DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telcon

David Frost

12/19/70; 12:10 p.m.

F: You got my message about the Freemans?

K: Yes, although my staff is gradually stifling me.

F: They said you were out with the President.

K: Yes, but since then I have been back. Are John and Catherine coming? I may be a few minutes late. Why don't we say 12:45. Is your Mother coming?

F: No. Mother is going back to New York, so I have just taken her to the airport. I am going to Miami.

K: I have heard good reports about your performance last night. Everybody except Haldeman liked your line about Santa coming down the chimney and saw Hickel coming up.

F: The President was so generous afterwards.

K: He liked it very much. I was at the Indian Embassy and I resented you.

F: Did you have a good time?

K: No.

F: I will tell Catherine it is 12:45. That was a lovely thought of yours that they should come.

ms

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Congressman Mahon/Mr. Kissinger

12:30 p.m., December 19, 1970

M: We are trying to work out something with the Senate on this language. I have before me the appropriation bill as passed by the House, the supplemental appropriation bill, and the special foreign aid authorization 1991. [He read the Fulbright Amendment which is Section 838 of the Defense appropriation bill -- clause 3.]

K: We cannot possibly live with that.

M: I agree. We have watered it down. [He read the new language]
It was watered down in conference. We have passed the bill in the
House, and they are balking as you know.

[Mr. Kissinger asked Congressman Mahon to read it again, which he
did]

M: One time we say you can't and one time we say you can. I think you can live with this as amended. It is being proposed we take out all this language and what we said in conference which I just read, and that we rely wholly upon the authorizing bill. The authorizing bill says in line with the expressed intent of the President of the United States, none of the funds may be used to finance the introduction of ground troops and advisors into Cambodia. The President has said more than once that he doesn't expect to send ground forces in.

K: We could live more easily with that than the longer version.

M: What about military advisors? Can you circumvent that or live with it?

K: We can't live with it. We are not crazy about it and would prefer not to have it, but we can probably live with that.

M: Of course, those Cambodians need advice and assistance.

K: If this were a sensible operation, we would have advisors.
All that K.K.K. business about our sliding into a commitment without
knowing it is nonsense. We didn't slide into Vietnam. We made
conscious decisions. We knew what was going on.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

12:30 p.m., December 19, 1970

M: I would like to read from page 48 of the bill on Defense, with
respect to using U.S. ground forces in Cambodia. The majority of
the House doesn't think we should tie the President's hand even on
ground troops in Cambodia. The Senate is so locked up on this,
and the President has said he didn't intend to send them back in anyway.
[He read from the Conference Report -- Section 843] We didn't like
what the Senate said because we thought it was too restrictive.
[He read what the House said.]

K: We would strongly prefer that.

M: The Senate agreed in conference to this on the appropriations
bill. This really gives clearance for ground forces in Cambodia in
the event it is necessary to support an orderly withdrawal and
disengagement. The Senate will not want that and won't accept it.
That was in the Conference Report on the Defense bill.

K: We would like that best.

M: It has been suggested we leave it out of our bill and put what
we had in the bill last year which would make a prohibition of ground
forces in Laos and Cambodia.

K: That's fine with us, too. We cannot restrict Vietnam forces.

M: You had just as well quit. It's absurd. I talked to Mansfield,
Albert and Ellender and to Ford and Stennis. Who at the White House
is working with those people in an effort to get some sort of
settlement to break the logjam?

K: Timmons is our Congressional Liaison man. John Lehman
of my staff, and, of course, I am available if you need me. I talked
with Stennis at some length this morning.

M: That Stennis amendment in the bill was crazy.

K: He said he would drop it.

M: He would want to drop it if he could. Stennis would like to
interpret it to mean something else.

K: That is my view, too.

M: We want to get all the help we can from the White House to
get the Senate. The House wants to support the President as far as
possible in these matters. What can we do to pacify Fulbright a bit?

By. NARA, Date 5/20

12:30 p.m., December 19, 1970

K: We don't care so much about the proscriptions on U.S. forces provided you leave in that Stennis-Church colloquy. That we can live with. We want nothing to limit Vietnamese forces.

M: I completely agree with you. I wanted to touch base and have some of your people working with the Senate. We told them when they had a package, we could go over this afternoon and talk with them.

K: I appreciate the spirit with which you are approaching this and what you are doing.

lds

Bv. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Korry
3:00 p.m., December 19, 1970

K: I have talked to Irwin and there is no problem about staying until April as far as I know. He has to talk to the Secretary.

Ko: You spoke today? I had an unsettling talk this morning. Irwin said it could happen next week.

K: I don't believe it. I talked to him around noon. If it doesn't happen the way I said, I would be prepared to intervene.

Ko: It's terribly unsettling.

K: Of course, and you don't deserve it.

Ko: They are using me as a football indirectly with you. It goes back to the people around the Secretary with the development business. The President accepted the Peterson report and they think I ganged up with you. The recommendation that the Peterson Commission adopted would denigrate the powers of the Department. They haven't ever gotten over it and have been waiting ever since.

K: I didn't have any views.

Ko: I have explained that a dozen times. I don't know where I go from here.

K: Hold on a bit. Things are always in a state of flux.

Ko: With four kids...

K: You don't deserve to have to panic, and don't. We will do what we can.

Ko: Irwin's talk this morning goes back to our talk the other day.

K: I had hoped it would straighten out without White House interference, but I am prepared to intervene.

Ko: When I go back, we are entering a rough period on the copper thing. I will be sending cables. I will also write a letter with regard to your latest NSSM.

K: I would love that. Would you do that? I won't show it to anyone.

Ko: Thank you, Henry.

lds

By. NARA, Dato.

5/26

Telcon
Mr. Molina, Ford Motor Co.
12/19/70; 3:45 p.m.

K: I just found on my calendar I owed you a call before the 21st.

M: Yes.

K: I told the State Department I talked to you, but I want to make clear we don't think it is a good idea for the Chairman to go down there. From a political point of view we would like to give them as little opportunity as possible to claim sanctions from us. But if lower level people want to go on an inconspicuous basis so that they won't get political mileage out of it, it is your business. But this is what you have been told, isn't it?

M: I am going down to see Charley Meyer on Tuesday afternoon. I haven't talked to him as yet. This is the kind of information the Chairman wanted.

K: My judgment is it wouldn't help me your ______ interests in the long run; you let yourselves be used politically. They will either make a x deal with you on its merits or they won't. We have no opposition for you to continue to operate and, privately, that is your business. We would like you to keep a toehold there.

M: This is the kind of information the Chairman wanted because he will not go if it is contrary to our government. Thank you very much, I will pass the information on.

ms

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Congressman Passman/Mr. Kissinger

4:15 p.m., December 19, 1970

P: I will take three minutes, but it's worth your listening. Last year, the House passed the military sales bill; the Senate passed it on June 30; it went to conference on July 11. It's been in conference going on 6 months. Fulbright is determined to destroy the MAP program -- the $200 million for military sales has more to it -- it has to do with excess equipment. This is tremendously important; it concerns a half million dollars in excess equipment. There's not a chance for them to break this conference because I think Fulbright intends to destroy it. Recognizing that I went before the Rules Committee and got a specific rule so we could keep the military sales in the bill. It came back to conference and agreed on $200 million. Now there is a socalled package deal and I said I refuse to make myself a party to the package if it includes only military sales. I am not going to pull the rug out from under the President. Military sales are important but especially the excess military equipment. We went to conference -- it passed the House. It was unanimous in the Senate. They have themselves on the hook and are trying to use the Appropriations Committee to get off the hook. I refuse to go along until you are willing to tell me you want to forego the military sales and military excess equipment. We are right back where we started. I said stand pat and you will win the battle. Are you people going to back me if I stand pat? Get the word through to your leaders in the Senate. I will not yield until the White House tells me to yield. My chairman will back me.

K: I will do that.

P: Talk especially to Bow -- tell him to stand pat. When it goes to the Senate, tell them the President is not willing to accept the language.

K: What language?

P: It places restrictions on use of excess property.

K: Not the use of American troops?

P: No; it is tying hands on disposing of excess equipment.

K: All right.

P: Thank you.

lds

TELCOM (Tape)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

December 19, 1970 -- 5:30

K: Mr. President

P: Henry, I was going to ask you -- anything new on Warsaw?

K: It seems to be -- the riots seem to have subsided, the reports we get is of great tension; some factories still occupied by workers but no actual riots in the street.

P: I bet it was a lot rougher on the President's case.

K: Oh, we have conversations of that little bastard, Babr...

P: Yeah, yeah.

K: ... and he says well if this goes on another day or two, that's the end of Ostpolitik. So strangely enough they see it the same way that I do. He is a bastard.

P: Thank God the British didn't want to get involved. You know the one great thing that we have to remember here, you realize if we had Wilson here, he would be pushing Brandt rather than trying to hold ...

K: Oh, yeah. Oh, of course and he would be pushing you to go to -- for him to go to Moscow.

P: Yeah, he'd be going. I was thinking one thing we ought to do as soon as Al gets a day of rest we ought -- I ought to get a first-hand report from him.

K: Absolutely, he'll be ready Monday for you.

P: Fine, well we will sit down and just ...

K: I had a brief discussion with him today.

P: How's he feeling?

K: He's feeling fine. He's quite optimistic. He thinks that we can -- he says Thieu was really actually very upset by that 40,000 withdrawal we made this year in violation of our promise to him which wasn't done by you.

P: Yeah.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MP E0 12958
By NARA Date 6/10/70

TELCON (Tape)
The President/Mr. Kissinger

December 19, 1970 -- 5:30

- 2 -

K: ... and it just created but this is just a temporary problem. But basically he is very optimistic about the situation. He says in South Vietnam, as somebody who has been there three years ago, we are within an eyelash of victory.

P: The thing about Thieu though we have to really shape him up in this respect. We have to go all the way for much further action ______ there is no question at this point. He's got to -- he must recognize -- our military, Henry, play a double game out there, a lot of them they want to stay you know ...

K: Right.

P: ... Of course we want them to stay as long as is necessary but some of them just want to stay period. They encourage him in this and say well, you can't do it boys, we've got to stay. Well, because you know, this is their last war and they know it.

K: Well, his problem is the election in October. That's, I think, what he's got in his mind and he would like to keep things as settled as he possibly can but actually Haig had a very, very good conversation with him and they are planning and it's all set. One thing, Mr. President, Laird is going out there early January and I think you may have to tell him before he goes what we are thinking of because otherwise it will surface out there and he'll try to kill it.

P: You tell him what we're thinking, you know.

K: I don't mean in terms of withdrawals, I mean in terms of operations.

P: Oh, I know. But in terms of the operation -- well, we'll just tell him about the operation and tell them to keep it quiet.

K: He's pretty good once he knows it's irrevocable. That's not the sort of thing he usually leaks. Well, let me -- I will be the ...

P: I agree, I agree. We've got to get everybody ______ but I'm not going to surface it with State until ...

K: With State, I wouldn't -- you don't need to do it with State until about a week ...

MJD E0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By ____ NARA Date 6/9/04

TELECON (Tape)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

December 19, 1970 -- 5:30

- 3 -

P: It's a military operation.

K: That's right. Now Haig discussed it with Godley, our Ambassador in Laos ...

P: What did he say?

K: He's enthusiastic.

P: Well, now can Godley get me Souvanna to ask for it and cooperate?

K: He thinks he can get full cooperation from Souvanna.

P: Well, that will make a tremendous difference.

K: Yeah.

P: Yeah.

K: Well, that part of it ...

P: Godley is enthusiastic.

K: Godley, according ...

P: That's one man -- I mean I -- we all make mistakes, I underestimated him, I thought ...

K: I did too, Mr. President.

P: But you know, you were right -- the thing about it is, though, that he thought that's what I wanted to hear.

K: That's right.

P: But he's a loyal man and when he found out it was the other way, he has become -- what do they call him, General Godley?

K: Yeah, Marshal Godley.

P: Yeah.

K: No, he's become good and Haig thinks ...

DECLASSIFIED

MJD F0 12958

Authority

By NARA Date 6/10/70

TELCON (Tape)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

December 19, 1970 -- 5:30

- 4 -

P: He's really very good, tough as hell.

K: Oh, he's tough and he's been very effective but Haig thinks we can -- that both of those operations we are thinking of, particularly the second one, may have an almost decisive impact.

P: Well, you know it's about time to rip them up, finish them off.

K: And if it works, then it ought to do in the northern two corps what the other operation did in the southern two and if that's the case, it will be a year and a half.

P: Sell the whole thing in terms of accelerating the withdrawals.

K: Exactly.

P: Accelerate the withdrawal, it will be hard... do you want to fight it, you want to stick it -- keep our guys out? We've got them on the ropes now.

K: I think we do and they don't know how to start an attack on you and they haven't really -- and I must say based on my discussions at Harvard, not that they will vote for you or anything like this, but they just don't have any convictions behind their position anymore and ...

P: Well, the interesting thing -- amusing to me they are trying to blow life into that fellow Gardener's common cause now and they are trying to blow life -- you know the reaction to the Scranton Commission and Goodell thud ...

K: Exactly.

P: ... the universitives didn't blow up, they didn't participate in the campaign. They are sure of -- Harris comes out in the pools showing that we are weak -- that's temporary, that will change, you know what I mean.

K: That's right.

P: But the main point, as you well know, this whole business is that these bastards finally learned that they've got to run their schools.

K: Out of -- out of ...

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/1/04

December 19, 1970 -- 5:30

- 5 -

P: They don't react enthusiastically when I say that they have to take the responsibility because they are a bunch of weaklings, that's their problem.

K: That's absolutely right.

P: But I tell you, it's a hellva lot different now than it was a year ago.

K: Oh, God -- what if you compare it with the situation right after Cambodia. Who would have thought that the supplemental would have rolled through and things like that. And that's an indication of the public mood.

P: There's nothing we can do to stir the Polish thing up?

K: I'm afraid not but still here is another Communist regime that has had to use troops against its own workers.

P: Get that out.

K: Right.

P: Let's get the real PR effort on that and don't let State, Defense -- The regime, are they putting out defense of the regime, they hope that everything -- no violence, I hope not.

K: I haven't seen anything yet. We had a meeting yesterday and we ...

P: In one column, I noticed that the United States, Scalli was being carried and he's right but I just want to be damn sure that we don't appear that we're stirring them up but on the other hand, we know that we don't condone this at all.

K: We may be impudent, Mr. President, but what these fellows say depends a lot on what they are told.

P: Yeah.

K: If they are told this is another indication of a workers' revolution in a Communist regime, some of them will say it and that's what we ought to get out.

P: Get that out and around through the bureaucracy tomorrow, will you?

MVD FO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author:
By NARA Date 6/10/84

December 19, 1970 -- 5:30

K: Absolutely

P: Fine

K: In fact, I'll do it ...

P: This is the President's view, will you do that?

K: Yeah, I'll do it immediately.

P: All right, Henry, good. Well, take off and tell Haig we'll see him -- we won't both him tomorrow, okay.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Set aside at least an hour, you and I and he, just the three, don't you think?

K: I think that would be good just for the first crack at it so that you get it first hand.

P: Right but then I think we ought to expose him to a couple of others.

K: Right.

P: We'll bring everybody along on this other operation. Laird, Laird -- look he knows very well that the whole ball would go up if what resulted in our policies lose in 72 in Vietnam, he doesn't want that.

K: Right. I wouldn't get State in until Laird gets back.

P: No.

K: I think a good way of handling it is to tell Laird what you want...

P: Yeah.

K: ... and then he can help sell it when he gets back on the basis of his trip.

P: That's right, good. And then get him a little credit.

K: Right.

P: In this one, we don't care about credit, we just want it done.

DECLASSIFIED

MFD FO 2958
Author

By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELCOM (Tape)
Mr. Kissinger/The President

December 19, 1970

K: I think it would be very helpful.

P: Although I'll tell Moorer and I'll tell Moorer he's not to tell Laird. Now, let's start playing the game rough.

K: I think, Mr. President, it is another example because they only had a force of about 3,000 there and Haig said that if we had put in helicopter gunships which hadn't been authorized ...

P: I would have authorized them _______________

K: Well, it would have been really like shooting pigeons but as it was, it was a slaughter. And even if the figure is exaggerated, I don't know how they count a 1,000 from the air, the fact is that the town that they took has been evacuated and has been retaken and that the pressure in that area has stopped.

P: Yeah, the AP is out writing a story everyday that Cambodia is about to fall.

K: That's right and ...

P: We've got to _______________

K: Well, Laird, he liked very much -- he didn't give me -- I didn't have a chance to talk to him about the press yet. But I thought you might like to know that because that operation had succeeded.

P: ?

K: Right, Mr. President

P:

K: Well, because, Mr. President, when you gave that order we immediately called Pursley ..

P: He tried to countermand.

K: Instead, well, he did it in the clever bureaucratic way, he sent out a request for further information. Well, that way it would have gone on for 4 days, then the next day, you called me again and I just called Moorer directly and I said the hell with the further information, do it -- anything that flies and if you hit water buffaloes, just drop it.

MFD FO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELCON (Tape)
Mr. Kissinger/The President

December 19, 1970

P: Right.

K: And that's how it got done.

P: And it helped.

K: It broke the back of that particular enemy offensive. I told you right away, it wasn't a major thing, one way or the other but if we stiffle it in the beginning ...

P: Psychologically it helped.

K: Psychologically it helps the Cambodians immensely and it helps with our own press, that's the point of it here. And it keeps the North Vietnamese loose until we start the other operation

P: ?

K: And then when the one after that comes, they will really be racked up.

P:

K: Oh, no. Well, if we didn't do it with 550,000, why should they think we'll do it now.

P:

K: Well, Godley is all for it. Right Mr. President.

P: All right.

K: Right, bye.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FEO 12958
Authentic
By ____ NARA Date 6/4/04

TELECON (Tape)

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

K: Hello, Bill?

R: Hi, Henry. How are you? I want to talk to you about this
German situation. Were you in there when the President talked to
Dewey and McCloy?

K: Oh, yeah.

R: Well, did he tell them to [let me get everybody off the phone here -- just a second, I've got my grandchildren here and they're on the phone, I think. Hold on.] Did he indicate to them he wanted them to sort of sound off.

K: Absolutely, definitely, totally not! It had absolutely... You know, you have heard him on what he thinks of Ostpolitik, and he may have made a few remarks to that effect. I'll let you see the notes. I've got them. As I told you, the purpose of the meeting -- the primary purpose was to avoid a meeting with the Arms Control group and to give McCloy a chance to sound off. Most of what McCloy said had nothing to do with Brandt, but had to do with something that we had already done; namely, not withdraw troops. Two-thirds was the speech he always makes. Then he made a few comments about Brandt. Then Acheson made what he's now said to every newspaper. The President made a few general remarks, and then they talked also about other things. But the purpose of the meeting was in no sense... It was a total accident that it came about at that time.

R: Well, it's causing a hell of a lot of problems. We are running into a real head-on struggle with it with the Germans because they just think we are lying to them. I guess you saw the article in the TIMES this morning.

K: Yeah, but they have sent us a cable saying they've been trying to kill that. Have you seen that?

R: No, but whether they were or weren't, the fact is that this is how they think. And Acheson, instead of keeping ______, he said it again in the paper. He reasserted what he said.

K: Yeah, well, that's inexcusable.

R: You know, if the President wants to create a crisis with the German government.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/9/04

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger 2 -

K: No, no, but believe me, that isn't what he... He had no such thought, and there is no possible way...

R: I know, but the point is, Henry, he's got to wise up for Christ's sake. He can't go around and talk to those four gossips and tell them what he thinks without them telling everybody. Christ, I heard Dewey at the party the other night. He was telling me he's delighted -- this is just what we need. I said, well, for Christ's sake...

K: What is what we need?

R: Well, what Acheson is saying. In other words, if the President tells those four fellows what's on his mind, if he sorts of lets his hair down and thinks they are going to keep it to themselves, he's as naive as Eisenhower. Jesus Christ, they're the biggest gossips you can find. They're bigger than Maxine Cheshire. They'll tell everybody that they see and they would all like to be Secretary of State. In fact, they think they are. Jack McCloy is pushing his law firm, too. He's telling all his God-damned clients, and he's got the Arabs coming into his office as if he's running the God-damned government.

K: But you know how it happened, Bill. It wasn't that he had wanted to tell them what he thought. You know how he is. When people talk to him this way, he has a tendency to fall into the mood. This was not intended as anything except a hand-holding session which he does maybe two or three times a year with these guys, and it's taken on because of Acheson's public popping off...

R: Well, McCloy is telling everybody, too. When the Arabs now come to this country, they stop in to see him in his law office.

K: But he hasn't even talked to McCloy about the Arabs...

R: That doesn't make any difference at all.

K: ...in a year.

R: He's got them all thinking. What I'm saying is that each one of these... Now, Dewey is a little bit different. He said to me the other night -- he said, 'I'm not even sure what the hell we're doing.' He said, 'Henry has given me a lot of papers to look over on things, and I read them over. I'm not sure...' He was talking about IndoChina in this case. We have to figure out what the hell kind of mischief we can get into, not through design but through inadvertence.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD E0 12958
Author
By NARA Date 6/9/04

K: You are absolutely right. I agree with you, Bill.
We have to be more...

R: Discreet about things. I would have absolutely no objection if the President decides, 'Look it, I want to get four old guys in here and use them for purposes of sounding off and pretending that I'm washing my hands of it.' That's all right. I'm perfectly prepared to play by any gameplan.

K: No, but that isn't what it was, and you know it isn't.

R: No, but that's what I'm saying. That's why...

K: That's how it's coming out.

R: I don't get annoyed at/whatever the President decides, after he reflects on it, if he decided to follow a course of action, I am prepared to give full support even though I at times may not agree, but it seems to me that's my role. I should do that. On the other hand, I get madder than hell when, by inadvertence, we stumble into things that really... It just makes it...

K: Well, I agree with that part of it. I think there are two parts of it. One is that these guys have been totally indiscreet about a conversation which really was designed to give McCloy a chance to say we shouldn't withdraw our troops. Secondly, the Germans, of course, are playing a deliberate game now of pretending that we are keeping them from an agreement and shifting their problems to us. Now, they are not all that innocent in this thing, either. Ehmke was popping off around town here in October at a time that we were keeping them from a Berlin agreement, at a time when there wasn't the slightest excuse that we were dragging our fight. In fact there is no excuse for it now.

R: I'm sure that's true, and...

K: But we still shouldn't give them the excuse...

R: There, again, I know... I'm not plugging for the Germans. I don't give a damn if the President wants... Suppose he decides that we want to oppose it's bad to say it publicly.

K: Well, if we want to oppose them, you are of course, absolutely right. We shouldn't use Dewey, Acheson and McCloy.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/04

R: Or if we are going to use them, let's use them in a planned way. Say, look it, here's a good way of talking out of both sides of our mouths and getting away with it, if that's what he wants to do. But we ... Just because we haven't thought it through, we stumble into these things. Now you know damn well, if you know McCloy, what he does. He's got a hell of a big law firm. He's got a hell of a lot of oil clients. He likes to be in on matters in Europe because that also helps his law firm. He's getting garrulous as hell and you know he's going to tell everybody that he sees about it. As far as the arms control thing, he didn't help himself. In fact, the President is going to have a greater problem with those people because they are all so rare now. They say, well for Christ's sake, he sees Dewey, Acheson, McCloy but he won't see his own Committee.

K: McCloy has been a little tricky about. McCloy, himself, said that if he saw a small group and he were a part of it, that would take care of his committee.

R: Of course, he didn't say that to his committee. Right in front of his committee is when he came...

K: No, you told me that.

R: He told me that this had nothing to do with his committee and it was not a substitute, and that you had urged him to come in to see the President and this wasn't a substitute at all, and he was sort of pressed...

K: Hell, I don't like McCloy particularly. I think he's one of the most over-rated men in America.

R: Well, I think probably in his day he was all right, but...

K: I mean, he talks a lot. I think he's completely outdated as far as Europe is concerned. He remembers the Germany and the Europe of the early '50's. You can't push them around like this anymore.

R: No, and I mean he was... I mean you've got Clay and McCloy and Acheson all who feel that they have a sort of a pride of ownership of Berlin which is all right.

K: But you know it was the President who thought up this group. He called them all separately. I only learned about it afterwards. It grew up after some Gridiron dinner when he was talking to Dewey and he's seen them twice, I think. You remember when he saw them once before.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: MW FO 12958
By: NARA Date 6/10/64

R: Dewey is a little more discreet, and I think Dewey is a little perplexed himself. He said he wasn't sure what the point was; on the other hand, he said he and McCloy were really applauding what Acheson has been saying -- they said, that's just right; that's what we ought to do. And I said, well, for Christ's sake, if that's what we ought to do, it ought to be done by a program -- the result of a program and not by the result of an accident.

K: Incidentally, I don't know whether you saw the traffic on some other stuff. Last week, Ehmke called me up -- you know who he is -- and said that he had missed me on that trip when he was over here and he was going to be over here and could he see me. So, I said fine. The next thing I knew he was saying he was coming over especially to see me. So I told Marty to join me so that it isn't a White House/Ehmke conversation.

R: I wonder about these things. Every time Strauss, even if Marty's there, he goes back and tells everybody that he's got an "in" and that what we are saying publicly is not what we are saying privately. He uses you, too, for his own political advantages.

K: Well, he'll use anybody.

R: I know it. Well, I think we have two major problems with our two major allies -- Germany and Japan -- in which we are heading into a hell of a storm.

K: Well, I think we ought to wind up the textile negotiations one way or the other this week.

R: We've got a major storm buildup in both places, and both of them are inexcusable. There's no God-damned reason for it. Insofar as Germany is concerned, nothing has happened up to date that should cause us to have any concern. Now obviously, things could happen in the future that would be unfortunate. Obviously, we have to guard against those, but it seems to me the way to guard against them is try to be reasonable as hell and say, sure, this is a good direction in which to move. We've got to watch things, etc., etc.

K: Well, my personal view on it is this. I agree with your statement. There's nothing we can do about and we shouldn't try. I think that the basic direction of German policy, even though Brandt is a decent man and wants to stay with the West, is going to lead to German nationalism and is going to give over a period of time the Soviets an increasing voice there, but that is nothing we can do anything about by Acheson-like statements.

MJD E0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author:
By NARA Date 6/9/04

- 6 -

R: Well, I'm not so sure. I agree with you there's nothing we can do about what they have done. I mean, how the hell can anybody take issue with that. I think there's a good deal we can do about the future, but I don't think this is the way to do it.

K: Oh, I agree with that.

R: Taking the case in NATO, there was general agreement among everyone, including the Germans, that there were pitfalls; we had to be careful; the Germans vowed in public and in private that they would not get out of step, etc., etc. Now, obviously, that may be wrong; obviously, they may be misleading us. But, Christ, we don't want to be...

K: No, I don't think they'll do it deliberately. Well, I think Bahr is, of course, totally unreliable. You agree with that. And I think Scheel is a dope, but that's neither here nor there. I think the basic trend is going to lead towards a more nationalistic policy, but the worst thing we can do is behave like a maiden aunt, clucking our tongue without having a concrete proposal.

R: And, of course, the building nationalism which is not only growing in Germany but everywhere -- but particularly in Germany -- is going to be more than assisted, and really increased at a real fast tempo if they can say that the United States is treating Germany as if they are a God-damned puppet. I mean, here we are trying to do the best we can to improve our relations with the Soviet Union, and the United States is talking out of both sides of its mouth. That's what frightens me and, as you noticed, the Russians are exploiting that now. The Russians and their propaganda -- if they don't believe what the Americans tell you publicly because they are lying to you. What they really think is what they are saying privately, and what they are saying privately is that you have no right to do anything you want to that helps you. I mean, if you don't do what they tell you, why they won't like it.

K: I think we should, in general, applaud detente and specifically trying to stay out of as much of their internal dispute as we possibly can.

R: And, three, don't let them do anything... Don't agree to anything that we don't think is acceptable.

K: We shouldn't break the back of the people who worked with us in Germany for 20 years, but none of this requires Acheson popping off and none of this requires public posturing. I think the stance you've taken is the one that I agree with.

R: You know, we got the NATO allies now in NATO to repeat exactly our position; that is, our position is 'fine, this is good; we think you

MJO F.O. 12558
DECLASSIFIED
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/1/04

- 7 -

ought to move in this direction, but only on the conditions that you,
yourself, have stated. The conditions you've stated are that there
have to be satisfactory solutions to the problem of Berlin, and we all
agree what those solutions should be -- certainly in terms of principles.
There should be free access; there should be communication between
the two parts of Berlin; there should be better postal facilities and better
phone facilities. All these other things by and large are things that
the Russians won't be able to do probably.

K: On Berlin? Yeah. Well, on Berlin I think there's no disagreement at all. On Germany, as between you and me, I think that the trends, simply based on German history and the personalities, are more dangerous than one can deduce from what they are now saying and doing. But still, it is beyond our ability to effect by the sort of thing that Acheson is doing.

R: That's right. But suppose we decide that we should do everything we can to prevent the trend that you are speaking of...

K: No, I don't think...

R: Even if we decided to do that, though, the way to do it is to fasten on to Berlin.

K: Absolutely.

R: Because the Russians can't get off that hook; if we keep the Federal Republic in line, the Federal Republic says there has to be a satisfactory solution to the problem of Berlin; it has to be a solution acceptable to the allies. We understand that we can't do anything; unless there's a satisfactory solution, we won't ratify the treaty either with Russia or Poland. Unless there is a satisfactory solution, we won't have a European Security Conference. We all agree what a satisfactory solution is. Now the Russians can't accept our satisfactory solution.

K: I feel that the policy we have, in fact, been pursuing over the last year or so is correct.

R: In the NATO communique...

K: You know, the fact that I think that German [End of tape]

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/9/04

Secretary Rogers (New Tape) (believe this is continuation of
Mr. Kissinger previous tape)

...where all it took was for the United States to frown and K: / XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX everyone would jump to attention. I mean supposing Brandt came to Acheson and said, 'All right, what do you want me to do?' What would he tell him?

R: I asked McCloy the other day -- he said that he was afraid that the developments of Ostpolitik would prevent a peace treaty being signed. I said, 'Well, now let me ask you now. Do you seriously think that a peace treaty can be signed? Can we reach a peace?' He said, 'Well, no.' I said, well, what's your point then. You know, a peace treaty is out of the question.

K: And, you know, so what? Supposing there isn't that much glory in a peace treaty for us to sign. He says the Germans are making peace with the Russians without us. Well, you know, so what?

R: You know, that's what... Dean Rusk was there. He said to McCloy, "So what, suppose they make a peace treaty we like. What's wrong with it? If they make one we don't like, there's a hell of a lot wrong with it."

K: Yeah, but if they do something we don't like, they can do it in the form of a lot of other things other than what is called a peace treaty. They are going to the first victims of an unfavorable peace treaty, not we.

R: Of course. And, as a matter of fact, if we decide that they are moving in a direction we don't like or moving in a way which is wrong, we probably by our actions can have the government thrown out.

K: Well, why don't we do this, Bill. We have two problems:

(1) we have the German one -- let me put that aside for one second.

(2) we have the problem of these four garrulous old men. I think the way to handle that is to let you know ahead of time when the President is thinking of calling them, and that way, we avoid any impression -- and I will do that.

R: I think if we go into it again, I'd better be there because at the end of the meeting I would like to say to them, if he is going to have them (I think he should quit seeing them) but if he should, I think then we should say to them, 'It is understood that this is not for the purpose of having you make statements after you leave.' Obviously, if you go to the White House, then you come out and have a press conference and say a lot of things, people think you are authorized to say them.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/9/04

K: Well, the thought that they might make statements -- that was probably naive for the press -- it didn't occur to anybody, so it was always understood that these were private meetings. But I see no reason in the world why we can't do it on this basis. (A) They should be kept ...

R: Why does the President announce these things to the press anyway? Why doesn't he just go ahead and have the meeting. He sees some people without telling the press and other times, he does it.

K: Frankly, what must have happened there -- I had nothing to do with that part of it. Ziegler must have come walking into the office and he must have just run through his list with him. But ...

R: I sometimes think he gets sort of carried away with how much news he's going to make that day.

K: Well, the whole news policy is something that, if it were my business, I would express some views on, but I think this watching every day's news summary drives one crazy, and is fruitless.

R: I think so, too.

K: Because things disappear. Three days later, no one knows what one was so excited about.

R: Right. And whether you are in the paper every day or not .. In the first place, the President is bound to get a lot of attention, and secondly, you don't gain anything by trying to get a little more coverage.

K: Now, on the German policy, I think we should just ... My own view is that we shouldn't protest too much one way or the other. We should just say there's a general agreement -- the details we don't get into, or something like that. And on Berlin, play it the way we are doing it.

R: Yeah, I think so. So far, the way we've played it in Berlin is good. We've gotten the Russians confused as hell and I don't think anything is going to happen between now and their parting Congress.

K: And I'll be damned though if I understand what the Germans are saying that we are holding up in Berlin. There has never been a proposition that we could accept or that they have asked us to accept.

R: I don't know if they are saying that, have they said that?

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/1949

K: Well, no, they are not saying it as a government. Ehmke said it when he was over here or so Joe Kraft claimed but Kraft is such a son-of-a-bitch that you can't tell what ... whether he made it up or whether Ehmke really told him that.

R: Kraft just says things like that to get us to respond to find out what our answer would be if they said it.

K: Yeah, yeah.

R: That's his technique.

K: But if he ... I think basically on Berlin there is no problem. There oughtn't to be a problem.

R: I don't think there is.

K: On the basic Ostpolitik, I think that's an artificial crisis, they are not doing anything now.

R: That's right. It is true that there may be a crisis.

K: But then I think ... I agree with you, we ought to decide it, you ought to announce it. Certainly you don't want to use Acheson to popping off all over the place to set our German policy.

R: Well, Henry, if we decide this -- to have a policy to try to announce public policy and at the same time we want to express some reservations privately, let's figure out the best way to express them privately. Just that simple, how do we want to do it? Sure as hell we don't want to do it with Acheson, McCloy, Dewey and Clay.

K: Yeah. No, it turned out unfortunately.

R: We also have a hell of a problem in Japan.

K: Well, what do you think we should do, I am so sick of this thing. Everybody and his grandmother has gotten into that act. I thought last May we had it nearly solved when Kendall got into it, then it was happily forgotten. I don't know why Sato started the negotiations again if it is going to cause so much trouble, we didn't want it.

R: Yeah, well, I think the thing to do ...

K: Excuse me (another phone ringing)

DECLASSIFIED
MJD EO 12958
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

- 4 -

K: Hello.

R: You've got to go.

K: In a minute.

R: Well, I think that probably there is nothing to do this next week or so, I think if it doesn't work out, I'd like to have the President ask me to work with Flanigan. I think I can ... in the case of Okinawa, I worked out some language that got us off the Congressional hook pretty well and satisfied Sato and I think it's possible here again. I think someone like Peter does a hell of a good job -- I think he's much better than Stans but I still think that if we are fairly close to an agreement, and I talked to him on the phone last night, I have a feeling that there are ways that I can figure out to do it that ...

K: Oh, well, if you are willing to do it, why don't we give it until the middle of the week and if then early next week it isn't at an agreement

R: I think probably ... I got a letter ... a cable from Aichi asking me to take part in it, he is very concerned and their government as you know is afraid they are going to be thrown out. Now maybe there is nothing we can do but I am perfectly prepared to do it to see if we can't work out some middle ground, we are fairly close to an agreement.

K: We are fairly close and during the week the Japanese asked two or three things of us which you know I don't understand the issue well enough but which seemed to me from a political point of view but the textile industry won't yield now. Our people think that if the textile people don't accept it, it isn't worth having.

R: Yeah. Well, anyway I ... If you remember we had almost the same tie-up, a different way of course, with Okinawa about how we had submitted to the Congress and how they had submitted to the ______ and so forth and we had worked out some language which ...

K: No, I think Bill, I agree. Why don't we do this, if by Christmas they haven't come to a solution, I will recommend to the President that we will shift it to you.

R: I wouldn't ... Let's be sure so that Peter doesn't ...

K: No, no, Peter can work with you.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/4/04

- 5 -

R: That's right. Just in effect say that this is getting to be you know damn near crisis and that in view of that, that I should take an active role with Peter in it and have Aichi probably too I think because he's upset as hell, naturally. I think maybe I could have ... although politically I wouldn't have any weight with the textile people, I think they'd be a little more impressed if I said, for example, you know this could ...

K: You're in a much better position to make the political case to them ...

R: That's right.

K: ... and appeal to the national interest than Peter whom they have to look at as one of theirs.

R: That's exactly right. And also I could assure them if they were on the verge of getting damage that I could assure them that the President would act and I didn't want to tie him down in express terms because if we tied him down that way it would be unacceptable to the Japanese Government, they couldn't stand it. Well ...

K: Well, let's do that if it doesn't get solved by Thursday.

R: Yeah, okay.

K: And I don't think it will.

R: Yeah, I don't think so.

(laughter)

K: Okay.

R: Okay Henry.

K: Right.

R: Right, bye.

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida
Tape --

Y: We are somewhat confused. Would you kindly explain the situation on your side.

K: Yeah.

Y: How should we proceed from now on?

K: Well, the situation on our side is that we can not sell your proposal to our industry.

Y: I see.

K: They simply will not have any of it and there's no point in our making an agreement since the point of the agreement, the political point, was to please the industry.

Y: Uh-huh.

K: You understand there's no point in making one that they don't like.

Y: That's right.

K: Now we will see early in the New Year whether we can come up with some compromise that they will like which I then should -- you may tell me whether I should give it to you or Oshiba (spelled phonetically)

Y: Um-huh

K: But frankly I am rather sick of this whole enterprise and I just as soon not have too much to do with it anymore.

Y: Yes I can personally see how you feel.

K: And I have to tell you honestly I was outraged when the Chief Editorial writer of the Washington Post was received by your Mr. M ...

Y: Yes.

K: And was told by him that we were trying to dictate terms as if this were the Battleship Missouri on the textile agreement.

Y: That's right, was that told by Mr. M?

K: That's right, this was told to Mr. M by ...

Y: Yes, yes, the chief editorial writer was here a few days ago.

MJD F0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/9/04

Page 2

K: Yeah.

Y: Did he write any story?

K: No because he is an old friend of mine and I didn't tell him the truth but I told him that it wouldn't be fair. But he may still write it, he just came back three days ago.

Y: I see. That was really too bad, that was really too bad.

K: But I don't, you know -- he may yet write it, that's a minor point, I just don't see where we can go from here. We will try early in the New Year to see whether there is some way we can reformulate what you have put to us in that telephone conversation.

Y: That's right.

K: And if we can, I will come back to you or which would be better to give it to you or to give it to your man here?

Y: If it is too troublesome on you personally, then best through your expert to his counterpart in your place...

K: All right.

Y: ... in order to avoid any misunderstanding.

K: All right.

Y: What if I told you on December 17th from our time over the telephone exactly the position of my own friend and is very firm and what Mr. M says this is the final -- I mean the definite position and if you need some modification on certain specific points, I will press very hard on my own friend in order to meet your need. As you can appreciate on our side, my friend is also in an extremely difficult position ...

K: Oh, yes.

Y: ... and he hasn't got much room ...

K: That's why I wonder whether it mightn't be best just to forget the whole thing.

Y: Yes, I think -- I think you are wise not to go further for the right one.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F-O 12958
Author:
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELCOM
Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida
Tape --

K: You remember I didn't want to start it again.

Y: Precisely, precisely but my friend felt he's not an expert and he felt a sense of obligation to your friend, wanted to do something and he felt the agreement would be much better than legislation from both sides, that was what he felt.

K: Yeah.

Y: And he made up his mind to go ahead with the negotiations on the assumption that we could quickly reach an agreement.

K: Yeah.

Y: That you were correct and right but from now on uh uh -- still I personally if possible at all would very much like to see an agreement.

K: Well, I will have to see if we can reformulate your proposition.

Y: Yes.

K: And see whether we can put it -- you see our trouble is we have already gone beyond what our industry likes.

Y: That's right, that's right.

K: So we just -- we have no maneuvering room left.

Y: That's right and the same, exactly the same position on our side.

K: Oh, yes, it's a very -- it's too bad. It's very much too bad.

Y: Personally I'm sorry to take so much of your time but I personally feel if you could succeed and go ahead with the legislation and succeed in doing so perhaps that might be best for both of us.

K: Might be better.

Y: That is my personal feeling.

K: Yeah

Y: Do you feel that way?

DECLASSIFIED
MJD EO 12958
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELCONE
Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida
Tape --

K: Well, I am beginning to think that way but ...

Y: But since we have come all that way and as I recall you said in October
from that meeting you took a calculated risk in making that first
communique with a view to reach an agreement to the open negotiations.

K: Well, I thought I could count on the assurances.

Y: So did I.

K: It is very damaging to my friend to have made promises now twice but that's neither here nor there, if it can't be done we also don't want to weaken the position of your friend.

Y: That's right, that's right so if there is still some hope of reaching an
agreement, then I would certainly do my very best to press very hard
on my own friend to modify some of the specific points and on your side I'm afraid we will have to ask you to try to reformulate
what I told you over the telephone.

K: Yeah, I understand.

Y: So that -- we will try to reach an agreement.

K: Well, I will try to -- I will be back to you early in January.

Y: Early in January.

K: Right.

Y: Fine, in the meanwhile and this is a technical question, as we understand
on the 30th of December two experts having lunch.

K: Yes.

Y: Our expert invited yours for lunch. Should we -- should my friend tell
our expert about the substance of what I told you over the phone so that
over the lunch they could discuss on substance or should we make it just
a social engagement.

K: Well then it will leak if he tells it to your expert.

K: Well, let me check with Mr. F and I'll let you know.

MJD F0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida

Tape --

Y: I see and uh uh we are suffering heavily from the question of decrease, so if it is better to hold it ...

K: I will let you know.

Y: Then perhaps we had better keep it until I hear something from you early next month.

K: Right, I will be in touch with you about it.

Y: Fine.

K: Okay.

Y: I am sorry to disturb you but ...

K: No, no disturbance and I will talk to you soon.

Y: I would very much like to get out of this very difficult situation on both sides since the prestige of your friend and mine.

K: Yeah, this is why I think you people should keep quiet in making unfriendly comments about what we are doing in these negotiations.

Y: Exactly so would you mind if I tell my own friend about Mr. M's recent comment.

K: No, not at all.

Y: And keep him quiet.

K: I would appreciate it if you could.

Y: All right, I will do that.

K: All right.

Y: Would you mind just repeating again what Mr. M told the editor?

K: He said that what we were doing in the textile negotiations was like trying to make you come to the Battleship Missouri and you would never accept that humiliation.

DECLASSIFIED

MFD FO 12958
Author

By NARA Date 6/10/84

Tape --

Y: I see. That's too bad, too bad. He should never have said that, never said it. We will see to it that he keeps quiet and behaves himself.

K: All right. Well, we have the same problem on our side sometimes.

Y: Yes. The reason we are somewhat confused was Mr. S's comment for substan ____ but during our understanding of the situation so ...

K: Which comment?

Y: ... I hope to hear from you again and until then because this question of decrease of what I called you would be held here with my own friend.

K: Good.

Y: And our expert in your place does not know the precise ...

K: No, my expert does know.

Y: At this moment he doesn't know the precise ...

K: No, our expert knows, yours doesn't.

Y: I see, all right.

K: Our expert is fully familiar with it.

Y: I see, all right so then in that case in order to keep this line of communication absolutely confidential perhaps we have to do something about it. So, would you kindly ...

K: I will let you know next week whether you should instruct your expert.

Y: Yes and in that case, would you please take into account that this might be leaked on our side unfortunately.

K: Right, good.

Y: Thank you very much and I hope to hear from you soon.

K: Yes, we will be in touch with each other.

Y: Thank you very much.

K: Goodbye.

Y: Goodbye.

[End of Tape]

MJD 12958
DECLASSIFIED
 Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/04

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
12/21/70 8:50 a.m.

L: I understand you're going to have a meeting at 11:00 on the language problem we've been having with various conference reports between the House and the Senate.

K: I don't know about it.

L: At 11:00 with Dick Capen going over and Fred Bozart (sp?).

K: Who called it?

L: I am told that you did.

K: My over-zealous staff doesn't tell me these things.

L: Well, all I wanted was to make sure that Fred came too. He is very knowledgeable. He has worked up there on these committees.

K: If there is such a meeting we'll let anyone you want come.

L: Good. Next item, evidently Hugh Sidey was told at the White House that the President's statement as his press conference only applied to that one day . . .

K: On what?

L: As far as Cuba was concerned and that the situation was such that on the next day the tender was back in the port.

K: He couldn't have been told that at the White House. I haven't talked to him in a long time and no one else knows about it.

L: He was briefed.

K: Not at the White House.

L: I think he was and his information is incorrect. That tender will probably go in there some time this morning or went in last night but that story is just not true.

K: Well, A, he wasn't briefed at the White House.

L: Was there a story put out that the President's statement applied only to that one day?

By. NARA, Dato. 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird

12/21/70 8:50 a.m. page 2

K: Certainly not. No one made any comment on the President's press conference over here.

L: Well there was none over here either.

K: I was told the other day that at a State Department briefing there was a statement that it applied not for all eternity. But that was not said here. Second, whether the tender was there the next day or not we can't go on poo-pooing this thing. Whether it was there one day later or five. A, we didn't put the statement out. Secondly, I think the position we ought to take is that the Soviets ought to be under no misapprehension on what will happen if they begin servicing submarines out of Cuba.

L: In the Caribbean?

K: Out of Cuba.

L: Okay. We can't deny that the tender is there. But the Time story is wrong because it wasn't there then. They say they got it from White House sources. Around this town I don't believe any of these things anyway. People do that to put us on the wrong trail.

K: That's right.

L: Getler's story on the [planes]. I don't know where he got that but I think he got it from State -- thought they deny it. But the Time story happens to be wrong. We've got to be careful about denying it thought.

K: We can't deny it because by the end of this week the day it will be true. I will get to the President about it before 11:00.

L: I think we can do something to get it back in perspective without denying it.

K: Mel, I was going to call you. The President asked on Saturday -- ordered that there be put our a reaffirmation of the importance of handling classified documents carefully in all agencies. It's because of all the leaking all over town. That will be over to you today.

L: We've got tight security over here, but I can't handle it when we escalate it all over the government. As far as some of these things are concerned, maybe we shouldn't give them such wide distribution.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Volpe
12/21/70 11:00 a.m.

V: I would like to report my proposal for action I can take today if it meets with your approval. I have reviewed very carefully the recommendations of the Commandant. [Volpe read Commandant's recommendations for the Coast Guard Admiral and Captain.] I have reviewed this very carefully. The action I propose is as follows: 'It is my view that no purpose would be served by subjecting either to court martial . . . both understand the serious errors of judgment . . . I therefoer direct the Commandant to withdraw the . . . court martial.'

K: I will have to check with the President but that sounds good to me.

V: I fully concur with the letters of reprimand and that both officers will immediately offer their resignation from the service.

K: My reaction is it sounds good, but let me check with the President.

V: These men will be out of the Coast Guard, but my suggestion is we don't subject them to a court martial. The quicker we can release this the better, and the fewer leaks we will have.

K: I will get to the President as soon as I can.

Further conversation: 11:16 a.m.

K: I have just talked with the President. He would prefer it if your statement rather than saying court martial it was suggested that a court of inquiry recommended the following actions. Unless the summary will be public.

V: The summary will go to the public. The transcript will go to the Library of Congress.

K: Then he goes with you.

V: We went with kindness. They are still bumped from the Navybut ? ? ? ? ?

K: It will go this afternoon.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Henry Brandon
Mr. Kissinger
11:15 a.m., 12/21/70

B: Hello.

K: Henry. Are you free for dinner tonight?

B: Yes. We are expecting you. What time do you think?

K: I am having a Christmas party for our staff to see the ones that are not collapsing at their desks.

B: I was just wondering how big a party it will be.

K: Fairly big as a matter of fact. After that I will be glad to come.

B: What time?

K: Will 8:30 pm be alright? Or I will take you out. With Muffy's condition and all.

B: No. I think we will be more comfortable at home and Muffy said she probably would retire before dinner if that is alright. We gave a party for 75 children yesterday.

K: It isn't but I have no choice. I will see you about 8:30 pm.

mlh

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
12/21/70 11:25 a.m.

R: I'm a little concerned on the Cuba idea -- Ron is going to
make a further statement?

K: The President wanted to put out a statement he wrote himself
for the press conference. We got a copy of it over to you.

R: But have there been any developments?

K: There has been a Time and a Newsweek story on it.

R: I'm talking about developments. That's just journalistic
gossip. Have there been any real developments?

K: Well, there are these ships running around there.

R: I hate to have the President makeing statements on this.

K: He won't.

R: But Ziegler will do it in his name.

K: Only if there is a question about it.

R: The question will be 'Is there any truth to these stories?' If
we go around saying it's a serious matter it will lend credance . . .

K: He is not going to say that. He is going to say there is an under-
standing and the spirit of the understanding is being observed. He is not going
to characterize it at all.

R: What I have says "Moscow can be under no illusions about the
seriousness with which we regard . . . "

K: Absolutely not. That's not right.

R: We got that from Al.

K: That's not right. Let me get this and call you back.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

11:30 a.m.

12/21/70

K: That is not the statement that is being made. It's simply a summary in 62 -- we have LDX'd it to you, it's on it's way. The first paragraph is what you have put out on the understanding. Give assurances and they broadened the understanding. There's an understanding between us and the Soviets on relations with Cuba. We will watch military activity around Cuba closely.

R: If there have been no statements, why should we --

K: They are essentially accurate. This is what he wanted to say at the press conference and didn't for some reason. Its written out by himself. It doesn't say they are doing anything wrong in violation.

R: I am afraid it will give that impression.

K: I think they are nibbling away the edges of it.

R: If the President feels there's activity, he wants to do something about it to cause the other side to reconsider what they are doing, that's one thing but if he is responding to a magazine article -- we are not briefed that they are doing anything different.

K: Conducting re-fueling operations on submarines out of these ports and putting in submarine tender and ______ side by side. It's not a violation but further movement.

R: Ron could say as we made clear before so it seems as though we are repeating.

K: I will do that. He should. We are watching it closely.

R: If Al is there, ask him to call me.

K: Let me get this done and he will call you in 10 minutes.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCORN

Atty. Gen./Kissinger

2:10 pm

12/21/70

K: Sorry to take you away from the sunshine. I have a political problem. You know the case of the character I have been talking to you about -- the Russian. The President would like to release him and wants to start procedures this week. I want to stay out of line of fire if I can.

AG: Work it through State.

K: I wonder if you could call Rogers and say the President feels a sense of obligation and doing it for Christmas. Leave me out of it.

AG: We can use the President's name?

K: That's right. I haven't checked with him on using you this way but he wants it done and I feel I should be out of it. You can say Haldeman was present when the decision was made. Will you call me?

AG: I will do it and either I or Bob Marti (?) will call you.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
L. Shearer/Kissinger
4:07 pm 12/12k 21/70

K: You harrassing me again?

S: Harassing you? We would just like to find out if you have a body guard.

K: What do you mean?

S: A security man who protects you so no one can kidnap you -- an FBI agent, a Treasury agent, a State Dept. security agent?

K: Yes.

S: Why would that be, Hank?

K: Because of threats.

S: In the mail or on the phone.

K: I prefer not to go into it. All sources.

S: Any plans to return to Harvard?

K: No final decisions but my relations with colleagues are very good there and whether I leave or stay has nothing to do with them.

S: What's your tenure?

K: If I do not go back in Feb. I will have to resign but I have reason to believe I will be welcome back. My colleagues have been very generous and the news stories are wrong.

S: You will have to resign.

K: Yes, but no problem unless of course I stay away 6 years or something.

S: Do you hope to go back or become a film star?

K: I think I would make a great matinee idol, don't you? By the way, you have made quite a bit about my initiating news briefings. I have never called anyone to set one up.

S: No, we didn't say that. You are the star spokesman.

K: I have talked with them but I am not the star spokesman.

S: Klein thinks you are.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/20

L. Shearer/Kissinger

4:07 pm 12/21/70

K: Well, there's no problem on that but 4 months ago you had a statement saying I took the initiative with the editors.

S: I don't think so, Hank. We were told that if the WH wants to put it's best foot forward they always send Kissinger. Moynihan and Kissinger are intellectuals. We have said when the WH wants to put its best foot forward they send you. That fair?

K: That may be but I cannot say that. Who calls me "The Kid?"

S: That's popular on campuses.

K: I hadn't heard that.

S: When are you coming out next? Give us a call and come by. We will have a drink or a girl or something.

K: OK.

S: Great, Hank.

Further conversation: 4:30 pm

K: On this what you call a body guard business, I don't know what the news is but that sort of thinking gives people ideas.

S: The news services have it. Reuters just came up with a big story.

K: What does it say?

S: Can I call you?

K: It's not world shaking.

S: It gives a reason for your having a body guard. It's not vanities of vanities -- Say you are being protected from hordes of girl girls.

K: That's not the reason.

S: Of course not. That gives the reason. I will call you back.

(He called back and read verbatim from the article. It was now not taken, as Shearer went too fast.)

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
President/Kissinger

7:25 pm

12/21/70

P: I talked with Rogers on this Ivanov case and I have worked it out. He said he Dobrynin asked to see him. I said tell him President made a commitment and we will carry it out but it's technical and we will do it early in January. He said fine and that he could tell him. A decision was made without letting anything happen on the Congressional side. Otherwise, people jump on us so when you see him tomorrow say that the Secy. has notified you that he will carry it out. Shk Shortly, after Congress leaves. Secy. will carry it out with him.

K: I called you earlier when you were at the reception. They have restored 4 SAM sites that have been hitting Laos. Laird wants to hit them and I think he should.

P: Sure.

K: It will show you meant what you said.

P: No big announcement.

K: We don't need any. They may scream a little.

P: When do you see --

K: 1:00 tomorrow.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Sec. Laird
12/21/70; 7:30 p.m.

K: Did you seduce all those press women?

L: No, I had a good time -- shook hands with them and gave them a little pat every now and then.

K: I am going to take a little course from you. I talked to him and he thinks you should do that.

L: I will just on a one time basis. If the weather clears we will go, Henry. I think it is right. They fired five missiles out of there and I just think we have to hit them.

K: Right. Okay.

feg

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Rogers
12/21/70; 8:10 p.m.

K: I hope you are not as partied out as I am.

R: Just about. I just spoke to the President so . . .

K: You mean on the Ivanov thing? His understanding is that you will tell Dobrynin he will be released early in the year.

R: After the Congress is gone. Okay, Henry. The only problem on the strikes on the SAMS -- Jesus Christ I hope they are more effective than they usually are. How large?

K: It's a one hour operation and not going to use a lot of planes.

R: The only reservation I have for not doing it is just how effective are they? I have a feeling that they kid us about it.

K: I feel we have not always had accurate reports. We should certainly not let them go back to the same three in a very short time.

R: On the policy I have no doubt about it. I thought what the President said at the press conference was very good and as long as we say they continue to fire on our reconnaissance planes I don't think we have a problem.

K: I was interested when Cooper and Aiken were here and they did not seem to have a problem.

R: My only problem is if it's good. (I missed a part here about a conversation with someone.) It's floating all over town.

K: I hit the Acheson point very well. I said when we have something to say the Secretary of State will say it.

R: I think it's fine and I wish they would quit sending so many people over here.

K: He claims that F ______ put him up to it.

R: I think it's fine. We will see how the stories come out. I thought the President looked a little tired. I hope he is alright.

K: I wasn't there. I think he ought to get away. He has not really been away since the election.

By.

NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
12/21/70; 9:00 p.m.

P: You know on that business of Laird's -- what was the timing on that?

K: Tomorrow and the next day.

P: What's the situation on the Supplemental at the present time? Is it
pretty well . . .

K: I think it is pretty well through.

P: The thing I was thinking . . .

K: Let me check the Supplemental out to see if there is any problem.

P: We can wait a couple of days until that's done. If it's done, I don't think it should be limited. What they want to do is knock out a hell of a lot of choke points. We are going to get the same blame whichever way it goes. I want to see a more . . .

K: Then they better hold it right now. They are only planning 16.

P: You mean 16 planes?

K: Yes. It would take care of those sites.

P: But it woulnd't help us on the big overall planning.

K: That would have to be done separately.

P: No, no, no. . .

K: He may have already issued the order. I better get him right away.

P: If we are going to get the heat, we may as well do more.

feg

MJD F.O. 2958
DECLASSIFIED
Authentic
By ____ NARA Date 6/9/04

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland

December 21, 1970 -- Page 1

H: The memo ...

K: Yeah.

H: I've already talked to CIA and State INR.

K: Yeah, but I just want to make sure it goes now.

H: Yeah, well I have it.

K: Okay.

H: I have a draft.

K: Yeah but now look are we gonna -- how many hours will it take to
get it typed.

H: The girl's right here, she should be able to do it in about 1/2 hour.

K: Okay, it's got to be there before 8:00.

H: Okay, I can get it there easily by 8:00 if someone knows where to
take it.

K: Give it to the usher to take to the President immediately with a
red tag.

H: Okay, okay.

K: Put it in an envelope -- in a yellow folder with a note **HOLD WAY**
from me.

H: Okay.

K: But it's got to be there before 8:00.

H: Okay, fine, Well, do you want me to read it to you?
Yeah, quickly.

K: How long is it?

H: Well, it will be about 2 pages.

K: Okay, go ahead read it.

H: Okay. First sentence (tape went blank).

(END OF TAPE)

TELCORN (Tape)

Mr. Kissinger /Bill Hyland

December 21, 1970 -- Page 1

H: Really gave him considerable leeway.

K: But why couldn't you reason that this was just their mistake, that
if they hadn't done that, it would have been a good thing to do.

H: Oh, I don't think that [citek] for the new regime opposes the treaty
but I think they may oppose the whole spirit behind cooperation
with Bonn and being at odds with the East Germans and others.
I can't say for sure ....

K: Okay, now look here's what I want you to do in this memo for the
President. First, explain briefly what it does in internal politics.
Secondly, what it means in bloc politics, you know greater voice
for the East Germans ---

H: Right, right.

K: ... and thirdly, what it does in East-West politics.

H: Yeah, okay.

K: Now, do you agree with my assessment, which incidentally I just
was playing the devil's advocate, I agree with you.

H: Oh, (laughter)

K: I mean I can't judge the domestic politics but I agree with you on
the other -- on the Ostpolitik.

H: Well, Ulbricht is going to -- this is a windfall for Ulbricht -- he
is going to blame a great deal of it on Ostpolitik and ...

K: I agree with this. Now, the next thing I wonder is this, I think the
Russians may decide is either to toughen up their line generally
slightly towards the whole West or they may decide that they need
some detente in the West and it is safer to do it with us than with
the Germans.

H: Yeah, I think the latter is more likely.

K: Do you agree with that?

H: Yeah, I think they will have to cool it with the Germans and end it
up with us.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FEO 12958
Authority
By ____ NARA Date 6/10/70

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland

December 21, 1970 -- page 2

K: You think that's right.

H: That would be my guess, yeah.

K: Okay, will you put that in the memo.

H: Yeah, yeah, we can put it in.

K: You know just say it's speculation, just do a page and a half or so.

H: One thing I would like to stick in the memo that I have in the draft is that the Russians -- it's not clear at all whether the Russians were even consulted on this and they may be somewhat nervous over Gierek because he simply is not well-known to them.

K: Put that in, that goes into Bloc politics.

H: Yeah, yeah. And the other thing is of course we don't really know how the people are gonna take it, sometimes when a regime shows this kind of weakness and instability ....

K: I think that's exactly right. It gets worse.

H: It gets worse because the people could think they can get even more.

K: That's right.

H: So I would like to have something to say that.

K: No, I agree but just what you need is a section that says this is what happened and section two, this is what it means inside Poland domestically.

H: Right.

K: Thirdly, this is what it means inside Poland foreign policy. Third, this is what it means to internal Bloc politics. Fourthly, this is what it means for the Soviet Union and especially for Soviet foreign policy.

H: Okay.

K: Now can you do that, that's about -- but don't make it much more than 2 pages.

H: No, no, okay.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/4/04

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland

December 21, 1970 -- page 3

K: And can you get it over to the President tonight.

H: Well, do you want me to -- does someone come in and take a look at it or what?

K: Well, have you got it finished?

H: Just about, I want to make some ...

K: Well, why don't you read it to me when -- well make the revisions and call me and read it to me.

H: Okay, will you be there for some time or not?

K: Another hour.

H: Okay, I'll do it easily by then.

K: Okay.

H: Okay, I'll call you back and read you what I have.

K: Good and let's get a CIA assessment.

H: We've already asked CIA and I&R to do a joint piece for early in the morning.

K: Good.

H: Because there is stuff coming in, Gearick has made this speech and I've seen a summary of it.

K: What did it say?

H: Well, he had promised wage increase to some workers and that he would re-examine the plan and then he pledged a loyalty and good relations with the Russians.

K: Right.

H: Which is about the minimum that could happen.

K: Put that in the memo though.

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 29 78
Author

By NARA Date 6/1/70

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCORN

R. Evans/Kissinger

9:16 am

12/22/70

E: I have a ______ shot because I make it available to you for your protection.
I heard about ______ that this morning.

K: That kidnapping.

E: It's fascinating.

K: Now my staff has another hope.

E: What's your view now on Israel and the M.E. Do you think there's hope
or will go to deadlock?

K: My private, off-the-record view is that it will lead to deadlock.

E: Or confrontation on the Canal?

K: Why?

E: They spook themselves into thinking they have to build up. If Sinai stays in
Israeli hands, they are ceding it.

K: Oh, the Egyptians.

E: The Israelis will let it go until they are worried about it, knock it out, and then
there's the Russians. So you think they will go nowhere. So do I.

K: I hope they will but I think it will be a series of deadlocks. Don't attribute
this to high Administration officials with German accents.

E: Where are you going to be Christmas?

K: Perhaps with my children/

E: Let's get together after New Years for dinner.

K: I would like that.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Rogers/Kissinger

10:30 a.m.

12/22/70

R: I just got a call from Ted Kennedy. He sent a fellow, Jim Knowland, to contact the NVN on prisoners. Knowland says he has a complete list of the prisoners. Knowland is conveying the list to Bruce. Also there's a letter on the prisoners. I asked him not to tell anyone on this. It was clear though that he has given it to the press. He said we could run the names through the computers if we had them.

K: When did he talk to you.

R: Two minutes ago.

K: He called and said he would talk only to the President and the President refused the call.

R: I am trying to get him now. We can run it through the computers and see if there's any new name. But can't do a thing with him.

K: He is out for himself. Did you see the cable on Fulbright's staff going over? They have asked that a letter go to Dong by June (?). Fulbright asked for conditions and get a reply by the 23rd. Lowenstein is over there now. Obviously they are playing this all over the place.

R: Let's think about it. If you are dealing with someone like Mansfield, it's one thing but Kennedy only notifies you.

K: He will publish it.

R: I think he has. He said let us check on it and you will raise false hopes if it's the same old list, but he said you know how these things ooze out and he is getting calls from the press. How would they know about it unless he told them?

K: I will tell the President what it's about.

R: I have prisoner people here now to talk it over.

K: We should check the names and notify families if there are new ones and then let Kennedy claim it if there are any new ones.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger

11:12 am

12/22/70

K: I was on the phone with Kennedy when you called. He told me what he told you but apparently he has talked with the press.

R: I told you that.

K: When I said what will you do, he said it had oozed out. When I said who oozed, he said he had. To confirm it.

R: His man talked to Bruce and said what he told me. 368 names -- 20 dead, 9 released, 339 alive and captured.

K: He told me -- he said I had talked with you and I supported your view that we mustn't raise hopes here. He said Bruce has the list.

R: If he is going to say something, we have to say something that suggests it will not be new information either. They have asked Bount to come up tomorrow.

K: We have gotten to them on the prisoners. It's probably publicity.

R: Lowenstein must have a list. I am going to try to find out from Fulbright. It's a macabre thing.

K: On the human thing, it's outrageous.

R: I will try to find Kennedy.

K: I know he is not on the floor. I got that impression but it might be wrong.

R: On Blount. I guess he should go if he wants to.

K: I don't think we can do anything on that.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Irwin
12/22/70 11:42 a.m.

I: I just learned that the price of nuclear fuel is going to go up -- the release is being made tomorrow. The AEC told us and told the Congress today. I gather the decision was made in the White House.

K: We've had no part in it.

AL I: Then you and I are in the same boat.

K: I don't know a damn thing about it. I don't even know the implications of it.

I: Well, one is that it brings the price up somewhere closer to what it might be from the centrifuge basis. But there is still an $8.00 difference. Also this brings French technology into line with ours as far as the cost is concerned. Obviously they didn't give either you or us a chance to talk about it.

K: I am going to raise hell about it. I didn't know about it, but I think you and I should see to it that it doesn't happen again. That's in Flanigar's office.

I: I imagined it was Peter's shop.

K: Right. Thank you.

By. NARA, Date

5/26

Telecon
The President
12/22/70 11:55 a.m.

P: Did you get a chance to give Ron something on this Cuba thing?

K: Yes, we did it yesterday.

P: I know, but some Congressmen are asking . . .

K: We gave him stronger language today.

P: I told him to say . . . to state categorically . . . we have got to say that there is an understanding, that we expect it to be kept and we have surveillance going over there every day. He's got to have a strong categorical line. And I think you or Laird should get Rogers and Gurney in and say here is the situation; there is no base at this time. And if there is one, we'll ask him. We have got to make it very clear to them we are not being hoodwinked. Tell them there were pictures and we've removed stuff. Then if we have to make an issue of it it will look like Congress forced us. This President isn't going to screw around with the Russians. Get Gurney and Rogers in.

K: Yes sir. I talked to Kennedy. Do you want me to come over and tell you about it?

P: No, I've got some people. Just tell me briefly over the phone.

K: He had notification from North Vietnam and he sent a staff man over to get the list. He never told us ahead of time. He told Rogers and me that he sent Knowland over. As far as we can tell, it's exactly the list we've got, but since he didn't give us the list we are checking to be sure of the number and what we've got. He gave us the same number as we already had.

P: Why don't you tell him that?

K: I told him, and both Rogers and I told him not to make an announcement till we've checked the list because we were playing with peoples' hopes . . .

P: That's right, peoples' hopes . . .

K: But he did it anyway.

P: Did it occur to you to have a statement made immediately.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon
The President

12/22/70 11:55 a.m. page 2

K: We gave it to Ron. He's going to do it. He says this is
exactly the list we have.

P: Say we have a list of ______ names and have no indication that there is anything new in this list. You've got to give it to Ron so he can hit them on this.

K: Rogers and S ______ are mad and so it Fulbright, because he's scooping him.

P: Why don't you call Rogers and tell him he should make a statement on it. Say . . . or no, I'll call Rogers. Okay. Thank you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
12/22/70 12:12 p.m.¹

K: The President has talked to you by now?

R: Yes he has. McCloskey is going to brief the press; I think we've got it in hand. Let me review what's happened. Kennedy's man did not make a copy of the list available. I thought he was going to. But he did not. Then I said to Bruce 'did you ask him for it' and this is incredible, he said no. That's incomprehensible. Our most experienced diplomat. Then I got Kennedy. He said he wanted to make the list available. Habib reached Knowland at the airport and he has made it available. Fulbright's man has also got a copy and he's coming back with it. So we've got these two of them with lists, which will take the charge off Kennedy.

K: Oh yes, he and Fulbright and he are at each other's throats. Fulbright has actually been more responsible on this.

R: We are going to point out that both of these things happened. As far as we can tell the 339 is the same number we have been operating on the basis of. This information may not change what we've known; we want no false hopes raised.

K: Ziegler is saying the same thing. He's going into no detail.

R: I told McCloskey to give them a fairly full rundown.

K: That's right and we'll give the questions to you.

R: Okay, another thing. I'm going to be asked tomorrow about the understandings. The President put it in terms of "Let there be no misunderstanding . . ." I have a little difficulty with what Mel has appeared to say.

K: You are talking about Vietnam now?

R: Yes.

K: I thought you were still talking about Cuba. Okay I understand.

R: I'm thinking of having something written on the understanding and I'll send it over to you first.

K: That might be the best way of doing it. If everyone does it, you, Mel and over here, they might find one word changed in one version and make something of the differences.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

12/22/70 12:12 p.m. page 2

R: What the President said was pretty good. He said "let there be no misunderstanding." This is the understanding of the President -- If the lives of forces in South Vietnam are in jeopardy as we continue the withdrawal, I'll do what I can must to protect them.

K: But the President would say the reconnaissance flights were in the understanding. I think the second thing is a unilateral declaration on our part. It would be useful for them to understand, but not necessary.

R: Mel saw an NSC thing in which he listed the understandings. Have you seen that?

K: All I saw was what Mel sent to you on a November meeting in which Johnson explained his understanding of the bombing halt. He did list reconnaissance as part of the understanding. I will get that over to you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Sen. Gurney/Kissinger

12:20 pm

12/22/70

K: The President asked me to call on the concerns you have on Cuba. I want you to know on his behalf and we will arrange a briefing for you. We are not taking it lightly and we will not tolerate any offensive systems in the Western Hemisphere.

G: I have a complete briefing at the CIA. There's no question we have a submarine base there so I will make noises.

K: We are not trying to stop (?) your convictions but we want you to know we are taking this seriously and taking measures we are not making public at this time.

G: I am glad to hear that.

K: You will give us no pain if you present your views.

G: It's very serious if they have tried this twice before.

K: We will not let them service submarines. It will not be any good if they don't do that. We won't let them do that. Offensive force.

G: Those SOBs are trying to ______ on us everywhere. What bothered me was that he couldn't see a reaction.

K: There was but we wanted to keep it out of the public arena.

G: Thanks for calling and tell the President I appreciate it. Please keep on top of it so that we can prevent them from doing this.

K: We have no intention of permitting it.

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Kissinger (on IO)
12:40 pm, 12-22-70

H: (Did not hear this but assume he said something like how are we coming on the prisoner thing).

K: We have got it under control.

H: Did you ever get to Kennedy?

K: He said he was within five minutes of announcing it. He went out afterwards on it. Haig and I should have a half hour with the President this afternoon and then either Wednesday or Thursday, we should have Moorer in. We can't do the planning for the operations we are conducting. We are considering that until Laird is ordered by the President that is what he wants. I would like both of the meetings before Christmas. I want Haig and myself to see him separately so that he (Haig) can talk to the President about the pressures.

H: Okay.

K: What did you want with me?

H: Just the prisoner thing. Have you covered the President on it?

K: Yes. Rogers says they have given them names exactly as we have them.

H: Have we released them?

K: Of course we have told the families. If new families are notified as a result of this --

H: How do we keep those families from dealing with Kennedy?

K: I don't see how we can. They have also been dealing with Fulbright and they have also invited Blount over.

H: Why do you think they are doing this now?

K: I think they are hurting with public opinion.

mlh

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger
4:11 pm 12/22/70

K: I called you earlier about that POW thing. The Kennedy maneuver and I wanted to see if we can analyse for new names.

L: I told Rogers we can do it in 10 minutes. He said he had the list.

K: What's holding it up?

L: He wanted to give it to the President first.

K: What's the President going to do with it?

L: Hold a minute and let me check to see if it's arrived. They haven't delivered it to us yet. I have been trying to get it. It takes a ______ because we have the records.

K: I have the 20 dead.

L: I have that. We have been waiting for it. (Asks someone else if they have the list). All we have are the ticker stories that he tried to get the President and couldn't reach him.

K: He didn't have the list when he called the President. He called us before he released the story and said his man was going to Bruce with the names.

L: State doesn't have it yet. We are waiting for it.

K: He wasn't giving it to the President. That's politics.

L: We only have 20 people who died. It will only take us a minute. These guys are standing by to run it.

K: Another thing -- Rep. Rogers and Sen. Gurney are screaming on Cienfuegos. He wants them to have a briefing.

L: They scream that tender is in port and ? ? ? ? ?

K: Let's see if they leave tomorrow. That would be the best.

L: Our briefing was tough but they feel that the President's news conference doesn't support the briefing.

K: We have been taken away from that. Did you see what we put out yesterday?

L: Yes but that's not going to help.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

4:11 pm

12/22/70

K: The President wants to take a harder line.

L: I will but tomorrow at the press conference. Bill will be asked about this at the press conference tomorrow.

K: I will call him.

L: Let me talk about one other thing. Haldeman has been talking to Wallace and Buzzard thinking I should take tougher line on intelligence things like the line we have had in the past.

K: It will go away in a couple of days.

L: We start hearings in a couple of days. A few things we did get carried away on. What I am going to do is put all that human intelligence of investigation of civilians to Gen. Bennett and ask him to report to me. So we don't get hit hard on this. I was shocked yesterday that Moynihan said that Defense was running spies at the conventions. That was the Secret Service. To protect us I will have investigations of civilians under Bennett and get them approved and we don't want to do away with it.

K: It will also simmer down.

L: We are asserting strikt civilian control and the Secy. of Defense is taking control and reassign responsibilities down the line. I will call Haldeman and say it's all I can do.

K: And check with me. Sometimes the boys in the front office get mad over eager. They all over the place.

L: You understand?

K: Of course.

L: We haven't made much progress on the budget. If you have a problem, let me know.

K: I will.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Herb Klein

12/22/70 4:15 p.m.

Klein: I got a call from Stuart Alsop. He would like to get the facts straight regarding the bombing of Hanoi. He thinks it would be useful to get the facts straight on the understanding.

K: I agree.

Klein: I think it would be helpful to talk to you.

K: But not now. He can either wait a week da or not.

Klein: You don't think you could telephone him tomorrow morning?

K: No, it's a long, complicated story. But I will call him either tonight or tomorrow morning and work something out.

Klein: Okay, thank you. I will tell him.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Amb. Rabin/Kissinger

4:22 pm

12/22/70

K: I read you are running for Prime Minister.

R: It's (notetaker interrupted). I got a cable about additional developments I once told you when I came back. About certain contacts we have in Europe.

K: You want to come in?

R: For 5 minutes.

K: Should it be today or can it wait until tomorrow.

R: I leave tomorrow for Puerto Rico. If it can be done today for a few minutes.

K: What an Israeli Ambassador is doing celebrating Christmas is beyond me.

R: I am not but I am doing work there. The right job, at the right time and in the right place.

K: How about 6:15?

R: I will see you then.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

Telecon

Stuart Alsop

12/22/70 ca. 4:45 p.m.

A: What I want to do is to write a piece about the understandings reached by the previous Administration on Vietnam. It seems to me it needs a lot of clarification; there's been a lot of misrepresentation about it.

K: Are you saying that the President is misrepresenting it? That would be a novel way of getting inside information.

A: No, not at all. I am, for instance, particularly struck by Braden's piece in today's Post saying Laird was lying in his teeth. Is there any way of getting at what was and was not agreed to?

K: Yes, but I'd like to check it with the President first. It depends on how you understand an understanding. How the other side took it and how we saw it.

A: You say something and I say I understand you because I understand English.

K: And you leave the clear implication that if no one objects, that's the way you are going to act. So, I've just been called to the President...

A: Could you check into this. I think it needs clarification.

K: Yes I can and I think so to and you're one of the few people I would trust with it. I will look into it and call you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secreta ry Rogers
12/22/70 5:35 p.m.

R: I was calling to tell you that Habib has checked Kennedy's man's list and the names on the list -- 339 -- are identical with what we have and the dead they list are identical to ours with two exceptions and they include two additional men dead on our list who aren't on Hanoi's.

K: In other words, they gave us nothing.

R: That's right.

K: I think we should make a statement to that effect.

R: I agree. I thought in the statement tomorrow I would say that Hanoi picked out two well-known Senators, asked them to come to Paris or send an assistant, building up hopes and it turned out to be a cruel hoax.

K: Excellent.

R: Then we should press them and say that the thing to do now is to permit inspection by the independent body, probably the ICRC, and return the sick and disabled.

K: That sounds excellent to me.

R: I think the President will be interested in this.

K: I'll tell him right away.

R: One other thing. The President wants to take a hard line on the naval activity in the Caribbean/ say we are watching very carefully and it's clear that the understanding covers any servicing of ships with offensive weapons or something like that in port.

K: That's very careful. We should say we are watching very carefully and it's clear that the understanding covers any servicing of ships with offensive weapons or something like that.

R: In port?

K: That is something we should leave open. That just encourages doing it out of port. Why say that?

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

12/22/70 5:35 p.m. page 2

R: Then say the servicing of submerged in and around Cuba?

K: Yes, why not say that? Maybe we'll have a chance to talk about that.

R: Okay. Another thing. Is there any reason in the NSC paper on understandings -- any reason why we can't make the contents public without reference to the paper itself. Let me read what I have in mind: It's a quote from President Johnson on October 29 when he said that both Moscow and Hanoi were "clear that we shall continue reconnaissance of North Vietnam."

K: I don't see any reason why we can't.

R: Here's an understanding we inherited and we have no reason to doubt it.

K: I think that there is nothing wrong with that.

R: I'll get a paper sent over to you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Sen. Dole/Kissinger

5:55 pm

12/22/70

K: I was just talking to the President and I wondered if you want to take on Kennedy on the POW thing because he called this morning and said he had urgently to talk to the President. Then he calls Rogers and says he has a list of names. Rogers and I ask him to keep it quiet until we could check the names in order not to raise hopes. He wouldn't do that. He didn't release the names. We have finally gotten the names and there's not one single name we haven't had. He is raising false hopes at Christmas time.

D: No new names?

K: No. We have two more names that weren't put on the list. So it's the same old list we have had.

D: So all hopes and dreams are dashed.

K: Fulbright had the same request and send a man over but he kept quiet.

D: I was asked today and said I didn't know if it were new. Someone asked me today about it and wondered if Kennedy tried to upstage. I said we didn't play that game.

K: It doesn't take but 15 minutes to check those names.

D: I don't know. He may show up in a while. Nothing but a press conference then.

K: That's right. He called us but then he went to leak to the press on names and finally when we get the names we find there's no new name. Whether you do it today or tomorrow, doesn't matter.

D: It might be better tomorrow. It's a valid point to raise -- in his haste to make news he made much misery. Thanks and Merry Christmas.

K: Merry Christmas to you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Secy. Laird

7:07 p.m., December 22, 1970

L: Hello Henry.

K: Hello Mel, how are you?

L: Very good. Say I wanted to let you know -- the reason I am calling you is to tell you there are 339 names you know.

K: Yeah

L: And this is moving on the ticker you know that.

K: Right.

L: The names were not released by Kennedy but released by Renie Davis.

K: Who is this? Oh, he's the peacenik.

L: I have checked and there are no new names on the list. All of the names listed have been reported previously through unofficial lists.

K: The criticism of Kennedy was not that he gave out the 368 names but that he gave the impression that he had something that he didn't.

L: 339 names on our lists -- 9 have been returned and 20 have been reported dead. That's 368 exactly the list I had. Think we ought to put out a little statement on it -- maybe the President would want to put one out.

K: Rogers was going to put one out in the morning.

L: I don't think we should sit all night on this and let everyone think we have a big new list circulating.

K: I think you have a point there.

L: Henry, I don't want you to think I can't get you information, I can get you information but we had to have the list first. We got the list and it came from this very lousy source.

K: I know you can get me information Mel. This meeting tomorrow morning at 9:15 is going to be on Haig's report and some military planning growing out of it.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/Secy Laird

7:07 p.m., December 22, 1970

L: I thought it was about the budget.

K: I want to talk to you afterwards about the budget. There is one problem I have with Shultz which I think I can work out ...

L: Very good.

K: ... and I want to talk with you and Moorer before I go back to Shultz.

L: Okay Henry, see you in the morning.

K: Right, Mel.

Another conversation -- 7:31 p.m., December 22, 1970

L: Sorry to bother you but I think we ought to put out some kind of a statement. You didn't want to make a statement ...

K: The President wanted Rogers to do something on background.

L: We should put out some kind of a statement tonight. With all these wives calling in here, we've got to tell them something. Got a deluge here with requests. So that they don't think they have got something coming to them ...

K: My worry is I don't want Rogers to think we are scooping him on this. But if you get requests, you have to say there are no new names.

will ask

L: They are asking, if you are holding this for a press conference, why?

K: Why don't you call Bill on this and tell him you are doing that and then it is okay.

L: Right. Okay, Henry.