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**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** Dr. Kissinger, one of the major questions on our minds and hearts, is the matter of the hostages. At this moment we are still in a transitional period with regard to them, nevertheless, I would like to ask you this: What are your views on the conditions set forth for their release? And secondly, do you feel that the imprisonment of these poor, innocent individuals has become politicized in this election year?

**DR. KISSINGER:** Rabbi Berkowitz, first of all let me express my gratitude for the opportunity to be here in DIALOGUE. The Rabbi suggested very tactfully before I came here, that I keep my answers short. I might say, if I succeed in doing this, all of you will have been present at an historic occasion. But knowing my proclivity and reputation, I have urged Rabbi Berkowitz to interrupt me when I go on too extensively. I want to say that to indicate that he is not being impolite, he's carrying out my wishes, and also to give you some hope that this DIALOGUE will end at some point. Now, let me talk about the hostages. I think the hostages have turned into a great human tragedy for the people involved, and for their families. Against their wishes they have become a symbol of America's role in the world and they have been caught up in the last stages of an election campaign. I do not suggest that this was planned by the Carter administration. I do believe, however, that it was planned by the Iranian authorities and that in this sense it is their final insult to the United States to believe that they can affect the American election by particular proposals. I want to stress that the President is right in exploring what has been put before him. My own view, in general, is that in hostage situations, one does not negotiate. If this were last November, for example, I would be strongly opposed to any negotiations. I agree with the Israeli method, which is not to negotiate. Because if the captors learn that there is a price, one then moves from the issue of principle to the issue of the specific price to be paid and one is then

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in an endless process. Since this particular position was not taken eleven months ago, we now find ourselves confronted by four specific demands. And I have serious questions about them. As put, I have serious questions about the staged release of the hostages in relation to the demands, because it creates the impression that each group is being held hostage for the fulfillment of another demand and therefore violates the concept that hostages should not be for sale. That is why I think all the hostages must be released together. Secondly, I find unacceptable the proposition that if we do not meet these demands, these hostages will then be tried. *That*, I believe, must be firmly rejected. Third, there seems to be an idea that the United States has to pay off the Iranian debts in the United States. On this I have the most serious questions because that seems to me to be a disguised form of ransom. And fourth, I have consistently opposed the introduction of large quantities of military equipment in a war in which the national interest of the United States is so uncertain, and no less on behalf of a government that has systematically humiliated us for a year, and that will attempt to achieve a fanatical hegemony in the Persian Gulf area if it prevailed. So, that particular aspect of the exchange causes me serious doubts. On the other hand, I do think the Carter administration is correct in exploring whether it is possible to reduce the terms as they are now stated to conditions that are compatible with our honor and with our laws and with our integrity. So, I do not criticize the process of negotiation, but I do want to indicate those aspects of the outcome that would give me grave difficulty.

**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** In a broader sense, Dr. Kissinger, beyond even the immediate resolution of the hostage situation, what insights can our foreign policy makers gain from the entire event, from the way we dealt with our ally, namely, Iran and how we related to the Shah? What is your assessment of the lessons we can learn from the entire Iran situation?

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DR. HENRY KISSINGER

DR. KISSINGER: I think, Rabbi Berkowitz, it is important to understand the nature of the relationship that existed between the Shah and eight U.S. Presidents of both political parties. This was never a partisan issue. It was the policy of Democratic and Republican Presidents alike. Allow me to provide some background to the situation. Iran is the most populous country in the area. It has frontiers with the Soviet Union, with Iraq and with Pakistan. In 1972, the Soviet Union introduced large quantities of modern weapons first into Syria, then into Iraq. That was followed by a friendship treaty between Iraq and the Soviet Union, which usually means that the foreign policies of

RABBI WILLIAM BERKOWITZ

the two countries are made very closely compatible with each
other. Simultaneously, the British withdrew their forces from
the Persian Gulf. So, therefore, the practical problem was that
there be some counterweight to the Soviet armed radical regime
in Iraq: otherwise it would achieve domination of the Persian
Gulf and radicalize the entire area. This was the reasoning that
led us to approve the sale of arms to the Shah of Iran, as a
means of counterbalancing the Soviet arms in Iraq. We did not
do this as a favor to the Shah. This sale is often presented as
some sort of act of personal friendship, for example, between
the Shah and me. But to the Shah, the Secretary of State was

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about four levels below him—unbelievable as this may seem—and while he treated me with great correctness and politeness, it was not on the basis of personality or personal friendship, but on the basis of similar national interests.

As for recent events, the collapse of the pro-American government in Iran was a sheer political tragedy. Whether it could have been averted, we will never know. But what we do know is what Ambassador Sullivan, who was our last Ambassador to Iran, published, that there were three incompatible policies being pursued simultaneously by the United States Government, the practical result of which had to be, to complete the demoralization of the existing structure and to create a vacuum in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf—of which we now see the consequences. The second lesson from this is the illusion that our natural friends are radicals, that we can somehow appeal to the radicals in that area and elsewhere. This is a tendency which led us sometimes to Libya, sometimes to flirtations with the PLO, and sometimes to flirtations with Khomeini. The purpose of the taking of the hostages seems to me to have been twofold. One, to radicalize the government of Iran, and move it as far away from the United States as it is possible to be. And secondly, to create such an impression of American impotence and of American unreliability so that no element of Iran would any more rely on the United States. Both those two objectives seem to me to have been importantly achieved and the final haggling that is now going on about the hostages is to culminate the process and is, therefore, a matter of profound worry. Moreover, the whole situation in the Middle East has shaken the confidence of moderate governments in the United States. When the King of Jordan takes a trip to Baghdad at the beginning of a war, we're in a new environment, because five years ago he would have taken a trip to Washington. This indicates that the moderates have lost their confidence and are trying to appease the radicals. And now we are caught in a situation in which two governments are fighting a war, that as I said rather flippantly a few weeks ago—and I repeat it here—my only

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regret in the war between Iran and Iraq is that only one of them
can lose it.

**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** You've worked at one time in different capacities for a variety of American Presidents. As you see it, what are the qualities that make for a great President? And what are the qualities that lead to a flawed presidency?

**DR. KISSINGER:** The most important task of a national leader and especially of a President as the only national elected leader who has executive authority, is to take our country from where it is to where it has not been. That is, he must have a vision of the future. And this presents a dilemma because when his scope for *action* is greatest, the knowledge on which to base such an action is very often at a minimum. However, when the *knowledge* is greatest, the scope for action has often disappeared. For example, in 1936, one French division could have stopped the Germans, the Nazis, when they re-occupied the Rhineland. And I'm sure the world would still be arguing today whether Hitler was a maniac or a misunderstood nationalist and Ph.D. theses would be written on that subject. The fact is that the French and British leaders did not have the courage to act upon their intuition, or maybe they did not have the intuition. They waited until they were sure and it cost 20 million lives. The same problem exists at every moment, and especially in the contemporary period which is characterized by upheavals in technology, upheavals in the social structures of states, and in the relation among states. That is why the most important task of a President, of a national leader, is to have a vision of what it is that one wants to build. I believe the most important quality of a leader is vision and courage. One can hire all the analysis, but what one cannot hire is courage and some view of the future. Therefore, every national leader, every President, must have some of the attributes of a prophet. But at the same time,

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he cannot get too far out of touch with the people, because if he
does, then they cannot follow him. And if he confines his activi-
ties only to public opinion polls, he will always be a prisoner of
events, and the public does not forgive its leaders for catas-
trophes, even if the catastrophes reflect what they thought they
wanted. So these are the two extremes between which a Presi-
dent must navigate and on which a President will be historically
judged.

**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** In recent days because of the Presiden-
tial campaign, the issue of Presidential decision-making has
emerged once again. As the public understands it, the President
is surrounded by advisors who present him with various options
and policies, and possibilities; but it is at this point that public
confusion abounds, namely, what happens after a President is
offered the options? How does the act of decision occur? Is the
President, for example, a captive of his advisors? Do his ad-
visors argue it out in a collegial style before the President? Does
a President, for example, reject all the advice he might get and
then follow his own course? In short, as someone like yourself,
Dr. Kissinger, who intimately understands the decision-making
process, my question is, on what basis a Presidential decision
occurs and whether the President himself need be a first rate
intellect or statesman in order to come to the right decision?

DR. KISSINGER: It's a very important and difficult question, Rabbi Berkowitz. And there's not a simple answer because it depends so importantly on the personality of the President. Actually, there are two aspects to the decision-making process. There always is a formal decision-making process and then there's the *real* decision-making process. The formal decision-making process is expressed in the Cabinet, in the National Security Council and in a whole host of committees that have either legal or other authority to address a problem. However, it is safe to say that I know of no administration in which the

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Cabinet made any decisions. The Cabinet is composed of too many disparate elements for that and usually the Cabinet sessions that I have attended and of which I have heard debriefing sessions, in which various cabinet members report to their colleagues of what they were doing, are not distinguished by excessive precision or revelation of the most intimate details, since frankly almost everything you tell in a Cabinet meeting leaks. Therefore for major issues there usually are smaller committees, such as the National Security Council for foreign policy or the Council for Economic Policy for economic policy. I'm mostly familiar with the National Security Council process. Theoreti

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cally, the President is supposed to be presented with options
and every new President who comes into office claims that that
is what he wants, and that is indeed what he thinks he wants.
But the fact of the matter is that individuals in the government
very often have very strong opinions. And if you ask them to
present three options, they usually give you two absurd ones
and one realistic one. I used to say that when I was in the State
Department, if I asked for three options even if I didn't know
anything about the subject and even if the options were written
in Swahili, if I had picked the second option out of the three, I
would have been in accord with the bureaucracy 90% of the
time. You see, the middle option is usually the one they want.
So the first thing you have to distinguish between is the real
options and the phony options.

The second thing is you generally do not become the President unless you have a very strong will. And an advisor generally does not go into government unless he wants the job. And so there is a subtle psychological interplay between the President and his advisors in which one has to resist the temptation of becoming a courtier and telling the President what he wants to hear. And there *is* a great bias in the deliberations towards what the President is presumed to want. President Kennedy in 1962 during the deliberations of the Bay of Pigs wisely absented himself from the meetings of the executive committee that was dealing with these matters until they had reached some sort of a consensus and *then* he joined them so that his actions or presence would not intentionally influence their deliberations. I think this was a very good procedure. In general though, I have to repeat that the decision-making process depends on the President. As a general proposition I have seen that the degree of preparation of the President in a subject determines how active a role he will play and is the case as his Administration goes on. This is true of almost every President that I have seen. Moreover, he has to keep in mind not only the intrinsic merit of the subject but the attitudes of the people around him. He has to consider the morale of his associates. One of the hardest things for a President to achieve is to get

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really objective advice. And one of the hardest things for him to
do is to take a decision that removes himself from the conflicts
of the various Cabinet members and advisors who at one and
the same time are men of strong convictions and men whose
success or failure determines the relative pecking order in the
organization. I have tried to give you a realistic picture of what
happens and not what is written in political science textbooks.

**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** You, Dr. Kissinger, experienced in your own personal lifetime the ugly and violent presence of fascism and Nazism. In recent months we have been witness to a dramatic surge of fascism and Neo-Nazism around the world, whether it be in Italy or Belgium or France or England or even the United States. My question then is this: How do you feel concerning this upsurge? And what do you think it signifies or indicates about our world?

**DR. KISSINGER:** Rabbi Berkowitz, I think it is no accident that historically Jews have been in the forefront of the struggles for justice, for liberty, and for equality. This has been the case because they know from their own experience that when these principles are violated by people, they themselves become early victims.

We are living now in a world in which the resorting to force in
the settlement of international disputes and the settlement of
domestic disputes is becoming more and more prevalent. We
are also living in a world in which there are organizations like,
for example, the PLO that have a vested interest in organizing
distrust of the Jewish communities around the world. Then
there is the oil problem which is bringing about gradually a
change in the economic and social structure of all industrial
democracies. Before OPEC imposed the oil problem in 1973 the
political issue for most countries was how to divide an increas-
ing costly share of the gross national product. Now they have to
divide a constant and in some cases a shrinking share of the

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gross national product. And for all these reasons, plus the en-
couragement of groups with vested interests, a situation has
developed where in the public mind certain problems, that are
to be sure problems, like, for example, the West Bank negotia-
tions, have become a cop-out and a surrogate for everything
else. And so people then like to believe that 'if it were only not
for Israel and only not for Jewish pressures' then there
wouldn't be an oil problem. And this in violation of all experi-
ence that all these underdeveloped countries have developed
their own radicalism! So I think indeed we are facing a very
serious problem. In addition, I think the problem of anti-
semitism is inseparable from the problem of justice in the world
in general. And the problem of anti-semitism is not a purely
Jewish problem because in a world in which anti-semitism is
tolerated, oppression becomes the tool of the strongest against
everybody who is weak and everybody who is defenseless.

**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** Dr. Kissinger, the Carter human rights policy has been criticized for focusing on the shortcomings of our allies and friends thereby, ironically, undermining and weakening them, while ignoring, in essence, the overwhelming faults of the true totalitarian countries of the world. Do you agree with this criticism? And, in outline, what role *do* you see human rights playing in a concrete fashion within American foreign policy?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I think, Rabbi Berkowitz, that this is a very difficult question to answer. Philosophically, the United States has to stand for human rights on a global basis. However, then it faces two concrete questions: What does that mean in terms of foreign policy? And secondly, what methods are most appropriate to achieve these objectives? When I was in office I believed—and perhaps excessively—that the best method in dealing with totalitarian systems was not to utilize a direct, visible means of confrontation but to use quiet diplomacy. By these

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methods we managed to increase immigration of Jews from the
Soviet Union from some 400 in 1969 to some 35,000 in 1973. I
would say in retrospect that more public statements might well
have been a useful adjunct to that policy.

Our successors adopted a very challenging human rights
policy and abandoned it as far as the totalitarian states were
concerned, that is as far as the Communist states were con-
cerned, after about six months. They did that because they
found it interfered too much with other objectives. And so they
then concentrated on allies. But that is and was a big under-
taking. If the United States makes as its task to bring about
democratic institutions in all friendly countries, then I think we
have an obligation not simply to overthrow or undermine
governments with which we disagree but to fight for—at least
ideologically and politically—governments with which we
agree. Otherwise we will turn the world over to radicals. The
practical consequence of assaulting pro-American governments
that are not democratic is to turn the countries over to totali-
tarian governments that are no more free, and on top of it
violently anti-American. This is what has happened in Central
America. It also was one of the reasons that led to the collapse
of the Shah of Iran. And it has affected our policies elsewhere.
So indeed, it is a very complicated issue. We have to stand for
human rights. We have to insist that the rights of minorities be
protected. But we also have to know what the best methods are
to achieve practical results and we also have to know finally
that if we take the first step—we must be prepared to take the
next step. Otherwise we’re simply engaging in public relations
exercises.

RABBI BERKOWITZ: In a statement at NATO headquarters
in Brussels some years ago you said, "I believe the relationship
between morality and foreign policy is not a simple one. I agree
that it is necessary to have strong moral convictions, but it is
also necessary to bring into relationships the realities of the

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situation with moral purposes. I believe foreign policy without moral convictions lacks a sense of direction." Dr. Kissinger, could you amplify on what you see as the relationship between foreign policy and morality? How do the two realms differ and how does one attain moral purpose in foreign policy while avoiding moralism on the one hand and cynicism on the other?

DR. KISSINGER: Rabbi Berkowitz, I think that this is the most difficult question of statesmanship. For the philosopher there are no gradations of morality. A thing is either good or evil. For the statesman on the other hand there are rarely absolutes. The philosopher needs a clear perception of his goals. The statesman needs that also but he is doomed to approaching his goals in stages. The statesman lives in a world in which today there are 150 sovereign states meaning 150 independent wills. And so the art of the statesman is to keep in mind his objective while approaching it in steps, each of which is imperfect. Hopefully, each will be a moral improvement over its predecessor. But by definition it has an element of immorality and even an element of amorality. Thus, the morality of the statesman is expressed in his willingness to persevere towards distant goals which indeed *have* to be moral, through stages that are occasionally and very frequently and indeed usually, imperfect. Now therefore, it is not always easy to tell the difference between a charlatan and a truly moral man, between a moralist and a man of great moral convictions. And yet, paradoxically, the pure pragmatists become prisoners of events. They are adrift on the sea of circumstance. But it requires faith to build something of substance. For example, I have often believed as I've often said, that the State of Israel was a dream before it became a reality. And if it hadn't been a dream, it would never have become a reality, and realists would never have gone there to build a state. So, one must ask how to have dreams that are not purely fanaticism, and yet be willing to operate by stages in a complex environment. This is our deepest challenge. And it is not easy to give a pat answer for how to solve it.

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**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** Dr. Kissinger, not too long ago, you said at the World Jewish Congress the following: "One cannot separate the destiny of Israel and the destiny of the Jewish people from the destiny of mankind." What did you mean by linking these destinies?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I think a world in which Israel would become a purely expedient object for the power politics of other nations and a world in which the Jewish people would be treated as a minority defined only by its own strength would be a world without justice. And therefore, a world without deeper purpose, a world without human rights and a world which would have committed such an offense to humanity that it would no longer be recognized. And it is for this reason that the fate of Israel is more than simply the fate of a national state but an appeal—no, not an appeal—but a test of the conscience and of the principles of liberty and freedom for all of mankind. And Israel can never

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be assessed simply in terms of power politics, but has to be
assessed in terms of the deeper purposes of human motivation.

**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** A major discussion, in recent years has been over the issue of the kind of relationship of the United States to Israel. One school of thought asserts that Israel is a definite strategic ally and asset of and to the United States and thus we should support her. Another school of thought declares that Israel has moral value, historical significance and the sharing of common values between her and the United States and warns that commitments based on strategic assets and *realpolitik* are dangerous since they are essentially amoral and capable of changing. Dr. Kissinger, what is your view? How should the United States view the State of Israel—as strategic asset, moral commitment or both?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I think, Rabbi Berkowitz, it has to view it as *both*. I think there's a moral commitment to Israel which does not derive from the fact that it is a strategic asset even though it *is also* a strategic asset. Because when all is said and done, it is the one country which we can be sure will never change its friendship for the United States and which in a foreseeable crisis represents a relationship of fundamental strategic importance; nevertheless, I would not rest the relationship on that strategic importance alone.

**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** In recent months and throughout several years we've seen an attempt by the United States to come close to the PLO. Whether it has been through handshakes on receiving lines, or through secret diplomatic meetings, or by calls for Palenstinian homelands, the Carter administration, it would seem according to many, has moved in the direction of coming closer to the PLO. Dr. Kissinger, what are your thoughts on the position that the United States should take—should there be recognition or negotiation with the PLO?

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DR. KISSINGER: This is a subject on which I have been expressing myself since 1973 and therefore you are all able to see that I'm not saying now in 1980 what is expedient for this moment. I do not believe that the PLO is a negotiating partner for the United States. I even go further than the official position. I do not think the PLO is a partner for the United States even if it accepts Resolution 242. The last thing we need in the Middle East from an American point of view—and I'm not speaking now from an Israeli point of view—is another radical state, armed by the Soviet Union with its leadership trained by the Soviet Union, and wedged between Jordan and Israel and a menace to both of them. And therefore I have consistently opposed the idea of a Palestinian state and the idea of the PLO and I think the negotiation of the West Bank should be conducted between Jordan and Israel and everything else is an illusion.

RABBI BERKOWITZ: Dr. Kissinger, what is your overall assessment of the Carter administration Middle East policy and how do you think a Reagan Middle East policy would differ? Or for that matter, how *should* the policy of the next President, no matter who, differ? And finally, American friends of Israel have been concerned that if Governor Reagan were to win the election he would appoint to his cabinet, John Connally, or that he would bow to the Saudi and oil company interests, to the detriment of Israel? How do you respond to these genuine concerns?

DR. KISSINGER: Rabbi Berkowitz: when President Carter came to office I was hoping for a two-term Administration, having gone through the experiences of the Vietnam conflict and of Watergate. I thought that America which has not had a two-term Presidency since the fifties and therefore has a young generation that has never seen a Presidency without catastrophe required a successful two-term Presidency. However, I

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have become progressively more critical of the Carter adminis-
tration and I have strongly supported Governor Reagan
because I have been convinced that the policies of the current
administration are crisis prone, that there is a bias towards
radical movements and states, that there is an inadequate ap-
preciation of the balance of power and of regional balances and
that the cumulative effect of this will be such an undermining of
the international order that there is a risk, a constant risk
abroad and a constant threat to friendly countries. Now to reply
specifically to the Middle East policy: I was extremely critical
at the beginning of the administration of the attempt to arrange
a Geneva conference with Soviet support or with Soviet partici-
pation and which would include the PLO and which would at-
tempt to settle all issues in the Middle East simultaneously in
one great conference. I thought this would lead to the isolation
of our friends, to the isolation of the moderate governments of
the Middle East and to a high risk of an explosion. Obviously,
President Sadat shared the same assessment and took his
heroic initiative in going to Jerusalem, which was answered by
the government of Israel with an equally heroic, though less
dramatic, response in its willingness to give up the tangible
security guarantees of the possession of the entire Sinai for the
intangible assurances of peaceful intentions, and one *has* to
give credit to this tremendous act on the part of the Israeli
government. I believe that the Camp David agreement was a
major step forward and I've always supported it. But since
then, I feel that our policy has started to disintegrate. There
has been an unstated premise that the autonomy negotiations
could be pushed in the direction that would be tantamount to
creating a Palestinian state in the guise of a Palestinian entity
or some other form.

In addition, in terms of the Carter Middle East policy, there
has been the passivity in the face of the collapse of the era of the
pro-American government in Iran which in turn has given such
tremendous impetus to the radical elements in the Middle East
that those states that used to rely on us in the Arab world and
that we required for a compromise solution have become much

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more cautious and much less willing to follow our lead. I believe
that the Reagan administration would differ from a Carter ad-
ministration in understanding first of all that the West Bank is
just one small part of a big problem in the area that has several
components.

First, there must be a military balance between East and
West in that area or nothing can succeed. Secondly, the United
States must support the moderate against the radical element.
Therefore, it is inconceivable to me that a Reagan administra-
tion would ever find itself tacitly or in any other way playing up
to Libya or the PLO or to similar organizations. Third, I believe
that there would be a coherent design in which it is understood
that one cannot yield political objectives to economic blackmail
because if that process is started once, we would find ourselves
in the same position as with the hostages in that the demands
escalate constantly. Now let me add that I am here in DIALOGUE
in my private capacity. I have supported Governor Reagan out
of a profound conviction. But I am not a member of his staff.
Therefore, I cannot answer you whom he will appoint to what
cabinet position. But I *have* had many talks with him and
precisely because I am independent, precisely because I owe
him nothing and precisely because I want nothing from him, I
would not be here if I did not believe that his Presidency would
be better for the national security of free people and for the
future of our country and of Israel.

**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** Dr. Kissinger, since we're discussing Governor Reagan, let me ask you about the attempts to call the Governor a warmonger, or a belligerent man who is trigger-happy, or someone who is dangerous. Now, you've indicated you've spent a good deal of time with him, you understand his views and his approaches. How do you assess the characterization of Governor Reagan as warmonger, or trigger-happy? Would a Reagan administration jump into war at the slightest drop of a hat? Based upon your assessment, what seems to be Governor Reagan's understanding of the world?

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DR. KISSINGER: I have concluded, concerning my judge-
ment of Governor Reagan that he is a prudent man who would
make deliberate and thoughtful decisions. I believe even more
importantly that the risk of war is not the rash action of a
President. Once you are President and you know what modern
weapons can do, reality forces you to be prudent. Rather, the
risk of war is an international environment that so grows out of
control that sooner or later vital American and free world inter-
ests are threatened and then a war becomes unavoidable. Who
would have thought it possible four years ago, that the Straits
of Hormuz would be threatened on both sides by potentially
hostile regimes? Who would have thought it possible that 10
million barrels of oil could suddenly disappear as the result of a
war between Iran and Iraq? We have had since 1977, two invas-
sions from Communist territory in Zaire. We've had Cuban
troops in Ethiopia. A Communist coup in South Yemen. Soviet
occupation in Afghanistan. Vietnamese occupation in Cam-
bodia. The collapse of Iran. The Iran-Iraq war. That process, if
it continues, has a high likelihood that something will get out of
control of the statesmen. Therefore, I think the obligation of a
President is to *avert* crises from happening. I have seen an
advertisement of President Carter's which says that he's con-
fronted twelve war-like situations and has managed to keep
America out of them. I would like to see an advertisement in
1984 that we've had a President who prevented twelve war-like
situations from *arising*. Secondly, I do not think a Reagan Ad-
ministration would go to war at the slightest drop of a hat; but I
will also have to tell you in all candor that an administration
that says it will *never* go to war may * invite * war, because it is
only the readiness to defend your fundamental principles that
makes aggressors desist from their course. And it's easy
enough to make statements about peace. But if we want to have
both peace and justice we have to be prepared to defend them
seriously, because no one should pretend that he can forego the
readiness to defend his fundamental values. Finally, as far as
Governor Reagan's understanding of the world, I think that
what he wants is to return American policies to some fundamen-

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tal principles and to create a predictable American foreign policy so that allies and adversaries both know what they can expect. I think he has healthy instincts in these respects and from what I have seen I think he will surround himself with responsible and thoughtful advisors.

**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** Let me turn to a very crucial area that affects us all: The future of U.S.-Soviet relations. In recent days, we have heard a great national discussion on the entire matter of SALT and the issue of strategic superiority. Dr. Kissinger, in a nuclear age, does nuclear superiority make sense? Does it have strategic value? Does it have political impact?

**DR. KISSINGER:** That, Rabbi Berkowitz, is again an extraordinarily complicated question, because we're dealing here with weapons of extraordinary destructiveness, whose impact is almost theological in the sense that nobody really knows what would happen if they were used in a systematic manner. I would say the following: We enjoyed a meaningful nuclear superiority for about twenty-five years. By meaningful, I would define it this way: For twenty-five years we were in a position to offset the Soviet conventional superiority, and geographic advantage and capacity to intervene in contiguous areas by having a significantly larger number of nuclear weapons and to have them in such a way that we had at least a theoretical advantage to do to the Soviet retaliatory forces what Israel did to the Egyptian air force in 1967, that is, to reduce their counterblows to acceptable levels. In 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, the United States had something like 3500 warheads, and the Soviet Union had about 70. In 1973, at the end of the Middle East War, when we went on nuclear alert, we had about 8000 warheads, and the Soviet Union had 700. Now that was already very uncomfortable, because of the enormous destructiveness of the weapons. But still, if you are an old-time Russian general looking at the superiority against you and see it is 12 to 1, you decide that you

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are going to have the confrontation some other day. And therefore, in the middle of Watergate while we were being assailed from all sides, the Soviets quit that confrontation after about 24 hours. Today the numbers are so large on both sides that it is very hard to answer your question of who is superior. And it also becomes very complicated to argue whether it is indeed possible to achieve superiority; which however does not mean that you can stand still, because to maintain parity you have to make certain efforts. But one of the consequences of nuclear parity is that the conventional balance, that is the regional balance of power becomes of greater and greater importance, and that is why we therefore must have the capability of intervening in trouble spots. If, for example, we had a 1973-type situation again in the Middle East, the Soviets might not quit in 24 hours and then the ability to reinforce locally would be of the most decisive importance. And so *that* is particularly the problem we have today; not the question of nuclear superiority in the abstract.

**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** Dr. Kissinger, there has been a national debate on the issue of ratification of the SALT II treaty. What is your view on this? Is it in our national interest to ratify SALT II, or do we require a new SALT III treaty? In short, how do you assess the future of arms control?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I think, Rabbi Berkowitz, that in the nuclear age, all political leaders have an obligation as they are building weapons, also to attempt to control them. They have this obligation both objectively, and towards their own people. The question however now is: How does one deal with SALT II? I think it's important to get the record straight. SALT II was signed in June of 1979. In July 1979, I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and offered a bipartisan approach by which ratification might have been achieved. That was not picked up by the Carter Administration until Novem-

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understanding with the Soviet Union that you cannot use SALT as a safety valve, while geo-political aggression takes place in every other category. So the first thing that would have to be done is to see whether the Soviet Union would agree to discuss some rules of international conduct, and I don't think it's too burdensome a rule to say that Soviet armies should stay inside the borders of the Soviet Union. Second, what does one do about SALT II, starting November 5th, when the political campaign is over? Since I know no one who believes that it can be ratified in its present form, I have suggested on my own that I think it is not inconsistent with the position of Governor Reagan (though he has not expressed it explicitly) that we do two things. One, that we begin a negotiation immediately on SALT III which is to be a 10-year agreement and which would therefore enable the agreement to affect the military procurement on both sides. This is important because what's left of SALT II is only about three and a half years and most weapon systems take about six years to prepare. Secondly, that we go over SALT II on a bipartisan basis and take the noncontroversial items which represent, I would say, about 85% of SALT II, and see whether they can be made into an interim agreement to keep the arms race on some kind of check while SALT III is being negotiated. I think this would be a reasonable solution to what is now an intractable problem that has been unnecessarily politicized.

**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** Dr. Kissinger, one more geo-political question, that I would be remiss if I didn't ask: During the course of this year, we've seen a number of events, such as the Russian combat forces in Cuba, the Soviet intervention in the Horn of Africa, the invasion of Afghanistan—to cite just a few. Do you see such Soviet military boldness as a result of a premeditated plan, or simply the action of an aggressive power, flaunting its military superiority? Furthermore, do you see the United States in a second-rate position in terms of our standing with the Soviets, and in the world? Do you see us as some have

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charged in global retreat which could lead to a situation where
war or surrender are the only courses that we have before us? If
this be so, how do you suggest that we go about reversing this
frightening trend especially in light of maintaining some form
of detente?

DR. KISSINGER: Rabbi Berkowitz, if we were to take a map of the world in 1970, and compare it with a map of the world in 1980, we could only conclude that there has been a systematic Soviet expansion. If you look at Cuban troops in Ethiopia, and Soviet troops in Afghanistan, you see two prongs of a pincers that are taking the Middle East between them and are gradually squeezing it. If you add to it that Communist-armed guerrillas from Libya are invading the territories of Morocco, and if then Morocco should suffer the same fate as Iran, you would see the whole northern coast of Africa—with the exception of Egypt—in hostile hands. Now whether that is a Soviet geo-political design, or a show of its military potential, it doesn't really make a difference to us. And if you add to it the turmoil in Central America, partly caused by us, you can at least say the following: There is no trouble spot in the world where the Soviet Union exercises a soothing influence. There is no terrorist movement that the Soviet Union does not directly, or indirectly support, train, and use. There's no embarrassment to the Western world that the Soviet Union does not encourage. And as long as this continues, true peace is impossible, and detente is going to be just a series of palliatives. In the long term, this is not even in the Soviet interest, because the United States will not be defeated without noticing it, and when we notice it, we'll resist. And this is the ultimate danger of war. And it's to prevent that situation from arising which you describe as either a collapse, or going to war, that statesmanship consists of. Now, you ask me what should we do? Well, it's extremely difficult to elaborate a blueprint especially in the limits of our discussion. But let me make, nevertheless, a few headings of what needs to be done. First, we need to rebuild our military capacity and we

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need to rebuild them not only by throwing money at them, but
by dealing with the conceptual problem that I described earlier,
namely: What is American security in a world of more or less
nuclear parity, and therefore greater danger of conventional
and local aggression? Secondly, we must rebuild our alliances
and bring home to our allies that there has to be a certain
homogeneity in political, as well as in military outlooks. It can-
not go on forever that the United States supplies the defensive
areas to countries that essentially conduct neutralist policies in
the Middle East, and in East-West relations. And I think our
European allies will have to choose between the two; there can-
not be military integration and totally separate political
policies. The third goal has to do with the developing countries.
We have suffered from the nostalgia that we can win over the
radicals to our side. But, our normal allies in the developing
world are the moderate governments, that are not basing their
policies on anti-Americanism, that are not fomenting every
area, that are not appealing to every slogan. And we have to
make a distinction between moderates and radicals. Or to put it
another way: There has to be a benefit of being America's
friend, and a penalty in being America's adversary. If you
watch the resolutions of the non-aligned movement, they have
become progressively more insolent and hostile to the United
States, as we have attempted to approach them. I've said to a
leader of the non-aligned world last year, after the Havana Con-
ference, "that it is statistically not possible that we are *always
wrong*. Just by accident, we've got to do something right, *some
times*, that you can note in your declaration!" But if they insist
on hostility as their organizing principle, then they cannot de-
mand our support, and that is a choice we must impose on them.
With respect to the Soviet Union, as I said earlier, it is in keep-
ing with the Soviet interest that they learn a sense of their
limits. We have to bring an end to the Soviet geo-political offen-
sive that you have described earlier. It is not possible for them
to preach co-existence, and at the same time, engage in aggres-
sion in every part of the world. On the other hand, if they are
prepared for genuine co-existence, we must be prepared for gen-

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uine negotiations and not make confrontation a principle of our policy for its own sake. So we must be prepared to negotiate, but the Soviet Union must be prepared to accept some principles of international conduct. And finally, this leads me to a fundamental issue which can best be illustrated by the current Iranian situation: How do you encourage moderation? Do you encourage moderation by giving in to the demands of radicals, and hoping that they then become moderates, or do you encourage moderation by thwarting the demands of radicals and showing that only the moderate course can prevail? I believe in the second course, and I fear that the Carter Administration has believed, and believes in the first course.

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**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** The Talmud, in a splendid discussion of history, and its forces, discusses whether it is the time, or the locale/situation, or the person who is the primary determinant of events. Whatever one's perspective on this issue might be, you, Dr. Kissinger certainly have known across the years, the leading figures of our time, and I, together with the more than six thousand people here tonight, would be most curious to hear from you, your recollection, and assessment of three leading figures, who, as it turns out, all appeared on this platform in *DIALOGUE* and who, sad to say, are no longer with us; and the three that I bring back to mind with great reverence, and affection, love, and regard, are Hans Morgenthau, Nelson Rockefeller, and Golda Meir.

**DR. KISSINGER:** Rabbi, Hans Morgenthau was my teacher, and my friend, occasionally my intellectual adversary, and always a man I respected and admired. He lived in the world of ideas, and was never given an opportunity to put them to the test in practice. He was scrupulously honest, and he believed that it was important to free the United States from the sentimental oscillations between excessive commitment, and excessive withdrawals. He therefore had the courage to develop a political theory based on the national interest, which in his sense had a moral quality, because he included, and attributed in his view of the national interest, the moral convictions and purposes of a society. He and I differed about how to end the Vietnam war, without either of us being comfortable with our allies. He was not a protestor by nature, and I was not a warrior by nature. Still, we had reached different conclusions as to how to extricate the United States from the morass of Indo-China. While we differed here, afterwards our paths converged again. And throughout, I admired his integrity, and I liked his understated sense of humor. He was one of the seminal figures of thought and someone without whom, life is a great dealier. Now, Nelson Rockefeller on the other hand, was a completely different personality. He was a man of action, and he

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was an artist. His great strength was an intuitive perception of
the right course. He was an aristocrat in a society that doesn't
have a formal aristocracy, and therefore he felt that he owed to
this society national service for all the advantages which he in-
herited. Above all, he had a very touching faith in the power of
reason. He was constantly assembling panels of experts, which
I as a Professor—knowing how PhDs are acquired—valued
somewhat less, perhaps than he did. I was his associate in three
presidential campaigns, which failed in part because he had a
very naive belief that you get to be nominated President
because you have the best program, and he spent an inordinate
amount of time and money on developing programs which then
others later implemented, because the programs were devel-
oped at the expense of his collecting delegates. To me, Nelson
Rockefeller had a quintessentially American quality: extremely
optimistic, a little inarticulate, idealistic, hopeful, a great sense
of the obligation towards the oppressed, and the disadvantaged
and the threatened. I thought he was a great man, and I
thought it was an enormous tragedy that he never became
President.

Now, Golda Meir, as you must have experienced her, Rabbi Berkowitz, was an original. I dealt with her as a friend, and occasionally as an adversary, but: always with enormous affection. She treated me like a favorite nephew, who if he happened to stray from the family line, would be the subject of a particular outburst of displeasure. But when all was said and done —and we had had formal positions—she said to me once, that somebody came to her and said that ‘What I can’t stand about Kissinger, is that he is first an American, then he’s Secretary of State, and then he is finally, and thirdly, a Jew.’ And she said. ‘That’s OK with me, because you see, I read from right to left anyway!’ I remember that when we had gone through the controversies that our positions imposed on us, in front of her advisors, we always went out into the kitchen, and had a little private talk, and I’m proud to say we never failed to come to an agreement; and once Golda had made an agreement, she had the courage of a lioness in fighting it through a cabinet not known

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for its excessive reticence. One other thing: For her Israel was
not a country, but it was part of her being and the boys that
were killed or wounded in wars were not citizens, they were part
of her family. I never saw her show any emotion in the conduct
of official business, except once when I brought a list which we
finally got, of the prisoners from Syria. I had brought it back
from Damascus, and I gave her the list, and she handed it to the
Chief of Staff, and both of these rather hardboiled characters
turned their backs on me, and started weeping for a few
moments. It was that combination of sentimentality, courage,
dedication and faith, that not only was what made Golda and
Israel, but is what mankind needs for survival and for hope.

**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** Dr. Kissinger, in studying and surveying your writings and speeches, the inevitable conclusion seems to be that they are pervaded by a sense of pessimism and even, of tragedy. Do you regard your thought as being essentially tragic? In other words, in the role of statesman, or historian, do you feel yourself to be an optimist, or a pessimist?

**DR. KISSINGER:** May I tell, Rabbi Berkowitz, a comment that a British reviewer made on my book? He said, 'I don't know if Mr. Kissinger is a great writer, but anyone finishing this book is a great reader.' I think that Rabbi Berkowitz has proved that he is a great reader. Now, to answer your question, Rabbi, I would have to say it is the duty of a statesman, insofar as he can, to be neither an optimist, nor a pessimist, but a realist, to make as accurate an assessment of the real forces as he finds them. Now, under contemporary conditions, these show very grave dangers, and very grave complexities. Let me also respond to the second aspect of your question, which asks not only am I a pessimist, or an optimist, but am I, or do I have a sense of tragedy? Well let me answer, that, in a way I'm not *only* a historian or *only* a statesman. As a historian, you cannot avoid a sense of tragedy. No society in history has every been

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permanent. Everything built by man has sooner or later collapsed. And if you look at the varieties of nations and societies in the kaleidoscope of history, you would be arrogant to believe that any one statesman or maybe even any one nation is more than a speck of dust in an infinity of time. On the other hand, as a statesman, you have no right to act this way. As a statesman, you must act as if you could build for eternity and you must act to assure continuity, and hope and progress to the people that you represent and hopefully to the people of the world, even though deep down, you know that there may be a greater design of which you are only an infinitesimal part.

**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** And finally, Dr. Kissinger, are you hopeful about the future of America?

**DR. KISSINGER:** Well, Rabbi, I would say this. For the next five to six years, we face a period of enormous danger. There is a great Soviet military capacity. There is turmoil in the Persian Gulf, in East Asia, in Central America; we never before faced so many crises simultaneously, and therefore for the next five to six years, even under the best of management, it will require enormous discipline, and enormous dedication and enormous wisdom. On the other hand, if I look at the problem of our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, I would conclude that the only thing I really could add is the accumulation of military power. After all, they have a political system that has not solved the problem of succession. They have an economic system that is inherently stagnating because you cannot run a modern economy by a system of total planning. They have huge bureaucracies that are in constant conflict with each other. And when you look at China, which is a simpler society, and the fantastic problems they have in restructuring it, and escaping some of the tendencies that are inherent in Communism, you can see what lies ahead for the Soviet Union whenever they turn to their problems of domestic reform. Now, unfortunately, there

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is a grave danger that they will try to escape their domestic problems by foreign adventures. *That* is the challenge of the next five to six years. And, if we get through these next five to six years, then I am quite optimistic about the next fifteen years. And I *do* think that we have an opportunity to get through the next five years. It will be difficult, but I believe that we will in fact reach a turning point towards a stabler, and more hopeful future. And that I consider to be the biggest issue of the moment.

**RABBI BERKOWITZ:** Many years ago, a young scholar wrote: "Men become myths, not by what they know, or even by what they achieve, but by the tasks they set themselves." Little did the author of these words realize, that they could one day be applied to his own life. For the author of those words, Dr. Henry Kissinger, has become a legend in his own time, for the paramount tasks he had, and has set for himself: namely, the building of a structure of peace, of a stable world order in the midst of chaos, confusion, and disarray. Indeed, throughout these years, his work has continually reminded us that if the democratic nations fail, it will be because of the faulty strategy of idealists with too many illusions, facing the cynical realists with too little conscience. Hence what is needed, is both idealism and realism. And so whether we share his unique blend of idealism and realism or not, whether we agree or disagree with him is secondary: For no one can disregard his talents, his efforts, his achievements, his dedication, his devotion.

Picture Credits p.4, 9, 15, 27 United Press International.

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