5/26/99 Testimony Before
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity
to testify on the ABM treaty and missile defense.

Let me begin with some qualifications. I am not a
technical expert. I have not had the opportunity to review
the provisions of the treaty in detail. But I have thought
about the political and strategic implications of missile
defense and the impact of the ABM treaty on it. And the ABM
treaty was negotiated under my general aegis during the
Nixon Administration. Therefore let me explain my general
view about missile defense, how the ABM treaty came to be
negotiated, and where in my view we are now in a general
sense with respect to it.

I was always uneasy about the doctrine of mutual
assured destruction. The first responsibility of government
is to provide for the security of the people. To the extent

the U.S. has the ability to provide for the defense of the
country, it would be a dereliction of duty not to do so. I
cannot accept the proposition that we contribute to peace by
exposing our population to vast and foreseeable dangers as
an act of policy. I cannot imagine what an American
President would say to the American public if there should
be an attack, and if he would have to explain that he did
nothing to prevent or defeat the resulting catastrophe. I
think the legitimacy of government would be threatened if
such a condition existed. So, for all these reasons, I have
been an advocate of missile defense ever since I entered
government.

Then how did the ABM treaty come about? When President
Nixon came into office, one of his first acts was to propose
an ABM system. It was based on much more elementary
technology than now exists, but it provided for twelve

2

[y]

defense sites circling the United States and was put forward with the argument that it would disabuse the Soviets of any temptations to risk a limited nuclear attack, prevent third country attacks, and protect against an accidental missile launch.

But then we faced various oppositions from groups dedicated to the theory of mutual destruction. One group maintained that the ABM system would not work. Another group said that it would be destabilizing. Though the criticisms contradicted each other, they affected the Congress. As a result, in every Congressional session, the number of defense sites was reduced. By 1971, Congress had whittled the proposed ABM system down to two defense sites. And it was clear that these last two sites would be under pressure in every budgetary cycle thereafter.

3

Limiting an ABM system to only two sites did not make
any strategic sense. And by that point, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff did not want to spend scarce resources on what they
considered to be an essentially useless enterprise. We
negotiated the ABM treaty because we wanted to get something
for what the U.S. Congress was going to do anyway--kill the
ABM program. The Soviet Union was expanding its military
strength and our Congress was cutting back U.S. military
strength. And it was under those conditions that we thought
we would put a ceiling on the ABM in order to limit the
Soviet ABM system, which Moscow had already started to
build. We also used the ABM treaty to extract concessions
from the Soviet Union in the SALT talks.

I never felt comfortable with the ABM treaty. But
there was nothing we could do about it because the defense
budget was being cut deeper each year by Congress. It was

4

[y]

not really until the advent of the Reagan Administration
that a plausible technology for strategic defense existed.
As soon as Reagan put forward his 1983 Strategic Defense
Initiative, I supported it. And I continue to support a
missile defense for the same reasons.

When President Reagan put forward his SDI proposal, a
group of concerned scientists came to see me in order to get
me to join them in opposition to it. And they made the
traditional arguments--first, that it was destabilizing and
secondly, it wouldn't work--despite my difficulty in
grasping how it can be both. When I asked them to explain
to me the mechanics of how and why they believed it would
not work at various levels of attack, it was plain that at a
fairly low level of attack involving several hundred
warheads, it worked fairly well, but became degraded only as
more and more warheads were added to the attack.

5

[y]

That seemed to me to strengthen and not weaken the case for missile defense. In the absence of missile defense, penetration becomes totally predictable--a simple question of mathematics. But it is different even when there exists even a light missile defense. Since the aggressor does not know which of his missiles will get through, as the threshold rises the inhibitions to an attack must also rise. And in the Soviet case, I always felt that if they knew that they would have to launch several hundred missiles in order to get a significant number through the missile defenses, that was a lot safer for America than if they knew that any missile that they launched was bound to get there.

The circumstances that existed when the treaty was drafted and agreed to were notably different from the situation today. Specifically, the current threats, as set forth by our Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, have moved

6

[y]

us into a new national security environment, one that was
not even considered, let alone anticipated when the ABM
treaty was signed. The country that signed it, the USSR,
has disappeared as a legal entity. Missile technologies
have evolved in sophistication. The acceleration in the
proliferation of ballistic missile and WMD technologies are
putting capabilities in the hands of nations that were not
even remotely considered to be candidates to possess such
destructive power when the agreement was concluded.

One of the reasons ballistic missiles are attractive to
so many countries is that there are currently no defenses
against them. They are almost guaranteed to arrive at their
targets. Given their destructive power, they are terror
weapons by their mere existence in the absence of deployed
defenses. History teaches that weakness is provocative and,

7

[y]

in a real sense, the absence of missile defense provokes
others into seeking such weapons.

The threat to the U.S. from missile proliferation
is real and growing. This was underscored last year by the
Rumsfeld Commission, which stated that the threat posed by a
number of hostile Third World states "is broader, more
mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in
estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community."

Further, the Commission stated that "the U.S. might well
have little or no warning before operational deployment" of
missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory by these same
states.

Secretary of Defense Cohen confirmed the findings of
the Rumsfeld Commission on January 20, 1999, when he stated,
"... we are affirming that there is a threat, and the threat
is growing and that we expect it will soon pose a danger not

8

only to our troops overseas but also to Americans here at
home."

All of us need to recognize that at some point, and
admittedly some will differ on where this point is, the ABM
treaty constrains the nation's missile defense programs to
an intolerable degree. Secretary Cohen, also on January 20,
stated that the Administration recognizes this fact and will
require modifications to the treaty. He also suggested that
if an agreement on this issue, presumably with the Russians
or others, could not be obtained, then the U.S. would
consider withdrawal.

I share this view. Quite apart from the legal
arguments that are made by experts as to the possibility
that with the end of the USSR the treaty technically may no
longer be in force, the treaty was signed with an eye to an
environment that simply does not exist today.

[y]

[y]

For these reasons, I believe that it is strategically
and morally necessary to build a missile defense.

Strategically, because of the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and the missile technology to deliver them.

Morally, because the doctrine of mutual assured destruction,
which I have opposed in my writings for at least thirty
years, is bankrupt. It may have had a limited theoretical
sense in a two-power nuclear world, but in a multinuclear
world, it is reckless.

I would favor the deployment of a nationwide missile
defense system as soon as technologically possible. An
impressive array of technical options cannot be adequately
explored until we solve the problem of ABM treaty
restrictions on development and testing. We need to find a
way to end the restrictions the ABM treaty impose on the

10

[y]

research, development, testing and deployment of missile
defense systems as soon as possible.

I have no clear view how to handle the ABM treaty,
except that I would not let it stand in the way. First, it
is possible to argue that the ABM treaty was made with an
entity that no longer exists. It is also possible to use
the abrogation clause in the ABM treaty, but I think that is
not the key issue.

The key issue is whether it should be a national policy
to build a missile defense. The battle lines are always
forming along the same issue--whether the missile defense
system will work. There always will be those who make the
claim that a tremendous system is coming along five years
down the road, at which point, those same people will argue
that there is an even better one coming along five years

11

after that. So there will never be a "right time" for
deployment.

Therefore, we need to get about the task of developing
and deploying ballistic missile defenses that are the most
cost effective and the most technically capable of deterring
and defending against these new threats, and doing so
without inhibitions from the treaty. There is ample time to
conduct the necessary negotiations since the shape of the
system is still under consideration, and no violation would
occur until deployment. There are two qualifications: (1)
Research must proceed immediately and not be delayed pending
negotiations, and (2) Deployment must take place as soon as
a system is chosen. To the extent the Russians do not agree
to the necessary amendments, the alternative is to exercise
our right, as provided in the treaty, to extend six months
notification that we intend to withdraw from the treaty.

12

DRAFT

5/25/99 #2

I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity
to testify before this Committee on the ABM treaty and
missile defense.

Let me begin with some qualifications. I am not a
technical expert. I have not had the opportunity to review
the provisions of the treaty in detail. But I have thought
about the political and strategic implications of missile
defense and the impact of the ABM treaty on it. And the ABM
treaty was negotiated under my general aegis during the
Nixon Administration. Therefore let me explain my general
view about missile defense, how the ABM treaty came to be
negotiated, and where in my view we are now in a general
sense with respect to the ABM treaty.

is to provide for the security of the people. To the extent
the U.S. has the ability to provide for the defense of the
country, it would be a dereliction of duty not to do so. I
cannot accept the proposition that we contribute to peace by
exposing our population to vast and foreseeable dangers as
an act of policy. I cannot imagine what an American
President would say to the American public if there should
be an attack, and if he would have to explain that he did
nothing to prevent or defeat the <u>legitimacy</u> of the <u>catastrophe</u>. I think the
legitimacy of government would be threatened if such a
condition existed. So, for all these reasons, I have been
an advocate of missile defense. <u>Ever since I entered</u>
<u>government</u>

2

[y]

But then we faced various oppositions from groups dedicated to the mutual destruction. One group maintained that the ABM system would not work. Another group said that it would be destabilizing. Though the criticisms contradicted each other, they affected the Congress. As a result, in every Congressional session, the number of defense sites was reduced. By 1971, Congress had whittled the proposed ABM system down to two defense sites. And it was clear that these last two sites would be under pressure in every budgetary cycle thereafter.

3

[y]

Limiting an ABM system to only two sites did not make
any strategic sense. And by that point, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff did not want to spend scarce resources on what they
considered to be an essentially useless enterprise. We
negotiated the ABM treaty because we wanted to get something
for what the U.S. Congress was going to do anyway--kill the
ABM program. We did not want to lose our two sites without
getting something from Moscow in return. The Soviet Union
was expanding its military strength and our Congress was
cutting back U.S. military strength. And it was under those
conditions that we thought we would put a ceiling on the ABM
in order to limit the Soviet ABM system, which Moscow had
already started to build. We also used the ABM treaty to
extract concessions from the Soviet Union in the SALT talks.

4

budget was being cut deeper each year by Congress. It was
not really until the advent of the Reagan Administration
that a plausible technology for strategic defense existed.

Initiative, I supported it. And I continue to support it for the same reasons.

[4]

That seemed to me to strengthen and not weaken the case
for missile defense. In the absence of missile defense,
penetration becomes totally predictable--a simple question
of mathematics. But it is different even when there exists
even a light missile defense. Since the aggressor does not
know which of his missiles will not get through, as the
threshold rises the inhibitions to an attack must also rise.
And in the Soviet case, I always felt that if they knew that
they would have to launch several hundred missiles or a hundred
missiles, whatever the number is, in order to get a
significant number through the missile defenses, that was a
lot safer for America than if they knew that any missile
that they launched was bound to get there.

[y]

[y]

The circumstances that existed when the treaty was drafted and agreed to were notably different from the situation today. Specifically, the current threats, as set forth by our Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, have moved us into a new national security environment, one that was not even considered, let alone anticipated when the ABM treaty was signed. The country that signed it, the USSR, has disappeared as a legal entity. Missile technologies have evolved in sophistication. The acceleration in the proliferation of ballistic missile and WMD technologies are putting capabilities in the hands of nations that were not even remotely considered to be candidates to possess such destructive power when the agreement was concluded.

One of the reasons ballistic missiles are attractive to so many countries is the well-known fact that there are currently no defenses against them. They are almost

7

[y]

guaranteed to arrive at their targets. Given their destructive power, they are terror weapons by their mere existence in the absence of deployed defenses. History teaches that weakness is provocative and, in a real sense, the absence of missile defense provokes others into seeking such weapons.

8

[y]

Secretary of Defense Cohen confirmed the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission on January 20, 1999, when he stated, "... we are affirming that there is a threat, and the threat is growing and that we expect it will soon pose a danger not only to our troops overseas but also to Americans here at home."

9

[y]

I share this view. Quite apart from the legal
arguments that are made by experts as to the possibility
that with the end of the USSR the treaty technically may no
longer be in force, the treaty was signed with an eye to an
environment that simply does not exist today. The threats
we face are now, mature and immediate.

10

[y]

I would favor the deployment of a nationwide missile defense system as soon as technologically possible. An impressive array of technical options cannot be adequately explored until we solve the problem of ABM treaty restrictions on development and testing. We need to find a way to end the restrictions the ABM treaty impose on the research, development, testing and deployment of missile defense systems as soon as possible.

11

forming along the same issue--whether the missile defense
system will work. There always will be those who make the
claim that a tremendous system is coming along five years
down the road, at which point, those same people will argue
that there is an even better one coming along five years
after that. So there will never be a "right time" for
deployment. [I have not followed the technology enough to
make a good judgment about which technology should be
deployed. But on the philosophical point of the need for
missile defense, I have no doubt.]

12

[y]

13

CYJ

DRAFT

5/25/99 #2

[y]

is to provide for the security of the people. To the extent
the U.S. has the ability to provide for the defense of the
country, it would be a dereliction of duty not to do so. I
cannot accept the proposition that we contribute to peace by
exposing our population to vast and foreseeable dangers as
an act of policy. I cannot imagine what an American
President would say to the American public if there should
be an attack, and if he would have to explain that he did
nothing to prevent or defeat the catastrophe. I think the
legitimacy of government would be threatened if such a
condition existed. So, for all these reasons, I have been
an advocate of missile defense.

2

But then we faced various oppositions from groups
dedicated to the mutual destruction. One group maintained
that the ABM system would not work. Another group said that
it would be destabilizing. Though the criticisms
contradicted each other, they impacted the Congress. As a
result, in every Congressional session, the number of
defense sites was reduced. By 1971, Congress had whittled
the proposed ABM system down to two defense sites. And it
was clear that these last two sites would be under pressure
in every budgetary cycle thereafter.

[4]

3

[y]

4

[y]

budget was being cut deeper each year by Congress. It was
not really until the advent of the Reagan Administration
that a plausible technology for strategic defense existed.
As soon as Reagan put forward his 1983 Strategic Defense
Initiative, I supported it. And I continue to support it
for the same reasons.

5

[y]

That seemed to me to strengthen and not weaken the case
for missile defense. In the absence of missile defense,
penetration becomes totally predictable--a simple question
of mathematics. But it is different even when there exists
even a light missile defense. Since the aggressor does not
know which of his missiles will not get through, as the
threshold rises the inhibitions to an attack must also rise.
And in the Soviet case, I always felt that if they knew that
they would have to launch two hundred missiles or a hundred
missiles, whatever the number is, in order to get a
significant number through the missile defenses, that was a
lot safer for America than if they knew that any missile
that they launched was bound to get there.

6

[y]

7

[y]

8

[y]

9

I share this view. Quite apart from the legal arguments that are made by experts as to the possibility that with the end of the USSR the treaty technically may no longer be in force, the treaty was signed with an eye to an environment that simply does not exist today. The threats we face are new, mature and immediate.

10

[y]

11

[y]

12

[y]

13

DRAFT

Let me begin with some qualifications. I am not a
technical expert. I have not had the opportunity to review
the provisions of
the treaty in detail. But I have thought about the
political and strategic implications of missile defense and
the impact on it of the ABM treaty. And the ABM treaty was
negotiated under my general aegis during the Nixon
Administration. Therefore let me explain my general view
about missile defense, how the ABM treaty came to be
negotiated, and where in my view we are now in a general

will respect &c A B D treaty
philosophical sense

[4]

the ability to provide for the defense of the country, it
would be a dereliction of duty not to do so. I was always
uneasy about the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. I
cannot accept the proposition that we ~~reckon people by~~
~~by approximately one population in ten four million~~
remaining vulnerable as an act of policy. And I cannot
~~wail~~
would
imagine what an American President will say to the American
public if there should be an attack, and if he would have to
~~explain~~
or defeat the argument
say that he did nothing to prevent it or to defeat it. I
think the legitimacy of government would be threatened if
such a condition existed. So, for all these reasons, I have
been an advocate of missile defense.

Then how did the ABM treaty come about? When President
Nixon came into office, one of his first acts was to propose
an ABM system. It was based on much more elementary
technology than now exists, but it provided for twelve
defense sites circling the United States and was put forward

2

[4]

From then on, the decision to destroy one group of defense sites was made by a special group of experts. Another group maintained that the ABM system would not work. Another group said that it would be destabilizing. Though the criticisms contradicted each other, they impacted the Congress. As a result, in every Congressional session, the number of defense sites was reduced. By 1971, Congress had whittled the proposed ABM system down to two defense sites. And it was clear that these last two sites would be cut in every two budgetary cycles. The process is under way.

The next cycle of defense reductions will begin in the next budgetary cycle.

3

[4]

I never felt comfortable with the ABM treaty. But
there was nothing we could do about it because the defense
budget was being cut deeper each year by Congress. It was
not really until the advent of the Reagan Administration
that a plausible basis for strategic defense existed. As

4

[4]

defense, the penetration becomes a simple question of mathematics. It is predictable. Since the aggressor does not know which of his missiles will not get through, as the threshold rises the inhibitions to an attack must also rise.

6

[y]

not even considered, let alone anticipated when the ABM
treaty was signed. The country that signed it, the USSR,
challenged as a legal entity
has changed. The recent technologies have evolved in
sophistication. The acceleration in the proliferation of
ballistic missile and WMD technologies are putting
capabilities in the hands of nations that were not even
remotely considered to be candidates to possess such
destructive power when the agreement was concluded.

One of the reasons ballistic missiles are attractive to
so many countries is the well-known fact that there are
currently no defenses against them. They are almost
guaranteed to arrive at their targets. Given their
destructive power of WMD, they are terror weapons. And
in absence of deployed defenses, their mere existence, without
being fired, terrorizes rational people. History teaches
that weakness is provocative and, in a real sense, the

7

[y]

8

[4]

[On the surface the positions of the Administration...]?

9

[4]

Therefore, we need to get about the task of negotiating
with Russia to amend the provisions of the existing ABM
treaty so that we are free to proceed promptly to develop
and deploy ballistic missile defenses that are the most cost
effective and the most technically capable of deterring and
defending against these new threats, and doing so without
inhibitions from the treaty. There is ample time to conduct
the necessary negotiations since the shape of the system is
still under consideration, and no violation would occur
until deployment. There are two qualifications: (1)

Research must not be delayed pending negotiations, and (2)

10

DRAFT

Let me begin with some qualifications. I am not a
technical expert. I have not had the opportunity to review
the treaty in detail. But I have thought about the
political and strategic implications of missile defense and
the impact on it of the ABM treaty. And the ABM treaty was
negotiated under my general aegis during the Nixon
Administration. Therefore let me explain my general view
about missile defense, how the ABM treaty came to be
negotiated, and where in my view we are now in a general
philosophical sense.

[4]

the ability to provide for the defense of the country, it
would be a dereliction of duty not to do so. I was always
uneasy about the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. I
cannot accept the proposition that we reassure people by
remaining vulnerable as an act of policy. And I cannot
imagine what an American President will say to the American
public if there should be an attack, and if he would have to
say that he did nothing to prevent it or to defeat it. I
think the legitimacy of government would be threatened if
such a condition existed. So, for all these reasons, I have
been an advocate of missile defense.

2

[4]

But then we faced various oppositions. One group
maintained that the ABM system would not work. Another
group said that it would be destabilizing. Though the
criticisms contradicted each other, they impacted the
Congress. As a result, in every Congressional session, the
number of defense sites was reduced. By 1971, Congress had
whittled the proposed ABM system down to two defense sites.
And it was clear that these last two sites would be cut in
the next budgetary cycle.

3

4

[y]

When President Reagan put forward his SDI proposal, a
group of concerned scientists came to see me in order to get
my signature on opposition to it. And they made the
traditional arguments--first, that it was destabilizing and
secondly, it wouldn't work. It is difficult to see how it
can be both. When I asked them to explain to me the
mechanics of how and why they believed it would not work at
various levels of attack, it was plain that at a fairly low
level of attack involving several hundred warheads, it
worked. According to these scientists, it worked fairly
well, but became degraded only as more and more warheads
were added to the attack.

5

If you can get an opponent into a position without a
defense, the penetration becomes a simple question of
mathematics. It is predictable. Since the aggressor does
not know which of his missiles will not get through, as the
threshold rises the inhibitions to an attack must also rise.
And take the Soviet case. I always felt that if they knew
that they would have to launch two hundred missiles or a
hundred missiles, whatever the number is, in order to get a
significant number through the missile defenses, that was a
lot safer for America than if they knew that any missile
that they launched was bound to get there.

[4]

6

[y]

not even considered, let alone anticipated when the ABM
treaty was signed. The country that signed it, the USSR,
has changed. The recent technologies have evolved in
sophistication. The acceleration in the proliferation of
ballistic missile and WMD technologies are putting
capabilities in the hands of nations that were not even
remotely considered to be candidates to possess such
destructive power when the agreement was concluded.

One of the reasons ballistic missiles are attractive to
so many countries is the well-known fact that there are
currently no defenses against them. They are almost
guaranteed to arrive at their targets. Given the
destructive power of WMD, they are terror weapons. And
without deployed defenses, their mere existence, without
being fired, terrorizes rational people. History teaches
that weakness is provocative and, in a real sense, the

7

[y]

8

[y]

[On the surface the positions of the Administration..]?

9

[y]

Therefore, we need to get about the task of negotiating
with Russia to amend the provisions of the existing ABM
treaty so that we are free to proceed promptly to develop
and deploy ballistic missile defenses that are the most cost
effective and the most technically capable of deterring and
defending against these new threats, and doing so without
inhibitions from the treaty. There is ample time to conduct
the necessary negotiations since the shape of the system is
still under consideration, and no violation would occur
until deployment. There are two qualifications: (1)
Research must not be delayed pending negotiations, and (2)
To the extent the Russians do not agree to the necessary
amendments, the alternative is to exercise our right, as

10

07 17 1995 4:44AM

FROM HERITAGE FOUNDATION 2026751758

P. 14

CYJ

THE ABM TREATY AND MISSILE DEFENSE

Document #5

I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to testify today on this very important subject. The ABM Treaty, which arguably served some strategic purpose when first negotiated, now increasingly has become an obstacle to the advancement of those interests. That treaty, negotiated a generation ago in a starkly different geopolitical environment with a state that no longer exists, has become historically and strategically outdated. The ABM Treaty has become a significant constraint on the ability of the United States government to fulfill its foremost responsibility -- to protect the people of the United States from external aggression.

I initially was an opponent of the ABM treaty. Now, this may sound strange since the ABM treaty was negotiated under my aegis during the Nixon Administration. Therefore let me explain my general view about missile defense, how the ABM treaty came to be negotiated, and where in my view we are now in a general philosophical sense.

I have always believed that it was morally indefensible for any administration to make the American population hostage to the Soviet Union or to any other potential attacker as a deliberate act of policy. As I wrote in my memoirs (White House Years, p. 208):

> "It seemed to me highly irresponsible simply to ignore the possibility of an accidental attack or the prospect of nuclear capabilities in the hands of yet more countries. China was only the first candidate. Others would follow. Without any defense an accidental launch could do enormous damage. Even a small nuclear power would be able to blackmail the United States. I did not see the moral or political value of turning our people into hostages by deliberate choice."

I have never believed in the doctrine of mutual vulnerability. I have never believed that you reassure another country by making yourself defenseless. I cannot accept the proposition that we reassure people by remaining vulnerable. And I cannot imagine what an American president will say to the American public if there should be an attack, and if he would have to say that he did nothing to prevent it or to defeat it. I think the legitimacy of government would be threatened if such a condition existed. So, for all these reasons, I have been an advocate of missile defense.

Then how did the ABM treaty come about? When President Nixon came into office, one of his first acts was to propose an ABM system. It was based on much more elementary technology than now exists, but it provided for twelve defense sites circling the United States and was put forward with the argument, which happened to be our strong conviction, that it would disabuse the Soviets of any temptations to risk a limited nuclear attack, prevent third country attacks, and protect against an accidental missile launch.

5-17-1999 4:45AM

FROM HERITAGE FOUNDATION 2026751/58

But then we faced opposition from the usual coalition. One group maintained that the ABM system would not work. Another group said that it would be destabilizing. And in every congressional session, the number of defense sites was reduced. By 1971, Congress had whittled the proposed ABM system down to two defense sites. And it was clear that these last two sites would be cut in the next budgetary cycle.

Limiting an ABM system to only two sites did not make any strategic sense. And by that point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not want to spend scarce resources on what they considered to be a essentially useless enterprise. We negotiated the ABM Treaty because we wanted to get something for what the U.S. Congress was going to do anyway - kill the ABM program. We did not want to lose our two sites without getting something from Moscow in return. The Soviet Union was expanding its military strength and our Congress was cutting back U.S. military strength. And it was under those conditions that we thought we would put a ce ling on the ABM in order to limit the Soviet ABM system, which Moscow had already started to build. We also used the ABM treaty to extract concessions from the Soviet Union in the SALT talks.

I never felt comfortable with the ABM treaty. But there was nothing we could do about it because the defense budget was being cut deeper each year by Congress. It was not really until the advent of the Reagan Administration that a plausible basis for strategic defense existed. As soon as Reagan put forward his 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative, I supported it. And I continue to support it for the same reasons.

When President Reagan put forward his SDI proposal, a group of concerned scientists came to see me in order to get my signature on opposition to it. And they made the traditional arguments -- first, that it was destabilizing and secondly it wouldn't work. It is difficult to see how it can be both. When I asked them to explain to me the mechanics of how and why they believed it would not work at various levels of attack, it was plain that at a fairly low level of attack involving several hundred warheads, it worked. According to these scientists, it worked fairly well, but became degraded only as more and more warheads were added to the attack.

That was the situation in 1972. Since that time, the geopolitical situation and strategic environment have radically changed. The opposition to missile defense has lost the moral high ground and the strategic arguments against it have become much weaker now that the

07-1999 4:45AM

Soviet Union has disappeared. Moreover, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology has greatly complicated the international situation.

The threat the U.S. faces from missile proliferation is real and growing. This was underscored last year by the Rumsfeld Commission, which stated that the threat posed by a number of hostile Third World states "is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community." Further, the Commission stated that "the U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational deployment" of missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory by these same states.

All of us need to recognize that at some point, and admittedly some will differ on where this point is, the ABM Treaty constrains the nation's missile defense programs to an intolerable degree. Secretary Cohen, also on January 20, stated that the Administration recognizes this fact and will require modifications to the Treaty. He also suggested that if an agreement on this issue, presumably with the Russians or others, could not be obtained, then the U.S. would consider withdrawal.

There has been some suggestion that the administration may want two ground based sites that would require amending the treaty. There are two problems with this: 1) the Russians will never agree, which gives them an effective veto; and 2) It conflicts with the basic concept of the treaty. Article I of the Treaty prohibits the deployment of a defense that is capable of defending all U.S. territory against missile attack. Article I even prohibits constructing the base for such a defense.

There seems to be no reconciling these two basic positions: why keep the treaty that prevents or limits a nationwide system if the purpose of the administration's plan, as evidenced by amending the treaty, is to defend the territory of the United States? If the threat is real, why limit the defensive response at all? This is an incoherent position that cannot be rationally sustained.

It makes little sense to argue that we must limit ourselves because of the need to continue strategic arms reductions with the Russians. First of all, the Russian Duma has not ratified START II and does not appear inclined to do so in the foreseeable future. Second, the Russians can ill afford another strategic arms race. Third, history shows that the Russians are more serious on arms reductions when we are serious about missile defense. This was the lesson of Ronald Reagan's SDI program, which was a factor in producing arms reductions in the 1980s. Finally, as a matter of principle, we should not let the Russians have a veto over whether we defend ourselves from Iraq, North Korea or other rogue states.

5-17-1999 4:46AM

FROM HERITAGE FOUNDATION 2026/51/58

The problem with the ABM Treaty is not only that it prevents the deployment of a nationwide ballistic missile defense. It also prevents the testing and development of advanced systems and technologies in space, on the sea and in the air that could make a system more effective. In other words, it forces our scientists to artificially constrain themselves in developing missile defense-related technologies.

Opponents of missile defense often argue that the necessary technologies are not ready. But at the same time they defend the ABM Treaty, which prevents robust development and testing. They cannot have it both ways. The most important constraints hampering the development of missile defense technologies are not scientific or cost-related constraints, but those imposed by the Clinton Administration's policy of upholding the outdated ABM Treaty.

Another element of strategic irrationality imposed by the ABM Treaty is that it allows the United States to provide a measure of missile defense for its allies that it denies its own people. I understand that the Clinton Administration is emphasizing theater missile defense for U.S. allies. It is difficult to understand why the administration would place a higher emphasis on defending allies than on defending Americans. The reason can not be a lack of technologies, because as I understand it, the same technologies that can be used for defending allies overseas can be used to defend Americans at home. The problem seems to be, once again, the ABM Treaty, which the administration apparently believes can more easily accommodate theater missile defenses than national missile defenses.

I support missile defense for U.S. allies. I do not support every application that is being made to this principle because I don't see any sense in starting a tremendous confrontation on something that is still theoretical. But I totally support the principle that the United States should build missile defenses for itself and its allies.

Absent the ABM Treaty, a global missile defense system based on Navy ships at sea, specifically Aegis cruisers supported by a variety of off-board sensors, could be used to defend U.S. friends and allies around the world, in addition to U.S. territory, in a way that is not provocative. The Navy Theater Wide (NTW) missile defense system is being developed as a theater system for deployment in 2007, but it is being politically constrained from having a national missile defense capability because of ABM Treaty considerations. Some experts believe that this would be the most cost-effective option.

The ABM Treaty also imposes constraints that go beyond the deployment of missile defenses. Article V of the Treaty, for example, prohibits even the development and testing of the sea-based option. The same limitation pertains to air-based, space-based and mobile land-based options. In other words, some of the most promising technical options are completely precluded by the basic provisions of the ABM Treaty.

If the U.S. is going to have rigorous testing program for missile defense, these

07-17-1999 4:47AM

limitations must be dropped. As I understand it, the Administration is even interpreting the ABM Treaty to mean that it prohibits the use of targeting data generated by satellite sensors by certain kinds of theater defense systems. I think that it is imperative that the U.S. removes these limitations and develops the most effective missile defense technologies.

I would favor the deployment of a nationwide missile defense system as soon as technologically possible. A lack of technology does not seem to be the problem. From what I have seen, there seems to be an impressive array of technical options that could be explored to protect against missile attacks. In any event, they cannot be adequately explored until we solve the problem of ABM Treaty restrictions on development and testing. I believe we need to find a way to end the restrictions the ABM Treaty impose on the research, development, testing and deployment of missile defense systems as soon as possible.

I believe that it is strategically and morally necessary to build a missile defense. Strategically, because of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missile technology to deliver them. Morally, the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, which I have opposed in my writings for at least thirty years, is bankrupt. It may have had a limited theoretical sense in a two-power nuclear world, but in a multinuclear world, it is reckless.

Therefore we cannot give any nation a veto over missile defense. We can talk to other nations about the world in which there will be a missile defense and how to manage it, but we cannot give any nation a veto.

I have no clear view how to handle the ABM Treaty, except that I would not let it stand in the way. First, it is possible to argue that the ABM Treaty was made with an entity that no longer exists. It is also possible to use the abrogation clause in the ABM Treaty, but I think that is not the key issue.

The key issue is whether it should be a national policy to build a missile defense. Are we serious about it? Are we going to fight the battles that have been going on now for twenty years? Are the battle lines are always forming along the same issue - whether the missile defense system will work. There always will be those who make the claim that a tremendous system is coming along five years down the road, at which point, those same people will argue that there is an even better one coming along five years after that. So there will never be a "right time" for deployment. I frankly have not followed the technology enough to make a good judgment about which technology should be deployed. But on the philosophical point of missile defense, I agree.

I do not want to get into a legal debate on the treaty, for I am not a lawyer. I understand that this committee has already heard from lawyers and legal scholars stating that in their view the ABM Treaty is no longer legally valid. I am sympathetic to that

5

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view, but I will leave it to them to explain the current legal status of the treaty.

However, I will say this: in my view, the collapse of the Soviet Union fundamentally changed the strategic context in which the ABM Treaty was both negotiated and implemented. Thus, from a strategic perspective, the treaty is no longer relevant. It seems logical to me that the fundamental change in circumstances brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union would have legal as well as policy implications. The political collapse of the Soviet Union and the impact of that collapse on strategic policy and the collapse of the ABM Treaty as a legally binding agreement, if that is deemed to be the case, should not be seen as merely coincidental events.

In conclusion, the U.S. needs to fashion a strategic defense policy that is realistic and strategically coherent. Either the missile threat is real, or it is not. If it is real, then the only strategically responsible policy is to find the quickest and most effective way to protect the American people against missile attack. There is no reason to pursue a missile defense program by attempting to amend the treaty, when the likely outcome of that process is the deployment of ineffective systems.

DONALD RUMSFELD

SUITE 405
400 NORTH MICHIGAN AVENUE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60611

TELEPHONE 312-645-0251
FACSIMILE 312-645-0258

MAY 19 1999

May 18, 1999

Via fax 212-759-0042
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Dear Henry:

I have thought a bit about your ABM Treaty testimony and put some ideas in the attached memo. I have also attached an old *Wall Street Journal* article which has brief statements by a number of people. There might be a useful thought or two in the article.

One of the people I talk to on this subject is Dr. Bill Graham. He is knowledgeable and understands not only the treaty but the technicalities of ballistic missile defense as well as the interaction between national and theater ballistic missile defense. Bill was President Reagan's Science Advisor and Deputy Director of NASA. He served on the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission with me and did an excellent job. In addition, he is on the Advisory Board to the Department of Defense Ballistic Missile Defense Office, so he is current. I've attached his contact information in case you wish to give him a call.

I hope this is helpful. Do send me a copy of your testimony when it is prepared.

Attachment

DR/nsp

051899.35(4)

Dr. William R. Graham
National Security Research, Inc.
1523 - 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
Voice: 202-462-7161
Fax: 202-462-7166
e-mail: wrgraham@erols.com

ABM Treaty

[As you discussed in the meetings this weekend, MAD is not an appropriate deterrent for the kinds of individuals who lead the countries of concern to us.]

The circumstances that existed when the treaty was drafted and agreed to were notably different from the situation today. Specifically, the current threats, as set forth by our Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, have moved us into a new national security environment, one that was not even considered, let alone anticipated when the ABM treaty was signed. The country that signed it, the USSR, has changed. The recent technologies have evolved in sophistication. The acceleration in the proliferation of ballistic missile and WMD technologies are putting capabilities in the hands of nations that were not even remotely considered to be candidates to possess such destructive power when the agreement was finalized.

Quite apart from the legal arguments that are made by experts as to the possibility that with the end of the USSR the treaty technically may no longer be in force, the treaty was signed with an eye to an environment that simply does not exist today. The threats we face are new, mature and immediate.

It may be possible to fashion ballistic missile defense systems that are treaty compliant, as some have argued. The problem with that concept is that our goal certainly ought not to be to have ballistic missile defense systems that are "treaty compliant." The only logical goal, given the new and emerging threats, is to have ballistic missile defense systems that are "threat compliant."

Therefore, we need to get about the task of negotiating with Russia to amend the provisions of the existing ABM treaty so that we are free to proceed promptly to develop and deploy ballistic missile defenses that are the most cost effective and the most technically capable of deterring and defending against these new threats, and doing so without inhibitions from the treaty. There is ample time to conduct the necessary negotiations since the shape of the system is still under consideration, and no violation would occur until deployment... It must be added, however, that to the extent the Russians do not agree to the necessary amendments, the alternative is to exercise our right, as provided in the treaty, to extend six months notification that we intend to withdraw from the treaty.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL THURSDAY, JUNE 20, 1996

# Do We Need a Missile Defense?

One of the defining issues between Bill Clinton and Bob Dole is missile defense. The Republicans' Defense of America Act would require Congress to select an antiballistic missile system next year and deploy it by 2003—possibly at the price of withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, under which the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed not to defend themselves from missile attack. Mr. Clinton, who sees no immediate threat, wants to study missile defense for three more years and then possibly deploy a system that is compatible with the ABM Treaty.

After many delays, the Defense of America Act is likely to come before the House soon. The bill has next to no chance in the Senate, where a motion to bring it to the floor for debate was filibustered by Democrats this month.

Is there a threat to national security? If so, how soon do we need a missile defense, what system should we deploy, and how much would it cost? Could an effective system be built under the limitations of the ABM Treaty?

We asked these questions of 11 defense experts.

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry:

The U.S. is committed to defending its territory, troops and allies against ballistic missile threats. Preventing missile proliferation and deterring use remain our first lines of defense, but they may not always work against terrorists or outlaw nations, such as Iran. That is why President Clinton has asked Congress for $3.4 billion this year and $14.1 billion over five years to strengthen our ballistic missile defenses.

Most of that money will go to defenses against the threat that is here and now—the shorter-range missiles like the Scuds that Saddam Hussein used against us in Desert Storm. Getting improved defenses against this immediate threat to our forces in the field is our highest priority. Rogue states do not currently have the capability to threaten U.S. territory with ballistic missiles and it is likely to be many years before they could. Our ballistic missile defense program positions us to be ready to

counter any ballistic missile threat to U.S. territory if and when it emerges.

Mr. Perry

A bill sponsored by Sen. Bob Dole and Rep. Newt Gingrich would mandate deployment of a ballistic missile defense for U.S. territory by 2003, whether or not a threat exists. By contrast, our program

calls for an intensive effort to develop a national missile defense system over the next three years. If we decide to begin production at that time, we would be ready to deploy by 2003. But if the threat has not emerged by then, we would continue to improve the technology.

We want to deploy the most capable system against an actual threat, not a less capable system against a hypothetical danger. Committing to a system before it is needed would waste resources that our military requires for other priorities, result in a defense that is obsolete when it is needed, and could undermine the ABM Treaty, thereby jeopardizing the elimination of thousands of nuclear warheads under the START I and II treaties.

Retired Air Force Gen. Charles A. Horner was commander in chief of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and the U.S. Space Command and director of the air campaign in Desert Storm:

It's a presidential election year but where is the debate on ballistic missile defense? Saddam Hussein used ballistic missiles against our forces and the families of our allies. Desert Storm was the wake-up call. So why no debate?

One reason is that many Americans think we already have such defenses. When I commanded the North America Aerospace Defense, visitors touring the operations center Inside Colorado's Cheyenne Mountain were asked what they thought of our ballistic missile defenses. Approximately 80% responded that they had confidence in our missile defenses: some described our defenses as "excellent" and "wonderful." In fact, such defenses don't exist.

A second reason is that the Clinton administration has not defined national security policies to replace the outdated guidance used to fight the Cold War. We have declared victory over the Soviet Union, yet we and Russia have been unable to shed the Cold War logic of "mutually assured destruction." The ABM Treaty may have made sense a quarter of a century ago, but today we need a new vision based on the recognition that war between Russia and the U.S. is unlikely but that there are serious threats to each of our homelands. In fact, Russia has greater need at this time for missile defenses due to its proximity to North Korea, China, India, Iran and others. This could provide a basis for cooperation, as Bob Dole has suggested.

We need missile defenses now. The technologies needed for a variety of defense systems have been developed. Every day we delay deployment encourages our potential enemies to develop or acquire long-range missiles. I know firsthand that a ballistic missile is an ultimate form of terror. We couldn't stop them during Desert Storm and we can't stop them now. It's time we started the debate and informed our people. They'll know what to do if given the facts.

* * *

Frank J. Gaffney Jr. served in senior positions in the Reagan Defense Department and is now coordinator of the Coalition to Defend America:

The nation's inability to intercept even a single ballistic missile launched at this country is an invitation to disaster. China's recent use of missiles to coerce and intimidate Taiwan, coupled with its threat to attack Los Angeles if the U.S. interfered, is but the most recent evidence that neither American interests nor terrorism can be properly safeguarded as long as vulnerability to missile attack persists. These developments also underscore

that the danger is both clear and present—not, as the Clinton administration disingenuously contends, a problem at least 15 years off.

It seems clear that the U.S. will ultimately deploy robust, global antimissile systems. In all likelihood, it will do so starting with near-term, affordable capabilities at sea. Thanks to the nearly $50 billion that the U.S. has already invested to purchase and operate a fleet of Navy crUISers carrying Aegis antiaircraft missiles and radars, it can rapidly modify these systems to intercept both shorter- and long-range ballistic missiles. By so doing, it can begin defending Americans—as well as our friends and forces overseas—in as little as three years for an additional investment of just $2 billion to $3 billion.

The question is: Will deployment occur before the U.S. needs these defenses or will they be put into place after a catastrophic attack has occurred?

Robert G. Bell is senior director of the National Security Council:

The administration's strategy for defending against the growing danger of weapons of mass destruction relies on three lines of defense.

First is prevention. This includes implementing the two Start treaties, which would remove two-thirds of the strategic nuclear weapons that threatened us at the height of the Cold War. It includes ratifying the treaty banning chemical weapons, obtaining an indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Missile Technology Control Regime, and negotiating a nuclear framework accord with North Korea.

Second is deterrence. Any rogue nation foolish enough to contemplate using weapons of mass destruction against the U.S., our armed forces or our allies must not be confused about how we would respond. As Defense Secretary Perry has stated, it would be "devastating" and "absolutely overwhelming."

The third line of defense is our theater missile defense and national missile defense programs. Both reflect a rational assessment of the missile threat.

For the immediate threat from Scuds and other missiles with ranges of less than 1,000 kilometers, we have deployed upgraded Patriots and are poised to deploy more advanced Patriots (PAC-3) and Navy Lower Tier theater missile defenses. For the emerging threat of longer-range theater ballistic missiles, we are developing the Army Theater High Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) and the Navy Upper Tier theater missile defenses, with deployment planned after the end of the decade. The third threat is the prospect that a rogue state will obtain a strategic ballistic missile that could threaten our homeland. The intelligence community does not believe it is likely that we will face such a threat to the continental U.S. within the next 15 years. We are developing a deployment option for national missile defense that could be fielded by 2003, eight years in advance of that date. The North Korean Taepo Dong II might be able to reach parts of Alaska and Hawaii in the 2000-2005 timeframe. If that threat should materialize, we are prepared to deal with it.

This is a sound plan that enjoys the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Caspar W. Weinberger, chairman of the Reagan administration:

Ballistic missiles constitute a major threat to the U.S. Other nations that are or could become politically unstable have these nightmare weapons now—and we have no defense of any kind against them.

This threat is magnified many times by three things:

1) Even if we started today, it would take us at least three to four years to deploy even a rudimentary defense against ballistic missiles.

2) We cannot take even the first steps to deploy any effective defense as long as we

refuse to end our adherence to the ABM Treaty.

3) The Clinton administration is so adamantly against any effective defense against these missiles that the president veues every congressional attempt to begin development and deployment of an effective defense; and the president and the

State Department Russia's demands by negotiating to "strengthen" the ABM Treaty so that it would prevent even reasonably effective defenses against shorter-range missiles.

Recently, the Clinton administration has been following its usual tactic—blocking every effort to begin work leading to deployment of even a roughly $5 billion plan for sea-based defenses while contending that there is no threat now and that the soonest other nations could acquire attack missiles is "at least a decade away." A decade is an extremely short time, even assuming the Clinton estimate is right. There are major doubts about his self-deluding guess. Mr. Clinton in effect laughs off the present threat, saying that the risk is too minimal to warrant the cost. But he has given us no estimate of the cost of replacing the hundreds of thousands of people that would be killed and the cities destroyed by missiles ready to be fired now, and against which we have no defense at all.

Mr. Weinberger

* * *

Fred C. Ikle, *undersecretary of defense in the Reagan administration, is with the Center for Strategic and International Studies:*

Among quite a few influential Americans a curious belief lingers from the worst years of the Cold War like a hereditary illness. This belief, apparently held by President Clinton and several of his senior officials, maintains that the U.S. must preserve a treaty negotiated with (and violated by) Brezhnev's Soviet Union obligating "both sides" to remain totally undetermined against ballistic missile attack.

The ABM Treaty was based on three assumptions. First, that only one "other side"—the former Soviet Union—will realistically threaten the U.S. with nuclear-armed missiles. Second, that this single "other side" remains locked in an irreconcilable conflict with the U.S. And third, that the "other side's" government will always be in control of all its missiles.

Since none of these assumptions obtains today, those who still hold to this belief prefer to clothe it with all sorts of technical and fiscal reasoning. To build missile defenses, they argue, would divert too much money from other priorities of the defense budget—as if the defense of the U.S. against the most catastrophic kind of attack were not a high priority. Or they argue that the missiles of countries that might want to threaten the U.S. with nuclear attack do not yet have the range to reach the U.S.—as if it would take more time to extend existing missiles' range than to build missile defenses.

Or they point out—correctly—that nuclear and other mass destruction weapons could be smuggled into the U.S. or delivered by aircraft. This argument is like saying we should not lock the front door because a thief could come in through the back door that we also left open. Of course, the several routes of attack must be defended against; and of course, such defenses can never be guaranteed to be perfect.

Donald Rumsfeld was secretary of defense during the Ford administration.

Only someone deep in denial can contend that the U.S. cannot be threatened by ballistic missiles. Rogue states like Iran, Iraq and North Korea have made clear

their determination to acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. China and Russia, if inclined, could threaten many countries, near and far, with nuclear missiles. Missiles are a weapon of choice for intimidation, precisely because the world

knows that once a missile is launched, the U.S. is not capable of stopping it.

Under the ABM Treaty, the U.S. chose to deter the Soviet missile threat exclusively by offensive means. That approach is inadequate as weapons proliferate among rogue regimes that may not behave rationally. The U.S. must have insurance against missile attacks and against missile blackmail.

Cost is not a reason not to move ahead; it is only an excuse. We can deploy an affordable defense against limited attacks on the U.S. and highly effective protection against theater missile attacks against U.S. and allied forces oversens by upgrading the Navy's Aegis cruisers. Improving radar and battle management systems and deploying ship-based interceptors would provide mobile antimissile platforms costing less than 2% of the annual defense budget. This is a bargain compared to the human and material cost of a single missile strike on the U.S., or our forces abroad.

History teaches conclusively that weakness is provocative. We know that deterrents work. The way to avoid the threat of weapons of mass destruction is to establish the certain knowledge that such weapons cannot be effectively used against the U.S. It is irresponsible not to do so promptly.

Mr. Rumsfeld

James Schlesinger was director of Central Intelligence (in the Nixon administration), secretary of defense (under Nixon and Ford) and secretary of energy (under Carter):

There appears to be little dispute regarding the need for theater missile defense to protect our forces and selected allies. The lingering debate is over the need for aggressive development and deployment of national defenses for the U.S. itself.

I believe the case for deployment of a thin area defense, once a system has been adequately tested, is overwhelming. Over time ballistic missiles that can reach the U.S. will become available to rogue nations. The recent Chinese hit that Los Angeles was more important to Americans than Taiwan tells us that others believe that the U.S. may be susceptible to nuclear blackball—with its inhibiting effects on U.S. foreign policy. One must also recall that in recent years Russia itself has drifted toward a "first use" nuclear doctrine.

When should deployment occur? It is not necessary to set a date. Development should be pursued aggressively with all deliberate speed. The date for deployment (in the early years of the next century) should be determined only after completion of testing and after proper program definition. Program costs will depend on the design of the system but ultimately the deployment will cost in the tens of billions of dollars.

Finally, if the Russians are wise, a modest and thin area defense should be achievable within the framework of a modified ABM Treaty. Such a defense is, incidentally, in keeping with the treaty's original concept. The treaty has been amended in the past: it can be amended again. To preserve the treaty—a major symbol of their international status—the Russians likely are prepared to pay a price. But preserving the treaty should not be the primary objective of our negotiators—if it means exclusion of a national missile defense.

Edward Teller is a physicist who worked on the Manhattan Project and helped develop thermonuclear energy:

Accelerating development of technology has increased military dangers in the world and decreased the security of the U.S. The oceans no longer protect us. This is a fact that American public opinion prefers to ignore. The present government in Washington goes along with it.

More than 20 nations already have some means of missile attack. These missiles may carry conventional explosives, chemical or biological weapons, or atomic bombs. The danger is growing, but it is present even at this time.

A real possibility of missile defense exists and its cost has been overestimated. Figures like $60 billion have been mentioned. Such a high expenditure is connected with our neglect of the most effective defense-shooting down missiles shortly after takeoff, which is when they are most vulnerable. Even $60 billion distributed over 10 years is less than 3% of our military expenditures. Is it not the first duty of our armed forces to defend the American people?

The ABM Treaty certainly makes deployment and even planning of defense more difficult. It is obsolete and should be replaced by a multilateral treaty requiring the announcement of the firing, the purpose and the orbit of any missiles.

Henry F. Cooper was director of the Strategic Defense Initiative during the Bush administration and chief U.S. negotiator at the General defense and space talks during the Reagan administration.

America's vulnerability to ballistic missile attack is a leadership failure of potentially disastrous proportions. Defending against this threat has been possible for years but the necessary political will has been missing. When President Reagan and Bush pressed to deploy effective defenses, Congress undermined progress. Now that most in Congress want to proceed, President Clinton is dragging his feet. Throughout, Ideological commitment to the ABM Treaty—as negotiated in 1972, at the Cold War's peak—prevented development and deployment of the most affordable, most effective defenses. We must choose: either affordable, effective defenses and a significantly amended (or no) ABM Treaty or continued vulnerability.

While the layered defense I believe we ultimately need will cost around $30 billion and take at least a decade to build, we can end America's total vulnerability in this decade for $2 billion to $3 billion. This is possible because the U.S. Navy has already invested $50 billion in its Aegis air defense system deployed on 22 cruisers around the world. With freedom from ABM Treaty constraints, the Navy could adapt this existing infrastructure to begin defending America and our overseas troops and allies by the end of the decade. This we should do while debating what comes next.

James Woolsey, formerly President Clinton's director of Central Intelligence, now practices law in Washington.

Within the very near future theater-range ballistic missiles will threaten most of our allies, our overseas bases and some U.S. territory (e.g. a North Korean threat to Alaska). There is also the existing threat of Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles. Future instability in, or accidental launches from, Russia and China cannot be ignored. And the international trade in space-launch vehicles

and other technology transfers create uncertainty about the speed with which this situation will worsen.

Mr. Woolsey

Work on our vital Army and Navy theater defensive systems seems to be constrained both by inadequate funding and by the administration's agreeing to discuss Russian demands that we "dumb down" these theater systems, going beyond what is required in the ABM Treaty (which does not limit theater defenses). We should not do this.

We would probably need at least two antiballistic missile sites to provide a thin protection of the whole U.S. against small attacks. This could be done, for several billion dollars more than current programs cost, under a modified version of the original 1972 ABM Treaty. Protecting all 50 states under the treaty's 1974 version, which limits us to one site, is probably not feasible. A cheaper national defense, but one that would require withdrawal from the treaty or at least a major revision, would use an upgraded version of the Navy's Upper Tier theater missile defense system. Space-based defenses could be yet more effective, but they would also be more expensive and would clearly conflict with the treaty.