WEDNESDAY MORNING - 6 DECEMBER 1972

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Wednesday, Dec. 6, 1972

B11

# An Admiral's Gift to the Nation

By Jack Anderson

Men who achieve in government often cash in after they retire by writing books. Lyndon Johnson collected $1.2 million for his memoirs. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger reportedly are being approached with $1 million offers for their writings.

But at least one prominent public servant is asking nothing except a couple of complimentary copies of his book. He is crusty, old Admiral Hyman Rickover, who rose from obscurity and overcame adversity to push upon the Navy a nuclear submarine that the brass didn't want.

Thus, Rickover, the son of a Polish pants presser, achieved fame in his time. He could have collected tens of thousands in royalties, therefore, for his book, "Eminent Americans: Namesakes of the Polaris Submarine Fleet." But the 316-page book would have cost at least $10 if it had been published commercially in hardback.

The 72-year-old seafarer told us from his hospital bed, where he is recovering from a heart attack, that he wants to

ton to George Washington Carver, and include comedian Will Rogers, revolutionary patriot Casimir Pulaski, Hawaiian King Kamehameha, Daniel Boone and Indian hero Tecumseh.

Ruth died last May before she could see her work in print, but the book is dedicated touchingly to her.

The printing arrangement was unusual. Congress authorized its own printing of 12,000 copies, then specifically allowed Rickover to publish the book commercially if he wished. Rickover chose not to make a penny.

Footnote: The book is available for $1.25 (mailing included) from the Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20042, Stock number 5271-00315, House Document number 92-345.

## Greek Gift-Bearer

A Greek national made a secret $15,000 gift to President Nixon's campaign and got a $4.7 million contract a few months later to refuel the U.S. 6th Fleet in Greece.

The golden Greek is Nicholas Vardinoviannis of Motor

Nixon campaign early this year, but it didn't get reported until Nov. 2.

The timing of the contribution could not have been better for a man bent on making money from the Republican administration. It came just as the Navy was deciding to give the 6th Fleet a homeport in Greece.

The gift raises a possible criminal question. If the Justice Department can prove that Vardinoviannis was conducting even informal "negotiations" at the time of the gift, then he was in violation of federal laws governing foreign contractors. Formal Pentagon solicitation of bids did not begin until May, some weeks after the gift.

This is not the only slippery question in the Navy's deal with the Greeks on the use of Athens as a homeport. There is a mystery over a $5 million "relocatable pier" being built for the fleet's destroyers there.

It began when the Navy chief, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, vowed to Congress that "we do not have any intention to build military facilities for our

A crusading Greek exile, Elias Demetracopoulos, tipped off Congress to Zumwalt's seeming inconsistency. Now, Reps. Ben Rosenthal, (D-N.Y.) and Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.), chairmen of the House European and Near East subcommittees, have asked the General Accounting Office to investigate.

Still more trouble is in the offing. Assistant Defense Secretary Warren Nutter has assured Congress that the main reason for homeporting is to keep Navy "families together rather than apart" by bringing wives to Athens. But the Navy's guide for sailors gives a racier vista on homeporting.

In a "Q and A" section, the guide asks: "Does Athens have any 'action'?" Then it answers itself, "Yes... Ask another single man who has been here for awhile. In addition to the domestic variety, the tourist traffic is considerable... Also, American servicewomen and government secretaries are not exactly wallflowers."

Footnote: The Defense Department assured us that there was nothing political in

Confidential

Foreign Report

Published by The Economist Newspaper Limited
25 St. James's Street, London SW1A 1HG

1274 6 December 1972

## Contents

* Mr Nixon and the 'European Year'
* Allende in quest of the Holy Grail
* Dim prospects for Salt 2
* How far will France back Amin?

# Mr Nixon and the 'European Year'

The reappointment of **Henry Kissinger**, as President Nixon's top adviser on foreign affairs and as head of the National Security Council, is one of the few positive developments in the western world in the past week. Reports that friction has arisen between President Nixon and his chief adviser over the Vietnam negotiations have been widely attributed to the machinations of President Thieu, in his effort to get better terms for the Vietnam ceasefire agreement.

In fact, there has been a significant degree of disharmony within the 'Kissinger shop' - and much well-informed speculation about Kissinger's future. This seems to have been dispelled by the definite announcement that Kissinger will continue in his present post and that, for the time being, Mr Rogers, the Secretary of State, will continue in his. Between them, they will have immense problems to sort out, in terms of the United States' relations with Europe and the relations between the west and the communist powers.

Insofar as any definite lines of policy have been laid out, it seems clear that the Nixon Administration will insist on what is termed a 'comprehensive' arrangement with western Europe on the major issues: defence problems, the monetary issue, and the enormous questions of trade relations between Europe and America, and between both Europe and America and the third world.

It is widely said that the relationship between the United States and Europe is in a period of 'fluidity' or 'movement'; in fact the more appropriate word is confusion.

FILE COPY

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The irony is that this coincides with the Americans' determination that 1973 should be the 'European year'. Who exactly determined that 1973 should be the European year is by no means clear; the genesis of the notion is widely ascribed to Mr. Nixon and/or Mr. Kissinger. Because of the confusion that now exists in Europe, it can at least be argued that 1973 is not the best year to be chosen as the European year.

Sophisticated European observers are suspicious of the whole concept; they feel, intuitively, that the calendar-conscious Americans will try to fit all the world's problems into an arbitrary framework, to ensure that as from 1 January, 1973, Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger will devote all their energies to the problems of Europe. Diplomacy cannot in practice be conducted according to the calendar.

These points were thrashed out at the recent conference at Valley Forge of the 'Interdoc' organisation (International Documentation and Research Centre, based on The Hague), attended by a fairly select group of experts in the fields of diplomacy, politics, journalism and intelligence. The American delegates, headed by the former Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, argued pragmatically that, because of the 'pile-up' of international conferences affecting Europe's future - the European 'security conference', the Salt negotiations, and the talks on MBFR - the Nixon Administration had no option but to regard 1973 as the crucial year for Europe. European delegates tended to stress the importance of working out clear-cut lines of policy before the west entered into negotiations with the Russians.

The 'Interdoc' conference was only one of several similar gatherings designed to offer guide-lines for future relations between America and Europe, in relation to the Russians' long-term objectives. The Atlantic Treaty Association will hold a similar conference in Holland in the new year. Last week, the North Atlantic Assembly met in Bonn; those present included 22 American senators.

From the welter of expertise, a few basic conclusions can be drawn. Specifically:

(i) **The Nixon approach:** Whether the Europeans like it or not, the Nixon Administration is going to press for a 'comprehensive' deal with Europe. The jargon varies. Some pundits describe it as an 'across-the-board' deal; others, in the more simplistic language of yesteryear, talk about 'linkage'. The essential point is that Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have decided that the whole complex mosaic of relations between the United States and western Europe should be sorted out in some kind of 'package'. Many leading Europeans would like to trade off 'deals' on the economic front against 'deals' on the defence front; in terms of western Europe's interests this might make sense, but the Nixon Administration sees things differently. And, by one means or another, the Administration is sending out signals about what it wants done.

(ii) **The need for 'institutionalisation.'** One of the basic weaknesses of the west - if the term 'west' may be used in the broadest sense - is that on many of the crucial issues nobody knows who exactly is negotiating with whom. The confusion has existed on both sides of the Atlantic; but, to some extent, the Nixon Administration has now put its house in order by announcing that Henry Kissinger will continue to be its 'supremo' in foreign affairs for the next four years, though the exact role of Mr. Connally still seems slightly obscure.

The Americans argue, understandably, that they need some definite European entity with which they can negotiate - but this begs a million questions. Meanwhile, until such an organ is established, the Americans 'will do business with whomsoever business can be done.' That is the way top experts in Washington are talking. From the

2

American standpoint, this makes sense; it might mean that the Americans deal with the commissioners in Brussels through bureaucratic channels, or it might mean that Mr Nixon engages in 'hot-line'-style negotiations with President Pompidou, Mr Heath or Chancellor Brandt.

(iii) **The role of France.** A great deal has been written about the recent German elections, and the new role that Herr Brandt may play, given his fresh 'mandate' from the west German electorate. But in terms of Europe's future, a more pivotal event may be the French parliamentary elections scheduled for next spring. It is at least arguable that this might be a watershed for western Europe.

The assumption in the highest circles in Washington is that the gaullists are bound to lose ground, fairly heavily; and that this will pave the way for a 'restructuring' of French foreign policy. For the moment, Mr Nixon and his advisers set great store by the theory that, in the very highest echelons of French politics, there is a new note of realism - although further down the line (both in the civil service and in the armed forces) old gaullist illusions of grandeur die hard. Not to put too fine a point on it, Kissinger's policy is predicated on the assumption that Pompidou is a realist, if nobody else is. (For France's role in Africa, see article below.)

(iv) **West Germany's role.** There is little doubt that both President Nixon and Mr Heath would have been happier if the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) had won the recent election in west Germany; but, for the moment, the line that is being put out in Washington is that there are advantages in 'continuity' of foreign policy in Bonn. What intrigues some western intelligence experts, however, is the reaction in east Germany to Brandt's victory.

A secret report of the central committee of the east German communist party indicates that Brandt is widely regarded as a liberator; and that the credit for the recent 'Basic Treaty' between the two Germanies is almost universally given to him. (On the night of his election victory, some east Germans went so far as to send him telegrams of congratulation - which led to an investigation of the post office clerks who accepted these messages.)

The irony is that the Honnecker regime is now hoist with its own petard. It helped to sell the idea that the basic treaty would result in a relaxation of travel restrictions, and so forth; the ploy was to help Brandt to win the election. Honnecker now finds that his compatriots to some extent have taken all this seriously. So, to avoid fostering hopes which they know will not be fulfilled, Honnecker and his lieutenants have now decided to play down the basic treaty.

Even before the signatories' pens have been put to paper, something like two million east Germans have already been told that they are not eligible for visits to the west. This twist in the situation is strengthening the position of Herr Strauss, the leader of the Christian Social wing of the CDU. In international terms, it means that Nixon and Kissinger are slightly more uneasy than they were two weeks ago about the stability of west Germany as an ally.

(v) **Negotiation with the Russians.** The basic problem of the west is that there are conflicting ideas on how the Russians should be dealt with. Without painting too bleak a picture, there is discernible uncertainty in the highest circles in Washington about what exactly Russia's aims are, in the context of the new 'triangular' relationship between the United States, Russia and China.

Many west European diplomats subscribe to the theory that the only way to get on with the Russians is never to do anything that might offend them; some observers cite

3

Norway's curiously ambiguous handling of the 'Russian submarine' affair last week as an illustration of this trait.

Perhaps more significant is the way the western powers reacted to the Rumanians' idiosyncratic challenge to their Russian overlords during the first week of the preliminary talks in Helsinki on the staging of a European security conference. The western powers seemed to be almost bending over backwards to help the Russians out of a dilemma when the Rumanian delegate tried to hammer home the point that all countries participating in the conference would be independent sovereign nations, irrespective of whether they belonged to power 'blocks' or not. (If France had challenged the United States on some apparently procedural point, would the Russians have used their influence to ease the path of the American delegate?)

The points at issue were cogently summarised by Dean Rusk, in an under-reported speech at the 'Interdoc' conference, in which he expressed in judicious language his misgivings that in the 'European year' western Europe would start off negotiations with the Soviet Union from a 'minimalist' bargaining position, whereas the Russians would start off from a 'maximalist' bargaining position.

Basically, this is the price the Europeans pay for their lack of political cohesion. There is an urgent need for the 'institutionalisation' referred to above.

In the course of the next year, the 'Committee of Nine' set up by the North Atlantic Assembly will almost certainly recommend that there should be an annual summit conference between the President of the United States and the leaders of western Europe - with the agenda carefully prepared beforehand by a joint secretariat. Whether western Europe in this context should embrace the 'EEC Nine' or the whole Nato membership is of secondary importance; the idea is worth pursuing.

Only by such actions can western Europe impress upon the Russians that it is a body with common ideals and principles, and not a flabby jelly.

## Allende in quest of the Holy Grail

The two key stopovers in President Salvador Allende's current trip are New York and Moscow. In the United Nations General Assembly on Monday, Chile's marxist ruler complained about the World Bank's lending policy and delivered an emotional attack on the 'monopolistic intrigues' of some of the big American corporations with interests in Chile. These are obviously the ITT (International Telephone and Telegraph Company) and the Kennecott mining company, which is still campaigning to recover some of its assets taken over last year.

Dr Allende then flew on to Moscow, where the way had been carefully prepared for him by the secretary-general of the Chilean Communist party, Sr Luis Corvalán, and the director of the Central Bank, Sr Inostroza.

Dr Allende is said to have told one of his senior advisers before his departure that the main purpose of his whole trip was to negotiate a $500m loan from Russia to cover the mounting bill for food imports and tide the government over to the parliamentary elections due in March. It is almost inconceivable that the government parties could win a majority in those elections; it is more likely that the opposition will win around 60 per cent of the votes. But Dr Allende's only hope of avoiding the kind of electoral humiliation, which might shake the present willingness of the armed forces to co-operate with the regime, lies in putting foodstuffs and basic consumer goods back into the shops and curbing inflation.

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There are now clear indications that the Russians (despite their initial fears that they would be asked to shoulder the economic burden of shoring up another Cuba) will be ready to help; and it is even possible that some of the cheap grain that the Americans have contracted to supply to Russia will be re-routed – with Russian labels, naturally – to Santiago, where the shortage of wheat is acute and white bread is virtually unobtainable.

The behaviour of **General Carlos Prats Gonzalez**, the army commander-in-chief, who is running the administration for the two weeks that Dr Allende is abroad, is being closely watched. General Prats remains an enigma to most Santiago politicians, and his motives for agreeing to take on the powerful job of minister of the interior early in November are still hotly disputed. Now 57 years old, he was formerly defence attaché in Buenos Aires; he is regarded as an intelligent opportunist who may eventually decide to follow the example of an early soldier-turned-politician, President Carlos Ibáñez. Like Dr Allende, he is thought to be an active freemason; reports circulate in Santiago that this may provide a personal link between the two men. The Santiago lodge is said to have played a major part in negotiating the entry of the armed forces into the cabinet.

It is not yet clear to what extent General Prats will be ready to underwrite the programme of the Popular Unity government. Dr Allende wanted him to resign his post as commander-in-chief when he became a minister so that he could appoint his personal friend, General Brady, to replace him. But General Prats successfully resisted this plan, and now combines direct control of the army with one of the key cabinet jobs. This should give him an effective power of veto over major decisions. But he has not yet really made his presence felt.

The opposition leaders point out that, despite the government's promise that no one involved in the wave of strikes in October would be punished, 28 employees have been dismissed by the central bank. The generals have not yet been called upon to add their signatures to a decreto de insistencia ('decree of insistence'), a document signed by all members of the cabinet that has been used by the Allende regime in the past to force through the takeover of private firms. If the military ministers signed one of these decrees (as is now most unlikely) it would be taken as a clear vote of support for marxist policy.

In the latest of a series of carefully phrased press conferences, General Prats outlined some of his basic political convictions. Interviewed by the Santiago weekly Ercilla, he praised Dr Allende as a 'patriot' and a 'truly charismatic personality', but also expressed his sympathy for ex-president Frei and his alarm at the proliferation of violent extremist groups in the country. He rejected the idea that the armed forces should take over the government, on the ground that this would lead to a dictatorship that would 'turn the Chilean people into Tupamaros'. He also declared his belief in 'economic independence', in terms which some observers equated with the philosophy of the radical generals in Peru.

The other two military members of the cabinet – Admiral Huerta and air force General Claudio Sepulveda – have remained more shadowy figures. They were selected by their respective commanders-in-chief to represent the other two branches of the armed forces, and both are regarded as unsympathetic to the aims of the Popular Unity government. Their problem is that as basically non-intellectual career officers they will find it difficult to hold their own against clever dialecticians, such as the finance minister, Sr Orlando Millas.

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The odds are that – contrary to some initial rumours – Chile will remain quiet during Dr Allende's absence. The real clash is likely to come around March. If the opposition can win a moral victory (by pulling in about 60 per cent of the votes), the armed forces, which have been pulled deeper and deeper into politics over the past year, may then decide to present Dr Allende with a clear ultimatum: to respect the wishes of the majority and call a halt to his programme, or to resign and hold new presidential elections.

Dr Allende's fiery talk at the United Nations General Assembly did not carry as much conviction at home as it did among the more emotional UN delegates.

## Dim prospects for Salt 2

The second round of Salt (strategic arms limitation talks) has opened in Geneva without clear-cut directives from the United States – which is perhaps hardly surprising in view of Henry Kissinger's preoccupation with the Vietnam talks. The odds are that Salt 2 will limp along for some time; until President Nixon and Kissinger are able to give the matter their undiluted attention.

Meanwhile, a face-saving device probably will be found in the creation of a permanent commission of experts to supervise the agreements that were reached in Salt 1. This will give the illusion that momentum is being maintained.

Well informed sources within the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency note that Mr Nixon has given no precise information on how he will interpret Senator Jackson's amendment, which demands that America's negotiating position in Salt 2 be based on numerical equality with the Russians in offensive missiles, rather than on the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine of nuclear 'sufficiency'.

It is not enough, these sources argue, for the White House to say that the Jackson amendment was not binding. That was true in a legal sense, since it was approved only by the Senate and not by the House of Representatives; but the question is how Mr Nixon will represent the amendment to the Russian negotiators – as a real limitation that leaves him no choice, or as a mere recommendation that he is free to ignore.

The temptation is to say that the President will brush the Jackson caveat aside when the time comes. But this ignores the fact that, if Salt 2 ever comes to the point of the conclusion of an actual treaty, it will have to muster a two-thirds majority in the Senate for ratification. If Senator Jackson does not like the final version, he will probably be able to muster a blocking third of 34 negative voters.

It needs to be stressed that the intention in Geneva is to write a treaty which would replace Salt I's interim five-year 'agreement' on offensive weapons. At the outset the basic American conception of the treaty is unclear. If the President and Mr Kissinger should come round to accepting Jackson's 'equality' concept, what will they offer the Russians as a *quid pro quo* for the American technological superiority in Mirvs (multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles)?

Mr Averell Harriman, who has been comparatively silent lately on Vietnam, has recently argued that rigid insistence on numerical equality in missiles might conceivably doom Salt 2. He advocates a 'mutual and equal level of strategic strength', regardless of the mix of weapons. This is not too far from the 'sufficiency' concept.

The odds are that Mr Nixon and Mr Kissinger will try for some sort of overall parity – with the Russians ahead in some respects, the Americans in others. This

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concept was at the heart of the Salt 1 agreement on offensive systems. It permitted a Soviet lead in actual numbers of both land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (1,054 for the United States, 1,618 for Russia) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (710 to 950), while recognising the American lead in multiple warheads and, therefore, total striking power.

The first hint of Mr Nixon's Salt 2 intentions may become evident when the Defence Department in Washington resubmits its request for $20m in research funds to develop a second-generation Mirv system with the capacity to destroy Soviet missile silos. This so-called 'hard-target' warhead was rejected earlier this year by a Senate-House conference committee when it considered this year's weapons authorisation bill. But the Defence Department's research division, headed by Mr John Foster, is certain to try again to get the development money.

Officials in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (headed by Mr Gerard Smith) see things differently. They fear that pursuit of the 'hard-target' Mirv might even provoke the Russians to break off the Salt 2 negotiations, on the ground that this idea smacks of a first-strike capability, which both sides have tacitly renounced. But the White House has shown some interest in the hard-target Mirvs, ostensibly as 'bargaining chips'.

In this context, the attitude of the new Secretary of Defence, Mr Elliot Richardson, will be highly important. But the ultimate decision will lie with Mr Nixon, who in turn has placed heavy reliance on Kissinger in the area of arms negotiations.

In the past, Kissinger's role has been to mediate between Foster and Smith. His tendency has been to overrule the hawks when this seemed necessary to keep the negotiations going. He and Richardson got on well together; if they had not, Richardson would not have been appointed to the Pentagon post. But early in the new year they will have to do some hard thinking about America's exact aims. It is disturbing that, on this very important subject, there are signs of uncertainty in American policy.

## How far will France back Amin?

France's sudden interest in Uganda looks like a classic piece of gaullist opportunism. Last week, Kampala radio reported that the Pompidou government had promised to increase its aid to Uganda - the implication being that this was to offset the cancellation of Britain's £10m development loan.

This move has to be seen, however, in the context of French policy in the whole region. France is reinforcing its position in Djibouti, and the importance of this area will be underlined next month when President Pompidou pays an official visit to French Somaliland and Ethiopia. (See FOREIGN REPORT, 22 November, 1972, No. 1272). Uganda's proximity to the area is therefore of strategic interest to the French.

Another factor is that increased French support for General Amin's regime would fit in with France's Middle East policy, particularly its growing friendship with Libya; the Libyan connection is increasingly affecting France's traditional policy in the black African states. The Israelis are convinced that Chad's recent decision to break off diplomatic relations with Israel was taken with French advice and under Libyan pressure.

Uganda, which broke diplomatic links with Israel earlier this year, and which has in recent months thrown its whole weight behind Libyan foreign policy aims, is therefore

7

regarded by some officials in the Quai d'Orsay as a suitable recipient of French aid. Reports are now circulating that the French might even provide Amin with certain types of military equipment, if the Libyans pay for it – admittedly, a big if.

But the whole affair has to be put in perspective. The French are too realistic to entertain illusions that President Amin would prove a stable client. And the state of Uganda's armed forces would probably render any conventional military aid meaningless.

The French ambassador in Kampala, M. Albert Thabault, commented on the Ugandan claim by saying that French aid would be increased by only a small amount (about £300,000), which would be limited to cultural and technical co-operation, and would specifically exclude economic and industrial schemes. The Ugandans themselves mentioned only French 'scholarships', an investigation into the prospects of wine-growing in Uganda, and French aid to their information ministry – which is probably a reference to the talks which have gone on for some time between French and Ugandan officials about setting up a French broadcasting station in Kampala.

In fact, the Ugandan reports of increased French aid were designed to boost Ugandan morale and to irritate Britain, after Britain had cancelled its development loan. For tactical reasons, the French do not wish to disavow the generosity ascribed to them. But they are pulled both ways. They relish the idea of extending their influence in east Africa, but they do not want to have their fingers burned by Amin.

## The EEC connection

Moreover, any moves that France may make will be fitted into the pattern of its policy towards the whole of Africa. In this context the visit to Lagos of M. Billecoq assumes significance. It was M. Billecoq, a secretary of state in the French ministry of foreign affairs with responsibility for development assistance, who in Upper Volta last month elaborated M. Pompidou's decision to relax the franc-zone regulations; this move should allow the African states to control at least part of their foreign exchange earnings.

But, until recently, the French government regarded African requests for such a liberalisation as unreasonable; and last month's concession may be more apparent than real (France will reserve its right to withdraw backing from currencies of franc-zone members who show insufficient fiscal 'discipline'). President Pompidou linked the move for liberalisation with the need to encourage trade between French-speaking and English-speaking Africa, and M. Billecoq suggested that 'the precedent of the sterling area' might be a useful guide.

In fact, the reform is the result of African resentment against stringent French controls; and France's continued reservations were reflected in Billecoq's remark that the new system would necessitate 'extremely strict customs barriers' – hardly the thing to facilitate inter-African trade.

France's conflict between the need to adapt its African links to the enlarged Common Market, and the desire to reinforce its influence before newcomers have a chance to poach, was manifest at almost every stage of M. Pompidou's recent African tour. On the whole, the latter motive proved stronger. Pompidou promised, for instance, that France would 'not spare any efforts to help the French-speaking states retain their cohesion ... the future of our culture and civilisation is also at stake'.

This is a legitimate propaganda ploy with the French-speaking states. But Britain and the other western powers are watching with interest France's tactics towards Amin.

© WORLD COPYRIGHT RESERVED 1972 THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD.
'FOREIGN REPORT' IS SUPPLIED ON THE CONDITION THAT IT IS REGARDED AS CONFIDENTIAL BY THE RECIPIENT.
IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES MAY THE CONTENTS BE REPRODUCED WHOLE OR IN PART.

PRINTED BY WATERLOW & SONS LTD. LONDON, FOR THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD. LONDON SW1A 1HG

par JEAN
BOURDIER

Henry KISSINGER :
« LE CHEMIN DE LA PAIX »

On peut le suivre

Il est évident que, de prime
abord, l'intérêt porté à ce
livre sera dû en grande
partie au nom de son auteur.
Ce sera là une réaction bien
normale, mais aussi le résul-
tat d'un malentendu. Car
deux choses sont à préciser
d'emblée : l'ouvrage mérite
de toute manière d'être lu
pour sa propre valeur et ses
propres idées, et, en second
lieu, il ne peut contribuer en
rien ou presque à préciser
l'action politique actuelle du
conseiller de Nixon.

Conçu comme un travail

universitaire — mais sans le
côté un peu poussiéreux qui
est généralement évoqué par
ce terme — « Le chemin de
la paix » est une étude mi-
nutieuse et précise du congrès
de Vienne, ou plus exacte-
ment du rétablissement des
relations internationales en
Europe après les guerres de
la Révolution et de l'Em-
pire.

Certes, à travers cette
thèse, les sympathies et les
aspirations personnelles de
l'auteur apparaissent assez
clairement : il est « metterni-

chien », partisan de la raison — au besoin contre la passion — et, par voie de conséquence, favorable à l'établissement d'une sorte de « règle du jeu » diplomatique permettant seule, selon lui, la coexistence, ouvrant donc « le chemin de la paix ».

Mais, dans ce livre, Henry
Kissinger s'est surtout voulu
analyste et historien. L'étude
y précède la profession de
foi, et il se trouve quoque cette
étude est menée de main de
maître. C'est tout et c'est
suffisant.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CURRENT NEWS

PART II-MAIN EDITION-1200

THIS SUPPLEMENTS PART I-EARLY BIRD EDITION

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1972

NEW YORK NEWS - 7 DECEMBER 1972 P-2

Expect Peace by Dec. 20,
U.S. Tells Aides in Saigon

By JOSEPH FRIED

Staff Correspondent of THE NEWS

Saigon, Dec. 6—Senior United States officials here have been advised by Washington to expect a Vietnam sources said today.

The disclosure came as U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker canceled a trip this week to Katmandu, where he was to visit his wife, Carol Laise, the American Ambassador to Nepal. Sources said Bunker is remaining at his post in anticipation of peace developments later this month and efforts to get South Vietnam to endorse it.

Despite the notice to U.S. authorities here, South Vietnam continued publicly to deny that any agreement was imminent. "Tin Song," a newspaper which reflects the views of President Nguyen Ven Thieu, quoted "highly placed sources in the South Vietnamese government" as a stress that "a cease-fire could not take place about Dec. 15"

as predicted in some quarters.

The officials reportedly labeled such reports as "completely false" and designed to "create an atmosphere of false optimism."

Reliable sources here, meanwhile, reported presidential adviser Henry Kissinger is continuing his efforts to obtain further Communist assurances which could be used to convince a reluctant Thieu to go along with the peace settlement.

Strengthen Commission

While the U.S. in the current round of Paris negotiations has dropped Saigon's main demand that Hanoi formally agree to the withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam,

sources said Kissinger is still attempting to obtain a tacit understanding that some North Vietnamese troops would be pulled out. He also is seeking to strengthen the role of the four-nation supervisory commission which would enforce the cease-fire and greater guarantees for safeguarding Cambodia and Laos. One possibility being explored, sources said, is a trade of Communist political prisoners held by South Vietnam for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops. While the draft peace pact calls for the freeing of political prisoners as part of the PW swaps, the terms of the civilian releases are said to be vaguer

CONTINUED PAGE 2

WASHINGTON POST - 7 DECEMBER 1972 P-1

Kissinger, Tho Talk 5 Hours
As Optimism Mounts in Paris

By Jonathan C. Randal

Washington Post Foreign Service

PARIS, Dec. 5—Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger and North Vietnam's Le Due Tho held a five-and-a-half hour private meeting today and were due to resume their search for a Vietnam cease-fire agreement Thursday.

The two men shook hands at the beginning and end of the meeting, and the cordiality of the gesture appeared to support optimistic rumors, rampant in the French press, of impending agreement.

But neither, the American nor North Vietnamese delegations departed from their standard news blackout on the substance of the talks, which resumed after an unexplained one-day postponement.

The White House announced that another meeting would be held at 3 p.m. Thursday. This week's session of the stalemated formal peace talks,

also taking place in Paris, should have ended by that hour.

The French press speculates that Kissinger and Tho may be working on the final wording of a cease-fire agreement. This optimistic view was helped along by word from the White House of heavy diplomatic traffic between Kissinger and President Nixon as well as by Saigon newspaper dispatches predicting a cease-fire by Christmas.

Among the most optimistic speculation here was the unconfirmed suggestion that the negotiators had found a way around what Saigon has termed the "capital" problem holding up signature of the October draft accord: Withdrawal of North Vietnam's troops from South Vietnam.

In return for Saigon's freeing of a large number of political prisoners held in its jails, North Vietnam would agree to the vaguest possible indication

of its willingness to withdraw its troops.

In the past, North Vietnam has refused to admit the presence of its troops in South Vietnam, and the draft accord specifically leaves the release of political prisoners in South Vietnam to be decided by the Vietcong and Saigon governments in deliberations after the cease-fire. For all practical purposes the Saigon government could refuse to release these political prisoners for months under the terms of the draft accord.

Perhaps because of such reports, sources close to the Vietcong delegation again reported that the South Vietnamese insurgents were depressed with the current round of secret talks. The Vietcong were said to maintain that the United States had not dropped the Saigon-influenced revised proposals which Kissinger presented two weeks

NEW YORK NEWS

7 DEC. 1972 P-60

New Zealand
Pulling Out

Saigon, Dec. 6 (Special)—New Zealand will end its war role in South Vietnam with the withdrawal of the last of its military advisers by Dec. 20, reliable sources said today. At the height of the war, New Zealand provided 2,000 troops, mostly artillerymen. Until early this month, 56 New Zealand military personnel stayed on here to train, South Vietnamese militia platoon leaders and Cambodian troops. The military advisers are to be withdrawn within the next two weeks, though Auckland has expressed interest in providing civilian advisers to assist South Vietnam in the future.

—Joseph Eified

WASHINGTON POST

7 DEC. 1972 P-23

Accord Must Require

Pullout, Says Saigon

By Thomas Lippman

SAIGON, Dec. 7 (Thursday)—The South Vietnamese government said today that "it is determined not to be part of any agreement" to end the war "that does not explicitly, in black ink on white paper," require the total withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops.

In a broadcast on the state-owned Saigon radio, the Thieu government issued its strongest and most explicit warning to date that it would refuse to honor any peace accord worked out in the current Paris negotiations that did not satisfy South Vietnam on this point.

"If the South Vietnamese government, the sole and unique legal government in the South, does not sign the agreement, then any peace treaty concluded is just a paper headed for the waste-basket, for the South Vietnam-americ government will not recognize it. The South Vietnam-americ government will not abide by it," the broadcast said.

South Vietnam's insistence that Hanoi acknowledge the presence of its troops in the South and agree to withdraw them is believed to have been one of the main sticking points that has delayed the signing of a peace agreement.

ago and which subsequently led to a nine-day interruption in the talks.

Today's meeting took place in the fashionable western suburb of Neulieu in the three-

CONTINUED PAGE 2

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RADIO - TV
DEFENSE DIALOG

RADIO TV REPORTS INC. WASH., D.C., SUMMARIES NOT TO BE QUOTED.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1972 (BROADCASTS OF DEC 6)

SUMMARY OF NETWORK NEWS IN THIS ISSUE

ROGER MUDD, CBS: Henry Kissinger and NVN's Le Duc Tho resumed their private peace negotiations today in Paris. PETER KALISCHER, CBS: Visually it was the friendliest yet. A Kissinger joke drew a laugh and a slap on the back, and obviously a witty rejoinder from the NVNese. Everybody seemed to exude a sense of positive accomplishment and nobody wanted to hide it. When the meeting broke up the unprecedented good-bye handshakes had an almost seal-the-deal look about them. CHARLES COLLINGWOOD, CBS: It now appears that the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks will be concluded this week and that an agreement will be reached perhaps as early as tomorrow between Washington and Hanoi, although both those two are having great difficulty convincing their allies, the Saigon Government on the one hand and the National Liberation Front on the other, of the merits of the forthcoming document.

HOWARD K. SMITH, ABC: In SVN the Saigon Command reported 80 communist attacks within a 24-hour period, the heaviest battle activity in weeks. In one of the worst attacks more than 50 communist rockets were launched against Tan Son Nhut Airbase on the very outskirts of Saigon. CHARLES BURKE, ABC: Today's rockets were obviously aimed at Tan Son Nhut Airbase itself, but as usual, some of the big rockets were off target and civilians suffered as well. Actually civilians got the worst of it in what was the first rocket attack here in eight months, and the heaviest since the Tet attacks of 1968. The airbase, largest in SVN, and headquarters of the US Command, took most of the rockets and was also hit by mortars. Yet the casualty toll on Tan Son Nhut was relatively light. Unlike civilians, the military has sand bags and shelters for protection. Still, one American airman was killed, another wounded. Both were cut down while working on these helicopters.

JOHN CHANCELLOR, NBC: In San Diego a House subcommittee opened hearings into the racial rioting aboard the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk. GEORGE LEWIS, NBC: The panels' first witness was Capt. Marlin Townsend, skipper of the Kitty Hawk. He had no comment this morning, but earlier he said the incident onboard the ship was minor, that there is no racial discrimination on the Kitty Hawk. The ship's Executive Officer, Commander Ben Cloud, was also called to testify. From the accounts of some of the crewmen Cloud gave an order to separate the rioters and Marine guards aboard the Kitty Hawk and was countermanded by the Captain. Cloud denied that.

REASONER, ABC: In Brussels today, Defense Secretary Laird told the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that President Nixon will recommend to Congress that the US keep 300,000 troops in Europe at least until mid-1974. Laird predicted Congress will approve the recommendation. Laird also made clear that the US expected European allies to pay a fair share of their defense costs.

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FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THIS PUBLICATION CALL MR. HARRY ZUBKOFF, OX 52884

CBS EVENING NEWS CBS-TV 7 PM

Kissinger and Tho Resume Talks

ROGER MUDD: Henry Kissinger and NVN's Le Duc Tho resumed their private peace negotiations today in Paris.

There was a time when Kissinger and Tho met in absolute secrecy, but as Peter Kalischer points out in his report on today's session, all that has changed.

PETER KALISCHER: The secret VN talks were on again today along with the usual race by newsmen to find out where Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were holding them. The name of the game is follow Henry, and the players are cars and motorcycles carrying camermen or photographers, police trying to stop them, everybody armed with walkie talkies or radio telephones and nobody paying any attention to the traffic lights.

This time the rendezvous was a private house owned by a wealthy French-American jeweler in the Paris suburb of Neuliey.

Dr. Kissinger, as host, made a point of greeting Le Duc Tho when he drove up. Both sides had their full staffs with them, indicating an important work session ahead. It lasted nearly five and a-half hours, including a lunch break and a stroll in the garden.

There was the usual tete a tete between Kissinger and Tho plus interpreter, which today enlarged to include nearly all members of the two delegations.

Visually it was the friendliest session yet. A Kissinger joke drew a laugh and a slap on the back, and obviously a witty rejoinder from the NVNese. Everybody seemed to exude a sense of positive accomplishment and nobody wanted to hide it.

When the meeting broke up the unprecedented good-bye handshakes had an almost seal-the-deal look about them. And later, the communists not only announced tomorrow's meeting, but for the first time, when and where it would take place.

A lengthy meeting, extreme cordiality played out purposely or accidentally before the cameras, indicates that the Washington-Hanoi nego-

tiations at least are approaching a conclusion.

Peter Kalischer, CBS News, Neuliey Sur Seine.

CHARLES COLLINGWOOD: It now appears that the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks will be concluded this week and that an agreement will be reached perhaps as early as tomorrow between Washington and Hanoi, although both those two are having great difficulty convincing their allies, the Saigon Government on the one hand and the National Liberation Front on the other, of the merits of the forthcoming document.

There was very intense bargaining today between Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho on modifications for the draft text before them, but for the first time since this round began, one can say with assurance that the VN talks are still on course and are nearing their end.

Charles Collingwood, CBS News, Paris.

## Rocket Attack On Tan Son Nhut

MUDD: Just outside Saigon today communist rockets struck on and near the sprawling Tan Son Nhut Airbase. The rocket attack came during daylight hours and was said to be the heaviest in the Saigon area in more than four years.

RICHARD WAGNER: Tan Son Nhut had not been attacked in almost eight months, but the huge 23-square-mile base has once again proven to be too tempting a target for the communist 122mm rockets.

As soon as the attack began, just before eight o'clock this morning, the base was sealed off and put on red alert.

After the 45-minute attack ended, hundreds of civilian employees stood about outside waiting to go to work. Finally, they were admitted and the red alert called off, but no photographers or camermen were permitted to enter the airbase.

Observers who did get in reported light damage, and the US Command in Saigon announced that one American serviceman was killed and two wounded in the estimated 50-rocket attack.

As is usual in these rocket strikes the missiles that missed their intended targets took a higher toll than the ones fired more accurately.

2 Thursday, December 7, 1972

The 122mm rocket is not capable of being fired with pinpoint accuracy and many of those fired missed Tan Son Nhut completely and fell among the SVNese civilians who live around the base. At least five of them were killed today and more than 30 wounded. Most of the dead were women and children as the men of the homes which were blown away had already left for the day's work.

Quick action by expert fire detection teams located the position of the rocket launchers and SVNese regional force troops went after the communists who were identified as being part of the well known K-11 Sapper Battalion, a unit of the NVNese Army's Seventh Division.

Villagers here, some six miles from Saigon, told the SVNese troops that the communists had taken over their village late yesterday and held all the residents captive through the night as they set up their rocket launchers.

The attacking SVNese forces poured fire into the area with helicopter gunships in the air and automatic weapons and grenades on the ground.

There were no immediate reports of the number of NVNese contacted or casualties suffered or inflicted by either side, but casualties were being taken.

Attacks like this have of course more propaganda value than military value. They serve to remind anyone who needs reminding that although peace talks go on far away, here at home the war continues.

Richard Wagner, CBS News, Saigon,

ABC EVENING NEWS ABC-TV 7 PM

Indonesian Foreign Minister Predicts Peace Agreement In Few Days

HARRY REASONER: Indonesia's Foreign Minister Adam Malik predicted today that a VN peace agreement will be signed within a few days.

Malik told reporters in Djakarta that there are strong indications the two sides had resolved their major differences.

Indonesia is one of the nations that has agreed to supervise an

IC cease fire.

In Paris today Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho smiled broadly at each other and shook hands after a negotiating session lasting five and a-half hours.

The display of amenities strengthened speculation that a settlement is not far off.

We have a Paris report from ABC's John Rolfson.

JOHN ROLFSON: The news everyone's waiting for is not where the negotiators are going, but since they don't tell even that, pursuing Henry Kissinger's car is the first move in the hope of learning how they're doing on ending the war.

Through heavy Paris traffic up the Champs Elysees and past the Arch of Triumph Kissinger's motorcade went to still a different meeting house, the third they've used this week.

When the NVNese arrived, Kissinger was there to welcome them, Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy pausing on the steps till their host showed them inside.

It was the American turn to pick the meeting place in the rich suburb of Neuliey.

The house in which Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho are meeting this time belongs to an American who has lived most of his life in France and who owns this big jewelry store here in Paris.

Mr. Claire, how did the negotiators come to choose your house?

MR. CLAIRE: As an American war veteran I was always involved in Franco-American relations here in Paris, so the result was that both governments knew my house very well and they probably selected it because they found that the size was right or the location.

ROLFSON: Have you been living in it since then or have they been preparing it?

CLAIRE: No, I left Sunday night and I'm staying in a hotel around the Champs Elysees.

ROLFSON: They lunched inside and came out into the yard for air and perhaps to let it be seen that they were together working to end the war, even though they consider it desirable to say nothing till their work is done.

3 Thursday, December 7, 1972

After five and a-half hours they left with a handshake, the kind of gesture that might be interpreted as sealing a bargain, except that word came later that there's another meeting tomorrow, their work not finished yet.

A report now on the pursuit of the news from ABC correspondent Lou Cioffi.

**LOU CIOFFI:** You get the impression that although they go through the motions of trying to keep the location of their meetings secret, they're not really trying very hard. All the meeting places so far have been easily found (unintelligible) of motorcycle.

The chase usually begins in front of the American Embassy Residence where Henry Kissinger is staying. The radio-equipped bikes come in all colors and shapes, and so do the motorcycle drivers. Each of them has his own idea of what the well dressed motorcyclist will wear.

Women's lib is also represented in the person of a 20-year-old girl. Her male companions admit that she's a real tiger.

The wait outside the Embassy Residence is usually long and cold and there's no telling who might arrive, even a large painting of George Washington on horseback.

The real drama begins when Mr. Kissinger and his party leave. Today the police put a human wall in front of the motorcycles to prevent us from following, but no one got really too excited. Everyone, including the police knew that other motorcycles were waiting at the end of the street and they immediately took up the chase through Paris.

The people of Paris seem to be taking all this hectic activity in stride in spite of a certain amount of understandable confusion.

One little French boy was asked if he knew what was happening. He said, "Yes, the American Prime Minister is here."

Lou Cioffi, ABC News, Neyee.

## 80 Communist Attacks In 24 Hours

**HOWARD K. SMITH:** In SVN today the Saigon Command reported 80 communist attacks within a 24-hour period, the heaviest battle activity

in weeks. In one of the worst attacks, more than 50 communist rockets were launched against Tan Son Nhut Airbase on the very outskirts of Saigon.

ABC's Charles Burke has a report.

**CHARLES BURKE:** Today's rockets were obviously aimed at Tan Son Nhut Airbase itself, but as usual, some of the big rockets were off target and civilians suffered as well.

An old woman and three children were badly wounded here. A rocket hit as they ate breakfast in another part of the house. Four other civilians were killed as they walked down a dirt road just outside the airbase. They were on their way to work.

Aside from their shrapnel torn bodies, the only evidence that six feet long, 100-pound rockets hit here are the gaping holes in the ground.

There's also the grief expressed in so many faces. This family lost a young woman. She was a wife and mother.

Coming from possibly as far as ten miles away, the rockets ripped up many holes. Officials' casualty counts had eight civilians killed, 48 wounded.

No SVNese military men were reported killed or wounded in the half-hour attack, but one of their civilian employees was wounded.

Charles Burke, ABC News, Saigon.

## Laird Tells NATO Nixon To Recommend US Keep 300,000 Troops In Europe

**REASONER:** In Brussels today, Defense Secretary Laird told the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that President Nixon will recommend

4 Thursday, December 7, 1972

RADIO - TV
DEFENSE DIALOG

RADIO TV REPORTS INC. WASH., D. C., SUMMARIES NOT TO BE QUOTED.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1972

(BROADCASTS OF DEC 6 and Dec 5)

LLOYD DOBBINS and Bernard KAPLAN, NBC-TV, Tom FENTON and Peter KALISCHER, CBS-TV, and Lou CHIAFFI and John ROLFSON, ABC-TV, all report from Paris on the two versions of the Paris peace and cease fire talks going on. The regular session of the weekly semi-private talks went on as scheduled every Thursday. Afterwards the US was again more optimistic about the outcome of the private talks taking place just outside Paris. However, again, the communists warned that the US is dragging its feet in the private negotiations and that a deadlock could still occur. Meanwhile, outside of Paris KISSINGER and THO met again for a four hour meeting during which KISSINGER took a couple of walks through the garden. After the talks ended and as usual, no word about what was said, KISSINGER and THO shook hands for the public.

JOHN CHANCELLOR, NBC-TV, reports the B-52 bombers continued to drop tons of explosives on what was described as a major NVNese staging area just above the DMZ.

JOHN CHANCELLOR, NBC-TV, Walter CRONKITE, CBS-TV, and Harry REASONER, ABC-TV, all report no American was killed in combat during the past week, however, three GI's lost their lives in non-hostile causes and there was one more GI reported missing.

JOHN CHANCELLOR, NBC-TV, reports at the NATO meeting in Brussels Secretary of State ROGERS read a letter from President NIXON pledging that the US under certain conditions would maintain its present troop strength in Europe.

JOHN CHANCELLOR, NBC-TV, Bob SCHIEFFER, CBS-TV, and Harry REASONER, ABC-TV, all report that Jeffrey ALLISON, a nineteen year old sailor, was sentenced to five years in prison for setting fire aboard the aircraft carrier Forestal while it was docked at Norfolk last summer. The fire caused over seven million dollars damage and ALLISON could have received a life sentence for the act.

ERIC SEVAREID, CBS-TV, reports on the NATO talks and the shift in world peace movements. Recent US actions implies a long era of coexistence, however, competitive.

TED KOPPEL, ABC-TV, reports SVNese officials in Washington no longer doubt the US will sign a cease fire agreement with the NVNese, however, they are concerned still about the NVNese troops remaining in SVN. President THIEU may turn his issue over signing the peace agreement to the people of SVN or he may step down in favor of someone who would sign the agreement - the latter alternative not being favored by the US. One VNese official reported feels even if an honorable settlement comes to VN, it will be spelled with a small "h".

JACK ANDERSON, SYNDICATED RADIO, reports THIEU is more worried about peace then about war. This information reportedly came from a secret cable from Ambassador Ellsworth BUNKER.

JACK ANDERSON, also reports the Marines top brass have spread the word they want more pictures of women in the ranks. The pictures will be used to help determine which young lady gets a top level secretarial job says ANDERSON. Not the reason says the Marines, just want to give the more hefty girls an incentive to trim their waistlines.

NBC NIGHTLY NEWS NBC-TV 6:30 PM

Still More Peace Talks In Paris

JOHN CHANCELLOR: In Paris today Henry KISSINGER of the White House and THO of NVN met again in the cease fire talks. Their fourth session this week.

And today being Thursday, the semi-public meeting of the peace talks took place at the Hotel Majestic in Paris.

LLOYD DOBYNS: It was the NVN-ese turn to host the private talks so THO arrived first at the villa at Gvi Seravet (?).

It is owned by the French communist party and has been used for these meetings several times before.

Henry KISSINGER arrived for the afternoon meeting from his lunch with French Foreign Minister Maurice SCHAUMAN (?).

KISSINGER regularly briefs SCHAUMAN about the progress of the talks and sometimes SCHAUMAN has some comment to make afterward but he did not today.

KISSINGER came out with his aides for short walks in the yard but THO did not make his usual appearance. The last time they had met Gvi Seravet the two men took a long walk and held an animated conversation in the garden.

Today their talks were kept inside and lasted four hours.

There has been no comment about what was said today.

THO and KISSINGER will meet again tomorrow afternoon - their tenth session since November 20.

The White House said this afternoon that these private meetings are lasting a little longer then had been expected but there is still the feeling that the talks are cordial, that progress is being made, and that an agreement is not far away.

Semi-Private Peace Talks Also Rambled
On

BERNARD KAPLAN: However cordial the outward signs were at Gvi Seravet, today's formal weekly session of the VN conference in Paris was less encouraging.

The NVNese and VC representatives knocked down rumors of an

imminent cease fire.

The VC's Madame BINH said the US is prolonging the negotiations by raising what she called absurd demands for the withdrawal of NVN-ese troops from the south.

NVN's VEE was even harsher. He warned that the negotiations are again approaching a deadlock.

The obstacles apparently still standing in the way of an agreement and the tough language used here today at the meeting did not alter American predictions that peace is coming.

AMBASSADOR PORTER: We pointed out some of the progress that has been made against great difficulties in negotiating the final phase of this extremely difficult problem.

KAPLAN: The spokesman of the American delegation at the Hotel Majestic session said he remained confident that an agreement will be reached relatively soon.

B-52's Still Drop Tons Of Bombs
Over VN

CHANCELLOR: In the fighting, B-52 bombers accompanied by fighter planes, today dropped tons of explosives on what was described as a major NVNese staging area just above the DMZ.

To the south, government troops and militiamen attacked enemy soldiers occupying two villages seven miles northeast of Saigon.

Government sources said thirty of the enemy were killed.

No US Casualty Deaths

CHANCELLOR: The American command issued weekly casualty figures today. For the second consecutive week, there were no American combat deaths although three Americans died in accidents.

And seven Americans were wounded last week.

The SVNese said they had more than three hundred killed and more than thirteen hundred wounded.

US Will Maintain Troops In Europe

CHANCELLOR: At the NATO meeting in Brussels today, Secretary of State ROGERS read a letter from President NIXON pledging that the

2

Friday, December 8, 1972

US under certain conditions would
maintain its present troop levels
in Europe.

Sailor Sentenced To Five Years At
Hard Labor

CHANCELLOR: A nineteen year old
sailor, named Jeffrey ALLISON (?)
of Oakland was sentenced to five
years in prison today for starting
a multi-million dollar fire aboard
the aircraft carrier Forestal last
July.

He could have got life in prison.

CBS EVENING NEWS CBS-TV 7:00 PM

Paris Peace Talks Continue

WALTER CRONKITE: There were
peace talks on top of peace talks
today in Paris. First the weekly
session where second team members
of the American and NVNese delega-
tions held sway.

And in the private sessions be-
tween Henry KISSINGER and NVN's
THO.

TOM FENTON: For the first time
in four and a half years of VN ne-
gotiations, as far as is known,
there were two sets of peace talks
in Paris on the same day.

At the Hotel Majestic, the of-
ficial and by now largely superceded
peace talks, were low key and brief.

Afterward Deputy American nego-
tiator Haward ISHAM was mildly op-
timistic.

HAYWARD ISHAM: We pointed out
some of the - the progress that has
been made against great difficulties
in negotiating the final phase of
this extremely difficult problem.

FENTON: The sole (?) party re-
presented by its chief negotiator
was the VC, who's Mrs. BINH casti-
gated Saigon and Washington for
holding up the cease fire agreement.

The real negotiations were else-
where.

PETER KALISCHER: Henry KISSING-
ER first lunched with French Foreign
Minister Maurice SCHAUMAN, who flew
back from a NATO conference in
Brussels to hear KISSINGER's cour-
tesy briefing on how the talks were
progressing.

Afterward, with no comment from

either, KISSINGER took the road
for an afternoon meeting with THO
at Gvi, fifteen miles west of
Paris.

Meanwhile, the NVNese as hosts,
arrived at the Gvi villa first,
followed at about three o'clock
by KISSINGER's big cadillac.

With a settlement apparently in
sight, newsmen waited for some
dramatic sign that this was the
final session. But they never got
it.

As daylight waned, the American
delegation took its habitual turn
in the garden. But today, THO
did not join them.

When the four hour meeting broke
up under flood lights, there was
still more negotiating ahead.

Shortly after the delegation
cars headed back to Paris, another
meeting was announced for tomorrow.

US GI's Still Die In VN

CRONKITE: Last week's Indo-
China casualty figures are out and
they show that no Americans were
reported killed in the war although
one was added to the list of mis-
sing.

Seven Americans were wounded.

SVNese dead for the week were
put at three hundred and thirty-
six and the allies claim to have
killed more then twelve hundred
VC and NVNese.

Biggest Act Of Sabotage Draws Five
Year Prison Term

CRONKITE: A military judge to-
day sentenced a sailor to five
years in prison for what is des-
cribed as the biggest case of sabo-
tage in US Navy history.

Nineteen year old seaman ap-
prentice Jeffrey ALLISON of Oakland,
California, was found guilty of
setting a seven and a half million
dollar fire aboard the aircraft
carrier Forestal.

BOB SCHIEFFER: The Forestal
was undergoing repairs here when
the fire broke out. Navy investi-
gators never found a motive, but
they claim ALLISON confessed.

The young seaman was apprehen-
sive as he entered court today but
maintained innocence saying inves-
tigators twisted his words.

His father, a California highway

3

Friday, December 8, 1972

patrolman and a ten year Navy veteran, stood by his son's story.

DUSTIN ALLISON: He said he
definitely did not do it. Because
he was looking forward to his trip
to the Mediterranean and he said I
wouldn't set my own ship afire.

That was his own words. And I
believe him.

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Well, I don't think there is any question that in view of - of the evidence we've heard, and our own beliefs individually, that Jeff is right in the continual maintaining that he is innocent - that in the view of the state of this - that we have legitimate legal issues to appeal and that we will.

SCHIEFFER: There was testimony
during the trial that ALLISON had
been experimenting for years with
LSD. The Navy did not allege he
was under its influence when the
fire broke out but there was evi-
dence he brought LSD aboard three
days before the fire.

In asking for a stiff sentence,
Navy prosecutor Kenneth GREEN said
this incident brought to light the
Navy's worst fears about mixing
drugs and shipboard life.

A problem still unresolved.

Sevareid Comments On NATO Meeting

ERIC SEVAREID: (First portion lost because of network difficulties)

...peace of central Europe down
the middle. Germany.

Western power, diplomacy and
money were unable to change things.

We can recall asking the then
Secretary of State, Mr. DULLAS, what
would do it, what could soften this
stark and rigid separation of the
old continent.

He said time will do it. Time
has been doing it. Not acts by
government in the first ... (Again
network difficulties)

...and behind this is the great
military - great power military
stalemate discouraging serious
risks and confrontations.

So it seems natural that today
the US, Britain and Franch agreed
to open contacts with East Germany.
A kind of defacto recognition short
of exchanging ambassadors.

And following the earlier lead
of BRANDT and the West Germans.

The other eleven sovereignties
in the Atlantic Alliance will pro-
bably follow along.

It is going to make the idea of
an all European Security Council
more believable. It will make the
hopes of mutual reduction of big
power forces on both sides of the
line more realistic.

All these moves are part and
parcel of the NIXON-KISSINGER con-
cept of a more relaxed world of
power.

It is in the framework of that
structure that was slowly falling
into place and was dramatically
helped along by the nuclear arms
agreement with Russia and the pre-
sidential opening to China last
winter.

And a guess - one of the next
steps in the historic process will
be a refashioning of Cuban-American
relations. Though not on a formal
diplomatic level for some time to
come.

Hopes that CASTRO's regime will
collapse have dwindled away. His
hopes for revolution in these US
and the thought of black Americans
as a spearhead have surely diminish-
ed.

In both Administration and Con-
gress, groups are now working dir-
ectly on ways to break up the
impasse.

An anti-hijacking agreement is
possible. The lifting of restric-
tions on other nations' trade with
Cuba is possible.

The gradual abandonment of
Guantanamo Bay now of dubious mili-
tary value is possible.

In his inaugural speech, Presi-
dent NIXON said the era of confron-
tations must give way to the era
of negotiations.

That implies a long era of co-
existence, however, competitive.
Because everybody inhabits this one
and only unexpandable globe.

ABC EVENING NEWS ABC-TV 7:00 PM

Peace Talks On Two Levels In Paris

HARRY REASONER: In Paris today
there were two separate sets of
meetings on a VN settlement.

One involved a substantive nego-

4

Friday, December 8, 1972

tiation being conducted in secrecy
by Henry KISSINGER and Hanoi's
chief representative.

The other was the semi-public
session held almost every Thursday
by the allies and communists which,
if nothing else, provide each side
with a forum to accuse the other of
bad faith in seeking an end to the
war.

LOU CHIAFFI: The statements issued after the regular Thursday meeting did not give any clear indication of how the talks are going between Henry KISSINGER and NVN's THO.

Whether peace is getting closer
or whether peace is getting further
away really depends on whether you
are an optimist or pessimist.

The SVNese admit the talks are
in their decisive phase but they
continue to insist that there can
be no settlement until all NVNese
troops leave the south.

The NVNese say this is not part
of the original agreement reached
with the US and they warn it could
bring the talks to a stalemate.

They accuse the US of dragging
its feet.

The American delegation said
that great progress has already been
made and regretted the communist
accusation.

MAN: The other side did charge
us with a - did repeat charges of
bad faith and making a turnabout.

We do not find these charges
are founded or consistent with the
events or the realities and we told
them so.

CHIAFFI: The most pessimistic
of the four delegations was the
VC's Madame BINH.

But she also best summed up the
results of the one hundred and
sixty-ninth meeting of the Paris
peace talks.

She said, today will not be the
end of the conflict in VN.

JOHN ROLFSON: There have been
peace talks on two levels today.
The regular weekly meeting of the
four delegations in Paris and then
the real negotiations here in the
French countryside at Gvi.

Before the negotiations, Henry
KISSINGER went to the Kay Doresay
(?) for lunch with French Foreign
Minister SCHAUMAN. KISSINGER per-
iodically talks to the French since
they provide facilities for the ne-

gotiations and since they are to
participate in a peace conference
after a settlement.

The negotiators met in mid-
afternoon outside Paris at Gvi in
a house they have used before be-
longing to the French communist
party.

It was the NVNese turn to chose
the place.

A four hour meeting. KISSINGER
took a couple of breaks to walk in
the garden talking with his staff.

As usual, the few who know are
not telling exactly how the secret
talks are going.

The only clues came from the
earlier public meeting.

KISSINGER and THO did not par-
ticipate in it but their regular
delegations made clear that there
are still serious problems.

Despite the optimistic atmos-
phere of the past few days, the
NVNese again warned of possible
deadlock.

And while the Americans call
this the final stage, they cau-
tioned there could still be dis-
appointments and setbacks.

Henry KISSINGER and THO parted
once again with a handshake which
may be routine with them in pri-
vate but it is only the second
day they have done it where the
public could see.

So, if nothing more, they mean
to signal a favorable mood in
which they will continue their
negotiating tomorrow.

## SVNese Presenting Attitude Against US

TED KOPPEL: SVNese officials
here are privately expressing much
the same gratitude toward Washing-
ton that Ann BOLIN (?) felt when
Henry the VII agreed to have her
beheaded rather then burned at the
stake.

They appreciate the style, if
not the end result.

There is no longer any doubt
among VNese officials in Washington
but that the US will sign an agree-
ment with NVN.

The question is, whether Presi-
dent THIEU will legitimize the
agreement by also signing.

Allowing NVNese troops to remain
in SVN is thought to be so unpal-
table to the SVNese people that

5

Friday, December 8, 1972

President THIEU may put the question of signing to a public all Congressional referendum.

In either case it would probably be turned down and President THIEU could then reject the agreement in the name of his people.

Alternatively, President THIEU could offer to step down in favor of someone who would sign the agreement.

That, the SVNese believe, would not be a popular decision here in Washington because THIEU's continued presence is the only thing that permits President NIXON to go on referring to an honorable settlement.

Even if, as one VNese told me, honorable is now being spelled with a small h.

### Three GI's Die In SVN

**REASONER:** The US command in Saigon in its latest casualty report listed no American combat deaths for the second straight week.

Three US servicemen died of non-hostile causes.

### Sailor Convicted Of Setting Fire Aboard Ship

**REASONER:** A nineteen year old sailor from Oakland, California, Jeffrey ALLISON, has been convicted of what officials call the largest act of sabotage in US naval history.

A Navy judge in Norfolk, Virginia found ALLISON guilty today of arson and sabotage in the seven and a half million dollar fire aboard the aircraft carrier Forestal last summer.

ALLISON was sentenced to five years in prisonment. He could have gotten life.

There were no casualties in the fire which broke out while the Forestal was anchored at Norfolk.

### JACK ANDERSON WAVA-RADIO NEWS SYNDICATED 5:05 PM DEC 6

Thieu More Worried About Peace

**JACK ANDERSON:** President THIEU has admitted to American Ambassador

Ellsworth BUNKER that he is more worried about peace then war.

A secret cable from the Ambassador quotes THIEU as saying he knows how to cope with the communists on the battlefield but he doesn't know how to deal with them politically.

He is worried that the disciplined communist cadres could win the political struggle in the countryside.

His own cadres, he complained, are amateurs compared to the communists.

Meanwhile, SVNese intelligence officers, we've learned, are urging President THIEU to hold out as long as he can against the cease fire.

They claim the communists are in a weak military position and that the SVNese can use the delay to strengthen their own position.

### Marine Top Brass Want More Women In Ranks

**ANDERSON:** The Marines top brass have spread the word they want more pictures of women in the ranks.

A recent directive makes it mandatory for women NCO's to submit pictures with each promotion.

The pictures, we've learned, will be used to help determine which young lady gets a top level secretarial job.

Well, the Marines explained to us hastily, that their top brass are not looking for knock outs as secretaries - the brass just want to give the more hefty girls an incentive to trim their waistlines.

6

Friday, December 8, 1972

THE ECONOMIST, 9 DECEMBER 1972 (13)

We're all watching

It is only half of the story to say that Henry Kissinger needed to get Vietnam out of the way before he could make 1973 the year he sorts out the tangle in Europe, or takes a hard look at the one in the Middle East. Even this remarkable manipulator knows that he cannot manipulate himself out of the iron realities of how countries judge each other: which means that he needs to deal with the last loose ends in Vietnam in a way that does not actually make it harder for him next year to deal with governments, in Bonn or London or Jerusalem, which in the last resort have to rely on what America will do for them if things get rough.

There have been a lot of eyes watching Mr Kissinger this week. It has seemed increasingly likely that the present meetings with Le Duc Tho in Paris really are the last round: that a ceasefire agreement is about to be signed, and that soon the planes will be on their way to bring back the first American prisoners from North Vietnam, and the first international supervisors will be assembling, with varying degrees of cynicism, to watch over the ceasefire. The Vietnam war has always been both a war about self-determination for South Vietnam and a war about America's relationship with the rest of the non-communist world. It is not only in Saigon that every word of the settlement Mr Kissinger finally accepts will be examined with a microscope.

Between them, President Nixon and Mr Kissinger have brought off a small miracle in the past four years. They realised, when they came to office in 1969, that the United States needed a few years of peace and quiet in the world, and that one necessary step towards achieving this was to detach the Soviet Union and China from North Vietnam's war aims. They saw the opportunity provided by the enmity between China and Russia, and by the fact that both of them needed economic help from somewhere. The result has been, step by step, and each step just about exactly on schedule, the new American relationship with the two great communist powers. It has been a model of pre-planned foreign policy. But Mr Kissinger knows that so far he has achieved no more than a suspension of hostilities: a truce, which may last no longer than the heartbeat of Leonid Brezhnev and Chou En-lai, in which the real problems of our half-century's war of ideas still to be settled. There is still no clear understanding about the Soviet Union's future relationship with either half of Europe, or China's with the small countries to its south; or about the American relationship with western Europe; or about the ultimate disposition of that small corner of the world that happens to lie around Armageddon. These things are the agenda for Mr Kissinger's next four years, if he chooses to stay the course. It is his bad luck that they are coming on to the agenda just when his winding-up of the Vietnam war is being put to the test of public inspection; but that is how the timetable has gone, and he has to live with it.

The three things to look for

There are three main tests that are going to be applied to the Vietnam settlement, to see whether it fits Mr Nixon's definition of peace with honour. The first is whether the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord is given some fairly crisp instructions about its job of supervising a future election. The fact that this curious body will have to operate on the unanimity rule, as Mr Kissinger said it would on October 26th, means that it is not going to be the coalition government the communists have been asking for; the existing Saigon government will stay in power, and it can tell its man on the council to veto anything it does not like. Even so, "supervising the election" is a dangerously loose phrase.

It certainly includes deciding who the candidates should be, and watching over their freedom of speech during the campaign, and superintending the counting of the vote. It ought not to include taking over the other jobs of local government, least of all the work of the police. The danger that one side or the other will nevertheless try to twist the council to its own purposes is increased if the council is not just a single committee based in Saigon but is allowed to set up branches in the 44 provincial capitals and, below them, in the 268 district capitals, and worse still if it tries to go into business in every village in the country. The proper function of the National Council is to be a sort of loudspeaker through which any candidate who thinks he is not being given the normal freedoms of a democratic election can make his voice heard. One sub-council in every province is probably enough to do that, and each of these sub-councils should be told in advance what the Saigon government and the National Liberation Front have agreed that it can and cannot do. President Thieu, who has been saying since 1969 that the NLF can help to supervise the election that follows the settlement, ought to be able to accept that.

No veto on the checkers

The second test by which the settlement will be judged is the power given to the team of international supervisors; and it is important that these, unlike the National Council, should be given as loose a rein as possible. Of course, nobody expects this handful of men to find out everything that is happening everywhere in Indochina. There is too much jagged tree-covered emptiness around the place for that. But they can do better than the old fiasco of a control commission under Indian chairmanship did in the years after 1954 if certain things are made clear to them. They should be able to check whether North Vietnam really does take its troops out of Laos and Cambodia, as it promised to do in October; if it does, its only remaining route into the south will be across the fairly short, and relatively more easily controlled, border between the two Vietnams along the 17th parallel. And in South Vietnam itself it should be made clear that the four-nation supervisory commission does not have to be unanimous, or even to have a majority in favour of action, before it goes out to check a report that somebody is breaking the rules. That was how the Indians ruined the old commission; they usually voted with the Poles in favour of sitting on their behinds when the Canadians wanted to do something about a communist violation. The new system could avoid that sort of nonsense if any two countries were entitled to inspect a reported violation, and say what they thought of it, without having to get the permission of the other two. No doubt that would mean most of the work being done by the Indonesians and Canadians, if Mr Trudeau agrees to let his country take part; but at least it would prevent the supervisors fiddling with mutual vetoes while the ceasefire agreement was burning to ashes around them.

The third test, of course, is what happens to those North Vietnamese divisions sitting in the corners of South Vietnam. It is as wrong that they should be there as it would be if most of the west German army were sitting inside east Germany in support of a rebellion by east German non-communists against Herr Honecker—especially since North Vietnam agreed in October that the future of South Vietnam was a matter for “the two South Vietnamese parties” alone to decide. The failure of so many western liberals to make that comparison

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

3-E

76 Votes for Terror

It turns out, to no realistic observer's surprise, that collectively the United Nations does not accept that terror is a legitimate and urgent matter for international action. Rather, some 76 members—those which voted Monday simply to study the causes of terror—sanction the view that terror is a legitimate instrument of national policy. Many Arabs view terror as a suitable weapon for use against Israel; many black Africans view it as a suitable weapon against minority white African governments; their various patrons go along. Instead of condemning the practice or moving along the several legal avenues towards control of it, the 76 voted in effect for terror. The United States was among 34 states in opposition; 16 abstained.

The initial impulse of some people of good will is to conclude that the United Nations has, again, "failed" or been dishonored. This is a misleading judgment. In matters of this sort, the U.N. cannot transcend the will of its majority. To ask for more is to hold the world body to an impossible standard. In a certain strictly limited sense, terror in its many contemporary aspects is like, say, the multinational corporation: it is a new international phenomenon, brought into being by new forces and new technology; and it is difficult legally as well as physically to get a handle on simply because it is beyond the sovereign reach of any one nation. Instead of blaming the U.N. for not solving at one crack this extremely complex problem, people ought to salute the U.N. for having the institutional courage to try tackling it. Mr. Waldheim, the new Secretary General, is owed a special bow; it was on his initiative that the General Assembly seized the nettle.

If the American-led effort to shape legal forms within which to combat terror has been rebuffed, then that does not mean the final barrier to unbridled savagery has been

WASHINGTON POST
13 December 1972

removed. On the contrary, the political way is now clear for individual nations to intensify counter measures of their own. All states, of course—the Soviet Union and Egypt which voted "for" terror, the United States and Israel which voted "against"—already take various steps. But by the decision of the 76 to strike terrorism from the international agenda, all states have been put on notice that they must, as Britain's man put it, "redouble our own national effort." States must "act on their own or co-operate regionally," Israel's representative added.

Whether anyone likes it or not, this is what is already happening; it is a tendency which gains not only in necessity but in a certain respectability from the vote at the U.N. The terrorists do not observe the common rules of respect for national sovereignty and human rights: ask, for instance, those who fired into the New York apartment of a Soviet diplomat whose children were at play there. They cannot expect to be treated in respect in turn.

Does this mean more violence is to be expected? In the short run at least, probably yes. A few Palestinians will keep sending—and, no doubt, receiving—letter bombs. African "liberation" movements will do what they can in white-run Africa, aided, by the way, by funds from the World Council of Churches. It is a grim and frightening prospect and a good number of innocents are likely to be the victims, some chosen as victims precisely for their innocence. States or groups which are victims of terror now know for sure, if they did not know before, that their first line of defense against terror must be self-defense and that the international community, though it may continue to tut-tut, has forfeited standing to condemn counter-terror conducted in the name of self-defense.

WE'RE ALL WATCHING...Continued

with Germany is part of the moral ambivalence they have shown during most of the Vietnam war. Unfortunately, the United States long ago gave up the power to insist on the withdrawal of all of Hanoi's men before peace was signed; Mr Nixon proposed a ceasefire-in-place, which meant with quite a lot of North Vietnamese over the border, as long ago as 1970.

The real test of this part of the peace agreement, or of the private protocols that go with it, is not whether all of General Giap's men get out. The settlement can still work if, by the time the last American troops leave South Vietnam three months after the ceasefire, the number of North Vietnamese left in the south, and the places they are concentrated in, are no more than sufficient for these troops to perform the legitimate function North Vietnam is said to want them to perform.

The legitimate function that North Vietnam sees for these troops, as described by the sort of Europeans who usually speak for Hanoi, is to prevent Mr Thieu breaking his part of the deal. North Vietnam now realises, these men say, that the most it can hope to do for the National Liberation Front is to make sure that the NLF can take part in a reasonably free election, and operate as a normal opposition party afterwards. It is resigned to the fact that given the way most South Vietnamese feel at the moment, the NLF will win no more than a minority of the votes. In fact, if this story is true, the North Vietnamese are prepared to accept the sort of settlement that happened in Greece after the end of the civil war there in 1949. But they know that the NLF's own armed forces are far too weak to make sure that the election really happens, and that the NLF's minority of elected candidates are allowed to take their seats afterwards; so they want to keep enough of General Giap's men in the south to make sure that Mr Thieu lives up to his side of the bargain.

There is nothing in this that the United States need object to: if North Vietnam is at long last ready to accept

an elected government in Saigon, it is necessary to make sure that the election takes place. The arrangements for the North Vietnamese withdrawal can therefore provide for the temporary leaving behind of a deterrent force. There will have to be an understanding about how many men this needs, and where they should be. They will have to be open to inspection by the international supervisors, and it must be understood that they will go home once the whole deal is seen to be working. If the North Vietnamese presence can be defined in these terms—and the Americans make it clear that any other movement by it will bring their air force back into action—it need no longer be an obstacle to peace.

The penalty of being seen to fail

If the agreement that Mr Kissinger and Le Duc Tho eventually produce comes reasonably close to passing these three tests, Mr Nixon will have the sort of peace he wants. There is no democratic way of prescribing the sort of government South Vietnam will have in ten years' time; it was to stop the North Vietnamese prescribing it, in their own non-democratic way, that the Americans went into the war. The most that can be done is to make sure that the war ends with a political system in South Vietnam that leaves the choice of the next government to the preference of the majority of the people who will have to live under it. That has been, through all the years of bloodshed, the necessary justification of the American part in the war. It should be a matter of embarrassment to many American liberals that they failed to keep their eyes fixed on that principle. Mr Nixon and Mr Kissinger have tried to. The working out of the Paris agreement will show whether they succeeded. They will not want the negotiations of the next four years—with the European community, with Mr Brezhnev, with Mrs Meir and Mr Sadat—to take place to the accompaniment of the slow rumble of a collapsing peace in Indochina. But if they can show that they have held to their principle through all the difficulties of the past four years, and have made the principle stick, they are men who are going to be listened to.

4-E

2CZC LUA177 091840 PLB095 NAX
00 LPI

UNITED PRESS

TALKS 12-9

1ST NIGHT LD TALKS PLB051

BY GERARD LOUGHRAN

PARIS (UPI)-- WHITE HOUSE AID HENRY A. KISSINGER
TODAY WOUND UP AN ADDITIONAL WEEK OF SECRET TALKS WITH HANOI
REPRESENTATIVES ON A DEFINITIVE VIETNAM PEACE TREATY.

HE SPENT THREE HOURS AND FORTY MINUTES WITH SENIOR NORTH
VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATS LE DUC THO AND XUAN THUY BARGAINING
OVER DIFFRENCES TO BE OVERCOME BEFORE THE SIGNING OF A FINAL
PEACE AGREEMENT.

KISSINGER LEFT THE HEAVILY-GUARDED MEETING PLACE AT
GIF-SUR-YVETTE, A RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY 15 MILES SOUTH OF PARIS,
AND REPORTED TO WASHINGTON ON THE RESULT OF HIS SIXTH MEETING
WITH THO THIS WEEK.

NO SIDE ISSUED ANY COMMENT INDICATING THEY HAVE RESOLVED
THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

THE WHITE HOUSE WAS EXPECTED TO ANNOUNCE LATER TONIGHT
WHETHER KISSINGER WILL REMAIN IN PARIS FOR FURTHER CONTACTS, OR
FLY BACK TO CONSULT WITH PRESIDENT NIXON.

MORE GS/BOP1938 NNNN

UNITED PRESS

TALKS 12-9

1ST ADD 1ST NIGHT LD TALKS PARIS PLB095 X X PRESIDENT NIXON.

FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER MAURICE SCHUMANN TOLD NEWS MEN
SHORTLY BEFORE TODAY'S KISSINGER-THO MEETING HE REMAINED
OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF AN EARLY PEACE.

SCHUMANN SAID HE STOOD BY HIS RECENT STATEMENT THAT NEWSPAPER
WRITERS WERE TOO PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE NEW
PARIS PEACE MEETINGS. HE SPOKE AFTER REVIEWING VIETNAM
WITH PRESIDENT GEORGES POMPIPOU WHO MET KISSINGER
FRIDAY.

THE WHITE HOUSE ADVISER LEFT FOR PARIS WITH A WEARY WAVE
OF HIS HAND TO NEWS MEN WAITING OUTSIDE THE SMALL, WALLED
GIF-SUR-YVETTE VILLA, WILLED TO THE FRENCH COMMUNIST
PARTY BY THE LATE FRENCH PAINTER FERNAND LEGER.

THE COMMUNIST NEGOTIATORS EMERGED FROM THE MEETING WITH
BROAD SMILES.

SCHUMANN ALSO TOLD NEWS MEN FRANCE WAS PREPARED TO PLAY
A LARGER ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR A VIETNAMESE PEACE IF ASKED
TO DO SO. HESAID PARIS ALREADY HAD PLEDGED TO TAKE PART IN
THE PLANNED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH WILL DISCUSS
GUARANTEES FOR THE PEACE AGREEMENT, AND WOULD BECOME ONE OF THE
GUARANTEES OF THE PACT.

PICKUP 5TH GH: ASKED

GS/BOP1948 NNNN

UNITED PRESS

2CZC LUA181 091856 PLA142

2CZC LUA190 091932 PLB102 NXI

00 LPI

TALKS 12-9

2ND ADD 1ST NIGHT LD TALKS PARIS PLB096 X X PACTO.

THE ONLY BRIEF INTERMISSION IN TODAY'S SESSION CAME
AT 5 P.M. (1600 GMT) WHEN KISSINGER, HIS DEPUTY GEN. ALEXANDER
HAIG AND AN AIDE TOOK A BRIEF STROLL THROUGH THE VILLA GARDEN.

THE THREE MEN COULD BE SEEN HAVING A LIVELY DISCUSSION WITH
BROAD GESTURES OF THEIR ARMS BEFORE THEY REJOINED THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE 10 MINUTES LATER.

PICKUP 5TH PGH: ASKED

GS/BOP2032 NNNN

UNITED PRESS

UNITED PRESS

UNITED PRESS

UNITED PRESS

["2C2C LUA192 091945 PLB104 NXI\nUU LPI", "TALKS 12-9\nURGENT", "2ND NIGHT LD TALKS PLB095\nBY GERARD LOUGHRAN", "PARIS, UPI) -- WHITE HOUSE AIDE HENRY A. KISSINGER\nCOMPLETED A WEEK OF SECRET PEACE TALKS WITH HANOI REPRESENTATIVES\nTODAY AND SCHEDULED A NEW SESSION WITH THEM FOR MONDAY.", "THE U.S. PEACE MISSION, WHICH MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT, SAID\nKISSINGER'S DEPUTY, GEN. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, WAS FLYING\nBACK TO WASHINGTON TONIGHT TO REPORT TO PRESIDENT NIXON ON\nTHE PROGRESS OF THE SECRET MEETINGS.", "EXPERTS FROM THE U.S. AND NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION\nWILL HOLD A TECHNICAL SESSION SUNDAY, U.S. DELEGATION SPOKESMAN\nDAVID LAMBERTSON SAID.", "MORE GS/BOP2045 NNNN", "2C2C LUA194 091954 PLB103 NAI\nUU LPI", "TALKS 12-9", "1ST ADD 2ND NIGHT LD TALKS PARIS PLB104 X X SAID.", "LAMBERTSON SAID HE COULD NOT STATE THE PURPOSE OF SUNDAY'S TECH-\NNICAL-LEVEL MEETING -- THE FIRST SUCH KNOWN SESSION IN THE\n4 1/2 YEAR OLD PARIS TALKS.", "DIPLOMATS THEORIZED THE MEETING MIGHT BE CHARGED WITH\nPUTTING INTO WRITING DETAILS OF POSSIBLE COMPROMISES REACHED\nBY THE TOP NEGOTIATORS THEMSELVES.", "THEY TOOK AS A HOPEFUL SIGN THE FACT THAT KISSINGER DECIDED\nTO STAY IN PARIS AND ANNOUNCED THROUGH THE SPOKESMAN ANOTHER\nMEETING FOR MONDAY.", "KISSINGER FLEW INTO PARIS NOV. 19 TO OPEN THE CURRENT\nADDITIONAL PHASE OF PRIVATE TALKS WITH HANOI'S LE DUC\nTHO AND XUAN THUY, ANNOUNCING HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS\nFROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO SPARE NO EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AN EARLY\nSATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIATING EFFORT.", "MORE GS/BOP2052 NNNN", "2C2C LUA197 092001 PLB106 NXI\nUU LPI", "TALKS 12-9", "2ND ADD 2ND NIGHT LD TALKS PARIS PLB105 X X EFFORT.", "THE U.S. MISSION DID NOT IMMEDIATELY REVEAL THE SITE OF\nSUNDAY'S OR MONDAY'S MEETINGS. KISSINGER HAS BEEN MEETING\nTHE HANOI DIPLOMATS IN A VILLA LENT TO THEM BY THE FRENCH\nCOMMUNIST PARTY, A HOUSE BELONGING TO A NORTH VIETNAMESE\nIN SUBURBAN CHOISY LE ROI AND IN A RESIDENCE SELECTED IN\nTHE NEUILLY SUBURB BY THE U.S. DELEGATION.", "CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS OVER THE WEEKEND WAS CONSIDERED\nINDICATIVE OF THE SPEED WITH WHICH KISSINGER WAS PRESSING FOR\nA FINAL ACCORD.", "THE TWO SIDES HAVE NEVER MET ON A SUNDAY BEFORE.", "THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ANOTHER KISSINGER-THO MEETING WERE\nANNOUNCED HOURS AFTER FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER MAURICE\nSCHUMANN TOLD NEWSMEN HE REMAINED OPTIMISTIC ABOUT AN EARLY\nSOLUTION OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM.", "KISSINGER SPENT THREE HOURS AND 40 MINUTES TODAY WITH\nTHO AND THUY AT GIF-SUR-YVETTE, A RESIDENTIAL SUBURB 15 MILES\nFROM THE HEART OF PARIS. -- THE SIXTH MEETING THIS WEEK.", "PICKUP 3RD PGH: KISSINGER LEFT", "GS/BOP2058 NNNN"]

CAMBODGE

LE GOUVERNEMENT DU PRINCE SIHANOUK REFUSE LE PLAN DE CESSEZ LE FEU DU PRESIDENT NIXON

HONG KONG 10 DECEMBRE (AFP).

LE PEUPLE DU CAMBODGE CONTINUERA A SE BATTRE ET A REJETER
LE PLAN DE CESSEZ-LE-FEU DE NIXON, A ANNONCE DIMANCHE LA RA-
DIO DE PEKIN.

LA RADIO RETRANSMETTAIT LES DECLARATIONS DU VICE PREMIER
MINISTRE ET MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE DU GOUVERNEMENT ROYAL D'U-
NION NATIONALE DU CAMBODGE DU PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK, M. KHIEU
SAMPHAN, QUI A NOTAMMENT PRECISE LES POSITIONS DE SON GOUVERNE-
MENT: "PAS DENEGOCIATION, PAS DE COMPROMIS, PAS DE
CESSEZ LE FEU... SI NOUS REFUSONS LE PLAN DE CESSEZ LE
FEU DE NIXON, IL SERA REDUIT A NEANT".

FAISANT ETAT DE LA PRESSION EXERCÉE PAR LES FORCES DE LIBERA-
TION SUR PHNOM PENH, LE MINISTRE A DECLARE: "TOUTES LES ROUTES
STRATEGIQUES SONT SOUS NOTRE CONTROLE, ET IMPRATICABLES POUR
L'ENNEMI. LE REGIME MILITAIRE DE PHNOM PENH EST EN TRAIN DE

S'ECROULER MILITAIREMENT ET ECONOMIQUEMENT ET N'ECHAPPERA PAS
A L'ANEANTISSEMENT'.

M. KHIEU SAMPHAN A CONCLU EN LANCANT UN APPEL GENERAL A
L'OFFENSIVE POUR LA LIBERATION COMPLETE DU CAMBODGE DANS UN
PROCHE AVENIR.

(AFP)-(ML) %28%00 05.51

1%00

AFP-040

TYPHON SUR LE VIETNAM.

SAIGON, 10 DECEMBRE (AFP)

LE TYPHON "THERESE" S'EST CONCENTRE SAMEDI APRES-MI-
DI A 250 KM A L'EST DE QUI NHON, DANS LA PROVINCE DE BINH
DINH, ANNONCE DIMANCHE MATIN LA DIRECTION DE LA METEOROLOGIE
A SAIGON.

LE TYPHON S'AVANCE LENTEMENT VERS L'OUEST ET ATTEINDRA
LES COTES DES PROVINCES DE PHU YEN ET DE BINH DINH (SUR LA COTE
DU CENTRE ANNAM) AUJOURD'HUI A MIDI.

AFP/GP

%22 05.31

AFP-047

LE JAPON EST PRET A PARTICIPER A LA RECONSTRUCTION DE L'INDOCHINE

TOKYO 10 DECEMBRE (AFP).

LE MINISTRE JAPONAIS DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES M. MASAYOSHI
OHIRA, EST PARTI DIMANCHE POUR SAIGON, OU. IL DOIT PARTICIPER
A PARTIR DE LUNDI A LA SEPTIEME CONFERENCE MINISTERIELLE
POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DU SUD-EST ASIATIQUE.

LA CONFERENCE SERA ESSENTIELLEMENT CONSACREE AUX POSSIBILI-\TES DE COOPERATION ENTRE LES NATIONS DU SUD EST ASIATIQUE POUR
LA RECONSTRUCTION DE L'INDOCHINE APRES LE CESSEZ LE FEU
IMMINENT AU VIETNAM, DECLARE-T-ON DANS L'ENTOURAGE DE M. OHIRA.

LE MINISTRE DOIT ANNONCER A LA CONFERENCE QUE LE JAPON PAR-
TICIPERA ACTIVEMENT A LA RECONSTRUCTION DE L'INDOCHINE ET QU'
IL ABANDONNERA LA PRATIQUE DE L'AIDE LIEE'.

L'AIDE DU GOUVERNEMENT JAPONAIS AU DEVELOPPEMENT ECONO-
MIQUE DOIT ETRE PORTEE A 0,7 POUR CENT DU PRODUIT NATIONAL
BRUT DU JAPON, AJOUTE-T-ON DANS L'ENTOURAGE DE M. OHIRA.

(AFP)-(ML) %22. 06.12

## NECESSARY PARTNERS

# Nixon-Kissinger Relation

By MAX LERNER

(Los Angeles Times Syndicate)

(First of a series)

One of the best of the gathering bundle of Kissinger stories tells of the woman who meets him at a party and asks unbelievingly, "Are you the real Henry Kissinger?" And the answer comes back, "So I am told." There must be times when he must pinch himself to make sure that the reality isn't all a dream story, and that this immense advisory power of his won't dissolve into a puff of smoke.

The Nixon-Kissinger partnership — for that is what it is — stands almost by itself in American history. True, there have been predecessor examples of President and adviser working in intimacy on foreign policy outside the regular Cabinet structure.

One instance was Col. House and Woodrow Wilson in the peacemaking that ended World War I. But the two men fell out, their relation corroded and it became a partnership that failed.

A second was Harry Hopkins and Franklin Roosevelt in the prosecution of World War II and the handling of the alliances with Great Britain and the Soviet Union. But while there was a striking harmony of mood and personality between the two men, it was a relation of the leader

and his shadow, of the mind that conceived and the hand that executed.

On the Vietnamese War, both Kennedy and Johnson had national security advisers — McGeorge Bundy and Wait Rostow — who were largely troubleshooters, but in neither case was there a true partnership.

BETWEEN Mr. Nixon and Kissinger there is one. It is a very unlikely partnership.

Each has come to it starting at a different point and by a different road. Their convergence in their present roles is one of the great events of our time, possibly of profound meaning for world history.

Seen from this angle, Richard Nixon's story is one of preparation not only for power but for a great role in history. His prime passion was to gain the presidency. This once gained, his passion aimed beyond it, to achieve for America a place in the global power structure that would at least arrest the erosion of American power.

He was first attracted to Woodrow Wilson, who struck a pact with God to orient American war power toward making the world "safe for democracy." He learned from Whittaker Chambers and John Foster Dulles to translate this into making it safe from Communist expansionism. His first glimpse of moving beyond this came through his admiration for Charles de Gaulle — not an internationalist, but a nationalist with a deep sense of tradition.

Lerner

INA STAR 12/10/72

## nship Unique In History

However, 1968 found Mr. in Nixon still looking for someone who could make his goals real by methods he could feel at home with.

HENRY KISSINGER started his own path at Weimar, Germany, growing up as a Jewish boy in a Nazi climate, the son of a lowly schoolteacher. He was subject to the everyday humiliations, but they didn't remain to rankle within him.

The family came to America in 1938 when he was 15. They lived a typical refugee life at New York, with Henry going to high school and also working in a factory to help the family income.

In 1942, at 19, he was drafted, and in a military camp met another private — Fritz Kraemer — who became his Army friend and intellectual mentor. He went to Germany with the 84th Division (to which, as it happens, I was attached as a war correspondent), served brilliantly in military government and, at the end of the war, he continued briefly as civilian instructor

a command intelligence school.

BUT HE FELT he was learning nothing, came back to the United States, enrolled at Harvard, flashed through it with a roll of 'thunder and lightning' and in a decade had become a leading thinker on nuclear weapons and global politics.

The improbable paths of the two men converged in 1968. They were both largely without illusions. Kissinger had helped Nelson Rockefeller with his abortive campaign for the presidency, had a poor opinion of Mr. Nixon and had said so.

However, Mr. Nixon didn't bruise easily. He had a messy war on his hands, a seething internal situation and cold relations with the other Great Powers. He gambled and took Kissinger.

Thus it happened that the Quaker boy from Whittier, who knew power, went partners with the Jewish boy from Nazi Germany, who knew ideas and was looking for a power base.

IT WASN'T only the brilliance of the man which attracted Mr. Nixon. There had been other brilliant men. It was his sensitive and exact feel for history and his detachment about power.

Kissinger in turn found a Mr. Nixon drastically different from what he had expected. The two men were attuned not only to power but to each other. Each man's ego was fed, and there was a subtler interweaving of thought and action in each than either had thought possible.

It was a necessary partnership. Give me a place to stand, Archimedes had said, and I will move the world. Kissinger needed a place to stand. Mr. Nixon had the place, but he needed a direction and a philosophy to back it up. Each man had prepared himself for a role which only the other could enable him to fulfill. That is why I call them necessary partners.

(NEXT: Vietnam as Obstacle Course)

La restauration d'un monde

D'APRES tous les sondages, d'après tous les observateurs, Richard Nixon sera réélu en novembre prochain. Un mois avant l'élection présidentielle, la campagne laisse l'opinion indifférente, comme si déjà les jeux étaient faits. Par la fau-

te du sénateur McGovern, incapable d'imposer son « image » ou sa personnalité ? Probablement. Mais aussi, personne ne le nie, pas même les démocrates, parce que Richard Nixon a surpris adversaires et partisans : il a tenu plus qu'il ne promettait. Et c'est dans la conduite de la politique étrangère avant tout que l'opinion lui reconnaît mérite et succès, bien que la guerre du Vietnam continue et qu'il ait, au cours de son premier mandat, ordonné plus de bombardements que ne l'avait fait son prédécesseur. A en croire les observateurs, il n'a même pas besoin d'obtenir un cessez-le-feu avant les élections — ce qui donne aux négociations une meilleure chance d'aboutir.

Tâchons d'établir un bilan provisoire de la diplomatie Nixon ou, si l'on préfère, de la diplomatie Nixon-Kissinger. Nul ne peut discerner exactement ce qui, dans la conception et l'exécution, revient à l'un ou à l'autre. Il se peut que Nixon n'ait sans Kissinger n'eût pas été le même. Mais le mot du maréchal

Toffre vaut pour les relations entre les deux hommes : « Je ne sais pas qui a gagné la bataille de la Marne, mais je sais qui l'aurait perdu. » En cas d'échec ou de décision jugée inopportune, la presse entière des Etats-Unis s'acharnait sur Nixon. De quel droit lui laisser la responsabilité des échecs et lui enlever celle des réussites ?

Dès le début de 1969, Nixon s'est donné deux objectifs prioritaires : sortir « honorablement » du guêpier vietnamien, reprendre les relations avec Pékin et améliorer celles avec Moscou. L'état de l'opinion américaine lui dictait l'un et l'autre. Aussi bien, en diplomatie comme en stratégie, l'art est simple et tout d'exécution.

Au premier abord, les deux objectifs semblaient peu compatibles : comment renouer avec Pékin qui soute-nait et ravitaillait le Nord-Vietnam, alors que celui-ci continuait à subir un orage d'acier ?

Raymond ARON.

(Suite page 2, col. 1, 2, 3)

Ytre?!

Aurants

KISSINGER

par Raymond ARON