Institute of World Affairs, March 11-13, 1966

Henry A. Kissinger

AMERICA AND EUROPE - A NEW RELATIONSHIP

This evening I will speak to you about American-European relationships and will do so against the background of the recent discussions in Paris concerning the reorganization of NATO. These discussions have revealed the assumption of many Americans that everything in the Atlantic Alliance would be alright were it not for the rather self-willed policy of the President of France. The proposition that I would like to make is that the difficulties in American-European relationships may be symbolized in the personality of President de Gaulle, but they are not caused by him. Instead, they reflect deep-seated, structural changes in the nature of foreign policy in the contemporary period. These changes are in part due to the successes of previous American policies, but as with all successful policies, each achievement provides a point of departure and not a final resting place. One of my friends in Washington once said to me, "How is it possible that one man can stand up against two-hundred and fifty million people?" The answer is that one man cannot stand up to two hundred and fifty million people. And if there are certain difficulties that have persisted for many years, it is time to inquire into their causes and possible remedies.

The difficulties which NATO is now facing fall into two categories. Some stem from structural causes and others reflect decisions of policy. Let me speak first of the structural causes.

of policy. Let me ask that of the structural causes.

dories. Some atom from structural causes and others reflect decisions
The difficulties which NATO is now facing fall into two cate-
and feasible remedies.

have periahed for many years, it is time to induce into their causes
red and fifty million people. And it there are certain difficulties that
fifty people?" The answer is that one man cannot stand up to two hundred
boable that one man can stand up against two-hundred and fifty mil-
place. One of my friends in Washington once said to me, "How is it
achievement provides a point of departure and not a final resting
vions American policies, but as with all successive policies, each
bony period. These changes are in part due to the successive of pre-
aested, structural changes in the nature of foreign policy in the contem-
Gamble, but they are not caused by him. Instead, they reflect deep-
relationship may be symbolized in the personality of President de
that I would like to make is that the difficulties in American-European
rather self-willed policy of the President of France. The proposition
everything in the Atlantic Alliance would be straight were it not for the
differences have revealed the assumption of many Americans that
emeralons in Paris concerning the reorganization of NATO. These
relationship and will do so against the background of the recent dia-
This evening I will ask to you, spont American-European

Henry A. Klauder

Institute of World Affairs, March 11-13, 1988

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Of those, the most important is, of course, the recovery of Europe. At the end of the war the period of greatest American strength coincided with the period of the greatest European weakness. There developed a relationship between Europe and the United States which was based on the urgency of meeting the immediate crisis. However, to many who formulated America's post-war policy, this relationship is seen as the only possible one. Every European country, with the exception of Great Britain, had been defeated at one stage or another during the war. Every European country, with the exception of Great Britain, had been occupied at one stage or another during the war. Societies were shattered. Political confidence was low. Europe was dependent on the United States for economic support, for political assistance, and above all for military security. A "father knows best" attitude grew up among American policy-makers, and in the European countries, again with the exception of Great Britain, foreign policy consisted of an attempt to influence essentially American decisions. But the relationship which was inevitable during the forties, would be unhealthy as a permanent pattern.

Since that era, Europe, partly because of American assistance, has recovered economically. And with this economic recovery, some of the political confidence and the traditional political dynamism returned as well. Also, with European economic integration, the relationships between Europe and the United States were bound to be put on a new

between Europe and the United States were bound to be put on a new
path. Well, Vlao, with European economic integration, the relationships
the political confidence and the traditional political dynamism returned
has recovered economically. And with this economic recovery, some of
Since that era, Europe, partly because of American assistance,
would be unstable as a permanent
to influence essentially American decolonization. But the relationship which
the exception of Great Britain, foreign policy concreted of an attempt
Americans policy-makers, and in the European countries, again with
military security. A father knows best. An attitude drew up among
States for economic support, for political assistance, and above all for
ed. Political confidence was low. Europe was dependent on the United
occupied at one stage or another during the war. Societies were at differ-
ent. Every European country, with the exception of Great Britain, had been
Great Britain, had been defeated at one stage or another during the war.
the only possible one. Every European country, with the exception of
who formulated America's post-war policy, this relationship is seen as
based on the urgency of meeting the immediate criteria. However, to many
developed a relationship between Europe and the United States which was
coincided with the period of the greatest European meekness. There de-
Europe. At the end of the war the period of greatest American strength
Of those, the most important is, of course, the recovery of

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[y]

footing. Much of the discussion about the European Common Market, for instance, emphasizes the desirability of an "outward looking" Common Market. I agree with this, as an abstract proposition. But it is important to keep in mind that a common market inevitably must be, to some extent, inward looking. By definition a common market is formed because the outside tariff barriers are higher than the inside tariff barriers. It is therefore by definition somewhat discriminatory toward non-members. Thus the realistic issue is the degree of the discrimination, not the fact of it. A unified Europe, moreover, representing a greater weight, must structurally be a more difficult negotiating partner. I say this not because I am opposed to a united Europe--I believe that this is a price well worth paying--but because some of us have been reluctant to admit that there was a price to be paid.

Secondly, the process of de-colonization, has produced a shift in perspective between Europe and the United States, and, indeed, a reversal of roles. In the 1950's many Europeans were arguing, rightly or wrongly, that in their colonial areas they were defending larger interests than their right of possession. The United States replied that the larger interests of freedom required it to disassociate itself from its European allies in all matters that did not concern the defense of Europe. As far as Europe is concerned, the process of de-colonialization has been largely accomplished--painfully and with serious domestic difficulties. As a result, Europe is now concentrating primarily on

differences. As a result, Europe is now concentrating primarily on
has been largely accomplished--basically and with serious domestic
Europe. As far as Europe is concerned, the process of de-colonialization
its European allies in all matters that did not concern the defense of
the larger interests of freedom required it to disassociate itself from
terests than their right of possession. The United States replied that
or roughly, that in their colonial areas they were defending larger in-
reversal of roles. In the 1950's a many Europeans were ardent, rightly
in perspective between Europe and the United States, and, indeed, a
Secondly, the process of de-colonization, has produced a shift
have been reluctant to admit that there was a price well worth paying--but because some of us
believe that this is a price well worth paying--but because some of us
partner. I say this not because I am opposed to a United Europe--I
ing a greater weight, must structurally be a more difficult negotiating
crimes not the fact of it. A United Europe, moreover, represent-
toward non-members. Thus the realistic issue is the degree of the dis-
tant barriers. It is therefore by definition somewhat discriminatory
formed because the outside tariff barriers are higher than the inside
bar, to some extent, inward looking. By definition a common market is
it is important to keep in mind that a common market inevitably must
Common Market. I agree with this, as an abstract proposition. But
for instance, emphasizes the desirability of an "outward looking"
tooing. Much of the discussion about the European Common Market,

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European problems. It is the United States that is appealing to its European allies for support in regions distant from the NATO area. And it is receiving approximately the same reply from its European allies that they received from us in the 1950's. Having left these areas with great emotional turmoil, the Europeans are finding it psychologically and politically impossible to return. In the future it is likely that any extra-European problems will have to be dealt with largely by the United States and without very great European support, regardless of who is in office in various European countries.

Thirdly, when the Atlantic relationships were formed, the Europeans were obsessed by two dangers: one, they believed that a Soviet attack was, if not imminent, at least highly possible; and two, they feared that the United States might revert to its traditional isolation. They, therefore, were eager to tie the United States as closely as possible to the defense of Europe. As far as the Europeans were concerned, the primary purpose of the command structure of NATO and its military deployment was to create an automatic commitment by the United States to the defense of Europe. The Europeans wanted an American general in charge of the defense of Europe because they wanted to make sure that any Soviet aggression would immediately become a confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. They wanted American troops in Europe because they wanted, to put it crudely, hostages so that they were

Europe became they wanted, to put it crudely, boatsies so that they were
the United States and the U.S.B.R. They wanted American troops in
any Soviet addression would immediately become a confrontation between
charge of the defense of Europe because they wanted to make sure that
to the defense of Europe. The Europeans wanted an American general in
department was to create an automatic commitment by the United States
primary purpose of the command structure of NATO and its military
the defense of Europe. As far as the Europeans were concerned, the
therefore, were eager to tie the United States as closely as possible to
that the United States might revert to its traditional isolationism. They,
was, if not imminent, at least highly possible; and two, they feared
were opressed by two dangers: one, they believed that a Soviet attack
THIRDLY, when the Atlantic relationship was formed, the Europeans
who is in office in various European countries.

United States and without very great European support, regardless of
extra-European problems will have to be dealt with largely by the
and politically impossible to return. In the future it is likely that any
with great emotional turmoil, the Europeans are finding it psychologically
sames that they received from us in the 1960's. Having left these areas
And it is receiving approximately the same reply from its European
Europeans allies for support in regions distant from the NATO area.
Europeans problems. It is the United States that is appealing to its

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not entirely dependent on the unsupported promise of an American President. This has always created a difference in perspective, because once an American was in command and American troops were deployed in Europe, the U.S. was bound to try to make some rational sense out of its military commitment. Since the early 1950's there have been recurring debates between the United States and Europe. Every measure that we proposed to strengthen the local defense of Europe was interpreted by the Europeans as weakening the over-all defense of the NATO area. The reason was that the Europeans were not primarily interested in planning a military campaign; they wanted to create a political commitment by the United States to the defense of Europe, which was a different thing.

Be that as it may, both of these conditions have changed. Most Europeans no longer believe that a Soviet attack is probable, and they have been so convinced of the American commitment to their defense that they no longer feel that there are hazards in pursuing policies that may not reflect our wishes. In many respects, the policies that are now being pursued by President de Gaulle and by some others in Europe with more careful methods, reflect not a lack of confidence in the United States commitment, but the opposite. It is precisely because they are certain that the United States will come to their defense in most foreseeable

that the United States will come to their defense in most foreseeable
commitment, but the opposite. It is precisely because they are certain
careful methods, reflect not a lack of confidence in the United States
humored by President de Gaulle and by some others in Europe with more
not reflect our wishes. In many respects, the policies that are now being
they no louder feel that there are hazards in basing policies that may
have been so convinced of the American commitment to their defense that
Europeans no louder believes that a Soviet attack in probable, and they
Be that as it may, both of these conditions have changed. Most
truly.

ment by the United States to the defense of Europe, which was a different
in planning a military campaign; they wanted to create a political commit-
ares. The reason was that the Europeans were not primarily interested
bated by the Europeans as weakening the overall defense of the NATO
that we proposed to attend the local defense of Europe was inter-
recurring debates between the United States and Europe. Every measure
of its military commitment. Since the early 1960's there have been
in Europe, the U.S. was bound to try to make some rational sense out
once an American was in command and American troops were deployed
President. This has always created a difference in perceptive, because
not entirely dependent on the unaccounted bromide of an American

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[Y]

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circumstances that our opponents in Europe believe that they can pursue
policies which may be contrary to our intentions.

This is reinforced by the nature of modern technology. Modern weapons produce a kind of dispute which is unique in military history. In the past, a nation which was threatened with attack had two choices: surrender or resistance. If it resisted, it had to do so at the place at which the aggression took place. It could not debate with its allies about shifting the scene of devastation to some other territory. The technology in modern weapons provides precisely this possibility. Many of the proposals made by the United States about the defense of Europe have the practical consequence of limiting any war that might break out to the European continent. Such a war would obviously be less devastating to us than one that occurred on our own territory. To the Europeans on whose territory this war would be fought and who have memories of conventional wars which were highly destructive, the prospect of such a war is intolerable. And, therefore, their tendency is to promote a strategy in which war, if it becomes inevitable, will take place largely as a nuclear exchange which bypasses them.

Moreover, the growth of nuclear stockpiles on both sides has produced a somewhat paradoxical change in the nature of commitments. In one of his recent defense reviews Secretary McNamara said that in case of a general nuclear war anywhere between 120 and 150 million

case of a general nuclear war anywhere between 150 and 150 million
In one of his recent defense reviews Secretary McNamara said that in
produced a somewhat paradoxical change in the nature of commitments.
Moreover, the growth of nuclear stockpiles on both sides has
so a nuclear exchange which piques their fear.

attractively in which war, if it becomes inevitable, will take place anyway.
A war is intolerable. And, therefore, their tendency is to promote a
conventional war which were highly destructive, the prospect of such
whose territory this war would be fought and who have memories of
as far as one that occurred on our own territory. To the Europeans on
European continent. Such a war would obviously be less devastating to
practical consequence of limiting and war that might break out to the
proposals made by the United States about the defense of Europe have the
in modern weapons provides precisely this possibility. Many of the
shifting the scene of devastation to some other territory. The technology
which the address him took place. It could not debase with its allies upon
annexure or resistance. If it related, it had to do so at the place at
In the past, a nation which was threatened with attack had two choices:
weapons produce a kind of damage which is mind in military history.

This is reinforced by the nature of modern technology. Modern
belligerents which may be contrary to our intentions.

circumstances that our opponents in Europe believe that they can breathe

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Americans might be killed in a matter of days. A little later he said, "Nevertheless, the American commitment to the defense of Europe has remained unchanged." I would submit that it must make a difference to an American President whether no American civilians are likely to be killed, which was the situation in 1949, or whether he must make the decision on the assumption of 120 million casualties. It does not weaken our commitment to admit that we are living in a different world in 1966--a world which requires different assessments of risks.

So, on the one hand, the nature of modern technology must create enhanced reluctance to go to nuclear war, and would even if President de Gaulle were sitting in Washington. On the other hand, those issues with respect to which a nuclear response is still credible are likely to be so fundamental that it may take place whether or not a formal commitment exists. In the past, an alliance was necessary, or was thought to be necessary, because it reinforced a basic community of interests. In the nuclear age such a reinforcement may no longer be required. In 1962 when Communist China attacked India, Prime Minister Nehru was asked in the Indian Parliament whether he had sacrificed anything by not having been a formal ally of the United States. His reply implied that India, though neutral, received about the same support that Pakistan would have received, though an ally. And Nehru was essentially

that Pakistan would have received, though an ally. And Nehru was essentially
rely implied that India, though neutral, received support the same amount
anyhow by not having been a formal ally of the United States. His
Nehru was asked in the Indian Parliament whether he had sacrificed
required. In 1962 when Communist China attacked India, Prime Minister
interests. In the nuclear age such a reinforcement may no longer be
thought to be necessary, because it reinforced a base community of
commitment exists. In the past, an alliance was necessary, or was
be so fundamental that it may take place whether or not a formal
with respect to which a nuclear response is still credible are likely to
devide were sitting in Washington. On the other hand, those issues
enhanced reluctance to do to nuclear war, and would even if President
30, on the one hand, the nature of modern technology must create
in 1968--a world which requires different assessments of risks.
weaken our commitment to admit that we are living in a different world
the decision on the assumption of 150 million casualties. It does not
to be killed, which was the situation in 1949, or whether he must make
to an American President whether no American civilians are likely
remained unchanged." I would submit that it must make a difference
"Nevertheless, the American commitment to the defense of Europe has
Americans might be killed in a matter of days." A little later he said,

[x]

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[Y]

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right. We assisted India because of its intrinsic importance which did not require reinforcement by a treaty. Similarly, allies may now believe that insofar as our commitments continue, they are not likely to be affected by anything that they do, nor need they be purchased by a particularly conciliatory policy.

This leads to the paradoxical situation in which neutrals receive some of the protection that used to be reserved for allies, and allies reserve for themselves the privileges of policies that used to be associated with neutrals. This is a hard world, and it explains the exasperation of some of our policy-makers, but I consider it to be a fundamental factor of the contemporary scene.

Moving from the structural problems to the problems that are subject to political decision, let me list first the policy issues that exist today in European and Atlantic policy. Let me then explain what I think the American reaction to them to be, and let me state where I agree or disagree with the American reaction.

First, the policies. One of the fundamental questions concerns the nature of European organization: whether Europe should continue to be composed of nations in the traditional sense, whether Europe should form a confederation or whether Europe should move toward supranational institutions and a federal state. A second question involves the kind of

Institutions and a federal state. A second question involves the kind of
a confederation or whether Europe should move toward a multinational
composed of nations in the traditional sense, whether Europe should form
nature of European organization: whether Europe should continue to be

First, the policies. One of the fundamental questions concerns the
the American reaction.

reaction to them to be, and let me state where I agree or disagree with
European and Atlantic policy. Let me then explain what I think the American
to political decision, let me state that the policy issues that exist today in

Moving from the structural problems to the problems that are subject
of contemporary scene.

some of our policies, makes it, but I consider it to be a fundamental factor
with neutrals. This is a hard world, and it explains the exasperation of
reserve for themselves the privileges of policies that need to be associated
some of the protection that need to be reserved for allies, and allies

This leads to the paradoxical situation in which neutrals receive
particularly conciliatory policy.

affected by anything that they do, nor need they be purchased by a
that insofar as our commitments continue, they are not likely to be
not require reinforcement by a treaty. Similarly, allies may now believe
right. We saluted India because of its intrinsic importance which did

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relationship which Europe, regardless of how it is eventually organized, will have with the United States? What kind of Atlantic community is likely to emerge? Is a unified Europe a precondition to forming a closer Atlantic partnership or will it make it more difficult?

A third problem concerns the nature of East-West relations. What conception does one form of the evolution of the Communist world? How does one attempt to influence it and, above all, who is going to try to influence it? Is it to be done by the Atlantic community as a unit or by the United States and by Europe as two separate units, or by the United States and each individual European country?

There is the pervasive problem of German unity. This is a problem which has been swept under the rug for twenty years and which I would predict is going to become one of the important issues and potentially divisive issues both in Europe and in the Atlantic area, of the next twenty years. Since World War II, Germany has been absorbed in economic reconstruction, and it has tried to achieve equality within the Atlantic Alliance. Both Germany and its allies avoided the issue of unification by postulating that any growth of NATO strength would automatically promote German unification. It is now clear that German unity will not come about by adding a unified Germany to the current NATO. German unification inevitably will require a consideration of the issue of Germany's

multiplication inevitably will require a consideration of the issue of Germany's
come out by adding a unified Germany to the current NATO. German
promote German unification. It is now clear that German unity will not
by boat lifting that any growth of NATO strength would automatically
Alliance. Both Germany and its allies avoided the issue of unification
reconstruction, and it has tried to achieve equality within the Atlantic
States. Since World War II, Germany has been absorbed in economic
division issues both in Europe and in the Atlantic areas of the next twenty
years. It is going to become one of the important issues and potentially
which has been swept under the rug for twenty years and which I would
there is the pervasive problem of German unity. This is a problem
United States and each individual European country?

or by the United States and by Europe as two separate units, or by the
to influence it? Is it to be done by the Atlantic community as a unit
How does one attempt to influence it and, above all, who is going to try
What conception does one form of the evolution of the Communist world?

Atlantic partnership or will it make it more difficult?
likely to emerge? Is a unified Europe a precondition to forming a closer
will have with the United States? What kind of Atlantic community is
relationship which Europe, regardless of how it is eventually organised,

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eastern frontier, of troop deployment in central Europe, and,
specifically, of nuclear weapons and of the whole political structure
of Europe and the Atlantic area. I am not saying that any changes in
these respects would bring about German unification. I am saying
that since German unification will be a prime issue in Germany, and
therefore in Europe, and that since one cannot really think about German
unification without considering these issues, they are going to be on the
agenda of both Europe and the Atlantic area in the next twenty years.

Then there are the global problems which I have already mentioned:
the relationship of Europe to American involvement outside of Europe.

There is the whole range of strategic doctrine, which in the past
twenty years has been developed more or less unilaterally by the United
States with some contribution from Great Britain. There have been at
least three major changes of American strategic doctrine bearing on the
relation of conventional to nuclear forces, on the role of tactical nuclear
weapons and on the doctrine of the use of strategic forces. In recent years
the major issue in the field of strategic doctrine has concerned the
participation by the Federal Republic of Germany in the control of nuclear
weapons and the proposal by the United States of various forms of nuclear
sharing, of which the NATO multilateral force is the most obvious example.

sharing, of which the NATO multilateral force is the most obvious example. Weapons and the proposal by the United States of various forms of nuclear participation by the Federal Republic of Germany in the control of nuclear the major issue in the field of strategic doctrine has concerned the weapons and on the doctrine of the use of strategic forces. In recent years a relation of conventional to nuclear forces, on the role of tactical nuclear least three major changes of American strategic doctrine behind on the States with some contribution from Great Britain. There have been at twenty years has been developed more or less militancy by the United There is the whole range of strategic doctrine, which in the past the relationship of Europe to American involvement outside of Europe. Then there are the global problems which I have already mentioned: stands of both Europe and the Atlantic areas in the next twenty years. Multification without considering these issues, they are going to be on the therefore in Europe, and that since one cannot really think about German that since German multification will be a prime issue in Germany, and these respects would bring about German multification. I am saying of Europe and the Atlantic areas. I am noting that any changes in specifically, of nuclear weapons and of the whole political structure eastern frontier, of troop deployment in central Europe, and,

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as arising, of which the NATO multilateral force is the most obvious example. Mesbons and the proposal by the United States of various forms of nuclear participation by the Federal Republic of Germany in the control of nuclear the major issue in the field of strategic doctrine has concerned the weapons and on the doctrine of the use of strategic forces. In recent years a relation of conventional to nuclear forces, on the role of tactical nuclear least three major changes of American strategic doctrine bearing on the States with some contribution from Great Britain. There have been at twenty years has been developed more or less multilateral by the United There is the whole range of strategic doctrine, which in the past the relationship of Europe to American involvement outside of Europe. Then there are the global problems which I have already mentioned: agenda of both Europe and the Atlantic areas in the next twenty years. Multification without considering these issues, they are going to be on the therefore in Europe, and that since one cannot really think about German that since German multification will be a prime issue in Germany, and these respects would bring about German multification. I am asking of Europe and the Atlantic areas. I am not saying that any changes in specifically, of nuclear weapons and of the whole political structure eastern frontier, of troop deployment in central Europe, and,

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Let me summarize what I think to be the American attitude with
respect to each of these problems. First of all, with respect to European
integration, the United States has passionately promoted European federalism.
It has argued that the American experience is a good model for Europe
to follow. Deputy Assistant Secretary Schaetzel once said in 1962, "The
United States with its balance of power and federal and state division
is the unique political experiment in federation about which we are proud
and self-conscious. We believe that our system works. It is a natural
human reaction to believe that it might work also for others."

The United States has promoted European federation, not only
because it believes in federalism in the abstract, but because the United
States is convinced that a federated Europe is necessary in order to form
an Atlantic Community. A United Europe was believed to possess the
resources to play a global role together with the United States. It has
been argued that only an inadequate economic scale is keeping the Europeans
from supporting us in areas outside of Europe. And it has been maintained
that if Europe united, we could create an Atlantic Community on the basis
of what is called the "twin-pillar concept": one pillar in Europe and another
on this side of the Atlantic.

With respect to East-West relations, the United States has up to
now conducted those largely bilaterally and so has every other member of

now conducted those largely plurally and so has every other member of
With respect to East-West relations, the United States has up to

on this side of the Atlantic.

of what is called the "win-billar concept": one billar in Europe and another
that it Europe united, we could create an Atlantic Community on the basis
from subporting us in areas outside of Europe. And it has been maintained
been argued that only an inadequate economic acade is keeping the Europbena
reasons to play a global role together with the United States. It has
an Atlantic Community. A United Europe was believed to possess the
States is convinced that a federated Europe is necessarily in order to form
because it believes in federalism in the abstract, but because the United

The United States has promoted European federation, not only
human reaction to believe that it might work also for others."

and self-conscious. We believe that our avowed works. It is a natural
is the unique political experiment in federation about which we are proud
United States with its balance of power and federal and state division
to follow. Deputy Assistant Secretary Scherzetl once said in 1963, "The
It has argued that the American experience is a good model for Europe

integration, the United States has passionately promoted European federalism.
respect to each of these problems. First of all, with respect to Europe

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the Atlantic alliance. With respect to strategic doctrine, the debate in recent years has concentrated on the attempt to create an integrated NATO defense structure for nuclear weapons, by means of a nuclear force which at one and the same time would give the Germans a voice in nuclear planning, but not a finger on the nuclear trigger.

I think that these policies which I have described, briefly and therefore inadequately, but which I see by your program you are about to discuss at much greater length, had been wise when they were conceived. Today they may be based on premises which do not necessarily reflect the realities of the next decade. Let me explain my views.

First, while I am in favor of European unity, I have never understood why it should be a primary American interest to promote one particular form. With all due respect to the splendid experience of American federalism, I do not believe that the American experience of two centuries ago is directly relevant to the European scene today. The United States was built by states of similar cultural background, with the same history, the same language, having just fought a war together, and having very similar political institutions. Europe is composed of countries whose concept of nationalism has been developed by opposition to each other and, therefore, any federation in Europe would present greater difficulties than it did in the United States. This does not mean that I would not like to see

it did in the United States. This does not mean that I would not like to see
therefore, any federation in Europe would present greater difficulties than
concept of nationalism has been developed by opposition to each other and,
amilar political unit alone. Europe is composed of countries whose
the same language, having that thought a war togethier, and having very
was built by states of aimilar cultural background, with the same history,
so is directly relevant to the European scene today. The United States
federatiam, I do not believe that the American experience of two countries
form. With all due respect to the splendid experience of American
why it should be a primary American interest to promote one particular
first, while I am in favor of European unity. I have never understood
reflect the realities of the next decade. Let me explain my views.
Today they may be based on premises which do not necessarily
to discuss at much greater length, had been wise when they were con-
therefore inadequately, but which I see by your program you are about
to describe as being based on premises which do not necessarily
force which at one and the same time would give the Germans a voice
NATO defense agriculture for nuclear weapons, by means of a nuclear
recent years has concentrated on the attempt to create an integrated
the Atlantic alliance. With respect to strategic doctrine, the debate in

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it happen. I am simply saying that one cannot apply the American
experience mechanically.

Secondly, while we should, of course, be happy if a supranational
Europe developed, it is not self-evident that a federal Europe would be
easier for the United States to deal with than a confederal Europe. It
is an accident that Jean Monnet, who is in favor of federalism, is also
a friend of the United States, while President de Gaulle, who favors
a confederal solution, happens not to be a friend of the United States.
It would be a great mistake to deduce from that that the structures which
these two men recommend would inevitably follow their preferences. A
confederal Europe would permit the United States to maintain some
influence at many centers, while a federal Europe would require the
United States to stake everything on relations with one center. And
when I ask myself how this center is likely to operate, I again reach
the heretical conclusion that if a united Europe is formed by smashing
too many of the existing structures, it is not inconceivable that its sense
of identity will derive from anti-American feelings. When I try to envision
an electoral campaign that reaches from Scotland to Sicily and from
Schleswig-Holstein to the Spanish border, it does not seem inconceivable
that it might be based on demagogic appeals. And in those circumstances,
I would warn against the assumption that there is an automatic relationship
between federal institutions in Europe and a pro-American policy. Again,

between federal institutions in Europe and a pro-American policy. Again, I would warn against the assumption that there is an automatic relationship that it might be based on demographic aspects. And in those circumstances, Sputnik-Holstein to the Spanish border, it does not seem inconceivable an electoral campaign that reaches from Scotland to Sicily and from of identity will derive from anti-American feelings. When I try to envision too many of the existing structures, it is not inconceivable that its agenda the historical consequence that it a united Europe is formed by amounting when I ask myself how this center is likely to operate. I again reach United States to take everything on relations with one center. And influence at many centers, while a federal Europe would require the confederal Europe would permit the United States to maintain some these two men recommend would inevitably follow their preferences. A It would be a great mistake to deduce from that that the structures which a confederal solution, happens not to be a friend of the United States. A friend of the United States, while President de Gaulle, who favors its an accident that Jean Monnet, who is in favor of federalism, is also easier for the United States to deal with than a confederal Europe. It Europe developed, it is not self-evident that a federal Europe would be secondly, while we should, of course, be happy if a multinational experience mechanically.

It happen. I am simply saying that one cannot apply the American

- 13 -

[A]

[Y]

- 14 -

if it happens organically and naturally, we should not oppose it. Above all, I think that the internal organization of Europe is primarily a European problem. I would simply warn against too mechanical a conception drawn from models which may fit economics, but not necessarily politics.

I question the proposition that a united Europe will inevitably share our burdens around the world. I do not think it is true that the reason the Europeans are not assisting us, in Vietnam, or in other parts of the world, is due to the inadequacy of their economic resources. On the contrary, history shows us that Holland, having small resources, possessed a vast empire thousands of miles away; and the United States possessing vast resources before World War II, conducted no global policy. In order to share other countries' burdens, a country must sense a community of interest and believe that unless these burdens are shared they will not be carried at all. Neither of these conditions exists today. No British policy before World War II could have obtained American support, because we were essentially convinced that on any issue that was vital enough to involve our interests. And this is the situation that exists in many parts of the world today.

I think that there is an inconsistency between the attempt to develop integrated defense structures for the Atlantic area and the pursuit of a bilateral foreign policy. Many NATO debates in recent years have concerned

pilots' foreign policy. Many NATO states in recent years have concerned
integrated defense structures for the Atlantic area and the benefit of a

I think that there is an inconsistency between the attempt to develop
today.

interests. And this is the situation that exists in many parts of the world
essentially convinced that on any issue that was vital enough to involve om-
before World War II could have obtained American support, because we were
carried at all. Neither of these conditions exists today. No British policy
interest and believe that unless these burdens are shared they will not be
shared other countries' burdens, a country must pose a community of
resources before World War II, conducted no global policy. In order to
empire thousands of miles away; and the United States possessing vast
plenty shows us that Holland, having small resources, possesses a vast
is due to the inadequacy of their economic resources. On the contrary,
Europeans are not satisfying us, in Vietnam, or in other parts of the world,
our burdens around the world. I do not think it is true that the reason the
I question the proposition that a united Europe will inevitably share
from models which may tilt economics, but not necessarily politics.

I think that the internal organization of Europe is primarily a European
if it happens organically and naturally, we should not oppose it. Above all,

- 14 -

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the question of who decides how to go to nuclear war. Yet when almost every Western head of state tries to prove his special ability to deal with the Soviet leaders there results a constant tendency to conduct every kind of negotiation essentially bilaterally. It is hard to imagine how one can have an integrated strategy for nuclear matters while diplomacy remains bilateral. In fact, the sensible procedure would be to start at the other end of the scale, to integrate the diplomacy and work from there to strategy.

Thus I would argue that the presuppositions of the late forties and early fifties no longer fit the current situation. One of the worst things that De Gaulle is doing is to press his challenge so intransigently and so objectionable a manner as to obscure the fact that he is raising some very important questions. Even if we do not like his answers, we have to consider that the questions are valid.

In the late 1940's and early 1950's the integrated commands and the nature of the command structure symbolized the political commitment of the United States. Within NATO in the 1950's, strategic debates were on the whole a substitute for the political debates which were made impossible by the fact that Europe was so completely dependent on American support.

In the next decade this condition is bound to change. A different balance has to be established between the political and military priorities in the alliance. Our tendency in recent years has been to try to avoid these debates by creating new command structures for nuclear defense--or, more

destates by creating new command structures for unclear defense--or, more
in the alliance. Our tendency in recent years has been to try to avoid these
balance has to be established between the political and military priorities
In the next decade this condition is bound to change. A different
to the fact that Europe was so completely dependent on American support.

whole a substitute for the political debates which were made impossible by
United States. Within NATO in the 1960's, strategic debates were on the
nature of the command structure emphasized the political commitment of the
In the late 1940's and early 1950's the integrated command and the
desires are valid.

important questions. Even if we do not like his snobbishness, we have to consider that
oppositionable a manner as to obscure the fact that he is raising some very
that De Gualle is doing is to press his challenge so intrinsically and so
early titles no longer fit the current situation. One of the worst things

Thus I would argue that the preambulations of the late tortles and
of the scale, to integrate the diplomacy and work from there to air these.

pilots. In fact, the sensible procedure would be to start at the other end
have an integrated strategy for unclear matters while diplomacy remains
of negotiation essentially piloted. It is hard to imagine how one can
the Soviet leaders there results a constant tendency to conduct every kind
every Western head of state tries to prove his abject spitality to deal with
the question of who decides how to do to unclear war. Yet when almost

- 15 -

- 16 -

specifically, by suggesting the creation of various nuclear forces. I
believe, that this policy attempts to deal with the effect rather than the
basic cause of the problem. The following statement seems to me true
about nuclear forces, Atlantic or multilateral. None of the nuclear forces
thus far proposed will enable any nuclear country to be forced into a nuclear
war against its will. No country presently able to go to nuclear war can be
prevented from going to nuclear war as a result of these forces. No non-
nuclear country will be able to go to nuclear war as a result of these forces.
In other words, nothing is changed, except some shifting of expenditures.
Therefore one is not buying a solution, but a permanent crisis. No country
that has contributed a few billion dollars to such structures is going to
remain satisfied with the kind of arrangements that are now proposed.
Nor, is it likely that we can maintain indefinitely a position in which out
of one side of our mouth we tell the Germans that their participation in
these nuclear forces enables them to play a role in nuclear strategy, while,
out of the other side, we are telling the Soviets that participation in these
forces prevents the Germans from getting their finger on the nuclear trigger.
Sooner or later somebody is bound to recognize that these two propositions
are mutually exclusive.

Finally, I believe that the issue of nuclear control is a hopeless
issue on which to attempt to unify European and American policy. It is
inconceivable that any voting formula is going to induce any country to run

inconceivable that any voting formula is going to induce any country to run
into trouble on which to attempt to unify European and American policy. It is
obvious that the issue of nuclear control is a hopeless
matter.

Finally, I believe that the issue of nuclear forces is a hopeless
matter. We must act immediately.

Sooner or later somebody is bound to recognize that these two propositions
forces prevents the Germans from detaching their forces from the nuclear trigger.
out of the other side, we are telling the Soviets that participation in these
these nuclear forces enables them to play a role in nuclear strategy, while,
of one side of our month we tell the Germans that their participation in
Nor, is it likely that we can maintain indefinitely a position in which out
remain attached with the kind of arrangements that are now proposed.
that has contributed a few billion dollars to such structures is going to
Therefore one is not playing a solution, but a permanent criteria. No country
In other words, nothing is changed, except some shifting of expenditures.
unclear country will be able to do to nuclear war as a result of these forces.
prevented from doing to nuclear war as a result of these forces. No one-
war against it will. No country presently able to do to nuclear war can be
thus far proposed will enable any nuclear country to be forced into a nuclear
apart nuclear forces, Atlantic or multilateral. None of the nuclear forces
basic cause of the problem. The following statement seems to me true
believe, that this policy attempts to deal with the effect rather than the
specifically, by underestimating the creation of various nuclear forces. I

- 18 -

- 17 -

the risks of nuclear war. No President, having voted against going to
nuclear war, will go to nuclear war because a majority of his allies holds
the view that we should do so. Our allies can be protected by a political
structure in which their vital interests are considered as our vital interests,
and not by a constitutional formula. If we disagree in our definition of
vital interests, no voting formula is going to change the situation.

Therefore, I would conclude that the important problem in American-European
relationships in the future is not the problem of military strategy in its
traditional, technical sense. Indeed, the only way we can contest the
proposals that are being made to us is by offering some conceptions that
are adequate for dealing with the problems of the next decade and not by
attempting to make the future simply a projection of the past.

I believe that the internal structure of Europe is a matter that
should be left primarily to the Europeans. I believe also that before we
can come up with any technical remedies we have to face some facts that
may be rather painful; but which seem to me to be a pre-condition of
relationships that developed after the war, while they represented a great
American achievement, are not healthy in the long run, either for us or
for the Europeans. It is not healthy in the long run for us because, looking
ahead to the next decade or two, I would expect the United States to become
increasingly engaged in areas outside of Europe. Given the fact that our

increasingly embedded in areas outside of Europe. Given the fact that our
should to the next decade or two, I would expect the United States to become
for the Eurobetta. It is not healthy in the long run for us because, looking
American achievement, are not healthy in the long run, either for us or
relationship that developed after the war, while they represented a great
may be rather painful but which seem to me to be a pre-condition of
can come up with any technical remedies we have to face some facts that
should be left primarily to the Eurobetta. I believe also that before we
I believe that the internal structure of Europe is a matter that
attempting to make the future imply a projection of the past.

are adequate for dealing with the problems of the next decade and not by
proposals that are being made to us by offering some conceptions that
traditional, technical sense. Indeed, the only way we can confront the
relationships in the future is not the problem of military strategy in its
Therefore, I would conclude that the important problem in American-European
vital interests, no voting formula is going to change the situation.

and not by a constitutional formula. If we disagree in our definition of
structure in which their vital interests are considered as our vital interests,
the view that we should do so. Our allies can be protected by a political
nuclear war, will do to nuclear war because a majority of his allies holds
the risks of nuclear war. No President, having voted against doing to

- 17 -

- 18 -

top personnel is already overburdened with decisions in many parts of the world, I do not see why it is wise for us to fight for the privilege of making all the decisions in every square inch of territory around the Soviet periphery and particularly in an area with a tradition of political vitality and resources to play a more autonomous role. I think it is not healthy for us to be the only country in the West that has to make all the decisions. I think we require somebody from another group that has an organic capability to act autonomously.

I do not think it is healthy in the long term for Europe to abdicate all decisions to the United States because, while this may end the danger of Gaullism, it may produce neutralism and abdication from the international scene and may leave us extremely lonely in the crises of the years ahead. It cannot be in our interest or in Europe's interest for Europe to become a Greece to our Rome to which one goes for the good life, but which otherwise does not play a significant political role. Therefore, for political and psychological, and not strategic reasons, I have always been very dubious about schemes which seek to perpetuate the present situation in which decision-making is centralized in Washington and the Europeans act primarily as advisers. The only European country that can carry that off is Great Britain. No other European country could operate in such a system

is Great Britain. No other European country could operate in such a system
primarily as advisors. The only European country that can carry that off
decision-making is centralized in Washington and the European Union
spont schemes which seek to pervert the present situation in which
bachological, and not strategic reasons, I have always been very much
convinced not to play a significant political role. Therefore, for political and
a Greece to our Rome to which one does for the good life, but which otherwise
it cannot be in our interest or in Europe's interest for Europe to become
accuse and may leave us extremely lonely in the chaos of the years ahead.
Gallipoli, it may produce neutralism and apportion from the international
all decisions to the United States because, while this may end the danger of
I do not think it is healthy in the long term for Europe to apportion
itself autonomously.

require somebody from another group that has an organic capability to
only country in the West that has to make all the decisions. I think we
to play a more autonomous role. I think it is not healthy for us to be the
and particularly in an area with a tradition of political vitality and resources
all the decisions in every square inch of territory around the Soviet border
world. I do not see why it is wise for us to fight for the privilege of making
top personnel is already overburdened with decisions in many parts of the

- 18 -

- 19 -

without abdicating sooner or later.

Let me conclude with one further comment. The tragic element
in any consideration of foreign policy is that when the scope for action is
greatest, the knowledge on which to base such action is relatively small.
Once the knowledge has been acquired; the scope for creativity is relatively
limited. I have presented to you, not the truth, because only the future
can reveal that, but an assessment of what may be or perhaps should be
an historical process. When these assessments are made nobody can know
whether they are correct, and I know many dedicated people who hold
completely different views from mine and I have great respect for them.

The problem in any revolutionary period is this: Foreign policies
tend to be made by bureaucracies, and bureaucracies operate by a standard
of routine, by a standard operating procedure. Their tendency is to project
the past into the future. As long as events continue according to traditional
patterns the inherited wisdom of an existing policy is helpful. The dilemma
that revolutions present is that they require a change in routine and that the
pre-suppositions of one period become the obstacles to an understanding
of the next period. What one cannot tell in advance is whether one is living
in a revolutionary period or whether the inherited wisdom is still valid. My
argument is that Atlantic relationships are in a fundamental state of flux, that

argument is that Atlantic relationships are in a fundamental state of flux, that in a revolutionary period or whether the inherited wisdom is still valid. My of the next period. What one cannot tell in advance is whether one is living pre-subpositions of one period become the obstacles to an understanding that revolutions present is that they require a change in routine and that the patterns the inherited wisdom of an existing policy is helpful. The dilemmas the past into the future. As long as events continue according to traditional of routine, by a standard operating procedure. Their tendency is to project tend to be made by puresocracies, and puresocracies operate by a standard The problem in any revolutionary period is this: Foreign policies completely different views from mine and I have great respect for them. whether they are correct, and I know many dedicated people who hold an historical process. When these assements are made nobody can know can reveal that, but an assessment of what may be or perhaps should be limited. I have presented to you, not the truth, because only the future Once the knowledge has been acquired; the scope for creativity is relatively greatest, the knowledge on which to base such action is relatively small. in any consideration of foreign policy is that when the scope for action is Let me conclude with one further comment. The trade element without advocating sooner or later.

- 19 -

[A]

- 20 -

the challenges we have received are not accidents, that the questions
that have been put to us cannot be answered with self-righteousness and
with moral indignation, but that they can be dealt with only by better
answers.

Henry A. Kissinger

of policy. Let me ask that of the structural causes.
The difficulties which NATO is now facing fall into two categories. Some stem from structural causes and others reflect decisions

and possible remedies.
have berated for many years, it is time to indure into their causes
red and fifty million people. And if there are certain difficulties that
lion people?" The answer is that one man cannot stand up to two hundred
possible that one man can stand up against two-hundred and fifty mill-
place. One of my friends in Washington once said to me, "How is it
achievement provides a point of departure and not a final reating
vions American policies, put so with all successive policies, each
borsary period. These changes are in part due to the successes of pre-
aested, structural changes in the nature of foreign policy in the contem-
gsmile, put they are not caused by him. Instead, they reflect deep-
relationships may be symbolized in the personality of President de
that I would like to make is that the difficulties in American-European
rather self-willed policy of the President of France. The proposition
everything in the Atlantic Alliance would be straight were it not for the
discussions have revealed the assumption of many Americans that
canons in Paris concerning the reorganization of NATO. These
di-relationshipa and will do so against the background of the recent dis-
This evening I will ask you, spont American-European

Henry A. Klaasen

Institute of World Affairs, March 11-13, 1968

- 2 -

between Europe and the United States were bound to be but on a new
as well. Alao, with European economic integration, the relationships
the political confidence and the traditional political dynamism returned
has recovered economically. And with this economic recovery, some of
since that era, Europe, partly because of American assistance,
pattern.

was inevitable during the forties, would be unhealthily as a permanent
to influence exasentially American decolonial. But the relationship which
the exception of Great Britain, foreign policy concreted of an attempt
American policy-makers, and in the European countries, again with
military security. A "father knows best" attitude drew up among
States for economic support, for political assistance, and above all for
ed. Political confidence was low. Europe was dependent on the United
occupied at one stage or another during the war. Societies wereatter-
Every European country, with the exception of Great Britain, had been
Great Britain, had been defeated at one stage or another during the war.
the only possible one. Every European country, with the exception of
who formulated America's boat-war policy, this relationship is seen as
based on the urgency of meeting the immediate crisis. However, to many
developed a relationship between Europe and the United States which was
concided with the period of the greatest European meekness. There de-
Europe. At the end of the war the period of greatest American strength
Of those, the most important is, of course, the recovery of

- 3 -

[A]

- 3 -

[N]

differences. As a result, Europe is now concentrating primarily on
has been largely accomplished--basically and with serious domestic
Europe. As far as Europe is concerned, the process of de-colonialization
its European allies in all matters that did not concern the defense of
the larger interests of freedom required it to disassociate itself from
terests than their right of possession. The United States replied that
or wrongly, just in their colonial areas they were defending larger in-
reversal of roles. In the 1920's many European were arguing, rightly
in perspective between Europe and the United States, and, indeed, a
Secondly, the process of de-colonization has produced a shift
have been reluctant to admit that there was a price to be paid.
believe that this is a price well worth paying--but because some of us
barrier. I say this not because I am opposed to a United Europe--I
and a greater weight, must structurally be a more difficult negotiating
criminization, not the fact of it. A United Europe, moreover, represent-
toward non-members. Thus the realistic issue is the degree of the dis-
tant barriers. It is therefore by definition somewhat discriminatory
formed because the outside tariff barriers are higher than the inside
pe's, to some extent, inward looking. By definition a common market is
it is important to keep in mind that a common market inevitably must
Common Market. I agree with this, as an abstract proposition. But
for instance, emphasizes the desirability of an "outward looking"

footing. Much of the discussion spont the European Common Market,

- 3 -

[4]

- 4 -

Europe because they wanted, to but it crudely, hoarsed so that they were
the United States and the U.S.B.R. They wanted American troops in
any Soviet addression would immediately become a confrontation between
charge of the defense of Europe because they wanted to make sure that
to the defense of Europe. The Europeans wanted an American general in
department was to create an automatic commitment by the United States
primary purpose of the command structure of NATO and its military
the defense of Europe. As far as the Europeans were concerned, the
therefore, were eager to tie the United States as closely as possible to
that the United States might revert to its traditional isolation. They,
was, if not imminent, at least highly possible; and two, they feared
were opressed by two dangers: one, they believed that a Soviet attack
Thirdly, when the Atlantic relationship was formed, the Europeans
who is in office in various European countries.
United States and without very great European support, regardless of
extra-European problems will have to be dealt with largely by the
and politically impossible to return. In the future it is likely that any
with great emotional turmoil, the Europeans are finding it psychologically
allies that they received from us in the 1960's. Having left these areas
And it is receiving approximately the same reply from its European
European allies for support in regions distant from the NATO area.
Europeans problems. It is the United States that is appealing to its

- 4 -

M4

[Y]

- 5 --

that the United States will come to their defense in most foreseeable
commitment, but the opposite. It is precisely because they are certain
careful methods, reflect not a lack of confidence in the United States
burdened by President de Gaulle and by some others in Europe with more
not reflect our wishes. In many respects, the policies that are now being
they no longer feel that there are hazards in basing policies that may
have been so convinced of the American commitment to their defense that
Europeans no longer believe that a Soviet attack is probable, and they
Be that as it may, both of these conditions have changed. Most
thing.

ment by the United States to the defense of Europe, which was a different
in basing a military campaign; they wanted to create a political commit-
ment. The reason was that the Europeans were not primarily interested
in Europe as weakening the over-all defense of the NATO
that we proposed to strengthen the local defense of Europe was inter-
recurring debates between the United States and Europe. Every measure
of its military commitment. Since the early 1960's there have been
in Europe, the U.S. was bound to try to make some rational sense out
once an American was in command and American troops were deployed
President. This has always created a difference in perspective, because
not entirely dependent on the unreported promise of an American

- p -

[N]

- 6 -

["case of a general unclear war anywhere between 150 and 150 million\nIn one of his recent defense reviews Secretary McNamara said that in\nproduced a somewhat paradoxical change in the nature of commitments.", "Moreover, the growth of nuclear stockpiles on both sides has\nas a nuclear exchange which pياتαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαιασαια

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[N]

that Pakistan would have received, though an ally. And Nehru was essentially
relying upon it not having been a formal ally of the United States. His
Nehru was asked in the Indian Parliament whether he had sacrificed
required. In 1963 when Communist China attacked India, Prime Minister
interests. In the nuclear age such a reinforcement may no longer be
thought to be necessary, because it reinforced a basic community of
commitment exists. In the past, an alliance was necessary, or was
be so fundamental that it may take place whether or not a formal
with respect to which a nuclear rationale is still credible are likely to
de Garfield were sitting in Washington. On the other hand, those issues
enhanced reluctance to do nuclear war, and would even if President
so, on the one hand, the nature of modern technology must create
in 1966--a world which requires different assessments of risks.
weaken our commitment to admit that we are living in a different world
the decision on the assumption of 130 million casualties. It does not
to be killed, which was the situation in 1949, or whether he must make
to an American President whether no American civilians are likely
remained unchanged." I would submit that it must make a difference
"Nevertheless", the American commitment to the defense of Europe has
Americas might be killed in a matter of days. A little later he said,

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[N]

institutions and a federal state. A second question involves the kind of
a confederation or whether Europe should move toward a supranational
composed of nations in the traditional sense, whether Europe should form
nature of European organization: whether Europe should continue to be
First, the policies. One of the fundamental questions concerns the
the American reaction.

some of our policy-makers, but I consider it to be a fundamental factor
with neutrals. This is a hard world, and it explains the exasperation of
reserve for themselves the privileges of policies that need to be associated
some of the protection that need to be reserved for allies, and allies
This leads to the paradoxical situation in which neutrals receive
particularly conciliatory policy.

affected by anything that they do, nor need they be purchased by a
that insofar as our commitments continue, they are not likely to be
not require reinforcement by a treaty. Similarly, allies may now believe
right. We sautated India because of its intrinsic importance which did

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[N]

-9-

unification inevitably will require a consideration of the issue of Germany's
come spont by adding a unified Germany to the current NATO. German
promote German unification. It is now clear that German unity will not
by basing that and growth of NATO attempt would automatically
Villiance. Both Germany and its allies avoided the issue of unification
reconstruction, and it has tried to achieve equality within the Atlantic
Europe. Since World War II, Germany has been separated in economic
division issues both in Europe and in the Atlantic areas, of the next twenty
predict is going to become one of the important issues and potentially
which has been swept under the rug for twenty years and which I would

There is the pervasive problem of German unity. This is a problem
United States and each individual European country?

or by the United States and by Europe as two separate units, or by the
to influence it? Is it to be done by the Atlantic community as a unit
How does one attempt to influence it and, if so, who is going to try
What conception does one form of the evolution of the Communist world?
A third problem concerns the nature of East-West relations.

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[7]

- 11 -

now conducted those landably plausibly and so has every other member of
With respect to East-West relations, the United States has up to

on this side of the Atlantic.

of what is called the "twin-billar concept": one billet in Europe and another
that it Europe united, we could create an Atlantic Community on the basis
from supporting us in areas outside of Europe. And it has been maintained
been agreed that only an inadequate economic scale is keeping the Europeans
reasons to play a vital role together with the United States. It has
an Atlantic Community. A United Europe was believed to possess the
States is convinced that a federated Europe is necessarily in order to form
because it believes in federalism in the abstract, but because the United
The United States has promoted European federation, not only

and self-concerns. We believe that our system works. It is a natural
in the unique political experiment in federation about which we are proud
United States with its balance of power and federal and state division
to follow. Deputy Assistant Secretary Scherzel once said in 1963, "The
It has argued that the American experience is a good model for Europe

integration, the United States has systematically promoted European federalism, respect to each of these problems. First of all, with respect to Europe
Let me summarize what I think to be the American attitude with

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[v]

- 12 -

[N]

it did in the United States. This does not mean that I would not like to see
therefore, any federation in Europe would present greater difficulties than
concept of nationalism has been developed by opposition to each other and,
similar political institutions. Europe is composed of countries whose
the same language, having that thought a war togetber, and having very
was built by states of similar cultural background, with the same history,
do is directly relevant to the European scene today. The United States
federalism. I do not believe that the American experience of two centuries
why it should be a primary American interest to promote one particular
First, while I am in favor of European unity, I have never underated
reflect the realities of the next decade. Let me explain my views.

To-day they may be based on premises which do not necessarily
to diocles at much greater length, had been wiser when they were con-
therefore inadequately, but which I see by your program you are spout
I think that these policies which I have described, briefly and
inروس planning, but not a tender on the nuclear tripper.
force which at one and the same time would give the Germans a voice
NATO defense structure for nucleus weshow, by means of a nucleus
recent years has concentrated on the attempt to create an integrated
the Atlantic alliance. With respect to strategic doctrine, the debate in

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[v]

- 13 -

[Y]

between federal institutions in Europe and a pro-American policy. Again, I would warn against the assumption that there is an automatic relationship that it might be based on demographic abodes. And in those circumstances, Schleswig-Holstein to the Spanish border, it does not seem inconceivable an electoral campaign that reaches from Scotland to Sicily and from of identity will derive from anti-American feelings. When I try to envision too many of the existing structures, it is not inconceivable that its aenea the heretical conclusion that it is a united Europe is formed by amending when I ask myself how this center is likely to operate. I again reach United States to take everything on relations with one center. And influence at many centers, while a federal Europe would require the confederate Europe would permit the United States to maintain some these two men recommend would inevitably follow their preferences. A It would be a great mistake to deduce from that that the structures which a confederate solution, happens not to be a friend of the United States. A friend of the United States, while President de Gaulle, who favors its an accident that Jean Monnet, who is in favor of federalism, is also easier for the United States to deal with than a confederate Europe. It Europe developed, it is not self-evident that a federal Europe would be Secondly, while we should, of course, be happy it is an unambiguous experience mechanically.

it happen. I am simply asking that one cannot apply the American

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[A]

- 14 -

I question the proposition that a united Europe will inevitably share
our burdens around the world. I do not think it is true that the reason the
Europeans are not assisting us, in Vietnam, or in other parts of the world,
is due to the inadequacy of their economic resources. On the contrary,
history shows us that Holland, having small resources, possessed a vast
empire thousands of miles away; and the United States possessing vast
resources before World War II, conducted no global policy. In order to
share other countries' burdens, a country must sense a community of
interest and believe that unless these burdens are shared they will not be
carried at all. Neither of these conditions exists today. No British policy
before World War II could have obtained American support, because we were
essentially convinced that on any issue that was vital enough to involve our
interests, Britain would commit itself first.
And this is the situation that exists in many parts of the world today.

pilots' foreign policy. Many NATO states in recent years have concerned
integrated defense structures for the Atlantic area and the pursuit of a
s

interests. And this is the situation that exists in many parts of the world
essentially convinced that on any issue that was vital enough to involve our
before World War II could have obtained American and/or, because we were
carried at all. Neither of these conditions exists today. No British policy
interest and believe that unless these purdена are shared they will not be
shared other countries' purdена, a country must have a community of
reasons before World War II, conducted no global policy. In order to
empire thousands of miles away; and the United States possessing its
history shows us that Holland, having small resources, possesses a vast
is due to the insolvency of their economic resources. On the contrary,
Europeans are not satisfying us, in Vietnam, or in other parts of the world,
our purdена around the world. I do not think it is true that the reason the
I question the proposition that a united Europe will inevitably share
trom models which may fit economics, but not necessarily politics.
problem. I would imply warm adieu too mechanical a conception drawn
I think that the internal organisation of Europe is primarily a European
it it happens organically and naturally, we should not oppose it. Above all,

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[N]