July 20, 1965

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mac:

In my last note I indicated that I would let you have a few
impressions of my trips to Europe in which over a period of six
weeks I visited London, Paris, Rome, The Hague and Bonn. Let me
group my observations by category:

(1) The MLF decision: It is often alleged that we abdicated
our leadership position by removing the pressure for the MLF.

I believe this judgment to be mistaken. The people who were
hurt by the MLF decision were a small minority mostly in the Federal
Republic--and even there the MLF was not the most important factor
in the relative decline of Erhard and Schroeder. Had we pressed the
MLF, there would have been no country--except Germany--where a reliable
majority for the MLF could have been found within the government. In
every country--including Germany--the MLF would have been the subject
of acrimonious partisan debate. The failure was the one-sided pressure
of the months before and not the Presidential decision of last December.
Most leading Europeans were relieved and not disappointed by that step.

If you look at the situation country-by-country the case becomes
clearer still:

--In Britain, the majority of the Labor government was strongly
opposed to the MLF. Even if we had succeeded in pressuring Britain
into formal acceptance, the Labor government would have spent the next
months trying to scuttle the scheme by dragging their feet in its
implementation.

.....

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

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July 20, 1965

--In Germany, if De Gaulle's recent actions could have been presented as having been provoked by the MLF, the CDU might well have been hopelessly split.

--In no other country did there exist the kind of support which could have withstood a real crisis. The Netherlands was at best lukewarm; its interest, if any, was to isolate France.

--Italy's actions would have depended entirely on domestic considerations. My conversation with Saragat left little doubt that even he--whom the State Department had always described to me as one of their staunchest allies--had little stomach for a showdown with France.

(2) The current state of the MLF/ANF Debate. It is my impression that the group which dominates the State Department's European policy is systematically blocking alternatives by carrying out the President's directives to avoid any semblance of pressure in its most literal sense. In this manner, they prevent the crystallization of any other project. After the German election, I expect them to surface a variation of the old proposal with the argument that it has now been demonstrated that there is no alternative.

Secretary McNamara's recent proposal to constitute a select committee to consult on nuclear matters is a case in point. The idea was well received in Europe. Many felt that, if anything, it did not go far enough and should have included political consultation. At the same time, senior Europeans say that they have been told by United States officials that the proposal was made without the knowledge of the State Department; that it was a minor initiative; that the MLF/ANF remains the top priority. (Of course, now that the proposal has been cold-shouldered in Paris, our official line may shift.)

I think it is a mistake to start in again where we left off last year and head once more for the same impasse. It seems to me that the McNamara proposal, carefully elaborated, would be a constructive way to get discussions started in a different framework. Even if the consultations he envisages prove unsatisfactory, their failure would be a better justification for a new nuclear structure than the obsessive reiteration of the old slogans about nuclear control. France will find it much more difficult to stay out--and if she does such a framework would create least obstacles for a post De Gaulle government to join eventually.

....

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

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July 20, 1965

(3) The Position of Germany. I cannot begin to do justice to this complicated problem in a letter. Suffice it to say that the impact of events of the past few years has been almost wholly unfortunate. President de Gaulle bears a heavy responsibility. But our officials are not a little to blame because of their almost complete lack of comprehension of German psychology. Most of our eminent men encountered Germany in the Adenauer era. It is easy for them to believe that Germany is the most stable ally, the most reliable, the natural pillar of our European policy. Another-- smaller--group is professionally anti-German; to them Germany is still largely unregenerate. Between these two groups the Federal Republic is subjected to oscillations which it is ill prepared to handle. The pro-German group makes demands which exceed the psychological strength of present-day Germany; the professional anti-Germans restlessly develop schemes which shake German confidence.

The dominant group in the State Department uses the Federal Republic, as the alibi and the battering ram for its one-sided, almost obsessive, anti-French bias. In their eagerness to isolate De Gaulle, eminent Americans engage in extremely dangerous anti-French tirades towards the Germans. It simply cannot be in our interest to stimulate German distrust of France or to lecture the Germans on the implications of their superior strength vis-a-vis France. (I am speaking of conversations which I heard--not reports by others.) De Gaulle's provocations are real enough; little is gained, however, if we compound his errors with our own.

If Germany is constantly asked to choose between the United States and France it will ultimately opt for unification by methods which are bound to be disruptive. To be sure, the decision is not entirely up to us. De Gaulle may force a showdown whatever our policy. In that case, we should be clearly on the defensive; the showdown should be demonstrably imposed on us. This is why I believe that the President's tactics of ignoring provocations wherever possible are essentially correct. By the same token, there is no question that the dominate group in the State Department and influential individuals outside encourage every anti-French move--sometimes openly, always tacitly. Their major objective seems to me to be to isolate and if possible to humiliate De Gaulle.

Their obsession with De Gaulle causes our officials to spend too much of their time on inventing pinpricks. It causes them constantly to overestimate the degree of opposition to De Gaulle in Europe and to misjudge the support for our favorite solutions. For months Europeans were encouraged (if not formally then privately) to use the agricultural issue to make advances toward supranationality. The judgment was that

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

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July 20, 1965

De Gaulle always yielded to superior strength and that French farmers badly needed the Common Market. The fact is that De Gaulle rarely bluffs on fundamentals. The crisis which has resulted is unnecessary because it jeopardizes what has already been achieved. And the final result is likely to be closer to De Gaulle's conception than to ours. Have we thought through this passionate commitment to supranationality? Even if it is correct, are our methods likely to further it? I am not saying that De Gaulle's actions are the result of our provocations. My concern is that faced with a profound, philosophical challenge too many of our officials concentrate on scoring debating points and on expedients which defeat their own purpose.

The present tendency of the State Department forces it to woo the Federal Republic in order to thwart France. This excessive obeisance to the short term swings of German opinion will conclude by alienating both Paris and Bonn. It is futile because the ultimate orientation of Germany cannot be determined by a dramatic confrontation. It is dangerous because our seeming pressure magnifies the German sense of insecurity and may produce an exaggerated impression of the options available to the Federal Republic. Beneath the seemingly placid surface of Germany, all kinds of disquieting currents are developing. It would be the gravest error to turn NATO, in effect, into a German-American alliance--as I have heard it suggested.

(4) The Role of the State Department. The gropp which dominates European policy in the State Department does not seem to me responsive to the real issues in Atlantic affairs. They are focusing on one problem --that of nuclear control--which is likely to prove the least significant issue. My objection to the MLF/ANF schemes is not that they are wrong, but that they are essentially irrelevant. Some of the Grand Old Men of the early days of NATO--men whom I respect greatly--compound this tendency. And the few foreign service officers with a sense of history and a feel for Europe--like Bill Tyler--have been shunted off where they cannot affect basic decisions. The result is a single-minded absorption with one particular scheme and--I regret to say--a reporting system about the reliability of which I have serious doubts. Almost all briefings which I have received about the alleged state of mind of Europeans have been one-sided or simply wrong.

Most of the premises of the dominant group in the State Department seem to me wrong. The long-term danger in Europe is not an excessive assertion of European will but the opposite--a tendency to abdicate all responsibility.

....

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

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July 20, 1965

Whatever the provocations, our response tends to break the back of
those elements in Europe ready to play a serious international role.
The result is that we are likely to lose whether we fail or succeed.
If we fail, Europe will organize itself against us. If we succeed,
ten years from now Europe may have lapsed into the situation of Italy
--only too eager to turn over foreign policy to us but unreliable in
any period of stress. I cannot believe that it is in our interest to
be the only country in the West conducting a serious foreign policy.
It will, in my view, exceed our psychological resources even before it
overstrains our physical strength. Even in the nuclear field, I cannot
persuade myself that our non-proliferation effort should begin by pressing
our oldest allies at a moment when nuclear weapons threaten to spread
to much more dangerous countries.

I am not suggesting that I have a master scheme which would
magically remove all difficulties. Indeed, it seems to me that we
should avoid any grandiose projects for a while. What is most needed
is an analysis of where our long-term interest lies, specifically what
kind of structure in Europe and in the Atlantic area it is in our interest
to promote, how we visualize the role of Europe in the evolution of the
East-West dialogue, how Europe and the United States can share responsibilities
globally. Cliches about community spirit and indivisible interests obscure
the issue. If we could be precise about what we want, we might distinguish
better between those aspects of French policy which are irritants and
those which are dangerous and between what is significant with respect to
the Federal Republic rather than what is convenient.

Reading these notes over I find that they repeat in large part
what I have often said elsewhere. In all likelihood I am no more immune
from finding what I expect in Europe than the people I criticize. Also,
I recognize that my views are rejected by most of the established experts
in the field (certainly within the government) and there is no reason why
you should accept my analysis rather than that of others with stronger
credentials.

With every good wish.

July 20, 1965

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mac:

I believe this judgment to be mistaken. The people who were
hurt by the MLF decision were a small minority mostly in the Federal
Republic--and even there the MLF was not the most important factor
in the relative decline of Erhard and Schroeder. Had we pressed the
MLF, there would have been no country--except Germany--where a reliable
majority for the MLF could have been found *within* the government. In
every country--including Germany--the MLF would have been the subject
of acrimonious partisan debate. The failure was the one-sided pressure
of the months before and not the Presidential decision of last December.
Most leading Europeans were relieved and not disappointed by that step.

.....

implementation.

months trying to scuttle the scheme by dragging their feet in its
into formal acceptance, the Labor Government would have abet the next
obverse to the MLK. Even if we had succeeded in breaking Britain
--In Britain, the majority of the Labor Government was strongly
clearer still:

 clearer still;

Most leading Europeans were relieved and not disappointed by that step.
of the months before and not the Presidential decision of last December.
of acrimonious barteran debate. The failure was the one-sided pressure
every country--including Germany--the MLK would have been the subject
majority for the MLK could have been found within the Government. In
MLK, there would have been no country--except Germany--where a reliable
in the relative decline of Erhard and Schröder. Had we pressed the
Republi--and even there the MLK was not the most important factor
part by the MLK decision were a small minority mostly in the Federal
I believe this judgment to be mistaken. The people who were

our leadership position by removing the pressure for the MLK.

(1) The MLK decision: It is often alleged that we applied

Group my observations by category:

weeks I visited London, Paris, Rome. The Hagne and Bown. Let me
impression of my trip to Europe in which over a period of six

Dear Mac:

Washington, D. C.

The White House

Mr. McGeorge Bundes

PERSONAL AND COMBINED

July 30, 1962

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

- 2 -

July 20, 1965

....

least opacities for a host De Gaulle Government to join eventually.
difficult to stay out--and it does each a framework would create
of the old slogans about nuclear control. France will find it much more
justification for a new nuclear structure than the offensive refutation
tions he envisages prove unattainable, their failure would be a better
get discussions started in a different framework. Even if the conven-
McMurray proposal, carefully elaborated, would be a constructive way to
bear and head once more for the same impasse. It seems to me that the
I think it is a mistake to start in again where we left off last
in Paris, our official line may shift.)

top priority. (Of course, now that the proposal has been cold-shouldered
Department; that it was a minor initiative; that the MLF/VAM remains the
officials that the proposal was made without the knowledge of the State
same time, senior Europeans say that they have been told by United States
So far enough and should have included political consultation. At the
was well received in Europe. Many felt that, if anything, it did not
committee to consult on nuclear matters is a case in point. The idea
Secretary McMurray's recent proposal to constitute a select
there is no alternative.

old proposal with the argument that it has now been demonstrated that
After the German election, I expect them to enforce a variation of the
In this manner, they prevent the crystalization of any other project.
directives to avoid any compliance of measure in its most literal sense.
is systematically blocking alternatives by carrying out the President's
that the group which dominates the State Department's European policy

(2) The current state of the MLF/VAM Deputés. It is my impression

that the situation will be bad little atom each for a showdown with France.
be--whom the State Department had always described to me as one of their
allegations. My conversation with Saritat left little doubt that even
--Italy's actions would have debended entirely on domestic con-
its interest, it and, was to isolate France.

could have withstood a real crisis. The Netherlands was at least inkwame;
--In no other country did there exist the kind of subport which

been pobeasely split.
presented as having been brooked by the MLF, the CDU right well have
--In Germany, it De Gaulle's recent actions could have been

PERSONNEL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bungy

- 3 -

July 30, 1962

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

July 20, 1965

....

It was to make advances toward subordinationality. The judgment was that
were encouraged (it not formally then privately) to see the agricultural
rule the abort for our favorite solutions. For months Europeans
to overestimate the degree of opposition to De Gaulle in Europe and to
much of their time on inventing blunders. It causes them constantly
their opposition with De Gaulle causes our officials to abhor too

to be to isolate and it be possible to humiliate De Gaulle.
move--sometimes openly, always tacitly. Their major objective seems to me
Department and influential individuals outside encourage every anti-Brench
same token, there is no question that the dominate group in the State
ignoring brovocations wherever be possible are essentially correct. By the
imposed on us. This is why I believe that the President's tactics of
should be clearly on the defensive; the showdown should be demonstrably
De Gaulle may force a showdown whatever our policy. In that case, we
pound to be disruptive. To be sure, the decision is not entirely up to us.
and France it will ultimately ob for multiplication by methods which are
It Germany is constantly asked to choose between the United States

compounding his errors with our own.
De Gaulle's brovocations are real enough; little is gained, however, if we
France. (I am speaking of conversations which I heard--not reports by others.)
to lecture the German on the implications of their superior strength viva-ante
simply cannot be in our interest to stimulate German dialogue of France or
engage in extremely dangerous anti-Brench trades towards the Germans. It
anti-Brench piece. In their egerness to isolate De Gaulle, eminent Americans
as the slid and the patterning raw for its one-aided, almost oppressive,
The dominant group in the State Department nears the Federal Republic,

schemes which shake German confidence.
Present-day Germany: the professional anti-Germans restlessly develop
German group makes demands which exceed the psychological strength of
subjected to oscillations which it is ill prepared to handle. The bro-
largely unselfereate. Between these two groups the Federal Republic is
awakened--group is professionally anti-German; to them Germany is still.
the most reliable, the natural bilar of our European policy. Another--
era. It is easy for them to believe that Germany is the most stable ally,
biology. Most of our eminent men encountered Germany in the Adenauer
to place because of their almost complete lack of comprehension of German
de Gaulle bears a heavy responsibility. But our officials are not a little
evening of the past few years has been almost wholly unfortunate. President
complicated problem in a letter. Suffice it to say that the impact of
(3) The Position of Germany. I cannot begin to do justice to this

Mr. McGeorge Bandy

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July 30, 1962

BENIGNANT AND CONFIDENTIAL

[x]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

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July 20, 1965

....

44

of Europe will put the obsolescence of the dominant group in the State Department
seem to me wrong. The long-term danger in Europe is not an excessive assertion
of the premiers of the dominant group in the State Department

added or dimly wrong.

have received about the alleged state of mind of Europeans have been one-
reliability of which I have serious doubts. Almost all briefings which I
particular scheme and--I regret to say--a reporting system about the
basic decisions. The result is a single-minded orientation with one
for Europe--like Bill Tyler--have been amounted off where they cannot affect
And the few foreign service officers with a sense of history and a feel
the early days of NATO--men whom I respect greatly--compound this tendency,
but that they are essentially irrelevant. Some of the Grand Old Men of
issue. My objection to the MLK\VM scheme is not that they are wrong,
--that of unclear control--which is likely to prove the least significant
to the real issue in Atlantic affairs. They are focusing on one problem
European policy in the State Department does not seem to me reasonable
(4) The Role of the State Department. The Groth which dominates

alliance--as I have heard it argued.

be the gravest error to turn NATO, in effect, into a German-American
of Germany, all kinds ofANTI-QUOTING CURRENTS ARE DEVELOPING. IT WOULD
available to the Federal Republic. Beneath the seemingly placid surface
of insecurity and may produce an exaggerated impression of the options
It is dangerous because our seeming pressure magnifies the German sense
orientation of Germany cannot be determined by a dramatic confrontation,
alleviating both parte and Bonn. It is futile because the ultimate
opposition to the short term wing of German opinion will conclude by
the Federal Republic in order to thwart France. This excessive

The present tendency of the State Department forces it to go

expedients which defeat their own burlooes.

Many of our officials concentrate on scoring deputing points and on

My concern is that faced with a protomug, philosophical challenge too

saying that De Galle's actions are the result of our provocations.

It is the correct, are our methods likely to further it? I am not

thought through the basis of commitment to subordinationality. Even

likely to be closer to De Galle's conception than to ours. Have we

it jeopardize what has already been achieved. And the final result is

on fundamentals. The criteria which has resulted is unnecessarily because

badly needed the Common Market. The fact is that De Galle rarely pinates

De Galle always yielded to superior strength and that French farmers

Mr. McGeorge Bunch

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July 30, 1962

BORDERLY AND CONFORMIST

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

- 5 -

July 20, 1965

With every good wish.

Henry V. Kiebler

Sincerely yours,

With every good wish.

You should accept my analysis rather than that of others with stronger credentials.

Reading these notes over I find that they repeat in large part the Federal Republic rather than what is convenient those which are dangerous and between what is significant with respect to better between those aspects of French policy which are irritants and the issues. If we could be bolder about what we want, we might distinguish globally. Clashes about community spirit and indigible interests operate East-West dialogue, how Europe and the United States can share reëpresentations to promote, how we vitalize the role of Europe in the evolution of the kind of structure in Europe and in the Atlantic area it is in our interest it is an analysis of where our long-term interest lies, specifically what should avoid any grandiose projects for a while. What is most needed mathematically remove all difficulties. Indeed, it seems to me that we I am not suggesting that I have a water scheme which would

beneath ourselves that our non-belligerent effort should begin by breaking

overstraining our hydraulic strength. Even in the nuclear field, I cannot

It will, in my view, exceed our geological resources even before it

and period of stress. I cannot believe that it is in our interest to

--only too eager to turn over foreign policy to us put multiple in

ten years from now Europe may have reached into the attraction of Italy

If we fail, Europe will organise itself against us. If we succeed,

Whatever the brovocations, our response tends to preclude the pack of

Mr. McGeorge邦德

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July 30, 1962

PERSONNEL AND COMBINED

February 7, 1966

Personal and Confidential

Dear Mac:

For your own information, I am
sending you a copy of some papers
summarizing impressions of my
recent trip to Europe. At his
request, I have sent copies to
Francis Bator.

I would appreciate it if these
papers did not circulate outside the
White House.

Best regards.