THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, July 31, 1978 A3

# Labor to Weigh Cost Of Safety to Industry

By Bob Kuttner
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Labor Department's chief of worker health and safety told a Senate hearing yesterday that his agency will weigh the costs to business before issuing new standards to protect workers. That policy is the President Nixon's.

In testimony last week, Labor Secretary Peter J. Brennan indignantly denied any political interference in the enforcement of occupational health and safety rules.

But according to Labor Department sources, the portion of Stender's testimony yesterday promising to consider economic factors was added at the insistence of the Office of Management and Budget.

After Mr. Nixon's remarks to a friendly business audience last Thursday, OMB Director Roy L. Ash and other economic alides emphasized to reporters the President's desire to shift the emphasis of federal policy away from regulation, in favor of economic growth.

President Nixon's speech called for reevaluating "the trade-off between increasing supplies and certain other objectives, such as improving the environment and increasing safety."

In opening comments yesterday, Senate Labor Committee Chairman Harrison A. Williams Jr. (D-N.J.) called the President's statement "unconscionable."

"I cannot accept the proposition that economic ills can be cured by lowering the health and safety standards

for American workers," Williams said.

Stender defended the slow process by which OSHA sets standards as necessary to give the Labor Department all the information it needs. The process includes receiving scientific findings on workplace hazards from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, convening advisory panels, giving written comments, convening hearings, proposing the standards, accepting more comments and eventually issuing the standards.

Of 17 standards proposed by HEW, only two have been issued by the Labor Department. Four have been pending since the summer of 1972.

At yesterday's hearing, AFL-CIO legislative director Andrew Blemiller criticized OSHA's enforcement policies and the business lobby campaign pressuring Congress to modify the OSHA law. Despite the claims of harassment, Blemiller said, OSHA's average fine for violations is about $70.00.

He also attacked OSHA's policy of delegating enforcement to state agencies. The 25 state agencies approved by OSHA have added a total of only 356 new inspectors, Blemiller said.

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Washington Star-News

Friday, July 19, 1974

A-5

# Swirls in Ambiguity

Whatever the motive, Kissinger never saw any summaries of Lake's conversations. The FBI compiled 27 summaries between May 14, 1970, and the end of the tap, and Haldeman got all of them.

This was because of a White House policy change enacted May 13 by Nixon, Haldeman and Hoover. Under its terms, Kissinger was no longer to receive any wiretap summaries. According to FBI records, he had received 37 in all up to then. Nixon had received 34. Haldeman was to receive 52 before the surveillance campaign ended.

May 13, the day of the Nixon-Haldeman-Hoover meeting at the White House that removed Kissinger from the flow of wiretap summaries, was also the day on which, according to Hoover memoranda, a tap was installed at Kissinger's request on another close aide, Winston Lord. He, too, remained under surveillance until Feb. 10, 1971.

PERHAPS by coincidence, May 13 was also the day on which Kissinger decided to accept Halperin's request to be cut off entirely as a consultant to the NSC. He, too, disented from the Cambodia policy.

Both Halperin and Lake emerged in another context in the committee record that even more clearly reflects an internal White House

suspicion of Kissinger's staff — if not of Kissinger himself.

On Dec. 29, 1969, Hoover wrote Nixon to inform him that Halperin had been in contact with Clark Clifford, defensedefense secretary in the Johnson administration, over an anti-Vietnam war magazine article Clifford was preparing. Mentioned in the letter was "a meeting with 'Henry' today" concerning which Lake, according to Hoover's "sensitive sources," advised an unidentified Clifford associate "'Henry' wants to see him then."

A WEEK LATER, there were staff repercussions in the Haldeman wing of the White House. Alexander P. Butterfield, in a top-secret memo to Jeb Magruder, gave these instructions: "You should go — first of all — to Al Haig (not to Lake)

and find out who participated in Henry's Dec. 29 meeting."

Another tantalizing piece of circumstantial evidence is the fact that Nixon personally ordered a September 1969 wiretap on Marvin Kalb, the CBS newsman who of all diplomatic correspondents in Washington had the best access to Kissinger. According to the FBI, Nixon, through then-Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell, "instructed that results should go only to the attorney general and H. R. Haldeman" — not to Kissinger, who then still routinely received summaries.

Kissinger himself may have summed up the tangled situation months later, in August 1971, when internal security director Robert L. Mardian, on presidential orders, personally carried the politically sensitive

wiretap file from a safe at the FBI to the Oval Office.

ON THE WAY, Mardian later revealed to Watergate investigators, he stopped off in Kissinger's office to check the contents of the wiretap file against summaries and logs still kept by Kissinger and Haig. As Mardian recalls it, Kissinger murdered "something to the effect, 'Do you have what I said on the phone,' implying according to Mr. Mardian that Mardian had results of a wiretap on Dr. Kissinger."

Mardian, the FBI report observed, felt the remark "was in extremely poor taste, under the circumstances" — one of Kissinger's characteristic little jokes, perhaps. But then again, perhaps he was serious.

Kissinger Wiretap Role

By Oswald Johnston

Star-News Staff Writer

"The President is weak. He has difficulty saying no. He wants to please all and he dislikes having to make a choice . . . With a man like this, Henry Kissinger of course has great influence.

"But if we in the White House were only four or five, we could run the government. As it is, we can't and Nixon has yet to find a way of doing that."

—An unidentified White House official, quoted by London Sunday Times correspondent Henry Brandon and overheard over an FBI wiretap July 1969.

The voluminous record of White House wiretapping, snooping and bugging released yesterday by the House Judiciary Committee only deepens the ambiguity of Henry A. Kissinger's role in the surveillance of 17 government officials and reporters.

Far from proving conclusively that Kissinger "initiated" all the taps or even some of them, there is a tantalizing thread of circumstance running through the record which suggests that some of the taps were in part intended in self-defense.

Throughout the extended agony of Watergate, there has been a recurrent rumor of Oval Office disenchantment with Kissinger, of Kissinger in a deadly bureaucratic struggle with H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, of a despotic and poisonous atmosphere of suspicion.

EVER SINCE the wiretapping campaign became known publicly more than a year ago, Kissinger has tried to explain privately that he fingered some of his aides as surveillance targets in order to help them prove their loyalty.

Two of them have rejected that claim and are suing Kissinger. But their former mentor has noted wryly several times that his choice of scholars, liberals and Democratic hold overs from previous administrations to be staff associates "was not exactly" applauded by Nixon loyalists in the White House.

But now, in the five volumes of documents released yesterday, there is something approaching evidence of Kissinger's claim.

The wiretapping campaign began May 9, 1969, and continued until Feb. 10, 1971, when it ceased without having found or stemmed a single news leak.

ACCORDING to all accounts of the campaign, the precise moment it began was when Kissinger telephoned FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to complain about a news report revealing U.S. bombing in Cambodia.

As the narrative emerges from the committee papers, the ambiguity of Kissinger's role also began that day, with the selection of Mor-

SECRETARY KISSINGER

J. EDGAR HOOVER.

ton H. Halperin, one of Kissinger's hand picked National Security Council aides, as the first target.

According to memoranda Hoover prepared to formalize the wiretapping, it was Kissinger's ranking aide, then Col. Alexander M. Haig, who actually named Halperin. But Hoover's confidential in-house memo concerning the telephone conversations that day makes it plain Hoover himself selected the first suspect.

THERE WERE FBI files on Halperin going back to 1962 that suggested he was a skeptic on the Vietnam war, a hold over from the Pentagon's Systems Analysis Bureau of previous administrations and known for "a very definite Kennedy philosophy," Hoover explained. Further, Halperin was a "so-called Harvard-type Kennedy" man, "part of the Harvard clique, and, of course, of the Kennedy era."

Hoover, presumably, was fully aware that Kissinger, who brought Halperin into the NSC, has spent most of his own pre-administration career at Harvard. Kissinger quickly accepted the recommendation, and the tap was installed three days later.

The tap on Halperin lasted until Feb. 10, 1971, when all the taps were discontinued. By that time, Halperin had been out of the administration well over a year, having left the NSC full-time in September 1969, and having severed his relationship as a consultant in May 1970.

DURING the life of the Halperin tap, the FBI prepared 27 summaries of overheard conversations. Eleven of these went directly to President Nixon, according to committee records, 16 to Haldeman and only two to Kissinger, in May and October 1969.

Kissinger's role appears more ambiguous still in the case of Anthony Lake, another close NSC aide who was tapped only after he resigned from the administration in protest against the May 1970 invasion of Cambodia.

According to the Hoover memoranda, Kissinger himself requested the Lake tap, which was installed May 13, 1970 — shortly before Lake's resignation became effective. The tap remained in force until Feb. 10, 1971.

In closed testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kissinger last September explained it his way: Lake was "my personal assistant . . . literally before whom I had no secrets," whose appointment had been opposed by the White House bureaucracy and whose resignation over Cambodia policy immediately made him a "security problem."

"NOW, I would not have remembered that I personally, that it was at my personal direction and I think this may well have been an FBI euphemism but this was the reasoning that led to the tapping of Mr. (Lake)," Kissinger told the senators somewhat lamely.

William V. Shannon: The Kissinger Affair

WASH. STAR NEWS
7/23/74

Once again, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has marched up the hill and down the hill and accomplished nothing.

With Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger scheduled as the next-to-last witness, the committee is nearing the end of its "investigation" of Kissinger's involvement with the 17 White House wiretaps, with the "Plumbers" operation and with his possible misstatements of fact during his confirmation hearings.

During those hearings last September, outside observers urged the committee to explore his involvement thoroughly and not be distracted by Kissinger's intellectual brilliance and aura of success. But the committee asked him some pointed questions, deputized two of its members to review the documentary evidence in private with Kissinger and then voted to accept his version.

THE QUESTION of his involvement began to surface again as the House Judiciary Committee reviewed the documentary evidence as part of its impeachment inquiry. After his highly publicized cease-fire negotiations in the Middle East, Kissinger was discomfited to be asked at his first Washington news conference about these disagreeable matters. He quickly cut off that line of questioning.

The following week, he counterattacked in another news conference in Salzburg, Austria, with his empty threat to resign.

A majority of the members of the Senate then put on a display of craven sycophancy that could only dismay any genuine believer in democratic equality and the rule of law. Without waiting to find out the facts or study the issues, these senators signed their names to a resolution assuring him of their complete confidence and,

in effect, saying they wanted him to continue in office on his own terms, whatever the facts might be.

By last week, even Sen. J.W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was dismissing the matter as "a tempest in a teapot."

What is in dispute is not the relatively unimportant question of whether Kissinger "initiated" most of the wiretaps. The real question is— was this wiretapping of newsmen and high government officials designed to shut off national security "leaks," as President Nixon and Kissinger contend, or was it primarily a program of domestic political spying, as a different reading of the evidence would suggest?

The wiretap program began immediately after the publication of an article about the secret bombing of Cambodia. Why then were three of the four persons first chosen to be tapped all individuals who had no

access to this military data? Why were taps continued on some individuals long after they had ceased to have access to any secret data? Why did Kissinger, speaking through his aide Gen. Haig, repeatedly overrule FBI requests that a nonproductive tap on Morton Halperin be discontinued?

WAS IT because the tap on Halperin, though "nonproductive" in a national security sense, produced interesting political information?

Did the secretary subtly mislead the committee last September? Does the committee intend to hold him fully accountable for his words and deeds? Or does it tacitly accept a double standard of candor and behavior if the alleged offender is famous and seemingly successful?

In a constitutional democracy, those questions cannot be regarded as a tempest in a teapot.

imes. They already know that dozens of old-line Democrats, patriots in the tradition of Sam Rayburn and John McCormack, will refuse them. They must have some Republican votes as window-dressing. So reporters besiege Republican committee members in the corridors of the Capitol. They press them for commitments against the President. They urge them to make sensational statements against him. They ask defamatory questions, they invite predictions of impeachment, and tailor their conclusions to fit their witch hunt. Thus the media lobby for impeachment!

So what? Judiciary Committee will any Republican liberty for a man by Tom Paine's have this consistent the triumph

"Let the jury consider the verdict," the King said, for about the twentieth time that day.

"No, No!" said the Queen. "Sentence first — verdict afterwards."

— Lewis Carroll —

"ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND."

This is why you see this message only in the Washington Star-News.

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A20

WEDNESDAY

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

Nixon, Kissinger and the Wiretaps

7/17/74

PRESIDENT NIXON'S new letter on wiretapping substantially eases, though it does not end, the crisis hanging over his Secretary of State. Dr. Kissinger had threatened to resign if he were not cleared of the suspicion that he lied at his confirmation hearing last September in denying having "initiated" wiretaps to plug "national security" leaks in 1969-71. To be sure, on May 22, 1973, Mr. Nixon had accepted full personal responsibility for those taps and had described Dr. Kissinger's role—as the Secretary himself was to describe it in September and thereafter—only as helping supply the names of those who were tapped. Questions then arose, however, about both the accuracy of this version and about the extent of Mr. Nixon's continuing support for it.

First, material was leaked suggesting at first glance certain literal discrepancies between Dr. Kissinger's September testimony and FBI records of the time. Then, a White House tape was leaked in which Mr. Nixon was quoted as saying (on Feb. 28, 1973) about Dr. Kissinger's role in the taps, "he asked that it be done." Finally, when, last month in Salzburg, Dr. Kissinger threatened to resign if his word were not upheld, President Nixon conspicuously refrained from upholding it, thus raising the further question of whether the Secretary of State still enjoyed the confidence of his chief. In the unsparing atmosphere of Watergate Washington, given Mr. Nixon's understandable preoccupation with his own political survival, it was bound to be asked whether by one devious strategy or another, he was letting Dr. Kissinger go.

Well, events have moved on. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is immersed in its inquiry into whether Secretary Kissinger told it the truth last fall. After hearing a string of FBI witnesses, Chairman J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) has declared that the alleged Kissinger-FBI discrepancies, even if real, are "not of any great substance." No one else on the committee seems inclined to disagree. As for Mr. Nixon, he waited a long month—a delay itself raising questions—but he then did offer the committee a letter reaffirming his May 1973 statement that in the wiretaps at issue, Dr. Kissinger

was "operating under my specific authority" and "carrying out my express orders." So, though Dr. Kissinger himself is to testify on July 23 and General Haig on July 30, the committee now seems disposed to give the Secretary the rousing vote of confidence for which he appealed a month ago. Dr. Kissinger's status in the White House may not be entirely clear but his standing on Capitol Hill is tall. We see no substantial reason to suspect that he will not remain Secretary of State.

That hardly ends the matter of the wiretaps. If their political aspect is fading, their legal aspect is still very much alive. In leaks, Dr. Kissinger has been identified as having given the FBI the names of 13 national security officials and four journalists who were tapped. Of this number, three of his erstwhile national security aides have filed civil suits against Dr. Kissinger (and others) charging that the FBI taps on them—obtained without a warrant or court order—were illegal. The penalty is a fine of up to $100 a day.

Since being challenged, Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger have claimed that the taps at issue were legal at the time. But this is in dispute. Early on, this administration advanced a claim that, under the 1968 federal wiretap law, it could wiretap or bug without a court order in cases of domestic security or foreign intelligence. In 1972, however, the Supreme Court rejected 8 to 0 the government's contention that it did not need a warrant for domestic security taps. The three suits by former Kissinger aides challenge the contention that no warrant is needed for a foreign-intelligence tap—the kind which the government says applies here. Judge Gerhard Gesell, in his charge to the Ehrlichman jury, asserted, "Even the proper concern of the President of the United States and others in high office to prevent leaks of national security information would not have justified a warrantless search of Dr. Fielding's office without his permission"—a tap, of course, is a search. It should not be necessary to note that rulings in court, not assertions of legality by the government, will determine whether the wiretap law was being properly observed by all concerned, including the President as well as Secretary Kissinger.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Wednesday, July 31, 1974

B 3

# Recalling the Seminar

ISRAELI, From B1

he kidded, implying that he
might just have initiated
some of the stories himself.

Then he added seriously:
“I did make six or seven
transatlanic phone calls
last night. And altogether I
have made some 30 calls to
all parties involved over the
past week. But you have to
give Britain’s Foreign Secre-
tary, James Callaghan,
credit for bringing together
the foreign ministers of
Greece and Turkey.”

The guest list drew heavi-
ly from Capitol Hill, and, of
course, the talk turned to
the House Judiciary Com-
mittee's impeachment pro-
ceedings against President
Nixon.

Rep. Sidney R. Yates (D-
Ill.) said that sentiment in
the House "is growing for
impeachment."

Sen. Henry Jackson (D-
Wash.) and Sen. Abraham
Ribicoff (D-Conn.) debated
when the case will reach the
Senate for trial in the event
the full House of Represent-
atives votes a bill of im-
peachment.

They agreed that the Sen-
ate probably wouldn't get
the case until the end of
September and that the trial
would "go way beyond the
November election— possi-
bly to the end of the year."

Sen. Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.)
agreed with those estimates.
Javits arrived with televi-
sion personality Barbara
Walters.

Sen. Charles Percy (R-Ill.)
said he could see "some
good" coming out of the
hearings.

"Out of this tragedy, I see
some beneficial effects.
There has been an erosion
of (Congressional) powers
ever since the days of
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Now
with the Supreme Court de-
cision on the Nixon tapes,
there will be a change," he
said.

Percy's wife, Lorraine,
had been at the Judiciary
Committee hearings in the
afternoon and had told Rep.
Peter Rodino, the committee
chairman, "what a great job
he has been doing."

Nancy Kissinger arrived a
half hour before her hus-
band, and he did not see her

at first. Then former Su-
preme Court Justice Arthur
Goldberg and Arthur Burns,
chairman of the Federal Re-
serve Systm, said to him,
"Your wife is here."

Kissinger immediately
broke off his talks with sen-
his wife, who was sitting on
a sofa, surrounded by other
guests. She was sipping a
soft drink and said she now
feels fine after her bout
with ulcers.

Mrs. Kissinger, who looked tan and healthy, said that she is enjoying the swimming pool at the Nebraska Avenue home of former Ambassador to Luxembourg and Mrs. Wiley T. Buchanan Jr., which the Kissingers are currently renting.

"Henry swims more than I
do," she added. "He takes a
dip before breakfast and ev-
ery night when he gets
home from the office."

She said that painters be-
gan work yesterday on the
Georgetown house which
the Kissingers will occupy
in September.

THE WASHINGTON POST

B4

Wednesday, July 31, 1974

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ONE OF A COLLECTION
OF PATTERNS

14 Essays on th

Reviewed by
John Seelye

The reviewer is the author of "The True Adventures of Huckleberry Finn," "The Kid" and "Dirty Tricks."

In the words of Jack Nachbar, "As perhaps the most purely native American story form, the Western may be looked upon as a metaphor of the American culture out of which it grew." You can hang a 20-gallon hat on that one, and this book does just that. It is a collection of essays written by 14 of the growing number of scholars who have turned to the study of the materials of our popular culture.

Discussion ranges from a lengthy, even exhaustive discussion of the rise of the Western by Jon Tuska, with the usual adulation lavished on early examples of the genre, to representative selections from Robert Warshow's definitive work "The Immediate Experience," which abstracts some powerful generalities from the

universals of art, especially explanation of the reasons kids like Westerns, valuable perhaps as a definitive demonstration of the art of making the obvious dull.

But, for better or worse (mostly better) these essays strive to make two points: (1) the Western is our national drama, a projection of a mass ego upon the blank territory of the great American desert, and (2) the Western hero is a representative man, more specifically a Christ, though often a judge, cut along the lines of Old Testament prophets.

In sum, as theater the Western is a national act of religion, the cowboy our national icon, thus fulfilling the ecclesiastical root of the word "matinee."

Discussion tends to pivot around a number of common subjects: John Ford, "High Noon," John Ford, "Shane," John Ford, Sam Peckinpah, John Ford, John Wayne and, last but not least . . . Americans during the past 40 years may not have had a Ford in their garage, but they certainly had one in their theaters at least once a year.

I recently spent several

F

cultural appreciation, but I found myself saying, 'untiringly wise' and 'the best theater blunders I've seen'.

Makarios Praises
U.S. After Meeting
Kissinger for Hour

NYTimes 7-30-74

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 29 — Archbishop Makarios conferred with Secretary of State Kissinger for more than an hour today and concluded that “the role of the United States is really very constructive” in efforts to obtain a settlement of the Cyprus issue.

On his arrival from New York for the meeting, the Cypriote leader had said that “the United States attitude toward the Turkish invasion should be more clear and decisive.”

Mr. Kissinger evidently explained in some detail what he and his aides had been doing in secret diplomacy with the Governments of Greece and Turkey to soldify a cease-fire on Cyprus.

“I think Dr. Kissinger prefers silent diplomacy,” Archbishop Makarios said to reporters in the State Department lobby, with Mr. Kissinger at his side.

“Dr. Kissinger is playing an increasingly constructive role behind the scenes,” he added.

Secretary Kissinger said that United States policy was directed to obtaining a peace settlement that would guarantee the sovereignty of Cyprus and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

In their meeting—the second in eight days—Mr. Kissinger and Archbishop Makarios did not touch on the question of the Archbishop's claim that he is still the President of Cyprus, a State Department official said. A coup forced Archbishop Makarios to flee Cyprus on July 15. The presidency is currently being filled by Glafkos Clerides, former President of the House of Representatives.

U.N. Group

hoped to see the matter resolved. But members leaving the Council hall expressed apprehension over the new developments.

Today's meeting, the seventh in nine days, was called at the insistence of the Soviet Union, apparently against the wishes of many members who say there is little the Council can do to unit the negotiations at Geneva are completed.

## Bigger Soviet Role

The widely held view of delegates here is that the Soviet Union wants a role in the negotiating efforts to settle the Cyprus crisis and that it has chosen the United Nations as a platform for this purpose, in addition to sending an observer to Geneva.

Delegates maintain that this new diplomatic effort by the Soviet was reflected in its insistence on a meeting Sunday night and another today as well as in Moscow's intensive backstage efforts to line up support for its proposal from Asian and African delegates.

The Soviet resolution today stressed that Cyprus was a member of the nonaligned bloc and Soviet delegates spoke of the Council's dispatching a mission to Cyprus that would be made up of representatives of the Soviet Union and two nonaligned countries — Kenya and Indonesia.

According to some delegates, as part of the new diplomatic

议, 阿格拉夫·伊凡诺夫斯基(拉脱维亚)和前苏联外交部长伊万·托卡提诺夫(哈萨克斯坦)等参加。

who was then the Soviet Union's foreign minister, and the other two were later replaced by other members of the Council.

Plaid Perfect: Bonwit's shirt jacket together with Perfect way to travel ... comfortable, neat plaid

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Politics and the Arts, Vol. 171, No. 4 & 5, Issue 3107-08, July

27 & August 3, 1974. Published weekly (except the issues of January 12, July 13, July 27, August 17) and distributed by The New Republic, 1244 19th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20036. Phone 331-7494. Single copy, 50¢; Yearly subscriptions, $15; foreign, $18; armed forces personnel or students, $10. Send all remittances and correspondence about subscriptions, undelivered copies and changes of address to Subscription Department, The New Republic, 381 West Center Street, Marion, Ohio 43302. Copyright 1974 by The New Republic, Inc. Item g. Second class postage paid at Washington, DC. Indexed in Reader's Guide.

Contents

Comment

Kissinger under Fire, Arrest Records, Wiretap Happy, Highflying Fares, Disclosures (1975)

The Nixon Watch—Awaiting Judgment—
John Osborne

"Greek Bearing Gifts"—Walter Pincus

Proxmire's Intentions—Jonathan Groner

What's Happening to Free Speech?—
Nathan Lewin

Confessions of an Academic Administrator
—Anonymous

Films—Stanley Kauffmann

Reconsideration: A Fan's Notes
—Jonathan Yardley

Books—Reviews by Calvin Bedient, Patrick Keane, J. Anthony Lukas, Elaine Reuben, Melvin J. Friedman, Sheldon Frank

Art—Kenneth Evett

Poem—Robert Wallace

Fine Print—Doris Grumbach

Correspondence

The Staff

Editor-in-Chief—Gilbert A. Harrison

Chairman, Editorial Board—Martin Peretz

Publisher—Robert J. Myers

Managing Editor—David Sanford

Executive Editor—Walter Pincus

Literary Editor—Doris Grumbach

Associate Editors—John Osborne, Stanley Karnow, Eliot Marshall

Assistant to the Editors—Gwen Somers

Assistant to the Literary Editor—
Cherryl Holt

Editorial Staff—Lincoln Caplan, Jonathan Groner, Edward Zwick

Contributing Editors:

Alexander M. Bickel, Robert Brustein,

Robert Coles, Joseph Featherstone,

Gerald W. Johnson, Peter J. Ognibene,

John Seelye, Melville J. Ulmer,

Allen S. Whiting, Paul R. Wieck

Films and Theater—Stanley Kauffmann

West Coast Editor—Peter Barnes

Production Manager—Mary Henninger

Assistant Production Manager—
Ellen Cochran Hicks

Circulation Manager—Elizabeth A. Scanlan

Business Manager—Pearl Wilmer Ramsey

Assistant Business Manager—
Constance Cole Twining

New Republic Feature Syndicate—
Leslie B. Seagrave

Advertising and Promotion—
Ilene Briggin Kahane

Receptionist—Ruby McGowan

Advertising Representative—
E. Laurence White

Kissinger
Under Fire

"What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it? What do you do with it?" That passionate outburst by Secretary of State Kissinger at the end of the Moscow summit early last month was directed against those in Washington, notably Defense Secretary Schlesinger and Sen. Jackson, who have been relentlessly insisting that the US must lead the Soviet Union in the deployment of nuclear weapons. The Secretary is plainly worried, rightly so, by the ominous but real prospect of an accelerating and needless arms race that will plague not merely this transitional administration, but the next one and the one after that. He is convinced now is the time to slow down, that if we wait it may be too late, and before returning home, he pledged that he would initiate a national debate on strategic choices. We wish him well. But if he does take on the American military establishment and its foremost congressional spokesman, Kissinger may bite off more than he can chew. It is at least doubtful that he can even depend upon firm support by the President, whose bid for votes in his fight against impeachment may make him hostage to the military hard-liners. That dependency is something the Secretary can no more control than he can the strategic decisions of the Russians, who also know with whom Mr. Nixon must negotiate at home and why.

The Secretary is eloquent when he warns of what we are letting
ourselves in for unless a solid arms agreement with the Soviet Union
is soon reached. However, his task would have been eased if he'd
spoken earlier. Consider his initial, permissive attitude toward mul-
tiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). These weapons
were conceived on the theory that a larger number of warheads per
missile would make it easier to penetrate a Soviet anti-ballistic mis-
sile (ABM) system then thought to be under consideration by Moscow.
In late 1970, when it became apparent that the Russians might limit
their ABM structure or even abandon it, a group of present and past
presidential advisers including John McCloy, Dean Rusk and Cyrus
Vance suggested that the MIRV be abandoned, lest it raise weapons
development to a more costly and dangerous level to the disadvan-
tage of both sides. Perhaps Kissinger did not feel at the time that he
could engage the proponents of MIRV in budgetary debates over
weapons systems; at any rate, he went along with the Pentagon.
MIRVs, manufactured at the rate of three a day, are now being added
to the more than 7500 warheads already in the US arsenal. Nor did

6

THE NEW REPUBLIC

Kissinger object to the Trident submarine, 10 of which are being built at one billion dollars each, or to the $15 billion program to construct an armada of 244 B-1 bombers. Forces have thus been put into play which are extremely difficult to reverse. In addition, and whatever his present squabble with the Secretary of Defense, Kissinger was silent in January when Schlesinger unveiled his so-called "flexible doctrine," which calls for a more diverse array of weapons and targeting procedures, capable of executing "a wide range of options in response to potential actions by the enemy." In the opinion of Herbert Scoville and other experts, this deceptively attractive alternative to "massive retaliation" increases the chances of nuclear war by seeming to make it safer to wage. If Kissinger is now so alarmed that he intends to go to the mat and wrestle with the advocates of "flexible response," he will have many sympathizers, but also very powerful opposition.

When he accompanied the President to Moscow in July, Kissinger did seek an accord on the limitation of MIRVs, which had not figured in the interim arms agreement signed in 1972. Unless this "conceptual breakthrough" was achieved, he realized, there was scant hope of putting a lid on a military build-up. Soviet insistence on catching up with the US in MIRVs would prompt Pentagon technicians to perfect even deadlier weapons such as the maneuverable reentry vehicle (MARV) now in blueprint, and the momentum of technology would soon overtake any hopes of restraint through diplomacy. In Kissinger's word, we had to "cap" the geyser quickly. But Leonid Brezhnev was under pressure from his own marshals to match US technology and could not concede to a settlement that left the Soviet Union in what he regarded as an inferior position. At the same time, the specter of impeachment made it hazardous for the President to enter into a deal that might be denounced by the right wing on Capitol Hill. The only agreement of note reached in Moscow, on subterranean testing, was therefore negligible at best, and at worst one that heightens the risks of a global nuclear conflagration.

The 1963 nuclear test ban treaty, ratified by the US, the Soviet Union and more than 100 other countries, outlawed nuclear testing everywhere but underground. The Russians had repeatedly called for a total ban, possibly because they calculated that an absolute prohibition would drive a wedge between the US and the Chinese, who along with the French refuse to accept any limitations on testing. Kissinger has opposed a total ban precisely because he wishes to minimize US differences with China, and he has been supported in this position by Pentagon specialists who automatically suspect any restraints on weapons accumulation. The result in Moscow last month was an administration "victory" but a loss nonetheless. In the first place, the treaty negotiated there does not come into effect for 21 months, during which time all sorts of weapons can be developed. Thereafter, tests up to 150

kilotons of explosive power are permitted, which means the treaty imposes no real curbs on current arms technology. Some arms control experts submit that the diluted agreement will encourage the spread of nuclear weapons, that smaller nations will not be deterred from imitating the behavior of the superpowers. Officials of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimate that 24 nations may have nuclear weapons within the next 10 years unless technical and political barriers to proliferation are strengthened. According to these officials Japan, West Germany, Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan and South Korea could build atomic arsenals any time they choose.

Viewing the likelihood of a galloping arms race within the near future, MIT Professor George Rathjens has put forth the startling thesis that the rush to develop and improve advanced weapons might be restrained by halting arms control negotiations, for, he says, the negotiations simply increase incentives to acquire new arms as bargaining chips. Rathjens contends that the US ought to pause long enough to shape a unified policy on the limitation of weapons before continuing to talk to the Soviet Union on the subject. In this, he is not far from Kissinger, in that both seek a strategic debate, out of which a consensus might emerge on a weapons policy to avert Armageddon.

We hope Kissinger gets the discussion he wants, and that he takes an aggressive part in defining the terms of the debate. Yet it must be said that the issue of arms control in the present atmosphere will turn less on who needs what weapons and when and why, than on who needs Richard Nixon in the White House and whom he needs to stay there. A Secretary of State may be more popular or more intelligent than a President, but he cannot function effectively as an agent of change in an administration on the verge of collapse. Kissinger's high hope that he can rise above the ruins and lead the country toward greater restraint in expenditures for new weapons is probably illusory. The internal conflicts over the arms budget are in a sense peripheral; the central struggle is over who can fill the vacuum created by a paraplegic President, to use Stewart Alsop's phrase. The President needs Kissinger, but not as much as he may need many of the critics of the Secretary's new-found cause of arms limitation. That is why the Secretary may find it prudent to postpone his Great Debate, hoping, like the rest of us, that the impeachment process is mercifully rapid, and that a less beleaguered administration can in future concentrate on the meaning of Kissinger's basic question about "strategic superiority." The Secretary won't be twiddling his thumbs meanwhile. He will have continuing discussions with Arabs and Israelis. He is planning fresh talks in China, where the internal political balance is shaky. He must renegotiate the status of US bases in Spain and Portugal. And he must deal with a whole new power equation in Greece and Cyprus.

RAY SAIDEL

## 'Piece by Piece — Israel for Oil — That Is the Basic Deal'

# Kissinger's Gift to the Arabs — Israel

Addressed to William Loeb: Although on the surface things seem quiet in the Middle East, the pot continues to boil. With the "separation of forces" on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts now complete, agreements, suspected and unsuspected are surfacing.

Dr. Kissinger, presumably with the approval of President Nixon, has made great promises of support to the Arabs. This, in turn, has apparently given the Russians to believe that the United

States is weak in the "Determination Department," as well as defense and, perhaps, was one factor resulting in their very hard stand in the recent Nixon-Brezhnev talks, even to showing their disdain for this country by cutting off our radio and TV newsmen when they didn't like what they were saying. If this had happened in reverse, it would be considered a major provocation.

The Presidents gift of a nuclear power plant

to Egypt stunned the world. Even the Russians have consistently refused this, considering it a very dangerous move. But the Nixon-Kissinger team apparently thought of it as a "Grand Gesture" and, of course, it certainly impressed Sadat.

Egypt already has a surplus of electric power at Aswan and while Dr. Kissinger protests that, with proper safeguards, it would have no atomic bomb capability, many of our lead-

SAIDEL

Page 19

Ray Saidel of Manchester and a first-hand observer of the Mideast scene writes Israel is waiting in vain for a sign the Arabs desire peace. He sees renewed pressure on Israel to give up more land and adds, "We live in a world where it is 'good business' for powerful countries to give in to terror and negotiate with murderer."

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

WASL POST

7/25/71

... And Sisco's Shuttle Diplomacy

Full-scale war between Turkey and Greece was averted and the 7-year-old military dictatorship in Athens toppled when Washington belatedly abandoned permissiveness and laid down the law to the Greek junta.

There is little doubt Greece would have responded to Turkey's invasion of Cyprus with its own invasion of Turkey were it not for Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco's backstage pressure in Athens. In most undiplomatic language, Sisco told the Greek generals that the U.S. would abandon them to inevitable destruction if they attacked Turkey. Jolted by this unexpected threat, the military dictatorship backed down and thereby guaranteed its own fall on Tuesday.

But there is no room for American self-congratulation here. The generals held tyrannical power so long because of Washington's coddling. The Cyprus crisis which has shaken the NATO alliance should have been averted by the United States. What's more, this menacing question remains: will bitterness by ordinary Greeks toward Washington for wet-nursing the dictatorship eventually propel their nation out of the Western alliance?

U.S. follies toward Athens date back to the Johnson administration, which embraced the Greek military coup of April 1967. U.S. diplomats in Athens felt the obscure colonels masterminding the coup would have collapsed at a single word from Washington, but that word never came. This policy was perpetuated by the Nixon administration, freezing tyranny in Greece.

Despite a growing coolness toward Athens recently, the U.S. has rigidly refused to pressure the military dictatorship. The current junta, dominated by Brig. Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides, seemed puzzled that Washington demanded so little for friendship and military aid.

Noting American permissiveness coinciding with increased opposition from the Greek people, Ioannides decided on the ancient expedient of faltering regimes: a foreign adventure. Athens's plot to take over Cyprus should have been foreseen and prevented by Washington. Instead, as the junta expected, there was no U.S. interference.

Moreover, working-level State Department officials who wanted to condemn Athens for the Cyprus plot after it occurred were overruled by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, heeding Pentagon fears of losing Greece as NATO's anchor. Had Kissinger instead aligned himself with the British against the coup, congressional critics

believe, the Turks might have been dissuaded from invading Cyprus—a contention bitterly disputed by administration policymakers.

By the time Sisco left Washington at 11 p.m. July 17 for his try at shuttle diplomacy, the administration was resigned to a Greek-Turkish war which would shatter the West's strategic posi-

tion against Moscow and threaten the NATO alliance. Thankfully, at that belated hour, Sisco talked tough to the Greeks.

When Sisco arrived in Athens Friday morning, July 19, the generals informed him they would respond to Turkish invasion of Cyprus by invading Turkey. Sisco's hardboiled reply: except for the U.S., you have no friends in NATO—or the world. You can expect nothing from the Communist world. In the Third World, you are pariahs. And if you attack Turkey, you will lose the U.S. and be totally isolated.

Flying to Ankara that night, Sisco told the Turks that the U.S. would work with Turkey and Great Britain to undo Greek meddling in Cyprus. But the Turks seemed determined to teach Athens a lesson. At 5:45 a.m. Saturday, Sisco was informed of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus to begin 15 minutes later. He left Ankara for Athens at 6:30 a.m.

In Athens, the Greeks reiterated their intention to counterattack against Turkey. Again, Sisco recited his tough line. Stunned that Washington finally meant business, the generals backed down. When Sisco left for Washington last Monday night after negotiating the shaky cease-fire, it was clear the Ioannides regime could not survive.

Luckily, it was replaced not by nationalistic young colonels vowing a redemptive war against Turkey but by a civilian government headed by old conservative Constantine Karamanlis. But the United States has not escaped the consequences of its follies. The harvest from anti-American seed sown in Greece since 1967 by Washington's pro-junta policies has yet to be revealed.

We reported from Athens in June 1969 that the U.S. embrace of the junta—because of military requirements in the Eastern Mediterranean—posed “immense danger to long-range stability” in the region. That prediction was fully realized by the Cyprus crisis. Whether Sisco's belated badgering of the Greeks can forestall the prediction's full consequences will require undeserved but eagerly welcomed good fortune.

By Joe Heibberger—The Washington Post

*In Athens, Under Secretary of State Sisco "recited a tough line."*

© 1974, Field Enterprises, Inc.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 1974

Panel on Behalf of the President

within—close to the Presidency, that's growing," and "people are going to start perjuring themselves..." He described the genesis of the D.N.C. break-in; the employment of Liddy, the formulation of a series of plans by Liddy which Dean disavowed, as did Mr. Haldeman; the belief that the C.R.P. had a lawful intelligence gathering operation and the receipt of information from this source; and the arrest at the D.N.C. on June 17, 1972. He then informed the President of a call to Liddy shortly thereafter inquiring "... whether anybody in the White House was involved in this" and the response, "No, they weren't."

### Dean's 'Clear Instructions'

Dean next laid out for the President what happened after June 17. He informed the President "I was under pretty clear instructions (laughs) not to really investigate this... I worked on a theory of containment—to try to hold it right where it was," and he admitted that he was "totally aware" of what the F.B.I. and grand jury were doing.

Throughout these disclosures the President asked Dean a number of questions such as:

P. Tell me this: did Mitchell go along?

P. That could be—Colson know [sic] what they were talking about?

P. Did Colson—had he talked to anybody here?

D. No. I think this was an independent—

P. Did he talk to Haldeman?

D. . . . Strachan. Some of it was given to Haldeman. uh, there is no doubt about it. Uh—

P. Did he know what it was coming from?

Altogether, the President asked Dean more than 150 questions in the course of this meeting.

Dean then described to the President the commencement of what he alleges was a cover-up involving himself and others as not learning of the cover-up at the time. In addition, Dean

can just that, you

in no way related to Watergate or to the 1972 political campaign, and which were in the area of national security, would be compromised in the process of the Watergate investigation and the attendant publicity and political furor. The recent public disclosure of the F.B.I. wiretaps on press and N.S.C. personnel, the details of the plumbers operations, and so on, fully justifies that concern.

As a result of this concern and the F.B.I.'s request through Pat Gray to John Dean for guidance regarding some aspects of the Watergate investigation, because of the possibility of C.I.A. involvement, the President directed John Ehrlichman and me to meet with the director and deputy director of the C.I.A. on June 22. We did so and ascertained from them that there had not been any C.I.A. involvement in the Watergate affair and that there was no concern on the part of Director Helms as to the fact that some of the Watergate participants had been involved in the Bay of Pigs operations of the C.I.A.

We discussed the White House concern regarding possible disclosure of non-Watergate-related covert C.I.A. operations or other nonrelated national security activities that had been undertaken previously by some of the Watergate participants, and we requested Deputy Director Walters to meet with Director Gray of the F.B.I. to express these concerns and to coordinate with the F.B.I., so that the F.B.I.'s area of investigation of the Watergate participants not be expanded into unrelated matters which could lead to disclosures of earlier national security or C.I.A. activities.

The President's statement of May 22, 1973, completes the evidence of this transaction, and verifies the circumstances which led to the meeting of Haldeman and Ehrlichman with the C.I.A. officials on June 23, 1972. The President stated:

> Within a few days, however, I was advised that there was a possibility of C.I.A. involvement in some way.

> It did seem to me possible that, because of the involvement of former C.I.A. personnel, and because of some of their apparent associations, the investigation could lead to the uncovering of covert C.I.A. operations totally unrelated to the Watergate break-in.

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SPECIAL REPORT WAVA RADIO

3:15 PM JULY 23

Kissinger and Schlesinger

JAMES LIMBACH: Secretary of State Henry KISSINGER and Defense Secretary James SCHLESINGER meet weekly over breakfast to discuss affairs of state.

Are they friends of rivals for the President's attention and favor?

Well the impression fueled by KISSINGER is that there is growing competition between the two on the direction the nation will take in the future on defense and foreign policy.

The controversy centers on the "doomsday" weapons and how strong the United States should be militarily in the nuclear field in contrast to the Soviet Union.

At one point during a news conference in Brussels, KISSINGER indicated somewhat warily that Mr. NIXON may eventually have to make a choice between him and SCHLESINGER. KISSINGER's thesis is that there's no need for over-kill in developing new weapons. He asked, rhetorically, "What, in God's name, is superiority?"

SCHLESINGER does not want to halt research and development on a new generation of missiles while the Soviets are proceeding to deploy their first multiple warhead missiles.

While the two giants in the Cabinet appear to be sparring in public, rumors persist that KISSINGER has lost some ground as the President's favorite mentor. There's been a growing feeling among White House aides that KISSINGER has creamed off the credit for many of the President's foreign policy initiatives, while some KISSINGER supporters believe that he perhaps has stayed too long in the administration and has inevitably been touched by Watergate.

The tenuous relationship between KISSINGER and SCHLESINGER is covered mainly from the Secretary of State's point of view in a book entitled "Kissinger," by brothers

Bernard and Marvin KALB, both CBS news correspondents.

The book indicates that SCHLESINGER balked at massive arms aid to Israel during the war with the Arabs last October, and that only through KISSINGER's intervention did the U.S. airlift to Israel get under way.

SCHLESINGER's aides say the facts are just the opposite, that KISSINGER wanted to help Israel but surreptitiously rather than in a dramatic show of calling out the Air Force to fly tanks and planes. According to SCHLESINGER's people, the Defense Secretary learned that Israel's position was deteriorating. One aide said the Defense Secretary was told by Israeli Embassy officials that Israel could last only four days more without the emergency airlift. They said SCHLESINGER then took it upon himself to order the airlift, even before permission had been obtained from Portugal to use the U.S. Air Force Base in the Azores as a refueling point. Portugal later gave permission.

During the war, KISSINGER and SCHLESINGER conferred privately following a harsh letter from Soviet Communist Party leader, Leonid BREZHNEV, indicating a possible unilateral move in the Mediterranean and then decided to call a general alert of teh nation's armed forces around the world. They then informed President NIXON, and he approved.

Well the full story of those days of negotiations and decisions probably will not emerge until KISSINGER and SCHLESINGER write their own memoirs. Meantime, the two Cabinet officers appear to be vying for Mr. NIXON's ear, and the President seems to be leaning toward SCHLESINGER.

This is James Limbach, WAVA News.

PLEASE NOTE: A complete transcript of the interview with Michael COLLINS is available. The Today Show July 24, 1974 NBC Network.

5 Thursday, July 25, 1974

Kissinger: Major War Averted

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger expressed the belief yesterday that the threat of major Greek-Turkish warfare has been averted although heavy fighting continued on Cyprus after the agreed cease-fire deadline.

The United States continued to make peace appeals in Athens and Ankara throughout the day after the intended 10 a.m. EDT sease-fire was to go into force. Continued shooting on Cyprus caused American officials to say early last night that there may be "some slip-page" in plans for Greece and Turkey to begin peace talks Wednesday in Geneva, under British auspices.

Despite breaches in the cease-fire, Kissinger said at midday, "We believe ... that a rather complicated crisis which had dangers of internationalization has been overcome."

Throughout a week of warfare on Cyprus following the coup led by Greek officers of the Cyprus National Guard which deposed Archbishop Makarios as President on July 15, unanticipated developments confounded the diplomacy of the United States and other media-tors. In the same pattern, the United States yesterday was simultaneously re-ceiving praise for achieving the cease-fire, and working intensively to sustain it.

Archbishop Makarios, initially reported killed in the coup, and then rated politically finished by many U.S. strategists when he escaped from Cyprus, appeared yesterday in the State Department, smiling benignly on everyone, including Kissinger.

The archbishop was politically revitalized by the Turkish troop landing on Cyprus last Friday night which checkmated the coup. Arriving in Washington

See RELATIONS, A10, Col. 5

By Harry Naltchayan—The Washington Post

Secretary Kissinger greets Archbishop Makarios before talks here.

FEATURES COLUMNISTS

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 22 JULY 1974 (16)

KISSINGER-SCHLESINGER FEUD
What It's All About

**A** CRUCIAL POLICY BATTLE is shaping up in Washington between two of the most powerful members of the Nixon Administration.

The protagonists: Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger.

The issue: basic U. S. defense policy and its impact on relations with the Soviet Union.

The lines on which these two influential Cabinet members are joining battle have emerged quite clearly in recent days.

**The Kissinger position:** The Secretary of State, in effect, maintains that the Defense Secretary is advocating policies that impede negotiations with the Soviets and threaten to rigger a runaway arms race that would wreck superpower *létente*. The Kissinger view is that the Pentagon is operating on the basis of outdated notions about the concept of 'strategic superiority' in an era of intercontinental missiles and multiple warheads.

**The Schlesinger position:**
The Secretary of Defense feels strongly that Mr. Kissinger is willing to risk U. S. security in order to promote the Soviet-American *détente*. Mr. Schlesinger's intimate friends allege

that the Secretary of State tends to underestimate America's real strength and sets too high the price the U. S. should be willing to pay for *détente* with Russia.

The first major skirmish in this policy battle occurred in the immediate aftermath of the latest Nixon-Brezhnev Summit that failed to produce a new arms agreement.

In explaining that failure in Moscow July 3, Mr. Kissinger said: "Both sides have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint, and that is not a thought that comes naturally to military men on either side."

Mr. Schlesinger's riposte was almost instantaneous. Within a few hours, he called a press conference in Washington to defend the Pentagon. Mr. Schlesinger, alluding to the Kissinger statement, declared: "There is no problem with the Department of Defense. I think that we have firm civilian control in this country."

Four questions are at the heart of the conflict:

1. Superpower *détente*. Mr. Kissinger argues that the U. S. has an overriding interest in reinforcing its new relationship with the Soviet Union—and that nothing should be allowed to jeopardize this.

Mr. Schlesinger questions whether there actually has been a change in Soviet motives and aims that would justify major concessions by the U. S. In his view, the success of superpower *détente* in the long run will depend, not on American willingness to make concessions, but on the continued strength of U. S. armed forces.

2. U. S. strategic policy. Mr. Schlesinger maintains that it is vital for U. S. to see to it that the Soviet Union does not gain strategic superiority—or even to appear to achieve that position. In his view, a shift in the balance would have dangerous political and psychological implications. Even

though the U. S. remained militarily strong, Allied confidence would be eroded; Russian leaders would be tempted to take greater risks in a crisis.

Mr. Kissinger, on the other hand, questions the significance of "strategic superiority" in a situation where both sides have thousands of nuclear warheads. In his words: "One of the questions we have to ask ourselves as a country is what in the name of God is strategic superiority. What do you do with it?"

3. Negotiating strategy. Mr. Schlesinger believes that the U. S. is in a strong bargaining position—with a gross national

product twice that of the Soviets and an impressive technological lead. His supporters argue that this gives the Russians a greater incentive to pay a price of its own for an arms agreement.

Mr. Kissinger believes that political and economic pressures will handicap the U. S. in future arms competition. Therefore, an early agreement is essential.

4. Warhead numbers. The two Cabinet members disagree profoundly on the number of missiles and warheads the U. S. and Russia should be

allowed to retain under any new arms agreement. Mr. Schlesinger insists that the U. S. must have an advantage of nearly 2 to 1 in the number of intercontinental missiles armed with MIRV's—multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicles. He considers this is the only way to maintain "essential equivalence" in view of the enormous Soviet advantage in numbers and total throw weight of their missiles. And an arms agreement on any other terms, he contends, would jeopardize U. S. security.

Mr. Kissinger challenges the Schlesinger argument on numbers, contending that it can unnecessarily undermine *détente*. He argues that the U. S. holds a clear strategic advantage over the Soviets—and can afford to concede liberal terms to achieve an agreement with Moscow. "If we have not reached an agreement well before 1977," he warns, "then I believe you will have an explosion of technology and an explosion of numbers at the end of which we will be lucky if we have the present stability."

Thus, the lines are drawn for a classic battle over defense policy between Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Kissinger—with President Nixon caught in the middle.

In the months ahead, a presidential decision will be unavoidable. The Administration will be forced to hammer out a firm position for a new round of arms negotiations with the Soviets. When the showdown comes, some impartial political observers say, it is difficult to see how both of the protagonists can survive in office—given the intellectual and emotional character of the two men involved.

*The foregoing assessment was written by Joseph Fromm, an Associate Executive Editor of "U. S. News & World Report."*

Secretary Kissinger

Secretary Schlesinger

Now heard among officials unfriendly to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is speculation that he is deliberately picking a quarrel with Defense Secre-

tary James R. Schlesinger on high-level nuclear strategy. The story they put out is that Mr. Kissinger wants to

resign on a "respectable" issue—if he loses—concerning defense policy rather than face further controversy about his role in wiretapping.

1-F

LOS ANGELES TIMES - 5 JULY 1974(16)

ACCUSES JACKSON OF ATTEMPT AT 'SURVEILLANCE'

# Soviet Editor Assesses Detente's Opponents

A delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. recently completed a 10-day tour of the United States, which included meetings with members of the U.S. Congress. The author was part of the delegation and published the following notes (excerpted here) in a front-page article in the government newspaper Izvestia on his return to Moscow.

BY LEV TOLKUNOV

Although the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet has long-standing, wide and active contacts with dozens of parliaments throughout the world, including parliaments of major Western countries, this was the first delegation of the Supreme Soviet to visit the United States. It has taken a long time to establish parliamentary contacts on a permanent basis between our countries.

The main aim of our talks was not to compare the forms and methods of activity of the two highest legislative bodies —though, certainly, those taking part in the talks were interested in these, too—but to study as best as possible the stands of the congressmen on the main problems of both Soviet-American relations and the international situation as a whole. This was all the more necessary since it was the first time that we met at one table to discuss the whole complex of difficult and many-sided problems.

We proceeded from the fact that the development of Soviet-American relations is not a time-serving matter but a long-term perspective process, necessary for both sides and for the whole world. What is involved is the creation of a pattern of relations which would include not only contacts on a governmental level, but also permanent ties between the highest legislative bodies, public organizations, scientists and the like.

This was not a talk between the representatives of the two "superpowers," as the opponents of international detente are trying to present Soviet-American contacts. American congressmen shared our opinion that the development of U.S.S.R.-U.S.A. relations must be conducted in a way that no other countries are damaged, and no traditional bilateral contacts with other countries are impaired.

It would be most naive to believe that the conversion from confrontation to negotiation and cooperation, to normalization and improvement of relations is idyllic harmony between the two powers.

This is not and cannot be so. This was not

Lev Tolkunov is editor-in-chief of Izvestia and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet. This abridged translation of his article was prepared by Novosti Press Agency at The Times' request.

envisioned by either side. Both are aware of the differences in their socioeconomic systems, their ideologies and social ideals, and their approaches toward many major issues in one part of the world or another.

In the present period when relations have changed for the better, special tasks face those who by their office and occupation should address the masses and influence public opinion. I mean political leaders and members of parliament who are called upon to build the foundation of legislative and public support for the efficiency of interstate relations.

The most notorious and most active opponent of detente and improvement of Soviet-American relations is Henry Jackson, the Democratic senator from the state of Washington. Jackson's political future is tied to his crusade against detente.

Jackson has other pursuits besides trying to undermine Soviet-American relations, however. Once again with his eye on the next presidential election, the senator poses as a protector of the environment and as a fighter against the arbitrariness of the oil companies.

But Jackson's main pursuit is combatting international detente. And it is here that he finds his main allies. The senator wants to be the spokesman of the entire military-industrial complex. Jackson speaks not only for the arms manufacturers, but also for the Pentagon's hawks, who, in conditions of an improved international atmosphere, do not always find it convenient to call for the further arms race.

Another leader opposing improved Soviet-American relations is George Meany, president of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. He, too, is a faithful ally of Henry Jackson.

The opponents of detente have a common tactical trick. None of them, with the possible exception of Meany, make a frontal attack against the idea of detente. On the contrary, they make a general bow to it. They seek "only" its improvement. And

who would dare come out openly with a platform of new rounds of the arms drive, moreover nuclear war? It would be political suicide. Bypassing maneuvers are altogether different.

Another example, drawn out in time and extensive in consequences, is the attempt to hinder the expansion of trade between the two countries. Behind this attempt lies the far-reaching aim of meddling in the Soviet Union's domestic affairs.

The representatives of the Administration are perfectly aware of the absurdity and groundlessness of this approach.

The meaning of the Jackson Amendment to the trade reform bill is that the granting of most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union in commercial transactions with the United States and in extending U.S. Export-Import Bank credits must be accompanied with American interference in Soviet home affairs, with American surveillance over "freedom of emigration" of Soviet citizens. This is Jackson's idea of detente and of equality for the two great powers!

The opponents of detente do not present trade and economic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union as a mutually beneficial process. But in spite of the opposition, economic relations are expanding. Trade between the two increased from $200 million in 1971 to $1.3 billion in 1973. The joint U.S.S.R.-U.S.A. Trade Commission has already held four regular sessions, while the U.S.S.R.-U.S.A. Trade and Economic Council held its inaugural meeting at the end of February, 1974. Trade representations have begun to function in each other's capitals.

The members of parliament of our two countries are called upon to play an important part in the improvement of Soviet-American relations. On them rests the great responsibility for deepening detente and shaping public opinion that will actively support the further positive changes in world affairs.

We proceeded from this in our business contacts with the members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. It can be noted with satisfaction that such an approach met with understanding on the part of many of our American counterparts. But, of course, no one expected that we would reach full agreement at our very first meeting.

SPACE BUSINESS DAILY - 12 JULY 1974(16)

ISRAEL UPS TAXES $1 BILLION TO BOLSTER DEFENSE

Israel announced last week that it was raising taxes by nearly $1 billion to bolster its defense forces and to halt burgeoning inflation and a severe balance of payments deficit resulting from the October War.

Citing the continuing threat to Israel, Defense Minister Shimon Peres reported to the Knesset that the Soviets have supplied Syria with MiG-23 fighters and SAM-9 surface-to-air missiles -- two of the most advanced weapons in the Soviet Arsenal.

Peres also reported that Soviet military officers "sustained casualties" while serving in forward Syrian battlefield command posts during the October War.

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Kissinger continued

Yugoslavia

**ALL THINGS CONSIDERED,** the indefatigable Kissinger has discovered that oil, in addition to its many other uses, can also serve as a diplomatic fuel.

—Politika, Belgrade (socialist).

Australia

**IT IS FASHIONABLE** these days to be cynical about the so-called "Kissinger diplomacy." He is neither God nor Mohammed nor the son of either... but it is hard to see where the world would have gone these past two years without Henry Kissinger's hand at the tiller.

—The Australian, Canberra (independent).

India

**IF THERE HAS BEEN** any complaint it has been about his reverse bias—several American Jewish leaders have voiced the feeling that too often Dr. Kissinger... has sacrificed the vital interests of the Jews and Israel. Ironically enough the Europeans have a more or less similar complaint... that the German-born Kissinger is more at ease with the Chou En-lais of the world than with his own fellow Europeans. The truth of course [is] his approach is concerned... with what is a possible compromise... and therefore practical.

—The Hindu, Madras (conservative).

Hong Kong

**IT IS NOT DENYING** Kissinger's genius and great achievements in some areas to suggest that he has performed less than satisfactorily or even dismally in others. If U.S. relations with traditional enemies in Moscow and Peking have never been better, its relations with some traditional allies have never been worse.

—Hong Kong Standard, Hong Kong (independent).

Mexico

**THERE ARE** [in Kissinger] kernels of Metternich, plus others of Casanova and, in unguarded moments, of the Marquis de Sade.

—Jose Alvarado, in *Excelsior*, Mexico City (independent).

Canada

**THUS FAR,** Dr. Kissinger's efforts, in Vietnam, Peking, the Middle East, have been pure cosmetics.

—Winnipeg Free Press (independent).

Egypt

**WHAT WE HAVE HERE,** then... is an American President... who feels that if he is able to achieve some results in the Middle East crisis, he would be able to cover up his scandal. ... Are the clouds over Nixon's head and the glow surrounding Kissinger sufficient to bring about a significant change in American policy?

—Mohammed Hassanein Haykal, former Editor,

Al Ahram, Cairo (independent).

Lebanon

**A SYRIAN-ISRAELI** agreement would represent the end of all Arab-Israeli wars. ... If Kissinger gives up no one will be able to pursue the issue further. ...

—Al-Nahar, Beirut (independent).

Israel

**WASHINGTON HAS BECOME** gradually aware of the fact that in the process of easing tensions between the big powers, Russia made all the gains while the U.S. made all the concessions.

—Ma'ariv, Tel Aviv (independent).

**I FEAR THAT** the impact, or rather the spell, that the American Secretary has cast on the Israeli Government exceeds what our foreign policy can afford. ...

—M. Bar'eli in *Davar*, Tel Aviv (Labor daily).

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**KISSINGER IS A MASTER** of the art of employing an effective blend of pressure and accommodation at the right moment... with optimal exploitation of the political and psychological realities...

—Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Zurich (independent).

**IT MAY BE THAT** the "gap" between Kissinger and Japan arises from the difference in his and Japan's approaches to Japan-U.S. problems ... the Japanese Government and the Japanese mass media tend to look at them from a localistic, short-run, and partial point of view.

—Japan Times Weekly, Tokyo (independent).

**THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT** make excuses to Dr. Kissinger for its "switch" to a relatively pro-Arab stand. ... This is the kind of crisis from which Japan alone must find the way out.

—Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo (independent).

**KISSINGER IS NOT** a prophet of peace, a Utopian. ... Rather he has penetrated the most secret and hidden mechanisms of "Realpolitik"; he has weighed the interests at stake and the relationships of power with utter realism, clarifying them ... on the basis of the logic of balance.

—La Stampa, Turin (liberal).

**THERE ARE SOME** lessons to be drawn from Kissinger's vicissitudes. First, the fact that there are no "supermen" ... and ... no viable substitutes for a strategy based on justice and conciliation. ... Second, that the older friends ... are preferable to the new ones. Third, that Watergate is a cancer that infests all American foreign policy, and thus Western policy....

—Pietro Sormani, in *Domenica del Corriere*, Milan (independent weekly).

**EVEN IF THE RESULTS** of the Moscow visit were meager ... Kissinger's negotiations there [were] one of the year's major political events.

—Svenska Dagbladet, Stockholm (conservative).

**NIXON NEEDS SUCCESS** in his foreign policy. ... Brezhnev also needs to be able to point to positive results. ... Before Kissinger's arrival *Izvestia*, indeed, declared that the Soviet government would implement the Party Congress' decision on improved relations with the United States.

—Nya Tioning, Uppsala (liberal).

**DR. KISSINGER...** a foreign adventurer ... the "Broker of Peace" ... is [also] known for his disastrous role in the Vietnam War. ... The fact that ... he led the President to capitulation ... constitutes a disgrace....

—Hestia, Athens (conservative).

**HE CONDUCTS** foreign relations with a virtuoso impressario's panache of neat elegance, adroit skill, and the bravura of a film star.

—Obolabo Ogunsanwo, in *The Sunday Times*, Lagos (independent).

**A NUMBER OF AMERICAN** papers have published sensational articles about the "triumph" of the diplomacy of Mr. Kissinger in the Middle East. Actually the mountain has brought forth a mouse. For the moment, Washington's diplomacy is purely utilitarian. The oil embargo ... was effective. Washington was compelled to make gestures in favor of the Arab countries.

—Pravda, Moscow (Communist Party daily).

Switzerland

Japan

Italy

Sweden

Greece

Nigeria

U.S.S.R.

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