to wait for the end of the battle to see the final policy filter out. Our main policy now is to adapt

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old multilateral approaches to new circumstances. This Admin-
istration has always taken a strong stand in support of the
European Economic Community. It would, of course, be ridiculous
to support the EEC and then undermine that support by making
unilateral advances to individual nations. We have no policy
of undercutting multilateralism in our dealings with Europe. I
am confident that policy-makers in the United States know that
unilateral decisions here could never successfully impose on other
nations in a new international monetary system. The old two-
pillar concept still remains valid. Again, we must separate
individual local tactics from long-range policy--especially in the
area of American relations with the EEC.

**Question:** Currently, I feel that old "American first" notions seem to be returning to the fore. What is the future of the relationship of the United States to Europe?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) A counterpoint to your concern is the proposition that the self-concerns of the European nations are what have caused the current crisis. But let's not argue about who is more nationalistic. It is really not very useful to contrast national self-concern with international cooperation. In the United States there is a common illusion that we are most reliable when we are being philanthropic. A prior Secretary of State, I recall, once said that we have no quarrels with nations--only quarrels on behalf of nations. We are surely not out after any Fortress America. We must focus on the interests of all parties involved in international matters. The two-pillar concept is still vital to us, and the vitality of the two-pillar concept is going to become more and more important as we deal in the coming period with the problems developing in the communist world.

**Question:** I would like to add an addendum to a prior question.
The cold war provided us with a fixed perception of the world.
Now a great deal of uncertainty assails the people in the United
States and Europe. Can the simplistic views of the cold war
rhetoric be supplanted by new similarly simple views?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The cold war rhetoric gave us a notion of a bipolar world in which there was a constant threat to nation borders by organized military units. In addition, it gave us the belief, which to some extent has been borne out, that economic

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development is the route to political stability. Now we have new problems. Let me say that it is not at all clear what motivates the communists to push for a detente. It could be one of two things: First one, because they view a detente as desirable; or two, because they view it as a means to promote disintegration of the will and resolve of the Western nations. Personally, I don't think that the Soviets have made up their minds whether the movement toward a detente is essentially an offensive policy on their part, or rather one that they are forced to seek in their own self interest. But regardless, in this new world we must recognize as we deal with international communism, that things are more complex and differentiated than they were in the immediate post-war era.

**Question:** I would like to revert, if I may, to economics. After three revaluations and a floating of the mark, I wonder if a period of readjustment that you have referred to hasn't been a bit long as it has affected Germany. We appear to be treated the same as people who have not been cooperating with the United States in the area of currency valuation. Is there any relief in sight?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) One of the first things I did when I came into this job was to get rid of international economics. I did that (and I must say that humility is not one of my strong virtues) because I didn't have confidence in my ability to handle it. After what I have seen since, though, I am convinced that the economists themselves don't have much confidence in their own abilities to handle it. (Laughter) In talking about economic matters, I didn't mean to concern myself exclusively with currency valuation. Regarding the particular question whether any special consideration can be given in the German case, I would like to leave to negotiation. I say this recognizing that certain Treasury officials might not be entirely pleased with my remarks to this point at the conference.

**Question:** (Question was unintelligible)

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The problem of war in a nuclear age is a horrible one, and the President's choices under extreme situations involved decisions which cannot be settled in advance. Even if a nuclear challenge were made to Florida itself, the President would have to weigh quite carefully all available considerations in deciding what to do. It is true that our traditional notions about

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the military alliance are not fully adequate to deal in the current age with such a war threat. It is in everybody's interest, of course, that nuclear risks be brought into line with the realities of threatened war.

**Question:** Can you say a few words about the apparent contrast between the peace efforts currently in the news and the Russian buildup in strategic forces?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) With respect to the growth of Soviet military power, let me emphasize that this growth does not mean that the Soviets could defeat the West, or that they could occupy Europe. The West can defend itself. The West is okay, at least if we are well organized. The problem, I think, is manageable. What is important is that we pose to the Soviets a threat sufficient to make it not worthwhile for them to make a military move in Europe.

All nations are tempted by the desirability of conducting peace overtures. Peace overtures are always popular on the home-front. The key, though, is to use the peace overture in a way that adds to international political stability. If the desire for peace becomes a mere platitude, a mere psychological ploy, then it is hard to maintain the will and strength that is required for a stable international order. Let me say a word about our two peace initiatives. They are very different. The Peking initiative comes after 22 years of a complete absence of communication with the Chinese. We are at the very beginning of a process with the Chinese. Our problems with them are philosophical. There are not many areas of the world in which Chinese and American interests are in direct conflict. The Chinese summit will lead to some concrete results, true; but that is not the heart of the matter. What is really important at this time in the relationship between the United States and China is intangible, philosophical.

The Moscow summit will be something entirely different. There, from the first press conference of his Administration, the President has made it clear that a summit with the Russians would only be possible after considerable concrete gains had been made in negotiations with the Russians. We have sought as much understanding as possible with the Russians prior to the setting of a summit. In SALT, at Berlin, and in other arrangements

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ments, such progress has been made. Further, it is worth
noting that we have not seen aggressive provocation recently
by the Russians elsewhere in the world. But we are not
going to Moscow without consultation with our allies. It is
not in our interests to precipitate a series of unilateral races
to Moscow--to have foreign policy become mere atmospherics.

**Question:** [The question was asked in German and the notetaker
did not understand it.]

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Let me say that our approach to a
European Security Conference is one of a cautious lack of
enthusiasm. (Laughter) The major problem in the European
Security Conference area is that we don't quite understand what
is going on there. We are certainly not opposed to a Security
Conference but nobody yet has come up with an agenda, or indicated
why there is such urgency about having one. I say again that we
don't oppose it, but I do think our European allies should ask
themselves what is really at stake here. It is possible that
the Russians want a ratification of the post-war situation to come
out of the Conference. It is also possible that the Russians
have come to the conclusion that the current alliance system is
no longer valid. Certainly matters of culture and trade would
be appropriate subjects for discussion at a Conference. The
decision essentially must be that of our European allies. We
would certainly not resist going along, but really don't see any
point to pressing for a European Security Conference at this time.

**Question:** Given the fluid situation of the United Nations, now,
following the admission of the Republic of China, and given the
change in status of Berlin, is there any chance for a role for the
German Democratic Republic in United Nations?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) To be very frank, I haven't thought this
one through. My personal impression is that the general trend in
the United Nations would be toward something which might result
in dual membership for the Germanys--that, of course, is not the
United States policy.

[At this point George Ball confirmed the full off-the-record status
of Dr. Kissinger's remarks and announced that Dr. Kissinger had
to leave the meeting].