organizational needs include the shift in emphasis in the Alliance, to which I referred earlier, from sole reliance on the U.S. commitment to greater inter-dependence, and the shifting balance of military power between the two major groups of nations as new weapons, strategies and policies are developed and placed into operation.

The web of interrelated responsibilities for Berlin dramatizes the issues. In a legal sense, the integrity of Berlin itself is a tripartite responsibility of Britain, France and the U.S., for our continued presence there is legally based upon our "right of occupation" derived from World War II. This places the responsibility for political and at least any initial military action for maintaining access to, and viability within, the Berlin community on these three powers. Therefore, one level of our Berlin contingency planning is tripartite in nature.

However, we recognize of course that the Federal Republic has
obvious special interests and responsibilities towards Berlin, and that
West Germany contributes a major portion of the NATO forces which would

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West Germany contributes a major portion of the NATO forces which would
obvious special interests and responsibilities towards Berlin, and that
However, we recognize of course that the Federal Republic has
Berlin contingency planning is tributary in nature.

the Berlin community on these three powers. Therefore, one level of our
initial military action for maintaining access to, and viability within,
War II. This places the responsibility for political and at least any
on these powers.

there is legally based upon our right of occupation" derived from World
reasonability of Britain, France and the U.S., for our continued presence
issuance. In a legal sense, the integrity of Berlin itself is a tributary
The web of interrelated responsibilities for Berlin dramatizes the
policies are developed and placed into operation.

between the two major groups of nations as new weapons, strategies and
Greater Inter-dependence, and the shifting balance of military power
which I referred earlier, from sole reliance on the U.S. commitment to
organisational needs include the shift in emphasis in the Alliance, to

be engaged in any large-scale conflict which might follow. Therefore,

the three powers include representatives of West Germany in the bulk

of their planning of their actions to meet the various contingencies

which may arise in Berlin. A quadripartite Ambassadorial group (as

well as more senior and more junior four-power groups) meet in Washington

upon call -- often several times a week -- to work out these common

contingency plans. This is a second level of this multilateral planning.

NATO adds a third level. Should a conflict break out involving

a defense by the three powers of their Berlin responsibilities, it

would almost certainly lead to a coming into force of the NATO Treaty

obligation of all the Alliance powers. NATO as an institution, as well

as each of its members, rightly expects to be kept informed about the

contingency planning done by the quadripartite organization, and to have

some of the initiative themselves, for their destiny is also at stake.

Through Secretary General Stikker and our respective permanent NAC

representatives we have tried to keep them informed. Sometimes we have
accommodate their expectations.

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representatives we have tried to keep-shorn of information. Sometimes we have
Omnibus Outline of Operations

Through Secretary General Stikker and our respective permanent MAC
some of the initiative themselves, for their destinies is also at stake.
contingency planning done by the quadripartite organization, and to have
as each of its members, rightly expects to be kept informed about the
obligation of all the Alliance powers. NATO as an institution, as well
would almost certainly lead to a coming into force of the NATO Treaty
a defense by the three powers of their Berlin responsibilities, it

NATO adds a third level. Should a conflict break out involving
contingency plans. This is a second level of this multilateral planning.
upon call -- often several times a week -- to work out these common
well as more senior and more junior four-brower groups) meet in Washington
which may arise in Berlin. A quadripartite Ambasadorial group (as
of their planning of these actions to meet the various contingencies
the three powers include representatives of West Germany in the bulk
be engaged in any large-scale conflict which might follow. Therefore,

not done as good a job toward the NAC as we should, but the pace of
action among the 15 is generally slower than among the four and the
problems are urgent. This skeleton account of the relationship between
the groups participating in the Berlin planning process illustrates
the complexities of getting speedy, responsible, forceful action in
an Alliance of free nations. Yet we need such action in response to
centrally directed provocations from the Communist side if we are to
survive. Allied response to the recent incidents in the Berlin air
corridors is a product of the foregoing planning mechanism. I think
this shows that a multilateral alliance of free nations which take
their responsibilities seriously can act decisively and successfully
in the face of such provocations.

Prescience within the Alliance in perceiving early the critical
areas which may require swift, efficient decisions and actions in a
crisis gives us the opportunity of working out in advance an agreed
procedure to achieve such swift decisions and actions. Such agreement
may well require statesmanship as well as analysis of the problem and

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may well require statesmanship as well as analysis of the problem and
procedure to achieve such swift decisions and actions. Such agreement
crises gives us the opportunity of working out in advance an agreed
area which may require swift, efficient decisions and actions in a
precaution within the Alliance in perceiving early the critical

In the face of such provocations.

their responsibilities seriously can act decisively and successfully
this shows that a multilateral alliance of free nations which takes
corridors is a product of the foregoing planning mechanism. I think
survive. Allied resistance to the recent incidents in the Berlin air
centrally directed provocations from the Communist side if we are to
an Alliance of free nations. Yet we need such action in response to
the complexities of getting speedy, reasonable, forceful action in
the groups participating in the Berlin planning process illustrates
problems are urgent. This skeleton account of the relationship between
action among the 12 is generally slower than among the four and the
not done as good a job toward the MAC as we should, but the pace of

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development of a technically feasible solution.

The current military problems of the Alliance are two-fold. The first is to get on with the non-nuclear build-up so that a broad range of options will be available to NATO to reply to Communist provocations. The range should not be limited to either surrender or all-out nuclear war. The core of the second range of military problems is nuclear weapons. We need enough nuclear power to deter Soviet adventurism or to prevail if deterrence should fall. The present preeminence of U.S. nuclear power available for the defense of the Atlantic Alliance is, I think, clear to all. Yet, it is understandable that the European members of NATO wish to assure themselves that the combined nuclear striking power of the U.S. and the other nuclear forces at the disposal of NATO are organized and capable -- and will be used if necessary -- to meet the Soviet threat to Western Europe itself.

Sharing participation in the decision to use nuclear weapons --
if we are to be confronted with such a decision -- is a knotty, if not

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If we are to be confronted with such a decision -- is a knotty, if not sharing participation in the decision to use nuclear weapons -- to meet the Soviet threat to Western Europe itself.

of NATO are organised and capable -- and will be used if necessary -- striking power of the U.2. and the other nuclear forces at the disposal members of NATO wish to assure themselves that the combined nuclear I think, clear to all. Yet, it is understandable that the European nuclear power available for the defense of the Atlantic Alliance is, prevail if deterrence should fail. The present preeminence of U.2. weapons. We need enough nuclear power to deter Soviet adventure or to war. The core of the second range of military problems is nuclear The range should not be limited to either surrender or all-out nuclear of options will be available to NATO to reply to Communist provocations. first is to get on with the non-nuclear build-up so that a broad range The current military problems of the Alliance are two-fold. The development of a technically feasible solution.

insoluble, problem. Much talk about the sharing of 'control'' has
centered on a false issue: the balancing of 15[2] or perhaps 4-- fingers on
the trigger. Or is it a safety catch? To the extent that the debate
has focussed on this issue, it appears to miss an important distinction.

Of all things, last minute command is least divisible. Here, it
seems to me, it is difficult to put the responsibility upon anyone other
than the U.S. President, with the understanding that he will consult with
the NAC and the allies to the extent time may permit. He can, of course,
commit himself to operate within pre-agreed guidelines. The formulation
of policy for the contingencies in which the trigger might be pulled, the
elaboration of force structures and strategies for operation and negotia-
tion will determine what choices can be made, not only at the last minute,
but must be made well before the last minute. It is here that we should seek a broader,
more effective, and more responsible participation by the partners of NATO.

Realizing that the critical component of the over-all forces available
in a NATO war will be the national forces of the U.S. and we have targeted

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in a NATO war will be the national forces of the U.S. and we have targeted
Realizing that the critical component of the overall all forces available
more effective, and more reasonable participation by the partners of NATO.
but must be made well before it is here that we should seek a broader
tion will determine what choices can be made not only of the last minute-
elaboration of force structures and strategies for operation and negotia-
of policy for the contingencies in which the trigger might be pulled, the
commit himself to operate within pre-agreed guidelines. The formulation
the MAC and the allies to the extent time may permit. We can, of course,
than the U.S. President, with the understanding that he will consult with
seems to me, it is difficult to but the reasonability upon anyone other
has focused on this issue, it appears to miss an important distinction,
the trigger. Or is it a safety catch? To the extent that the debate
centered on a false issue: the balancing of 125 or perhaps 4 fingers on
insoluble problem. Much talk about the sharing of control" has

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these forces for the benefit of the entire alliance. Our national
targetting system dovetails with and sometimes *doubles up* duplicates coverage of
Soviet nuclear installations threatening Western Europe. It is important
that the Europeans know this to be so. My guess is that is is not quite
enough for the U.S. to assure you of this and that those Europeans
favoring independent national nuclear forces, a "European" nuclear
force or a greater NATO nuclear force derive in substantial measure from
an uneasiness about reliance on a system over which they have no control.

Of course, any of these forces would be of doubtful value unless so
correlated with U.S. national nuclear forces as to be operationally a
single force. Perhaps there is value--although I think it may be more
psychological than military--in enhancing the nuclear forces at the
disposal of NATO. A land-based strategic force in Europe has many
serious detriments. In a second strike situation it is likely to have
Insufficient warning time to get off the ground. It would be a travesty
if we should shoot part of our nuclear force without a coordinated over-
all attack designed to do the job properly. It seems to me imperative
that the command nuclear decision be a unitary one and should be --

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that the command nuclear declaration be a military one and should be
all attack designed to do the job properly. It seems to me imperative
if we should shoot part of our nuclear force without a coordinated over-
unufficient warning time to get off the ground. It would be a travesty
serious detriments. In a second strike situation it is likely to have
disappear of NATO. A land-based strategic force in Europe has many
psychological than military--in enhancing the nuclear forces at the
single force. Because there is value--although I think it may be more
correlated with U.S. national nuclear forces as to be operationally a
of course, any of these forces would be of doubtful value unless so
an unneCESSARY about reliance on a system over which they have no control.
force or a greater NATO nuclear force derive in substantial measure from
favoring independent national nuclear forces, a "European" nuclear
enough for the U.S. to assure you of this and that those Europeans
that the Europeans know this to be so. My guess is that it is not quite
Soviet nuclear installations threatening Western Europe. It is important
targeting system dovetails with and sometimes affords coverage of
these forces for the benefit of the entire alliance. Our national

1 - 18 -

by the President of the U.S. in accordance with NATO guide-lines agreed upon in advance. Any other system is simply not workable. This reasoning leads me to the judgment that increased participation by the Alliance in nuclear decisions should be in the area of policy formulation, preparations and planning. These will be largely determinative of our course of action in the moments of crisis when military command is imperative.

I have outlined for you several major features of U.S. defense policy. First, NATO is central to the U.S. defense and national security objectives in much the same way as the U.S. is central to those of the NATO powers. Second, we are building a stronger nuclear force as well as a stronger non-nuclear capability. Third, we believe that our NATO allies should concentrate more vigorously on the non-nuclear buildup than they have to date. Fourth, we recognize that the existence of difficult problems of NATO organization which should have trans-Atlantic solutions. We believe these problems can be, and are being, worked out with the good-will and recognition of mutual interdependence. Finally, we

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with the good-will and recognition of mutual interdependence. Finally, we
solutions. We believe these problems can be, and are being, worked out
difficult problems of NATO organization which should have trans-Atlantic
than they have to date. Fourth, we recognize that the existence of
allies should concentrate more vigorously on the non-nuclear build-up
as a stronger non-nuclear capability. Third, we believe that our NATO
NATO powers. Second, we are building a stronger nuclear force as well
objectives in much the same way as the U.2. is central to those of the
policy. Fifth, NATO is central to the U.2. defense and national security
I have outlined for you several major features of U.2. defense
imperative.

course of action in the moments of crisis when military command is
preparations and planning. These will be largely determinative of our
in nuclear decisions should be in the area of policy formulation,
leads me to the judgment that increased participation by the Alliance
upon in advance. Any other system is simply not workable. This reasoning
by the President of the U.2. in accordance with NATO guide-lines agreed

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are deeply committed to NATO.

The leadership which the U.S. has shown in the course of the present Berlin situation, including our continued deployment of over five divisions to the continent of Europe, have amply demonstrated the fullness of our commitment to the defense of Europe. It has never been more fully accepted in the U.S. than it is today, and my recent experiences here on the continent lead me to believe that the Europeans are much less concerned over the certainty of our commitment than they may have been in times past. The fact that we have extra European interests which diverge from time to time to those of our NATO allies, will lead us from time to time to disagreements, but these are the kind of frictions which friends who share important common interests in greater things are perhaps bound to have. Nevertheless, they will not rupture the fundamental friendship and mutual obligations.

We strongly believe that NATO's political as well as military problems are solvable if we all continue to work and sacrifice together toward a common goal--which is rooted in our mutual defense but encompassing something bigger: our shared beliefs in the freedom and democratic institutions which characterize Western civilization.

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which characterise Western civilization.

thing bigger: our shared beliefs in the freedom and democratic institutions common goal--which is rooted in our mutual defense but encompassing some-
are solvable if we all continue to work and sacrifice together toward a
We strongly believe that NATO's political as well as military problems
and mutual obligations.

to have. Nevertheless, they will not rupture the fundamental friendship
who share important common interests in greater things are perhaps bound
time to disagreements, but these are the kind of frictions which friends
from time to time to those of our NATO allies, will lead us from time to
divisions to the continent of Europe, have amply demonstrated the fullness
Berlin situation, including our continued deployment of over five
The leadership which the U.S. has shown in the course of the present
are deeply committed to NATO.

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