## ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

### MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**TIME AND PLACE:** Washington Star Building
Third Street, S. E.
Washington, D. C.

5 November 1971; 1:00 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS:**
* Crosby Boyd, Board Chairman
* Jack Kauffmann, President
* Willmott Lewis, Business Manager
* Charles Seib, Managing Editor
* Smith Hempstone, Editorial Page Director
* Jim Heavey, Editorial Writer
* Crosby Noyes, Foreign Affairs Editor
* Rudolph Kauffmann, Associate Editor
* Burt Hoffman, Assistant Managing Editor
* George Sherman, State Department Reporter
* Dr. Kissinger
* Coleman Hicks (Notetaker)

[Conversation at the lunch table began with light exchanges about acupuncture in Peking. Dr. Kissinger told several stories about the acupuncture that members of the Peking trip had seen. He discussed briefly the accommodations provided in Peking. A question was raised about press coverage for the next trip to China. Dr. Kissinger indicated that he didn't want anything printed. He then said that the number of newsmen that could go would doubtless be far short of the demand and that there would surely have to be some pooling of news coverage.

He indicated that about 2,000 applications for the China trip had already been received from newsmen. He further indicated that there was a total of some 430 newsmen involved on the trip to Rumania. He indicated

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that the China trip would doubtless require a smaller number than that
because of the difficulties the Chinese would have adequately to accom-
modate large numbers of newsmen. He did, however, stress that it
would be more than a "mere pool". ]

Question: Will there be more than 100 newsmen then?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) I can't really say anything about exact numbers.

Question: Will the newsmen be predominately Americans?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) We will set a number of newsmen to go;
they will be Americans. The Chinese simply do not have the accom-
modations to deal adequately with a huge number of newsmen. They
insist on doing everything to perfection. Merely providing accommo-
dations in hotels, interpreters, transportation, and so forth would pose
an impossible problem for them if a gigantic number of American
newsmen went with the President.

Question: Are you indicating that something is different on this trip
from what it would be, for instance, on a trip to Eastern Europe?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) In eastern Europe, screwups are normal.

That's not the case in China. I jokingly told Chou at a point in our trip
when we had returned some place five minutes ahead of schedule that I
was upset because I could no longer be certain, as I had been up to then,
that I could properly set my watch by our arrivals and departures. The
Chinese, of course, would not be substantively damaged by doubling of
the number of newsmen from the United States. They are not concerned

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about that. The stories are going to get out regardless of how many
newsmen are there. An increase in newsmen will not lead to an in-
crease in the quantity of news that comes out of the President's trip.

The Chinese concerns related not to the amount of news that comes out of
the President's trip, but proper handling of the members of the Presi-
dential trip. Again, it is a question of interpreters, transportation,
hotel rooms, etc.

**Question:** You mean the old Chinese firedrill? [Conversation at the table questioned what the Chinese firedrill reference was meant to imply; the person who made the original remark finally stated that it meant everything was all fouled up.]

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I can't speak with any authority about how things would be in the provinces, but as far as Peking is concerned, preparations there for us were meticulous. Our advance people were awed by the state of preparation on the part of the Chinese. Our people presented a full book of proposals on technical arrangements for the President's trip. The Chinese studied it for 36 hours and then knew it better than our own people knew it themselves.

**Question:** When can we look forward to diplomatic relations with the Chinese?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Not at the end of this trip.

**Question:** Within the next five years?

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**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Let me raise a question now about what the status of these remarks are. My understanding is that everything is fully off-the-record. [Off-the-record status for Mr. Kissinger's remarks was confirmed by the persons at the table. A spokesman for the **Star** indicated that absolutely nothing from the conversation would be printed unless unless Dr. Kissinger was asked, and so agreed.] (Mr. Kissinger continued his answer) Eventually diplomatic relations will come to be.

**Question:** Are the Chinese well informed about the U. S., or are their views distortions of the real facts here? For instance, do they understand the political imperatives on the American domestic scene?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I think the Chinese are very well informed about the major views of well known people in the United States. Their knowledge about major speeches is really amazing. Whether they would understand the functional role that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee plays, for example, I don't know.

**Question:** I don't think anyone else does either. (Laughter).

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The Chinese can be contrasted sharply to the North Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese have always stressed short-term tactical impact on domestic American politics. The Chinese, however, pride themselves on their long-term view. They look to

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for the future. They surely give the American domestic political
scene consideration. But in their system the important thing is to
say that something is the result of a particular insight of Mao or
Chou--especially Mao. So they are less prone to stake out and
acknowledge tactical positions based on domestic politics in another
country. They asked a lot of questions about the United States, but
nothing, for instance, about the particularities and subtleties of
any individual *New York Times* editorial.

**Question:** Are they aware of somebody like George Wallace?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) They are certainly aware of George
Wallace. They asked probing questions, for instance, about foreign
aid,--wanting to know whether, now that we can look back on the results
of our foreign aid programs following the war, we would do the same
thing. They wondered if we would follow the same policy and build
up our potential competitors. The Chinese are more ideological
and less doctrinaire than the Russians, if you can understand that
distinction. The Russians always give you the impression that you
are dealing with a psychiatrist. They, like the psychiatrist, are willing
to listen to what you have to say; but they constantly give you the im-
pression that what you say has no impact on them, because they know
more about you than you know about yourself--that they don't need you.
The Chinese may philosophically be even more committed Communists
than the Russians. But the Chinese are more open when you speak to

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them than the Russians.

**Question:** What did you answer to the question about building our competitors with foreign aid? Did you have advance information about the foreign aid bill?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) No, I came back on Tuesday. We fought the amendments that had been proposed to the foreign aid bill fiercely; but we had no idea that the bill itself could be defeated.

**Question:** When the Chinese asked the question about foreign aid building competitors to the U. S., did they have in mind Japan?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The discussion about foreign aid really began because they read the President's speech in Kansas City, where he made some statements about quantities of foreign aid. Of course, they think about Japan; but it wasn't the Japanese problem *per se* which motivated the question.

**Question:** Do you think they are trying to learn something from our experience with an eye toward future problems that they might face?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) No, I don't think they were concerned about their own future; they were just interested in our role internationally.

**Question:** What did the Chinese say on the Middle-East?

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**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I really can't talk about the specific topics that we discussed in China. I am trying to give you the mood of the trip, though.

**Question:** What can we expect with China in the United Nations?

[At this point the questioner jokingly stated that we would then have China in the bull shop. There was general laughter.]

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) We can surely expect that the Chinese will attempt to distinguish themselves from the other superpowers, but I really do not expect visible radical behavior by the Chinese.

I think it will be low-key and moderate. Let me say that the Chinese are capable of enormous discipline. When I make these comments about China, trying to give you the mood during the trip, I don't want to imply that we were snowed by the Chinese. They are ideologically extremely tough; but tactically I think we will see moderation in the United Nations from them.

**Question:** Does the way that the Chinese dealt with you indicate a change in their attitude?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) There are really two questions: whether the way we were treated reflected a change of attitude on the part of the Chinese toward us; and whether it reflected a change in general. Judging from the views of third parties with whom I have talked, I take it that the Chinese have historically always been very meticulous. From

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what the Pakistanis say, for instance, their experience has been
very similar to ours. I don't think the Chinese behavior toward
us reflected either a change in attitude toward the United States or
a more general change in attitude.

**Question:** Did you notice any change in Chou's power on the second trip?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I didn't see any change in Chou's apparent power.

**Question:** Do you get the impression that the leaders in China are too far out ahead of the people?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Well our intelligence, of course, indicated that there were considerable difficulties in the countryside about the American initiative.

**Question:** How do they handle that?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) With a great deal of subtlety. As an example: on our first trip, the only thing that was announced to the people was that we had arrived. On the second trip they announced the arrival and the identities of the fifteen people who met the American plan--all high ranking Chinese officials. The next day, there were two pictures published in the *Daily Worker*--one with Chou, two social aides, and me; the other, a full group picture. This was the first time that the Chinese people had seen their leaders with senior

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American officials. After that, we were taken to the Revolutionary
Opera. There, I believe all of the people in attendance were cadres.
Following that, however, we went on sightseeing expeditions where
we were exposed to the Chinese people at large. In other words,
every day they escalated our contact with the population.

Question: What about Lin Piao--did you see him?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) No, some say that he is no longer around to be seen.

Question: What do you say?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) I really don't know.

Question: Did they have anything to comment along the lines that Chou took with Scotty Reston about busting our alliance with Japan?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) To get out their line on Japan, Reston is good enough. They don't need us. Let me turn for a moment to the question of our alliance with Japan. You know, one must distinguish givens in our relationship to Japan from matters which were affected by the China trip. Among the givens were the reversion of Okinawa, the inevitable conflict over textiles, the New Economic Policy, and the growth of strength in the Japanese nation. Our first trip to China made more visible trends which were inevitably occurring.

Question: With their seat on the Security Council, do you see a role for China to use the United Nations to embarrass the Russians?

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**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) It is impossible to say with certainty what will happen. I think it is clear that the Chinese do not want all Russian problems--other than that involving their frontier--to be solved. Generally, of course, we can expect the Chinese to support Arab radicals and so forth in the UN.

**Question:** Turning back again for a moment to Japan, analysts have observed a regular deterioration in our relationship with the Japanese-- a deterioration which appears to be leading to the downfall of Sato. It is also said among these experts that you are not particularly concerned about the Japanese problem.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) It is absolutely absurd for anyone to say that a senior American official can be disinterested in the problems of the Japanese. Japan is the number two industrial power in the non-communist world, and the number three industrial power in the world. It is also the most powerful nation in Asia. We have to be interested in a nation like that. When looking at the Japanese, we have to separate tactics from long term trends. We have to ask what was avoidable in the Japanese situation, and what real effect the China initiative has had on our relations with the Japanese. The first trip was a profound shock to the Japanese. Was it avoidable? The first question is whether we could have talked to the Japanese in advance. It would have been impossible. First of all, in order to talk to the Japanese

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it would have been necessary to talk to Taiwan; notifying Taiwan, of course, would have meant fully publicizing the visit. Secondly, the Japanese have the only government in the world which is leakier than ours. (Laughter)

**Question:** The Formosans can keep a secret.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Yes, they are capable of keeping a secret. But the Japanese, it seems, are really governed by a structure which makes it impossible for them to avoid leaks. There is no one person in the Japanese government with enough authority to act without involving people who are going to leak.

**Question:** Couldn't have the President handled this personally with Sato?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The information would have been of no use to Sato, except for him to leak it. The Japanese Prime Minister, you know, is the chairman of a committee. He can't act on his own. In the past, we have attempted to deal through emmissaries with Sato, but as of yet, we have not found a channel which is leak-proof.

**Question:** Why was such secrecy required?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) In order to understand that, one has to remember the time frame that we were dealing with. This was in May and June--the time of the Pentagon Papers, the time when we were getting regular Senate resolutions and daily editorials (diatribes against the Administration.)

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**Question:** Those editorials were really challenging government deception, weren't they?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) They were challenging presidential authority.

If we had spoken publicly about the trip, it would have triggered an enormous debate on all the issues: on whether the China trip was tied to settling the Vietnam War, on what effect it would have on the seven points, on what impact it would have on peace, on who should appear in the delegation, etc. We would have ended up negotiating bitterly here in the United States a month prior to the meeting. And the subject of the negotiations would have been a trip to a nation where we know nothing about the people. Also, it is important to remember that in those times we were using third parties to communicate with the Chinese. It took nearly three weeks for messages to get back-and-forth. We could not control the speed of our communications.

**Question:** But the debate now, following the China trip, hasn't forced you to speak about the substance of the trip.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) We have discussed some preliminary matters.

**Question:** If the trip had fallen flat, would it have been kept a secret?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) No, we would have announced it, in a low-key way.

**Question:** Before the first trip, did you know that the Chinese would be receptive to the concept of a presidential visit?

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Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) Yes, in a general way.

Question: Was the initiative, then, on the part of the Chinese?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) We had had exchanges for some two and a half years with the Chinese. These exchanges were unrelated to various moves in the Vietnam theater. The two developments were proceeding parallel.

Let me return for a moment to complete my answer to the question about the Japanese. Following the China initiative, the next three shocks were the New Economic Policy (which was independent of our China affair), the problem over textiles (which really had been bungled by the Japanese), and the UN vote (where we can argue tactics, but surely not motives). All of these shocks to Japan were independent of the issue of secrecy on the China trip. Let me get to the fundamental question about Japan and that, of course, relates to the future of the Japanese. Again let me emphasize that there is nothing more ridiculous than suggesting disinterest on my part vis-a-vis the Japanese. The next ten years in Japan will be comparable to the last generation of developments in Europe. You know, the Americans are prone to view everyone else in the world as American, with some affection. They secretly believe that if you caught an Englishman off guard at 4:00 a.m. in the morning, for instance, you would find that he really spoke without an English accent. In 1857, the Japanese moved from

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feudalism to emporer-worship in a year. In 1945, they moved from
emporer-worship to democracy in a month. We chose to interpret
the 1945 convulsion as the final convulsion in Japanese affairs. Let
me cross-reference to Europe for a moment, looking at the decade
of the 1960's. I believe it is axiomatic that nobody voluntarily
shares another's burdens. Peoples only take up their own burdens--
then they are forced to. We have to hope that there will be a congruity
of burdens, as they are perceived by the Europeans which leads them
to share some of the pressures currently bearing on us. Following
the war, the Japanese did not limply follow the American policy
simply because they are Americans in disguise. They followed us
with discipline because it was in their interest to follow us. Only we
could give them what they needed--technology and reform. The Japanese
have a tribal view of their society. They believe that there is a cultural
peculiarity in Japan which enables the Japanese to adopt any form of
government without sacrificing the basic tribal essence of their society.
Japanese independence from American influence is inevitable, and so
is adjustment to this independence. I have always thought that some
Japanese leader--not Sato, but probably the man after Sato--would
have to make an overture to China, with or without an American
opening to Peking. All the Peking trip has done is to accelerate the
process of readjustment in American/Japanese relations.

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**Question:** Are you indicating a dramatic change in the basis of security in Asia?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) No. What I am talking about is statesmanship. In the field of security, some defense arrangement will be required. It is just a fact that we could not afford to see Japan occupied by a hostile power. If we were to leave and Japan to be attacked, we would have to go back and get involved again. Let me state for a minute my personal impression that during the 1950's and 1960's the Japanese determined that it was in their best interest not to build weapons (which would become technologically overcome by events) or armies (which would be very costly), but rather to build an industrial base on which they could subsequently expand into the military field if required. Their fourth five-year plan, which by the way was announced before our trip to China, spends more than the last three five-year plans put together.

**Question:** But it is still not very much, is it?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) No, not by our standards; but they do now have an industrial base from which they can spring into armaments.

**Question:** Arent' we really forcing the Japanese to rearm, at least to the extent of defensive nuclear weapons?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Really, I consider the discussion of defensive nuclear weapons to be ridiculous. Either you are nuclear or you are

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not nuclear. Anybody who thinks that there is a distinction of importance
between defensive and offensive nuclear weapons has been smoking
pot.

**Question:** The Secretary of Defense indicated that, didn't he?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Look, it is hard enough for me to keep
my own ideas sorted out, without being held responsible for what
the Secretary of Defense is thinking. Really, doesn't it seem a
bit ridiculous for the United States to be paying huge sums of money
to defend the number two industrial power in the non-communist
world--a power which is also a serious economic competitor with
the United States? In July, Secretary Laird did attempt to nudge the
Japanese a bit on the assumption of defense burdens, but on the issue
of defensive nuclear weapons, we are going to have to bite the bullet.
What is really involved there is the whole question of nuclear weapons
per se. In the area of defense, the Japanese are going to get where
they are going on their own.

**Question:** The Nixon Doctrine sort of pushes them along, doesn't it?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Yes, Nixon Doctrine, plus the China
development, plus the Japanese development itself all head in that
direction. It is very unusual and unlikely to see a nation as powerful
as Japan without a significant defense establishment for which it is
paying itself.

**Question:** What lies in the future for the Japanese in terms of pro-
tecting their trade routes? They are forbidden in their Constitution
now to station soldiers overseas.

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**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) This is the really interesting question about the development of Japan to me: how they will move to defend their economic lifelines especially in Asia. It is not the old Japan which interests me; it is the Japan from here into the future about which I am curious.

**Question:** Can I return to China for a moment? I know in general summitry theory it is thought you need a base on which to support discussions. Is the China initiative an exception to that general rule?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Summits are generally useful at two points of development: at the end of a long process, or at the beginning of a new process. In the Soviet area, the summit will follow a long period of concrete developments. Anybody who has followed our relationship with the Soviets could predict virtually all the subjects and courses of actions which will be taken up at the summit. In the China case, what we are after is the beginning of a new process--a need to set a course. In China itself, establishing a process of this type requires the very top people. We will get concrete achievements from our summit in China. There will be something--there won't be a disgraceful lack of objective achievement. But I am not sure that you writers will be worrying about the concrete things that come out of the China trip. The most important things will not be concrete developments. The key is philosophical--the views that each side has of the other's

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motives, etc. This is what will be important at Peking, whereas
the results of the Soviet summit may be more objectively concrete and
visible. The Peking trip is peculiar this time. Any subsequent trip
by the President will be a more typical summit trip, where consider-
able concrete preparations will be required in advance.

**Question:** Does this mean that you are going to China without knowledge of what will happen?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I am very confident that we will get
significant accomplishments in China. These Chinese came to a
very hard decision in 1969 seriously to explore an opening with the
United States. They have had to explain this rapproachement to their
people. Newsmen in China will see Chou en Lai and probably come
quickly to the view that the United States President could not in any
way have affected Chou's plans. Whatever pushed them to the initial
decision about an initiative with the United States, though, will pressure
them to some positive results.

**Question:** What is the Chinese objective: to get the United States
out of Asia or to keep us in Asia as a responsible power?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The Chinese are surely required philosophically to take a position that peoples should be required to remain within their home territories. But to be fully honest, I don't think we will find too much pressure in China for the total withdrawal of American interests from Asia. My instinct is to think that for the United States to do what

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the Chinese want us to do, we will have to maintain some presence
in Asia.

**Question:** What do they want from us?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Well, the Chinese are interested to end their general policy of isolation. They want to get into the arena of international affairs. As they look around, the Chinese come obviously to the conclusion that the United States is not the principal superpower menace to China.

**Question:** You mean in contrast to the Russians?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) In contrast perhaps to the Russians, the Japanese, perhaps even the Indians. The United States has never really wanted anything from China; China is basically a continental power.

**Question:** Have the Chinese downgraded the importance of the Vietnam conflict?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) They know what the Senate Foreign Relations Committee doesn't appear to know: that we are leaving Vietnam. Major business in Asia should not be overshadowed by the Vietnam conflict. This the Chinese understand.

**Question:** Do the Chinese want Hanoi to spread Communism in Southeast Asia?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Politically, it seems to me that it would not be particularly in the Chinese interest to have a strong Communist power in Hanoi administering the two Vietnams, Laos and Cambodia.

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**Question:** What about the timing of the trip?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I can't go into that, but as we have indicated before, the announcement will come before December 1.

**Question:** What are your instincts about the India/Pak situation?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) It's a mess. (Laughter)

**Question:** Couldn't the China summit have been held in a mutually agreed-upon third country. Could that have been sold to the Chinese?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Remember that prior to our first trip our communications with the Chinese were very slow. We could not control the speed of our communications; other parties were reading our mail. In addition, let me ask you this. Where could you find a neutral power around the world?

**Question:** How about Switzerland?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Well, in some place like Switzerland, the meetings would have been extremely visible.

**Question:** I am talking about the President's trip now.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) To have met in some place like Switzerland would have made the meetings very formal. The use of a neutral site really wasn't very seriously considered. Especially looking at the first trip, we came to the conclusion that we would rather have the Chinese tape our conversations than to have them taped by a so-called "neutral" power.

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**Question:** Security is no problem then in China?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Well, things are either very secure, or we're going to see the damnest thing you can imagine.

**Question:** The anti-U.S. feelings must be very strong among the people. Are they quite unhappy?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) During our visits, we have certainly had the impression that nothing happens accidentally in China. Whether there are really any spontaneous elements in the population, it is impossible to say. I just don't know. We did see a number of people at the Revolutionary Opera, but I feel that they were all cadre members. Our first time out in public was at the Summer Palace, but we were with Politburo members. We did see some school children. They didn't know what to do when they saw us. Finally, they began to clap a little bit. Having been told to return any clapping I received in China, I clapped back. Following that we were extremely visible to regular Chinese population members. There was a clear attempt to display us and have us seen. We had no security problems.

**Question:** Was the first trip scary?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Really, I had the feeling that it was so much out of my control, that I might as well relax. At the guest house, for the longest time I couldn't understand how they worked

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the coordination of personnel. Periodically, at exactly the same moment, 15 separate Chinese would arrive, just at the time that Chou was coming in. Subsequently I discovered that there was a building in the compound where these Chinese were staying. The Chinese almost always anticipate your wants. They are very unobtrusive about it though; you don't feel harassed.

**Question:** How about the food?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) It was exclusively Chinese food. I happen to like Chinese food, and this was spectacularly good food.

**Question:** Where will you and the President speak privately?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) I wouldn't be too sure about any place. If any place, I suppose we will have to talk on the plane. Of course we will have our major discussions prior to our arrival.

**Question:** Did the Chinese appear to be upset by such things as the President's traveling with the power to press the button to trigger nuclear warfare?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) The Chinese have not raised any issues about the exercise of Presidential powers. They simply have not raised subjects merely to needle us.

**Question:** Will the President meet with Chou and Mao?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) Most of the meetings will be with Chou, but certainly he will see some of Mao.

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**Question:** On the Soviet summit, can we anticipate a SALT agreement prior to the summit?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I can see whom you have been talking to.

**Question:** How are White House-State Department relations?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Just fine. (Laughter) I am interested by this idea that we would hold out in the SALT discussions for something to be settled at the summit. If we are at the end of Phase I, that is to say a defensive agreement, and a freeze on major offensive weapons (that was the agreement on May 20) that could be closed at Moscow. We will surely be close to the end of Phase I, if we haven't achieved it by that time. Other issues, of course, are obvious:
MBFR discussions regarding Europe; the Middle-East; and generally Soviet-American relations around the world.

**Question:** Following June the shipment of soviet arms to Egypt has gone down to a low level. Will they be willing to talk about an arms embargo at the summit?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I can't speculate about that.

**Question:** Will you be going to Moscow to set the agenda?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) No. When we deal with the Soviets, of course, they have an Ambassador in Washington, and our channels are a bit more direct than they are with the Chinese.

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**Question:** You're still using third parties with the Chinese then?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) We have direct channels, but we haven't yet revealed them.

**Question:** Is it at Warsaw?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) At Warsaw the Russians pick everything up. Warsaw has turned out to be a little more than a Post Office.

We wait month-to-month for an independent announcement from the Chinese. Their representative there comes in, reads what he has been given from Peking. When we respond, they indicate that they're going to have to go back to Peking, and so forth. It hasn't been a very imaginative center of diplomacy.

**Question:** The Chinese are sending a very high-powered delegation to the United Nations. Perhaps that will provide an avenue for communications.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) We'll have to see about that.

[At this point the discussion ended and Dr. Kissinger left the room]