[y]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

an adequate consideration of the morale of the Air Force or
the integrity of the Alliance. (Indeed, the Skybolt was
cancelled against the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.) We have brutalized our allies within NATO, in West
New Guinea and in the Congo to score points unrelated to
any overriding conception. The State Department is a shambles,
demoralized by the weakness of the Secretary of State and
the interference of the White House.

The Administration's extraordinary pragmatism has led to an extremely fitful policy. Periods of lethargy alternate with sudden moves to impose some rapid solution, usually on our allies. We do not seem to be able to distinguish between friends and opponents. From Laos to Yemen to the Congo, we have taken the position that if our friends are not perfect we will line up with our enemies to destroy them. Brazil teeters on the edge of anarchy. Iran could go any day. The situation in Vietnam is likely to deteriorate; the scale of Communist attacks is certainly increasing.

Our actions are equally erratic towards our allies.
First we undercut the British government on Skybolt. Then
we offered it a Polaris force on the condition that it be
assigned to NATO. This raises innumerable technical questions
casting doubt on our sincerity. In any event, we have made

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller -8- January 8, 1963

an offer to the British government while furnishing the
Opposition arguments for rejecting this offer. The Nassau
agreement has been preceded and followed by statements by
the President and the Secretary of Defense that national
nuclear forces are useless and dangerous. Having undermined
Adenauer last year, we are now doing the same to MacMillan,
and we have tried to do it also to De Gaulle.

We have claimed that there is no conceivable difference
of interest between us and our European allies. Yet we have
pressed the United Nations onward in Katanga against the best
judgment of our European allies who, it might be well to recall,
know the area longer and more intimately than we do. Most
of our European allies believe--not incorrectly--that Tshombe's
sin in the eyes of the Afro-Asian bloc has been, not secession,
but pro-Western sentiments. The United Nations activity in
the Congo contrasts with its passivity when Indonesia invaded
New Guinea. Finally, the United States, together with the
United Nations, imposed the cession of that territory on The
Netherlands.

In the process, we have been undermining the most im-
portant asset any nation has--its reputation for reliability.
All over the world, we are encouraging a political style

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Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

which must erode confidence among nations and also the stability
of pro-Western governments. We are encouraging leaders whose
opportunism will make them unreliable partners when they are
most needed.

In a period of revolutionary change the Administration
lacks a clear or coherent concept of reality. Except for the
Cuban affair, where action was in a sense imposed on us, its
foreign policy record has been dismal.

In short, Kennedy's foreign policy is essentially a
house of cards. Its weakness has been obscured by three
factors: (a) we are still so strong that we can impose even
wrong policies on many parts of the world; (b) fortuitously
for us, the Communist movement has been rent by internal
schisms. Had the Soviets been able to throw their whole
might against us we would already be in desperate jeopardy;
(c) an enormously skillful use of public relations stifles
debate and has neutralized any possible focus for opposition.

However, sooner or later we will have to pay the price
for this manipulativeness and brutality, both at home and
abroad. At that moment, everything will depend on the
existence of an alternative. Today the public is confused.
Few people know what the issues are; even fewer appreciate
the seriousness of our situation. It is hard to stand up

the seriousness of our situation. It is hard to stand by
new people who know what the issues are; even fewer appreciate
existence of an alternative. Today the hucke is confused.
aproved. At that moment, everything will depend on the
for this manipulativeness and prudence, both at home and
However, sooner or later we will have to pay the brice
depose and pass neutralized any possible foci for opposition.
(c) an enormously skilful use of public relations stills
might against us we would already be in desperate jeopardy;
schism. Had the Soviets been able to throw their whole
for us, the Communist movement has been rent by internat
wrong policies on many fronts of the world; (b) tortuously
factors: (a) we are still so strong that we can impose even
house of cards. Its weakness has been opacured by three
In sport, Kennedy's foreign policy is essentially a
foreign policy record has been drawn.

Cuba affair, where action was in a sense imposed on us, it
lacks a clear or coherent concept of reality. Except for the
In a period of revolutionary change the Administration
most needed.

opportunism will make them unreliable partners when they are
of pro-Western governments. We are encouraging leaders whose
which must erode confidence among nations and also the stability

Hon. Nelson V. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

C>

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Hon. Nelson A. Rockfeller

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January 8, 1963

against the trend when there is no leader to symbolize and
legitimize concern.

The nation and the cause of freedom require someone to
warn, to exhort and to outline a new approach. This seems to
me your distinctive role. No one can predict whether it will
be successful by 1964. It is clear that no other course can
succeed. If the present policies do not produce an impasse
Kennedy will be unbeatable in 1964. But sooner or later they
must produce an impasse. And then those who warned in time
will be as desperately needed as Churchill was in 1940 and
De Gaulle in 1958.

I am not suggesting that you cry alarm because it is
politically expedient. On the contrary, I am urging it because
the future of freedom requires it. This seems to me the way
you can render a great service to the nation throughout the
Sixties. Events will vindicate you and enable you to
transcend the tacticians now in power in Washington, who by
an excess of "realism" lose all touch with reality.

transcend the tacticians now in power in Washington, who by
Sixties. Events will vindicate you and ample room to
you can render a great service to the nation throughout the
future of freedom requires it. This seems to me the way
politically expedient. On the contrary, I am arguing it because

I am not suggesting that you cry alarm because it is
De Gaulle in 1958.

will be as deliberately needed as Churchill was in 1940 and
what produce an imbalance. And then those who warned in time
Kennedy will be unustaple in 1964. But sooner or later they
succeed. If the present policies do not produce an imbalance
be successful by 1964. It is clear that no other course can
me your distinctive role. No one can predict whether it will
warn, to export and to outline a new approach. This seems to
The nation and the cause of freedom require someone to
legitimize concern.

against the trend when there is no leader to arbitrate and

Mon. Nelson V. Rockefeller -10- January 8, 1963

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Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

IV. <u>Substantive Requirements.</u>

It seems vitally important that the next year be used
for a detailed, careful study of key issues. In 1964 you
will be under constant pressure to state your positions.
There will be no time for preparation and briefing. You will
then have to draw on material developed in 1963. Moreover,
should you be elected, it is likely that we will be in the
midst of an international crisis requiring immediate action.
Then the difference between success and failure may hinge
on nuances which have to be understood this year.

In the foreign and national security fields, effective
opposition depends on the existence of a specific alternative
program. On NATO, disarmament, the United Nations and the
emerging nations, important thoughts can be stated. But they
will require careful preparation.

The need is apparent in the domestic field as well. It
is clear that the low rate of economic growth is one of the
great problems of the Sixties. You have already referred to
it in your speech to the N.A.M. Yet to make an effective issue
of it, it will not be enough to advocate an increased rate of
growth in the abstract. There should be a detailed program to
back it up.

pack it up.

growth in the abstract. There should be a detailed program to
of it, it will not be enough to advocate an increased rate of
it in your speech to the U.V.M. Yet to make an effective issue
Great problems of the Sixties. You have already referred to
is clear that the low rate of economic growth is one of the
The need is apparent in the domestic field as well. It
will require careful preparation.

emerging nations, important thoughts can be stated. But they
program. On NATO, disarmament, the United Nations and the
opposition debate on the existence of a specific alternative
In the foreign and national security fields, effective
on advances which have to be understood this year.

Then the difference between success and failure may hinge
might of an international crisis requiring immediate action.
should you be elected, it is likely that we will be in the
time have to draw on material developed in 1963. Moreover,
There will be no time for preparation and briefing. You will
will be under constant pressure to state your positions.
for a detailed, careful study of key issues. In 1964 you
It seems vitally important that the next year be need
IV. Substantive Requirements.

Hon. Nelson V. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

Similarly, your insistence on reductions in government spending has attracted a good deal of attention. But how would you answer the charge--made, for example, in the *New York Times*--that this is equivalent to cutting social welfare programs? I am no expert on domestic policy. But it would seem to me that you might ask some task force to work out answers to these problems. A detailed analysis of issues such as these, utilized later in public pronouncements, would also be the best method for dealing with the criticism, particularly from business elements, that your views on domestic issues are unsound or erratic.

As for the utilization of this material, it seems to me that it should be done in two stages. 1963 should be devoted to rallying the Republican Party, articulating a general philosophy and expressing your concern. Such speeches as your Inaugural Address or your talk to the N.A.M. would be highly appropriate. In 1964, you should develop a specific and detailed program for both foreign and domestic policy. In this manner you will be able to establish a contrast between a serious, responsible statesman and the Madison Avenue approach of current Washington.

The tasks for 1963 can be accomplished more or less within your present organization. The elaboration of a

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Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

comprehensive program for 1964 requires a systematic broadening
of your base, bringing in the best talent available. There
should be a small overall steering group and special task
forces on individual problems. (The nucleus of such a
group already exists.)

Recommendations

(A) A group initially composed of John Gardner, Caryl Haskins, Milton Katz and myself should address itself to the definition of the major challenges before the nation and indicate general avenues of approach. Where appropriate, this group would bring in specialists. It would act in a way like the Overall Panel in the Special Studies Project.

John Gardner, Caryl Haskins, Milton Katz and I have been
meeting at my private initiative--without any relationship to
you--for the past two years to discuss problems of common
interest. I have explored the idea of focussing on a program
for you informally with them, and they are willing to serve.
We could keep the character of the group as a private discussion.
All of the people I have mentioned are very eager to avoid an
identification with a political effort at this time. It
would help a great deal, however, if occasionally you were
able to meet with it.

able to meet with it.

would help a great deal, however, if occasionally you were
identification with a political effort at this time. It
VII of the people I have mentioned are very eager to avoid an

We could keep the character of the group as a private discussion
for you informally with them, and they are willing to serve.

interest. I have explored the ideas of focusing on a program

hom--for the best two hours to discuss problems of common
meeting at my private initiative--without any relationship to
John Gardner, Carly Haskins, Milton Kats and I have passed
Panel in the Special Studies Project.

prin in specialist. It would act in a way like the Overall
avenués of approach. Where appropriate, this group would
of the major challenges before the nation and indicate General
Milton Kats and myself should address itself to the definition
(A) A group initially composed of John Gardner, Carly Haskins,

Recommendations

Group already exists.)

forces on individual problems. (The nucleus of such a
should be a small overall steering group and special task
of your own, printing in the past talent available. There
comprehensive program for 1964 requires a systematic proceeding

Hon. Nelson V. Rockettetter

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January 8, 1963

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

4. Underdeveloped Countries (Including Latin America).

Professor James Coleman--U.C.L.A. (Africa).

Professor Myron Weiner--University of Chicago (India).

Adolf Berle (Latin America).

Professor Milton Katz--Harvard University (Economic
Development).

Professor Edward Mason--Harvard University ) (Economic and
Professor Raymond Vernon--Harvard University) Political
Development)

5. United Nations.

Professor Lincoln Bloomfield--M.I.T.

6. Scientific Policy.

Caryl Haskins.

Professor Kistiakowsky.

Professor Zacharias--M.I.T.

I know all these people personally and I am certain
they would agree to help, particularly on an informal briefing
basis. A similar list could be prepared on domestic issues.

Meeting with groups such as these would also serve the
purpose of establishing your credit with the academic community.

(D) Contacts with foreign visitors should be handled according to the procedure outlined in my memorandum of December 7, 1962.

(E) The research group should continue to prepare background
material and recommend positions.

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Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

(F) Consideration should be given to deepening your foreign contacts. I would strongly recommend a visit to Europe in June. Our relations with Europe have deteriorated alarmingly. A visit to Europe would enable you to speak out more easily on what may well turn into our most difficult foreign policy problem. If you wish to take this trip, preparations should be made about six weeks in advance.

Another trip which should be considered is to India and Pakistan.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

V. Organizational Requirements.

In many respects, organization represents your most serious problem. The difficulty is created in part by Kennedy's style of politics; in part by the nature of the Republican Party; in part by your own organizational structure.

Turning first to the Kennedy style of politics, there is no doubt that this represents his most remarkable achievement. Indeed, the Kennedys enjoy the same kind of superiority over more traditional politicians as did Napoleon over the generals of the ancien regime. Napoleon's victories were almost never due to superior strength. Rather, he confounded his opponents by the dexterity of his movements, based on thorough, meticulous organization.

The same is true of the Kennedys. The old-style politicians rely on good fellowship and temporary alliances for limited purposes. They tend to play hunches; they try various measures to see which works. Even the full-time politicians are in a deep sense amateurs.

The Kennedys are different. They never depend on good fellowship; they never play hunches. They have succeeded because they know. They have understood that luck is the residue of design. Their research is meticulous; their

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Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

organization all-embracing. State by state--and in Massachusetts county by county--they know who the key people are; what issues concern the voters; what bargains have to be struck; what solutions can be imposed.

I saw something of the Ted Kennedy-George Lodge campaign. Lodge, whom I supported publicly, is a nice fellow who had recruited an able staff. Yet, there was about his whole operation an aura of improvisation. He tried gimmicks which his campaign manager thought clever and which were, in fact, not bad. But basically he was playing hunches. He did not know how a victory might be put together. His organization was slipshod. He would go into towns without advance preparations. He engaged in two television debates with the third candidate, Stuart Hughes, in which he did not seem to know what point he wanted to make and he therefore wound up on the defensive. In short, he had no strategy.

By contrast, Ted Kennedy had left nothing to chance. He had an organization which blanketed the state. He had a theme. He knew what it took to win. His visits to various towns were meticulously prepared. His actions were coherent where Lodge's were fitful.

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Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

Whatever your ultimate decision in 1964, it is essential
that your organization be strong and disciplined. If 1964
is not to turn into a shambles, you and your key advisors
should chart now the course you wish to follow in various
contingencies. Only in this way can you dominate events.
This alone will give you the criteria to determine success
or failure. It is the prerequisite to real flexibility.

I am bound to say that in this respect I am worried--
perhaps due to my ignorance of what is actually being done.
In so far as I have been able to see, some of the problems
in your organization pointed out in my memorandum of November
18, 1960 still exist. Too much still depends on the inspira-
tion that you can give individual members of your staff.
There does not exist below you a focus for your activities,
to coordinate, to plan and to press forward.

Yet, you require just such a focus. Your duties as
Governor, your representational functions and other activities
simply do not permit you to supervise every detail of your
organization. Your role should be to inspire and chart the
basic course. Others should work on matters which may be
decisive in the long run but which do not attract your
immediate attention. This will free your energies for the
things only you can do: to chart the overall course and to

crops only you can do: to chart the overall course and to
immediate attention. This will free your energies for the
decisive in the long run but which do not attract your
passive course. Others should work on matters which may be
organization. Your role should be to inspire and chart the
simply do not permit you to abate every detail of your
Governor, your representative functions and other activities
Yet, you require just such a focus. Your duties as

There does not exist below you a focus for your activities,
tion that you can give individual members of your staff.

18, 1960 still exist. Too much still depends on the inspira-
tion in your organization pointed out in my memorandum of November
In so far as I have been able to see, some of the problems
b衍思 due to my ignorance of what is actually being done.

I am bound to say that in this respect I am worried--
or failure. It is the brateduates to real flexibility.

This alone will give you the criteria to determine success
continuities. Only in this way can you dominate events.

should chart now the course you way to follow invarious
is not to turn into a samples, you and your key equals
that your organization be strong and disciplined. It 1964

How. Nelson V. Rockettler

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January 8, 1963

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Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

make the fundamental decisions.

The need for tight organization is equally important in
the political field. Here I tread warily, for I do not really
know what is being done. Still, for whatever they are worth,
my observations are as follows:

George Hinman has done a superb job in establishing your
credit within the Republican organization. This is an essen-
tial first step. However, side by side with gaining the
confidence of the regular organization, it seems to me
important to build some organizational strength of your
own. It would be dangerous to be entirely dependent on general
expressions of goodwill which, from the average politician's
point of view, are a wise precautionary move. Nucleus volunteer
groups of all kinds seem to me essential, if not to obtain
the nomination, then for an eventual campaign. A nation-wide
survey should be made, very discreetly, as to who could fur-
nish the leadership for such an effort. 1964 will be too
late.

In other words, the two efforts--preparing for the
Convention and preparing for the eventual campaign--should
be separated at least conceptually and probably organizationally
as well. Moreover, it is not too early to prepare for a campaign

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller -21- January 8, 1963

even should you finally decide not to be a contender. Your
chances will depend importantly on whether your key advisors
have a clear strategic concept. It was the absence of such
a concept--of a notion of how victory could be achieved--
that doomed Nixon in 1960. Someone in whom you have confi-
dence--or a group--should determine what specific steps are
required to develop a strategy and to build an organization.
Responsibility should also be clearly established for the
implementation of these steps.

If this is not done in 1963, each of your advisors will
continue to attempt to get your approval for specific courses
of action which, however meritorious in themselves, will lack
coherence. You in turn will be in the impossible position of
having to judge on an individual basis measures whose merits
ultimately depend on their relationship to each other.
Considerations of morale may override strategic judgments.
A series of improvisations are a handicap in all circumstances,
as 1960 clearly proved. They will lead to disaster in dealing
with organizers of the skill and ruthlessness of the Kennedy
family.

There already exists an embryonic strategy group. George
Hinman, Rod Perkins, John Deardourff, Hugh Morrow, Bill Ronan,

e

Human, Rod Perkin, John Boardour, Hugh Morrow, Bill Rous, George
family.

There already exists an exemplary strategic group. George

with organizers of the skill andруinesses of the Kennedy
as 1960 clearly proved. They will lead to disaster in dealing
A series of improvisations are a handicap in all circumstances.
Considerations of morale may overrule strategic judgments.

ultimately depend on their relationship to each other.
paving to judge on an individual basis measures whose merits
coherence. You in turn will be in the impossible position of
of action which, however meritorious in themselves, will lack
continue to attempt to get your approval for a specific course
It this is not done in 1963, each of your advisors will
implementation of these steps.

Reasonability should also be clearly established for the
required to develop a strategy and to build an organization.
decision--or a group--should determine what specific steps are
that done Nixon in 1960. Someone whom you have confi-
a concept--or a notion of how victory could be achieved--
pave a clear strategic concept. It was the absence of such
clauses will depend importantly on whether your key advisors
even should you finally decide not to be a contender. Your

How. Nelson V. Rockefeller -31- January 8, 1963

PERSONAL AND COMBINED

9

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Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller -22- January 8, 1963

Lloyd Free and I have been meeting about once a month for dinner. However, there are a number of drawbacks to such an informal arrangement. For one thing, the meetings are too infrequent. They are not sufficiently focussed since no one is responsible for an agenda. They consist in effect of reports by the various participants about their activities.

This is enormously helpful. However, a certain "senatorial courtesy" prevents serious criticism. And in any case, no one has enough information--much less responsibility--for driving towards a deeper consideration, for acting as devil's advocate, and for following-up. You need someone to provide the kind of supervision Bobby Kennedy supplied for his brother.

Among your present advisors I would urge George Hinman for this role.

Thus, from the organizational aspect as well, 1963 will be a crucial year. It is the period when you can shake down your organization. It will give you an opportunity to shape events. It will enable you to confront 1964 with a maximum of options.

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Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

Recommendations

(A) Someone should act as your chief of staff on national matters, to plan and implement substance, organization, and strategy. My recommendation is George Hinman.

(B) A small strategy group should be created. This group should also work out *in detail* the strategy for 1964, including key issues.

(C) A survey should be made of resources available for citizen or volunteer groups.

or volunteer groups.

(C) A survey should be made of resources available for citizen
pay issues.

should also work out in detail the strategy for 1964, including
(B) A small strategy group should be created. This group
strategy. My recommendation is George Human.

(A) Someone should act as your chief of staff on national
matters, to plan and implement substance, organization, and
(A) Someone should act as your chief of staff on national
matters, to plan and implement substance, organization, and
strateg. My recommendation is George Human.

Recommendations

Hon. Nelson V. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller -24- January 8, 1963

VI. Some Random Strategic Thoughts.

A. Image.

A question frequently asked about you is: "What does Rockefeller really stand for?" You have also been vulnerable to the charge--preposterous as it is to anyone who knows you--that you are more interested in the office of the Presidency than in the purpose it serves. All this is another way of saying that your position has not made the necessary impact. You still lack a clear profile in the public mind across the nation. This is why I believe it is so important that in 1964 you develop a detailed program.

In the coming months a great deal of discussion will undoubtedly focus on the problem of your "image." As pointed out earlier, the minimum objective should be to establish a clear profile whether you run or do not run, win or lose. Should you not run or not be elected, people should feel that they have missed a great opportunity. This would give you a platform for the following four years.

In order to establish a profile, a sharp distinction from Kennedy is needed, both with respect to substance and in terms of style. Your best chance is to be yourself. Integrity should be contrasted with opportunism; class with surface brilliance;

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Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

a coherent philosophy with a kind of pragmatism that confuses activity with policy. Solid virtues of reliability should be contrasted with brash cafe society glamour; loyalty to subordinates with the cut-throat competition of the New Frontier. Some of the methods which were very helpful in the New York State campaign--designed to establish you as a "regular fellow"--should in my view be toned down on the national scene. Your strongest asset nationally will be the conviction that you are a statesman and a leader for emergencies.

## B. The Republican Party and the Independents.

A succession of Republican candidates has foundered on the dilemma that the Republican Party is not strong enough to win an election by itself. But without the enthusiastic support of the regular organization, any campaign is doomed from the outset. (Eisenhower as a war hero is a special case here.)

The situation is further complicated because to rely entirely on the Republican Party is to use a hide-bound instrument. Thus, the requirements of gaining Republican support complicate obtaining a national following. In the long run, this problem is soluble only by a basic reform in the Republican Party. In the immediate future, there seems

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Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

to me no choice except to revitalize what exists.

This might be accomplished in two stages. 1963 should be largely devoted to an appeal to the Republican Party. The theme should be that slogans like "liberal" and "conservative" are outdated, along the lines of your Inaugural Address. The issue is a lasting progress for the United States. And for this--so the argument might go--the Republican Party is the proper instrument. It is not bound by tired slogans or by formulae of the Thirties. It strives to liberate the national energies. It understands the nature of the foreign challenge. It is the party of Lincoln, Elihu Root and Theodore Roosevelt which has stood for both progress and human dignity throughout its history.

The goal throughout 1963 should be to raise the morale of the Republican Party. It must be convinced that it matters who is nominated and who wins. It must be infused with a desire for victory so that it will go out and work. It should feel a deep sense of loss if things turn out badly.

1964 should then be used to outline a detailed program along the lines discussed above. In this way you will have an opportunity to preserve your influence through the Sixties. If you seek to dissociate yourself from the Republican Party,

It you seek to dissociate yourself from the Republican Party, an opportunity to preserve your influence through the Sixties. Along the lines discussed above. In this way you will pass 1964 should then be used to outline a detailed program a deep sense of loss it things turn out badly.

for victory so that it will go out and work. It should feel who is nominated and who wins. It must be influenced with a desire of the Republican Party. It must be convinced that it matters The goal throughout 1963 should be to raise the morale of the party.

which has stood for both progress and human dignity throughout It is the party of Lincoln, Flinn, Root and Theodore Roosevelt energies. It understands the nature of the foreign challenge formulae of the Sixties. It strives to liberate the national broader instruments. It is not pound by tired slogans or by tries--so the argument might go--the Republican Party is the frame is a lasting progress for the United States. And for are outdated, along the lines of your Inaugural Address. The theme should be that slogans like "liberal" and "conservative" largely devoted to an abneg to the Republican Party. The

This might be accomplished in two stages. 1963 should be to me no choice except to reevaluate what exists.

Hon. Nelson V. Rockefeller

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January 8, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller -27- January 8, 1963

you will be destroyed politically if you refuse to run or
if you are defeated. If you can create a strong base within
the Republican Party, you can become a symbol even if you do
not win the election. Even Adlai-Stevenson managed to create
a following which stuck with him through a decade of
vicissitudes. You are a much stronger and greater person
and the need to which you respond is infinitely more valid.

No one can predict success. You do have an opportunity
to create an alternative to existing trends and this would
in itself be a major service. But I cannot stress enough that
your role throughout the Sixties will be fundamentally affected
by your preparations in 1963.

by your preparations in 1963.

Your role throughout the Sixties will be inimitably affected in itself be a major service. But I cannot stress enough that to create an alternative to existing trends and this would

No one can predict success. You do have an opportunity and the need to which you reboard is infinitely more valid.

You are a much stronger and greater person a following which attack with him through a decade of not win the election. Even Adlai-Stevenson managed to create the Republican Party, you can become a symbol even if you do not win the election.

You will be destroyed politically if you refuse to run or if you are defeated. It you can create a strong base within your party you will be destroyed politically if you refuse to run or if you are defeated. It you can create a strong base within your party you will be destroyed politically if you refuse to run or

Hon. Nelson V. Rockettler

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January 8, 1963

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR
FROM: Hugh Morrow

JANUARY

14, 1963

SUBJECT: Digest of speech by Felipe Herrera, President of the Inter-American Development Bank, to the Congress of American Industry, NAM, December 5, 1962

The broad factors which unify the diverse nations of Latin America demand coordinated attention and unified action. These factors include the following:

First -- the growth in population, while a handicap, still makes man the best guarantee of achieving progress if his activities are coordinated. Wide disparity in population density and per capita product make the increase of agricultural productivity one of the most important problems.

Second -- Excessive dependence on exports of food and raw materials make it necessary to promote, over the long term, reciprocal, coordinated and continuous adjustments between exportable production of primary products and world demand.

Third -- The trend towards industrialization has increased greatly since World War II. The emphasis has changed from investment in public services and primary product production to manufacturing activities, with the consequent emphasis on modern technological methods.

Fourth -- Because the largest impediment to the growth of the manufacturing sector has been and continues to be the lack of markets, Latin America is attempting to expand its markets through the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Association.

In addition to coordinating these tour broad areas there is much to be done in convincing the citizens of Latin America that the best means of securing material progress and political consolidation is to establish sound financial conditions.

# # #

INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

808 17TH ST., N.W. WASHINGTON 25, D.C. TELEPHONE EX. 3-4171

OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES IN LATIN AMERICA

Address prepared for delivery by Felipe Herrera, President of
the Inter-American Development Bank, before the 67th Annual
Congress of American Industry sponsored by the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers, at the Afternoon Session, 2:30 p.m.,
Wednesday, December 5, The Waldorf Astoria, New York

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen;

As president of a financial organization whose basic function
is to promote the economic and social development of Latin America, I am
profoundly grateful for the honor of expressing before this highly dis-
tinguished and important group some views on the obstacles faced by this
vast region in its drive for progress and on the advantageous opportuni-
ties it offers to men of enterprise.

The occasion for such an analysis is singularly opportune par-
ticularly at a time when Latin America is undergoing a critical period of
transition in which diverse drives and trends align themselves in opposi-
tion or alliance in search of new formulas for equilibrium. This is a
time when the anxiety which naturally arises from a lack of knowledge of
definitive solutions can lead to pessimistic conclusions. But, since
change is the inevitable way of life and what matters is to give this
change controlled incentive and intelligent direction, it is also a time
when multiple opportunities are opening up for the fertile exploitation
of the new circumstances.

For this very reason we must begin by pointing out that Latin
America is unquestionably a real union but, at the same time and without
contradiction since it is a living and acting reality, it is a region
full of complexities and contrasts. The nations south of the border make
up a coherent whole but on the basis of inalienable diversities and profound
differences.

We cannot reach a true definition of Latin American situation on
the basis of a brief analysis and easy generalizations.

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Identical results will not even flow from the same economic,
financial and fiscal deportment in all of these countries.

Let me cite some examples: The price level in Country A of
Latin America increased by about 4 per cent a year between 1954 and 1961
and its national currency maintained its dollar quotation. Its balance
of payments position remained fairly steady. Monetary and fiscal policies
served as a brake to the excessive expansion of the means of payment and
domestic monetary income. These factors brought the following positive
results to country A: Industrial output increased by almost 70 per cent
during that period and per capita national income grew at an annual rate
of more than 2 per cent.

Country B followed a similar fiscal and monetary policy seeking
to maintain stability in the level of domestic prices, in its dollar quo-
tation and in its balance of payments. Its exchange rate has not varied
in the last decade and during that time the level of prices remained vir-
tually stable. However, the results for Country B were negative: The
per capita product dropped by 0.2 per cent a year between 1950 and 1960.

The fiscal and monetary policies of Country C have been strongly
expansionist. The price level rose five times between 1956 and the present,
and its national currency depreciated in proportion. Results were naturally
unfavorable: Industrial output, as well as the per capita product, remained
practically at a standstill.

Finally, Country D also followed a markedly expansionist policy.
The exchange rate rose five-fold between 1956 and 1961 and the price level
increased four-fold during the same period. Yet national industry has
expanded markedly and the country has succeeded in maintaining an annual
per capita production growth rate of nearly 3 per cent.

There are broad underlying causes that go beyond the differences
between one country and another and between one district and the next.
Common characteristics prevail and determine economic features and proc-
esses which, owing to their magnitude and the pressure they exert on all
the countries as a whole, demand coordinated attention and unified action.
Let us examine some of these factors:

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR
FROM: Sarah Goddard

January 17, 1963

SUBJECT: "World Without Want" -- Digest of book by
Paul G. Hoffman

World Without Want outlines Paul Hoffman's concern with what he considers the four malignant curses of our time: hunger, poverty, illiteracy and disease.

Hoffman's thesis: "Morally we cannot escape concern; politically, the seething unrest demands it; economically, we will gain from it. The bluntest and most accurate answer to why we should be concerned is that we must if we are to survive."

Simple charity will not do. The author urges profitable investment from abroad. While 70% of the capital required for economic development must come from the privileged minority of advanced countries, the sum needed to finance an adequate rate of growth is less than 5% of the world's annual outlay for defense. He urges that more of this aid be channeled through the United Nations, which has accumulated vast knowledge for making aid programs effective.

Hoffman points out that the 100 underdeveloped countries are a great new economic frontier. "If per capita incomes in the underdeveloped world were to be lifted in the 1960's, steadily year by year, by only 2.5 percent, exports to these countries from the industrially advanced world, which totaled $164 billion for the ten years 1950-1960, should reach $350 billion for 1960-1970. For the United States -- assuming it retains its current share of the international trade flow -- such an increase would mean, by 1970, an estimated additional $8.5 billion in exports every year."

2.

This, Hoffman stresses, is good business: "Foreign aid is not charity." It is sound business management and a major contribution to political stability.

Capital shortage is the deep-rooted problem at the heart of the whole problem of overcoming poverty. In a country where up to 60% of the people are going hungry, one of the most pervasive dilemmas is the attempt to acquire savings for investment, and no solution is presently in sight.

During the 1950's, in nearly two-thirds of the underdeveloped countries, domestic savings did not rise at all in relation to gross national product.

In half of them, it declined.

Even assuming maximum self-help, Mr. Hoffman believes that low-income countries still need foreign exchange. To the extent that a country sells abroad, it can buy abroad. However, a recession or depression in an industrialized nation has more impact on the underdeveloped countries than on the industrialized nation itself.

On the subject of problems arising from fickle markets in industrialized countries, Dag Hammerskjold pointed to the paradox that the industrial nations' "progressive expansion of aid has not been matched by equal progress in the reduction in obstacles to the growth of trade."

The United Nations is considering two possible remedies for the price squeeze in which underdeveloped countries periodically get caught. One is the creation of an insurance fund that would come to the rescue of a country whose only source of livelihood had suddenly been knocked from under it; the other is price control for certain selected commodities.

3.

Mr. Hoffman believes that some serious mistakes were made in the 1950's, in assistance programs. In the 1950's, development assistance programs were thought of as charity or "giveaways." International development programs suffered in the 1950's from an ill-defined but often deep-felt prejudice against anything that involved "planning." For many years, the concept of government planning was suspect domestically in the United States, and this attitude rubbed off onto international planning efforts. One of the most dangerous mistakes of the 1950's was a failure to realize that development cannot proceed without concentrating on an increase in human knowledge and skill.

It is Paul Hoffman's belief that by placing increasing use on the United Nations, we will be selecting that channel of aid which will give the most effective results at the lowest possible cost. Above all, development must proceed at a faster rate. "That the 1950's taught us this transcendent lesson was dramatically demonstrated by the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly which invoked a Development Decade for the 1960-1970 period." The Assembly set as its goal a 5% increase each year in the aggregate income of the developing countries. It means a per capita increase over a ten-year period between 1960 and 1970 of less than $30 -- the very minimum at which we should aim. However, as Mr. Hoffman makes clear, a staggering amount of foreign exchange will be required if the modernizing countries are to reach this goal.

WESTERN UNION
TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SF-1201 (4-60)

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination

500P EST JAN 19 63 SYA271 0A200
0 BHA065 NL PD AR BEVERLY HILLS CALIF 19
GOVERNOR NELSON ROCKEFELLER, MSGR DLY GET SIG
GOVERNORS MANSION ALBANY NY
RE PAKISTANI APPEALS FOR WESTERN HELP IN KASHMIR ISSUE.

MAY I RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER RECOMMENDING PUBLICLY UNITED STATES URGE BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN SIGNED MUTUAL NON-AGGRESSION TREATY TO WHICH THIS COUNTRY AND BRITAIN WOULD BE SIGNATORIES, THEREBY IN EFFECT GUARANTEEING FRONTIERS OF PAKISTAN AGAINST WHAT LATTER BELIEVES IS REAL THREAT FROM INDIA MADE MORE OMINOUS AS RESULT RECENT WESTERN MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

RE KASHMIR SPECIFICALLY IF PLEBISCITE APPROVED ORIGINALLY BY INDIA AND UNITED NATIONS PROVES IMPRACTICABLE COULD YOU SUGGEST CREATION OF CONDOMINIUM IN KASHMIR HEADED BY INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION PRESIDED BY UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE WITH INDIAN,

PAKISTANI, AND LOCAL KASHMIRI MEMBERS AS MINIMUM.

NET RESULTS WOULD BE FIRSTLY, MAKING POSSIBLE DEFENSE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT WHICH WITHOUT PAKISTAN IS INDEFENSIBLE. SECONDLY, WE WOULD SHOW OUR ALLIES THROUGHOUT WORLD WE BACK THEM WHERE THEY HAVE LEGITIMATE NEED FOR OUR ASSISTANCE. THIRDLY, PAKISTAN WOULD BE LESS INCLINED TO SLIP FURTHER INTO RED CHINESE ORBIT, A TENDENCY RECENTLY MANIFESTED BY CHINESE PAKISTANI FRONTIER AND TRADE AGREEMENTS. FOURTHLY, WE WOULD SHOW WORLD UNITED STATES SEEKS RECONCILLIATION OF NATIONS THROUGH HARD-HEADED PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TAILORED TO INDIVIDUAL GIVEN PROBLEMS.

ABOVE REASONS AMPLY JUSTIFY IN MY OPINION ANY PRESSURE WE PLACE ON INDIA TO AGREE TO PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF DISPUTE. I WOULD VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS SUBJECT.

RESPECTFULLY
ANDREW BRICHANT 9465 WILSHIRE BLVD BEVERLY HILLS CALIF.

In a speech before the Atlantic Council* in Washington on January 14, 1963, General Norstad expressed his views on the command and control of NATO nuclear forces. This problem has become one of the overriding questions within the North Atlantic Community, not only because of its military importance, but also because of the political issues it raises. It has been thrown into sharp focus by U.S. unilateral action in the Cuban crisis, by the U.S.-British disagreement over the Skybolt program, and by the resulting Nassau agreement.

## I. The Norstad Views

A. The importance of a European voice in the control over strategic weapons. Norstad starts from the premise that the nations of Europe now act from a new strength, a strength which demands from the U.S. an increasing recognition of them as true partners in the Alliance.

Norstad cites three convictions held by most Europeans.

1. Nuclear weapons in some strength or form are essential to their defense.

2. A guarantee of the continuing availability of the weapons on which their freedom depends is essential to them.

3. The Europeans must have a voice in the decision-making process on the use of the weapons in order to fulfill their responsibilities to their own people as well as to the Alliance.

B. A NATO multilateral deterrent

1. Norstad favors a NATO deterrent force where the nuclear weapons which back up NATO principles would be wholly committed to the Alliance.

- Actual custody of the warheads, however, would be retained by the donor country. This would, in Norstad's view, avoid nuclear proliferation.

2. The role of the NATO Council. The NATO Council would develop

*
The Atlantic Council was founded as an educational medium in the U.S. on matters affecting closer cooperation in the field of political economic and cultural affairs of the Atlantic nations. Norstad has just been appointed Chairman of the Council, where he succeeds Christian Herter. Other officers include: Dean Acheson, former Presidents Hoover, Truman and Eisenhower, Will Clayton and Lewis W. Douglas.

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"guidelines, rules of engagement, principles and established conditions for the possible use of the weapons..." If time allowed, the Council would be consulted in an emergency.

3. The executive body. Since the 15-member council is too unwieldy to direct military operations or act in urgent situations, the Council should create a smaller executive body "wholly responsive to it."

a. Membership of executive body. The Council might consist of three countries contributing weapons to the NATO nuclear stockpile: the U.S., Britain, and France.

b. Representation of interests of other NATO members. To make sure all 15 NATO countries were represented, the NATO Secretary-General could preside over the executive group, but "not necessarily as a voting member."

4. Possible variations of the executive body. Norstad suggests two possible variations of the composition of the executive body, both designed to deal with crucial questions posed by the creation of a small executive group.

a. **Germany**. West Germany might be given "some appropriate representative status" with the executive body, since the size, strength and geographic position of the country involve it in almost every aspect of central European defense.

b. **The other NATO nations**. The executive body might have two additional members elected from among the NATO nations on a rotating basis. However, such enlargement of the body might limit its effectiveness.

5. Voting in the executive body. If a unanimous decision could not be reached in the executive body, Norstad feels that a majority vote should govern.

- In such an event the minority member could reserve the option to withhold the forces of his own country (although such an option would be virtually meaningless).

- However, the weapons made available to NATO by the dissenting country would have to remain committed and available to NATO.

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C. Cohesion vs. strain in NATO

1. Norstad plays down the stresses and strains in NATO as evidence of the freedom of expression which the NATO countries enjoy. Although the Alliance reveals deficiencies and disagreements, some of them serious, the most important fact of the Alliance is its basic unity.

a. Berlin over the years has offered the best example of Allies standing together.

b. The *Cuban crisis* was an outstanding demonstration of such unity.

- The achievement of unanimity was remarkable.

- However, the occasion was unique because of the *promptness* and the *positiveness* with which the declaration to stand together was reached.

2. The "future Europe will be defined by Europeans, as it should be," but there is a present trend toward "the thoughtful second look." "The pattern of the future, if we are to survive...is going to be the *full pattern* of the Atlantic Community."

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## II. Questions raised by Norstad's speech

### A. The concept of a NATO multilateral deterrent

1. U.S. strategic planners in the Administration have, until recently, considered a multilateral NATO force to be _militarily_ superfluous, since U.S. forces reportedly already cover Soviet strategic targets.

2. The only argument for a NATO force which has carried much weight has been its _political_, rather than its military value.

- European doubts about the willingness of the U.S. to use nuclear weapons in defense of Europe have created serious divisions within the alliance.

- These doubts about the U.S. commitment have spurred both French and British efforts to create nuclear forces independent of the U.S.

3. _It is questionable_, however, whether a NATO multilateral nuclear force would provide a _genuine answer_ either (1) to European doubts about the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe, or (2) to the problem of nuclear proliferation.

a. Attempts to devise such a force have consistently bogged down in the virtually insoluble problem of command and control: any control system which would be acceptable to all the NATO nations is likely to end up with a decision-making apparatus so surrounded by safety mechanisms that its triggering mechanism is virtually ineffective. In

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particular, the U.S. insistence on a veto over the use of
any weapons it donates to the alliance (for us a vital
safety mechanism), has the effect of reviving European
doubts about the U.S. commitment to defend Europe, doubts
which were the chief reason for proposing the multilateral
force in the first place.

b. In addition, the French refusal to commit its nuclear forces to the proposed NATO force provides ample evidence that the NATO force does not necessarily solve the problem of nuclear proliferation.

4. The only type of multilateral force which would go any way toward meeting Europe's demands for control over the strategic forces which defend them is a <u>European multilateral force</u>, in which French and British nuclear forces would be merged.

- This is the only scheme which avoids the difficulties raised by U.S. insistence on its veto. However, it is doubtful whether such a force could be large enough to make much difference in deterring the Soviet Union. Moreover, given the French attitude, it is extremely unlikely that it could ever become an actuality.

B. <u>Control of the warheads of the multilateral force</u>

Norstad believes that the actual physical custody of the nuclear weapons or warheads of the NATO multilateral force should be

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retained by the donor country. In his opinion this would avoid
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to which he is opposed.

There may be a very good case for the U.S., Britain and
France (if she will cooperate) retaining physical possession of
the weapons they commit to the Alliance. But such a scheme in
itself does not provide an answer to the problem of the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons.

In fact, it is possible to take the point of view that the
possession of nuclear weapons by a NATO force represents in itself
a form of nuclear proliferation.

C. Relationship between the NATO Council and the proposed Executive Body.

Norstad states that the NATO Council, in order to be able to
act in emergencies or to direct military operations, should create
a smaller executive body "wholly responsive to it."

He thus slides past one of the thorniest questions to be
overcome if a NATO multilateral force is ever to be created. The
very fact that the executive body could make decisions affecting
the interests of all the fifteen NATO nations without the positive
consent of twelve and possibly thirteen of them would raise a
major constitutional question for the countries not represented
in the decision-making process.

Hitherto the NATO Council has made its decisions unanimously.
In other words, no decision could be taken if it was opposed by

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any one NATO member. But in the NATO executive body Norstad proposes the smaller NATO nations would have no representation except the non-voting presence of the Secretary-General.

The key problem in setting up such an executive body is the very fact Norstad glosses over: that the decisions it might take, decisions which might involve the whole North Atlantic Community in all-out nuclear war, might well have to be made by a body **not** "wholly responsive" to the wishes of all the nations represented on the NATO Council.

### D. The position of Germany; membership on the executive body

Norstad points out that the size, strength and geographic position of West Germany and its involvement in almost every aspect of the defense of central Europe must somehow be taken into account in the composition of the executive group he proposes. He suggests that Germany might be given "some appropriate representative status" with the executive body. However, he does not define whether Germany should be an actual member of the executive body, and if so, whether it should be a voting or non-voting membership.

- Any war involving nuclear weapons is likely to involve Germany sooner and more deeply than any other European nation; this would indicate that she should have a major voice, including the right to vote, on a matter of such concern to her.

- However, the executive body is to be comprise of the countries contributing to the nuclear stockpile, and Germany is enjoined

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from manufacturing nuclear weapons.

This problem is undoubtedly not insoluble, but Norstad is
extremely vague as to the way in which it should be solved.

E. Majority voting in the executive body

Norstad's proposed executive body would undoubtedly be more
effective if it took decisions by majority voting in any case
where unanimity could not be achieved. However, the clear impli-
cation of such a policy is that France and Britain, voting to-
gether, could involve the U.S. in a nuclear war without U.S. consent.
It is extremely doubtful whether such an agreement would ever be
accepted by the people and the Congress of the U.S., even though
in actual fact the situation now prevailing is not very different.

SPEECH BY GENERAL LAURIS BORSTAD

ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 14 JANUARY 1965

MAYFLOWER HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

It is an honor to be here this evening and a pleasure indeed to be with so many old friends and colleagues. I am touched by your kindness to me, beyond that, I am moved by your presence here. It means to me that we share the same beliefs and that we are all willing to work for what we believe.

I am honored to accept the Chairmanship of the Atlantic Council of the United States. Coming as I retire from my profession, it permits me to continue to serve a cause which in any event would have remained a dominant interest — the cause of the Atlantic Alliance. My aim and purpose will be to carry on the work inspired and directed by Governor Harter. I am greatly pleased to continue my association with the distinguished citizens who are the officers and the directors of the Council.

"Toward a true Atlantic Community" — these familiar words describe the high aim and goal of the Council's work. There were as we all know several public-spirited groups of Americans who worked in past years for this same aim. The fact that these groups have been brought together under one roof is progress in itself. The Atlantic Council is how the principal citizen-group in this country supporting NATO and other Atlantic Community interests. It is, further, the American Chapter of the Atlantic Treaty Association, the international body of which Ambassador Burgess is the Chairman. It is also the American sponsor of the Atlantic Institute of which another very distinguished American, Ambassador Lodge, is the Director General.

This streamlining of effort and purpose is healthy indeed. We have a good example of it in this room this evening. I come to you expecting to be a guest and now it looks as if I am going to be with you for some time. I can only hope that, as a "Man who Came to Dinner," I will not ever stay my welcome.

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that, as a "Man who came to dinner," I will not overestimate my welcome, and now it looks as if I am going to be with you for some time. I can only hope example of it in this room this evening. I come to you expecting to be a guest this streamlining of effort and purpose is necessary indeed. We have a good Ambassador lodge, is the Director General.

Honor of the Atlantic Institute of which another very distinguished American, body of which Ambassador Bureaus is the Chairman. If it is safe the American Ambassador, the American Chapter of the Atlantic Treaty Association, the International Trade country supporting NATO and other Atlantic Community Interests. If it, progress in itself. The Atlantic Council is now the principal citizen-group in aim. The fact that these groups have been brought together under one roof is definitely shifted groups of Americans who worked in but here for this same high aim and goal of the Council's work. There were as we all know several "Toward a free Atlantic Community" — these statements describe the and the directors of the Council.

continue our association with the distinguished citizens who are the officers of the work inspired and directed by Governor Herzer. I am greatly pleased to the cause of the Atlantic Alliance. My aim and purpose will be to carry on so severe a cause which in any event would have remained a dominant interest — United States. Coming as I retire from my profession, it becomes me to continue I am honored to accept the Chairmanship of the Atlantic Council of the same periphery and that we are all working to work for what we believe. Beyond that, I am moved by your presence here. It means so much that we share so much of our friends and colleagues. I am concerned by your kindness so much as

If it is an honor to be here, this evening and a pleasure indeed to be with

MYALLMONG HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL, BY JANUARY 1963

SECRET BY GENERAL LYNN MORGAN

Anyone who has been long associated with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation comes to have for it and for its purposes and principles an
allegiance that is compelling and a hope that grows. Having served the
Alliance for so many years, I am perhaps particularly marked by this influence,
and frankly I hope that I am. The influence of the NATO idea is entirely for the
good — for the individual, for the nation and for the world. My work with this
great organization has, I believe, deepened my devotion to my own country,
strengthened my faith in its aims for a peaceful and prospering world.

This is not the time or the place for a detailed report of military strengths or weaknesses. That would be exist, some quite serious, is a matter of public record. On the other hand, the fact that the Alliance possesses very real military strength, conventional and nuclear, is also recognised. Looked at in the political and military context of today, our forces are significant: they are to be reckoned with on the land, at sea, and in the air. I am confident that this strength will continue to grow — as it should, as it must.

When I was a young man I was taught, as I suppose we all were, that one
should not overindulge in the luxury of looking backward — that the direction
of progress was forward. But as I was bringing to a close my military career,
I found myself measuring the meaning of some of the changes and events of the
last twelve years.

The memory I have of Europe in the last of the 1940s and early 1950s, and
a powerful one it is, is of a climate of apathy and despair. The signs were
everywhere, in the streets crowded with unemployed, in the nearly empty stores,
in the smokeless factories, but most sharply on the faces of the people them-
selves, faces on which were written the fear and the hopelessness of that hour.
I recall, as many of you will, that the question at that time — a question
asked by intelligent, well-informed people — was not whether war would come but
rather in what month, on what day.

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rather in what month, on what day, asked by intelligentsia, well-informed people — we not whether man would come put I recall, as many of you all, that the discussion at that time — a question arises, faces on which were written the text and the piousness of that hom. in the smokeless factories! but most sharply on the faces of the people them- everywhere, in the streets crowded with unemployed, in the nearly empty stores, a powerful one it is, ie, at a climate of shyness and despond. The faces were the memory I have of Europe in the last of the 1920s and early 1930s, and just before here.

I found myself measuring the meaning of some of the changes and events of the ot progress was toward. But as I was printing to a close my military career, should not overburden in the luxury of looking backward — that the direction when I was a young man I was taught, as I suppose we all were, that one that this strength will continue to grow — as it should, as it must.

they are to be reckoned with on the land, at sea, and in the air. I am confident at the political and military context of today, our forces are significant: real military strength, conventional and nuclear, is also recognized. Looked upon record. On the other hand, the fact that the Alliance possesses very or weaknesses. That weaknesses do exist, some quite serious, is a matter of time is not the time or the place for a detailed report of military strengths

strengthened by itself in its time for a beautiful and brooding worth.

Great organization has, I believe, deepened an devotion to my own country, good — for the individual, for the nation and for the world. My work with this and truly I hope that I am. The influence of the NATO idea is entirely for the Alliance for so many years. I am therefore heartily worked by this influence, significance that is compelling and a hope that grows. Having served the Organization comes to have for it and for its purposes and branches an

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Between the then and the now, the contract is all but unbelievable. How we see a Europe that is strong, confident, dynamic. It is a Europe which is as much a success of American policy — as I am sure the Europeans would be the first to admit — as it is of their own efforts. For more than a decade after the war, the weakness of Europe was a major factor influencing the policy of this country. In the decade ahead, the strength of Europe will play a major role in shaping our plans, our programs, and our objectives as a nation. We are no longer dealing with war-shattered peoples. We are dealing with countries which on the basis of their improved status, their achievements in recent years, will demand to an increasing extent recognition as true partners. I believe also that they will appreciate to an increasing extent that with rights and recognition come increased obligations to the Alliance and beyond.

A strong Europe is, thank God, a fact of life.

The recent NATO meetings and the Moscow Conference remind us that policy conferences tend to be reported chiefly in terms of weapons and military structure. Since nuclear weapons have become the symbol of power in our time, their importance in policy considerations has taken on the very greatest dimension. It is clear, however, that such discussions look beyond weapons, powerful and dangerous as they may be, and explore the objectives of nations, groups of nations, and of the Alliance itself.

Having retired from the active Service, I need not and perhaps should not at this time involve myself in details of military organization, much less present myself as an expert on weapons and equipment. I do wish to speak of what is at the very heart of this great problem of nuclear power in its military application — the questions of the locus of authority and how that authority should be exercised.

These questions of authority and control are now very much with us. They will remain with us whatever level of nuclear effort may be considered appropriate

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will remain with us whatever level of nuclear effort may be contemplated in the short term. These questions of authority and control are now very much with us. United States

crated. — the questions of the locus of authority and how that authority should be exercised. The very heart of this great problem of nuclear power in its military application must be an expert on weapons and equipment. I do wish to express my own view at this time. I involve myself in details of military organization, and I know too well at this time that we must be able to act with the greatest freedom. Having retired from the active service, I need not and cannot hope anything but

Europe of nations, and of the Alliance itself.
Powerful and dangerous as they may be, and explore the objectives of nations, dimensions. If it is clear, however, that such discussion look beyond weapons, their importance in policy considerations has taken on the very greatest significance. Since nuclear weapons have become the stamp of power in our time, conferences tend to be reported chiefly in terms of weapons and military. The recent NATO meetings and the Messrs. Conference remind us that policy

come increased obligations to the Alliance and beyond.
That they will appreciate so an increasing extent that with rights and recognition
will demand to an increasing extent as true partners. I believe so
which on the part of their improved status, their achievements in recent years,
no longer dealing with war—shattered peoples. We are dealing with countries
role in shaping our lives, our programs, and our objectives as a nation. We are
of this country. In the decade ahead, the strength of Europe will be a major
after the war, the weakness of Europe was a major factor influencing the policy
the fact that to admit — as it is at their own efforts. For more than a decade
as much a success of American policy — as I am sure the Europeans would be
as we see a Europe that is strong, confident, dynamic. It is a Europe which is
between the then and the now, the contract is all but unbreakable. Now

for the Alliance and regardless of the form in which that effort may be
organised.

Here the views in Europe, as in the United States, vary over a wide range.
Nevertheless, there are some common denominators which appear fundamental. Most
Europeans are convinced that nuclear weapons, in some strength and in some form,
are essential to their defense. They want a guarantee of the continuing
availability of the weapons on which they must place dependence for the
preservation of their freedom. Further, they wish a voice, an influence, in
the decision-making process. They feel they need this in order to fulfill their
responsibilities to their own people as well as to the Alliance.

These convictions are very real to the Europeans. I find them extraordinarily
reasonable. Like the renewed strength of Europe, they must be accepted as a
fact of life.

The time has come to grasp this problem. There must be willingness on the
part of all to consider the views, the needs, of others. Since every nation
stands to gain, and should gain, from a successful resolution of the problem,
each must be prepared to give in its own and in the common interest.

Let us say that I am well aware of the complexity of this subject and the
danger of trying to make it appear simpler than it is. But before I am too
long out of uniform, while experience is still fresh, I would like to make a
few suggestions and conclusions of my own. They are not offered as the
solution to this difficult problem. It is enough that they should contribute
something to the discussion now taking place.

I believe it is the desire of almost all NATO nations that the authority
over the nuclear capability which supports NATO defense plans should be vested
in the Alliance itself. To meet this desire, the nuclear weapons deployed for
the purpose of giving reality and substance to the NATO principles should be
wholly committed to the Alliance. I am opposed to the proliferation of

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whoever committed to the Alliance. I am opposed to the proliferation of
the burden of having reality and substance to the NATO principles should be
in the Alliance itself. To meet this desire, the nuclear weapons debarred for
over the nuclear capability when authorizes NATO defense plans should be ended
I believe it is the desire of all NATO nations that the authority
something to the discussion now taking place.

solution to this difficult problem. It is enough that they should contribute
tem arguments and conclusions of my own. They are not offered as the
long out of minority, while experience is still fresh. I would like to make a
gender of trying to make it appear smaller than it is. But before I am too
I let me say that I am well aware of the complexity of this subject and the
even may be preferred to give in its own and in the common interest.

I am not able to agree with the conclusions of the UN General Assembly
on the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council is a body which is
responsible to the UN and should function from a successful resolution of the problem,
but of all to consider the views, the needs, of others. Since every nation
the time has come to stop this problem. There must be willingness on the
part of the UN.

reasons. Like the renewed strength of Europe, that must be accepted as a
reasonable right to their own bequeath as well as to the Alliance.

the decision-making process. They feel they need time in order to fulfill their
preservation of their freedom. Further, they wish a voice, an influence, in
effectiveness of the reasons on which they must place dependence for the
are essential to their defense. They want a guarantee of the continuing
Europeans are convinced that nuclear weapons, in some strength and in some form,
nevertheless, there are some common denominators which appear fundamental. Not
Here the views in Europe, as in the United States, vary over a wide range.

organized.

independent control and authority, as most of us are. In my judgment, the actual physical custody of the weapons or warheads, therefore, should be retained by the doper country.

By taking on this new authority, the NATO Council would assume a wider responsibility. To discharge this responsibility, the Council should develop, as indeed it has started to do, guidelines, rules of engagement, principles and established conditions for the possible use of the weapons in the defense of the people and territory of the Alliance.

In principle, the responsibility relating to the NATO nuclear capability is a collective one; it must be shared by all of the fifteen member countries. However, a conference of fifteen states is hardly an effective operational or executive body. It should not be expected to direct military operations nor, in emergency, to take those urgent decisions which might be required to initiate such operations.

One answer to this problem would be for the Council to create a smaller executive body wholly responsive to it. In its simplest form this body might consist of a representative from the countries contributing to the NATO nuclear stockpile: the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. To make sure that all fifteen countries are represented, that all views are heard, and to assist in integrating the overall efforts of the Alliance, the Secretary General, who serves all member nations, could preside over this executive group but not necessarily as a voting member.

The formula I am suggesting seeks to respect the rights and responsibilities of each NATO member. It does so by adding strength and stability to the Alliance as a political authority. It seeks a solution within the structure and spirit of NATO. On the other hand, it should go a long way toward meeting the particular requirements of certain countries, France for instance, since it recognises the special position of the three NATO nations possessing a nuclear capability.

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the specific position of the five NATO nations possessing a major superpower.
Requirements of certain countries, France to instance, since it recognises
NATO. On the other hand, it should be some distance forward meeting the criterion
a political authority. It seeks a solution within the structure and spirit of
of each NATO member. It aims to add strength and substance to the Alliance so
the formula I am suggesting some to respect the rights and responsibilities
not necessarily as a voting member.

who serve as [N] member nations, could breathe over the executive branch put
that in integrating the overall efforts of the Alliance, the Secretary General,
that [N] fifteen countries are represented, that [N] views are heard, and to
stockholm: the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. To make sure
that a representative from the country contributing to the NATO member
executive body who is a reasonable to it. In the subject form this body might
One answer to this problem would be for the Commiss to create a smaller
than operations.

emergence, to take those urgent decisions which might be required to initiate
executive body. It should not be expected to direct wholly operations nor, in
However, a conference of fifteen states is partly an effective operational or
is a collective one: it must be agreed [N] of the fifteen member countries.
In [N] [the reasonableness] relating to the NATO member capabilities
beneath and territory of the Alliance.

enablers conditions for the possible use of the weapons in the defense of the
as indeed it has been stated to do, [N] [substitute] role of engagement, [N] [broad] and
reasonableness]. To discharge this reasonableness, the Commiss should develop
By failing on this new authority, the NATO Commiss would seem a wider
retained by the other country.

against hypothetical enemy of the weapons or warheads, [N] [bore] should be
independent control and authority, as much as we. In my judgment, the

There are at least two possible variations of the executive group to which I have just referred. For instance, the size, the strength, and the geographic position of the Federal Republic of Germany, the involvement of that country in almost every aspect of the defense of central Europe, and, somewhat more recently, the status of the Germanic countries in the European Union. Perhaps this could initially be not by giving Germany some appropriate representative status with the executive body. Another possible variant would be to have two additional members elected from among the NATO nations on a rotating basis, although enlargement of the body might limit its effectiveness.

I believe the NATO nations agree that their responsibility is a collective one. The Council as a whole could, therefore, as I have suggested, direct and supervise the development of the Alliance's nuclear capability and lay down rules governing its use. In a military emergency, the Council as a whole should of course be consulted if time allows. But in the most urgent situations, the executive body should in my opinion take action in the first instance, being guided by the rules established by the Council, the highest political authority of the Alliance. Because a prompt and positive decision would be essential in a quickly-developing situation, the rule of unanimity may not be workable even in this small group. If a unanimous decision could not be reached, a majority vote could govern, and in my judgment should govern. In such an event, the member in the minority could reserve the option of withholding the force of his own country, although in logic it would be desirable to commit them and in practice this would probably be inevitable. However, the weapons which the dissenting country will already have made available for use by the force of other countries, under the common NATO plan, must remain committed and available.

A formula of the sort I have just outlined would, I am convinced, permit the NATO political authorities promptly to exercise their powers in a military

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The NATO Political authorities promptly to exercise their powers in a modified
A formula of the sort I gave just outlined would, I am convinced, permit
available.

other countries, under the common NATO plan, must remain committed and
dissenting countries will already have made available for use by the forces of
in practice time would properly be available. However, the weapon when the
its own country, although in itself it would be desirable to commit them and
member in the minority could reserve the option of withholding the forces of
vote could govern, and in my judgment should govern. In such an event, the
in this small group. It is a manifest decision which not be resolved, a majority
a quickly-developing situation, the rate of majority may not be worldwide even
of the Alliance. Because a brought and positive decision would be essential in
enjoyed by the rules established by the Council, the highest political authority
executive body should in my opinion take action in the first instance, being
of course be committed in time and soff. But in the most serious situation, the
rules governing its use. In a materially emergent, the Council as a whole should
embark the development of the Alliance's nuclear capability and lay down
one. The Council as a whole could, therefore, as I have suggested, direct and
I believe the NATO nations agree that their responsibility is a collective
might limit its effectiveness.

among the NATO nations on a rotating basis, although enlargement of the body
Another possible variant would be to have two additional members elected from
Germany some appropriate representative states with the executive body.

Somehow be taken into account. Perhaps the only country initially be not in living
that country in some event, except of the damage of central Europe, etc.
Geographical position of the beautiful Republic of Germany, the involvement of
which I have just referred, for instance, the state, the strength, and the
there are at least two possible variations of the executive branch to

emergency. It may meet some of the desires — the demands — of the Europeans for a voice, a real voice, in the control of military power.

The ideas I have presented involve difficulties I know. There are technical problems of organization. There may well be problems of law. There are certainly political involvements, perhaps most especially for those NATO members who would not be included in a three or four or five-member executive body. However, I am sure that our European allies will consider any constructive proposal. They realise, at least as well as we do on this side of the Atlantic, that the future of the Alliance may well depend on an early answer to the question of authority over the NATO nuclear capability.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is by no means the only structure binding together the Atlantic community but it is, I think, the most important. Perhaps this importance stems from its having some into being for the purpose of dealing with a primary, even primal, responsibility of government — self defense. But while we do not forget the need for military forces and weapons and take satisfaction from NATO's increasingly effective shield, we also realise that military defense is not the sole purpose, the only reason for being, of the Alliance.

NATO's founders, with wisdom and statesmanship, recognized that an alliance so created must, while looking to its military power, draw its true strength from an ever expanding area of common interest — political, economic and moral. The founders, therefore, provided in Article Two of the Treaty, that the parties should "strengthen their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of principles upon which these institutions are founded and by promoting conditions of stability and well being."

The Alliance was designed to preserve the peace, to provide security, to guarantee our freedom, but it was also designed to preserve, to ingratiate and

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Guarantee our freedom! but it was also designed to preserve, to improve and
pursue promoting conditions of stability and well-being."

Better understanding of principles upon which these institutions are founded
the battle should "arise when their free institutions" by bringing about a
more. The founders, therefore, provided in Article two of the Treaty, that
from an ever expanding area of common interest — politics, economics and
so created may, while looking to its military power, draw its true strength

NATO's founders, with wisdom and statesmanship, recognized that an alliance
Villiance.

that military defense is not the sole purpose, the only reason for being, of the
and fakepolitik from NATO's increasingly effective shield, we see refashion
defense. But while we do not forget the need for military forces and weapons
of defense with a primarily, even primarily, reasonableness of government — soft
beneath this importance adumns from its having come into being for the purpose
pursuing together the Atlantic community put it as I think, the most important

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is by no means the only structure
answer to the creation of authority over the NATO unies, especially
the Atlantic, that the future of the Alliance may well depend on an early
etiological proposal. They realize, at least as well as we do on this side of
polity. However, I am sure that our European Union will counter and com-
mande who would not be included in a time or four or five-member executive
are certainly political involvements, because most explicitly for the NATO
counter problems of organization. There was well to be problem of law. There
the ideas I have presented involve difficulties I know. There is no
for a voice, a rest voice, in the control of military power.
emergency.
If any one of the desires — the demands — of the European

The ideas I have presented involve difficulties I know. There is no
for a voice, a rest voice, in the control of military power.
emergency.
If any one of the desires — the demands — of the European

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to expand, a way of life that is free and dynamic and which, in reality as well as in purpose, provides for the welfare of the peoples of all our countries and of the countries beyond.

Of the freedoms we enjoy, we cherish and defend, a vital one, is freedom of expression — a freedom that includes the sovereign right tocriticize. Our day seems to have generated a passion for criticism which at times ascribes our friends and I am sure confuses our foes. On occasion it may even bewilder us. It is certainly plain enough that this right is now being exercised to the full by members of the Alliance on both sides of the Atlantic.

I, for one, question the form that some of the criticism is taking. It is true, quite true, that the Alliance reveals, for all to see, deficiencies and disagreements, some of them serious. But to see only the problems is to miss the most important fact of the Alliance: the fact of its basic unity.

Berlin has, over a period of years, offered the most frequent and perhaps the best examples of the Alliance standing together. But to use a more recent illustration, we witnessed at the height of the Cuban urisde what I believe should rank as an outstanding demonstration — a spectacular demonstration — of Allied unity.

The facts concerning Castro's action during the Cuban test are quite straightforward. They must have been as encouraging to President Kennedy and the American authorities as they were chilling to Mr. Khrushchev.

On that important Monday when the President disclosed the situation to the American people, our Chairman this evening, Mr. Acheson, presented the United States position to the North Atlantic Council in Paris. There the unanimous support of the Alliance was assured. That our fifteen sovereign states could achieve unanimity on such a grave issue was remarkable enough; what made the happening unique was the preponderance with which the unanimity was

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made the tabernacle into the hophouse with which the sacrifice was
confined, and then, on such a grave estate, the sacrifice enough, what
sacrilege, to adopt, of the Alliance was secured. That our fifteen sovereign states
United States position to the North Atlantic Council in Paris. There the
American people, our citizens this evening, Mr. Acheson, precluded the
On that important Monday when the President disclosed the situation to
and the American authorities as that were shifting to Mr. Kennedy,
attracting forward. They must have been الشOCKING to President Kennedy
The facts concerning NATO's action during the German war are due
of Villeroy's unity.

should rank as an outstanding demonstration — a spectacular demonstration —
illustration, we understood at the height of the German offensive what I believe
the best examples of the Villeroy standing together. But to use a more recent
Berlin peace, over a period of, offered the most transparent and明白
was the most important step of the Alliance: the lack of the best unity.
and disagreements, some of them serious. But to see only the program is to
be true, quite true, that the Alliance reveals, for all to see, deficiencies
I, for one, creation the form that some of the criticism is taking. If
will fly apart of the Alliance on both sides of the Atlantic.

He. If it is certain, plain enough that this right is now being exercised to the
our friends and I am sure corresponds our fee. On occasion it may even happen
Our day seems to have generated a passion for criticism which of course should
of expression — a freedom that includes the sovereign right tocriticize.

Of the freedoms we enjoy, we Cherish and defend, a part of our freedom
of the countries beyond.

as in Henry's, provides for the welfare of the people of the countries and
to expand, a way of life that is free and democratic and which, in reality, as well

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Jailed inボルト-エーリック・コスコ. These are current issues. But we seek
the evolution I gave above of strength and of the organization of the
free men, demand the creation of a true Atlantic Community."

Herbert just a year ago stated in the Declaration of Rights "that our survival as
the representatives of many nations who under the jurisdiction of Governor
we will" be sought to be the *only* basis of the Atlantic Community. I John
own firm conviction that the benefit of the future, if we are so survive, and
for one, welcome the present flash — the thoughtful second look. If we are
the future Europe will be defined by Europeans, so it should be. But I,
to matters of defense.

Preserve what has been tried and proven. The interest relates specifically
association of the fifteen countries of NATO — and, with this, a desire to
be growing interest in pointing on to the good that has come from the larger
Community will off for sufferations of nations. As the same time, there
If it is recognized, of course, that some abstract balance within the Atlantic
ocean. I believe that there is now a tendency to take a longer second look.
Europeans due to defend the strength and the power toward the side of the
on what might be offered a "Europeans" solution — the establishment of a
as well as influences from the side of the Atlantic, were focusing espouse
surge. Six months to a year ago I was impressed that forces at work in Europe,
ment of newHotspot arrangements, the creation of a new structure of relation-
ship. You are all aware of the preoccupation of the Europeans with the develop-
ment of a new Hotspot.

of which when initially considered. Here we took positive action of what kind we
never been able to match title in the same of influence. Here we took
rescued and the effectiveness of the declaration to stand further. There has
been

Room 5600
30 Rockefeller Plaza

January 31 '63
19

To: Dr. Kissinger

From: BERENT-FRIELE M. Wise

Mr. Friele is in Brazil
until Wednesday, February 6,
which explains memos from Mr. Wheatley.

January 31, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller

FROM: Henry Wheatley

SUBJECT: Governor-elect of the State of Bahia, Brazil

The Governor-elect, Antonio Lamonte, Jr. is visiting the United States and has expressed an interest in seeing you.

Mr. Friele called on Dr. Lamonte on January 22nd. You had received a wire from Congressman Albert Thomas of Texas requesting your good offices in greeting the Governor. In a reply on your behalf to Congressman Thomas, Mr. Friele described Governor Lamonte as "an extremely attractive and dynamic person and a great friend of the United States." On the same day he arrived in New York, he received a telephone call from President Goulart and returned to Brazil that evening. Mr. Friele expressed the hope that a meeting with you could be arranged later, and in his absence I am writing to suggest that you see the Governor-elect at your office in New York City if your schedule permits.

Dr. Lamonte is now in Washington and will be in New York on Thursday, February 7 and Friday, February 8. He is awaiting word of your response to his request before making final plans to leave for Europe.

cc Mrs. Boyer
    Miss Dalrymple
    Mrs. Savell
    Dr. Kissinger

Mr. Friele

January 31, 1963

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Henry Wheatley

SUBJECT: Visit of King Savang Vathana of Laos, February 22.

His Royal Highness Sri Savang Vathana, King of Laos, will be making a brief, unofficial visit to the United States on route from Canada to Poland and the Soviet Union. He is accompanied by his half-brother the Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and a party of 14. They will arrive by plane in the morning of February 22.

The State Department has suggested that you call on King Savang Vathana at the Waldorf Towers on Thursday, February 22, at 12:30. They thought this hour would be most convenient for you since it is shortly before the luncheon which you are giving for President Betancourt.

King Vathana, who is 55 years old, became King of Laos on the death of his father in 1959. He attended the School of Political Science in Paris, served as Secretary General of the Kingdom of Laos for ten years, later as President of the Laos Privy Council. He was in the United States in 1947 as Advisor on French-Siamese Conciliation Commission; led the Laoian delegation to the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1952; made a State visit to the United States in 1956.

cc Mrs. Boyer
    Miss Dalrymple
    Mrs. Savell
    Mr. Friele
    Dr. Kissinger✓

February 15, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNOR

From: Henry A. Kissinger

Subject: **Admiral Arleigh Burke**

The other day in Washington, I spoke with Arleigh Burke, former Chief of Naval Operations. He is extremely unhappy about the current state of affairs, and said he would be very interested in being helpful to you.

Admiral Burke is very well connected with conservative elements in the country. I think it might be useful if an appointment were arranged with him some time during the next few months.

If you approve, I would be happy to arrange a meeting.

meeting.

It you approve, I would be happy to arrange a
next few months.

an appointment were arranged with him some time during the
tive elements in the country. I think it might be useful if
Admiral Burke is very well connected with conserva-
would be very interested in being helpful to you.

unwillingly about the current state of affairs, and said he
Burke, former Chief of Naval Operations. He is extremely
the other day in Washington, I spoke with Arleigh

From: Henry V. Kiebler

MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNOR

February 12, 1963

March 26, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

I have been thinking about the idea of your going to Brazil this year. I can see many arguments for it, however, there are a few negative considerations which I believe you should consider before making your final decision.

1. It is conceivable though not likely that Leftists will use this as an occasion for anti-American demonstrations. If this happens, Kennedy certainly would not mind and I do not believe that American intelligence agencies will kill themselves to prevent it.

2. The political situation in Brazil is extremely unstable. My judgment of Goulart and Dantas is that they are both extreme opportunists. I consider it possible that they may combine a somewhat conservative economic policy with an extremely radical foreign policy. It seems to me not inconceivable that Goulart is planning another chaotic situation in which he can emerge as a kind of Vargas. If that happens, too close an association or pictures showing you being very intimate with him, may hurt you.

3. Your contacts in Brazil are so good that you really have all the information and you do not need a visit there for your own education.

All things considered, I would recommend not going to Latin America this time. If you would like to take any trips in addition to the one to Europe, you might consider India or some parts of Africa.

Attract.

to the one to Europe, you might consider India or some barbs of
America's late time. If you would like to take such barbs in addition
All things considered, I should recommend not going so far inatin
for your own equation.

3. Your contacts in Brazil are so good that you really have
much work to do.

batteries spanning how long being very intimate with him,
Europe. If that pabula, too close an association or
couscetic attraction in which he can emerge as a kind of
not inconceivable that Goulart is basing troops
an extremely radical foreign policy. It seems to me
may comprise a somewhat conservative economic policy with
extreme heterogeneities. I consider it possible that the
My judgment of Goulart and Bauta is that they are pop
3. The political situation in Brazil is extremely volatile.

will fill themselves to prevent it.

I do not believe that American intelligence agencies
It is true pabula, Kennedy certainly would not mind and
see this as an occasion for anti-American demonstrations.

1. It is conceivable though not likely that Kennedy will

before seeing your final decision.

The negative considerations which I believe you should consider
the best. I can see many arguments for it, however, there are a
I have been thinking about the idea of your going to Brazil

FROM: HENRY V. KISSIMLER

REMEMBERING TO: THE GOVERNMENT

HENRY V. KISSIMLER

March 20, 1963

March 26, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

1. The question at issue is the same one that has arisen time and time again in the discussion of the Bricker Amendment. The fear is that the President could appoint someone to a potential UN Disarmament commission who would then sign some agreement in the field which would bind the United States because it was an executive agreement, which the President would not submit to the Senate in treaty form.

2. The argument is as familiar as it is silly. There was great fear of this same sort of thing at the time of the UN Genocide Convention and at the time of the Human Rights Convention. In the former case the convention was submitted to the Senate for ratification but then withdrawn because it obviously was not going to pass, and has not been resubmitted. In the latter case, it has never been submitted. The whole furore arose because some lower judge in California ruled that the UN Declaration on Human Rights (not a treaty) was binding US law. This opinion was over-ruled by the California Supreme Court which declared the Human Rights Declaration to be a general statement of goals of the UN, not binding domestic law.

3. The supporters of the Bricker Amendment, among which Mr. Morris has long been prominent, are worried about something which has not yet really happened--significant action by the President which would bind us internationally but which is not submitted to the Senate for ratification. It is inconceivable to me that in the areas of disarmament or arms control that the public or the Congress would ever let any such action be taken in the form of an executive agreement. In any event, the right to appoint someone to the UN delegation to discuss such matters would certainly not increase his authority to do so.

CONCLUSION: You should not raise this issue.

January 8, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNOR

From: Henry A. Kissinger

Subject: *Some Additional Notes on the Skybolt Controversy*<br>(Impact on the Alliance)

I. *History*.

The backbone of the British defense effort ever since
1951 has been the so-called independent deterrent. It was
encouraged after 1956 by our revision of the MacMahon act,
enabling us to give nuclear information to Great Britain.

The British retaliatory force has been composed of a
V-Bomber force numbering about 175. In 1957, Britain began
to develop its own missiles, called Blue Streaks--similar to
our Thor. This development was scrapped in February, 1960
in favor of Skybolt. Throughout the spring of 1960, the
Conservative government was under constant attack by Labour,
which charged (a) that Britain should abandon its independent
deterrent and (b) that if the deterrent was maintained, it
should not rely on Skybolt because it was a weapon which,
as Denis Healey said, "would never be delivered."

The debate about the utility of the British retaliatory
force took on added intensity after the advent of the Kennedy

Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller -2-

January 8, 1963

Administration. Harold Wilson, returning from Washington, claimed in February, 1962, that he had been told that the United States did not consider the British strategic forces of any significance; the British military effort should be channeled in other directions. This was denied by the British government. Labour then challenged the government to produce a single official United States statement affirming that it valued the British deterrent. This the government was unable to do.

With respect to Skybolt, the Conservative government consistently refuted Labour's charges by referring to an agreement with the United States to supply the missile.

*(New York Times, June 6, 1960.)* This has never been contradicted by us. Suddenly, a week before the last NATO meeting, we cancelled Skybolt without warning.

## II. The Nassau Agreement.

This is a document of extraordinary ambiguity. It offered Great Britain Polaris missiles (type not specified). It says that British Polaris forces are to be "assigned" to NATO and "targeted" by it. Except in circumstances where supreme national interests are at stake, they will be used for the "international defense of the West under all circumstances."

[y]

Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

-3-

January 8, 1963

Does this mean that Great Britain can use them independently or only that it can withhold their use when supreme national interests are at stake? Who determines whether supreme British interests are at stake: the United States, Great Britain or NATO?

If the terms "assigned" and "targeted" are used in their conventional sense, Britain will have no operational control over the Polaris forces in ordinary periods. They are therefore much less useful for political maneuvering than an independent Bomber force.

Other questions arise: Does Britain have a warhead for the Polaris? What type did we offer? If the latest model, it will not be available for three or four years. In any case, Great Britain cannot build Polaris submarines before 1968.

What does "targeted" mean? If Britain wants to reserve independent use, then in a crisis either the NATO plan cannot be fulfilled or the British will not be able to dispose of their weapons.

Who controls the so-called NATO multilateral force? SHAPE? The NATO Council? How?

At the NATO Council meeting, McNamara criticized independent forces. At Nassau we seemed to concede them while hedging

Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

-4-

January 8, 1963

with conditions which make it hard to tell just what we have
offered. The Nassau communique also stresses that strategic
war is "indivisible." If this is true, separate nuclear forces
make no sense. If we support independent forces, we need a
new strategic theory. As things stand, we have offered
Polaris submarines with one hand and with the other we have
furnished ammunition to all those domestic forces in Great
Britain and France who seek to thwart them. Labour spokesmen
will be able to use our own statements in their efforts to
scuttle the Polaris deal.

The Nassau communique reverses traditional NATO doctrine
by calling nuclear weapons the "shield" and conventional
weapons the "sword." None of our Continental allies agree
with this. Indeed, I doubt whether we are prepared to face
the implications. Do we really propose to fight a conventional
war in Europe? If so, not only will NATO forces have to be
increased, but their deployment must be radically altered.
This is a dangerous, perhaps reckless, policy. If we propose
to defend Europe with conventional forces, how are we going
to protect Iran?

### III. Political Implications.

There is general agreement that Skybolt could have been

Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

-5-

January 8, 1963

finished for $250 million. This sum, while not inconsiderable, represents less than 0.5% of our defense budget. In order to save this amount, we have thrown away the $350 million already spent. We have scrapped the major military program of our closest ally without consultation or even warning. Great Britain will have to recast its retaliatory force from airplanes to submarines and spend about twice for Polaris what it had planned for Skybolt.

We have also hastened the obsolescence of the weapon in which we are still strongest: the manned bombers of our own Air Force. It is clear that considerations of cost were not the primary determining factor. The real problem is a strategic theory which is almost a caricature of push-button warfare. It is no accident that the *London Times* called Kennedy's behavior"less than honest." (I would like to discuss this with you at greater length at your convenience.)

The Skybolt decision will reopen the nuclear debate in Great Britain. The possibility is real that the British nuclear program will be scrapped before 1968 when Polaris becomes available. This is almost a certainty if Labour comes into power--and MacMillan's position has certainly been severely shaken by this controversy.

Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

-6-

January 8, 1963

Such an outcome is all the more likely because, by MacMillan's admission, Britain will have to suffer a deterrent gap of three to four years after its V-Bomber force becomes obsolete around 1965 and before Polaris becomes operational around 1968-69. It will be argued that if Britain can get through this period without its own nuclear forces, it may as well do without them altogether. Is it to our interest to bring home to Britain such a sense of impotence?

If our Polaris offer is genuine, the circumstances which produced it militate against French acceptance. Can France make its own program dependent on an offer of future delivery of missiles after Britain's experience with Skybolt? Thus it seems certain that the French will push their own program regardless of what we do about Polaris. We have lost the possibility of a comprehensive re-examination of NATO strategy. Much of the policy of our European allies will seek to hedge against our unreliability. They will reason that if we would behave so brutally even to Britain, which really subordinated almost everything to its special relationship with us, what prospects do they have?

Apart from the bona fides of the Polaris offer, we have changed our proposals to NATO so often that no one can tell

Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller

-7-

January 8, 1963

any more what we want or believe. We have "assigned" sub-
marines to NATO--only to have this gesture turn out to be shifting
them from one United States headquarters to another. We have
spoken of a NATO force with mixed crews, of a European force,
even of a land-based force--all in the space of two years.
How can other governments base their policy on so mercurial
an ally?

The action in Katanga completes the record. We assert
that our interests and those of Europe are indivisible. But
we act in every instance independently and against the best
judgment of our closest allies. Most Europeans are convinced--
and, I believe, correctly--that Tshombe's crime in the eyes
of the United Nations majority was not secession but a
pro-Western bias. Whatever the merits of the Katanga action,
it is not likely to give the Europeans an incentive to
entrust us with the sole responsibility for their future.

April 2, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: CORT SCHUYLER'S MEMORANDA

I have read Cort Schuyler's memoranda about NATO. I think that his view represents the situation of a few years ago but is no longer adequate to the new reality.

Cort sees a great deal of merit in the formal "assignment" of units to SHAPE. I think in the nuclear field this is largely symbolic and does not touch the heart of the problem. We have to face the issue directly whether we are prepared to see an independent center of nuclear decision in Europe and coordinate its action with ours through the process of political consultation. Our present course, of which Cort's proposal is a more intelligent version, tends towards the denuclearization of Europe. This, I fear will eventually produce neutralism. I agree with you about the desirability of a European Atomic Force.

I am going to send you a fuller statement about this in another week.

this in another week.

I am going to send you a full statement about

destrapidity of a European Atomic Force.
eventually produce neutrality. I agree with you about the
towards the demobilization of Europe. This, I fear will
of which Cort's proposal is a more intelligent one, tends
to the process of political consultation. Our present course,
decision in Europe and coordinate its action with ours through
we are prepared to see an independent center of influence
of the peoples. We have to face the task directly whether
field side is largely symphonic and does not touch the heart
"appointment" of units in SWAN. I think in the near future
Cort sees a great deal of merit in the total

also put is no longer adequate to the new reality.
I think that the view represents the situation of a few years
I have read Cort Schuyler's memorandum about NATO. I

SUBJECT: CORT SCHUYLER'S MEMORANDUM

FROM: HENRY V. KISSINGER

MEMORANDUM TO: GOVERNOR NISSON V. ROCKEFELLER

April 3, 1963

April 12, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: GOVERNOR NELSON ROCKEFELLER
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

I talked to Frank Meyer on the telephone yesterday. Difficult as he was in his conference with you, it has born some fruit. He told me that if you were the Republican nominee, he would endorse you. He also said that if you continued to take a strong line on foreign policy, he would not oppose you before the nomination, though he would not make any endorsement until after you are officially nominated. He said that he has talked very often to Senator Goldwater and that Goldwater likes you personally very much and will back you once you have the nomination, without reservation.

I told Mr. Meyer that I did not know whether you had decided to be a candidate and that as far as I knew, you were going to make the decision later this year, however, I was glad to learn of his views.

to learn of his views.

Going to make the decision later this year, however, I was glad
decided to be a candidate and that as far as I know, you were
I told Mr. Meyer that I did not know whether you had
you once you have the nomination, without reservation.

that Goldwater likes you personally very much and will pack
said that he has talked very often to Senator Goldwater and
any endorsement until after you are officially nominated. He
obobe you before the nomination, though he would not make
tinued to take a strong line on foreign policy, he would not
nominee, he would endorse you. He also said that if you con-
some fruit. He told me that if you were the Republican
Ditticit as he was in his conference with you, it was por
I talked to Frank Meyer on the telephone yesterday.

FROM: HENRY V. KIRRINGER
TO: GOVERNOR MELSON ROCKKEITLER

MEMORANDUM

April 13, 1963

August 30, 1963

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
22 West 55th Street
New York, New York

Dear Nelson:

I am sending you a letter which Edward Teller wrote me last week recommending that you make another statement on the nuclear test issue. While I have great sympathy for Edward and admire his courage and dedication, I do not agree that this is an appropriate moment for another statement on nuclear testing.

The reservations proposed by Edward are already contained in your statement of two weeks ago. To repeat them would simply seem like unnecessary carping. I think you have a good position now which has already in effect been supported by Eisenhower and others. It does not seem to me that another statement would affect the issue of radification or increase your influence in determining foreign policy in the larger sense. I would therefore recommend against it.

With kind regards.

Henry V. Klaageber

Witk Klaageber

the larger sense. I would therefore recommend against it.
or increase your influence in determining foreign policy in
that another statement would affect the issue of ratification
supported by Eisenhower and others. It does not seem to me
have a good position now which can be already in effect been
would study seem like unnecessary carving. I think you
contained in your statement of two weeks ago. To repeat them
The reservations proposed by Edward are already
unclear testing.

that this is an appropriate moment for another statement on
Edward and admire his courage and dedication. I do not agree
on the nuclear test issue. While I have great empathy for
wrote me last week recommending that you make another statement
I am sending you a letter which Edward Teller

Dear Nelson:

New York, New York

33 West 22nd Street

The Honorable Nelson V. Klaageber

August 30, 1963

P. O. Box 808
Lavermore, California

August 26, 1963

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

It seems very likely that the test ban treaty will be ratified. There is a great danger that it will be ratified without reservations. It would seem to me highly desirable if Nelson would make a second short and emphatic statement stressing the need for reservations. The most important of these, in my opinion, would be the following:

First, that in case of aggression nuclear weapons can be used without delay.

Second, that the treaty shall not inhibit purely defensive preparations jointly to be undertaken by our Allies and ourselves.

Thirdly, that Plowshare outside the United States be permitted provided no sizeable amount of radioactivity is deposited outside the nations that participate in the operation.

I know that you will be in a better position to formulate the reservations in a proper manner. There may be additional reservations but the three listed above seem to me most important. Having talked with some people I gained the impression that the restrictions mentioned in Nelson's earlier statement have not been clearly understood by everyone as suggestions for formal reservations.

In making a second statement Nelson might stress the importance of the treaty, he might point out the pressures originating from the Administration, and he might emphasize the importance of each Senator using his most conscientious judgment.

A second short statement by Nelson---which would not take back any of his earlier points---could be really useful. It might be even politically advantageous. It does not help if resistance against Russia is left to Goldwater. Many Senators resent the Administration's tactics. The second statement could be effective and popular.

I shall arrive in Washington late on Saturday, the 31st. I expect to be on MEET THE PRESS on September 1st, which is to be filmed in Washington, and will be shown the same day. For Labor Day I have no plans. On the 3rd and 4th I shall probably be in the Boston area on my usual consulting jobs. I plan to fly back to the West Coast on the evening of the 4th, to be present at the meeting on the 5th at Stanford, where I am appearing on the request of Nelson's office. I doubt that a visit with Nelson can be worked in. If this should prove possible, however, I would be really happy.

With best regards,

Edward Teller

ET:gg

the Vision letter

October 8, 1963

With all Washington's head-holding despair about the military take-
overs in Honduras and the Dominican Republic, and before them in Ecuador and
Guatemala in this year alone, the real issues facing the Hemisphere aren't
even being debated. These are simply: economic development of Latin America
in partnership with the U.S., and the struggle to block the spread of Castro-
communism, again in partnership with the U.S.

Because it is the richest nation in the world, because it is the
bulwark of the West's struggle against communism, and because it is the nat-
ural leader of the Western Hemisphere, these huge and fundamental problems
are laid in the lap of the U.S. They cannot be avoided. Events in Santo
Domingo and Tegucigalpa cannot be explained, as the Administration would like,
on the basis of "local situations" without relevance to the Latin American
whole. They are directly traceable to the fact that the U.S. under the Ken-
nedy administration is not living up to the fundamental challenges facing it:

* The "isolation" of Cuba is a myth. Castro-communist agents are openly at war with every government on the arc of the Caribbean. Homegrown extremists threaten the stability of other nations further to the south. The Administration still has no program with a Chinaman's chance of toppling the Castro regime, and it has yet to work out a policy flexible enough to help other countries fight local and imported subversion.

* The Alliance for Progress, while well intentioned, has not been
carried through vigorously enough to convince Latin America of its fundamen-
tal value. Although President Kennedy refers again and again to the fact that
"Latin America is the most critical area in the world today", it is starkly
apparent that his government has treated it on a second or third priority basis.

A catalog of failures -- of commission and omission -- on these basic
issues is long and tawdry, starting with the Bay of Pigs and leading to the
emasculation in the House of Representatives of the Alliance for Progress
budget. President Kennedy and his aids have plenty of good ideas and good in-
tentions for Latin America, but they have never shown the energy or sense of
purpose to translate them into meaningful and sustained policy. To this day
the Administration hasn't even found a man of national stature to put the Alli-
ance and other inter-American problems across, either here or in Latin America
-- as it has with Harriman for South Asia, Stevenson for the UN, Williams for
Africa, and even Shriver for the Peace Corps.

What good does it do to argue whether or not any form of aid should
be withdrawn from Honduras? Toward what goal do we consider acts of retali-
tion against the military-civilian government in the Dominican Republic?

Latin America is threatened to its foundations by a communist-extremist con-
spiracy which attempts to make orderly development impossible. Military reac-
tion in the face of this provocation is often inevitable, and not always un-
justified. If Washington wants to see pure democracy in this Hemisphere, it
must take the vigorous steps necessary to make it possible.

October 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: DIGEST OF "DEFENSES OF PEACE" BY STEPHEN E. SEADLER
         AS REQUESTED

1. It is imperative to find a way to bring the arms race to a successful and safe end. This can never happen in disarmament negotiations as they are now conducted. The first step must be "ideological disarmament," so that the Soviet Union and the Chinese will no longer approach international relations with a philosophy of violence which makes all peaceful negotiations fruitless.

2. The weapons of war are now so destructive that we can no longer be satisfied merely to punish the aggressor after he has acted. We must prevent the aggressor from attacking by considering a threat to the peace as illegal as the actual aggression itself. We should, therefore, consider the Communist ideology a threat to the peace because it is inherently violent.

3. The most significant shortcoming of Western approach to Communism is our failure to appreciate the nature of the Communist philosophy, and our failure to formulate policy on the basis of such an understanding.

a. The "dialectics" of Communism dictate that capitalist society must undergo <u>sudden</u> change. That capitalism could gradually evolve into something worthwhile is inconceivable from a Communist point of view.

b. The "historical materialism" of Communism dictates policies of violence and ruthlessness. Force is needed to accomplish change.

c. Communism is technically not an ideology to the Communist. The Communist never deals in ideas (as did the Fascist). The Communist must always deal only in historical fact and objective truth. His system is, therefore, not subject to debate.

MEMORANDUM TO: THE GOVERNOR

Page 2. 10/11/63

4. With this new appreciation of the inherently violent nature of Communism, we should adopt a new foreign policy approach:

a. In all foreign policy assessments we should recognize that the Communists are directed by their philosophy to use force to achieve their goals. (This is particularly important to remember during those "peace offensives" which the Communists alternate with more belligerent periods.)

b. We should adopt the position that that part of the ideology which preaches violence is, itself, a violation of the United Nations Charter, particularly those provisions which obligate members to respect treaty provisions and international law.

c. We should establish a "UN Committee on Dialectical Materialism" to study the subject and recommend that the USSR and other nations "affirming Dialectical Materialism rescind it or adequately modify it."

d. We should stop all present disarmament negotiations and announce that there is no sense in trying to attain actual disarmament until we have "Ideological Disarmament" -- the renunciation of the Communist philosophy of violence. Under UN auspices we should institute negotiations for "Ideological Disarmament." After "Ideological Disarmament" has been achieved (in other words after the Communists have renounced the philosophy of violence inherent in Communism) then actual disarmament would follow easily.

COMMENT: Mr. Seadler's proposals whice academically provocative, have, at best, limited practical value -- as he, himself, implies with a simple historical fact:

"When I(deological) D(isarmament) is completed in the case of Communism, it will not be the first case on record. It will, however, be the first case not preceded by military defeat and occupation."

Digest prepared by Douglas L. Bailey, gone over by Henry A. Kissinger

October 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Governor
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

The *New York Times* of October 23 reports that you said the
following about Vietnam:

"When a leader in a country is attacked,
the people of that country tend to rally behind
him, even if they didn't support him earlier.
Something like that has happened in South
Vietnam."

I believe this position should be reconsidered for the following
reasons:

a) I would not involve Lodge as a critic of this Administration.
In my judgment of his character, he will be only too eager to contradict
you.

b) The statement implies that but for the President's inter-
vention the people of Vietnam would not support their government and
that this might be desirable. I think your criticism should be exactly
the opposite. I would recommend adopting the following position:

1) The difficulties in Vietnam are the direct result of our
inconsistent policy with respect to Laos. The so-called coalition
government in Laos has opened up a line of supply for the Communist
guerrillas into Vietnam. The establishment of a so-called coalition
government in Laos has created the precedent for similar demands in
Vietnam. Thus both the political and military positions in Vietnam have
been compromised by our actions in Laos.

been combusted by our actions in Korea.

Vietnam. June past the political and military positions in Vietnam gave
Government in Korea has created the precedent for similar demands in
Soviet Russia into Vietnam. The establishment of a so-called coalition
Government in Korea has opened up a line of supply for the Communist
inconsistent policy with respect to Korea. The so-called coalition
i) The difficulties in Vietnam are the direct result of our
the objective. I would recommend adopting the following position:
that this might be desirable. I think your criticism should be exactly
attention the people of Vietnam would not support their Government and
p) The statement implies that put for the President's inter-
you.

In my judgment of his character, he will be only too eager to contradict
a) I would not involve myself as a critic of this Administration.
reasons:

* Vietnam."
* Something like that has happened in South
  him, even if they didn't abduct him earlier.
* the people of that country tend to rely upon
* "When a leader in a country is attacked,
following upon Vietnam:

The *New York Times* of October 23 reports that he said the

FROM: Henry V. Kirtlinger

TO: The Governor

MEMORANDUM

October 23, 1963

-2-

2) Public attacks by the Administration on the Diem Government illustrate once again the unfortunate style of conducting policy by press releases and confusing public relations gimmicks with diplomacy.

3) The chief object of any guerilla war is to demoralize the existing government. If we undermine the Diem regime, we are really doing the Viet Cong's work for them. Moreover, how can our encouragement of a military revolt against the Diem government be reconciled with our disapproval of military revolts in other parts of the world?

4) A public announcement by Secretary McNamara that we would withdraw 1,000 troops by the end of this year and the remainder by 1965 must give comfort to the Viet Cong. It must be proved to the Communists that if they hold out long enough, they are bound to prevail.

5) We should, of course, use our influence to bring about a government which is responsive to popular demand, but we should also keep in mind that in a guerrilla war defeating the Communists must have first priority.

cc. Mr. Hinman
Mr. Perkins
Miss Goldthwait

Mrs. Goldsmith
Mr. Perkin
cc. Mr. Hinsman

first priority.

keep in mind that in a guerrilla war deterring the Committee must have
Government which is reasonable to popular demand, but we should also
2) We should, of course, see our influence to bring about a
that it they hold out long enough, they are bound to prevail.

must have comfort to the Viet Cong. It must be proved to the Committee
withdraw 1,000 troops by the end of this year and the remainder by 1962
4) A hupite announcement by Secretary McNaught that we would
the world?
reconciled with our draft proposal of written proposals in other parts of
encouragement of a written proposal against the Vietnam Government be
resulting from the Viet Cong's work for them. Moreover, how can our
the existing Government. If we determine the Vietnam regime, we are
3) The chief object of any guerrilla war is to demoralize
broad releases and confounding hupite relations among troops with other
illustrate once again the unfortunate style of conducting warfare by
5) Hupite attacks by the Administration on the Vietnam Government

-5-

October 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Governor

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

Newspaper reports quote you as having stated that Goldwater
made a serious mistake in opposing ratification of the Test Ban
Treaty. I would recommend going easy on this line of argument. We
endorsed ratification of the Treaty rather lukewarmly. I do not
think we should be in a position of implying that the Test Ban was a
good thing.

As a general proposition, I would recommend drawing the line
with Goldwater on domestic issues. On foreign policy I would not
stress my differences unless there are clear questions of principle,
such as foreign aid. If you win the primaries, it will be necessary
to get the support of some of Goldwater's backers, and I think you
might agree most easily on a foreign policy line.

cc. Mr. Perkins
Mr. Hinman
Miss Goldthwait

Mr. Goldwater
Mr. Human
cc. Mr. Perkins

might agree most easily on a foreign border line.
to set the standard of some of Goldwater's packets, and I think you
such as foreign aid. It you win the primaries, it will be necessary
after all differences unless there are clear directions of principle,
with Goldwater on domestic issues. On foreign border I would not
be a general proposition. I would recommend leaving the line
out of mind.

To a general proposition, I would recommend leaving the line
out of mind.

Since we should be in a position of relying that the Test ban was a
encumbered proposition of the Treaty rather infrequently. I do not
believe I could recommend going any further on this line of argument. We
made a serious mistake in objecting to proposition of the Test ban
because of the serious mistake in objecting to proposition of the Test ban
Remember that reports indicate you are having tested that Goldwater

FROM: Henry V. Kretzmer
TO: The Governor

MEMORANDUM

October 23, 1983

STATE OF NEW YORK

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

EXECUTIVE CHAMBER

ALBANY

COPY

October 28, 1963

Dear Mr. Seadler:

Please forgive the delay in writing to thank
you for your letter and the copy of your study on
the "Defenses of Peace."

I agree with you about the crucial importance
of recognizing the causes of Communist behavior.
Clearly, without such an understanding, our policies
are doomed to futility, as you suggest.

I am grateful for the opportunity to see the
copy of your paper.

Mr. Stephen Edward Seadler
W. A. Sheaffer Pen Company
Fort Madison, Iowa

cc: Dr. Kissinger (w/photo of digest)

3-20-63-5M (281-326)

cc: Dr. Krasinger (w\photo of qfrest)

Port Madison, Iow
W. V. Chester Pen Combust
Mr. Stephen Edward Bedder

B\ Nelson V. Heekeloff

Sincerely,

copy of hom letter.
I am grateful for the opportunity to see the
are deemed to be utility, as your best.
Clearly, without any understanding, our buffer
of recognizing the cause of Communist behavior.
I agree with your point the crucial importance
the "Defenses of Peace."

hom for hom letter and the copy of hom spool on
please forgive the delay in writing to thank
the "Defenses of Peace."

Dear Mr. Bedder,

October 58, 1963

COPY
ALBANY
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF NEW YORK

[L]