TELCONE
Ambassador Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:55 a.m. 10/15/72

AD: Hello.

HK: Anatol?

AD: Yes. You called me yesterday.

HK: I did.

AD: Well, I just had a nice weekend with my wife.

HK: Well, whenever they tell me you are in a car without a telephone I know you are with Harriman.

AD: I started to call you back but they mentioned to me that you had called back. It was around 11:00 o'clock and I didn't want to bother you.

HK: Right. Two things: one, I'll get you that letter on the postponement.

AD: Fine.

HK: That's being written now and that's fine.

AD: OK.

HK: And also it looks like as if that Berlin thing is all right.

AD: Oh, fine.

HK: We will just confirm it. I'll let you know by noon, all right?

AD: Good.

HK: One urgent matter to discuss with you.

AD: Yes.

HK: I discussed yesterday the settlement with the President.

AD: On this.

HK: No, with the Vietnamese.

AD: Oh yes.

DECLASSIFIED

- 2 -

HK: And you know also discussed with him what they indicated the problems were.

AD: Yes.

HK: For us really, the two biggest problems are not the ones they mentioned, all of those could be settled. The two biggest problems are the units in the south. We recognize they can't pull them all out, but if there could be at least some token movement and most importantly the question of military supplies to them. And what the President wants to do is to write a letter to Brezhnev.

AD: Yes.

HK: And, which I can get to you this morning.

AD: Um hum.

HK: And see whether it is possible for you to express in a strictly private way your general intentions in this respect.

AD: I understand.

HK: Because if that were done, then he would feel more justified to take the steps, the formal steps that are in the agreement; which, of course, would not be public.

AD: I understand. This is just for his own consideration. I could send him a----

HK:

HK: Now, you see one problem we have. We have almost no incentive to settle it by November 7.

AD: You have not?

HK: No, I mean I'm honest with you.

AD: Yes.

HK: Because it can only make trouble and it cannot gain us a hell of a lot. But on the other hand, it's a war that's gone on for ten years and if the conditions are right one shouldn't say just because there's an election one waits four more years. And Hanoi does seem ready to settle now. So if the conditions could be met we would settle quickly. Also, for your information I'm going to Saigon and I'll arrive there Tuesday. Now

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: N.W.APA Staff

- 3 -

if it were possible to get some answer from you by Wednesday.
I wouldn't use it there but it would affect the confidence with
which I actx in insisting on a settlement which believe me will
not be easy for them to accept.

AD: I understood.

HK: You see if it leads to a blowup in Saigon we will just have to
delay.

AD: I understand.

HK: We cannot have a public confrontation with Saigon during the
election campaign.

AD: I understand. But in this case does that mean that both of us
will do something---

HK: If we knew this, if we knew what your intentions are it would
really then enable us to take greater risks. It seems to me
you know, I don't want to speak for your government it seems
to me imporbable that you would--that under conditions of
peace your incentive would certainly--would seem to me to
be less.

AD: Yeah.

HK: We would certainly be prepared to reduce our military aid
enormously.

AD: Yes, yes. Well you see, you would want the last two put in
the letter because I think with only two days left it would be
rather difficult to get all answers. The last one you put to
me.

HK: What's the last one?

AD: You mentioned a reduce of our aid to North Vietnam.

HK: I would like some indication of that, yes.

AD: Well, I mean you may put in your letter but I am afraid that it would
be rather difficult to get by Wednesday a reply on the scope of
of questions.

HK: What are the other questions?

AD: You mentioned about Hanoi in the sense that you would like to have--about the token--and military supplies--token movement out of south Vietnam.

HK: Of their forces.

AD: Yes well that is two and the third one as I understand.

HK: No, we don't mean their supplies moved, we mean their forces.

AD: But on their supplies, you would like to have some kind of understanding.

HK: With you, yes.

AD: Understanding with us or with them?

HK: With you.

AD: Then I didn't understand you. I thought you---

HK: I don't want an understanding with them about the supplies.

AD: I thought about supplies you remember you have an argument or a question of---

HK: I'll handle that.

AD: Replacement.

HK: We don't need you for that.

AD: So it was replacements.

HK: No, no I'm talking about the question of

AD: Of token movement of their troops.

HK: Yes. The movement of their troops out of the country.

AD: Token one. Yes then the have to recognize.

HK: No, no, they just do it. Our intelligence will pick it up.

AD: Yes, all right. And the second about--

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012655
Date 10-01-1975
By W.N. Stale Gaspari

- 5 -

HK: Of your supplies.

AD: We have got to make some kind of indication to you.

HK: That's right.

AD: To you.

HK: To us. And that might then enable us to make a very rapid
settlement.

AD: Well, it's a rather difficult question but of course I will send
immediately this to the first Secretary because it is a question
of rather serious importance as you perfectly understand.

HK: Right.

not

AD: Yes, I will do it. When is the letter but in reference to our talks.

HK: The letter does not refer to our talks

AD: Because it is government-to-government now.

HK: No, no, what do you mean. The letter does not refer to anything
that you said to me.

AD: Yes because.

HK: No, you just tell him here is the problem.

AD: OK. When you will give me this letter?

HK: By noon.

AD: By noon today, yes. You will send some messenger?

HK: You want to come over at noon?

AD: As you like, I could come.

HK: Why don't you come to the Map Room. And then I'll also have
the postponement letter for you.

AD: OK. So at noon.

HK: Right

TELCONE

Ambassador Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:55 a.m. 10/15/72

AD: Hello.

HK: Anatol?

HK: I did.

AD: I'm started to call you back but they mentioned to me that you had called back. It was around 11:00 o'clock and I didn't want to bother you.

AD: Fine.

AD: OK.

AD: Oh, fine.

AD: Good.

AD: Yes.

AD: On this.

HK: No, with the Vietnamese.

AD: Oh yes.

- 2 -

AD: Yes.

HK: For us really, the two biggest problems are not the ones they mentioned, all of those could be settled. The two biggest problems are the units in the south. We recognize they can't pull them all out, but if there could be at least some token movement and most importantly the question of military supplies to them. And what the President wants to do is to write a letter to Breshnev.

AD: Yes.

AD: Um hum.

AD: I understand.

HK:

AD: You have not?

AD: Yes.

BEGASSITET
Autobahn E012958
BY NARA Date 5/1/64

if it were possible to get some answer from you by a Wednesday.
I wouldn't use it there but it would affect the confidence with
which I act in insisting on a settlement which believe me will
not be easy for them to accept.

AD: I understand.

AD: I understand.

HK: If we know this, if we know what your intentions are it would
really then enable us to take greater risks. It seems to me
you know, I don't want to speak for your government it seems
to me imporable that you would--that under conditions of
peace your incentive would certainly--would seem to me to
be less.

AD: Yeah.

HK: What's the last one?

AD: You mentioned a reduction of our aid to North Vietnam.

CLASSIFIED
E012958

AUTHOR: E012958
BY: SARA DINE 5/10/69

AD: You mentioned about Hansi in the sense that you would like to have--about the token--and military supplies--token movement out of south Vietnam.

HK: Of their forces.

HK: With you, yes.

HK: With you.

HK: I'll handle that.

AD: Replacement.

AD: So it was replacements.

HK: No, no, they just have to do it. Our intelligence will pick it up.

HK: Of your supplies.

HK: That's right.

AD: To you.

HK: Right.

AD: Yes, I will do it. When is the letter but in reference to you
our talks.

AD: Yes because.

HK: By noon.

AD: OK. So at noon.

HK: Right.

TELCORN

Ambassador Dobrynin/Kissinger

10:20 a.m. 10/15/72

AD: Yes.

HK: Anatol?

AD: Yes.

HK: We're putting together that letter about the postponement.
What years do your records show that we agreed on?

AD: Well, I don't have it here, I just will try to recall---
I remember it was, I think one year was including--
well I don't even, Henry, I am afraid--do you not have it
on your own?

HK: Well, I'll find it, I just thought you might have it easier
than I did.

AD: Well, I don't have it just unfortunately right now. I am afraid
I just don't---

HK: OK, I'll

AD: I do remember but I'm not so sure.

HK: I'll find it.

AD: There is, I think, a six-year--well including all the years
including one---'75, you remember.

HK: I know '75 and '77 are years.

AD: Yes, will I don't know, you look in your files. We don't
have any files here with me today.

HK: Good, thank you.

AD: Thank you very much.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012052
By: N.A.P. 00304

TELCONE
Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

8:02 p.m., October 15, 1972

K: Mel.

L: Yes, Henry.

K: Oh, I think you're returning a call you've already returned.

L: Oh, well, I was over here having dinner -- I've got my bride out at Poor Richard's restaurant and there was a call here for me.

K: Oh, no, that was the earlier call.

L: Okay.

K: Good to talk to you. Give my best to Barbara.

L: Well, this is our 27th wedding anniversary.

K: Oh, isn't that great!

L: I thought I would take her out to dinner tonight.

K: Isn't that great.

L: Well, we're at Poor Richard's restaurant if you want us.

K: Well, nobody is going to endure me for 27 years.

L: Okay.

K: Right.

L: Take care. Bye, bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01258

By CNARA Date 03/25/84

Telcon
Ambassador Dobrynin/HAK

Oct. 15, 1972; 8:35 p.m.

K: Hello

D: Hello, Henry. You are already back?

K: Yes, Anatol.

D: Have you had a chance to look through it?

K: Yes. I had a chance to look through it.

D: Do you have any additional comments?

K: Well, here is the comment I have to make. We have had a study made of all the prisoners there and of course we haven't been able to approach the Saigon government yet.

D: Uh, huh.

K: Because I want to present the agreement to them myself. And I think something can be done but first the other side must work with us realistically.

D: Uh, huh.

K: Now the biggest problem I have concerns their own forces in the south because the practical consequence of their proposal is that not only do they want to keep all of their forces in the south, they want Saigon to release 40,000 people whom they consider, you know, guerrillas, to then join those forces. And that is an almost impossible product to sell. Now you know if we spend 6 weeks on it we can probably get something done.

D: Yeah.

K: If you are going to do it in 2 or 3 days they have to be concrete in one of two ways. If they pull some of their units out, then I have a much better basis to talk.

D: You mean along those lines you mentioned.

K: Along the lines I mentioned. Let them move some of the divisions. My proposal to them was that they should move the divisions that were never in the country before March 25th. That they moved in after March 25th. Most

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012357
By CNARA Date 05/01

-2-

Most of them are in the northern part of the country so they wouldn't really have to go all that far to go back.

D: You mean, oh, much rather, very much symbolic to begin with.

K: Yes.

K: Because, my impression was you said...

K: I am talking about, they have about 10 divisions there more or less. If they kept 7, that would be...I don't want to say exactly how many they should move.

D: It's a rather difficult thing for us to be involved in all this...how many really.

K: But I don't even want to tell them how many they should move.

D: I understand.
should

K: It should be a noticeable number. If we can get some assurances of that we are in a much better position to bring about the release of some of these prisoners. I do not believe, I honestly do not believe that Thieu will release them if the North Vietnamese forces stay. If we get out, he is losing all our forces, he is losing the military strength, we are pulling all our air force out. Now the other route is that they could enter the agreement, I don't know, we have sent them yesterday a phrase which is not in the text you have, at the end of paragraph 8 c) we have added a phrase that says the two parties will do their utmost to achieve an agreement within three months. I have already told you orally. We have said that we will do our best and make a maximum effort. Now I think I can do even better. I think we can get about, just looking at the list, we might be able to get 10,000 released fairly quickly.

D: What is the essence of your second proposal?

K: The essence of my second proposal is if they gave us a combination of the withdrawal of some forces then I could make more complete my assurances.

D: It seems the second is the same as ...because you said...

K: The other route is...there are two routes. If they pull out their forces we can release more of their forces faster.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012857
By CNAR Date 05/01/87

-3-

D: Yes. And what is the second route?

K: The second is that we forget about their forces in which case their releases will be more along the lines we proposed to them.

D: You mean within the three months.

K: Within the three months an agreement.

D: Oh, an agreement.

K: Yes.

D: And if you are going to do something then it will be within the first months so to speak.

K: That's right, within the first months.

D: Oh, I see. But I will not argue with you about the difference.

K: But there's a big difference because our present proposal is, not that anyone should be released but that an agreement should be reached within a three months period.

D: You mean the agreement on...

K: On the release schedule.

D: But not the releases within the three months.

K: No.

D: Oh, I see. Then I misunderstand you.

K: And we are willing to give them an additional assurance that that we are willing to use our maximum influence that these releases take place.

D: You are speaking about within three months you will reach agreement or within three months you are going to release them?

K: The present proposal is that within three months we will reach the agreement. And the second route is if they pull something out we will have substantial releases within three months.

D: Well it is difficult these combinations, particularly in terms you discussed with us, because you mentioned to us the suggestion from your

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E1-12872
By CNRA Date 5-1-69

-4-

side for our consideration, but now it's rather the second of your proposals. At first I really thought you were proposing something noticeable from the point of view of air force -- and then which gave all of you something to begin, but now you are rather tied up not with the show of willingness from their side to withdraw something for the time being but rather commit themselves to a certain number of divisions. This is rather difficult for us to do anything.

K: No, no, you don't have to get into the divisions at all.

D: Yes, but you mentioned...

K: But you asked me for an idea.

D: But the idea is now...

K: The idea is that they should withdraw some forces. How many let them discuss it with us.

D: I understand. But I think I had better leave it on this basis without going into all the details.

K: I don't think you should go into any details. You could say first they want to move at the schedule they have established then we have the massive problem of how to bring Saigon along with this.

D: No, I understand. But first there really is now the question with which you are tied up with troop withdrawal one way or another, but it is up to them to discuss it with you.

K: It is up to them.

D: OK.

K: But you can tell them this. Even without a withdrawal we will make some efforts in that direction. It will just be harder.

D: Well, I understand. But in order to make it more quicker and sure...

K: That's right.

D: OK. And this I will mention to Moscow. Of course my impression is whether Moscow will look into this. And to take all the proposals, I said this because just make it on the second part about troop withdrawals as a token of a show of willingness or which now no need at all. Because I understood your proposal...

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E12587
By CNARA Date 05/25/87

-5-

K: A show of willingness would be very helpful.

D: But just a question of withdrawal...

K: It would be very helpful.

D: But it is argued a show of willingness in terms of divisions, because it is difficult from our side I am thinking about.

K: You don't have to give them the numbers.

D: So I leave it as it was. On a new question you are tied up with this new thing and I thought you preferred to discuss even without this side of it.

K: Without the prior agreement.

D: It would make it too difficult, otherwise you could be in a deadlock.

K: Well, if we are in a deadlock that's not the worse thing that can happen to us.

D: Well some kind of things are relevant since we are going deeper into other things (laughs]. This is the point. ------

K: We take your views very seriously, but...

D: That's what you really listen to.

K: But we have made absolutely the maximum concessions that's possible to make.

D: No, no, I am not arguing with you, but I simply tried to make it clear our point of view and then I would like to be ready more what you are really up to.

K: What we are up to without any withdrawal on their side we are willing to make a big effort in Saigon, but I am not very optimistic. With some withdrawals on their side we can make a bigger effort and we can have bigger numbers released right away.

D: I understand.

K: That is a fact of life.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012557
By CNARA Date 05/01/57

-6-

D: No, no, I would like to hear more your position a little more. OK, Henry and you are leaving tomorrow at 10?

K: 10:00-10:30.

D: 10:30. Well, in the morning we will have time to say hello.

K: Well, absolutely, Anatol.

D: I will telephone you. All right?

K: Good. And tell Gromyko not to coach them. They are tough enough without it.

D: Well, we know this. This we know. Bye, bye.

Oct. 15, 1972; 8:35 p.m.

K: Hello

K: Yes, Anatol.

D: Uh, huh.

D: Uh, huh.

D: Yeah.

-2-

K: Yes.

K: I am talking about, they have about 10 divisions there more or less.
If they kept 7, that would be... I don't want to say exactly how many they
should move.

D: It's a rather difficult thing for us to be involved in all this... how many
really.

D: I understand.
should

D: It seems the second is the same as ... because you said...

K: The other route is... there are two routes. If they pull out their forces we can release more of their forces faster.

-3-

D: Oh, an agreement.

K: Yes.

K: On the release schedule.

K: No.

-4-

D: Yes, but you mentioned...

D: But the idea is now...

K: It is up to them.

D: OK.

K: That's right.

CLASSIFIED

Date: 5/1/68
By: B. MARS

-5-

K: It would be very helpful.

D: Well some kind of things are relevant since we are going deeper into other things (laughs]. This is the point. --------

D: I understand.

K: That is a fact of life.

CLASSIFIED
1972

K: 10:00-10:30.

K: Well, absolutely, Anatol.

DECLASSIFIED
Authentic
B: ANA DUE G/ALOF
E012958

TELCOM

Robert Haldeman/Kissinger

10:10 a.m. - 10/16/72

RH: Bob, Henry.

HK: Yes, Bob.

RH: I'm over at the President's house and he was wondering if you could come up and chat with him for a bit sometime today.

HK: Oh, Jesus. It's almost--you know if he tells me to I have.. no choice.

RH: Well, if it's a problem why don't you stay there and talk on the phone. I'll suggest.

HK: Because, you know, I am in the office with a 100 things to go over.

RH: Yeah.

HK: And Between you and me I wanted to rest a couple of hours, too.

RH: Yeah. OK. Let me see if you can just do it on the phone. Try that anyway. You know, you ought to talk over this whole thing about what we wer talking about last night.

HK: How about first thing in the morning. You know it doesn't matter when I go.

RH: OK. That'll be good. I'll make that point and we'll see what works out. I'll get back to you.

HK: I've had yet another idea. It would be an intermediate idea. I'm pretty persuaded that we shouldn't stall it beyond---first of all the way this momentum is going I'd have to put brakes on it in a way that would be transparent. But one thing that I have thought of doing is go to Saigon, come back here and then take the same route again next week and just add the final destination. That would push the whole thing back by six days.

RH: What good would that do?

HK: That would save Thieu's face. You know, he wouldn't have been blackjacked into it. It would give him a few more days to clean up the security areas around Saigon and it prevents an absolute confrontation next week.

UNCLASSIFIED

Approved 30772958

By: NARA Dues 5/16/72

- 2 -

RH: You don't know if you're going to have one. That should be a fallback position.

HK: That's what I mean. Well if he goes along enthusiastically we stick to the schedule.

RH: Yeah.

HK: If he stonewalls we have no choice except to break off anyway.

RH: This would be an intermediate to that.

HK: This would be an intermediate to that I would come back then Saturday night I would be back.

RH: Yeah.

HK: And go on the road again Tuesday the same itinerary the only thing is the President would then speak on the 31st rather than on the 25th.

RH: Yeah.

HK: It has the additional advantage as I see it politically not that it is closer to the election but that if anything gets unstuck there's less time for it.

RH: That's not valuable.

HK: What?

RH: I don't think that's---there are more negatives to that than positives. One side versus the other that's a better position than just dropping it at that point probably.

HK: Well, that's what I think. See the problem is, Bob, I've reviewed all the exchanges. We have used these time schedules really ruthlessly to get changes in the text that otherwise would take weeks to get. Now I'm doing a letter to Brezhnev from the President today to get some you know, indication of Soviet supplies.

RH: Yeah.

HK: Just to button up the agreement.

RH: Yeah.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: E017958
Date: 5/1/97

TelCon
Secy. Peterson/Mr. Kissinger

October 16, 1972, 10:32 am

P: Three things I want to be sure we are coordinated on; one, on this interest rate thing, Hal tells me you've completed that, is that right, on the basis we discussed.

K: No, no, no. I've, god damn it. I think he ---

P: I got the impression that you'd reviewed it with--

K: I mentioned it to Dobrynin as a thought, I didn't give him any figures.

P: Oh, I see.

K: And he is waiting for you--he said he thought it was a reasonable idea. I told Hal to tell you on Saturday, God damn him, I have not completed it. You told me not to complete it.

P: No, I thought you had more or less worked it out at 4% and $710, and that was fine with me if that was the deal. You have not done that.

K: No, Hal wanted to say start at 5 and go down, and I said, No, I don't want more than 4.

P: Right. Okay. But 4 and 710, if the numbers are right it is fine with you.

K: Right, not more than that.

P: Above 4 it starts hurting them, not too badly it seems to me.

K: Right.

P: All right. Second--well I'm glad we've had it, because I saw Alkimov and Pablichev last night and they didn't seem to know anything, so okay. Now, as I understand, you do not want an announcement tomorrow, you want it Wednesday.

K: That's correct.

P: All right. Now, Henry, my signals on the Maritime deal were so unbelievably confused that I want to hear it from you. Whether the President would be involved or not involved.

K: I think on this one, the President probably wants to be involved.

P: I would think so. Now, therefore, that suggests the ceremony.

TelCon
Secy Peterson/Mr. Kissinger

Oct. 16, 1972, 10:32 am

-2-

over there I would think.

K: I agree.

P: Okay, Tuesday is off for you; I'm tied up Thursday, Potolichev wanted it tomorrow; but Wednesday, does that feel all right with you?

K: Wednesday is great.

P: Okay, but do you see the President witnessing--

K: I think the President might well want to be present at the signing.

P: Yeah, all right. Okay. Now, the third thing that I want to be sure you're aware that I am sensitive too is that there's a very fine balance between getting a deal that is good back home but not creating undue problems for you with them. I've got a lot of questions, Henry, I want you to read the briefing on this KVM business. I have done everything I could to suggest how they've cooperated with us, we very much appreciate it, it was an unprecedented problem, and I don't want you thinking that I generated any of the caving in business that appeared in one of the newspapers, cause we haven't.

K: Pete, I wouldn't think that.

P: Yeah. But that's essentially where its coming from, and see my answer and if you've got any other suggestions, fine, on how to handle it.

K: Good.

P: Finally, with Potolichev you should know that he asked for a couple of small things. He wants a third guy in the commercial office, for example, on both sides. You know the diplomatic--

K: You handle that.

P: And the Kama River Purchasing Commission he wants. And that we think is okay with the new KVM D.U.K. system, and he would like some assurance that I will give sympathetic attention to further offices. Now, my sense of this deal after the bludgeoning on the Maritime deal is we should not move in a direction of being accommodating.

K: I agree completely.

RECLASSIFIED
Date: 01/29/85
Author: B. KAMA
Title: B. KAMA Due 5/14/85

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10:40 a.m. October 16, 1972

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Oh Yes. I decided not to bother you -- I knew you were so busy thinking and so on. When are you leaving?

K: In about two minutes.

D: Oh, oh. Well for the time being I have nothing, but when I will have, I will act through Haig.

K: Right. You can get him immediately.

D: Am I correct that your schedule approximately when you are leaving from San Juan.

K: Tomorrow night.

D: Tomorrow night.

K: And I can be reached on the plane, so I wouldn't worry about this.

D: I see and from San Juan when you go to Hanoi?

K: On Sunday.

D: This is really what I would like. One question, yesterday I checked with Haig about your approach to Chinese on this subject too.

K: That's correct.

D: Yes, may I check with you--if you ask only one question of them, I don't want really to go into details, but just for our own information --are you raise the whole specter of this issue.

K: I raise the same with them as I raise with you.

D: The whole range--

K: Yeh.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012058
by MW. Kissinger

Page 2

D: I mean on the ------and the same time on the military deliveries.

K: That's correct. Especially the military delivery.

AD: Especially the military deliveries, because this is the main point really.

HK: That's right. We don't have so confidential relations with them despite what your newspapers say occasionally, and therefore we haven't gone into quite that much detail about the forces.

D: Oh I see, huh hmm.

HK: We've mentioned it, but we haven't mentioned it in as much detail. But on the deliveries, we have mentioned it almost verbatim the same way.

AD: In the same way, yeh, I see.
This is important just to know how it is in general.'

HK: I haven't got the means of talking to them as easily as to you.

AD: Yeh, I understand. I am sure you have in one way or another.

HK: Oh, no, I am in touch with them, but not as closely as with you.

AD: Today, I heard you bomb North Vietnam now rather strongly.

HK: That what?

AD: That you continue bombardment on North Vietnam.

HK: No, no that's under control. That's nonsensical baloney. I've got it now under good control.

AD: So it will be no surprise when you will be there.

HK: No, no.

AD: Better not. (chuckling)

HK: It's being cut in half.

AD: I see. And you are going to send to me today the letter you mentioned yesterday.

HK: Send it back here?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012055

By: WW. PAPAS 5/24

Page 3

AD: I mean the letter--yes I gave it to you yesterday.

HK: Okay.

AD: So Haig will send it.

HK: Haig will send it.

AD: I would really like to have it because it is important <u>mission</u>.

HK: Well, I think it would make a big difference in the world situation.

AD: Yes--what in general are your expectations?

HK: I think that if they show any understanding for our position on those issues, I think we will settle it in a couple of weeks.

AD: Yeh, Yeh. This is the point.

HK: And you know, when these things are ripe, they ought to get settled.

AD: Yeh, well you see it's rather difficult now, because it looks so on the issue of the troops when you mentioned it will be given kind of understanding or negotiations but now it looks as though well it's not an agreement but understanding of mutual position somebody who wants to be committed or not committed but now you have rather reopened this issue--this is why I am a little worried, quite frankly.

HK: Well we are willing to do it by understanding.

to

AD: No, I mean to my impression there was no really big issue up/the last meeting maybe or the last--

HK: No, no, I always made that point. I have never deviated from that point.

AD: No it's not a deviation--but specifically the same manner from the very beginning.

HK: In the beginning we only talked about political points.

AD: No, I know, but when you discuss--

HK: That's been raised at every meeting in which military points were discussed.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By N.M. Parry Date 09-04-97

DECLASSIFIED

authority

E012055

Page 4

D: I know that because they mention it to us that we simply refused to discuss this question, that's all--

K: But that doesn't mean we didn't---

D: I know, but they don't really, raise it with others--it's a difficult question. For me it was basic understanding that for the time being this is comparatively easy but maybe not too long. Maybe it could point another way but now it is--

K: But they have to understand that I have an unbelievable problem in Saigon.

D: Yeah.

K: They seem to think that I confess to disorders in Saigon but that isn't true.

D: I think they could believe in this---if Saigon is concerned with you, there is some anticipation there.

K: Well, you know people say that about your relations with East Europe and you know it isn't true.

D: Yes, they have some difficulties don't they.

K: Over a period of months we can have our way, but over a period of weeks we cannot.

D: Yes, it is difficult now. But it looks so that it could be an announcement before them, but not really announcement over the difficulty of the agreement. The signing I mean. But it doesn't look to me that they much detail.

K: That's right. No, well we could make an announcement with as much detail as I've given you.

D: Up till now but it's who--they are not cowards.

K: No, I'm seeing them tomorrow so I hope we can make some progress there.

D: I hope so too. But you only see the second man there.

K: Yes, but he must have given him very precise instructions.

Page 4 5

D: Yes, I know there's really no problem because they look for you there. But my impression was from--as I discussed with you yesterday--that General Le Duc Tho gave me impression that you both are moving rather well.

K: That's my impression, too.

D: But at the same time, the question raises on you because you said we are freeing Americans and they didn't want to free those who are fighting for their on government. They are looking a different way, not as it is in South Vietn;am, but rather like it was for another but that we are freeing immediately all of the American prisoners of war.

K: We don't give back the North Vietnamese right away.

D: Well, you know, with the North Vietnamese in the South, it bothers.

K: Yes.

D: It is rather difficult for them publicly to put it this way.

K: Yes. There's no problem about returning North Vietnamese.

D: I know, I know it is no problem. It is a question about those who is in South Vietnam. You understand then the problem.

K: Yes. We can do something about the South Vietnamese, we can get sentences shortened. You know, there are many things we can do in practice. It would release a large number of them.

D: Yes, it is true. Rather you should withdraw in the sense that they could accept any except that they don't want any with you, withdraw any

K: The North Vietnamese!

D: Yes.

K: But all we are asking is that they move some--we don't figure that's intelligence, they don't have to confirm it.

D: Yes I understand. Well I understand the whole situation. I do wish you the very best because it's in common interest.

K: I couldn't agree more.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MWAPR-500-00304

Page 6

D: When are you going to be back?

K: For example, you see, it's a combination of things--if we could get some answers from you on the other issue--on the supplies.

D: Yes, with--

K: All we think--I hate to use the word--they are lengthened in a sense that if we get satisfaction on one, we can be a little more flexible on the other.

D: Well, you raised two questions, and I--you're right, you raise it so I take it in the time of the report but it was about a kind of understanding for future mutual delivery of goods--military goods to Vietnam in general.

K: Right

D: It is what--but I don't think, but of course with the understanding that you and I are partners, but at the same time you raise the troop withdrawal which is much more difficult for us because you already have got--

K: Mr. Ambassador--

D: No, I rather prefer to split it more If I understand you correct.

K: That is correct. From you we can get more help on the supplies.

D: Yes, not specifically in the--

K: I agree

D: You already know that I don't, so to speak--

K: That is correct.

D: Because otherwise to tell them "get out", they are not ready.

K: I understand.

D: And then there is still the question about presence of their troops or no presence of their troops, even I don't like to tell them.

K: It all is clear.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: N.M. Pa. 500-0040

Page 7

D: Okay, Henry.

K: Good, Anatol.

D: Give my regards---

K: If you have any problems, call Haig and he--

D: It will given a chance to look into this business and I want for it, all right--

K: On Wednesday, and Peterson is going to propose to you today this thing of lowering the sum, calculating the interest at 2.8 but throwing in the agreement 4% with the lower sum.

D: Okay, Peterson propose today?

K: Yes.

D: Well, we will look about this and we will report to Moscow.

K: Good.

D: And if you could just mention to General Haig to call ______ because I do want to finish this business with the Embassy if possible. I mean, just let him look into this once more without obligations.

K: Now, what is the issue there because I --

D: It is still about the height of the building.

K: Well, we agree to give you the height you want.

zone

D: No, that is to say, it's only because the controls they agree.

K: But that's because of the zoning commission

D: I agree, but it is not really the zoning commission. But you shouldn't bother now because---

K: Let me do it when I get back.

D: Yes, okay. When you say you be back.

K: Well, probably early next week. Around Monday or Tuesday.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FA12058
by M.W. Baar 00304

TELCOM

Robert McNamara/Kissinger

1:15 p.m. - 10/16/72

RM: Henry, you asked for a progress report.

HK: Yes.

RM: It took God seven days to create the world, it's difficult to recreate North Vietnam in two but I'll have a report for you tonight. Where do you want it delivered?

HK: To the situation room.

RM: Yeah, what time?

HK: Oh, I don't much care, 7:00 or 8:00.

RM: Seven o'clockish.

HK: Right. In what sort of state will it be?

RM: Well it will be typed three, four or five pages, we're typing here we're going to work on it this afternoon. But the figure I think will be on the order of $600 million a year average.

HK: And you get that how?

RM: I'm not saying how we get it.

HK: Is that in addition to bilateral US?

RM: That's just---I understood you wanted to know how much they need. That's how much they need. We don't discuss how they can get it.

HK: Right. Well what is your estimate of what you can get?

RM: From whom?

HK: I mean, I asked an estimate from us but do you think one could get them that much?

RM: Yeah. That depends on how much ______ puts up but I think well it is clearly dependent on the US but I think the answer is yes, the Nordic countries, multilateral institutions the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, Japan if the US puts up a substantial percentage of it you definitely could

CLASSIFIED

30172958

BANA DRE 5/1/90

- 2 -

HK: Right.

RM: And I don't cover that at all.

HK: Right. And do you have it broken down according to some
categories?

RM: Yes.

HK: Well, that would be very helpful.

RM: Food, etc.

HK: Terrific.

RM: You know it's a day and a half's effort.

HK: Yes. Well it's enough to give me some idea I mean we're not
going to be able to make any agreement.

RM: If you want to buy the dinner or supper and come in and have it
here I'll give it to you here otherwise I'll take it to
the Situation Room at 7:00.

HK: OK, I don't know what my own---I may have to go up to Camp
David.

RM: All right.

HK: Well, hell you don't have to take it in. I'll get it picked up.

RM: OK, have it picked up here at 7:00 p.m. then.

HK: Good.

RM: If you want to come to supper at just give me a call and let us know.

HK: Terrific.

RM: Fine, thanks very much

HK: OK.

DECLASSIFIED
Auth: E0172958

BROOKFIELD
MARIA DUE 5/1/91

TELCON
Lloyd Shearer/Kissinger
1:20 p.m. - 10/16/72

HK: Hello.

LS: Hey, Henry, how are you?

HK: OK Lloyd.

LS: Do you let anybody photograph you at home? Would you let us photograph you at home?

HK: My home in Washington?

LS: Yes sir.

HK: It looks like a goddam doctor's office.

LS: I know that's why--you know we got to get something for our 101 papers that nobody else has. So if we could get a photo on the john.

HK: On the john, of course.

LS: One of those *kix* things, that would help us you know in the upcoming story which we haven't yet done.

HK: What is that story going to be again, you told me the other day.

LS: Four years of Henry Kissinger.

HK: If I survive the next four weeks you can do it.

LS: Anyway, what the hell what's that restaurant. Is there a restaurant in Paris called the Carlton Lucas?

HK: Lucas Carlton, yes.

LS: Lucas Carlton.

HK: What about it?

LS: I was just wondering if you had been in that restaurant.

HK: Yes I was.

LS: Would you recommend it.

95005-SSS-003

Aubrey

B. M.A. Date 5/16/76

- 2 -

HK: Well it's the only one that serves at 10:30 at night.

LS: There's a new one the Grand Favor.

HK: And on Sunday.

LS: Well you operate at such strange times.

HK: Oh yes. But it is a good restaurant.

LS: Apparently.

HK: Why, are you going to run something on that, too.

LS: I don't know what you have reference to, Henry. I don't know the name.

HK: That is true.

LS: Trying to keep up with you is a hopeless occupation. Nobody wants to do that. You know that you're the most colorful guy in this Administration and

HK: That's not saying a hell of a lot ---

LS: Huh?

HK: That's not saying an extraordinary amount but I'll take any little compliment that comes my way.

LS: That's right. Anyway what we would like to do is grab a few shots of you in your hideway.

HK: Certainly.

LS: If that's OK with you.

HK: Yes.

LS: And so I would come over and take a few fast shots.

HK: But when.

LS: Today.

HK: Today, you cant. Are you in town?

BROKEN CLASSIFIED

E012958

Anthony
B. NARA DUEG/LOT

LS: Yes.

HK: Oh no today is out of the question I'm working all day.

LS: Henry, you can't do that, I mean you've got to stop for a few minutes.

HK: Today I can't but in principle you can do it sometime.

LS: All right the next time I'm in principle which is a very good community we'll do it.

HK: Will you do that?

LS: Of course.

HK: Good, I didn't know you were in town.

LS: Right, I have to come from time to time.

HK: Well, let me know next time and drop in, you've never been in my---

LS: Yes I have.

HK: You've been in my office?

LS: Yes. OK, well THEN we'll do it some other time, but we would like to do it and the reason I thought we might do it now is we would like to do it before the year is out and we're coming down to it in October.

HK: You can do it within the next two or three weeks.

LS: I don't like to come back to Washington.

HK: I'm screwed up I don't know when I'll get home.

LS: Let me ask you this, OK look if you do get a break we could do it early in the morning maybe you could just call the hotel and leave a message for me. Would you do that like a good guy?

HK: I will but I doubt it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012587
By CNAR Date 6/16/72

TELCONE

Ambassador Dobrynin/Kissinger

2:00 p.m. - 10/16/72

AD: Hello.

HK: Anatol?

AD: Oh, you are the idiot

HK: Incidentally can you send me back if you agree to that letter? It was our only copy the one on

AD: You mean what you made me?

HK: On deferment, on postponement.

AD: I'll call back, no problem.

HK: OK, we are going to delete that sentence we discussed the one in the letter from the President to the Secretary General. We will delete the first sentence.

AD: The last sentence on the first page?

HK: Right and we will instead, such an indication from you

AD: Just a minute I would like to write it.

HK: Why don't I send you over the correct.

AD: You will send it, IK that would be even better.

HK: I'll send it right over because the President also added another sentence that we don't think we're doing it only for public opinion.

AD: I understand.

HK: It is not relevant to anything you have to do but is an

AD: Could you read me over what you added.

HK: At the end of the first page last paragraph, "such an indication from you would do much to accelerate agreement between the United States and the DRV".

AD: And indication, yah. What is the next one?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01238

By: CNARA Date: 05/01/87

HK: Then at the end of the second paragraph you know where we talk about the American public.

AD: Yeah.

HK: After that we add this sentence: "Moreover, such a one-sided arrangement would violate the principle of reciprocity and equality of commitment which must be the foundation of any lasting settlement and which is the foundation on which it has been possible to build the significant progress that has been achieved in our own bilateral relations.

AD: What foundation do you mean?

HK: The foundation of our reciprocity and equality of commitment which we stand by.

AD: Oh, and commitment.

HK: Right that is not in reference to you that is in reference to the DRV.

AD: I understand. OK you will send right now?

HK: Right.

AD: With a messenger.

HK: Right.

AD: And I will convey in a very few hours, all right.

HK: Right.

AD: I would like to check the other two or three points. One, on this United Nations business on the two Germanies you do not put into the motion the whole ______ the reply from Gromyko.

HK: Right.

AD: For the time being it is a private discussion between you and him.

HK: Exactly.

AD: So this is the understanding as of now. Second about the _______

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Eolaster
By: CNARA Date: 06/07/87

- 3 -

you mean only Hanoi or the whole of North Vietnam.

HK: What do you mean?

AD: About the ______ you said when you will be in Hanoi.

HK: No, no it will be the whole of North Vietnam.

AD: And you are going to reduce all of the North Vietnam the bombing. It is a matter of clarification. This is all I need. OK, please send me this right now and I will send it to Brezhnev.

HK: Good, thank you.

AD: You will leave tomorrow in the morning?

HK: I'll be there til about 10:00.

AD: About 10:00, just in case, General Haig will be here?

HK: Right.

AD: OK Henry, bye.

TELCONE

Ambassador Dobrynin/Kissinger

2:00 p.m. - 10/16/72

AD: Hello.

HK: Anatol?

AD: Oh, you are the idiot

AD: I understand.

- 2 -

AD: Yeah.

HK: The foundation of true reciprocity and equality of commitment is the principle of non-discrimination.

AD: Oh, and commitment.

HK: Right.

AD: With a messenger.

HK: Right.

HK: Right.

HK: Right.

HK: Exactly.

BCLASSIFIED
Author: E017958
Date: 5/1/96
BY: NINA DRU

- 3 -

HK: What do you mean?

AD: And you are going to reduce all of the North Vietnam the bombing. It is a matter of clarification. This is all I need. OK, please send me this right now and I will send it to Bresheev.

HK: Good, thank you.

HK: I'll be there till about 10:00.

HK: Right.

AD: OK Henry, bye.

95CLASSIFIED

Air Force

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01258

By CHNARA Date 01-01-87

TELCONE

Ambassador Dobrynin/General Haig

5:55 p.m., October 17, 1972

D: Hello, General.

H: Hi, Mr. Ambassador.

D: I would like first we discussed yesterday about this announcement
about the American strategic arms limitation.

H: Oh, yes.

D: Well, in principle they agree with your proposed date, Thursday, 19th so let's agree on this so it will be announced both here and in Moscow. Secondly, about the text they would like -- but it's really up to you if you don't want -- to make in the beginning some additions saying something like this, "In accordance with the agreement reached during the third American summit meeting in Moscow . ."

H: . .

D: . . . but let's finish it. "In accordance with the agreement reached during the third American summit talks in Moscow concerning the continuation of active negotiation on limitation of strategic offensive arms, the Governments of the USSR have agreed . ." -- and there it is as you proposed -- " . . have agreed that the talks between the USSR and the USA Delegation would resume in Geneva on November 21st, 72."

H: That doesn't offer us any difficulties.

D: Yes, so I think it will be a good idea if you could -- maybe in much better English language but I put directly from Russian. I will repeat, if you don't mind.

H: Alright.

D: "In accordance with the agreement reached during the third American summit meeting in Moscow concerning the continuation . ." -- and here I put "of active negotiations."

H: Concerning the what?

D: "The continuation of active negotiations on limitation of strategic offensive arms." Maybe it's different in English but I will give you exactly translation from Russian -- maybe it doesn't sound very well but this is it. "The Governments of USSR and the United States have

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E1-2582
By CNAR Date 01/17/72

TELCOM
Ambassador Dobrynin/General Haig

5:55 p.m., October 17, 1972

- 2 -

D: (cont'd) agreed that the talks between the USSR and USA Delegation would resume in Geneva, Switzerland on November 21st, 72."

H: Okay.

D: I will repeat once more, you don't mind. "In accordance with the agreement reached during the third American summit meeting in Moscow concerning the continuation of active negotiations on limitation of strategic offensive arms, the Governments of the USSR and the USA have agreed -- the talks between the USSR and USA Delegations would resume in Geneva, Switzerland on November 21st." We will announce as you propose on Thursday, 19th.

H: Okay. We plan to do this at 11:00.

D: Here?

H: Right.

D: Okay, 11:00 Washington time.

H: Right. Now if I have any trouble with this language, I'll come right back to you. It doesn't look like there should be any problem. Maybe we would want to shorten it for English a little bit.

D: Yes. You might make it two or three ....... but approximately.

H: Okay, fine.

D: This is the first thing. If you have some really comments, please call me within an hour if you could.

H: Alright, sure.

D: Second, about this talks of Peterson and Patolichev. There are two points really. First, they are really stuck on this figure on 3%, 2.75 or 2.8.

H: Um-humm.

D: Really in my impression they are on impasse. They are at a deadlock. I am rather obliged to ask you to make a report to the President and make a final decision because we really are telling you as we reported when before Mr. Peterson really changed the previous agreement on a Maritime Agreement -- a agreement which we have already with them.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01235R
By CNAR Date 01/10/72

TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/General Haig
5:55 p.m., October 17, 1972

- 3 -

D: (cont'd) One of his arguments was that if you accept this Maritime, then we will accept this one on the percentage.

H: Yeah, yeah.

D: So it was one of the arguments quite frankly I used in Moscow to convince them not to change once the agreement because first agreement was $8.00 per ton. But then you insist to accept the world range but more than that Peterson insists on world rate plus one dollar above the world rate. And it was really out of our agreement but we accepted it with understanding that we will finish on a Lend-lease basis. Now when we come back, he now says, "No, no, no; I have instructions only 7/3."

H: I see.

D: So this is one question I would like you for instance to look if it's possible to make a report and make a final decision. Second, do you have in mind any already procedure tomorrow and when to sign because as it looks to me now the Commercial Treaty is ready for signing.

H: Uh-huh.

D: The announcement for the Trade there is no difficulty. Especially about Lend-lease everything is ready except this percentage and postponement.

H: Yes.

D: Because it was utterly clear. So do you plan or the President to plan or he gave an order or instructions to have any ceremony tomorrow because Peterson mentioned to me the possibility although he said that maybe the President will come to the ceremony tomorrow and he will sign Executive Order or ...

H: Yeah.

D: Or give the order for or announcement maybe for EXIM Bank.

H: Well, I think quite frankly he's been holding up waiting to hear that this other matter had been resolved.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By LBNARA Date 01-26-77 StLOT

TELCON

Ambassador Dobrynin/ General Haig

5:55 p.m., October 17, 1972

- 4 -

D: Oh, I see. So he has not yet finally decided yet about the ceremony?

H: No, because he's just been waiting to hear from Secretary Peterson.

D: Secretary Peterson, I understand.

H: Do you think -- I think tomorrow would be awfully close on this thing.

D: Well, I really why I mentioned this Wednesday because it was Henry twice mentioned to me. When he left he said he would make a reference to the President to do it on Wednesday so --

H: Yeah, he did.

D: . . twice to Moscow only because of this so now I'm simply asking you whether we will have it or not because Moscow really expects us to sign tomorrow.

H: Yeah, yeah.

D: So now we ask you where instructions about -- well, not instructions -- we mentioned them yesterday but Peterson still demands three but they were so sure that we will get 2.75 so they are silent for the second day. And so I don't know what I have to report to him really because --

H: Well, I think we have to take another look at this approach and see if we can work something out. My instincts would be to get that done maybe we ought to think about Thursday or Friday for the signing, so we have another day to iron this out. I'm confident it will be ironed out; it just has to be.

D: Yeah. But President doesn't hear and he's not going on some peace-making or something because what I really had because Guzenko when he was -- you mentioned that he will be three or four days and it turns out to be two weeks.

H: Yeah.

D: On Patolichev, I specifically asked twice "Henry, is it really necessary for him to come on Sunday or better for him to stay away?" And he called me back and say, "Yes, I asked the President . . ." At first he said, "No, hold on." but then minute later he called me, "No, he may come. It's the decision of the President."

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Eolaser
By CNARA Date 01/17/72

5:55 p.m., October 17, 1972

H: Yeah, I remember.

D: So he is here, very, very important ______ so again I will wait until next week. This I really don't like.

H: Yeah.

D: As a matter of pride I can admit not to certain kind of understanding.
If we agree, we'll agree. Otherwise, it sounds rather not encouraging.
So it's not a politic problem but . .

H: Yeah, well, let me --

D: So please check it with whom it concerned and then let me know if
possible.

H: Good, I'll call you back.

D: Okay.

H: Fine. Good, Mr. Ambassador.

D: Okay, thank you very much.

H: Right, bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOLAST
By CNARA Date Stated

TelCon

Amb. Dobrynin/General Haig

6:17 pm, Oct. 17, 1972

D: Hello.

H: Hello, Mr. Ambassador.

D: Yes, General,

H: I think I have a better feel for this. Quite frankly we are a
little--

D: You mean about the last one.

H: No, no, no, it's about the trade <u>renew</u> lease thing.

D: Yes, well please tell me.

H: When we went down from 3.5 to 3, we did that in the light
of the Maritime thing, and we thought we had moved down
rather substantially.

D: Yes. Kennedy mentioned the 2.8 when I talked to him on Monday.

H: XXXX Yeah. Let's do this. Secretary Peterson--I told him
to get over and we'll make our rock bottom proposal. And, if
he can see Mr. Patolichev at 6:45.

D: 6:45, where, in his office?

H: No, he could go over to your place if you prefer, whatever
you wish.

D: Yes, before I'm meeting at his house, or is changed, or does
he prefer to have a dinner at his, or does he prefer to have it
womewhere else?

H: You could do it at his house if you think that's all right.
with Mr. Peterson,

D: It's all right for us. We can meet <u>tomorrow</u>, its practically
the same.

H: All right

D: I will be back with you, right now.

H: Okay, what I'm worried about is to try to get this thing wrapped
up so that we could have the signing tomorrow, if at all possible.

D: Yes, this is the point. Mr. Patolichev really wants

TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/General Haig

6:35 pm, October 17, 1972

D: Hello

H: Fine, on this language, Mr. Ambassador.

D: Thank you very much. We'll get in touch at 9:00 in the morning.

H: Right, and we'll do it here at 11:00.

D: Yes,

H: Now, I hope we can get this other thing straightened out.

D: I just asked Patolichev to come the meeting with Peterson and stay to talk with the evening. And, he tells me now that we are about to finish this business.

H: Well, I think we can work this thing out tomorrow afternoon and tie everything up.

D: Yes--

H: We'll have the President there--

D: This was the best way to do it.

H: Good.

D: Thank you very much.

H: Fine, Mr. Ambassador.

D: Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

EOI 2058
By: NN Pa. Dec 17 1972

TELCORN

Marvin Kalb/Kissinger

3:55 pm - Oct. 23, 1972

K: Hello.

MK: Hello.

K: Marvin, how are you?

MK: Good. You must be absolutely exhausted.

K: Well, I'm a little tired.

MK: I guess you got a little rest on the plane.

K: Well, actually, I think it exhausts you on a long flight. It isn't fatigue. I think something must happen on this east/west leg that isn't just fatigue.

MK: Yes. Listen, help a poor struggling fellow--

K: Listen, you bastard, you've been putting out stuff I'm finding out what I'm doing from reading your transcript.

MK: Tell me where I've been right or wrong. (Laughter)

K: Get it from your own intelligence.

MK: Well, it's a diplomatic response, but was that experience of the last five days uncommonly difficult?

K: Well, it had its moments.

MK: Yeah. Has it held up anything?

K: One thing that was totally wrong is that the meeting with the Foreign Minister was arranged because Thieu refused to meet.

MK: And that's wrong.

K: That is wrong. I mean, that had been set up that way. That was of a more technical nature.

MK: I see. Well, this is something that they passed to us from Saigon.

K: Yeah.

CLASSIFIED

Auburn 8/22/72

BY: XIMIA DUE: 8/22/72

TELCORN

Marvin Kalb/Kissinger

3:55 pm - Oct. 23, 1972

2

MK: Do you have the sense that you are on the time table that you set up?
Or, will it be held up a bit.

K: No, it's more or less on -- you know, you can make it slow, or medium
and fast one-- I think it is on the medium one.

MK: And is there any---

K: This is off the record.

MK: Okay, okay. For guidance then. Is the election emphasis to the
public comment realistic?

K: Well, not as far as we are concerned. Absolutely not.

MK: Absolutely not.

K: Look, Marvin, you've read a lot of what I've written inside on this
war.

MK: Yes, I have.

K: But, you know whether I'm right in my judgments or not. What we
wanted to get out this war--whatever mistakes we made in getting
into it was a sense that when we left it the public could feel it was
an act of statesmanship and we could at last deny them something
and put it behind us. Now we can have no incentive whatever to have
this thing promised by political debate.

MK: Right.

K: And, you know I don't know what the motives of the other side are.

MK: Right.

K: But we are going at an orderly pace, you know, that perhaps progress
is being made, which is more than we've ever said before.

MK: Do you think that you will be obliged to a--in a couple of days
go semi-public on this.

K: Well I have said, yesterday, and when I arrived that I would have a
press conference in a couple of days.

MK: You did say that!!