# Old Goalie Makes Big Leagues

## This Morning

By Dave Kindred

Henry Kissinger

Naturally, Kissinger was asked about the Redskinettes, who were ordered under cover of their old truck driver uniforms after a week of skin. Kissinger is, after all, the world diplomat who once explained the phenomenon of a pudgy Harvard prof passing as a sex symbol by saying, "Power is the ultimate aphrodisiac." It would be a grievous fault, indeed, to have Kissinger in hand and ignore the navel crisis precipitated by the Redskinettes three weeks ago.

"It seemed," he was told, "that your diplomatic skills might have been needed to resolve the affair."

A chuckle from the chairman here.

"I'm afraid I would have gone the other way in the decision," Kissinger said.

See KINDRED, D16, Col. 1

"As a kid I was, to the despair of my father, a wild soccer fan," Henry Kissinger said yesterday.

"I used to hide soccer magazines under my studies. When my father was out of the room, I would read the soccer magazines. My father always said, 'Henry, if you continue along this line, you will come to no good end.'"

Kissinger sighed.

"And now I have fulfilled my father's prophecy."

Done with Harvard and LBJ, Rockefeller and Nixon, done with Vietnam and Cambodia, no longer entwined with Tina Louise, Kissinger three days ago was appointed chairman of the board of directors of America's major professional soccer league, the North American Soccer League.

He is quick to point out the job pays nothing and he really isn't running the league. But then, he doesn't have much time for anything beyond an advisory meeting once a month or so. It's just fun for a guy who used to be a goalkeeper.

That was in Germany. Until he broke his hand at age 8 or 10, Kissinger played in the goal. Then he became a forward. His family's flight from Nazi Germany ended his soccer career at 15. In the United States, he worked and went to night school, leaving little time for a headlong dash to no good end.

As it happened, however, he developed an interest in American sports and now identifies himself as "a sports fan in general." Yesterday he pronounced the Redskins "very, very good," saying, "They have a much more imaginative offense than before."

D 16

Sunday, October 3, 1978

THE WASHINGTON POST

# Kissinger Sees U.S. a Soccer Power

KINDRED, From D1

But we disgress Soccer talk to-
day...

"As goalie, how good were you?"
Kissinger was asked.

"When..."

Suddenly, Kissinger's dog, Tyler,
set up a barking clamor that must
have ruined a KGB agent's ears some-
where.

"Excuse me," Kissinger said, "my dog has seen a squirrel." And the former secretary of state, a man who bestrode the world, leaped off in pursuit of his squirrel-crazed hound.

"Stop it," Kissinger directed Tyler,
and, amazingly enough, Tyler stopped
it.

Returning to his seat, Kissinger
said, "I tell you, I'm never going to
get killed by an invasion of squirrels.
Tyler hates squirrels."

We were appraising the old goalie,
the young Henry Kissinger.

"When I was goalie," he said, "they
were high-scoring games."

Another small chuckle.

"To put it kindly..."

A pause here while Kissinger
searched for the proper phrase.

"... to put it kindly, my commitment was in excess of my ability."

Happily for soccer, Kissinger's com-
mitment to developing the game in
the United States is as real as his itch
to play it as a kid. On his own, he
has attended three World Cups and,
while working, he has sought out soccer
matches all over the world. He
is, truly, a fan, and his devotion to
soccer was so obvious that the American
league's officials figured, what
the heck, let's ask him to help us.

Kissinger was delighted.

"Owners kept calling on me to get
an opinion on a number of things,
particularly in relation to international soccer," Kissinger said. "So
some of them suggested I join the
board of directors. I thought it was a
joke."

"It is definitely not a case of 'let's
get Kissinger in and get some publicity,'" said Steve Danzansky, president of the Washington Diplomats of the NASL. "It evolved out of two
years' consultation with Dr. Kissin-

ger. We simply found out how much he knows. He will help us in several areas, such as planning: how we proceed with TV, what our national image is, how we make gains internationally."

Kissinger says he hopes the United
States will become competitive in
world soccer competition. By 1990,
he said, the World Cup ought to be
played here.

"First, I would like for the sport to
become a major sport in America
with mostly American players," he
said. To that end, he hopes the best
athletes turn to soccer.

"But what about the glamor-money
sports?" he was asked. "How can
soccer ever draw the best athletes
when baseball, basketball and football
offer so much money and soccer,
in relative terms, so little?"

"It is really a question of what they play in school," Kissinger said. "And I do not think it is really competitive in that way."

"There are enough good athletes for everything. This country is the best in every sport, in baseball and football and basketball. It just doesn't seem possible we wouldn't be among the best in soccer."

Lest Edward Bennett Williams sell
away Kissinger's seat at RFK, the
old goalie quickly added that he
doesn't intend that soccer replace
football.

"Football is a tremendous game.
Like most American games, it is
rather intellectual. In soccer, it is
obvious what is going on. American
games, like baseball and football,
get rather complicated. Soccer is a
continuous flow of action, also, while
in football you get controlled, violent
action in a limited period of time. I
think football is tremendous."

Some of that football action, whether violent or not, is one thing Kissinger would like to see in professional soccer.

"The game has become too defensive," he said. "When I was a kid, the scores were about twice as large as they are now. They were like 5-2 and 4-2. Now scores are 1-0 and 2-1. What the NASL has tried to do with some rules that go against interna-

tional rules (injury, timeouts, substitutions, shootouts) is open it up a bit.

"I know Prince Rainier from
Monaco, who is active in soccer in
France, has been pushing for rules
to help the offense."

One thing more. The NASL announced three days ago that Kissinger purchased an option to buy a franchise in the league. Might we soon see the Kissinger Kickers battling the Dips?

Nope. "Oh, I technically bought an option," Kissinger said, adding softly, "but right now all the teams are losing money."

Father Kissinger would be proud
of such restraint.

BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION
BROADCASTING HOUSE WHITELADIES ROAD BRISTOL BS8 2LR

TELEPHONE & TELEGRAMS BRISTOL 32211

LH

24th May, 1982

Suzanne MacFarlane,
Dr. Kissinger's Office,
Suite 1021,
International Club Building,
1800 K Street,
Washington D.C.
U.S.A.

Dear Ms MacFarlane,

After his interview with Bernard Levin, Dr. Kissinger requested a copy of the transcript of the programme - I have pleasure in enclosing one.

A conversation between BERNARD LEVIN
and DR. HENRY KISSINGER

BL
American history is largely made up of
individual success stories but there have
been few to compare with this one. The
man who arrived as an unknown youth, a
refugee from Nazi-ism and rose to become one
of the most powerful men in the land and to
help shape the course of modern history,
Henry Kissinger.

Was that the drive of your ambition, the
need to succeed in a land where you were
among strangers - it often has been, you'll
agree.

HK
Well, it was certainly an influence on my
life, but the idea of becoming Secretary of
State of a major political force in the
United States quite literally had never crossed
my mind, and even when I was appointed by
President Nixon when he invited me for an
interview after his election, indeed its
manner is to speak very elliptically, I
knew he had offered some position but I
didn't know which and I thought it was Head
of the Policy Planning Staff of the State
Department which was about five levels
below that of the Security Adviser so
whatever the impact of my youth, it did not
generate a drive towards high political office.

BL
What did you want first?
You, you had an academic career of course,
is that what you really wanted?

HK
I, er, when I came to the United States
I had to work in a shaving brush factory
because we had to go to night school even
for High School, and then for college

- 1 -

[lc]

so before the War my ambitions were
extremely modest, I was studying to be an
accountant, er, after the War when I
received a scholarship to go to Harvard
my ambition was to be a professor; I took
an interest in contemporary affairs, I had
always been interested in foreign policy
partly from an historical point of view,
partly from a contemporary point of view,
but quite literally until 1969 it never
occurred to me that I would be an actor,
let alone a principal actor, I had never
held a press conference of any sort until
1969.

BL
Well you seem to have taken to it very
naturally, I must say..

HK
Yes, I received a lot of credit for handling
the press with..skillfully, and people asked
me how I learned it..the fact is I simply
started, I didn't learn it.

BL
That historical background you spoke of a
moment ago clearly is also a very very
important part in your thinking isn't it?
It, er...and you always struck me as
having an almost Shakespearean horror of
anarchy and social disintegration, is that the
European background?

HK
Well, I think the horror of anarchy
and social disintegration derives in part
from my youth, having seen it and having
learned that societies can collapse
and civilisation can collapse. My original
plan in, for my academic writing was

- 2 -

[LC]

to deal with the nineteenth century up to the outbreak of World War I, about the construction of peace and the collapse of a peaceful order, that's why I started writing on Metternich but that was supposed to be the prelude to a long and extended series of works of the notions of international stability and the peace, derived more from my academic work, the consciousness that societies can take a very evil turn, and would have to ascribe to my youth...but Americans, and this separates me from many Americans who have never seen it, can't imagine it.

BL Yes, that's very clear, but um, at some point you must have seen that the great powerful figures of your historical studies were fascinating to you as men, Metternich, you mentioned Metternich, Bismark, Castlereagh, these are people you've written about, and clearly..I mean do you identify with any of them at all.....

HK That's usually said, but I don't identify.. how can I identify with Metternich... Rhenish aristocrat, speaking French, governing a German state...

BL Very cunning, very skilful and very successful.

HK Yes, the problems he had to deal with.

BL Right.

HK If one asks oneself how can one learn anything about international affairs, the only thing one can learn is really history, from history...it isn't an automatic

- 3 -

lesson, but the problem of equilibrium, er
the problem of what it is worth fighting for,
er, not the content, but the fact that there
has to be something and the impact of
personality on events, these are all, can be
studied in history, and one of the most
fascinating aspects is the relationship of
personalities on events because each,
all contemporaries have the same information
available to them, but in each generation
there are only a few who distil this into
a perception of the future, and..but what
the limits of this are and how you reconcile
this with democracy, this is a big
philosophical problem for our period.

BL

Were there any people, any individuals who
influenced you enough to shape your thinking..
I don't mean the historical figures, but
teachers, mentors, did you have any?

HK

Yes, I er, I had one, somebody picked me
up when I was a military service aide, a
man totally unknown called Fritz Kraemer,
er, German origin, but not Jewish, he did
not have to leave, he left; extremely
conservative but I met him in the Army when
I was 18 and he said to me 'You have a
first class political mind, you ought to use
it', which had never occurred to me
at the time, and he took a great interest in
me...he has since disavowed me because he
thinks I am too flexible in negotiations with
the Soviet Union and he is an extreme,
an extremely hard line and rigid on this
subject, but he was a great influence on my
life. There's a Professor at Harvard, a
Professor Elliott who er ...helped influence

- 4 -

[LC]

my interest in political theory, er and
in the political field there was
Nelson Rockefeller who was a very great
influence on teaching me something of the
intangibles of the political process, as
indeed the political process.. these were
major figures in my life.

BL

Well the figures, the historical figures
we've talked about a little, I
it's interesting that those great foxes
who ruled Europe for centuries, Richelieu
to Adenauer if you like,
it's a figure that really doesn't exist
in the United States, does it?

HK

That's right

BL

There have been great figures in the
United States but not that kind of er,
that kind of subtle mind, I suppose
that is shaped by centuries of history.

HK

Well, and also we never had the problems
of Europeans. Europeans lived with rather
narrow margins of safety - no British
statesman could afford to say let the
continent fall under the domination of a
major power, and we will then see whether it
has good-will towards us. Because if it
turned out that it didn't have good-will
towards Britain it would be too late for
Britain to react, so British
policy through centuries was to prevent the
continent from being dominated by a major
power regardless of what Britain thought

- 5 -

[lc]

of its domestic structure. Americans have had a much wider margin of safety, they could let the events happen and so Americans find it very hard to believe, to live in a world which has neither peace nor war, in which there is every problem, every problem you solve is an admission prize for someother difficulty, and this sense of continuity, this sense of ambiguity where the Soviet Union is both adversary and negotiating partner - it goes down very hard. The Liberals and Conservatives are both united in the proposition that there must be a terminal point. The Liberals believing that good will supplies its remedy, the Conservatives arguing that if only the trumpet is clear enough the walls of Jericho will collapse automatically and you're quite right it's this sense of complexity that Europeans have that doesn't exist in America.

BL It's a kind of - I don't use the word pejoratively, though it can be, it's a kind of innocence isn't it?

HK It's a kind of good innocence because it also leads to great efforts, every problem being believed to be soluable...

BL But then it must lead to repeated disappointment.

HK It leads to repeated disappointments, and I believe that in the next twenty years or so we will be driven to a more European

- 6 -

[LC]

approach to foreign policies simply
because we are no longer so predominant
in the world that we can wait for lack
of ambiguity, we must now act in complex
situations and therefore in a relativistic
way.

BL

You once said something, wrote something,
and you quoted a marvellous remark of
Bismark's that 'we must listen for the
footsteps of history and then try to
follow in them', well today...

HK

Well, what's even more complicated, he said
'if you listen carefully you can'...I don't
remember the exact phrase, you you can
'hear the rustle of the mantle of God
in the footsteps of history and if you
are fortunate you can get hold of a little
corner of it'.

BL

Well of course that is a perfect definition
of the European spirit we are talking about,
we you....can only just get hold of the corner
rather than grasp the whole thing....but
in fact if you look at the world today
and after all you've done a good
deal looking at the world today, um, there's
a terrible paradox here/in that if you look
at the Soviet Union, never mind the countries
of her Empire, here is a country which is
in every conceivable respect a catastrophe,
a country whose rulers can't feed their
own people, can't allow them the smallest
particles of liberty - we ought to be able,
in the West, to make rings round them;
the fact of the matter is the balance

- 7 -

[lc]

subtly and constantly, and with ups
and downs of course, tilts the other way,
why?

HK Because, er, it's not because the
Soviet Union has a diabolical master plan
for dominating the world as so many people
think...

BL O.K.

HK In fact, the Soviet Union operates as a
monolith and we are divided so in economic
negotiations, or most negotiations, they
can play off various part of the industrial
world, industrial democracies against
each other; second the Soviet Union, while
not brilliant in their diplomacy, is
extremely persistent, while the West, when
it has a position, whatever its position
is, after six months of deadlock you will
get ideas that the deadlock has to be broken
by some Western initiative, so that the
Soviets can collect concessions over an
extended period of time whose cumulative
effect is significant even if any one of
them is marginal, er, the Soviet successes,
such as they are, are really a reflection
of the spiritual exhaustion of the West;
it ought to be possible, intellectually it
will never be explicable, why the countries
that had all the resources could not
combine for long enough to bring about
a major negotiation, and when we speak of
long enough we are speaking not of twenty
years, we are speaking of maybe five
years, there is a leadership struggle
inevitably coming in the Soviet Union

- 8 -

[Lc]

it must be about priorities, it can't
be about anything else, and it must be
between those who think they can have
everything and aggressive foreign policy
and economic co-operation with the West,
and those who think other priorities must
be set. That we cannot influence this
is really a criticism of our own...of the
tendency to put immediate domestic
considerations before even the medium range
perspective.

BL Well, not only can we not influence it,
we seem to be unable, in a position, unable
to take advantage of it even...

HK That's right...

BL Well then you see you...

HK ...the Soviet Union needs us to feed its
party line

BL Right

HK It needs our credit and it needs our
technology..

BL Yours anyway..

HK And its, so it is inexplicable that we
deal with this as a strictly market
phenomenon...more than that, in fact if
we dealt with it as a market phenomenon

- 9 -

[LC]

we'd be all right, but we extend credits
to enable the Soviet Union to do what it
can never do for itself.

BL Is this the price of detente then, are
we paying...

HK No I think it isn't the price of detente,
it is something, it is the price of not
understanding that, because the opposite
of detente er...comes from confrontation,
leads to the laws of public support and
to constant crises in the domestic
structures, what is needed is a willingness
to resist Soviet expansionism where it occurs,
to be very tough towards Soviet aggressiveness
but to put before the Soviets in some
negotiation: a vision of the world that they
can have if they stay within their own borders
and if they agree to major disarmament
agreements, but nobody has been willing to do
this and detente tends to be interpreted as
a kind of psycho-therapy where you, where
the mere fact that you talked to the Soviets,
regardless of content, is supposed to supply
its own calming tendencies; that version of
detente is of course dangerous, but that
there must be some diplomatic contact with
the Soviet Union if we had confidence in
ourselves and some notion of what we
want to build, I think it would not only be
manageable but it is essential.

BL There's a very good symbol of the
failure you've been speaking about in
the present, very rapidly, as far as I can
see, very rapidly growing um...the

- 10 -

[LC]

movement for unilateral disarmament,
nuclear disarmament, does that worry you..
I mean... fundamentally, obviously it must..

HK

...we are rapidly moving into a position where the defense of the West is based on nuclear weapons because no Government has wanted to make the efforts for another strategy, the populations are being assailed by nuclear pacifism, conventional forces are not being built up, that must lead to a catastrophe somewhere down the road.

BL

Well there's a ...

HK

This is in effect unilateral disarmament even though the appeals are theoretically directed to both sides, they are not heard on the other side..

BL

In practise that is obviously so, but then that seems to be a spectacular forgetfullness of the lessons of history, and lessons of very modern history at that.

HK

I would have to say that one of the... it, that, it is not the result of detente as such because one of the reasons there has been impetus given is because it was believed by many well meaning people that we in America were too callous on the question of nuclear war and engaged in too easy confrontation of rhetoric, so we probably could have

- 11 -

[L]

pre-empted some of this agitation by
putting forward complete proposals earlier,
something we are now rectifying.

BL Um, um. You said once that Vietnam
taught America that while her power was
infinite, ..power was great, it was not
infinite.

HK Yes.

BL Now what's been the result of that hard
learned lesson in that respect?

HK Well unfortunately the lesson has not
been learned as a hard lesson, the lesson
has been simplified in our domestic debate
between those because those who opposed
the War in Vietnam had turned it totally
into a moral issue about the criminal, or
at least psychiatrically unbalanced
propensities of those who found themselves
having to conduct the war. This of course
begs the principal question. The people
who entered the war, who preceded the
administration which I served had perfectly
rational and even moral motives, in the
tradition of American foreign policy of
resisting aggression they did not
calculate as they should have, the
relationship of means to ends, and there's
no doubt that they resisted an evil system
but they staked more and they were not
willing to risk enough than was good for
our world position, but that aspect
of the Vietnam War, the relation of ends
to means, when American military powers
should be at stake, that is being drowned

- 12 -

[LC]

out in that shrill debate on strictly moralistic issues as if it were a question of the personal evil of a whole succession of American leaders of both parties.

BL Could America go isolationist - not necessarily in a very dramatic way...

HK Yes, I think America could go isolationist... and er, in fact it's more isolationist today than it has been in my view in the entire post war period, because America has been isolationist in two modes either by claiming that it was morally too good for this world, or by claiming that it was not yet good enough to engage itself in this world, it must therefore concentrate on self-improvement and that second kind of isolationism is now the slogan of the radical opposition for example to the nuclear strategy and general orientation of foreign policy ; that coupled with disillusionment with European policies and Japanese policies to some extent could produce a kind of isolationism.

BL Well, looking at it from the European point of view obviously one of the things running through Europe like a bacillus at the moment is the ....

people wondering whether the United States would in fact risk herself to come to the aid of Europe in a really serious confrontation.

HK That is true, and part of the problem

- 13 -

[LC]

there is that the various NATO countries
for a variety of reasons have tied
themselves to a strategy that is
inherently less and less credible
but have not been willing to make the
sacrifices to develop a more terrible
strategy ...

BL Is that a failure of leadership?

HK I think it's a failure of leadership, yes.

BL Well it's a very serious one is it not?

HK It could be a catastrophic one because you
cannot make strategic nuclear war credible
by reaffirming the same slogans at every
NATO meeting, er and the result is these
mass demonstrations.

BL O.K., what can we do about it?

HK I think we have to tell the public what is
needed, somebody has to put before the
public that mass extermination is not a
strategy, that er the limitation of war is
the pre-condition of defence, but we
also have to explain to the public that if we
stigmatize nuclear weapons in all their
applications we, what ever our view on
conventional weapons, there will be an
interim period before we can build them
up, we will bring about a unilateral
disarmament that has two consequences.
One, it may encourage nuclear blackmail
by the other side if we are considered
to be that terrified, and secondly
it may create the impression that we would
rather be defeated by conventional weapons

- 14 -

[Lc]

than to resort to the other, to nuclear weapons, and history shows that to calculate a conventional balance concisely is nearly impossible, so on both of these grounds we need a stronger leadership in all of our countries to put up...I think in this respect the United States has done better than its allies.

BL

Do I take it then that you think the decision on the neutron bomb was a mistake?

HK

I think it was a mistake, yes. I don't understand the agitation about it, I don't understand the moral benefits of being incinerated on top of the other consequences which is the advantage of the non-neutron bomb. I mean nobody claims that they are more humane but there is this paradox that the liberal humane people seem to have developed a vested interest in the most awful theories of warfare because they don't trust their governments. They are afraid that if you give them any alternative that saves human lives they'll go to nuclear war so they write these scenarios as if killing 500million people or 300million people were the most natural form of deterrents and don't tolerate intellectually addressing means of limiting the dangers, of course its a difficult problem to limit it, and of course we should prefer conventional defence but we cannot disarm ourselves even if all nuclear weapons were destroyed, the guilty secret would remain in the minds of men and therefore deterrents of the factories would exist or the knowledge how to build the factories would exist. So it simply isn't possible, it, the problem of deterrents will be with us no matter what we do.

- 15 -

[lc]

BL You said, not long ago, that the age of the super powers is drawing to its end. What's going to follow?

HK Well,

BL What makes you so sure that's happening?

HK Well, like all general statements it has its limitations. I believe the complexity of the contemporary balance of power is that it is no longer a margin as it was in the 19th and early 20th Century. Then, military, economic and political power were more or less the same. Now in the military field the equilibrium is more or less determined by the super powers. But, they cannot impose their political will even on countries much weaker than they, so there are many more players in the political field and they are not the same. In the economic field you have yet a new group of players who are economically very powerful, like the OPEC countries, and yet can be militarilly, and even politically, extremely weak. So the statesman has always to know which of these various circus rings he is playing in and each has its own rules.

BL In the world that's coming then, is there a place for men like you? Well never mind men like you, for you. Do you, do you dream of returning to some kind of public office?

HK In America....

BL I can't believe, and I won't believe, even if you maintain it with mighty oaths, that you're content to spend the rest of your life writing books and giving lectures.

- 16 -

[Lc]

**HK** When you first leave office you go through a, at least I went through a considerable withdrawal period. Then there comes an intermediate period where you more or less consciously think of returning in some form. Finally, in America, you have to understand that there is nothing you can do about getting into office, and if you do aim for it as a central purpose of your life, you will destroy yourself. You will become totally opertunistic and you will really then constantly calculate to whom to attach youself. So I will have to tell you I am now conducting my life as if I will never return to office. Could it happen? In America it depends entirely on personalities. There is no normal way it can happen and no normal way it can be precluded. It depends who will be President, it depends what the perception of the dangers is. Nobody could have predicted what would happen to me in '69 and had I aimed for it I would never have reached it. So I will have to tell you that I really am conducting my life today without thinking of it and it may be hard to believe but the alternative really would be to make myself prey of forces that are totally accidental.

**BL** Well, of your achievements to date of which are you the most proud?

**HK** The one of which I'm most proud is probably having made a contribution to holding our country together during the collapse of its executive authority in 1973 and 1974. It was not a foregone conclusion that a country whose President was visibly loosing the authority to act in either to promise or to threaten would not be challenged, and to conduct a strong foreign policy in these conditions, in the middle of a Middle-East war, and to bring that to a conclusion not

- 17 -

[LC]

incompatible with our interests, that I
consider my most difficult assignment.

BL And of what, which of your achievements do
you have the greatest regret? If any.

HK Well, I think probably I would say two.
Probably we should have, when we came in, in
1969, faced exclusively what it took to win
the Vietnam war and decided whether we wanted
to pay that price rather than go through the
slow process of gradual withdrawal which we
managed, as it turned out, rather successfully
in terms which we'd set ourselves, but which
cost a great deal in our domestic region.
The second is a more specialised problem. I
think we had an opportunity in 1974 to draw
Jordan on to the West Bank of the Jordan river
and establish thereby an Arab presence, other
than the PLO, on the West Bank and it coincided
with the, the opportunity coincided with
the resignation of Nixon and the taking of
office of a non-elected President not yet
firmly confident in foreign policy. But that,
I believe, would have changed the history of
the subsequent negotiations.

BL: Henry Kissinger, thank you very much.

- 18 -

[4]

4/5/82

HAK:

Prof. N. Gordon Levin, Jr., of the
American Studies Department at Amherst
College would like permission to reprint
150 copies of excerpts 3 and 4 of "Years
of Upheaval" which appeared in the _Boston_Globe_. It would be part of an assigned
reading program for use in his course
on American Diplomatic History III.

Approve __H__ Disapprove __________

LAW OFFICES

LEVY & NORMINTON

A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION
433 NORTH CAMDEN DRIVE, SUITE 1200
BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA 90210-5547
TELEPHONE (213) 550-0345

CABLE ADDRESS
LENLAW

CHARLES M. LEVY
THOMAS M. NORMINTON
STEVEN G. SMALL
TOM LALLAS
DOUGLAS P. WIITA
JOEL J. BERMAN
PETER C. BRONSON
CHASE MELLEN III
JEFFREY L. LEVINE
DAVID NAGGAR

IN REPLY PLEASE REFER TO:

April 15, 1982

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL VIA EXPRESS MAIL

Dr. Henry Kissinger
1800 K Street, NW
Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006

Re: Raoul Wallenberg

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

While you are in Los Angeles with respect to the
Progressive Savings and Loan Association functions, a
friend and client of mine, Arthur Gilbert, and I will have
the pleasure of meeting you at both the reception and at
the dinner in your honor. We are both pleased to have
been included amongst the guests.

Arthur and I would like to speak with you privately
for a period of approximately one-quarter of an hour. We
have been very active in attempting to achieve the freedom
of Raoul Wallenberg.

Specifically, we wish to discuss with you our
engaging your services in attempting to achieve the freedom
of Raoul Wallenberg. If you accept, and are successful,
you will be paid a fee of $1 million.

Please advise as to any time during your stay in
Los Angeles when you will have an opportunity to meet with
me and Arthur Gilbert.

CML/rp

cc: Mr. Arthur Gilbert

WALTER J. LEVY

30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10020

April 16, 1982

Dear Henry:

I have just received the second volume of your memoirs through the Center for Strategic and International Studies with your inscription, which I greatly appreciate.

Needless to say that I find your book a most extraordinary document on your stewardship of the Ship of State during the Years of Upheaval. I believe I have never come across a work of this magnitude, which is not only extraordinarily informative and fascinating but equally as readable.

To my chagrin I noticed that in some of the press comments there was some slight criticism of your handling of the difficult oil problem that arose during this period. Having been intimately involved with you on this subject, I know how unjustified and unfair this criticism is. I believe nobody could have done it more competently and more responsively than you have done it.

With sincerest regards,

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
c/o The Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Georgetown University

The New York Times

C/O BEIT AGRON
JERUSALEM, ISRAEL

DAVID K. SCHPLER
Chief Correspondent

Tel. 223330
225644

MAR 23 1982

March 12, 1982

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In the course of traveling I have just caught up here with the second Time installment of your new book. I thought it was a remarkable piece of writing, and I wanted to say so.

Richard Nixon must have been as thoroughly dissected and psychoanalyzed in print as any living being. But your perceptions had an authority and a human sensitivity that made them compellingly fresh. And, I should add, a literary quality. I was especially struck--moved may be a better word--by the way you dealt with ambiguity. People are often reluctant to admit its existence. Your paragraph about putting an arm around the President was a remarkably graceful example of the value of doing so. I started to talk about these excerpts with an Israeli friend at dinner last night, and he mentioned the same paragraph with admiration.

Your evident recovery from the operation is good news. I hope it continues.

The New York Times

84 STATE STREET
BOSTON, MASS. 02109

[lc]

MAY 7 1982

ANTHONY LEWIS

May 5, 1982

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter, which followed me from Israel and reached me here only last week. It encourages me to put a question to you.

During the trauma of the last few weeks in Israel I have wondered what your current views on the Palestinian question and the West Bank were. To put it bluntly, you were responsible for the great achievement of the separation agreements on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. Time and circumstance prevented a similar interim step on the Jordanian front, and the situation has since become much more difficult. But I still believe that you are in a unique position to suggest the beginning of a way out.

My question: Would you be willing to talk about this with me? It could be a background discussion for a column. Or it could be a straight news interview--I am confident that it would be significant news.