DOUG MILLS—AP

‘We say “Boris,” we say “George” ’: The two leaders ride a golf cart at Camp David

aggressor to find and destroy. But Yeltsin
isn't likely to be pushed offshore. "Your
definition of what's most stable is influ-
enced by whether you have three warm-
water coasts or nine time zones on land,"
says Jack Mendelsohn, deputy director of
the Washington-based Arms Control Asso-
ciation. In the end, Bush and Yeltsin will
probably negotiate a trade-off: so many So-
viet ICBMs in exchange for so many U.S.
Trident submarine warheads.

One catch is that Bush cannot be entirely
sure Yeltsin speaks for the other three for-
mer Soviet republics where strategic mis-
siles are deployed: Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan. He said his proposals are
based on "constant interaction" and
"agreements" with the other republican
leaders. But there are many points of fric-
tion between Russia and its partners. Early
last week Yeltsin snubbed the Japanese
foreign minister and skipped the Moscow
session of the Mideast peace talks in order
to visit the Black Sea, where the Ukraini-
ans claim control of the former Soviet fleet.
Despite such problems, nuclear weapons
are under unified commonwealth com-
mand, which Yeltsin effectively domi-
nates. "We think Yeltsin can deliver," says
a senior U.S. official, "but of course it's
something we have to watch."

If Bush and Yeltsin can reach agree-

ment, verification is not likely to be the
problem it has been before. This time, the
Russians want technical and financial help
from the United States in dismantling
their weapons. "In the past, we sought an
intrusive verification system so that we
could see what was going on," says a senior
aide to Secretary of State James Baker,
who visited Moscow last week. "Here's a
case where they're coming to us and saying,
'We'd like to go through with this destruc-
tion process, and we need your help to do it.'
So we're partners in the exercise."

**Sharing technology:** Yeltsin's proposal to en-
large the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) scored a neat rhetorical point. In
1983, Ronald Reagan offered to share SDI
technology with the Soviets—a promise
that some U.S. officials aren't eager to
keep. Pressing his case at a news confer-
ence in New York, Yeltsin said Moscow had
its own plans for a missile shield, and he
stressed that Russia has extensive experi-
ence in space. At Camp David, Bush ex-
pressed "a lot of interest" in Yeltsin's pro-
posal and said it would be discussed by
experts from both sides. "There are a lot of
practical problems, of course," said a senior
U.S. official, "but there are also new politi-
cal reasons to take a good hard look at it."

But a power struggle at home could
thwart Yeltsin's disarmament plans. With

On the Table

Both sides have pledged deep cuts
in long-range weapons systems.

U.S. Will

■ Terminate B-2 production at 20 aircraft

■ Stop production of warheads for sub-based missiles

■ End purchase of advanced
cruise missiles

U.S. Offers To

■ Eliminate the MX missile

■ Convert Minuteman to single-
warhead missile

■ Reduce sea-based warheads by
one third

Russia Will

■ Dismantle 130 ICBM silos

■ Halt production of Blackjack and Bear-H heavy bombers

■ Halt production of long-range
cruise missiles

■ Reduce number of missile subs
on combat patrol by half

■ No longer target U.S. locations

prices soaring as a result of his economic
reforms, his government has only about a
10 percent approval rating in opinion polls.
He has come under increasingly sharp at-
tack from conservatives, including his own
Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, and the
chairman of the Russian parliament, Rus-
lan Khasbulatov. Looking to the outside
world for politically helpful economic as-
sistance, Yeltsin compared the common-
wealth to "a baby in diapers. You don't
want to drop it," he said.

Ironically, some American officials are
just beginning to approve of Yeltsin. Long
suspicious of his emotional stability and
his devotion to democracy, they are begin-
ning to respect his skills. When Baker and
his aides discussed arms control with Yel-
tsin last week, they were surprised by the
improvement in his grasp of detail. "He
knew it, he knew it cold," said one U.S.
official. "And it was very, very, very tech-
nical. It was really impressive." At Camp
David, Yeltsin revealed that he and Bush
are on a first-name basis. "We say 'Boris,'
we say 'George'," he told reporters. The
question is whether Yeltsin can hang onto
power long enough to cash in on all the
dividends of peace.

RUSSELL WATSON with MARGARET GARRARD
WARNER, JOHN BARRY and CLARA BINGHAM
in Washington, CARROLL BOGERT at the
United Nations and FRED COLEMAN in Moscow

NEWSWEEK : FEBRUARY 10, 1992

DOUG MILLS—AP

RUSSELL WATSON with MARGARET GARRARD
WARNER, JOHN BARRY and CLARA BINGHAM
*in Washington, CARROLL BOGERT at the*
*United Nations and FRED COLEMAN in Moscow*

On the Table

U.S. Will

U.S. Offers To

■ Eliminate the MX missile

Russia Will

■ Dismantle 130 ICBM silos

NEWSWEEK : FEBRUARY 10, 1992

able observers, now commands much more support today. In Ukraine, the nationalists are pressing President Leonid Kravchuk to confront Russia more sharply on the issues between them.

I experienced the anti-American version of Russian nationalism at a dinner in Moscow with a group of 10 up-and-coming young Russians. They argued that the United States was taking advantage of the current situation and that the term "new world order" was highly presumptuous because it assumed that Russia would no longer be a significant factor in world affairs.

Above all, Russian nationalism translates into a desire to restore traditional dominance over the other republics. A major personality in the Russian Parliament told me, "We would never have put forward the Commonwealth if we had thought it possible that Ukraine might actually become independent. I will never accept Kiev as a foreign city."

No Russian I met accepted that Ukraine can be truly independent; no Ukrainian wanted any central organs to survive. To a man, the Ukrainians spoke of the threat of Russian imperialism—a view shared by the leaders of several other republics I have since

met. The Russians argued that Ukraine agreed to an "economic space" but then immediately issued its own currency. The Ukrainians insisted that Russia accepted their independence but immediately challenged Ukraine's borders by raising questions about the status of the Crimea. The Russians see the Commonwealth as a mechanism to preserve as much of the central machinery as they can. The Ukrainians envision it as having no permanent status or organs— not even a secretariat to prepare foreign-minister meetings. They totally reject any concept of a united armed force.

Yeltsin and Kravchuk are probably responsible enough to avoid a blowup. But neither was brought up on the principle of democratic compromise, and as discontent accelerates, they could be replaced by less accommodating personalities—or pushed to side with nationalists.

A series of disagreements over military issues is also bound to exacerbate matters in the short run. First, there is a fundamental conceptual dispute. Russia foresees a centrally controlled Commonwealth army. Two

senior military leaders in Moscow told me they wanted a 2-to-3-year transition period in which the existing armed forces would remain under Moscow's central control. One of them flatly stated—twice, in case I missed it—that Yeltsin should take over all the armed forces by decree and then ask Ukraine to negotiate. This may be the reason why Yeltsin has not formed a Russian army. Ukraine naturally sees the Commonwealth armed force as a menace to its independence.

The practical disagreements are concentrated in three areas: nuclear weapons, the future of the Black Sea Fleet, and command and control over conventional weapons. But the deepest issue is the future of the Army. Russia sees Ukraine's armed forces as a militia to protect politicians and buildings and wants the Commonwealth to defend Ukraine's borders. I met no Ukrainian who would tolerate this view. They would consider such a defense establishment an army of occupation.

Over all this floats the General Staff in Moscow, now for the first

time effectively without political control by Party, KGB or government. It represents the Commonwealth, which has neither political institutions nor personnel. The political vacuum has left the General Staff with unprecedented independence, though in practice it has put itself at the service of Yeltsin.

What does all this mean for the United States? At present, U.S. policy toward the former Soviet Union seems to be driven by two concerns: the immediate food crisis and the issue of control of nuclear weapons. These are important challenges. But the former is, in the short run, a technical problem of distribution. The latter has received a great deal of technical attention, and much useful American help has already been given. We must take care, however, lest the nuclear issue become exploited by centralizers aiming to reconstitute the old Empire.

The United States has been remarkably slow in dealing with the new republics. When I visited Ukraine, it had only two U.S. diplomats with no direct communication to Washington. (This is being rectified.) I suspect the presence in the other republics is even more negligible. The rare visits of U.S. officials deal almost

exclusively with the nuclear issue—an important but limited dialogue, since it will end when nuclear weapons are removed.

To navigate through the existing maelstrom, the United States should pursue these seemingly contradictory but in fact complementary policies:

* Washington must keep in mind that Russia is the heir of a proud and heroic tradition and that recent events have been a devastating blow to its self-esteem. It is essential that Washington make clear in actions and words that it considers Russia an appropriate partner in world affairs and a major country with legitimate security interests. Russia extending from

St. Petersburg to Vladivostok and possessing thousands of nuclear weapons no longer needs the territorial buffers it considered so essential throughout its history. And it needs to devote resources hitherto spent on imperial expansion to economic recovery.

* At the same time, Russia must be given to understand that new expansionism—by force or blackmail—will exact a heavy price. It would clash with U.S. principles and frighten Russia's neighbors. And it would

reactivate the cycle of confrontation between Russia and the world.

* The United States should rapidly expand its economic and cultural contacts with the key new republics. We must remember that an imperial heritage has left most of them little experience in international affairs. They need sensitive encouragement. We must balance the attention Yeltsin deserves with the support the new republics require. We must find subjects to talk to them about other than nuclear control. This should be balanced with commensurate programs toward the other republics.

* If Russia respects the new situation and remains within its borders, a significant Western aid program would be in order.

We are facing an extraordinary opportunity—a fundamental recasting of relations between the former Soviet Union and the rest of the world. If dealt with wisely, it can open an unprecedented era of cooperation. But such opportunities are fleeting and must not be wasted by an obsession with technical issues that are no more than the symptoms of change.

VLADIMIR SUMOVSKY-SYGMA
Military disputes: In port with the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol

## Russians worry about 'fascist nationalism' in republics like Ukraine

NEWSWEEK: FEBRUARY 10, 1992 35

ANTHONY RAY—JB PICTURES

‘The Arabs will understand’: Guarding seized property in the Silwan neighborhood

# Settlers Inside the Walls

## Remaking the Muslim sector of ancient Jerusalem

These settlers are polite. Unlike their brethren in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, they say they want to befriend Arabs. They study Arabic. They avoid carrying machine guns. They invite Palestinian neighbors in for coffee. And they patronize local Arab merchants. Still, they don't take any chances. Sarah Ben Moyal's home near Herod's Gate in Jerusalem's Old City is equipped with walkie-talkies, to keep her in touch with security forces. Unlike other houses in the neighborhood, settler homes feature bars on the windows and barbed wire over the gate. When her children go out, a government-paid armed guard goes with them; they don't play with local Arab children. It's complicated, but "Jews must be able to live anywhere in the Land of Israel," says Ben Moyal, 37. "The Arabs will understand and accept us."

Don't hold your breath. With the support of a government still committed to expanding Jewish settlement, the ultranationalists of Ateret Cohanim are building a beachhead in the most sensitive Palestinian community of all, the Old City's Muslim Quarter. More than 600 settlers now live outside the Jewish Quarter; their number will double with completion of a housing project near Damascus Gate. Many choose sites near the Western Wall and Al-Aqsa Mosque, Islam's third holiest shrine (map). Some envision a day when Israel rebuilds Herod's Temple in its place. Says Palestinian journalist Majeda al-Batsh, who lives in the Muslim Quarter: "If they're so nice, why are they coming in with police protection?"

Even before Israel seized Jerusalem in 1967, middle-class Arabs had begun moving out of the Muslim Quarter to escape

overcrowding. Arabs charge that subsequent Israeli policy has softened it up for conquest. They contend the government has long denied them permits to refurbish aging homes or build additions. As a result, they say, the tiny, crowded neighborhood has deteriorated. In 1978, a new Likud government stood by when a quiet movement to supplant Old City Arabs began; a few apartments were taken over on grounds that they once belonged to Jews, and two yeshivas opened. Ariel Sharon, now the

housing minister, later bought an apartment that he seldom visits, though it is heavily guarded around the clock.

Remaining Old City Arabs are increasingly hemmed in. Government officials have allowed construction of a vast new Jewish housing and commercial complex outside Jaffa Gate, just to the west. That squares with Sharon's current drive to build homes for 90,000 additional settlers in the occupied territories. Late last year, settlers stormed six houses in Silwan, just outside the Old City walls; they forced the families out at gunpoint. The same settlers have announced plans to build 200 homes for Jews in the village. Meanwhile, economic hardship caused by the sputtering *intifada* has made cash buyouts attractive to Muslim Quarter residents.

**Financial support:** Where cash won't work, a welter of Turkish, British, Jordanian and Israeli laws governing housing often does. For example, one 1950 law allows Israel to seize the property of any "absentee" Palestinian. Technically, that would include every Palestinian who was in an Arab country, including Jordan, which controlled the Old City from 1948 to 1967. The settlers also get substantial legal and financial support from Sharon's ministry. Knesset member Dedi Zucker says government officials "know they are bending the law, circumventing the law and breaking the law." But settler spokeswoman Tehila Rapps says that it all is aboveboard. "We don't force Arabs out," she said. "We pay good money for homes in bad condition." In any case, the settlers say, they answer to a higher authority. Says Rabbi Shlomo Aviner: "We are told [by the Bible] to settle the

Land of Israel everywhere, so most certainly in the Old City."

Israeli officials know that the move on the Muslim Quarter could lead to violence and even revive the Palestinian uprising. That, in turn, could endanger the Middle East peace talks, which barely inched forward in Moscow last week. But the government is ambivalent about the peace process anyway. And in the Muslim Quarter, it seems to be ready for trouble. Police and army units inside the walls built by Suleiman the Magnificent have been beefed up, and the quarter is heavily patrolled by agents of Shin Bet, Israel's security police. Arabs say their visitors are often searched. Meanwhile, several Jews have been stabbed in the Muslim Quarter. If the quarter explodes, the blast could be felt for thousands of miles.

THEODORE STANGER and EETTA PRINCE-GIBSON in Jerusalem

36 NEWSWEEK : FEBRUARY 10, 1992

RUSSIA: FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION

23

Reading 6

JUMPSTARTING THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY

This NEWSWEEK article details the positives and negatives of Boris Yeltsin's attempts to lead the former Soviet Union toward a market economy.

"Shock Therapy" — With Emphasis on Shock

*Yeltsin abruptly raises Russia's cost of living*

Boris Yeltsin called it “shock therapy.” For millions of Russians and their neighbors in other republics of the former Soviet Union, it meant a distinctly unhappy New Year. In Moscow’s state stores, the price of bread quadrupled. The free-market prices of sausage went up more than sixfold, and pork sold for 465 rubles a pound—more than the average wage for a month’s work. Yeltsin’s overnight price reform had Russians worrying about runaway inflation. “We used to go shopping with one 10-ruble note,” said a worker named Yuri. “Now we need a suitcase full of them.”

Yeltsin insists that things will have to get worse before they can get better. "The economy is sick," the Russian president said in a New Year's message. His cure was a sudden shift from the centrally planned economy to free-market mechanisms. Higher prices were intended to lure more goods into the shops, in the hope that prices would stabilize when supply and demand come into balance. "It will be hard, but the period will not be long," Yeltsin promised. "We are talking of six to eight months." With a painful winter ahead, it was by no means certain that Yeltsin would have that much time before the Russian people – and the military–lose patience. And thorough economic reform will take far longer than Yeltsin hopes. Meanwhile, sharply higher prices could prove to be more shock than therapy.

... Yeltsin's price reforms seem to go just far enough to inflict pain on consumers without guaranteeing any long-term gain. In theory, individual state stores set their own prices, but so far most of their prices appear to be set by bureaucrats rather than market forces. And although most prices have been decontrolled, ceilings have been set for key commodities ranging from milk and bread to fuel oil and vodka. The sharp price increases in Russia forced some of the other former Soviet republics to follow suit more quickly than they had planned.

... Reform will come much harder in Russia than it did in countries like Poland. The republic is vastly larger, with a volatile ethnic mix that does not exist in Poland. Russia's chronically inefficient distribution system is crumbling rapidly. One neighbor to the south, Armenia, has increased its agricultural production by privatizing farmland. But the added produce cannot get to market in Russia because of inadequate rail transport.

The most tangible impediment to economic reform is the military-industrial complex, which in the past devoured as much as 30 percent of the gross national product. Yeltsin is moving toward a smaller, all-volunteer army. That is essential for the economy, but it remains to be seen whether he can pull it off. Millions of soldiers and defense workers will have to be retrained, factories will need retooling and the generals and plant managers will have to surrender most of their power.

Perhaps equally important, the mind-set of the Russian people is quite different from that of Poles or Hungarians. The Soviet system taught them to believe in a kind of egalitarianism that is suspicious of individual advancement. Profit is increasingly honored in Eastern Europe, but in Russia the middlemen who make money by bringing suppliers and consumers together are regarded as criminals.

Countries like Poland have had far more experience with free enterprise. Communism was forced on the Poles nearly 30 years after it was imposed on Russia, and the Polish economy was more advanced to begin with. Even under Communist rule, 80 percent of Polish farmland remained in private hands, while a few private businesses were allowed to operate. "We, after all, did have the private sector," says Stanislaw Ciosek, Poland's ambassador in Moscow. "But here, by and large, these people have not had that kind of historic school at all. They were transferred straight from feudalism into Lenin's or Stalin's system of government."

Turning his people into capitalists, and doing it in a hurry, may be a task that is beyond even the talents of Boris Yeltsin. If he fails, the outcome could be frightening. "The situation in this country and its capital is very much like that of 74 years ago," writes the Moscow newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta. "People queue for bread, the empire is falling apart, the number of small sovereign republics is mushrooming and armed citizens in exotic uniforms are marching through the streets and squares of former district centers under the multicolored banners of new independent states." All this is so reminiscent of the civil war that began in 1918 that many Russians fear the past is fated to repeat itself. But whatever happens, a communist economy seems to have no place in anyone's future. Russia's only choice is to break sharply with the past – and hope for the best.

— NEWSWEEK, January 13, 1992

Newsweek Education Program
Copyright © 1992 by Newsweek, Inc.

24

RUSSIA: FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION (L)

Reading 7

AVOIDING AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM

Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wonders if Boris Yeltsin's economic decontrolling process will work before austerity measures exacerbate strains both within and among the republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The New Russian Question

*U.S. policy must seek to prevent the return of aggressive nationalism*

... It is the essence of revolutions that they seem to contemporaries like a series of unrelated incidents. Especially a country like the United States, which takes stability for granted, has a tendency to consider upheavals as a temporary deviation from the familiar. This is why Yeltsin is treated as the linear descendent of Gorbachev and the so-called Commonwealth of Independent States as if it were the old Soviet Union with a different name. Some Western leaders exhibit a subconscious impatience with the emergence of multiple sovereignies. At times they act as if they would prefer the old superstate, simply leavened by democratic ideals and market economies.

These attitudes, understandable as they may be, overlook the most important consequence of the second Russian revolution: the collapse of an imperial state that from the time of Peter the Great brought pressure on all its neighbors, started more wars than any other European state and culminated in a Communist monolith. Because of the emergence of new national states on the territory of the former Soviet Union, Yeltsin cannot be dealt with as if he were Gorbachev. The Russian Republic is the largest of the successor states and comprises three fourths of the former Soviet territory and half its population. But there are also 11 other republics; the largest, Ukraine, has a population nearly as big as France's.

American policy, nostalgic for the simpler verities of a single power center, has acknowledged these new facts but been hesitant to deal with their implications. This ambivalence and overemphasis on stability threaten the prospects for peace because they could rekindle the Russian Republic's historic tendencies toward domination.... Peace and progress require that the United States must not end up on the wrong side of the conflict between the center and the emerging nationalities.

That conflict is now compounded by the fact that all the republics are undergoing major economic and political crises which accentuate the tensions between them. The economic crisis is the legacy of decades of stagnation caused by the Stalinist central command system. Yeltsin has courageously tried to spur reform by freeing prices, gambling that decontrol will bring out hoarded goods and stimulate production. Most of the other republics have followed suit. But the question is whether the process can work before the resulting austerity wrecks the political system.

The economic crisis exacerbates strains both within and

among the republics. And the old guard is taking advantage. One melancholy reformer noted that on certain levels the August coup "succeeded." The bureaucracy remains permeated by Communists. Former apparatchiks are now in the enviable position of being able to sabotage the government's policies from within while their ideological leaders criticize them from without. These frustrations make nationalism a convenient rally cry both in Russia and in Ukraine....

No Russian I met accepted that Ukraine can be truly independent; no Ukrainians spoke of the threat of Russian imperialism — a view shared by the leaders of several other republics I have since met. The Russians argued that Ukraine agreed to an “economic space” but then immediately issued its own currency. The Ukrainians insisted that Russia accepted their independence but immediately challenged Ukraine's borders by raising questions about the status of the Crimea. The Russians see the Commonwealth as a mechanism to preserve as much of the central machinery as they can. The Ukrainians envision it as having no permanent status or organs — not even a secretariat to prepare foreign-minister meetings. They totally reject any concept of a united armed force.

... A series of disagreements over military issues is also bound to exacerbate matters in the short run ...

Over all this floats the General Staff in Moscow, now for the first time effectively without political control by Party, KGB or government. It represents the Commonwealth, which has neither political institutions nor personnel. The political vacuum has left the General Staff with unprece-

25

Reading 7 continued

* At the same time, Russia must be given to understand that new expansionism—by force or blackmail—will exact a heavy price. It would clash with U.S. principles and frighten Russia’s neighbors. And it would reactivate the cycle of confrontation between Russia and the world.

— Henry A. Kissinger
NEWSWEEK, February 10, 1992

26

Reading 8

RODINA

According to this piece from The New Yorker, while the world focuses on the policies and problems of the new Commonwealth of Independent States, it is easy to lose sight of the ex-Soviet citizens who have been rendered stateless by the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Last month, as Boris Yeltsin's entire Cabinet threatened to step down and thousands of hard-liners marched in Manezh Square demanding Yeltsin's resignation and calling for the return of the Soviet Union, we realized what a difficult thing it is to be an ex-Soviet citizen right now. With the distractions of coups d'état, fallen Presidents, fractious governments, and outbreaks of fighting, it is easy to overlook the human face of history. Two hundred and ninety million people have been rendered effectively stateless by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and now face a precarious future with no guaranteed social contract. They are no longer Soviet citizens, and not really Russians, although that is the name they tend to fall back on. For the moment, the name of the place where they live is still the one that Yeltsin picked last December—Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv, the Commonwealth of Independent States—and its inhabitants are already calling it the S.N.G., stuck in the habit of referring to their country by initials, but it is difficult to know whether they want to think of themselves as citizens of the S.N.G. or only as a group of people gathered by accident in the landmass that geographers call Central Eurasia.

We in the West may have thought of the Soviet Union as a backward nation that cruelly replaced serfdom with collectivized farms, or as a technological marvel that launched Sputnik and put the first man in space, or even as an evil empire. As a rule, we haven't thought of it as simply a country, capable of inspiring patriotic allegiance, and of providing a kind of security, if not affluence, for its citizens. So if it was unnerving this spring to see self-styled patriots marching on the Kremlin, and to watch Yeltsin's government waver from week to week between democracy and dictatorship, it was both unnerving and surprisingly touching to see Natalia Mishkutienok, the female half of the ice-dancing pair who took the gold medal in the Winter Olympics, frown and shake her head when she heard the Olympic anthem played to honor her, instead of the Soviet national anthem, and saw the pale-blue flag of the "Unified Team" raised, instead of the red-and-gold flag under which she had trained: she was participating in an international competition as a representative of a country that did not exist.

Reactions like Mishkutienok's are all the more affecting because they fly in the face of more widely publicized attitudes among her countrymen. When Mikhail Gorbachev

ushered in the era of *glasnost*, allowing people to air their country's dirty linen without much fear of reprisal, it became fashionable for them to publicly deplore most things about the Soviet Union. Symbols like the flag and the anthem were not immune; in fact, there was an especially virulent press campaign against the anthem. One of its greatest foes was a *Moscow News* writer named Stanislav Rassadin: he acquired a certain renown for an article—headed "Why Is the Soviet Anthem So Insipid?"—in which he pointed out that the song was officially sanctioned by Stalin, and that when the Second World War was at its height Stalin had made a special trip to the front to congratulate the author "in order to delicately inquire if the author would have anything against his changing one punctuation mark." Rassadin added, "This while executing millions of people!"

In the current outspoken era, it has been easy to assume that while Russia, and the idea of Russia, could inspire grudging loyalty and love, the Soviet Union could not. Tolstoy's famous images—of Natasha Rostov dancing in a peasant cottage, and of the earnest Levin working the land with his serfs on his estate as he pines for Kitty Scherbatsky—remain indelibly in our heads. This is the Russian soul we recognize in the West, and it is the essence of *rodina*—the word Russians use when they talk sentimentally about the land of their birth. But over the past seventy-five years a new, Soviet homeland became part of *rodina*, and the new images live on in the ex-Soviet Union, mingled confusingly with memories of a heroic deeper past. Ten-year-olds recite poetry by Lermontov and Pushkin, and protest when their new schoolbooks contradict the Communist precepts they learned in first grade. Twenty-year-olds leave flowers at the graves of Tchaikovsky, Chekhov, and Dostoyevski, and also line up at Lenin's Tomb.

Unlike Natalia Mishkutienok, many of her countrymen are probably ambivalent about the loss of their flag and their anthem, but the loss of their country's name and, through that name, their country is part of what has produced the present malaise. In a way, not only Mishkutienok's reaction but also Rassadin's is evidence of the hold that the now defunct Union had on its people. And it is this hold—the persistence of *rodina*—that motivates both the thousandodd People's Deputies who daily challenge Yeltsin and the thousands who march against him. No matter what their political agenda, the first thing that these people want is a national identity.

—From the "Notes and Comment" section of "The Talk of the Town"
from The New Yorker, May 11, 1992.
© 1992 The New Yorker Magazine Inc.

JAN 31 '92 07:19PM NEWSWEEK EDITORIAL

P.4/14

IN0206 russia

On my recent visit to Kiev + Moscow I called en route at his new foundation to discuss the future of the Soviet Union with some of his officials. All this had disappeared by the time of my most recent visit to Moscow and Kiev last month. Only the penetrating cold remained. Life was harder than ever. Politics had changed beyond recognition. +

[9]

It is the essence of revolu-
tions that they seem to contem-
poraries like a series of unrelat-
ed incidents. Especially in a
country like the United States,
which takes stability for grant-
ed, has a tendency to consider
upheavals as a temporary devi-
ation from the familiar. This is
why Yeltsin is treated as the
linear descendant of Gorba-
chev and the so-called Com-
monwealth of Independent
States as if it were the old Sovi-
et Union with a different name.
Some Western leaders exhibit a
subconscious impatience with
the emergence of multiple sov-
ereignties. At times they act as
if they would prefer the old su-

# (((MORE)))))

JAN 31 '92 07:20PM NEWSWEEK EDITORIAL

P.5/14

IN0206 russia DEPT. in
perstate, simply leavened by democratic
ideals and market economics. +

PAGE-3

[22]
These attitudes, understandable as they
may be, overlook the most important conse-
quence of the Russian revolution: the col-
lapse of an imperial state that for three
centuries brought pressure on all its neigh-
bors, started more wars than any other Eu-
ropean state, and finally culminated in a
Communist monolith. Because of the emer-
gence of new national states on the territory
of the former Soviet Union, Yeltsin cannot be dealt with as if he
were Gorbachev. The Russian Republic is the largest of the succes-
sor states and comprises two thirds of the former Soviet territory
and half its population. But there are also eleven other republics;

the largest, Ukraine, has a population as big as France. +

[15]
American policy, nostalgic for the simpler verities of a single
power center, has acknowledged these new facts but been hesitant
to deal with their implications. This ambivalence and overempha-
sis on stability threaten the prospects for peace because they
could

rekindle the Russian Republic's historic tendencies toward domi-
nation. For the former polyglot Empire can be reconstituted only
by military force and a return to the state of hostility toward the

(((MORE))))

P.6/14

IN0206 russia

DEPT. in

PAGE-4

outside world that existed for centuries under Tsars and Commis-
sars. No peoples have been more abused by their government than
those of the old Empire, and no country has been in a more
permanent state of conflict with its neighbors. Peace and progress
require that the U.S. must not end up on the wrong side of the
conflict between the center and the emerging nationalities. +

[15]

That conflict is now compounded by the fact that all the repub-
lics are undergoing major economic and political crises which
accentuate the tensions between them. The economic crisis is the
legacy of decades of stagnation caused by the Stalinist central
command system. Yeltsin has courageously tried to spur reform by
freeing prices, gambling that decontrol will bring out hoarded
goods and stimulate production. Most of the other republics have
followed suit. But the question is whether the process can work
before the resulting austerity wrecks the political system. →

[6]

Yeltsin's advisers combine an almost mystical feeling that in
the
end things will work out with
impatience for quick results; first-name? mp
Gaidar, the chief economic
planner, and others were hopeful that prices were starting to
head down. But this visitor saw
no evidence of that. Most of my
interlocutors seemed to forsee
serious unrest by fall if there is

(((MORE))))

["JAN 31 '92 07:21PM NEWSWEEK EDITORIAL", "P.7/14", "IN0206 russia\nno dramatic improvement. +", "DEPT. in", "PAGE-5", "□Prices are certainly outra-\ngeous: a kilo of beef costs half a\nmonth's salary in both Kiev\nand Moscow. Meanwhile, Yelt-\nsin is under attack and busily\ncriticizing ``predators'' for rais-\ning prices too high. Recently, he\nordered the price of sausages\nlowered in one store he visit-\ned-proof the ``free markets''\nconcept is not yet established. +", "[12]", "□There is still a cushion of savings and hoarded goods. What will happen when these run out? No provisions have been made to assure adequate supplies of consumer goods. Privatization plans are only crudely formulated so far. One leading reformer told me that agricultural reform cannot begin this year because the Russian parliament has refused to act on it. +", "[11]", "□Yeltsin and others express the hope that the economy can be stabilized by October.", "But Gaidar admits it will take about two years, provided responsible policies are followed-a still dubious proposition. Others predict a further 30% decline in GNP this year, with stabilization in", (((MORE)))", "[9]"]

JAN 31 '92 07:22PM NEWSWEEK EDITORIAL

P.3/14

IN0206 russia DEPT. in PAGE-6
mid-to-late 1993. Can the political structure last that long?

[6]

The economic crisis exacerbates strains both within and among the republics. And the old guard is taking advantage. One melancholy reformer noted that on certain levels the August coup 'succeeded.' The bureaucracy remains permeated by Communists. Former apparatchiks are now in the enviable position of being able to sabotage the government's policies from within while their ideological leaders criticize them from without. These frustrations make nationalism a convenient rallying cry both in Russia and in the Ukraine. Russians worry about the 'fascist nationalism' symbolized bytkfirstname mp Zhirinovsky, who garnered only 6% of the vote

in the Presidential election but, according to some knowledgeable observers, now commands five times as much support today. In Ukraine, the nationalists are pressing President Leonid Kravchuk to confront Russia more sharply on the issues between them.

[16]

I experienced the anti-American version of Russian nationalism at a dinner in Moscow with a group of ten up-and-coming young Russians. They argued that the United States was taking advantage of the current situation, and that the term 'new world order' was highly presumptuous because it assumed that Russia would no longer be a significant factor in world affairs.

[7]

(((MORE))))

["JAN 31 '92 07:22PM NEWSWEEK EDITORIAL", "P.9/14", "IN0206 russia", "DEPT. in", "PAGE-7", "personality in the Russian parliament told me that the Common-\nwealth must not become a loose confederation like the European\nCommunity. ``We would never have put forward the Common-\nwealth if we had thought it possible that the Ukraine might\ndeclare itself independent,'' he said. ``I will never accept Kiev\nas a\nforeign city.'' +", "[9]", "□No Russian I met accepted that the Ukraine can be truly inde-\npendent; no Ukrainian wanted any central organs to survive. To a\nman, the Ukrainians spoke of the threat of Russian imperialism.\nThe Russians argued that the Ukraine agreed to an ``economic\nspace'' but then immediately is-\nsued its own currency. The\nUkrainians insisted that Rus-\nsia accepted their independ-\nence but immediately chal-\nlenged the Ukraine's borders\nby raising questions about the\nstatus of the Crimea. The Rus-\nsians see the Commonwealth as\na mechanism to preserve as\nmuch of the central machinery\nas they can. The Ukrainians en-\nvision it as having no perma-\nnent status or organs-not\neven a secretariat to prepare\nforeign minister meetings.", (((MORE)))))"]

["JAN 31 '92 07:23PM NEWSWEEK EDITORIAL", "P.10/14", "IN0206 russia", "DEPT. in", "PAGE-8", "They totally reject any concept\nof a united Armed Force. +", "[22]", "Yeltsin and Kravchuk are\nprobably responsible enough to\navoid a blow-up. But neither\nwas brought up on the principle of demo-\ncratic compromise, and as discontent accel-\nerates, they could be replaced by less accom-\nmodating personalities-or pushed to side\nwith nationalists.+", "[8]", "A series of disagreements over military\nissues is also bound to exacerbate matters in\nthe short run. First, there is a fundamental\nconceptual dispute. Russia forsees a central-\nly controlled Commonwealth army. Two\nsenior military leaders in Moscow told me\nthey wanted a 2-3 year transition period in which the existing\narmed forces would remain under Moscow's central control. One\nof them flatly stated-twice, in case I missed it-that Yeltsin\nshould take over all the armed forces by decree and then ask the\nUkraine to negotiate. This may be the reason why Yeltsin has not\nformed a Russian army. The Ukraine naturally sees the Common-\nwealth armed force as a menace to its independence. +", "[13]", "The practical disagreements are concentrated in three areas:\nnuclear weapons, the future of the Black Sea fleet, and command\nand control over nuclear weapons. But the deeper issue is the", {"bbox": [789, 1395, 923, 1416], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE)))]}"]

["JAN 31 '92 07:23PM NEWSWEEK EDITORIAL", "P.11/14", "IN0206 russia", "DEPT. in", "PAGE-9", "future of the armed forces. Russia sees the Ukraine's forces as a\nmilitia to protect politicians and buildings and wants the Com-\nmonwealth to defend Ukraine's borders. I met no Ukrainian who\nwould tolerate this view. They would consider such a defense\nestablishment an army of occupation. +", "[8]", "Over all this floats the General Staff in Moscow, now for the\nfirst\ntime effectively without political control by Party, KGB or govern-\nment. It represents the Commonwealth, which has neither politi-\ncal institutions nor personnel. The political vacuum has left the\nGeneral Staff with unprecedented independence, though in prac-\ntice it has put itself at the service of Yeltsin. +", "[7]", "What does all this mean for the United States? At present, U.S.\npolicy toward the former Soviet Union seems to be driven by two\nconcerns: the immediate food crisis, and the issue of control of\nnuclear weapons. These are important challenges. But the former\nis, in the short run, a technical problem of distribution. The\nlatter\nhas received a great deal of technical attention, and much useful\nAmerican help has already been given. We must take care, howev-\ner, lest the nuclear issue become exploited by centralizers aiming\nto reconstitute the old Empire. +", "[10]", "The United States has been remarkably slow in dealing with the\nnew republics. When I visited the Ukraine, it had only two U.S.\ndiplomats with no direct communication to Washington. (This is\nbeing rectified.) I suspect the presence in the other republics is", {"bbox": [790, 1394, 924, 1416], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE)))"]

JAN 31 '92 07:24PM NEWSWEEK EDITORIAL

P.12/14

IN0206 russia

DEPT. in

PAGE-10

even more negligible. The rare visits of U.S. officials deal almost exclusively with the nuclear issue-an important but limited dialogue, since it will end when nuclear weapons are removed.+

[9]

[5]

Washington must keep in mind that Russia is the heir of a proud and heroic tradition and that recent events have been a major blow to its self-esteem. It is essential that Washington make clear in actions and in words that it considers Russia an appropriate partner in the conduct of world affairs and a major country with legitimate security interests. Russia extending from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok and possessing thousands of nuclear weapons no longer needs the territorial buffers it considered so

(((MORE))))

P.13/14

IN0206 russia DEPT. in PAGE-11

essential throughout its history. And it
needs to devote resources hitherto spent on
imperial expansion to economic recovery.→

[19]

□ At the same time, Russia must be given to understand that new expansionism-by force or blackmail-will exact a heavy price. It would clash with American principles and frighten Russia's neighbors. And it would reactivate the cycle of confrontation and suspicion between Russia and the world.→

[7]

□□ The United States should rapidly expand its economic and cultural contacts with the key new republics. We must remember that an imperial heritage has left most of them little experience in international affairs. They need sensitive encouragement. We must balance the attention Yeltsin deserves with the support the new republics require. We must find subjects to talk to them about other than nuclear control. This should be balanced with commensurate programs toward the other republics.→

[9]

□□ If Russia respects the new situation and remains within its borders, a significant Western aid program would be in order. →

[2]

We are facing an extraordinary opportunity-a fundamental recasting of relations between the former Soviet Union and the rest of the world. If dealt with wisely, it can open an unprecedented

(((MORE))))

["JAN 31 '92 07:25PM NEWSWEEK EDITORIAL", "P.14/14", "IN0206 russia", "DEPT. in", "era of cooperation. But such opportunities are fleeting and must\nnot be wasted by an obsession with technical issues that are no\nmore than the symptoms of change.", "henry--an excellent piece even though eye thought the germans\nstarted more wars than the soviets....as always, many thanks for\nyour efforts best maynard +", "[7]", {"bbox": [164, 482, 281, 505], "category": "Text", "text":(((END)))", "[3]"]

2487 WORDS

Kissinger Newsweek Article 1/31/92

When I last visited Moscow in early 1989, Gorbachev was still in charge; reform was being talked about but only within the framework of a liberalized Communist system. The satellite orbit was in place; any discussion of the Soviet Union breaking up would have been considered madness. All this had disappeared by the time of my most recent visit to Moscow and Kiev; only the penetrating cold remained. Life was even harder than before. Politics had turned unrecognizable.

It is the essence of revolutions that they seem to contemporaries like a series of unrelated incidents. Especially to a country like the United States, which takes stability for granted and has a tendency to treat upheavals as a temporary deviation from the familiar. This is why Yeltsin is treated as the linear descendant of Gorbachev and the so-

called Commonwealth of Independent States as if it were the old Soviet Union with a change in name. Some in Washington exhibit a subconscious impatience with the sudden emergence of multiple sovereignties. At times they act as if they preferred the old superstate leavened by democratic ideals and dedicated to free market economics.

These attitudes, understandable as they are, will deprive us of the most important aspect of the Russian revolution for the peace of the world - the collapse of the imperial state that for three centuries absorbed nationalities, brought pressure on all its neighbors, started more wars than any other European state, and finally culminated in a Communist Empire. Because of the emergence of new national states on the territory of the former Soviet Union, Yeltsin can not be dealt with as if he were Gorbachev. He is President of the Russian Republic - the largest of the successor states comprising two

3

But there are also ten other republics, of which the Ukraine
is the largest, with a population comparable to that of
France.

American policy, nostalgic for the simpler verities of a
single power center, has acknowledged the fact but been
hesitant to deal with the reality. This ambivalence and
attendant over-emphasis on stability could rekindle historic
tendencies toward domination in the Russian Republic and bring
about a recurrence of the historic tragedy of the peoples of
the former Soviet Union. For the former polyglot Empire can be
reconstituted only by the militarization of its society and a
perpetual state of latent hostility toward the outside world.
Centralizers in the former Soviet Union - under Tsars and
Commissars - have always invoked an environment more hostile
than the internal conflict of the nationalities. No peoples

4

have been more abused by their government than those of the
old Empire, and no country has been in a more permanent state
of conflict with its neighbors. This is why peace and progress
require a creative reaction to the break-up of the old Empire.

The U.S. must not end up on the wrong side of the conflict
between the imperial center and the emerging nationalities
that is inherent in every process of decolonization. On the
territory of the former Soviet Union it is compounded by the
fact that the territories seeking independence are contiguous
to the imperial center and that all the republics are
undergoing major economic and political crises which
accentuate the conflicts between them.

The economic crisis is the legacy of decades of stagnation
caused by the Stalinist central command system. Yeltsin has
courageously tried to spur reform by freeing prices in the
hope is that rising prices will bring out hoarded goods and

5

stimulate production. Most of the other republics have
followed suit - as indeed they had to if they did not want
their goods to chase the higher prices in the Russian
Republic. His challenge is whether the process can work
quickly enough before the resulting austerity wrecks the
political system.

At this relatively early stage of the process, a visitor
becomes far more aware of austerity than of progress. The
almost mystical feeling that in the end things will somehow
work out is matched by impatience for quick results; Gaidar,
the chief economic planner, spoke in terms of 3-4 weeks. He
and others were hopeful that prices were starting to head
down, though this visitor saw no evidence of this. Everybody
seemed to think that social unrest is likely by spring if
there is no dramatic improvement.

6

Prices are certainly outrageous (a kilo of beef costs half a month's salary in both Kiev and Moscow). Meanwhile, Yeltsin is under attack and busily criticizing "predators" for raising prices too high. Recently, he peremptorily ordered the price of sausages lowered in one store he visited - in other words, the "free markets" concept is not yet firmly established.

There is still a cushion of savings and hoarded goods. What will happen when these run out and when wages see them frozen? I saw nothing to contradict the view that prices have been released into a void. No provisions have been made - or probably could have been made - to assure adequate supplies of consumer goods. Privatization plans have been just a gleam in the planners' eyes. One leading reformer told me that agricultural reform cannot begin this year because the Russian parliament has refused to act on it at all.

X

7

While Yeltsin and others express the hope that the economy
can be stabilized by October, Gaidar admits that it will take
about two years *provided* responsible economic policies are
followed - of which there is as yet no conclusive evidence.
Others predict a further 30% decline in GNP this year with
stabilization in mid-to-late 1993. Can the political structure
last that long? I would doubt it unless the outside world
generates support in the form of consumer goods.

The economic crisis exacerbates the tensions within and
among the republics. And the old guard is taking advantage of
that situation. One melancholy reformer noted that on certain
levels the August coup "succeeded." The bureaucracy remains
permeated by Communists. With the Communist party no longer
technically in charge, its disciples are in the enviable
position of being able to sabotage the government's policies
from within while their leaders are criticizing them from

X

8

without. These frustrations cause nationalism to be a
convenient rallying point both in Russia and in the Ukraine.
Russians worry about the "fascist nationalism" symbolized by
Zhirinovsky, who garnered only 6% of the vote in the
Presidential election but, according to some knowledgeable
observers, now commands five times as much support. In
Ukraine, the nationalists are pressing Kravchuk to confront
Russia on the many issues between them ever more sharply.

In Russia, nationalism translates into traditional
imperialism made more tolerable by a measure of administrative
autonomy. A major personality in the Russian parliament who
only a year ago was a vocal opponent of Gorbachev's told me
that the Commonwealth must not become a loose confederation
like the European Community: "We would never have put forward
the Commonwealth if we had thought it possible that the

X

9

Ukraine might declare itself independent. I will never accept Kiev as a foreign city."

At a dinner in Moscow with a group of ten younger Russians considered promising examples of the coming generation, my interlocutors argued that the union must be kept together and hinted strongly that the Baltics belonged to their sphere. They also felt that the United States was taking advantage of the current situation, and that our use of the term "new world order" was highly presumptuous because it assumed that Russia would no longer be a significant factor in world affairs. Their views of American culture - or lack of it - paralleled the disdain of French intellectuals of the Fifties.

No Russian I met accepted that the Ukraine can be truly independent; no Ukrainian I met accepted that the union or any other central organ survives, and to a man spoke of the threat of Russian imperialism. The Russians argued that the Ukraine

X

10

agreed to an "economic space" but then immediately issued its
own currency. The Ukrainians insisted that Russia accepted
their independence but had immediately challenged the
Ukraine's borders by raising questions about the status of the
Crimea. In other words, the two republics disagree profoundly
not only about what was agreed upon, but about the very
purpose of the Commonwealth. The Ukrainians see it as having
no permanent status and no permanent central organs - not even
a secretariat to prepare meetings of the Foreign Ministers;
they totally reject any concept of a united Armed Force. The
Russians see it as a mechanism to preserve as much of the
central machinery as they can. They play for time and spoke to
me of a transition period of 2-3 years in which to reassert
control. Moreover, the dispute between Russia and the Ukraine
parallels similar conflicts between Russia and other key
republics.

11

In calmer times Russia and the Ukraine might be able to compromise their political differences, though not if Russia's intention is to regain its former colonies. Yeltsin as President of Russia and Kravchuk as President of the Ukraine are probably responsible enough to avoid a blow-up. But as discontent accelerates, they could be replaced in each capital by less accommodating personalities - or be pushed by nationalist forces in that direction - not that either was brought up on the principle of democratic compromise.

But a series of disagreements over military issues is bound to exacerbate matters in the short run. First, there is a fundamental conceptual difference. Russia's concept of the Commonwealth as an instrument of control necessitates a centrally controlled Commonwealth army. Two senior military leaders in Moscow told me they wanted a 2-3 year transition period in which the existing armed forces would remain. One of

X

12

them flatly stated - twice in case I missed it - that Yeltsin
should simply take over _all_ the armed forces by decree and
then ask the Ukraine to negotiate. "It would," he smugly
noted, "put us in a stronger position for the talks." This may
be the reason why Yeltsin has not formed a _Russian_ army. The
Ukraine naturally sees the Commonwealth armed force as a
menace to its independence.

The practical disagreements are concentrated in three areas:
nuclear weapons, the future of the Black Sea fleet, and
command and control over nuclear weapons. But these are
surrogates for the deeper problem of the role of the armed
forces. Russia sees the Ukraine's forces as militia to protect
politicians and buildings. The Commonwealth army would protect
the Ukraine's external borders. I met no Ukrainian who would
tolerate this view. They would consider such a defense
establishment an army of occupation.

13

These already difficult problems are compounded by a nearly
total lack of trust. Each side told me that it had asked the
other why it needed such large armed forces. Each insisted
that it had not received a satisfactory answer.

Over all this floats the General Staff in Moscow, now for
the first time effectively without political control by Party,
KGB or government. It represents the Commonwealth which has
neither political institutions nor personnel. The political
vacuum has left the General Staff with unprecedented scope. In
practice it has put itself at the service of Yeltsin who is in
effect playing for time. Instead of using the historic Russian
tactic of giving up territory to the enemy, the better to
regroup, Russia today stalls on the issue of reform of central
institutions, hoping that with recovery will come the
opportunity to reassert authority.

14

What does all this mean for the United States? At present, U.S. policy toward the former Soviet Union seems to be driven by two concerns: the immediate food crisis, and the issue of control of nuclear weapons. These are important challenges. But the former is in the short run a technical problem of distribution and in the long run merges with questions of overall recovery. The latter has received a great deal of technical attention and much useful American help has already been given. We must take care, however, lest this issue becomes exploited by centralizers aiming to reconstitute the old Empire.

The United States has been remarkably slow in dealing with the new republics. When I visited the Ukraine, a country with a population as large as France, it had only two American diplomats with no direct communication to Washington, though this is being rectified. I suspect that the American presence

15

in the other republics is even more negligible. The rare
visits of American officials to the new republics deal almost
exclusively with the issue of nuclear control - an important
but for the new republics negative dialogue since it will end
when all nuclear weapons have been removed, as all new
republics have agreed. All this plays into the hands of those
in Moscow aiming to restore the dominance of the old order.

To navigate through the existing maelstrom, the United
States should pursue two seemingly contradictory but in fact
complementary policies:

[1] Washington must keep in mind that Russia is the heir of a proud and heroic tradition and that recent events have been a major blow to its self-esteem. It is essential that Washington make clear in actions and in words that it considers Russia within its present borders an appropriate partner in the conduct of world affairs and a major country

X

16

entitled to its own security interests. This proposition runs
so counter to Russia's historically imperial role that several
of my interlocutors asked me to repeat it more than once.

Yet it is true. Russia extending from St. Petersburg to
Vladivostok and possessing thousands of nuclear weapons no
longer needs the territorial buffers it considered so
essential throughout its history. And if it could devote to
its own people the resources hitherto spent on imperial
expansion, it could much more rapidly overcome its economic
crisis.

[2] At the same time, Russia must understand that imperial
expansion - by force or blackmail - will exact a heavy price
sooner or later. It will clash with American principles; it
will frighten all of Russia's neighbors. It involves a high
risk of starting again the historic cycle of confrontation and
suspicion.

(N)

X

17

[3] The United States should rapidly expand its economic and cultural contacts with at least the key new republics. We must remember that an imperial heritage has left most of them little experience in international affairs. They need sensitive encouragement. We must balance the attention Yeltsin deserves with the support the new republics require. There must be subjects to talk to them about other than nuclear control.

[4] If Russia shows respect for the new situation and remains within its own borders a significant Western aid program would be in order.

We are facing an extraordinary opportunity - a fundamental recasting of relations between the former Soviet Union and the rest of the world. If dealt with wisely, it can open an unprecedented era of cooperation. But such opportunities are fleeting and must not be wasted by an obsession with the

JAN-30-1992 22:47

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

212 421 3934 P.03

2573 WORDS

Kissinger Newsweek Article 1/30/92

It is not often that a history buff has the opportunity to watch a revolution unfold, as I did on a visit to the former Soviet Union a few weeks ago. I had last seen Moscow in early 1989, Gorbachev was still in charge; reform was being talked about but only within the framework of a liberalized Communist system. The satellite orbit was still in place; any discussion of the Soviet Union breaking up would have been considered madness.

All these fixtures had disappeared by the time of my most recent visit, only the penetrating cold remained. Life was even harder than before. Politics had turned unrecognizable.

It is the essence of revolutions that they seem to contemporaries like a series of unrelated incidents. Symptoms tend to be confused with causes; apseas with a sense of

JAN-31-'92 FRI 13:38 ID: STEIGENBERGER DAVID TEL: NO:

41 81 431171

H300 P07

212 421 3934 P.05

8

"fascist nationalism" symbolized by Zhirinovsky, who won the only 6% in the Presidential election but, according to some experts, now commands five times as much support. In the Ukraine, the nationalists are pressing Kravchuk to confront Russia on the many military issues between them, even more strongly. In Russia, nationalism means traditional imperialism made more tolerable by a measure of administrative autonomy. A major personality in the Russian parliament who only a year ago had been a vocal opponent of Gorbachev's alleged centralising tendencies, said in response to my suggestion that the Commonwealth must not become a loose confederation like the European Community: "We would never have put forward the Commonwealth if we had thought it possible that the Ukraine might declare itself independent. I will never accept Kiev as a foreign city."

JAN. 31-'92 FRI 13:38

ID: STEIGENBERGER DAVID TEL NO: 41 81 431171

10

41 81 431171

212

421

3934

H300 P08

P.06

At a dinner in Moscow with a group of ten young Russians and ~~one considered promising examples of the coming generation, my~~
~~interbulls~~
~~opposite numbers~~ argued that the union must be kept together
and hinted strongly that the Baltics belonged to their sphere.
They also felt that the United States was taking advantage of
the current situation, and that our use of the term "new world
order" was highly presumptuous because it assumed that Russia
would no longer be a significant factor in world affairs.
~~The Russians~~
~~of American culture - or lack of it - paralleled ours~~

~~Yeltsin as President of Russia and Kravchuk as President of the Ukraine are probably responsible enough to manage the blunder.~~

~~By around 1989,~~

~~a blow-up situation. But as discontent accelerates, they could be replaced in each capital by less accommodating personalities or be pushed by nationalistic forces in the direction of not that either was brought up on the principle of democratic government.~~

~~The next day, at any rate,~~

~~a meeting of the Russian parliament,~~

~~and the British government,~~

~~and the French government~~

~~began~~

~~to meet~~

~~and any other government~~

~~that either was brought up on the principle of democratic government.~~

~~The British government~~

~~met~~

~~and accepted that the union survives,~~

~~the Russian government~~

~~and accepted that the Ukraine can be truly independent.~~

~~The dispirited French intellectuals of the Elysée~~

~~The French government met and accepted that the union survives, the Russian government met and accepted that the Ukraine can be truly independent.~~

~~The dispirited French intellectuals of the Elysée F尊

JAN-31-'92 FRI 13:43

ID: STEIGENBERGER,DAVOS TEL NO: 41 81 431171

H300 P15
212 421 3934 P.02

imperialism
historical experiences that several of my interlocutors asked
me to repeat it more than once.

Yet it is true. Russia extending from St. Petersburg to
Vladivostok and possessing thousands of nuclear weapons no
longer needs the buffers it considered so essential throughout
its history. And if it could devote to its own people the
resources hitherto spent on imperial expansion, it could much
more rapidly overcome its economic crisis.

[2] At the same time, Russia must understand that imperial
expansion - by force or blackmail - will have a price sooner
or later, and will clash with American principles. It will
frighten all of Russia's neighbors and start again the
historic cycle of confrontation and competition.

[3] The United States should rapidly expand its economic and
cultural contacts with at least the key new republics. We must
remember that the imperial heritage has left most of them

TOTAL P.02

JAN-31-'92 FRI 13:44 ID: STEIGENBERGER DAUDS TEL NO: 41 81 431171

H300 P16

JAN-30-1992 22:58

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

18

little experience in international affairs. They need sensitive encouragement. We must balance the attention Yeltsin deserves with the support the new republics require. [4] If Russia shows respect for the new situation and remains within its own borders a significant Western aid program would be essential. [in order]

We are experiencing an extraordinary opportunity - a fundamental recasting of relations between the former Soviet Union and the rest of the world. If dealt with successfully, it can open an unprecedented era of cooperation. But such opportunities are fleeting and they must not be wasted by dealing with symptoms of decline.

1

2573 WORDS

It is not often that a history buff has the opportunity to watch a revolution unfold, as I did on a visit to the former Soviet Union a few weeks ago. I had last seen Moscow in early 1989. Gorbachev was still in charge; reform was being talked about but only within the framework of a liberalized Communist system. The satellite orbit was still in place; any discussion of the Soviet Union breaking up would have been considered madness.

All these fixtures had disappeared by the time of my most recent visit; only the penetrating cold remained. Life was even harder than before. Politics had turned unrecognizable.

It is the essence of revolutions that they seem to contemporaries like a series of unrelated incidents. Symptoms tend to be confused with causes; spasms with a sense of

2

direction. This is a special problem for the United States,
with its long history of [isolation?]. Americans take
stability for granted and have the tendency to squeeze
upheavals back into a familiar framework. To many of them
Yeltsin appears as the linear descendant of Gorbachev and
other centralizing rulers. The so-called Commonwealth of
Independent States is treated as if it were the old Soviet
Union with a different name. There is a subconscious
impatience with the sudden emergence of multiple
sovereignties. Many American officials would seem to prefer
the old superstate leavened by democratic ideals and dedicated
to free market economics.

These attitudes, understandable as they are, may cause us to
miss the most important aspect of the Russian revolution - the
collapse of the imperial state that for three centuries
collected nationalities, brought pressure on all its