ROSTOW, GENE

YALE UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOL
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

November 27, 1973

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
The State Department
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Henry:

Many, many thanks for your warm and
responsive letter.

I enclose for your information some
correspondence with Sir Frank Roberts, a
most excellent and sagacious British Ambas-
sador, now retired, who was my predecessor
as President of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-
tion. His reports on the posture of H.M.G.
may fill in, or confirm, your own information.
If they are entirely duplicative, there is
always the wastebasket!

Yours cordially,

EVR/dhw

Enclosures

October 31, 1973

Sir Frank Roberts
25 Kensington Court Gardens
London W3 5QF, England

Dear Frank:

I have just come from a lunch with the French Ambassador to the United States, here for the day, and of course we discussed the Middle Eastern crisis and its effect on alliance relations. He seemed excellent in his own views (he had spent a good deal of his career both at Brussels and at the U.N.), and in his appreciation of what is at stake. And he confirms that Kissinger is annoyed. While I am clear that our government should never be annoyed, many of the loyal Atlantic Council members in Washington last week were very angry indeed about the European position, and I was (and am) immensely concerned. The notion that Germany and other countries objected to the American airlift, and the British arms embargo, were extremely offensive to our friends.

First, let me reiterate that the problem is not a matter of personal sympathies with either the Israelis or the Arabs. I recently started a speech here on the subject (before a Jewish group) with Weizmann's great remark that the Arab-Israeli conflict is not a conflict between right and wrong, but between two rights. We must approach the crisis in terms only of alliance interests, which are and will remain fundamental. This is a thrust at NATO, not a local quarrel.

Secondly, my disadvantage in this affair is that I know too much about it from the inside. Perhaps the Israelis did neglect opportunities for reconciliation. I never witnessed any myself, nor, in subsequent conversations with Sisco and Rogers, have any been revealed. In our experience at the governmental level, the only problem was Egypt's persistent and sustained refusal to agree to any conference of the parties (or indeed, any other procedure) to negotiate the agreement required by Resolution 242, unless Israel promised in advance to return to the Armistice Demarcation Lines of June 4, 1967. This was one of the points the Security Council rejected in 1967, as George Brown, Michael Stewart, Caradon, Bill Rogers, and Harold Bealey, among others, have made clear in public. Actually, as Rusk told Riad in September, 1968, we would support the return of the Sinai to Egypt, pursuant to an agreed timetable, provided the Sinai was completely demilitarized: hardly an unreasonable condition, in view of the events of August. The Israelis agreed to that proposal then (they suggested that demilitarization be monitored by joint Egyptian-Israeli patrols, not by U.N. forces). I confirmed in 1971 that this was

Sir Frank Roberts

2

October 31, 1973

still the Israeli position. I'm sure that we could get that outcome
today, although the timetable might be a little longer now than then.

Egypt knows that this is the American and Israeli position. I
told them so myself at the time, and thereafter.

But the mistakes of the past are irrelevant to the problems we
face today. As Foy Kohler used to say, the trouble with diplomacy is
that you have to deal with the situation as it is, and can never say
we should have done something else twenty years ago.

What we are dealing with is a Soviet policy, exploiting the Arab
sense of grievance at the existence of Israel, and designed to radi-
calize the moderate Arab states, split Europe from America, destroy
NATO, and bring the whole arc from Morocco to Iran under Soviet control.
Their plan failed in 1967. They have now spent six years, and untold
billions of dollars, in arming, training, and directing the Arab armies
for Der Tag -- October 6, 1973. They have made progress. The only force
which frustrated the Soviets thus far is the brilliance of the Israeli
army, and the determined and effective diplomacy of the United
States.

The best cure I can think of now, both to protect our immense
interests in the Middle East and to repair the damage to alliance rela-
tions, is indicated in the enclosed Resolution which the Atlantic Council
of the United States passed last Thursday, with the strong support of
Pete Collado, of Exxon. A quick peace, fully backed by all the allies,
is the only hope for the oil states, and for all of us. Peace in terms
of the 1967 Resolution should help convince Egypt and even Syria that
their adventures with the Soviets have brought them nothing but tragedy,
and that they have no real choice but to turn back to us.

The French Ambassador yesterday stressed that where there is a real
threat to the alliance, solidarity must be restored. He stressed that
they could support Resolution 242 if only insubstantial boundary changes
are involved. I assured him that that was indeed the American position,
according to public statements by LBJ (September, 1968) and Rogers.

If our government has failed in consultations, the European govern-
ments, and especially yours, should now vigorously take the lead to
develop and sustain a clear-cut NATO position in the U.N. and elsewhere,
about how and on what terms peace is to be attained and assured.

I cannot exaggerate how much good could be done by such an initiative,
both substantively and for alliance relations.

The prospects for a settlement are indeed better than they have ever
been, because we got the Russians to agree to the Third paragraph of the

Sir Frank Roberts

3

October 31, 1973

October 22 Resolution, after the Egyptians and Syrians had been beaten in the field. We simply must not fail this time to see it through.

Should I talk to these themes in London next month? As you know, my style is not that of George Ball. I rather think I could do some good by tackling the issues head on, after my own fashion.

What is your advice?

I have no word yet from van Schendel about the post-Amsterdam meeting. It remains nearly impossible for me to go to Paris in two weeks, although I am inclined to reconsider in view of the gravity of the situation.

Could you ask Alan to squeeze an answer out of van Schendel and Hallostein?

With warm regards,

Yours, as always,

EVR/dhw

Enclosures

bcc: The Honorable Joseph Sisco

western union

MESSAGE CONFIRMATION COPY

ATTN DOROTHY WILENSKI YALE LAW SCHOOL
127 WALL ST
NEW HAVEN CT 06520

377

INTL LT TDNT NEW HAVEN CT 49 10-31 1124A EST
INT LT SIR FRANK ROBERTS 1973
25 KENSINGTON CT GARDENS
LONDONW85QF (ENGLAND)

STRONGLY URGED BRITISH LEADERSHIP IN EUROPEAN INITIATIVE TO ACHIEVE
ALLiance SOLIDARITY ON NEXT STAGES OF MIDDLE EASTERN PEACE EFFORTS
AS BEST AND ONLY CURF FOR EUROPEAN AMERICAN SPLIT WHICH IS BECOMING
MORE DANGEROUS EVERYDAY STOP LETTER FOLLOWS STOP

REGARDS ROSTOW

COL 25

WU 5184 (11-72)

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Miss JANE PICKER raised a question about third-party rights in treaty law. She recalled claims by Soviet jurists that space-spying was contrary to international law. The Chicago Air Convention was cited as requiring permission for overflights. They also argued that requirement of permission was imposed by customary international law. Formally, this raises the question whether a non-signatory can claim treaty rights, whether the provisions are also customary law or not, that can be enforced.

Dr. ROSENNE noted that the whole topic of treaties and third states had been closely examined by the International Law Commission, and its proposals had been incorporated in the Vienna Convention. At the same time, Articles 38 and 43, as well as the preamble to the Vienna Convention, contained general reservations on the difficult question of the relations between treaty law and customary international law.

The CHAIRMAN thereupon declared the session adjourned.

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SECOND SESSION

Friday, April 24, 1970, at 8:15 p.m.

# The United Nations and Legal Aspects of the Search for Peace in the Middle East

The session convened at 8:15 o'clock p.m. in the Jade Room of the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. Professor ROGER D. FISHER of the Harvard Law School presided and introduced the speakers.

## LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By Eugene V. Rostow •

The topic set for the discussion tonight—legal aspects of the search for peace in the Middle East—must of course be examined, like any other legal problem, in the context of history and policy. The processes of politics which have been at work in the Middle East for more than sixty years make the famous Near Eastern Question of the nineteenth century seem like a children's game. The Near East has in fact plagued world politics for centuries. Disraeli's celebrated remark could have been made by nearly all his predecessors, and by all his successors. Over and over again, local rivalries, conflicts and enmities, bitter in themselves, have become irreconcilable when linked to the conflicting aspirations and fears of world Powers.

Since the focal point of our concern is the present and the future, I shall do no more than recall the break-up of the Turkish Empire, and the rise of Zionism and of Arab nationalism, during the first World War; the dissolution of French and British security positions, during and after the second World War; the emergence of Soviet ambition in the area, and its connection first with the Zionist cause, as a device to drive the British out of the Eastern Mediterranean, and then with the Arab dream of destroying Israel, as the catalyst for transformations greatly in its interest; and the special rôle of the United Nations in the creation of Israel in 1947, and in the wars and controversies which have swirled around it ever since.

Against this background, and that of customary international law, the effort to achieve a condition of peace in the Middle East—or at least a condition of peace between Israel and its neighbors—is taking place within a sharply defined legal framework. Three sets of documents are of primary importance in delineating that framework: the Armistice Agreements of 1949;¹ the Cease-Fire Resolutions of the Security Council, of June,

• Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs, Yale University.

¹ 42 U.N. Treaty Series 303, No. 656 (1949) (with Jordan); *ibid.*, 327, No. 657 (1949) (with Syria); *ibid.*, 251, No. 654 (1949) (with Egypt); *ibid.*, 287, No. 655 (1949) (with Lebanon).

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65

1967; ² and the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.³ Other documents and rules of law are germane—the Tripartite Declaration of 1950,⁴ for example, and successor statements, including the Eisenhower Middle East Resolution of March 9, 1957, which was amended and reaffirmed in 1961; ⁵ the Security Council resolutions on belligerency, the Suez Canal, and many other subjects; and the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea.⁶ But the three documents I first listed dominate the problem, because they represent and embody rare moments of agreement on basic issues, made by the parties, and supported by the great Powers.

In view of my involvement in these problems for a time as an official of our Government, let me make explicit what will in any event be plain: that I shall take a position here which represents not only my personal and professional opinions, but those of American policy as well—American policy, be it said, increasingly conscious of Soviet penetration of the Middle East, and necessarily concerned to prevent Soviet hegemony.

I shall start, if I may, with Security Council Resolution No. 242, of November 22, 1967, for I consider it to be primary. That resolution was achieved after more than five months of intensive diplomatic effort on the part of the United States, Great Britain, Denmark, Canada, and a number of other countries. The history of that effort gives the text a very plain meaning indeed.

It will be recalled that when large-scale hostilities erupted on June 5, 1967, the Soviet Union blocked American cease-fire proposals for several days, until it realized what was happening in the field. Then, when the Cease-Fire Resolutions were finally in place, a major diplomatic campaign, extending around the world, was brought into focus first in the Security Council; then in the General Assembly; then at Glassboro; and finally back in the Security Council.

A number of positions emerged. Their interplay, and the resolution of that interplay, is reflected in the resolution itself.

The Soviet Union and its chief Arab associates wished to have Israel declared the aggressor and required, under Chapter VII if possible, to withdraw to the Armistice Demarcation Lines as they stood on June 5th, in exchange for the fewest possible assurances ⁷: that after withdrawal, Israeli maritime rights in the Strait of Tiran would be "no problem" (sometimes the same thought was expressed about the Suez Canal as well); and that after Israeli withdrawal the possibility could be discussed of a document that might be filed with the Secretary General, or of a Security Council resolution, that would finally end any possibility of claiming that a "state of belligerency" existed between Israel and her neighbors.

² Security Council Res. 233, 234, 235, 236 (1967); 62 A.J.I.L. 303-304 (1968).

³ Security Council Res. 242 (1967); 62 A.J.I.L. 482 (1968).

⁴ 22 Dept. of State Bulletin 886 (1950).

⁵ 71 Stat. 5, P.L. 87-5, March 9, 1957; 75 Stat. 463, P.L. 87-195, Sept. 4, 1961.

⁶ 15 U. S. Treaties 1606, T.I.A.S., No. 5639; 516 U.N. Treaty Series 205; 52 A.J.I.L. 834 (1958).

⁷ See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV.1351, pp. 21-27, June 8, 1967.

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The Israeli position was that the Arab governments had repudiated the Armistice Agreements of 1949 by going to war; that the parties should meet alone, and draw up a treaty of peace; and that until negotiations for that purpose began, Israel would not weaken its bargaining position by publicly revealing its peace aims, although the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister did state publicly and officially that Israel had no territorial claims as such, but was interested in the territorial problem only insofar as issues of security and maritime rights, and, of course, the problem of Jerusalem, were concerned. Meanwhile, Israel began its administration of Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and Sinai as the occupying Power under the Cease-Fire Resolutions, justifying its policies "at the municipal level," and without annexations, in the perspective of that branch of international law.⁸

The United States, Canada, most of the West European and Latin American nations, and a large number of nations from other parts of the world, supported a different approach, which ultimately prevailed.

In view of the taut circumstances of May and June, 1967, no majority could be obtained, either in the Security Council or the General Assembly, to declare Israel the aggressor. The question of who fired the first shot, difficult enough to resolve in itself, had to be examined as part of a sequence of Byzantine complexity: the false reports of Israeli mobilization against Syria; the removal of U.N.E.F. forces from the Sinai and the Gaza Strip; the closing of the Strait of Tiran; the mobilization of Arab forces around Israel, and the establishment of a unified command; and the cycle of statements, propaganda, speeches and diplomatic efforts which marked the final weeks before June 5. Before that mystery, sober opinion refused to reach the conclusion that Israel was the aggressor. No serious attempt was made to obtain a resolution declaring the United Arab Republic to be the aggressor.

Secondly, the majority opinion both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council supported the American view, first announced on June 5, 1967,⁹ and stated more fully on June 19, 1967,¹⁰ that after twenty bitter and tragic years of "war," "belligerency," and guerrilla activity in the Middle East, the quarrel had become a burden to world peace, and that the world community should finally insist on the establishment of a condition of peace, flowing from the agreement of the parties.

Third, the experience of the international community with the understandings which ended the Suez Crisis of 1956-1957 led to the conclusion that Israel should not be required to withdraw from the cease-fire lines

⁸ Stone, No Peace-No War in the Middle East 7-20 (1969); E. Lauterpacht, Jerusalem and the Holy Places 50-51 (1968); McNair and Watts, The Legal Effects of War, Ch. 17 (1966); Gutteridge, "The Protection of Civilians in Occupied Territory," The Yearbook of World Affairs 290 (1951); Stone, The Middle-East under Cease Fire 10-13 (1967); Gazit, Israel's Policy in the Administered Territories (1969); Government of Israel, Two Years of Military Government, 1967-1969, (1969).

⁹ 56 Dept. of State Bulletin 949-953 (1967).

¹⁰ President Johnson, "Principles for Peace in the Middle East," 57 Dept. of State Bulletin 31 (1967).

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except as part of a firm prior agreement which dealt with all the major issues in the controversy: justice for the refugees; guarantees of security for Israel's border, and her maritime rights in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal; a solution for Jerusalem which met the legitimate interests of Jordan and of Israel, and of the three world religions which regard Jerusalem as a Holy City; and the establishment of a condition of peace.

In 1957, in deference to Arab sensitivity about seeming publicly to "recognize" Israel, to "negotiate" with Israel, or to make "peace" with Israel, the United States took the lead in negotiating understandings which led to the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai, and the stationing of U.N.E.F. forces along the Sinai border, in the Gaza Strip, and at Sharm-el-Sheikh. The terms of that understanding were spelled out in a carefully planned series of statements made by the governments both in their capitals, and before the General Assembly. Egyptian commitments of the period were broken one by one, the last being the request for the removal of U.N.E.F., and the closing of the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping in May, 1967. That step, it was clear from the international understandings of 1957, justified Israeli military action under Article 51 as an act of self-defense.¹¹

Fourth, while the majority approach always linked Israeli withdrawal to the establishment of a condition of peace through an agreement among the parties which would also resolve long-standing controversies about the refugees, maritime rights, and Jerusalem, the question remained, "To what boundaries should Israel withdraw?" On this issue, the American position was sharply drawn, and rested on a critical provision of the Armistice Agreements of 1949. Those agreements provided in each case that the Armistice Demarcation Line "is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims or positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question."¹² Many other provisions of each Agreement make it clear that the purpose of the Armistice was "to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine" and that all such non-military "rights, claims, or interests" were subject to "later settlement" by agreement of the parties, as part of the transition from armistice to peace.¹³ These paragraphs, which were put into the agreements at Arab insistence, were the legal foundation for the controversies over the wording of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Security Council Resolution 242, of November 22, 1967.¹⁴

¹¹ Many of the critical documents appear in Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East, September, 1956-June, 1957 (1957, esp. pp. 332-342; United States Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East," prepared by the Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service (1967, rev. ed., 1969). See also H. Finer, Dulles over Suez (1964), Chs. 17 and 18.

¹² 42 U.N. Treaty Series, 256, Art. V, par. 2 (1949).

¹³ *Ibid*., Preamble, p. 252; Art. I, p. 252; Art. IV, par. 3, p. 256; Art. XI and Art. XII, p. 268.

¹⁴ "The Security Council . . .

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That resolution, promulgated under Chapter VI of the Charter, finally received the unanimous support of the Council. It was backed in advance by the assurance of the key countries that they would accept the resolution and work with Ambassador Jarring to implement it.

It is important to recall what the resolution requires. It calls upon the parties to reach "a peaceful and accepted" agreement which would definitively settle the Arab-Israeli controversy, and establish conditions of "just and lasting peace" in the area in accordance with the "provisions and principles" stated in the resolution. The agreement required by paragraph 3 of the resolution, the Security Council said, should establish "secure and recognized boundaries" between Israel and its neighbors "free from threats or acts of force," to replace the Armistice Demarcation Lines established in 1949, and the cease-fire lines of June, 1967. The Israeli armed forces should withdraw to such lines, as part of a comprehensive agreement, settling all the issues mentioned in the resolution, and in a condition of peace.

On this point, the American position has been the same under both the Johnson and the Nixon Administrations. The new and definitive political boundaries should not represent "the weight of conquest," both Administrations have said; on the other hand, under the policy and language of the Armistice Agreements of 1949, and of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, they need not be the same as the Armistice Demarcation Lines.¹⁵ The walls and machine guns that divided Jerusalem need not be restored. And adjustments can be made by agreement, under paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 242, to guarantee maritime rights "through international waterways in the area," and, equally, to guarantee "the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones."¹⁶

"(1) Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

"(2) Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones."

¹⁵ Speech by President Johnson, Sept. 10, 1968, 59 Dept. of State Bulletin 348 (1968); Speech by Secretary Rogers, Dec. 9, 1969, 62 Dept. of State Bulletin 7 (1970).

¹⁶ See note 14 above.

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This is the legal significance of the omission of the word "the" from paragraph 1 (i) of the resolution, which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces "from territories occupied in the recent conflict," and not "from the territories occupied in the recent conflict." Repeated attempts to amend this sentence by inserting the word "the" failed in the Security Council. It is therefore not legally possible to assert that the provision requires Israeli withdrawal from all the territories now occupied under the Cease-Fire Resolutions to the Armistice Demarcation Lines.

This aspect of the relationship between the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, and the Armistice Agreements of 1949 likewise explains the reference in the resolution to the rather murky principle of "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war."<sup>17</sup> Whatever the full implications of that obscure idea may be, it would clearly permit the territorial adjustments and special security provisions called for by the Security Council resolution<sup>18</sup> and the Armistice Agreements of 1949.

The resolution provided that the Secretary General should appoint a representative to consult with the parties, and assist them in reaching the agreement required by paragraph 3 of the resolution.

I might add a word on the much mooted question of who has "accepted" the resolution. As I indicated earlier, this is not a real issue, since the key parties to the hostilities had given advance assurances that they would co-operate with the Secretary General's representative to promote the agreement called for by the resolution. Shortly after Ambassador Jarring had begun his consultations in the area, however, the question emerged, in the form of Arab insistence that Israel indicate its "acceptance" of the resolution, or its "implementation" of the agreement, before discussions could proceed. One version of these proposals would be that Israel withdraw to the Armistice Demarcation Lines, as they stood on June 4, 1967, in advance of negotiations on any other problems of the resolution. This position, of course, would violate the text of the resolution, and the experience of broken promises which the text reflects.

A good deal of the diplomatic history of this problem is reported in Foreign Minister Eban's comprehensive speech to the General Assembly on October 8, 1968.<sup>19</sup> The Israeli position is summarized in the statement of May 1, 1968, made to the Security Council by the Israeli Permanent Representative to the United Nations:

> In declarations and statements made publicly and to Mr. Jarring, my Government has indicated its acceptance of the Security Council resolution for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace. I am also authorized to reaffirm that we are willing to seek agreement with each Arab State on all matters included in that resolution.

On May 31, 1968, Foreign Minister Eban reiterated this statement in the Israeli Parliament.

17 Security Council Res. 242 (1967), Preamble.

18 See S. M. Schwebel, "What Weight to Conquest?", 64 A.J.I.L. 344 (1970).

19 U.N. General Assembly, 230th Plenary Session, p. 1686.

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Corresponding statements have been made publicly and privately by other parties to the conflict, but without specific reference to the requirement of "agreement" in paragraph 3 of the resolution. The Government of the United Arab Republic has repeatedly said that it accepts the resolution as requiring "a package deal," but it has thus far rejected procedures for consultation and negotiation accepted by other parties to the conflict.

There is great skepticism among the parties: a skepticism altogether natural against the background of more than twenty years of history. The Arabs fear that Israel has no intention of withdrawing, even to secure and recognized boundaries; Israel fears that the Arabs have no intention of making peace.

But Israel has said repeatedly and officially that it has no territorial claims as such; that its sole interest in the territorial problem is to assure its security, and to obtain viable guarantees of its maritime rights; and that, even on the difficult issue of Jerusalem, it is willing to stretch its imagination in the interest of accommodating Jordanian and international interests in the Holy City.

These assurances by Israel have been the foundation and the predicate of the American position in the long months since June, 1967. If the Arabs are skeptical of Israeli professions, their remedy is obvious: put them to the test of negotiation. They could be sure, as Prime Minister Golda Meir remarked the other day, that the position of the United States in the negotiating process would come more than half way to meet their claims.

To this point, however, it has proved impossible to initiate the final stages of the processes of consultation and negotiation which are necessary to the fulfillment of the resolution. The reason for the stalemate is simple. The Government of the United Arab Republic has refused to implement the resolution. And thus far it has been backed in that posture by the Soviet Union. President Nasser could not long persist in this stand against the will of the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, and in the nature of Arab opinion, no other party to the conflict can move towards peace.

In this connection, Secretary Rogers' recent comment is illuminating. He stated:

> We have never suggested any withdrawal until there was a final, binding, written agreement that satisfied all aspects of the Security Council resolution.

> In other words, we have never suggested that a withdrawal occur before there was a contractual agreement entered into by the parties, signed by the parties in each other's presence, an agreement that would provide full assurances to Israel that the Arabs would admit that Israel had a right to exist in peace.

> Now, that is what has been lacking in the past. The Arabs have never been willing to do that; and if that could be done, we think it would be a tremendous boon to the world.

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Now, we have also provided that the security arrangements would be left to the parties to negotiate, such as Sharm-al-Shaykh, and the Gaza Strip, the demilitarized zone, and so forth.²⁰

It is easy to understand the Soviet position, and that of the United Arab Republic, in terms of a policy of political and military expansion which threatens not only Israel, but Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the states of the Persian Gulf. It is not, however, a posture easy to reconcile with the terms and purposes of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

## THE MIDDLE EASTERN CRISIS

By *Quincy Wright* *

There have been periodic crises in the Middle East since history began, notably since the chosen people, heeding the voice from the burning bush, escaped Egyptian persecution by invading the land of the Canaanites. Egyptian, Hittite, Assyrian, Persian, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, and Crusader remains, as well as evidences of Turkish, French, British, Arab, and Jewish occupations in more recent times, attest these struggles. The present crisis began with the Balfour Declaration during World War I, while Britain and the Arabs were fighting Turkey. It assured a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.

Under the British Mandate which affirmed the Declaration and also the rights of the Arab people, there was comparative tranquillity for a decade. The Jewish population increased from eleven to eighteen percent in the predominantly Arab state, but the advent of Hitler induced large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine until the Jews were over thirty percent of the population. This caused serious anxiety among the Arabs, sporadic hostilities, a Zionist demand for a Jewish state and, in 1947, a British declaration that it would withdraw and turn the problem over to the United Nations. A General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, partitioned Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an international state of Jerusalem, all to be closely related economically.

The Arabs refused to accept partition, which seemed to violate Article 80 of the United Nations Charter protecting the rights of the “peoples” of Palestine under the Mandate. The Jews prepared to occupy the area awarded to them, the Arabs resisted. Israel was recognized by the United States, the Soviet Union and other states in May, 1948. Hostilities ensued, half a million Arabs fled from Israel, United Nations mediator Count Bernadotte was assassinated by Jewish terrorists, and armistices were concluded in 1949, through the mediation of Ralph Bunche who had succeeded Count Bernadotte, along the existing occupation lines giving Israel fifty

²⁰ 62 Dept. of State Bulletin 218-219 (1970).

* University of Virginia.

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percent more territory than that awarded by the partition resolution, including the western area of Jerusalem. Israel was admitted to the United Nations on May 11, 1949.

The Arabs considered themselves in a state of war with Israel and closed the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. The Armistice was imperfectly observed. Arab "Fedayeen" raids and Israeli retaliations often came before the United Nations. In 1956 Israel sought further increase in its territory and, supported by an Anglo-French invasion of the Suez area to protect the Canal, invaded Sinai allegedly for security and opening of the waterways to its shipping. The United Nations General Assembly, after the British and French had vetoed a Security Council resolution, approved a resolution supported by the United States and the Soviet Union, insisting on the Charter principle prohibiting use or threat of force in international relations against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and demanding withdrawal of Israeli, British, and French forces from the territories they had occupied. These withdrawals were effected after Egypt had agreed to the stationing at its discretion of a United Nations force on its side of the Israeli-Egyptian armistice line. Israel had refused to allow the force on its side of the line and had been assured of the right to navigate through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to its port of Eilat at the end of the Gulf. The United Nations had in 1952 unsuccessfully asserted the right of Israel to free navigation in the Suez Canal.

Although these arrangements maintained comparative tranquillity for ten years, the Arabs continued to maintain that they were in a state of war with Israel, there were occasional raids and retaliations across the armistice lines, and in the spring of 1967 President Nasser of Egypt closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, moved forces into Sinai alleging that Israel was preparing for an attack on Nasser's ally, Syria, and told the United Nations that it must withdraw its force from the border. Secretary General U Thant acquiesced in this demand after Israel had again refused to permit the force to go to its side of the border. Some members of the force had been killed in border hostilities and India had said that it would withdraw its contingent from the force in any case.

In June, Israel, claiming that Egypt's actions and preparations for military attack by both Egypt and Syria indicated aggressive intent, although Nasser had said he would not initiate hostilities, invaded Sinai, destroyed the Egyptian air force, occupied the Gaza Strip and Sinai, and also the Golan Heights in Syria, the West Bank of the Jordan, and Jordan Jerusalem. The Security Council promptly passed Cease-Fire Resolutions which were finally accepted by Israel and the Arabs, leaving Israel in occupation of more than twice the territory it had been occupying under the Armistices of 1949. The General Assembly met in July and passed a resolution calling upon Israel not to take any action which would change the status of Jerusalem. This was in response to Israel's law of June 27 extending "the operation of Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to the eastern part of Jerusalem," generally interpreted to imply "annexation."

December 17, 1973

# THE ISSUES AT GENEVA

## I. Introduction

The purpose of this memorandum is to identify and discuss the principal issues likely to arise at the Geneva Conference on peace in the Middle East, from the point of view of the national interests of the United States.

The fact that the Geneva Conference has been called is an important achievement of American diplomacy, as well as of Israeli arms. The United States has sought to bring such a conference about since 1949. The idea has been anathema to the Arab states, and has been opposed by Soviet diplomacy since the middle fifties.

Until now, the Arabs have pursued a policy of "no peace with Israel, no recognition, and no negotiations," in order to keep alive the possibility of undoing what they regard as the injustice of the Balfour Declaration, the Palestine Mandate, and the subsequent development of Israel as a state. In the vocabulary of Middle Eastern diplomacy, "peace," "Geneva," "conference," and "negotiations" have been forbidden words, for which diplomats had to find ambiguous substitutes.

The Arab states have been able to sustain this position only because the Soviet Union has effectively intervened in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and used it as an instrument of Soviet expansion in the area. Exploiting Arab hostility to the existence of Israel as a catalyst, the Soviet Union prepared the Arab states for war in 1967 and 1973, in order to radicalize the moderate Arab states, divide Europe from the United States, and outflank and neutralize NATO itself. Soviet policy in the Middle East

THE ISSUES AT GENEVA

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represents a mortal threat to the basic security interests of Europe and
the United States. It has been frustrated thus far only by the brilliance
of Israeli arms, backed by the staunch and thus far effective diplomacy
of the United States, both in 1967 and in 1973. Obviously, if the Soviet
Union offers the Arabs the glittering hope of destroying Israel, they
cannot in the nature of Arab politics elect the course of peace.

The Geneva Conference is being convened pursuant to the Security
Council Resolution of October 22, 1973, invoking a cease-fire in the
fighting which began with the Arab attack on Israel of October 6, 1973.
The third paragraph of that Resolution, upon which the United States
insisted as the indispensable condition for any cease-fire, is a "decision"
of the United Nations, binding on all members under the Charter. It
requires the parties forthwith to negotiate a just and durable peace,