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wishes to reactivate Europe's traditional national rivalries as so many of
his American critics allege. On the contrary, he affirms the goal of unity
for Europe as passionately as his detractors. But where the American and
European "integrationists" insist that European unity requires that the
role of the nation-state be diminished, De Gaulle argues that unity depends
on the vitality of the traditional Europe. [To De Gaulle the states are
the only legitimate source of power; only they can act responsibly.]

> . . . it is true that the nation is a human and sentimental
element, whereas Europe can be built on the basis of
active, authoritative and responsible elements. What
elements? The States, of course, for, in this respect,
it is only the States that are valid, legitimate and
capable of achievement. I have already said, and I
repeat, that at the present time there cannot be any
other Europe than a Europe of States, apart, of course,
from myths, stories and parades.¹⁷

> The States are, in truth, certainly very different from
> one another, each of which has its own spirit, its own
> history, its own language, its own misfortunes, glories,
> and ambitions; but these States are the only entities that
> have the right to order and the authority to act.¹⁸

> Thus De Gaulle's proposals for European unity invariably envisage
> a confederation of states rather than supranational institutions. In his
> press conference of September 5, 1960, President de Gaulle called for
> regular consultation between the European governments, for specialized
> subordinate agencies and for an assembly formed of delegates from the
> national parliaments. He urged a European referendum "so as to give this

17

Major Addresses, *ibid.*, Press Conference on May 15, 1962, p. 176

18

Major Addresses, *ibid.*, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, pp. 92-93.

[Y]

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launching of Europe the character of popular support and initiative that
is indispensable."

This affirmation of the need for European unity has been repeated
regularly:

...France. . .must help to build Western Europe into an organized union of States, so that gradually there may be established on both sides of the Rhine, of the Alps and perhaps of the Channel, the most powerful, prosperous and influential political, economic, cultural and military complex in the world. 20

...Western Europe must form itself politically. Moreover, if it did not succeed in doing so, the Economic Community itself could not in the long run become stronger or even continue to exist. In other words, Europe must have institutions that will lead it to form a political union, just as it is already a union in the economic sphere. 21

...Western Europe appears likely to constitute a major entity full of merit and resources, capable of living its own life, indeed not in opposition to the New World, but right alongside it. 22

Most of these ideas were incorporated in the Fouchet Plan for European integration proposed by France in 1961 to its partners in the Common Market.

19

Ibid, p. 93.

20

Major Addresses, ibid., February 5, 1962, p. 159.

21

Major Addresses, ibid., Press Conference on May 15, 1962, p. 174.

22

Charles de Gaulle, Press Conference on July 23, 1964, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 208, New York: French Embassy, Press and Information Division, p. 4.

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[Y]

It is often argued that De Gaulle's philosophy is a subterfuge for a design to establish French hegemony in Europe--the mirror image of the French claim that American conceptions camouflage our thirst for domination. It is impossible, of course, to be certain about De Gaulle's "real" designs. However, if French hegemony is his aim, he has chosen a curious road toward it. If a united Europe makes its decisions on the basis of a unanimous vote of its member states--as De Gaulle has proposed --it can be dominated, if at all, only by moral leadership. France could achieve pre-eminence only if French leaders succeeded in identifying themselves with the main currents of opinion in Europe. [The other states are not likely to be so blind to their interest or so unsure of themselves as to refrain from casting their veto if they disagree with French policy.]

Differences between France and the United States over the future of Europe have been compounded by disagreements over Atlantic policy. These have gone through two contradictory phases. During his first three years in office (from 1958-1961), De Gaulle repeatedly urged the coordination of Western policies on a world-wide basis. In September 1958, he proposed a global Directorate composed of the United States, Great Britain and France. The United States rejected this with the argument that it could not designate one of its European partners to speak for the others. No attempt was made to explore De Gaulle's reaction to the possibility of a wider forum.

De Gaulle returned to the theme of the need for coordination in his 23rd press conference of March 25, 1959. In 1960, he made yet another plea for a common Western world-wide policy.

23

Major Addresses, op.cit., Press Conference on March 25, 1959, p. 49.

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We feel that, at least among the world powers of the West, there must be something organized--where the Alliance is concerned--as to their political conduct and, should the occasion arise, their strategic conduct outside Europe, especially in the Middle East, and in Africa, where these three powers are constantly involved. Furthermore, if there is no agreement among the principal members of the Atlantic Alliance on matters other than Europe, how can the Alliance be indefinitely maintained in Europe? This must be remedied.²⁴

This idea was pressed particularly urgently with respect to the Congo crisis in 1960.

When nothing came of these proposals, De Gaulle reverted to his usual, perhaps preferred, tactic of acting unilaterally and trying to force his partners' hand. After 1961, he stopped urging concerted Western action. Instead, he stressed that only a strong Europe would receive a respectful hearing from the United States or the U.S.S.R. Increasingly, De Gaulle seemed to expect that the development of Europe's economic strength and sense of identity would leave the United States no choice except to concede a coordination of policy.

This is not to say that De Gaulle's policy was primarily a reaction to being rebuffed by the United States. Rather, two changes in the international situation caused him to consider American support less crucial and made independent action appear rewarding. When De Gaulle proposed the Directorate, a global showdown seemed possible. The Lebanese crisis had just occurred; Soviet intransigence was at its height. This impelled De Gaulle to try to insure American support in case a showdown proved unavoidable. Since 1961 the threat from the Soviets has seemed to recede, and the need for

24

Major Adresses, *ibid*. Press Conference on September 5, 1960, p. 96.

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concerted action has diminished proportionately. Indeed, with the
growth of American involvements in Asia and Latin America, the shoe
is now somewhat on the other foot. It is the United States which presses
its European allies to share its global responsibilities and the Europeans
who are reluctant to assume world-wide risks.

But while De Gaulle has sought to foster a French and ultimately
sense of
a European identity, he has never ceased affirming the need for close
association between Europe and the United States. He opposes, not the
Alliance, but the concept of integration on which it is based. In his view,
to assign tasks on the basis of a division of labor will erode France's
identity:

> It is intolerable for a great State to leave its destiny up to the decisions and action of another State, however friendly it may be. In addition, it happens that, in integration... the integrated country loses interest in its national defense, since it is not responsible for it. The whole structure of the Alliance then loses its resilience and its strength.²⁵

Integration would lead to an abdication of responsibility and a sense of
impotence. Ultimately, this would demoralize France's foreign policy.
It would oblige France and Europe to accept the tutelage of the United
States forever.

De Gaulle has opposed both the Nassau Agreement, which tied the
British nuclear program to that of the United States, and the proposed
NATO multilateral force for the same reason. Both programs, in his view,
made Europe completely dependent on the United States. Whatever influence
Europe could exercise would depend not on its weight or its conceptions but

25

Major Addresses. Ibid., Press Conference on April 11, 1961, p. 124.

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on its ability to sway essentially American decisions.[] Europeans would be lobbyists and not partners. De Gaulle considers such a role demeaning for a great power and he is convinced that it will destroy the moral substance of the "integrated" partner.

France had been materially and morally destroyed by the collapse of 1940 and by the capitulation of the Vichy people. . . .

That is why, with regard to the United States--rich, active and powerful--she found herself in a position of dependence. France constantly needed its assistance in order to avoid monetary collapse. It was from America that she received the weapons for her soldiers. France's security was dependent entirely on its protection. With regard to the international undertakings in which its leaders at that time were taking part, it was often with a view to dissolving France in them, as if self-renouncement were henceforth its sole possibility and even its only ambition, while these undertakings in the guise of integration were automatically taking American authority as a postulate. This was the case with regard to the project for a so-called supranational Europe, in which France as such would have disappeared, except to pay and to orate; a Europe governed in appearance by anonymous, technocratic and stateless committees; in other words, a Europe without political reality, without economic drive, without a capacity for defense, and therefore doomed, in the face of the Soviet bloc, to being nothing more than a dependent of that great Western power, which itself had a policy, an economy and a defense--the United States of America.²⁶

Thus De Gaulle, in 1959, withdrew the French fleet from NATO command. He argued that naval power by definition was designed for use in areas not protected by NATO commitments. According to De Gaulle, this was the reason that the major portion of the American and British fleets remained under national control. When the French army returned

26

Major Addresses, *ibid.*, Press Conference on July 29, 1963, pp. 233-4.

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from Algiers, most of it was stationed in France and not "integrated"
into NATO. The motive for this was not only De Gaulle's objection to
the concept of integration but also a reason less flattering to the often
proclaimed image of a powerful, cohesive France:

> ...it is absolutely necessary, morally and politically, for
> us to make our army a more integral part of the nation. Therefore,
> it is necessary for us to restation it, for the most part, on
> our soil; for us to give it once again a direct responsibility
> in the external security of the country; in short, for our
> defense to become once again a national defense.²⁷

In De Gaulle's judgment, twenty-five years of humiliating conflict and
several military revolts against legitimate authority made it more
important to integrate the French army into French society than into
NATO.

Few of De Gaulle's policies have so embroiled him with America
as his insistence on an autonomous nuclear strike force.

> We are in the atomic age and we are a country that can be
> destroyed at any moment unless the aggressor is deterred
> from the undertaking by the certainty that he too will
> suffer frightful destruction. This justifies both alliance
> and independence. The Americans, our allies and our friends,
> have for a long time, alone, possessed a nuclear arsenal. So
> long as they alone had such an arsenal and so long as they showed
> their will to use it immediately if Europe were attacked--for
> at that time Europe alone could be attacked--the Americans
> acted in such a way that for France the question of an invasion
> hardly arose, since an attack was beyond all probability . . . .
> It is impossible to overestimate the extent of the service, most
> fortunately passive, that the Americans at that time, in that way,
> rendered to the freedom of the world.

> Since then the Soviets have also acquired a nuclear arsenal,
> and that arsenal is powerful enough to endanger the very life
> of America. Naturally, I am not making an evaluation--if

27

Major Addresses, *ibid*., Press Conference on May 15, 1962,
pp. 180-1.

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indeed it is possible to find a relation between the degree of one death and the degree of another--but the new and gigantic fact is there. From then on, the Americans found and are finding themselves confronted with the possibility of direct destruction.²⁸

These views have caused American spokesmen to charge De Gaulle with fomenting distrust of the United States. He has been lectured on his ignorance of the technical requirements of nuclear strategy and ridiculed for excessive pretensions. Actually, De Gaulle's analysis of the situation does not differ radically from Secretary McNamara's. Both agree that the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal confronts the United States with an unprecedented challenge. Both insist that NATO strategy must be adapted to new realities. They disagree less in their analysis than in the conclusions to be drawn from it. Looking at NATO from the point of view of division of labor, the United States considers French resources better spent on conventional forces than on nuclear arms. From the perspective of vindicating France's identity, De Gaulle is not so concerned with the technical aspects of strategy as with the political problem of choice. The United States considers central control over nuclear weapons crucial for the contingency of general war; De Gaulle gives priority to France's impact on the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy. Secretary McNamara strives for strategic options; President de Gaulle seeks political ones.²⁹

28
*Major Addresses*, ibid., Press Conference on January 14, 1963, pp. 216-7.

29
For a fuller discussion of the strategic problems, see Chapters IV, V and VI.

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Franco-American relations have been further irritated by conflicting views of East-West relations. [As in most other controversies, each side has accused the other of the same offense: of planning a settlement, if not at the expense, at least to the exclusion of the other.] In the United States, De Gaulle's comment that Europe extends from the Atlantic to the Urals is often cited as proof of a thinly veiled desire to negotiate directly with Moscow. In France, United States bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union are taken as an indication that the United States is seeking a separate accommodation with the U.S.S.R., perhaps as detrimental to Europe as the Yalta agreement is said to have been.

At times both sides seem primarily concerned with scoring debating points. De Gaulle's statement that one day Europe would again extend from the Atlantic to the Urals did not imply a deal with the Soviet Union: He speaking for Europe.

On our old continent, the organization of a western group, at the very least equivalent to that which exists in the east, may one day, without risk to the independence and the freedom of each nation and taking into account the probable evolution of political regimes, establish a European entente from the Atlantic to the Urals. Then Europe, no longer split in two by ambitions and ideologies that would become out-of-date, would again be the heart of civilization.³⁰

The reorganization of Europe to which De Gaulle refers is to take place *after* Communist ideology no longer dominates in the Soviet Union, *that is* when Russia is once more a national, and not an ideological, state pursuing a policy dictated by its national interests. This is the precise eventuality foreseen in American post-war policy for a final settlement. By the same

30

*Major Addresses, ibid.*, Press Conference on May 31, 1960, p. 78.

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token, our French critics do us an injustice when they see our groping efforts to adjust to complex situations as a complicated, perhaps sinister, master plan. United States policy toward the Soviet Union does not reflect a devious desire to settle all issues unilaterally.

Basically, it seeks to implement one interest which the two great nuclear powers must have in common: to prevent a general holocaust.

Indeed, French and American analyses of Soviet trends are not so different as the controversy sometimes suggests. Both are of the view that at some point the Soviet system will be transformed. Both believe that this transformation will mark the starting point for fruitful negotiations. They disagree not over the fact of evolution but its nature, not over the ultimate desirability of a diplomatic settlement but about who will be the spokesman for the West when it takes place. Above all, they differ about the nature of a stable international order and the role of individuals in relation to it.

The United States has a tendency to believe that peace and stability is the "natural" condition. Crises must, therefore, be caused by personal ill-will rather than by objective conditions. If tension persists it is because Communist leaders continue to be unreasonable; it can be alleviated by establishing an atmosphere of trust and good personal relations. As a result, United States policy toward the Soviet Union has oscillated between two opposite approaches: During periods of tension, the United States tends to see Soviet policy as conducted by highly purposeful, ideologically inspired men operating according to careful, long-range plans. During periods of détente, American leaders have often acted as if a settlement could be achieved by good personal relations with their Communist counterparts.

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Great stress is placed on creating a proper atmosphere. Either approach leads to an avoidance of concreteness. During periods of tension this is because negotiations are believed to be useless, and during periods of detente it is because of a reluctance to disturb the favorable atmosphere. In either case, the final goal of our confrontation with the Soviets is often described as some definite point in time where peace can be said to have broken out. American policy statements have a tendency to envisage a permanent end of conflict and a world living under what is often described as "the rule of law."

De Gaulle's view is more historical and less legalistic. Peace to him is not a final settlement but a new, perhaps more stable balance of forces. "Now, in the last analysis and as always, it is only in equilibrium that the world will find peace." An equilibrium can never be permanent but must be adjusted in constant struggles. But however temporary a balance, France and Europe must find their proper place in it, not as objects of policy but as its author.

Similarly tension, in De Gaulle's view, is not so much caused by the personal attitudes of individual Communist leaders as by the dynamics of the system which they represent. To him, internal instability does not affect a real presence and demoralization is the distinguishing feature of Communist leadership groups.

31

Major Addresses, ibid., May 31, 1960, p. 78.

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During my lifetime, Communist ideology has been personified by many people. ... Each of these holders in his turn condemns, excommunicates, crushes and at times kills the others. In any event, he firmly fights against the personality cult of the others.³²

Having erected an unnatural system, Soviet leaders are under constant pressure to divert attention by foreign adventures.

... there is in this uproar of imprecations and demands organized by the Soviets something so arbitrary and so artificial that one is led to attribute it either to the premeditated unleashing of frantic ambitions, or to the desire of drawing attention away from great difficulties: this second hypothesis seems, all the more plausible, to me since, despite the coercions, isolation and acts of force in which the Communist system encloses the countries which are under its yoke, and despite certain collective successes which it has achieved by drawing upon the substance of its subjects, actually its gaps, its shortages, its internal failures, and above that its character of inhuman oppression, are felt more and more by the elites and the masses, whom it is more and more difficult to deceive and to subjugate.³⁴

Since in De Gaulle's view Soviet aggressiveness does not reflect a real grievance but domestic instability, it must be resisted and not accommodated by the West. To yield to Soviet blackmail would not alleviate internal Soviet stresses but only supply an incentive for further demands. Thus during the Berlin crisis, De Gaulle spoke as follows:

32
<u>Major Addresses</u>, <u>ibid.</u>, Press Conference on July 29, 1963,
p. 236.

33
<u>Major Addresses</u>, <u>ibid.</u>, Press Conference on September 5, 1960,
p. 84.

34
<u>Major Addresses</u>, <u>ibid.</u>, Press Conference on September 5, 1961,
p. 140.

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we do not allow ourselves to be moved by all the tumult,
all the flow of invective, of formal notifications, of threats
launched by certain countries against other lands and especially
against ours. This is all the more true in that we realize
the tactical element that enters into all this staging by those
who, so to speak, make it their job to upset others.

in their camps the struggle between political trends, the
intrigues of clans, the rivalries of individuals periodically
lead to implacable crises, whose sequels--or even whose
premonitory symptoms--cannot help but unsettle them. Moreover,
we know that in those countries there are conflicting national
grievances in spite of the absolutism of their ideology. We
realize therefore only too well that they readily indulge in
virulent utterances and sensational outbursts in order to lead
people astray--within their own country and outside--without,
however, overstepping certain bounds. 35

De Gaulle rejected the "exploratory" conversations on Berlin urged by
the United States and Britain as a means of determining Soviet intentions.

He refused to join the talks because:

> . . . so long as the Soviet Union does not put a stop to its
> threats and its injunctions and bring about an actual easing
> of the international situation, we believe that we have spared
> our allies and ourselves the catastrophic retreat, dramatic
> rupture or tragi-comical engulfment, in which the conference
> would obviously have ended. 36

And he did not participate in the Geneva disarmament conference, predicting
that it would do nothing except present irreconcilable plans. 37

35
*Major Addresses*, *ibid.*, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, pp. 84-5.

*Major Addresses*, *ibid.*, February 5, 1962, p. 160.

37
*Major Addresses*, *ibid.*, Press Conference on May 15, 1962, p. 181.

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For this reason the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has been a constant source of friction between the United States and France. To De Gaulle it is an example of an American action which ignored, and even jeopardized, a major French interest in order to promote an American conception of the general interest. The inevitable corollary is that a similar situation could arise in other fields as well. The major thrust of De Gaulle's policy is to put France, and perhaps Europe, into a position where settlements against its wishes are impossible.

In short, De Gaulle's view is remarkably consistent in all major policy areas: Unity, whether in alliance with the United States or in association with European countries, depends on the vitality of the member states. Only those capable of taking responsible action can form meaningful associations. There is no inconsistency in affirming the Atlantic Alliance while insisting on the peculiarity of France or the identity of Europe.

To De Gaulle, the two notions are complementary--though this may seem disingenuous or even cynical to many Americans.

For centuries, one of the chief problems of Western political thought has been how to achieve unity while respecting diversity. One does not have to agree with the methods or policies of President de Gaulle to recognize that he has posed an important question which the West has yet to answer. There is merit in his contention that a political unit must mean something to itself before it can have meaning to others. To American spokesmen the French insistence on autonomy is prima facie proof of distrust of American intentions. To France's President, the United States reluctance to concede this autonomy appears to be a device to perpetuate our hegemony and to reduce France to the status of an impotent satellite.

Before a state can contribute usefully to common decisions, it requires a sense of responsibility; it must be convinced that its opinions matter.

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frequently
While De Gaulle's tactics have been brutal, the United States has shown extremely little understanding for the special psychological situation of France. Even in the best of circumstances, a country which has been ravaged by two world wars, and which barely avoided civil war in 1958, in 1960 and again in 1962, could not be expected to find its fulfillment in the "Grand Design" of others.
No matter who governed in France, he would have had to face the problem of restoring France's faith in herself. To argue about the technical feasibility of various schemes of Atlantic partnership is to miss De Gaulle's central intention. Many of his actions are designed to rediscover a sense of purpose for France--a goal that transcends any specific policy issues. How well De Gaulle has succeeded in this task is proved by the fact that two years after the end of the Algerian war France, far from being torn to pieces by internal schisms--as most observers expected--is the most active European country in international affairs.

Although De Gaulle has often exaggerated this essentially psychological mission, there is merit in his view that no theoretical conception of European or Atlantic unity can become a reality if all the diverse loyalties and convictions which have formed historical Europe must be destroyed in order to achieve it. The tendency of his opponents to refuse to take his challenge seriously and instead to treat De Gaulle as a relic to be outwaited has prevented a meaningful discussion from which a new common conception of Atlantic relations might have emerged. Difficult as it may be to deal with De Gaulle's France, we would do well to remember

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that it is more in the interest of the West than a France wracked by dissension or abdicating from the international stage.

The United States as the leader of the Alliance is rightly concerned with solving immediate problems, so much so that the future often seems to it like a linear projection of the present. De Gaulle is more concerned with the period ten or fifteen years hence. Precisely because in the immediate future Europe's security is assured by the United States, De Gaulle wants to use this respite to establish an insurance against a shift of emphasis in American policy at a time when all present leaders will have disappeared and American attention may be focussed on other continents. The hypersensitivity of American policymakers who constantly protest their good faith is therefore as irrelevant to this concern as the rhetorical challenge to the French to describe circumstances in which differences of interest might arise. No one could have predicted at the beginning of any decade of this century what the world would look like at its end. The unexpected by definition cannot be described; it would be folly to ignore the lessons of history, however, to insist that all contingencies are predictable. De Gaulle does not have to be able to describe circumstances which might arise when the convictions of existing leaders are no longer relevant in order to reserve some measure of control over the destiny of his country or his continent. However arrogant his style, De Gaulle's approach to history is relatively humble. American leaders while personally humble are much brasher in their vision of the future.

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Though most American leaders tend to ascribe Allied tensions to the obstinancy of one man, the structure of present disputes is not novel. During World War II, many senior American leaders committed to assumptions about Soviet good faith and a world-wide system of collective security reacted with considerable hostility to Churchill's attempt to insure the peace by some physical safeguards. Churchill's views were then treated with the same patronizing attitude now reserved for De Gaulle. British concerns about the post-war European balance of power were considered as short-sighted and a symptom of old-fashioned nationalism. However, a subtler style, the prestige of Great Britain's heroic wartime effort and a common language prevented the conflict from being so explicit. In our impatience to realize "Grand Designs" we are sometimes reluctant to admit that a statesman must concern himself not only with the best but also with the worst contingency and this causes us at times to be obtuse about the psychological needs of our allies.

But if his critics have shown little compassion for his special circumstances, De Gaulle has often thwarted his own aims by his abrupt tactics and his imperious style. Not comfortable with the give and take of negotiations, the French President has moved through a series of *faits accomplis* to force his allies to accept his objectives. A rationalist, he has acted as if his views were certain to prevail by virtue of their logical necessity and that the feelings of other statesmen were, therefore, irrelevant. A profound believer in historical necessity, he has acted as if the logic of events would always override the sensibilities of others.

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No doubt, this is a heroic posture. But, man is not governed by
reason alone. And history, however inevitable it may appear in retrospect,
is created by men, most of whom lack the vision of the French President
--though they do not lack his power. The paradox of De Gaulle's position
is that he claims to speak for Europe, but he has not found it possible
to create a following outside of France that sees him as a European
statesman. He has alienated many potential supporters by his excessive
rationalism and unilateral tactics. Many individuals who share his dedication
to a European identity in world affairs have been driven into opposition by
De Gaulle's wounding insistence on intellectual submission to his maxims.
De Gaulle's rigid defense of an extreme conception of sovereignty has
antagonized even those who do not see the choice between a federated or
confederated Europe as an issue of principle. Though the French proposals
for European political unity actually offer a better guarantee against the
hegemony of a single European state than the dominant American schemes,
De Gaulle's methods suggest that he will cooperate only if others accept
his unilateral pronouncements. Although France and the United States
seem to agree on the principle of a strong and autonomous Europe, De Gaulle's
tactics give rise to the impression that he desires autonomy,
not to enhance the unity of the West but to be free to pursue policies
contradictory, if not hostile, to those of the United States.

Ironically, De Gaulle has become a symbol on both sides of the
Atlantic of principles contrary to his pronouncements and probably to
his intentions. He has enabled many in Europe not heretofore noted for
their devotion either to European unity or to Atlantic partnership to

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advocate some ideal model of either relationship in order to avoid making whatever progress is possible now. By evoking so many memories of authoritarian rule, De Gaulle has polarized the discussion within Europe in a manner that makes it next to impossible to come to grips with the substance of his thought. A strong Europe was bound to present a challenge to American leadership. But by couching this challenge so woundingly, De Gaulle has spurred American self-righteousness rather than the objective re-examination of Atlantic relationships which the situation demands.

History will probably demonstrate that De Gaulle's conceptions --as distinct from his style--were greater than those of most of his critics. But a statesman must work with the material at hand. If the sweep of his conceptions exceeds the capacity of his environment to absorb them, he will fail regardless of the validity of his insights. If his style makes him unassimilable, it becomes irrelevant whether he is "right" or "wrong."

Though De Gaulle has performed enormous feats in lifting his country's sights almost by an act of will, there are objective limits which great and strong-willed statesmanship may extend but cannot change altogether. De Gaulle's insistence that France and the United States are equal is true in a moral sense but if pushed too far, it must bring into the open a permanent disparity of strength. In any collision the superiority of American resources is likely to prevail regardless of the validity of the competing views. By generating so much personal ill-will among American leaders, De Gaulle may rend the fabric of illusion on which his policy depends. The irony of Franco-American rivalry is that De Gaulle

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has conceptions greater than his strength, while United States power
has been greater than its conceptions.

In the meantime, there is something of a Greek tragedy about
the dispute between the United States and France. Each chief actor,
following the laws of his nature, is bringing about consequences: quite
different from those intended. Either the "American" or the "French"
concept of Atlantic relationship might have succeeded. Competing
as they do--with no comprehension of the real intention of the other
--they may bring on what each side professes to fear most: a divided,
suspicious Europe absorbed once again in working out its ancient
rivalries. Tragedy, to many Americans at least, is to find oneself
thwarted in what is ardently desired. But there is another and perhaps
more poignant tragedy, that of fulfilling one's desires and then finding
them empty.

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# CHAPTER II
## THE PROTAGONISTS: THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE

### A. The United States and the Atlantic Community: The Grand Design

Problems which may be structural in origin ultimately emerge as policy issues. Thus within the Atlantic Alliance controversy has grown about the future organization of NATO and the relative roles of its members. The chief protagonists have been the United States and France. Now debating the wisdom of negotiating with the Soviets, now contesting the role of nuclear weapons, always disputing the future organization of Europe and the structure of the Alliance, the two countries have sometimes acted as if each had a psychological need to use the other as a foil.

Each side has developed elaborate theories of the evil designs of its opponent. French spokesmen have charged that a primary goal of United States policy is to keep its hands free for some super-Yalta--a strictly bilateral settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union. American commentators have dismissed French policy as reflecting nothing but outdated nationalism and the illusion of grandeur of a bitter man who cannot forget past slights, real or fancied. French critics have accused the United States of seeking to maintain its dominant position by disguising its aspirations behind high-sounding words about an Atlantic community whose practical consequence will be to dissolve Europe's identity. Leading Americans have replied by emphasizing the futility of seeking to base policy on past glory and they have accused De Gaulle of trying to identify European unity with French hegemony.

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The ironical aspect of the dispute is that both protagonists profess the same objectives. France and the United States avow the goal of European unity. Both insist that their policy will lead to closer Atlantic cooperation. Each side argues that its policy will cause the Communist dictatorships to become more tractable in the long run and thus return the Soviet Union to the community of nations.

It could be thought, then, that the dispute is primarily one of tactics. In fact, the controversy goes deeper. At issue are two conflicting conceptions of international order, two different views of the historical process, two variant visions of the future. What gives the controversy its tragic quality is that each approach might have succeeded but for the existence of the other. Each side has the power to prevent the other from realizing its objective. Neither can achieve its own without the cooperation of the other--France even less than the United States. Any discussion of Atlantic policy must therefore begin by tracing the conflicting views of the United States and France.

American policy toward Europe in the post-war period has been remarkably consistent. Greatly influenced by such wise Europeans as Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann, in fact often following their lead, four post-war American administrations have supported movements toward European integration. In the early days of the Marshall Plan, the United States urged that a European organization allocate American economic aid among the individual European countries. It strongly pressed the European Defense Community which would have brought about an integrated European army. When the French Parliament hesitated to ratify that treaty--to which, of course, the United States was not a party--Secretary Dulles threatened an "agonizing reappraisal" of American foreign policy.

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In the end the treaty was not ratified; yet, American policy did not change. The United States welcomed the formation of the Common Market as a step toward European political union. It threw its considerable prestige against British efforts to dilute the Common Market by turning it into a free trade area. As late as 1962, Undersecretary of State Ball warned against the danger of treating the Common Market simply as an economic enterprise and opposed the efforts of the Scandinavian countries and Austria to enter it without making a commitment to political unity.

The United States strongly supported the view that Britain could be induced to join Europe only if European economic integration grew so successful that Britain would have no alternative.

European political unity was considered by American policymakers as an essential prerequisite to the formation of an Atlantic community. On July 4, 1962, President Kennedy proclaimed his Declaration of Interdependence between the United States and a United Europe. A politically and economically integrated Europe would become an equal partner with the United States and share with us the burdens and obligations of world leadership.¹ To its fervent enthusiasts, in Europe as well as in the United States, such a partnership seemed realizable by only one method: a politically unified Europe in close association with the United States. Similarly, a single solution was offered for the achievement of European unity: supranational institutions operating on the basis of majority vote and controlled by a European Parliament.

1

John F. Kennedy, "The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership," July 4, 1962, DOSB, Vol. XLVII, No. 1204 (July 23, 1962), pp. 131-3.

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Four arguments were generally advanced on behalf of a federated Europe: to end Europe's internecine wars, to provide a counterweight to the U.S.S.R., to bind Germany indissolubly to the West and to provide an adequate partner for the United States.² American pronouncements always equated a united Europe with full integration on the basis of supranational institutions. Anything less was not considered to be unity.

Prominent among the factors producing the preference for supranational institutions was the conviction that the American experience was directly applicable to Europe. "The United States of America, with its balance of power and Federal-State division, is the unique political experiment in federation, about which we are proud and self-conscious," said Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Schaetzel. "We believe that our system works. It is a natural human reaction to believe that it might also work for other people."

2

See for example, Douglas MacArthur II, Ambassador to Belgium, "The New Europe--Its Challenge and Its Opportunities for the United States," address to Young Presidents' Organization, Inc., Phoenix, Arizona, April 9, 1962, DOSB, Vol. XLVI, No. 1192 (April 30, 1962), p. 711.

3

J. Robert Schaetzel, "The United States and the Common Market," speech to 1962 Summer Institute of the Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada, August 18, 1962, DOSB, Vol. XLVII, No. 1210 (September 3, 1962), p. 351. See also Christian Herter, *Toward an Atlantic Community*, Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, N.Y. & Evanston: 1963, pp. 55-6.

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A similar note was struck by President Kennedy in 1962:

> The debate now raging in Europe echoes on a grand scale the
debates which took place in this country between 1783 and 1789.
Small states are sometimes fearful of big ones. Big states are
suspicious for historical reasons of one another. Some statesman
cling to traditional forms--others clamor for new ones. And
every eye is on the hostile powers who are never far away. All
this reminds us of our own organic deliberations.⁴

The incentive to urge the American model was especially great
because the nation-state, according to American spokesmen, had become
obsolete. Walt Rostow, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council of the
State Department, argued:

> The major historic lesson of the Second World War; namely,
> that in the world of the second half of the 20th century the
> individual nation-states of Europe could only execute effectively
> a major role on the world scene if they were to unite. The arena
> of world affairs had widened out to embrace the whole of the
> planet; and the technology of effective power had outstripped
> the scale of the old states of Europe.⁵

To be sure, the American attitude was very ambivalent: It
exalted the nation-state in emerging areas and looked to nationalism in
Eastern Europe as a counterweight to Soviet Russia, but it denied its
validity in Western Europe where the concept had originated. Nor has
the United States been quite so ready to apply its lessons of the obsolescence
of the nation-state to itself. Nevertheless, the passion of the American
view was not reduced by what might, at first blush, seem like an inconsistency.

4. John F. Kennedy, "Trade and the Atlantic Partnership," remarks to Conference on Trade Policy at Washington, D.C., May 17, 1962, _DOSB_, Vol. XLVI, No. 1197 (June 4, 1962), p. 907.

5. W.W. Rostow, "The Atlantic Community: An American View," speech to Belgo-American Association, Brussels, May 9, 1963, _DOSB_ Vol. XLVIII, No. 1249 (June 3, 1963), p. 856.

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There is no evidence that any serious consideration was given to
whether a partnership among equals was really likely to operate as smoothly
or mechanically as official pronouncements suggested. Occasionally the
question was posed hypothetically only to be rejected. McGeorge Bundy
explained the dominant view as follows: "...in the end our confidence
in Europe rests on deeper and more solid political grounds. These peoples
are our cousins by history and culture, by language and religion."
Considering the record of internecine wars of these "cousins" some questions
might have been raised about how well-founded such confidence really was.

The notion that there was a harmony of interests between the United
States and Europe remained unquestioned. Dean Rusk was expressing the
conviction of three post-war administrations when he said:

> In 1947 the American Government decided that it would link the
> recovery of Europe to efforts at European unification. We chose
> quite consciously not to play a balance-of-power game with the
> nations of Europe but to build toward a strong partnership in
> the affairs of the West.⁷

6

McGeorge Bundy, "Policy for the Western Alliance--Berlin and After,"
speech to Economic Club of Chicago, December 6, 1961, DOSB, Vol. XLVI, No.
1185 (March 12, 1962), p. 423.

7

Dean Rusk, "Some Issues of Contemporary History," speech to the
American Historical Association, Washington, D.C., December 30, 1961, DOSB,
Vol. XLVI, No. 1177 (January 15, 1962), p. 86.

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As the years went by one particular form of European organization
came to be identified with the substantive policy which a united Europe
was likely to carry out. In the American view, an "integrated" Europe
would be "outward looking"; a less cohesive Europe would be parochial.
A supranational Europe would become a partner to the United States; a
Europe organized along different lines would remain a burden or perhaps
turn into a rival. In short, an integrated Europe was essential to complete
the "Grand Design." This was expressed by Under-secretary of State Ball:

> As we have felt the increasing weight of the burdens and
> responsibilities of leadership--increased geometrically by the
> existence of a real and present danger from Communist ambitions
> --we have wished, sometimes wistfully, for a closer and stronger
> Atlantic partnership. Yet a strong partnership must almost by
> definition mean a collaboration of equals. When one partner
> possesses over 50 percent of the resources of an enterprise and
> the balance is distributed among 16 or 17 others, the relationship
> is unlikely to work very well. And so long as Europe remained
> fragmented, so long as it consisted merely of nations small by
> modern standards, the potentials for true partnership were always
> limited.⁸

This too was the theme of President Kennedy in his speech at the Paulskirche
in Frankfurt in 1963:

> It is only a fully cohesive Europe that can protect us all
> against fragmentation of the alliance. Only such a Europe
> will permit full reciprocity of treatment across the ocean,
> in facing the Atlantic agenda. With only such a Europe can
> we have a full give-and-take between equals, an equal sharing
> of responsibilities, and an equal level of sacrifice. 9

8. George Ball, "Toward an Atlantic Partnership," speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, February 6, 1962, DOSB, Vol. XLVI, No. 1184 (March 5, 1962) p. 366.

9. John F. Kennedy, Address at the Paulskirche, Frankfurt, Germany, June 25, 1963, DOSB, Vol. XLIX, No. 1256 (July 22, 1963), p. 122.

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Partnership presupposed equality of strength; the United States
would concede to a strong and integrated Europe responsibilities withheld
from a coalition of nation-states. Thus Presidents Kennedy and Johnson,
as well as Secretary Rusk, have hinted that the United States was prepared
to grant to a united Europe the nuclear autonomy which it had resisted
giving individual allies--even though many of the arguments made against the
national nuclear forces would seem to apply as strongly to a European nuclear
force.

Although United States spokesmen extolled the virtues of partnership
with a united Europe, they were rather vague about its nature. George
McGhee, then Under-secretary of State, spoke of a "tightly integrated
Europe" and a "somewhat looser Atlantic association." He described common
tasks in aiding underdeveloped nations and in defending the frontiers of
freedom, but he did not spell out the content of these objectives or how
the partnership was going to function in practice. There was an implication
that the partnership would apply to a sharing of the burdens but that the
goals would remain those set by the United States during its period of
dominance--not indeed because we wished to perpetuate our hegemony but
because a decade and a half of unchallenged leadership had accustomed
American leaders to believe that their views inevitably reflected the
general interest.

has

The American view, for all its idealism, has ignored those factors
which made the American experience unique. The American federal union was
formed on a new continent by states sharing a common historical experience.
The American colonies had jointly fought a war to achieve their freedom.

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They were roughly of the same size. They had no tradition of sovereignty in the conduct of foreign relations. Their peoples were of similar cultural background and spoke the same language.

The situation in Europe differs fundamentally. Every European state is the product of many centuries of a history in which a sense of national identity was often linked to what distinguished a nation from its neighbors. Independence for many European states required a long process of struggle against the domination of other European nations. In other words, the countries of Europe were formed in a manner which emphasized national peculiarities. In Europe, moreover, the conduct of foreign policy and the assumption of responsibility for national defense have been considered among the key attributes of sovereignty. An attempt to abolish the European nation-states, or to reduce their role drastically, represents a much more profound wrench with the past than the establishment of the United States of America did two centuries earlier.

The present-day attitudes of the European states toward the supranational forms of unity are as different as their histories. Smaller countries with a habit of dependence find supranational institutions easier to accept than those which were once major powers. Italy, where the nation-state was never really consolidated, and the Federal Republic of Germany, whose sense of identity was smashed in the war, are less reluctant to be amalgamated in a supranational entity than France or Britain, the countries in Europe with the longest history as great powers.

The relative weakness of the nation-state in Europe in the post-war period had been due partly to factors which proved to be temporary and invasion from the East. But economic which emphasized Europe's dependence on the United States. Economic

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has recovery/tended to reduce Europe's receptivity to America's political maxims. This/coincided with the belief that the Soviet threat was ending--a development also fostered by American policy.

These factors might have been counterbalanced had Europe wished to play the global role envisaged for it by the "Grand Design." But the process of decolonization has sharply reduced Europe's interest in extra-European affairs. And for a European role, the nation-state is not so obsolete as is sometimes alleged. If European countries are willing to confine their foreign policy to Europe, those joint efforts that modern conditions require are mostly technical or economic in nature. These may be left to experts--perhaps even supranational commissions of experts. But they do not require the supranational political institutions favored by the United States.

Finally, the assumption that economic integration would inevitably lead to political unity and that institutions in the economic field could be transplanted into the political arena has been proved overoptimistic. In the economic field, problems are primarily technical. Within each European government, there has been a well-established tradition of entrusting these matters either to the automatic operation of a market economy or to a group of experts./ On the other hand, foreign policy involves issues of prestige and power, which are much less suitable for compromise. Nor is it self-evident that supranational bodies of experts would necessarily conduct a more "outward looking" policy than established political leaders. The behavior of the Common Market Commission with

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respect both to Britain's entry into Europe and the Kennedy Round would seem to indicate the opposite.

But whatever the structure, origin or degree of European integration--whether it was the Europe of De Gaulle or the Europe of Monnet--one question could not be postponed indefinitely: What kind of policy would a united Europe pursue? The assumption that a united Europe and the United States would inevitably pursue parallel policies and have similar views about appropriate tactics runs counter to historical experience. A separate identity has usually been established by opposition to a dominant power: The European sense of identity is unlikely to be an exception to this general rule--its motive force could well be to insist on a specifically European view of the world. This is all the more true because a European sense of identity can no longer be nourished by fear of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet threat is thought to be diminishing. Even if the reality of this threat were accepted, it would provide an incentive for American assistance and thus lead to an Atlantic, not a European, conception. In short, a united Europe is not likely to share our burdens without a major voice in the political direction of the Atlantic world--which is another way of saying that it will challenge American hegemony in Atlantic affairs. This may well be a price worth paying for European unity; but if American policy has suffered from an unwillingness to recognize that there was a price to be paid,

Had it not been for General de Gaulle, these problems might have remained dormant for many years. But his emergence as President of France

10

For an elaboration of these points see below, Chapter VIII.

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precipitated a fundamental change in the United States-European dialogue. Deliberately, often cynically, exploiting the ambiguities and ambivalences of the American conception, President de Gaulle has proclaimed a completely different view of Atlantic partnership and European unity. This has produced a bitter, often personal, reaction among those who had considered the previous formula as the only possible one. But outraged pride is not a good guide to policymaking. European-American relations will never again be the same as they were before De Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, which excluded Britain from the Common Market and marked a watershed in European-American relations. Waiting for his disappearance is not a policy but an evasion. It, therefore, becomes essential to try to assess without rancor the policies of the French President.

## B. The Illusionist: De Gaulle's Challenge to the "Grand Design"

If an international system could be designed with the symmetry of a geometric axiom, the primary concern of allies would be the requirements of the common undertaking. Their efforts would be regulated by criteria of over-all efficiency and on the basis of a division of labor. But such a perfect symmetry is the illusion of Utopians--or of island powers.
Historically aloof and geographically isolated, such nations consider that the main function of foreign policy is to remedy the peril which has caused them to commit themselves to a joint enterprise. Secure in their identity, they expect their allies to find fulfillment in being components of an over-all design. Such was the attitude of Great Britain toward the Continent during the Napoleonic wars.

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This, too, has been the tendency of the United States since it assumed major international responsibilities after World War II. Security has been depended on the defense of geographically remote areas to be achieved by coordinating the efforts of all potentially have threatened countries. We therefore expected our allies to fit themselves into an over-all strategy or "Grand Design" essentially devised in Washington and dependent on the meshing of all components. States were judged according to their contribution to this conception, with relatively little concern for their history or tradition. Any attempt on the part of our allies to adjust their positions relative to each other has been considered out-dated nationalism.

However, a society rarely draws its inspiration from serving as a contributor to an over-all division of labor; more usually its cohesiveness reflects a sense of shared historical experience and the conviction that it represents a more or less unique set of values. An international system, no matter how rational, cannot be vital unless it conforms, at least to some extent, to the self-image of the states composing it. The text of any coalition is its ability to relate to the common effort of the values, aspirations and national peculiarities of the member states.

The clash of old values with new conceptions becomes a particular problem when the international system is in a state of transition. In any period of change traditional loyalties will conflict with the requirements of new organization. If the new structure represents too drastic a break with the past, it will never achieve the spontaneity required for organic growth. (This was in part the problem with the unification of Italy.) If the traditional pattern is too rigid, either the society will disintegrate in the face of the need for adaptation or the new structure will be very fragile.

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A society whose sense of identity is highly developed may find it psychologically easier to deal with the problem of change than a society unsure of itself. Change does not threaten the meaning of existence for a cohesive society as it does for a society wracked by self-doubt. For a cohesive society adaptation becomes a matter of prudent calculation; it is seen as an essentially technical problem. A society which has suffered severe shocks is less flexible. It must balance the benefits of a new set of international arrangements against the dangers of possible moral disintegration. Before it can decide what it wishes to become, it has to rediscover what it is. France has had this problem since the end of the First World War.

Few countries have experienced the travail which France has suffered since it lost much of its young generation in World War I. Victorious in 1918, France knew better than any of its allies how close to defeat it had been. Inchoately, the survivors of that catastrophe felt that France could not stand another trial like the one just surmounted. Deprived of its youth, fearful of its defeated antagonist, feeling misunderstood by its allies, France experienced the inter-war period as an almost uninterrupted succession of frustrations. Domestically, the Third Republic witnessed mounting governmental instability. In foreign policy, France was torn between its premonitions and its sense of impotence.

Nothing could have expressed France's sense of insecurity better than the fact that at a moment when its army was the largest in Europe and Germany's was limited by treaty to 100,000 men France began to build the Maginot Line. What made the action all the more poignant was that the Treaty of Versailles had specifically prohibited Germany from stationing military forces in the

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Rhineland. But an attack on France presupposed the remilitarization of that area. In other words, at the height of its victory France felt so insecure that it did not think itself able to prevent the breach of the peace treaty by its disarmed enemy and constructed a defensive line for that contingency.

As if paralyzed by seeing her fears come true, France stood by while Germany rearmed and proceeded to abrogate one after another of the restrictions put on it by the Treaty of Versailles. The French collapse of 1940 was as much moral as military. Even though France emerged among the victors of World War II, its leaders were aware, despite all rhetoric and perhaps because of it, that France had been saved largely through the efforts of others. Once more, peace brought no respite. Instead, the Fourth Republic, under the same governmental instability as the Third, and in addition it had to go through the searing process of decolonization. Humiliated in 1940, the French army had barely been reconstituted when it was obliged to engage in nearly two decades of frustrating colonial wars, each of which ended in defeat.

President de Gaulle's brutal tactics sometimes give the impression that a powerful, self-confident France has been a permanent feature of the post-war landscape. But during the war in Algeria, France was on the verge of civil war three times in the span of four years. So well has De Gaulle succeeded in his tour de force that even his critics act as if the only problem for Europe were to moderate excesses of French assertiveness--a notion which would have been inconceivable five years ago. But less than a decade has passed since a wise (and pro-Western) French author could write:

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...the pretention to indifference. ... is never completely absent. It attracts like nostalgia. ... At the very moment when we are torn out of our solitude, we go on dreaming of it; ... we want to stand by the wayside and watch the traffic go by. ... Our victory in 1918 cost us too dearly. Since then we have wanted to recoup; the result is we have lost everything. Strictly speaking the French nation no longer exists. She is disintegrating at this moment. She proved unable to secure her lands against invasion because she was no longer strong enough to do so alone, and because her allies were not able to come to her aid quickly enough to prevent occupations. This is why France has had such a strong inclination to declare herself neutral. Then no one would have had the right to enter her. ... We are living like a ruined landlord unwilling to seem bankrupt. ... We have not been so unhappy in France for a hundred years; our literature has not been so sad; and only because during this time we have experienced hardly anything but deceptions: the Republic in difficulties, socialism bankrupt, our wealth gone, our wars badly conducted. 11

This spiritual malaise must be understood as the essential background for President de Gaulle's policy. A certain egocentricity on our part causes us to see many of De Gaulle's actions as being primarily motivated by a desire to annoy or to humiliate us. In fact, the central concern of De Gaulle is likely to be quite different. For the greater part of his career, he has had to be an illusionist. In the face of all evidence to the contrary, he has striven to restore France's greatness by his passionate belief in it. At first he was the leader of an insignificant faction of Frenchmen casting their lot with the Allies. His primary task, as he saw it, was to re-establish the identity and the integrity of France. Churchill and Roosevelt could concentrate on the tangible goal of winning the war. To De Gaulle, the war had an intangible purpose. Victory was

11

Brice Parain, "Against the Spirit of Neutrality," Confluence, Vol. 4, No. 4 (January 1956), pp. 370-9.

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empty if it did not also restore the position, indeed the soul, of France.
Churchill and Roosevelt understandably considered this quest peripheral
to their central objective and treated De Gaulle's insistence as an
irritating interruption of more important problems.

The conflict between the pragmatic and the intangible which
started during the war has continued to this day. The United States,
blessed with stable government, its sense of identity enhanced by its
war experience, could pursue single-mindedly whatever technical schemes
its bureaucracy thought up at any given moment. To De Gaulle, governing
a country wracked by a generation of conflict and decades of frustration,
the mode of reaching a goal has been as important as the objective itself.
He judges the merit of a policy not only by technical criteria but by its
contribution to enhancing France's sense of identity.

Though De Gaulle often acts as if opposition to United States
policy were a goal in itself, his deeper purpose may well be pedagogical:
to teach his people and perhaps his Continent the habit of independence
and self-reliance. The "folie de grandeur" of which De Gaulle is so often
accused is a peculiar kind, for it is tied to a profound awareness of the
suffering and disappointments of his country. In 1960 this caused him to
speak as follows:

Once upon a time there was an old country all hemmed in by
habits and circumspection. At one time the richest, the
mightiest people among those in the center of the world stage,
after great misfortunes it came, as it were, to withdraw within
itself. While other peoples were growing around it, it remained
immobile. In an era when the power of States depended upon
their industrial might, the great sources of power were stingily
meted out to it. It had little coal. It had no petroleum.
Furthermore, its population was no longer growing as, in some

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years, it numbered fewer births than deaths. In the doubt and the bitterness which it came to have about itself as a result of this situation, political, social and religious struggles did not cease to divide it. Finally, after two world wars had decimated, ruined and torn it, many in the world were wondering whether it would succeed in getting back on its feet.¹²

De Gaulle has chosen to revitalize France by an act of faith powerful enough to override a seemingly contrary reality. In De Gaulle's view, an almost mystical communion has existed since the war between himself representing the general interest and the French people. Thus, during the revolt in Algiers in 1960, De Gaulle could say: "Finally, I speak to France. Well, my dear country, my old country, here we are 13 together, once again, facing a harsh test." The effort to achieve greatness required that France regain--wherever possible--the right of independent decision. France could agree with the decisions of others: but it had to make clear that this represented a voluntary act and not the abdication of the impotent.

This is why De Gaulle never tires of insisting on his imperturbability in the face of Soviet threats or American criticisms. During the height of the Berlin crisis of 1960, De Gaulle spoke as follows:

12
Charles de Gaulle, Address on June 14, 1960, *Major Addresses, Statements, and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958-January 31, 1964* (Henceforth referred to as *Major Addresses*), French Embassy, Press and Information Division, New York, 1964, p. 79.

13
*Major Addresses, ibid.*, January 29, 1960, p. 74.

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But however resounding these commotions may be, obviously they could not succeed in upsetting or intimidating France. We are today strong enough, stable enough, sufficiently self-assured not to allow ourselves to be impressed by word battles or gesticulation.¹⁴

In De Gaulle's concept, a great nation moves at its own pace; its objectives are dictated by its interests. Its sense of purpose enables it to become the master of events instead of their prisoner.

Part of the dispute between France and the United States, therefore, concerns the philosophical issue of how nations cooperate. Washington urges a structure which makes separate action physically impossible by assigning each partner a portion of the over-all task. Paris insists that a consensus is meaningful only if each partner has a real choice. Therefore, each ally must have the technical capacity for autonomous behavior. Washington, postulating a community of interests, relies on "consultation" as the principal means for solving disagreements. Influence in its view is proportionate to a nation's contribution like share-owning in a stock company. Paris insists that influence depends not only on the existence of consultative machinery but also on the availability of other options.

Where United States spokesmen stress the concept of partnership, De Gaulle tends to emphasize the idea of equilibrium. Many United States officials assert that all disputes can be settled by talking things over in a "community spirit." To De Gaulle, sound relationships depend on the proper assessment of an existing balance of forces. If the balance of forces is correctly calculated, an arrangement is always possible. If not, good will cannot serve as a substitute. Philosophic convictions thus combine with

14

Major Addresses, *ibid.*, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, p.84.

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personality to produce De Gaulle's aloof and uncompromising diplomatic style.

To him, being swayed by personal emotion is a form of servitude or of

irresponsibility:

> Man "limited by his nature" is "infinite in his desires."
> The world is thus full of opposing forces. Of course,
> human wisdom has often succeeded in preventing these
> rivalries from degenerating into murderous conflicts.
> But the competition of efforts is the condition of life.
> Our country finds itself confronted today with this law
> of the species, as it has been for two thousand years.¹⁵

The art of statesmanship is to understand the nature of the world
and the trend of history. A great leader is not so much clever as lucid
and clear-sighted. Grandeur is not simply physical power but strength
reinforced by moral purpose. Nor does competition inevitably involve
physical conflict. On the contrary, a wise assessment of mutual interests
should produce harmony:

> Yes, international life, like life in general, is a
> battle. The battle which our country is waging tends
> to unite and not to divide, to honor and not to debase,
> to liberate and not to dominate. Thus it is faithful
> to its mission, which always was and which remains human
> and universal.

De Gaulle's nationalism is in the tradition of Mazzini, who
thought that nations which have achieved their independence would respect
the dignity of others. His diplomacy is in the style of Bismarck, who
strove ruthlessly to achieve what he considered Prussia's rightful place

15
*Major Addresses*, ibid., May 31, 1960, p. 75.

16
*Ibid.*, p. 78.

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but who then tried to preserve the new equilibrium through prudence,
restraint and moderation.

However, De Gaulle's conception of the role of the nation-state
inevitably clashed with the American conviction of its obsolescence.
Washington considers insistence on autonomy divisive and as implying a
desire for separate, perhaps antagonistic, policies. Paris regards the
attacks on its independent stance as indicative of hegemonial designs.

Both sides have pressed their arguments with such vigor because
from its perspective each is right. De Gaulle is correct in insisting
that independence does not exclude cooperation. But he has stressed his
autonomy so insistently and with such abrupt methods that French
separateness at times seems to have become an end in itself. The United
States is correct in affirming an underlying community of interests. But
our emphasis on organizational devices blinds us to psychological realities.
One particular method of European integration and Atlantic partnership has
become as much an end to America as the affirmation of independence has to
France. Involved, ultimately, are differing conceptions of truth. The
United States, with its technical, pragmatic approach, often has analytical
truth on its side. De Gaulle, with his consciousness of the trials of
France for the past generation, is frequently closer to the historical truth.

Disagreement, of course, is not confined to theoretical issues. In
his effort to vindicate a more autonomous role for France, De Gaulle
challenges many basic American policies with respect to European unity,
nuclear policy and East-West relations. The problem is not that De Gaulle

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wishes to reactivate Europe's traditional national rivalries as so many of
his American critics allege. On the contrary, he affirms the goal of unity
for Europe as passionately as his detractors. But where the American and
European "integrationists" insist that European unity requires that the
role of the nation-state be diminished, De Gaulle argues that unity depends
on the vitality of the traditional Europe. To De Gaulle the states are
the only legitimate source of power; only they can act responsibly.

> ... it is true that the nation is a human and sentimental
element, whereas Europe can be built on the basis of
active, authoritative and responsible elements. What
elements? The States, of course, for, in this respect,
it is only the States that are valid, legitimate and
capable of achievement. I have already said, and I
repeat, that at the present time there cannot be any
other Europe than a Europe of States, apart, of course,
from myths, stories and parades.¹⁷

Thus De Gaulle's proposals for European unity invariably envisage
a confederation of states rather than supranational institutions. In his
press conference of September 5, 1960, President de Gaulle called for
regular consultation between the European governments, for specialized
subordinate agencies and for an assembly formed of delegates from the
national parliaments. He urged a European referendum "so as to give this

17

18

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launching of Europe the character of popular support and initiative that
19
is indispensable."

... France. . . must help to build Western Europe into an organized union of States, so that gradually there may be established on both sides of the Rhine, of the Alps and perhaps of the Channel, the most powerful, prosperous and influential political, economic, cultural and military complex in the world. 20

... Western Europe must form itself politically. Moreover, if it did not succeed in doing so, the Economic Community itself could not in the long run become stronger or even continue to exist. In other words, Europe must have institutions that will lead it to form a political union, just as it is already a union in the economic sphere. 21

... Western Europe appears likely to constitute a major entity full of merit and resources, capable of living its own life, indeed not in opposition to the New World, but right alongside it. 22

19

Ibid, p. 93.

20

Major Addresses, *ibid.*, February 5, 1962, p. 159.

21

Major Addresses, *ibid.*, Press Conference on May 15, 1962, p. 174.

22

Charles de Gaulle, Press Conference on July 23, 1964, *Speeches and Press Conferences*, No. 208, New York: French Embassy, Press and Information Division, p. 4.

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It is often argued that De Gaulle's philosophy is a subterfuge for a design to establish French hegemony in Europe--the mirror image of the French claim that American conceptions camouflage our thirst for domination. It is impossible, of course, to be certain about De Gaulle's "real" designs. However, if French hegemony is his aim, he has chosen a curious road toward it. If a united Europe makes its decisions on the basis of a unanimous vote of its member states--as De Gaulle has proposed--it can be dominated, if at all, only by moral leadership. France could achieve pre-eminence only if French leaders succeeded in identifying themselves with the main currents of opinion in Europe. The other states are not likely to be so blind to their interest or so unsure of themselves as to refrain from casting their veto if they disagree with French policy.

De Gaulle returned to the theme of the need for coordination in his press conference of March 25, 1959. In 1960, he made yet another plea for a common Western world-wide policy:

23

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24

Major Adresses, *ibid.*, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, p. 96.

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But while De Gaulle has sought to develop a French and ultimately
a European identity, he has never ceased affirming the need for close
association between Europe and the United States. He opposes, not the
Alliance, but the concept of integration on which it is based. In his view,
to assign tasks on the basis of a division of labor will erode France's
identity:

> It is intolerable for a great State to leave its destiny up to the decisions and action of another State, however friendly it may be. In addition, it happens that, in integration, the integrated country loses interest in its national defense, since it is not responsible for it. The whole structure of the Alliance then loses its resilience and its strength.²⁵

25

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on its ability to sway essentially American decisions. Europeans would be lobbyists and not partners. De Gaulle considers such a role demeaning for a great power and he is convinced that it will destroy the moral substance of the "integrated" partner.

26

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27

Major Addresses, ibid., Press Conference on May 15, 1962,
pp. 180-1.

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Franco-American relations have been further irritated by conflicting views of East-West relations. As in most other controversies, each side has accused the other of the same offense: of planning a settlement, if not at the expense, at least to the exclusion of the other. In the United States, De Gaulle's comment that Europe extends from the Atlantic to the Urals is often cited as proof of a thinly veiled desire to negotiate directly with Moscow. In France, United States bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union are taken as an indication that the United States is seeking a separate accommodation with the U.S.S.R., perhaps as detrimental to Europe as the Yalta agreement is said to have been.

> On our old continent, the organization of a western group, at the very least equivalent to that which exists in the east, may one day, without risk to the independence and the freedom of each nation and taking into account the probable evolution of political regimes, establish a European entente from the Atlantic to the Urals. Then Europe, no longer split in two by ambitions and ideologies that would become out-of-date, would again be the heart of civilization.³⁰

The reorganization of Europe to which De Gaulle refers is to take place *after* Communist ideology no longer dominates in the Soviet Union, that is when Russia is once more a national, and not an ideological, state pursuing a policy dictated by its national interests. This is the precise eventuality foreseen in American post-war policy for a final settlement. By the same

30

*Major Addresses*, *ibid.*, Press Conference on May 31, 1960, p. 78.

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Similarly tension, in De Gaulle's view, is not so much caused by the personal attitudes of individual Communist leaders as by the dynamics of the system which they represent. To him, internal instability is the distinguishing feature of Communist leadership groups.

31

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During my lifetime, Communist ideology has been personified by many people. . . . Each of these holders in his turn condemns, excommunicates, crushes and at times kills the others. In any event, he firmly fights against the personality cult of the others.³²

. . . there is in this uproar of imprecations and demands organized by the Soviets something so arbitrary and so artificial that one is led to attribute it either to the premeditated unleashing of frantic ambitions, or to the desire of drawing attention away from great difficulties: this second hypothesis seems all the more plausible to me since, despite the coercions, isolation and acts of force in which the Communist system encloses the countries which are under its yoke, and despite certain collective successes which it has achieved by drawing upon the substance of its subjects, actually its gaps, its shortages, its internal failures, and above that its character of inhuman oppression, are felt more and more by the elites and the masses, whom it is more and more difficult to deceive and to subjugate.³⁴

32
*Major Addresses, ibid.*, Press Conference on July 29, 1963, p. 236.

33
*Major Addresses, ibid.*, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, p. 84.

34
*Major Addresses, ibid.*, Press Conference on September 5, 1961, p. 140.

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...we do not allow ourselves to be moved by all the tumult, all the flow of invective, of formal notifications, of threats launched by certain countries against other lands and especially against ours. This is all the more true in that we realize the tactical element that enters into all this staging by those who, so to speak, make it their job to upset others.

...in their camps the struggle between political trends, the intrigues of clans, the rivalries of individuals periodically lead to implacable crises, whose sequels--or even whose premonitory symptoms--cannot help but unsettle them. Moreover, we know that in those countries there are conflicting national grievances in spite of the absolutism of their ideology. We realize therefore only too well that they readily indulge in virulent utterances and sensational outbursts in order to lead people astray--within their own country and outside--without, however, overstepping certain bounds. 35

> "...so long as the Soviet Union does not put a stop to its threats and its injunctions and bring about an actual easing of the international situation, we believe that we have spared our allies and ourselves the catastrophic retreat, dramatic rupture or tragi-comical engulfment, in which the conference would obviously have ended. 36

36 *Major Addresses*, *ibid.*, February 5, 1962, p. 160.

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The differing views about the nature of stability and of peace also produce the clashing conceptions about the significance of the Sino-Soviet split and about policy toward Communist China. The United States convinced of the importance of intentions in the conduct of foreign policy, is tempted to back the Communist power which professes the most peaceful goals. De Gaulle believing that an equilibrium is the only reliable basis for stability is more concerned with weakening the stronger Communist partner if necessary by playing its weaker Communist opponent off against it. The United States with its global responsibilities is bound to see in Communist China an objective threat to its interests. De Gaulle leading a country with primarily European interests considers a Russia extending its power into the center of Europe as a primary threat. He sees no reason to embroil himself with a distant country whose weight could moreover become useful in diverting Soviet energies. What is involved here is a certain divergence of interests between us and Europe; De Gaulle's analysis is far from unique in Europe even if his methods to give it effect are.

Beyond differences of assessment over Communist trends, we encounter once more the same disagreement as in other Franco-American controversies, whether Europe is to constitute an autonomous center of decision or whether it will see its role primarily in influencing American choices. De Gaulle is concerned not only with the fact of negotiations but also with France's role in them. He would object to any settlement which France did not help to formulate--regardless of his opinion of its substance.

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For centuries, one of the chief problems of Western political thought has been how to achieve unity while respecting diversity. One does not have to agree with the methods or policies of President de Gaulle to recognize that he has posed an important question which the West has yet to answer. There is merit in his contention that a political unit must mean something to itself before it can have meaning to others. To American spokesmen the French insistence on autonomy is *prima facie* proof of distrust of American intentions. To France's President, the United States reluctance to concede this autonomy appears to be a device to perpetuate our hegemony and to reduce France to the status of an impotent satellite.

INSERT: Before a state can contribute usefully to common decisions, it requires a sense of responsibility; it must be convinced that its opinions matter.

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frequently

While De Gaulle's tactics have often been brutal, the United States has shown extremely little understanding for the special psychological situation of France. Even in the best of circumstances, a country which has been ravaged by two world wars, and which barely avoided civil war in 1958, in 1960 and again in 1962, could not be expected to find its fulfillment in the "Grand Design" of others. No matter who governed in France, he would have had to face the problem of restoring France's faith in herself. To argue about the technical feasibility of various schemes of Atlantic partnership is to miss De Gaulle's central intention. Many of his actions are designed to rediscover a sense of purpose for France--a goal that transcends any specific policy issues. How well De Gaulle has succeeded in this task is proved by the fact that two years after the end of the Algerian war France, far from being torn to pieces by internal schisms--as most observers expected--is the most active European country in international affairs.

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In the meantime, there is something of a Greek tragedy about
the dispute between the United States and France. Each chief actor,
following the laws of his nature, is bringing about consequences quite
different from those intended. Either the "American" or the "French"
concept of Atlantic relationship might have succeeded. Competing
as they do--with no comprehension of the real intention of the other
--they may bring on what each side professes to fear most: a divided,
suspicious Europe absorbed once again in working out its ancient
rivalries. Tragedy, to many Americans at least, is to find oneself
thwarted in what is ardently desired. But there is another and perhaps
more poignant tragedy, that of fulfilling one's desires and then finding
them empty.