All this shows that the problem of aerial photography is not a question which, under present conditions, would lead to effective progress toward insuring security of states and successful accomplishment of disarmament.

This conclusion is suggested by the fact that your proposal, unfortunately, does not mention the necessity for reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons.

It is therefore natural that people should ask more and more often what the proposal for aerial photography and the collecting of such information would really do to end the arms race. If such a proposal does not promote the ending of the arms race, then it means that it does not remove the threat of a new war. It does not lighten the burden which the peoples are bearing in connection with this arms race. Would such a proposal satisfy the expectations of the people of our states and those of all countries?

Finally, it is impossible not to stop and think about what would happen if we occupy ourselves with the questions of aerial photography and the exchange of military information without taking effective measures for reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons.

I have apprehensions which I cannot help but share with you. Would not such a situation lead to the weakening of vigilance toward the still existing threat of violation of the peace generated by the arms race?

My remarks do not at all mean that we cannot achieve an agreement on important aspects of the disarmament problem. I would like to call your attention to the fact that on very substantial aspects of this problem our positions have become so close that we would be able to reach a definite agreement.

Let us take such a question as the establishment of levels of armed forces for the great powers.

It is generally recognized that this is a question of great importance. Originally, the idea of establishing levels to which armed forces of the Big Five should be reduced, as is known, was put forth by your Government together with the Governments of Great Britain and France in 1952.¹ In the interest of achieving general agreement on this matter, which is so important for the problem of disarmament, we decided to adopt this joint proposal of the U.S., England, and France as a basis for discussion. Consequently we have a common point of view on this question. It is very important for us to arrive at agreement on this point.

¹ Department of State Bulletin, June 9, 1952, p. 910.

21

On the question of atomic weapons, we must remember that at the present, when the greatest armies of the world have at their disposal such means of mass destruction as atomic and hydrogen weapons, it is impossible, of course, to talk about disarmament without touching on this important subject. Therefore, we have always attached paramount importance to the problem of prohibition of atomic weapons. In the discussion of this problem, one of the substantial subjects of disagreement was the question of dates when the prohibition against the use of atomic weapons would go into force. In our desire to bring the opposition positions closer and to thereby facilitate and expedite the achievement of agreement on this subject, we agreed to accept the dates for putting into force the prohibition on the use of atomic weapons which were proposed by the representatives of England and France in the subcommittee of the U.N. Commission on Disarmament in London in April 1955.¹

I think you will agree that the proposal concerning the stage at which prohibition against the use of atomic weapons would come into force, as proposed by England and France, and accepted by the Soviet Union, satisfies our common interests.

It would be desirable—and I think completely feasible—to reach an agreement also on this question.

It also seems expedient for us to reach agreement at this time on putting into effect several measures designed to prevent sudden attack by one state or another. We feel that this measure would be in accord with the interests of maintaining peace and security of nations and in this respect it would be possible to reach agreement also concerning the form of control suitable to the above-mentioned problem.

You, Mr. President, as a military man, know from your own experience that modern war requires drawing into military action armies of many millions and an enormous quantity of technical combat equipment. In this connection great importance has now been acquired by the definite locations where concentrations of large military groups can take place and whose armaments would include all this technical combat equipment. The system of control proposed by us,² namely the creation of control posts in large ports, at railroad junctions, on automobile highways, and at airfields, is designed to prevent dangerous concentrations of troops and combat equipment on large scale and thereby remove the possibility of sudden attack

¹ *Ibid.*, May 30, 1955, p. 897.

² For text of Soviet proposal, see United Nations document DC/SC.1/26/Rev. 2, May 10, 1955 (also document DC/71, Annex 15), in *Disarmament Commission, Official Records: Supplement for April to December 1955*, pp. 17-25.

22

by one country against another. Establishment of such posts would
be an important step toward relaxation of international tension and
the establishment of trust among states.

In my opinion our proposal concerning control posts has the ad-
vantage that it provides a definite guaranty against a sudden attack
by one state against another.

I think you will agree that the proposals introduced by us con-
cerning levels of armed forces, the dates for coming into effect of the
prohibition of nuclear weapons and for the establishment of control
posts can promote the reduction of tension in international relations
and strengthening of peace. I do not see, therefore, any reasons why
we could not arrange to reach agreement on these questions. Such
joint decisions of the Four Powers would have tremendous importance
because they would put into the hearts of millions of people the assur-
ance that disarmament is fully realizable and that real steps are being
taken in this direction. An agreement on these questions would open
the way toward solution of other questions which concern the problem
of disarmament. It would encourage the strengthening of that
atmosphere of cooperation and mutual understanding which we initi-
ated at Geneva, and it would create favorable conditions to put into
practice a broader program of disarmament and control over this
disarmament.

In presenting ideas to you, Mr. President, I am inspired by the
sincere desire to achieve through a frank exchange of opinions on the
problem of disarmament better mutual understanding which may
facilitate reaching agreed decisions on this most important problem.

Inasmuch as the solution of these questions depends mainly on the
four great powers who participated in the Geneva Conference, I have
taken the liberty of sending copies of this letter to Mr. Eden and Mr.
Faure and hope that you will not misunderstand this action.

I hope soon to receive your ideas on the questions touched upon in
this letter.

With sincere respect,

N. BULGANIN

Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin,
October 11, 1955¹

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I wish to thank you for your letter of Sep-
tember 19, 1955 about my Geneva proposal of July 21 that we ex-

¹ Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 24, 1955, pp. 643-644.

23

change information about military establishments and permit recip-
rocal aerial inspection over our two countries.

You raise a good many questions, and I shall not be able to reply to
them until the doctors let me do more than at present. In any
event, a full reply calls for preliminary work by my advisers and this
is actively under way.

Let me now say, however, that I am encouraged that you are giving
such full consideration to my Geneva proposal. I hope that we can
agree on it, not as a cure-all, but, as I said at Geneva, to show a spirit
of non-aggressiveness on both sides and so to create a fresh atmosphere
which would dispel much of the present fear and suspicion. This, of
itself, would be worthwhile. It would, I believe, make it more pos-
sible to make progress in terms of comprehensive plans for inspec-
tion, controls and reductions of armament, which will satisfy the
high hopes of our peoples, and indeed of all the world.

I have not forgotten your proposal having to do with stationing
inspection teams at key points in our countries, and if you feel this
would help to create the better spirit I refer to, we could accept that
too.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement
by Secretary of State Dulles, November 16, 1955¹

We must all feel the seriousness of this moment as our Conference
draws to an end.

We came here carrying a heavy responsibility. Last July the
Heads of our Governments met and agreed to make a new effort to
solve some of the stubborn problems which have long defied solution—
the problem of Germany, the problem of disarmament and the prob-
lem of breaking down the barriers which separate the Soviet bloc from

¹ Text from conference document MFM/DOC/77, Nov. 16, 1955.

The Geneva Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States (John Foster Dulles), the United Kingdom (Harold Macmillan), France (Antoine Pinay), and the Soviet Union (V. M. Molotov) was held from Oct. 27 to Nov. 16, 1955, pursuant to the Directive of the Heads of Government of July 23, 1955 (ante). For the published record, see *The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955* (Department of State publication 6156, December 1955).

24

the free world. They gave to us, the Foreign Ministers, the task of
attempting to translate their purposes into concrete realities.

The United States undertook, with the utmost seriousness, its share
of the common task. We dedicated immense effort to preparation
for this Conference. I know that the Governments of France, and
the United Kingdom, and so far as it was concerned, the Federal
Republic of Germany also made similar efforts. All this involved
work of unprecedented intensity between the close of the July Con-
ference of Heads of Government and the opening in October of this
Conference of Foreign Ministers.

We brought here the results of that preparatory work and we have
presented them, not as rigid positions but as bases for negotiation.
There is, however, little agreement to record, as our communique
makes plain.

I.

The first item of our Agenda involved the problem of European
security and Germany. The three Western Powers came forward
with proposals both for European security and for the reunification
of Germany—two problems which the four Heads of Government
agreed were closely linked. Our proposals for European security in-
volved a great effort to give the Soviet Union assurance that its secu-
rity would not be impaired if Germany should be reunified. Special
safeguards were proposed to reassure the Soviet Union if reunified
Germany, in the exercise of its inherent right of collective self-defense,
should elect to associate itself with the North Atlantic Treaty and the
Brussels Treaty Organization.

The merit of our security proposals is demonstrated by the fact that
the Soviet Union seemed to find in them much with which to agree.
It has been made apparent that security is not the primary reason
why the Soviet Union does not agree to the reunification of Germany.
That is an important demonstration, and it may be helpful for the
future.

However, the indispensable premise of our security proposal was
the reunification of Germany, without which we feel there can be no
solid peace in Europe. And the Soviet Union made no effort what-
soever to meet this point or to comply with that portion of our Direc-
tive which called for the reunification of Germany by free elections.
The Soviet Delegation refused to discuss the provisions of our reuni-
fication proposal and it never submitted a reunification proposal of its
own. It pointed to alleged obstacles to German reunification such as
the existence of NATO and Western European Union. But it never
said that it would permit the reunification of Germany even if these

544645—60—5

25

alleged obstacles were done away with. Rather, it took the position that it would not permit the so-called German Democratic Republic, the regime which the Soviet Government has installed in East Germany, to be subjected to the test of free elections.

The Soviet refusal even to contemplate free elections in East Germany has a significance which goes far beyond the confines of Germany. It highlights, as no words could, the situation throughout Eastern Europe. If the so-called German Democratic Republic cannot stand the test of the people's choice, no more can the regimes imposed on the other peoples of Eastern Europe. This topic was not on our Agenda because the Soviet Government had refused to accept it there. But we were all conscious of the fact that Soviet preoccupation with its problems in Eastern Europe weighed heavily upon it at this Conference.

Last July, Chairman Bulganin agreed that there was a close link between German reunification and European security; that the four Powers had a responsibility for the reunification of Germany and that Germany should be reunified by free elections. The Government and people of the United States will find it hard to understand why, in the light of this, Chairman Bulganin sent to this Foreign Ministers Conference a Delegation which was apparently under orders not to discuss seriously the matter of German reunification.

Conditions in Eastern Europe may be such that the Soviet Union feels that it cannot now agree to free elections in any area it controls, because that would have a contagious effect. But we think it unfortunate that this was not foreseen by the Soviet Government before it agreed at the highest level and under the most solemn circumstances that Germany should be reunified by free elections.

The attitude of the Soviet Government here will almost certainly impair the development of confidence which the Summit meeting sought to foster.

## II.

The second item of our Directive was Disarmament. In this matter primary responsibility was not given to this Foreign Ministers Conference. The Heads of Government agreed, last July, to work together through the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to develop an acceptable system for disarmament. The Foreign Ministers here were given what might be called a watching and supporting role.

Nevertheless, I believe that our discussions on disarmament have been useful. I hope they have led the Soviet Delegation to realize the sincerity of United States purpose. We have made it clear that we are determined to seek reduction of armament, but we want reduc-

26

tion that can be checked and controlled, so that it will not be one-sided. President Eisenhower's proposal for exchange of blueprints and aerial inspection was presented as a start toward that goal.

The Soviet Union has suggested the giving of pledges not to wage an atomic war. We pointed out that the four of us here, and indeed most of the nations of the world, are already pledged not to wage any war in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

The great weight of world opinion and the potency of moral judgment should be directed against the initiation of *any* war, and not merely wars with particular weapons. Any war is horrible. And any government which defied world opinion by going to war in violation of its previous solemn pledges could not be relied upon to keep its new pledge not to use atomic weapons.

Therefore, in the case of atomic as of other weapons, the primary task is to find means of supervision and control. Pledges alone are not enough.

We believe that the Western point of view in these respects is now better understood and that the representatives of the four of us, with Canada, on the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission will accordingly now be able more effectively to carry on their work. The agreement of the four Heads of Government to work through that Subcommittee is, of course, unchanged by anything we have done here.

### III.

Item III of our Agenda dealt with the Development of Contacts. Here again, there is no agreement to record. It is apparent that there has been little change in the sensitiveness of the Soviet Government to the introduction into the Soviet Union of any ideas which conflict with the official ideology.

The free democracies believe that human beings were given minds with which to think, and consciences with which to judge right and wrong, and that human dignity requires freedom of thought and freedom of conscience. We also believe that the peoples of the world are essentially a single family, the members of which are naturally sympathetic with each other. Therefore, we believe that peace and human dignity are best served by allowing ideas, knowledge, and news to be freely exchanged.

We do not expect this to happen all at once so far as the Soviet bloc is concerned. Indeed our Directive contemplates that the barriers which interfere with free communications shall be eliminated only gradually and not abruptly. Recognizing this, we made only modest proposals which we believed the Soviet Government could

27

accept. However, no concrete proposal made by the Western Powers for the elimination of barriers to the free exchange of ideas and information between our peoples was acceptable to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was primarily interested in contacts which might enable it to obtain valuable technological information or to enable it to obtain strategic goods rather than the commodities of peaceful trade which our Directive specifies.

The talks here of our experts have for the first time brought many new vistas into the realm of practical discussion. No agreements have been reached, but I think that the efforts made will not die.

I expect that each of our Governments will act in these matters in terms of particular items, and in terms of its judgment as to whether to reduce barriers is in its national interest. But one element in that decision is bound to be the eagerness of people to know more about each other and to learn of new ideas.

Since the July Summit Conference certain barriers to communication have, in fact, been eliminated. The process now started is almost sure to go on. It may proceed only slowly and unevenly, but the process now started is, we believe, not easily reversed.

## Conclusion

International conferences rarely produce as much as people hope from them. We should not complain that hopes are high because the existence of those hopes inspires us to do our best. Having myself lived through more conferences than are the lot of most human beings, I have learned not to be readily discouraged.

I recall that the three Western Powers took the initiative which led to the Heads of Government Conference. They pointed out in their note to the Soviet Union of May 10, 1955, "We recognize that the solution of these problems will take time and patience. They will not be solved at a single meeting nor in a hasty manner."

And I recall that President Eisenhower on his return from the Summit Conference said that he was "profoundly impressed with the need for all of us to avoid discouragement merely because our own proposals, our own approaches, and our own beliefs are not always immediately accepted by the other side."

This Conference has had its merits. We have talked plainly. We have in the main discussed seriously and without vituperation. Our talks have not been wholly barren.

The Government and the people of the United States want to develop better relations with the Soviet nation. Our hope for the future derives from our belief that the Soviet Government will, sooner or later, come to see that the advantage to it in better relations with the

28

West is far greater than the local and passing advantages which it
could gain at the price of forfeiting the good relationship which, at
the Summit Conference, the Soviet rulers seemed to want.

On my return to the United States, I shall report to President Eisen-
hower. He has closely followed this Conference on a day-to-day
basis, and will evaluate its result against the background of his vast
knowledge and abhorrence of war, and his dedication to the cause of a
just and durable peace.

I am confident that our national policy will continue to find the way
to serve the cause of human dignity, as represented by the freedom
of individuals to exchange ideas; the cause of humanity, as presented
by control of disarmament; and the cause of justice, as represented
by the unification of Germany.

*Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement*
*by Foreign Minister Pinay, November 16, 1955*¹

As one stage of our work is drawing to its close, I would like to make
an objective assessment of the results of this meeting. Although it
has led to no conclusion on any of the points which we were instructed
to study by the Heads of Government, it has at least given each of us
an opportunity to make a clear statement of his position.

Last July, the Heads of Government, meeting in this room, declared
their peaceful intentions and their resolve to seek the solution of all
outstanding problems between East and West by means of negotiation.
Those intentions and that resolve remain unaltered; the French Dele-
gation has, indeed, been inspired by them during the whole of the work.
They will continue to inspire us in the long-term task on which we are
about to embark.

May I now summarise briefly the principles which have guided the
French Delegation during these last weeks.

Instead of accepting so-called settlements which would merely have
concealed fundamental disagreements, the French Delegation has been
at pains to seek solutions whose moderate, concrete and progressive
character would make them acceptable to us all.

In order that security should be real and lasting, we proposed to
base it on the reunification of Germany and on reciprocal physical
and military guarantees.

We do not feel that disarmament, either, could be real or lasting
unless it were guaranteed by effective controls.

¹Text from conference document MFM/DOC/76, Nov. 16, 1955.

29

Finally, East-West contacts cannot permanently be improved unless they include the removal of obstacles to mutual contacts between individuals and the free circulation of ideas.

In all these spheres, provided there is at least some positive move towards a settlement at the outset, we consider that the only worthwhile solutions are those which are gradual.

It was with this in mind that the Western Delegations and, upon occasion, the French Delegation, submitted a set of proposals¹ of which I must remind you in order to show what possibilities of agreement have been offered during this Conference.

As early as October 27, the first day of the Conference, a coherent set of proposals dealing with both the reunification of Germany and security was placed before the Soviet Delegation. I had the opportunity, moreover, in two of my speeches, to give Mr. Molotov all the necessary complementary information on those proposals in which, in accordance with the Directive of the Heads of Government, it was suggested that the two aspects of the problem be dealt with under one head.

On October 31 came the Western proposals on East-West contacts. On November 4, in order to take into account certain points raised by the Soviet Delegation, we proposed that experts from Western and Eastern Germany should join in the work of drafting an electoral law, and that the date of the elections be fixed for 1956.

On November 10, to all these proposals was added a statement by the Four Powers on the question of disarmament.

Today we have submitted a new draft resolution on this point, largely based on our exchanges of view with Mr. Molotov.

Finally, I would remind you that on November 14, the French Delegation took the step of tabling a draft statement by the Four Powers on the development of East-West contacts.

I want to emphasize that all these proposals took account of the Soviet Delegation's wishes as known to us before the Conference or as expressed here. In the most recent we have gone even further in the hope of arriving at some sort of constructive agreement, however limited.

I would now like to examine the three points of our agenda.

The Soviet Delegation's proposals concerning security are not as realistic as our own, since they concentrate on the two following main themes:

¹ For texts of the various Western proposals mentioned in the next several paragraphs by Pinay, see *The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955* (Department of State publication 6156, Dec. 1955), pp. 27-33, 136-137, 199-201, 227, 245-248, and 266-267.

30

(i) The eventual dissolution of the Atlantic Pact;

(ii) Perpetuation of the division of Germany.

According to Mr. Molotov, that is the road which should lead us to security in Europe.

In point of fact, these two requirements are political requirements and are totally unrelated to the organisation of security.

In our view, security consists in giving to each a real guarantee that there shall be no individual aggression in Europe and that should any such aggression unhappily occur, it would be stopped, indeed throttled, by instantaneous collective action.

The mere participation of European countries in a purely legal system cannot constitute security, for that would, in fact, deprive them of any positive guarantees. It is essential that security should be based on a system of reciprocal limitation and control which, being freely accepted by all, would lead to the restoration of confidence.

So long as there exists in Eastern Europe a group of powers so closely welded together that no individual voice is ever raised on any question, the peoples of Western Europe will find their own defence organisations irreplaceable as the basis of their security.

The expressions "Europe for the Europeans" and "Europe united in security" in reality conceal the wish to deprive the Western countries of the system of collective defence which the present balance of forces in Europe renders indispensable.

I shall never tire of repeating that the existence of several regional security systems does not by any means in itself constitute a danger of aggression. Indeed, I must repeat that the regional organisations for the defence of Western Europe, so far from contravening the Charter, implement one of its main clauses.

We have already said that those organisations do not threaten the security of Eastern Europe but rather contribute to the security of all countries. The French Government can say that it has left no stone unturned to ensure that, within the limits at present imposed by the division of Europe, the integration of the German Federal Republic with the West should be brought about in circumstances which would guarantee the security not only of France and the Western countries but of all other countries as well.

If, according to the wishes of the Soviet Union, the status quo is to be maintained, there is no need to elaborate a new system of security, for the only practical effect of such a system would be to increase the dangers we are trying to avoid and to maintain the present abnormal situation in Germany.

If, on the other hand, we came to an agreement, in accordance with our instructions, on the ways and means of bringing about reunifica-

31

tion, it would have to come about, as the French Government has never ceased to repeat, not only in freedom, but in a manner compatible with security for all.

Our proposals on this subject are logical and realistic, since they would make each stage in the achievement of German unity correspond with a stage in establishing European security. If they were accepted, neither the USSR nor anyone of us would have to take a leap in the dark. The USSR, like us, would be forearmed against any threat or any danger. But I cannot help feeling some concern as to whether the Soviet Delegation has quite realised the dangers inherent in its proposals from the very standpoint from which it approaches the problem, namely security.

I am convinced that if the Soviet Government will now study carefully the proposals we have made, it will be able to assess the consequences of an indefinite postponement of the settlement of the German question, which would lead to constant friction and rivalry in the heart of Europe. Such a policy would lead to that very "rebirth of German nationalism and militarism" which the French Government cannot accept. It is the duty of the four Powers to forestall such a development.

We had the same anxieties when we came to the problem of disarmament. Our wish is clear: we want to introduce, as soon as possible, a disarmament programme which will promote world peace and security, devoting no more than a minimum of human and economic resources to armaments in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. As M. Edgar Faure emphasised at the Conference of Heads of Government, we want to devote the resources freed by disarmament to improving the welfare of the peoples[—]not only our own peoples, but, in a spirit of international fellowship, all the peoples of the world and especially the least favoured.

It must be recognised that the basic condition of disarmament is the creation of a system of international control which will guarantee to each country that the others will loyally carry out their undertakings, and that its own security will not be endangered. We are forced to note that, at the moment, the Soviet Union is not prepared to accept such control for itself, while we on our side are ready to submit to it at once.

We had hoped that we might be able to satisfy our peoples by attempting to take the first step towards disarmament. We proposed to the Soviet Union that we should seek agreement on the principle of an initial series of positive and concrete measures which could be applied at once to create the atmosphere of détente we desire. That was the purpose of the draft statement which the three Western Powers,

32

isters submitted to their Soviet colleague on November 10.¹ But he did not accept it. We continue to believe that the line we suggested was the right one, and to hope that we may return to it. It depends on the Soviet Union whether or not we can take a first step together. The road to disarmament will be long, but we are determined to persevere.

Personally I would have liked at least to conclude Item 2 of the Agenda on the note of that determination, which I am sure we all share, to continue the work for disarmament in the United Nations Sub-Committee, and with a reminder of the undertakings contained in the United Nations Charter not to resort to force in any form. A paper to this effect was submitted to the Soviet Delegation,² which did not feel able to accept it.

On the third item of the Agenda, the French Delegation has been inspired by the same concern for effective results and the same desire for an agreement acceptable to all. Our Memorandum of October 31³ and our proposal of November 14⁴ bear witness to that. I repeat: we want to expand spiritual and material contacts between the Soviet Union and our country. We have to recognise that the extent of agreement reached by the Experts is insufficient to fulfil the hopes aroused by the July Conference. This agreement has been reached solely on exchanges which already exist. It falls far short of the Directive from the Heads of Government which instructed us to break down stage by stage the barriers still existing between us. We have never supposed they could be removed overnight.

The French Delegation has therefore insisted on the *gradual* removal of the impediments to free communications. We thought that would be both desirable and possible.

We also hoped for progress on the subject of East-West trade. The attitude of the Soviet Union has disappointed us. Nevertheless, we, for our part, are resolved to do what lies in our power to increase our purchases from and sales to the Soviet Union, thus contributing to the expansion of East-West trade.

But since it is true that mistrust is the child of ignorance, we persist in the belief that the barriers separating us must gradually be lowered. We place our faith in the judgment of the people both here and in Eastern Europe, who want to know each other as they really are and not through the distortions of propaganda. There is widespread hope that a free exchange of spiritual and material values

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 199-201.

² *Ibid.*, p. 227.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 245-248.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 266-267.

33

between the East and the West will be established. We have taken
note of this hope. Our future action, drawing strength from our
traditions, must be such as to ensure that this hope will not prove an
illusion for Europe.

I should like to conclude this statement with my eyes towards the
future. The French people's desire for peace is not satisfied by the
simple repetition of assurances. That is why the French Delegation
has consistently defended the set of concrete and realistic proposals
of which I have just reminded you.

We are convinced that agreement is possible on the questions that
still divide us. The July Conference re-established between us four
a contact which had been too long interrupted. For this contact to
produce the constructive decisions indispensable to the spirit of
détente acclaimed on all sides, we must create that atmosphere of
mutual understanding which our peoples demand.

That is the task to which each one of us should devote himself after
this Conference is over.

*Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement*
*by Foreign Secretary Macmillan, November 16, 1955*¹

Four months have passed since the Heads of Government met in
Geneva. Why did this meeting send a thrill of hope and expectation
round the world? It wasn't that the discussions were specially re-
markable. It wasn't that the directive, by which they passed to us
a number of problems to solve, was anything very new or very start-
tling. It wasn't that they reached any very sensational agreement.
It wasn't really what they did or said. What struck the imagination
of the world was the fact of the friendly meeting between the Heads
of the two great groups into which the world is divided. These men,
carrying their immense burdens, met and talked and joked together
like ordinary mortals. It was not from some new and profound
political decision or formula that the Geneva spirit was born. It was
from the ordinary human contacts of the leaders of vast organisations
of mankind.

For a moment it seemed as if the blind forces that have so often
led the world to its fate were to be halted. The dark clouds rolled
back and the sun shone out.

¹Text from conference document MFM/DOC/81, Nov. 16, 1955.

34

The Geneva spirit was really a return to normal human relations. It meant a readiness to discuss and to negotiate. It meant a reversion to some of that flexibility without which the conduct of human affairs becomes almost intolerable. It meant "give and take" in international life. It meant seeing the other man's point of view. It meant above all, the human note. It was because something of all this was sensed in every home that the Geneva meeting last July was hailed with relief and gratitude.

What I fear we must recognise as the immediate result of our meeting during the last three weeks is that, instead of taking another step forward, at the best, we are locked again in a stalemate; at the worst, we have taken a step backward. I am not so much concerned that we have failed to agree on all the questions which we were instructed to discuss. What worries me is that the Soviet Delegation do not seem to mind our failure. During the first few days of the Conference it was clear that there would be difficulty in making progress. Nevertheless, there were certain aspects of the problem which looked promising.

Let us take our discussions on Item I. We did more or less succeed in abandoning the long wrangle as to whether security came before German reunification or German reunification before security. After some preliminary hesitations, we actually succeeded in doing as we were bidden to do. We discussed both subjects under a single heading. On the security part of the problem, we seemed even to be making progress. I do not say that there were not considerable differences between the Soviet and Western proposals on security. There were. But these proposals were at least on the same plane of thought. They were concerned with the same things. We were like two men trying to do a jigsaw puzzle together. We were looking for the pieces to try to fit them into the right place. Indeed, many of the details of our proposals were similar: the zone, the system of inspection and control, the limitation of armaments within the zone, the interchange of radar facilities and all the rest. It is true that the Soviet Delegation demanded the dissolution of N.A.T.O. But this in their second paper they were prepared to postpone. N.A.T.O. was to be provisional. Well, we all know the traditional lasting quality of what is provisional. Moreover, in paragraph 6 of their last paper circulated yesterday,¹ the Soviet Delegation accept the principle of "the inalienable right of States to individual or collective self-defence". N.A.T.O. is an organisation for collective self-defence.

¹ For text of the Soviet proposal, see *The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955* (Department of State publication 6156, December 1955), pp. 174-175.

35

In the light of all this, I felt, and still feel, that, on the question of security, we could have made considerable progress, if only we could have made a parallel advance on the German question. I do not say we could have reached a final agreement. But we could have laid the foundations of an agreement. We could have put expert teams to work and then met again in two or three months' time to review and ratify the results of their labours. I felt that there would be no difficulty in writing a Security Treaty, which would satisfy East and West, if the freedom and unity of Germany could be secured. There were, of course, some gaps to be filled up or bridged. But none seemed unbridgeable. But when Mr. Molotov returned from Moscow the real division between us emerged with brutal frankness. This division is political, not military or strategic. But here, alas, there is a great gulf fixed—we thought the meeting last July had done something to narrow it, but now again it seems wide and deep.

The real problem is our radically different approach to German reunification. We believe that individuals and nations should be free. Free to choose their own form of government and free to choose their own future. We also believe they should be free to choose their own friends. The Soviet Government, however, continues to believe in its right, nay its duty, to impose when they can political and economic systems on other nations and to withhold from them the right to choose their own future. It is not from fear of German military revival, it is not from the addition that Germany might make to the strength of N.A.T.O. (should she decide to join it); it is not from these anxieties that the Russians have taken their decision to bar the right of the German people to settle their affairs at home and abroad. They have been guided by something which is even more alarming to us than a practical objection. A practical objection we can deal with in a practical way. They seem to be acting upon a principle. It is in our view a wrong and wicked principle. But all history has shown that, when men act on wrong principles, they are much more difficult to deal with even than when they act on no principles at all.

The little passages that I have had with Mr. Molotov on the subject of free elections and the varying merits of the single list and the open candidature system have been illuminating. Once more it is clear that we are back in that strange nightmare where men use the same words to mean different things—peace-loving, democratic[, ] freedom—all these splendid words, which we have inherited through the long history of civilised Europe, have clear and inspiring meanings to us with deep undertones. They appear to have a wholly different significance to the Soviet Government. And so that contact, that meeting of minds and almost of hearts, which seemed to have taken place four months

36

ago, is—for the moment—broken. We stand looking at each other, across the Great Divide. Yet I do not feel altogether discouraged, I feel that there are many new forces operating in the Communist world and in the satellite countries which they control. There is an old saying which Mr. Molotov may know: "He admires the sea, but stays at the edge of the forest". I cannot help thinking that last summer's Geneva idyll was not a vague or sham affair. There was a genuine longing on both sides of the Iron Curtain to break down the wretched thing; to let the free current of thought and human contacts, which had so long been cut off between us, start again. But when it comes to the point, the Soviet Government has not set out to sea. They have stayed on the edge of the forest.

It was a French historian who said: "Il faut vouloir les conséquences de ce qu'on veut". I feel that the Russian Delegation and the Russian Government really do want pacification and security. They really do wish to see an end to the terrible dangers of war, involving almost human destruction, that now hangs over mankind. But they are not prepared as yet to accept the consequences of what they wish. They cannot see that, if there is to be this new event in the world—a real relaxation of tension—then there must be a genuinely new approach to other problems. The German people must be allowed to live their own lives. They must be allowed to choose their own economic and social system. They must be allowed to decide their own foreign policy. Guarantees the Germans, and those with whom they may be allied, may properly be asked to give. But freedom the Germans have a right to demand. I have been driven to feel that the Soviet Government does not accept that right. Yet if they wish a general system of European security to grant that right to Germany is one of the consequences they must accept.

It is just the same with the question of breaking down barriers against the free movement of ideas and persons between the nations of the world. We are forced to conclude that really the Soviet Government does not want this uninhibited flow. They do not welcome it. They may even fear it. All this makes me wonder whether there is not some truth in the pregnant saying which I heard recently. I will quote it: "The terrible thing is that the Russian Government fears our friendship more than our enmity." Yet this isolation cannot last for ever. Western books cannot always be excluded as subversive or Western newspapers always be banned as corrupting. Information cannot, year after year, be classed as espionage or travel restricted to the hand-picked groups. After all, this is mediaevalism—or a parody of mediaevalism. I believe that behind this facade of xenophobia and insularity there is a real longing of ordinary Russians to know more

37

and see more of our folk. All the suspicion is at the top. All the friendliness is down among the people.

Before I finish, I must say a word on disarmament. Our exchange of views on disarmament has been useful; but it would be wrong to suggest that agreement is at hand. We agree in our objective, but not on the best means to attain it. We are all agreed in wishing to see a lessening of armed forces of all types, and armaments of all categories. We all want to avoid the mounting costs of producing modern weapons and to devote our resources to more constructive purposes. We want disarmament—so long, of course, as we do not jeopardise security. But to achieve this, two things are necessary: confidence and controls. I have already spoken about confidence—it is the key to all our problems. As for the problem of controls, I regret Mr. Molotov's failure to reply to my questions ¹ about the rights and powers of the international control organ, which is an essential part of any disarmament agreement. It is not enough to say in general terms that we all favour inspection and control. We must agree on what we really mean by these words.

We have all been forced to admit that we know at present of no method for guaranteeing the abolition of nuclear weapons or controlling nuclear material. I hope that our urgent studies of this problem will in time yield positive results. Meanwhile, let us all give thought as to whether we could not make a start with measures of disarmament on a limited scale. This would pave the way for agreement at a later stage on a really comprehensive disarmament convention.

To sum up: to deal with each item in our agenda—European Security and Germany: Disarmament: Contacts between East and West—there must be a new spirit. A vague bonhomie, or a few phrases are not enough. These are words or gestures—outward things. The Geneva spirit, if it is anything, is an inward spirit. Its light is not bright today. It burns low. But it burns. It has not been extinguished. Like those street lamps, which I remember so well as a child, it needs but one sincere touch of the lamplighter to set it once more aflame.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

38

*Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement*
*by Foreign Minister Molotov, November 16, 1955*¹

Our meeting has been convened in accordance with a decision of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers and has examined questions which were specified by the Directives adopted at the Conference in July. Its object was to discuss urgent international problems and by joint efforts to secure a further relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of confidence among states.

The chief question which we had to consider was that of European security and that of Germany, which was connected therewith. And this is quite understandable. There is no more important contemporary problem than that of the consolidation of peace between peoples and the prevention of the danger of a new war. This, in particular, relates to Europe where twice in the past a world war was unleashed. It was precisely from this premise that the Heads of Government of the Four Powers proceeded. As will be seen from the text of their Directives, in which a connexion is established between the two questions mentioned, the question which came up first for discussion was that of European security.

It is quite natural that the problem of security should occupy first place in the minds of the peoples of Europe. The German question is of a subordinate nature in relation to this problem. If European security is guaranteed, then, ipso facto, security for the German people will also be guaranteed and, with it, more favorable conditions for a solution of the whole German problem, including the restoration of German unity.

Throughout the whole of this Meeting the Delegation of the USSR has endeavored to convince the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America of the necessity of adhering to the Directives of the Heads of Government on guaranteeing security in Europe. With this object in view we submitted a draft of the basic principles for an all-European treaty on collective security in Europe. We pointed out that the way of creating military groupings like the North Atlantic bloc and the Western European Union could lead to no good. Such actions force other European states to create their own groupings. Only a system of collective security, embracing all the European states, irrespective of the difference in their social and political structure, can promote peace and security in Europe.

¹Text from conference document MFM/DOC/82, Nov. 17, 1955.

39

If certain Western states have not yet reached the stage of creating organizations of collective security for the whole of Europe, they might begin with a security pact for parts of Europe, including both the existing German states and those European countries which are ready now to enter this organization. There are also direct instructions to this end in the Directives of the Heads of Government. With the same object in view we also submitted other proposals. Nevertheless no agreement has been reached.

On the part of the representatives of the USA, France, and the United Kingdom, wishes were expressed which were by no means in accordance with the decisions of the Heads of Government. An attempt was made to get us to agree not only to the remilitarization of West Germany, which is already being carried out since the Paris Agreements, but also to the remilitarization of East Germany and to the inclusion of the whole of Germany in military groupings of the Western powers. It was proposed that all this should be carried out by means of appropriate all-German elections in accordance with the so-called "Eden Plan." Such a proposal could not meet with the support of all the members of the Meeting.

The solution of the German question, the unification of Germany, is connected with the question of what course the development of a united Germany should follow: whether she will proceed along the road of transformation into a militaristic state, included, moreover, in military groupings of several powers, or whether she will develop as a peace-loving and democratic state, taking no part in any military blocs whatever, and cooperating with other states in the cause of consolidating peace.

Whoever evades an answer to this question delays the solution of the German problem.

We must express our regret that at our Meeting we did not succeed in achieving the proper attitude toward the German problem. Although the representatives of the Western Powers spoke much and with relish about Germany, they did not even agree to give a hearing to the representatives of the German people, rejecting our proposal to invite representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic. This can in no way be justified. Discussion of the German question was doomed to failure from the very fact alone that it took place without the participation of the Germans, without the participation of the representatives of both West and East Germany.

On the other hand, the proposals of the Three Western Powers were in obvious contradiction to the actual situation in Germany and to the interests of ensuring peace and security in Europe.

40

The German question cannot be solved now without taking into consideration the fact that there exist two German states with different social structures. We must not lose touch with actual reality. It is perfectly clear that attempts to have West Germany absorb East Germany are impracticable. Nevertheless, the proposals of the Three Western Powers in substance were that West Germany should absorb East Germany with the help of the "Eden Plan." Such calculations are without any foundation.

We are for the restoration of the unity of Germany on the basis of free all-German elections. But we cannot assist the plans of remilitarizing any part of Germany, much less all of Germany, and the plans of including it in military groupings directed against the USSR and other peace-loving states.

A plan of reuniting Germany was presented to us which ignored the basic problem, that of the reunification of Germany as a peace-loving and democratic state. We were offered such a plan, according to which the very reunification of Germany was made contingent on the remilitarization of all Germany and on the entry into the North Atlantic bloc (NATO) not only of West Germany, which has already occurred, but also of East Germany, to which the German Democratic Republic categorically objects.

All this was done as if in fulfilment of the Directives of the Heads of Government, although plans and drafts of this kind on the German question also radically contradict the interests of European security and the interests of the German people. In the meantime, it is stated in the Directives of the Heads of Government that the solution of the German question and the reunification of Germany must be carried out "in accordance with the national interests of the German people and with those [the interests] of European security."

What did the discussion of the question of European security and Germany lead to?

The discussion showed that the question of European security is a very important question for all the nations of Europe and that without the solution of this question the German question cannot be solved either. At the same time, it showed that European security can also be ensured with the presence of two German states. However, for this it is necessary that the plans of remilitarizing Germany be rejected, whether they are the Paris Agreements or new far-reaching intentions, embracing not only West but also East Germany.

The discussion also showed that the solution of the German question must become, first of all, the task of the Germans themselves and that without the participation of the Germans the consideration of the question of Germany in general cannot be fruitful at all.

544645—60—6

41

All this shows that the proposal of the German Democratic Repub-
lic concerning the creation of an All-German Council, contained in
the address of the Government of the German Democratic Republic
to our Meeting, is mature and perfectly correct. The establishment
of an All-German Council of representatives of the parliaments of
both German states will not violate the interests of any one of the now
existing German states and must not affect the social order obtaining
in the German Democratic Republic or in the German Federal Repub-
lic. It is necessary that the representatives of the German Demo-
cratic Republic and the German Federal Republic should finally start
a joint discussion of all problems which disturb the German people.
It is necessary that a rapprochement and cooperation start between
the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic.
Without it, it is impossible to prepare the unification of Germany.
We must not imagine that the Americans, the French, the British, or
the Russians are more interested in the solution of the German prob-
lem than the Germans themselves are. The solution of the German
question will move ahead only when the Germans themselves under-
take the work, and the Soviet Union, the United States of America,
France, and the United Kingdom help them. Then conditions will be
created for the unification of Germany, and a united Germany will
be revived as a really peace-loving and democratic state.

The discussion of the question of European security and Germany
has not yet brought about agreed conclusions. We hope, however,
that this discussion will be profitable, that the solution of these ques-
tions will not be delayed, and that we shall reach agreed conclusions
and decisions.

The Meeting paid considerable attention to the problem of disarma-
ment. This problem affects the vital interests of all nations.

The nations of the whole world, perhaps, want nothing so much as
the ending of the armaments race. It can hardly be denied that from
such states as the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, and France they expect actual measures for the pre-
vention of atomic warfare. To remain deaf to the voice of nations
means not to justify the confidence of the peace-loving people of the
world.

In the Directives of the Heads of Government on the disarmament
problem the desire was expressed to eliminate the threat of war and
reduce the burden of armaments. Accordingly, the Foreign Ministers
were instructed to consider the work done by the Disarmament Com-
mission, to take into account the opinions and proposals advanced at
the Conference of the Heads of Government, and to discuss whether it
is possible to take further useful initiative in the matter of disarma-

42

ment. However, we cannot congratulate ourselves on the results achieved.

It suffices to acquaint ourselves with that proposal which was submitted on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France concerning this problem. This proposal does not contain a single word on terminating the armaments race. Nothing is said about reducing armaments. In general it is silent concerning the necessity for forbidding atomic weapons, although the UN expressed itself in favor of this as early as 1946.

Recently the Government of the United States of America, and later the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, started to reconsider the positions they had previously taken regarding the problem of reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic weapons. They reject consideration of disarmament measures. Moreover, at the Meeting the Western Powers adopted a position which is in direct contradiction to the Directives of the Heads of Government. In spite of these clear Directives, they tried to argue here that at the present time it is impossible to carry out a general program of disarmament, and they proposed to restrict themselves to the establishment of control and inspection without taking any measures for a reduction in armaments. Such an approach to the problem of disarmament cannot yield positive results.

The position of the Soviet Union is clear and consistent. Our premise is that the main problem in the field of disarmament is the application of practical measures directed toward the termination of the armaments race, and the liberation of peoples from the threat of atomic war. This can be achieved only through the steadfast execution of unanimous decisions previously taken by the UN concerning the necessity for concluding an international convention which provides for considerable reduction in all armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons, with the establishment of international control.

All this was reflected in the proposals of the Soviet Government of May 10 of this year. It is not by accident that these proposals are meeting with ever-increasing approval in all countries.

The Soviet Union believes that even in the present situation it is possible to achieve considerable success in the matter of disarmament, including the elimination of the danger of a surprise atomic attack. Under present conditions pending the conclusion of a general convention providing for complete prohibition of atomic weapons, a moral and political condemnation of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons would have enormous significance. If such a moral and political condemnation were adopted by the UN on the initiative of the four states represented here, it could not be ignored.

43

That aim is also pursued in our proposal that the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France should make a declaration that they refuse to be the first to use atomic and hydrogen weapons.¹ It is difficult to overestimate the importance of such an action for the strengthening of mutual confidence among states, for freeing nations from the fear of atomic attacks.

We thought also that our Meeting had declared unanimously that the Four Powers would refrain from using armed forces against each other and would settle all the disagreements which exist or may arise between them by peaceful means only.²

Unfortunately, neither of these proposals was accepted by the Three Western Powers and, therefore, we have to close our Meeting without having reached any practical results in this important matter.

This cannot, however, influence our resolve to continue our efforts to bring about disarmament. The Soviet Union will continue to strive persistently and consistently for the cessation of the armaments race and for the elimination of the threat of atomic war.

It is also necessary to say a few words about the third point of the agenda—the development of contacts between East and West.

The Soviet Delegation submitted proposals directed towards the elimination of barriers between East and West which hinder unobstructed trade and economic relations which are the real basis for strengthening all other relations between nations. It has also submitted a number of proposals concerning the development of contacts in the fields of culture, science, press, radio, arts, sports, tourism, etc.

However, the Soviet Delegation was not supported by the delegations of the USA, the UK, and France, whose proposals are far removed from the spirit of cooperation which permeated the consideration of the question of contacts at the July Conference of the Heads of Government in Geneva.

The Soviet Delegation thinks that there was a good basis for coming to an agreement on this question if all the participants in the Meeting followed the Directives of the Heads of Government and observed the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. It was on such an assumption that the Soviet Delegation also submitted its proposals.

We believed that in all the fields mentioned above it would be possible to bring the points of view of the Four Delegations closer together. This should, of course, be reflected in a concerted decision,

¹ See *The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers* ..., pp. 185-186.

² See *ibid*., p. 226.

44

while continuing to work on other questions on which disagreements
between us still existed, many of which could be considered through
bilateral negotiations between the parties concerned.

Nevertheless, the Delegations of the Three Western Powers per-
severed in submitting proposals which are entirely concerned with
the competence of the respective states, are concerned with the in-
ternal affairs of those states and evidently could not be considered by
this Meeting.

We are still of the opinion that the consideration of the question
of contacts by this Meeting will help the attainment of concerted de-
cisions. However, the Soviet Government will not wait for such
decisions and will take practical measures for the development of
contacts with those countries which desire to develop them. We hope
to attain practical results in this respect in accordance with the com-
mon aims of the development of international relations.

We attach great importance to the results of the Geneva Conference
of the Heads of Government which has reflected the great longing of
nations for the lessening of tension in international relations. Since
that Conference the Soviet Union has already carried out a number of
new measures directed towards the easing of international tension and
the strengthening of mutual confidence among states in the Geneva
spirit. The Soviet Union will go further along this way, together with
those to whom the interests of peace and international collaboration
are dear.

This Meeting of Foreign Ministers has come to a close without
having taken any essential decisions.

The Meeting has shown that every step forward on the way to a
further lessening of international tension provokes considerable diffi-
culties and makes it necessary to overcome obstacles and moods which
often drag matters not forward but backwards. Even today we some-
times heard statements made in the spirit which is not the Geneva
spirit at all. But by acting like that it is possible to bring about a
situation nearing isolation and not the improvement of our position
among the peoples of the world.

On the other hand, our Meeting has helped to draw the attention of
wide circles to the most important problems of our time. This will
undoubtedly give a positive result.

Now have become manifest not only the obstacles but also the opportu-
tunities for a successful solution of such problems as the problem of
ensuring European security, the problem of disarmament, the German
problem, the development of economic and cultural relations between
East and West, etc. We are convinced that this Meeting will prove
to have been useful for the development of international cooperation
and for further lessening of international tension.

45

*Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Communiqué,*
*November 16, 1955*¹

In compliance with the Directive issued by the Four Heads of Gov-
ernment after their meeting in Geneva in July, the Foreign Ministers
of the French Republic, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the United States of America met in Geneva
from October 27 to November 16, 1955. They had a frank and com-
prehensive discussion of the three items entrusted to them in the Direc-
tive, namely: 1. European Security and Germany, 2. Disarmament,
and 3. Development of Contacts between East and West.

The Foreign Ministers agreed to report the result of their discus-
sions to their respective Heads of Government and to recommend that
the future course of the discussions of the Foreign Ministers should
be settled through diplomatic channels.

*Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Tripartite Declara-*
*tion on Germany and European Security, November*
*16, 1955*²

At Geneva, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom
and the United States of America tried to reach agreement with the
Soviet Foreign Minister on what the Four Heads of Government in
July agreed were the closely linked problems of German Reunification
and European Security. To this end they made a proposal for the
Reunification of Germany by free elections in 1956 and for a Treaty
of Assurance giving the Soviet Union far-reaching safeguards against
aggression when Germany was reunified.

 Marshal Bulganin in July had agreed that the Reunification of
 Germany was the common responsibility of the Four Powers and
 should be carried out by means of Free Elections. The Soviet Foreign
 Minister, however, despite the Directive of the Heads of Government,
 made it plain that the Soviet Government refused to agree to the
 Reunification of Germany since that would lead to the liquidation of
 the East German regime. He made counterproposals which would
 have involved the continued division of Germany as well as the even-
tual dissolution of the Western security system. It is for this reason
 that the negotiations have failed.

¹Text from conference document MFM/PR/1, Nov. 16, 1955.

²Department of State press release 649, Nov. 16, 1955.

46

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are aware that this result must bring a sense of cruel disappointment to the German people, East and West of the zonal border which now unjustly divides them. However, the three Foreign Ministers believe that the Soviet Government will come to recognize that its own self-interest will be served by ending the injustice of a divided Germany. They believe that the Soviet Government will realize that so long as it persists in withholding unity from the German people, thus perpetuating the division of Europe, there can be no solid security in Europe, nor indeed in the world.

The three Western Powers will themselves not cease their efforts to end the injustice and wrong now being done by dividing the German people and will continue to stand ready to contribute to the security which can be enjoyed by all only when Germany is reunified.

## Radio-Television Report by Secretary of State Dulles on the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Washington, November 18, 1955¹

For the last three weeks the British, the French and ourselves have been negotiating with the Russians at Geneva. I got back yesterday and reported fully to the President in a talk which began last evening and was resumed this morning. Now I am reporting to you, the American people.

As I expect most of you know, this Geneva meeting did not reach any agreements. As a result, many questions are in the air.

* Does this mean that the so-called "spirit of Geneva" is dead?

* Does it mean that the risk of war has increased?

* Will the so-called "cold war" be resumed in full vigor?

* Will the United States now have to change basically its military and mutual security programs?

* Does it mean an end to negotiating with the Soviet Union?

* I shall try to answer all of these questions.

First of all, however, I would like to recall how this latest Geneva Conference came about.

I go back to last spring. Until then Soviet Russia had been pursuing a menacing policy. That was Stalin's line. He believed it was possible to ride roughshod over the free nations.

After Stalin died, that effort continued for a time. The Soviets made intense and blustering efforts to keep West Germany apart from

¹Department of State press release 659, Nov. 18, 1955 (corrected).

47

the other Western European nations. Despite this, the Federal Republic of Germany last May joined NATO and the Brussels Treaty creating Western European Union.

This Soviet failure was followed by a change in the Soviet demeanor. Stalin's successors professed, at least superficially, to desire cooperative relations with the free nations. And they made important concessions for this purpose.

For example, they had for eight years refused to sign the Treaty which would give Austria her freedom. But last May they signed that Treaty¹ and pulled the Red Army out of Austria.

They made their peace with Tito, who for seven years had been the object of their most bitter attacks because he had taken Yugoslavia out of the Soviet bloc.

They moderated their propaganda and their manners.

They made it clear that they would like to sit down and talk with the Western nations.

The United States responded, as it always will respond, to any prospect, however slight, of making peace more just and durable. That response was backed up with virtual unanimity and on a bipartisan basis. So, the United States joined with Britain and France to invite the Soviet leaders to the "Summit" Conference at Geneva. There President Eisenhower met for six days with the Heads of the other three Governments, in an effort to create a better atmosphere and a new impulse toward the solution of the problems that divide us.

That meeting indicated a desire on all sides to end the bitterness and harshness which could generate war. War, all recognized, would be a common disaster.

In addition, the Heads of Government agreed that their Foreign Ministers should get together in October to negotiate about European security and the problem of Germany, about the limitation of armament and about the reduction of barriers between the Soviet bloc and the free world.

The three Western leaders recognized that the value of the "Summit" Conference would be largely determined by subsequent results. Thus, President Eisenhower, in the closing speech of the Conference, said, "Only history will tell the true worth and real values of our session together. The follow-through from this beginning by our respective Governments will be decisive in the measure of this Conference." ²

¹ For text of the treaty, and related documents, see *The Austrian State Treaty* (Department of State publication 6437, April 1957).

² *Ante*, p. 12.

48

Following the Summit Conference the United States, in cooperation with Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, prepared thoroughly for this Foreign Ministers Conference that was to come.

We were fully aware of the complexity of the problems which we faced. The Summit Conference had shown deep differences on the issues of German unity and European security, disarmament and freer contacts. To be acceptable, solutions of these problems must take account of legitimate interests on both sides—especially as to security.

Our preparations for the meeting recognized this basic fact. The Western proposals provided the basis for real negotiations with the Soviet Union.

In my initial statement to the Conference, I expressed the point of view I have just outlined. "The United States", I said, came "to this meeting dedicated to exploring patiently and sincerely all possible approaches to realistic solutions of these problems".

Despite the effort, no specific agreements were reached.

The explanation, as I see it, is this: the Soviet Union appears to want certain results in terms of European security, disarmament and contacts of a sort. But it is not yet willing to pay the price needed to get these results. And when I say pay the price, I do not refer to bargaining terms. I mean the price in terms of doing what is inherently necessary to reach the results which we all say we want.

Let me illustrate what I mean by telling you what happened at the Conference.

## I

First of all, we talked about European security and Germany. The Soviet Union wanted security against the possible resurgence of German militarism. This was not unreasonable in the light of what the Russians had suffered from the German armies during World War II. The Western Powers were indeed prepared to meet the Soviet Union in this matter.

We made security proposals of a serious and far reaching nature. Perhaps the best proof of their merit is the fact that the Soviet Delegation later came up with security proposals which copied many features of our own.

But there was one basic and decisive difference. Our proposals were based upon the reunification of Germany. We do not believe that solid peace in Europe can be based on the injustice of a divided Germany. The Soviet proposals were based on preserving the Soviet puppet regime in East Germany and the indefinite division of Germany, at least unless Soviet control could be extended to all Germany.

49

The Soviet Union at the Summit Conference had explicitly promised to consider the reunification of Germany by free elections and had explicitly recognized the close link between the reunification of Germany and European security.

We tried hard, but in vain, to get the Soviet Delegation to discuss seriously the problem of the reunification of Germany.

When the Soviet Union came to face up to what that involved, it balked. Obviously, if Germany were reunified by free elections this would mean the end of the puppet regime which the Soviet Union has installed in East Germany. This in turn would almost surely have serious repercussions upon the other satellite countries of Eastern Europe. There the Soviet-controlled governments are facing rising pressure. Many within the satellite countries believe that the "spirit of Geneva" means that they are entitled to more tolerance and to governments more responsive to the needs and aspirations of their own nation[s].

So the Soviet Union took the position that while they were eager to get a treaty of European security they would not be willing to sacrifice their East German regime to get it. Despite what they had agreed to at the Summit Conference, they declared they would preserve their regime in East Germany, in clear defiance of the ardent wishes of the East Germans themselves.

Some had thought that the Soviet Union might be willing to allow Germany to be reunified by free elections if reunified Germany would not enter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But in fact the Soviet Delegation made it abundantly clear that it would not permit Germany to be reunified by free election[s] even on such terms.

So we see that although the Soviet Union doubtless wants a European security system to which it is a party, it is not willing to provide an essential prerequisite, namely the reunification of Germany in freedom.

## II

The second problem that we had to discuss was that of limitation of armament. Primary responsibility in this field is now with the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee. But the Foreign Ministers were directed to help if they could.

Both sides showed an eager desire to bring about limitation of armament. We want this both as an aid to peace and to permit economic resources to be devoted in greater measure to the benefit of mankind. But the Western nations are unwilling to agree to disarm unless we can be sure that both sides are carrying out the agreement. That is why we insist that disarmament be effectively supervised and controlled.

50

Three times in this century the United States experience has shown that one-sided weakness in disarmament does not in fact preserve peace. The United States does not intend now to risk its very existence upon promises which may not be kept.

The United States is, however, second to none in its desire for safeguarded reduction of armaments. It was to make that more possible that President Eisenhower, at the Summit Conference, proposed to the Soviet Union an exchange of blueprints of military establishments, and then aerial inspection to verify the blueprints and thereby improve the atmosphere by dispelling the fear of aggressive intentions on either side. That concept of President Eisenhower was rejected by the Soviets, although they did recognize for the first time that aerial inspection had a proper place in a control system.

But the Soviet Union does not attach the importance which we do to inspection and control. It continued to urge agreements, even though there was no way to check adequately whether these agreements were being fulfilled.

So our discussion of disarmament was inconclusive. We left further development of the subject to the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament.

It seems that the Soviet Government feels as yet unable to allow inspection and control which, if it is adequate, would open up their society which is still largely based on secretiveness. So the Soviet Union, while wanting the immense benefits that could come from reduction of armament, is not willing to submit itself to the safeguards which would make this possible.

### III

The third and final item of our Agenda was the development of contacts between the East and the West. The Western Powers put forward 17 proposals of a concrete nature. Many of these would have involved the freer exchange of ideas, information, and news. All such proposals the Soviet Delegation rejected. It was willing to have contacts which would enable it to garner technical knowhow from other countries. It was willing to send and receive persons under conditions which it could closely control. But it reacted violently against anything that smacked of the elimination of barriers to a freer exchange of ideas. It abhorred the introduction into the Soviet bloc of thoughts which might be contrary to the official doctrine of the Soviet Communist Party.

So we reached no agreement on this topic.

The reason again is clear. We believe that human contacts are designed, not to serve governmental purposes, but to enable the mem-

51

bers of the human family to have the understanding and knowledge of each other which is a foundation for durable peace. But after a generation of fanatic indoctrination, the Soviet rulers can hardly bring themselves to loosen their existing thought controls to permit of freer contacts with the free world.

## IV

On all these matters dealt with at Geneva we tried to negotiate seriously with the Soviet Union. We wanted to reach constructive agreements if that could be done. But we were not prepared to reach agreements at the expense of the aspirations or security of the United States or its partners. Neither were we willing to make so-called "agreements" which were really meaningless. So when the Soviet Union showed itself unwilling to negotiate seriously on this basis we came away without agreement.

It would have been easy to make some apparent agreements with the Soviet Union—but they would have been without real content. They would have given an illusion of a meeting of minds, where none in fact existed. The three Western powers stood steadfastly against that kind of a performance. In doing so, they showed their confidence in their own strength and in the steadfastness of their own people. Thereby, this Conference may have improved the prospects for real agreements in the future.

## V

I now turn to the answers to the questions which I put at the beginning:

(1) Does this second Geneva Conference end the so-called "spirit of Geneva"?

The answer to that question depends upon what is meant by the "spirit of Geneva". Some felt that the spirit of Geneva was some magic elixir which would of itself solve all of the great problems of the world. Obviously, it was not that. Any such view was doomed to disillusionment.

That was never the view of the President nor myself. We constantly warned against that view. President Eisenhower, before he went to Geneva, said that that Conference would be a beginning and not an end. At Geneva he said that the value of the Conference could only be judged by what happened afterwards. And after he returned he told the American people that the acid test of the Summit Conference would begin when the Foreign Ministers met.

That testing, so far as it has gone, has shown that the Soviet leaders would like to have at least the appearance of cooperative relations with the Western nations. But it has shown that they are not yet willing to

52

create the indispensable conditions for a secure peace. Also they have seriously set back the growth of any confidence the free world can justifiably place in Soviet promises. They did this by refusing to negotiate for the reunification of Germany, to which they had agreed in July.

However, they seem not to want to revert to the earlier reliance on threats and invective. In that respect the spirit of Geneva still survives.

(2) Has the outcome of the second Conference at Geneva increased the risk of general war?

President Eisenhower said that he believed that the Summit Conference made it less likely that there would be open war between our countries. Nothing that happened at the Foreign Ministers Conference requires a change in that estimate. So that aspect of the Geneva spirit also remains.

(3) Do the events of the last three weeks mean that the cold war will be resumed in its full vigor?

The phrase "cold war" is a loose one.

Of course, there are sharp differences between the objectives of the Soviet Government and our own. We believe in justice for all and in the right of nations to be free and the right of individuals to exercise their God-given capacity to think and to believe in accordance with the dictates of their mind and conscience. We shall not cease to pursue these objectives or ever seek a so-called peace which compromises them.

However, these great purposes which have been characteristic of our nation from its beginning can be and will be pursued by us without resort to violence or without resort to the use of hatred and perversion of truth which are characteristic of war. It is our purpose to continue to seek friendship and understanding with the Russian people as a whole and to use truth as the instrument of our national policy.

The "cold war" in the sense of peaceful competition will inevitably go on. The spirit of Geneva could not and did not change that fact. Moreover, we must assume that the Soviet Union will continue its efforts by means short of war to make its system prevail as it has done in the past. We can, however, hope that this competition will not entail all the same hostility and animosity which so defiled the relations between us in the past.

(4) Will the United States now have radically to revise its programs for defense and mutual security?

The answer to this is "no". We have not lowered our guard on the basis of Soviet promises and did not do so because of the Summit Conference. Our security programs, which are bi-partisan in char-

53

acter, are designed to meet the peril as long as it may continue. We
are on what we call a long haul basis. Our military strength must
be based on the capability of the Soviet bloc and cannot vary with
their smiles or frowns. We will reduce our own military strength
only as the Soviets demonstrably reduce their own. Hence the out-
come of the Geneva Conference does not require us to alter the general
scope of our programs. Their general order of magnitude can remain
as planned.

Our steady policies have proved their worth. We believe in hold-
ing fast and reinforcing that which has proved good.

(5) Does this last Geneva Conference mean an end to future
negotiation with the Soviet Union?

It need not be an end and neither the President nor I believe that it
will be an end. It would of course be foolish to attempt new negotia-
tions if everything remains as it was when this last Conference came
to an end.

We know, however, that conditions will change because change is
the law of life.

At this Geneva Conference the Soviet Union had to face up con-
cretely to the cost of achieving the larger results which it says it wants
in terms of European security, disarmament, and increased contacts
between East and West.

On this occasion no positive results were achieved. But I recall
that President Eisenhower, after returning from Geneva, said that he
was "profoundly impressed with the need for all of us to avoid dis-
couragement merely because our own proposals, our own approaches,
and our own beliefs are not always immediately accepted by the other
side."¹ And he pointed to the difficulty of bridging the wide and deep
gulf between individual liberty and regimentation and between the
concept of man made in the image of God, and the concept of man as
the mere instrument of the State.

That gulf has created obstacles so great that they could not be
overcome at this recent Geneva Conference.

That does not mean that our efforts at that Conference were wasted.
The proposals we advanced were basically sound and respected the
legitimate interest of all. When solutions come, they will have to take
into account the principles which we sought to apply.

The Soviets pride themselves on being realists. They have shown
in the past that they will adapt their policies to facts and realities
once they recognize them. We believe that the free nations, by main-
taining and strengthening their unity, can make it apparent to the
Soviet Union that solutions such as we proposed are in its real inter-

¹ *Ante*, pp. 14–15.

54

est and will benefit them more than the local and temporary advantages to which they now seem to attach overriding importance.

Of course the Soviets will not change their policies if they believe that the free world is going to fall apart. That is why continuation of the present partnership of the independent nations is indispensable to a peaceful solution of present problems.

It is vital that all free nations, including ourselves, clearly understand this basic truth.

I am happy to be able to make a good report about this partnership.

In Paris, before the Geneva Conference, we had a useful session of the NATO Council. It was attended by virtually all of the Foreign Ministers of the 15 member countries. It served further to cement the unity represented by the Council.

While in Europe I also consulted with leaders of the movement to develop still further the unity of Europe. This movement is again becoming vigorous. In my talks, I made clear that the initiative for further steps toward European integration must come from the Europeans themselves but that the United States stands ready and eager to help to realize this great idea.

I went to Spain, Italy and Yugoslavia. In each place I had a full and helpful discussion of the international scene. The result was, I think, to create better understanding and firmer ties of friendship.

Finally, a most important fact is that at the Geneva Conference there were the closest personal and working relations between the British Foreign Minister, Mr. Macmillan[,] and the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Pinay, and myself. We also worked closely with the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany in matters that concerned it.

This spirit of fellowship, which fortified our common effort in a common cause, is one of the important products of the Geneva Conference.

The statement which I make to you tonight follows extended conference with President Eisenhower. He authorizes me to say that he fully shares the evaluation which I have made of the Geneva Conference and of its impact upon our national policies. That evaluation stems from the President's ruling and life purpose for a fair, just and durable peace for the world, a purpose which I share and which, with him, I strive to implement.

And now, in closing, let me read from my verbatim notes of our conference at Gettysburg this morning. As I was leaving, the President turned to me and said:

"I know that no setback, no obstacle to progress will ever deter this government and our people from the great effort to establish a just

55

and durable peace. Success may be long in coming, but there is no temporal force so capable of helping achieve it as the strength, the might, the spirit of 165 million free Americans. In striving toward this shining goal, this country will never admit defeat."

Letter From Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower,

January 23, 1956¹

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In the firm conviction that you share my concern over the present state of the relations between our countries, I should like to impart to you my ideas regarding possible means of improving those relations.

You, I am sure, agree with me that the present international situation requires all States, particularly the Great Powers, which bear special responsibility for assuring world-wide peace and the security of nations, to take measures that may help further to lessen international tension and strengthen confidence and cooperation between States. This would satisfy the heartfelt longing of peoples to live in peace and tranquillity and to devote their material resources and energy to creative and constructive work, cultural advancement, and prosperity.

At the Meeting of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers at Geneva, we all expressed our readiness to strive for a lessening of international tension and an improvement in relations between States in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation.

There is no doubt that for any future lessening of international tension the question of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States has special significance.

This raises the problem of the necessity for taking steps to improve substantially the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. Such improvement of Soviet-American relations would be a genuine contribution toward ameliorating the entire international situation and maintaining and consolidating world peace.

The history of the relations between our countries is convincing proof of the fact that their friendly cooperation, based on a striving for mutual understanding, mutual respect for sovereignty, and which

¹ Text from White House news release, Jan. 28, 1956.

56

was later based on the common struggle against the forces of aggression, satisfies the highest interests of the peoples of both countries.

It is certainly not by accident that, with the exception of the period of foreign intervention against the young Soviet Republic, the peoples of our States have never fought each other; that between them there have never been and are not now any irreconcilable differences, nor any frontiers or territories that might become an object of dispute or conflict.

This is why the Soviet people received with complete understanding your statement at the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers at Geneva, in which you remarked: "The American people would like to be friends of the Soviet people. There are no disputes between the American and Soviet peoples, there are no conflicts between them, there is no commercial hostility. Historically our peoples have always lived in peace."¹

Life itself has proven that cooperation between the USSR and the USA has been based, not on accidental and short-lived motives but on fundamental and enduring interests. This found a significant manifestation, first of all, in the fact that our countries were allies during both World Wars.

You, as one of the outstanding military leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition, are especially aware of the fact that the military cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States during the years of the Second World War played a most important part in crushing the common foe—the Fascist aggressors. Bound by the ties of blood shed by the best sons of the people of both countries, their military alliance, which was also shared by Great Britain, France, China, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Greece, and other countries of the coalition of freedom-loving peoples, endured with honor all trials of the war, which was thrust upon our peoples by the forces of aggression in the West and in the East.

It is highly regrettable that in the postwar period the relations of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and the USA should have worsened. The impairment of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, whatever the reasons may be, is contrary to the interests of both the Soviet and the American peoples and adversely affects the entire international situation.

¹ President Eisenhower's statement of July 18, 1955 is printed in *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955* (Department of State publication 6046, October 1955), pp. 18-22. The portion quoted by Chairman Bulganin differs somewhat from the original, presumably because of translation and retranslation.

544645—60—7

57

I am sure that you, like myself, are convinced that the differences between the social structures of the USA and the USSR should not prevent our countries from maintaining the political, economic, and cultural relations in which our peoples are interested. In the years preceding the Second World War, Soviet-American relations progressed considerably, especially in the economic field. During the war the relations between our countries reached new heights, which was due to the wide support of the peoples of our countries and which strengthened their mutual sympathies. This helped shorten the war and lessen the sacrifices of nations.

It is of course impossible not to take account of the fact that during the period of the "cold war" between the USSR and the USA serious disagreements have arisen with regard to various international problems connected with disarmament, the assurance of security in Europe, the German question, together with certain problems of the Far East, and the importance of the above-mentioned problems is recognized. At the last meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers at Geneva, even with the narrowing of the gap between the positions of both sides with regard to individual matters under discussion, substantial divergences became manifest and further efforts will in time be needed to reach the necessary agreement on a solution of the above problems.

Nevertheless, a continuation of the existing state of Soviet-American relations cannot further the settlement of unsolved international problems. At the same time an improvement in Soviet-American relations that would satisfy our peoples' longings for the furthering of friendly relations between our countries might create a new international atmosphere favorable to the settlement of controversial questions by means of negotiations on a mutually acceptable basis.

It is impossible not to see that a practical solution of the problem of a further lessening of international tension and strengthening of confidence between States, including the improvement of Soviet-American relations, is in the interest of both the Soviet and the American peoples as well as of all other nations.

I believe that you, Mr. President, will agree that under existing conditions international tension is fraught with the possibility of breaking the peace, with nations reaping all the dangerous consequences thereof.

Moreover, it is well known to everyone that the newest implements of war, such as atomic and hydrogen weapons, various instruments of present-day jet and rocket techniques, as well as other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, place the peoples of all countries in an equally dangerous situation in the event that international peace is disturbed,

58

threatening to subject their territories and, above all, densely popu-
lated districts of highly developed countries to the devastating effects
of atomic war.

At the present time more than ever, it is the duty of each State
to be concerned with the maintenance and strengthening of peace,
the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means alone, in
harmony with the aims and principles of the United Nations.

There can be no doubt that the peoples of the Soviet Union and
the United States of America are equally interested in putting an
end to the armaments race, which forces them to waste their strength
and resources for unproductive purposes. The existing armaments
race not only saddles nations with a heavy burden of military expendi-
tures and thereby creates obstacles to the promotion of their material
welfare, but also greatly intensifies the danger of a new war.

The improvement of Soviet-American relations would lighten the
task of putting an end to the armaments race and would contribute
to a fuller utilization of the economic resources of States in the
interest of peace. In this case the resources now going into unpro-
ductive military expenditures could be used for purposes of improv-
ing the material well-being of nations, lowering taxes, raising real
wages, housing and public construction, aiding underdeveloped coun-
tries in the interest of peace, and of strengthening international
cooperation.

All of this would contribute considerably toward the expansion of
the domestic market as well as the furtherance of international trade
and would moreover ensure a corresponding increase in production
and in employment of the population on the basis of an expansion
of the peace economy.

The fact should be recognized that events have recently taken place
the positive significance of which could not fail to be reflected in
the over-all international situation. The past year was one in which
no war was being waged in any part of the world. Recently certain
complicated international problems that had remained unsolved after
the end of the Second World War have been settled.

For the first time since the last war, a meeting of the Heads of
Government of the Four Powers was held in Geneva, and the results
achieved by us at that meeting were genuinely and fervently wel-
comed by the peoples of the entire world as corresponding to their
aspirations and hopes.

Recently an improvement has been noted in contacts between
countries of the East and West, particularly between the Soviet
Union and the United States of America, although it is still far
from possible to consider such contacts as broad and adequate. As

59

for the USSR and the USA, these expanded contacts have shown
how great are the longings of the peoples of our two countries for
the further development of such contacts and of friendly cooperation.

In all these important international events, in which the Soviet
Union has been advocating a stronger peace and friendship among
nations, the results achieved have to a considerable extent been due
to the cooperation that has taken place between our countries.

I am genuinely convinced that an improvement in Soviet-American
relations is urgently needed.

In my opinion this purpose could be served by the conclusion of a
treaty of friendship and cooperation between our countries.

Such a treaty could make provision for the parties, in a spirit of
genuine cooperation and mutual understanding, to develop and
strengthen the friendly relations between the people of the USSR
and the USA on the basis of the principle of equal rights, mutual
respect for State sovereignty, and noninterference in internal affairs,
and to settle all their international disputes, in accordance with the
provisions of the UN Charter, by peaceful means alone.

The treaty might also provide for the agreement of the parties to
cooperate in developing and strengthening economic, cultural, and
scientific cooperation between the USSR and the USA, based on the
principle of mutual advantage and equality of rights.

My colleagues and I feel that the conclusion of such a treaty be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States of America would be
an important contribution to the development of Soviet-American
relations and at the same time an act of great international
significance.

I firmly believe that the proposal concerning the conclusion of a
treaty of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and the USA
for the improvement of Soviet-American relations in the interest of
strengthening peace and for the further lessening of international
tension will be favorably received by you and will evoke a positive
response from the Soviet and American peoples, as well as from
those of other countries.

It is my opinion that the spirit of the treaty which I propose is
embodied in the draft enclosed herewith.

I trust that I may soon receive an expression of Your Excellency's
thoughts on this subject.

Respectfully,

N. BULGANIN

60

[Enclosure]

Draft

A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the President of the United States of America,

Inspired by a desire for a further lessening of international tension and for the establishment of trust between States and acting in the interest of maintaining world-wide peace and security,

Being desirous of strengthening the friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States of America,

Being convinced that a strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on the basis of the principles of equal rights, mutual respect for State sovereignty, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, conforms to the vital interest of both countries,

Asserting their faith in the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to cooperate and live in peace with all peoples and with all governments,

Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and have designated as their plenipotentiary representatives:

For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

For the President of the United States of America
who, having communicated to each other their full powers,
which have been found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Parties will develop and strengthen, in the spirit of sincere cooperation and mutual understanding, friendly relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America on the basis of equal rights, mutual respect for State sovereignty, and noninterference in internal affairs.

ARTICLE II

The Contracting Parties have agreed, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to settle all their international disputes by peaceful means.

ARTICLE III

The Contracting Parties will contribute to the development and strengthening of economic, cultural and scientific cooperation between the two States, on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit and equal rights.

To implement the present Article, appropriate agreements may be concluded between the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE IV

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification. It shall become effective on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification which is to take place in the City of ............ in the shortest possible time.

The Treaty shall be valid for 20 years from the date of its coming into force. Upon the expiration of the aforesaid period each of the Contracting Parties shall have the right to denounce it. Such denunciation shall become effective one year from the date on which notice thereof is given.

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In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and have
affixed their seals thereto.

Done at .................................... on .................................... 1956, in two copies in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

By authority of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

By authority of the President of the United States of America

January 28, 1956¹

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I wish to thank you for your letter of January twenty-third, delivered to me by Ambassador Zaroubin. I have given it careful thought.

Let me say at the outset that I do indeed believe that the present international situation requires all states, particularly the great powers, to seek to lessen international tension and strengthen international confidence and cooperation.

As the power of destruction grows, it becomes imperative not merely to strive to control and limit that power, but also to do away with antagonisms which could tempt men to use that power. That view, I can assure you, is held by the people of the United States and by their political leaders without any exception whatsoever.

I am confident that that view is also shared by all the peoples of the world, and that those who have been entrusted with political authority have a high duty to respond to the universal longing of the peoples for peace.

As you are good enough to recall, I have more than once alluded to the immensely valuable asset we have in the historic friendship between our peoples. I profoundly believe that upon that foundation better political relations could be established. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that there is in the whole world no people more sincerely dedicated to building a structure of peace than the American people. Our whole nation longs for a cessation of the strains and dangers now present in the international situation. There is indeed no honorable thing that we would not do if we were convinced that it would promote a just peace in the world.

It is from this viewpoint that I have examined your present suggestion that the cause of peace would now be served by the conclusion between our countries of a treaty of friendship and cooperation of 20 years duration.

¹Text from White House news release, Jan. 28, 1956.

62

I first observe that our countries are already bound to each other by a solemn treaty—the Charter of the United Nations. The treaty which you now propose would consist of three substantive articles. I observe also that each one of these is already covered by the explicit provisions in this United Nations treaty between us.

The first article of your draft would bind our two countries to develop friendly relations between our peoples on the basis of equal rights, mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs. As members of the United Nations we are already bound through that organization “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.

The second article of your proposed treaty would bind us to settle our international disputes by peaceful means alone. This is an undertaking to which our two countries are already bound by the provisions of Article 2(3) of the Charter of the United Nations which specifies that “all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means”.

The third article would bind us to the strengthening of economic, cultural and scientific cooperation. Chapter IX of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with “International Economic and Social Cooperation” pledges us to work for “solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems”, and to “international cultural and educational cooperation”.

The Charter of the United Nations constitutes a solemn treaty not only between your country and our own—it is a treaty among many countries, all of whom are bound to us and to each other, and all of whom are concerned with world peace. The American people sincerely desire to help make reality of these charter goals.

But the present state of international tension was not prevented by the words of the Charter. How can we hope that the present situation would be cured merely by repeating those words in a bilateral form?

I wonder whether again going through a treaty-making procedure, and this time on a bilateral basis only, might indeed work against the cause of peace by creating the illusion that a stroke of a pen had achieved a result which in fact can be obtained only by a change of spirit.

Friendly collaboration between states depends not solely upon treaty promises but upon the spirit that animates the governments of the states concerned and upon actual performance.

It was in the hope of promoting such a spirit and such performance that I went to Geneva last July, a course which had no peacetime

63

precedent in American history. Despite the doubts of many that the mission would, in fact, serve any useful purpose, I felt that the existing situation was so serious that no chance for improvement, however slight, ought to be neglected. In Geneva you expressed similar views and aspirations.

I had earnestly hoped that out of that meeting with you and with the Heads of Government of France and the United Kingdom would come a bettering of international relations, especially as between the four nations there represented and in relation to particular problems for which our four nations had a particular responsibility.

Unhappily, the American people have had sadly to conclude that the events following our meeting have not given substance to their hope.

Permit me to recall to your mind a short record of recent events.

At Geneva we directed our Foreign Ministers to propose effective means for the solution of three specific problems.

The first of these problems was that of European security and Germany. We explicitly agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections should be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security. However, despite constructive proposals put forward by the three Western powers for German reunification and European security, your Government felt that it could not at this time entertain any proposal dealing with the reunification of Germany by means of free elections.

The second problem was that of disarmament. In our Geneva discussion of that problem I made my "open skies" proposal in the hope that we might actually do something to convince the world that we had no aggressive purposes against each other. But this proposal your Government rejected at the Foreign Ministers meeting.

The third problem was the development of contacts between East and West. The Western Ministers proposed many concrete measures to bring about closer relations and better understanding, none of which was accepted by your Government. Despite that fact there has, as you point out, recently been some improvement in contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

A further deterioration has taken place because to us it has seemed that your Government had, in various areas of the world, embarked upon a course which increases tensions by intensifying hatreds and animosities implicit in historic international disputes. I share your conviction that an improvement in Soviet-American relations is urgently needed. But frankly, our people find it difficult to reconcile what appears to us to be the purposes of your Government in these

64

areas with your present words—words which so rightly emphasize
the special responsibility of our Governments to lessen international
tension and strengthen confidence and cooperation between states.

I deal with the history of this past year solely for the purpose of
enabling us with better prospect of success to chart our future. This
nation holds out the hand of friendship to all who would grasp it in
sincerity. I have often said, and I now repeat, that there is nothing
I would not do to promote peace with justice for the world. But
we know that it is deeds and not words alone which count.

Consider, Mr. Chairman, what a vast change would be effected not
only in our relations but throughout the entire world if there were
prompt measures to reunify Germany in freedom within the frame-
work of security; if there were carried out our wartime pledge to
respect the right of peoples to choose the form of government under
which they will live; if there were arranged such mutual opening
of our countries to inspection that the possibilities of surprise attack
would vanish and if reductions of armament were made practical,
with the release of productive power for the betterment of mankind.
Consider, also, the mountain of distrust and misunderstanding that
would disappear if our peoples freely exchanged news, information,
visits and ideas.

These are all matters which you and I have discussed together
at Geneva. They are results to which my nation remains dedicated
and toward which we are prepared at any moment to move in a
spirit of conciliation. May I hope, from your letter, that you too
are dedicated to these great ends?

I shall look forward to receiving a further expression of your views.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin,
March 1, 1956¹

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In accordance with my message to you of
October eleventh, I have now thoroughly reviewed your letter of
September nineteenth, regarding the objective of an acceptable system
of disarmament which we discussed at Geneva.²

I have noted with satisfaction that you have expressed agreement

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Mar. 26, 1956, pp. 514-515. President Eisenhower's letter was delivered by Ambassador Bohlen at Moscow on Mar. 5, 1956.

²For texts, see *ibid*., Oct. 24, 1955, pp. 643-647.

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with the importance of providing mutual safeguards against surprise
attack and with the desirability of reciprocal reductions in armaments.
You have credited me with a sincere desire to find a way to settle the
important problem of international control and inspection.

It would appear, however, that you raise the following questions
with regard to my Geneva proposal. You ask whether the adoption
of my offer would lead to the reduction of armaments, and express
doubt. You suggest the need of extending the inspection to other
countries. You raise other points regarding nuclear weapons.

I am confident that the adoption of my Geneva proposal combined
with ground inspection teams which you proposed, thus reducing
the danger of surprise attack, will in fact lead to a reduction of
armaments, the lessening of tensions, and the brightening of the
prospects of a durable peace. Certainly the United States is fully
resolved to achieve those ends. My representative on the Subcom-
mittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission will be pre-
pared to help develop a program to carry out that resolve, through
appropriate action by our Governments.

In my judgment, our efforts must be directed especially to bringing
under control the nuclear threat. As an important step for this
purpose and assuming the satisfactory operation of our air and
ground inspection system, the United States would be prepared to
work out, with other nations, suitable and safeguarded arrangements
so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the
world would no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive
weapons. With this could be combined my proposal of December 8,
1953, "to begin now and continue to make joint contributions" from
existing stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an
international atomic agency.¹ These measures, if carried out ad-
equately, would reverse the present trend toward a constant increase
in nuclear weapons overhanging the world. My ultimate hope is
that all production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world
will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.

I am mindful of the difficulties in this regard, pointed out in your
Government's proposals of May 10, 1955,² arising from the possibilities
for evading international control and organizing the clandestine
manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The risks inherent
in failing to achieve control, however, make it imperative to over-
come the difficulties involved and to devise and implement an effec-
tive system of safeguards. With genuine efforts on both sides, I feel
confident we can succeed in this endeavor.

¹ *Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1958, pp. 847-851.

² See *ante*, p. 3.

66

In general, my feeling is that disarmament should be sought pri-
marily, though not exclusively, in terms of limitations on armaments
rather than on men. The former are more subject to supervision,
regulation and control than the latter. In the present state of inter-
national affairs and especially in the absence of real peace in the
Far East, I foresee that it may be difficult to agree on reductions
in the general level of armed forces at this time. It should, however,
be possible now to agree on measures having a stabilizing effect, deal-
ing with the control and limitation, under proper safeguards, of
major types of armaments. These measures will be an essential part
of the comprehensive system required to provide security to partici-
pating states.

If the United States and U.S.S.R. and our associates on the Sub-
committee—the United Kingdom, France and Canada—can reach
a basic agreement, I am confident that other nations would want to
join in what they would regard as a favorable development for world
peace. With the agreement of other nations concerned, the United
States would expect the agreed system of supervision to apply, in an
appropriate and effective manner, to forces and facilities which we
both have outside our borders.

During the early phases of such a program, both the U.S.S.R. and
the United States would have very extensive military strength, in-
cluding stocks of nuclear weapons. I wish to make it clear that, so
far as the United States is concerned, we would continue to hold such
strength, not for aggression, nor for narrow national purposes, but
as a contribution toward world stability in this transitional period.

I welcome the indication that you are giving major attention to this
subject which has such extraordinary significance to the peoples of our
two countries and of the other nations of the world. May I assure
you and the people of your country that the objective of the United
States continues to be the attainment of a just and durable peace.

I hope that the coming meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee
will succeed in making real progress toward that goal.

I also wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge receipt of your
letter of February first¹ which replied to mine of January twenty-
eighth. My view remains generally as expressed in that letter. But
I shall continue to study the problem with a view to seeing whether
it seems that any useful new steps can be taken as between us. I may
communicate again with you later on this matter.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

¹Text in *Department of State Bulletin*, Mar. 26, 1956, pp. 515-518.

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Letter From Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower,
June 6, 1956¹

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I think you will agree with me that at the present time the problem of disarmament continues to be one of the most important and urgent international problems.

After the end of the Second World War, which caused innumerable
sacrifices and great material losses to humanity, all of us were deter-
mined to do everything possible in order not to allow a third world
war to break out. It was with this aim in mind that after the Second
World War the nations began negotiations on the reduction of arma-
ments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. Unfortunately, these
negotiations have not as yet produced any positive results. I believe
that you also share the opinion that the appearance of new types of
weapons for mass destruction, such as atomic and hydrogen weapons,
makes the necessity of solving the problems of disarmament particu-
larly urgent. I need not give more details to you, who are an out-
standing military man and who were so close to the events of the past
war.

You will recall, Mr. President, that at the Meeting of the Heads of
Government of the Four Powers at Geneva, of which we still retain the
warmest recollections, all participants, including you on behalf of the
Government and people of the United States, expressed the common
desire to eliminate the threat of war and to diminish the burden of
armaments.

The Soviet Government directed particular attention to the study
of how the disarmament talks could overcome the deadlock in which
they find themselves at present. The facts show that the negotiations
on the question of disarmament which were conducted in the U.N.
subcommittee have not given positive results. Recently these nego-
tiations have become extremely complicated. Actually, the activity
of the subcommittee on disarmament is retarding progress in this
matter. Under such conditions it is difficult to expect the U.N. talks
to lead to concrete results in the area of disarmament in the very near
future.

Taking this circumstance into consideration, the Soviet Govern-
ment decided to make a new approach to the solution of the disarma-
ment problem. We should like to have this aspiration of the Soviet
Government correctly understood.

¹ Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 20, 1956, pp. 300-301.

68

We have become deeply convinced that now, when a definite easing of international tension is taking place and the "cold war" is becoming a thing of the past, there are more favorable conditions for stopping the armament race and for taking disarmament measures. Under these conditions we believe that until such time as an international agreement on the disarmament problem is reached, the efforts of states should be directed toward each one's taking concrete measures for reducing armaments, which measures could be carried out without waiting for the conclusion of an international agreement on disarmament. The execution of such measures would undoubtedly contribute to further lessening of international tension and to strengthening of mutual trust among the nations, which in turn would lead to the creation of more favorable conditions for the realization of an all-embracing universal program of disarmament.

I trust, Mr. President, that you will agree that an initiative of the Great Powers, including the Soviet Union and the United States, which have at their disposal the greatest armed strength and material resources would be of decisive importance in this respect.

Guided by the high aims of strengthening peace among peoples, the Soviet Government decided to take the initiative and, without waiting for a disarmament agreement, make a large cut in the armed forces of the Soviet Union, amounting to 1,200,000 men, this in addition to the 1955 cut of 640,000 men. The armaments and combat materiel of the armed forces of the U.S.S.R., as well as the military expenditures of the Soviet Union in the U.S.S.R. state budget, will be cut accordingly.

In line with this decision, 63 divisions and separate brigades are being demobilized, including three air divisions and other combat units numbering over 30,000 men stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic. We of course understand that the withdrawal from Germany of the said number of Soviet troops does not solve the question entirely. This measure of the Soviet Government is only the first step. However, we base our thinking on the premise that if the Governments of the United States, England, and France, which have their troops on German territory, would for their part also take steps to reduce their armed forces in Germany, then this would undoubtedly prepare the ground for more decisive steps in this matter. At the same time we have in mind that such measures on the part of the governments of the four powers could later lead to an agreement on a sharp reduction in the foreign armed forces in Germany or the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from German territory.

69

My colleagues and I express the hope that the Government of the United States and that you personally, Mr. President, will carefully examine the enclosed statement of the Soviet Government on the question of disarmament dated May 14,¹ and that on your part you will make a significant contribution to the cause of ending the armaments race, and to the cause of a further easing of international tensions and strengthening of universal peace.

Appropriate steps by our states would undoubtedly be supported by other countries, which would mark the beginning of a practical realization of the all-embracing program of disarmament mentioned above.

With sincere respect,

N. BULGANIN

## Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin, August 4, 1956²

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I refer to your letter of June 6 to which I have given a great deal of thought.

It confirmed your announcement of last May that you plan to reduce somewhat the manpower level of your armed forces. Such a reduction I welcome. That would correspond with the action of the United States Government in steadily reducing the size of its armed forces ever since the end of World War II, with an exception only for the Korean war period.

However, I doubt that such reductions of this particular kind as our governments may make in their respective national interests will contribute effectively to eliminate the fear, and the vast cost, generated by national armaments. There is obvious need of international supervisory mechanisms and controls which will encourage greater reductions. I regret that we have made so little progress in this respect.

Some time ago I agreed to your proposal for ground inspection on the assumption that you would also agree to my proposal for aerial inspection, and exchange of military information, made at Geneva a year ago. So far, I understand that you reject this on the ground that it would be an intelligence operation. What I proposed was to be preceded by an exchange of complete military blueprint infor-

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 301-305.

² For text see *ibid.*, Aug. 20, 1956, pp. 299-300.

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mation, and was designed to make known to each other that neither of us is preparing a sudden massive attack against the other, and that each of us is fulfilling such agreements as I trust we shall be able to reach in the field of disarmament. Surely that kind of intelligence is desirable and necessary, and in the interest of peace and international confidence. Can we not make progress on this?

And also I recall my letter to you of March 1, 1956, when I proposed that, after a date to be agreed upon, production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world would no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons. I had hoped that this proposal, which seemed to me to be of considerable significance, would appeal to you as an important step toward bringing the nuclear threat under control. However, you have never responded to that proposal, and your letter of June 6 makes no reference to the control of nuclear weapons. May I again urge careful consideration of the matter, and especially my proposal of last March?

You refer in your letter to a possible reduction of our respective forces in Germany. Obviously the problem of forces in Germany cannot be dealt with as an isolated matter. In this respect, I must confess that I am greatly disturbed by the developments which have occurred since we met at Geneva last year. We there agreed that the reunification of Germany was a common responsibility of the four Governments at Geneva, and we also agreed that Germany should be reunified by means of free elections carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security. Not only has this not happened, but I hear of statements from your side which seem to imply that your Government is determined to maintain indefinitely the division of Germany.

I must confess that I am perplexed as to how we can work together constructively if agreements which are negotiated at the highest level after the most thorough exploration do not seem dependable.

Nevertheless, it is my earnest hope that we will find ways to make progress toward a meaningful control of armaments, a hope shared, I believe, not only by ourselves but by the peoples of the world.

I and my associates have never ceased to give the most intensive study to this whole matter of limitation of armaments and above all the elimination of the growing threat of nuclear weapons and new means of delivery. If this study develops further possibilities of international action, as I trust it will, I shall communicate them to you, either directly or through the appropriate organs of the United Nations. In this connection, I must say that I do not share

71

your view about the activities of the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee. Discussions there have done much to shed light on this difficult problem and, I hope, to narrow somewhat the gap between our points of view.

May we not, Mr. Chairman, do more to realize the hopes which were born of our meeting at Geneva? We then made promises, notably about Germany, which desperately need to be fulfilled. We pledged ourselves to disarmament efforts which could be fruitful of good for all the world if only we could agree on measures of supervision and control which should be attainable if neither of us has anything hostile to hide. We sought to find the way to develop contacts which would enable our peoples, through better knowledge of each other, to strengthen their friendship, which can be a precious bulwark of peace.

We realize that efforts are being made in your country to eradicate some of the evils of an earlier period. This we welcome. But I hope that you and your associates will not confine these efforts to those evils as manifested within your Party and nation. Those evils were also projected into the international field. Even today they constitute a grievous obstacle to doing those things which we both agreed ought to be done. This situation needs also to be remedied by a new spirit for which I earnestly appeal.

I am,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Memorandum From the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Union, September 2 [?], 1956¹

[Unofficial translation]

1) A unanimous decision was reached in Moscow in September 1955 between the Government delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union to resume diplomatic relations. Since this agreement has been put into effect, and the Embassies in Bonn and Moscow have assumed their functions and familiarized themselves with their duties, the Federal Government thinks it time to call to mind another agreement reached in connection with this matter. The agreement in question is contained in a communication written by the Soviet Prime Minister, Marshal Bulganin, to the

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 24, 1956, pp. 486-493. The memorandum was delivered on Sept. 7, 1956.

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Government delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany on 13 September 1955,¹ and is expressed as follows:

The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its conviction that the diplomatic relations now being resumed will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany in the interests of peace and security in Europe.

In expressing this conviction, the Soviet Government bases itself on the belief that the establishment and development of normal relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany will contribute to solving open questions affecting the whole of Germany, and will thus help to solve the main national problem of the entire German people—the re-establishment of the unity of the German Democratic State.

In its reply of the same date, the Federal Government confirmed this agreement, expressing it in the same words.

The Federal Government bases itself on the assumption that it was, and still is, the earnest intention of both sides to realize that agreement and to conduct their policy accordingly.

In the spirit of this agreement, the Federal Government takes the liberty of outlining to the Government of the U.S.S.R. its ideas as to how the reunification of the German people can best and most quickly be accomplished in a manner satisfactory to those primarily concerned, and, at the same time, to all nations.

2) The Government of the U.S.S.R. has of late on various occasions expressed the opinion that the existence of two German states is a reality which must be taken into account and that it must therefore be left to these two states to bring about reunification. It has repeatedly hinted that it does not at present consider the reunification of Germany urgent. Accordingly, it has repeatedly proposed that a European security system should be created in which initially two German States should participate as members.

On the other hand, it was the Soviet Government itself which, only a few years ago, designated the solution of the German problem as a task which brooked no delay (note addressed by the Soviet Government to the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, on 28 September 1953).² The Soviet Government expressed its view at that time in the words—

¹For text of Bulganin's letter, see 86th Cong., 1st sess., *Documents on Germany, 1944-1959: Background Documents on Germany, 1944-1959, and a Chronology of Political Developments Affecting Berlin, 1945-1956* (printed for use of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 8, 1959), pp. 155-156. This text represents a different translation from that quoted in the above memorandum from the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Union.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 26, 1953, p. 548.

544645—60—8

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that the question of the re-establishment of the national unity of a democratic Germany was and remained the main issue confronting the German people, an issue in the settlement of which every peace-loving people in the whole of Europe is interested.

In its note of 15 August 1953, to the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States,¹ in which it expressed the same conviction, the Soviet Government furthermore stated the following:

> No excuses whatsoever can justify any further delay in this matter, since, in the present circumstances, the Governments of France, Great Britain, the United States, and the USSR, bear the main responsibility for arriving at a solution. On no account must any measures be postponed which—and even if they be merely aimed at a gradual solution of the problem of the reunification of Germany—can promote the formation of an all-German Democratic Government.

The Federal Government is unable to perceive any reason which might cause the Soviet Government to change its views on the urgency of the problem of reunification. The Federal Government is, for its part, of the opinion that each one of the reasons which at the time convinced the Soviet Government of the urgency of the question continues to exist at present—in fact, in greater measure. In its note of 10 March 1952, to the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States,² the Soviet Government itself said it was abnormal that seven years had already elapsed since the cessation of hostilities without any peace treaty having been concluded with Germany. Meanwhile, this abnormality has now continued for eleven years. In its note of 9 April 1952, to the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States,³ the Soviet Government even mentioned the fact that the continued partition of Germany entailed the danger of an outbreak of hostilities in Europe. The Federal Government shares the view expressed by the Soviet Government at that time that any continuation of the partition of Germany represents a serious international danger. Even though a certain improvement is happily apparent in the situation in comparison with the acute international tension which still existed in 1952, there can be no doubt that any pacification of Europe calls for a solution to the problem of German reunification and accordingly the removal of the dangers inherent in the partition of Germany. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that it is the honest intention of Soviet foreign policy to secure world peace and to bring about a lasting order in Europe offering all nations security, liberty, and prosperity. On the other

¹ *Ibid.*, Sept. 14, 1953, p. 354.

² *Ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1952, p. 531.

³ *Ibid.*, May 26, 1952, p. 819.

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hand, the unnecessary prolongation by the Soviet Government of the partition of Germany by its assertion, contrary to the views of an overwhelming majority of the other countries in the world, of the existence of two German States, seems to the Federal Republic incompatible with these intentions.

3) The Federal Government points out with satisfaction that, with regard to the legal situation, there is agreement: when the Four Powers assumed the governmental power on the cessation of hostilities, they undertook the obligation to maintain Germany as a whole. During the time that followed, they have repeatedly admitted this legal obligation and their moral responsibility for the reestablishment of Germany's unity. Thus it was, for instance, in explicit recognition of this "common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany" that the directive from the four Heads of Government, addressed to their Foreign Ministers on 23 July 1955, was drawn up.

4) In the opinion of the Federal Government, international developments during recent years can in no circumstances justify so profound a change of opinion as seems evident from more recent utterances on the part of the Soviet Government. The Federal Government is aware that the Soviet Government substantiates its present view of the question of the reunification of Germany, i.e. by the fact that the Federal Republic has decided to set up her own national forces and to join the defense system of NATO and Western European Union. The Federal Government nonetheless believes that the Soviet evaluation of this policy is based on erroneous premises and assumptions and is unable to give up the hope of convincing the Soviet Government and the Soviet people of the fallacy of such assumptions and premises.

5) It cannot be assumed that the setting up by the Federal Republic of her own national forces calls forth apprehension on the part of the Soviet Government in regard to its own security or the security of Germany's eastern neighbors. It is one of the irrefutable prerogatives of every sovereign state to exercise the right of individual and collective self-defense, a right accorded to every state in article 51 of the charter of the United Nations, of which the Soviet Union is a member. Furthermore, the Soviet Government itself proposed, in its draft peace treaty for Germany on 10 March 1952,¹ that a reunited Germany should be allowed to have her own national forces (land, sea, and air) necessary for the defense of the country. The strength

¹ *Ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1952, p. 532.

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of the forces that the Federal Republic is planning to set up is, by
comparison with the population of the Federal Republic, far below
the strength of armaments of most other states in Europe, and par-
ticularly in Eastern Europe. The general compulsory military service
introduced by the Federal Republic is the same form of military
service which is usual in the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic is
the only country in the world solemnly to renounce the production
not only of all weapons of mass destruction (atomic armaments, bio-
logical and chemical weapons), but also of numerous heavy arma-
ments. This fact alone clearly reveals the defensive nature of her
military measures.

6) At the same time, it reveals the attitude taken by the Federal Government to the question of disarmament. It takes an active interest in a general disarmament agreement.

This interest derives first and foremost from general reasons of
securing peace. The German Federal Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer, said
in Moscow on 9 September 1955:

The most precious possession that every German is intent on safeguarding is peace. We know only too well how much the Soviet and German peoples in particular suffered during the last war, and I therefore believe that I shall find your understanding if I say that the horror of the destruction which would be wrought by a modern war, of the millions of human sacrifices, of the razing of homes and factories, of the devastation of towns and countryside, has left its indelible mark on each and every one of us. We know in Germany, too, that the scientific and technical progress achieved since the last war in the field of nuclear fission and other related fields has put possibilities of destruction into the hand of man, the mere thought of which causes one to shudder. After all, everybody in Germany knows that the geographical position of our country would jeopardize us to the highest degree in the case of an armed conflict. You will therefore find nobody in Germany—not only among responsible political leaders but also in the entire population—who even remotely toys with the thought that any one of the major political problems awaiting solution could be solved by war. The longing which has gripped humanity that war may have outlived itself by its own dreadfulness—that longing is deeply and strongly rooted in the heart of every German.

That remains valid in undiminished measure today.

It would also be a misunderstanding to assume that the Federal
Government is opposed to general disarmament because it links it
with the simultaneous settlement of the question of German reunifica-
tion and because it continues to set up its own forces.

The interrelation between the problem of disarmament and that of
reunification is ineluctable. It would be rendering a sorry service
to the cause of disarmament indeed if one detached it, after the man-
ner of many a well-meaning world-reformer, from all political aspects
and argued, so to speak, in a vacuum. In the hard reality of this

76

world, general disarmament can be brought about only if the political prerequisites exist. For the states simply will not—as experience has shown often enough—be prepared to carry out disarmament honestly as long as there are smoldering conflicts which may burst into violent flame any day. That is why what matters is to remove the causes of the tension existing today, which have led to the present high level of world armament. The Federal Government, however, has repeatedly stressed the fact that it considers it quite possible to solve the problem of disarmament hand in hand with that of reunification. It is therefore by no means of the opinion that a disarmament agreement must be deferred until reunification has been achieved.

It is perfectly evident that the setting up of its own forces is not in contradiction to the wishes of the Federal Government in regard to disarmament. A disarmament agreement cannot be concluded on the basis that one state with no soldiers at all remains at that level, while another with over a hundred divisions reduces that number by twenty, forty, or sixty. Rather must one base oneself on a comparable level of armaments—a principle which, moreover, was recognized in the protracted, but unfortunately fruitless, disarmament efforts made at the beginning of the thirties. Thus the setting up of its own forces does not in any way preclude untiring and active efforts on the part of the Federal Government to bring about a general disarmament agreement.

7) Even the fact that the forces are being raised in connection with the Federal Republic's membership in NATO and the Western European Union does not change anything in this evaluation. If this is what is causing the Soviet Union apprehension, then it must be stated first of all that all the fears expressed by the Soviet side in regard to the membership of the Federal Republic in these organizations are based on erroneous premises concerning their nature. Both NATO and the Western European Union are alliances which exclusively serve the purpose of individual and collective self-defense. It is an example of what can be accomplished in the area of limiting armaments and armament control when peoples work together for the purpose of conciliation and relaxation of tension.

The members of the Atlantic and Western European defense organizations are in complete agreement with regard to their defensive goals. Each of them has the greatest interest in insuring that no member country in pursuing her national political aims takes any steps which might lead to hostilities. Membership in these organizations must therefore have a moderating effect on the policy of every member state. A member state may count on the help of its allies only if it is the victim of aggression.

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At this juncture, it must be repeated that, after the wars and catastrophes of recent decades, the longing of every people, and in particular of the two peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union, so much afflicted in two world wars, for an international order offering security and peace to all is very understandable. The Federal Government is determined to achieve the reunification of the two separate parts of Germany exclusively by peaceful means. It is ready at any time to repeat this renunciation of force, which has already been given to the Western peoples and which is valid for its relationship with all peoples, to the Soviet Union, and to the eastern neighboring countries in binding form.

8) Furthermore, it is a regrettable misunderstanding if the Soviet Government assumes that the Western Powers will demand that the whole of Germany belong to NATO and the Western European Union after reunification. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have never imposed any such condition. On the contrary, it was stated clearly, even at the Berlin Four Power Conference in 1954,¹ that the policy of the three Western Powers was to accord to a reunited Germany absolute freedom to decide her own foreign policy. The Federal Government has also consistently championed the principle that a future all-German Government must be free to decide whether it wishes to seek security in an alliance with the West, with the East, or without any alliance at all. The Federal Government has made this principle of freedom of decision for a reunited Germany a cornerstone of its policy.

This attitude is confirmed by the fact that the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in their Geneva proposal of 28 October 1955, on "Reunification of Germany and [European] Security"² offered the Soviet Union, for the contingency of German reunification's being achieved, a considerable number of security guaranties which were to become effective even if the all-German Government declined to accept membership in the Western defense system. Additional security guaranties were also to be provided according to this proposal for the event that a united Germany should decide for membership in NATO. These included the mutual assistance which both sides should promise each other contractually for the event of an armed attack in Europe by a NATO member against a state not belonging to NATO and vice versa.

¹ For published record, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954* (Department of State publication 5399, Mar. 1954).

² *The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955* (Department of State publication 6156), pp. 27-33.

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This state of affairs was again quite correctly described by the British Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, in his statement to the House of Commons on 23 July 1956.

9) If the Soviet Government should continue to believe itself unable to agree to the reunification of Germany because the forces and military installations of NATO would be advanced a few hundred kilometers eastward if a united Germany were to decide to join NATO, this concern could be removed by appropriate arrangements. After British Prime Minister Eden had, on the basis of such considerations, already proposed for discussion on the 18th of July 1955, in Geneva the creation of a demilitarized zone between East and West, for the same considerations it was stated in point 3 of the joint draft proposal of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, dated 28 October 1955, for a treaty with special guarantees for the event of the reunification of Germany:

> In parts of the zone which lie closest to the line of demarcation, there might be special measures relating to the disposition of military forces and installations.

The Federal Government deeply regrets that there has so far been no detailed discussion of this significant proposal, based on the general idea that it is not intended to improve, by the reunification of Germany, the military situation of any one group of powers.

10) In any case, the Federal Government earnestly desires to take into account the security considerations of the Soviet Union as far as humanly possible, even if it cannot admit that, seen through objective eyes, the security of the Soviet Union could in any way be prejudiced by the policy of the Federal Republic. The Federal Government was therefore appreciative when the problem of the reunification of Germany was closely linked, at the two Geneva conferences in 1955, with the problem of a European security system. Despite the final results of the Geneva negotiations, disappointing to the German people, it is of the opinion that the discussion of the security and reunification problems has led to a certain amount of progress and that a number of proposals were submitted whose further discussion would be fruitful.

The Federal Government is in favor of a European security system based on a solemn renunciation by all members of the use of force in solving political disputes in their mutual relations. In a security system of this kind, each member state should commit itself to refuse an aggressor any support whatsoever. The Federal Government adopts fundamentally a positive attitude to these ideas. It also does not exclude other suitable proposals for elements of a security

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system. Therefore it is also in favor of a mutual assistance obligation of all members of a European security treaty for the event of an armed attack in Europe by a NATO member against a state not belonging to NATO and vice versa. As far as it is fear for her own security that causes the Soviet Union to withhold her consent to the reunification of Germany, there is nothing to prevent the considerations expressed hitherto from being reexamined with a view to ascertaining their applicability.

11) The Soviet Government, for its part, submitted to the Geneva Conference on 28 October 1955, the draft of a general treaty on collective security containing a number of similar proposals.¹ A fundamental difference between the Soviet proposal and that of the West, however, consisted in the fact that the former envisaged the membership of two German States in this treaty system.

Together with the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the Federal Government believes that a European security system participated in by two German States is in itself a contradictory idea doomed to failure. This idea is also inconsistent with the directive issued by the four Heads of Government on 23 July 1955, which explicitly states the close relation between the reunification of Germany and the problem of European security, and which therefore envisages the simultaneous treatment of both questions. The reasons for this relationship have often been explained: The partition of Germany represents an abnormal situation. A security system based on that situation would in fact petrify it, so to speak, while the aim of a security system should, after all, be to create normal conditions and, at the same time, to satisfy the alleged or real security needs of those directly or indirectly participating.

The Federal Government therefore considers it indispensable to link the solution of both questions to each other in such a manner that, from the very beginning, only one German State, namely reunified Germany, joins the European security system.

12) This demand leads to the question of how the reunification of Germany can be achieved.

Even as recently as 23 July 1955, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Marshal Bulganin, reached an agreement with the Heads of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, to the effect that "the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-48.

80

elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national inter-
ests of the German people and the interests of European security."
When this agreement was signed on 23 July 1955, the Paris agree-
ments of 23 October 1954,¹ had been in force for quite some time
and the Federal Republic was a member of NATO and WEU. None-
though, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, on 8 November
1955, declined the proposal of the three Western Powers in Geneva ²
that free elections should be held in the whole of Germany by secret
ballot before the end of September 1956, substantiating his rejection
by saying that the situation which had prevailed since the Berlin
conference in 1954 had undergone a serious change in consequence
of the Paris agreements. Contrary to the Geneva directive issued
by the four Heads of Government on 23 July 1955, Mr. Molotov
expressed the view that the question of holding free all-German
elections was not yet ripe for discussion and that first of all a "rap-
prochement and cooperation" between the two German States—exist-
ing in his opinion—was necessary.

Thus the Soviet Foreign Minister imposed a new condition for the
reunification of Germany which, in effect, amounted to making the
reunification of Germany impossible for a long time to come.

The Soviet Government should not close its eyes to the fact that
the regime of the so-called "German Democratic Republic" has not
succeeded, even in the course of several years, in winning the con-
fidence and assent of its population. That regime claims to represent
a state of working people, particularly laborers and farmers, and the
laborers and farmers of Central Germany are the very people whose
overwhelming majority deeply resents that regime. The Federal
Government does not doubt that the Soviet Government itself did
some earnest thinking on the matter after 17 June 1953. Unfortu-
nately, conditions in Central Germany have not in any way improved
since those events. On the contrary, a continuous stream of refugees
continues to pour, month by month, from the Zone into the Federal
Republic.

Contrary to this picture, which sketches the real state of affairs in
the Zone, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, asserted in Ge-
neva on 8 November 1955, that a "mechanical fusion of the two separate
parts of Germany by so-called free elections would lead to violation
of the vital interests of the workers in the GDR [German Democratic

¹ For text, see *London and Paris Agreements, September-October 1954* (Department of State publication 5659, Nov. 1954), pp. 63-122.

² See *The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955* (Department of State publication 6156, Dec. 1955), pp. 136-137, 145-152.

81

Republic]."¹ It would reestablish the rule of large monopolies, the Junkers, and the militarists, throughout Germany. The workers of Germany, said Mr. Molotov, had, for the first time, found their real fatherland in the form of the GDR, a German State in which not the large monopoly owners and Junkers but the working people themselves were the masters.

These comments reveal how little the Soviet Foreign Minister is acquainted with economic and social conditions in Germany. Any conversation that he cared to hold with German laborers and farmers would prove to him that he has a completely inaccurate idea of the social conditions prevailing. On the other hand, the concept of the functionary is familiar to every worker in Central Germany, and everyone knows that no private contractor in the Federal Republic would dare to impose "quotas of work" such as are being dictated by the functionaries of the Socialist Unity Party and the "Free" Association of Trade Unions.

The Federal Government would appreciate it if, as the result of the establishment of a Soviet Embassy in Bonn, the Soviet Government would obtain a true picture of the political and social conditions prevailing in the Federal Republic. The Soviet Government would then indubitably have to drop the objections to the holding of free elections that it now raises in view of the political and social conditions in both parts of Germany.

13) Since its great peace edict of November 1917, the Soviet Government has ever been the champion of the cause of self-determination for all peoples. This principle, which is regarded by the Federal Government also as fundamental for the peaceful co-existence of nations and which has found expression in the charter of the United Nations, in the Atlantic Charter, and in many other documents of a decisive nature, says: Every nation shall be entitled to determine freely its own destiny. It shall decide for itself in what community of states and under what form of government it chooses to live, what social order it prefers, what foreign policy it pursues, and with what states it desires close cooperation.

The Federal Government appeals to the Government of the U.S.S.R. to remain faithful to this principle it has continually proclaimed. If the German people were accorded the possibility to decide their own fate, they would undoubtedly vote in their entirety against the formation of two German States and for their immediate reunification within one German State. The fact that they have to choose between different forms of government and different economic

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 148, in different translation.

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and social systems must not be allowed to stand in the way of their
being accorded the opportunity of an election with freedom of
decision.

A year ago, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, stated in San
Francisco:

As far as our proposals, the proposals of the Soviet Union, concerning the
reunification of Germany are concerned, we hold the following view: The
regime prevailing at present in Eastern Germany should, of course, not be ex-
tended to a united Germany any more than should be the regime existing in
Western Germany. What regime is to exist and will exist in a reunified
Germany—that is a matter which the German people will have to decide for
themselves in all-German free elections. (TASS, 27 June 1955.)

The Federal Government is in complete agreement with this decla-
ration. It is, naturally, aware of the fact that the partition of
Germany, which has lasted many years, has led to considerable differ-
ences in the social structure within Germany. But only a national
representation elected by the entire German people has any right to
create an order which brings the two parts of Germany closer together
again, and secures such social achievements as are regarded by the
entire German people as progressive. Any other solution is impossi-
ble, if only for the reason that the workers of the Federal Republic
are entitled to insist that the reunification of Germany should not
lead to their political and social achievements being jeopardized.

In this view, the Federal Government believed itself in agreement
with several earlier statements by the Soviet Government. The latter,
in its note of 15 August 1953, said, for instance, that, in consequence
of all-German free elections, "the German people themselves will,
without interference from foreign countries, solve the problem of the
social and national structure of a democratic Germany." ¹

In consequence of more recent Soviet utterances, the Federal Gov-
ernment is unfortunately no longer certain of that agreement. Ad-
dressing the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers on 2 November
1955, the Soviet Foreign Minister stated that the re-establishment of
the unity of Germany could not be brought about at the cost of the
social and economic achievements of the workers in the GDR.² It is
the belief of the Federal Government that a national assembly elected
by the entire German people would be the best guardian of achieve-
ments regarded as such by the whole of the workers. However, Mr.
Molotov continued by saying that the statement made by the Govern-
ment of the GDR to the effect that the GDR would not allow its demo-

¹For text of the note, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 14, 1953, pp. 354-356.

²The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955 (Department of State publication 6156, Dec. 1955), pp. 89-97.

83

cratic and social reforms to be encroached upon must be taken into
account.

It is generally known what features are counted in the GDR among
the so-called "democratic reforms": the suppression of the Social
Democratic Party, the assimilation of the Christian Democratic and
Liberal Parties, the obstruction of free elections for the People's
Chamber, the suppression of freedom of opinion and of the press, the
abolition of freedom of coalition and of the right of workers to strike,
the systematic removal of the professional middle class, the suppres-
sion of freedom of worship, and the practice of a despotic and
politically controlled system of jurisdiction. Is a future all-
German parliament to be committed to the perpetuation of this policy?

The Federal Government would appreciate a clear statement by
the Government of the U.S.S.R. that it does not intend to restrict the
freedom of decision of a freely elected all-German people's represen-
tation in fundamental questions affecting the internal order of the
German people.

14) The Federal Government is convinced that free elections
throughout Germany, whatever their outcome, should have only
one aim, viz., to unite the German people and not to divide them. The
formation of a new system of government must therefore not be
allowed to lead to the political persecution of supporters of the old
system in any part of Germany. That is why the Federal Govern-
ment is of the opinion that measures should be taken to insure that,
after the reunification of Germany, nobody should be legally prose-
cuted or discriminated against in any other way merely on account
of his former activity for the authorities or a political organization
in either part of Germany.

15) The Federal Government would appreciate a reply from the
Government of the U.S.S.R. to the questions broached in the fore-
going. It would consider it useful if in this way an exchange of
views were initiated which would promote agreement of the Four
Powers on reunification.

Anybody postponing indefinitely the solution of the problem of
German reunification is incurring a heavy responsibility not only to
the German people, whose only reaction to their deprivation of the
recognized right to reunification is bitter disappointment; rather does
this problem affect peace, easing of tension, and security in the whole
of Europe—in fact, in the world. By no means least worthy of men-
tion is the fact that its solution is in the fullest interests of the Russian
people itself. It cannot be desirable in the long run to the Soviet
Union, either, for the entire German people to regard Soviet policy
toward Germany as continual interference in internal German affairs.

84

The establishment of normal neighborly relations between the German and Russian peoples is dictated by the interests of both nations. As long as almost seventy million people in the heart of the European continent have the feeling that the Soviet Union is arbitrarily refusing, in the face of every international law, reunification and free self-determination within a national order of their own choosing, the establishment of genuinely normal relations between the two peoples will be impossible.

## Note From the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States, September 2, 1956¹

The Heads of Government of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reached agreement at the first Geneva conference in July 1955 that the settlement of the German question and of the question of reunification should be accomplished by means of free elections, "carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security." At the second Geneva conference, in October and November 1955, it unfortunately proved impossible to agree on ways and means of putting this resolution into effect. And now more than half of 1956 has elapsed without any progress having been achieved in this matter.

The German Federal Government feels constrained to call the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the gravity of this fact.

All four Powers have at all times recognized the responsibility incumbent on them with regard to the reestablishment of Germany's unity as one state. This responsibility is not adequately discharged by mere assent to the principle of reunification without any agreements being reached regarding practical ways and means of realizing it.

Quite recently, in his prepared statement of 13 June of this year, the Secretary of State of the United States called German reunification "a major objective of the West" and stressed the conviction "that the attitude of the West toward the Soviet Union should be determined by the endeavor to promote the reunification of Germany in

¹Handed to Secretary of State Dulles by the German Ambassador to the United States, Heinz L. Krekeler, on Sept. 7. Similar notes were delivered on the same date to the British and French Governments. Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 24, 1956, pp. 485-486.

85

freedom.”¹ On 17 June 1956, the President of the United States said in his message to the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, “The ending of the division of Germany is essential to the development of friendly and cooperative relations between the Western nations and the Soviet Union.”² Finally, the President of the United States, in his letter of 4 August this year to the Soviet Prime Minister, Marshal Bulganin, recalled the agreement reached at Geneva by the Heads of Government on the reunification of Germany and expressed concern that no action had been taken.³ The Federal Government noted these statements with great satisfaction. It is in complete agreement with them, particularly on the count of German reunification not being merely a question of German national interests but a question of comprehensive and decisive importance to the future relations between West and East and consequently to the maintenance of world peace. The Federal Government sees in those statements an indication of the serious desire of the United States to take practical, effective steps to reestablish the unity of Germany.

Since several attempts to reach an agreement on this matter by means of large conferences have failed, the Federal Government does not consider it expedient to suggest that another conference be convened at the present moment. It is of the opinion that a new conference should be convened only when a well-founded prospect has been created through normal diplomatic channels that such a conference may lead to success.

The Federal Government urgently appeals to the Government of the United States of America to resume energetically its efforts to advance the matter along these lines.

The Federal Government takes the liberty of making its own contribution to such efforts in the form of a memorandum addressed to the Government of the U.S.S.R. It considers this procedure useful in view of the fact that it has for some time past been engaged in an exchange of views with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France and has happily reached agreement with those Governments. On the other hand, it has so far had no opportunity of entering into detailed discussion with the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the question of reunification.

In view of the fact that, although the question of reunification can be dealt with to some purpose in bilateral exchanges of views, it can be solved, by reason of its legal nature, only jointly with all four governments, the Federal Government takes the liberty of forwarding

¹ *Ibid.*, June 25, 1956, p. 1047. Quoted text is from a joint Adenauer-Dulles communiqué.

² *Ibid.*, July 16, 1956, p. 106.

³ *Ante.*

86

to the United States Government the text of the memorandum¹
addressed by it to the Government of the U.S.S.R.

Note From the United States to the Federal
Republic of Germany, October 9, 1956²

The Government of the United States of America presents its
compliments to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Federal Gov-
ernment's note of September 2, 1956, which enclosed a copy of the
memorandum addressed to the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the question of the reunification of Germany.

The Government of the United States fully shares the Federal Government's view that it is incumbent upon the four powers to fulfill the task undertaken by them in the directive issued by the Heads of Government at Geneva in July 1955 for the reunification of Germany by means of free elections carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security. This is a task which, as the note of the Federal Government points out, cannot be adequately fulfilled "by mere assent to the principle of reunification, without any agreements being reached regarding practical ways and means of realizing it."

The achievement of German reunification in freedom is a fundamental goal of United States policy. Together with the governments of France and the United Kingdom, the Government of the United States put forward proposals at the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1955 for the reunification of Germany by free elections and for a treaty of assurance giving the Soviet Union far-reaching security safeguards when Germany was reunified. So far, however, the Soviet Government has refused to discuss these proposals. The Government of the United States nevertheless continues to hope that the Soviet Government will fulfill its responsibilities in accordance with the agreement reached by the Heads of Government. For its part, the Government of the United States will not cease to pursue its efforts to achieve the reunification of Germany, the continued division of which constitutes a grave injustice to the German people and makes impossible the establishment of a basis for lasting peace and security in Europe.

¹ *Supra*.

²Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 22, 1956, p. 632.

87

To this end, the Government of the United States welcomes the initiative taken by the Federal Government and shares the desire set forth in the latter's memorandum that it may lead to an exchange of views which might promote agreement among the Four Powers on reunification, as well as on a sound system of European security, which can be achieved only if Germany is reunited.

In transmitting to the Soviet Government a copy of its reply to the note of the Federal Government, the Government of the United States is conveying the hope that the Soviet Government will respond to the initiative of the Federal Government in such a way that the Four Powers may be able to give effect to the agreement made at Geneva to achieve the reunification of Germany by means of free elections.

## Note From the United States to the Soviet Union, October 10, 1956¹

The Government of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the memorandum which was addressed to the Soviet Government on the second of September by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and of which a copy was sent to the Government of the United States. The Government of the United States now has the honor to transmit to the Soviet Government a copy of the reply which it has returned to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.²

The Government of the United States attaches great importance to the reunification of Germany, which is a basic objective of its policy. It is convinced that the continued division of Germany must be brought to an end in the interests not only of the Germans themselves but of all nations anxious to safeguard the peace of Europe. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States have on various occasions acknowledged their responsibility for bringing about the reunification of Germany, and agreed in the directive given by the Heads of Government of the Four Powers to their Foreign Ministers in July 1955 to carry out this responsibility. No progress has been made since then. The detailed proposals put forward by the Western

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 22, 1956, pp. 632-633. Parallel notes were delivered to the Soviet Government at the same time by the Governments of France and the United Kingdom.

² *Supra*.

88

Powers at the subsequent Foreign Ministers' Conference, which were designed both to end the division of Germany and to establish a firm system of European security, have met with no affirmative response from the Soviet Union.

The Government of the United States therefore hopes that the Soviet Government will give careful consideration to the German memorandum and will, in response to the initiative taken by the Federal Government, state its view as to how effect can be given to the agreement made by the four Heads of Government at Geneva to restore German unity by means of free elections.

# Swiss Invitation To Hold a Heads-of-Government Conference in Switzerland, November 6, 1956¹

Unofficial translation

The threat of a third World War and a new trial by force with all their tragic consequences weighs upon humanity.²

However, peace can and must still be saved.

To this end, the Swiss Federal Council addresses an urgent appeal for a conference to take place without delay of the four Chiefs of Government who met at Geneva in July 1955, namely, of the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, to whom might be added the Chief of the Indian Government as the representative of the Bandung Conference powers. This conference could be held on the territory of the Swiss Confederation. The Federal Council offers its good offices for the organization of the conference.

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Nov. 26, 1956, p. 839. The invitation was sent in telegrams from the President of Switzerland, Markus Feldmann, to the Governments of the United States, France, India, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

²On Nov. 4 Soviet troops in Hungary had overthrown the government of Imre Nagy, which had come into power on Oct. 24 as a result of anti-government and anti-Soviet demonstrations. The Soviet Government had also threatened Israel, Britain, and France in this period, in connection with the military operations which those nations were conducting against Egypt, and it had proposed (Nov. 5) a joint intervention in Egypt by Soviet and American troops—a proposal which the United States rejected as undercutting the United Nations. See *Department of State Bulletin*; see also *United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956-June 1957* (Department of State publication 6505, Aug. 1957).

544645—60—9

89

Reply by President Eisenhower to Swiss Suggestion for a
Heads-of-Government Conference, November 10,
1956¹

The Federal Council's suggestion ² for a meeting in Switzerland of the five Chiefs of Government has received urgent and sympathetic consideration here. I appreciate the sincerity of the Swiss proposal and share the concern for the preservation of peace which inspired it. However, the United Nations is actively seized with the various problems posing a threat to world peace and I believe that the interests of all will be best served by carrying these initiatives through to a successful conclusion.

Letter From Chairman Bulganin to
President Eisenhower, November 17, 1956³

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The military attack on Egypt has brought on a serious aggravation of the international situation. In consideration of this fact it is the duty of all states and especially those countries which bear the basic responsibility for the preservation of peace to find means for the solution of questions in dispute through negotiations.

In this dangerous moment for the cause of peace the Soviet Government considers it essential to appeal to the governments of all countries and in the first instance to the governments of the great powers to unite their efforts for their adoption of urgent measures directed towards the prevention of war, cessation of the arms race and the solution of questions in dispute by peaceful means.

In sending to you the declaration of the Soviet Government on the question of disarmament and reduction of international tension my colleagues and I express the hope that the U.S.A. and you personally, Mr. President, will examine with all attention the proposals of the Soviet Government set forth in the declaration.

BULGANIN

¹ Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Nov. 26, 1956, p. 839.

² *Supra*.

³ Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 21, 1957, pp. 89-93.

90

[Enclosure]

Declaration of the Soviet Government Concerning the Question of
Disarmament and Reduction of International Tension

[Extracts]

NOVEMBER 17, 1956

The armed attack of England, France and Israel on Egypt has created a situation dangerous for the cause of peace and has placed before the peoples in all sharpness the question of the threat of a third world war. It is known that in the above-mentioned countries large scale measures have been carried out for the mobilization of ground, naval and air forces, for calling up reserves, for mobilization of industry, transportation, and lines of communication for servicing military needs. Thus in these countries in essence has been created a wartime situation, especially if it is taken into consideration that in all countries of the North Atlantic bloc (NATO) rabid military propaganda has been unleashed. The aggressive actions of England, France and Israel against Egypt, the military measures undertaken by them, and the situation of war hysteria have created a real danger of expansion of the conflict with the utilization of the destructive means of the latest military equipment.

There comes to attention the fact that those circles of the Western powers who are responsible for the aggression against Egypt attempt at the present time, through fabrications concerning the aggressive intention of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and Europe, both to distract attention from the fact of the open aggression committed against Egypt and thereby to hide the collapse which this adventure has suffered.

Attempts are being made to fan with regard to the Soviet Union a slanderous campaign in connection with the collapse of the counter-revolutionary military plot against People's Hungary, which is, as has now become completely clear, an integral part of the general plot of the imperialists against the peace and security of the peoples, both in the Middle East and in Europe. All sorts of fabrications are being spread concerning an alleged concentration of Soviet troops undertaken in various countries of Eastern Europe, unusual movements of Soviet forces to the western and southern borders of the U.S.S.R., etc. All this is utilized by certain circles in the West for a rebirth of the cold war, for an ever greater increase of the arms race in the countries of NATO, this basic aggressive grouping which has been openly used in recent times for the preservation and reestablishment of the shameful system of colonial repression.

The creation of this tense situation, including the intensification of the arms race, is advantageous in the first instance to the monopolists

91

of the United States, England and France, who are squeezing out
fabulous profits from military orders. Such a situation permits them
also to preserve at high levels the taxes on the working people who
are bearing on their shoulders the main burden of expenditures for
armament and for preparation for ground, naval and air warfare.

If the Soviet Union were actually guided by any sort of attendant
considerations, the situation which has arisen for it from the point
of view of the relation of forces between the powers, and had the ag-
gressive intentions which are attributed to it, then it would seem that
the Soviet Union could utilize the situation which has been created
at the present time for attack against the armed forces of the Atlantic
bloc and could have achieved the military objectives ascribed to it in
regard to Western Europe even without the use of modern nuclear
weapons and rockets.

It can be stated directly that at the present time the strategic situa-
tion in Western Europe is advantageous to the Armed Forces of the
Soviet Union to an even greater degree than that obtaining at the end
of the Second World War, when the mobilized and armed Soviet
Army could have become consolidated in all of Western Europe if the
Soviet Union had pursued such an aim.

But, at the end of the Second World War as at the present time,
the U.S.S.R. did not and does not have any other aims than the pres-
ervation and strengthening of peace, which the peoples of all coun-
tries long for.

The events of recent times in the Near East have graphically shown
how great are the forces interested in the preservation of peace and
ready to restrain aggressors with all resolution. At the same time,
these events have shown that the aggressive circles of certain powers
are prepared in the name of their narrow interests to throw peace
into the abyss of a new world war, threatening the peoples with new
military conflicts fraught with serious consequences for mankind.

This is why the Soviet Union at this moment of responsibility is
again raising its voice for the cessation of the armaments race, for
the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and for the prohibi-
tion of tests of these weapons.

For the purpose of the practical and speediest realization of these
demands, in which all peoples are vitally interested, the Soviet Gov-
ernment proposes:

(1) To reduce in the course of two years the armed forces of the
Soviet Union, the United States of America, and China to 1-1.5 mil-

92

lion men for each of these states, the armed forces of England and France to 650,000 men each, and those of each of the remaining states to 150,000-200,000 men.

As a first step to this, to reduce in the course of the first year, the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, and China to 2.5 million men and the armed forces of England and France to 750 thousand men for each of these states.

The above-mentioned countries should reduce their armaments accordingly.

(2) To effect in the course of the above-mentioned period the ban of atomic and hydrogen weapons, with the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, the ban on their use, full destruction of stocks of these weapons, and their elimination from the armaments of states.

As a first step, to cease immediately the testing of atomic and hydrogen bombs.

(3) To reduce during 1957 by one-third the armed forces of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, England, and France stationed on the territory of Germany, with establishment of appropriate control for this reduction.

(4) To carry out during 1957 the significant reduction of the armed forces of the United States of America, England, and France stationed on the territory of countries participants in NATO, and the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stationed on the territory of member-countries of the Warsaw Pact.

(5) To liquidate in the course of two years, foreign army, naval, and air bases on the territories of other states.

(6) To curtail the military expenditures of governments in the course of two years, corresponding to the reduction of armed forces and armaments, banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and the liquidation of foreign military bases on the territories of other states.

(7) For observation of the carrying out by the states of the obligations undertaken by them concerning disarmament, to establish a strict and effective international control, utilizing all necessary rights and functions for this purpose.

For the purpose of preventing a sudden attack by one state on another, to establish on the territory of states on a reciprocal basis, control posts in large ports, railroad junctions, highways, and airports, which will see that no dangerous concentration of armed forces and armaments takes place.

The Soviet Government has already repeatedly expressed its attitude toward the proposal about the so-called plan for aerial photography and declared that this proposal does not decide either the problem of controlling disarmament or preventing aggression.

93

Considering, however, that the proposal for aerial photography is presented as a condition for reaching agreement on disarmament questions, which creates serious obstacles for achieving such an agreement, the Soviet Government for the purpose of facilitating the quickest achievement of agreement is prepared to consider the question of using aerial photography in the area in Europe where basic military forces of the North Atlantic Pact are located and in countries participating in the Warsaw Pact to a depth of 800 kilometers to the East and West from the line of demarcation of the above-mentioned military forces, if there is agreement of the appropriate states.

In proposing the realization of the above-mentioned measures, the Soviet Government considers that after their implementation it is necessary to raise the question about the complete liquidation of armed forces and armaments of all types with retention by states of only such contingents of militia (police) which are necessary for assuring internal security and the security of frontiers.

The Soviet Government, true to its policy of guaranteeing peace and desiring to create confidence among peoples that armaments will never be used for deciding disputes among states, again proposes to conclude a pact of nonaggression among countries belonging to the North Atlantic Alliance and the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Such a pact, considering that among its members would be the Soviet Union and the United States of America, that is, the states having the most powerful armed forces, would radically change the entire international situation, aiding the reduction of international tension and the creation of trust among states.

Since the examination in U.N. agencies of disarmament questions has so far not led to any real results in deciding the question of reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic weapons, the Soviet Government considers it necessary, along with the continuation of efforts in this direction in agencies of the U.N., to seek more effective means for settling these problems. Considering that the present international situation dictates the necessity for taking immediate measures for the purpose of preventing war and stopping the armaments race, the Soviet Government considers it appropriate to convoke a conference of heads of governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, England, France, and India, as was proposed by the President of the Swiss Confederation.¹ Such a conference could assist achievement of agreements on questions dealing with the problem of disarmament.

The successful conduct of a conference of heads of governments of the five states could prepare for the convocation of a wider conference

¹ Ante, p. 89.

94

for examination of these questions, in which the heads of government of all countries participating in NATO and in the Warsaw Pact could take part. The Soviet Government considers it desirable that such a conference should also be attended by the heads of government of a series of other countries and, first of all, the Chinese People's Republic, India, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and Burma, which are not either in the Warsaw Pact or in such military groups as NATO, SEATO, or the Baghdad Pact.

If difficulties are encountered in convoking a conference of the heads of government of the five powers, then in the opinion of the Soviet Government the convocation of the cited broader conference would meet the interests of reducing international tension and improving the international situation.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary with all seriousness to underscore the fact that before the world at present are two paths: either the path of terminating the cold war, rejecting the policy of "positions of strength," disarmament, and the creation of all conditions for the peaceful coexistence of states with different economic and social systems, or the continuation of the armaments race, the continuation of the cold war—the path leading to an unprecedentedly burdensome and destructive war which would bring to the entire world inestimable calamities and sufferings.

The Soviet Government has stood and stands for the position that in the world there are no controversial problems which could not be settled peacefully taking into account the legitimate interests of the appropriate states.

As for existing ideological disagreements, they cannot be the basis for exacerbation of relations among states, for propaganda of war, and even more for application of force of one state against another state. Such disagreements can and must be decided by means of a struggle of ideas, in which the advantages of one ideology or other, also of one economic system or other, will be proven by the very course of historical development.

## Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin, December 31, 1956¹

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have given careful consideration to the declaration by the Soviet Government to which you had invited my

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 21, 1957, p. 89.

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attention in your letter of November 17, 1956, but find myself in basic
disagreement with the analysis of your government as it relates to
the source of international tension.

The people of the United States cannot accept the declaration's
attempt to dismiss as "a slanderous campaign" the world's indignant
reaction to the Soviet armed actions against the people of Hungary.
While the Soviet Government has not responded to the constructive
recommendations of the United Nations with respect to Hungary,
the parties at dispute in the Middle East have accepted the assistance
of the United Nations. A similar response by the Soviet Union to
the resolutions of the United Nations concerning Hungary would con-
stitute a significant step toward the reduction of the tensions to which
the Soviet declaration addresses itself.

Your government's statement suggests that the strategic situation
in Western Europe is now advantageous to the armed forces of the
Soviet Union. This statement does not seem calculated to relieve
international tensions. Moreover, I am convinced in the light of
my long association with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
that it is fully capable of carrying out its mission of collective defense.

You suggest further meetings of heads of government. I could
agree to a meeting whenever circumstances would make it seem likely
to accomplish a significant result. But, in my opinion, deliberations
within the framework of the United Nations seem most likely to pro-
duce a step forward in the highly complicated matter of disarmament.
Accordingly the United States will make further proposals there.

I take hope from your apparent willingness to consider aerial in-
spection as a positive factor in the problem of armaments. Much to
my regret, however, your government's declaration does not signify
willingness to seek agreement on the basic element of my Geneva pro-
posal of averting surprise attack through aerial inspection of the
centers of our military power.

The United States is giving this and your other disarmament pro-
posals careful study. We are prepared to discuss them, as well as
the further United States proposals, in forthcoming meetings of the
Disarmament Subcommittee.

You may be sure that our government will continue its efforts in
behalf of effective control and reduction of all armaments. It will
be my never-ending purpose to seek a stable foundation for a just
and durable peace in the mutual interest of all nations.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

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Joint Declaration by President Eisenhower and the
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
(Adenauer), Washington, May 28, 1957¹

The President and the Chancellor agreed that the basic aim of the policies of their two countries is the maintenance of peace in freedom. To that end it is the common policy of their governments to work for the achievement of conditions in which all nations can live in peace and freedom and devote their energies and resources to promoting the welfare of their peoples.

They agreed that the realization of these conditions depends upon the removal of the causes of tension existing between the Soviet Union and the Free World. This tension is mainly attributable to the acts and policies of the Soviet Union, among them the deprivation of other peoples of their freedom.

The President and the Chancellor noted with great concern the consequences of the brutal Soviet intervention in Hungary. The continued suppression of the rights of the Hungarian people makes it difficult for other nations to accept as genuine the professed Soviet desires for peaceful coexistence.

The President and the Chancellor reaffirmed that the ending of the unnatural and unjust division of Germany is a major objective of the foreign policies of the two governments. Germany must be re-united on a free and democratic basis by peaceful means. If the Soviet rulers really desire peace and the relaxation of international tension, they can give no better proof than to permit the reunification of Germany through free elections.

The President and the Chancellor emphasized that the restoration of German national unity need give rise to no apprehension on the part of the Soviet Union as to its own security. It is not the purpose of their governments to gain any one-sided military advantage from the reunification of Germany. In conjunction with such reunification, they stand ready, as stated at the two Geneva conferences of 1955, to enter into European security arrangements which would provide far-reaching assurances to the Soviet Union.

II.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that NATO is essential for the protection of the security of the entire free world. They agreed that the defensive strength of NATO must be further improved in the

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, June 17, 1957, pp. 955-956.

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face of the continuing Soviet threat and the absence of a dependable agreement for major reductions of armaments. The German Federal Government will proceed as rapidly as possible with building up its agreed contribution to the Western collective defense system.

For the purpose of contributing its fair share to the defense of the North Atlantic area, the United States intends to maintain forces in Europe, including Germany, as long as the threat to the area exists. As the North Atlantic Council agreed at its recent meeting at Bonn, the Atlantic Alliance must be in a position to use all available means to meet any attack which might be launched against it. The availability of the most modern weapons of defense will serve to discourage any attempt to launch such an attack.

### III.

The President and the Chancellor expressed gratification over the significant progress made over the last several months toward closer economic integration in Europe. The Chancellor expressed his belief that the treaties establishing EURATOM and the European Common Market, signed at Rome on March 25 of this year, constitute a further step of historic significance toward European unity. The President expressed the great interest of the United States Government and of the American people in these treaties and his belief that their entry into force will benefit not only the people of Europe, but those of the entire world.

### IV.

The two governments are in agreement that efforts must be pressed in the United Nations to reach agreement on measures for disarmament, with respect to both conventional and nuclear weapons, under an effective system of international control.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that, if a beginning could be made toward effective measures of disarmament, this would create a degree of confidence which would facilitate further progress in the field of disarmament and in the settlement of outstanding major political problems, such as the reunification of Germany.

They agreed that if such initial steps succeed they should be followed within a reasonable time by a comprehensive disarmament agreement which must necessarily presuppose a prior solution of the problem of German reunification. Accordingly, the Chancellor advised the President, as he has the French and British Governments, that the Federal Republic would consider that the conclusion of an initial disarmament agreement might be an appropriate time for a conference on the reunification of Germany among the Foreign Ministers of the four powers responsible therefor. The United States

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will consult with the French and British Governments regarding this matter.

The President stressed that any measures for disarmament applicable to Europe would be accepted by the United States only with the approval of the NATO allies, which he hoped would take a leading role in this regard, and taking into account the link between European security and German reunification. He assured the Chancellor that the United States does not intend to take any action in the field of disarmament which would prejudice the reunification of Germany. He stated that the United States would consult with the German Federal Government closely on all matters affecting Germany arising in the disarmament negotiations.

## Four-Power Berlin Declaration on the
Reunification of Germany, July 29, 1957¹

Twelve years have elapsed since the end of the war in Europe. The hopes of the peoples of the world for the establishment of a basis for a just and lasting peace have nevertheless not been fulfilled. One of the basic reasons for the failure to reach a settlement is the continued division of Germany, which is a grave injustice to the German people and the major source of international tension in Europe.

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, which share with the Soviet Union responsibility for the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace treaty, and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, as the only Government qualified to speak for the German people as a whole, wish to declare their views on these questions, including the question of European security, and the principles which motivate their policies in this regard.

1. A European settlement must be based on freedom and justice. Every nation has the right to determine its own way of life in freedom, to determine for itself its political, economic and social system, and to provide for its security with due regard to the legitimate interests of other nations. Justice requires that the German people be allowed to re-establish their national unity on the basis of this fundamental right.

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 19, 1957, pp. 304-306. This statement was issued at Berlin by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany and by the French, British, and American Ambassadors to the Federal Republic.

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2. The reunification of Germany remains the joint responsibility of the Four Powers who in 1945 assumed supreme authority in Germany, a responsibility which was reaffirmed in the Directive issued by the four Heads of Government in Geneva in July 1955. At the same time the achievement of German reunification requires the active co-operation of the German people as a whole under conditions ensuring the free expression of their will.

3. The unnatural division of Germany and of its capital, Berlin, is a continuing source of international tension. So long as Germany remains divided there can be no German peace treaty and no assurance of stability in Europe. The reunification of Germany in freedom is not only an elementary requirement of justice for the German people, but is the only sound basis of a lasting settlement in Europe.

4. Only a freely elected all-German Government can undertake on behalf of a reunified Germany obligations which will inspire confidence on the part of other countries and which will be considered just and binding in the future by the people of Germany themselves.

5. Such a Government can only be established through free elections throughout Germany for an all-German National Assembly.

6. There should be no discrimination against a reunified Germany. Its freedom and security should not be prejudiced by an imposed status of neutralization or demilitarization. Its Government should be free to determine its foreign policy and to decide on its international associations. It should not be deprived of the right recognized in the Charter of the United Nations for all nations to participate in collective measures of self-defense.

7. Re-establishment of the national unity of Germany in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the German people would not in itself constitute a threat to Germany's neighbors nor would it prejudice their security. Nevertheless, so as to meet any preoccupation which other governments may have in this respect, appropriate arrangements, linked with German reunification, should be made which would take into account the legitimate security interests of all the countries concerned. It was for this reason that, at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference, the Western Powers made proposals for a treaty of assurance on the reunification of Germany.

8. The Western Powers have never required as a condition of German reunification that a reunified Germany should join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It will be for the people of a reunified Germany themselves to determine through their freely elected Government whether they wish to share in the benefits and obligations of the treaty.

9. If the all-German Government, in the exercise of its free choice, should elect to join NATO, the Western Powers after consultation

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with other members of NATO are prepared to offer on a basis of reciprocity, to the Government of the Soviet Union and the Governments of other countries of Eastern Europe which would become parties to a European security arrangement, assurances of a significant and far-reaching character. The Western Powers are also prepared, as part of a mutually acceptable European security arrangement, to give assurance that, in the event of a reunified Germany choosing to join NATO, they would not take military advantage as a result of the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

10. But the Western Powers could not contemplate that the existence of NATO itself should constitute the subject of negotiations.

11. The reunification of Germany accompanied by the conclusion of European security arrangements would facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. Conversely, if a beginning could be made toward effective measures of partial disarmament, this would contribute to the settlement of outstanding major political problems such as the reunification of Germany. Initial steps in the field of disarmament should lead to a comprehensive disarmament agreement which presupposes a prior solution of the problem of German reunification. The Western Powers do not intend to enter into any agreement on disarmament which would prejudice the reunification of Germany.

12. Any measures of disarmament applicable to Europe must have the consent of the European nations concerned and take into account the link between European security and German reunification. The Four Governments continue to hope that the Soviet Government will come to recognize that it is not in its own interest to maintain the present division of Germany. The Western Powers are ready to discuss all these questions with the Soviet Union at any time that there is a reasonable prospect of making progress. At such time there will be many points relating to the procedure for German reunification and the terms of a treaty of assurance which will be worked out by detailed negotiation.

In advance of serious negotiations the Western Powers cannot finally determine their attitude on all points. Nor can they contemplate in advance the making of concessions to which there is no present likelihood of response from the Soviet side. If negotiations are to be fruitful, both sides must approach them in a spirit of accommodation and flexibility. Through this declaration the Western Powers, in full accord with the Federal Republic, wish again to manifest their sincere desire to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union in order to reach a European settlement and to give evidence that the paramount objective of their policy is the attainment of a just and lasting peace.

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Report to the Supreme Soviet by the First Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Khrushchev),
November 6, 1957¹

[Extract]

We stand for the policy of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries, and we favor both friendly bilateral agreements in the interests of strengthening peace and agreements on collective security in Europe and Asia.

The relations among states with different systems are based on five principles: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs for economic, political or ideological reasons, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. One must recognize the reality that there are socialist states and capitalist states, that they are proceeding along their own paths and that their systems are the internal concern of their peoples. All the controversial issues in the relations among states must be settled by negotiation, without war. To live without war on the basis of peaceful competition is the foundation of peaceful coexistence!

Consistently pursuing a peace-loving policy, the Soviet Union is striving to achieve mutually acceptable agreements with the Western countries on all questions pertaining to the problem of disarmament. The Soviet Union is ready to reduce its armed forces and armaments considerably, to prohibit atomic and hydrogen weapons and to discontinue tests of these weapons immediately, with the establishment of international control, if the Western powers carry out the same measures. It will not be our country that holds back.

If all states, above all the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. as the states which have the largest economic and military resources, succeeded in settling, in a businesslike manner and in a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding, the major international problems, including the disarmament problem, the chances of averting another war and of establishing a lasting and stable peace for all countries and peoples would increase considerably. The Soviet Union will firmly adhere to its policy of lessening tension in relations among states, at improving relations with all countries, including the United States, since the establishment of mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States can exercise a decisive influence on improving the entire international situation. At the same time we do not want to improve relations between our two countries at the expense of the

¹Text from *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Dec. 18, 1957, pp. 17-18.

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interests of other countries, at the expense of the deterioration of U.S. relations with Britain, France and other countries. Furthermore, our country would like to have good relations with all states which are against war and which stand for peaceful coexistence, and we are doing everything in order to establish such relations. The right way to achieve this is to reject a "position of strength" policy, since the final stage of such a policy is war.

The imperialists are trying to use for their own purposes even such a fact as the launching of an artificial earth satellite by the Soviet Union. They have begun to blow all the bugles and to sound the alarm, declaring that the launching of the satellite by the Soviet Union allegedly threatens peace and the capitalist states with a new weapon.

We solemnly declare that our people have never thought nor will they ever think of using any means of destruction unless our country is attacked by imperialist states. We realize that if the Soviet Union has succeeded, through the efforts of scientists, engineers and workers, in creating an earth satellite, then other countries, especially such a highly developed country as the U.S.A., can do the same. Of course, our country's achievement is of great importance because we are winning the competition with capitalist countries in point of time. But a state which was first to achieve such a result must not kindle passions that would raise the temperature of the "cold war" and create conditions for an armaments race. As is known, the "position of strength" policy and competition in armaments lead to war, and under present-day conditions war means incalculable victims and the destruction of enormous material wealth.

U.S. and British statesmen recently organized a separate meeting¹ in order to seek ways not of easing tension, but of increasing it and continuing the armaments race. We would like a high-level meeting of representatives of the capitalist and socialist countries for the purpose of reaching agreement, on the basis of a consideration of reality and mutual understanding, on excluding war as a method of settling international problems, ending the cold war and the armaments race, establishing relations among states on the basis of coexistence and settling contentious issues not by means of war but by negotiations. By means of peaceful competition in economic and cultural development and in the fullest satisfaction of man's requirements and needs.

This is the stand of all the fraternal Communist and Workers' Parties and of those socialist parties which subscribe to Marxist-Leninist views. Some bourgeois parties also adhere to the position of peaceful coexistence.

¹On Oct. 23-25, 1957; see Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 11, 1957, pp. 739-742.

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Today the peace-loving peoples are expressing their concern, not without reason, about the fact that this "competition" is taking another course. As shown by the recent meeting between the President of the U.S.A. and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the ruling circles of these two leading capitalist countries continue to pursue the "position of strength" policy. It is clear from the communique published after this meeting that, under the pretext of an allegedly growing threat from the Soviet Union, the ruling circles of the United States and Britain have reached an agreement on further intensifying the "cold war," on increasing military allocations for the production of means of destruction and, consequently, on preparations for war.

A meeting of all the heads of government of the states belonging to the aggressive North Atlantic bloc has been scheduled for December; this bodes no good for the cause of peace. Attention is drawn to the fact that the governments of a number of NATO members were headed or are headed by the leaders of socialist parties. These parties, which call themselves socialist, are actually carrying out the policy of the imperialist circles. They are misleading the working class, trying to make it appear that the Soviet Union does not want to reach an agreement on the disarmament question and the relaxation of international tension and that they are therefore compelled to continue the armaments race. But this is deception of the working people, and the imperialists are making artful use of this policy of certain leaders of socialist parties.

It was no accident that Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Macmillan invited Mr. Spaak, the present NATO secretary, who is a prominent representative of the Belgian Socialist Party, to their meeting of the U.S. and British heads of government. Facts show that the imperialists are busily enlisting right-wing socialists in the antipopular cause of preparing war.

But whatever methods the imperialists may use, their schemes are doomed to failure. The people do not want war, they are vigilantly standing guard over peace, they have opposed and will continue to oppose the aggressive schemes of international reaction.

The Soviet Union has stood and stands for peace throughout the whole world and will do everything to prevent the threat of a new war. We shall continue to seek disarmament and the banning of weapons of mass destruction of peoples; we shall struggle to create an atmosphere of trust among peoples and to make the United Nations a real instrument of peace.

The most aggressive circles of imperialism are seeking to create conflicts wherever possible, to intensify the threat of war and in this way to divert considerable forces and resources of the socialist countries from constructive labor. The tactics of the aggressive circles lie in

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encircling the socialist countries with their bases and forming and expanding military blocs.

The policy of maintaining and intensifying international tension is the line of imperialist reaction. The imperialists are waging a cold war policy and are striving to maintain the arms race. The most concrete expression of this is Dulles' concept of constantly keeping the world "on the brink of war." By this means the imperialists want to assure a high business level for the U.S. monopolies, which are profiting from the armaments race and increasing the working people's tax burden. An easing of international tension and disarmament are not profitable for them. Abandonment of the armaments race would force the monopolies to convert production from a military basis to production for peaceful needs. Such a reorganization of production would be in the interests of the people, but it frightens the monopolists, for it would entail lowering the monopolies' profits from military orders. They are afraid of worsening the situation and of increased difficulties in marketing civilian goods. The monopolists also fear that a relaxation of tension and abandonment of the armaments race would deprive them of the possibility of keeping the working people in a state of fear, scaring the people with the "menace of Communism" and, under this pretext, bludgeoning the progressive forces that are defending peace. The policy of cold war, the armaments race and intensification of international tension is needed by the imperialists to strengthen the dictatorship of monopoly capital. The imperialists are trying to convince the workers that the military situation will assure a high level of employment and that this is also advantageous for the workers. But the leading workers are well aware of the instability of the military situation; they realize that they cannot build their prosperity on the armaments race.

There is another prospect—that of developing civilian production. There are enormous possibilities for mutually profitable trade among all countries. The Soviet Union, like the other socialist countries, has many times expressed its readiness to participate in the broadest possible development of trade relations. There is no doubt that this provides a stable basis for the development of trade and economic relations among peoples. It is fully in keeping with our peaceful policy directed toward peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

A peace policy directed toward the relaxation of international tension and the consolidation of friendship among peoples is the banner of the socialist states. That policy accords with the basic interests of the working people, with the interests of developing and strengthening a new socio-economic formation and consolidating the cause of peace throughout the world.

544645—60—10

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Experience shows that the only correct path in the development of international relations is a policy of peaceful coexistence, a policy of strengthening peace and friendship among peoples.

In advocating a policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, we, of course, have no intention of asserting that there are no contradictions between socialism and capitalism, that complete "harmony" can be established between them, or that a reconciliation of the communist and bourgeois ideologies is possible. Whoever would adopt this point of view would be retreating from Marxism-Leninism. The ideological differences are irreconcilable; they will exist. But this does not exclude peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition between socialist and capitalist countries.

With the current developments in military technology, an imperialist attempt to unleash a world war would lead to incredible destruction and loss; the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons and ballistic rockets would bring in its wake tremendous disaster to all mankind. By bringing on this disaster, the capitalist system would doom itself to inevitable destruction. The peoples would no longer put up with a system which brings torment and suffering to mankind and unleashes bloody, aggressive wars.

Though we are convinced that as a result of a new war, should one be unleashed by imperialist circles, the system which creates wars—the capitalist system—would perish and the socialist system would win, we Communists do not want a victory by such means. We Communists have never sought and will never seek to achieve our aims by such terrible means; this is immoral and contradictory to our communist world view. We work from the premise that wars are not necessary to advance socialism.

The world socialist system possesses powerful economic, political and military resources. Regardless of how the imperialists may rave, they will not succeed in breaking the growing strength of the world socialist system and they will not succeed in stopping the forward movement of society toward communism.

## Letter From Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower, December 10, 1957¹

[Extracts]

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am addressing this letter to you in order to share with you certain thoughts regarding the international situation

¹ Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 27, 1958, pp. 127-130. President Eisenhower replied on Jan. 12, 1958; see *post*.

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which is developing at the present time. The Soviet Government has
recently examined the international situation in all its aspects. In
doing so, we could not of course fail to give serious attention to the
fact that at the initiative of the United States of America and Great
Britain measures are now being developed the purpose of which is a
sharp intensification of the military preparations of the NATO mem-
bers, and that specific plans are being considered in connection with
the forthcoming session of the NATO Council.

It is already evident that these measures in their essence amount
to the mobilization of all the resources of the member states of NATO
for the purpose of intensifying the production of armaments and
for preparations in general for war. The NATO leaders openly state
that at the forthcoming session military and strategic plans providing
for extensive use of atomic and hydrogen weapons will be considered.

It is also very obvious that all such activity is taking place in an
atmosphere of artificially created nervousness and fear with respect
to the imaginary "threat" from the U.S.S.R., and, in the effort to
create such an atmosphere, particularly wide use is being made of
references to the latest scientific and technical achievements of the
Soviet Union.

In our view there is serious danger that, as a result of such actions,
international developments may take a direction other than that re-
quired in the interest of the strengthening of peace.

On the other hand, in all states of the world there is a growing
and spreading movement for a termination of the armaments race,
and for averting the threat of an outbreak of a new war. Peoples
are demanding that a policy be followed whereby states may live in
peace, respecting mutual rights and interests and deriving advantage
from cooperation with one another, instead of sharpening their knives
against one another.

All of this leads us to the conviction that in the development of the
international situation a moment of great responsibility has arrived.

We feel that in this situation the responsibility that rests upon the
government of every state in determining its future foreign policy is
greater than ever before. Especially great is the responsibility of the
governments of the great powers.

Let us suppose that, in calling for further development of military
preparations with special emphasis on the creation of new types of
weapons of mass destruction, the American military leaders expect
to achieve some success. But nothing can change the fact that even
with the present status of military technology a situation has de-
veloped for the first time in history where in the event of war the ter-
ritory of none of the great powers will any longer be in a privileged
position that would spare it from becoming one of the theaters of

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war from the very beginning of the conflict. Nothing is changed in this respect, even by the fact that the U.S.A. has a network of far advanced military bases, nor by plans to use territories and military potential of Western European allies.

At the present time in the United States of America there has been proclaimed the thesis of "interdependence" of the countries members of NATO. A new and increased contribution to the military preparations of this alliance is expected of them. No little pressure is being exerted upon them to obtain consent for the stationing of nuclear and rocket weapons in their territory.

Apparently for the purpose of reducing the dangers which are fully understandable and are caused in these countries by the prospect of having nuclear weapons stationed in their territory, military circles in the West are attempting to implant the idea that the so-called "tactical" atomic weapons are not very different from conventional types of weapons and that their use would not entail as destructive results as that of atomic and hydrogen bombs. One cannot fail to see that such reasoning, designed to mislead public opinion, constitutes a dangerous attempt to justify preparation for unleashing an atomic war.

Where can all this lead?

The military situation of the U.S.A. itself, in our opinion, will in no way improve as a result of this; the U.S.A. will become no less vulnerable, while the danger of war will increase still further.

As for plans to transfer nuclear weapons to allies of the U.S.A. in Europe, such a step can only further aggravate an already complicated situation on that continent, initiating a race in atomic armaments among European states.

One likewise cannot fail to take into account, for example, the fact that the placing of nuclear weapons at the disposal of the Federal Republic of Germany may set in motion such forces in Europe and entail such consequences as even the NATO members may not contemplate.

One of the arguments advanced in military circles in the West to justify the demand for expanding military preparations is the so-called theory of "local wars." It must be most strongly emphasized that this "theory" is not only absolutely invalid from the military standpoint but is also extremely dangerous politically. In the past too, as we all know, global wars have been set off by "local" wars. Is it possible to count seriously on the possibility of "localizing" wars in our time when there exist military groupings opposing one another in the world and including dozens of states in various parts of the

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world, and when the range of modern types of weapons does not know any geographic limits?

One's attention is also attracted by reports regarding the existence of plans for combining in some form the military blocs created by the Western powers in various parts of the world—NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact. I cannot but say to you, Mr. President, that we evaluate the development of such plans as a trend directly opposed to the principles of a joint strengthening of international peace and security, in the name of which the U.N. was created with the active participation of our two countries. In fact, if even now the existence of so-called military blocs exerts a baneful influence on the entire international situation, then it is completely obvious that an attempt to bring states together, to include those of several continents in a program which in essence amounts to joint preparation for a new war, would mean undermining the U.N. and would inflict irreparable damage upon it.

During all these years the minds of men in the West have been poisoned by intensive propaganda, which, day after day, has implanted the thought of the inevitability of a new war and the necessity of intensified preparations for war. This propaganda for war, which contributed not a little toward aggravating the international situation and undermining confidence in the relations between states, is one of the chief elements of the policy of "a position of strength."

It seems to us that at the present time the international situation has become such that the actions taken by states in the very near future, and primarily by the great powers, will to a considerable extent determine the answer to the main question which so deeply concerns all mankind, namely:

Will the movement in the direction of a war catastrophe continue, and with ever-increasing velocity, or will those who are responsible for the policy of states enter upon the only sensible path of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between all states?

After all, for this it is necessary only to cast a sober look at the present situation; to recognize in fact that every country has the right to choose its own form of government and its own economic system; to renounce any attempt to settle international questions by force; to renounce war once and for all as a means of solving international disputes; and to build relations between states on the basis of equality, respect for the independence of each state, and noninterference in the internal affairs of one another, on the basis of mutual benefit.

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If one proceeds from the premise of insuring universal peace, it is
necessary, in our opinion, to recognize quite definitely the situation
that has developed in the world where capitalist and socialist states
exist. None of us can fail to take into account the fact that any
attempts to change this situation by external force, and to upset the
status quo, or any attempts to impose any territorial changes, would
lead to catastrophic consequences.

I am well aware, Mr. President, that in your statements you have
repeatedly expressed the thought that no durable peace can be based
on an armaments race and that you strongly desire peace and coopera-
tion with other countries, including the Soviet Union. This was also
stated in your conversations with N. S. Khrushchev and myself during
the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government of the Four
Powers in the summer of 1955. Unfortunately, however, it must be
said that in practice all the steps taken by the Soviet Government to
improve relations with the United States have not up to now met with
a positive response on the part of the Government of the United States
of America.

Meanwhile, the present state of Soviet-American relations cannot
give any satisfaction either to the Soviet people or, it seems to us,
to the American people. The tense and even almost hostile character
which these relations very often assume cannot be justified from a
political, economic, or moral viewpoint. It is an inherently absurd
situation when two gigantic countries which have at their disposal
everything that is necessary for their economic development, which
have repeatedly and successfully cooperated in the past, and which,
we are convinced, even now have no irreconcilable conflicts of interest,
have been as yet unable to normalize their mutual relations.

This problem is all the more significant because the fate of universal
peace depends to a high—probably even decisive—degree on the state
of mutual relations between our countries under present conditions.
For this very reason, it is especially important that our two countries
display initiative and take the step which peoples have already been
awaiting for a long time, namely, breaking the ice of the "cold war."

For this the necessary prerequisites exist. I have no doubt that the
American people do not want a new war any more than the Soviet
people do. Our countries, in close cooperation, achieved victory in the
struggle against Hitlerite aggression. Is it possible that now, when
prevention of the universal calamity of a new war depends to such
an enormous degree upon our countries, we should fail to find within
ourselves the courage to face the facts clearly and be able to unite our
efforts in the interests of peace?

A consciousness of the gravity of the present situation and a deep
concern for the preservation of peace prompts us to address to you,

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Mr. President, an appeal to undertake joint efforts to put an end to the "cold war," to terminate the armaments race, and to enter resolutely upon the path of peaceful coexistence.

Allow me to set forth what exactly, in our opinion, might be done in this respect.

We regret that, because of the position taken by the Western powers, the disarmament negotiations did not bring about successful results. The Soviet Union is, as before, prepared to come to an agreement concerning effective disarmament measures. It depends on the Western powers whether the disarmament negotiations will be directed into the proper channel or whether this problem will remain in a deadlock.

We must recognize that the achievement of an agreement on disarmament is hindered by the fact that the sides which take part in the negotiations lack the necessary confidence in each other. Is it possible to do something to create such confidence? Of course it is possible.

We propose the following things. Let us jointly, with the Government of Great Britain, undertake for the present only an obligation not to use nuclear weapons, and let us announce the cessation, as of January 1, 1958, of test explosions of all types of such weapons, at the beginning at least for two or three years.

Let us jointly, with the Government of Great Britain, agree to refrain from stationing any kind of nuclear weapons whatsoever within the territory of Germany—West Germany as well as East Germany. If this agreement is supplemented by an agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on renunciation of the production of nuclear weapons and on the nonstationing of such weapons in Germany, then, as has already been officially declared by the Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia, these states likewise will not produce or station nuclear weapons in their territories. Thus would be formed in Central Europe a vast zone with a population of over one hundred million people excluded from the sphere of atomic armaments—a zone where the risk of atomic warfare would be reduced to a minimum. Let us develop and submit to the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact for consideration a joint proposal for the conclusion of some form of nonaggression agreement between these two groupings of states.

In order to normalize the situation in the Near and Middle East, let us agree not to undertake any steps that violate the independence of the countries of this area, and let us renounce the use of force in the settlement of questions relating to the Near and Middle East.

III

Let us conclude an agreement that would proclaim the firm intention of our two states to develop between them relations of friendship and peaceful cooperation. It is time to take measures to halt the present propaganda in the press and on the radio which generates feelings of mutual distrust, suspicion, and ill will.

It is also necessary to reestablish the conditions for a normal development of trade relations between our countries, since mutually advantageous trade is the best foundation for the development of relations between states and the establishment of confidence between them.

Let us do everything possible to broaden scientific, cultural, and athletic ties between our two countries. One can imagine what fruitful results might follow, for example, from the cooperation between Soviet and American scientists in the matter of further harnessing the elemental powers of nature in the interest of man.

There is no doubt whatsoever that the implementation of the above-mentioned measures, which would in no way harm either the security or the other interests of any state, would be of enormous significance to the promotion of a wholesome atmosphere in the entire international situation and to the creation of a climate of trust between states, without which one cannot even speak of insuring a lasting peace among peoples.

The creation of the necessary trust in relations between states would then make it possible to proceed with the implementation of such radical measures as a substantial reduction in armed forces and armaments, the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production and the destruction of stockpiles, the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territories of all states, including the member states of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact, and replacement of the existing military groupings of states with a collective security system.

The critical period in the development of international relations in which we are now living makes it necessary, perhaps as never before, to adopt realistic decisions that would be in accord with the vital interests and the will of peoples. The experience of the past tells us how much can be done for the benefit of peoples by statesmen who correctly understand the demands of the historic moment and act in accordance with those demands.

Knowing you, Mr. President, as a man of great breadth of vision and peace-loving convictions, I hope that you will correctly understand this message and, conscious of the responsibility which rests with the leaders of the United States of America and the Soviet Union in the present situation, will manifest a readiness to combine the efforts of our two countries for the noble purpose of turning the course of events

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in the direction of a durable peace and friendly cooperation among
nations.

Attaching great importance to personal contacts between states-
men, which facilitate finding a common point of view on important
international problems, we, for our part, would be prepared to come
to an agreement on a personal meeting of state leaders to discuss both
the problems mentioned in this letter and other problems. The partic-
ipants in the meeting could agree upon these other subjects that might
need to be discussed.

Respectfully,

N. BULGANIN

NATO Heads of Government Meeting:
Communiqué, December 19, 1957 ¹

[Extracts]

International Situation

1. The aim of the Soviet bloc is to weaken and disrupt the free world. Its instruments are military, political and economic: and its activities are world wide. To meet this challenge the free world must organize its resources—moral, military, political and economic—and be ready to deploy them wherever the situation demands. Our Alliance cannot therefore be concerned only with the North Atlantic area or only with military defence. It must also organize its political and economic strength on the principle of interdependence, and must take account of developments outside its own area.

2. In the course of our meeting we have therefore reviewed the international situation and, in particular, the dangers to world peace arising from Soviet actions and threats. In spite of the dangers of the situation which are obvious to all, the Soviet Union has made no real contribution to the solution of major problems causing inter-

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 6, 1958, pp. 12-15; see also *North Atlantic Treaty Organization Meeting of Heads of Government, Paris, December 1957* (Department of State publication 6606, Mar. 1958), pp. 105-110.

The Heads of Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Paris, Dec. 16-19, 1957, for the first top-level meeting of the North Atlantic Council since the founding of the Alliance more than 8 years before. They came together because they desired to increase the effectiveness of NATO in relation to current international political, military, and economic problems arising out of the policies of the Soviet Union. For the Declaration issued with the Communiqué, see *North Atlantic Treaty Organization Meeting of Heads of Government*, pp. 103-110, and *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 6, 1958, pp. 12-15.

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national tension. We have especially in mind the problems of the reunification of Germany in freedom, and the continuing anomaly of the isolation of Berlin—the capital of Germany. We renew and reaffirm our declaration of 23rd October, 1954 which had in view the establishment on a firm basis of the security and freedom of Berlin.¹ The perpetuation of injustice to the German people undermines international confidence and endangers peace. At the Geneva Conference of Heads of Government in July, 1955, the Soviet leaders took a solemn commitment that “the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security”.² We call upon the Soviet Government to honour this pledge.

3. We have reviewed the situation in the Middle East. In line with the peaceful aims of our Alliance, we confirm the support of our Governments for the independence and sovereignty of the states in this region, and our interest in the economic well-being of their peoples. We believe that the stability of this important area is vital to world peace.

4. We express our interest in the maintenance of peace and the development of conditions of stability and economic and political well-being in the vitally important continent of Africa. We hope that the countries and peoples of that continent who are disposed to do so will cooperate within the free world in efforts to promote these purposes. We affirm the readiness of our countries to cooperate for our part with the countries and peoples of Africa to further these ends. Historic, economic and other friendly ties between certain European countries and Africa would make such co-operation particularly desirable and effective.

5. In the course of our review of the international situation we have given consideration to recent serious events in Indonesia. We view them with concern.

## *The Working of the Alliance*

6. The strength of our Alliance, freely concluded between independent nations, lies in our fundamental unity in the face of the danger which threatens us. Thanks to this fundamental unity, we can overcome our difficulties and bring into harmony our individual points of view. In contrast, as events in Hungary have shown, the Soviet bloc is held together only by political and military coercion.

¹ For text, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents* (Department of State publication 6446), vol. II, p. 1758.

² See the Directive of the Four Heads of Government to the Foreign Ministers, July 23, 1955 (ante).

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7. Although progress has been made, further improvement is needed in our political consultation. . . .

## Disarmament

8. We recall that in the course of this year, the Western countries taking part in the London Disarmament talks put forward to the Soviet Union, with the unanimous agreement of NATO, a series of concrete proposals providing, subject to effective controls:

- for reduction of all armaments and military forces;

- for the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

- for the reduction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons;

- for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests;

- for measures to guard against the risk of surprise attack.¹

9. We note with regret that these various proposals, which would halt the armaments race and add to world security if they were accepted, were rejected en bloc by the Soviet Union, although they had been approved by 56 members of the United Nations.

10. We regret that the Soviet Union has brought about a deadlock in the disarmament negotiations by declaring their intention to boycott the United Nations Disarmament Commission which had been extended, by a strong majority of the General Assembly, to include 25 nations.

11. We denounce Soviet tactics of alternating between peace propaganda statements and attempted intimidation by the threat of nuclear attack.

12. We deplore, also, that the leaders of the U.S.S.R. do not allow the Soviet populations to be impartially informed and enlightened by the services of the United Nations at the same time as the populations of other member countries, as to the danger of destruction to which all peoples would be exposed in the event of general war. A resolution to this effect was adopted in November, 1957, by the General Assembly of the United Nations by 71 nations against 9 nations of the Soviet bloc.

13. We emphasize that, in order to be effective, any disarmament agreement implies adequate international control, that the acceptance of such control is the test of a true desire for peace and that the Soviet Union refuses to put this principle into practice.

14. We have decided to establish a Technical Group to advise on problems of arms control arising out of new technical developments.

¹ See United Nations document DC/SC.1/66, Aug. 29, 1957, in *Fifth Report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission* (DC/113), annex 5.

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15. In spite of the successive setbacks given by the Soviet Union to the cause of controlled disarmament and of peace, the NATO Council will neglect no possibility of restricting armaments within the limits imposed by security and will take all necessary action to this end.

16. We state our willingness to promote, preferably within the framework of the United Nations, any negotiations with the U.S.S.R. likely to lead to the implementation of the proposals recalled above.

We are also prepared to examine any proposal, from whatever source, for general or partial disarmament, and any proposal enabling agreement to be reached on the controlled reduction of armaments of all types.

17. Should the Soviet government refuse to participate in the work of the new Disarmament Commission, we would welcome a meeting at Foreign Ministers' level to resolve the deadlock.

## NATO Defence

18. The Soviet leaders, while preventing a general disarmament agreement, have made it clear that the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds, are being introduced in the Soviet armed forces. In the Soviet view, all European nations except the U.S.S.R. should, without waiting for general disarmament, renounce nuclear weapons and missiles and rely on arms of the pre-atomic age.

19. As long as the Soviet Union persists in this attitude, we have no alternative but to remain vigilant and to look to our defences. We are therefore resolved to achieve the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength, taking into account the most recent developments in weapons and techniques.

20. To this end, NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defence of the Alliance in case of need. In view of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons, the Council has also decided that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

21. The deployment of these stocks and missiles and arrangements for their use will accordingly be decided in conformity with NATO defence plans and in agreement with the states directly concerned. The NATO military authorities have been requested to submit to the Council at an early date their recommendations on the introduction of these weapons in the common defence. The Council in permanent session will consider the various questions involved.

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Scientific and Technical Co-operation

25. We recognise that in most of our countries more should be done to increase the supply of trained men in many branches of science and technology. ...

28. We have decided to establish forthwith a Science Committee. ...

29. The Science Committee will be responsible in particular for making specific recommendations to the Council for action on a proposal by the French Government for a Western Foundation for Scientific Research and on the many other valuable proposals which have been put forward by the NATO Task Force on Scientific and Technical Co-operation and by the NATO Parliamentarians Conference.

Economic Co-operation

30. We are united in our common purpose to promote the economic and social development of our peoples and to assist the peoples of other countries to achieve the same objective. We consider that the purpose of government in a free society is to enlarge the opportunity of the individual rather than to subordinate him to the state.

35. Under present circumstances, our defensive Alliance takes on a new significance. Only an intensified collective effort can safeguard our peoples and their liberties. We have, together, ample capacity in freedom to defend freedom.

36. We have taken a series of decisions which will promote greater strength and greater security not only for our own nations but also for the world at large.

Soviet Proposals Sent to NATO Members, United Nations Members, and Switzerland, January 8, 1958¹

The present international situation is marked, on the one hand, by the continuation of the "cold war," intensification of the armaments race, particularly in the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons,

¹This document was transmitted as an appendix to individual letters sent to each of the Governments. Text from *Efforts of the Soviet Union towards Summit Talks: Documents January-May 1958*; Soviet News Booklet No. 29 (London, no date), pp. 3-10.

117

and a direct danger to world peace, to the fate of the whole of man-
kind. On the other hand, it is marked by a gigantic growth of the
forces demanding peace and security. The peoples are calling with
increasing determination for the "cold war" to be ended, for a halt to
the frantic arms race, for mankind to be freed from the danger of war
so that, at long last, men and women may be enabled to rid themselves
of fear for their lives and for the future of their children.

Today, for the statesmen, the government leaders who bear the pri-
mary responsibility for the policies of their countries, there is and can
be no more urgent or noble task than that of establishing lasting peace
and removing the danger of atomic war that is looming over mankind.

Gravely concerned over the situation that has arisen in the world,
and desirous of doing everything in its power to lay the foundation
for a radical improvement in the international situation, the Soviet
government recently made a number of proposals to the governments
of the member-countries of the North Atlantic Alliance (N.A.T.O.),
and also to the governments of all the other member-states of the
United Nations Organisation—proposals aimed at achieving, by joint
efforts, a relaxation in international tension, at creating the necessary
atmosphere of trust in relations between states. At its recent session
in December, 1957, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet passed a resolution
which likewise puts forward definite proposals aimed at reducing in-
ternational tension, at putting an end to the "cold war," and calling
on the parliaments and governments of all countries to take the neces-
sary steps to prevent events from developing along dangerous lines,
to defend peace and rid mankind of the nightmare of an atomic war
of annihilation.

One cannot fail to point out that after making a sober appraisal of
the international situation, many governments, eminent statesmen,
political and public figures, and representatives of broad public circles
with different social positions and different political views and reli-
gious beliefs, are more and more insistently demanding that an end be
put to the arms race and that the road to war be barred.

It is becoming increasingly clear to all that the issue today is:

> Either the "cold war" continues, in which case mankind is faced
> with the danger of it developing into "hot war";

> Or else the principles of the peaceful co-existence of states receive
> universal recognition. In this case there will be opened up for man-
> kind the prospect of the peaceful development of the peoples along
> the path of spiritual and material progress.

The Soviet government is pleased to note that the principles of the
peaceful co-existence of states have already won international recog-
nition on a wide scale. They met with unanimous recognition and

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approval at the 12th General Assembly of the United Nations, which passed a special resolution on this most important question. In this way, the United Nations member-states recognised that the basis of relations between them, irrespective of their social systems, must be the principles of mutual respect and mutual benefit, non-aggression, mutual respect for sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity, and non-interference in one another's internal affairs. The Soviet government welcomes the General Assembly's appeal to all states to do their utmost to strengthen world peace and develop friendly relations and co-operation, and to use only peaceful means to settle all outstanding issues.

Today statesmen and political leaders cannot ignore the peoples' irrepressible desire for peace.

As is well known, even the documents of the recent session of the N.A.T.O. Council have a great deal to say about peace; they say that the organisation "will never be used for aggressive purposes," and that its member-countries "are always ready to settle international problems by negotiation, taking into account the legitimate interests of all." If that is so, if the western powers, and in the first place the United States, adhere to these principles in their relations with other countries, then there is no obstacle to appropriate agreements being reached by means of negotiation in the interests of peace.

The Soviet government fully shares the view of a number of governments and also the ever-increasing demand of broad international public circles that a summit conference of statesmen would be helpful in removing the danger of a new war. Such a conference could find effective ways for settling the problems which are profoundly disturbing all peoples, and for bringing about the necessary turn in the development of international relations. Experience shows that unless there are personal meetings between the leading statesmen who bear the primary responsibility for the policies of their countries, it is difficult to count on mutually acceptable decisions being reached on pressing international problems, especially in view of the acute and complicated character of these problems.

Naturally, the point at issue is not that of the fundamental differences between existing social systems, the differences between socialism and capitalism, the ideological differences between states. Such questions are the domestic concern of each country, and cannot form the subject of international negotiations. What is being dealt with is the pressing international problems which can and should be solved by means of negotiations between the states, taking into account their mutual interests.

The Soviet government bears in mind the fact that it would, of course, be difficult at such a conference of government leaders to reach

119

agreement on all these questions. The attention of such a conference should be focused primarily on the most urgent questions, whose settlement would lay the basis for an improvement in the whole international situation. Examination of other problems could be referred to a subsequent stage in negotiations between the states. There can be no doubt that if agreement is reached first of all on a few individual questions, this would be conducive to the settlement of other outstanding international problems as well. Such a method of gradually solving the outstanding problems that face the states at the present time, when the necessary confidence in relations between states is still lacking, appears to be the most realistic and most justified method.

Guided by the aim of strengthening world peace, taking into account the broad movement of the people in favour of talks between the statesmen of East and West, and also taking into consideration the statement of the participants in the Paris session of the N.A.T.O. Council on their readiness to solve international problems by means of negotiation, the Soviet government proposes that during the next two or three months of this year a summit conference be held of leaders of states, with the participation of the heads of government. At the conference they could first of all discuss problems whose settlement would meet the aspirations of the peoples and would serve as an important beginning for a radical change in the international situation and the ending of the "cold war."

1. At the conference the proposal for an immediate ending, at least for a period of two or three years, of hydrogen and atomic weapon tests should be considered. The need for such a step is evident. The cessation of the test explosions of hydrogen and atom bombs would stop the development of prototypes of ever more destructive and deadly weapons.

At the same time an agreement on this matter would demonstrate the determination of the powers to take definite steps to end the race in atomic weapons and to reduce the danger of an atomic war. The usefulness of an immediate examination of this problem is also underlined by the fact that the majority of states, including all powers which possess nuclear weapons, recognise the necessity of reaching an agreement on the ending of nuclear weapon tests. The conclusion of such an agreement is made easier by the fact that it would not require any measures of control that are complicated and hard to achieve, and would do no harm to any of the states.

Naturally, the conference would also provide an opportunity for exchanging views on certain other aspects of the disarmament problem, especially since the disarmament talks have been suspended at the present time and the conditions for resuming them in the United Nations agencies are as yet lacking.

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pendent of their social system, on the basis of mutual respect for
sovereign rights and non-interference in their internal affairs satisfies
the vital interests of peoples, and promotes the strengthening of friend-
ship and of economic cooperation among them. This is confirmed,
in particular, by the successful completion of bilateral negotiations
and the signing in Washington of a Soviet-American agreement in
the fields of culture, technology, and education, as well as by the suc-
cessful collaboration of the scientists of many countries in the program
of the International Geophysical Year.

The Soviet Government also attaches great importance to the estab-
lishment and expansion of regular personal contacts between govern-
ment and public figures of the countries of the East and the West for
an exchange of opinions on current international questions. The
expansion of such ties and contacts in the near future could be realized
by means of the mutual exchange of parliamentary delegations and
delegations of public entities; mutual exchange of delegations of sci-
entific, technical, and cultural workers; mutual exchange of artists,
theater troupes, symphony orchestras, etc.; mutual exchange of scien-
tific and technical literature and documents, including designs and
blueprints of machines and equipment, descriptions of technological
processes, etc.; free access to industrial exhibitions; mutual exchange
of students, professors, and university delegations; every kind of en-
couragement for tourism, sporting events, etc.

11. Cessation of propaganda for war, hostility, and hatred between peoples

Notwithstanding the fact that ten years have already passed since
the adoption in October 1947 of the resolution of the UN General
Assembly on the banning of propaganda for war,¹ this unanimous
resolution of the assembly is not being implemented in a number of
countries. The idea of inevitability of a new war is being continually
suggested to the peoples of these countries in the press, by radio and
television, and by other means; the necessity of a race in nuclear arma-
ments and of a further increase in military budgets and taxes on the
population is being urged.

There is no doubt that, with good will and a mutual desire on the
part of all participants in the summit conference, it would not be
difficult to reach an understanding on the question of ceasing propa-
ganda for war and carrying on instead a propaganda for friendship
among peoples.

A settlement of this question could be achieved by means of the
adoption of a joint declaration whereby the governments participating

¹ See General Assembly Res. 110 (II), Nov. 3, 1947; in U.N. General Assembly, *Official Records, Second Session, Resolutions 16 September-29 November 1947*, D. 14.

221

in the conference would confirm their intention to carry out faithfully
the resolution of the UN General Assembly of October 1947 on the
banning of all kinds of propaganda for war inimical to the cause of
peace and mutual understanding and would undertake to adopt effec-
tive measures for the suppression of such propaganda in their own
countries.

12. *Ways to ease the tension in the Near and Middle East*

In recent years in the Near and Middle East there have periodically
come into being centers of tension containing the seeds of dangerous
international conflicts capable of leading to a breach of world peace.
In order to reduce tension in the Near and Middle East, it is necessary
to create in the countries of that region the assurance that any breach
of peace in the Near and Middle East on the part of any aggressive
forces whatsoever will be decisively condemned and stopped. One
of the measures could be a joint declaration of powers condemning the
use of force in the settlement of disputes in the Near and Middle East,
as well as interference in the internal affairs of the countries of that
region. It would also be possible to come to an understanding on the
mutual obligations of the countries participating in the conference
not to supply weapons to the countries of the Near and Middle East,
and also not to station nuclear and rocket weapons in those countries.

Considering the economic difficulties being experienced by the
countries of the Near and Middle East, and their aspiration to con-
solidate their independence, the necessity arises of also considering the
question of economic collaboration with the countries of the Near and
Middle East, especially in the field of assistance for the creation in
them of a national industry, proceeding from the principles of full
equality and mutual benefit without the imposition upon them of any
political, military, or other conditions whatsoever that are incom-
patible with the principles of independence and sovereignty.

Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council,
May 7, 1958¹

[Extract]

The North Atlantic Council held its spring ministerial meeting in
Copenhagen from May 5 to 7, 1958.

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, May 26, 1958, pp. 850-851.

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5. During their consideration of the international situation the Ministers had a discussion on the question of a possible summit conference. The Council believes that summit meetings are desirable if they offer prospects of reaching settlements on important questions. The Council considers that conferences at the summit are not the only way, or necessarily the best way, of conducting negotiations or reducing international tensions. In any event, such conferences must be properly prepared and take place in a favorable atmosphere.

6. The Ministers regretted that during the last few weeks the Soviet Union has made the preparations for a possible summit conference more difficult by posing unreasonable conditions. The Soviet Union has recently aggravated international tension by its veto in the Security Council of the United States proposals to reduce the risks of surprise attack over the Arctic.¹

7. Despite the disappointment and doubts to which the Soviet attitude gives rise, the NATO Governments will not be discouraged nor give up their attachment to the principle of negotiation.

8. Should a summit conference take place at this time it should consider certain important problems, among others the German problem, which were identified by the Heads of Governments meeting at Geneva in 1955 and on which, unfortunately, little or no progress towards a solution has been made. Controlled disarmament, desired so ardently by all peoples, should be one of the main questions on the agenda. The proposals made by the Western Powers on 29th August, 1957 ² and approved by a large majority in the United Nations ³ could afford a reasonable basis for this discussion.

9. The Council expressed the hope that it might yet prove possible, in spite of repeated Soviet refusal, to inaugurate expert technical discussions, between representatives of the Soviet Union and of the Western Powers principally concerned, on detailed measures on control over disarmament. Agreement on measures necessary, for example, to prevent surprise attack or to detect nuclear explosions might go far towards demonstrating the possibility of agreement on disarmament, improving its prospects and accelerating its application when reached. In order to prepare the way for such agreement the Council will consider the possibility of carrying out studies and experiments on the technical problems of inspection and control.

¹ See Department of State Bulletin, May 19, 1958, pp. 816-820.

² For text, see *ibid*., Sept. 16, 1957, pp. 451-455.

³ See *ibid*., Dec. 16, 1957, pp. 961-966.

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Statement by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
May 16, 1958¹

[Extracts]

The peoples, who yearn for the threat of atomic war to be removed, will find nothing encouraging in the decisions of the May session of the N.A.T.O. Council. It is worth noting that the aforementioned communiqué in fact gives a negative appreciation of the very idea of a summit meeting. It says flatly that summit meetings are neither the only means, nor necessarily the best means of holding talks or easing international tension. Comparing these words with the statement by the governments of the western powers made shortly after the Soviet government proposed last December to hold an East-West summit meeting, there remains not the least doubt that the May session of the N.A.T.O. Council tried to take a step backwards.

The N.A.T.O. Council decisions reflect the position of certain western statesmen who, under various pretexts, are trying to evade convening a summit meeting and to drown in fruitless debate the question of pressing measures to ease international tension, in the same way as was done with the disarmament problem in the United Nations bodies over a period of 13 years.

No particular perspicacity is required to discern the motives which prompted the United States government in sending its allies, on the eve of the N.A.T.O. session, Notes objecting to the proposal of the Polish People's Republic for the establishment of a denuclearised zone in Central Europe. That was clearly an attempt by the United States ruling circles to place a *fait accompli* before their allies in order to avoid a divergence of opinion among the participants in the session on the Polish proposal—which had met with positive comments and support everywhere, including the N.A.T.O. countries—and to make more difficult the introduction of that proposal for summit discussion.

One is justified in asking the following question: Why did the May session of the N.A.T.O. Council again advance the demand that a summit meeting should discuss the German problem which the participants in the session, as their statements make clear, interpret as the unification of Germany—a matter which is the German people's own affair. The United States government, like the governments of other western powers, is fully aware that attempts to arrogate, over the

¹Text from *Efforts of the Soviet Union for Summit Talks and Peace: A Second Collection of Documents covering the period April 22-July 2, 1958*; Soviet News Booklet No. 34 (London, no date), pp. 25-29.

224

heads of the governments of both German states, the right to act for
the Germans in accomplishing the national task of the German people
have already proved untenable. All the facts make it clear that the
governments which have the last say in N.A.T.O. have no desire to
reckon even with the sound pronouncements of statesmen of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany who say that the preparations for a summit
meeting should not be burdened with the question of whether or not
the problem of German unification is placed on the summit agenda.

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany is known to be
of the same view. It is clear that if the demand to discuss the ques-
tion of Germany's unification at the summit is nevertheless advanced,
it has no other purpose than to block fruitful talks on the relaxation
of tension in international relations. On the other hand, it cannot
be denied that agreement between the powers on ripe international
issues and a relaxation of East-West tension will create a more favour-
able climate for Germany's reunification.

As for that part of the German problem for whose solution the four
powers are responsible, that is, the conclusion of a peace treaty with
Germany, the Soviet government has already submitted for the con-
sideration of the western powers a proposal to discuss this matter at
a summit conference, with the participation of the German Demo-
cratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in these delib-
erations. The participation of representatives from both German
states in the preparation of a peace treaty would undoubtedly help to
give the German people a clear picture of Germany's future develop-
ment and give an impetus to the pooling of efforts by the two German
states in the matter of reestablishing the national and state unity of
the German people.

Continuing their policy of protracting the preparations for a
summit conference, the western powers at the May N.A.T.O. Council
session did not refrain from blaming the Soviet Union for obstructing
the early completion of these preparations. It is hardly worth
dwelling on these inventions, which nobody can take seriously. The
authors of the communiqué of the Copenhagen N.A.T.O. session
themselves hardly expect them to be believed. No juggling with facts
can conceal that it was precisely the Soviet Union that took the initia-
tive in raising the question of a top-level conference and that for half
a year now the Soviet government has been doing its best to bring
about this meeting.

Attempts to deal with the Soviet Union on the basis of "preliminary
terms" are well known and they have never been successful and never

225

can be. The summit conference is not a subject for bargaining, it is a
vital need of our time. The attempts of the United States govern-
ment to bargain unilateral concessions from the Soviet Union in re-
turn for its agreement to take part in the meeting are absolutely futile
and contrary to the elementary requirements of international co-oper-
ation.

Attaching great significance to the prevention of a surprise attack, the Soviet Union has long proposed discussing this question at a summit conference and has set forth its generally known considerations on a possible system of forestalling a surprise attack. As for singling out separate areas for aerial inspection, the Soviet government, meeting the United States government's wishes half-way, came out for the establishment of open-sky zones in Central Europe, and also in the Far East and a corresponding part of the United States. These proposals are known to remain in force, but Washington has obviously lost interest in them.

In view of the prospects for a summit conference, the concluding communiqué of the N.A.T.O. Council session touches also on the disarmament problem. As a "basis for talks" on disarmament, however, it again puts forward the proposals made by the western powers on August 29, 1957, which in effect have the purpose of creating new obstacles to the solution of the disarmament problem.

The Soviet government has insisted and will continue to insist on the need for settling pressing and ripe international problems on whose solution the future of the world depends. It is for that very reason that the Soviet Union has proposed the following questions for summit discussion:

The ending of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests as the first im-
portant step towards the removal of the threat of atomic war;
abandonment by the powers of the use of atomic and hydrogen
weapons and the conclusion for that purpose of a pertinent interna-
tional agreement; the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the
N.A.T.O. powers and the Warsaw Treaty powers; the establishment
in the centre of Europe of a zone free from atomic, hydrogen and
rocket weapons; and also a number of other ripe problems.

The Soviet government has met the wishes of the western powers
half-way on a number of issues relating to the preparation of a sum-
mit meeting.

It has agreed to carry out preparatory work through diplomatic
channels and the Foreign Ministers, as well as to hold in the course
of these preliminary conferences, in case of need and by common con-

226

sent, an exchange of opinion on questions which the sides propose for inclusion in the summit agenda, in order to ascertain the advisability of including this or that question and the possibility of adopting mutually acceptable decisions on them.

The question today is: Will the western powers continue to invent various delays in the course of preparations for a summit meeting, leading to an intensification of the war danger—the very purpose of the May session of the N.A.T.O. Council—or will they take the road of honest talks and co-operation? For its part the Soviet government is invariably prepared for such talks and for co-operation in the interests of reducing international tension and in the interests of peace among the peoples.

## Tripartite Aide Memoire Presented to the
Soviet Union, May 28, 1958¹

The Governments of the US, UK and France after consideration of the Soviet Government's Aide Memoire of May 5, have concluded that the positions of the governments with regard to the purpose of the talks between the three Western Ambassadors and the Soviet Foreign Minister and of a subsequent Foreign Ministers' meeting are sufficiently close to permit the substantive preparatory work for a possible Summit meeting to proceed without delay. It is their understanding that this work should go forward along the following lines:

The purpose of the preparatory work shall be to examine the position of the various governments on the major questions at issue between them and to establish what subjects should be submitted for examination by Heads of Government. It is understood that it would not be the purpose of the preparatory work to reach decisions, but to bring out, by general discussion, the possibilities of agreement. When they have made progress in these talks the Ambassadors and the Soviet Foreign Minister will also have the task of agreeing on the time, place and composition of a Foreign Ministers' meeting.

The special tasks assigned to the Foreign Ministers themselves shall be to establish whether they are satisfied that the preparatory work affords the prospect that a Summit meeting would, in fact, provide

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, July 7, 1958, p. 16. The note was presented by the British Ambassador at Moscow on behalf of the United Kingdom, the United States, and France.

227

the opportunity for conducting serious discussions of major problems and be the means for reaching agreement on significant subjects. If and when this has been established to their satisfaction, the Foreign Ministers will then reach agreement on the date, place and composition of a Summit meeting.

Tripartite Memorandum on Proposals for
Summit Agenda, May 28, 1958¹

The Governments of the US, UK and France believe that the present international situation requires that a serious attempt be made to reach agreement on the main problems affecting the attainment of peace and stability in the world. They consider that, in the circumstances, a Summit meeting would be desirable if it would provide the opportunity for serious discussions of major problems and would be an effective means of reaching agreement on significant subjects.

They regard such settlements as constituting effective means for developing a spirit of confidence in their relations with the Soviet Union which could lead to cooperation among nations in the pursuit of a just and lasting peace.

Such settlements, if they are to serve this purpose, must take into account the legitimate interests of all the parties concerned and must embrace the necessary elements to assure their implementation.

In his letter of January 12, 1958, President Eisenhower put forward a series of proposals to Premier Bulganin. The Governments of the US, UK and France consider that they form the basis for mutually beneficial settlements at a meeting of Heads of Government. Some of the considerations which underlie this view are set forth below. In making their proposals in the field of disarmament, the three governments recall their obligations, undertaken in the UN Charter, not to use any weapons against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. While a comprehensive disarmament remains their ultimate aim, they propose certain practical balanced and interdependent measures which would mark significant progress toward controlling the arms race and thus reducing the danger of war. Progress of this sort would also create an atmosphere of confidence which could facilitate settlement of the political controversies

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, July 7, 1958, pp. 12-16. The memorandum was presented by the British Ambassador at Moscow on behalf of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

228

that disturb relations between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. Reduction in both nuclear weapons and conventional armed forces and armaments are vital for this purpose. The three Governments therefore consider it desirable to make clear once again what were the reasons which led them to put forward far reaching proposals for partial disarmament in 1957.

1. Measures to control production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons and to reduce existing military stocks of such materials

As for the nuclear problem, the heart of the matter is not the mere testing, but the weapons themselves. The Western Powers seek a dependable ending to the accumulation of nuclear weapons and a dependable beginning of the steady reduction of existing weapons stockpiles. Since there is no known reliable means for detecting the weapons already made, the most effective and feasible way to work toward the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons is to halt production of fissionable materials for making them and to begin reducing weapons stockpiles by equitable transfers to peaceful uses. The Western Powers are prepared to discuss these measures and the ratios of materials to be transferred from existing weapons stocks to peaceful uses with a view to arriving at equitable proportions for such transfers by the states concerned.

2. Suspension of nuclear tests

If there is agreement to put an end to the production of new fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, the way lies open to an immediate solution of the problem of nuclear testing. So long as unrestricted manufacture of nuclear weapons continues, and new means are being developed for delivering nuclear weapons rapidly and surely the suspension of nuclear testing does not constitute disarmament. It is relevant to underline the fact that the existence of nuclear stocks, which are constantly growing, constitutes a much more serious danger than nuclear tests. Thus, the Western Powers propose not only the suspension of nuclear tests but the stopping of production of new fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion of stocks of these materials to peaceful uses. Testing could be stopped indefinitely if the necessary inspection system is installed and the production of fissionable materials for weapons is also effectively ended. Both would be carried out under effective measures of international control.

3. The reduction and limitation of conventional arms and manpower

An agreement on initial verifiable reductions of armed forces and their stocks of arms could ease the way toward settlement of problems

229

which create international friction. In their turn, such settlements
could set the stage for further reductions. This is a sound approach
for developing confidence in relations between the countries. On the
other hand, unverified and uncontrolled unilateral measures can well
be merely shifts in deployment or temporary reductions. They do
not inspire confidence.

With these considerations in mind, the Western Governments pro-
pose that the Soviet Union join them in agreeing on an initial limita-
tion of their armed forces; and on placing in storage depots within
their own territories, and under the supervision of an international
control organization, specific quantities of designated types of arma-
ments. They will be prepared also to negotiate on a further limitation
of their armed forces and armaments provided that compliance with
commitments above has been verified to mutual satisfaction, that there
has been progress toward the solution of political issues, and that
other essential states have accepted equitable levels for their armed
forces and armaments.

4. Measures to guard against surprise attack

Until general controlled disarmament becomes a reality, the surest
way toward the development of confidence lies in lifting fears of
surprise attack. Growing capabilities of surprise attack on a massive
scale underscore the importance of a prompt beginning on measures
to deal with this problem. The Western Powers want to meet it on
the broadest scale possible. The Governments of the US, UK and
France express their readiness to enter into discussion of this subject
both from the standpoint of technical considerations of ways and
means of achieving this end in the most practical way and from the
standpoint of initial areas to be included in the progressive installa-
tion of such a system. In this connection the three Governments re-
affirm their willingness as expressed in the United Nations Disarma-
ment Subcommittee on August 29, 1957,¹ to consider the installation
of a system of air and ground inspection as a safeguard against sur-
prise attack on a comprehensive scale embracing all of the US, USSR,
Canada, and with the consent of the countries involved, the greater
part of Europe as well. If this proposal is not acceptable to the
USSR, the three Governments are also prepared to consider the estab-
lishment in the first instance of smaller zones in the Arctic and
European regions, provided that the latter also included a significant
part of the territory of the Soviet Union. As the US indicated
at Geneva in 1955, if agreement is reached on the installation of

¹ For text of Western disarmament proposals, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 16, 1957, pp. 451-455.

230

measures of air and ground inspection on the comprehensive scale outlined above, negotiations could be undertaken promptly both with other sovereign states involved and with the Soviet Union for the appropriate extension of such inspection, on a reciprocal, equitable basis and subject to the consent of any governments concerned, to bases outside of national territory.

### 5. Use of outer space for peaceful purposes

An opportunity to stop the development of new and more powerful weapons was tragically lost a decade ago when the US offer to renounce making atomic weapons and to make the use of atomic energy an international asset for peaceful purposes only was not accepted. A great step forward in building confidence among peoples and in reducing the danger to humanity from new and powerful weapons would have been made if this offer had been accepted. The responsible countries are faced once more with a similar decision, laden with serious consequences for mankind. The three governments propose that the Soviet Union join in the establishment of a group of experts who would make the necessary technical studies for determining what measures are required to assure that outer space is used for peaceful purposes only.

### 6. Reunification of Germany in accordance with the terms of the 1955 Directive of the four Heads of Government to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs

The continued division of Germany is a major obstacle to the restoration of confidence and the creation of conditions of genuine peace and stability in Europe. Thirteen years have passed since the end of the war in Europe, yet no peace settlement has been made with Germany. A necessary prerequisite for such a settlement is the creation of a government which truly reflects the will of the German people. Only a government created on such a basis can undertake obligations which will inspire confidence on the part of other countries and which will be considered just and binding by the people of Germany themselves.

The Heads of Government in Geneva recognized the common responsibility of the four powers for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany. They agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany through free elections should be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security. The Western Powers propose that the Soviet Union join with them in immediate steps to carry out their responsibility by agreeing to permit an all-German Government to be formed by free elections and

231

enabling it to carry out its functions. Such an agreement would give tangible evidence of a common desire on the part of the four governments to create the conditions of trust on which a lasting peace can be based.

## 7. *European security arrangements*

The Western Powers are aware of the fact that the Soviet Union has expressed concern that the creation of a freely-chosen all-German Government with the full attributes of sovereignty would bring about changes in the present situation in Europe which the Soviet Union would consider detrimental to its security interests. The three governments are prepared to enter into arrangements concerning European security which would give assurances to the Soviet Union in this regard. The arrangements they envisage would involve limitations on forces and armaments. They would also involve assurances designed to prevent aggression in Europe by the exchange of undertakings to take appropriate action in the event of such aggression.

The three governments seek no one-sided advantage in such arrangements, nor do they contemplate entering into arrangements which would give a one-sided advantage to the Soviet Union to the prejudice of their essential security interests. Confidence can be created by international agreements only if the agreements take equally into account the legitimate security interests of all the parties concerned.

The Western Powers call on the Soviet Union to enter into negotiations on the subject of European security in this spirit, with a view to concluding a treaty which would enter into force in conjunction with an agreement on the reunification of Germany. This would recognize the close link which the powers concerned have agreed exists between the two subjects. The linked settlement of these two questions and the confidence created thereby would also permit further progress to be made in the limitation of armaments generally.

## 8. *International exchanges*

Lasting peace requires a satisfactory settlement of the problems which concern the general relationship between the peoples of Eastern Europe and those of the Western countries. An important step forward along the path of mutual understanding would be made if the interested governments agreed to remove the obstacles which still prevent peoples from knowing each other and to satisfy the common aspirations of all men by guaranteeing them objective and complete information and by promoting closer cultural ties and human relations.

In July 1955, at the Geneva Conference, the four Heads of Government included this question in the directives given to the Ministers of

232

Foreign Affairs. While some progress has been made in certain fields
since that date, much remains to be done to eliminate the obstacles
which still hinder mutual acquaintance and understanding, the con-
ditions for a durable and genuine peace.

9. Means of strengthening the United Nations

The peoples of the world look upon the UN organization and the
pledges of its members embodied in its Charter as man's best hope
for peace and justice. Thus, the Western governments cannot but
welcome the recent assertion of the Soviet Union that it believes in the
importance of the United Nations and its role in the maintenance of
peace and security as well as in the peaceful settlement of interna-
tional issues. Like the USSR, they deem that efforts should be made
to strengthen the United Nations by every means, so that it should be
able to fulfill its tasks more effectively. One practical way in which
this can be done now is through an undertaking by the Governments
of the US, UK, France and USSR that they will, as a matter of
policy, avoid vetoing Security Council recommendations as to how
nations might proceed toward the peaceful solution of their disputes.

10. Ways of easing tensions in Eastern Europe

The creation of conditions of stability in Eastern Europe based on
relations of independence and friendship among the countries of the
area would greatly contribute to the cause of promoting a just and
lasting world peace. That this should come about is thus not an as-
piration of neighboring Western Europe alone, but of all the world.
This international interest found its expression in the international
agreements concerning the right of the peoples of the area to choose
their own governments; the peace treaties with their provisions de-
signed to safeguard human rights; the efforts of many countries to
improve the economic welfare of the people; and efforts to eliminate
interference in their internal affairs.

The Western Powers believe that a serious discussion of the prob-
lem posed by the existence of tensions in Eastern Europe should be
held with the aim of eliminating interference in the internal affairs
of the countries of that region and the use of force in the settlement of
disputes there.

The Western governments believe that the proposals set forth above
are feasible and could be put into effect now. They believe their im-
plementation is verifiable. The proposals take into account the le-
gitimate interests and security needs of the countries concerned.
Their adoption could create a basis for the development of an atmos-
phere of confidence and trust that would favor the growth of more
active mutually beneficial relations between our peoples and
governments.

544645—60—18

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Tripartite List of General Headings for Reviewing
Specific Agenda Proposals, May 31, 1958¹

(With only Western items listed as examples)

*Disarmament*

(a) Measures to control the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and to reduce existing military stocks of such material;

(b) The suspension of nuclear tests;

(c) The reduction and limitation of conventional arms and manpower;

(d) Measures to guard against surprise attack;

(e) The use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

*European Security and Germany*

(a) Reunification of Germany in accordance with the terms of the 1955 Directive of the four Heads of Government to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs;

(b) European security arrangements.

*International Exchanges*

(a) Cessation of jamming of foreign broadcasts;

(b) Censorship;

(c) Free distribution and sale to the public of books and publications;

(d) Free distribution and sale of foreign newspapers and periodicals;

(e) Freedom of travel.

*Methods of Improving International Cooperation*

Means of strengthening the United Nations.

*Other Topics*

Ways of easing tension in Eastern Europe.

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, July 7, 1958, pp. 16-17. The list was handed to the Soviet Government on May 31, 1958.

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Czechoslovak Memorandum, May 31, 1958¹

Unofficial translation

Bearing in mind the interests of strengthening world peace and security, the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic has more than once expressed its conviction as to the urgency of an early convocation of a summit Conference which would provide a forum for discussing the most important and most pressing international issues, the solution of which would contribute to the relaxation of tension in the world, to the restoration of confidence and to the promotion of peaceful coexistence among states.

The idea of convening a Conference of the Heads of Governments is already deeply rooted in world public opinion. The nations are justified in expecting that it will take place as early as possible. Under the pressure of world public opinion even the Western Powers have expressed their concurrence in principle with the holding of the Conference.

On the other hand, however, there have recently been intensified attempts at belittling the significance of the Conference and at delaying its convocation. As a result of the assumption that the concern of the world public opinion has already been sufficiently lulled, the adversaries of the Conference seek to cast in doubt its purpose and opportuneness. In this connexion it is not possible to disregard the position taken in respect of the Conference of the Heads of Governments by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council at its recent session in Copenhagen. In the closing communique of the session ² doubt is expressed whether at the present time the summit Conference is the best means for the lessening of international tension. However, the development of events in recent years has shown quite clearly that after the consideration of these important questions of international policy in other world forums failed to produce the expected results, a summit Conference, attended by the Heads of Governments, appears to be the most effective means for a discussion which would undoubtedly be instrumental in the relaxation of international tension.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic are of the opinion that the summit Conference should discuss the problems contained in the proposals submitted by the Government of the U.S.S.R., which received full support in the Declaration of the Member States of the

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 6, 1958, pp. 540-541. For U.S. reply of Sept. 12, 1958, see *post*.

² *Ibid.*, May 26, 1958, p. 850. See also *ante*, pp. 222-223.

235

Warsaw Treaty of May 24, 1958,¹ including such serious and press-
ing problems, for the settlement of which there exist today genuine
prerequisites, as the cessation of nuclear tests, the pledge of the
Great Powers to renounce the use of nuclear weapons, and the con-
clusion of a nonaggression pact between the States Members of the
North Atlantic Treaty and the States Members of the Warsaw
Treaty. The broad masses of world public opinion have accepted
and greatly appreciate the proposal submitted by the Polish People's
Republic for the establishment of an atom-free zone in Central
Europe as an important contribution to the lessening of international
tension and the elimination of the threat of an atomic war in Europe.
The more regrettable is, therefore, the position held by certain West-
ern Powers which are rejecting this proposal. The reasons given
for this rejection cannot weaken the conviction of the broadest masses
of the population of the European as well as non-European countries
that the proposal is beneficial to the cause of peace and security.

None of these problems is being submitted for discussion in the interest of one side alone. It is life itself that has placed them before the nations of the world, and their consideration and settlement would not harm the interests of any country, but, to the contrary, would help to improve the international situation, strengthen security in Europe and eliminate mutual distrust.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, as well as the other
States Members of the Warsaw Treaty, categorically reject the con-
sideration of the provocative and construed question of the so-called
situation in the countries of Eastern Europe, for the inclusion of
which in the agenda of the summit Conference the ruling circles of
some NATO States are pressing. Similar proposals constitute in-
admissible interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states,
incompatible with international law and the United Nations Charter.

Nor can the question of the unification of Germany, which the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council at its last session sought
to force onto the agenda of the Conference, constitute an item suitable
for consideration by the Conference. This question can only be re-
solved by the German people themselves, represented by the two
German States—the German Democratic Republic and the German
Federal Republic.

Neither the raising of such conditions as the discussion at the Con-
ference of the question of disarmament on the basis of the proposals
submitted by the Western Powers on August 29, 1957 ª can, in the

¹ Excerpts from the communiqué and other published papers of the meeting held at Moscow are printed in *The New York Times*, May 28, 1958.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.

236

opinion of the Czechoslovak Government, in any way be regarded as a constructive approach to expediting its convocation. These proposals have already been rejected as impracticable and inacceptable.

The requirement of a speedy convocation of the Conference at the summit is fully met by the last Memorandum of the Government of the Soviet Union of May 5 of this year, which fully opens the prospects for an expeditious termination of the preparatory work resulting in agreement and followed by an early convocation of the Conference of the Heads of Governments.

The questions to be considered are of such gravity that they impose the categorical demand to refrain from further delays, to bring the negotiations through diplomatic channels to a speedy conclusion and to proceed to the conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs followed by that of the Heads of Governments.

Regarding the composition of the parties to the talks, it is necessary to proceed from the real situation in such a manner as to promote to the utmost the achievement of positive results. This requirement is fully met by that part of the Declaration where the States Members of the Warsaw Treaty have expressed their consent with a limited participation at the summit Conference of three [four] Countries Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and three Countries Members of the Warsaw Treaty and have authorized the Soviet Union, the Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic [the People's Republic of Roumania] to attend the Conference on behalf of the countries which are signatories of the Warsaw Treaty.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic wishes to seize this opportunity to stress once again its previously expressed readiness to contribute by all means at its command to a speedy convocation of the summit Conference and to the creation of the most favourable prerequisites for its successful result.

The Czechoslovak Government expects that also the Governments which today have major responsibility for the convocation of the Conference at the summit will on their part not fail to do everything in order to fulfill the hopes that the nations have placed in the summit Conference.

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Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to
President Eisenhower, June 11, 1958¹

Official translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The present situation with respect to the negotiations on the preparation of a summit conference compels me to address this message to you.

Nearly two months have already elapsed since preliminary negotiations through diplomatic channels, proposed by the Western Powers, were initiated on the preparation of the said conference. Some time ago, when the Western Powers brought up the question of preliminary negotiations through diplomatic channels, the Soviet Government expressed serious doubts as to whether such procedure would facilitate the convening of a summit conference. We did not conceal our apprehension that by initiating such negotiations we might find ourselves on a slippery path which would result in delaying the whole matter and postponing the meeting of the heads of government. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government consented to these negotiations, since the Western Powers insisted on such a method of preparing the conference.

Unfortunately, our apprehensions regarding preliminary negotiations are beginning to be borne out. In the matter of preparing the conference we are, as before, marking time, and, as a matter of fact, on a number of questions we are even moving backwards. In such a situation many people, and not only in the Soviet Union, are beginning to ask the question whether the proposal itself for conducting preliminary negotiations of this kind was not calculated to put additional difficulties in the way of convening a summit conference. When the Soviet Government addressed the Government of the USA and the governments of other countries six months ago with an appeal to convene a broad international conference of top government officials, we were guided by the desire to find, through joint efforts, a way toward a radical change in the situation that has developed in international relations. We believe and still believe that at this conference agreement should be reached to ease relations between states, to liquidate the "cold war," to ensure conditions of peaceful coexistence of states, and not to resort to war as a means of resolving outstanding issues. One should not be reconciled to the dangerous direction which the development of relations between states has now taken, especially between the great powers. At the present time, when the destructive

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, July 21, 1958, pp. 96-101. For a statement issued on June 16 by the Department of State regarding this letter, see *ibid*., p. 96. For the President's reply, dated July 1, see *post*.

238

power of the weapons that states have at their disposal knows no
limits, inaction would be a crime. The time has come for energetic
joint intervention on the part of responsible government officials for
the purpose of averting a terrible danger, of liberating humanity
from the oppressive threat of atomic war, and giving people what
they need most of all—lasting peace and confidence in a tomorrow.

In January of this year you, Mr. President, responded to the pro-
posal to call a summit conference and communicated that you were
prepared to meet with the leaders of the Soviet Union and other states.¹
The Governments of the United Kingdom and France likewise re-
sponded to this proposal. All of this strengthened our hopes for an
early convening of such a conference and was well received by other
governments and the peoples of all countries.

Under such conditions it was natural to expect that in the course of
preliminary negotiations the parties would strive to submit for con-
sideration at the conference those pressing international problems with
regard to which, with the good will of the participants in the negotia-
tions, it would actually be possible to achieve positive results even now
and put the international situation on a healthier footing. We still
adhere to these views, particularly in connection with preparing the
agenda for a summit conference.

I take the liberty of again listing problems which, in the opinion
of the Soviet Government, should be considered at this conference.
These problems are the following:

Immediate cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests;

Renunciation of the use of all types of atomic, hydrogen, and rocket
weapons;

Creation in Central Europe of a zone free of atomic, hydrogen, and
rocket weapons;

Conclusion of a nonaggression pact between states;

Prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes, liquida-
tion of foreign military bases in foreign territories, and international
cooperation in the study of outer space;

Reduction in the number of foreign troops stationed in the territory
of Germany and within the borders of other European states;

Conclusion of a German peace treaty;

Prevention of surprise attack against one state by another;

Measures to expand international trade relations;

Development of ties and contacts between states;

Cessation of propaganda for war, hostility, and hatred between
peoples;

Ways to ease the tension in the Near and Middle East.

¹ See the President's letter of Jan. 12, 1958, *ante*.

239

We are putting the question of universal cessation of atomic and
hydrogen weapons tests in the forefront. Why are we doing this?
For the simple reason that such tests are, even now, in peacetime,
poisoning the atmosphere and the soil, contaminating every living
thing on earth, having a pernicious effect on the health of human
beings, and threatening the life of future generations, not to speak
of the fact that these tests are leading to the creation of new and even
more destructive types of weapons, the use of which in the event of
an outbreak of war would have the most serious consequences for
humanity.

An agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, which is possible
even now, would strengthen trust between states, would contribute
to the creation of a peaceful atmosphere, for which the peoples of all
countries are so starved, and would be a good beginning which would
pave the way toward solution of all major international problems.
In striving for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests we have unilat-
erally ceased testing, although this places us in an unfavorable posi-
tion as compared to NATO member countries. After all, it is well
known that the USA and the United Kingdom have conducted a
considerably greater number of experimental explosions of nuclear
weapons than the Soviet Union has, and thus an agreement on the
cessation of these tests would stabilize the situation to the advantage
of the NATO countries. But we are willing to accept this, we are
sacrificing our interests, guided by the higher interests of mankind,
and we consider that a cessation of nuclear weapons tests by all states
would not give rise to distrust but would rather contribute to the
achievement of the main goal—to avoid war.

In making the said decision to cease tests we appealed to the USA
and the United Kingdom to follow our example. However, much to
our distress, the Governments of the USA and of the United Kingdom
have not agreed to this and are continuing to carry on explosions of
nuclear weapons. In these circumstances we consider it particularly
important that this question be urgently discussed at a summit
conference.

Likewise, who can deny that reaching agreement on such questions
as renunciation of the use of all types of nuclear weapons, conclusion
of a nonaggression pact between the parties to the Warsaw Treaty
and the North Atlantic Alliance, and creation in Central Europe of
a zone free of nuclear and rocket weapons would result in easing
international tension and would be an important step toward the
solution of the disarmament problem as a whole?

Is it not in the interests of all countries that propaganda for war
should cease, a propaganda which in certain states is conducted day
in and day out, thus poisoning the relations between states?

240

And would it not be sensible to discuss such a question as the free
development of trade and of other economic relations between states
and mutually advantageous ways of considerably broadening such
relations? I believe that the business circles in many countries,
including the United States of America, would agree that it would
be extremely useful to solve this problem. My views on this matter
were set forth in greater detail in my letter addressed to you on June 2.¹

I believe that I am not mistaken in stating that by now few people
could be found who would have the audacity to deny that reaching
agreement on the questions proposed by us for consideration at a
summit conference would correspond to the vital interests of every
country and every people.

As you know, Mr. President, in the proposals handed to your Am-
bassador in Moscow on May 5 the Soviet Government set forth its
views on the questions that might be discussed at the said conference.
We did this in order to facilitate reaching agreement to convene the
conference. In so doing we also took into account the views expressed
by the governments of the Western Powers, primarily by the Govern-
ment of the USA, in the course of the exchange of opinions concerning
the preparation of the meeting. I am enclosing with this message
the text of these proposals of the Soviet Government.²

In introducing its proposals for the agenda of a meeting of heads
of government, the Soviet Union has stated from the very beginning
that it is prepared to consider, with common consent, other proposals
as well that would contribute to terminating the "cold war" and the
armaments race. On the other hand, I should like to emphasize very
definitely that if the Western Powers are not prepared to seek a solu-
tion at this time to all the questions proposed by the Soviet Union for
discussion at the conference, then some of them could be selected and
agreement could be reached on them, which would facilitate our
further progress toward strengthening peace.

We expected that the governments of the USA, the United Kingdom,
and France would consider the proposals of the Soviet Union with due
attention and would determine their attitude toward them, and also
that they would, on their part, be concerned with narrowing to the
greatest possible extent the gap between the positions of the parties

¹ For text of Khrushchev's letter, and of the President's reply dated July 14, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 4, 1958, pp. 200-202.

² The enclosure was the Soviet memorandum of May 5 (ante) with the addition of a final paragraph which reads as follows:

"The Soviet Government is convinced that good will and readiness to seek mutually acceptable solutions, with due regard for the interest of the parties concerned, can ensure the success of a summit conference and can cause the necessary shift in the development of the international situation in the interest of strengthening peace among nations."

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and facilitating the preparation of the conference. However, after studying the documents recently received from the three Powers in reply to the proposals made by the Soviet Government on May 5, we have discovered, to our profound regret, that in these documents questions are again raised which do not bring the possibility of agreement any closer but rather make it more remote and which we have repeatedly and clearly stated to be unacceptable to us. We ask ourselves: why are the governments of the Western Powers acting in this way—does this possibly reflect a desire to insult us in some way?

Indeed, the so-called question of the situation in Eastern Europe is again raised in the proposals of the Western Powers that have been transmitted. A new attempt is thus made to return to a stage through which we have already passed and to impose discussion of a matter with regard to which the positions of the parties have long been exhaustively clarified. The Government of the USA knows very well that this is no subject for discussion. We have already repeatedly stated that we regard it inadmissible to raise such a question at an international conference. The Soviet Union does not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of other sovereign states and is of the opinion that no one can claim the right to such interference.

It is not difficult to imagine what an absurd situation the world would be in if at international conferences we started to bring up problems concerning the internal systems of states which were somehow not to the taste of certain people in other countries. Any rapprochement between states is out of the question if we engaged in discussions of the fundamental differences existing between social systems. Is this the path toward lessening international tension? To insist on interfering in the affairs of other states, on discussions of their internal affairs by third countries having no authority whatever to do so, means starting on a course of gross violation of the UN Charter, which prohibits such interference; it means mocking the principles of the United Nations.

The absolutely fictitious nature of the very talk about the so-called "tension in Eastern Europe," by which they attempt to justify the demand for including this question in the agenda for the conference, is also obvious. The Soviet Union has diplomatic relations with all the countries of Eastern Europe and maintains the most active relations with them. And I must say that we know of no signs of any kind of "tension" in this area. If the Government of the USA has any lack of clarity with regard to the situation in these countries, it also has ambassadors in almost all of these countries and nothing prevents it from elucidating matters of interest to it through normal diplomatic channels. And if we are to speak frankly, anyone who has the slight-

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est knowledge of the present international situation knows full well that the tension endangering the cause of peace is to be sought in entirely different directions.

If the governments of the Western Powers, which know full well the point of view of the Soviet Union and of the people's democracies themselves concerning this question, still consider it possible to propose it again for consideration at the conference, can this be understood as being anything other than proof of an intention to bury in its very embryo stage the conference with the participation of the heads of government?

It is also impossible to give any other appraisal to the desire of the three Western Powers to impose consideration of the problem of the unification of Germany at the conference with the participation of the heads of government. And in this case, as the Soviet Government has already repeatedly had occasion to bring to the attention of the Government of the USA, it is a question of a problem which does not come within the competence of an international conference. It seems to us that it should have been recognized long ago as an indisputable truth that under present conditions the unification of Germany can be brought about solely as the result of the efforts of the two sovereign states now existing on German territory. The GDR and the FRG can, given the desire on both sides, reach agreement between themselves much more easily without the interference of third countries. After all, the Germans in the East and in the West of Germany speak one and the same language; they will not even need interpreters for their negotiations, not to mention foreign guardians who would decide for the Germans questions concerning the destiny of the German people.

As is well known, even the Government of the FRG has stated that discussion of the problem of the unification of Germany should not be considered as a condition for convening a summit conference. Apparently it is not inclined to assume the heavy responsibility of frustrating a conference the convening of which has been long awaited by the peoples of the world. Should the position of the three Western Powers be understood to mean that they are prepared to assume such a responsibility, and are they not using the question of the unification of Germany as a means of creating additional difficulties for an agreement on convening a summit conference?

In the proposals of the Western Powers there have been set forth considerations concerning the matter of European security. The importance of this problem at this time is of course indisputable. A great deal must and can be done to strengthen peace in Europe and to lessen the danger of a war breaking out on the European continent. But what proposals are made to us in this matter?

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If we are to speak frankly—and I think that only under conditions of complete frankness can our exchange of opinions be really useful—the sense of these proposals, which are presented as a plan for strengthening European security, amounts to the following: the Western Powers desire to draw all Germany into their military grouping and wish to reassure the peoples of Europe by statements concerning the furnishing of “guarantees.”

As long ago as our meeting in Geneva we called attention to the fact that the proposal concerning some sort of guarantees for the Soviet Union was strange, to say the least. It is a known fact that guarantees are usually given by a strong state (or states) to a weak state. In this connection the basic premise is the inequality of strength, and a strong state determines the conditions with respect to the weak state. A state to which guarantees are given is made dependent on the state which gives these guarantees. History contains many examples where a state that had given guarantees violated its obligations and thereby created a situation where there was no way out for the state to which the guarantees had been given. You will agree, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union is not a weak state and that, consequently, it needs no guarantees, since it is able to defend its interests itself. Thus the conditions which would justify the very raising of the question of guarantees are lacking in this particular case. Behind the raising of the question of guarantees as applied to the USSR there is obviously the desire to place our state in a position that would be unequal with regard to other states, which in itself demonstrates how unfounded this desire is.

It would be a different matter if the Great Powers, including the USSR, should assume mutual guarantees and consequently accept such a solution of the problem as would not place any of the Powers in an unequal or even humiliating position. But the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, the tremendous significance of which cannot be denied if the situation is evaluated objectively, would satisfy this requirement of mutual guarantees.

The artificial nature of this entire proposal for “guarantees” to the Soviet Union becomes particularly clear if account is taken of the fact that the powers occupying the command position in the North Atlantic military grouping, the entire activity of which is dominated by military preparations against the Soviet Union and the countries friendly to it, are the ones who are proposing that they assume the role of the guarantors. Thus “security guarantees” are proposed to us on the part of a bloc of countries which are constantly forging the instruments of war, the military leaders of which make appeals almost daily for atomic war against the Soviet Union, and the propaganda machinery of which constantly fans the feelings of war hysteria. Perhaps there

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are people who tend to close their eyes to reality and to rely on reassuring words, but we do not belong to this category. I do not doubt even for a minute that under similar circumstances the Government of the USA would take the same position.

It is our firm conviction that the task with regard to the question of European security does not consist in advancing some sort of “guarantees” for the Soviet Union, guarantees that are not needed by it, but rather in ensuring the security of all European nations and in creating a situation where Europe could not again become the arena of a new war.

It is the achievement of this goal that would be furthered by the creation in Central Europe, as proposed by the Government of the Polish People's Republic,¹ of a zone free of nuclear and rocket weapons and also by a reduction, with the establishment of appropriate mutual control, in the number of foreign troops stationed in the territories of European states, primarily in Germany. The implementation of these measures would not violate the interests of any state. On the contrary it would sharply reduce the possibility of an outbreak of atomic war in an area where now huge masses of armed forces and armaments of the opposing groupings of states are concentrated in immediate proximity to each other. The creation of the said zone in one area could gradually lead to such zones also coming into being in other places, and an ever-increasing portion of the territory of the globe would be excluded from the sphere of preparations for atomic war. The risk of peoples being involved in such war would thereby be diminished.

We believe that such a question as the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between states parties to the Warsaw Treaty and states parties to the North Atlantic Alliance was long ago ready for decision. The conclusion of such a pact, the significance of which was also emphasized by Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, would in no way violate the existing relationship of forces between the two groupings, and would at the same time be tremendously beneficial. The element of stability and reassurance that is so necessary would be injected into the entire international situation. Nations would see that the most powerful states from a military standpoint have achieved agreement among themselves and do not want war. Need it be said that the threat of war would immediately be reduced, since it is absolutely clear that a new military conflagration in Europe, and not only in Europe, under present conditions can occur solely as a result of a conflict between the two main groupings of powers.

¹For the exchange of notes between Poland and the United States concerning the so-called "Rapacki Plan," dated Feb. 14 and May 8, 1958, respectively, see Department of State Bulletin, May 19, 1958, pp. 821-823.

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In this connection I should like to recall that, since the date of the transmittal on May 5 of the proposals of the Soviet Government, the question of concluding a nonaggression pact was considered at a conference of countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which developed a draft of such a pact and addressed the countries members of NATO with a joint proposal on this matter. The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the USA will consider the said draft and communicate its views thereon.

In the proposals of the governments of the USA, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as in the proposals of the Soviet Government, other questions are raised pertaining to disarmament. We believe that such questions deserve serious attention. However, considering the experience of long negotiations in the Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission, concerning which we have already had occasion to set forth our point of view, we doubt that these questions in the form in which they are presented in the present proposals of the Western Powers are being advanced in order really to achieve a concerted solution thereof, or to reach an agreement on complete disarmament, or to implement even the initial measures such as the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, etc.

Why do we express such doubts and lack of confidence? It is because the Western Powers, those same powers that took part in the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament and in fact represented NATO there, after receiving our concrete proposals on urgent measures for disarmament, have actually failed to give us a reply to these proposals. They again repeat their previous proposals, arguing that the problem of disarmament can only be solved as a whole, so to speak. In this way they are attempting to force the issue back to the old course which was not productive and to renew futile discussions of the problem of disarmament "as a whole."

Such a discussion, more accurately described as a dispute, concerning the problem of disarmament, has continued for over 13 years behind closed doors. Actually no negotiations were conducted; this was merely a deception of public opinion, where illusions were created as if the matter of disarmament were moving forward, but in reality not a single practical problem of disarmament was settled. Moreover, under the cover of these disarmament negotiations the Western Powers started an unprecedented armaments race. This is why the Soviet Union has refused to take part in the work of the Disarmament Commission, and we shall not take part in it as long as the NATO countries insist on their demands, absolutely unacceptable principles as regards the approach to the problem of disarmament.

The Government of the USA well knows that the Soviet Union has been and remains an advocate of a radical solution of the problem of

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disarmament. It has repeatedly proposed to the Western Powers that agreement be reached on an all-embracing program of disarmament, including a considerable reduction in armed forces and armaments, the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and appropriate measures of international control. However, the Western Powers have not manifested the desire to reach agreement on such broad measures of disarmament.

If we have not succeeded in the course of 13 years in reaching agreement on the problem of disarmament "as a whole," with the solution of certain problems linked with the solution of others, then can it be expected that with such an approach this problem can be settled in the course of a few days at a conference of heads of government? Is it not obvious that the only realistic method is to single out and solve in the first instance those problems which have already become ripe for settlement and then proceed to the solution of the most complicated problems. This is what the Soviet Union proposes.

The Soviet Government has considered and still considers it to be its duty to do everything possible to promote the speediest possible solution of the disarmament problem. We were guided by this goal when we were recently adopting the decisions to reduce substantially our military forces and to cease unilaterally the testing of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons in the Soviet Union. Desiring to expedite the reaching of an agreement on a universal cessation of such tests, the Soviet Government met the desires of the governments of the USA and the United Kingdom to designate experts to study the methods of detecting possible violations of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

We hope that this new step of the Soviet Union will be duly appraised by the Western Powers and that, as a result, a more favorable atmosphere will be created which would promote the convening of a summit conference at the earliest possible date.

Mr. President, I believe that the time has come to clarify thoroughly and with complete sincerity the positions of the parties with regard to the main question: Do all the parties really wish a summit conference to be convened? I must say that the documents transmitted to us by the Western Powers have evoked serious doubts on our part in this connection. It is difficult to escape the thought that the authors of the proposals set forth in these documents were guided not by the desire to find a solution that would be the most acceptable to all parties but rather were searching for questions for the solution of which the time is not yet ripe, so as to be able to say later that they were right in predicting the failure of a conference of heads of government.

It was all of this that compelled us to address you with this letter. We should like to know definitely whether the governments of the

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Western Powers have serious intentions with regard to organizing a summit conference and conducting negotiations the results of which are awaited literally by all mankind, or whether there is a desire to lull the attention of the peoples, to create an impression that contacts have been established and negotiations are being conducted, and to raise in reality questions which not only lead to a failure of preparations for the meeting but also to no summit conference as such taking place, so as to accuse our country later of "obstinacy." Such a tactic is very well known to us from the experience of certain previous negotiations.

The Soviet Government has most closely examined the views concerning the possible agenda of a summit conference as set forth in your messages, Mr. President. We have expressed our opinion in detail on these proposals and have stated that a number of questions among those proposed by the Western Powers are regarded by us as acceptable for discussion.

We are also prepared to consider the question of methods of strengthening the United Nations, which has been touched upon in the correspondence between our two governments, because we also have something to say in this connection.

Mr. President, I have presented to you with complete sincerity my views with regard to the present situation concerning the preparations for a conference at the summit. In this situation the responsibility that is devolving upon the governments of the Great Powers is particularly great. In order to understand the whole depth of this responsibility it suffices to imagine how distressed all the peoples would be if we should fail to find a common language. No one would be able to understand and justify such government officials as cannot agree even on how to begin negotiations among themselves while the world is seized with the fever of an ever-intensifying armaments race and at a time when there is no corner left where human beings are free from the oppressive fear of the threat of a new military eruption.

We are convinced that through joint efforts of states, and primarily through joint efforts of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, it is entirely possible to achieve a radical improvement in the international situation. An important step in this direction could be a meeting of top government officials with the participation of heads of government. We express the hope that the Government of the United States of America will consider this message with due attention and will on its part take all the necessary steps in order not to allow frustration of a high-level conference and to clear from the path of such a conference the obstacles that are being artificially created.

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Simultaneously I am sending messages on this question to the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and to the President of the
Council of Ministers of France.

With sincere respect,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

News Conference Statements by Secretary of State
Dulles, June 17, 1958¹

[Extracts]

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you assess for us now the possibilities of a summit conference after yesterday's diplomatic "courtesies" exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States?

A. I assume you put the word "courtesies" in quotation marks. It is not easy to evaluate the great mass of material which was given out yesterday although of course part of it is material with which we have been familiar.²

The exchanges that have taken place at the meetings of the three Western Ambassadors with Foreign Minister Gromyko result from an effort on our part to try to make the careful preparation which we believe is essential to have a successful summit meeting. The letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower and the comparable letters which have been sent to Prime Minister Macmillan and President of the Council de Gaulle indicate apparently an unwillingness on the part of the Soviet Union to face up to some of the practical problems that were raised by the proposals that had been put forward in Moscow by the three Western Ambassadors.

You will recall that the Soviet Union has consistently professed, at least, to believe that a summit meeting should deal with matters as to which there was a good possibility of agreement. We have accepted that view although also we believe that there should be a permissible discussion of other matters of great importance even though there was not a likelihood of agreement. But we have felt that it would be important to find out what were the matters as to

¹ For the text of the complete news conference, see Department of State Bulletin, July 7, 1958, pp. 6-10.

² In view of the Soviet Government's expressed intention to publish its exchanges with the Western Powers on the proposed summit meeting, the Department of State made public a number of the documents in press release 830, June 16, 1958. These documents are printed *ante*, pp. 227-234.

544645—60—19

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which—to use a Soviet term—there was a good possibility of agreement. So we took up these various matters and asked for an exposition of Soviet views on them, and we gave certain expositions of our views at that point.

Apparently the Soviet Union wants to break off that kind of preparatory work and to move directly, without preparation, into a summit meeting. It still professes to want to have a meeting to reach certain agreements and to deal with matters as to which agreement is likely. But it seems unwilling to probe in advance to find out whether or not an agreement in fact is likely and when we ourselves, at the present state of affairs, do not see where any agreement of great significance is likely.

Now the breaking off of these talks, if indeed that is the meaning of the Soviet letters—and it seems to be one interpretation—the breaking off of those preparatory talks would certainly require a reevaluation of the situation by the Western Powers.

You may recall at the meeting at Copenhagen of the NATO Council there was unanimous expression of the fact that any summit meeting would have to be carefully prepared.¹ Now there seems to be an indication on the part of the Soviet Union that it is not willing to have careful preparation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us an idea of the reason for this zigzagging course of the Soviet on the summit conference—why they are blowing hot and cold, possibly on one occasion one way and now in another direction?

A. I don't think that their basic attitude has varied. Their tactics have varied. They have wanted and still, I guess, want to have a summit conference if they can have such a conference on their own terms, where they would feel that they could score a propaganda victory, where they could give the free world the impression that the cold war was over, relax our efforts, and so forth. That's a very natural objective if they can get away with it. And they have been trying to get away with it by various means. We have been trying to hold to a steady course of saying we want to have a summit conference if it can be conducted under conditions where it will be not a mere spectacle but a real means of solving some of the world's problems, and let's find out in advance whether it will be that kind of meeting.

Now they have squirmed quite a lot when it comes to that aspect of the matter. They have squirmed, you might say, in a tactical way while still holding to the broad strategic concepts of wanting to have a meeting on their terms. Now it looks as though they had come to the

¹ See ante, pp. 222–223.

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conclusion that a careful diplomatic study of the matters that might
be discussed would disclose such a disparity of views that there would
really be no solid, logical reason for having such a conference. And,
being faced up with that, they are now swinging back to try to bring
it about on their terms by a broad propaganda offensive. Their tac-
tics have been one of zigzag or squirming; their basic objective is to
have the kind of meeting which would serve their purposes. I think
in that respect they have been consistent.

Letter From President Eisenhower to
Chairman Khrushchev, July 1, 1958¹

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I was frankly surprised by your letter of
June 11. You complain about delay in preparations for a summit
meeting precisely at the moment when the Western Powers have
submitted a proposal for a serious and effective procedure for conduct-
ing these preparations. This refutes the allegation contained in your
letter that the three Western Powers are creating obstacles and im-
peding progress toward a summit meeting.

The position of the Western Powers concerning holding of a meet-
ing of Heads of Government has been clear from the outset. They
consider such a meeting desirable if it would provide an opportunity
for conducting serious discussions of major problems and would be
an effective means of reaching agreement on significant subjects.
From the known positions of the Soviet Government, there is no evi-
dence so far that such is the case. That is why the Western Powers
insist on adequate preparatory work, and why they have put forward
their proposal to facilitate satisfactory completion of this work.

The Soviet Government instead has disrupted the discussions in
Moscow by taking upon itself to publish with bare hours of warning
and no attempt at consultation the documents exchanged between it
and the Western Powers, including diplomatic documents originating
from the Western Powers. This action is scarcely consonant with
the spirit of serious preparation in which the Western Powers entered
into these diplomatic exchanges. It cannot but cast doubt on the
intentions of the Soviet Government concerning the proper prepara-
tions for a summit meeting.

Following receipt of the Soviet agenda proposals on May 5 the
three ambassadors in interviews on May 28, 31, and June 2 presented

¹Text from White House news release, July 2, 1958.

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in return the Western agenda proposals. They also outlined to Mr. Gromyko a suggested procedure for overcoming the difficulty caused by the fact that the two sets of proposals were widely divergent. The Western Ambassadors are quite ready to offer comments on the Soviet agenda proposals and to clarify certain points in their own proposals on which the Soviet Government seems to have misconceptions. But the Western Governments cannot agree that the discussions between their ambassadors and Mr. Gromyko should be based exclusively on the Soviet list any more than they would expect the Soviet Government to agree to base the discussions solely on the Western list. Since the topics in both lists fall under certain general headings, the Western proposal was that preparatory discussion of the individual topics put forward by the two sides should take place within the framework of these general headings. Had this been accepted by the Soviet Government, the Soviet Foreign Minister and the ambassadors could have proceeded to examine the positions of the various governments on the topics in both lists and establish what subjects should be submitted for examination by the Heads of Government. Neither side would, during the preparatory stage, have been able to veto the inclusion of any topic for discussion and an opportunity would have been afforded to find some common ground for later consideration by the Heads of Government.

Mr. Gromyko promised an official reply to the above proposal. Instead, however, the Soviet Government has now addressed communications to the Heads of Government of the three Western Powers, in the form of your letters of June 11, which repeat the arguments in favor of the Soviet set of proposals of May 5 and criticize some of the Western proposals which it happens not to like. The procedural proposal put forward by the ambassadors has been ignored altogether.

You allege in your letters that the Western Powers by including, as possible subjects of discussion at a meeting of Heads of Government, some of the great political issues that create grave tension are trying to prevent the holding of a summit meeting. There is no warrant for this allegation. A meeting of Heads of Government would not respond to the hopes and aspirations of mankind if they met under an injunction that seals their lips so that they could not even mention the great political issues that gravely trouble their relations and endanger world peace.

In spite of the arbitrary action of the Soviet Government and its apparent unwillingness to negotiate seriously on concrete points at issue, the Western Powers do not propose to abandon hope or to relax their efforts to seek solutions of the major outstanding problems. If the Soviet Government is equally serious in pursuing this goal, it will

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accept the procedural proposal put forward by the Western Powers
or advance some equally effective and workable alternative.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Note From the Soviet Union to the
United States, July 15, 1958¹

Unofficial translation

Note No. 40/OSA

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to address itself to
the Government of the United States of America on the following
question.

The Government of the USSR considers that the situation unfolding
on the European Continent obligates the Governments of all interested
states to undertake efforts for working out joint measures which would
halt the sliding of Europe toward war and to find roads toward the
strengthening of peace on the basis of the growth of mutual trust and
the broadening of multilateral cooperation between European states.

Both world wars experienced by mankind were brought down first
of all on the head of the European nations. No one can deny that as a
result of these wars the greatest human sacrifices and material losses
were borne by these very countries of Europe. Tens of millions of
Europeans were killed on the field of battle, perished through the
bombing of peaceful cities, died from wounds and diseases, were tor-
tured in Fascist concentration camps. In the course of military opera-
tions, many once well-built and flourishing cities and villages were
obliterated from the face of the earth, irreplaceable monuments of
culture were destroyed. At the cost for every country of those who
will not return, for every family of the losses and incredible physical
and moral strain, the peoples of Europe merit the right to worthwhile
existence without fear of tomorrow, for themselves and for the fate of
future generations.

Today, the peoples of the European countries are again compelled
to live under the conditions of feverish military preparations, under
the threat of still a more terrible military catastrophe. The principle
of impartial cooperation in international affairs, about which not little
was said in the period of struggle with the common enemy is far from
respected by all.

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 22 1958, pp. 462-466. The U.S. reply is dated Aug. 22, 1958 (post). (As corrected.)

253

It is impossible not to see that such measures as the continuous whipping up of the armament race, especially atomic and hydrogen, the growth of armies and military expenditures, the establishment of nuclear and missile bases on foreign territories, the transfer of this armament into hands of new states, first of all to the Federal Republic of Germany, means in reality nothing other than preparation of war. This aim is served and conducted in some countries by propaganda which permeates with a lack of faith in the possibility for preserving peace, nourishes feelings of enmity, estrangement and downright hostility toward states and peoples which are located beyond their military groupings, have chosen different political and social systems and are building their own life in accordance with their ideals. Creation of opposing military groupings of states has given birth on the European Continent to deep distrust and dangerous situation of tension.

It becomes more apparent every year that a war in Europe, if it unhappily should break out, and if at the same time special prohibitive or, at least, delimiting measures are not taken, will be a war using nuclear and ballistic means of annihilation. Despite the unilateral halting of tests of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons by the Soviet Union, the USA and England continue to conduct such tests, to reject the conclusion of an agreement concerning renunciation of their use and, at the same time, they draw their allies in the North Atlantic Pact more and more into preparations for a ballistic missile-atomic war.

The assertion that supposedly by creating and accumulating the most deadly and destructive means of annihilation, mankind protects itself from the danger of a war utilizing these means appears as a challenge to good sense. The more atomic and hydrogen bombs in the arsenals of states, the wider the circle of states having nuclear and rocket weapons, the closer to each other the armed forces and bases of these powers, the more likely is the occurrence of a military explosion. To retain such a situation is just like holding a blow torch in a gun-powder magazine.

It is not difficult to imagine what would take place if the country-participants of the Warsaw Pact, instead of the measures which they take for the purpose of reducing tensions in Europe, began to operate in the same direction as the countries of NATO. It is understandable that the danger of a military explosion would increase one hundred-fold if they, in accordance with the example of NATO, in their turn began to impose an armaments race on other states, to move their military bases on foreign territories closer to the vital centers of the states-participants in the opposite military grouping, to send into the airspace of Europe to meet the American airplanes, which are con-

254

tinuously in the air and armed with atomic and hydrogen bombs, their
own such military airplanes.

Being the largest state in Europe which twice in the course of one
generation was subjected to invasion over its western borders, the
Soviet Union, naturally, cannot but show unremitting concern over
security in Europe which is inseparable from its own security. Mil-
lions of Soviet people did not give their lives on the field of battle
during the Second World War in order that now the Soviet people
could indifferently observe how in Europe inflammable material for
a new war was being accumulated.

Like the other peace-loving states, the Soviet Union did and con-
tinues to do everything depending upon it to remove the danger of
war and to establish peaceful co-operation based on trust among all
the European states regardless of their social structure and member-
ship in one or the other grouping of Powers.

The Soviet Union liquidated its military bases located in the terri-
tory of other states. Beyond the confines of its own borders the Soviet
Union does not maintain stockpiles of atomic and hydrogen arms or
missile launching sites. In the last three years the strength of the
Soviet armed forces has been reduced unilaterally by a total of two
million one hundred forty thousand persons. In this regard the
armed forces of the USSR in the German Democratic Republic were
reduced by more than ninety thousand persons. Military expendi-
tures and armaments were correspondingly reduced. At the last
session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR a resolution was approved
for the unilateral cessation by the Soviet Union of tests of all types
of atomic and hydrogen arms.

At the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the
states participating in the Warsaw Treaty, which took place at the end
of May in Moscow,¹ a decision was made concerning the withdrawal at
a very early date from the Rumanian Peoples Republic of the Soviet
armies which were there in conformity with that treaty and also con-
cerning an additional reduction of the Soviet armies stationed in the
territory of the Hungarian Peoples Republic.

Desiring to weaken the split appearing between the two basic
groupings of powers in Europe which are in military conflict and to
exclude the danger of the growing contradictions between them, the
participants in the meeting proposed the conclusion of a pact of non-
aggression between the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty and the
member-states of the North Atlantic Alliance. The Soviet Govern-
ment is convinced that the conclusion of such a pact of non-aggression
would be a reliable preventive measure, strengthening the peace in
Europe.

¹ See *The New York Times*, May 28, 1958.

255

In spite of the tremendous positive role of such a pact of non-aggression, it is impossible, however, not to take into consideration that this measure represents only an initial step, the minimum, that it is necessary to undertake under present conditions for the purpose of establishing in Europe an atmosphere of due trust among states. It would be an unforgivable omission if, along with this, no effort was made to establish additional transitional steps from the present dangerous situation toward the establishment of the conditions of a firm peace in Europe.

The Soviet Government proceeds from the assumption that peace and security in Europe cannot be secured without the uniting of the efforts of all European states and the establishment among them of wide, all-inclusive cooperation. The experience at hand in regulating important international questions testifies that with good will on all sides possibilities and reserves can always be found for mutually acceptable decisions in aid of peace. Thus, in the first postwar years peace treaties were concluded with Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Italy, and Finland, which to a significant degree contributed to the normalization of the position in Europe. Even more convincing testimony of this is the signature by the states in 1955, even under conditions of "cold war" and sharpened mistrust, of the Austrian state treaty, which reestablished the political and economic independence of Austria, as a neutral state.

The Government of the USSR, of course, knows that the governments of many Western European states, and also the USA, retain points of view different from its own on the reasons which have led to the present tension in Europe, just as in regard to the suitable measures for lessening this tension in the relations among European states.

Nevertheless, despite this, it is indisputable that the situation in Europe demands that the governments of the European countries rise above the present disagreements. Polemics not reinforced with real constructive steps, can of themselves neither stop the falling bombs nor lessen the force of their explosions. It cannot be allowed that disagreements disturb the sober contemplation of the facts which today fill Europeans with the feeling of deep alarm, and hide the most important thing—the necessity of earnestly and patiently seeking an agreement on concrete steps leading to the establishment of lasting peace in Europe.

As is well known, in the period between the two world wars the plans of guaranteeing security in Europe and the organization of general European cooperation suffered ruin above all because agreement was not achieved among the leading states which had the most powerful armed forces and whose united efforts would have made ag-

256

gression impossible. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, it is
necessary to study that period of history and not to repeat the serious
errors of the past.

It is no longer necessary now to prove that the attempts to substitute for the solution of the tasks facing Europe as a whole the practice of founding on a narrow, closed basis different unions of individual European states, like the coal and steel community, the common market, EURATOM, and so on, lead only to a situation in which these states more and more are opposed to the other states of Europe, digging ever deeper the ditch dividing today the Western part of Europe from the Eastern.

The idea of cooperation of all European states, their drawing
together in the interests of preserving the peace, of securing the well-
being and flourishing of Europe, has deep roots in history and in the
present life of European peoples. In the East as well as in the West
of our continent, the striving for the development of mutual under-
standing and all round intercourse among European states is becom-
ing stronger. The fact in particular that at the XII Session of the
UN all European states and the USA voted for the resolution on
peaceful and good neighborly relations among states¹ testifies in
particular to this.

The Soviet Government considers that the governments of European
states, and the Government of the United States, if they all wish to
stop the dangerous development of events in Europe, should make
efforts toward working out on a regional basis general European de-
cisions, which in practice could be brought into existence at the present
stage and which could be acceptable for all governments. In this
connection it is introducing a proposal on concluding a treaty of
friendship and cooperation by the European states and also by the
United States.

In the view of the Soviet Government, in such a treaty it would be
advisable to include provisions directed toward warning and ward-
ing off aggression in Europe and toward strengthening the security
of all European countries. In this it would be important to express
the obligation of the European states and also the USA not to assist
militarily or economically or to support morally any state disturbing
the peace of Europe, regardless of whether they are or are not partners
of the aggressor state under existing military pacts and treaties. It
is known that the idea of such an agreement has been expressed many
times in recent years including by the Governments of the USA,
England, and France.

¹General Assembly Res. 1236 (XII), Dec. 14, 1957, in U.N. General Assembly, *Official Records, Twelfth Session. Supplement No. 18* (A/3805).

257

Taking into account the fact that the achievement of an agreement on disarmament is attended by significant difficulties and that the efforts made over many years in that direction have led to no progress whatever, the Soviet Government proposes to consider in the treaty measures which would make possible the elimination of the arms race and the execution in Europe of measures for curtailing the armies of the organizations of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance. The initiative on the part of the European states in searching for such partial solutions could open the perspective also for broader agreements connected with the problem of disarmament.

Of major significance for preventing armed conflicts in Europe would be the foundation in direct continuity with the line dividing the military groupings existing in Europe of a zone in which neither the production nor the stationing of atomic, hydrogen, and rocket weapons would be allowed. In this case the parties to the treaty would take on the obligation to respect the status of the said zone and consider the territory of the states entering into it as excluded from the sphere of employment of the said type of arms.

In the treaty it would be desirable also to consider providing for the beginning of the reduction in the next one or two years of the number of foreign armed forces on the territory of Germany to 1/3 or to a limit otherwise agreed on. With the carrying out of such a reduction it would be possible to agree on the establishment of a reliable system of control and inspection of the execution of this obligation by the parties to the appropriate treaty.

The Soviet Government expresses itself in favor of the execution of aerial photography in the limits of a definite zone located on both sides of the line dividing the armed forces of the states party to the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Alliance to prevent surprise attack.

The development of the economy of the states-party to the treaty, the adjusting of peaceful business intercourse and mutual understanding among them undoubtedly would be facilitated by the expansion of mutually profitable and equitable economic cooperation on a basis excluding any discrimination or artificial limitations of any kind. Inclusion in the treaty of the above provisions would be all the more useful in that the encouragement of free-world trade would render good service to a number of states in whose economy especially in recent times unhealthy phenomena are making themselves felt.

The Soviet Government is a supporter of the development of the cooperation of European states and also of the USA for the solution of the great task of peaceful uses of atomic energy. It considers it desirable to express in the treaty the readiness of its participants to

258

exchange experience of scientific research and industrial application of atomic energy, as well as raw material, materials and equipment. The joining of the efforts of the participants of the treaty in this field would assist in raising the well-being of people, the further development of science and culture and would ever more push ahead the frontiers of knowledge of the laws of nature and their utilization for the good of man.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the participants of the treaty would be able to put on a more solid foundation the development of ties and contacts with each other, especially along the lines of science, technology and culture with the aim of mutual familiarization with the national accomplishments of the peoples.

The treaty would also envisage other measures, the realization of which would facilitate lessening of the threat of an outbreak of war in Europe. The Soviet Government is guided by the conviction that the proposed measures in the aggregate will lead to the transformation of Europe into a zone of lasting peace and real security.

Taking into account the considerations outlined above, the Soviet Government is introducing for the examination of the Government of the United States of America and also of the governments of European states a draft "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of European States" and expresses the hope that the Government of the United States will regard this proposal favorably.

Moscow, 15 July 1958

[Enclosed Text of Proposed Treaty]

The Signatories

Resolved to promote in every way the development of friendly relations and cooperation between European states and to resolve all questions arising between them exclusively by peaceful means;

Recognizing that the creation of an atmosphere of trust between them is the most important task of the peoples of the European States, of excluding the possibility of the outbreak of a new war on the European continent;

Animated by a desire to carry out the high principles of the UN and in development of the situation in keeping with the resolution concerning peaceful and good neighborly relations between states, approved by the XII Session of the General Assembly of the UN,

They have decided to conclude the present treaty on Friendship and Collaboration of the European states and to these ends have agreed as follows:

¹Two paragraphs of preamble inadvertently omitted in cited text.

259

Article 1

The signatories of the treaty may be all European states and the United States of America which recognize the aims and accept for themselves the obligations set forth in the present treaty.

Article 2

The signatories will, in the spirit of genuine cooperation and mutual understanding, develop and strengthen good neighborly and friendly relations among their peoples on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual advantage.

Article 3

The signatories obligate themselves to solve all disputes which may arise among them exclusively by peaceful means and in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

In case a situation arises which could lead to a deterioration of the friendly relations between states or create a threat to the peace in Europe, the signatories will consult at once with one another for the purpose of taking such necessary mutual measures as are found appropriate for the elimination of the situation which has arisen.

Article 4

If one or more of the signatories is subjected to an attack on the part of any state, the other signatories to this treaty obligate themselves not to provide military and economic aid or moral support to the aggressor regardless of whether or not they are bound as allies or by some other commitments with the aggressor state.

Article 5

Until the conclusion of a general agreement on the limitations of arms and of armed forces and the banning of atomic weapons the signatories are obligated:

a) To reduce in the course of 1 to 2 years their armed forces and arms located in the territory of Germany by 1/3 or by another agreed amount, whereby the reduced contingents of armed forces must be withdrawn from the territory of Germany to within the confines of their own national borders.

After the aforesaid reduction of armed forces and armaments, to consider the question of the further reduction of foreign armed forces which are stationed on the territory of Germany and also the reduction of foreign armed forces located on the territory of other European

260

states with the removal in both cases of the reduced contingents of
the armed forces to the confines of their own national borders.

Regularly, and not less than twice yearly, to exchange information
on the strength of armed forces and the quantity of armament of the
signatories located on the territory of other states in Europe;

b) For the prevention of a possible surprise attack to provide for
the conducting of aerial photography within a zone extending for 800
kilometers from the line demarking the armed forces of the member-
countries of the North Atlantic Treaty and the participating states of
the Warsaw Treaty. Such a zone will be established by agreement
with the states whose territories are included in this zone.

The representatives of the signatories in the course of not more than 6 months after the signing of the present treaty will define the boundaries of the zones specified in paragraph (b) and will also establish an appropriate system of control and inspection for the fulfillment of the obligations specified in the present Article.

### Article 6

The signatories unanimously favor the creation of a zone in Central Europe, free from the production and presence of atomic, hydrogen, and missile weapons, as well as from the equipping and manning of the above mentioned types of arms. This zone ought to comprise with the agreement of the appropriate governments the territory of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Polish Peoples' Republic, and the Czechoslovak Republic.

The signatories are obligated to respect the status of this zone and
consider the territory of the governments which comprise it as ex-
cluded from the sphere of use of atomic, hydrogen, and missile
weapons. They recognize as indispensable the establishment of an
appropriate system of control and inspection for fulfillment of agree-
ment concerning the creation of such a zone.

### Article 7

Proceeding on the belief, that economic cooperation and contacts
between states are the natural and stable foundation for the strength-
ening of peaceful and friendly relations between them, the signa-
tories are obligated:

a) To develop economic cooperation and an exchange of experience;
to extend the necessary cooperation to one another in the matter of
solving the most urgent economic problems having the most important
significance for insuring the full employment of the population and
the improvement of their well being;

261

To develop in every possible way cooperation in the field of trade between the countries participating in the agreement on the principles of full equality and mutual benefit.

b) To take measures toward the gradual elimination of the obstacles and limitations still existing in the field of the development of economic relations between states on the basis of bilateral and multilateral agreements, as well as within the framework and by means of the European economic commission of the UN;

c) To develop cooperation in the field of utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including exchange of experience in the construction of electric power stations, industrial, transport and other construction, operating by atomic energy, and the exchange of specialists, raw and other materials, and equipment.

### Article 8

For the purpose of broadening international ties and cooperation in the field of science and culture, furthering mutual understanding between peoples, the signatories are obligated to develop and strengthen mutual ties in the field of science, culture, technology, and education. To these ends they express readiness to discuss in the near future concrete questions of cultural and scientific cooperation, having in view the conclusion of a bilateral or multilateral agreement on these questions.

### Article 9

The present treaty is valid for a period of 10 years.

The treaty is subject to ratification in conformity with the legislative powers of the signatory states of the treaty.

### Article 10

The treaty is open for the adherence of all European states.

### Article 11

The present treaty, the Russian, English, French and German texts of which are authentic, will be submitted to the custody of the Secretary-General of the UN.

In witness thereof, the plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.

DRAWN UP IN THE CITY .................................... 1958.

262

Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to
President Eisenhower, July 19, 1958¹

Unofficial translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The course of the recent events shows that we are now living through one of the most responsible moments of history, that the world has been placed on the brink of a catastrophe. Alarm is gripping the minds of people in all continents, popular masses are coming into motion, realizing as they do that a war conflagration, wherever it begins, may spread to all the world.

As allies in past battles, we know, although in different degrees, what the blood and ruins of the past world war were like. We realize what horrors a new war can bring to mankind, and we have no moral right to play with fire in the powder magazine into which the world has been turned because of the arms race.

Under these conditions the armed intervention started by the United States in Lebanon, and then by Britain in Jordan, and the danger of an intervention looming large over Iraq and all the states of the Arab world, may bring about extremely dangerous and unpredictable consequences, can set off a chain reaction which it would be impossible to arrest.

We address you not from positions of intimidation, but from positions of reason. If there can be any talk of intimidation, it should be referred to the irresponsible military leaders of the United States, such as the commander of the American Sixth Fleet, who are now diligently engaged in it. With a zest worthy of a better cause, he pronounces such provocative speeches that if he were a citizen of countries which have prohibited military propaganda, he would have been arraigned before a court, or submitted to a medical check-up and placed in a madhouse because such statements can be made only by a criminal or a person out of his senses. The laurels of this naval commander have deprived of sleep the Secretary for Defense also.

We know that the United States has atomic and hydrogen bombs, we know that you have an air force and navy. But you are also well aware that the Soviet Union, too, possesses atomic and hydrogen bombs, an air force and a navy, plus ballistic missiles of all types, including intercontinental ones. However, we believe that at this momentous hour it would be more reasonable not to bring the heated atmosphere to a boiling point, it is sufficiently inflammable as it is. The statesmen of countries must seek for solutions not by means of fanning war psychosis, but reasonably and calmly, so as to rule out war and insure world peace.

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 11, 1958, pp. 231-233.

263

What do the United States and Great Britain want to achieve by landing their forces in Lebanon and Jordan?

You explain the armed intervention in Lebanon by President Chamoun's request to help him combat aggression. But an internal struggle is under way in Lebanon, and the events in that country prior to the landing of the American troops could in no way be classed as direct or indirect aggression by other states, a fact confirmed by the United Nations observers and the United Nations Secretary General. An internal struggle was going on there and you yourself have confirmed this.

The principle of noninterference of other states in the internal strife going on in this or that country is a generally recognized standard of international law. It is not for me to tell you that the American people and their government categorically objected in the past to foreign interference in the American civil war, in the struggle between the South and the North. I do not even mention the fact that in the case of Lebanon, the Lebanese President's appeal to the United States was not supported by the Parliament of that country, and the speaker of Parliament strongly protested against the American armed intervention. Consequently, the "invitation" sent by Chamoun has no constitutional power.

The same situation prevails in Jordan, where the British troops have been sent not to uphold the interests of the people and the country, but to save the monarchy. The rulers of Lebanon and Jordan, who have lost the support of the people in their countries, and who cannot rely on their armies which refuse to support anti-national regimes, have decided to look for cover in the shadow of the Anglo-American guns, to lean back on the interventionist forces. But history still does not know any case when the throne and government could be propped up by bayonets, particularly foreign ones. The twentieth century leaves no illusions on this score.

The military intervention of the United States and Britain in Lebanon and Jordan has been undertaken at the request of irresponsible rulers who do not enjoy the support of their peoples and act against their will. And such a request was enough for American and British troops to be sent to Lebanon and Jordan in circumvention of the United Nations, which was informed post factum of this aggressive act.

It is also said that the American and British troops have invaded Lebanon and Jordan to defend the lives and property of American and British citizens there. But this is a very old trick of the colonialists. It will mislead no one, the more so because everyone knows

264

that no foreigners, including Americans and Britons, were hurt or threatened either in Lebanon or Jordan.

You, Mr. President, often make public statements in support of the United Nations, but by their actions in Lebanon and Jordan the governments of the United States and Great Britain are dealing a body blow at this international organization. At such a momentous hour in the life of the peoples, the United Nations has actually been pushed out of the way with the bayonets of the American and British forces.

The aggressors are now playing with fire. It is always easier to start a fire than to put it out. But once kindled, it is better put out at the very beginning than when the flame flares up and sets afire the neighboring homes. The most correct solution in the present conditions would be to withdraw the occupationist forces immediately from the Middle East and to give the peoples of this area an opportunity to decide their destiny for themselves.

At this grim period of history, when we cannot afford to wait an-
other minute, the Soviet Union which has always come out for world
peace, against war, for peaceful coexistence, cannot remain indifferent
to what is happening in the Middle East, next to its borders. The
Soviet Union cannot keep aloof when the question of war or peace
is being decided.

This is why the Government of the Soviet Union proposes to call
immediately a conference of the heads of government of the U.S.S.R.,
the United States, Britain, France and India, with the participation
of the United Nations Secretary General, to take urgent measures to
stem the beginning military conflict.

We propose to meet on any day, at any hour, the sooner the better.
You are perfectly aware that history has left us a small margin in
which to avert war, to prevent the annihilation of many millions of
people, to prevent the destruction of great material and cultural
values.

In its statements the Government of the Soviet Union has set forth
sufficiently clearly its views regarding the peaceful solution of urgent
Middle Eastern problems. The Soviet Union believes that a solution
can and must be found conforming to the vital interests of the Middle
Eastern peoples, insuring their sovereign rights, and with due regard
for the interests of all states associated with the countries of this area.

The Western governments say that they are interested in using
oil and other raw material resources in this area of the world. But
the nations of this area do not deny this opportunity to the Western
powers. They demand only one thing; that this problem should be
solved on an equitable and mutually profitable commercial basis which
is the most reasonable principle.

544645—60—20

265

The Soviet Government believes that the conference of the heads of government of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Britain, France and India could consider also the question of discontinuing arms deliveries to the Middle East, as earlier proposed by the U.S.S.R.

We deem it necessary that this summit conference should work out concrete recommendations to end the military conflict in the Middle East and submit them to the Security Council so that this United Nations body would study them with the participation of representatives from the Arab states.

The question of the conference's date and place cannot be an obstacle to its convocation. The Soviet Government is prepared to agree to any place, including Washington, if for some reason Geneva or another capital of a neutral country will not suit the Western powers. The main thing is not to wait, not to waste priceless time because cannons are already starting to speak. We propose to meet at Geneva on July 22.

The most reasonable act of our governments in the prevailing conditions would be to convene a summit conference to settle the military conflict which has broken out in the Middle East. This would be a priceless contribution to the cause of consolidating peace and international security. This would be an irrefutable proof that the idea of peaceful and not military solution of questions can and must triumph throughout the world. The ending of the aggression in the Middle East would be wholeheartedly greeted by all the peoples irrespective of color, religious convictions or political views.

In conclusion I wish to lay special emphasis on the fact that the question of whether the conflict in the Middle East will be settled through war or peace now depends on your Government, on you personally, Mr. President.

The Soviet Government expects that the Government of the United States and you, Mr. President, will understand this appeal correctly, that it will meet with your positive response and readiness to turn the course of events radically from the road of war to the road of peace.

I have simultaneously approached on the above question the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Macmillan, the President of the Council of Ministers of France, Mr. de Gaulle, and the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

266

Letter From President Eisenhower to
Chairman Khrushchev, July 22, 1958¹

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have received your communication of July 19.

May I assure you that the establishment and maintenance of a just peace is the dominant influence in American policy. I cannot agree that the United States has acted in Lebanon in a manner calculated to disturb the peace. Rather it is motivated by the purpose of helping stop acts of violence, fomented from without, designed to destroy the genuine independence and integrity of that small nation. Such a process, if unchecked, would have grave implications for all small nations everywhere.

The manner in which you have chosen to express yourself is hardly calculated to promote the atmosphere of calm reasonableness which, you correctly say, should replace the presently overheated atmosphere.

I am not aware of any factual basis for your extravagantly expressed fear of the danger of general war.

What has happened in regard to Lebanon is this:

On Monday, July 14, the lawful Government of Iraq was violently overthrown. On the same day a comparable plot against the Kingdom of Jordan was discovered and barely thwarted. The Government of Lebanon, which had already for some months been subjected to indirect aggression from without, appealed to the United States for instant assistance. In the light of the developments in neighboring Iraq and Jordan, it felt that nothing less than immediate help would make it possible to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. The United States responded to this appeal.² We knew that the plea was based upon solid facts that showed that Lebanon was gravely menaced.

Surely, it is not "aggression" thus to help a small nation maintain its independence.

You speak of "armed conflict in the Near or Middle East". There has been the bloody coup in Iraq, the plot to assassinate those who compose the Government of Jordan, and the civil strife in Lebanon fomented from without. Otherwise, I know of no "armed conflict". Unless those of aggressive disposition are far gone in folly, they would not start war because Lebanon, with a population of about 1½ million, is helped to maintain its integrity and independence. The real danger of war would come if one small nation after another were

¹Text from White House news release, July 22, 1958.

²For President Eisenhower's statement and message to Congress of July 15, 1958, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 4, 1958, pp. 181-183.

267

to be engulfed by expansionist and aggressive forces supported by the
Soviet Union.

We do not want to see a repetition of the progressive destruction
of the independence of small nations which occurred during the
1930s and which led to the Second World War. To be acquiescent
in aggression, be it direct or indirect, is not the road to peace.

This does not mean that the United States is dedicated to a perpetu-
ation of the status quo in the Arab world. The United States recog-
nizes and sympathizes with the yearning of the Arab peoples for a
greater nationalistic unity. For example, the United States promptly
recognized the United Arab Republic, bringing together Egypt and
Syria, as soon as it was apparent that the change was accepted by
the people concerned and after the new government had undertaken
to meet the normally applied international standards.¹

But it is one thing to change the international status quo by
orderly and peaceful processes, and another thing to change it by
indirect aggression. Such processes cannot be reconciled with a peace-
ful world or with the ideals of the United Nations which recognizes
the equal rights of nations large and small and the dignity and worth
of the human person.

The action of the United States in relation to Lebanon was fully
in accord with the accepted principles of international law and with
the Charter of the United Nations. The Government of Lebanon
was one which had been chosen by freely held, peaceful, nationwide
elections only a little over a year ago. The appeal to the United
States was made by the President of Lebanon with the full approval
of the Cabinet. When last week the Soviet Union introduced in the
United Nations Security Council a Resolution condemning our action
in Lebanon, that Resolution received only one vote—that of the Soviet
Union itself. I also note that efforts were made within the Security
Council to provide Lebanon with increased protection from the United
Nations so as to preserve its integrity and independence, thus per-
mitting United States forces promptly to be withdrawn. There were
two such proposals, each defeated by the one vetoing vote of the
Soviet Union.²

How does the Soviet Union reconcile its allegation that United
States forces in Lebanon endanger world peace with the veto of these
two proposals?

¹ Following the plebiscite conducted in Egypt and Syria on Feb. 21, 1958, the U.S. Government extended recognition to the United Arab Republic on Feb. 25. For the statement on recognition, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Mar. 17, 1958, p. 418.

² See *ibid*., Aug. 4, 1958, pp. 198-199.

268

Am I to conclude, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet Union seeks by
imputing to others war motives and itself boasting of its nuclear and
ballistic missile power, to divert attention from the steady erosion of
the independence of small nations? Are we, as civilized peoples, to
accept the increasing use of violence, murder and terrorism as instru-
ments of international policy? If so, this constitutes the real danger
to peace. The United States will steadfastly oppose that danger and
seek to strengthen the established processes of international law and
order.

The Soviet Union, by its constant abuse of its veto power in the
Security Council—its veto of today was the 85th—would tear down,
and not strengthen, the orderly processes which the nations have
established for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Your present proposal seems further calculated to derogate from
the authority and prestige of the United Nations. What you propose
amounts in effect to five nations, without sanction of the United
Nations and without conformity with its Charter, reaching what you
call "recommendations" regarding the Near and Middle East which
would then be submitted to the United Nations Security Council.
But in reality such so-called "recommendations" would be decisions
and the process would in effect make the United Nations into a "rubber
stamp" for a few great powers.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, when procedures are sought to be
improvised to meet what is alleged to be a situation of great urgency,
this can scarcely be expected to save time. It raises a whole series of
new problems which must be considered by the various nations that
might consult together, and by others which might feel that they were
improperly omitted and which are deeply concerned with the Near and
Middle East.

If, indeed, the Soviet Union seriously believes that there is an im-
minent threat to world peace, it is bound by the United Nations
Charter to take the matter to the Security Council. By Article 24
of the United Nations Charter, the Soviet Union, with other members
of the United Nations, has conferred on the Security Council "primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security", and all the members have agreed that, in these matters, it
"acts on their behalf." It is also agreed that that Council has the
responsibility to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace"
and to "decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or
restore international peace and security". Surely this solemn under-
taking ought to be respected.

The Security Council is already dealing with certain phases of the
problem alluded to by your note. If you or we believe that other
aspects of this problem or other problems should be urgently dealt

269

with in the interest of peace, then it lies open to any of us to enlarge
the scope of the Security Council consideration. Furthermore, under
the Charter, members of government, including Heads of Govern-
ment and Foreign Ministers, may represent a member nation at the
Security Council. If such a meeting were generally desired, the
United States would join in following that orderly procedure.

I do not, of course, exclude the discussion, outside the United
Nations, of world or regional problems, not posing alleged imminent
threats to the peace. I cannot but deplore the persistent refusal of
your Government for so many months to agree to the adequate prep-
aration of a "summit" meeting at which we could exchange considered
views on the great problems which confront the world. The Ambas-
sadors of France, the United Kingdom and the United States were
negotiating at Moscow with your Foreign Minister to develop a list
of topics which might lend themselves to considered and useful dis-
cussion at a summit meeting. These negotiations were broken off by
your Government on June 16th.

In conclusion, I venture to express in most earnest terms my hope
that the Soviet Government will unite with us for real peace. The
longing of mankind for peace is too precious to be used for ulterior
purposes. I hope that ways can be found to act for peace in accord-
ance with the standards prescribed by the Charter of the United
Nations. All the world, I believe, knows that peace with justice
is the dedication of the American nation. We have in the past
sacrificed greatly for that devotion. We have loyally complied with
the pledge we made, by the United Nations Declaration of January 1,
1942, to renounce any aggrandizement for ourselves.¹ Just as we shall
resist any efforts to use love of peace to mask aggression, so we shall
equally never fail to take any step, at any sacrifice, which will genuinely
promote the cause of peace and justice in the world.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to
President Eisenhower, July 23, 1958 ²

Unofficial translation

MR. PRESIDENT: I received your reply to my message of July 19th. I also received replies from Mr. Nehru, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. de Gaulle to my messages to them of July 19.

¹For text, see 81st Cong., 1st sess., *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49* (S. Doc. 123), pp. 2-3.

²Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 11, 1958, pp. 234-235.

270

At the present time we should not like to go into polemics in regard to the reasons which have called forth tension and created a threat to peace in the region of the Near and Middle East. On all these questions the point of view of the Soviet Government was set forth in my message of July 19. I wish only in the most decisive fashion to reject the assertion contained in your message that the Soviet Union supports expansionist and aggressive forces in the world. Now, particularly after the armed intervention of the USA in Lebanon and Great Britain in Jordan, no one can retain any doubts if they existed in regard to who in fact is carrying on an expansionist and aggressive policy which threatens peace and security of the peoples.

The Soviet Government considers that at the present time the threat to general peace is so serious that it is necessary not to lose time in polemics which might only postpone the achievement of agreement (but) to take all possible and most urgent measures in order to prevent the beginning of a world conflict. We should not underestimate the danger of such a conflict inasmuch as there are forces which stand for the broadening of the zone of aggression and in the first instance are nurturing plans of a military attack on Iraq.

Precisely in order to prevent the beginning of a world conflict we proposed the immediate calling of a conference of the chiefs of state of USSR, USA, Great Britain, France and India with the participation of the Secretary General of the UN, Mr. Hammarskjold. We note with satisfaction that the proposal of the Soviet Government about a meeting of the chiefs of state has met from your side a positive response. The Premier of Great Britain, Mr. Macmillan, the Premier of the Council of Ministers of France, Mr. de Gaulle, and the Premier of India, Mr. Nehru, have supported the desirability of such a meeting, for which we express to them our gratitude.

The views relating to the calling of a conference of the chiefs of government within the framework of the Security Council expressed by Premier Macmillan of Great Britain¹ are acceptable to us. The Soviet Government in its message of July 19 already noted that the Security Council should not be bypassed. Considering the necessity to take urgent decisions in the interests of the preservation of peace, we consider that the form of meeting of the chiefs of government in the given instance should not have a decisive significance. It is important that this meeting should take place as early as possible in order that it might be possible more quickly to find a correct decision which would contribute to the preservation and strengthening of peace, which would lead to calm in the region of the Near and Middle

¹ For text, see *The Times*, London, July 23, 1958, p. 8.

271

East and would contribute to a lessening of tensions in the relations
between states.

We also are in agreement with that approach to the work at this
special session of the Security Council which Mr. Macmillan proposes.
We agree that at this special session of the Security Council no reso-
lutions whatever should be introduced unless they will flow from a
previous agreement and that the goal will consist in the achievement
of an agreement and not in the fixing of disagreement by the method
of voting.

In this regard the Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that
the chiefs of governments in the aim of achieving the quickest con-
crete decisions in the interests of the preservation and strengthening
of peace will have the opportunity for joint consultation not only in
an official procedure.

Inasmuch as in the given instance the question revolves around the
consideration in the Security Council not of the usual current ques-
tions but of questions of particular importance from the viewpoint
of the preservation of peace and the guarantee of security, we consider
that in this case it would be useful to enlist for participation in the
work of the Security Council India—the largest Asiatic country which
has received universal recognition as a state out for the strengthening
of peace. Its participation would be really useful in contrast to the
participation of one of the so-called permanent members who factually
represents no one. We consider it necessary that in the work of the
Security Council there should take part the representative of India
in the person of its Premier J. Nehru who has agreed to participate
in a meeting of the chiefs of state.

In your message, Mr. President, you say that if a special session
of the Security Council with the participation of the chiefs of govern-
ments is desired by all, then the USA will join in this orderly
procedure.

As regards the Soviet Union, inasmuch as Premier Macmillan of
Great Britain, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the French
Republic, Mr. de Gaulle, the Premier of India, Mr. Nehru, and you,
Mr. President, as is seen from your message agree to participate per-
sonally in the special session of the Security Council, the Soviet Union
will be represented at this session by the chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the USSR.

It goes without saying that representatives of the interested Arab
states must be brought into a discussion of the question in the Security
Council with the participation of the chiefs of government of the
above mentioned five powers.

The Soviet Government should like to know as quickly as possible
the opinion of the Government of the USA for the calling of the

272

Security Council with the participation of the chiefs of governments.
On our part we submit the proposal to begin such work in the Security
Council on July 28 in New York.

Sincerely,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

Letter From President Eisenhower to
Chairman Khrushchev, July 25, 1958¹

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have studied your letter of July 23. I find in it apparent misunderstandings of the views expressed in my letter of July 22, which I would request you to read again more carefully.

I then said that if, despite the facts established in the recent meetings of the Security Council, your Government still desires to allege that the situation in Lebanon constitutes an imminent danger to peace in the Middle East, the proper forum for appropriate discussion is the United Nations Security Council. I am glad that you now recognize the responsibility of the United Nations and have withdrawn your original proposal which would have gravely undermined the prestige and authority of the United Nations.

My letter pointed out that the Charter of the United Nations authorizes members of government, and that of course includes Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers, to represent a member nation at the Security Council and that if such a meeting were generally desired, the United States would join in following that orderly procedure. It is, of course, not yet certain that such a meeting is in fact "generally desired", although that may prove to be the case.

You now make specific suggestions dealing with the composition of the Security Council and the conditions under which nations other than members of the Council may participate in discussions of the Council. My letter to you of July 22 urged that one of the advantages of proceedings in the Security Council is that there are established rules on these matters and it is accordingly not necessary to rely on improvising. I pointed out that when rules of this kind are sought to be improvised, there is raised a whole series of new problems, notably as to the participation and non-participation of various states. The United States will adhere, in these respects, to the Charter, which lays down the conditions under which nations which are not members of the Council may participate in the discussions of the Council.

¹Text from White House news release, July 25, 1958.

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As to the agenda, we agree that it should be limited to a discussion of the problems of the Middle East, including the causes of those problems. I would, however, be lacking in candor if I did not make clear that to put peace and security on a more stable basis in the Middle East requires far more than merely a consideration of Lebanon and Jordan. These situations are but isolated manifestations of far broader problems. In my opinion the instability of peace and security is in large measure due to the jeopardy in which small nations are placed. It would be the purpose of the United States to deal with the specific incidents you raise within that broad context. To do otherwise would be to be blind to the teaching of history.

You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that World War II was brought about by a series of acts of direct and indirect aggression against small nations. In March 1939 the then head of the Soviet Communist Party pointed out that the failure of nonaggressive nations, among which he named Britain and France, to check direct or indirect aggression against small countries meant "giving free rein to war and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war". That forecast unhappily proved true.

You will also recall the 1950 "Peace through Deeds" Resolution of the General Assembly ¹ which condemns the "fomenting of civil strife in the interest of a foreign power" as among "the gravest of all crimes".

It is my earnest hope that through the United Nations Security Council steps can be taken in regard to the Middle East which, by making peace more secure there, will help promote it elsewhere.

In conclusion, I suggest that the Permanent Representatives of the members of the United Nations Security Council in New York should exchange views, under arrangements made by the Secretary General, to ascertain that a meeting of the kind and under conditions I suggest is generally acceptable. If so they should also agree upon a date which would be generally satisfactory. The date of July 28 would be too early for us.

I am today authorizing our own Permanent Representative to act in this sense.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

¹General Assembly Res. 380(V); *Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20* (A/1775), pp. 13-14; also printed in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents* (Department of State publication 646, July 1957), vol. I, pp. 168-169.

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Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to
President Eisenhower, July 28, 1958¹

Unofficial translation

MR. PRESIDENT: I received your communication of July 25 which is an answer to my communication of July 23 regarding the convocation of a conference of Heads of Government.

Regrettably, I am obliged to state that in this reply the Government of the USA diverges from its position taken on July 22 about an urgent convocation of a special meeting of the Security Council with the participation of the Heads of Government for examining the situation in the area of the Near and Middle East.

Now it is clear that the Government of the USA is carrying on matters to delay the convocation of the conference of the Heads of Government and does not want that this conference should take urgent measures for the peaceful solution of the military conflict that has arisen in the region of the Near and Middle East.

It cannot but be noted that your agreement to the convocation of the conference of the Heads of Government within the framework of the Security Council, which you mentioned in your communication of July 22, was positively interpreted in all countries. The agreement of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France and India regarding the meeting of the Heads of Government brought some reassurance, and the peoples with full justification expected that this conference would take place as soon as possible and would guarantee the preservation and strengthening of peace in the Near and Middle East. The Soviet Government expressed its agreement with this proposal of Mr. Macmillan, inasmuch as the Prime Minister of Great Britain, proposing to carry out a conference of the Heads of Government within the framework of the Security Council, stated explicitly that in the course of this conference it was not desirable to introduce any resolutions if they do not originate from previous agreement and that the objective of our joint work would be to achieve fruitful agreement and not the fixation of disagreements by means of voting.

Your current reply represents a step backwards from the achieved agreement and, naturally, cannot but evoke serious anxiety among the peoples. The Government of the USA proposes that instead of the examination by the Heads of Government of the five powers of the situation dangerous for peace in the Near and Middle East, this question should again be transferred to a regular session of the Security Council of the UN. This proposal is now also supported by the

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 18, 1958, pp. 275-277.

275

Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Macmillan. But what can this bring? You, of course, know well that the Security Council, as the experience of its last sessions showed, is not capable in its regular meetings to adopt an urgent and effective solution for this question. In this region an unceasing accumulation of armed forces is taking place and it more and more is becoming a powder-magazine which can explode from the smallest spark and evoke a world catastrophe.

In these circumstances it is necessary in the quickest manner for the Heads of Government of the five powers—the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France and India—to meet, with the participation of the Secretary-General of the UN, who being invested with high authority could reach an agreement about the quick termination of the military conflict in the region of the Near and Middle East and about measures for preserving and strengthening universal peace.

It is entirely evident that if we with complete sincerity desire to find a way for reducing tension then we must agree that in the present instance these five powers must first reach agreement on the necessary measures for preserving and strengthening peace. Can anyone doubt that, if these powers succeed in reaching agreement about the immediate termination of the armed conflict in the Near and Middle East, any other state which is actually interested in strengthening peace would welcome and support such a solution (sic).¹

The proposal of Mr. Macmillan on July 22 about holding a conference of the Heads of Government within the framework of the Security Council envisaged a meeting of the Heads of Government of such a character.² But, as I have already noted, at the present time you, Mr. President, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain diverge from this proposal. One cannot but see that in this manner a course is being taken in order to bury the agreement already achieved about the most rapid meeting of the Heads of Government of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France and India.

We cannot accept this.

The Soviet Government firmly stands on the position of struggling for the preservation and strengthening of peace, on the position of the peaceful co-existence of states irrespective of their social-economic systems. The Soviet Government consistently comes out for the solution of conflicts by peaceful means through negotiations. Therefore we insist upon the immediate thwarting of aggression, upon the immediate withdrawal of troops of the interventionists from the territories of Lebanon and Jordan.

According to our deep conviction a meeting of the Heads of Government of the five powers, with the existence on all sides of sincere striv-

¹ The expression “(sic)” in cited source.

² For text, see *The Times*, London, July 23, 1958, p. 8.

276

ing for this, would assist in finding a way and possibilities for liquidating the armed conflict and for introducing reassurance in the region of the Near and Middle East.

In this connection the Soviet Government expresses its satisfaction with the view expressed by the Head of Government of France, Mr. de Gaulle, in his communication of July 26 ¹ that he supports the proposal of the convocation without delay of a conference of the Heads of Government of the five powers with the participation of the Secretary-General of the UN, which, as we understand, does not diverge from the proposal of the Soviet Government on this question. We consider, as we announced earlier, that this would be the most correct course which could guarantee a rapid achievement of a solution of the urgent problem of terminating the military conflict in the Near and Middle East.

To delay further the convocation of the conference of the Heads of Government, a reference is made in your communication to the fact that supposedly a misunderstanding took place of the formulation about the meeting of the Heads of Government made by the Government of the USA. In this case one cannot but ask whether this formulation was specially proposed in such a form in order that it give grounds for differing interpretations and lead to the loss of time in correspondence for making more precise its meaning. Inasmuch as you in your communication of July 22 expressed agreement for participating in a special session of the Security Council with the participation of the Heads of Government, we in the resulting conditions could not but understand this as your agreement for the quickest convocation of such a session. Now you, diverging from the quickest convocation of the session, recommend to take up again the reading of your letter of July 22. Is it possible to understand these words of yours any differently than as a testimony of the fact that the Government of the USA clearly does not want measures to be taken for thwarting the armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan in the quickest manner (sic) ? ²

I will not disguise, Mr. President, that the line of the Governments of the USA and Great Britain in fact for rejecting a conference of the Heads of Government cannot but evoke anxiety among the peoples, who with impatience await for the armed conflict in the Near and Middle East to be put to an end and for measures to be adopted for preserving and strengthening universal peace.

In all countries representatives of the public with anxiety ask the question—do not the Governments of the states, who are responsible

¹ Not printed here.

² The expression “(sic)” in cited source.

277

for the current tense situation in the Near and Middle East, want to
blunt the vigilance of the peoples and on the sly to prepare for new
acts of aggression. Of course, for the Government of the USA it
is better known than to anyone else that American forces continue
to debark in Lebanon where, with the support and cover of American
bayonets, the Special Emissary of the State Department Murphy¹
has undertaken suspicious activity and who unceremoniously inter-
feres in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The concentration of Amer-
ican Naval Forces is taking place in the eastern part of the Mediter-
ranean Sea, American reinforcements are being sent by air from
Europe to the Near and Middle East, and especially, to Turkey in the
area of Adana. In this connection the extensive preparation for armed
interference in the affairs of the Arab East, which has taken place
recently in Turkey itself, attracts special attention. King Hussein
of Jordan, who has lost the support of his people and depends on the
assistance of the interventionists, dares to rattle sabers and to threaten
a march on Baghdad. He appears as an obedient tool in the hands of
known Western powers which have plotted against the peoples of the
Arab East. A clear tendency to expand the region of aggression is
noted. The threat of an armed attack hangs over the Iraq Republic.

Thus a delay in the negotiations about a meeting of the Heads of
Government of the five powers, which is accompanied by an ever larger
accumulation of armed forces in the Near and Middle East, leads to a
further sharpening of the situation, to a broadening of the conflict,
and can lead humanity to a catastrophe.

Now, as never before, rapid and energetic action is necessary which
would guarantee the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from
Lebanon and Jordan and would make the widening of the area of mil-
itary conflict in the Near and Middle East impossible. There is no
time to be lost.

It is impossible, however, not to mention that instead of facilitating
the urgent convening of a conference of the Heads of Government
with the aim of immediately putting an end to the armed conflict in the
region of the Middle and Near East, the Government of the USA is
sending its Secretary of State to London to a meeting of the members
of the Baghdad Pact. Hasty attempts are being made somehow to
patch up this Pact, the withdrawal from which by the only Arab
country, Iraq, is evidence again of the failure of the policy conducted
"from a position of strength" by the Western states, a policy of knock-
ing together aggressive blocs. At the same time the Government of
the USA seeks in every way possible to hamper the solution of what
is now the main problem, and of that for which all humanity is now

¹ Robert D. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

278

waiting, the question of the ending of the armed intervention of the USA and Great Britain in the Near and Middle East; it seeks to lead the discussions about the meeting of the Heads of Government into a labyrinth of endless discussions about the form and procedure of this meeting.

A conference in London of the representatives of the Governments of Great Britain, the USA, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran looks like a plot against the Arab countries under conditions when, instead of the withdrawal at full speed of the foreign forces from Lebanon and Jordan, the preparation for armed intervention in the affairs of the Iraq Republic goes forward. Isn't all this being done in order to arrange for new acts of aggression and by means of conducting a policy of faits accomplis to face the world with an ever larger and larger widening of the military conflict? But it is impossible not to consider the serious consequences of such a policy, particularly for its initiators, insofar as peoples in our time are sufficiently vigilant and cannot reconcile themselves with acts of aggression.

The Government of the USA is doing everything in order to frustrate a meeting of the Heads of Government of the five powers, which ought to put an end to the armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan and take timely measures for the maintenance and strengthening of universal peace.

Consequently, you are not on the road toward a solution of the military conflict, which has begun in the Near and Middle East, in the interests of the maintenance and strengthening of peace, but you are conducting the affair toward a widening of the area of military conflict and you are placing before humanity the threat of a world catastrophe. Thereby you, in the first instance, assume the heavy responsibility before humanity and history for the consequences of such a policy of the Government of the USA. A heavy responsibility also lies on the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Macmillan, who, although he tries to equivocate, conducts essentially the same policy, aimed at the frustration of the adoption of any measures for the liquidation of the military conflict in Jordan and Lebanon.

In view of the extraordinarily tense situation created in the region of the Near and Middle East, the Soviet Government considers essential, as before, the immediate convening of a conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France and India with the participation of the Secretary-General of the UN.

As to the place for the conduct of this conference, we directed attention to the statement of the Head of the Government of France, Mr. de Gaulle, in his message of July 26, that he prefers that this meeting take place in Europe. The Soviet Government has already

279

previously expressed itself in favor of having the meeting take place in Europe, and supports the proposal of Mr. de Gaulle. It is all the more necessary to consider the question of conducting the conference in one of the cities of Europe since voices are heard among the diplomats of the USA and in the American press that the American authorities will meet with difficulties in the matter of guaranteeing the security of the Heads of Government if the conference is called in the USA. We did not want to place the Government of the USA in an embarrassing position on this question. Therefore, not objecting to the convening of a conference in New York as before, the Soviet Government agrees to a meeting in Geneva, Vienna, Paris, or in any other place acceptable to all the participants. We would also welcome the reaching of agreement about the meeting of the Heads of Government in Moscow whereby the Soviet Government guarantees for the delegation full security and necessary conditions for fruitful work. We are convinced that the Soviet people would welcome envoys who would arrive in order to adopt urgent measures for terminating the conflict in the Near and Middle East and for strengthening universal peace, and the Soviet people would demonstrate their inflexible devotion to the matter of peace.

In your communication the question is avoided about the participation of the Prime Minister of India in the conference of the Heads of Government. In connection with this I consider it necessary to underscore again that the participation of India in the mentioned conference would have great significance for achieving constructive solutions for settling the situation in the Near and Middle East.

As to the date for holding a conference of the Heads of Government with the participation of the Secretary-General of the UN, we named the date July 28. Inasmuch as you stated that this date is too early for the Government of the USA, we are ready for another early date and would want to receive a clear reply to this question about when the USA would be ready to participate in a conference of the Heads of Government of the five powers. I would want to receive from you, Mr. President, as rapid a reply to my communication as possible.

With respect,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

280

Letter From President Eisenhower to
Chairman Khrushchev, August 1, 1958¹

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: For several centuries personal correspondence
between Heads of Government and Heads of State has been an ex-
tremely valuable channel of communication when the normal diplo-
matic channels seemed unable to carry the full burden. However, it
has always been recognized—not just as a matter of diplomatic form
but as a requirement of efficacy—that the essential ingredient in such
correspondence, whether confidential or public, was a tone of serious
purpose and an absence of invective.

It is in this tradition that I reply to your letter of July 28.

I consider it quite inaccurate for you, both implicitly and explicitly,
to convey the impression that the Government of the United States has
embarked on a policy of delay based on niggling procedural argument.
The fact is that the differences between us are not procedural but basic.

Very simply, the two basic points which the United States has stated
many times in the past, and which I repeat now, are (a) do all of us,
the Charter Members of the United Nations, agree that the United
Nations Security Council has the principal responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security; and (b) shall small
nations as well as a few so-called "great powers" have a part in the
making of decisions which inevitably involve them?

As to my first point—What of the United Nations? It was created
out of the travail of World War II to establish a world of order and
of justice. It embodied and still embodies the hopes of mankind. At
this juncture, when you claim peace is endangered, you would push it
aside—we would invoke its processes.

This leads to my second point—What of the smaller powers of this
world? Shall they be ignored or shall the small nations be repre-
sented in the making of decisions which inevitably involve them?
History has certainly given us ample proof that a nation's capacity
to contribute to the advancement of mankind is not to be measured by
the number of divisions it can put in the field. You must be aware,
as I am, of the many very specific proposals made these last years by
the so-called smaller powers which have been of great value to all of us.

The stated assumption in your letter that the decisions of five great
powers will be happily accepted by all other interested powers seems
to indicate an attitude on your part which could have dangerous
consequences in the future for the smaller powers of this world.

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 18, 1958, pp. 274-275.

544645—60—21

281

Your position, which means that the desires, the dignity, in fact the security, of the smaller nations should be disregarded, is one which the United States has consistently opposed and continues to oppose today. Essentially you are proposing that we should join you in a policy reminiscent of the system of political domination you imposed in Eastern Europe. The United States cannot accept that point of view.

The problem of the Middle East is not one of a threat of aggression by the United States but rather the threat, by others, of further indirect aggression against independent states. This problem is clearly the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council.

I am, therefore, instructing the United States Permanent Representative to the Security Council to seek a special meeting on or about August 12 of the Security Council under Article 28(2), which would permit direct discussions among Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers. I would hope that you would similarly instruct your Permanent Representative. Such a meeting will make it possible for the Council to discharge its responsibilities in the manner contemplated by the Charter.

As for the place of the meeting, the United States agrees that the meeting might be held elsewhere than New York City but we could not agree to the meeting being held in Moscow. The memory of the well-organized mass demonstration and serious damage to the United States Embassy in Moscow is too fresh in the minds of the American people.

If such a meeting is arranged, I expect to attend and participate and I hope that you would do likewise.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

## Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower, August 5, 1958¹

[Extracts]

Unofficial translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I received your message of 1 August. I am fully in agreement with the propositions stated in it about the significance of personal correspondence between the Heads of Government. Personal correspondence in our conditions must serve the principal

¹ For the full text of this letter, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1958, pp. 342-346.

282

objective which the peoples place before themselves—the securing of
peace and peaceful coexistence among states regardless of their social
structure.

I am also in agreement with you that between us at present an un-
usual correspondence has taken shape. Understand me correctly,
this unusual correspondence has been the result of unusual steps which
were undertaken by the USA and Great Britain in the Near and
Middle East. . . .

... Inasmuch as the Governments of the USA and Great Britain evaded the convocation of a conference of the Heads of Government of the five powers, and the Security Council, as we have already noted, has shown itself incapable of assuring a solution of the question of the situation in the Near and Middle East in the interests of peace, the Government of the Soviet Union with the aim of speediest adoption of the necessary measures for stopping the aggression instructed its representative at the UN to demand the convocation of a Special Session of the General Assembly of the UN for the discussion of the question of the withdrawal of the troops of the USA from Lebanon and troops of Great Britain from Jordan. The Soviet Government hopes that the consideration of that question in the General Assembly, in which there are represented large as well as small states, will permit finding of a way to liquidate the war danger created in the Near and Middle East by the actions of the USA and England and bring tranquillity to that area.

Mr. President, I think that you will agree with me that in connection with the events in the Near and Middle East which have faced the world with the threat of general war with all its countless calamities for the peoples the question has especially sharply arisen of creating the conditions for the peaceful coexistence of states and the liquidation of the "cold war" which has poisoned the entire international situation. The Soviet Union and all peace-loving countries seek the coming of such a time when no great power can commit aggression even against a small power. The aggression of a small country against a great power is in general not possible. A small country does not have those divisions about which you speak in your letter, Mr. President. It is necessary for us to take into account real conditions and possibilities. A world war cannot be unleashed by a small country, but by a great power which has many divisions and many atomic and hydrogen arms, which has many missiles, bombers and other means of destruction. For precisely this reason the great powers should agree not to take steps which would place the world on the brink of military catastrophe. The Soviet Government

283

believes that it is necessary to develop in every way contacts and ties
between the statesmen of all countries. Personal meetings of the
leaders of states can reduce existing tension, facilitate the creation of
trust and mutual understanding between states and aid in a more
rapid thawing of the ice of "the cold war". We ascribe an especially
great significance to such contacts and, as you know, even in Decem-
ber of last year proposed the convocation of a conference of states-
men at the highest level. We are convinced that a conference at the
highest level with the membership which we have previously been
proposing would aid, with effort on the part of its participants, in
finding ways and means of liquidating the condition of "cold war",
and make impossible the emergence of a hot war.

Let us do everything necessary so that such a meeting, which is
awaited by all peoples, is not postponed until eternity. We await
your agreement with our proposal on a conference at the highest level
and are ready to take part in such a conference at any time. The
speediest possible convocation of a conference at the highest level is in
the interests of all states, large and small.

In conclusion I would like to express the hope that the Government
of the USA will support the proposal for the convocation of a Special
Session of the General Assembly of the UN, which could be a good
step towards the relaxation of tension and would prepare the ground
for the speeding of a meeting at the Summit.

Respectfully,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

Statement by President Eisenhower, August 5, 1958¹

I welcome Mr. Khrushchev's agreement ² that the problems we have
had under discussion in our recent exchange of letters should be placed
again before the United Nations. I regret that he did not accept the
Security Council with the Heads of Government present as the appro-
priate forum in view of his alleged concern over the threats to the
peace. However, the General Assembly is completely acceptable, par-
ticularly since the United States previously proposed on July 18th
such a procedure to the Security Council.³

I am therefore instructing the United States Permanent Representa-
tive to the Security Council to move the previously presented United

¹ Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1958, p. 342.

² *Supra*.

³ See *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 4, 1958, p. 197.

284

States resolution requesting that this matter be put before the General Assembly. This resolution has been held in abeyance in order to permit consideration of Mr. Khrushchev's proposals of July 19th, 23rd, and 28th.

## Note From the United States to the Soviet Union, August 22, 1958¹

The United States Government has examined the Soviet Government's note of July 15 and the draft Treaty attached to it. It does not propose at present to comment on the substance of either. This is not because it agrees with what is said or with the premise on which the Soviet Government bases its arguments. The reason is simply that the United States Government notes that the proposals embodied in the draft Treaty are largely a reflection of proposals already included in the Soviet Memorandum of May 5 about an agenda for a meeting of Heads of Government, although surprisingly no mention is made of such meeting in the Soviet note of July 15. The Western powers have made their own suggestions for topics to be examined by Heads of Government. They are prepared to express their views about the Soviet proposals and to receive Soviet views about their own. For this purpose, the Western powers suggested, as long ago as May 31, a practical procedure for discussing the agenda which would be fair to both parties. They still await a reply to this and also to their letter of July 1. In the meantime, to their regret, the preparatory discussions in Moscow are at a standstill. The United States Government believes that the first thing to be done, before the proposals of either party are discussed, is to resolve this question.

## Aide Memoire Presented by the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States, September 9, 1958²

The German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) at its meeting July 2, 1958, unanimously passed the following resolution, which was endorsed

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 462. Identical notes were delivered to the Soviet Government by the British and French Embassies. For the U.S. reply, see *post*, pp. 291-292.

²Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 20, 1958, pp. 614-615. Identical aide memoire were delivered on Sept. 9 to the American, British, French, and Soviet representatives at Bonn.

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by the German Federal Council (Bundesrat) at its meeting July 18, 1958:

In order to promote the reestablishment of German unity, the Federal Government is herewith directed to request the four powers France, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States, to set up, either at a future international conference (summit conference) or independently thereof, a four-power group (at least at the level of an ambassadors' conference) with a mandate to prepare joint proposals for the solution of the German problem.

The Federal Government shares the desire expressed in the Bundestag resolution, that a group of the four powers responsible for the solution of the German problem be set up either at a future international conference (summit conference) or independently thereof. It hopes that this group will study proposals concerning the reestablishment of German unity, and carry out the preparatory work necessary for final negotiations to be held at a later date.

In compliance with the mandate given to it by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, and in view of the talks in preparation for an international conference which have been taking place in Moscow between representatives of the four powers responsible for the reunification of Germany the Federal Government begs to direct the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the desire expressed in the above resolution.

## Note From the United States to Czechoslovakia, September 12, 1958¹

The United States Government refers to the memorandum of the Czechoslovak Government of May 31 stating that Government's views with regard to the holding of a Summit conference and participation of Czechoslovakia in it.

The considerations set forth in the Czechoslovak memorandum present an erroneous picture of the attitude of the United States Government. The United States does not underestimate the significance of a Summit meeting nor is it attempting to delay its convocation. However, the United States attaches more importance to the achievement of genuine agreements than to the forum in which those agreements are reached.

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 6, 1958, pp. 539-540. The note was delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia by the American Embassy at Prague on Sept. 12.

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The unanimity reached at the Third Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly ¹ and the successful outcome of the technical talks at Geneva ² demonstrate that useful agreements can be attained in various appropriate ways. With regard to a Summit conference, the United States continues to hold that it would be desirable if it would provide opportunity for serious discussion of major problems and if it would be an effective means for reaching agreement on significant subjects.

A concrete effort to prepare for such a conference was made on March 31 by the three Western powers when they invited the Soviet Government to initiate diplomatic talks in Moscow for this purpose. The preparatory discussions met with difficulties arising from the fact that the proposals as to what problems should be examined by the Heads of Government put forward by both sides were too diverse to be acceptable to either. The Western powers attempted to resolve these difficulties by proposing on May 31 that all specific proposals be reviewed in diplomatic talks in Moscow under general categories in order to determine which should be submitted for examination by Heads of Government. On July 1 and again on August 22, the United States, together with France and the United Kingdom, expressed regret that the preparatory discussions in Moscow were at a standstill and called upon the Soviet Government to consider the practical procedure for discussing a Summit conference agenda which they had suggested on May 31. It is the Soviet Union that has blocked any progress on this matter by its failure to accept this proposal or to submit an equally effective and workable alternative. There is no basis for the Czechoslovak assertion that the United States is endeavoring to delay the convocation of a Summit meeting.

In discussing the Western proposal concerning Eastern Europe, the Czechoslovak memorandum seeks to create the impression that the Western powers wish to interfere in the internal affairs of the Eastern European countries. It has been the traditional policy of the United States Government to support the right of all countries to freedom and independence and the right of their peoples to choose their own form of government. The United States Government therefore seeks to develop adequate guarantees against any interference in the internal affairs of all countries and against the use of force in the settlement of disputes which may arise. In accord with this policy the United States Government agrees that the political and economic systems of

¹ See Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 15, 1958, pp. 409-412.

² For background and text of the "Report of the Conference of Experts To Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests," see *ibid*., Sept. 22, 1958, pp. 452-462.

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the Eastern European countries are the exclusive concern of their peoples.

The United States Government believes that it would be premature to consider the composition of a Summit conference until the agenda for such a conference has been agreed upon. If, after agreement is reached on an agenda, it appears that Czechoslovakia's participation would serve a useful and constructive purpose, the United States Government would welcome such participation. The Czechoslovak Government will understand, of course, that although many countries would likely believe that their interests would be involved in any discussions carried out at a Summit conference, such a conference to be effective would have to be limited in size.

The Government of the United States agrees that the object in determining the composition of a Summit conference should be to promote to the utmost the achievement of positive results, and welcomes the Czechoslovak Government's assurance that it is ready to create favorable conditions for the success of a Summit conference.

## Note From the Soviet Union to the United States on a Peace Treaty With Germany, September 18, 1958¹

*Unofficial translation*

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Government of the United States of America and considers it necessary to transmit the following for its information.

On 5 September of this year the Soviet Government received the note of the Government of the German Democratic Republic in which disquiet is expressed in connection with the impermissibly delayed preparation of a peace treaty with Germany.² In the note a proposal is advanced about the urgent creation of a commission of representatives of the four great powers whose tasks would be the carrying out of consultations about the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany. As the Government of the G.D.R. communicated, notes to the same effect were addressed also to the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and the French Republic. Moreover, the G.D.R. Government made it known that it simultaneously proposed to the Government of the F.R.G. to create a commission of representa-

¹ Text in *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 20, 1958, pp. 616-617. Identical notes were delivered to the United States, United Kingdom, and French Em-bassies at Moscow.

² For text, see *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 13 (Oct. 5-20, 1958), pp. 11121-11125.

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tives of both German states which would examine from a German point of view all questions connected with the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany. According to the proposal of the G.D.R. Government, this commission will occupy itself also with questions relevant to the competence of the two German states, connected with the creation of a united peace-loving democratic Germany.

Taking into account that the question about preparing a peace treaty is that part of the German problem for the decision of which all states which participated in the war, and in the first place the four great powers, bear responsibility, the Soviet Government would like to express to the Government of the U.S.A. its considerations regarding the proposals advanced by the Government of the G.D.R. so that in the nearest future it might be possible to undertake joint steps in the interest of a peaceful settlement with Germany. The statement of the G.D.R. Government points out how acutely the German people feel that abnormal situation which already in the course of 13 years has been preserved in Germany as result of the absence of a peace treaty with this country. It is a new reminder to the great powers on whom lies the main responsibility for a peaceful settlement with Germany about the need at least to fulfill their duty before the German people. The proposal of the G.D.R. Government about the creation of a commission of representatives of the four powers and also of a corresponding German commission for the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany takes into account the concrete conditions which have arisen up to the present and opens the way for a practical solution of this long since matured problem.

The Soviet Government being an advocate of the basic solution of the German question has repeatedly come out in the past with proposals, directed toward an urgent conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, which unfortunately have not at that time met support on the part of the Western powers. Recently it once more advanced this question in connection with the preparation for the convocation of a summit meeting considering it necessary to examine this as one of the important problems of the agenda of such a meeting.

The indisputable fact is evident to all that the absence of a peace treaty with Germany leaves open many questions which profoundly disturb the whole German people and affect important interests of the other European peoples who took part in the war with Germany, including the interests of their security. No one has the right in the course of such a long time to deprive the German people of a possibility of enjoying all the benefits of a peaceful situation, all the more since the solution of analogous questions in connection with all the countries drawn into the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany has long since been a passed stage.

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The conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany would finally draw a line under the past war and its heavy consequences for the European peoples and would undoubtedly have important significance for reducing tension and guaranteeing security in Europe. At the same time it would permit the guarding from any outside interference the internal development of Germany and the restoring in full measure of its sovereignty and independence. Germany would be placed in all relations in a position of equality with other states and would receive access to the U.N. The working out of the draft of a peace treaty, which would define the political and economic conditions of the development of Germany and its military status, is dictated also by a real need to give the German people clear perspectives for the development of Germany in the future.

In supporting the initiative of the Government of the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Government has also in mind that the preparatory work's concluding a peace treaty with the participation of the Governments of both German states would facilitate a rapprochement between them and the unification of their efforts for the purpose of restoring the state unity of Germany.

The Soviet Government hereby informs the Government of the U.S.A. that it has notified the G.D.R. Government about its agreement with its proposal to create a commission of representatives of the four powers with the aim of carrying out consultations about preparing a peace treaty with Germany.

It also supports the idea of the creation of a commission of representatives of both German states and declares its readiness to render any aid for the activity of such a commission. The Soviet Government expects that the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the obligations lying on it in connection with the peaceful settlement with Germany, also will support the said proposals of the Government of the G.D.R. and will adopt the necessary steps for their realization. The Soviet Government would be grateful to the Government of the U.S.A. for the receipt in a short time of its considerations on the question touched upon.

Notes of identical content have been addressed by the Soviet Government also to the Governments of Great Britain and France.

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Aide Memoire Presented by the United States to the
Federal Republic of Germany, September 30, 1958¹

The Embassy of the U.S.A. has been instructed to inform the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs as follows:

The Government of the United States refers to the Aide Memoire of the Federal Government of September 9, 1958, which draws attention to a resolution passed by the German Federal Parliament and endorsed by the German Federal Council. This resolution calls for the establishment of a Four Power group composed of representatives of the powers responsible for solution of the German problem with a mandate to prepare joint proposals for the solution of the German problem. It also suggests that the group envisaged would be set up either at a future international conference of Heads of Government or independently thereof.

The Government of the United States notes that the Government of the Federal Republic shares the desire expressed in the resolution of the German Legislature and that it hopes that this group will study proposals concerning the reestablishment of German unity and carry out the preparatory work necessary for final negotiations to be held at a later date.

The Government of the United States welcomes the initiative of the Federal Government. As the latter is aware, the German problem is an important element in the proposals put forward by the Western Powers to the Soviet Government on May 28 for an agenda for a meeting of Heads of Government. The preparatory talks in Moscow for such a meeting, mentioned in the Federal Republic's Aide Memoire, have been in suspense since the end of May because of the Soviet Government's failure to reply to the Western proposal of May 31 for overcoming the procedural difficulty caused by the divergence in the Soviet and Western sets of agenda proposals. Additional efforts to obtain a response, made by the Western Powers on July 1 and August 22, have also so far been to no avail.

The Western Powers continue to hold that a summit meeting would be desirable if it would provide opportunity for serious discussions of major problems and if it would be an effective means of reaching agreement on significant subjects. The Government of the United States hopes that the Soviet Government will now reply to the Western proposal so that the preparatory talks which would cover the

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 20, 1958, pp. 613-614. Identical notes were delivered to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American, British, and French representatives at Bonn.

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important question of Germany, may continue. At the same time,
in view of the crucial importance of the settlement of the German
problem to the relaxation of world tensions, the Government of the
United States is also prepared to discuss the German problem in a
separate Four Power group to be set up in accordance with the desire
of the Federal Government expressed in its Aide Memoire of
September 9.

The Government of the United States has constantly sought to
bring about the creation of a freely-elected all-German Government
which would be truly representative of the German people and which
could conclude a peace treaty. Until such a Government is created
the continued division of Germany maintains a situation in which a
segment of the German people is forced to suffer the oppression of a
regime imposed on it from without.

For a long time, efforts to resolve German questions have been
thwarted by the refusal of the Soviet Government to agree to any
plan which would make reunification possible in a way which would
insure the freedom of the whole German people. Once a freely-elected
all-German Government truly representative of the German people
has been created, it would be possible to proceed with such a Govern-
ment to the conclusion of a peace treaty. The Government of the
United States is informing¹ the Soviet Government of its support of
the initiative of the Federal Republic and urging the Soviet Govern-
ment to give it favorable consideration.

Note From the United States to the Soviet Union,
September 30, 1958 ²

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compli-
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and on instruction of its Government has the
honor to state the following:

The United States Government wishes to refer to the Soviet Gov-
ernment's note of September 18. It regrets that the Soviet note ignores
the proposals made by the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany, which were contained in an Aide Memoire of September 9
addressed to the Governments of France, the Soviet Union, the United

¹ Infra.

² Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 20, 1958, pp. 615-616. Identical notes were delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American, British, and French Embassies.

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Kingdom and the United States. These proposals, based on an unanimous resolution of the German Federal Parliament which was endorsed by the German Federal Council, also called for the establishment of a Four Power group to discuss the German problem. The United States Government observes that instead, the Soviet note is based on proposals made by the so-called "Government of the German Democratic Republic".

The United States Government fully shares the view expressed in the Soviet Government's note that "no one has the right to deprive the German people for such a long time of the opportunity to enjoy all the advantages of a state of peace".

It also notes with satisfaction the statement that the Soviet Government is "in favor of a fundamental settlement of the German question". It is well known to the Soviet Government that this has long been the aim of the United States Government. It is sufficient to recall the opening words of the Berlin Declaration which was made by the Governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States on July 29, 1957:

> Twelve years have elapsed since the end of the war in Europe. The hopes of the peoples of the world for the establishment of a basis for a just and lasting peace have nevertheless not been fulfilled. One of the basic reasons for the failure to reach a settlement is the continued division of Germany, which is a grave injustice to the German people and a major source of international tension in Europe.

The United States Government agrees that, as stated in the Soviet note, "the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany would finally draw the line below the last war", and that the German people should themselves participate in the preparation of such a treaty. An essential prerequisite for the negotiation of a peace treaty is, however, the creation of a Government which truly reflects the will of the German people. Only a Government created on such a basis could undertake obligations which would inspire confidence on the part of other countries and which would be considered just and binding by the people of Germany themselves. Moreover, German representatives at any discussions about a peace treaty which were held in advance of the reunification of Germany would, as the Soviet Government must be aware, have no power to commit a future all-German Government to any of the conclusions reached. For these reasons, the United States Government considers that the first task in any discussion of the German problem must be the reunification of Germany and the formation of an all-German Government by means of free elections.

On the method by which such Government should be formed, the United States Government finds the proposals in the Soviet Government's note both unrealistic and unsatisfactory. According to these

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proposals, the question of the reunification of Germany is to be left to a commission composed of representatives of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone. The regime established in the Soviet Zone of Germany does not represent the will of the people of Eastern Germany. It is rightly regarded by the people of all parts of Germany as a regime imposed by a foreign power and maintained in power by foreign forces. Since this regime has no mandate from the people it purports to speak for, it would violate any genuine concern for the interests of the German people to allow such a regime to participate in any discussions involving their future Government.

In the Directive issued by the Four Heads of Government at Geneva in 1955,¹ the Soviet Government recognized its responsibility for the reunification of Germany. The Directive provides *inter alia*: "The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security". The United States Government cannot accept that the Soviet Government has the right unilaterally to evade this responsibility or this agreement. In accordance with its similar responsibility the United States Government, in conjunction with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, has on many occasions put forward proposals designed to achieve the restoration of German unity. These Western proposals recognize the right of the German people to determine their own way of life in freedom, to determine for themselves their own political, economic and social system, and to provide for their security with due regard to the legitimate interests of other nations. They provide for the exercise of this right through the holding of free elections throughout Germany, the establishment of an all-German Government, and the negotiation with this Government of the terms of a peace treaty.

The Government of the United States is ready at any time to enter into discussions with the Soviet Government on the basis of these proposals, or of any other proposals genuinely designed to insure the reunification of Germany in freedom, in any appropriate forum. It regards the solution of the German problem as essential if a lasting settlement in Europe is to be achieved. This problem has been included as one of the subjects which the Western Powers put forward on May 28 for examination at a conference of Heads of Government. Although the Soviet Government agreed that preparations for such a conference should be made between representatives of the Four

¹ *Ante*, under date of July 23, 1955.

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Powers in Moscow, these preparations have been in suspense since the end of May because of the Soviet Government's failure to reply to the Western proposals of May 31 for overcoming the procedural difficulty caused by the divergence in the Soviet and Western sets of agenda proposals. The further Western communications of July 1 and August 22 have so far also remained unanswered. Since the Soviet Government has indicated in its note that it, too, attaches importance to the solution of the German problem, the United States Government hopes that the Soviet Government will now reply to the Western proposal so that the preparatory talks may continue.

In the interests of making progress on this subject, the Government of the United States is, however, prepared to discuss the German problem in a separate Four Power group to be set up in accordance with the desire of the Federal Government expressed in its Aide Memoire of September 9. The purpose of the group would be to discuss proposals connected with the German problem and to carry out the preparatory work necessary for final negotiations to be held at a later date either at a conference of Heads of Government, if one can be arranged, or otherwise.

The Government of the United States hopes that, in view of the importance of settling the German problem, not only for the German people but also as a contribution towards the relaxation of tension in Europe, the Soviet Government will agree to the procedure set out above.

A copy of the United States Government's reply ¹ to the Federal Government's Aide Memoire of September 9 is attached. The United States Government is also informing the Federal Government of the terms of this note.

## Note From the Soviet Union to the United States on Germany and the Berlin Situation, Nov. 27, 1958 ²

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addresses the Government of the United States of America as one of

¹ *Supra*.

² Official translation from the *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 19, 1959, pp. 81-89. On the legal aspects of the Berlin situation, see the Department of State memorandum of Dec. 19, 1958; *ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1959, pp. 5-13. For U.S. reply, see *post*, pp. 315-319.

Khrushchev, in a speech on Nov. 10, called for the removal of "the remnants of the occupation regime in Berlin" and demanded that the United States, France, and Britain "reach agreement" with the East German regime "if they are interested in any questions concerning Berlin." The Department of State immediately repeated a news conference statement by Secretary Dulles of Nov. 7 that "we are most solemnly committed to hold West Berlin, if need be by military force." Dulles discussed Khrushchev's speech at his news conference on Nov. 26. For excerpts from the Dulles and Khrushchev statements, see *Documents on Germany, 1944-1959* (Senate committee print), pp. 307-317.

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the signatory powers of the Potsdam Agreement on the urgent question of the status of Berlin.¹

The problem of Berlin, which is situated in the center of the German Democratic Republic but the western part of which is cut off from the GDR as a result of foreign occupation, deeply affects not only the national interests of the German people but also the interests of all nations desirous of establishing lasting peace in Europe. Here in the historic capital of Germany two worlds are in direct contact and at every turn there tower the barricades of the "cold war." A situation of constant friction and tension has prevailed for many years in this city, which is divided into two parts. Berlin, which witnessed the greatest triumph of the joint struggle of our countries against Fascist aggression, has now become a dangerous center of contradiction between the Great Powers, allies in the last war. Its role in the relations between the Powers may be compared to a smoldering fuse that has been connected to a powder keg. Incidents arising here, even if they seem to be of local significance, may, in an atmosphere of heated passions, suspicion, and mutual apprehensions, cause a conflagration which will be difficult to extinguish. This is the sad pass to which has come, after the 13 postwar years, the once joint and concerted policy of the Four Powers—the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France—with regard to Germany.

To assess correctly the real importance of the Berlin problem confronting us today and to determine the existing possibilities for normalizing the situation in Berlin it is necessary to recall the development of the policy of the Powers parties to the anti-Hitler coalition with respect to Germany.

It is common knowledge that the USA, as well as Great Britain and France, by no means immediately came to the conclusion that it was essential to establish cooperation with the Soviet Union for the purpose of counteracting Hitlerite aggression, although the Soviet Government constantly indicated its readiness to do so. In the capitals of the Western states opposite tendencies prevailed for a long time and they became especially marked in the period of the Munich deal with Hitler. Entertaining the hope of controlling German militarism and of pushing it eastward, the governments of the Western Powers tolerated and encouraged the policy of blackmail and threats pursued by Hitler and acts of direct aggression by Hitlerite Germany and its ally, Fascist Italy, against a number of peace-loving states.

¹ For text, see 81st Cong., 1st sess., *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49* (S. Doc. 123), pp. 34-48.

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It was only when Fascist Germany, upsetting the short-sighted calculations of the inspirers of Munich, turned against the Western Powers, when Hitler's army started moving westward, crushing Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and toppling France, that the governments of the USA and Great Britain had no alternative but to admit their miscalculations and embark upon the path of organizing, jointly with the Soviet Union, resistance to Fascist Germany, Italy, and Japan. Had the Western Powers followed a more farsighted policy, such cooperation between the Soviet Union, the USA, Great Britain, and France could have been established much sooner, in the first years after Hitler seized power in Germany, and then there would have been no occupation of France, no Dunkirk, no Pearl Harbor. Then it would have been possible to save millions of human lives sacrificed by the peoples of the Soviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia, France, Britain, Czechoslovakia, the USA, Greece, Norway, and other countries to curb the aggressors.

The creation of the anti-Hitler coalition is a fact without precedent in modern history, if only because states with different social systems united in a defensive and just war against the common enemy. The Soviet Government highly reveres the concord of nations that took shape in the struggle against Fascism and was sealed by the blood of the freedom-loving peoples. The Soviet people would like to preserve and develop the feelings of trust and friendship that marked their relations with the peoples of the USA, Britain, France, and the other countries of the anti-Hitler coalition during the grim years of the last war.

When the peoples were celebrating victory over Hitlerite Germany a conference of the heads of government of the Soviet Union, the USA and Great Britain was held in Potsdam in order to work out a joint policy with respect to post-war Germany. The Potsdam Agreement, to which France acceded soon after it was signed, generalized the historical experience of the struggle waged by the peoples to prevent aggression by Germany militarism. The entire content of this agreement was directed toward creating conditions precluding the possibility of yet another attack by Germany against peace-loving states, toward preventing German militarists from unleashing another world war so that Germany, having abandoned forever the mirage of a policy of conquest, might make a firm start on the road to peaceful development.

Expressing the will of the peoples who made untold sacrifices for the sake of crushing the Hitlerite aggressors, the governments of the Four Powers solemnly undertook to eradicate German militarism and

544645—60—22

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Naziism, to prevent forever their revival, and to take all steps to ensure that Germany would never again threaten its neighbors or the preservation of world peace. The participants in the Potsdam Conference expressed their determination to prevent any Fascist and militaristic activity or propaganda. They also undertook to permit and encourage all democratic political parties in Germany.

For purposes of destroying the economic foundation of German militarism, it was decided to eliminate excessive concentration in Germany's economy, represented in the form of cartels, syndicates, trusts, and other monopolies, which ensured the assumption of power by Fascism and the preparation and carrying out of Hitlerite aggression.

The Potsdam Agreement contained important provisions whereby Germany was to be regarded as a single economic entity, even during the occupation period. The agreement also provided for the creation of central German administrative departments. The Council of Foreign Ministers, established by a decision of the Potsdam Conference, was instructed to prepare a peace settlement for Germany.

The implementation of all these measures should have enabled the German people to effect a fundamental reconstruction of their life and to ensure the creation of a united, peace-loving, democratic German state.

Such are the main provisions of the Potsdam Agreement, which ensured an equitable combination of the interests both of the nations that had fought against Germany and of the fundamental interests of the German people themselves, and at the same time created a sound basis for carrying out a joint policy by the Four Powers concerning the German question, and, hence, for extensive and fruitful cooperation between them in European matters in general. However, further developments deviated a great deal from the direction mapped out at Potsdam. Relations between the USSR and the Three Western Powers kept deteriorating. Mutual distrust and suspicion kept growing and have now developed into unfriendly relations.

The Soviet Government sincerely hoped that after the victorious end of the war it would be quite possible, notwithstanding all the inevitability of ideological differences, to continue the fruitful cooperation between the Great Powers that headed the anti-Hitler coalition, on the basis of sober recognition of the situation resulting from the war.

The policy of the Western Powers, however, was increasingly influenced by forces obsessed with hatred for Socialist and Communist ideas but which concealed during the war their hostile designs against the Soviet Union. As a result, the course was set in the West toward the utmost aggravation of the ideological struggle headed by

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aggressive leaders, opponents of the peaceful coexistence of states. The signal for this was given to the United States and to other Western countries by W. Churchill in his notorious Fulton speech in March 1946.¹

The conflict between the two ideologies—a struggle of minds and convictions—in itself could not have been particularly detrimental to relations between states. The ideological struggle has never abated and it will continue so long as there are different views on the structure of society. But, unfortunately, the pronouncements of W. Churchill and those who share his views influenced the minds of other Western statesmen, which had the most regrettable consequences. Governmental bodies and the armed forces joined in the ideological struggle that blazed forth. The results are universally known. Instead of developing cooperation between the major Great Powers, the world was split into opposing military alignments and competition began in the manufacture and stockpiling of atomic and hydrogen weapons. In other words, war preparations were launched. The Soviet Government deeply regrets that events took such a turn, since this prejudices the cause of peace and runs counter to the natural desire of peoples for peaceful coexistence and friendly cooperation. There was a time when the leaders of the USA and Great Britain, in particular Franklin D. Roosevelt, the outstanding American statesman, reflecting the sentiments of the mass of the people, proclaimed the necessity of creating such a system of mutual relations between states under which the nations would feel secure and people everywhere could live all their lives without fear.

A particularly drastic change in relations between the USA, as well as Britain and France, and the Soviet Union occurred when those powers shifted to pursuing a policy in Germany that ran counter to the Potsdam Agreement. The first violation of the Potsdam Agreement was the refusal by the governments of the USA, Great Britain, and France to honor their commitments under the aforesaid agreement regarding the transfer to the Soviet Union of the agreed amount of industrial equipment from West Germany, in partial compensation for the destruction and damage inflicted upon the national economy of the USSR by the aggression of Hitlerite Germany.

But the matter did not end there. With every passing year the governments of the USA and Great Britain drifted farther and farther away from the principles underlying the Potsdam Agreement. The same road was followed by France which, although it acceded to the Potsdam Agreement later, cannot, of course, disclaim its share of the responsibility for carrying out this agreement.

¹ Mr. Winston Churchill spoke on Mar. 5, 1946, at commencement exercises at Westminster College, Fulton, Mo.

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Having embarked upon the restoration of the military and eco-
nomic potential of West Germany, the Western Powers revived and
strengthened the very forces that had forged Hitler's war machine.
Had the Western Powers honored the Potsdam Agreement they would
have prevented the German militarists from regaining their positions,
checked *revanche* tendencies, and not permitted Germany to create
an army and an industry manufacturing the means of destruction.
However, it is a known fact that the governments of the Three Powers
not only failed to do this but, on the contrary, sanctioned the creation
of a West German army and are encouraging the arming of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, disregarding the commitments made at
Potsdam. Moreover, they included West Germany in the North At-
lantic bloc, which was created behind the back of the Soviet Union
and, as everyone is aware, against it, and are now arming West Ger-
many with atomic and rocket weapons.

It is evident that the bitter lessons of the murderous war have been
lost on certain Western statesmen, who are once again dragging out
the notorious Munich policy of inciting German militarism against
the Soviet Union, their recent comrade in arms.

The legitimate question arises as to whether the very promoters of
the present Western policy with respect to Germany can guarantee
that the German militarism nurtured by them will not once again turn
against its present partners and that the American, British, and
French peoples will not have to pay with their blood for the violation
by the governments of the Three Western Powers of the Allied agree-
ments on the peaceful and democratic development of Germany. It
is doubtful whether anyone can give such guarantees.

The policy of the USA, Britain, and France with respect to West
Germany has led to the violation of those provisions of the Potsdam
Agreement designed to ensure the unity of Germany as a peace-loving
and democratic state. And when a separate state, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, was set up independently [of the Soviet Union] in
West Germany, which was occupied by the troops of the Three
Powers, East Germany, where forces determined not to allow the
German people to be plunged once again into disaster assumed the
leadership, had no alternative but to create in its turn an independent
state.

Thus, two states came into being in Germany. Whereas in West
Germany, whose development was directed by the United States,
Britain, and France, a government took office the representatives of
which do not conceal their hatred for the Soviet Union and often
openly advertise the similarity of their aspirations to the plans of the
Hitlerite aggressors, in East Germany a government was formed
which has irrevocably broken with Germany's aggressive past. State

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and public affairs in the German Democratic Republic are governed by a constitution fully in keeping with the principles of the Potsdam Agreement and the finest progressive traditions of the German nation. The rule of monopolies and Junkers has been abolished forever in the GDR. Naziism has been eradicated and a number of other social and economic reforms have been carried out, which have destroyed the basis for the revival of militarism and have made the German Democratic Republic an important factor of peace in Europe. The Government of the GDR has solemnly proclaimed that it will fulfill, to the letter, its commitments under the Potsdam Agreement, which, incidentally, the Government of the FRG obstinately evades.

The inclusion of the FRG in the North Atlantic bloc compelled the Soviet Union to adopt countermeasures, in as much as the commitments binding the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France were broken by the Three Western Powers, which united with West Germany, and previously with Italy, against the Soviet Union, which had borne the brunt of the struggle against the Fascist aggressors. That closed military alignment created an equal threat to other countries as well. Such a situation compelled the Soviet Union, as well as a number of other European countries that were victims of aggression by German and Italian Fascism, to establish their own defensive organization, concluding for this purpose the Warsaw Treaty, to which the GDR also acceded.

There is only one conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing: The Potsdam Agreement has been grossly violated by the Western Powers. It is like the trunk of a tree, once mighty and fruitful, but now cut down and with its heart taken out. The lofty goals for which the Potsdam Agreement was concluded have long since been renounced by the Western Powers, and what they are actually doing in Germany is diametrically opposed to what the Potsdam Agreement had envisaged. The crux of the matter is not, of course, that the social and political systems of the GDR and the FRG are basically different. The Soviet Government considers that the solution of the question of social structure of both German states is the concern of the Germans themselves. The Soviet Union stands for complete noninterference in the internal affairs of the German people, or in those of any other people. But the GDR's movement towards socialism has given rise to the enmity and profound hostility of the Federal Government toward it—which finds full support and encouragement by the NATO members, and, above all, the United States.

The Government of the FRG, encouraged by the Western Powers, is systematically fanning the “cold war,” and its leaders have repeatedly stated that the FRG would pursue the policy “from a position of strength,” i.e., a policy of dictation to the other German

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state. Thus, the Government of the FRG does not want a peaceful unification of the German people, who are living in two states under different social systems, but is nurturing plans for abolishing the GDR and strengthening at the latter's expense its own militaristic state.

The Soviet Government fully understands the position of the German Democratic Republic, which does not want to see the democratic and social gains of the German working people destroyed, the property of capitalists and landlords restored, the land, plants, and factories taken away from the people, and the GDR subjected to a militarist regime. The recent elections for the People's Chamber and local bodies of the German Democratic Republic are yet another striking indication that the population of the GDR unanimously supports the policy of its Government, which is aimed at preserving peace and reuniting Germany on a peaceful and democratic basis, and is fully determined to defend its Socialist gains. The Soviet Union expresses complete solidarity with the GDR, which is firmly defending its lawful rights.

If one is to face the truth, one should recognize that other countries are not too eager either to support the plans of the Government of the FRG for unifying Germany by force. And this is understandable, since peoples including those of France and Great Britain, are still smarting from the wounds inflicted on them by Hitlerite Germany.

Traces of the last war are far from erased from French towns and villages. The ruins left in the capital and in many cities of Great Britain after the bombings by Nazi planes have not yet been removed, and millions of Britons cannot forget the tragic fate of Coventry. The peoples that were subjected to occupation by the Hitlerite army fully understand these feelings. They lost millions of men and women, killed or tortured to death, and saw thousands of cities destroyed and villages burned on their soil. The Soviet people will never forget what happened to Stalingrad, nor will the Poles ever forget the fate of Warsaw, nor the Czechoslovak people that of Lidice. American families also came to know the grief of losing their kith and kin. Germany twice unleashed world wars and in both cases dragged into them the United States of America, whose sons were compelled to shed their blood in lands thousands of miles away from American shores.

Mindful of all this, the peoples cannot and will not permit the unification of Germany on a militaristic basis.

There is another program for uniting Germany, which is advocated by the German Democratic Republic. This is a program for uniting Germany as a peace-loving and democratic state, and it cannot fail

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to be welcomed by the peoples. There is but one way to put it into effect, that is, through agreement and contacts between the two German states and through the establishment of a German confederation. The implementation of this proposal would, without affecting the social structures of the GDR and the FRG, direct into the single channel of a peaceful policy the efforts of their governments and parliaments and would ensure a gradual rapprochement and merger of the two German states.

The Soviet Union, as well as other states interested in strengthening the peace in Europe, supports the proposals of the German Democratic Republic for the peaceful unification of Germany. The Government of the USSR regrets that none of the efforts made in this direction has as yet produced any positive results, since the governments of the United States and other NATO members, and, above all, the Government of the FRG, do not, in fact, display any concern either for the conclusion of a peace treaty or for the unification of Germany.

Consequently, the policy pursued by the United States, Great Britain, and France, directed as it is toward the militarization of West Germany and toward involving it in the military bloc of the Western Powers, has also prevented the enforcement of those provisions of the Potsdam Agreement that pertain to Germany's unity.

Actually, of all the Allied agreements on Germany,¹ only one is being carried out today. It is the agreement on the so-called quadripartite status of Berlin. On the basis of that status, the Three Western Powers are ruling the roost in West Berlin, turning it into a kind of state within a state and using it as a center from which to pursue subversive activity against the GDR, the Soviet Union, and the other parties to the Warsaw Treaty. The United States, Great Britain, and France are freely communicating with West Berlin through lines of communication passing through the territory and the airspace of the German Democratic Republic, which they do not even want to recognize.

The governments of the Three Powers are seeking to keep in force the long-since obsolete part of the wartime agreements that governed the occupation of Germany and entitled them in the past to stay in Berlin. At the same time, as stated above, the Western Powers have grossly violated the Four-Power agreements, including the Potsdam Agreement, which is the most concentrated expression of the obligations of the Powers with respect to Germany. Moreover, the Four-Power agreements on the occupation of Germany, which the governments of the USA, Great Britain, and France invoke in support of their rights in West Berlin, were approved by the Potsdam Agreement

¹ For texts of agreements, see 86th Cong., 1st sess., *Documents on Germany, 1944-1959* (printed for use of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).

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or adopted for its implementation. In other words, the Three Powers are demanding, for their own sake, the preservation of the occupation privileges based on those Four-Power agreements, which they themselves have violated.

If the USA, Great Britain, and France are indeed staying in Berlin by virtue of the right stemming from the aforementioned international agreements and, primarily, from the Potsdam Agreement, this implies their duty to abide by these agreements. Those who have grossly violated these agreements have lost the right to maintain their occupation regime in Berlin or any other part of Germany. Furthermore, is it possible to insist on the occupation regime being maintained in Germany or in any part thereof for more than 13 years after the end of the war? For, any occupation is an event of limited duration, which is expressly stipulated in the Four-Power agreements on Germany.

It is well known that the conventional way to put an end to occupation is for the parties that were at war to conclude a peace treaty offering the defeated country the conditions necessary for the re-establishment of normal life.

The fact that Germany still has no peace treaty is the fault primarily of the governments of the USA, Britain, and France, which have never seemed to be in sympathy with the idea of drafting such a treaty. It is known that the governments of the Three Powers reacted negatively to every approach the Soviet Government has made to them regarding the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany.

At present, the USA, Great Britain, and France are opposed, as follows from their notes of September 30 of this year, to the latest proposals for a peaceful settlement with Germany put forward by the Soviet Union and the GDR, while making no proposals of their own on this question, just as they have made none throughout the postwar period. As a matter of fact, the last note of the US Government is a restatement of the position that proved to be utterly unrealistic, whereby Germany's national unity is to be re-established by the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, and France rather than by the German states that are to unite. It also follows from the US Government's note that it is once again avoiding negotiations with the Soviet Union and the other interested states for the purpose of preparing a peace treaty with Germany. The result is a veritable vicious circle: The US Government is objecting to the drafting of a German peace treaty by referring to the absence of a united German state while at the same time hampering the reunification of Germany by rejecting the only real possibility of solving this problem through agreement between the two German states.

Is it not because the Western Powers would like to prolong indefinitely their privileges in West Germany and the occupation regime

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in West Berlin that they take this position on the question of drafting
a peace treaty? It is becoming increasingly clear that such is the
actual state of affairs.

The Soviet Government reaffirms its readiness to participate at any
time in negotiations to draft a peace treaty with Germany. However,
the absence of a peace treaty can by no means be an excuse now for
attempting to maintain the occupation regime anywhere in Germany.

The occupation period in Germany has long since become a thing
of the past and any attempts to prevent the disappearance of special
rights of foreign powers in Germany are becoming a dangerous anach-
ronism. The occupation regime in Germany has never been an end
in itself. It was established to help the healthy forces of the German
nation to build their own new peace-loving and democratic state on
the ruins of a militaristic Germany.

Desirous of living in peace and friendship with the entire German
people, the Soviet Union has established and is maintaining normal
diplomatic relations with both German states. Close friendly rela-
tions bind the Soviet Union to the German Democratic Republic.
These relations were embodied in the treaty concluded between the
Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic on September 20,
1955. In accordance with this treaty, relations between the two states
are based on complete equality of rights, respect for each other's
sovereignty, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. The
Soviet Government proceeds from the same principles in its relations
with the other German state—the Federal Republic of Germany.

On their part, the governments of the USA, Great Britain, and
France proclaimed an end to the occupation regime in the territory of
the FRG, which had been under their control and administration,
when they signed the Paris agreements. The Four-Power status of
Berlin came into being because Berlin, as the capital of Germany, was
designated as the seat of the Control Council established for Germany's
administration during the initial period of occupation. This status
has been scrupulously observed by the Soviet Union up to the present
time, although the Control Council ceased to exist as early as ten years
ago and there have been two capitals in Germany for a long time. As
for the USA, Great Britain, and France, they have chosen to abuse in
a flagrant manner their occupation rights in Berlin and have exploited
the Four-Power status of the city for their own purposes to the detri-
ment of the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and the
other Socialist countries.

At one time, the agreement on the Four-Power status of Berlin
was an agreement providing for equal rights of the Four Powers,
which was concluded for peaceful democratic purposes, which pur-
poses later became known as the Potsdam principles. At that time,

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this agreement met the requirements of the day and was in accordance
with the interests of all its signatories—the USSR, the USA, Great
Britain, and France. Now that the Western Powers have begun to
arm West Germany and turn it into an instrument of their policy
directed against the Soviet Union, the very essence of this erstwhile
Allied agreement on Berlin has disappeared. It was violated by three
of its signatories, who began using it against the fourth signatory,
i.e., against the Soviet Union. It would be ridiculous to expect that
in such a situation the Soviet Union or any other self-respecting
state in its place would pretend not to notice the changes that have
occurred.

An obviously absurd situation has thus arisen, in which the Soviet
Union seems to be supporting and maintaining favorable conditions
for the Western Powers in their activities against the Soviet Union
and its Allies under the Warsaw Treaty.

It is obvious that the Soviet Union, just as the other parties to the
Warsaw Treaty, cannot tolerate such a situation any longer. For the
occupation regime in West Berlin to continue would be tantamount
to recognizing something like a privileged position of the NATO
countries, for which there is, of course, no reason whatsoever.

It is hardly possible seriously to believe that the Soviet Union will
help the forces of aggression to develop subversive activities, much
less to prepare an attack on Socialist countries. It should be clear
for anybody with common sense that the Soviet Union cannot main-
tain a situation in West Berlin that is detrimental to its lawful
interests, its security, and the security of other Socialist countries.
It would be well to bear in mind that the Soviet Union is not a Jordan
or an Iran and will never tolerate any methods of pressure upon it
for the purpose of imposing conditions advantageous to the opposing
NATO military bloc. But this is precisely what the Western Powers
are trying to get the Soviet Union to endorse in their attempts to
retain their rights of occupants in West Berlin.

Can the Soviet Union disregard all these facts, which affect the
vital security interests of the Soviet Union, of its ally—the German
Democratic Republic—and of all the member states of the Warsaw
Defense Treaty? Of course not! The Soviet Government can no
longer consider itself bound by that part of the Allied agreements
on Germany that has assumed an inequitable character and is being
used for the purpose of maintaining the occupation regime in West
Berlin and interfering in the internal affairs of the GDR.

In this connection, the Government of the USSR hereby notifies
the United States Government that the Soviet Union regards as null
and void the "Protocol of the Agreement between the Governments
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of

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America, and the United Kingdom on the zones of occupation in Germany and on the administration of Greater Berlin," of September 12, 1944, and the related supplementary agreements, including the agreement on the control machinery in Germany, concluded between the governments of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, and France on May 1, 1945, i.e., the agreements that were intended to be in effect during the first years after the capitulation of Germany.¹

It is easy to see that all the Soviet Government is doing by making this statement is to recognize the actual state of affairs, which consists in the fact that the USA, Great Britain, and France have long since rejected the essentials of the treaties and agreements concluded during the war against Hitler Germany and after its defeat. The Soviet Government is doing no more than drawing conclusions that inevitably ensue for the Soviet Union from this actual state of affairs.

Pursuant to the foregoing and proceeding from the principle of respect for the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Government will enter into negotiations with the Government of the GDR at an appropriate time with a view to transferring to the German Democratic Republic the functions temporarily performed by the Soviet authorities by virtue of the above-mentioned Allied agreements and under the agreement between the USSR and the GDR of September 20, 1955. The best way to solve the Berlin problem would undoubtedly be to adopt a decision based on the enforcement of the Potsdam Agreement on Germany. But this is possible only in the event that the three Western Powers return to a policy in German affairs that would be pursued jointly with the USSR and in conformity with the spirit and principles of the Potsdam Agreement. In the present circumstances this would mean the withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Germany from NATO with the simultaneous withdrawal of the German Democratic Republic from the Warsaw Treaty [organization], and an agreement whereby, in accordance with the principles of the Potsdam Agreement, neither of the two German states would have any armed forces except those needed to maintain law and order at home and guard the frontiers.

Should the Government of the United States be unwilling to contribute in such a way to the implementation of the political principles of the Allied agreements on Germany, it will have no reason, either legal or moral, for insisting on the preservation of the Four-Power status of Berlin. Some ill-wishers of the Soviet Union may of course try to interpret the position of the Soviet Government in the question of the occupation regime in Berlin as the striving for some sort of

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-8, 10-12. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3070, 3071.

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annexation. It goes without saying that such an interpretation has
nothing in common with reality. The Soviet Union, just as the other
Socialist states, has no territorial claims. In its policy, it is firmly
guided by the principle of condemning annexation, i.e., the seizure of
foreign territories and forced annexation of foreign peoples. This
principle was proclaimed by Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, as
far back as the first days of Soviet power in Russia.

The USSR does not seek any conquests. All it wants is to put an
end to the abnormal and dangerous situation that has developed in
Berlin because of the continued occupation of its western sectors by
the USA, Great Britain, and France.

An independent solution to the Berlin problem must be found in the
very near future since the Western Powers refuse to take part in the
preparation of a peace treaty with Germany and the Government of
the FRG, supported by the same powers, is pursuing a policy hamper-
ing the unification of Germany. It is necessary to prevent West
Berlin from being used any longer as a springboard for intensive
espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities against Socialist
countries, the GDR, and the USSR or, to quote the leaders of the
United States Government, to prevent its being used for "indirect
aggression" against the countries of the Socialist camp.

Essentially speaking, the only interest the United States, Great
Britain and France have in West Berlin consists in using this "front-
line city," as it is vociferously called in the West, as a vantage point
from which to carry on hostile activities against the socialist countries.
The Western powers gain nothing else from their stay in Berlin as
occupants. The ending of the illegal occupation of West Berlin
would cause no harm whatever, either to the United States or to Great
Britain or France. It would, on the other hand, substantially im-
prove the international atmosphere in Europe and set peoples' minds
at rest in all countries.

On the contrary, the Western powers' insistence on continuing their
occupation of West Berlin would lead to the conclusion that the matter
is not confined to "indirect aggression" against the GDR and the
Soviet Union, and that some other plans are apparently being kept
in view for an even more dangerous use of West Berlin.

The Soviet Government makes this approach to the Government
of the USA, guided by the desire to achieve a relaxation of interna-
tional tension; to put an end to the state of "cold war" and pave the
way for the restoration of good relations between the Soviet Union
and the United States, as well as Great Britain and France; to clear
away everything that gives rise to clashes and quarrels between our
countries; and to reduce the number of causes leading to conflicts.
Indeed, one cannot escape the fact that West Berlin, in its present

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status, is just such a source of discord and suspicion between our countries.

Of course, the most correct and natural way to solve the problem would be for the western part of Berlin, now actually detached from the GDR, to be reunited with its eastern part and for Berlin to become a unified city within the state in whose territory it is situated.

However, the Soviet Government, taking into account the present unrealistic policy of the USA as well as of Great Britain and France with respect to the German Democratic Republic, cannot but foresee the difficulties the Western powers have in contributing to such a solution of the Berlin problem. At the same time, it is guided by the concern that the process of liquidating the occupation regime may not involve any painful break in the established way of life of the West Berlin population.

One cannot of course fail to take into account the fact that the political and economic development of West Berlin during the period of its occupation by the three Western powers has progressed in a different direction from the development of East Berlin and the GDR, as a result of which the way of life in the two parts of Berlin are at the present time entirely different. The Soviet Government considers that when the foreign occupation is ended the population of West Berlin must be granted the right to have whatever way of life it wishes for itself. If the inhabitants of West Berlin desire to preserve the present way of life, based on private capitalistic ownership, that is up to them. The USSR, for its part, would respect any choice of the West Berliners in this matter.

In view of all these considerations, the Soviet Government on its part would consider it possible to solve the West Berlin question at the present time by the conversion of West Berlin into an independent political unit—a free city, without any state, including both existing German states, interfering in its life. Specifically, it might be possible to agree that the territory of the free city be demilitarized and that no armed forces be contained therein. The free city, West Berlin, could have its own government and run its own economic, administrative, and other affairs.

The Four Powers which shared in the administration of Berlin after the war could, as well as both of the German states, undertake to respect the status of West Berlin as a free city, just as was done, for instance, by the Four Powers with respect to the neutral status which was adopted by the Austrian Republic.¹

For its part, the Soviet Government would have no objection to the United Nations also sharing, in one way or other, in observing the free-city status of West Berlin.

¹ See *The Austrian State Treaty* (Department of State publication 6437).

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It is obvious that, considering the specific position of West Berlin, which lies within the territory of the GDR and is cut off from the outside world, the question would arise of some kind of arrangement with the German Democratic Republic concerning guarantees of unhindered communications between the free city and the outside world—both to the East and to the West—with the object of free movement of passenger and freight traffic. In its turn West Berlin would undertake not to permit on its territory any hostile subversive activity directed against the GDR or any other state.

The above-mentioned solution of the problem of West Berlin's status would be an important step toward normalizing the situation in Berlin, which, instead of being a hotbed of unrest and tension, could become a center for contacts and cooperation between both parts of Germany in the interest of her peaceful future and the unity of the German nation.

The establishment of free-city status for West Berlin would firmly ensure the development of West Berlin's economy, due to its contacts on all sides with the states of the East and the West, and would ensure a decent standard of living for the city's population. For its part, the Soviet Union states that it would contribute in every way toward the achievement of these ends, in particular by placing orders for industrial goods and amounts that would fully ensure the stability and prosperity of the free city's economy, and by regular deliveries on a commercial basis of the necessary quantities of raw materials and food stuffs to West Berlin. Thus, by the liquidation of the occupation regime, not only would the more than two million people of West Berlin not be harmed but on the contrary they would have every opportunity to raise their living standard.

In case the Government of the USA and the governments of Great Britain and France express their agreement to consider the question of liquidating the present occupation regime in West Berlin by setting up a free city within its territory, the Soviet government would be willing on behalf of the Four Powers to enter into official contact on this matter with the government of the German Democratic Republic, with which it has already had preliminary consultations prior to the sending of the present note.

Naturally, it would also be realized that the GDR's agreement to set up on its territory such an independent political organism as a free city of West Berlin would be a concession, a definite sacrifice on the part of the GDR for the sake of strengthening peace in Europe, and for the sake of the national interest of the German people as a whole.

The Soviet Government, guided by a desire to normalize the situation in Berlin in the interest of European peace and in the interest of a peaceful and independent development of Germany, has resolved to

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effect measures on its part designed to liquidate the occupation regime in Berlin. It hopes that the Government of the USA will show a proper understanding of these motives and make a realistic approach to the Berlin question.

At the same time, the Soviet Government is prepared to enter into negotiations with the governments of the United States of America and with those of the other states concerned on granting West Berlin the status of a demilitarized free city. In case this proposal is not acceptable to the government of the USA then there will no longer remain any topic for negotiations between the former occupying powers on the Berlin question.

The Soviet Government seeks to have the necessary change in Berlin's situation take place in a cold atmosphere, without haste and unnecessary friction, with maximum possible consideration for the interests of the parties concerned. Obviously, a certain period of time will be necessary for the powers which occupied Germany after the defeat of Hitler's Wehrmacht to agree on proclaiming West Berlin a free city provided, naturally, that the Western powers display due interest in this proposal.

It should also be taken into consideration that the necessity may arise for talks between the municipal authorities of both parts of Berlin and also between the GDR and the FRG to settle any questions that may arise. In view of this, the Soviet Government proposes to make no changes in the present procedure for military traffic of the USA, Great Britain, and France from West Berlin to the FRG for half a year. It regards such a period as fully sufficient to provide a sound basis for the solution of the questions connected with the change in Berlin's situation and to prevent a possibility of any complications, provided, naturally, that the governments of the Western powers do not deliberately seek such complications. During the above-mentioned period the parties will have an opportunity to prove in practice their desire to ease international tension by settling the Berlin question.

If the above-mentioned period is not utilized to reach an adequate agreement, the Soviet Union will then carry out the planned measures through an agreement with the GDR. It is envisaged that the German Democratic Republic, like any other independent state, must fully deal with questions concerning its space, i.e., exercise its sovereignty on land, on water, and in the air. At the same time, there will terminate all contacts still maintained between representatives of the armed forces and other officials of the Soviet Union in Germany and corresponding representatives of the armed forces and other officials of the USA, Great Britain, and France on questions pertaining to Berlin.

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Voices are raised in the capitals of some Western powers that those powers do not recognize the Soviet Union's decision to relinquish its part in the maintenance of the occupation status in Berlin. But how can one place the question on such a level? He who today speaks of nonrecognition of the steps planned by the Soviet Union obviously would like to talk with the latter not in the language of reason and well-founded arguments but in the language of brute force, forgetting that the Soviet people are not affected by threats and intimidation. If behind the words about "nonrecognition" there really lies the intention to resort to force and drag the world into a war over Berlin, the advocates of such a policy should realize that they assume a very grave responsibility for all its consequences before all nations and before history. Those who indulge in sabre-rattling in connection with the situation in Berlin are once again betraying their interests in preserving for aggressive purposes the occupation regime in Berlin.

The Government of the Soviet Union would like to hope that the problem of normalizing the situation in Berlin, which life itself raises before our states as a natural necessity, will in any case be solved in accordance with considerations of statesmanship, the interests of peace between peoples, without the unnecessary nervous strain and intensification of a "cold war."

Methods of blackmail and reckless threats of force will be least of all appropriate in solving such a problem as the Berlin question. Such methods will not help solve a single question, but can only bring the situation to the danger point. But only madmen can go to the length of unleashing another world war over the preservation of privileges of occupiers in West Berlin. If such madmen should really appear, there is no doubt that strait jackets could be found for them. If the statesmen responsible for the policy of the Western powers are guided by feelings of hatred for communism and the socialist countries in their approach to the Berlin question as well as other international problems, no good will come out of it. Neither the Soviet Union nor any other small socialist state can or will deny its existence precisely as a socialist state. That is why, having united in an unbreakable fraternal alliance, they firmly stand in defense of their rights and their state frontiers, acting according to the motto—one for all and all for one. Any violation of the frontiers of the German Democratic Republic, Poland, or Czechoslovakia, any aggressive action against any member state of the Warsaw Treaty will be regarded by all its participants as an act of aggression against them all and will immediately cause appropriate retaliation.

The Soviet Government believes that it would be sensible to recognize the situation prevailing in the world and to create normal relations for the co-existence of all states, to develop international trade,

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to build relations between our countries on the basis of the well-known principles of mutual respect for one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in one another's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit.

The Soviet Union and its people and government are sincerely striving for the restoration of good relations with the United States of America, relations based on trust, which are quite feasible as shown by the experience in the joint struggle against the Hitlerite aggressors, and which in peacetime would hold out to our countries nothing but the advantages of mutually enriched spiritual and material cooperation between our peoples, and to all other people the blessings of a tranquil life under conditions of an enduring peace.

Communiqué by the Foreign Ministers of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, December 14, 1958¹

The Foreign Ministers of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States met on December 14, 1958 in Paris to discuss developments in the Berlin situation during the past month, including notes addressed to their several governments on November 27 by the Soviet Union. The four Foreign Ministers had the benefit of an oral statement on the situation in Berlin by Herr Brandt, Governing Mayor of that city.

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States once more reaffirmed the determination of their governments to maintain their position and their rights with respect to Berlin including the right of free access.

They found unacceptable a unilateral repudiation by the Soviet Government of its obligations to the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in relation to their presence in Berlin and the freedom of access to that city or the substitution of the German authorities of the Soviet Zone for the Soviet Government insofar as those rights are concerned.

After further discussion of the Soviet notes of November 27, 1958 the four Foreign Ministers found themselves in agreement on the

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 29, 1958, pp. 1041-1042. The Foreign Ministers were Maurice Couve de Murville, France; Heinrich von Brentano, Federal Republic of Germany; Selwyn Lloyd, United Kingdom; and John Foster Dulles, United States.

544645—60—23

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basic issues to be dealt with in the replies to those notes. They will consult with their allies in the NATO Council, following which the four governments will formulate their replies.

## North Atlantic Council Declaration on Berlin, December 16, 1958¹

1. The North Atlantic Council examined the question of Berlin.

2. The Council declares that no state has the right to withdraw unilaterally from its international engagements. It considers that the denunciation by the Soviet Union of the interallied agreements on Berlin can in no way deprive the other parties of their rights or relieve the Soviet Union of its obligations. Such methods destroy the mutual confidence between nations which is one of the foundations of peace.

3. The Council fully associates itself with the views expressed on the subject by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany in their statement of 14th December.

4. The demands expressed by the Soviet Government have created a serious situation which must be faced with determination.

5. The Council recalls the responsibilities which each member state has assumed in regard to the security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the three powers in that city. The member states of NATO could not approve a solution of the Berlin question which jeopardized the right of the three Western powers to remain in Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it, and did not assure freedom of communication between that city and the free world. The Soviet Union would be responsible for any action which had the effect of hampering this free communication or endangering this freedom. The two million inhabitants of West Berlin have just reaffirmed in a free vote their overwhelming approval and support for that position.

6. The Council considers that the Berlin question can only be settled in the framework of an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on Germany as a whole. It recalls that the Western powers have repeatedly declared themselves ready to examine this problem, as well as those of European security and disarmament. They are still ready to discuss all these problems.

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4.

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Note From the United States to the Soviet Union on
Germany and the Berlin Situation, December 31,
1958¹

The Government of the United States acknowledges the note which was addressed to it by the Government of the USSR under date of November 27.

The note contains a long elaboration on the events which preceded and followed the last war. It attempts to portray the Western Powers—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as supporters of Hitlerism as against the Soviet Union. This portrayal is in sharp contrast with the actual facts. In this connection we refer to the contemporaneous statement made by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 31, 1939. In that statement he refers, among other things, to the "conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23" and points out "we now had a rapprochement and the establishment of friendly relations between the USSR and Germany". The statement goes on to assail the British and French Governments for their opposition to Hitlerism in the following language:

> "The ruling circles of Britain and France have been lately attempting to depict themselves as champions of the democratic rights of nations against Hitlerism, and the British Government has announced that its aim in the war with Germany is nothing more nor less than the 'destruction of Hitlerism' . . . everybody will understand that an ideology cannot be destroyed by force, that it cannot be eliminated by war. It is therefore not only senseless, but criminal to wage such a war—a war for the 'destruction of Hitlerism' camouflaged as a fight for 'democracy'."²

The situation of Berlin of which the Soviet Government complains and which it considers abnormal is a result of the very nature of the German problem such as it has existed since 1945. When the empire of Hitler collapsed the Western Allies were in military possession of more than one-third of what subsequently was occupied by the Soviet authorities.

The Soviet Union was in possession of Berlin. On the basis of the agreements of September 12, 1944 and May 1, 1945, the Western

¹Text from Department of State press release 781, Dec. 31, 1958.

² For extracts from Molotov's speech, see *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (selected and edited by Jane Degras for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1953), vol. III, 1933-1941, pp. 388-400.

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Allies withdrew, thereby permitting a Soviet occupation of large parts of Mecklenburg, Saxony, Thuringia and Anhalt, and concurrently, the three Western Powers occupied the western sectors in Berlin, then an area of rubble.

The Soviet Union has directly and through its puppet regime—the so-called German Democratic Republic—consolidated its hold over the large areas which the Western Allies relinquished to it. It now demands that the Western Allies should relinquish the positions in Berlin which in effect were the *quid pro quo*.

The three Western Powers are there as occupying powers and they are not prepared to relinquish the rights which they acquired through victory just as they assume the Soviet Union is not willing now to restore to the occupancy of the Western Powers the position which they had won in Mecklenburg, Saxony, Thuringia and Anhalt and which, under the agreements of 1944 and 1945, they turned over for occupation by the Soviet Union.

The agreements made by the Four Powers cannot be considered obsolete because the Soviet Union has already obtained the full advantage therefrom and now wishes to deprive the other parties of their compensating advantages. These agreements are binding upon all of the signatories so long as they have not been replaced by others following free negotiations.

Insofar as the Potsdam agreement is concerned, the status of Berlin does not depend upon that agreement. Moreover, it is the Soviet Union that bears responsibility for the fact that the Potsdam agreement could not be implemented.

The Soviet memorandum purports formally to repudiate the agreements of September 12, 1944 and May 1, 1945. This repudiation in fact involves other and more recent engagements. We refer in this connection to the Four Power agreement of June 20, 1949 whereby, among other things, the Soviet Union assumed "an obligation" to assure the normal functioning of transport and communication between Berlin and the Western Zones of Germany. This "obligation" the Soviet Union now purports to shed. The United States also refers to the "summit" agreement of July 23, 1955 whereby the Four Powers recognized "their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question", a phrase which necessarily includes the problem of Berlin.¹ Apparently the Soviet Union now attempts to free itself from these agreed responsibilities and obligations.

The United States Government cannot prevent the Soviet Government from announcing the termination of its own authority in the

¹ For texts, see 86th Cong., 1st sess, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1959* (printed for use of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).

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quadripartite regime in the sector which it occupies in the city of Berlin. On the other hand, the Government of the United States will not and does not, in any way, accept a unilateral denunciation of the accords of 1944 and 1945; nor is it prepared to relieve the Soviet Union from the obligations which it assumed in June, 1949. Such action on the part of the Soviet Government would have no legal basis, since the agreements can only be terminated by mutual consent. The Government of the United States will continue to hold the Soviet Government directly responsible for the discharge of its obligations undertaken with respect to Berlin under existing agreements. As the Soviet Government knows, the French, British and United States Governments have the right to maintain garrisons in their sectors of Berlin and to have free access thereto. Certain administrative procedures have been agreed with the Soviet authorities accordingly and are in operation at the present time. The Government of the United States will not accept a unilateral repudiation on the part of the Soviet Government of its obligations in respect of that freedom of access. Nor will it accept the substitution of the regime which the Soviet Government refers to as the German Democratic Republic for the Soviet Government in this respect.

In the view of the Government of the United States, there can be no "threat" to the Soviet Government or the regime which the Soviet Government refers to as the German Democratic Republic from the presence of the French, British and United States garrisons in Berlin. Nor can there be any military threat from Berlin to the Soviet Government and this regime. The forces of the three Western Powers in Berlin number about ten thousand men. The Soviet Government, on the other hand, is said to maintain some three hundred and fifty thousand troops in Eastern Germany, while the regime which the Soviet Government refers to as the German Democratic Republic is understood also to maintain over two hundred thousand men under arms. In these circumstances, the fear that the Western troops in Berlin may "inflict harm" appears to be wholly unfounded. If Berlin has become a focus of international tension, it is because the Soviet Government has deliberately threatened to disturb the existing arrangements at present in force there, arrangements to which the Soviet Government is itself a party. The inhabitants of West Berlin have recently reaffirmed in a free vote their overwhelming approval and support for the existing status of that city. The continued protection of the freedom of more than two million people of West Berlin is a right and responsibility solemnly accepted by the Three Western Powers. Thus the United States cannot consider any proposal which would have the effect of jeopardizing the freedom and security of these people. The rights of the Three Powers

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to remain in Berlin with unhindered communications by surface and air between that city and the Federal Republic of Germany are under existing conditions essential to the discharge of that right and responsibility. Hence the proposal for a so-called "free city" for West Berlin, as put forward by the Soviet Union, is unacceptable.

As is stated in the Soviet Government's note of November 27, it is certainly not normal that thirteen years after the end of the war there should still remain in a part of German territory a system of occupancy instituted in 1945. The United States deplores this fact and the fact that Germany has not yet been reunified so that Berlin might resume its rightful position as capital of a united Germany. If the treaty of peace, which alone can bring an end to this situation, has not been concluded with a reunited Germany, the responsibility in no way rests with the Three Western Powers which have not spared any effort to bring the Four Powers out of the impasse where they have so long found themselves. Pending the conclusion of a peace treaty, the present situation continues.

In reality, the form of government in Berlin, the validity of which the Soviet Government attempts to contest today, is only one aspect, and not the essential one, of the German problem in its entirety. This problem, which has often been defined, involves the well-known questions of reunification, European security, as well as a peace treaty. It has in the past been discussed without success in the course of numerous international meetings with the Soviets. The Government of the United States has always been and continues today to be ready to discuss it. The United States made clear this readiness in its note to the Soviet Union of September 30, 1958, in which it was stated:

> "The Government of the United States is ready at any time to enter into discussions with the Soviet Government on the basis of these proposals (i.e., the Western proposals for free all-German elections and free decisions for an all-German Government) or of any other proposals genuinely designed to insure the reunification of Germany in freedom, in any appropriate forum. It regards the solution of the German problem as essential if a lasting settlement in Europe is to be achieved".

The Soviet Union has not yet seen fit to reply to this note.

Public repudiation of solemn engagements, formally entered into and repeatedly reaffirmed, coupled with an ultimatum threatening unilateral action to implement that repudiation unless it be acquiesced in within six months, would afford no reasonable basis for negotiation between sovereign states. The Government of the United States could not embark on discussions with the Soviet Union upon these questions under menace or ultimatum; indeed, if that were in-

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tended, the United States would be obliged immediately to raise a protest in the strongest terms. Hence, it is assumed that this is not the purpose of the Soviet note of November 27 and that the Soviet Government, like itself, is ready to enter into discussions in an atmosphere devoid of coercion or threats.

On this basis, the United States Government would be interested to learn whether the Soviet Government is ready to enter into discussions between the Four Powers concerned. In that event, it would be the object of the Government of the United States to discuss the question of Berlin in the wider framework of negotiations for a solution of the German problem as well as that of European security. The United States Government would welcome the views of the Soviet Government at an early date.

## Note From the Soviet Union to the United States on the Problem of Germany, January 10, 1959¹

Unofficial translation

No. 1/OSA

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of the United States of America to that entirely abnormal situation which has arisen as a consequence of the delayed solution of one of the most important international postwar problems—the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

While with other states which participated in the Second World War on the side of Germany peace treaties have already long been concluded and their development has been established on an independent national basis, the German people still do not have a peace treaty, which deprives them of the possibility of realizing their state sovereignty in full measure and of becoming an equal member in the family of nations. Furthermore, foreign troops still continue to remain on the territory of Germany and in some of their units, for example in West Berlin, even an occupation regime is retained.

The delay of a peace settlement with Germany from year to year leaves unsettled many questions which affect the interests not only of Germany but also of countries which took part in the war against Germany. The lack of a peace treaty with Germany seriously worsens the situation in Europe, gives rise to suspicion and distrust in relations between states, (and) hinders the normalization of these relations.

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 9, 1959, pp. 333-337.

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It is impossible to ignore that, taking advantage of the absence of a peace treaty, in West Germany German militarism is again rising to its feet and collecting its forces. This cannot but disturb the Soviet people as well as other European peoples to whom militaristic Germany more than once has brought terrible calamities and sufferings. A peace treaty corresponding to the interests of the peaceful development of Germany would create the conditions necessary for terminating forever the repetition of the tragic events of the past when German militarists drew humanity into ruinous wars with coLOSSAL human and material losses.

Being true to the obligations it assumed in connection with Germany and considering the legitimate interests of the German people and of other European peoples, the Soviet Government during postwar years has repeatedly advanced proposals to the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France to work out and conclude a peace treaty with Germany. Unfortunately, the proposals of the U.S.S.R. relating to a peaceful settlement with Germany have not encountered a favorable attitude on the part of the Western powers, which have not only not advanced any of their own proposals whatever but also have not seriously desired to discuss this problem which has long been a pressing one. In addition, for many years there has been advanced by them one and the same thesis, that so-called free all-German elections should have alleged priority and that not the Germans ought to concern themselves with the question of the reunification of Germany but the four former occupation powers. This thesis has also appeared as the chief content of the notes of the Western powers of September 30, 1958 to which an exhaustive answer was given in the notes of the Soviet Government on the Berlin question of November 27, 1958.

If one does not beguile himself with illusions and looks truth in the eye, it is necessary to recognize that the reestablishment of the unity of Germany ought to go forward through a number of stages in the course of rapprochement between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. Today the beginning of that process can only be desired, the success of which however depends on the efforts of both German states. To reject the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany means to bring matters to a stage whereby the German people would have neither a peace treaty nor a unified national state. This would mean the preservation of the existing unacceptable situation creating the possibility that the Federal Republic of Germany will endeavor to impose on the German Democratic Republic an internal system on its model. But in this case the German Democratic Republic in its turn would rightly raise the question of changes in

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the result of an ultimatum timed to expire in May. We are dealing
with a negotiation in July. In these negotiations the Foreign Secretary has shown great skill and patience, and I think that the right hon. Gentleman's references to him were singularly ungenerous. He has strengthened confidence among our Allies, but a confidence which is based upon mutual understanding. We have a united Western position and we are determined to remain united on essentials. We are determined equally to be able to distinguish between firmness and obstinacy. That is the theme of our position in the West today.

I need deal only with one or two points which have been covered already. Within a few weeks we shall see the outcome of this meeting. There it is; it is a very critical moment. I have never hoped that it would solve all these questions, but I did hope, and I still hope, that it will reduce the matters in dispute into a manageable compass, and present them in such a way that the remaining points can be presented and considered by a meeting of heads of Government. If the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale is right in his analysis of the Soviet position—and of course we have to take into account Mr. Khrushchev's speeches as well as Mr. Gromyko's statements—this should not present an impossible task.

The right hon. Gentleman made many references to the question of European security. We have been asked what our plans are, and why no progress has been made. We put forward a plan at the beginning of the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva. It was a comprehensive plan, which covered the whole process of settling and pacifying Central Europe—and was none the worse for that. It included provision for discussing a zone of limitation of armaments. This plan still represents the Western position. I wish we could make progress with it, but we cannot hope to do so until the immediate question of Berlin has been disposed of. We cannot make progress without that.

The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition objected that this was a package deal, and that we were not prepared to deal with the points individually. Curiously enough, that is what we have been doing for five weeks. The first point to be settled in the package deal is the Berlin problem, and when we have disposed of that no doubt we shall be able then to pass on to the next. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] The proof of the pudding is in the eating. The trouble is that the first chapter of the package has taken a long time.

Mr. Gaitskell rose—

*The Prime Minister: We will get on. Never mind. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be pleased when we do.*

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I now want to say something about the Summit. Some people assume it must take place, and others that it cannot. Some people seem to regard it as an end in itself and others, more reasonably, as a means to an end. I have always hoped it would take place, for two reasons. Incidentally, I was attacked by the hon. Member for Attercliffe who asked why we had suddenly got interested in the Summit. I attended a Summit Conference four years ago. This is not a new conversion to the idea of a Summit meeting. I am in favour of it because I think that certain decisions can be taken only by a meeting with Mr. Khrushchev, and it may be that the Berlin question is one.

This will be a first step, and we can then get on to the great questions which lie behind. But if it is the first step it may be that it can be taken effectively only at the Summit. My second reason—and I do not claim that everyone would agree—is that such a meeting, if conducted rather on the lines of the recent Foreign Ministers' meetings, would be of great value in itself. I will tell the House frankly that I believe the failure of the 1955 Summit Conference was that there were far too many plenary sessions and far too few private talks and negotiations. These discussions have been conducted under a quite different method and a considerable advance has been made as a result of the different procedure. I think that there is an advantage in that meeting of the heads of Governments and, in the case of the United States, one who is also a head of State.

On the Western side we meet continually. We make journeys and see each other, but there is a kind of gulf fixed between East and West. It was partly for that purpose that I undertook this journey to Moscow,¹ which I think has been worth while. For the same reason, I would welcome another Summit meeting taking place by the methods I have described. I would hope that we might be able to give the answers to those Governments immediately concerned to the questions passed to us perhaps by the Geneva Conference on Berlin. We might be able to give the answers also, if they are ready for us, to some of the other questions from the nuclear discussions. That would clear away the first obstacle. Then we would probably be able to define the next target to be approached. Here the question of general disarmament is far the most hopeful, and that might follow the same processes of discussion, leading to other Summit meetings.

That is my answer to the right hon. Gentleman's proposal. I cannot promise anything to the House. I can only try my best. All of us have to work together as Allies. If only we could succeed in making this step, in reaching a solution, even a temporary solution,

¹ See joint communiqué of Mar. 3, 1959, ante.

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and a reduction of tension on the whole problem of Berlin, we could
immediately turn to those wider questions upon which, I agree with
the right hon. Gentleman, the whole future of the world must depend.

It is very easy to throw out all kinds of concepts and ideas when one
is not in the position of having to try to carry them out. I hope that
I shall not be thought cynical if I say that I do not think that Utopia
can be reached in a single bound. There are many points on which,
if we could begin to bridge the gap, we could make further progress.
Therefore, I would be very content if I could see the kind of develop-
ments which I have tried to describe to the House.

I recognise the dangers, although I think that they may be over-
estimated, of a great spread of nuclear power; but I think that the
first thing is that the three Powers themselves should at least set the
example of making an agreement upon tests. If that breaks down,
what hope have we of making by any gestures, something which will
appeal to all these other people? If it succeeds, we can proceed to
the problems of general disarmament. Then we can proceed both to
nuclear disarmament and to dealing with the manufacture and storing
of the plutonium, to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, and
trying to prevent the spread of nuclear power throughout the world.

I will be frank and say that I do not think that we can do anything
until we can make a start. When we have made a start, we can see
where we are and get on. It is easy to throw out these concepts, but
it is very difficult to carry them out. I say frankly that the journey
we have to go in this pilgrimage is likely to be a long one and it will
require patience as well as faith.

News Conference Statements by President Eisenhower,
July 8, 1959 ¹

[Extract]

Q. Mr. President, Averell Harriman reports that on June 23, Pre-
mier Khrushchev told him, "Your Generals talk of maintaining your
position in Berlin with force. That is bluff. If you sent in tanks,
they will burn and make no mistake about it. If you want war, you
can have it, but remember, it will be your war. Our rockets will fly
automatically." ²

¹ Text from White House news release, July 8, 1959.

² W. Averell Harriman had interviews with Premier Khrushchev at Moscow on June 23 and 24, 1959, which were widely reported in the press. An article by Harriman on his conversations appears in *Life* magazine of July 13, 1959.

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*What do you think of talk such as this?*

**The President:** Well, I don't think anything about it at all. I don't believe that responsible people should indulge in anything that can be even remotely considered ultimatums or threats. That is not the way to reach peaceful solutions.

Q. Mr. President, Mr. Harriman also reported that he thought it would be a good idea if Mr. Khrushchev were invited to the United States, to rid him of some of his misconceptions. I know we have talked about this before, but what do you think about an invitation to him at this time, inasmuch as Mr. Mikoyan and Mr. Kozlov have already come here?¹

**The President:** Well, here is something that I would never rule out of the realm of possibility. But we have, as I say, very tough questions to settle. We have to concert our positions with our friends and allies, so if this man were to be—make just a ceremonial visit, I'd say there it would be only a matter of his own, let's say, oh, reception would be the thing that would be important in the country.

Q. Mr. President, the Foreign Ministers are going to be back at Geneva again on Monday. I wonder if you could tell us if you see any change in the prospects of agreement on Berlin and thereby the possibilities of a summit, whether you have given Secretary Herter any new instructions this morning?

**The President:** Well, I think there has been no change in our attitude from that reported by Mr. Herter shortly after he returned from Geneva from his prior visit.

We continue to say that the firm position we have is that one—that of respecting our responsibilities and making certain that we retain our rights with respect to Berlin. From there on, and with that solid conviction as the unmovable stone in the whole structure, we

¹ Anastas Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., made an unofficial visit to the United States from Jan. 4 to 20, in the course of which he talked with Secretary of State Dulles on Jan. 5 and 16, with President Eisenhower on Jan. 17, and with Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon and Secretary of Commerce Lewis E. Strauss on Jan. 19. For comments on the Mikoyan visit, made by Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower at their news conferences of Jan. 13 and 21, respectively, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 2, 1959, p. 156, and White House news release of Jan. 21, 1959.

Frol R. Kozlov, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., visited the United States from June 28 to July 12, 1959. The occasion for his visit was to open the Soviet exhibition on Science, Technology, and Culture, held in New York. He met twice with the President and once with Secretary of State Herter. The President commented on Kozlov's visit at his news conferences of July 1 and 8, 1959 (see White House news releases).

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are ready to talk and discuss anything because we certainly do want to find some way of reaching a solution that will not keep the whole world on edge—well, for example, as evidenced by the number of questions that are properly brought up on this matter right here in meetings such as this. And, I concede that under the present conditions they are proper, and they are newsworthy. But we are trying to get to a place where that will be a little less than that, and we must do it in my opinion, if we are going to do a real service for the citizens of the world.

News Conference Statements by Secretary of State Herter,
July 9, 1959¹

[Extracts]

Q. Mr. Secretary, you are returning now to Geneva to resume your talks with Mr. Gromyko and the Western Ministers. Would you give us at this time your assessment of the possibility of reaching any worthwhile agreement on Berlin there and laying the groundwork for any summit conference please?

A. I am afraid I couldn't give that to you in terms of betting odds. We naturally don't know just what we will find at Geneva from the point of view of any change or any more explicit interpretation of what at the moment we are not certain about in the Russian position.

As you know, at midnight of the night on which we decided to recess, Mr. Gromyko put out a statement in Geneva ² which indicated that the position we had taken with respect to the last proposal made by the Soviets contained certain misinterpretations. However, our statement that we put out earlier in the day was based not only on the wording of the document but on Mr. Khrushchev's radio speech which had come over to us that same afternoon.³

Here in Washington I made a report to the nation a few days after our return and I think it was on June 28th that Mr. Gromyko saw fit to answer that particular statement.⁴ He took exception to some of the things I had said and we have been studying with great care the wording that he has used with respect to the exceptions that he has

¹ For complete text of the news conference, see Department of State press release 500, July 9, 1959; also in *Department of State Bulletin*, July 27, 1959, pp. 107-116.

² Statement of June 19; ante.

³ For excerpts, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959), pp. 316-328.

⁴ Ante, pp. 396-400 and 403-415.

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taken. In particular he objected to an assumption that we had made, and I think we probably made on the basis of evidence before us, that if we entered into any interim agreement with respect to Berlin and then resumed negotiations at the expiration of the term of that agreement, we would have forfeited our occupation rights. Mr. Gromyko indicated that was an entirely false assumption, and that otherwise they would not have suggested we would resume negotiations after a blank period of time. That is a new point on which we certainly would want some clarification.

The other point, which is very indefinite of course, is the one concerning their suggestion of an interim agreement, at first for a year and then one-and-a-half years. Both Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Khru-shchev made the statement that the period of time was neither a matter of importance or of principle. This presumably means the period of time is one for negotiation.

I think that we shall have to explore first of all, when we get back to Geneva, the meaning of those statements—if the meanings are as apparently intended by the Russians—but certainly not borne out by the earlier documents.

I think there is some possibility we might reach agreement. I dare say there is some possibility but we are not saying it with optimism. I have never been optimistic, as you know, about reaching a successful negotiation.

With respect to the summit conference, I think that was made amply clear by the President: Unless we can make progress which would justify such a conference, that he would not be willing to go.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in the event that your negotiations at Geneva are not successful, is there a fully agreed Allied plan on counter-measures to maintain our position in Berlin, if the Soviets take some unilateral action?*

A. That matter has been discussed for a considerable period of time and I would say that on the whole our position is well concerted.

*Q. Could you elaborate on that?*

A. No, I wouldn't go into details.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke of the absence of the German and the French Foreign Ministers. Have you been in consultation with Secretary Lloyd over the last several weeks?*

A. No, I haven't been in direct conversation with him at all. I have talked with the Ambassador once or twice here.

426

Q. Has there been contact between the President and Mr. Macmillan?

A. None direct, that I know of.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the lack of these contacts in the interim, plus a number of other items, including an interpretation by Mr. Macmillan which differed from ours on the progress of the first meeting, and the near crisis situation in some respects between our Government and France over nuclear armaments, taking these things cumulatively, how much are they likely to militate against a united front amongst the Western Allies at this second meeting?

A. Well, I assume that any family difficulties we have are always taken account of by the Russians. On the other hand, I can say this—I have said it before, and I want to repeat it: That in Geneva the united front was a genuine front, and I hope it is a front that will hold, and hold effectively. Both the process of consultation and the process of reaching agreement—and I mean genuine agreement—was very real, and to me very heartening.

Q. In that connection, sir, if I may, does it mean that the position of our Government is that we are willing to go to these meetings—I am not talking about the Summit now—on the Foreign Ministers' level, ad infinitum?

A. No; not necessarily. "Ad infinitum" is quite a long time. I think that if we feel we are making real progress, we will stick with them. If we feel that we are stymied and are making no further progress, we would be very frank about it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech I believe you said that Mr. Khrushchev had said that no item in the Western proposal package was negotiable. Have you had any reason to revise your opinion of that now?

A. No, that statement of Mr. Khrushchev's applied to our proposal, the 7-point proposal with regard to West Berlin, not to the initial Western peace plan. It was on that that he said that none of the seven points was subject to negotiation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the position the United States has taken with regard to the continuation of our rights in Berlin, how could these be modified at all in any new discussion, based on these latest remarks of Mr. Gromyko's?

A. Well, as I say, the remarks of Mr. Khrushchev, and those of Mr. Gromyko do not exactly jibe, and I think that our first respon-

427

sibility is to find out what the official position is. As you know, the remarks of Mr. Khrushchev were as reported in an interview, the remarks of Mr. Gromyko in documentary form, and I think that we have a definite responsibility to find out which represents the official Russian attitude.

*Q. Do you have any idea that the US might modify its position on the maintenance of its rights in Berlin?*

A. We have not indicated any such thing.

*Q. If the Russians withdraw their limitation on alleged—or proposed limitation on our rights in Berlin, does that qualify as the progress that is necessary to go on to the Summit? Or will we require some other further progress?*

A. Well, as you know, we hadn't come close to agreement. There are other elements, obviously, that have still got to be planed out, and when I mentioned this one particular attitude of the Russians, it doesn't necessarily mean that a satisfactory answer to that means a satisfactory agreement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if the Soviets did give a satisfactory answer on that point, would it be possible for the Western Powers then to join in negotiations on the basis of the Soviet proposal?*

A. Not necessarily. The Soviet proposal contains a number of things that I think you would realize, in view of our position, are objectionable to us. The Soviet proposal and our own proposals I think had only two or three things in common, that actually overlapped, from the point of view of points at issue. I would hope that we would return to negotiation on the basis of our proposals.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I am not clear from your remarks as to whether you are more optimistic now as to some agreement with the Soviets than you were after the negotiations recessed and you gave your television report to the nation.*

A. No, nothing has happened since. The only thing is the Gromyko statement I spoke of, that is the only thing that has intervened, and that is an important statement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would agreement on a reasonable agenda be enough at Geneva to take the two sides on to a Summit meeting?*

A. Well, that determination would be made elsewhere. I would not make that determination. A reasonable agenda might cover a lot of things. At a Summit meeting there is no way of stopping any

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head of state who is there from bringing up any subject he wants to
bring up. I am not at all sure how precise an agenda would be re-
quired, if any at all. The President has taken the same position con-
sistently, that if the developments were such in the present negotia-
tions that are going on to justify a Summit conference, he will be
glad to go to it.

*Q. What would you consider as progress sufficient to warrant a Summit conference?*

A. That determination I would not want to make at this time.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, various Soviet spokesmen, including Premier Khrushchev, in the past few weeks have said that the Soviet Union definitely will go ahead and sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany unless we agree to proposals that the Soviet Union believes acceptable. What do you think would be the result if the Soviet Union went ahead and signed such a separate peace treaty?*

A. Well, a separate peace treaty is a part of two questions. One is the question of the access routes and the sovereignty to be exercised over the access routes. Actually, the Soviet Government when it created the East German State in 1955 had an exchange of letters, known as the "Zorin-Bolz letters", with the newly created East German Government,¹ in which, on the one hand, all access rights to Berlin dealing with the civilian population were put in the hands of the East German Government. Those dealing with access rights of the garrisons of the three Allied Powers in West Berlin were reserved to the Russians in accordance with the agreement which they had with the Allies.

Today, if the Russian Government wanted to turn over to the East German Government the access rights that we now enjoy, they could do so by the plain cancellation of that Zorin letter. So that the peace treaty, as such, is not an essential part of that particular act.

I think that in talking of a separate peace treaty the Russians hope that they can get other nations outside of the Soviet bloc to recognize the East German Government at the same time that they make a peace treaty with East Germany.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the points in both the Eastern and the Western Berlin proposals is the creation of some kind of all-German*

¹ For the Soviet-East German exchange of letters, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955* (New York, 1956), pp. 111-112. Also printed in *86th Cong., 1st sess., Documents on Germany, 1944-1959* (printed for use of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations), p. 158.

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group. The Russians insist on parity. We have proposed a 25-10 ratio, I believe.¹ Is this non-parity posture of the West an absolute position?

A. Well, the numbers that make up the group I don't feel is an item of too great importance. In the proposal that we made in the Western Peace Plan for a so-called "all-German committee", we used that proportion. But we said that all decisions of the group should be made by a three-quarters vote. So that, in effect, either side had a veto on the other. If agreement had to be reached, the numbers on each side are not of primary importance.

## Statement by President Eisenhower on Exchange of Visits
With Chairman Khrushchev, August 3, 1959²

The President of the United States has invited Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to pay an official visit to the United States in September. Mr. Khrushchev has accepted with pleasure.

The President has also accepted with pleasure Mr. Khrushchev's invitation to pay an official visit to the U.S.S.R. later this fall.

Mr. Khrushchev will visit Washington for 2 or 3 days and will also spend 10 days or so traveling in the United States. He will have informal talks with the President which will afford an opportunity for an exchange of views about problems of mutual interest.

On his tour of the United States, Mr. Khrushchev will be able, at first hand, to see the country, its people, and to acquaint himself with their life.

President Eisenhower will visit Moscow and will also spend some days traveling in the Soviet Union. This will provide further opportunity for informal talks and exchange of views about problems of mutual interest with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

¹ *Ante*, p. 351.

² Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 24, 1959, p. 263.

For the President's remarks in connection with the issuance of the invitation to Khrushchev, see White House news releases for July 29 and Aug. 3, 1959. For Vice President Nixon's comments, at a news conference at Moscow on Aug. 2, see *Toward Better Understanding: Vice President Nixon's Visit to the Soviet Union and Poland, July-August 1959* (Department of State publication 6881, Sept. 1959), p. 25. Nixon's visit, to open the American exhibition at Moscow, reciprocated the visit of First Deputy Chairman Kozlov to the United States in June and July 1959 to open the Soviet exhibition at New York.

430

On his tour of the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower likewise will be able, at first hand, to see the country and its people, and to acquaint himself with their life.

Both Governments express the hope that the forthcoming visits will help create better understanding between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and will promote the cause of peace.

*Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement*
*by Secretary of State Herter, August 5, 1959*¹

As we come to the end of the second phase of the Geneva talks, I think that it will be useful to summarize briefly the course of the negotiations and the prospects that lie ahead.

## I

I regret that, despite the hopes held at the start of this Conference, we have not been able to reach an agreement.

These discussions started in Geneva to consider questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin.

They took place because the Soviet Union last year suddenly announced that, unless the Western allies accepted its proposal for a change in the status of Berlin, it intended to change the situation in Berlin unilaterally after May 27.

The three Western Powers rejected this proposal, and stated that no useful discussions could take place against the background of a Soviet strategy of duress.

After the Soviet Union removed the threat by indicating that the date of May 27 was not significant, the Four Powers agreed to meet in Geneva to try to deal with these problems through negotiation. This is what I call a strategy of consent.

The Western Powers approached this task in good faith. They genuinely sought to find an agreed solution to the problem which the Soviets had raised. They continued this effort, earnestly and vigorously, for the better part of the last three months.

## II

The Conference agenda gave first place to the question of Germany. The Western Powers agreed that this question was of overriding

¹U.S. doc. US/DEL/21 (also Delegation press release 19), Aug. 5, 1959; also issued as conference doc. RM/DOC/69, Aug. 5, 1959.

431

importance. At the start of the meeting, they proposed a Western
Peace Plan to achieve German reunification through the free choice
of the German people. This Western Peace Plan was acclaimed
throughout the world as a constructive offer.

The Soviet Union never gave this plan a moment's serious
consideration.

The reason was clear: The Soviet Union knew that German reunification in freedom would end Communist rule in East Germany.

Instead, the Soviet Union proposed, in effect, that the Four Powers formalize the division of Germany by signing separate peace treaties with the two parts of Germany. This the Western Powers refused to do.

### III

The Foreign Ministers then turned to the question of Berlin to see
if they could agree on an interim Berlin arrangement.

A good deal of the time in those negotiations was spent in an
effort to find out what Mr. Gromyko's position was on certain points.
On the central problem of "rights" we never did succeed in finding
out. This made our talks more like a research expedition than that
free interchange of views, which is necessary to fruitful results.

This Soviet manner of negotiation may have resulted from the
contradiction between the Soviet Union's ostensible and actual purposes in this Conference.

The Soviet Union is, as far as I can determine, not really interested
in "improving" the situation in Berlin. It is interested in getting the
Western Powers out of Berlin. Apparently continued competitive
co-existence of freedom and communism in Berlin is unrewarding to
the Soviet Union.

The key to our differences about Berlin is thus not so much in the
specific issues we have discussed as in the basic question of whether
or not the West Berliners are to remain free.

The Soviet proposals to date have seemed to us to be designed
gradually to annex these people to the communist system against
their will. This cannot be permitted.

We are willing to enter into an interim arrangement with the Soviet
Union which will assure a continued prospect of freedom for Berlin.
Such an interim arrangement might include five elements, which I
shall discuss in turn.

### IV

*First, force levels in Berlin.*

We proposed statements noting the decision of the Soviet Govern-
ment no longer to maintain forces in Berlin and making known the
intention of the Western Governments to limit their forces in West

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Berlin to their present level and to consider from time to time the possibility of reducing such forces if developments permit.

The Soviet Union refuses to accept any reference to its projected withdrawal of forces from Berlin—another indication of its consistent position of non-reciprocity—and proposes to drastically reduce our forces in West Berlin below the approximately 11,000 men now stationed there.

Why is the Soviet Government so anxious to reduce these forces drastically?

The Soviet Foreign Minister says that Western forces should be only symbolic. The total communist forces in East Germany are of the order of 500,000 men, not counting another 350,000 so-called Workers' Militia. In other words, Western forces in Berlin are less than 2% of the forces that surround them.

Clearly, the Soviet Union is proposing a drastic reduction of Western forces not for the reason given, but as the first step toward total withdrawal of Western forces. When the period specified in an interim agreement had expired, it would then call for still another reduction. And so on, until we no longer had any forces in Berlin.

This situation would not be substantially altered by a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Berlin. These forces would merely be stationed a few miles outside the city limits. To withdraw Western forces from Berlin would be an entirely different matter.

The real difference between the Soviet Union and the Western allies is thus not as to the level of Western forces in Berlin. It is whether Western forces should stay in Berlin, or eventually be withdrawn.

We are determined that adequate Western forces will stay in Berlin as long as they are wanted by the peoples of West Berlin and are essential to their protection.

## V

The second element of a possible interim Berlin arrangement involves the arms for the forces in Berlin.

The Four Powers are agreed in principle that nuclear weapons and missile installations shall not be located in West Berlin. Some differences over phraseology still exist, but should not prove impossible to resolve. The Western Powers have never had the slightest interest in or intent to deploy such weapons in West Berlin. This provision was added to the Western proposal for an interim Berlin arrangement specifically to meet asserted Soviet concerns.

## VI

The third element of an interim arrangement involves restraints on certain unfriendly activities in Berlin.

544645—60—31

433

The Western proposal is that measures should be taken, consistent with fundamental rights and liberties, to avoid activities in or with respect to Berlin which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests, or amount to interference in, the internal affairs of others.

The Secretary General of the United Nations would be requested to provide a representative, supported by adequate staff, to be established in Berlin, with free access to all parts of the city for the purpose of reporting to the Secretary General any propaganda activities which appear to be in conflict with the foregoing principles. And the four governments would consult with the Secretary General in order to determine the appropriate action to be taken in respect to any such report.

The Soviet Union's position on such activities differs from this Western proposal in two major respects:

*First*, the Soviet Union suggests much more extensive restraints on activities in West Berlin than in East Berlin. We insist that both parts of the city be treated even-handedly.

*Second*, the Soviet Union proposes that a Four Power Commission have the right to "supervise" and "assure the implementation" of restraints on West Berlin without any corresponding inspection of East Berlin. This proposal is obviously unacceptable because of its discriminatory nature.

We recognized, however, the desirability of some inspection machinery. To meet this need and thus narrow the difference between the Soviet Union and ourselves on this point, we added to our proposal the suggestion for a UN presence in Berlin which I have described.

Foreign Minister Gromyko's rejection of this proposal and his labelling it as "artificial" in our private sessions has been, to my mind, one of the more regrettable results of this Conference. If there is ever to be real progress toward peace based on justice, there must surely be a strengthening of the main instrument that is available to us for international cooperation—the United Nations. In walking away from any possibility of a UN role under an interim Berlin arrangement, the Soviet Union has evidenced an attitude toward the United Nations which cannot help but make the search for peace more difficult.

## VII

The *fourth* element involved the question of the duration of any interim agreement on Berlin and the position at the end of that agreement.

434

The Soviet Union's presently avowed aim is to "change" existing Berlin rights and responsibilities. Since we are determined that this aim shall not be achieved without our consent, it was important that the Western Powers have some assurance that any arrangements here agreed upon did not have that automatic effect.

It will be recalled that the interim agreement offered to the Soviet Union on June 16 was to last until the reunification of Germany. And in the preamble to that agreement it was recognized that:

> "... pending reunification, the existing situation and the agreements at present in force can be modified in certain respects ..."

Mr. Gromyko objected to any agreement lasting until the reunification of Germany and the Western Foreign Ministers then changed their offer to provide that:

> "The arrangements ... can in the absence of reunification be reviewed at any time after five years by the Foreign Ministers Conference as now constituted, if such review is requested by any of the Four Governments."

Mr. Gromyko again objected, stating that under this formulation the arrangements here agreed to would continue if, after such a review, the Foreign Ministers' Conference was unable to reach agreement upon changes. He insisted that any arrangements agreed here expire by their terms after a specified period.

This Soviet position had to be examined in the light of Mr. Gromyko's categorical refusal to answer the question frequently put to him, both in plenary and in private sessions, as to the status of the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers with respect to Berlin in the event that the Foreign Ministers were unable to reach agreement in any subsequent negotiations.

It was necessary also to review that proposal in the light of repeated statements by Mr. Khrushchev, as well as by Mr. Gromyko, that the Soviet Union was somehow entitled unilaterally to void the rights of the Western Powers with respect to Berlin by signing a separate peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic. On June 10, for example, Mr. Gromyko said that the USSR was not prepared to insist on "immediate and complete abolition" of the occupation regime in West Berlin, but would agree to the provisional maintenance of certain of these rights on condition, and I quote, "that such a situation would exist only for a strictly limited period, namely one year".¹ While he has since failed to repeat this frank avowal of purpose, he has equally refused to renounce or deny it.

¹ For text of Gromyko's statement, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959), pp. 260-266.

435

In the most recent discussions with Mr. Gromyko, the Western Foreign Ministers indicated that they were prepared to consider interim arrangements relating to Berlin under an agreement which would expire after a specified period. At the same time they made it unmistakably clear that neither the agreement nor its expiration would be in derogation of the now existing rights and responsibilities of the Western Powers with respect to Berlin. They insisted that an appropriate statement to that effect be included in any agreed arrangement which would expire after a specified period. There are several ways in which this assurance could be expressed. The Soviet Union should be willing to agree to one of those ways if, as Mr. Khrushchev said in his speech of July 28, the Soviet Union is seeking agreements which do not do any "moral or material damage to either side."¹

At no time—and I wish to emphasize this point—at no time did we ask the Soviet Union to perpetuate or reaffirm our rights. There was no need for us to do so. These rights, which on a number of occasions have been recognized by the Soviet Union as *legitimate* in origin and *continuing* in fact, derive from our victory in the war. The manner in which they would be exercised was specified in solemn post-war agreements entered into by the Soviet Union. Nothing that the Soviet Union was asked to state or to do at Geneva would add to or detract from those rights or from Soviet responsibilities. The only thing that was contemplated here was a modification of the agreements spelling out how those rights are to be exercised.

In view of our heavy responsibilities for the more than 2,000,000 inhabitants of West Berlin, which I have recently reaffirmed on behalf of my Government, we feel that we *are* entitled to a plain answer to the question:

"At the end of the period specified in any interim agreement with respect to Berlin, will the Soviet Union maintain that this agreement has weakened our rights or not?"

Mr. Gromyko's only reply has been, "Let us not answer that question." He seems to be saying, "Let us wait and see."

Any such answer is totally unacceptable to my Government, which on repeated occasions has made it plain that it does not intend to enter into any agreement which could be interpreted as an express or implied weakening of those rights.

VIII

The *fifth* element involves civilian and military access to and from West Berlin.

The three Western Powers propose that free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by water, and by air for all persons, goods

¹ For an extract, see *ibid.*, pp. 523-527.

436

and communications, including those of the forces of the Western Powers stationed in Berlin, be maintained in accordance with the procedures in effect in April 1959. Freedom of movement would continue to be maintained between East and West Berlin. All disputes which might arise with respect to access would be raised and settled between the four governments. The latter would establish a Quadripartite Commission which would meet in Berlin to examine in the first instance any difficulties arising in connection with access and would seek to settle such difficulties. The Commission might make arrangements, if necessary, to consult German experts.

The language of the Soviet proposal on this point is much briefer than that of the Western Powers. Its formulation has some elements which are unacceptable to us. But, as I understand it from our discussions and leaving the issue of the Quadripartite Commission aside, the substance of the Western position on civilian and military access to and from and within Berlin during an interim arrangement for Berlin is not unacceptable to the Soviets. I trust that my understanding is correct.

## IX

A final question involves the arrangements to get on with discussions concerning the all-German problem, including the association of both parts of Germany in those discussions.

We believe that the German question is important and pressing. We propose that it be the subject of continuing discussion by this Foreign Ministers' Conference, as presently constituted, though, perhaps at a different level and place.

This procedure would enable the Four Powers to discharge responsibilities in regard to this question which they have repeatedly acknowledged.

It would enable German advisers to play a role which has been devised and tested in the present discussions.

It would permit us to proceed flexibly with, as Mr. Lloyd said on July 23, "any combination or permutation of delegations here in this room",¹ agreeing from time to time on the specific procedures to be adopted in the light of our developing work.

The Soviets, by contrast, originally insisted on linking an interim arrangement for Berlin to the establishment of a mixed committee of free and communist Germans which would negotiate about the all-German question including the matter of a peace treaty.

This was an unrealistic proposal and I hope that the Soviets have come to recognize it as such.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 473.

437

Not only is there no logical tie between the work of such a Com-
mittee and an interim Berlin arrangement, but the basic idea of
having a mixed committee of free and communist Germans is only
valid if it is part of a phased process which will lead to German
unification whether or not that committee reaches agreement. The
reason for this is simply that, unless it is part of such a larger
process, the Committee is certain not to reach agreement. The Com-
munist members of the Committee will reject unification in freedom,
and the representatives of the Federal Republic could not accept
unification on any other basis.

For these reasons, the Western proposal seems a more promising
approach to this question.

X

These then are the differences and the areas of agreement that have
been defined in the past few weeks. I believe that the work of the
Conference has been useful in isolating these points, which could lead
to a Berlin settlement.

I would hope, therefore, that we will resume our negotiations, at
a date to be determined by our governments in order to address these
differences, one by one. If we can reconcile these differences, this
should lead to an agreement which will give real hope for a secure
position for the free people of West Berlin. This should also permit
a start to be made on overcoming the continued division of Germany.

Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement
by Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, August 5,
1959¹

After three months of discussions, this last plenary meeting of our
conference provides each of us with the opportunity to sum up his
views and perhaps to say also a few words on the prospects for the
near future. That is what I would like to do, in my turn, as briefly
as possible, on behalf of the French delegation.

In the first place and at great length we talked about Germany as
a whole. We did that first by mutual agreement and directly, then
indirectly when the Soviet delegation raised, in connexion with
Berlin, the question of setting up an all-German committee, while
linking it with an interim arrangement on the former German
capital.

¹ Conference doc. RM/DOC/70, Aug. 5, 1959.

438

The Western delegations on their part tabled a comprehensive plan providing for several stages and dealing jointly with the German question and with European or general security problems which are unanimously recognized as being tied to the solution of the German question. Fundamentally, we believe that reunification should be brought about through free elections, that a peace treaty should then be concluded and that steps should in any case be taken in order to ensure that the union of the two parts of Germany will not in any way prejudice security in Europe but, on the contrary, contribute to strengthen it methodically. We may conceive all kinds of stages and contemplate all types of interim solutions in order to bring about compromises which become more and more difficult as time goes by. The only point on which it seems that we cannot compromise is this principle: since its destiny is at stake, the German people must have the last word in this matter. No government, and least of all one which is not representative, may set conditions and decide in the last resort.

It has become apparent here once again that the Soviet Govern-
ment does not share the point of view of the Western Governments.
All of us know, moreover, that the issue is the fate of the present
regime in Eastern Germany. Such is the actual reason why, as before,
we have not been able to agree. We shall have to come back to it,
trusting in the normal evolution of men and positions, in order that a
situation should finally prevail in accordance with natural law and
therefore with the interests of peace in Europe. We, for our part,
are ready to resume discussions at any time.

As long as there is a German question, there will be a question of
Berlin. Only the reunification of Germany will make it possible to
unite the two parts of the city at present divided and to bring about
in both halves of Berlin the same political, economic and social regime.

There is a point on which, I think, we are in agreement with the
Soviet Union: as long as this aim is not achieved, the Western part
of Berlin must remain as it is now. It must keep its democratic
regime which corresponds to the unanimous will of its population.

Where we do not agree is when, from the Russian side, emphasis
is put on the dangers that would arise from this situation and when,
to remedy them, we are asked to accept radical changes in the present
status. We do not believe that the situation in Berlin is the source of
serious tensions, so long as it is respected by both sides. On the
contrary, we believe that the very modifications proposed could lead
to difficulties by substituting a precarious situation for one where
order and stability have prevailed for the last fifteen years.

However, we did not refuse to consider the Soviet delegation's con-
cern about Berlin and from the very start we have shown readiness to

439

examine with them all practical steps likely to do away with the risks which they alleged existed. While discussing a practical arrangement we were concerned about two things: not to discard any measure compatible with the normal exercise of our own responsibilities in Berlin; not to prejudge in any way the solution of the German problem as a whole nor to impair a juridical situation which is the only actual guarantee for maintaining freedom in West Berlin.

That is why we could not accept to establish any link whatever, between a *modus vivendi* for Berlin and the already mentioned Soviet proposal to set up an all-German committee whose terms of reference would be to discuss reunification and a peace treaty. Such a proposal was wholly in conflict with our own views on the solution of the German problem. I spoke at length on that subject and I need not revert to it. Furthermore it was completely opposed to the spirit in which we contemplate the Berlin arrangement.

Likewise, we indicated firmly that we could not accept any text which could mean or imply that by signing an Arrangement we were relinquishing the rights which we hold as a result of historical circumstances which followed the end of the war and by virtue of agreements concluded since then with the Soviet Union. On this essential point we finally failed because we could not get the Soviet delegation to take an unequivocal stand on the question we put to them, simple as it was.

It may be necessary for me to be more specific on that since we might have to discuss it again in the future.

During the first stage of the conference we already contemplated concluding an arrangement on Berlin which would have remained valid until German reunification. Then, on 10¹ and 19 June, our Soviet colleague put before us a new proposal. It limited in particular the term of the agreement to one year, then to eighteen months. On this point the conference went into its first recess. When we resumed our discussions in July we did not reject the possibility of an agreement limited in time. It never meant however that we at any time envisaged accepting a modification of the juridical situation at the end of the said term.

Our draft of 28 July² was devised in that spirit: it was suggested that after five years new negotiations should take place on the Berlin issue. Pending an agreement, the concluded arrangement would have remained in force. We thus believed that we were meeting the wishes of our interlocutors since we intended to keep in force, during the new discussions, the already considerable limitations to which we would have agreed.

¹ See *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959), pp. 260-266.

² Not printed.

440

Mr. Gromyko clearly pointed out to us that he was not satisfied. He wished to sign an Arrangement valid for a definite period. The Arrangement would lapse at the end of the said period and a new agreement would be negotiated.

We accepted to follow this line and we were thus naturally led to ask him a question: what would be the situation between the end of the given term and the conclusion of a new arrangement? It seemed to us obvious that this situation would be the *status quo ante*, namely, the present one. We could never get our colleague to confirm this interpretation. That is why we could not reach agreement.

I do not contend meanwhile that once this point was settled and any link suppressed between Berlin and an all-German committee, it only remained to sign the agreement. We had quite a few things to settle as regards the other parts of the arrangement, in particular the contingents of Western garrisons in Berlin, the reciprocal limitation of propaganda or subversive activities, the duration of the agreement to come. It does not seem unlikely, however, that solutions could be found once the questions of principle are solved.

Such, in the view of the French delegation, are the conditions in which we are today ending the second phase of our conference. By common agreement we have decided to interrupt our discussions now because we are faced with certain basic difficulties which we are unable to iron out for the time being. Doubtless, for the solutions to become ripe, there will be necessary a period of reflexion which, for each of us, will take place in a wider context than that which was ours in Geneva.

*Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement*
*by Foreign Minister Gromyko, August 5, 1959*¹

The participants in the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers are today summing up the work accomplished. The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to dwell on the basic results of our negotiations.

Not only in the States whose representatives are in this room, but also in other countries the peoples have followed the course of the Geneva negotiations with unrelenting attention. This is only natural, for at our Meeting we have considered important international problems the settlement of which will very greatly affect the destinies of the world.

¹ Conference doc. RM/DOC/71, Aug. 6, 1959, and correction 1, Aug. 10, 1959.

441

The work of our conference has been largely devoted to endeavouring to find ways for the settlement of two complex unresolved questions remaining as a legacy from the Second World War: a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin. No one capable of assessing the situation objectively will deny that so long as these questions remain unsettled they will impede the establishment of the conditions for lasting peace in Europe.

The whole development of international relations, the whole situation in Europe, still affected as it is by the consequences of the past war, indeed life itself, set with increasing insistence before the Powers which fought Germany as well as before the two German States the ever more pressing task of preparing and concluding a German peace treaty. With every day that passes this task becomes more urgent.

The other very acute and overripe question discussed at our conference was the question of West Berlin. It would be hard to find another place anywhere in the world constituting so malignant and dangerous a knot of contradictions between States, so permanent a source of friction between them, as West Berlin. More than fourteen years after the end of the war the foreign occupation regime still remains there. The territory of West Berlin is used for disruptive activities aimed against various States and principally against the State in the heart of which Berlin is situated, namely the German Democratic Republic.

The fact that the representatives of the four great Powers have met round the conference table after several years' interruption in order to make new efforts to settle the questions connected with the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin is itself very significant.

We should not fail to note also the important fact that for the first time representatives of both German States, of the German Democratic Republic and of the Federal Republic of Germany, have participated in the examination of questions affecting Germany.¹ That means that a realistic approach to the problems of Germany is making headway with increasing assurance. Whereas not so long ago the idea prevailed in some quarters in the West that the Germans could be kept as far as possible in the background away from negotiations, it has emerged clearly from the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers that questions touching on the vital interests of the Germans cannot be settled without the Germans themselves, without the German Demo-

¹ For texts of statements by the West German Adviser (Gréwe) and the East German Adviser (Bolz), see *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959), annexes I and II, respectively.

442

cratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany participating
in discussions on those questions.

The significance of the 1959 Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers
lies primarily in the fact that serious attempts have been made here to
bring closer together the positions of the States on the most important
unresolved international questions.

I believe my colleagues will agree when I say that the work
of this conference has been done in a businesslike atmosphere, with
a frank exchange of views, and has resulted in a better understanding
of the positions of the participants.

It must be said quite frankly that after many years of "cold war"
the participants in this Meeting came to the conference table with an
onerous legacy which impeded the establishment of relations based on
confidence and mutual understanding which are so necessary for fruitful
negotiations.

Meticulous and persistent work was required in order to bring to
light what was common to the different positions of the participants of
the conference. To what extent has our conference coped with that
task? How useful has its work been? We shall get an answer to
these questions, if we evaluate objectively the results of the discussion
on each of the questions considered.

In his statement today, Mr. Herter attempted to give a review of
what took place at our conference. However, the picture that emerged
is one-sided and bears little resemblance to the true facts. That applies both to the question of a peace settlement with Germany and to
the Berlin question. Who could take his words seriously when he
claims that the Soviet proposals were designed to annex West Berlin,
to formalize the division of Germany, and so on? There is, of course,
nothing in common between this allegation and the true state of affairs, and those who, from motives of cheap propaganda, say the
opposite are well aware of it.

Let us first consider the Berlin question, on which, in our opinion,
the most tangible rapprochement between the positions of the different
sides was achieved. There can be little doubt that our conference has
progressed towards a realistic approach to the settlement of questions
affecting West Berlin.

In general, it may be said that all the participants of this conference
have recognized the need to change the situation in West Berlin.

The all-round exchange of views has led above all to agreement
being reached in regard to the range of questions affecting West Berlin
which must be covered by an appropriate interim arrangement. By
mutual agreement it was decided that this arrangement must cover,
in particular, the strength of the armed forces of the three Powers in
West Berlin, a ban on atomic weapons and guided missiles on the terri-

443

tory of West Berlin, the prohibition of disruptive activities and hostile
propaganda, access to West Berlin, a specific time limit for this ar-
rangement to remain in force and subsequent negotiations on West
Berlin.

As a result of the exchange of views, it can now be noted that all
the participants of this conference have agreed that the interim
arrangement must be definitely limited in time. For the Soviet
Union this is of fundamental importance, since, as we have more than
once pointed out, it is unable to put its signature to any document
perpetuating the existing occupation regime in West Berlin.

Great importance attaches to the fact that it has been agreed that
an arrangement concerning West Berlin shall include provisions
prohibiting the stationing of any forms of nuclear weapons and missile
installations in West Berlin.

In discussing the Berlin question, all the participants based their
arguments on the principle that the way of life chosen by the popu-
lation of West Berlin should not be disrupted. This principle is
clearly safeguarded in the Soviet proposal for a Free City, which
would, as the Soviet Government is more firmly convinced every day,
be the most equitable solution to the question of West Berlin in the
present circumstances. Our subsequent proposals for certain interim
measures with regard to West Berlin are also based on this principle.

We can express only satisfaction at the fact that during these talks
it has been acknowledged that it is essential to settle the question of
inadmissible subversive activities and hostile propaganda. The So-
viet Government has raised this question on several occasions, stressing
that it is high time to put an end to a state of affairs in which West
Berlin is a centre for subversive activities and hostile propaganda
systematically conducted against a number of States and primarily
against the German Democratic Republic.

In connexion with the anxiety expressed by the Foreign Ministers
of the United States, France and the United Kingdom over the ques-
tion of safeguarding access to West Berlin, the Soviet Government,
in agreement with the Government of the German Democratic Re-
public, has announced that when the appropriate provisional arrange-
ment is concluded, and during the operation of this arrangement,
communications between West Berlin and the outside world will be
maintained in the same form as they now are.

In dealing with the question of access to West Berlin, Mr. Herter
has referred to the Soviet Union's acceptance of the Western Powers'
standpoint on this question. We have agreed that the existing ar-
rangements for access to West Berlin shall be maintained, by which
we mean the arrangements which actually exist at present, and not
the proposal which has been put forward by the representatives of the

444

Western Powers with regard to this question. Moreover, no one can interpret our standpoint on this question, or on any other question, except ourselves.

Another positive result of our conference is that all those taking part have agreed that further negotiations on West Berlin shall take place after the expiration of the term of validity of the interim arrangement.

In speaking about the results of the work done at our conference and in noting that our positions have been brought closer together in respect of a number of questions, we cannot of course ignore the fact that on certain matters there are still a good many differences between the participants.

One problem on which the two sides have not yet managed to reach a common point of view, and one which will play an important part in the process of reaching an appropriate agreement is the question of reducing the number of foreign troops in West Berlin.

The representatives of the Western Powers have in principle announced their readiness to take steps to reduce their armed forces in West Berlin. But this is clearly not enough, for such a declaration by the three Western Powers is rather a declaration of good intentions, while the situation in Berlin calls for definite action and, since we are concerned with an agreement, for definite commitments.

While we have reached the common view that the arrangement must have a provisional character, and that there must be further negotiations on the expiration of this agreement, the participants of this conference have not yet been able to agree on an actual term for this arrangement. The Soviet Government, as you are aware, proposes that this term should be a year and a half, bearing in mind that at the end of this period the negotiations between the two German States would also have been concluded. We have several times explained that the question of the term during which the provisional arrangement should remain in force is from our point of view neither a major one nor one of principle.

But of course this question must be settled in accordance with the realities of the situation in Germany, and the 18 months' term suggested by us fully meets the requirements of that situation.

It must be assumed that the Governments of the three Western Powers will take a more realistic position in future than they are taking now in proposing to extend the term of operation of the arrangement for as long as five years. It is self-evident that the Soviet Union cannot agree to this.

Further negotiations are needed also on the question of the forms and methods to be used for supervising the fulfilment of commitments undertaken by the parties to the arrangement.

445

Our approach to an interim arrangement depends on whether a decision is taken that direct negotiations will be conducted between the German States with a view to a peace settlement and the reunification of Germany, or whether this question is to remain open as before, and the present position maintained, with no political negotiations of any kind between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, even though the necessity for such negotiations is becoming more urgent every day, especially with regard to questions affecting the peace treaty. In the Soviet proposals, these two problems—that of negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, and that of the interim arrangement regarding West Berlin—have been treated in their natural interdependence. It must not be forgotten that if, as a result of the work done by an all-German committee or in the course of negotiations between the German States in some other form which is acceptable to them, the possibility of concluding a peace treaty with Germany should arise, this would mean that the Berlin question had also been finally settled.

We cannot of course exclude the possibility that in view of the Federal German Government's stubborn refusal to contribute towards a rapprochement between the two German States, negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany may not lead to the desired results. Should this be the case, the Soviet proposals provide that the participants of the Geneva conference should undertake further negotiations on West Berlin.

To judge from all the evidence, the Western Powers would like to restrict the scope of the talks to an interim arrangement affecting only West Berlin, and would prefer not to raise the question of negotiations between the two German States. They are, it seems, disposed to settle only those questions in which they themselves have a direct interest; meanwhile other questions, of greater substance from the standpoint of the common interest in consolidating peace and of the necessity of drawing a final line under the Second World War by concluding a peace treaty with Germany, would be set aside.

It cannot be said, however, that the exchange of views on the subject of negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany has been fruitless. One fact that deserves attention, for example, is that the Western Powers have in fact recognized the necessity for negotiations between representatives of the two German States on questions which, if the suggestion of the USSR and the German Democratic Republic were adopted, would be examined in an all-German committee; I mean questions

446

connected with the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty
with Germany, the discussion and working out of specific measures
for the reunification of Germany and the development of contacts.
The Western Powers have thus taken a certain step in the direction
of acknowledging the part that both German States must play in
settling these questions, although they have not been consistent in
this, since they do not conceive of such negotiations between the
Germans being conducted otherwise than under the aegis of the
four Powers.

I may remind you that in the proposals put forward by the
Western Powers themselves during the first stage of the work of
this conference, the idea was advanced that an all-German con-
mittee should be established and that negotiations on political ques-
tions should be conducted in this committee between the representa-
tives of the two parts of Germany. If the Governments of the
United States of America, the United Kingdom and France are now
suggesting that such questions should be made the subject of negotia-
tions between the six Powers represented at the Geneva conference,
this shows only that the Powers I have named are still a long way
from repudiating their inclination to interfere in such purely Ger-
man affairs as the problem of German reunification and the working
out of a common point of view between the German States with
regard to the peace settlement with Germany. Of course, no matter
how great may have been the difficulties encountered by our con-
ference in trying to reach agreement on the question of negotiations
between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic
of Germany, as well as regarding the interdependence between an
interim arrangement and the adoption of a decision regarding the
aforesaid negotiations, we cannot sit back and fold our arms. Both
these questions have arisen out of the realities of life, and the lack
of progress in settling them can mean only one thing—that these
questions still remain open.

We consider it particularly important to weigh up the results
achieved by our conference with respect to a German peace treaty.
Until this question is settled it is impossible to eliminate the vestiges
of the Second World War, which are weighing heavily on the
situation in Germany and in Europe as a whole.

Delay in bringing about a peace settlement with Germany makes
it is impossible to remove altogether the consequences of the last war
in Europe, which are continuing to cause uncertainty and complica-
tions in relations between many States and which constitute a threat to
the security of the nations of Europe. At the same time we must not
forget the feelings of the German people, who are still being denied a
peace treaty more than 14 years after the end of the Second World War.

447

We can state that as a result of the detailed and thorough exchange of views which has taken place at this conference, the necessity and importance of concluding a peace treaty which would ensure the peaceful development of Germany and give the German people its rightful place in the family of nations has been confirmed.

It is to be regretted, however, that the Foreign Ministers of the Western Powers have not gone further in acknowledging the significance of a German peace treaty, with the result that our conference has not been able to make any progress in settling this pressing problem of today.

In view of the fact that the question of a peace treaty with Germany is becoming increasingly urgent, the Soviet Government offered a Draft Peace Treaty for the consideration of the present conference. This Draft, or at least a great many of its more important provisions, was the subject of discussion at our conference. We regret that the Western Powers were disinclined to recognize the necessity of concluding a peace treaty with Germany, in view of the actual situation which has developed in Germany. We regret that they want as before to preserve the existing situation in Germany, which as a result of their policy has been split into two parts, one of which, Western Germany, is steadily being converted into a military jumping-off ground for NATO and into a militaristic State.

The participants of the Geneva conference are undoubtedly well aware of the Soviet Union's position with regard to a peace treaty with Germany. Our view has been put forward many times in speeches by the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev. In the course of the negotiations the Soviet delegation has frequently contributed statements clarifying this subject and tried to convince the representatives of the Western Powers that it is essential to take practical steps in regard to the preparation of a German peace treaty without further delay.

To brush aside the necessity for settling such a problem as the conclusion of a German peace treaty is impossible. Whether anyone likes it or not, the problem of a peace settlement with Germany is put forward by life itself and a solution for it will be found. This is a point which the Soviet Government and its Head in person have made many times.

In summing up the actual results of the present negotiations then, we are led to the conclusion that the detailed and frank discussion of the problems which we were commissioned to examine by our respective Governments has helped to clarify many aspects of these problems. A great many misunderstandings have been cleared up and the positions of both sides have become more definite. This is

448

of course a valuable thing in itself, for it will substantially facilitate
the further examination and settlement of matters on which there
is disagreement. But this is by no means all. On many questions
the two sides have come closer together, as we have rightly men-
tioned in our communique.¹

With all this, of course, we should be wrong if we failed to see
that there are still disagreements among the participants of this
conference, and indeed substantial ones, including major questions of
principle, above all the questions of a German peace treaty and of
direct negotiations between the two German States.

The Soviet Government assumes that this obliges the States repre-
sented at our conference to make further efforts to find mutually
acceptable solutions. Matters on which the Ministers have failed to
reach agreement can be examined and settled at a meeting of Heads
of States.

Our conference, then, has done a good deal of work and this work
has unquestionably been useful.

It is no secret that there are still influential groups here and there
in the West which are calculating on exacerbating conflicts between
States and increasing international tension. They are happy only
in the oppressive atmosphere of the cold war. Nothing terrifies them
more than the fresh air of international détente and the restoration
of co-operation between States. It is understandable that these peo-
ple do not like any step which makes agreement between States easier
and, as though trying to encourage themselves and hoodwink others,
they cry out about failure and deadlock, prophesy the breakdown of
subsequent negotiations, and so forth.

Any negotiations can, of course, be made to fail if there is no
wish for agreement. No great efforts are needed to wreck them; all
that is needed is the absence of readiness to come to terms with the
requirements of life and with reality. But it must be said outright
that if there are people who are calculating in this way, responsibility
for the consequences will rest upon their shoulders. In the past there
has been no lack of readiness on the part of the Soviet Government
to help in finding mutually acceptable solutions. This applies to the
Berlin question as well. But of course, it does not all depend on us.

It is common knowledge that in the course of our conference the
opponents of international agreement have done their best to put
spokes in the wheels, trying now one way, now another to hamper the
work of the conference. Everyone knows who these inveterate
pessimists are. I shall not be giving away any secrets if I say that the
roots of the policy which is aimed at wrecking a rapprochement

¹ *Post*, pp. 456-457.

544645—60—32

449

between States must be sought primarily, in many respects, in certain
circles in Western Germany. All this only confirms once more that
obstacles are being deliberately put in the way of a relaxation of inter-
national tension.

The Soviet Government attaches prime importance to the settle-
ment of the important questions which have been examined at our
conference. In order to succeed in building a lasting peace it is
essential to do away with the vestiges of the last war, which exist in
the form of the non-settlement of the question of a German peace
treaty and the continuation of the occupation regime in West Berlin.

The development of relations between certain States represented
at our Meeting is of great importance for the improvement of the
entire international situation. This year, one of the first interna-
tional events to bring a noticeable access of warmth into the atmos-
phere which generated the "cold war" was, as we all know, the talks
which the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, and Foreign Secre-
tary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, had with the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, and other members of the
Soviet Government during the British statesmen's visit to the Soviet
Union.¹

At the moment important events are taking place in the develop-
ment of Soviet-American relations. After an exchange of visits by a
number of statesmen, among which we must give first mention to the
visit of the First Vice-Chairmen of the Soviet Council of Ministers,
Mr. Mikoyan and Mr. Koslov, to the United States of America,² and
the visit of the United States Vice-President Nixon to the Soviet
Union,³ and after the exchange of exhibitions, which marks a step
towards acquainting the peoples of both countries with the life of the
other, it has now been agreed that the Chairman of the Soviet Council
of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, should visit the United States and that
the United States President, Mr. Eisenhower, should visit the Soviet
Union.⁴

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the coming
meetings between the Soviet and the United States leaders. In the
present circumstances these meetings will have historic significance,
and this is recognized throughout the world.

Those who have taken part in the Foreign Ministers' Meeting will
report on the results of its work to their respective Governments,
which will be able to examine the results achieved and to decide on
the next step in examining the problems which have constituted the

¹ For text of joint communiqué of Mar. 3, 1959, see ante.

² See footnote ante, p. 424.

³ See footnote ante, p. 430.

⁴ See the President's statement of Aug. 3, ante.

450

agenda of this conference. As we arranged, agreement will also be
reached on the time and place for a resumption of the work of the
Foreign Ministers' conference as now constituted.

*Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement*
*by Foreign Secretary Lloyd, August 5, 1959¹*

Agreement to have this meeting of Foreign Ministers was reached after considerable preliminary negotiation. Since 11 May except for a short interval, we have been discussing questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin. We have now decided to bring this phase of our meetings to an end. It is not a final end; the draft communiqué upon which we have agreed shows clearly the intention of both sides to renew these discussions.

It is natural that before we recess we should take stock of the
situation.

I believe that there are two tests to be applied to any conference. Firstly, whether it results in any specific agreement of value, secondly, what is its impact upon the course of international events, upon the international atmosphere, upon the prospects for agreement in the future.

I will take the first test first. The Western side came to the conference with three objectives. Firstly, we wished to make some progress towards the reunification of Germany, secondly, we wished to secure reaffirmation of the right of the people of West Berlin freely to choose their own system of society. We regarded free access between West Berlin and the outside world as an essential element to ensure that freedom of choice. Our third aim was to achieve some reduction of tension and some improvement of the prospects of stability in Europe.

With regard to German reunification, all four Governments have affirmed their recognition of the right of the German people to restore their national unity. All four have professed their belief in German unity and free elections and the conclusion of a peace treaty which will regularize the position in central Europe. The Western Powers have not been able to agree with the Soviet Union on how to make progress towards that goal. I do not propose to review in any detail the substance of the comprehensive plans put forward by the two sides. Mr. Herter, Mr. Couve de Murville and I have explained at

¹ Conference doc. RM/DOC/72, Aug. 5, 1959.

451

length the merits of the Western Peace Plan. Mr. Gromyko, for his part, has expounded the merits of the Soviet Draft Peace Treaty. I record again our belief that we will never be able finally to determine this problem without recourse to the freely expressed wishes of the German people as a whole, all 70 million of them.

Apart from clear statements of our respective positions, we did not make progress towards the reunification of Germany.

I believe that it was realistic then to consider the problem of Berlin. That was the immediate matter which had led to our conference. Again it is true that we have not reached a concrete agreement. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that our discussions about Berlin have been of benefit. We have clarified and narrowed down the issues. We have got away from the conception of unilateral action within fixed time limits. We have been trying to deal with these matters by negotiation and we have affirmed our intention to continue so to do.

There has been common ground between us to the extent that both sides have asserted their desire to maintain the freedom of the people of West Berlin to choose their own system of society. The Soviet Government have put forward their idea of a free city. Our doubt about that has been whether in fact the Soviet plan would preserve this free choice for the West Berliners. We are not prepared to accept arrangements which might mean continuing pressures on the people of West Berlin and would ultimately involve them in the surrender of their freedom of choice. We have maintained our conviction that the presence of Western troops in Berlin is necessary as a symbol of our continued commitment to the freedom of West Berlin. As we have pointed out many times, the presence of our troops is desired by the overwhelming majority of West Berliners.

Mr. Gromyko has made it quite clear that his purpose is to bring to an end the occupation status of West Berlin, whether or not reunification has taken place. He considers it outmoded and outlived. We are quite prepared to do that when reunification takes place, but not before. That has been the basic issue between us on Berlin.

There being no prospect of either side accepting the other's point of view on this matter, we turned to consider an arrangement for a kind of standstill for a fixed period. We have examined the position to see whether modified arrangements could be agreed, acceptable to both sides, and which from the point of view of one side or the other could be regarded as an improvement in the present situation. The Western side has shown its willingness to negotiate on the basis of a limitation of our forces in West Berlin. We have been prepared to agree that the armaments of our forces there should continue not to include nuclear weapons or missile installations. Complaints have been put forward about hostile propaganda and subversive activities

452

emanating from West Berlin. We, for our part, have made reference
to what emanates from East Berlin, but the Western side has been
prepared to agree on a reciprocal basis that, to use a neutral expression,
"questionable activities" in Berlin should be reduced. On the ques-
tion of the duration of the agreement, we were willing to agree to a
period of five years. The Soviet proposal has been for 18 months, but
they have said that they do not think the actual length of time of the
agreement is a matter of importance or principle. The Soviet Govern-
ment has stated its willingness to maintain free access. Mr. Gromyko
has also said that they will take no unilateral action during the period
covered by the agreement, or during the phase of negotiations which
no doubt would follow.

Within this framework I have always been optimistic that a limited
agreement of this sort could be achieved. Perhaps I have been more
optimistic than some of my colleagues.

What then has been the cause of our failure? We have so far been
unable to reach agreement on what would be the position at the end
of the period. The way I put it in my speech of 23 July was:—

"To sum up, at the end of the interim period, if no agreement has
been reached in the meantime, we are in exactly the same position as
we are in today over rights and everything else to do with Berlin".¹

On 20 July, I quoted ² the words of the Opposition spokesman in
the House of Commons when speaking on this matter on 8 July. Mr.
Bevan said:—

"There is no suggestion as far as I can see that we should abandon
our occupation rights in Berlin if we agree to a time limit. All they
(the Russians) say is that the two sides take up their respective posi-
tions at the end of the period as they take them up now."

Mr. Gromyko has never publicly or privately accepted either of these
statements as accurate. Of course any situation is affected by the
passage of time. We cannot expect the rest of the world to stand still
because there is an agreement for a fixed term about Berlin. But the
Western side wishes to feel that it would approach the next phase of
negotiations about Berlin in the same position as it is in today. In
other words, we would not be deemed to have altered our position, ex-
cept as strictly defined by this limited agreement. The Soviet Govern-
ment advocated an agreement for a limited period on the ground that
during the period progress might be made on German problems as a

¹ For full text of Lloyd's statement on July 23, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959), pp. 470-473.

² *Ibid.*, p. 446.

453

whole, which would affect for the better the prospect of a final settle-
ment for Berlin. It seems to me reasonable that if that is their pur-
pose, they should accept the broad proposition that at the end of the
period, if there has not been such progress leading to agreement, we re-
assemble on the same basis as we have been talking here. That would
seem to us to be of the essence of a standstill.

We have argued out this matter at such length between ourselves
publicly and privately without carrying conviction to the other side,
that I feel it a good thing that there is to be a pause in the discussions.
I hope that during such a pause the Soviet Government will be able
to reflect upon this matter and settle something which is of importance,
but nonetheless fairly simple. In short, I hope that after a careful
study of our discussions the Soviet Government will find it possible to
give us the kind of assurance which we have sought.

There has been one other matter which we have discussed at some
length. Mr. Gromyko put forward his proposal for an all-German
committee. We stated clearly our objections to his proposal. We in-
dicated what we considered to be a reasonable method of continuing
discussions about these wider German problems without calling upon
either side to concede any point of principle. Our feeling was that
this conference, as at present constituted, might continue in being for
the purpose of facilitating the consideration of the German problem
as a whole, meeting at whatever time, or level or place that might seem
appropriate.

Mr. Herter has already referred to the words I used on 23 July. I
said:—

"Our formula permits of any combination or permutation of the
delegations here in this room today, to meet from time to time for pur-
poses which could be defined precisely or left general. Nothing is
compulsory, nothing is forbidden."

Mr. Gromyko did not feel able to accept this proposal. Again I
hope that he will reconsider his position.

I have tried to set out my assessment of the course of our discussions
according to the first test which I laid down for any conference, that
of whether specific agreements have been concluded. No specific
agreement has been concluded but we have not made it more difficult for
later agreement and if we are patient I think we may achieve it after
there has been an interval in the discussions. The second test which I
have suggested should be applied to any conference is its impact upon
the course of international events and upon the prospects of future
negotiations. Failure to reach agreement has in the past filled people
with a feeling of foreboding about the future and has increased ten-
sion. It has seemed to make a crisis inevitable.

454

I do not believe that any sensible person could possibly have that feeling about the end of this phase of these negotiations. The atmosphere between the four of us has been friendly; the discussion has been temperate; there has seemed to be a genuine desire to find some common ground, while holding fast to what we regard as positions of principle; we have *not* made these stubborn problems more difficult of solution in the future.

In the last 48 hours we have had a remarkable example of the way in which the atmosphere has improved. The British Government welcomed very much the statement that Mr. Khrushchev is to visit the United States and that President Eisenhower is to visit the Soviet Union. We have always believed that personal contact between the leading statesmen and the peoples of our various countries can play an important part in establishing conditions for genuinely peaceful co-existence. We believe that the visit which Mr. Macmillan paid to the Soviet Union, on which I accompanied him, resulted in better relations between the Soviet Government and the British Government.¹ I agree with what Mr. Gromyko has said on that point. I am sure that such a pattern of personal contacts is likely to bring a further reduction of tension and the kind of atmosphere in which agreements are possible.

I cannot see how the maintenance of an atmosphere of cold war suits any of us. In view of the destructiveness of modern weapons all countries, large or small, now have a common interest in the maintenance of peace. We shall not however do this just by asserting our desire for it. It requires concrete action by the Governments of the leading countries of the world. We for our part in the United Kingdom have taken in agreement with the Soviet Government specific measures with regard to the expansion of mutual trade, the development of mutual contacts and the facilitation of communications. We believe that what we have done will have a beneficial effect, not only within the technical limits of the matters agreed, but also in the wider field of our broad political relationship with the Soviet Union.

Of course the manifold and complex problems which involve the matters at issue between us cannot be solved by a single meeting or a single conference. Our discussions here have shown how much patience is required. I understand the exasperation of those who want quick results, something definite, something specific, something that will make a good headline. Nevertheless, I am sure that our work here, although it has not produced such quick or specific results, has played its part in setting the pattern according to which the two sides should handle these great international issues in the months and years to come.

¹ See ante, pp. 333-335.

455

I hope for a system which will consist of periodic meetings at which the great problems affecting the peace of the world may be considered by Heads of Governments. The basic conception upon which the Charter of the United Nations was drafted was that if there is to be peace in the world it must be based on a broad agreement between the great powers. Since the war, there has not been that broad agreement. We think the best way to achieve it is to accept the idea that there must be periodic high level meetings. Sometimes these meetings may succeed in producing agreements on specific problems. If they always produce the decision to continue the process of meeting and negotiation, then we shall be evolving a system of regulating international affairs which is basically necessary if we are to avoid a constant atmosphere of crisis.

According to this second test, I assert that our meetings here in Geneva have been of substantial value. We have failed to reach final agreement on particular matters, but we have been able to make a real contribution towards the creation of the correct atmosphere for the further international discussions which we know must follow.

## Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Communiqué
Issued by the Four Foreign Ministers, August 5, 1959¹

The Conference of Foreign Ministers met in Geneva from 11 May to 20 June and from 13 July to 5 August, 1959.

The conference considered questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin.

The positions of the participants in the conference were set out on these questions.

A frank and comprehensive discussion took place on the Berlin question.

The positions of both sides on certain points became closer.

The discussions which have taken place will be useful for the further negotiations which are necessary in order to reach an agreement.

Furthermore the conference provided the opportunity for useful exchanges of views on other questions of mutual interest.

The Foreign Ministers have agreed to report the results of the conference to their respective Governments.

¹ Conference doc. RM/COM/2, Aug. 5, 1959.

456

The date and place for the resumption of the work of the con-
ference will be settled through diplomatic channels.

Statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko Upon Conclusion
of Foreign Ministers Meeting, Geneva, August 6, 1959 ¹

[Extract]

Unofficial translation

The foreign ministers conference which took place in Geneva has
done considerable and useful work. A thorough discussion of ques-
tions which had great significance for all peoples of Europe and for
the cause of peace has led to a definite rapprochement taking place
in the positions of the sides, and on a number of questions the pos-
sibility of agreement can be seen. At the same time, on certain
questions there are still substantial differences between the partici-
pants of the conference. This in our opinion only emphasizes the
necessity for further efforts on the part of interested states to achieve
mutually acceptable decisions. We hope that this is precisely the
direction in which matters will proceed and that the further negotia-
tions which have been agreed upon by the governments of the states
participating in the Geneva conference will be fruitful.

The development of events on the international arena and above
all such a notable fact as the agreement reached on the journey of
N. Khrushchev, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to the
United States and the visit of U.S. President Eisenhower to the
Soviet Union indicate that the climate of international relations is
getting notably warmer and better.

The Soviet Government on its part will do everything within its
power so that the problems of a peaceful settlement with Germany,
which is becoming urgent, and the question of West Berlin which
were discussed at the Geneva conference might find their settlement
in the interests of easing international tension and strengthening
peace. Anyone who does not help this assumes a great responsibility
for the consequences.

¹ Text from files of Department of State.

457

Summary Statement on Foreign Ministers Meeting at
Geneva by Secretary of State Herter, Washington,
August 6, 1959¹

[Extract]

Nine weeks of negotiation at the Foreign Ministers Conference in
Geneva have ended in a recess.

It is with deep regret that I must report the lack of agreement
on the basic issues we discussed relating to the problems of a divided
Germany and of Berlin.

The Western Powers sought particularly to obtain an agreement
that would safeguard the freedom of the more than two million people
of West Berlin. We negotiated earnestly in good faith. We were
willing to offer concessions in return for equivalent counter-concessions.

The Soviet Union, however, pursued an objective that made successful negotiation impossible. This was to ease the Western Powers out of West Berlin as quickly as possible.

The Soviet Foreign Minister used two means to do so. One was
to undermine the right of the Western Powers in Berlin. Those
rights protect the freedom of the West Berliners.

The other was to bring about so drastic a reduction of the Western
protective troops in West Berlin that the morale of the people there
would fall and the whole situation there deteriorate.

My brief visit to Berlin ² during the course of the Conference convinced me even more than before that we must stand firmly by our obligations. I am sure the American people believe this too.

Although we reached no agreement on the major issues before us,
our Conference served to lessen the sharpness of the crisis over Berlin
provoked by the Soviet Union. It also brought about a narrowing of
differences on some points. It thus moved us in the direction of the
agreement the Western Powers will continue to seek when the
Conference meets again.

I am encouraged by the fine spirit of unity among the Western
Powers daily demonstrated at Geneva. This is a hopeful augury
for continuing constructive relationships among us.

¹ For full text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 24, 1959, pp. 269-270.

² See *ibid*., Aug. 10, 1959, pp. 198-200.

458

Radio-Television Address by President Eisenhower,
September 10, 1959¹

[Extracts]

During the past 2 weeks I have conferred, as you know, with Chancellor Adenauer of Germany, Prime Minister Macmillan of Britain, and President de Gaulle of France, all old friends of mine. I talked with Prime Minister Segni of Italy, also with Mr. Luns of Holland and Mr. Spaak of Belgium, who are, respectively, the President and Secretary General of the NATO Council.²

I outlined to them the reasons for my invitation to him [Chairman Khrushchev], which are simply: first, to give him the opportunity to see what America and Americans are like—to let him see and feel a great and thriving nation living in real freedom; second, to give him, face to face, the basic convictions of our people on the major issues of the day, including West Berlin, and to hear from him directly his own views on those issues.

I assured our allies in private conversations, as I have on other occasions publicly, that my invitation to Mr. Khrushchev does not contemplate merely a ceremonial visit—just as it does not suggest any purpose of reaching definitive negotiation. But it does imply the hope that serious exploratory efforts may reveal new opportunities for practical progress toward removal of some of the causes of world tensions.

Conversations with Chairman Khrushchev will not include any negotiation concerning subjects that directly relate to the interests of our allies or to any other part of the free world.

In this connection I know that neither America nor her allies will mistake good manners and candor for weakness; no principle or fundamental interest will be placed upon any auction block. This is well understood here and abroad.

Allied leaders expressed their understanding of the reasons that prompted the invitation to Mr. Khrushchev to visit America. While their hopes for progress revealed varying degrees of optimism, each was convinced that the effort was clearly one that had to be made.

Each of the leaders with whom I talked is fully aware of America's conviction that any agreement to hold a summit meeting must be

¹ For full text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 28, 1959, pp. 435-438.

² See *ibid.*, Sept. 21, 1959, pp. 403-413.

459

based upon the certainty that our status and rights in Berlin will be respected. In addition we believe there must be some clear Soviet indication, no matter how given, that serious negotiation will bring about real promise of reducing the causes of world tensions.

Should a summit meeting on such a basis ensue:

We and our allies stand ready always to negotiate realistically with the Soviets on any mutually enforceable plan for a reduction in armaments.

We are prepared to make a real beginning toward solving the problems of a divided Germany.

We are hopeful of arranging for wider contacts in ideas, publications, persons, and information.

We are, in short, ready to negotiate on any subject within the limits dictated by the dedication of our Government and our people to the cause of a just peace and our loyalty to the United Nations and to its basic concept. That concept is that international disputes should be settled by peaceful means in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.

I repeat; we shall not retreat from these ideals or principles or weaken in our resolution to remain strong in their defense. This means that we must be as concerned about the freedom of 2 million West Berliners as we are about the freedom of any part of our coalition.

We must be concerned about threats to freedom, no matter where they may occur.

## KEY TO PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATION

Though specific problems may at times present such difficulties as to prevent immediate, practicable solution, yet we must all understand that wherever freedom is denied or lost—whether in Asia, Africa, the Americas, or in Eastern Europe—by that much is our own Nation's freedom endangered. Firmness in support of fundamentals, with flexibility in tactics and method, is the key to any hope of progress in negotiation.

The choice before world leaders is momentous.

In the past, conferences have all too often been characterized by suspicion, threat, and stubborn prejudice, and results have been barren and bleak. But, could we create an improved atmosphere of mutual understanding and serious purpose, it would be possible to attack, with renewed hope, the problems that divide us.

If the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. has constructive ideas and suggestions that could provide the basis for responsible negotiation on the issues that divide us, we would welcome the opportunity to study them with our allies.

460

It is my profound hope that some real progress will be forthcoming, even though no one would be so bold as to predict such an outcome.

Fellow Americans, we venerate more widely than any other document, except only the Bible, the American Declaration of Independence. That Declaration was more than a call to national action. It is a voice of conscience establishing clear, enduring values applicable to the lives of all men.

It stands enshrined today as a charter of human liberty and dignity. Until these things belong to every living person their pursuit is an unfinished business to occupy our children and generations to follow them.

In this spirit we stand firmly in defense of freedom.

In this spirit we cooperate with our friends and negotiate with those who oppose us.

If the forthcoming visit of Mr. Khrushchev¹ to this Nation should bring to him some real appreciation of this spirit and this conscience, then indeed the venture would be a thousandfold worthwhile.

I know that all America prays to the Almighty that this might come to pass.

## Joint Communiqué by the United States and the Soviet Union, September 27, 1959*

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., N. S. Khrushchev, and President Eisenhower have had a frank exchange of opinions at Camp David. In some of these conversations U.S. Secretary of State Herter and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, as well as other officials from both countries, participated.

Chairman Khrushchev and the President have agreed that these discussions have been useful in clarifying each other's position on a number of subjects. The talks were not undertaken to negotiate issues. It is hoped, however, that their exchanges of view will contribute to a better understanding of the motives and position of each and thus to the achievement of a just and lasting peace.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the President of the United States agreed that the question of general disarmament is the most important one facing the world today. Both governments will make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem.

¹ Khrushchev arrived in the United States on Sept. 15, 1959, for a 13-day visit.

Text from White House news release, Gettysburg, Pa., Sept. 27, 1959.

461

In the course of the conversations an exchange of views took place on the question of Germany including the question of a peace treaty with Germany, in which the positions of both sides were expounded.

With respect to the specific Berlin question, an understanding was reached, subject to the approval of the other parties directly concerned, that negotiations would be reopened with a view to achieving a solution which would be in accordance with the interests of all concerned and in the interest of the maintenance of peace.

In addition to these matters useful conversations were held on a number of questions affecting the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States. These subjects included the question of trade between the two countries. With respect to an increase in exchanges of persons and ideas, substantial progress was made in discussions between officials and it is expected that certain agreements will be reached in the near future.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the President of the United States agreed that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the application of force but by peaceful means through negotiation.

Finally it was agreed that an exact date for the return visit of the President to the Soviet Union next spring would be arranged through diplomatic channels.²

## Remarks by Chairman Khrushchev at the National Press Club, Washington, September 27, 1959²

[Extracts]

The first thing that will interest you, of course, would be my impressions about the meetings with President Eisenhower. We had pleasant talks with him and of all the subjects touched upon, there was a great deal in common in our understanding of the position and in our understanding of the need to improve relations between our two countries. It should be realized, of course, that it is not so easy to do away with the burden that has piled up during all these cold war years. One cannot hope for a sudden change of atmosphere. But the process of improving relations between our countries would require a

¹ A White House announcement of Jan. 17, 1960, stated that the President would visit the Soviet Union June 10-19, 1960 (Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 1, 1960, p. 147).

² Text from the American press, Sept. 28, 1959.

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great deal of effort and patience and, above all, desire to achieve that end on both sides.

The Soviet Union, our government, and the people I represent are guided by the interests of consolidating peace and friendship between nations.

We have been and we will make every effort to put an end to the cold war, and to improve relations between our countries.

I have no doubt whatsoever that the President is sincere in his desire to improve relations between our countries. I must say that I believe the President faces more difficult conditions than I do. Apparently there are yet in the United States influential forces which are opposed to an improvement in relations between our countries and to a relaxation of international tension. That should be taken into consideration.

But I believe that in the final run common sense will prompt the right course of action in the settlement of international problems, of course directed towards the consolidation of peace throughout the world.

Our talks with the President will be followed by his visit to the Soviet Union. Our people will meet him with the same cordiality and hospitality that your people accorded me and persons who accompanied me, and the other Soviet representatives who accompanied me. Now, gentlemen, I am prepared to answer your questions.

*Q. Henry Taylor, Scripps-Howard Newspapers: Mr. Chairman, the joint communique says both sides expounded their views on Berlin. Has the position of the Soviet Union changed as a result of your talks with President Eisenhower?*

A. That is, I must say, a very complicated question which is not so easy to reply to because, for one thing, I do not know how the author of the question understood our position on the Berlin question. But we did have an exchange of views with the President on the question, and we found much in common. I think a reply like that is quite sufficient for the press conference.

*Q. An "Izvestia" correspondent: Which questions in your view are the most mature for discussion at Heads-of-Government meetings?*

A. All matters which up to now have brought about a cold climate in our relationships with the United States could be, should be, discussed at such a conference in order to warm up the atmosphere and

463

melt these matters, these questions which have been frozen, in order
to improve relations between our two countries.

Q. (Questioner unidentified)—Mr. Chairman, do you think that a summit meeting is now assured? Where and when do you propose to hold it probably?

A. Only a director of some institution can tell his employees that all
is now ready and sign an order or instruction of some sort. This is a
different sort of business. You need agreement of all the parties
concerned to have a summit meeting, and for that reason I cannot say
that everything has already been done, that all the arrangements have
been made. The Soviet government and myself, we feel that the time
is ripe to hold such a meeting. As to the time when it could be held,
well—as to the place where it could be held, I am perfectly indifferent
on that score. I am prepared to go anywhere the others would like to
hold the meeting. Perhaps Geneva would be a good place.

Q. Ernest Barcella, United Press International—Has the hope for a permanent world peace increased as a result of your talks with President Eisenhower?

A. Hope in this respect has never left me, and I always believed that if the people concerned make an effort, peace could be assured. After meeting with the President, my hopes in this respect increased still further because I feel that the President is as concerned about assuring the peace as we are.

Q. John Scali, The Associated Press—Do you still believe that the only way to solve the German problem is to sign peace treaties with both Eastern and Western Germany?

A. As day follows night, so peace follows war. And therefore, peace should be signed and since there is no united Germany, we think that peace should be signed with the two German states. I see no other way towards that end. If you have any other suggestions, voice them. But I don't think there is a different way toward peace.

Q. Louis Cassels, United Press International—Would Russia allow foreign observers on its soil at the precise moment that proposed disarmament began, allow them to travel at will during the process of disarmament, and allow them to remain there until all disarmament is completed?

A. If you read our new proposals presented to the United Nations in my speech ¹—we are [have?] presented those proposals carefully—

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV/799, Sept. 18, 1959, pp. 34-38.

464

you will see I believe that this point is made perfectly clear. But I
am perfectly willing to repeat the gist of it here.

We believe that in the process of disarmament, each stage of dis-
armament, the development of disarmament should be accompanied by
the development of inspection and control. That is to say that in
accordance with each stage of disarmament there should be introduced
the appropriate inspection and control, and this throughout the whole
process of disarmament. When the disarmament becomes general,
the controllers should certainly, the observers should certainly remain
in order to make sure that the agreement is fully observed.

If our disarmament proposals are accepted, if there is general dis-
armament in world, then the question of secrecy would simply dis-
appear because then anyone could go anywhere, see anything, except
perhaps the places which a housewife would prefer not to see.

Q. Sarah McClendon, "The Manchester (N.H.) Union-Leader":
If there is disarmament how many men would you thus release for
your civilian economy?

A. I think that this is a case not only of journalistic but of womanly
curiosity. (Laughter and applause.) But I can say that if we get
general disarmament, which we want very much, all our generals,
officers, admirals, privates, flyers will return home.

Q. William Jorden, "New York Times"—When President Eisen-
hower asked you for assurances that Western rights in West Berlin
would continue to be respected, what was your answer?

A. We exchanged views with the President on many subjects. And I do not believe that we necessarily have to make everything public. We will make as much public as need be. I think that we have already made perhaps more than enough public. But of course the time will come when more will be revealed. Is that clear?

News Conference Statements by President Eisenhower,
September 28, 1959¹

[Extracts]

Q. Mr. President, could you give us a general evaluation of your
talks with Mr. Khrushchev, and tell us specifically whether the renun-

¹ White House news release, Sept. 28, 1959. See also the statement by James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President, *infra*.

544645—60—33

465

ciation of force mentioned in the communiqué¹ means that Mr. Khrushchev now has withdrawn any Soviet threats or ultimatums with respect to Berlin?

The President:

Now, the Chairman and I discussed the Berlin question at length. Now, as you know, no specific negotiations can be carried out in such questions as this without our allies, but you will have read the communiqué which brings up this point and said that negotiations are to be reundertaken after making proper arrangements, so, in the aim to get a solution that will protect the legitimate interests of the Soviets, the East Germans, the West Germans, and above all, the Western people.

And over and above this, we agreed in addition to what we said—the communiqué said—that these negotiations should not be prolonged indefinitely but there could be no fixed time limit on them.

Now, I think that's perfectly clear and plain, and since it was the agreement of two individuals, I think that I should not attempt to go further in expounding on that point.²

Q. Mr. President, do you feel, sir, that the conditions you have previously mentioned for going to a summit conference have now been met or still are to be met in further negotiation?

The President: I would say, for myself, this: The conditions I have set so far, so far as I am concerned, I mean the conversations have, so far as I am personally concerned, removed many of the objections that I have heretofore held; but again this is a matter for negotiation and consultation with our allies. And, as I say, the progress that has been made is—I can say that we have to consider, as long as we are going to negotiate, that there is progress because we are not on an impasse.

Q. Mr. President, can we take it, sir, that your agreement that there is to be no fixed time limit on the negotiations over Berlin also means that there can be no fixed time limit on our occupation rights there, and our access rights to that city?

The President: Well, of course there can be no fixed limit. We do say this, all of us agree that this is an abnormal situation, all the world does.

¹ Ante, pp. 461-462.

² See also remarks at Washington on Oct. 1, 1959 by Assistant Secretary of State Andrew H. Berding (Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 19, 1959, pp. 544-547).

466

Here is a free city, sitting inside a Communist country, and a hundred and ten miles from the Western Germany to which it feels it is a part. Therefore, the only way you can get a solution is by negotiations that will probably take some time, and we agree that these would not be unnecessarily or unduly extended, but we did say there is no fixed time limit in which they will be—to which they are limited.

Q. Mr. President, to use your phrase, do you think that you and Mr. Khrushchev did melt some of the ice around East-West relations, and if so, how much?

The President: Well, I'd say this: The most that could be done here is a beginning.

I think that there are a number of people close to him that are quite aware of some of the problems that come about unless we do melt some ice. For example, he himself deplored the need for spending so much money on defenses. We tried, between ourselves, to talk for a little bit about our comparative costs, therefore how we could calculate just exactly how much of our wealth is going into these things that are, after all, negative and sterile and purely defensive.

Well, this was an interesting exercise, but of course we got nowhere except his continued insistence—they're just too expensive, we must find better ways.

The same way with the individual whose name I never forget exactly—the man who was talking to Mr. McCone.¹ Well, Mr. McCone's opposite number.² He pointed out that their effort to develop this program of peaceful use of atomic energy—he said we must do it together because it is just too expensive for one country alone.

So, in a number of ways you find, if the ice is melted, an awareness on their part, not only the one that great wars are unthinkable—that's in the background, but in many ways, detailed ways, they are finding out—we just have to do something that's a little bit more reasonable than what we have been doing.

Q. Sir, the most important of the three preconditions for a summit that we've made now seems to be the removal of threats to Berlin. I know you touched on that in the first question, but I wonder if you could indicate to us whether the Chairman did promise to ease the pressure or remove pressure somewhat.

¹ John A. McCone, Chairman, United States Atomic Energy Commission.

² V. S. Yemel'yanov, Chief of the Main Administration for the Use of Atomic Energy.

467

The President: I think the statement I have read is completely-
answers your question, and the reason that I don't want to say any
more—we stated, I mean we agreed exactly on that statement, and I'm
sure that he himself will make it; corroborate it. But to go further,
can be putting words in somebody else's mouth, that I don't think is
fair.

Now, I personally think that the question is answered right there.
There is no fixed line, time, on this. No one is under duress, no one
is under any kind of threat, and as a matter of fact, he stated emphati-
cally that never had he any intention to give anything that was to be
interpreted as duress or compulsion.

Q. Mr. President, when we move into these new negotiations on Berlin, could you tell us whether we will be guided by the same standards and principles that we had before, namely, that any solution must guarantee allied rights there, and protect the freedom of the West Berliners?

The President: I can't guarantee anything of this kind for the sim-
ple reason, I don't know what kind of a solution may finally prove
acceptable, as I say, but you must start out with this. The situation
is abnormal. It was brought about by a truce, a military truce, after
the end of the war—an armistice, and it put strangely a few, or a
number of free people in a very awkward position.

Now, we've got to find a system that will be really acceptable to all
the people in that region, including those most concerned, the West
Berliners.

Statement by James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the
President, September 28, 1959¹

In response to some press queries after the President's press
conference: ²

The President, of course, did not mean that the freedom of the
people of West Berlin was going to be abandoned or that allied rights
were going to be surrendered by any unilateral action.

What he was referring to was that he could not now give in detail
the ultimate solution of the Berlin question. Any agreement must be

¹ Text from White House press release, Sept. 28, 1959.

² See *supra*.

468

acceptable to the people of the area, including the most concerned—the people of West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany.

News Conference Statement by Chairman Khrushchev,
Moscow, September 29, 1959¹

Unofficial translation

Q. Could you comment on the statement of President Eisenhower at his press conference of September 28 which says that in the course of the exchange of views between you and President Eisenhower an agreement was reached that talks on the Berlin question "are not to be dragged out for an indefinite time, but also that no time limit whatever can be set for them."

A. President Eisenhower has correctly characterized the agreement reached by us. We agreed indeed that talks on the Berlin question should be resumed, that no time limit whatsoever is to be established for them, but that they also should not be dragged out for an indefinite time.

The Soviet Government would like to express anew its confidence that all parties concerned will strive to solve the West Berlin problem without delay in accordance with the interests of relaxing tension in Germany and in Europe, and with the interests of strengthening peace.

News Conference Statements by Secretary of State
Herter, October 6, 1959²

*Secretary Herter:* Ladies and gentlemen, there is one question that I suspect might come up during the course of this conference, and I am taking the liberty of answering it even before it is posed, and that has to do with a possible summit conference.

We have been communicating with our allies on the various subjects brought up between the President and Chairman Khrushchev at

¹ Unofficial translation from *Izvestia*, Sept. 30, 1959.

² For complete text of the news conference, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 26, 1959, pp. 575-581.

469

Camp David.¹ Among these is a possible summit conference. The matter of a summit conference, and when or where it might be held, is, as the President said last week, a subject for consultation with other nations. Until that process has been completed, I cannot properly say anything further.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you care to sum up for us the points of value in the Khrushchev visit and discussions of the Chairman with President Eisenhower, in the way of second thoughts, since a week has elapsed since the Premier has left this country?

A. I take it that that question is on points of value. That, it seems to me, would have to be answered in two parts. First, the short-range value: I think that the meetings did have value in easing to some degree existing tensions. I think that they had value in allowing the President and Mr. Khrushchev to get to know each other better as individuals. And I gather from such statements as have been made by Mr. Khrushchev since he left the United States that he is publicly stating that he has a very high regard for the President. I think the trip as a whole had value in that certainly Mr. Khrushchev must have seen a good many different facets of American life with which he had not previously been familiar, and undoubtedly that had its good points.

With respect to the substance of the conversations themselves, as you have been informed by the President and by the communique, the decisions, particularly with respect to Berlin, certainly have eased the question of any threat in connection with further negotiations that might be undertaken.

With respect to disarmament, which was discussed only in very general terms, as I understand it, between the President and Mr. Khrushchev, there was certainly in Mr. Khrushchev's attitude a degree of real sincerity, which, of course, has to be balanced against the proposal itself, as it was made at the United Nations, and as it has sometimes, rather skeptically I think, been termed a propaganda document.²

From a long-range point of view I think it still remains to be seen how valuable the visit has been. On that score, I can only say that time will tell, but I would like to be optimistic.

¹ See Joint Communiqué issued on Sept. 27, ante.

² U.N. doc. A/PV/799, Sept. 18, 1959, pp. 34-38.

470

### QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON BERLIN

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have just said that the talks at Camp David with respect to Berlin have eased the situation with respect to any threat toward future negotiations. In your speech before the United Nations,¹ which happened before the Camp David talks, you said it was only after this threat had been withdrawn that the Western Powers agreed to negotiate in the interest of peaceful exchange.

A. Yes, the threat had been withdrawn, but only temporarily, as you may recall it. And the point we were negotiating about at the end was a temporary settlement over Berlin. And, actually, the breaking point in those discussions came when we could receive no assurances from the Russians that if negotiations were resumed, after "x" period of time, our rights would not be impaired.

Q. So that was the point on which we broke off the talks, that there existed a new threat during the Berlin talks?

A. Yes, it was made clear that they would give no assurances that, after a given period of time for a modus vivendi for Berlin, if negotiations were resumed our rights would remain unimpaired.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have spoken, of course, of the easing of tensions due to the withdrawal of the threat. Now do you have any specific information that would give you any hope that we have any more chance of reaching an agreement on Berlin and on Germany at the summit meeting than we had at the Geneva conference last summer?

A. No, I can't say that I can give you that assurance.

### DISARMAMENT

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that you were convinced that Mr. Khrushchev was sincere in what he said about disarmament. In the talks at Camp David did the Russians give any indication at all of what they are prepared to do on control and inspection?

A. No, there were no detailed discussions of control and inspection. That has been the stumbling block of any successful negotiations on this subject, and nothing was said in regard to specifics in that matter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider that the threat to Berlin, about which you were talking earlier, has now been indefinitely lifted or permanently lifted? What phrasing would you use?

A. I presume that the word "indefinitely" is better than the word "permanently." "Indefinitely" was the word that was used in con-

¹ For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 5, 1959, pp. 467-475.

471

nection with the prolongation of the conversations—that they would not be prolonged indefinitely.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in regard to the nuclear test ban negotiations, there was nothing in the communique on that subject. Was that discussed at Camp David in any detail?*

A. As far as I know it was not discussed between the President and Mr. Khrushchev. It was discussed by myself with Mr. [Andrei] Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister], and no new light was shed on reaching agreement there.

## DEFINITION OF THREAT TO BERLIN

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you spell out a little bit more in detail what you mean when you say the Camp David talks eased the threat to Berlin, and particularly would you define what the threat to Berlin is, or was?*

A. Well, the threat to Berlin, as it was stated and has been restated on several occasions, was that the Russians would draw up a peace treaty with the East Germans and would transfer to the East Germans all the rights of sovereignty in the routes of access to Berlin; that thereafter the obligations which the Russians undertook to maintain the open communications for the people of West Berlin, whether they were persons or goods or communications, would then be transferred to the East Germans. But if we made any move to maintain our own rights as against the East Germans, the Russians would then support the East Germans. That was the threat that was made.

*Q. That goes back to November of last year.¹*

A. That's right.

*Q. But the Soviet position still is, I believe, that the West should get out of Berlin. So in that respect, I suppose the threat to Berlin remains?*

A. The Russian position, as I understand it, is that the occupation status of our troops in Berlin should not be perpetuated forever.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any inconsistency in your statement just a few moments ago that we have not separated the Berlin issue from the whole issue of German reunification and President Eisenhower's statement at his last news conference that the Berlin situation was an abnormal situation?*

¹ See Soviet note of Nov. 27, 1958, ante.

472

A. There is nothing inconsistent in that. Mr. Couve de Murville, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, and I all agreed in Geneva that it was an abnormal situation, that it was abnormal in that you still had occupation troops after a period of 14 years, that likewise it was a free city surrounded by an inimical Communist group and that was an abnormal situation. We have never denied that for a moment.

Q. Has it not been our position though that it was abnormal because the division of Germany was abnormal?

A. We have certainly taken that position.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we can get this Berlin thing a little clearer. You have defined the threat to Berlin and then you have defined our position and you said the Russians have withdrawn the threat. Have they said they will not now withdraw their troops and hand over authority? Or just what is the situation? Or did they just postpone the threat?

A. What they have said is that they put no time limit on the negotiations, which in effect meant that there would be no unilateral action on their part, while the negotiations are continuing.

Q. But this is still their goal, to hand it over to the East Germans?

A. It is very much their goal. In fact, there was a message from Mr. Khrushchev to the East Germans sent, I think today, congratulating them on the valiant stand that they are making to get rid of the occupation forces in Berlin.

Announcement of Invitation to Chairman Khrushchev To Visit France, October 23, 1959 ¹

The President of the French Republic has invited the President of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union to come to France. Mr. Khrushchev has made it known, in response, that he thanked

¹Text from The New York Times, Oct. 24, 1959. Released simultaneously in Paris and Moscow.

In the course of talks held by British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd at Paris with French leaders, Nov. 11-12, it was announced that President Charles de Gaulle had accepted with "great pleasure" an invitation from Queen Elizabeth to visit the United Kingdom from Apr. 5 to 8, 1960.

The White House announced on Jan. 6, 1950, that President de Gaulle would visit the United States Apr. 22-25.

British Prime Minister Macmillan visited Washington Mar. 26-30.

473

General de Gaulle and that he accepted his invitation. The date and the program of the voyage in France of Mr. Khrushchev will be fixed later.

## Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Khrushchev, December 21, 1959¹

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you are aware I have just met with President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan. Among the subjects we discussed was the possibility of our having a meeting with you to consider international questions of mutual concern.

We agreed that it would be desirable for the four Heads of State or Government to meet together from time to time in each other's countries to discuss the main problems affecting the attainment of peace and stability in the world. I therefore wish now to express my readiness to meet with you, President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan at the earliest feasible time. In view of the engagements of all of us, as they are known to me, we had thought that the opening date for the proposed conference could be April 27 and that Paris would be the most appropriate place for the first meeting.

I very much hope that this proposal is acceptable to you.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

## Communiqué by Western Heads of State and Government, December 21, 1959*

The President of the United States of America, the President of the French Republic, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany met in Paris and at Rambouillet on the 19th, 20th and 21st of December, 1959 and exchanged views on various subjects of common interest.

In the course of these meetings consideration was given to the views expressed by the member governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the meeting of the Council held in Paris from the 15th to the 17th of December.

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 11, 1960, p. 44. For Khrushchev's reply, dated Dec. 25, 1959, see *post*.

*Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 11, 1960, pp. 43-44.

²Not printed here. See communiqué of Dec. 22, 1959, *post*.

474

Among the subjects discussed were East-West relations, disarma-
ment and problems relating to Germany including Berlin. On the
last point the Heads of State and Government reaffirmed the prin-
ciples set forth in the Four Power communique of December 14, 1958,
and in the declaration of the North Atlantic Council of December 16th,
1958 on Berlin.

The Heads of State and Government agreed on the desirability of
a Four Power conference with the Chairman of the Council of Minis-
ters of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The purpose of
this conference would be to consider a number of questions of mutual
concern. President Eisenhower, General de Gaulle and Mr. Mac-
millan have sent letters to Mr. Khrushchev proposing such a meeting
beginning on the 27th of April in Paris. These letters were delivered
in Moscow this morning. The texts are being immediately released.
The Heads of State and Government have agreed on the procedures
to be followed in preparation for the proposed meeting and have
issued the necessary directives to this end.

The North Atlantic Council will be informed of the results of the
present conversations at the Ministerial meeting which will take
place on the 22nd of December, and the Council will be regularly
consulted during the course of the preparatory work.

The Heads of State and Government express the hope that the
proposed conference will contribute to the strengthening of peace with
justice.

Communiqué Issued by the North Atlantic Council,
December 22, 1959 ¹

The North Atlantic Council completed its Ministerial Session on
December 22.

The Council heard an account by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of France, speaking on behalf of the Governments of the United
States, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of
Germany, of the conclusions reached by the Heads of State and of
Government during their discussions in Paris from the 19th to the
21st of December in regard to East-West relations. During the de-
tailed discussions which followed, the Council recognized that the

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 11, 1960, pp. 44-45. The North Atlantic Council began its regular Ministerial session in Paris on Dec. 15. For text of communiqué issued at the close of the first part of the Ministerial Meeting, on Dec. 17, see *ibid*., Jan. 4, 1960, pp. 3-4.

475

views expressed by the four Governments fully reflected those which
had been expounded by its members on December 15th. The Council
gives its full support to the position adopted by the four Governments.

The Council takes note of the arrangements proposed to the Soviet
Government for the opening of negotiations in Paris in April. It
agrees with the arrangements made to secure full consultation with
all member Governments during the preparation of these negotia-
tions and undertakes to play a constructive part in ensuring their
success. It instructed the Permanent Council to ensure that member
Governments are informed and consulted, and to make the necessary
arrangements to that end.

The Council heard a report from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Italy, on behalf of the five Western members of the Committee
of Ten on Disarmament (Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom
and the United States), regarding the decisions taken by them. It
agrees with the five Governments that March 15th should be proposed
for the meeting of this Committee. It approves the arrangements
made in regard to prior consultations, and instructs the Permanent
Council, calling as it desires upon the NATO military authorities,
to consider what further assistance it can give to the consideration of
plans for controlled disarmament.

While welcoming the new prospects of negotiations and agreement,
the Council thinks it necessary to reaffirm the principles which it set
out in its statement on Berlin on the 16th of December, 1958, and to
emphasize once again that the Alliance must remain vigilant and
strong. The Council shares the hope of the Heads of State and of
Government that the forthcoming conference will contribute to the
strengthening of peace with justice.

Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President
Eisenhower, December 25, 1959¹

Unofficial translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your letter in which you con-
firm your readiness to take part in a summit meeting of the Four
Powers and communicate the understanding reached on this question
between you, Prime Minister Macmillan and President de Gaulle.
First of all I wish to express my deep satisfaction that you, Prime
Minister Macmillan and President de Gaulle consider it desirable for
the discussion of the main international problems from time to time

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 18, 1960, p. 77.

476

to arrange a meeting at the highest level of the countries taking part in such a meeting.

The Soviet Government can only welcome such a declaration. We have always considered that it is exactly through the personal meetings of statesmen on the highest level that urgent international problems can be resolved in the most effective manner.

The Soviet Government expresses its readiness for conducting the summit meeting in Paris.

Unfortunately the date named for this meeting of April 27, 1960, is not convenient for the Soviet Government. In connection with this, we would like to suggest as a possible date for this meeting the 21st of April or the 4th of May 1960.

The Soviet Government hopes that one of these dates will be acceptable for the Government of the United States of America as well as for the Governments of Great Britain and France and that its proposal will not make any difficulty in the choice of a definitive date for the meeting of the Heads of Government.

I hope, Mr. President, that these considerations will be acceptable to you.

With warm regards.

N. KHRUSHCHEV

## Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Khrushchev, December 29, 1959¹

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I note with satisfaction that you have agreed to participate in a Summit meeting of the Four Powers in Paris which Prime Minister Macmillan, President de Gaulle and myself proposed to you. I can well understand the difficulty of arriving at a date commonly acceptable to the four of us.

I have been in touch with Prime Minister Macmillan and President de Gaulle in regard to the alternative dates which you suggest. Unfortunately, due to other engagements, both President de Gaulle and I would not find it possible to meet on April 21. I further understand that Prime Minister Macmillan has prior commitments which run from May 3 until mid-May.

Provided that this is acceptable to you, the best arrangement would seem to be for the meeting of the Four Powers to open in Paris on May 16.

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 18, 1960, p. 77.

477

I trust, Mr. Chairman, that this will not present any difficulties to
you and that we may agree to meet in Paris on that date.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President
Eisenhower, December 30, 1959¹

Unofficial translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I received your letter of December 29 in
which you express yourself in favor of a summit meeting of the Four
Powers in Paris beginning May 16, 1960.

The Soviet Government considers this date acceptable.

It is now possible to note with satisfaction that as a result of the
joint consultations among the Governments of the Four Powers final
agreement has been reached on the date and place for convening a
summit conference.

N. KHRUSHCHEV

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 18, 1960, p. 78.

478

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960