6

[Y]

1924 was followed by the annexation of Bessarabia, a third of Poland, the Baltic States and an attack on Finland. World War II led to the creation of the satellite orbit in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva gave way to the attempted penetration of the Middle East and a crisis over Berlin. And, the spirit of Camp David was ended with another Berlin crisis and the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

During each previous Soviet peace offensive, many in the West - including by many sale threats of annihilation as hailed a fundamental change in Soviet attitude. In the 1920's a noted

historian wrote:

> The former crusaders of world revolution at any cost have exchanged their swords for machine tools and now rely more on the results of their labor than on direct action to achieve the ultimate triumph of the proletariat.¹

When Stalin abolished the Comintern in 1943, the then Senator Connally from Texas commented: "Russians for years have been changing their economy and

1 Michael T. Florinsky, *World Revolution and the USSR*

p. 216

standby, sometimes almost religiously anti-communist, indicating the intention toinvade the country and is more likely to be done by individual ill - will than of structural

7

approaching the abandonment of Communism and the whole Western world will

be gratified at the happy climax of their efforts."¹ In 1956, Secretary

Dulles was impelled by the spirit of Geneva to say:

> The Soviet leaders are scrapping thirty years of policy based on violence and intolerance.²

This is matched by Secretary Rusk's statement early in 1964:

> They [the Communists] appear to have begun to realize that there is an irresolvable contradiction between the demands to promote world Communism by force and the needs of the Soviet state and people.³

> The fact that each of these assessments (except the KENNEDY last were proved wrong does not indicate that no change in Soviet conduct is possible.

> It does suggest that it is important for the West to understand that the causes of tension are not unique to the Soviet Union, and that there are other elements in play.

> Soviet system is not simple but complex with elements making for tension

nations require an understanding that single explanations of the
Soviet system are inherently misleading. The sole factor in the Communism
and bellicosity and other elements more conducive to accommodation.
world making for bellicosity and animus for accommodation. Some trends
will make it more difficult for the long-long may produce a

New York Times, May 23, 1943

U.S. Department of State Press Release, No. 92, February 25, 1956

Press Conference
Jan-March '64

13

and the "adventurism" which risks a historical movement on one throw of the dice.

Belief in the predominance of "objective" factors explains why whenever Soviet leaders, ~~they~~ in the past have had to make a choice between Western good-will and a territorial or political gain, ~~they~~ have unhesitatingly chose the latter. The ~~respect and friendship gained~~ of the Western world order were built up during World War II was ruthlessly sacrificed to the possibility of establishing Communist-controlled governments in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva did not survive the temptations offered by the possibility of penetrating into the Middle East; the spirit of Camp David ended with another ultimatum on Berlin; the many overtures of the Kennedy Administration were rebuffed until the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that the balance of forces was *in fact* not favorable.

The reliance on the analysis of "objective" factors is one of the reasons why negotiations with the Soviets have often been so frustrating.

Communist negotiators cannot admit that they were swayed by the persuasiveness of opponents whose understanding of the basic laws of development is, by

14

NX definition, inferior to their own. They cannot reciprocate "concessions"

because they believe that concessions are made to reality not to individuals.

They will get a great length
They may change their position but a great deal depends for them on

dose of their own solution. For them a great deal
demonstrating that they are moving at their own pace. Above all, their
depends on an averaging out seems basic to most Western negotiators,
to live and - take of as beginning process.

attitude towards Western negotiators is very similar to that of Western

psychiatrists towards their patients: no matter what is said they think

they understand their Western opposite number better than he understands

himself.

The ritualistic conviction in the importance of the class struggle

causes Soviet leaders to adopt a posture of irreconcilable hostility

towards the non-Communist world whatever the tactical change of line.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union comes out resolutely against peaceful coexistence in the ideological sphere. This is a simple truth that all who regard themselves as Marxists-Leninists should have mastered long ago.

1

MF

September 21, 1963

15

In these terms peaceful coexistence is justified as a tactical device to overthrow the West. Thus, in the reply to Chinese charges that it was abandoning the revolution, the Communist Party of the USSR proposed the following test for the policy of "peaceful co-existence"; "Does the policy of peaceful co-existence favor the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries? Does it favor the upsurge of national liberation movements?" And in another reply to their Chinese detractors the Soviet Communist Party affirmed: "We stand fully for the destruction of Imperialism and Capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable destruction of Capitalism, but are doing everything for this to be accomplished by class struggle and as soon as possible."

Moreover, "peaceful co-existence" tends to be justified by Soviet leaders as the logical application of Leninist tradition, a proposition which

1
September 21, 1963

2
July 14, 1963

period in Europe has been the isolation of the Communist parties.

Under the impact of many factors, to which United States policy has occasionally contributed, this isolation is beginning to break down.

In Italy, for example, the "opening to the Left" has resulted in new found strength for the Communist Party. In France, the demoralization of the traditional parties by de Gaulle and the change in tactics by the Communist Party has opened up prospects of a Popular Front for the first time in thirty years.

If the West is to act purposefully in this situation, it requires unity. Bilateralism and its attendant temptation of stressing the immediate national advantage must stimulate a race for Moscow's favor.

The present difficulties of Communism provide an unusual opportunity for serious negotiation if the West can develop a unified program and if it does not substitute salesmanship for statesmanship. The disarray in Eastern Europe and the growing nationalism should permit a differential

approach to the various countries based on their performance in
foreign policy and the degree of their liberalization at home. A
new look may be possible at the arms race. But central to any
settlement is some conception of the future of Germany. No other
issue illustrates so well the need for unity and for purpose, for an
agreed Allied position as well as for concreteness.

26

... It is true that the signature of the Franco-German treaty came as a surprise to many Americans, particularly in the light of what had already been achieved without formal commitments. ... Fears which have been expressed that the Franco-German Treaty might be used as a vehicle for a new power alignment in Western Europe have so far proved groundless. It is in the interest not only of Germany and France but of Europe and the whole Atlantic community that they remain so.¹

There were hints that Germany, if it did not pursue its French ties, might replace Great Britain as America's special partner in Europe.

But the Franco-German Treaty, if it was to mean anything, had to produce a new power alignment. It was an attempt to begin with a bilateral implementation of the Feuchet Plan, which had been rejected by the other members of the Common Market with the argument that it did not go far enough and needed final action to be taken by the other European countries. Had the Franco-German Treaty functioned properly, it might have provided an incentive to the other European countries to join.

In any event, it would have produced a common Franco-German position on most issues. This certainly could not help but affects the bargaining position

1
George McGhee, "Some Thoughts on Current Issues,"
July 16, 1964, DOSB, Vol. LI, No. 1310 (Aug. 3, 1964), p. 140-141

30

in the long run. Germany has emerged as the balance wheel of the Western Alliance. The most exposed Western ally, seventeen million of whose people are Communist hostages, is increasingly torn between the rivalries of its allies, the temptations of its opponents and its own ambivalent national goals. As German policy has become less anonymous, it has also grown more vulnerable.

After a relatively brief honeymoon, the Federal Republic is likely to find its view about the control of the MLF and the need to expand it to include land-based missiles clashing with ours. It may differ with us about arms control negotiations. It is bound to press for unification more energetically than its allies. All this time, the Communist countries will exploit the latent anti-German feeling.

Confused by the constant wooing, the Federal Republic may overestimate the range of flexibility open to it. France, in turn, seeing that the Franco-German Treaty by which it had sought to fetter Germany had the practical

35

[Y]

who look on the Federal Republic as an inevitable supporter of Atlantic-

- purposes may thus have some unpleasant surprises in store. The mood of

some of those pressing for flexibility in Germany was expressed by Senator

Höppe at a convention of the Free Democratic Party, criticizing the

Western powers for insisting on their special prerogatives in West Berlin,

Senator Höppe said:

> Our elementary national interest is paramount. We cannot be satisfied with safeguarding the status quo. First in the strength of the West, in its political superiority in the inventiveness of the free world all can be maintained and strengthened only if we exercise initiative in that which we are free to act on in accordance with our national interests.¹

Erich Mende, Vice Chancellor and FDP minister for all-German affairs later

supported Höppe. Unless relations are handled with great delicacy on both sides of the Atlantic such an attitude carries within it the seeds of

serious misunderstandings.

1 Spandauer Volkszeitung, Spandence Volkszeitung, Sept. 13, 1964. I am indebted to Hans Speier, author of a forthcoming book on Germany for calling my attention to this quotation.

46

Conference of May 1964 that NATO reaffirm its commitment to German unification and that the three Western powers initiate new diplomatic overtures on behalf of German unification.

To be sure, the Western allies were

belong to German unification de

deserved a more positive reception. In the light of this received, it is clear that

probably correct in their view that any proposal acceptable to the

Federal Republic would probably not prove negotiable with the Soviet

Union.

But negotiability is only one criterion and not inevitably the
most crucial decisive one. If we can discuss only those items which the Soviets
have declared negotiable, the agenda of any conference will inevitably
be determined by them. On the issue of Germany, in particular, one purpose
of Allied negotiations should be to demonstrate that if neither no progress
is made towards unification, the onus for it rests on the Soviets.

In any such process, the Federal Republic must of course play a
crucial role. It is not enough for Germans to insist that unification
is primarily an Allied responsibility. The emergence of the Federal
Republic as one of the key problem partners of the Atlantic Alliance, coupled
with the success of the