*

TELCOM

June 24, 1973

Mr. Len Garment - Mr. Kissinger

11:25 a.m.

K: Hello.

G: Hello, Henry.

K: Len, How are you?

G: Good. The reason I was pressing to get you was that I had a call from Armand Hammer. A quick bit of background. We sat next to each other at the dinner the other night and he said that the Secretary General was very desirous of finding a control over the whole problem with the Jews in the Soviet Union. And, felt that one of the best things that could be done, he, Hammer, felt, would be to find an American Jew of great eminence as the Ambassador.

K: Impossible.

G: And that he felt that Brezhnev would look on that kindly. In any event....

K: Well, is he a Jew?

G: I don't know whether he is or not. But the name of Arthur Burns came up and this morning he a call came Hammer saying that Zimcheck said that they would look very favorably on that.

K: Yeah.

G: Now, Hammer is no fool.

K: Well, I'll check on it.

G: And obviously....

K: I'll ask the Russians whether that's true.

G: This came up yesterday at the meeting that they had in San Francisco and Zimcheck said that they would like to have a reaction on that. If there was a possibility of Mr. Burns doing it, that they would look upon that very favorably.

K: Well, let me check.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Dated 6/2/74

G: It would be quite an extraordinary move.

K: Well, let me check.

G: Well, OK, but I wanted you to have that. Because....

K: Well they have left but I can talk to them later.

G: All right. And Hammer met briefly with Burns the other night.
So there you are.

K: Good.

G: All right.

K: Thank you.

G: Thank you.

DEG ASSIGNED

Authority EO 12958

D#H

NARRATOR

*

TELCONE

June 24, 1973

Mr. Kissinger - Secy. Butz

11:32 a.m.

K: Hello?

B: Henry.

K: Mr. Secretary, how are you?

B: Fine. Are you here or are you in San Clemente?

K: No, I'm in San Clemente. Look, the Soviets yesterday, when they
were talking to us, offered to conclude a five-year deal starting when
this present one is finished, for the purchase of 5 million tons annually
of grain - - wheat, corn, barley, soy beans and other grain products
for convertible currency. And they want to exchange letters between
the President and Brezhnev. Now....

B: That's a minimum of 5 million tons a year.

K: That's right.

B: Of wheat, or corn, or beans...

K: Barley, soy beans and other grain products.

B: Any grain.

K: That's right.

B. It would be primarily, though, wheat, corn, or bean.

K: That's what I would think. Now, of course..

B: What do they want in return for it?

K: Nothing.

B: They just want a guarantee that they will be able to get 5 million tons a year.

K: Right. Now, what I would like to do---where are you?

B: I'm at my home.

CLASSIFIED
DEPT.
Authority E012858
DALLAS NARAD 6/2/84

*

2

K: All right. I will get this letter to Washington immediately. And I will have it hand delivered to your home.

B: Yes, that's all right, Henry.

K: Now, could you let me know soonest, one, what you think of this. Second, what this will do to our ability to sell grain to other countries in that period. Like the Chinese. Thirdly, what it does to, you know, how vulnerable it makes us domestically. And, you know, we don't have to do it in the next few days. We can just hold it a few weeks.

B: Frankly, at first blush, Henry, I would prefer not to do it right away. Until we can get our July 1 crop report, which comes out on July 8.

K: OK, that is fine...

B: That will give us, first, a pretty firm handle on this year's production. Now then, our wheat crop is here, but as you may know, Henry, we're going to come pretty close to scrapping the bottom of the barrel in the next crop year before June 30, 1974. And that is not because of short production this year. We're going to have by all odds our biggest crop ever this year.

K: Yeah, but this will not start till 1975.

B: Oh, this would start after the current year.

K: Well, this will start...

B: This will start July 1, 1974.

K: Well, it includes the current grain deal--well, it says '73 to '80 but the way they interpret it means that it goes into effect after the current grain deal. But what I need from you, first of all I need this to be kept secret.

B: That's right.

K: Second, I need your best judgment, if possible in some written form, by the end of the day out here.

B: All right. I will do that. But I'm not quite clear on this right now. This would start after the current crop year which would be July 1, 1974?

Soviet

K: Well, what it says is, Foreign Trade organizations will purchase in the United States of America in 1973-80 up to an average of 5 million tons annually of grain.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
Dated NARADY 6/2/84

TELCONE

3

B: OK, then 1970--that would start with the current crop.

K: Right, but aren't they already buying?

B: Yes, they've got a commitment for next year that is in excess of this
already, Henry.

K: So, that would cover that.

B: That's right. And I'll feel safer after this next year, but I guess that
would cover the commitment they've got.

K: Yes, that would cover the commitment. This would not be in addition.

B: Yeah, but I don't see what they give us in return for our guarantee to
make this available.

K: Now, what do you mean?

B: Well, if we guarantee to make a minimum of 5 million tons annually
to them, they must have some concession they are making to us. What
would that be? They are just guaranteeing to take 5 million tons and they
think that is good for us.

K: Yeah, but, you know, ... let us worry about whether we should get a
concession or not. I mean, what is the concession we should get for it?

B: I know one of the things we'd like to get, of course, is more information
out of the Soviet Union on their crop condition and like that. We think we
are getting some more in the Agricultural Agreement we signed here in
Washington last Tuesday, but not a great deal more. And I should think
that if we are going to supply them a minimum like this we ought to be
able to know if they will exceed it or not. This is one of our worries now,
Henry, is that we are overcommitting ourselves for sales in the next 12
months beyond the physical quantities we will have available.

K: Well, obviously, in the next 12 months we have already committed more
than this agreement would call for.

B: Yeah, well, all right.

K: Now, I'm trying to understand what the implications of this are. Whether
we should use wheat for getting other concessions--that decision we will
make in another context.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Dated NARA Ref. 6/2/94

4

*

B: OK.

K: What we would like to know is how much this takes of our available
grain.

B: All right, I'll get back to you just as....

K: I mean, can you see what I mean. I'd like to know if this takes so
much of our available grain that we've got nothing left for other countries.

B: Well, the answer is no. I think. Now, Henry, I wrote you a memo
just the other day, you haven't gotten it yet. About a conference we had
with ~~Wang~~ Huang Chen, the Chinese Ambassador here.

K: Yeah.

B: He was in our office for about 40 minutes. We had a very good conference.
And he was very frank about their need for grain.

K: Yeah, but that is one of the things I would like to know. What is the
impact of this on other countries.

B: All right, I'll get that back to you.

K: And then, we will probably opt for not doing it now. But since Brezhnev
appealed to the President directly and personally asked for a decision, we
can't just flick it off.

B: All right, now he may have appealed because of negotiations currently
taking place between Continental Grain Company and the Russian trading
agency in New York.

K: I don't think so. We had told him we wanted to put it on a long term
basis.

B: All right.

K: And that we couldn't do it on a year to year basis.

B: All right.

K: And we want to know if a five year deal gives you a better chance for
planning.

B: It will.

K: So, when you give us your judgment by the end of the day, and then I
will be in close touch with you and I will get that letter back to you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Date 6/2/84
D# 4444

TELCOM

June 24, 1973

Mr. Kissinger - Secy. Shultz

11:45 a.m.

K: Hello?

S: Hi, Henry.

K: Mr. Secretary? Where the hell are you?

S: Where I'm at Camp David. About to leave.

We had Patolocheck up here and his friends and he is, I think, just about leaving now.

K: OK, Well, I hope they are as noble people as their...as his boss is.

S: Well, I think they've had a pleasant time up here.

K: Good, now George, Brezhnev is pushing for a five-year, five million ton grain deal between us and them and he wants it signed this week. Now we will almost certainly not agree to that. But since I don't understand the issues sufficiently well I've already talked to Butz. Can I send you the letter that he wants to send to the President in which he wants the President to accept and get your comments ______ back by the end of the day? Out here---that means at night there.

S: Well, I'll send it. I don't know.... Butz is presumably the person who would know about the physical quantities...

K: That's right, but you can tell me about...

S: The other side of it has to do with the credits that go with it.

K: Well he doesn't ask for credits. They offer to pay cash. Or convertible currency.

S: I see.

S: That would be a very touchy thing to do right now because of the great stress on our food supply.

K: Well, as I understand it it would not require an increase of what is already committed next year.

S: Well, let me talk with Butz about it and I'll try to meet with him a little later in the day. I'm going to chopper down here in a few minutes.

DECE. AGREE?

Authority E.O. 12958
DATE NARAD DAE 6/2/73

TELCONE (San Clemente)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

June 24, 1973 5:20 p.m.

HK: ..... because if they can't find anything worse than that, then it was a major success.

RN: On the grain thing, how do you think--

HK: On the grain thing Mr. President I have talked to Shultz and Butz, both of them think it is an extremely good deal, they have a few nitpicks on the letter that they would like to change, their only recommendation is not to announce it now.

RN: Yeh, why don't you tell --pass the word to them, that we have got to get to our people and so forth, and we think it would be very positive to have a good announcement in two-three weeks.

HK: Well, I'll tell them the truth, I'll tell them we accept it in principle, that we have one or two minor changes, which I'll give them, which I'm sure they will accept, but that we have to wait until our crop report is in and we are also concerned about the impact on prices of a major announcement now, so we promise them that by the end of July we'll be prepared to make the announcement on the terms that they gave us.

RN: If we can.

HK: We can do that because both Shultz and Butz--Butz who at first when I told him orally was making all the noises that covered himself with the Washington Post--you know what are we getting for it, is now enthusiastic for it--you know they are paying cash, there is no credit--

RN: well ______ the effort for crying out loud of the Post and others pissing on the other grain deal was ridiculous, that was a good deal.

HK: Of course it was a good deal

RN: Everybody wanted it at the time.

HK: And they are paying market prices for it. We know it five years ahead of time so no one can be accused of manipulating the market. IT's a first rate deal all the way around.

RN: Right, that's good. Accept the principle and so forth and you're getting the Mid-East thing off too--

*

Page 2

HK: The Mid-East thing is already there.

RN: Good.

HK: And if anything can do it--I mean we have gone as far as we can go.

RN: Well anyway, they probably won't recognize that it goes far, but they might, they might--Gromyko may--he's the expert.

HK: Gromyko will recognize it's the big change from what we have given them previously, so you have fulfilled your commitment of making an effort.

RN: Yeh, yeh, good. And Dobrynin will know that too.

HK: Oh Dobrynin will certainly know it and they have to explain it to Brezhnev. I have given them a commentary article by article of what we have changed

RN: Good. That's as much as we can do.

HK: I think it was an outstanding week, Mr. President.

RN: Ahhhh, it better be. For what we put into it--I mean six meals with this guy was about enough to break anybody.

HK: (Laughs) Yeh that is the truth.

RN: Every night for six nights.

HK: That is true, Mr. President and the sort of unrelenting pressure he puts on you.

RN: Oh boy.

HK: But I think it was worth it, Mr. President.¹

RN: Of course, of course, of course. Not only in terms of what the agreements were, but worth it in terms of what we found out with regard to their motives

HK: Exactly.

RN: They were very frank talks.

HK: Which we could have found out in no other way.

RN: No way.

HK: And I think it showed the American public what the important aspects

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012858

Dated: 6/2/04

Page 2

of our policy are.

RN: I hope so.

HK: I have no doubt of it.

RN: It'll be interesting to get your friends in the East. I think the conservatives like --you might check with your friend in NY--the gal--they may not like it you know--

HK: No, she likes it--she thinks we did very well.

RN: Does she?

HK: Oh yeh--it's interesting. Very well.

RN: It's interesting, so we shall see. Okay.

HK: Right Mr. President, Congratulations.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: EO 12958

Dated: NARA Dts: 6/2/04

TELCONE (San Clemente)
Amb. Dobrynin/Brezhnev /Mr. Kissinger

June 24, 1973 5:40 p.m.

HK: How are you?

AD: Thank you very much, I'm just speaking to you in the room of the Secretary General and he just wanted to speak with you.

HK: Did you put that call in?

AD: No. I received that call--

HK: That's right. That's right.

AD: But he was intended to call you, so it was a coincidence, I'm just calling from his own house--

HK: I see. Well did you have a good trip?

AD: Yes, it was a very good one. In fact I think everything is all right.

HK: Good, I'm delighted.

AD: And he just wants to say a few words --

HK: Well what I wanted to tell you was first about the agricultural deal. We have discussed this with our associates and in principle it is all right. There are a few minor ~~things~~ changes that we propose,

AD: Yes.

HK: For example, you have the letter in front of you?

AD: Not now. In a few minutes I will call you back because I have it in my room.

HK: Right, but you will see the changes are minor. And we would like to delay it for a month, but the Secretary General can tell his colleagues that it settled in principle.

AD: But why to wait for a month?

HK: One month because we have--we get our crop report on July 30 and while we are making all these regulations it would have a very unsettling effect on prices.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12058
By N.W. Capua 5-20-73
00340

Page 2

we

AD: We will not publish anything really --it would just give it through confidential channels--nobody even knows accept you and him [Brezhnev] and the President. That's all.

HK: Well then--

AD: He would like to come with this back home. But there is 100% assurance that nobody but he and I will know.

HK: Okay, then we can almost certainly do it.

AD: Okay I will discuss with you exactly he wanted and second if you could tell me tomorrow and I will send a 100% assurance until you tell when it could be published or announced.

HK: Okay fine.

AD: We aren't going to say anything about it.

HK: But we have to date the letter --

AD: Until you tell us to make it public.

HK: Yeh, but we have to date the letters back then because if we date the letters now and then the question is why didn't you publish it--

AD: Okay. It's okay --you may publish it--without maybe date you just sign it--the date we will put later on.

HK: Okay. Good.

AD: The second thing--what?

HK: The second thing is I have sent you some new --some changes on the thing we discussed last night.

AD: Oh I see. When I receive it today or tomorrow?

HK: You will get it around 9:00 tonight.

AD: Okay, thank you very much.

HK: But you keep in mind we made an effort and we also have our problems.

AD: I understand this is what I try to spend yesterday before meeting and after meeting.

Page 3

HK: And that we really if you compare it with the earlier versions you will see
we have made an effort.

AD: And will you send them some letter you mentioned on Thursday or
Wednesday.

HK: We'll--let me see what we can do there.

AD: Okay.

HK: Even in this if you could meet us at all, I think we would have a basis
for joint action.

AD: Okay. Now he just want to speak to you, Henry.

HK: Right, how is he going to do that?

AD: Well, we will speak in Russian and you will answer in Russian now--just
a minute.

HK: Hello?

LB: Hello, Mr. Kissinger.

HK: Oh hello, Mr. General Secretary.

AD: He will tell you in Russian and then I will take the telephone and explain it
in English, all right?

HK: That would be excellent, so I won't answer him, I'll just let him talk.

AD: Okay.

LB: [Begins speaking in Russian]

AD: [translating] Hello Henry, he says his ______ was fine
and he would like to use this occasion on the telephone--because he really
intends to call the President, but now he just wants to use this occasion
and tell you he--the Secretary General--feels that they--I mean ______
and the Secretary General and the President have done a great job and he
appreciates it very much and he would like to convey his real thanks to
the President for everything that was done and at the same time wish
him very best and he would like to tell you appreciation for what you have
done, Dr. Kissinger and (he is telling me right now) and he said what
he mentioned to you yesterday was a joke--

HK: Well, I understand that. And we have had a historic week and it has been

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By: MWAPAS Jocelyne
Date: 04/04/2004

a privilege and I have admired how he has conducted himself.

AD: Henry--he says now he would like to address Dr. Kissinger, he says. He begins that ______ and the President have done a great job, now I really hope that you (Dobrynin) and you Dr. Kissinger continue on the job and specifically he said I expressing if everything will go all right with this letter--he means about the grain.

HK: Yes.

AD: And he mentioned the other question.

HK: Yeh, yeh. I understand

AD: And he said well it depends --either I'm going to kiss many times Mr. Kissinger and Dobrynin or either I'm going to punish both of you.

HK: (laughs) That's fair enough. And we'll continue to work in the same spirit of the last week.

AD: Okay, I will tell him.

HK: And you will call me in 10 minutes?

AD: Yes, I will call in 10 minutes.

HK: Good Anatol.

AD: And my best regards to the President for everything he has done--I think he has done a great job. And you of course, Henry as you know. So the very best, Henry. I will call you in 10 minutes.

HK: Thank you Anatol. Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012052
By: WW. CAPTAIN J.P.

*

June 24, 1973 5:40 p.m.

HK: How are you?

HK: Did you put that call in?

HK: Good, I'm delighted.

HK: Well what I wanted to tell you was first about the agricultural deal. We have discussed this with our associates and in principle it is all right. There are a few minor things changes that we propose,

AD: Yes.

HK: One month because we have--we get our crop report on July 18 and while we are making all these regulations it would have a very unsettling effect on prices.

DELEGATED
Authority E012958

Dated: 6/2/73
P.O. BOX 674

Page 2

*

we

HK: Well then--

HK: Okay fine.

HK: Okay. Good.

AD: The second thing--what?

DECEMBER 9, 1988

Amendment E.O. 12958

Dated NARAD, 9/2/88

Page 3

*

AD: Okay.

HK: Hello?

LB: Hello, Mr. Kissinger.

AD: Okay.

DEC 1978

DEPARTMENT
Authority E.O. 12858
Dated NARA Ref. 6/20/89

Page 4

HK: Yes.

HK: Yeh, yeh. I understand

AD: Okay, I will tell him.

HK: Good Anatol.

DELEGATED

Authority E012958

Dated NARA Dated 6/2/04

*

TELCONE (San Clemente) (Residence)

Sec. Shultz/Kissinger

5:50 p.m. - 6/24/73

(First part of conversation was not on tape)

K: ...on that thing we discussed earlier.

S: Yeh.

K: And they see no problem in it. Now the only thing is they would like to exchange these letters on a confidential basis now and hold the announce for as long as we want to. Do you see anything wrong with that?

S: Well only that there is this everpresent tendency for things to leak.

K: Not when they're done in my office.

S: Well, it's very hard. I think it's a chancy thing.

K: Well, if we don't tell anybody else, except you, me and the President then it will - we will have at last found the leaker, won't we?

S: Well, Butz

K: We don't have to tell Butz that we did it.

S: Did he call you?

K: No.

S: Said he was going to. I don't see why if you have a verbal understanding with Dobrynin, why you can't say that we'll do it but we'll do it as of some date to be determined and date the letter then. I'm just thinking about our conversation and concern that everything be legitimately.

K: Yeh, I think that's a good point. I'll tell him we'll give him our word that it will be done by the end of July and if he can't trust that then he's just in trouble.

S: I thought Brezhnev came across very well on TV. I watched the whole thing tonight.

DECEMBER 9, 1973

Authority E.O. 12958

2

K: I read the speech; it's pretty good.

S: It was generous and he does beautifully on television. He's a natural.

K: Oh, he's a great ham.

S: He has this wonderful interpreter who's worth a gillion dollars to him.

K: Yeh, no question.

S: He's great. The Camp David thing seemed to go along pretty well. We had Patolichev and his people and they were very pleased to have a chance to be up there and wander around.

K: Good. No, I think it was a good week.

S: It was an excellent week. And I think you really have something to be proud of there, Henry, you really did a marvelous job.

K: Well, it's a weird situation where, except for these tawdry things, we could mark this as the turning point towards peace and away from Vietnam and everything else. Instead we're jumping back into the mire tomorrow.

S: Yup, it'll be very bad.

K: Yeh, well thank you, George.

S: You deserve all the credit that can possibly be placed on your doorstep.

K: You've been a very good friend. I look forward to seeing you when you come out here.

S: OK and keep your ear out on things in which you have a connection between our domestic problem and our international problem. It has never been more real and apparently real too because our inflation problem is a direct result of international development so that the export control business which I think has horrendous foreign policy implications.

K: So do I and to which I am violently opposed.

S: Well, it is directly connected with this feeling in Washington, both in Congress and in the Executive that you can sit around and decide what you ought to do and then just order it. That you can

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Date 6/2/04
Dkt 14883

3

order prices to remain stable at some level and that you can say
gasoline at the pump will be maintained at X and then you can do
that regardless of the fact that oil prices are rising all around
the world and you just know that if you won't pay the price, you won't
get the product.

K: Of course, I believe
food

S: ... retail/prices to be at some level and there aren't any consequences.
My god the poultry crop is liable to be killed off by this act.

K: Yeh.

S: It's just going to get us. It's a ____ long-term problem.

K: And of course I believe that the way really to show strength is to stick to what you're doing.

S: We would have been much better off to do that. I think if the President,
I must say at the end of 60 days were to go back to what we believe in
and then really go out and fight for that we'd be a helluva lot better off.

K: Yeh. You know I don't know enough about the substance but I hate
to see 180 degree changes in course. In my field we've never gone
wrong by adopting a theory and sticking with it.

S: Right and everytime we depart from it in my field we get in trouble.

K: Well we would in my field too. And I talked for an hour and a half
with Connally on the plane at his initiative. He was beating at me to
use my influence to get more aggressive economic policies but he
couldn't tell me what he wanted. And I wouldn't do it anyway.

S: You can't indulge in showmanship which interjects itself into the flow
or reality without the reality overpowering the showmanship. Sooner
or later, the reality is going to assert itself.

K: George, the best showmanship is to do the right thing. You can't
substitute theater for government. Well, I hope we have a good chance
to talk when you come out.

S: Very good sir.

K: Good. Thank you, George.

DECEMBER 9, 1988

Authority F012858

TELCON (San Clemente)
Dobrynin/Kissinger

6/24/73 - 6:50 p.m.

K: Hello, Anatol.

D: Henry, I just checked with the Secretary General and he thinks it's quite all right with this that you mentioned.

K: OK.

D: So he.

K: Well, you can consider it settled then and we'll initial it

D: What I will do, I will send you tomorrow through the White House initialed by him the letter you have and you will initial your own version.

K: And we'll initial it.

D: Yeh, you initial and give it through the White House or send it to me and I will send it to Brezh.

K: OK.

D: So and I will give it to the White House or and you will give your text with your amendment.

K: Good.

D: Really . . . . . exactly.

K: OK, good. "Approximately" rather than "a minimum of".
the extra phrase

D: Yes, yes and in that place you mentioned.

K: OK. Good.

D: We will initial the text you already have.

K: All right.

D: And you will initial the text plus the two amendments you mentioned.

K: Exactly.

D: OK. Please send to the White House and I will pick up and then I will them tomorrow to Paris.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By M.N.&P.534-0034

2

K: I hope we have a plane going back tomorrow.

D: Well, maybe the day after tomorrow.

K: OK. Well, we'll certainly have one either tomorrow or the day after.

D: Yeh, then I will keep them and send them there.

K: Well, you can count on having it and really you tell the General Secretary to enjoy his movie.

D: I understand. The only thing he does want to have it with him when he gets back at Moscow. This is the point, nothing else.

K: OK, well we'll do our damndest.

D: Yes, I understand and thank you for everything that you've done.

K: It was a privilege and I'm sure we made somehistory this week.

D: Henry, bye, bye.

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Dobrynin/Kissinger

6/24/73 - 6:50 p.m.

K: Hello, Anatol.

K: OK.

D: So he.

K: And we'll initial it.

K: OK.

D: So and I will give it to the White House our and you will give your text with your amendment.

K: Good.

D: Really . . . . . exactly.

K: OK. Good.

K: All right.

K: Exactly.

DECE ASSIGNED

Authority E012858
D# NARA Dkt 6/24/73

*

2

D: Henry, bye, bye.

DECE ASSIGNED

Authority EO-12958

D#NAMIDB 6/2/69

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Sec. Shultz/Kissinger

6:50 p.m. - June 24, 1973

(First part of conversation not on tape)

K: Here is how I have settled it with the Russians. They don't want to say "a minimum" but they are willing to say "approximately 5 million."

S: That's fine.

K: And they accept the other sentence as is. And what we will then do, but that's only for the 3 of us, is to initial the letter which means this freezes the text but it doesn't constitute a commitment until it's signed.

S: I see.

K: You see what I mean.

S: That sounds reasonable.

K: What it says is "This is what we will sign if we sign anything. It protects them against our changing our mind but it doesn't commit us - changing our mind on the deal, but it doesn't commit us to make the deal. You see what I mean?"

S: Yeh. That's good.

K: And I think that's a proper way of proceeding.

S: Right.

: Now have you talked to Butz?

K: No.

S: I think it's really important that you do.

K: Why, I said he hasn't tried to reach me.

S: Well, then initiate a call, but I think you ought to listen to him because he'll tell you just what I told you, so that there can't be any suggestion at all that he wasn't fully involved.

K: OK, but we don't have to go into initialing with him because that's too complex for him to understand.

S: No, that's all right.

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Sec. Butz/Kissinger

6/24/73 - 17:00 p.m.

K: Mr. Secretary.

B: Yes.

K: I've been talking to George Shultz and I just wanted to confirm with you my understanding of his understanding of your views. You think that this is basically an appropriate deal but that you think we shouldn't do it until the end of July or middle of July.

B: Is it urgent to get it out right now?

K: No, what we could do is to tell them this is what we will do, but we will not sign it for three or four weeks.

B: All right. Unless there is some urgent reason I think that would be preferable especially from George's point of view. I have no objections to doing it now because the commitments for the next 12 months already exceed 5 million tons; therefore there is no problem.

K: But would you object if the President gave his oral assurance that he will proceed.

B: No sir, I think it would be good to do this and you see George is sensitive on the cost of living part of this and if we waited until we get the July 1 crop report that comes out July 10, I'm sure that's going to be favorable. At that point there will be less impact on cost of living if we announced it after the July crop report.

K: Then what we will do is tell the Russians where the two changes that George gave me that they've accepted.

B: Yeh, that's ok. I talked to General Scowcroft and those two changes were in paragraphs 1 and 4 of the

K: Right. Well, in paragraph 1 they, instead of "a minimum" they want to say "approximately".

B: That's all right.

K: And the second one they've accepted.

B: That is they'll notify us if they exceed this.

K: Right.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 1258
Dated: 6/24/73
NARRATIVE

2

B: Ambassador Dobrynin had lunch with me in my office two or three weeks ago and he personally agreed to this at that time.

K: So the way we will leave it is, we will keep this secret, we will not sign the letters until - well, we will talk to you about it - the middle or end of July -- but we'll give them a sort of gentleman's understanding that that's what we intend to do with this.

B: Tell them that the reason for the delay is our crop report comes out on July 10 and they'll understand that. I think anytime after that will be appropriate, Henry.

K: OK.

B: All right, thank you.

K: Nice to talk to you.

DELEGATES OF

Authority EO 12958

Dated: 6/2/64

TELCOM (San Clemente)

Cong. Patman/Kissinger

8:40 a.m. - 6/25/73

K: Hello.

P: This is Wright Patman, Mr. Kissinger.

K: How are you?

P: All right, I hope you are.

K: Yes, I'm fine. I'm taking the liberty of calling you which - I normally never call members of Congress on votes.

P: Well I'm glad to talk to you.

K: But I'm so concerned on this vote on Cambodia today that I wanted to take this opportunity to tell you that I really believe that if we could stay with the House version, that anyone who has voted for it will, in a matter of weeks, see that we are working on producing a solution there and in any event, I can tell you that personally thought, it shouldn't be made public, that if

P: I won't make it public. I've voted with the President on most of your war measures.

K: I know you have. That if what we are trying to do doesn't work by September we'll in any event stop the bombing.

P: I'm sympathetic, I'll do my very best to carry out your suggestion.

K: But we're not asking for a blank check here, it's a complicated diplomacy with Brezhnev, Chou En-lai and a few others involved.

P: Yes, sir. Well, I have great confidence in you Mr. Kissinger.

K: Well, you've been a great patriot and I appreciate this very much.

P: Yes, sir. Thank you sir for calling.

K: Nice to talk to you.

P: Bye.

DELEGATES
Authority E01258
DAILY NEWSPAPER
6/25/73

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Dobrynin/Kissinger

10:30 a.m. - 6/25/73

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol, how are you?

D: Good morning. I just receive a telegram from Brezhnev from his plane addressed to the President.

K: Right.

D: I have just within 30 minutes dictated to Colonel Kennedy so he has a text but if you don't mind I could read it now but he put it down.

K: Please.

D: (Reads) 'His Excellency Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America.

"Leaving the territory of the United States of America, I express to you, Mr. President, to the government and to the people of the United States my sincere gratitude for the warm welcome and hospitality which were accorded during our visit and for the constructive spirit of our fruitful negotiations. I am confident that the work we did together over the last few days will well serve the interests of the peoples of our two countries and become a new important contribution to the stronger universal peace.

"My very best wishes to you, Mr. President, to the members of your government and all the American people.

L. Brezhnev
Aboard IL-62"

And without this text he sends his personal best wishes to you, Mr. Kissinger or Dr. Kissinger as he put it.

K: Thank you very much and I can tell you I have talked to the President this morning and he feels very warmly about this week and I have just given a press conference in which I summed it up in very positive terms.

2

D: Well, I think the journey was really a good one and was with good results.

K: I think it can be said that we probably had a historic meeting.

D: Yes, I agree with you, Henry.

K: Now on that agricultural thing, Anatol.

D: I already sent to Kennedy.

K: Good. Now what I will do is I will get it initialed

D: He already initial.

K: No, no, the President's - didn't you want it initialed from the President too?

D: Yeh. Yeh.

K: I will get the President to initial his reply.

D: Yes, exactly - only his reply with two additions you propose yesterday.

K: Exactly. And yours is also changed?

D: No, ours really as it is because I couldn't retype it, but when it will be signed we are prepared to type it as you put it.

K: OK.

D: You understand because I already have the Russian text which was you have it exactly and I didn't want to retype it this way - he just initial but when it is signed we will include yours so we are quite prepared to receive your letters or initials where your phrase is already there.

K: OK, fine, then I think that the best thing would be if you initialed also our copy.

D: That's all right with me. But then in this case I will initial because he's not here.

K: Of course that's fine.

D: That's all right with me.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.012204
By: N.A.A.iga
H.O. 100

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By M.W. Mains Date 05-04-65

K: We trust you more than you trust me.

D: (Laugs)

K: But the only thing is now we have one minor problem. We have no
plane coming back today.

D: When it could be delivered here tomorrow? When?

K: Well I think before the evening, but what we can do is we have an
LDX machine so it will be a copy but it will have the President's
initial on it.

D: OK, will be fine.

K: Good, you will have it by the end of the day.

D: Yes, this will be quite enough. OK.

K: Good, thank you.

D: And thank you very much Herr y, once again.

K: Well, you and I did good work.

D: Yes, and my personal thanks to the President, real ly. Please tell
him.

K: You can count on it.

D: Thank you Henry very much and now have a little bit rest.

K: Thank you.

D: Bye bye.

K: Bye.

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Dobrynin/Kissinger

10:30 a.m. - 6/25/73

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol, how are you?

K: Right.

K: Please.

D: (Reads) "His Excellency Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America.

L. Brezhnev
Aboard IL-62"

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: EO 1288
Date: 6/25/73
D#: 9704

2

*

D: I already sent to Kennedy.

D: He already initial.

D: Yeh. Yeh.

K: OK.

K: Of course that's fine.

D: That's all right with me.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Date 6/2/89
P. #1 KARA

3

D: (Laugs)

D: OK, will be fine.

K: Good, thank you.

D: Yes, and my personal thanks to the President, really. Please tell him.

K: You can count on it.

K: Thank you.

D: Bye bye.

K: Bye.

D# NARA ID 6/2/04

TELCON (San Clemente)

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Shultz

12:30 p.m. 6/25/73

HK: Hello George, two quick things.
One the President wanted me to make sure, which I'm sure requires--
which I'm sure isn't necessary--that these letters we discussed yesterday
be kept secret until we make them formal.

GS: Okay, well I haven't discussed them with anyone.

HK: Good. And we'll just proceed as I mentioned yesterday. We won't
sign them --we'll just initial them which freezes the text.

GS: I understand that Butz has given a memorandum to you.
identical

HK: Right, which is identical with yours and I talked with Butz afterward--
It was essentially what you said.

GS: Right.

HK: And I talked to him after we talked and he fully supported it.
Second, could we have--if their is a Voelker committee on international
monetary things, could Chuck Cooper sit in on that?

GS: There is something called the Voelker group in which he can certainly
sit in--

HK: I mean the Voelker group

GS: And that is a staff group who are working on papers and so forth.

HK: If he could--

GS: Whenever--when it comes to things that are important, then we assemble
a different kind of groups, and I just do that personally--Voelker is sort of
our staff secretary.

HK: Yeh, well that's different. I'm talking about the staff group--

GS: I have no objection to it.

HK: Good. I'd appreciate that. Many thanks.

GS: Okay. I signed today a memorandum for the President which will wind
up with you out there I presume having to do with the IDA and Asian
Development Bank

Page 2

HK: Oh yes.

GS: On various conditions under the new ____ and so on--these I have, but before I would sign the memo I wanted to know whether or not it had been cleared with NSC. I had been told he it had been cleared with your staff

HK: I think I know the substance of it--

GS: So you'll get it and then you can see whether you agree with it.

HK: Good. If I have no problem I'll just send it into the President.

GS: Okay. Thank you Henry.

DEC 1 ASSIGNED
Authority E012958
D# A11 NARR D19 6/2/94

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Jerry Warren/Kissinger

6/25/73 - 5:30 p.m.

K: Hello.

W: Hello. It's Jerry, Henry.

K: Yes, Jerry.

W: I thought that went very well this morning.

K: Yeh, I thought it was a good mood. I don't know how much they'll
cover given the day's events.

W: I think they'll get it in. Now on your next briefing, Ron and I talked
about it and Ron is up to his ears in Watergate as you can imagine.
What would you think about tomorrow morning in an informal setting,
coffee and juice, rolls and things like that. I understand you're busy
tonight and I can understand that. We could set it up tonight but it's
awfully short notice.

K: Yeh, no I can't do it.

W: Right, but we would be happy to set it up tomorrow morning for some
time early in the morning like 8:30 or 9 o'clock.

K: Why not Wednesday?

W: Wednesday would be all right. We'll lose a lot of people like Murray
Marder and Marvin Kalb and Stan Carter and Bob Keatley of the
Wall Street Journal, Steven Barbour of the London

K: Oh no, then let's do it tomorrow.

W: I think if we did it tomorrow morning

K: But in what setting could we do it - on the record?

W: I think you should. I really think it should be on the record because
that way there would be no possibility of misinterpretation and we

K: But what could I add - wouldn't it be better to wait for a day's news
play so that I see what additional comments there are.

W: We'll do that in the morning but they're all going to be writing analysis
for Wednesday morning's paper. Today they're writing the communique
for tomorrow's paper.

DECEMBER 6, 1973

Authority E.O. 12858
DISTRIBUTION: D/D, NARRATED 6/25/73 9:20 A.M.

2

K: Yeh.

W: We could do this tomorrow morning after assessing how the spot news played.

K: But if you say instead of - well, I just wonder if it should be later in the morning.

W: If we do it earlier then these people have all day - we have all day to work out your transcript to get it back to the important people back in Washington. Not to everybody but to the important people back in Washington and have an embargo for Wednesday morning papers.

K: All right, let's do it 9 o'clock tomorrow.

W: Would you like to do it at the San Clemente Inn. We can get a room there?

K: It's up to you.

W: Or we can do it here at Laguna.

K: No, I don't want to go all the way up there.

W: All right, why don't we do it at a room in the San Clemente Inn at 9 o'clock.

K: OK, and that's for everybody?

W: That's for everybody who's traveling with us; it's not for the locals, you know. You'll have some Japanese in there and some French and some Britishers.

K: No television?

W: No television. And no recorders - I mean no tape recorders.

K: OK, but now the only thing I don't want to hear is that we're doing this to take the heat off Watergate.

W: No, as a matter of fact the reporters want it this way. It's not that you scheduled it this way - it's that the reporters want it this way.

K: Yeh, OK, fine. Look, what was that point that Dean made that Rockefeller told me and I told the President and the President told him?

DECEMBER 9, 1978

Authority E012958

DATE 6/2/78

3

W: I think that was the point he made, I wasn't listening exactly, but he said that the information got to Rockefeller who got it back to Kissinger.

K: That's total nonsense.

W: Sure it is. Our position on the whole thing is - right now Ron's position is that we're not going to deny these things in piecemeal fashion. We're going to try to do it in an orderly fashion and pick our own proper forum at the appropriate time and not be panicked by this guy spilling a lot of things about a lot of different people.

K: Yeh. I haven't seen it; I mean I just saw bits and pieces of it.

W: That's all I saw too. I was on the phone most of the day.

K: Yeh, OK, good - 9 o'clock.

W: 9 o'clock at the San Clemente Inn and we will alert you to what room it is and have someone escort you.

K: Good. Fine. Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 1298

TELCON

June 26, 1973

Mr. Kissinger - Hugh Morrow

9:02 a.m.

K: Hello?

M: Hello, Henry.

K: Hugh, how are you?

M: OK.

M: I wanted to call you about this testimony yesterday referring to your announcement.

K: Right. Well, I have no recollection that Nelson ever said a thing like this to me and I'm planning to deny it.

M: I think you are absolutely right.

K: And I don't believe that Nelson ever talked to Hoover.

M: I don't think he ever did either. The only thing that we might say is this: it makes no sense to us and in any event we have no information on it and no comment. The Governor is out of the state on vacation and not presently available. Now, he should be calling in to Norm Hurd at some point.

K: Where is he?

M: Pardon?

K: Where is the Governor?

M: I wish I knew. He's not going that one country that you objected to. Thank god. But, he's somewhere in Europe, Henry, I just don't know where. When I talked to him Saturday he said he didn't know where he was going -- just heading East.

K: Well, Hugh, will you tell the Governor or get word to him that I'm not going to volunteer anything. But, that if the issue comes up, I plan to say that I had no such conversation with Gov. Rockefeller and I reported no such thing to the President.

M: Very good, Henry. I'm sure the Gov. will say the same thing.

K: Good.

M: Bye.

DECEMBER 5, 1973

Authorized E012858
Date 6/2/73

P.O. Box 674

TELCONE

June 26, 1973

Mr. Kissinger - James Keat

9:20 a.m.

Kt: Hello?

Kt: Dr. Kissinger, Jim Keat of the Baltimore Sun.

K: Yes, how are you?

Kt: Fine. I'm most intrigued by the lack of information about the Middle East and I understand there are considerable constraints on what you can say but I was just wondering if you could discuss whether you got any feeling that there is any further give in the Soviet position as opposed to about a year or six months ago. Is there any prospect of further movement with their cooperation.

K: Well, we're talking on the deep background basis.

I think everybody is constrained by their allies, but I think that probably there is a willingness to undertake some reexamination but I don't where it will lead for a little bit.

Kt: Now, you say, everybody is constrained by their allies, do you indicate by that that the Russians still consider the Egyptians their allies? What the nature...

K: Well, I think they have a major stake in the Arab world, if not formally by alliances. They have a stake in Iraq. They are concerned about their basic position in the Arab world. Whether they are technically allies or not.

Kt: Uh huh. Well, does this leave them latitude to decide that a settlement in which there must be a good amount of giving on both sides is in their interest?

K: Well, that is of course the big problem. Whether there is enough give on both sides.... to permit this. And, that we will totally see in the next month.

Kt: Well, do you look for anything specific in the next few months?

K: I think we'll have to have some more exchanges before we can be sure about that.

Kt: What about your reading of Brezhnev personally now, as opposed to May '72.

K: Well, in May 1972 he was very anxious to show that it was a collective leadership, partly, perhaps to split the blame about seeing us after the bombing.

CLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

Dated 6/2/73
P.O. Hl

K: This time he made it very clear that he was in charge. When I first met him in 1972 he followed his briefs more. I mean he was bound by briefs he had in front of him. Now he speaks extemporaneously.

Kt: Now, does this reflect a greater confidence in his personal position or a greater grasp of his material? Has he grown as someone who is dealing with foreign policy?

K: Has he grown?

Kt: I mean, a man can be less tied to a brief either because he feels he is the sole leader or because....

K: No, he is more confident.

Kt: How much does he depend on Alexandrov?

K: No, Alexandrov wasn't much in the meetings here. I would have said here he referred more to Gromyko, but there were many meetings where he and the President and I met alone and there were a few where he and the President met alone.

Kt: And...

K: Alexandrov to my recollection was not present at any meetings.

Kt: Now at any meetings, or at any of the plenaries.

K: Well, he was present at two plenary meetings. But, now let run through them. At the President's office, he wasn't present. At Camp David, he was present at one meeting but not at two others. And he wasn't present at either of the two long meetings at San Clemente. And he wasn't present at the airplane.

Kt: He wasn't?

K: I mean, he was on the airplane.

Kt: But not up in the compartment.

K: Right.

Kt: Third and last. The guys who came here from Moscow were, I think very strong in the belief that Brezhnev group really needed or wanted something gold plated on the trade subject to take home and it doesn't seem to me that he got it, at least not publicly.

K: Well, you know, I am struck, if I may be candid with you, by how the press has a tendency to raise a certain expectation. Then when it doesn't happen

DELEGATES

Authority E012958
DATE NARA DRE 6/2/04

K: even though there wasn't any basis for it to begin with, they say there must have been a disappointment. Now, I can tell you, I have worked on the Summit since the last Summit. This doesn't prove anything but I tell you nothing happened that was not foreseen. Now if you tell me we should have foreseen bigger things but... there never was a plan to come up with anything concrete in the economic field at the Summit. At no stage was there such a plan. Nothing much can happen until MFN is passed. And, really, the substance of the Summit went substantially as planned. You have to understand, and this is off the record, right now there is such a mood of melaise --but look at the Summit in terms it was designed. If this summit had occurred as it did three months after the last Americans had left VN, in an atmosphere of American national domestic reconciliation, everyone would say this was the big turning toward peace. That's when the agreement on the prevention on nuclear war would have had some symbolic significance. Now, when everyone is flying specking because they feel attention is being diverted, you have to put the design of the Summit into a different setting than its execution. And, therefore since the design was to mark maybe the end of the Cold War period, it wasn't really ever considered that this would be a huge economic summit.

Kt: Well, without disputing what you say about the press' expectation, the thing that struck me early last week through the Wash. and Camp David statement, this was the point that they kept hammering on. Now, were they just talking to the American public....

K: I think they thought they could make a major impact on the Senate by their meeting with the Foreign Relations Committee which incidentally was the wrong Committee to meet with since their economic... it was not the wrong Committee for Foreign Policy. That is not where they are having trouble.

Kt: But Dobrynin knows that. Is he less sharp on Amer. politics than he is credited to be?

K: No, he is very sharp. But he may not be the only advisor. And you know, it is a question of... you have to take my word for it. There never was any plan for a specific outcome. The economic section of the communique... again off the record... was written before they ever got here.

Kt: OK. Can you clarify this business of the mixed meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev? Now I think one of the reasons for the confusion is that some of the questions themselves are confused. Are we talking about... Were there two separate meetings? One which would be the President's return to Moscow as the next Soviet-Amer. Summit but that there might be before that a CSCE summit... is that what he had in mind?

K: I'll tell you the truth. You must always allow for the fact that leaders get carried away with themselves. If he was thinking of anything other than exuberance. In my opinion there is no possibility of a return visit to Moscow within a year and I don't see how we could get another Summit put together with any success in 6 to 8 months. And we certainly will not go a summit to have had a meeting.

DECEMBER 9, 1988
Authority E.O. 12958
Date 6/20/88
D-11 HARRIS

4

K: I mean short of some overwhelming cataclysmic crisis. So if he was thinking of anything at all it must have been hoping for a European security conference. On that opposition they said it depends on the evolution of the European security conference. And we are neutral on it. My guess is that the Europeans will be pushed into wanting a summit and then we will have to go along.
I mean we are neutral. We have no overwhelming desire no way or another.

Kt: Why is he talking to Pompidou now?

K: I think he's talking to Pompidou because we stopped in Warsaw on our way back from Moscow and so he can do the same thing in our alliance. Second, because the French like to create the impression that they have an independent field of activity and think those are the principle reasons. We're not concerned about it.

Kt: No, I wasn't indicating that. Do you have any feeling whether it was by French initiative or by Soviet initiative?

K: I am not sure. I think it is one of those things that serve both of their purposes. We've got slightly conflicting reports.

Kt: Is there anything else in the way of just general results or impressions that you would like to convey if that background does get held...or a feeling...

K: Well, you know I am apologetic about this god-damn meeting. I was willing to do it anytime it suited the press. It turned into a national issue, I mean at least a local issue.

Kt: I distinctly had the impression last night that you did not call off the last session. That was not my question.

K: Well, I think, candidly, I believe this meeting, this summit, if we are lucky in trying to bring off this over a period of years, could be seen in retrospect as extremely important. See, if you have a score card and say what achievements were break throughs and what aren't. As I explained yesterday, if this policy takes hold, we can't have break throughs as such. Because the turn has been accomplished. But it was the first time that there have been two sequential summits between Soviet and Amer. leaders so that in the first time....all other have been one-sided affairs. And they have never had a program to pursue over the years.
Now, as I said, this thing could reverse again. It's getting harder to reverse. With so many bureaucracies involved on both sides, and after all, take the Soviet situation, in all the newspapers they've seen every agreement has been printed in their newspapers. Three quarters of their newspapers have been devoted to this for a week. I don't underestimate their ability to reverse course. But you pursue this for another year or so and at least it is something that must be considered. So I think this summit, if we are able to put all the other pieces in place too around the world, could be seen as one of the major steps in a major order international order. And you can't just measure it in terms of this or that agreement. When you are dealing with

DELEGATES AGREE
Authority E012958
DATE NARRATED 6/20/89

crisis you could measure progress in terms of agreement. When you are
putting up a building you have to look at the total architecture.

Kt: Do you get the feeling that they are really basically anxious to develop this relationship as we are?

K: Yes, I think they are as anxious but what their own reasons are I must tell you I would reserve judgment on that. But it has often happened in history that something was started for one reason and developed a momentum of its own.

Kt: Do you have any feeling that they might lean harder on Hanoi? As part of this developing relationship with us?

K: My impression is that they will not stir up the situation in VN.

Kt: I was thinking of the other direction.... rather than stir up x it up,
...

K: I think they will contribute to stabilizing it...
But that is also off the record.

Kt: OK. Thanks very much

K: Bye.

DEPT ASSISTED

Authority EO-12858

D/AH

NARA Dts

*

TELCORN

June 26, 1973

Mr. Kissinger - Ambassador Dobrynin

11:00 a.m.

K: You think that is all right the way it is.

D: Yes.

K: O.K.

D:

K: ...... which we have some thought about it in regard to Salt.

K: Anatole, we have been receiving some information with respect to silos which we have in ............ and rather than put it into an official channel we will put in in a private channel.

D: O.K.

K: I would like appreciate some sort of answer.

D: O.K. .......... what I mentioned to you yesterday.

K: Yes, and he was very pleased. I am staying in the U.S. That is pure speculation. You know, that is Marvin Kalb again.

D: When will you be back?

K: Around the 8th.

D: ........ Elizabeth and David.

K: That's very kind of you. Yes, around the 8th. And Anatole, you got the letter yesterday.

D: Yes, and thank you very much.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12587
By N.W.ala 5-21-73 004304

TELCORN

June 26, 1973

11:00 a.m.

D: Yes.

K: O.K.

D:

D: O.K.

K: I would appreciate some sort of answer.

D: When will you be back?

K: Around the 8th.

D: ......... Elizabeth and David.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Dated NARA Dkt 6/2/84