ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
AT PACEM IN TERRIS IV CONVOCATION

SHERATON PARK HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DECEMBER 2, 1975

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY

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Pacem in Terris made its appearance in Easter Week of 1963 and attracted some attention, for it was clearly addressed beyond the limits of the Roman Catholic community to the world at large, and in terms and by a man of spaciousness and perceptible authority. In the United States the impact of the encyclical was enhanced by the fact of its having appeared during the incumbency of our first Catholic President and during the majority, if you will, of a generation of American Catholics for whom papal encyclicals did directly influence views on public affairs and, for those in public life, influenced conduct as well. We were -- if a brief parochialism may intrude here -- between that generation of Catholics such as Al Smith, who once asked Robert Moses what in the hell a Papal Encyclical was, and the generation now coming along which shows every disposition to wonder why anyone bothers to issue them. It was, in any event, an unaccustomed, even a heady experience. In the United States political liberals, who were by then reasonably well disposed towards President Kennedy, and were themselves rather enjoying the experience of being somewhat less ill disposed towards Rome, showed some enthusiasm for this evidence that the Pope was a liberal, too. I was then an Assistant Secretary of Labor and was at some pains to assure the Harvard graduates in the administration and the press that the Holy Father was indeed in favor of the minimum wage, indeed that Holy Fathers had been so for some time. Being so heavily Catholic, the AFL-CIO was not accustomed to paying much heed to what the Papacy thought about wages and working conditions, but the Harvards appeared to be impressed. Among the laity there was even, I think, some elucidation. For generations they had been beset by aged

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Irishmen, doing their best, who from drear episcopal studies
in 19th-century slums had been sending forth diocesan
letters denouncing "liberalism", by which term they intended
the Manchester School of Economics, but which the Democratic
faithful assumed to mean the New Deal and its forebears.
Earlier encyclicals, even *Quadregesimo Anno*, presented
themselves to a Catholic community in America that was but
little trained to serious social analysis, and still less
accustomed to having its views in such matters taken
seriously. In this respect, as in so many others, Pope John
appeared at the propitious moment: Confidence had risen;
suspicion had declined. Thereafter the "native" political
liberalism of American Catholics was much more at ease with,
and even, I think, reinforced by what was clearly seen as
Church doctrine.

This was all rather sectarian, however. Nothing, or
next to nothing in the large was affected. Catholic social
thinking had never theretofore had any serious influence on
American public policy, whether in domestic or foreign
affairs, and *Pacem in Terris* had none either. Thus, as he
done in *Mater et Magistra*, John in this encyclical most
emphatically restated the principle of subsidiarity, first
enunciated by Piux XI in *Quadragesimo Anno*, a proposition
with doctrinal roots going as far back as Aquinas. This
principle states as a "fixed and unchangeable rule" that
"one should not withdraw from individuals and commit to the
community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise
and industry" and further that it is an "injustice," indeed
a "grave evil and a disturbance of right order, to transfer
to the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be
performed and provided for by lesser and subordinate
bodies." Now a century earlier -- just to keep matters
complicated -- such papal doctrine would have been seen as
the embodiment of liberal principle. But by 1963 this was
no longer so. To the contrary, American liberalism was at
that very moment about to enter a period of unprecedented
attachment to whatever is the opposite of the principle of
subsidiarity. The state was encouraged to take over more
and more individual functions, and the highest levels of the
state were encouraged to take over more and more of the
functions of the "lesser and subordinate" levels. There is
every sign that American liberalism is just now coming out
of this phase and may indeed be adopting a principle of
subsidiarity of its own, but in neither situation does
*Pacem in Terris* appear to have had any influence.

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What is noteworthy, however, is that the encyclical continues to enjoy quite a vigorous life. If it has had little or no influence on social policy, it appears, *mirabile dictu*, to have had and to be having considerable influence in the less accessible realms of American political thought.

Indeed although the notion verges on the bizarre, it is the case nonetheless that this papal encyclical seems altogether an appropriate subject for study during this coming bicentennial year, a tract indeed to be studied as if it were a contemporary statement of views wholly congruent with and reminiscent of those of the Founding Fathers themselves. There is no mystery to this. The authors of the founding documents of the American Republic and of this Roman Catholic discourse, were both adherents to the Natural Law school of philosophy, and constituted their respective regimes, the one real and the other ideal, in just those terms. *Pacem in Terris* bears rereading. It is more Greek than Hebraic in tone, heavily indebted to Neo-Platonist doctrine, and openly acknowledging of this debt.

"For, as Lactantius so clearly taught...." It has surely been some time since American statesmen could be depended upon to be quite certain as to just who Lactantius was, much less what it was he so clearly taught. But we would not be surprised to learn that some at least of the Founding Fathers were. This third-century apologist was one of those who with Augustine preserved the doctrine of natural law and helped incorporate it into Catholic teaching. Given some confusion on the subject, it is nonetheless clear enough that Lactantius stands in that company of Church fathers, and in point of time first among them, to assert that the state is a product of a social contract or convention among men for the repression of certain evils, which is to say that the individual exists prior to the state and owes his first allegiance not to the state but to God. The great question - always - of political philosophy concerns the nature of the individual and the claims which the state may make on the individual. The drafters of the American constitution, and of

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Pacem in Terris both insisted that the individual was divine and the claims the state may make upon him are both strictly limited and conditional on the behavior of the state itself. To assert this may be nothing exceptional, but to conclude it, as the issue of a detailed and coherent account of the nature of man and of his world, sets these men apart from most men at all times, and most particularly, most men in these times.

It is for just this reason, is it not, that we find ourselves drawn to such coherent and comprehensive statements as we try to deal with issues of foreign policy in our time, issues which have assumed such a cosmic quality. The reason for this is known to everyone, and quite clearly stated in Pacem in Terris itself, in a section headed, with what caprice one dares not speculate, "Signs of the Times":

> Men are becoming more and more convinced that disputes which arise between States should not be resolved by recourse to arms, but rather by negotiations.

> It is true that on historical grounds this conviction is based chiefly on the terrible destructive force of modern arms; and it is nourished by the horror aroused in the mind by the very thought of the cruel destruction and the immense suffering which the use of those armaments would bring to the human family....

In the atomic era, the encyclical concluded, war could never be just and ought to be unthinkable.

Now it is the historic fact that two American statesmen -- one hopes we are not so lost in the Orwellian fog that it is no longer permissible to mention both their names --, Richard Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, saw this situation for what it is, seized the moment, and with competence and courage engaged our great nuclear adversary, the Soviet Union, in a dialogue from which emerged the compelling and mutually shared conviction that unless the nuclear arms race were ended, mankind was doomed. And so they set about to end it, commencing the process which we know as *detente*. As an act of statecraft, it has not had its equal in our time. It is little wonder that we are only slowly growing accustomed to the new circumstances in which the world lives in the aftermath; that we are finding the adjustment difficult; and are properly concerned as to whether we have got the hang of it.

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The first fact of *detente* is that it is not a condition, such as peace or war, but a process that can lead away from or toward either, accordingly as we successfully manage the process -- or fail to do so. The process arises from the simultaneous necessity to deal with two nominally incompatible imperatives. The first is the technological imperative, which commands that we cooperate as with a partner; the other is the ideological imperative that commands that we compete, as with an adversary.

Now a fleeting acquaintance with sociobiology -- with the argument of Edward O. Wilson, for instance -- suggests that this combination is not at all unnatural, indeed that all manner of species manage something of the sort. But it is troubling to men because of our poor efforts to get things straight in our minds, which for most of us comes down to trying to be consistent. *Detente* demands inconsistency. Inconsistency of the highest order of constancy. Clearly it is going to make demands on us of an unusual order.

And yet of an order not inaccessible to analysis, even of a certain clarity. The technological imperative is easy enough to grasp: A generation is coming of age in America which has known it since birth. So, equally, is the ideological imperative to those who will grasp it. *Detente* is a word we use to describe an approach to nations who are not friends, whose governments are based on principles different from ours, whom we are not sure we can trust and who have great military power which they have shown an inclination to use to the detriment of freedom. This is something we have understood in the past -- the essential antagonism of the Communist system to ours -- and most of us in truth still do understand it. Our problem has to do with continuing to understand that this is not just a fact, but a salient fact, one from which an imperative arises every bit as compelling as that which arises from the facts of nuclear armament.

Why is this difficult?

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It has not helped that we picked the wrong word to describe the present process. *Detente* is a French word -- perhaps the cause of precision would have been better served had we chosen something from the German! -- which means, first, relaxation of tension, as with physical objects like muscles. Now such wholesale relaxation is exactly what will not happen under *detente*. To the contrary, political *detente* can at most lead to a redistribution of tension from the technological sector to the ideological one, such that there will be a pronounced *increase* in the latter.

It is probably not a good thing to rely heavily on mechanistic analogues for human behavior, but in this instance it seems justified. The Communist system contains a certain amount of energy, capable of doing work. Any lessened expenditure of energy on military technology will lead to an increased expenditure on what the Communists will see as the equally inviting, equally productive area of ideological conflict. The relaxation of tensions in the one sector will lead more or less automatically to more intense conflict in the other. That is what *detente* means. The question, to repeat, is why we find this difficult to grasp.

It helps to note that the Soviets have had no such difficulty. It is fairly clear that ideological conflict has been stepped up on their side, or at very least expanded to new areas. With the fall of Southeast Asia, the perimeter of pressure in that region is much expanded, with results already evident. Where necessary, military force is used. At this moment, for example, the Soviets in effect have landed -- Cuban troops, but Soviet withal -- on the Southwest coast of Africa, even as they are consolidating military facilities on the Northeast coast of that continent. It is fair to assume they mean to colonize Africa, and manifest that they are already partially successful, their main problem being opposition from another Communist power, and also from the fact that the United States will call them in stances of open military operations, as indeed the Secretary of State has done.

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Blocked at one point, they shift to another. The United Nations offers near limitless opportunities in this respect. Last month, in an infamous act, the General Assembly declared that "Zionism is a form of racism..." This was seen as an Arab initiative, but was it? The Ukraine, for one, was a sponsor of the resolution, which directly served an *announced* Soviet cause. Four years ago *Pravda* published -- and indeed the *New York Times* reported it on February 19, 1971 -- a two-part article "Anti-Sovietism is the Profession of the Zionists" accusing Jews of all manner of plots against Communism, much as Hitler had accused them of plots in support of it. A campaign was begun which explicitly and heavily stressed the Nazi-Zionist theme. Its unmistakable intent was revealed by such grotesque things as a television documentary that super-imposed Ben-Gurion's face on that of Hitler. And so it is indeed no accident that two days after the Zionism resolution passed the General Assembly this year a TASS political observer wrote:

> ...Zionism is racism pure and simple of the same [variety] that ... was practiced in the not too distant past by Hitler's Germany.

This was all one campaign, serving the Soviet need to deal with what is one day going to be its central political problem -- or may already be -- that of ethnic conflict, and also serving its general aims in the Middle East. It is a daily occurrence in Turtle Bay, as elsewhere in the world.

Now there is nothing devious in this. The Soviet leaders have repeatedly stated that *detente* does not mean an end to ideological competition. They have not perhaps stressed that is means an *increase*, but surely that is something for *us* to perceive, not for *them* to proclaim.

Once again, why do we have such difficulty? I will suggest three clusters of influence, ranging from the temporary to the persisting.

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The first, and temporary, condition arises from what I have elsewhere called a failure of nerve within the American elites that controlled and directed foreign policy in the postwar period. 1963, the year *Pacem in Terris* appeared, was crucial in this regard. It was the year the commitment to Vietnam became, if not irreversible, then at all events one which was never reversed until failure was both inevitable and visible.

Now this sort of thing happens. Nations lose wars, and there are almost always consequences that are not so much political in nature as social. This is to say a class, or even a caste, is defeated in the process. Something of this sort has happened. The Vietnam war was quintessentially an elite decision, made by a confident, essentially coherent, and to that point undefeated foreign policy establishment.

Then it was defeated.

The results were curiously unnerving.

There was an immense effort to transfer blame. One recalls the spring of 1970, when the tensions between supporters and opponents of the war led some of this elite to hint broadly that the continuation of the doomed enterprise in Asia was a scheme to use the Catholic working class to bring about facism.

This didn't work, and even if it had, the elites involved found themselves assaulted from within. Not to put too fine a point on it, their children would not fight in their war. Before it was over, the R.O.T.C. building at Harvard had been converted to a day care center. Worse, a singularly derelict day care center. Almost a forlorn day care center, as if fecundity itself had been discredited, and shame was everywhere. Saul Bellow was quick to see it, which is what novelists are for, which is to say to know things before they are known. Mr. Sammler saw well enough in New York City an elite that would not defend itself.

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Time heals such hurts. Time and the circulation of elites, of which Pareto wrote. What it means for the moment however, is that in the area of ideological encounter our responses are much slowed. Where we had been quick to sense danger -- even, sometimes, quick to perceive opportunity -- We are now slow to do so. Events have to penetrate much deeper into the political and bureaucratic system in order to evoke a response. There has been a decline in authority. Students of public administration delight to tell the story of a Congressional hearing during World War II in which the then war production chief, a Detroit executive, was asked why he thought a certain proposal he had made would work, to which the executive replied that the General Motors Corporation paid him $200,000 a year to know when something would work, and when it would not. That kind of authority is gone. The committees, in the general sense and I need hardly note the specific ones, require lengthly justification, and are slow to give consent. Hence, in this temporary sense, the Soviets have an advantage and detente has difficulties.

An intermediate cluster of influences which retard our responses to communist aggression may be simply stated as the superior capacity of Marxist argument to induce guilt. Observe that this is stated as a relative relationship. Liberal democracy makes great claims on nonliberal societies, and has done so for some time. There is probably not now in the whole of the world a totalitarian state which does not have a constitution guaranteeing individual liberties. On the other hand, there is not a liberal society which does not contain a real Marxist or neo-Marxist movement dedicated to its overthrow on grounds of insufficient liberality. Nor is there any liberal society which is not torn by doubts on this score. Yeats sensed the mood:

> Come fix upon me that accusing eye.
> I thirst for accusation...

It is said that if a Communist regime were to take over in the Sahara there would in time be a shortage of sand, and we shall doubtless in time have tested that hypothesis, but we can be fairly confident that to the very end there would be those in the West convinced that the sand had gone to build swimming pools for the rich -- in the West. The

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Communist Manifesto is heavy with such accusation -- interpolated between Marx and Engel's insistent analysis of the creative dynamics of capitalism, and its force provides the true dynamic of the doctrine. It is for a master such as John Dollard to delineate the role of guilt in liberal society -- it is what makes us most humane as well as, at times, a bit absurd -- but none can doubt that it is a weapon used against us by our adversaries.

More specifically, it is a weapon which our adversaries contrive to have us use against ourselves. This technique was much in evidence not long ago at the United Nations when, on the 30th anniversary of the UN and in a moment of relative peace in the world, the United States introduced a resolution - which had been readied a month earlier - calling for a general amnesty for political prisoners. Now if there is one thing Communism has brought to human experience, it is the phenomenon of political prisoners on a social scale: not just individuals, but masses. The Soviets know their interests in such matters. TASS immediately denounced the measure as an "unsavory stratagem" to distract attention -- truly! -- from the anti-Zionist resolution passed two days earlier. The first American press accounts written in New York took a different line, to wit, that the resolution had been introduced in retaliation for the anti-Zionist resolution; but the general effect of such accounts, in this country and others, was to distract attention from the measure we had proposed to the question of what motives we had in doing so. A classic mechanism for inducing guilt. Soon American commentators were all but apologizing for what we had done. It suggests the enormity of this inversion, that perhaps the shrillest protest came from a columnist who was once an assistant at the United Nations to that indomitable patriot who so nobly served us there, Adlai Stevenson. The general drift of the critique was encapsulated from Scarsdale by a man who for fifteen years served as vice president of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. In the words of this worthy, presumably now much versed in the ways of democracy, we were able

... without a blush, to present a resolution urging amnesty for political prisoners in other countries while overlooking our own country's inability to behave generously to our political prisoners...

One need not go on.

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No forgiveness; no redemption. John XXIII took the name of a disgraced antipope, and resumed the Johanine tradition. Not so the guilt ridden American.

This guilt is most difficult to handle just now in our relations with the post-colonial nations. We begin with the assumption of exploitation, a burden of guilt, the final burden of colonialism, which we evidently assumed when we took on "the leadership of the free world," as the phrase once went. Which is not to say there was no exploitation. There was the unforgivable humiliation of peoples the world over. The point here has to do only with the impact of these events on the American conscience, generations later and vast distances from events which Americans were scarcely aware of and only in the most peripheral way involved in at the time. But more recently -- and I would venture more importantly -- there has been the more complex phenomenon of the steady falling away from politically liberal norms and the gradual establishment of leftist totalitarian regimes in the formerly democratic post-colonial states. This has been a great disappointment to the West, and the disappointment is now almost final. Speaking somewhat beyond the evidence, I would suggest that our emergent reaction is one of questioning where we went wrong, where we failed. Did we, for example, give enough aid. Hence the more demanding the claims made upon us by the new nations, the more support such claims gather from some, at least.

I would not wish to be seen as explaining all of this response -- or all of that part of it which seems to me uncalled for and unhelpful, in contrast to a decent and constructive concern to help others. I am prepared, however, to ask whether some part of it is not based on fear -- fear, again among Western elites -- that comes of seeing the vast multitudes of the world nominally turned against us. Now the fact of the matter is that most of the new nations have opted for the regimes we now see in those areas not from egalitarian urges, but from the very opposite. In almost every nation, a post-independence generation has come to power, and within that generation a more or less small elite which -- and why should this surprise us -- finds in leftist, statist doctrine an excuse for gathering all power to itself, an excuse which cannot be found in democratic doctrine. Ergo. There is no nation so poor it cannot

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afford free speech, but few elites which will put up with
the bother of it. A few days ago an enormous building was
opened opposite the United Nations, constructed by a public-
spirited group to provide offices for various United Nations
campaigns for economic development and like enterprises,
and also containing a hotel where UN delegates might
conveniently stay. The daily cost of the cheapest room in
this hotel is about the equivalent of the annual per capita
income of an Indian peasant. But what does that matter? At
the opening ceremonies a brochure was distributed for the
new hostelry. The cover described it simply as:

NEW YORK CITY'S NEWEST REFUGE FOR
THE PRIVILEGED

Now guilt can be induced by all this -- and also fear. (It
is altogether worth asking how much our present discomfiture
arises from the psychological mechanism of identification
with the aggressor.)

To state again, there is an element of guilt in our
relations with many of the newly leftist nations in the
world, which is not to be accounted for by older concerns.
(Further evidence: observe our disinclination to acknowledge
what these new nations have become.) Part of it may
be accounted for by the continuing success of Marxist
doctrine in inducing guilt in the West, part by a separate
but related sublimation of aggression. Neither of these
phenomena is likely to fade rapidly, but on the other hand,
if we observe that Soviet society commanded unreasoning,
irrational sympathies only for about two generations, we
may reasonably assume that our present difficulties in
dealing openly with the newer nations will not last much
longer than that.

Of the third cluster of influences, I have written
elsewhere, and need not dwell upon at length. This is the
long term ideological drift away from liberal democracy, the
influence of which, I have argued, crested in 1919, at
the end of the First World War, and has declined ever
since. In a lecture given at that worthy Jesuit institution
the University of Detroit, just weeks before the appearance
of Pacem in Terris, Leo Strauss, the foremost political
philosopher of his time in America, spoke more generally of

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was the failure of what he called "the modern Project". This/a world system that grew out of the political philosophies of the 16th and 17th centuries and which in, say, 1914, seemed well on the way to triumph. The West, at this time, was certain of its purpose, a "purpose in which all men could be united." It had a clear vision of its future "as the future of mankind." It was not less certain of its power. At that time, Strauss observes, this country, Britain, and Germany, if united, could have had their way, without force, in any region of the world. All went well, or well enough, for a bit thereafter, until Communism, which had been seen as a parallel movement to the modern project -- part of it really, "a somewhat impatient, wild, wayward twin" -- revealed itself, as Strauss puts it, to "even the meanest capacities" as something else, as something else, as Stalinism and post-Stalinism. Oriental despotism was once again a major force in the world; and finally to cite Strauss,

> The only restraint in which the West can put some
> confidence is the tyrant's fear of the West's immense
> military power

For the rest there is decline. Specifically, the purpose of
a universal society, "a society consisting of equal nations,
each consisting of free and equal men and women, with all
these nations to be fully developed as regards their power
of production, thanks to science" -- that purpose is no
longer sustainable. In its stead political society in the
foreseeable future reverts to what it always has been, what
Strauss called "particular" society -- "society with
frontiers, a closed society, concerned with self-improvement."

One must accept this as a long-term condition, but also
see in it the essence of what might be our long-term security.
For a particular society is a society that can be defended --
and, I think, will be.

It comes to that. Out of the decline of the West there
will, I sense, emerge a rise in spirits. We have shortened
our lines. We are under attack. There is nothing in the
least in the culture that suggests we will not in the end
defend ourselves successfully.

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We shall do so as we have in our armamentarium the incomparable weapon of liberty. We are the party of liberty, all of us: Republicans and Democrats, McCarthyites and Wallaceites, Mathiasands and Ampetsands. Always have been, even when least true to it. And as the lights go out in the rest of the world, they shine all the brighter here. This requires discipline of ourselves, -- by government and about government. But that is not beyond us. How do you suppose we have got to a bicentennial without knowing something of such matters? In the United Nations today, half the nations have had a violent internal change of government within the past eleven years. What it requires, most of all, is truth-telling: to one another, and to the rest of the world. We are not merely advised in this matter, to those who would lend some authority to Pacem in Terris, we are commanded:

> The first among the rules governing the relations between States is that of truth.

Already, we hear voices from the other world asking for truth. From us. About them. Most particularly, and most poignantly, we hear voices from the Soviet Union which ask no more than Pacem in Terris commands: that as between governments and their respective peoples "it is not fear which should reign but love..."

This is our strength: that we can say this, and that the nations with which we are leagued can say it. Those who cannot say it must perforce hear us with ever mounting concern, a concern which they attempt to allay by measures which will only enhance it.

Surely we must see this. Just as we must see the persistent attempt to dissuade us from speaking out for what it is: the assertion of their weakness and our strength. The night the American amnesty resolution was introduced, a German newspaperwoman called on me, an appointment made several weeks earlier. As we sat down she said, "Before beginning, let me just tell you that already the news of what the United States has proposed will be being whispered from cell to cell in East German prisons. You would think such news would never reach such places, but it does and it is what keeps you alive. I know. I spent four years in one of them." On the heels of our initiative, one American commentator,

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 20, 1975

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Office of the White House Press Secretary

Nov. 20, 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I am today announcing a number of decisions that provide a comprehensive response to any discrimination against Americans on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex that might arise from foreign boycott practices.

The United States Government, under the Constitution and the law, is committed to the guarantee of the fundamental rights of every American. My Administration will preserve these rights and work toward the elimination of all forms of discrimination against individuals on the basis of their race, color, religion, national origin or sex.

Earlier this year, I directed the appropriate departments and agencies to recommend firm, comprehensive and balanced actions to protect American citizens from the discriminatory impact that might result from the boycott practices of other governments. There was wide consultation.

I have now communicated detailed instructions to the Cabinet for new measures by the United States Government to assure that our anti-discriminatory policies will be effectively and fully implemented.

These actions are being taken with due regard for our foreign policy interests, international trade and commerce and the sovereign rights of other nations. I believe that the actions my Administration has taken today achieve the essential protection of the rights of our people and at the same time do not upset the equilibrium essential to the proper conduct of our national and international affairs.

I made the basic decision that the United States Government, in my Administration, as in the administration of George Washington, will give "to bigotry no sanction." My Administration will not countenance the translation of any foreign prejudice into domestic discrimination against American citizens.

I have today signed a Directive to the Heads of All Departments and Agencies. It states:

(1) That the application of Executive Order 11478 and relevant statutes forbid any Federal agency, in making selections for overseas assignments, to take into account any exclusionary policies of a host country based upon race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age. Individuals must be considered and selected solely on the basis of merit factors. They must not be excluded at any stage of the selection process because their race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age does not conform to any formal or informal requirements set by a foreign nation. No agency may specify, in its job description circulars, that the host country has an exclusionary entrance policy or that a visa is required:

(2) That Federal agencies are required to inform the State Department of visa rejections based on exclusionary policies; and

(3) That the State Department will take appropriate action through diplomatic channels to attempt to gain entry for the affected individuals.

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I have instructed the Secretary of Labor to issue an amendment to his Department's March 10, 1975, Secretary's Memorandum on the obligation of Federal contractors and subcontractors to refrain from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex when hiring for work to be performed in a foreign country or within the United States pursuant to a contract with a foreign government or company. This amendment will require Federal contractors and subcontractors, that have job applicants or present employees applying for overseas assignments, to inform the Department of State of any visa rejections based on the exclusionary policies of a host country. The Department of State will attempt, through diplomatic channels, to gain entry for those individuals.

My Administration will propose legislation to prohibit a business enterprise from using economic means to coerce any person or entity to discriminate against any U. S. person or entity on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex. This would apply to any attempts, for instance, by a foreign business enterprise, whether governmentally or privately owned, to condition its contracts upon the exclusion of persons of a particular religion from the contractor's management or upon the contractor's refusal to deal with American companies owned or manged by persons of a particular religion.

I am exercising my discretionary authority under the Export Administration Act to direct the Secretary of Commerce to issue amended regulations to:

(1) prohibit U. S. exporters and related service organizations from answering or complying in any way with boycott requests that would cause discrimination against U. S. citizens or firms on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin; and

(2) require related service organizations that become involved in any boycott request to report such involvement directly to the Department of Commerce.

Related service organizations are defined to include banks, insurers, freight forwarders and shipping companies that become involved in any way in a boycott request related to an export transaction from the U. S.

Responding to an allegation of religious and ethnic discrimination in the commercial banking community, the Comptroller of the Currency issued a strong Banking Bulletin to its member National Banks on February 24, 1975. The Bulletin was prompted by an allegation that a national bank might have been offered large deposits and loans by an agent of a foreign investor, one of the conditions for which was that no member of the Jewish faith sit on the bank's board of directors or control any significant amount of the bank's outstanding stock. The Bulletin makes it clear that the Comptroller will not tolerate any practices or policies that are based upon considerations of the race, or religious belief of any customer, stockholder, officer or director of the bank and that any such practices or policies are incompatible with the public service function of a banking institution in this country."

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[LJ]

I am informing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board that the Comptroller's Banking Bulletin reflects the policy of my Administration and I encourage them to issue similar policy statements to the financial institutions within their jurisdictions, urging those institutions to recognize that compliance with discriminatory conditions directed against any of their customers, stockholders, employees, officers or directors is incompatible with the public service function of American financial institutions.

I will support legislation to amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which presently covers sex and marital status, to include prohibition against any creditor discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin against any credit applicant in any aspect of a credit transaction.

I commend the U.S. investment banking community for resisting the pressure of certain foreign investment bankers to force the exclusion from financing syndicates of some investment banking firms on a discriminatory basis.

I commend the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., for initiating a program to monitor practices in the securities industry within their jurisdiction to determine whether such discriminatory practices have occurred or will occur. I urge the SEC and NASD to take whatever action they deem necessary to insure that discriminatory exclusion is not tolerated and that non-discriminatory participation is maintained.

In addition to the actions I am announcing with respect to possible discrimination against Americans on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex, I feel that it is necessary to address the question of possible antitrust violations involving certain actions of U.S. businesses in relation to foreign boycotts. The Department of Justice advises me that the refusal of an American firm to deal with another American firm in order to comply with a restrictive trade practice by a foreign country raises serious questions under the U.S. antitrust laws. The Department is engaged in a detailed investigation of possible violations.

The community of nations often proclaims universal principles of human justice and equality. These principles embody our own highest national aspirations. The anti-discriminations measures I am announcing today are consistent with our efforts to promote peace and friendly, mutually beneficial relations with all nations, a goal to which we remain absolutely dedicated.

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 20, 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

The purpose of this Memorandum is to underscore the applicability of Executive Order 11478, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-261); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 as amended by P.L. 92-269; and pursuant regulations to all Federal personnel actions, including those which involve overseas assignment of employees of Federal agencies to foreign countries which have adopted exclusionary policies based on a person's race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age.

In making selections for overseas assignment, the possible exclusionary policies of the country to which an applicant or employee is to be assigned must not be a factor in any part of the selection process of a Federal agency. United States law must be observed and not the policy of the foreign nation. Individuals, therefore, must be considered and selected solely on the basis of merit factors without reference to race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age. Persons must not be "selected out" at any stage of the selection process because their race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age does not conform to any formal or informal requirements set by a foreign nation. No agency may list in its job description circulars that the host country has an exclusionary entrance policy or that a visa is required.

If a host country refuses, on the basis of exclusionary policies related to race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age, to grant a visa to an employee who has been selected by a Federal agency for an overseas assignment, the employing agency should advise the Department of State of this act. The Department will take appropriate action through diplomatic channels to attempt to gain entry for the individual.

The Civil Service Commission shall have the responsibility for insuring compliance with this Memorandum. In order to ensure that selections for overseas assignments are made in compliance with law, Executive Order, and merit system requirements, each agency having positions overseas must:

(1) review its process for selection of persons for overseas assignments to assure that it conforms in all respects with law, Executive Order, and merit system requirements; and

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 20, 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE

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(4) The President has exercised his discretionary authority under the Export Administration Act to direct the Secretary of Commerce to amend the Act's regulations to:

(A) Prohibit U.S. exporters and related service organizations from answering or complying in any way with boycott requests that would cause discrimination against U.S. citizens or firms on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin; and

(B) Require related service organizations that become involved in any boycott request to report such involvement directly to the Department of Commerce.

Related service organizations are defined to include banks, insurers, freight forwarders and shipping companies that become involved in any way in a boycott request to an export transaction from the U.S.

(5) The President has stated that his Administration will not tolerate discriminatory commercial banking practices or policies based upon the race or religious belief of any customer, stockholder, employee, officer or director of a bank and that such practices or policies are incompatible with the public service function of banking institutions in this country. The President supports a Banking Bulletin issued by the Comptroller of the Currency to that effect and has encouraged the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to issue similar policy statements to the financial institutions within their jurisdictions.

(6) The Administration will support legislation to amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which presently covers sex and marital status, to include prohibition against any creditor discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin against any credit applicant in any aspect of a credit transaction.

(7) In regard to the investment banking industry, the President has:

(A) Commended the U.S. investment banking community for resisting the pressure of certain foreign investment bankers to force the exclusion from financing syndicates of some investment banking firms on a discriminatory basis;

(B) Commended the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) for initiating a program to monitor practices in the securities industry within their jurisdiction to determine whether such discriminatory practices have occurred or will occur; and

(C) Urged the SEC and NASD to take whatever action they deem necessary to insure that discriminatory exclusion is not tolerated and that non-discriminatory participation is maintained.

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PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 606

PC#80

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOLLOWING NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
BRUSSELS, DECEMBER 12, 1975

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Ladies and gentlemen, the U.S. delegation considers this meeting to have been very successful. It was conducted in the spirit of friendship and close consultation which characterizes the relationship in the North Atlantic Community. The communique speaks for itself and, therefore, I will go straight to your questions.

**QUESTION:** There are reports in both the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* today of United States contribution of $50 million to Angola in recent months. Could you respond to those reports?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have not had the privilege of reading either of these distinguished newspapers today, and I will not go into any details. I have stated the other day that the United States cannot be indifferent to massive Soviet supplies of arms and is in contact with other interested African countries.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, on that point, could you amplify this aspect of it? Do you have any concern that there will develop in Angola, if there is not already, a war of proxy between the major powers? And in addition to that, how would you distinguish between the degree of major power involvement in Angola and the Vietnam situation, the Vietnam history?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States wishes that the situation in Angola be handled as an African problem and it would support a solution in which no outside power participates and in which the Organization of African Unity will cooperate with the parties inside Angola to find an African solution. The United States did not become concerned until there had already taken place substantial Soviet involvement and the introduction of massive outside equipment and later the introduction of Cuban forces. I think, as I have pointed out repeatedly, there should not be a war by proxy of the great powers. I do not think it is a situation analogous to Vietnam because in Vietnam the conflict had a much longer and more complicated history, but the United States cannot be indifferent to what is going on in Angola.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you frequently say that the United States should not be indifferent. But in what manner would the United States respond? Can you tell us what sort of counter-measures the United States might take in this situation?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States favors a solution in which all of the parties in Angola can negotiate with each other free of outside interference and in which the problem of Angola is handled as an

For further information contact:

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PR#606

African issue. The United States will support any solution in this direction. Failing that the United States will try to prevent one party by means of massive introduction of outside equipment from achieving dominance.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, on a previous occasion you mentioned the possibility that the Angolan involvement of the Soviet Union couldn't help but affect other aspects of the Soviet-American relationship. Do you see it at any point as endangering the entire policy of detente?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Incidentally, I ought to make one thing clear. The press reports yesterday gave the impression that all of the afternoon session was devoted to Angola. The afternoon session yesterday was devoted to East-West relations, in which Angola played a relatively minor role. So, this is a NATO meeting. This is not a meeting of African problems, and I think this should be clearly understood. It cannot but affect relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as I stated publicly before, if the Soviet Union engages in a military operation or massively supports a military operation thousands of miles from Soviet territory in an area where there are no historic Russian interests and where it is, therefore, a new projection of Soviet power and Soviet interests. But again let me emphasize to you, ladies and gentlemen, that this was a NATO meeting, in which Angola played a relatively insignificant role and was used only as an illustration of more general problems.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary General (sic), did you talk about Spain, or did you propose bringing Spain closer to NATO?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We did not have an opportunity to go into the problem of Spain and the future relationship of Spain in any formal sense. The United States favors a closer relationship of Spain both to the Atlantic organization as well as to Western Europe.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could expand a bit, amplify this extreme concern the United States has over Angola. Why is this situation so different? You referred to distance, but after all the Soviet Union has massively armed many countries in the world and I don't remember this type of strong talk from the United States. What is it about Angola -- ?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Should I point out again to you, ladies and gentlemen, that this was a NATO meeting? You may have received certain briefings yesterday. The subject was not Angola. The subject was the Western alliance and, while I am glad to answer questions on Angola, I want to point out that it is being raised by you, ladies and gentlemen, much more acutely than it was raised by us.

**QUESTION:** This has continued as a process now of several weeks where the United States has been extremely concerned publicly.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It makes a difference whether the Soviet Union is arming a country or whether it is arming a faction in a country. It makes a difference whether the Soviet Union is operating in an area of traditional relationships or whether it is attempting to establish a new pattern of dominance.

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**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the last time you attended a NATO meeting, just before it you expressed your conviction that Portugal would not easily remain a member of the Alliance because it was going Communist. What is your assessment now? What has been Soviet behavior with respect to Portugal and what does that mean in terms of Angola?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I hope that the non-American members here noted the single-mindedness with which the American press pursues its obsessions. Now, first let me make clear I did not say the last time that Portugal could not easily remain a member of NATO because it was going Communist. I said it the other way around. I said if Portugal went Communist, it could not easily remain a member of NATO. I believe that, on the whole, the situation in Portugal has improved. The danger of Portugal going Communist seems less. The possibility of a pluralistic evolution seems better. So, therefore, this particular danger which I referred to last time is not as acute as it was then.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you didn't answer about the Soviet Union's role in Portugal.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think that the Soviet Union's role in Portugal is not as acute as its role in Angola.

**QUESTION:** Will the U.S. bases in Turkey reopen? And when? And to what extent do you consider them inoperative ever since they were closed?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Closed bases are generally inoperative, but I had a very good talk with the Foreign Minister of Turkey this morning. I expect that the negotiations about the bases will soon be given a new impetus and I have invited the Foreign Ministers to come to Washington by the end of January. I hope that we will be able to conclude the negotiations by then.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I assume that you mentioned the Middle East in your discussion. If this is correct, are you happy about the state of affairs in the Middle East now as a result of your step-by-step diplomacy? Isn't there any change of heart from the part of the United States regarding the Palestinians and the PLO to accelerate the process of peace in the Middle East?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't think the Middle East was designed to inspire happiness and, therefore, I cannot say I have reached that state of contentment with it. With respect to the Palestinians, I have not repeated the American position for 48 hours and never in Brussels. So let me say that the United States cannot change its position until the Palestinians recognize the existence of Israel and until they accept the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. At that point we will look at our position again.

**QUESTION:** Do they have to recognize Israel before Israel recognizes them or must this come simultaneously? For you cannot ask the Palestinians. It's fair enough that both of them recognize each other at the same time, isn't it?

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PR#605

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is in the context that the United States can look at its position, but not under present circumstances -- in the context that I have given.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you think that the stands of Greece and Turkey are more conciliatory now for the solution of the problems between the two countries and that of Cyprus?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Having talked to the Foreign Ministers of both Greece and Turkey, I have the impression that the conditions for a resumption of the communal talks are good. Of course, they will meet each other this afternoon and it would be a rash man who would predict what happens when an actual interaction occurs between Greek and Turkish representatives. My impression is that the conditions for a resumption of communal talks are good and that both Foreign Ministers recognize the importance of making rapid progress towards a settlement. We believe that a package deal is necessary and that it should take into account the sense of dignity of both communities. We will use our influence in that direction.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, have you got any new evidence from the Soviet Union which makes you confident that you will be ready to go in four or five weeks, as you had said you would, on SALT? Also, what assurance is there that the conflicts within the United States Government on SALT will be resolved within four or five weeks?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I wouldn't describe the discussions in the American Government as "conflict". The issues are technically complicated and require careful study. I am confident that we will come up with a solution that will have support of all the agencies. As I have pointed out, going to Moscow is based on the presupposition that both sides will be prepared to modify their positions; and, therefore, it is based on the assumption, indeed in the knowledge, that the Soviet Union, as well as we, will be prepared to modify the last positions which each side took. I'm quite confident that the date that has been indicated, or the approximate date, will be maintained.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you said that Angola was a minor issue in the discussion and the main topic was East-West relations. So, after this discussion, what is your assessment of the present status of East-West relations?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There are worrying elements such as Angola. There remains, nevertheless, the necessity to attempt to improve relations between East and West on the basis of reciprocity and there is a recognition on the part of all allies that the process of improvement of relations requires an undiminished concern for Western security.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you said yesterday that the United States supports the resumption of the inter-communal talks, but you also mentioned something about a way of relating other interested parties to it at a later state. What would you envisage by that?

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PR#606

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The most interested parties, of course, are the Governments of Greece and Turkey, and this is a question that the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey will deal with this afternoon. It is my impression, having talked to both of them, that they are approaching a consensus on this and I expect that this problem will be solved. But I'd leave it up to them to announce the details.

**QUESTION:** Yesterday you expressed your concern about the Communist pressure on the southern countries of the Alliance. What is your opinion on the Italian situation and, also in your opinion, what would be the consequences for the Alliance of having participation of the Italian Communists in the government which, as you know very well, is not terribly improbable for the future?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I did not yesterday express any opinion on the questions which you raised. Of course, we consider the Italian domestic situation a matter for Italians to decide -- all the more so as our advice is likely to have the opposite effect from the one we wish to bring about. But if I were forming a government in Italy, which is unlikely, I would not move in the direction of an "historic compromise".

**QUESTION:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

* * * * * * * * *

The Secretary
of State

[c]

Press Conference

MAJOR TOPICS: SALT Compliance, Angola, Palestine Liberation Organization

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, before I go to your questions I thought it would be helpful to review some of the SALT issues that have been raised. I will not get into a debate with aspirants to political office, either statewide or national. Therefore, I will not deal with specific testimony that may have been given except to note that no opportunity was presented to any member of the Administration to present the truth. What I would like to do is to deal with categories of assertions that have been made and then to explain the real state of affairs with respect to them.

The assertions have been made that there have been massive Soviet violations; that the Administration colluded with the Soviet Union in masking these violations; that the Administration has not pursued the issue of violations diplomatically; and that senior officials, especially the President, have not been kept informed about the facts with respect to these violations.

I would like to discuss with you the procedures that the government is following with respect to SALT compliance and illustrate them with one or two examples.

First of all, it is important to keep in mind that with respect to SALT or with respect to the strategic forces on both sides, we are dealing with military establishments of great technical complexity, that are constantly engaged in military activities. These military establishments, moreover, on both sides are in the process of constant change, so that there is great fluidity in what one observes.

December 9, 1975

Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

We are not dealing with a static situation; we are dealing with a fluid situation. Therefore, too, the information that is obtained has to go through various stages of analysis.

The first information about any event is usually extraordinarily illusive and ambiguous, and one part of the process of the government is to refine the information until we reach a point at which senior officials can make a reasonable decision. I believe it is a good working hypothesis to assume that government is not run by conspiracy but by serious people trying to come to serious conclusions about difficult topics, especially when the charge of a violation of a formal agreement is not a minor matter to be introduced into the diplomatic discourse.

Now first of all, what is meant by a violation? There are several meanings that can be attached to the notion of violation that are being used interchangeably in the current debate.

* A violation can be a deliberate violation of a SALT limitation, aimed at increasing the Soviet strategic capability in ways which the agreement was intended to preclude.

* Second, a violation can be an action inconsistent with the sense or the spirit of the agreement and tending to undermine its viability, even though it is not prohibited by the agreement. There can be borderline situations where a technical violation cannot be established, but where the activity strains the interpretation of particular provisions.

* Third, there can be unintended violations

PR 596/79

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occurring; for example, through negligence of higher officials responsible for insuring compliance by their subordinate organizations.

* Fourth, there can be actions not banned by an agreement but which complicate verification of the agreement.

* Fifth, there can be ambiguous activities resulting from differing interpretations of the provisions of the agreements.

* Sixth, there can be activities that are assessed as ambiguous due to inadequate information or misinterpretation of information which suggests a violation where in fact none exists.

I want to repeat that many compliance issues will arise initially as ambiguous activities which could apply to any of these categories. Our policy is to seek clarification of ambiguous situations as soon as there is a tangible basis for doing so and to resolve ambiguities as quickly as possible in order to preclude development of a more serious situation.

Now to go to the procedures for handling allegations of violations. Any one of these categories would be initially reported in intelligence channels, either from the Central Intelligence Agency or from the Department of Defense. The Department of State and the White House have no independent means of acquiring any of this information. There is no instance in which a reported violation was not immediately—an alleged violation—was not immediately reported to the President. And we have searched all the files of all the incidents.

I will, in a minute, discuss the handling of intelligence, and I would like to talk now about the procedures that are followed.

In order to deal with the problem of compliance, there are four institutions. There is a special intelligence committee, which was established by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the summer of 1973. This committee makes a quarterly report on the problem of SALT compliance. This committee—I'm looking now for how many meetings it has held; well, it has met quarterly since July 1973, so you can figure it out for yourselves—and all of its reports have gone directly to the President as well as to every senior member of the Administration that is dealing with the problem of strategic arms.

In addition, there are three other bodies. There is the Verification Panel of the NSC

[National Security Council]. There is the Verification Panel Working Group. And there is, of course, the NSC itself.

The Verification Panel Working Group of the NSC has met on SALT matters 11 times since the middle of 1973. The Verification Panel has met four times on SALT matters—has met four times on compliance issues exclusively since 1973. But in addition, it has met 40 times on SALT matters since 1973. Each of these meetings, each of these 40 meetings, is preceded by a CIA briefing that includes all compliance issues. So that in addition to the four formal meetings, there were 40 meetings of the Verification Panel where whatever compliance issues existed at the time were brought to the attention of the Verification Panel.

The President has been briefed on compliance matters 10 times since the middle of 1973, six times in the Administration of President Ford. There has been one NSC meeting solely devoted to compliance issues and parts of others.

The procedure is that the working group will attempt to determine what is going on and will devise either options or recommendations for consideration by the Verification Panel. The Verification Panel then reviews it and makes a recommendation or defines options. In all the meetings that I have described of the Verification Panel, there was never a split decision. The allegation that individuals or departments have held up consideration of compliance issues, have obscured consideration of compliance issues, have refused to deal with compliance issues, is a total falsehood. All the decisions of the Verification Panel with respect to compliance have been unanimous. That is to say, they were agreed to by the Department of Defense, by the [Joint] Chiefs of Staff, by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, by the Central Intelligence Agency, and by the State Department.

There is no doubt that there may have been differences of opinion in the working group as these papers were being considered. I am not familiar with these disagreements, because unless they are passed on to the Verification Panel there would be no particular reason for me to deal with them.

Let me now turn to the handling of intelligence. First of all, I think it is important to understand how the flow of information to the President is handled, because it is a rather grave matter if it can be alleged that information is being kept from

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the President of the United States. The flow of information to the President is handled in the following way:

The President receives daily, unabbreviated and without a covering summary, the President's daily brief and the daily intelligence bulletin of the Central Intelligence Agency. These are placed on his desk together with separate notes from various departments every morning and waiting for him when he comes to his office.

In the period of the Presidency of President Ford he has had, until recently, the practice of reading those two intelligence summaries in the presence not of a member of the National Security Council staff but in the presence of a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency. Therefore any intelligence item that would deal with compliance would come to his immediate attention. And in compiling a list of the various compliance issues, it is apparent that the President's daily bulletin would reflect the information of the Central Intelligence Agency, as you would expect, within no more than 2 weeks of its first appearance on a technical level.

Secondly, any memorandum from a Cabinet member or from the head of an agency is transmitted to the President, usually in those cases with a summary by the NSC staff on top of it. But never is the summary alone sent to the President. Therefore any Cabinet member, any member of the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, all have the opportunity, and know they have the opportunity, to address the President directly. Never has the Assistant to the President held up any memorandum from any of these individuals, or any other memorandum addressed to the President by the head of an agency.

However, there is no memorandum in the files by any of these individuals, by any Chief of Staff of any of the services, by any head of any department raising any of the issues that have been alleged in recent testimony. There is nobody who has claimed that the issue of compliance was not being adequately pursued. There is nobody who has objected to the handling of the information. There has been no reclama of any of the decisions of the Verification Panel, except in one case where one department that had first recommended one course of action—that course of action being not to protest a seeming issue of noncompliance because

it wanted to protect its sources of intelligence—later changed its mind and recommended that the issue be raised in the Standing Consultative Commission.

When that department changed its mind, the President agreed with that new position, and the decision of the Verification Panel was changed.

The reason there have been so few NSC meetings on the subject is because the decisions of the Verification Panel have always been unanimous, and because no member of the Panel has ever appealed to the President with a contrary view.

With respect to the handling of intelligence, all intelligence concerning alleged noncompliance was immediately distributed to all the members of the Verification Panel and by them to those of their senior members that were concerned with SALT.

For the period that a preliminary investigation was going on, the intelligence was not distributed in the technical publications that were addressed to those whose primary responsibility was not concerned with SALT at a level below the Cabinet level. The longest time this ever took place was a period of 2 months, and usually the so-called hold has been for a period of about a week or two to permit the refinement of intelligence.

There has been no case in which the intelligence was not distributed in the quarterly intelligence publication that was concerned with the question of SALT monitoring. And in no case was intelligence kept from members of the Verification Panel.

Even during the period that this refinement was going on, the United States did not feel itself precluded from taking diplomatic action. For example, in one instance, which I will get into in a minute in greater detail—in one instance there were reports of unidentified construction in Soviet missile fields. We received this report on June 20 [1973] at a time when [General Secretary] Brezhnev was in the United States. It seemed improbable that the Soviet Union would violate the agreement by blatantly building additional missile silos; and therefore, a further study of the subject was ordered.

Nevertheless, on June 26 the United States sent a note to the Soviet Union, in the Presidential channel, raising the issue of that construction, even before we had begun our detailed examination of the issue. In that case the distribution of that infor-

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mation was kept out of those journals that went to individuals not concerned with SALT matters, until August 8, when it was generally distributed. In that interval two American notes had been sent to the Soviet Union, in the Presidential channel, raising that issue.

Now as I have pointed out, the issue of compliance is an extremely complicated one, and in rummaging through the files of various departments it is not difficult to find memoranda written by subordinates who have no idea of what is going on in the overall picture, who will write down their own perceptions of what they think is happening—usually in the modern form of memoranda of conversation to themselves that nobody ever sees, on which no one can ever comment, and which appear 3 years later in a context that no one can ever discover.

But let us take the case of these missile silos. There appeared in the summer of 1973 in a number of Soviet missile fields, the beginning of some construction that clearly looked like additional silos. If these had been converted into missile silos, there was no question that they would have represented a clear violation of the agreement.

The construction of a silo generally takes 2 years to complete. And it is important for you to keep in mind, in any event, that almost any of these noncompliance events extend over a time span that, to be significant, is months and usually years, so that those of us who are engaged in policymaking, and not rhetoric, must have an opportunity to study the problem before we draw any final conclusions. And we do have this opportunity.

Now when we approached the Soviet Union within 6 days of receiving that information in the White House, we were told that these would be command and control silos and that as the construction proceeded it would become increasingly evident that they would be command and control silos.

This, incidentally, was also the judgment of our intelligence community. Our intelligence community believed that almost certainly these were command and control silos. The question being raised was whether, at some later time, they could be converted into missile silos.

It is also fair to point out that the Soviet Union, in reply, raised certain questions about certain ambiguities in American practices, which we

were not excessively anxious to have publicized, and which accounted for the fact that these exchanges were conducted in a rather less dramatic manner than some people might have thought appropriate.

There were six exchanges in this channel of increasing specificity, in which we began to advance criteria which could be met in order to assure us that these silos were in fact intended for command and control. This extended over a period of a year. At that point in 1974 we moved the discussion from the Presidential channel to the Standing Consultative Commission and made formal representations building on the previous exchanges. We have since received assurances, and I believe it is the unanimous opinion of all agencies, that we are dealing with command and control silos. We have been given criteria which seem to us for the time being adequate; and there is no agency that today disputes that this issue is for the time being quiescent, though we will be vigilant in making certain that any unusual construction activity at these silos would raise profound questions.

For a variety of reasons, including the fact that the information about alleged noncompliance inevitably involves sensitive intelligence, I cannot go through all of the allegations that have been made; though I would perhaps mention one other, which is the most serious one and which comes closest to the borderline of a possible violation, which has to do with the testing of certain antiaircraft radars in what might be considered an ABM [antiballistic missile] mode.

The issue is complicated by the fact that, at American insistence, the ABM treaty includes a provision that antiaircraft radar could be used—could be tested—in a manner in space for range instrumentation purposes. I might point out that this was our idea, and if we had not included that, that issue of the SA-5 radar could have been more rapidly resolved.

We received information that some testing was going on with respect to the SA-5 radar in 1973. At that time it was routinely distributed, and nobody paid any attention to it because it was not put into connection with a possible ABM testing program. Between April and June 1974 some more tests took place which at least raised the problem that the radar might be tracking incoming missiles. That clearly is not permitted by the

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treaty, though it raises an ambiguity with respect to whether this is done for range instrumentation purposes.

In any event, several meetings of the working group and the Verification Panel took place. The first decision in December 1974 was, on the recommendation of the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, that this issue not be raised because we did not wish to reveal the source of our intelligence.

In January 1975 the Defense Department reversed itself and recommended that the issue be raised. As a result, the issue was raised in February 1975. Since then, within a 17-day period after we had raised the issue, this activity has stopped, has not since been resumed. It was at the borderline of violation, but it has now stopped.

There are other issues, some having to do with unilateral American statements which the Soviet Union specifically disavowed. I think it is at least open to question whether the United States can hold the Soviet Union responsible for its own statements when the Soviet Union has asserted that it does not accept that interpretation. Therefore the issue of SALT compliance has been handled in a serious manner. It stands to reason that no responsible U.S. official could wish to make an agreement with the Soviet Union and permit the Soviet Union to violate it with impunity. It stands to reason that the United States would not accept noncompliance with an agreement that had any conceivable impact on the strategic equation.

I would, in fact, suggest that this debate of the allegation in which some violations are invented, and in which the lack of vigilance of the Administration is asserted, may tempt the very noncompliance which it claims to seek to avoid, because it may create the impression that the U.S. Government would make a serious agreement on a matter affecting the survival of the United States and that its senior officials would then collude in a violation of this agreement.

Let no foreign government believe that this is conceivable. And I think the time has come that we deal with each other more seriously.

I want to make just one other point before I go to your questions. That point concerns the endless allegations that a secret agreement was made with the Soviet Union respecting 70 missiles to be placed on submarines that by now are 30 years old, or 25 years old, that have not been off the coast of

the United States since 1967.

On the face of it, this charge should be too absurd to require any commentary. I dealt with it at great length in a press conference on June 24, 1974, and June 26, 1974. It concerned a highly technical issue: Which missiles were eligible for retirement as part of those that had to be dismantled in order to shift from land-based to submarine missiles, and whether and what kind of new missiles could be placed on submarines without being counted.

I refer you all to this press conference, if you want to go into the technical complexities of this issue, except to say there was no secret agreement, that whatever there was in that interpretative statement was stated publicly by me at the press conference that I gave in Moscow the night the SALT agreement was signed on May 26, 1972. It was repeated in a discussion of the Verification Panel on June 5, 1972. It was contained, practically verbatim, in a note distributed to all the agencies on June 19, 1972, and it was testified to by Gerard Smith before the Jackson committee in July 1972. There was no secret agreement.

Some overawed technocrats found what they thought was a loophole by which, if the Soviets wanted to design a missile that they didn't have anywhere for just that one category of Diesel submarines that was 25 years old, they might conceivably place it on that submarine. We, of course, would never have accepted this.

When we raised this loophole with the Soviet Union, even though they thought it was—shall we put it kindly—a rather strained interpretation, they nevertheless closed the loophole, and despite some rather excited testimony last week, let me say flatly that no price was paid for closing a loophole that did not exist and that we would never have accepted and that ran counter to the whole record of the discussion.

I think I can stop at this point and take your questions on this or any other topic.

*THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, to what extent is politics interfering today with your attempts to work out a new SALT agreement? And do you see a deadline beyond which it would be, because of the political campaigns, impossible to make any real progress on a treaty?*

A: As Secretary of State it is my obligation to recommend to the President what I believe to be in

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the national interest. My recommendations are not affected by the political situation and I have, so far, seen no evidence that his decisions are affected by the political situation.

I cannot say that the debate that is going on greatly enhances the atmosphere of confidence in the country, but our recommendations are not affected by the political situation. We are not operating against a deadline.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, can I just change the subject for a moment? Have you proposed to the Israeli Government, as reported today, that it should drop its boycott of the Security Council debate? And also, do you see any indications the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] may be shifting its attitude with regard to its recognition or nonrecognition of Israel's right to existence?

**A:** I will answer this question, but may I then recommend that we take all SALT questions and then go to all other questions? I will answer this one, though.

The United States has indicated to the Israeli Government that it would be better served if it participated in the Security Council debate, though it is of course clear that the Israeli Government may not wish to be in the room while the PLO delegate is actually speaking.

This position of ours has been clear.

Our attitude with respect to the PLO is unchanged. I haven't reaffirmed it for about 48 hours, so it is about time that I do it again: We will not deal with the PLO, negotiate with the PLO, or urge Israel to deal with the PLO, as long as the PLO does not recognize the existence of Israel and as long as the PLO does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. That will be our attitude during the Security Council debate, and I would like to stress again that the only resolutions that the United States considers relevant for the Security Council debate are Resolutions 242 and 338, and we will not accept any resolution that tries to introduce any element that goes beyond 242 and 338.

Now on SALT?

**Q:** Yes, now on SALT-do you have any evidence today that the Soviet Union is prepared to offer, in your own words, a reasonable and serious counterproposal to the last American proposal that was made to the Russians?

**A:** The exchanges which we have had with the Soviet Union since November indicate that the

Soviet Union realizes that no settlement is possible on the basis of its present proposal, and that it is willing to negotiate on the basis of the proposition that it must modify its position, and that we are then also prepared to look at our position. And it is on this basis that a trip by me to Moscow has been discussed.

**Q:** Are there plans for such a trip in the immediate future?

**A:** I would expect such a trip to take place within the next 4 weeks ...

**Q:** Mr. Secretary ...

**A:** ...4 to 5 weeks.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, in your discussion earlier you made some reference to the fact that at one point, as I recall, after the evidence had emerged that the Soviets were building a certain kind of silo-at one point the Soviets raised some questions about American practices that we, as I understood you, were not anxious to publicize. Could you tell us any more about what those practices might have been?

**A:** No, the basic point that I wanted to make is this: It was in our interest-we were interested, as long as there was no conclusive evidence-to keep the debate on the confidential level and to permit both sides to raise with each other technical issues in which they could raise questions and clarify questions.

I would say that the issues that the Soviet Union raised did not in fact involve violations of the agreement by the United States, but from the point of view of Soviet photography they might not have been self-evident. And it is, therefore, one of those issues where ambiguous evidence is produced, in good faith, that can be clarified by further exchanges. There have been no American violations of the agreement except in the technical sense that I have described.

**Q:** Are they satisfied with your response to that?

**A:** It is still being discussed, but I think we are making progress.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, you touched most lightly on the strongest issue, which is a continuing one in Congress, which is a claim that Soviet performance on the agreement has failed to live up to your own assurances of what you told Congress the Soviet Union was expected to do.

**A:** I said ...

**Q:** You referred to the unilateral agreements.

[Lc]

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One of the issues which is a continuing one up there, of course, is the question of conversion of Soviet light missiles to heavy missiles. Could you deal broadly with the question, which you only touched on earlier, of the unilateral statements and the Soviet nonagreement and nonperformance on those unilateral statements?

A: All right, let me first deal with another issue. One of the arguments that is being made is that the SALT agreement was sloppily negotiated—between myself and [Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly F.] Dobrynin, usually—and that we are now suffering from the draftsmanship, from that draftsmanship.

Well, first of all, I do not believe that the SALT agreement was sloppily negotiated. But in any event, the text of the agreement was negotiated in Helsinki. There is not one paragraph in that document that was drafted by any other group than the negotiating teams in Helsinki, which included representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Department, the State Department and, indeed, all interested agencies, and which was backstopped by a technical panel here. So that the charge that documents were drafted in the absence of technical advisers is absolutely ludicrous.

Now the exchanges that took place between Dobrynin and me, first of all, were confined to very few matters and usually concerned a question of principle; such as, whether offensive weapons should be dealt with simultaneously with defensive weapons or whether they should be dealt with separately. That question, strange as it may seem today, took 3 months of exchanges to settle, and those of you who followed SALT matters will remember that at the end of May 1971 it was settled with an agreement in principle that offensive and defensive negotiations should proceed in parallel. That did not require great technical knowledge.

As soon as that decision was made, it was shifted to the SALT delegation in Helsinki, and all the implementing negotiation of that was conducted in Helsinki.

Then on my visit to Moscow in April 1972, the Soviet Union made a proposal and for the first time—in which, for the first time, they agreed to include submarine missiles in the offensive count and proposed a procedure by which this could be accomplished by the retirement of land-based or other missiles.

I might add that one of the most ardent advocates of this particular solution is a prospective candidate for the Senate—from Virginia, in case any of you have any question of whom I am talking about [laughter]—because he did not wish to build any additional nuclear submarines at that time.

This general proposal was brought back by me from Moscow, was put before the National Security Council at a meeting in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Arms Control [and Disarmament] Agency and our chief negotiator were represented. Specific instructions were given how to work out the technicalities of it, and it then was worked out in detail in Helsinki. Those were the two areas in which I was most active.

Now let us deal with the specific issue of the conversion of light to heavy missiles. In the agreement there is a provision which was also put in, in part at our request—but at any rate which we accepted without any difficulty—to the effect that the existing silos could be increased by 15 percent in the process of modernization. This is the only legal requirement of the agreement; that is, if either side increased any of its silos by more than 15 percent, it would be in violation of the agreement. There is no charge that this has been done. In fact, it has not been done. The intelligence community agrees that the increase in silo dimensions in the modernization program of the Soviet Union does not exceed 15 percent.

The United States added another unilateral statement to the effect that, if in these SS-11 holes a missile were placed which was significantly larger than the SS-11, that we—I don't know what phrase we used, at any rate, that we ...

*Q: "Significantly larger?"*

A: "Significantly larger" was the phrase. I don't know whether we used the phrase, "We consider this a violation ..."

*Q: Substantially larger?*

A: No, "significantly larger" is the phrase. But I don't know whether we said it's a violation or what we said, what the specific-incidentally, that statement was drafted by the delegation.

*Q: But wasn't it on your instructions from ...*

A: That unilateral statement?

*Q: That was issued by the delegation, as I recall, the last day of the negotiations, just to finish up the piece of paper.*

A: Wait a minute. Let me make clear—I don't

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want to play a game. I agreed with everything the delegation did. I think the delegation did a good job. Everything that the delegation did was finally approved in the White House.

The text of it, however, was not drafted by me but approved by me, and I am therefore fully behind it. I am simply trying to get the sequence straight.

Now for about a year, our intelligence indicated that the two new Soviet missiles that were being developed, the SS-17 and 19, were about 15 to 20 percent larger than the ones that had existed in 1972.

Q: Yes.

A: Fifteen to 20 percent-don't hold me to these precise figures, because I am doing it from memory. But it is in that range, and it is always with an inaccuracy factor.

Starting in the middle of 1974, it became apparent that at least one of them, the SS-19, could be as much as 40 percent larger. So we had the dilemma that we have a missile that is larger, by that percentage, than the SS-11 put into a hole that is not, however, in violation of the agreement by a better utilization of existing space and more efficient use of fuel. And that raises a serious question.

We are attempting-the assurances I gave in 1972, which were based on the provision of the agreement, obviously dealt with the missiles we then knew. We obviously did not know in 1972 what missiles the Soviet Union would be testing in 1974; and the questions I was asked were always concerned with whether the Soviet Union would be able to put the SS-9 into the SS-11 hole-the SS-11 hole being the smaller one. And all of my answers, obviously, had to be directed toward the missiles I knew, and not toward the missiles that came along 2 years later.

With respect to the SS-19, we are attempting to put limitations on this in the current round of SALT negotiations, and it is in that category, which Secretary Schlesinger [former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger] has also described, of no specific violation but of being sufficiently ambiguous to raise some questions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, a 3-part question. What evidence do you have that the Soviet Union realizes no settlement is possible on the basis of its last known existing proposal? Secondly, do you have reason to believe that there is now, or soon

will be, a new Soviet proposal? And what are the prospects for a new SALT agreement within the next 3 or 4 months?

A: If I go to Moscow-or the fact that I say that I will in all probability go to Moscow- indicates that I have evidence that the Soviet Union will not insist on its last proposal, because otherwise there would be no point in going.

Q: But is there a new one in the works?

A: When that proposal will be surfaced- whether it will be surfaced then, when I am there, or whether it will be surfaced ahead of time-that remains for discussion.

Your second question? What was it?

Q: The second part: Is there a new proposal?

A: At any rate, since I have stated that we will not accept their last proposal, if there is no new proposal there will be no settlement. There is no possibility of our accepting the last Soviet proposal.

Now what do I think the chances are? I believe that if both sides make a serious effort, the differences should be solved. The Soviet Union must make a serious effort, and we are prepared to make a serious effort. I am moderately optimistic.

Q: Well even to be talking about going to Moscow, you must know something that we don't. You would not go there just for the winter weather. Do you have a reason to believe that if you ...

A: I said I had reason to believe that they will not insist on their last proposal.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the news reports in connection with Admiral Zumwalt's [former Chief of Naval Operations Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.] testimony carry the phrase here that the Admiral suggested that "Mr. Kissinger's lack of candor"-and I am quoting from a news report, sir-"sprang from a personal and political commitment to the success of the detente policy" which made him "reluctant to report the actual facts." How do you react to that, sir?

A: I have stated how we have handled information, and I think my statement makes it absolutely clear that the Admiral got carried away by his political ambitions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned among the possible violations Soviet interference with national means of inspection. Have they interfered with our...

A: No, I have listed that as a...

LCI

9

**Q:** *A possibility, yes. Have they interfered, or are they now attempting to interfere, with our national means of inspection? And while I have the floor, how are you doing on the threshold test ban, and what are the prospects in that agreement?*

**A:** The question of interference with national means of detection: There has been a Soviet program from the middle—it dates back from the middle of the 1960's—to make photography and other means of detection more complicated.

There have been some actions since the SALT agreement in that category. Several of those have been raised with the Soviet Union. Some of those that have been raised have been ended. None of those, up to now, have fundamentally interfered with our national means of detection.

**Q:** *Are they currently trying to interfere?*

**A:** Well you know there are so many separate things going on, there is always an effort. We have several things before them at this moment. I have said that, up to now, nothing has decisively interfered with our national means of detection.

And the second question is: How are we doing on the test ban?

**Q:** *And what are the prospects of getting a settlement on that quickly? There is a deadline on that, I believe, coming up.*

**A:** We are negotiating it. There are only one or two issues left, and therefore it can be settled any time but it hasn't been settled yet.

**Q:** *Aren't those the same issues, though, that existed last July?*

**A:** That's true. And so either they will be settled or they will not be settled. And I know that is going to be the headline tonight. [Laughter.]

**Q:** *Mr. Secretary, I think you know that this issue to which you have addressed yourself here this afternoon is so complex that many of us, and probably most of the members of the public, are unable to understand the details that you are referring to. I wonder if...*

**A:** Yes, but they can understand the procedures to which I am referring, and those are perfectly plain.

**Q:** *I am just wondering, Mr. Secretary, if you would address yourself to the various political charges—or the various charges that you claim arise from political motives—and in simple language, categorically deny them, if that be the...*

**A:** Well I am not saying all of them arise from political motives. Some do, some don't. But I don't

want to go into the question of motives.

I think I have dealt with all the essential charges. The charge that information has been deliberately withheld is false. The charge that the President was not briefed is false. The charge that either I as Secretary of State or as Assistant to the President have refused to deal with compliance issues is false. The charge that there were secret agreements is essentially false.

And I think these are the major items; if there is anyone else who wants to ask—or if I have left one out I will be glad to...

**Q:** *If I may just follow up: Why do you say "essentially" false?*

**A:** Because there was an interpretative statement that for some reason was not distributed to the bureaucracy, even though the essence of it was distributed to the bureaucracy and even though the bureaucracy was instructed to testify as to its contents. Why it was not distributed, I cannot for the life of me remember now. But the bureaucracy was told that such an interpretative statement would be negotiated, its content was distributed to it, so technically speaking this was not seen, but the content was known.

**Q:** *Mr. Secretary, two questions: On SALT Two, just so that I am clear, you said you would probably go to Moscow within 4 to 5 weeks. Is it a fair assumption that you are not going on this trip you leave on tomorrow?*

**A:** That is correct.

**Q:** *And if so, what has happened? I think you left the impression you would go to Moscow before Christmas. Was there some slippage, or some bureaucratic problem, here or in the Soviet Union?*

**A:** Well I think there is no sense going to Moscow until we have our positions prepared in great detail and until we are confident also that on the Soviet side there is sufficient understanding of what is needed. And given the travel schedules of all of the key members here, it seemed on the whole best not to hurry the process and to move at a pace that permitted a very detailed examination of all of the issues.

**Q:** *Mr. Secretary, the second part of that question deals with another ambiguity, or what-have-you: It's the charge that the Soviets have perhaps built another ABM test site at Kamchatka. Can you address this?*

**A:** This is an issue that is now under discussion with the Soviet Union, and I simply want to

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explain the issue. It is one of these technical issues. There is no dispute that the radar in Kamchatka faces the Soviet Union and not the United States. And therefore we are dealing with a test radar. The ABM treaty requires that ABM testing could take place only at agreed test ranges, and we listed ours. The Soviet Union didn't list theirs.

*Q: You listed one for them.*

A: We unilaterally listed one for them, and the Soviet Union gave an ambiguous reply to that, saying what their test ranges were was generally known, but they would not confirm or deny the one we gave for them; and I think we claimed two for ourselves.

If the Soviet Union had claimed the Kamchatka range for itself at that time, there would be no problem. If the Soviet Union told us today that the Kamchatka range is an ABM test range then, supposing we were satisfied about the characteristics of the radar, there would be no significant problem.

So here we are dealing with a technical issue of what an agreed test range is—since there is no disagreement that the radar in Kamchatka faces into the Soviet Union and therefore must be used for some sort of internal tracking.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that you wouldn't have made these very important announcements here today and this report on intelligence and evaluation and how it all works if it hadn't been for the investigations on Capitol Hill?*

A: I didn't say anything about the investigations on Capitol Hill.

*Q: Yes, I know you didn't—but I mean this obviously is a reply to them, right?*

A: I did not criticize the investigations.

*Q: No, I didn't say you did. But I say, isn't it a good thing that we have had all this come out today, and isn't it true that it wouldn't have come out had it not been for the investigations up there?*

A: Well then the question is whether it could have come out without some of the wild charges that were made. But be that as it may, I am not criticizing the effort of the Congress to get clarity about how the intelligence process operates. And to the extent that my briefing today was elicited by the Congress, I have no objection if you give some credit to them.

*Q: Do you think this will take care of the subpoena now? You say you think this will be...*

A: No, no, on the subpoena—the subpoena

has nothing to do with this. The subpoena concerns covert operations and recommendations of Secretaries of State when I was not in office. It has nothing to do with any recommendations I made—recommendations of a previous decade to previous Presidents.

The President has exercised executive privilege with respect to that. I am under instructions from the President with respect to it. The resolution of this issue is between the White House and the committee. It is not an issue that concerns any actions while I have been Secretary of State, and it has nothing to do with the SALT issue. It has to do with the subject of covert operations, and the reason the President has exercised executive privilege is because he believed that recommendations of Cabinet members to the President should be protected. But I am not expressing a personal opinion on that subject.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, can we turn to another subject?*

A: Can we wind this up fairly soon? I have some luncheon guests upstairs who are getting restless.

*Q: All right. Mr. Kissinger, on the subject of Angola, you and the President have made some accusations. A protest has been made to the Soviet Union about alleged intervention. There's comments about Cuban intervention there. Isn't it about time that you told us roughly what the United States has done in the way of helping forces in Angola, and since when?*

A: I have said that the United States has tried to be helpful to some neighboring countries. Whatever we have done has started long after massive Soviet involvement became evident. So this is not a case that really lends itself to great dispute on that subject, because the Soviet Union has been active there in this manner since March. But I would rather not go any further until we see what can be done in the present diplomatic effort.

*Q: What can be done, Mr. Secretary?*

A: Well that's what we are trying...

*Q: What are the available opportunities open to the United States...*

A: That's what we are trying to find out. We have stated repeatedly that outside powers should stay out of Angola, and especially, extra-continental powers should stay out of Angola.

*Q: What do you mean, Mr. Secretary, when you say whatever we have done started long after*

The Secretary
of State

Speech

November 24, 1975

Detroit, Michigan

Office of Media Services

Bureau of Public Affairs

BUILDING AN ENDURING FOREIGN POLICY

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Economic Club of Detroit.

I come before you tonight to talk about what is right with America's foreign policy.

This nation, no matter how much some may cast doubt on it, is still seen as the land of hope by all the millions around the world who cherish freedom, the dignity of man, and peace. Without us there can be no security. Without us there can be no hope for progress. America has been true to its responsibility. And I am here to say that it will remain so.

Out of the ashes of World War II, we and our allies built a new world. We had learned from bitter experience that America's safety and world peace, America's prosperity and the world economy, were inextricably linked. In this spirit the United States promoted the economic and political recovery of Western Europe and Japan. We strengthened our defense and forged our first peacetime alliances; they have preserved the global balance of power for a generation. We pioneered in arms control, so that the specter of global cataclysm might never become a reality. We and our partners built a cooperative global economic system so that growth, prosperity, and development could be the common heritage of mankind. We have mediated conflicts and helped settle problems from the Middle East to Berlin.

The technological and managerial genius of this country has been the driving force of global change; our science and communications have circled the planet and stretched to the moon and beyond. The American people have reached out with generosity to their fellow men afflicted by

disease, hunger, deprivation, natural disaster, war, and oppression. More than any other nation, we have taken in immigrants and refugees, fed the starving, and educated the youth of other lands. We owe the world no apology for what we have done. We have much to be proud of.

And a generation after World War II, with conditions radically altered and the postwar period of international relations at an end—partially as a result of the success of previous policies—the United States successfully adapted its foreign policy to a new era. At the beginning of this decade we faced a number of urgent tasks:

* The military balance was being altered by the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the acceleration of weapons technology.

* We were bogged down in a war that we would not win and seemingly could not end.

* For 20 years we had isolated ourselves from China—in other words, from one quarter of the human race.

* Our relations with the Soviet Union were characterized by constant tension and confrontation on the access routes to Berlin, in the Middle East, and in the Caribbean.

* Diplomatic relations with most Arab states were broken and progress toward peace in the Middle East was stalemated.

* The new strength and vitality of Europe and Japan required major adjustments in the practices and responsibilities of the previous two decades.

We have come a long way in the first half of this decade. American foreign policy has been transformed. We brought peace to our nation for

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the first time in over a decade and a half.

We have ended our isolation from China and opened a growing relationship with the world's most populous nation. U.S.-Soviet relations have entered a new period. In place of continual crises there are continuing negotiations—in arms control, economic relations, and international issues—which give both sides a stake in peace and have lessened the chances that great-power confrontation will lead to nuclear Armageddon.

In the Middle East we have restored diplomatic relations with all of the key countries of the Arab world. We have helped to move the area from stagnation to hope. Three major agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors have opened the path to peace—a path on which we are determined to persevere.

Our relations with Europe and Japan have been given new balance and impetus. As the recent economic summit demonstrated, they have never been better.

Above all, not only our country, but the world, is at peace. For the first time since the end of World War II, no nation anywhere is engaged in military conflict with another.

This is the true record of our foreign policy—not the debates, the innuendos, and political wrangling that so often form the headlines of the day. It is the end result of the trips, the meetings, the summits, the agreements, the setbacks, and the achievements of the everyday conduct of foreign affairs. These are the building blocks of a dream all Americans share—the vision of a peaceful, just, humane, and progressive world.

We have had our disappointments, and we have made our mistakes. After the bitter experience of Viet-Nam, America has learned that it does not possess the power to right every wrong or to solve every problem. We know that our influence is finite, though the demands upon it and the injustices of the world often seem infinite. And we understand that America, like all human institutions, is fallible.

But the vast majority of Americans remain convinced—as your Government is—that if we do not resist aggression, if we do not work for a better world economy, if we do not promote liberty and justice, no nation will do it for us—at least no nation that shares our values.

I want to speak tonight about the broader vision of a lasting peace, and how America is needed to turn that vision into a reality.

## America and Global Peace

The allied statesmen who built the postwar international order would not recognize the international landscape we see today. The evolution that has taken place over 30 years has transformed the environment in which America lives. The world of the last quarter of the 20th century will be vastly different from that to which we have grown accustomed—but it is a world that we must help to shape.

These are the broad tasks of our foreign policy:

In an age of continuing peril and exploding technology, we must maintain and improve our national defense. In the aftermath of Viet-Nam, we have strengthened and modernized our military forces. This process will continue. We know that peace requires an equilibrium of power—and this Government will maintain it. No nation can remain great if it leaves its safety to the mercy or the good will of others. Any realistic hope of better relations with the Communist powers—and there is such hope—depends on a strong America which leaves other countries no realistic course except restraint and cooperation. So long as potential adversaries continue to expand and improve their forces, we will maintain a modern defense that cannot be challenged.

We will place our priority on our alliances with the great industrial democracies of the Atlantic community and Japan. In the new era, the industrial democracies have found that security involves more than common defense. We joined together out of fear; but we can stay united only if we find deeper and more positive common purposes. The moral unity of the democracies—in an era when their values are a minority in the world and buffeted by difficulties at home—is one of our greatest resources. A sense of solidarity in a turbulent world can help all of our peoples recover the confidence that their societies are vital, that they are the masters of their destinies, that they are not subject to blind forces beyond their control.

This is why the United States attaches so much importance to the economic summit just concluded in France. The agreement to cooperate in economic policy, energy, and development, the major progress made on monetary questions, could usher in a new era of unity and confidence among the industrial democracies. We will never forget that our most important relationships are with those nations which share our principles, our way

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of life, and our future.

We strongly support the words of the Declaration of Rambouillet signed by President Ford together with the leaders of Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Germany: "We came together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. We are each responsible for the government of an open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social advancement. Our success will strengthen, indeed is essential to democratic societies everywhere."

We will strive to transform the relationship with the major Communist powers. Foreign policy must be based on reality, not rhetoric. And today's reality is that we live in a world of nuclear equality. This has been imposed by technology. It could not have been prevented; it cannot be ignored or reversed by unilateral decision. It means that we must manage a fundamental conflict of values in the shadow of nuclear holocaust. We are striving to preserve peace while defending our essential principles and interest.

At the same time, the Communist monolith of a generation ago has fragmented into bitter rivalries, and many Communist countries have turned to the West for more constructive bilateral relationships. This provides the opportunity for a careful policy of relaxation of tensions. Future generations would not understand it if partisan controversy caused us to forget that in the nuclear age the relaxation of tensions is a moral imperative as well as a practical necessity. We will spare no effort in building habits of restraint and moderation among the superpowers.

But the easing of tensions cannot endure if we relax our vigilance. We must understand the need for both defense and relaxation of tension; both firm action in crises and willingness to resolve problems on a realistic and fair basis. We must be prepared for either course; the choice rests with our adversaries.

We cannot ignore, for example, the substantial Soviet buildup of weapons in Angola which has introduced great-power rivalry into Africa for the first time in 15 years. This Soviet involvement is resented by African nations most of all. But the United States cannot be indifferent while an outside power embarks upon an interventionist policy—so distant from its homeland and so removed from traditional Russian interests. The Soviet Union still has an opportunity for a policy of restraint which permits Angolans to resolve their

own differences without outside interventions. We would be glad to cooperate in such a course. But time is running out; continuation of an interventionist policy must inevitably threaten other relationships.

Nor can we ignore the thousands of Cubans sent into an African conflict. In recent months the United States has demonstrated, by deed as well as word, its readiness to improve relations with Cuba. We have cooperated with steps to ease the inter-American boycott against Cuba and to restore a more normal relationship between the nations of the Americas and Cuba. But let there be no illusions: A policy of conciliation will not survive Cuban meddling in Puerto Rico or Cuban armed intervention in the affairs of other nations struggling to decide their own fate.

To Cuba, as to other nations with whom our relations have been strained, I say this: The United States has no higher goal than to ease the conflicts that have torn the globe for nearly a generation. We will be flexible and cooperative in settling conflicts. But we will never permit detente to turn into a subterfuge for unilateral advantage. The policy of relaxation of tensions is designed to promote peace, not surrender. We will be flexible, but we shall insist on reciprocity and restraint.

**We shall work to shape a prosperous and equitable economy.** The productivity and economic strength of this country is one of our greatest assets. We have used it to help consolidate the vitality of the industrial democracies, to stabilize political relations with potential adversaries, and to fashion new ties with the developing countries.

The division of the planet between North and South—industrial and developing—is now becoming as pressing an issue as the division between East and West. Yet our economies are interdependent, and neither North nor South can long accept growing division without paying a costly and unnecessary price. International order and a thriving world economy can only be built on the basis of cooperation. Economic warfare will mean decline for everyone, but most of all for the developing world. Therefore at the U.N. General Assembly special session in September the United States put forward a practical program of collaborative endeavor on energy, food, trade, raw materials, and the needs of the poorest. We will continue our efforts on all these fronts.

Cooperative solutions are our objective, but we will not accept the proposition that any group

4

of nations, no matter what its temporary economic power, can exercise its strength arbitrarily to the detriment of the world economic system. The economies of the industrialized nations have been severely shaken by the rapid and exorbitant rise in energy prices. The balance of payments and development programs of the poorer countries have been undermined to a point that no conceivable aid program could compensate.

International peace and stability now clearly require an international economic system that embraces the aspirations and needs of all nations. The United States will come to next month's Conference on International Economic Cooperation—the consumer-producer conference—with every intention to help find cooperative arrangements just to all. But we cannot accept indefinitely placing our economy at the mercy of decisions made far away or being asked to redress hardships and meet deficits caused by the actions of others.

## The Asian Dimension

Let me now discuss in some detail one part of the world of particular interest to all Americans: the continent of Asia.

Next week President Ford will travel to Asia to reaffirm our stake in that vast region's future and to strengthen important bilateral ties.

The United States is a Pacific power. Our history has been inextricably linked to Asia. No region is of greater importance to us. None is more dynamic. None merits more America's enduring interest and purpose.

The security interests of all the great world powers intersect in Asia. Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and the United States have important stakes in the region. All would be affected by any major conflict there. It is an area vast in population, rich in culture, and abundant in resources. The United States has been involved in three long and costly Asian wars in the past generation. We have learned, at painful cost, that equilibrium in Asia is essential to our own peace and safety, and that no stable order in that region can be maintained without our active participation.

Through much of the postwar period, America engaged itself deeply in Asia to build up friendly nations and to contain Communist expansion. American policy achieved major and lasting successes—the emergence of a prosperous and democratic Japan in close alliance with us; the defeat of aggression in Korea; the continued independence and growing dynamism of the many

small friendly nations in the region.

But by the late 1960's our policies needed to adjust to new realities. We were too directly committed militarily. At times America acted as if its stake in its allies' security was greater than their own.

Thus, throughout the first half of this decade we have sought to fashion a new Asian policy—a policy that gradually reduced our military presence and aimed, instead, at augmenting the strength and vitality of our allies. We sought to stabilize the region by fashioning a balance among the major powers, bringing our commitments into line with our interests.

American policy has had several basic objectives:

* To preserve the sovereignty and independence of our friends in Asia;

* To consolidate our alliance with Japan, by giving our most important Asian ally a greater role and equal partnership;

* To open the door to constructive ties with the People's Republic of China;

* To reduce tensions and promote political solutions to Asian regional conflicts; and

* To encourage self-help and regional cooperation among smaller allies.

On all these fronts much progress has been made in the last few years. Our relations with both adversaries and friends have markedly improved. We have extended the range of our diplomacy without reneging on our commitments to our allies. We have adjusted our military posture to maintain a balance in Asia in the face of changing strategic requirements and political trends. We have expanded our economic relations in many countries.

Most importantly, the structure of Asian peace policy has proven strong enough to withstand the tragedy in Indochina. There was widespread initial apprehension that it might signal—or precipitate—a general American retreat from Asia and even from global responsibilities. Our policy since then has greatly eased those fears.

It is as clear as ever that no serious effort to resolve major problems in Asia can succeed without America's participation. The future of Japan and our other allies, the easing of tensions with potential adversaries, the problem of peace in Korea, the continuing independence of the nations of Southeast Asia all depend significantly on a strong and responsible American policy.

5

[Lc]

This is why President Ford visited Japan and Korea a year ago on his first overseas trip. This is why he will leave for Asia again at the end of this week to visit the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

For the future we have set ourselves the following tasks:

**We will maintain a continuing strong role in Asia.** We know that military power alone will not guarantee security. National cohesion and social justice are essential for effective resistance against subversion or external attack. We know, too, that nationalism and self-reliance are the dominant trends in the region. But foreign policy begins with security, and a military balance remains fundamental to peace and the easing of tension. Given Asia's importance to our security and well-being, we owe it to ourselves and to those whose future depends on us to preserve a firm and balanced military posture in the Pacific.

**We will continue to strengthen our partnership with Japan.** Japan is our principal Asian ally and largest overseas trading partner. Japan's participation is essential to international efforts to promote economic recovery. Our hopes for a peaceful and prosperous Asia depend in large part on Japan's creative collaboration on many international issues. Japan's experiment in political leadership without the attributes of military power is anchored in turn upon our security treaty—which threatens no one and is widely recognized as a pillar of regional stability. In short we regard Japan not as an occasional or temporary ally, but as a permanent friend.

In the early 1970's, in response to Japan's growing economic strength and some bilateral strains, we went through a period of adjustment in our relations. There were frictions—some avoidable by more thoughtful U.S. actions. But these tensions have been overcome by devoted effort on both sides. Today our relations are the best they have been in 30 years. We face no serious bilateral problems. We are collaborating on a vast agenda:

* To advance the prosperity of the industrial democracies;

* To ease tensions with the Communist countries;

* To extend the new era of cooperation to the members of the less developed world.

**Our bilateral relationship—which depends so much upon intangibles of conduct and**

understanding—has acquired a deeper quality. There have been important cultural exchanges, which have enhanced our sensitivity to each other's national style and values. The first visit by an American President to Japan last fall and the historic visit of the Emperor and the Empress to the United States—and the warm reception that each people extended to the other's leader—demonstrated the extraordinary depth and strength of this friendship.

We do not propose to rest on the accomplishments of the past.

* We will preserve the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security while continuing to adapt its practical arrangements to the changing military and political environment.

* We will strengthen our political consultation, in the full realization that we will not always pursue identical policies, but that we have it in our power to assure compatible approaches and full understanding of occasional disagreements.

* We will harmonize even more closely our national policies to combat recession and promote economic expansion.

* We will continue to deepen the cultural dimension of our ties, which strengthens the bonds between our peoples.

In all our dealings we intend to honor a higher standard of concern and consultation than normally obtains even between allies—one that reflects the profound quality of our partnership.

**We shall continue to advance our relationship with the People's Republic of China.** For a generation our two great countries were separated by a gulf of suspicion and hostility. The reestablishment of ties in recent years has had a significance far beyond its impact on our two countries: It has transformed the international landscape.

There have long existed attachments of sentiment and high regard between the Chinese and American peoples, which we have never ceased to value. But the United States and the People's Republic of China came together again after two decades because of necessity. It was mutual interests that impelled us both—without illusions—to launch a new beginning. These mutual interests continue. They can be the foundation of a durable, growing relationship.

We and the People's Republic of China have parallel concerns that the world be free from domination by military force or intimidation—what our

6

[L.C]

many joint communiques have termed "hegemony." We have affirmed that neither of our two countries should seek hegemony, and that each would oppose the attempts of others to do so. Our commitment to this policy will not change. The United States will continue to resist expansionism as we have throughout the entire postwar period. But we will also avoid needless confrontations. We will not be swayed from our effort to improve relations with potential adversaries and to build a more stable international environment.

The United States and China have also agreed to pursue the normalization of our relations. The United States remains dedicated to the principles of the Shanghai communique. We do not challenge the principle of one China--a principle that is maintained by Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. While time may yet be required to resolve our remaining differences on this issue, the direction of our policy is clear.

Since we lack the full range of diplomatic links with the People's Republic of China, and since so much depends on our mutual perceptions of the world scene, exchanges of views on the international scene between the President and the leaders of China are essential and assume special significance.

President Ford's visit to China next week will be the first contact between a U.S. President and Chinese leaders in nearly 4 years. We can expect the talks to be marked by the scope and the directness which have marked our previous encounters and which best serve leaders whose societies are different but whose policies are rooted in realism.

Disagreements in ideology and national interests exist; there will be no attempt to hide them. It is inevitable, therefore, that each side will determine its own policies according to its own situation and perception of its national interest. These are not subject to the instruction of the other. Both of us are self-reliant; both of us understand the difference between rhetoric and action, between tactics and basic strategy.

This spirit of candor and mutual respect has infused our new relationship with the People's Republic of China from its beginnings over 4 years ago. On this basis we are prepared to make our relationship an enduring and constructive feature of the world scene.

We shall continue to strive to reduce tensions and promote more durable arrangements for peace on the Korean peninsula. An atmosphere of confrontation regrettably persists on the Korean peninsula. The United States has a major stake in

maintaining the peace and security of the Republic of Korea. American forces are still stationed there in keeping with our Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea. Our commitment to South Korea rests not only in our historic relationship with the Korean people--a bond forged by common sacrifice in war. It derives as well from the recognition that the security of Japan--our closest ally in the Pacific--is directly linked to the security of Korea. We will continue to work with our friends to preserve the balance. We will resist with determination any unilateral attempt to change or upset the equilibrium on the peninsula.

At the same time we and the Republic of Korea are prepared to move to a more permanent solution. We have proposed a conference among North and South Korea, the United States, and the People's Republic of China to discuss the dissolution of the United Nations Command while preserving the Korean armistice agreement. And in that context we are willing to consider other measures to reduce tensions, including a wider conference to negotiate more fundamental arrangements for peace in Korea. We will not acquiesce in any proposals which would exclude the Republic of Korea from discussions about its future. And we will not allow our military presence, which derives from bilateral agreements, to be dictated by third parties. But we are prepared now to transform the armistice arrangements to a permanent peace. And we are ready to talk to any interested country, including North Korea, about the future of Korea--provided only that South Korea is present.

We shall seek a new structure of stability in Southeast Asia. This Administration inherited the conflict in Indochina and brought our involvement to an end. That chapter in our history, which occasioned so much anguish, is now closed. As for our relations with the new governments in that region, these will not be determined by the past; we are prepared to look to a more hopeful future. The United States will respond to gestures of good will. If those governments show understanding of our concerns and those of their neighbors, they will find us ready to reciprocate. This will be especially the case if they deal constructively with the anguish of thousands of Americans who ask only an accounting for their loved ones missing in action and the return of the bodies of Americans who died in Indochina. We have no interest to continue the Indochina war on the diplomatic front; we envisage the eventual normalization of relations. In the interim we are prepared to consider practical arrangements of mutual benefit in such

7

fields as travel and trade.

One of the basic purposes of our original commitment in Indochina was to provide a buffer of security and time for the many nations of Southeast Asia to enable them to develop their own strength and cohesion. In this regard our efforts proved successful. These nations have preserved their independence; they are assuming increasing importance. We have a substantial stake in the well-being of the Philippines and Indonesia, which President Ford will visit next week. We have important links with Thailand and strong ties of friendship with Singapore and Malaysia. And we have a longstanding association with our ANZUS partners - Australia and New Zealand.

These nations are preserving their independence through economic development, a serious effort to relax tensions, and institutions of regional cooperation. All of them are examples of self-reliance and national resilience. All of them also seek to maintain and broaden their association with us—and all of them wish the United States to remain actively engaged in Asia.

In short the new Asia is an important pillar of the structure of global peace. It is a central element in the design of our foreign policy.

## America's Responsibility

Thirty years ago, when we were first summoned to leadership, we were the only country to have survived World War II with its institutions and economy intact. In that era we were overwhelmingly predominant in nuclear weapons and in every measure of military and economic strength. The American people, with pride in their victory and fresh memory of the folly of isolationism, confidently assumed the responsibilities of world leadership.

Inevitably, with time other nations—allies and adversaries—recovered and developed their strength. It was natural that decolonization and an expanding economy would produce new centers of economic power and political influence. And it was understandable that the American people would tire of the burdens of leadership and ask for another balancing of America's interests and commitments.

But history gives us no respite. To build peace, other nations must do more—but we must do our share. Today's foreign policy and today's international environment pose for us a novel psychological challenge. We can no longer overwhelm our problems with resources; we must learn

foresight, tactical skill, and constancy. We can no longer expect our moral preferences to hold sway simply because of our power; we must possess patience and understanding. We cannot shape a new world by ourselves; we must elicit from others, friend and foe alike, a contribution to the arduous process of building a stable international order. America's challenge today is to demonstrate a new kind of leadership—guiding by our vision, our example, and our energy, not by our predominance.

Only rarely in history does a people have the chance to shape the international environment in which it lives. That opportunity is America's today. But we can meet the opportunity only as a united and confident nation.

In a world of thermonuclear weapons, shrunken distances, and widely dispersed power, we cannot afford disunity, disarray, or disruption in the conduct of our foreign affairs. Foreign policy requires authority. Our ability to maintain peace fundamentally involves the belief of other nations that our word counts, that we have a coherent policy, that we possess steadiness and resolve.

It is time, therefore, to end the self-flagellation that has done so much harm to this nation's capacity to conduct foreign policy. It is time that we outgrew some of the illusions that characterized the long-past period of our isolationism—the idea that we are always being taken in by foreigners; the fear that military assistance to allies leads to involvement rather than substitutes for it; the pretense that defense spending is wasteful and generates conflict; the delusion that American intelligence activities are immoral; the suspicion that the confidentiality of diplomacy is a plot to deceive the public; or the illusion that tranquillity can be achieved by an abstract purity of motive for which history offers no example. In the nation with the highest standard of living and one of the richest cultures of the world, in the nation which has come closest of all to the ideals of civil liberty and democracy, it is long past time to put a stop to self-doubt about our example and role in the world.

We have already gone through a traumatic period—with assassinations, resignations from our two highest offices, and a political climate still poisoned by the residue of the war and domestic turbulence of the previous decade. And we are now one year before our Presidential election.

But this country cannot have a moratorium on a responsible foreign policy. Let us never forget that there are many in the world who do not wish

8

us well; that there are crises and challenges which will not wait for our elections. We must keep in mind that in a world where totalitarian government can manipulate friendly political parties, there is a grey area between foreign policy and overt intervention which we deny ourselves only at grave risk to our national security.

The bitterness that has marked so much of our national discourse for a decade no longer has reason or place. A great responsibility rests upon both the Congress and the Executive. Our foreign policy has been most effective when it reflected broad bipartisan support. This spirit of cooperation has never been more essential than today. Our free debate once again must find its ultimate restraint in the recognition that we are engaged in a common enterprise.

The decade-long debate over executive pre-dominance in foreign policy is now a thing of the past; Congress' reassertion of its role and prerogative is now a dominant and important fact in our political life. In recent years congressional investigations have served the country well in correcting many abuses. We must discover the excesses of the past, overcome the abuses that are uncovered and insure that they will never be repeated. This is the deepest strength of a free society. But it should be possible to cleanse our institutions without disrupting the conduct of our Nation's business abroad and buffeting all the instruments of our policy. When the most confidential documents are spread on the public record as a matter of routine there is a danger that rather than cleanse our government we will produce timidity and obfuscation in our bureaucracy and loss of confidence abroad.

We must resist the myth that government is a gigantic conspiracy. The truth is that the vast majority of public servants are serious, dedicated, and compassionate men and women who seek no other reward than the consciousness of having served their country well.

We need nothing so much as a restoration of confidence in ourselves. President Ford, a man of Congress, has conducted his Administration with

an unprecedented commitment to cooperation and conciliation with his colleagues of the House and Senate. But he has some fundamental obligations to the national interest.

* We cannot allow the intelligence services of this country to be dismantled.

* We must preserve our ability to maintain the confidentiality of other governments' dealings with us and our dealings with them.

* We must maintain our defenses and a prudent program of economic and military assistance to other countries with whom we have productive political relations.

* We must achieve a rational division of labor between Congress' defining of broad national commitments and the Executive's constitutional responsibility for tactics, the execution of policy, and the conduct of negotiations.

Ladies and gentlemen: It is the responsibility of Americans—of all political persuasions, in both branches of government, in the public and the press—to help shape a national policy in a positive and cooperative spirit. It is the responsibility of this Nation to exercise creative leadership in a moment of uncertainty, in a world that cries out for inspiration.

America is the only country whose destiny always seemed open, whose future always appeared more compelling than its past. We have been the hope of mankind, not only because we stood for freedom and offered a haven to the oppressed, but because we have demonstrated time and again the resiliency and indestructible spirit of free men. We have not lost our understanding of our true interests or our humane concern for the fate of our fellow men.

This country's foreign policy is not a burden; it is a success and a promise. We have done great things. There are great things yet to do. If the American people stand together, we will leave as our legacy a more secure, prosperous, and just world than the one that we inherited.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STA-501

In the nation with the highest standard of living and one of the richest cultures in the world, in the nation which has come closest of all to the ideals of civil liberty and democracy, it is long past time to put a stop to self-doubt about our example and role in the world.

But this country cannot have a moratorium on a responsible foreign policy. Let us never forget that there are many in the world who do not wish us well, that there are crises and challenges which will not wait for our elections.

We must keep in mind that in a world where totalitarian government can manipulate friendly political parties, there is a gray area between foreign policy and overt intervention which we deny ourselves only at grave risk to our national security.

The bitterness that has marked so much of our national discourse for a decade no longer has reason or place. A great responsibility rests upon both the Congress and the executive. Our foreign policy has been most effective when it reflected broad bipartisan support. This spirit of cooperation has never been more essential than today. Our free debate once again must find its ultimate restraint in the recognition that we are engaged in a common enterprise.

The decade-long debate over executive predominance in foreign policy is now a thing of the past; Congress' reassertion of its role and prerogative is now a dominant and important fact in our political life. In recent years congressional investigations have served the country well in correcting many abuses. We must discover the excesses of the past, overcome the abuses that are uncovered, and

insure that they will never be repeated—this is the deepest strength of a free society. But it should be possible to cleanse our institutions without disrupting the conduct of our nation's business abroad and buffeting all the instruments of our policy. When the most confidential documents are spread on the public record as a matter of routine, there is a danger that rather than cleanse our government we will produce timidity and obfuscation in our bureaucracy and loss of confidence abroad.

We need nothing so much as a restoration of confidence in ourselves. President Ford, a man of Congress, has conducted his Administration with an unprecedented commitment to cooperation and conciliation with his colleagues of the House and Senate. But he has some fundamental obligations to the national interest:

- We cannot allow the intelligence services of this country to be dismantled.

- We must preserve our ability to maintain the confidentiality of other governments' dealings with us and our dealings with them.

- We must maintain our defenses and a prudent program of economic and military assistance to other countries with whom we have productive political relations.

- We must achieve a rational division of labor between Congress' defining of broad national commitments and the executive's constitutional responsibility for tactics, the execution of policy, and the conduct of negotiations.

Ladies and gentlemen: It is the responsibility of Americans—of all political persuasions, in both branches of government, in the public and the press—to help shape a national policy in a positive and cooperative spirit. It is the responsibility of this nation to exercise creative leadership in a moment

December 15, 1975

849

America is the only country whose destiny
always seemed open, whose future always
appeared more compelling than its past. We
have been the hope of mankind, not only be-
cause we stood for freedom and offered a
haven to the oppressed but because we have
demonstrated time and again the resiliency
and indestructible spirit of free men. We

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at Detroit

Press release 578B dated November 25

Q. Mr. Secretary, American investments in Spain are valued at more than $1.5 billion. We have major military bases there. What is our future there with the successors of General Franco?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States
attaches very great importance to its rela-
tionship with Spain. We hope that Spain
will join the Atlantic community as well as
the European Community. We will do our
best to cooperate in an evolution in Spain
that will make that possible, and we will do
our utmost to strengthen our traditional
friendly relations with Spain.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why is Russian oil being discussed as part of future economic agreement terms with the Russians? Is it wise for us at this time to make ourselves dependent on Russian oil in military strategic terms, especially in terms of what's happened since we've been dependent on Middle Eastern oil?

Secretary Kissinger: The amount of Rus-
sian oil that is being discussed will not
create any substantial dependence.

The basic problem with respect to energy
is to increase the supply of energy available
to the industrial nations. The high oil price
is being maintained by cuts in production.
The more additional oil can be brought on

the market, the deeper the cuts in produc-
tion will have to go among the members of
the oil cartel, until a point is reached where
they may no longer be willing to sustain it.

We will not make ourselves dependent on
Russian oil to any significant degree, and the
amount that we are going to purchase from
the Soviet Union is of primarily symbolic
significance at this point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what in your opinion is the most crucial problem facing America today? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I can only
speak about foreign policy, because on do-
mestic policy I am an arguer against uni-
versal suffrage. [Laughter.]

In foreign policy, our most complicated
problem is to realize—that is, to gear our
policies so that they can be sustained over
the long term. We have had a record of os-
cillating between extremes of intransigence
and extremes of conciliation. We have had
a tendency to believe that we can reward
countries by friendly relations and punish
them by cruel relations. But what we need is
a perception of our long-term interests—a
realization that we can no longer impose our
solutions on all parts of the world but that
we have to work together with some coop-
erative relationships.

We have to resist expansion of the Com-

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Department of State Bulletin

[L.C]

munist countries, but we have to do it by
means that are more complicated and that
are more suited to the ability to gain public
support than has been the case in the im-
mediate postwar period when we were so
enormously strong in relation to the rest of
the world.

Our biggest problem is to make the Amer-
ican people understand this need for a long-
term policy. And this, frankly, is one of the
reasons why I make all these trips around
the country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, recent news articles state that Canada is planning to cut their oil exports to the United States. What is your reaction to this, and what effects do you think it will have on future U.S. oil requirements?

Canadian Oil Exports to U.S.

Secretary Kissinger: We have not been
happy with this Canadian decision, and we
have attempted to delay its implementation
for as long as possible—above all, in relation
to the refineries that have been built spe-
cifically to take care of Canadian oil. We are
attempting to work out swap arrangements
to reduce the impact of these cuts.

Basically, there is no solution to the
American energy problem except a sub-
stantial program of conservation and a mas-
sive program of alternative sources of
energy, which we should develop together
with other consuming countries. Otherwise,
we will continue to be at the mercy of deci-
sions that are not made in America.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask the fol-
lowing question: Can the effectiveness of the
CIA be restored after the damage inflicted
by the Senate Select Committee?

Secretary Kissinger: If you give me a
chance, I'll say something about the House
committee also. [Laughter.]

I think that the events of the last year
have had a serious effect on our intelligence
agencies. I think it is high time that they
be given the opportunity to go back to their
business and not spend all their time defend-
ing themselves, explaining events that have
happened five or ten years ago. And I believe

that the new Director, George Bush, can do
this.

Economic Summit Meeting at Rambouillet

Q. Mr. Secretary, I think I'm the token woman tonight, and I would like to ask you what function do you see summit conferences, such as the recent one held at Rambouillet, serving as far as foreign policy is concerned?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the summit
conference at Rambouillet brought together
the leaders of six industrial democracies,
which between them control about 70 per-
cent of the world trade. They met to discuss
the recession that has come to all of their
countries. But beyond that, they met to dis-
cuss the future of democratic institutions
in the world.

The biggest problem that is faced in the
democracies today is to give the people
there the sense that they are not subject to
blind economic forces outside of their con-
trol.

The recovery of none of these countries is
possible without some cooperative action by
the others. So the six leaders dedicated
themselves to joint efforts at economic re-
covery. They made major progress in solv-
ing the monetary issue that had divided
them. They had agreed to cooperate on ques-
tions of energy.

It can well be that this summit meeting,
which was conducted in one of the most
constructive and harmonious atmospheres
that I can recall at any international meet-
ing, could mark a turning point not only in
the economic recovery of these countries but
also in giving a new sense of vitality to the
democratic institutions which are now under
such heavy attack.

Settlement of Cyprus Question

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask the following question: What steps has the Secretary of State taken to stop the expulsion of Greek Cypriots and the colonization of many of the Turks to occupy the Turkish zone on Cyprus?

December 15, 1975

851

Secretary Kissinger: We believe very strongly that a just settlement of the Cyprus question is in the interest of Greece, in the interest of Turkey, and above all, in the interest of Greek Cypriots.

We believe that such a settlement must respect the dignity of the Cypriot population and must enable refugees to return to territories from which they were expelled. At this particular moment, most of the movement of Greeks out of the Turkish area has already occurred. It occurred nearly a year ago.

So we are putting all of our effort behind bringing about a negotiated solution as rapidly as we can. We are in close contact with the Governments of Greece and Turkey and with the Government of Cyprus and with the leaders of the various communities.

Unfortunately, the domestic situations in various countries have been complicated. And some of our own decisions have also added to these complications. But we hope that we can bring about a just settlement in the foreseeable future.

## Trends in U.S. and Soviet Defense Expenditures

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday Mr. Schlesinger [James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense] said that if the United States is not second to the Soviet Union in terms of its defense posture, it is very close to being second. Would you please comment?

Secretary Kissinger: Secretary Schlesinger was talking about trends that concerned him. He was talking about the trend that the Soviet Union is spending about 15 percent of its gross national product for defense while we spend only about 5 percent of our gross national product on defense. And it is true that if these trends continue over an indefinite period inevitably the Soviet Union will gain militarily on us.

I think Secretary Schlesinger would agree that if we take the situation today in terms of strategic forces, in terms of high-technology weapons, in terms of the Navy, we are still superior.

The great Soviet advantage is in ground forces that can be introduced into regional situations. I would agree with Secretary Schlesinger that if we look ahead over a period of five years, we must strengthen the forces that can resist local aggression, and that if we do not, then many opportunities for blackmail will arise.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I noted in your discussion tonight, in the structure of the global peace—are South America, Mexico, and Canada being overlooked in our foreign policy?

## Western Hemisphere Relations

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think you will ever find a Secretary of State who will admit that he has ever overlooked anything. [Laughter.]

Q. Not even slightly? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: Not even slightly. [Laughter.]

When I was in private life, nothing used to infuriate me more than a government official who would arrive to tell me that all options had been considered and the best possible one had been chosen; and that if I only knew as much as he did, I wouldn't bother him with questions. [Laughter.]

Well, I am here to tell you that all options have been considered. [Laughter.]

In fact, I do not think that Mexico and Canada have been neglected. As far as Canada is concerned, I make more news at a dinner party there than most people make with formal speeches. [Laughter.]

The problem in our relations with Latin America is that, on the one hand, there is a desire for some spectacular event but, on the other hand, there is the reality that many of the Latin American countries see themselves pulled between their traditional relationships in the Western Hemisphere and their temptation to join some of the Third World activities. And there is a reward in many Latin American countries for taking a posture of confrontation with the United States.

But, still, we have started what is called a new dialogue with the countries of Latin

852

Department of State Bulletin

America, which, while it has not had spec-
tacular results, has had the results which
we think are achievable.

If an announcement by me of a trip to
Latin America did not always produce an
international crisis, I would say that I am
planning to go there fairly soon. [Laughter.]

Investigation of CIA

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask the fol-
lowing question: What possible effect will
the current investigations regarding the CIA
have on current American foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think when
calm returns to this country and people ask
themselves what exactly it is that is al-
leged against the CIA—leaving aside some
spectacular events—I think we will find that
in a very complex situation, in many gray
areas of national policy, it has served the
country well.

I think that there is no intelligence serv-
ice in the world that could survive the pub-
lic exposition of all of its activities and the
publication of all of its documents—or of so
many of its documents—which is the case
today. The impact on many foreign coun-
tries is unfortunate. I know some of these
investigations have been conducted seriously
and in an attempt to get at the truth.

But we also have to be able to get back to
the business of government at some point,
and the intelligence community has to go
back to the business of conducting intelli-
gence. This is the balance that must now be
struck.

President Ford's Visit to China

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you cite some spe-
cific areas of trade between China and the
United States that will be expanded as a
result of President Ford's impending visit?

Secretary Kissinger: The basic purpose of
President Ford's visit to China is to bring
about a better comprehension on both sides
of the major policy directions of the other.
Growing out of this, there may be an im-
provement in trade, as was the case in 1972,

but we are not going to China in order to
negotiate a specific trade agreement. That
will be done at other levels and in another
manner. In our experience the Chinese have
preferred to do their business deals through
private channels rather than through gov-
ernment-to-government deals.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see a comparison
between Prince Metternich leaving Vienna
in 1848, ending the Metternich era, and the
pressure you are presently under for ending
the Kissinger era? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I'll tell you:
When he got under pressure, he had been
in office for 38 years [laughter]; so in the
year of 1999 I will entertain this question
[laughter].

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what changes do you foresee in U.S. foreign policy in light of the recent appointment of the new Secretary of Defense?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, if
you do not tell it to the Pentagon, I will have
to say that the foreign policy of the United
States is not made at the Pentagon. [Laugh-
ter.] But Secretary [of Defense Donald H.]
Rumsfeld is a long-term associate of mine
and of course a close friend of the President,
and I am convinced that this new team will
work together harmoniously and effectively.

I do not believe that there will be any
substantial changes in the conduct of for-
eign policy, because the basic decisions on
foreign policy are made by the President and
he has not changed his views. But the
method of making them will work very well.

Relations With Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of Cuba's con-
tinuing propensity for international trouble-
making—most recently in the United Na-
tions on Puerto Rico and the anti-Zionist
resolution, and on Angola—is it prudent to
provide them with easier access to their
Latin neighbors and the OAS [Organization
of American States] agencies, and shouldn't
we actively oppose their membership or ex-
pansion of their involvement in Latin Amer-
ican affairs?

December 15, 1975

853

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States has been prepared to improve our relations with Cuba and not to stand in the way of those Latin American countries which for their own reasons have decided to improve their relations with Cuba.

The OAS decision on July 16th really ratified what the Latin American countries had been doing anyway—that is to say, it left each country free to establish whatever ties it wished to establish with Cuba—which is exactly what had been happening before the Cuba decision. This is why these are the safest decisions to make. [Laughter.]

But the United States, as I said in my prepared remarks, will not accept Cuban meddling in Puerto Rico or Cuban intervention in the affairs of other countries. Therefore the process of improving relations depends on Cuba conducting a responsible foreign policy. If it does not, we cannot continue the process we have started.

## Reunification of Viet-Nam

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you believe the political implications to be in the unification of Viet-Nam?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, de facto, Viet-Nam has been administered as a single country ever since the Communist conquest of South Viet-Nam. There was a pretense of a separate administration in the South, but they never permitted foreign diplomats to be established there.

We expect that by next spring the unification of Viet-Nam is likely to be concluded. The impact on the neighboring countries of that step will not be so formidable. But the weight of Viet-Nam, a country with a population of over 40 million—with the enormous amount of military equipment, both what they acquired themselves and what they captured—is going to be very considerable.

And the test, again, is whether it will use its weight with restraint or whether it will engage in adventurous policies, and the possibility of normalizing relations with us depends on the external conduct of this unified Viet-Nam.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what good and bad effects do the multinational companies have on our foreign policy?*

## Multinational Corporations

*Secretary Kissinger:* First, to take the positive effects, the biggest problem in development is the transfer of capital and technology. This becomes increasingly difficult through governmental sources because of the growing resistance to the use of public funds for development purposes. The multinational corporations are a much more flexible instrument for the transfer of capital and technology and, curiously, less of a political mortgage on the countries concerned.

On the other hand, at least in the past, the multinational corporations have not always been fully sensitive to the political conditions of the countries in which they operated, and they have been under increasing pressure from the point of view of expropriation and from political pressure.

We are attempting to develop a code by which multinational corporations might operate in foreign countries and to which foreign countries would agree so that they have some assurance against what they consider some of the abuses and the multinational corporations have some assurance against some of the pressures to which they have been exposed. We are discussing this now with the heads of several of the multinational corporations to see whether we can come up with an agreed document that we then would put before the United Nations or some other appropriate international forum to get a code of action for multinational corporations.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you support Mr. Moynihan's [Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Representative to the U.N.] position at the United Nations on the Zionist resolution and his statement on the President of Uganda?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Pat Moynihan is an old friend of mine. And when one has a friend at Harvard, one holds on to him [laughter], as I did with him. I recommended that he be

854

Department of State Bulletin

appointed to this position after I had read
an article of his in which he laid out in some
considerable detail what he thought the ap-
propriate strategy of the United Nations
should be.

He has my full confidence and support and
the full confidence and support of the Presi-
dent.

Pat Moynihan got a little bit upset last
week because the British Ambassador to the

United Nations attacked him. I must say
that if I can ever reduce the attacks on me
to foreigners, I'll celebrate. [Laughter.] He
is a distinguished public servant. The Presi-
dent and I met with him this morning. We
assured him of our full support. I am de-
lighted to say that he has agreed to stay on
and that he will continue in his calm, meas-
ured, and quiet way to do his job. [Laugh-
ter.]

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Detroit November 25

Press release 580 dated November 26

Q. Mr. Secretary, on April 29, 1965, Pres-
ident Ford, then a Michigan Congressman,
issued a statement in which he condemned
Turkey for the genocide of the Armenian
people. Last December 13, 1974, the White
House informed me that the President was
sticking to his condemnation of the Ottoman
Turkish Government of 1913.

On April 8, 1975, the House passed a reso-
lution, voted overwhelmingly, to mark April
24 this year as a national day of remem-
brance of man's inhumanity to man, par-
ticularly in the massacre of the Armenian
people. According to Congressman [David
N.] Henderson of North Carolina, at the
urging of the State Department the words
"in Turkey" were deleted from that resolu-
tion because of delicate negotiations on the
Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece.

When that resolution passed the House
and went to the Senate subcommittee chaired
by Senator Hruska of Nebraska, the Asso-
ciated Press reported on April 23, 1975, that
time is running out, and the State Depart-
ment has bottled the resolution, did not want
the resolution out of Senator Hruska's sub-
committee. According to Senator John Tun-
ney—Jerry Hill, his chief aide—your office
contacted Senator Hruska and said under no
means should any resolution on the Arme-
nians come out of that committee.

Could you explain to me why so much
pressure on a simple resolution marking the
observance of 60 years?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I am delighted to go to news conferences in which I learn some news, and the fascinating events which you have just described are all news to me. I cannot tell you how moved I am when I hear Congressmen and Senators report the intolerable pressures to which they are exposed by the Department of State which prevent them from passing legisla-
tion. I will quickly get in touch with those
of my aides who have that tremendous in-
fluence so that they can use their pressure
when it will do me some good. [Laughter.]

I have to tell you that most of the de-
tailed events you described here are news to
me. It is obvious that the United States at-
taches importance to its friendship with
Turkey, a country with which we have a long
relationship and which is in a very strategic
position. It is also clear that in the face of
the arms cutoff that was already taking
place, we would not want to upset that rela-
tionship more than was necessary.

I did not personally involve myself in the
discussions of the Armenian resolution.
What happened to the Armenians 60 years
ago was a great tragedy occurring in the
Ottoman Empire, not in the present Govern-

December 15, 1975

855

ment of Turkey. But I think that the stories
of that overpowering influence of my office
on the congressional committees are, like
Mark Twain's death, slightly exaggerated.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the debate on foreign policy and the press, particularly during a campaign year, offers a chance for dialogue and dissent in the public. How does that affect your ability to conduct the foreign relations of the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: Nobody should take the position that foreign policy cannot be conducted in the face of a democratic debate. In fact, it is the essence of a vital democracy that it can conduct a coherent foreign policy while debating the fundamental issues.

At the same time, the foreign policy of
the United States deals with the permanent
interests and values of the United States.
These should not be determined primarily by
partisan considerations. Therefore some re-
straint—some greater restraint—should be
placed on the foreign policy debate by both
sides than on domestic debate. The Admin-
istration in office should not claim that it is
the repository of all wisdom and should re-
member, as we do, that there is a continuity
in American foreign policy that includes the
administrations of both parties. The oppo-
sition should keep in mind that we should
not give the impression to foreign countries
that the basic direction of our foreign policy
in all categories is going to get changed
every eight years.

So within these limits I think that debate
should go on and can be fruitful, and as far
as we are concerned, we will certainly wel-
come it.

Outside Intervention in Angola

Q. Mr. Kissinger, in your speech last night you talked about the lack of restraint shown by the Soviet Union and Cuba in intervening militarily in Angola. What, in practical terms, can you do about it for the United States? What reaction can there be?

Secretary Kissinger: Our primary concern
at this moment is to put an end to it and to

see whether an African solution can be
found to an African problem; that is to say,
whether the countries of Africa and the
local forces in Angola can work out a solu-
tion without turning Angola into an arena
for great-power rivalry.

Q. In other words, a coalition government?

Secretary Kissinger: We certainly favor the report of the Conciliation Committee of the Organization of African Unity which called for negotiation among all three groups and a possible coalition government, yes.

Continuing Middle East Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports that you feel that step-by-step negotiations in the Middle East no longer are useful, and that perhaps you should move to a conference form of negotiations for a more permanent settlement of the question. Are those reports accurate? And why is step-by-step negotiation no longer useful? And also, what form of conference negotiations are you talking about?

Secretary Kissinger: I just glanced at such a report in one of our leading Eastern newspapers, and I am afraid to contradict them because then they will write an editorial against me. [Laughter.] That would be such an unusual event for them that I dare not do it.

Basically our view has always been that we are prepared to support the step-by-step approach if the parties want it. Specifically, we are prepared, and continue to be prepared, to support a negotiation between Syria and Israel with respect to the Golan Heights. And in that respect I do not agree with that particular report which I have seen.

However, if the parties would not be able
to agree on a negotiation, we would be will-
ing to encourage a Geneva-style negotiation
or a Geneva negotiation based on the origi-
nal participants and on the original letters
of invitation. Failing that, we are prepared
to have a preparatory conference to the
Geneva Conference or an informal meeting
again of the original membership. So we are

856

Department of State Bulletin

prepared to support any negotiating effort
that the parties themselves are.

Q. But are step-by-step negotiations out,
or—

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Q. They are not out?

Secretary Kissinger: They are not out.

## U.S. and World Economies Linked

Q. Mr. Secretary, last night you referred
to the need for a prosperous economy, the
divisions of a planet between North and
South, the rebirth of some of our former
opponents after World War II, and you
closed with the statement that our foreign
policy is not a burden.

Secretary Kissinger: Is not a burden, yes.

Q. What would you say to the 8 million
unemployed in this nation, particularly in a
city like Detroit that has been hard hit by
the recession, and to those citizens who are
opposed to continuing foreign aid?

Secretary Kissinger: I would say to them
that, first of all, the unemployment is not
caused in any sense by foreign aid. Even
technically, the money we spend for foreign
aid is useful to the other countries only be-
cause they spend it here, and therefore it
makes jobs rather than depriving people of
jobs.

Secondly, I would say to the unemployed
that they have to understand—and I would
say to all Americans that they have to
understand—that our prosperity and our
security are now inextricably linked with
that of the rest of the world. And as events
in the past five years have shown, if the rest
of the world collapses economically, what-
ever difficulties we have here will be greatly
magnified, and if there is conflict, it will run
major risks for the United States.

So I would say that our foreign commit-
ments and our foreign involvement reflect
not a favor to other countries and not an act
of charity, but that they are an expression
of the American self-interest and are in the

interest of all Americans, including the un-
employed.

Now, of course, we must reduce unem-
ployment in America, and we must have a
strong economic recovery. When the leaders
of the industrial democracies met two weeks
ago, this was recognized as the principal
goal of all these countries—preeminently of
ours. So I do not want to set up an opposi-
tion in which our people have to suffer for
the sake of foreign policy. Our people have
to understand that the economic difficulties
in this country are not caused by our foreign
policy and that they would be worse without
a forward-looking foreign policy.

## Extension of U.N. Force on Golan Heights

Q. Mr. Secretary, U.N. Secretary Wald-
heim is reportedly having difficulty in effect-
ing a continuation of the so-called cease-fire
on the Golan. Do you have any more encour-
aging word at this time, and what if the
agreement is not continued after Sunday's
deadline?

And since I am on the question of the
United Nations, would you care to comment
on whether there will be a censorship on
[Daniel P.] Moynihan, [Clarence M.] Mitch-
ell, and their associates at the United Na-
tions against the brutal majority?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, with re-
spect to the discussions that Secretary Gen-
eral Waldheim is conducting, I have not yet
seen an official report by Secretary General
Waldheim of what he was told in Damascus
and in Jerusalem, though I expect to find
this when I return to Washington today.

What is being discussed is not a continu-
ation of the cease-fire, but a continuation of
the mandate of the U.N. forces on the Golan
Heights; that is to say, of the UNDOF [U.N.
Disengagement Observer Force] group. We
still believe that an extension of the man-
date is essential and that an increase in
tension on the Golan Heights would serve
nobody and would create the most serious
difficulties for all those who want to make
progress toward peace, while not helping the
more radical elements either.

[LC]

December 15, 1975

857

With respect to Ambassador Moynihan, I
have repeatedly stated that he has our full
confidence. There is no question of muzzling
him—for that matter, there is no physical
possibility of muzzling my friend Pat Moyni-
han. [Laughter.]

But that has never been the issue. There
has not been an issue. There has been no
dispute. This is an invented crisis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Bill Leggit, writing in
the current issue of Sports Illustrated, said
that the proposed baseball trip by major
league players to Cuba—governmental ap-
proval of that is imminent as late as this
week. Can you comment on the status of that
proposal?

Secretary Kissinger: It was imminent at
one point; it is not imminent now.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I hate to digress from
these important subjects of discussion here
this morning, but you were to meet with
some of our labor leaders and editors here
this morning. I wonder if you could comment
on what those discussions involved.

Secretary Kissinger: I met with the labor
leaders last night and with the editors this
morning. One of the purposes for me of
these trips is to get a feeling for what is on
the minds of the various concerned citizens
in the areas that I visit, and therefore I
usually schedule three or four groups of
people of various professions and concerns
and have a give-and-take.

In order to permit the frankest kind of
discussion, I always have those off the rec-
ord; so it would not be appropriate for me
to discuss the content of these conversa-
tions. But I do want to say that I find these
meetings extremely helpful in giving me,
within the limited time available, a feel of
what is on the minds of the leaders of the
areas that I visit.

Q. Could you give us a broad overview, for
instance, of what the chief concern is of
most people?

Secretary Kissinger: I am afraid if I give
an overview, they will give an overview, and

then we will never hear the end of it.
[Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, last night you described
the success of American foreign policy. I be-
lieve that many would consider it not so
successful, given events of the last several
weeks—such as the Japanese proposals at
Rambouillet calling for debt moratorium, a
new international development and rapid
development of thermonuclear fusion power.
Also, you have similar proposals coming out
of the UNCTAD Conference [U.N. Confer-
ence on Trade and Development] at Geneva
and Soviet discussions of the transfer ruble.
You also have the revolutionary success in
Angola, the unstoppable revolution in Portu-
gal, and in the Middle East, where your policy
has basically backfired with the hegem-
ony now of the Communist Party in Leba-
non. What makes you believe, with these
international developments, and domestically
the exposures of your and the National Se-
curity Council involvements in gunrunning,
dopepushing and assassinations, that you
will be able to, number one, escalate toward
confrontations with the Soviets around
Bangladesh, the Middle East, or Angola—or,
number two, that you will be able to contain
the growing influence of the U.S. Labor
Party in the LaRouche-Evans presidential
campaign?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I like the ob-
jectivity with which your questions are put
to me [laughter], permitting an easy yes-
and-no answer [laughter].

Of course I have to say my perspective is
perhaps a little biased, but it is not exactly
the same as yours. The United States can-
not keep others from making proposals that
we do not approve of. But the test of the
policy is not whether these proposals are
made, but whether they are accepted; and
we were extremely satisfied by the results
of the Rambouillet Conference, and we think
that the results of it indicate that the in-
dustrial democracies are working more
closely together than at any time in the
postwar period.

The other items you raised are too com-
plicated to deal with at this brief meeting.

858

Department of State Bulletin

Status of U.S.-Soviet Arms Talks

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said recently that the arms talks with the Soviet Union are stagnated.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. What is causing the stalemate, and what are the chances for breaking it? What will it take to break it?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the stalemate has been caused basically by the issue of whether to count the so-called Backfire bomber and how to take into account the so-called cruise missiles in relation to the overall totals that had been agreed to at Vladivostok. These are complicated technical issues, and the status of the negotiations is such that if that deadlock is broken, it can be concluded reasonably rapidly after that in working out the details.

The prospects are hard to foretell at this moment. It is our position—we are prepared to review our position if the Soviet Union is prepared to review its position. We cannot make new proposals simply because the Soviet Union rejects our old proposals without offering any alternatives. If the Soviet Union is prepared to review its attitude, then we can see what can be modified in ours so that a mutually acceptable compromise can emerge.

At this point I cannot give you a judgment of the degree to which this is possible, because there have not been any detailed talks since my last press conference.

Q. Following up on that, Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether you consider it a possibility that you might be meeting with one or another of the Soviet leaders before the end of the year on that subject?

Secretary Kissinger: That possibility exists, but it is not yet absolutely firm.

U.S. and Canadian Concern on Oil

Q. Mr. Secretary, some Canadian sources are under the impression this morning that you are unduly critical of their own self-interest when it comes to their own oil. How do you see that again?

Secretary Kissinger: I was self-critical of their interests?

Q. Of Canadians' interests, preserving their self-interest when it comes to their oil.

Secretary Kissinger: You mean in answer to a question yesterday?

Q. Yes; apparently so.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have not seen these comments, and I was afraid there might have been a loose microphone around a dinner table again yesterday. [Laughter.]

We understand the Canadian concern with looking after their own interest with respect to their own oil. We have our own concerns with respect to the refineries in the Middle West that have been put there primarily because of the expectation of Canadian oil. Therefore we have to work out some arrangement by which both of these concerns can be met.

We consider our relations with Canada excellent and that these problems can be worked out amicably and in a cooperative spirit. So if my answer yesterday came across as critical, it was not intended that way. It was intended to state a problem which we both have and which we should both attempt to solve—and are attempting to solve.

Q. You foresee no difficulties?

Secretary Kissinger: I foresee difficulties, but I foresee that we will solve them.

Alleged Violations of the SALT Agreement

Q. Mr. Secretary, Aviation Week and Space Technology has accused you and the President of a deliberate policy of secrecy and deception at the SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. Do you have any response to that editorial?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is a disgrace when the President and the Secretary of State can be accused of deliberately deceiving the American public with respect to alleged violations of our major adversary.

Serious people are bound to differ when you have complicated weapons systems on

December 15, 1975

859

both sides of great technological complexity. When there is a report of violation, it is investigated. That takes some time. Then representations are made. That may take some time.

But there has been no violation that has been reported that has not been brought to the attention of the Soviet Union and has not been energetically pursued—or, I should rather say, no allegation of a violation—and I think this is an unworthy editorial.

*Q. Therefore, to follow up, they say the Soviet Union is building an irreversible Soviet military advantage. You say that is totally wrong?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The Soviet Union is building up its strategic forces—but not on the basis of violations of the agreement, but on the basis of investment in its strategic forces.

I do not believe that the Soviet Union can build an irreversible advantage in strategic forces against the United States if we are on our toes. They will certainly not do it on the basis of violations of the SALT agreement. Whether they do it by being willing to spend more than the United States is another matter. But on the basis of violations of the SALT agreement, it is not correct.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there is this continuation of sniping by forces in Washington that you will leave the Administration before the end of the year. Is that possible; is it probable? And could your congressional critics put you in a position where you just could not function?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have no plan to leave the Administration. I received perhaps excessive praise at one stage. I may receive excessive criticism now—and I admit that I consider any criticism excessive. [Laughter.]

As I said yesterday, you cannot conduct foreign policy without authority, and if the authority of the government is constantly eroded, foreign policy will suffer. But I think that senior officials have to be prepared to take criticism as well as praise, and I am not complaining about it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, following that up, sir, are there any indications that the revelations of the Pike committee [House Select Committee on Intelligence] and the Church committee [Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities] have had specifically detrimental effects on foreign policy?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am not so familiar with the revelations of the Pike committee; I am familiar with charges of the Pike committee. On the whole, I think that the Church committee has attempted to do a serious job with a very difficult subject—with an assignment that it did not seek out but that was given to it. Nevertheless, even though the effort was serious, it was not helpful to the conduct of our foreign policy for the publication of all these documents to take place, and this is why the President opposed it.

*Q. Could you expand on this point that you made in your speech last night that Russia's interventionist policy must inevitably threaten other relationships? You were speaking in reference to Angola. Could you expand more precisely on what you meant there?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I meant it is difficult to reconcile this with the principles of coexistence that were signed in 1972, and this would have to be taken into account by our policy if it continues.

## U.S. Program To Help Developing Countries

*Q. Could you elaborate on the policy of the State Department in response to the proposals that were made by Japanese Minister Miki at Rambouillet where he called for a worldwide economic development program to be facilitated by the establishment of a new economic—new monetary institutions, that called for a debt moratorium for the underdeveloped sector, and for international cooperation on rapid development of thermonuclear fusion power. And, secondly, could you explain why the contents of Minister Miki's offer had not been reported to the American press and instead are being confined to the chambers of the National Security Council?*

860

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Kissinger: Well, if Prime Minister Miki made such proposals, it is his responsibility to put them to the American press if he wants them published. I, frankly, am not familiar—I may not have focused on his presentation, but I do not recall this degree of detail. But, at any rate, there is no reason, from our side, not to have Japanese proposals put forward—except a courtesy that the Japanese would put forward their own proposals, and not we.

Now, with respect to the specific proposals, the United States is opposed to debt moratorium because it would fall almost exclusively on us and because we do not believe that this is the right way of proceeding.

The United States strongly favors a major effort of the developed countries to establish a better cooperation with the developing countries. At the U.N. special session of the General Assembly, the United States put forward a very sweeping program in many categories of income maintenance, new investment, help to the poorest countries, food reserves, in which the industrial countries and the developing countries could cooperate and in which the United States could show greater flexibility.

The United States will support that program. That is our program. Other countries are free to put forward their program. Thermonuclear fusion—the peaceful uses of thermonuclear fusion have not even been solved yet, and therefore it is not the most immediate issue that is before mankind. But our proposal has been put forward—our position has been put forward in great detail on September 1 before the special session of the General Assembly.

Those are the programs that we support. Other countries have every right to put forward their proposals, but we do not necessarily endorse them.

## Diplomacy and Narcotics Control

Q. Mr. Secretary, one time the United States was successful in stopping opium poppy production in Turkey, and it is our understanding now that the production of poppies is growing again. Has the United

States given up totally on using diplomacy to try to limit the supply of heroin to this country?

Secretary Kissinger: No. We consider that the control of opium traffic is one of our most important objectives, and we have been working with the Turkish Government on the control of the poppy production. It is a very important domestic political issue in Turkey because the swing districts are also the districts in which poppy production is most widespread. But we have worked out with the Turkish Government a process of harvesting by which the so-called straw process, by which the poppy harvest is processed in governmental plants; and therefore the private sale of the opium is, to all practical purposes, eliminated.

This has so far worked rather well. And Representative [Charles B.] Rangel, who has been one of the chief advocates of this program, looked into it and found it extremely helpful.

## Visit to Africa

Q. Mr. Secretary, when will you make a visit to black Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: I hope during the course of next year.

Q. Can you give us a specific date?

Secretary Kissinger: No. The dates depend on other international events; but I have talked to several African leaders, and I hope to visit there next year.

Q. Members of the congressional caucus have criticized you repeatedly for not going over to visit black Africa in the past. Can you comment on that?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have been in close touch with members of the Black Caucus, and they have worked together with us on a policy paper in which we want to take their views into account. I have been so heavily engaged in the Middle East problems that were more urgent, if not more important, and I have been out of the country so much on these other trips which were caused by immediate crises that I could not

December 15, 1975

861

take a trip to Africa. But I hope very much
to be able to do it next year.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you see any
indication that the OPEC [Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations
will be contemplating oil increases for the
United States this year or next year?

Secretary Kissinger: Price increases?

Q. Yes. And, if so, what can we do to negotiate on the basis of some of the foodstuffs that we ship to them?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there is a meeting—the so-called consumer-producer conference is scheduled to meet in Paris on December 16, and we will get a clearer indication at that point of what the long-term policy of the oil-producing nations is.

Our impression is that there is no immediate risk of an increase in oil prices. But, as I said yesterday, it is a serious matter for all of the industrial countries, as well as for the developing countries, to have their domestic economies or their development programs made totally subject to decisions that are taken far away and which are entirely made without reference to their concerns. Therefore we hope very much that the OPEC nations will think very seriously before they contemplate another increase.

## U.S.-Iran Relations: Cooperation and Shared Interests

Address by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.¹

To put any discussion of Iran and our relations with it in perspective, I like to remind Americans that, while we take pride in approaching the 200th anniversary of our independence, we as a nation are still very young. Iran also celebrated an anniversary recently, but of a slightly different order of magnitude—in 1971 Iran marked the 2,500th

anniversary of the establishment of its monarchy.

Although U.S.-Iranian relations began to develop early in this century, we first began to collaborate closely during World War II and in the tense postwar years in the face of Soviet moves to expand their influence and control to the south. As the U.S. Government accepted responsibility to assist free nations to maintain their independence, we found Iran a country of great strategic importance that had the will to resist the pressures of its powerful neighbor. On that basis was formed a partnership that has steadily developed. That partnership has been to an extent formalized by our association in the CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] alliance and by our numerous bilateral agreements in various fields. Its substance, however, does not rest only on formal documents but on the major interests which we share.

The interests which we share with Iran have until recently been primarily bilateral and regional: that the countries in the Persian Gulf region remain independent and free to choose their own courses of political and economic development, that this oil-rich and strategic region remain free from hostile external influence, that destabilizing and destructive radical movements not gain a foothold, and that the trade routes from the Persian Gulf to the rest of the world remain open. Under the leadership of His Imperial Majesty, however, Iran has always taken a view of its interests and responsibilities far broader than the immediate region, recognizing the growing indivisibility of the world's problems and of the solutions to them. In the past few years Iran's success in developing its economic, social, and defense capabilities has given it the means to play a larger role on the world scene.

We have come to look to Iran as a stabilizing influence in its region. We see Iran as a country ready to use its influence for peace and stability in the Persian Gulf region and to cooperate with its neighbors in the interests of mutual security. Much is said in the press—at times critical—about the large arms purchases Iran is making and the

¹ Made before the 26th Kentucky World Trade Conference at Louisville on Nov. 18. Mr. Atherton is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

862

Department of State Bulletin

American role in Iran's development of its defense capabilities. It is natural, however, that a country of Iran's size and strategic location, and with its large population and high state of economic development, would wish to be able to defend itself against outside threats and to play a role commensurate with its interests.

Iran's ability to serve the cause of peace is well illustrated by the effective role Iran has played in support of Secretary Kissinger's efforts to bring about a lasting settlement in the Middle East. Iran shares with the United States the ability to talk with both Israel and the Arab countries. During the months of negotiations Iran gave quiet but steadfast support in various capitals to those governments seeking to pursue a course of moderation. Its efforts have been especially helpful to Egypt, with which it has developed very close relations during the last year. Iran's grant and loan commitments, permitting Egypt to rebuild its cities and develop its industry, have been of great significance. They have given Egypt tangible evidence that it can diversify its ties and its sources of external assistance.

I can say with confidence that, without Iran's encouragement, our efforts to promote a peaceful settlement would have been far more difficult. In addition to its diplomatic and financial contributions to the peacemaking effort, Iran has recently accepted the great responsibility of sending peacekeeping forces as part of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in the Middle East. Elsewhere in the region, Iran has readily shared its affluence with its neighbors; and large-scale economic arrangements have been made with Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

As Iran pursues its interests in the world, we will from time to time find that those interests do not always coincide with ours. That is only natural. I know of no family in which all members always agree; and it would be strange if independent countries with differing cultural, historical, and geographic backgrounds did not at times disagree. It is well known, for example, that we have differed with Iran on the issue of oil

prices; but both our governments have determined that this difference should not stand in the way of cooperation in other areas to our mutual benefit.

World War II and the cold war brought us together. But the world changes; and while shared strategic perceptions are still an important part of our relationship, new issues are giving new dimensions to that relationship—the global issues of food, population, energy. Solutions for these issues are neither easy nor obvious, but will require the cooperative efforts of the world's best brains. In the various fora in which these issues are approached, we find Iran playing an active and leading role.

I have so far been talking of the broad scene and would now like to narrow the field a bit to look at the range of our interests in Iran. This conference has been focusing on trade with Iran. I will only note what a major market Iran has become for U.S. agricultural and industrial exports. In 1974 the value of our exports to Iran was $1.7 billion. In only the first nine months of 1975, our exports have totaled $2.4 billion, of which about two-thirds are civilian and only one-third military.

Iran is also, of course, a major area for American investment. Significant investment by American firms in Iran started about 30 years ago and has grown steadily until it is today at a level of well over a billion dollars. Its participants include many of our major firms, as well as some of our moderate-sized companies.

Because of wise policies of both the Iranian Government and of the investing companies, American investment in Iran has not been of the sort that has occasionally aroused accusations of exploitation in other countries. Rather, American firms have invested in Iran as part of joint ventures with Iranian entrepreneurs. As a result, American and Iranian skills and knowledge have worked together to bring ever higher technology into play in the Iranian economy in ways that serve the interests of Iranian development plans as well as the financial interests of the joint venturers.

The number of American employees in

December 15, 1975

863

Iran was kept at a minimum from the start, and Iranians have been trained to replace them as rapidly as possible. The spinoff of talented managers and workers has contributed to the rapid development of purely Iranian firms in advanced industrial fields. These firms have in turn become important customers for licensed American technology.

Concurrently with the development of joint American-Iranian business ventures, and in part because of it, has come the growth of perhaps the most important of our many cultural ties with Iran: the vast number of Iranians who have studied and are now studying in American institutions. The Iranian student body in the United States is roughly 15,000 in number, and it would be difficult these days to find an American college that does not have at least a few Iranian students. I understand that there are about 100 here at Louisville. Many senior Iranian officials have studied in the United States, including a number of Cabinet ministers, and, most notably, Ambassador Zahedi [Ardeshir Zahedi, Iranian Ambassador to the United States]. This greatly facilitates relations between our countries.

The multiplicity of the ties of economics, culture, and technical cooperation which bind the United States and Iran, and the importance which the United States attaches to Iran as a stabilizing and friendly influence in the Middle East, caused the two governments to agree, almost exactly one year ago, to establish a Joint Commission to expand and diversify the many aspects of our bilateral cooperation.

I will not talk at length of the work of the Joint Commission. I will simply note that under the Commission, there have been formed committees on agriculture, on economic and financial affairs, on manpower, on nuclear energy, and on science and education. Each of these committees has been active in developing new programs of cooperation in its special field. The work of these committees is largely in the governmental field, but a private sector affiliate has also been created—the Joint Business Council. Its chairman, Mr. John Logan, was your luncheon speaker today. I understand he is

off to Tehran next week to consult with his Iranian counterparts.

In closing, I will say that our relationship with Iran is a very special one. A quality which characterizes it and is important to me as a day-to-day practitioner of diplomacy is our ability to talk out the problems that inevitably arise between dynamic governments. As Ambassador Zahedi has frequently said, these are problems within the family which can be resolved within the family. The ability to talk together frankly within the family is both a preventive and a cure for misunderstanding.

Building on our history of cooperation and our ability to talk together frankly, we expect our special relationship with Iran to continue to develop and expand into new areas and to bring ever-increasing benefits to both the American and the Iranian people.

Study of U.S.-Japan Relationships
in Science and Technology Completed

Press release 554 dated November 5

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

A panel of distinguished experts has recently completed a comprehensive study of relationships between the United States and Japan in the fields of science and technology. Their report was signed in Washington on November 4. Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., formerly Science Adviser to the President, and Dr. Saburo Okita, president of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, were cochairmen of the binational panel. Other American members of the Executive Committee were Ambassador T. Keith Glennan, former NASA Administrator, and Dr. Robert W. Hiatt, president of the University of Alaska. Their Japanese counterparts were Dr. Tatsuaki Miyajima, Atomic Energy Commissioner, and Dr. Junnosuke Nakai, professor at Tokyo University.

Senior officials from a variety of departments, agencies, and ministries in the two governments also served on the review panel, which was established in accordance

864

Department of State Bulletin

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[lc]

December 4, 1975

NO. 589

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. INGERSOLL
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
UNION LEAGUE OF PHILADELPHIA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

December 4, 1975

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY -- THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION

The Union League was formed to support the Constitution and the Union -- the United States of America. In those days the threat to the Constitution and Union came from within; today our future as a nation and people depends increasingly on what happens beyond our borders. The same patriotic impulses that led to the formation of the Union League are needed today as we grapple with the questions of what role the United States should play in world affairs. At the same time, the foreign policy challenges we now face are different in many ways from those we faced in the early years of our Republic, and even those of the postwar and Cold-War era. They require different responses from the Executive branch, the Congress, the American public at large, and private public-spirited organizations such as the Union League.

For many years now, in many ways, we have been in transition from the Cold-War and postwar period:

- First, American military predominance has been challenged by Soviet nuclear parity, as well as by nuclear proliferation and the rise of new centers of power around the world. And we learned in Viet-Nam that the application of superior material resources was not sufficient to guarantee victory against an opponent more disciplined and determined than ourselves and our friends.

- Second, American economic predominance has been challenged by the recovery and the integration of Western European economies, the dramatic growth of Japan, and the sudden emergence of oil-rich countries.

- Third, America's exalted self-image has been blurred and shaken by our increasing realization of our own domestic problems and weaknesses, and our awareness that pluralistic democracy may not be suitable for, or desired by, other peoples with different traditions and circumstances. America's beacon light to the world has been turned inward, and has become a searchlight focusing on our own problems.

- Finally, the new international issues of economic interdependence -- energy, population, food, the environment, the law of the sea -- have arisen alongside the traditional political and military security

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issues with which we had become so familiar. The new issues require new forms of international cooperation.

The increasing complexity of world problems, and the increasing importance of our own internal problems, create a temptation for Americans to return to an earlier isolationism. But that option is no longer realistic. We no longer dominate the world, but we cannot ignore it either. I will not waste the time of this audience by proving the need for continuing a responsibly activist foreign policy. What I would like to concentrate on is the domestic dimension of that policy -- primarily the interaction between the Executive and the Congress, and directly between the government and the people.

## The Executive and the Congress in Foreign Policy

Our constitution allocates certain powers and duties for national security and foreign policy to the President, others to the Senate and the House of Representatives acting separately, and still others to the Congress as a whole. The founding fathers could not of course have anticipated many of the specific executive-legislative disputes in this area that have arisen through the years, or perhaps even the rise of political parties and the possibility that one party would control the Presidency while the other would control the Congress. But by providing for overlapping jurisdiction in many aspects of foreign policy (as in other areas of national policy), and for the election in different ways of the President and of the two Houses of the Congress, they deliberately institutionalized conflict between the two branches of government. These are the philosophical reflections with which we in the Executive branch comfort ourselves in times of trouble with the Congress over foreign policy issues.

It is clear beyond doubt that the Congress, responding both to its own feeling that it has been too acquiescent to the Executive in the recent past, and to public demands for greater Congressional oversight, is determined to be more involved in foreign policy formulation and execution. The Executive branch recognizes this -- frankly, we can hardly do otherwise. We are moving to improve our diplomatic relations with the Congress in order to avoid unnecessary conflict over prerogatives and issues.

Our adjustment to Congressional self-assertion in foreign policy is complicated by the changing nature of foreign policy issues. Many of these issues cannot be handled solely by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee. For example, international financial and monetary matters come within the purview of the Banking Committee. Issues involving military security aspects attract the interest of the two Armed Services Committees.

Some people have been critical of the way the Congress is organized to deal with national security and foreign policy issues; I will shrink from criticism, but I cannot resist noting that within the Executive branch, the National Security Council system -- of which I chair the Under Secretaries Committee -- does provide a mechanism for studying foreign policy issues and presenting them coherently to the President for decision. Both Senator Humphrey, and the Murphy Commission -- or Commission on the organization of the government for the conduct of foreign policy -- have proposed the establishment of a Joint Committee on National Security as a way to give the Congress the same sort of coordinated, coherent overview of foreign policy issues.

Another factor which has complicated recent executive efforts to consult with the Congress, particularly the House, is that individual members of Congress no longer feel so keenly the constraints of hierarchy and party

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discipline. The Democratic Caucus, and other groups like the Black Caucus or Congressman Don Fraser's group on human rights, may have as much influence as the formal committees on issues that they make their own. The State Department has no choice but to take account of shifting power realities in the Congress and to develop relations with these de facto power centers, but it is frequently difficult -- and sometimes impossible -- to discern exactly who is on first, or who is umpire and who is coach.

The requirements of Congressional consultation have kept Secretary Kissinger and the rest of us extremely busy. The Secretary recently estimates that he spends one-fourth of his time on Congressional relations. He has probably shuttled between the Department and Capitol Hill even more often than between Cairo and Tel Aviv. While we recognize the desirability of close understanding with the Congress, we are also aware that there are physical limits to the time the Secretary can spend in testifying before every committee or subcommittee that requests him, and we believe that there are other people in the Department who are qualified to speak with authority on foreign policy.

In pursuit of detente with the Congress, we have tried to broaden and deepen consultations. More people from the Department are going to the Hill to talk to members of Congress and their staffs. More extensive debriefings of and discussions with congressional and staff delegations are conducted after their return from overseas trips.

In order to consult effectively with the Congress and allow it to exercise oversight over foreign policy, the Administration has provided unprecedented amounts and kinds of classified information to the Congress in recent months. Nevertheless, while respecting the authority and the views of the Congress, the Administration must preserve its own ability to conduct foreign policy. For example, we have been extremely concerned that some classified information transmitted to certain committees of the Congress finds its way shortly thereafter into the press, or is officially published as a committee report without the Administration's consent. We are aware of the dangers of overclassification. We do not intend to abuse security classification to protect erring officials rather than national security. But we cannot ignore the dangers arising from the inability to protect properly classified information. If candid diplomatic exchanges are published, future exchanges will be less candid. If the sources of intelligence are revealed, they will start to decline to reveal further intelligence, or be rendered unable to do so. If information on the effectiveness of intelligence-gathering methods is made public, previously unwitting sources of such information will take new counter-measures.

Another recent example was the demand of the House Select Committee on Intelligence for a memorandum critical of our 1974 Cyprus policy sent directly to Secretary Kissinger by a middle-level Foreign Service Officer. While respecting the Committee's claim that it needed to know about in-house criticism of our policy in order to exercise its oversight function, the Administration was determined not to release information which would explicitly identify career officials of the Department with the advice they had provided to policy-level officials. We are convinced that the confidentiality of the relationship between policy-level officials and their advisers must be protected both to protect the careers of the advisers from outside pressures and to protect the candor and integrity of the policy-making process itself.

In this instance the issue was resolved when the Committee accepted the Secretary's offer to include the contents of the dissenting memorandum,

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PR 589

without attribution to its author, in an amalgamation of comments critical
of our Cyprus policy. This solution provided the Committee with the informa-
tion it had sought, but protected the Administration's ability to continue
to obtain the best and most candid policy advice from its career officials.

Another problem between the Congress and the Executive is the growing
Congressional tendency to attempt to advance American values through legis-
lative action designed to influence the conduct of what other nations
regard as their internal affairs.

The increasingly volatile human rights issue is a case in point. There is
of course no difference between the Executive and the Congress on the importance
we attach to the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout
the world; this is a traditional and legitimate goal of American foreign
policy.

However, we doubt that human rights can be advanced by restrictive amendments
to legislation which authorizes security assistance to allies and friendly
governments. Last year the Congress added a new section, 502B, to the
Foreign Assistance Act stating the following: "It is the sense of Congress
that, except in extraordinary circumstances the President shall substantially
reduce or terminate security assistance to any government which engages in
a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights. The President is directed to advise the Congress of what such
extraordinary circumstances necessitate security assistance to such govern-
ments." This amendment puts us in the position of setting up abstract value
judgments on the human rights performance of friendly governments, and on
whether the level of our security assistance to them -- otherwise justifiable
in terms of our common defense and our bilateral relations -- should be
reduced or ended. In our view no nation, large or small, would respond to
such pressures in the way the Congress hopes.

A concrete example of the ineffectiveness and counterproductivity of such
legislation restrictions is the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to our Trade Act,
demanding explicit assurances on emigration from the Soviet Union in return
for most-favored-nation treatment and export credits. These demands trigger-
gered a Soviet rejection of our bilateral trade agreement, which has meant
that Western Europe and Japan are benefitting much more than we are from
the expansion of trade with the USSR. Meanwhile, fewer Jews have been
permitted to leave the Soviet Union.

We cannot claim, of course, that the Executive branch's discreet diplomatic
ways of communicating our values and interests to foreign governments will
produce the results desired by all Americans. No doubt Congressional restric-
tions have been attempted partly out of a sense of frustration at the failure
of such diplomatic efforts. Unfortunately, Congressional restrictions
inevitably appear to the countries concerned as insulting public ultimata
which their national pride obliges them to reject, and thus they often
make matters worse.

In my view, the more the Congress involves itself in foreign policy-making,
the more it will come to share the Executive branch's perception of the
limits of American influence on world affairs. For example, while human
rights are widely supported in the Congress, those countries that really
respect these freedoms are in a minority in the United Nations. This was
demonstrated in the recent abhorrent United Nations resolution declaring
Zionism to be a form of racism; our subsequent introduction of a resolution
calling for amnesty for all persons imprisoned for non-violent political
crimes; and its withdrawal after other nations loaded it up with pro-terrorist
amendments.

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PR 589

[LJ]

The world is a tough neighborhood, and while we must defend our interests and ideals, we must also realize the limits of our ability to make them prevail.

## The Government and the Public in Foreign Policy

If bipartisanship and comity on foreign policy issues is missing from Executive-Legislative relations, it is at least partly because we are in transition from the postwar and Cold War era and a foreign policy response backed by a public consensus, into a new era for which no consensus yet exists. In a pluralistic democracy such as ours, no foreign policy can long be successful unless its basic elements are sustained by such a consensus. This is because a policy supported by only one political party, one Administration, or Congress, is inherently limited in time and scope and cannot command the support of our friends and allies, or the respect of our potential adversaries.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's "Psephologic Summit" in September of this year, which brought together 10 top public opinion analysts, revealed what we already had suspected; that there is a decline in the importance attached by the public to foreign policy issues and a corresponding rise in preoccupation with domestic issues. This is natural, given our current economic circumstances, but there is the risk that the pendulum will swing too far. While in 1964 a public cross-section had named international issues as the five most important facing the United States, by 1974 the first foreign policy issue was ranked only seventeenth. That clearly is not reflective of the realities confronting our country today.

Other surveys cited during the testimony indicated a public desire for a more stringent definition of American national interests in world affairs, greater selectivity in the military commitments the United States makes, and a skittishness about situations which might call for the use of American forces. At the same time, the pollsters reported that there is a public awareness of international interdependence and a corresponding rejection of an isolationist posture for the United States in world affairs.

I cite these conclusions reached by the major pollsters, because I wish to suggest that the Department of State is listening very carefully to expressions of public opinion these days. As we enter a new era in our national experience -- one in which foreign policy is no longer really foreign, but increasingly a part of our everday life at home -- we need to have a much more precise and subtle sense of where our citizens stand, what they perceive their needs and interests to be, what they would like their foreign policy to accomplish. This we can only acquire through more intimate, more profound, more personal contact with the country whose interests we represent abroad.

Secretary Kissinger and I have tried to lead by example within the Department. He has taken time from a crushing schedule to visit 12 cities in this country over the past 10 months. My schedule, too, has been crowded with speeches and discussions with quite a cross-section of Americans.

On November 10, in Pittsburgh, Secretary Kissinger announced another experimental program in our effort to be more closely in tune with America -- a series of "town meetings" in five regional centers across the United States in which senior State Department policymakers will be present primarily to listen to the views of local citizens groups on four issues central to the future of our foreign policy.

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PR 589

We are making other efforts to develop and maintain contacts with special sectors of American society: academia, business, labor and so forth.

Our goal is to involve officers at every level in the Department in what I would call learning experiences in their own society.

Beyond what we can learn from such encounters, we hope to convey not only information about real foreign policy issues and our position on these issues, but the need for different ways of thinking about foreign policy than we have been accustomed to in our earlier period of isolationism, or our recent postwar, Cold-War period of internationalism.

-- First, most Americans have been historically indifferent to foreign affairs most of the time. Now we need to have a higher and most sustained level of public attention to foreign affairs.

-- Second, in the past we have allowed our foreign policy in certain areas to be dominated by special interest groups; in Latin America, by investors; in parts of Europe and the Middle East, by various American ethnic groups. Our foreign policy is now too important to us and to the world to allow it to be dominated by special interests. Thus we need a public which has an overall concept of the national interests and values and which resists particularism.

-- Third, we have tended to believe the American example was universally valid, and interpreted the actions and attitudes of other countries by our own standards. In a multi-polar and variegated world we need to develop more tolerance and understanding for peoples and governments whose situations and perceptions are so different from our own. The coming domestic and congressional degate on the Panama Canal Treaty will require such an effort by the American public, to understand Panamanian and Latin perceptions. Any treaty on strategic arms limitation will require an effort to understand Soviet security concerns as well as our own. Other complex international issues will require a similar empathy.

-- While American foreign policy, and public opinion thereon, has always had a high moral content, we must all learn to recognize that foreign policy issues involve our self-interest as well, and may have more than one moral dimension. To present the Cyprus issue as purely a matter of Turkish violation of Cypriot soil and American arms restrictions, for example, does not do justice to it. One must also consider the position of the Turkish Cypriots, who for many years believed they were a persecuted minority on the island, as well as the American and NATO military interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Finally, because of our traditional distaste for international involvement, followed by the more recent period of American pre-eminence, Americans have often been susceptible to calls for simplistic solutions to complex international problems. With greater public attention to foreign policy must come greater patience, an awareness of the intractability of many problems and a better understanding of apparent paradox and contradiction in our strategies and tactics. Americans need to understand, for example, why we must maintain a strong national defense and alliances in order to discourage any Soviet opportunism, while at the same time seeking agreements with the Soviet Union which would reduce military forces and tensions, would increase trade, and would create vested interest in cooperation; why we seek to improve our relations with the People's Republic of China while maintaining our diplomatic and military commitments to the Republic of China; why we seek to coordinate our actions on energy with the other

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industrialized democracies, and at the same time discuss energy problems
with OPEC and seek improved bilateral relations with individual OPEC
countries to give them a positive stake in our prosperity.

## Conclusion

Gentlemen, the vast changes sweeping the world require new responses from all of us -- the Administration and the Congress, the public and organizations such as the Union League of Philadelphia. We in the Administration know we must do our best to consult with the Congress and the public, exchange views, and search for consensus on the foreign policies we must follow and the role of each institution in formulating and implementing these policies. I thank the Union League of Philadelphia for this opportunity to talk to you, and I hope you will consider what role you can play in leading and adapting public opinion to the new foreign policy challenges we face.

Thank you.

* * * * *

UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/2254 (ES-V)

14 July 1967

Fifth emergency special session
Agenda item 5

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

without reference to a Main Committee (A/L.528/Rev.2)7

2254 (ES-V). <u>Measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem</u>

<u>The General Assembly,</u>

<u>Recalling</u> its resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,

<u>Having received</u> the report submitted by the Secretary-General, 1/

<u>Taking note with the deepest regret and concern</u> of the non-compliance by
Israel with resolution 2253 (ES-V),

1. <u>Deplores</u> the failure of Israel to implement General Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V);

2. <u>Reiterates</u> its call to Israel in that resolution to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;

3. <u>Requests</u> the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution.

<u>1554th plenary meeting,</u>
<u>14 July 1967.</u>

1/ A/6753 and S/8052.

67-16771

Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/2253 (ES-V)

5 July 1967

Without reference to a Main Committee (A/L.527/Rev.1)

2253 (ES-V). Measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City,

1. Considers that these measures are invalid;

2. Calls upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution not later than one week from its adoption.

1548th plenary meeting,
4 July 1967.

67-15896

UNITED· NATIONS

SECURITY

COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/252 (1968)

21 May 1968

RESOLUTION 252 (1968)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1426th meeting,
on 21 May 1968

The Security Council,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of
4 and 14 July 1967,

Having considered the letter (S/8560) of the Permanent Representative of
Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem and the report of the Secretary-General
(S/8146),

Having heard the statements made before the Council,

Noting that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions, Israel has
taken further measures and actions in contravention of those resolutions,

Bearing in mind the need to work for a just and lasting peace,

Reaffirming that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

1. Deplores the failure of Israel to comply with the General Assembly resolutions mentioned above;

2. Considers that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status;

3. Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution.

68-11751

147

regime" for Jerusalem. According to this partition plan (U.N.G.A. Resolution 181 (II), Pt. III), Jerusalem was to be administered by the Trusteeship Council, governed by a U.N-appointed governor, demilitarized, neutralized, and protected part of an economic union of Palestine involving the Jewish and Arab States. Freedom of press, religion, speech, confession, conscience, and access to the holy places was guaranteed. The scheduled inauguration of the international city was October 1, 1948, and after 10 years, a referendum was to be held in Jerusalem to approve modifications in the city's status. The first Arab-Israeli war began on May 15, 1948, and this international city was never formed.

Subsequent U.N. actions reaffirmed the provisions of the partition plan providing for the internationalization of Jerusalem. U.N. Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948, repeated in paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 the main points outlined in the partition plan. U.N. Resolution 303 (IV) of December 9, 1949, also restated the intention of the General Assembly to create a "corpus separatum" and requested the Trusteeship Council to prepare a statute for Jerusalem, a constitution for the international city.

The Trusteeship Council's statute for Jerusalem was presented to the General Assembly on June 14, 1950 (A/1286), in which the fait accompli was recognized giving Israel and Jordan sovereignty over those portions each held and leaving sovereignty of the religious shrines to the international regime. The Ad Hoc political committee debated the Trusteeship Council's report in December 1950, finally adopting a resolution which in effect rejected the statute's recognition of Jordanian and Israeli sovereignty and which sought the international regime called for in Resolution 181. But the Ad Hoc committee resolution failed to get a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly (30 in favor, 18 against, nine abstentions).

The debate over the legal status of Jerusalem at this point concerned two questions: first, did Resolution 303 instruct the Trusteeship Council to recognize Israeli and Jordanian control of the city or did the resolution tell the Trusteeship Council to create the international city envisioned in Resolution 181; and, second, should the United Nations insist on its "corpus separatum" even if this required force, or should the United Nations accept the Trusteeship Council's adjustments? Jordan and Israel rejected international control, each seeking to keep its half of the city. Other Arab States favored internationalization of Jerusalem.

Israel and Jordan annexed those portions of the city occupied by their forces in 1948-49, and left the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization in control of the no man's lands which served as buffer zones between the hostile forces. From 1949 until 1967, Jerusalem had a dual nature—in theory, an international city as described by the United Nations, but in practice two cities, one Jordanian and one Israeli. In 1967, Israel occupied the Jordanian part of Jerusalem and annexed it to the State of Israel (or to use the Israeli phrase, Jerusalem was "integrated").

On July 4, 1967, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 2253 (ES-V) calling upon Israel to rescind the law (Law of Administration Ordinance of June 26, 1967) which granted Israeli municipalities the right to expand their borders and extend their services and administrations into new areas: in effect, to annex territory. The U.N.G.A. passed a similar resolution, 2254 (ES-V), on July 14, 1967, again calling upon Israel to rescind the annexation of Jerusalem. The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 252 (1968) on May 21, 1968, which The U.N. Security Council resolution 267 (1969) of July 3, 1969, further condemned Israel for its failure to comply with the U.N. resolutions on Jerusalem, and Security Council Resolution 251 (1969) of September 15, 1969, repeated the condemnations, Resolution 298 (1971) of September 23, 1971, repeated the call to rescind all measures and actions that changed the status of Jerusalem. Security Council Resolution 279 (1976) of November 22, 1976, stated that it is "inadmissible" to acquire territory by force, a judgment which would apply to the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem.

In narrow international legal terms, it would appear that Jerusalem is an international city as described by Resolution 181, and reaffirmed several times since. There were conflicting votes in various United Nations bodies in 1950 whether to recognize Israeli and Jordanian sovereignty over parts of the city. A majority of the Ad Hoc Committee voted to reassess the statute's recognition of Israeli and Jordanian sovereignty, but the General Assembly, by failing to muster the two-thirds majority necessary, apparently supported the Trusteeship Council's recognition of the fait accompli. The votes in the General Assembly

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time, a warren of silent, medieval, narrow streets, the silence broken by transistor radios. One may dodge traffic in the new city, and one may wait for passing sheep in the old city. New Jerusalem strids toward the future; old Jerusalem rests on the continuum of history.

The foregoing description is not intended to denigrate either the new or the old, but to illustrate the differences in tempos, life styles, the attitudes of the people and towns in which they live, and the cultures they represent. In the whole of Jerusalem, there are two cities, one Arab and the other Israeli, each of which represents the best and the worst of their cultures, and each of which is separated from the other by a gulf of centuries, continents, and civilizations. Yet both exist together, each covered with a veneer of the other's presence. The two Jerusalems share more than geography; they will have to share the future; and they will have to make accommodations and compromises that will allow both to exist together.

A paradox of Jerusalem divided and unified is that most people concerned with the city have opposed its division, at least in principle, and now that it is united, want it to stay that way. The argument has been mainly over the form and the method of unification, the unilateral nature of the action by Israel, and the uncertainties of having religious shrines under the control of one state. Jordan is the one state most injured by the Israeli unification, since it is Jordanian nationalism and territory that have been lost. But restoring Jerusalem to the Jordanian status quo ante bellum is impossible, for too much has been changed under the Israelis. If there were guarantees beyond the Israeli word that shrines would remain open and not subject to change, and if Jordan could either be appeased or included in the administration of the city, it would appear likely that most Muslims and most Arabs could live with an Israeli Jerusalem.

The kaleidoscope of history presents Jerusalem in many guises: divided and unified; integrated and segregated; homogeneous and heterogeneous; slave and free; tolerant and persecuting; peaceful and wartorn; rich and poor; dependent and independent; exalted and abused. Often its status is obvious, and just as often its status is clouded with doubts of sovereignty, rights, and jurisdictions. Equally valid cases can be made that Jerusalem is divided or unified, or that it should be divided or unified. Jerusalem, as a point of controversy among religious, ethnic, or national communities, is as divided today as it has ever been and as unified today as it has ever been. The prospects for a reasonable accommodation free to maintain its multifaceted character, may rest on the capacity to compromise of the governments, the religious communities, and the people of Jerusalem.

VI. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD JERUSALEM

U.S. policy toward Jerusalem has undergone one change. The United States supported internationalization of the city prior to the 1948 war, but after the war supported functional or partial internationalization that would allow Israeli and Jordanian political rights in the city. The change amounted to a recognition of the political realities of the Israeli and Jordanian occupations, and apparently occurred during the deliberations of the Conciliation Commission. On October 24, 1948, President Truman said that U.S. policy would continue to follow the Democratic Party platform, which he quoted: "We continue to support, within the framework of the United Nations, the internationalization and protection of the holy places in Palestine." But when the Conciliation Commission proposed to the United Nations on September 1, 1949, that Jerusalem be divided into Israeli and Jordanian zones with a joint council to administer the city, the United States supported the proposal. The U.S. Representative stated in the debate that U.N. internationalization was not enforceable,¹⁰

An Australian resolution before the General Assembly in 1949 called for a strict adherence to the principle of internationalization. The resolution passed (303 of December 9, 1949), but the United States voted against the resolution, again, maintaining that it was unenforceable.¹¹

⁹ Presidential Papers, Truman, 1948, p. 844. The Democratic platform as adopted on July 14, 1948, read: "We continue to support, within the framework of the United Nations, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of the holy places in Palestine."

¹⁰ Kirk, George. The Middle East, 1945-50. Survey of International Affairs, London, Oxford University Press, 1951, p. 306.

¹¹ Stebbins, Richard. The United States in World Affairs, 1949. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1950, p. 410.

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One year later, the United States supported a Swedish resolution which would have recognized functional internationalization of certain holy places but left political control of Jerusalem to Israel and Jordan. U.S. Representative John C. Ross told the Ad hoc Committee that the United States was "considerably disappointed" that Jordan rejected the resolution because the Jordanians feared a loss of their political rights.¹² The United States suggested that internationalization would be an undemocratic denial of rights for the people of Jerusalem. The Swedish resolution lost, but a Belgian resolution calling for a four-man commission to study the Trusteeship Council's Statute for Jerusalem was passed by the Ad hoc Committee.¹³ The Belgian resolution did not receive the required two-thirds vote in the General Assembly.

Israel moved all its government offices except the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem in 1949 and 1950. When the Foreign Ministry moved to Jerusalem in 1953, the United States kept its Embassy in Tel Aviv. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said on July 28, 1953: "The United States regrets that the Israeli Government has seen fit to move its foreign office from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem".¹⁴ The Secretary said the action would be detrimental to the U.N. and its responsibility for an international city because the Israelis were making Jerusalem a national city. On June 1, 1953, Secretary Dulles had told a radio-television audience that Jerusalem was a universal holy city, as emphasized by U.N. resolutions to that effect, but he went on to say: "This does not necessarily exclude some political status in Jerusalem for Israel and Jordan".¹⁵ The Secretary's statement of June 1, 1953, reaffirms Jordanian and Israeli political rights in Jerusalem, but the statement of July 28, 1953, suggests that political status should not include the use of Jerusalem as a capital city.

When Jordan decided to make Jerusalem its second capital and began planning construction of governmental offices in Jerusalem, the State Department objected. An aide memoire delivered to the Jordanian Prime Minister on April 5, 1960, said in part: "The U.S. Government * * * cannot recognize or associate itself in any way with actions which confer upon Jerusalem the attributes of a seat of government of a sovereign state, and are thus inconsistent with [the] United Nations interests in the status of the city."¹⁶

The United States continues to oppose unilateral action affecting the status of Jerusalem. A White House statement of June 28, 1967, said that the United States would not recognize "hasty" unilateral actions by any party in the Jerusalem dispute. Secretary of State William Rogers said on December 9, 1969, that the United States opposed unilateral actions taken by Israel that changed Jerusalem's status. Secretary Rogers also reaffirmed the U.S. position that Jerusalem should be a unified city and that the special religions and cultural status of the city necessitated a special regime that would recognize the rights of political and religious communities in the city.

The United States abstained on the first five United Nations resolutions denning Israeli annexation but voted for the sixth resolution of September 25, 1971. It is not clear whether the U.S. vote on that resolution was an indication of a change in policy, or part of a tactical diplomatic maneuver necessary at the time. It was, in any case, a reversal of the usual hesitancy to condemn either Israel or Jordan. On the previous votes, the United States abstained because it believed that separating the Jerusalem problem from other Arab-Israeli issues would not contribute to an overall settlement.

In view of the American attempts in 1971 to arrange a partial settlement along the Suez Canal, perhaps the United States now believes that some issues can be handled separately, and has decided to support the U.N. position that Jerusalem should be considered independently from other issues. Another possible explanation for the change could be recent Israeli actions in Jerusalem, such as the plans to construct an apartment building complex in east Jerusalem, which the United States feels would drastically alter the character of the city. If that should be

¹² Documents on American Foreign Relations. Published for the World Peace Foundation. Princeton, 1950, vol. XII, p. 667.

¹³ The Trusteeship Council's Statute for Jerusalem recognized Israeli and Jordanian sovereignty in the city, and internationalized only holy places. The Belgian resolution, in effect, sought to rewrite the statute to bring about full internationalization. The United States abstained in the Trusteeship Council vote which approved the statute on Apr. 4, 1950.

¹⁴ Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 19, 1953, p. 177.

¹⁵ Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1953, p. 822.

¹⁶ Digest of International Law. Edited by Marjorie M. Whiteman. Department of State Publication 7403. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963, vol. 1, p. 594.

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the true explanation, the U.S. vote in September 1971 would be comparable to the Dulles statement in 1953 and the aide memoire of 1960 when the United States spoke out against what it believed were extreme actions.

As already noted, there has been a general hesitancy to condemn, at least publicly, the actions of Israel and Jordan in Jerusalem. This hesitancy could perhaps be attributable to a politically-motivated desire to remain aloof from the controversies within the American religious community over the future of Jerusalem. And since the Jerusalem issue, like all issues in the Arab-Israeli dispute, is charged with emotion, the government may be trying to avoid the dilemma of justifying its actions and policies through legal explanations to a populace generally unfamiliar with the problem except on an emotional level. Another possible explanation for the absence of either a direct American policy statement or a specific American plan for the future of Jerusalem is that both nations directly involved, Jordan and Israel, are friendly with the United States and there is little desire to injure that friendship unnecessarily. A final and perhaps most reasonable explanation is that if the United States is to work for a peace in the Arab-Israeli dispute and continue its role as a broker or mediator, it must remain flexible and uncommitted to any final solutions on the future of Jerusalem. U.S. policy opposes an imposed settlement and supports a peace worked out by the parties themselves, and the best solution to the Jerusalem problem will be one determined by the Arabs and Israelis, so long as it insures free access for all to the city.

## VII. ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE

As long as the contestants for Jerusalem base their rights to the city on historical claims supported by morality, there will be little progress toward a solution that will answer the demands and needs of all of the people, nations, and own control of Jerusalem by citing history and scripture. A settlement acceptable to all concerned will have to be one providing unrestricted access to the city and its holy places. To end the current animosity and prevent future violent changes in the city's status, it is imperative that an arrangement be found and implemented which will give the maximum amount of access to Jerusalem for all who would seek it.

There are any number of alternatives or combinations of alternatives which would answer most of the demands and solve most of the problems for control of and access to Jerusalem. Perhaps the greatest problem is finding a solution that will meet the national and religious needs of the local people—Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian, Jew, Christian, and Muslim—which will either diminish or region. At present, any solution which would reduce or nullify Israeli control over all of Jerusalem apparently is unacceptable to the Arabs. Any solution which does not give Palestinian or Jordanian Arabs either autonomy, or a role in the administration of Jerusalem, apparently is unacceptable to the Arabs. Any solution which makes religious communities dependent on the sufferance of political institutions apparently is unacceptable to the United Nations.

### The alternatives

(1) Status Quo Post 1967.—Israel would keep the annexed territory, would establish whatever controls or restrictions over access to the religious shrines it wanted, and would be allowed by the United Nations to make these unilateral decisions. The advantages of an Israeli Jerusalem are that the city would remain unified; all would enjoy free access to the holy places (if the Israeli state-ments to that effect are valid); and the administration of the city would be rela-tively uncomplicated as compared with some of the more complicated arrange-ments cited below. The disadvantages of an Israeli Jerusalem are that Arabs and Muslims do not accept Israeli control over their religious shrines and historical sites; the United Nations will be allowing a unilateral decision to stand contrary to a U.N. decision; there will be no international voice in the control or protec-tion of the shrines.

(2) Status Quo Ante Bellum.—The eastern sections of Jerusalem would be returned to Jordan (or to a Palestinian state, if one should be formed), and the city would be redivided generally along the lines that existed from 1949 to 1967. The new dividing lines could be drawn so as to include the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall of the old city in the Israeli sector. The redivision could either be physical (with barbed wire and no man's land), or it could be just the symbolic drawing of a line. Since few would want a return to the barriers, a sym-

78

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

LETTER DATED JUNE 1, 1971, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SYRIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Acting upon instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following.

The spiritual leaders, nine patriarchs and pastors, of all Christian communities in Syria, being greatly alarmed and profoundly distressed by the illegal measures the Israeli Zionist authorities are taking tozionize the Holy City of Jerusalem, and expell its Arab Christian and Moslem inhabitants in violation of Security Council decisions and General Assembly resolutions, adopted on 10 May "An appeal to Christian conscience". The text of the appeal is attached.

I shall be grateful if this letter and the attached appeal are circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

GEORGE J. TOMEH,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative.

AN APPEAL TO CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE

The events which are currently taking place in the city of Jerusalem are so grave that their dimensions and implications go beyond the local aspects to the framework of which biased propaganda is trying to confine them. Spiritually and morally, however, they are of the level of human civilization, which they are seriously threatening with destruction, as they are threatening the creative power of man.

The process of expelling the Christian and Moslem inhabitants of the city, their physical liquidation and their replacement by Jews—this process, in addition to being tragic and brutal, exceeds the political and demographic aspects of the subject.

Palestine, its human and land an unique

For century and religiout City was, al of the three to the work history and

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162

Kingdom and Northern Ireland, with the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, to determine the rights and claims of Moslems and Jews in connection with the Western or Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. December 1930. London, H.M.S.O., 1931.

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Samuel, Edwin, viscount. A lifetime in Jerusalem; the memoirs of the second Viscount Samuel. London, Abelard-Schuman, 1970. 335 p.

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Scotfield, John. Jerusalem; the divided city. National Geographic, v. 115, April 1959: 492-531.

Shalem, Diane. Jerusalem, spring 1968. Jerusalem, Jerusalem Municipality, 1968. 45 p.

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Shorter encyclopedia of Islam. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1961.

Smith, George Adam. Jerusalem: the topography, economics, and history from earliest times to A.D. 70. 2 vols. London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1908.

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Stevens, Georgiana G. Jerusalem—1968. Vista, v. 4, July–August 1968: 30-37.

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— Palestine Royal Commission report. Command 5479. London, H.M.S.O., 1937.

United Nations. General Assembly, Question of an international regime for the Jerusalem area and protection of the holy places. Official Records (V) supplement 9. Doc. A/1286. Lake Success, N.Y., 1950.

— Palestine Commission report to the General Assembly. Doc. A/532. Apr. 10, 1948.

— The situation on the Middle East. Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council Resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969), and 271 (1969) and General Assembly Resolution 2254 (ES-V). Doc. S/10124, or A/8282. Feb. 18, 1971.

— United Nations Special Committee on Palestine report to the General Assembly. Doc. A/364. 5 vols. 1947.

United Nations. Security Council. Armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan. Doc. S/1302/Rev.1. Apr. 3, 1949.

— Report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly Resolution 2254 (ES-V) relating to Jerusalem. Doc. S/8146, or A/6793. Sept. 12, 1967.

— Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council Resolution 298 (1971) of Sept. 25, 1971. Doc. S/10392. Nov. 19, 1971.

United Nations. Trusteeship Council. Statute for the city of Jerusalem. Doc. T/118/Rev. 2. Apr. 21, 1948.

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World Zionist Organization. Jerusalem. The Central Zionist Archives. Jerusalem, 1970. 31 p.

The Secretary
of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Speech

December 16, 1975

Paris, France

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

ENERGY, RAW MATERIALS, AND DEVELOPMENT:
THE SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Con-
ference on International Economic Cooperation.

The challenge of our time is to build a stable
and just international structure. This task has two
principal dimensions. There is the imperative of
peace—the more traditional problems of building
security, resolving conflicts, easing tensions. These
issues dominate the agenda of relations between
East and West. No less urgent is the imperative of
justice—the compelling requirements of global
economic progress and social advance. These are
now the major issues in the relationship between
North and South. They too carry the potential for
either conflict or order. Neither the goal of peace
nor that of social justice can be achieved in isola-
tion. We must succeed in both quests or we will
succeed in neither.

Social justice and economic progress are our
concerns at this conference. We meet here to
launch the dialogue that has been so often urged
and so long awaited. The convening of this meeting
should itself be a reason for hope. For we believe it
represents a commitment to the path of concilia-
tion. It demonstrates a recognition that consumer
and producer, industrial and agricultural, de-
veloped and developing, rich and poor must to-
gether address the challenges of the global econo-
my.

The United States will work with dedica-
tion and energy for a positive outcome. We will do
so in our own self-interest and in the interest of a
more just and prosperous community of nations.

We will do our utmost to help mobilize the world's
resources and the talents of men and women every-
where in the service of economic progress and
common well-being.

In the past 2 years we have all learned that no
nation or group of nations can solve its economic
problems in isolation. In a world which is be-
coming increasingly interdependent, we have
witnessed that inflation and recession affect us all.
We have seen that no country can achieve redress
by exporting its economic difficulties or by exact-
ing an exorbitant economic price from others.

But our deepest challenge is political. Eco-
nomic distress magnifies the problems of govern-
ment in all our countries, clouding the prospects of
social peace and democratic institutions. We have
seen that national economic problems thus become
international; they spawn clashes of interest and
protectionist pressures that strain the fabric of col-
laboration, even among traditional friends. We have
all come to understand that, if unresolved, the
competing claims of developed and developing,
consumers and producer, will thwart any effort to
build a stable and progressive international struc-
ture.

Our future depends now not on blind eco-
nomic forces but on choices that statesmen make.
The world's nations can struggle in national or
ideological contention—or they can acknowledge
their interdependence and act out of a sense of
community. The United States has chosen the path
of cooperation.

The United States, as the world's strongest

PR 612

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economy, has demonstrated its resilience: we are on the road to recovery. We might best survive any new round of economic warfare. But it is my country's conviction that tests of strength benefit no nation. The approach that we took at the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly in September reflects our vision of a more positive future.

The special session reached consensus on an impressive range of economic problems. This commitment to cooperation can become a benchmark in human affairs—if its spirit is carried forward. We owe our people solutions, not slogans. So let us set to work. Let us implement the consensus of the special session and take up its unfinished tasks. Let us make this conference a decisive step toward their achievement.

## The Road to This Conference

We are here because 2 years ago the international structure was gravely tested by a crisis in energy. No problem on the international agenda is more crucial to the world economy. As this conference demonstrates, it has led us to a much broader consideration of the range of related issues.

The unprecedented expansion of the global economy in the decades since World War II relied upon the plentiful supply of energy at reasonable prices. It produced economic growth, fostered industrialization, and encouraged development in every quarter of the globe.

Thus the energy crisis—caused by a combination of the 1973 embargo and the fivefold increase in the price of oil—has dealt a serious blow to global stability and prosperity.

Inflation, recession, and payments balances significantly worsened in all the industrialized world and in those developing nations which had realized substantial progress toward industrialization. The poorest of the developing countries, struggling to make modest steps toward progress, were dealt the cruelest blow of all. Their hopes for growth were—and continue to be—thwarted. Their development planning has been disrupted. Even their agricultural production has been undermined by the increased cost of petrochemical fertilizers. For the vast majority of the developing world economic justice was poorly served.

In response to the energy crisis, the United States sought first to reach a consensus among the industrialized nations. We worked together to as-

sure basic security against future arbitrary disruptions in oil supply and against potential oil-induced financial difficulties. We pledged ourselves to long-term cooperation in energy conservation and the development of alternative energy supplies. We agreed not to resort to protectionist measures, and we began unprecedented cooperation in our economic policies as dramatized by the recent economic summit in Rambouillet [November 15-17, 1975].

These actions were not taken in a spirit of confrontation. Most are prudent steps of self-protection which have effect only if confrontation is provoked by others. Others involve an urgent program for the development of alternative sources to the benefit of all.

But the collaboration of the industrial countries has always been conceived as only part of a larger program for economic progress. From the beginning, we have foreseen an effort to develop a constructive dialogue leading to close and mutually beneficial long-term economic ties with oil-producing nations—so that our investment and technical support would contribute to their development, and their prosperity would contribute to the worldwide expansion of trade and development. We recognize that the only durable basis for constructive relations is an economic system which fosters the prosperity of all. Each of us has a stake in the progress of others.

Last April, at the invitation of the President of France, we agreed to begin this discussion. The industrial nations wanted to focus on energy. The oil-producing and other developing nations wanted to give equal priority to a wider range of development issues, including prices and markets for other raw materials, and to international financial questions. The industrial nations regarded these issues as too varied and complex to be addressed effectively in a single forum. The April preparatory conference failed to reconcile these positions.

To demonstrate its desire for a constructive and cooperative solution the United States worked closely with other participants in developing a mutually satisfactory arrangement: energy, the concerns of the less developed countries about raw materials, development, and related financial matters would be addressed as part of a discussion of global economic problems, while maintaining enough distinction between them for a useful dialogue.

3

The United States is committed to a serious and wide-ranging program of cooperation with the developing world. My country understands full well, and has shown in its many proposals, that this dialogue must encompass issues of concern to all sides—including the needs of the many nations not in attendance here. For us, this clearly requires a discussion of the effects of energy prices on the world economy. For cooperation depends on mutual respect, mutual understanding, and mutual benefit.

To this end, at the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly 3 months ago, the United States made a series of proposals in several areas:

* To insure the economic security of developing countries against shortfalls in export earnings, food shortages, and natural disasters;

* To accelerate their economic growth by improving their access to capital markets, technology, and foreign investment;

* To better the conditions of trade and investment in key commodities on which many of their economies are dependent, and to set an example in the vital area of food;

* To improve the world trading system and make it better serve development goals, and realize through the multilateral trade negotiations a strengthening of developing country participation; and

* To address the especially urgent needs of the poorest countries devastated by current economic conditions.

The Seventh Special Session ended on a note of conciliation and cooperation. The spirit of the session was carried forward to the October preparatory conference in Paris where the declaration laid the basis for our meeting today.

This will be the attitude of the United States here. Progress has been made in many areas, and this conference must move us forward.

## The Work of the Commissions

The four commissions that this conference is establishing have much work before them:

* The Commission on Energy should promote an effective world balance between energy demand and supply. It should work for practical cooperation among industrialized and developing countries to develop new energy supplies. And it should lay the foundations of a mutually beneficial long-term relationship between energy producers and consumers.

* The Commission on Raw Materials should work to establish the conditions for stable, long-run supplies of raw materials vital to global progress at prices that are remunerative to producers and fair to consumers.

* The Commission on Development should strive to accelerate economic development in all nations, especially the poorest. In particular, it should bring together industrial nations and oil-wealthy nations to provide financial support for the development initiatives of the U.N. Special Session.

* The Commission on Finance should address financial issues as they relate to the work of the other three commissions. It should seek to strengthen the sense of shared financial responsibility for the health and growth of the international economy.

With a cooperative approach, the commissions can give direction and impetus to related activity in other forums and organizations, under whose jurisdiction a number of these issues fall. They can serve as clearing houses for information and motivate other organizations doing similar work. They can identify areas where necessary work is not being done, and devise new initiatives where needed.

The United States will support progress on a broad range of topics in the context of the four commissions. But we have a special interest in the following areas:

*First, the price of oil and the security of oil supply as they affect the international economy;

*Second, the serious balance-of-payments problems of developing countries;

*Third, the conditions of international investment;

*Fourth, the issues of key commodities, especially food;

*Fifth, the problems of trade; and

*Sixth, the urgent needs of the poorest countries.

Let me discuss each of these in turn.

4

## Energy

First, energy. The application of science and technology to tap the vast energy potential imprisoned beneath the earth, radiated by the sun, generated by the movement of wind and water across the earth's surface or locked in the core of matter, is fundamental to the hopes of millions to pull themselves above a bare struggle for existence. For the expansion of the global economy for both developed and developing countries depends heavily on our harnessing and efficiently employing the world's energy resources.

Some nations are particularly well endowed with these resources; some have the scientific and technological expertise to explore and utilize that potential. The international flow of energy, investment capital required to produce it, and goods produced from fuels have become in effect a global energy system which sustains all our economies. Only through international cooperation can all nations benefit from these processes and can the world economy harness its energy resources most effectively.

The United States is committed to a cooperative approach. We have much to offer. We have produced more energy than any other nation in the history of mankind; our energy science and technology are the most advanced and we have tremendous potential for future energy development in our country and abroad. The United States also has much to gain from cooperation. Our energy needs are the world's largest; our ability to raise living standards for all our citizens depends on greater energy production and the more efficient use of energy resources.

This dialogue and this conference have these tasks:

* First, it is time to reach a common evaluation of the relationship between changes in energy prices and the stability and performance of the world economy. The abrupt and arbitrary increase in the price of oil has been a major factor in rates of inflation and unemployment unprecedented since the 1930's. It has led to serious balance-of-payments deficits, indirectly through global recession and directly through higher-priced imports.

By extraordinary effort the industrial countries, on the whole, put their payments back in balance over the last year, although at a high cost to the well-being of their peoples. Thus the im-

mediate burden of the massive petrodollar deficit is now borne largely by the developing countries which have little or no oil resources.

Developing countries by definition tend to have less of a margin to reduce consumption, to restructure energy use, or to shift to alternative sources when the oil price rises. They are the most vulnerable—and the most wounded.

A lower oil price would make possible more rapid economic recovery around the globe. It would assist the developing countries by easing their enormous balance-of-payments burden and their debt burden, and increasing foreign demand for their exports. A lower price, along with stability of supply, would also benefit producer nations over the long term by easing the urgency for consuming countries to develop alternative supply sources.

Conversely, any further increase in prices would seriously hamper economic recovery, retard international trade, compound the internal difficulties of many countries, weaken the ability of the advanced nations to assist the developing, and strain the fabric of international cooperation.

It is time for a serious discussion of this issue. We are prepared to make a sustained effort to achieve understanding.

* Second, we must collaborate to find new sources of energy and intensify our conservation efforts. All consuming countries, developed and developing, must use energy more efficiently and develop more abundant supplies. Producers need to prepare their economies for the day when they will have exhausted their easily accessible oil reserves.

Individually, the industrialized countries are accelerating the development of their own energy sources. The United States is developing its conventional fuels and also new sources, including nuclear power, to replace fossil fuels. We have committed massive resources to research and devoted our best talents to this effort; we expect it to result in a substantial increase in U.S. energy production. In Europe, major efforts have been launched along the same lines, with the North Sea as the most dramatic example of the potential. The development of alternative energy sources is vital.

In the near future, the industrial countries will take the first steps toward welding these national programs into a coherent cooperative program. These programs are designed to promote

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5

conservation and to accelerate the development of alternative energy supplies through large-scale joint projects and cooperation in research and development. We will demonstrate our commitment to the maximum development of new energy by agreeing not to permit imported oil to be sold in our internal markets below a common minimum safeguard price.

This effort will bring a better balance to the world energy market. But as it gathers support, it will bring important benefits to developing as well as industrial countries. The programs that the industrial countries are undertaking, and those that many developing countries have within their potential to undertake, can lead to additional and more secure supplies of energy, which can be a spur to their prosperity and development. All nations will have access to a larger pool of energy resources, and there will be less competition for oil. The efforts of developing countries to increase their own production of energy, if supported, can be the single most important step they take to secure their development for future generations.

At the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly, the United States proposed an international energy institute. Through such an organization, the developed countries and OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries can assist poorer developing nations to utilize energy more efficiently, increase their own production, and improve allocation and distribution of existing resources. It could identify current or new energy technologies most relevant to their special needs. The institute can help oil-producing countries to improve the use of their own energy.

Using the most advanced techniques of analysis, the institute could help assess all countries' energy resources and requirements. Staffed by experts drawn from government, industry, and academic life in both industrialized and developing countries, it could provide training for local and regional technicians or specialists in energy problems. It could become a central point of contact where policymakers and experts could exchange ideas on plans and programs. We see the institute as a first bridge between the massive effort the industrialized countries have now launched to develop alternative sources of energy and the effort which the developing countries must now undertake.

In addition, the United States has suggested a number of other means by which the talents and

experience of the developed nations, collectively and individually, can assist developing states to find and exploit new energy sources and conserve their national patrimony. We will advance these proposals in the Energy Commission. We anticipate a full exchange of views on their scope and substance.

Oil producers and nations with the technology to help develop oil resources share an interest in cooperation on conservation and exploration. But this cooperation will be easier to forge in a stable energy market with a more appropriate structure of energy prices.

● Third, the United States seeks a greater participation and contribution of the oil-producing countries in the international economy. With the extraordinary transfer of wealth that has taken place, it is in the common interest that the oil-producing nations be constructive members—not challengers—of the world economic system; that investment and the latest technology be made available to them on a reimbursable basis for their development programs; and that the flow of goods and services be enhanced between producing and consuming countries.

We believe that these three issues—a better understanding of the effects of oil price increases on the world economy, cooperation on conservation and new production, and the orderly integration of OPEC economies into the global economy—are priority tasks for the energy forum.

## Balance of Payments

The balance-of-payments problems of developing countries are an immediate and urgent task for this conference to address, closely related to the energy issue. Current projections indicate that the developing world in 1976 will be collectively in deficit by about $35 billion. Bilateral and multilateral aid, along with direct investment, will finance roughly $25 billion of this. The question is whether borrowing from international capital markets can again this year make up the remainder. If not, some countries will be forced to reduce imports, cut back development programs, and further mortgage their future. The deficits of the developing countries thus could endanger not only their own well-being but also the stability of the

6

international trade and financial system.

A multitude of ideas and proposals are al-
ready before us. Let us address steps that can be
taken now.

* First, the members of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] should promptly agree on the details of the trust fund which the United States has proposed to furnish concessional financing for the poorest countries. It would provide these countries additional resources of $1-$2 billion a year, using the profits from IMF gold sales as well as national contributions. We are well on the way to resolving outstanding issues on IMF gold; let us take final action on the trust fund in January.

* Second, the members of the IMF should complete negotiations next month on the new development security facility. The United States made this major proposal to provide more substantial financing to countries facing temporary shortfalls in export earnings due to the world business cycle or commodity fluctuations. We proposed this on September 1; its realization in January would be an impressive demonstration of international resolve and responsiveness.

* Third, the IMF should approve on one-third increase in member quotas, thus expanding its potential financing for all members.

Final approval can and must be taken on each of these proposals at the meeting of the IMF Interim Committee in Jamaica in early January. Together with substantial unused regular drawings still available to developing countries, these measures will add significantly to the capacity of developing countries to sustain their needed imports and their development programs. But however substantial these facilities, they may not be enough. Once the trust fund and these other proposals have been implemented in January, we must determine how best to respond to the remaining balance-of-payments problems of the developing countries.

The United States is committed to finding a constructive solution. Our specific response will depend in part on whether there is a general across-the-board financing problem or one concentrating on a few countries. One promising approach would be to expand the credit that developing countries can draw from the IMF by liberalizing the rules governing access to regular IMF resources. The IMF

Board could, for example, increase the size of each credit drawing, base them on expanded new quotas, or add a new drawing beyond those now available. Decisions on such proposals will need to be based on close analysis of their effect on the financial integrity of the IMF. Secretary [of the Treasury William E.] Simon will present our analysis and proposals for increased use of the IMF at the Interim Committee meeting.

We cannot emphasize enough the need for immediate action in this area to supplement the long-term proposals which have already been made. The responsibility does not lie with the industrialized countries alone. We cannot be expected to bear the major burdens for remedying balance-of-payments problems in which the actions of others play such a significant role. There is a collective obligation to act; there must be a joint program involving the industrialized, as well as the oil-producing, countries.

Investment and Technology for Development

The balance-of-payments deficits of the devel-
oping countries will perhaps moderate as the global
economy recovers from recession. But sustained
economic growth requires the continuous applica-
tion of capital, technology, and management skills
to development needs.

Private investment has always been a major factor in the growth of the global economy. My own country has benefited from foreign investment throughout its history. Today more than ever the developing countries need this capital in addition to the limited supply of official development assistance.

To make this possible, governments of devel-
oping countries need better access to world capital
markets. The United States has urged that tech-
nical assistance and expertise be provided to devel-
oping countries that are ready to enter long-term
private capital markets for the first time. We have
proposed a major expansion of the resources of the
World Bank's International Finance Corporation
[IFC] to strengthen the private sector in devel-
oping countries and to enhance their international
competitiveness for private capital. We have recom-
mended creation of an international investment
trust to mobilize private portfolio capital for in-
vestment in local enterprises. And we are contri-
buting to the work of the IMF/World Bank
Development Committee to assist in removing

7

impediments to developing countries' access to
capital markets.

But we also believe that one of the most
important vehicles for transferring capital, tech-
nology, and management skills to where they are
most needed is private enterprise. There simply is
not enough governmental capital available. Because
of ideological considerations, these private enter-
prises operate in an investment climate increasingly
clouded by unpredictable national legislation and
uncertain rules of the game. In this environment
everybody suffers. Host countries are deprived of
the capital resources, technology, and management
which these enterprises uniquely provide, as well as
a source of tax revenue. Home countries are de-
prived of the overseas markets, investment income,
and the new ideas and techniques which come with
foreign contact. And the enterprises themselves are
squeezed at both ends, making overseas investment
less worthwhile for them and reducing their contri-
bution to home and host country alike and to the
global product.

The United States has taken an active part in
international efforts to facilitate international in-
vestment on a basis that serves the interests of all
parties. We are willing to explore voluntary guide-
lines for the behavior of both transnational
enterprises and governments. At the United
Nations I stated four basic principles that should
be included:

* Transnational enterprises must obey local law and refrain from unlawful intervention in the domestic affairs of host countries.

* Host governments must treat these enterprises equitably, without discrimination among them, and in accordance with international law.

* Both governments and businesses must respect the contractual obligations they freely undertake.

* Principles for transnational enterprises should apply to domestic enterprises where relevant.

But efforts should not be limited to general
guidelines for investment. Other remedial measures
are possible.

Taxation is one such area. Because they
operate in multiple jurisdictions, transnational
enterprises may sometimes be subject to either
double taxation or inappropriate tax incentives.
The result in either case is that investment patterns

are distorted. We must find ways to enable both
host and home countries to coordinate their tax
policies and make them more equitable to each
other and to productive enterprises.

A second area for improvement is inter-
governmental consultation on investment disputes.
This is especially important to developing countries
whose progress is dependent on a climate con-
ductive to an adequate flow of investment. It is
time to develop generally accepted international
rules for the settlement of investment disputes and
the arbitration of differences and other guidelines
for dealing with problems arising between govern-
ments and enterprises. The United States recom-
mends that the World Bank's International Center
for Settlement of Investment Disputes be given a
greater role in solving important investment
controversies.

International assistance for development must
also focus on the advancement, selection, and
application of modern technology. Many countries
in the developing world are already on the path of
industrialization. They have proved their capacity
to take advantage of the vast storehouse of modern
technology. The United States encourages this en-
deavor. We have long been in the forefront of the
effort to train more managers, technicians, and re-
searchers in the developing countries to carry this
forward.

Most technology transfer takes place through
international investment and the operations of
transnational enterprises on a licensing, equity, or
contract basis. The United States understands the
concern of many developing countries not to
become the repository of obsolescent technology.
Technology must be suited to local needs, the
terms and conditions must be mutually acceptable,
and it must be effectively managed and utilized.
Developing countries must be enabled to make
their own informed choices of foreign or domestic
technology, to adapt it to their own needs and
conditions, and to manage its application skillfully.
This technology transfer requires the development
of human capabilities—the management and skills
that constitute the infrastructure of technological
development.

People—their training and their placement in a
country's management systems—are the key to
making technology a producing resource. Inter-
national cooperation can make no greater contri-
bution to development than to foster the training

8

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of a corps of specialists in each country competent to select, bargain for, and manage technologies. We see this requirement as an important topic for consideration by the Commission on Development, and we will make concrete proposals to this end.

## Commodities

A healthy global economy requires that both producers and consumers find protection against the cycle of raw materials surplus and shortage which chokes growth and disrupts planning. We must insure more reliable supplies of vital commodities on terms fair to all.

The problem is most urgent in food, mankind's most critical need. The cycles of feast and famine, widely fluctuating prices of basic foodstuffs, and breakdowns in the system of storage and transportation continue to afflict mankind. These show few signs of abating. And in the long run, growth in demand for food threatens to outrun the expansion of supply.

As the world's largest producer and exporter of food, the United States recognizes its special responsibility: At home, we have been committed to policies of maximum food production and have removed all production restraints; internationally, we have proposed a system of grain reserves to help moderate fluctuations in world prices and supplies.

We believe that our grain reserves proposal can be a model for cooperation on other commodity problems. It takes into account the interests of producers and consumers. It makes special provision for the concerns of developing countries. Its reliance on buffer stocks minimizes the distortion of trade and improves the efficiency of the market. We now await the cooperation and commitment of others to help implement this proposal.

Most importantly, we are increasing our assistance to developing countries—not merely for short-term relief, but to help them boost their own agricultural production. Our bilateral aid programs in this area have been expanded greatly. We also strongly support the proposal first made by oil-exporting countries for an international fund for agricultural development. We have announced our willingness to make a contribution of $200 million, or one-fifth of the worldwide goal of $1 billion.

Other commodities are of critical importance

to many countries, either as producers or consumers. Many developing countries depend crucially on earnings from commodity exports to lift their people above subsistence levels, to support basic social programs, and to finance the beginnings of industrialization. The solution to commodity issues will affect not only the developing countries, but also the industrial countries—who are in fact the largest producers, consumers, and exporters of commodities. The economies of all countries are affected by the instabilities of the market—the vulnerability of agricultural commodities to the vagaries of weather and shifts in world demand; the sensitivity of agricultural and mineral markets to fluctuations in the business cycle in industrial countries; and the higher prices of critical energy imports.

At the Seventh Special Session a consensus was achieved that commodity issues should be approached cooperatively. The U.S. position is that a realistic and constructive approach will require that we:

* Establish producer-consumer forums for discussions of key commodities;

* Reduce obstacles to producers' access to markets and to consumers' access to supplies;

* Rely more on buffer stocks, where feasible and necessary, in preference to restrictions on trade and production;

* Improve the productivity and marketability of agricultural raw materials; and

* Expand worldwide production capacity in other key commodities.

We now stand ready to cooperate in establishing producer-consumer forums and discuss copper, bauxite, and other commodities. We plan to address the question of supply and market access in the multilateral trade negotiations [MTN] in the next several months. We have proposed that the IFC and the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] make available increased financing for mineral development and look forward to progress in the near future. We plan to support the U.N. Revolving Fund for National Resources Exploration. Finally, we have proposed establishment of an organization to finance and coordinate research on nonfood tropi-

9

cal products to improve their productivity and
competitiveness.

We look forward to additional discussion of
these measures in the Raw Materials Commission
of this conference.

Trade

An expanding and more open international
trading system is a principal factor in the growth
and development of both developed and develop-
ing nations. We are committed to the strengthening
of this system so it can better serve the needs of
the international community and include, impor-
tantly, the developing nations.

Trade enables nations to earn their own way.
It is the most consistent with national dignity and
with the efficiency of the economic system.

Over the last 5 years, in a major step of inter-
national cooperation, all the major industrial na-
tions have committed themselves to establish a
generalized system of tariff preferences, giving de-
veloping countries better access to the markets of
all industrial nations.

The United States will implement its general-
ized system of preferences in 2 weeks' time. Under
this system we will eliminate duties on 2,724 tariff
items, representing some 19 percent of dutiable
non-oil imports from eligible countries in 1974.
This will open up significant potential new markets
for the products of developing countries in the
United States.

Tropical products are a promising area of ex-
port expansion for many developing countries. The
international trading system should encourage this
expansion. In the multilateral trade negotiations in
Geneva, work is beginning on a package of tariff
concessions on tropical products for early imple-
mentation. We attach much importance to this ef-
fort.

Tariff escalation—the process by which tariffs
are progressively increased on goods as they move
higher on the ladder of processing—is an obstacle
to the exports and industrialization of many de-
veloping countries. At the U.N. Special Session we
proposed that reduction, or in some cases elimina-
tion, of tariff escalation be an important goal for
the multilateral trade negotiations. The effort to
identify and negotiate specific changes will begin
next year.

This effort, however, is related in our view to
the issue of access to supply of raw materials. Con-
sumers cannot be expected to improve access to
their markets for finished products if they face re-
strictions on supplies of related raw materials. Thus
the Geneva negotiations must also improve access
to supply as well as access to markets.

Reducing or eliminating nontariff barriers to
trade is another major task facing the international
trading community. We will make a particular ef-
fort to negotiate special and differential treatment
for developing countries in this area.

An improved and strengthened world trading
system would not be complete, however, if it did
not insure greater sharing by developing countries
of both benefits and responsibilities. Developing
countries should gradually take on the normal obli-
gations of reciprocity and trade rules as they
progress.

The multilateral trade negotiations are the
most effective forum for pursuing all these objec-
tives.

The United States put forward proposals in
many of these areas at the recent meeting of the
Trade Negotiations Committee in Geneva as goals
for 1976. The developing countries will also bene-
fit from progress in all other areas of the negotia-
tions, which we now hope will be completed in
1977.

The United States is committed to a role of
leadership in the multilateral trade negotiations.
We will seek rapid progress for the benefit of both
developing and developed countries. I believe that
this conference and its relevant commissions
should endorse the work of the MTN. It should
provide continued support for the negotiations by
monitoring and contributing ideas to the work in
Geneva.

Global Poverty

Our deliberations here must address the plight
of the one-quarter of mankind whose lives are over-
whelmed by poverty and hunger and numbed by
insecurity and despair. This group has suffered im-
measurably from high prices of food and fuel.
Their export revenues have been seriously under-
mined by global recession.

In these regions less than one person in five is
literate; one baby in 10 dies in childhood, and in

10

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some areas closer to one out of two; life expectancy is less than 50 years; and birth rates continue to be intolerably high. Public expenditures for education and health care are low—and their per capita income has been declining for the last 4 years.

And so today, alongside the Third World with its increasing power and assertiveness, there has come into being a fourth world, where human beings still struggle for bare existence.

In one international conference after another, we have all pointed to the fourth world with sincere intentions of giving immediate help, providing long-term assistance, and devising special arrangements. We have agreed that this is a major test of a just international structure. It is time for all of us here to act on our words. Three areas need immediate action.

* First, many of the poorest cannot finance balance-of-payments deficits because they cannot gain access to capital markets or because of high interest rates on what little finance they can obtain. The trust fund which the United States proposed in the IMF to provide up to $2 billion for emergency relief is of special benefit to them. Let us reach a consensus to create this trust fund at next month's IMF meeting in Jamaica.

* The second area for immediate action is food aid. No obligation is more basic than our insuring that the poorest are fed. This fiscal year the United States expects to provide more than 6 million tons of food aid—or more than 60 percent of the 10 million ton global target set by the World Food Conference and a 20 percent increase over last year's contribution. Others must donate their fair share.

* Third, the poorest countries need preferential and expanded access to official concessionary financial aid. The United States will do its part. More than 70 percent of our bilateral development assistance now goes to low-income countries. The concessional financing of the international financial institutions should also be expanded. At the Seventh Special Session, my government pledged to support the fifth IDA [International Development Association] replenishment and the regional development banks. We are making every effort to secure congressional appropriations for funds already committed. We hope that the traditional and

new donors will help the poorest through financial contributions to both bilateral and multilateral programs.

Let us urgently rededicate ourselves to action on behalf of the poorest among us. Such action is the responsibility of the entire world community—not just the industrial countries, but also the more affluent in the developing world. While no one commission will be dealing with the totality of problems of the fourth world, each commission has a responsibility to be conscious of the need for special consideration for the poorest.

## Conclusion

The nations and economies of the world are many; our differences are great. But our reasons for pulling together are far greater. Therefore our dialogue here must be candid but with a positive spirit and cooperative attitude. The prosperity, the progress, and indeed the security of the world may depend upon whether we succeed in finding realistic answers to the kinds of problems before us at this conference. For lasting peace around the globe will depend not only on containing conflict, but mounting progress. It requires not merely the preservation of stability, but the fulfillment of human aspirations.

The issues we face are often technical, but their implications could not be more profound. They go to the heart of our future. Only rarely in history does mankind consciously swing out from familiar, well-marked paths to move in new directions. Only rarely does humanity comprehend as clearly as we do today that change is imminent and that the direction to be taken is subject to human decision. The nations of the world face such an opportunity now.

We have the possibility of forging international relationships that will govern world affairs for the next several decades. We can bring together developed and developing, producer and consumer, in common endeavors—or we can go our separate ways, with every one of us paying the price for a lack of vision in lower standards of living and increased international tensions. Mutual interest should bring us together; only blindness can keep us apart.

The American people have always believed in

3. Demands the withdrawal without further delay of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus, and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs;

4. Calls upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to facilitate the voluntary return of all refugees to their homes in safety and to settle all other aspects of the refugee problem;

5. Calls for the immediate resumption in a meaningful and constructive manner of the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, to be conducted freely on an equal footing with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement based on their fundamental and legitimate rights;

6. Urges all parties to refrain from unilateral actions in contravention of resolution 3212 (XXIX), including changes in the demographic structure of Cyprus;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his role in the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities;

8. Also requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of the Security Council and to report on its implementation as soon as appropriate and not later than 31 March 1976;

9. Calls upon all parties to continue to co-operate fully with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus;

10. Decides to remain seized of this question.

## U.S. Supports Continuation of U.N. Force in Cyprus

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on December 13, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.

## STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER

USUN press release 186 dated December 13

In the consultations which have preceded this meeting, the United States has stressed two views.

First, we agree with the Secretary-General that the renewal of UNFICYP [U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus] is essential. UNFICYP remains a vital factor in the preservation of stability on the island. With-

out stability the direct negotiations between the parties, which we consider indispensable, cannot be expected to progress.

Secondly, we recognize that the agreement of the concerned parties to the resolution by which UNFICYP is renewed is important both to those negotiations and to the continuance of UNFICYP's effectiveness.

We are accordingly particularly pleased that in the course of the long and skillful consultations conducted by the Security Council President and the Secretary General, the parties most directly concerned, whatever their difficulties, have accepted the resolution which we have just adopted. We urge that this spirit be continued and that the parties will not only provide effective cooperation with UNFICYP in Cyprus but also will contribute to the speedy resumption and progress of the intercommunal negotiations.

We have had occasion to remark here before that the question of Cyprus is one which has placed particularly great demands upon the time and resources of the United Nations. The arduous consultations which have preceded this meeting have now given the members of this Council a direct experience of the nature of the extended efforts which the Secretary General has repeatedly made to further understanding and negotiations among the parties.

Speaking from our own experience, I would like to say once again that the United States deeply appreciates the skillful and painstaking thought and action which the Secretary General has given to this issue. He has our full support for the further actions which he has informed the Council that he intends to take.

In this connection, I wish also to reaffirm the respect and admiration which my government feels for the dedication and galaxy of the commander and men of UNFICYP. As the Secretary General's report makes unmistakably clear, the operations of the Force in all parts of Cyprus have again done honor to the high tradition and standing of U.N. peacekeeping.

We leave this debate with a renewed sense that the unstinted response which so many

January 12, 1976

65

in the United Nations have made to the re-
quirements of the Cyprus problem now
places a compelling obligation on members—
and most especially upon the immediate
parties—to progress rapidly toward its solu-
tion. On this matter, our organization has
done everything, and more, that could rea-
sonably be asked of it. Those who have so
benefited by its work can now fairly be
asked to repay its efforts with their own.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹

The Security Council,

Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 8 December 1975 (S/11900 and Add.1) that in existing circumstances the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed not only to maintain the cease-fire but also to facilitate the continued search for a peaceful settlement,

Noting from the report the conditions prevailing
in the island,

Noting further that, in paragraph 68 of his report, the Secretary-General has expressed the view that in the present circumstances the best available means of making progress towards a settlement is through continued talks between the representatives of the two communities and that such talks can only be fruitful if the interlocutors are ready and authorized to engage in meaningful negotiations on all essential aspects of a settlement of the Cyprus problem,

Noting also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed
that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island
it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond
15 December 1975,

Noting that General Assembly resolution 3395 (XXX) of 20 November 1975 reaffirmed the urgent need for continued efforts for the effective implementation in all its parts of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) of 1 November 1974 which was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974,

1. Reaffirms the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, as well as subsequent resolutions and decisions on the establishment and maintenance of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus;

in Cyprus;

2. Reaffirms its resolutions 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974 and 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975 and calls for their urgent and effective implementation;

3. Urges the parties concerned to act with the ut-
most restraint and to continue and accelerate deter-
mined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives
of the Security Council;

4. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1976 in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force;

5. Appeals again to all parties concerned to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in its continuing performance of its duties;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the mission of good offices entrusted to him by paragraph 6 of resolution 367 (1975), to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report not later than 31 March 1976.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Poland Sign
New Fisheries Agreement

Press release 613 (Corr.) dated December 16

The United States and Poland signed on
December 16 in Washington a new fisheries
agreement concerning Polish fishing off the
Pacific coast of the United States.

The new agreement is the first bilateral
transition agreement in implementation of
the new U.S. fisheries initiative. The U.S.
fisheries initiative was announced by Secre-
tary Kissinger in a speech to the American
Bar Association Convention in Montreal,
Canada, last August. The Secretary described
proposals in Congress to establish a 200-mile
fishing zone by unilateral action as "ex-
tremely dangerous" and incompatible with
efforts to solve fisheries problems in the
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea.

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/383 (1975); adopted by the Council on Dec. 13 by a vote of 14–0, with the People’s Republic of China not participating in the vote.

66

Department of State Bulletin

THE CONGRESS

First Progress Report on Cyprus
Submitted to the Congress

*Message From President Ford* ¹

*To the Congress of the United States:*

I am submitting, pursuant to Public Law 94-104, the first of a series of reports on efforts this Administration is making to help resolve the Cyprus problem. Subsequent progress reports, as required by this legislation, will be forwarded to you at sixty-day intervals.

In his speech before the U.N. General Assembly on September 25 [22], 1975, the Secretary of State outlined the Administration's policy on the complex Cyprus problem as follows:

The details of a Cyprus settlement are for the two communities themselves to decide. However, in keeping with U.N. resolutions which the United States has fully supported, the following principles are essential:

A settlement must preserve the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

It must insure that both the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot communities can live in freedom and have a large voice in their own affairs;

The present dividing lines cannot be permanent. There must be agreed territorial arrangements which reflect the economic requirements of the Greek-Cypriot community and take account of its self-respect;

There must be provisions for the withdrawal of foreign military forces other than those present under the authority of international agreements; and,

There must be security for all Cypriots; the needs and wishes of the refugees who have been the principal victims and whose tragic plight touches us all must be dealt with speedily and with compassion.

These elements, which we consider essential to a settlement, are consistent with the aspirations of the overwhelming majority

of the people of Cyprus. Beyond that, only the Cypriot people can decide how to rebuild and preserve their sovereign, independent nation so it may again serve the interests of all its citizens.

With this appreciation of both the opportunities and limitations of U.S. action, I declared immediately following enactment of P.L. 94-104 on October 6 that the United States would make a major effort to encourage a resumption of the Cyprus negotiations and to facilitate progress by all the parties involved—Greece, Turkey and Cyprus—toward a peaceful and equitable solution. I also stated that the United States would undertake whatever role the parties themselves wanted us to play in achieving a settlement.

Immediately thereafter, we took a number of steps through diplomatic channels aimed at helping the parties find a basis for resuming the intercommunal talks under the aegis of U.N. Secretary General Waldheim. As a first step, I wrote directly to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey to stress the importance the United States attaches to the resumption of the intercommunal Cyprus talks and to emphasize our wish that the Cyprus problem be removed as a source of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean. My letters were followed by a series of communications from Secretary Kissinger to the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey and to President Makarios of Cyprus. In each of these communications, an effort was made to define the differences as we saw them between the negotiating positions of the other parties and to urge that an effort be made to narrow the gap.

The Secretary of State, during the past sixty days, also has consulted extensively with several of our major European allies who have engaged in corresponding and complementary initiatives with the Greek,

¹ Transmitted on Dec. 8 (text from White House press release).

January 12, 1976

59

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Turkish and Cypriot governments. Parallel initiatives also were undertaken during this period by the European Community.

These initiatives have not produced a major breakthrough; but taken together they have advanced prospects for a negotiated settlement. A new appreciation now exists in Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia that delay in resuming the intercommunal talks will harden attitudes and make future progress more difficult. In each capital, there is a desire to begin anew an earnest search for a solution. Each party also has a realistic understanding of what it must do to make progress possible.

In Ankara, the Turkish Foreign Minister announced on October 21, shortly after the Turkish senatorial elections, that the time was opportune to search for a solution and that all aspects for a settlement could be discussed at the intercommunal talks. Turkey has also indicated that it would encourage the Turkish Cypriots to engage in meaningful negotiations within the intercommunal framework. There is also a recognition in Ankara that a discussion of their position on territory is essential once the intercommunal talks have been resumed and that troop reductions as well as steps to resolve the refugee issue are essential ingredients to any Cyprus settlement.

Similar meaningful changes have occurred in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot negotiating positions with respect to such subjects as the organization of the future central government and the division of responsibilities and delegation of authority to the future regional administrations.

In sum, we have seen, as have our principal Western allies, a narrowing of differences on most of the key issues necessary to negotiate a Cyprus solution. The range of disagreement between the parties now seems to us surmountable. Under such circumstances, it should have been possible in November to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. However, once a date had been scheduled in New York for the Cyprus debate at the U.N. General Assembly, the parties felt

compelled to await the outcome before sitting down with the U.N. Secretary General to resume actual negotiations.

Now that the United Nations has completed its consideration of the Cyprus question and passed a new resolution calling for intercommunal negotiations, efforts to schedule new talks are underway. We have consulted U.N. Secretary General Waldheim and the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. Our common interest is to have renewed negotiations of sufficient depth and duration to allow full discussion of all key substantive issues. There is every reason to believe this kind of negotiation will begin in the very near future. To facilitate this effort, I have asked the Secretary of State to give special emphasis to the subject of Cyprus negotiations when he meets with the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers during the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels in the second week of December.

We now find ourselves at an important juncture in the search for a Cyprus settlement. The negotiating framework which has emerged finally should allow early and orderly discussion of the most serious substantive issues, including refugees which hold the key to a final settlement. We have succeeded in moving to this point in large part because, since early October, the United States has been free to resume an active, evenhanded role among all the parties. The outcome of the resumed Cyprus negotiations may depend upon our ability to maintain this role in the months ahead.

An important beginning has been made in the past sixty days toward the elusive goal of a peaceful, equitable, and enduring Cyprus solution. In the days ahead, I believe our efforts will bring results if we continue to have the support and understanding of the Congress. I intend to review with you in subsequent reports the progress that has been made in the common quest to restore peace and stability to the island of Cyprus.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, December 8, 1975.

60

Department of State Bulletin

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could expand a bit, amplify this extreme concern the United States has over Angola. Why is this situation so different? You referred to distance, but after all the Soviet Union has massively armed many countries in the world and I don't remember this type of strong talk from the United States. What is it about Angola—

Secretary Kissinger: Should I point out again to you, ladies and gentlemen, that this was a NATO meeting? You may have received certain briefings yesterday. The subject was not Angola. The subject was the Western alliance, and while I am glad to answer questions on Angola, I want to point out that it is being raised by you, ladies and gentlemen, much more acutely than it was raised by us.

Q. This has continued as a process now of several weeks where the United States has been extremely concerned publicly.

Secretary Kissinger: It makes a difference whether the Soviet Union is arming a country or whether it is arming a faction in a country. It makes a difference whether the Soviet Union is operating in an area of traditional relationships or whether it is attempting to establish a new pattern of dominance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the last time you attended a NATO meeting, just before it you expressed your conviction that Portugal would not easily remain a member of the alliance because it was going Communist. What is your assessment now? What has been Soviet behavior with respect to Portugal, and what does that mean in terms of Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: I hope that the non-American members here noted the single-mindedness with which the American press pursues its obsessions. Now, first let me make clear I did not say the last time that Portugal could not easily remain a member of NATO because it was going Communist. I said it the other way around. I said if Portugal went Communist, it could not easily remain a member of NATO.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you didn't answer about the Soviet Union's role in Portugal.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the Soviet Union's role in Portugal is not as acute as its role in Angola.

Q. Will the U.S. bases in Turkey reopen? And when? And to what extent do you consider them inoperative ever since they were closed?

Secretary Kissinger: Closed bases are generally inoperative. But I had a very good talk with the Foreign Minister of Turkey this morning. I expect that the negotiations about the bases will soon be given a new impetus, and I have invited the Foreign Minister to come to Washington by the end of January. I hope that we will be able to conclude the negotiations by then.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I assume that you mentioned the Middle East in your discussion. If this is correct, are you happy about the state of affairs in the Middle East now as a result of your step-by-step diplomacy? Isn't there any change of heart from the part of the United States regarding the Palestinians and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] to accelerate the process of peace in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think the Middle East was designed to inspire happiness, and therefore I cannot say I have reached that state of contentment with it.

January 12, 1976

55

Q. Do they have to recognize Israel before Israel recognizes them, or must this come simultaneously? For you cannot ask the Palestinians. It's fair enough that both of them recognize each other at the same time, isn't it?

Secretary Kissinger: It is in the context that the United States can look at its position, but not under present circumstances—in the context that I have given.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that the stands of Greece and Turkey are more conciliatory now for the solution of the problems between the two countries and that of Cyprus?

Secretary Kissinger: Having talked to the Foreign Ministers of both Greece and Turkey, I have the impression that the conditions for a resumption of the communal talks are good. Of course, they will meet each other this afternoon, and it would be a rash man who would predict what happens when an actual interaction occurs between Greek and Turkish representatives.

My impression is that the conditions for a resumption of communal talks are good and that both Foreign Ministers recognize the importance of making rapid progress toward a settlement. We believe that a package deal is necessary and that it should take into account the sense of dignity of both communities. We will use our influence in that direction.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you got any new evidence from the Soviet Union which makes you confident that you will be ready to go in four or five weeks, as you had said you would, on SALT? Also, what assurance is there that the conflicts within the U.S. Government on SALT will be resolved within four or five weeks?

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't describe the discussions in the American Government as "conflict." The issues are technically complicated and require careful study. I am confident that we will come up with a solution that will have support of all the agencies.

As I have pointed out, going to Moscow is based on the presupposition that both sides will be prepared to modify their positions; and therefore it is based on the assumption, indeed on the knowledge, that the Soviet Union, as well as we, will be prepared to modify the last positions which each side took. I'm quite confident that the date that has been indicated, or the approximate date, will be maintained.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that Angola was a minor issue in the discussion and the main topic was East-West relations. So, after this discussion, what is your assessment of the present status of East-West relations?

Secretary Kissinger: There are worrying elements such as Angola. There remains, nevertheless, the necessity to attempt to improve relations between East and West on the basis of reciprocity, and there is a recognition on the part of all allies that the process of improvement of relations requires an undiminished concern for Western security.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said yesterday that the United States supports the resumption of the intercommunal talks, but you also mentioned something about a way of relating other interested parties to it at a later state. What would you envisage by that?

Secretary Kissinger: The most interested parties, of course, are the Governments of Greece and Turkey, and this is a question that the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey will deal with this afternoon. It is my impression, having talked to both of them, that they are approaching a consensus on this, and I expect that this problem will be solved. But I'd leave it up to them to announce the details.

Q. Yesterday you expressed your concern about the Communist pressure on the southern countries of the alliance. What is your opinion on the Italian situation and also, in your opinion, what would be the consequences for the alliance of having participation of the Italian Communists in the government, which, as you know very well, is not terribly improbable for the future?

56

Department of State Bulletin

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 20, 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

(1) That the application of Executive Order 11478 and relevant statutes forbid any Federal agency, in making selections for overseas assignments, to take into account any exclusionary policies of a host country based upon race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age. Individuals must be considered and selected solely on the basis of merit factors. They must not be excluded at any stage of the selection process because their race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age does not conform to any formal or informal requirements set by a foreign nation. No agency may specify, in its job description circulars, that the host country has an exclusionary entrance policy or that a visa is required;

(3) That the State Department will take appropriate action through diplomatic channels to ensure that all international agencies, including the United Nations, act in a manner consistent with this statement.

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I have instructed the Secretary of Labor to issue an amendment to his Department's March 10, 1975, Secretary's Memorandum on the obligation of Federal contractors and subcontractors to refrain from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex when hiring for work to be performed in a foreign country or within the United States pursuant to a contract with a foreign government or company. This amendment will require Federal contractors and subcontractors, that have job applicants or present employees applying for overseas assignments, to inform the Department of State of any visa rejections based on the exclusionary policies of a host country. The Department of State will attempt, through diplomatic channels, to gain entry for those individuals.

My Administration will propose legislation to prohibit a business enterprise from using economic means to coerce any person or entity to discriminate against any U. S. person or entity on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex. This would apply to any attempts, for instance, by a foreign business enterprise, whether governmentally or privately owned, to condition its contracts upon the exclusion of persons of a particular religion from the contractor's management or upon the contractor's refusal to deal with American companies owned or managed by persons of a particular religion.

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Q Was that a complete list, Bill, for this trip?

MR. GREENER: Yes.

Q Are there wives going?

MR. GREENER: I don't know.

Q When do you expect an itinerary on the Ford trip, and also will we be getting any briefing beforehand?

MR. GREENER: We are working now with State for a couple of briefings, and we will give the details of these perhaps later today. But they have not worked out all the dates and the times.

Q Are wives going on the trip?

MR. GREENER: Let me answer this one, and then I will get back to you.

One, a detailed background briefing on CSCE and the other on the entire trip.

We are checking to see if wives are going with the delegation. I did not have an answer for you on that. That is about it.

Q Has the United States agreed to set up a monitoring system in the Sinai as part of an interim agreement between the Arabs and Israel? Are the Egyptians and Israelis?

MR. GREENER: They are still in the midst of negotiations and I think it is too early to make any announcements until such settlements have been made.

Q Bill, we were given to understand the President would be vetoing that one price extension bill with a rollback today. Is there any word on when the veto message will be available?

MR. GREENER: It will be early this afternoon, and we will have someone down here to brief on it.

Q Another question in connection with that. I was not at Saturday's briefing. I just wanted to be clear on what was said. Did the President say Saturday that he would veto any extension of price controls, or was he referring specifically to this bill with the rollback or a six-month extension?

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MILITARY ADDEES ALSO FOR POLAD

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT DELIVERED BY SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE ON JUNE 10:

QUOTE: MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I
APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY FOR YOU OUR REASONS
FOR PROPOSING AN AUGMENTATION OF FACILITIES ON THE ISLAND
OF DIEGO GARCIA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. AS I HAVE INDICATED
IN PREVIOUS APPEARANCES BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE AND
ELSEWHERE, WE BELIEVE THIS PROJECT IS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR OUR FORCES WHICH OPERATE
PERIODICALLY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

SINCE MY LAST APPEARANCE HERE, THE PRESIDENT HAS SIGNED
THE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION ACT OF 1975 (PUBLIC LAW 93-552),
WHICH AUTHORIZSD 18.1 MILLION DOLS TO BEGIN CONSTRUCTION OF
THESE FACILITIES, SUBJECT TO CERTAIN QUALIFICATIONS. IN

RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST, AS SPECIFIED IN SECTION
513(A)(1) TF THAT BILL, THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIED TO THE
CONGRESS ON MAY 12 THAT HE HAD EVALUATED ALL THE MILITARY
AND FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS REGARDING THE NEED FOR
UNITED STATES FACILITIES AT DIEGO GARCIA AND CONCLUDED
THAT THE CONSTRUCTION OF SUCH A PROJECT IS ESSENTIAL TO
THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. IN THE
ABSENCE OF ANY NEGATIVE ACTION BY CONGRESS, IT WILL BE
POSSIBLE TO COMMENCE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SUPPORT
FACILITIES THIS FALL. AN ADDITIONAL 13.8 MILLION DOLS
IN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FUNDS HAS BEEN REQUESTED IN THE
FY 76 BUDGET.

AT THE PRESENT TIME WE HAVE A LIMITED COMMUNICATIONS
STATION ON DIEGO GARCIA. THE PURPOSE OF THE NEW
CONSTRUCTION WOULD BE TO EXPAND THIS STATION TO INCLUDE
CERTAIN SUPPORT FUNCTIONS BEYOND ITS PRESENT COMMUNICA-
TIONS ROLE. THE PROPOSED EXPANSION WOULD INCLUDE THE
FOLLOWING:

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-- THE RUNWAY WOULD BE LENGTHENED TO 12,000 FEET FROM ITS PRESENT 8,000 FEET TO PERMIT THE OPERATION OF LARGER CARGO AIRCRAFT AS WELL AS HIGH PERFORMANCE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT UNDER A VARIETY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE TROPICAL CLIMATE;

-- THE FUEL STORAGE CAPACITY WOULD BE INCREASED FROM THE PRESENT 60,000 BARRELS OF AVIATION FUEL TO A TOTAL OF 380,000 BARRELS OF AVIATION FUEL AND 320,000 BARRELS OF FUEL OIL FOR SHIPS;

-- AN ANCHORAGE WOULD BE DREDGED IN THE SHALLOW CORAL LAGOON WHICH COULD ACCOMMODATE THE SHIPS OF A CARRIER TASK GROUP, AND A PIER WOULD BE CONSTRUCTED TO PROVIDE ABOUT 550 FEET OF BERTHING PRIMARILY FOR THE RAPID LOADING OR UNLOADING OF FUEL;

-- VARIOUS AIRFIELD IMPROVEMENTS WOULD INCLUDE ADDITIONAL PARKING APRONS, AN ARRESTING GEAR FOR EMERGENCY USE, AND LIMITED AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE FACILITIES;

-- ADDITIONAL QUARTERS FOR APPROXIMATELY 300 OFFICERS AND MEN WOULD BE CONSTRUCTED; AND

-- STORAGE, POWER, AND OTHER ANCILLARY FACILITIES WOULD BE EXPANDED PROPORTIONATE TO THE INTENDED SUPPORT FUNCTIONS.

THE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FUNDS REQUIRED FOR THIS PROJECT WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 37.8 MILLION DOLLS, TO BE CARRIED OUT BY SEABEE UNITS THROUGH FY 79. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 600 SEABEES ON THE ISLAND COMPLETING PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED WORK ON THE COMMUNICATIONS STATION AND HARBOR, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO BE FINISHED DURING THIS CALENDAR YEAR. THERE ARE ABOUT 430 U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO OPERATE THE COMMUNICATIONS STATION AND THE AIRSTRIP. WITH THE EXPANSION PROGRAM, THIS NUMBER WOULD RISE TO APPROXIMATELY 60%.

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THE TOTAL COST OF THE IMPROVEMENTS WE HAVE REQUESTED ON DIEGO GARCIA, INCLUDING THE SALARIES OF THE CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL, THEIR FOOD AND FUEL, THE REPLACEMENT COSTS OF EQUIPMENT USED IN THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS, THE PROCUREMENT OF HARDWARE FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS STATION, AND ALL OTHER OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE COSTS WOULD BE ABOUT 108 MILLION DOLS, OR ROUGHLY THE COST OF A SINGLE NAVY OILER. IN VIEW OF THE FLEXIBILITY WHICH THE PROPOSED INSTALLATION ON DIEGO GARCIA WILL OFFER TO OUR FORCES, AND THE OPERATIONAL ECONOMIES IT WILL MAKE POSSIBLE, WE FEEL THAT THIS IS A PRUDENT INVESTMENT.

OUR PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE IN REQUESTING THIS FACILITY IS TO PROVIDE SECURENACCESS TO LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR OUR FORCES OPERATING IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. FOR EXAMPLE, OUR NAVAL FORCES OPERATING THERE TODAY MUST RELY EITHER ON LOCAL SOURCES OF FUEL OR ELSE MUST BE REPLENISHED BY A CHAIN OF TANKERS STRETCHING OVER 4,000 MILES FROM U.S. FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES. THE ADDITIONAL FUEL STORAGE WE HAVE PROPOSED WOULD PERMIT A NORMAL CARRIER TASK GROUP TO OPERATE FOR ABOUT 30 DAYS INDEPENDENT OF OTHER SOURCES OF SUPPLY. THAT MARGIN OF TIME COULD SPELL THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ORDERLY RESupply OF OUR FORCES AND A HASTY IMPROVISATION WHICH COULD PLACE UNWIELDY DEMANDS ON OUR SUPPORT ASSETS IN OTHER AREAS. THE SAME IS TRUE OF THE REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE WHICH COULD BE PERFORMED ON SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT.

IN SHORT, THE PROPOSED FACILITY WOULD PROVIDE THE ASSURANCE OF U.S. CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY AND MAINTAIN FORCES IN AN AREA WHICH HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT OVER THE PAST DECADE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, FOR NEARLY TWO CENTURIES THE INDIAN OCEAN WAS THE MILITARY PRESERVE OF GREAT BRITAIN, WHICH EXERCISED CONTROL OVER THE VITAL SEA LANES TO INDIA AND THE MANY OUTPOSTS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. FROM THE EARLY

19TH CENTURY, BRITAIN OPPOSED CZARIST ATTEMPTS TO EXTEND RUSSIAN RULE INTO SOUTH ASIA, JUST AS IT LATER COOPERATED IN COUNTERING POSTWAR STALINIST EFFORTS IN AZERBAIJAN TO

UNCLASSIFIED