["JAN-S. 8/1988-1989, 'Herold Schmijan', bb. 100-108;\nReception from \"The Western Summit,\" (1980) Pointing", "D. 19-20; Western Plan - 1929", "Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1963,", "Document on International Affairs: 1929, for\n1930-1948; Western Peace Plan", "Tentative for Royal Institute of International Affairs,", "Document on International Affairs: 1930, for\nDiplomacy; Documents on International Affairs:", "Diplomacy: Planning", "\"De Canille Balka at 'Flexibility' on Berlin,\"", "18 (De Canille)", "Committee of International Affairs,", "Document on International Affairs: 1961", "12. 1961. 45-48 (De Canille)\nRoyal Institute of International Affairs, 1960\nen, 1961, International Affairs: 1960", "Selection from De Canille, Brian Crozier", "1982-1983 (German 2BD)", "Dozentent an der Universität, bb. 198-194;", "Deutscher Kongreß, \"Von Marion Graff zu Donhoff", "A. K. K. K. K. K. K. K. K. K. K. K. K. K

Hyland Research:
The Berlin Crisis: 1958-1961

April 28, 1992

page 2

## Book II:

### Black tab letters:

A. "Khrushchev's Shell Game," Richard Lowenthal

B. "Des Alten Stunde," Von Marion Grafin Donhoff

C. *Documentation zur Deutschlandfrage*, pp. 169-174;
135-136 (German SPD)

D. Selection from *De Gaulle*, Brian Crozier

E. *Documents on International Affairs: 1960*
for Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1964, pp. 42-46 (De Gaulle)

F. *Documents on International Affairs: 1961*
for Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1965, pp. 110-118 (De Gaulle)

### Red tab letters:

A. "De Gaulle Balks at 'Flexibility' on Berlin,"
press clipping

B. Diplomacy; *Documents on International Affairs:*
*1959* for Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1963, pp. 14-16; 34-59; *Western Peace Plan*

C. *Documents on International Affairs: 1959*, for
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1963,
pp. 34-58; Western Plan - 1959

D. Selection from "The Western Summit," (1960) *Pointing*
*The Way: 1959-1961*, Harold MacMillan, pp. 100-108;
178-216

SOME PUBLICATIONS OF THE
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (quarterly), edited by Hamilton Fish Armstrong.

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS (annual). Volumes for 1931, 1932, and 1933, by Walter Lippmann and William O. Scroggs; for 1934-1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939 and 1940, by Whitney H. Shepardson and William O. Scroggs; for 1945-1947, 1947-1948 and 1948-1949, by John C. Campbell; for 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953 and 1954, by Richard P. Stebbins; for 1955, by Hollis W. Barber; for 1956, 1957 and 1958, by Richard P. Stebbins.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (annual). Volume for 1952 edited by Clarence W. Baier and Richard P. Stebbins; for 1953 and 1954, edited by Peter V. Curl; for 1955, 1956 and 1957, edited by Paul E. Zinner.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD (annual), edited by Walter H. Mallory.

THE SCHUMAN PLAN: A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1950-1958, by William Diebold, Jr.

SOVIET ECONOMIC AID: The New Aid and Trade Policy in Underdeveloped Countries, by Joseph Berliner.

RAW MATERIALS: A Study of American Policy, by Percy W. Bidwell.

FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEXT PHASE, by Thomas K. Finletter.

NATO AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, by Ben T. Moore.

AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, by William A. Hance.

DEFENSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST: Problems of American Policy, by John C. Campbell.

INDIA AND AMERICA: A Study of Their Relations, by Phillips Talbot and S. L. Poplai.

JAPAN BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, by Hugh Borton, Jerome B. Cohen, William J. Jorden, Donald Keene, Paul F. Langer and C. Martin Wilbur.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY, by Henry A. Kissinger.

MOSCOW-PEKING AXIS: Strengths and Strains, by Howard L. Boorman, Alexander Eckstein, Philip E. Mosely and Benjamin Schwartz.

CLIMATE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE TROPICS, by Douglas H. K. Lee.

WHAT THE TARIFF MEANS TO AMERICAN INDUSTRIES, by Percy W. Bidwell.

UNITED STATES SHIPPING POLICY, by Wytze Gorter.

RUSSIA AND AMERICA: Dangers and Prospects, by Henry L. Roberts.

STERLING: Its Meaning in World Finance, by Judd Polk.

KOREA: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations, by Leland M. Goodrich.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1942-1952, by Henry L. Roberts.

AMERICAN AGENCIES INTERESTED IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, compiled by Ruth Savord and Donald Wasson.

JAPANESE AND AMERICANS: A Century of Cultural Relations, by Robert S. Schwantes.

THE FUTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES: Political Implications of Economic Development, by Eugene Staley.

THE UNDECLARED WAR, 1940-1941, by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason.

THE CHALLENGE TO ISOLATION, 1937-1940, by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason.

MIDDLE EAST DILEMMAS: The Background of United States Policy, by J. C. Hurewitz.

BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES: Problems in Cooperation, a joint report prepared by Henry L. Roberts and Paul A. Wilson.

TRADE AND PAYMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE: A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1947-1951, by William Diebold, Jr.

SURVEY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (in four volumes, 1928-1931), prepared under the direction of Charles P. Howland.

pp. 220-238.

1958

EDITED BY
PAUL E. ZINNER

Published for the
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
by
HARPER & BROTHERS

NEW YORK
1959

Soviet Note/Dipl. Exchanges

220 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

claims that those who create that shield are proved by that
fact to be evil militarists. It claims that those who draw to-
gether to get protection from that shield are "aggressive
groupings." It claims that those who seek only defense should
prove it by renouncing all but inferior weapons, leaving
modern weapons to be a monopoly of those who have a
tragically long record of expansion by the use of violence.

It claims that certain of our aerial defense precautions are
dangerous and frightening. But when we try to make it
possible to revise them on the basis of reciprocal international
inspection that will give a large measure of assurance against
surprise attack, the Soviets say "nyet." They did so again at
the United Nations Security Council last week.

The Soviet Union professes not to want to use nuclear
weapons but insists upon continuing at a feverish pace to
multiply such weapons in its own arsenals. It calls the free
world to rely upon Soviet promises not to use its nuclear
weapons in the event of war despite the long record of
broken promises to which I have alluded.

This Communist propaganda line is designed to produce
a world dominated by the military power of the Sino-Soviet
bloc. Freedom would have no adequate defense. There is a
duty to look behind words that sound alluring and to see and
reject the underlying plot against freedom.

I hope that the lessons of Berlin—the lesson taught by its
surroundings, the lesson taught by its faith, and the lesson
taught by the cooperative action of the free—will be ap-
plied to the larger context of world affairs.

(56) *Soviet Note, November 27, 1958.*

*(Excerpts)*

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics addresses the Government of the United States of America
as one of the signatory powers of Potsdam Agreement on the
urgent question of the status of Berlin.

The problem of Berlin, which is situated in the center
of the German Democratic Republic but the western part
of which is cut off from the GDR as a result of foreign occupa-
tion, deeply affects not only the national interests of the

*Department of State Bulletin, v. 40 (January 19, 1958), pp. 181-189.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS: EUROPEAN SECURITY, GERMANY 221

German people but also the interests of all nations desirous
of establishing lasting peace in Europe. Here in the historic
capital of Germany two worlds are in direct contact and at
every turn there tower the barricades of the "cold war." A
situation of constant friction and tension has prevailed for
many years in this city, which is divided into two parts. Ber-
lin, which witnessed the greatest triumph of the joint strug-
gle of our countries against Fascist aggression, has now be-
come a dangerous center of contradiction between the Great
Powers, allies in the last war. Its role in the relations between
the Powers may be compared to a smoldering fuse that has
been connected to a powder keg. Incidents arising here, even
if they seem to be of local significance, may, in an atmosphere
of heated passions, suspicion, and mutual apprehensions,
cause a conflagration which will be difficult to extinguish.
This is the sad pass to which has come, after the 13 postwar
years, the once joint and concerted policy of the Four Powers
—the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France—with re-
gard to Germany.

When the peoples were celebrating victory over Hitlerite
Germany a conference of the heads of government of the
Soviet Union, the USA and Great Britain was held in Pots-
dam in order to work out a joint policy with respect to post-
war Germany. The Potsdam Agreement, to which France
accessed soon after it was signed, generalized the historical
experience of the struggle waged by the peoples to prevent
aggression by German militarism.

The Potsdam Agreement contained important provisions
whereby Germany was to be regarded as a single economic
entity, even during the occupation period. The agreement
also provided for the creation of central German administra-
tive departments. The Council of Foreign Ministers, estab-
lished by a decision of the Potsdam Conference, was in-
structed to prepare a peace settlement for Germany.

The implementation of all these measures should have en-
abled the German people to effect a fundamental reconstruc-
tion of their life and to ensure the creation of a united, peace-
loving, democratic German state.

222 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

The policy of the USA, Britain, and France with respect to West Germany has led to the violation of those provisions of the Potsdam Agreement designed to ensure the unity of Germany as a peace-loving and democratic state. And when a separate state, the Federal Republic of Germany, was set up independently [of the Soviet Union] in West Germany, which was occupied by the troops of the Three Powers, East Germany, where forces determined not to allow the German people to be plunged once again into disaster assumed the leadership, had no alternative but to create in its turn an independent state.

Thus, two states came into being in Germany. Whereas in West Germany, whose development was directed by the United States, Britain, and France, a government took office the representatives of which do not conceal their hatred for the Soviet Union and often openly advertise the similarity of their aspirations to the plans of the Hitlerite aggressors, in East Germany a government was formed which has irrevocably broken with Germany's aggressive past. State and public affairs in the German Democratic Republic are governed by a constitution fully in keeping with the principles of the Potsdam Agreement and the finest progressive traditions of the German nation. The rule of monopolies and Junkers has been abolished forever in the GDR. Nazism has been eradicated and a number of other social and economic reforms have been carried out, which have destroyed the basis for the revival of militarism and have made the German Democratic Republic an important factor of peace in Europe. The Government of the GDR has solemnly proclaimed that it will fulfill, to the letter, its commitments under the Potsdam Agreement, which, incidentally, the Government of the FRG obstinately evades.

The inclusion of the FRG in the North Atlantic bloc com-
pelled the Soviet Union to adopt countermeasures, in as much
as the commitments binding the Soviet Union, the United
States, Great Britain, and France were broken by the Three
Western Powers, which united with West Germany, and
previously with Italy, against the Soviet Union, which had
borne the brunt of the struggle against the Fascist aggressors.
That closed military alignment created an equal threat to
other countries as well. Such a situation compelled the Soviet
Union, as well as a number of other European countries that
were victims of aggression by German and Italian Fascism,
to establish their own defensive organization, concluding for

EAST-WEST RELATIONS: EUROPEAN SECURITY, GERMANY 223

this purpose the Warsaw Treaty, to which the GDR also ac-
ceded.

There is only one conclusion to be drawn from the fore-
going: The Potsdam Agreement has been grossly violated by
the Western Powers.

Actually, of all the Allied agreements on Germany, only
one is being carried out today. It is the agreement on the
so-called quadripartite status of Berlin. On the basis of that
status, the Three Western Powers are ruling the roost in
West Berlin, turning it into a kind of state within a state
and using it as a center from which to pursue subversive
activity against the GDR, the Soviet Union, and the other
parties to the Warsaw Treaty. The United States, Great
Britain, and France are freely communicating with West
Berlin through lines of communication passing through the
territory and the airspace of the German Democratic Repub-
lic, which they do not even want to recognize.

The governments of the Three Powers are seeking to keep
in force the long-since obsolete part of the wartime agree-
ments that governed the occupation of Germany and en-
titled them in the past to stay in Berlin.

If the USA, Great Britain, and France are indeed staying
in Berlin by virtue of the right stemming from the afore-
mentioned international agreements and, primarily, from the
Potsdam Agreement, this implies their duty to abide by these
agreements. Those who have grossly violated these agreements
have lost the right to maintain their occupation regime in
Berlin or any other part of Germany. Furthermore, is it possi-
ble to insist on the occupation regime being maintained in
Germany or in any part thereof for more than 13 years after
the end of the war? For, any occupation is an event of limited
duration, which is expressly stipulated in the Four-Power
agreements on Germany.

It is well known that the conventional way to put an end
to occupation is for the parties that were at war to conclude a
peace treaty offering the defeated country the conditions
necessary for the re-establishment of normal life.

The fact that Germany still has no peace treaty is the fault
primarily of the governments of the USA, Britain, and
France, which have never seemed to be in sympathy with

224 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

the idea of drafting such a treaty. It is known that the gov-
ernments of the Three Powers reacted negatively to every
approach the Soviet Government has made to them regarding
the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany.

At present, the USA, Great Britain, and France are op-
posed, as follows from their notes of September 30 of this
year, to the latest proposals for a peaceful settlement with
Germany put forward by the Soviet Union and the GDR,
while making no proposals of their own on this question,
just as they have made none throughout the postwar period.
As a matter of fact, the last note of the US Government is a
restatement of the position that proved to be utterly un-
realistic, whereby Germany's national unity is to be re-
established by the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, and
France rather than by the German states that are to unite.
It also follows from the US Government's note that it is
once again avoiding negotiations with the Soviet Union and
the other interested states for the purpose of preparing a
peace treaty with Germany. The result is a veritable vicious
circle: The US Government is objecting to the drafting of
a German peace treaty by referring to the absence of a united
German state while at the same time hampering the reunifi-
cation of Germany by rejecting the only real possibility of
solving this problem through agreement between the two
German states.

Is it not because the Western Powers would like to pro-
long indefinitely their privileges in West Germany and the
occupation regime in West Berlin that they take this position
on the question of drafting a peace treaty? It is becoming
increasingly clear that such is the actual state of affairs.

The Soviet Government reaffirms its readiness to partici-
pate at any time in negotiations to draft a peace treaty with
Germany. However, the absence of a peace treaty can by no
means be an excuse now for attempting to maintain the oc-
cupation regime anywhere in Germany.

The Four-Power status of Berlin came into being because
Berlin, as the capital of Germany, was designated as the seat
of the Control Council established for Germany's administra-
tion during the initial period of occupation. This status has
been scrupulously observed by the Soviet Union up to the
present time, although the Control Council ceased to exist as
early as ten years ago and there have been two capitals in

EAST-WEST RELATIONS: EUROPEAN SECURITY, GERMANY 225

Germany for a long time. As for the USA, Great Britain, and
France, they have chosen to abuse in a flagrant manner their
occupation rights in Berlin and have exploited the Four-
Power status of the city for their own purposes to the detri-
ment of the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic,
and the other Socialist countries.

An obviously absurd situation has thus arisen, in which the
Soviet Union seems to be supporting and maintaining favor-
able conditions for the Western Powers in their activities
against the Soviet Union and its Allies under the Warsaw
Treaty.

It is obvious that the Soviet Union, just as the other parties
to the Warsaw Treaty, cannot tolerate such a situation any
longer. For the occupation regime in West Berlin to con-
tinue would be tantamount to recognizing something like
a privileged position of the NATO countries, for which
there is, of course, no reason whatsoever.

In this connection, the Government of the USSR hereby
notifies the United States Government that the Soviet Union
regards as null and void the "Protocol" of the Agreement
between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United States of America, and the United
Kingdom on the zones of occupation in Germany and on the
administration of Greater Berlin," of September 12, 1944,
and the related supplementary agreements, including the
agreement on the control machinery in Germany, concluded
between the governments of the USSR, the USA, Great
Britain, and France on May 1, 1945, i.e., the agreements that
were intended to be in effect during the first years after the
capitulation of Germany.

It is easy to see that all the Soviet Government is doing by
making this statement is to recognize the actual state of
affairs, which consists in the fact that the USA, Great Britain,
and France have long since rejected the essentials of the
treaties and agreements concluded during the war against
Hitler Germany and after its defeat. The Soviet Govern-
ment is doing no more than drawing conclusions that inevi-
tably ensue for the Soviet Union from this actual state of
affairs.

Pursuant to the foregoing and proceeding from the prin-

226 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

ciple of respect for the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Government will enter into negotiations with the Government of the GDR at an appropriate time with a view to transferring to the German Democratic Republic the functions temporarily performed by the Soviet authorities by virtue of the above-mentioned Allied agreements and under the agreement between the USSR and the GDR of September 20, 1955.¹⁰ The best way to solve the Berlin problem would undoubtedly be to adopt a decision based on the enforcement of the Potsdam Agreement on Germany. But this is possible only in the event that the three Western Powers return to a policy in German affairs that would be pursued jointly with the USSR and in conformity with the spirit and principles of the Potsdam Agreement. In the present circumstances this would mean the withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Germany from NATO with the simultaneous withdrawal of the German Democratic Republic from the Warsaw Treaty [organization], and an agreement whereby, in accordance with the principles of the Potsdam Agreement, neither of the two German states would have any armed forces except those needed to maintain law and order at home and guard the frontiers.

An independent solution to the Berlin problem must be found in the very near future since the Western Powers refuse to take part in the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany and the Government of the FRG, supported by the same powers, is pursuing a policy hampering the unification of Germany. It is necessary to prevent West Berlin from being used any longer as a springboard for intensive espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities against Socialist countries, the GDR, and the USSR or, to quote the leaders of the United States Government, to prevent its being used for "indirect aggression" against the countries of the Socialist camp.

Of course, the most correct and natural way to solve the problem would be for the western part of Berlin, now actually detached from the GDR, to be reunited with its eastern part and for Berlin to become a unified city within the state in whose territory it is situated.

¹⁰ Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955, pp. 108-111.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS: EUROPEAN SECURITY, GERMANY 227

However, the Soviet Government, taking into account the present unrealistic policy of the USA as well as of Great Britain and France with respect to the German Democratic Republic, cannot but foresee the difficulties the Western powers have in contributing to such a solution of the Berlin problem. At the same time, it is guided by the concern that the process of liquidating the occupation regime may not involve any painful break in the established way of life of the West Berlin population.

One cannot of course fail to take into account the fact that the political and economic development of West Berlin during the period of its occupation by the three Western powers has progressed in a different direction from the development of East Berlin and the GDR, as a result of which the way of life in the two parts of Berlin are at the present time entirely different. The Soviet Government considers that when the foreign occupation is ended the population of West Berlin must be granted the right to have whatever way of life it wishes for itself. If the inhabitants of West Berlin desire to preserve the present way of life, based on private capitalistic ownership that is up to them. The USSR, for its part, would respect any choice of the West Berliners in this matter.

In view of all these considerations, the Soviet Government on its part would consider it possible to solve the West Berlin question at the present time by the conversion of West Berlin into an independent political unit—a free city, without any state, including both existing German states, interfering in its life. Specifically, it might be possible to agree that the territory of the free city be demilitarized and that no armed forces be contained therein. The free city, West Berlin, could have its own government and run its own economic, administrative, and other affairs.

The Four Powers which shared in the administration of Berlin after the war could, as well as both of the German states, undertake to respect the status of West Berlin as a free city, just as was done, for instance, by the Four Powers with respect to the neutral status which was adopted by the Austrian Republic.

For its part, the Soviet Government would have no objection to the United Nations also sharing, in one way or other, in observing the free-city status of West Berlin.

It is obvious that, considering the specific position of West Berlin, which lies within the territory of the GDR and is

228 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

cut off from the outside world, the question would arise of some kind of arrangement with the German Democratic Republic concerning guarantees of unhindered communications between the free city and the outside world—both to the East and to the West—with the object of free movement of passenger and freight traffic. In its turn West Berlin would undertake not to permit on its territory any hostile subversive activity directed against the GDR or any other state.

The above-mentioned solution of the problem of West Berlin's status would be an important step toward normalizing the situation in Berlin, which, instead of being a hotbed of unrest and tension, could become a center for contacts and cooperation between both parts of Germany in the interest of her peaceful future and the unity of the German nation.

The establishment of a free-city status for West Berlin would firmly ensure the development of West Berlin's economy, due to its contacts on all sides with the states of the East and the West, and would ensure a decent standard of living for the city's population. For its part, the Soviet Union states that it would contribute in every way toward the achievement of these ends, in particular by placing orders for industrial goods and amounts that would fully ensure the stability and prosperity of the free city's economy, and by regular deliveries on a commercial basis of the necessary quantities of raw materials and food stuffs to West Berlin. Thus, by the liquidation of the occupation regime, not only would the more than two million people of West Berlin not be harmed but on the contrary they would have every opportunity to raise their living standard.

In case the Government of the USA and the governments of Great Britain and France express their agreement to consider the question of liquidating the present occupation regime in West Berlin by setting up a free city within its territory, the Soviet government would be willing on behalf of the Four Powers to enter into official contact on this matter with the government of the German Democratic Republic, with which it has already had preliminary consultations prior to the sending of the present note.

Naturally, it would also be realized that the GDR's agreement to set up on its territory such an independent political organism as a free city of West Berlin would be a concession, a definite sacrifice on the part of the GDR for the sake of strengthening peace in Europe, and for the sake of the national interest of the German people as a whole.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS: EUROPEAN SECURITY, GERMANY 229

The Soviet Government, guided by a desire to normalize the situation in Berlin in the interest of European peace and in the interest of a peaceful and independent development of Germany, has resolved to effect measures on its part designed to liquidate the occupation regime in Berlin. It hopes that the Government of the USA will show a proper understanding of these motives and make a realistic approach to the Berlin question.

At the same time, the Soviet Government is prepared to enter into negotiations with the governments of the United States of America and with those of the other states concerned on granting West Berlin the status of a demilitarized free city. In case this proposal is not acceptable to the government of the USA then there will no longer remain any topic for negotiations between the former occupying powers on the Berlin question.

The Soviet Government seeks to have the necessary change in Berlin's situation take place in a cold atmosphere, without haste and unnecessary friction, with maximum possible consideration for the interests of the parties concerned. Obviously, a certain period of time will be necessary for the powers which occupied Germany after the defeat of Hitler's Wehrmacht to agree on proclaiming West Berlin a free city provided, naturally, that the Western powers display due interest in this proposal.

It should also be taken into consideration that the necessity may arise for talks between the municipal authorities of both parts of Berlin and also between the GDR and the FRG to settle any questions that may arise. In view of this, the Soviet Government proposes to make no changes in the present procedure for military traffic of the USA, Great Britain, and France from West Berlin to the FRG for half a year. It regards such a period as fully sufficient to provide a sound basis for the solution of the questions connected with the change in Berlin's situation and to prevent a possibility of any complications, provided, naturally, that the governments of the Western powers do not deliberately seek such complications. During the above-mentioned period the parties will have an opportunity to prove in practice their desire to ease international tension by settling the Berlin question.

If the above-mentioned period is not utilized to reach an adequate agreement, the Soviet Union will then carry out the planned measures through an agreement with the GDR. It is envisaged that the German Democratic Republic, like any

230 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

other independent state, must fully deal with questions concerning its space, i.e., exercise its sovereignty on land, on water, and in the air. At the same time, there will terminate all contacts still maintained between representatives of the armed forces and other officials of the Soviet Union in Germany and corresponding representatives of the armed forces and other officials of the USA, Great Britain, and France on questions pertaining to Berlin.

Voices are raised in the capitals of some Western powers that those powers do not recognize the Soviet Union's decision to relinquish its part in the maintenance of the occupation status in Berlin. But how can one place the question on such a level? He who today speaks of nonrecognition of the steps planned by the Soviet Union obviously would like to talk with the latter not in the language of reason and well-founded arguments but in the language of brute force, forgetting that the Soviet people are not affected by threats and intimidation. If behind the words about "nonrecognition" there really lies the intention to resort to force and drag the world into a war over Berlin, the advocates of such a policy should realize that they assume a very grave responsibility for all its consequences before all nations and before history. Those who indulge in sabre-rattling in connection with the situation in Berlin are once again betraying their interests in preserving for aggressive purposes the occupation regime in Berlin.

The Government of the Soviet Union would like to hope that the problem of normalizing the situation in Berlin, which life itself raises before our states as a natural necessity, will in any case be solved in accordance with considerations of statesmanship, the interests of peace between peoples, without the unnecessary nervous strain and intensification of a "cold war."

Methods of blackmail and reckless threats of force will be least of all appropriate in solving such a problem as the Berlin question. Such methods will not help solve a single question, but can only bring the situation to the danger point. But only madmen can go to the length of unleashing another world war over the preservation of privileges of occupiers in West Berlin. If such madmen should really appear, there is no doubt that strait jackets could be found for them. If the statesmen responsible for the policy of the Western powers are guided by feelings of hatred for communism and the socialist countries in their approach to the

EAST-WEST RELATIONS: EUROPEAN SECURITY, GERMANY 231

Berlin question as well as other international problems, no good will come out of it. Neither the Soviet Union nor any other small socialist state can or will deny its existence precisely as a socialist state. That is why, having united in an unbreakable fraternal alliance, they firmly stand in defense of their rights and their state frontiers, acting according to the motto—one for all and all for one. Any violation of the frontiers of the German Democratic Republic, Poland, or Czechoslovakia, any aggressive action against any member state of the Warsaw Treaty will be regarded by all its participants as an act of aggression against them all and will immediately cause appropriate retaliation.

The Soviet Government believes that it would be sensible to recognize the situation prevailing in the world and to create normal relations for the co-existence of all states, to develop international trade, to build relations between our countries on the basis of the well-known principles of mutual respect for one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, non-interference in one another's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit.

The Soviet Union and its people and government are sincerely striving for the restoration of good relations with the United States of America, relations based on trust, which are quite feasible as shown by the experience in the joint struggle against the Hitlerite aggressors, and which in peacetime would hold out to our countries nothing but the advantages of mutually enriched spiritual and material cooperation between our peoples, and to all other people the blessings of a tranquil life under conditions of an enduring peace.

Moscow, November 27, 1958

(57) United States Statement, November 27, 1958.¹¹

The Soviet Government has today handed the United States Ambassador in Moscow a communication relating to Berlin. Apparently similar notes have been received by the Ambassadors of France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The communication is a very long one and will of course receive careful study.

The Soviets seem to be proposing that, while they keep their grip on East Berlin, the three Western allies abandon their rights in West Berlin and retire in favor of what is

¹¹ Department of State Bulletin, v. 39 (December 15, 1958), p. 948.

232 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

called a "free city." Their "free city" proposal is limited to West Berlin. The Soviet Government indicates that, unless the three Western allies accept this Soviet proposal within 6 months, the Soviet Union will consider itself free of its obligations to them in relation to Berlin.

It is clear that a number of fundamental considerations are raised which will have to be kept in mind while we study the Soviet note.

One of these is that the United States, along with Britain and France, is solemnly committed to the security of the Western sectors of Berlin. Two and a quarter million West Berliners in reliance thereon have convincingly and courageously demonstrated the good fruits of freedom.

Another consideration is that the United States will not acquiesce in a unilateral repudiation by the Soviet Union of its obligations and responsibilities formally agreed upon with Britain, France, and the United States in relation to Berlin. Neither will it enter into any agreement with the Soviet Union which, whatever the form, would have the end result of abandoning the people of West Berlin to hostile domination.

The Western allies have for years sought to negotiate with the Soviets for the freedom of all of Germany, of which Berlin is part, on the basis of free elections by the German people themselves. Indeed, the three Western powers are still awaiting a reply to their latest proposals presented on September 30, 1958, to the Soviet Government.

The United States Government will consult with the British and French Governments as well as with the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO in regard to the new Soviet note.

(58) *Four Power Western Communiqué, December 14, 1958.*¹²

The Foreign Ministers of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States met on December 14, 1958 in Paris to discuss developments in the Berlin situation during the past month, including notes addressed to their several governments on November 27 by the Soviet Union. The four Foreign Ministers had the benefit of an oral statement on the situation in Berlin by Herr Brandt, Governing Mayor of that city.

¹² *Ibid.* (December 29, 1958), pp. 1041-1042.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS: EUROPEAN SECURITY, GERMANY 233

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States once more reaffirmed the determination of their governments to maintain their position and their rights with respect to Berlin including the right of free access.

They found unacceptable a unilateral repudiation by the Soviet Government of its obligations to the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in relation to their presence in Berlin and the freedom of access to that city or the substitution of the German authorities of the Soviet Zone for the Soviet Government insofar as those rights are concerned.

After further discussion of the Soviet notes of November 27, 1958 the four Ministers found themselves in agreement on the basic issues to be dealt with in the replies to those notes. They will consult with their allies in the NATO Council, following which the four governments will formulate their replies.

(59) *Declaration of the North Atlantic Council, December 16, 1958.*¹³

1. The North Atlantic Council examined the question of Berlin.

2. The Council declares that no state has the right to withdraw unilaterally from its international engagements. It considers that the denunciation by the Soviet Union of the interallied agreements on Berlin can in no way deprive the other parties of their rights or relieve the Soviet Union of its obligations. Such methods destroy the mutual confidence between nations which is one of the foundations of peace.

3. The Council fully associates itself with the views expressed on the subject by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany in their statement of 14th December.

4. The demands expressed by the Soviet Government have created a serious situation which must be faced with determination.

5. The Council recalls the responsibilities which each member state has assumed in regard to the security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the three powers in that city. The member states of NATO could

¹³ *Ibid.*, v. 40 (January 12, 1959), p. 4.

234 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

not approve a solution of the Berlin question which jeopardized the right of the three Western powers to remain in Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it, and did not assure freedom of communication between that city and the free world. The Soviet Union would be responsible for any action which had the effect of hampering this free communication or endangering this freedom. The two million inhabitants of West Berlin have just reaffirmed in a free vote their overwhelming approval and support for that position.

6. The Council considers that the Berlin question can only be settled in the framework of an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on Germany as a whole. It recalls that the Western powers have repeatedly declared themselves ready to examine this problem, as well as those of European security and disarma-ment. They are still ready to discuss all these problems.

(60) United States Note, December 31, 1958.¹⁴

The Government of the United States acknowledges the note which was addressed to it by the Government of the U.S.S.R. under date of November 27.

The note contains a long elaboration on the events which preceded and followed the last war. It attempts to portray the Western Powers—France, the United Kingdom and the United States—as supporters of Hitlerism as against the Soviet Union. This portrayal is in sharp contrast with the actual facts. In this connection we refer to the contemporaneous statement made by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on October 31, 1939. In that statement he refers, among other things, to the "conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23" and points out "we now had a rapproachement and the establishment of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany." The statement goes on to assail the British and French Governments for their opposition to Hitlerism in the following language: "The ruling circles of Britain and France have been lately attempting to depict themselves as champions of the democratic rights of nations against Hitlerism, and the British Government has announced that its aim in the war with Germany is nothing more nor less than the 'destruction of Hitlerism' . . . everybody will understand that an ideology cannot be destroyed by force, that it cannot be eliminated by war. It is therefore not only senseless,

¹⁴ Ibid. (January 19, 1959), pp. 79-80.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS: EUROPEAN SECURITY, GERMANY 235

but criminal to wage such a war—a war for the 'destruction of Hitlerism' camouflaged as a fight for 'democracy.'"

The situation of Berlin of which the Soviet Government complains and which it considers abnormal is a result of the very nature of the German problem such as it has existed since 1945. When the empire of Hitler collapsed the Western Allies were in military possession of more than one-third of what subsequently was occupied by the Soviet authorities.

The Soviet Union was in possession of Berlin. On the basis of the agreements of September 12, 1944 and May 1, 1945, the Western Allies withdrew, thereby permitting a Soviet occupation of large parts of Mecklenburg, Saxony, Thuringia and Anhalt, and concurrently, the three Western Powers occupied the western sectors in Berlin, then an area of ruble.

The Soviet Union has directly and through its puppet regime—the so-called German Democratic Republic—consolidated its hold over the large areas which the Western Allies relinquished to it. It now demands that the Western Allies should relinquish the positions in Berlin which in effect were the *quid pro quo*.

The three Western Powers are there as occupying powers and they are not prepared to relinquish the rights which they acquired through victory just as they assume the Soviet Union is not willing now to restore to the occupancy of the Western Powers the position which they had won in Mecklenburg, Saxony, Thuringia and Anhalt and which, under the agreements of 1944 and 1945, they turned over for occupation by the Soviet Union.

The agreements made by the Four Powers cannot be considered obsolete because the Soviet Union has already obtained the full advantage therefrom and now wishes to deprive the other parties of their compensating advantages. These agreements are binding upon all of the signatories so long as they have not been replaced by others following free negotiations.

Insofar as the Potsdam agreement is concerned, the status of Berlin does not depend upon that agreement. Moreover, it is the Soviet Union that bears responsibility for the fact that the Potsdam agreement could not be implemented.

The Soviet memorandum purports formally to repudiate the agreements of September 12, 1944 and May 1, 1945. This repudiation in fact involves other and more recent engagements. We refer in this connection to the Four Power agree-

236 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

ment of June 20, 1949 whereby, among other things, the
Soviet Union assumed "an obligation" to assure the normal
functioning of transport and communication between Berlin
and the Western Zones of Germany.¹⁵ This "obligation" the
Soviet Union now purports to shed. The United States also
refers to the "summit" agreement of July 23, 1955¹⁶ whereby
the Four Powers recognized "their common responsibility for
the settlement of the German question," a phrase which
necessarily includes the problem of Berlin. Apparently the
Soviet Union now attempts to free itself from these agreed re-
sponsibilities and obligations.

The United States Government cannot prevent the Soviet
Government from announcing the termination of its own
authority in the quadripartite regime in the sector which it oc-
cupies in the city of Berlin. On the other hand, the Govern-
ment of the United States will not and does not, in any way,
accept a unilateral denunciation of the accords of 1944 and
1945; nor is it prepared to relieve the Soviet Union from
the obligations which it assumed in June, 1949. Such action
on the part of the Soviet Government would have no legal
basis, since the agreements can only be terminated by mutual
consent. The Government of the United States will con-
tinue to hold the Soviet Government directly responsible for
the discharge of its obligations undertaken with respect to
Berlin under existing agreements. As the Soviet Government
knows, the French, British and United States Governments
have the right to maintain garrisons in their sectors of Berlin
and to have free access thereto. Certain administrative pro-
cedures have been agreed with the Soviet authorities accord-
ingly and are in operation at the present time. The Govern-
ment of the United States will not accept a unilateral repudi-
ation on the part of the Soviet Government of its obligations
in respect of that freedom of access. Nor will it accept the
substitution of the regime which the Soviet Government re-
fers to as the German Democratic Republic for the Soviet
Government in this respect.

In the view of the Government of the United States, there
can be no "threat" to the Soviet Government or the regime
which the Soviet Government refers to as the German Demo-
cratic Republic from the presence of the French, British and
United States garrisons in Berlin. Nor can there be any
military threat from Berlin to the Soviet Government and

¹⁸ *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1949*, p. 104.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1955, pp. 225-227.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS: EUROPEAN SECURITY, GERMANY 237

this regime. The forces of the three Western Powers in Ber-
lin number about ten thousand men. The Soviet Govern-
ment, on the other hand, is said to maintain some three
hundred and fifty thousand troops in Eastern Germany, while
the regime which the Soviet Government refers to as the
German Democratic Republic is understood also to main-
tain over two hundred thousand men under arms. In these
circumstances, the fear that the Western troops in Berlin
may "inflict harm" appears to be wholly unfounded. If Ber-
lin has become a focus of international tension, it is because
the Soviet Government has deliberately threatened to dis-
turb the existing arrangements at present in force there, ar-
rangements to which the Soviet Government is itself a party.
The inhabitants of West Berlin have recently reaffirmed in
a free vote their overwhelming approval and support for the
existing status of that city. The continued protection of the
freedom of more than two million people of West Berlin is a
right and responsibility solemnly accepted by the Three
Western Powers. Thus the United States cannot consider any
proposal which would have the effect of jeopardizing the
freedom and security of these people. The rights of the Three
Powers to remain in Berlin with unhindered communica-
tions by surface and air between that city and the Federal
Republic of Germany are under existing conditions essential
to the discharge of that right and responsibility. Hence the
proposal for a so-called "free city" for West Berlin, as put
forward by the Soviet Union, is unacceptable.

As is stated in the Soviet Government's note of November
27, it is certainly not normal that thirteen years after the end
of the war there should still remain in a part of German
territory a system of occupancy instituted in 1945. The
United States deplores this fact and the fact that Germany
has not yet been reunified so that Berlin might resume its
rightful position as capital of a united Germany. If the treaty
of peace, which alone can bring an end to this situation, has
not been concluded with a reunited Germany, the responsibil-
ity in no way rests with the Three Western Powers which
have not spared any effort to bring the Four Powers out of
the impasse where they have so long found themselves. Pend-
ing the conclusion of a peace treaty, the present situation
continues.

In reality, the form of government in Berlin, the validity
of which the Soviet Government attempts to contest today,
is only one aspect, and not the essential one, of the German

238 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

problem in its entirety. This problem, which has often been
defined, involves the well-known questions of reunification,
European security, as well as a peace treaty. It has in the
past been discussed without success in the course of numer-
ous international meetings with the Soviets. The Govern-
ment of the United States has always been and continues to-
day to be ready to discuss it. The United States made clear
this readiness in its note to the Soviet Union of September
30, 1958, in which it was stated:

"The Government of the United States is ready at any
time to enter into discussions with the Soviet Government
on the basis of these proposals [i.e., the Western proposals
for free all-German elections and free decisions for an all-
German Government], or of any other proposals genuinely
designed to insure the reunification of Germany in freedom,
in any appropriate forum. It regards the solution of the Ger-
man problem as essential if a lasting settlement in Europe
is to be achieved." The Soviet Union has not yet seen fit to
reply to this note.

Public repudiation of solemn engagements, formally en-
tered into and repeatedly reaffirmed, coupled with an ultima-
tum threatening unilateral action to implement that repudi-
ation unless it be acquiesced in within six months, would
afford no reasonable basis for negotiation between sovereign
states. The Government of the United States could not em-
bark on discussions with the Soviet Union upon these ques-
tions under menace or ultimatum; indeed, if that were in-
tended, the United States would be obliged immediately to
raise a protest in the strongest terms. Hence, it is assumed
that this is not the purpose of the Soviet note of November
27 and that the Soviet Government, like itself, is ready to
enter into discussions in an atmosphere devoid of coercion
or threats.

On this basis, the United States Government would be
interested to learn whether the Soviet Government is ready
to enter into discussions between the Four Powers concerned.
In that event, it would be the object of the Government of
the United States to discuss the question of Berlin in the
wider framework of negotiations for a solution of the Ger-
man problem as well as that of European security. The
United States Government would welcome the views of the
Soviet Government at an early date.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS: EUROPEAN SECURITY, GERMANY 239

G. Cultural, Technical and Educational Exchange.

(61) *Communiqué and Text of an Agreement between the United States and the USSR on Exchanges in the Cultural, Technical and Educational Fields, January 27, 1958.*¹

The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics announced today that an agreement on exchanges had
been reached. The agreement was signed by Ambassador
William S. B. Lacy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State,
for the United States and by Georgi N. Zaroubin, Ambassador
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for the Soviet
Union. The agreement undertakes to provide for exchanges
in such media as radio and television broadcasts and showing
of films, as well as to arrange over the next two years for
wider exchange in the cultural, technical, and educational
field. In the academic area, exchanges of graduate students,
instructors and professors of the universities of both countries
will take place for the first time. Exchange of scientists for
purposes of lecturing and research are to be worked out by
the respective Academies of Science. In medicine and agricul-
ture there are multiple exchange visits covering a two-year
period. Other exchanges are to take place between athletic
teams, while outstanding entertainment groups and artists
are to visit each other's country.

Some of the exchanges are to begin in the near future.
With respect to others—such as direct air flights between
New York and Moscow—there was agreement "in principal"
and further discussions will be held.

This Agreement is regarded as a significant first step in
the improvement of mutual understanding between the
peoples of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, and it is sincerely hoped that it will be carried out
in such a way as to contribute substantially to the betterment
of relations between the two countries, thereby also con-
tributing to a lessening of international tensions.

The text of the Agreement follows:

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON EXCHANGES IN THE CULTURAL, TECHNICAL AND EDUCATIONAL FIELDS

By agreement between the Governments of the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, v. 38 (February 17, 1958), pp. 243-247.

388

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1958

161. UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE EAST GERMAN REGIMES AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN DISCHARGING FOUR-POWER RESPONSIBILITIES WITH REGARD TO BERLIN: Replies Made by the Secretary State (Dulles) to Questions Asked at a News Conference November 26, 1958 (Excerpts)¹

The position of the United States, and I think I can fairly say of the United Kingdom and of France, is that there is an obligation, an explicit obligation, on the part of the Soviet Union to assure to the United States and to the other allied powers and, indeed, to the world generally, normal access to and egress from Berlin. And that is the responsibility of the Soviet Union. It was expressed explicitly at the time of the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting held in Paris in June of 1949,² following, you will recall, the end of the Berlin blockades and the consequent airlift. At that time the Four Powers exchanged what were formally called "obligations" to assure these rights. We do not accept the view that the Soviet Union can disengage itself from that responsibility. And, indeed, that responsibility was in essence reaffirmed at the time of the summit meeting of July 1955, when the Four Powers recognized their "responsibility" for the German question.³ That phrase, "the German question," has always been held to include the question of Berlin. And so, again, you had a reaffirmation by the Soviet Union of its responsibility in the matter. We do not accept any substitute responsibility, in that situation, for that of the Soviet Union.

We would certainly not deal with them [the East German officials in any way which involved our acceptance of the East German regime as a substitute for the Soviet Union in discharging the obligation of the Soviet Union and the responsibility of the Soviet Union.

We might [deal with the East German officials as agents of the Soviet Union], yes. There are certain respects now in which министерства functionaries of the so-called G.D.R. [German Democratic Republic are being dealt with by both the Western powers, the three allied powers, and also by the Federal Republic of Germany. It all depends upon the details of just how they act and how they function. You can't exclude that to a minor degree because it is going on at the present time and has been. On the other hand, if the character of the activity is such as to indicate that to accept this would involve acceptance of a substitution of the G.D.R. for the present obligation and responsibility of the Soviet Union, then that, I take it, we would not do.

¹ The replies printed here are taken from pp. 947-949, 950, 952, and 953 of the Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 15, 1958, reprint of Department of State press release No. 721.

² See the communiqué of June 21, 1949, of the Sixth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers; text in A Decade of American Foreign Policy: State Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 110-112.

³ See American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, pp. 1896-1907.

Doc. 161

WESTERN EUROPE

589

I think that it is agreed between us [the three Western powers] that we might [deal with the East German officials as agents of the Soviet Union]. But, as I say, the question of whether we would or would not could have to depend upon the precise circumstances which surrounded the action, and that can't be anticipated in advance of knowing what, if anything, the Soviet Union is going to do.

There have been, as you point out, dealings on a de facto basis [with East Germany], particularly on an economic basis and in terms of transit back and forth between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. There has been an appreciable degree of de facto dealing with the G.D.R., and there is this trade agreement, whereby the Federal Republic gets particularly brown coal and things of that sort from the eastern part of Germany in exchange for certain manufactured goods. As to any differences within the Federal Republic about that, I am not in a position to throw light upon it. I am not aware of any differences which are of sufficient magnitude so that they have come to my attention.

I think it would be unwise for me to try to give categorical answers to every particular illustration [of the circumstances under which the Western powers would deal with the East German officials], because, obviously, this is a situation to be dealt with upon a tripartite or quadripartite basis. I think I had better just stand on the proposition that in my opinion it is the combined judgment of all four of us that nothing should be done which would seem to give the G.D.R. an authority and responsibility to deal with the matters as to which the Soviet Union has explicitly assumed an obligation to us and a responsibility to us.

I would hardly think that the present mood of the Soviet Union makes this a propitious time for such a negotiation [of a treaty reuniting Germany and then of a treaty of peace with the reunified German state]. Actually, of course, we would in these matters be largely guided by the views of the Federal Republic of Germany, which is primarily concerned and which has a government with which we have the closest relations and in which we have the greatest confidence. Their views in these matters would carry weight with us. I have had no intimation of this kind from the Government of the Federal Republic.

The rights and status of the allies in Berlin and the responsibilities and obligations of the Soviet Union do not in any way whatsoever derive from the Potsdam agreements. Indeed that subject is, I am told by my own legal adviser, not even mentioned in the Potsdam agreements. Therefore to say that because the Potsdam agreements have been violated the Soviet Union is relieved of obligations which it assumed explicitly some 4 years later seems to be a non sequitur, to put it mildly. Perhaps in order to present a better case, indeed to see whether they had any case at all, the matter is being reviewed.

300

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1938

We have at the present time flights and facilities which we are using which involve various media [of access to Berlin]. There is the air which is used; there is the autobahn, which is used; there is a railroad which is used; to some extent canals which are used. We do not intend to abandon any of our rights as regards any of these particular ways. Now, in just what proportions they would be used, that I can say. Indeed, I don't know today in just what proportions the four different ways are being used. But I would think you can say that we would not abandon any of the rights which were explicitly reaffirmed in the agreement of June 1949.

... If the Soviet Union takes the position that the Potsdam agreement is nonexistent, the consequences of that would be not to destroy our rights in Berlin, because they don't rest upon the Potsdam agreement at all, but it might greatly compromise the territorial claims of Poland, which do rest upon the Potsdam agreement primarily.

... Nothing that has been said recently indicates that there is any intention or desire on the part of either the Soviet Union itself or the puppet regime, the G.D.R., to stop access to and from Berlin. The only issue that seems to have been raised is whether or not the Soviet Union can itself dispose of its responsibilities in the matter and turn them over to the G.D.R. But there has not been any intimation of any kind that the result of that would be a stoppage. It would be a shift of responsibility and authority.

Now, you will recall that at the time when we recognized the Federal Republic we reserved, in order to be able to carry out our obligations vis-a-vis the Soviet Union as regards access to and fro, we reserved out of the sovereignty which was restored to the Federal Republic the rights which we had as regards Germany as a whole and as regards Berlin,⁴ so that we did not disenable ourselves from carrying out the undertaking which had been expressed in the June 1949 agreement. And when the Soviet Union recognized the G.D.R., it made a somewhat comparable reservation so as to keep itself in the position to carry out its obligations under the June 1949 agreement.

And really the issue now is whether the Soviet Union can, by restoring all of these rights to what it recognizes as the government of East Germany, disenable itself from carrying out its obligations to us. And I think that, at least so far as it is exposed, the motivation at the present time would be not a purpose to drive us out of Berlin or obstruct access to Berlin but to try to compel an increased recognition and the according of increased stature to the G.D.R.

... Nothing that has been said or intimated indicates that the issue will arise [as to how the Western powers would free their access to Berlin in the event of a new blockade]. We do not intend to wall either in fact or in law, any of the rights which we have. But I purport

⁴ See art. 2 of the Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers in the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris, Oct. 23, 1954; text in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, pp. 486-490.

Doc. 161

WESTERN EUROPE

591

not to speak in terms of a military threat, you might say, a relation to a situation which we have no reason to believe will occur.

We have not ruled out any of our rights at all. All I have said is that nothing that was said, which Khrushchev or anybody else in recent weeks has said, suggests that there is now any purpose on the part of either the Soviet Union or the G.D.R. to impede or obstruct our access by the various media that are available to us to and from Berlin. Therefore it seems to me that the question as to whether, if they did it, we would use force is an academic proposition because, as I say, nothing has happened to indicate that there is any present intention on their part to do that.

## 162. NULLIFICATION OF THE 1945 POTSDAM AGREEMENT ON GERMANY, PROPOSED TRANSFER OF EAST BERLIN FROM RUSSIAN TO EAST GERMAN JURISDICTION, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A "FREE CITY" OF WEST BERLIN: Note From the Government of the U.S.S.R. to the Government of the United States, November 27, 1958 (Excerpts)¹

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addresses the Government of the United States of America as one of the signatory powers of the Potsdam Agreement² on the urgent question of the status of Berlin.

The policy of the USA, Britain, and France with respect to West Germany has led to the violation of those provisions of the Potsdam Agreement designed to ensure the unity of Germany as a peace-loving and democratic state. And when a separate state, the Federal Republic of Germany, was set up independently [of the Soviet Union] in West Germany,³ which was occupied by the troops of the Three Powers, East Germany, where forces determined not to allow the Germany people to be plunged once again into disaster assumed the leadership, had no alternative but to create in its turn an independent state.⁴ Thus, two states came into being in Germany. Whereas in West Germany, those development was directed by the United States, Britain, and France, a government took office the representatives of which do not conceal their hatred of the Soviet Union and often openly advertise the similarity of their aspirations to the plans of the Hitlerite aggressors, in East Germany a government was formed which has irrevocably broken with Germany's aggressive past. State and public affairs in the German Democratic Republic are governed by constitution fully in keeping with the principles of the Potsdam Agreement and the finest progressive traditions of the German nation. The rule of monopo list and Junkers has been abolished forever in the GDR. Nazism has been

Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 19, 1959, pp. 81-89. Similar notes were delivered to the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom and France at Moscow. Text in A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, 34-48.

The Federal Republic of Germany came into formal existence on Sept. 21, (see *ibid*., pp. 609-610), and achieved full sovereignty on May 5, 1955 (see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, pp. 483-485 and 1734).

The German "Democratic Republic" was proclaimed by the Soviet Government on Oct. 7, 1949, and was declared by the Soviet Government to have achieved full "sovereignty" on Mar. 25, 1954 (see *ibid*., pp. 1756-1757).

Doc. 162

The Berlin Crisis: 1958-1962, Jack M. Schick,
University of Pennsylvania Press (Philadelphia:
1971), pp. 29-68.

CHAPTER 2

Dulles' Flexibility

CONTRARY to the popular impression of Secretary Dulles as the coldest of the cold warriors, he responded with considerable flexibility to the "deadline crisis." He had to be flexible. First, the crisis offered the prospect of a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Soviet authorities could use East German troops in a buffer role on the ground routes, but only to a point or Moscow would lose control. The United States always insisted anyway that Soviet officers were responsible for actions of the East German police on the access routes.

Second, in Washington, a military judgment persisted—dating at least from 1948—that Berlin could not be defended. Dulles visited General Clay in the winter of 1949 during the airlift. General Howley, who in 1947 became American commandant in Berlin under General Clay, records that Dulles did not react enthusiastically to the airlift. Dulles believed that the airlift would prove insufficient and that the Soviets could win over the Berliners with offers of food.¹ Dulles may have retained his earlier attitude when he calculated his cautious response to the next Berlin crisis, ten years later, in 1958.

Third, a crisis in Berlin is never simply an American-Soviet affair. Both sides have allies and foreign parties they must consult. Poland and France, for example, have a direct interest in any settlement affecting the future of Germany. France and Britain are occupying powers in Berlin. Both Bonn and Pankow, of course, have high political stakes riding on the future of the city. Thus, Washington

1. Frank Howley, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

30 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

and Moscow are open to influence from many sources. Their policies are as bold as the least bold of their allies will allow. In the "deadline crisis" of 1958, Dulles tried to construct a consensus among the Western powers for negotiating with Moscow. Khrushchev, similarly, had to pull together his allies in Eastern Europe and he called Warsaw Pact meetings rather frequently in the crisis years. Little is known of his inter-ally negotiations during the crisis.

Fourth, Dulles' perception of Soviet intentions probably was the most significant factor in his flexibility. Dulles said he did not believe Khrushchev would press the crisis to the point of war. Nevertheless, he perceived Khrushchev to be more unpredictable and dangerous than Stalin, and wished to treat Khrushchev with a wider margin for error. To be certain of avoiding war with a power whose foremost official sometimes talked and gambled recklessly, Dulles quickly moved toward negotiations even though crisis conditions were not very promising for a settlement. He believed that any war in Europe would be a general war. He also perceived the Berlin crisis as an excellent opportunity to negotiate improved security for the Soviet Union in exchange for new safeguards guaranteeing the security of the Federal Republic and Berlin. He believed that Moscow had a severe security problem in Eastern Europe—demonstrated by the East German and Polish/Hungarian uprisings in 1953 and 1956 respectively—and had raised the Berlin crisis to resolve that problem. Just possibly, he thought, Moscow might consider measures to increase stability both in Eastern and Western Europe.

1. *The Berlin Policy of Secretary Dulles*

Before Premier Khrushchev's statement on November 10, 1958, the Washington press corps asked Secretary Dulles at his press conference on November 7 about his "allegedly adopting too rigid a position regarding possible talks with Russia on the German problem." Khrushchev had accused him of foot-dragging after Moscow proposed a summit conference in the Bulganin letter of December 10, 1957. In reply, Dulles did not deny his rigidity:

> The position of the United States so far remains as it has been historically for the last few years, and particularly as it was expressed in the joint communiqué which was issued as a result of the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955. We take the position

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY 31

that the Four Powers, former occupying powers, have the responsibility to bring about the reunification of Germany. That was agreed to then by the Soviet Union. It was also agreed that Germany should be reunified in freedom by free elections. We hold to that.²

Obviously, free elections would allow the Federal Republic to absorb the DDR. The Soviets consistently rejected this proposal even though they seemed willing to consider it in 1955. Asked to comment on Ulbricht's claim to West Berlin, he replied: "... we are most solemnly committed to hold West Berlin, if need be by military force." ³

Sixteen days after Khrushchev's November 10 statement about the Potsdam protocol, Dulles shifted his position. He was asked a pre-arranged question at a press conference and answered as follows:

> Q. Mr. Secretary, what if, despite this responsibility, the Soviets go ahead and turn over to the East German authorities the check points on the Autobahn and control to the land, sea, and air routes? Now the question would arise; would we deal with the East German officials who would man the check points, for example, even as—

> A. Well, we would certainly not deal with them in any way which involved our acceptance of the East German regime as a substitute for the Soviet Union in discharging the obligation of the Soviet Union and the responsibility of the Soviet Union.

> Q. Does that mean that we might deal with them as agents of the Soviet Union?

> A. We might, yes. There are certain respects now in which minor functionaries of the so-called G.D.R. are being dealt with by both the Western Powers, the three allied powers, and also by the Federal Republic of Germany. It all depends upon the details of just how they act and how they function. You can't exclude that to a minor degree because it is going on at the present time and has been. On the other hand, if the character of the activity is such as to indicate that to accept this would involve acceptance of a substitution of the G.D.R. for the present

2. *Documents*, p. 338.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 339.

32

THE "DEADLINE CRISIS"

obligation and responsibility of the Soviet Union, then that, I take it, we would not do.⁴ [my emphasis]

In the press conference, Dulles repeated what he had said on November 7. Now, however, he acknowledged Khrushchev's threat of November 10 to invest the DDR with authority to manage traffic on the access routes. The "agent theory," as the State Department called it, enabled Dulles to remove the spike from Khrushchev's club. Let him replace Soviet officers with DDR police; the United States will accept the change, Dulles seemed to be saying. The "agent theory" was the first sign of Dulles' flexibility in the "deadline crisis."⁵

Dulles' remarks on November 26 can be explained by his estimate of the threat. He believed, as "a foregone conclusion," that the Soviets would accept the risks of transferring the functions of their traffic agencies to the DDR.⁶ The State Department intended to request the United Nations Security Council to censure the Soviet Union when the transfer occurred. For military contingency planning, Dulles preferred to resort initially to another airlift rather than to challenge a blockade on the ground. If the Soviets withdrew from the Berlin Air Safety Center and threatened the continuation of flights, Dulles and the President believed the United States would probably have to "order military air transports and fighter aircraft into the corridors."⁷ Dulles thought a military confrontation could be avoided if negotiating tactics were flexible enough.

On November 20, the National Security Council (NSC) heard Secretary Dulles' assessment of the crisis. If his later press conference remarks on November 26 were any indication of what he said at the NSC meeting, he perceived the issues that Khrushchev raised to be primarily of a political nature:

> Let me say, however, that nothing that has been said recently indicates there is any intention or desire on the part of either

4. *Ibid.*, p. 344. Prearranged questions are a State Department custom formally protecting the Secretary from blame. If his answer becomes controversial the Department can say that the question dictated the answer.

5. With each adjustment in his position, Dulles provoked an uproar in Bonn, partly because he did not give the West Germans prior notice of changes in his thinking. *The New York Times*, November 27, 1958, p. 19.

6. *Ibid.*, November 19, 1958, p. 1.

7. Eisenhower wrote later that his administration completed Berlin contingency planning as early as January 1954. See "My Views on Berlin," *Saturday Evening Post*, December 9, 1961, p. 19.

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY 33

of [sic] the Soviet Union itself or the puppet regime, the G.D.R., to stop access to and from Berlin. The only issue that seems to have been raised is whether or not the Soviet Union can itself dispose of its responsibilities in the matter and turn them over to the G.D.R. ... It would be a shift of responsibility and authority ... and I think that, at least as far as it is exposed, the motivation at the present time would be not a purpose to drive us out of Berlin or to obstruct access to Berlin, but to try to compel an increased recognition and the according of increased stature to the G.D.R.⁸

Since the United States could not prevent the Soviet Union from transferring traffic management to the DDR, Dulles proposed that he bend to the extent necessary to accommodate Soviet pressure. He argued that a mere transfer of authority ought not to justify a war with the Soviet Union. For this reason, Dulles did not look for another blockade to occur immediately. Viewing Khrushchev's statement of November 10 as a demand for recognition of the DDR, Dulles changed his own position to prepare for a transfer of authority while holding the Soviets responsible for whatever they did. He certainly gave no indication of accepting Khrushchev's interpretation of the Potsdam protocol.

On November 21, Bonn signed a supplemental trade agreement⁹ with Pankow, inadvertently confirming the Secretary's view that one could do business with the East Germans in strictly operational terms without granting them diplomatic recognition. Bonn drew a distinction between what the United States could do—as one of the four parties to the occupation protocol—and what Bonn had to do to support life in the Soviet zone. Pankow immediately took advantage of Dulles' "agent theory" as a sign of implied recognition.

In judging the crisis to be a political one, Dulles made a distinction between political and military factors which the Soviets themselves did not make at that time.¹⁰ Moreover, the Soviet Union had no way "to compel an increased" recognition ... to the DDR," as Dulles phrased the Soviets' intention, unless they exerted pressure on the access routes and expressed "a purpose to drive us out of Berlin or to obstruct access to Berlin ..."

8. *Documents*, pp. 347-348.

9. *The Times* (London), November 22, 1958, p. 6.

10. Raymond L. Garthoff. *Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953)*, chapter 3.

34 THE "DEADLINE CRISIS"

The note of November 27 challenged Dulles' assessment. The Soviet Union stated it would oppose any treatment of the East German police ignoring DDR sovereignty. By insisting on more than "a shift of responsibility and authority," the Soviets ruled out Dulles' "agent theory." They expressed a desire to abolish the Berlin occupation regime, including special routes of access. A few days earlier, Dulles had doubted that they had this objective. Their negotiating deadline effectively bound up the military aspects of the crisis with the political ones, again contrary to his expectation.

But Dulles did not change his mind about Soviet objectives. The State Department admitted the Soviet note did not appear to favor the Secretary's "agent theory." ¹¹ It seemed more relieved that the transfer of authority over the access routes would not take place for six months. Again it desired to leave Moscow a way out when the deadline expired, although it doubted the crisis would reach military proportions. The note did compel Dulles to switch priorities. In a statement for the President, Dulles reacted sharply to Moscow's threat to change the occupation regime unilaterally and postponed any further discussion of his "agent theory." The administration wanted to give the population of West Berlin an urgently needed boost, now that Moscow threatened a new crisis.¹²

Dulles proved sensitive to the threatening tenor of the Soviets' note without, however, giving any indication of reassessing his own judgment of their objectives. As early as November 30, Dulles proposed to the President that the Western reply to the Soviet note should include an offer of negotiations.¹³ At the NATO Ministerial Council meeting on December 15, Dulles recommended that he and his fellow NATO ministers negotiate a way out of the crisis.¹⁴ He proposed the Western note of September 30, 1958, as a basis for preparing a reply to the Soviets. This note, representing the Western position of 1955, dis-

11. *The New York Times*, November 28, 1958, p. 1.

12. The Statement read: "The President reiterated our government's firm purpose that the United States will not enter into any new arrangement or embark on any course of conduct which would have the effect of abandoning the responsibilities which the United States, with Great Britain and France, has formally assumed for the freedom and security of the people of West Berlin." *Documents*, p. 364. In stating that "the United States will not enter into any new arrangement," Dulles momentarily de-emphasized the possibility of entering into operational relations with the East Germans.

13. *The New York Times*, December 1, 1958; p. 1; December 3, 1958, p. 1.

14. *Ibid.*, December 17, 1958, p. 1 F.

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY 35

cussed ways and means of achieving German unity.¹⁵ In proposing that the last Western note be used as a basis for future negotiations, he seemed convinced the Soviets did not mean what they said in their November note, and that a real possibility existed for deflecting them from a collision course. If the alliance made a positive approach in favor of negotiations, he suggested it could avoid war and possibly derive political gains from the crisis. The allied declaration on Berlin of December 16 reflected Dulles' positive view.¹⁶

The initial United States response in the "deadline crisis" appeared in two documents. The first, a strictly legal rejoinder ¹⁷ by the State Department on December 20, tried to correct the distortions of the record which the Soviet note contained. The Department pressed at least one point to good advantage. It observed the contradiction between Khrushchev's assertion that the Western powers had voided the Potsdam protocol and had therefore released the Soviet Union from its obligation to the occupation protocol and his insistence that the Potsdam protocol itself had not been voided. If the two protocols were linked together, as he argued, the Potsdam protocol must have been voided along with the occupation protocol. The State Department concluded: "The position is, on its face, completely untenable."

Although Khrushchev held an untenable legal position, the position revealed again the one-sided objectives he had in the crisis. By responding the Potsdam protocol, he could argue for demilitarizing the Federal Republic as the protocol had once required for all of Germany. By claiming the Western powers had nullified the occupation protocol, he could avoid having his argument for demilitarization apply to all of Germany, that is, to the DDR as well. In effect, he wanted Bonn to disarm without the DDR also disarming.

The second part of the Western reply to the Soviet note of November 27 came in notes from Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn on December 31.¹⁸ The notes clearly bore Dulles' imprint. First, the allies accepted the Soviet proposal for negotiations with qualifications. Following Secretary Dulles' suggestion at the NATO Ministerial Council meeting, the notes quoted the Western note of September 30 containing a proposal for "free all-German elections." The December

15. *Documents*, p. 337.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 364-365.

17. For the text, see *ibid.*, pp. 367-378.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 378-381.

36 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

notes defined Berlin as "only one aspect, and not the essential one, of the German problem in its entirety." In rejecting the Soviet free city proposal, the allies indicated that any discussion of Berlin would have to be in a much broader context than the Soviet note allowed. They ignored Moscow's statement that unless they negotiated about the free city proposal no negotiations would be possible.

Second, the allies also ignored the deadline for changing Berlin's status within six months. The American note declared: "the United States could not embark on discussions with the Soviet Union upon these questions under menace or ultimatum; indeed, if that were intended, the United States would be obliged immediately to raise a protest in the strongest terms." The note gave the Soviets the benefit of the doubt: "It is assumed that the Soviet Government, like itself, is ready to enter the discussions in an atmosphere devoid of coercion or threats."

Third, the four allies proposed broad negotiations. Professing to find acceptable points in the Soviet note—for example, a willingness to discuss Germany and European security—the allies did not respond to the entirety of the Soviet note. Rather than replying at equal length to the long exposition of Soviet policy with which it had been presented in November, the allies shortened their reply to stress their interest in negotiations. They did not fully address the Soviet note. Instead, they replied with a counterproposal which took little account of the original note. The Soviet Union could therefore discount the allies' firm rejection of the free city proposal in light of their transparent desire to negotiate.

The Western notes were dispatched on December 31 before Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan left for Washington. At the December NATO meeting, Dulles announced that Mikoyan would visit the United States ostensibly for the purpose of stimulating East-West trade.¹⁹ He expected Mikoyan to bear a Soviet reply to the Western notes in a continuing diplomatic dialogue.

On January 5, Mikoyan met Secretary Dulles and presented a memorandum outlining the forthcoming note of January 10 and draft treaty proposal. He was still in the United States when the note arrived and was therefore available for explaining it. When ques-

19. *The New York Times*, December 19, 1958, p. 1 H. Or as Mikoyan said, he was coming to the United States for a private "vacation trip." *The New York Times*, January 12, 1959, p. 1.

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY 37

tioned before and after January 10, he stressed Moscow's willingness to negotiate. He said he was a reasonable man who sometimes "names a higher price than he expects to get for his goods."²⁰ But he did not suggest any substantive changes in the Soviet position and dwelled on the consequences of a nuclear war if the Western powers failed to negotiate.

Secretary Dulles apparently viewed the presence of Mikoyan in the United States and the note of January 10 as evidence of a serious Soviet interest in negotiations, all deadlines aside.²¹ He did not read the peace treaty proposal at face value any more than he had the free city proposal. But he probably observed that the draft treaty covered broader issues than Berlin. Since Mikoyan urged negotiations strictly on Soviet terms and Dulles consistently recommended negotiations on Western terms, Dulles saw a possibility, therefore, that both parties could agree to negotiations *per se*.

At his press conference on January 13, Dulles took a definite step toward negotiations:

> Q. Mr. Secretary, is it our position that free elections are the only method of reuniting Germany? In other words, do we say, "No free elections, no reunification"?

> A. Well, we never have said that. The formula of reunification by free elections was the agreed formula. It seems to us to be a natural method. But I wouldn't say that it is the only method by which reunification could be accomplished.²²

Dulles' statement on free elections loosened the rigidity of the free elections formula without abandoning it. He did not specify any other methods of reunification. He merely adopted a flexible posture which is all he claimed Mikoyan had done. Moreover, he desired flexibility because, as he understood it, Mikoyan had "made clear that there was no intention on the part of the Soviet Union to have their note treated as . . . an ultimatum with a fixed time limit." In other words, he thought Mikoyan had taken advantage of the December 31 note giving Moscow the benefit of the doubt. Thus, Dulles predicted that negotiations would take place: "There seems to be a sharp

20. *The Times* (London), January 10, 1959, p. 6.

21. *Ibid*., January 12, 1959, p. 1.

22. *Documents*, p. 406. Again Bonn expressed shock at Dulles' remarks. *The New York Times*, January 14, 1959, p. 9.

38 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

difference of opinion as to what we talk about, but there is at least
a common denominator, I think, in terms of a feeling that there should
be discussions."

On his return to Moscow, Mikoyan suggested in a press conference
that the six-month deadline could be extended if negotiations got
under way. He said: "The main thing in our proposal is not the
six-month deadline, but the proposal to have the talks"; and he
added: "and to end the occupation status of West Berlin." ²³ He
expressed an interest in Secretary Dulles' statement pertaining to free
elections, although he said, "it did not contain any constructive
proposals."

The State Department immediately accepted Mikoyan's extension of the deadline as a concession and restated its own view that "negotiations would be useful." ²⁴ It had the impression that the rejection of the Soviet deadline by the West had moved the Soviets to relent in their insistence for negotiations about Berlin alone. But, once again, Tass-in reporting Mikoyan's Moscow press conference-contradicted the Department's impression. The official news agency revised Mikoyan's statement to read: "If the talks take place in the spirit of a reciprocal desire to find a correct solution to the problem, and if we are convinced of good will on the part of the Western powers to negotiate with the object of ending the occupation regime in West Berlin, it would not be difficult, I believe, to extend the talks for two or three weeks, or even for two or three months." ²⁵ The Soviets had not relented and Berlin remained the focus of Soviet objectives. When the Department thought the Soviets were relenting, the Soviets believed they were just beginning to score.

In his press conference of January 27, Dulles suggested how far
the United States would go in negotiations. Dulles did not consider
Soviet proposals of the early 1950's for a German confederation and,
more recently, for a peace treaty with two Germanies to be useful
solutions to the problem of German unity. They sealed the partition
of Germany. When pressed to explain whether he could conceive of
an acceptable form of confederation, he gave-surprisingly-the
impression that he could:

you can have a confederation which is, in fact, of very con-
siderable progress toward reunification. . . . Now I don't like,

23. *The New York Times*, January 25, 1959, p. 1.

24. *Ibid*.

25. Embree, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY 3

as I said, to use the word around which emotions revolve. But
the matter of finding ways which, in fact, will promote re-
unification is a matter which, I think, can be and should be
studied as resourcefully as possible.²⁶

With qualifications Dulles moved away from free elections—the
1955 formula—toward confederation leading to free elections as a
method of creating unity in all parts of Germany. Having agreed on
January 13 to negotiate with the Soviets, he then prepared on Janu-
ary 27 to negotiate with them on parallel subjects, in this case, the
issues of a German confederation.

The subsequent course of the negotiations in 1959 revealed that Dulles had two proposals: a maximum proposal on German unity with safeguards for Soviet security and a minimum proposal—appearing later in 1959—for a Berlin settlement. Dulles wanted a *modus vivendi* on Berlin incorporating an access agreement in writing. Depending upon Moscow's price, a *modus vivendi* could be a gain for the Western powers, removing some of the uncertainties about the access routes.

From his experience in previous negotiating sessions with the
Soviets, Dulles had little reason to be optimistic about a maximum
or minimum settlement. On the other hand, he seemed convinced that
the danger of war with which both sides had to contend provided a
common basis on which a settlement might be constructed. In a
statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 28,
he said:

> Let us make perfectly clear that we are fully alive to the grave hazards in the present situation. Every reasonable and decent effort must be made to avoid needless provocations, to find a modus vivendi, and to reduce the danger of a war which under present conditions would involve a large measure of world-wide annihilation.²⁷

Secretary Dulles' Berlin policy affirmed the feasibility of change
in the status quo in Berlin and Germany, and he met the Soviets half
way. But the emphasis on where change should occur first was not
the same for Dulles and the Soviet leaders. Dulles preferred changes
beginning in Germany as a whole resulting in changes for Berlin.
Khrushchev and Mikoyan started from the other end of the problem,

26. *Documents*, p. 410.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 411.

40 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

demanding changes in Berlin as a requisite to larger changes in Germany. The two sides examined the status quo from very different perspectives. Confusion resulted when tactical shifts in the position of one were viewed through the perspective of the other. Confusion compounded when one considered a shift of the other a success in his own terms rather than in the terms and perspective of the other. Both favored change and therefore negotiations.

## 2. Dulles' Preference for Negotiations

The three instances of Dulles' flexibility—his “agent theory,” his remarks on free elections, his movement toward discussion of a con- federation—illustrate his intention to get negotiations started. Dulles did not simply reject Khrushchev's and Mikoyan's initiatives, but maneuvered to draw them onto more favorable ground for the United States. He acted in the spirit of conventional diplomacy which he believed was appropriate to the “deadline crisis” and which he was skilled in using.²⁸

Dulles seemed confident his flexibility would pay off. He tried to persuade the Soviets to discuss German unity even though they said they had no interest in it. He did not consider the Soviets' fear of German unity and their campaign against West Berlin in a crisis atmosphere as sufficient obstacles to his diplomacy. Dulles also tended to ignore or to attribute little credibility to Soviet diplomatic notes.²⁹ He did not think all Soviet communications were propagandistic, necessarily, but most of them were for him unreliable indices of Soviet foreign policy.

Dulles had an explicit perception of Soviet policy which provided him with a substitute for face-value readings of diplomatic notes from Moscow. He prided himself on his knowledge of the Soviet Union.³⁰ An address Dulles delivered in the early days of the “deadline crisis” illustrates his thinking. On November 18, after Khrushchev's initial

28. The strengths and weaknesses of Dulles' diplomacy are perceptively described in Richard Gould-Adams, *The Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles* (London; Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1962), especially chapters 1 and 16.

29. For an excellent discussion of this point and other aspects of Dulles' perception of the Soviet Union, see Ole R. Holsti, “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia,” *Enemies in Politics*, David J. Finlay, Richard R. Fagen, and Ole R. Holsti, eds. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1967), p. 43 ff.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-56.

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY 41

pronouncement on Berlin, Dulles spoke to the National Council of Churches at its Cleveland conference on a changing world.³¹ He directed himself to the “problem of change as seen by a Secretary of State.”

Speaking about the Soviet Union, he said: “There is nothing ‘inevitable’ about communism except that it too is bound to change.” He perceived six “forces” working for change in the Soviet Union. First, he argued that the Soviet emphasis on scientific education was incompatible with “enforced conformity of mind.” As the Soviets penetrated outer space, they would also penetrate “the fallacies of Marxism.” Second, the “growing demand for greater personal security” would have to be met by policy relaxation which, in turn, would allow “individualism” to assert itself all the more. Third, an increasing demand for consumer goods would operate in the same manner as the demand for personal security.

Fourth, he believed nationalism in Eastern Europe placed the Soviets in a dilemma: “The Soviet rulers must either grant more independence, and thus liberate forces which oppose the existing regimes, or else they must revert to the Stalinistic tactics of brutality, and face the increased likelihood of violent revolt. . . .” Fifth, he observed that a foreign policy of bluster and threat had brought the Soviets little results. They had resorted to a policy of professed friendship—peaceful coexistence—which the West had encouraged and through which, he thought, the Soviets would develop “a vested interest in respectability.” Sixth, given the unpopularity of communism demonstrated, for example, by the refugee traffic through West Berlin, he argued that internal popular pressures which “will change the character of communist rule gain weight as that rule is denied external successes.” He expected these six forces to liberalize the Soviet Union.

Dulles respected the technical and military power of the Soviets.³² But he did not grant their regime real internal strength: “Dictatorships usually present a formidable exterior. They seem, on the outside, to be hard, glittering, and irresistible. Within they are full of rottenness.”³³ In fact, he looked for the eventual ruin of the Com-

31. *The New York Times*, November 19, 1958, p. 6.

32. Holsti, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-273.

33. John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1950), p. 242.

42 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 34 and correlated that event with further progress in world order: "I believe . . . that peace depends upon the growing internal difficulties of Soviet Communism and its inability to consolidate its present and prospective areas of conquest." 35 Dulles had no quarrel with the Soviet people. He looked to them and their demands for change as natural allies.

Dulles believed political change occurred through a dialectical process of demand, resistance, and new demand.36 He thought that with appropriate encouragement this process would favor the West because Western communities, unlike dictatorships, allowed free expression of popular demands. He conceived of his diplomacy as an effort to guide the process of change through peaceful solutions of conflicts.37 To encourage the Soviet Union to accept inevitable changes, he thought the United States should try to contain the Soviets externally, compelling them to confront their internal dilemmas. Once the Soviets turned inward, he believed they would be more willing to engage in "competitive efforts conducted by peaceful means, and not start a war that could consume us all."

For these several reasons—the changes occurring in the Soviet Union, the tenuous rule of the CPSU, and the general direction of history—Dulles did not treat Soviet official speech very seriously. He looked behind the speech—behind the November note, for example—to see what really motivated it. He professed to see a security motivation stimulated by internal contradictions. He probably regarded East Germany as a little USSR with the same internal problems, although more pronounced, than its sponsor-ally.38

34. For example, in 1956 in a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dulles described at great length the debilitating effects that—in his mind—Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign had produced in the Soviet Union. *The New York Times*, May 16, 1956, p. 8.

35. Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

36. He describes this process more fully in his earlier work, *War, Peace and Change* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939), pp. 164-169. His sister attributes his view of the dialectics of change to his "work with Bergson." Eleanor Lansing Dulles, *John Foster Dulles: The Last Year* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1963), p. 188.

37. In Beal's biography, Dulles is described as "having spent a lifetime evolving plans to channel the process of change to the ends of peace and human justice. . . ." John Robinson Beal, *John Foster Dulles* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 203; also chapter 2, p. 321. And according to Dulles himself, peaceful change is the highest value in political life. *War, Peace and Change*, p. 9.

38. *The Washington Post* reported that Dulles believed Soviet demands were

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY

Dulles' perception of Moscow's political weaknesses gave him a certain optimism that the crisis could be exploited to the West's advantage. He judged that the Western powers could construct a powerful defense in the "deadline crisis" through political pressure on the internal dilemmas of the Soviet regime in Eastern Europe. Dulles urged that great pressure be placed on Moscow, but he believed that the pressure should be exerted by political rather than military means because of the danger of general war any Berlin crisis raised acutely. He warned Khrushchev that the United States possessed the will and capacity to defend West Berlin. But he devoted his efforts to reducing tensions, and the United States carefully refrained from using available forces in a warning demonstration.

He much preferred to deploy the "armies" of world public opinion. World opinion was a moral and legal concept Dulles used to justify the settlement of disputes within the bounds of international law. He believed that the CPSU, for example, would "pay attention to other people's sense of right and justice. That is always of interest, even to despots."39 He also believed that power of world opinion explained the influence he perceived 'individualism' and "nationalism" exerting in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He associated the concept with his earlier interest in a policy of "liberation," essentially a propaganda offensive beamed at the populations of Eastern Europe.40

In the Berlin crisis, Dulles was aware of the propaganda value of his Berlin policy and tried to deflect Soviet propaganda from drumming on the theme of imminent war and to expose Moscow's proposals as vindictive and oppressive to the German people. He vigorously rejected the Soviet case for holding down "a great people like the Germans." He set two propaganda requirements for the United States position in the "deadline crisis": (1) that the history of Western occupation in Berlin be restated to counter the Soviet version of it, and (2) that the Western alliance assume a positive negotiating position, offering counterproposals on the future of Berlin and Germany to place Moscow on the defensive.

On January 7, 1959, the State Department released a document entitled "The Soviet Note on Berlin: An Analysis," which contrasted

motivated by fears of an East German uprising. *The Washington Post*, December 21, 1958, p. 1.

39. Dulles, *War or Peace*, p. 164.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 164-169.

44 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

Soviet allegations in the note of November 27 with the record of Western occupation. According to the Soviet note, for example, the Western powers "are ruling the roost in West Berlin, turning it into a kind of state within a state and using it as a center from which to pursue subversive activity against the GDR, the Soviet Union, and other parties to the Warsaw Treaty." The State Department, clearly appealing to public opinion, responded by stating:

> It is clear that the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed that there should be a rebirth of free political parties and the reestablishment of essential political freedom in Germany as a whole including the free flow of information and publications. . . . These principles were never practiced inside the Soviet Zone of Germany. . . . It was this direct Soviet action that led to the popularity and the significance of Western newspapers and radio stations . . . in Berlin and in East Germany.⁴¹

The Department blamed the Soviets for obstructing the provisions of the Potsdam protocol allowing "the free flow of information." This case presumably accorded with German public opinion, the prime audience in the crisis.

Dulles' second propaganda requirement was to assume a positive negotiating position. In the period immediately following the Soviet note of November 27, he seemed anxious to present a constructive response. He studied the Soviet position for ways to match it for novelty or to strike parallels with it. For example, Dulles readily agreed with Khrushchev about the "abnormal" condition of a Germany divided for thirteen years. In his experimentation with Berlin access, free elections, and confederation, he prepared to offer proposals for change equally attractive to those of the Soviet notes. In effect, he tried to deprive the Soviet leaders of political influence in Western Europe and America with their subtle but popular argument that the time had come to recognize the "reality" of two Germanies. His diplomacy had to demonstrate flexibility when elements of British opinion, for example, favored change.

41. The United States Department of State, *The Soviet Note on Berlin: An Analysis*, Publication 6757, January 1959, p. 13.

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY 45

### 3. *The Risks in Negotiation*

In opting for a strategy of negotiations in the "deadline crisis," Dulles incurred two risks. First, his preference for negotiations could mislead Khrushchev to believe that the United States would accept some of his proposals, particularly an improvement of relations with the DDR. Dulles' relatively forthcoming attitude was the kind of gain Khrushchev wanted and expected from pressure tactics. Khrushchev also preferred negotiations as a method of producing desired changes. A decision not to negotiate or to delay would have signaled a more difficult United States attitude. He would have had to consider that his drive to overturn the Berlin occupation regime had little effect on the United States.

Dulles thought he could prevent miscalculation by moving swiftly to open negotiations. Negotiations, he believed, would clarify intentions on both sides. In principle, negotiations should clarify matters. But Soviet leaders were looking for the kind of responsiveness Dulles displayed as evidence that he recognized their growing nuclear power. And when they saw that he reacted flexibly to the pressures of a crisis they were tempted to conclude that he recognized and feared their strength.

The Soviet leaders at the time were prone to miscalculation because they were no more inclined to accept diplomatic correspondence at face value than Secretary Dulles was. It should be noted that Khrushchev distinguished between "progressive elements" in the United States favoring détente with the Soviet Union and "reactionary forces" striving to bring the two powers close to war.⁴² He perceived a struggle in the Eisenhower administration over the formulation of policy similar to the struggles in the Kremlin. He observed, however, that the initial American response favored negotiations. Dulles hedged on the agenda, insisting that European security and German unity take the place of the Soviet proposed peace treaty. But with further encouragement from the Soviet Union, perhaps Khrushchev thought, the hand of the pro-détente faction in the administration would be strengthened. Then a discussion of the treaty could begin in earnest. If Khrushchev ignored what Dulles said and judged him by his actions—his willingness to negotiate—he probably felt en-

42. See, for example, his speech on the U-2 incident. *The New York Times*, May 6, 1960, p. 7.

46 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

couraged. Dulles' position contained ambiguity, but perhaps Khru-
shehev did not expect a perfectly clear response, given his assumption
of a struggle of factions within the administration.

Dulles provided the Soviets with ample information they could
misconstrue. In his idea that East German agents could represent the
Soviet Union on the Berlin access routes he made a gesture toward
Soviet proposals. Similarly, in his move away from free elections and
his move toward confederation—away from the solution favored by
Bonn and toward a solution often advanced by Pankow—he probably
raised Soviet expectations. He did not wander far from the 1955
formula, but—most noteworthy—he demonstrated a willingness to
negotiate and to alter the old formula.

Dulles incurred a second risk by stressing negotiations to the
neglect of a fall-back position. He did not speak with any urgency
for a military strategy: a plan for using conventional forces to defend
the access routes and West Berlin. As mentioned earlier, persistent
military judgment originating in the Berlin blockade of 1948–1949
held that Berlin could not be defended on the ground.⁴³ And, as
always, military options were in short supply for defending an enclave
like West Berlin.

These factors aside, however, General Maxwell Taylor, Army Chief
of Staff, tried to develop a conventional forces strategy for Berlin in
November 1958 and later.⁴⁴ For example, when *The Herald Tribune*
reported that Dulles believed the Soviets would transfer traffic man-
agement to the DDR, rumors circulated in Washington that the
administration would resist this kind of move by forcing armed
convoys or armed trains through East German obstacles on the
Berlin-Helmstedt *autobahn*.⁴⁵ The Army reportedly prepared con-
tingency plans to implement this option, if necessary. One plan called
for the graduated application of force: (1) armed truck convoys
would be sent up the *autobahn*, and (2) if East German police barred
these convoys from entering or leaving the *autobahn*, another con-

43. At the time of the Berlin blockade, General Clay and Ambassador Robert Murphy urged the use of force on the Berlin-Helmstedt *autobahn* so the Soviet Union would be compelled to recognize Western rights of access. Failure to do so, they thought, would make the Western position more precarious than ever. They were overruled by the National Security Council which preferred an airlift. Davison, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-127.

44. *The New York Times*, November 13, 1958, p. 1.

45. *The Herald Tribune*, November 21, 1958, p. 1.

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY 47

voy escorted by infantry and tanks would be sent "to test Soviet intentions." ⁴⁶

After the Soviet note of November 27 arrived in Washington, the commander, United States Army, Europe, stated publicly that he would not accept any "infringement" of ground access to Berlin.⁴⁷ At the December NATO Ministerial Council Meeting, General Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, requested the Council to accelerate planned increases in allied divisions, nuclear-armed battalions, and integrated air defense forces.⁴⁸

Joseph Alsop, in his column of December 19, explained the Army's emphasis on ground countermeasures in contingency planning. He reported that the U.S. could no longer rely completely on an airlift to break a blockade. Alsop wrote: "Radar jamming is the development that blocks the escape by airlift from the Berlin impasse. . . . Sometime ago, powerful Soviet radar jamming mechanisms were installed at four sites surrounding Berlin." ⁴⁹ Alsop criticized the lack of a decision at the NATO meeting to assemble and organize appropriate ground forces for an *autobahn* probe.⁵⁰

NATO itself continued to rely on a military strategy favoring the first use of nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression. Since 1953, the Eisenhower Administration had decelerated increases in United States ground forces deriving from requirements for the Korean War and had approved actual reductions. In the address in which he stated the massive retaliation policy for deterring general war, Secretary Dulles referred to NATO discussions in which he said: "The U.S. put forward a new concept, now known as that of the 'long haul' that meant a steady development of defensive strength at a rate which will preserve and not exhaust the economic strength of our allies and ourselves. This would be reinforced by the striking power of a strategic air force. . . ." ⁵¹ In NATO's version of the massive retaliation policy, the alliance powers planned nuclear retaliation for

46. *The New York Times*, November 25, 1959, p. 12.

47. *Ibid.*, December 1, 1958, p. 1.

48. *Ibid.*, December 18, 1958, p. 16.

49. *The Washington Post*, December 19, 1958, p. 13.

50. He hailed the appointment of Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy to serve as the United States representative in interallied contingency planning sessions as an encouraging sign. As in 1948, Murphy favored ground countermeasures rather than an airlift to relieve West Berlin. *The Herald Tribune*, January 19, 1959, p. 16.

51. *The New York Times*, January 13, 1954, p. 2.

48 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

any Soviet incursions into NATO territories.⁵² With the advent of "battlefield" nuclear weapons in the late 1950's, Dulles toyed with the idea of limited nuclear war,⁵³ but he never urged any change in retaliatory strategy.

General Norstad proposed in 1957 that NATO develop a force of thirty divisions on the Central European front. He suggested the primary purpose of this force should be to enable NATO to control a small Soviet incursion without initial resort to nuclear weapons or to compel the Soviets to invade in great strength, requiring a NATO nuclear response clearly as a measure of last resort.⁵⁴ Norstad's proposal received considerable public discussion, some of which even suggested that "a 30-division force on the line might be able to cope with a massive conventional assault without calling down reprisals."⁵⁵ The communiqué of the NATO December meeting did not acknowledge the Norstad proposal. Drawing upon this proposal and the Army's plan for ground resistance on the *autobahn*, the Kennedy Administration eventually constructed a conventional military strategy to defend West Berlin.

The fact remains that in January 1959 Dulles did not possess the plans and organized conventional forces for a military strategy in the "deadline crisis." The United States retained an airlift capability and fighter aircraft in West Germany or within reach of West Germany and, perhaps, enough ground forces which could be spared for an armed or escorted *autobahn* convoy, but no authorized conventional strategy for using them. Dulles had a fragmentary fallback position at best. Although the 1954 policy was modified, Dulles still depended upon that policy and corresponding strategic nuclear forces of massive retaliation alone to sustain the presence of the United States in Berlin.⁵⁶

52. According to Roger Hilsman: "Present NATO policy does not allow for a conventional response to even a limited aggression. And this policy means exactly what it says, principally because the means for any other policy are not available." "The Developing Strategic Context," *NATO and American Security*, Klaus Knorr, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 36.

53. Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, 36 (October 1957), 25-43.

54. Robert E. Osgood, *NATO, The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 160-165.

55. Roger Hilsman, "On NATO Strategy," in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), *Alliance Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 173.

56. Reston reported that Dulles would consent, if necessary, to an armed convoy in another Berlin blockade. *The New York Times*, February 10, 1959,

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY

The absence of a known and authorized fallback position other than general war offered further evidence to encourage Khrushchev to believe that the United States would have to accommodate his proposals. The Soviets' position included an assessment of the balance of nuclear power. Khrushchev believed an era of nuclear parity had arrived. He thought each side merely had to demonstrate, as in the Sputnik launchings of 1957, a capability for producing a long-range offensive delivery system. Given a stand-off at the nuclear level, the Red Army had—in Khrushchev's mind—a preponderant influence in Europe. He seemed convinced that the time had arrived when he could reverse any United States threat of retaliation into a factor paralyzing Western diplomacy. He expected Soviet nuclear power to produce a handsome political payoff by the Western powers, in a way yet to be evolved, accepting some form of the Soviet proposals. To deflate his expectations, the United States would have had to demonstrate the military capacity to remain in West Berlin without reliance on a starting strategy which simply and horribly called down a nuclear war on Berlin, on all of Europe, and possibly on the United States itself.

### 4. Acheson's Alternative

Speaking for the Democratic Advisory Council, a shadow-cabinet of sorts, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson deplored the lack of conventional military preparedness in the "deadline crisis."⁵⁷ For this reason, he scored the Eisenhower Administration's optimism about the outcome of the crisis. Acheson regarded Berlin as the "linch-pin" of the entire Western position in Europe. The loss of Berlin would be so great a blow to the Atlantic alliance, he argued, that the United States might very well find its influence confined to

p. 4. A policy for ground action was compatible with the massive retaliation policy, however, if undertaken with the idea that the action would succeed because the Soviets were not likely to risk massive retaliation by opposing it. In this sense, a ground probe would serve merely as an adjunct to the threat of massive retaliation and probably would not be intended as a very substantial non-nuclear action. This conclusion seems particularly evident since the policy of massive retaliation and Berlin contingency planning were both completed in 1954 and were undoubtedly related in the series of papers the National Security Council produced that year. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 19.

57. Acheson, "Wishing Won't Hold Berlin," *Saturday Evening Post*, March 7, 1959, p. 86.

50 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

the Western Hemisphere. The Soviets, in his mind, forced the issue to learn how the United States would react. He diagnosed the crisis as a contest of wills and he proposed a reaction appropriate to the contest. He said: "... the Soviets must be convinced that we are genuinely determined to keep traffic to Berlin open, at whatever risk, rather than abandon the people of Berlin and permit the whole Western position to crumble."⁵⁸

He proposed reducing reliance on massive retaliation because the U.S. no longer had a nuclear monopoly. Instead, he favored an initial and extended non-nuclear response for Berlin contingencies: "the only visible alternative is to use Western conventional power to remove obstacles to traffic to and from Berlin, both on land and in the air." He urged "a building-up of NATO power in Europe, an increase in American troop strength and a return of British and French divisions to the continent, possibly Turkish and Italian re-inforcements, and a strengthening of NATO's tactical air force." Also, he argued for a mobilization of Army strength and a "crash" ICBM program to close an anticipated missile gap.

Acheson suggested that these actions would raise risks for the Soviets to ponder because "the West would have disclosed the will to resist." These measures—Acheson's argument aside for the moment —would have been spectacularly offensive to Khrushchev's prestige, making it more difficult for him to back away. A contest of wills is peculiarly difficult for a great power to refuse.

General Taylor supported Acheson's call for non-nuclear military options, although not necessarily all of Acheson's measures. Taylor also announced that General Norstad had requested supplemental forces for the "deadline crisis" and that he, Taylor, had seconded the request.⁵⁹ In another context, he said that in the event of an engagement between Soviet and United States troops: "I would expect that at such a time common sense would apply and I could well visualize a considerable preliminary phase before the fateful decision to pass to general war were taken."⁶⁰

58. *Ibid.*

59. *The New York Times*, March 15, 1959, p. 1; *The Washington Post*, March 15, 1959, p. 1.

60. *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 20, 1959, p. 16. In his later book, Taylor recommended a substitute policy for massive retaliation which he called "The Strategy of Flexible Response." He complained that the Eisenhower policy inhibited Berlin contingency planning. *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 6, 8. The Kennedy Administration, in 1961, used Taylor's phrasing, "flexible response," to describe its own military policy.

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY 51

Most importantly, Acheson and Taylor proposed forces needed for the fallback position missing from Dulles' brief. Some of Acheson's proposals probably exceeded what was needed. He candidly admitted nuclear war could result from the course he recommended. He believed that the Soviets would reverse themselves when confronted with an obvious will to resist. He stressed the military aspects of the crisis because he saw little chance for successful negotiations if the Soviet Union insisted it would negotiate only on its own terms. He thought negotiations on arms limitations in Europe could be useful if the Soviets would consent to troop reductions. In any event, he thought it would be most unwise to put off a confrontation. The risks would be greater for all parties the longer the issue remained unresolved. He particularly feared the effects on Bonn of a prolonged crisis.

The administration ignored its critics. The President implied that even if Congress appropriated increases for conventional forces, he would not expend the appropriations.⁶¹ The administration's defense of its policies indicated that it lacked military options. On February 18, President Eisenhower declared at a press conference that the Soviets would be responsible for war over Berlin. He also said, "We are not saying that we are going to shoot our way into Berlin."⁶² This statement did not explain how the Soviets would realize that they were responsible for a nuclear war, particularly if the United States would have to initiate one because it refused to shoot its way into Berlin with conventional forces. He did not say, for example, that the Soviet Union should be aware that the United States would initiate appropriate military action if Moscow interrupted access to Berlin.

On February 25, in response to a question from the press on the subject of Berlin contingency planning, the President stated that "plans" existed for defending Berlin, implying the existence of alternatives to massive retaliation.⁶³ But he reiterated on March 12: "We are certainly not going to fight a ground war in Europe. What good would it do to send a few more thousand or indeed even a few divisions of troops to Europe?" Presumably, massive retaliation remained the only significant possibility. The President balked at this conclusion in the following exchange:

61. *The New York Times*, March 12, 1959, p. 12.

62. *Ibid.*, February 19, 1959, p. 1.

63. *Ibid.*, February 26, 1959, p. 12.

52 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

Q. Is the United States prepared to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend free Berlin?

A. Well, I don't know how you could free anything with nuclear weapons. I can say this: the United States, and its Allies, have announced their firm intention of preserving their rights and responsibilities with respect to Berlin. If any threat, or any push in the direction of real hostilities is going to occur, it's going to occur from the side of the Soviets.

Now if that would become reality, and I don't believe that anyone would be senseless enough to push that to the point of reality, then there will be the time to decide exactly what the Allies would in turn, expect to do.⁶⁴

In other words, the President admitted that a nuclear defense of Berlin would be self-defeating. Yet, when asked if he envisaged an intermediate response to a Berlin contingency, he answered: "No. I think we might as well understand that—might well all of us understand this: I didn't say that nuclear war is a complete impossibility. I said it couldn't, as I see it, free anything. Destruction is not a good police force."

The administration continued to rely on a massive retaliation policy in the "deadline crisis," nonetheless acknowledging the contradiction that destruction caused by massive retaliation "is not a good police force."⁶⁵ The contradiction is, of course, inherent in defending West Berlin and is the source of the nightmare associated with the risks of war in a Berlin crisis. Conventional military options can alleviate—they do not remove—the contradiction. With saber-rattling, the Soviet Union can always make the problem scary. If the President did not believe the Soviets would be "senseless enough" to "push in the direction of real hostilities," they could confound his thinking by acting close to the brink. In 1958, they were prepared to press the administration quite far on Berlin to extract concessions on Bonn's access to nuclear weapons. But without the local forces to at least raise the nuclear threshold and maneuver the Soviets into some hard choices of their own, the administration had no way to even alleviate

64. *Ibid.*, March 13, 1959, p. 12.

65. By March 8, Secretary of Defense McElroy had rejected the Army's proposal for increasing conventional forces. He said it would be very difficult to restrict a military contingency in Berlin to "limited war" proportions. *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 9, 1959, p. 9.

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY

the harshness of the contradiction posed by a rational defense of Berlin.

### 5. Dulles' Travels

Thus armed or disarmed without a fallback defense of Berlin, Dulles proceeded in late January and early February to prepare for East-West negotiations. Before these negotiations could begin, he had to fashion an agreed Western position. Soon after Mikoyan departed Washington, Secretary Dulles announced he would be visiting London, Paris, and Bonn. Acknowledged differences persisted among the Atlantic allies on the content and timing of negotiations. Dulles had to contend with a wide range of approaches to the "deadline crisis." At one end of the spectrum, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan proposed tactics of even greater flexibility than Dulles and favored a relatively early conference with the Soviets. He shared Dulles' premise that the Soviet Union initiated the crisis to obtain security guarantees. At the other end were the French, who looked askance at diplomatic flexibility and favored a later conference, after the May 27 deadline expired. They did not share Dulles' views about Soviet motives. Chancellor Adenauer, while appearing more flexible than President Charles de Gaulle, actually preferred the French position or something harder.⁶⁶ Dulles found himself in the middle of this range of opinion.

In London, Dulles discovered that the British wanted an East-West conference by late April or early May in Geneva.⁶⁷ In addition, Macmillan wanted to take diplomatic initiatives himself. Nineteen fifty-nine was an election year. The day before Dulles arrived, the London press reported that Macmillan would visit the Soviet Union to hold bilateral discussions on Berlin and other issues with Khru-shchev.⁶⁸ Dulles believed that Macmillan's move probably would an-tagonize de Gaulle and Adenauer. In London, Macmillan confirmed that Khrushchev, at Macmillan's suggestion, had consented to bilateral discussions. Dulles apparently did not raise strong objections.

Now it seemed a little more urgent that they reach a meeting of minds on what, exactly, should be negotiated. Together, they ex-

66. *The New York Times*, February 1, 1959, p. 1.

67. *The Herald Tribune*, February 2, 1959, p. 2; *The New York Times*, February 4, 1959, p. 3.

68. *The Times* (London), February 3, 1959, p. 10.

54 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

plored possible security measures which might be conceded to the Soviets in exchange for concessions loosening Moscow's hold on Germany. Dulles did not have the same longstanding passion for limiting arms that Macmillan did. Dulles earlier opposed any suggestion that the Western powers should withdraw from Central Europe—a suggestion which figured explicitly in British plans for limiting nuclear and non-nuclear forces on both sides in Central Europe. He still flatly opposed disengagement in 1959. However, his consideration with Macmillan of a possible exchange of concessions over Berlin drew him—interestingly enough—into a serious exploration of British proposals that he had previously rejected.

Macmillan and Dulles agreed to an early foreign ministers' conference. Macmillan seemed amenable to an "agent" arrangement with the East Germans for Berlin access. Dulles heard Macmillan's opposition to any plans for ground countermeasures as they discussed interallied contingency planning.⁶⁹ In spite of the technical difficulties, the British preferred an airlift because, they argued, it was to the West's advantage to force the Soviets into a position where they would have to take responsibility for the first shot.

After his consultation with Dulles, Macmillan officially announced he would visit the Soviet Union for the purpose of exploring "what our policies and actions should be."⁷⁰ Actually, he wanted to test Khrushchev's reaction to Western assurances of European security, including: (1) British proposals—dating back to the Geneva Conference of 1955—for the creation of a "bigger state" embracing West Germany and a neutral East Germany; (2) suggestions for precautions against surprise attack on the central front; and (3) a partial reduction and limited withdrawal of Soviet and Western forces in a zone incorporating Central Europe. Macmillan insisted he did not and could not plan to negotiate anything. He simply wished to explore the Soviet proposals, he said, and to outline Western ones.

Paris did not react favorably to Macmillan's Moscow visit. The French deplored his timing. De Gaulle predicted that the Soviets would think the Western powers were eager to negotiate within the deadline period.⁷¹ He opposed an East-West conference before May

69. *The New York Times*, February 11, 1959, p. 1.

70. *Ibid.*, February 6, 1959.

71. *Ibid.*, February 5, 1959, p. 3.

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY

27, arguing that negotiations in the context of Soviet threats would jeopardize the occupation regime in Berlin. De Gaulle also informed Dulles that France held to the 1955 free elections formula for German unity without much confidence that the Soviets would accept that formula now. De Gaulle expressed reluctance in promoting changes in the status quo and opposed the so-called "agent theory." Agreeing with the British, he preferred an airlift to a ground probe for contingency planning.

In Bonn, Dulles and Adenauer reached a general accommodation. They did not attempt to build specific joint positions. Although unfavorable to flexible diplomatic tactics, Adenauer agreed anyway to negotiations with the Soviets before May 27. He had reservations about the proposals for European security which Dulles and Macmillan contemplated. He decided not to obstruct Dulles' efforts because, in any event, the future of the Federal Republic lay with the alliance. Adenauer deferred to Dulles, leaving the United States free to probe the Soviet proposals without having to specify beforehand the type of settlement to be reached.⁷² Dulles and Adenauer agreed to a "no concessions without counterconcessions" formula.⁷³ On the military aspect of Berlin access, the West Germans also agreed with the British that an airlift would be the least dangerous course.⁷⁴ They rejected Dulles' "agent" proposal.

While none of his allies changed position, Dulles, on returning to Washington, expressed satisfaction: "We are willing to talk with the Soviets in a sincere effort to reach agreements."⁷⁵ Thus the alliance moved toward negotiations before May 27. The French opposed negotiations and consented only because they did not, at this point, want to be diplomatically isolated. The British desired early negotiations and led the way toward them. Dulles rested, satisfied he had brought the alliance to the point where it accepted early negotiations. The specific terms of negotiations remained controversial and undetermined. If negotiations failed, he said: "We are in general agreement as to the procedures we shall follow if physical means are

72. Charles Wighton, *Adenauer-Democratic Dictator* (London: Frederick Muller, Limited, 1963), pp. 273-274.

73. *The Times* (London), February 9, 1959, p. 8.

74. Bonn preferred an airlift anyway to avoid total interruption of civilian traffic to West Berlin.

75. *Documents*. p. 413.

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RIDING THE STORM

This was very useful although very diffuse. I think I got him round to my view of a Summit Conference. Meanwhile, telegrams came in showing (a) that the Americans are against us, (b) that the French have ratted-and gone back on what de Gaulle and the others had more or less agreed.¹

While the Chancellor and I were talking rather at large, the others held a much more businesslike discussion. At the full conference in the afternoon we persuaded the Germans to agree with our view of procedure; that is, that a date for the Summit should be fixed as well as one for the Foreign Ministers. They also agreed to try to persuade the French.

We left Bonn at 5.45 p.m. (German time), arriving in London just after 6 p.m. (London time). We at once decided to send a firm telegram to Washington maintaining our view. There was already an allied working group in Paris, drafting a joint reply to the Russian note. We therefore instructed our delegate

not to accept any draft reply to the Russian note except on our lines. This means, for the moment, complete deadlock. But it is a great thing to have got such complete agreement with the Germans. For (if they do not switch back, like the French) they have a good deal of influence with the Americans.¹

I noted in my diary:

Dr. Adenauer seems to have said some very nice things about me and our visit to the radio and the journalists *after* we had left. This is encouraging.²

Although the Germans, like the French, seemed to be yielding a little, so also were the Americans. At any rate no answer could be sent on behalf of the three Western Governments until I had seen the President. Meanwhile, I had to turn my mind to another subject. So many are the preoccupations and so manifold the duties of modern Ministers-especially Prime Ministers-that the greater part of the day before I left for America was spent in listening to and answering an animated debate in the House of Commons on the Suez operations of three years before. It arose in this way. It was

¹ 13 March 1959.

² 14 March 1959.

A VOYAGE OF DISCOVERY

641

necessary to obtain Parliamentary approval of the financial agreement which we had finally reached with the Egyptian Government.

Chancellor of Exchequer opened-with a dull but sufficient speech, explaining the provisions. Gaitskell followed with an admirable speech, attacking the whole Suez episode, and ending with a call for my impeachment. (This was the only mistake. It was a bit too melodramatic.) It was one of the best speeches I have heard him make.¹

After this the discussion rather dragged itself along in a very thin House.

We got-very strangely-a majority of seventy² although both sides had Three-line Whips and it was a Vote of Censure.¹

At 2 a.m. on the morning of 18 March Selwyn Lloyd and I, with our usual staffs, left London Airport in a Comet, arriving at Ottawa at 7.30 a.m., Canadian time. We were met by the Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, and drove with him to Government House.

The Canadians have suffered a grievous loss by the sudden death of Sidney Smith, Minister for External Affairs. This happened yesterday afternoon. He died of a heart attack. He was an agreeable and talented man-a university professor brought suddenly into politics by Diefenbaker.... He had just begun to find his feet.

We asked the Canadians yesterday afternoon (when we heard this news) about cancelling or postponing our visit. But they were strongly opposed to this.

I naturally made a reference to this sad event in my little speech at the airport.³

It was pleasant to be once more at Rideau Hall. My bedroom was in the old oval room which Dorothy and her sisters had used as a sitting-room more than forty years before. Vincent Massey, the Governor-General, received me with his usual hospitality. He

has aged a lot since I last saw him. He is, however, as elegant, cultivated, and charming as ever.³

¹ 16 March 1959.

² At this time our normal majority in the House of Commons was only about fifty.

³ 18 March 1959.

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I was glad that this time we had reversed the usual process by going to Ottawa before going to Washington. The Canadians certainly appreciated the gesture.

From 10 a.m. until noon we had a talk with the Prime Minister. He had with him only Howard Green, the Conservative Leader in the House of Commons.

I made the Foreign Secretary do most of the talking. The Prime Minister asked intelligent questions. He and his Ministers are very sympathetic with our point of view and agree completely with us about how to handle the Berlin and German problem. This is partly due to confidence in us (Diefenbaker has always been very friendly with me personally, dating from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference) and perhaps even more results from their deep suspicion-amounting now to active dislike of the Eisenhower Administration.¹

At noon we both attended a full meeting of the Canadian Cabinet.

I gave an exposé of the European situation, etc., and of our Russian impressions. They seemed to be quite happy about this.¹

After luncheon with Diefenbaker we were taken to the gallery in the House of Commons where a curious little scene occurred.

The Prime Minister referred to our presence in the gallery. This was received with great applause. We got up and bowed.

We heard the Prime Minister's speech on Sidney Smith. Mike Pearson followed (as Leader of Opposition) and then a Socialist. It was all very well done, in the best Parliamentary tradition.¹

The rest of the day was taken up with further talks with ministers and between officials on both sides on a number of Anglo-Canadian questions. This was followed by a party given by the High Commissioner and dinner at Government House. Considering our early start I was glad that the last event was small and informal.

The next day, 19 March, we arrived at Washington at noon where we were met by Vice-President Nixon, Chris Herter, Under-Secretary of State, and two old friends from Algiers days-Robert Murphy and Frederick Reinhardt. The British Ambassador was

¹ 18 March 1959.

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643

also there, and when we got to the Embassy was able to give us the latest news.

Since Foster's last visit to Europe, Caccia has not seen him at all. He went straight into hospital, where he still is. (The President, incidentally, rang up before luncheon to welcome me and suggested that we should call at the hospital to see him tomorrow.)

Senator Fulbright (Democrat; Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee) and Senator Aiken (Republican) came at 5 p.m. and stayed an hour. They both seemed to have moderate and sensible views.¹

There was dinner at the White House where I was glad to meet again Mrs. Foster Dulles.

Janet was as delightful as ever-but she looked, not naturally, pretty tired and worn.

The position about Foster seems to be still obscure. He has had a new and very fatiguing treatment which may or may not succeed in 'retarding' the spread of the cancer. Nobody sees him, except the President-who goes every other day. He reads papers and summaries of telegrams and rings the State Department. He is still Secretary of State. ... This has now been the position for several weeks and is causing a good deal of confusion at such a critical moment.

Janet Dulles wants [Foster] to resign. She told me that she wanted to take him away from Washington-to the South-for a bit. She clearly feels that he cannot live very long, and would like to make his remaining time as happy as possible. But I fear that to keep working is his idea of happiness, and that he clings to the job. The President, out of loyalty to his friend-whom he trusts and reveres-will not ask for his resignation.¹

The next morning we went to the White House, where the President gave me his usual friendly welcome. Then followed a rather tragic scene which is best described from my diary:

> Foreign Secretary and I went to White House. President met us, and we motored with him to the Walter Reed Hospital. Foster Dulles was sitting up, in dressing-gown, and although

¹ 19 March 1959.

644

RIDING THE STORM

very thin and even emaciated, talked with conviction and vigour. But it was even more of a monologue than ordinarily, and his views much more inflexible than they had seemed at our last talk. It was a strange scene. The President sat on a sofa, the Foreign Secretary and I sat in low armchairs in the sitting-room of this 'hospital suite' ... while Foster-in another chair, higher and harder, discoursed on Communism, Germany, Berlin, etc. He was *against* almost everything. He was strongly against the idea of a *Summit*; he did not much like the Foreign Ministers' Meeting. He thought we could 'stick it out' in Berlin, and that the Russians would not dare to interfere with us. There would be no war-unless the Russians challenged it.

The President did not say anything. I said a few words, which I afterwards regretted, because I felt I ought not to have argued at all with this dying man. Foster could *not* have been nicer or more genuinely glad to see us. He had particularly asked to see me and took my hand and held it clasped in his two hands for quite a few moments when we said goodbye. It was a splendid exhibition of courage and devotion. But I felt that his illness had made his mind more rigid and reverting to very fixed concepts. I felt also sorry for the President.¹

When we left the hospital at 12.30 p.m. we drove to a naval installation where the helicopters were waiting.

We had about thirty-five to forty minutes in the air and got... to Camp David (F.D.R.'s 'Shangri-La') about 1.30 p.m. The President has to rest *before* a meal-so luncheon was not till about 2.15 p.m.¹

The President was in capital form, clearly very glad to escape from the White House.

This is a delightful spot, 1800 feet up, surrounded by woodland, overlooking a wide valley with the mountains beyond. There is a main hut or bungalow-a large 'sun-parlour'-with also room for ten or twelve to eat. My bedroom, the President's, Herter's and Selwyn Lloyd's are in this main building-very simple but very comfortable. The rest of the party live in huts-some with one and some with two bedrooms-which are scattered

¹ 20 March 1959.

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645

about the camp. We have brought with us Brook, Caccia, Hoyer Millar and Bishop as *permanent* members of the Camp party. Others are flown in, as wanted, and return to Washington-by helicopter.¹

We began talks at 3 p.m. which lasted on and off until dinner.

The whole of today was taken up with the draft reply to the last Soviet note and how to phrase our references to the Foreign Ministers' and the Summit meeting. At times, we got quite heated-indeed I made an outburst just before dinner, and said I would have to send a separate note, and we must 'agree to differ'. President got quite animated. Eventually, I said that each side had better produce their own drafts, going as far as they could to meet the other's point of view-then we could 'sleep on it' and reach a final conclusion the next day. This was agreed.

The fact is that the President-left to himself-is *very* reasonable and wants to help. He especially wants to help me. He took me out for a drive alone in his car to his Gettysburg Farm in the course of the afternoon-as a break between the discussions-and was most friendly and intimate. He spoke freely about Foster-a few weeks must decide whether the disease could be 'retarded' or not. He thought it unlikely that he could go on. But whom could he appoint? Herter was good-but after his own and Foster's illness, was it wise to have a man who could only walk with crutches? Foster has been ringing up from the hospital to find out what is happening, and of course Murphy and Libby Merchant take the rigid State Department view. Herter is himself much more flexible. He is also a really charming man. As he has been a long time (twenty years or more) in politics, he is much more aware of public feeling than the State Department officials.¹

Throughout our talks the American Ambassador in London, Jock Whitney, was particularly helpful. He seemed to have a considerable influence with the President. After dinner the great problem of the draft reply was left aside.

We had a film, called *The Great Country* or some such name. It was a 'Western'. It lasted three hours! It was inconceivably banal.¹

¹ 20 March 1959.

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Telegrams from home began to arrive, sometimes a source of more trouble and sometimes comforting. On this occasion the news proved good.

The unemployment debate was obviously a triumph for Macleod. Bevan made a fool of himself in the Cyprus debate. Both the Harrow and Belfast by-elections have gone well. There is much talk of an early election in all the papers.¹

The next morning, after nearly half-an-hour's discussion between the President and myself, we agreed a draft reply which was in the nature of a compromise.

Both 'sides' were up early and exchanging drafts and counter-drafts. The whole spirit was excellent and really co-operative. Merchant was helpful, and I felt that the President had told his people to go as far as they possibly could to meet us. So I thought it wise to accept, among many phrases and paragraphs that I liked, some words that I did not like so much.²

In effect Eisenhower accepted our definition of the purpose of the Foreign Ministers' meeting:

to reach positive agreements over as wide a field as possible, and in any case to narrow the differences between the respective points of view and to prepare constructive proposals for consideration by a conference of Heads of Government later in the summer.

We had to agree to the somewhat ambivalent formula proposed by the President to the effect that 'as soon as developments in the Foreign Ministers' meeting warrant holding a Summit Conference' the Heads of Government would be glad to participate. We got off the necessary telegrams both to the French and the Germans as well as to the NATO Powers. In spite of my apprehensions, none of these raised any objections, and the joint note from the United States, the United Kingdom and France was presented in Moscow on 25 March in the terms which had been settled at Camp David. The note in effect proposed that the Foreign Ministers should start their conference on 11 May in Geneva, and that arrangements for

¹ 20 March 1959.

² 21 March 1959.

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647

a Summit meeting should be referred to it. On 30 March the Soviet agreement was received. This therefore brought to a conclusion the first stage of the results of the Moscow visit. We must now wait and see what the conference would bring.

After our discussions about the Summit at Camp David we went on to a useful discussion on Germany and Berlin. This is summarised in my diary.

Emergency planning for Berlin in the event of a blockade. The American Defence people seemed much more realistic than they had been some months and weeks ago. I do not now fear that they will take (unless some generals get out of hand) any dangerous action. ... There was a long argument about exactly what would be done in different circumstances, ranging from a D.D.R. NCO stamping a pass in place of a U.S.S.R. one, to something amounting to a refusal of passage of our military stores. They seem at last to be realising that civilian traffic, by which the two and a quarter million people of Western Berlin live and have their being, is much more important than anything else. Since there has not been, at present, any word about stopping this, we must be careful not to take-in relation to our military traffic-action which would lead to a general blockade. Then it would be really we who would have blockaded Berlin.

We then passed to our ideas as to 'limitation and inspection of forces in an agreed area'. The President (in spite of almost universal disapproval of his military advisers) rather liked the idea. He quite saw that we *must* have something constructive if we are to resist the dangerous Rapacki plan and what is called 'disengagement'. The President felt that we should work out big and imaginative proposals and not always be driven to a purely negative position. General [Nathan] Twining winced at this.¹

The next and most complex problem to be discussed was that of the abolition or restriction of atomic tests. Before leaving for Moscow I had taken up with the President the possibility of reaching some agreement by a compromise on the control system. But progress had been very slow, and on 10 March, since the Soviet representatives were still maintaining the right of veto over inspection teams, the President had told me that he thought the time had

¹ 21 March 1959.

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come for the conference in Geneva to go into recess, if only to
demonstrate that the West did not intend to make any further con-
cessions. I accepted this in a message on 13 March; but I con-
sidered that a date for reconvening the Geneva conference ought to
be made public at the same time. To this the President agreed.
Accordingly, when we were at Camp David, we had a long discus-
sion about the future of the conference.

Although no final conclusion was reached, we agreed that we
could not let the conference fail. If it broke down, it would be
best to do so on Russian intransigence about controls. Even then,
it would perhaps be possible to get an agreed statement of
differences on outstanding points and try to get them settled at
the Summit.

I asked what would happen if the Russians were not unyielding
about control. President said that we should take the agreement
[about atmospheric tests]-at least for three or four years-and
let underground testing go hang. He knew his advisers would be
shocked, both he and Foster thought the political gain would out-
weigh any technical disadvantage. I was very glad to hear this.¹

On Sunday 22 March, while the President and I went to church
in a neighbouring village where he read the lesson, our advisers dis-
cussed in general the problems of the Middle and the Far East.

On returning, we started on Middle East and reached a good
measure of agreement on what we could or could not do together
and the dangers against which we must plan. The Americans did
not try to push us too much into Nasser's arms, although (like us)
they are very worried about Iraq.¹

We also had in the course of the day an excellent discussion on
economic questions. On our side

we deployed, with some vigour, our grievances-on tariffs, quotas,
and cancelled contracts. The situation is getting worse not better.
There is a threat that all 'electrical' contracts are to be forbidden.

President and Herter both proclaimed their own belief in
'liberalising' trade. But they were very eloquent about their
difficulties. Congress is hostile; lobbying and log-rolling are rife;

¹ 22 March 1959.

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649

the Republican Party is just as uncontrollable as the Democrats,
and the Democrats (for all their talk) just as Protectionist as the
Republicans. It was rather a pathetic reply to our protests. For
the first time in our talks, President was really embarrassed.
However, we stuck to our point, and I hope the discussion may
prove useful.¹

We continued our pressure on Washington with varying success in
the months that followed. The only real satisfaction we achieved was
the removal of the ban, often capriciously applied on grounds of
national security after considerable expense had been incurred in
winning a contract, on certain classes of heavy electrical supplies.

We left Camp David by road at 4 p.m. In the course of the drive
the President

talked at large about the future of the world. He is certainly a
strange mixture. With all his crudity and lack of elegance of
expression, he has some very remarkable ideas.¹

His chief theme was the need to 'institutionalise' the nations of the
free world. Somehow or other Britain and the Commonwealth,
Europe and the United States ought to be able to develop more
precise methods of resisting Communism all over the world.

He developed this theme at some length-monetary, tariff and
all other policy could be unified, and our power *together* would be
much more-three or four times more-than our power separ-
ately, however closely we work together. For our present co-
operation depends too much on personal factors, like our own
friendship.¹

On the way back

we called to see poor Foster Dulles at his house (he has left the
hospital for a day or two, but returns for further observation).
He seemed much better than on Friday-altogether a different
man. He talked much more sensibly, and seemed to bear no
resentment against the decisions taken at Camp David. No
doubt his intransigence on Friday was the result of his weakness
and the terrible time he has been through.¹

¹ 22 March 1959.

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This was the last time I saw Dulles. He resigned on 15 April and died on 24 May. With all his faults, he had an element of greatness—a strange and essentially lonely man.

The following afternoon, after the usual Press conference, we had a talk with Douglas Dillon and Robert Anderson, which although frank never ceased to be friendly.

We had a good 'go' with Dillon and Co. about American Protectionism, particularly the wool quota and the disgraceful way our electrical machinery contracts are being treated. The trouble is that they agree with us, but seem to be helpless in face of the [vested interests] which dominate American politics on these issues.¹

The final meeting at the White House served to initial an agreed record of our discussions and decisions and make our farewells. At 5 p.m. I saw the Commonwealth Ambassadors for an hour and gave them an account of our journeying since 20 February. At 6 p.m. a party was given by the Vice-President, Nixon, with a number of leading Senators and Congress leaders, Republican and Democrat.

They gave us quite a 'gruelling' for an hour or more—this was a most useful exercise, as these are the men who really control Congress.¹

We reached home the following morning. The long odyssey arising from my decision to visit Moscow was now concluded. We could only wait hopefully for the development of events. Meanwhile there were some skirmishes with the Russians before the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries, which seemed to me unpromising.

I sent as usual accounts of what had taken place at Washington to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, de Gaulle and Adenauer. In the course of his reply the Chancellor once again expressed his fears lest the Western powers showed insufficient firmness. One paragraph is revealing:

> I do indeed hope that in the conferences to come the free peoples of the West will make a firmly united stand in their discussions with Khrushchev. I know from my experiences of the

¹ 23 March 1959.

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651

National-Socialist era in Germany how strong a position the dictator holds in the conduct of negotiations, free as he is to disregard any possible effect on public opinion and the views of his own Parliament. During the years of National-Socialist rule I realised how difficult was the task of inspiring a spirit of unity amongst the free peoples vis-à-vis the dictator Hitler. I do most earnestly hope that we can all learn from history, thrusting differences of opinion into the background so that the common cause which unites us can come the more prominently to the fore.

I also made my usual report to the House of Commons, which went well enough. The NATO Council met in Washington from 2 April to 4 April, celebrating the tenth anniversary of its foundation.

The telegrams from Washington about the NATO meeting are not very good. The Germans are behaving in a very crude and silly way, and the French are joining them in attacking Britain for 'defeatism'. This is quite contrary to the real views of the German Ministers and officials, von Brentano; Scherpenberg, etc., as well as Couve de Murville and M. Joxe. But the Germans are frightened of Adenauer. . . . The French are equally afraid of de Gaulle, whom it suits to support Adenauer politically in return for German help financially and in economic policy—particularly French 'protectionism'. The Americans are leaderless (both Eisenhower and Dulles have left Washington for the South—the former for a 'golfing holiday', the latter (I fear) to die.¹

The Geneva conference was about to reassemble after its recess. Unfortunately scientific opinion had changed since the report of the experts a year before. It was now believed possible to conceal much larger underground tests than had previously been estimated. But the President, and I agreed with him, was anxious to make some move before the conference reassembled. After an interchange of a number of messages a policy was settled. The United States repeated their wish to make a comprehensive agreement covering all forms of testing, if Russia would give up her insistence upon a veto on all inspections and become less intransigent in the application of control. However, if Russia would or could not co-operate on that basis,

¹ 4 April 1959.

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then we would be prepared to accept a limited agreement prohibiting atmospheric tests up to a distance of fifty kilometres above the earth. This agreement could be enforced without elaborate controls and these after all were the tests which were the most injurious to human health. At the same time, research into the possibility of effective control either above fifty kilometres or underground might continue.

Unfortunately the Russians' first reactions were unfavourable. Indeed Khrushchev now began a somewhat crude attempt to break up the solidarity of the Western powers. He sent me a long letter, dated 14 April, of nine closely typed foolscap pages. Much of it was devoted to somewhat effusive praise of my efforts, both in going to Russia and in my visits to Paris, Bonn and Washington and expressing the hope that a Summit could soon be arranged. But the most important part of the letter was an attack upon the aggressiveness of the United States and the 'stupid inflammatory statements being made by their military leaders'. It was skilfully drafted and being purely personal in character put me in some difficulty. In acknowledging it briefly I reminded Khrushchev that we were still awaiting his reply to the proposal for at least a limited ban on tests, which had been sent to him a few days before. I also told the Russian Ambassador that although I would treat the letter as a private letter, I would make known to my French, American and German colleagues that part of it which contained suggestions for the Foreign Ministers' meeting and the points bearing on a possible Summit Conference. In doing so I made it clear to our allies that while it was obvious that Khrushchev was trying to drive a wedge between Britain and her friends, he was genuinely afraid of the power of the United States and was anxious for a Summit meeting. Khrushchev followed up his letter by a protest to the United States and Germany about missile bases in Europe. When he finally replied to our suggestion for the ban of atmospheric tests he declined the limited prohibition which we proposed, on the grounds that it 'left the problem of the arms race unsolved'. At the same time he took up a suggestion, which I had put forward in conversation in Moscow, that the number of on-the-spot investigations of suspicious phenomena might be limited to three or four a year on each

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side. This, on consideration, was unacceptable to our allies. Both Eisenhower and de Gaulle rightly felt that Khrushchev was merely trying to cause trouble between us before the Foreign Ministers' conference met.

In an audience with the Queen I had referred to Khrushchev's personal letter in some detail. After a visit to Windsor on 21 April I wrote to her in the following terms:

> Since Your Majesty showed such interest in the private letter which Mr. Khrushchev sent me I am arranging for a copy to be sent. What seems to me so important in this letter is not so much the proposals that it makes but the tone and character and style of the communication. It is quite unlike the normal and polemic epistle which he sends from time to time and publishes almost before the recipient has had time to get it. This seems to me to have certain elements of sincerity. At any rate it is worth studying from the psychological point of view if we are to make progress in negotiating with the Soviet Government—which in fact means Prime Minister Khrushchev.

Accordingly, in replying to Khrushchev, I thought it wise to adopt the same tone and to send as long a reply as I could devise, for it seemed bad manners to make a short answer to so prolix an epistle. I therefore began by reassuring Khrushchev that whatever might be the occasional foolish statements made by military men in all countries, from my personal knowledge the American leadership was working anxiously for peace:

> I can assure you of this: I have now known President Eisenhower intimately for some seventeen years. I know most of his leading advisers and friends. I am absolutely convinced that the American Government has no such intention as you fear, and this for two reasons: First, they are men of high moral standing to whom the idea of loosing all this horror upon the world would be utterly repugnant. They would think it wrong. Secondly, they know quite enough about the military strength of the Soviet Union not to underestimate it. Such a policy, therefore, in addition to being wrong, would be foolish; for nobody can make a nice calculation of the precise degree of damage which each country would have to face at the end of a nuclear war. I do hope

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that you will put out of your mind the suspicion that the Americans have any such intention. I believe that if you recall even the short meeting that you had with President Eisenhower, at Geneva, you will be convinced of what I have said.

After referring to the Anglo-Soviet agreements which we had reached in March and the forthcoming visit of the President of the Board of Trade to Moscow, I argued that the best method of reducing world tension was to plod on steadily, even if slowly, with discussing the issues which might cause trouble and trying to deal with them one by one. In Khrushchev's long letter he had revived the idea of a non-aggression pact between Britain and Russia. On this I observed,

> the re-creation of international confidence will be a gradual process. There are no short-cuts to this goal. We must work towards it by steady and patient discussion of the issues which still divide us—in the hope that the resolution of some of our differences will bring confidence to seek wider agreements.

The conclusion of a formal pact of non-aggression is no substitute for this process of removing misunderstandings and resolving differences. It could not in itself give the international confidence which we need. All the members of the United Nations have, after all, bound themselves to renounce aggression by adhering to the provisions of the Charter: but this has not prevented the fears and suspicions which have grown up between the nations of the world since the end of the war. In my view, therefore, a pact of non-aggression cannot be our starting point: it must rather be the culmination of the efforts on which we are now engaged to reach a better stage of international understanding. But it is my earnest hope that, if those efforts succeed, they may be crowned by a formal multilateral pact of non-aggression to which all the principal countries of the world could adhere. Meanwhile I would be willing, as I told you in Moscow, to make a general declaration on the lines which I suggested in Moscow if you thought that this would be useful.

The Opposition, during this anxious time, were considerate in not pressing for too much information. There was a Foreign Affairs debate on 27 April, but I did not think it necessary to take part.

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Greatly to the confusion of some of his Party, Bevan made an unequivocal declaration that if the Labour Party returned to power, they would at once stop all atom and hydrogen bomb tests. The debate 'passed off very quietly—Foreign Secretary made an excellent speech, pitched in a low and business-like tone'.¹

This private correspondence with Khrushchev was something of an anxiety. De Gaulle took it very calmly as a mere piece of manœuvring. Adenauer was more concerned, and wrote on 30 April:

> An exchange of letters with Khrushchev at this moment seems to me a bad idea. Most probably it would give the Soviet dictator the impression that he will in actual fact succeed in driving a wedge in the Western front.

Eisenhower, who was now sending frequent and confidential messages about many of his own problems, had complete confidence in my good faith. Nevertheless I thought it right, in view of my long friendship and close relations with the President, to send him, through the British Ambassador, a package containing the text of the private correspondence between Khrushchev and myself. I asked him to read it and return it. No one else had seen this correspondence except the Foreign Secretary. As I told Caccia, I had not even mentioned it to the Cabinet. I thought it a good thing to keep this private, 'because, although it may be rather a long shot, I think it might be useful to keep this line open—it might be useful in an emergency'.

On 7 May the American Ambassador in London handed me the following reply from the President:

> Thank you very much for your Top Secret and Personal letter of May fifth. I am handling it exactly as you suggested; I have made no copy of any kind and I am sending back the two attachments through the British Embassy in a sealed envelope.

> Your recent summarisation of the Khrushchev message had already given me a quite clear understanding of the entire document; but of course I do appreciate your anxiety to make sure that you and I personally remain as close on these matters as we possibly can.

¹ 27 April 1959.

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I should like to say also that I am in complete agreement with your answer. It is courteous but firm.

Thus ended, on a note of uncertainty and even anxiety, this phase in the long struggle between the Communist powers and the free world. Much would depend upon the meeting of Foreign Ministers about to be opened. It was clear to me that the Russians would avoid any real negotiation, but try to treat it as a mere preliminary to fix the procedure and date of the Summit meeting which they wanted. It was equally likely that the President would not agree to a Summit meeting unless some reasonable progress had been made by the Foreign Ministers. It would be on the horns of this dilemma that I felt sure I should soon be impaled. Meanwhile we must wait upon events. The path to the Summit was indeed to prove both tortuous and perilous.

CHAPTER XIX

The Cyprus Tangle

THE problem of Cyprus, to which I had devoted so much fruitless endeavour during my short period as Foreign Secretary,¹ returned in a most painful form at the very beginning of my Premiership, when the decision to release Archbishop Makarios from detention in the Seychelles resulted in the resignation of my colleague and old friend Lord Salisbury.² Although the Government survived the shock of Lord Salisbury's resignation, we entered, in the spring of 1957, upon a painful and sometimes dangerous journey in relation to Cyprus, which was not destined to reach a conclusion for another two years.

The conference with the Greeks and Turks held in London in the summer of 1955³ had at least demonstrated to the world that Cyprus was not a mere 'colonial' question but a great international issue. The Turkish Government's position was relatively simple. While they were rightly anxious to protect the interests of the Turkish inhabitants of the island they recognised that these represented a minority of the population. Any scheme of self-government must therefore include provisions for their protection. If these could be secured they might be induced to agree to self-government as an alternative to partition. What they could not stomach was a solution which allowed Cyprus to become a threat to their own security. It was true that Turkey was now allied with Greece through the NATO structure. Nevertheless in view of its geographical situation, lying off the Turkish coast and commanding, perhaps threatening, her main harbours, the island could not be allowed to pass into the hands of a nation which might become politically hostile. The Turks had watched ever since 1944 various Communist attempts to seize

¹ See *Tides of Fortune*, p. 660 ff.

³ See *Tides of Fortune*, p. 660.

² See above, pp. 228-30.