38

1 peculiarity of the Middle East situation that wars break out
2 between countries that are technically at war with each other
3 and that the chief nations do not recognize each other's
4 existence, which has the implication that if the recognition
5 is withdrawn, the right to existence is questioned. So the
6 normalization point is something that would have to be
7 elaborated.

8 So I do not think it can be negotiated just as it is, but
9 one can take the positive elements in it and from that point
10 of view, I think it was a contribution. I believe that in a
11 comprehensive approach it should be taken seriously with the
12 qualifications I gave.

13 Senator Hagel: How do you believe we should handle
14 Arafat? We have obviously tried to marginalize him, not deal
15 with him. That apparently has not been very effective. What
16 is your suggestion as to how we deal with Arafat?

17 Secretary Kissinger: The problem about Arafat is, does
18 he create the Palestinian mood or does he reflect the
19 Palestinian mood? Is he a cause or a symptom? Surely he has
20 spent all of his life as a revolutionary leader, and therefore
21 settling down to civil administration does not hold a great
22 attraction for him. And probably he believes that his
23 legitimacy derives from the fact that he has been an
24 uncompromising opponent, in effect, of Israel's existence.

25 The challenge we have put to the Palestinians to come up

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39

1 with a responsible leadership is a valid request. It is not
2 clear whether the Palestinians by themselves can generate this
3 or whether, at a minimum, the other moderate Arab states
4 should play a role in legitimizing a leadership that deals
5 with the issue of terrorism and final borders.

6 Senator Hagel: In your opinion -- and you held two of
7 the most significant, important responsible offices in the
8 Government of the United States at one time actually -- with
9 all of the responsibilities, commitments that America has
today that consume the time of the President, the Vice
11 President, the Secretary of State, the National Security
12 Advisor -- and the agenda is long and we know the items,
13 Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, India, Haiti now,
14 others, in addition to the Israeli-Palestinian issue -- are we
15 stretched too thin in having enough focus of leadership, of
16 resource base, of commitment to do the things that apparently
17 are not being done in the Middle East in trying to forge some
18 kind of a process, the Road Map you spoke of? You talked
19 about a protracted stalemate. We have not been able to break
that stalemate. Is it in any way related to too many
21 commitments, or does that not have anything to do with this
22 elusive effort that we have been at since 1948?

23 Secretary Kissinger: The question has two parts. One is
24 are these issues so complex that they cannot possibly be dealt
25 with in a comprehensive way, and the second is can the U.S.

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40

1. Government be organized to deal with them in a comprehensive way.

3. With respect to the first question, I would argue that if they are not deal with in a comprehensive way, they will not be dealt with at all effectively because then one always takes a piece of it and there will be some part that is not -- that disturbs whatever progress you have made.

8. I believe that it will be seen that what we did in Iraq -- that American actions in Iraq are contributing to an atmosphere in which peace can be negotiated more effectively between the Israelis and the Palestinians if only because it removes the possibility of a conventional war for the foreseeable future between Arab-organized armies and the Israelis.

15. It is, however, a fact that in a world in turmoil, in which you not only have the Middle East but one has to think about North Korea, how to put China into an international system, what to do with a Russia that is redefining itself and reemerging, plus the European integration, that the management of a comprehensive foreign policy becomes a huge task.

21. It is inherent in the nature of the governmental process that the urgent may have priority over the important. If you ask yourself where do I want to be 5 years from now, that is a question you can defer until tomorrow. How to deal with the latest crisis in Baghdad or a suicide bomber is something to

41

1 which you have to respond immediately and that will absorb

2 your energy. This is a question that any administration has

3 to deal with, and I believe we are dealing with it, but it is

4 something that one always has to look at carefully.

5 Senator Hagel: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

6 The Chairman: Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

7 Senator Nelson.

8 Senator Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 Mr. Secretary, last year Deputy Prime Minister Olmert
dropped the equivalent of a political earthquake when he said
that major portions of the West Bank settlements should be
disbanded, withdrawn from, a political earthquake because he
had been one that had been articulating the whole Israel,
followed by 2 or 3 months by the Prime Minister making a
statement that he thought that some settlements should be
withdrawn, and then when he went in front of the Likud Central
Committee, was booed for that position. And Prime Minister
Sharon continues to talk about a one-party solution instead of
a two-party solution.

20 Where do you think that is taking us?

21 Secretary Kissinger: Prime Minister Sharon, to go back
to the question of Senator Biden, is vilified in Europe as a
hard-liner, as somebody similar to some of the totalitarian
types, but he has made huge changes in the Israeli perception
of the world. Whatever one thinks of the settlements, for an

[4]

42

1 Israeli Prime Minister to announce the possibility of their

2 being abandoned goes against the whole history of the Zionist

3 movement for which settlement was a part of the Israeli

4 identity. So I think it is not just a political move, it is a

5 spiritual move, even though it is not put in those terms, and

6 for this to become part of the Israeli internal discussion,

7 however limited it is put forward in its initial stages.

8 Now, it is also important, it seems to me for Sharon and

9 also for the peace process, that this come about as expression

10 of Israeli security policy and not as something extorted from

11 them through American pressure, or in a negotiation. So it

12 seems to me that the combination of the security fence and the

13 unilateral withdrawal, provided the security fence is brought

14 into a rational relationship with Israeli strategic

15 necessities, it is a major step towards an ultimate

16 negotiation.

17 Senator Nelson: If you overlaid in that if the Israeli

18 policy was to pull out of the Gaza, does that create the

19 circumstances where then, in your opinion, there would be such

20 an atmosphere for a settlement?

21 Secretary Kissinger: I think the objective conditions

22 for a breakthrough in negotiations exists not necessarily in

23 the next 6 months but, say, within the next 2 years or the

24 next 18 months. Once all the parties recognize, which I think

25 actually the Israelis have recognized, that there is no deus

[Y]

43

1 ex machina, there is nobody going to hand it all to them, the

2 Americans will not be able to deliver everything, and the

3 Europeans recognize that it does not do any good to keep

4 stirring up unfulfillable hopes, and if we then keep heading

5 towards the implications of what is almost inherent in some of

6 the processes that have started, I could imagine a

7 breakthrough, provided we can find one moderate Arab leader

8 who is willing to take some responsibility for it. It cannot

9 be done simply by outside countries.

10 Senator Nelson: I agree.

11 What if President Assad of Syria were to suddenly seize
12 the moment and come forth and say we are going to stop all of

13 the international terrorist activity that is harbored in
14 Syria? Would that not be a cataclysmic change that could

15 suddenly cause a shifting of the tables toward peace?

16 Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have written in an article
17 about 6 weeks ago commenting on President Assad's interview

18 with the New York Times, that this is an initiative that
19 should be explored. If he means that the negotiations can

20 start where they left off -- if he really means that -- all

21 that was left in these negotiations was a strip of land along

22 the Sea of Galilee of a few hundred yards wide. That, of
23 course, raises questions of riparian rights and it is not a

24 simple question, but it is a definable question.

25 And also, if President Assad were prepared to make a

Y

44

1 genuine peace agreement with Israel, while the Palestinian

2 question still is unsettled, that would create a major

3 incentive for the Palestinians.

4 On the other hand, for Sharon to engage in a final status
5 negotiation with Syria involving settlements on the Golan
6 Heights at a moment that he is dealing with settlements in
7 Gaza and the potential settlements beyond the security fence,
8 that is a really tough domestic question in Israel. And for
9 the United States to promote a negotiation with Syria and let
10 Syria, with respect to terrorism, take the step, similar to
11 Libya's with respect to nuclear weapons, is an important

12 ~~But~~ if Assad were prepared to get rid of the Hizbollah in
13 the Bekka Valley and the headquarters of terrorist groups in
14 Damascus, I think it would be an important step towards peace
15 if they explored the Syrian option.

16 Senator Nelson: He told me that he would not cause any
17 preconditions, and I have asked that question nine ways to
18 Sunday to make sure that I was hearing what he was saying.

19 Secretary Kissinger: He would not cause any?

20 Senator Nelson: He was saying he would not impose any
21 preconditions. Now, you hear a different opinion, whoever is
22 speaking, but that is what he said to me eyeball to eyeball
23 with our U.S. Ambassador sitting there and with his foreign
24 minister sitting there. But, oh, it is a tortuous path.

25 Thank you.

45

1. Secretary Kissinger: I think it is something that should be explored, always keeping in mind that we must insist on the end of the terrorist activities from Syrian soil.

4. The Chairman: Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

5. Senator Chafee.

6. Senator Chafee: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Ambassador.

8. This arguably is the darkest period of Israel's existence, this 4-year intifada, and certainly the chaos and the violence we read about every morning in the papers we condemn. As Robert Malley said, who will testify in the second panel, the Road Map, embraced but all but believed by none, as the only route we have out of this except, as you said, a deus ex machina, is the Geneva Accords. This in detail addresses all the issues, the Palestinian right of return, the recognition of Israel as a state for the Jewish people, Jerusalem, the Temple Mount, the settlements, and of course, very importantly the disarmament of militias and their renunciation of terror. This is signed by Israelis and Palestinians.

21. And my question is why would members of our administration, such as Secretary Powell testify 2 weeks ago that he took heat for meeting with the signatories of the Geneva Accords? And Secretary Wolfowitz publicly announced some support for the Geneva Accords, and he took some heat for

46

1 it from the administration. Why is that and out of this

2 darkness is some light that this administration would condemn

3 or renounce?

4 Secretary Kissinger: The Geneva Accords are a

5 negotiation between an Israeli who has made important

6 contributions in the past but who is totally marginalized in

7 Israeli politics. If the Israeli Government and Arab

8 governments came to such a conclusion, I do not think it would

9 be vetoed by the United States.

10 There are aspects of it that, looking at, seem improbable

11 to me. I find it hard to imagine that Israel can live with an

12 outcome in which access to the Wailing Wall has to go through

13 some Arab territory no matter what the international guarantee

14 is. But this gets into fine points that would take us too

15 far.

16 I am not saying it is not possible for private groups to

17 get together and draw up paper plans. Governments have not

18 been able to do that.

19 But the refugee part of the Geneva Accords I think is

20 extremely dangerous. The refugee part of the Geneva Accord

21 establishes a right of return in some proportion to those

22 returning to other countries, and secondly, they reopen the

23 question that the decision will be left to Israel, subjecting

24 Israel to constant pressure to adjust its attitudes. It is

25 not definitive from that point of view. But I do not know

[Y]

47

1 whether it is useful to discuss details of an accord made

2 between private people.

3 Senator Chafee: I guess that would be my point. As I

4 said, Mr. Malley will say the Road Map, embraced by all but

5 believed in by none --

6 Secretary Kissinger: I do not quarrel with the Road Map.

7 Senator Chafee: We might quibble about the language on

8 the right of return. My reading of it is that the

9 Palestinians do concede the right of return, and it is very

10 specific about --

11 Secretary Kissinger: The trouble with the Road Map -- it

12 is not a trouble. It is --

13 Senator Chafee: If I could just finish.

14 Secretary Kissinger: Oh, excuse me.

15 Senator Chafee: So my question is, why is this not more

16 closely looked at as a vehicle of peace if that is our goal?

17 Secretary Kissinger: There is no reason not to use the

18 Road Map in a serious negotiation. The Road Map is a good,

19 general statement of what should be settled in a negotiation.

20 Once one had a serious negotiation, the Road Map would be one

21 of the documents one would take very seriously.

22 Senator Chafee: More so than the outline of Geneva.

23 Secretary Kissinger: More than?

24 Senator Chafee: You are saying the Road Map has more

25 potential than the outlines from Geneva. Do I hear you right?

48

1 Secretary Kissinger: The acoustics or my hearing is failing me. More serious than what?

3 Senator Chafee: More potential for a resolution of the various issues, that sticking to the Road Map has more potential -- am I hearing you correctly -- than the very, very specific agreements reached in Geneva?

7 Secretary Kissinger: I think the Road Map has more potential than the Geneva Accords.

9 Senator Chafee: I do not have any other questions.

10 The Chairman: Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

11 Senator Sununu.

12 Senator Sununu: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 Dr. Kissinger, I think in answering a previous question, you talked about the potential for withdrawal from certain Israeli settlements, and you said that even as they withdraw, Israel should engage Egypt. In what way should they engage Egypt?

18 Secretary Kissinger: Dennis Ross has submitted a paper to you on that subject. He thinks that as Israel withdraws, it is going to create potentials for all kinds of adjustments that need to be made and that it would be a wise Israeli course to discuss with Egypt a way by which territory that is begin abandoned or settlements that are being abandoned, on the one hand, do not begin a new terrorist wave and, secondly, can be used in a constructive way for the development of the

49

1 Gaza. But I think you should ask Dennis Ross this question

2 when he testifies here.

3 Senator Sununu: I will do my best to do so, but I wanted
4 to get your assessment of what kind of steps or approaches on
5 the part of Israel could make a substantive difference.

6 Secretary Kissinger: What he says and what I believe too
7 -- let me speak for myself and let him speak for himself.

8 What I believe is that as Israeli settlements are given up,
9 this is such a significant change in Israeli policy of such
10 major consequence for the Arab world, that Israel should do it
11 unilaterally where it can, but it should simultaneously
12 indicate to the Arab world that the change in Arab conditions
13 is something they would be prepared to discuss with them and
14 in which the moderate Arab countries could make an important
15 ~~unilateral~~ contribution.

16 Senator Sununu: In your testimony you suggested that the
17 security wall facilitates the abandonment of obstacles that
deprive so much of Palestinian life of its dignity. I think
18 those are pretty accurately your words. But much of the
19 complaint about the practical implementation, the construction
20 of the wall is that it has created a new set of barriers, a
21 new set of obstacles, division in villages, division of
22 farmland, and division of families. So does that not in part
defeat the purpose or the value that you were describing?

25 Secretary Kissinger: We are talking really about two

50

walls, one that may be built unilaterally on the basis of

whatever security needs Israel thinks it has. I do not

necessarily endorse the *exact* line for that. The second one

is one which is either parallel or close to what will be the

final border. That, if it is intelligently drawn and

thoughtfully drawn, should minimize the obstacles.

What is now happening, as I understand, in the occupied

territories is that there is plethora of checkpoints and great

impediments to movement. One could imagine that once that

wall exists, the movement on the Palestinian side of the wall

would be essentially unimpeded or much less impeded.

Senator Sununu: But it would seem to me that the

situation you described, the one is a hypothetical and one

that might have the benefits you describe, and the other is

the practical or the real, at least in parts, that is again

creating these divisions.

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is very important to

have a comprehensive effort of development and progress in the

Middle East along the lines that I have described. If it is

proved impossible to do this, then I think Israel is entitled

to take unilateral actions, and we should use our influence --

and I believe we are using our influence in this team that is

now in Israel -- to get the wall placed in a way that it

reduces the impediments to Arab dignity.

Senator Sununu: Well, along those very lines, you talk

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51

1 about American opposition to the wall. I do not know if it

2 was in your testimony. It might be in the op-ed that you

3 wrote at the end of last year. But you suggest that America

4 should reconsider its opposition to the wall, but to the

5 extent that the U.S. has expressed concerns or opposition, it

6 is along the lines that you just described having to do with

7 the placement for just these reasons.

8 Secretary Kissinger: I think the administration is very

9 close to the position that I have indicated now.

10 Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate that clarification.

11 Secretary Kissinger: I have not discussed this with the

12 administration. When I wrote this article, there was

13 opposition to any concept of a wall. I think now the

14 administration's view, as I have understood it, is very close

15 to what I have described here.

16 Senator Sununu: So you do not believe that the work that

17 is being done now to address the concerns of the routing, the

18 division, the obstacles --

19 Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the mission of

20 Assistant Secretary Abrams and of Deputy Security Advisor

21 Hadley is meeting the concerns that I have expressed here.

22 Senator Sununu: I appreciate that clarification. It

23 seems to me that that is the difference between the potential

24 of this being constructive in the ways that you describe or

25 you hope or the wall being as divisive and as

[Y]

52

1. counterproductive as anything that has been done. It seems to
2. me that the issue of land ownership, land confiscation is as
3. visceral and inflammatory as anything that is happening in the
4. Middle East right now.

5. Secretary Kissinger: I look at the wall as a
6. contribution to coexistence, not as a means of supporting new
7. settlement policy.

8. Senator Sununu: Thank you very much.

9. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10. The Chairman: Thank you very much, Senator Sununu, and
11. thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger, for coming to us, being so
12. forthcoming and comprehensive in your answers. We appreciate,
13. as always, your attendance at our meetings and the leadership
14. that you bring.

15. The chair would like to now recognize the next panel, and
16. that will include the Honorable Dennis Ross, Director and
17. Ziegler Distinguished Fellow, the Washington Institute for
18. Near East Policy; Mr. Robert Malley, Middle East Program
19. Director of the International Crisis Group; the Honorable
20. Martin Indyk, Director of the Saban Center for Middle East
21. Policy, The Brookings Institution.

22. Gentlemen, we thank you very much for coming today. Your
23. full statements will be placed in the record. Let me ask you
24. to testify in the order that I introduced you which would be,
25. first of all, Mr. Ross, then Mr. Malley, and then Mr. Indyk.

54

STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS ROSS, DIRECTOR AND ZIEGLER

DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST

POLICY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Ambassador Ross: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will take

10 minutes and I want to basically offer a perspective on why

I think we are not at a point where we can achieve what is a
comprehensive solution to the problem, but that does not mean
you do not make the effort to transform the situation. I

think what I will do is I will focus on why we are at that
point, why we need a way station and what the options are for
producing a way station.

But before I get into that, let me offer one observation
on the exchange between Senator Biden and Secretary Kissinger,
and that was really on the role of the Arab states and what
they can do. I am a believer that we do have to see Arab
responsibility, which is something we have not seen. I am a
believer that that is critical for making it easier for
Palestinians both to compromise on issues where, in fact,
there is not a context that has been created for compromise,
as well as to be able to confront groups like Hamas and
Islamic Jihad. Having an Arab umbrella would make it much
easier to do that.

The problem is we have not seen that up until now, and I
would say the reason we have not seen it is because even
though I think there is a desire on the part of many of the

M1

Mr. Chairman:

The Arab-Israeli conflict has proved so resistant to diplomacy because the obstacles to a solution are in some respects more psychological than diplomatic.

Israel is militarily stronger than any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly able to inflict heavy losses on Palestinian terrorist groups. But it has also evolved into a middle-class advanced society and, as such, the strain of guerrilla warfare is psychologically draining, generating an ambivalent rigidity in Israeli society. Prior to the Oslo agreement, the Israeli peace movement viewed reconciliation with the Arab world primarily in terms of psychological reassurance; land would be traded for peace and recognition even though Israeli concessions were permanent and the Arab quid pro quo would be revocable. But since the intifada, the vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in reconciliation; they want victory and the crushing of their Arab adversaries.

At the same time, there is growing uneasiness over the open-endedness of the enterprise. With the apparent endlessness of the intifada and the stalemate in the peace process, a sense of resignation is growing. The desire to turn on the tormentors is beginning to be offset by signs of a hunger for peace at almost any price.

Israel finds itself facing the classic dynamic of guerrilla warfare as it has played out for two generations now. The terrorists not only do not recoil from terrorism but practice an egregious form of it because a violent, emotional, (and to bystanders) excessive retaliation serves their purpose: it may trigger intervention by the international community, especially the United States, to end the conflict by imposing a peace. That process gradually reduces Israel's sense of security even while the world's media and diplomats bewail its alleged excesses. Torn between a recognition of strategic necessities and the pull of emotional imperatives, Israel runs the risk of sliding into institutionalized ambivalence.

On the Palestinian side, expulsion from a territory for centuries considered Arab is an open wound; accepting the perceived Israeli intrusion has thus far been beyond Palestinian emotional and psychological capacities. The internal Palestinian debate is essentially over how to overcome the Jewish state; one group is arguing for permanent confrontation, while moderates are willing to move toward

2

EJ

the same objective in stages. Only a tiny minority considers permanent coexistence desirable.

In the half-century of Israel's existence, no Palestinian leader has fully recognized Israel or renounced the right of refugees to return. Even the Palestinian signatories of the Geneva Accord went no further than to relate the return of refugees to a proportion of refugees accepted by third-party countries. Government-sponsored public assaults on the very concept of a Jewish state are unremitting.

The breakthrough in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations took place in 1977, when President Anwar Sadat made his historic trip to Jerusalem and, among other gestures, laid a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. There has never occurred a similar act of grace on the part of Palestinian leaders.

When so little confidence exists, it is difficult to move in one step from impasse to a final solution. At the same time, there are some hopeful signs. The formal deadlock may be obscuring the possibility that, almost imperceptibly, a framework for an agreement is emerging. In Israel, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's recent pronouncements suggest that the dominant Likud party is undergoing soul-searching based on the recognition that the biblical claim to all of Palestine involves a demographic time bomb as Arabs become a majority and demand control of the entire land. This change of attitude implies a willingness to give up much of what Israel gained in the 1967 war in return for Palestinian acceptance of the 1948 defeat and the division of the land of Palestine.

At the same time, the Palestinians may be in the process of learning that they have no military option and that, at least for tactical reasons, coexistence with Israel is unavoidable. An increasing number of Arab states would settle for any terms acceptable to Palestinians.

A forthcoming proposal has come from Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. According to its imprecise outline, Israel would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in exchange for the normalization of relations with the Arab states. Literally, this would imply Israeli abandonment of all settlements and Arab control of the Old City of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by normalization, and is silent about such issues as the return of refugees which would surely be insisted on in an actual negotiation.

3

[Y]

This first engagement in the peace process by an Arab state not
having a direct national conflict with Israel nevertheless includes
positions that have produced the existing deadlock. The 1967 "border"
in Palestine - unlike the Egyptian, Syrian, or Jordanian frontiers with
Israel - was never an international frontier but a ceasefire line
established at the end of the 1948 war. It was never recognized by
any Arab state until after the 1967 war and has been grudgingly
accepted recently by states that do not yet recognize the legitimacy of
Israel. I have never encountered an Israeli prime minister or chief of
staff who considered the '67 borders defensible.

Despite all these obstacles, both sides may be in the process of
reconsidering previous attitudes. The Palestinians have suffered vast
losses and the total disruption of their economy. Israel has learned
that demography threatens its existence; a large and rapidly growing
Arab population undermines the prospects for a state at once Jewish
and democratic. Annexation of significant portions of the West Bank
can no longer be considered a national Israeli interest.

This may be why all the parties have endorsed — with varying
degrees of conviction — a document listing forty simultaneous steps to
be carried out in three stages. Drafted by the United States, Russia,
the European Union, and a representative of the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, and labeled the "Road Map," its implementation is
supposed to be supervised by the quartet that drafted it.

Nevertheless, we must be careful not to exaggerate what the
Road Map stands for. It is not a recipe for resolving the Middle East
deadlock. Rather, it represents a reasonable compromise on rather
general objectives. These goals are stated as if they could be achieved
simultaneously by each side acting more or less autonomously.

The Road Map does not establish criteria for verification,
consequences of violation, or the sequence of acts within each stage.
The language veers toward truisms. For example, with respect to
refugees, the Road Map calls for an agreed "just, fair, and realistic
settlement." To the Palestinian "fair and just" means a return of most
refugees, and to the Israeli "realistic" means, at most, a token return
of refugees.

The negotiators working their way through these generalities
have some positive elements to sustain them. The new impetus to
diplomacy reflects the revolutionary changes wrought by American
policy in the Middle East. The elimination of Iraq as a significant

4

military force has removed for a considerable period the possibility of
an Arab-Israeli war fought by regular armies. The American insistence
that the Palestinian Authority produce a more representative and
responsible negotiating partner than Arafat has provided the
framework to weaken the terrorist structure on the West Bank.

A combination of these factors has encouraged Prime Minister Sharon to offer the elimination of settlements established in violation of Israeli law, to proceed to dismantle the settlements in Gaza, and to acquiesce in the concept of the creation of a Palestinian state with "contiguous" territory — the code word for opening a discussion over the future of settlements that impede this objective.

If this were a negotiation unencumbered by historical and
psychological legacies, one could note the respect in which the parties
have approached each other: on the creation of a Palestinian state; on
ending the occupation in the greatest part of the West Bank; on the
principle of abandoning at least settlements beyond the dividing line;
on the need to end terrorism. What is lacking is even the minimum of
trust to negotiate the implementation of these principles.

The Palestinians believe that Israel seeks to reduce the Palestinian state to a series of enclaves surrounded by Israeli territory and pierced by an Israeli road network — in short, a state virtually indistinguishable from limited internal autonomy. Most Israelis are convinced that for the Palestinians any agreement represents only a stage in an ultimate war of extermination. Arab and Palestinian newspapers and schoolbooks and Arab and Palestinian television treat the state of Israel as an illegitimate interloper that must be removed from the Arab world.

Allied divisions have compounded the problem. Critics attack U.S. policy for what they consider one-sided support of Israeli policy. At the same time, almost all European leaders have advocated a solution which does not meet the realities of the moment or of historical experience: the return of Israel to the '67 borders with only the most minor modifications; the consequent abandonment by Israel of all (or nearly all) of the Israeli settlements established since; partition of Jerusalem; some accommodation to the Palestinian view on return of refugees, all this to be imposed by the U.S.

The quid pro quo is an undefined "normalization" and perhaps an
international guaranteeing force. The quid pro quo of normalization is
a special characteristic of the Arab-Israeli negotiations. In almost all

other negotiations, mutual recognition of the parties is taken for granted, not treated as a concession. In fact, nonrecognition implies the legal nonexistence of the other state, which, in the context of the Middle East, is tantamount to an option to destroy it. Israel was established by a U.N. resolution in 1948. No other members of the United Nations have been asked to pay a premium for recognition.

Nor is an international guaranteeing force a solution. For what precisely does an international guarantee mean? Against what danger does it protect and by what means? The historical record of multilateral guarantees is dismal, especially in the Middle East.

International guarantees are likely to prove empty against terrorism. If Israel's armed forces with a vast stake in the outcome could not prevent infiltrations, how is an international or even an American force going to do it? It is much more likely to prove a barrier against Israeli retaliation than against Palestinian terrorism. The probable outcome is that an international force would become hostages who will either purchase their safety by turning their backs on violations or, if they risk their lives by serious efforts, they will incur casualties at which point the governments supplying the forces will be under pressure to withdraw them.

No progress is possible without a major diplomatic effort by America. But America should not be asked to break Israel's psychological back and jeopardize its existence as an independent state. Having lived unrecognized by its neighbors for most of its history, subjected to systematic terrorism, surrounded by states technically at war with it, and aware of an essentially unopposed publicity campaign against its existence throughout the Islamic world, Israel will not base its survival on assurances and guarantees without a clear assurance regarding its security requirements. It needs defensible frontiers and a strategy that gives it a plausible opportunity to withstand the most likely dangers.

The end of terrorism must go beyond a cease-fire, which keeps the threat alive, to the dismantling of the terrorist supporting structure. Even if dismantling the terror apparatus proves difficult to do quickly, ending the systematic rejection of Israeli legitimacy and incitement to terror in the media are within the scope of immediate Palestinian decision. Above all, Palestinian and Arab leaders must find a way to convey that they have accepted the permanence of Israel's existence.

6

At the same time, Israel needs to take American advocacy of a contiguous Palestinian state seriously. It implies not only an end of new settlements but a reduction of the existing ones that impede the promised contiguous Palestinian state, and the new strategic frontier must reflect genuine security needs.

The practical implication is that the Road Map's goal of a comprehensive settlement by 2005 is unachievable. It is unimaginable that a new Palestinian prime minister precariously extracted from Yasser Arafat will be in a position to renounce the right of Palestinians to return to their place of origin in the early stages of the Road Map process. It is inconceivable that Israel would make a final agreement that does not contain such a clause or that it would entertain transfers of populations without a tested period without terrorism — if then. Thus even if a comprehensive agreement is the ultimate goal, it must contain within it a prolonged interim period for testing the commitment to peaceful coexistence.

But if comprehensive peace is not achievable within the time frame established by the Road Map, the establishment of a provisional Palestinian state as envisaged in Stage II can be realized. The goal will not be comprehensive peace, which is a legal concept, but coexistence, which reflects the absolute precondition for peace.

A "coexistence agreement" could be helped rather than hindered by the fence Israel is in the process of creating, though not in the present location. A physical barrier is more effective than an international guaranteeing force. It would facilitate Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian cities and the abandonment of checkpoints that deprive so much of Palestinian life of dignity. By the same token, Israel must be serious about leaving the territories and the settlements beyond the security fence to Arab jurisdiction. A security barrier would provide a line on the other side of which settlements would have to live under Palestinian rule or be abandoned. Is the Palestinian objection primarily to the fence, in principle, or to the ratification of the permanence of Israel that the fence represents?

The intrusion of the fence beyond the 1967 borders should be kept to a strategically necessary minimum. But the principle of it is important: It should not be discouraged by the United States; rather, the United States should try to shape it to contribute to what seems the best way to a rapid breakthrough. The alternative of some sort of imposition conceived by conventional wisdom might well bring peace at

7

the price of encouraging continued irredentism and turning the
agreement into a prelude for another round of confrontation.

An interim agreement may be the only way to keep the refugee
issue from blocking a settlement. Any agreement deserving the
appellation "final" must resolve the refugee question. No Israeli
government can settle for less; no Palestinian leader has yet been
found to renounce unambiguously the right of return.

If that problem should prove insoluble, the security fence could
provide a provisional dividing line that makes possible a Palestinian
state even before a final settlement. The territorial adjustments could
be balanced by returning some portions of Israeli territory to
Palestinian rule. Particular attention should be paid to areas where a
return of Arab population would ease the demographic problem. In
that context, a provisional arrangement for Palestinian government in
Arab sections of Jerusalem can be discussed.

Such an approach requires freeing Middle East diplomacy from
some of its formalistic, almost doctrinaire, constraints. Our partners in
the quartet need to view Middle East peace as something more
complex than a device for using the United States to extract
concessions from Israel for little more than the word "peace." The
Palestinians must make a choice between the requirements of genuine
acceptance of the Jewish state and an interim solution that creates a
Palestinian state immediately and marks a major step toward dealing
with the settlement issue, even if it falls short of the entire range of
their aspirations. Israel must abandon a diplomacy designed to
exhaust its negotiating partners and instead concentrate, in close
coordination with the United States, on the essentials of its
requirements.

A comprehensive diplomacy to achieve these objectives should
have the following components:

--The United States would play a principal mediating role in the
negotiation of an interim agreement, buttressed by a general
statement of objectives for the overall goals, providing a link between
an interim and a comprehensive settlement. Our European allies could
contribute by suspending the flood of plans by which they seek to
improve their position in the Arab world but in reality radicalize it by
raising unfulfillable expectations:

8

--A major contribution could be the Mideast initiative put forward by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and in the process of being discussed by European and American leaders. A concept of a Middle East development and political reform project jointly undertaken by the Atlantic and Middle Eastern nations would create a context defined by positive goals rather than inherited hatreds. Any lasting settlement implies ultimate reconciliation, and a major international effort should be undertaken to help restore civilian life in the Palestinian state. Once confidence is restored and true coexistence evolves, the incentive to maintain the security fence may well disappear.

--The Palestinian Authority needs to reinstitute itself along more representative lines. The moderate Arab states should facilitate the negotiations by encouraging adjustments in the Palestinian position they would not dare on their own.

--Europe and the United Nations, backed by the United States, could generate an international commitment to assist in the creation of a viable Palestinian entity, at first under an interim agreement and later on when a permanent settlement is reached. That commitment would imply a level of assistance that could be effective only in the context of a new set of institutions.

For both sides, a resolution will be traumatic. For many in Israel, the abandonment of settlements and the partition of Jerusalem will be perceived as a repudiation of much of the history of the Jewish state. For the Palestinians, it will be an end to the myth by which their society has lived. America's role is central: It needs to overcome the illusion that America can impose some paper plan and, at the same time, to move the parties with determination toward a goal that seems, at last, conceptually within reach.

Mr. Chairman:

At the same time, there is growing uneasiness over the open-
endedness of the enterprise. With the apparent endlessness of the
intifada and the stalemate in the peace process, a sense of resignation
is growing. The desire to turn on the tormentors is beginning to be
offset by signs of a hunger for peace at almost any price.

2

4

M

7

[Y]

- The United States would play a principal mediating role in the negotiation of an interim agreement, buttressed by a general statement of objectives for the overall goals, providing a link between an interim and a comprehensive settlement. Our European allies could contribute by suspending the flood of plans by which they seek to improve their position in the Arab world but in reality radicalize it by raising unfulfillable expectations:

3,002 words

2/22/04

SFRC Testimony - February 24, 2004

2

On the Palestinian side, expulsion from a territory for centuries
considered Arab is an open wound; accepting the perceived Israeli intrusion has
thus far been beyond Palestinian emotional and psychological capacities. The
internal Palestinian debate is essentially over how to overcome the Jewish state;
one group is arguing for permanent confrontation, while moderates are willing to
move toward the same objective in stages. Only a tiny minority considers
permanent coexistence desirable.

6

Egyptian, Syrian, or Jordanian frontiers with Israel — was never an international frontier but a ceasefire line established at the end of the 1948 war. It was never recognized by any Arab state until after the 1967 war and has been grudgingly accepted recently by states that do not yet recognize the legitimacy of Israel. I have never encountered an Israeli prime minister or chief of staff who considered the '67 borders defensible.

8

The negotiators working their way through these generalities have some positive elements to sustain them. The new impetus to diplomacy reflects the revolutionary changes wrought by American policy in the Middle East. The elimination of Iraq as a significant military force has removed for a considerable period the possibility of an Arab-Israeli war fought by regular armies. The American insistence that the Palestinian Authority produce a more representative and responsible negotiating partner than Arafat has provided the framework to weaken the terrorist structure on the West Bank.

10

11

[x]

12

14

15

The intrusion of the fence beyond the 1967 borders should be kept to a strategically necessary minimum. But the principle of it is important: It should not be discouraged by the United States; rather, the United States should try to shape it to contribute to what seems the best way to a rapid breakthrough. The alternative of some sort of imposition conceived by conventional wisdom might well bring peace at the price of encouraging continued irredentism and turning the agreement into a prelude for another round of confrontation.

[Y]

- A major contribution could be the Mideast initiative put forward by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and in the process of being discussed by European and American leaders. A concept of a Middle East development and political reform project jointly undertaken by the Atlantic and Middle Eastern

19

Feb 21 04 10:03p

p.1

3,018 words

A solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is often described as seeking to reconcile formal negotiating positions. But the conflict has lasted so long that it requires a diplomatic approach.

(because the obstacles to a solution are in some respects more psychological than diplomatic.)

Israel has never been more militarily powerful and, at the same time, never more psychologically vulnerable. Israel is militarily stronger than any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly able to inflict heavy losses on Palestinian terrorist groups. But it has also evolved into a middle-class advanced society and, as such, the strain of guerrilla warfare is psychologically draining, generating an ambivalent rigidity in Israeli society. Prior to the Oslo agreement, the Israeli peace movement viewed reconciliation with the Arab world primarily in terms of psychological reassurance; land would be traded for

p.1

Feb 22 04 12:29p

Feb 21 04 10:03p

peace even though the Arab quid pro quo would be revocable. But since the
and recognition
intifada, the vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in reconciliation; they want
victory and the crushing of their Arab adversaries.

At the same time, there is growing uneasiness over the seeming open-
endedness of the enterprise. With the apparent endlessness of the intifada and
the stalemate in the peace process, a sense of resignation is growing. The
desire to turn on the tormentors is beginning to be offset by signs of a hunger for
peace at almost any price.

Israel finds itself facing the classic dynamic of guerrilla warfare as it has
played out for two generations now. The terrorists not only do not recoil from
terrorism but practice an egregious form of it because a violent, emotional, (and
to bystanders) excessive retaliation serves their purpose: it may trigger
intervention by the international community, especially the United States. That
process gradually reduces Israel's sense of security even while the world's
media and diplomats bewail its alleged excesses. Torn between a recognition of

Feb 22 04 12:30p

Feb 21 04 10:03p

p.3

On the Palestinian side, expulsion from a territory for centuries
considered Arab is an open wound; accepting what the population considers the *perpetrated*
Israeli intrusion has thus far been beyond Palestinian emotional and
psychological capacities. The internal Palestinian debate is essentially over
how to overcome the Jewish state; one group is arguing for permanent
confrontation, while moderates are willing to move toward the same objective in
stages. Only a tiny minority considers permanent coexistence desirable.

In the half-century of Israel's existence, no Palestinian leader has fully
recognized Israel or renounced the right of refugees to return. Government-
sponsored public assaults on the very concept of a Jewish state are unremitting.
Even the Palestinian signatories of the Geneva Accord went no further than to
relate the return of refugees to a proportion of refugees accepted by third-party
countries. The breakthrough in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations took place in 1977,

E.3

Feb 22 04 12:30p

Feb 21 04 10:03p

When so little confidence exists, it is difficult to move in one step from the
present impasse to a final solution. At the same time, there are some hopeful
signs. The formal deadlock may be obscuring the possibility that, almost
imperceptibly, a framework for an agreement is emerging. In Israel, Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon's recent pronouncements suggest that the dominant Likud
party is undergoing soul-searching based on the recognition that the biblical
claim to all of Palestine involves a demographic time bomb as Arabs become a
majority and demand control of the entire land. This change of attitude implies a
willingness to give up much of what Israel gained in the 1967 war in return for
Palestinian acceptance of the 1948 defeat and the division of the land of
Palestine.

Feb 21 04 10:03p

5

5 p

Feb 22 04 12:30p

Feb 21 04 10:03p

Both sides may be in the process of reconsidering previous attitudes.

The Palestinians have suffered vast losses and the total disruption of their economy. Israel has learned that time and demography threaten its existence; a large and rapidly growing Arab population undermines the prospects for a state at once Jewish and democratic. Annexation of significant portions of the West Bank can no longer be considered a national Israeli interest.

Feb 21 04 10:04p

Feb 21 04 10:04p

Feb 21 04 10:04p

p.9

9

p.9

Feb 22 04 12:31p

Feb 21 04 10:04p

10

Allied divisions have compounded the problem. Critics attack U.S. policy
for what they consider one-sided support of Israeli policy. At the same time,
almost all European leaders have advocated a solution which does not meet the
*experiences of past decades* nor the realities of the moment; the return of Israel
*or of historical equilibrium.*
to the '67 borders with only the most minor modifications; the consequent
abandonment by Israel of all (or nearly all) of the Israeli settlements established
since; partition of Jerusalem; some accommodation to the Palestinian view on
return of refugees, all this to be imposed by the U.S.

Feb 21 04 10:04p

11

Its overwhelming challenge is terrorism, against which international
guarantees are likely to prove empty. If Israel's armed forces, with a huge stake
in the outcome, could not prevent infiltrations, how is an international or even an
American force going to do it? It is much more likely to prove a barrier against
Israeli retaliation than against Palestinian terrorism. The probable outcome is
that an international force would become hostages who will either purchase their

safety by turning their backs on violations, or risk their lives by serious efforts, at

P.11

Feb 22 04 12:32p

Feb 21 04 10:04p

12

not base its survival on assurances and guarantees without a clear recognition of

the terror apparatus might be difficult to do quickly, but ending the systematic

scope of immediate Palestinian decision. Palestinian leaders must find a way to

P.12

Feb 22 04 12:32P

Feb 21 04 10:04p

p.13

13

p.13

Feb 22 04 12:32p

Feb 21 04 10:05p

14

A coexistence agreement could be helped rather than hindered by the fence Israel is in the process of creating, though not in the present location. A physical barrier is more effective than an international guaranteeing force. It would facilitate Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian cities and the abandonment of checkpoints that deprive so much of Palestinian life of dignity.

A senior Israeli official said yesterday that he would provide a line on the other side of which settlements would have to live under Palestinian rule or be abandoned. Is the Palestinian objection primarily to the fence, in principle, or to the ratification of the permanence of Israel that the fence represents? By the same token, Israel must be serious about leaving the territories and the settlements beyond the security fence to Arab jurisdiction.

Feb 21 04 10:05p

The intrusion of the fence beyond the 1967 borders should be kept to a strategically necessary minimum. But the principle of it is important: It should not be discouraged by the United States; rather, the United States should try to shape it to contribute to what seems the best way to a rapid breakthrough. The alternative of some sort of imposition of conventional wisdom might well bring peace at the price of encouraging continued irredentism and turning the agreement into a prelude for another round of confrontation.

Feb 21 04 10:05p

16

problem. In that context, a provisional government in Jerusalem could be discussed.

Israel must abandon a diplomacy designed to exhaust its [WORLD MISSING] and

p.16

Feb 22 04 12:33p

Feb 21 04 10:05p

17

--A major contribution could be the Mideast initiative put forward by
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and in the process of being discussed
by European and American leaders. A concept of a Middle East development
and political reform jointly undertaken [by] the Atlantic and Middle Eastern
nations would create a context defined by positive goals rather than inherited
hatreds. It is true that any lasting settlement implies ultimate reconciliation, and
a major international effort should be undertaken to help restore civilian life in

P.17

Feb 22 04 12:33p

Feb 22 04 12:45p

Feb 21 04 10:05p

18

3,018 words

2/21/04

A solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is often described as seeking to reconcile formal negotiating positions. But the conflict has lasted so long because the obstacles to a solution are in some respects more psychological than diplomatic.

2

peace even though the Arab quid pro quo would be revocable. But since the
intifada, the vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in reconciliation; they want
victory and the crushing of their Arab adversaries.

On the Palestinian side, expulsion from a territory for centuries
considered Arab is an open wound; accepting what the population considers the
Israeli intrusion has thus far been beyond Palestinian emotional and
psychological capacities. The internal Palestinian debate is essentially over
how to overcome the Jewish state; one group is arguing for permanent
confrontation, while moderates are willing to move toward the same objective in
stages. Only a tiny minority considers permanent coexistence desirable.

4

5

This first engagement in the peace process by an Arab state not having a direct national conflict with Israel nevertheless includes positions that have produced the existing deadlock. The 1967 "border" in Palestine — unlike the

6

10

Allied divisions have compounded the problem. Critics attack U.S. policy for what they consider one-sided support of Israeli policy. At the same time, almost all European leaders have advocated a solution which does not meet the experiences of past decades nor the realities of the moment: the return of Israel to the '67 borders with only the most minor modifications; the consequent abandonment by Israel of all (or nearly all) of the Israeli settlements established since partition of Jerusalem; some accommodation to the Palestinian view on return of refugees, all this to be imposed by the U.S.

Its overwhelming challenge is terrorism, against which international
guarantees are likely to prove empty. If Israel's armed forces, with a huge stake
in the outcome, could not prevent infiltrations, how is an international or even an
American force going to do it? It is much more likely to prove a barrier against
Israeli retaliation than against Palestinian terrorism. The probable outcome is
that an international force would become hostages who will either purchase their
safety by turning their backs on violations or risk their lives by serious efforts, at
which point the governments supplying the forces will be under pressure to
withdraw them.

12

No progress is possible without a major diplomatic effort by America. But America should not be asked to break Israel's psychological back and jeopardize its existence as an independent state. Having lived unrecognized by its neighbors for most of its history, subjected to systematic terrorism, surrounded by states technically at war with it, and aware of an essentially unopposed publicity campaign against its existence throughout the Islamic world, Israel will not base its survival on assurances and guarantees without a clear recognition of its security requirements. It needs defensible frontiers and a strategy that gives it a plausible opportunity to withstand the most likely dangers.

The end of terrorism must go beyond a cease-fire, which keeps the threat alive, to the dismantling of the terrorist supporting structure. Even if dismantling the terror apparatus might be difficult to do quickly, but ending the systematic rejection of Israeli legitimacy and incitement to terror in the media are within the scope of immediate Palestinian decision. Palestinian leaders must find a way to convey that they have accepted the permanence of Israel's existence.

13

[4]

14

A coexistence agreement could be helped rather than hindered by the fence Israel is in the process of creating, though not in the present location. A physical barrier is more effective than an international guaranteeing force. It would facilitate Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian cities and the abandonment of checkpoints that deprive so much of Palestinian life of dignity. It would provide a line on the other side of which settlements would have to live under Palestinian rule or be abandoned. Is the Palestinian objection primarily to the fence, in principle, or to the ratification of the permanence of Israel that the fence represents? By the same token, Israel must be serious about leaving the territories and the settlements beyond the security fence to Arab jurisdiction.

some portions of Israeli territory to Palestinian rule. Particular attention should
be paid to areas where a return of Arab population would ease the demographic
problem. In that context, a provisional partition of Jerusalem could be
discussed.

Israel must abandon a diplomacy designed to exhaust its [WORD MISSING] and
instead concentrate, in close coordination with the United States, on the
essentials of its requirements.

[Y]

17

18