January 4 6: The only sane policy is for the US to enter into immediate negotiations with the USSR on the highest level, to offer every kind of disarmament honestly to the Russians and to go on offering and negotiating until it is clear what disarmament they will or will not agree to. Unless this determined, persistent, and honest effort is made, we are not prepared to continue to remain a passive bastion of America in a nuclear war and the rubber stamp to her policy which must make such a war inevitable. (suggestions: stop all tests, no nuclear weapons to new countries or sites in Nato countries; disarmament of Nato countries offered to USSR for radical disarmament, including inspection and international control; also conventional weapons; instages, but immediately)

February 15 186: Mr. Humphrey, who is chairman of the Senate sub-committee on disarmament, argued that nothing could be achieved by offering the SU 'as a first step' a nine-point package so comprehensive that 'what would be left for a second, third or fourth step agreement would be rather insignificant...'. He therefore suggested that the package should be broken up and its proposals negotiated separately; that the best 'first step' would be an agreement to end testing of nuclear weapons; and there should be a joint study by American and Soviet experts of two problems of inspection: how to police the suspension of weapon tests, and how to cut off the manufacture of fissionable material for weapons.

Russians don't want Foreign Minister's meeting because can't stand Dulles

FOR RELEASE FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1958

From: FOREIGN AFFAIRS
58 East 68 Street
New York 21, N.Y.
LEhigh 5-3300

New York, September 18 -- Unless the suspension of nuclear testing can be made part of a satisfactory disarmament agreement, with adequate safeguards against surprise attack, the United States should agree only to ban testing of weapons with appreciable fall-out, as defined by the United Nations. That is the view expressed here today by Henry A. Kissinger, author of "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" and the man who drafted the Rockefeller Report on Military Aspects of International Security.

Writing in the October issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, which will be published tomorrow, Dr. Kissinger maintains that even if inspection proves entirely feasible, a complete test ban will gravely weaken the capability of the free world to resist Soviet aggression or Soviet blackmail. Instead, he proposes that the Western Powers agree to test weapons only within an agreed fall-out quota well below that resulting from recent tests.

Summarizing his argument against a complete ban, Dr. Kissinger writes: "The difficulty with a total ban on nuclear testing is that it will build up world-wide reluctance to resort to nuclear weapons, the only means of defense now existing against Soviet aggression or Soviet military pressure. It will impede if not prevent the articula-

2.

[LC]

tion of a strategy for the defense of Europe. It will increase the danger that any war that does break out will take the most catastrophic form. By freezing weapons development after only the most fearful applications of nuclear power have been fully explored, it will increase the possibilities for Soviet atomic blackmail without reducing the free world's peril. As a first step it goes too far and in a too uncertain direction."

Dr. Kissinger, who is now associate director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, believes it is essential that the United States develop nuclear weapons of "finer discrimination, less destructive power and greatly reduced fall-out." This can be accomplished, he asserts, while still having due regard for the legitimate fears of people everywhere regarding the dangers from fall-out.

He proposes that the United Nations should set a maximum dosage of permissible fall-out, assigning half to the United States and its allies and half to the Soviet bloc. For two years, during which the quota would be progressively reduced, ultimately to zero, all countries would agree to register with the U.N. all tests involving fall-out, and both sides would agree not to exceed their assigned limit.

"If the Soviet Union rejected our proposal," Dr. Kissinger writes, "we and our allies should impose a steeply decreasing quota on ourselves, thus forcing the Soviet Union into the position of being solely responsible for any health hazard in nuclear testing."

[LC]

3.

Among the advantages of this approach, according to the author, is the simplicity of inspection. "If no radioactivity were found, no violation was taking place."

Dr. Kissinger contends that a complete test ban would lead to an increased campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons altogether. This in turn would create a climate of opinion in which it became politically impossible for governments of Western Europe to accept the nuclear weapons which are absolutely essential to their defense.

The next step, he foresees, would be the withdrawal of American forces in Europe -- since they cannot be defended without nuclear weapons, the collapse of NATO and the withdrawal of our allies as effective participants in the defense of the free world.

NUCLEAR TESTING AND THE PROBLEM OF PEACE

By Henry A. Kissinger

World opinion has been gratified by the recent agreement of the Soviet and Western blocs on methods of ensuring compliance with a complete ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. Although the position of the United States has not been explicit, our willingness to meet with Soviet scientists at Geneva did imply that we considered a test ban desirable if the technical means could be found to detect violations. Now we are assured that inspection is feasible, within "a high degree of probability." As a consequence, throughout the world today there are the highest expectations that the United States will agree to suspend all testing of nuclear weapons.

The hopes which have been focused on such an agreement are intense and varied. Many thoughtful people concerned about the danger of radioactive fall-out maintain that the quest for security must not be allowed to endanger the health of future generations. Others argue

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Kissinger - 2.

world order which would permit us to live with our perils and our
opportunities.

In the absence of such a vision we have been extremely vulnerable
to every apparent shift within the Soviet Union. The West has os-
cillated between considering the Soviet bloc a monolith pursuing its
goals without any reference to foreign actions, and placing confi-
dence in a basic transformation of Soviet society which would end
our dangers without the necessity of great efforts. Of late, there
have been insistent demands for an end of the cold war, sometimes
with the implication that this could be achieved with a change of
(1)
definition.

In this connection a great deal of hope has focused on the end-
ing of nuclear tests. Concerned about the danger of fall-out, many
thoughtful people maintain that the quest for security must not be
allowed to endanger the health of future generations. Others argue

(1). See for example Walter Millis and J.C. Murray, *Foreign Policy and the Free Society*, New York: Fund for the Republic, 1958, p. 53 ff.

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Kissinger - 3.

that the end of nuclear testing is essential to build confidence for
more fundamental agreements, especially in the field of disarmament.
It would prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons to other Powers.
It would lessen the dangers of thermonuclear wars. And these argu-
ments receive additional force from an insistent Soviet campaign that
nuclear tests should be unconditionally banned and nuclear weapons
outlawed.

The yearning for an end of the cold war is surely understandable.
But the hopes which have been attached to a nuclear test ban may be
questioned; at least they should not have been raised so high in
the absence of careful analysis. In particular, little thought seems
to have been given to the psychological and political consequences
of a complete ban, and its relationship to current defense policies
or to any long-term goals of the free world. Instead, the debate
has concentrated on the technical problems of inspection. And al-
though we refused to be specific, by agreeing to meet with Soviet

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Kissinger - 4.

scientists at Geneva to discuss methods of checking compliance with a ban, we clearly implied that a complete cessation of nuclear tests was desirable provided such a ban inspection was feasible.

This article questions whether a complete ban on nuclear testing is desirable. It seeks to develop a proposal for a limited ban which would take account of many of humanity's fears without involving the risks inherent in a complete ending of tests. It goes without saying that in the nuclear age the desire to achieve lasting peace should be taken for granted. At issue can only be the best means to achieve this end.

II

Because of the concern with the technical aspects of ending nuclear tests it may be useful at the start to state the technical difficulties. It is generally agreed that surface nuclear explosions can be detected at considerable distances by equipment which measures radioactivity and shock waves. The difficulty arises

(2). For a very good account of methods of detecting nuclear weapons testing see "The Detection of Nuclear Weapons Testing," by Jay Orear,

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Kissinger - 8.

reassembling its testing machinery. Present United States tests involve scores of installations and thousands of personnel. It

would be impossible to keep these teams together once a test ban

had been agreed upon. Even a strong indication of Soviet violation

might therefore leave the United States at a serious disadvantage or at least without adequate recourse.

Moreover, there is a great difference between obtaining information which is technically reliable and establishing a similar political and psychological clarity. It is often maintained that a violation of the test ban would have a catastrophic impact on world opinion. But this assumes a degree of certainty about Soviet intentions which all past experience belies. The Soviet Union has always shown an extraordinary skill in presenting its challenges in an ambiguous manner, partly by masking its own actions, partly by charging its opponents with similar transgressions. True to its usual tactic, it is quite likely that the Kremlin, within a short

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Kissinger - 9.

time of signing an agreement to end nuclear tests, would accuse us
of violating it, if only to build up pressure against the possibil-
ity of evasion. In the resulting atmosphere of recrimination it
will be difficult to separate sincere charges from the customary
exchanges of the cold war. The result might well be a further weak-
ening of the will of the free world.

Finally, it is quite possible that a complete ban on testing
would enable the U.S.S.R. to overtake us in the military applications
of nuclear energy. A complete test ban would magnify our already
great difficulty in inducing our ablest scientists to work on nuclear
substantial
weapons. With further progress unlikely, they would undoubtedly
seek other fields of research. The Soviet Union by contrast will
be able to keep its research teams together much more easily either
by compulsion or by arranging appropriate incentives. And it may
feel less dependent on testing in order to achieve scientific pro-
gress. The experimental method is instinctive to the West. Marxist

Greece. The experimental method is inoperative to the West. Marxist
feel less dependent on testing in order to achieve scientific pro-
by computation or by arranging appropriate incentives. And it may
be able to keep its research teams together much more easily either
seek other fields of research. The Soviet Union by contrast will
weaken. With further progress unlikely, they would undoubtedly
great difficulty in inducing our ablest scientists to work on nuclear
of nuclear energy. A complete test pan would magnify our already
would enable the U.S.A. to overtake us in the military applications
Finally, it is quite possible that a complete pan on testing
ening of the will of the free world.

 exchanges of the cold war. The result might well be a further weak-
 will be difficult to separate sincere charges from the customary
 ity of evasion. In the resulting atmosphere of recrimination it
 of violating it, it only to build up pressure against the possible-
time of signing an agreement to end nuclear tests, would accrue us
Krasinger - 9.

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Kissinger - 10.

dogmatism places much greater reliance on theory. For example, the Kremlin announced its first nuclear explosion several days before it took place. Thus even if the rate of scientific progress were the same, the Soviets might gain an advantage because of greater confidence in untested data. Or else they could use a temporary cessation to prepare tests of superior weapons. In any event we must keep in mind that the best inspection system can only guard againstSECRET methods of evasion in the nature of things.

### Insert A

And in the nature of its system, evasion is easier to attempt and to conceal for the Soviet Union than for the West. In the West a ban on nuclear testing would be largely self-policing, neither public opinion nor the scientists who would have to undertake them would countenance it. But scientists would not themselves test it. Evasion is not by the danger of Soviet technical advances or

by the political and practical difficulty of inspection. For it may well be that the basic motive behind the Soviet pressure for a complete ending of nuclear tests is a conviction that the U.S.S.R. would gain substantial advantage from a complete ban which it scrupulously observes and continued to observe.

The wisdom of a complete end to SECRET tests for the free world countries would support a test ban see Melman, Seymour, Inspection for Disarmament, p. 231 ff.

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Kissinger - 10.

dogmatism places much greater reliance on theory. For example, the Kremlin announced its first nuclear explosion several days before it took place. Thus even if the rate of scientific progress were the same, the Soviets might gain an advantage because of greater confidence in untested data. Or else they could use a temporary cessation to prepare tests of superior weapons. In any event we must keep in mind that the best inspection system can only guard against presently known methods of evasion. In the nature of things it is difficult to protect against a contingency not yet imagined.

Nevertheless, the deepest concern about a complete ban on testing is produced not by the danger of Soviet technical advances or by the political and practical difficulty of inspection. For it may well be that the basic motive behind the Soviet pressure for a complete ending of nuclear tests is a conviction that the U.S.S.R. would gain substantial advantage from a complete ban which it scrupulously observed and continued to observe. The wisdom of a complete end

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Kissinger - 11.

of nuclear tests so often advocated as a "first step" depends on
the answer to the question "first step towards what?"

### III

It may be argued that such a question is a symptom of the dis-
trust which has produced the cold war. Unless both sides are wil-
ling to take some risks in the quest for peace, it will be said,
the world will be doomed to an indefinitely continued armaments race
and eventual destruction. Since the death of Stalin, great changes
have occurred in the Soviet Union, brought about by the new bureau-
cracy, the increasing demand for consumer goods, and the entire ap-
paratus of an industrialized society. The Russians' expressed de-
sire for peaceful coexistence represents, according to this line of
thought, a concession to the pressures of these new forces. Given
time and patience, the Soviet Union may evolve into a society not
unlike ours. A willingness to make concessions is said to be all
the more essential because of the insistent demands of world opinion.

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Kissinger - 12.

Because these assertions derive from attitudes which have con-
tributed so much to the stability and often the freedom of our so-
ciety and that of many of our allies, it is difficult to contradict
them. A status quo Power always has difficulty in understanding a
revolutionary state; indeed the conviction that its stability is
"normal" is one condition of the cohesiveness of its society. In
our time this complacency takes the form of assuming that all indus-
trial societies must more or less automatically approximate our pat-
tern of government. All our instincts tempt us to accept the peace-
ful professions of our opponent and to refuse to believe in implac-
able hostility.

Were it not for this difficulty of understanding, no revolution
would ever have succeeded. A revolutionary movement always starts
from a position of inferior strength. It owes its survival to the
reluctance of its declared victim to accept its professions at face
value. It owes its success to the psychological advantage which a

value. It owes its success to the psychological advantage which a
reinstatement of its declared victim to accept its profession at face
from a position of interior strength. It owes its survival to the
would ever have succeeded. A revolutionary movement always starts
were it not for this difficulty of understanding, no revolution
able hostility.

ful professions of our opponent and to refuse to believe in implac-
tem of Government. All our instincts tempt us to accept the hence-
trial societies must more or less automatically approximate our bat-
our time this complacency takes the form of assuming that all inau-
"normal" is one condition of the cohesiveness of its society. In
revolutionary state; indeed the conviction that its stability is
them. A status quo Power always has difficulty in understanding a
ciety and that of many of our allies, it is difficult to contradict
tripped so much to the stability and often the freedom of our so-


Because these assertions derive from attitudes which have con-
Kießinger - 13.

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Kissinger - 13.

single-minded purpose confers over an opponent who does not believe
that some states may prefer victory to peace. The ambiguity of the
Soviet challenge derives in part from the skill of the Soviet lead-
ership; in considerable measure it is also produced by the tendency
of the free world to choose the interpretation of Soviet motivations
which best accords with its preconceptions. Neither Lenin's writ-
ings, nor Stalin's utterances, nor Mao's published works, nor Khrush-
chev' declarations, have availed against the conviction of the West
that a basic change was imminent and that a problem deferred was a
problem solved. It is only to posterity that revolutionary move-
ments appear unambiguous. Because a status quo Power is never cer-
tain until too late that another state intends to overthrow the in-
ternational system, revolutionary parties or states throughout his-

tory have achieved successes out of proportion to the initial strength
by presenting each claim as a specific, limited objective which
often in itself seems perfectly reasonable.

However weak a revolutionary Power or party at the beginning, it
can substitute psychological strength for physical power; it can use

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Kissinger - 14.

the very enormity of its goals to defeat gradually an opponent who
cannot come to grips with a policy of unlimited objectives.

This becomes a particular problem if the revolutionary Power
systematically exploits this weakness. In Soviet terminology, for
example, the concepts war and peace are so inherently confusing that
Soviet pronouncements have an inevitable tendency to mislead the
free world. Since, according to Communist theory, the social struc-
ture of capitalist states necessarily produces war, real peace can
be achieved only by the world-wide triumph of Communism. Thus any
act by the Soviet Union, however warlike on the surface, is pacific
by definition and any measure by a capitalist state, however seem-
ingly conciliatory, tends toward war. Therefore, too, the slogan
peaceful coexistence has in the past never had more than a tactical
significance in Communist terminology. "Marxism-Leninism," wrote
Mao, "does not allow concessions to be regarded as something purely
negative. . . . Our concession, withdrawal, turning to the defensive

Kissinger - 15.

or suspending action, whether in dealing with allies /emphasis added/ or enemies, should always be regarded as part of the entire revolutionary policy, as an indispensable link in the general revolutionary line. To be sure, the protestations of peaceful coexistence have recently become more insistent, though for a reason not very flattering to the West: war has become unnecessary to encompass the downfall of the free world.

Such an argument may not prove persuasive to the increasing number of people in the free world whose desire for an end to the cold war is so intense that they refuse to believe either in the lessons of the past or in the most fundamental professions of Communist doctrine. But even the most optimistic should ask themselves why Khrushchev can be expected to deal any more gently with the countries of the free world than with his erstwhile colleagues in the Soviet Presidium. What was the doctrine of collective leader-

(4). Mao Tse-tung, "Selected Works," v. 2, 1937-1938 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 263-4.

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Kissinger - 16.

ship but the principle of peaceful coexistence applied to the rela-
tions of Soviet leaders to one another? Yet it was used ruthlessly
by Khrushchev first to paralyze opposition by branding it contrary
to the principle of collective leadership and then to defeat his
opponents one by one. Khrushchev could not have succeeded domesti-
cally had he not been able to convince his colleagues of his sincer-
ity before destroying them one at a time. Is it not at least pos-
sible that the men who arrested the leaders of the Hungarian Revo-
lution while negotiating an armistice and executed them despite a
safe conduct promise are now seeking to apply these same methods to
weaken the cohesion of the free world and then to destroy its mem-
bers piecemeal? A wise policy will at least consider this contin-
gency and will not risk everything simply for the sake of agreement.

To be sure, the free world has a duty to seek to spare mankind
the horrors of another war. It must strive for any agreement that
offers such prospects. But a real relaxation of tensions can come

Kissinger - 17.

about only if the Soviet leaders become convinced that they cannot
use negotiations to induce us to disarm unilaterally, that any a-
greement must be _mutually_ advantageous. We must consider, then, in-
sistent Soviet demands for a complete ban on nuclear testing is not
designed to paralyze the free world rather than to bring about a
peace as we understand the word.

IV

Rightly or wrongly, the free world has based its defense on
nuclear weapons. We need not here review the circumstances nor ana-
lyze the motives that led to this decision. It is enough to note
that nowhere in the Western world are there sufficient conventional
forces to resist the Soviet preponderance in conventional strength;
nowhere is there any immediate prospect of developing them. As Wes-
tern defense policies have evolved after World War II, nothing now
stands in the way of Soviet domination of Eurasia save the Soviet
reluctance to pay the price of a nuclear war.

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Kissinger - 18.

That is why the Soviet Union has systematically sought to para-
lyze the will to use the weapons around which the entire Western
defense effort has been built. It has done this both by creating
a substantial nuclear stockpile of its own and by seeking to have
nuclear weapons outlawed, abolished.
Appealing to the most basic fears of
humanity, the whole apparatus of Soviet policy, from diplomacy to
"peace" congresses, has sought to undermine our reliance on the most
effective - or at least the only available - means of resistance
to Soviet domination.

The free world should therefore have no illusions about the
implications of a complete ban on nuclear tests. The cessation of
nuclear tests must contribute to a climate of opinion which will
increase our reluctance to invoke our only defense. For if a ces-
sation of nuclear testing is a first step to anything it is to an
increased campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons altogether. If these
weapons are too dangerous to test, so the argument will go, they

Weapons are too dangerous to test, so the argument will go, they
increased campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons altogether. If these
assumption of nuclear testing is a first step to anything it is to an
increase our reluctance to invoke our only defense. For it a ces-
nuclear tests must contribute to a climate of opinion which will
implications of a complete pan on nuclear tests. The cessation of
The free world should therefore have no illustrations about the
to Soviet domination.

effective - or at least the only available - means of resistance
"peace" congresses, has sought to undermine our reliance on the most
humanity, the whole apparatus of Soviet policy, from diplomacy to
nuclear weapons program: Appeasement to the most basic fears of
a substantial nuclear stockpile of its own and by seeking to have
defense effort has been built. It has done this both by creating
lyse the will to use the weapons around which the entire Western

That is why the Soviet Union has systematically sought to para-
Kießinger - 18.

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Kissinger - 19.

are surely too terrible to use.

Nor will the demoralization of the free world be compensated for by gains in the battle for the minds of men. The present pressures in favor of a complete test ban are at least in part due to our failure to offer any alternative and to our seeming reluctance to make any agreement at all on an issue of such deep concern to mankind. In such an atmosphere, it is an illusion to believe that the cessation of nuclear testing will placate world opinion. Most of the countries advocating an end to nuclear testing will then urge the outlawing of nuclear weapons altogether. That this is the aim of Soviet policy was made explicit by Khrushchev: "After the termination of nuclear weapons tests, it would be possible to raise the question of the Powers making a solemn undertaking not to use hydrogen and atomic weapons and henceforth to adopt a decision on the

> See a comment by Adlai Stevenson: "Because even the testing of nuclear weapons, let alone their use, is incompatible with human welfare I have urged for years that we take the initiative toward an agreement to end such tests. Now Russia has taken the lead and there is reason to hope that we can reach a reasonable agreement on methods of inspection against violation." *The New York Times*, June 9, 1958.

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This image does not contain any text. It appears to be a drawing or painting.

total prohibition of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons...."

In the present state of Western defenses such a prohibition is tantamount to unilateral disarmament. The one-sidedness of our military establishment has deprived our diplomacy of flexibility. If the free world possessed a conventional force sufficiently powerful and mobile to blunt Soviet aggression by similar forces, the complete cessation of nuclear testing would not be so dangerous. But none of the advocates of a nuclear test ban has been prepared to cham-

pion a build-up of conventional forces sufficient to offset the

Insert B

no P

Insert B

In fact, many of them have contributed to the rigidity which is the

price we pay for the evasions of a decade: first by opposing conventional
Unless we are prepared to accept a settlement on Soviet terms,
rearment in the early 1950's as unnecessarily diverting resources

from economic reconstruction and then by deriding efforts to develop a
we must have a military establishment which we can develop a in-
spectrum of nuclear weapons.

voke for our defense. If we are not willing to run some risks for
the preservation of our values and our interests, the collapse of the
free world is inevitable and no amount of rhetoric can eliminate

(6) The New York Times, June 29, 1958.

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Kissinger - 21.

this fact.

V

The willingness to run risks depends in part on the options afforded by our military establishment. We require more conventional forces. We must have a wider spectrum of nuclear weapons. We must stop pretending that we can have security on the cheap.

One of the penalties of the defensive is that the choices which we must make are more difficult than the aggressor's, if only because the dangers against which we must protect are more varied. The aggressor can choose his point of attack; he can select the weapons system which seems most promising; he can concentrate on the area where his opponent is weakest either geographically or in weaponry.

The defender must be able to defend all likely targets of aggression and against any weapons system that may be employed. Two consequences follow: (a) at equal levels of military effort the aggressor usually has an advantage; and (b) the defensive requires a more advanced

Kissinger - 22.

weapons technology than its opponent. The side which concedes the first blow must have a more mobile and better protected retaliatory force, for it must be able to withstand the attrition of the initial attack. Its weapons must be lighter so that they can be rapidly moved to threatened areas. It must possess a range of capabilities which deter the aggressor from tilting the scales by expanding either the area or the intensity of the conflict. The side which concedes the first blow therefore runs major risks if it compounds the disadvantage of the defensive with a frozen weapons technology. This is particularly true in the present stage of weapons development.

The current state of weapons technology in fact provides ideal conditions for atomic blackmail. The nuclear weapons with which we are most familiar and which are most fully tested are also the most destructive. Any war would have to be conducted in their shadow. Under present circumstances they even inhibit recourse to conventional weapons, for the danger of a nuclear showdown will be

Kissinger - 23.

thought to be inherent in <u>any</u> conflict. This has already been ar-
ticulated in Great Britain where Lord Russell has insisted that even
surrender is preferable to running the risk of <u>any</u> war.

(7)

It is <u>therefore</u> essential that we develop nuclear weapons of
finer discrimination, less destructive power and greatly reduced
fall-out. This need exists regardless of whether we intend to rely
on a conventional or on a nuclear defense. As long as the defensive
effort of the free world is polarized between inadequate convention-
al forces and nuclear weapons of enormous destructiveness, the Sov-
iet bloc will be able to pose the dilemma of suicide or surrender
in a variety of forms. By engaging in or encouraging aggression
with conventional forces it can force our leaders to choose between
yielding or invoking a strategy which will involve catastrophic cas-
ualties. Even if we build up conventional forces and resist intt-

(7). Russell, Bertrand, "Freedom to Survive," New Leader, July 7-14, 1958.

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Kissinger - 24.

ially without recourse to nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union may be
tempted to utilize a few weapons of low-yield unless deterred by

the knowledge that we have ample weapons of similar discrimination

Otherwise we may be placed in the position of having to decide whether the mere "worth an all-out war." employment against us of nuclear weapons is and superior technology. A conventional war can be kept conventional only if we are prepared with a wide variety of nuclear weapons.

This will be true whether or not the Soviet Union follows suit.

The rhetorical question "Why develop clean weapons if they use dirty weapons against us?" is surely no more pertinent than the argument "Why rely on bullets if the opponent has nuclear weapons?" This reasoning would loosen all constraints on us and would lead to the continued elaboration of ever more destructive weapons. Moreover, of course, the availability of clean weapons is of great importance for the protection of our own troops and even civilian populations who may be endangered by fall-out from our own weapons.

But the essential purpose of having a wide range of clean weapons is not to

The side which concedes the first nuclear blow must have more advanced weapons. The aggressor employing nuclear weapons against conventional forces will have a relatively concentrated target because, massed firepower is difficult to achieve otherwise in a conventional war. He can therefore employ relatively crude weapons, the aggressor by contrast will have dispersed before employing nuclear weapons.

nuclear

having first dispersed his forces.

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Kissinger - 24.

otherwise we may be placed in the position of having to decide whether the mere worth and all-out war (P) employment against us of nuclear weapons is superior technology. A conventional war can be kept conventional only if we are prepared with a wide variety of nuclear weapons.

The rhetorical question "Why develop clean weapons if they use dirty weapons against us?" is surely no more pertinent than the argument "Why rely on bullets if the opponent has nuclear weapons?" This reasoning would loosen all constraints on combat and would lead to the continued elaboration of ever more destructive weapons. Moreover, of course, the availability of clean weapons is of great importance for the protection of our own troops and even civilian populations who may be endangered by fall-out from our own weapons.

But the essential purpose of having a wide range of clean discriminating weapons is to give the free world an option which does

Kissinger - 26.

For a test ban, if it did not lead immediately to the outlawing of all nuclear weapons, it will at least perpetuate the one-sidedness of our military establishment and the polarization of our political and strategic thought, magnifying our inhibitions against defending our values and our interests with the only weapons available in the foreseeable future.

VI

Would not the end of nuclear testing avoid the diffusion of
nuclear weapons among other Powers? Of course, a nuclear test ban
will only inhibit the independent development of nuclear weapons
by "fourth" Powers. It will not necessarily prevent the distribu-
tion of nuclear weapons from the stockpiles of the major nuclear
Powers, nor will it stop them from turning over blueprints to an
ally. Nevertheless a complete ban on nuclear testing will have psy-
chological and political consequences which will make it difficult
for other Powers to acquire nuclear weapons, particularly in the

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Kissinger - 27.

free world. The issue of a ban on nuclear testing is therefore in-
separable from that of nuclear sharing.

The situation with respect to nuclear sharing can be summarized
as follows: The Communist bloc possesses a decisive military super-
iority in all contiguous areas. The Soviet Union can threaten with
nuclear weapons all peripheral areas and much of Africa from its
own territories; Communist China is overwhelmingly stronger than
any neighboring state in conventional weapons. In these circumstances
the Soviet Union may have decided that it has little to gain and
a great deal to lose from the diffusion of nuclear weapons. Indeed,
in view of the political unreliability of some of the satellite ré-
gimes, Russia probably has a positive interest in keeping nuclear
weapons out of their hands. Communist China may feel that it does
not require nuclear weapons to achieve its objectives in the immed-
iate future. Against all neighboring states they are unnecessary
and against the United States it may feel sufficiently assured of

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Kissinger - 28.

Soviet support to defer building up its own stockpile.

The immediate objective of the Communist bloc is therefore to prevent the development of a nuclear capability under local control on the Eurasian continent. For if this can be prevented, Western Europe and other contiguous areas will eventually become neutralized.

Without a nuclear capability of its own, Europe will find it impossible to resist the increasingly bold Soviet threats of nuclear warfare, which have been a cardinal aspect of Soviet diplomacy in every crisis since Suez. Europe, should it want to be defended, would then become entirely dependant on the American assessment of its danger. In such a situation the Soviet Union may well calculate that we would be reluctant to invoke the destruction of the United States for the defense of Europe, or that even an all-out war could not prevent them from seizing Europe. For after the initial exchange of blows the U.S.S.R. would remain supreme in Eurasia. That the

(9) See Peregrine Worsthorne, "Our Bomb and Theirs: As the Russians See It," **Encounter**, July 1958. Also Raymond Garthoff, "Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age," *New York, Prager, 1958*.

Kissinger - 29.

Soviet Union is concerned with achieving the impotence of Europe
and not with the threat offered by a European nuclear establishment
is demonstrated by the Soviet protest against the plan to equip the
Swiss army with nuclear weapons. By no stretch of the imagination
can Switzerland be suspected of aggressive intent against the U.S.S.R.

In negotiating about a nuclear test ban we must therefore take
care not to contribute to a climate of opinion which will make our
position on the Continent untenable and a local defense of Europe
impossible. Already influential groups in Britain argue for a uni-
lateral renunciation of nuclear weapons and considerable pressures
exist in Germany against equipping German forces for nuclear war.
In both countries the cessation of nuclear tests is considered as
an initial move away from atomic weapons. The more the Soviet Union
succeeds in building up a distinction between nuclear weapons and
other weapons, while retaining full control of its own stockpile,

(10) The New York Times, August 9, 1958.

Kidsinger - 30.

the more it will paralyze the will of the Western alliance to resist.

If we permit a distinction to grow up between our military es-
tablishment and that of our NATO allies, our expulsion from Europe
is almost inevitable. Further delay in the distribution of nuclear
weapons to our European allies will give the Soviet Union more time
to persuade Europeans that they will be able to escape involvement
in any conflict by refusing to permit nuclear installations on their
territory. Logically, this denuclearization of Europe will be fol-
lowed by a demand that American troops withdraw, since their equip-
ment is so obviously nuclear. At the very least it will expose us
to great pressure to withdraw all our nuclear installations from
the Continent. Western Europe would then be impotent, at the mercy

of Soviet Russia. NATO would cease to be a meaningful alliance.

Insert D

Once the Soviet Union has succeeded in bringing about a divergence between our military establishment and that of our European allies, it may hope to paralyze our NATO partners by their impotence and us through the risks of its own production. The peoples must be under national control. From many points of view it would be highly desirable if the all-out war.

Kidsinger - 30.

If we permit a distinction to grow up between our military es-
tablishment and that of our NATO allies, our expulsion from Europe
is almost inevitable. Further delay in the distribution of nuclear
weapons to our European allies will give the Soviet Union more time
to persuade Europeans that they will be able to escape involvement
in any conflict by refusing to permit nuclear installations on their
territory. Logically, this denuclearization of Europe will be fol-
lowed by a demand that American troops withdraw, since their equip-
ment is so obviously nuclear. At the very least it will expose us
to great pressure to withdraw all our nuclear installations from
the Continent. Western Europe would then be impotent, at the mercy
of Soviet Russia. NATO would cease to be a meaningful alliance, Insert D, A unior

This is not to say that Europe must obtain nuclear weapons from
its own production or that these weapons must be under national con-
trol. From many points of view it would be highly desirable if the

or if there were formed a European atomic force, Kissinger - 31. on the model of EDC.

nuclear components of NATO were under NATO control. Similarly it is not essential that nuclear weapons be locally produced, but only that there be European participation in their use and control. Before we go much further in the direction of a complete ban on testing, we should at the very least amend our Atomic Energy Act to permit wider nuclear sharing. And our approach to the question of nuclear testing should be based on premises which do not inhibit nuclear sharing and which will not give impetus to Soviet ban-the-bomb propaganda.

Will not the possession of nuclear weapons by our allies increase the danger of war? This would be true if our allies felt thereby encouraged to attack the Soviet Union, or if they were to use nuclear weapons in their own quarrels outside of Europe. But excessive adventurousness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union can hardly be considered a European failing. Even in the less preferred contingency that nuclear weapons were under national rather than NATO con-

Because that nuclear weapons were under national rather than NATO control, considered a European failing. Even in the less preferred excessive adventitiousness via-à-vie the Soviet Union can hardly be use nuclear weapons in their own壘relle outside of Europe. But thereby encouraged to attack the Soviet Union, or if they were to create the danger of war? This would be true if our allies felt Will not the possession of nuclear weapons by our allies in-broadsides.

clear sharing and which will not give impetus to Soviet pan-the-pomp clear testing should be based on brevities which do not inculp it without wider nuclear sharing. And our approach to the question of nuclear, we should at the very least amend our Atomic Energy Act to better we go much further in the direction of a complete pan on test—that there be European participation in their use and control. Be-is not essential that nuclear weapons be locally produced, but only nuclear components of NATO were under NATO control Similarly it

Kießinger - 31.

[Y]

[Y]

Kissinger - 32.

trol, it is difficult to conceive the circumstances which would in-
duce any European country to unleash a unilateral attack on the Sov-
iet Union. The individual nuclear capability will remain so small,
the disproportion in vulnerability is so great that they could not,
by any rational calculation, use these weapons for offensive ends.
Their purpose would be to make the costs of aggression, particular-
of local adventures, prohibitive, and to discourage Soviet atomic
blackmail - not to impose defeat on the Soviet bloc by a unilateral
effort.
(11)

As for the use of these weapons to settle private quarrels out-
side Europe, this could be effectively forestalled by placing them
or an overall European
under NATO control. But even should they be under national control,
the likelihood of their use outside of NATO is slight. The diffi-
culty the French army has in Algeria is not inadequate firepower

(11) For a fuller discussion of the problems of the defense of Europe see the author's "Missiles and the Western Alliance," Foreign Affairs, April 1958.

[Y]

Kissinger - 33.

but the difficulty of finding targets against which this firepower
can be used. Atomic weapons have little significance in guerrilla-
type operations.

But what of the uncommitted? Is there to be no end to the dif-
fusion of nuclear weapons? First, it must be recognized that from
a technical standpoint the diffusion of nuclear weapons will grow
increasingly difficult to prevent, regardless of what decision is
reached with respect to nuclear testing. As the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy become widespread, more and more nations will become
familiar with nuclear technology. The end product of many atomic
reactors is plutonium, which is also the basic component of nuclear
weapons. As nuclear energy becomes more familiar, its military ap-
plications will be very difficult to control. Nothing short of the
original Baruch-Lilienthal plan seems capable of arresting this trend.

It does not follow, moreover, that because the diffusion of nu-
clear weapons must be stopped at some point it must be stopped at

Kissinger - 34.

this point, or that the most effective method is a ban on nuclear
testing. To be sure, the more nuclear Powers exist the more diffi-
cult it will be to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons. But we must
weigh this risk against the danger of ~~collaborating with the Soviet Union in the neutralization of Europe, which~~ Insert E
would leave us without powerful allies. Bilateral negotiations with
the Soviet Union to the exclusion of our European allies are fraught

It would place us ultimately into the position of having to defend the whole Soviet periphery <u>alone</u> against Soviet nuclear attack or Soviet atomic blackmail.

the diffusion of nuclear weapons directly rather than through the in-
direct method of a test ban, and to include our NATO allies as nu-
clear Powers in any agreement, preferably through a European Atomic
Community.

The difficulty with a total ban on nuclear testing is that it
stakes too much on a measure which in itself is of problematical
significance. It will build up world-wide reluctance to resort to
nuclear weapons, the only means of defense now existing against Sov-
iet aggression or Soviet military pressure. It will impede if not

Soviet periphery <u>alone</u> against Soviet nuclear attack or Soviet atomicatak. E.

If <u>U.S.</u> place <u>ne</u> ultimately into the position of having to defend the whole

Kissinger - 34.

this point, or that the most effective method is a ban on nuclear
testing. To be sure, the more nuclear Powers exist the more diffi-
cult it will be to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons. But we must
weigh this risk against the danger of collaborating with the Soviet Union in the neutralization of Europe, which
would leave us without powerful allies. Ance Bilateral negotiations with
the Soviet Union to the exclusion of our European allies are fraught
with grave danger. It would be much better to deal with the problem of
the diffusion of nuclear weapons directly rather than through the in-
direct method of a test ban, and to include our NATO allies as nu-
clear Powers in any agreement, preferably through a European Atomic
Community.

34b

[Y]

The difficulty with a total ban on nuclear testing is that it stakes too much on a measure which in itself is of problematical significance. It will build up world-wide reluctance to resort to nuclear weapons, the only means of defense now existing against Soviet aggression or Soviet military pressure. It will impede if not prevent the articulation of a strategy for the defense of Europe. It will increase the danger that any war that does break out will take the most catastrophic form. By freezing weapons development after only the most fearful applications of nuclear power have been fully explored, it will increase the possibilities for Soviet atomic blackmail without reducing the free world's peril. As a first step it goes too far and in a too uncertain direction.

direction.

As a first step it goes too far and in a too uncertain
world's peril. The possibilities for Soviet atomic弹mail without reducing the tree
bifications of unclear power have been fully explored, it will increase
form. By freezing weapons development after only the most careful ab-
the danger that any war that does break out will take the most catastrophic
the articulation of a strategy for the defense of Europe. It will increase
aggression or Soviet military pressure. It will impede it not prevent
unclear weapons, the only means of defense now existing against Soviet
affirmative. It will build up world-wide reluctance to react to
it takes too much on a measure which in itself is of problematical

34p

[Y]

[Y]

Kissinger - 35.

VII

One of the difficulties the free world has had in dealing with the Soviet bloc is that we have been clearer about the things we oppose than those we stand for. This has given much of our negotiations with the Soviet Union the quality of a stubborn rear-guard action designed primarily to thwart Soviet overtures. It has enabled the Soviet leadership to define the issues in international debate, putting us in the position of respondent rather than initiator. World-wide pressures are built up against us before we have a chance to demonstrate our own purposes and values.

We have to understand the perils in a total ban on nuclear testing; but equally we must take account of the real and deep concern about its uncertain hazards. If the dangers inherent in a complete test ban are great, it is incumbent on the United States to develop an alternative program which represents at least a beginning of an answer to the fears and hopes of so much

test a beginning of an answer to the question of so much
states to develop an alternative program which represents at
in a complete test pan are great, it is incumbent on the United
concern about its unnecessary hazards. If the dangers inherent
in testing, put equally we must take account of the real and deep

We have to understand the perils in a total pan on nuclear
demonstrate our own purposes and values.

pressures are built up against us before we have a chance to
position of respondent rather than initiator. World-wide
determine the issues in international debate, putting us in the
Soviet overtures. It has enabled the Soviet leadership to
of a stubborn rear-guard action designed primarily to thwart
much of our negotiations with the Soviet Union the quality
things we oppose than those we stand for. This has been given
with the Soviet bloc is that we have been clearer about the
One of the difficulties the free world has had in dealing

AII

Kissinger - 33.

[Y]

Kissinger - 36.

of mankind.

The United States might well propose that, while nuclear weapons are essential to the defense of the free world, we are prepared to make an agreement to mitigate their effects either from testing or from their use. Specifically we should offer to address ourselves immediately to the problem of fall-out, perhaps with special reference to the recent United Nations report. We should invite the Soviet Union to join a U.N. committee which would immediately set a maximum dosage of permissible fall-out from testing well below the level brought about by recent tests.

The U.N. committee should then assign a quota to the United States and its allies and another to the Soviet bloc on a 50-50 basis. (Since most of the potential "fourth" Powers are in the West, this would be a considerable concession to the U.S.S.R.) For two years all Powers would agree to register with the U.N. all tests which involve fall-out and both sides would agree not to exceed their quota. After two years the

would agree not to exceed their ducts. After two years the
with the U.N. all tests which involve fall-out and both sides
U.S.2.R.) For two years all Powers would agree to register
in the West, this would be a considerable concession to the
50-50 para. (Since most of the potential "fourth" Powers are
states and its allies and another to the Soviet bloc on a

The U.N. committee should then assign a duct to the United
from testing well below the level brought about by recent tests.
would immediately set a maximum dosage of permissible fall-out
should invite the Soviet Union to join a U.N. committee which
with special reference to the recent United Nations report. We
advise ourselves immediately to the problem of fall-out, perhaps
from testing or from their use. Specifically we should offer to
be prepared to make an agreement to mitigate their effects either
weapons are essential to the defense of the free world, we are
The United States might well propose that, while unclear
of meaning.

Kissinger - 30.

[Y]

Kissinger - 37.

quota would be substantially reduced, if necessary to zero.
Nations would remain free to conduct surface tests of "clean"
weapons, underground tests and tests in outer space, so long as
they did not cause fall-out. Technical experts from both sides
would agree on an adequate inspection mechanism, which could be
relatively simple.

Such an agreement while it would impede the arms race
would not stop weapons development altogether. It would
permit the continued elaboration of weapons which can be ap-
plied with discrimination, both in terms of fall-out and in
terms of yield. Indeed it will put a premium on such a
development because these weapons can be tested most easily
underground or within established "fall-out" quotas. It will
avoid placing the United States in the position of not trusting
its allies with the development of weapons which are essential
to their defense and which their opponent already possesses in
quantity. At the same time, it will impede the too rapid

At the same time, it will impede the too rapid
dquantity.

Its allies with the development of weapons which are essential
avoid placing the United States in the position of not trusting
underground or within established "fall-out"zones. It will
development because these weapons can be tested most easily
terms of yield. Indeed it will, but a premium on such a
bribed with discrimination, both in terms of fall-out and in
permit the continued elaboration of weapons which can be ab-
would not stop weapons development altogether. It would
such an agreement while it would impede the same race
relatively simple.

would agree on an adequate inspection mechanism, which could be
they did not cause fall-out. Technical experts from both sides
weapone, underground tests and tests in outer space, so long as
Nations would remain free to conduct surface tests of "clean"
dunits would be absolutely reduced, it necessarily to zero.

Kissinger - 37.

[Y]

Kissinger - 38.

diffusion of nuclear technology and thereby afford time for a careful study of this problem. The easiest weapons to develop are those with major fall-out effects. The least complicated method of testing is above ground. Thus such a proposal would channel future weapons development into the least destructive channels. It would reduce and ultimately eliminate whatever health hazard there may be in present testing.

Such a proposal would counteract the Soviet effort to elaborate a distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers or zones or warfare, a distinction which can only paralyze the free world. At the same time, it would call attention to a distinction between forms of warfare which are unnecessarily destructive and those which seek to confine devastation to the smallest possible proportions - a condition which is essential to make our deterrent posture plausible and to strengthen the will of the free world. If the Soviet Union rejected our /we proposal, and our allies should impose a quota on ourselves

broadsail, and our allies should impose a禁錮 on ourselves
will of the free world. If the Soviet Union rejected our
to make our deterrent posture plausible and to strengthen the
smallest possible proportions - a condition which is essential
destructive and those which seek to continue devastation to the
distinction between forms of warfare which are necessarily
free world. At the same time, it would call attention to a
or zones or warfare, a distinction which can only paralyze the
elaborate a distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear powers
such a proposal would counteract the Soviet effort to
health hazard there may be in present testing.

It would reduce and ultimately eliminate whatever
channels. The least destructive
channel future weapons development into the least destructive
method of testing is above ground. Thus such a proposal would
are those with major fail-out effects. The least complicated
careful study of this problem. The easiest weapons to develop
diffusion of nuclear technology and thereby afford time for a
Klaasiger - 38.

CYJ

Kissinger - 39.

In this manner, increasing pressure of world opinion could be built up against the most catastrophic use of nuclear weapons. While the Soviet leaders are less sensitive to this kind of pressure than those of the free world, they would nevertheless have a strong incentive to following suit.

This approach to the problem of nuclear testing would have the additional advantage that it would be much easier to inspect and therefore more difficult to violate. The inspection could concentrate on one problem reasonably well understood: that of fall-out. If no radioactivity were found, no violation was taking place. And there would be little inducement to disregard the agreement, for the advantages to be gained by violating it would be slight. Even more important, the consequences of a violation would be far less serious for those who had adhered to the agreement.

the consequences of a violation would be far less serious for
satisfied by violating it would be slight. Even more important,
decision to disregard the agreement, for the advantages to be
no violation was taking place. And there would be little in-
understood: that of fall-out. If no radioactivity were found,
inspection could concentrate on one problem reasonably well
to inspect and therefore more difficult to violate. The
have the additional advantage that it would be much easier
This approach to the problem of nuclear testing would
have a strong incentive to following suit.

pressure than those of the free world, they would nevertheless
While the Soviet leaders are less sensitive to this kind of
built up against the most catastrophic use of nuclear weapons.
In this manner, increasing pressure of world opinion could be

Kissinger - 39.

[Y]

Kissinger - 40.

A restriction of nuclear testing as outlined here would meet many of the fears of humanity without exposing the free world to incalculable peril. It would be a "first step" which avoids most of the dangers of a complete ban and yet achieves many of its goals. If the limitation of nuclear tests proved workable, the inspection system could be expanded, a start might follow, could be made in the reduction of arms, efforts could be made to reduce the danger of surprise attack. None of these measures is possible, however, as long as the Soviet Union is encouraged to believe, by the irresolution and evasions of the free world, that through skilful and persistent diplomacy it can break up the cohesiveness of the Western Alliance and undermine the will to resist aggression with the only effective weapon now at our disposal.

at our disposal.

will to resist aggression with the only effective weapon now
the cohesiveness of the Western Alliance and undermine the
that through skillful and bereavement diplomacy it can break up
to believe, by the irrefutation and evasions of the free world,
is possible, however, as found as the Soviet Union is encouraged
to reduce the danger of surprise attack. None of these measures
should be made in the reduction of arms, efforts could be made
which would be expended, a start
workable, the inspection system could be expanded, a start
many of its duties. If the limitation of nuclear tests proved
avoids most of the dangers of a complete pan and yet achieves
world to incalculable benefit. It would be a "first step" which
meet many of the fears of humanity without exposing the tree

A restriction of nuclear testing as outlined here would
not be possible at this time. It would be a "first step" which
would be made in the reduction of arms, efforts should be made
which would be expended, a start
workable, the inspection system could be expanded, a start
many of its duties. If the limitation of nuclear tests proved
avoid most of the dangers of a complete pan and yet achieves
world to incalculable benefit. It would be a "first step" which
meet many of the fears of humanity without exposing the tree
A restriction of nuclear testing as outlined here would

Kissinger - 41

VIII

It is widely believed in the West that the issue of nuclear testing is a touchstone of our sincerity. Many argue that the Soviet Union has scored a major gain by renouncing nuclear tests and that we exhibit lack of imagination and the absence of a moral dimension by not following suit. The reluctance to end nuclear testing, so the argument goes, is a symptom of the sterility and overconcern with military problems which has been at the root of so many of our difficulties.

There is no doubt that the Western world is in deep trouble. It has not been able to articulate either a philosophy or a program adequate to the challenge of the times. It has failed to identify itself with the revolutionary period through which we are living and it has not had the vision or the willingness to carry through a sustained program of world economic development. Because we have not been clear about our purpose with respect to the rest of the

Kissinger - 42.

world, we have often found it easier to concentrate on defensive measures than on those which might give a sense of direction to a world in turmoil.

But even in the military field our effort has lacked conception and has by no means been excessive. Even here we are inadequately prepared to deal with most issues with which we are likely to be confronted. We have insufficient strength for limited war. We are falling behind in the over-all strategic equation. The answer to our political dilemma is not to be found in reducing our defenses - for even here more effort and imagination is required - but in injecting a greater sense of purpose into our over-all performance.

No more important task confronts the free world than to develop a positive program for the construction of a new international order. Yet we will not be able to do so unless we define our alternatives correctly. However, is that contemporary problems involve a combination of all these factors. Our choice is not between working for the things in which we believe or attending to our necessities. If we cannot

Kissinger - 42.

As a nation of specialists we like to believe that a problem is either political or economic or military. The challenge to us, however, is that contemporary problems involve a combination of all these factors. Our choice is not between working for the things in which we believe or attending to our necessities. If we cannot