August 12, 1966

Major General Jonathan O. Seaman
APO 96345
San Francisco, California

Dear General Seamen:

Upon my return to the United States,
I would like to thank you for your hos-
pitality and kindness when I visited your
headquarters.

I was tremendously impressed by
what you are doing and I wish you con-
tinued success.

With kind regards.

Henry W. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards,

tinned success.
what you are doing and I wish you con-
I was tremendously impressed by

headquarters.
bility and kindness when I visited your
I would like to thank you for your hos-
Upon my return to the United States,

Dear General Sesman:

San Francisco, California
APO 96345
Major General Jonathan O. Sesman

August 12, 1966

August 12, 1966

General William C. Westmoreland
COMUSMACV
Saigon
APO 96243
San Francisco, California

My dear General Westmoreland:

I was very sorry that scheduling problems prevented us from meeting before I left. I would have liked to tell you how very much I appreciated the cooperation I received from your staff and yourself on the occasion of my visit to Vietnam. I found it a very useful experience and I cannot tell you how grateful I am for all the courtesies that were extended to me.

I thought I should mention particularly the officers that accompanied me on the trip who could not have been more helpful. They were: Lt. Col. Rufus Barnes, Major David L. Wise, Capt. Richard F. Kost, Lt. Col. Walter W. Plummer, Col. William Lueck from J-33 and Col. Willis B. Scudder from your protocol office.

I would like to single out Major Wise whose plane cracked up the morning that he called for me in Danang and who carried out his escort duties without flinching the rest of the way (despite some other harrowing plane trips).

It was a particular privilege to have an occasion to exchange ideas with you in a leisurely way at dinner.

With warm regards and every good wish.

Henry V. Klauder

Sincerely yours,

with warm regards and every good wish.

It was a particular privilege to have an occasion to exchange ideas with you in a familiar way at dinner.

benevolent circle without flinching the rest of the way (decided some other borrowing morning that he called for me in Danand and who carried out his escort I would like to single out Major Miao whose bane cracked up the

Willis B. Sonder from your protocol office.

Lt. Col. Walter M. Plummer, Col. William Lueck from t-33 and Col. Col. Bruce Barnes, Major David I. Miao, Capt. Richard E. Koel, me on the trip who could not have been more helpful. They were: Lt.

that were extended to me.

experience and I cannot tell you how grateful I am for all the kindneses on the occasion of my visit to Vietnam. I found it a very meaningful I appreciated the cooperation I received from you and all your homeostasis meeting before I left. I would have liked to tell you how very much I was very sorry that scheduling problems prevented me from

My dear General Westmoreland:

San Francisco, California

APO 96343

Saldan

COMMAAC

August 13, 1968

MACJ33

26 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HENRY KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Escort Officers

The following officers escorted Mr. Kissinger during his visit to
SVN on the dates indicated:

I Corps (Danang), 24 July 1966 - Lt Col Rufus Barnes, USAF, MACV J33

II Corps (Qui Nhon), 25 July 1966 - Maj David L. Wise, USA, MACV J33

III Corps (Bien Hoa), 21 July 1966 - Capt Richard F. Kost, USA, MACV J33

IV Corps (Vinh Long, Kien Giang), 22 July 1966 - Lt Col Walter W. Plummer, USA, MACV J33

Hau Ngia Province, 27 July 1966 - Col William Lueck, USA, MACV J33

Additional Assistance - Col Willis B. Scudder, MACV Protocol Branch

August 12, 1966

Major General Frederick Weyand
Commanding General- 25th Division
APO 96225
San Francisco, California

My dear General Weyand:

With kind regards.

PAPER A

VIETNAM

As "Defender of Democracy, Self-Determination and Freedom" the United States has assumed an international burden of mammoth proportions involving a commitment that permits a multitude of interpretations. Yet it is a position from which they dare not retreat, taxing as it may be, for fear of disrupting the balance of power, betraying the "cause" and concomitantly strengthening the ideological appeal of Communism and the territorial expansion of China. The current commitment is to Vietnam, a country whose socio-economic and political structure is totally alien to that of the United States yet the defense of which apparently warrants the presence of 250,000 American troops pursuing objectives, constantly redefined, but officially stated as those of "defending the country against aggression with a view to establishing a free, non-aligned South Vietnamese Government."

While the problems of policy implementation and agency coordination have necessitated considerable reorganization, it is quite evident that the Americans have now realized that militancy alone will not win this war. Equally, the battle for the minds of the Oriental peasant is not one at which the Americans have demonstrated expertise.

By name Vietnam is a country, but its history has denied it the chance of attaining "nationhood" for it has lived in the perpetual shadow of war, first under the direction of mediaeval warlords, then since the 1860s under Western domination for a century only to be followed by the ruthless oppression of Ho Chi Minh in the North and Diem in the South. The cause of war has not been economic misery but rather the ambitions of regional potentates, Western powers and finally ideological philosophies the implications of which are generally speaking far beyond the comprehension of the vast majority of the 15 million South Vietnamese. Historically their system of government has operated on a semi-autonomous regional basis. In a country of conflicting creeds and four major religions, three main geographical areas and thirty-five political parties, the notion of a Central Government is considered by many Vietnamese as an evil almost as serious as disease and hunger. However, since 1954, Ho has established central control in the North while endless attempts have been made by the Americans to set up a central government in the South.

After 1954 the stakes in Vietnam assumed new proportions, for Ho Chi Minh, who had previously invoked the help of all true Vietnamese Nationalists, threw off this well-worn guise only to embrace openly the fraternal help of Mao whose geographical proximity and ideological philosophy represented nothing but an asset to the cause of Ho, who began to pursue his long term objective of uniting Vietnam under his Communist control. In return, the Americans pledged assistance to South Vietnam, offering their services to Diem through the official medium of SEATO. Vietnam thus became the centre of a big political power play in which Moscow was only meekly involved, Peking represented the power behind Ho with nothing to lose, while Washington, concerned with the dire implications of the Domino Theory, became committed to the cause of defending South Vietnam's freedom from the Communist aggressor.

Thus, the present status quo in Vietnam has been derived from a

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strife-ridden past culminating now in a sphere of influence dominated
by military power, complicated by constant domestic, political and
religious upheavals and inundated with endless psychological propaganda
from Peking and Washington. Within the country there are innumerable
political and religious factions interminably jostling for power,
motivated by nationalism, religion and Communism yet often uncertain
as to what are their real objectives. They recognize no legitimate
authority yet demonstrate an unusual propensity for realigning their
allegiances almost on a daily basis. It would appear that the Buddhists,
under the cunning and enigmatic leadership of Tri Quang, control the
most effective political organization and are currently bidding for
power, yet their motives are uncertain for they have denounced both
Communists and Americans, not to mention the Catholics. Religion is
playing a leading role, for as so often is the case in the Orient, it
constitutes about the only truly comprehensible rallying point for an
impoverished and unsophisticated people.

Infiltration from North Vietnam has steadily increased since
1954, spearheaded by their acknowledged military and political arms,
the Viet Cong and N.L.F. In response, the American commitment to
Vietnam, and more generally to S.E. Asia, has grown from a few
hundred advisers to becoming an open combatant of 250,000 troops;
indeed, a U. S. pose of detachment would not be visibly a pose.
On a world-wide basis the conflict is generally viewed as being
due either to Communist obstinancy or American militancy. Washington,
being most sensitive to world opinion and the fact that they are fighting
a major war on a foreign continent, justify daily their involvement on the
basis of a "war against Communist expansion." The real objectives of
Washington and Peking should bear careful examination.

Self-interest is the predominating influence in any commitment,
whether it be individual or national. Objectives may be cloaked in any
number of different public pronouncements, yet I believe the real
American concern to be that of the containment of China, a continuation
of their Korean policy, rather than the democratic well being of South
Vietnam. The bellicose protestations of Mao and his comrades have
revealed a totally irresponsible attitude towards humanity and World
Peace suggesting that human life has little value so long as China
can re-establish the political domination and geographical boundaries
it enjoyed prior to the Western occupancy of China, following the
Opium Wars of 1840. The Chinese people are proud by nature, resentful
of their lost Empire and historically extremely cultured and intelligent.
As yet their military might is small in comparison to their massive
population, but the threat of an irrational, war-mongering Chinese govern-
ment, hungry for power, is one that greatly concerns Washington.

The Johnson Administration see Peking as the power behind Hanoi.
However independent Ho might claim to be, the fact remains that 85%
of his weapons are supplied from China. In order to attain their over-
riding objective of containing China, Washington has variously defended
their position on the basis of supporting self-determination in South
Vietnam, defeating the Viet Cong; assisting in local construction of
viable economic units and finally living up to their pledge to defend

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S.E. Asia against Communist expansion. The commitment is a military and ideological one, for while protecting the peasants with gun fire, the paramount importance of winning their confidence, assisting them in their simple yet essential village operations and building a progressive village community is being given increasing emphasis.

The stakes are too high for Washington to contemplate an ignominious retreat. They see a U. S. collapse in Vietnam as an immediate source of strength to the Chinese policy of militarism as opposed to the Soviet methods of peaceful co-existence. It is considered imperative that American policies in no way force Moscow to take a more public stand on the Vietnamese conflict. Lastly, failure by America to keep its commitments would not only result in such loss of face but also in possible drastic "domino" consequences for surrounding countries such as Thailand and India.

Given these objectives of Washington, one must consider if their successful implementation will, in fact, defeat the Viet Cong and contain China. While deployment of American power has killed 10,000 Viet Cong since January 1966, the American ability to pursue this grisly military process depends on the non-Communist part of South Vietnam staying reasonably solid. The more the non-Communists quarrel with each other and the more the Americans embitter one group by being dragged in to help another, the greater the danger that the whole policy will collapse disastrously. It would be both prudent and realistic if the U. S. established that they are not hooked onto any straight treaty obligation to any one particular Saigon government, nor just to the people of Vietnam, but rather to all peoples who lack the strength to resist by themselves the impulses of military power beamed from China. It must be clearly seen that midst the present chaotic struggle in Vietnam is the greater problem of coming to terms - peacemaking, not capitulatory - with China.

Thus, 'the Honolulu Embrace' was a serious diplomatic blunder for it reflected the J. S. espousal of an unpopular head of an unpopular regime. Consequently the Buddhist rebels are now out for a revolution, not a mere reshuffle of military leaders. It would seem inevitable that any future government will have to contain some strong Buddhist representation. The fact remains that the gory business of drawing a line against Communist expansion needs the visible consent of the local people, which can only be accomplished through an independent representative South Vietnamese government, capable of justifying continued U. S. occupation on the grounds that a majority of Vietnamese want help in preventing a Communist take-over. In short, Johnson must somehow remove Ky for he has lost popular support and a new government must be able to live with the Buddhists in Da Nang and Hue.

The implementation of military policy has not only been tempered by Congressional and public opinion at home but also by the dictates of avoiding escalation in Vietnam for fear of forcing Russia to offer sophisticated weapons to Hanoi. It is a two-process race between first, the grinding down of Hanoi and the Viet Cong by superior U. S. force (so far discriminately used in order to minimize civilian losses), and secondly a growing war weariness of the South Vietnamese which will from now on be reflected in what the Saigon Government says and does. It will largely be a case of who cracks first for it will be at least 1967 before a clear U. S. military advantage is gained. While

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escalation is rightly a controversial decision, I would favor at this stage, increased bombing on North Vietnam and particularly Hanoi and also an attempt to gain access through Laos to the Ho Chi Minh trail and subsequently to destroy it. I do not believe Russia would intervene (for their fear of Peking is just as great as Washington's) while the discomforts of war might be brought home more acutely to the North Vietnamese. In addition, not only would China be powerless to help, but it is also quite contrary to the philosophy of Mao to meet in direct conflict with a more powerful adversary. While currently the war is causing little hardship to North Vietnam, a measured increase in the destruction of Hanoi would probably increase the latter's willingness to come to the conference table, despite their present announcements to the contrary.

The ideological battle is undoubtedly the long-run element that will ensure either success or failure. On this front, the problems of implementation have been and will remain enormous, while already the blunders made are countless. Yet there are signs that not only are the Americans becoming attuned to the peasant's needs, but also the initial glamour of the Viet Cong, their promises and their methods, is vanishing fast. It takes time to understand the simple needs and Oriental mind of the village community but it is evidently essential that as soon as possible the military campaign become entirely subordinate to the economic and ideological and that A.I.D. refrain from promising to triple the flow of consumer goods to South Vietnam, when they know such promises are impossible due to the sorely taxed supply services. Such statements do more harm than good. Democracy means nothing to the Vietnamese peasant for the only politics he understands is that of the stomach. He must be helped to provide for himself and his family; his mind and support must be won for he is the prime target of the Communist infiltrators.

Under no circumstances should the U. S. withdraw from Vietnam until an honorable and viable compromise can be negotiated. There will be no victory in the classical sense, for military defeat will never be so complete as to forget the other side. It is essential that Washington's priority be that of reaching a 'modus vivendi' with China - a priority that is not a problem for Americans alone, although recognition of China in the UN would certainly facilitate negotiations and ostensibly bring China into the fold rather than blindly slamming the door. Her actions presently reflect those of a cornered rat with no responsibility and no recognition.

I am not advocating immediate disengagement by the U.S., but rather a calculated policy towards moving all the interested parties to the negotiating table. The attrition of the Viet Cong and the demolition of North Vietnam must continue at an accelerated pace. While China currently has nothing to lose from the continuation of the war, Hanoi must be made to suffer increased hardships. But at the same time a new South Vietnamese government must be formed incorporating Buddhist, Catholic and military elements. In all probability it will be more flexible than Ky's, war-weary, and more willing to negotiate, even to the point of giving the N.L.F. a place in the political system. Inevitably there are dangers in such a plan, particularly that of enabling the Communists to capture complete power after a brief face-saving interval - yet it also might oblige them to stay in opposition and defer their hopes much longer (as in Greece). Finally, one must question if such a coalition government can initially be formed and then survive. The answer would seem to lie somewhere in the area that their chances would probably, at this stage, be better than any

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other government.

Similar to Malaya, it will be a long war of patience in Vietnam characterized by pressure with restraint. The U. S. have the resources to wage war in S. E. Asia for many decades and this fact must be made eminently clear to the Chinese. Yet the support of the South Vietnamese is essential if a satisfactory 'modus vivendi' is to be established. America cannot and does not wish to carry the entire burden themselves; but the gauntlet has been thrown down and America cannot afford to retreat from their international commitment. It is my contention that through a process of negotiation and containment China can be tamed, but the inevitable compromise must be negotiated from a position of strength, as in Korea.

An ignominious American withdrawal at this stage is inconceivable, on a national basis in that Johnson could not politically tolerate the shame, and internationally in that it would only serve to fan the flames of Chinese expansion. It is a gruesome, ill-defined war for which the ultimate solution lies not in exporting the Great Society program and massive American resources, but rather patiently tailoring a program that the Vietnamese can comprehend and implement to their own benefit, allowing them the chance to organize themselves as a non-Communist society.

PAPER B

VIETNAM

The primary objective of the United States is to establish its power in South East Asia for the dual purpose of assuring the availability of the important resources of this region to the free nations of the world and denying these resources to our enemies in the event of armed conflict. At this point in history, the Chinese pose the greatest threat to the interest of the U. S. in that region. The Chinese contest the position of the free world nations in South East Asia, not only verbally with a stream of vindictive remarks on the Lin Piao model, but also physically as was witnessed recently on the India-China border. In Viet-Nam, China is providing substantial support in terms of materials and supplies to the Viet-Cong effort. It is essential that the U. S. understand the motives of China and consider the role of Russia, China's ostensible Communist ally, in order to place perspective upon the importance of the United States' interest in South East Asia.

A glance at a map of Asia gives a clue to China's dilemma. To the north and west, she confronts a more powerful country, Russia. In the southwest she is contained physically by the Himalayan mountains. But to the south, within easy access by land or sea, lie the rich lands of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Viet-Nam, and Malaya. Beyond them lies Indonesia. From an economic point of view South East Asia could provide China with desperately needed food to feed her people and valuable material resources such as tin and oil. Strategically, control of South East Asia would give China an opportunity to further spread her sphere of influence into India and Pakistan to the west, the Philippines to the east, and Australia to the south.

More significant than the economic and strategic value of South East Asia to China is the psychological aspect of control of this region. Three factors are important. First, honor and pride are extremely important in the Oriental culture as the U. S. witnessed in its dealings with Japan during and since World War II. Failure to dominate South East Asia has been a continually embarrassing point for the Chinese. Second, out of a deeply rooted tradition, foreigners, particularly Occidentals are, to the Chinese way of thinking, inferior species of mankind. There is ample evidence of this attitude derived from trade relations between the U. S. and China during the past two centuries. And third, China believes that it is destined to be the leader of "true" Communism and carry out the world Communist revolution. Failure to succeed in bringing about the world revolution has damaged China's prestige in its own eyes enough, but compounding the effects of this failure is the importance of honor and pride and the growing realization that, so far, the Communist movement has been more successfully guided by the Russians, an inferior specie of humanity. When U. S. Thant spoke of China as being a "nervous wreck" and of her frustration, he was referring in part to this particular psychological problem. A victory in Viet-Nam for Ho Chi Minh would provide an enormous psychological lift to China and would be interpreted as the first step toward the world domination of Communism. It is doubtful where the next Communist thrust would be, if the Viet-Cong did achieve victory in Viet-Nam. However, it is certain that there would be a thrust somewhere, since the Chinese would be encouraged by their success in Viet-Nam. The U. S. cannot afford to tolerate a Chinese victory in Viet-Nam.

Russia's interest in Viet-Nam is somewhat paradoxical. On one hand

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PAPER B

VIETNAM

she should desire a Communist victory in Viet-Nam. However, Peking, not Moscow, would benefit from this victory with added prestige in Communist circles, which is a relevant consideration since Russia and China are contending for leadership of the Communist movement. In this respect, if the U. S. can successfully contain China's aggressions, it will be to Russia's advantage since it will strengthen her claim as leader of the Communist movement. To date, Russia's participation in Viet-Nam has been only a token gesture in the form of material. There is some question whether the so-called "Soviet equipment" is not in fact a Chinese copy or equipment that belongs to the Viet-Cong third or fourth hand. From the point of view of the U. S., Russia's policy of remaining aloof is satisfactory, since time is apparently on our side. The recent downfall of Khrushchev was a manifestation of the trend in Russia which sees a passing of the militant Communism and arrival of a consumer-oriented economy designed to improve the Soviet standard of living. Competition between the US is free to operate indefinitely in South East Asia without considering Russia's interests. It does mean, however, that for the present Russia's interests are focused upon other problems and she feels that the current trend is working to her advantage.

Accepting the validity of the argument that there is ample justification for the United States' primary objective and accepting the fact that for historical reasons the battleground upon which the U. S. must attain its objective is Viet-Nam, we move to a lower level of abstraction for the secondary objective. This objective is to create a political entity in Viet-Nam that has sufficient strength to cope with domestic problems and withstand the aggressions of the Chinese with minimum aid from the U.S. Attainment of this objective in Viet-Nam is essential to reach the primary objective, unless the U. S. is prepared to provide the resources necessary to administer the domestic affairs of Viet-Nam possible without the cooperation of the Vietnamese as well as military resources. At present, it is questionable how long the people of the U. S. will tolerate utilization of military resources in Viet-Nam, let alone resources, which would be considerable in terms of men and dollars, to administer a government. It is useful to examine the relevant historical realities responsible for the creation of the situation in Viet-Nam for the purpose of assessing, first, what ingredients a government in Viet-Nam must have to successfully cope with domestic problems, second, the strategy that the U. S. should adopt to create such a government, and third, the obstacles and risks inherent in the implementation of this strategy.

The first historical reality which is somewhat obvious but is too often forgotten, is the existence of strong cultural ties between the Vietnamese and Chinese. Besides a similar ethnic and religious origin, the people of these two cultures share similar attitudes about the structure of the family, methods of farming and fishing, superstition, as evidenced by the similar origins of the "eyes" painted on the bows of their boats, dress habits, and sense of values. Both cultures are so alien to the American experience that the American mind has difficulty understanding or accepting these cultures. Remarks are made referring to the impossibility of understanding a Buddhist or reprimanding Ho Chi Minh for executing 100,000 Vietnamese. The Vietnamese can understand a Buddhist and accept the rationale for the mass executions; it is the American who fails to understand. He must begin by accepting the fact that any political structure that will be successful will be conceived in the context of Vietnamese culture

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VIETNAM

and such characteristics such as executions will be an integral part
of political life.

The second historical reality is that dictatorship is the traditional form of government for the Vietnamese. The traditional authority of power comes from a "heavenly mandate" backed up by military strength. Contemporary political leaders have experienced difficulty in getting a convincing "heavenly mandate" and have relied more upon military strength to substantiate their claims to power. Americans have yet to understand the significance of sheer military power to the Vietnamese as is evident by the U. S. insistence that an election be held to determine political fortunes. To the Vietnamese an election is an absurd idea, and the U. S. cannot expect the South Vietnamese to respect the "voice of the people" in the same way as do Americans.

The third historical reality is that Viet-Nam has suffered in recent years from an unfortunate imperialistic relation. During the past decade a form of Nationalism has begun to develop in Viet-Nam. At present the Nationalistic impulse is ill-defined and not fully understood, partly due to the split between the North and South and partly because the idea of Nationalism is completely foreign to the Vietnamese culture. Although Nationalism has not developed to the sophistication of instilling a universal sense of patriotism to a cause (although Ho Chi Minh has made great strides in this direction), Nationalism does mean anti-imperialism, and the U. S. will be always hampered in its actions in Viet-Nam by carrying the stigma of imperialism.

The fourth historical reality is that as an ideology Communism is easier to accept by the Vietnamese than democracy. The abstract concept of democracy is difficult to communicate to people who have no appreciation for the sacredness of common law, rights of individuals, and concept of individual ownership. Likewise, the esoteric points of Communism will not be understood by the Vietnamese peasant. To him Communism means "no rich people, no poor people." Democracy has no simple description that does not somehow involve words such as "freedom," which are not understood by the Vietnamese. It is important for Americans to understand that conceptually Communism can be more easily accepted than democracy by the Vietnamese and that democracy bears some of the imperialist stigma further hampering its acceptance. But more important, Americans must distinguish between the ideology and the political organization capable of influence through military action. Of the two, the latter is far more significant in the mind of the Vietnamese peasant, who shies away from expressing any views on any matter in his effort to survive in his topsy-turvy world.

The combination of these four historical realities form the necessary ingredients of a government that can survive in the Viet-Nam environment. In order to attain its objectives the U. S. must create a climate such that a government that is oriental in flavor, a dictatorship with strong military backing, anti-imperialistic, and sympathetic to Communism can develop naturally. Once this is done, the U. S. must be able to work with this government. Casual reflection would seem to indicate that this is a paradox in insanity and, in fact, it is a nearly hopeless problem to solve. Given that it is vital to have a strong government in Viet-Nam that is capable of handling its domestic problem, it must be a government that is indigenous to the

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VIETNAM

environment of Viet-Nam. If the nature of this government is different
from that of the U.S., it is the problem of the latter to make the
necessary adjustments in its thinking and learn to work with the
government in Viet-Nam in order to attain the United States' objective
of containing the Chinese.

At the moment the alternatives open to the U. S. for providing
the Vietnamese with a satisfactory government to meet its objectives
are limited. One alternative, which presently does not seem practical,
but should be kept in mind for possible use in the future, is coming to
terms with Ho Chi Minh. From all outward appearances Ho Chi Minh's
organization is the most effective in Viet-Nam and he, himself, is the most
popular leader. Of all the leaders in Viet-Nam, a nation under his leader-
ship would have the best chance of establishing its independence from Peking.
The motivation for this independence would come from Ho Chi Minh's Nationalistic
spirit. Unfortunately, his Nationalism is essentially anti-imperialist and
the U. S., even disregarding the lingering scars of present relations,
would have difficulty in working with Ho Chi Minh, since, faced with
the alternative between domination by Peking or dependence upon Washington,
he would probably take the former.

Another alternative is to continue with the present policy of cutting-
off the supply lines from the North to the Viet-Cong strongholds in
the South, destroying their organization, and driving them from the
South. The problem with this policy is that the objective of creating
a strong government is not being attained. Even if the Viet-Cong are
driven from the South, the likelihood of a strong government being left
is small. The U. S. has directed their efforts at the lowest level
possible; that of the peasant in the village; by providing farm tools,
outboard engines, and the like. The problem is that results can be
measured in terms of decades, which is too slow.

A third alternative is to continue with the military effort of
exterminating the Viet-Cong from the South, but directing the entire
domestic effort to creating a strong government. For this plan to be
effective the U. S. must admit that all the aspirations of the sundry
interest groups--the Buddhists, Catholica, students, military leaders,
profiteers, and peasants--cannot be satisfied. The U. S. must pick the
most promising leader and give him the necessary support to eliminate pagoda
riots, inflation, profiteering, and the countless list of problems. If
it is necessary to execute several thousand "traitors" to get the message
across, then this method should be adopted. Once the leader is firmly
established, the next step will be to build an efficient bureaucracy to
run the government.

None of these alternatives offers an easy solution to the United
States' objectives. For the present, the military objective of driving
the Viet-Cong from the South and protecting the South Viet-Nam border
from future infiltration is a common, essential factor of any alternative.
To prevent future infiltration it will be necessary to have a strong
government in South Viet-Nam opposed to Communist infiltration. The
extremely volatile nature of the political situation in South Viet-Nam
adds to the complexity of adopting a strategy and implementing it.

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VIETNAM

A given strategy may become obsolete within a short time after its
introduction. With this environmental characteristic as a constraint,
the U. S. must maintain a flexible position, being careful not to
become irrevocably committed to a given strategy. The present tenor
of the situation is such that the U. S. should shift its effort more in
the direction of the third alternative. While pursuing a plan to
strengthen Ky's government, the U. S. should remain alert to possible
changes in leadership or in strategy of North Viet-Nam or China in
order to move in the direction that offers the best chance to attain
its objectives.

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VIETNAM

"GI's trapped and killed 270 VC in heavy fighting today. American casualties were reported light." Day after day similar news headlines are read while drinking the morning cup of coffee and slowly our conscience dulls and such events seem unworthy of dark headlines, a second glance or a second thought. On to the ball scores. The U. S. may suffer from an arrogance of power says Senator Fulbright and the bitter reaction indicates that he has hit a sensitive nerve. How many killed and wounded today? Tomorrow? Are Americans killers or liberators? In rather agonizing terms, many are wondering why we are involved in a Vietnamese war, how we got there, and how we get out. War is an instrument of foreign policy at its rational best and to understand the war, Americans must understand the objectives of our foreign policy.

"The United States of America is joined with the people and Government of Viet Nam to prevent aggression," so states the Honolulu Declaration. President Johnson has said that we are "using only that force necessary to stop aggression...to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet Nam by North Viet Nam." Dean Rusk asserts that "the issue in Southeast Asia becomes worldwide because we must make clear that the United States keeps its word whenever it is pledged." He further claims that "we wish only that the people of South Viet Nam should have the right and opportunity to determine their future in freedom without coercion or threat..." This is limited in later testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the claim that we are not trying to impose a "pax Americana" on the world. These are the U. S. objectives as they have been stated and defended by our top foreign policymakers. Implied, but unstated, is a further objective that we are trying to limit China's sphere of influence in Asia.

At the highest level of abstraction, our goal is to establish world peace, even if maintained by bayonets. President Kennedy said that we seek "to make the world safe for diversity." It follows from this that we can live in "peaceful coexistence" with the Russians but must resist the expansionist bent of Red China when it attempts to deprive weaker nations of their freedom of choice by force. Otherwise the world will become unsafe for those who oppose the communist system, including, eventually, ourselves.

Since the end of World War II, the U. S. has applied this objective in preventing communist takeovers in Greece, Turkey, Korea, Laos and now Viet Nam. The situation is confused by the fact that it is part civil war and part external aggression. Most of the Viet Cong are South Vietnamese which would make the fighting there a civil war. If our goal is to make the world "safe for diversity," we must presumably allow diversity - specifically communism - if chosen by the people themselves. Hence we should not ordinarily interfere in an internal crisis of another country. However, the VC are aided and partially directed from Hanoi and their weapons are supplied by Red China. This makes the war not just an internal matter but an international affair in which China is attempting to expand its sphere of domination by force. The Vietnamese are not capable of defending themselves alone against such an attack and, in the case of most peasants, are not even aware of the consequences or meaning of the fighting going on about them. Hence part

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VIETNAM

of the burden of this fight must be borne by the U. S. as the only con-
cerned major power capable of preventing this spread of Chinese influence.

What we do in one area of the world will certainly influence what happens in other areas. If we are successful in defending South Viet Nam, it will surely encourage the resistance of those in nearby countries like Thailand who are similarly threatened. Likewise, if we fail, we are almost guaranteeing the needless loss of Southeast Asia to domination by China, which is inconsistent with the objective put forth by President Kennedy. Although many underdeveloped countries regard our involvement in Viet Nam as interference in an internal affair and dislike it, most would react even more adversely to a U. S. defeat there. India, for example, would be forced to make closer ties with Russia for protection against China.

Earlier in the history of this struggle, President Kennedy said that "we can help them...but they have to win it - the people of Viet Nam." After the troop and bombing escalations, it became a U. S. war and it is this present situation which must determine our immediate objectives in remaining there. Secretary Rusk has stated that "we must make clear that the U. S. keeps its word whenever it is pledged." Having gotten ourselves into the position of committing 300,000 troops to the defense of Ky or whoever opposes the VC in South Viet Nam, we cannot pull out without destroying the credibility of our commitment to other countries facing similar "wars of national liberation." A pullout would strengthen China's charge that the U. S. is a paper tiger, just when we need to support Russia's position in the communist bloc, vis-a-vis the Chinese, that peaceful coexistence is necessary because of the retaliatory response of the U. S. Undoubtedly a pullout would only embolden the Chinese to initiate other wars. Furthermore, in Europe, de Gaulle would be certain to use this as an example of his premise that the U. S. wouldn't risk its welfare for the defense of Europas. This would further weaken NATO. We could conceivably be faced with much more serious and widespread confrontations around the world if we pull out of Viet Nam prematurely. Therefore, it is essential to remain there until the country is stabilized and thus maintain our credibility.

One of the myths of the war is that we are fighting for the freedom of choice of the people. Choice is being exercised but not in the traditional ballot box sense. Peasants are choosing, often as a result of terror, by sheltering or not sheltering the VC. Their choice will determine the outcome. One of our aims must be to offer enough protection so that they can choose without terror. On the national level, the peasant has no choice. As Professor Kissinger pointed out, South Viet Nam is closer politically to Europe of the 16th and 17th centuries with its small groups having regional or functional (e.g., the military) loyalties, all vying for power. At present these groups seem destined to hang separately rather than survive together. None of these groups represents the peasant so freedom applies mainly to the minority groups in Saigon. Reluctantly, one is led to the conclusion that South Viet Nam is the hapless meeting ground of two political systems, both alien to the local population, seeking to establish a boundary between their spheres of influence - the South Vietnamese are mostly pawns in a larger power struggle.

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VIETNAM

What, then, are our immediate goals in South Viet Nam? According to the Honolulu Declaration we are pledged: "to defense against aggression, to the work of social revolution, to the goal of self government, to the attack on hunger, ignorance and disease, and to the unending quest for peace." These objectives aim at the development of a stable government. If they are to be implemented, two events must occur. The VC, which controls over half the country, must be destroyed as long as they refuse to negotiate and the active support of a vast majority of the people must be won by the Saigon government. This, in turn, demands a compromise among factions to form a central government which is responsive to the needs of the factions as well as the peasant farmer. It must be strong enough to protect the population from terror and aggression, from both within and without the country.

Various alternatives have been proposed to implement our objectives in Viet Nam. Regarding the military phase of the problem, hawks cry for escalation, doves call for immediate peace and withdrawal. Goodwin argues forcefully in the New Yorker (April 16, 1966) that the uncertainties of the situation impose a skepticism on statesmen, "from which flows at least two guiding rules for the conduct of international affairs to decide as little, in places of danger, as present urgencies require...and to take as few risks as possible, refusing to hazard enormous consequences on speculation." This philosophy served President Kennedy well in the Cuban missile crisis and serves President Johnson well in relation to further escalation of the war. Conventional bombing has been historically unsuccessful in cowing the bombed. It is more likely to intensify hatred and lead to more volunteers flowing into the South from the North and possibly China. Russian assistance might also be increased. Recent troop increases confirms the theory that escalation by the U. S. fosters escalation by the enemy. Hence it seems inadvisable to escalate either bombing or military involvement in the North.

At the other extreme, a hasty retreat, as in Laos, would leave the Viet Cong in control of much of the rural areas. With continued support from the North, they could quickly overwhelm demoralized South Vietnamese troops. The net effect would most likely be a rapid takeover by the VC with swift and ultimate reprisals against noncommunist opponents. In 1954, about 100,000 were executed in the North. Purges would probably be greater in the South where opposition is more organized. U. S. prestige as defender of the free world would suffer greatly. Not only would Viet Nam fall under Chinese domination, but Chou En Lai has already promised that Thailand is next. We could expect a monotonous repetition of events in other countries of Southeast Asia. If this process is to be repeated, as World War II indicates is probable, then we might as well minimize the initial loss of friendly territory by taking a stand in the first country to be attacked rather than waiting for two or three to be lost before fighting. In addition, by fighting in Viet Nam we have already bought time for a buildup of bases in Thailand since the enemy is busy elsewhere. Consequently, rapid withdrawal seems inadvisable as well.

Therefore the only alternative left is to remain fighting in the South until either the VC agree to peace negotiations or are eliminated as a major fighting force and some form of compromise government is firmly in control. The attainment of these goals requires both a political and a military solution which are interdependent.

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Fish (VC) cannot swim in a hostile sea (areas loyal to Saigon) - to paraphrase a famous slogan of Mao. That is to say, the VC cannot maintain their military effectiveness without the cooperation of the local villagers, however won. If the villagers can be won over to the Saigon government, then movements of the VC can be traced and VC forces destroyed. But the villagers can't be made loyal to Saigon without first, protection by either GVN or American troops, and second, motivation in the form of effective government aid. The former requires destruction of the VC main force and then capture of individual terrorists. The latter requires a national government with an enlightened policy, neither of which has ever existed in Viet Nam. It requires supplanting an idea of the good life inspired by the VC with a better idea. Unfortunately those in power must demonstrate their words with actions while those out of power can promise anything without delivering.

Presumably, by interdiction of infiltration routes and effective use of airborne troops, the main, company size, forces of the VC can be eliminated by the numerically superior GVN and American troops. This may take several years if recent history has relevance but should be attainable.

This leaves the more subtle and complex problem of winning "the minds and hearts of the people." To do this, the government must be able to effectively communicate its will and purpose through actions which aid the villager. Presently, few villagers have had any meaningful contact with the Saigon government. Policies dictated in Saigon seldom get carried out at the village level. There is a lack of trained personnel at the national, regional, and local level who can initiate and implement such things as an agricultural assistance program. The farmers' world is limited mainly to contact with local officials who are often corrupt and hated. Consequently, there is very little enthusiasm for supporting a government represented by such local authorities.

Recently the CIA has begun pacification at the local level through Political Action Teams (PAT). They have realized that the development of an effective government must begin at the local level and build upward. Local villagers must be brought into sympathetic contact with local officials. PAT members enter villages and perform useful, concrete tasks to better the lot of individual farmers. This generates an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between farmers and authorities from which flows better intelligence information. Such information aids the elimination of local VC threats and increases the security of the local population. With increased security and cooperation, more significant government programs can develop which further improves this relationship. Simultaneously work is needed to get regional authorities to be responsive to both the villagers and national planners so that such officials perform a two way communication function and an administrative function at the village level.

While activity in the villages is of paramount importance, some effort must be directed toward establishing a more viable central government. Where many disparate elements of power exist, Ky and others must be urged to form a government which represents all of these elements in one way or another. Buddhists and Catholics must be brought into positions of power and responsibility. If peace negotiations are ever successful, reform oriented elements of the Viet Cong will have to be included. Consensus on basic national goals is vital even if lesser

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differences abound. With such a consensus, a working infra-structure for the economy may be developed and programs might hopefully move from the discussion stage in Saigon to implementation in the villages. This would form the beginning of a meaningful government responsive to the needs of the people.

Wiping out major units of the VC is not the beginning of the end of our involvement there, but, rather, it is the end of the beginning. No doubt a military presence must be maintained there for decades, just as it has been necessary in Germany and Korea. Since over half the country-side is controlled by the Viet Cong, they must have more than coercion on their side - they also have the past miseries and future hopes of the peasants. The Saigon government must identify itself with a better life for the villager by increasing its involvement and aid at the local level while completely overhauling an inadequate government structure. The time scale for implementing reform and change in underdeveloped countries is, unfortunately, of the order of decades and centuries. In contrast, a revolutionary program like Project Headstart can be undertaken in the U.S. in less than a year and be nationwide immediately in its application. Any government which eventually evolves in South Viet Nam must develop a program that meets the needs of the peasants, in whose hands ultimate power resides for the fate of the country.

PAPER D

VIETNAM

The point of departure for the development of objectives appropriate to the United States position in South Viet-Nam must be an examination of the beliefs that have conditioned our diplomacy in the postwar era. Since 1947, American foreign policy towards both Europe and the Far East has been guided by a determination to maintain a balance of power between East and West. To do so, we have adhered to a doctrine of "containment" that was first proposed by George Kennan with respect to the Soviet Union. In the short-term, our government has sought to deter Communist leaders from attempting to achieve world domination by resort to aggressive means such that, in the long-term, stresses within Communist societies - notably those of Russia and China - would so increase that their leader would have to moderate their goals or witness the destruction of their political system. Once such a phenomenon had occurred, it was hoped that the Communists would enter into negotiations and resolve their outstanding differences with the West. The United States' self-interest, thus, dictated that it assume a blocking role and commit itself to the exertion of counter pressure for a protracted period of time. As President Truman recognized in 1947, the security of the United States was - and still is - intimately linked to the maintenance of a free and stable world order.

The application of this policy to Southeast Asia began in 1954 with the destruction of the French garrison at Dienbienphu and, with it, the least vestige of pro-Western power capable of containing a rapid Communist expansion in this area. In response to this situation, the United States was, at that time, incapable of assuming a direct blocking role even though Eisenhower, himself, had declared that American security was directly linked to that of Indochina. Truman's experience in Korea had indicated that "containment" would not succeed unless the U. S. was willing to commit ground forces in limited engagements. Such forces did not then exist in strength, and the Eisenhower administration was unwilling to mobilize the necessary troops so soon after the Korean conflict. Instead, it sought to stabilize the situation by what amounted to the creation of a nationalistic government in South Viet-Nam under the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem whom it supported with arms, economic aid, and military advisers.

Subsequently, the administrations of both Kennedy and Johnson supported this strategy. However, as the situation deteriorated both politically and militarily, our government became increasingly committed to more active participation. The culmination of this trend occurred when President Johnson, in anticipation of the imminent collapse of the Saigon government, introduced American combat troops into South Viet-Nam. Thus, in 1965, the U. S. assumed the direct blocking role which Eisenhower had abdicated in 1954.

Seen in this light, it is evident that present policy is a consistent exercise of the doctrine which has guided American diplomacy in the postwar era. As Rusk has stated, "Our commitments to South Viet-Nam are not taken in isolation but are part of a systematic effort in the postwar period to assure a stable peace." The United States has, thus, again committed itself to the forceful "containment" of Communism and, thereby, to the maintenance of the global order upon which its security depends.

In appraising the validity of this position in South Viet-Nam, four central assumptions must be questioned. First, implicit in present

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strategy is the belief that the balance of power would be significantly altered by a loss in this country. Considering only the nation itself, such is, most probably, not the case. Economically, it is strikingly weak and, geographically, offers access only to Cambodia, a country already open to infiltration through the Communist controlled portion of Laos. Psychologically, however, its significance is great in that a U. S. withdrawal would, doubtlessly, vindicate the Asian Communist doctrine of guerrilla warfare, thereby encouraging an expansion in the rest of Southeast Asia. In addition, a retreat would largely justify Peking's appeal for greater militancy in the world Communist movement. Finally, the failure of our government to honor its defense commitments could adversely affect the willingness of our allies to support our policies. In turn, the occurrence of these events either singly or in combination could markedly affect the long-term stability of world peace.

A second assumption basic to American policy is the belief that, if faced with a gradual U.S. victory in the South, Peking would not intervene on the part of its Vietnamese ally. In support of this assumption, it has been suggested that China's ideological goals - like those of the Soviet Union - are of a long-term nature. It would, therefore, be unwilling to sacrifice its ambition of world domination for a costly war in Viet-Nam that could involve it in a nuclear war with the United States. This thesis, however, presumes, as Kennan did with respect to Russia, that Peking is capable of discounting the present in terms of the future. Recently, the legitimacy of this argument has been questioned before the House panel on American policy toward China in a theory which maintains that to frustrate Hanoi and, more particularly, Peking within what they regard as their appropriate sphere of influence would be to create an unreasoning enemy capable of blind escalation. In support of this point, Peking's disregard of American atomic threats in Korea has been cited. This evidence should, however, be viewed in relation to the possibility that China feared an invasion by American troops who, in late 1952, were within miles of her border. Finally, speculation about China's behavior must, to some degree, hinge on even further speculation concerning what Russia's position would be in a nuclear confrontation between Peking and the U. S. On the one hand, the long-run incompatibility of its interests with those of China would suggest that it might not intervene. On the other, the Kremlin's continuing ideological conflict with the West would demand that it help maintain a balance of power between East and West in Asia. Consequently, the assumption underlying our policy is fraught with danger and uncertainty since it cannot be wholly substantiated.

The third issue central to our current strategy is the belief that, in the absence of direct Chinese intervention, America is capable of winning a guerrilla war in which military objectives are paralleled in importance by political activities. The task which faces our troops is that of interdicting the enemy's supplies and reinforcements while destroying his main units in the field. At the same time, the ability to succeed militarily depends on securing the support of the people among whom the guerrillas must live and operate. This, however, is, at least, partially contingent on the capability to provide some form of security, an activity which, in turn, hinges on the peasants' initial willingness to furnish information concerning the enemy's whereabouts and movements. The problem is, therefore, circular and vicious. Moreover, in attacking it, the U. S. must face several important constraints.

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For example, the central government lacks either the stability or
popularity to be a genuinely effective agent in securing the people's
loyalty. Historically, the population, 85% of which are peasants,
has been divided by a caste system that perpetuated an educated elite.
As a result, there has been no communion of interest between the
rulers and the masses that would foster a tradition of loyalty to a
central government. Instead, for the peasant, life has focused on the
village and it is to that subsystem that he has given his support.
Therefore, to secure his cooperation and commitment, economic and social
development must begin at this level. However, in implementing such
action, there exists the immediate impediment caused by a lack of
trained administrators and personnel. The assassinations by the Viet Cong
and the failures of the educational system have combined to produce an
acute shortage in this area. In recognition of these facts, the CIA
has organized the PAT program which, though apparently having some
success, still faces an enormous task.

A second example of a constraint upon effective action is the
inability of successive governments to mobilize the support necessary
to remain in power. To a degree, this shortcoming may be ascribed to
the period of France's colonization when in order to maintain its
influence, France promoted factionalism between the various socio-
economic and religious groups. The fruition of this policy is seen
today in the contest for power between the Catholics, Buddhists, and the
military. As a result, no one government has been able to make a
prolonged attack on the problems afflicting the country. The net effect
of this situation has been to impede the evolution of a viable alternative
to the brand of nationalism offered by the National Liberation Front. To
the peasant, ideological concepts of freedom and self-determination have
little or no appeal in the abstract. They must, instead, be given
meaning within the context of a consistent program of social development,
a type of program that past governments have not been able to provide.

On the military side, similar problems of implementation abound.
For instance, the military's control of the population is only effective
in the cities while the countryside is the province of the Viet Cong.
It is, therefore, difficult to provide the security which the villager
must have before he is willing to provide information concerning the
enemy. This fact becomes particularly important in light of the
general failure of American bombing to stem the stream of reinforcements
from the North, since it is, thus, difficult to attain the superiority
in manpower necessary to protect the rural population. Further, the
problem is compounded by the fact that the Viet Cong are well equipped,
well organized, and well led.

Finally, it would appear that American effectiveness in pursuing the
war is hindered by organizational, logistical, and administrative constraints.
For example, operational direction of the war is under strong control of
agencies in Washington. As a result, programs and policies do not
satisfy the needs of the Vietnamese people and they do not reflect the
realities of the administrative apparatus which must implement them
locally. In addition, logistical and support facilities are often
inadequate for the distribution of military and civilian supplies.
Finally, the prevalence of theft and corruption prevents much of American

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aid materials from reaching the village level for which they are in-
tended.

Despite these factors, however, the deterioration of our
position has ceased and there is evidence of increasing military
and political success. Captured Viet Cong prisoners and documents
indicate that American armed superiority has significantly reduced
the enemy's morale and instances of popular support through the
provision of information have encouraged the rural development
activities. It would, therefore, appear that, in the long-run, America
and its Vietnamese ally can exert sufficient leverage to achieve pacifica-
tion. This process will, however, require time to build the momentum
necessary for success.

It is in assuming that American public opinion will grant the
required time that the present administration has made its fourth
central assumption. The doctrine of limited, contained warfare,
while creating frustration for the enemy, also releases pressures within
this country. The bite of inflation and the prospect of seemingly
endless loss of American lives for vague and often intangible results.
has already generated a voluble dissent which, as indicated by recent
polls, is growing in size. Further, commitment of the U. S. to a limited
war runs counter to the prevalent faith in America the omnipotent, the
master of the Japanese and conqueror of two Germanys. In view of these
considerations, it seems probable that the internal pressure will mount
with the passage of time. Opinion will demand either withdrawal or
escalation and the administration will not be given the opportunity
to complete an orderly pacification.

With these historical and internal factors in mind, it is now
possible to frame objectives appropriate to the realities of the
American position. On the one hand, it would be unrealistic for
the government, having committed itself to the ideological conflict,
to withdraw either from South Viet-Nam or Southeast Asia. To do so
would be a grave psychological and political defeat that would, in
the long-run, doubtlessly shift the balance of freedom and power upon
which our security is seen to depend. On the other hand, a policy of
escalated warfare extending beyond the boundaries of South Viet-Nam
would be equally invalid. It would negate the traditional policy of
"containing" as opposed to destroying, a policy which, when properly
implemented, as in Europe, has proved effective in protecting our
interests. Further, it would run counter to our traditional values and
cast us in the role of the aggressor. Finally, this strategy could
lead to atomic conflict with China and, perhaps, Russia, a situation
in which our strength would be sapped and the world order destroyed.

Therefore, the U. S. must determine to fight a local war within
the confines of South Viet-Nam. Nonetheless, in pursuing this aim, the
enclave theory may be rejected. It would, in effect, be an admission
of defeat in that it would give control of the countryside and the
peasants to the Viet Cong. Moreover, it would subject our troops to
increasing harassment by forces operating from secure bases. Similarly,
attempting to negotiate from such a position would be unrealistic.
Thus, to adhere to this strategy would be tantamount to a direct
withdrawal with all the attendant political and psychological consequences.

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It is, therefore, necessary that our government either follow
the present course of action of gradually escalating in response to
increases in the enemy's strength or take the initiative and greatly
increase the number of American troops to place greater and greater
pressure on the Viet Cong. The first of these alternatives tends to
minimize the threat of Chinese intervention in that it would present
them with no sudden action that could be used as an excuse for attack.
In addition, the slow nature of the build-up takes account of the
enormous problems of implementation that have been discussed. Balancing
these considerations, however, is the probability that American public
opinion would not countenance involvement for the period of time
required for pacification.

The alternate strategy, in that it represents a rapid development of American forces, increases the possibility of Chinese intervention. Nonetheless, the likelihood of this occurring is diminished by the fact that China - in contrast to the Korean situation - would not be directly threatened nor would North Viet-Nam. Further, the long-term goals of these countries would, most probably, dictate acceptance of present containment. Perhaps of even greater importance is the consideration that such a build-up of troops and supplies would greatly increase present problems of implementation, particularly in terms of the logistics involved. Still, with the construction of support facilities that is presently taking place and with adequate planning, the problems in effecting this strategy could be solved without an extreme interruption of the war effort. Finally, this course of action, while certain to occasion increased public discussion, could be implemented in the near future while the administration is still supported by the majority of opinion.

In choosing between these alternatives, it is apparent that neither
is entirely satisfactory. However, the second, if coupled with a
willingness to negotiate, seems to offer the best chance of success.
Were the first course followed, it is probable that the war would eventually
be lost on the home-front, thus representing an enormous waste of lives and
resources and the postponement of a destructive defeat. In contrast, the
second alternative, while fraught with uncertainty, seems to offer a
hope of "containing" the advance of Communism and stabilizing the power
relationships in Southeast Asia. On the one hand, it would increase
the harassment of Viet Cong forces, thereby hopefully convincing them
of our will to win and our determination to fight. On the other, it
would offer some chance of gain by presenting the opportunity for a
neutral or coalition government in the South whose independence would,
however, have to be guaranteed by the American government. Finally,
in its timing, this alternative may offer the only chance of saving
the United States' long-term and traditional interests from the
ravages of its own public opinion.

PAPER E

VIETNAM

The objectives which are appropriate for the U.S. in Viet Nam (VN) can be seen on many levels, and must be distinguished according to various parameters. In terms of time, there are ultimate goals and immediate objectives. Those which are immediate involve conditions which might result in a satisfactory conclusion to the war. Those which are longer range relate to objectives for VN after the hostilities are terminated, and to the U.S. vis a vis Southeast Asia, the spread of hostile political movements, domestic politics, and much more.

In other terms, there are objectives--either immediate or longer range--for VN, and others for the U.S. Moreover, there are objectives for the U. S. both within VN, and others larger than but related to VN. Finally, there is a set of objectives which is appropriate to the circumstances and the realities of the situation today. These relate to ending the U. S. presence in VN, but necessarily take account of decisions which clearly have already been made, and constraints--no matter how senseless--which cannot reasonably be removed.

Insofar as the future of VN as a country is concerned, the objectives of the U.S. should be largely as they ostensibly are. The U.S. should seek political, economic, and social conditions which are appropriate to swift, coordinated, and balanced development. Volumes have been written describing and justifying these conditions (see W. W. Rostow: *The Stages of Economic Growth*, E. Hagen: *On the Theory of Social Change*, R. Heilbroner: *The Great Ascent*, etc.) they cannot be meaningfully treated here. However, equitable land distribution; social mobility; a growing middle class; increasing education; a basic infrastructure including roads, railroads, bridges, etc.; political stability; popular government; and an absence of internal and external strife are basic conditions necessary to assure economic and social development. Assuring self-determination, the elimination of the fact and the handicaps of colonialism, and the promotion of such development has been basic to the foreign policies of the U.S. since shortly after the end of WW II. The ultimate goals for VN should be, and purportedly are, consistent with these policies. The Honolulu Declaration of February 9, the Rusk speech of February 19, the Johnson speech of February 23, the Johns Hopkins speech, and the Rusk speech of May 24 all include these objectives for VN. Whether the U.S. is operating to further these goals is another question, but they are stated policy and they are appropriate.

The U.S. has ultimate objectives too, but they go far beyond VN as well they should. Appropriate for U. S. policy should be the desire to avoid violence, to reduce the threat of war including so-called "limited wars", to protect the U.S. and its people and property, to respect its treaties and commitments, to help assure peace and the right of self-determination throughout the world, to strengthen peace-making machinery within the world, and to aid the underdeveloped nations in achieving a plan for growth and a form of society consistent with their needs as reflected by the popularly demonstrated will of the citizens of those nations.

Resolving these objectives is the essence of diplomacy. Ordering these objectives to the satisfaction of the American voter is becoming an increasingly critical determinant of domestic politics. The war-fraught

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history of contemporary civilization is indicative of the ready conflict
which rests uncomfortably in this set of goals.

Though partly abstract, these objectives are not mere platitudes. They form the basis and the focal points of foreign policy. Their appropriateness is largely so elementary and their nature so unquestionably permanent, that they are practically self-evident. Conflicting priorities cannot be resolved in the abstract; decision rules are irrelevant to the practice of diplomacy. In the case of specific conflict, such as the issues involved in VN, priorities are necessary and decisions as to sacrifice, compromise, or firmness must be made. The immediate objectives of the U.S. in VN, like the reasons for being there and the/or our involvement and commitment, do reflect--or at least should so reflect--decisions as to which of these ultimate objectives is threatened, and which shall be sacrificed so as to preserve the others.

Unfortunately, circumstances indicate that this reasoning, too, is
a little abstract. For the U.S. presence in VN does not reflect a
coherently deliberated policy, but an escalating series of small
decisions. As Max Frankel wrote in the *New York Times* of May 22, 1966:

> What we are beginning to sense...is tragedy: the inexorable yet continually surprising march of incidents, evoking almost predictable responses, driving the drama along. Aid to sustain the land. Weapons to guard the land. Advisers to demonstrate the weapons. Helicopters to bear the advisers. Troops to guard the helicopters. Planes to protect the troops. More troops to build the bases. Still more troops to defend the builders. Shoot when shot at. Shoot to keep from being shot at. Shoot to protect. Shoot to destroy. Bomb to kill. Kill.

The immediate aims of the U.S. in VN are relevant only within the context of what has already occurred, what has already been said, what has already been promised, and the commitments which have already been made. That an objective might have been quite appropriate in other circumstances or in retrospect does not make it viable now. That the escalation which is already history did not take place as a result of viable objectives, or even as a result of deliberate or coherent decisions about the longer and broader objectives of U.S. policy is but a sad irrelevance now.

The appropriate objective for short-term policy is obviously to stop the war, to send the troops home, and to allow VN to begin the arduous job of developing its economy and its society; a job represented by the long term objectives discussed above. Unfortunately, how to fulfill the pacification objectives depends largely on the compromise decisions involved in the overall foreign policy goals elaborated earlier. However, it is quite apparent that these decisions have not been reached; no one is willing to decide that stopping Communism is more critical than peace, or vice versa, for example.

Given that "appropriate" short-term objectives for ending the war *per se* are relevant only within the context of these undetermined larger decisions, it might be alternatively possible to first derive appropriate long-term policy objectives, and from these develop

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consistent short-term goals for ending the war. Though this might
make logical sense, reasoning of this order would really amount to
nothing more than an academic game. For although the policy
decisions are seemingly flexible, significant de facto constraints
already exist; constraints so strong as to represent a decision
already reached.

As Jean Lacouture points out, there exist two short-term
alternatives. The U.S. can seek to negotiate an end to the war,
or it can seek to annihilate the enemy. From either of these roads
might flow more specific objectives for ending the war. Ideally, the
course to be followed should be consistent with, and flow from, a
decision as to the larger policy objectives of the U. S. Though
these decisions have not been explicitly announced, there are already
real barriers to U.S. action. In effect, the negotiation route has
been eliminated. Without really deciding, it has been decided that
the U.S. will seek annihilation. That this might be absurdly in-
appropriate is quite academic. Appropriate strategic objectives are
those which will further the commitment which has already been made.

That the U.S. is seeking annihilation is evident from many sides.
Most important, the enemy has expressed no will to negotiate. There
is absolutely no indication that the pre-bombing expectations of the
U.S. have been met; the enemy has not been bombed into a negotiating
stance. This was given further substantiation by the report of New
York Congressman Ogden Reid upon his return from VN earlier this
year. Reid dismissed the domestic clamor for a negotiated peace
as noble but meaningless; the North Vietnamese do not want to talk.

Despite talk to the contrary, it is equally apparent from the
actions of the U.S. that there is neither the hope nor the expectation
of an arranged peace. Instead, the build-up in VN continues. Over
two billion dollars of permanent base construction is underway in VN
now. These projects are so large that they require the joint participation
of four of the largest construction companies in the U.S., and have
necessitated the recruitment of unskilled labor from as far as St. Louis.

On the political front too, there is no likely possibility of turning
back. The Administration has committed itself. If anything, future
strategic objectives hold the promise of escalation, not negotiation.
Recent polls show--both the Gallup and Lou Harris polls of May 23, and
a privately sponsored poll conducted by the Opinion Research Corp. for
the Republican National Committee--that voters are increasingly
dissatisfied with the indecisive pace of the war. They want it stopped;
yet pulling out is unthinkable and negotiation is so far impossible.

By itself, negotiation is a flexible concept. There is inherently
no logical reason why Reid should be right, and why the enemy would be
unalterably opposed to compromise. The barrier here, of course,
involves terms. Just as the U.S. escalated its involvement without
the benefit of a coherent set of long range objectives, so it created an
intensity of commitment from which it can no longer retreat, and
which has done so much to inhibit its maneuverability that negotiated
peace is now an effective impossibility.

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PAPER E

VIETNAM

The U. S. must now face a wall of promises; commitments in the form
of hopes, lost lives, domestic uneasiness, and economic unrest; vast
sums of spent resources; an image of hope and expectation in jeopardy,
and the essence of America's "Might" hanging in the balance. These
barriers began with words, with after-the-fact defenses of steps already
taken, and with self-generating promises and boasts which have hauntingly
become self-fulfilling prophecies. By so passionately defending uncertain
decisions, the Administration has inflated promises and principles well
past the point of no return. It is committed to winning, appropriate
or not. From this implicit objective, the concept of "appropriateness"
takes on a new meaning. Appropriate strategic objectives must be
consistent with what is a likely "fact" of VN. The doves no longer have a
place; only the hawks are "in".

The implications and strategic objectives which flow from the "win
the war" goal are frighteningly incredible. Endeavoring to win the war
means escalation; escalation aimed at crippling North VN. Yet every
indication available to the layman promises increasing Chinese involvement
in direct response to a stepping up of U.S. efforts. Whether the Russians
will be forced to come to the aid of the North VN (NVN) too is at least
debatable. But there is little responsible theory that questions the
active participation of the Chinese. That Ho would rather avoid such
cooperation with China might well be so, but with accelerating attacks
on his territory, there will be no alternative but to embrace his
uncertain ally. His only other choice would be surrender, or more
politely, negotiation, but an alliance with China does not seem so
distasteful as to dictate such an extreme reversal of ambition.

Facing eventual confrontation with China, the U.S. might appropriately
consider pre-emptive war. Time is on China's side. The longer this
eventual conflict is delayed, the more developed will be China's
nuclear and conventional capability.

Military strategists agree that there is no hope of "winning" a
conventional land war with China. The country is too big to occupy, and
its potential ability to sustain a smaller-scale war far outweighs the
U.S.'s willingness to sacrifice manpower and domestic politics.

What can be concluded from these factors represents a logical
continuation of current circumstances and present objectives: the
U.S. must avail itself of China's poor air force and negligible air
defenses, and bomb strategic targets. The possibility of Russian
retaliation could be discounted by means of prior negotiation, and
promises of a sphere of influence in Asia. With the threat of China
eliminated, the U.S. could proceed to annihilate the NVN.

Far from a fanciful page of "Dr. Strangelove", these objectives
represent a logical extension of what has already been decided.
These are the steps which will have to be taken to assure "victory"
in the VN war. Such objectives might well be ludicrous in other
circumstances, but they seem eminently appropriate to the implicit
decisions which have already been made, and are the only objectives
which are appropriate (if this is to imply relevance and meaningfulness,
as it must) to current circumstances. This is undoubtedly a just
price to pay for the freedom of the "valiant" SVN.

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PAPER E

VIETNAM

II.

In terms of the long range objectives for VN, a problem in im-
plementation comes from the basic contradiction of war. It is inherently
inconsistent in the extreme to fight a war in an underdeveloped country
in order to supposedly aid unfettered development. From an already
unsophisticated economic and social base, the VN war has set back the
development objectives of the country to such a serious extent that
it can be measured only in generations. Village life has been
disrupted, the weak economic system has been wrecked, the country has
been physically destroyed, potential development resources have been
shifted to war, roads and bridges have been destroyed, urban life
has been irredeemably perverted. In short, the social and economic
fabric of an already tenuous VN society has been ravaged. This is
not conducive to the U.S.'s purported goals.

If the objectives of the U.S. are more realistically translated
as directed toward stopping Communism, regardless of the cost to VN,
the results are little better. The U.S. is understandably unable to
implement this objective except by force, and even here there are
difficulties. Totally lacking is a viable ideology; a dynamic
alternative to what the Communists--or suspected Communists--can
offer the VN peasant. The U.S. can flash its strength and affluence,
but it seems incapable of providing a ready means by which the VN
can reap some of the same benefits in its impatient quest for economic
growth. Instead, the U.S. points to the seemingly universal menace of
"Communism", and thereby justified inaction and inactivity.

In a fictionalized account of the interrogation of a captured
North Vietnamese, Eugene Burdick depicted this dilemma in *Sarkhan*:

He explained that he had heard it said many times over
Saigon radio that the liberation fronts were Communist, but
he had only laughed. Not once in the years he had been
soldiering had anyone told him he was fighting for Communism...
he did not know what Communism was....but I do not know what
it (the word democracy) means....I only want to drive the white
man out of VN, have our own free elections, and return to my
village.

"The French laughed at us, called us ants, and we accepted the name. If you are an ant and you are told on the French radio that you are an ant, you wish in a terrible way to destroy the people who call you an ant."

"Once (while a prisoner) I asked the American what he would
like from the war... He said he would like to go home and drive
his automobile. He said its top came down...That was all he saw
in the war." "What did you want from the war for yourself?"
"A chance for ants to build a new society".

-6-

PAPER E

VIETNAM

Racism is another difficulty which the Americans must overcome in order to implement their VN objectives. According to Malcolm Browne, the American reported for the AP in Saigon for three years, in his book, *The New Face of War*, the VN are acutely sensitive about race. The VN are intimidated by the Americans. They are made to feel inferior by the greater size of the typical American as compared to the VN, by the jealously regarded beards and moustaches which many U.S. soldiers sport, and by the overtly inferior manner with which they are regarded by U.S. troops. That the U.S. with three incidental exceptions during WW II, has used napalm only on Orientals, for example, adds to racial conflict. Though the French were disliked for similar reasons, the Americans are more abrasive.

'That's one thing about the French'...'They treated VN as a nation like dirt...but there was never any question of racial discrimination. Black Africans, Europeans, and Asians worked together without any racial separation...' There are strong racial overtones to some of the Viet Cong bombings in Saigon.

Americans and hence what they represent are disliked for other reasons too. U. S. officials such as the former commander, General Stillwell, recognize what they regard as "peculiarities" among the VN, but fail to adjust their activities accordingly. Stillwell was aware of the strong ancestral ties which the VN peasant has to his land. Not only is there little mobility, but the land has deep religious significance in that it is the burying place of one's ancestors. Yet, the General saw nothing wrong with Americans planes bombing this land and destroying the village, the peasant's ancestors (not to mention his children), and all that it represents. Indeed, the General could not understand why the Americans were disliked, especially since they were fighting against the Communists.

Space does not permit more extensive treatment of some of the other impediments to progress in VN. There is the internal strife; the American identification with the Catholics and the perceived opposition to the Buddhists; the history of U.S. support of the Diems who, ironically, are now missed in many circles because of their power but not their popularity; the political barriers which largely condition U. S. strategy; the silent opposition of America's allies; and most importantly, the internal inconsistencies of America's strategy and objectives, coupled with the confusion and disagreement with which the VN war is viewed in the U.S.

August 15, 1966

Major General William E. De Puy
Headquarters 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345
San Francisco, California

Dear Bill:

Upon my return to the United
States, I would like to thank you for the
splendid briefing you arranged for me
at your headquarters.

I am much impressed by what you
are doing.

Keep up the good work!

Kind regards.

Henry A. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards.

Keep up the good work!

are doing.

at your headquarters.

A splendid briefing you arranged for me

Upon my return to the United

Dear Bill:

San Francisco, California

APO 96345

Headquarters 1st Infantry Division
Major General William E. De Puy

August 15, 1966

August 16, 1966

Colonel D.J. Barrett, Jr.
Headquarters 9th Marines
3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF
APO 96602
San Francisco, California

Dear Colonel Barrett:

Many thanks for your letter of August 2nd and your thoughtfulness in sending the picture. It is a pleasant souvenir of an exciting day.

With every good wish for your important assignment.

With warm regards.

Henry A. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

With warm regards.

Assessment.

With every good wish for your important
exciting day.

It is a pleasant souvenir of an
3rd and your thoughtfulness in sending the
Many thanks for your letter of August

Dear Colonel Barrett:

San Francisco, California
APO 96602
3rd Marine Division (Rein) FME
Headquarters 3rd Marines
Colonel D. J. Barrett, Jr.

August 18, 1966

HEADQUARTERS
9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
c/o FPO San Francisco, California 96602

1/DJB/mvm
5000

AUG 1 5 1966

2 Aug 1966

Dr. Henry A. KISSINGER
Department of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Dear Doctor,

For all the shutter-snapping which was done the day you were with us, the enclosed represents a non-cost effective sample.

Nevertheless, I am sending it along so you can prove to your wife that you were really working while you were gone.

We enjoyed the chance to get to see you. Come again to the 9th Marines when you are ever near us.

August 16, 1966

Mr. John R. Burke
Second Secretary of Embassy
Embassy of the United States of America
Saigon, Vietnam

Dear John:

Thank you for your nice note of August 9th and
the enclosures.

The manner in which van Tuyen delivered the
material to you strikes me as typically Vietnamese.

I will be seeing Bill Bundy tomorrow and will
talk to him about your future plans. From what I
have seen of the White House since I have returned,
I do not think you will be happy there but if you want
me to I will raise your name.

Many thanks also for sending me the pictures.

With kind regards.

With kind regards.

Many thanks for sending me the pictures.

me to I will raise your name.
I do not think you will be happy there but if you want
have seen of the White House since I have returned,
talk to him about your future plans. From what I
I will be seeing Bill Bandy tomorrow and will

material to you strikes me as typically Vietnamese.
The manner in which van Tuyen delivered the
diplomacy.

Dear John,

Salomon, Vietnam
Embassy of the United States of America
Second Secretary of Embassy
Mr. John R. Burke

August 16, 1968

August 16, 1966

Admiral Siri G. Netara
Assistant Commander in Charge
Royal Thai Navy
Bangkok, Thailand

My dear Admiral Siri:

It was a great pleasure to meet you
at dinner with General Stilwell a few weeks
ago when I visited Bangkok. I very much
enjoyed the opportunity to talk with you.

I am sending you a copy of my recent
book. I hope you will find it useful.

With kind regards.

Henry V. Klaasenber

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards,

book. I hope you will find it useful.
I am sending you a copy of my recent

enjoyed the opportunity to talk with you.
So when I visited Bangkok, I very much
at dinner with General Stilwell a few weeks
It was a great pleasure to meet you

My dear Admiral Sir:

Bangkok, Thailand
Royal Thai Navy
Assistant Commander in Charge
Admiral Sir G. Netars

August 16, 1966

August 19, 1966

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The Ford Foundation
477 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mac:

As you may know, I recently spent nearly three weeks in
Vietnam on a mission similar to the one last year. (This
time, however, I carefully avoided the press.)

In one of my conversations with Bui Diem he made two
requests which are explained in the following extracts from
the memorandum of conversation!

"Toward the end of the conversation Bui Diem asked if he
might raise two related subjects. He wondered if Professor
Kissinger might discuss with some non-governmental body in
the United States the possibility of undertaking a study of the
Vietnamese Government in an effort to render itocratically
more efficient. What he had in mind was the assignment of one
or more experts in the field of public administration who might
come to Vietnam, conduct a detailed study and submit recommenda-
tions on the basis of which the Government might act to improve
its organization. He said that at the moment there were many areas
in which the Government was woefully inefficient. He would hope
that such a study might prove to be of inestimable assistance in
aiding the GVN to streamline itself....

....

stating the GVN to streamline itself.... that such a study might prove to be of inestimable assistance in
in which the Government was most fully efficient. He would hope
its organization. He said that at the moment there were many areas
tions on the part of which the Government might act to improve
come to Vietnam, conduct a detailed study and submit recommends-
or more experts in the field of public administration who might
more efficient. What he had in mind was the assignment of one
Vietnamese Government in an effort to render it puresentatively
the United States the possibility of undertaking a study of the
Klauder might discuss with some non-governmental body in
might raise two related subjects. He wondered if Professor
"Toward the end of the conversation But Diem asked it he
the memorandum of conversation,"
replies which are explained in the following extracts from
In one of my conversations with But Diem he made two
time, however, I carefully avoided the press.)
Vietnam on a mission similar to the one last year. (This
As you may know, I recently spent nearly three weeks in

Dear Macs:
New York 23, New York
477 Madison Avenue
The Ford Foundation
Mr. McGeerode Bmby

The Ford Foundation
Mr. McGeerode Bmby
477 Madison Avenue
New York 23, New York

And then 19, 1966

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

- 2 -

August 19, 1966

'The final item which Bui Diem wished to raise was the possibility of a survey, either by the Ford Foundation or some other qualified organization, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diem contends that the Ministry as presently organized and staffed is a poor representative of the nation. He would like suggestions for its overhaul and reorganization. He admitted that the Asia Foundation had recently carried out a survey and had made certain proposals. Nevertheless, he felt that it had not been profound enough to produce fundamental and long-lasting reforms.'

My own judgment is that no area of Vietnam is no more in need of advice than the public service and our AID mission is totally inequipped to supply it. If a good enough American advisory group could be organized it could have a real impact.

Bob Komer, with whom I discussed this, is of the same view.

My own interest in the project is only to get it started. Should I encourage Bui Diem?

Best regards.

Mr. McGeorge Bung

- 3 -

August 19, 1968

been profound enough to produce fundamental and loud-flescing reform." and had made certain proposals. Nevertheless, he felt that it had not He admitted that the Aalas Foundation had recently carried out a survey of the nation. He would like suggestions for its overhaul and reorganization. the Ministry as presently organized and staffed is a poor representative organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diem contends that of a survey, either by the Ford Foundation or some other qualified The final item which Bui Diem wished to raise was the possibility

My own judgment is that no area of Vietnam is no more in need of advice a real impact.

encourage Bui Diem?

Henry V. Klaander

Beat redarda.

Henry A. Klaarner

With kind regards.

to the public debate on that subject.
in my opinion, the best contribution
that your statement on Vietnam is,
also, I want to tell you again

your name.
how much I enjoyed the evening at
This is just a note to tell you

Dear Senator:

Washington, D.C.
United States Senate
The Honorable Jacob Javits

August 19, 1988