RAFAEL DE LA SIERRA

49 Beach Avenue
Larchmont, N.Y. 10538
914-834-3660 (Home)
212-484-6127 (Office)

OBJECTIVE

Senior position with multinational company using my special combination of 21 years of diversified worldwide business experience and expertise in corporate development, marketing and administration.

EXPERIENCE

Vice-President - International

WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

1972 - Present

CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT/STRATEGIC PLANNING

1981 - Present

Designed and directed a highly successful worldwide program to streamline company operations in all areas outside the United States. This program produced a two year savings of over $15 million. It was administered without interfering with the autonomy and entrepreneurial nature of our companies. This program covered 120 subsidiaries in 73 countries with 8000 employees and annual sales in excess of $1 billion.

* Planned consolidation of banking activities for subsidiaries in several countries; this reduced bank charges and lowered rates, producing annual savings of $2.2 million.

* Developed plan to lower advertising and media buying costs in several countries; this resulted in reducing costs by $1 million annually and obtaining better services.

* Created purchasing sub-committees in several countries which will save $4 million annually, lock in sources of supply and consolidate freight expenditures.

* Organized consolidation of worldwide property and casualty insurance to one broker and one insurance company. This produced savings of $700,000 annually.

* Implemented program to share distribution facilities country by country and by region, resulting in annual savings of $1 million annually and generating profits when used for compatible third-party products.

* Developed sharing of telecommunications network between Europe and the United States, producing substantial savings annually.

* Initiated steps to increase a division's sales 700% in a market where I discovered that our full potential had not been realized.

* Designed, maintained and circulated to senior management a comprehensive data base for 120 subsidiaries worldwide which was vital in our efforts to improve management of assets, eliminate redundant activities/equipment/personnel and maximize productivity.

WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

President and Chief Executive Officer

COSMOS SOCCER CLUB INC.

1974-1980

* Responsible for making the Cosmos the most prominent and well known soccer team in the world. Increased their revenues at a rate of 200% per year for six consecutive years.

COSMOS SOCCER CLUB INC. (Continued)

WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

* Responsible for increased average game attendance from 800 people per game in 1974 to over 50,000 people in 1980 with many games exceeding 75,000 people.

* Organized tours and international tournaments with the best teams in the world in 46 countries including a tour in the People's Republic of China in 1977.

* Negotiated and signed to contracts famous players such as: Pele' from Brazil, Franz Beckenbauer from Germany, Johann Cruyff from Holland and Giorgio Chinaglia from Italy.

* Negotiated leases at Yankee, Shea and Giant Stadiums.

* Negotiated together with Henry Kissinger on behalf of the U.S.A. to bring World Cup to the United States (1983).

## Special Projects - From time to time reporting directly to the Chairman

* Co-producer with Robert Redford of Academy Nominee film "Solar Film" (1980).

* Created and developed "The Energy Store", a nutritional fast food chain (1979).

* Developed and founded "Corp Air", a corporate helicopter service concept (1981).

* Oversaw the operation of Warner Bros. Jungle Habitat and Amusement Park in West Milford, New Jersey with attendance of over 1 million people per year (1972-1976).

## Vice-President

### ADMINISTRATION-FACILITIES

1972-Present

* Established the Facilities, Communications and Security departments of the corporation involving approximately 100' persons with a budget of 25 million dollars.

* Responsible for all construction done by the corporation with a staff of 25 people including award winning buildings such as:

  * 150,000 sq.ft. ($15 million) office building for Warner Bros. located in Burbank, California;

  * 250,000 sq.ft. ($14 million) record pressing plant for Specialty Records in Olyphant, Pennsylvania;

  * 100,000 sq.ft. ($10 million) office building for WEA Records located in Burbank, California;

  * Residential House in Acapulco, Mexico.

### Senior Associate

1963-1972

### CARSON, LUNDIN & SHAW, ARCHITECTS

1963 - 1972

Responsible for a variety of projects including:

* Warner Communications - World Headquarters; 500,000 sq. ft.

* CBS - World Headquarters; 400,000 sq. ft.

* Dow Jones - New York Offices; 150,000 sq. ft.

* Gulf & Western - World Headquarters; 350,000 sq. ft.

* Cities Services - World Headquarters; 150,000 sq. ft.

* American Tobacco - World Headquarters; 450,000 sq. ft.

## EDUCATION

1978 Fundamentals of Finance and Accounting: The Wharton School, University of Penn.

1963 Bachelor of Architecture: University of Florida

## AWARDS

1983 Hispanic Executive of the Year

1984 Independent Hispanic-American Workers Council Award

## PERSONAL

Date of Birth: September 6, 1939

Married, three children. Active in tennis, sailing, swimming.

Fluent in Spanish.

HENRY DELFINER
8 BROWN ROAD
LEXINGTON, MASS. 02173

April 11, 1984

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Washington, D.C.

Dear Secretary Kissinger :

Like many of my colleagues and students I had looked forward to hearing
you at the Fletcher School last week and like the vast majority of them I
feel sad that you had to decide to stay away. I had hoped to have a minute
of your time but will write instead what it was that I wanted to bring up
had I had the privilege of speaking to you:

It always occurs to me when discussing the problems of Latin America
that the spokesmen of the anti-American group are almost totally made up of
Spanish descended people as are the governments of the countries of the
region. The "masses" on whose behalf they inveigh against us, on the other
hand, are almost always Indian.

I wonder if one could not get closer to the solution of the problem
by drawing the Indians to our side thus outflanking the professional revo-
lutionists claiming to speak for them. We could thus—at least in the Western
Hemisphere-set right what the "est may have lost out on accomplishing in
the Asian and African parts of the Third World.

What I have in mind is attracting young potential leaders of the Latin
American countries of Indian descent into an American version of Lumumba
University in Moscow and training them here for future leadership roles.
I have no grandiose scheme in mind, but believe that as a start it would
suffice to set up an American Indian Institute in a part of our country
such as Arizona or New Mexico that has a strong and living Indian tradition.
I believe that a state university would be best from a funding point of view
and I believe that this Institute should concern itself with Indians in the
U.S. (training them to grow out of the role of handout recipients which so
many of them have become) and especially with Indians in other countries of
the hemisphere whose promising youths should be given scholarships to come
to the Institute to study in order to prepare for their future roles.

I think that men like Senators Goldwater or de Concini or perhaps best of
all both of them on a bipartisan basis might help to bring about the reali-
zation of this project.

I would be delighted if you thought this suggestion worthwhile, dear Secretary Kissinger, and if you would consider giving it your support.

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am

APR 16 1984

Jacques Delors

Paris, September 25, 1984

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

Many thanks for you congratulations; I
appreciated them very much, remembering of your
knowledge of european affairs.

Unfortunately, I will not be able to attend
your meeting in Paris on November 14-15. The tradition
is that the President-designate makes no comment on
present or future european issues, even on off-the-
record discussions.

Please let me know your plans so that me
can meet in Brussels as soon as possible in 1985.

OCT 1 1984

THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

CHAIRMAN
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

COMMISSION MEMBERS:
MR NICHOLAS F. BRADY
MAYOR HENRY G. CISNEROS
GOV. WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR.
DR CARLOS F. DIAZ-ALEJANDRO
MR WILSON S. JOHNSON
MR LANE KIRKLAND
MR. RICHARD M. SCAMMON
DR. JOHN SILBER
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
AMB. ROBERT S. STRAUSS
DR WILLIAM B. WALSH

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AMB. HARRY W. SHLAUDEMAN

SENIOR COUNSELLORS
REP. MICHAEL D. BARNES
SEN. LLOYD BENTSEN
REP. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD
SEN. PETE V. DOMENICI
SEN. HENRY M. JACKSON
REP. JACK F. KEMP
AMB. JEANE KIRKPATRICK
MR. WINSTON LORD
SEN. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS
MR. WILLIAM D. ROGERS
REP. JAMES C. WRIGHT

May 18, 1984

Dear Alex:

This note is long overdue but I want to reiterate again to you how invaluable your contribution was to the members of the Bipartisan Commission on Central America during our hearings. Your testimony stood alone in the impact it had on all the members and brought a new awareness to them as to the true state of affairs not only in Central America but all over the world.

I am deeply grateful for your taking the time and effort to appear before the Commission, but most importantly, I want to thank you for giving the Commission members the full value of your experience and wisdom. We all benefitted.

I hope to see you soon. With my warm regards and high esteem,

Le Comte Alexandre de Marenches
47 Avenue du Marechal
Lyautey
75016 Paris
France

2201 C STREET NW., ROOM 1004, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 TEL: (202) 632-7804

Corwin D. Denney

9500 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, California 90212
(213) 275-1111

18 April 1984

Mr. James Bennett, Vice President and General Manager
Columbia Broadcasting System
6121 Sunset Boulevard
Hollywood, California 90028

APR 27 1984

Dear Mr. Bennett:

For years I have noticed a number of television news reports which did not accurately portray to the American public the substance of news stories on subjects with which I have been familiar. But, never have I witnessed a more flagrant violation of the responsibility of newscasters than that which Bill Stout committed in his commentary on Bill and Jean Smith during the CBS 6 o'clock evening news on April 16, 1984. Admittedly, my wife and I consider Bill and Jean as friends but, even if not, I would be compelled to write the following:

Bill Stout allocated his entire verbal editorial to a 23-day trip made by Bill and Jean in 1982, which, according to him, cost the taxpayers $683,000, or some $833 per day for each of the 33 persons in the group. He intentionally gave the unmistakable impression to the viewers that Bill and Jean had grossly taken advantage of the taxpayers in order to enjoy a travelling vacation.

The next morning the Los Angeles Times featured the same story with the bold headlines entitled "Attorney General Smith's Expenses Top $683,000 for Multi-nation Trip". Although the headline was as misleading as Bill Stout's commentary, the Times had the sense of responsibility to disclose some of the details. It reported that $595,340 of the $683,727 was charged by the Air Force for the military aircraft used to carry the party. The difference between these two numbers amounts to $88,387, which then becomes $116 instead of $833 for each person per day. The use of the existing Air Force jet cost the taxpayers essentially nothing since the equipment was already in the inventory and would have been flying on training or other missions if it had not been used by Bill and Jean. The Times was sufficiently kind to briefly mention that the group included 16 Justice Department officials, 11 FBI Agents, 6 officials of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the State Department. Also, the Times alluded to the fact that the purpose of the trip was to convince foreign officials that the United States was serious about curbing drug trafficking.

To me, the awesome power of television has spawned completely irresponsible editorializing by newscasters. I always thought that journalists had a code of ethics which limited them to reporting events as accurately as possible without interpretation. After all, just what gives them the right or the judgment to tell the American public what the news means?

CDD:ds

cc: The Honorable William French Smith

THE
ECONOMICS
OF THE
HEALTH CARE
INDUSTRY

MAY 18 1984

Presented by
CORWIN D. DENNEY
at the
"New Imaging Technologies" Conference
Eisenhower Medical Center
Palm Springs, California
March 19, 1984

[LC]

It is a pleasure to speak, on behalf of the Board of Trustees of EMC, at this most impressive conference. As I note from the participant's list, you are a group of M.D.s and Ph.D.s who have travelled to Palm Springs from Washington, D.C., Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Hampshire, Minnesota, Utah, Michigan, and Texas, and a number of other places. It is an honor to have you here and I hope you did not come only because of sunny and warm Southern California.

When I was asked to speak to you today, I could not possibly imagine how I could add anything to your conference and I am still not convinced that I can. In fact, this is the first time I have ever tried to address a subject about which I have had nothing other than completely superficial experience. If I say anything which all of you do not know or should know better than I, I will be surprised.

As a complete layman in the medical field, I, of course, can make no technical contribution to the subjects you are discussing. However, I have developed some pretty strong feelings about the economics of the health care industry as a whole, and its impact on the Nation's overall financial health.

First, however, I would like to briefly comment on the Federal Government's policy toward basic research, including, of course, medical research. By basic research I do not mean applied, or clinical as related to the medical field, where a tangible result may be reasonably predicted within a specified period of time. But, rather true basic scientific investigations into the totally unknown where no one is able to forecast the end result nor the time frame, if and when, anything ever results. America has an outstanding record in such scientific endeavors and the results therefrom have served as a basis for the development of many products and services which contribute materially to our current standard of living and the defense of our country. For example, for the twenty-year period from 1953 to 1973, the United States is credited with 65% of the recognized 492 major technological innovations created throughout the world. For the first seventy-five years of this century, the United States was honored by having more Nobel Prize Laureates in science than any other nation by a large margin—132 went to U.S. scientists and 212 to the scientists of all other countries combined.

For the most part, American industry, functioning in a free enterprise profit-making environment, historically, has not been able to justify the funding of basic research. Consequently, over the

1

MAY 30, 1984

DE ROSE

FEW ALLIANCES IN HISTORY HAVE LASTED SO LONG AS THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. NONE HAVE ACHIEVED AS HIGH A DEGREE OF INTEGRATION OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AND COORDINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY. WHILE NATO HAS EXISTED EUROPE HAS KNOWN THE LONGEST PERIOD OF UNINTERRUPTED PEACE SINCE THE STATE SYSTEM ORIGINATED THE MODERN PERIOD.

WHAT THEN AMOUNTS FOR THE RESTLESSNESS OF SO MANY THOUGHTFUL OVSERVERS? PART OF ITS REASON UNDOUBTEDLY IS THE VERY SUCCESS OF NATO. A GENERATION GROWN ACCUSTOMED TO PEACE HAS LOST THE CONVICTION ABOUT ITS CAUSES. IT IS LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE WHY SOMETHING HAS _NOT_ HAPPENED. WAS WAR AVOIDED BECAUSE DETERRENCE WORKED OR BECAUSE THERE WAS NEVER ANY

2

THREAT OF AGGRESSION? IS THE WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORT
A NECESSITY OR A WASTE OF RESOURCES? HAVING EXPERIENCED
NO INTERNATIONAL CRISIS CENTERED ON EUROPE, THOSE
WHO HAVE GROWN UP SINCE THE END OF THE WAR -- SOON
TO BE A MAJORITY -- SHARE NEITHER THE CONVICTION
OF DANGER OF THOSE WHO CREATED NATO NOR THEIR COMMITMENT
TO ATLANTIC TIES.

BUT EVEN THOSE WHO HAVE RETAINED THE TRADITIONAL
CONVICTIONS FACE NEW COMPLEXITIES. FOR UNITY BASED ON
PREMISES OUTSTRIPPED BY TECHNOLOGY CAN ITSELF BECOME
AN ELEMENT OF INSECURITY. AND THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION
ABOUT THE TRANSFORMATION OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY SINCE
THE EARLY DAYS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. WHEN NATO
WAS FORMED THE UNITED STATES HAD AN ATOMIC MONOPOLY.
WHEN THAT ENDED, THE UNITED STATES POSSESSED A MARGIN
OF NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY THAT ENABLED IT TO THREATEN

3

CREDIBLY THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE MAIN DETERENT TO SOVIET AGGRESSION. SINCE THE MIDDLE SIXTIES THE GROWTH OF NUCLEAR STOCKPILES HAS OVERTURNED THAT EQUATION. IN THE PAST, NATIONS WENT TO WAR BECAUSE THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT APPEARED TO OUTWEIGH THE RISKS OF RESISTANCE. THE NUCLEAR AGE THREATENS TO REVERSE THAT CALCULATION. A GROWING NUMBER OF CRITICS ADVOCATE WHAT AMOUNTS TO ABDICATION; THE STRATEGY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS BECOME CONTROVERSIAL.

SOME FAVOR CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO. OTHERS ADVOCATE A RENUNCIATION OF WEAPONS OR AT LEAST THE FIRST USE OF THEM. NEITHER COURSE CAN GUIDE THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE. THE STATUS QUO HAS LOST CREDIBILITY WITH THE ADVERSARY AND THE PUBLIC. A RECOMMENDATION OF NO FIRST USE INDICATES THAT ONE WOULD RATHER BE DEFEATED BY CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS THAN TO RESORT TO THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL. IT MAY THEREFORE

INVITE AGGRESSION SINCE HISTORICALLY DETERRENCE WITH
PURELY CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS HAS PROVED ABSURD. HOW
TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR WITHOUT INVITING
CONVENITONAL AGGRESSION? HOW TO PRESERVE ATLANTIC
UNITY WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALTERED PATTERNS
OF DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC AN POLITICAL POWER?

THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IS EQUALLY DRAMATIC.

IN THE 1950'S EUROPE WAS ECONOMICALLY PROSTRATE AND MILITARILY IMPOTENT. THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY REPRESENTED 50% OF THE WORLD'S GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT. SINCE THEN EUROPE HAS RECOVERED A GREAT DEAL OF ECONOMIC VITALITY.

THE U.S. SHARE OF THE WORLD'S GNP HAS SHRUNK TO 22%-25%. THE UNITED STATES HAS SECURITY OBLIGATIONS IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD WHICH WERE DORMANT IN THE FIFITES. A REALLOCATION OF PHYSICAL BURDENS IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE. BUT A NEW DIVISION OF POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IS EVEN MORE CRITICAL. IT IS NOT

[L.C]

5

NATURAL FOR A CONTINENT OF EUROPE'S HISTORY AND RESOURCES
TO DELEGATE MOST SIGNIFICANT SECURITY DECISIONS TO
AN ALLY 3000 MILES AWAY. THIS BREEDS SUSPENSIBILITY ON
BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. A LARGER ROLE FOR EUROPE
IS A NECESSITY IF ALLIED UNITY IS TO CONTINUE WITH THE
NEXT GENERATION.

FRANCOIS DE ROSE HAS FACED THESE DILEMMAS AND
OFFERED A REMEDY. FEW ARE AS WELL-QUALIFIED FOR
THIS TASK BOTH BY CONVICTION AND BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN.

FRANCOIS DE ROSE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO STRATEGIC AND
POLITICAL THINKING IN THE ALLIANCE AS AN INDIVIDUAL
AND IN MANY OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; HIS LAST POST WAS
DISTINGUISHED TERM AS FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO NATO.

HE REPRESENTED A COUNTRY WHOSE DEFENSE POLICY WAS
A SEEMING PARADOX: REJECTING NATO INTEGRATION BUT
STRONGLY AFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIANCE.

HAVING ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE

[L.C.]

6

IT COULD NOT ESCAPE A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE
NEED FOR JOINT ACTION -- HOWEVER ORGANIZED.

FRANCOISE DE ROSE HAS BEEN A PASSIONATE BELIEVER
IN ATLANTIC UNITY. HE HAS HAD THE COURAGE TO CHALLENGE
FASHIONABLE THEORIES. HE BELIEVES NEITHER IN TRADITIONAL
NATO DOCTRINES NOR IN THE RENUNCIATION OF THE WEAPONS
AROUND WHICH OUR STRATEGY HAS DEVELOPED. HE URGES
A GREATER RELIANCE ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE. HE CALLS
FOR GREATER EUROPEAN UNITY TO ASSUME THAT RESPONSIBILITY.
HE RECOGNIZES THAT IN THE END THE WEST MUST KEEP
OPEN THE OPTION OF NUCLEAR DEFENSE AND HE OFFERS
VALUABLE SUGGESTIONS FOR LINKING THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES.

PERSONALLY, I AGREE WITH HIS PHILISOPHY AND ALMOST
ALL OF HIS RECOMMENDATIONS. BUT THAT IS NOT THE
KEY ISSUE. MORE IMPORTANT IS THE FACT THAT NO

[LC]

EDMOND DE ROTHSCHILD

CHÂTEAU DE PREGNY
1292 PREGNY - GENÈVE

Geneva, 20th September 1984

Dear Henry,

We had a preparatory meeting the other day with Alain Chevalier where we discussed the possibility of having additional French guests. We are going to forward you the suggested list as soon as possible.

I will be delighted to make a few introductory remarks on the European economic prospects on Thursday morning. Maybe Bernard Esambert, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of my bank in Paris, former Industrial Assistant to President Pompidou, could say a few words after me.

I frankly prefer making remarks at the first session rather than at the second as I may be a bit too pessimistic since I have my doubts that Europe can compete either with the United States or Japan.

Looking forward to seeing you soon again, I am

PS

May I take this opportunity to wish you a very happy, healthy and peaceful New Year, hoping that at long last the State of Israel will be having a government that will look realistically at the situation in the Middle East and at its economic future.

SEP 28 1984

DRAFT STATEMENT FOR THE SECRETARIES OF STATE
TO THE CONGRESS REGARDING THE JERUSALEM ISSUE

The signatories of this statement are (insert number)
former Secretaries of State who have served in Administrations
representing both national political parties dating back to
1961. Each of us is a friend of Israel, and we are dedicated to
the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

We are addressing this issue together today because we
share a common concern about the pending proposals to locate
our Embassy to Israel in Jerusalem, or alternatively to bring
our Consulate General in Jerusalem under the supervision of our
Embassy in Tel Aviv. In our view, such changes, reversing more
than three decades of U.S. practice, could only be interpreted
as a shift in the position of the United States on the status
of Jerusalem. Such a shift in our view would not only be
unwarranted but could jeopardize critical United States
interests in the region.

Jerusalem has a deep religious significance for people of
the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim faiths. Its status is one of
the fundamental issues that will have to be resolved if there
is to be true peace in the Middle East. It remains a highly
sensitive and emotional issue for both Arabs and Israelis. For

[L.C.]

these reasons, since 1948 the United States has never accepted
any State's unilateral claim to Jerusalem -- neither Israel's,
nor Jordan's prior to 1967. The U.S. position is that
Jerusalem should be undivided, but that its ultimate status
should be settled through negotiations in the context of an
Arab/Israeli peace. This has been a consistent theme in our
Middle East policy, one that to the present day has been
crucial to our ability to play the role of impartial mediator
in the Middle East peace process. The arrangements concerning
our Embassy in Tel Aviv and our Consulate General in Jerusalem
reflect a consistent, longstanding U.S. position on the
unsettled status of Jerusalem.

Finally, we are concerned that this legislation would
infringe upon the power granted to the Executive Branch by the
Constitution to conduct foreign policy. As former Secretaries
of State, we are acutely aware of the need for a single,
coordinated voice in the conduct of American diplomacy. For
these reasons, it is our deeply-held view that it would not be
in the national interest to change at this time the existing
arrangements concerning our diplomatic and consular posts in
Israel and Jerusalem, nor for Congress to publicly express a
preference for such a change.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

**Issue:** Whether Congress may constitutionally compel the President to move the U.S. embassy and ambassador's residence from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

**Summary:** Free-standing bills have been introduced in both houses of Congress to mandate relocation of the U.S. embassy and ambassador's residence from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. As expressed by their sponsors, the bills have the further objective of compelling the President to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. If enacted, the proposed legislation would be an unconstitutional infringement on the President's power over foreign affairs. Both the text and judicial interpretation of the Constitution make clear that the President is to be the "sole organ of communication" of the United States in its relations with other sovereign states. Incident to this exclusive power is the decision when, how and where to conduct diplomatic relations. Under the Constitution, questions of recognition are also within the exclusive domain of the President. Requiring the President to recognize Jerusalem as part of Israel would therefore also be inconsistent with the constitutional separation of powers.

**Background: The Jerusalem Issue**

When the Palestine question was considered by the United Nations General Assembly in 1947, the U.S. voted for Resolution 181 (II) of November 29, which called for partition of Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an international enclave or *corpus separatum* comprising the city of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and the surrounding environs, to be administered by the United Nations. However, in the fighting that ensued, the forces of Jordan seized control of the West Bank of the Jordan and the walled city of Jerusalem together with its eastern approaches, while Israeli forces seized the new sections of the city to the west of the walled city. Subsequent efforts in the United Nations to define a regime for the city failed, and in 1950 Israel proclaimed Jerusalem to be its capital. As a result of the 1967 war, Israeli military forces occupied the eastern sector of the city. Israel almost immediately extended its law there and in 1980 declared "United Jerusalem" to be the capital of Israel, moving important government ministries into the eastern sector of the city.

Since 1948 the United States has recognized the State of Israel. 1/ Recognition was granted, however, in the

1/ 3 Whiteman, *Digest of International Law* 167-69.

-2-

(L)

context of an Israeli assertion of statehood within the frontiers of the UN partition plan which called for an internationalization of Jerusalem. 2/ Despite later Israeli assertions of sovereignty over Jerusalem, the United States has never accepted the Israeli position that Jerusalem is part of Israel. Nor has the United States accepted Israel's extension of its laws to East Jerusalem following the 1967 war. We have continued to maintain that East Jerusalem is territory under belligerent military occupation, like other areas captured by Israel in 1967. Both before and after 1967 it has been consistent U.S. policy that: (a) Jerusalem should be undivided; (b) free access to its holy places should be assured for all faiths; and (c) the question of the final status of Jerusalem should be the subject of a negotiated resolution in the context of arrangements for a just and lasting peace in the region. 3/ In implementation of this policy, the United States has not accredited its Consulate in Jerusalem to any country, nor have we relocated the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem.

The proposed legislation is intended to change this long-standing policy of the United States. The bills which, aside from their titles are identical, provide:

> That notwithstanding any other Act, the United States Embassy in Israel and the residence of the American Ambassador to Israel shall hereafter be located in the

2/ Id. at 168. See J. Moore, ed., *The Arab-Israeli Conflict* xxiii(1977).

3/ See, e.g., 57 *Dept of State Bull.* 148 (1967) (Ambassador Goldberg in UN General Assembly); 61 *Dept of State Bull.* 76 (1969) (Ambassador Yost in UN Security Council); Letter of September 17, 1978 from President Jimmy Carter to Anwar Sadat, *Dept. of State Bull.* 7-11 (1978) ("the position of the United States on Jerusalem remains as stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the United Nations General Assembly on July 14, 1967, and subsequently by Ambassador Yost in the United Nations Security Council on July 1, 1969"); President Ronald Reagan, "A New Opportunity for Peace in the Middle East," *State Dept Current Policy* No. 417 (September 1, 1982) ("[W]e remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations").

-3-

[LC]

### city of Jerusalem. 4/

Although this text refers only to moving the embassy and ambassador's residence to Jerusalem, 5/ the sponsors have stated that the legislation would require the United States to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. 6/ Apparently, this act of recognition is to include East Jerusalem as well as West Jerusalem. 7/ Israeli law and policy no longer distinguish the two sectors of the city, and the bills make no distinction between them.

## Analysis

As is made clear by this case, where an embassy, consulate or other diplomatic mission is located may have independent

4/ S.2031 was introduced by Senator Moynihan on October 31, 1983, and is entitled "Relating to the residence of the American Ambassador to Israel." Cong. Rec. S.15079 (Oct. 31, 1983). Senator Moynihan had earlier offered a similar provision as an amendment to the State Department authorization bill for fiscal years 1984 and 1985, but upon the request of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations withdrew it with the understanding that hearings would be held on the subject at a later date. Senator Moynihan later re-introduced his amendment as a free-standing bill "to facilitate the work of the committee." Id., S.15084. The other pending bills are H.R. 4365, introduced by Congressman Lantos on November 10, 1983, and H.R. 4376, introduced by Congressman Gilman. Both bills are entitled: "to require that the United States embassy in Israel be located in the city of Jerusalem."

5/ See Cong. Rec. S.15082 (Oct. 31, 1983); Cong. Rec. E.5550 (Nov. 15, 1983).

6/ Cong. Rec. E.5550 (Nov. 15, 1983). ("It is time we stopped treating Israel as if it were a country without a capital. Jerusalem is the essence of Israel, acknowledged by the Government of Israel as its capital, and a city whose illustrious history deserves such a designation. Since the State Department is unwilling to correct this situation, it is incumbent upon the Congress to correct this anachronism by adopting my legislation. . . .") See Cong. Rec. S.15084 ("I believe that the United States should declare that it will hereforward treat Israel's capital as Israel's capital.")

7/ See S.15083 (Oct. 31, 1983).

-4-

[LC]

foreign policy significance, affecting both the form and substance of U.S. policy. As a result, legislation mandating establishment of a U.S. mission in a particular location constitutes a challenge to the President's authority to conduct the foreign policy of the United States.

In this case, there is extraordinarily strong support for the proposition that the proposed legislation would be an unconstitutional incursion into the President's foreign affairs power. As a general matter, it is the President in whom the "executive power" of the United States is lodged, U.S. Const. Art. II, Sect. 2, a power which historically has encompassed the power to conduct foreign relations. 8/ Further, the President's authority over a particular foreign policy issue is especially clear where it is supported by the text of the Constitution or endorsed by the judiciary. 9/ This is such

8/ See, e.g., E. Corwin, *The President* 178-79 (1957).

9/ In *Dames & Moore v. Regan*, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the basic mode of constitutional analysis for conflicts between the President and Congress. As first articulated by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (emphasis added):

1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. ...

2. When the President acts in absence of either a Congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which distribution is uncertain.

3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers *minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter*. ...

The question here presented is whether this is an example of Justice Jackson's third category, or whether, instead, this is a case where the President alone has constitutional responsibility for an issue. If the President alone is responsible, there is no true constitutional conflict between the branches, as the Congressional action is impermissible *ab initio*.

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a case. The Constitution expressly confers upon the President the power to conduct diplomatic relations on behalf of the nation, and Supreme Court decisions leave no doubt that the President has responsibility for determining the recognition policy of the United States. The President thus has an especially strong claim that the decision whether to locate our embassy in Jerusalem - thereby recognizing Jerusalem as part of Israel and its capital - is, under the Constitution, his alone to make.

## I. Relocation of the Embassy and Ambassador's Residence

It is well established that the power to conduct diplomatic relations includes the power to determine "how, when, where and by whom the United States should make or receive [diplomatic] communications.<u>10</u> The presence of the embassy and Ambassador's residence at particular locations in Israel is thus an integral part of the conduct of United States diplomacy with the State of Israel. The question presented is whether the President, or the Congress, is responsible for such diplomacy.

A key purpose of the Constitution was to end the chaos in American diplomacy caused by the supremacy of Congress (and the absence of an executive) under the Articles of Confederation.<u>11</u> Article II delineates the new powers granted to the President:

[He] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls . . . .

Art. II, Sect. 2, cl. 2. The same article provides further that the President "... shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers. "Art. II, Sect. 3. Through these provisions, the President is given the basic constitutional authority to conduct diplomatic relations on behalf of the United States: He selects (and, as a consequence, supervises) our diplomatic spokesmen, and determines when, where and how the United States will conduct diplomatic relations at home and abroad.

The drafting of the Constitution reveals this was a matter of careful consideration. As the Supreme Court has noted:

> An interim version of the draft Constitution had vested in

<u>10</u> L. Henkin, <u>Foreign Affairs and the Constitution</u> 47 (1972) (emphasis added).

<u>11</u> Id. at 33.

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the Senate the authority to appoint Ambassadors, public Ministers, and Judges of the Supreme Court, and the language of Article II as finally adopted is a distinct change in this regard.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 129 (1976).

In consequence of this constitutional allocation of power, in the words of John Marshall, "The President is sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.<u>12/ See United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).</u> Congress has nevertheless on occasion sought by legislation to control the President's decisions concerning the establishment of diplomatic facilities abroad. In response, the Executive has made a point in appropriate cases of construing these legislative efforts to be no more than recommendatory.<u>13/ President Reagan recently took this position with respect to legislation purporting to require the re-opening of consultates abroad.<u>14/ Thus, notwithstanding Congressional assertions</u>

<u>12/ 10 Annals of Cong. 613 (2800), reprinted in 5 Wheat. Appendix Note 1, at 26 (U.S. 1820).</u>

<u>13/ See, e.g., 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 242, 250-253 (1855) (act requiring or forbidding appointment of consuls at particular places "would be without efficacy," since Constitution has entrusted appointment and location of consuls to "sole discretion" of executive; therefore "shall" in statute is to be interpreted as "may"); Presidential Documents of Administration of Ronald Reagan 1060 (August 24, 1982) (provision of State Department authorization act requiring re-opening of seven designated consulates prior to opening of other consulates regarded as "a recommendation and not a requirement": "Under the Constitution, the President has the power to appoint consuls as well as ambassadors and other public ministers. Implicit in this authority is the right to decide when and where an ambassador or consul should be appointed.
Accordingly, . . . Congress cannot mandate the establishment of consular relations at a time and place unacceptable to the President.")</u>

<u>14/ Id.</u> The following year the executive requested, and obtained, from Congress a change in the legislation to avoid a conflict over this issue by eliminating the flat prohibition on opening other consulates.

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of power over the conduct of diplomacy, the executive branch
has not relinquished "the exclusive right of the President to
be the nation's intermediary in dealing with other nations".<u>15</u>

There are strong practical and policy reasons which support this Constitutional allocation of power and which demonstrate why Congress should not seek to pre-empt the President's control over diplomacy. To seek to override the President's judgment as to where United States facilities for conducting diplomacy are best situated obviously can impair foreign relations generally. It also may entirely overlook the views of the receiving state, which must approve the location of all diplomatic facilities. Although this might not be a practical problem in the case of Israel (at least for now), it serves to demonstrate why the Constitution assigned this authority to the President alone. It is simply not practical for diplomatic and consulate facilities to be governed by statute. To cite just one example, the host country might at a later date for security or other reasons wish to order the relocation of diplomatic facilities. The legislative process is too cumbersome to accommodate such shifting interests of American diplomacy.

The Executive, moreover, has consistently maintained that the President's plenary power over the diplomatic function means that even less permanent restrictions by Congress on his discretion are incompatible with the Constitution. Thus, the President has resisted the attachment of conditions to his ambassadorial nominees by the Senate in discharging its "Advice and Consent" function under Art. II of the Constitution.<u>16</u> Similarly, while recognizing Congress' constitutional role in appropriating funds for the conduct of diplomacy,<u>17</u> the Executive has taken the position that the appropriations

<u>15</u> E. Corwin, *The President* 184 (1957).

<u>16</u> 7 Op. of Atty. Gen. 193 (May 25, 1855). *See* Meyers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926) (Congress may not limit President's executive power of appointment by seeking to control removal of appointees from office); Congressional Research Service, *The Constitution of the United States of America* 527 (1972).

<u>17</u> U.S. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 1-2; Sect. 9, cl. 7.

["-8-", "[LC]", "power does not displace its own authority over ambassadorial appointments. 18/ As previously noted, President Reagan recently took the same position with respect to limitations on the expenditure of funds to establish new consulates. 19/ Therefore, given that the Constitution has been interpreted by the executive to prohibit these lesser forms of intrusion, the proposed, permanent legislation should be regarded as a clear threat to the President's Constitutional responsibility for conducting the diplomatic relations of the United States.", "## II. Congress Also May Not Compel the President to Recognize Jerusalem as the Capital and thus Part of Israel", "As described previously, an express intention of the sponsors of the proposed legislation is to compel the President to recognize Jerusalem as the capital and thus as a part of Israel. Moreover, it is customary practice of the United States and other nations to locate their embassies in the capital cities of receiving states. Although this is not required by international law, 20/ and the United States in", "18/ E.g., 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 186 (1855). See 41 Op. Atty. Gen. 230 (1955); L. Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution* 109 (obligation of Congress to appropriate funds for President's conduct of foreign policy); 113 ("If Congress cannot properly withhold appropriations for the President's activities, it ought not be able to impose conditions on such appropriations. Even when Congress is free not to appropriate, it ought not be able to regulate Presidential action by conditions on the appropriation of funds to carry it out, if it could not regulate the action directly.") The executive in some instances has complied with statutory restrictions over appropriations for the conduct of diplomacy as a matter of policy in order to avoid a constitutional confrontation with Congress. This was the case with respect to maintenance of a diplomatic mission to the Vatican, which, until recently, was purportedly "precluded" by a restriction on appropriations.", "19/ Underlying this practice is the principle that ambassadorial posts derive directly from the President's constitutional power--they do not depend upon legislative authorization. U.S. Const. Art. II, Sect. II, cl. 2. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 242 (1855); 22 U.S.C. §§ 3942-3944.", "20/ The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 23 U.S.T. 3227 (1961), provides that "the establishment of diplomatic relations between states, and of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent." Art. 2."]

[LC]

some instances locates its embassies elsewhere, 21/ the practice of locating embassies in capital cities is so widespread that moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem might be understood internationally to imply U.S. recognition of the Israeli claim -- especially as this is the stated intent of the sponsors. The proposed legislation, therefore, directly implicates the recognition power of the President.

In enumerating the various responsibilities of the two political branches, the Constitution does not expressly refer to the recognition power. Nevertheless, "[a]lmost since the origin of the federal government, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that *de jure* or *de facto* recognition of a foreign state is a political question to be determined solely by the executive branch." Transported *Aeros de Angola* v. *Ronair, Inc.*, 544 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1982). Various theories have been adduced to explain this practice: that the executive's power to "appoint" and "receive Ambassadors" is implicitly an authority to determine whether to recognize the governments for which they speak; that there is an overriding need for uniformity in the country's dealings with foreign countries, and thus the President's role as "sole organ of communication" for the United States implies the responsibility to determine when to speak to another authority as sovereign; and that recognition is an inherently executive power, and thus lodged in the President under Article II. Whatever the theoretical basis for the recognition power, however, overwhelming judicial support exists for the proposition that it is placed in the executive. *United States v. Pink*, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1941); *United States v. Belmont*, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).

Although the President does not ordinarily take a position on the status of territory disputed as between other nations, sometimes for overriding foreign policy reasons he does. In such cases, he is exercising his constitutional power of recognition, for, as the Supreme Court has observed, "[t]he refusal to recognize has a unique legal aspect. It signifies this country's unwillingness to acknowledge that the government

21/ For example, the U.S. Embassy to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is located in East Berlin, although the United States does not recognize Berlin as part of the sovereign territory of either the GDR or the Federal Republic of Germany. Similarly, the U.S. Embassy to Saudi Arabia has in the past been in Jidda, although Riyadh is that nation's capital. And for a number of years, the U.S. Embassy to Brazil remained in Rio de Janeiro although the capital had been relocated in Brazilia.

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In question speaks as the sovereign authority for the territory purports to control." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 76 U.S. 398, 410 (1964). Thus, if the President refuses to recognize Soviet sovereignty over the Baltic Republics or Afghan sovereignty over parts of Chad, he is exercising his power to determine the recognition policy of the United States.

When the President speaks on such questions, his views are s positive:

[C]an there be any doubt that when the executive branch of the government, which is charged with our foreign relations, shall, in its correspondence with a foreign nation, assume a fact in regard to the sovereignty of any island or country, it is conclusive on the judicial department? It is enough to know, that in the exercise of his constitutional functions, he had decided the question. Having done this, under the responsibilities which belong to him, it is obligatory on the people and the government of the Union.

Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 415 (1839) (emphasis added).

In this case, not only this President, but all U.S. President's since the founding of Israel have refused to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. It has been a fundamental aspect of U.S. policy that neither Israel, nor any other nation, may unilaterally determine the final status of at city. The proposed legislation would impermissibly interfere with this policy. It would also be inconsistent with the Fourth Geneva Convention22/, the cornerstones of the peace process --Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Camp David Framework, and President Reagan's September 1, 1982, initiative -- and the consistent position of the United States the United Nations and elsewhere. Given these effects and a consistent decision of the executive to decline recognition Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem, the proposed statute would clearly constitute an unconstitutional effort to interfere with the President's recognition policy.

The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Palestinian Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (1949). Article 47 of the Convention imposes a duty on Israel as belligerent party of East Jerusalem to preserve the existing law in force. Article 47 provides that Israel may not eliminate its ties as occupying power through annexation of the territory.

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### III. Conclusion

The President can invoke substantial constitutional authority to challenge the propriety of the draft legislation. At a general level, requiring the relocation of an American diplomatic facility to a sensitive spot in the Middle East would be a dubious incursion on the President's executive authority to conduct foreign policy. More particularly, it would interfere with his express constitutional authority to supervise the conduct of U.S. diplomatic relations, as well as his long-recognized responsibility to determine the country's recognition policy. In the specific case of Jerusalem, forcing the movement of our embassy would also conflict with a policy more than three decades old and would be contrary to United States legal positions concerning the status of the city.

LAW OFFICES OF
ROBERT ORMAN

SUITE 1154. BRUNSWICK BUILDING
69 W. WASHINGTON STREET
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60602

TELEPHONE: (312) 372-0515

(312) 372-0516

JUDITH COHEN
(OF COUNSEL)

February 22, 1984

Dr. Henry Kissinger
C/O The Kissinger Commission
1800 K Street N.W., Suite 400
Washington D.C. 20006

RE: <u>Seymour Hersh</u>

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I represent Morarji Desai in his libel suit against the author of <u>THE PRICE OF POWER</u> (the disgrace of the millennium). The purpose of the litigation is to expose that author for what we know him to be.

I write this letter in the hope of enlisting your assistance. While you are in a precarious position which may preclude your testifying in this matter, there is little doubt that you have access to the information, to the people, and, most importantly, to the ideas which will enable us to right those wrongs which so pervasively emanate from that book. A substantial judgment against the author and his publisher will vindicate all who have been injured. I would therefore be most appreciative for any advice, guidance, or direction which would assist us in reaching our ends.

RO:mm

FEB 27 1984

[LC]

ARNOLD & PORTER

1200 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
(202) 872-6700

CABLE: "ARFOPO"
TELECOPIER: (202) 872-6720
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1700 LINCOLN STREET
DENVER, COLORADO 80203
(303) 863-1000

BRUCE M. CHADWICK
DIRECT LINE: (202) 872-3986

November 19, 1984

Michael Nussbaum, Esq.
Nussbaum, Owen & Webster
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Robert Orman, Esq.
Suite 1154
Brunswick Building
69 West Washington Street
Chicago, Illinois 60602

David L. Carden, Esq.
Simon & Schuster, Inc.,
Summit Books, and
James Silberman
Suite 3500
Three First National Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60602

Gentlemen:

This will confirm that Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
has agreed to be available for a final deposition
session on Thursday, December 20, 1984, beginning at
9:30 AM. The location will be the offices of Kissinger
Associates, Inc., Suite 1100, 55 E. 52nd, New York,
New York.

bcc: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
William D. Rogers

NOV 21 1984

[LC]

the public
orsborn
relations group inc.

October 25, 1984

Henry Kissinger
1800 K. Street NW
Suite 400
Washington D.C. 20006

OCT 30 1984

Dear Honorable Mr. Kissinger:

Last year, thousands of San Francisco Bay Area residents responded to the "Day After" television broadcast by participating in a day designed to promote goodwill.

The "Toll After," held December 15, provided Bay Area residents an opportunity to combat feelings of "what can I do, I'm only one person," generated by the program and world affairs in general.

The concept of "Toll After" was for commuters to pay the bridge toll of the person in the car behind them as they crossed one of the Bay Area bridges that day. Anyone who has experienced the kindness of a stranger, realizes what an impact even such a small gesture can make.

We are expanding the concept this year to include other areas such as paying a stranger's parking meter fee.

As a panel member following last year's program, your comments concerning the "Toll After" would be greatly appreciated. Would you lend your support to the concept?

Scheduled for December 12th this year, the "Toll After" was originated by San Francisco businesswoman Carol Orsborn, who explains, "each of us should do what we can -- even if it means starting small. On any given morning, many commuters enter their cars with a feeling of optimism, but by the time someone cuts in front of them, they become angry and frustrated. What we need to do is reverse this, create a chain reaction that will make its way to the top."

Your opinion and/or support of the "Toll After" would be greatly appreciated. Thank you for your time.

1275 Columbus • San Francisco, CA 94133 • (415) 928-3600