OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

July 2, 1957

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Director of Special Studies
Rockefeller Brothers Fund
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Henry:

This is a belated word of appreciation for the June-13
issue of "The Reporter" which you asked to be sent to me, and
also for the inscribed copy of "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy."

So far, I have had an opportunity only to dip into the
book and to read the article in "The Reporter." In a few
weeks when I get away from the office, I am putting the book
at the top of the list for a careful reading. The article in
"The Reporter" is an important and well-written contribution
to the current discussion, and I found that it helped to
clarify my own ideas.

Thank you so much for making both of these available to
me, and congratulations to you on your extraordinary output
in the midst of the chaos of the Special Studies Project.

JRK:nr

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
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7100 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
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WASHINGTON 15, D. C.

OPERATING UNDER CONTRACT
WITH THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4-4200

2 July 1957

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Director of Special Studies
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Henry:

You won't like "Part II" as well. You will regard it as almost wholly negative, and quite rightly. I rewrote it at least six times and had to restrict it more and more in order to get it within the space limits--which, even so, are quite generous for the NR.

Part I certainly left no doubt in your mind that my regard for your book is the highest. But just for that reason I could not let your tactical model pass without challenge--the rest of the book is so damned impressive the parts I consider much weaker are likely to be swept along by weight of its authority. I've made the critique quite specific, even at the cost of omitting mention of some of your glosses, because--as I read it--your argument that limited nuclear war need not be unacceptably destructive of the areas in which it is fought is a key argument to your whole case for LNW. You do suggest in your chapter on arms limitation certain agreements which could, if sufficiently elaborated, provide the basis for limitation that might remove the difficulty, but I have regarded these as marginal suggestions. In other words, as I interpret the thesis you have said that the essential nature of nuclear ground tactics is such that once "strategic" attacks are removed from the picture war will be necessarily so limited that the marginal safeguards necessary to render it compatible with the survival of local society can be taken care of by agreement. My position, on the contrary, is that nothing inherent in nuclear ground tactics indicates that this will be the case, therefore, if society is to survive there must be drastically limiting agreements (which may, of course, be tacit). And I conclude that if we must depend on drastically limiting agreements we'd better not throw over the useful limit of confinement to conventional weapons, because it is our best hope.

From your letter I gather that your advocacy of LNW is a pis aller. Your book does not give that impression, at least not to me. Even so, I could not, in good conscience, let you get away with the argument that a thing ought to be possible (or ought to take a certain

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

Page 2

2 July 1957

form) merely because it is desirable (or desirable that it should
take that form). Obviously it would be a wonderful escape from the
"fires of Prometheus" if it were true that nuclear weapons favor
the free world. But, as you know, I've been struggling with this
question for several years and I just cannot convince myself that
this is the case. They are completely neutral, the curse of Nemesis
falling impartially on the free and the enchained.

I had lunch with Gil Harrison yesterday. I believe he is going
to invite you to reply to "Part II" through his correspondence section.
If you feel I have misinterpreted or distorted your case that is your
redress. Please don't assume that I did so deliberately, I really
sweated to make my points hard-hitting but fair.

Regarding your feeling that if we grant our opponent the nuclear
initiative as well as the general initiative we are sunk, my reply
must be that you have cast the problem in a setting I do not recognize.
I do not buy the "graduated deterrence" school's insistence on advance
declaration. I do not propose that we be committed irrevocably to
conventional limitation, but rather--negatively--that we not be com-
mitted irrevocably to nuclear limitation. It seems to me that the
theory of limitation, which you have carried farther than anyone
else (as I said, with great art and skill) implies that both sides,
so long as they behave rationally, will recognize the necessity of
drastic limits. Our opponents will recognize that they cannot risk
military action, or anything likely to provoke military reaction
from us, unless the possibility of limitation has been established
and the general frame of limitation is visible. This being the case
it seems to me that our proper advance posture is to emphasize the
necessity and possibility of limitation, not to stress the kind of
limits we should accept, which might vary quite markedly from case to
case. Beyond this, all I think we should say (declaratory deterrence)
is that we are prepared for any contingency, with the will and the
means that will not lead to all-out war, but that certainly will not
let the aggressor have a field-day.* Let him guess whether our reaction
will be nuclear or not. My guess is that he will not run the risk of initiating
and if his action initiative is confined to conventional terms we
should be prepared to go along. If he attacks with nuclear weapons
of course our reaction would be nuclear too. This admittedly leaves
him the initiative for a later shift of nuclear combat in an action
that starts out conventionally. But I honestly think you have grossly
exaggerated this danger. In LNW he equally has the option of a drastic
expansion of the limits.

Certainly this means that we must have "dual" forces ever ready.
But we have to have them anyway if we are to be prepared for the con-
tingencies in which nuclear war is not, as you say, "the wisest course."
Moreover--and this is a point I've hammered away at in Part II, the

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

Page 3
2 July 1957

jump from conventional action (granted that the circumstances
guarantee its limits, which you are reluctant to grant) to nuclear
action--both limited--is not nearly as great as you suppose. If
the numbers of men on the battlefield are limited by an understanding
that cities and other civilian establishments must not be used, or
can be used only in certain ways, then conventional battle can be
highly mobile too. And I cannot for the life of me see how his
taking advantage of the fact that the action is conventional to
convert it into a World War II type mass action would be different
from his taking advantage of the employment of nuclear weapons to
clobber Paris (or better, Antwerp and other ports). Except--and
this is to me always the important difference--that the conventional
limit is a source of assurance and security to him too. He knows
he runs little risk of utter defeat so long as the action remains
conventional; but neither do we.

Obviously I don't agree that the only way we can confine him to
conventional action is by threatening all-out war. The immediate
circumstances will have to be ruling. They may certainly be such
that a surprise shift on his part would lead to all-out war, but if
that is the case he will be aware of it, or afraid of it, and I think
these circumstances are rather unlikely. In other situations our
reaction will properly be a retaliatory shift, perhaps not as limited
as he would like but still limited. Because I do not agree with your
contrast between conventional and nuclear tactics, deployments,
mobilization, logistics and whatnot, I do not agree that this is to
be confronted with nuclear war under the worst possible circumstances.
To be confronted with a nuclear surprise attack, say on our forces
in S. Korea, would be much worse for us and much more difficult to
combat without going all the way. It seems to me that you have
neglected the contrast between democratic and communist psychology
on this point. In war, no matter what kind, we are alert and tense.
In "peace," however strained, we tend to be relaxed. We might, indeed,
lose our frontline force and suffer a severe setback if the enemy
made the shift in a conventional war he felt he was losing or in
which he was facing a stalemate that he found intolerable. But before
deciding to impose this loss upon us he must speculate about our reaction.
Our resources are effectively unlimited too, and he certainly couldn't
be sure of our inability to think of ways to hurt him quite as much
without pushing the issue to an ultimate showdown. But the risk he
would run that we might not be able to think of such a response and
consequently might precipitate a thermonuclear showdown would also
give him pause.

Enough of this private debate. You've done a whale of a job,
and it really pains me to be critical.

BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB, INC.

345 HUDSON STREET · NEW YORK 14, N. Y.

Editorial Board: JOHN MASON BROWN, BASIL DAVENPORT, CLIFTON FADIMAN, GILBERT HIGHET, JOHN P. MARQUAND

July 3, 1957

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
c/o Harper & Brothers
49 East 33rd Street
New York 16, N. Y.

Dear Dr. Kissinger;

We are sending you the August Book-of-the-Month Club News in which appears a notice of NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY (page six).

If you would like additional copies, please don't hesitate to let me know.

RT/e

C O P Y

UNITED STATES SENATE

June 29, 1957

Mr. Frank Altschul
Vice-President & Secretary
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
58 East 68th Street
New York 21, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Altschul:

Thank you for sending me a copy of Kissinger's
"Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," with your accompany-
ing note!

I have no doubt that it contains much material of
value to us in our present dilemma of American security.
So please accept my hearty thanks!

TFG:F

TLC: F

\s\ Theodore Francis Green

Yonra sincerely,

Thanks to us in our present dilemma of American security.

ing note!

"Uncertain Messages and Foreign Policy", with your accompanying
Thank you for sending me a copy of Krasinger's

Dear Mr. Vittachul:

New York St., N.Y.
28 East 84th Street
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
Vice-President & Secretary
Mr. Frank Vittachul

June 29, 1961

UNITED STATES SENATE

C O P Y

["New York 51, N.Y.\n28 East 88th Street\nCouncil on Foreign Relations, Inc.\nVice-President and Secretary\nMr. Frank Aftershaw", "With best regards, I remain\nat the first opportunity.\nYou may be sure that it will be read with interest\nand Foreign Policy.\"\nI am in receipt of your letter of June 5th, and\nI am in

HARRY FLOOD BYRD, VA. CHAIRMAN

ROBERT S. KERR, DELAWARE
J. ALLAN FREAR, JR., DELAWARE
RUSSELL B. LONG, CALIFORNIA
GEORGE A. SMATHERS, FLORIDA
CLINTON P. ANDERSON, N. MEXICO
PAUL H. DOUGLAS, ILLINOIS
ALBERT DORR, TENNESSEE

EDWARD MARTIN, P.A.
JOHN J. WILLIAMS, DELLAND
RALPH J. FLANDERS, V.T.
GEORGE W. MALONE, NEVADA
FRANK CARLSON, KANSAS
WALLACE F. BENNETT, UTAH
WILLIAM E. JENNER, INC.

ELIZABETH B. SPRINGER, CHIEF CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

June 25, 1957 1

Mr. Frank Altschul
Vice President & Secretary
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
The Harold Pratt House
58 East 68th Street
New York 21, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Altschul:

Thanks very much for sending me a copy of
Mr. Henry Kissinger's book.

I will certainly read this with care at the
first opportunity.

With best wishes, I am

"Foreign Affairs." There must be more articles, and I hope we can print our share of them. Certainly its inconceivable to me that the mere fact of your being in Cambridge instead of New York will make any difference to our remaining in contact. Its good news that you are to be down at any rate about once a month on the follow-up series of meetings to your book. You must be pleased with the acclaim that has greeted it.

Thank you again for your friendship
and for the generous expression of it in
your letter.

COPY

UNITED STATES SENATE
Committee on Armed Services

July 12, 1957

Mr. Frank Altschul
Vice-President and Secretary
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
The Harold Pratt House
58 East 68th Street
New York 21, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Altschul:

Many thanks for your letter of June 24 and the copy of NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY which arrived in my office recently.

I am glad to have this book and am taking it home tonight to read at the first opportunity.

I appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending this to me.

With best regards, I am

July 12, 1957

Dear Jim:

It has been a long time since I have heard from
you but I hope everything is going well. Believe it or not
I have not been in Washington for nearly a year -- much
to my regret for I would greatly enjoy an opportunity to sit
down and talk with you.

Did you ever receive the copy of my book which I
sent you? I would be fascinated to have your reactions to
it. When you next come to New York, I would greatly
welcome an opportunity to have a chat with you and I do
hope you will call me.

Kindest regards,

Lt. General James Gavin
Chief, Research & Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C.

July 13, 1957

Dear Jim:

There appears to be a difference of emphasis between us which may not be easy to remove although I think an extended session together sometime would show that our points of view are not really so very much opposed. You derive reassurance from the clear cut-off point between conventional and nuclear war. I am disturbed by the fact that unless we consider very carefully, and in advance of hostilities, how to conduct a nuclear war, we might find ourselves in a vicious circle of gradually expanding commitments. Everyone seeks to sweep the question of limited nuclear war under the rug -- some people because they are horrified by it, others because it seems to them to threaten their notion of an all-out strategy. I argue that at the very least, we should seek to devise a model for it. In addition I am convinced that such a model is to our advantage.

The point of my unilateral declaration proposal is not that a Soviet agreement to it would mean anything but that we cannot be certain that they have sufficient imagination to understand the limits of our intentions should we resort to nuclear weapons. I do not think it fair however to treat my suggestion for a diplomacy of arms limitation as a marginal suggestion. It also seems to me that we cannot have the best of both worlds. We cannot rely on the threat of nuclear war for purposes of deterrence and keep open the possibility of fighting a conventional war should deterrence fail. If our threat of possible nuclear retaliation is believed, it means that no opponent is likely to engage in a war except with the expectation that it might become nuclear. You do not want to eliminate the conventional capability and I agree with this. I, on the other hand, do not wish to forego examining the

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

15 July 1957

Dear Henry:

Today is my first day at the desk in about three weeks and your letter of 12 July just arrived. I hastened to reply. I have been about to write to you but thought I would wait for another few days until I completed the remainder of your book. I have about another 75-100 pages to go. I believe that your suggestion about getting together in New York is best and I will give you a ring when I next plan on being up that way.

I have been making some marginal notes in the book and I would like to send some comment to you. It is a splendid book and something of its character and composition has been long over due. I am very glad that you wrote it. Because of its length I am afraid it will not be as widely read as one would wish. There is a very favorable review in the Washington Post of about two weeks ago. Have you seen it? If you haven't I will send a copy of it to you. I cut it out at the time. As I say, I have been away on leave and I have not had time to go by any of the local book stores. It should be selling well. I have had about a half dozen requests to borrow my copy.

I will send you some detailed comment in a week or so. In the meantime, my congratulations on the very fine job that you did. I certainly agree with the Washington Post "It is the best book that will be published this year." I would go further and say that it is one of the most, if not the most, significant books of our time.

With best regards,

CONTINENTAL NATIONAL BANK
OF FORT WORTH
FORT WORTH, TEXAS

FRED KORTH
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

July 16, 1957

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Some two weeks ago my good friend Frank Pace, Jr. was thoughtful enough to send me a copy of your book "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy", which I have read with a great deal of interest. When I accompanied Frank to the National Security Forum at Maxwell Field a few weeks ago, he permitted me to read portions of the manuscript, at which time I was impressed with your handling of this very difficult problem. I can see now, after having your book, the complete knowledge which you have of the problems and the reflection of the views of the over-all group as well as the sub-committees.

I hope that on a future trip to New York I may have the opportunity of meeting you and of discussing this tremendously important problem with you.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Counsel on Foreign Relations
New York, New York

July 19, 1957

Dear Mr. Thompson:

Thank you very much for the copy of the Book-of-
the-Month Club News with a notice of my book, NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY. I am taking advantage of
your kind offer of additional copies and have asked your
secretary to send a few to me at 22 West 55th Street.

Mr. Ralph Thompson
Editor
Book-of-the-Month Club
345 Hudson Street
New York 14, New York

accompanying one-way missions will become more acceptable, particularly in view of the increased numbers of bombers thus made available.

The development of nuclear planes, (p. 121) would benefit the Soviet Union far more than the United States. Our current defenses, DEW Line etc. would be circumvented by long-range aircraft, and our heavily populated Atlantic and Pacific Coasts would become highly vulnerable to attack without warning.

I wish to congratulate you on your book, which is already a great success. This criticism is offered as an indication of my interest.

25 July 1957

Dear Henry:

In my last letter to you I said that I would comment in more
detail on your book after I finished it. I completed it a week or so
ago and I still feel that it is more than deserving of Chalmers M.
Roberts' review of it. In my letter I said that I would send you a
copy of the review if you wanted it and since I have not heard from
you I take the liberty of quoting the opening and concluding para-
graphs of the review:

"This is undoubtedly the most important book of 1957,
perhaps even of the past several years. This reviewer risks
that sweeping statement because this volume for the first
time marries the two sides of the central problem of Ameri-
can policy: the nature and military meaning of nuclear
weapons and the problem of conducting a foreign policy in
the light of the nuclear facts of life.

"This is a book which, if one may say so, President
Eisenhower should curl up with over a long weekend in the
quiet of his Gettysburg farm, and Secretary Dulles in the
isolation of his Duck Island retreat. It should be read by
every top civilian and military leader in the Nation. And
Congress would be the better informed if it took a three-
day recess with strict orders for all members to read every
one of Kissinger's 436 pages.

"It might very well be that many would reach conclu-
sions different from Kissinger's. But it is doubtful that
any would come away without a greater understanding of
nuclear weapons and their relation to our foreign policy
today."

I sincerely hope that it will be widely read. Because of its
length and the fact that it requires, in part, careful reading, and
some thinking while doing so, I am afraid that it will not be read as
widely as one would wish. I suppose that this feeling stems from the
disillusionment that comes from a number of years in Washington and
the inevitable conclusion that one comes to that our Nation's leaders
in civil and military affairs do very little reading except for news-
papers and a few easy-to-read news magazines.

If I were to disagree at all with the book in any fundamental
aspect such disagreement would come from my closer association with
the technical situation. Specifically, I feel that we are now into a

period when retaliation by manned aircraft attack is diminishing sig-
nificantly in its effectiveness. This is due to a tremendous increase
in the effectiveness of surface-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads
that either are, or certainly soon will be, coming into the inventory
of the leading powers. We seem to be well into a period when our most
effective deterrent will be the certain destruction of any impetuously-
launched offensive strike. This may be argued about with some sub-
stance on both sides at this day and hour, but it will not be worth
much argument in about another year. Many of our military planners
today appear to be in air warfare of the state of mind of the French
General Staff in land warfare in 1914, when they could think only in
terms of "the offensive," and "the offensive" once again. One is
often reminded of Jules Romains' description of the soul-searchings of
the Allied General Staff in his "Verdun" as they sought a solution to
the dilemma confronting them. They could not understand that mere
flesh and bone could not prevail against concentrated automatic weapons
in the hands of dug-in, determined men. Passchendaele and the Somme
will come again in the air if we blindly adhere to manned aircraft re-
taliation as a sure-fire tactic. This condition will prevail until
about the mid-60's, when the ICBM will cause a resurgence of offensive
power in great strength. As an aside, from the Army's point of view
this explains our intense preoccupation with the anti-ICBM at this
time. Considering lead time, the dynamic missile technology of our
times, and the essentials for survival, I know of nothing more impor-
tant to us now than a highly effective anti-ICBM system. And it is
attainable.

In the light of the above, I was interested in your reference to
Douhet on Page 93. I would agree with the idea that the principal
target of SAC today must be the USSR SAC. This has held true, in my
opinion, for quite some time now. And it suggests that there is some-
thing fantastically wrong in our air defense concentrations being
about our municipal areas, rather than SAC complexes. But I would go
further with Douhet and say that he was entirely wrong in his "nothing
that has happened in the history of warfare can affect aerial action,"
that has been extrapolated by Seversky into the view that "the man who
controls the skies above controls the land beneath." The missile era
has demonstrated the incorrectness of that Douhet view and it is becom-
ing clearly apparent now that the man who controls the land controls
the skies above. There is no way to hide in the skies against nuclear
missiles today -- none. And, in fact, we are reaching a period of
which it may well be written, nothing in the history of warfare can
affect land action. This, it seems to me, carries to a point beyond
your Douhet reference and suggests that not only is the modern applica-
tion of Douhet in error in that we must attack military targets rather
than municipal areas, but that such tactics of themselves do not guar-
antee success, since the air offensive will not in itself be a success-
ful tactic.

2

The most important thing that I get from your book is the point of view that we must have a spectrum of capabilities adequate to serve policy requirements. And further, that we are seriously in error when we elect to rely upon one weapons system, that of "massive retaliation," as an exclusive tactic. Now, I believe that your point is well made and well supported by the book. The shortcomings of a policy of such inflexibility are now becoming rather generally accepted. I feel, however, that I would go beyond the basis upon which you reject such a policy. I would reject it not only on the grounds that it would cause us to lose the initiative entirely, and that if it deterred anything it would be diplomatic action that might well, otherwise, resolve many issues between other nations and ours. I would reject it additionally on the grounds that massive retaliation in the present state of technology would probably be disastrous. We cannot now afford to launch a major portion of our national war resources on an offensive effort without knowing a great deal more about the character and level of effectiveness of the Soviet defenses. We are in the period when it is, or soon will be, best to probe and explore enemy defensive deployments, while at the same time we maintain our own defenses at the highest possible level. Somewhat like a good boxer, we should measure our opponent carefully, feel him out to determine his vulnerable spots, before we launch our strong right for the kill. To do otherwise would invite, if not insure, disaster. For this reason, therefore, in addition to those outlined in your book, I feel that our spectrum of capabilities must now clearly contain a capability to do this. It is not enough, under any circumstances today, to daydream about retaliation, or revenge, or whatever it is. We must be prepared to defend and strike with good military judgment and reasonable care.

I was pleased to note on Page 94 your reference to the importance of distinguishing between a strategy appropriate for the offensive and that for resisting the attack. Also, your statement on Page 98: "Superiority cannot be measured in numbers of offensive planes alone; it depends also on the capability for defense. A country which staked everything on its offensive air power would be simplifying the strategic problem of its opponent." And, your statement on Page 111: "Few concepts have been more difficult for us to accept than that the outcome of an all-out war may be determined not only by offensive power, but by the relative vulnerability of the contenders." I particularly like your summary of the problems of limited nuclear war, beginning on Page 201. I would agree with all of it, without reservation.

I find considerable comfort in your discussion on Page 242 on the "impact of strategy on Allies and uncommitted." This has been a source of considerable personal concern to me for several years and it has caused me to reach an impasse with NATO planners. Try as hard as I might when I was stationed in Europe with the VII Corps, I could not

convince them of the soundness of the views such as you have enumerated. Substituting thermonuclear weapons for divisions and assuring Europeans that any "aggression" will be met at once by the overwhelming power of SAC merely served to appease the economists and the politicians who lacked the courage to face the realities of our time. One cannot defeat somebody with nobody, and the farther out on the curve of application this concept of A-bombs for other forces goes, the more "neutral" the peninsula of Western Europe must inevitably become. I feel that the day of reckoning is just about upon us and we must face up to the fact that Western Europe must be defended there, and technologically it can be defended there. There is no military "need" to defend it from back here. This problem should be of great concern, since with the availability of ICBM's and the probable resurgence of the offensive as a more promising initial strategy, there will be many articulate spokesmen in important places who will find themselves forced to counsel for a "Fortress America." This would mean, of course, the loss of Western Europe and an attempt at survival, on our part, in isolation.

So far this must sound rather gloomy but I believe that the situation is not without considerable hope. Your chapter, "The Soviet Union and the Atom," makes this quite clear. Their system of command, to which you refer on Page 398, is quite pertinent to an understanding of their situation. Likewise, the search for innovation and the application of new ideas seems somewhat less likely, all things considered, in the Soviet military establishment than in that of the United States. I am inclined to feel, based on a study of what the USSR is doing, that the tradition of the great defense of Borodino and the great spiritual strength that made possible the destruction of the forces of Napoleon and von Paulus, remain dominant in Soviet military thinking. Despite the evidences of technological achievement that come to our attention, I still doubt that a Soviet dictatorship can temper and hone all of these resources into sharp, incisive instruments of global power that would destroy the Free World. It can be demonstrated that they could, but I doubt that, all things considered, they would.

In any event, if enough people will read your book with studious care and reach an appreciation of the many fine points you make, we will be far better off than we were before it was written.

July 27, 1957

My venerable Kraemer:

I thought you might like to see the following extract from
a four-page letter by General Gavin:

"I find considerable comfort in your discussion on Page 242 on the 'impact of strategy on Allies and uncommitted.' This has been a source of considerable personal concern to me for several years and it has caused me to reach an impasse with NATO planners. Try as hard as I might when I was stationed in Europe with the VII Corps, I could not convince them of the soundness of the views such as you have enumerated. Substituting thermonuclear weapons for divisions and assuring Europeans that any 'aggression' will be met at once by the overwhelming power of SAC merely served to appease the economists and the politicians who lacked the courage to face the realities of our time. One cannot defeat somebody with nobody, and the farther out on the curve of application this concept of A-bombs for other forces goes, the more 'neutral' the peninsula of Western Europe must inevitably become. I feel that the day of rechooning is just about upon us and we must face up to the fact that Western Europe must be defended there, and technologically it can be defended there."

It has been much too long since we have seen each other --
a symptom of the fatuousness of our living.

Warm regards.

Dr. Fritz A. Kraemer
4319 Fessenden Street
Washington, D. C.

July 27, 1957

Dear Jim!

I was awfully glad to have your letters of July 15th
and 25th. Your kind words about the book meant a great
deal to me. I have always admired your own views and the
courage with which you have defended them. As I have told
you many times, I owe a great deal both to your counsel and
to your inspiration. I agree with all your comments. There
is little doubt in my mind that whoever controls the land will
control the air above against manned airplanes, though not
against missiles.

Your comments about alliance policy could not be more
to the point. Unless we develop a capability for local defense
particularly in Europe, our alliance policy seems almost hope-
less. Early in October I shall be speaking to a conference
which will be attended by General Gruenther and General Norstad,
as well as some of the top European people, and this will be the
key theme of my presentation.

There is little likelihood that I shall be in Washington
before the end of September. Do let me know if you come to
New York.

Warm regards.

Lt. General James Gavin
Chief of Research & Development
Army Department
Washington 25, D. C.

["MANCHESTER NEW HAMPSHIRE UNION LEADER", "NEW HAMPSHIRE SUNDAY NEWS", "UNION LEADER CORPORATION", "WILLIAM LOEB, PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER", "MANCHESTER, NEW HAMPSHIRE", "August 2, 1957", "Dr. Henry Kissinger\nUniversity of Pennsylvania\nPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania", "Dear Dr. Kissinger:", "You may be interested in seeing the use made of\nthe part of your book which my friend, Stuart Symington, quoted\nthe other day in his speech.", "It especially struck us because we have been\nscreaming our editorial heads off over that particular aspect of the\nsituation for years, the difficulty of making people with bathrooms\nunderstand how people without bathrooms feel.", "How you awaken a complacent, somewhat stupid\nnation is an answer I do not know.", "Regards and best wishes.", "WL:Mrs.GKLynch\nenc.", "COUNCIL OF PROFITABLE CHARGES\nCOUNC

August 3, 1957

Dear Colonel Zierdt:

Your letter of July 29th addressed to the Publicity
Director of Harpers has been forwarded to this office.

In line with your request I am enclosing a glossy
photo of Dr. Kissinger, which I hope you will be able to
use, and a biographical statement. Since this is the only
photo Dr. Kissinger has available, we would very much
appreciate your returning it in good condition as soon as
you have finished with it.

Please let me know if you should need any further
information.

Lt. Colonel William H. Zierdt, Jr.
Editor of *Armor*
The U.S. Armor Association
1757 K Street, N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

August 3, 1957

Dear Captain Daoust:

I very much appreciated your letter of July 21st
and your very acute comments.

The information about the disabling of about 80%
of our striking force in the early 1950's came to me from
high Air Force officials, although I suspect that my
statement of it was somewhat unfortunate.

I was very struck by your analysis of the efficacy
of one-way missions and I think you are probably right
that as active defense improves, all missions may approx-
imate one-way missions (of course missiles are the one-way
missions *par excellence*). I agree with all your other points.
I do think it essential that a command be created with pri-
mary missions of conducting less than all-out wars for as
long as limited war forces are treated as a supplement to
the strategic forces, we will always find a reason for not
using them in the crisis which is certain to arise.

All good wishes,

Captain George A. Daoust, Jr.
412 Tennessee Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia

August 3, 1957

Dear George:

After saying innumerable times that I wanted to have
nothing to do with promotion, I always seem to plague you
with new ideas with respect to it. Walter Mallory mentioned
the other day that you were going to do some more advertising
in the New York Times and the Washington Post. I have a feel-
ing that an advertisement in such magazines as "Air Force" and
"Armor" which are very widely read might bring greater returns
because you would be appealing to a professional audience who
would not be reading these magazines were they not interested
in this range of subjects.

Looking forward to seeing you soon.

Mr. George Franklin
Council on Foreign Relations
58 East 68th Street
New York, New York

Handy Associates
INCORPORATED

Management Consultants

New York · San Francisco

570 Lexington Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

PLAZA 5-1911

August 9, 1957

INFORMAL MEMO TO DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

Have worked my way carefully through 80% of NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY, with tremendous awe and admiration for your capacity. Will be finished in another week.

Have progressed far enough, though, to suspect that you might find interest in the paper ENGINEER VS WAR which is enclosed.

You will note also that it has been picked up as text material for the National War College. It has sparked quite a bit of additional reaction in the few weeks since original publication in PENN STATE ENGINEER. Here is where it may fit in with the crucial task you have undertaken . . . .

It is a study aimed higher than even strategic doctrine, or even foreign policy of any one nation . . . a study aimed at OBJECTIVES of national foreign policy.

We are apt to continue to lose that chess game of international power as long as the OBJECTIVES of different nations are so diverse and conflicting.

Secret of leadership of large masses of people may lie in ability to crystalize and clarify OBJECTIVES based on common human dynamics to which these people can dedicate themselves.

Is it possible to find OBJECTIVES to which the fragmented 190 political units making up the 68% of world population not yet under Soviet control can all be dedicated . . . OBJECTIVES to which many, or most nations can direct their foreign policies?

If there is such a common GOAL, may it not be so universal that it also can eventually deserve full loyal support from ALL the world's people?

That is the search.

The INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORDER has used up most of the 5000 reprints they made, but may still have some left if you think they will be of value anywhere.

Howard G. Kurtz, Jr.

EXECUTIVE RECRUITMENT • ORGANIZATION PLANNING • EXECUTIVE INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PLANS
SALARY EVALUATION STUDIES • ESTATE PLANNING • EXECUTIVE COUNSELING

L

HOWARD G. KURTZ, JR.

Author of
"An Engineer vs. War"

Senior Associate
Handy Associates, New York

Now a senior associate in the management consulting organization, Handy Associates of New York, Mr. Kurtz is well known in the United States and in the international air transport industry.

He was born October 14, 1907 at Ardmore, Pennsylvania. Originally in the class of 1929 at Penn State, Kurtz left school for one year to graduate from the United States Army Flying School at Kelly Field. He returned to Penn State to receive the degree of Bachelor of Science in Industrial Engineering with the class of 1930.

Since this time Kurtz has been associated with air transportation. He was with American Airlines for about eighteen years after leaving school, rising to the position of Assistant to the Vice President and General Manager. He then became Assistant to the Executive Vice President, Atlantic Division, Pan American World Airways. Since leaving Pan American in 1953, he has been with Handy Associates.

While with American Overseas Airlines, Mr. Kurtz was assigned by the President of the airline to two years of graduate study at the then-new Russian Institute, at Columbia University in 1946-48. The study was interrupted for nine weeks while Kurtz went to Moscow for the Conference of Foreign Ministers to be responsible for the first American airline operation into Russia, as the American delegates were flown from Washington to Moscow and back. The graduate study by Kurtz was the spearhead of advance planning by American Overseas Airlines operation from New York to Moscow, as certified by the United States Civil Aeronautics Board.

Kurtz has written a psychological study of human anxiety in flight which has received international recognition. The study, "The Common Man — Up in the Air," is widely distributed by the International Air Transport Association, among its seventy-five member international air carrier from thirty-five nations. The study is used as a text for training stewardesses and captains on the basic principles of passenger reaction in the air. The study described the airplane cabin as a laboratory into which passengers of nearly all races, colors, creeds and nationalities come voluntarily. The paper discusses the universal human personality which emerges when anxiety has been aroused.

On December 19, 1956 the World Brotherhood Award was presented to Kurtz by Dr. Everett R. Clinchy, President, National Conference of Christians and Jews, in recognition for the more than 31,000,000 reprints across the world of the basic theme of another paper Kurtz wrote, titled "Toward Tomorrow". It captures the new concept of age philosophy by showing that, at any international airport, any day in the year, when the area is blanketed by cloud, one can see demonstrated that civil airmen of all races, colors, creeds and nationalities navigating blind in the cloud, have discarded everything less than the Golden Rule as unsafe—and willingly, have subjected themselves to a superior safety discipline.

In "An Engineer Versus War", Kurtz attempts to show that the engineering approach can be used to bring some of the problems leading to war into clearer focus.

AN ENGINEER VS. WAR

By HOWARD G. KURTZ, JR.
Senior Associate
Handy Associates, New York

(This is an engineering analysis focused higher than tactics, strategy, or even national policy . . . focused on the level of the objectives of national policy, in search for universal objectives common to people of all races, colors, creeds and nationalities which can determine the national policy of more and more nations, and eventually of all nations.

(The strategies and tactics for obtaining these objectives are omitted, to be dealt with in later studies.

(Crystalizing objectives does not infer that attainment of the objectives is either simple or easy. No time factor is included for the actual accomplishment of the objectives.

(But until objectives are clearly understood and shared by people of different races, colors, creeds and nationalities, no real progress can be made towards removing the threat which can effectively destroy civilization on both sides of an air-atomic war . . . as well as in the territories in between.)

## Summary and Background

The following pages contain highlights from an engineer's ten years analysis of the phenomenon of war. It is the preliminary engineering phase of clarifying the problem, by:-

1. Dissolving popular superstitions and beliefs concerning the cause of war,

2. Isolating the single critical or strategic factor which (a) is present in every case where the phenomenon occurs, and (b) without which the phenomenon cannot occur,

3. Showing that this critical factor is tangible and that it can be controlled,

4. Showing that it is a factor which is unrelated to ideologies, beliefs, creeds, or loyalties, and that people of all races, colors, creeds and nationalities can find common ground in action to control this strategic factor and the elimination of future war.

An engineer takes hold of a problem for the specific purpose of transforming the insights of pure scientists into practical action. He strives for workable simplifications. He concentrates on immediate design far short of potential perfection. He concentrates solely on tangible facets of a phenomenon which can be verified and controlled.

As an engineer approaches the phenomenon of war, his analysis of the problem is in two stages:- (1) He attempts to list all possible "causes" suggested from all sources and (2) He further analyses these "causes" in search for tangible factors which are subject to engineering study and development.

The first stage has been accomplished to an exhaustive degree by Dr. Quincy Wright, an outstanding American political scientist, in his two-volume classic, *The Study of War*.

This study brings together the causes of war distilled from studies in such academic disciplines as history; geography; biology; psychology; anthropology; sociology; philosophy and ethics; theology and religion; jurisprudence; military science; diplomacy; economics; political science; statistics; population; technology; social psychology; and international relations.

Before proceeding further, the engineer would admit several prejudices, at this point, subject to later confirmation:-

1. If there really are as many different "causes" of war as have been suggested from all these different academic approaches, the problems would be hopeless.

2. Since the observable aspects of war are so similar in every case where the phenomenon occurs, it would be assumed that it must be brought about by the same dynamics each time . . . and not by some different "cause" each time. All wars basically are similar in the same way that all frontal thunderstorms are similar . . . and brought about by similar dynamics . . . although each storm may vary in minor detail, severity, duration, location and rainfall.

3. While all the "causes" of war suggested may have validity, it can be suspected that there is a single dynamic common to them all which is the strategic factor for which we are searching. It must be a dynamic which meets two requirements:

1. It must be present in every case where war between nations occurred and

2. War could not occur if the factor is absent.

*The Study of War, Quincy Wright, University of Chicago Press, Chicago; and Cambridge University Press, London, 1942.*

Copyright 1957
Howard G. Kurtz, Jr.

It is just such a critical tangible factor which has been isolated.

It may be parallel to the isolation of the critical tangible factor in the phenomenon of malaria... the specific animal parasites in the blood. It is a tangible factor found in every case where the disease occurred... and without which factor the disease cannot occur. It is the factor which provides rational evaluation of all the "causes" of malaria which had been suggested such as mosquitos, swamps, etc. Mosquitos are a "cause" of malaria only to the extent that they carry the strategic factor, the animal parasite. Swamps are a "cause" only to the extent that they breed the mosquitos which carry the specific factor, the animal parasite.

Similarly, the critical or strategic factor in the phenomenon of war makes possible rational evaluation of all the different "causes" suggested by the scientists. Each such "cause" has a provable relationship to war only to the extent that it contains the critical factor we shall isolate.

It would be necessary to try to check each suggested "cause" against every war in history to find one that is present in every case where the phenomenon occurs. One great difficulty in the way of such an engineering analysis is the resistance against giving up superstitions, phantoms and beliefs which one wants to continue to cling to. The following are two examples:-

"Do conflicting beliefs or philosophies cause war?"

"All evil in the world today is caused by wicked men who do not believe in a Supreme Being and who claim to believe only in material values."

In many different ways, this theme is repeated constantly to religious people, as the explanation of the cause of the oncoming war.

And yet there is no observable evidence in history that spiritual or philosophic beliefs are the strategic factor in war, despite historians trying to prove otherwise. A few elementary observations may expose such unfounded earthly beliefs.

Example: The American people are a "Christian" people. And yet every war that the American people have fought has been against similarly "Christian" people... against "Christian" Englishmen... against "Christian" Spaniards... against "Christian" Mexicans... and "Christian" Germans twice in one generation, in present times.

There is no observable correlation to indicate that similarities in beliefs prevent wars, or that wars are caused by differences in such beliefs.

Example: In 1821 a Russian Tsar issued an edict that no one could fish in the waters of the North Pacific Ocean, except Russian citizens. This constituted a potential threat to America from expanding Russian military power... the possibility of Russia's expanding further down into Western Canada and Western America. American national reaction to this potential threat was part of the background of the American proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine, several years

later. This was an announced American determination to keep Russian or European powers from maintaining a military foothold on the American continents.

But there is no observable evidence to indicate that this potential threat to America did not exist merely because the Russians were "Christians" at that time... or that America should have failed to become alarmed until a hundred years later when, suddenly, official Russian beliefs were changed. The threat to America did not coincide with the change in Russian beliefs, but was dependent upon some other factor than philosophical beliefs.

There is no correlation between either similarities or differences in spiritual beliefs of a people and the generation of war.

Example: If similarities in philosophic belief prevented war between nations, and differences in such beliefs caused wars between nations, Tito's current Yugoslavia would be aligned, solidly, with its fellow dialectical materialist nation (U.S.S.R.) in violent opposition to "Christian" America. As this is written there is no observable evidence of such an alliance by Yugoslavia. If the alignment should change, it assuredly will be for some other reason than a change in the beliefs of either the American people or the Yugoslavs.

Throughout history no correlation can be found to link the beliefs of people with a specific critical factor generating war. At times Moslems and Christians can be found fighting each other... while at other times Moslems are fighting Moslems, and Christians are fighting Christians. People of varying religious or philosophic beliefs can be found fighting, at times, as allies... and fighting, at other times, as enemies. It is quite apparent that there must be some other dynamic common to all wars.

Example: If the doctrines of any one religious group contained the critical factor in the phenomenon of war or peace, the problem would be helplessly beyond the realm of any prompt or practical action to avert worldwide disaster in an atomic war.

If atomic war comes, millions of lives can be snuffed out from among people of all the world's religions. But how are the forces of Good deployed to meet this common threat?

Each religious group, by itself, is a small minority of world population. Each is incapable of taking effective unilateral action in disregard for all others. World population breaks down roughly as follows:-

<table><thead><tr><td>Religious Group</td><td>Percentage of world population*</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Roman Catholic</td><td>15%</td></tr><tr><td>Mohammedan</td><td>13%</td></tr><tr><td>Confucianist and Taoist</td><td>13%</td></tr><tr><td>Hindu</td><td>11%</td></tr><tr><td>Protestant</td><td>11%</td></tr><tr><td>Buddhist & Lamaist</td><td>8%</td></tr><tr><td>Eastern Orthodox</td><td>5%</td></tr><tr><td>Jewish</td><td>1%</td></tr></tbody></table>

* Based on religious population figures in 1947 Information Please Almanac.

In no sense can engineering efforts to find the critical or strategic factor in the phenomenon of war be

construed as anti-religious, or in conflict with religion. Instead, it is a serious search for a tangible factor which can be attacked and studied by people of all religious views, in an effort to protect the people of all religions from the common threat of war. The engineer is searching for common ground among people of all faiths and among scientists of all disciplines, so that all may protect themselves from mutual annihilation in an all-out air-atomic war.

The isolation of the physical strategic factor in the phenomenon of war, and the study of the universal human reactions to this factor, is in the realm of common ground in the study of physiological, visceral man. It is a realm in which science has a recognized privilege and duty to concern itself.

But it is essential to recognize that religious or philosophic beliefs are not, in themselves, the factors which cause wars to generate between nations.

## "Do conflicting political beliefs cause war?"

"All evil in the world today is caused by the fact that the national government owns the automobile factories in the Soviet Union, while private corporations own the automobile factories in America."

In countless variations this theme is hammered into the minds of the American people, through billions of dollars' worth of national advertising, pronouncements by business associations, political speeches, ghost-written feature articles and other means of molding public opinion. (The constant repetition of the theme in an effort to sell the public is quite parallel to the similar efforts in the U.S.S.R. to sell the Russian people on the idea that the war is being brought about because of the American beliefs in "capitalism".)

This thesis is devoid of support from any objective analysis of the phenomenon of war. A short glimpse at recent American history may provide a clue to dispel this fantasy.

Example: America is mobilizing for possible large-scale war in 1957 with observable patterns almost identical to American mobilization in 1941.

But, within this short period, America has mobilized against two radically different national political-economies.

In 1941 Americans were mobilizing for defense against a threatening Germany which encased "capitalism" so similar to American capitalism that some American citizens had invested more than $500,000,000 in the German industries which manufactured Hitler's military might.

But in 1957 Americans are mobilizing against a threatening Soviet Union which encases "communism" radically different from American political beliefs.

The American people can observe from their own recent personal experiences that the kind of politics encased in a nation threatening to America, is of no controlling interest. When threatened, the American people can be mobilized to fight against a country processing beliefs in "capitalism", or "communism", or any other kind of "ism". When threatened, the American people can be mobilized to fight against the threat-

ing nation with utter disregard for the current peculiarities of the political faiths of the opposing people.

Example: If any one national political group contained the critical factor in the phenomenon of war or peace, the problem would be helplessly beyond any practical action to avert world-wide disaster in air-atomic war. Each fragment of national or nationalistic civilization encases a peculiar and different political-economy. No two nations or areas are alike in "Way of Life." Each area is different from each other area's politics or economics. Each political fragment is a puny minority of world population incapable of effective unilateral action in disregard of the others.

World population breaks down into politico-economic fragments somewhat along these lines:--**

### Sovietized areas

32.05% of world population

10 national or area subdivisions, including U.S.S.R. and 9 satellites.

### Non-Sovietized areas

67.95% of world population

185 different national or area subdivisions

76 have recognizable independence or self-government

109 are non-self-governing and under domination or control or varying degrees of satellitehood to other Non-Sovietized nations.

A few sample percentages of world population may give a clue to the relative impotence of any single nation, in world crisis:-

<table><tr><td>19.814%</td><td>China</td></tr><tr><td>14.791%</td><td>India</td></tr><tr><td>8.250%</td><td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td></tr><tr><td>6.378%</td><td>United States of America</td></tr><tr><td>2.153%</td><td>United Kingdom</td></tr><tr><td>2.109%</td><td>Brazil</td></tr><tr><td>1.776%</td><td>France</td></tr></table>

America-first. . . France-first. . . England-first. . . Israel-first. . . Yemen-first. . . or any other nation-first are the stresses causing further fragmentation and disintegration in the face of drastic need for common action and common strength to meet a common threat of war.

As scientists, engineers, theologians, and thoughtful people of all nations or areas search for the strategic, physical factor in the phenomenon of war, this cannot be construed as anti-patriotic by the most loyal citizens of any nation or area. Unless some such common ground is discovered on which people of different races, colors, creeds and nationalities can meet for action with common objectives, the individual fragments of nationality will be atomized in the next war.

The peculiar political ideas of other nations become evil only *after* the foreign nation becomes a military threat.

After any nation becomes a threat to America. . . be it Germany, Japan, Russia, England, Spain, a coalition of South American countries, or any other area . . . the American libraries are filled with the "facts" to

**Estimated 1949 population statistics published by United Nations, World Facts & Figures, May 1951.

اند

picture the evils of having these foreign politico-economic theories forced upon the American people.

Similarly, *after* any nation becomes a threat to Russia, or to any other nation, their libraries are filled with the "facts" with which to build the evil visions of the foreigners who are threatening.

The libraries of any country are filled with the "facts" of the peculiarities of other countries. . . but these "facts" do not take on their evil potency until *after* some foreign nation becomes a military threat. The "facts" of different political systems do not bring about war. The become ammunition only *after* some other, deeper force is at work generating the war.

## The strategic or critical factor brought into focus

From a list of all wars between nations since nations were formed, one critical factor would be found to be present each time the phenomenon occurred.

That critical factor is *National Military Power*.

This conclusion is so blunt, and so obvious, that one's first reactions are to feel that it is frivolous.

But it can be proven to be a valid and important conclusion.

Is *National Military Power* the strategic factor in the phenomenon of war between nations?

The conclusions of the writer are two-fold, after completion of the study to date for which it is hoped that this paper will be an introduction.

I. *National Military Power* is the single, strategic, tangible factor in the phenomenon of war. If *National Military Power* had been absent, none of the wars between nations would have occurred. But with *National Military Power* present, and controlled by individual nations, the patterns of war generate, endlessly, with the dynamics of a new war emerging immediately after the grim conclusion of each "last" war. These patterns are predictable to an important degree, and will be sketched in greater detail on later pages. *National Military Power* is the critical factor which makes the phenomenon predictable, in an engineering sense. It is the concrete factor which can be found in all of the academic "causes" of war when there is some real correlation between the "cause" and war.

Strange, exotic spiritual or philosophic beliefs may be subjects for academic study, but they are not a cause of war until they are encased in a foreign nation which has become a military threat. Differences in economic ritual are subjects for endless scholarly analysis, but they are not a cause of war until they become encased in a foreign nation which has become a military threat. It is *National Military Power* which makes it possible for one nation to enforce its controls upon a satellite or colony against the desires of the people being dominated.

And so with all of the secondary "causes" suggested for war. They are important fields of study but they are not, in themselves, war until the strategic factor of national military power is introduced. . . just as the anopheles mosquito is a "cause" of malaria only to the extent that it may introduce the specific animal parasite of malaria.

II. The human dynamic aroused by a threatening *National Military Power* is in a realm beyond the jurisdiction of the conscious mind, in which people intentionally are taught different theoretical, philosophic, or political beliefs, and beyond the conscious identifications of race, color and nationality which tend to erect barriers between people. This human dynamic is *anxiety*. Anxiety is a complex, instinctive, automatic, compulsive human reaction to potential danger under certain conditions. These conditions are met when a person's existence appears to be threatened, and when normal reactions to such danger are thwarted and frustrated. Under certain specific environmental conditions, anxiety generates, and human judgments, attitudes and actions become predictable.

It is here that the research into the dynamics of war tends to coincide with the writer's twenty years of work and study of the controls which anxiety exert over public judgments, attitudes and actions among people of all races, colors, creeds and nationalities. It has been study of passenger reactions in flight on air transport planes along the world's airways.

There is increasing evidence that this work can be verified and agreed to by people of all differing faiths and beliefs. People of all races, colors, creeds and nationalities tend to have judgments, attitudes and observable actions similar to people of all other races, colors, creeds and nationalities when they are placed in the same environment which arouses anxiety. Judgments, attitudes and behavior are predictable under these conditions. It is not necessary, for example, for an airline captain or stewardess to inquire as to a person's religious beliefs or national loyalties before knowing what his or her reactions, attitudes and judgments will be to incidents in flight which arouse anxiety.

Universal acceptance of these conclusions may be evidenced by the world-wide, industry-wide chain-reaction to an aviation public reaction study titled *The Common Man-Up in the Air.*

If anyone doubts that there is a universal human personality of anxiety, it is suggested that he (1) Obtain a copy of this study from I.A.T.A. and (2) Go over it in detail with the pilot or purser or stewardess of any international airline, from any nation, as each such airline carries passengers of nearly all categories in any given month or year.

The study also shows how an engineer can work with the subject of anxiety as he might work with another eternal mystery. . . electricity. He deals only with observable and verifiable relationships and data, and does enter into the areas of conflict among philosophers. The engineer does not pretend to understand

*The Common Man-Up in the Air, from Public Relations Officer, International Air Transport Association, International Aviation Building, Montreal, Canada $.06 each.

electricity. He merely has learned what effect electricity has on certain things under certain circumstances.

When an engineer observes a relationship such as (1) when the switch is turned on... (2) the light goes on... he does not pretend to understand "why"?.

Similarly as an engineer studies public reaction in flight and observes the relationship (1) when a sudden loud noise can be heard from an engine backfire... (2) passengers react in certain predictable ways, he does not pretend to know "why?". He leaves the mystery of anxiety, itself, to the theologians, psychiatrists, and philosophers.

Similarly, he can observe the relationship (1) when the threat of an enemy military power increases... (2) people take greater defensive actions, without his pretending to know "why"?.

Using only this engineering approach with observable and verifiable data, it is possible to provide a rational explanation of the specific environmental aspects of the generation of war. This will show the critical role played by national military power... and the controls which the resulting anxiety exert over human behavior.

## OBSERVING AND PREDICTING THE PHENOMENON OF WAR

### Situation to be observed

These are observations in the changing environment of potential hazard which precedes a war and the changing behavior patterns of people in this changing environment.

During the prolonged period of observation, it is assumed that there is an *increasing* threat to this nation under observation, from an expanding foreign *national military power*.

As potential danger intensifies, both normal fear-reactions are frustrated and thwarted in the citizens of this nation (1) escape is impossible or impracticable and (2) it is equally impossible for the individual citizen to remove the threat or control his own destiny. The citizens are in a situation similar to passengers in an airplane, in flight, when something has happened to arouse apprehension.

It is possible to *observe* important changes in the behavior of the citizens as anxiety is intensified.

### Observed behavior patterns... preliminary examples

In contrast to the observed behavior of these same citizens at some other time when no hint or threat of war exists, there are noticeable changes in general behavior over a period of years as the potential threat from a *foreign military power* is increasing. Many pages could be filled with these observable behavior changes. The following are only a few sample observations:-

a. Alert the *defense* forces of the nation.

b. Increasing alarm and apprehension spread throughout nation calling for *national defense*.

c. Increasing size and strength of the *defense forces*.

d. Increased shifting of economic productivity

away from consumer goods and into *defense* material and mobilization.

e. Increased mobilization and recruitment of citizens into *defense* forces.

f. Increased centralization of politico-economic power in central government, in the interests of *defense*.

g. Decreased tolerance of individual thoughts or activities which do not fit into rigid rationalizations of *national defense*.

h. Citizens' willingness to accept more authoritarian leadership as national apprehension mounts with greater intensity of *defense* activity.

i. Increased expansion of military, economic, and diplomatic alliances with other nations in the interests of common *defense*.

j. Increased intentional "molding of public opinion" with spectres of fear, to arouse citizens to more anxious support of *defense* programs. etc. etc. etc.

*Defensive expansion* is the overall label which tends to identify all such observable behavior of the people in a nation existing under increasing threat from a *foreign military power*.

## Universal Application of Observed Data

When such a list of observable behavior patterns is compiled, it can be observed further that the list applies universally to any nation at any stage of its history when it was in such an environment of increasing threat to its national existence from a *foreign military power*.

Of even greater importance, it can be observed that the identical general patterns were observable on both sides of any prolonged build-up for war between nations.

Such observable behavior patterns are part of the character profile of the universal human personality of anxiety. As with the lifetime study of passengers in airplane cabins, it may be seen again in the study of war, that public judgments, attitudes and reactions, when controlled by anxiety, tend to be common to people of all races, colors, creeds and nationalities when subjected to similar anxieties. These human characteristics are controlled by fear and anxiety, not by conscious beliefs or ideas. Observable patterns of *defensive expansion* tend to be quite similar in major outline for the people of any nation so threatened at almost any stage of modern history.

*Defensive expansion* also is the observable pattern in even more uncivilized tribes when alarm has been spread about the potential threat from a neighboring tribe... as normal pursuits are dropped to increase production of spears and arrows... as sentries are posted and scouting parties sent out... as the propaganda experts stimulated tribal anxieties by the beating of tom-toms... as alliances are concluded with neighboring tribes in the interests of mutual defense against the potential threat.

But these verifiable observations omit a crucial point.

Why was the foreign military power expanding its threat to the nation being observed? Why was it aggressive?

This leads to the observable patterns of the generation of war. As two electric fields interact upon each other, in an engineering laboratory, when two magnets are brought into a critical relationship to each other... so there is a new dynamic when two powerful national military powers emerge in a special relationship to each other.

The phenomenon we have been observing is in two parts where (1) the national military power of one nation (2) creates an environment in a second nation which intensifies anxiety and apprehension in this second nation.

A new dynamic emerges when this second nation's national military power creates a similar environment of anxiety and apprehension in the first nation.

The national military power of each nation generates anxiety among the citizens of the other nation.

After each war, this dynamic environment in which war can generate becomes available again between the *two most powerful concentrations of military forces* which are *within mutual range* of each other's capacities for decisive destruction. War between these two nations becomes a live potential.

The matter of range is important. The dynamic interactions of war do not generate between military powers which are beyond the range of each other's capacity to do harm. Wars do not emerge in history between nations which could not hurt each other.

The polarity of *two* dominant concentrations of national military power is important. These dynamic patterns do not generate between a dominantly powerful nation and a weak neighbor. Although the defensive expansion of the larger nation may overpower the weak neighbor economically, diplomatically, or even militarily, the dynamic forces of major war generate only when the defensive expansion patterns of two powerful military nations come into overlapping conflict.

In modern times each nation's military department has a Planning Agency. This agency has the responsibility to scan the military horizon, constantly, to detect the foreign military power which is becoming the most dangerous potential threat. As this potential enemy is brought into focus, all national foreign policy becomes conditioned towards defensive expansion against this potential enemy.

The foreign policy of each of the two major powers within mutual range, thus, begins to focus upon the potential hazard of the other national military power.

Potential threat is all that is required to spark the dynamics of anxiety behavior. A simplified example of this is a parent who notices that his three year old child has wandered into the middle of a normally busy street. Whatever conscious reverie may have occupied his mind up to this point promptly is forgotten. Fear and anxiety take command of his actions, as he dashes to the middle of the street... heart pounding, entire body alert for action... to rescue the child.

It is inconsequential that there was no automobile in the road at that moment.

It is potential danger which sparks the dynamic human reactions. Anxiety-behavior does not remain dormant until the child actually is hit. It is excited by the possibility alone.

Similarly the dynamic interactions of war can generate as they have for eight years prior to 1957, between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., without either nation's soldiers having killed any citizens in the other country, by military command. It is the increasing potential danger which sparks the national anxiety-behavior.

The broad outlines of a build-up for war are predictable.

When the *two* dominant concentrations of national military power are *within range* of each other, almost any overt act by one nation can set off the observable patterns. Such action by the first nation intensifies fear and anxiety in the second nation. Stimulated by this fear and anxiety, the second nation takes one of the traditional actions of defensive expansion... which, of course, results in increased fear and anxiety in the first nation. The first nation reacts with increased apprehension by taking some step of defensive expansion, which results in increased apprehension in the second nation. Alarm in the second nation becomes more intense, leading to further defensive expansion, which generates more alarm in the first nation. This pattern of reciprocal anxiety is repeated, back and forth, back and forth, with each nation's patriotic defensive expansion increasing the potential danger to the other nation, in fact, and thereby intensifying the public apprehension in the opposing area. ... which reflects back in increased potential danger from the resultant defensive expansion.

With each exchange of anxiety, intensity of anxiety increases. As anxiety intensifies, retaliatory action becomes more hostile, more frantic, more emphatic, more forceful, more compulsive, more explosive. These are characteristics of human behavior controlled by intense anxiety.

The exact moment along this build-up when war is declared is a minor detail. The declaration might come at an early stage, as when the American Civil War was declared while both sides were still generally unarmed. Or the declaration may be delayed indefinitely while the actual reciprocating arms race builds up to explosive capacities as it now is building up between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

This whole build-up, as described, is a continuing change in the specific environment in which the citizens of a nation exist. The environment becomes increasingly charged with potential danger. Human beings react differently when placed in situations of deep apprehension.

Aroused and intense public anxiety is the vital ingredient required before any nation full of people can be manipulated into going to war. Public anxiety is the secret weapon which motivates people towards the sacrifices, sufferings and disaster of war. Unless public anxiety can be sustained at a high pitch no small clot

of political leaders can push a people into war. No matter how compulsively an international communist may dream of increased personal power in foreign lands... no matter how compulsively a colonial baron may dream of increased personal power abroad... no matter how compulsively an international capitalist may dream of owning all of the oil in the world... these dreams are empty personal crises unless they are supported by a well armed people driven involuntarily by intense anxiety into fighting a "defensive" war against an evil enemy.

To the people on each side of the build-up for war, the opposing people are portrayed as being "aggressive", "immoral", and "evil"... while identical behavior on one's own side must always be explained as being "defensive", "moral", and "good."

The national military power of each side provides the essential environment of potential danger to the people of the opposing side. If national military power did not exist, it would be impossible to create this environment of potential danger on a reciprocal basis which is a prerequisite for war between nations.

But as long as individual nations are allowed to control individual national military forces, wars will continue to generate endlessly in roughly predictable patterns. National military power is the strategic factor. It can be controlled.

## Air Power... The New Dimension of International Apprehension

The above reciprocating environments of anxiety can be observed in relation to wars throughout modern history, at least.

Only one basic change now is noticeable... the new dimension of Air Power has increased the range of fear and anxiety from foreign military power to its near-global limits.

The area of the world involved in a single war used to be limited by the basic range of military power.

Other nations become involved in a war only when they come within range of potential disaster, to arouse their national fears and anxieties.

When national military power had its range limited by the legs of man carrying swords or spears... or men on horseback... the anxiety-cyclones were of small area. As surface-bound military power increased its effective range by developing the wheel to include trucks and tanks and half-tracks... and by developing the boat to include modern transports, battleships and aircraft carriers, larger and larger areas of the world became involved in the potential hazards of war. Dominant military powers which had been beyond range of each other's forces... and therefore not at war with each other... became drawn into the traditional patterns on a larger and larger scale.

Air Power, today, has brought the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. into a new CLOSENESS which never has existed before in history. Today each of these two dominant military powers remaining after the last war is within immediate range of the other's capacities to drop crippling atomic and hydrogen and more terrible bombs. Intense American public apprehension is

pegged to the potential threat of Soviet military power, and intense Soviet public apprehension is pegged to the potential threat of American military power.

If each nation simultaneously could be deprived of the control of national military power this whole phenomenon of war would disappear like the disappearance of an electric field when the electricity is turned off.

But as long as each nation is allowed to continue to control national military force, the back-and-forth, back-and-forth increasing regeneration of anxiety will continue to build up explosive human motivations... until war comes as a release from tension-and-frustration.

Beliefs in materialism or particular religions are not critical, or even important factors in the generation of war. Beliefs in peculiar national political systems are not strategic or even important factors in this build-up for the most awful war civilization will ever have seen. These are merely the themes of the speechwriters, exporters, manipulators, politicians, circulation-builders, editorial writers and historians who try to explain their predicaments in terms of superstitions and fantasies of imagination.

The fears and apprehensions which generate this war come from threatening enemy military power.

There are no ideologies designed into Soviet Air Power, the threat of which grinds New York City to a deathlike stillness in the city's practice air raid drills. There is the threat of the critical enemy military power.

There are no ideologies designed into American Air Power, the threat of which to the Soviet people has been an intentional base of American foreign policy for more than eight years. There is the threat of enemy military power.

No device can be constructed in the nose of an atom-filled rocket, to sort out the faiths and beliefs of the people below, on target, who are about to die. The rocket contains the threat of enemy military power, not the threat of a philosopher's syllogism.

If an anxiety-ridden maniac raises a loaded gun to his shoulder, cocks it, points it at your head and places his finger on the trigger... is the critical factor in your predicament what church he goes to? what kind of banking system he uses? how he prays? whether he prays? Your personal crisis is related to his personal military power... the loaded gun.

The critical factor in the phenomenon of war is tangible, real, concrete and observable.

It is national military power. It has been conceived by scientists, designed by engineers and mobilized by people on both sides who are afraid. Once the deadly dynamics of war have built up between two nations, it then would be suicidal if one nation suddenly disarmed or decreased its military power. It would be overrun by force of the pent up fears and anxieties of the opposing people.

If the U.S.S.R. became weak, American anxiety would insist that it be rendered helpless, so that it could not again become a threat. Similarly, if the U.S.

became weak, Soviet anxiety would insist that it be rendered, helpless, so that it could not again become a threat.

"Two scorpions in a bottle" is an inadequate description of today's crisis. True, each is capable of killing the other. True this results in a temporary stalemate. But the moment either one would weaken its position, or deflect its attention from the poise for killing, the other would end the stalemate by quick victory.

The oversimplification of today's critical situation might be visualized by watching two armed men on the opposite sides of any war. Each has raised his loaded gun to firing position, cocked it, aimed it at the other's heart and placed his finger on the trigger. Each man is of a different Faith... each has a different patriotic loyalty... each is deeply convinced that the other is about to kill him and is now willing to die in self-defense. Although starting from different conscious loyalties and ideals and identifications the universal controls of anxiety have taken command of the behavior of both men to the point where they are doing exactly the same things, in exactly the same way, with exactly the same motivations. Fear and anxiety are common ground which tend to make people of all races, colors, creeds and nationalities react with identical judgments, identical attitudes and identical actions regarding the thing which has aroused the anxiety.

The crucial question of this age is whether it is possible to enter this tense picture and take away the guns from these two men.

If this is possible, we will have taken action in the physical world, by removing the guns.

We will have changed the psychological atmosphere by removing the explosive charge of anxiety which had been built up between the two men.

We will not have intruded into the realm of spiritual or philosophic contentions, nor into the realm of national loyalty and patriotism.

Each man can continue to be unequivocally patriotic and loyal to his own country. It is not necessary to kill foreigners to be patriotic, if one's own nation is not threatened.

Each man can continue to worship as he choses. It is not necessary to kill in order to believe.

By removing the guns, we will not have trespassed into the realm of each person's patriotisms and beliefs.

## Implications

When national military power is recognized as the strategic factor in the phenomenon of war, it becomes possible to evaluate actions and policies aimed at averting war... just as the isolation of the critical factor of the animal parasites made it possible to evaluate actions and policies aimed at removing the disease of malaria.

The League of Nations failed to prevent the build-up for war because it failed to control the strategic factor of *national military power*. The United Nations has failed to prevent the build-up towards an even more dreadful war because it failed to control the strategic factor of *national military power*.

All efforts will fail to prevent the build-up for war until a world-wide safety organization is brought into being which has a monopoly control of military power and can prevent any nation or group of nations from waging war, or threatening to wage war, against any other people.

During the period of growth, before all nations in the world belonged to this safety organization, it will have two primary missions (1) to prevent war between any member nations or areas and (2) to defend all member areas from any threat from outside powers.

Checks and balances of multi-national political control will have to be worked out to guarantee that this world-wide safety organization will not, itself, become an instrument of tyranny or oppression.

The impact of science on society today is to raise the question whether or not it is possible to create from the U.N. such a world-wide safety organization which can prevent war. It is a practical question of large scale organization.

The question of this age is whether large scale multi-national collective strength can be created in a world-wide safety organization committed to the mission of preventing war. This will mean the elimination of individual national freedom to threaten war unilaterally.

When the formulae are found which can bring nations together into pooled strength, to provide safety without loss of national or area independence, this multi-national combination may start forming anywhere. It may start in the U.S. with additional unions with different other regional safety organization. It could start in the U.S.S.R. with a new and enlightened relationship with the now-satellite areas. It could start with small or large number of other countries banding together for mutual protection against the hazards of being caught in a fight-to-the-finish between two national giants... with an organization designed around universal concerns and open to admit more and more member areas until, eventually, the guarantees of safety become world-wide. This will all be accomplished without trying to change any man's religion or his patriotic loyalty to his native land.

Safety is a universal objective. ☐

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# Commentaries
on
"An Engineer vs. War"

## Summary of Comments by Harry Overstreet

Mr. Kurtz has, in my mind, done a competent engineering job in isolating the strategic factor in the phenomenon of war. He comes to the intrinsically quite simple, but practically highly complex conclusion that national military power is the strategic factor. The answer to war is universal national disarmament.

This is plain, unadulterated sense. But while, from an engineering point of view, this is sound; from a psychological, social and political point of view it is full of bewildering perplexities. How to make this plain unadulterated sense clear and convincing to all the world is the problem.

The engineer has now to do what the TVA engineers had to do when they drew up their blueprints for a deemed Tennessee Valley; they must convince men's minds.

The value of the engineer's point of view is that it enables us to clear away a lot of cluttering nonsense and to get the center of the issue. But it doesn't alter the fact that a lot of work has to be done.

## Biography of Harry Overstreet

Professor Overstreet received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from the University of California in 1899. In 1901 he was awarded a Bachelor of Science degree from Oxford University. He also holds a research degree.

Since 1939 he has been Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, at the College of the City of New York.

His former positions include Associate Professor at the University of America. He has been a member of the New York Philosophical Society and the American Association for Adult Education. Professor Overstreet is the author of many books. "Our Free Minds" and "Let Me Think" are two of his latest.

## Summary of Comments by Everett Clinchy

"High Noon" was a Western in which anxiety was sustained by individuals who feared each other. Individual

opponents feared because each believed a man he mistralled was ever lurking around a corner with a finger on a trigger. Indeed, as the guns in each man's hands dominated his intentions and his existence, the anxiety mounted.

Howard Kurtz points to sustained and mounting anxiety as a basic cause of war. He relates this anxiety (a) to the colossal size of the mounting national armaments in the Moscow and Washington campus; a mushrooming process which focuses inordinate attention on destructive impulses; (b) to proximity of nations in a jet airplane age that does not allow anxiety, for fear of the opponent striking; (c) the interminable national race in air-wings, stockpiling weapons, inventing more destructive technics, trends to build up hate and the death-dealing wishes.

Therefore, Mr. Kurtz argues a case for world order under law, and international police authority substituting for militant national armament. Then anxiety can be relieved because no country legally can carry weapons. As a UN police force would be on constant watch, mankind may approach confidence and mutual trust. To be sure, there are other factors than anxiety which lead to war. Nevertheless, Mr. Kurtz' analysis makes a great deal of sense. Disarmament of individual nations accompanied by world organization with international law, together with world police authority to manage the violent, the deceitful, and the marauding, is the next step for world peace. The spiritual commitment to the sense of a world family of man, and education with regard to moral values, are indispensable elements in peace.

## Biography of Everett Clinchy

Dr. Clinchy's college education at Wesleyan University was interrupted by serving in the United States Army in World War I. After leaving the army he attended Lafayette College where he received a Bachelor of Science degree in 1920.

[1c]

He studied at Union Theological Seminary and at Col-
umbia University in 1921. In this year he received his
Masters Degree from Columbia University and was or-
dained as a minister. He took up pastoral duties as well
as continuing graduate study at Yale University. He re-
ceived his PhD at Drew University in 1934.

Dr. Clinchy was called to the Church of Christ at Wes-
leyan University in 1923. For five years he stayed there
and was instrumental in organizing the Federal Council
of Churches of Christ in America in 1928. He was secre-
tary of this organization until 1933. It was the beginning
of this period, 1928, that the National Conference of Chris-
tians and Jews was formed. Dr. Clinchy became president
of this organization in 1933 and has since devoted his full
time to this position.

A prolific writer, several of Dr. Clinchy's books are: "All
in the Name of God" and "Our Racial and National Minor-
ities". He is widely recognized as a leader in promoting
religious liberty.

Summary of Comments by Quincy Wright

Mr. Kurtz has an important insight into the problem of
war derived from his study of the anxieties of passengers
aboard an aircraft. If something happens, creating appre-
hension of danger, anxieties are likely to increase, per-
haps leading to panic because there is no opportunity for
the normal human reactions to danger of either running
away or facing and controlling the situation. In such cir-
cumstances the pilot may still anxieties by indicating the
nature of the danger and his capacity to control.

Mr. Kurtz has generalized his insight into the proposi-
tions

1) War is a human phenomena,

2) Human beings whatever their race or creed are
alike in many particulars,

3) Among these common characteristics are mount-
ing anxiety in the presence of danger which cannot
be controlled or run away from, and

4) The shrinking world is like an airplane in that the
danger of war from sudden nuclear attack cannot
be run away from or controlled by any person or
government.

I think this contributes to understanding the anxieties
which might lead to war in the contemporary world, but
these propositions seem somewhat inconsistent with Mr.
Kurtz' conclusion that the sole cause can be eliminated by
disarming the nations and establishing a single military
power in the world. Like many others he is really pro-
posing world government as a cure for war. The value of
this analysis, however, depends upon some indication of
the way in which world government can be achieved in
a highly nationalistic world.

Mr. Kurtz emphasizes the level of armaments and no
one would question the significance of the size, rates of
increase, and technological characteristics of armaments in
the causation of war. Both the League of Nations and the
United Nations recognized the importance of this prob-
lem, but years of negotiation indicate that agreements to
limit armaments are hard to achieve so long as interna-
tional tensions are high and anxieties for national security
great. How can tensions be reduced? How can national
security be assured? The problem of popular illusions and
misunderstandings of mutual fears and neurotic anxieties,

of economic and social dissatisfactions, of crusading ideol-
ogies intolerant of all others, of political ambitions, of
demands for autonomy, self-expression, independence, of
what the Greeks called "hybris." These and many more
factors enter into the causation of wars and progress in
reducing the probability of war seems to require a search
for remedies on many fronts, psychological, political, eco-
nomic, military and ideological.

Biography of Quincy Wright

Professor Wright received AB and LLD degrees from
Lombard College in 1912 and 1923, respectively. He also
was awarded a Master of Arts degree in 1913 by the
University of Chicago and in 1915 received the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy from the same university.

Professor Wright has taught at foreign colleges includ-
ing Tsing Hua University and the Turkish Institute. He is a
member of the advisory board of American Journal of
International Law. At various times between 1945 and
1949 he served as United States State Department con-
sultant and technical advisor to the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremburg, Germany. Other notable achieve-
ments included membership in UNESCO. He was high
commissioner of Germany in 1950, and has served as
President of the American Society of International Law in
1956.

Summary of Comments by Ernest Simmons

I have read with deep interest a copy of Howard G.
Kurtz' article, "An Engineer Versus War". Here an engi-
neer's keen analysis conclusively disproves many of the
commonly accepted causes of war and to this extent ren-
ders an important service, because for centuries clear think-
ing on the causes of war has been everlastingly obfuscated
by popular superstitions and erroneous beliefs.

It would be difficult to assail the cogency of Mr. Kurtz'
cause-and-effect pattern (national military-anxiety) which
leads to war. All would agree, I think, that if complete
and universal disarmament could be achieved, national
anxieties would be eliminated, and so would war. And
if there were a federated world system with an interna-
tional police force, potential violators of this order of
things could be checked.

What is lacking in Mr. Kurtz's presentation is how we
are to achieve this beatific state. How are we to obtain
complete and universal disarmament? It is men who
make war, not things. The effective cause of war or of
violence of any kind is the irrational component in the
nature of man. Even now we hear the deceptive argu-
ment on every side that since man has at last succeeded
in developing such universally destructive atomic-hydro-
gen bombs, therefore war will be eliminated. Could any-
thing be more irrational than the manufacture of atomic-
hydrogen bombs, and is there any reason to suppose, on
the basis of all human experience, that the irrational in
man will not eventually compel him to use these bombs
in war to slay millions of people?

We must eliminate the irrationalism in human nature
if we are to eliminate the irrationalism of war. This is the
primary cause of bloody strife among peoples. Its elim-
ination can be done progressively only by endless striv-
ing to improve the moral perfection of every individual
through repudiation of every form of violence. In his

deeply sincere and indefatigable efforts to promote peace among the peoples of the world, Mr. Kurtz is making a noble contribution towards this end, one perhaps more significant than the arguments of his article. For to those who dismiss the way of love and moral perfection as impractical, we must ask, "How practical is an atomic-hydrogen war to end all wars—or civilization?"

## Biography of Ernest Simmons

Professor Simmons received his Bachelor of Arts, Master of Arts, and Doctor of Philosophy degrees from Harvard University in 1925, 1926, and 1928, respectively.

During his stay at Harvard University from 1929 to 1939, Simmons rose from position of tutor of English Literature to Associate Professor of English and Russian Literature and Chairman of the Board of English Tutors. In 1941-46 he taught at Cornell University. He became chairman of the Department of Slavic Languages and Russian Literature at Columbia University in 1946, and retains this post at the present time.

Honorary positions held by Professor Simmons are: Chairman, Committee of Instruction, Philosophy Faculty at Columbia in 1949-50; Chairman, Slavic group, Modern Languages Association, 1952-54; Member, Executive Council Modern Languages Association, 1952-54.

Professor Simmons has written several books including, "English Literature and Culture in Russia," "Puskin and Dostaevski," "The Making of a Novelist". He was editor of "The USSR", a concise handbook. Professor Simmons also contributed articles to Atlantic Monthly, New Republic, and Nation Magazines.

## Summary of Comments by William Littlewood

I wish I could agree with Mr. Kurtz's conclusion that there is a simple common denominator to all wars wherever and whenever, and that this is, in essence, the very existence of national armaments. We must admit that national armaments do make possible the waging of wars proportionate to their intensity and destructiveness to the nature and extent of those armaments. However, to hold their existence solely responsible for wars is exactly like saying that one threw a stone because he had a stone. I think we must admit that if he did not have a stone, but had been motivated to do so, he might have hit you with a stick. The cause of his animosity and his hitting you, therefore, was not the existence of a weapon to do damage with, but something more complex and obscure.

I must adhere to the less hopeful belief that people, as individuals and as groups and as nations, are motivated basically by fundamental instincts, almost Freudian in their simplicity, combined and activated by the religious, social, political and economic complexes of modern society. The seven deadly sins are still fundamental and compelling forces in the world. The Ten Commandments would never have been delineated if it had not been acknowledged that people were strongly motivated and prone to violate them. You will find the approximate equivalent of the Ten Commandments of Christianity in any of the great religious and ethical beliefs of the world. These things are universal, they are fundamental, and they are the complex motivating forces, singly and in combination, which seem to lead people down the path to war.

I will agree with Mr. Kurtz that if we could obliterate all major armaments and keep them obliterated, we would have no wars of consequence. However, the hope of doing this at an early date seems more than remote, and we must, I fear, accept the fact that we will have them with us, and that the human weaknesses and sins can lead to a testing of the swords culminating in the possible destruction of mankind by the ultimate use of H bombs. We must, therefore, approach our problem on the constructive basis of building up a positive understanding of the uselessness of war as a solution of the universal human problem, rather than the impractical and negative denial to us of the tools to do physical harm.

I think we must acknowledge that the existence of vast military powers is motivated by many causes. High on the list we must rate fear, and I can easily subscribe to the reciprocal fears which Mr. Kurtz describes as resulting in the accelerated development of opposing military strengths. On the other hand, I think we must also recognize that behind the scene, publicly denied but fundamentally true, lie the selfishness and greed of individuals and of groups and of nations—if we are to identify such with the individuals who lead them. The self perpetuation of individual and group prestige and material success which is inherent within a military power, is one of the strong unacknowledged forces accounting for the existence of the ever expanding war machine. I think history has shown that wars have been motivated by greed, aversion, envy and entire gamut of individual and collective sins. I think it can also be shown that nations and groups, as in our own civil war, are sometimes driven by emotion rather than any reasonable preparation in manpower or armament as a spark to such conflict.

Therefore, I must regretfully feel that Mr. Kurtz has oversimplified the problem, and that we must continue to seek our solution on the constructive basis of patiently emphasizing and furthering an understanding of the true values of life and the inevitable desirability of the application of the Golden Rule throughout the world. Fortunately, there are at work today great universal forces promoting international understanding. I do not need to delineate them. Mr. Kurtz has been intimately associated with one of them in the form of international air transportation. In spite of all the Iron Curtains and barriers individuals and groups endeavor to impose to prevent mutual understanding and respect between the peoples of the world, these forces cannot be denied, and if given time will inevitably work the basic cure.

## Biography of William Littlewood

Mr. Littlewood graduated from Cornell University in 1920 with a degree in Mechanical Engineering. He was Assistant Superintendent of Niles Bent Pond Company from 1920 to 1924. He then accepted the position of Assistant Superintendent and Chief Inspector of the Ingersoll-Rand Company and acted in that capacity until 1927. He was General Manager of the Fairchild Engine Division of Fairchild Aviation Corporation from 1927 to 1930. At that time he accepted the position of Chief Engineer and Vice President of Engineering with American Airlines, the company he is with today as Vice President Equipment Research.

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

CLEVELAND 6, OHIO

DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE

August 12, 1957

Dr. Henry Kissinger
c/o Council on Foreign Relations
58 East 68 Street
New York 21, New York

Dear Henry:

Congratulations on your terrific contribution to our thinking on military policy by virtue of your recent publication: *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. I am preparing a "book review" for the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, but am not certain when it will be published, for unfortunately the book editor, Bob Snajdr, frequently holds these reviews too long.

Meantime, I thought you would be interested that I shall again conduct a Graduate Seminar on Military Policy this fall semester, which I feel confident will be more enriching and rewarding than my initial attempt during the fall semester, 1954. Your excellent work, along with other documents, will provide a more substantial base for my graduate students.

Which leads me to inquire whether or not you have readily available a rather comprehensive bibliography on military policy, other than the one in the back of your book, which may assist me in getting together relevant materials for the benefit of this seminar. I don't expect you to compile one especially for our use, but hope that you may have one available which I could readily employ. If so, I would appreciate your sending same to me as soon as convenient.

It is my sincere hope that our future relationships may be closer and more fruitful, at least from my standpoint. You are probably aware, by now, of the fact that Robert Strausz-Hupe has invited me to serve as Consultant to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, in which operation you are an Associate. Your project on the United Nations looks very inviting and interesting -- and if I feel that I can serve some useful purpose to men of your distinction I shall, of course, be most honored to work with you and the other distinguished Associates of the Institute.

Perhaps we may see each other at the September meetings of the American Political Science Association to be held at the Henry Hudson Hotel. I am chairman of the panel on "American Foreign Economic Policy" which will be presented on Friday morning, September 6.

Thanks for any assistance you can render on the aforementioned request.

AJH:mek

ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER

13 August 1957

Paris, France

Dear Henry:

Well, your book certainly seems to be making quite a splash, which doesn't surprise me. You have, of course, seen Russell Baker's story on page 1 of last Sunday's *New York Times*. You may not, however, have seen Alistair Cooke's story in yesterday's *Manchester Guardian*. Cooke's story roughly parallels Baker's in that it briefly summarizes the book and includes a few quotations. It would be perhaps more accurate to say that he summarizes one of your *Foreign Affairs* articles rather than the book.

Cooke states among other things that the book (or article) "threatens to agitate Washington as much as Mr. George Kennan's famous article in the same magazine that led to the Truman administration's policy on 'containment'. In brief, Mr. Kissinger is the first articulate proponent of limited warfare." Your book is, as of this moment, absolutely unavailable in Paris. I have, therefore, today ordered a copy from Washington.

I have been over here for a month serving in a job that had not existed before my arrival. It appears to carry the title of "Politico-Military Advisor to SACEUR." Anyhow, I seem to have the status of a Special Assistant to General Norstad.

If business or pleasure brings you this way, as I hope it does, please be sure to drop me a line. You might enjoy talking to some of the key people on our international staff here, and I feel sure that General Norstad himself would much enjoy talking with you.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Council on Foreign Relations
58 East 68th St.
New York 21, N. Y.

FREDERICK M. STERN

100 FOREST AVENUE
NEW ROCHELLE, N. Y.
---
TEL. NEW ROCHELLE 6-3867

August 13, 1957.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Director of Special Studies
Rockefeller Brothers' Fund
22 West 55th Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

May I congratulate you on your excellent book NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY and on the attention which, according to the New York Times of August 11, it seems to have found in responsible quarters in Washington. I admire both the breadth of your vision and the clarity of your analysis, and I hope very much that the impact of your book may bring about a decisive change in our strategic thinking and our foreign policy.

There is, however, in my opinion one point which deserves further elucidation. Granting the validity of all your arguments, a considerable strengthening of the ground forces of the United States and its allies, appears to me as an urgent necessity. You say, for instance, that in a conflict with a minor power that does not possess nuclear weapons -- which, however, may be armed and stirred into action by the Soviet Union or Red China -- we probably would not -- and should not -- use even the smallest nuclear weapons at our disposal. The psychological repercussions, especially among neutral nations, might outweigh the purely military advantages. But it is exactly this kind of conflict that has dominated the scene and may well increase in frequency and volume. At another point (page 262) you rightly refer to the respect which large ground forces command -- you mention "two hundred Chinese divisions" -- in the "newly independent states" as compared to "a B-52 or the strategic impact of a ballistic missile."

In the defense of Western Europe the side that lacks large ground forces may, perhaps after a see-saw campaign conducted with tactical nuclear weapons, have to give up or, in desperation, begin to employ atomic weapons of larger caliber. Even in a war fought with the smallest nuclear weapons you yourself seem to recognize the need for larger ground forces than are now available, and to warn against the reductions in these forces now planned by the United States and Great Britain.

2-

I personally feel that the need for ground forces will be even greater because of their extremely rapid attrition in the kind of warfare you advocate, and because of the understandable demands for protection on the part of the population of Germany, and other countries that may be involved.

In my opinion, these needs call for large, high-class, ready reserves. But though on Page 160 you concede that the existing ground forces of the United States and its allies are inadequate, you say on page 161: "It is no longer possible to count on a substantial mobilization of reserve forces...because mobilization may well unleash a retaliatory blow." Here it is not clear why mobilization should unleash a "retaliatory blow." In the case of Korea, which you mention in the same sentence, that "blow" did not materialize. After all, the mobilization of reserves can be carried out on a limited scale no less than any other military measure.

You furthermore say "that" the training of reserve forces is not likely to be adequate for using the complicated weapons and applying the intricate tactics of modern war." But the reserves which we and our allies now posses are not properly organized and trained. Actually, the quality of personnel needed for the handling of modern complex weapons can be obtained on a professional basis only for comparatively small contingents. Larger contingents can be much better won only from the civilian citizenry; for no amount of training can replace inborn qualities. In order to make these points clear, I am sending you under separate cover a copy of my book "The Citizen Army, Key to Defense in the Atomic Age," which will be published on August 26th. I hope you will agree that the creation of citizen armies would ideally dovetail with your own suggestions.

Please don't misunderstand me. I am fascinated by your book, and regard it as one of the most important contributions to the grave problems of our security. But I believe your argument will gain in strength by the inclusion of the program which I have proposed. For limited warfare - with or without tactical nuclear weapons - becomes much more feasible if the United States and its allies have well-trained, well-organized, ready citizen reserves at their disposal.

I shall be very glad indeed to have your comment.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK

15 August 1957

Dear Henry:

I have been most remiss in failing to write you before
to express my feeling that you have, in your book, made a very
great and long-lasting contribution both in the field of schol-
arship and to the national security of the United States. Yours
is the most outstanding single contribution to straight thinking
in the area under your title that we have had. In fact, we have
had damn few such contributions that could be classified under
the straight thinking heading.

I do include Osgood's book titled Limited War, and he has
leaned considerably on you, in the straight thinking category.

I admit to being very happy that you advertised my truism
about military power in my home state and my brother's home town
of Detroit.

I have been attempting to put together a book review of the
Masland-Radway, Huntington and Ekirch's books. Out of this effort
plus some conversations in the Pentagon I conclude that there is
a whole area of investigation that we have touched little if at
all in our Rockefeller endeavor. It seems to me that the tradi-
tional requirements - capabilities equation so useful in planning
in wartime is of questionable application in designing our armed
forces today. Something needs to be done about determining how
much is certainly enough in nuclear power. With best personal
regards.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Director of Special Studies
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, N.Y.

August 16, 1957

The following is an extract from Colonel G. A. Lincoln's letter to
Dr. Kissinger, dated August 15, 1957:

"I have been most remiss in failing to write you before
to express my feeling that you have, in your book, made
a very great and long-lasting contribution both in the
field of scholarship and to the national security of the
United States. Yours is the most outstanding single
contribution to straight thinking in the area under your
title that we have had. In fact, we have had damn few
contributions that could be classified under the straight
thinking heading."