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This transcript has not been checked against videotape and cannot, for that reason, be guaranteed as to accuracy of speakers and spelling of names. (JES, JS, TW)

CHARLIE ROSE Transcript #3273

August 20, 2002

CHARLIE ROSE, Host: Welcome to the broadcast.

Tonight, Dr. HENRY KISSINGER on the debate about Iraq.

You don't believe that Saddam Hussein will ever submit to a satisfactory inspection process that would remove--

HENRY KISSINGER, Former Secretary of State: No, I don't believe that.

CHARLIE ROSE: --the possibility.

HENRY KISSINGER: Right.

CHARLIE ROSE: So therefore, aren't-- isn't this all a lot of talk--

HENRY KISSINGER: No, it isn't a lot--

CHARLIE ROSE: --so that if you believe--

HENRY KISSINGER: --of talk.

CHARLIE ROSE: --that, in the end, you have to go in--

HENRY KISSINGER: I think that's--

CHARLIE ROSE: That's the realpolitik of the moment.

HENRY KISSINGER: I think the probability is that whatever we put forward, at the end, we will have to go in.

CHARLIE ROSE: And STANLEY TUCCI and EDIE FALCO on Frankie and Johnny now on Broadway.

EDIE FALCO, Actor: It's a lovely play about two, I think, lonely people--

CHARLIE ROSE: Right.

EDIE FALCO: --who've been around the block a few times and who could easily pack it in.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right.

EDIE FALCO: You know what I mean? And--

CHARLIE ROSE: Who could be without hope.

EDIE FALCO: Exactly.

CHARLIE ROSE: Yeah.

EDIE FALCO: And who could probably easily-- and-- could live the rest of their lives in this state of sort of cynicism and-- you know, and they run into each other, and this is about the possibility of maybe shaking things up a little bit.

STANLEY TUCCI, Actor: I think this is particularly hard because it's a two-hander. It's very physical. It's very emotional.

You know, these characters run the gamut of emotions and-- not to mention the physicality of the play, plus the element of nudity, which at this point, is the easiest thing in the world.

EDIE FALCO: Yeah.

STANLEY TUCCI: It's all the other stuff that's so hard.

CHARLIE ROSE: Kissinger, Falco and Tucci -- coming up.

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# Kissinger Says Others Can't Veto U.S. Attack on Iraq

**CHARLIE ROSE:** HENRY KISSINGER is here.

He served as national security adviser and secretary of state in the Nixon administration. He is arguably one of the most influential architects of American foreign policy since the Second World War.

This past week, he was part of a major debate over the U.S. policy on Iraq: Should the Bush administration use pre-emptive strikes to change the regime in Iraq at this time? What would the risk of such an intervention be? And what would be the consequences of inaction? And what kind of regime should be installed after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein?

All of these are the kinds of questions that people like Dr. Kissinger and others are asking both inside and outside the Bush administration. There is some controversy about who believes what, and so I look forward to this conversation to find out where Dr. Kissinger stands and what he believes and why.

Welcome.

**HENRY KISSINGER,** Former Secretary of State: Always good to be here.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** It's great to have you here. Tell me what you believe about a pre-emptive strike, later whether you are in agreement, you think, with where the Bush administration is, and how far apart you are from where the former national-- the national security adviser, Kissinger Associates and friend Brent Scowcroft is.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** Let me begin by saying I don't like the phrase ``pre-emptive strike'' because it implies an attack without any specific provocation. And my view is this. The administration has made a good case about the danger of weapons of mass destruction spreading into the hands of a country that is building them in violation of U.N. resolutions and of its undertakings in ending the Gulf war, of a regime that has demonstrated its hostility to the United States and has used these weapons against its own people and against its neighbors. So with the principle of it, I'm in substantial agreement.

In the execution of it will require three phases. It will require a diplomatic phase in which I do not think we should give a veto to others, but we should make a maximum effort to gain the understanding of others of why we are doing it.

Secondly, it needs a military strategy that is rapid and decisive in order to avoid being drawn into a long conflict which will inflame the area. And third, it needs a post-war scenario of how one governs the region-- the-- what is one of the major Arab countries, in the interval between the replacement of the regime and the creation of a new regime, and indeed, what the regime should be.

I believe therefore that the focus of our diplomacy should be on avoiding the creation of a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction, rather than on regime change as-- as such. I differ from Brent, my friend and long-term associate whom I admire greatly. I differ from him because he seems to think that there is no justification or there-- it is unwise to think of military action short of a specific provocation by means of these weapons of mass destruction. He also seems to think that it will interfere with the war against terrorism, and I believe that in terms of the war against terrorism, bringing these weapons of mass destruction under control, one way or another, is going to be very

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helpful because it demonstrates that the United States knows how to protect not only its
own interests but those of other countries.

And third, he seems to think that it is an obstacle to an Arab-Israeli settlement, which should come first. I believe that the time phase of those three are different. But I agree with him that some coherent concept is needed in order to execute the policy which I basically agree with.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Let me explore all of that, but let me just begin with this question. Do you believe the Bush administration has a coherent concept now and that they have a strategy now and that if, in fact, they make the decision -- the president is meeting in Crawford with his most important foreign policy advisers -- that they're prepared now to engage in a pre-emptive strike, a pre-emptive strike to the building up-- a pre-emptive strike to stop the building up of nuclear--

**HENRY KISSINGER:** I--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** --or biological or chemical weapons?

**HENRY KISSINGER:** I can only go by what the president and the secretary of state have said. They've both said that there does not yet exist a plan--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Right.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** --that the president has not, obviously, therefore, approved a plan. And therefore, I think the answer to your question is there is not yet an approved plan. I would be surprised, however, if there were not segments of this plan available in the State Department and in the Defense Department. And I believe that before the president makes a decision, he would be well advised to put them together and look at them as a coherent whole. And I don't think this requires an extraordinary amount of time. I think this is something that could be done probably in a month or so.

But in terms of does it exist today? Judging by the statements of the administration, it does not.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** There's no plan in place, and there's no plan on the president's desk, is the words they use.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** What-- I doubt even that it has been put together. I would be disappointed if the Defense Department, the State Department have not done their own planning for this contingency, but I do not believe they have put it together in one coherent plan.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Another colleague of yours, former secretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger-- this is like the House of Kissinger at odds with each other, it seems.

Lawrence Eagleburger said that he worries that Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, Richard Perle, long-time nuclear theoretician and defense policy-- an analyst-- are going to tell the president it's easy to do and try to push him into action early. Do you share that concern?

**HENRY KISSINGER:** Well, first of all, I have known Secretary Rumsfeld for 30 years, and I cannot conceive that he is not running the department. So the recommendation to the president will not be made by Wolfowitz, in my judgment--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Yeah.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** --or by Perle, but by Rumsfeld, the Defense Department recommendation. I personally believe, but I would not feel I'm qualified to make that recommendation-- I believe that the military phase could be relatively quick, particularly if we are there in overwhelming force and don't try to do it on the cheap.

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**CHARLIE ROSE:** OK. "Overwhelming force" means 200,000 American troops?

**HENRY KISSINGER:** I don't know, but--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Massive air power.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** No, I don't know-- I don't know what it requires, but I do believe that the outcome should be rapid and decisive and that the president's judgment on the importance of undertaking this step would be-- should be affected by-- by the military plan, but it should also be affected by the post-war assessment.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** All right. You went to see Secretary Powell, at his request, I assume, on August 12th.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** Correct.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** For what reason?

**HENRY KISSINGER:** For a very prosaic reason. I ran into-- into Powell at a dinner two or three weeks before then, and he said, "Why don't you ever come to see me?" And I said, "The next time I come to Washington, I'm going to let you know." And I had to go to Washington for a dinner, and I had the next morning free. And so I told him I am free between 8:00 and 11:00, or something like this. And he very graciously adjusted his schedule to see me. But I did not construe the invitation, nor did the subject justify it, as a crisis discussion. It was a conceptual discussion that included Iraq and included the Middle East, as was stated by the State Department.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** The conventional wisdom is that Secretary of State Powell disagrees with where Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Perle are with respect to an attack on Iraq now.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** Our discussion was not about bureaucratic positions. And I could not gather from my discussion where the secretary of state stands in relation to the secretary of defense. That was not the purpose of the discussion. And in any event, I think that any of these gentlemen ought to feel free to see me without then discussing it on television.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** But you think I should at least try, don't you?

**HENRY KISSINGER:** You--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** To find out what the conversation was about.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** If I were in your position, I'd ask the same question.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** You say-- contrary to conventional wisdom on the part of some people that an attack on Iraq will damage Israeli-Palestinian conversations, negotiations, you believe that, in fact, the road to Jerusalem might very well go through Baghdad, that it might have a positive rather than a negative impact, even though almost every Arab country that I know of is opposed to an attack on Iraq, in part because they want to see this Israel-Palestinian issue settled.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** And in part because if they put themselves out in front and say we should do it and then we don't do it--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Yeah.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** --they're in an extremely vulnerable position.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Within their own country, their domestic politics.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** Exactly. One's judgment on your question depends on one's judgment of motivations of these governments. The best hope for a-- even a temporary solution of the Arab-Israeli issue can-- will arise when the moderate governments can say in good conscience that they are the better defenders of Arab interests than the radicals in the area.

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And the reason why I believe, first, that the-- that a solution of the Iraq weapons of mass destruction would help an Arab-Israeli issue is because the terror-- and would help in the anti-terrorist campaign is because terrorism has been nurtured by man of the states in the region. It is, in fact, where it originated and where its based. So it is therefore important for these countries to understand and to really feel that for the United States-- to challenge the United States and to engage in actions that, in effect, undermine the international system, as we perceive it--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** By supporting terrorism.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** By supporting or tolerating--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** OK, tolerating.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** --terrorism--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Or allowing people within your nation state to do something to--

**HENRY KISSINGER:** Exactly.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** --enhance terrorism.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** It's extremely dangerous and has incalculable consequences. And therefore, to the extent that the United States can demonstrate its ability to undertake such an action, its influence on that part of the argument will-- will increase.

I'm assuming that those who are supporting terrorism are not going to be convinced by American restraint because bin Laden, after all, organized himself against our presence, not against our policies. And after--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** You mean because of our presence in Saudi Arabia?

**HENRY KISSINGER:** In Saudi Arabia.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Right.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** So in my view, if we could be successful in such an operation and brought it off properly, or if we can demonstrate that we can bring Saddam to heel on the weapons of mass destruction by inducing him to accept a system of inspection that greatly enhances the transparency of his regime, that this would help the negotiation in which the president-- the Arab-Israeli issue on which I think the president has laid out a rather subtle road map.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** To a Palestinian statehood and settlement of the issue.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** Well, if you have-- I've been here, where we've been discussing interim agreement versus overall agreement. The president has proposed creating a provisional Palestinian state. In order to create a provisional Palestinian state, you have to define some borders. You have to discuss how to deal with terrorism on the Arab-Israeli issue. And you have to discuss guarantees on all these things. That's my definition of an interim agreement.

Then when that is done, then the area that is under dispute geographically is reduced and defined. And if then that state can live side by side with Israel, for the-- for some period, I believe that the road to an overall settlement would be greatly eased.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** But you also believe that statehood should be deferred until all of those steps have taken place.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** I believe that--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Rather than now, and then-- create a state now and then let--

**HENRY KISSINGER:** No, I think--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** --there be a development of a relationship within two existing states.

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**HENRY KISSINGER:** No. No. In order to have a state, there has to be some solution, at least conceptually, of the terrorism problem and some obligations that that state undertakes with respect to terrorism. The purpose of creating that state would be to see whether it is possible for the Palestinians and Israelis to live-- to coexist-- wants coexistence. And this is, in effect, what Sadat did on the only really effective road to peace that's been taken.

He convinced the Israelis that he meant to coexist, and he did it first by a series of step-by-step approaches and then by going to Jerusalem in a great symbolic gesture. This is my idea of how the Palestinian issue can be brought to a conclusion. The conditions for that are not ripe now.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** To go back to my main point-- you don't not believe that an attack against Iraq, a pre-emptive strike against Iraq, no matter-- and done not on the cheap, as you say-- would in any way have a negative effect on the Israeli-Palestinian--

**HENRY KISSINGER:** No.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** --negotiations.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** If it is properly done, as I expect it to be if the president--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** What does ``properly done'' mean, that you consult--

**HENRY KISSINGER:** If it's properly done--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** --with the allies and--

**HENRY KISSINGER:** First of all, if the-- there has to be a period or-- there has to be an effort made to show that we are not simply indifferent to the views of-- of especially our allies and friendly countries, but not--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** In the region.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** In the region and in Europe. But not an endless period and not from the point of view of a veto. Secondly--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** And-- and let me just interrupt you. But in-- in other words, you're basically saying under no circumstances should we give Arab neighbors in the region--

**HENRY KISSINGER:** A veto.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** --a veto. Those that joined us in the coalition in the Gulf war should not be given a veto over unilaterally American action now against Iraq.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** I would think-- yes, that is what I would say. But I would say we should put forward a specific program of what we say is needed to eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

What kind of restraints have to be put on what Iraqi capabilities in order to achieve that? And to discuss that program, rather than the abstract program of regime change.

Then we need the military strategy that I described, and then, in putting-- in going to war, if we do, we should then deal with the general problem of weapons of mass destruction spreading, to see whether this new concept of pre-emption, which I-- in which I thought the president made an eloquent presentation-- but how this can be built into an international system so that not every nation can claim the right to pre-empt against every conceivable threat.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** How do you prevent that? I mean, in other words, after this why doesn't everybody look at the United States? Let's assume China. China would say why can't we move in a pre-emptive way against someone because we believe that they're not acting?

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**HENRY KISSINGER:** Because I think there are a number of requirements that would have to be met. One is that the regime is inherently dangerous.

Secondly, that the weapons in its possession represent a fundamental threat to the international system and not just a-- I mean, it's a tough problem which I don't claim to have solved. But-- and which we won't be able to solve as a pre-condition to doing this. But we should at least show a recognition of it and perhaps invite other nations for a discussion of this; why we are doing what we think we will be doing.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Let's take two or three of our most important allies -- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan. If we went in unilaterally and changed the regime with the kind of force it would take, what do you think they would do if we were successful, as everybody expects us to be, at some cost? What would they do?

**HENRY KISSINGER:** First of all, as I've said, I would not put it on the basis that we are going in to change the regime. I would put it on the basis of putting forward an inspection system for controlling the weapons of mass destruction.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** But doesn't everybody know what we are about? We don't trust Saddam Hussein and therefore we think we have got to get rid of him. And the bottom line is that is the point. They think he'll deal with terrorists. And if he has access to nuclear weapons, he has no compunction either about using them or giving them to terrorists.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** That is correct. And he will probably fall as a result of the military operations -- or should fall as a result of the military operation. But I don't know whether it is possible to make him back up to a point where he will accept an inspection system that would, to all practical purposes, undermine his present authority. I doubt that.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** I would too. I mean, you are, if anything, one of your skills is that you are a reader of men and women of power, whether it is Israeli prime ministers or Chinese-- or Chinese prime ministers, as well, or Chinese leaders. You have read them and you talk about them and what drives them. Clearly you don't believe that Saddam Hussein will ever submit to a satisfactory inspection process which would remove the possibility.

So, therefore, aren't-- isn't this all a lot of talk? So that if you believe that, in the end you have to go in and that's the real politic of the moment.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** I think the probability is that whatever we put forward, at the end we will have to go in. That's the hard probability.

You asked me what the policy is that in my view would be most effective. And I think the policy would be one that shows what our fundamental concern is, which is weapons of mass destruction in the hands of such a regime. But the outcome will in all likelihood would almost always be complete-- I mean, I can't conceive that we would rely on Saddam to execute an agreement.

So I think the likelihood of any policy that addresses the issues of weapons of mass destruction, the likelihood is that it will lead to war.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Your point is, I think, and saying what you have made obvious, that the issue is not that he is a bad man, the issue is that there is the possibility that they will- he will have access to nuclear weapons.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** And another thing is the United States saying that it will go to war against every man it finds [unintelligible].

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**CHARLIE ROSE:** That's a bad precedent to establish.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** That is not something on which you can run an international system.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Other nations--

**HENRY KISSINGER:** Especially when you're the strongest nation in the world.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** But is it really a question of language though?

**HENRY KISSINGER:** It's a question-- in the case of Iraq, you come up with the same answer whichever road you go to answer it.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** But for the future, it's better to go down the road of weapons of mass destruction as the issue.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** That would be my view. But it does not-- I do not believe it probable or even conceivable that this will avoid the military problem.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** They make two-- people, former associates of yours make two other points. One is that they say that they have seen no evidence, satisfactory evidence, that Saddam Hussein is close to having those weapons. Should there be clear and convincing evidence that they are imminent before you attack?

**HENRY KISSINGER:** I would think-- I personally would take the president's word if he says it's clear and convincing evidence. And-- but I would hope that there is clear and convincing evidence. I don't think we should engage in an endless domestic debate because it depends what you consider clear evidence on what size the stockpiles have to be.

But when the president attempts to induce the country to go to war -- and I repeat, I would approach it with the attitude of going along with him, as I do with the basic concept -- I would hope that he will have looked at the evidence -- and I'm certain he would have looked at the evidence -- and all the other conditions.

But where I differ with some of the critics who make comparable points, they are making these points as a way of avoiding the issue of military action. It's a similar issue that existed prior to the Gulf War. Do you go to war or do you rely on an embargo?

I would approach it with the attitude that the president has made the intellectual and political case and now the question is to get a coherent policy that meets all the other responsibilities that the president has in executing the policy.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** I cannot believe that you and Scowcroft and Eagleberger haven't talked about this. I have a hard time believing that you're not on the phone talking about this.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** I have not talked to Scowcroft for many months. I--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** You knew where he stood. I mean, he's been clear.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** About a year ago I wrote an article after the ``Axis of Evil'' speech in which I sort of endorsed the basic idea of the president but not necessarily the words. And Scowcroft and I had a conversation then. And so I know he disagrees with the concept.

Eagleberger and I have had a conversation. And Eagleberger is worried about going down a certain road rhetorically without being able or willing to implement it.

I think at the end of the day Eagleberger will be on the side that I represent here.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** He makes-- Well, I don't know about that, but you would know better than I would, I think. But he makes clear that he is in favor of changing the regime. It's just a question of whether you have your ducks in a row.

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**HENRY KISSINGER:** Yeah. And I'm saying that too.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** And that's what you are saying, although you seem to be-- believe, you know, that it's-- that the allies will come along, that you need not worry about the Arab-Palestinian-- that the Palestinian--

**HENRY KISSINGER:** Of course not. No, I'm not saying like that. I'm saying that when the chips-- right now, we are in the worst position in terms of public discussion. If you are an allied leader, you have a domestic opinion that is strongly against it, partly because the media are so strongly against it.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Wait a minute. The media in Europe? The media in the United States?

**HENRY KISSINGER:** The media in Europe are so strongly against military action against Iraq.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** And the media in--

**HENRY KISSINGER:** When a great friend of the United States has said he hasn't made up his mind on what to do, then you have to trim to some extent and not get yourself out front.

So right now the incentives for criticism are greater than the incentives for support because there is no clear definition of what they're supposed to be supporting.

I would think that if it is clearly understood what we are doing and if it is done in a manner respectful of the allies, we will get at least acquiescence and, in one or two cases, support. And I think our allies will come to understand that to break with the United States on a matter that the United States has considered, has defined as a vital security concern after 50 years of having their vital security concerns protected by the United States is not a matter that they should take lightly.

So I think at the end of the day if the military operation doesn't get too prolonged or if it doesn't get prolonged, not just too prolonged, it's rapid, I think we will find that we have enough allied support to do it.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** There are those -- and I have to get to this point -- who say, and former secretary Eagleberger is one of those, and I think-- I think Brent Scowcroft worries about it, what's it going to be like if we are successful?

Secretary Eagleberger says he's not convinced that those anti-Hussein, Saddam groups are so strong or so powerful or so organized as the people in the Pentagon seem to believe.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** Let me tell you, first of all, you also have to look at the opposite argument. Should we leave Saddam governing--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** You got me there.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** --just because we don't like the people who have so far surfaced?

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Right. Or just because the opposition to him is weak because he's been in power so long he's killed off everybody that might have been a viable successor.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** Exactly. Now I have-- I do not pretend to know enough about the domestic situation in Iraq to give you a blueprint of what should be done. I am not as convinced as some people are that it is possible to create a democratic regime there very quickly.

After all, there is no Islamic country, or certainly in that region, that has involved a democratic regime other than Turkey.

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**CHARLIE ROSE:** So it's not an easy job to create a democratic regime.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** And Turkey did it through a period of about 20 years of more or less benevolent autocracy.

I also have trouble in thinking through how you get Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis to work together. And that cannot simply be done by holding a meeting since they've had many meetings over the centuries and have never--

**CHARLIE ROSE:** And it wasn't easy in the Balkans.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** So it's going to be a tough problem. And it shouldn't be presented to the American public, we walk in there and we go out in a year and have a functioning democracy.

In fact, in the post-war reconstruction we ought to involve our allies and the people of the region precisely because it cannot be an American enterprise of a Christian nation in a Muslim state. This is one of the issues that will have to be dealt with at least in concept before we go in there.

But I don't want to make it look as though I'm using all of these things to delay. The decision needs to be made in some reasonable timeframe or the debate is going to sweep everything away.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** There is-- and let me hear you carefully on that. The risk is that a debate, a national debate about the wisdom of this policy--

**HENRY KISSINGER:** No, a national debate is important. It's essential, not just-- it's essential. But one cannot say-- First of all, the military plans are not appropriate for a public debate. At the end of the day, the military plans have always been left to the discretion of the president and to the command.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** I don't think that's what divides people anyway -- the military debate.

**HENRY KISSINGER:** How to solve the problem of Iraq after a military operation cannot be written down as a blueprint now. And there should be some fundamental debate to how rapidly one moves through certain phases. All I'm saying is as is inevitable in such a debate, some people raise issues in order to avoid a decision. I would think it is important for the president to get these discussions undertaken but within a timeframe that does not negate the relevance of the eventual decision.

**CHARLIE ROSE:** Thank you for coming. A pleasure to have you here. Dr. HENRY KISSINGER.

We'll be back in a moment. Stay with us.

Actors on 'Frankie and Johnny in the Clair de Lune'

**CHARLIE ROSE:** EDIE FALCO and STANLEY TUCCI are here.

They are the two stars of the current Broadway revival of Terence McNally's Frankie and Johnny in the Clair de Lune. The play was written in the 1980's. It follows one night in which Frankie, a waitress, and Johnny, a short order cook, return from their first date.

Here is a look at the performance.

[excerpt from ``Frankie and Johnny in the Clair de Lune'']