# CONTENTS

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## INTRODUCTION

### Part I - STRATEGY AND POLITICS

#### Chapter 1

##### General Premises

Political supremacy over military strategy - Interconnection of foreign and defence policies - Interdependence - Basis of Western defence to prevent war - Objective of disarmament and need for adequate defence until it is attained - Defence policy and public opinion.

2. The Meaning of Deterrence

Is the theory of deterrence still valid? - Consequences of nuclear parity - The most likely causes of war - Miscalculation, surprise attack, the "pause", - The danger of nuclear blackmail - "The" deterrent replaced by a series of deterrents - the requirement of second strike capacity and adequate conventional forces.

3. The Evolution of NATO

Achievements since 1950 - Background to the formation of NATO - The Treaty - German rearmament and the European Defence Community - Western European Union - Present organisation of NATO.

4. Soviet Strategy and Forces

Advantages from a closed society - Political and military policy after 1945 - Development of nuclear capability and changed defence posture - The propaganda

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offensive against foreign bases - Soviet reactions to
nuclear parity - the range of options available - The
Warsaw Pact - The strength of Soviet forces.

Part II - NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Nuclear Capability

Requirement of nuclear retaliatory forces - "Surviv-
ability" - Distinction between weapons and warheads - The
American retaliatory forces - Strategic Air Command -
Aircraft and missiles in service and under development -
Polaris - The British retaliatory forces - Future French
retaliatory forces - NATO forces - The missile gap -
Tactical use of nuclear weapons - Distinction between
strategic and tactical use - Tactical weapons available.

The Problem of Political Control

The nature of the problem - The dangers of nuclear
anarchy and the spread of nuclear weapons - Implications
for Europe and America - Various proposals examined
(i) Disarmament (ii) A non-nuclear club (iii) A joint
European strategic force within W.E.U. (iv) NATO as the
fourth nuclear power - General Norstad's proposals -
Polaris missiles for NATO rejected.

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7 **Pattern for Joint Political Control**

Control over the strategic forces - Prerequisite of policy based on mutual deterrence - Surprise attack reaction - Time for consultation - Assignment of all nuclear weapons in Europe to NATO - New Supreme Commander for nuclear weapons - Control over tactical use - Importance of initial use - Difficulties implicit in concept of limited nuclear war - Dangers of escalation and problems of effective political control - Separation of nuclear units from conventional formations and different channel of command - Suggestion that all nuclear units should be multi-national.

Part III - NATO FORCES

8 **Land Forces**

The development of NATO strategy - Forward strategy and the Lisbon force goals of 1952 - The trip-wire theory - 30 divisions and atomic weapons - Ratio of forces to space - Can we get 30 divisions? - Conscription - German Federal Republic - The United Kingdom - Other member nations - The organisation of army formations - Nuclear weapons - Conflicting military requirements of conventional and nuclear warfare - Practical difficulties in enforcing political control in existing structure - Dual purpose weapons - Mobile "fire-brigades" - A new protocol to the Brussels Treaty suggested to prescribe minimum force levels - Allied Forces Northern and Southern Europe.

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Special logistics problem of ammunition - The level of stocks - 90 and 30 day levels - Mobility and flexibility - and means to acquire it - Integration of the logistics system and suggestions how it may be achieved.

## Part IV - WHAT NEXT FOR NATO?

12

### Immediate Military Tasks

- The need for priorities - Nuclear doctrine summarized - Tactical nuclear weapons and tactical air forces - Sword and Shield concepts outmoded - Need for conventional forces - Problems from commitments outside NATO - Naval forces - Standardisation and logistics - French policy and NATO - Insistence on national sovereignty.

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### What Kind of NATO?

- Defence, economic or political functions? - The Committee of Three Report - The requirements of consultation in NATO - Changes in balance of power - Newly independent states - The Soviet Union and China - European Economic Community - Britain's application to join and its consequences - Lack of effective American leadership - Military technology and lack of policy - 'N-plus 1 country' problem - NATO essentially a defensive alliance - Main ideological challenge outside Europe - NATO should not seek to duplicate work of

En route - NATO among not seek to publicise work of definitive influence - Main idee of host challenge onto NATO - U-Alpha I community, problem - NATO essentially a体系 - Wart and technology and lack of boof - Join and its consequences - Lack of effective American European Economic Community - Britain's abdication to New York independent states - The Soviet Union and China - coalition in NATO - Changes in place of power - Committee of Three Report - The requirements of

Defence, economic or boofost functions? - The

12

What King of NATO?

sovereignEmpy.

Frequency boof and NATO - Inertia on national
NATO - Naval forces - Eustasgration and logistics -
conventional forces - Problems from commitments outfla
forcea - Sword and Brief concepts announced - Need for
ampharitrag - Tactical uncler weapons and tactical air
The need for brororriea - Uncles doctrine

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Immediate Writter Traf

Part IV - WHAT NEXT FOR NATO?

supposed.

of the logistics alatom and arguments how it may be
flexibility - and means to acquire it - Integration
atoques - 20 and 30 qsv reeles - Modifify and
specifl logistics problems of assumption - The leader of

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## INTRODUCTION

"Statesmanship, in the H-bomb age, must control not only the aims but the operations. It should direct military defence planning and the formulation of military doctrine. Hence statesmen and their diplomatic advisers must have a greater knowledge of military technique than they needed in the past. That is as important as for soldiers to submit to political direction. Even if we do not go so far as to merge the function of the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister, they and their expert advisers must combine much more closely. It is a new version of Plato's dictum that the affairs of the world would not improve until either the philosophers became the rulers or the rulers the philosophers."

Captain B.H. Liddell Hart¹

"Political planning must be aware of military realities, and military plans in turn must be responsive to political consideration... Our force goals, our military policy, our deployments and our war plans themselves must all reflect the purposes and spirit of our great community. Military and political problems are not separable, and military and political men must work ever more closely together."

President Kennedy²

1 "Deterrent or Defence" (Stevens Sons, London, 1960)

2 Speech to NATO Military Committee, 10 April 1961

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# THE POLITICS OF WESTERN DEFENCE

## PART I : STRATEGY AND POLITICS

### Chapter 1 : General Premises.

The first principle to be applied in considering problems of defence is that political policy must always be the master of military strategy. Political supremacy must be observed as a guide to action and when, as often happens, military requirements clash with political objectives, the political and not the military will must prevail.

Obviously expert military advice must provide the basis for an intelligent defence policy; I am not for one moment suggesting that the soldiers' job should be made impossible by the politicians. But unless the essential point is grasped that the purely military view is only one aspect of defence in its widest sense and cannot be considered in isolation, then problems cannot be seen in their right perspective. The advent of nuclear weapons has pointed the grim truth of Clemenceau's dictum that war is too serious a matter for generals: decisions which may invoke a nuclear holocaust certainly cannot be left to the generals. The vastly accelerated pace of modern war means that decisions of vital consequence may have to be taken in a matter of minutes and it is imperative that the responsibility for these decisions rests squarely on political shoulders.

these decisions rest adversely on political assumptions.
minutes and it is imperative that the responsibility for
of vital consequence may have to be taken in a matter of
as rapidly accelerated pace of modern war means that decisors
holocaust certainly cannot be left to the Generala. The
matter for Generala: decisions which may involve a nuclear
grim truth of Clemenceau's dictum that war is too serious a
perspective. The advent of nuclear weapons has pointed the
isolation, if they problems cannot be seen in their right
defence in its widest sense and cannot be considered in
grasped that the briefly military view is only one aspect of
by the politicians. But unless the essential point is
engaging that the soldiers, top should be made impossible
for an intelligent defence policy; I am not for one moment
Opinionally expert military advice must provide the base
political and not the military will must prevail.

military requirements clean with political objectives, the
be observed as a guide to action and when, as often happens,
the master of military strategy. Political ambiguity must
problems of defence is that political policy must always be
The first principle to be applied in considering

## Chapter I : General Premises.
### PART I : STRATEGY AND POLITICS

## THE POLITICS OF WESTERN DEFENSE

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This first principle becomes even clearer when defence policy is viewed in the context of foreign policy. Defence and foreign policies are inextricably interwoven: the two can be considered separately but it is impossible to divorce the one from the other. It is a truism to say that the best defence policy a country can have is a good foreign policy, but the logical consequences of the truism are rarely appreciated. If it is impossible to provide adequate defence for one's country by independent effort, it is equally impossible to pursue an independent foreign policy. A unilateral foreign policy is a contradiction in terms and is no more tenable than a unilateral defence policy.

It is now becoming increasingly recognised that no country today can hope to provide adequate defence for its people in isolation. This idea is expressed in the word "interdependence" which has recently been coined in international language. Although interdependence was the fundamental principle underlying NATO for years little more than lip service has been paid to it and it is only recently that the political implication has been faced at all. Even now the need for interdependence in international policy is still not generally accepted. Mr. Macmillan stated, rightly and bravely, in 1957, with the Suez fiasco safely behind him, "The time has passed when countries, however strong, can follow independent policies". The differing approaches of leading NATO powers

belligerent. The differings abscissions of leading NATO powers when countries, however strong, can follow independent

with the Suezuez safely behind him." The time has passed accepted. Mr. Macmillan stated, rightly and pravely, in 1957, "The United Nations has been paid to it and it is only recently that the political

principle underlying NATO for years little more than lip service national language. Vlthough interdependence was the fundamental "interdependence" which has recently been coined in inter-people in isolation. This idea is expressed in the word country today can hope to provide adequate defence for its

It is now becoming increasingly recognised that no more tenable than a minimal defence policy.

federal foreign policy is a contradiction in terms and is no impossioble to burrane an independent foreign policy. A mit- for one's country by independent effort, it is equally

aspreciated. It is impossioble to provide adequate defence put the logical consequences of the truism are rarely

defence policy a country can have in a good foreign policy, the one from the other. It is a truism to say that the best can be considered separately put it is impossioble to divorce and foreign policies are inextricably interwoven: the two policy is viewed in the context of foreign policy. Defence

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to the Soviet Union and the Summit, not to speak of their policies towards Africa, illustrate how far we have to travel along this road. Undoubtedly these political differences have tended to weaken the fabric of the alliance on which Western defence is based.

The doctrine of interdependence was set out in the communique issued after the talks between President Eisenhower and the British Prime Minister in October 1957, a year after the discord over Suez and as the Russian Sputnik underlined the urgency of NATO unity:

> "The arrangements which the nations of the free world have made for collective defence and mutual help are based on the recognition that the concept of national self-sufficiency is out-of-date. The countries of the free world are interdependent, and only in genuine partnership, by combining their resources and sharing tasks in many fields, can progress and safety be found. For our part, we have agreed that our two countries will henceforth act in accordance with this principle".

Obviously the implications of interdependence go much wider than defence arrangements and include the co-ordination of economic policies and programmes of aid to under-developed countries (which are beyond the scope of the present study) no less than political co-ordination. Equally obviously the consequent reorientation in national thinking and habits will be a painful and difficult process. But translation of this principle into practice is an essential element in the working

principle into practice is an essential element in the working
be a benefit and difficult process. But translation of this
consequent reorientation in national thinking and policies will
fall far than political co-ordination. Especially observationally the
countries (which are beyond the scope of the present study) no
of economic policies and programmes of aid to under-developed
wider than defence arrangements and include the co-ordination
Opinionally the implications of interdependence go much
so in accordance with this principle."

have agreed that our two countries will henceforth
progress and safety be found. For our part, we
resources and sharing tasks in many fields, can
only in genuine partnership, by combining their
countries of the free world are interdependent, and
of national self-sufficiency is out-of-date. The
help are needed on the recognition that the concept
world have made for collective defence and mutual
"The arrangements which the nations of the free
to the盟国 of NATO ally
the qiacord over Europe and as the Russian Sputnik underlined
and the British Prime Minister in October 1924, a year after
communique issued after the talks between President Eisenhower
The doctrine of interdependence was set out in the
Western defence is passed.

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out of an effective Western system of defence. The first step is to recognise what interdependent defence means in terms of political control of military strategy and foreign policy. There must be agreement about the ends if we are jointly to provide the means to achieve them. These implications in terms of the working of NATO and of political control in the defence field are further discussed in later chapters.

It is easy to say, of course, that the best solution to the innumerable and complex problems presented by an alliance of sovereign states is for them to surrender their national sovereignty and form an Atlantic federation or to convert NATO into a supranational authority. There is no gainsaying the logic and tidiness of this argument. But unhappily political realism suggests that such a solution raises even bigger problems than those it seeks to solve. In the same way one cannot, in the short run, advocate world government as the answer to the crises and tensions arising from a divided world and the failure to achieve disarmament. In the long run it can be argued that these ideals must be realised if we are to rid ourselves completely of the threat of war. But as the late Lord Keynes said, in another context, "In the long run we are all dead".

still dead."

Long Keyes said, in another context, "In the long run we are
ourselves completely of the threat of war. But as the fate
be argued that these ideals must be realised if we are to rid
and the failure to achieve disarmament. In the long run it can
answer to the crises and tensions arising from a divided world
cannot, in the short run, advocate world government as the
problem that seeks to solve. In the same way one
realism suggests that such a solution raises even bigger
logic and tigeness of this argument. But unash hypify political
into a supranational authority. There is no gainsaying the
sovereignty and form an Atlantic federation or to convert NATO
of sovereign states is for them to surrender their national
the innumerable and complex problems presented by an alliance
It is easy to say, of course, that the best solution to
chapters.

control in the defence field are further discussed in later
cations in terms of the working of NATO and of political
jointly to provide the means to achieve them. These imply-
policy. There must be agreement about the end if we are
terms of political control of military strategy and foreign
step is to recognise what interdependent defence means in
out of an effective Western system of defence. The first

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Until we can fashion the world to our liking we must make do with the world as it is. There is no escaping our present responsibility by devoting all our energies to counsels of perfection. We just have to go on grappling with the difficulties of working out a viable common defence policy, working within the limitations imposed by national sovereignty, while at the same time doing everything we can to encourage agreement between the NATO powers and the Soviet Union to take the first steps towards disarmament.

The next general premise is perhaps the most fundamental. It must be made clear beyond all doubt, not only to our own peoples but to the rest of the world also, that the whole basis and only purpose of Western defence is to prevent war. I do not think there is any disagreement on this thesis in the NATO countries; arguments about defence policy are concentrated upon the best way to deter war. Indeed the principle is embodied in the fashionable use of the word 'deterrence'. If war should break out, the deterrents will have failed.

Mr. Macmillan put the point well in his speech of welcome to General Norstad in 1957: "Let us be under no illusion; military forces today are not designed to wage war; their purpose is to prevent it. There will be no campaigns again like the old ones, with victory at the end of a long and balanced struggle; total war today can only mean total destruction." In a more dramatic way, the point is made by the motto painted over the gates of the Headquarters of the American Strategic Air Command at Omaha, Nebraska: "Peace is our Profession".

at Omaha, Nebraska: "Peace is our profession."

The States of the Headquarters of the American Strategic Air Command is more dramatic way the point is made by the motto painted over It was should preclude out, the deterrent will have failed. It is embodied in the fashionable use of the word 'deterrence.' It is treated upon the best way to deter war. Indeed the principle NATO countries; arguments apart, defence policy are concen- I do not think there is any disagreement on this theme in the past and only purpose of Western defence is to prevent war. People put to the rest of the world also, that the whole It must be made clear beyond all doubt, not only to our own

The next General Première is perhaps the most fundamental.

Take the fact that at least towards disarmament.

agreement between the NATO powers and the Soviet Union to
while at the same time doing everything we can to encourage
working within the limitations imposed by national sovereignty,
distinctions of working out a simple common defence policy.
perfection. We just have to go on gabbling with the
reasonability by devoting all our energies to communities of
go with the world as it is. There is no escaping our present
Until we can talk of the world to our liking we must make

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Yet while peace has been maintained by a balance of terror, the capacity of each side to destroy the other, there can be no illusions as to how precarious a peace it is, sustained only by a war of nerves and by great and increasing expenditure of resources. The only satisfactory and permanent basis for peaceful co-existence is world-wide disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, coupled with such arrangements for control and inspection as will satisfy all parties to the agreement that its terms are being observed. Against the background of mutual suspicion and fear which divides the free world and the Soviet Union and her allies, it is idle to pretend that comprehensive disarmament agreements will be reached easily or soon. The arms race is bred of fear and mistrust, not vice versa. Indeed it can well be argued that once this mutual mistrust has been allayed sufficiently to make a disarmament agreement feasible, the machinery of inspection and control that is at present the sine qua non of an agreement will no longer be a stumbling block.

The history of disarmament negotiations since the war makes depressing reading. While the Soviet Union bears heavy responsibility for this state of affairs we in the West are not entirely blameless. Too often we have allowed the Soviet Union to score easy propaganda successes by apparent reluctance to stick to our word when the Russians

apparent reluctance to stick to our word when the Russians
the Soviet Union to score easy propaganda successes by
What are not entirely implausible. Too often we have allowed
heavy reasonableness for this state of affairs we in the
make depressing reading. While the Soviet Union bears
The history of disarmament negotiations since the war
attempts to block.

Present the *line one now* of an agreement will no longer be a
tesnable, the machinery of inspection and control that is at
has been altered sufficiently to make a disarmament agreement
Indeed it can well be argued that once this mutual agreement
same race is pred of fear and mistrust, not *vice versa*.

Disarmament agreements will be reached easily or soon. The
her offices, if it is idle to pretend that comprehensive
fear which divides the free world and the Soviet Union and
operated. Against the background of mutual amputation and
all parties to the agreement that its terms are being
and arrangements for control and inspection will actually
disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, coupled with
and permanent plans for peaceful co-existence is world-wide
increasing expenditure of resources. The only satisfactory
it, sustained only by a war of nerves and by great and
there can be no influence as to how precautions a peace it
terror, the capacity of each side to destroy the other,
Yet while peace has been maintained by a balance of

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can plausibly present themselves as having accepted the major points of our proposals. Most of the problem of disarmament arises from the hard fact that those who want it most do not know how to get it and those who know how it could be achieved do not want it. That is to say, while pressure for disarmament comes primarily from public opinion, disarmament can only be achieved as the result of action by Governments. It is not enough for public opinion to want it or pressure groups to campaign for it; unless Governments, and the experts who advise them, also sincerely accept disarmament as a major policy objective, negotiations will never make significant progress. Just as effective defence can only be attained in the West by the collective effort and will of NATO members, disarmament can only become a practical possibility if they are united in their desire to attain it and agreed on their approach to its problems.

This does not mean that we should not keep on trying. Provided that the NATO forces are not weakened at any stage relative to those of the Soviet bloc, any agreement, however limited, would pay handsome dividends in terms of mutual confidence and by demonstrating that the fever of the arms race can be reduced without killing the patient. Like learning to walk, the first few steps are the most difficult.

race can be reduced without killing the patient. Like learning
confidence and by demonstrating that the lever of the arm
limited, would pay handsome dividend in terms of mutual
relative to those of the Soviet bloc, any agreement, however
provided that the NATO forces are not weakened at any stage
This does not mean that we should not keep on trying.

possibility if they are united in their desire to attain
of NATO members, disarmament can only become a practical
be attained in the West by the collective effort and will
significant progress, that as effective defence can only
as a major policy objective, negotiations will never make
experts who advise them, also sincerely accept disarmament
groups to campaign for it; unless Governments, and the
It is not enough for public opinion to want it or pressure
can only be achieved as the result of action by Governments.
disarmament comes primarily from public opinion, disarmament
achieved do not want it. That is to say, while pressure for
know how to get it and those who know how it could be
arises from the hard fact that those who want it most do not
points of our proposals. Most of the problems of disarmament
can summarily present themselves as having accepted the major

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Increasing pace follows inevitably from initial small successes. There was much optimism that a beginning could have been made by an agreement to ban nuclear tests after the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain agreed on a moratorium of such tests pending negotiations. However these negotiations, begun on 31st October 1958, broke down after more than 300 meetings in June 1961 and we are all back where we began. Failure to get this treaty, before technical advances and the development of nuclear capability by more and more countries undermines the effectiveness of its provisions, augurs ill for the progress of general disarmament negotiations.

Until disarmament agreements are concluded, however, the West must seek to attain the most efficient collective defence system that is possible. Determination to provide adequate defences to meet all likely contingencies is in no way inconsistent with an equal determination to achieve disarmament. Indeed the first is a necessary condition for the second. The military and political leaders of the Soviet Union are not lacking in realism and are unlikely to accept disarmament proposals based on theoretical strengths or to agree to proposals which would result in parity between East and West at a time when the balance is greatly in their favour.

favour.

Eat and West at a time when the balance is greatly in their
or to agree to proposals which would result in parity between
accept disarmament proposals based on theoretical strengths
Soviet Union are not lacking in realism and are unlikely to
for the second. The military and political leaders of the
disarmament. Indeed thetat is a necessary condition
will inconsistent with an equal determination to achieve
aggressive defences to meet all likely contingencies in no
defence system that is possible. Determination to provide
West must seek to attain the most efficient collective

Until disarmament agreements are concluded, however, the
disarmament negotiations.

its provocation, augurs ill for the progress of General
by more and more countries undermines the effectiveness of
technical advances and the development of nuclear capability
pack where we began. Fairme to get this treaty, before
after more than 300 meetings in June 1961 and we are all
these negotiations, begun on 31st October 1928, broke down
a moratorium of such tests bending negotiations. However
the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain agreed on
have been made by an agreement to ban nuclear tests after
successes. There was much optimism that a beginning could
Increasingly race follows inevitably from initial small

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Defence and disarmament present special problems for democratic countries and particular difficulties for parties of the Left. This is well illustrated by the arguments in recent years in the British Labour Party. Usually the Ministry of Defence is the graveyard of political reputations.

Except in times of crisis there is general reluctance to spend money on defence budgets. The desire to reduce taxation and the need to find money for social and welfare expenditure combine to restrict defence expenditure since this offers the readiest and most popular source of economy. The man in the street, as well as the politician, sees the money and resources spent on defence as standing between him and the new houses, new schools and new hospitals that seem so much more worthwhile. Reports of great expenditure on abortive or discontinued weapons and of designs which are obsolescent as soon as they leave the drawing board undermine public confidence and pose political problems for Ministers too.

Military superiority is more and more dependent upon the possession of the best fuels, the most resistant alloys and the most perfect electronic equipment. Competition in the field of physical science and mathematics has become as important as the quantity of armaments, and scientists and technologists have become as important as soldiers. Thus

technologists have become as important as soldiers. This
important as the quantity of armaments, and scientists and
the field of physical science and mathematics has become as
and the most perfect electronic equipment. Competition in
the base season of the best teams, the most resistant alloys

Military superiority is more and more dependent upon
confidence and base political problems for Ministers too.
as soon as they leave the drawing board undermining public
or discontinued weapons and of designs which are opalescent
more worthwhile. Reports of great expenditure on a sportive
new homes, new schools and new hospitals that seem a much
revenues abate on defence as standing between him and the
street, as well as the politician, see the money and
readiest and most popular source of economy. The men in the
compine to restrict defence expenditure since this offers the
and the need to find money for social and welfare expenditure
abend money on defence budgets. The desire to reduce taxation

Except in times of crisis there is general reluctance to
Ministry of Defence in the Graveyard of Political reputations.
recent years in the British Labour Party. Usually the
of the Left. This is well illustrated by the arguments in
democratic countries and particular difficulties for parties
Defence and disarmament present special problems for

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while on the one hand a steadily increasing proportion of
defence expenditure is devoted to purely scientific research,
on the other hand a choice has often to be made between using
the available scientific manpower and resources for military
or civilian benefit. The prolonged and sharp controversy
that took place recently over a British contribution to space
research is a case in point.

Statistics of defence expenditure since 1953 disclose
that in most NATO countries, despite the increasing
complexity and cost of weapons and equipment, there has
been a downward trend in the percentage of the Gross
National Product devoted to defence. In view of the short-
comings in the Western defence position, particularly in
Western Europe, this is very disturbing.

It is, nevertheless, a natural and inevitable tendency
in democratic governments and underlines the necessity of
obtaining the maximum value in terms of collective defence
for the money spent on defence by each individual country.
This can only be achieved by integration and the planning of
collective measures which offer greater security for a given
sum of defence expenditure than the equivalent sum, determined
by solely national considerations, would provide and also
tend to avoid wastage and duplication.

tend to avoid waste and duplication.

by solely national considerations, would provide and raise a
sum of defence expenditure than the equivalent sum, determined
collective measures which offer greater security for a given
This can only be achieved by integration and the planning of
for the money spent on defence by each individual country.
obtaining the maximum value in terms of collective defence
in democratic governments and underlines the necessity of
It is, nevertheless, a natural and inevitable tendency
Western Europe, this is very disturbing.

coming in the Western defence position, particularly in
National Product devoted to defence. In view of the short-
been a downward trend in the percentage of the gross
complexity and cost of weapons and equipment, there has
that in most NATO countries, despite the increasing

Statistics of defence expenditure since 1928 disclose
research is a case in point.

that took place recently over a British contribution to a space
or civilian benefit. The prolonged and sharp controversial
the available scientific manpower and reasons for military
on the other hand a choice has often to be made between using
defence expenditure is devoted to purely scientific research,
while on the one hand a steadily increasing proportion of

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By contrast totalitarian governments can give priority to defence projects and have a diplomatic flexibility impossible for governments depending upon the consent of their electorates. It is easy for them to scrap out-of-date weapons and bury mistakes of design in the government archives. They can talk about disarmament and re-arm at the same time without any internal challenge of inconsistency. Also the fact that the details of defence policy and expenditure do not have to be explained to the people makes it very easy for the Soviet Union to maintain a security system and safeguard the secrets of its weapons and installations to an extent that is not possible within NATO territories.

The presence of a body of well-informed public opinion behind its defence policy is essential for a democratic government. There is rarely a serious likelihood of public opinion turning neutralist or denying the principle of adequate defence. But unless the objectives and broad outlines of policy are appreciated by the electorate there is a real danger that the necessary money and number of men will not be forthcoming for the NATO Alliance. Unhappily in many countries there has not been the public information and discussion required to give a firm basis for the NATO plans for efficient collective defence. While there must be restrictions on the supply of military information to the public,

on the scrutiny of military information to the public, efficient collective defence. While there must be restrictions required to give a firm basis for the NATO plans for there has not been the public information and discussion forthcoming for the NATO Alliance. Unhesitating in many countries danger that the necessary money and number of men will not be policy are abhorred by the electorate there is a real defence. But unless the objectives and broad outlines of opinion turning neutralist or denying the principle of agemate government. There is rarely a serious likelihood of public peering its defence policy is essential for a democratic

the secrets of its weapons and installations to an extent
the Soviet Union to maintain a security system and safeguard
not have to be explained to the people makes it very easy for
fact that the details of defence policy and expenditure go
without any internal challenge of inconsistency. Also the

They can talk about disarmament and re-arm at the same time
weapons and purely mistakes of design in the Government archives.
of their electorates. It is easy for them to scrap out-of-date
impossible for governments depending upon the consent
to defence projects and have a diplomatic flexibility

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security is often carried too far. Frequently matter which
has appeared in American newspapers is still marked 'Top
Secret' in Britain. Governments and NATO authorities should
consider how far and not how little they can take Parliament-
arians and responsible bodies and persons who interest them-
selves in defence questions into their confidence. Otherwise
those of us who have the responsibility of informing and
leading public opinion are ill-equipped to do so.

This is not to say that there should be no limit to the
amount and kind of information available. What is wanted is
something between the almost automatic restriction of all
military information in Britain and the view widely held in
America that the press, acting on behalf of the people as they
claim, should have access to almost every category of
diplomatic and military intelligence. There is much to be
said in favour of President Kennedy's appeal¹ for more
restraint, although its timing just after the Cuba incident
was unfortunate. An official censorship is inconsistent with
a free society, and the press cannot be expected to impose a
voluntary censorship upon themselves. The obligation falls
upon the Government and Congress to cut off at source

1 27th April 1961

1 25th April 1961

upon the Government and Congress to cut off at source
voluntary censorship of themselves. The obligation falls
a free society, and the press cannot be expected to impose a
was unfortunate. An official censorship is inconsistent with
restraint, although its timing just after the Cops incident
said in favour of President Kennedy's apper for more
diplomatic and military intelligence. There is no way to be
of claim, should have access to almost every category of
America that the press, acting on behalf of the people as they
military information in Britain and the view widely held in
something between the almost automatic restriction of all
amount and kind of information available. What is wanted is
This is not to say that there should be no limit to the
leading public opinion are ill-equipped to do as.

those of us who have the responsibility of informing and
selves in defence questions into their confidence. Otherwise
artificial and reasonable bodies and persons who interest them-
consider how far and not how little they can take Parliament-
Secret, in Britain. Governments and NATO authorities should
have shared in American newspapers in a still marked 'Top
security is often carried too far'. Frequently matter which

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information which would be detrimental to security if published, although it is readily conceded that the established procedures of the American constitution make this a more difficult task than it is in Britain. However, it should not be impossible to strike a balance between providing sufficient material to enable public opinion to assess the real issues facing the Alliance and avoiding publication of information which could damage our security.

With the horrors of nuclear weapons readily understood and the non-existence of any defence in the orthodox sense against rockets, it will not be surprising if the feeling grows in the West that any attempts to provide adequate defence are fruitless. This sense of despair is genuine and comprehensible and cannot be overcome unless the NATO policy of deterrence and its relevance to the prevention of war and the hope of disarmament is understood and accepted.

To spread this understanding is one of our most urgent tasks.

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# Chapter 2: The Meaning of Deterrence

Is the theory of deterrence still valid ? To what extent has NATO and national Defence thinking been modified to meet the emergence of the rocket or guided missile as the major nuclear threat ? What kind of war is the most likely outcome if our basic policy fails and the Cold War becomes a hot one ? Can NATO forces deal with all likely contingencies ? Together with the considerations of political supremacy and interdependence set out in the previous chapter, these questions provide the basis for an assessment of a NATO Defence Policy.

Before essaying any answers, it is important to understand the questions themselves. For as in philosophy so in defence; sometimes if we fully understand a question we realise that either no answer is possible, or we know the answer already. A good deal of confusion and controversy in politico-military matters arises from different understandings of the same question and the consequent disputes about the answer are neither surprising nor very meaningful.

The first task, then, is to agree on what are the right questions; by attempting to understand them, we may hope to stumble upon the right answers. We shall never know for certain if they are the right answers, that is, that they

certain if they are the right answers, that is, that they
atleast show the right answers. We shall never know for
questions; by attempting to understand them, we may hope to
The first task, then, is to agree on what are the right
meaning of

debates about the answer are neither surprising nor very
understandable of the same question and the consequence
in politico-military matters arises from different
answers already. A good deal of continuation and controversy
rests that either no answer is possible, or we know the
defence; a sometimes it we fully understand a question we
atand the questions themselves. For as in philosophy so in
Before asking any answer, it is important to under-
Policy.

questions provide the basis for an assessment of a NATO Defence
interdependence set out in the previous chapter, these

Together with the considerations of political supremacy and
hot one? Can NATO forces deal with all likely contingencies?
outcome if our political failure and the Cold War becomes a
major nuclear threat? What kind of war is the most likely
to meet the emergence of the rocket or guided missile as the
extent has NATO and national Defence thinking been modified
Is the theory of deterrence still valid? To what

Chapter 5 : The Meaning of Deterrence

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have achieved the purpose of preventing war, because there
can never be any absolute proof. It is always possible to
argue that other factors and not our defence strategy account
for the continuation of peace. If our answers are wrong, we
probably will not live long enough to hold a post-mortem.

Additional obstacles to a clear exposition of Defence
policy spring, as in philosophy again, from unavoidable
emotional overtones which have become attached to words and
phrases such as 'the deterrent', 'nuclear strategy',
'political control', so that they no longer mean the same
thing to different people.

This confusion is particularly prevalent in relation to
the theory of 'deterrence' on which NATO defence policy is
built. It is sometimes suggested that this is an entirely
new concept, acquired along with the atomic bomb, strengthened
by the development of thermonuclear or hydrogen bombs and
fortified further by the ballistic missile. Yet it is as
old as man himself. It means no more and no less than the
simple proposition that if I am able to hit back as hard or
harder than the other chap can hit me, and he knows this, he
will not attack me as it will not be worth his while to do so.

will not attack me as it will not be worth his while to do so.
harder than the other chap can hit me, and he knows this, he
amiable proposition that if I am able to hit back as hard or
old as man himself. It means no more and no less than the
tortified further by the pejorative misstatement. Let it be so
by the development of thermoneuclear or hydrogen bombs and
new concept, acquired along with the atomic bomb, strengthened
built. It is sometimes suggested that this is an entirely
the theory of 'deterrence', on which NATO defence policy is
This confusion is partially prevented in relation to
ting to different people.

'Political control,' so that they no longer mean the same
bureaus and so 'the deterrent', 'unclear strategy',
emotional overtones which have become attached to words and
bureaus spring, as in philosophy again, from unavoidable

Additional obstacles to a clear exposition of defence
propably will not live long enough to hold a post-meeting.

for the continuation of peace. It is our answers are wrong, we
argue that other factors and not our defence strategy account
can never be any separate proof. It is always possible to
have achieved the purpose of preventing war, because there

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It is the same in international affairs as in the school playground: the bully never picks on one his own size. The power to retaliate in equal or greater strength is not enough in itself: it is equally essential to have the will to return blow for blow.

The principle of deterring aggression is thus not peculiar to the nuclear age - it was just as relevant in the days of bows and arrows or muzzle-loading muskets. It is the phrase that is new, not the concept. The phrase became fashionable in the period immediately after the last war, when the Americans had first an atomic monopoly and then later such overwhelming atomic and thermonuclear superiority that one could speak of "the Deterrent".

This was the period of the Dulles doctrine of massive retaliation. Defence strategy was simple and seemingly effective - although as mentioned above there can never be positive proof of what caused peace to be maintained. It was based on two main premises: first, that the full nuclear armoury would be used against any type of aggression, so that fear of such massive nuclear retaliation would be sufficient to deter a potential aggressor; secondly, that where the major powers were involved limited war was

where the major powers were involved limited with was
sufficient to deter a potential aggressor; secondly, that
so that fear of such massive nuclear retaliation would be
nuclear annihilation would be need against any type of aggression,
was based on two main premises: first, that the full
positive proof of what caused peace to be maintained. It
effective - although as mentioned above there can never be
retaliation. Defence strategy was simple and seemingly
This was the period of the Bulles doctrine of massive
superiority that one could apeak of *the Deterrent*.

then later such overwhelming atomic and thermonuclear
war, when the Americans had first an atomic monopoly and
became favorable in the period immediately after the last
in the decade that is new, not the concept. Thehras
days of power and arrows or munisle-loading munisels. It
benefits to the nuclear age - it was just as relevant in
the case that is new, not the concept. Thehras
the days of power and arrows or munisle-loading munisels. It
benefits to the nuclear age - it was just as relevant in
the case that is new, not the concept. Thehras
the days of power and arrows or munisle-loading munisels. It
benefits to the nuclear age - it was just as relevant in

The principle of determining aggression in time not
till we will to return blow for blow.

not enough in itself: it is equally essential to have
The power to retellate in some or greater strength in
playground: the power never plays on one pin own size.

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inconceivable - i.e. that any conflict would result immediately in a global nuclear war. As a consequence military thinking was confined almost exclusively to terms of nuclear hostilities.

There was thus only one deterrent - the nuclear strike force of the United States. In political shorthand, the deterrent was American H-bombs. When Britain developed her own independent strike force of first atomic and then thermonuclear bombs, this was, adopting a similar shorthand, described as the independent British deterrent.

It had been known for some time that the Soviet Union had become a nuclear power and was developing her nuclear capacity. Nevertheless in the West there was still such confidence in American superiority that the policy of "the deterrent" continued. It was not until October 1957, when the Sputnik demonstrated in a most dramatic way Russian technical advances in the field of rocketry, that second thoughts began to come. It did not require much technical knowledge to recognise that it would have been easier to land a rocket with a nuclear warhead on New York, London or Paris than to put the Sputnik into orbit.

Although this unmistakable revelation of Soviet nuclear capability had an immediate impact in the West and especially in the United States at the psychological and diplomatic

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levels, appreciation of the logical consequences in military terms was slow to develop. It took several years to eradicate the view that the only possible war was a global nuclear war; indeed this opinion still persists in some quarters. It is now increasingly accepted, however, that in the present state of nuclear parity a complete re-thinking of NATO military strategy is essential.

Nuclear parity, the existence of a situation whereby each side has the capacity to inflict crippling nuclear destruction on the other, has given rise to nuclear stale-mate. Equality in nuclear potential is not essential for nuclear stalemate to apply. It is sufficient if the other side has the capacity to retaliate with nuclear weapons on the cities and civilian population of a country initiating nuclear war. No nation can now make strategic use of nuclear bombs without at the same time involving almost certain nuclear annihilation for millions of its own citizens. Thus a state of nuclear nullity, to borrow Captain Liddell Hart's phrase, arises in which the earlier doctrine of massive retaliation is neither realistic nor credible. No-one can believe that the President of the United States or the British Prime Minister will authorise nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union in response to a frontier incident on the

the Soviet Union in response to a frontier incident on the
British Prime Minister will authorize nuclear attacks on
believe that the President of the United States or the
retaliation is neither reasonable nor credible. No-one can
Harsle a country, unless in which the earlier doctrine of massive
type a state of nuclear annihilation, to borrow Captain Liddell
certain nuclear annihilation for millions of its own citizens.

nuclear bombs without at the same time involving almost
nuclear war. No nation can make a strategic use of
the cities and civilian population of a country initiating
aide has the capacity to retake with nuclear weapons on
nuclear atollate to supply. If it is sufficient if the other
mater. Equality in nuclear potential is not essential for
destruction on the other, has given rise to nuclear stile-
ench aide has the capacity to inflictcribrping nuclear
nuclear parity, the existence of a situation whereby
thinking of NATO military strategy is essential.

that in the present state of nuclear parity a complete re-
in some quarters. It is now generally accepted, however,
was a global nuclear war: indeed this opinion still persists
years to erode the view that the only possible war
military terms was allowed to develop. It took several
levels, appreciation of the logical consequences in

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border of the Iron Curtain or a limited conventional attack. It is doubtful whether such a massive retaliation would in fact have taken place in the period of American atomic monopoly. Certainly no-one can imagine such a decision in similar circumstances today, when it carries with it the automatic nuclear devastation a few hours later of New York and London.

In short nuclear stalemate means the end of "the deterrent". Possession of nuclear strategic strike force is no longer by itself a sufficient deterrent to an aggressor in all circumstances. Temptation to snatch any easy gains that present themselves still remains up to the limit that the aggressor believes he can safely go without invoking a nuclear war. The risks to the aggressor in any such action are very great and as long as uncertainty continues, as it must always do, as to the "sticking-point" of the West, i.e. when it would be prepared to authorise a nuclear counter-attack to deal with non-nuclear aggression, the risks may outweigh the advantages.

But this is a highly dangerous situation. It is much better to replace the concept of "the deterrent" with that of a series of deterrents, a capacity to meet any type of attack or incident not involving nuclear weapons with