H. J. M. Kissinger
Receptionist
8-10-63
Purdue University

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELCOM
Prof. Landes/Mr. Kissinger

9:20 a.m., August 8, 1972

NASA Date 5/12/72

K: David, how are you?

L: Fine. I'll tell you why I'm calling. I've had a call from the brothers Kalb who want to do a book about you.

K: That's right.

L: And apparently you thought they might profit by talking to me.

K: Well, frankly, I have no idea what you are going to say but my impression was that you were less ______ to whatever is fashionable then most of my colleagues former colleagues.

L: I think that mya be. Let me just say this, I'm coming down to a meeting in Washington this evening and he arranged (Kalb) to talk to me tomorrow morning at breakfast and I was just wondering -- I know you're a busy man, do you have any time to see me tomorrow morning.

K: I will be in Camp David. Sure, I can see you at the end of the morning.

L: At the end of the morning.

K: About 11:30.

L: Yeah. Okay, I'd love to talk to you, just go over one or two things.

K: Sure.

L: That would be just perfect if you could squeeze me in.

K: Sure. Where can we reach you?

L: I'll be at the Watergate Hotel.

K: Right.

L: Tonight.

K: Right. Well, tonight I'll be in Camp David.

L: Yeah. Oh, okay. So I'll be at the Watergate Hotel and then I'm having breakfast there with Kalb.

K: Right.

*

TELCORN

Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

9:22 a.m., August 8, 1972

JK: Henry, how are you?

HK: Okay.

JK: I just called to say I hope we might have a chance to get together this week. How does it look to you?

HK: Hectic, but will you be here all week?

JK: I'll be here through the week; I'm going to leave Friday noon. But anytime between now and then would be good.

HK: Well, I'll definitely do it. I can't do it today.

JK: Fine.

HK: Let me get somebody to call you this afternoon.

JK: Okay.

HK: And we'll definitely do it.

JK: Okay, fine.

HK: Before the end of the week.

JK: Yeah, I would like to do that if we can. I would really like to have a chat.

HK: Right. I don't know how illuminating I'm going to be.

JK: You setting darkness and gloom?

HK: No.

JK: Are you setting darkness and doubt?

HK: No, no, no. Well, let's talk and see.

JK: Fine.

HK: Good.

JK: Well, will you have Dick call me or something like that?

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Nora Ephron

11:45 a.m. 8/8/72

HK: Hello.

NE: I wrote in my article that you were fast at returning phone calls but I didn't think you were this fast.

HK: Only to people I like.

NE: Thank you. Listen have written this article and it's just wonderful. I just wanted to check with you.
will

HK: Of course, /my father think so.

NE: Your father is in it and he'll like it too. I just wanted to check because I did paraphrase you and I also would like to beg you if I could use one direct quote because it is so hilarious, that everyone just loves it, but if I can't then I won't, right? Right. The direct quote at one point I asked you about whether your intuition about people had improved and you said, "I think I used to be D+ now I am about a B-"

HK: No, that's all right, you can use that.

NE: Now the other paraphrasing is --

HK: Do you think that is hilarious.

NE: I think it is just wonderful--I just love it--don't you think it is funny? It is way down at the bottom of my article and my editor asked me if I could move it up to the top and I said "no".

HK: I don't care what you do with it. You're very considerate--I don't care you can use it where ever you want.

NE: All right. I was going to use it at the bottom anyway. I have the story of the secret swinger and I have you saying "we'll you couldn't call me a swinger because of my job, why don't you just assume I'm just a secret swinger--is that a correct quote if you recall."

HK: No, what I said if I remember it correctly, was "You know that I can't do any public swinging because of the hours I keep, so why don't you just call me a secret swinger--or why don't you just assume I'm a secret swinger" because I didn't know who that girl was.

*

Telcon

Page 2

NE: Is it Yeng Shen Palace which has a dish named after you? The Chinese Restaurant.

HK: You didn't get that from me.

NE: No, but someone said that it was the Yeng Shing Palace that you go to, a lot.

HK: I have been one to the Yeng Shing Palace and I have been --what the hell--Empress j

NE: Is Empress the one you go to all the time?

HK: All the time means once every three months. Empress.

NE: Is that the one that has a dish named after you?

HK: I wasn't aware that I had a dish named after me.

NE: Oh yes, I read it somewhere, I just wondered what it was?

HK: No.

NE: Now the other paraphrasing is,"He cannot imagine marrying while he is in the White House, he says, no woman could separate him from what he does--it should be no one can separate who is he from what he does--does that bother you?"

HK: No.

NE: He has absolutely no idea of what he will do when he leaves the WH but he is not worried. It is pretty boring to ask permission for things like that

HK: You weally are very meticulous.

NE: Well I keep my world.

HK: I'm not exactly spoiled in that respect.

NE: One other thing is when you told me the story about Sally Quinnin the secret swinger thing you said--I said that was quite a longer time ago and you said "I was a baby then." I would like to use that.

HK: That's okay.

H. J. Kissinger, Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mosbacher

Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mosbacher

OECIASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: KML W. NASA Date: 5/12/84

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Mosbacher

11:58 88/72

M: Henry, how are you. I hope I'm talking to you in Washington and not Paris or Peking.

H: You are.

M: How are things going?

H: Pretty well.

M: Getting along without me?

H: Fairly. We miss you.

M: It's wonderful, everything is going along very well. We have had a good month--we have done a lot of traveling and trying to catch up with a lot of things.--Not your kind of traveling, just domestic --business kind of traveling.

H: Did you have a decompression period?

M: More or less, we have been kid of taking long weekends and an occasional day--but we've been to Texas, California and Canada and back--we've been fairly busy--but a different kind of busy and it's been fun and interesting. Everything is going along well and Pat is crying this morning because she misses you and that is the reason for my call she--we'll be home this weekend and next and if you had any chance of getting up, we'd love to have you.

H: Aren't you sweet. I don't think I'll be up this weekend, but let me call you about next weekend.

M: All right fine, because that will make my life that much easier--pat will be so happy if you do come.

H: I'd love to come.

M: Check out your schedule and let us know, because we'd love to have you.

H: Terrific.

M: Okay--we'll hear from you when? The early part of next week?

H: Yes.

*

Page 2

M: If you happen to find a friend of mine, give him my best down there.

H: (laughing) He's in California.

M: Oh, is he in California? That shows you how--we just got back from Canada--we haven't seen much of the papers or anything. How did he get out there without you?

H: Oh, you mean the President?

M: Oh yeh.

H: I thought you meant Haldeman--the President is here.--

M: Oh my god, how can he let Haldeman out there when he is here.

H: I don't know--they are probably doing something else that they don't want to tell me.

M: Right. I hope you can make it--we'd love to have you.

H: Good thank you.

M: Good, we'll talk to you next week.

H. J. S. Kissinger, R-III, and
President of the Republic
August 8, 1972

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sec. 3.6

TELCOM
Senator Aiken/Mr. Kissinger
12:35 p.m., August 8, 1972

NASA Date 5/12/72

K: Senator, how are you?

A: Oh, I'm extraordinary.

K: I beg your pardon.

A: How are you?

K: Okay.

A: That's the question.

K: I'm calling you about this Jackson Amendment to explain just where we stand on it.

A: Yeah.

K: Last week, you know, something was submitted which was perhaps a little exuberant. And I think everybody got a little bit carried away with himself. Now, what we would like to do -- our interest is to get some senatorial support for some of the unilateral declarations we made in the negotiations which have been submitted to the Congress.

A: Yeah.

K: So we have been working with Jackson over the weekend to get a new text which takes out the invidious cracks at the Soviet Union.

A: I see.

K: And which picks up the language from what Smith has already submitted to the Congress.

A: Yeah.

K: And states the Congress supports it.

A: Yeah.

K: And other things of the same nature. We would then -- when that is submitted, issue a statement here saying that this embodies senatorial support and provides the basis for the broadest possible consensus. It has no legal effect; it does not constitute a reservation or interpretation but merely a reaffirmation by the Senate of the negotiation process.

H. C. BROWN, as a private person, and as a candidate for Public Office, Voted for Republican Party.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

By: KHLW NARA Date: 5/23/74

- 2 -

TELCON
Senator Aiken/Mr. Kissinger

12:35 p.m., August 8, 1972

A: Yeah. Well, Scoop is offering that.

K: And Scoop will be offering that.

A: As spokesman for the Administration.

K: And between you and me, I sent a copy of that over to Dobrynin of both the White House statement and of the amendment. Of course, he can't get involved in our legislative process.

A: I've been an observer and a reporter. I told the State Department last Thursday afternoon that there was hell to pay up here.

K: Right.

A: Which was not an exaggeration but I didn't know that the Foreign Relations Committee was meeting on it Friday however and -- that was called at short notice and then they authorized me to tell the people downtown what the problem was and of course Scoop's philosophy has always been different than a lot of the others.

K: Right.

A: I told the boys last Friday that it's your problem.

K: Well, I think, Senator, what we are now endorsing is not a reservation or interpretation but simply an affirmation by the Senate that they support the unilateral statements we've already made part of the record.

A: Yeah.

K: And which have been submitted to the Senate.

A: Yeah.

K: And Jackson is willing -- It is a face-saving way frankly between you and me for Jackson to get out of it.

A: That's right. Yeah. I told him we've been the face-shaving one now for 7 years.

K: (laughter)

The New York Times and the Washington Post
in the Senate and ofikhamal
Pareekshakala Sami

OCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

By: K.L. V NASA Date 5/12/04

*

- 3 -

A: And when governments start face-saving, the instinct tickles down. It's a tickle-down theory to the individual. So, well, we will let nature take its course...

K: Right. Well, I just wanted you to understand where it stands and we hope you'll support it when it comes --

A: It will be up to Senator Mansfield and the Committee and they'd want to see it first.

K: Of course.

A: And get the implications also.

K: Right.

A: Because the Jackson Amendment could conceivably pass if the President supported it but if that happened, I think I was correct in saying that the bill itself would be killed because we know that Jackson and his friends would rather have no . . . . . . . . at all --

K: No, no; but we won't support the old amendment.

A: Well, that depends -- State Department boys asked me to suggest some wording the other day and I said you had people that were experts in devising wordings and I didn't bite on that one.

K: No, I think we --

A: Well, we'll see what it looks like when it gets up here and we'll --

K: We're not going to get behind the old amendment.

A: Well, that you've got to get away from it.

K: No, no; we are getting away.

A: Get away from it some way.

K: No, no; we are getting away from it.

A: Because even Scott said he got fooled on it.

*

TELCONE

Senator Taft/Mr. Kissinger

5:04 8/8/72

T: I'm calling on a couple of things. A very good friend and constituent of mine and actually a fine American--whe has done a lot for D. Patterson Air Force Base and that sort of thing--is named Louis Prouk, he was also one of the principal trustees I gather of the American National Standard Institute. Now I understand that there is a possibility and he is very keen on developing the possibility of holding the meeting of the National Standards--International Standards Institute of Geneva in the United States of September, 1973. But by law it is required that all members be permitted to attend--Cubans who are members under present conditions could not get visas. Our friends in Commerce have apparently already been in this--

H: Now who is a member?

T: The United States has a membership in

H: No, I mean what type of people?

T: In the American National Standards Institute?

H: Yeh.

T: Leading business men in the United States are members of the International Standards work with business in trying to develop International Standards of various types in business, etc., etc. But I gather this is a National Security Council matter already. I wanted to find out is there any chance that ______ in this position and could it be considered as a possible way if we desire to move toward doing something with the Cubans of making special arrangements in this case and what the implications are--he is pushing me because apparently they have a sort of September deadline themselves.

H: We cannot make any formal commitments--in the past in a case like this we have in fact made exceptions and I think with your interest, we might do that again. But he has to take his chances on that--but I will tell you.

T: But I gather it would have to be a formal commitment to the International Institute.

*

Page 2

H: Well, we did scientific conferences here where we made it
possible. But if they push us against the wall in an election period,
we'll come out...

T: Oh I don't know if that would be necessary. What you told me in itself
would let me breath encouragement to them, if exceptions have been
made and if there would be any kind of indication that we might be
interested at all, I think this would be interesting to the Americans
involved. Now where they can get off with the International people
without a commitment, I don't know. If we could point to some cases
where exceptions have been made, perhaps the International Institute
might ______ the situation.

H: Right. It is a hell of a lot easier if we take formal steps after the
election.

T: I am enough of a politician to know what you are saying. The other
thing is purely political--are you by chance going to be in Miami.

Sen. Taft:

H: Yes. I'm going to be in Key Biscayne with the President. /I am getting
or am having given for me a reception almost certainly on Sunday.
It will not be a press affair, although it will probably get some press
coverage--it won't be political really. What it is is ...

H: I don't ever mind being identified with you.

T: It's a big money thing, actually Henry.

H: I almost certainly as early as Sunday--I don't think I'll be there Monday.

T: You thing you'll be there Monday.

H: I'm certainly going to be there Tuesday. And if you do it on the day that
I'm there, I would certainly come.

T: I'd be pleased if you would. Let me crank that into it.

H: If you can do it Tuesday, I'd flatly promise you I would come.
Monday is a slight chance, Tuesday would be a certainty or Wednesday.

T: Very good. We'll work on it from there. I may write you about this
to give you a little background without any commitment to these people
until I found out who there are.

H: Excellent. Thank you bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E10258
By: L.B. NARA Date: 8-9-72

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin / General Haig

8:30 a.m., August 9, 1972

D: Hello.

H: Mr. Ambassador.

D: Yes.

H: General Haig.

D: Oh, hello, General. You are not sleepy -- it is only 8:45.
(laughter)

H: I'm never sleepy.

D: This is my impression too. Probably this is why you are a general.

H: That's why I'm a tired old man.

D: I see.

H: Henry is up at Camp David and he called me. He's very disturbed by these -- first, because Gerry Warren here when asked about consultations --

D: Yes, exactly, he mentioned.

H: He didn't know the answer and he tried to spread the line and in doing so he really made a mistake.

D: Yes, I know and I explained yesterday to Henry how it happened because Moscow was a little bit surprised because before he said it was only a private consultation and then it became public.

H: That's exactly right. Well, now there are some stories about it.

D: Yeah. And it was in the New York Times yesterday that Henry was consulting with the Soviet diplomat and there is only one diplomat who consults with him usually.

H: Right. Now, what we intend to do this morning is have Ziegler use the following guidance and see what you think about this. He would say, "There have been reports of discussions with Soviet officials with respect to the Jackson Amendment. I want to make it clear that the --" Hold on, I've got the wrong goddamn paper here. I've rewritten it three times.

D: Yes, you have too many papers.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01257
By CNAR Date StLOT

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/General Haig

8:30 a.m., August 9, 1972

- 2 -

H: [Bring in that piece of paper she's typing, will you. Right away.
The one I hand wrote. The version that's correct.]
We would say, 'Mr. Warren's comments were given in the context
of the discussions held in SALT 1 negotiations.'

D: Not here in Washington?

H: That's right.

D: That will make it clear. Not here in Washington.

H: Yeah. "The Jackson Amendment is generally consistent with the
language of the unilateral U. S. statement discussed in Moscow which
was subsequently conveyed to the Congress at the time the agreements
were submitted for consideration. Since the Soviets had no objections
to the statements at that time, we do not believe --"

D: Is it necessary to say. Just leave it as it is when you said I think
that's all.

H: Well, the trouble is that you have to have to have a reason for why
the inference --

D: Clearly it was read in Moscow, is that so? Because in this case
they will look whether there was objection or no objection.

H: Okay, okay.

D: In Moscow they may look you see and somebody will tell
but this is the same that was presented to Moscow and we really
didn't object officially but there was some I know . . . . . . . .
some other story.

H: All right.

D: So if it will be just saying it was made public.

H: Leave it just that way.

D: Yes, I think it is the best thing because it is true.

H: All right. Okay.

D: Because in Moscow it is the press that we accept really but not
officials specifically.

Husqville Times the paper is in
1964, 1965 or 1966
Macroeconomic
Pilotage Manual?

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/General Haig

8:30 a.m., August 9, 1972

By: KMLW
NASHA, Data: 5/12/04

D: Hello.

H: Mr. Ambassador.

D: Yes.

H: General Haig.

D: Oh, hello, General. You are not sleepy -- it is only 8:45.
(laugh)

H: I'm never sleepy.

D: I see.

December 13, 1972
The State of the Union
Inaugural Address
President Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

By: KH V NASA Date: 5/12/72

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/General Haig
& 36 a.m., August 9, 1972

- 2 -

H: [Bring in that piece of paper she's typing, will you. Right away. The one I hand wrote. The version that's correct.] We would say, 'Mr. Warren's comments were given in the context of the discussions held in SALT I negotiations.'

D: Not here in Washington?

H: That's right.

H: Yeah. "The Jackson Amendment is generally consistent with the language of the unilateral U.S. statement discussed in Moscow which was subsequently conveyed to the Congress at the time the agreements were submitted for consideration. Since the Soviets had no objections to the statements at that time, we do not believe --"

H: Well, the trouble is that you have to have a reason for why the inference --

H: Okay, okay.

D: In Moscow they may look you see and somebody will tell but this is the same that was presented to Moscow and we really didn't object officially but there was some I know . . . . . . . some other story.

H: All right.

H: Leave it just that way.

H: All right. Okay.

D: Because in Moscow it is the President we accept really but not press that officials specifically.

*

TELCONE

Robert Novak/Mr. Kissinger

10:07 a.m., August 9, 1972

N: Mr. Kissinger, this is Bob Novak, how are you?

K: How are you?

N: Good. I just wanted on a background basis if you see there's much
difference in the Jackson revision from his first amendment?

K: Yeah, I think there is a considerable -- you know, there is a difference
in not singling out the Soviets. I mean, the first paragraph. You know,
in substance what we did in the first paragraph -- I mean, what they
are doing now is to pick up the language of a unilateral reservation. we
made in the negotiations and just expressing Congressional approval
for that.

N: U-humm. So it has no particular effect.

K: Well, except to indicate that what the Administration told the Soviets
have Congressional support. That it adds no new elements to what
has already been communicated.

N: Whereas the first version would have added a new element.

K: Or at least to raise the implication that it did, yes.

N: Are the Soviets unhappy with the second version?

K: Off-the-record, the Soviets are unhappy when we indicate their state
of mind about the second version but I think they can live with it.

N: U-humm, u-humm. But they were a little upset about the first.

K: Well, you know, it is a little bit -- you know, if they had added a
similar reservation to their ratification, it would have meant a
singling out of the United States. I'm not saying that they didn't make
any formal comment, no.

N: One thing I'm a little confused on is that Ziegler's comment on the
first version at first indicated that it was not unacceptable to the
White House. Was that -- was he in error on that?

K: Well, what he wanted to indicate is that we would live with it if the
Congress passed it but that we had a position of neutrality with respect
to it.

*

TELCONE

Robert Novak/Mr. Kissinger

10:07 a.m., August 9, 1972

- 2 -

N: I see, and that was an adverse postion?

K: That was what? An accurate position.

N: That position was in fact the White House position.

K: Yes, but now we are supporting the present version.

N: I see. Very good. Okay, Henry.

K: Is your sidekick back?

N: Yeah, he's back. He'll be around for another couple of weeks before
the Republican Convention. You getting down there at all?

K: I'll go down when the President goes down and I'll stay in Key Biscayne
with him.

N: I see. Very good.

K: Right.

N: Thank you, Henry.

K: Bye.

*

TELCORN

Senator Cooper/Mr. Kissinger

12:08 p.m., August 9, 1972

K: John, how are you?

C: Fine.

K: Do you and your colleagues still want to come by?

C: Yes. We're having these awful votes up here every 15 or 20 minutes and I think it will probably be late in the afternoon. Is that a problem?

K: What's your definition of late in the afternoon?

C: Well, I think it will probably be 5:00 p.m.

K: That's all right. I can't do it for very long but if you'd want to --

C: 5 minutes is all.

K: We have more than that. Well, why don't you come at 5:00 and you bring Percy, Cav and Javits.

C: Yeah. Is that all right?

K: Excellent.

C: Let me bring up another matter which has nothing at all to do with it. My wife asked me to do this.

K: Well, anything she wants I automatically --

C: Tonight we're giving a dinner for all the public defenders. Now we first thought you probably don't want to get involved in the political business -- just all one side. If you do, we understand. If you feel otherwise, you can come before --

K: Could I come after? My problem is there's somebody coming down from New York with whom I have to have dinner.

C: Yes. Well, we'll be there from 7:30 to 10:30 and probably at 11:00 so you can come anytime you want to.

K: Let me try to come by around 10:00

The President's Office in H.O. 200, is open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Please call the President.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

TELCOM
Douglas Fairbanks/Mr. Kissinger

2:50 p.m., August 9, 1972

NASA Date 5/13/72

K: ... at Camp David.

F: How was it? Enjoyable I hope.

K: Yes, it's very pleasant up there but I was working most of the time.

F: Well, I gathered you would be but under pleasant surroundings.

K: Very pleasant surroundings. I can't do it tonight either but how about Friday?

F: Friday night? I can make it. There's a fellow coming in from Virginia. A very gay and civilized fellow called Joe Brian and he's coming up from Richmond.

K: That's fine.

F: He's just alone but he's an interesting, dark-headed amusing fellow. If you wouldn't mind him; otherwise, I can put him off and tell him to come Saturday.

K: Not at all. This was just going to be social.

F: Yeah, that's right. He is an amusing fellow.

K: Good, and I'll bring Nancy Maginnes, whom you remember?

F: Fine. Now let me make the arrangements. Where would you like to go afterwards? You want to come up to my apartment or do you want to go out somewhere in public, or where?

K: I'll leave it up to you. Why don't we go out someplace?

F: Fine, that's all right. I don't know one place from another but I'll --

K: Why don't you let me work that out? Actually, it's probably the case that everything closes here except La Grand Scene so we don't have a great deal of choice.

F: Well, that's true too. They also have a place here in the hotel downstairs too. That stays open.

*

TELCORN

Douglas Fairbanks / Mr. Kissinger

2:50 p.m., August 9, 1972

- 2 -

K: Does that stay open?

F: As long as the other, yeah.

K: Well, then we can --

F: Why don't we do that?

K: Okay.

F: Fine. We'll meet after the theater or do you want to have supper first? You can decide and let me know.

K: Good. I've actually seen the play so --

F: Oh, sure. I know you have. But whether you wanted to do something else or have dinner first. I'll bring ______ who you met before.

K: Of course. I liked her very much. I'll call you about it Friday morning.

F: And you'll remember about my photograph?

K: Oh, yes; you'll have that before you leave.

F: Oh, good. I just wrote you a little bread and butter letter.

K: Well, you are a gentleman. I've enjoyed it very much.

F: Posing as one.

K: No, you are one. See you Friday.

F: Right you are.

K: Bye.

*

TELCONE

Senator Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

4:20 p.m., August 9, 1972

K: Hello.

J: Henry, Scoop.

K: Scoop, I saw you on the platform --

J: ... some of my colleagues at 5:00.

K: I don't know what they want. And, you know, I have such an incentive to see them because they always support us so well.

J: (laughter) Well, you've got all your supporters coming down.

K: I said to Haig, among the 5 of them there is one vote every 10 votes.

J: Yeah, yeah. Well, listen, they're just trying -- look, they are licked up here number 1 --

K: Well, what do they want from me now?

J: What they want -- they're talking, you know, about such suggestions as covering the aggregate number of weapons should be taken into consideration. They're bringing in the whole forward base NATO situation.

K: No, I will not make any --

J: That's what they are up to.

K: After what we said today, that's it. We will stand on the text of what's been agreed to; we will not accept anybody's further elaboration.

J: Henry, they're licked. Now, that's number one. Number two, they've got the idea that the Administration will cave in --

K: We won't cave.

J: Because you need it before the election.

K: We need that interim agreement.

at

J: You don't need it/all. I'm telling you what they're playing up here.

*

TELCORN

Senator Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

4:20 p.m., August 9, 1972

- 2 -

K: But they're all Republicans.

J: I know it. But they are fronting for Fulbright and that's the whole story. And, you know, it's an outrageous thing. This is the pending business of passing it over because one senator offers an amendment; then they're not going to take it up.

K: Well, why don't they vote down the amendment?

J: Yeah, but they're afraid that we've got the votes. You see, they're licked and they're licked by a wide margin. You're not going to find but a tiny few that will support an amendment which denies equality.

K: Yeah.

J: We don't need to get into that. We're talking rough equality and that's negotiations. But the American people understand equality. You've got the best goddamn issue in the world, just stay put.

K: Right. What do you think -- first of all, I'm going to stay put.

J: I think they're playing games. They don't have a calendar up here and they're supposed to be in session Saturday. I think, you know, you've got the greatest opportunity in the world to put the spotlight on the failure of the leadership up here.

K: Okay. Well, look, I am not going to accept anymore modifications.

J: Well, you can't.

K: I will not. I will tell them if they want to vote against, that's their business.

J: Yeah. that's a matter for the Senate.

K: I'll tell them that it's inconceivable to me that this thing isn't coming to a vote and all your amendment expresses are the unilateral statements we've made to the Soviets that the Soviets had already accepted.

J: Right.

K: And I'm just not going to yield.

*

TELCONE

- 3 -

Senator Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

4:20 p.m., August 9, 1972

J: Right. And, you know, they're making the Russian argument about
forward bases in NATO and --

K: Well, let's worry about that in the negotiations. Why should the Senate
make this argument.

J

J: And the amendment and your unilateral statements don't tie things
up in a way which you can't negotiate.

K: Your amendment says nothing about forward based systems.

J: That's right. But that's what they're really doing, you see. They
want to take --

K: But look if I hold firm -- I'm going to tell them it's got to come to
a vote now.

J: Right. Just hang tough. They're licked.

K: I'll call you after I see them.

J: The other thing is, Henry, may I suggest -- I think they ought to
button their lips down. Ziegler can't handle a substantive questions
and Finney from the Times is trying -- and others -- trying to get
him screwed up on substance.

K: No, we're not going to say one more thing.

J: Well, you know, today's statements have got them going off in different
directions.

K: Well, today we had to make a statement because of the Russians.

J: Yeah, yeah. I wouldn't even answer those anymore. To hell with them!

K: No, no, but the Russians were going to make a statement if we
didn't.

J: Oh, really.

K: I mean, they were going to make a statement with regard to our
having consulted them ahead of time.

J: Yeah, yeah.

*

TELCONE

- 4 -

Senator Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

4:20 p.m., August 9, 1972

K: But that again was the result of somebody running off at the mouth.

J: That's right, that's right.

K: But we're going to shut everybody up now.

J: That's good.

K: And I'll call you --

J: Tell them just to stay steady, we've got it licked. Let them jump
around.

K: And I'll talk to you. I saw you on television last night.

J: How did you like my pantomine?

K: Well, you -- I didn't see too much smiling there.

J: (laughter) Rather a pensive picture. Well, I wasn't a 1,000 %.
No, I was a 1,000 per cent.

K: You were a thousand. You're a thousand percent behind.

J: I thought Buchwald's peice was pretty good.

K: (laughing) I thought that was a riot.

J: I'm just a thousand percenter. The hell with this five percenter --
you know, we had a lot of trouble with them a long time ago.

K: That's right. And no hundred percent, that's not good enough.
Okay, Scoop, I'll talk to you later.

J: Okay, bye.

K: Right, bye.

*

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Senator Cooper
8/9/72; 5:10 p.m.

C: Hello.

K: Hello, how are you?

C: We are in the vote. Immediately following this is the final vote.
That means we wouldn't get there until 5:30. Does that upset your plans?

K: Uh...

C: I'll tell you the truth. I don't believe the bill is coming up until...
an agreement is coming up until Monday.

K: Right.

C: And so if it doesn't suit your plans we can do it tomorrow or whatever
day suits you.

K: Well, let me see who is coming in at 5:30 to 6:30. Tomorrow is
tough for me.

C: Yes, next day?

K: Uh...

C: We couldn't get there before 5:00 -- we have another vote and that
takes ten minutes. We wouldn't be able to start until 5:20 at least.

K: Yeah. So you would prefer to come some other time.

C: Well, we will really come today if it suits you.

K: Well, why don't you come and I will shift my 5:30 appointment.

C: And we won't stay long.

K: Good. Let me ask you this about coming by your house. If I can't
get rid of that fellow who has come down here to see me can I bring him
by?

C: Yes, bring him by.

K: His name is Bludhorn -- head of Gulf and Western.

*

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Joseph Kraft
8/9/72; 5:14 p.m.

K: Hello.

JK: Hi, Henry. How are you?

K: Uh. . .

JK: Are you squeezed?

K: I beg your pardon.

JK: Are you squeezed?

K: Well, a group of senators who wanted to wait on me about that bloody Jackson amendment are caught in a vote so they will be delayed. Uh, would you like to come at 6:00?

JK: Uh. . .

K: Or does that squeeze you?

JK: Uh, no, I think I can come at 6:00. I'll come at 6:00.

K: Now, you know that group includes Cooper, Chase, Javits and (JK laughs) you know and Percy and I don't know how much. . .

JK: Look, why don't we . . . Can we talk now because I don't have a big . . .

K: Okay, let's talk now for a few minutes.

JK: I had merely a couple of really small things. I have been very impressed with the thing Sadat said about being willing to meet with the Israelis in the company of the big four. Something that we should be picking up but it didn't get picked up.

K: Well...uh...frankly we are trying to uh...our general view...this is off the record...is that the next time talks start on the Middle East we are going to handle them like other negotiations and set everybody up before we do anything. But it is one possible approach.

*

8/9/72; 5:14 p.m.

-2-

JK: I take it when you say the next time you are talking about after the election or...

K: Well, whenever they generate again. I would think after the election is more likely than before.

JK: Yeah. Can he hold on?

K: I don't know. I really don't know yet I think so.

JK: Yeah. And Kadafi (?)

K: Kadafi can hold on in terms of his domestic position. I don't know whether is mental equilibrium is up to it.

JK: I mean ... when you say this is one possibility -- that sounds you know that it is not a very interesting one for me.

K: Well, I think that one problem up to now has been you know sort of a madhatter's party -- ideas would get floated around -- everyone would go bearing(?) after them. Start a public debate and no one knew exactly what anyone wanted to accomplish. I'm not saying it is not a very interesting one. I think it depends what one wants to bring -- what one wants to accomplish. And before we commit ourselves to a forum we would like to get a better feel for what is doable in it.

JK: Isn't a get-together of Israelis and the Egyptians in itself . . .

K: That is in itself a significant event.

JK: Yes. The second area that I would sort of like to . . . When do you think there will be a Knesset renewal of the negotiations that Pete Peterson you know didn't succeed in breaking through on in Moscow? Is that going to be coming up in the fall?

K: That will come up in the early fall.

JK: Then that is before the elections?

K: Yeah.

*

-3-

JK: Uh. It looks to me as though this is a matter of price rather than
principle and that ...

K: I wish beyond the negotiations we had -- you know -- I were as
confident about -- you are exactly right. I think it is going to -- you
know somebody-- or both -- have to give somewhat on the price.

JK: Yeah, I see. Can you tell me anything about relations (?) to Vietnam?

K: None.

JK: None -- that's what I thought.

K: And I say this flatly.

JK: All right.

K: You know I don't know what would happen if they suddenly started
dreaming a tremendous effort again in Vietnam but in its present state
there is no relationship.

JK: Yeah. I did a thing yesterday where I could have made a point that I didn't think we had any program against reprisals and they at least said they were against them. Is that valid. I mean shouldn't we be doing something in this area.

K: It was a thoughtful article -- it was a very thoughtful article.

JK: Are we going to do something?

K: Uh. I'm getting it now really looked at. I think it is a very thoughtful
article.

JK: I think this is sort of an area in which you and ______ can drill
him. I don't know.

K: No. In fact I agreed with it essentially. You know -- one hasn't
really look at how one would do it.

*

-4-

JK: Is there any give on their side or?

K: Joe, I don't really want to talk about the negotiations. All I want to tell you is that I've yet to see an article that's informed. There can't be an informed article -- it's that simple.

JK: Why can't there?

K: Well -- harmless trade talk.

JK: Yeah, but I mean all that stuff about the COSVN and all that.

K: About which part of COSVN? I mean . . .

JK: The latest stuff -- I was away when it . . .

K: You mean the stuff about ceasefire?

JK: Yeah.

K: No, that was true. And there were somethings in documents but then you never know from that thing what they linked to in their negotiating position.

JK: Yeah. Uh . . .

K: But what you wrote in your last article, Joe, is still not looking back.

JK: Okay.

K: I mean the objective conditions exist and that nothing is inconsistent with that has yet surfaced.

JK: How about Japan? What kind of things do you need from Tōnaka ?
In what ways do you want it? For him to ease our trade positions?
To debate to try to get a multilateral?

K: Ah, yes, but that is going to be hard to sell to the Europeans.

*

-5-

JK: It seems to me that a head-knocking operations/ between us and the Japanese is really not a very useful . . .

K: No, and this will not be the primary focus of the discussion.

JK: It won't be.

K: It will not be -- emphatically not!

JK: I see. You mean the China policy is going to be the . . .

K: And beyond the China policy. Where do they and we -- where / will we go -- how can we partly -- have partly parallel and partly divergent policies and how do we handle that.

JK: So much pressure is here to move rapidly on that.

K: Well, he is a very energetic fellow. I think he may move faster than the pressure warrants.

JK: I see. And equally in letting down Taiwan, I take it.

K: Yeah, he is moving very fast.

JK: Has he fixed a date for going to . . .

K: Our information is towards the end of September.

JK: I see. Is that a thing I should come out to look at.

K: August 31st?

JK: Yeah.

K: I have no real feel for it yet. You know. If you have never seen him, he is a very interesting guy.

JK: Well, I have seen Tanaka. I mean I don't know him well, but I have seen him. Yeah, he is a very unusual Japanese.

K: Yeah.

JK: Will you be staying out on the coast after that?

*

-6-

K: Before and after.

JK: I see. You will be going from ...

K: From Miami to San Clemente. I'm going to Miami with the President which I think will be Tuesday.

JK: I see. So you will be there for the convention.

K: I'll be in Miami for a day and a half of the convention.

JK: I see.

K: A week from Tuesday. The convention opens when, Sunday night, Monday night?

Monday

JK: Sunday night the 21st and then I guess you'll be there the 22nd and 23rd.

K: Part of the 22nd and all of the 23rd.

JK: I see and then you'll fly out to ...

K: On the 24th.

JK: I see. Right.

K: Will you be at the convention?

JK: Yes, I am going to be at the convention. It's interesting that you are going to be there. Does that presage something?

K: Nothing at all. It just means that I am going to be with him. I am going to stay in Key Biscayne. Everybody else's ______ is nothing. I have no plans to participate in ... I will not participate in the convention except to attend some social functions. No formal functions. And I have no plans to participate in the campaign. You know I can't tell what will happen in October when things get really totally out of hand. You know, I don't know what last minute things may happen. But there is now no plan to do this.

JK: Well, look, I scrubbed my agenda so this is very, very useful and thanks very much.

The following are some of the employees who have been named in this document:
Mr. Kissinger
Mr. Ziegler
8/9/72; 5:45 p.m.

By: K.H. V. NASA Date: 5/13/64

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ron Ziegler
8/9/72; 5:45 p.m.

K: Ron, have you seen UPI 86?

Z: No, what does it say?

K: Where Mrs. Nixon said that it's a secret when Chou En-lai will come to Washington.

Z: Yeah, I handled that in the briefing.

K: She added he won't come unless we are here.

Z: Yeah.

K: Well, how did you handle it?

Z: I just said that you know she was speaking hypothetically. . .

K: Yeah, but how can we shut her up. She has no right to say this.

Z: Well, I don't know, Henry. That's a matter that we would be ______
______ perhaps but I put it down to the very degree I could.

K: Yeah, but the problem is if she says it once or twice more the Chinese are going to react.

Z: Yeah.

K: He has no intention of coming here.

Z: We better put that word to her.

K: Can you do that?

Z: Yeah.

K: Okay. There are no plans for him to come here and he won't come here as long as there is a Nationalist government in power.

Z: Okay.

K: Good.

*

TELCORN

Dwight Chapin/Mr. Kissinger

6:20 p.m., August 9, 1972

C: Henry, this is Dwight.

K: Yes, Dwight.

C: Who is the contact or what is the situation with Mrs. Leech (sp?) We need to contact her out in Hawaii. Is she the one that mentioned to you that there should be a bi-partisan reception?

K: Right.

C: Do you think the President should have to go or could we switch it to just Mrs. Nixon doing it?

K: She seemed to think it was important that the President would go.

C: Okay. Can our man contact her directly -- they are going to be out there tonight.

K: Sure, let them contact her. I think one of you should call her first because she doesn't even know yet there will be a reception.

C: Well, we don't either. We need to know exactly what she has on her mind. That's what our man will need to find out.

K: All right.

C: So that's what we'll do. We'll approach her and say we need to know exactly what she has on her mind.

K: Good. But get a gentleman to do it, will you?

C: Oh, we will. We won't use one of our sluggers on that.

K: Okay.

C: Okay.

*

TELCONE

Herbert Brownell/Mr. Kissinger

7:30 p.m., August 9, 1972

B: How are you?

K: Okay.

B: Good.

K: Look, I'm calling you about a problem that we discussed with the
Mexican President which has to do with -- which you probably don't
know anything about. At least, I didn't know anything about it --
the issue of the salinity of the Colorado River.

B: Oh, yes.

K: It has a legal origin.

B: Yes, indeed it does.

K: A very complex legal origin and probably the Mexicans are right in
their legal interpretation but in order to put the issue on ice for a
while, we agreed with the Mexicans that we would improve their
situation by some percentage immediately.

B: Um-humm.

K: And that we would then appoint somebody/would make a report to
the President on the legal and other implications of the problem
before the end of the President's term.

B: Yeah.

K: And who -- and that the President would then be guided by this
recommendation.

B: Yeah.

K: And we wanted very much that you would take the job. If you are
willing to consider it, of course, we would brief you fully on what the
situation is.

B: Yeah.

*

TELCONE

7:30 p.m., August 9, 1972

- 2 -

K: And I don't think this is by any means close to a full time job.

B: Sometime before next January.

K: That's right.

B: Yeah.

K: Well, between now and January.

B: Right.

K: The thing to do is we would appoint you now but it would be up to you how much time you'd spend on it.

B: Right.

K: But we'd like to be able to tell the Mexicans that we've appointed you.

B: Well, I would, of course, would like to do anything I could.

K: The reason we would like you to do it is because you would understand the political implications.

B: Yeah.

K: But you also have a superb legal background.

B: Well, I've had a lot to do with that at Colorado ____.

K: And the Mexicans feel extremely strongly about it.

B: My situation is, I am head over heels in this Russian gas project of ____ and Brown and Routh and I promised to spend some time in Moscow negotiating with the Russian Government this fall. It will probably be in October.

K: Right.

B: And you think if I answer it that way -- in other words, you say this is not a full-time job and if I get it organized right --

*

TELCONE

7:30 p.m., August 9, 1972

- 3 -

K: No, I think if you got it organized right, I would really think there
must be periods when you couldn't be doing something no matter what
your other obligations.

B: Right, right. When would it be announced?

K: Well, if you tell us, we could announce it next week or at some
mutually agreeable time.

B: Yeah.

K: We'd announce it -- the sooner the better.

B: Right. Well, I --

K: I must say -- Of course, the President is enthusiastic but so is
everyone else in the Administration so you would get total support.

B: This would not be a three man Commission or anything of that sort.

K: No, the Mexicans wanted a Commission but we wanted one man.
Of course, you could get as many associates as you wanted but they
would be working for you.

B: All right. Well, I'll do it. I'm going to be down in Washington to
see Peterson on this Russian gas thing on the morning of the 16th.
I was planning to come in in the afternoon of the 15th.

K: Well, why don't we try to get together then?

B: All right. If that's a date with you, we can make it say preferably
later in the afternoon on the 15th.

K: The 15th -- let's aim for that.

B: All right. I'll show up at your office unless I hear from you the
contrary around say 5:00 p.m.

K: Excellent.

B: All right. Fine, Henry.

K: And I'm incidentally extremely interested in that gas deal and I've
been working with Peterson on it.

Hegere, domino, ut incolam, domum tuam, domumque tuam, domumque meam

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L.V. NAVA. Date: 5/13/72

TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger
10:00 a.m., August 10, 1972

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. I was wondering about that group I saw this morning indicating that we were backing away from Jackson. I think they picked up something that Ziegler said that we were --

K: No, what happened there, Mr. President, was that Jackson was making statements interpreting his own amendment.

P: Yes, I understand that.

K: In a way that we couldn't really live with in the negotiations.

P: I see.

K: So what we did was to support his amendment but all of that was arranged with Jackson.

P: Not his interpretation.

K: Not his interpretation.

P: Yeah, yeah. I suppose it's just that the press wants to make it appear that we are backing off.

K: Exactly.

P: But Jackson understands it. I don't care that we do it, I just want to be sure Jackson understands we're not backing off.

K: No, no, no; I talked to him.

P: I just don't want those damn Doves to figure they won something.

K: No, no; I talked to Jackson.

P: Good.

K: Yesterday afternoon and he's delighted.

P: Good, good, good.

K: In fact I owe him a call this morning.

The President of the Republic of China

By: K. L. W. NASHA, Date: 5/13/04

TELCORN
The President/Mr. Kissinger
10:00 a.m., August 10, 1972

P: You might tell him that I called, that I was working up here on some matters and then I called and I was outraged by the way the press was trying -- you know, he'll like that. I understand perfectly what he's doing but you know, he's giving his interpretations. You can also tell him for his own private information that that certainly is not something that hurts us. As you know, I mean, we've told the Russians that we have some problems with people like this.

K: Right.

P: And that we understand this. That we cannot support as he well knows but that we'll support the Resolution though. I think you can, you know, within reason indicate that we understand what's happening. But I don't want him to feel that we're embarrassing him.

K: No, he was as of yesterday evening, he was very happy. He thinks we're supporting him outstandingly.

P: Yeah, yeah. The problem is that he may be unhappy because of the headlines, you see.

K: Well, I'll call him as soon as we've finished talking.

P: Put it on the basis of -- you know, that we were talking and I just wanted to just assure him that we understand that sometimes somebody's got to be out in front of a thing like this but that our position has to be for the wording of the Resolution which we support. I mean, the wording of the Amendment but the interpretations of course we cannot associate with that. That's something that each person has got to go on his own.

K: Yeah.

P: Because we didn't knock it down. When you read Ziegler's comments, he didn't say we -- he said we didn't disagree; he just said we are only supporting the other. Which is the way he should say it.

K: Exactly. Exactly right, Mr. President.

P: But don't give anything to those Doves.

K: Exactly.

P: Okay.

The president of the republic has the power to call a special session of the Senate or to convene a special session of the House.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

6/13/72
By: KM, V
NASA Date: 5/13/72

TELCONE

Senator Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

10:10 a.m., August 10, 1972

K: Scoop.

J: Yeah, Henry.

K: Why are you such a pain in the neck? I had 5 senior Senators complain about you to me yesterday.

J: Listen, if you don't shut up Ziegler pretty soon, you're going to have all our friends in Europe on your back. (laughter) I know we all have our problems.

K: Well, we might just as well talk Swahili.

J: Just talk frankly about it.

K: Listen, he didn't know what he was saying -- you mean, that European nuclear --

J: Yeah, I read the transcript and you know, a complete misinterpretation of the Amendment. I've been trying to help the Administration with our friends in Europe, you know.

K: I know you have, I know you have and he's shutup as of today.

J: But you saw this news story is out on it.

K: Yeah. That's why I called you. I'm distressed.

J: Oh, Jesus. Maybe I ought to get some kind of letter of clarification when we get down to the -- we don't need it now but when we get on the floor because they're trying to leave an impression -- Well, you know what it is. I wish you'd read that transcript. It was bad. I couldn't believe it. You know, I mentioned it to you on the phone but I hadn't had a chance to read it and I read it last night and geez he's doing the very thing that's going to make your job a hell of a lot difficult when you get down to those talks. The old forward based business --

K: Well, he didn't say they were included.

J: The NATO thing.

K: Yeah.

H. W. SHERMAN, PRESIDENT
SUGGESTED BY: JAMES M. BROWN
REPRODUCIBLE

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sept. 3.5

By: J. M. S. NASH, D.C.

Date: 5/12/72

TELCON
Senator Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

10:10 a.m., August 10, 1972

J: Well, you read it and he has, you know, failed to understand the fundamental points that we are just not going to allow the European issue to be tossed in with the basic issue on the ICBMs.

K: Yeah.

J: And this is what he didn't do.

K: Well, you see, frankly, I would like to get that whole debate shutup now on this issue because we can handle it much better in the negotiations where we can get it so wrapped up in other things.

J: I understand. And what he attributed to me, of course, is not correct, you know, about my statements on Europe. I didn't say what he said.

K: You send the orders now to shutup.

J: Yeah. Well, you understand the problem because I think you're going to have to have some clarification on this, Henry, because when Symington brought in that overall business and now they're talking aggregate; it's all coming out of ACDA.

K: Well, one of these Senators told me that a senior member of ACDA talked to him and was shocked by your statement.

J: Well, that's where they're getting it. Symington brought it to me and then Javits brought it to me separately.

K: They wanted me to make a statement. Well, I told them we stood behind your Amendment -- I just want you to know what I said --

J: Yeah, yeah.

K: As it is written. But I didn't want to get into the question of what we will negotiate. There has to be a sharp distinction anyway between weapons -- when you talk about forward base systems, you can only talk of a very few weapons that have strategic significance in any event.

J: Well, these jokers are talking about -- I mean, they're making the Russian argument, Henry.

K: I know it.

The 1960s TV show from the collection of
the late Donelson House in Nashville,
 Tennessee

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

6/24/72 NARA ID: 5/13/04

*

TELCOM

Senator Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

10:10 a.m., August 10, 1972

- 3 -

J: And they don't talk about their IRBMs. I mean, what the hell
100 IRBMs in Europe can dispose of the 7,000 warheads they
keep talking about that McNamara raised long time ago.

K: Scoop, on substance there's no question that you are right.
Now, what they are going to do incidentally -- just so that you
are sure -- so that you know -- they are going to quote something
I said at that Congressional briefing which said in assessing the
strategic balance you have to look at accuracy, mix and you know,
a lot of things.

J: Yeah.

K: I mean, they are just going to quote that from my statement.
They told me that. But that doesn't mention forward based systems.

J: Right. Well, they can do anything they want on that.

K: No, I just want you to know.

J: But they're not going to say this is what you said independently
of this meeting with them.

K: No, I told them they could say nothing about the meeting.

J: Yeah. I don't want them to -- Well, I think though, Henry,
something needs to be said here about the European issue.

K: What's the parliamentary situation?

J: Well, the parliamentary situation is that it's the pending business
and they have to get the unanimous consent each day to pass it
over and go on to another matter. Now, if we object, of course,
we get into a shouting match and no one wants to do that.

K: Well, when is it coming up now?

J: Well, I don't know. I've talked to Hugh and Mansfield is just
playing difficult and I think what you folks have to do is just
remain steady and you've got I think all the advantages with you.

K: Well, we're not going to say one other word now.

J: Well, I think they should be absolute moratorium on it. You ought
to look at that transcript and see if you don't want to clarify the

Re: phone calls to the open lab
to the effect that I'm a foreign
P.U. student

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L.V. NASA Date: 5/13/74

- 4 -

TELCOM

Senator Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

10:10 a.m., August 10, 1972

J: (cont'd) European problem now.

K: I haven't looked at the actual text. I'll look at it right away.

J: If you will and get it marked up on the key points there. I just went through it rather hurriedly last night and it was pretty bad. I've kept my mouth shut up here; I haven't said anything.

K: No, you've been very good. Let me take a look at it, Scoop.

J: All right, fine.

K: Good.

H. Kissinger, Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Kissinger

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Geroge Shultz

8/10/72 11:00 a.m.

By: K.L. V. NASA Date: 5/13/74

HK: ...no, he recognizes there may be some unpleasantness. When would this surface?

GS: Well, it probably would surface as soon as I would go to see him.

HK: When would you see him, next week?

GS: I would expect to see him next week.

HK: And that's the best time?

GS: No, there is nothing necessary about next week. The problem is that the longer this situation is allowed to drift unattended, the more it will resolve itself along the path of least resistance which is
.....

HK: No, I think it is useful to show out these....

GS: What the French may use it for -- the Germans are not enthusiastic about him at all. They are sort of going along with the French --the British are in the same....

HK: Well, we should focus it on the personality--we should just keep countries out of it.

GS: Yeh, well, we also have the business that he's been there for two terms and that's probably long enough anyway.

HK: Okay. Thank you George.

H. G. W. Bush, the 42nd President of the United States

By: K.H. W. NASHA, Date: 5/13/94

TELCOM

Senator Fulbright/Mr. Kissinger

12:00 Noon, August 10, 1972

F: Good morning, Henry.

K: Mr. Chairman, how are you?

F: Well, I'm pretty well. How are you?

K: I'm fine. I miss seeing you.

F: Well, I miss seeing you. Of course, Betty has been ill and I haven't been around much so I haven't been keeping up with my --

K: I've meant in fact to suggest that we might get together so that I could talk to you a bit about Vietnam.

F: Fine. Let me talk a little about the interim agreement if I might.

K: Yes.

F: This thing is getting -- You know, I was very pleased with both of those.

K: I know and you've been a great support.

F: It's gotten into a kind of a nitpicking state of confusion and I was going to try an idea on you. I was thinking of writing a very simple plain letter to the President along this line, a very brief one. I wanted to try it out on you because you're aware I'm sure of the Jackson and all that's happened there. I say, "Dear Mr. President, in connection with Senate consideration of the interim agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms which you signed in Moscow, considerable confusion has arisen from a variety of interpretations placed on various versions of amendatory language proposed by Senator Jackson. This is leading to delay in approving the agreement and involves the danger of obscuring its significance. I hope you will consider stating that the agreement which you signed speaks clearly for itself and you are satisfied that no amendment whatever is necessary to the Resolution authorizing accepting the agreement. That is the position which the Committee on Foreign Relations when it unanimously recommended approval of the interim agreement. Sincerely yours." And that's all.

*

TELCOM

12:00 Noon, August 10, 1972

By: KHLW NASA Date: 5/13/94

- 2 -

K: Well, I'm afraid that we've already taken a position which makes that impossible.

F: Really?

K: I mean --

F: After all it's been shifting here. I mean, there have been two or three shifts. Are you locked into any kind of a -- regardless of what develops out of it. There has developed some confusion.

K: Well, we are perfectly willing to say that we accept no interpretation to the Amendment. You know, I understand that there is a great deal of confusion --

F: *t* hat's what I mean.

K: About what this amendment means.

F: That's correct. That's what I'm trying to say here. You see, yesterday Ziegler --

K: You want us to say that we don't think the Jackson Amendment is necessary or do you want us to say that no interpretation of the Amendment is valid?

F: Well, I would prefer that you just say that you don't -- I don't mind if you say you don't object to the language as you understand it but you don't think any Amendment is necessary or -- you know that you've never felt that it needed any amending or interpretation.

K: Well, as we understand the Jackson Amendment --

J: ... yourself.

K: Well, our understanding of the Jackson Resolution is that it puts the Senate behind the statements taken from the record of the negotiations, specifically some of the unilateral reservations we've made -- not reservations --

F: Some of those I was thinking of even proposing a substitute if I have to using the precise language from your agreement -- I mean, your own language.

A. M. S. T. L. E. R. C. S. A.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 92030, Sec. 3.6

By: K.L. V. NAVA, Date: 8/12/94

TELCONE

12:00 Noon, August 10, 1972

K: Well, that's what the first paragraph of this Amendment does.

F: Yeah, but the second one doesn't. The second one has a clear implication while it doesn't say it -- it's like this, you stop beating your wife -- but the language very clearly means that this interim agreement provides for an interior position in the United States. Now you can argue one way or another but -- And Jackson himself in his own statement on the floor said we have gone from superiority back in the days of Kennedy to sufficiency, whatever that may mean he added, to now subparity. In other words, he's saying this agreement is subparity and I don't believe it's fact and I don't believe you believe it's a fact.

K: Well, you know my views. I've expressed them before.

F: I do.

K: Before the Senate.

F: And I don't think what he's saying and means is consistent with your views. And I just think it's a damn shame for an agreement like this to get all bogged down in a lot of confusion.

K: Well, I don't think, Mr. Chairman, that we can do that letter but we will certainly disassociate ourselves from any interpretations such as that each category has to be equal or that it precludes --

F: That's what the clear implication is, Henry. And that's how people are interpreting it. That's why, people like Cav and Cooper and Javits are very upset about it. It's not just me.

K: No, no, I know; I talked to them yesterday.

F: did you?

K: Yeah. I mean, this was not to be public but they asked to see me.

F: Oh, I see. Well, do you see any harm in this letter in any case?

K: Well --

F: That's all right. I don't --

K: What I frankly, as you know, Mr. Chairman, I would like to avoid not because of this letter which is a temperate and fair letter, even if we don't react to it positively. I'm trying to avoid situations of

OCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12939, Sec. 3.6

Re: What if the President called the House and said, 'We need a recess.'

By: K.L. V. NAFU Date: 5/12/84

TELCOM

12:00 Noon, August 10, 1972

K: (cont'd) potential rejection of your views by the President because I think that after-the election, you know, we talked about this before but after the election, we have to find a more cooperative way of conducting the nation's business than has been the case. And so from this long term point of view, I have some concern with it.

F: Humm. Well, of course, if you would make -- I didn't expect any -- He doesn't have to write me a letter, I was just thinking maybe that he would state, you know. Really if he would state --

K: You see, I don't think he would --

F: ... say anything very ...

K: I want to be honest with you. I don't think he will state this so then there is a letter by you on record in which you've asked the President to do something he won't do.

F: I see.

K: Then it turns into a vote. You know, are you with the President or are you with the Chairman and we don't really want that because I really understand the concerns of the people and as a friend, you know, speaking to you now strictly off-the-record -- this is not a fight we particularly sought. I mean, this debate that has come here.

F: I didn't think you did.

K: I mean, I'm counting on you not to repeat it. We have sort of been triggered into it and we are now trying to get the possible outcome.

F: Well, I thought that without you telling me. I mean, I couldn't believe that, you know, that you had instigated it. It started somewhat like Gale McGee reported in the Committee the first day. He said, well, you know, Jackson spoke to me orally about this and I said I'd go along with it but when I saw the language, it wasn't the way I thought it would be.

K: Yeah.

F: That's exactly what Gale said in the Committee meeting.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 92030, Sec. 3.6

AUG. 10, 1972

By: K.J. W.

NASHA, Data: 5/13/04

TELCONE

12:00 Noon, August 10, 1972

- 5 -

K: So our interest of course was to get the broadest possible base of agreement and it's a pity that it's now turning into as you said yourself at the beginning, there is so much now theological debate going on. Now this is the only thing -- there's nothing wrong with your letter. The only thing is I am certain that the President will not give you the reply you are asking for. I mean, I just know his --

F: He certainly won't give a --

K: He will not say that the Amendment should be dropped. That I am confident.

F: You suggested a moment ago you thought maybe --

K: He would be prepared to say that he backs the literal language of the Amendment and he accepts none of the interpretations.

F: Would he go so far as to say -- you asked a moment ago this business about the equality of a single weapon system, in other words, ICBM.

K: Well, you know, again here -- may I speak for myself for a minute?

F: Sure.

K: When I looked at that phraseology, I think, for example, one could drop the phrase "intercontinental" before "strategic forces".

F: Um-humm.

K: You see what I mean?

F: Yeah.

K: And that would then really -- how you define strategic forces would then be a subject for negotiations.

F: You know, we suggested that they put in "overall" I believe is the word. And, Henry, when we've said that, we were trying to reach somewhat the same idea. The overall level.

The President's Office
the Senate
the House
the Pres. and the Vice President's Office
the Senate and the House of Representatives

By: K.L.V. NAVAQ Date: 5/12/04

TELCON

12:00 Noon, August 10, 1972

K: I haven't talked to the President about this. I did talk to him in general this morning, this is why I am so confident of his views. Now if you wrote a letter -- it would be nice if we could get an exchange between you two gentlemen in which you agree.

[End of Tape 1 - Begin Tape 2]

K: This Amendment has created a lot of confusion because of the particular interpretations that have been made and does it mean that interpretations made by particular Senators on the floor are thereby accepted by the Senate and then we could undoubtedly say no. You see what I mean?

F: Um-humm. Any way I could -- I don't how to phrase it.

K: Let me give some thought to --

F: ... refer to this but Jackson didn't ...

K: Can I reach you this afternoon?

F: Yeah.

K: Or do you want to do it immediately?

F: No.

K: Let me see what is possible here.

F: Okay.

K: And let me see whether we could come up with something.

F: Okay. I just hate to -- you know Jackson has run over this thing and what I'm afraid of is there is a feeling, Henry, that Jackson has got the votes no matter what he puts in there because of the Armed Services Committee and they customarily pass --

K: Look, we have no interest in driving a line between Hawks and Doves on this issue.

F: I wouldn't think you would be.

The John F. Kennedy Library in Kennedy, N.Y.

is a National Historic Site and a National Park Service National Park Site.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1295A, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L. V. NAVAQ Date: 5/12/84

TELCOM

12:00 Noon, August 10, 1972

K: This is something on which we want the broadest possible support. We have no interest in winning a vote and we'd really -- this is something which the Foreign Relations Committee has been so helpful and on which we need to cooperate with you in the next round.

F: Well, you see what irritates a number of the members there is Jackson is the only man who came out and said he would raise questions about it; he didn't believe it was good agreement right from the beginning.

K: Well, I remember that meeting in the East Room where all of you gentlemen supported us and even there he stood up.

F: Yeah.

K: Well, let me call you this afternoon.

F: Okay.

K: And then when I call you, let's also make a luncheon date for next week perhaps.

F: Okay. Bye.

K: Bye, Mr. Chairman.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: KMLN WAHA Date: 5/12/94

TELCON / Jack
Mr. Anderson/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., August 10, 1972

K: Hello, Mr. Anderson, how are you?

A: Fine. I appreciate your calling back.

K: Not at all.

A: I'm trying and continue to try whenever we've got anything that involves your shop to try as we were once able to do to check with you if that's all right with you.

K: No, I'd be delighted to do it and you've always been very meticulous.

A: Well, I've --

K: You know, we had this one situation --

A: That one interlude where we had so much and I had been in touch with people in the office and even then should have gotten in touch with you and apologized for not having done it.

K: Well, I understand.

A: Well, we've got a national intelligence estimate number 50-68 and it goes into Southeast Asia after Vietnam. Tukes a look afterwards and it came from your area and I saw no reason not to go ahead with it but I wanted to check with you to see if you had any reason why I ought not to or whether it was out-of-date.

K: Well, what do you mean it came out of my area? Is it national intelligence estimate?

A: Yes, a national intelligence estimate number 50-68.

K: What is the date of it?

A: Doesn't have a date on it or at least I don't have the covering sheet. The other sheet does not have a date on it.

K: Do you mind if I look at it?

A: I certainly do not mind.

K: Is it fairly recent or --

TELCONE /Jack
Mr. Anderson/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., August 10, 1972

A: I just got it.

K: You know what my view has to be. I can never believe that publishing
classified documents is in the national interest. You know, we
obviously have different perspectives here.

A: Of course.

K: So my view will be inherently that it is not in the national interest.
Now after I look at it . . . if there is any particular reason, you
know in addition to the general reason why you shouldn't publish
it, I'll take the liberty of letting you know.

A: Well, I'm interested -- I want to do that and I want to for two reasons.
I want to be sure that I have a little more guidance from the top
if you will allow me and also I want to be sure of the accuracy.
By that, whether it's up-to-date or whether there is something I
ought to know that would counter it.

K: You may find that we may not want to engage in a debate on it and
run the risk of getting it published without giving our side or
different view. At any rate, it is courteous of you to give me this
chance.

A: What we can do -- I'm quite willing to not refer to the fact that I discussed it with you. I'm only interested in getting the facts straight.

K: Look, Mr. Anderson, you've been -- this is a very courteous thing
of yours to do. You had always done it except for that one interlude
when you really had a hell of a lot and things got out of hand all
around. /Lloyd Shearer was going to bring you and me together at
In fact,
some point.

A: He mentioned that and that's another reason why I feel that we
should touch base on these things cause it keeps happening and as
long as it's going to keep happening, I want to be responsible as
I possibly can.

K: Well, I appreciate your courtesy. And I will get the document and
after I have looked at it, I will call you back.

A: Many, many thanks.

By: J. M. W.
NASA Dated: 5/13/04

The president of the open line to the President of the Republic of Italy

By: K.M.W. NASA Date: 5/13/72

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Sen. Javits

8/10/72 6:16 p.m.

SJ: After a very long debate, the Foreign Relations Committee took a position against all amendments and reiterated the position of the President as expressed by you as being very adequate definition of the strategic posture of the United States and our policy in future SALT negotiations.

HK: Are we going to get a vote then tomorrow?

SJL: Yes, I think you can--likely tomorrow or Saturday and though we will not agree on the time, we are telling everybody that the vote could come at any time, so they can't go away, and that results in pressure on us because people are anxious to go away. So you ought to see this paper and I'll send it up then.

HK: You can send it over--I think the major thing now is to get the agreement behind us.

SJ: Yes, and I am rather hopeful that this will.

HK: Okay, good.

SJ: But it quotes you. I don't think I didn't say you because I didn't want to bring your name into it, so I used the catechism the statement made in the name of the President on June 15, 1972. You are the one who said it.

HK: Well, I can't disavow myself....

SJ: No, no, it's all in the record, but I didn't introduce your name into.

HK: All right, thankyou, Jav.

SJ: Okay, Henry.

Heg, J. Henry. The open line
and, Henry. Is it constitutional
Pursuant to Act?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.8

By: KMLV
NARA. Date: 5/12/84

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Senator Fulbright

6:50 p.m. 8/10/72

HK: Mr. Chairman. How are you.

SF: Hello, Henry. You all are causing us an awful lot of trouble, but ... I don't know whether we will live through it or not.

HK: Well, you rise to all these challenges from what I have heard.

SF: I thought this was one occasion where we were all in agreement.

HK: Oh, I tell you, if there was one quarrel that we didn't look for here, it was this one.

SF: Well, me either,

HK: I know it, look, I know it. You and I have talked enough about this one to know that this was one in which we were working on the same side of the... As I understand it, the Foreign Relations Committee is now tomorrow going to come out of this against this amendment, isn't that right?

SF: We met this afternoon about two hours and I think there were 12 members there and we had agreed upon a statement disapproving of the amendment and the and of course two of them I think one--the President said--he didn't want to vote one way or the other. The sentiment I think of most of them was no amendment at all--there have been three or four amendments now been filed, you know.

HK: Yeh, I've seen them. Some of them--the Cranston amendment, I don't know if that's still active.

SF: Well, they are all lying there and we feel that really no amendment is appropriate.

HK: Well, this thing is now going to come to a vote tomorrow?

SF: The majority leader said he would bring it up about noon and lay it down. I would guess there would be considerable discussion--it's the kind of thing that would...

HK: Well, we now have the issue though in which the Senate can express itself. Isn't that right? I mean that they are likely to vote for or against the amendment?

The president of the executive board is the chief executive officer of the corporation.

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12938, Sect. 3.6

Page 2

SF: That's right.

HK: And so we'll get it resolved by Saturday sometime.

SF: Well, I don't know about that Henry. There are some of the members and I am not the only one who feel very strongly about it. I mean I think Pace and Cooper--if Republicans feel as strongly or more so than I do. The Committee, as you know, has stood although I think the great majority of them favor no amendment at all. And a proposition like Henry's as you know does not really go to this Amendment--its a proposition as a guideline for the future and if you are going to have a thing like that, why the hell, he doesn't put it on as a separate resolution. It doesn't have to be all this, because it tends to denigrate this agreement, which all of us really are strongly in favor of, I mean--I don't know how ____ or Spaz Sparkman may think about it, but I'd say everybody else feels strongly in favor of it.

HK: I have no question about it. And I have talked enough to you and your colleagues to know that this is one in which you have been most supportive of the Administration. And absolutely, we are talking about a situation that developed under these circumstances, so there isn't much sense in having an exchange of letters....

SF: That's good, yes....

HK: That's really what I wanted to find out.

SF: No there is no point in a letter. That was just an idea before this meeting and then the meeting developed and there is no point in any letter.

HK: That's what I wanted to check with. The best thing we can do now is to let nature take its course and let the amendment either succeed or fail.

SF: That's right.

HK: And in either event we will get the agreement passed and that will be a major step forward.

SF: Oh, I think so.

H. J. Jackson, Jr., the ex-Officer-in-Charge
and, Sir, I am a commercial
Representative of?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KM.L. NAFU Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Page 3

HK: And I want you to know, Mr. Chairman, that however that vote comes out, we appreciate your help in steering this thing through.

SF: Of course, I told you, I think these two agreements are the most significant things you have accomplished.

HK: I agree with you. I feel exactly the same way.

SF: Some of us just feel that allowing Jackson is not only what his words are, but what he specifically stands for, it is his --he is a symbol of something that as a person in his position over the years and his attitude toward Russian, all of this can't be eliminated from the significance of it and this ______ is given you see on the floor is what bothers us.

HK: Of course, we have disassociated ourselves from that.

SF: well, if Jackson prevails, it is very hard--there it stands, he is the author of this and he says this is what it means.

HK: Well, I am not really calling to effect your vote. I told you primarily because we had this idea of exchange of letters and I wanted to make sure that my sense was the same as yours. That has really been overtaken by events

SF: That is correct.

HK: Good, well let's you and me when this thing is over, have lunch and see where we stand in general. And however it comes out, we appreciate your management.

SF: Thank you.

HK: Good, Goodbye.