[L.C]

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

DECEMBER 1955 - MARCH 1957

I. Introduction

The object of this study is to analyze American diplomacy in the Middle East, during the Suez Crisis, from the decision to offer American aid for the construction of the Aswan Dam in December 1955, to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in March 1957. The study is an analysis of American diplomacy, rather than American policy during this period. It will endeavor to examine American actions (and lack of action) as they occurred, within the train of events. As stated, this is not a study of the basic policy objectives of the United States in the Middle East. These objectives have been defined and discussed many times, and in spite of any inadequacies which may exist in their formulation, or clarity of definition, they will be assumed as given. On the basis of these given principles and policy objectives, American actions and tactics will be analyzed, and related to the assumed general objectives.

The first and basic assumption about American policy in the Middle East is that it is a function of the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Policy measures in the Middle East, as elsewhere, have as their primary objective the promotion of the security of the United States vis-à-vis the USSR. Consequently, the United States strives to increase its influence in the region and to diminish Soviet influence, so as to promote conditions in which the strategic assets and the natural resources of the Middle East could be best

2.

utilized in the interest of American security. The strategic importance of the Middle East for communications and existing, as well as potential bases, and the dependence of Western Europe on Middle East oil, are generally accepted and shall not be discussed here.

Notwithstanding this primary policy objective, there are certain secondary objectives which can be viewed both as corollaries of it, and as stemming from the general environment of American ideals and culture. Among these secondary objectives are the preservation of peace and the promotion of the welfare of the people in the area. They can be viewed as corollaries of the primary objective of promotion of American security, on the assumption that social and political stability will decrease the susceptibility of the region to Soviet encroachments. The relationship of these secondary objectives to American ideals and culture, is obvious and need not be elaborated here.¹

It is inevitable that the implementation of this policy be subject to various restraints and be hampered by contradictions. The restraints are inherent in Western culture and morality. The American constitutional structure and the environment of American domestic politics are additional restraining factors. The contradictions stem from inevitable conflicts of objectives and priorities.

To illustrate with a few examples: The preservation and strengthening of NATO require close association between the United States and Britain and France. Such an association with former colonial powers is

¹ For recent discussions of American policy objectives in the Middle East see: Badeau, John S., "The Middle East: Conflict in Priorities," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 2, January 1958, pp. 233-236; Campbell, John C., *Defense of the Middle East*, New York, (Harper & Bros. for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1958, pp.3-7; Nolte, Richard H. and Polk, William R., "Toward a Policy for the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 4, July 1958, pp. 645-648.

3c. No. 4, July 1928, pp. 642-648.
William H., "Toward a Policy for the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 3, January 1928, pp. 533-536; Campbell, Beat see: Hesam, John S., "The Middle East: Conflict in Priorities," 1. For recent discussions of American policy objectives in the Middle

Britain and France. Such an association with former colonial powers is
ning of NATO require close association between the United States and
To illustrate with a few examples: The preservation and加强-
inevitable conflicts of objectives and priorities.

It is inevitable that the implementation of this policy be and-
and need not be elaborated here.¹

of these secondary objectives to American ideals and culture, is opinions
assessability of the region to Soviet encroachments. The relationship
on the assumption that social and political stability will decrease the
use of collaterals of the primary objectives of promotion of American security,
bribery of the welfare of the people in the area. They can be viewed
among these secondary objectives are the preservation of peace and the
as stemming from the general environment of American ideals and culture.
secondary objectives which can be viewed both as collaterals of it, and
notwithstanding this primary policy objective, there are certain


generally accepted and will not be discussed here.

pursue, and the dependence of Western Europe on Middle East oil, are
of the Middle East for communications and existing, as well as potential
utilised in the interest of American security. The strategic importance

of the Middle East for communications and existing, as well as potential
utilised in the interest of American security. The strategic importance
of the Middle East for communications and existing, as well as potential
utilised in the interest of American security. The strategic importance

2.

[lc]

3.

a factor complicating American relations with some of the Arab states. The American interest in the preservation of Israel, stemming from its commitment to the United Nations and preservation of the independence and integrity of its members, as well as from considerations of domestic policy, is another complicating factor in US-Arab relations. A further illustration of such contradictions are attempts to increase American influence among neutral nations, and at the same time to appear to respect their desire for neutrality.

The task of diplomacy is not only to make clever moves on the chessboard of international politics, but also to resolve contradictions between equally worthy objectives. Consequently, this study will analyze American diplomacy in the Middle East in terms of the tactical moves made and their relationship to basic policy objectives, as well as its success in resolving the contradictions stemming from some of the secondary objectives.

Such an analysis, at this time, three years after the events, is greatly handicapped by the unavailability of government papers and documents. However, as most of these materials will remain classified for many years, this situation is not likely to be altered in the foreseeable future. Inevitably, much of this study will be based on conjecture. Nevertheless, in view of the ever pending recurrence of similar crises, a study of a previous one, even if based on incomplete information, may be of value.

## II. The Aswan Dam

United States involvement in the Aswan Dam project was clearly political in nature. The United States believed that its participation in the project would enable it to exert influence upon the direction of

in the project would enable it to exert influence upon the direction of
political in nature. The United States believed that its participation
United States involvement in theavan Dam project was clearly

II. The Vanwan Dam

tion may be of value.

crises, a study of a previous one, even if based on incomplete informa-
ture. Nevertheless, an overview of the ever expanding recurrence of similar
similarities. Inevitably, much of this study will be based on convec-
tions. However, as most of these materials will remain classified
for many years, this situation is not likely to be altered in the fore-
documents. However, as most of these materials will remain classified
is greatly handicapped by the unsatisfactory of government agencies and
SHOW an analysis, at this time, three years after the events,
the secondarily objectives.

as its success in resolving the contradictions stemming from some of
moves made and their relationship to past policy objectives, as well
analyze American diplomacy in the Middle East in terms of the tactical
lines between equally worthy objectives. Consequently, this study will
cheaperd of international policy, but also to resolve contradictory
The task of diplomacy is not only to make clever moves on the
respect their desire for neutrality.

influence among neutral nations, and at the same time to appear to
illustrate of such contradictions are attempts to increase American
belliger, is another complicating factor in U2-Arab relations. A further
and integrity of its members, as well as from considerations of domestic
commitment to the United Nations and preservation of the independence
The American interest in the preservation of itself, stemming from its
a factor complicating American relations with some of the Arab states.

3.

[C]

4.

[LC]

Egyptian policies and energies over a considerable period of time. However, United States involvement was never whole hearted. Besides the advantages, there were serious liabilities to be incurred by participating in a project of such magnitude, and entering into a moral, if not legal, long term commitment of this nature. It was these doubts which were primarily responsible for the vacillations in the American attitude toward participation in the project.

Initially, there was a clear link between offers of American aid to Egypt and Egyptian agreement to cooperate in a Western sponsored defense alliance. Attempts to induce Egypt to align itself with the West in the Cold War were resumed, (after their initial failure in 1951), soon after President Eisenhower took office. In April 1953, the President started an exchange of correspondence with President Naguib of Egypt, discussing apparently among other subjects also the question of Egyptian cooperation in the establishment a regional defense organization linked to the West. Naguib answered in early July stating that a satisfactory solution of the dispute over the continued stationing of British troops in the Suez Canal zone could clear the way for Egypt to cooperate on a new basis with the West, in the defense of Egypt and other Arab states. In an attempt to encourage this trend of thought in Egypt, President Eisenhower responded on July 15, 1953, assuring Naguib that "simultaneously" with the conclusion of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement on Suez, he would be prepared to see "firm commitments" entered into by the United States for economic aid and the "strengthening" Egyptian armed forces "to discharge their increased responsibilities."² The implication of the President's pledge seems to have been that he expected that

² *New York Times*, July 31, 1954.

New York Times, July 31, 1933.

tion of the President's pledge seems to have been that he expected forces "to discharge their increased responsibilities." The implications of the United States for economic aid and the "strengthening" Egyptian armed forces, he would be prepared to see "firm commitments," entered into by Egypt, President Ennieson reëmboned on 11 July 1933, seeming Magrip other Arab statesman. In an attempt to encourage this trend of thought in coöperate on a new basis with the West, in the defense of Egypt and British troops in the Gres Canal some could clear the way for Egypt to satisfy other solution of the dispute over the continued stationing of tion linked to the West. Magrip answered in early July affecting that a Egyptian cooperation in the establishment a regional defense organization, discussing abrurfly amount other aspects into the question of dent started an exchange of correspondence with President Magrip of soon after President Ennieson took office. In April 1933, the President in the Cold War were reëamed (after their initial failure in 1921), defense alliance. Attempts to induce Egypt to sign itself with the to Egypt and Egyptian agreement to coöperate in a Western abovementioned initially, there was a clear link between offers of American aid toward participation in the project.

were primarily reasonable for the oscillations in the American attitude legal, long term commitment of this nature. It was these couple which giving in a project of such magnitude, and entering into a moral, it not advanced a, there were serious liabilities to be incurred by Magrip ever, United States involvement was never whole hearted. Besides the Egyptian policies and energies over a considerable period of time. How-

44.

[C]

5.

[LC]

he expected that a new Anglo Egyptian agreement would result in increasing Egyptian responsibilities for the defense of the Suez Canal, and that Egypt would be prepared to exercise those responsibilities in co-operation and coordination with the West.

It is difficult to estimate what influence this and other similar United States pledges had on the course of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. It seems, however, that following the solution the Anglo-Egyptian crisis over the British bases in the Canal zone, there was willingness on both sides to explore the question further. Negotiations on the implementation of President Eisenhower's pledge started both in Cairo and in Washington immediately after the initialling of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on July 15, 1954. In October, an Egyptian mission came to Washington for further negotiations on economic aid and Egyptian development projects. Discussions were held both with the State Department and the Foreign Operations Administration, as well as with the World Bank. Among the subjects discussed was the Aswan Dam. Details about the negotiations were not made public but it appears that little, if any, progress was made on the Aswan Dam question.³

The realization of the project was not advanced much during the first nine months of 1955. Technical studies on the feasibility of the project and the economics of it were carried out by the World Bank. However, no decision was taken on the question of Western participation in the financing of the Dam. It is not unreasonable to assume that a most important delaying factor was Egypt's refusal to become in any way associated with the Western alliance system. Not only did this refusal rule

³ *New York Times*, October 26, 1954.

6. [LC]

out the military aid program previously contemplated, but it almost certainly resulted in a reexamination of the question of economic aid to Egypt. However, the conclusion that the Nasser regime should be supported was reaffirmed. It was considered in the West's interest that there be a strong and stable government in Egypt. It was hoped that continued support may, in the course of time, induce it to change its attitude toward the West.

As for the Aswan Dam, there were persuasive arguments both for and against United States involvement in this particular project. On the positive side, there was of course Egypt's need. It was estimated that the project would help Egypt increase its productive capacity so as to enable it to keep up with its rapidly increasing population. Thus, it was hoped that the project would help to forestall a further decline in the standard of living and the political instability accompanying it. Moreover, a project of such magnitude was likely to preoccupy Egypt for many years, and necessitate such concentration of national resources, that military adventures, either with Israel or over the Sudan, would become unlikely for some time. It may help calm down the atmosphere and might create conditions under which an Arab-Israeli peace could be concluded. Furthermore, Egypt would be dependent on Western aid during a period of at least ten years while the project was under construction, and therefore more amenable to Western influence. Finally, it was hoped that American aid in a project of such magnitude, which has assumed considerable symbolic and political importance in Egypt, would help win good will and raise American prestige in the country.

The case against American participation in the project was partly

7.

[LC]

based on the reverse of these same arguments. By committing itself to aid a project of such magnitude, the United States would actually bind itself to support the governments and policies of Egypt for the duration of the project, lasting ten to fifteen years. Once becoming involved in the project, it would be impossible for the United States to dissociate itself from it, without major repercussions for American prestige and influence in the Middle East. Such a commitment would be a very imprudent one to make, especially in an area as unstable as the Middle East. Moreover, it was by no means certain that assistance on the project would win for the West good will and gratitude. On the contrary, as Secretary of State Dulles subsequently stated, it was likely that when the great financial burdens of the project caused complaint, the responsibility "would be placed upon the foreign lenders and they would end up by being disliked instead of liked."⁴

As 1955 went by, the argument both for and against assistance were reinforced by events. A complication developed with respect to obtaining the agreement of the riparian states to the project. Some of them, notably Sudan and Ethiopia, preferred different schemes for control and utilization of the Nile waters, and were in various degrees opposed to the Aswan Dam. The agreement of the Sudan to the project was specifically required by the terms of a 1929 Convention providing that no project on the Nile could be undertaken by either Egypt or the Sudan without the consent of the other. Sudanese consent was also necessary because the project would involve the flooding of considerable areas within the Sudan, including the town of Wadi Halfa. However, negotiations on the subject between Egypt and the Sudan broke down in April 1955 amidst bit-

⁴ United States Department of State, *United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956-June 1957*, Washington 1957, p. 375, (Hereafter referred to as S.D. Doc. II).

8.

[LC]

ter accusations by each side against the other. An even more unpleasant crisis between the two countries occurred in July when Premier al Azhari and seven members of the Cabinet broke off negotiations they were holding in Cairo with President Nasser and Egyptian officials on various questions of mutual concern, including the division of the Nile waters. The crisis, apparently caused by al Azhari's repudiation of his alleged support for a union between Sudan and Egypt, inevitably complicated all aspects of Egyptian-Sudanese relations.⁵

Egypt's increasingly more outspoken neutralist policy was another factor to be taken into account. Not only did Egypt itself decline cooperating with the Western alliance system, but it also exercised pressure on other Arab states not to do so. Particularly strong pressures was put on Iraq not to join what subsequently became the Baghdad Pact. After the Pact was signed, propaganda against the Pact and against the West in general increased considerably. It was primarily due to Egyptian opposition that other Arab states failed to join the Pact, as was originally expected.⁶

Moreover, Egypt took an increasingly active role in propagating neutralism at international gatherings. Nasser played a prominent part in this respect at Bandung. A strongly neutralist stand with anti-West-

⁵ *New York Times*, April 8, 1955; May 21, 1955; July 30, 1955. When the negotiations were broken off in July the Egyptian press blamed the United States and Britain for their alleged influence on the Sudan, in an attempt to "isolate Egypt" because of its refusal to join a Western defense alliance.

⁶ Campbell, op. cit., pp. 49-62; Sir Reader Bullard (ed.), *The Middle East, A Political and Economic Survey*, (OUP for RIIA, 1958), p. 200.

9.

[LC]

ern overtures was taken by Egypt at the United Nations and at other occasions as well.

Finally, 1955 was the year of the Egyptian-Czech arms deal. News of the agreement, made public in September, was accompanied by assurances that Egypt did not intend to ally itself with the Soviet Union, but would continue its neutralist policy. Nevertheless, the agreement occasioned considerable alarm in the West. The shipment of arms to Egypt greatly increased Soviet popularity in the Middle East and caused further decline in Western prestige. But a cause of greater concern was the resultant growing dependence of Egypt on the Soviet Union, both militarily and economically. It was feared that even if Nasser wished to continue a neutralist policy he soon will be unable to do so, because of his dependence on Soviet supply of spare parts to his re-equipped army, and on Soviet good will in its disposition and marketing of Egyptian cotton.⁷

These events had a mixed effect on the consideration given to the question of American aid on the Aswan Dam project. On the one hand, it was clearly inadvisable to become associated in the project prior to an agreement being reached on the question between Egypt and the Sudan. Though not a decisive factor, it was nevertheless desirable to avoid the appearance that the United States was supporting Egypt against the Sudan and Ethiopia which were opposed to the project.

Egypt's neutralist policy, and propaganda against the West and Western military alliances was another argument against United States participation in the project. If Nasser was actively engaged in undermining Western influence in the Middle East and Western efforts to establish a defensive alliance in the region, there was little logic in the argument.

⁷ On the arms deal see W. Z. Laqueur, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*, (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 221-227.

Beat, (New York: Freer, 1922), pp. SSI-SSS.

On the same page see M. Z. Isadoff, The Soviet Union and the Middle

tropian a defensive alliance in the region, there was little logic in mining Western influence in the Middle East and Western efforts to establish Western military alliances was another argument against United States Egtbf's a neutralist policy, and probably against the West and against the Soviet and Eftlobs which were opposed to the project.

To avoid the appearance that the United States was embarking Egtbf onto the Soviet Union. Though not a decisive factor, it was nevertheless desirable prior to an agreement being reached on the question between Egtbf and the Soviet Union, it was clearly undesirable to become associated in the project of American aid on the Vaman Dam project. On the one hand events had a mixed effect on the consideration given to

Soviet good will in its diabatization and marketing of Egyptian cotton.⁵

bendence on Soviet абbrly of abate bate to his re-enshield amry, and on
a neutralist policy he soon will be muple to do so, because of his de-
and economically. It was learned that even if Haaer wished to continue
enlistant growing dependence of Egtbf on the Soviet Union, both militarily
decline in Western breifite. But a cause of greater concern was the re-
greatly increased Soviet homogeneity in the Middle East and caused further
occasioned considerable alarm in the West. The anuiment of arms to Egtbf
put would continue its neutralist policy. Nevertheless, the agreement
enances that Egtbf did not intend to sily itself with the Soviet Union,
news of the agreement, made bupit in September, was so combined as a se-
公平, 1922 was the year of the Egyptian-Czech arms desr.

occasions as well.

ern overtures was taken by Egtbf at the United Nations and at other

[LC]

10.

in supporting him and helping him to remain in power. Moreover, large scale assistance to an avowedly neutral country, the "neutrality" of which tended to favor the Soviet Union, was bound to raise questions among America's allies as to the relative merits of neutrality and alignment.

The arms deal seems to have thrown the United States off balance and to have introduced an air of nervous urgency about the Middle East in general, and relations with Egypt in particular. It was considered necessary to take urgent steps to prevent Egypt from increasing its dependence on the Soviet Union. The sincerity of Nasser's desire to maintain Egypt's independence of both blocs was not doubted, but it was feared he may not be able to do so unless he received Western aid to counteract his growing dependence on the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the issue remained in abeyance for several weeks. The final decision to offer Western aid for the construction of the Aswan Dam was taken only after it was reported that the Soviet Union had offered to help finance the Dam and that Egypt was considering the Soviet offer. The purpose of the West's offer was clearly to forestall the acceptance of Soviet aid on the project, which it was feared, might put Egypt irreversibly on the road to becoming a Soviet satellite. Whether the Soviet Union seriously considered at that time the possibility of offering assistance for the Dam is difficult to say. The manner in which the alleged Soviet offer was published strongly suggests that Egypt was using this, whether such offer existed or not, as a means to pressure the United States to accept a favorable decision. Reports about the alleged Soviet offer received great publicity during the first half of October,

Soviet offer received great publicity during the first half of October, United States to accept a favorable decision. Reports about the alleged using this, whether an offer existed or not, as a means to pressure the the alleged Soviet offer was bandied about strongly suggests that EIGHT was offering assistance for the Dam if difficult to say. The manner in which the Soviet Union seriously considered at that time the feasibility of but EIGHT irreversibly on the road to becoming a Soviet satellite. Whether the acceptance of Soviet aid on the part of, which it was offered, might Soviet offer. The purpose of the West's offer was clearly to foretell offered to help finance the Dam and that EIGHT was considering the Dam. Dam was taken only after it was reported that the Soviet Union had The final decision to offer Western aid for the construction of the Va- Nevertheless, the false remained in evidence for several weeks. counteract his growing dependence on the Soviet Union. learned he may not be able to do so unless he received Western aid to retain EIGHT's independence of both pieces was not coupled, but it was dependence on the Soviet Union. The sincerity of Western's desire to maintain to take urgent action to prevent EIGHT from increasing its demand in general, and relations with EIGHT in particular. It was considered and to have introduced an air of nervousness about the Middle East The arms deal seems to have thrown the United States off balance if anything.

10.

11.

[LC]

while the United States and the world were still stunned by the news
about the arms deal, announced two weeks earlier. The reports came from
Egyptian sources, and no confirmation could be received at that time
from the Russians that such an offer had been made. Soviet spokesmen
publicized their general offers of economic aid, but made no mention of
the Aswan Dam. Most probably the matter was discussed between Soviet
and Egyptian officials, and the Russians apparently did give some indi-
cation of their willingness to help. The Egyptian ambassador reportedly
informed Secretary of State Dulles about such a Russian offer on October
17. ⁸

Whatever the case, whether a Soviet offer was actually made or
not, the United States was at that time not prepared to risk what it
considered would be a great diplomatic defeat. It is unlikely that
American officials took the reports about the Soviet offer at face value.
The prevailing opinion in the Administration at that time was that the
threat of a Soviet economic offensive in the Middle East and elsewhere
was a bluff. It was doubted that the Soviet Union was able, in terms
of available resources and priorities, to undertake to assist the Dam
project. ⁹ However, the argument that no chances could be taken on this
issue prevailed. It was considered that Egyptian acceptance of Soviet
aid on the Dam would not only be a heavy blow to United States prestige
and influence, but would deliver Egypt irrevocably into the Soviet orbit.

Consequently, when negotiations on the subject were resumed in

⁸ For reports from Egyptian sources about the alleged Soviet offer, see *New York Times*, October 11, 1955; October 14, 1955; November 21, 1955; For the report on the meeting between Ambassador Hussein and Secretary of State Dulles, see *New York Times*, October 18, 1955; On November 5, 1955 Ambassador Hussein told the press: "There was a great deal of delay in this matter. Now perhaps the Soviet Offer will speed things up." (*New York Times*, November 6, 1955).

⁹ D. A. Schmidt in the *New York Times*, November 16, 1955.

9 D. A. Schmidt in the *New York Times*, November 16, 1922.

10 *New York Times*, November 6, 1922).
11 For reports from Egyptian sources about the alleged Soviet offer, see
12 *New York Times*, October 11, 1922; October 14, 1922; November 31, 1922;
13 For the report on the meeting between Ambassador Huseini and Secretary of
14 State Dules, see *New York Times*, October 18, 1922; On November 2, 1922
15 For the report on the meeting between Ambassador Huseini and Secretary of
16 New York Times*, October 11, 1922; October 14, 1922; November 31, 1922;
17 For reports from Egyptian sources about the alleged Soviet offer, see
18

Consequently, when negotiations on the subject were resumed in
and influence, but would deliver Egyptian irrevocably into the Soviet orbit,
said on the Dam would not only be a heavy blow to United States breathe
infantebreastfed. It was considered that Egyptian acceptance of Soviet
project. However, the argument that no chance could be taken on future
of available resources and priorities, to undertake to assist the Dam
was a null. It was deemed that the Soviet Union was sole, in terms
threat of a Soviet economic alternative in the Middle East and elsewhere
The prevailing opinion in the Administration at that time was that the
American officials took the reports about the Soviet offer at face value.
considered would be a great diplomatic defeat. If it is unlikely that
not, the United States was at that time not prepared to risk what it
Must have the case, whether a Soviet offer was actually made or
19.

20. Informed Secretary of State Dules about such a Russian offer on October
21. The American officials, and the Russians absently did give some indi-
22. the Vaman Dam. Most properly the matter was discussed between Soviet
23. and Egyptian officials, and the Russians absently did give some indi-
24. the American that such an offer had been made. Soviet spokesmen
25. and Egyptian sources, and no confirmation could be received at that time
26. about the American that such an offer had been made. The reports came from
27. while the United States and the world were still attributed to the newes
28.

11.

12.

[LC]

November, United States and IBRD officials were more favorably disposed to the project than before. The Egyptian mission, headed by the Minister of Finance Abdel Moneim al Kaissouni opened negotiations on November 21. Its expectation of a speedy agreement without much bargaining was not realized however. The American and IBRD officials, though willing to contribute toward the construction of the Dam, insisted on conditions and safeguards which the Egyptians were reluctant to accept. However, agreement was finally reached, and the offer was officially announced on December 17. The West's offer included a United States grant of $56 million and a British grant of $14 million for preparatory work on the first stage of the Dam. Moreover, the two governments gave assurances of sympathetic consideration of further support toward financing the latter stages of the project. The American and British grants for the first stage were to be supplemented by a $200 million loan by the World Bank.¹⁰

In addition to the primary purpose of forestalling Russia's participation in the Dam project, the West's offer had several other objectives. It was hoped Western participation would help raise Western prestige in the area and make Egypt more amenable to Western influence. Furthermore, it was expected that Egypt's concentration on internal development projects would lead to amelioration in Middle East tensions, and to cessation of propaganda directed against the West and against the Baghdad Pact. If a change in atmosphere actually occured, Arab-Israeli tensions might also subside and progress be made toward the solution of their differences.

¹⁰ For details on the progress of negotiations see *New York Times*, October 17, 1955; October 24, 1955; October 31, 1955; November 21, 1955; December 8, 1955; On the final Western offer see *New York Times* December 18, 1955; *Times*, October 19, 1955; see also *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 861, (December 26, 1955), p. 1050.

13.

The next step was up to the Egyptian government. While it seems that Finance Minister al Kaissouni, who headed the Egyptian mission to Washington, favored the acceptance of the Western offer, it received in Cairo a much cooler reception. Egypt objected to the demand that the construction of the coffer dams and diversionary canals at the first stage be let by competitive bidding, and insisted instead that in the interest of a speedy start, the contracts be assigned by the Egyptian government. (The Egyptians proposed that the work be divided between American, British, French, Swiss and West German firms). While this problem seemed to have been settled later on by compromise, other questions were much more difficult to resolve.¹¹

The issues on which no agreement was reached were the Egyptian demand for a more firm commitment by the United States, Britain and the World Bank that assistance will be rendered at the later stages of the project, and the Bank's requirement that it exercise constant supervision over Egypt's economic policies, as long as the Dam was under construction.¹² Both issues were loaded with political implications. The Egyptians apparently felt that a more firm commitment to assist in the later stages of the project was being held up as means to exercise pressure. There were of course legal obstacles preventing the Administration from undertaking a long term commitment. Nevertheless, the provision in the original offer that further American contribution will be contingent upon the "then existing circumstances"¹³ seemed essential, if American

11. *New York Times*, January 31, 1956; February 17, 1956.

12. For details on the conditions see D.A. Schmidt in *New York Times*, January 3, 1956; On Congressional opposition to authorization for long term aid commitments, see *New York Times*, January 16, 1956; April 28, 1956.

13. Text of the communique on the West's offer, *Department of State Bulletin*, December, 26, 1956 (Vol. XXXIII, No. 861), pp. 1050-1051.

14.

[L.C]

participation in the project were to serve its political purpose. The Bank's requirement to exercise constant supervision on Egypt's economic policies was viewed by Egypt as an infringement of its sovereignty. Though it probably was inspired by sound business practice with the intent to safeguard Egypt's ability to repay the load, this provision too had political implications. Internally, theasser regime would have laid itself open to criticism that it was mortgaging Egypt's independence. Secondly, the Bank's supervision of the management of Egypt's economy might have been used to influence the course of Egypt's domestic and foreign policy.

It is unlikely that the political implications of these conditions were overlooked by American and British officials. On the contrary, it is reasonable to believe that one of the attractions of the project, as far as Western interests were concerned, was its suitability to serve as a means to influence the course of Egyptian policies.

Very little was said publicly about the conditions and their political implications, and it seems that they were presented in very vague form. This leads one to believe that it was hoped that Egypt would accept the proposal. This expectation did not materialize. From the very beginning, the Egyptian government let its suspicions be known and demanded clarifications and explanations. Consequently, discussions were held on the subject throughout January and February. At the end of January Eugene Black, the President of the World Bank arrived in Cairo and following two weeks of negotiations seemed to have reached an

Cairo and following two weeks of negotiations seemed to have reached an
of Tanssary Eugene Black, the President of the World Bank arrived in
were held on the subject throughout January and February. At the end
and demanded further illustrations and explanations. Consequently, discussions
the very beginning, the Egyptian government let itslef anabaptize be known
would accept the proposal. This expectation did not materialize. From
any cause found. This leads one to believe that it was proved that Egypt
political implications, and it seems that they were presented in very
very little was said publicly about the conditions and their
to serve as a means to influence the course of Egyptian policies.
project, as far as Western interests were concerned, was its antipathy
to it, if it is reasonable to believe that one of the attractions of the
conditions were overlooked by American and British officials. On the con-
If it is unlikely that the political implications of these condi-
foreign policy.
might have been need to influence the course of Egypt's domestic and
Secondly, the Bank's arbitration of the management of Egypt's economy
itself opened to criticism that it was a mortgaging Egypt's independence.
 political implications. Internally, the "sawmill regime would have laid
suppression Egypt's ability to repress the load"; this provocation too had bad
it properly was inspired by sound business practice with the intent to
bitterness was viewed by Egypt as an infringement of its sovereignty. In
Bank's requirement to exercise constant supervision on Egypt's economic
participation in the project were to serve its budgetary purposes. The

14.

[c]

[LC]

15.

understanding on the matter with Egyptian leaders.<sup>14</sup>

The optimism about the outcome of Black's negotiations was not well founded. In March, without explicitely rejecting the Western proposals, the Egyptian government offered certain counterproposals. The main purpose of these seems to have been to obtain a more explicit commitment on behalf of the United States and British governments with respect to the financing of the latter stages of the Dam. Moreover, the Egyptian government considered it advisable to eliminate the gradual phasing of the project in its own plans, apparently as a supporting argument for its request for a commitment for the financing of the entire project.<sup>15</sup>

The United States seems to have remained favorably disposed to the project while the Egyptian counterproposal was being considered during the months of March and April. The testimony of Undersecretary of State, Herbert Hoover, Jr. before the House of Foreign Affairs Committee on March 20, 1956, and the general tenor of the questioning bear witness to this favorable disposition. A similar conclusion can be drawn from Secretary of State Dulles's unsolicited assurance to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 30 that the Dam would not.

<sup>14</sup> For details of those negotiations see: *Times*, December 28, 1955; January 30, 1956; February 10, 1956; February 11, 1956; *New York Times*, January 3, 1956; January 7, 1956; February 10, 1956, February 13, 1956, February 17, 1956.

<sup>15</sup> *New York Times*, July 3, 1956. US Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, * Hearings, Mutual Security Appropriations for 1957.84th Congress*, 2nd session, 1956, p. 23.

16.

[LC]

substantially increase Egypt's cotton production.

However, events in the Middle East gradually affected a change in the Administration's thinking. Egypt actually continued its efforts to undermine the Baghdad Pact, and to subvert pro-Western governments throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Violent anti-British propaganda directed at East Africa emanated from Cairo radio. Fedayeen raids against Israel continued and tension mounted. Moreover, Egypt's relations with the Soviet bloc continued to expand. The scope of the arms deal of the previous year turned out to be larger than originally estimated, which meant that Egypt's economic commitments to the Soviet bloc were much larger too. However, the event that started the ball rolling and led to the reappraisal of American policy and the ultimate withdrawal of the Aswan Dam offer was Egypt's recognition of Communist China, announced on May 16. The act was viewed gravely because Egypt was the first nation to extend recognition since the Korean War and it was expected that other Arab states would follow suit.

The reappraisal of relations with Egypt evolved around the question whether the policy followed thus far of supporting the new regime should continue. The alternative seems to have been the maintenance of correct, but cool relations; not writing Egypt off as a total loss, but not staking any hope on it either. Instead of trying to support both Cairo and Baghdad, the proposed shift would have definitely favored

16 US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1956, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956, p. 19. US Congress Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Mutual Security Program for final 1947, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 34-35. The tenor of the questioning and the answers of the Administration's witnesses changed markedly by May. Cf. US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Mutual Security Program for Fiscal 1957, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 135-136.

17.

[LC]

Baghdad to Cairo.

The policy reappraisal necessarily involved re-examination of
the offer to assist in the construction of the Aswan Dam. The previous
arguments "pro" and "con"¹⁷ were apparently weighed again, but the case
against American participation seems to have been stronger this time.
Egypt showed little, if any, disposition to concentrate its energies on
the Dam, and its foreign involvements, largely directed toward the un-
dermining of Western influence, greatly increased. Moreover, through-
out the first half of 1956, propaganda against the US (as well as the
West in general) continued. The Western conditions became an irritant
in Egyptian-American relations, lending support to the view that even if
the project were successful, the economic difficulties will be blamed
upon the lender countries, and they would end up being "disliked" rather
than "liked". A further factor in the decision to withdraw the American
offer seems to have been the feeling it aroused among the Baghdad Pact
nations and perhaps certain other allied nations, that aid they should
have been receiving was instead channeled to dubious neutralists like
Nasser. It was considered desirable to demonstrate that a policy of
playing off one side against the other was not going to win favor with
the United States.¹⁸

Finally, the factor which tipped the scale in favor of the Amer-
ican offer in the previous autumn, was apparently re-evaluated. The

17 See above pp. 6-10.

18 John R. Beal, *John Foster Dulles, (New York: Harpers, 1958)*, pp. 258-261. *S.D. Doc. II*, pp. 50, 375-376.

S28-501. 2d. Dec. II, pp. 20, 352-356.

John R. Beef, *John Foester Dufles* (New York: Harpers, 1928), pp. 18-19

15 See above pp. 4-10.

The offer in the brevions autumm, was shavenly re-evaluated. The
finally, the factor which fibbed the scale in favor of the Amer-
the United States. 18

bribing oil one side against the other was not going to win favor with
Musser. It was considered desirable to demonstrate that a policy of
have been receiving was instead channelled to candidates neutraffic like
nations and belligerent certain other allied nations, that aid they should
offer seems to have been the feeling it aronked among the Bablyard back
than "liked". A further factor in the decision to withdraw the American
upon the lender countries, and they would end up pointing "dialfied" rather
the project were successful, the economic difficulties will be planned
in European-American relations, lending abroad to the view that even it
West in general) continued. The Western conditions became an irritant
out the first part of 1926, probably against the U2 (as well as the
demining of Western influence greatly increased. Moreover, through-
the Dam, and its foreign involvements, largely directed toward the un-
Eggt showed little, if any, disabation to concentrate its energies on
against American participation seems to have been stronger this time.
agreements "bro" and "con" were shavenly weighed against, put the case
the offer to assist in the construction of the Vaman Dam. The brevions
The policy rehash was necessarily involved re-examination of
Baghdad to Cairo.

15°

18.

decision to offer American assistance was made under the psychological impact of the arms deal. The effect of this impact faded with time. Doubts about the Soviet willingness and capability to assist in the project increased. Moreover, the possibility that the Soviet Union may step in if the West did not participate was viewed less alarmingly since involvement in the project was no longer regarded as likely to produce bliss and harmony between donor and recipient.

Growing sentiment in Congress against US participation undoubtedly had some influence, but it should not be overrated. There is no evidence that the Administration made any effort to counter-act this tendency in Congress. Had it tried, it probably would have succeeded, as it did in other cases involving policy toward neutrals. In any event, policy on this matter was made in the State Department. The views of Congress may have strengthened the case for withdrawal of the American offer, but, there is little doubt that had Congress remained neutral the decision would still have been the same. ¹⁹

The reappraisal of policy took place during June and July, and there were indications in the press that a change of policy toward Egypt had been decided upon. The Egyptian government in an attempt to forestall the withdrawal of the offer, decided in July to accept it and thus keep the door open for further negotiations and modifications. However, their acceptance came too late, and the United States was not disposed to change its position, even at the risk that its public rebuff to Nasser may strain relations between the two countries. It may even

19 For expression of Congressional views see *New York Times*: April 28, 1956; July 15, 1956; July 17, 1956; also US Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Mutual Security Appropriations for 1957. 84th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 23-26.

19.

[LC]

be, as John R. Beal suggests, that a public rebuff was actually intended
in order to have the point registered as clearly as possible.<sup>20</sup>

The reason for the withdrawal of the offer was of course not
economical or purely technical, as suggested in the official communique.<sup>21</sup>
It was not the doubts about Egypt's capability to go ahead with the
project or repay its loan, that prompted the American decision. Not
was it a technical lapse of the offer, with the termination of the fis-
cal year. The withdrawal of the offer was the direct result of the change
in American policy toward Egypt. By the abrupt withdrawal of its offer,
the United States wished to deliver a blow at Nasser's prestige and in-
fluence in the Middle East, and show that his policy of playing off one
side against the other, hitherto hailed as a great success, did not pay
off after all. The rebuff to Nasser, was also intended to serve as a
boost to the Baghdad Pact and those among America's allies who may have
felt that they were being let down, while Nasser's unfriendly policy
was winning more concessions.

### III. The Crisis Over the Nationalization of the Canal

The withdrawal of the American offer to aid in the financing
of the Aswan Dam was not followed by a Soviet offer to the same effect,
as the pessimists had feared. On the contrary, a few days after the
Western offer was withdrawn, the Soviet and the Egyptian bluff became
apparent. On July 21st the Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov announced
in Moscow that the USSR was not considering aid to Egypt in the construc-

<sup>20</sup> Beal, *op. cit.*, pp. 258-260.

<sup>21</sup> *New York Times*, July 20, 1956. According to one report, Eugene Black, President of the World Bank had not even been informed that the offer was likely to be withdrawn. Some ten days before the American announcement Black is reported to have written Nasser expressing hope for successful conclusion of the negotiations. (*New York Times*, July 24, 1956).

20.

[LC]

tion of the Dam.²² In this respect the American gamble, if it was a gamble, seemed justified. It can also be assumed that, at least initially, the effect upon the neutrals and uncommitted nations was as the United States had desired it to be--a lesson that playing one side against the other is not necessarily a profitable policy. In the Arab world, however, the reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the abrupt withdrawal of the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable sympathy for Egypt on the other. There was, moreover, considerable suspicion of Western motives. Even Nasser's opponents in the Arab world were critical of the American move which was considered a premeditated blow not only at Nasser but at Arab nationalism as well. The popular press throughout the Arab world blamed the withdrawal of the American offer on Jewish influence upon American policy. Furthermore there was widespread belief that the Soviet Union would step in and assist Egypt in the construction of the Dam. This belief persisted despite the denial that there was a Russian offer to that effect.²³ Nevertheless, the cancellation of the offer seemed to constitute a severe blow to Nasser's prestige in the Arab world.

One of the objectives of the withdrawal of the Western offer was to strike a blow at Nasser's prestige, but it seems that the United States government did not expect as strong a reaction on his part as actually took place. When on July 26th President Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company the West was taken completely

22 New York Times, July 22, 1956.

23 *Ibid*., July 25, 1956.

["S3 *Ibid* 1941, July 23, 1942.", "S5 *New York Times*, July 25, 1945.", "nationalization of the Suez Canal Company the West was taken completely\nactually took place. When on July 5th President Mussolini announced the\nStates government did not expect as strong a reaction on his part as\nwas to strike a blow at Mussolini's brevetage, but it seems that the United\nOne of the objectives of the withdrawal of the Western offer", "Arab world.", "offer seemed to constitute a severe blow to Mussolini's brevetage in the\nWestern offer to that effect. Nevertheless, the cancellation of the\nErgobat on the other. There was moreover, considerable ambivalence about the\nWestern offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American move which was considered a premeditated blow not only\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nof the Western offer, on the one hand, and considerable ambiguity for\nthe reactions were mixed. There was great shock at the sudden withdrawal\nof the American offer to that effect. There was moreover, considerable\nambivalence about the withdrawal of the American offer on the other\nfrom Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\nmoral motives. Even Mussolini's opponents in the Arab world were critical\n

21.

[LC]

by surprise. The shock and surprise evinced in the Western world does not seem to have been justified. It was in the nature of the Egyptian regime that the rebuff to President Nasser was bound to lead to a very strong reaction; a reaction which Western policy makers could have foreseen.

The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, came in the course of a violently anti-western speech in Alexandria on July 26, 1956.²⁴ The nationalization and the speech in which it was announced were clearly meant as a counter-blow against the West. It seems that Nasser was obliged to strike back if he was to retain his position as leader of the Arab world. However, the decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company was not made on the spur of the moment in response to the Western challenge. The decision stems from Nasser's nationalist philosophy, and his realization that Egypt's geoographical position was a source of power. As revealed a few weeks subsequently by one of Nasser's close advisors, planning for the nationalization started in 1954. At that time the decision was taken to "wage the Suez Canal battle" in 1956 (after the British withdrawal). What remained to be done was to choose the most propitious moment to strike the blow.²⁵

Nasser's move seems to have attained the desired effect. His prestige in the Arab world soared and his position was again secure. Popular enthusiasm for Nasser's move was such that even his opponents in the Arab world deemed it advisable to issue public statements of support. Such statements were made by Premier Nuri es Said of Iraq and President Chamoun of Lebanon.²⁶ Western prestige and influence on the other

²⁴ For excerpts from the speech see SD Doc. I, pp 25-30.

²⁵ Article by Mohammad Hassanin Haikal in Akher Saa, as reported in the *New York Times*, August 16, 1956.

²⁶ *New York Times*, August 6, 1956; *Times*, August 6, 1956, August 8, 1956

22.

[LC]

hand declined sharply. Moreover, the intended diplomatic effect of the withdrawal of the Western offer to finance the Aswan Dam was completely overshadowed by Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and the crisis it created.

The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company was meant to be a challenge to the Western powers. It was taken as such, mainly in Britain and France. The United States, the main target of Nasser's violent speech of July 26, seemed to have taken a more detached view. The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company did not affect the security of communications through the Canal, statements to the contrary by Western spokesmen not withstanding. Once British troops were withdrawn from the Canal zone any possible obstacle to interference with traffic was removed, and the Canal fell entirely into Egyptian hands. The strong reaction in Britain and France to the nationalization of the Canal stemmed both from emotional grounds and rational political considerations. To many in France, the Canal was a symbol of French contribution to civilization. In Britain, it was a symbol of imperial glory. The loss the shareholders suffered from the nationalization of the Canal, was certainly also a factor determining British and French reaction, though not a major one. Of greater importance was the apprehension that the nationalization of the Canal might kindle a wave of nationalism leading to the nationalization of the oil installations in the Middle East. Indeed, the nationalization of the Canal did encourage some Arab nationalists to discuss the possibility of seizing Western oil installations. This was not likely to bear immediate results, but it did sow seeds in Arab minds.²⁷

However, the most important factor behind the British and French

27 *New York Times*, August 3, 1956.

23.

[LC]

reaction, was their assessment of President Nasser and his objectives. They saw Nasser working against Western influence throughout the Middle East and Africa. He talked of the establishment of an Arab Empire stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf. He repeatedly displayed an almost pathological hostility toward the West. To many in Britain and France the developments recalled the events of the 1930's: a dictator declaring his implacable hostility to the Western powers and gradually undermining their influence. They remembered that Hitler was not stopped in time because people would not believe him to be a menace. They were determined to stop Nasser. The dependence of their economies upon unobstructed traffic through the Canal greatly increased British and French apprehensions. To Eden, who thought in 1954 that the Canal could be entrusted to Egypt, the nationalization seemed to indicate that he was mistaken. In both Britain and France the feeling was that their lifeline could not be entrusted to a dictator who has openly declared his hostility.²⁸

The American reaction to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company was much milder than that of the British and French Governments. The Suez Canal did not constitute a vital waterway for the United States. Neither did the Canal have any sentimental significance for Americans. Unlike Britain and France, the United States was not concerned about the financial aspects of the seizure. Americans held only 2,000 of 800,000 Suez Company shares. However, the American government did share some of the British and French misgivings about President Nasser. As a maritime power it was vitally interested in the security of the Canal and in un-

²⁸ *New York Times*, July 28, 1956. See also editorial in the *Times*, July 30, 1956.

24.

[LC]

obstructed passage through it. Moreover, the United States was greatly concerned about the effect that possible interference with traffic through the Canal might have upon its Allies in Western Europe, who were dependent of Middle Eastern oil. For these reasons there was an agreement in principle with the British and French governments that Nasser's move must not go unchallenged. The United States Government shared the view of its British and French allies that steps should be taken to insure free and unhindered passage through the Canal.29 However, their identity of views was not complete. The United States Government did not share the British and French opinion that the West should respond by an attempt to remove Nasser from the scene.

The American disposition to back its British and French allies was tempered by several considerations. The United States had always been reluctant to fully identify itself with its European allies in their policies in Asia and Africa. The desire to win the good will of Asian and African nations further increased this reluctance. Since Nasser presented the issue as one of self-determination and liberation from imperialism the situation required a cautious response. Moreover, there were many who thought that the West could benefit from the experience gained in dealing with the crisis created by the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company a few years before. The independent course steered by the United States on that occasion enabled it to assume the role of a mediator and help reach a peaceful solution to the crisis.

29 To some, British, French and American statements about the necessity to insure free passage through the Canal might have sounded a bit hollow, in view of their failure to defend the principle of freedom of transit in the case of Egyptian interference with Israeli shipping.

25.

[LC]

Finally, domestic political considerations seemed to dictate moderation. The United States was in the midst of an election campaign and the administration was highly interested in maintaining the appearance of "peace, prosperity, and progress."30

The formal American reaction to Nasser's nationalization speech was a diplomatic protest to Egypt concerning the tone and content of Nasser's statements regarding the United States.31 The American decision to accept the British and French governments' invitation to participate in consultations on the situation now created was of more far reaching consequences. The United States was represented at the three-power talks by Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy, as Secretary of State Dulles was in South America at the time. It is not clear what transpired during the first two days of the conversations which opened in London on July 29th. However, it seems that Britain and France were resolved that the Canal must not be left under Egypt's exclusive control. The two governments considered plans for placing the Canal under international supervision, and were determined to use force if Egypt resisted such a project. It seems that Mr. Murphy was instructed to listen to British and French views, but to avoid committing the United States in any respect. This seems to have been a source of some irritation. The British and French press reminded the United States that the United States decision to withdraw the offer to finance the Aswan Dam precipitated nationalization. Moreover, public opinion in the two countries was highly critical of the lukewarm support the United States had given to its allies in

30 *New York Times*, July 29, 1956; *Times*, July 30, 1956.

31 *SD Doc. I*, p. 33.

26.

[LC]

the crisis. ³²

The crisis initially involving only the relations between the Western powers and Egypt, was gradually becoming more complex. Not only were there relations with Egypt to consider but there seemed to be developing a crisis in confidence between the allies. The British and French determination to use force to impose international supervision over the Canal and the growing criticism of American policy in these two countries seems to have caused some concern in Washington. Consequently, on July 31, Secretary of State Dulles unexpectedly went to London to participate in the talks. Another gesture of support for its allies undertaken by the United States on the same day was the freezing of Egyptian assets in American banks, a step which the British had taken three days earlier. ³³ Mr. Dulles's arrival in London was warmly welcomed by the British and the French. His presence seemed to have helped reconcile some of the differences and to draw allied policies closer together.

The Three-Power talks were concluded on August 2nd with a statement affirming the international character of the Canal and declaring that Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company "threatens the freedom and security of the Canal as guaranteed by the convention of 1888." The Three Powers decided to convene a conference of the parties to the convention of 1888 and other nations particularly concerned with the use of the Canal, in order to consider steps for the establishment of an international system of operation for the waterway. ³⁴

³² *New York Times*, July 29, 1956; July 30, 1956; August 1, 1956; *Times*, July 31, 1956; August 1, 1956 (editorial); August 3, 1956.

³³ *New York Times*, August 1, 1956.

³⁴ *SD Doc. I*, pp. 34-36.

27.

[LC]

Britain and France apparently agreed at the conference, at least tempor-
arily, to desist from the use of force, while the United States seems to
have promised more firm public and diplomatic support in the efforts to
place the Canal under international supervision. The change in the Amer-
ican attitude and its more outspoken support for the British and French
position is clearly evident in the statement issued by Secretary Dulles
upon his return from London on August 3 and in the radio-television re-
port to the nation by the President and the Secretary of State on the
same day. 35

The period between the end of the Three-Power Talks and the be-
ginning of the first London conference on August 16, was taken up by
attempts to define the issues and formulate the policies. The first
question was: How can Egypt be induced to accept a system of inter-
national control? However, the United States favored a course of diplomatic and economic pressure.
criticism from Asian and African countries, and did not wish to appear
to exercise such pressure either unilaterally or in concert with colonial
powers. The United Nations, the usual instrument for mobilizing inter-
national support for a course of action, seemed to be ruled out in this
case. It was unlikely that the Western powers could obtain wide enough
support in this organization for action against a member of the Asian-
African bloc. Moreover, an appeal to the United Nations would have pro-
vided the Soviet Union with a convenient propaganda platform to declare
its support for Egypt and the Arab world against the Western powers. 36

35 For text see SD Doc. I, pp. 37-42.

36 *New York Times*, August 9, 1956; August 12, 1956.

28.

[LC]

Under these circumstances, some half hearted gestures of pressure against Egypt were made, such as the slowing down of the foreign aid program. 37 However, little real pressure was applied. The United States apparently hoped that the London conference would solve the issue for the Western powers.

As for the relations with its allies, they did not deteriorate further during this period. While the United States continued to urge upon Britain and France the desirability of solving the issue by peaceful means, it apparently did not press its allies for a commitment not to use force as an ultimate resort. This position was reflected in President Eisenhower's statement during his news conference of August 8. He stated that he could not conceive of military force being a good solution; and later, in answer to a question by a British reporter that he had not meant to say "that anyone has to surrender rights without using everything they can to preserve their rights."38

There seemed to have remained a considerable difference between the three Western allies as to the purpose of the conference to be convened in London. It is unlikely that anybody expected the conference to reach unanimous agreement to place the Suez Canal under international supervision, in view of its composition, which included both the Soviet Union and a few Asian nations. Yet Britain and France seem to have hoped to attain a wide measure of support for such a plan. They proposed to present the plan to Nasser and if he refused to accept it, to impose it

37 New York Times, August 9, 1956.

38 SD Doc. I, pp. 45-46.

["38 AD DEC. I, db. 42-43.", "39 New York Times, August 9, 1950.", "ent the plan to Waseer and if he refused to accept it, to impose if\nattain a wide measure of authority for such a plan. They proposed to bu-\nand a few Vassan nations. Yet Britain and France seem to have proposed to\neradicate in view of its combination which included both the Soviet Union\nand the British Commonwealth. It is unlikely that anybody expected the conference to\nbe conducted in London. If it is unlikely that anybody expected the conference to\nbe conducted in London, it is unlikely that anybody expected the conference to\nbe conducted in London. If it is unlikely that anybody expected the conference to\nbe conducted in London. It is unlikely that anybody expected the conference to\nbe conducted in London. It

29.

[LC]

upon him with international approval. The American attitude seems to have been that the conference should try to find a base upon which Egypt would be willing to negotiate. Moreover, the United States placed a very high priority on the avoiding a split between the Western powers and the Asian countries.

It was mainly due to Secretary Dulles that finally a formula acceptable to 18 nations was arrived at. As late as August 21st only 14 nations expressed themselves in favor of the Western plan. Four Asian and African nations, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia were noncommittal. In last minute negotiations, in an attempt to avoid a split between the Asian and African countries on the one hand and the West on the other, a Pakistan amendment to the proposal was accepted. The only important feature introduced by the amendment was that the status of the board of the international authority will be defined by a convention to be negotiated with Egypt. On the whole, the amendment did not alter the essence of the Western plan. However some of the delegations hoped that modifications in language would make the plan more acceptable to Egypt and enable it to enter into negotiations.³⁹

On the last day of the conference the 18 nations supporting the Western proposal agreed to send a committee of 5 headed by the Australian Prime Minister Mr. Menzies to Cairo to present the plan "to explain its purposes and objectives... and to find out if Egypt would agree to negotiate a convention on the basis thereof."⁴⁰ Again there seemed to have

³⁹ See *New York Times*, August 17-23, 1956. For the record of the conference proceedings see *SD Doc. I*, pp. 55-287. For the original Western proposal, and amended text finally adopted see *Ibid.*, pp 289-292.

⁴⁰ *SD Doc. I*, pp. 293. See also *New York Times*, August 24, 1956.

31.

[LC]

al system for operation of the Canal.<sup>42</sup>

American officials were highly displeased with these troop move-
ments and statements. In their assessment, any threat and pressure might
make it impossible for Nasser to negotiate because of prestige reasons.
There were reports of separate attempts by Americans in Cairo to induce
Nasser to negotiate and of serious disagreements within the five nations
committee as a result of the American tendency to be more condiliatory.<sup>43</sup>
However, these efforts were of no avail, and the Menzies mission came
to an end on September 9 without any results being achieved.

With the failure of the Menzies mission, the question arose
what the next step would be. On September 10, the British and French
Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers met in London to discuss the
situation. It appears that they were inclined to bring the matter to
a head. However, before force could be used to impose an international
system of operation for the Canal upon Egypt, it was necessary to go
through the motions of appealing to the United Nations, and find a for-
mal pretext for intervention. Moreover, the British Government was under
considerable political pressure at home, to refer the issue to the United
Nations. However, largely due to American opposition to bringing the

T

42 For details on British and French military preparations see *Times*, August 3,4,5,6,7, 8, 9, 11, etc.; *New York Times*: August 5,6, 7, 8, 13, etc. For announcement on the stationing of French troops on Cyprus, see *New York Times* August 30, 1956; *Times*, August 30, 1956. For details of a particularly strong speech by Foreign Minister Pineau on September 2, reasserting readiness to use force if necessary, see *New York Times*, September 3, 1956.

43 *New York Times*; August 30, September 2, September 9, 1956.

43

*New York Times*, August 30, September 3, September 8, 1926.

temper 3, 1926.
reassuring readiness to use force if necessary, see *New York Times*, September 3, 1926.
*New York Times* August 30, 1926; *Times*, August 30, 1926. For details of etc. For announcement on the stationing of French troops on Coha, see *New York Times*, August 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, etc.; *New York Times*, August 5, 6, 7, 8, 13. For details on British and French military preparations see *Times*, 43

Nations. However, largely due to American objection to bringing the
considerable political pressure at home, to refer the issue to the United
 States pretext for intervention. Moreover, the British government was under
strong the motions of abetting to the United Nations, and find a for-
reason of operation for the Canal upon Eigt, it was necessary to go
a head. However, before force could be used to impose an international
situation. If abbras that they were inclined to bring the matter to
Prime Ministera and Foreign Ministers met in London to discuss the
what the next aft would be. On September 10, the British and French
With the failure of the British mission, the question arises
to an end on September 8 without any result being achieved.
However, these efforts were of no avail, and the British mission came
committee as a result of the American tendency to be more accommodat-
ive to negotiate and of serious disagreements within the five nations
There were reports of separate attempts by Americans in Cairo to induce
make it impossible for Masser to negotiate because of preoccupation
ment and statements. In their statement, and threat and pressure might
American officials were highly dissatisfied with these troop move-
ments for operation of the Canal.

45

31.

[rC]

32.

issue to the United Nations at that time, this action was deferred.<sup>44</sup>

The statesmen did decide, however, to authorize the Suez Canal Company to recall its pilots from Egypt. This move, demanded by the Company earlier, had been postponed at the instigation of the two governments. The recall of the pilots was expected to create a situation in which a military intervention would be necessary, and indeed seem justified. In order to continue the smooth operation of the Canal, Egypt would be forced to detain the pilots on their jobs against their will. If the pilots left, it was expected that the operation of the Canal would break down. The British and French governments would consider a military intervention justified in either case: to protect the pilots, many of whom were British and French nationals, from the infringement upon their rights by Egypt, or to restore smooth operation of the Canal.<sup>45</sup>

The United States, on the other hand, worked for continued diplomatic negotiations in the hope that tempers would gradually cool and a solution to the problem might be found. Secretary of State Dulles was particularly insistent that the matter should not be brought to a head. This was one of the reasons why the United States opposed referring the matter to the United Nations. The American government also tried to influence the British and the French not to recall the pilots at that time, fearing that this might aggravate the situation. Moreover, to avoid drama and help cool off the atmosphere, the American government preferred continued negotiations through diplomatic channels rather than

<sup>44</sup>On the Anglo-French discussions, September 10-11, see *New York Times*, September 10-12, 1956.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

33.

[LC]

calling another international conference. New emphasis was also given to the strong American opposition to the use of force. This point was pressed upon the British and the French through diplomatic channels, and was reiterated both by Secretary of State Dulles and President Eisenhower. It seems that this stand did not stem only from domestic political considerations, the issue of "peace" being a major point in the Republican presidential campaign. American officials feared that the use of force might lead to a decline of Western prestige and influence in Asia and Africa. Furthermore, the American view was that the use of force would be futile, and could not help reach a final solution to the problem.⁴⁶

In the tense atmosphere following the breakdown of the Cairo negotiations, the proposal was made to create the Suez Canal Users Association. The proposal originated with the United States, and Britain and France accepted it at the American suggestion. However, a misunderstanding again developed among the allies. The idea seems to have been conceived in some haste, and apparently was not fully thought out. In any event, there was a very marked difference between the British and French Governments on the one hand and the United States government on the other hand, in their understanding of the nature of the Association and its purpose. It seems that the United States was motivated by two main objectives in its proposal to establish the Association. First, it desired to give Britain and France a convenient way out from the situation they had worked themselves into, and from which there seemed to have

⁴⁶New York Times, September 2, 8, 10, 1956. For statement reiterating American opposition to the use of force, see SD Doc I, pp. 327, 331-333. New York Times, September 11, 12, 1956.

34.

[LC]

been no other exit but the use of force. A pparently, the American government believed that the British and the French actually desired to avoid the use of force if possible. The other major objective of this proposal was to provide Egypt with another opportunity to negotiate. For this purpose, officials tended to minimize the political implications of the Association, and put the emphasis upon its technical and operational aspects. It was stated that the Association would be "a provisional de facto working arrangement until formal agreement can be reached."47

While the above-mentioned objectives seem to have been primarily responsible for the proposal to create a Suez Canal Users Association, it would only be fair to add that the United States continued to hope that an arrangement could be arrived at by which the Suez Canal would be put under some kind of international supervision. To achieve this aim, the United States government consistently endeavoured to mobilize support from other nations. One of the purposes of the Suez Canal Users Association seems to have been to serve as a vehicle translating the interests and desires of the principal users of the Canal into collective action to achieve the objective of an international system. This point was emphasized by Secretary of State Dulles at the beginning of his news conference of September 13, when he said that the United States government did not believe that the rights of the users "can be adequately safeguarded if each nation, much less if each ship, must fend for itself."
However, the lack of clarity as to the Association even among those who conceived it, became apparent when in the course of the same news conference,

47 New York Times, September 16, 1956. SD Doc I, p. 336.

35.

Mr. Dulles stated several times that if Egypt prevented the passage of
ships belonging to members of the Association, then "under those con-
ditions, each country would have to decide for itself what it wanted
its vessels to do."⁴⁸

The American view that the British and French governments de-
sired to extricate themselves from their commitment to impose an inter-
national system of operation of the Canal upon Egypt by force was not
well founded. The British and French governments viewed the purpose of
the Association in a very different light from their ally. In their
view, it was a device to force a showdown with Nasser. Prime Minister
Eden announcing the proposal to establish the Suez Canal Users Associa-
tion in the House of Commons on September 12 said that if the Egyptian
Government

"should seek to interfere . . . with the operation of the Associa-
tion, or refuse to extend the essential minimum of cooperation,
than that Government will once more be in breach of the Convention
of 1888. . . . In that event, Her Majesty's Government and others
concerned will be free to take such further steps . . . as seem to
be required . . . either through the United Nations or by other
means, for the assertion of their rights."⁴⁹

Outside the capitals of the principal three Western allies the
reception for the plan was not very favorable. Some of the European
nations feared that participation in the Association might lead to
involvement in a costly boycott of the Suez Canal. The Indian Govern-
ment saw the plan as a provocation to Egypt and as a Western device
to force a showdown. So did the Egyptian government, which rejected it
immediately.⁵⁰

⁴⁸SD Doc I, p. 336, 338. *New York Times*, September 13, 16, 17, 1956.

⁴⁹SD Doc I, pp. 333-334. See also *New York Times*, September 13, 14, 1956.

⁵⁰*New York Times*, September 13-16, 1956.

20 *New York Times*, September 13-14, 1926.

21 *New York Times*, September 13, 1926. See also *New York Times*.

22 *New York Times*, September 13, 1926. 23 *New York Times*, September 13, 1926.

24 Immediately.

to force a showdown. So did the Egyptian Government, which rejected it
ment into the僵 as a confrontation to Ebbt and as a Western device
involvement in a costly conflict of theuez Canal. The Indian Govern-
ments learned that participation in the Association might lead to
recognition for the biam as not very favorable. Some of the Indians
outside the cabaret of the principal three Western allies the
mesa, for the assertion of their rights."46
be required . . . either through the United Nations or by other
concerned will be free to take any further action . . . as seem to
of 1888. . . . In that event, Her Majesty's Government and others
than that Government will once more be in possession of the Conven-
tion, or request to extend the essential minimum of cooperation,
"should seek to interfere . . . with the operation of the Vessels-
government

tion in the House of Commons on September 15 said that it the Egyptian
Eben announcing the proposal to ratify theuez Canal Users Vessels-
view, it was a device to force a showdown with Heser. Prime Minister
the Association in a very different light from their ally. In this
well composed. The British and French governments viewed the bimboe of
nations' analogy of operation of the Canal about Ebbt dy force was not
arised to extricate themselves from their commitment to whose an inter-
view the American view that the British and French governments do-
its issues to do."48

gitions, each country would have to decide for itself what it wanted
strikes pelting to mempera of the Association, then "under those con-
Mr. Drules stated several times that it Ebbt prevented the base of

32.

[fc]

36.

[LC]

As soon as these apprehensions became apparent, the United States sought means to alleviate them. At his news conference on September 13, Secretary of State Dulles categorically stated that no concerted boycott of the Canal was contemplated. At the same time, it was reported that in case that passage through the Canal became impossible, plans were being made to supply dollar credits to the Western European countries to enable them to purchase their necessary oil supplies from the dollar area.

In response to Prime Minister Nehru's warning of the dangers he saw in proceeding with the plan to establish the Association, President Eisenhower emphasized the deep American interest in a peaceful solution to the problem. In press reports from Washington, the United States position regarding the establishment of the Association was described as "flexible."

Mr. Dulles was reported to be willing to accept far-reaching changes in the plan "if others came up with acceptable ideas" for settling the dispute.⁵¹

An attempt was made to resolve the differences as to the purpose of the Users Association at the second Suez Canal Conference convened in London on September 19. The conference, called to discuss the establishment of the Suez Canal Users Association, was attended by representatives of the eighteen nations which subscribed to the earlier Western plan.

The conference was marked at the outset by the lack of unity. The Scandinavian nations and Japan were afraid that if they committed themselves to pay tolls to the Suez Canal Users Association, then Egypt might deprive them of the use of the Canal. Pakistan, Spain and Ethiopia urged

51*New York Times*, September 16-18, 1956.

[LC]

37.

moderation, fearful that the establishment of the Association might ultimately lead to an armed conflict. Under these circumstances, the preservation of unity, or rather the appearance of unity, took precedence over practical achievements as the main objective of Western diplomats at the conference. It was apparently feared that the United States, Britain and France might become isolated from their allies and thus lose some of the moral backing for their policies. In the negotiations which followed the plan was considerably watered down, and a tentative proposal was adopted for which the support of at least fifteen nations could be expected. The principal concession made to those who feared that the Association might involve them in a boycott of the Canal, was the provision that the tolls could be paid either to the Association or to the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority, at the discretion of each member.⁵²

The United States accepted this plan readily, Britain and France reluctantly. The French Government was particularly dissatisfied with the plan. The French deferred their adherence to the Association until after a stormy cabinet meeting and accepted it only with reservations. Adherence to the Association was coupled with an announcement that the French Government was resolved to guard "future liberty of action to seek full international control of the waterway."⁵³

⁵²*New York Times*, September 21, 22, 1956. For the declaration providing for the establishment of the Suez Canal Users Association, see *SD Doc I*, pp. 365-366.

⁵³*New York Times*, September 22, 23, 1956.

[LC]

38.

The Users Association continued to be a source of friction among the allies throughout September and October. Organizational talks attended by representatives of fifteen nations (Japan, Pakistan and Ethiopia sending observers only), ended in the establishment of a loose organization whose functions appeared to be limited to being a vague vehicle for consultation.⁵⁴ At the same time, the vague organizational setup did leave open the possibility of turning the Association into an effective instrument of policy, provided the principal powers participating in it could agree to do so. Constant pressure was exercised by the British and the French upon the United States to use its influence to have the tolls of American-owned ships paid to the Users Association rather than to the Egyptian Canal Authority. The United States stalled on this issue, fearful that such a move might provoke a showdown with Egypt. Even if no showdown developed, the United States wished to avoid any aggravation of the crisis as long as private negotiations were taking place among the British, French and Egyptian foreign ministers at the Security Council in New York. After these talks ended, the United States finally gave in to British and French pressure and it was reported that it would use its influence to have the tolls of American-owned ships, even under foreign registry, paid to the Suez Canal Association. However, a new hitch developed. In the American view, the Association was to keep a minimum amount of the tolls collected for covering some of its own expenses, turning over the bulk of the tolls to the Egyptian government. This

⁵⁴New York Times, October 6, 1956. For further details on these talks see New York Times, October 2, 1956. For details on the organizational setup, see SD Doc II, pp. 104-108.

[LC]

40.

on October 11.<sup>57</sup> On one occasion, during a television interview on the NBC network on September 23, Mr. Dulles described the situation as dangerous, and went as far as to say that if a solution recognizing the rights of nations whose economies depend on the Suez Canal were not found, then he did not think that "you can expect to go on forever asking nations not to resort to force."<sup>58</sup> In spite of the statements reiterating the American adherence to the principles adopted at the first Suez Canal Conference, the actions of the United States government seemed to the British and French to frustrate any progress toward the implementation of these principles.

The United States on its side did not present any clear alternative proposals. At one point, it appeared that the United States favored economic pressure. On October 1, there were reports in the press that the United States had slowed down its foreign aid projects in Egypt. A few weeks later, it was explained that the government merely made a quick review of the aid program when the crisis developed, but, as the situation had eased somewhat, it was decided to let aid shipments continue.<sup>59</sup> As to the question of how Egypt could be induced to accept the Western plan, Secretary of State Dulles expressed the hope that international moral pressure would ultimately bear results. During his news conference on September 26, the Secretary of State advocated a policy of "patience" and expressed the view that the undermining of

<sup>57</sup>*New York Times*, October 10, 1956; October 12, 1956. *SD Doc II*, pp. 109-116.

<sup>58</sup>*New York Times*, September 24, 1956.

<sup>59</sup>*New York Times*, October 1, 1956; October 28, 1956.

[L.C]

41.

confidence created by the nationalization of the Canal was bound to have long-run economic repercussions, the realization of which would induce Egypt to adopt a more reasonable attitude on the problem.⁶⁰

The British and the French were particularly incensed over occasional statements emphasizing the differences between the American approach to the problem and the attitudes of its allies. Such was the case with Mr. Dulles's statement at his news conference of October 2 on the eve of the Security Council meeting, in which he said that the United States played a "somewhat independent role" in Asia and Africa, and does not fully identify its policy in those areas with that of the "so-called colonial powers."⁶¹

If the view that the United States actually continued to adhere to the ultimate objective of placing the Canal under an international system of operation is accepted, there still remained very serious differences between the allies as to the tactics to be pursued. This became apparent again during the session of the Security Council, which was called to discuss the issue. Britain and France in requesting a meeting of the Security Council, probably viewed it as a motion they had to go through before embarking upon military operations. For this reason, the United States was not enthusiastic about the British and French appeal to the United Nations. In an attempt to avoid such a development, the United States maneuvered its allies into agreeing to private negotiations with the Egyptian foreign minister. These negotiations brought

⁶⁰SD Doc II, pp. 87-98. *New York Times*, September 27, 1956.

⁶¹SD Doc II, pp. 103-104. *New York Times*, October 3, 1956.

42.

about agreement on six principles to govern the operation of the Canal,
among them being the requirement that "the operation of the Canal should
be insulated from the politics of any country." However, in the absence
of provisions for the enforcement of these principles, provisions upon
which the negotiators could not agree, the mere statement of principle
was far from satisfactory. Britain and France insisted, therefore,
upon proceeding with the vote on a resolution embodying both the six
principles and the eighteen nations' plan for international operation
of the Canal. While the first part endorsing the six principles was
adopted by the Council unanimously, the second part approving the
eighteen nations' plan was vetoed by the Soviet Union.⁶²

⁶²*New York Times*, October 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 1956. *SD Doc II*,
p. 120.

43

[LC]

#### IV. The Military Intervention and the Withdrawal of Forces.

With the adjournment of the Security Council session, the question as to the next step to be taken posed itself before the British and French governments. They were faced with the alternative of accepting the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company as an established fact, and reconciling themselves with the control over the Canal by a hostile power. To be sure, their statements since nationalization had taken place committed them to the establishment of a system of international control by the use of force if need be. However, face-saving devices for a diplomatic retreat could certainly have become available if such a course were chosen. The other alternative was to proceed with the imposition of a system of international operation of the Canal upon the Egyptian government. Such a course would have required the adoption of a somewhat independent course by the two allies against the wishes of the United States government. How the system of international control could have actually been imposed upon Egypt by military force is not clear. It is possible that the British and the French expected Nasser to fall from power as a result of military action on their part and to be replaced by a more moderate government which would be willing to come to terms with the allies. Subsequent events proved that the British and the French governments decided upon the latter alternative.

No reliable information has been made public about how and when plans were made for joint military action. Some indication of the course chosen could have been found in the speech delivered by Prime Minister Eden at the Conservative Party's Annual Conference on October 13, in which

[LC]

44

he firmly rejected the policy of peace at any price. On October 16, the British Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary visited Paris and had lengthy talks with their French counterparts. According to some sources, this was the occasion that the decision was made to launch a military operation.⁶³ Surprisingly, the American government seems to have been unaware of what was lying ahead. Most probably, some of the preparations did not escape the attention of American officials. It was subsequently reported that an almost complete blackout on information regarding the Suez crisis had been imposed by the British and the French, and that routine consultations with American officials had been discontinued. Whether these signals of alarm were brought to the attention of the Secretary of State and the President is unclear. The President was certainly preoccupied during those days with the last stages of the Presidential election campaign. The Secretary of State had to deal with the rapidly developing situation in Eastern Europe. Apparently neither found much time to devote to the bits of information trickling in about the Anglo-French preparations.⁶⁴

It was only on October 27, when the Israeli mobilization became apparent, that the President sent a message to Prime Minister Ben Gurion urging that no forcible initiative be taken. A further message was sent by the President on October 28 accompanied by a public statement about

⁶³Michael Foot and Mervyn Jones, *Guilty Men 1957: Suez and Cyprus* (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1957), pp. 194-196. Merry and Serge Bromberger, *Les Secrets de l'Expedition d'Egypte* (Paris: Editions des Quatre Fils Aymon, 1957), p. 84.

⁶⁴*New York Times* November 1, 1956.

[L.C]

the situation. Furthermore, the Department of State announced on the same day that steps had been taken for the evacuation of non-essential American personnel from the Middle East. At the same time, consultations regarding the situation began in Washington between British, French and American diplomats in pursuance of the tri-partite declaration of May 25, 1950.⁶⁵

At the news of the Israeli invasion, the United States called a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the situation and to consider steps for the immediate cessation of hostilities. British and French diplomats were consulted on this step but no particular decisions were reached for concerted action. On the morning of October 30, the American representative at the United Nations pressed for an early meeting of the Council. The British and French, however, asked for a delay of a few hours until after the British and French cabinets had a chance to meet and the three powers had an opportunity to work out a common policy. Apparently suspicious that Britain and France were planning some independent action on their own, the American representative agreed to a postponement of one hour only from 10 a.m. to 11 a.m. By this time, news of the British and French ultimatums to Egypt and Israel was probably received in Washington.⁶⁶

⁶⁵New York Times, October 29, 1956. For the text of President Eisenhower's statement, see SD Doc II, p. 134. For the announcement by the Department of State, see SD Doc II, p. 135.

⁶⁶New York Times, October 30, 31, November 1, 1956. For the speeches by Eden and Mollet announcing the British and French ultimatums, see SD Doc II, pp. 138-142.

[LC]

The British and French ultimatums took Washington by surprise. Most likely, the United States government was aware that Britain and France were planning some kind of independent action, though apparently no solid information on the details of it was available. The first reaction among high government officials was one of extreme anger. President Eisenhower was most irritated, and Secretary of State Dulles felt that the British and French moves were a personal affront to him. Strongly-worded protests were conveyed to the British and French governments, expressing displeasure at the course they were taking and at the failure to consult and concert policies with Washington. The United States was opposed to the use of force outside the United Nations and regarded the British and French intervention as establishing a precedent dangerous to world peace. Moreover, the Americans did not think that military intervention could achieve any practical results leading toward the solution of the Suez Canal problem. Finally, Washington viewed the British and French action as seriously weakening the Western argument against Soviet imperialism at a most inopportune time, when Poland and Hungary were revolting against Soviet domination.⁶⁷

With the British and French vetoes of the American resolution in the Security Council on October 30, the rift between the allies became complete. The United States was now faced with a dilemma of putting a stop to the military operations without straining its relations with Britain and France any further. The United States considered it desirable to assume the leadership in stopping the military operations. It was

⁶⁷*New York Times*, October 31, November 4, 1956. *SD Doc II*, p. 142.

[LC]

49

United States and the Soviet Union to bring the military operations in Egypt to a halt.⁷⁰

The Soviet note caused considerable tension not only in the capitals of the three nations involved in the hostilities and threatened by the Soviet Union, but in Washington as well. While there was no general belief in the imminence of a Soviet military move, American officials considered that the threat of Soviet intervention could not be ignored. The United States responded on the same day by a strong statement rejecting the Soviet proposal. The statement, issued by the White House, declared that any introduction of new forces into the Middle East would be a violation of the United Nations resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt, and added that "it would be the duty of all United Nations members, including the United States, to oppose any such effort." American opposition to the Soviet proposal was expressed also in the Security Council and the Soviet move was defeated in the absence of the necessary majority. On the following day, November 6, President Eisenhower telephoned Prime Minister Eden to urge him to accept a cease-fire and was told that the decision had already been taken. While undoubtedly important additional considerations were involved, it would appear that the Soviet note did have a considerable effect upon the decision to accept a cease-fire.⁷¹

70 *New York Times*, November 5, 6, 1956. For the text of the Soviet notes to the British, French and Israeli Prime Ministers, see *SD Doc II*, pp. 183-188.

71 *New York Times*, November 6, 7, 1956. For the text of the White House statement rejecting the Soviet proposal, see *SD Doc II*, pp. 182-183.

[L.C.]

The cease-fire found a small section of the Canal occupied by British and French forces, while almost the entire Sinai peninsula was held by Israeli troops. The presence of foreign troops could have been used as a means to pressure the Egyptian government to enter into negotiations for the establishment of an international system for operation of the Canal and for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. It seems that the British, French and Israeli governments each desired to follow such a course. The United States was faced with the choice of supporting such a policy or urging its allies to withdraw their forces. It seems justifiable to assume that the United States continued to adhere at that time to the view that the Suez Canal should be put under an international system. It would seem, that for a while, the State Department considered supporting a course of delaying the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt, until some progress was made in negotiations on the Suez Canal and possibly towards the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The American plan for the establishment of two committees to seek a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the opening of the Suez Canal under international supervision reflected such a policy.

However, on November 11, this plan was put off indefinitely, probably indicating a shift in the State Department's position.⁷² Soon it became clear that the alternative course of pressing Britain, France and Israel to withdraw their forces without any prior commitment on the part of Egypt was decided upon. This decision stemmed partly from an

⁷²*New York Times*, November 12, 1956.

[L.C]

S2

of their forces before they could expect any help from the United States in meeting their growing oil shortage. The suspension of foreign aid operations in Israel was intended to have a similar effect.

On November 24th, the General Assembly adopted a resolution with the support of the United States, reiterating its call to Britain, France and Israel to withdraw their forces "forthwith." In the face of mounting pressure, the British and French Governments announced on December 3 their decision to start immediately the withdrawal of their troops from the Canal Zone. The evacuation of British and French forces was completed on December 22.<sup>74</sup>

The United States warmly welcomed the decision to withdraw and declared on this occasion that "it will now, more than ever, become imminent upon all members of the United Nations to insure that the remaining issues are dealt with justly and promptly."<sup>75</sup> In the following months, diplomatic efforts to obtain a measure of Egyptian cooperation for a system of international operation of the Canal continued. These efforts were, however, not fruitful. They resulted in an Egyptian memorandum sent to foreign diplomatic missions in Cairo on March 18, 1957, stating Egypt's readiness to adhere to the Constantinople Convention of 1888. This was followed by a declaration of the principles to guide the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority in its operation of the Canal, contained

<sup>74</sup>*New York Times*, November 22, 23, 24, 25, 26; December 4, 23, 1956. For the text of the General Assembly's resolution, see *SD Doc II*, pp. 238-239. For the British announcement of the decision to withdraw, See *SD Doc II*, pp. 240-244.

<sup>75</sup>*SD Doc II*, pp. 244-245.

[L.C]

in a letter to the United Nations Secretary General on April 24, 1957. In the absence of provisions for the enforcement of these principles, or other arrangements for international control over the operation of the Canal, the Egyptian declaration fell far short of what was considered necessary by the British, French and American governments. The American views about the inadequacy of a mere declaration on the part of Egypt were stated in the Security Council by Ambassador Lodge on several occasions during April and May. However, for practical purposes, the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and the unfettered control of Egypt over the Canal were accepted by the Western powers as an accomplished fact.⁷⁶

The problem of the withdrawal of Israeli forces was a more difficult one to solve. By the end of January, Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula. However, Israeli forces remained in occupation of Sharm al-Sheikh and the Gaza Strip until March, when assurances were given by the American Government of its support for the retention of the United Nations Emergency Force at Sharm al-Sheikh in order to insure free navigation through the Straits of Tiran, and for measures to bring about the cessation of raids from the Gaza Strip into Israel.⁷⁷ As a result of these measures, tension along the Israeli-Egyptian border has considerably subsided since.

⁷⁶For the text of the Egyptian memorandum of March 18, 1957, see SD Doc II, pp. 371-372. For the Egyptian declaration of April 24, see *ibid.*, pp. 386-390. Ambassador Lodge's statements in the Security Council, see *ibid.*, pp. 390-392, 394-397.

⁷⁷See *SD Doc II*, pp. 255-269, 276-277, 322-333.

[LC]

The record of American policy throughout the crisis was one of vacillation and lack of clarity. These vacillations stemmed partly from divergent and sometimes contradictory objectives pursued by the United States. There was a contradiction between the requirements of close cooperation with the European allies and the American desire to dissociate itself from its European allies, on issues pertaining to the former colonial areas. Moreover, considerations of domestic politics and the Republican desire to create an image of their party as "the party of peace," had a profound effect upon foreign policy during the crisis. The confusion created by the pursuit of these divergent goals was compounded through the "diplomacy by press conference." The dodging answers given by the President and Secretary of State at the spur of the moment to correspondents' questions were often taken as official policy pronouncements, whether they were intended as such or not.

The dilemmas faced by American policy-makers at that time were undoubtedly of a most serious nature. A good case could be made both for and against many of the decisions taken. Whatever the merits of American policy, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the diplomacy of the period did not prove equal to the occasion.

APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY

1953:

July 15: Eisenhower letter to Naguib pledging US aid to Egypt when the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the British base in the canal zone is resolved.

1954:

July 15: Agreement settling the Anglo-Egyptian dispute initiated in Cairo.

October 19: Agreement between Britain and Egypt regarding the Suez Canal base signed in Cairo.

October: Egyptian economic mission visiting Washington.

1955:

April 4: Breakdown of Egyptian-Sudanese negotiations.

5: Britain adheres to Iraqi-Turkish alliance, later to be known as the Baghdad Fact.

May: Negotiations between Egypt and the Sudan resumed.

July 27: Negotiations between Egypt and the Sudan break down again amidst bitter accusations by both sides.

September 27: Czech-Egyptian arms deal announced.

October 17: Ambassador Hussein reported to have informed Dulles of Soviet offer to finance the Aswan Dam.

November 21: Negotiations on the financing of the Aswan Dam open in Washington.

December 3: Britain and Egypt sign agreement on the future of the Sudan.

17: US and British offer to aid the financing of the Aswan Dam is announced.

ii

1956:

March 2: Dismissal of Glubb Pasha.

May 17: Egyptian recognition of Communist China.

June 13: British evacuation from the Suez Canal base is completed.

18: Soviet Foreign Minister' Shepilov's visit to Cairo. Reports of a very favorable Russian offer to help finance the Aswan Dam.

July 18: Dulles informs the Egyptian ambassador that the American offer to help finance the Dam no longer stands.

20: British offer of aid to finance the Dam is officially withdrawn.

22: Shepilov statement that the USSR was not considering aid to Egypt for the construction of the Dam.

26: Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal. Nasser's speech in Alexandria.

28: US protest to Egypt on the tone and content of Nasser's speech. Freezing of Egyptian accounts in British banks.

29: Freezing of Egyptian accounts in French banks.

July 29- August 2: Three-Power talks in London.

July 31: Freezing of Egyptian accounts in American banks. Dulles leaves for London.

August 16-23: The First Suez Canal Conference.

23: Announcement by ICA of the suspension of certain aid projects for Egypt. Other projects to continue.

29: The stationing of French troops on Cyprus announced.

September 3-10: The Menzies mission to Cairo.

10-11: British and French Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers meet in London.

12: The plan to establish a Suez Canal Users Association announced by Eden in the House of Commons.

15: Foreign pilots leave Suez Canal jobs.

19-21: Second Suez Canal Conference

[LC]

iii

1956, cont.

September 26-

October 13:

Meeting of the United Nations Security Council.

16: British and French Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers confer in Paris.

27: Eisenhower message to Ben Gurion following the news on the Israeli mobilization.

28: Second Eisenhower message to Ben Gurion.
Evacuation of non-essential American personnel from the Middle East.
Consultations in Washington between US, British and French officials in pursuance of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950.

29: Israeli invasion of Egypt.

October 30: British and French ultimatums to Egypt and Israel.
US resolution calling on Israel to withdraw vetoed by Britain and France.

November 2: UN General Assembly meets.

2: General Assembly resolution calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces.
Dulles takes ill.

5: Israel completes occupation of Sinai peninsula and accepts cease-fire.
British and French paratroopers land in Egypt.
Soviet Union sends threatening notes to Britain, France and Israel and proposes joint US-Soviet intervention.

6: Britain and France accept cease-fire.

26: General Assembly resolution reiterating call to Britain, France and Israel to withdraw "forthwith" from Egyptian territory.

December 3: Britain and France announce decision to start immediate withdrawal of their forces.

22: Evacuation of British and French troops from Egypt is completed.