THE WASHINGTON POST, SUNDAY, JANUARY 30, 1983

# Mr. Shultz Goes to China

### Henry A. Kissinger

## What Should Come Out of This Trip

Sino-American relations have been on a roller coaster for the past generation. In World War II and its immediate aftermath, America somewhat sentimentally tried to promote a weak China, torn by civil war, to great-power status. Then, with the Chinese revolution and the Korean war, came a swing to the other extreme of seemingly permanent hostility, with contact between the two countries to all intents and purposes broken off. When a rapprochement finally took place in the early 1970s, many Americans fell prey to our nationalistic national habit of equating relations among states with relations among people and endowed it with qualities of personal friendship.

In the nature of things, this raised exaggerated expectations that could not be fulfilled. Almost inevitably, strains have developed. To some extent occasional squabbles are a sign of maturation, of a normal relationship between countries. Still, the tensions in recent years have gained their own momentum, threatening to damage the important common long-term objectives of both countries.

It is to reverse this process that Secretary of State Shultz has set out on his journey.

Conventional wisdom has it that the current difficulties are largely due to the clumsiness of the Reagan administration. To be sure, some of the exuberant early statements on Taiwan will not be landmarks in the annals of diplomatic finesse, and the unpropitious timing of the textile issue just prior to the Shultz visit makes one wonder about the coordinating mechanism in our government.

The fact remains that the administration has gone to extraordinary lengths—even more remarkable given its starting point—to emphasize its commitment to close ties with Peking. And it took two to make the textile issue intratable. The causes of the strains in Washington-Peking relations go deeper; they antedate the Reagan administration; they have been exacerbated in both countries by errors of judgment and domestic conflicts.

These strains originate, indeed, in the two countries' differing approaches to foreign policy. During the early period of renewed contacts, much innocent nonsense could be heard about how "unnatural" had been the estrangement between the American and the Chinese peoples,

as if rapprochement fulfilled a deep emotional necessity on both sides. The facts were far more prosaic. China, in its marvelous history of 3,000 years, has never had the experience of dealing with other societies on the basis of equality. It has felt most comfortable when able to be aloof, self-contained, as a culture whose uniqueness placed it beyond the reach of outsiders.

For China there was nothing at all unnatural about living apart from America. Nor can it be said that in 1971 there was a groundswell of grass-roots demand in the United States for an opening to China.

What brought the two nations together was not sentiment but awareness of a common threat. The Chinese saw an awesome buildup of Soviet military power along the border, including nuclear missiles and 40 modern combat divisions. By 1969, it was obvious to China that Marxist theory not only did not shield it from military pressures; on the contrary, the newly promulgated "Brezhnev doctrine" claimed the right to enforce the unity of the Communist world by military might.

For the United States, opportunity combined with necessity. The expansion of Soviet military power and constant Soviet pressures on the international equilibrium had been for us a familiar feature of the postwar scene. But it was only in the late 1960s that the United States began to sense the limits of its power and to recognize the need for associations beyond our traditional allies. The process was given impetus by a sophisticated president to whom an unsentimental perception of power relationships was congenial rather than anathema. There were powerful incentives for a rapprochement with China: to balance the Soviet Union, either to restrain it or to induce it to negotiate seriously; to isolate Hanoi to give it an incentive to end the Vietnam War; to maintain American self-assurance amid our messy withdrawal from Indochina by demonstrating our continuing capacity for major positive initiatives.

The new links between China and America flourished so long as the two sides kept their eye on the common objective of resisting what their communiqués came to describe as "hegemony." Simply put, this meant resistance to Soviet attempts to overturn the global balance of power and some agreement on an appropriate strategy to achieve this end.

There were inevitable differences in tactical perspective. In the developing world, Peking

often relied on competing with Moscow in appealing to radical movements, which led it to back some leaders and causes that were hardly America's favorites. Also, China was leery of Washington's relations with Moscow, explicitly fearful that détente would undermine the West's willingness to stand up to the Soviet Union, implicitly suspicious that it might lead to a U.S.-Soviet arrangement at China's expense.

These differences were downgraded early on because each side had an interest in rapid and visible progress—the United States to demonstrate its new options amidst the frustrations of the Vietnam war; China to discourage the Soviet Union from attempting to apply the "Brezhnev doctrine" to it. Thus both sides strove to achieve a coordination of purposes if not of policies. High-level Chinese-American meetings were unique in that they rarely concerned concrete or technical negotiations; most of the conversations dealt with basic geopolitical assessments, projections and strategies. In the touchy field of Washington's relations with Moscow, the United States took great pains to keep Peking fully informed. In this manner, tactical differences were kept in perspective and not allowed to harm the essentials of Sino-U.S. relations. In that process, interestingly enough, our relations with the Soviet Union prospered as well.

The succeeding years made this mutual restraint increasingly difficult to maintain. Domestic upheavals preoccupied the leaders of both countries and spilled over into foreign policy. At first, relations with Moscow were at the heart of the problem. The United States always had a difficult passage to navigate: if Washington grew too exuberant about détente, we would disquiet Peking and stampeede it into its own overtures to Moscow in order to avoid being left at the gate. If we were too intransigent, Peking might take our counterbalancing of Moscow for granted and be tempted to flaunt opposition to us on bilateral issues or in some areas of the world without fear of being left alone with the Soviet Union.

The Carter administration oscillated between both extremes. The Vance wing gave clear priority to improving relations with Moscow; the Brezzeinski wing spoke of a "China card" as if Peking were a weapon in our arsenal. But a card can be discarded as well as played; the

Page Two

unintended consequence was the unnerving in-
ference that, for the right price from Moscow,
we might loosen our ties with Peking.

The Reagan administration suffered from no
such ambivalence. Its anti-Soviet pronouncements
seemed to freeze us into a rigid hostility toward the
Soviet Union, which freed China to adopt, at little
risk, a militant Third World posture of "a plague
on both your houses." At the same time, some
members of the new administration expressed
philosophic convictions very different from those
of their predecessors with respect to China itself
and its relationship to Taiwan, causing Peking to
fear (incorrectly) a regression to the Dulles era.

Nor is the fault all on the American side. Since
the first American visit to China, Peking has ex-
perienced major domestic upheavals of its own. It
would be astonishing if China's internal political
battles remained confined to the publicized issues.
Inevitably, some of the stridency in the reaction to
American policies reflected, at least in part, fac-
tional rivalries exploiting the presumed embarrass-
ments of Chinese leaders at not obtaining greater
or more rapid concessions from the United States.
In recent years, the Taiwan issue—which is genu-
inely neuralgic for the Chinese—has nevertheless
been pursued with extraordinary stridency, even
after the Reagan administration had gone out of
its way to emphasize the priority it attached to Pe-
king. No president could have conceded more than
Reagan did in the August 1982 communique.
Nevertheless, the Chinese assault on him inexpli-
cably continued for many months. The ambiguous
rapprochement with Moscow as well almost surely
grows out of some internal maneuvering in the
People's Republic—perhaps an insistence by the
armed forces on some diplomatic respite so long as
the Chinese military buildup receives such a low
domestic priority.

Whatever the cause, U.S.-Chinese relations
are less good than they should be, given the en-
during parallel interests of the two countries in
maintaining the global balance of power.

A stock-taking on both sides is overdue.

The real story of Secretary Shultz's visit to
China will not be the familiar issues, such
as Taiwan, trade and normalization. At
stake will be something intangible: the way the
United States and China view their respective
roles on world affairs and, above all, whether
these views can be harmonized. And this trip is
of enormous importance. It is crucial above all
to be clear about what cannot be accomplished
and should not be attempted.

The Shultz visit cannot finally resolve the
Taiwan issues. In the Shanghai communique of
1972, the accord on normalization of 1979 and
even more explicitly in the communique of
1982, the United States has repeatedly committed
itself to the proposition that there is only
one China and that it would not support any
variety of a two-China solution. Moreover, the
United States has already recognized Peking as
the government of all of China. In the process,
both sides have had to make painful adjust-
ments on such issues as American arms sales.

The future of Taiwan must now be left to his-
torical processes, and for the Chinese on both

sides of the Taiwan straits to work out in their
own subtle ways as Chinese leaders themselves
have affirmed. What remains for both sides is to
live up to the letter and spirit of existing under-
takings. The secretary will surely hear Chinese
views as to what that spirit entails. But formal di-
plomacy has exhausted the subject; the legal
framework cannot be stretched further.

Nor would the subject of trade by itself war-
rant a trip to Peking by the secretary of state. To
be sure, trade and technology will become in-
creasingly important to China (the speed of its
modernization will depend on it). Both sides have
real complaints: Our tactics in the recent textile
notigations have been execrable. Chinese bu-
reaucracy can be maddening for American inves-
tors and companies to deal with. We have been
too glow in fulfilling promises on technology
transfer. The Chinese have changed their eco-
nomic plan repeatedly in recent years.

But at the heart of these issues—and the rea-
son they fester—is the inadequate political pri-
ority that U.S.-Chinese relations have received
from both sides. Neither country can want to—
nor afford to—win these battles. Both have a
stake in overcoming bureaucratic inertia and
suspiciousness. It is high time for the top lead-
ers of both countries to address once again the
fundamental dimensions of the relationship
and to lift discussions to the strategic plane.

Above all, the United States should show no
nervousness over Sino-Soviet negotiations. A ma-
ture relationship between the United States and
China can only be based on the premise that each
side is quite able to assess its own national inter-
est without outside instruction. Washington and
Peking regulate their relationships with other
countries not as a favor to each other but to serve
their interests in peace, security and progress.

If each side is wise, it will not deliberately jan-
gle the nerves of the other by invoking a Soviet
option. China is entitled to ease tensions with its
northern neighbor if it can—just as we are trying
to do—but it must avoid doing so in a way that
makes Moscow the arbiter of both European-
American and Sino-American relationships. Each
side's freedom of action is in the end restricted by
a set of truths that each ignores at its peril:

First, it is a preeminent strategic interest of
the United States to prevent Soviet domination
of the Eurasian landmass—the much-stressed
hegemony—for that would shift the global bal-
ance of resources and power irreversibly to
Moscow's advantage. A threat to the security of
China would undermine the global equilibrium
as surely as Soviet domination of Europe. And a
weakening of America would jeopardize the se-
curity of China. Statesmen can make use of
these facts; they cannot uninvent them.

Second, China realizes—even when it does not
awow—that its frontier of over 4,000 miles with
the Soviet Union is its fundamental security
problem. As China modernizes, it turns into a
potential long-range danger for Moscow, if only
because it will be less and less subject to intimid-
ation. Peking knows very well, moveover, that it is
being wooed because the United States is in play;
in our absence it might be threatened. Just as the
United States—if it is rational—cannot push
U.S.-Soviet détente to the point of endangering

Chinese security, so China, if it is farsighted, can-
not wish to forfeit America's vital interest in its
security and territorial integrity.

Still, reality is not self-implementing. In
America, each new administration
proudly proclaims the failure of its prede-
cessor and its determination to start afresh—
obligious to the fact that this must unsettle all
leaders who have staked their country's fate on
the previous dispensation. The Chinese ap-
proach is patient and aloof; the Middle King-
dom has a horror of appearing as a supplicant.
Washington acts as if good faith and bonhomie
supply the lubricant of international relations.
Peking assumes that its interlocutor has done
his homework and will understand subtle indi-
rections; the Chinese approach can therefore
appear impersonal, even condescending. To the
Chinese, Americans often appear unstable and
slightly frivolous. To Americans, Chinese occa-
sionally present themselves as either inscruta-
ble or uncommunicative.

Thus both countries need to understand each
other's psychology better and to establish the
confidence that this understanding will last. We
have to face the fact that the Chinese have de-
veloped serious doubts about our political or even
emotional stability. At one point we seemed to in-
vite military cooperation and then backed away.
We promised cooperation on transfer of tech-
nology and in effect reneged. All this raised
doubts whether we were really interested in a
close relationship. Even where Peking acknowl-
edges our commitment to maintain the balance of
power, doubts have developed whether we are
able to interpret it correctly in concrete circum-
stances or act on our interpretation.

When the United States is perceived in Pe-
king as an inadequate guardian of the equilib-
rium, as it was over Angola, Ethiopia, Afghani-
stan and Iran, there are two consequences: Pe-
king is tempted toward Moscow despite all its
suspicion, if only to gain time. And the 'bilat-
eral issues of Sino-American diplomacy—like
Taiwan or trade—must carry a disproportion-
ate burden of the relationship.

Chinese policy and rhetoric of the past few
years have made their own contribution to the
impasse. It does not build confidence to urge
the United States into a defense of the balance
of power and then give it equal billing as a
threat to peace with the Soviet "hegemonist."
In recent years the vocabulary of criticism from
Peking has been far more prevalent than that of
cooperation. Peking must understand that only
a relationship built on some strategic under-
standings and cooperation on some interna-
tional issues will command American public
and congressional support for the long term.
We cannot sustain indefinitely a relationship
that in the public mind consists of constant irri-
tation over Taiwan, some economic links (per-
ceived as helping China more than us), and
rhetorical battles in international forums.

Secretary Shultz—I am certain—will seek to
make clear that we view the world in geopoliti-
cal terms relevant to Chinese perceptions.
There are several areas in which Chinese and
American views should be harmonized, or at
least the range of our disagreements under-
stood. First, of course, is policy toward the

adjustments on arms sales and peace. To America, however, painful these positions reflect the realities of a complex

situation. The legal framework cannot be stretched further. The future of Taiwan must now be left to historical processes, and for the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan strains to work out in their own subtle ways as Chinese leaders themselves have affirmed. What remains for both sides is to live up to the letter and spirit of existing undertakings. The Secretary will surely hear Chinese views as to what that spirit entails. But formal diplomacy has exhausted the subject; no new negotiations seem feasible.

Nor would the subject of trade by itself warrant a trip to Beijing by the Secretary of State. To be sure, trade and technology will become increasingly important to China (the speed of its modernization will depend on it.) Both sides have real complaints: Our tactics in the

1/28/83

# The Shultz Visit to Beijing

Sino-American relations have been on a roller coaster for the past generation. In World War II and its immediate aftermath, America somewhat sentimentally tried to promote a weak China, torn by civil war, to great power status. Then, with the Chinese revolution and the Korean war, came a swing to the other extreme of seemingly permanent hostility, with contact between the two countries to all intents and purposes broken off.

When a rapprochement finally took place in the early 1970's, many Americans fell prey to our nostalgic national habit of equating relations among states with relations among people and endowed it with qualities of personal friendship.

2

It is to reverse this process that Secretary Shultz
has set out on his journey.

What Went Wrong?

Conventional wisdom has it that the current
difficulties are largely due to the clumsiness of the
Reagan Administration. To be sure, some of the exuberant
early statements on Taiwan will not be landmarks in the
annals of diplomatic finesse and the unpropitious timing
of the textile issue just prior to the Shultz visit
makes one wonder about the coordinating mechanism in

3

our government.

The fact remains that the Administration has gone
to extraordinary lengths--even more remarkable given its
starting point--to emphasize its commitment to close
ties with Beijing. And it took two to make the textile
issue intractable. The causes of the strains in Washington-
Beijing relations go deeper; they antedate the Reagan
Administration; they have been exacerbated in both
countries by errors of judgment and domestic conflicts.

These strains originate, indeed, in the two
countries' differing approaches to foreign policy.
During the early period of renewed contacts, much
innocent nonsense could be heard about how "unnatural"
had been the estrangement between the American and the
Chinese peoples, as if rapprochement fulfilled a deep
emotional necessity on both sides. The facts were
far more prosaic. China in its marvelous history of

4

3000 years has never had the experience of dealing with
other societies on the basis of equality. Until well into
the 19th century the status of foreigners was defined
in terms of various degrees of dependency towards
the Middle Kingdom; when the first British ambassador
appeared at the end of the 18th century he was treated
as a vassal offering tribute. During the modern period-
until after World War II-China was dominated and
exploited by foreigners, and made the victim of
unequal treaties. For these reasons, China has felt
most comfortable when able to be aloof, self-contained,
as a culture whose uniqueness placed it beyond the
reach of outsiders.

For China, in short, there was nothing at all
unnatural about living apart from America. Nor can it
be said that in 1971 there was a groundswell of grass-

5

What brought the two nations together was not sentiment but awareness of a common threat. For China a shared ideology with Moscow obscured geopolitical realities for a decade. Then the Cultural Revolution absorbed Chinese energies in domestic strife. But by the late 1960's the Sino-Soviet disagreements over ideology had spread to basic security concerns. Moscow grew uneasy about the emergence of a major military power along an unrecognized frontier of 4,000 miles only thinly populated on the Soviet side. The Chinese saw an awesome build-up of Soviet military power along the border, including nuclear missiles and forty modern combat divisions. By 1969, it was obvious to China that Marxist theory not only did not shield it from military pressures; on the contrary the newly

6

For the United States, opportunity combined with
necessity. The expansion of Soviet military power and
constant Soviet pressures on the international equilibrium
had been for us a familiar feature of the postwar scene.
But it was only in the late 1960's that the United
States began to sense the limits of its power and to
recognize the need for associations beyond our traditional
allies. The process was given impetus by a sophisticated
President to whom an unsentimental perception of power
relationships was congenial rather than anathema. There
were powerful incentives for a rapprochement with China;
to balance the Soviet Union, either to restrain it or
to induce it to negotiate seriously; to isolate Hanoi
to give it an incentive to end the Vietnam war; to

7

The new links between China and America flourished so long as the two sides kept their eye on the common objective of resisting what their communiqués came to describe as "hegemony". Simply put, this meant resistance to Soviet attempts to overturn the global balance of power and some agreement on an appropriate strategy to achieve this end.

There were inevitable differences in tactical perspective. In the developing world, Beijing was less concerned than we were with encouraging moderate governments; its strategy often relied on competing with Moscow in appealing to radical movements, which led it to back some leaders and causes that were hardly America's favorites. Also China was leery of Washington's

8

relations with Moscow, explicitly fearful that detente
would undermine the West's willingness to stand up to
the Soviet Union, implicitly suspicious that it might
lead to a US-Soviet arrangement at China's expense.

These differences were downgraded early on because
each side had an interest in rapid and visible progress;
the United States to demonstrate its new options amidst
the frustrations of the Vietnam war; China to discourage
the Soviet Union from attempting to apply the "Brezhnev
doctrine" to it. Thus both sides strove to achieve a
coordination of purposes if not of policies. High-
level Chinese-American meetings were unique in that they
rarely concerned concrete or technical negotiations; most
of the conversations dealt with basic geopolitical
assessments, projections, and strategies. With
respect to most of the world-Europe, Asia, the Middle
East--Chinese and American perceptions were in fact

9

parallel. Elsewhere, while articulating its ideological
convictions, Beijing did not translate them into policies
that would have benefitted Soviet expansionism--a policy
it still continues in Southeast Asia and Africa. In
the touchy field of Washington's relations with Moscow,
the United States took great pains to keep Beijing fully
informed. In this manner tactical differences were
kept in perspective, and not allowed to harm the essentials
of Sino-US relations. (In that process, interestingly
enough, our relations with the Soviet Union prospered as
well.)

The succeeding years made this mutual restraint
increasingly difficult to maintain. Domestic upheavals
preoccupied the leaders of both countries and
spilled over into foreign policy. At first, relations
with Moscow were at the heart of the problem. The
United States always had a difficult passage to
navigate: If Washington grew too exuberant about

10

detente, we would disquiet Beijing and stampede it
into its own overtures to Moscow in order to avoid being
left at the gate. If we were too intransigent, Beijing
might take our counterbalancing of Moscow for granted
and be tempted to flaunt opposition to us on bilateral
issues or in some areas of the world without fear of
being left alone with the Soviet Union.

The Carter Administration oscillated between both
extremes. The Vance wing gave clear priority to improving
relations with Moscow; the Brzezinski wing spoke of a
"China card" as if Beijing was a weapon in our arsenal.
But a card can be discarded as well as played; the
unintended consequence was the unnerving inference
that for the right price from Moscow we might loosen
our ties with Beijing.

The Reagan Administration suffered from no such
ambivalence. Its anti-Soviet pronouncements seemed to

11

freeze us into a rigid hostility toward the Soviet
Union which freed China to adopt, at little risk, a
militant Third World posture of "a plague on both your
houses." At the same time, some members of the new
Administration expressed philosophic convictions
very different from its predecessors with respect to
China itself and its relationship to Taiwan, causing
Beijing to fear (incorrectly) a regression to the
Dulles era.

Nor is the fault all on the American side. Since
the first American visit to China, Beijing has experienced
major domestic upheavals of its own. The succession to
Mao, the overthrow of the Gang of Four, the struggle for
preeminence afterwards, and finally the attempt to
leaven a planned economy with decentralization and
incentives were each bound to leave some disgruntled
elements within China. It would be astonishing if China's

12

internal political battles remained confined to the publicized issues. Inevitably some of the stridency in the reaction to American policies reflected, at least in part, factional rivalries exploiting the presumed embarrassments of Chinese leaders at not obtaining greater or more rapid concessions from the United States. During the Ford Administration, the domestic ambitions of the Gang of Four led to internal controversies and actions (such as the conspicuous invitation to James Schlesinger to visit China after he had been dismissed by President Ford) which came close to intervening in our domestic affairs during an election campaign. In recent years the Taiwan issue-which is genuinely neuralgic for the Chinese--has nevertheless been pursued with extraordinary stridency even after the Reagan Administration had gone out of its way to

13

emphasize the priority it attached to Beijing. No
President could have conceded more than Reagan did
in the August 1982 communique. Nevertheless, the Chinese assault
on him inexplicably continued for many months. The
ambiguous rapprochement with Moscow as well almost
surely grows out of some internal maneuvering in the
People's Republic-perhaps an insistence by the armed
forces on some diplomatic respite so long as the Chinese
military build-up receives such a low domestic priority.

Whatever the cause, US-Chinese relations are
less good than they should be, given the enduring
parallel interests of the two countries in maintaining
the global balance of power.

## What Can Be Accomplished.

The real story of Secretary Shultz's visit to
China will not be the familiar issues such as Taiwan,

14

trade and normalization. At stake will be something intangible; the way the United States and China view their respective roles on world affairs and above all whether these views can be harmonized. And this trip is of enormous importance. It is crucial above all to be clear about what can _not_ be accomplished and should _not_ be attempted.

The Shultz visit can _not_ finally resolve the Taiwan issues. In the Shanghai communique of 1972, the accord on normalization of 1979, and even more explicitly in the communique of 1982, the United States has repeatedly committed itself to the proposition that there is only one China and that it would not support any variety of a two-China solution. Moreover, the United States has already recognized Beijing as the government of all of China. In the process both sides have had to make

15

adjustments on American arms sales and China on our
phraseology with respect to our desire for a peaceful
solution. These positions, however painful, reflect the
realities of a complex situation.

The future of Taiwan must now be left to historical
processes, and for the Chinese on both sides of the
Taiwan strains to work out in their own subtle ways
as Chinese leaders themselves have affirmed. What
remains for both sides is to live up to the letter and
spirit of existing undertakings. The Secretary will
surely hear Chinese views as to what that spirit entails.
But formal diplomacy has exhausted the subject; the legal
framework cannot be stretched further.

16

recent textile negotiations have been execrable.

Chinese bureaucracy can be maddening for American investors and companies to deal with. We have been too slow in fulfilling promises on technology transfer.

The Chinese have changed their economic plan repeatedly in recent years.

But at the heart of these issues--and the reason they fester--is the inadequate political priority which US-Chinese relations have received from both sides. Neither country can want to--nor indeed afford to--win these battles.

Both have a stake in overcoming bureaucratic inertia and suspiciousness. It is high time for the top leaders of both countries to address once again the fundamental dimensions of the relationship and to lift discussions to the strategic plane.

Above all the United States should show no nervousness over Sino-Soviet negotiations. A mature relationship

17

between the United States and China can only be based
on the premise that each side is quite able to assess
its own national interest without outside instruction.
Washington and Beijing regulate their relationships
with other countries not as a favor to each other
but to serve their interests in peace, security and
progress. Tension between Moscow and Beijing is not
a boon bestowed on us by the Chinese; to the extent it
exists it reflects realities; it neither can nor should
be promoted by us. By the same token, close ties between
Washington and Beijing--in which I deeply believe--are
not an act of altruism on our part; they either
reflect a correct evaluation of our common interests
or they will wither.

If each side is wise, it will not deliberately
jangle the nerves of the other by invoking a Soviet
option. China is entitled to ease tensions with its
northern neighbor if it can-just as we are trying

18

to do-but it must avoid doing so in a way that makes
Moscow the arbiter of both European-American and
Sino-American relationships. Each side's freedom of
action is in the end restricted by a set of truths
which each ignores at its peril:

First, it is a preeminent strategic interest of
the United States to prevent Soviet domination of the
Eurasian landmass-the much-stressed hegemony--for that
would shift the global balance of resources and power
irreversibly to Moscow's advantage. A threat to the
security of China would undermine the global equilibrium
as surely as Soviet domination of Europe. And a weakening
of America would jeopardize the security of China. Statesmen
can make use of these facts; they cannot uninvent them.

Second, China realizes--even when it does not avow--
that its frontier of over 4,000 miles with the Soviet Union

19

is its fundamental security problem. As China modernizes
it turns into a potential long-range danger for Moscow,
if only because it will be less and less subject to
intimidation. Objectively, Sino-Soviet relations over
the decades are likely to be wary. Diplomacy can ease
that tension for longer or shorter periods, never eliminate
it. No rapprochement can shortern the frontier; no
withdrawal of Soviet troops can guarantee against their
return. Beijing knows very well, moreover, that it
is being wooed because the United States is in play; in
our absence it might be threatened. Just as the
United States--if it is rational--cannot push US-Soviet
detente to the point of endangering Chinese security, so
China, if it is farsighted, cannot wish to forfeit
America's vital interest in its security and territorial
integrity. Nor with China lightly sacrifice its economic
relations-so essential to rapid modernization-with the
industrial democracies.

20

Still, reality is not self-implementing. Differences
in national style, history and geography are often
obstacles to an identity of views. The American
approach to policy is episodic and at the same time
insistent. Each new Administration proudly proclaims
the follow of its predecessor and its determination
to start afresh---oblivious to the fact that this
must unsettle all leaders who have staked their country's
fate on the previous dispensation. The Chinese approach
is patient and aloof; the Middle Kingdom has a horror
of appearing as a supplicant. Washington acts as if
good faith and bonhomie supply the lubricant of
international relations. Beijing assumes that its
interlocutor has done his homework and will understand
subtle indirections; the Chinese approach can therefore
appear impersonal even condescending. To the Chinese,
Americans often appear unstable and slightly frivolous.

21

To Americans, Chinese occasionally present themselves
as either inscrutable or uncommunicative.

Thus both countries need to understand each other's
psychology better and to establish the confidence that
this understanding will last. We have to face the
fact that the Chinese have developed serious doubts
about our political or even emotional stability. At
one point we seemed to invite military cooperation and
then backed away. We promised cooperation on transfer
of technology and in effect reneged. All this raised
doubts whether we were really interested in a close
relationship. Even where Beijing acknowledges our
commitment to maintain the balance of power, doubts
have developed whether we are able to interpret it
correctly in concrete circumstances or act on our
interpretation.

There were many domestic reasons why we did not

22

oppose Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia or
the first Communist coup in Afghanistan and behaved
so fecklessly when Iran was taken over by a government
hostile to the West. But to the Chinese these events
spelled a shift in the balance of power inimical to
their interests with respect to which we proved ineffective.

When the United States is perceived in Beijing as an
inadequate guardian of the equilibrium there are two
consequences: Beijing is tempted towards Moscow despite
all its suspicions, if only to gain time. And the
day-to-day issues of Sino-American diplomacy--like
Taiwan or trade--must carry a disproportionate burden
of the relationship.

23

it equal billing as a threat to peace with the Soviet
"hegemonist". In recent years the vocabulary of
criticism from Beijing has been far more prevelant than
that of cooperation. Beijing must understand that only
a relationship built on some strategic understandings
and cooperation on some international issues will command
American public and Congressional support for the long
term. We cannot sustain indefinitely a relationship which
in the public mind consists of constant irritation over
Taiwan, some economic links (perceived as helping China
more than us), and rhetorical battles in international
forums. When all is said and done, there is a deep,
positive element in Sino-American relations; they have
proved their durability through a decade of upheaval in both
countries. This alone provides a basis for a new advance.

Secretary Shultz,-I am certain,- will seek to make

24

clear that we view the world in geopolitical terms
relevant to Chinese perceptions. There are several
areas in which Chinese and American views should be
harmonized, or at least the range of our disagreements
understood. First, of course, is policy toward the
Soviet Union in general. In addition, we should maintain
a continuing intimate dialogue on specific international
issues:

-- Where United States and Chineses interests
converge and what may be done to concert our
actions, for example Afghanistan and Indochina.

-- Where we have divergent policies but seek
to avoid conflict--for example, in Korea,
where we back opposing sides within the context
of a shared interest in avoidance of war in the
peninsula.

-- Where we have different perceptions--such as

25

the Middle East and Africa--but where policies
should at a minimum not obstruct efforts for
peace.

-- Relations with Europe and Japan, where on
the whole American and Chinese interests run
parallel.

In my experience, the best approach in discussions
with Chinese leaders is complete frankness. It is wiser
to admit that some positions are in a state of evolution
than to pretend to settled views which dialogue will
reveal as shallow or empty. It would help if, -as the
dialogue develops,- the American positions could be
given as much of a bipartisan cast as possible. [The
Chinese are interested above all in our strong power.]

At the same time, Secretary Shultz's hosts must
not place the entire weight of the trip on him. It is
to be hoped that the Chinese contribution will transcend

26

the occasional hectoring of recent years, especially
the grating tendency to treat American presentations
as if we were students taking an examination. Beijing
cannot simply act as a critic of our guardianship of
the balance of power; it has to assume some responsibility
of its own.

I am convinced that both sides to this dialogue
will be represented by men with the wisdom to transcend
the recent past. Neither side can have promoted the visit
in order for it to fail; each side knows that a failure
would not leave us with the status quo but mark a
setback. Nor can one single exchange provide the
necessary depth and stability. Senior Chinese leaders
should continue the process in Washington. And however
difficult the dialogue may be, negotiating with the Chinese
has the advantage that undertakings will be strictly

27

honored.

Of the operational matters, the only issue requiring urgent attention is transfer of technology, which has a broader significance. This not only will affect the pace of China's modernization, but also symbolize our commitment to it. The obstacles so far have been both bureaucratic (on both sides) and philosophical. The bureaucratic problems usually melt when it is understood that the top leadership is determined to proceed.

The philosophical issue goes deeper. Our restrictions on trade with Communist countries have as their purpose to prevent the strengthening of strategic capabilities hostile to us. But China is decidedly not a Soviet ally, nor is it in the same class of military power. China could not represent a military threat to American interests for the rest of this century, by

28

which time current technology will be superseded.

In any event, statements stultify themselves if they
seek to preempt too distant a future as much as if they
refuse to look far enough ahead. China, in my view,
should be given the same status for technological
transfer as India and Yugoslavia. It would convey
that we understand, and take seriously, the strategic
parallelism of interest.

Many American leaders have visited Beijing in the past
decade. All have been impressed by their hosts'
thoughtfulness and meticulousness. None will have
gone at a more propitious juncture than Secretary
Shultz. I have every confidence that it will make
a major step forward to the benefit of our two countries
and the peace of the world.

1/26/83

# The Shultz Visit to Beijing

Sino-American relations have been on a roller coaster for the past generation. During World War II and its immediate aftermath we yielded to sentiment in trying to promote a weak China, torn by civil war, to great power status. Then the Chinese revolution and the Korean war brought a swing of the pendulum to the other extreme; contact between the two countries was to all intents and purposes broken off. When a rapprochement finally took place in the Seventies many Americans fell prey to our nostalgic national habit of equating relations among states with relations among people and endowed it with qualities of personal friendship. In the nature of things this raised exaggerated expectations that could not be fulfilled. The relationship has proved its durability. Nevertheless, almost inevitably, strains have developed. To some extent occasional squabbles are a sign of maturing, of a normal relationship among states.

2

Still the tensions have been excessive. Domestc upheavals
in both countries have exaggerated the intrinsic merit
of disputes. Some are gaining their own momentum, threatening
to override common long-term objectives of both countries.

## What Went Wrong?

Conventional wisdom has it that the current difficulties
are largely due to the clumsiness of the Reagan Administration.
To be sure some of the exuberant early statements on Taiwan
will not go down into the textbooks of diplomatic finesse.
Bringing the textile issue to a head just prior to the
Shultz visit makes one wonder about the coordinating mechanism
in our government.

3

starting point--of underlining its commitment to close
ties with Beijing. And it took two to make the textile
issue intractable. The causes of the strains in Washington-
Beijing relations go deeper; they antedate the Reagan
Administration; their origin lies in different approaches
to foreign policy; they have been exacerbated by errors
of judgment and domestic conflicts in both countries. During
the early period of renewed contacts much innocent nonsense
was written and spoken about how "unnatural" had been the
estrangement between the American and the Chinese people
as if rapprochement fulfilled a deep emotional necessity
on both sides. The facts were far more prosaic. China
in its marvelous history of three thousand years has never
had permanent allies; indeed it had no diplomatic relationships
in the European sense of sovereign equality at all. For
the greatest part of Chinese history the status of foreigners
was defined in terms of various degrees of dependency towards

4

the Middle Kingdom; when the first British ambassador appeared
at the end of the 18th century he was treated as a vassal
offering tribute. For the rest of its history China was
dominated and exploited by foreigners; that is, it was again
not dealing as equals. China has felt most comfortable
aloof, self-contained as a culture whose uniqueness placed
it beyond the reach of outsiders. For China, in short,
there was nothing at all unnatural about living apart
from America.

As for America it had in this century developed an
emotional bond to China. But since it coincided with the
period of foreign incursions many Chinese do not remember
it with equivalent affection. In any event it can hardly
be said that in 1971 there was a great popular demand in
America for an opening to China.

5

ideology with Moscow obscured geopolitical realities for a decade. Then the Cultural Revolution absorbed Chinese energies in domestic strife. But by the late Sixties the conflict could no longer be swept under the rug. Disagreements over ideology spread to basic security concerns. Moscow grew uneasy about the emergence of a major military power along an unrecognized frontier of 4000 miles only thinly populated on the Soviet side. China was realistic enough to understand that it had the only border with the Soviet Union which was not protected by some outside security arrangement.

(And indeed that because of Beijing's ideological intransigence there was no other nation with a significant interest in China's security.) By 1969 it was obvious that Marxist theory not only did not shield it from military pressures; under the Brezhnev doctrine Moscow claimed the right to enforce the unity of the Communist world by military might. Compounding the Chinese insecurity was the unsettled

6

state of its southern frontier with India over which a
war had been fought in 1962, an insecurity heightened as
Indian-Soviet relations warmed throughout the Sixties.

For the United States opportunity combined with necessity.

The build-up of Soviet power and constant Soviet pressures on the international equilibrium had been a familiar feature of the postwar scene. But it was only in the late Sixties that we began to sense the limits of our power and the need for associations beyond our traditional allies among the industrial democracies. The process was given impetus by a President to whom, for once, an unsentimental perception of power relationships was congenial rather than anathema.

There were powerful incentives for a rapprochement with China: to balance the Soviet Union either to restrain it or to induce it to negotiate seriously; to isolate Hanoi to give it an incentive to end the war; to ease the pain for Americans of our messy withdrawal from Indochina by

7

demonstrating a capacity for major initiatives.

The new links between China and America flourished so long as the two sides kept their eye on the common objective of resisting what their communiqués came to describe as "hegemony". Simply put, this meant resistance to Soviet attempts to overturn the global balance of power. That common objective presupposed some agreement on what was the essence of the threat, and on an appropriate strategy.

There were inevitable differences in tactical perspective. In the developing world Beijing was less concerned than we were with encouraging moderate government; its strategy relied on competing with Moscow in appealing to radical movements. This led it to back some leaders and causes that were hardly America's favorites. Also China was leery of Washington's relations with Moscow, explicitly fearful that detente would undermine the West's willingness to stand up to the Soviet Union; implicitly suspicious that it might lead to a US-Soviet arrangement at China's expense.

8

These differences were obscured early on because each side had an interest in rapid and visible progress: the United States to demonstrate its new options amidst the frustrations of the Vietnam war; China to warn the Soviet Union off seeking to apply the Brezhnev doctrine to it. Major efforts were made by both sides to achieve a coordination of purposes if not of policies. High level Chinese-American meetings were unique in that they rarely concerned concrete or technical negotiations. Most of the conversations dealt with basic assessments, projections and strategies. With respect to most of the world--Europe, Asia, the Middle East--Chinese and American perceptions were in fact parallel. Elsewhere, still faithful to its ideological convictions, Beijing stopped short of policies that would have benefitted Soviet expansionism--as it still does in Southeast and Southwest Asia. In the touchy field of Washington's relations with Moscow we took great pains to keep Beijing fully

9

informed. In this manner tactical differences were placed
in perspective and unharmed. (In that process, interestingly
enough, our relations with the Soviet Union prospered as
well.)

The succeeding years made this mutual restraint increasingly
difficult to maintain. Major domestic transformations
preoccupied the leaders of both countries and spilled over
into foreign policy. At first, relations with Moscow were
at the heart of the problem. The United States always
had a difficult passage to navigate. If we grew too exuberant
about detente we would disquiet Beijing and stampede it
into its own overtures to Moscow to avoid being left at
the gate. If we were too intransigent Beijing might take
our counterbalancing of Moscow for granted and tempt it
to flaunt opposition to us on bilateral issues or on
particular areas of the world without fear of impairing
the overall equilibrium.

10a

The Carter Administration oscillated
between both extremes. The Vance wing gave clear
priority to improving relations with Moscow; the
Brezezinski wing spoke of a "China card" as if
Beijing was a weapon in our arsenal. But a
card can be discarded as well as played; the
unintended consequence was the inference that
for the right price from Moscow we might loosen
our ties with Beijing.

10

The Reagan Administration suffered from no such
ambivalence. Its anti-Soviet pronouncements seemed to
freeze us into a rigid hostility toward the Soviet Union
which freed China to adopt, at little risk, a militant
Third World policy of "a plague on both your houses."
At the same time some members of the new Administration
expressed philosophic convictions very different from its
predecessors with respect to China itself and its relation-
ship to Taiwan, causing Beijing to fear (incorrectly) a
regression to the Dulles era.

Nor is the fault all on our side. Since the first
American visit to China, Beijing has experienced major
domestic upheavals of its own. The succession to Mao,
the overthrow of the Gang of Four, the struggle for pre-
eminence afterwards and finally the attempt to leaven a
planned economy with incentives were each bound to leave
some disgruntled elements within China. It would be

11

astonishing if China's internal political battles remained
confined to the publicized issues. Inevitably some of
the stridency in the reaction to American policies reflected
factional rivalries exploiting the presumed embarassments
of Chinese leaders at not obtaining greater or more rapid
concessions from the United States. During the Ford
Administration the domestic ambitions of the Gang of Four
led to criticism and actions (such as the conspicuous invitation
to Beijing of officials dismissed by Ford during an election
campaign) which came close to intervening into our domestic
affairs. In recent years the Taiwan issue--which is genuinely
neuralgic for the Chinese--has nevertheless been pursued
with extraordinary stridency even after the Reagan
Administration had gone out of its way to emphasize the
priority it attached to Beijing. No President could have
conceded more than Reagan in the August 1982 communique.
And yet the assault on him--inexplicably--continued for

12

many months.

The ambiguous rapprochement with Moscow almost surely
involves some internal maneuvering in the People's Republic.
It is a symptom of our ignorance of internal Chinese trends
that we have great difficulty identifying particular groups
with particular policies or determining who favors what
policies and for what reason. Whatever the cause, US-
Chinese relations are less good than they should be, given
the enduring parallel interests of the two countries in
maintaining the global balance of power.

What Can Be Accomplished.

The real story of the visit will not be the familiar
issues with Beijing datelines such as Taiwan, trade and
normalization. At stake will be something intangible:
the way the United States and China view their respective

13

The beginning of the process of transcending petty
bilateral bickering is therefore to get clear what can
<u>not</u> be accomplished and should <u>not</u> be attempted.

The Shultz visit can <u>not</u> finally resolve the Taiwan
issue. In the Shanghai communique of 1972, the accord
on normalization of 1979, and even more explicitly in the
communique of 1982, the United States has repeatedly committed
itself to the proposition that there is only one China
and that it would not support any variety of two-China
solutions. Moreover the United States has recognized Beijing
as the government of all of China. In the process both
sides have had to make adjustments. For many in the United
States the restrictions in arms sales to Taiwan in the 1982
communique are painful. For the Chinese the American reiteration
of its desire for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue

14

is grating. Yet they reflect the realities of a complex
situation. The legal framework cannot be stretched further.
The future of Taiwan must now be left to historical processes
and for the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan straits
to work out in their own subtle ways. What remains for
both sides is to live up to the letter and spirit of existing
undertakings. The Secretary will surely hear Chinese views
as to what that spirit entails. For formal diplomacy has
exhausted the subject; no new negotiations seem feasible.

Nor would the subject of trade by itself warrant a
trip to Beijing by the Secretary of State. To be sure
trade and technology will become increasingly important
to China; the speed of its modernization will depend on
it. But in practice trade will get its real impetus from
improving political relationships. Both sides have real
complaints. Our tactics in the recent textile negotiations
have been execrable. Chinese bureaucracy can be maddening

15

in processing American investment proposals. We have been
too slow in fulfilling promises on technology transfer.

Neither country can want to--or indeed afford to--win these
battles. Both have a stake in overcoming bureaucratic
inertia and suspiciousness. It is high time for the top
leaders of both countries to address once again the fundamental
dimensions of the relationship and to lift discussions
to the strategic plane.

Above all the United States should show no nervousness
over Sino-Soviet negotiations. A mature relationship between
the United States and China can only be based on the premise
that each side can assess its own national interest without
instruction from the other. Washington and Beijing regulate

16

their relationships with other countries not as a favor
to each other but to serve their interests in peace, security
and progress. When these interests coincide, Sino-
American relations thrive; when they clash, cooperation
disintegrates. Tension between Moscow and Beijing is not
a boon bestowed on us by the Chinese; to the extent it
exists it reflects realities; it neither can nor should
be promoted by us. By the same token close ties between
Washington and Beijing--in which I deeply believe--are
not an act of altruism on our part; they either reflect
a correct evaluation of our self-interest or they will
wither.

Within the limits dictated by security each side will
of course adjust its relations to Moscow on the basis of
its tactial necessities and other considerations. But
if each side is wise it will not deliberately jangle the
nerves of the other lest it trigger a series of

17

self-fulfilling prophecies making Moscow the arbiter of
both European-American and Sino-American relationships.
Neither country can want to encourage international tensions
not imposed by circumstances. Neither Washington nor Beijing
can seek to blackmail each other, if only because both
sides would lose if either were perceived as influencable
by pressure. Each side's freedom of action is thus
restricted by a matrix of principles which each ignores
at its peril:

First, the United States must avoid Soviet domination
of the Eurasian landmass--the much-stressed hegemony--
for that would shift the global balance of resources and
power irreversibly towards Moscow. A threat to the security
of China would undermine the global equilibrium as surely
as Soviet domination of Europe. And a weakening of America
would jeopardize the security of China. Statesman can
make use of these facts; they cannot invent them.

18

Second, China realizes--even when it does not avow--
that its frontier of over 4000 miles with the Soviet Union
is its fundamental security problem. As China modernizes
it turns into a potential long-range danger for Moscow,
if only because it will be less and less subject to
intimidation. That tension can be eased by Moscow-Beijing
diplomacy, never eliminated. No rapprochement can shorten
the frontier; no withdrawal of troops can guarantee against
their return. Beijing knows very well that it is being
wooed because the United States is in play; in our absence
it might be threatened. Just as the United States--if
it is rational--cannot push US-Soviet detente to the point
of endangering Chinese security; so China, if it is
farsighted, cannot wish to forfeit America's vital interest
in its security and territorial integrity. Nor will China
lightly sacrifice its economic relations with the industrial
democracies.

19

Still reality is not self-implementing. Differences
in national style, history and geography are often obstacles
to an identity of views. The American approach to policy
is too episodic and personal. Each new Administration
proudly proclaims the folly of its predecessor and its
determination to start afresh--oblivious to the fact that
this must unsettle all leaders who have staked their country's
future on the previous dispensation. The Chinese approach
is patient and systematic; the Middle Kingdom has a horror
of appearing as a supplicant. Beijing assumes that its
interlocutor has done his homework and will understand
subtle indirections; the Chinese approach can therefore
appear aloof, even condescending. Washington acts as if
good faith and bonhomie supply their own rationale. Beijing
conducts itself as if only its views deserve the appellation
of rationale. To the Chinese, Americans often appear
unstable and slightly frivolous. To Americans, Chinese

20

Thus both countries need an understanding of the other's psychology and to work on establishing the confidence that this understanding will last. The Chinese have had to deal with four Presidents and five Secretaries of State in a little over ten years--each taking pains to distinguish himself from his predecessor. The United States has encountered an equally dramatic alteration of personnel, though the mainlines of Chinese foreign policy have been maintained with greater steadiness.

21

Even where Beijing acknowledges our commitment to maintain
the balance of power, doubts have developed whether we
are able to interpret it correctly in concrete circum-
stances or act on our interpretation.

There were many domestic reasons why we did not oppose
Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia or the first Communist
coup in Afghanistan and behaved so fecklessly when Iran
was taken over by a government hostile to the West. But
to the Chinese these events spelled a shift in the balance
of power inimical to their interests with respect to which
we proved ineffective. When the United States is perceived
in Beijing as an inadequate guardian of the equilibrium
there are two consequences: Beijing is tempted towards
Moscow despite all its suspicions, if only to gain time.
And the day-to-day issues of foreign policies--like Taiwan
or trade--must carry a disproportionate burden of the
relationship.

22

American zig-zagging must bear its responsibility.

But Chinese policy and rhetoric of the past few years has made its own contribution to the impasse. It does not build confidence to urge the United States into a defense of the balance of power and then give it equal billing as a threat to peace with the Soviet "hegemonialist."

Criticism is inevitable when two such different cultures seek to cooperate. But in recent years the vocabulary of criticism from Beijing has been far cooler than that of cooperation. Beijing must understand that only a relationship built on some strategic understandings and cooperation on some international issues will command American public and Congressional support for the long term. We cannot sustain indefinitely a relationship in which we are lumped with the Soviets and which consists in the public perception of irritation over Taiwan, some economic links (perceived as helping China more than us) and rhetorical

23

When all is said and done there is a deep, positive
element in Sino-American relations: they have survived
a decade of upheaval in both countries; this alone provides
a basis for a new advance. Secretary Shultz--I am certain--
is dedicated to this objective. His preeminent objective
will be to give a new dynamic to Sino-US relations. He
will seek to make clear that we view the world in geopolitical
terms relevant to Chinese perceptions. It would be wrong
to conceive these conversations as a public relations exercise
to be satisfied with more or less standard expositions
of well-known positions. The Chinese are too subtle and
analytical not to see through conventional briefing papers--
especially when they deal with past actions.

There are at least four areas in which our views should
be harmonized or at least the range of our disagreements
understood. In addition to the Soviet Union we should

24

talk about each of the major issues on the world scene:

(1) Where United States and Chinese interests converge and what may be done to concert actions, for example Afghanistan and Indochina. (2) Where we have different and parallel interests at the same time--for example, Korea, where we back opposing sides within the context of a shared interest in avoidance of war in the peninsula. (3) Where we have different perceptions--such as the Middle East and Africa, but seek Chinese restraint in seeking to obstruct us. (4) Our overall strategy towards the industrial democracies where on the whole American and Chinese interests run parallel.

In my experience the best approach in such discussions is complete frankness. It is wiser to admit that some positions are in a state of evolution than to pretend to settled views which dialogue will reveal as shallow or empty. It would help if--as the dialogue develops--it

25

could be given a bipartisan cast, a sense that what is
set forth will last beyond one Administration.

At the same time Secretary Shultz's hosts must not
place the entire weight of the trip on him. It is to be
hoped that the Chinese contribution will transcend the
occasional hectoring of recent years, especially the grating
tendency to treat American presentations as if we were
students taking an examination. Beijing cannot simply
act as a critic of our guardianship of the balance of power;
it has to assume some responsibility of its own.

I am convinced that both sides to this dialogue will
be represented by men with the wisdom to transcend the
recent past. Neither side can have promoted the visit
in order for it to fail; each side knows that a failure
would not maintain the status quo but mark a setback.
Nor can one exchange provide the necessary depth and stability.
Senior Chinese leaders should continue the process in

26

Washington. And however difficult the dialogue may be,
negotiating with the Chinese has the advantage that under-
takings will be strictly honored.

Of the operational matters the only issue requiring
urgent attention is transfer of technology, which has a
broader significance. This not only will affect the pace
of China's modernization, but also symbolize our commitment
to it. The obstacles so far have been both bureaucratic
(on both sides) and philosophical. The bureaucratic problems
usually melt when it is understood that the top leadership
is determined to proceed.

27

for the rest of this century by which time current technology
will be superseded. In any event, statesmen stultify
themselves if they seek to preempt too distant a future
as much as if they refuse to look far enough ahead. China,
in my view, should be given the same status for
technological transfer as India and Yugoslavia. It would
convey that we understand and take seriously a parallelism
of interest.

Many American leaders have visited Beijing in the
past decade. All have been impressed by their hosts'
thoughtfulness and meticulousness. None will have gone
at a more propitious juncture than Secretary Shultz. Having
had the privilege of making the first visit, I have, of
course, a deep commitment to the Sino-American dialogue.
I have every confidence that this one will make a major
step forward to the benefit of our two countries and the
peace of the world.

1/24/83

The visit of Secretary of State George Shultz to China will surely determine the course and quality of Chinese-American relations for the remainder of this Administration and probably for the remainder of the decade. Unfortunately success will not lend itself to treatment by the media.

For it will consist of intangibles: the way the United States and China view their respective roles in world affairs, above all whether these views can be harmonized.

Much less important will be the familiar staples with Beijing datelines: Taiwan, trade, normalization.

Sino-American relations have been on a roller coaster for the past generation. During World War II and its immediate aftermath we yielded to sentiment in promoting a weak China torn by civil war to great power status.

The Chinese revolution brought a swing of the pendulum to the other extreme; hostility became seemingly fundamental and permanent, contact between the two countries was to all intents and purposes broken off. When rapprochement

7

led in Moscow by appealing to radical movements. This caused it to back some leaders and causes that were hardly America's favorites. Also, China was always leery of Washington's relations with Moscow, explicitly fearful that it would undermine the West's willingness to stand up to the Soviet Union, implicitly suspicious that it might lead to a US-Soviet arrangement at China's expense.

early on during the first months because each side had an interest in demonstrating a visible need for rapid progress: the United States to demonstrate options amidst the frustrations of the Vietnam war; China to give us a stake in its security should the Soviet Union seek to apply the Brezhnev doctrine to it. After these immediate needs were satisfied the potential differences were contained for some years because major efforts were made to achieve a coordination of purposes if not of policies. High level Chinese-American meetings were unique in

8

that they rarely concerned concrete or technical issues.

Most of the conversations dealt with assessments, projections and strategies. In the touchy field of Washington's relations with Moscow great pains were taken to keep fully Beijing informed, and to ease Chinese concerns that deals might be made at their expense. In this manner tactical differences were seen in perspective and limited by the need to achieve common objectives. With respect to most of the world--Europe, Asia, the Middle East--Chinese and American perceptions were in fact parallel. Elsewhere, still faithful to its ideological convictions, Beijing stopped short of policies that would have benefitted Soviet expansionism--as it still does in Southeast Asia.

The succeeding years made this mutual restraint increasingly difficult to maintain. Major domestic transformations preoccupied the leaders of both countries and spilled over into foreign policy. At first relations

10

[y]

seemed to freeze us into a rigid hostility which no Chinese
while seed China adopted at little with a militant third
World policy of "a plague on all your lives."

policy could affect. At the same time its rhetoric implied a
new Administration expressed

philosophic convictions (with respect to China) very different
from its predecessors, causing the Chinese to fear a
Berkeley

Berkeley (incredibly)
regression to the Dulles era.

Nor is the fault all on our side. Since the first
American visit to China, Beijing has experienced major
domestic upheavals of its own. The succession to Mao,
the overthrow of the Gang of Four, the struggle for preeminence
afterwards and finally the attempt to leaven a planned
economy with incentives were each bound to leave some
disgruntled elements within China. It would be astonishing
if China's internal political battles remained confined
to the publicized issues. Inevitably some of the stridency
in the reaction to American policies reflected factional
rivalries exploiting what seemed to be some Chinese leaders'
leaders of not obtaining greater control of Chinese
embarassments in the Ford administration the domestic
During

11

ambitions of the Gang of Four led to criticism and actions (such as the impromptu invasion of Beijing of officially disintegrated by Fordham University students) with respect to our East-West policies, which came close

to intervening into our domestic affairs. In recent years the Taiwan issue--which we owe it to the Chinese government for the Chinese--to recognize as a neuralgic one--has nevertheless been pursued with extraordinary stridency even after the Reagan Administration had gone out of its way to emphasize the

primarily Beijing, not Pungtung importance it attached to Sino-American relations. The could have preceded more than Reagan in taking office in August 1982, but that would have been unambiguous rapprochement with Moscow almost surely involves some internal maneuvering in the People's Republic. It is a symptom of our real ignorance of internal Chinese trends that we have great difficulty identifying particular groups with particular policies or determining who favors what policies and for what reason. For several reasons

US-Chinese relations are less good than they should be, given the enduring parallel interests of the two countries in maintaining the global balance of power. The issue

12

of Taiwan festers. A totally needless confrontation
on textile trade--exacerbated by a failure to fulfill
earlier promises of technology transfer--shadows Secretary
Shultz's trip. The hints and rumors of a Sino-Soviet
rapprochement are unnerving to some in the West. There
is a danger of a whole series of self-fulfilling prophecies
making Moscow the arbiter of both European-American and
Sino-American relationships, -a situation whose first victim
will surely not be the United States.

What Can be Accomplished.

The staples of the recent dialogue cannot offer a roadmap

to that; they may in fact confuse it. The beginning of
the process of fashioning a little political victory
wisdom is therefore to get clear what can not be accomplished
and should not be attempted.

15

inertia and suspiciousness. If they quarrel it should not be on issues of principle and concept not over technical disputes of experts. It is high time for the top leaders of both countries to add their voices to the fundamental dimensions of the relationship, and to lift it up to a higher plane.

Above all the United States should show no nervousness over Sino-Soviet negotiations. A mature relationship between the United States and China can only be based on the premise that each side can assess its own national interest without instruction from the other. Washington and Beijing regulate their relationships with other countries not as a favor to each other but to serve their interests in peace, security and progress. When these interests coincide, relations thrive; when they clash, cooperation disintegrates. In this concept of tension between Moscow and Beijing is not a boon bestowed on us by the Chinese; it reflects a real need to end the war. It grows out of existing realities; it can surely not

be promoted by us. By the same token close ties between
Washington and Beijing--in which I deeply believe--are
not an act of altruism on our part; they either reflect
a correct evaluation of our self-interest or they will
wither. In my view a threat to the security of China
would undermine the global equilibrium as surely as Soviet
domination of Europe. And a weakening of America will
jeopardize the security of China. Statesmen can make
use of these premises; they cannot invent them.

Within the limits dictated by security each side
will of course adjust its relations to Moscow on the
basis of its tactical necessities and other considerations.
But if each side is were it will not deliberately jenk the nerves
of the other side it would trigger a jump in the nerves.
Neither country can want to encourage unnecessary international
tensions or encourage hostility with other countries
not imposed by circumstances. Neither Washington nor
Beijing can seek to blackmail each other, if only because
both sides, either were
each would lose if the other is perceived as influencable

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American interest in its security and territorial integrity.

Yet reality is not self-implementing. Differences in national style, history and geography are often obstacles to an identity of views. The American approach to policy is too episodic and personal. Each new Administration proudly proclaims the folly of its predecessor and its determination to start afresh--oblivious to the fact that this must unsettle all leaders who have staked their country's future on the previous dispensation. The Chinese approach is analytical and systematic; the Middle Kingdom has a horror of appearing as a supplicant. Beijing assumes that its interlocutor has done his homework and will understand subtle indirections; the Chinese approach can therefore appear aloof even condescending. Washington acts as if good faith and bonhomie supply its own rationale.

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Beijing conducts itself as if no other analysis deserves
the appellation of rational. To the Chinese, Americans
often appear unstable and slightly frivolous. To Americans
Chinese occasionally present themselves as either inscrutable
or uncommunicative.

Despite these differences in style and culture Sino-
American relations have remained extraordinarily durable.

a basis for a new advance still exists. Secretary Shultz believes it is dedicated to this objective. His preeminent objective will be to give them a new impetus. He will seek to make clear that we mean the world of political terms relevant to Chinese affairs, and this presupposes a stability of purpose and concept.

on which both sides can count. Each side has seen many
changes of leaders in the past decade. The Chinese have
had to deal with four Presidents and five Secretaries
of State in a little over ten years--each taking pains
to distinguish himself from his predecessor. The United
States has encountered an equally dramatic alteration
of personnel, though the mainlines of Chinese policy

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have been maintained with greater steadiness. Nevertheless
Sino-American relations are now encumbered because in
recent years far too much attention has been devoted
to peripheral issues and to surface irritations. We
have to face the fact that the Chinese have developed
serious doubts about our political or even emotional
stability. We have raised too many prospects only to
pull back. At one point we seemed to invite military
cooperation and then backed away. We promised cooperation
on transfer of technology and in effect reneged. All
this raised doubts whether we were really interested
in a close relationship. Even where Beijing accepts our
commitment to maintain the balance of power, doubts have developed
whether we are able to interpret it correctly in concrete
circumstances or act on our interpretation.

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There were many important domestic and a few sensible international reasons why we did not oppose Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia, the first Communist coup in Afghanistan and behaved so fecklessly when Iran was taken over by a government hostile to the West. But to the Chinese they spelled a shift in the balance of power inimical to their interests with respect to which we proved ineffective.

A country with the longest tradition of self-government in history is loath to entrust its fate to the vagaries of personalities, when the United States is perceived in Beijing as an inadequate guardian of the equilibrium there are two consequences: Beijing is tempted towards Moscow despite all its suspicions, if only to gain time for the day-to-day issues of foreign policies--like Taiwan or trade--must carry a disproportionate burden of the relationship.

The preeminent challenge of the trip to Beijing is to discuss a geopolitical and indeed historical concept.

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Zhou Enlai said during our first meeting: "Our word counts." I believe all American negotiators have found this to be the case.

Of the operational matters the only issue requiring urgent attention is transfer of technology, which has a ~~symbolic~~ significance. This not only will affect the pace of China's modernization, but also symbolize our commitment to it. The obstacles so far have been both bureaucratic (on both sides) and philosophical. The bureaucratic problems usually melt when it is understood that the top leadership is determined to proceed.

The philosophical issue goes deeper. Our restrictions on trade with Communist countries have as their purpose to prevent the strengthening of strategic capabilities ~~potentially~~ *lastically* to us. But China is decidedly not a Soviet ally nor is it in the same class of military power. China could not represent a *military* threat to American interests for the rest of this century by which

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