THE PRESIDENT: Well, with regard to the questions as to why Americans feel we were wrong to make the tapes, that is not particularly surprising. I think that most Americans do not like the idea of the taping of conversations, and frankly, it is not something that particularly appeals to me.

As a matter of fact, that is why, when I arrived in the White House and saw this rather complex situation set up where there was a taping capacity, not only in the President's office, the room outside of his office, but also in the Cabinet Room, and at Camp David, and in other areas that I had the entire system dismantled.

It was put into place again in June of 1970 (1971) because my advisors felt it was important in terms -- particularly of national security affairs -- to have a record for future years that would be an accurate one, but a record which would only be disclosed at the discretion of the President, or according to directives that he would set forth.

As you know, of course, this kind of capability not only existed during the Johnson Administration, it also existed in the Kennedy Administration, and I can see why both President Johnson and President Kennedy did have the capability because -- not because they wanted to infringe upon the privacy of anybody, but because they felt that they had some obligation, particularly in the field of foreign policy and some domestic areas, to have a record that would be accurate.

As far as I am concerned, we now do not have that capability, and I am just as happy that we don't. As a matter of fact, I have a practice, whenever I am not too tired at night, of dictating my own recollections of the day. I think that perhaps will be the more accurate record of history in the end.

I think we go to the UP now, and then we will come to the television.

QUESTION: Mr. President, on July 6, 1972, you were warned by Patrick Gray that you were being mortally wounded by some of your top aides. Can you explain why you did not -- who they were, why, what was going on?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, in the telephone conversation that you refer to that has been, of course, quite widely reported in the press, as well as on television, Mr. Gray said that he was concerned that as far as the investigation that he had responsibility for, that some of my top aides were not cooperating.

Whether the term was used as "mortally wounded" or not, I don't know. Some believe that it was, some believe that it was not, that is irrelevant. He could have said that.

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The main point was, however, I asked him whether
or not he had discussed this matter with General Walters
because I knew that there had been meetings between
General Walters, representing the CIA, to be sure that
the CIA did not become involved in the investigation,
and between the Director of the FBI.

He said that he had. He told me that General
Walters agreed that the investigation should be pursued
and I told him to go forward with a full press on
the investigation to which he has so testified.

It seemed to me that with that kind of a
directive from Mr. Gray, that that was adequate for the
purpose of carrying out the responsibilities.

As far as the individuals were concerned, I
assume that the individuals that he was referring to in-
volved this operation with the CIA. That is why I asked
him the Walters' question. When he cleared that up,
he went forward with the investigation and he
must have thought it was a very good investigation
because when I sent his name down to the Senate for
confirmation the next year, I asked him about his
investigation. He said he was very proud of it. He
said it was the most thorough investigation that had
ever taken place since the assassination of President
Kennedy, that he could defend it with enthusiasm and that
under the circumstances, therefore, he had carried out
the directive that I had given him on July 6th.

So, there was no question about Mr. Gray having
direct orders from the President to carry out an investi-
gation that was thorough.

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Page 5

QUESTION: Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen testified on April 15 of this year he met with you and warned you at that time there might be enough evidence to warrant indictments against three of your top aides, Messrs. Ehrlichman, Haldeman and Dean. You accepted their resignations on April 30, calling Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman two of the finest public servants you had known. After that you permitted Mr. Haldeman, after he had left the White House, to hear confidential tapes of conversations you had had in your office with Mr. Dean. My question is why did you permit a man who you knew might be indicted to hear those tapes which you now will not permit the American public or the federal prosecutors handling the case to listen to?

THE PRESIDENT: The only tape that has been referred to that Mr. Haldeman has listened to at my request, and he listened to that tape -- if that was the one on September 15 -- because he had been present and was there, I asked him to listen to it, and be sure that as far as any allegation by Mr. Dean with regard to that conversation was concerned, I wanted to be sure that we were absolutely correct in our response. That is all he listened to. He did not listen to any tapes in which only Mr. Dean and I participated. He listened only to the tape on September 15 -- this is after he had left office -- in which he had participated in the conversation throughout.

QUESTION: Mr. President, one of the lingering doubts about your denial of any involvement is concerning your failure to make the tapes available either to the Senate committee or the Special Prosecutor. You made it perfectly clear you don't intend to release those tapes.

THE PRESIDENT: Perfectly clear?

QUESTION: Perfectly clear. But is there any way that you could have some group listen to the tapes and give a report so that might satisfy the public mind?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't believe, first, it would satisfy the public mind, and it should not. The second point is that as Mr. Wright, who argued the case, I understand very well, before Judge Sirica this morning, has indicated, to have the tapes listened to -- he indicated this also in his brief -- either by a prosecutor or by a judge or in camera, or in any way, would violate the principle of confidentiality, and I believe he is correct. That is why we are standing on the proposition that we will not agree to the Senate committee's desire to have, for example, its chief investigator listen to the tapes, or the Special Prosecutor's desire to listen to the tapes also, we will oppose, as Mr. Wright did in his argument this morning, any compromise to the principle of confidentiality.

Let me explain the principle of confidentiality exists or it does not exist. Once it is compromised or it is known that a conversation that is held with the President can be subject to a subpoena by a Senate committee, by a grand jury, by a prosecutor, and be listened to by anyone, the

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Page 6

principle of confidentiality is thereby irreparably damaged. Incidentally, let me say that now that the tapes are no longer being made, I suppose it could be argued what difference does it make now that these tapes are also in the past. What is involved here is not only the tapes; what is involved, as you ladies and gentlemen well know, is the request on the parts of the Senate committee and the Special Prosecutor, as well, that we turn over Presidential papers, in other words, the records of conversations with the President made by his associates. Those papers and the tapes as well, cannot be turned over without breaching the principle of confidentiality. It was President Truman that made that argument very effectively in his letter to a Senate committee, or his response to a Congressional committee, a House committee it was, in 1953, when they asked him to turn over his papers. So whether it is a paper or whether it is a tape, what we have to bear in mind is that for a President to conduct the affairs of this office and conduct them effectively, he must be able to do so with the principle of confidentiality intact. Otherwise, the individuals who come to talk to him, whether it is his advisors, or whether it is a visitor in the domestic field or whether it is someone in a foreign field, will always be speaking in a eunuch-like way, rather than laying it on the line as it has to be laid on the line if we are going to have the creative kinds of discussion that we have often had, and it has been responsible for some of our successes in the foreign policy period, particularly in the past few years.

QUESTION: Mr. President, can you tell us who you personally talked to in directing that investigations be made both in June of 1972, shortly after the Watergate incident, and last March 21, when you ordered a more intensive investigation?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. In June, I of course talked to Mr. MacGregor first of all, who was the new chairman of the committee. He told me that he would conduct a thorough investigation as far as his entire committee staff was concerned. Apparently that investigation was very effective except for Mr. Magruder, who stayed on. But Mr. MacGregor does not have to assume responsibility for that. I say responsibility for it because basically what happened there was that he believed Mr. Magruder and many others have believed him, too. He proved, however, to be wrong.

In the White House, the investigation responsibility was given to Mr. Ehrlichman at the highest level, and in turn he delegated them to Mr. Dean, the White House Counsel, something of which I was aware, and of which I approved.

Mr. Dean, as White House Counsel, therefore sat in on FBI interrogations of the members of the White House staff because what I wanted to know was whether any member of the White House staff was in any way involved. If he was involved, he would be fired. And when we met on September 15, and again throughout our discussions in the month of March, Mr. Dean insisted that there was not -- and I use his words -- "a scintilla of evidence" indicating anyone on the White House staff was involved in the planning of the Watergate break-in.

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Now, in terms of after March 21, Mr. Dean first was given the responsibility to write his own report, and I did not rest it there. I also had a contact made with the Attorney General himself, Attorney General Kleindienst, told him -- it was on the 27th of March -- to report to me directly anything that he found in this particular area, and I gave the responsibility to Mr. Ehrlichman on the 29th of March to continue the investigation that Mr. Dean was unable to conclude, having spent a week at Camp David and unable to finish the report.

Mr. Ehrlichman questioned a number of people in that period at my direction, including Mr. Mitchell, and I should also point out that as far as my own activities were concerned, I was not leaving it just to them. I met at great length with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell on the 22nd. I discussed the whole matter with them. I kept pressing for the view that I had had throughout, that we must get this story out, get the truth out, whatever and whoever it is going to hurt, and it was there that Mr. Mitchell suggested that all the individuals involved in the White House appear in Executive Session before the Ervin committee. We never got that far, but at least that is an indication of the extent of my own investigation.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you have said repeatedly that you tried to get all the facts, and just now you mentioned the March 22nd meeting. Yet former Attorney General John Mitchell said that if you had ever asked him at any time about the Watergate matter, he would have told you the whole story, chapter and verse. Was Mr. Mitchell not speaking the truth when he said that before the committee?

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Mr. Lisagor, I am not going to question Mr. Mitchell's veracity, and I will only say that throughout I had confidence in Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell, in a telephone call that I had with him immediately after it occurred, expressed great chagrin that he had not run a tight enough ship, and that some of the boys, as he called them, got involved in this kind of activity, which he knew to be very, very embarrassing, apart from its illegality, to the campaign. Throughout I would have expected Mr. Mitchell to tell me in the event that he was involved or that anybody else was. He did not tell me. I don't blame him for not telling me. He has given his reasons for not telling me. I regret that he did not, because he is exactly right. Had he told me, I would have blown my stack, just as I did at Ziegler the other day. (Laughter)

QUESTION: Mr. President, how much personal belief, to what degree of personal blame do you accept for the climate in the White House, and at the election committee, for the abuses of Watergate?

THE PRESIDENT: I accept it all.

QUESTION: Mr. President, I want to state this question with due respect to your office, but also as directly as possible.

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THE PRESIDENT: That would be unusual. (Laughter)

QUESTION: I would like to think not. It concerns --

THE PRESIDENT: You are always respectful, Mr. Rather.
You know that.

QUESTION: It concerns the events surrounding Mr. Ehrlichman's contact, and on one occasion your own contact with the judge in the Pentagon Papers case, Judge Byrne.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

QUESTION: As I understand your own explanation of events and putting together your statement with Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony, and what you said, what happened here is some time late in March, March 17, I believe you said, you first found out about the break-in at the psychiatrist's office of Mr. Ellsberg; that you asked to have that looked into, and that you later, I think you said April, instructed Attorney General Kleindienst to inform the judge,

Now, my question is this. If while the Pentagon Papers trial was going on, Mr. Ehrlichman secretly met once with the judge in that case, you secretly met another time with the judge and Mr. Ehrlichman. Now, you are a lawyer, and given the state of the situation and what you knew, could you give us some reason why the American people should not believe that that was at least a subtle attempt to bribe the judge in that case, and it gave at least the appearance of a lack of moral leadership?

THE PRESIDENT: I would say the only part of your statement that is perhaps accurate is that I am a lawyer. Now, beyond that, Mr. Rather, let me say that with regard to the secret meeting with the judge, as he said, I met with the judge briefly. After all, I had appointed him to the position. I met him for perhaps one minute outside my door here in full view of the whole White House staff, and everybody else who wanted to see. I asked him how he liked his job. We did not discuss the case and he went on for his meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman.

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Now, why did the meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman take place? Because we had confirmed that Mr. Gray could not be confirmed, as you will recall. We were on a search for a Director of the FBI. Mr. Kleindienst had been here and I asked him what he would recommend with regard to a Director, and I laid down certain qualifications.

I said I wanted a man preferably with FBI experience, and preferably with prosecutor's experience, and preferably, if possible, a Democrat so that we would have no problem with confirmation. He said, "The man for the job is Byrne." He said, "He is the best man. I said, "Would you recommend him?" He said, "Yes."

Under those circumstances then, Mr. Ehrlichman called Mr. Byrne. He said, "Under no circumstances will we talk to you." He said, "Ehrlichman, "will talk to you, if he felt that it would in any way compromise his handling of the Ellsberg case."

Judge Byrne made the decision that he would talk to Mr. Ehrlichman, and he did talk to him privately, here. And on that occasion, he talked to him privately, the case was not discussed at all-- only the question of whether or not, at the conclusion of this case, Mr. Byrne would like to be considered as Director of the FBI.

I understand, incidentally, that he told Mr. Ehrlichman that he would be interested. Of course, the way the thing broke eventually, we found another name with somewhat the same qualifications, although, in this case, not a judge. In this case, a chief of police with former FBI experience.

Now, with regard to the Ellsberg break-in, let me explain that in terms of that, I discussed that on the telephone with Mr. Henry Petersen on the 18th of April. It was on the 18th of April that I learned that the Grand Jury was going away from some of its Watergate investigation and moving into national security areas.

I told Mr. Petersen at that time about my concern about the security areas, and particularly about the break-in as far as the Ellsberg case is concerned.

And then he asked me a very critical question, which you, as a non-lawyer will now understand, and lawyers probably will, too. He said, "Was any evidence developed out of this investigation, out of this break-in?" And I said, "No, it was a dry hole." He said, "Good."

Now, what he meant by that was that in view of the fact that no evidence was developed as a result of the break-in, which is, incidentally, illegal, unauthorized, as far as I was concerned, and completely deplorable. But since no evidence was developed, there was no requirement that it be presented to the jury that was hearing the case. That was why Mr. Petersen, a man of impeccable credentials in the law enforcement field, did not, at that time on the 18th, at a time that I told him what I had known about the Ellsberg break-in, say, "Let's present it then to the Grand Jury," because

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nothing had been accomplished, nothing had been obtained
that would taint the case.

It was approximately ten days later that
Mr. Kleindienst came in and said that, after a review
of the situation in the prosecutor's office in Washington,
in which Mr. Petersen had also participated, that
they believed that it was best that we bend over back-
wards in this case and send this record of the Ellsberg
break-in, even though there was no evidence obtained from
it that could have affected the jury one way or another,
send it to the judge.

When they made that recommendation to me, I
directed that it be done, instantly. It was done.
Incidentally, the prosecutor argued this case just the
way that I have argued it to you, and whether or not it
had an effect on the eventual outcome, I do not know.

At least, as far as we know, Mr. Ellsberg
went free. This being one of the factors, but that
is the explanation of what happened and, obviously,
you, in your commentary tonight, can attach anything
you want to to it.

I hope you will be just as fair and objective
as I tried to be in giving you the answer.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, what is the state of your
certainty in your Vice President at this point in time?

THE PRESIDENT: I have noted some press speculation
to the effect that I have not expressed confidence in the Vice
President and therefore I welcome this question because I want
to set the record straight. I had confidence in the integrity
of the Vice President when I selected him as Vice President
when very few knew him, as you may recall back in 1968 --
knew him nationally. My confidence in his integrity has not
been shaken and in fact it has been strengthened by his
courageous conduct and his ability even though he is contro-
versial at times, as I am, over the past four and a half years.
So I have confidence in the integrity of the Vice President
and particularly in the performance of the duties that he has
had as Vice President and as a candidate for Vice President.

Now obviously the question arises as to charges
that have been made about activities that occurred before he
became Vice President. He would consider it improper, I
would consider it improper for me to comment on those charges
and I shall not do so but I will make a comment on another
subject that I think needs to be commented upon and that is,
the outrageous leak of information from either the Grand Jury
or the prosecutors or the Department of Justice or all three,
and, incidentally, I am not going to put the responsibility
on all three until I learn from the Attorney General who at
my request is making a full investigation of this at the
present time -- I am not going to put the responsibility
about the leak of information with regard to charges that have
been made against the Vice President and leaking them all in
the press.

Convicting an individual -- not only trying him but
convicting him -- in the headlines and on television before
he has had a chance to present his case in court is completely
contrary to the American tradition. Even a Vice President has
a right to some, shall I say, consideration in this respect let
alone the ordinary individual. And I will say this, and the
Attorney General I know has taken note of this fact, any
individual in the Justice Department or in the prosecutor's
office who is in the employ of the United States who has
locked information in this case to the press or to anybody
else will be summarily dismissed from government service.
That is how strongly I feel about it and I feel that way
because I would make this ruling whether it was the Vice
President or any individual.

We have to remember that a hearing before a Grand
Jury and that determination in the American process is one
that is supposed to be in confidence, it is supposed to be
a secret, but because all kinds of charges are made that will
not stand up in open court and it is only when the case gets
to open court that the press and the TV have a right to
cover it -- well, they have a right to cover it but I mean
have a right it seems to me to give such broad coverages to
the charges.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, at any time during the Watergate crisis did you ever consider resigning and would you consider resigning if you felt that your capacity to govern had been seriously weakened, and in that connection how much do you think your capacity to govern has been weakened?

THE PRESIDENT: The answer to the first two questions is no, the answer to the third question is that it is true that as far as the capacity to govern is concerned that to be under a constant barage twelve to fifteen minutes a night on each of the three major networks for four months tends to raise some questions in the people's mind with regard to the President and it may raise some questions with regard to the capacity to govern. But I also know this. I was elected to do a job. Watergate is an episode that I deeply deplore and had I been running the campaign rather than trying to run the country and particularly the foreign policy of this country at this time it would never have happened, but that is water under the bridge, it is gone now.

The point that I make now is that we are proceeding as best we know how to get all those guilty brought to justice in Watergate but now we must move on from Watergate to the business of the people, and the busi ess of the people is continuing with initiatives we began in the first Administration.

QUESTION: Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment.

We have had thirty minutes of this press conference. I have yet to have, for example, one question on the business of the people, which shows you how we are consumed with this. I am not criticizing the members of the press because you naturally are very interested in this issue, but let me tell you years from now people are going to perhaps be interested in what happened in terms of the efforts of the United States to build a structure of peace in the world. They are perhaps going to be interested in the efforts of this Administration to have a kind of prosperity that we have not had since 1955 -- that is, prosperity without war and without inflation -- because throughout the Kennedy years and throughout the Johnson years whatever prosperity we had was at the cost of either inflation or war or both. I don't say that critically of them, I am simply saying we have got to do better than that.

Now our goal is to move forward then, to move forward to build a structure of peace. And when you say do I consider resigning, the answer is no, I shall not resign. I have three and a half years to go or almost three and a half years and I am going to use every day of those three and a half years trying to get the people of the United States to recognize that whatever mistakes we have made that in the long run this Administration by making this world safer for their children and this Administration by making their lives better at home for themselves and their children deserves high marks rather than low marks. Now whether I succeed or not, we can judge then.

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QUESTION: Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: We always have to have Mr. Deakin
for one.

QUESTION: As long as we are on the subject of the American tradition and following up Mr. Rather's question what was authorized, even if the burglary of Dr. Fielding's office was not, what was authorized was the 1970 plan which by your own description permitted illegal acts, illegal breaking and entering, mail surveillance and the like.

Now under the Constitution you swore an oath to execute the laws of the United States faithfully. If you were serving in Congress, would you not be considering impeachment proceedings and discussing impeachment possibility against an elected public official who had violated his oath of office?

THE PRESIDENT: I would if I had violated the oath of office. I would also, however, refer you to the recent decision of the Supreme Court or at least an opinion that even last year which indicates inherent power in the presidency to protect the national security in cases like this. I should also point out to you that in the three Kennedy years and the three Johnson years through 1966 when burglarizing of this type did take place, when it was authorized on a very large scale, there was no talk of impeachment and it was quite well known.

I shall also point out that when you ladies and
gentlemen indicate your great interest in wire-taps, and
I understand that, that the height of the wire-taps was when
Robert Kennedy was Attorney General in 1963. I don't
criticize it, however. He had over 250 in 1963 and of
course the average in the Eisenhower Administration and
the Nixon Administration is about 110. But if he had had
ten more and as a result of wire-taps had been able to
discover the Oswald plan it would have been worth it.

I will go to another question.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, do you still consider Haldeman and Ehrlichman two of the finest public servants you have ever known?

THE PRESIDENT: I certainly do. I look upon public servants as men who have got to be judged by their entire record, not by simply parts of it. Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman, for 4-1/2 years, have served with great distinction, great dedication, and like everybody in this deplorable Watergate business, at great personal sacrifice and with no personal gain.

We admit the scandalous conduct. Thank God there has been no personal gain involved. That would be going much too far, I suppose.

But the point I make with regard to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman is that I think, too, that as all the facts come out, that -- and when they have an opportunity to have their case heard in court and not simply to be tried before a committee, and tried in the press, and tried in television, they will be exonerated.

QUESTION: Mr. President, could you tell us your recollection of what you told John Dean on March 21 on the subject of raising funds for the Watergate defendants?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. Mr. Haldeman has testified to that, and his statement is accurate. Basically, what Mr. Dean was concerned about on March 21 was not so much the raising of money for defendants, but the raising of money for the defendants for the purpose of keeping them still -- in other words, so-called hush money. The one would be legal -- in other words, raising a defense fund for any group of any individuals, as you know, is perfectly legal and it is done all the time. But if you raise funds for the purpose of keeping an individual from talking, that is obstruction of justice.

Mr. Dean said also on March 21 there was an attempt, as he put it, to blackmail the White House, to blackmail the White House by one of the defendants. Incidentally, that defendant has denied it, but at least this was what Mr. Dean had claimed. And that unless certain amounts of money were paid, I think it was $120,000 for attorneys' fees and other support, that this particular defendant would make a statement, not with regard to Watergate, but with regard to some national security matters in which Mr. Ehrlichman had particular responsibility.

My reaction, very briefly, was this: I said, as you look at this, I said, "Isn't it quite obvious, first, that if it is going to have any chance to succeed, that these individuals aren't going to sit there in jail for four years? They are going to have clemency; isn't that correct?"

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QUESTION: Mr. President, earlier in the news conference you said that you gave Mr. Haldeman the right to listen to one tape because you wanted to be sure that we are correct. I think I am quoting you correctly. Now you have indicated that you still feel that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman had the right to listen to one tape because you wanted to be sure that we are correct. I think I am quoting you correctly.

Now, you have indicated that you still feel that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman are two of the finest public servants that you have ever known. You have met with their lawyer at least twice that we know of. Are you and Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman coordinating their and your defense and, if so, why?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no, as far as my defense is concerned, I make it myself. As far as their defense is concerned, their lawyer has demonstrated very well before the committee that he can handle it very well without any assistance from me.

Mr. Theis.

QUESTION: Mr. President, to follow a question on the Agnew situation, you have said in the past that any White House official who was indicted would be suspended and that anyone convicted would be dismissed. Should Vice President Agnew be indicted, would you expect him to resign or somehow otherwise stand down temporarily until cleared?

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Mr. Theis, that is a perfectly natural question and one that any good newsman, as you are, would ask. But, as you know, it is one that it would be most inappropriate for me to comment upon. The Vice President has not been indicted, charges have been thrown out by innuendo and otherwise, which he has denied to me personally and which he has denied publicly, and to talk about indictment and to talk about resignation, even now -- I am not questioning your right to ask the question, understand -- but for me to talk about it would be totally inappropriate and I make no comment in answer to that question.

QUESTION: Mr. President, looking to the future on Executive privilege, there are a couple of questions that come to mind --

THE PRESIDENT: I thought we got past that, Clark, that was a year ago.

QUESTION: But we have the future --

THE PRESIDENT: All right, fine.

QUESTION: Where is the check on authoritarianism by the Executive if the President is to be the sole judge of what the Executive Branch makes available and suppresses? And will you obey a Supreme Court order if you are asked and directed to produce the tapes or other documents for the Senate Committee or for the Special Prosecutor? And, if this is not enough -- (Laughter) -- is there any limitation on the President, short of impeachment, to compel the production of evidence of a criminal nature?

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THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything else?

QUESTION: No, I think that would be enough.
(Laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: No, I was not being facetious but I realize it is a complicated question. The answer to the first question is the limitation on the President in almost all fields like this is, of course, the limitation of public opinion, and, of course, Congressional and other pressures that may arise. As far as Executive privilege is concerned in the Watergate matter and I must say the ITT file and so forth, that this Administration has, I think, gone further in terms of waiving Executive privilege than any Administration in my memory, certainly a lot further than Mr. Truman was willing to go when I was on the other side, as you recall, urging that he waive Executive privilege.

Now, with regard to what the Supreme Court will do or say, the White House Press Secretary, Assistant Press Secretary, Mr. Warren has responded to that already. I won't go beyond that and particularly I won't make any statement on that at this time while the matter is still being considered by Judge Sirica. I understand his decision will come down on Wednesday and then we will make a determination. But as far as the statement that Mr. Warren has made with regard to the President's position of complying with a definitive order of the Supreme Court is concerned, that statement stands.

QUESTION: Mr. President, last week in your speech you referred to those who would exploit Watergate to keep you from doing your job. Could you specifically detail who "those" are?

THE PRESIDENT: I would suggest that where the shoe fits, people should wear it. I would think that some political figures, some members of the press, perhaps, some members of the television, perhaps would exploit it. I don't impute, interestingly enough, motives, however, that are improper because here is what is involved; there a great number of people in this country that didn't accept the mandate of 1972. After all, I know that most of the members of the press corps were not enthusiastic, and I understand that, about either my election in '68 or '72. That is not unusual:

Frankly, if I had always followed what the press predicted or the polls predicted, I would have never been elected President. But what I am saying is this, people who did not accept the mandate of '72, who do not want the strong America I want to build, who do not want the foreign leadership that I want give, who do not want to cut down the size of this government bureaucracy that burdens us so greatly and to give more of our government back to the people, people who do not want these things, naturally, would exploit any issue, if it weren't Watergate, anything else, in order to keep the President from doing his job.

And so I say I impute no improper motives to them, I think they would prefer that I fail. On the other hand, I am not going to fail, I am here to do a job and I am going to do the best I can and I am sure the fair-minded members of this press corps -- and that is most of you -- will report when I do well and I am sure you will report when I do badly.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, you recently suggested today that if the late Robert Kennedy had initiated ten more wiretaps he would have been able to discover the Oswald Plan, as you described it, and therefore presumably prevent the assassination of President Kennedy.

THE PRESIDENT: Let me correct you, sir. I want to be sure that the assumption is correct. I said if ten more wiretaps could have found the conspiracy, if it was a conspiracy, or the individual, then it would have been worth it. As far as I am concerned, I am no more of an expert on that assassination than anybody else, but my point is that wiretaps in the national security area were very high in the Kennedy Administration for a very good reason; because there were many threats on the President's life, because there were national security problems, and that is why that in that period of 1961 to 1963, there were wiretaps on news organizations, on news people, on civil rights leaders, and on other people. I think they were perfectly justified and I am sure that President Kennedy and his brother, Robert Kennedy, would never have authorized them, as I would never have authorized them, unless he thought they were in the national interest.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you think then that threats to assassinate the President merit more national security wire taps particularly?

THE PRESIDENT: No. No, as far as I am concerned, I was only suggesting that in terms of those times -- of those times -- to have the Oswald thing happen just seemed so unbelievable. With his record -- with his record -- that with everything that everybody had on him, that that fellow could have been where he was in a position to shoot the President of the United States, seems to me to have been a terrible breakdown in our protective security areas.

I would like to say, however, that as far as protection generally is concerned, I don't like it, and my family does not like it. Both of my daughters would prefer to have no Secret Service. I discussed it with the Secret Service. They said they have too many threats, and so they have to have it. My wife does not want to have Secret Service, and I would prefer, and I recommended this just three days ago, to cut my detail by one third, because I noticed there were criticisms of how much the Secret Service was spending.

Let me say that we always are going to have threats against the President, but I frankly think that one man probably is as good against a threat as a hundred. That is my view, but my view does not happen to be in a majority there, and it does not happen to agree with the Congress- so I will still have a great number of Secret Service around me; more than I want, more than my family wants.

QUESTION: Mr. President, during March and April, you received from your staff on several occasions information about criminal wrongdoing and some indication that members of your staff might have been involved. My question, sir, is

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Page 19

why didn't you turn this information over immediately to the
prosecutors instead of having your own staff continue to make
these investigations?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, for the very obvious reason that in March, for example, the man that was in constant contact with the prosecutor was my Counsel, Mr. Dean. Mr. Dean was talking to Mr. Petersen. I assumed that anything he was telling me he was telling the prosecutors and in April, after Mr. Dean left the investigation, Mr. Ehrlichman was in charge. I would assume, and incidentally, Mr. Ehrlichman did talk to Mr. Kleindienst. That is why it was done that way. The President does not pick up the phone and call the Attorney General every time something comes up on a matter; he depends on his Counsel or whoever he has given that assignment to to do his job, and that is what I expected in this instance.

QUESTION: Mr. President, in your Cambodian invasion speech of April 1970, you reported to the American people that the United States had been strictly observing the neutrality of Cambodia. I am wondering if you in light of what we now know, that there were 15 months of bombing of Cambodia previous to your statement, whether you owe an apology to the American people?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly not, and certainly not to the Cambodian people, because as far as this area is concerned, the area of approximately ten miles, which was bombed during this period, no Cambodians had been in it for years. It was totally occupied by the North Vietnamese Communists. They were using this area for the purpose of attacking and killing American Marines and soldiers by the thousands. The bombing took place against those North Vietnamese forces in enemy-occupied territory, and as far as the American people are concerned, I think the American people are very thankful that the President ordered what was necessary to save the lives of their men and shorten this war which he found when he got here, and which he ended.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. President.

END

(12:20 P.M. PDT)

15

KISSINGER-ROGERS

BY KENNETH J. FREED

WASHINGTON (AP)-DESPITE CONSTANT REPORTS THAT HENRY A. KISSINGER WILL GET HIS JOB, SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS SHOWS NO SIGN OF LEAVING.

KISSINGER HAS SHOWN INCREASING INTEREST IN HEADING THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AFTER YEARS AS PRESIDENT NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER.

ALTHOUGH DENYING THAT NIXON HAS TALKED TO HIM ABOUT A SWITCH, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS CLOSE TO KISSINGER HAVE DONE NOTHING TO SQUELCH THE SPECULATION.

JUST THE OPPOSITE, IN FACT. FOR INSTANCE, ONE SOURCE SAID THAT AS RECENTLY AS FOUR MONTHS AGO KISSINGER "WOULD HAVE SAID NO" TO BECOMING SECRETARY OF STATE.

NOW, THE OFFICIAL SAID, "I CAN'T SAY." HE SAID THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE TO CHANGE KISSINGER'S MIND, ONE OF THEM WATERGATE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, ROGERS REPEATEDLY DENIES THE TWO MOST PREVALENT RUMORS ABOUT IS FUTURE; THAT HE WILL GO TO THE SUPREME COURT OR THAT HE WILL BE NAMED AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION.

ROGERS HAS TOLD THE PRESIDENT HE PREFERS ACTION AND COULD NOT SIT STILL LONG ENOUGH TO HANDLE THE RESEARCH NECESSARY ON THE COURT, NOR WHAT HE CONSIDERS THE ROUTINE AND NARROW FUNCTIONS OF THE MOSCOW POST.

SOURCES SAID WATERGATE HAD BROUGHT A CHANGE IN KISSINGER'S THINKING BECAUSE OF HIS CONCERN FOR THE SUCCESS OF CURRENT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

THEY SUGGESTED THAT KISSINGER AS SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE IN A MORE DIRECT POSITION TO CARRY ON THE DIPLOMACY NECESSARY TO SHORE UP THE CONFIDENCE THAT OTHER NATIONS HAVE IN THE UNITED STATES.

ANOTHER VIEW WAS OFFERED BY OTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES WHO SAID KISSINGER WANTS TO MOVE FROM HIS WHITE HOUSE OFFICE TO DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE FROM THE WATERGATE SCANDAL.

SR944AED

AUGM 9

16

STOCKTIE

FIRST LINE REPORT

MARVIN KALB

JULY 17, 1973

MARVIN KALB: Good morning. The latest chapter in the Rogers-Kissinger feud. That in one minute.

(Announcement)

MARVIN KALB: Officials at the State Department say the story was inspired by the White House, probably by Henry Kissinger. Officials at the White House say the story was inspired by State Department officials who are unhappy about the stewardship here of Secretary of State Rogers. And then, of course, there are non-officials who say the story was inspired not by the White House and not by the State Department, but by sources who have always been intrigued by the Kissinger-Rogers feud.

The story in question, reported last Friday by my colleague Dan Rather, is that Kissinger will replace Rogers as Secretary of State, perhaps as early as this September. Although this is not the first time this story has surfaced, it is the first time in a long time, and it got good play here and around the world. As Rather said, it's a plan, and not yet a Presidential decision, and the plan could be scratched for a variety of reasons. Therefore, not the story itself so much as the impact of the story upon the Washington bureaucracy, that is what seems to fascinating.

Kissinger says the President never talked to him about it, and the White House Press Office, under repeated questioning, refuses to deny it; not because it is true, officials stress, but because it is their mandate neither to deny or confirm it. Their explanation is the story has come up before and there is no point in responding to it every time it does. Still, there was no denial, and that prompted other reporters to write about it over the past weekend.

Rogers was then on his way to Tokyo, and his press spokesman told reporters enroute, as well as the State Department Press Office here, that there would be no comment on the story, no comment and no speculation. However, by the time the Rogers party arrived in Tokyo there had been some change of heart, or so it seems. A State Department official traveling with the Secretary talked with Kyes Beech, a reporter for the Chicago Daily News, and reportedly told him that Kissinger was the source of the story that Kissinger would replace Rogers. Reporter Beech quotes an official as saying, "Henry wants the job all right, but he's probably telling the truth

- 2 -

when he says the President hasn't discussed the matter with him.
The reason is, Kissinger hasn't got the guts to ask Nixon for the
job. One reason Kissinger wants the Secretary's job," this official
continues, "is to get out from under the shadow of Watergate."

Whether this quoted official had the Secretary's permis-
sion to speak is unknown. What is known is that, once this story
ran on the wire tickers, Kissinger blew his stack, believing that
the State Department was out to discredit him. Kissinger demanded
to know who was traveling with Rogers and who talked to Kyes Beech.
Who was traveling would be easier to find out than who talked. Any-
way, each of the two principals believes that the other, or people
supporting the other, is out to do him in, and the rumors and the
speculation and the back-biting on both sides compose a bureaucratic
wonder to behold.

It has been clear for some time that there is no love
lost between Kissinger and Rogers. That is an old story. It has
also been clear that at some point Rogers will resign from his job.
Some of his friends say this fall. And then what? Only the Presi-
dent really knows, and he has other problems on his mind far more
important to him at the moment than who runs the State Department.
It has been running, and running down, for so long now that another
month or two or three won't make any real difference.

# # # # # # #

The Hartford Times

DAILY AND SUNDAY

A Member of The Gannett Group

UNION & REPUBLIC

ROGER C. CORYELL, Publisher

Charles A. Betts, Executive Editor

Don O. Noel Jr., Editor, Editorial Page

William P. Pike, Managing Editor for News

Nat A. Sestero, Managing Editor, Administration

Page 30 Wednesday, Sept. 12, 1973

# Disturbing side-effects in Kissinger's policies

It is unfortunate that so much attention has focussed, in the confirmation hearings with Henry Kissinger, on his role in covert wiretaps of members of the White House staff and of newsmen.

Dr. Kissinger has been nominated to be secretary of state, not chief of internal security. And while his acquiescence in wiretaps to determine the political reliability of his colleagues is an unhappy bit of history, it is relatively unimportant in any broad assessment of his role in the nation's leadership.

KISSINGER is the genius of this administration's foreign policy — in the sense both of the man whose intellect dazzles all challengers and of teacher, guardian and inspiring force.

That is commonly accepted to have been a laudable role. Dr. Kissinger is the negotiator if not the author of some of the most widely accepted accomplishments of this administration.

But it is not an unblemished record.

Kissinger is a manipulator. Like the Austrian diplomat of the last century, Metternich, he believes in ordering the world into neatly packaged spheres of influence, within which each great power is free to a large extent to do as it pleases.

That minimizes antagonisms and frictions among the superpowers, and thus avoids the risks of war. In a nuclear age, that is no small accomplishment.

But it has a tendency to diminish moral leadership. The world once neatly divided, the superpowers have little incentive to worry about minor miscarriages of justice.

The world's concern for the declining economic fortunes of the developing nations — often because

of cartel-like behavior among the industrial nations — is near an all-time low, as Robert McNamara of the World Bank keeps reminding us.

America finds itself so bemused by detente with the Soviet Union that we sell our wheat at prices we subsidize, and give little moral support to the victims of neo-Stalinist repression — even though failing crops and rising dissent are problems that ought to put Moscow's leadership at a bargaining disadvantage.

Kissinger's hope for stability in Latin America rests not so much on helping create economic equity south of the border, the goal we set in the Alliance for Progress a decade ago, but rather in persuading the Soviets and Chinese that Latin America is part of our sphere of influence in which they ought not meddle because we will not meddle in theirs.

CONGRESSIONAL critics should be concerned, too, with Dr. Kissinger's blithe assumption that only executive-brancn action can cope with a complex world.

He is capable, in these hearings, of referring to "the old days when treaties were submitted to the Senate," and of offering no clear distinction between an executive agreement . and a Senate-ratified treaty.

Dr. Kissinger's nomination will, of course, be ratified. He has long been secretary of state in fact if not in name, and there is probably no clearer case for a president's right to have the advisers and colleagues he chooses.

But the Senate ought to help make the nation aware of the risks of the Nixon-Kissinger-Metternich foreign policy, and to insist on frequent ex-amination of its side-effects.

An Editorial

Kissinger: A Disaster

In a brilliant column at the top of our back
page today, Paul Scott suggests, hopefully but
not realistically,

that the confirmation hearings beginning tomorrow before the United States Senate on Dr. Henry Kissinger's nomination as secretary of state will look into certain basic questions dealing with Kissinger's political philosophy.

According to
Scott, Dr. Kissinger
is attempting to in-
troduce into U.S.
foreign policy the
idea of the German
philosopher Hegel

(1770-1831) that there are no permanent truths or immutable principles. Scott points out that if there are no basic truths or immutable principles, as Kissinger claims, then the senators should ask him on WHAT is his proposed new International order going to be built?

It has been quite evident to this newspaper for a long time that Dr. Kissinger's views are entirely different from those of the founding fathers of this nation. As Scott puts it, "At issue is the basic question of whether one believes that freedom comes from God and is a gift to all mankind, and not a few, and that this truth never changes."

At the moment, the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy is being accomplished at the cost of increased prices and shortages in the United States and even the curbing of help for famine-stricken nations. The Nixon-Kissinger effort is in effect turning the United States away from being the

AN EDITORIAL

DR. KISSINGER

An Editorial

Kissinger: A Disaster

(Continued from Page One)

defender and protector of the free world and transforming it into the protector of communism and socialism in Russia and China — all in exchange for some vague promise of peace.

As has now been shown, Mr. Nixon, by giving his domestic advisers a free hand, brought political disaster upon himself at Watergate. The question now is whether he has given the same sort of free hand to Dr. Kissinger. This time the disaster will be not only Mr. Nixon's, it also will be that of all of us and the entire nation.

In this connection, there recently was an extremely revealing UPI interview with Karl and Paula Kissinger, the uncle and aunt of Dr. Kissinger. When asked why Dr. Kissinger went to work for President Nixon, Aunt Paula said, "HE WORKED FOR KENNEDY AND HE DIDN'T GET ALONG WITH HIM. HE SAID KENNEDY WAS TOO IMPRESSED WITH HIS OWN PERSONALITY. JOHNSON WAS TOO SELF-CONFIDENT, BUT NIXON — AND UNDERLINE THIS — NIXON LETS HIM DO WHAT HE WANTS."

This newspaper over a period of years has stated that it considers Dr. Kissinger to be the greatest disaster ever to hit U.S. foreign policy. This is because, in our estimation, Dr. Kissinger is a European-type intellectual whose thinking, in the opinion of this newspaper, is dominated by the philosophies of Hegel and by the European ideas which were rejected by the founding fathers of our nation.

Combined with this European attitude, Dr. Kissinger has the arrogance of the kind of intellectual who regards himself as being better than the average citizen and who believes he knows exactly what ordinary mortals should be told to do.

Dr. Kissinger once wrote a book about the Austrian diplomat Metternich, who was responsible for the Peace of Vienna in 1814. Dr. Kissinger has apparently identified himself with this historical figure and sees himself as the Metternich of the Twentieth Century.

He has been encouraged in this silly conceit by persons such as President Nixon and others who are overly-impressed by Harvard-tainted scholarship. These people, as Aunt Paula Kissinger said, keep giving him his own way.

The confirmation of Dr. Kissinger as secretary of state would be a disaster for everyone — except that succession of overblown ladies whose company Dr. Kissinger seems to enjoy on the theory, apparently, that the Metternich of long ago also was quite a ladies' man.

On the other hand, this newspaper does not share Columnist Paul Scott's optimism that the Senate will do anything except to superficially question Dr. Kissinger and then confirm him with many laudatory statements from Senator Fulbright and others of that ilk.

William Loeb, Publisher

26 September 1973

A-12

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS

Washington, D.C., Thursday, August 23, 1973

# Kissinger to Be Chief in Task and Title

By Oswald Johnston
Star-News Staff Writer

For the first time since John Foster Dulles ran things from Foggy Bottom more than 15 years ago, the actual director of U.S. foreign policy is also going to

be its nominal chief, the secretary of State.

William P. Rogers, the outgoing secretary, reflected just a bit of doubt yesterday in a farewell session with reporters, when a question was raised about Henry A. Kissinger's newly

announced dual role as White House foreign policy adviser and secretary of State. "I'm not sure, too sure, just how that's going to work," Rogers said.

In the bland, antiseptic State building, anticipation among foreign service professionals at the prospect of having foreign policy directed once again from their agency has mounted in recent weeks as rumors of Rogers' impending departure began to multiply.

AS A PRACTICAL matter, however, the changeover is likely to mean little to the average State Department bureaucrat, to the average foreign diplomat, or to the average American citizen.

U.S. policy, as it has been for 4½ years, will continue to be directed by President Nixon in consultation with Kissinger.

The State Department itself, as it has been for more than a decade, will be entrusted with the management — not the formulation — of policy.

The number of officials of the U.S. government who really know what is going on will remain about as small as it has been during the Nixon-Kissinger years of White House dominance.

THESE presumptions about the future were offered today by an experienced student of U.S. policymaking, a veteran of both the State Department bureaucracy and Kissinger's elite staff of experts in the National Security Council.

The forecast: Kissinger, acting on his deeply ingrained distrust of bureaucracy, will create a functional replica of the NSC staff on "the seventh floor — the State Department jargon for the executive echelon of the building.

Outside that core, the speculation runs, "the rest of the building could be as far away from the center of power as the whole building is today from the White House and the NSC.

"The dividing line between those in the know and those outside will simply move geographically — from the Executive Office Building to the top two floors of State."

ROGERS himself dropped a hint that similar thoughts crossed his mind during his brief informal session with the press, in his paneled seventh floor office, with its elegantly curtained view of the Potomac, Lincoln Memorial, and the flight path of planes descending to National Airport.

There has been occasional tension, "a certain challenge," between State and the White House during his years as secretary, Rogers conceded.

"I think not so much between Henry and myself as, I think, between the White House and the department," Rogers explained.

"I think part of that was because there was a feeling on the part of the White House that the government was not leak-proof, and if you wanted to do things without a lot of public knowledge, you had to do it quietly. I suppose it is partly a natural jealousy that exists between bureaucracies."

A SUCCESSION of administrations has developed a security classification system which, tightened up by a year-old executive order in the Nixon administration, can effectively seal off most of the State Department's bureaucracy from policy-making as effectively as it has been during the past 4½ leak-conscious years of Nixon-Kissinger direction.

Nevertheless, a secretary Kissinger will be under far more pressure in the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate climate of Washington than Kissinger, the adviser, had ever been.

He will have to appear in public more frequently, attend ceremonial functions, make public statements of policy at ministerial meetings, NATO conferences and U.N. assemblies. He will have to answer questions on Capitol Hill — and "if the White House tries to claim executive privilege because Kissinger is acting in his capacity as national security adviser rather than secretary of State, all hell will break loose," one former policy adviser speculated.

STILL, there are gradations. One possible option for Kissinger could well derive from his new accountability to Congress as a member of the Cabinet.

To get along with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with which he has so far maintained excellent informal and personal relations, Kissinger may have to open institutional panels of communications — and the distrusted State Department bureaucracy may well be his best tool.

Besides Dulles, the other dominant secretary of State in recent history was Dean Acheson, and under his leadership, unlike Dulles' the bureaucracy flourished.

Under an "Acheson option," a one-time state official mused, Kissinger would still take over the seventh floor, but instead of bypassing the bureaucracy with a small elite staff, he would seek to engage it and use it by installing his men in the chain of authority.

IF THAT happens, the surge of morale in the Foreign Service could have lasting effect.

"Of course," the former official warned, "they shouldn't expect too much. Latin America will remain a back porter in U.S. policy and the attitude toward Africa won't change.

"And, after a honeymoon of five or six months, a reaction will set in.

"There will be leaks, and Kissinger will be upset about them, and the policy-making eventually will be sealed off from the rest of the bureaucracy. In the end, it will probably be about the same thing you have now."