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of 1968, announced after Soviet troops crushed a rebellion
against the communist government of Czechoslovakia, pro-
claimed that Soviet conquests in Eastern Europe were irrevers-
ible. Putting it simply, Brezhnev said, "what's mine is mine."
By Soviet probes in Latin America, Africa, the Persian Gulf
and the Mideast against allies and friends of the United States,
that doctrine has been extended to mean "what's yours is
mine." The Soviet leaders must be made to understand that it
would be both irrational and immoral for the United States
and the West to accept the doctrine that the Soviet Union has
a right to support wars of liberation in the non-communist
world without insisting on our right to defend our allies and
friends under assault and to support true liberation movements
against pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World.

We cannot expect the Soviets to cease being communists,
dedicated to expanding communist influence and domination
in the world. But we must make it clear to the Soviets that
military adventurism will destroy the chances for better rela-
tions between the United States and the Soviet Union. We
must also make it clear that the revised Brezhnev Doctrine of
not only defending but extending communism will be answered
by a Reagan Doctrine of defending and extending freedom.
Our only common interest is to conduct ourselves in such a
way that such conflicts do not escalate into nuclear confronta-
tion.

In view of the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons,
both nations have a mutual interest in working together to
combat international terrorism, whether promoted by states or
individuals. With the progress that is being made in the tech-
nology of miniaturization, the time is not far off when the
danger of breaking the nuclear threshold will come from
individuals and not only nations. If the nuclear genie gets out
of the bottle, the fallout could affect all nations and particularly
those which have nuclear weapons. The Soviets should be asked
to join us in a declaration that terrorists and those who give
aid and comfort to terrorists are guilty of an international
crime and should be dealt with accordingly.

While we should hold the Soviets accountable for the actions
they take that are opposed to our interests, we should recognize
that they are not responsible for all of the troubles in the world.
The income gap between nations that produce raw materials
and those that consume them, famine due to climatic causes,
radical Muslim fundamentalist and terrorist movements ema-

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nating from Libya and Iran—all of these problems would exist even if the Soviet Union did not exist. But rather than exploiting such problems, the Soviet Union should join the United States and other Western nations in combating them. The Soviets should be especially concerned about the rise of Muslim fundamentalism not only because one-third of the population of the Soviet Union is Muslim, but also because the Muslim revolution competes with the Soviet revolution for the support of people in Third World nations.

There is one phase of our competition which should be brought under control—competing with each other in fueling the arms race in the Third World. U.S. and Soviet arms sales to Third World countries run to billions of dollars. Most of these countries are desperately poor, and they need economic assistance far more than they need additional arms. For the Soviet Union to arm India, while the United States arms Pakistan, can only end in tragedy for the people of both countries. Even though these are only non-nuclear arms, they are instruments of war, and small wars always have the potential of escalating into nuclear wars. There is no prospect for reducing arms sales soon, if at all, but both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have an interest in controlling them and not letting them drag us into conflict.

## IV

Turning to collateral issues, while it is an illusion that trade by itself will lead to peace, an increase in unsubsidized trade in nonmilitary items can provide a strong incentive for the Soviet Union to avoid conduct that increases political tensions between our two countries. Trade and political issues are inexorably linked. For the United States to increase trade, which the Soviets need and want, at a time when they are engaging in political activities that are opposed to our interests, would be stupid and dangerous. No nation should subsidize its own destruction.

One of the most widely held misconceptions is that person-to-person programs and cultural exchange will significantly reduce tensions. As a longtime supporter of such programs, I must reluctantly point out that this is not the case. "Getting to know you" is not the issue between the Soviet Union and the United States. What are called the three Cs—consular, cultural and commercial issues—will and should receive appropriate attention at summit meetings. But since Soviet authorities

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## SUPERPOWER SUMMITRY 9

decide who is to go to the United States and what and whom foreigners can see in the Soviet Union, no one should be under any illusion that agreements in such peripheral areas by themselves have any significant effect on the nature of the conflict between the two superpowers.

The most highly charged emotional issue is that of human rights abuses in the Soviet Union. The Soviets insist that under no circumstances will they allow their internal policies to be a subject for negotiation with another government. We should make human rights a top-priority *private* issue but not a *public* issue. We saw this principle in practice in 1972. In my summit conversations with Brezhnev, I privately urged that he lift limitations on Jewish emigration in order to gain support for détente in the United States. A record 37,000 exit visas were granted in that year. The following year, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the trade bill put public pressure on the Soviets to increase Jewish emigration. The Soviets reacted by sharply *reducing* the number of visas rather than *increasing* them.

### v

For the past five years I have strongly urged holding annual summit meetings. Such meetings can serve useful purposes apart from reaching any major substantive agreements. Most important, they can substantially reduce the risk of war from miscalculation. This will be the case not because the two leaders will charm each other or find that they like each other but because they will understand each other's interests, respect each other's strength, and know the limits beyond which they cannot go without running the risk of armed conflict. This was a factor after the 1973 summit which probably helped to convince Brezhnev that I was not bluffing later in the year (October 1973) when I ordered an alert of our forces to back up our demand that he not intervene unilaterally in the Middle East war.

Moreover, when a summit meeting is scheduled, it inhibits one side from engaging in actions that would be clearly against the interests of the other during the period before the meeting; thus each party will have an incentive to avoid conduct which might poison the atmosphere. This factor probably also played a role in cooling the 1973 crisis.

A summit meeting is also a very useful tool to get a bureaucracy moving. The Soviet bureaucracy is notoriously and madeningly slow, rigid and inflexible. The U.S. bureaucracy is

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10 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

not free of such faults. There is nothing like the deadline of a summit to knock heads together and to shape up a bureaucracy. The danger which must be avoided is pressure, especially from the bureaucracy, for agreements for agreements' sake to ensure the success of the summit. It is far better to have no agreement at all than to negotiate a bad one.

VI

One hundred and fifty years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville observed with incredible foresight:

> There are at the present time two great nations in the world which seem to bend toward the same end although they start from different points: I allude to the Russians and the Americans—the Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common sense of the citizens; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm: the principal instrument of the former is freedom, of the latter servitude. Their starting point is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems to be marked out by the will of heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.

This was written long before the communists came to power in Russia. We must recognize that while Russians and Americans can be friends, our governments are destined by history to be adversaries. Yet while we are destined to be adversaries, we have a mutual interest in avoiding becoming enemies in a suicidal war. This requires a candid and honest recognition of our irreconcilable and permanent differences, not a superficial glossing-over of them. A difference not recognized can be dangerous. A difference recognized can be controlled.

The one absolute certainty about the Soviet-American relationship is that the struggle in which we are engaged will last not just for years but for decades. In such a struggle, one advantage the Soviet Union has over the United States is that its foreign policy has consistency and continuity. The leaders change but the policies remain the same. Khrushchev wore short-sleeved shirts and Brezhnev wore French cuffs, but both set the same foreign policy goals: the extension of Soviet domination and influence in the world.

Every eight years and sometimes every four years, American policy, with bipartisanship virtually ended by the Vietnam War, oscillates between extremes of underestimating and overestimating the Soviet threat. What is needed is a steady, consistent policy with bipartisan support that does not change from one

RICHARD NIXON

November 5, 1985

26 FEDERAL PLAZA
NEW YORK CITY

In my conversation with Deng, we covered a wide range of domestic and foreign policy issues. I shall try to cover in this letter those subjects he might raise with you and on which you might want to make points with him.

You can assume that he will be very tough on Taiwan. I made the point that the President had shown great courage and statesmanship in changing his views on Taiwan but that there was no way that he could at this time go further than he had gone and accede to the P.R.C.'s request via Margaret Thatcher that he mediate the issue. I emphasized that there was still a strong pro-Taiwan sentiment in the Congress, as evidenced by the Winston Lord confirmation hearings, and that the President had too much on his plate politically to tackle this issue at this time. I assured him that the Administration would not provide military assistance to Taiwan which would increase their offensive capability and that it would not discourage any efforts to reach a rapport. I deliberately tried to cut the conversation on this matter short so that we could get on to other issues. He was obviously not satisfied but he at least was left with no illusions that the President might be persuaded to play a mediator's role.

We had a long discussion of the strategic balance in the world. I noted that since my first visit in 1972, the Soviet threat as far as the P.R.C. was concerned was far greater today. The Soviets had moved from a position of nuclear parity in 1972 to nuclear superiority in the most powerful and accurate nuclear weapons -- land-based strategic and intermediate missiles. I also pointed out that the encirclement which the P.R.C. was concerned about in 1972 was far more dangerous today with the Soviets and their allies in Afghanistan, Vietnam, and

2

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Cambodia. I also made the point that the Soviets were now moving into a dominant position in North Korea. He tried to down play the significance of the Soviet planes in North Korea but was obviously sensitive on this score. I would urge that you indicate that your intelligence indicates a Soviet determination to replace the P.R.C. as the major supporting power for North Korea and that this, thereby, increases the encirclement danger.

I also made the point that while we understood why the P.R.C. would want to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union, public statements to the effect that the Chinese considered the U.S. and the Soviet Union to be equal obstacles to peace gave ammunition to the hawks who opposed President Reagan's decision to provide technology for the P.R.C. and would jeopardize any further transfers in this regard which the Chinese very much want. I told him that I had personally supported the technology transfer and would continue to do so but that while I trusted the Chinese leadership, there were strong and powerful forces in the Congress and the media who did not and who would seize upon the evidences of Sino-Soviet rapprochement to block such transfers in the future.

This got his attention. He insisted that the P.R.C.'s new independent line served the cause of peace. He made the point that getting the Soviet Union to move on the "three obstacles" -- Cambodia, Afghanistan, and their forces on the northern border -- would serve not only the interests of China but the cause of peace. But like Hu Yaobang, to whom I made the same points, he reacted almost violently to the suggestion that if the P.R.C. received technology there is a possibility they might make it available to the Soviet Union in the future. It was the only time during the two hours that he became very agitated and raised his voice saying, "Never, never, never." Of course this is what he had to say and it could have been an act, but you could well build on the point that I made because I think it does pose a real problem for technology transfers in the future. Their cozying up to the Soviets and particularly their equating of the U.S. and the Soviet Union as potentially aggressive powers could cause serious problems in the event that technology transfers are considered.

[L.C.]

3

It was obvious that I had hit a raw nerve, because he went to considerable length then to point out that in spite of the public statements, he wanted to make it very clear that the P.R.C. had far more differences with the Soviet Union that it had with the United States. On the other hand he made the point that because China was a very weak country militarily and would continue to be for a long time, "We don't want to tie ourselves to one chariot." I responded by saying that I recognized his concern and that what we should do was to develop a close strategic relationship privately between our military and intelligence agencies but to keep a low profile on that relationship publicly. He responded enthusiastically to that suggestion, observing that it was "a very good idea" and that he would welcome such cooperative contacts. I believe that this gives you a very good opening to follow up on my suggestion that you should make it clear that you are not sharing the views that he and you expressed with anybody else except the President and that consequently you are going to be very candid with him and you would hope that he would follow the same course with you.

He was more guarded than Hu Yaobang and Zhao in his evaluation of Gorbachev. But he did state categorically, "We have seen no change in his policies yet in relation to us." He said that they will continue to explore economic, cultural and other ties but until there was movement on the three obstacles, there could not be a real rapprochement. However, I sensed that if Gorbachev was smart enough to move on even one of the obstacles, we might expect a significant change on this front. In any event, you may want to explore the matter with him further.

On SDI, I noted that he had come out flatly against it and then gave him my own rationale which, incidentally, may not be exactly the same as yours. I pointed out first that the Soviet Union was spending twice as much on missile defense as we were. As far as a foolproof population defense was concerned, I pointed out that most of the experts do not believe it would be possible until the next century but that a system that would defend enough missile sites to deny the Soviets a first strike capability could become operational in the next

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ten years. I emphasized strongly that the major threat to peace in the world was the Soviet SS-18 first strike capability which provided a dangerous probability of their being able to use nuclear blackmail against the United States and our friends. I made the point that 40 MX missiles were not enough of an incentive to get the Soviets to reduce that threat and that in dealing with the Russians I had found that you can't get something from them unless you have something to give to them. He emphatically said, "I agree." I made the additional point that any program that makes the United States more secure, makes our friends more secure and, particularly where Japan was concerned, makes the credibility of our deterrent absolutely indispensable. I didn't have to paint any pictures for him to realize that if the U.S. nuclear deterrent lost credibility, the Japanese would have no option but to develop their own nuclear defense capability. He responded, in my view somewhat lamely, by saying that he didn't believe absolute parity was possible and that superiority is now irrelevant. He came down hard on the point that a nuclear arms race risks war and would hurt everyone. I got his attention somewhat when I observed that the P.R.C.'s opposition to SDI helps the Soviet Union by encouraging them to stonewall the President at Geneva. I won't go into further detail of our rather long conversation on this subject except to point out a rather curious conversation I had with Henry. He said that Han Xu had suggested that he talk to me about my conversation with Deng on SDI prior to the time that he sees Deng later this month. I also made my usual point, and yours as well, that it wasn't the existence of nuclear weapons but the failure to resolve political differences which lead to their use which brings war. His interview in *Time Magazine* last week would seem to reflect that point of view.

It was interesting to note how he had changed since the two times I talked to him in 1979 and the other occasion in 1982. He bluntly said that the P.R.C. had changed its policy of forming a line against the Soviet Union running from Japan, through China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Europe. While Mao had said that war was inevitable, the situation has now changed and that he no longer believed that was the case. The Soviet Union has encountered great "problems" and the United States has recovered from

4/5/85

HAK:

Last month Richard Nixon sent you a copy of <u>No More Vietnams</u> and you sent a short note of reply. That exchange is at back.

The former President has now sent
you another note - this time en-
closing a letter of praise from
Lee Kwan Yew.

How about something like the
attached as a further reply?

Approve ____

as edited ____

Rosemary

(CV: Date when signed)

HENRY A. KISSINGER

January 30, 1986

I am writing to lend my support for the nomination of Mr. Teddy Kollek, Mayor of Jerusalem, for the Nobel Peace Prize. I urge the Committee to give Mayor Kollek its highest consideration in view of his singular efforts since 1965 to promote harmony and well-being among Arabs, Jews and Christians. Within the setting of the continued irresolution of the broader issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Mayor Kollek's achievements--the deepening and expanding of the patterns of co-existence among the communities of Jerusalem--represent significant tangible progress and the hope for the future.

Mayor Kollek, in his untiring devotion to the many representatives of his community has consistently striven for an environment of goodwill, economic prosperity and above all, an everlasting peace in a region known for its tragic turmoil. Mayor Kollek's profound commitment to peace in a region that has known only turmoil is a reflection of his devotion to human dignity. In this regard, I hope the Committee will give every consideration to his nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize.

The Norwegian Nobel Committee
Drammensveien 19
255 Oslo 2
Norway

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919

FEB.24 '86 11:16 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

February 24, 1986

Attn: Chris, then Ann-Louise

From: Jody

Rosemary continues to be bed-ridden with the flu. She has dictated the beginnings of HAK's ltr nominating Teddy Kollek for the Nobel Peace Prize--but said Ann-Louise will have to finish up.

Ltrs are to be received by the Nominating Committee by February 1st, so you'll have to backdate accordingly.

Address: The Norwegian Nobel Committee
Drammensveien 19
255 Oslo 2
Norway

From: Rosemary

"To the Nobel Committee:

I am writing to nominate for the Nobel Peace Prize, the Mayor of Jerusalem, Mr. Teddy Kollek. I urge the Committee to give Mayor Kollek its highest consideration in view of his singular efforts since 1965 to promote harmony and well-being among Arabs, Jews and Christians. Within the setting of the continued irresolution of the broader issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Mayor Kollek's achievements--the deepening and expanding of the patterns of co-existence among the communities of Jerusalem--represent significant tangible progress and the hope for the future. "

RN NOTE FOR ANN-LOUISE:

HAK ought to protect himself on the issue of the status of Jerusalem, but I am not quite sure how to handle this.

Following is sample--HAK's ltr nominating Elie Wiesel for the 1985 prize.

APR 29 1986

69 CHESTER SQUARE LONDON SW1

24 April 1986

Dr Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
26th floor
350 Park Avenue
New York NY 10022

I have read your article on Central America with great interest and I believe that it represents a very constructive initiative in a complex but vitally important area for the security of the United States and the West.

If I recall correctly, this was an approach which you indicated to me that Mr Caputo was willing to support. What you do not mention in the article, but which you had apparently discussed with our Argentine friend, is what happens if the Nicaraguans reject the proposed structure designed to give them locally guaranteed security instead of Soviet and Cuban surrogate status. The logical consequence of a Nicaraguan rejection, which would be communicated to them in advance, is that the Latin American community would then give the United States carte blanche to deal with the situation. I had understood that this was the idea, but I have noted that the follow through was omitted in your article.

The main purpose of writing, however, is to call to your attention that during my recent too long stay in Buenos Aires, President Alfonsin after meeting the US Congressional delegation headed by Tip O'Neill announced that he was opposed to any policy which would stimulate the activity of the contras, and that force was not a solution for the Central American problem. That gratuitous public statement of policy, contrary to the firmly expressed view of President Reagan, is another example of the political subtlety of our Argentine friends. Furthermore, it would seem to cut the ground out from under the implied threat to the Nicaraguans that they play ball, or else. In fact, according to Alfonsin there is no "or else". Is there more here than meets the eye? If so, I would be delighted to be illuminated.

You might be amused by a "cooked up" letter sent to Perry Worsthorne designed to shock in a situation where a little shock would do no harm, I think. I would not be surprised, however, if the views expressed do represent an increasing current of thought in the United States.

Hope all goes well with you and that I'll have a chance of seeing
you soon.

Peregrine Worsthorne, Esq.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH

London

April 22, 1986

Dear Mr. Worsthorne,

Although I come from the far off mid-western state of Iowa in the United States, I have been a fairly regular reader of yours for many years. On the eve of my departure home I feel compelled to write you this letter in order to comment on your latest column in last Sundays' Telegraph and also in order to let off some of the steam I have been building up during the past week since the American attack on terrorist targets in Libya.

In your transparently artful leader of Sunday you communicate rather grandly and pompously to your readers that after careful consideration and on balance, Prime Minister Thatcher displayed statesmanship in supporting America in its attack on Libyan targets. Before reaching this conclusion you indicated we Americans were ill advised to do what we did, but our President faced irresistible pressure to do

"something". Mrs. Thatcher's action you classified as statesmanship because of the risk to the continuation of the Atlantic Alliance that a refusal might have entailed. What courage to support us, although we were wrong! It was simply a question of doing what suited your country because otherwise the U.S. might have scrapped its heavy burden under the NATO alliance.

I and most Americans have a greater respect than you for your Prime Minister. We are convinced that she supported us because she thought that what we were doing was morally right and she wanted herself and her country to be counted with us and not because of your patronizing phrases of yesterday. I regret to tell you that my countrymen are fed to the gills with the fulfillment of our NATO treaty obligations, especially as we get nothing but kicks in the teeth in return. Have no doubt that there will be a careful reappraisal of the American posture vis-a-vis Europe as the result of recent events. This has been in the cards for some time but it has now become a matter of urgency.

I have no doubt you will be able to deny any anti-American prejudice by referring to a number of your columns or other writings in the past. I hate to appear insulting, but somehow you have managed to write something at one time or another on every side of almost every question you have addressed. Your patronizing arrogance toward Americans is however very near the surface of all your utterances, oral or written.

- 3 -

The NATO alliance was created in 1950-51 as the result of the fear that spread throughout Europe when North Korea launched its unprovoked aggression against South Korea. United States armed forces, with token support from the United Nations, held the line against aggression in Asia. Shrill European voices were raised, frightened by the specter of similar Russian aggression in Europe - a Europe unwilling to prepare itself for its own defence. Secretary of State Acheson with the full backing of a mid-westerner, Harry Truman, put together the NATO alliance. This alliance has placed a treaty obligation on my country to keep about 350'000 armed men in Europe and to pay for their upkeep. This has represented a very considerable expense for all American taxpayers. We engaged in exceedingly expensive research and development of tactical nuclear weapons and missiles in order to protect Europe from a feared Soviet onslaught. This effort had to stress nuclear weapons because of the European refusal to make the required effort to prepare its own conventional defense (compulsory military service, high defence budgets etc.).

America does have a common heritage with most of the countries of Europe that tugs at our heartstrings, but please disabuse yourself of the proposition that a free Europe is essential for the survival of freedom in America, or indeed in the Western Hemisphere. We have the capability of defending our homeland from totalitarian aggression and we

- 4 -

still have the guts to use that capability if required to
safeguard and defend our liberty. We also have a domestic
economic market place large enough to provide an acceptable
degree of well being which would avoid the social upheavals
you Europeans are always wailing about. We have this because
we are willing to roll up our sleeves and work and produce
and distribute more goods and services to more people than
any other society in the history of the world. The system
that has achieved this result is unvarnished capitalism.

We would undoubtedly shed tears if Europe were Sovietized and
we probably would be willing to consider requests for help,
if there remained a chance of success. I also have no doubt
we would trade with a Soviet Europe while making certain they
could not do to us what they may have done to you. Possibly
after several generations of Msgr. Kents, Greenham
Commonites and more of their ilk you will be able to
convince your Soviet masters that they should release you
from bondage. I hope so, but God helps those who help
themselves.

After reading you for so many years, I am certain that you
are convinced that with British and European sophistication
and urbanity (as contrasted to American stridency and
vulgarity) you will be able to roll back the tide of
Marxism-Leninism and establish yourselves as the arbiters
between these two equally gauche and vulgar societies. Let us
look at the record of the 20th Century, because the rest is

too distant to be relevant.

In 1914 Europe's dynastic jealousies and ambitions propelled the world into a carnage hitherto unknown to man. Britain's youth was destroyed in the trenches of France and bolshevism triumphed in Russia. Had it not been for American intervention with material and men, the Kaiser would certainly have called the tune in Europe.

Our intervention can hardly be termed selfish since if in 1940 the Channel proved uncrossable, the Atlantic in 1914 would certainly have been impenetrable. The French mutinies of 1918 and the British fatigue were overcome by the surge of new enthusiasm from America. Europe, and the West won - then what? America, as it is wont to do, turned its back on Europe (no doubt confident that its superior statescraft would create a stable world) and left you to put the pieces together. You did it so well that in less than twenty years Europe was on the edge of an abyss and in twenty two years Britain was fighting for its life again. America again responded to Britain's call with very substantial aid prior to becoming formally involved in the war (while the Soviets were allied to Hitler), and afterward with the blood of our sons, whose bodies are buried all over Britain and the European continent. Had it not been for America, Hitler's Thousand Year Reich would be in its 54th year. I am certain however that America would still be living in freedom, a freedom tempered by the sadness of the loss of Europe, but

- 6 -

freedom nevertheless.

What you have to decide Mr. Worsthorne, unequivocally and
without elegant quibbling, is whether American or Russian
society is more consistent with the kind of society Britain
and Europe wants. We are tired of trying to sell you our
product. I think that you will find that before too long you
will have to decide for yourselves and then do what is
necessary to be sure you can defend such a society by
yourselves in the face of Soviet efforts to "convince" you of
the superiority of their system.

All of us wish you luck and we will be watching with great
interest how events develop. In the meantime our boys will
come home and we will spend our taxpayers money to protect
ourselves. If you want our products we will sell them to you,
if not, we shall consume them ourselves. I know you will look
forward with relish to those stimulating intellectual
conversations and negotiations with the urbane Kremlin
leadership over delicious sugar cakes by the samovar in
charming dachas. The impact of English public school culture
mixed with continental sophistication shall no doubt mellow
and convince the imperial appetites in Moscow.

Meanwhile, we shall continue to eat hamburgers and junk food,
wear outlandish mass produced clothes and travel in
oversized, gaudy automobiles, but in FREEDOM, Mr.
Worsthorne. In our American society, if one wants to be

69 CHESTER SQUARE LONDON SW1

10 October 1986

Dr Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K. Street NW
Washington DC 20006

OCT 16 1986

Dear Henry,

Just a short note to congratulate you on your Newsweek article which I thought was excellent. It presented the problems in an easily understandable way and gave constructive indications as to what should be done about them. I saw President Reagan on television before I left New York, saying that he was going to Iceland with a "realistic" attitude. He said, "I repeat, a realistic attitude, which should answer some of the domestic criticism we have been receiving". Do you think he reads Newsweek?

All of us enjoyed our dinner with you and your colleagues and found many of the comments of great interest. I will be following up with you the developing American Express-Advent International relationship. Maybe when you are over to see Loel we could have a chat. I will probably see him in Lausanne on 20 October.

I must say that Kalb's resignation is irritating. These damn journalists whose moral burden is so heavy that as soon as they get a bit short of breath, they have to jettison it, give me a pain. It's a big mistake to have your conscience as press spokesman. If you do, you may have to pay a big price. However, any administration that decides to frighten a foreign leader and writes internal memoranda concerning how it is going to do it, after all that has happened in recent years, deserves all that it gets.

Congratulations again for your excellent contribution and I hope to see you again soon. My best to Nancy,