...

According to this last statement, the Soviets are assumed to be as incapable of exploiting nuclear superiority for political advantage as are the ruling defense intellectuals of the United States.

## Parity and Arms Control

In subsequent questioning by the Subcommittee's counsel, Mr. Kendall asked Dr. Enthoven:

> Was there any deliberate thinking or policy on our part to allow them to achieve this parity on the theory that our superiority was itself destabilizing

> Dr. Enthoven. I can assure you the answer is no on that point. People outside of the Defense Department have argued that *position* but it has clearly *not been a factor in force planning within the Defense Department*.

One person "outside" the Defense Department who has expressed contrary views is Dr. Carl Kaysen, formerly White House deputy to McGeorge Bundy, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. In an article in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1968, Kaysen wrote:

> The next Administration will (then) face the task of making the public case for the explicit acceptance of strategic "parity" with the Soviets, or in the alternative, giving in to these pressures and beginning a new set of developments in our strategic forces, with consequences that are unpleasant to contemplate.

> The core of the case for accepting "parity" has already been put, but it bears repetition, and a

...

little elaboration. In essence [Kaysen agrees with McNamara and Enthoven] we cannot expect with any confidence to do more than achieve a secure second-strike capacity, no matter how hard we try.

Kaysen further agreed that Assured Destruction "parity" provides the favorable condition for meaningful U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements. As he put it:

> We are in a position in relation to our superpower adversary in which, for the present and near future, the balance of forces is such as to make possible new and far-reaching arms-control agreements. With not too widely disparate levels of offensive forces, and some deployment of defensive forces on both sides, the possibility of an agreed "freeze" in further deployments of strategic weapons looks more favorable than it has for some time.

Perhaps persuaded by the Strategic Parity School, President Johnson, at the occasion of the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on July 1, 1968, announced that the Soviet Union and the United States were going to initiate talks concerning the reduction of offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems. Shortly thereafter, Premier Kosygin proposed a package of nine Soviet arms control measures, which, if adopted, would permit a major reduction in arms budgets. Kosygin made no mention of the possibility of on-site inspection for any of the arms control proposals he suggested. Kosygin advocated a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, the ending of their manufacture, and the liquidation of nuclear stockpiles. Each of these proposals has

...

been a standard Soviet propaganda ploy in the arms control area
and, of course, no method of checking on such sweeping proposals
was presented.

Kosygin's third proposal, the limitation and subsequent
reduction of means of delivery of strategic weapons, was particu-
larly welcomed in Washington. Last September, the U.S. reluctantly
decided to deploy the Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system.
This decision was announced to the world in a speech by Secretary
of Defense McNamara, in which he gave all the arguments as to why
such a system should not be deployed before stating that the
United States would deploy an ABM system in order to deter a
possible future Chinese Communist missile attack on the United
States. The U.S. decision, made with obvious reluctance, was
perhaps taken to induce the Soviets to stop their own ABM deploy-
ment, or at best to initiate discussions to this end. Kosygin
also proposed a limitation and subsequent reduction of means of
delivery of strategic weapons, a ban on the flights of bombers
carrying nuclear weapons, a limitation of zones for voyages of
submarines carrying missiles, a ban on underground testing of
nuclear weapons, the liquidation of foreign military bases, and
measures on regional disarmament aimed primarily against Israel.

Kosygin's arms control measures were not the constructive
offers which many Western leaders believed them to be. For their

...8...

own reasons, the Soviets want the missile talks to start. In
fact, they went out of their way to advise Washington on the eve
of their impending invasion of Czechoslovakia that this "police
action" should in no way interfere with discussions on arms
control. The Soviets recognize that the only way they can be
certain to overcome the U.S. in strategic weapons is by inhibiting
U.S. desire to maintain its advantage. Protracted arms control
discussions serve this purpose.

Do the Soviets Want to Halt the Arms Race?

Many Westerners believe that the Soviet Union can no
longer compete for strategic advantage with the United States
without seriously hurting its economy. Therefore, the Soviet
Union wants to halt the arms race. Some students of the Soviet
economy contend that with the present level of Soviet arms
expenditures, the Soviet Union cannot achieve the growth rate
it has set for its various economic development plans. On the
other hand, the Soviet Union reported on July 20 that the
industrial output during the first six months of 1968 rose
about 9 percent over the same period last year. This is a
remarkably high growth rate and would appear to indicate that the
Soviet Union cannot only buy guns but some butter, and still have
resources left over for additional investments in capital required
for increased industrial productivity.

..9..

The Sino-Soviet dispute is also cited as a major reason
for the Soviet Union's need for an accommodation with the
West. In time, the Soviets may indeed be so fearful of the
Chinese that they will seek a genuine accommodation with the West
to secure their Eastern borders. But, at the present time, the
Soviet advantage in strategic weaponry and other forms of military
power is such that the Peking regime, confronted by civil war,
presents no real threat to the Soviets.

Inspite of the vast changes that have taken place in
Soviet society in the past half-century, there has been a remark-
able continuity in the world view and objectives of the ruling
elite. Since its founding, the Soviet Union has consistently
sought to develop its military power while simultaneously advo-
cating comprehensive disarmament schemes. The basic motive is,
of course, the ageless Machiavelian dream of sovereigns to build
up one's own strength while decreasing that of one's adversaries.
This concept was refined in Khrushchev's important January 6,
1961 speech:

The struggle for disarmament is an active struggle
against imperialism, for _restricting its military_
potentialities. Peoples must do everything to
achieve the prohibition and destruction of atomic
weapons and all other mass destruction weapons.
Peace will then be insured and there will open before
peoples the most favorable prospects for organizing
their lives in accordance with their aspirations and
interests. [Emphasis Added]

..10..

Since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Soviet Union has been pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence while the United States and its Western allies have been pursuing a policy of détente. Peaceful coexistence means permanent competition, particularly in the ideological realm between East and West, by any means short of outright war between the two sides. détente implies the establishment of an indivisible peace based on security and harmonious contacts.

The Test Ban Treaty in 1963 was considered an act of détente by the West and a phase of peaceful coexistence by Soviet leaders. By agreeing to the partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the Soviets may have prevented the United States from acquiring precise knowledge about certain nuclear explosion effects which may be essential for the future effectiveness of both its offensive and defensive missile systems. Senator Jackson's Report dwells on the consequences of this inhibition:

> When our Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee was conducting hearings on the then proposed Limited Test-Ban Treaty over five years ago, several expert witnesses warned us that we did not know enough about EMP [one of the effects of a nuclear detonation called the electromagnetic pulse] and the possible effects it might have on our IBM and other missile systems. However, expert proponent witnesses assured us that over-design, that is, providing more hardening against EMP than was thought necessary, would solve this problem and we should not be too concerned about it. Now, five years later, EMP is still a serious problem.

..11..

Soviet activity over the years suggests that Moscow's interest in a détente is, at this time, at best highly ambiguous. For the last several years, the Soviet Union has become the major supplier of arms and equipment to North Vietnam. Without its aid, the war in Vietnam would have ended some time ago. The Soviet involvement in the Middle East has increased enormously in the aftermath of the disastrous defeats suffered by the Arabs in the 1967 Middle East war. Astute observers who have visited the Arab countries during recent months bring back a very pessimistic diagnosis: most of the Arab leaders believe that another war is inevitable in the Middle East. Such a war could not take place without Soviet acquiescence. Not to be ignored is the Soviet naval build-up in the Middle East, in the Red Sea and in the Persian Gulf. This build-up apparently has been undertaken to enable the Soviet Union to achieve the century-old dream of the Czars, namely, hegemony in the Persian Gulf and in the area between India and the Suez.

The former Yugoslav Vice-President, Djilas, believes that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia reflects the degeneration of the Russian Revolution into Imperialism. There has been a noticeable hardening of the Soviet ideological control inside the USSR and some evidence of a growing ascendancy of the Soviet

..12..

military. The decision to invade Czechoslovakia revealed the tremendous social weakness of the Soviet system; but a politically weak -- while militarily strong -- power can be a very dangerous one to deal with.

## The Soviet Military Build-Up

The Soviets have spent twice as much as the U.S. has in offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems in the past five years. Soviet expenditures in R&D now exceed those of the United States in the military field. The concerted rise in these expenditures evidenced in the past several years may result in the Soviets unveiling some surprisingly new weapons in the next several years. This was suggested by V.D. Sokolovsky in the 1968 edition of his important book, *Military Strategy*:

> It must be assumed that in the near future radical corrections will be able to be introduced into this system as a result of the incorporation of various cosmic means. All of this in turn conditions the nature of a future war, the methods of waging it, and the principles of organization of the armed forces. (p. 196)

Regarding this prospect, the Preparedness Subcommittee

Report concluded:

> It is particularly sobering to note that the test facilities in which the Soviets are investing so heavily give them the capability for further shortening this leadtime since it makes more difficult the already handicapped intelligence

..13..

task by permitting the Soviets to screen their
tests from our view. We think it is also signi-
ficant that this heavy Soviet investment in test
facilities may signal their intentions to develop
new systems big enough and advanced enough to
require such facilities.

Soviet offensive missiles have six-times the payload of
their American counterparts. In addition, the Soviets have
built and tested F.O.B.S. whose creation was against the spirit
if not the letter of the treaty on the peaceful uses of space.
Furthermore, while the extent of Soviet ABM deployment is a
matter of debate in American intelligence circles, the fact of
this deployment is not debated. Soviet ABM deployment began
after agreement was reached on the 1963 partial nuclear Test Ban
Treaty -- which suggests that the Soviets did not envisage the
Test Ban Treaty as a step toward East-West reconciliation.

On the defensive side, the United States Senate this
summer agreed -- with some reluctance -- to the authorization of
funds for the Sentinel ABM system. The belated U.S. decision to
go ahead on the Sentinel system was emphatically _not_ the start
of a new "arms race." It was a decision not to lose a race al-
ready in progress, a race in which the Soviets threaten to
leave us behind.

ABM defenses have become a key factor in the East-West
confrontation. One-sided possession of a ballistic missile

..14..

defense system by the USSR, even accepting uncertainties about
its effectiveness, will be perceived throughout the world as
giving the USSR at least marginal strategic superiority over the
U.S. It will be very difficult for other nations to believe that
the undefended U.S. has superiority and that its determination
to resist nuclear blackmail will be adequate in time of crisis.
Soviet missiles targeted against the U.S. might become the
equivalent of Soviet tanks pressuring Prague.

Progress in both offensive and defensive technology
continues. Defensive measures force the offense to change, at
considerable cost in money and effort. It blocks some kinds of
attack otherwise available at little cost. Progress in both
defense and offense interact upon each other in a dynamic time
syndrome. It is impossible to judge which nation leads in total
military technology. If U.S. research and development expenditures
continue to decline, the Soviets should achieve technological as
well as strategic superiority before too long. They might even
make the "surprise" technological breakthrough which they seek.
As Soviet Colonel V.M. Bondarenko put it.

The creation of a weapon that is new in principle
and secretly nurtured in scientific research
bureaus and constructors' collectives can in a
short time sharply change the relationship of
forces. The *surprise* appearance of one or another
new type of weapon is advancing as an essential
factor, especially in contemporary circumstances.

...15...

Surprise in this area not only demoralizes the enemy, it also for a long time deprives him of the possibility of using effective means of protection from the new weapon.*

Strategic equality, in the nuclear age, between one nation pursuing an opportunist policy and the other one pursuing a status-quo policy could be most dangerous to the former. This is true because of the nature of nuclear weapons and the immeasurably greater importance of the time factor and the tremendous advantage of the first strike.

With this in mind, an analysis of the factors that would determine the outcome of a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the two superpowers may shed light on the question whether one side or the other could achieve marginal strategic superiority, which could be exploited politically in a crisis situation. These factors are the relative vulnerability, and the number and effectiveness of offensive delivery vehicles: ICBMs, submarine-launched missiles and intercontinental bombers; the magnitude and effectiveness of ABM air defense and ASW Systems; the effectiveness of warning and command and control systems; and the adequacy of civil defense preparations. The effectiveness of all of the foregoing

*The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs*, ed. by William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), p. 358.

..16..

systems is highly sensitive to key technical parameters such
as the size of the Circular Error Probability (C.E.P.) and the war-
heads of offensive missiles, the time-between-launch of missile-
carrying submarines, and the capabilities of defensive radars
to discriminate between real warheads and decoys. Obviously,
the outcome of a hypothetical nuclear exchange will be dependent
on both quantitative and qualitative factors. Assume A attempts
to destroy B's 1000 ICBMs in their silos. With inaccurate re-
entry vehicles and low-yield warheads, some 3000 missiles might be
required for the task. With either more accurate delivery systems
or larger yield warheads, only 1000 missiles would be needed. In
fact, depending on how A's missile silos are clustered, the job
might conceivably be done with only a fraction of B's ICBM force.
If, on the other hand, A protected his missiles with an ABM, B would
have to send for more ICBMs against them. Similarly, the ability
of A to retaliate with his submarine-launched missiles will depend
upon the number of submarines he keeps on station, the rapidity
of his launch system (the first missile launched will reveal
the submarine's location and make it vulnerable to a quick
response strike), and the effectiveness of B's ASW systems.
The missiles A launches against B's targets will have to
penetrate B's ABM system. The penetration aids A places
in his re-entry vehicles will reduce the yield of his warheads
and thus ease the burden of B's civil defense arrangements.
Comparable interactions will occur with respect to A's retaliatory

..17..

bomber force. How much of it would be airborne or dispersed at
the commencement of the exchange? How effective is B's SAM
system and his interceptor force? The prospective outcome of
these hypothetical exchanges cannot be calculated by rough
aggregation but only by painstaking analysis of each offensive-
defensive confrontation.

Let us turn from this scenario to reality. The U.S.
has chosen to let its quantitative advantage slip and relied
on qualitative superiority. Presumably, if a Soviet techno-
logical breakthrough is anticipated, a counter can be developed
and deployed in time to forestall Soviet advantage. This approach
has merit. It assumes, however, that U.S. technology is and will
remain superior to that of the Soviets. It also assumes that
U.S. intelligence will provide timely warning of Soviet techno-
logical gains so as to permit sufficient time to deploy an
effective counter. There is considerable uncertainty about the
validity of all of these assumptions. Therefore, it would seem
unwise for the U.S. to abandon numerical advantage in delivery
systems. At the same time, since the outcome of a nuclear
exchange will be the resultant of offensive-defensive interactions,
the composition of an adequate strategic force must be determined
relative to that of the adversary, rather than aim at some
arbitrary ratio of numerical advantage. It would seem, however,

..18..

that a combination of superior U.S. forces-in-being and potentially superior forces-in-prospect might eventually convince the Soviets that a continuation of the arms race would not be advantageous. The Soviets are not so convinced at the present time. Rightly or wrongly, the Soviets believe that even marginal advantage in one kind of strategic weaponry can be exploited politically. The Soviet possession of an ABM system, for example, gave the Soviets the diplomatic initiative and induced the U.S. to seek arms talks with Moscow to end the deployment of such systems. American fears of a spiraling arms race can lead to self-emasculation of American power. Soviet leaders do not share these fears. In the face of growing Chinese nuclear capabilities it is unrealistic to expect the Soviets to agree to a moratorium on defensive systems, including the ABM. It is even more dangerous for the U.S. to enter into a tacit understanding with the Soviet Union on a missile moratorium. Unless agreement were reached on detailed on-site inspection, we would be at the mercy of Soviet secrecy and deception. The U.S. must take into account errors in intelligence resulting from Soviet secrecy.

..19..

Beyond the Security Gap

The deep cleavage between the thought patterns and world outlook of American leaders and those of the Byzantine militarized bureaucrats who control the destiny of the Soviet Union, is at the very heart of the problem. The civilized Washington statesmen seem unable to abandon the belief that the rulers in Moscow, whom they assume to share the values of humanism, are groping, as they are, for a harmony of interests. In a 1961 analysis, "Khrushchev and the Balance of World Power," prepared for and strongly endorsed by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, we read:

> . . . the drive for power is a continuous factor in foreign relations and thus genuine peace between capitalism and communism is unthinkable; and that international politics, even in times of peace, is really a continuation of war by other means.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, a foreign policy advisor to Presidential candidate Hubert H. Humphrey, has written:

> Until now peace was safeguarded through asymmetrical deterrence. . . That system worked for twenty years. It is being replaced by a novel state of symmetrical deterrence. . .

> In the past, there had been many warnings against becoming obsessed with the allegedly evil character of Soviet intentions, and admonitions to concentrate primarily on Soviet capabilities. Today the tendency is to rely more on the allegedly peaceful character of Soviet intentions and to downgrade the importance

..20..

of increased Soviet capabilities. Yet the scope
of capabilities does make a difference, irrespective
of motives . . .

Furthermore, since formally contrived parity appears
unlikely, it is to be expected that the Soviet Union
will seek to undo what remains of U.S. strategic
superiority and, in the process, whatever the Kremlin's
actual calculations, will inevitably appear to be
seeking superiority. This will exact its price in
ideological and psychological terms, making peaceful
adjustments of conflicting interests more difficult.

Oddly enough, the analysis endorsed by Senator Humphrey and
elaborated by Brzezinski parallel the views expressed, during
the Presidential campaign, by Mr. Nixon -- for which he was
castigated by Vice-President Humphrey.

Military power is a continuum. Its influence issues
organically from both its nuclear and conventional components.
The power that a nation possesses at the top of its military
weapons scale will insure its capacity to utilize all lesser
forms of military strength. The key issue is the role which U.S.
strategic power should play in inducing Soviet leadership to help
stop the conflict in Southeast Asia and resist starting new
crises in Korea, Berlin and the Middle East.

U.S. Soviet arms control talks will probably take place.
But comprehensive arms control agreements with the Soviet Union

..21..

are unlikely for the foreseeable future. History has shown that
successful negotiations are the product of strength not weakness.
The long-term prospects of a real U.S.-Soviet détente will be
high if the U.S. demonstrates to the Soviet Union that it has
no intention of being talked into losing the contest for marginal
strategic superiority. The U.S. should continue to press for
mutually advantageous restraints in weapons development, procure-
ment and deployment. Yet, the U.S. pursuit of arms control agree-
ments with the Soviet Union must go beyond formal technical
understandings which quickly become out of date. Neither the
partial Test Ban Treaty, nor the Non-Proliferation Treaty, if
adopted, will do anything to moderate the political hostility
toward outsiders inherent in the Soviet leaders' world outlook.
That hostility will diminish only if Russia's masters begin to
meet the desires of Russia's masses for a more tolerant and
humane society.

But the communist bureaucracy has everything to lose
and nothing to gain by this process -- hence, they are seeking
to block it by overcoming its source: the ideas, ideals and
power of the West, particularly the United States. The dialecti-
cal thought processes of Soviet leaders do not inspire them to
seek accommodation with their opponents but their negation.

..22..

Dialectical materialism (Diamat) is a philosophy of
revolutionary change, and, hence, of conflict. It is _not_ a
philosophy of gradual change, compromise and cooperation. This
is why a good many non-communists cannot reconcile it with their
more easy-going views about the future of human society -- and
why they prefer not to think about it or to draw the proper
security conclusions from Soviet deployments and diplomatic
maneuvers.

All officials of the Soviet Union, civil and military,
have graduated from course programs in dialectical thought which
are the equivalent of graduate and post-graduate study in American
universities. For this reason, the gap between the mental pro-
cesses of the communist and non-communist elites is deep and wide.
If, in evaluating communist policies, Western analysts apply
analytical techniques developed by and for their own system of
ratiocination, they will gain few insights. If they assume
that their own policies and statements on such matters as parity
or stability convey the same meaning to communists as to themselves,
they are certain to be mistaken. Only to the degree that Western
analysts make themselves students of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic
can they begin to understand communist policies.

..23..

As long as the dialectical reasoning holds sway in Moscow, we will do well to remember that certain arms agreements may be viewed by Soviet leaders as important means of restricting U.S. military potential. The present rate of Soviet ICBM build-up, their extremely active development program in space and in weapons -- both offensive and defensive -- and their stated strategic doctrine, argue against the assessment that the USSR is seeking and will be content with "strategic parity" with the U.S. Stability is a concept alien to dialectical thinking. For the Kremlin's dialecticians, parity is a midway point between inferiority to the U.S. and a historical opportunity to achieve superiority over the U.S. in the 1970s. The fact that the "nuclear means of struggle is limited as a weapon of politics," wrote Soviet candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Ye. I. Ribkin, "does not negate either the possibility of the unleashing of war by the aggressors or the possibility of our victory in it." The Soviet leadership places great emphasis upon the development of "correct concepts" of strategy and unlike American leaders have never renounced the concept of victory. The will to win has always been the fundamental precondition of success in any confrontation.

Because of their systematic training in all forms of conflict, Soviet leaders regard strategy as an organic whole.

..24..

Current Soviet leadership, both political and military, has
far more understanding of the positive role of strategic forces
in their overall strategy than the U.S. civilian leadership,
who encouraged strategic parity, have displayed. Conceivably,
the Soviet leadership has outsmarted us with respect to
strategic decisions and arms control discussions concerning
them, as well as outspending us.

Hence, President-elect Nixon was not playing "a nuclear
numbers game" in warning this nation about "a gravely serious
security gap." Rather, he prepared the ground by which he can
escape from McNamara's most monumental error -- the parity trap.

[107]

On October 31st, President-elect Richard M. Nixon charged that Democratic leadership had presented the United States with "a gravely serious security gap." Where do we and the Soviets stand in strategic competition? A report on the status of U.S. Strategic Power by the Subcommittee on Preparedness Investigation, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, of September 27, 1968, inter alia, stated:

> The Soviets are approaching parity with us in this field [strategic power] . . . the Subcommittee took a long, hard look at our research and development capability as compared with that of the USSR. We found the view sobering . . . This report expresses our concern about the adequacy of our presently approved level of strategic nuclear forces . . . it would be the height of imprudence for us to assume that the Soviets would not follow an even more aggressive policy and undertake an even more extensive and dangerous range of risks if they attained nuclear superiority or even parity.

## Policies Leading to the Security Gap

Weapons decisions made by former Defense Secretary Robert Strange McNamara from 1961 to 1968 determined the present U.S. strategic posture. Because of the long time it takes to design, build and deploy new strategic weapons, McNamara's strategy will be reversed only with difficulty by an Administration headed by Mr. Nixon. McNamara's recent book, *The Essence of Security*, provides "the rationale for the impending strategic arms limitations talks, the most momentous Soviet-American negotiations in a half-century."

...2...

Mr. McNamara's long and passionate identification with
arms control is well established. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
from first-hand observation, wrote of him as follows:

> Next to the President, McNamara . . . probably
did more than anyone else to sustain the dis-
armament drive. With his sense of the horror
of nuclear conflict, his understanding of the
adequacy of existing stockpiles, his fear of
nuclear proliferation, his analytic command of
the weapons problem and his managerial instinct
to do something about an irrational situation,
he forever sought new ways of controlling the
arms race.*

After years of silence on the sustained build-up in
Soviet ICBMs and the Soviet deployment of an ABM system,
Mr. McNamara surprisingly conceded both developments in
November 1966. He held, however, that the appropriate U.S.
response was not to counter with its own ABM defense but to
negotiate with the Soviets for a mutual freeze on ABM deploy-
ments. But it was not until after the signing of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty on July 1, 1968, that concrete arrange-
ments for talks were made -- only to be put in abeyance by the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

During the 1967 Glassboro Summit, Mr. McNamara told
Premier Kosygin that it was in the mutual interests of the

*A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p.504.

...

United States to halt and then turn back the strategic nuclear arms race. McNamara rested his case on three propositions: 1) any ABM can be easily defeated by offensive missiles costing much less than defensive systems; 2) military superiority between the superpowers has lost all meaning; and 3) strategic nuclear weapons deployments by either power will invariably trigger a responsive building-up by the other. These ideas, accepted as gospel by the Johnson Administration, have led to a rapid decline in our relative strategic advantage over the Soviet Union. In his "security gap" speech, Mr. Nixon argued that "for us deliberately to let a weaker but basically expansionist nation achieve parity indicates an erosion of our commitment and will."

Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that this is what happened under Mr. McNamara's defense stewardship. Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, testifying in April 1968 before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, elaborated the salient aspects of the Pentagon's strategic thought:

> There are . . . different missions which could be assigned to our strategic forces.

1. Assured destruction: In order to deter a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies,

...

we believe our forces must have an assured destruction capability. By this we mean the unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor -- even after a surprise attack on the United States ...

**3. Damage limiting:** The purpose of this mission would be to limit damage to the United States and its allies by significant amounts, should deterrence fail and the Soviets start a war...

... any attempt we might make to achieve more than a fully adequate assured destruction capability must be considered in light of probable Soviet reactions. I believe that part of the Soviets' strategic policy is the maintenance of an assured destruction capability. The Soviets clearly have the means to maintain this capability. Thus, the Soviets can and would react to any steps we might take to achieve a full first-strike capability or to limit damage to ourselves significantly. Hence, forces bought for this mission would contribute little to our national security, and they would push the arms race one step further. Thus, we and the Soviets should accept a state of mutual deterrence.
(Emphasis Added)

Implicit in the foregoing statement is the assumption that the dialectically trained Soviet leaders think as we do and, too, want parity.

Dr. Enthoven continued:

Thus, while "nuclear superiority" appears to be an attractive concept, we do not know how to take advantage of it in order to achieve our national security objectives. In other words, since the Soviet Union has an assured destruction capability against the United States, it is not clear at all how our superior nuclear forces might be converted into real political power. Nevertheless, we now have "nuclear superiority," and we expect to keep it.

...5...

## Parity and Arms Control

...

...7...

...8...

...9...

Inspite of the vast changes that have taken place in Soviet society in the past half-century, there has been a remarkable continuity in the world view and objectives of the ruling elite. Since its founding, the Soviet Union has consistently sought to develop its military power while simultaneously advocating comprehensive disarmament schemes. The basic motive is, of course, the ageless Machiavelian dream of sovereigns to build up one's own strength while decreasing that of one's adversaries. This concept was refined in Khrushchev's important January 6, 1961 speech:

> The struggle for disarmament is an active struggle against imperialism, for restricting its military potentialities. Peoples must do everything to achieve the prohibition and destruction of atomic weapons and all other mass destruction weapons. Peace will then be insured and there will open before peoples the most favorable prospects for organizing their lives in accordance with their aspirations and interests. [Emphasis Added]

..10..

Since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Soviet Union has been pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence while the United States and its Western allies have been pursuing a policy of détente. Peaceful coexistence means permanent competition, particularly in the ideological realm between East and West, by any means short of outright war between the two sides. Détente implies the establishment of an indivisible peace based on security and harmonious contacts.

..11..

..12..

Report concluded:

..13..

..14..

..15..

...16...

systems is highly sensitive to key technical parameters such as the size of the Circular Error Probability (C.E.P.) and the warheads of offensive missiles, the time-between-launch of missile-carrying submarines, and the capabilities of defensive radars to discriminate between real warheads and decoys. Obviously, the outcome of a hypothetical nuclear exchange will be dependent on both quantitative and qualitative factors. Assume A attempts to destroy B's 1000 ICBMs in their silos. With inaccurate re-entry vehicles and low-yield warheads, some 3000 missiles might be required for the task. With either more accurate delivery systems or larger yield warheads, only 1000 missiles would be needed. In fact, depending on how A's missile silos are clustered, the job might conceivably be done with only a fraction of B's ICBM force.

..17..

..18..

..19..

Beyond the Security Gap

..20..

..21..

..22..

Dialectical materialism (Diamat) is a philosophy of
revolutionary change, and, hence, of conflict. It is *not* a
philosophy of gradual change, compromise and cooperation. This
is why a good many non-communists cannot reconcile it with their
more easy-going views about the future of human society -- and
why they prefer not to think about it or to draw the proper
security conclusions from Soviet deployments and diplomatic
maneuvers.

[10]

..23..

..24.

Report # A - 20

December 10, 1968

Harriet Fast Scott - a

TO: FTD

SUBJECT: Henry A. Kissinger - Through Soviet Eyes

SOURCES: Soviet Publications since 1959

ANALYSIS:

1. Time after time the names of certain American theorists appear in the Soviet press. This article could have been written about Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Robert Osgood, General Maxwell Taylor, Robert Strausz-Hupe, Bernard Brodie, William Kintner, Stefan Possony, Walt Rostow and a dozen others. And British Air Marshal E.J. Kingston-McCloughry and the Frenchman Raymond Aron are not unknown to the Soviet officer. This paper will take Henry A. Kissinger as an example because he will be influential in the new administration. Since he is known in the Soviet Union, what picture he presents to them may have far-reaching effects on future strategy, and ultimately, technology.

2. Sixteen books are quoted. With the exception of the three-volume series *International Relations After the Second World War*, all the rest are military books. In many cases, the quotations are from the same author contributing to many different books, for example, Lt. Col. Kondratkov. Quotes from eight magazine articles are given. After May 1967, there are no quotations by name. This occurred for several reasons, one being that the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR was approaching and all themes were directed toward this event. The other was that the general term "American ideologists say that" or "the ideologists of imperialism write" was used instead of individual names. The quotations which followed were similar to the ones given.

3. The change in quotations between the different editions of *Military Strategy* are most interesting. Two additional quotations were added in the second (1963) edition. These were retained in the third (1968) edition but two other quotations were omitted, one referring to the Red Chinese. In contrast, the quotation in the second edition of *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army* is completely different from the quotation from the fourth edition. The third edition of *Military Strategy* and the fourth edition of *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army* are part of the seventeen-volume series, "The Officer's Library", described as being textbooks for home study by the Soviet officer.

4. Kissinger's book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, published in the US in 1957, was published in the Soviet Union in 1959 in Russian. Maxwell Taylor's *Uncertain Trumpet*, Bernard Brodie's *Strategy in the Missile Age* (U.S. 1959, USSR-1961), Robert Osgood's *Limited War*. British Air Marshal E.J. Kingston-McCloughry's *Global Strategy* was translated. In 1966, George Lowe's *The Age of Deterrence* was published by the Soviet Military Publishing House--"Voyenizdat". For example, 4,800 copies were issued; there were omissions and an introduction was added.

5. The question naturally arises: are the Soviets trying to conduct a dialogue with the West? As pointed out earlier, the Soviet officer knows of Kahn, Kissinger, Knorr, Gavin and Hanson Baldwin. Would his US counterpart know as many Soviet writers? Sokolovsky, yes; Rotmistrov, perhaps; Ribkin, Larionov, Lomov, Bondarenko, Korotkov, or Sidelnikov? A General Talensky, who has not

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written for the Soviet military press in fifteen years, became quite well-known in the U.S. through appearing in a Soviet-translated magazine, *International Affairs*. In desperation perhaps, the Soviets launched a magazine called *Soviet Military Review* a few years ago, conveniently translated into French and English. Unfortunately, none of the articles originally appeared in the Russian press, and their content makes it clear they were written for foreign consumption and 'disinformation.'

We are not certain if they react to American writings or not. There are indications that weapon systems appear at intervals regardless of what the United States does: The ABM, mobile missiles, and FOBS are part of long-range technological goals. In certain cases, they may react and react strongly, as for instance, in Czechoslovakia. The American concept of 'bridge-building' has been severely criticized as 'subversive export of counterrevolution' and propagandized as the reason Czechoslovakia had to be 'saved' by the Warsaw Pact countries.

If we are to understand the Soviets, it would help to understand Soviet concepts of us, however distorted. The report that follows represents an area of Soviet perceptions that remains largely unexplored in the United States.

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SOURCES: Soviet publications since 1959

Introduction:

This paper does not pretend to be comprehensive. Sixteen books were found which make reference to Mr. Kissinger in examining some fifty Soviet military books. The process was complicated by the fact that most Soviet books lack indices and search must proceed on a page by page basis. *Communist of the Armed Forces*, the fortnightly publication of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, was examined similarly through its last 90 issues. References turned out to be more than expected.

No attempt has been made to check the original text of Mr. Kissinger's works for the alleged quotations. Rarely does the Soviet author footnote quotations, and when he does, it is often from a translated version of the book and not the original. In this case, what they think Mr. Kissinger said is what is important, for the Soviet reader will not have access in most cases to the original and will lack the ability to read it in English, too, perhaps.

Voyna i Politika (War and Politics) Major Ye. I. Ribkin, Voyenizdat, 1959.

p. 108 "The idea of the perniciousness and adventurism of the strategy of atomic-thermonuclear war is developed by the British Marshal Slessor, in the book, *Deterrence*, and by the American military writer, Kissinger, in the book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, and by others."

Za Shirmoy "Ogranichennykh"Voyn (Behind the Screen of "Limited" Wars), A. Ye. Yefremov, Voyenizdat, 1960.

p. 21 "Military theoreticians of the West do not hide their irritation over the enormous successes of the Soviet Union in strengthening its defense capability. "The creation in the USSR of long range aircraft which can cover an enormous distance and return, taken together with the growth of Soviet reserves of nuclear weapons was a radical change in the strategic relationship of forces in the post-war period," wrote Kissinger, distressed over the loss by the United States of superiority in 'atomic air power.'"

p. 25 "The theory of 'limited war', writes another military theoretician, Kissinger, must be based on the understanding of the fact that 'after our atomic monopoly came to an end, to force an unconditional surrender on the enemy at a price acceptable for us, had already become impossible.'

"Such a way of putting the question is very indicative. It testifies to the fact that not a few bourgeois politicians and military leaders are already convinced of the impossibility of defeating the governments of the socialist system and forcing a capitalist order on them. The appearance of the theory of 'limited war' to a certain degree is an admission by its authors that now there are no real forces which could restore capitalism in the Soviet Union and in the countries of the socialist camp. Voluntarily or involuntarily even the violent enemies of the communist system would have to agree with the correct conclusion made at the XXI Congress of the CPSU on the question of the full and final victory of socialism in the USSR.

"However, while many bourgeois military leaders have lost hope of finding a means of forcing the countries of the socialist camp to capitu-

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late, nevertheless they still continue to count on the possibility of realizing their aggressive plans in relation to these countries, by waging local wars against them. The goal formulated by Kissinger speaks of this - to be prepared "to defeat the Soviet Union or China in local clashes.""

p. 27 "American and British military theoreticians vow and swear that all these rules will be directed so as not to let war escalate to total war and thus lessen the losses for the civilian population. Kissinger, for example, proposes not to make raids on towns located at a distance of more than 500 miles from the combat zone.

"The supporters of the theory of 'limited' wars have tried to assure in every possible way that the enemies of the USA will be forced to abide by these rules because their breaking will evoke a corresponding "repulsion" from the side of the ruling circles of the United States - an increase of the power of the nuclear weapons used by the Americans and an enlargement of the framework of its use.

"In the event of a 'limited nuclear war', states Kissinger, the armed forces of the Western powers, covered, like a shield, by strategic aviation, will begin to carry out 'dosed destruction of limited objectives'. In his view, the war would proceed about like this. The State Department would give the enemy some ultimatum. If they rejected it, American tactical aviation would subject a definite region to nuclear attack, which would be occupied by the ground troops of the USA. Then a new demand would be made. If they again declined, it would all start again. In such a way, state the American military theoreticians, war against the USSR, the Chinese People's Republic and other socialist countries, must proceed!"

p. 29 "Proceeding from the concept of 'limited' wars, many bourgeois military theoreticians came forth with various projects for some reconstruction of the military machines of Western powers. Kissinger proposed instead of the existing division of the Armed Forces of the USA into the army, air force and navy, to create two organizations: Strategic forces and tactical forces.

"Strategic forces, in his opinion, must include strategic aviation, army units designated for protection of overseas bases, and those formations of naval forces which were planned for use in total war. Tactical forces, Kissinger recommended would include units and formations of the army, air force and navy which would be needed for waging 'limited' war.

"These recommendations, however, evoked strong objections in the ranks of leading military figures. They stated that the proposals of Kissinger for organization would be too bulky and extremely expensive."

p. 34 "Major maneuvers, carried out under the code name 'winter shield', were conducted in FRG in February, 1960. 65,000 American troops and two West German armored brigades took part in these maneuvers. According to the American press, these were 'maneuvers, embodying the basic concepts of Dr. Kissinger: small caliber nuclear weapons, limited region of combat operations, and the exclusion of industrial objectives and rear area airfields from bombardment.'

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"In correspondence with the conclusions of all these exercises, the American command made some reorganizations in the structure of its army, which fitted the plans of 'limited' war. In the spring of 1958, the USA had created 'strategic army corps' or, as they were called 'STRAC.'"

p. 48 "As a matter of fact, is it possible, for example, to assume that this or that country has taken upon itself the obligation to observe the rules which obviously pursue the goal of simplifying aggressive actions against it? Just take the proposal of Kissinger not to make raids on cities lying outside the 500-mile zone of the front lines. It is well known that the military strategists of the USA plan to conduct combat actions on the territory of other continents. Therefore, by following his proposal, Kissinger wants to create conditions in which they would have the possibility of bombing from their numerous overseas bases, almost all the centers of the probable enemy. At the same time the area of the USA would be completely safe from a retaliatory strike."

p. 48 "The advocates of the theory of 'limited' wars, feeling the weakness of their position concerning the possibility of the adoption by the other side of the proposals of the American military for rules of waging wars, resorted to various dodges. They stated that a formal agreement to such rules might not be necessary. The very logic of things, they averred, would force the belligerent sides to hold to these rules. Kissinger, Osgood, and others stated, for example, that it was fully possible to have an unspoken agreement between countries not to use too powerful hydrogen bombs. They affirmed that supposedly it was possible to agree not to use 'dirty' bombs, which caused strong contamination of spaces by radioactive fallout, and substitute 'clean' bombs for them. All these arguments pursue only one goal - to create the impression of the possibility of 'humane' nuclear war, in the course of which military actions supposedly might be directed only against military objectives and the loss among the civilian population would be considerably lessened.

p. 51 "To observe this or that limited ways and means of conducting war only as long as they remained favorable for them, and to swiftly reject these limitations when they ceased to answer to their interests, - this is the way the new concepts of the Kissingers and Osgoods look. It is no accident that when they start talking of putting their recommendations into practice, these military theoreticians begin to talk absolutely contrary to that which they affirmed in their own scientific works. It is known, for example, that the West German magazine, *Der Spiegel*, asked Kissinger, when he came to FRG in the beginning of 1959, the question of what would happen if 'limited' war, which certain circles of NATO countries wanted unleashed in connection with a conflict over West Berlin, failed. Kissinger without thinking gave a prepared answer: 'Give the Russians an ultimatum, and if necessary, conduct total war...'"

*Marksizm-Leninizm o Voyne i Armii* (Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army) 2nd edition, Editors: Col. G.A. Fedorov, Col. N.Ya. Sushko, and Col. B.A. Beliy, Voyenizdat, 1961.

p. 280 "According to American calculations, in a successful enemy attack, fifty of the largest industrial centers of the USA would be fully destroyed 40 per cent of the population of the country and about 60 per cent of industry. (See: H. Kissinger, *Yadernoye Oruzhiye i Vneshnaya Politika*, Moscow, 1959, p. 59.)"

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Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya Posle Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny, Vol. 1, Editor: A.G.
Mileykovskiy, Politizdat, 1962. (Int'l Relations after the Second World War)
p. 658 "The basic research centers, the strongholds of 'real politics', in the USA are Chicago and Princeton Universities. The leading American theoreticians 'of the politics of force' are the major philosophers and sociologists R. Niebuhr, J. Burnheim, Professors H. Morganthau and R. Osgood (Chicago), the eminent diplomat and historian G. Kennan, H. Kissinger (Princeton), the famous military commentator and publicist Hanson Baldwin (New York Times) and his less famous but no less militant relation Leland Baldwin (Professor of history at Pittsburgh University) and many others."

"The influence of 'real politicians' is felt in many works of British, French, Belgium and other bourgeois-internationalists. As concerns FRG, those preachers of 'the politics of force' a long time ago took up leading positions in the apparatus of 'psychological war' and in bourgeois science."

Voyennaya Strategiya, (Military Strategy) Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovsky, Editor, first edition, Voyenizdat, 1962.

p. 72 "In December of 1959, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee published a special report "The Development of Military Technology and Its Effect on the Strategy and Foreign Policy of the United States" prepared by the Johns hopkins Washington Center and serving as an official document of Congress. In addition, in the United States books appeared by R. Osgood - *Limited War*, B. Brodie - *Strategy in the Missile Age*, General Maxwell Taylor - *Unreliable Strategy [The Uncertain Trumpet]*, Henry A. Kissinger - *The Necessity for Choice*, a group of authors [Robert Strausz-Hupe, William R. Kintner and Stefan T. Possony] *A Forward Strategy for America*, and in Britain the book of Air Marshal Kingston-McCloughry - *Defense, Policy and Strategy*, and a number of others."

p. 73 "The most timely, from the point of view of clarification of the present military strategy of the West, is the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as well as the books of General Taylor - *The Uncertain Trumpet*, and of Professor Henry Kissinger - *The Necessity for Choice*.

"*In 1961, Taylor and Kissinger were appointed special military and political advisers to President Kennedy, and almost all the proposals contained in their books have found or are finding practical realization: previously, Kissinger was consultant to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff."

p. 73 "An even more depressing evaluation of the United States position was given by Kissinger, who decisively rejects any illusions as to the invulnerability of the United States.

"In referring to the vast influence of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic on the course of world social development, he says bitterly that "the successes of Moscow and Peking will offer the same magnetic attraction as the accomplishments of Europe in the 19th Century. No economic aid can counteract the belief that the West is doomed."*

*Henry A. Kissinger. *The Necessity for Choice*, 1961, p.7.*

p. 74 "Characteristically, in his book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*,

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which appeared in the United States in 1957, Kissinger was still in favor of a strategy based on the threat of unlimited use of nuclear weapons, that is, the unleashing of a general nuclear war. However, the events of the last four years have forced him to arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions as to the necessity for choice, in his words, 'between humiliation and general nuclear war.'"

p. 80 "Certain American military ideologists (Kissinger, for example) replace the expression 'preventive war' with the expression 'surprise (first) strike.' The distinction is purely formal, and pointless since the first strike can also herald the beginning of preventive war. No matter what this strike is called, its main aim is the maximum achievement of surprise."

p. 313 "Henry Kissinger has something more definite to say apropos of this: '...a general war conducted with modern weapons will be decided by the operations of the armed forces which the enemy has at the beginning of the war. We can no longer count on a more or less long period of time in which to mobilize.'*

"1* H. Kissinger, *Yadernoye Oruzhiye i Vneshnaya Politika*, [Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy], Moscow, Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1959, p 150."

p. 338 "Using destructive means of armed combat -- nuclear weapons and other devices for mass destruction -- the imperialists will attempt to liquidate the social structure in the countries of socialism, including total annihilation of entire socialist states. They do not hide their plans. For example, Henry Kissinger in his book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, writes: 'The idea that victory in a war will be assured by annihilation of the industrial potential of the enemy and by undermining the morale of the civilian population is the basic principle of British as well as American strategic planning.'*

"1* H. Kissinger, *Yadernoye Oruzhiye i Vneshnaya Politika*, Moscow, Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1959, p 373."

Ob *Osnovnykh Zakonakh Khoda i Iskhoda Sovremennoy Voyny*, (Basic Laws of the Course and Outcome of Modern War) Col. P.I. Trifonenkov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Voyenizdat, 1962.

p. 98 "It is well known that during the last 10-15 years, bourgeois military figures and writers have published many different books on military questions. Among them, a leading place is occupied by: *The Second World War* - W. Churchill, *Crusade in Europe* - D. Eisenhower, *From Normandy to the Baltic* - B. Montgomery, *War Memoirs* - C. De Gaulle, *A Soldier's Story* - O. Bradley, *Recollections of a Soldier* - G. Guderian, *Conduct of War* - E. J. Kingston-McCloughry, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* - H. Kissinger, *Strategy* - B.H. Liddell Hart, *Military Doctrine of the USA*, D.O. Smith, *Results of the Second World War and Fatal Decisions*, - by a group of German generals who had served in Hitler's army, and others."

*Voyennaya Strategiya*, (Military Strategy) Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovsky, editor, second edition, Voyenizdat, 1963.

p. 78 Same as first edition, p. 72, but with this book added: "J. Hitch - *Military Economics in the Nuclear Age*."

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p. 79 Same as first edition, p. 73. "The most timely..."

p. 80 Same as first edition, p. 73. "An even more depressing..."

p. 80 Same as first edition, p. 74. "Characteristically,..."

p. 86 "However, according to American press reports, in 1962 the successes of the imperialists in the field of reconnaissance of Soviet strategic rocket bases were more than modest. Thus, Kissinger wrote in the periodical *Foreign Affairs* for July 1962: '...that for the strategy of counterforce to remain successful to some degree, it is necessary to know the locations of the targets ahead of time. This is especially important with respect to rockets which cannot find objectives for a strike. Taking into account...the vastness of Soviet territory, our information of Soviet launch sites unavoidably has a fragmentary character.' In the future, he stresses, Soviet rockets will be more and more dispersed and well protected in special underground structures (shafts); a significant number of rockets will be mobile or be based at sea, which makes their discovery even more difficult."

p. 90. Same as first edition, p. 80. "Certain American military..."

p. 96. "Thus, Kissinger points out that 'limited nuclear war will automatically escalate into a general war because the losing side will continually commit new resources in order to restore the situation.'

"1* The Foreign Affairs, July, 1962."

p. 352 Same as first edition, p. 313. "Henry Kissinger has..."

p. 379 Same as first edition, p. 338. "Using destructive..."

Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya Posle Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny, Vol. 2, Editors: A.A. Lavrishchev and D.G. Tomashevsky, Politizdat, 1963.

p. 99 "The 'open skies' plan would not help solve the task of preventing a surprise attack. On the contrary, its realization would be only playing into the hands of an aggressor. 'The greatest advantage from an 'open skies' agreement,' wrote J.P. Morray, 'would be gotten by the aggressor.' The reasonableness of this opinion was also admitted by the famous American military specialist H. Kissinger.

"1* H.A. Kissinger. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. N.Y. 1957. p. 218."

p. 373 "'Our allies (in NATO) with the exception of England...'- complained the American military theoretician H. Kissinger, 'with horror think of the possibility of a new conflict arising... They try to minimize the reality of the danger threatening them...' 

"1* H.A. Kissinger. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 273."

Osnovnoy Vopros Sovremennosti (The Basic Question of Today) N.M. Nikol'sky, 'International Relations' Publishing House, Moscow, 1964.

p. 48 Footnote: "69. Not only M. Taylor, of course, come out with such criticism. Critics of past American strategy were widespread in the American press, it even became a sort of 'mode'. Even J. Kennedy, himself,

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came to the White House with new ideas to a certain degree. Such military ideologists of American imperialism as H. Kissinger, R. Osgood, F. Miksche, J. Gavin, B. Brodie and others, came forth with proposals for new military-strategic concepts."

p. 68 "In July, 1962, the famous military theoretician, H. Kissinger, came out with a concept worked out in detail analogous to tactical nuclear war. In an article, 'The Unsolved Problems of European Defense,'¹ he set forth a plan for rebuilding the organization of troops of NATO in Europe for waging tactical nuclear war, which, in his opinion, was the most suitable form of aggressive war for Western powers against the socialist countries. At the same time, just as in his earlier works,² Kissinger did not deny that 'limited nuclear war will automatically escalate into general war, because the losing side will keep putting new reserves into action.'³ Kissinger also considers that tactical nuclear war is a most risky way because it assumes the preventive use of the nuclear weapon by the Western powers. 'It is clear,' he wrote, 'that to make a basic stress on tactical nuclear defense means to stay on a riskier path, although more feasible. In this, the West must be first to use the nuclear weapon at an early stage of combat actions.'⁴

"¹ See: Henry A. Kissinger, 'The Unsolved Problems of European Defense,' *Foreign Affairs*, 1962, July.

2. 'It is absolutely obvious that the possibility of general war lies in any limited war between the great powers.' (H. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice*, N.Y., 1960, p. 59).

3. Henry A. Kissinger, *The Unsolved Problems*, etc., p 520

4. Ibid., p 531.

p. 269 Footnote. "44. See K. Knorr, *The Military Potential of States*, Klaus Knorr expresses the views of influential aggressive circles of the USA: he is a consultant of many official government organizations, including the National War College, the President's Commission on Questions of policy in relation to material reserves, the administration of foreign operations, and the European Economic Commission of the UN. The State Department often asks for the services of K. Knorr. The aggressive views of K. Knorr are propagandized both in actucal books and also in a number of his speeches. In 1959, for example, at the Atlantic Congress taking place in London, K. Knorr, with another military ideologist of the USA, H. Kissinger, spoke with appeals for aggressive war."

## Books Published After Khrushchev's Ouster

*Problemy Revolyutsii v Voyennom Dele* (Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs) Editor; Col. P.M. Derevyankov Voyenizdat, 1965.

p. 48 "On Soviet Military Doctrine" General Colonel N.A. Lomov, Professor.

"Even the superficial acquaintance with this theory [of local wars] in the works of its overseas authors (Osgood, Kissinger, Brodie, Taylor and others) shows that at its base lie the definite political goals of monopolistic capital. With the help of local, regional wars, imperialist circles are trying to realize their aggressive, reactionary plans. In this, they try to point out that such wars are safe for the people and even advantageous for the workers of capitalist states."

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p. 51 "With a successful attack by the enemy on 50 major industrial centers of the USA,' writes H. Kissinger, '40 per cent of our population, up to 50 per cent of the basic buildings and about 60 per cent of our industry will be completely destroyed.'1*

"1* . Kissinger. *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1959, p. 59."

p.129. "New Means of Fighting and Strategy" Colonel V.V. Larionov, Candidate of Military Sciences.

"One of the military ideologists of imperialism, H. Kissinger, writes: 'The idea that victory in war is secured by destroying the industry of a potential enemy and undermining the moral spirit of the civilian population is a basic principle of English and American strategic thought."

*Programma KPCC o Zashchitye Sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva* (Program of the CPSU on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland) General Major K. Bochkaryev, Colonel I. Prusanov, and Colonel A. Babakov, Voyenizdat, 1965.

countries

p. 60 "In recent years in capitalist, there have appeared many books, brochures, articles in which, with cynical frankness and with pretensions of a scientific character, not only the unavoidability but even the desirability and expediency of nuclear war is substantiated. Such are the writings of the American military 'theoreticians' H. Kahn, H. Kissinger, M. Taylor, the British historian Seton-Watson, the French sociologist, R. Aron, and many others."

*Marksizm-Leninizm o Voyne i Armii* (Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army) Eds: General Major N. Ya. Sushko and Col. S.A. Tyushkevich, Voyenizdat, 1965. 4th

p. 54 "The militarists, sitting in the Pentagon, receive wide support from 'civilian militarists' such as Kahn, Kissinger, Wolshetter, Schelling, who persistently propagandize nuclear war as a means of tying the 'American system' on nations, that is, installing the world domination of American imperialism."

*Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya Posle Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny*, Vol. 3. Editors: D.Ye. Mel'nikov and D.G. Tomashevsky, Politizdat, 1965.

p. 43. "Such variants and their modifications have been tried in recent years by American military-political theoreticians, beginning with the theory of 'limited nuclear war' of the sort formulated in his time by H. Kissinger in the book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. and ending with the doctrine of 'the strategy of flexible response' proposed by General Maxwell Taylor which is now the official military-political doctrine of the USA. As for the details which distinguish one variant and modification of the doctrine of 'limited nuclear war' from the other, it can be said that is essence they boil down to this: in world thermo-nuclear war, the USA and its partners in aggressive blocs have no chance of victory at all, so it is necessary in practical policies and strategy to view such a war as the last means of struggle against possible nuclear enemies. As a basis for continuing the policy 'from a position of

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strength', it is necessary to adopt a course of preparation and waging 'of limited wars', in which, along with conventional kinds of armaments, might be used, in extreme circumstances, nuclear weapons also, but tactical, and not strategic. In this, the doubtful calculation is made that 'limited' nuclear war with the use of tactical thermonuclear weapons, might be, with the help of foreign policy and diplomacy, held in a local framework and not allowed to escalate into world thermonuclear catastrophe."

p. 308 "Kissinger wrote of this in an article 'The Nuclear Dilemma of NATO', 'If West Germany is seriously interested in receiving the nuclear weapon, then the 'multilateral forces' probably will turn out to be only an intermediate measure and possibly will be the easiest way for Germany to get the nuclear weapon.'* 1*
"1* The Reporter, March 28, 1963."

p. 374 "'Our ability to carry out a massive retaliatory strike did not prevent the Korean war, nor the loss of the northern part of Indochina... not even the Suez crisis,' wrote the famous American military theoretician and sociologist, specializing in international questions, Henry Kissinger, Director of the special research center of the 'Rockefeller Fund', and worker in a number of other American scientific research organizations, occupied with foreign policy problems, in 1957.

"The doctrine of 'massive retaliation' threatened, as Kissinger explained, 'to paralyze the policy' of the United States and to 'deprive it of flexibility. Pointing out the power of modern weapons, he stressed that 'general war, obviously, would be a most extreme means' and that its use was connected with 'extreme risk' for American ruling circles themselves. As for the allies of the USA, Kissinger admits that the reliance of the high American political and military command on 'massive retaliation' and on 'global atomic war' has evoked the deepest concern in countries tied to the United States with allied obligations."

p. 375 "Stressing that the cost of unleashing general nuclear war might be 'too great, because such a war might become our only answer to challenges thrown by the enemy' Kissinger proposed that the effectiveness of the American 'policy of strength' and American diplomacy might be increased by using 'limited' wars for American goals. The last he divided into four basic categories: 1) wars between 'second-rate governments' primarily in the East; 2) wars with the participation of one of the great powers against countries situated in a clearly less advantageous position; 3) military conflicts between a great power and a small country, escalating into a broader war; and 4) 'limited' war between great powers."

p. 377 "'...The United States cannot allow itself another slump like the one which characterized the preceding decade-and-a-half,' noted H. Kissinger in 1961, 'Another 15 years of the weakening of our position in the world like the one we experienced after the end of the Second World War, would lead to where we would be in a position of 'fortress America' in a world in which we basically would have no importance... We are not omnipotent. We are no longer invincible.'* 1*
"1* H. Kissinger. *The Necessity for Choice. Prospects of American Foreign Policy*. N.Y., 1961. p 1, 2."

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p.527 "In January, 1962, in Delhi, Henry Kissinger, special adviser to the President of the USA on questions of foreign policy, was visiting. Journalists asked him why the USA did not offer India aid with arms in connection with military actions in Ladakh and the Northeast border region. Kissinger answered that US military aid was meant only for use in big wars and not in border conflicts."

*Methodologicheskiye Problemy Voyennoy Teorii i Praktiki*, (Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice) editors: Gen. Major N. Ya. Sushko and Lt. Colonel T.R. Kondratkov, Voyenizdat, 1966.

p. 52 "When one part of the ideologists of imperialism try to justify and legalize thermonuclear war and speak out as open apologists of nuclear violence, another part recognizes the danger of thermonuclear war. Thus American professor H. Kissinger frankly points out that thermonuclear war might lead to the downfall of the social system, to the "undermining of all social systems." But even these ideologists do not reject in principle, thermonuclear war but would like only to limit, to localize it. In their opinion, limited, local war with the use of tactical nuclear weapons is a less dangerous, for the imperialists, means of realizing pre-datory plans. Such wars, states the American professor-internationalist V. Kaufman, would protect imperialism from revolutionary and other shocks, which are the unavoidable results of big wars."

*Problemy Voyny i Mira*, (Problems of War and Peace) Editors: Ye.D.Modrzhinckaya, B.T. Grigoryan and T.R. Kondratkov. (Kondratkov is a Lieutenant Colonel but is not so identified in this book). "Mysl" Publishing House, 1967.

p.93 "Another part of the ideologists of imperialism, recognizing the danger of thermonuclear war, in principle do not reject it, but wish only to limit, to localize the sphere of use of the nuclear rocket weapon in the interests of politics. These ideologists would like to squeeze world thermonuclear war into a definite framework, desirable for them, set ad- visable borders for it, and turn it into a more advantageous and less de- structive means of achieving agressive political goals. This tendency is reflected in the theory of limited, local wars, in the creation of nuclear weapons of small caliber for use in such wars. Limited, local wars are seen as a less dangerous instrument for realizing predatory political plans. These wars, writes the American professor-internationalist V. Kauf- man, "protect us from revolutionary and other shocks, which are the una- voidable results of big wars."

"Limitation, according to the ideas of these bourgeois ideologists, must apply to the most diverse sides of war: its political goals, the use of nuclear combat means, geographical size, objectives of destruction, and the time of the taking place of military actions. They distinguish several kinds of limited, local wars: wars between little states, not touching the interests of big powers; wars between major Western capital- ist countries and little countries with the non-interference of other states; Wars between great powers and little states; and, finally, limited wars between the great powers which do not escalate into a world thermo- nuclear melee."1*

"1* See: H. Kissinger. *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Moscow, 1959, p. 202-209.

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p. 244 "Unfortunately, the militarists first turned their attention to the possibilities of using the new theory [of games] for their own interests. One of its creators, Morgenshtern, busied himself with this. With similar attempts also came forth H. Kahn, T. Schelling, M. Halperin, H. Kissinger, B. Brodie, A. Wolstetter, K. Knorr, R. Osgood and D. Brennan. These attempts are especially dangerous because neither generals nor society in general is prepared to verify the scientific basis of the conclusions of Kahn and company, who are called in the USA 'the new civilian militarists.' Their conclusions are taken on faith because they trust the theory and they themselves come forth in the role of experts in this theory."

p. 258 "One of the methods is all the same 'the compelling flaw'. In its simplest form, this is the break in the channel of communications with the enemy after the transmission of the ultimatum. Another variant is imprudent conduct. In particular, H. Kissinger from Harvard University recommends the threatening of 'potentially unreasonable actions from our side.' This theme is worked out in special detail by H. Kahn. As an example he gives the game of 'chicken.' Its rules: two automobiles approach each other on a collision course. The one that turns is the 'chicken.' 'This game,' declares Kahn, 'is a useful analogy, because it brings out several important sides of international relations...An experienced player sits in the automobile drunk, throwing out the window an empty whiskey bottle, so that everyone will be convinced that he is drunk as a cobbler. He puts on heavy dark glasses so that it is clear that he can see nothing. Just as the auto picks up speed, he pulls off the steering wheel and throws it out the window.' The enemy can do nothing but give way.

p. 271. "The famous ideologist of American imperialism, H. Kissinger, gives a similar analogy of the characteristics of peaceful coexistence, who maintains that 'Soviet leaders view 'peaceful coexistence' ...as the best means to undermine existing international ties with the help of any actions short of general nuclear war.'

"1* H. Kissinger. *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, p 211±

p. 432 "The idea of 'peace through the balance of fear' or through 'mutual deterrence' is being exploited by B. Brodie, T. Schelling, H. Kissinger, M. Halperin, J. Strachey, H. Bull, A. Buchan, L. Halle and R. Osgood."1*

"1* H. Kissinger. *The Necessity for Choice. Prospects of American Foreign policy*. New York, 1961."

(For *Military Strategy*, third edition, see the next page, 11 (2))

The Periodical Press (from October, 1964)

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces) the fortnightly military-political journal of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy. #17 September 1965

'On the Nature of World Nuclear Rocket War' Lt. Col. Ye. I. Ribkin, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences. p 50.

"However, in the social conscience of the capitalist world, ever greater dissemination is being given the view of radical changes in the nature of war; and that 'war has stopped being a continuation

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Voyennaya Strategiya, (Military Strategy) Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D.
Sokolovsky, editor. Third Edition. Voyenizdat, 1968.

p.71 Same as first edition. Book added in second edition is omitted.

p.72 Same as first and second edition. "An even more depressing..." The paragraph on the Chinese People's Republic has been omitted.

p.72 Same as first and second editions. "Characteristically..."

p.77 This paragraph has some additions and omissions. It reads: "The military command of the United States intends to solve the reconnaissance problem primarily by launching a large number of special reconnaissance satellites. Thus, Kissinger wrote on the dependence of the 'counterforce' strategy on reconnaissance means, in the periodical *Foreign Affairs*, for July 1962, '...that for the strategy of counterforce to remain successful to some degree, it is necessary to know the locations of the targets ahead of time. This is especially important with respect to rockets which cannot find objectives for a strike.' In the future, he stresses, Soviet rockets will be more and more dispersed and well protected in special underground structures (shafts); a significant number of rockets will be mobile or be based at sea, which makes their discovery even more difficult."

p. 80 Same as first and second editions. "Certain American military..."

p.88 Same as second edition. "Thus Kissinger points out..."

p.348 Same as first and second edition. "Using destructive..."

(The quote on page 313 of first edition, [352 in second edition] beginning "Henry Kissinger has..." is omitted in the third edition.)

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and weapon of politics.' Such an opinion is held by people of the most varied political leanings. Among them are also the staunch supporters of imperialism who recogniza, nevertheless, the fatal nature of nuclear war and accept the policy of peaceful coexistence in one degree or another. The late President of the United States J. Kennedy, for example, inclined to their opinion. This opinion is held by the military theorists and ideologists Liddell Hart, H. Kissinger, M. Taylor, E. Kingston-McCloughry, R. Osgood. They, of course, do not deny the policy of militarism and are fighting for the preservation of nuclear weapons, although they fear the results of their use."

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, #18, September 1965;

'The Aggressive Essence of the Political Ideology of Imperialism' Lt. Colonel T.R. Kondratkov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences p. 9.

p. 10 "Thus, the ideologists of NATO want to create the impression as if capitalism still had a future, that it might escape its downfall and therefore it must be defended by any means, including military. 'Future world war,' writes one of the most zealous ideologists of imperialism, H. Kissinger, 'will be waged not for the sake of this or that particular goal, for the sake of the existing systems', that is in the interests of preserving the bourgeois system and securing the world rule of monopolistic capital. Thus the soldiers and sailors of NATO are charged with the obligation to be ready to spill blood and sacrifice themselves for the purposes of preserving a system of hired slavery."

p. 15 "The meaning of violence itself, the ideologists of imperialism reduce mainly to war. The chronological limits of armed violence endlessly expand, and spread to all the history of mankind, writing down all formations without exception. The militaristic conception of military violence as the basis of politics represents an ideological platform legalizing war with the use of the nuclear weapon. In the book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, the American professor-militarist H. Kissinger states that: 'already now foreign policy must be adapted to the position in which the nuclear weapon is 'conventional.' In the works of other bourgeois authors, the idea is pursued of the necessity of overcoming the fear of the nuclear weapon and to assert its right as an instrument of politics."

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, #1, January 1966;

'The Adventurism of the military-political Concepts of Imperialism' Lt. Colonel N. Ponomaryev, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences p. 42.

p. 46 "While not rejecting the necessity for Western powers to continue to prepare for world nuclear rocket war, the doctrine of 'flexible response' at the same time envisaged the use of armed forces equipped both with nuclear and with conventional means of waging war, in any conflicts with which the imperialists might have to meet. Thus, a course was taken on the wider than previously use of military force for the aggressive policy of imperialist states. The military-theoretical expression of this policy, in particular is the theory of 'limited', 'local' wars. This theory justifies the unleashing of 'limited' or 'local' wars for the sake of preserving the colonial system, the strategic positions of imperialism in various parts of the world. Many printed works of bourgeois ideologists are

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devoted to its basis. It is sufficient to name the books by H. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice*, Pierre Gallois, *Balance of Fear*, and the three volume work *Politics in the Twentieth Century* by H. Morgenthau.

p. 47 "In recent times, the ideologists of imperialism have added to the doctrine of 'flexible response', the theory of 'escalation.' The idea of 'escalation' was introduced in 1961 by a former adviser of President Kennedy, H. Kissinger, in the book *The Necessity for Choice*. A more expanded version is given by H. Kahn in the work *On Escalation. Metaphors and General Picture*, in which '44 steps' are envisaged of the course of war up a staircase - from 'an alleged crisis' as the author expresses it, to general, all-out 'spasmodic' war (when'all buttons are pushed'.)

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, #13 July 1966:

"Dangerous Concepts" A. Yefremov (A review of *The Military Doctrines of NATO Countries*, a collection of translated articles, Voyenizdat 1966) p.90.

p. 92 "The articles in the collection contain quite a lot of material which testifies to the fact that squabbles in the Atlantic coalition have already come to a head and reasons are given for this. 'Contradictions are growing,' unhappily states Mr. Kissinger, who has acquired fame in the West for his theory of 'limited wars', in one of his articles. Kissinger, by the way, expresses himself rather obscurely. Some organs of the bourgeois press speak of the reasons for the trouble in NATO with great certainty. The West German military magazine, *Wehrkunde*, for example, writes that it is caused by 'changes in the relationship of political forces between the United States and Western Europe, and also between the countries of Western Europe.'

p. 93 "The USA has fastened their strategy, based on the American monopoly on the atomic cudgel, on their allies. They have tried to keep this monopoly even in recent years. And it is not for nothing that Kissinger proposes: 'The USA will keep control over the nuclear weapon, and the European countries of NATO will orient themselves toward conventional armed forces.' He and his colleagues are turning themselves inside out to 'make the nuclear hegemony of the USA acceptable for their allies.'

p. 93 "The dissatisfaction with American diktat is more and more tangible in France. 'The imperative tone of the Americans has only intensified resistance. France, expressing the fear of European countries, has quite acutely aggravated the sharpness of the contradictions,' states Kissinger about the situation which has been created. These fears have grown even more after the USA, at the December session of the NATO Council came out with persistent demands for the allies to take an active part in the war in Vietnam. And this absolutely did not please the majority of members of the North Atlantic bloc."

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, #21 November 1966:

"The Export of Counterrevolution in the Policy of American Neocolonialism"
Captain 3rd Rank V. Golubev p.80.

p. 83 "The Strategy of the 'Big Cudgel'

"In recent years in the USA, advocates of the strategy of the 'big cudgel' have become noticeably active. The aggressiveness of American

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foreign policy has sharply grown. The monopolistic bourgeoisie of the United States has openly declared war on the national-liberation revolution. Under the guise of the strategy of 'limited' wars, the ruling circles of the USA are conducting a plundering policy of armed suppression of the movement of peoples in underdeveloped countries for their complete national and social liberation. The most zealous advocates of such a strategy are the not unknown politicians and ideologists of American imperialism R. McNamara, M. Taylor, M. Bundy, H. Kissinger and R. Osgood."

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil #2 January 1967:

"Militarism - The Tool of Monopolistic Capital" Lt. Colonel A. Migolatyev, p. 82.

p. 85 "Militaristic propaganda primarily praises war, justifies the arms race, broadly advertises the nuclear rocket might of the West, first of all, of the United States. In the USA the idea of militarism is advocated in the 'writings' of R. Strausz-Hupe, W. Kintner, H. Kahn, H. Kissinger, B. Brodie, M. Taylor, R. Osgood and many other ideologists of monopoly."

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, #9 May 1967:

"The Path of British Diplomacy" V. Ryzhikov, Candidate of Juridical Sciences, p. 79

p. 81 "Ally or Satellite?

"However, in the United States itself in recent times, the statement often appears that England is more and more losing its value for them and that it is time to put a period on that 'special' relationship with it. 'In recent years,' writes the not unknown American military theoretician, Henry Kissinger, in the book *Uneasy Partnership*, 'many influential Americans have come to the conclusion that England is pretending to have an influence which does not correspond to her strength...They are against that which by any method singles out England."

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, #10 May 1967:

"Apology of the Aggressive Policy of American Imperialism" Colonel A. Bulatov, Candidate of Military Sciences, a book review, *On Escalation*; p 87.

p. 87 "It is becoming more and more difficult for the apologists of nuclear rocket war in the USA to openly follow a course for its preparation and unleashing. In order to mask their criminal goals, they try to place under a policy of atomic madness the theoretical base which would justify aggression and help fool the American people. Therefore how generous are the monopolists of the USA on financing various 'scientific' institutes, which are working out similar theories. In their number are the Hudson Institute which does research on the Pentagon's orders on problems of international relations and military strategy. Recently the dollar press has been widely advertising the theory of 'escalation' as a sort of new theoretical conception of the director of this Institute, Herman Kahn and published in book form as *On Escalation*. In the past Kahn worked closely with the 'Rand Corporation' - the Pentagon's brain trust - with the well-known military theoreticians H. Kissinger and Professor B. Brodie - authors of the notorious 'Plan for the Occupation of Russia'. Before the reviewed book, he published two works: *On Thermonuclear War* and *Thinking About the Unthinkable*, vainly trying to show in them that nuclear war for the USA was advantageous and not dangerous. The new book puts forth the same idea but in a more theoretical form."

4 January 1969

Dr. William R. Kintner
Deputy Director
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pa.

Dear Bill:

Thanks very much for your last letter with regard to Federal appointment. In the meantime, as I am sure you have learned, it seems that someone by the name of Frank Shakespeare of CBS is a Nixon favorite for the position of USIA Director. Shakespeare purportedly suggested and arranged Nixon's vaudeville show with the new Cabinet.

The thing that really disturbs me about this is that the administrations, whether Democratic or Republican, seem to regard USIA as an information distribution center, with all of the orthodoxy and dogma that goes into advertising, public relations, "creating an image," etc. No one seems to regard the Agency as a political organization, engaged in tough political combat with competitors who have out-classed and out-maneuvered us repeatedly. I have over the years accumulated a string of such failures and have referred to them in my lectures. What is needed in USIA is a group of top political thinkers, with extensive field as well as academic experience, men who above all know intimately the modus operandi and dialectics of our main adversary.

The network people are primarily technicians, with no foreign service experience. It is my conviction that even VOA should not be run by a broadcaster. I say that particularly because I have had many years of professional broadcasting experience, in CBS, NBC and ABC, before I ever went overseas. Nothing really was accomplished at the Voice during the management of John Chancellor and John Daly. Ed Murrow could have done more as Director of USIA had his

health been better and had he not been hemmed in by the musical chairs bureaucracy of the Agency. He was very frank to me himself about this. And now we are about to get another CBS "personality."

Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies

January 10, 1969

Dear Bill:

This is to brief you on the latest developments:

1. I received, filled, and returned to 450 Park Avenue the green application form, using as possible references Wm. I. Nichols of THIS WEEK, John Chamberlain of the King's Features and you - the men who have known me for about 20 years.

2. I'll have a little boost from Senator Mundt, possibly Bob Taft, and certainly from Johnanes, one of the original "bright young men" of John Foster Dulles who later took over from Scott McLeod.

3. I listed one more job as a possibility, that on the Policy Planning Council. Hanes said that this moribund body has a chance to be revitalized in the new administration, and it might be a useful interim position.

4. I debriefed a couple of old friends from USIA and they fully confirmed the feelings I expressed in my last letter to you, i.e. there won't be any possibility for innovation until the policy changes in the State Department take place. A position there makes sense only for the purposes of getting acquainted with the inner workings and personnel of the agency - or in order to hold the seat for someone to be selected later.

It appears there is nothing more to do but to wait. I have a scheduled vacation (in Haiti) for January 16-27, and perhaps something will start happening after I come back.

If you think there is anything else for me to do, please, let me know right away.

PS. If the opportunity arises, please, keep me in mind as a participant in a negotiating effort, be it in connection with the Vietnam settlement or anything else within my broad area of competence. I have no "cultural barriers" and quite often I can figure out what goes on in the comrades' heads even before they themselves are aware of it.

One more point: I do not envisage any difficulties with the security clearance, since my files in the FBI and CIA should be in good order.

THE
GEORGE
WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY

Washington, D.C. 20006

Czechoslovakia
And
The
Experts'
Myopia

by Vladimir Petrov

This has just
come out; it was
written last September,
and was very interesting
to us.
V. P.

[LC]

One of the curious things about the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia is that it caught by surprise practically all communist world-watchers. Newspaper correspondents in Prague, Moscow and other capitals, and staff experts on communist affairs in their government offices suffered acute professional embarrassment when the news about the appearance of Soviet tanks in the streets of Czechoslovak cities was announced over Radio Prague. From all evidence, Western intelligence services were also caught flat-footed. President Johnson reportedly learned about the invasion from none other than Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. Even more distressing is that, judging by their expressions of "shock and dismay" in the interviews immediately following the events of August 21, most leading American Sovietologists on university campuses were equally unprepared for this development.

The failure of the CIA to anticipate the Soviet move is perhaps understandable. Although the Warsaw Pact troops had been massing along the Czechoslovak borders for some time, this action could conceivably have been interpreted as an instrument of political pressure; the Soviet field commanders themselves probably did not receive the signal to open a certain envelope with the orders to cross the border until shortly before the zero hour. But whatever the excuses to which the searchers for "hard evidence" might be entitled, such excuses

> ... inability of the observers to put themselves into the shoes (in this instance) of Soviet leaders and see things their way.

do not absolve political analysts. The latter were not obligated to forecast the timing and the scope of the intervention, but they certainly could be expected to predict its probability on the basis of their knowledge of communist behavior and modes of operation, of the specific situation in Czechoslovakia, and of the Soviet reaction to the developments in Prague in the preceding months and weeks.

That they didn't poses a question of the general misperception on the part of so many Western observers of the communist world, their apparent inability to take adequate cognizance of relevant facts and draw from them rational conclusions. To a large extent, the fault lies with the excitable reporters on the scene, and it was admittedly difficult even for seasoned analysts to pinpoint what truly mattered in the flood of news from Eastern Europe. But it also ought to be admitted that many scholars — and government experts — had been emotionally inclined to accept the incredibly optimistic slant of the news at face value.

Misperception in critical situations is a very serious matter. As Ralph K.

American Sovietologists on university campuses were equally unprepared...

White, of the University, points out in his recent book (Nobody Wanted War, Doubleday, 1968) "misperception might explain how normally sane human beings can unwittingly, without intending the consequences, involve themselves step by step in actions that lead to war." And he shows how self-delusions and the inability to perceive the enemy's viewpoint were a major factor in the histories of wars.

In the specific case of Czechoslovakia, the United States has not been a direct party to the conflict. While the Czechoslovaks have been regarded as "good guys" and the hardline Soviet leaders, together with their followers in Eastern Europe, as "bad guys," the emotional involvement of the American public has been relatively limited. The sad memory of Hungary in 1956, the craving for détente with Moscow, the growing isolationism in the country, and the spectaculars of the Presidential campaign all served to dilute public interest in the Czechoslovak crisis. However, precisely because of this relative detachment, our surprise at the Soviet move appears even more puzzling, carrying with it far-reaching and ominous implications. If objective political analysts cannot foresee such a cataclysm in a well-studied area, if trained and experienced news reporters cannot adequately detect major developments in the onrush of fast-breaking news, we must assume that something is inherently wrong with their overall approach to their task.

7

The answer, I submit, should be looked for in one of the forms of misperception analyzed by White, namely in the lack of empathy — the apparent inability of the observers to put themselves into the shoes (in this instance) of Soviet leaders and see things *their* way. To be sure, Soviet reasons for intervention had been spelled out numerous times in news reports, background articles, and in elaborate and intelligent discussions of the crisis by eminent authorities—

the Soviet fear of the contagious effects of the Czechoslovak peaceful revolution, the expressions of distrust and poorly concealed hostility towards Moscow in the uncensored Czechoslovak press, the economic reforms and the penetration of Western private capital into Czechoslovakia, Prague's general rapprochement with West Germany, the growing independence of the reformist leadership and its reluctance to permit Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Czechoslovak territory, the "liberals" attacks on the "conservatives" and other pro-Soviet figures, the excitement of the youth and intelligentsia, the disclosures of the crimes of the Stalin era, and, of course, obnoxious to Moscow, the cheers from the West every time Czechoslovakia appeared to be moving further towards international democratization and external independence.

At the same time, however, the prevailing feeling among political analysts (and, consequently, of the American public and the government) was that the Soviets had no choice but to bow to the forces of change and to adjust to the new situation, much as the U. S. does in analagous situations. To that end, the press, including the analyses of many reputable specialists, cited a multitude of reasons—

the continuing Soviet preoccupation with the hostile Chinese and the resulting dependence of Moscow on the good will of "moderate" communist parties for the showdown with Peking scheduled for the fall, the psychological impossibility of repeating Hungary in the presumably relaxed atmosphere of the

> ... remember the Suez campaign of 1956, the Bay of Pigs, or the overthrow of the Diem government in Saigon?

late 1960's, the general weakening of Moscow's grip on the communist regimes of Eastern Europe (underscored by neutralist tendencies in Yugoslavia and Rumania), the presumed need for the Soviets to keep open the channels of communication with the United States, thereby fostering dissent and disarray within the NATO alliance.

Some analysts even reasoned that the Soviets would abstain from anything drastic as their contribution to the "stop Nixon" campaign in the U. S. Considerable evidence exists that the White House itself entertained such hopes while secretly planning a Johnson-Kosygin summit meeting and praying for a breakthrough in the Paris peace talks.

Most of this speculation was very clever, very sophisticated, and to a large extent, plausible. I myself was convinced last spring that such considerations were present in the minds of the Soviet leaders. I expected them to take into account the fate of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the heavy burdens of the armaments race resulting from the increase of tension in international relations, the Soviet image abroad, and the reaction within the Soviet Union itself, particularly among the youth and the intellectuals.

At the same time I wondered about two unknowns in this complex equation. One was the never openly acknowledged, almost irrational fear of Germany — divided or reunited — rooted in the trauma of World War II. Another was an equally unspoken but doubtlessly cumulative effects of the defections in Eastern Europe from the Soviet fold. The revolts in East Germany in 1953 and in Poland and Hungary in 1956; the breakaways of Tito and Ceausescu; the angry assaults of the tiny and totally helpless Albania — all must have been deeply humiliating to the Kremlin leaders, perennially worrying over the specter of the fall-

> ... the responsibility for Western inaction must be shared by political analysts...

ing dominoes. Having reconciled themselves to being unloved by their satellites, how far, I was asking myself, were they prepared to go in a display of self-restraint in dealing with Czechoslovakia? Would they follow the example of the United States? Or would they prove to be true to their own nature?

Whatever optimism I had vanished when Pravda published (on July 18) the text of the joint Warsaw Pact nations' (Rumania and, of course, Czechoslovakia being absent) message to the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The ultimatum sternly ordered Dubcek and his colleagues to put their house in order and asserted the right of the other communist states to intervene in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. This document, of such overriding importance, should have left no doubt as to the top priority Moscow attached to the Czechoslovak crisis. From then on, it was only a question of whether the Czechoslovaks themselves could carry out the terms of the ultimatum and, perhaps, of what position the United States would take. In retrospect, it also appears clear, judging by the remarkable efficiency of the invasion, that military contingency plans of the Soviet command were also approved about that time — if not earlier.

To my knowledge very few Russia-watchers recognized the threat and sounded the alarm. (Victor Zorza of the Manchester Guardian was an exception.) To others, the events of August 21 fell like a bolt out of the blue. As the military occupation became an accomplished fact, expressions of "shock and dismay" were heard everywhere. Even at this late date, some analysts refuse to admit their failure, insisting quite irrelevantly that the Soviets had acted against their own best interests, that they would be forced to withdraw before too long under all kinds of pressure, that it was Moscow's leaders who misperceived and miscalculated.

Admittedly, to predict the Soviet move was no easy task. In reaching a decision involving multiple and complex considerations, the Soviet leaders themselves were probably far from unanimous, and throughout they showed signs of hesitation and uncertainty. Yet the choice had nar-

8

rowed down to a simple choice — intervene or not intervene, for from Moscow's point of view the situation in Czechoslovakia was rapidly nearing the point of no return, with the Prague authorities helplessly floundering and clearly incapable of stemming the tide. Our political analysts first erred in underestimating the capacity of the Soviets to act decisively, probably because this capacity is such a scarce commodity in democratic societies. Their second error was in attributing to the Soviet leadership our own scale of values, which was plainly an exercise in wishful thinking. The third was a characteristic presumption of so many experts in international affairs: that of knowing what is good and what is bad for a given foreign nation, and a corresponding (but historically insupportable) assumption that "civilized" governments normally act in their own best interests as such are defined by detached and dispassionate scholars. This is often not true even in democratic societies where big issues are freely discussed — remember the Bay of Pigs, the Suez campaign of 1956, or the overthrow of the Diem government in Saigon? It is much less true in the communist world.

Finally, there was an error — quite widespread among liberal Sovietologists — in assuming that there exists, basically, the same logic and the same way of reasoning among all modern leaders and that, perhaps with minor variations — attributable to prejudices, ideology, upbringing, or insufficient sophistication — all leaders behave more or less the same way. The impressive Soviet record indicating certain substantial differences between the communist and, say, American behavior, was consciously or subconsciously dismissed. Aren't we all changing, becoming more enlightened and subtle in exercising power and self-restraint, and in taking into account the enormous complexities of the modern world?

Of course, alarming signs during the last few years came from within the Soviet Union suggesting a withering away of the "liberalism" of the immediate post-Stalin era. But those had been regarded as purely internal developments, not necessarily transferable to the international arena where the Soviets appeared to be aligned

> Even at this late date, political analysts refuse to admit their failure...

with "moderate" communists. Whatever the toughening of Soviet international behavior, many assumed that it could be explained by the strains of the Vietnam War: didn't we ourselves deviate from the "norm" in *our* behavior because of the same war? The temptation to attribute to alien political systems our own views, judgments, and concerns seems to be irresistible to a great many otherwise knowledgeable experts.

In the end, the watchers of the Czechoslovak crisis had lost sight of the perception of events from the perspective of the Kremlin. The Warsaw ultimatum was either played down or dismissed altogether by Western analysts. The Soviet-Czechoslovak encounters at Cierna and Bratislava, with the unprecedented attendance of the full membership of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as well as the initial withdrawal of the Warsaw Pact troops from the maneuvers in Czechoslovakia, were interpreted as signs of Soviet weakness or rationality. The Czechoslovak, on the other hand, supported by the vast majority of the world's communist parties, appeared to display cool defiance and determination to defend their newly won freedoms. Under such circumstances most analysts thought Moscow would avoid military occupation, even if it could be certain the West would take no action. Events proved them wrong, and the appearance of half a million Soviet troops in the heart of Europe, in a country that had never been occupied before, has upset the strategic balance of power in Europe no less than the placing of Soviet missiles in Cuba upset the balance in the Western Hemisphere in October, 1962. The significance of this drastic change is still given scant notice in the American press, although it has been fully realized in Europe and, somewhat belatedly, by the United States Government.

> Whether or not the invasion could have been thwarted is now a matter for speculation.

Whether or not the invasion could have been thwarted is now a matter for speculation. I personally believe that a strong warning from the White House *before* the event, noting that such a move would invalidate the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding following the Cuban missile crisis, might prevent the ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, could endanger cultural and trade relations and would compel the United States to transfer additional troops to West Germany, would have, at the very least, made the Soviets pause to guess what the next American move might be. As in 1956, anti-Soviet feelings in Eastern Europe are running high, making any kind of military confrontation with the West unthinkable to the Soviets in view of their extended and vulnerable communications across the countries with deeply divided populations.

Alternatively, it is also possible that the United States could have extracted, in return for a hands-off stand regarding Czechoslovakia, concessions on some other outstanding issues: in the form of a cease-fire in Vietnam, a tolerable agreement on the Middle East, or a return of the Pueblo crew.

But in order to take a firm stand, the American government and public needed a much clearer picture of what was going on, and an authoritative forewarning about the likelihood of Soviet action. To the extent that neither was forthcoming, the responsibility for Western inaction must be shared by political analysts, within and outside the government, who had misread the mind of the Soviets and grossly exaggerated the Czechoslovak ability to resist, thereby helping to create a climate in which no action was possible.

There is no assurance the United States would have acted even had the climate been different and the advice been sound. But this is an entirely different matter. For the moment, we will do well to examine our embarrassing lack of empathy in this particular episode, keeping in mind that the next time around American interests may be involved much more directly and that our failure to perceive through the eyes of the adversary may have much more dangerous consequences.

9

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

3508 Market Street - Suite 350
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19104
EVERGREEN 2-0685

WILLIAM R. KINTNER, Director

31 October 1969

Dear Henry:

Robert has told me of his conversation with
you yesterday. I was very happy to learn of your
concern about the outrageous conduct toward Robert
by the Committee chairman. Please find enclosed a
copy of a letter I wrote to Bryce Harlow the other
day.

You may not know that I have kept somewhat
abreast of your battles via our mutual friend, Fritz.
It would seem to me that a roving Ambassador appoint-
ment could be a very helpful thing to the cause we
all share; namely, the security of this country in
a period of growing challenges. Robert is an
excellent reporter and could be a first-rate
troubleshooter. In between missions, he would,
of course, be located in foggy bottom and there,
I believe, he would be a most useful countervailing
force.

With all good wishes,

The Hon. Henry Kissinger
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

WRK/mr
Enclosure

27 October 1969

Dear Bryce:

My attempt to reach you on Friday was to discuss
with you what might be done about the latest onslaught
against Robert. As you may know, quotes from Robert's
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
supplied the King of Morocco with information that
purports to show Robert pro-Israel. I was present at
the hearing and have re-read the testimony, and I can
assure you there is no logical basis for this interpre-
tation. Nonetheless, this complicates a lengthening
ordeal. From the bottom of my heart, I hope that evil
men will not be permitted to prevail; that Robert's
friends will fight his battle; and that his selfless
service will be rewarded.

My feeling for Robert aside, I believe that the
Administration's yielding to Robert's opponents would
not only set a dangerous precedent in the Senate but
also weaken its prestige abroad. Would it not be the
best strategy to advance rather than retreat? If the
King of Morocco cannot be convinced that the charges
against Robert are baseless and that he has nothing to
gain by yielding to Arab extremist blackmail -- as, I
think, could be done -- then only one course seems to
be open: the Administration should state that Robert
is needed for a more important job, and that, regretfully,
it must switch him from serving Morocco to this more
urgent post.

Is it not possible to send him to Greece where
the present Ambassador to Morocco is supposed to go?
Or to Portugal or to some other country in the North
Atlantic Alliance about which he knows more than most
professionals? Or, perhaps even better, could he be
nominated Ambassador-at-Large? He would be at his best

2

as a trouble-shooter. I have good reason to believe
that Senator Fulbright, having run out of ammunition,
would not seek to block Robert again. If the President
so decides, this need be done quickly so that bureau-
cratic foot dragging cannot again interfer with the
President's purpose.

If my suggestion seems to you a good one in
principle, I am sure that you will be able to improve
upon it. The most important thing is not lose momentum.

Robert has been put, without any fault of his
own, in a most awful position. I wonder how he has
been able to stand up to it so long with fortitude and
dignity. His friends must now rally to his cause which
has, through Fulbright's deviousness, become the
President's as well.

The Hon. Bryce N. Harlow
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

WRK/mr