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THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1979

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1979

House of Representatives,

Subcommittee on International
Operations of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs and the
Subcommittee on Civil Service
of the House Committee on Post
Office & Civil Service

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met in joint session, pursuant to
notice, at 2:00 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building,
Hon. Dante B. Fascell and Hon. Chairwoman Patricia Schroeder,
joint chairmen.

Mr. Fascell. The subcommittees will come to order.

We meet today to continue our consideration of the Foreign
Service Act of 1979. Our distinguished witness today is Dr.
Henry Kissinger whose past and present accomplishments need no
embellishments. We are delighted to see you back this year.
We spent too much time together and I hope profitably. Therefore,
I would like to extend a warm welcome to you and express
my appreciation on behalf of the committee for your taking the
time to be with us on a matter that is of great importance to
a lot of people and I think some don't realize how important
the whole issue is, although it seems rather bureaucratic and

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

1 a little bit technical but has such a direct impact on the well-being of those who are charged with the responsibilities of the formulation and the implementation of the foreign policy of the United States.

5 Therefore it serves us all well to look at these matters
6 very carefully with a great deal of concern and compassion and
7 intelligence because what we are doing is something that we
8 know is in the best interest of our country and important to the
9 success of whatever foreign policy we have. We have to pay our
10 respects to those people who labor long and hard to carry out
11 the directives of the Secretary and that is a difficult job
12 at best, regardless of who is the Secretary.

13 Mrs. Schroeder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 I join in welcoming you here. My opening statement is
15 posed in the form of a question because even though I did not
16 get to deal with you on the Foreign Relations Committee, having
17 been a student of yours I learned you ask the first question
18 before he asks one of us, so as you give your prepared statement
19 one of the things I think that I have been the most worried
20 about and these hearings have had a bearing on has been a series
21 of articles that has appeared and probably the one most recently
22 was September 6 in the Washington Post which I will put in the
23 record, dealing with our relationship with Mexico, with some of
24 the blunders and faux pas' we have had whether we talk about
25 natural gas or whether we talk about illegal immigration or what

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have you.

There seems to be in the tone of those articles a feeling that somehow we are able to zero in and do the most abrasive thing, it is often much more the form of style than substance but we have not been able to do that very well. It ties into these hearings because we have heard a lot of comments about the lack of minorities in policymaking decisions in our professional diplomatic corps and we had many minority groups testifying here about that and there is a severe lack of hispanics and Chicanos in there.

It appears to be almost a cloning of white males from the Eastern Establishment.

Mr. Fascell. Harvard, you can say.

Mrs. Schroeder. If you looked good in a turtleneck you have ten more points. So one of the things as you are directing your thoughts to this whole area we are talking to, I would appreciate some of your analysis as to whether or not this would help us substantially. Are we getting in trouble because of our professional diplomats who are not reflecting our society or is it political appointees getting us in trouble or do we just have a wonderful propensity to stay in trouble? Can we do anything to deal with those things and I think our neighbor, Mexico, has been the one most in focus.

I thank you and apologize for asking the first question but I learned that long ago from you at Harvard.

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Mrs. Schroeder's complete opening statement follows:

"I was disturbed to read, in the Washington Post of September 6, 1979, an article by Marlise Simons on the deteriorating relations between the United States and Mexico. I ask that the article be included in our hearing record.

(A copy of the article to be furnished for the record follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

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Mrs. Schroeder. Our policy towards Mexico seems to be one of bluster. On issue after issue, our government takes action which almost seem calculated to raise the ire of the Mexicans. I am not just speaking of our ill-fated effort to purchase much-needed natural gas from energy-rich Mexico. I am also speaking about our government's basic inability to come to grips with the issue of illegal immigration, and about our government's protectionist attitude when it comes to purchasing agricultural commodities from Mexico, and about our government's abrasive manner in demanding that clean-up costs for the recent Gulf oil spill be paid by Mexico. In all these instances, the failure of our diplomatic effort appears to be due as much to style as to substance.

The Washington Post article relates a history of misunderstanding and posturing leading to mistrust and suspicion. It talks about vastly different negotiating styles and misread signals.

I am concerned by this very sad diplomatic showing. I would have hoped that the professional diplomats in the State Department could have avoided this situation. I do not know whether our diplomats or our political appointees are to blame. I do note that our former colleague who was recently appointed to be a special ambassador for Mexican-American relations cannot speak Spanish.

One cause of this problem is clear. The Foreign Service

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has been and continues to be an overwhelmingly white and male institution. Despite the fact that the United States has a significant number of Hispanics who are highly qualified to perform diplomatic assignments, there are no major decision makers in Mexican-American relations who are Hispanic.

Denver, my home town, and the entire Western part of the country have many, many individuals of Mexican descent who are familiar with the Mexican way of doing business. These people are highly competent, completely loyal to the United States, and willing to work in the State Department. The State Department has, however, turned a cold shoulder on these people. It has a Foreign Service Entrance Exam which discriminates against all minorities. It has a promotion and tenure system which appears, at times, to be little more than an old boy's network. It has not recruited minorities and it has not made them feel welcome.

I believe that if we had a few Chicanos working on Mexican-American relations, some of these seemingly intractable problems could be worked out. A few Hispanics in the State Department might keep our government from making the awful blunders which have characterized our recent relations with Mexico. Problems like natural gas, illegal immigration, and trade might be cut down to size if the United States utilized one of its most valuable resources, American citizens of Mexican descent.

Mr. Fascell. Thank you.

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Dr. Kissinger, I know you have a prepared statement so why don't you proceed as you will.

STATEMENT OF FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER

Mr. Kissinger. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen of the committee, I would like to say first of all what a pleasure it is for me to appear here. I testified here in this room frequently and I have very warm recollection of my encounters in this room.

Before I read my prepared statement, I would like to make two or three informal remarks. First I would like to stress that I volunteered for this testimony. I was not asked by the Department of State to do it and I volunteered because of the importance I attached to this legislation.

I cannot be said to have been one of the greatest admirers of the Foreign Service when I was serving in the White House as a National Security Advisor. But when I had to work with the Foreign Service as Secretary of State I became convinced that it is one of the most dedicated and one of the ablest and one of the most indispensable groups of men and women in our government.

In our system with its frequent alternation in high office, it is indispensable to have a professional corps that represents the continuity of our foreign policy that operated professionally, that look at foreign policy from the point of view of the general interest and while of course there are exceptions in any large organization, in my experience I have never worked with as able a

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group and as dedicated a group and as I read this proposal, this proposed legislation, it is an attempt to strengthen the professionalism.

It seeks to insure a recognition of measure and it attempts to open up the career ladder to the most promising men and women.

So with your permission I will now read my formal statement and I don't know how you would like me to deal with Mrs. Schroeder's question but I should do that in the question period or how you propose to handle that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Fascell. Dr. Kissinger, I would assume, knowing you, that it is already covered in your statement but you go ahead.

Mr. Kissinger. I must say she achieved her purpose, she did catch me on something that is not in my statement.

Mr. Fascell. When you conclude your formal statement, address yourself to that.

Mr. Kissinger. I will finish my statement and then address myself to that question.

This country and its leaders are fortunate to have a diplomatic service second to none in its professional competence and dedication to the public interest. For eight years, first as National Security Adviser and then as Secretary of State I was privileged to work with the Foreign Service both in Washington and at our posts abroad.

From that dual experience, I can attest to the heavy reliance of our political leadership on the expertise of our

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career diplomats for the successful conduct of foreign affairs.

With the complexity and multiplicity of our international interests in the world today, there is no substitute for a strong Foreign Service. Presidents who fail to use fully the institutional strengths and loyalties of the Service do so at risk.

The Congress was wise to exempt the Foreign Service from the operative provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act last year. The case for maintaining a strong, separate Foreign Service is clear. The conduct of foreign relations differs in substance and form from other Federal services. Given the importance of the issues involved, members of the Foreign Service must be of highest quality and professionalism, heavily aware of our own interests as well as foreign languages and cultures. They must be willing to accept obligations different in nature and more extensive by those in other civilian services.

For example, they must be willing and able to serve in a wide variety of posts abroad, to undertake a dozen different assignments during a typical career, and often to live for long periods with deprivation of amenities, hardship, crisis, stress, and sometimes physicaldnager. In short, they must be truly dedicated to the service of their country.

But the Foreign Service has had to live under a charter which has grown increasingly obsolete and cumbersome in recent years. Again the Congress was wise to call on the Executive Branch in 1976 to submit a "comprehensive plan" to improve

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and simplify the personnel systems of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. Time prevenged us from filing more than an interim report in response to that request during my tenure as Secretary.

I applaud Secretary Vance on completing that process and sending forward a bill which would accomplish long overdue reforms. I strongly support that bill.

Although I do not claim familiarity with some of the detailed personnel provisions of the bill, I am satisfied that it would effect the three changes most needed to strengthen the Foreign Service and to enable it to meet more effectively the challenges ahead.

First, the bill recognizes the clear distinction between the Foreign Service and the Civil Service. As recognized in the interim report filed in January of 1977 by then Deputy Under Secretary Larry Eagleburger at my direction, earlier efforts to induce into the Foreign Service persons whose skills and services are needed only in domestic assignments were ineffective and unrealistic.

The Foreign Service should be limited to those obligated and needed to serve on a worldwide basis, and the presence in the Service of several hundred persons who have never and will never serve abroad should not continue. The conversion features of the bill appear to protect fully the rights of individuals concerned.

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Second, the Administration proposal would consolidate and codify the personnel system and laws of the Foreign Service -- as also suggested in the 1977 interim report. The present multiple array of personnel categories and subcategories deters good management and make individual inequities hard to avoid. The hundreds of amendments passed to the Foreign Service Act of 1946 and the many personnel laws which affect Service personnel need restatement and updating.

The pending bill provides a contemporary reaffirmation of the role of the Foreign Service which should provide an excellent charter for many years to come.

Finally, and most importantly, the pending measure would provide needed closer linkage between granting career status, advancement, compensation and retention in the Foreign Service and continuing high performance requirements. I am frank to say that although this was the intent of the 1946 Act, it has not always been reflected in practice. The intended "up or out" principle has been breached too often. Officers at the top career ambassador and career minister ranks have been immune from performance evaluations and selection-out and sometimes stay on long past their prime periods of service.

Presidents and Secretaries have often had to dip well down into the ranks to find prime candidates for ambassadorial and other key assignments. When legal challenges or legislative deferrals of pay raises have blocked mandatory and voluntary retirements,

it has proven impossible to advance and reward the most pro-
mising, younger and middle grade officers at a satisfactory
rate, and has made it impossible to retain some of the best in
recetn years.

A number of constructive and creative features of the bill
help overcome these structural defects after a transition
period. I would commend several such provisions in particular.

Annual selection-out procedures for all career members of
the Service, from the most senior to the most junior;

Retention in service at the most senior ranks will require
the positive act of extension of renewable three year appoint-
ments after expiration of brief time-in-class limits;

Entry into the Senior Foreing Service would require pro-
motion of a rigorous new senior threshold which is well
designed to help assure that of the most capable reach the toA.
ranks; and performance pay and added instep pay increases for
outstanding and meritorious service would provide new incentives.

All of these provisions and others will be administered and
safeguarded against abuse by selection board procedures.

In summary, I would urge your support for the proposed
new Foreign Service Act. It will preserve and strengthen the
best traditions of the Service, and make it possible for its
members to better perform their essential role and missions now
and in the future.

Mr. Fascell. Thank you very much for that very concise

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and clear statement of the objectives of the efforts of this
subcommittee in conjunction with what the Department has proposed
and initiated under your tenure as Secretary of State in the
Foreign Service Act in 1979, and now if you would like to address
yourself to the other question.

Mr. Kissinger. Chairwoman Schroeder has preempted me with
her question by getting it in first. She has given me five
minutes to think about an answer which might be unwise but
at any rate, it seems to me that two questions were raised. One,
the relationship, our relationship to Mexico and, secondly, the
impact of the type of personnel that is serving us abroad on that
relationship and specifically whether the shortcomings in that
relationship are due to the inadequate representation of minorities
in a broader spectrum of American life in the Foreign Service.

I believe that our relations with Mexico are of extraordinary
importance. Within a measurable period of time we will for the
firsttime in our history have as our neighbor a country which
will by the turn of the century approach major status. It is
already in the upper group of the developing nations. How we
manage such a relationship is of very great consequence, not only
in North America but in our relationship to other developing,
and developed nations for that matter.

The immediate urgency is that Mexico as a result of the
discovery of large resources of energy, will have to make some
fundamental decisions about its own development as it develops

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its energy resources. It has observed that economic development by itself can bring major political problems both internally and foreign policy problems in the sense that whatever choices it makes, can either bring it into conflict with the United States or into a new cooperative relationship with the United States.

It seems to me that the energy problem with Mexico can only be dealt with in a larger context in which both Mexican national aspirations and our longer term purposes can be recognized.

Now I believe that we have not always approached Mexico on that philosophical ladder. We have had too much of a tendency to deal with Mexico in terms of the issues that arise, immigrants, competition from particular Mexican manufacturers or agricultural products, narcotics, all of which are immediate irritants but which are not germain entirely to the fundamental decisions that Mexico has to take.

In addition we are dealing here with a proud country of a complex history and great ambivalence towards the United States partly as a result of its history. I would think that a new approach to Mexico is essential and indeed if it is not taken and if we permit the day to day affairs to fester they may become insoluble and I also do not believe that Mexico can be approached only on the basis of energy. We have to place energy into a context that is also relevant to Mexico's purpose and not use it to our own.

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Now to what extent has the composition of our Foreign Service affected our failure so far to address Mexico in the right manner. Incidentally I am not making this as a partisan issue. I think the history of our relationships with Mexico did not start in -- I do not date that back to 1977.

I am speaking here of a general relationship. To what extent has that been affected by the composition of the Foreign Service? I would think on the whole that the Foreign Service is not the culprit in that relationship. On the whole, it has been national orientation towards looking at the world in terms of East-West rather than in terms of North-South and we have not addressed as a nation creatively the problem of organizing a sense of community in the Northern Hemisphere to the same degree as we have addressed ourselves to Atlantic relationships and South Pacific relationships as with Japan.

Yet in terms of our long-term future I believe Mexico will be as important to us if not more so than some of our traditional close allies.

So I think that the major shortcomings have been at the policymaking level. At the same time I believe that it is important to open up the Foreign Service to more representative approaches and more representative attitudes of the American people primarily in order to bring that perspective to the attention of policymakers.

I do not like to think of Foreign Service officers

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serving their countries as ethnic representatives. They
are Foreign Service officers of the United States and not of
any particular constituency, but it would certainly help the
policymaking projects and the prospects that are brought to
bear if a wider representation of various groups in our society
and of other educational institutions then those that have pre-
dominated could be achieved.

But I believe this legislation will be an important step
in that direction and I think that certainly during the Adminis-
trations with which I was familiar, as well as in this Adminis-
tration, a conscious effort has been made in the direction that you
have suggested.

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1 Mrs. Schroeder. If I could ask you then a follow up
2 question. I totally agree with what you are saying, you do not
3 want them to be ethnic representatives. They still represent
4 the U.S. but I am pleased with what you are saying because I
5 think it can help synthesize all of us in the policymaking
6 area.

7 Basically, the reason the Foreign Service is so important
8 is practically all people -- we are not talking about tech-
9 nology -- but the other very sticky issue we have had to deal
10 with here is the issue of the age 60 mandatory retirement for
11 all people in the Foreign Service.

12 As you know, in the Congress there has been an awful lot
13 of pressure to do away with all mandatory retirement. You may
14 not have thought about this issue yet, and you may want to
15 submit your answer for the record. But that is going to be a
16 very difficult issue for these two committees to get together
17 to deal with when we get to whether or not people should have
18 to retire at the age of 60 in the Foreign Service.

19 You know, there has been a lawsuit and many people are
20 staying in, and I only ask you that question because I think a
21 lot of your statement related to the problems of not having
22 upward slots to move people into that were very talented.

23 Mr. Kissinger. This is an issue that I have thought
24 about but I would appreciate if I could, on reflection to this
25 or other questions, send in written amplifications.

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1 Mr. Fascell. We will be delighted to have any additional
2 comments you care to make in writing, Mr. Secretary.

3 Mr. Kissinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is
4 very important that the careers of the Foreign Service
5 officers be relatively homogeneous; that is to say all of them
6 be available to serve abroad and rotate back home on roughly
7 the same pattern and according to the needs of the Service.

8 It is the experience, on which I am sure the Department
9 can supply you the relevant statistics, that with each -- as
10 you go up in the age groups, the ability and willingness to
11 serve abroad diminishes and, therefore, if there is no
12 mandatory retirement age, you run the risk of a group of
13 individuals whose contribution to the Service is bound to be
14 of a different nature than that of their colleagues and are,
15 therefore, in a special category by reason of age.

16 Also, as I understand this legislation, it provides the
17 discretion to the Secretary of State to extend individuals
18 beyond the retirement age if there is a special need for their
19 service.

20 So, I feel that this mandatory retirement age is
21 especially necessary in the case of a service in which ability
22 to serve abroad is an important criterion in addition to the
23 fact that there must be more rapid movement upward than has
24 been the case recently.

25 Mr. Fascell. Mr. Derwinski.

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1 Mr. Derwinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 Mr. Secretary, I would like to pick up a point in your testimony. There is a point in your testimony where you spoke of the difficulty under existing law of applying what you refer to as the intended up or out principle. In other words, you found it difficult to pursue this and I presume your predecessor did and this bill we are trying, in this bill we are trying to give the Secretary more administrative flexibility in that direction.

10 This seems, if I interpret your total statement correctly, key to keeping, as well as the proper placement, of aggressive, effective young diplomats. Is that a misstatement on my part?

14 Mr. Kissinger. That is correct. What this legislation would do is, first, reinforce the Congressional intent that the up and out principle be strictly carried out and by establishing uniform procedures and uniform categories of personnel, it would make it easier to accomplish it.

19 Secondly, with the establishment of the senior Foreign Service, there is the provision that the appointment be on a three-year renewable basis so that in addition to the annual up and out review of the selection board, there is a three-year review in which the appointment cannot be renewed, which has a possibility of not renewing the appointment in the Service unless it is judged to be in the interest of the

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1 country and the Service to extend it.

2 So there is an additional hurdle that permits honorable
3 retirement in which there is slightly less invidious selection
4 board reluctance to select out no matter how many criteria you
5 give them, particularly when you get into the upper end, but
6 not to renew an appointment I think is psychologically easier
7 than to select out at the end of one year.

8 At any rate, it establishes another hurdle and another
9 way of accomplishing an honorable retirement.

10 Mr. Derwinski. On an entirely different subject, the
11 bill before us contains a limit of five percent of non-career
12 personnel to assist the Secretary and President in carrying
13 other foreign policy for that given Administration. When we
14 reformed the Federal Civil Service a year ago, the figure
15 established for non-career personnel was 10 percent.

16 In other words, twice the number that we are allocating
17 for the non-career personnel in Foreign Service. Do you have
18 any comment on that percentage or the entire principal
19 practice of utilization of non-career personnel?

20 Mr. Kissinger. I have not really thought through which
21 percentage is the right one. There is some advantage in
22 having some non-career personnel in for relieving purposes.
23 When I was in office, I made it a practice to appoint to key
24 positions mostly Foreign Service personnel. I think almost
25 all of the Assistant Secretaries when I was in office were

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1 career because it seemed to me that if this is the Service

2 that has to carry out a foreign policy, it must also be given

3 the responsibility for the high office. So, off-hand, I would

4 like to think about whether five percent is too restrictive.

5 I would not have found it too restrictive but I would like to

6 think about that a little more and perhaps submit a written

7 answer.

8 Mr. Derwinski. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 Mr. Fascell. Mr. Mica.

10 Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions.

11 Mr. Fascell. Mr. Buchanan.

12 Mr. Buchanan. I appreciate very much your introductory
13 remarks, as well as your statement, Dr. Kissinger. As someone
14 who was around at the time, it seemed to me you went through
15 this process of gaining appreciation from the Department of
16 State and the Foreign Service personnel through the experience
17 of serving as Secretary of State.

18 Mr. Kissinger. Absolutely. I am a convert and perhaps
19 therefore more fanatical than the true believers.

20 Mr. Buchanan. But as you are aware, perceptions can be
21 as important as realities, in particular in the democratic
22 form of government, and I do think there are so many people
23 here in the Congress and around the country who have not yet
24 gone through that conversion experience whose perceptions of
25 the Department of State and Foreign Service officers is much

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1 less favorable than the reality of what I too believe to be a
2 very fine Foreign Service.

3 So I think you render us some significant service in
4 throwing your weight and your enormous prestige so clearly on
5 their side and speaking in their behalf.

6 Mr. Kissinger. I think as our foreign policy becomes
7 more and more complicated it will become impossible for our
8 political leadership to handle it adequately unless there is a
9 reservoir of people who represent continuity and a perception
10 of our national interest that is essentially nonpartisan and
11 that has matured over long periods of service.

12 I know what some of the standard objections are and there
13 are organizational problems in the Department of State that
14 have nothing to do with personnel, that sometimes slow down
15 procedures. But in terms of personnel, I believe that it is a
16 truly outstanding group and that would be further strengthened
17 by the passage of this act.

18 Mr. Buchanan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 Mr. Fascell. Thank you, Mr. Leach.

20 Mr. Leach. Mr. Secretary, I would like to say as someone
21 who used to work for you in the bowels of State, that I
22 welcome you particularly to this committee. I am wondering if
23 you would comment as someone who has held a unique position,
24 on one hand having been head of the NSC and the other head of
25 the Department of State, whether you feel that in retrospect

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1 there is a conflict between these two positions and is there
2 anything institutionally or legislatively that ought to be
3 considered about enhancing either the power of NSC or the
4 Secretary of State in the field of foreign affairs.

5 I must say I am biased to think the Secretary of State
6 should be the primary position because Constitutionally he is
7 more responsible to the Congress itself. Would you care to
8 comment in that direction?

9 Mr. Kissinger. You know that when I was security advisor
10 I did not always support the prerogatives of either the
11 Secretary of State or of the Department.

12 Mr. Leach. Or the President himself.

13 Mr. Kissinger. I think it is true in any event, a
14 President will substantially condition foreign policy
15 according to a style with which he is comfortable. There is
16 no point in our reviewing how the position of the security
17 advisor came to be administered as it was during the period of
18 the Nixon Presidency. I would not basically favor some legis-
19 lation that would prescribe how to do it, but as a general
20 proposition, I would say this.

21 The principal foreign policy advisor of the President
22 should be the Secretary of State. The principal manager of
23 our foreign policy should be the Secretary of State. I do not
24 think it is a good practice even though I participated in a
25 system that violated the principle that I am now putting

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1 forward, I do not think it is a good practice to try to
2 control the Department of State or the Secretary of State
3 through a personal advisor of the President.

4 It is an invitation to institutional irresponsibility
5 because you have a large department which, when it is cut out
6 of the policymaking process, is bound to do something and what
7 it then does is likely to tilt the policymaking process in a
8 direction that may not be desired by the President simply
9 through the way of bureaucratic inertia and through ignorance.

10 Therefore, I think if the President has not full confi-
11 dence in his Secretary of State, he should replace him and get
12 somebody in whom he does have full confidence. The security
13 advisor's principal role should be to make sure that the major
14 options which are interdepartmental in nature get to the Pres-
15 ident and to act as a traffic cop and as a sort of a substan-
16 tive conscience in the development of the options but not as
17 an alternative center of policy and not as somebody that
18 foreign governments perceive as a rival source of influence.

19 I say this with all regard for the President incumbent
20 and it is not aimed at the pre-incumbent. Having operated the
21 system from both ends, it is a view that I have developed.

22 Mr. Leach. To take that a step forward, would you hold
23 the same view on the relationship with the Secretary of State
24 to any ambassador at large position? For example, should the
25 area of foreign affairs be carved out, any area of foreign

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1 affairs be carved out to any specific individual in a

2 responsible sense outside the confines of the Secretary of

3 State?

4 Mr. Kissinger. You are now going to get me into major

5 trouble with a dear friend whom I respect enormously, but I

6 believe as a general proposition, ambassadors at large ought

7 to report through the Secretary of State and under the general

8 direction of the Secretary of State.

9 Of course, every ambassador is an ambassador of the
10 President, not of the Secretary of State, and no one can pre-
11 vent a President from asking whoevers advice he chooses in
12 policy formulation. But I think as a general proposition
13 negotiators should be under the general direction of the
14 Secretary of State.

15 Mr. Leach. There has been a good deal of discussion in
16 recent years, in recent months particularly, that there may
17 have been some intelligence breakdowns. Do you believe that
18 ambassadors in the field have sufficient authority vis-a-vis
19 their station chiefs and also in Washington; do you believe
20 there are adequate institutional mechanisms to assure that the
21 Department of State has sufficient influence over intelligence
22 decisions which impact on foreign policy?

23 Mr. Kissinger. There have been such major changes in the
24 organization and control of intelligence, even since I was in
25 office, that my information may not be fully up to date. You

26

1 have two conflicting problems. One is -- I am doing this as
2 viewed from the perspective of the President -- one is that it
3 may be that the ambassador does not always have full control,
4 even though he has theoretical control, over intelligence
5 operations.

6 The other one is that the intelligence community and the
7 Department of State, knowing they have to get along with each
8 other, may make some bureaucratic arrangement with each other
9 that may prevent alternatives from coming up for Presidential
10 consideration and I can think of two or three instances during
11 my period in office of either tendencies where the ambassador,
12 though in theoretical control, did not fully understand what
13 the intelligence community was doing and in other cases where
14 some bureaucratic nonaggression treaty was made which pre-
15 vented alternatives from being accomplished up to the
16 President in time.

17 Mr. Leach. In recent years we seem to be seeing a steady
18 erosion of the functions for which the Department of State is
19 responsible. For example, early in this Administration we saw
20 the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs being transformed
21 to ICA. We have a serious consideration currently being given
22 to putting commerce functions with INS and there are proposals
23 within Congress to move certain commercial work to the Depart-
24 ment of Commerce or elsewhere.

25 If this trend continues, one can visualize the CIA

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27

1 playing a greater role in the political area or maybe even GAO
2 coming into the administrative function.

3 I wonder if you would care to comment on what is a
4 partial breakup of the Department of State that is occuring,
5 with some further challenges in the future on whether foreign
6 affairs is primarily political or the economic political
7 aspects as well as the intelligence aspects which must be more
8 closely defined, and whether there is a potential problem
9 developing where the Secretary of State will have a lower
10 level of jurisdiction. And is this proper or should it be the
11 power of State to consolidate in these areas rather than
12 elsewhere?

13 Mr. Kissinger. Before I answer this question, I would
14 like to expand on the previous answer, the one about whether
15 ambassadors should report through the Secretary of State. I
16 maintain that is a position I favor but I want to make very
17 clear that insofar as it may be applied to the Middle East
18 negotiations that I have the highest regard for Ambassador
19 Strauss, that I was simply talking about the general organ-
20 ization in principle and not about personalities here.

21 Now, as to your question, I believe that the biggest
22 foreign policy problem the United States confronts is to get
23 an overall strategic or geopolitical national view of our
24 purposes in the world and of our interest.

25 Secondly, I believe the difference between successful and

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28

1 mediocre policy is in a series of nuances across a broad

2 spectrum of decisions and, therefore, I am uneasy about the

3 increasing fragmentation of our foreign policy and the

4 difficulty of creating either procedures or periods of time

5 for reflection which will permit this general approach.

6 Now, I have to say that part of the reason for that

7 fragmentation is not just organizational decisions by the

8 White House; it is also Congressional decisions in which

9 particular constituencies believe they can gain greater

10 influence by fragmenting off some part of the decisionmaking

11 process.

12 I also believe even though when I was in office I had no

13 opportunity to change it and I have not fully thought through

14 how to change it, I think the internal organization of the

15 Department of State is too fragmented and does not lend itself

16 ideally to this overall approach to foreign policy but is --

17 as a general proposition, I would believe that there must be

18 some focal point below the President where the various con-

19 siderations come together so taht when they get to the Pres-

20 ident he has a range of choices that are rather carefully

21 articulated rather than a series of tactical decisions.

22 Mr. Leach. Thank you.

23 Mr. Fascell. Mr. Gilman.

24 Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 It is a pleasure having the former Secretary with us once

200 7th STREET, S.W., REPORTERS' BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 554-2245

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29

1 again. It seems natural to have you here before us, Mr.

2 Secretary. We miss seeing you here.

3 With relation to some of the aspects of this new
4 proposal, I did have a great deal of reservation about our
5 whole Civil Service reform and I am concerned we may be all
6 taking the merit out of the merit system. I hope we are not
7 taking the service out of the Foreign Service by some of these
8 proposals.

9 I am concerned about the up and out principle and I am
10 wondering whether there is sufficient protection built into
11 this new procedures to protect those who rise rapidly and as a
12 result may be forced out of the Foreign Service, the rise
13 being primarily due to their good qualifications and good
14 service.

15 There is a limitation of time, I believe five years, and
16 at a maximum grade. Then if the Secretary is not disposed to
17 extend the time he may be forced out of service. I would
18 welcome your thoughts about whether there should be some
19 protection built into the system to protect those who rise
20 rapidly through the Foreign Service.

21 Mr. Kissinger. Of course, it seems to me there are two
22 problems with respect to those who rise rapidly. One is that
23 some people are extremely good at lower levels but then reach
24 their ceiling and you cannot always be sure that high
25 performance at a lower level guarantees high performance

[x]

30

beyond a certain level of performance, so, therefore, it is

quite possible for somebody to be promoted rapidly and then to

be selected out on merit.

The second issue is the one you raised, where somebody
has performed outstandingly at all levels, including the high
level, but then because of the selection out procedures and
because he is relatively younger than the others he finds
himself in a position where he is forced out because there is
not sufficient vacancies or because he comes up against the
abstract provisions of a law.

Again, as I told the chairman before we entered this
room, I cannot pretend that I have studied all the provisions
or the alternative provisions of this bill. My temptation, my
quick temptation would be to say that I would have confidence
in whoever the incumbent Secretary of State is to retain in
the Service those that he considers essential for his mission
because his own performance depends on it.

If he has any sense of responsibility to the Foreign
Service, as every Secretary of State that I know has either
had or developed, he will try to make sure that no person is
selected out simply on a routine basis.

But since I do not know what protection could be built
in, I, in reading this bill, was not bothered by this problem
but that is not necessary. If you would let me know what
specific protection you would have in mind, I could comment

300 7th STREET, S.W., REPORTERS' BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20034 (202) 554-2245

31

1 perhaps more lucidly.

2 Mr. Gilman. I welcome that opportunity and I will pass

3 on something to you.

4 With regard to a mandatory retirement age, I think the
5 bill provides for mandatory retirement age at 60. As you
6 know, we have had a great deal of debate in Congress about
7 eliminating many of the mandatory retirement agencies and we
8 feel men and women beyond age 60 are certainly highly capable
9 of serving our nation.

10 What are your thoughts about the 60 retirement age?

11 Mr. Kissinger. I think the Foreign Service is in a very
12 particular position here in that respect, more than the Civil
13 Service. Given the necessity of serving abroad and given the
14 special demands that are made on the Foreign Service officers,
15 experience shows with every decade the percentage of those who
16 cannot or will not serve abroad increases. So, I would think
17 that in view of the special nature of the Service, mandatory
18 retirement age of 60 is appropriate, though as I am
19 approaching it myself, I may develop second thoughts about it.

20 Mr. Gilman. In speaking of second thoughts -- and I will
21 divert from the bill -- there was a great deal of criticism,
22 as you may recall, about the shuttle diplomacy that you
23 engaged in in the Middle East. Some of us thought it was very
24 effective and it probably brought us closer to peace.

25 As you look back now and compare shuttle diplomacy to

200 7th STREET, S.W., REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 554-2345

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1 other methods of diplomacy, do you still advocate that as an
effective vehicle for a Secretary?

3 Mr. Kissinger. It is very difficult to prescribe a
4 particular method of diplomacy because it depends so much on
the circumstances and on the personality. The shuttle
5
diplomacy was initiated during a period in which a critical
6
7 domestic situation coincided with a very dramatic foreign
policy development.
8

9 That is to say, we had Watergate at home. We had a
10 Middle East crisis abroad, an oil embargo against all of the
industrial democracies, the danger of massive economic re-
cession and it was important to have a dramatic assertion that
12 with all our travail, the United States could remain purpose-
ful and could discharge its responsibilities to the rest of
the world.
15

16 For that reason it was in that period important to have a
17 demonstration of a rapid capacity to settle problems but not
all problems lend themselves to rapid solution. I would say
19 that as a general proposition, high officials should not
20 travel unless they are pretty sure of their outcome because if
they fail, it depreciates their prestige. So I would list
22 shuttle diplomacy as one of the methods that can be used. It
23 is a rather risky one because you are staking the prestige of
24 your office and your country and if you fail at it, you have
produced a major setback.
25

[L]

33

1. So, I would not recommend it as the only method. In the
2. circumstances that I faced I think still in retrospect it was
3. the best way to move things to a constructive solution.

4. Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We hope you will
5. be back again.

6. Mr. Fascell. Mr. Pritchard.

7. Mr. Pritchard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8. Mr. Secretary, I too am very pleased to see you back on
9. the Hill, although I know you come back with some regularity.

10. I was very glad to hear what you said about structure of the
11. organization of our foreign policy, and it has to go through
12. the Secretary of State to strengthen it.

13. It seems each time we have a new Administration, the
14. President finds it more convenient, even though he generally
15. agrees with the overall policy, he pretty soon finds it more
16. convenient to have some way of sort of going around the system
17. because he wants to do things quicker or for a variety of
18. reasons.

19. Now, doesn't the same thing hold true when we get to the
20. country and the ambassador there? I see we have eight
21. programs. We have a CIA; we have all these things operating
22. in a country. Doesn't the ambassador have to call the shots
23. if you are going to have an effective program in a country?

24. Mr. Kissinger. I think that the ambassador should be
25. responsible for all American activities in the country to

300 7th STREET, S.W., REPORTERS' BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 554-2345

34

1 which he is accredited; otherwise he is in a very difficult
2 position.

3 Mr. Pritchard. We do this, don't we?

4 Mr. Kissinger. On the national level there is a
5 propensity of Presidents -- you see it now in Presidents of
6 such different personality -- to the physical proximity that
7 seems to make a great deal of difference and even the five
8 minute car ride from the Department of State to the White
9 House seems to create a psychological barrier.

10 Secondly, I must say with all my affection for the
11 Department of State, it is capable of producing papers whose
12 precision of thought leaves something to be desired, so a
13 President who wants to do something and sends it over and then
14 asks for a recommendation can find himself frustrated by
15 waffling papers.

16 On the other hand, if he bounces them back two or three
17 times, I think the only way to make a department responsible
18 is to give it responsibility. In the field I think there has
19 been tremendous improvement over the last 10 years in
20 strengthening the responsibility of the ambassador for the
21 operations and it depends partly on the energy level of the
22 ambassador whether he really wants to exercise his authority
23 and those ambassadors who are abroad because they like the
24 good life will then have a tendency not to exercise their
25 responsibility and to ride along with the bureaucratic tide.

300 7th STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20034 (202) 554-2345

35

1 It is an unwise way of proceeding. The best ambassadors,
2 good ambassadors, do not do that.

3 Mr. Pritchard. But each time you sort of go around it
4 because you feel the situation calls for going around it, why
5 you just weaken that situation and really the only way you do
6 it is by hauling these people up and either getting rid of
7 them or making them toe the mark.

8 Mr. Kissinger. Absolutely. I have to say in my experience I had all the preconceptions about the waffling character of the State Department. On the other hand, if you insist on performance, it is one of the most impressive instruments that exist and with strong leadership, it is second to none in the world.

14 Mr. Pritchard. If the Secretary of State or the
15 Administration relies on the State Department and that message
16 clearly goes down to the organization, it seems to me it
17 functions better when it knows what it is doing will really be
18 it.

19 Mr. Kissinger. And if you don't, you have 10,000 dis-
20 affected, irresponsible people around who have to do something
21 in the course of the day, and they will then push foreign
22 policy in a very erratic direction, so you don't really have
23 that much choice.

24 I want to stress, as you all know, that I honored this
25 principle when I was in the White House. There were special

36

circumstances while I was there, but I think institutionally

the foreign policy has to be conducted through the Secretary

of State and through the Department of State if it is to have

coherence.

Mr. Pritchard. I would agree. We talk about the

mandatory 60-year old age limit. I know we used to have it in

business. In most cases it seemed to me it was an easier

thing to do, instead of having to face up and fire people, you

had an execution.

It took some of the onus off unloading someone or moving them into a less responsible spot. On the other hand, don't you think we have to have some flexibility because, you know, there are people who have experience and connections and have all that.

Mr. Kissinger. As I understand the provisions of this bill, the Secretary of State does have the authority to extend appointments above age 60 if he considers this in the national interest. I think that this protects those cases where individuals are essential.

Mr. Pritchard. I am getting closer to 60 so ---

Mr. Kissinger. There are a few people in this room who are going the other way.

Mr. Pritchard. Finally, on protection for the individual employee, if you give complete protection it seems to me that you lose quite a bit in flexibility of management, and I think

200 7th STREET, S.W., REPORTERS' BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

37

1 in the case of the State Department it would seem to me --

2 maybe you don't agree -- that we would sort of have to lean,

3 because it is such an essential service and so important on

4 the cutting edge of this country's problems, that we have to

5 allow the management of the Department and maybe hold the

6 protection based on the ability of the people in there

7 essentially.

8 Mr. Kissinger. That would be my instinct. My instincts

9 would be to maintain administrative flexibility.

10 Mr. Pritchard. You know we are going to run counter into

11 all of the groups or the associations or whatever they have in

12 every one of these organizations.

13 Mr. Kissinger. But I think the Foreign Service is a very

14 special institution that requires a particular treatment

15 because of the complexity of its job, because of the hardship

16 that is involved and in some of the service and because of the

17 crucial nature of the decisions in which they are involved. I

18 think general principles of retirement that apply in other

19 fields of endeavor should not be applied.

20

21

22

23

24

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rs fols edm

oint Comms.
ousForAff
-1 79
bIntl'Ops 2

PO & CS
ub vServ

srs 1

Mr. Prtichard. How about a little tradeoff on paying them
a little more money for a little less protection?

Mr. Kissinger. I am in principle in favor of paying them
more money. There is, of course, the merit provisions in this
bill, which I think are very favorable. I think as a practical
matter you, the members of this committee, are in a better position
to judge it than I.

As a practical matter, to take the Foreign Service out of
this general pay scale of the Civil Service, this would be a form
of discrimination that would be hard to put through. So, failing
the ability to do this, I am satisfied with the merit provisions
of this Act.

Mrs. Schroeder. Mr. Gray?

Mr. Fascell. Mr. Gray?

Mr. Gray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you state in your testimony, on page 3, "The
Administration's proposal would consolidate and codify the
personnel system in all foreign service as also suggested in the
1977 interim report. The present multiple array of personnel
categories and subcategories deters good management and makes
individual inequities hard to avoid."

In your opinion, how does a new Act provide for the free
flow and better utilization of women and minorities in the Foreign
Service, and what safeguards do you see there, against the
continuation of a sort of closed service, as in the past?

srs 2

39

Mr. Kissinger. What this comment refers to is the various categories that have grown up either by administrative practice or by law; it does not refer to whatever categories may exist in the minds of those who are administering the general provisions.

By establishing one single, homogeneous Foreign Service by abolishing various different categories, it makes it possible to administer the personnel practices in a uniform manner.

I would have though that the intent of the Congress and the consensus, our national consensus, been that greater attention should be paid to minorities, to women, and generally to groups that have heretofore been disadvantaged, it would be reflected in the Administration's procedures; it would be also reflected in the administration of the promotion system. But I must say that this statement was not addressed to that question that you have raised.

Mr. Gray. Do you see anything in the Act that will try to correct those inequities of the past?

Mr. Kissinger. I cannot immediately identify it, but I know the people who are administering this Act in this Administration. I would like to think also in the previous Administration, but certainly the people who would be administering this Act, seem to me to be very conscious of these inequities; and I would not object to some congressional expression that called particular attention to this and established it as a criteria to which one should pay attention in admission and in promotion.

srs 3

40

Mr. Gray. You mean, should not the administration procedures, or do those administration procedures, from your point of view at this time, or as proposed in the Act, provide those particular groups, women, minorities, who have not been in the Foreign Service, have that opportunity to get into the Foreign Service? Or are you saying perhaps there needs to be something stronger in terms of a statement in the Foreign Service Act?

Mr. Kissinger. When I was Secretary, the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Larry Eagleburger, started procedures which brought about a dramatic increase both in applications and in admissions into the Foreign Service. We took special care both with respect to women and with respect to minorities, to make sure the promotion system operated, keeping in mind past inequities.

I have the impression that these efforts, which were begun when I was Secretary, have been strengthened in the present administration, but I think so far this has been a matter of administrative decision.

I am told that affirmative action and equal opportunity are now merit principles to which attention is paid, and that this Act would strengthen the already-existing provisions in favor of the broadest representation.

Mr. Gray. My concern is fortunately that I really wanted to get to your feeling about whether or not some strong statement or language ought to be in the Act itself, rather than depending on the good wishes of the administrator, whoever the Administrator

srs 4

41

1

might be, or the Secretary at that moment. You are not the Secretary.

2

3

Mr. Kissinger. Again, I have not thought about this problem, but offhand I would think a strong statement in the Act, a statement of purpose, would seem to me to be very appropriate.

4

5

6

7

8

9

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Mr. Fascell. Mr. Secretary, we have been talking about some myths that have been maybe partially factual, that are hard to put away. One is the whole problem of eletism and the continuation of eletist groups in any society, rightly or wrongly, and perhaps because of necessity in training and perhaps because of misperception.

13

14

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That has happened in the State Department with the old saws of striped pants and while I headed graduates from ethereal institutions of higher education. But it seems to me that on the level of discussion that you just had with Mr. Gray, it is quite clear that for some time the Department has been responding to the necessity for broader representation of American society in the Foreign Service, and that there really should not be with any thinking person, while much needs to be done, any real substantive change, even though some of us thought -- and I must confess I was one of those, too -- that felt somebody had to wear a turtleneck sweater and some kind of football letter in order to get into the Foreign Service.

25

Mrs. Schroeder is whispering to me, "they do."

srs 5

42

Mr. Kissinger. You have to remember that most of the Foreign Service believes that the incumbent Secretary of State could never have made it into the Foreign Service if he had not been appointed by the President to his office.

Mr. Fascell. I might add, for a question of perspective, there are a lot of myths surrounding Congressmen, and I don't want to get into that right now.

Mr. Kissinger. I don't mean this Secretary of State, incidentally. They think that about every Secretary of State.

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Mr. Fascell. The other myth that has surrounded the Depart-
ment and is a kind of perception that refuses to die and, as I say
again, sometimes with some foundation, has been this question that
it is just loaded with deadheads or deadwood. We hear that about
every department of government and the Congress, but it has seemed
to just stick with particular regularity to the Department of
State.

Now, you addressed the whole question of up and out, the
importance of admissions, and it seems to me that a genuine effort
has been made to deal with that problem.

Mr. Kissinger. I think a genuine effort has been made,
Mr. Chairman. I think the popular image is substantially incor-
rect. Of course, it applies to a few individuals and they will be
the ones that stick in people's minds.

I found that the tougher the crisis was, the better the For-
eign Service responded. I have not seen any statistical breakdown
of its composition. I would be surprised if the old image of the
Ivy League predominance is still correct, but a systematic effort
has been made to broaden its base to make it more representative
and, after all, the primary incentive to be in the Foreign Service
is the word "Service."

Most of the people could earn more money elsewhere and they
do it because they believe in their country and they want to serve
their country, and that is their reward and that is why they work
long hours with great dedication, and I really think the public

44

1 image is substantially incorrect.

2 Any bureaucracy develops procedures which can be maddening
3 but they can be overcome and they do not reflect the quality of
4 the personnel.

5 Mr. Fascell. Mr. Secretary, I personally agree with you. I
6 have been in Congress 25 years and I have had an opportunity to
7 observe the State Department at very close range from vantage
8 points of the congressional responsibilities which I have, and my
9 own conclusion is that, by and large, a tremendous number of dedicated people are extremely conscientious, motivated by the best of
10 motivations and continue to serve our country, and it is unfortunate that these few cases that lend such credence to the myths
11 12 die so hard.
13

14 There is another one, and that is that the average American
15 businessman just cannot get any help from the American embassies
16 anywhere in the world and that, if he really wants to get the kind
17 of pragmatic American help that he ought to have, he needs to go
18 to the British embassy.

19 I know that is not true, and therefore there are several considerations which are floating around the Congress which Mr. Leach
20 alluded to a moment ago which may not be in response to this particular myth but nevertheless are here. They confront us as a
21 22 reality.
23

24 One of them is that the trade function of State would be dif-
25 fused in some manner either by division, by augmenting the powers

45

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of the special trade representative or by putting him over in Commerce or a combination of both so that the special trade functions on commodities north and south which have a tremendous impact on our foreign policy and east-west trade would no longer be the responsibility of State.

The other is that the Commerce functions would be better served -- I have forgotten how many positions, 126 positions -- by moving them to the Commerce Department. And I was an unwilling participant to this, I must confess; I saw no way out of it. That has already been done with respect to the agricultural special representation in the Agriculture Department, and here we go. What is your comment on all of this?

Mr. Kissinger. I have always been opposed to this. First, on the general comment that embassies don't give adequate assistance to commercial interests, my experience has been that the fault is much more frequently on the side of the business community. They generally do not come to the Government until they are in such a desperate situation and they are already in so much trouble that it is almost impossible to do anything for them.

Contrary to other countries, where there is some sort of a commercial strategy, our people do not come to the Government at a time when you can do something and they come to the Government when they are in desperate straits and then they expect some miracle at the last moment. That was my experience with respect to our business community and the Secretary of State.

48

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h 4

There is no reason in the world why ambassadors of the United
States cannot and should not and do not represent our economic
interests, but it is very wrong to create special constituencies
which then can go back to different departments with narrow inter-
ests, not related to our present foreign policy and then in the
Congress to special committees that again are not primarily
responsible for our foreign policy in terms of our foreign
representation abroad.

I opposed it with respect to commerce attachés. I think it
is unwise with respect to agricultural attachés, and I would say
there what I said about the Secretary of State. If our ambassador
cannot represent our economic interest, it was a poor appointment,
because economics is such a vital factor of our relationship to
the rest of the world today.

Mr. Fascell. Let me discuss one more and then I will con-
clude with this. One of the more troublesome -- they are all very
difficult -- has been one that involves the American public gener-
ally and we get to the problem of consular service, where again
people who are in trouble and who are desperate simply expect --
even though the charter is not there, and maybe the capability is
not there -- the Marines to be called out or some other dramatic
event when they have a particular personal problem in a foreign
country dealing directly with the consular service.

One hears this myth over and over again. The allegation and
the question has arisen as to whether or not consular services

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47

1 generally should be separated from the Department or perhaps the
2 level of skills with respect to these particular people should be
3 changed so that you don't keep them at the high level of Foreign
4 Service attainment as a necessary part of consular service and
5 give them some other skill, maybe social service or community
6 relations or some other thing.

7 But the Department has been faced with this problem for some
time, and that is the perception and the expectancy of the Ameri-
can public generally traveling abroad, that in some way they are
entitled to some kind of special service that is not being ren-
dered to them by the consular service, and this redounds then to
the disadvantage of the Department of State generally in carrying
out its foreign mission.

14 Mr. Kissinger. There are a number of problems. First, there
15 are so many Americans traveling abroad right now and so relatively
16 few consular offices in relation to the numbers of Americans
17 abroad that, as most parts of the Foreign Service, they are
18 overworked.

19 Secondly, usually the case arises when there is some legal or
technical obstacle and it depends then very much on the legisla-
tion of the country which they are in. Whatever influence an
21 American representative has abroad depends on the foreign policy
22 relationship we have with that country and on the price that that
23 country is willing to pay for generally good relations with the
24 United States.

43

Therefore the impact of the consular office depends impor-
tantly on the foreign policy impact of the United States overall,
and to separate the consular offices from that would be to give
them an assignment that is almost impossible to carry out.

Mr. Fascell. Congress has not helped; because of budgetary
reasons and what not we have inisted on the closing of consular
offices. We reduced the number of people in a department that is
already the smallest in the Government. We have been very, very
tight about the budget in terms of real growth, and so we in Con-
gress bear part of the responsibility of the inability of the
Department to respond to these things.

But one of the major thrusts in this whole legislation is to
improve the morale of people who find themselves in the consular
service, and we don't do it by actual legislation. The thrust is
that, through proper management -- I agree with you that you have
to rely on the Secretary of State -- people in the consular
service would be given a greater opportunity for fulfillment in
the entire panoply of State Department operations so that every-
body would have an opportunity to get over into the political or
economic and ultimately get to the top, which is to become a chief
of mission. But I don't see how we can write that in the legisla-
tion. This is a function of management.

Mr. Kissinger. That would be my view.

Mr. Fascell. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

Ms. Schroeder.

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Ms. Schroeder. Mr. Secretary, as the co-Chair I would like to just make one plea. I want to lobby you a bit and hope we can engage you in a little shuttle diplomacy, and that is on behalf of the spouses in the Foreign Service. We have a chance here to do something about their condition and we have some people that I think you have heard of down in OMB who are not quite agreeing with the State Department position on this.

But all I hope is that you look at the different arguments that have been made and I hope we can persuade you because you are always very eloquent and I think it would be nice to have you on our side.

I don't think there is anything more important than the condition of many of the spouses in the Foreign Service. As you know, the divorce rate, I think, is higher because of conditions they have been subjected to. We have degraded spouses; we have made them do all sorts of things. We have moved them all over the world. They could never have a pension in their own name unless they found a magic pension that they could invest in wherever they are stationed. And if they are divorced we tell them, "You had lots of honor," which is hard to eat and hard to wear and it doesn't keep you warm.

As you know, under community-property states under the pension programs in most foreign services in almost every other country in the free world there is a vesting of a certain part of someone's pension after so many years of marriage that is

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automatic. We are trying to get that in rather than forcing
everyone to go to court and honor it. It is causing a little
difficulty with OMB.

I would be more than happy to try to persuade you and put you
back to work shuttling back and forth down there and see if you
can help us in this battle as we deal with this bill.

Mr. Kissinger. Let me look at this and I will write you a
letter with my views. I have not had a chance to look into this.

Mr. Fascell. Dr. Kissinger, thank you very much.