Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Bryce Harlow
1/24/70 8:30 a.m.

K: I had a call from Congressman Passman yesterday evening and I said I cannot talk to you until Bryce Harlow first clears it and he said... I can't tell you what he said.

H: Something crazy?

K: No, let me tell you. He claims he's largely responsible to get our bill through.

H: Yea, he wants this 35 million dollar deal.

K: He says he will go from 54 to 315. He did do what we wanted. He restored the funds.

H: We rolled him.

K: What do you mean?

H: We went beyond what he was willing to do. On the 35 million dollar deal...

K: I said I didn't handle the parliamentary situation, and he said couldn't I call him back.

H: I got into this yesterday. I had Bill Timmons dealing with Otto. until I could study it a little. He's very tricky on these things. When he's making a deal, it's probably lower than the parliamentary situation is forcing him into.

K: Making a better deal for himself?

H: That's right. On this we stood pretty sturdy--we got more than he offered. Defense had 35 million dollars elsewhere for Taiwan.

K: 35 he's satisfied with.

H: I understand.

H: He's willing to approve the jets, the 54 if we give him...

K: ... the 35 face saver.

H: yes.

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

page 2

K: He may have been drunk for all I know, but he was trying all day to reach me.

H: I've got to call Laird. I called Hannah; he said Alex Johnson was handling it. Johnson said somebody in Defense was handling it. So I called all over Defense, and it finally comes back to Laird. I told Otto confidentially we're going to get the money from funds he didn't even know existed.

K: __________ told me he'd get 24--he wants 35.

H: Ford is very eager to do what he says.

K: His basic attitude on State is to screw the nationalists.

H: Gerry Ford believes if we *do* don't do this, Otto will get it back in conference and clobber the economic situation.

K: That's what he told me he'd do. He gave me a long parliamentary reply. All I know is that he wants 35 million urgently.

H: Okay. You want me to keep you in touch with what I find out from Mel?

K: Yes, and when you find out, I'll call him and get the credit like I always do.

H: Okay, unless the news is bad, and then I'll call.

K: No, all I ask is that when you call him, let him know I've been in touch with you, so when I need something from him I'll have some credit.

By KLW NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Hal Saunders

1/24/70 9:08 a.m.

K: The Secretary of State mentioned to the P yesterday that he thought we were making progress in New York. The P asked me and I told him that was not my impression, but I could be wrong.

S: No, I think you are right. The Soviets seem to be moving toward the French. Yost sees this as progress--I don't and I don't think Sisco does. But I'll give you a memo to give the P. [Recap of situation].

K: But that's absurd.

S: I think so. Joe wrote the Secretary and the memo said he didn't think it represented progress, so what the Secretary is doing it listening to Charlie Yost.

K: Okay fine.

S: I'll do you a wrap-up.

K: Explain the basic issues in a page or two.

S: Okay.

Saunders

1/24/70 11:20 a.m.

K: Len Garment has a redraft of that statement. Would you go over it with him and then talk to Sisco? I've no problems with it. But make sure Sisco has seen it. Okay?

S: Fine. It's okay with you as it stands?

K: Yes. But I'm counting on you to make sure there's no hook in it I'm not observing.

S: Right. I'll do that.

K: Can you come to his office in about 5 minutes.

S: Yes.

By: KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Sonnenfeldt

1/24/70 9:15 a.m.

K: I've looked over... Who sent over that snazzy briefing book? State?

S: Yes, that's right.

K: I don't think the P will be able to do much with the cover memo. It's too vague. He doesn't know most of the issues.

S: They're pretty good in Roger's memo. I didn't see any way of finessing that. I tried to put it out the 7 or 8 things where he should watch out.

K: On their Nigerian part--do they have anything on that?

S: Yes. They've covered all the topics, except textiles.

K: I think he should know how great our sense of urgency on Nigerian

S: You put whatever changes you want on it and I'll change it. But I think the State memo is quite a good one, and solid. It's silly to repeat everything they say.

K: We could just reorganize what we give him.

S: I'll be coming--I'll see you before you see Beam, shortly before 10:30.

*

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Senator Fulbright
1/24/70 10:00 a.m.

F: I forgot last night, that's Lincoln's birthday weekend. The dates I had here were the 6th, 7th, and 8th. Are any of those free for you? Do they interfere with your social life?

K: They may, as a matter of fact. What will it be, about an hour?

F: Not over an hour and a half. This first meeting is just sort of to get acquainted. Whether we do it any more depends on how you react to it.

K: Well, in principle it's something I'm eager to do. I'd like to maintain contact, if we can work it out in a way that stays on a personal basis. How about 5:00 on Thursday the 5th?

F: At my house?

K: Yes, that's what Bryce Harlow ruled as the way . . .

F: Whatever you say.

K: Why don't we say you asked me to come by for drinks?

F: Yes, that's the way it is.

K: You're free to invite whoever you want.

F: What I had in mind was: Sparkman, the ranking Democrat. Invite Mansfield--he probably can't come (leadership roles and such) but I ought to ask him. Ask Gore--he's the second man down--he won't be able to come. That would leave Church and Symington.

K: So it would be Sparkman, Church and Symington?

F: Plus myself, then Aiken. Mundt is in the hospital, so Aiken and Case.

K: Find. How about Cooper?

F: Yes. It would be good to have him if you think so.

K: Yes. But it's your party. Nobody you've mentioned would bother me.

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

page 2

F: If by any chance 2 or 3 can't come I'll go on to others, might even go off the committee, choose discrete people.

K: But there will be no staff there.

F: No. I think if this is good we can go on. I want to improve understandings on both sides. I don't think State understands what we're doing. I've never, in all my years on this, had an ambassador tell me he was told not to tell me what he's doing. If one thing for a general or a CIA man, but never an ambassador. I think they're afraid of the committee. Some are hold-overs from Rusk days, and have absorbed that feeling, but the real purpose of our committee is to be helpful. We can't be helpful or discharge our duties if we don't know what's going on. They want to keep this secret; I can't accept that.

K: It depends on which ones you are talking about. Out concern-- we have no intention of making any secret agreements, so we are not concerned about restraints that might be exercised on us. But we are concerned about continuity of policy. The last the White House wants is a confrontation with the Foreign Relations Committee.

F: We don't want it either.

K: Speaking personally, there will be every disposition to be cooperative.

F: Right. Whether or not we are sold on the practicability of Vietnamization, we'd like to see it work. This is what some people don't understand. I'd like to conduct our committee in a way that would be helpful to this. Some people, like Alex Johnson and those others from the previous administration have absorbed an animosity toward the Committee and me. The Brown letter . . .

K: The what letter?

F: The Brown letter which made a basic commitment to pay Koreans for their troops--this is not just a military matter. Brown was the Ambassador. This is an example of what is not acceptable practice. They insisted on keeping it secret. They expect us to vote on this without our knowing what they're doing. It's no good in the long run.

K: Senator, you will understand that I will not be in a position to make any agreements for the Administration.

By KHC

NARA, Dalo

page 3

F: Absolutely. There will be no commitments on either side.
Do you know where I live?

K: No.

F: 2527 Belmont Road, not far from ... near the Mosque. Next to the French Embassy, two doors from East of the Mosque.

K: I sometimes get your mail; I live at 2527 Waterside Drive.

F: No kidding.

K: No. I'll see you at 5:00 on Thursday, February 5?

F: Right.

By KCLV NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird

1/24/70 10:45 a.m.

L: I'm going to send you the memo.

K: Okay. You understand what happened, don't you? McClokey
did the backgrounding at State. I wouldn't know a 141 from a helicopter.

L: Yes. The only problem is that they announced that we would take
the markings off those planes and I have to let someone know Russell and some
of those people know. They were madder than hell. I said the P thought it
was needed to pacify the Nigerian commander. I called them down; said it
was a humanitarian thing. So we'll take the markings off. Shall we
go ahead and execute?

K: Yes.

L: Okay. There's no pickcup for us till Tuesday on the X trucks
but we will start painting the planes today. On the public affairs aspect
of this--I'm suggesting State handle it and also the Congressional contacts.

K: On that operation?

L: Yes. We've already had 40 requests from reporters wanting
to fly. I don't think we should fly too many of these reporters around.

K: I don't have any strong views on that.

L: But if you or State wants us to . . . but we should only have
one man on public affairs aspects.

K: I'll call Richardson.

L: Okay. I tried to reach you last night, but you were out on the
town. On the memo, I didn't have instructions to go ahead, but not we'll
start painting. I hate to paint those goddam planes just to take off USAF.
But we'll do it.

K: Okay. Did Bryce Harlow get to you on the Passman thing?

L: Yes. I've got a package for the Chinese in addition to the portion
under military assistance.

K: If we could get a surplusxxxxx ________.

L: I've got it: Nike surplus moving out of H ________. Putting in
75 104s. Over 150 million dollars in investment costs.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Laird
1/24/70 10:45 a.m.

page 2

K: Who beside Sykes and Rivers and Passman?

L: Sykes and Rooney had lunch with General ________ Sykes said he would go to Passman.

K: Good, because he was bugging me all last evening.

L: The only major problem with Passman is that he won't sit down long enough to listen to the package. If we are limited to 350 million dollars we can't put any F-4s in China.

K: He backed off on the F-4s.

L: As long as I promise on the telephone to put them in.

K: No, he backed off on that. He just wants 35 million on equipment. What it is he leaves up to you.

L: It's hard to handle Passman because of other things that are involved.

K: I don't know him. He came through on the foreign aid thing though, so I've had to give him a hearing. I'm sure you'll work it out.

L: Bill was going to see him; I went over it with Bill. He has the memo. You tell the P still object to painting out USAF but we've started painting.

K: Okay, I'll tell him. Incidentally you're all set for an appointment the day after you come back.

L: Good.

*

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Dwight Chapin
1/24/70 11:00 a.m.

C: It has been suggested that we send Tricia to Nepal. What do you think about going to Osaka at the same time?

K: There are a lot of hippies in Nepal.

C: Yea, Roger G. says under no conditions should she go there. He says it's a horrible place.

K: Was he the advance man?

K: Yes.

K: Horrible physically?

C: Yes. That's where he had sickness among his party. Primitive and colder than hell.

K: It won't be when he gets there.

C: In March.

K: Well, I would listen to his advice.

C: I was wonderabout Osaka.

K: I think that's a good idea.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

Telecon
Hal Saunders

1/24/70 9:08 a.m.

K: But that's absurd.

K: Okay fine.

S: I'll do you a wrap-up.

S: Okay.

Saunders

1/24/70 11:20 a.m.

S: Right. I'll do that.

S: Yes.

*

Telecon

KXXX Secretary Richardson

1/24/70 12:32 p. m.

By KH NARA, Dato

K: I've been talking to Morris and Kennedy and I'm getting ready to see Ruser. I just want to understand what that mission is supposed to accomplish.

R: We have a feeling from the cables from Truehart and in Lagos that they don't seem to see the urgency that we do. We thought the most effective way to get through to them would be to have people go over there. The other side of it is we thought to some extent there may be some aspects of their point of view we ought to understand and this would be an opportunity for this also. And third, Newsome fears there are some weaknesses in the mission itself.

K: Yes, but that's none of my business.

R: No, but it would be an opportunity to talk to Truehart. Ruser will know. He's worked on a lot of things. He's the principal author of the IA-ECOSOC and worked on Micronesia. He's clear headed, capable.

K: My concern--unheroic as it is--could you send me over a piece of paper asking me to send an NSC man with them? So it will be clear we didn't ram this down people's throats.

R: Surely. I just talked to Bill this--I was concerned there might be some sensitivity.

K: Was there?

R: No, he was very calm on it.

K: Well, I find it very valuable to do this, but I think a piece of paper would keep the records straight. And on any State Department personnel matter, I'll instruct Kennedy to keep out--that's not his business. He is busy enough fighting off his colleagues on my staff

R: Okay, Henry. And thanks you for seeing Claus.

By KHU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

Telecon
Haldeman

1/24/70 1:05 p.m.

K: Going home huh?

H: Yea.

K: While I'm working?

H: Yea.

K: If you started paying over time I'd be in business.

H: If we started paying on productivity you'd be wiped out.

K: Good response. Chapin asked me to talk to you on Habib. I think the P should talk to him just long enough that we could say he's seen him.

H: He felt very strongly he shouldn't.

K: Why?

H: I don't know. He thought about it and then said there's no reason why I should see him.

K: I think he's wrong. Otherwise it looks as if he's down-grading them.

H: You want him to do it for symbolism, not for substance?

K: Yes. I want Habib to be able to say he's got the P's backing.

H: We could put him on the schedule and not put him in.

K: Yes, we could do that.

H: I guess that's pretty dangerous though. Let's crank the P in on this on Monday.

K: Okay,

By KHC NARA, Dato. S/12/04

TelCon

Henry A. Kissinger and Elliot Richardson

January 24, 1970

**HAK:** Just for the sake of our relationship, I understand that there is some feeling in State that Packard wanted to get a crack at the President before anyone else did. I know there is going to be a State-White House confrontation and I am not going to duck it any further, but that is a different problem. I would like you to come over this afternoon and look at a briefing book I have prepared for the President. You decide whether there is any loading. If anyone got to the President it was Gerry.

**Richardson:** I think I wouldn't help the situation by telling Bill that I had the impression that Packard or Laird had talked with the President. I wasn't particularly bothered about it.

**Kissinger:** You know as well as I know this idea of two additional Minutemen had not been presented by anybody and Smith consistently opposed any additional deployment. To say that Gerry was not opposed was news to me.

**Richardson:** What happened was that it was one that Rogers himself, having heard the concerns that Gerry had, thought taking it to the President might make some sense.

**Kissinger:** If he had put it to me, it could have gone through the system. Gerry submitted a letter to the President on December 30 and one on January 21 which says at the end, " . . . ." That is what Gerry submitted to the President and what the President had in his briefing book.

**Richardson:** If you tell me something, that is it as far as I am concerned. I don't have any questions about it.

**Kissinger:** I have him an advance copy of comments which I was going to make which I don't think loaded it one way or the other. I don't care about Bill because he is trying to construct a confrontation but I just want you to understand.

**Richardson:** I am sorry if I added fuel to the fire. I don't need to see the briefing book to believe what you tell me.

**Kissinger:** It is available to you because you must have my assurance.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

**Richardson:** I appreciate your feeling on that but I really don't need it as far as you and I are concerned.

**Kissinger:** The other matter we just have to have it out and there is not any other way of dealing with it. OK But that has nothing to do with you.

**Richardson:** Thank you Henry. I think it is good for Kennedy and Ruser to go to Lagos at this point.

**Kissinger:** I will be talking to them.

**Richardson:** I discussed it with Ruser and it would be useful for you to see him from the point of view of his role if he were able to reflect your thinking directly.

**Kissinger:** I will talk to Ruser.

**Richardson:** I can get Ruser to go over with Kennedy.

**Kissinger:** Certainly.

**Richardson:** The main reason for his talking to you directly is to get a feeling for the urgency of it.

**Kissinger:** Certainly.

By KL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

*

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

9:25 am 1/26/70

L: . . . that State Dept. is so worked up.

K: I don't know what you are calling about.

L: About this overflight

K: How did it get over there?

L: They say from your shop

K: Absolutely not

L: I want you to understand what I am doing. We have a target for the B-52's in Laos. In the interagency group I am telling them to talk against it.

K: Are you for it?

L: Yes, but not in that channel. We can hit it now.

K: So I can tell the President you are for it.

L: I want a new assessment on the targeting. I am expecting on today and I will go over it carefully. I told the President that as soon as we got a target I will hit it. But I don't want the NYT ---

K: To the best of my knowledge, on the first thing, that strike on the pass

L: B-52's there

K: I was handling it like a menu strike. I was going to send your memo to the President. I got a report that your man brought it into the Godley group.

L: Godley has it in telegrams to State. Even overflight is in there.

K: My people didn't do it. I handled it like a menu

L: In these meetings it is best to take an opposite position. I don't want it to get all the way through the government.

K: I understand very well. So I know.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger

9:25 am 1/26/70

-2-

L: It will work out much better. If we have to go to Bill directly, it is better to do it directly than through State.

K: On that toxins thing, I am beside myself

L: I have kept my people quiet.

K: Your people have been superb. I thought that was what you were calling about.

L: Just wanted you to know that my people are taking a position I don't agree with and then we will hit that target without fanfare.

K: One problem. The way papers are moved through the NSC. State tries to move them out and make them bilateral State-Defense papers

L: We haven't. State is up in arms about the way we handled the toxing thing. But we did it because we thought that's the way you wanted it. Everytime we take dissent

K: They state their position and you state yours. Tell them to lay off.

L: But if we refuse to go along they say we are dragging our feet.

K: On the French paper -- we don't want a settled paper but we want options

L: I have one or two other things but I will get back to you later.

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
10:25 am 1/26/70

R: On this WSAG meeting this morning. Marshall Green attend because Alex is testifying. I have doubts about the B'52's. It will play right into Fulbright's hadn. I think we should talk to the President. Laird will stand with us.

K: He will probably agree with you but that isn't what he will do. But that's for your information. I think the 4 of us should get together.

R: The Senate is accusing us of escalating in Laos and this will play into their hands.

K: At the meeting I will get the process positions on record and not argue. I'll get the memo to the President. If he wants to proceed, OK. If not---. We don't need Wheeler? You, Mel, the President and myself.

R: We have a lot of work on the foreign policy statement. Why How does the President want to handle this thing. He might want to send up the whole thing. What we have in mind might be constructive. An assessment of our policy. All the statements the President has made plus my testimony,

K: This isn't a competitive enterprise.

R: I know but I want to know how the President wants to handle it. I will handle it anyway he wants. The basic idea is excellent.

K: I haven't seen it.

R: Each year they have the documents of the President which is very important.

K: You have no disagreement here.

R: The trouble with out submitting -- first, he tends to have something in mind generally. Someone comes up with a suggested draft not knowing what he has in mind and he says its a lot of crap. If we knew what he was thinking, and had an outline.

K: Who works on it seems to me only relevant on how best document gets produced. The ideal solution will be to work on it together. I will come over anytime you want and then all three of us can get together.

R: I think we should know what he has in mind. Speech length -- long? Philosophical approach? Recapitulation of events?

K: I think it is foolish to work competitively or separately. We should see what he has in mind and who could do it best. What he has in mind is less detailed. He has no intention of putting all or the major part of public statements into it. One could easily be the extension of the other.

*

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Roger s/Kissinger

10:25 am

1/26/70

-2-

R: I was committed to put forth a posture statement. I was committed several months ago. Let's get together

K: I sent over in October a xxx notice that the President was working on it. Ted Eliot was working on it and we were in touch with him

R: But we didn't know what he was working on.

K: I will come over and tell you exactly what it is. When we have a draft we will let you see it. We are both working for the same thing.

R: OK thanks

*

By KHC

NARA, Dato

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger
10:45 am 1/26/70

Z: Background right?

K: I have edited it.

Z: "... the review will take into account any." Can I say that?

K: I have promised the French there will be no direct crack at the Libyans.
Say sympathetic attitude

Z: Instead of positive "... will take into account the Middle East arms balance." Emphasises our friendship with Israel.

K: Can you do that?

Z: This statement is entirely consistent.

By KM U NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger
1:00 pm 1/26/70

R: I got Holt whose one of the staff men. The committee had just broken up. He said they would not disclose that and not even disclose witnesses. There is plenty of time to discuss anything re disclosure.

K: They can leak it of course. Nothing you can do about that. About that other matter, the B-52's. The President is going incommunicado. I hope he will make a decision! Could you send over your suggestions? Marshall Greene did very well this morning. He will make at least a phone call. I would like you on record. I will ask Mel to do the same. Mel is not on your side.

R: Could I call Mel? I won't say anything about this. Has he talked to the President?

K: To the best of my knowledge, no. The President may not address it this afternoon. If he doesn't, we have 24 hours anyway. He is making a 15 minute speech tonight on the veto. That's the problem. If you could send over your views, I will ask Mel to send over his separately.

R: I hope he will at least take talk to me on the phone.

K: He will at least talk to you on the phone.

R: The military always say they are going to be so effective. This one ______. We could do it later. We would only be killing some men at the most. We have other planes to do it -- perhaps not so well. Perhaps not as effective.

K: My instinct is to wait until they have done something. Marshall Green gave his very best.

R: Since things are going so well in Vietnam -- If the people heard this going on they would say we are doing the same thing as in Vietnam.

K: He won't want to get into that this week. Make sure the issue is forced by getting your ideas over here.

R: I will. Thanks.

*

By KHL NARA, Dato

TELCON
McGrury/Kissinger
3:00 pm 1/26/70

Mc: There's some sort of struggle between the State Dept. and the Whit House.
The State Dept. is in league with Harry Wilson.

K: I had not better get into this.

Mc: Are we going to get Gowon to let ?? I have been reading about the Irish
famine

K: I am just trying to get it done. I don't want any points. It doesn't help to say we are trying to press Gowon. You just get his back up/

Mc: They should spring the Western report. Go to your meeting and we will talk later.

By KHC NARA, Dalo

5/12/04

Telcon
The President/Kissinger

Jan 26, 1970

4:00 P.M.

P: Why don't you run that problem by Mitchell and let me know about that too.

K: OK, Mr. President.

P: The only missing factor if he could... it up they are building down there. Publicly I wouldn't be able to say that. You know privately the facts and psychologically, but publicly we couldn't say that. Escalation is the big deal, isn't it?

K: That is what the argument would be. I lean slightly toward it because I feel we have to go for broke with Hanoi. But it's a close decision and it is not a grave mistake.

P: Bill doesn't feel so strongly as I did on the Cambodian thing.

K: And he feels very strongly about it.

P: He knows that Laird is for it.

K: I told him to talk to Laird because I don't want us to be stuck with the whole thing. I will call Laird. I will get all the papers assembled.

P: I don't want too much.

ms

*

By KHC NARA, Dale 5/12/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

4:32 pm 1/26/70

K: Have you been brow beaten by Bill? The present delay. He is leaning toward doing it. He wants a letter for his eyes only.

L: Sure

K: A piece of paper over here saying you are recommending it and why.

L: When this came up before I was criticized. I said when there was a target I would hit it.

K: Why don't you say in that letter that you recommend and what you want. He wants to know how essential that is. Can I have it by 6:00?

L: You will have to talk to Bill. He is very upset.

K: If Mel and Wheeler recommend it strongly, I will talk to Bill.

L: I wish it hadn't gotten into that channel. What about authority on overflight?

K: That got into State and they are screaming about that too. If that's the problem, we will approve that.

L: I will get you a memo

K: Can you do it in the next hour.

L: Yes

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger

5:15 pm 1/26/70

H: Did you talk to the President? Do you have a plan?

K: Yes

H: Are you going to go ahead?

K: I am going to consult Mitchell. After Habib. I hope it won't take very long.
He has to focus on the Wilson briefing.

H: He has 20 minutes tomorrow morning.

K: It's all set up and we can make the decision until midnight.

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
6:40 pm 1/26/70

L: You should have that. I sent it over to you at 6:01 pm on the LDX. I tried to put out in a brief manner.

K: You recommend it on its merits. You're not just carrying out orders of some months ago.

L: Oh, no. One other thing. There was a procedural mistake made in some cosmic material to the NATO capitals. It was sent by registered mail instead of by courier. It was some girl here. There is no evidence of a security break. I am starting an investigation. The Soviets probably know about the material anyway, but you can't be easy on somehting like this. I just though you might hear about it and I wanted you to know what it is about.

K: When can you have breakfast some day? Thursday?

OK

K: And you will let me know?

L: We will just do it

K: 7:45

L: 7:45 am over here.

(Subsequently, Mr. Laird's office called to say he had forgotten about another breakfast which he could not break. It was therefore decided that Mr. Kissinger would breakfast with Mr. Laird on Wed. at 7:45.)

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
1/26/70 6:00 p.m.

K: Two things: Phil Habib is here. It's going to ruin our position with the press to find out that we are in 100 percent agreement.

R: We've been in agreement on most things.

K: That's right. I agree completely with all the views you've expressed to him and I know the P will too--that's exactly his policy. Second, on that letter . . .

R: You mean the B-52 one?

K: Yes.

R: I just signed it.

K: Oh good.

R: I talked to Mel--he said the P told him as soon as you get a target why don't we send some of these in.

K: Well, that's true . . .

R: But it's a different ball game. We have got to express our views in view of events that occurred since then. The P doesn't want to be bound by something from 4, 5 or 6 months ago.

K: He wants to say "Is it essential, or very important." He doesn't want to do it on the basis of what he said in June or July.

R: Mel's own people are not for it.

K: Well, that's one of those fancy deals. I don't know about that. He should put his views on paper as the situation stands, not in terms of the old situation.

R: I don't like to always appear to oppose something . . .

K: My only view is that this would have to have overwhelming reasons to make up for the fact that the press conference on Friday could turn on that issue.

R: Yes, as Marshall pointed out if anybody's guilty of escalation it's probably us. We have been more successful in recent months than anybody expected and we've had these strikes. It would have no serious effect--then what's the point?

*

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
1/26/70 6:00 p. m.

page 2

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: No, this is not in the same category at all as last year.

R: As a matter of fact, while we're on the phone, I think we ought to give serious thought to the possible effects of retaliating in the event of a mini Tet offensive. We want not to convey to the enemy that we've made a Dean Acheson mistake. If a provocation exists then I'd favor it.

K: Yes, and it might be the thing to trigger the negotiations.

R: I think you might mention to the P that I feel this way about it.

K: Why don't we get together and talk about it, and I'll tell the P.

R: When there was the possibility of the coup...

K: That worked beautifully.

R: All we'd need is enough provocation to convince the American people. Then we could go back to Vietnamization.

K: Maybe you and Mell and I should talk about it together and then go to the P.

R: Okay.

By: KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
Wheeler/Kissinger

7:00 pm 1/26/70

K: I am getting the book together for the President and I haven't gotten the JCS or your own letter.

W: I sent it to Laird. He had sent his and he says it contained the same as mine. You understand my problem

K: I will communicate your problem

W: He says it contained the same thing

K: Is that correct?

W: One thing you should know. I saw the message that Godley sent to the commanders involved. He will have to tell Souvanna Phouma and also there are some friendly troops that will have to be pulled out. So the operation will have to be slipped one day.

K: Will the target still be there?

W: I think so

K: You don't need a decision today?

W: Tomorrow will be soon enough.

Further conversation: 7:22 pm

W: I thought as the principal military advisor I could be of some help. Timing. We missed the chance for that today. If we could get a affirmative between 9 and 10 -- preferably closer to 9:00 -- then we can still do it.

K: I will get the answer tonight. I know what you are up against.

W: I am sorry I couldn't meet your request.

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger

Mr. Haldeman

1/26/70; 7:30 p.m.

H said the President would like K to have Habib in the Cabinet Room at 9:15 and the President would come right out. K said he wanted to leave a memorandum for the President so that he would know exactly what to say. H said K should go in and get the President after he had Habib in the Cabinet Room and give him the memo then. H said the President asks that K really make it 15 minutes since he has to be back in the Residence. K asked if the President realized that he has to make a decision on hitting Laos today. H said yes. K asked what's with the President only working 14 hours these days. H said he wanted to get back to the house and get all the phone calls about his great speech.

K said Le Duc Tho, highest ranking North Vietnamese man in negotiations -- who hasn't been there for a while -- was arriving on February 4 ostensibly to attend the session of French Party Congress. K said, as H knew, K had offered to go over there on the 8th. K said we have to be cautious but he really thought we might get somewhere.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
Richardson/Kissinger
7:50 pm 1/26/70

K: You are still in the office? You are ready to leave and want to establish your presence.

R: I'm taking one full briefcase. We are getting into an embarrassing situation in IA-ECOSOC situation

K: I am talking to Vaky now. He will do a few tonight and talk more to the President tomorrow. I had to get the President's OK first and ?????.

R: Thought I'd sound a note of urgency. Now that I know you will be working all night on it I am greatly relieved. Just do what Vaky tells you.

K: You do what Vaky tells you and I do what Vaky tells me. Why don't we give it all to him?

R: We could do worse.

K: He has an unbeatable system. He goes to State and gets his papers cleared and then he comes back here and has his papers cleared. We are aiming for confrontation, not negotiation.

By K.L. NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Yoshida/Kissinger
8:10 pm 1/26/70

K: How are you? I am calling you about the problem of last week. We are completely confused here. The conversation took place and nothing of the sort you told me happened. Your man was very tough and uncompromising (?)

Y: The new man under my friend?

K: My friends say maybe that piece of paper we both worked on has no authority and it completely ruins our channel. We would appreciate it if you could tell us honestly if this will be done.

Y: My friend has it and I have a copy too.

K: It has never happened and there has never been a sign of intention of carrying it out. Our negotiator doesn't know what is happening. I tell him something is going to happen and nothing happens

Y: Your man met our new man and our new man here didn't offer your man here anything at all

K: Not at all

Y: Nothing at all. I will -- my friend. My friend said that everything would work out in that direction.

K: He took a step back. Certainly no step forward.

Y: All right. Could I -- I would like to talk with my friend as soon as possible directly and I will find it out.

K: It would be much better to tell us frankly then my friends presitge is being undermined with nothing that happens. We keep shifting negotiations -- to Tokyo -- and then nothing happens. You said we should request an appointment with your friend for early this week and that hasn't been settled yet.

Y: Let me check with my friend immediately if you can

K: If you could tell me what the situation is immediately I would appreciate it.

Y: It will take awhile. I have some difficulty unlike yourself of getting in touch with him. As soon as I can get in touch with him, I will be in touch with you. So could you

By KCL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

-2-

K: OK. I will be available

Y: I am not in the position of yourself of being able to look into the matter and follow it up. I will do my best.

K: I would appreciate it. It will destroy this channel because no one will believe us again. And it will ruin the atmosphere that was built up

Y: Could you wait awhile. It may take two hours or so

K: You can call me tomorrow morning my time if you want. Say 9:00

Y: Your time.

By NARA, Dato 5/27

TELCON
N. Rockefeller/Kissinger
8:50 am 1/27/70

K: Blood was flowing everywhere.

R: It's the greatest thing that has happened. Gilda Meir came out with a marvelous statement this morning.

K: It's the only thing we could do.

R: From my point of view this is fantastic. I said in the letter I would not let that happen.

K: I am calling because you called him and he will be tied up with Wilson

R: I just want to thank him

K: Aren't you nice and I will tell him. He is tied up all day but I will get to him sometime.

R: I am thrilled. I just like to reach out and thank somebody onee in a while. It could have been for me (?).

K: I don't mind making grand stand plays if it helps peace in the Middle East but if it hurts and makes more tension ...

R: I hope that veto sticks. He should have come on TV and explained why he vetoed the tax bill and then he wouldn't have had to do this. I and several others tried to tell him and even wrote him letters. Sometimes I wish he's listen to his friends.

K: Our nightmare is that we will have a depression and recession simultaneously.

R: I am coming down tomorrow for lunch with Fulbright. Just a quiet lunch

K: How about 3:00

R: How are you before lunch? I may have to come right back here in the afternoon.

K: I have the NSC and Wilson

R: I will call your secretary and let you know. I am seeing Marke today and trying to make sure he doesn't run against Goodell.

K: I am seeing Buckley today

By. NARA, Date 3/97

Telecon
U. Alexis Johnson
1/27/70 9:00 a.m.

K: I read through all the appers on this damn thing. There's no
doubt in my mind that this has been _ascending_ (?). All this proves is that
we got double-crossed, rather than schnookered.

J: I really hate to believe that. I can't understand it. It's really
not in character, and it's not in their interest.

K: I called him last night; said I'm getting out. I said we cannot go
any further on our side. We've got to know one way or the other. If we can't
know, we'll never deal with that fellow again--I don't mean Sato, I mean my
man.

J: No, of course not. Was there any explanation?

K: No, he says he doesn't understand. He says he just doesn't understand.

K:

J: I've never been more baffled.

K: I've seen him on other things; he was 100 percent authentic and the
script was followed. This is not the only thing I've seen him on.

J: I see, I see. That only makes it all the more baffling and frustrating, and we've lost two months here. If we hadn't thought there was any deal . . . Up to this point everything has gone consistent with what was known off the record.

K: They haven't done anything that indicated there's a special deal--
that's what gets me. We've made not an inch of progress.

J: We've just lost time here is the problem. I tell you what. I think . . . I still haven't any word from--I've got a telegram from Armin here--about Javits and Miazawa. Javits talked to Sato: " . . . clearly Sato was preoccupied with textiles . . . he said settlement should have been achieved before this . . . Sato said he would like my reactions as to what I heard from Miazawa . . . Let me send this to you.

K: I'll stay away from Shimoda, but if you want me to I'll tell him the P
is disturbed. You give me the word. I'll not do it on my own.

J: And then you and I and Maury should discuss what we do from here on out

K: And you tell me if you want me to talk to Shimoda--I won't take any initiatives.

UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By C.C. NARA, Dato 5/27

Telecon

Mr. Y
1/27/70 9:10 a.m.

Y: I talked with my friend just a few hours ago.

K: Yes.

Y: He was very sorry to hear that you feel confused at the results of the recent conversation between our new gentleman and your man here. He meant to be more productive. My friend will meet your man this week and will explain to your man the situation as much and as frankly as he can go without diverting (?) the understanding. So could you wait for his report?

K: All right.

Y: And my friend asks you to assure your friend that he will honor the understanding between our friends.

K: All right.

Y: And his top aide here . . .

K: Yes, I know.

Y: has already agreed with my friend about the figures in that understanding.

K: Right.

Y: My friend expressed his deep concern as well as regret . . . The problem from my friend's point of view is essentially of a technical nature. How to put things through our bureaucracy, and probably yours too, as quickly and also as naturally as possible, and frankly and apparently ~~he is working~~ his working people have been somewhat puzzled and confused. However my friend remains optimistic about overcoming these difficulties.

K: Okay.

Y: My friend considers this line of communication invaluable now in the future as well as we both need it. He mentions the *meeting* here of Senator Javits. Apparently the Senator was well-briefed on the three ______ and he would like you to pay attention to the Senator's report.

K: I just read it--it was a pretty positive report.

Y: That is the result of my conversation with my friend.

UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dale S/27

Telecon
Y
1/27/70 9:10 a. m.

page 2

K: I appreciate this very much and will communicate it to my friend within the next 15 minutes.

Y: I myself am sorry I am not being expert on this.

K: I understand. I always talked to you candidly because of our friendship.

Y: I did my best.

K: I know you did.

Y: I could not talk on the subject with any authority.

K: I hope it will come out all right and it won't make any difference.

Y: I get the strong impression my friend is very concerned and KAXXY serious and shares your view that the earliest solution must be reached in an acceptable way.

K: I appreciate this. It is a peculiarly personal problem to my friend--which you understand--this is why it is important to do it properly.

Y: That is right.

K: And we will be in touch I hope in the near future.

Y: When you get a report . . .

K: After my man has seen your friend we will look at it again.

Y: And you could tell me about your reactions?

K: Right.

Y: It is essentially a problem of technical nature. Being a democratic KANASKA country we have to deal with this problem in a specific way. That is the difficulty for my friend. He is basically optimistic on getting over these technical difficulties.

K: Good.

Y: I hope to hear from you again.

K: I will call you after your friend has talked to our man.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

9:15 am 1/27/70

K: I just talked with the Japanese again. This character said that Sato is mortified that we are up set. He wants to honor the conversation and ???? He wants us to read the conversation with Javits to see how his mind is going. He will talk to Armin when he sees him this week and with no reference to prior agreements. He expects it to be consistent when he sees Meyer. He has the problem of managing a bureaucracy that is unaware of the situation.

J: He made a commitment without being able to carry it out

K: He's trying to make us out as SOB's to help them out. Another thing he said is that Aichi is fully abroad now and he says he agrees with the figures.

J: The figures -- do you take that to be a reference to the figures in our proposal?

K: Yes

J: Well/ it's a little encouraging.

K: They keep us hoping

J: For two months they have had us out on the string

K: I can see what the President's position would be though if he had promised something no one knew about and then had to pass it through the government without saying what is going on. And some of it must seem pretty ridiculous to them. Can you send over that Javits report?

J: Yes, it's on its way

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Gen. Wheeler/Kissinger
10:00 am 1/27/70

K: I was just talking to the President on this business and one of his problems is that all the principles have taken great care to protect themselves in writing. He wonders about two things. If you flew every tactical thing against this can you do some damage?

W: Oh, yes, and we are already but B-52's are more suitable.

K: He wants to get everyone together and see what we say

W: I understand State is taking a very negative view.

K: There was no positive view from your shop.

W: I was just brought a copy of his memo when the phone rang

K: If you were to fly every tactical airplan against this target would that help?

W: Yes but

K: It's not what you wanted.

W: They are flying now. We will do that anyway.

K: If You don't need authority on that. How long do you think that target will stay?

W: I can say that this morning

K: About the imminent attack

W: We cannot start for 24 hours. Godley has to get in touch with Luang Prubang.

K: Let me see if we can get a meeting together. I think they should get together face to face. In the meantime, will you send everything out against them?

W: I will do that.

K: I am calling Laird right away. The President has authorized overflights. You will hear it officially but I thought I'd let you know.

By NARA, Dato 5/27

Telecon
Secretary Laird
1/27/70 10:08 a.m.

K: I just talked to the P--he authorized that strike in the pass area--
that overflight State is screaming about.

L: He authorized it last week, didn't he?

K: Yes, and then the State objections--well, at any rate, it's on.

L: We're not going to do that until we have a concentration; when we
do, we will.

K: On that Northern target--he'd like a meeting. Bill has come in
with a scorcher. He let it fly. Every tactical . . .

L: We should have gone on that by 10:00 today. I better start flying
tactical today. The target will disperse when we go in with heavy tactical
air, but I'm afraid it will disperse anyway.

K: He'd like to do it, but not on such short notice.

L: He was after me to hit targets there. We had better assume
we're not going to use 52s there.

K: We have to let this target ge and have a meeting on giving you
the authority to hit with B-52s in that area when they develop.

L: It's the best target we've had for 52s since I became Secretary of
Defense--- they should start hitting it now. Four thousand troops won't stay
together that long. If I don't hear from you by 10:30 I'll tell them to use
tactical air--not the best, but will have to do it. Put as many sorties in
there as we can fly. I'll talk to you about this other matter later.

K: Let me get up to him again.

L: You tell me. I'm not disappointed if it's turned down. I'm just
trying to get the best target we can. We've never had this many troops
together. Bill Rogers was raising hell with me as I were irresponsible.

K: No, the P is on your side.

L: He's usually on my side, but I usually don't get anywhere. I
appreciate the sympathy though.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By: NARA, Date: 5/27

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger

12:55 pm

1/27/70

K: ... discuss no content

Z: What should I say about Nigeria?

K: It was discussed and there's a great concern for relieving the hunger and starvation

Z: I'll say they were in close touch and will stay in close touch. What was discussed?

K: Nigeria, arms control, SALT, future of Europe and European/American relations, East-West relations including the European Security Conference proposals, and Vietnam

W: What should I say if they ask for our position on ESC?

K: That we are willing to go to one if we can decide on an agenda that makes it worthwhile.

Z: And Vietnam. Just a report?

K: I told Wilson that his man should give no substance.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELCOM
Vice President/Kissinger
1:30 pm 1/27/70

VP: So that I will be aware for my Face the Nation speach Sunday, what is the current state of the Arab-Israeli business. I have been getting a distorted picture.

K: Let me give you

VP: Can you get me a memo on it?

K: A memo with out position with out recommendations. We have a memo to the President on this for his press conference Friday night.

VP: Someone wants me to meet with Pompidou and escort him to the ???.
I didn't think it's good because of the Libyan jets thing and I turned it off

K: When? Did you give your reason?

VP: This morning. Did I do right? He doesn't know a thing

K: Then it's alreight. Wilson wants to talk to you at one of the social functions. Are you coming tonight?"

VP: Yes

K: Are you coming to the lunch tomorrow?

VP: No

K: Let me talk to your staff and arrange 5 or 10 minutes with him for you.
I think it would be good for you.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Richardson/Kissinger
3:47 pm 1/28/70

K: We are having an NSC meeting tomorrow with Wilson attending. We will talk about some European issues and I will begin with 5 or 10 minutes of outline of the issues. The President wanted to call the Secretary now but I know he can't be reached. Could he talk about the European Security Conference for 5 - 10 minutes. Do you think that can be done?

R: I think so. How much are you going to talk on the NSC paper that Miriam worked on?

K: Just in a general way. We have come to an agreement between our side and yours. We will raise the issue but not load the discussion.

R: I ask the question primarily to inquire how prepared Bill should be on that.

K: I will talk briefly about that. But in a brief way. It will be mostly a show. I will talk for 10 minute, Bill for 10 minutes, Laird for 10 minutes and then we will call on Wilson for his comments.

R: I thought it was a damn interesting paper. I found particularly interesting the analysis in the first half.

K: Marty Hillenbrand didn't like it but I do. I don't understand why he didn't.

R: I heard he was agrieved by the process but I don't know why.

K: He would not have been able to produce this.

R: I got a lot out of it myself.

K: I think we should try more of these papers.

R: I do too. In general we have now developed a variety of tools and we should mix it up depending on the case. I will get this word to Bill. He can do this without much additional work, having been to the Ministerial Meeting.

By Cao NARA, Dato 5/27

Telcon
The President
1/27/70; 5:15 p.m.

N: Did you find those targets yet?

K: They found at least two others in addition to the one.

N: In other words, three of them. What is your view? Is that enough to give them a shock effect?

K: Yes, I would not go outside that area.

N: Is 3 enough to give them a shock effect?

K: It wasn't enough to escalate it beyond what you are doing. They will notice you are doing not just tit-for-tat.

N: They will note it is something new?

K: Up to now we have hit only at SAM sites from which they attacked. Now we are hitting all the SAM sites in the vicinity.

N: We agree we ~~are~~ will go on these three. I think it is a good decision. Don't you agree with my deal - no tit-for-tat?

K: I agree completely. What I told Mel is to hit all the sites in that area. He thinks there are three - there are certainly more than one.

N: They will know how they got hurt.

K: We will just say we hit the SAM sites.

N: It was brought down by SAM and therefore we hit the SAM sites in that area. We may not have to explain anything.

K: No, because they will not give us a map of their SAM sites. Their infiltration incidentally keeps stepping up and it is now at a level about 10,000 a month in excess of their losses. Now they have stepped up supplies in December and January. Since Jan 10 they have put about 19,000 men into the pipeline as compared to 8,000 in the whole month of December.

N: It looks to me like they are aiming for the summer and late spring.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

K: I would guess after the next troop deployment, but they might just drive on in March. They may start attacking with the forces they have but I think your assessment if they do it in their normal way one would have to say about April-May. 60 to 90 days lead time. I must say if they are going we are not going to be better off later on.

N: I would rather hit them now.

K: The earlier they attack the greater the confession how weak they really are.

N: Is Haig back?

K: He will be back on Sunday night and we will get a judgment Monday or Tuesday from him.

N: What has been reporting?

K: He hasn't been too explicit. He just says he is getting a full study. He visited every regiment of the ARVN, and is going to give us a pretty cold-eyed assessment. I had a talk with Laird this morning about that meeting next week -- the one we discussed yesterday -- Laird said he isn't much in favor of hitting the north and we ought to do what Abrams recommends -- just to hit more in the south. I am concerned about this metamorphosis of Abrams views and Abrams may think he is going to become the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

N: I tell you right now it is going to be Moorer. The Navy guy. We settled that.

K: May I ask Laird to give you two or three names?

N: Yes, I want to make the decision soon. I can't believe Abrams is against hitting the north.

K: He didn't ring true when he talked to you. I remember how upset he was on the flight to Bangkok and Saigon when you were talking troop withdrawals and how nonchalant he was when you talked a few months later. I would feel more comfortable if he still holds that view after the Chairmanship is settled. He seemed to me to take troop withdrawals a little too easily in that conversation. When you said cross to Cambodia he said no I wouldn't want to do that. I don't know what has caused him to change. Haig incidentally thinks that too. I don't think Laird promised him anything - it may be in the back of his own mind. And I think the

- 3 -

more quickly we settle it the better off.

N: I am convinced it should be the Navy man. I think it is the Navy's
turn.

K: After all, Wheeler hasn't shown anything in the last 6 months.

N: Yes, he has sort of pooped out, but he is tired. How about this Navy
fellow? Will he hit it hard?

K: He is not a great brain, but he will hit it hard.

N: We could take Chapman.

K: No, that would be a terrible kick in the teeth for the Navy.

N: About Laird having the meeting at all --

K: He is cagey, as you know, but what he said is knock the hell out of
them in South Vietnam. I said why aren't you doing that now?

N: Prepare a note from me to Abrams. I am going to put it in writing
that I want him to step up the attacks now in the south.

K: I don't think you ought to put it in writing. That is the sort of order
you ought to be able to put orally and get it carried out.

N: Say in view of the inviltrations now above everything we ought to
succeed. On the second thing, I think we better have that meeting.

K: You will have to have the meeting, but I am just wondering what will
happen if they both come out against it.

N: You can talk to Mitchell and ask what he things, but if you get Rogers
in the meeting the thing to do is push him. Bill has got to be concerned
about of lot of things. The Mid East is all going flat. SALT - you and
Dobrynin are the big guns. We may have to have the damn summit in order
to divert the attention from this miserable thing in Vietnam.

K: If we can keep Gerry talking away, like the Japanese negotiations,
but that would require that the Russians play pool. Then break the
deadlock in July and meet in September.

By NARA, Date 3/27

N: I think this meeting with the British was good for all of us. They do have a view of the world that goes back through centuries and ought to cooperate. I think taking them into our confidence will help a great deal. Did you talk to Stuart?

K: Yes, he was enthusiastic. Trent, who is their Cabinet Secretary was impressed by the meeting and says he has never heard the Prime Minister so enthusiastic about anything as the NSC meeting. Trent was not at the NSC meeting.

N: Thorough notes were taken and I want him to have a copy. They will give it to him. Can you have your guy give him a copy? Give Trent one and tell him I thought he should have been at the meeting and I didn't realize he was not there. And I want him to have a complete transcript.

K: What he says is that he wanted to send over three or four of his people to see how we have organized this machinery, to see what they can adopt.

N: You go ahead on this intelligence thing.

K: Yes, I had a little talk with him.

N: Well, this damn infiltration thing, of course, it doesn't prove anything yet, does it?

K: No because if their figures are correct their numbers have been going down so that they should just be replacing them for the time being. For two or three months we don't have too much to worry about.

N: I don't give a damn about two or three months. I want to look down the road and see when we are going to get this damn thing over with. There is no answer to winning it.

K: If they don't start negotiating in February then I think some jolt may be necessary.

N: You have a feeling the jolt may start the negotiating pattern again? All right. Fine.

ms

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Elliot Richardson
1/27/70 6:55 p.m.

R: I had an interesting day. I'm calling now on Nigeria/Biafra. It
came up 2 or 3 times. I want to be sure we are on the same wavelength.
The situation is undoubtedly hard.

K: Yes, and I've got an intercept here, which you have probably
seen, which is . . .

R: Sure is. Well, there was a little colloquy between Rogers and
Stewart on Nigerian sensitivities.

K: If that blows, the P will blow with it.

R: We think going about at the edge of the risk of counter-productivity
including pushing ______ as hard as possible, especially in the use of
enclave airfields--want to be sure in going this far that I'm doing so on the
basis of what the P would want done.

K: What you've done up to now, or going beyond?

R: Well, keeping at it.

K: My impression is you are doing what the P wants done.

R: Emphasize the essentiality of an enclave airfield, and for Truehardt
to go back to see Aida (?) again.

K: If one million are dead and everybody screams, this will be necessary,
don't you think?

R: I think so.

K: And besides it's morally correct.

R: No question about that. It's a tough problem--what exactly produces
the optimum results in reaching the relief problem. We can over-indulge
our own concern at the cost.

K: That is an argument we would be receptive to.

R: I think I'm reflecting the P's concern in going as far as we've gone.

K: That is my understanding. Others will be able to point at other
things that don't show that same intensity. But my reading from having talked
to him is what you just said.

By [illegible] NARA, Dale 5/27

TELCOM

Packard/Kissinger

9:28 am

1/28/70

K: I was talking to Mel on how to move this stuff through the safeguard to the President. We are going to have a DPRC meeting on Friday. The best would be if you could present the three basic choices. First is the one we have already done. Second, Whitman plus command authority, Third, Whitman plus ____ on 4 bases.

P: You don't want to consider fallback to ID only?

K: No.

P: Whiman plus bases is the one you want to take.

K: If we could take a look at what you are doing as you do it I would like that but it isn't necessary.

P: I can get it to you tomorrow.

By C.C. NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
President/Kissinger
3:55 pm 1/28/70

P: I just wanted to be sure that you follow up on hitting as many SAM sites as they can find. Any in this area, not just one. Tell these fellows it's an opportunity. Maybe 6 or 8. If there are others a few miles away, get those. What do they use?

K: 105's

P: Not B-52's?

K: We have never used B-52's in NVN.

P: Now would be the time.

K: It is better to save those. B-52's are for area work and this is a pinpoint job.

P: We can say there was an understanding that reconnaissance sites were not out.

K: They have never used MIG 21's

P: We said we would hit reconnaissance targets, didn't we?

K: Yes

P: No more of this tit for tat. That's what happened in Korea. We are not going to do it.

K: I talked to Laird today about the $65 million for pollution and that is all right. I never showed him the Berlin note to State.

P: That I kept referring to.

K: That's OK. I said it was a note to Brandt.

P: If there isn't one in the area tell them to find others.

K: There are several.

P: Bring in the planes and run them out. The British seem happy.

K: Wilson drew me aside after the lunch and said the NSC meetings were most interesting. He had never seen options presented before. So they can see the whole range of issues. Also, he was interested in the

*

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

4:00 pm 1/28/70

K: You are pre-empting me. I told the President about the briefing this morning. He said as long as you are going for the SAM site, go for them all. He said 6 or 8 but I know there aren't that many.

L: We are going for all that were active last night. We only have 2 locked in, but if we find others we will go for those too.

K: Will you send me a memo? This is just between the WH and Defense. I am not putting it/the machinery.

L: That pollution thing. Let me send you something ______ in black and white. Everyone is saying we can keep our commitments.

K: I thought what you said this morning to me and later more delicately around the table was important. You had better get that paper over right away.

L: We could do something along that line as a second choice. Our budget is $8 million below last year. When you cut down on the budget you can't do everything. I don't think I am getting through

K: You are getting through to me loud and clear. I have been wanting to do something like that for a long time.

L: I will put it in.